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The Russian Concession in Wuhan (1896–1925) – Imperialism and Great Power Rivalry

Introduction

The central Chinese city of Wuhan was the only European concession area in the Chinese interior. The Treaty of Tianjin opened the city as a trading port in June of 1858, and it quickly became a major center of merchant activities. Subsequently, with the progressive decline of the political power of the Qing Dynasty, five foreign powers established extraterritorial enclaves in Wuhan along the Yangtze River. This paper focuses on the Russian concession in Hankou¹, and how Russian imperialism influenced Chinese political and urban history. I will argue that despite the initial economic interests of Russian merchants, the Russians' main ambition in China was to create a power balance between itself and other foreign powers. In actuality, there was little economic motivation behind the establishment of the Russian concession in Wuhan; the government developed it halfheartedly at best, with large parts of the concession area unused. The reason underlying the concession can only be understood as a desire to demonstrate to other imperial powers that Russia, as well, was a powerful nation, deserving of equal claims. For this reason, I maintain, we need to arrive at an understanding of the term "imperialism" that describes its variegated nature in the Russian and Chinese context.

In the first part of this essay, I introduce early Russian trading and investment activities in the Wuhan area, the impetus of the concession's establishment, and a number of its basic properties. The second part situates the Russian concession in Wuhan within the broader framework of Russian imperialism, as well as Russia's post-revolutionary leadership role in the global communist and anti-imperialist movements. Western scholarship has not moved far beyond the debate over whether Soviet post-revolutionary policies

1 Present-day Wuhan, the only Chinese city which spreads equally on both sides of the Yangtze River, formerly consisted of three separate cities: Hanyang and Hankou to the north of the river, and Wuchang, today the provincial capital of Hubei Province, on the southern side of the river. The foreign concession area was located exclusively in Hankou. Cf. Pi Mingxiu (ed.), *Jindai Wuhan Chengshishi* [Modern Urban History of Wuhan], Zhongguo Shehui Kexue Chubanshe, Beijing, 12/ 1993; Website: History of Wuhan: http://www3.wuhan.gov.cn/portal/hm/hisList_1.jsp

in China can be understood as relapses into traditional imperialist modes, as has been argued by Whiting, Elleman and Pantsov.² On the other side of this debate, Lukin has argued that Soviet Russia's behavior in China must be seen in the light of Soviet communist internationalist ideology and thus cannot be equated with traditional imperialist practice.³ This essay draws on the specific case of the Russian concession in Wuhan to add to this scholarly dispute by more clearly identifying the rationale behind Russian interests in China.

The Russian Concession in Wuhan

The Treaty decreeing the establishment of the Russian concession in Wuhan (*Hankou E' Zujie di Tiaoyue*) was signed on June 2, 1896. However, Russian economic activities in the area predated the concession by more than 30 years. While trade relations between Russia and China formally extend back to the early 18th century⁴, it was the Treaty of Tianjin (1858) and the Second Opium War, which prompted Russian economic activity in Wuhan.⁵ The Treaty, whose signatories were China, Britain, France, the United States, and Russia, decreed, among other points, the opening of eleven new treaty ports (including Hankou), permission for foreigners to travel to the interior of China, and permission of foreign navigation and commerce on the Yangtze River. Russian business and trade soon flourished along the mid- and lower Yangtze River. Russian tea traders established a number of trading companies in the city, and in 1863, they built the first factory for the production of brick tea⁶ outside of Hankou near the British concession area⁷. This factory,

2 A. S. Whiting, *Soviet Policies in China, 1917–1924*, New York 1954; B. A. Elleman, *Diplomacy and Deception: the secret history of Sino-Soviet diplomatic relations, 1917–1927*, Armonk, N. Y. 1997; Pantsov, *The Bolsheviks and the Chinese Revolution*, Honolulu 2000.

3 A. Lukin, *The Bear watches the Dragon – Russia's Perceptions of China and the Evolution of Russian-Chinese Relations Since the Eighteenth Century*, Armonk, N.Y. 2003.

4 Russia gained trading rights which made it possible for Russia to import up to 95 percent of its tea from China, already before 1850. Russia also became a major supplier of Chinese tea to Europe, making rich profits from transit trade. Lukin, p. 67.

5 Yuan Jicheng, "Hankou Zujie Gailian", [Overview of the Hankou Concessions], edited by the Shanghai Municipal Committee for Historical Materials, in: *Liechiang zai Zhongguo de Zujie* [The Concessions of the Great Power in China], *Zhongguo Wenshi Chubanshe*, 4/1992, pp. 188–206, p. 188.

6 Brick tea (*zhuancha* 砖茶) is a rectangular mass of compressed tea leaves, regarded by the Chinese as low-quality tea. While green tea was exported mainly to the United States, black tea went to Great Britain and brick tea to Russia (Fang Fang,

which was soon joined by two others, employed around 900 people and utilized steam engines to replace traditional hand-presses. It was the first modern industrial factory fueled by foreign investment in Hankou. Russia also established the first industrial wharf and warehouse dock on the river front in 1871.⁸ Until the 1890s, Russian traders had almost entirely monopolized the tea market in the middle and lower Yangtze area, eventually sidelining the British who, instead, dominated the tobacco trade.⁹ In 1894, Russian businesses accounted for 85 percent of tea leaves that were directly exported.¹⁰

Despite the profitability of the Russian tea business and the rather substantial early investment activities this involved, the Russians did not have nearly as much political and diplomatic influence as the other imperial powers in China. For more than 30 years after the opening of the Hankou port the Chinese successfully resisted Russian demands for their own concession area in Hankou. Initially the Russian consulate in Shanghai was concurrently in charge of the affairs of Russian businesses in Hankou, and specific Russian business matters were entrusted to the local US consulate.¹¹ In 1869, however, Russia was allowed to establish a separate consulate in Hanyang, one of the three districts of Wuhan.¹² In 1891, the Russian crown prince Nikolaus came to China and visited Hankou, where he was received by Governor Zhang Zhidong. Chinese accounts are divided as to the purpose of this visit; some scholars argue that he came to visit the Hanyang Steel factory that the Chinese local government had invested in, and that the Chinese used this visit to demonstrate their own achievements during the Self-Strengthening period to this representative of a foreign imperial power.¹³ However, other scholars argue that he only visited the Russian factories, and cite this as evidence of the attention of the Russian imperial government to Russian business interests in Hankou and China in general, thus displaying a

Hankou de Cangsang Wangshi [The Vicissitudes in the Life of the City of Hankou], Wuhan, Hubei Renmin Chubanshe, 2004, p. 135).

7 The British concession had been established in 1861. Cf. Yuan Jicheng, *Jindai Zhongguo Zujie Shigao* [Papers on the History of Concessions in Modern China], Zhongguo Caizheng Jingji Chubanshe, 1988, p. 79.

8 *Ibid.*, p. 80.

9 Yuan Jicheng, "Hankou Zujie Gailian" (note 5), p. 199 f.

10 Cf. Fang (note 6), p. 138.

11 Hu Lianxun, "Jiu Hankou E' Zujie Kaipi shi de Fangshi Chaiqian Jiufen" [Demolition and Resettling Disputes at the Time of the Opening of the Russian Concession Area in Old Hankou], Wuhan Wenshi Ziliao/ Shihaiouguchen, July 2003, pp. 27-28, p. 27.

12 Yuan Jicheng, "Hankou Zujie Gailian" (note 5), p. 199.

13 Cf. Tang Haoming, *Zhang Zhidong* (in three volumes), Beijing: Renmin Wenxue Chubanshe, July 2002, p. 387 ff.

classical imperialistic Russian behavior.¹⁴ During the visit of the Russian Crown Prince, just like a number of times before, the Russian consulate in Hankou again pushed for the establishment of a concession in Hanyang, but the Russian request for a concession-like base for their entrepreneurs in Hankou was successfully refused by the Qing government.¹⁵

A significant change of the international political situation in East Asia towards the end of the 19th century led to a strengthening of Russian bargaining power and political influence in China. The Chinese historian Yuan Jicheng argues that, if the Opium Wars can be considered as the beginning of Western capitalist encroachment upon China, the Sino-Japanese War of 1894/95 marked the beginning of what became known, in Western scholarship, as the carving-up of China by the Great Powers (*Diguo Zhuyi Lieqiang guafen Zhongguo*). According to Russian media at that time, the Russians saw the defeat of China by Japan as a great opportunity to stand by China against Japan, thereby strengthening their strategic position and extending their political and economic influences in China.¹⁶ The Triple Intervention, a joint and ultimately successful effort by Russia, France, and Germany to push Japan off the Liaodong Peninsula, put Russia in an advantageous bargaining position against China. These three countries provided welcome support for China against Japan, yet each of them had their own demands for spheres of influence and military bases on the Chinese mainland, with Germany, for example, establishing a naval base in Shandong in 1898. Ostensibly to protect China from both the Germans and the Japanese, and after bribing the Chinese negotiators, the Russians signed a military agreement with the Qing government. In return for their support for the Qing government against the other foreign intruders, the Russians were not only given a 25-year lease of the southern tip of the Liaodong Peninsula, including the city of Dalian and the Port Arthur Naval base¹⁷, but also allowed to finally establish Russian territorial concessions in Tianjin and Hankou. Furthermore, the Treaty of Alliance allowed Russia to build a railway through Manchuria¹⁸

14 Cf. Yuan Jicheng, *Jindai Zhongguo Zujie Shigao* (note 7), p. 80.

15 Fei Chenkang, *Zhongguo Zujie Shi* [History of Chinese Concessions], Shanghai Shehui Kexue Yuan Chubanshe, 10/1991, p. 260.

16 Cf. Yuan Jicheng, *Jindai Zhongguo Zujie Shigao* (note 7), p. 78 f.

17 J. Grasso/J. Corrin/M. Kort, *Modernization and Revolution in China – From the Opium Wars to World Power*, Armonk, N. Y. 2004, p. 58.

18 The official explanation for the necessity of the construction of a Russian railway on Chinese territory was that the railway was an important mean to quickly deploy Russian troops to help China in the case of future aggression of Japan. A. Lukin, *The Bear watches the Dragon* (note 3), p. 69.

and Russian settlements, including the one in Harbin¹⁹. The location of Hankou as a site of territorial concession was most likely chosen with regard to the economic stakes of Russian tea merchants in that city.

Due to this agreement between Russia and the Chinese imperial government, the Russians were finally in a position to gain similar rights to Chinese territory as other major imperialist powers, most importantly Britain. While this rivalry between the imperialist powers, which found its expression in the competition over spheres of influence within China, was certainly the major motivation for the Russian demand for concessions, the political weakness of the Qing government also became increasingly obvious (in the defeat by Japan) and Russia, as the other powers, sought to gain effective measures to protect their business interests in the face of an anticipated decline into political and economic chaos. No measures are more efficient for this purpose than territorial concessions and extraterritoriality, a right which exempts foreign nationals from local judiciary. The treaty which decreed the establishment of the Russian concession in Hankou in June 1896 affirmed the right to extraterritoriality, and in this the Russians had achieved a critical balance of power with the other imperial countries in their quest for territorial concessions in China.²⁰

Indeed, in some ways the Russians even appeared more dominant; the Russian concession area was the largest of all foreign concession areas.²¹ Parts of it were paddy fields, other parts were undeveloped, and there were also areas with Chinese households and businesses.²² However, despite the size of the area and the appearance of equality with the other powers, or even superiority to them, in fact, the Russians did very little to develop their concession. It appears that they simply did not have the resources to actually develop the concession, build modern infrastructure, and make a prosperous Russian stronghold on the Chinese mainland.

In addition, as recent local research has shown, the Chinese resisted the Russian takeover and it took the Russians six years to force the removal of Chinese households in order to facilitate their own development efforts.²³ According to the treaty, Chinese were not allowed to sell or let their property to anyone but the Russian government and at a low and fixed price. However,

19 *Ibid.*

20 Cf. Yuan Jicheng, *Jindai Zhongguo Zujie Shigao* (note 7), p. 81.

21 Of the total area assigned for the Russian and the French concession, the latter to be established at the same time, Russia received two thirds and France received one-third of the land.

22 Cf. Hu (note 11), p. 28.

23 *Ibid.*

the local Chinese refused to accept the agreement and did not move out of the concession area. This conflict continued until 1902, with the Russians petitioning to local and provincial authorities and the Chinese landowners refusing the moving and compensation arrangements. This part of the treaty was finally renegotiated and the Russians paid a lump sum to the local government, which was now obligated to push the remaining Chinese out of the Russian concession, if necessary, with the use of force.²⁴ As a consequence, some Chinese scholars say that, in the Russian concession area, the Chinese locals continued to have a number of rights, including a continuation of certain property rights.²⁵ Only with the resolution of this dispute in 1902 did the Russians begin construction of infrastructure, such as administrative buildings as well as roads. Also in 1902, the Russian consulate, which so far had been located in Hanyang, moved into the concession area. The owners of the tea factories and other Russian merchants built a number of luxurious Russian-style houses. There was an industry bureau, as well as a Russian police office with the right to arrest Chinese citizens.

It is clear from the accounts by urban historians of Wuhan that Hankou has always been a trade-focused concession.²⁶ While the Russians were continually mentioned as pioneers in Chinese trade, the nation that built the first modern tea factory, they did not venture into other industries. Indeed, unlike the other powers involved in the Hankou trade, especially those with concession areas, the Russians did not even engage in the banking business.²⁷ Additionally, in the Chinese accounts of concession-era Hankou, there is no discussion of Russian cultural life, in distinct opposition to the frequent references to the British and French. Apparently, the Russians did not involve themselves in education, missionary work or the media, and were devoted to economic pursuits. Additionally, they apparently were not wealthy enough to really develop their concession and make substantial investments, a fact that applies to the Russian concession in Tianjin as well.²⁸

24 Ibid.

25 Yang Duo, "Hankou Waiguo Zujie de Chansheng he Shouhui Jianshu (fu zujie tu)" [A Simplified Account of the Establishment and Return of the Hankou Foreign Concessions (with Maps)], Wuhan Wenshi Ziliao (xuanji), Hubeisheng Wuhanshi Weiyuanhui Wenshi Ziliao Yanjiu Weiyuanhui (Hubei and Wuhan Committee for Literary and Historical Research), December 1980.

26 Yuan Jicheng, "Hankou Zujie Gailian" (note 5), p. 197; Pi Mingxiu, Wuhan Jinbainianshi (1840-1949) [History of Wuhan during the last Hundred Years], Huazhong Gongxueyuan Chubanshe, 1985, p. 50 ff.

27 Cf. Pi (note 26), p. 51 ff.; Dong Mingcang, "Hankou de Zujie yu Waiguo Yinhang" [The Hankou Concessions and Foreign Banks], in: Liechiang zai Zhongguo de Zujie, Zhongguo Wenshi Chubanshe, 1992, pp. 227-233.

The Return of the Russian Concession in Wuhan – National and Local Frameworks

The Beijing government refused diplomatic recognition to the new Bolshevik regime in Russia after it came to power in October 1917. Yet in the wake of China's perceived humiliation at the Versailles Peace Conference and upsurge in nationalism, many Chinese appeared to become more receptive to the Bolshevik message. To take advantage of the situation, the Soviet government issued what became known as the First Karakhan declaration in July 1919.²⁹ The declaration offered equal treatment to China and promised to abolish all unequal treaties between the former Tsarist government and China. What appeared to be a true manifestation of Leninist Anti-Imperialism was certainly a very attractive part of the "Marxist-Leninist package" offered by the Bolsheviks.³⁰ The New Russia, trying to break out of their diplomatic isolation and to undermine their traditional imperial rivals, wanted the Chinese as their allies against Britain and the other Great Powers. The Beijing government, on its part, used the declaration to revoke diplomatic recognition to the remaining white-Russians in China and declared the abolishment of all extraterritorial rights of the White Russians in China on September 23, 1920. This move was promptly followed by the so-called Second Karakhan declaration, issued on September 27, 1920, which reaffirmed the content of the first declaration.³¹ While the Soviets had gained a first partial success, in that the Chinese government revoked its diplomatic recognition of the old tsarist regime, Beijing still refused to recognize the Bolsheviks. Instead, along with the revocation of recognition of the White Russians and the announcement that henceforth the Chinese government would be in charge of the nineteen Russian consulates, the Beijing government ordered the return of the Russian concession areas in Tianjin and Hankou to Chinese sovereignty.³²

In reaction to this order from Beijing, troops of the provincial government and local Chinese police marched toward the Russian concession in order to

28 Cf. Fei (note 15), p. 264.

29 The declaration is named after Lev Karakhan who at that time (1919) was deputy people's commissar of foreign affairs and was to become the first Soviet ambassador to China after the resumption of diplomatic relations on May 31, 1924. Elleman, *Diplomacy and Deception* (note 2), p. 17.

30 Sheridan, quoted in: *ibid.*, p. 18.

31 Elleman, *Diplomacy and Deception* (note 2), p. 178.

32 Zhou Dediao, "Minchu Hankou De 'E Zujie de Jieshou yu Gaizhi Pingxi" [Analysis of the Return and Systemic Change of the Russian Concession in Hankou during the Early Republican Era], in: *Wuhan Wenshi Ziliao*, 12/ 2002, 55-58, p. 56.

take it back, but the concession was successfully defended by English, French, and American police stationed in the concessions area. On October 8, 1920, the French consul in Hankou declared that the Russian concession had become a part of the French concession, and thus, any changes in the status of the concession had to be negotiated with the French authorities. Following this, the English, French, and American troops succeeded three more times in deterring attempts by Chinese troops to take back the Russian concession area (*ibid*). In these joint efforts we see that, while constantly maneuvering and trying to undermine each other in the fight for the largest possible influence in China, the Great Powers also acted together when it proved useful for their own purposes. Afraid that the return of the Russian concession would trigger anti-foreign sentiments and hasten the return of their own concessions, the other foreign powers defended a weaker Russia from the Chinese forces.³³

In August 1922, the Soviet representative Adolf Joffe arrived in China to promote and negotiate the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and the new Russian government. Joffe met with Sun Yat-sen, head of the Southern government, who welcomed the new Soviet approach to China. The talk between Sun and Joffe led to a memorandum of understanding issued on January 26, 1923 in which Joffe praised Sun's government organization.³⁴ This declaration obviously caused discomfort for the Beijing government, because of the animosity between the Beijing Warlord government in the North and the Guomindang in the South, both of whom aspired to be the sole representative of all of China. Trying to use the situation to its advantage, the Bolshevik government sent their diplomatic representative to Beijing in September 1923 to start negotiations with the Beijing government about the resumption of diplomatic relations between China and Russia. The negotiations finally led to the establishment of official diplomatic relations with the signing of the Sino-Soviet Treaty on May 31, 1924; among the seven separate agreements, one decreed the abandonment of Russian concessions on Chinese domestic territory. However, as we will see further below, the most tangible advantage the Chinese could draw from this announcement of the abandonment of the Russian concessions was to use this fact to urge

33 The same applies in the fascinating case of the diplomatic quarter in Beijing which, according to the Boxer Protocols, was under the authority of the foreigners and thus out of reach for the Chinese government. The Dutch minister was in charge of the Russian legation and could refuse its turnover to the Bolsheviks when demanded by Foreign minister Wellington Koo in 1924 (for details, see Elleman, *Diplomacy and Deception* [note 2], p. 162 ff.).

34 Cf. Yuan Jicheng, *Jindai Zhongguo Zujie Shigao* (note 7), p. 248.

the other foreign powers to follow suit and also renounce their extraterritorial rights. In fact, the Soviets received much of the property of the former concessions, including the consulates, buildings, and Russian churches.³⁵

Regarding the Hankou concession, it was agreed that it was to be transferred back to the Chinese authorities on July 1, 1924, with the former Tsarist Russian consulate, located within the concession area, to be taken over by the new Soviet representatives.³⁶ On June 22, 1924, a Soviet diplomat came to Hankou to have consultations with the local authorities to ensure a smooth turnover of the concession and prepare for future regular trade relations between the two nations.³⁷ While the Chinese Five-olor-Flag was raised on the former industrial bureau of the Russian concession on that day, the actual return of the concession and its change of status into a special district under Chinese authority took place nine months later, on March 2, 1925.³⁸ Yet, Bruce Elleman has shown that, despite the May 31, 1924 agreement and the proclaimed abandonment of the Russian concessions in China, the Soviet Russians in fact took over most of the property of the former Tsarist concessions, and this also applied to the concession buildings in Hankou, although Chinese historians continue to claim that with the formal return of the concession, the "problem" had been solved. In fact, Chinese historians praise the return of the Russian concession in Hankou as a perfect example for a well-prepared and professional turnover.³⁹

Traditional Tsarist imperialism or Internationalist Communist Revolutionary Strategy?

Bruce Elleman has demonstrated how the Bolsheviks violated the most important parts of the May 31, 1924 agreement⁴⁰ and uses recently discovered documents to show that Moscow retained extraterritoriality and consular jurisdiction by refusing to negotiate new agreements and signing secret agreements with the Guomindang Nanjing government in 1929 and 1939.⁴¹ An-

35 Elleman, *Diplomacy and Deception* (note 2), p. 159.

36 Cf. Yuan Jicheng, *Jindai Zhongguo Zujie Shigao* (note 7), p. 251.

37 Cf. Zhou (note 32), p. 56.

38 Cf. Yuan Jicheng, *Jindai Zhongguo Zujie Shigao* (note 7), p. 251.

39 Cf. Yuan Jicheng, *Jindai Zhongguo Zujie Shigao* (note 7); Zhou (note 32).

40 They consolidated their control over Outer Mongolia, did not return the Chinese Eastern Railway as had been agreed upon, and finally requested most-favored nation status with the other foreign powers in China. The latter request amounted to nothing but the renewal of the terms of the unequal treaties which formed the basis for the foreign presence in China. Elleman, *Diplomacy and Deception* (note 2), p. 168 ff.

41 *Ibid.*, p. 187 ff.

other measure to preclude the factual abolishment of extraterritoriality was the Soviet nationalization of foreign trade which was decreed in 1923. This meant that anyone engaged in foreign trade was automatically to be considered a Soviet government official and thus a subject of diplomatic immunity.⁴² In this way, the Soviet government had secured this status for virtually all Soviet citizens in China, a year *before* official diplomatic relations were resumed and the abandonment of extraterritoriality proclaimed in the mutual treaty. Russian citizens were never tried under Chinese law.⁴³ Elleman uses this to argue that the new Bolshevik government simply continued where the Tsarist imperialists had left off.

In opposition to this argument Lukin suggests that Soviet Russian expansionary policy was rooted in communist internationalist ideology, and that Russian enclaves in China were seen as bases for world revolution.

“Only lack of understanding of the broader ideological basis of Soviet foreign policy in this period could lead to the view that Communist Russia merely used revolutionary rhetoric to conceal its continuation of the traditional imperialist and expansionist policies of the Russian empire.”⁴⁴

The primary goal of Russian foreign policy at the time was to promote national revolution as part of world revolution and with regard to the Russian representatives in China after 1921, it was impossible to distinguish between the Comintern and the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs.⁴⁵ An integral part of the internationalist strategy was the weakening and expulsion of the imperialist foreign powers in China.

A look at the Russian concession in Hankou, the circumstances of both its establishment and return suggests little serious commitment at establishing a permanent presence or a cultural legacy in China. The Russians did not diversify their industrial investment nor did they engage significantly in cultural or missionary activities. The Russians obviously did not have the resources to expand business or make substantial investments in China. Instead we find that during the second half of the 19th century, the strategic rivalry between Russia and Western European powers, and later with an increasingly strong Japan, were the major motivations to establish a balance with these powers on the Chinese mainland. With the advent of Russia as the base

42 Ibid, p. 181 f.

43 The same applied to the remaining Germans in Hankou, whose legal affairs were taken care of by the Dutch consulate, after the return of the German concession in Hankou to Chinese authorities. Cf. Zhou (note 32), p. 58)

44 A. Lukin, *The Bear watches the Dragon* (note 3), p. 83.

45 Ibid, p. 82 f.

for, and leader of, the worldwide communist movement after the success of the October Revolution in 1917, Russia's rivalry with the Western powers, especially Britain, continued, although the ideology behind this rivalry had changed. To equate the transfer of former White Russian properties to the Soviet diplomatic representatives in China with traditional imperialism is not a strong argument, when we consider the Russian concession or later Soviet properties in Hankou. Instead, the negligible economic ambitions of the Russians throughout the late imperial and early Bolshevik periods support Lukin's ideology-based argument. The ideological perception of China as the next revolutionary ground, and the resulting rivalry with the imperialist powers, prompted the Russian demand for a continued presence in China. The case of the Russian concession in Wuhan thus calls for a reconsideration of the motives of Russian imperialism and its juxtaposition with that of the other Great Powers in China. The prevalent use of the term "Great Powers" in the historiography of modern China, as if speaking of a monolithic entity, must be questioned and replaced with a more differentiate treatment of each one of them.