Only With the Best Intentions: International Organizations as Global Civilizers

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RESÜMEE

The emergence and massive increase of international organizations (IOs) since the mid-19th century, which has led to a system of “global governance”, has inspired much research and produced many explanations. In the more recent discussion, a critical consideration has been dominant that deconstructs two highly normative characterizations, namely that these institutions mitigated often violent conflicts since the middle of the 19th century and helped the “world community” make use of the potential emerging from increasing worldwide interactions. Examples of the first dimension range from the Hague Peace Conventions (1899 and 1907), the Red Cross to the International Court of Justice (1945) and the human rights documents since the Universal Declaration (1948) up to 

the International Criminal Court (2002). Examples of the second motivation include the standardization of technology, the harmonization of world trade regulations, as well as global health politics and the concern for “development cooperation”. From different angles, it is argued today – as detailed in the introduction of this issue – that IOs were powerful instruments for the European powers and the US to maintain their hegemonic positions. They institutionalized and perpetuated global imbalances, veiled by a discourse that presented them as being neutral players altruistically seeking to improve the world. This legitimizing self-characterization was built upon the idea of a civilizing mission that proved to be enduring, actually guiding their politics up to the present. While true, little recognised as of yet is that the missionary character changed in response to the fact that IOs become more global over time, both in terms of their memberships and in regard to their agendas. Added to that, “non-Western” actors appropriated the IOs for their own concerns, often through internal conflict, thereby transforming their guiding ideas. This argument will be presented in six parts: First, an introductory part providing an overview of what the concept “civilizing mission” means and how it can be employed in the study of IOs. It is followed by an analysis of the international civil service and human rights in the UN system. Afterwards, the article presents the role of civilizing ideas developed by non-Western actors, and, lastly, the concept of “global governance” will be discussed.

**Civilized, Barbarians and Civilizing Missions**

The conceptual problem of the notion “civilization” is, as Mazlish accurately holds, that neither a clear-cut definition nor a universal acceptance thereof exists. In addition, civilization is often compared with or even considered equal to the concepts of “culture”, “modernity” or progress, which further blurs the notion’s content. The concept of civilization emerged during the Enlightenment “as part of the European imaginary”, even though the dichotomy between civilized and barbarian can be traced back to the Greek view during the Persian War in the 5th century BC, which was followed by the Romans and medieval Europeans. The concept’s definition shows a high level of complexity and imprecision, and is “inextricably imbricated with other categories by which historical materials are organized, such as culture, nation and race”. It is important to emphasise that in European – and other world – regions different understandings of “civilization” competed with each other; a clear-cut “European civilization” hardly exists, but rather

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1 In this article, the notion of the “West” is only used as a working concept that typically entails North American, (West) European and other European settler colonies’ shared belief systems, even though these are only constructions and ascriptions, which were both, used to differentiate these from “other”, “non-western” (The “West” and the “Rest”) conceptions as well as adopted and modified by the latter. By no means does the use of the word include a belief in the dichotomic imagination of a world subdivided into west/east or North/South.


constitutes a construct that was used to define “Europe” against other non-European regions. This means that in this article the notion of “civilization” as such and “European civilization” in particular shall be understood as mere constructions. Civilization was seen as a Eurocentric notion of the 18th century as well as “a universalistic measuring rod against which all societies could be compared. In regard to the former, this implied that non-European societies had to become like their European model, or at least as close as possible.” The conceptualization of the notion has notoriously focused mostly – if not exclusively – on Europe, even though others also thought of themselves as being different from “savages”: for example, the Chinese as the Middle Kingdom, Romans embraced the Pax Romana, Arabs distinguished between city and nomads. Mazlish sees these self-images as being parallel to the European “civilization” concept. Also, other civilizations than the European one found recognition; however, explicitly or implicitly these were often regarded as possessing only “a second-class civilizational status” in comparison with the Western model. What made Europe different was its tendency to “expand and explore”. Racism was a normal element in the European discourse on civilization in the 19th century: “the supremacy of European civilization, as it defined itself against its own inner barbarians, but especially as it sought to subordinate to its rule the rest of the world – lesser peoples and civilizations – carried a simple explanation: racial superiority. The scientific explanation, of course, was also a justification, as well as a prescription to cure any possible feelings of guilt”, even though there were critical voices as well. In the end of the 19th century, “international lawyers integrated their nationalism in a larger, humanist version of European civilization, sometimes defining nationhood … in a cosmopolitan way, as an aggregate of, or political compact between, individuals.” Mazower also emphasises that Europeans saw their “civilization” as superior: “Granted the existence of very different cultures and societies around the world, what the lawyers did was to show how the idea of a standard of civilization could provide a criterion for determining global rank and appropriate diplomatic practice.” Lawyers in the 19th century developed a sort of civilizational hierarchy: (1) civilized and half-civilized: Europeans and European settler colonies; (2) Barbaric powers like Ottomans and Chinese, exhibiting some state capacity; and (3) “savage” peoples in Africa and the Pacific.

6 Ibid., pp. 91, 17, 27.
7 “[T]he claim to the obvious superiority of European civilization was shaken both internally, by thinkers such as Mill, Freud, and Elias … and externally by its world wars basically civil (although uncivilized) in nature. Nevertheless, for all practical purposes, until the end of World War II the notion of a superiority of European civilization largely prevailed. Even as a ghost, it exercised a kind of ghastly power.” B. Mazlish, Civilization and its Contents (3), pp. 69-70, 92.
The concept of civilization has mostly served political motives by establishing an internal and external social hierarchy (internal barbarians within civilizations\textsuperscript{10} and the “others” in colonial territories), while “another function of the concept of civilization is to represent an aspiration”\textsuperscript{11}. The common understanding – in the West – of the concept of civilization included a general refinement of the social order, advanced agricultural and industrial development, urbanity, professional specialization, a complex system of transport, and sophisticated economic, social and cultural structures.\textsuperscript{12} Based on the colonial expansion and the related increase in power, Europe largely served as main reference for the idea of civilization, which suggested opposing models like the “civilized” (Europe) and the barbarians (other world regions). Bowden even speaks of an “Empire of Civilization” and holds that “the dominant architects of international society continue to be informed and influenced by a faith in the Enlightenment ideal of progress and human-kind’s universal linear march toward modernity that is universally liberal democratic, market capitalist, and cosmopolitan in appearance.”\textsuperscript{13} Cosmopolitanism was, however, only maintained by “the rational, civilized and universal West”.\textsuperscript{14}

Other civilizations, even those recognised by the West, such as the Chinese or Indian, have largely been ignored when it came to setting up structures of international organization, or as some label it today, global governance. This is the reason why it appears enriching to analyse historical and contemporary international organizations critically in order to identify the underlying concepts of a civilizing mission. As the bigger and better known IOs were mostly European or Western enterprises, at least in the beginning: the connection with both a colonial mindset and a humanistic attitude, particularly in European societies, seems to suggest that civilizing missions being carried out in European countries and toward non-European societies, also decisively influenced the very concept of international organizations.

Jürgen Osterhammel stresses two main features of modern civilizing missions. First, it needs a civilizer who is convinced of his superiority, or the general desirability of his plans, and expects that the recipients of these missions from the outside would basically welcome these endeavours.\textsuperscript{15} Similar views – and this is the first point in understanding IOs as institutionalized and “internationalized” forms of civilizing missions – direct the policies of international organizations. To give one example, the first IOs of the 19\textsuperscript{th}...

\textsuperscript{10} M. B. Salter, Barbarians & Civilization in International Relations, London/Sterling 2002, pp. 19, 28-29, 53-54.
\textsuperscript{11} B. Mazlish, Civilization and its Contents (3), pp. 139-141.
\textsuperscript{13} B. Bowden, Empire of Civilization (2), pp. 2, 3.
century, the international public unions, initially dedicated to technical standardization (thus a seemingly “neutral” and “un-political” field), served as the conservation of the Western norm and value system, which would henceforth determine, mostly unchallenged, international relations. Later such a role was played by specialized organizations such as the International Labour Organization (ILO), the World Health Organization (WHO) or international finance institutions. Their activities “are much more similar in terms of their expected impacts than the often almost impossible to unravel multitude of organizations would suggest. They all share the expectation that developing states will develop once they share the same attitudes to technology as the specialized agencies themselves.” Osterhammel’s definition also corresponds to global inequality, which co-determined the creation and development of IOs.

Wolfgang Schröder distinguishes between three main typologies of civilizing missions: (1) those within a state; (2) those which target societies in other states: and (3) civilizing missions that address the international system as a whole. In the latter case, one finds IOs particularly present. Admittedly, there is a problem in analysing the politics and programmes of IOs as civilizing projects. There is neither a “reference civilization” serving as a standard nor a uniform recipient culture. It is hard to tell whether rather British, French, Spanish, or US-American models of civilization were dominant when organized internationalism emerged. One can, however, assume that a “cosmopolitanized Western civilization” mixture emerged as a result of continuous negotiations, firstly dominated by British and French cultural ideas, and later expanded mainly through North American models. This negotiated concept of “civilization” mirrored minimum standards, which served to identify which societies, peoples, and states qualified as participants of the “civilized community of peoples”, be it members of an IO, or those who would attain membership after a transition to “civilization”, or those who were put on the back burner and were expected to work hard before becoming part of the civilized club. Such a classification is particularly obvious in the preamble to the Covenant of the League of Nations, which speaks of “organised peoples” implying the existence of non-organized or less civilized

20 A nice example for a civilising mission carried out by an NGO is the British Salvation Army whose activities outside of Europe are illustratively depicted by H. Fischer-Tine, Global Civil Society and the Forces of Empire, in: S. Conrad / D. Sachsenmaier (eds.), Competing Visions of World Order. Global Moments and Movements, 1880s–1990s, New York et al., pp. 29-67.
peoples. Minimum standards included the general acceptance of Western-designed international law and more specifically labour norms, health regulations, human rights, and environmental standards or criteria for the granting of International Monetary Fund loans. At least in the beginning, non-Western societies did not participate actively in these negotiation processes; instead they served as references for regions “to be civilized”. Consequently, the applied notion of modernity seemed to be genuinely European.

As unconscious and vague the Europeans’ civilizing missions may have been, they were operating along such a line that was based on Western values, norms and patterns, and standardized rules mostly of European origin. Western European and then North American-European or Western concepts shaped the goals, the structures, the organization, the power relations, and concrete design of policies within and through IOs. Examples would be international norms of weights and measures, telegraphic regulations or labour rights elaborated upon by the International Labour Organization, but also the notion that the League of Nations was mainly a US-inspired venture put into practice by Europeans and the United Nations (UN) was a project largely designed by the United States, which simultaneously carried on the British Empire to some extent. The attribute “international” helped them to claim authority in the light of “neutrality” and “universality” as it was considered less driven by particularistic national interests and more by the belief in a common good. In the following section, I will illustrate my argument by going through the history of IOs.

International Organizations and their Universal Civilizing Missions

One major element in the establishment of IOs was the dedication to “improve the world”. This ambition coincided with the maintenance of a Western-dominated world order, even though this was not necessarily a conscious strategy but rather an implicit conviction that it would be the best to civilize the world with a Western blueprint in hand. It draws attention to the fact that a liberal idealism was at the heart of the founders’ endeavours, which gave wings to many supporters of IOs who regarded them as universal keys to bring well-being to humanity, although non-Western perspectives and civiliza-

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tions were largely ignored. One can describe that as a form of “enlightened colonialism”; their motives mirror benevolent Eurocentric patrimonialism.\textsuperscript{25}

It is important to note that this mission was not necessarily aimed exclusively at non-Western societies, at least not in the beginning. From the Hague Peace conferences until the creation of the United Nations, “civilizing the world” meant first of all to pacify Europe and the West; “universal” meant European/Western and was only later extended to other world regions. The role of international law as a “gentle civilizer of nations”, as elegantly put by Martti Koskenniemi, was decisive for European endeavours to avoid violent conflicts among countries and instead build institutions around international treaties to mediate non-violent solutions instead.\textsuperscript{26} One of the most illustrative examples is the League of Nations, which represented the European desire to pacify the continent and civilize inter-European relations and thus also the behaviour of the respective peoples. Another is the civilization of international relations. If we interpret civilization as a synonym for a peaceful settlement of interpersonal conflicts within a society, then we see that this was transferred to international relations.\textsuperscript{27} With this understanding, international agreements and organizations have become crucial instruments to civilize relations between nation-states and agencies to civilize others. The transformation of colonialism became highly influential in this regard, as it turned at the end of the 19\textsuperscript{th} century more explicitly to civilizing missions that sought to make colonized people “fit to stand for themselves”. After humanism in Europe contributed to the maturing idea that personal characteristics were not based on genetics but on sociocultural influences, a missionary belief developed that replaced the racist ideology of Europeans who considered themselves biologically superior compared with other peoples. This belief in a genetic superiority was substituted with the conviction of the cultural superiority of European civilization, although the former still continued as a principle, at least underneath the surface. According to this civilizing thought, non-Europeans also could profit from this European-made progress, one should only help them to get on the “right” track. Thus, European civilizing missions contained the idea to bring the people in the world closer to the “European” to improve themselves.\textsuperscript{28} European civilizations, particularly the British under Queen Victoria, apparently seemed attractive to other societies, also outside of Europe.\textsuperscript{29}

The world fairs of the 19\textsuperscript{th} century exposed the technical and cultural accomplishments of “civilization” and further showed “social, cultural and anthropological hierarchies”, which downgraded less advanced “civilizations”.\textsuperscript{30}

\textsuperscript{26} M. Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations (8).
\textsuperscript{27} See M. B. Salter, Barbarians & Civilization (10).
This paralleled a similar stance in the policies of IOs and international law that developed “standards of civilization”. After all, the attraction of European civilizations was transferred to the emerging system of international organization. The membership in an IO and thus the participation in the “community of nations” or “global community” appeared desirable for many states, although this also led to repercussions on the condition of the domestic societies. In the 19th century, perceptions of “civilizing deficits” led to dichotomous categories such as “centre vs. periphery”, static vs. dynamic, “backward cultures” vs. “advanced societies”. Simultaneously emerging international organizations accompanied this process, which elevated general standards of the “centre” as expressions of “progressive societies” to international norms. IO member states (“Insiders”) were considered to be progressive, advanced, inventive, while non-members (“Outsiders”) were seen as mere receivers of input from the “Inside”. Madeleine Herren argues that besides the international public unions, forms of international intervention into the administrations of societies evolved that were regarded as a “uncivilized” or at best a “half-civilized” periphery from a European perspective. Following this line of thought, IOs became civilizers of the world through, for example, human rights, development, fair trade relations, a civil conduct of armed conflicts, etc.

According to several authors, the first formulation of a European (in contrast to British or French) civilizing mission took place at the Berlin Conference in 1884/85, where the European colonial powers decided upon the fate of African territories. Anghie and Gong also argue that a European civilizing mission was at the heart of evolving international law, starting in the 19th century. Gong points out that “[w]herever possible, the European countries sought to bring traditional, non-European countries into the international society in as orderly and humane a manner as possible.” Anghie concludes that the League of Nations’ mandate system, development concepts of the UN, and

31 M. Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations (8); G. W. Gong, The Standard of ‘Civilisation’ (9). See also B. Bowden, Empire of Civilization (2), chapter 5.
34 S. Conrad / D. Sachsenmaier, Competing Visions of World Order (20), p. 6.
more recent efforts to define good governance follow same line. Indeed, the influence of international lawyers was decisive in the establishment of “universal” norms defining “standards of civilization”, whose attainment eventually allowed non-Western countries to enter the “international community” of peoples.

In the mandate system, League of Nations member states supervised former German and Ottoman colonies in Africa, the Middle East, and the Pacific. These mandate territories were grouped into A, B and C mandates — according to the expected civilization potential. Without a doubt, the system led to various forms of governance, degrees of self-determination, as well as mixed results regarding the successes and failures. Nevertheless, the very intention of the mandate system creators reflects the purpose to civilize and/or maintain colonial power or influence. According to Mazower, the mandate system “extended imperial control in a less overt form. Nothing showed better the extent to which the League of Nations remained part of a worldview that took the virtues of empire for granted.” For Mark Salter, the mandate categories corresponded to the hierarchization of barbarians and savages. Susan Zimmermann depicts the mandate policies of the League as a “specific form of reform-oriented internationalisation of colonialism”.

One can extend that argument: the mandate system of the League of Nations that administered the colonial territories of the defeated war parties was guided by an “internationalized” civilizing mission. The former colonies were meant to be “released” into independence after a transition period when they were finally “civilized”. The mandate system included “the promise that any coercive rule existing under a liberal world order would be temporary, a station on the way toward an ethical kind of hegemony of the cosmopolitan bourgeoisie under which people everywhere would enjoy the riches – and the political voice – of the citizens in the powerful republics.”

40 “The Ottoman Middle East was carved up into ‘A’ mandates, where the mandatory powers (Britain in Iraq and Palestine, France in Syria and Lebanon) were merely to provide ‘administrative advice and assistance’ to peoples in theory soon to be granted self-government. Most of German Africa became ‘B’ mandates, which the mandatory power was to administer under a list of conditions, including that the territory be opened to commerce and the inhabitants protected in various ways.” “C’ Mandates were in ‘remote’ areas: Southwest Africa, German New Guinea, Western Samoa and some Pacific Islands. “The status of the ‘C’ mandates was particularly ambiguous: the Mandatory power was allowed to administer them ‘as integral portions of its territory’. S. Pedersen, The Meaning of the Mandates System: An Argument, in: Geschichte und Gesellschaft, 32 (2006) 4, p. 561.
41 S. Pedersen, The Meaning of the Mandates System (40).
42 M. Mazower, Governing the World (9), p. 166.
45 “To those colonies and territories which as a consequence of the late war have ceased to be under the sovereignty of the States which formerly governed them and which are inhabited by peoples not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world, there should be applied the principle that the well-being and development of such peoples form a sacred trust of civilisation and that securities for the performance of this trust should be embodied in this Covenant.” Covenant of the League of Nations, Article 22.
There is another facet. The mandate system enabled the colonial powers to transfer the moral burden of colonial administration to a technocratic, faceless bureaucracy: “as domestic public opposition to colonialism had eaten away the moral foundation of colonial empires, they were eager to find an alternative way of managing the administration of these territories in order to keep them open for trade and exploitation.” Thus it legitimated development and the well-being of the “natives” as international principle, which marked the change from exploitative colonialism (imperialism) to cooperative colonialism, which, according to Rajagopal, is development.47 While the 19th-century positivist international law authorized colonial exploitation, the mandate system pretended to guarantee their protection.48 In general, civilizing missions have become a central element of colonialism since the end of the 19th century, which increasingly found expression in international organizations. The mandate system thus perpetuated (informal) colonialism by internationalizing the civilizing mission, while it also civilized colonial rule through its internationalization: “Internationalism was not the antithesis to empire but its civilizer”.49 Also Geyer and Paulmann emphasise that internationalists were “missionaries of civilization”.50

Another illustrative example of civilizing missionary positions in the European interwar period is the conflict within the International Labour Organization on labour rights for persons in non-self-governing regions. The first ILO conference after World War I tackled the question whether international labour standards, with a strong reference to European industrial society, should also be applied in “overseas” areas. The colonial powers addressed this issue initially with a strongly restrictive attitude, which later on softened. It was a matter of “civilizing mission” to equip these workers with a part of labour norms. This provision became famous as the “colonial clause” of Article 35 of the ILO constitution. The colonial powers thus managed to install exceptions for their “overseas” territories from the international labour standards. In practice, the article served the colonial powers before World War II to enfeeble demands for a quicker implementation of these norms in the colonies.51 So, these civilizing endeavours of IOs also had their limits when major powers’ interests were affected. Put together, the whole of ILO conventions and recommendations are labelled the International Labour Code, which includes “a

48 A. Anghie, Colonialism and the Birth of International Institutions: Sovereignty, Economy, and the Mandate System of the League of Nations, in: New York University Journal of International Law and Politics, 34 (2002) 3, p. 515. Moreover, “the League was subordinate to the will of sovereign states. In the mandates, this relationship was reversed entirely. Here, international institutions, rather than being the product of sovereign states, were given the task of creating sovereignty out of the backward peoples and territories brought under the mandate regime.” Ibid., pp. 544, 545.
50 “Despite rival interpretations of what constituted the essence of civilization, debates among internationalists always converged on this topic, which held out the promise of unifying modern societies, if not the world.” M. H. Geyer / J. Paulmann, Introduction (30), p. 9.
many-sided international standardization in the fields of labour, social insurance and other topics related to the welfare state.” The ILO’s labour standards mainly followed the models in democratic and industrialized societies of Western Europe and North America, including the existence and influence of particular interest groups such as trade unions, company federations, and women’s organizations.\textsuperscript{52}

When the United Kingdom and France, in particular, saw the League as increasingly impotent in fighting the rise of fascism and Nazi Germany’s aggressiveness, the delegated and universalized civilizing mission was taken back to London, Paris, and eventually Washington. The war propaganda employed rhetoric of “civilizing the fascist barbarians”. The UN was then designed to restore the lost faith in (Western) civilization after two massive wars and the Holocaust,\textsuperscript{53} and should eventually achieve what the League failed to do: to civilize Europe and the world.

After World War II, direct European control over the colonies could no longer be justified, although the colonial powers needed another two decades to accept this. The new international system was more subtle but still represented an indirect version of the old one.\textsuperscript{54} Koskenniemi points out that the “sacred trust of civilization”, represented in the mandate system, replaced formal European imperialism “as the perspective from which international law conceived Europe’s outside”, which then was substituted by the trusteeship system of the UN.\textsuperscript{55} Zimmermann describes the UN Trusteeship Council – that by and large continued the mandate system of the League – and the development policy of the United Nations as elements of a forward-looking strategy. According to this strategy, the “international community” was composed of many participants that committed themselves to “particular Western universal basic values.”\textsuperscript{56}

Obviously, growth in number of international actors, especially in the 1960s, challenged the Eurocentric dominance.\textsuperscript{57} Particularly, the US feared a demographic menace to Western civilization, a “Malthusian nightmare”: “Worried at the prospects of being swamped by ‘Oriental civilization,’ the United States would forestall this [Western model of development], not through the race war Hitler had forecast but rather by Westernizing the colonial world.”\textsuperscript{58} The old ideas needed to be mediated between old colonial powers and the newly independent countries. For this the concept of “development” was instrumental because it fixed the supposed necessity to include the rest of the world into the realm of modernity, i.e., into the Western economic system. Within this sphere, capitalism was expected to generate advanced economic growth. The higher goal of development was

\textsuperscript{52} B. Reinalda, Routledge History of International Organizations (16), pp. 230-234.
\textsuperscript{53} “Aimé Césaire and Frantz Fanon argue that the Holocaust and Nazi rule removed any moral authority that Europeans might have. Europe’s ‘civilizing mission’ was in crisis if Europe itself was barbaric. Both writers agree that the methods used by the Nazis were colonial methods, perpetrated for the first time on Europeans instead of ‘natives’.” M. Salter, Barbarians & Civilization (10), p. 111.
\textsuperscript{54} R. C. Young, Postcolonialism. An Historical Introduction, Oxford et al., p. 4.
\textsuperscript{55} M. Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations (8), p. 171.
\textsuperscript{56} S. Zimmermann, ‘International – transnational’ (18), p. 44.
\textsuperscript{57} M. Herren, Internationale Organisationen seit 1865 (36), p. 34.
\textsuperscript{58} M. Mazower, Governing the World (9), pp. 285, 273-276.
modernization, equated with a Westernization of the “Third World”, today one would speak about “globalization”. In reality, of course, the implementation of this conception led to quite different outcomes. However, in the discourse, development served to justify the ways and means of the industrialised world, which should serve as uncontested models for the not yet industrialized world, i.e., the “underdeveloped” or later “developing countries”. The most prominent example to illustrate the belief in modernization is still the model of development stages by Walt Rostow, which determined that all societies had to undergo five phases of development, from an initial traditional to the final mass consumption society.

It may be helpful to describe the relationship between “developed” and “underdeveloped” or “developing” countries and societies in three ways: (1) as the West is racially/socially/economically superior than the “rest” it is legitimate to keep it that way (colonial superiority view); (2) as the non-Western world regions suffer, the “developed” world has an interest or is morally obliged to help them develop themselves (benevolent colonialism); and (3) the aggressive exploitation of Western colonialism and imperialism affected the disfiguration and impoverishment of non-Western societies – all reformist endeavours within the Western-dominated world system only serve to maintain existing power relations and only appease the poor, hungry and underprivileged (critical or postcolonial narrative). The second narrative obviously displays the conviction of the global civilizers in international organizations. Compared with the first narrative, the second seems to be progressive, but according to the third it was just an adaptation to the times, where open Western racial-cultural supremacy was challenged. The postcolonial view also regards “development” critically: Even the opening of the concept of development to consider other “developments” such as “participatory” or “socialist” development, or the one proposed by non-Western states in the demand for a New International Economic Order (NIEO) in the 1970s, still maintained the idea that development as such was desirable: “Development had achieved the status of a certainty in the social imagery.” Again, international organizations represented an institutionalized expression of the belief in a somewhat modified concept of progress and (Western) modernity.

A Point In Case: International Civil Servants as Agents of Civilization

Since the 19th century, technological progress seemed synonymous with “advanced societies”, i.e., civilized (and sovereign) nations. However, this not only includes the technical measures and norm-setting policies of IOs, the internal microcosm of these institutions

59 R. C. Young, Postcolonialism (54), pp. 44, 49.
also gave the impression of Western prevalence. Professional networks of emerging vocations (lawyers, physicians, economists, engineers, etc.) formed transnational networks, built respective institutions, and set up the first international public unions, which were only established formally by intergovernmental agreements but essentially remained non-state bodies. These inspired internationalist professional networks can be seen as the forerunners of the international civil service of the 20th century as well as the driving forces of international organization in history. An initially European-dominated international civil service felt dedicated to the task of globally distributing Western conceptions – first in the technical area and later regarding comprehensive social questions.

From the late 19th century until the 1920s, the new social elites in Western societies became involved in the progressive and social democratic movements that fought for “gradual, democratic, expert-guided change through reforms meant to remedy the worst ills and abuses of laissez-faire industrialization”. These individuals mostly came from the new professional middle class, comprising educators, social workers, journalists, physicians, lawyers, economists, and/or businessmen who were all motivated to “improve society.”63 We can regard liberal internationalism64 as a form of powerful ideas that tied together an epistemic community within IOs and outside of these institutions.65 Important internationalists influential in the creation of the League of Nations were the South African Jan Smuts and the British Alfred Zimmern. While they shared a belief in the benefits – for the world and/or, in particular, the British Empire – of international cooperation, both also considered this rather as a Western project and not a multicultural enterprise. It is astonishing that particularly Smuts was convinced of “white supremacy” and that this belief in racial superiority went hand in hand with his belief in international cooperation.66 As Smuts was influential in the planning of both the League of Nations and the United Nations, it is important to emphasise this belief in international cooperation as an enterprise of civilized people as a key idea on which international organizations are built. We can regard the Secretariat of the League of Nations as a place where liberal internationalism became institutionalized.

The international civil service is a concept that only began with the League of Nations in 1920: According to several definitions, international officials can be described as being independent of governments and should therefore be responsible for running the international secretariats. They were supposed to be highly competent, loyal to their organization and internationalist in mind, although not giving up their own national “identity”. One may add that an international version of the Weberian understanding of

64 Mazower speaks of three internationalisms: liberal, communist, and fascist. M. Mazower, Governing the World (9). As all these three concepts seem European, it will be necessary to analyse diverging internationalisms in non-Western societies as well.
65 See, for instance, P. M. Haas, Introduction (63), pp. 1-35.
66 Mark Mazower vividly analyses the contradictions of the internationalism that inspired both men. M. Mazower, No Enchanted Palace (23).
bureaucracy was influential: the idea of a non-political, neutral, effective, and efficient bureaucrat, somewhat mirroring Protestant-secular rationalism. If we take the notion of IOs as norm-generating bureaucracies, a remark by the League’s first Secretary-General illustrates the main narrative of the impartial international civil service working successfully in the background: “It is not always those who secure public praise to whom thanks are mainly due, and the work unknown to the public which is done behind the scenes is often a large factor in the success which has been obtained.”

The recruitment practices in the early years of the League provide an insight into some shared beliefs: When a Member of Section or higher-ranked official was travelling, particularly in countries like China or the Latin American subcontinent, “well-qualified” candidates had a good chance of becoming staff members in Geneva. There is reason to believe that the travelling League officials evaluated candidates they found matching according to a set of Western-oriented parameters. For example, the first Director of the Health Section, Ludwik Rajchman, proposed a Chinese physician he had met on his trip in China. In Rajchman’s telegramme to Drummond, he emphasised that Dr. Tsefang F. Huang was “exceptional” but also that his medical background was a US-American medical training. In the case of staff from Latin America, there was obviously a relation to the Secretary-General’s overall desire to demonstrate the very “international” – in contrast to the perceived European – character of the League. In the first half of the 20th century, we can observe a widely shared belief in European-North American liberal internationalism within the League’s Secretariat, in which national links and peculiarities played a significant role. If we take the Eurocentric idea of Europe as the centre of the world, the staff was rather internationally minded although national loyalties were never abandoned. But a true influence of non-Western ideas of, for instance, bureaucracy or diplomacy, seemed not to notably influence the British-French imprint of the Secretariat’s “nature”. The staff of the League Secretariat showed an increasingly internationalist understanding, but certainly (and understandably) not the global and intercultural idea of the late 20th century. The internationalist thought was clearly inspired by Western ideology and thus per se seemed to keep out non-Western ideas, although it somewhat

67 In accordance, the UN Charter, Article 101, 3, states: “The paramount consideration in the employment of the staff and in the determination of the conditions of service shall be the necessity of securing the highest standards of efficiency, competence, and integrity. Due regard shall be paid to the importance of recruiting the staff on as wide a geographical basis as possible.”
69 Letter from Eric Drummond to Thanassis Aghnides, Geneva, 12th December 1927 (LN Archives).
70 “[F]ound exceptional candidate health section doctor huang strongly recommended health ministry excellent medical background superior American health degree occupied responsible posts china stop in view general personal circumstances early appointment essential stop grateful decision three years contract commencing March next initial salary eighteen thousand two hundred family travelling reimbursable outright rajchman pekinote ipeiping”. Telegramm from Rajchman to Eric Drummond, (from China (Peiping), received in Paris C), 24/11/1929.
paternalistically included non-Western staff members—but only if they shared the same belief in internationalism and an international bureaucracy and thus could legitimize, for example, the universal civilizing mission expressed in the ideas of the mandates. Internationalism was therefore crucial to a basic conviction on which the civilizing thought was founded. Internationalists further combined two key elements of international organization since the 19th century: first, colonialism was seen as problematic insofar as it meant a gradually challenged (European) domination over others—therefore civilizing missions seemed to promise a new moral justification; and second, the ruling classes were only interested in reforms, which would by and large uphold the existing power relations, i.e., Western dominance. Therefore, internationalism embraced international organizations and their reformist approach to improve and civilize the world according to the European blueprint.

After 1945, with the creation of a similarly inspired international civil service of the United Nations, the situation changed insofar as the staff became increasingly affected by East-West conflict concerns. More interesting from our perspective, however, was the entry of non-Western staff after decolonization took off in the 1960s: Western critics soon bemoaned the diminishing quality of non-Western staff members but also their increasingly important governmental ties. In 1971 the UN issued an internal report that deplored disorder, inefficiency, the waste of resources, personal disputes, and useless transfers of incapable employees from one department to another, as well as a decline of motivation and independence of the international staff. A similar report in 1985 mostly confirmed these harsh findings, which led Yves Beigbeder, a former civil servant himself, to identify a crisis of multilateralism: “One reason is that the Western democracies no longer recognize their creature, over which they have lost some of their control; for them, the organizations have thus become politicized.”

Here it appears obvious that a “politicization” was only detected if the practices deviated from the “normal” European methods and work ethics—a divergence from the uncontested impartial bureaucrat (as described in the UN Charter) constituted politicization. Consequently, the increasingly culturally diverse international civil service running the organization’s day-to-day business was considered not to be inspired anymore by the good values of liberal internationalism. Besides the Soviet employees, many non-Western staff members supported policies that were perceived as anti-Western, such as the New International Economic Order, demanding a more just international trade regime favouring the poorer countries. Subsequently, Western governments started to set up special programmes that were attached to the UN and specialized organizations, but had separate budgets, recruitment policies, and concrete goals.

By this, the West sought to circumvent Western-critical UN bodies equipped with secretariats they perceived as increasingly inefficient, costly and politically opposed to Western policies. Here, the dilemma of the civilizing mission becomes apparent: Somehow, the Western governments attempted to impose their idea
of international organization again through special programmes on which the under-funded UN bodies heavily relied. On the other hand, it could be seen as a real problem that the staff became gradually less competent (in terms of the goals and tasks of the staff) and increasingly dependent on governments (also contrasting the UN Charter’s provisions for the staff).

In a way, development policies after 1945 were inspired by a revisited version of paternalistic internationalism: “The international civil servants of the World Bank, FAO [Food and Agricultural Organization], and WHO [World Health Organization] inherited this faith in the ability of professionals to craft rational social policy”. When the non-Western regions sent personnel to the international secretariats, particularly after 1960, these new international civil servants had to a certain extent to adjust to the existing Western organization structure and management culture. Unlike seemingly radical demands in 1974 of the Third World for a New International Economic Order suggest, there seemed to be no serious break with the Western-oriented structures, codes of conduct, and personnel policies. The non-Western personnel did alter the international civil service in practice (and as mentioned before, not few Western observers argued for the worse in terms of competence and impartiality) – but apparently not decisively with regard to the general outlook of the secretariats. Nevertheless, in this area hybridizations have taken place – while Western-style forms, such as codes of conduct, were kept up, these did not necessarily represent the reality and have often been eroded or simply redefined in actuality. An example would be the regionally different ways to put internal employment requirements designed in Geneva or New York – best practice, required qualifications, transparent recruitment procedures, competitive hiring, etc. – into practice outside the Western world. In reality, traditional clientelism and beliefs in gender or age hierarchies seem at times to weigh more than qualifications, effectiveness, or gender equality. This example demonstrates that in many areas Western concepts were only officially upheld, while in practice they were increasingly challenged by hybridizations.

It would be worthwhile to analyse to what extent the international civil service, since 1960 increasingly diverse, rather than following a Western understanding of modernity brought in concepts of modernity from other world regions/countries or were key players in developing an IO sui generis and hybrid idea of modernity at international secretariats.

What one can see in this example is that international organization and the respective institutions appeared to change in their general outlook and began to acquire a “truly” global representative character, at least in terms of represented nations and world regions. A modified mission to make the world a better place still was at the core of their raison d’être. The pledge “to do good” served to make the individuals and groups responsible for and working in IOs believe they were serving a higher or common good, which was translated into the very mission IOs had to fulfil. Consequently, IOs were considered le-

gitimate and even absolutely essential (and irrevocable) institutions due to their civilizing vocation – and now even more representative as the globe seemed justly represented.

**The Concept of Human Rights**

The concept of human rights became more prominent and influential after the Second World War. The characterizations of human rights as either a “gift” to the world or an instrument to foster Western dominance have increasingly been nuanced by newer research. Following up on these arguments, I understand the concept as another expression of a civilizing endeavour. With this I do not mean that human rights were a mere instrument of the West to de-radicalize social and political unrest in other parts of the world and make it the only internationally accepted expression of protest. International human rights – meaning the classical individual (civil and political) rights and possibly also the economic, social, and cultural rights – certainly have Western origins, but were used by non-Western actors for their own demands and interests. Among others, Erez Manela showed that Woodrow Wilson’s call for self-determination after World War I inspired non-Western peoples to long for it too. Roland Burke emphasises that the non-Western enthusiasm for the right of self-determination was matched by a strong support for human rights after 1945. He demonstrates that many non-Western protagonists upheld human rights mostly to support their struggle for independence, to fight against racism, and later to denounce, particularly South African apartheid, “Zionism”, and Pinochet’s dictatorship in Chile. More importantly, he argues that the first universalists in terms of international human rights were in fact non-Western countries, while North Americans and West Europeans still argued that many non-Western societies were not yet ready to introduce and implement human rights in full due to their development stages: “In the opening years of the 1950s, cultural relativism was the language of the Western colonial powers, which resisted any attempt to extend human rights to their colonies”. Even moral eminences like René Cassin – probably due to pressure from his government – called it improper to apply human rights obligations to countries “at the lowest stage of development”. Burke’s argumentation with regard to Western relativism sheds a light on the neglected dimension of Asian, Arab, and African contributions in the making of international human rights, even though it remains debatable to what

82 Ibid.
extent non-Western actors believed in human rights or simply used them. The fact that the Europeans and US-Americans were the first relativists, based on civilizational arguments, is an interesting aspect with regard to the civilizing mission narrative: “Western colonial delegation attempted to evade their human rights obligations through a feigned reverence for the traditional culture of indigenous inhabitants. Their arguments to this end constituted a distinct subspecies of cultural relativism.” Similar to the “colonial clause” of the ILO labour regulations, the opposition of Western governments and intellectuals against the immediate effectiveness of human rights for “uncivilized” peoples also suggests that they should first have to “earn” human rights – an idea that seems fundamentally divergent from the contemporary idea of “universal” human rights. Similar to the right to self-determination, human rights thus appear as concepts to civilize Europe first after the traumatic experience of World War II and the Holocaust, only as a second thought were these extended to other world regions, with a relativism based on civilizational differences. It is remarkable that non-Western actors adapted these concepts for their own struggles for self-determination and independence. Nevertheless, the examples of self-determination (only for Europe), human rights (only for the civilized) or the unsuccessful proposal of the Japanese in 1919 to include a clause on racial equality illustrate the difficulty of non-Western actors to take these attempts of civilization seriously in practice.

To the fragmentary and double-standard universality of human rights, the Third World added their civilizing mission in terms of these rights: The non-Western countries used both human rights as a concept and the UN as a stage to condemn apartheid, to criticise Israel and Pinochet’s Chile, and to denounce former colonial masters with resolutions favouring decolonization and condemning racism. These all were sensitive themes for the West. Chilean torturers, racist Boers, occupying Zionists, and their allied imperialists in the US and former colonialists in Europe were targeted as subjects to be “civilized” by the human rights-defending “international community” speaking through international organizations.

In sum, even though today human rights are often perceived as a moral instrument of the West to “civilize” other world regions, in the origins of the UN human rights politics these rights were emphasised rhetorically by the West, while their concrete one-to-one application to non-Western societies was seen as problematic. Then the “Third World” began using the concept to attack the West with “their weapons” in the 1970s and thus somehow modified the civilizing mission expressed in the concept of human rights as it was now used against the “original” civilizers.

83 Ibid.
84 “Die neue internationale Ordnung hielt mit der Festlegung eines Zivilisationsgefälses eine ambivalente Bot- schaft bereit, zumal 1919 der japanische Vorschlag, die Gleichstellung der Rassen in die Völkerbundssatzung aufzunehmen, gescheitert war.” M. Herren, Internationale Organisationen seit 1865, p. 58 (36); See M. Mazower, Governing the World (9), pp. 162-164.
Non-Western Civilizing Missions

My argument that international organization as a process and the respective organizations as institutional expressions of this process were mostly driven by Western-inspired civilizing endeavours seem to neglect non-Western influences. Non-Western ideas, concepts, and actors were certainly not only recipients of civilizing missions, but also contributed to the continuous change of this powerful concept at international organizations.

First of all, non-Western countries wanted to become members of the civilized club and thus started efforts to “civilize” their societies in order to be accepted as “civilized nations”. In fact, some Asian and Middle Eastern nations were actually considered as being “civilized” by Western observers – even though at a secondary position – which found expression, for example, in the presence of some non-Western delegations at the Hague peace conferences. This recognition of the Ottoman Empire, Egypt (1801–1882), Japan, and, of course, the United States only took place reluctantly and merely because these nations tried to “imitate” Europe. When international recognition did not set in as expected, and with the rejection of introducing racial equality as one of the League’s cornerstones, the Japanese, particularly, pursued to establish an “Asian” or “Eastern” counter-civilization to challenge the Western-dominated model of civilization in international organizations: “The nation must persuade the fellow Asians, who had also been prone to follow the path of Westernization, to awaken to their Asian destiny and join together in reconstructing ‘Asian ideology, Asian political organization, and Asian society’.” But this Asianist rhetoric of the Japanese, who eventually were recognised as “civilized” thanks to their economic success in the 1970s, proved to be unsuccessful among other nations in the 1930s and seemed to have no influence on the civilizing mission at international organizations at all. However, the Bandung conference in 1955, also seen as the birth of the later Non-Aligned Movement, can be interpreted as a form of alternative non-Western organization (in the sense of the process), where a modified civilizing mission began to take shape. In the final communiqué of the conference, Asia and Africa were identified as the “cradle of great religions and civilisations which have enriched other cultures and civilisations while themselves being enriched in the process. Thus, the cultures of Asia and Africa are based on spiritual and universal foundations.” The document also underlined that this wish to strengthen Asian-African cooperation did not base itself on an “exclusiveness or a rivalry with other groups of nations and other civilisations.

86 M. B. Salter, Barbarians & Civilization (10), p. 17.
87 A. Iriye, Cultural Internationalism (85), pp. 36, 39, 44-49. See P. Duara, “The Discourse of Civilization and Pan-Asia

88 Particularly the Trilateral Commission, established in 1973, can be interpreted as a joint effort of Japan, the US, and Europe to safeguard the capitalist system. “By 1980, the countries represented in the Trilateral Commission traded two-thirds of all world exports, and nearly two-thirds of world GNP. The effect was to weaken the bargaining power of the South, at the very moment that the latter’s own internal cohesion was starting to splinter under the impact of the oil crisis.” M. Mazower, Governing the World (9), p. 313.
and cultures”, but that “Asian and African cultural co-operation should be developed in the larger context of world co-operation.” However, Iriye soberly analyses a missed opportunity: “Had this sort of collective action been continued, the Third World might have enriched the vocabulary and content of cultural internationalism: Asian, African, Middle Eastern, and Latin American nations might have cooperated with one another in the cultural as well as other spheres and strengthened internationalism, even as it was being undermined by the geopolitics of the cold war.” The conference document further supported human rights as formulated in the UN realm, but also described the right to self-determination of peoples and nations as a “prerequisite” to their full enjoyment. Most interestingly, the Bandung communiqué ascribed Asia and Africa a “duty towards humanity and civilisation” to avoid a nuclear war and thus to promote disarmament. Although conference documents like this often merely present shiny rhetoric, it is still remarkable that the Asian and African representatives at Bandung described their world regions as responsible for the salvation of human kind and civilization, unlike the capitalist and communist barbarians toying with the ultimate atomic catastrophe. Here, Asian and African nations see themselves as civilizers – and saviours – of the world who turned to the United Nations to stop the arms race for the sake of mankind.

The prominent period of the 1970s, when the Third World displayed a remarkable self-consciousness by challenging Western predominance in many intergovernmental settings and regarding various policy fields seemed to have been accompanied by a sort of non-Western variation of civilizing mission addressed to IOs. The main assumption to improve – at least the “poor” part of – the world was still influential, but own methods for making the (Third) world a better place gained momentum. One of the most convincing examples is the Primary Health Care (PHC) episode supported by the WHO and initially also by United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF): The goal was to achieve “health for all” but not only through Western medicine, vaccinations, and more physicians and hospitals, but also with a stronger reliance on non-Western traditional medicine systems, local health workers like the Chinese “barefoot doctors”, and decentralized basic health care. Shortly, an improvement of particularly rural health conditions with the means of poor societies with non-Western health systems. Primary Health Care became temporarily a very powerful concept that was widely adopted – at least rhetorically

91 A. Iriye, Cultural Internationalism (85), pp. 161-162.
92 “The Conference considers that disarmament and the prohibition of the production, experimentation and use of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons of war are imperative to save mankind and civilisation from the fear and prospect of wholesale destruction. It considered that the nations of Asia and Africa assembled here have a duty towards humanity and civilisation to proclaim their support for disarmament and for prohibition of these weapons and to appeal to nations principally concerned and to world opinion, to bring about such disarmament and prohibition.” Asian-African Conference, Bandung. April 18-24, 1955. Final Communiqué (90), p. 4.
93 “The Asian-African Conference gave anxious thought to the question of world peace and co-operation. It views with deep concern the present state of international tension with its danger of an atomic world war. The problem of peace is correlative with the problem of international security. In this connection, all states should co-operate, especially through the United Nations, in bringing about the reduction of armaments and the elimination of nuclear weapons under effective international control” Ibid., pp. 4-5.
– at the WHO. Interestingly enough, the concept was seen as promising also for the “rich” world, even though Europeans and physicians in general were reluctant to consider this form of non-Western mission as appropriate. The WHO European regional office responded sceptically to the universal claim of the PHC concept: As Europe constituted a technically and industrially “advanced” region with a “highly organised medical coverage”, PHC was rather seen as important for “developing countries”. Even though the European office admitted that PHC was also significant for Europe, its relevance was, however, different: “it must be adapted to European cultural and developmental achievements” because diseases and health problems of Europeans were different from those of other world regions.94

Even though conditions in various world regions certainly differ, the reaction may also be read as a general reluctance to adopt non-Western concepts to civilize Europe, to put it provocatively. In any case can we interpret Primary Health Care as a hybrid form of civilizing mission in global health politics that included significant non-Western elements. Many non-Western member states and WHO representatives were convinced that this new approach would actually achieve “health for all in the year 2000”, as a momentous PHC conference in 1978 proclaimed. This conviction of the right methods in combination with an intriguing optimism do allow us to qualify PHC as a civilizing mission, which was shaped to a large extent by non-Western concepts, even though it did not abandon the Western medical approach entirely but rather constituted a mixture of Western and traditional non-Western medicine.

Similar elements of introducing non-Western civilizing missions might be alternative cultural concepts as through the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the demand for a New Information and Communication Order, or the entire human rights debate beyond the first and second generation rights catalogue (including the right to self-determination, to development, or the elusive “right to be different”).

In a way, Akira Iriye believes, imperialism can even be regarded as a form of internationalism: “it brought different races and cultures together and established an international ‘community’. Imperialism spread Western civilization to non-Western areas of the world and thus contributed to developing global awareness.”95 It raises the relevant question to what extent the inclusion of non-Western peoples/cultures (on equal terms) into internationalist thought would have destroyed the intra-Western consensus. One has to keep in mind, however, that the IOs in the 20th century – although some of its guiding figures earnestly advocated cooperation with the non-West – did not practise a “global internationalism”; their civilizing mission did not change but stick to the idea of inequality. The UN, contrary to how it appears today as the saviour for suppressed victims from their savage governments (in Asia and Africa, in particular), continues to try to civilize

94 From Dr. D. Glyn Thomas, to: Dr. D. Tejada de Rivera, ADG. EURO Report for the International Conference on Primary Health Care, Regional Director’s Report: P7/48/7, 21 March 1978 (WHO files), p. 11.
95 A. Iriye, Cultural Internationalism (85), p. 41.
the violent transformations Western powers in Afghanistan or Iraq undertake as their own 21st-century version of a civilizing mission, and thus – in practice – substantiates its role as civilising force of both, the “uncivilized” and the civilizers. This is insofar noteworthy as also non-Western actors participate actively in the endeavour to civilise the Western civilizers, which results in a broader legitimisation of the UN’s mission when it reminds also Western powers of international law obligations or human rights commitments. So in the end, the UN appears to be the legitimate civilizer of “less civilized” regions and societies (“developing” areas) as well as the only civilizer of the new Western civilizing missions in the Arab world (anti-terrorism), Africa (humanitarian interventions), or Latin America (“war” against drugs, for instance).

Global Governance as a Civilizing Mission

“As a means of rescuing the mission of empire from its darker, dirtier side, this language of responsibilities, care, and duties survives with surprisingly few alterations into our own times as the vocabulary with which a postcolonial ‘international community’ now validates rule by its own executive organs, in the shape of the United Nations.” In the course of contemporary “globalization” and the concept of “global governance” that emerged since the early 1990s, tendencies of a modified international civilizing mission underline that international organizations continue civilizing the world. After the neoliberal decade of the 1980s and the collapse of Eastern European socialism, globalization became a major catchword that has often been equated with economic and financial globalization only. In this context, in which capitalism appeared to be the uncontested worldwide system, calls for international, or rather global regulation emerged: global governance should handle all the good and bad aspects caused by increasing global intertwining. The notion has not been authoritatively defined, despite the existence of a Commission on Global Governance installed by the UN in the mid-1990s. The problem of the term is that it neglects “government” (the UN is not a world government) and rather hints at a collectivity of various actors and “international regimes” (trade, human rights, environment, etc.). Some authors equate global governance with international organization(s). This provides the opportunity to regard global governance as a historical phenomenon that already started in the mid-19th century. This is insofar relevant as global governance can be directly connected to a form of world order – or maybe better “ordering” the world as an ongoing process – apparently based on some universally shared values. This interpretation of global governance would suggest, if applied to the mid-19th century, that already the public unions addressing technical areas were expres-

97 M. Mazower, Governing the World (9), p. 73.
98 C. Murphy, International Organization and Industrial Change (n. 46).
sions of a general motivation to regulate and “order” the world based on certain (Euro-
pean) standards and associated belief systems. I see this as (another) argument against
the functionalist assumption of politically neutral technical agencies. In any case, as IOs
gained worldwide reputation since they were considered neutral or “international”, so
global governance is portrayed by some as a positive (or neutral) way to address global
problems in the interest of all people (or mankind).

One may find some similarities between the combination of self-interests of the West
and civilizing convictions in terms of global governance, for instance with regard to the
categorisation of the mandate territories. The UN Millennium Development Goals or
the Global Compact are good examples as they rely on traditional Western beliefs (de-
velopment, economic growth, human rights, and social responsibility to appease the un-
happy) following humanitarian convictions (like the “responsibility to protect”) without
seriously putting the existing, largely Western-dominated, world order into question. 99

An important element of the civilizing process was the limitation of violence, a general
tendency to establish legal rules to civilize and humanize armed conflicts. Mazlish con-
siders that in the Middle Ages absolutist monarchies promoted this restraint from vio-
lence also to maintain power, while asking whether today the UN is doing the same. 100

The reference to international law as an example of mediation rather than going to war
was considered an achievement of “civilized peoples”. In general, the establishment of
international legal regulations laid the foundation for an international community of
“civilized” states that accepted certain norms and rules. Those who did not were un-
civilized. 101 Regarding these “humanitarian duties”, Mazower sees a continuity between
making peoples in independent mandate territories in the 1920s and 1930s “fit for the
modern world”, the UN trusteeship system, and the more recent concept of a “respon-
sibility to protect”. 102

John Gerard Ruggie states that “[a]t the normative level, liberal
internationalism, of which the United States has been a leading champion, tradition-
ally has served as an animating vision of global governance.” In this context, notions
like “global community” or “global civil society” suggest a sort of worldwide network,
while those who diverge from this unwritten consensus are declared an “uncivil society”,
such as transnational criminal or terrorist networks. 103 Thus I follow Yakub Halabi who
provides a rather critical interpretation of global governance: “Global Governance is
an attempt to manipulate the forces of globalization, mitigate globalization’s negative
effects, and privilege states that follow global rules” and it “involves an attempt by the
developed countries to regulate relations among states and to bind developing states to
global rules. But, perhaps more importantly, global governance helps shape domestic
institutions within the latter countries so that they become more compatible with global

103 J. G. Ruggie, Foreword, in: T. G. Weiss / Ramesh Thakur, Global Governance and the UN. An Unfinished Journey,
Bloomington (IN), p. xix.
regulations, ensuring that developing states will not engage in economic nationalism at
the expense of the developed countries.”104 I rhetorically ask whether this is really a new
phenomenon. In addition, it seems that the richer countries’ supposed “forced integra-
tion” of poorer countries into a system of global rules also originates from a deep belief
that these universal sets of norms and rules are actually the best for all – thus combin-
ing the pursuit of own interests and benevolent motives.105 Halabi further distinguishes
between three groups of economically poorer states from a Western viewpoint. The first
group is “underdeveloped states” receiving little foreign direct investments (FDI) due
to a lack of modern capitalist institutions, small markets, high illiteracy rates, and low
per capita income. The West doubts their rationality and wants to advance them out of
altruistic motivation. The second are states receiving little FDI, but are considered to be
strategically (Egypt, Turkey) or economically (oil exporters) important, in company with
labour-intensive economies that do not pose a threat to Western countries. The Bretton
Woods institutions put them under pressure to adopt free market economies. The third
are states attractive for FDI in the past 20 years (newly industrialized countries, NICs):
“These states have challenged the developed countries in their own markets and are the
ones that have been consistently pushed to adopt Western models of economic order and
to help create, among other things, a level playing field in international trade”.106 This
grouping appears similar to the categorization of the mandate system and can be seen as
reflecting the economic-financial “maturity” of the respective states.

Conclusion

Power structures, contemporary problems, events, and personal preferences and networks
have shaped the origins and further development of international organizations and their
policies. Nonetheless, the civilizing missions international organizations followed have
been another powerful element in the making of IOs. It appears necessary to use the
plural form, as several competing and contradictory civilising missions co-existed. Other
authors have already identified civilizing features of IOs. I go further and consider these
as an almost ingenuous and often unconscious driving force that has been elementary for
the very establishment and further advancement of international organizations. Accord-
ingly, I deem it helpful to identify civilizing missions as a discourse of a perceived moral
obligation and personal dedication to “do good” at the heart of international organiza-
tion since this discourse not only reflects the longing for progress and modernity as well

104 Y. Halabi, The Expansion of Global Governance into the Third World: Altruism, Realism or Constructivism?, in:
105 Interestingly enough, the recent emergence of new regional or prospective “world powers” (China, India, Brazil)
rather led to 19th-century power politics with a strong reference to national sovereignty and less to alternatives
and a fundamental questioning of the present international system. See The Economist, 20 August 2010, and T.
G. Weiss / R. Thakur, Global Governance and the UN (103), p. xix,
as the belief in the natural superiority of initially mostly Western, secular, technocratic, and up-to-date techniques or solutions, but also mirrors the benevolence of the decisive actors, mostly deeply embedded in humanitarianism or, more general, liberal internationalism. At the same time cultural relativism as a European invention went along with civilizing missions that were initially rather aimed at Western societies to improve social conditions and prevent wars. Nominally these missions also included non-Western societies. However, there were limitations that were not necessarily motivated by colonial interests only but also postulated in the belief that these societies were not ready yet for (1) self-rule, (2) independent economic government, (3) social achievements such as human rights, labour rights, freedom of speech, or gender equality, and (4) in general not fit for democracy (even applicable today).

It is important to note since benevolent civilizing missions often ignored cultural peculiarities, the “otherness” of non-Western societies was often only considered collectively in comparison with the Western ideal (the “West and the rest”), not between the “others”. In colonial times it joined the belief of racial inferiority; later on cultural “backwardness” replaced the former, including the articulated need to advance to Western standards. With good reasons, it has been argued that since the emergence of IOs these incorporated a problematic paternalism. This has proven to be long lasting. The current discourse and practice of global governance has been elevated to an impersonal and secular catechism of enlightened multilateralism: Peace, human rights, democracy, the preference of diplomacy over violence, and the belief in international solutions have become cornerstones of international politics, at least at the rhetorical level.

In comparison to the war-torn first half of the 20th century when the League of Nations – founded in the spirit to prevent a second (European) world war – proved to be impressively ill equipped and lacking substantial support to maintain the fragile European peace, there has certainly been an improvement despite the problems for international organization in view of the East-West conflict. However, the non-Western countries seemed to do both, adapt unconditionally to pre-existing concepts and procedures of IO, and at times contesting these fiercely with success in some policy areas. Non-Western actors, however, appeared hardly able to challenge the very concept of international organizations and civilizing missions fundamentally, also as a result of an often brittle unity. One may certainly argue that particularly since the 1970s, and even more so since the beginning of the new millennium, rising non-Western powers have challenged the Western imprint on IOs.

However, international organizations also sought to civilize colonialism and later civilizers. Furthermore, also non-Western ideas were introduced and contributed to modifying the nature of civilizing missions carried out by IOs. Nevertheless, the debate on a truly global health policy or global human rights – in contrast to neo-colonial medicine in world health or Western individualized rights – often moved within the previously established frameworks, and in the end succeeded to broaden the dimension of “global health” and human rights. When it comes to funding or policy priorities, however, the hybridized forms we can see still bear a rather Western imprint (human rights, health
programmes, development projects, global governance) to civilize the world. It seems that also non-Western actors and ideas supported the idea of making the world a better and more civilized place. In the case of Primary Health Care, we can detect both a combination of Western medical practices to non-Western “health realities” with existing “traditional” practices, as well as a challenge to the previously by and large hardly contested pre-eminence of Western medicine as the superior standard. The prevalence of Western concepts in general and in world health politics in particular seems to hint at a perpetuated Western civilizing mission, conducted by health organizations since the early 20\textsuperscript{th} century. Nevertheless, the strong influence of the Chinese concept that combined traditional Chinese medicine with Western medicine, adapted to the challenge of remote rural populations, can be seen as a sort of non-Western version of civilizing efforts. With Primary Health Care, the WHO challenged predominant Western definition methods of what is necessary but at the same time created a sort of non- (or less) Western-dominated civilizing mission to bring “health for all” to the world’s peoples. Interestingly, the advocates of PHC as a sort of hybrid non-Western version of civilizing mission were also uneasy about other world regions – here Europe in particular – that showed more scepticism regarding the applicability of this concept to their region.

Contemporary IOs are also shaped by civilizing missions that contain Western patterns of making the world a better place by making the world more “European”, “Western”, or simply “modern”. These “best intentions” have also led to laudable successes, such as the improvement of labour conditions, women’s rights, democratic standards, or better health conditions. Large problems remain that often display a pitiable lack of holistic approaches or inappropriate measures applied to culturally different regions. Today it seems difficult to be “uncivilized”: “While the word ‘civilization’ has become almost taboo, the underlying doctrines are flourishing more than ever. The key words now are development, modernization, and human rights.”\textsuperscript{107} In accordance, nowadays the belonging to the “international community” requires the acceptance of international law, rules, and norms – and a hierarchy is also still shimmering through when politicians and academics speak of rational and “rogue” states, or news magazines write about “serious states”.\textsuperscript{108} My argument that a global civilizing discourse has been one of the essential driving forces for international organization shall contribute to a more accurate study of international institutions as an alternative to a questionable postcolonial overall condemnation of these institutions, and too normative and applauding assessments of IOs as only universally legitimate global “governors”. It will be of particular research interest in the future to look closer at non-Western internationalisms and their influence on civilizing features of IOs.

\textsuperscript{107} J. Fisch, Internationalizing Civilization, p. 257 (37).  