

Managing Shifting Spatial Orders: Planning Bombay's Free Port and Free Zone, 1830s–1980s

Megan Maruschke

ABSTRACTS

The free zone features frequently in research on contemporary globalization; the visible exploitation in zones reveals the inequality produced by global economic entanglement. Yet, there is very little historical research on how these practices may be related to elite and state-based globalization projects. Using official reports and correspondence from government ministries, this article examines two free-port and free-zone plans from the 1830s and the 1960s in Bombay, and follows them forward, concluding with the present port situation. These plans were never realized, but they may both serve as a lens through which we can identify the actors who pursue globalization projects, through which they seek to channel connectivity in particular places. Moreover, the concept portals of globalization draws attention to the variety of entangled spaces of what we call the global economy and how these have shifted over time.

Freizonen sind häufig Gegenstand der Forschung zur gegenwärtigen Globalisierung, da sich in ihnen die von globalen Wirtschaftsverflechtungen erzeugten Ungleichheiten besonders deutlich zeigen. Dennoch gibt es nur wenige historische Untersuchungen dazu, welche Rolle Freizonen in von gesellschaftlichen Eliten oder Staaten gelenkten Globalisierungsprojekten spielen. Auf der Grundlage offizieller Berichte und der Korrespondenz von Regierungsministerien untersucht dieser Artikel zwei Freihafen- und Freihandelszonenpläne in Bombay aus den 1830er und 1960er Jahren und begleitet die Hafenentwicklung bis zur Gegenwart. Diese Pläne wurden nie umgesetzt, aber können als Beispiele dienen, anhand derer wir die Akteure besser identifizieren können, die Globalisierungsprojekte verfolgen, um die globale Vernetzung bestimmter Orte zu steuern. Überdies lenkt das Konzept der "Portale der Globalisierung" die Aufmerksamkeit auf die verschiedenen verwobenen Räume der Weltwirtschaft und darauf, wie diese sich im Laufe der Zeit verlagert haben.

1. Introduction

In her work on global cities, Saskia Sassen indicates that free trade zones, also known as special economic zones and export-processing zones, serve important functions similar to the global city: they are nodal points through which global circuits of capital and goods enter and exit nation states.¹ Through their tax incentives, lax labour regimes, and rescinded duties, free trade zones enable (often foreign) corporations to employ low-wage workers to handle manufactures for a global marketplace. Zones are usually demarcated by a physical barrier to maintain their separate legal and tax status, as well as to guard against labour unrest and pilfering.² In 2015, *The Economist* estimated that three-quarters of countries around the world contain such zones, totalling 4,300 at the time of research.³ In connecting free trade zones and global cities, Sassen suggests that these places share a similar function in the global economy, specifically in managing processes of globalization, leading to the “unbundling” of these places from their respective nation states.⁴

Much of the research on zones stems from the social sciences and is investigated in the present context. Even so, instead of connecting free trade zones to contemporary global cities, many authors seek to express the historical continuity of contemporary zones by linking them to free ports of the past: colonial free ports, treaty ports, or Hanseatic League ports.⁵ Likewise, a recent history of Livorno’s free port around 1500 refers to it as an early example of today’s special economic zones.⁶ These statements are anecdotes to draw the reader in, not historical claims; there is no historical study to support them.

- 1 S. Sassen, *The Global City. Introducing a Concept*, in: *Brown Journal of World Affairs*, 9 (2005) 2, pp. 27–43.
- 2 A. Ong, *Zoning Technologies in East Asia*, in: *Neoliberalism as Exception: Mutations in Citizenship and Sovereignty*, Durham 2006, pp. 97–118.
- 3 *Special Economic Zones: Political Priority, Economic Gamble*, in: *The Economist*, 4 April, 2015, <http://www.economist.com/news/finance-and-economics/21647630-free-trade-zones-are-more-popular-everwith-politicians-if-not> (accessed 27 June 2016); *Special economic zones: not so special*, in: *The Economist*, 4 April, 2015, <http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21647615-world-awash-free-trade-zones-and-their-offshoots-many-are-not-worth-effort-not> (consulted 27 June 2016).
- 4 S. Sassen, *Spatialities and Temporalities of the Global: Elements for a Theorization*, in: *Public Culture*, 12 (2000), pp. 215–232, pp. 218–219.
- 5 T. Takeo, *Free Trade Zones in Southeast Asia*, in: *Monthly Review*, 29 (1978) 9, pp. 29–41, p. 30; D.L.U. Jayawardena, *Free Trade Zones*, in: *Journal of World Trade*, 17 (1983) 5, pp. 427–444; K.Y. Wong and D.K.Y. Chu, *Export Processing Zones and Special Economic Zones as Generators of Economic Development: The Asian Experience*, in: *Geografiska Annaler. Series B, Human Geography*, 66 (1984) 1, pp. 1–16, p. 1; M. Guangwen, *The Theory and Practice of Free Economic Zones: A Case Study of Tianjin*, People’s Republic of China, dissertation, Ruprecht-Karls University of Heidelberg, 2003; J.J. Wang and D. Olivier, *Port-FEZ Bundles as Spaces of Global Articulation: The Case of Tianjin, China*, in: *Environment and Planning A*, 38 (2006) 8, pp. 1487–1503, p. 1487; Ong, *Neoliberalism as Exception* (fn. 2), p. 103; P. Amitendu and S. Bhattacharjee, *Special Economic Zones in India: Myths and Realities*, London, 2008, p. 1; J. Bach, *Modernity and the Urban Imagination in Economic Zones*, in: *Theory, Culture & Society*, 28 (2011) 5, pp. 98–122, pp. 98–99; A. Aggarwal, *Social and Economic Impact of SEZs in India*, New Delhi, 2012, pp. 15–36; K. Easterling, *Extrastatecraft*, London, 2014, pp. 25–69; P. Khanna, *Connectography: Mapping the Global Network Revolution*, London 2016, pp. 279–280.
- 6 C. Tazzara, *The Free Port of Livorno and the Transformation of the Mediterranean World*, Oxford University Press, 2017; C. Tazzara, *Capitalism and the Special Economic Zone, 1590–2014*, in: R. Fredona and S. Reinert (eds.), *New Perspectives on the History of Political Economy*, London (forthcoming 2018).

What these anecdotes point to is an impression among historians and social scientists alike that specific places like ports have served and continue to serve as key nodal points in an increasingly globalizing economy; they are the places where “that which is foreign” enters the nation state.⁷ Though it may be possible to link the zone and the free port’s general functionality in the “global economy,” such a generalization supposes the global economy to be “flat” and seamlessly integrative, negating that societies enter periods of various spatial (economic and political) constellations; free ports and free zones are situated within these larger spatial orders. Using portals of globalization as a research lens helps us to focus on these particular places, in which global entanglements are dense.⁸ In doing so, we can study how the actors who plan these free ports and free zones also perceive changing spatial world orders, and seek to use these projects to reposition their place within them.⁹ Therefore, in contrast to Sassen, it is not my understanding that these zones, ports, cities, and their combinations are sites of national “unbundling.” This article examines free-port and free-zone plans from the 1830s and the 1960s in Bombay (Mumbai) and follows them forward, concluding with the present port situation. These plans were never realized, but they may both serve as a lens through which we can view how actors try to enact “globalization projects” by seeking to channel connectivity through particular places. Bombay is one of India’s primary commercial and naval ports. The port and the city became increasingly important over the course of the nineteenth century as the East India Company’s rule became more territorial, gaining Bombay’s hinterlands. In the 1840s, Bombay then became the seat for the Bombay Presidency, as the governing structure for India was formalized, leading to the eventual exit of the company in 1858. Post-independence (1947), Bombay became the capital of the state of Bombay, later the state of Maharashtra. It maintained its reputation as a primary city of commerce and remained a “major port,” a classification signifying that the port is run under the central government’s authority. It also remained a naval port for the Indian navy. Though it appears that Bombay maintained its functionality, its positionality in both of these territorializing entities – British India and India – was just as uncertain as its positionality within trading networks during the periods under investigation. In the 1830s, these uncertainties ranged from the national standardization of governing practices in British India to new free trade regulations in the British Empire, thus weakening the East India Company’s hold on certain commodities. By the mid twentieth century, planners, merchants, and business houses needed to contend with a decolonizing Cold War system of states and import substitution at home, which prioritized production for

7 M. Geyer, *Portals of Globalization*, in: W. Eberhard and C. Lübke (eds.), *The Plurality of Europe: Identities and Spaces*; Contributions made at an International Conference Leipzig, 6 - 9 June 2007, Leipzig 2010, pp. 509–520, p. 510.

8 M. Middell and K. Naumann, *Global History and the Spatial Turn*, in: *Journal of Global History*, 5 (2010) 1, p. 162.

9 M. Maruschke, *Zones of Reterritorialization: India’s Free Trade Zones in Comparative Perspective, 1947 to the 1980s*, in: *Journal of Global History*, 12 (2017) 3, pp. 410–432, p. 413. C. Miller, *From Foreign Concessions to Special Economic Zones: Decolonization and Foreign Investment in Twentieth-Century Asia*, in: L. James and E. Leake (eds.), *Decolonization and the Cold War: Negotiating Independence*, London 2015, pp. 239–253.

the domestic market. In both contexts, planners, merchants, and business houses sought to regain their positionality under new circumstances; plans to implement free ports and free zones functioned as projects to control flows of goods and capital in certain places and to reposition this port city within spatial orders.

The port sector is an interesting sector to study from a local point of view, precisely because a port's outlook must be rooted in its trading networks, its institutional embeddedness in the state, and its competition. A port needs specific types of infrastructure – at the port itself, as well as in its forward and backward linkages – to deal with trade within its circuits, and it must avoid a tariff disadvantage in comparison to port competitors. In this article, to understand how actors sought to manage the positionality of Bombay's port in its networks, competition, and spatial orders, I look first at a free-port plan from 1833.¹⁰ This plan provides a view into how merchants – themselves quite mobile – sought to reposition the city within British imperial port networks, as governance in India became more territorial and an imperial free trade system emerged. The second part of this article discusses plans for the city to deal with the aftermath of having been a nodal naval and commercial port under the British Empire. The tension lies between trying to maintain a central role in India's trade and to create a more sustainable living space that reworks, to some degree, the spatial inequalities produced in the city under colonialism. Therefore, looking at plans – even failed ones – reveal how actors sought to deal with changes in the port's connectedness and embeddedness in shifting spatial regimes.

2. A Free Port for Bombay

Bombay looks to the casual observer like an obvious location for a port city, ideally suited for commerce due to the presence of a natural harbour as well as its centrality along India's western coastline. However, a fraught process of institutionalization and infrastructure development made it into the thriving port it became. After an initially unsuccessful attempt to settle Bombay, King Charles II granted the East India Company the rights to settle the islands in 1667, which established the first factory there in 1668. However, the East India Company worked for over two centuries to eclipse Surat, another west-coast port city that hosted many European factories, and establish Bombay as the supreme trading port on India's west coast. This project was finally successful, solidified in part by the floods and fires that destroyed Surat in 1837, but it was mainly a result of the growing political power of the East India Company that diverted trade to Bombay.¹¹ Following the company and private merchants' push to shape Bombay into western India's primary port, the city and its port were soon embedded within the growing territorial rule of the company over much of India, resulting by 1858 in direct British

10 The research for this article is based on my dissertation: M. Maruschke, *Portals of Globalization: Mumbai's Free Ports and Free Zones, c. 1833–2015*, Dissertation, Universität Leipzig, 2016.

11 M. Kosambi, *Commerce, Conquest and the Colonial City: Role of Locational Factors in the Rise of Bombay*, in: *Economic and Political Weekly*, 20 (1985) 1, pp. 32–37.

rule over India; the company was dissolved soon thereafter. By the 1860s, major engineering projects reshaped the city – the construction of railways, new docking facilities, and the opening of the Suez Canal – which followed on the heels of a cotton boom. The trade boom in cotton during the American Civil War period (1861–1865),¹² but also opium trade with China, created a demand to expand port facilities along with the city itself. In short, scholars who try to understand the centrality of Bombay in British imperial and Indian trading networks agree that specific individuals, governmental institutions, and collective actors such as business houses sought to make Bombay central within these networks.¹³ They also worked hard to foster and produce these trade connections in the first place.

This section recounts one of these efforts to produce and reinforce Bombay port's centrality in colonial trading networks. It examines how business elite in Bombay sought to institute a free port in the harbour during the 1830s, during a period of shifting imperial trade and the increasing territorialization of India. My focus is on how the plan fit into these actors' strategy to both reposition the city, in terms of gaining importance in the empire, and how this repositioning would be enabled by the city playing a more central role as a key node in a British imperial trade route. The way trade was managed within the formation of "India" and in the British Empire as a whole, were major factors behind Bombay's shifting port practices.

2.1 Shifting Spatial Frameworks in India and the British Empire

As a chartered company, the East India Company controlled British trade between the so-called East Indies and Britain, while the trade within the East Indies, basically any intra-Asian trade, including that between China and India, was operated by private merchants.¹⁴ The East India Company, unlike other European trading companies, allowed extensive private participation in trade, making the organization extremely flexible.¹⁵ This private participation, however, was also necessary, as the company was forbidden from shipping opium to China, which had banned its sale through imperial edict; the company's sale of opium there would jeopardize its trading rights in China. Therefore, private traders operating "country craft" would sell Indian opium, allowing for the purchase of luxury items destined for the British market such as tea. Instead, Parsi (Zoroastrians of Persian descent living in India, especially Bombay) and European agency houses, including many in Bombay, procured the opium crop and shipped it to China,

12 S. Beckert, *Emancipation and Empire: Reconstructing the Worldwide Web of Cotton Production in the Age of the American Civil War*, in: *The American Historical Review*, 109 (2004) 5, pp. 1405–1438.

13 For example, see: M. Kosambi, *Bombay and Poona: A Socio-Ecological Study of two Indian cities; 1650–1900*, Stockholm 1980.

14 K.N. Chaudhuri, *The English East India Company: The Study of an Early Joint-Stock Company 1600–1640*, 1965 (reprint), London 1999. See also: K.N. Chaudhuri, *The Trading World of Asia and the English East India Company, 1660–1760*, 1978 (reprint), Cambridge 2006.

15 P. Marshall, *Private British Trade in the Indian Ocean before 1800*, in: A.D. Gupta and M.N. Pearson (eds.), *India and the Indian Ocean, 1500–1800*, Calcutta 1987, pp. 276–300; O. Prakash, *The English East India Company and India*, in: H.V. Bowen, M. Lincoln, and N. Rigby (eds.), *The Worlds of the East India Company*, Suffolk 2002, pp. 1–18.

a practice that by 1820 had become highly profitable.¹⁶ Bombay was an important node in the opium network along with Singapore, where opium was trans-shipped, and Canton, its destination. This position ensured both the accumulation of wealth by private individuals in Bombay and the need to create more and better docking facilities on the island.

Through the company's territorial expansion, especially from around the turn of the nineteenth century, it could control trade flows while not always participating directly in that trade itself. This territorial expansion allowed the company to control access to commodities, including opium, by channelling commodities through particular ports. Controlling the opium trade was, therefore, an important factor driving the company's territorial expansion, according to Nick Robins. The opium grown in Malwa, part of the Maratha territory, was being exported through Portuguese-controlled outposts, such as Goa, and then shipped to Macao, which depressed the price of the company's Bengal opium.¹⁷ After unsuccessfully trying to control the Malwa trade, the company allowed Malwa opium to be transported to Bombay for a small transit duty. By 1831, 90 per cent of Malwa opium passed through Bombay.¹⁸ In total, exports of opium from India to China grew from approximately 4,000 chests at the turn of the nineteenth century to 23,000 chests by 1833.¹⁹ By 1843, the company conquered Sind, the territory with the only remaining ports in India that shipped non-company opium.

In 1813 and 1833, changes within the East India Company shifted how trade was carried out throughout the empire. The company had lost its exclusive trading rights to and from Asia, due to the "free trade" lobby at Lancashire's manufacturing industries.²⁰ As the company gained power and land in India, it conversely subsided to pressure by private merchants in Britain and India, and lost its monopoly trading rights on all goods, apart from tea, through the Charter Act of 1813. The subsequent Charter Act of 1833 reorganized the East India Company's control over India: it limited the legislative powers of the governors of the Madras and Bombay presidencies, administrative units in colonial India that were two of the three major centres of British political power. This act also turned the governor general of Bengal into the governor general of India. Thus, a process of state-building was under way, which was characterized by a combination of territorial expansion, upscaling, and simultaneous state decentralization.²¹ That is to say, as more competencies fell under the authority of a growing Indian government, it was also in a process of decentralizing itself financially from the Bengal Presidency. These transitions produced many opportunities but also anxieties in Bombay.

16 J. Keay, *The Honourable Company: A History of the English East India Company*, New York 1991, pp. 454–455.

17 N. Robins, *The Corporation that Changed the World: How the East India Company Shaped the Modern Multinational*, 2nd ed., London 2012, p. 159.

18 *Ibid.*

19 *Ibid.*

20 J. Keay, *The Honourable Company* (fn. 16), pp. 451–453.

21 E. Thompson and G.T. Garratt, *Rise and Fulfilment of British Rule in India*, Allahabad 1962, p. 473.

2.2. The Free-Port Plan

Bombay merchant houses advocated a free port for Bombay based on changes in shipping within the empire, the territorial restructuring of India, as well as specific problems with shipping charges in Canton. These negotiations over the shape of the port took place at a time when it was unclear who should and would control trade and Bombay's port: private commercial actors; an emerging central government of India, or the local government of Bombay. Moreover, the port complex was not a single port. The navy controlled part of the foreshore, while other locations included private and open facilities. In short, there was not a single Bombay port to speak of.

Empire-wide changes prompted local action in Bombay. Mariam Dossal writes, "Bombay merchants felt they would be able to hold their own if trade incentives were provided, import and export duties withdrawn, and Bombay declared a free port."²² There were three proposals floated by Bombay-based merchants to the government, all of which involved changes in warehousing at the docks and customs fees. The most extensive of which, and the one perceived to be most useful, was the "Free Port or Entrepôt for China Goods" model. Doveton and Bruce, the firm that formed the committee to consider the plan, described the situation in Canton and competition as the key motivating factors. These factors external to Bombay prompted a search for models by the city's merchants to reorganize the port and customs procedures. The plan was meant to reorganize trade between Canton and Bombay and, ultimately, between Bombay and British ports. Bombay was an important port in the opium trade to Canton, as outlined previously. However, there were few goods traders could bring back to Bombay, meaning that ships were only fully laden in one direction. Furthermore, the way that ships were charged customs fees at Canton was favourable to larger vessels because ships paid similar fees, regardless of size.²³ These merchants proposed that by freely allowing goods to be imported and (re-) exported from Bombay with very limited charges, only enough to cover costs, Bombay could become an entrepôt between China and Britain. Opium traders could ship opium to Canton and return to Bombay with tea. Traders from Britain would only have to sail as far as Bombay for tea, rather than to China.

The Bombay government was not entirely drawn in by the proposal, but recognized that in the wake of the change to a free trade system, a new business environment was emerging. In 1834, the Bombay government sent a questionnaire to various firms to seek their opinion on the matter. Replies were received from some of the most prominent businesses, such as Forbes and Co., Remington and Co., Nicol and Co., B. and A. Hornusjee and Co., Leckie and Co., Adam Skinner and Co., Thomas Crawford, Roger de Faria and Co., and Jamsetjee Jejeebhoy and Co.²⁴ Many of these companies founded, just

22 M. Dossal, *Imperial Designs and Indian Realities: The Planning of Bombay City, 1845–1875*, New Delhi 1991, pp. 143–144.

23 B. Doveton and W.C. Bruce to L.R. Reid, January 20 (1834), p. 3 (Z/E/4/14/D557, 1834–1837), India Separate Revenue Department (ISR), General Correspondence (GC), India Office Records (IOR), British Library (BL).

24 M. Dossal, *Imperial Designs* (fn. 22), p. 144.

a few years later, the Bombay Chamber of Commerce and Industry, which pushed for many of the future key developments of Bombay's port.²⁵ The questionnaire asked merchants to analyse the trade situation, not only in Bombay but within the trading network of the empire. These questions related to their experience and knowledge of Singapore as a model free port, and whether such a system in Singapore was harmful to Bombay's trade, or whether Bombay should form part of a system of free ports that would link Bombay to Singapore. The questions also dealt with how to balance the interests of private traders, who were vital to the city and presidency's success, with the need for public revenue under the current shifting circumstances of Bombay as a presidency.²⁶

Popular opinion among Indian and European merchants were in favour of turning Bombay into a free port. Despite references to Singapore (without mentioning the specifics of Singapore's port), the proposal, in fact, suggested something along the lines of a modified bonded warehouse, a secured warehouse in which goods could be stored duty-free until sale or trans-shipment. The bonded warehouse system had been implemented at several ports in Britain since the early 1800s, and this was, in fact, seen as the main solution that could be tailored to Bombay, whose merchants advocated for a bonded warehouse for all goods meant for re-export. In contrast, the Bombay government advocated a bonded warehouse specifically for "China goods" that were to be re-exported, thus directing very specific trade flows without losing other customs revenue.²⁷ The debates within these letters between Bombay merchants, the government of Bombay, and the government of India relate to whether this system should be confined to "China goods"; whether only Bombay or a system of ports should be reformed, or whether other locations might be more favourable. These letters compared port practices in Calcutta and Madras to Bombay, Singapore, Canton, Cape Town, and British "home ports." They were in search of a model, but each group of actors – the government of Bombay, Bombay's merchants, and the government of India – had different motivations for controlling trade in Bombay; no model could truly satisfy all interests.

What emerged from these negotiations is that the Bombay government could no longer act entirely on its own to implement such a scheme, but needed to defer to the government of India, which, in turn, validated the argument that converting Bombay into a free port by eliminating import and export duties, would increase shipping and trade, but it objected to providing specific incentives at one Indian port without taking into consideration the acquired territory as a whole. The government of India agreed to become acquainted with the various systems of ports within the three presidencies that formed the new "British Territories in India" so that it could reform customs practices as a single, unified system, rather than a piecemeal promotion.²⁸ This view changed

25 For these developments, see: S. Hazareesingh, *Interconnected Synchronicities: The Production of Bombay and Glasgow as Modern Global Ports, c. 1850–1880*, in: *Journal of Global History*, 1 (2009) 4, pp. 7–31.

26 "Queries for Answers," *Fort William*, May 19, no. 5. Govt. Dept. (1834), ISRD, GC, IOR, BL.

27 Separate Department letter to the Court of Directors of the East India Company, July 25 (1834), ISRD, GC, IOR, BL.

28 "Note prepared by the Secretary to Government in the General Department," April 25 (1834), ISRD, GC, IOR, BL.

Bombay's position from a port within a system of ports connected through their trading patterns to a port controlled by a territorial power with an interest in its activities. Its practices no longer needed to be connected to practices in "foreign" ports, such as Canton or Singapore, but rather to other "Indian" ports. Therefore, while merchants in Bombay still saw Bombay as a port connected to its trading networks, the government began to see it as part of a territorial system that required uniform management. The framework for comparative policies shifted, leaving a territorial rather than a networked understanding of the positionality of Bombay's port.

Regardless of this decision to not turn Bombay into a free port, by the 1850s, Bombay had become an entrepôt for the export of opium to China, and by the 1860s a major cotton exporter, despite not having ever been a "free port." Bombay's first cotton mills were established by local entrepreneurs, many of whom were Parsis, using the proceeds of this trade. In the 1860s, private development of the harbour resulted in competing port facilities that dominated the foreshore. By the 1870s, the Bombay Port Trust was established, which eventually took over all of these facilities. Bombay's trade was finally controlled under a single authority, which favoured facilities for steamships, increasingly in use by British merchants by the 1870s, over the sails used by Indians. The port's infrastructure reinforced desired, imperial trade routes.²⁹

Today, the Bombay Port Trust is the largest landholder in the city, occupying approximately the same 1,800 acres it gained in the 1870s and 1880s.³⁰ It is still run by the central government as a trust. The central government, therefore, owns most of the harbour and is the largest landholder in Mumbai today. The city is managed by various subnational State³¹ institutions, leading to regular conflict with the port, i.e. central government, over the role that the port and sea-based trade should play in the city's economy.

3. A New Port, City, and Zone for Bombay

In the following, I outline how, following independence (1947), Bombay's elite and local government sought to deal with the legacy of having once been an important port city for the British Empire, which includes changing the spatial dynamics of the port in the city, but also repositioning the city in external trade networks, even under import substitution. Since independence, managing the port and industry's negative impacts on the city's space – but maintaining the port's necessary functions for Bombay and India's economy – have been key debates. These debates on how to rein in the negative effects of the port's centrality but profit from its connectivity have been connected to larger issues regarding urbanization and industrialization.

29 For details on these developments, see: Hazareesingh, *Interconnected Synchronicities* (fn. 25).

30 D. D'Monte, *Old Port Trust, Lands on the Dock*, in: *Mumbai Reader '08*, Mumbai 2009, pp. 204–209, pp. 204–205.

31 A capitalized "State" is used to refer to a subnational state rather than the state of India.

3.1 Bombay in Independent India

Bombay's port faced a number of challenges in the decades following independence. Its trade continued to flourish, and under import substitution, goods were produced in India for the domestic market. However, manufacturing inputs and machinery needed to be procured from abroad for such production. Dealing with the congestion of both the port and the city were part of key issues – including industrialization, population growth, and resulting urban planning – facing India, Bombay State (after 1960, Maharashtra State), and its capital, Bombay.

As early as the 1920s and 1930s, international organizations identified population growth in what would soon be known as “third world” countries as a potential cause for concern,³² and for planners in India, this demographic trend was seen as a challenge to overcome nationwide.³³ Following independence, the central government did not focus on urban planning, as only 16.8 per cent of India's population lived in urban areas by 1951; rather, industrialization informed urban planning.³⁴ Industries were lured away from urban centres to balance population growth and decongest urban centres developed during the British Empire, which was also meant to bring jobs to where most Indians lived, the countryside. By the 1960s and the 1970s, populations in major cities like New Delhi, Bombay, Calcutta, and Madras were growing at an annual rate of 3.3 per cent. City planning slowly became a priority of the central government as part of its demographic policy, but it was largely driven by the subnational States in which these cities were located.³⁵ By 1961, while only 17.8 per cent of Indians lived in urban spaces, 28.2 per cent of Maharashtrians did.³⁶ These numbers grew steadily: by 2001, while 27.8 per cent of Indians lived in urban areas, 42.4 per cent of Maharashtra's population was urban.³⁷ There was, therefore, significant pressure on the State of Maharashtra to create a plan to deal with urbanization, long before it became a national priority. Some of the difficulties faced in the city stemmed from the very fact that it had been so central to the British Empire, and it subsequently became independent India's prime business city.

The Bombay Plan was written in 1944 by leading Indian industrialists. This plan outlined the corporate sector's vision of independent India's business environment. It was an unsuccessful attempt to create a strategic partnership between the state and Indian business houses.³⁸ However, Bombay's business elite, including the authors of the report, influenced later developments in Bombay and the State of Maharashtra, even if their

32 A. Bashford, Population, Geopolitics and International Organizations in the Mid Twentieth Century, in: *Journal of World History*, 19 (2008) 3, pp. 327–347.

33 C.R. Unger, Towards Global Equilibrium: American Foundations and Indian Modernization, 1950s to 1970s, in: *Journal of Global History*, 6 (2011) 1, pp. 121–142, pp. 137–140.

34 C.R. Unger, *Entwicklungspfade in Indien: Eine internationale Geschichte, 1947–1980*, Göttingen 2015, p. 211. See especially section three, Industrialization and Urbanization, pp. 152–274.

35 *Ibid.*, p. 211.

36 Maharashtra is the subnational state in which Bombay is located.

37 Planning Commission, Government of India, *Maharashtra Development Report*, New Delhi 2007, p. 321.

38 M. Kudaisya, The Promise of Partnership: Indian Business, the State, and the Bombay Plan of 1944, in: *Business History Review*, 88 (2014) 1, pp. 97–131.

direct influence was not sought by the central government. The State of Maharashtra was the first subnational State in India to set up its own agencies and legislation to deal with urbanization and to increase industrialization.³⁹ The State (then Bombay State, comprising today's Gujarat and Maharashtra) held a Maharashtra Commercial and Industrial Conference in 1956 to solicit views from business interests on the State's economic problems; this conference later became a regular fixture, constituting the Maharashtra Economic Development Council (MEDC) in 1957, which was a forum for business chambers throughout the State, including the Bombay Chamber of Commerce and Industry, as well as the Indian Merchant's Chamber, one of the key institutions behind the Bombay Plan.⁴⁰ By 1978, the MEDC comprised 33 constituent members, including national associations for specific sectors, and over 300 associate members representing national and local businesses,⁴¹ some of which were subsidiaries of foreign firms.⁴² Shortly after founding the MEDC, the State set up a Board of Industrial Development in 1960, which eventually became the Maharashtra Industrial Development Corporation (MIDC) in 1962 through the Maharashtra Industrial Act.⁴³ These agencies promoted business interests and industrialization for Maharashtra.

While urbanization and industrialization became political priorities of the State in the decades following independence, the central government also began looking for ways to ease congestion at Bombay's port, which was and continues to be owned by the central government. The port trust operates independently and is financed by its own services but falls under the authority of the ministry of transport and is subject to the Port Trust Act (1873, 1879, and 1963). Bombay's port continued to be both a commercial port and a naval port, a legacy of its key role in British shipping and naval activities. By the 1950s, the Bombay Port Trust was the largest employer in the city and, even today, continues to be the city's largest landowner, as aforementioned.⁴⁴ The Mumbai Port Trust (as it is currently known) presently employs over 30,000 workers; about 80 per cent of its revenue is spent on wages.⁴⁵ The port's sheer magnitude leads to tensions: it is run by the central government but clearly plays a key role in the dynamics of public space and employment in Mumbai, a city managed by multiple subnational State agencies. Its trade is a national priority, but locals may profit from its trade they may also be hindered by the port's presence, congestion, and dominance of the foreshore.

By the 1940s, city planners in Bombay were concerned about overcrowding in the city, and sought solutions to create a counter-magnet that would attract new arrivals away

39 A. Shaw, *The Making of Navi Mumbai*, New Delhi 2004, p. 61.

40 Maharashtra Economic Development Council (MEDC), MEDC: 1957–1977, Bombay (1978), p. 1, General Reference Collection (GRC), BL.

41 Some firms operated nationwide and were headquartered in other cities and/or in Bombay.

42 MEDC, MEDC: 1957–1977 (fn. 40), pp. 10–18.

43 "About Us. History," Maharashtra Industrial Development Corporation website, <http://www.midcindia.org/about-midc> (accessed 22 December 2017).

44 D. D'Monte, *Ripping the Fabric: The Decline of Mumbai and its Mills*, New Delhi 2002, p. 236.

45 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, OECD, *The Competitiveness of Global Port-Cities*, s.l. 2014, p. 237; *Ibid.* (fn. 44), p. 241.

from Bombay and potentially also serve as a new home for many already living in the city. Because of Bombay's geography and historical development, based on the colonial city centre adjacent to the port, the southernmost part of the island served as the business centre. Every workday, people travelled from the north of the city to the south, and then returned to the north again, leading to severe congestion (this is still the case). Many of the State's industrial areas were located within the city, causing further congestion. The city and port's spatiality heavily reflected the imbalance of imperialism, which prioritized trade and defence.

3.2 Expanding Bombay Port

In 1946, the Grace Committee was appointed to reorganize the navy's only dockyard at Bombay's port and discuss the future direction of the Indian navy after independence. In 1947, the committee's report concluded that expansion of the navy's facilities at the current site was not possible, since it was restricted by a built-up city and the commercial traffic at the port. The committee suggested shifting the navy out of Bombay's port to the mainland side of Bombay's harbour (Thane Creek) at Nhava Sheva.⁴⁶ This recommendation was not followed because the site selected, though ideal for a deepwater port, was completely undeveloped: there was no electricity, no running water, no railroad, and no roads connected to the site. The navy stayed at their present location and sought to reclaim land instead, but the idea of shifting port facilities to Nhava Sheva remained in the minds of the Bombay Port Trust, which ran the commercial side of the port. Nhava Sheva and the surrounding area of Bombay's eastern-mainland side of the harbour became the focus of the State of Maharashtra's efforts to decongest Bombay's population, industry, and port, all legacies of having been an imperial port city. By the early 1950s, the government of India believed that the present site of the port had been exhausted. There were draft limitations, not to mention congestion facing the port within the harbour, and on the mainland, rail and road connections to the port. In 1964, the Bombay Port Trust master plan, undertaken by the consultants Bertlin & Partners, UK, proposed extending the port's facilities to Nhava Sheva.⁴⁷ This extension to the mainland coincided with the identification of the mainland side of Bombay's harbour as a site for a future satellite city for Bombay. The planned port at Nhava Sheva set the terms of the agreement for the location of the new satellite city.⁴⁸

46 G.M. Hiranandani, *Transition to Eminence: The Indian Navy 1976–1990*, New Delhi 2005, p. 135.

47 Ministry of Shipping and Transport, Government of India, 1969–1970, Annual Report, 42–43, Annual Reports (AR), India Office Records (IOD), Central Secretariat Library (CSL); World Bank, Project Completion Report, India. Nhava Sheva Port Project. Report Number 12189, July 14 (1993), p. 1, http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/1993/07/14/000009265_3960925200204/Rendered/PDF/multi_page.pdf (accessed 22 December 2017); and Ministry of Shipping and Transport, Government of India, 1968–1969, Annual Report, p. 35, AR, IOD, CSL.

48 R. Mehrotra, *Twin City: Navi Mumbai Thirty Years Later*, in: *Mumbai Reader '07*, Mumbai 2008, pp. 118–129, p. 119.

The proposals from the 1960s echoed a 1945 post-war development-committee recommendation that areas on the mainland across Bombay's harbour be developed to curb the city's growth; just two years later, an unofficial report by N.V. Modak and Albert Meyer urged for a policy of "industrial dispersal" out of Bombay that would be supported by housing.⁴⁹ Both publications were influential in subsequent reports and legislation that sought to restrict industrial sites through land-use zoning (districting) policies. A 1965 publication by Bombay's leading architects, Charles Correa and Pravina Mehta, as well as the engineer Shirish Patel advocated a single urban area to be developed on the mainland connected across the harbour to Bombay.⁵⁰ This article in the journal *Modern Architects Research Group* became influential and secured the idea of a "twin city" for Bombay, as a solution for its congestion and overcrowding.⁵¹ This publication was endorsed by the MEDC, which formed a study council for the development of the mainland across the harbour the following year, and invited the authors of this plan to participate. Along with academics and industry representatives, the Bombay Port Trust also sent representatives to the meeting to consider the development of a town that elaborated on the *Modern Architects Research Group* publication and referred directly to the English *New Towns Act* of 1946.⁵²

At the 1964 meeting of the MEDC, a free trade zone to be developed by the government of Maharashtra was proposed for Nhava Sheva to complement the new city and the port-expansion scheme,⁵³ which would assist in "industrial dispersal," and the influx of foreign trade would help to establish the port. The fact that this zone was proposed by a business lobby for a State government is significant; while major ports like Bombay Port Trust and free trade zones fell under the authority of the central government through the ministry of transport and the ministry of commerce and industry, the government of Maharashtra along with private-business interests there sought to play a larger role in these policy areas by linking these policies to a subnational State policy: the creation of the New Bombay satellite town on the other side of Bombay's harbour. At first, this zone proposal was rather vague:

*The Govt. [of Maharashtra] should implement the proposals for formation of State ports and shipping committee... [and] should investigate the potentialities of creating a free trade zone round one of the ports.*⁵⁴

The minor and intermediate ports were under the authority of the State, rather than the central government's ministry of transport, but congestion was so severe at Bombay Port

49 A. Shaw, *Navi Mumbai* (fn. 39), p. 63.

50 C. Correa, P. Mehta, and S. Patel, *Planning for Bombay*, in: *MARG*, 18 (1965) 3, pp. 30–56, *Indian Merchants' Chamber (IMC)*.

51 A. Shaw, *Navi Mumbai* (fn. 39), pp. 66–67.

52 *Ibid.*, pp. 74–75.

53 MEDC, *MEDC: 1957–1977* (fn. 40) p. 46.

54 *Ibid.*

(a major, central-government port) that the State played an active role in pushing for the selection of a new site for port expansion at Nhava Sheva.

In 1965, the central government established a free trade zone at Kandla, a remote port in northwest India (Gujarat).⁵⁵ When the central government intimated that it had no additional plans for zones beyond Kandla, the MEDC changed its strategy:

*The Government [of Maharashtra] should establish an industrial estate in Maharashtra where goods could be imported under bonded warehouses, processed and reexported so as to avoid the usual formalities of import duties, excise duties, etc.*⁵⁶

Describing such a policy as a “bonded” industrial estate in the above quote was strategic: the central government sanctioned State governments to implement industrial estates,⁵⁷ though, in fact, bonded warehouses were generally located on central government port-trust land and were reviewed by the central government’s ministry of finance.⁵⁸ The proposed space could, therefore, be a zone, without officially being labelled a free trade zone: the central or State government could set up an industrial estate on port-trust land (Nhava Sheva) and also label it a bonded warehouse, thus creating a zone-estate hybrid that would be equivalent to a free trade zone and would likely cater to exporting Indian businesses rather than foreign firms. These industrialists were hoping to create such a loophole.

Unlike the export-processing zone, industrial estates were widely pursued by States within India, starting with an industrial estate in 1955 in Rajkot, Gujarat. Several industrial estates set up in the 1950s and early 1960s were joint projects including Indo-American, Indo-German, Indo-Japanese, and Indo-French centres.⁵⁹ By 1972, there were already 572 industrial estates approved, 427 of which had been built, and as many as 366 were already in operation all over India;⁶⁰ these estates could be sponsored by either the central government or States, and a small percentage of estates (2 per cent by 1970) were also private.⁶¹ Within India, the industrial-estate programme was widely used to encourage small businesses to manufacture for the domestic market.⁶² This tool referenced international standards for estates promoted by the United Nations Industrial Development

55 For Kandla Free Trade Zone, see: Maruschke, *Zones of Reterritorialization* (fn. 9); P. Neveling, *Structural Continuities and Untimely Coincidences in the Making of Neoliberal India: The Kandla Free Trade Zone, 1965–91*, *Contributions to Indian Sociology*, 48 (2014) 1, pp. 17–43.

56 MEDC, MEDC (fn 40), p. 68. Found in: *Summary of Reports of the Sectional Committees as Finally Adopted at the Maharashtra Commercial and Industrial Conference, 1964* (emphasis added).

57 P.C. Alexander, *Industrial Estates in India*, Small Industry Extension Training Institute, New York; Bombay 1963, p. 17.

58 Ministry of Finance, Department of Revenue, Government of India, *Report of the Customs Reorganisation Committee*, s.l. 1958, p. 69, AR, IOD, CSL.

59 A.S.E. Iyer, *Co-operation Between and Assistance to Small-Scale units in Industrial Estates in India*, in: *Industrial Estates in Asia and the Far East*, New York 1962.

60 Report of the Working Group on Financing of Industrial Estates, Bombay 1972.

61 United Nations Industrial Development Organization. *Guidelines for the Establishment of Industrial Estates in Developing Countries*. Vienna 1978, p. 21.

62 S. Deva, *Establishment of Industrial Estates in India*, in: *Journal of Administration Overseas*, 15 (1976) 3, pp. 150–159.

Organization and championed by the Stanford Research Institute in California, United States.⁶³ The industrial-estate programme, though carried out mainly by States, was a national strategy with the explicit purpose of enabling industries to move out of cities like Bombay and Calcutta (known as “industrial dispersal”), to remove the imbalanced concentration of industries that had developed out of colonial trade relations.⁶⁴ More broadly, the estate was part of independent India’s import-substitution policy, whereby production was aimed for the national rather than international market, the goal of which was to overcome the trade inequalities established by colonialism and entrenched in neocolonialism.

Through the planning of New Bombay and the Nhava Sheva port, New Bombay was extensively connected to districting development concepts, whereby decentralized residential nodes would be accompanied by industrial districts. Several industrial belts had been developed in the area by the MIDC as early as 1962, before development on the twin city began.⁶⁵ These areas were purchased by the parastatal agency, developed into plots with industrial sheds that were connected to power grids, water, etc., and were then leased to small-scale industries. These spaces were seen as serving a very local purpose of decongesting Bombay, while also creating jobs and promoting small-scale industrial production for the domestic market. They were, therefore, outlets for import substitution that simultaneously served as vehicles for local development. They operated within the domestic economy, not apart from it, and were oriented towards the even spatial distribution of domestic industrial growth. They were the impetus of the Indian import substitution drive.

In contrast, the free trade zone proposed for Nhava Sheva would serve a national purpose of generating foreign exchange through exports needed for domestic production to continue. Rather than focusing on internal connections, such a space of external articulation required, according to Indian officials, a remote location which served the purpose of shielding the new city from the externally oriented activities of the zone:

*A Free-Trade Zone should be created near a major port where ample facilities for ocean-going ships are available or can be created... It would be advantageous to the Free-Trade Zone to have such a natural boundary as would facilitate customs supervision, and thereby discourage the smuggling of goods into the country.*⁶⁶

The idea of creating a new space that would shield the area around the zone to prevent smuggling had already been fulfilled by Kandla’s port and its free trade zone. Bombay had been one of the first considerations for India’s first zone, but as this report indicates,

63 W. Bredo, *Industrial Estates: Tools for Industrialization*, International Industrial Development Centre, Stanford Research Institute, Glencoe, IL 1960.

64 United Nations Industrial Development Organization, *The Effectiveness of Industrial Estates in Developing Countries*, Vienna 1978, p. 57; P.C. Alexander, *Industrial Estates in India* (fn. 57), p. vii.

65 A. Shaw, *Navi Mumbai* (fn. 39), p. 117.

66 Maharashtra Economic Development Council, *Report on Free-Trade Zone in Maharashtra*, 1964 (reprint) 1970, p. 3, GRC, BL (emphasis my own).

the Free-Trade Zone Committee of the Board of Trade (ministry of commerce) found the idea of isolating any portion of Bombay's port "impossible," which is why the plan was shifted to Kandla's remote location.⁶⁷ In fact, Kandla's port was supported because of its potential to decongest Bombay's port.

The MEDC planners, Bombay's business elite, planned to turn Bombay port's woes – congestion – into a sign of its strength and importance to the Indian state. The fact that the port was so busy indicated that it should be expanded, and therefore, Bombay's population and industries should likewise follow the port across the harbour. The port-zone complex was considered an essential component of this strategy:

*All these views and ideas suggest the conclusion that the best remedy for relieving congestion in Bombay and accelerating industrialisation around Bombay is to explore the possibilities of creating a large new port near Bombay and establishing a Free-Trade Zone around such a new port. The satellite towns to be formed for relieving the congestion in Bombay should be, as the Industrial Location Panel has remarked, within a few hours' distance from the City of Bombay in order to enable industrialists and industries to maintain a close contact with the city. Such a port and Free-Trade Zone, in our view, can be created at Shewa-Neva (Sheva-Nhava) located only seven miles to the East of Bombay Harbour and situated on the Kolaba coast line of Thana Creek. This port could serve as a big import and export centre and would thereby reduce appreciably the pressure on Bombay harbor. Moreover, by virtue of its being a new port it would be free from the serious population and industrial concentration and, therefore, it would be ideal for creating a Free-Trade Zone.*⁶⁸

Bombay served a national function of connecting India to world trade and, therefore, needed to be decongested to continue serving India's industrialization drive. This report, while emphasizing the official policy of urban decongestion, acknowledged that dynamic places like Bombay were still central to Indian and local business interests. Bombay, more so than any other location within India, had the necessary skilled technicians, labourers, and entrepreneurs needed for a national export drive.⁶⁹ Promoting exports to the Western market was a key component in increasing India's foreign-exchange earnings, allowing Indian businesses to purchase the imported inputs needed for domestic production under import substitution.

MEDC planners situated Bombay as a port city of national importance, not only one that is externally connected. To do so, they referenced other important ports in the US:

Highly industrialised port-cities like New York, San Francisco, New Orleans, etc. have Free-Trade Zones which clearly suggests that it is always convenient to establish Free Tra-

67 Ibid., p. 4; see also Maruschke, *Zones of Reterritorialization* (fn. 9).

68 Maharashtra Economic Development Council, *Report on Free-Trade Zone* (fn. 66), p. 4.

69 Ibid., p. 5.

*de-Zones near industrial port towns, and that a Free-Trade Zone at Shewa-Neva which is in the proximity of Bombay City would be the ideal location.*⁷⁰

The Nhava Sheva port and free-trade-zone project enabled a natural boundary and isolation on the one hand, and connectedness on the other hand: access to markets such as West Asia (Middle East), North and East Africa, as well as Australia.⁷¹ The interplay between these two tendencies – isolation and connection – indicates a view that managing this space and the potentially connectedness it enabled was a national priority.⁷² The Indian Council of Foreign Trade concurred that Bombay's mainland contained the locational advantage for a zone: it was at once isolated and well-connected to port facilities.⁷³ Eventually the project for creating a free trade zone at Nhava Sheva was dropped and Bombay's zone was developed at Santacruz in 1973, near the airport on the island, rather than the mainland side or near the port.

3.3 A New Port City in Bombay's Harbour

Though the free-trade-zone project pursued by the State government in relation to New Bombay was dropped, the idea of a new port city was pursued further. In 1970, the State government accepted that Bombay's growth could be curbed by the proposed twin city and formed the City and Industrial Development Corporation of Maharashtra (CIDCO) to develop New Bombay. CIDCO is a limited public company listed under the Indian Company Act, which is wholly owned by the State.⁷⁴ CIDCO came up with a draft plan for the new city by 1973, which formed the basis for the city's development from the 1970s onwards. Having been developed mainly by this single parastatal agency, the new city's planning was relatively comprehensive.

The Bombay Port Trust was the main advocate of the plan to construct a satellite port on the mainland, to relieve traffic congestion at the present site. Still, in the mid 1970s, it appeared that the satellite port would be an extension of Bombay's port, rather than a separate institution, and the Bombay Port Trust was the body that moved to acquire the land at Nhava Sheva.⁷⁵ In 1973, Nhava Sheva and a port outside Calcutta, Haldia, were both selected by the ministry of transport to focus intensively on container traffic, specifically to overtake the container-handling abilities of Bombay's port.⁷⁶ By 1980 the Nhava Sheva project had only just started acquiring land, constructing the site, and receiving the necessary financing; at this point, congestion was so severe at Bombay's port that the ministry of shipping reported times when there were more than 30 ships waiting

70 Ibid., p. 5.

71 Ibid., p. 6.

72 Maruschke, *Zones of Reterritorialization* (fn. 9).

73 Report on Free-Trade Zone (fn. 66), p. 5.

74 A. Shaw, *Navi Mumbai* (fn. 39), p. 83.

75 Ministry of Shipping and Transport, Government of India, 1971–1972, Annual Report, pp. 45–46, AR, IOD, CSL; Ministry of Shipping and Transport, Government of India, 1974–1975, Annual Report, p. 39, AR, IOD, CSL.

76 Ministry of Shipping and Transport, Government of India, 1972–1973, Annual Report, p. 46, AR, IOD, CSL.

approximately one and a half months to berth at the port.⁷⁷ Though Nhava Sheva had been planned for container traffic, by 1980, the Bombay Port Trust moved to acquire additional equipment to facilitate the growth in container traffic, by which point in time Nhava Sheva became a separate port project, rather than connected to Bombay Port Trust management.⁷⁸

A clean break with old institutions influenced the development of the new port. By the 1980s, the funding and construction of Nhava Sheva was under way as a separate port, as it was recorded in ministry of shipping documents under its own section, rather than under the Bombay Port Trust.⁷⁹ According to the World Bank project completion report, Kandla and Bombay's ports were other financiers of the project, along with the central government.⁸⁰ It was also financed by loans from the World Bank, the government of the Netherlands, and the Saudi Fund for Development.⁸¹ All three provided consulting in relation to the port project. When the port opened in 1989, it was named Jawaharlal Nehru Port Trust after India's first prime minister. The name suits it: the port is nationally important in that currently almost 60 per cent of India's entire container traffic is routed through the port.⁸² It is specifically heralded as India's port of global and national importance, and in current national infrastructure drives, Narendra Modi, India's current prime minister, has given speeches to open new facilities there. Despite the new name, it is still colloquially referred to by locals as well as shippers and logistics firms as Nhava Sheva.

Today, the two trusts are both owned by the central government and were meant to be complementary. Mumbai's port was meant to focus on break-bulk cargo and petroleum, oil, and lubricants, while the Jawaharlal Nehru port would cover container traffic. Major foreign shipping companies that had frequented Mumbai's port switched their services to the Jawaharlal Nehru port during the 1990s, including Maersk, American President Lines, SeaLand, and P&O, which costed Mumbai Port Trust, according to a prominent local journalist, INR 10 million revenue per day.⁸³ Instead of dying a "natural death," as many city planners and activists in Mumbai would have liked, Mumbai's port has continued to seek new deals to expand its capacity to challenge the Jawaharlal Nehru port.⁸⁴ Mumbai's port is extending its facilities to include an offshore berth to handle container traffic, while the Jawaharlal Nehru port now has a liquid-cargo terminal and is in the

77 Ministry of Shipping and Transport, Government of India, 1980–1981, Annual Report, p. 23, AR, IOD, CSL.

78 Ibid., p. 27.

79 Ministry of Shipping and Transport, Government of India, 1984–1985, Annual Report, p. 33, AR, IOD, CSL.

80 World Bank, Project Completion Report (fn. 47), p. 20.

81 Listed here as the Saudi Fund Development Authority: Ministry of Surface Transport, Government of India, 1988–1989, Annual Report, p. 58, AR, IOD, CSL.

82 U.R. Patel and S. Bhattacharya, *Infrastructure in India: The Economics of Transition from Public to Private Provision*, in: *Journal of Comparative Economics*, 38 (2010) 1, pp. 52–70, p. 64.

83 D'Monte, *Ripping the Fabric* (fn. 44), p. 239. One crore equals ten million.

84 *Conflicting Signals*, *Financial Express*, February 8, 1998, in: D'Monte, *Ripping the Fabric* (fn. 44), p. 240.

process of adding special facilities for chemicals.⁸⁵ This complete separation in operations accounts for a significant deal of competition between the ports for carriers, which partly shapes how the ports operate today. Furthermore, while Mumbai's port is one of Mumbai's key institutions, city and State officials have little capacity to rein it in.

4. Conclusion

What we see both in the 1830s and in the post-independence period, indicates that actors on various scales situated Bombay's port as part of larger political projects. The relative strength of Bombay's port could enhance the state or empire, but it could also potentially detract from both by undermining trade controls. Various actors – merchants, business houses, associations, industrialists, and State government institutions – have planned how this port connects abroad, by focusing on building specific infrastructure necessary for certain types of trade, such as steamships and, later, containers. Furthermore, they sought to mitigate the effects of this connectedness. Following major shifts in the state and global economy in which this port is embedded, its facilities needed reworking to stay relevant and to mitigate the local effects of long-term connectedness. Indeed, the post-independence debates, though focused also on increasing trade and the port's relevance, also sought to deal with the consequences of having been nationally important for India's external trade, which, contradicting key elements of import substitution, was also necessary to enable production for the domestic economy. Siting a zone at a new port was intended to increase foreign trade, thereby creating a draw away from Bombay's port and city to decongest both. Therefore, creating a site of enhanced external connectedness, rather than “unbundling” that site from the state, can also be part of a plan to evenly develop state space, thereby serving a dual globalizing and territorializing function.

Portals of globalization as a research lens allows us to see how actors seek to manage global trading networks and produce regional or imperial connectivity by building up institutions and creating the physical and legal infrastructure for such a place. In contrast to the view that these places of intense transregional connectivity represent an “unbundling” of this place from the nation state, this article sought to demonstrate how, in fact, actors try to rearticulate their positionality and connectedness in a variety of overlapping spatial frameworks. These actors also seek to reposition themselves in a world order that is not always in reference to generating actual connectedness in terms of trade or other “flows.” These goals may refer to cultural or social constructs of great cities, ports, etc., which require benchmarks but do not try to manage globalization processes themselves. Furthermore, this fixation with creating or maintaining the functionality of key nodes through which actors manage “flows” of goods, capital, and people is to some extent

85 Port Details, Jawaharlal Nehru Port Trust website, http://www.jnport.gov.in/port_details.aspx (accessed 22 December 2017).

also driven by the remembrance and articulation of past experiences of having once been “global,” but also by the repercussions of past “globality.”⁸⁶ Once Bombay became an important port city for British India, what happens when such a system collapses? Therefore, there is also a drive to maintain important functions and deal with transitions to new spatial orders.

86 M. Middell, *Erinnerung an die Globalisierung? Eine ganz vorläufige Skizze zu den Portalen der Globalisierung als lieux de mémoire*, in: K. Buchinger, C. Gantet and J. Vogel (eds.), *Europäische Erinnerungsräume*, Frankfurt am Main 2008, pp. 296–308; A. Mah, *Port Cities and Global Legacies: Urban Identity, Waterfront Work, and Radicalism*, Basingstoke 2014.