The American Way of Empire: The United States and the Search for Colonial Order in the Philippines

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RESÜMEE

Der Erwerb kolonialer Besitzungen der USA im Pazifik und der Karibik wird oft als temporäre Abweichung von einer grundsätzlich anti-kolonialen nationalen Tradition gedeutet, und dabei betont, dass die Kolonialherrschaft der USA weder in Anlage noch Ausprägung mit den europäischen Imperien vergleichbar sei. Dieser Aufsatz zur US-Kolonialpolitik in den Philippinen hinterfragt diese Sichtweise und skizziert das Interesse amerikanischer ‚Kolonialexperten' an administrativem und militärischem 'know-how', das aus europäischen Erfahrungen gewonnen wurde. Nach einem Jahrzehnt intensiver Transfers gewann jedoch die Deutung vom „Sonderweg" amerikanischer Kolonialbestrebungen die diskursive Oberhand. Die Vorstellung von der vorgeblichen Einzigartigkeit und Benevolenz des amerikanischen Kolonialprojekts auf den Philippinen speiste sich einerseits aus dem Stolz über die dort durchgeführten sozialtechnischen Steuerungsmaßnahmen und andererseits aus dem an die Kolonisierten gerichteten Versprechen politischer Partizipation und letztendlicher Unabhängigkeit.

1. Imperial *Sonderweg* or "Transnational Nation"?

The field of U.S. history is currently undergoing a fundamental transformation as the traditional historiographical claim to an exceptional national development of the United States has received increasing scrutiny by scholars who advocate the internationalization of American history.[1] Recent transnational histories of the United States as well as

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1   This tendency is analyzed in: K. K. Patel, Transatlantische Perspektiven transnationaler Historiographie, in: Geschichte und Gesellschaft, 29 (2003) 4, pp. 625-647; for a programmatic statement, see: D. Thelen, The Nation

path-breaking work on transatlantic ideational transfers during the era of progressivism have shed new light on the international dimension of American history and helped to contextualize the nation's historical development.[2]

Despite highly innovative work on the historical configurations of U.S. expansionism, however, much analysis of the American empire still remains largely shaped by the powerful and enduring legacy of exceptionalist thought.[3] At the core of this teleological world view rests the thesis of the exceptional position and promise of the United States as chosen nation and successful democratic experiment.[4] The missionary dimension of this world view is saturated with a pronounced anti-European thrust in which the new world is transfigured as a counter-model of historical development to the old world. As a consequence, American and European approaches to colonial empire are seen by many as incompatible, despite their temporal simultaneity largely unrelated.

The following essay on American rule in the Philippines questions such assertions and documents the intense interest of the United States in the colonial knowledge of European powers, in particular Great Britain. In contrast to the assertion that contemporaries interpreted the U.S. colonial empire as a counter-model to European approaches, a closer look at the Philippine case demonstrates the initial intensity with which transfers of British colonial 'know-how' informed American approaches to colonial warfare and governance.

2. Colonial Order I: the Quest for Military Control

After victory in the Spanish-American War of 1898, the United States acquired colonies in the Caribbean and the Pacific Ocean and entered a phase in its national history in which empire and colonial state-building were equated with international stability, progress, and civilization.[5] The Philippine Islands constituted America's largest colony. The Filipinos had struggled against the Spanish crown, which had colonized large parts

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and Beyond: Transnational Perspectives on United States History, in: Journal of American History, 86 (1999), pp. 965-975.

2   I. Tyrell, Transnational Nation. United States History in Global Perspective since 1789, New York 2007; T. Bender, A Nation among Nations: America's Place in World History, New York 2006; on transatlantic exchange during the progressive era, see: A. R. Schäfer, American Progressives and German Social Reform, 1875–1920: Social Ethics, Moral Control, and the Regulatory State in a Transatlantic Context, Stuttgart 2000; D. T. Rodgers, Atlantic Crossings: Social Politics in a Progressive Age, Cambridge (Mass.) 1998.

3   Exceptions to this trend with particular relevance to our understanding of the U.S. colonial project in the Philippines are: P. A. Kramer, The Blood of Government: Race, Empire, the United States, and the Philippines, Chapel Hill 2006; J. Go / A. L. Foster (eds.), The American Colonial State in the Philippines: Global Perspectives, Durham 2003.

4   As introduction to the concept of exceptionalism, see: E. Glaser / H. Wellenreuther (eds.), Bridging the Atlantic: The Question of American Exceptionalism in Perspective, Cambridge (Mass.) 2002; D. T. Rodgers, Exceptionalism, in: A. Molho / G. S. Wood (eds.), Imagined Histories: American Historians interpret the Past, Princeton 1998, pp. 21-40; D. L. Madsen, American Exceptionalism, Jackson 1998; D. K. Adams / C. A. v. Minnen (eds.), Reflections on American Exceptionalism, Staffordshire 1994.

5   As introduction see: F. Ninkovich, The United States and Imperialism, Malden 2001.

of the archipelago since the mid-16th century, and after the defeat of Spain by the United States an indigenous liberation movement under the leadership of Emilio Aguinaldo hoped for independence, proclaimed the Philippine Republic, and formed a provisional government.[6]

The administration of William McKinley ignored such aspirations and dispatched expeditionary forces against the remaining Spanish troops on the islands. In December of 1898, Madrid transferred control over the Philippines to the United States in the Treaty of Paris. Simultaneously, Washington rejected the drive for Filipino independence and war between Aguinaldo's poorly equipped troops and the U.S. Army commenced in February of 1899.[7]

More than 125,000 U.S. troops were deployed during the military conquest of the islands between 1899 and 1913. More than 4,200 U.S. soldiers were killed and 3,500 wounded. The Filipino forces lost at least 20,000 soldiers, and estimates of the number of civilian casualties range from 250,000 to 750,000, approximately ten percent of the pre-war population.[8]

Despite the strong U.S. military presence and technological superiority, the United States encountered great difficulties in breaking Filipino resistance. In addition, the environmental and climatic conditions in the colony posed a severe challenge to troops unaccustomed to the tropics and drastically increased the soldier's disease susceptibility. While about ten percent of U.S. troops were wounded in battle, some regiments reported a fifty percent loss due to tropical diseases.[9]

The political and military leadership in Washington assigned the improvement of health conditions among soldiers a top priority, and U.S. military surgeons soon explored the experiences of neighboring European colonial armies in the tropics in the quest for transferable know-how. The British case soon emerged as the most trusted and relied on reference point for improvements to America's colonial army.[10]

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6   The Filipino independence struggle and the role of Aguinaldo are analyzed in: P. S. d. Achutegui/M. Bernad, Aguinaldo and the Revolution of 1896: A Documentary History, Quezon City 1972; J. H. Schumacher, The Propaganda Movement, 1880-1895: The Creation of a Filipino Consciousness, The Making of the Revolution, Quezon City 1997.

7   Most recently: D. J. Silbey, A War of Frontier and Empire: The Philippine-American War, 1899–1902, New York 2007; F. Schumacher, 'Niederbrennen, plündern und töten sollt ihr'. Der Kolonialkrieg der USA auf den Philippinen, 1899–1913, in: T. Klein / F. Schumacher (eds.), Kolonialkriege. Militärische Gewalt im Zeichen des Imperialismus, Hamburg 2006, pp. 109-144.

8   Michael Adas estimates the civilian casualties at more than 700,000, see: M. Adas, Dominance by Design: Technological Imperatives and America's Civilizing Mission, Cambridge (Mass.) 2006, p. 134; see also: J. M. Gates, War-Related Deaths in the Philippines, 1898–1902, in: Pacific Historical Review, 53 (1984), pp. 367-378; G. A. May, 150,000 Missing Filipinos: A Demographic Crisis in Batangas, 1887–1903, in: Annales de démographie historique (1985), pp. 215-243.

9   Data in: M. Gillett, The Army Medical Department 1865–1917, Washington D. C. 1995, p. 216.

10   Climatic induced health concerns remained foremost on the minds of military planners during the first decade of the 20th century even after medical research and social engineering had improved conditions for American soldiers and civilians in the Philippines. The Philippine Commission, America's colonial executive council reported in 1901: "While it may be confidently anticipated that the establishment of a well-organized department of public health in these islands will lead to a general improvement in sanitary conditions, it will doubtless remain true that troops which are forced to campaign in the damp lowlands, or to garrison towns which have

This ironic twist, that an ex-colony turned empire now relied on advice from its former imperial center from which it had separated in a bloody war for independence, was the latest manifestation of a fundamental transformation in Anglo-American relations in the second half of the 19th century.[11] This "great rapprochement" (Bradford Perkins) was fostered and accompanied by and accelerated through the transfer of power in the international system from British dominance to American primacy.[12] It was mainly characterized by peaceful crisis management (i.e. the Venezuela Boundary Crisis 1895/1896), the extension of mutual support in international affairs (i.e. during the Spanish-American War of 1898 and the Anglo-Boer War of 1899–1902), intensified transnational relations, and the development of a strong sense of kinship between Britain and the United States.[13] American entrance into the club of colonial powers benefited from and simultaneously contributed to the intensification of this rapprochement process.

Only months after the U.S. victory in the Spanish-American war, Lt. Colonel Robert O'Reilly, designated chief surgeon for the American occupation force in Cuba and later surgeon general of the United States, embarked on an inspection tour of Jamaica to study the lessons learned by the British with regards to the housing, clothing, and feeding of soldiers stationed in the tropics.[14]

O'Reilly's recommendations had far reaching consequences for the U.S. Army's sanitary and medical policies. His report facilitated the introduction of new khaki colored uniforms and tropical helmets. It also supported the development of procedures for food hygiene and the prohibition of liquor. Finally, the insights gained from O'Reilly's inspec-

sprung up in situations where towns should never have been built, will suffer more or less severely from diarrhea, dysentery, and malaria." U.S. Department of War, Report of the Philippine Commission, 1901, v. 1, pp. 63-64; on American public health policies and tropical medicine in the Philippines: W. Anderson, Colonial Pathologies: American Tropical Medicine, Race, and Hygiene in the Philippines, Durham 2006; W. Anderson, Immunities of Empire: Race, Disease, and the New Tropical Medicine, 1900–1920, in: Bulletin of the History of Medicine, 70 (1996) 1, pp. 94-118.

11   W. N. Tilchin, Theodore Roosevelt and the British Empire: A Study in Presidential Statecraft, New York 1997; H. C. Allen, Great Britain and the United States, 1783–1952, London 1954; K. Bourne, Britain and the Balance of Power in North America, 1815–1908, London 1967; A. E. Campbell, Great Britain and the United States, 1895–1903, London 1960; C. S. Campbell, Anglo-American Understanding, 1898–1903, Baltimore 1957; R. G. Neale, Britain and American Imperialism, 1898–1900, Brisbane 1965; B. Perkins, The Great Rapprochement: England and the United States, 1895–1914, New York 1968.

12   A. E. Eckes, Jr./T. W. Zeiler, Globalization and the American Century, Cambridge 2003, pp. 9-37; P. K. O'Brien/A. Clesse (eds.), Two Hegemonies: Britain 1846–1914 and the United States 1941-2001, Aldershot 2002.

13   This sense of kinship was most evident on the level of popular reactions to Queen Victoria's death and President McKinley's assassination. Americans, although staunchly republican, had come to regard Victoria as a model ruler. Her death in 1901 created enormous attention in the United States and inspired an outpouring of pro-British sentiment. Those sympathies were reciprocated when President McKinley was shot in September 1901 with strong expressions of British affection for and sympathy with the United States. See: C. S. Campbell, Jr., Anglo-American Relations, 1897–1901, in: P. E. Coletta (ed.), Threshold to American Internationalism: Essays on the Foreign Policies of William McKinley, New York 1970, pp. 221-255; see also: M. Sewell, 'All the English-Speaking Race is in Mourning': The Assassination of President Garfield and Anglo-American Relations, in: The Historical Journal, 34 (1991) 3, pp. 665-686; M. Sewell, Queen of Our Hearts, in: S. Ickingrill/S. Mills (eds.), Victorianism in the United States: Its Era and Legacy, Amsterdam 1992, pp. 206-234.

14   Will Study British Methods, in: The New York Times, December 6, 1898, p. 14; also: Troops in the Tropics, in: The Washington Post, December 6, 1898, p. 9.

tion tour provided pragmatic arguments for the improvement of military barracks and the building of the highland-sanatorium "Camp John Hay" as part of the construction of a summer-capital in Baguio, two-hundred and sixty kilometers north of Manila.[15]

The construction of this sanatorium was part of a new approach to troop rotation developed by army surgeons in close collaboration with their British counterparts. From a medical point of view, the climatic conditions in the Philippines were deemed detrimental to the health, and consequently the fighting performance, of U.S. soldiers. Many surgeons thus recommended frequent rest and recuperation in non-tropical climate zones, ideally in the United States.

As the temporary return to the United States for large amounts of troops was deemed too costly and logistically inefficient, regiments would rotate between high- and lowlands to allow for recuperation and tropical acclimatization and thus serve an important military function. As the head surgeon for the Philippine Department argued:

> *Camp John Hay is as necessary to U.S. troops as the hill stations of India are to English troops [...] Without Baguio, in the present lengthened tropical tour of service, a decided increase in insanity, in border line cases of various psycho-neuroses, and in tuberculosis would be inevitable.*[16]

In the 'battle' against the degenerative impact of tropical conditions, O'Reilly had also recommended the recruitment of troops deemed accustomed to such environmental challenges. He specifically suggested the creation of African-American regiments, a policy which was begun in 1899.[17] The logical next step was to follow the British approach completely and to raise indigenous colonial support troops in the Philippines.[18]

His recommendation, however, encountered initial resistance. In March of 1899, the *Washington Post* printed the headline "Not to have a Native Army: Methods of Imperialistic England not to be followed." The paper reported:

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15 On American urban planning in the colonial Philippines: F. Schumacher, Creating Imperial Urban Spaces: Baguio and the American Empire in the Philippines, 1898–1920, in: A. Ortlepp / C. Ribbat (eds.), Taking Up Space: New Approaches to American History, Trier 2004, pp. 59-75; D. Brody, Building Empire: Architecture and American Imperialism in the Philippines, in: Journal of Asian-American Studies, 4 (2001) 2, pp. 123-145; T. S. Hines, The Imperial Facade: Daniel H. Burnham and American Architectural Planning in the Philippines, in: Pacific Historical Review, 41 (1972) 1, pp. 33-53; R. R. Reed, City of Pines: The Origins of Baguio as a Colonial Hill Station and Regional Capitol, Baguio City 1999.

16 Major P.C. Field, Medical Corps, n.d. untitled report extract, in: Dean Worcester Papers, Papers and Documents, v. 3, Special Collections Library, University of Michigan.

17 W. B. Gatewood, Jr., Black Americans and the White Man's Burden 1898–1903, Urbana 1975, pp. 261-292.

18 On native troops in American service: U.S. Department of War, Adjutant General's Office, Military Information Division, Colonial Army Systems of the Netherlands, Great Britain, France, Germany, Portugal, Italy, and Belgium, Washington D. C. 1901; see also: J. R. Wollard, The Philippine Scouts: The Development of America's Colonial Army, Ph.D. dissertation, The Ohio State University 1975; B. McAllister Linn, Cerberus' Dilemma: The U.S. Army and Internal Security in the Pacific, 1902–1940, in: D. Killingray / D. Omissi (eds.), Guardians of Empire: The Armed Forces of the Colonial Powers, c. 1700–1964, Manchester 1999, pp. 114-136; G. Y. Coats, The Philippine Constabulary, 1901–1917, Ph.D. dissertation, The Ohio State University 1968.

> *Although authorized by the new army law to recruit an army of 35,000 in the colonial possessions, the President will not avail himself of the opportunity. The real reason for this decision is said to be a desire to avoid as much as possible all appearance of imitating imperialistic England. In other words, the native troops of India are to have no counterpart in the United States.*[19]

There were several reasons for President McKinley's initial hesitancy to appropriate the tested British model, all of which were less informed by an American desire to stay aloof of European colonial models than by political maneuvering. For one, the Democratic Party, whose platform remained strongly opposed to empire, had suggested a congressional amendment to the 1899 Army Organization Bill to allow the replacement of homeward bound American troops with native soldiers. The opposition thus envisioned that the re-organization of the colonial army along British lines would ease a future withdrawal from the islands and eventually end America's 'adventure' of colonial empire.

In addition, the presidential hesitancy was also a response to reservations about arming the colonized, expressed by a number of congressional and military leaders in Washington. In this context, the British experience served as a negative foil for imagined and anticipated disastrous consequences of arming Filipinos. In this discursive context, the British example was used as a warning with frequent references to the 1857 Sepoy Rebellion. As Augustus Bacon of Georgia argued on the floor of the U.S. Senate:

> *[…] I shall never forget the impression made upon me in looking at the pictorial newspapers […] with the pictures of the sepoys bound to the mouths of cannon and blown to pieces […] I do not want any such transactions under the American flag.*[20]

This negative disposition was not uncommon, as long as the assumption prevailed that the U.S. Army would quickly and decisively end the war in victory. As the campaigns dragged on and as the numbers of American casualties increased, military and civilian resistance to a colonial support army all but vanished. The British model of arming large numbers of natives in the colonies now became the order of the day in the American Philippines. By 1901 the first native regiments were founded which would ultimately grow close to 10,000 native soldiers in the Philippines and another 7,000 in Cuba and Puerto Rico. They formed an important part, in some parts of the Philippines certainly the backbone of the colonial army.

In addition to the continuous inter-imperial ideational exchanges on military matters, the Anglo-Boer War (1899–1902) afforded the American military an unprecedented opportunity to compare its actions in the Philippines with British colonial warfare in South Africa. This war was an important milestone on the way to the close association between both nations, and America's 'benevolent neutrality' during the war accelerated

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19   Not to have a Native Army, in: The Washington Post, March 7, 1899, p. 1, my emphasis.

20   Quoted in: P. A. Kramer, Empires, Exceptions, and Anglo-Saxons: Race and Rule between the British and United States Empires, 1880–1910, in: Journal of American History, 88 (2002) 4, pp. 1315-1353.

the rapprochement between both powers and utilized the conflict as a platform for the celebration of Anglo-Saxon unity.[21]

Yet, American support for the British cause in South Africa and the nation's infatuation with British colonial 'know-how' was widely debated in the United States. The anti-imperialists who had failed to prevent the creation of an American overseas empire utilized the South African War to condemn their own nation's imperial policies.[22] Nationally acclaimed journalists and publicists and many members of Congress, particularly from the Democratic Party, portrayed the Boer War as a struggle for independence of a heroic people against the commercial interests of an unjust empire. British strategy in South Africa, in particular the introduction of the concentration policy, did much to damage the image of the Empire in substantial segments of the American public.

In December 1900, American writer and social commentator Mark Twain emphasized this downside of Anglo-Saxon cooperation with his scathing critique of the British and American colonial wars. At a dinner in the Waldorf-Astoria Hotel in New York he introduced Winston Spencer Churchill with the words:

> *For years I've been a self-appointed missionary to bring about the union of America and the motherland. […] Yes, as a missionary I've sung my songs of praise. And yet I think that England sinned when she got herself into a war in South Africa which she could have avoided, just as we sinned in getting into a similar war in the Philippines. Mr. Churchill, by his father, is an Englishman; by his mother he is an American – no doubt a blend that makes the perfect man. England and America; yes we are kin. And now that we are also kin in sin, there is nothing more to be desired. The harmony is complete, the blend is perfect.*[23]

The supporters, on the other hand, activated the sentiment of Anglo-Saxonist kinship and portrayed the Anglo-Boer War as an example for the advance of civilization.[24] In this discourse the Boers appeared as backward looking people who stood in the way of progress and would benefit from the uplifting effects of British colonial rule. For the supporters of an American empire, Anglo-American solidarity and lesson-learning from the British, such as Theodore Roosevelt, Henry Cabot Lodge, Albert J. Beveridge, John Hay,

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21   T. J. Noer, Briton, Boer, and Yankee: The United States and South Africa, 1870–1914, Kent 1978; R. B. Mulanax, The Boer War in American Politics and Diplomacy, Lanham 1994; W. N. Tilchin, The United States and the Boer War, in: K. Wilson (ed.), The International Impact of the Boer War, New York 2001, pp. 107-122; S. E. Knee, Anglo-American Understanding and the Boer War, in: Australian Journal of Politics and History, 30 (1984) 2, pp. 196-208; B. Farewell, Taking Sides in the Boer War, in: American Heritage, 27 (1976) 3, pp. 20-25, pp. 92-97; W. B. Gatewood, Jr., Black Americans and the Boer War, 1899–1902, in: South Atlantic Quarterly, 75 (1976) 2, pp. 226-244.

22   On anti-imperialism: R. E. Welch, Jr., Response to Imperialism: The United States and the Philippine-American War, 1899–1902, Chapel Hill 1979; E. B. Tompkins, Anti-Imperialism in the United States: The Great Debate, 1890–1920, Philadelphia 1970; R. L. Beisner, Twelve Against Empire: The Anti-Imperialists, 1898–1900, New York 1968; P. Foner / R. C. Winchester (eds.), The Anti-Imperialist Reader: A Documentary History of Anti-Imperialism in the United States, New York 1984.

23   M. Twain, Mark Twain's Speeches, Whitefish 2004, p. 65.

24   S. Anderson, Racial Anglo-Saxonism and the American Response to the Boer War, in: Diplomatic History, 2 (1978) 3, pp. 219-236.

and Alfred Thayer Mahan, Anglo-Saxonism provided a powerful impetus and reassuring racialized ideological framework.

The concept advanced the argument that the civilization of the English-speaking nations was superior to that of any other nation because of allegedly inherited racial traits and characteristics, in particular industry, intelligence, adventurousness, and talent for self-government. Those abilities were contrasted with the accomplishments of other races in a hierarchy of racial success.[25] Advocates emphasized that Anglo-Saxonism had provided the basis for the perfection of democratic government and that Britain and America were consequently ideally suited for the civilizational uplift of the imperial mandate. In addition, Anglo-Saxonism fused with a social-Darwinist conception of international relations turned colonialism into a racial mission and obligation for the betterment of global conditions.

Such racial interpretations of Anglo-American cooperation and the South African War were complemented by a number of less mundane and very pragmatic considerations. The simultaneity of America's colonial war in the Philippines and Britain's war in South Africa offered multiple connections for those Americans charged with the military security of the empire. The U.S. government sent observers to South Africa to study British military tactics, military hardware and medical progress for applicability to America's own colonial war in the Philippines.[26] Most importantly, the simultaneous military blunders of both nations resulted in an intensive Anglo-American discourse on improving the professionalism of the armed forces and enabled close collaboration on military reform which laid the foundations for the long-lasting defense cooperation of Britain and America.[27]

In addition, the simultaneity of events enabled American advocates of empire to frame their support and their understanding of American actions in the Philippine theater through reference to British experience and behavior. This discursive strategy, the British Empire as reassuring reference point for the moral propriety of American actions, became widespread after the American military conduct in the archipelago came under close scrutiny and public criticism in the United States. In particular the so-called concentration zones designed to isolate Filipino resistance and the widespread use of torture

25   On Anglo-Saxonism and the American empire, see: P. A. Kramer, Empires, Exceptions, and Anglo-Saxons (footnote 20); R. Horsman, Race and Manifest Destiny: The Origins of American Racial Anglo-Saxonism, Cambridge (Mass.) 1981; A. M. Martellone, In the Name of Anglo-Saxondom, for Empire and for Democracy: The Anglo-American Discourse, 1880–1920, in: D. K. Adams / C. A. v. Minnen (eds.), Reflections on American Exceptionalism (footnote 4), pp. 83-96; S. Anderson, Race and Rapprochement: Anglo-Saxonism and Anglo-American Relations, 1895–1904, Rutherford 1981.

26   For example: U.S. Department of War, Adjutant-General's Office, Military Information Division, Reports on Military Operations in South Africa and China, July 1901, Washington D. C. 1901.

27   As one historian has observed: "The weaknesses exposed in the American and British armies in the Spanish-American War and Boer War produced closer collaboration between the two states on military reform." See: R. J. Barr, The Progressive Army: US Army Command and Administration, 1870–1914, New York 1998, p. 59; see also: T. K. Nenninger, The Leavenworth Schools and the Old Army: Education, Professionalism, and the Officer Corps of the United States Army, 1881–1918, Westport 1978.

(the so-called 'water-cure') by American soldiers interrogating Filipino prisoners of war, were in part legitimized by reference to British tactics during the Boer War.[28]

The executive and the military leadership's approach at first questioned the credibility of the charges. But after more and more witnesses of torture and abuse came forward, the government argued that American actions had been an appropriate response, morally justified by the brutality of the guerilla war waged against the colonizers by the independence movement. In a third and final step and in response to increasing Congressional demand for the court-martial of important commanders in the Philippine campaign, advocates of imperial expansion responded with frequent references to British actions in South Africa and claimed the moral superiority of the Anglo-American cause in taking up the "White Man's Burden". The analogies drawn from the empire's war against the Boers were to contextualize American actions as 'natural' and 'legitimate' responses by an army confronted with a guerilla enemy. "So we see," the *Washington Post* argued, "that the United States does not stand alone in having furnished isolated cases of bad conduct toward an inferior people or in exposing and punishing them. Human nature is very much alike everywhere."[29]

The army in the Philippines had followed the example set by its British cousins in Africa, so the argument went. And because the empire was considered the most enlightened imperial power of all, American actions that followed the British example could not be considered indicative of a break-down of moral order. War was hell, and moral scruples about the conduct of troops, in South Africa or in the Philippines, were, according to many enthusiasts of empire, simply out of place as they irresponsibly delayed victory and thus slowed down the march of civilization:

> *There is nothing easier than to criticize army movements from the comfortable seclusion of a library chair. […] war is stern and cruel, and cannot reasonably be anything else […] War means fighting and fighting means killing.*[30]

The analogies of the South African and Philippine-American wars utilized the Anglo-Saxonist rhetoric of racial solidarity. The common war experience fostered not only an intense inter-imperial discourse on the applicability and transferability of colonial 'know-how' but fermented a widely held sense of common destiny which left a deep cultural imprint.[31]

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28   On torture during the Philippine-American War: F. Schumacher, "Marked Severities": The Debate over Torture during America's Conquest of the Philippines, 1899–1902, in: Amerikastudien / American Studies, 51 (2006) 4, pp. 475-498.

29   A Few African Parallels, in: The Washington Post, July 27, 1902, p. 18.

30   Guerilla Warfare, in: The Los Angeles Times, January 20, 1901, p. B6.

31   For example, Elbridge Brooks, famous author of juvenile literature, introduced his popular With Lawton and Robert (1900), in which an American boy volunteers in the Philippine War and fights for Britain in the Boer War, with the theme of imperial 'brotherhood': "[…] the Stars and Stripes in the Philippines, and the Union Jack in South Africa, are advancing the interests of humanity and civilization […]". E. S. Brooks (with Lawton and Roberts), A Boy's Adventure in the Philippines and the Transvaal, Boston 1900, p. 1.

3. Colonial Order II: the Quest for Administrative Control

The military conquest of the Philippines was accompanied by the American search for an appropriate model of colonial governance for the islands. In the government's program of research and fact-finding on all matters colonial, the British Empire quickly emerged as the leading reference point as it had in colonial military affairs. Many contemporary American analysts and observers praised the advantages of British rule, the efficiency of its colonial administration, and its enlightened approach to colonial state building.

In part, this pro-British Empire attitude was enabled by a discursive conceptual differentiation between what contemporaries described as 'negative' and 'positive' forms of imperial control.[32] 'Negative' imperialism was characterized by conquest, the mere desire for profit and the resulting exploitation of the indigenous population. 'Positive' imperialism on the other hand aimed at order out of chaos and placed great emphasis on fostering the development and civilizational 'uplift' of the colonized. This distinction and the accompanying re-interpretation of British rule in India in particular, enabled many American proponents of overseas expansion to openly praise the accomplishments of the British Empire.[33]

In December of 1899, Secretary of War, Elihu Root, the chief architect of America's colonial policies, described the mechanics of inter-imperial knowledge transfer in a letter to a friend:

> *The first thing I did after my appointment was to make out a list of a great number of books which cover in detail both the practice and the principles of many forms of colonial government under the English law, and I am giving them all the time I can take from my active duties.*[34]

The secretary kept a reference library of mostly British texts on colonial law and administration in his office and considered the systematic evaluation of the activities of other colonial powers an essential guide to American decision-making. So did the State Department under Secretary of State John Hay who instructed American diplomats in Great Britain, France, the Netherlands, and Germany, to collect and forward comprehensive analyses of those nations' colonial policies.[35]

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32   John M. Coski suggested this discursive conceptual differentiation, see: J. M. Coski, The Triple Mandate: The Concept of Trusteeship and American Imperialism, 1898–1934, Ph.D. dissertation, College of William and Mary 1987, pp. 60-62.

33   For many American advocates of imperial expansion Britain's brutal suppression of the Sepoy Mutiny in India, 1857/58, had been a watershed in London's administration of the subcontinent, after which enlightened, selfless, and impartial civil servants were trusted with the administration and the East India Company abolished; for the impact of British actions in India on American anti-imperialists: A. Raucher, American Anti-Imperialists and the Pro-India Movement, 1900–1932, in: Pacific Historical Review, 43 (1974) 1, pp. 83-110.

34   Letter Root to Samuel L. Parish, December 1, 1899, in: Elihu Root Papers, Library of Congress Manuscript Division.

35   Hay to Samuel Porter (France) No. 613, Hay to Choate (Great Britain) No. 111, Hay to Stanford Newell (Netherlands) No. 217, Hay to Henry White (Germany) No. 858, May 2, 1899, in: RG 59, Diplomatic Instructions, Microfilm Series M77.

President William McKinley followed a similar direction and ordered the First Philippine Commission, a fact-finding committee under the direction of Cornell University president Jacob Gould Schurman, to collect information on modes of colonial governance in preparation for American rule in the Philippines. This commission carefully studied the situation in the archipelago and compiled substantial data and analyses on the colonial practice of other powers in the region. In this context, Montague Kirkwood, a British lawyer who had already served as an advisor to the Japanese colonial administration of Formosa, prepared a thorough analysis of the administrative, judicial, social, and military dimensions of British rule in India, Burma, Ceylon, the Federated Malay States, and the Straits Settlement. This analysis "Administration of British Colonies in the Orient" was included in the final four-volume *Report of the Philippine Commission to the President* officially presented on January 21, 1900.[36]

The recommendations of colonial experts were accompanied by the massive research program initiated by the Library of Congress and a number of government departments to collect information from all colonies and dependencies worldwide.[37] Some of the results, such as the Treasury Department's report *The Colonial Systems of the World* received widespread distribution and remained in use for years as standard reference texts in executive as well as legislative deliberations on colonial policies.[38] Its conclusions confirmed the McKinley administration's particular interest in the emulation of British models:

> *The most acceptable and therefore most successful of the colonial systems are those in which the largest liberty of self-government is given to the people. The British colonial system, which has by far outgrown that of any other nation, gives, wherever practicable, a large degree of self-government to the colonies.*[39]

Advocacy of learning from the British Empire was not limited to governmental decision-making circles but was complemented by a widespread public discourse, carried out in the nation's magazines and newspapers. Their contributions often extensively praised the accomplishments of British colonial rule as the American public was introduced to the intricacies of colonial law, administration, and comparative colonial trade. The crown's representatives in Egypt, the Malay Straits, India, and Hong Kong became icons of popular reference and Anglo-American solidarity.

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36   U.S. Congress, Senate, Report of the Philippine Commission to the President, S. Doc. 138, 56th Congress, 1st Session, 1900.

37   The Library of Congress became an initial clearing house for information on other colonial systems and information on America's colonial possessions. On request by Henry Cabot Lodge, chairman of the Senate Committee on the Philippines, it compiled extensive bibliographies on material available to colonial decision-makers. For example: A. P. C. Griffin, A List of Books relating to the Theory of Colonization, Government of Dependencies, Protectorates, and Related Topics, Washington D. C. 1900.

38   Department of the Treasury, Colonial Administration, 1800–1900: Methods of Government and Development adopted by the Principal Colonizing Nations in their Control of Tropical and other Colonies and Dependencies, Washington D. C. 1901, p. 1199.

39   Ibid., p. 1407.

During this period of intense search for colonial models, universities, professional organizations, and scholarly journals also placed themselves at the service of empire. In particular, historians, sociologists, political scientists, and economists advanced the call for close inter-imperial learning and initiated numerous research projects into a wide variety of colonial issues.[40] The nation's universities established courses in comparative colonial administration and economy relying heavily on British expertise.[41] The University of Chicago even appointed a Colonial Commissioner, Alleyne Ireland, who gained prominence as a prolific writer, government advisor, and ardent proponent of transplanting British colonial methods to America's new overseas territories.[42]

On the colonial frontier, Americans also tapped into the resources of British imperial experience. They devoured the writings and reminiscences of imperial administrators such as Lord Cromer, frequently visited British colonies in the neighborhood, conducted inspection tours in Egypt and India, and traveled halfway around the world to meet top-level officials of the Empire's colonial civil service.[43] Or they simply visited the colonial office in London like Captain George Langhorne, who recalled later:

> *[…] in 1899, en route to the Philippines for the first time, I passed through London and went to the colonial office there, and […] asked the officials if they had any colony where the people were similar to those in these islands. They then told me of the Malay States and gave me a number of blue books, reports, etc […] They were of much use in the associations I had with the Filipinos during my first tour in Luzon.*[44]

Despite their enthusiasm for the British record of colonial empire, those charged with the development of American colonial state-building emphasized that the appropriation of European, and in particular British, models would strive for a balance between outside input and national traditions. For Secretary Root for example it was imperative:

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40   G. Marotta, The Academic Mind and the Rise of U.S. Imperialism: Historians and Economists as Publicists for Ideas of Colonial Expansion, in: American Journal of Economics and Sociology, 42 (April 1983) 2, pp. 217-234. F. C. L. Ng, Governance of American Empire: American Colonial Administration and Attitudes, 1898–1917, Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago 1975; B. C. Schmidt, The Political Discourse of Anarchy: A Disciplinary History of International Relations, Albany 1998, see chapter 4.

41   A number of British authors on colonialism reached fame as standard textbooks and reference works: John R. Seely, The Expansion of England, Boston 1898; C. W. Dilke, Greater Britain, New York 1869; E. G. Wakefield, A View of the Art of Colonization with Present Reference to the British Empire, London 1849; A. R. Colquhoun, The Mastery of the Pacific, New York 1899; highly influential were also works by famous British colonial administrators such as E. B. Cromer, Modern Egypt, New York 1908; G. N. Curzon, Lord Curzon in India, New York 1906.

42   F. C. L. Ng, Governance of American Empire (footnote 40), pp. 75-87; for a selection of Ireland's writings, see: A. Ireland, Tropical Colonization: An Introduction to the Study of the Subject, New York 1899; id., The Anglo-Boer Conflict: Its History and Causes, Boston 1900.

43   We have for example detailed descriptions of at least five meetings between W. Cameron Forbes, Governor General of the Philippines and Lord Cromer in London. Descriptions are to be found in Forbes' excellent diaries, i.e.: Journals of W. Cameron Forbes, First Series, v. III, January 1909 [there is only one long entry for the month] LC Manuscript Division; First Series, v. V, June 1, 1912; First Series v. V, November 17, 1913; Second Series, v. I, April 17, 1915.

44   Langhorne quoted in: D. J. Amoroso, Inheriting the "Moro Problem": Muslim Authority and Colonial Rule in British Malaya and the Philippines, in: J. Go / A. L. Foster (eds.), The American Colonial State (footnote 3), pp. 118-147, p. 118.

> *To take the lessons we could get from the colonial policy of other countries, especially Great Britain, and to apply it to the peculiar situation arising from the fundamental principles of our own government, which lead to certain necessary conclusions which don't exist in Great Britain or Holland, notwithstanding the spirit of liberty and freedom in both those countries.*[45]

This flexible approach resembled what theorists of cultural transfer have described as appropriation and rejection. Information is borrowed freely from the experience of others, reconfigured, and applied to a new context.[46] The British experience of empire thus provided an intellectual framework within which Americans could discuss their own ideas about colonial rule.[47] The insights from inter-imperial exchanges were pitted against the nation's core values and earlier experiences with continental expansion.

Those experiences suggested the evolutionary nature of the American system of progression from territory to statehood as exemplified by the Northwest Ordinance of 1787 and the administration of the Louisiana Territory.[48] Territories would pass through a state of preparation during which the inhabitants would acquire basic experience and training for self-government. It was this sense of progression that inspired the tendency to differentiate between American and British approaches to colonial administration. While London focused on the development of colonial infrastructures, Americans would focus on the preparation of the colonized for self government and eventual independence.

For the Philippines this produced a dual approach. The administrative framework for the northern half of the archipelago resembled that of a British crown colony. The sovereign power retained complete legislative and executive authority over the islands, as the Filipinos were deemed largely unfit for popular participation in government and because the continued war in the archipelago made it impossible for American government to give too much power to locally elected representatives before not total control had been established. Indigenous political participation was postponed until an unspecified later date.

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45 P. C. Jessup, Elihu Root, Binghampton 1938, p. 345; in an interview with Jessup in September 1930, Root elaborated this theme further, see: P. C. Jessup Papers, LC Manuscript Division, Part I: Elihu Root Material, 1600–1939, interview September 20, 1930, box 227.

46 As introduction to the concept of cultural transfer: C. Eisenberg, Kulturtransfer als historischer Prozess. Ein Beitrag zur Komparatistik, in: H. Kaelble / J. Schriewer (eds.), Vergleich und Transfer. Komparatistik in den Sozial-, Geschichts- und Kulturwissenschaften, Frankfurt am Main 2003, pp. 399-417; J. Paulmann, Internationaler Vergleich und interkultureller Transfer. Zwei Forschungsansätze zur europäischen Geschichte des 18. bis 20. Jahrhunderts, in: Historische Zeitschrift, 267 (1998), pp. 649-685; J. Paulmann, Interkultureller Transfer zwischen Deutschland und Großbritannien. Einführung in ein Forschungskonzept, in: R. Muhs / J. Paulmann/W. Steinmetz (eds.), Aneignung und Abwehr. Interkultureller Transfer zwischen Deutschland und Großbritannien im 19. Jahrhundert, Bodenheim 1998, pp. 21-43.

47 A. Iriye, Intercultural Relations, in: A. DeConde (ed.), Encyclopedia of American Foreign Policy: Studies of the Principal Movements and Ideas, New York 1978, pp. 428-441.

48 For example: H. K. Carroll, The Territorial System of Our New Possessions, in: Outlook, 63 (December 23, 1899), pp. 966-968; this positive identification with America's past was not undisputed. Some critics decried the incompetence and the lack of professionalism in previous territorial administration. For critique and the demand for a professional civil service: D. S. Jordan, Colonial Lessons of Alaska, in: Atlantic Monthly, 82 (1898), pp. 577-591; A. L. Lowell, Colonial Civil Service: The Selection and Training of Colonial Officials in England, Holland, and France: With an Account of the East India College at Haileyburg (1806–1857), New York 1900.

In the southern half of the islands, in Sulu, Mindanao, and Palawan populated by Muslim ethnic groups described by the Spaniards as *Moros*, Washington at first followed the indirect rule model established by Britain in the Malay Straits, where British officials governed in the name of Malay sultans. Americans perceived this framework of colonial rule as a system that preserved indigenous structures of authority while securing strict British control over revenues and expenditures.

In July of 1899, Brigadier-General John Bates negotiated a treaty with the Moros in which indigenous rulers recognized the supreme authority of the United States and promised to suppress piracy in exchange for economic subsidies and relative freedom of action.[49] The main goal of this agreement was to prevent the southern islands from joining the independence struggle of the North led by Emilio Aguinaldo. Once the independence army had been defeated by the summer of 1902, the Bates-Treaty and its concept of indirect rule was increasingly seen by the colonial government as an obstacle to colonial state-building in the Philippines.

This process aimed at integrating the various components of the Philippines into one colony under complete American control. The widespread practices of polygamy and slavery among the *Moros* defined them as backward and uncivilized in American eyes and resulted in the preferential treatment of the northern Christian Filipinos over the Muslim South. A heterogeneous alliance of church leaders, abolitionists, progressive reformers, and staunch imperialists exerted increasing pressure on the U.S. government to abandon the British model of indirect rule which was increasingly considered a liability. As Leonard Wood, first governor of the Moro Province wrote to an English friend:

> *You are quite content to maintain rajahs and sultans and other species of royalty, but we, with our plain ideas of doing things, find these gentlemen outside of our scheme of government, and so have to start at this kind of proposition a little differently.*[50]

Such an approach, Wood admitted, might work within the British system but would be counterproductive to America's long-term plans. Wood and other colonial officials became more assertive in their suggestion that the history of Indian-white relations during the Euro-American conquest of the American West provided ample guidance for an effective system of governance for the southern Philippines.[51] The Bureau of Insular Affairs, the American equivalent to the colonial office in London, devised removal plans while the U.S. Army launched a war on the Filipino Muslims which lasted up to World

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49   On American policies in the southern Philippines: P. G. Gowing, Mandate in Moroland: The American Government of Muslim Filipinos, 1899–1920, Quezon City 1983.

50   Wood quoted in: D. J. Amoroso, Inheriting the "Moro Problem" (footnote 44), p. 139.

51   P. G. Gowing, Moros and Indians: Commonalities of Purpose, Policy, and Practice in American Government of two Hostile Subject Peoples, in: Philippine Quarterly of Culture and Society, 8 (1980), pp. 125-149; for the application of Indian stereotypes and experiences beyond the southern Philippines: W. L. Williams, United States Indian Policy and the Debate over Philippine Annexation: Implication for the Origins of American Imperialism, in: Journal of American History, 66 (1980) 4, pp. 810-831; A. Paulet, The Only Good Indian is a Dead Indian: The Use of United States Indian Policy as a Guide for the Conquest and Occupation of the Philippines, 1898–1905, Ph.D. dissertation, Rutgers University 1995.

War One to subjugate the Moros and militarily prepare their assimilation into main-stream colonial society.[52]

4. Epilogue: The Renaissance of Exceptionalism

The St. Louis world's fair, officially called *Louisiana Purchase International Exposition*, opened its gates to the public on April 30th, 1904.[53] Visitors were introduced to a dazzling spectacle of revolutionary technologies, such as new modes of transportation and communication. In addition, the fair also developed a coherent vision of America's new empire through presentations of the colonial 'other'. Ethnographic displays were an integral feature of world's fairs and international expositions. The display of 'exotic' races typically emphasized their backwardness and state of savagery and thus provided imperial self-assurance and entertainment in the colonial metropolis often under pseudo-scientific disguises.

At the St. Louis World's Fair anthropological exhibits reached unknown highs with the largest ethnographic shows ever. More than 2,000 natives were brought to the fair from all corners of the globe and displayed in large supposedly natural and indigenous habitats, much like a human zoo. To be sure, as at other fairs, the display of the 'exotic' served the colonial propaganda also in St. Louis. But the Louisiana Purchase Exposition also provided a radical departure in the tradition of ethno-shows and ethnographic displays by outlining the possibility of inclusion through educational uplift.

So far, the 'exotic other' had simply provided a static backdrop for the social Darwinist ideology of colonial supremacy. The nations of the 'civilized world' were supposedly engulfed by a world of darkness in which dangerous and benighted races threatened the course of progress. Their fate was extinction, their potential for change negligible. The St. Louis world's fair gave those colonial discourses a distinct American accent by insisting on the dynamic nature of progressive evolution. In a paternalistic ideology of uplift, progress and inclusion into the one world was to be achieved through benevolent assimilation. The process was deemed difficult and tedious, and not everyone would succeed.

This emphasis on the possibility of change, of progress through enlightenment, permeated the entire fair and reflected its emphasis on education. With this focus the United States

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52   On the so-called 'Moro-War': A. J. Bacevich, Jr., Disagreeable Work: Pacifying the Moros, 1903–1906, in: Military Review, 62 (1982), pp. 49-61; D. S. Woolman, Fighting Islam's Fierce Moro Warriors, in: Military History Magazine, 19 (2002), pp. 34-40; D. Smythe, Guerrilla Warrior: The Early Life of John J. Pershing, New York 1973; W. W. Thompson, Governors of the Moro Province: Wood, Bliss, and Pershing in the Southern Philippines, 1903–1913, Ph.D. dissertation, University of California at San Diego 1975; G. Jornacion, The Time of the Eagles: United States Army Officers and the Pacification of the Philippine Moros, 1899–1913, Ph.D. dissertation, University of Maine 1973.

53   As introduction to the St. Louis world's fair: W. Kretschmer, Geschichte der Weltausstellungen, Frankfurt am Main 1999, pp. 157-165; Y. M. Condon, St. Louis 1904 – Louisiana Purchase International Exposition, in: J. E. Findling / K. D. Pelle (eds.), Historical Dictionary of World's Fairs and Expositions, 1851–1988, Westport 1990, pp. 178-186; R. W. Rydell, All the World's a Fair: Visions of Empire at American International Expositions, 1876–1916, Chicago 1984, pp. 154-183.

attempted a new outlook, in conscious contrast to Europe, on the colonial system, the predominant system of order for large parts of the world in the early 20th century. As a colonial power, it suggested that progress and civilization could flow to even the remotest corners of the earth and rejected those who insisted on fixing the current division of the one world for eternity.

The fair's most popular ethnographic display, the Philippine exposition, reflected this conceptual departure from what Americans perceived to be the European way of colonial rule. At the displays' center was a gigantic habitat onto which more than 1,200 members of various ethnic groups from the archipelago were temporarily resettled. This 'human zoo' became the unrivalled attraction of the fair.[54]

The 'Philippine Reservation', as it came to be called, had several goals: it was to disseminate information about America's largest colony, project the image of a pacified possession, contain anti-imperial critique during the elections of 1904, discursively integrate the colonization of the islands into a national narrative of progress and expansion, and firmly establish the United States as a benevolent alternative to European approaches to colonial empire in the public mind.

The fair organizers reflected the importance which colonial state-building in the Philippines afforded social engineering projects. The civilizational potential of the colonized and the 'benevolence' of the colonizer found its symbolic unity in the model school of the Philippine habitat in which 40 Filipinos received daily elementary instruction in front of more than 2,000 visitors.[55] Educational reform in the Philippines was indeed an important project of American colonial governance.[56] It was intended to prepare the colonized for eventual participation in administration, military, or educational roles. The small model school on the exhibition grounds was to convey this message including its rhetorical return of the colonial discourse to the idea of exceptional mission and to a tendency of discursive demarcation from European models of colonial governance. The message appeared to have resonated with the audience, as one visitor remarked: "Other countries fear the education and enlightenment of the people over whom they exercise sovereignty. The United States fears ignorance."[57]

As the recruitment of Filipinos for the colonial bureaucracy accelerated, such pronounced demarcation from the old world strongly shaped debates over the appropriate

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54   The Philippine exposition is described in: J. D. Fermin, 1904 World's Fair: The Filipino Experience, Quezon City 2004; N. J. Parezo / D. Fowler, Anthropology Goes to the Fair: The 1904 Louisiana Purchase Exposition, Lincoln 2007, pp. 164-193; R. W. Rydell, All the World's a Fair (footnote 53); S. L. Vostral, Imperialism on Display: The Philippine Exhibition at the 1904 World's Fair, in: Gateway Heritage, 13 (1993) 4, pp. 18-31; P. Kramer, Making Concessions: Race and Empire Revisited at the Philippine Exposition, St. Louis, 1901–1905, in: Radical History Review, 73 (1999), pp. 74-114.

55   The school is described in: S. L. Vostral, Imperialism on Display (footnote 54), p. 29; N. J. Parezo / D. Fowler, Anthropology Goes to the Fair (footnote 54), pp. 174-175.

56   M. Adas, Dominance by Design (footnote 8), pp. 129-182; G. A. May, Social Engineering in the Philippines: The Aims and Execution, and Impact of American Colonial Policy, 1900–1913, Westport 1980.

57   Quoted in: A. Paulet, To Change the World: The Use of American Indian Education in the Philippines, in: History of Education Quarterly, 47 (2007) 2, pp. 173-202, here p. 179.

approach to colonial governance. Americans increasingly transfigured their country's colonial enterprise into a mission for nation-building as they simultaneously began to question the model character of the British Empire. Many observers in the United States suggested that while the European colonial powers were by and large interested in the retention of their power, Washington's colonial policies remained mostly interested in the preparation of the colonized for ultimate self-government and independence. Within this interpretive framework, the U.S. colonial empire aimed at 'benevolent assimilation' and civilization 'uplift' and not colonial rule and even exploitation *ad infinitum*.
In his State of the Union Address of December 1902, President Theodore Roosevelt had already outlined the core idea for this argumentative thrust:

> *Not only does each Filipino enjoy such rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness as he has never before known during the recorded history of the islands, but the people, taken as a whole, now enjoy a measure of self-government greater than any granted to any other Orientals by any foreign power. […] Taking the work of the army and the civil authorities together it may be questioned whether anywhere else in modern times the world has seen a better example of real constructive statesmanship than our people have given to the Philippine Islands.*[58]

This self-transfiguration of the new colonial masters into anti-colonial agents of development, who aimed at turning the Philippines into: "[…] a sort of glorified Iowa,"[59] quickly took hold and began to shape and define the parameters of the U.S. colonial discourse. Francis Burton Harrison, the governor general of the islands from 1913–1921, even went so far as to re-interpret the U.S. approach to the Philippines as an anti-colonial model which had irritated the established European colonial powers and created distress for their justifications of rule:

> *The result of our heresy have been far-reaching, and have shaken seriously the colonial offices of Great Britain, of France, and of Holland; they have also brought hope and inspiration to millions of patient brown and yellow men who find in the new ideas of America a promise for the future.*[60]

This discursive location of the colonial project as anti-colonial civilizing mission was designed to rhetorically bridge the national divide on the compatibility of republic and empire and simultaneously seal the ideological and moral super-elevation of the nation in demarcation from the old world. In the long run, this tendency has fostered a sense of colonial amnesia and a simultaneous renaissance of the notion of American exceptional-

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58   Theodore Roosevelt, State of the Union Address 1902, see: http://www.presidential-speeches.org/State-of-the-Union–1902-Theodore-Roosevelt.php (accessed on November 22, 2008).

59   "A sort of glorified Iowa" from diplomat and journalist Nicholas Roosevelt's book The Philippines: A Treasure and a Problem (1926), quoted in: M. Adas, Dominance by Design (footnote 8), p. 166.

60   Harrison quoted in: M. Adas, Improving on the Civilizing Mission? Assumptions of United States Exceptionalism in the Colonization of the Philippines, in: Itinerario, 22 (1998) 4, pp. 44-66, here p. 47.

ism.[61] It has masked the memory for a time in which the British Empire served the United States as an admired and trusted reference point, worthy of emulation, a model for the American way of colonial empire; a time in which American colonial planners sought British advice in many areas from tropical medicine to colonial governance and colonial urban planning to colonial warfare. In this inter-imperial discourse on the transfer of colonial 'know-how' in the early 20th century, many American contemporaries perceived their empire not as exceptional but connected their colonialism to what they understood to be a much larger, world-encompassing Anglo-Saxon mission.

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61   On the pervasive sense of colonial amnesia: A. Kaplan, Violent Belongings and the Question of Empire Today: Presidential Address to the American Studies Association, October 17, 2003, in: American Quarterly, 56 (2004) 1, pp. 1-18.