

Brazilian Development Cooperation and Portals of Globalization

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ABSTRACTS

This article addresses portals of globalization within the framework of Brazilian development cooperation, which serves as an engine to increase Brazil's economic and political influence in other parts of the former Portuguese empire. The text employs the concept of portals of globalization as places where cultural transfers and technology exchange occur by looking at the increased production of export goods. Development cooperation projects embody such places of transfers and exchange between the state actors directing them, while boundaries become blurred between what 'local' and 'foreign' elements are in projects' construction and practice. The case study drawn upon is that of Brazil-Mozambique development relations in the public health sector in Mozambique, as a case of South-South cooperation.

Dieser Artikel analysiert Portale der Globalisierung im Rahmen der brasilianischen Entwicklungszusammenarbeit, die Brasiliens wirtschaftlichen und politischen Einfluss in anderen Teilen des ehemaligen portugiesischen Kolonialgebiets steigern sollen. Portale der Globalisierung werden hier als Orte verstanden, an denen Kulturtransfers und Technologieaustausch stattfinden, um vor allem die Produktion von Exportgütern zu erhöhen. Projekte der Entwicklungszusammenarbeit zwischen staatlichen Akteuren werden als solche Orte des Transfers und Austauschs verstanden. Dabei wird deutlich, dass sowohl bei der Konzeption als auch bei der Umsetzung der Kooperationsprojekte die Grenzen zwischen dem "Lokalen" und "Fremden" immer wieder verschwimmen. Die Fallstudie untersucht brasilianisch-mosambikanische Entwicklungsbeziehungen im Bereich des öffentlichen Gesundheitswesens in Mosambik als Beispiel einer Süd-Süd-Kooperation.

1. Introduction

Besides contemporary economic and political aspirations, Brazil and Mozambique share a former colonizer, an official language, and commerce links stemming from the Atlantic slave trade. Government representatives from both sides have habitually used these elements to justify the pursuit of ambitious development cooperation projects between the two former Portuguese colonies and members of the Global South. However, their limited economic resources, recurring social problems, and changes in political agendas under new administrations have made the follow-up of concrete projects a challenge in their cooperation. This article focuses on the discourses, motivations, and obstacles that may shape the process of establishing such projects and, eventually, their function as portals of globalization.

The Mozambican state has been very welcoming and willing to implement international cooperation projects, which has made it a favourite among many foreign donors, including Brazilians, according to a former director of the Brazilian Cooperation Agency (Agência Brasileira de Cooperação, ABC).¹ The official discourse he espoused in 2014 promotes the Mozambican state as the biggest recipient of training and technology transfers from the Brazilian state over the past several years. ABC, established in 1987 as a wing of the Brazilian ministry of foreign affairs (more commonly known as Itamaraty), is tasked with coordinating technical cooperation, with the logistical help of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). Since Brazilian diplomats and other government officials tend to discursively reject the term ‘aid’ in favour of ‘cooperation’ (although this definition can be contested), I refer here to Brazil’s projects as ‘development cooperation’.

One of the obstacles concerning Brazilian-Mozambican development cooperation is precisely the lack of official information about these efforts, which have only over the past decade begun to be assessed in integrated financial reports by Brazilian government agencies.² Considering this, I conducted interviews and archival research in Brazil and Mozambique to piece together the project case study, as well as the framework of the two states’ development cooperation, for this article and my doctoral dissertation. In the main part of this article, I will investigate specific aspects of Brazilian development cooperation, past and present, and locate the concept of portals of globalization within it.³ These portals are not only the concrete sites where this cooperation plays out, but are also analysed here as articulations of an emerging South-South or lusophone development project. This approach is complemented by that of cultural transfers, as suggested

1 Interview with ABC’s director, Ambassador Fernando Marroni de Abreu, on 10 March 2014 in Brasília, Brazil.

2 The first of such reports was *Cooperação Brasileira para o Desenvolvimento Internacional 2005-2009*, Brasília: AE/PR, Ipea, MRE, ABC, 2010, http://www.ipea.gov.br/portal/images/stories/PDFs/Book_Cooperacao_Brasileira.pdf (accessed 12 March 2014).

3 M. Middell and K. Naumann, *Global History and the Spatial Turn: From the Impact of Area Studies to the Study of Critical Junctures of Globalization*, in: *Journal of Global History*, 5 (2010), p.162.

by Matthias Middell and Katja Naumann, to get a closer look at the concrete actors and institutions that establish and manage such portals.⁴

In the words of historian Michel Espagne, 'Research on transfers sets out to examine new possibilities for escaping cultural history's national framework by studying in a quasi micro-historical fashion the process through which an object is translated from its context of emergence into a new context of reception.'⁵ The 'portal' aspect represents the sites where interactions and exchanges occur relevant to this case study, and the transfer aspect represents how the product of such interactions and exchanges moves between locations (or cultural, political, and economic contexts). Especially relevant to the 'portals' concept, Espagne has further stated, 'Whatever the way in which one defines the context of reception or departure, one must treat these contexts during the transfer process as stable unities, between which the transfer unfolds.'⁶

After broader historical, discursive and theoretical explorations into Brazilian-Mozambican cooperation, this article turns to a medication factory, named the Mozambican Society of Medicines (Sociedade Moçambicana de Medicamentos, SMM), as an illustrative example of what can perhaps become a portal of globalization. Brazilian funds covered the factory's construction and equipment, while government agencies from both Brazil and Mozambique managed the project in its technical cooperation phase. Signed into agreement in 2003, the SMM's factory took ten years to start producing on-site. The factory, located in Matola, Mozambique, is the first publicly owned facility that produces antiretroviral drugs in Africa, and it is reportedly one of the costliest and most prominent cooperation projects Brazilian government agencies have managed so far. Objectives include selling the medications not only in Mozambique but also to neighbouring countries in Southern Africa, which has also been struggling with high rates of human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) infection.⁷

The function of the Oswaldo Cruz Foundation (also known as Fiocruz), Brazil's public medical research and innovation agency, has been to transfer technology and train Mozambican employees to produce antiretroviral drugs and other generic medications, so that the Mozambicans can take control of the factory's operation. The factory in Matola is modelled after the Farmanguinhos factory and laboratory in Rio de Janeiro, which produces the same medications. Mozambicans were invited to Farmanguinhos to experience the operation of the factory themselves, which they, according to a Fiocruz official, could then apply in their own factory.⁸ Here, there are two stable points, or 'portals',

4 Ibid.

5 M. Espagne, *Comparison and Transfer: A Question of Method*, in: M. Middell and L. Aulinas (eds.), *Transnational Challenges to National History Writing*, Basingstoke 2013, p. 11.

6 Ibid., p. 13.

7 A. Rossi, *Depois de 10 anos, fábrica de remédios contra Aids começa a produzir na África*. O Estado de S. Paulo, <http://www.estadao.com.br/noticias/cidades,depois-de-10-anos-fabrica-de-remedios-contra-aids-comeca-a-produzir-na-africa,1092215,0.htm> (accessed 2 November 2013).

8 *Fábrica em Moçambique não vai só empacotar anti-retrovirais*, Deutsche Welle, last modified 26 July 2012, <http://www.dw.de/f%C3%A1brica-em-mo%C3%A7ambique-n%C3%A3o-vai-s%C3%B3-empacotar-anti-retrovirais/a-16125078> (accessed 15 May 2013).

between which the product is being transferred: the factory in Brazil and the SMM's factory. However, their 'portal' functions still appear limited by political, bureaucratic, economic, and other obstacles surrounding cooperation between the two states. As the article progresses, the focus will be narrowed down to relevant processes and agents within the sphere of the SMM's factory.

Using an actor-based perspective – largely from the Brazilian side of the cooperative effort – and fieldwork, this article focuses on conditions around and within the factory project that qualify some political and material elements, as well as obstacles, transfers, exchanges, mediations, and regulations between the actors involved. The following two sections take a closer look at Brazilian development cooperation – which has discursively prioritized the so-called 'African Countries of Official Portuguese Language' (Países Africanos de Língua Oficial Portuguesa, PALOPs) – to integrate it with the concept of portals of globalization. The 'official Portuguese language' part of the acronym is an important designation because while Portuguese is the language of government and academia in those countries, many in the population do not consider it their first language. Still, Brazilian officials emphasize the shared language of their former colonizer as a major draw for cooperation in the PALOPs. In practical terms, development cooperation is riddled with organizational and financial issues in Brazil and the recipient countries, but the ambitious intentions of the countries' leaders, as well as key, costly projects like the SMM's factory, have so far been preserved. Their potential to become stable portals of globalization remains, provided that individual priorities, differences, political changes, and resource shortages are mitigated.

2. From Haphazard to Recognized: Brazil's Presence in Mozambique

Shortly after World War II, the widely promoted idea of modernization maintained that there were stages of development all countries went through before reaching the supposed ideal of industrialized Western countries, and that this could be reached by economically and politically 'modernizing' with outside help, with very little concern for the public or the environment in the recipient country.⁹ The Brazilian ruling elite was primarily concerned with maintaining close relations with developed states to fuel its rapid growth and achieve greater political autonomy, according to José Flávio Sombra Saraiva.¹⁰

Africa's (then) Portuguese colonies – Mozambique, Angola, Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, and São Tomé and Príncipe – held a subaltern position in the Brazilian discourse, which at times explicitly favoured Portugal (Brazil's erstwhile colonizer), celebrated colonialism itself, and even mentioned the desire to 'conquer' other places in the world in

9 J. Pieterse, *Trends in Development Theory*, in: *Development Theory*, London 2010.

10 J.F. Saraiva, *África Parceira Do Brasil Atlântico: Relações Internacionais Do Brasil e Da África No Início Do Século XXI*. Coleção Relações Internacionais, Belo Horizonte 2012.

conjunction with Portugal.¹¹ The year 1961, however, signalled major changes in the constructed lusophone, or Portuguese-influenced, political and social sphere. The liberation wars broke out in Africa then. In Brazil, new leaders came to the executive branch at the national level, from centre-left workers' parties. Regarding relations with Africa, they held similar stances to the Workers' Party (Partido dos Trabalhadores, PT), which would come to power 40 years later under Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva. Brazilian presidents and their circles in the early 1960s began to discursively challenge Brazil's close alignment with Portugal and colonialism, and turn to their advantage a narrative of colonial-derived lusophone affinities used to justify Portuguese dominance in the colonies.¹²

Brazilian agencies came to portray themselves as offering an alternative to trade and aid given by the powers that had kept the African countries in dependency – a feature of the Brazilian development discourse that has lasted to this day.¹³ Over time, the Mozambican state would turn to Brazil for aid to build public institutions affected both by wars and dependent development. As the Non-Aligned Movement and African liberation movements got under way, Marxist and Weberian-inspired strands of dependency theory caught on as a challenge to the modernization paradigm, influencing – and majorly influenced by – Brazilian and other Latin American intellectuals.¹⁴ Eventually, dependency would be incorporated into international development discourse, without dismantling the core of modernization theory.¹⁵

Activities labelled 'technical cooperation' can be found in Brazilian diplomatic documents from the 1980s, many of them focusing on providing training to Mozambicans on coal mining.¹⁶ The concept of technical cooperation gradually came to be narrowed down to training and technology transfer, without stated commercial ends by Brazilian agencies, although projects could have mixed components – such as the SMM's factory, as will be discussed in more detail later.

11 From research I conducted at Fundação Getúlio Vargas (FGV) archives in Rio de Janeiro, March 2013, i.e.: N. Lima. *Documentos Contendo Entrevistas, Discursos e Mensagens de Negrão de Lima Incentivando e Comentando as Relações Luso-brasileiras*. Lisboa e Rio de Janeiro. FGV/CPDOC. NL ad po 1959.12.04.

12 On the lusophone affinities narrative: lusotropicalism, Gilberto Freyre's theory that Portuguese colonizers had created a harmonious, transcontinental community through sexual intermingling and Christianization, left an indelible mark on Portuguese and Brazilian discourses, and even self-imagination. See G. Freyre, *O Luso e o Trópico: Sugestões Em Torno Dos Métodos Portugueses de Integração de Povos Autóctones e de Culturas Diferentes Da Europeia Num Complexo Novo de Civilização: O Luso-tropical*, Lisbon, Comissão Executiva das Comemorações do V Centenário da Morte do Infante D. Henrique, 1961.

13 From FGV archival research in Rio de Janeiro, March 2013, see J.S. Pereira. *A Economia Do Colonialismo e Da Independência; Palestra Conferida No Curso de 'Introdução à Realidade Africana', Promovido Pelo Instituto Brasileiro de Estudos Afro-Asiáticos*. FGV/CPDOC. JSP pi td Pereira, J.S. 1962.03.03. See also P. Alberto, *Terms of Inclusion: Black Intellectuals in Twentieth-century Brazil*, Chapel Hill 2011, and F. Alvaro da Costa, *Documentos Da Política Externa Independente*, Vol. 1, Fundação Alexandre Gusmão, 2007.

14 A famous book adapting dependency theory to the specific case of Latin America, as opposed to a blanket assessment, was co-authored by Fernando Henrique Cardoso, who would later become president of Brazil. See F.H. Cardoso and E. Faletto, *Dependency and Development in Latin America*, Berkeley 1979.

15 Pieterse (fn. 9), p. 26.

16 Antecedentes Section - 64.VIII.07.02 Maço III, Box 691 – Moçambique Carvão – CT; Moçambique. Arquivo Histórico do Itamaraty, Brasília 1989.

Revolutionaries from the Mozambique Liberation Front (Frente de Libertação de Moçambique, Frelimo) had come to power after the 1974 fall of Portugal's authoritarian regime and the independence of its remaining colonies in Africa and Asia, which prompted much of the Portuguese elite to flee the new state.¹⁷ While discursively promoting a socialist model for state-building (and attempting to dismantle the colonial state apparatus), Frelimo employed dependency theory to explain poverty in the country, as Sérgio Chichava describes:

*In this epoch, the poverty that afflicted Mozambicans was seen as a direct consequence of Portuguese colonialism, whose policy involved not only enriching Portugal at the expense of Mozambican sweat but also maintaining Mozambicans in perpetual dependency of metropolitan benevolence, without local rural and industrial development... Portugal's interest was to pillage Mozambique... and maintain its people in ignorance. Besides, Frelimo contended... there had been much sabotage and anarchy by the colonialists, who had transformed an already lagging economy into complete chaos.*¹⁸

As in Brazil, Mozambique still adopted Portuguese as its official language, and it resumed relations with the former colonizer not long after independence, as it sought diverse sources of financing for its reconstruction and industrialization projects. Today, Mozambique is a member of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and of the lusophone, anglophone, and francophone 'commonwealths' (the latter as an observer). As both an Indian Ocean and sub-Saharan African country, Mozambique has held a strategic position in terms of trade and politics, becoming one of the frontline actors in the liberation and anti-apartheid struggles of the twentieth century. It is a foreign investment and aid magnet, as well as a highly aid-dependent country. Like fellow former Portuguese colonies and others in Africa, the Mozambican state engaged in a socialist project that collapsed amid aggressions by neighbours, the collapse of the Soviet Union (a major aid donor), and mandated neo-liberal structural adjustments. Former colonial relationships progressed into relationships with foreign investors and a greater selection of aid donors, breeding a new cycle of dependency in Mozambique and various other African states. Brazilian government officials have since habitually espoused the rhetoric of owing a historical debt because of the forced labour of millions of Africans in households and on fields in colonial and imperial-era Brazil – a debt to be repaid by providing development aid, or 'cooperation'.¹⁹

The role of former colonizers as development aid donors is well known, but the role of Brazil and other former colonies as such is increasingly capturing the imagination of researchers from various fields. As in the discourse from fellow states of the constructed Global South, Brazilian officials like to differentiate their country's provision of develop-

17 T. Henriksen, Marxism and Mozambique, in: *African Affairs*, 77 (1978) 309, pp. 441–462.

18 My translation from: S. Chichava, 'Por que Moçambique é pobre?' Uma análise do discurso de Armando Guebuza sobre a pobreza. Conference Paper Nº19. II Conferência IESE "Dinâmicas da Pobreza e Padrões de Acumulação Económica em Moçambique", Maputo, Instituto de Estudos Sociais e Económicos (IESE), 2009. p. 6.

19 J.F. Saraiva (fn. 10).

ment cooperation from that of North-South aid, using points such as non-interference in recipients' internal affairs, a lack of conditions, and projects that are driven by demand on the recipients' side.²⁰

The governments of so-called emerging powers, such as China and Russia – and even those of socialist countries not considered major world powers or traditional donors – provided supplies to the government in Mozambique and other African countries amid liberation-related struggles for years. The Brazilian government, too, began to engage, to a smaller extent, in the provision of development aid in the 1960s and 1970s. In this period, a push from the executive and diplomatic realms of the state for Brazil's greater economic and political projection led to dedicated (though haphazard) efforts in Africa, under both Brazil's centre-leftist and subsequent right-wing military administrations.²¹ Even before Mozambique was independent, the Brazilian state established a diplomatic mission there; it received inquiries in the 1970s, largely related to industrial-level cooperation and capacity-building, and actively promoted Brazilian trade and cultural products, while keeping a close watch on foreign competition, according to Brazilian diplomatic dispatches from the period.²² Thus, despite oscillations in projects and priorities during governmental changes, the two states engaged in cooperation before Mozambique's statehood and subsequent neo-liberalization, and Brazil's consecration as a development donor through the ABC agency, following the fall of military rule in the mid-1980s. Over the past decade, international organizations and academics have recognized Brazil and other states as 'emerging' donors, welcoming their efforts as a complement or even foil to the aid of developed countries from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).²³

From an international relations point of view, political scientists were characterizing the country – during the Workers' Party's rule in Brazil (2003–16) – as a reliable, modern democracy of diplomatic and entrepreneurial finesse, and a leading BRICS member (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa).²⁴ Intertwined with this discourse is Brazil's status in-between a developing and developed country, an aid recipient and a donor, and a conflict mediator who is able to consort with diverse regimes and to respect their

20 This was a consistent discourse in interviews I conducted with Brazilian diplomats in Maputo during February 2012 and during February and March 2014 in Brasília.

21 For accounts of such diplomatic efforts before the much-reported Lula era, see J. Dávila, *Hotel Troipico: Brazil and the Challenge of African Decolonization, 1950–1980*, Durham, NC 2010.

22 From fieldwork I conducted at the Itamaraty Historical Archives, Brasília, February to March 2014. See Lourenço Marques C B Ofícios 72 01, and Lourenço Marques Ofícios C B 73 01/02/03.

23 African Economic Outlook, Africa and Its Emerging Partners. OECD, UNDP, AfDB, EU, Economic Commission for Africa, Development Centre. 2011; P. Kragelund, The Potential Role of Non-Traditional Donors' Aid in Africa, in: ICTSD Series on Trade-Supported Strategies for Sustainable Development: International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development, 2010, and H. Reisen, Emerging Partners: Anything but "Rogue Aid." Shifting Wealth: Helmut Reisen's blog, 2011, <http://shiftingwealth.blogspot.com/2011/05/emerging-partners-anything-but-rogue.html> (accessed 2 November 2013).

24 The original BRIC countries, from a term coined by Jim O'Neill of Goldman Sachs in 2001, are Brazil, Russia, China, and India. O'Neill predicted their rapid economic growth and thus international weight would change the world's investment landscape. As an example of the mentioned views on Brazil in particular, see S. Burges and L. Armijo, Brazil, the Entrepreneurial and Democratic BRIC, in: *Polity*, 42 (2010) 1.

sovereignty.²⁵ Nevertheless, a comprehensive Brazilian strategy for foreign policy – a *livro branco* (white paper) – was still in the works as of the end of 2017. A forum on Brazilian foreign policy had taken place during March 2014, including themes like “cooperation” and “Africa,” but the process may have been put on hold given Brazil’s deep economic and political crises that have unfolded since then.²⁶ In February 2012, the interim Brazilian ambassador to Mozambique still described Brazil as a ‘new’ society (in its present democratic form), reacting on an ad hoc basis as interests and problems emerge, despite acting in various international areas. He said Brazil ‘is still constructing something that at some point can be a proactive strategy, as experience accumulates regarding the consequences of our position in the world ... We should not overestimate the capacity of planning of the Brazilian government and our diplomacy. We may be very good at what we do, but there is not always global planning behind it.’²⁷ The image that contemporary Brazilian leaders project is one of a country willing and able to impart to African countries experiences and models deemed successful in combating similar development challenges in Brazil. It is the image of Brazil as a teacher – a good but imperfect teacher – more so than as an equal partner, one whose discourse rejects imperialist aspirations, shows respect for its recipients’ sovereignty, and values their potential. Former President Lula da Silva – who served between 2003–2010 and has been widely credited with advancing Brazilian-African relations – has stated that:

*this relationship that Brazil intends to maintain with the countries of Africa is not a relationship of an imperialistic country with a vocation for hegemony. We are already tired, we have already been colonized, we have already liberated ourselves from hegemony. Now, we want partnerships, we want comradeship, we want to work arm in arm for the construction of equitable international politics.*²⁸

However, the idea that South America’s biggest state and regional leader has a solely anti-hegemonic demeanour is not unanimously accepted: one example relates to its immediate region, as the Brazilian state has been accused of acting against the interests of states in the Southern Common Market (Mercado Comum do Sul, Mercosul), the trade bloc it is part of, and on behalf of its own capital expansion; another example concerns implementing major extractive projects in Mozambique that could affect locals negatively, without giving them all the facts or a say in the process.²⁹ Meanwhile, former

25 The ‘middle power’ discourse was evident in interviews I conducted with Brazilian diplomats Nei Bitencourt, João Marcelo Pires, and Jandyr Santos in Maputo on 15–18 February 2012. As examples of academic sources, see C. Vidigal, *Brasil: potência cordial? A diplomacia brasileira no início do século XXI*, in: RECIS, 4 (2010) 1, pp. 36–45, and P. Kragelund (fn. 23).

26 R. Ferraço, *Livro Branco da política externa brasileira*, *Diário do poder* <http://www.diariodopoder.com.br/artigo.php?i=19580874056> (accessed 18 December 2017).

27 My translation from an interview I conducted in Maputo on 18 February 2012 with Ambassador Nei Bitencourt.

28 My translation from: *Mensagem pelo rádio do Presidente Lula à África*. Brasília, 8 de agosto de 2003, in: *Repertório de Política Externa: Posições do Brasil*. Brasília: Ministério das Relações Exteriores, Secretaria de Planejamento Diplomático/Fundação Alexandre de Gusmão, 2007, p. 158.

29 S. Krapohl, *Regional Powers as Leaders or Rambos of Regional Integration? Unilateral Actions of Brazil and South*

Mozambican President Armando Guebuza (2005–2015) had publicly welcomed the presence of foreign investors and extractive practices in the country. Guebuza's rhetoric had promoted the idea that extractive practices would increase state receipts and lead to industrialization, which would then trickle down and diversify the economy and human development by creating more jobs and productivity.³⁰

In a 2011 address and related internet forum, Guebuza came out in favour of the mining and gas industries, largely the product of foreign direct investment (FDI), labelling them

*veritable levers for the development of our beloved motherland upon introducing new technologies that propel productivity [and create jobs and profits] in their own sectors and other sectors of activity ... For example, the intensification of mining and geological exploration has stimulated an increase in investment projects in the tourism sector of Pemba, Nacala, Tete, and Beira.*³¹

Attractively for Mozambique, Brazilian foreign policy has come to espouse the aim to obliterate poverty and underdevelopment in other countries, using solutions that have worked socio-economically in Brazil while expanding both countries' political, economic, and cultural capital via development and commercial cooperation. In fora such as the World Trade Organization (WTO), Brazilian representatives have repeatedly come out in support of fellow developing states' interests. The WTO's Doha Round, initiated in 2001, has showcased Brazilian claims for leadership and political cooperation with other developing states. Brazilian representatives have advocated for farm subsidy cuts by developed states and for keeping down the prices of HIV medications, despite possible intellectual property violations.³² The latter has been an important principle underlying the Brazilian implementation of the SMM's factory in Mozambique, which is meant to produce, pack, and commercialize generic medications.³³

3. Framing Brazil's Development Cooperation

Agriculture and public health, two of the most ambitious sectors in Brazil-Mozambique cooperation, squarely match Mozambique's donor-demanded Action Plan for Poverty Reduction (Plano de Acção para Redução da Pobreza, PARP). The plan's 2011 edition

Africa and their Negative Effects on Economic Integration in South America and Southern Africa (Paper presented at University of Leipzig at New Regionalisms seminar in Summer Semester, 2013.) The latter critique came from the spokesman of Justica Ambiental, the Mozambique wing of the Friends of the Earth NGO, when I interviewed him in Maputo, 9 February 2012.

30 A. Guebuza, Moçambique: Explorando outras formas de consolidação da cidadania, 2011, <http://www.armandoguebuza.blogspot.com/> (accessed 23 July 2013).

31 My translation. Ibid.

32 B. Dhar, Doha: A Developing Country Perspective, in: *Economic and Political Weekly*, 36 (2001) 46/47, pp. 4343–4345; A. Daemrlich and A. Mussacchio, Brazil: Leading the BRICS? *Harvard Business Review* (Feb. 2, 2011), and J. Galvão, Brazil and Access to HIV/AIDS Drugs: A Question of Human Rights and Public Health, in: *American Journal of Public Health*, 95 (2005) 7, pp. 1110–1116.

33 From Skype interview in Brasília with Fiocruz's José Luiz Telles, 11 March 2014.

(for 2011–2014), cited rural underdevelopment and a high prevalence of HIV in Mozambique as the main obstacles to development, saying about the latter:

*The continuous attention to be paid to diseases such as HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria, which threaten the productivity of the work force and constrain investments, thus accelerating the vulnerability to poverty of the low-income family, is an imperative that ought to accompany the efforts towards human and social development.*³⁴

The coordinator of the factory project from Fiocruz stated in 2012 that the Guebuza government offered the political stability, structures, power, and potential technicians necessary to make the project happen.³⁵ Besides that, she added, the relative ease of communicating in Portuguese motivated the choice of Mozambique as a location for the factory over a request from Nigeria – classified as Brazil's biggest trading partner and petroleum source in Africa.³⁶ Beyond catering to the priority of combating HIV as part of attempting to increase productivity, the medication factory provides a new industry for Mozambique, which fits in with the state's economic diversification goal. As for Brazil as the factory's coordinator, the investment in the extremely long, laborious process of opening a factory in another developing country had been largely due to former President Lula da Silva's desire to boost Brazil's global political prospects.³⁷ The global fight against HIV is an area where Brazil has been able to build clout, as exemplified by its role in Doha. The state has also strengthened its image through its commitment to HIV research, free provision of antiretroviral treatment domestically, and its willingness to share techniques and equipment for the production of generic medications with developing countries, as the case with Mozambique illustrates.³⁸

The centrality of the executive branch in Brazilian politics has meant that the act of presidents agreeing on a project proposal sets the project in motion and that state agencies may begin to deploy resources; but legislative and bureaucratic hurdles, as well as changing priorities under different governments and capacity limitations on both the sides of the provider and recipient, have impeded presidential agreements on development cooperation. ABC may have made too many commitments too quickly in the first decade of the 2000s. Under the presidency of Lula da Silva's successor and protégé, Dilma Rousseff (2011–2016), ABC had to finalize what it had already started, thereby being unable to start new projects due to financial limitations, according to its director in March 2014. While the former director attributed ABC's budget cuts to the devaluing of the Brazilian real (BRL) in relation to the American dollar (USD), and denied that the Rousseff administration had given less priority to development cooperation, he also claimed that

34 My translation from: In Plano de Acção Para Redução da Pobreza (PARP), Maputo 2011, p. 16.

35 Interview with Fiocruz's Lícia de Oliveira in Maputo, 13 February 2012.

36 Ibid. for interview. On Nigeria, see M. Ncube, C. Lufumpa and D. Vencatachellum, Brazil's Economic Engagement with Africa, in: Africa Economic Brief, 2 (2011) 5, pp. 1–11

37 Interview with Oliveira (fn. 35).

38 P. Chequer and M. Simão, O Brasil e o Combate Internacional Contra a AIDS, in: O Brasil e a ONU, Brasília 2008.

ABC's smaller budget had remained flat since Rousseff came to power in 2011.³⁹ In addition, Itamaraty, responsible for ABC's budget and policy, had been embroiled in a political and financial crisis, reportedly losing a great deal of favour with Rousseff. Service abroad was negatively affected and Brazilian embassy personnel in France declared a strike over salary delays in March 2014.⁴⁰

Amid crises, technical cooperation appeared to be more of a priority on paper and in discourse than practice for the Brazilian state, equalling only a fraction of what the state spends on commercial investments abroad, even after an apparent spike in spending as a donor. Besides its apparent volatility, Brazilian development cooperation is highly decentralized, with dozens of government agencies, municipalities, and educational institutions involved in different projects, all using their own ways of reporting. Although there are measures underway to address the lack of organization, this situation has thus far made Brazilian efforts in international development hard to gauge for researchers, as well as government officials involved in the projects themselves.⁴¹ ABC's then-director said that he could not give a definitive number of current projects at the time because the agency was still calculating it, and that there could actually be 6,000 ongoing in March 2014, if one defines projects as 'activities'.⁴² The Fiocruz official heading the agency's office in Maputo in 2014 said that perhaps foreign universities have 'more knowledge of what we are doing than we do ourselves'.⁴³

In fact, it was not until December 2010 that the Brazilian government began to issue an integrated financial report on the sum of Brazilian cooperation projects through Itamaraty, the ABC, and the presidency-linked Institute of Applied Economic Research (Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada, Ipea). This report, titled *Brazilian Cooperation for International Development: 2005–2009*, found that the Brazilian government spent BRL 2.9 billion (USD 1.4 billion) on development-cooperation projects between 2005–2009. The amount spent on such cooperation projects nearly doubled within that time. The brunt of the amount, a calculated 76 per cent, went into collaborations with international organizations and regional banks, including peacekeeping operations and collective development funds. The remaining 24 per cent was divided, according to the report, into three categories: technical, scientific, and technological cooperation; scholarships for foreigners; and humanitarian assistance.⁴⁴

39 Interview in Brasília with the director of the ABC agency. 10 March 2014, in Brasília, Brazil.

40 See L. Paraguassu. Itamaraty recupera status com o Planalto: Figueiredo ainda tem problemas a resolver na diplomacia. O Estado de S. Paulo, 2 January 2014 <http://www.estadao.com.br/noticias/impreso,itamaraty-recupera-status-com-o-planalto,1114209,0.htm>, and Um calote diplomático: Funcionários do Itamaraty paralisam as atividades. Istoé, last modified 7 March 2014, http://www.istoé.com.br/reportagens/351248_UM+CALOTE+DIPLOMATICO (accessed 7 March 2014).

41 See P. Kragelund (fn. 23), and G. Rosso et al., *Brazilian Cooperation's Projects in Portuguese-Speaking African Countries*. Instituto de Higiene e Medicina Tropical Universidade Nova de Lisboa 2011.

42 Interview with ABC director (fn. 39).

43 Skype interview with Telles (fn. 33).

44 *Cooperação Brasileira para o Desenvolvimento Internacional 2005–2009* (fn. 2). Statistics in paragraph, p. 19–21.

In 2013, Ipea/Itamaraty released their second of such reports, titled *Brazilian Cooperation for International Development: 2010*. It separated ‘technical cooperation’ from ‘scientific and technological cooperation’; ‘peace-keeping operations’ from ‘expenditures with international organs’, and represented a clear shift in priorities from the previous year.⁴⁵ Technical cooperation, coordinated by ABC, made up 11.5 per cent of the Brazilian government’s total spending on development cooperation in 2009; it went down to 6.3 per cent in 2010 because funds (of BRL 92.5 million) were allocated to Haiti, after an earthquake there; it was more than the financial support received by all the other South American countries combined (BRL 83.5 million). The proportion of spending on humanitarian and peacekeeping operations more than doubled over 2009 to 53.6 per cent of the total cooperation amount. However, the five PALOPs remained the recipients who received the most financial support in terms of technical cooperation, and who received the most overall in Africa (BRL 49.5 million of BRL 64.7 million).⁴⁶ Projects with Haiti have since proven difficult to implement, and its place within Brazil’s development cooperation has diminished, according to ABC’s director.⁴⁷ The latest of such reports, released in 2016, shows a scaling down in Brazil’s development cooperation-related spending for the 2011–13 period, having peaked in 2010 after the upward trend recorded since 2005.⁴⁸

The Brazilian state, sharing a former colonizer, official language, and sometimes stated ideologies with the PALOPs, has gradually built a relationship with their elite that has translated into ambitious development cooperation and mega corporate projects. These often also feature the interests, capital, and other support from third countries, multinationals, and international organizations. Development-related projects come packaged with a variety of political and economic interests, discourses, and the influence and experience acquired by Brazilian agencies, educational institutions, and municipalities from development cooperation with foreign actors.

The sites of these projects could be said to represent portals of globalization. The concept looks at places where major transnational exchanges, transfers, and regulatory efforts occur, and where mutual influences, networks, and normative formations, as well as ‘cultural constructions’ serve to ‘challenge national affiliation in communities of migrants, merchants, and travellers from distant places’, in the words of Middell and Naumann.⁴⁹ Similarly, Michael Geyer deals with ‘portals’ as a way to examine where, how, and by whose mediation elements come in and become part of a particular society and culture.⁵⁰ Projects between states of the Global South, sometimes developed jointly with a country

45 Cooperação Brasileira para o Desenvolvimento Internacional 2010 (2nd. Ed.), Brasília 2013.

46 Statistics for this paragraph found in *ibid*, pp. 18–30.

47 Interview with ABC director (fn. 39).

48 Cooperação Brasileira para o Desenvolvimento Internacional 2011–2013, Brasília: Ipea 2016, http://www.ipea.gov.br/porta/images/stories/PDFs/livros/livros/161017_livro_cobradi_2011_2013.pdf (accessed 5 June 2017).

49 M. Middell and K. Naumann (fn. 3), p. 162.

50 M. Geyer, Portals of Globalisation, in: *The Plurality of Europe: Identities and Spaces: Contributions Made at an International Conference Leipzig, 6–9 June 2007*, Leipzig 2010, pp. 509–520.

from the Global North, are implemented in another developing country through the appropriate Brazilian government agency, such as the Brazilian Agricultural Research Corporation (Empresa Brasileira de Pesquisa Agropecuária, Embrapa) for agriculture, and Fiocruz for health. The ABC agency is charged with coordinating the technical co-operation aspect of these projects, but its lack of legislative power means that hiring and procurement have to be done by a third party, in this case UNDP.⁵¹

Brazilians had previously been mostly recipients rather than aid donors and, thus, were trained by foreign donor agencies in projects. Now, Brazilians are assuming a lead role in training employees from other developing countries, in particular practices implemented domestically. While used as tools of national projection on the international stage, such practices are themselves products of foreign technology transfers and exchanges, and their adaptation to (Brazil's) domestic environment can then be further transferred abroad. Moreover, they will, in turn, likely be appropriated by locals in recipient countries, as well as reinterpreted and adapted. The practices could cause conflicts between those bringing in these technology and cultural transfers and those receiving and modifying them, but there is also a mutually constitutive learning situation for both sides. This scenario ties into Espagne's discussion on the hybridity surrounding cultural transfers between national contexts:

*Naturally, in attempting to show that the context of reception attains, thanks to the import, a certain hybridity, research on cultural transfers begins with the idea that the context of departure as well as that of reception are hybrid forms even before the transfer ... All national constellations are the result of past hybridization.*⁵²

In Geyer's view, neither globalization nor nationalization has been a complete or independent project. These processes and projects are intertwined to the point that it is now often hard to tell what is 'foreign' and what is 'local', and what decisions are incontestably the product of national sovereignty or of an international norm now taken as common sense.⁵³ Similarly, when a development model is formed, it is often a mixture of foreign and local actors involved in its making, adapted to local conditions, modified, and then possibly transmitted further afield. Therefore, despite constant discursive attempts at distinction by Brazilian representatives, it would be difficult to define what a 'Brazilian' model of development may look like. The hybridized practices implemented in Mozambique will possibly continue to be transferred further, while imbedded in a system of practices and social ordering to be shared, used, and reshaped by the actors involved. These practices are implemented from one possible portal of globalization to another – from the factory in Brazil to the factory in Mozambique – and, possibly, in the future, also to others.

51 L. Cabral and J. Weinstock, *Brazilian Technical Cooperation for Development: Drivers, Mechanics and Future Prospects*, London 2010.

52 Espagne (fn. 5), p. 13.

53 Geyer (fn. 50).

4. The SMM's Medication Factory as a Portal of Globalization

While the previous sections have relied more or less evenly on interviews, archival research, and secondary sources, the present section is mostly based on two separate interviews with Fiocruz officials. Interviews seemed to be the most effective means to convey up-to-date information on an evolving and relatively recent project. There is still not much comprehensive scholarly research on the topic. Furthermore, archives on the project allow only limited access.⁵⁴ The first interview, which took place on 13 February 2012 in Maputo, was with Lícia de Oliveira, the coordinator of the medication factory project for Fiocruz. I visited the factory in Matola then, but equipment and operators had not yet been brought in, and I only spoke with Brazilian officials involved in the project. The second interview took place via Skype over two years later, on 11 March 2014, with the director of the Fiocruz office in Africa, José Luiz Telles.

The ABC agency does not claim the factory project as its own, although it participates in it. ABC's project analyst for Mozambique expressed scepticism towards the factory's sustainability, if state funds from either Brazil or Mozambique were to be counted on; privatization was not off the table in discussions on the Mozambican side, he added during our interview in 2014.⁵⁵ Besides the training and technology transfers that would be considered technical cooperation, the SMM's factory is meant to become a commercial enterprise, which goes beyond the ABC's direct scope. Factory construction was funded with both public and private capital, including a financial contribution from the Brazilian mining company Vale, and Brazilian capital has also funded degrees for factory employees from Brazilian and other institutions.

Oliveira said that by early 2012, it had cost the Brazilian government USD 22 million among the process of renovating the SMM factory's large shell (a serum factory), setting up administration, training staff, buying equipment abroad and assembling it, and beginning to transfer the technology for all 21 medications they were planning to replicate at the factory. She added that Vale had stepped in to cover the USD 5.4 million the Mozambican government was supposed to contribute for the factory's construction but then failed to (citing the need to use public funds to deal with an emergent food-price crisis). Oliveira said Vale was also paying the salary of a top-level director brought from Fiocruz on a two-year contract to oversee the whole process of building and equipping the factory; equipment came from abroad and was being paid for by the Brazilian ministry of health, according to Telles.

An important element involving transfers and their products are actors, including the possible carriers, mediators, and modifiers of the related model. Fiocruz brought technicians and directors (including Oliveira) to reside in Mozambique during the project's implementation phase, and there were constant visits of Brazilian and Mozambican tech-

54 At Itamaraty, during my research in February and March 2014, I could only access documents up to 2010. Although the SMM's factory project had begun then, production had not.

55 Interview with project analyst Armando Munguba Cardoso on 20 February 2014, in Brasília, Brazil.

nicians to each other's countries in connection with this and other Brazilian development-cooperation projects. At the time of the interview, Oliveira said that more than 90 per cent of the factory's employees were from Mozambique (following Mozambique's labour laws mandating that most employees be locals).

Meanwhile, Brazilian employees such as Telles were travelling back and forth between the two countries. Telles had to deal with representatives at the institutional level and constantly negotiate with them about the factory project. Some employees have learned straight from the Farmanguinhos factory in Brazil and brought these practices back to the Mozambican factory. These employees have been influenced by people, institutions, and practices in their respective environments, which are, in turn, influenced by discourses coming from a broader level, such as foreign policy and development paradigms. Telles appeared to promote the official Brazilian development discourse, stating:

Also, as raw material for knowledge production, Brazil ends up innovating in this process. It is no longer that pattern of North-South cooperation. That is, we have sought out a pattern of horizontality, of mutual learning, and this makes an enormous difference in a process like this, of qualification. Therefore, the gain is not a financial gain, is not a gain in markets but is a gain in the foreign policy of Brazil; greater external recognition, and also a learning experience for us, the first time we build a medication factory outside of Brazil.⁵⁶

Oliveira also stated that the agency already learned a lot from the experience of opening the factory in Mozambique, a process that faced many delays due to bureaucratic and infrastructural obstacles. The factory started by packaging medications produced in Brazil, but it had begun producing its own medications, including, at the time, an antiretroviral drug in its testing phase, according to Telles. Hypertension medication and folic acid were also being produced, he said.

The Brazilian agencies' work in the public health domain abroad means contributing to the structuring of systems in another country through equipment, software, and knowledge transfers to technicians and administrators. Work on such a structuring scale is new to the Brazilian state, according to Oliveira; it has been an enormous endeavour to train and adapt practices, which is 'not a linear transfer of models' Farmanguinhos in Brazil is also using the experience to hone its processes. While the setup for the transfers and exchanges are there and actions have begun, it will be the staying power and impact of the factory that will determine whether it fits the label of a portal of globalization. Contributions to a larger system of norms and practices are an important part of the definition, and tangible present and future contributions of the nascent factory to that effect appear difficult to gauge at the moment.

In portals, actors institutionalize their capacity to handle certain forms of connectivity and knowledge transfer. Fiocruz, through the Farmanguinhos factory and lab, has been

56 My translation from Skype interview with Telles (fn. 33).

producing and distributing generic medication in Brazil for years and has been exporting its technology to countries in Latin America and Africa.⁵⁷ The factory is the first one Fiocruz installed abroad, directly replicating practices of the Farmanguinhos factory in another country. According to Oliveira, the SMM's factory was also the catalyst for the opening of Fiocruz's first office abroad, located in Mozambique. This office aims to cater to the larger African region, and it plans further projects, such as free maternal milk banks – a model successful in combating infant mortality in Brazil and also listed as part of Mozambique's PARP.⁵⁸ Telles said his duties as director of the Fiocruz regional office have involved acting as liaison with local authorities, including for the factory project; acting as a representative in international fora on relevant topics; facilitating project implementation, and identifying possible issues amid the office's monitoring and prospection of Fiocruz's projects in Africa. As some of the services the office offers, the Fiocruz website lists technology transfers as a way to strengthen systems in Palop, to implement and reform Palop's health institutes, and to train through distance-learning and postgraduate courses.⁵⁹ A Lula government press note in October 2008 stated the Fiocruz office would facilitate dialogue with health sectors in African countries on starting technical cooperation projects with Brazil. The note estimated that 80 per cent of Mozambique's HIV patients did not have access to adequate treatment, underscoring the importance of the new factory to the country's health system.⁶⁰ Thus, the SMM's factory and Fiocruz's office, both possible portals of globalization, could represent venues for Brazilian agencies and institutions – including the ministry of health, to which Fiocruz is linked – to pass on their aggregated and hybridized practices and regulations further afield.

As indicated before here, the process has not been so smooth. For the first time, a Brazilian institution outside of diplomacy had asked for representation abroad, according to Telles. Discussions with different wings of the Brazilian government had been dragging on since the office's inauguration in 2008, and the office's legal statute had not yet been worked out six years later. Thus, Telles, as a public servant, could not stay more than 90 days in Mozambique while receiving pay, which forced him to constantly go back to Brazil and limited the actions of the office to its immediate realm.

Pertaining to the factory, Telles cited three levels of challenges Fiocruz has faced: the first challenge is to implement a pharmaceutical industry in a state that has no experience or higher-education qualification programme in this field. Representatives of the Brazilian state feel like they have to provide Mozambican employees with training on every level,

57 Autonomia em medicamentos, Especial: Presidente Lula Visita a Fiocruz, in: Revista de Manguinhos, September 2004, pp. 10–11 <https://agencia.fiocruz.br/setembro-2004> (accessed 18 December 2017).

58 Plano de Acção Para Redução da Pobreza (fn. 34).

59 Fiocruz África – Fundação Oswaldo Cruz (Fiocruz), Ciência e Tecnologia Em Saúde Para a População Brasileira, Portal Fiocruz, 2013, <http://portal.fiocruz.br/pt-br/content/fiocruz-%C3%A1frica> (accessed 4 March 2014).

60 Nota à Imprensa, Visita do Presidente Lula a Moçambique. Brasília, 14 de outubro de 2008. Repertório De Política Externa: Posições Do Brasil (2008–2009). Brazil Ministry of External Relations/Fundação Alexandre de Gusmão, 2010, p. 245.

often sending them to Brazil, while contending with cultural differences between Brazilians and Mozambicans on-site at Matola. Despite identifying some commonalities in language and cultural background, Oliveira said there have been conflicts ranging from Mozambicans being bothered by Brazilians' lack of formality in official interactions, to feeling distrust that another perceived foreign ruler is imposing its way. Both governments have, however, made a lot of effort to overcome differences, and relations have improved significantly over time, she said. The second set of challenges has been to deal with the government representatives, who oversee the factory on the Mozambican side, and the third has involved negotiations with ministers and the president of Mozambique, which is where the Embassy of Brazil plays a very important role.

Telles characterized his own work as regularly entailing reinforcing the idea to Mozambican officials that this is a social enterprise that would bring benefits to Mozambique, in terms of reducing its dependency on outside pharmaceuticals, and more ability to negotiate prices and develop expertise in a new domestic industry. Furthermore, the factory has given Mozambique's regulatory sector the opportunity to strengthen its capacity in a new field. Training took place over the course of two years with the Brazilian National Health Surveillance Agency (Agência Nacional de Vigilância Sanitária, Anvisa), but it had not been extended or renewed in 2014. According to Telles, the SMM's factory used to be overseen by the Mozambican ministry of health (Ministério de Saúde, Misau). With a ministerial change in recent years, this responsibility was passed on to Mozambique's Institute for the Management of State Holdings (Instituto de Gestão das Participações do Estado, Igepe), which oversees businesses in which the state is a share-holder. Since then, Misau had distanced itself from the SMM's project, and its role had been reduced to buying the factory's medications, some of which were already on the local market by then, according to Telles. The focus had shifted to the sustainability of the project as a business, rather than as a public health-linked social project, and Fiocruz was in the process of evaluating the business and profitability plan. The financing of the factory has been one of the main problems being faced at that level, Telles said, adding that:

*Perhaps this is the first cooperation in which Mozambique has to disburse resources. The culture of cooperation there, especially North-South, is one of donations. So, this enterprise has the important active participation of the Mozambican government in the management and application of resources.*⁶¹

The Brazilian side had been donating the medication feedstock to the SMM's factory. The plan was for the factory to eventually purchase its own feedstock, as Farmanguinhos does from foreign companies, Telles said. The factory's operations were being maintained by Igepe, while Brazilian agencies were trying to extend their cooperation to finish the process of international certification and technology transfer for the 21 medications agreed upon. As of December 2017, the SMM's minimalist website listed the Mozambican state

61 My translation from Skype interview with Telles (fn. 33).

as owning 100 per cent of the factory – ‘proudly Mozambican’ – and Farmanguinhos as a partner on the same level as Vale, a brand identified as ‘Cinevideo’, and the local business ‘Pro-Air’, the only partner with any information about it on the partners’ page.⁶² The website gave no clear sign of Brazil’s enduring participation in the project. There was, however, a YouTube video, uploaded in 2013, with quotes from Telles and Oliveira, and a gallery picturing a visit to the factory by former President Lula da Silva, smiling while wearing a lab coat and hairnet.⁶³

On the Brazilian side, multiple agencies and institutions besides Fiocruz have been involved in health-related projects abroad over the past several years, with such projects reportedly numbering 31 in the PALOPs in 2011, according to a study commissioned by the World Health Organization (WHO).⁶⁴ The Brazilian ministry of health, traditionally relegated to domestic affairs, has taken on an important role in the implementation of Brazil’s projects abroad, including ‘advisory and consultancy services, human-resources training, technology/knowledge transference, and, in specific cases, equipment donations ... directed to areas of Brazilian proven expertise.’⁶⁵ Another key agency on the Brazilian side is Anvisa, which, although linked to the ministry of health, has administrative and financial autonomy. This institution is a good example of the mutual constitution of the domestic and foreign in development interactions (which have included training the regulatory agency in Mozambique):

*ANVISA participation in international health cooperation is conducted with the purpose of institutional strengthening of the agency and consolidating the international role of ANVISA in the creation of networks with the sanitary authorities from other countries. These networking-cooperation activities are credited to allow ANVISA to reinforce its institutional knowledge and increase the available information about health surveillance systems, rules and legislations in other countries. On the other hand, ANVISA international cooperation also represents an opportunity for spreading their own experiences and strengthening their international reputation.*⁶⁶

Thus, priorities identified as ‘foreign’ as well as ‘domestic’ affairs have converged in the form of agency and personnel in shaping Brazil’s health-related projects, including the antiretroviral drug factory in Mozambique. The SMM’s factory has been shaped by Brazil’s experience with other medication factories in its own territory, managed by many of the same agencies involved in the factory in Mozambique. With this in mind, the sites of development cooperation projects provide a good illustration of blurred lines between what is foreign and local. The resulting bundle, a combination of what comes in and

62 Início and Parceiros, in: SMM, Sociedade Moçambicana de Medicamentos, SA <https://smm2013.jimdo.com/> (accessed 5 June 2017).

63 Galeria, Ibid.

64 Rosso et al., Brazilian Cooperation’s Projects (fn. 41).

65 Ibid., p. 21.

66 Ibid., pp. 21–22.

what is encountered, is affected by globalized discourses, as well as different levels and sources of existing policy priorities and practices.

5. Conclusion

Using the Brazil-Mozambique cooperation case study of an antiretroviral drug factory in Mozambique, this article has applied the concepts of portals of globalization and cultural transfers in a development cooperation context. These concepts appear to be fitting analytical tools for Brazil's development cooperation and its linkages, and have the potential to be used to study other projects and networks of knowledge and technical transfers and exchanges, as they focus also on the content of policy transfers between actors.⁶⁷ As briefly demonstrated, there are mutually constitutive flows and actors at work in a particular site ('portal'), where they meet and participate in the receiving and further shaping of technology and cultural transfers. Portals of globalization represent the places where these exchanges, negotiations, and other interactions occur, among various actors involved in a transnational development project. Through a 'portal', one can witness a 'bundle' of mutual constitution and practices being conveyed, absorbed, learned, and modified, to be further relayed in the future. The influence of these exchanges on a wider system of development cooperation will depend on Brazil's own growing influence and acceptance as a donor, which international agencies had been optimistic about in the past decade. It will also depend on the dialogue and negotiation ability of its government agency representatives and how they are received by representatives in the countries in which they implement projects.

Another important aspect is the achievement of a strategy for development cooperation and its prioritization in Brazilian politics. As shown here, cooperation has so far been unstable in terms of garnering support and funding – with wide variations from one government to another, from Lula da Silva to Rousseff, and potentially also after Rousseff amid political and economic turmoil – and lacks an appropriate gauge for assessing the project's effectiveness and impact.

In terms of portals of globalization, this article has analysed Brazilian development cooperation as a case of South-South development politics, whose proponents have called for the emergence of a new international regime of development, for example via a joint BRICS development bank. My contribution here to the 'portals' discussion took a detailed look at the birth of a 'portal' not only on the micro level, but also within the framework and constellation of political, economic, and other factors that must align for a 'portal' to be established. Moreover, the idea espoused here of the constant and ongoing hybridization of practices points to a larger context of transfers. Rather than the 'unilateral' transfer of one national model of development to another nation, it underlines a

67 D. Stone, *Transfer Agents and Global Networks in the 'Transnationalization' of Policy*, in: *Journal of European Public Policy*, 11 (2004) 3, pp. 545–566.

larger chain of transfers in the realm of development – first from North to South, then from South to South, with exchanges, adaptations, and hence hybridizations at every step of the way. The SMM's factory itself can come to embody a portal of globalization moulded by other sites, as well as the aforementioned agencies and the people and discourses composing their actions and flows. The nascent 'portal' is handled on the ground by largely Mozambican technicians trained by Brazilians – employees who have their own manner of doing things, which could lead to conflicts with their trainers but also to mutual learning experiences, which applies to the institutional level, as exemplified in my interviews.

How Brazilians and Mozambicans have conducted the medication factory project could contribute to constituting larger policies, standards, and norms of development cooperation aggregated from negotiations, transfers, and adaptations at different levels of interaction. The portal of globalization represents the point of entry and exit of the products of transfers, where the actors, discourses, and practices embedded in a particular project assemble in a certain spot. Projects such as this factory do appear to have the potential to become stable 'portals'. However, the political, institutional, and financial apparatus around them needs to be harmonized before that can happen. Also, development cooperation needs to be given higher priority, so that it can survive oscillations in domestic interests and politics – including the rapid commercialization of projects.