Changes from the "Margins". Non-European Actors, Ideas, and Strategies in International Organizations. Introduction

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The history of international organizations (IOs) has received substantial research interest not the least as they are seen as significant actors in a variety of border-crossing processes, and their emergence and development seems to become one of the core topics of transnational and global historical studies. Indeed, processes of globalization have to a large degree been shaped by these institutions. When turning to the dynamics of the increasingly worldwide integration since the mid-19th century, one discovers IOs becoming crucial contemporary channels through which societies have managed their external relations and the enlarging spaces of their contacts. This also explains why an increasing number of actors, governmental as well non-governmental, made use of them. Not surprising, international organizations are depicted as "making and unmaking the threats of interdependence and interaction between polities and societies across borders", and as essential in the construction of national societies. Therefore, IOs are seen as makers of our modern world.[1]

The pasts of international organizations help in addressing hypotheses and arguments central to global history, ranging from the role of technologies and wars in deepening intercultural contacts, to the interdependence of national and transnational frames of action and complex spatialities, to processes of colonialism, European hegemony, and global inequalities. In short: the formations and changes of IOs offer an entry into the dynamics of globalization.

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1   P.-Y. Saunier, International Non-Governmental Organizations (INGOs), in: A. Iriye/P.-Y. Saunier (eds.), The Palgrave Dictionary of Transnational History, Basingstoke 2009, pp. 573-579, p. 579.

This has led to lively and inspiring research[2] that among others, has questioned problematic tendencies in earlier studies, in particular the following two: For long, insider studies dominated the literature, i.e., the descriptions and analyses written by officials of the respective organization, which often had commemorative functions.[3] Equally persistently present was the interpretation of the 1920s and 1930s as an "interwar period" and road to war, with which the League of Nations (LON), at least the organization at large, appeared as a failure that did not live up to its main goal: the creation of peace.[4] By now, however, the negative picture of the LON and other institutions of the first half of the 20th century has been put into perspective, as has the related idealized view of the United Nations (UN) as successor.[5]

All in all, an empirically solid research field has emerged that consists of different strands and debates, amongst others, around the issue of the periodization of international institutions and orders, the claims for vis-à-vis the reactions to postulates of universalism,[6] or the transnational dimension of IOs.[7]

In our view, there are two aspects that have received rather limited attention but are nonetheless significant for understanding IOs at the crossroads with global history, including discontinuities or shifts in IOs and the impact of the related actors from Latin American, African, and Asian regions. To put the state of the art in a nutshell: Political scientists and international relations scholars in particular – who long dominated the field of study – analyse IOs with a systematic and categorizing approach that accordingly tends to be less differentiated. Historians, on the other hand, have focused on specific institutions or

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2 Exemplary of new surveys and inventories are: M. Herren, Internationale Organisationen seit 1865. Eine Globalgeschichte der internationalen Ordnung, Darmstadt 2009; B. Reinalda (ed.), Routledge Handbook of International Organizations, London 2013; V. Bart, Internationale Organisationen und Kongresse, in: Europäische Geschichte Online, URL: http://www.ieg-ego.eu/barthv-2011-de URN: urn:nbn:de:0159-2011121203 (access on 27.01.2014); for widely discussed reinterpretations see: M. Mazower, Governing the World. The Rise and Fall of an Idea, 1815 to the Present, New York 2012.

3 The analysis of Jasmien van Daele on the International Labour Organization applies also to other IOs, see: J. v. Daele, Writing ILO Histories, in: idem/M. R. García/G. v. Goethem/M. v. d. Linden (eds.), ILO Histories. Essays on the International Labour Organization and its Impact on the World during the Twentieth Century, Bern 2010, pp. 13-39.

4 Among the first and widely heard critics is Akira Iriye, Global Community. The Role of International Organizations in the Making of the Contemporary World, Berkeley 2002.

5 S. Pederson, The Meaning of the Mandates System. An Argument, in: Geschichte und Gesellschaft 32 (2006) 4, pp. 560-82; idem, The Impact of League Oversight on British Policy in Palestine, in: R. Miller (ed.), Palestine, Britain and Empire. The Mandate Years, London 2010, pp. 39-65; D. Gorman, The Emergence of International Society in the 1920s, Cambridge 2012; S. Amrith/G. Sluga, New Histories of the UN, in: Journal of World History 19 (2008) 3, pp. 251-274; D. Laqua (ed.), Internationalism Reconfigured. Transnational Ideas and Movements between the World Wars, London 2011; M. Mazower, No Enchanted Palace. The End of Empire and the Ideological Origins of the United Nations, Princeton 2009.

6 I. Schröder, Die Wiederkehr des Internationalen. Eine einführende Skizze, in: Zeithistorische Forschungen 8 (2011) 3, pp. 340-349.

7 S. Kott, Les organisations internationales, terrains d'étude de la globalisation. Jalons pour une approche socio-historique, in: Critique internationale 52 (2011) 3, pp. 11-16; G. Sluga, Editorial. The Transnational History of International Institutions, in: Journal of Global History 6 (2011) 2, pp. 219-222; that special issues publishes articles coming out of conference entitled "Towards the Transnational History of International Organizations. Methodology / Epistemology, held in 2009 in Cambridge, United Kingdom.

periods and continuities in the development. The majority of both only hesitantly look beyond Europe and the US. Also, particular approaches tend to neglect transformation of time and the role of "non-Western"[8] actors and organizations; for example, consider research that combines the analysis of international relations, public administration, or organization sociology to emphasise internal dynamics of IOs as bureaucracies.[9]

While there are works that trace shifts in the agendas of IOs and driving actors, like the ones by Sunil Amrith and Thomas Fischer, they usually focus on one specific IO.[10] Studies with a more general outlook are rare, like Susan Zimmermann's contribution or the most recently compiled contributions in the *Oxford Handbook of the History of International Law*.[11] One of the reasons for this situation is the serious difficulty for any interest in the spaces to manoeuvre and actions of non-Western delegates and experts, which is caused by the argument that internationalism served the preservation of a Western-centred world order in changing global circumstances. Especially scholars working with approaches from postcolonial studies reason that IOs institutionalized and perpetuated global imbalances, veiled by a discourse portraying them as neutral players who altruistically sought to improve the world. They are seen as being established to maintain and globally enforce values, norms, patterns, and standardized rules of European origin, based on the analysis of the emergence of international law – out of which IOs originated – and its close linkage to imperial power.[12] Later, these institutional novelties aimed at

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8 The term "West" is used to indicate North American and (West) European shared belief systems and practices, although they are constructions and ascriptions, which often enough were instrumental to differentiate oneself from the "other", "non-western". By no means do we intend to substantiate a belief in the imagination of a world divided into West/East or North/South.

9 See J. Ege/M. E. Bauer, International bureaucracies from a Public Administration and International Relations perspective, in: B. Reinalda, Routledge Handbook of International Organization (2), pp. 135-148; S. R. Brechin/G. D. Ness, Looking Back at the Gap. International Organizations as Organizations Twenty-Five Years Later, in: Journal of International Organizations Studies 4 (2013) 2, special issue on "Sociological Perspectives on International Organizations and the Construction of Global Order", edited by M. Koch and S. Stetter, pp. 14-39; J. Trondal/M. Marcussen/T. Larsson/F. Veggeland, Unpacking International Organisations. The Dynamics of Compound Bureaucracies, Manchester 2010; M. Barnett/M. Finnemore, Rules for the World. International Organizations in Global Politics, Ithaca 2004.

10 S. Amrith, Decolonizing International Health. India and Southeast Asia, 1930-65, Basingstoke 2006; T. Fischer, Die Souveränität der Schwachen. Lateinamerika und der Völkerbund, 1920-1936, Stuttgart 2012; see also: M. Connelly, Taking of the Cold War Lens. Visions of North-South-Conflict during the Algerian War of Independence, in: American Historical Review 105 (2000) 3, pp. 739-769; v. Daele et. al., ILO Histories (3); T. Shepard, Algeria, France, Mexico, UNESCO. A Transnational History of Anti-racism and decolonialization, 1932-1962, in: Journal of Global History 6 (2011) 2, pp. 273-297; C. Stolte, Bringing Asia to the World. Indian Trade Unionism and the long Road towards the Asiatic Labour Congress, 1919–37, in: Journal of Global History 7 (2012) 2, pp. 257-278; R. Leemann, Entwicklung als Selbstbestimmung. Die menschenrechtliche Formulierung von Selbstbestimmung und Entwicklung in der UNO, 1945-1986, Göttingen 2013. Not taken into consideration by us is the long tradition of comparing cultures/civilizations, which has come under criticism for good reasons: M. Espagne, Comparison and Transfer, in: M. Middell/L. Roura (eds.), Transnational Challenges to National History Writing, Basingstoke 2013, pp. 36-53; on the neglect of extra-European thought and scholarship in political science/international relations see: R. Shilliam (ed.), International Relations and Non-Western Thought. Imperialism, Colonialism and Investigations of Global Modernity, London 2010.

11   S. Zimmermann, GrenzÜberschreitungen. Internationale Netzwerke, Organisationen, Bewegungen und die Politik der globalen Ungleichheit vom 17. bis zum 21. Jahrhundert, Wien 2010, pp. 187-211; B. Fassbender/A. Peters/S. Peter/D. Högger (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of the History of International Law, Oxford 2013.

12   M. Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations. The Rise and Fall of International Law 1870-1960, Cambridge

and were successful in perpetuating old patterns of thought and imaginings of order. When, after World War I, colonization had come under attack and the principle of national self-determination was established, which later led to the independence of many new states outside of Europe and the US,[13] direct control by Western powers had only been replaced by indirect rule. This was effectuated not the least through the Western-based international institutions and rules, mostly set up long before the new states could have a say in their formulation. Even for the time after decolonization, it is claimed that IOs helped to stabilize unequal power relations.[14]

Without doubt, they were, and still are, interest-driven and thus prone to serve particular concerns. Moreover, certainly for a long time their internal mechanisms and distributions of power have hindered even a rough representation of demands from different parts the world while imperialist structures and dynamics continued in these institutions.[15] On the one hand criticism of colonialism and Eurocentrism increased considerably after the end of the First World War;[16] on the other hand, IOs were increasingly conceived as means of "gaining access to international politics through the back door of internationalism" as well as membership as an indication of the status in global politics.[17] It would be surprising if both trends did not bring change. Would one not assume that

2002; A. Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty, and the Making of International Law, Cambridge 2004; idem, Hegemonic International Law in Retrospect, in: P. H. F. Bekker/R. Dolzer/M. Waibel (eds.), Making Transnational Law Work in the Global Economy, Cambridge 2010, pp. 19-33; T. Kayaoglu, Legal Imperialism, Sovereignty and Extraterritoriality in Japan, the Ottoman Empire, and China, Cambridge 2010. That non-Western actors nonetheless shaped international law is shown for instance: B. Rajagopal, International Law from Below. Development, Social Movements and Third World Resistance, Cambridge 2003; A. Anghie/B. Chimni/K. Mickelson/O. Okafor (eds.), The Third World and International Order. Law, Politics and Globalization, Leiden 2004.

13   Erez Manela, The Wilsonian Moment. Self-Determination and the International Origins of Anticolonial Nationalism, Oxford 2007; J. Fisch, Das Selbstbestimmungsrecht der Völker. Die Domestizierung einer Illusion, München 2010.

14   The issue of the persistence of Western universalism and hegemonic pursuit is discussed particularly intensive for the field of human rights, see among others: G. Gott, Imperial Humanitarianism. History of an Arrested Dialectic, in: B. E. Hernández-Truyol (ed.), Moral Imperialism. A Critical Anthology, in New York 2002, pp. 19-38. On Western, socialist, and anti-colonial traditions in the legitimization of human rights, see: S.-L. Hoffmann (ed.), Moralpolitik. Geschichte der Menschenrechte im 20. Jahrhundert, Göttingen 2010 (published in English as "Human Rights in the Twentieth Century" Cambridge 2011).

15   Michael Geyer and Charles Bright, for example, argue that in the course of the 19th century old metaphors of European expansion such as "thrust" and "projection" were replaced by "webbing" and "enveloping". Supported by new technologies, the telegraph, later the radio and telephone, transnational regimes of power emerged, which were facilitated though the creation of communication-based control systems, like the gold standard or international maritime law. These systems – which encompassed the world in global circles of power – served as the key of a "new" European imperialism that passed from the mere extension of direct rule to a lasting organization of the "others" in global monitoring systems. Via that way the European-Atlantic world became "the West" and got its status of a centring axis in an integrating world – integrating not the least through international organizations, see: M. Geyer/ C. Bright, World History in a Global Age, in: American Historical Review 100 (1995) 4, pp. 1034-1060, p. 1047-48.

16   M. Adas, Contested Hegemony. The Great War and the Afro-Asian. Assault on the Civilizing Mission Ideology, in: Journal of World History 15 (2004) 1, pp. 31-63; C. Aydin, The Politics of Anti-Westernism in Asia. Visions of World Order in Pan-Islamic and Pan-Asian Thought New York 2007.

17   M. Herren, Governmental Internationalism and the Beginning of a New World Order in the Late Nineteenth Century", in: M. H. Geyer/J. Paulmann (eds.), The Mechanics of Internationalism. Culture, Society, and Politics from the 1840s to the First World War, Oxford 2001, pp. 121-144, p. 125.

given these circumstances actors from Africa, Asia, and Latin America began to enter and appropriate IOs, also for working against the dominance of representatives from Western Europe and the US?

An example for a gradual redistribution of power and thus change is the case of the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), which is also dealt with in this special issue. With regards to "world cultural heritage", the previously dominating universalistic approach in the selection of qualified sites has given way to an awareness and appreciation of particularity. Nowadays, awarding the title and allocating the funds is meant to enable states to maintain their cultural sites themselves and not to do the preservation for them, as has hitherto been the case, which is in line with a clear-cut paternalism and self-understanding of having a civilizing mission. While the concept and practice of world cultural heritage had been confined to Europe when it was established, in the context of decolonization it was opened up. At the beginning, it was in the form of "development aid" for the preservation of cultural sites in other world regions; since the late 1960s, however, the notions of "civilization" and "culture" were pluralized and a serious effort towards a representation of (presumably) all cultures arose. Similar decentralization processes took place in connection to big projects for an internationally authorized Scientific and Cultural History of Mankind or the project on Mutual Appreciation of Eastern and Western Cultural Values, which demonstrate the changes of the organization.[18]

Against this background, we engaged the dynamics of change and the role of actors from non-European regions in these shifts have played. To do this, we looked across institutions, that is to say, we took different IOs into consideration. The issue is obviously closely linked to membership structures. Without participation from these parts of the world, there is no influence from the seeming "margins". Fortunately, the situation is encouraging – in terms of official representation as well as in regard to the composition of the secretariats – decolonisation, particularly since the 1960s, has led to a much more globally representative membership in IOs.

With such empirical evidence and the neglect of the literature, we began to explore the extent to which policies, programmes, and internal regulations were transformed due to the increasing involvement of actors from non-Western world regions. We also considered the resistance their initiatives met, how they succeeded or failed in terms of more visibility of their own concerns, larger spaces to manoeuvre, and decisions for redistribution of resources, which all together led towards a decentring of IOs. At the Third European Congress on World and Global History in 2011, we could discuss these issues at a panel, which was made possible through the support of the Centre for Area Studies at the University of Leipzig – our warmest thank for that. The presentations of

18   A. Rehling, Universalismen und Partikularismen im Widerstreit. Zur Genese des UNESCO-Welterbes, in: Zeit-historische Forschungen 8 (2011) 3, pp. 414-436; N. Braun, Globales Erbe und Regionales Ungleichgewicht. Repräsentationsprobleme der UNESCO-Welterbe-Liste, Hamburg 2007; L. E. Wong, Relocating East and West. UNESCO's Major Project on the Mutual Appreciation of Eastern and Western Cultural Values, in: Journal of World History, 19 (2008) 3, pp. 349-374.

the speakers we invited and the comments by Madeleine Herren, Sandrine Kott, and Corinne Pernet who joined the discussion were so stimulating that we set out with our colleagues to publish them.[19]

In the following section, we want to introduce the contributions and highlight the core findings in hope of instilling some curiosity and interest to read further.

Klaas Dykmann argues that the founding and further development of international organizations was fuelled by civilizing motives. The guiding principle "to do good" and "to make the world a better place" lies at the heart of IOs. In the beginning, it reflected the longing for progress and modernity as much as the belief in a natural superiority of Western, secular, and technocratic techniques of governance and solutions to global or border-transcending problems. Dykmann points out, however, that although Western civilizing missions remained a core feature and an elementary, often unconscious, driving force, a considerable change took place during the 20th century that also transformed IOs to some extent. First, non-Western IO members subscribed to the dominant civilization discourse in and propagated by these institutions. At least since the 1950s and 1960s, however, competing and contradictory civilizing missions coexisted. Non-Western actors "were certainly not only recipients of civilizing missions, but also contributed to the continuous change of this powerful concept" (p. 39) by appropriating the cause for their own concerns and by developing their own versions.

The second article deals with organized internationalism after WW I, focused on international women's movements and the impact of women from non-Western world regions. Examining the International Council of Women (ICW) and the International Alliance of Women (IAW), Leonie Rörich depicts a remarkable shift away from a European-North American-centred, universalist, and imperialistic outlook towards a more balanced perspective, receptive of the constellations feminists in other world regions were confronted with. The move reveals itself in the expansion into the non-Western world; both organizations admitted branches in Latin America, Asia, the Middle East, and Africa. Evidently, they did so on the grounds of a civilizing ambition or claimed responsibility for the concerns of women in the colonies. Still, the greater inclusiveness was consequential. A reconsideration of the exclusionary membership policy began, leading towards a changed admission policy for women associations from countries without full political sovereignty. It also was expressed in broader agendas and activities, especially in terms of addressing a variety of nation-specific feminist issues (visible in the adoption of resolutions on child marriage and polygamy). Added to that space, the criticism of imperialism was opened up, Western notions of feminism could be rejected directly, and Orientalist stereotypes and misrepresentations could be countered. These changes caused a culturally more diverse participation at the congresses of the ICW and IAW, and pluralized the composition of their internal bodies, all the way up to the execu-

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19   We are very glad that the manuscript has been accepted by Comparativ and grateful for the continuous support and patience of Forrest Kilimnik; without his carefully editing what follows would have looked quite different.

tive level, which Rörich traces in detail for the representation of Indian women. At the same time, she looks at the development of the three Indian women's organization of the time. All of them acted self-confidently in the ICW and IAW, presenting their own situation and policies as instruction for others. In response to the different religions they had to deal with, they imagined an Indian sisterhood and the idea of intercultural convergence, which they sought to insert into the international debates. By portraying such an All-India feminist unity as a variation of "inter-nationalism", they also redefined established notions. In general, they perceived themselves as shapers of the international scene, which is exhibited in their work towards a new feminist internationalism, their global agendas, and internationalization strategies. In parallel, Indian activists initiated regional cooperation and built connections to like-minded groups in European, Latin American, and Arab countries, which leads Rörich to conclude that the Indian women's movement possessed multiple scales and addressed simultaneously local, regional, national, and international concerns, which cautions against equating feminism between the world wars with European thinking and acting. To the contrary, feminist internationalisms were made in different parts of the world and in the context of trans-imperial and transnational networks.

The next four articles look at IOs of the second half of the 20th century, emphasising the 1960s and 1970s as period of transition, particularly for the shaping power of actors from Africa, Asia, and Latin America.

Chloé Maurel analyses the actors' influence and collaboration in UNESCO, as well as the resulting opening of the organization towards their demands and broadened scope of action. While European countries and the US initially dominated the membership and pursued policy, this changed rapidly. Many Latin American countries joined UNESCO in the first years after its establishment, in the early 1950s an Asian-African group established itself, soon followed by other coalitions. In the next decade, the decolonization processes turned the nominal share of Western members in the General Assembly upside down. In multifold ways, non-European representatives pressed that their concerns would be respected and that their interests would be served. In this process, the world outside of Europe and US gained prominence, visible already in the selection of meeting places of the yearly, later biennially General Conferences, as well as, even if to a lesser extent the elections of Director-General. Essential for the impact on and redirection of the UNESCO's agenda and programme was, according to Maurel, collaboration. As early as in 1948, joint action for common concerns began. Although it met fierce resistance, it achieved some of its goals and had institutional effects, such as the establishment of regional offices or the extension of official and working languages. In the 1960s even a collective endeavour to transform UNESCO into an "instrument of cultural decolonization" could be observed, for which an increased spending on projects in the newly independent states and a better representation in the Executive Board was requested, and partially granted. The fight for larger recognition and better status was flanked by a commonly voiced criticism, particularly of an unbalanced world regional representation in the secretariat and in the expert delegations, which were sent to non-Western coun-

tries. United action of members from Latin America, Asia, and Africa reached its peak in the late 1960s and 1970s, thereafter frictions and conflicting interest came to the fore. Nevertheless, a thorough shift in UNESCO's approach to cultural diversity remained, which the article shows by retracing the engagement in Africa. Whereas initially projects offering development aid dominated more and more, an appreciation of African culture, and thus a recognition of cultural diversity, held sway. Increasingly, the budget for the region was used to collect and preserve indigenous and threatened cultural manifestations, as well as to facilitate the knowledge production in Africa and its past in Africa itself, which reflects a rising sensitivity to the positionality of research and politics. In sum, Maurel concludes that "non-Western member states have progressively taken ownership of UNESCO, helped to decentre internal structures, and globalized policies and programmes, thus triggering significant changes in the direction of diminished command by the large powers from Europe and the US" (p. 92).

Policy adaptation besides the rising importance of actors and knowledge production outside of Europe for programmes of IOs are also addressed by Claudia Prinz, who deals with the international health agenda and global disease control programmes, in particular with the control of diarrhoeal diseases, one of the top priorities in international health and health-oriented development aid since the late 1970s. In her detailed reconstruction, she clarifies firstly that shifts in health politics result less from the disease and biomedical progress per se, but are more driven by the institutional settings in which respective research and politics are undertaken. Usually a multiplicity of actors is involved, ranging in the case of diarrhoea from the World Health Organization (WHO), to US and bilateral aid donors as well as numerous national governments, to research institutions in South Asia. An important role is also played by border-crossing institutional collaboration, involving researchers located in the global South, which is exemplified by the John Hopkins International Center for Medical Research, Calcutta and the Pakistan-SEATO, Cholera Research Laboratory, Dhaka – both instrumental in the development of the Oral Rehydration Therapy (ORT), which was made the foundation of a Special Programme for Diarrhoeal Diseases Control (CDD), globally promoted by the WHO, UN International Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF), UN Development Programme (UNDP) and the World Bank. Secondly, Prinz highlights the inherent tension between universalizing claims and the reassertion of local diversity in the formulation of a global "development" programme, which originates from the mutual constituency of locally and globally produced knowledge, local and global power, and the politics of health. Thirdly, the article calls attention to the impact of local knowledge and expertise on international programmes and policies by detailing the history of ORT. While the international development community was enthusiastic about this technology and treatment, the medical community in the many "developing countries", later also the persons responsible for the national diarrhoeal diseases control programmes, was rather sceptical. In this constellation, the authority of regionally generated and legitimized knowledge grew. Illustrative is International Center for Diarrhoeal Disease Research, Bangladesh, which became a major factor in the CDD. Staffed largely by Bangladeshi, it promoted

a regional perspective, operated globally, while it was also a transnational intersection, bringing researchers from epistemological cultures together and enabling multidirectional knowledge transfers.

The article by Changavalli Siva Rama Murthy leads into again a different arena, namely the Non-Aligned-Movement (NAM) and its shaping power of IOs, especially of the UN from the 1960s to 1970s. Here the role of non-European actors is addressed most explicitly, though in a different way, as influence from outside rather than from inside. The basic finding is clear and sharp: NAM was a notable source of transformation and strengthening of contemporary IOs despite its heterogeneous nature and different directions. Murthy subscribes most clearly to the above-mentioned research position that IOs were created by West Europeans and US-Americans, incorporated their values, and advanced their foreign policy interests. He thus considers the purposes of NAM countries as largely different from the interests of the US and its European allies, and consequently emphasises that NAM members countered the "Western dominance" in IOs by engaging with them instead of keeping themselves out. Their commitment arose from their appreciation of the normative power of IOs, i.e., their capability to establish rules of conduct and principles of accountability for all states, their view of IOs as useful devices to preserve freedom and peace, as well as to promote progress and justice. In terms of the concrete impact, the article highlights that NAM countries enhanced the democratic legitimacy of the UN, among others, by pushing the principle of universal membership, which was only adopted in 1964. Furthermore, they undercut the manoeuvring capacity of the "Western countries" and exploited their voting strength, for example, in the negotiations leading to the adoption of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in 1966. And they worked towards the reform of key structures of the UN, as visible in the initiatives leading to the addition of four non-permanent seats to the Security Council or to the threefold increase in membership of the Economic and Social Council. Their transformative role is demonstrated most strongly in two key policy areas: economic development and the control of armed conflicts through peacekeeping missions. The article notes, however, a second general line of the combined efforts of the developing countries, which was to achieve policy reorientations favouring their aspirations and interests, resulting, among others, in the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, new agendas taken up by the UN General Assembly and some of its specialized agencies, as well as new initiatives of the world.

The theme issue closes with an essay by Craig N. Murphy who discusses the International Organization for Standardization (ISO), the peak association of a global network of volunteers – private companies, experts, and national standard-setting bodies – who set international product standards. Together with its forerunner, the International Electrotechnical Commission, it has been the main facilitator of agreements on industrial standards, meant to create the needed infrastructure for a growing global economy. Murphy makes two arguments: Firstly, he reveals that ISO's current global legitimacy emerges from a long-standing and progressive inclusion of non-Europeans and representatives of colonized societies, despite the fact that ISO service to industrial economies played a ma-

jor role. In fact, from the beginning the movement of engineers and applied scientists for global standards was multi-regional and multi-racial, not the least due to its close connection to the electrical industry and the central role of Japan in that field. After World War I, (national) standardization bodies were founded increasingly outside of Europe, which gradually began to collaborate with ISO. That process was spurred in the 1950s by the UN and it technical assistance programmes, which often provided an advisor who helped local engineers establish a national industrial standard-setting body. Reacting to that, ISO began subsidizing these new institutions in the decade to follow. Secondly, Murphy sketches a fundamental change of ISOs interest from creating industrial standards to management systems, and since the end of the Cold War to standards for environmental protection and corporate social responsibility (including human rights, labour, etc.). With this shift, ISO increasingly addressed issues in which its non-Western members had a stake. Even more, many non-European firms and activists promoted environmental and social regulatory standards referring to broader concerns then those Western activists had in mind. This turned the organization into a prime place for negotiation, which again made its standard setting more global. Thus, Murphy concludes that "while the world's 'non-Western' majority may not have fully appropriated the ISO, they have become influential actors within it, working with its executive leadership to make fundamental changes in the organization's focus that may have a significant influence on the global political economy" (p. 138).

All in all, with this issue we hope to inspire research on IOs that explores the growing importance of these institutions in terms of their change, in particular due to the growing range of actors from increasingly different backgrounds and origins who appropriated them. We argue that the more diversified membership made possible open criticism and unequivocal protest against Eurocentric attitudes and regulations, which could grow at times into the formulation of counterproposals; being significant in the respective negotiation. Many different interests were at play and their concurrence explains – not alone but to a considerable extent – why IOs have become significant players. Uncovering the agency and changing potential of the only seeming "margins"[20] helps, in our view, to counter the construction of centres and peripheries, which is implicit in many accounts focusing on the limits of African, Latin American, and Asian voices in IOs. Admittedly, the historical and thorough empirical[21] perspectives that our colleagues and we take up complicate the matter. The impact and shaping power of non-European actors the articles present are always time-, place- and context-dependent. Still, maybe precisely because of that, they tell a fascinating process of decentring and renewal, hard-fought and with clear limits.

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20   We use the notion "margins" only to express the perceived perspective of non-Western regions and actors in the predominantly Western IOs.

21   For the challenge to reconstruct global historical processes from the archive due to the dominating national organization and collection archival material, and the potential of the archives of international organisations, see: E. Rothschild, The Archives of Universal History, in: Journal of World History 19 (2008) 3, pp. 375-401.

Also, beyond the concrete question addressed here, the articles can give encouragement, among others, for a well-needed historicizing of a widespread but problematic concept. Especially in political science, international organizations as a field of study has been somewhat replaced by the notion of global governance. However, global governance already existed in the 19th century with the increasing number of unions, commissions, professional networks, etc.[22] The concept emerged in the early 1990s as a response to the UN's failure to become a "global government" in the aftermath of the East-West conflict between the capitalist West and the Soviet Union. The notion sums up policy areas that the UN supports –human rights, democracy (after 1989), environment, etc. – but regards many stakeholders –states, IOs, NGOs, civil society, private sector, etc.– to be accountable in guaranteeing the responsible management of global problems, challenges, and flows. In the words of the first political science pioneers in the field, it meant above all to secure worldwide "governance" in times without a global government. This notion of "governance without government"[23] somehow diverges attention from organizations and actors, and their weaknesses, towards policy areas. Global governance thus promises a more positive connotation, even though the old actors and organizations are naturally essential participants as well. Is global governance consequently an artificial notion that describes what has already been out there before? Old wine in new bottles? A charming advantage of global governance is that it blurs the Western agents, even though the implied concepts and policies are by and large similarly Western-centric. One may argue that the invention of global governance served as a distraction from the Western-centric international organizations towards more globally legitimate policy areas. Global governance helped to simultaneously de- and re-institutionalize at the same time the Western world order built on controlling IOs. It can be interpreted as an actor-less reinvention of a regulating and defining power, which similarly to the UN in 1945 was based on Western values and concepts. This undermines the decentralization and "globalization" of international organizations, which we will describe with some examples in this issue. De- and re-institutionalization means that the central institutions – for example, for health (the World Health Organization), labour issues (the International Labor Organization), or food (the Food and Agriculture Organization) – now compete with other institutions such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Trade Organization as well as private funds for health or development and ear-marked programmes within organizations. This leads to a greater interconnectedness and complexity of actors and resources, and it further blurs responsibility and transparency, which may help to maintain old power structures. In other words, global governance helps to re-establish mostly Western-dominated power structures by weakening the now more globally representative (read: less Western) traditional IOs and establishing a new, less visibly insti-

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22   M. Herren, Internationale Organisationen (2); C. N. Murphy, International Organization and Industrial Change. Global Governance since 1850, New York 1994.

23   J. N. Rosenau/E.-O. Czempiel, Governance without Government. Order and Change in World Politics, Cambridge 1992.

tutionalized system of global governance that appears more globally legitimate. While global governance scholars often focus on specific areas in narrowly defined time periods, we would need a history of world government(s) and an actor-centred world ordering since the 19th century, which also looks at non-European concepts. We think the contributions in our special issue can also provide some insights in this regard.