Placing the Colonial State in the Middle: The Comparative Method and the Study of Empires

Reo Matsuzaki

RESÜMEE

Reo Matsuzaki fragt in seinem Beitrag nach Umsetzungsmöglichkeiten der vergleichenden Kolonialismusforschung. Dabei basieren seine methodischen Überlegungen auf den Ergebnissen der Fallstudien des vorliegenden Bandes. Er schlägt vor, nicht die einzelnen Imperien oder Kolonien miteinander zu vergleichen, sondern stattdessen als Vergleichskategorie den Kolonialstaat heranzuziehen. Damit gelänge es, verschiedene Bedingungen und Geschichten der Kolonisierten in Relation zu einander zu setzen. Um vom Einzelnen und Spezifischen zu abstrahieren und die Mechanismen herauszuarbeiten, welche die Interaktionen zwischen den einzelnen Regimes prägen, unterscheidet er drei politische Arenen des Kolonialstaates („International", „Home", „Domestic" arena). Dies ermöglicht es, auch Akteure in den einzelnen Arenen spezifisch untersuchen.

In the study of empires, structured comparisons are rarely employed as a means of understanding variation in policy outcome. The reason lies in the very nature of the subject matter: Empires are vast and complex political systems comprised of sub-units that often have little in common. As a result, it is difficult to devise a method of measurement that can be used to systematically compare outcomes across the sub-units. For example, the pre-World War II Japanese Empire, small relative to the vast British and French empires, included the settler colonies of Hokkaido and Karafuto; the 'leased' territory in the southern portion of Liaodong Peninsula; the highly authoritarian and largely autonomous government generals of Taiwan and Korea; the fully incorporated and semi-colonial province of Okinawa; the League of Nations mandate of Nan'yo (South Sea);

Comparativ | Zeitschrift für Globalgeschichte und vergleichende Gesellschaftsforschung 18 (2008) Heft 6, S. 107–119.

and finally, the ostensibly sovereign puppet regime of Manchukuo. Given this diversity, how is one to evaluate the relative 'successes'[1] or 'failures' of Japanese colonial efforts in Taiwan versus Korea, let alone Okinawa versus Manchukuo? Conversely, how are we to compare the struggles of the colonized people against Japanese coercion?

In this concluding essay, I continue the methodological discussion begun by Heé and Schaper by drawing upon the contributing articles in this volume. My proposition comes in two parts. First, we should move away from empires as the primary units of analysis. Instead, the colonial state, as a corporate actor with its distinct set of interests, should be placed at the center of our investigations. By making this conceptual move, we can treat the diverse background conditions and histories of colonized territories, as well as national traditions and geostrategic concerns of imperial metropoles, as variables that determined the development of colonial systems. Second, our attempts to analytically compare empires can be bolstered by specifying the political arenas in which the colonial state participated, as well as by identifying the mechanisms that structured interactions between the colonial state and other key players within each arena. My aim is to discuss how we can generalize from the uniqueness of the individual cases, and explain variation in outcome by systematically comparing interactions between similar types of actors across vastly different colonial environments.

1. The Comparative Method and the Colonial State

The comparative method, unlike commonplace comparisons, employs explicit rules when selecting cases in order to 'uncover' causal relationships, which are then generalized across a population of cases. Therefore, the goal is not necessarily to highlight interesting similarities or differences in the cases examined, but rather, to use these similarities or differences to support one's theoretical interpretation of the cases. The rules employed to select cases depend on the research question. Nonetheless, case selection criteria tend to conform to one of two methods developed by John Stuart Mill: the method of agreement or the method of difference.[2] In the method of agreement, two very different cases (in terms of possible causal factors) with similar outcomes are selected for comparative study. The task of the investigator is to expose the common set of factors that produced similar outcomes in two very different situations. The method of difference takes the opposite

1 By 'success', I mean the extent to which the colonizers were able to achieve their goals. I do not imply that Japanese colonization was (or could have been) good for the colonized people.

2 J. S. Mill, A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive: Being a Connected View of the Principles of Evidence and the Methods of Scientific Investigation, New York 1848. For elaborations and modifications of Mill's methods, see: A. L. George / A. Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences, Cambridge (Mass.) 2005; G. King / R. O. Keohane / S. Verba, Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research, Princeton 1993; A. Lijphart, The Comparable-Cases Strategy in Comparative Research, in: Comparative Political Studies, 8 (1975) 2, pp. 158-177; A. Przeworski / H. Teune, The Logic of Comparative Social Inquiry, New York 1970; C. C. Ragin, The Comparative Method: Moving Beyond Qualitative and Quantitative Strategies, Berkeley 1987.

approach by comparing two similar cases with different outcomes. By holding many of the likely causal factors/variables 'constant', the researcher investigates the validity of his or her theoretical claims and hypotheses.[3]

The application of both the method of difference and the method of agreement (or any other comparative technique) begins by measuring variation in outcome of some political phenomena. In the study of empires, this may be best accomplished by focusing on a colonial territory as the unit of analysis. After all, while colonies are exploited to advance the goals of metropolitan rulers, violence itself is perpetrated within the colonized societies. Resistance to oppression also takes place on the ground and in the localities, even if resistance involves external allies. Insofar as the outcomes we care about occur at the local level, measurement of variation should also be localized.

Although there are various outcomes (such as, degree of political racialization, extent of armed resistance, etc.) that could be measured and studied in comparative analyses of colonial territories, the effectiveness of a colonial state in providing / imposing 'outputs' serves as an analytically convenient starting point. In their study of political systems, Gabriel Almond and G. Bingham Powell argue that a functioning state engages in the following 'output' producing/imposing activities: (i) extraction of resources, such as money, goods, persons, or services; (ii) distribution of goods and services, such as education, health, sanitation, recreation, and safety; (iii) regulation of human behavior; and (iv) instillation of meaning and identity.[4] The outcomes of some of these activities are more quantifiable than others. Nonetheless, even if it is difficult to attach a precise numerical value to all of a state's 'outputs', by conceptualizing what an ideal-typical[5] state should be able to do, Almond and Powell provide a standard of evaluation that can be used to select and compare the performance of various political systems, including colonial states.

This is not to suggest that colonial states sought to provide/impose these 'outputs' in the same way or with the same intentions as modern nation-states. We find that many colonial states purposely limited the availability of educational opportunities to native inhabitants, for education helped unmask the injustices inherent to the colonial system. Colonial states also heavily taxed the colonized people, thereby intentionally destroying local communities and forcing people to live in slave-like conditions. Moreover, even

3 For critiques of Mill's methods, see B. Geddes, How the Cases You Choose Affect the Answers You Get: Selection Bias in Comparative Politics, in: Political Analysis, 2 (1990) 1, pp. 131-150; S. Lieberson, Small N's and Big Conclusions: An Examination of the Reasoning in Comparative Studies Based on a Small Number of Cases, in: Social Forces, 70 (1991), pp. 307-320. Lieberson lists the following problems with Mill's methods: (i) they do not take into account interaction effects between different causal variables; (ii) they do not provide any external validity of the argument; and (iii) conclusions that are reached using Mill's method are extremely volatile, since increasing the number of cases can lead to completely new and different variables becoming significant. Lieberson also questions the scientific validity of any research that examines only a small number of cases. He argues that (i) the severity of measurement error bias is inversely related to the number of observations; and (ii) the smaller the number of cases, the greater the danger of omitting important variables.

4 G. Almond / G. B. Powell, Jr., Comparative Politics: Systems, Process, Policy, Boston 1978, p. 286.

5 An ideal type is a conceptual tool that describes what an object should look like in its theoretically purest form. It does not mean that an object is good or desirable.

when a colonial state provided / imposed the above 'outputs', it was for the purpose of deepening its domination.[6]

Nonetheless, every colonial state, to a lesser or greater degree, extracted resources, distributed goods and services (albeit in a highly discriminatory manner), regulated and disciplined the behavior of the colonized people, and sought legitimation of its rule by controlling discourse and symbols. Therefore, while we should not forget that colonial states also engaged in other unambiguously destructive endeavors, by focusing on Almond and Powell's 'outputs', it is possible to compare vastly different colonial systems. Moreover, the uniqueness of each colonial territory is not lost in such an analysis. The differences across colonial territories in terms of culture, history, and geography, as well as differences in the aims and goals of colonizers, become an integral part of explaining variation in the provision/imposition of 'outputs'.

Unique background conditions, however, were not the only source of variation. The internal structure of the colonial state – which is seen here to be comprised of the various administrative, legislative, and judicial organizations within a specific colonial territory, as well as the individuals who staff these organizations – also varied across territorial units. As Max Weber argues, the most effective states were supported by efficient bureaucracies.[7] He writes:

> *[T]he purely bureaucratic type of administrative organization […] is, from a purely technical point of view, capable of attaining the highest degree of efficiency and is in this sense formally the most rational known means of exercising authority over human beings. It is superior to any other form in precision, in stability, in the stringency of its discipline, and in its reliability.*[8]

Furthermore, efficiency is increased when the state is autonomous from society. Like other corporate actors, such as trade unions and businesses, successful states are those that can single-mindedly pursue well-defined agendas without distractions or interferences.[9] Quite unlike the ideal-typical Weberian state, however, Joel Migdal finds that many colonial states were permeated by society. Overrun by the interests of local collaborators, businessmen, settlers, and missionaries, the colonial state was often hindered from

6 For example, the policy of the Korean and Taiwanese colonial states to rapidly increase educational 'opportunities' in the late 1930s was part of the strategy of "imperialization" (kōminka), where the goal was to eradicate Korean and Taiwanese national identities. See: L. T. S. Ching, Becoming Japanese: Colonial Taiwan and the Politics of Identity Formation, Berkeley 2001; W. Y. Chou, The Kominka Movement in Taiwan and Korea: Comparisons and Interpretations, in: P. Duus / R. H. Myers / M. R. Peattie (eds.), The Japanese Wartime Empire, 1931–1945, Princeton 1996; T. Komagome, Shokuminchi teikoku Nihon no bunka tōgō [Cultural integration of the Japanese colonial empire], Tokyo 1996.

7 M. Weber, Politics as a Vocation (pp. 77-128) and, Bureaucracy (pp. 198-244), in: H. H. Gerth / C. W. Mills (eds.), From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, Oxford 1946.

8 M. Weber, Economy and Society, v. 1, Berkeley 1978, p. 223.

9 For further discussion, see: P. B. Evans, Embedded Autonomy: States and Industrial Transformation, Princeton 1995; A. Stepan, The State and Society: Peru in Comparative Perspective, Princeton 1978.

pursuing its own agenda.[10] Meanwhile, lacking discipline and training, some colonial bureaucrats sought self-aggrandizement and sabotaged the colonial state's efforts to provide/impose 'outputs'. Moreover, even 'honest'[11] bureaucrats harbored personal interests and concerns that at times conflicted with their role as agents of the colonial state. Therefore, although most colonial states excelled at extracting and exploiting resources, they were often unable to monitor and discipline the colonized people.[12] Even in places such as the Philippines, where the American colonizers invested much time and money in an effort to construct a Weberian state, the colonial bureaucracy conformed more or less to this unflattering norm.[13] The image of a typical colonial state that thus emerges is one of a highly coercive actor that nonetheless exhibited extreme weaknesses.

Several of the authors in this volume focus squarely on these intra-state dynamics that produced variation in the effectiveness of the colonial state (as a corporate actor). In his essay on the Soviet empire, Teichmann traces early Soviet state-building efforts in Central Asia through the perspectives of three local administrators: Isaak Abramovich Zelenskii, Faizulla Khojaev, and Usman Iusupov. In their stories, we see how class and ethnic tensions within the local administration disrupted the operation of the colonial state. For example, while Zelenskii was sent to Central Asia by Moscow to solve the problem of inter-ethnic animosity, he was unable to overcome his own prejudices against Central Asian Bolsheviks. Meanwhile, Khojaev and Iusupov, both originating from Central Asia, were sandwiched between their identity as Central Asian Bolsheviks and their role as executioners of Stalin's ambitious nationality policies. They had to engage in a delicate balancing act, as they were easily suspected of treason both from above (Moscow) and from below. Indeed, Khojaev was purged in July 1937, partly due to his staunch insistence that Central Asian Muslim communities could 'reform' themselves from within.

While Teichmann's focus is largely on the interests and actions of specific colonial agents, Lindner draws our attention to the formal rules and structures of colonial bureaucracies, as well as to characteristics of the individuals who staffed these organizations. She notes that when German colonial expansion in Africa began quite suddenly and unexpectedly in the 1880s, a formal system for educating and training civilian colonial agents had not yet been devised; as a result, German colonial presence in Africa was maintained (particularly in the rural regions) through a network of military outposts. Meanwhile, the lack of competent civilian bureaucrats led to a situation where a large portion of the civil

10 J. S. Migdal, Strong Societies and Week States: State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World, Princeton 1988, pp. 28-31.

11 That is, from the perspective of the colonial authorities.

12 C. Young, The African Colonial State in Comparative Perspective, New Haven 1994.

13 See: W. Anderson, Colonial Pathologies: American Tropical Medicine, Race, and Hygiene in the Philippines, Durham 2006; M. Cullinane, Ilustrado Politics: Filipino Elite Responses to American Rule, 1898–1908, Manila 2005; W. C. Forbes, The Philippine Islands, Boston 1928; P. D. Hutchcroft, Colonial Masters, National Politicos, and Provincial Lords: Central Authority and Local Autonomy in the American Philippines, 1900–1913, in: The Journal of Asian Studies, 59 (2000) 2, pp. 277-306; G. A. May, Social Engineering in the Philippines: The Aims, Execution, and Impact of American Colonial Policy, 1900–1913, Westport 1980.

administration was staffed by present and former officers of the colonial corps.[14] Consequentially, although violence was commonplace throughout colonized Africa, German colonial states were exceptionally feared for their brutality. For example, the German colony of Togo was popularly known as the 'twenty-five country', for even low-ranking colonial officials were authorized to dole out sentences of twenty-five lashes for natives without any court order.

The structure of indirect rule, which was the most prevalent form of colonial administration in Europe's African colonies, also had an adverse effect on the cohesiveness of the colonial state. By bestowing upon native chiefs the power to distribute resources, collect revenue, and interpret customary laws, Europeans sought to create loyal allies in the localities. It was also a strategy born out of necessity, as Europeans were unable or unwilling to invest significant resources and manpower into their African colonies.[15] However, as Schaper displays, while this system allowed colonizers to govern over vast territories with minimal European presence, it also provided opportunities for African chiefs to pursue their own independent agenda. Ultimately, indirect rule blurred the boundaries between state and society, thereby weakening the colonial state's identity as a unified corporate actor. As bureaucratic efficiency was lost, so too was the colonial state's ability to provide/impose 'outputs'.

Nonetheless, there were important exceptions to this general trend. In contrast to most other colonial states, Taiwan developed into a modern (and despotic) Weberian state. Highly autonomous and disciplined, Taiwanese colonial bureaucrats were able to build an extensive network of roads and rail, eradicate the plague, minimize the outbreak of cholera, rapidly expand educational opportunities, and create an export economy that turned Taiwan into a highly profitable colonial possession.[16] In part, the Taiwan 'exception' can be explained by the single-minded obsession of Japanese policymakers to construct legal-rational authority in Taiwan. By minimizing the political participation of the Taiwanese, and even that of the Japanese settler community, the Government General of Taiwan ensured internal cohesion. The colonial state also paid salaries that were much

14 Although an extreme example even for a German colony, Lindner notes that as late as 1914, there were only ninety civilian administrators in the entire colony of Cameroon.

15 S. Berry, No Condition Is Permanent: The Social Dynamics of Agrarian Change in Sub-Saharan Africa, Madison 1993, see chapter 2; M. Mamdani, Subject and Citizen: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism, Princeton 1996, pp. 16-23.

16 G. W. Barclay, Colonial Development and Population in Taiwan, Princeton 1954; E. I. Chen, Goto Shimpei, Japan's Colonial Administrator in Taiwan: A Critical Reexamination, in: American Asian Review, 13 (1995) 1, pp. 29-59; H. Y. Chang / R. H. Myers, Japanese Colonial Development Policy in Taiwan, 1895–1906: A Case of Bureaucratic Entrepreneurship, in: Journal of Asian Studies, 22 (1965) 4, pp. 433-449; C. M. Ka, Japanese Colonialism in Taiwan: Land Tenure, Development, and Dependency, Boulder 1995; Y. Takekoshi, Japanese Rule in Formosa, translation by G. Braithwaite, London 1907; P. E. Tsurumi, Taiwan Under Kodama Gentaro and Goto Shimpei, in: Papers on Japan, Harvard University, East Asian Research Center, 4 (1967), pp. 95-146; id., Japanese Colonial Education in Taiwan, 1895–1945, Cambridge (Mass.) 1977.

higher than in the metropolitan bureaucracies, in order to attract competent Japanese administrators to Taiwan.[17]

However, analyses that focus exclusively on the internal composition of the colonial state tell, at best, only half the story. Whether a colonial state was able to provide/impose 'outputs' was also a function of the various interactions between the colonial state and other actors, both within and outside the colonial territory. It was indeed the case that the colonial state, irrespective of its cohesion or autonomy, was the dominant actor within a specific territory. Yet, even in the most unequal of relationships, the weaker player retains some ability to exert agency.[18] Therefore, for a more complete analysis, we must look beyond the internal characteristics of the colonial state and examine the interactions between the colonial state and other key players in three distinct political arenas: international, home, and domestic. By 'international', I refer to the relationships between the colonial state and foreign policymakers, missionaries, businessmen, and representatives of international organizations. 'Home' refers to the colonial state's interactions with the central government and bureaucracies, as well as with private individuals and organizations from the metropolitan region of the empire. Finally, 'domestic' is comprised of the intricate links between the colonial state and the colonized society.

At this point, my argument comes full circle. I began this concluding essay with a methodological discussion: I argued that a focus on the colonial state would allow researchers to compare seemingly different colonial territories. Yet, methodology is not the only reason why one might choose to focus on the colonial state, and its attempts to provide/impose 'outputs'. As the discussion of the three arenas displays, there are theoretical reasons as to why it may be advantageous to place the colonial state in the center of one's analysis. The colonial state, with its distinct identity, agenda, and interests, lies in the middle of all interactions within, and concerning, the colonial polity.

However, the tendency in the literature has been to ignore (often unconsciously) the role of the colonial state as a distinct corporate actor. Similar to how Marxist scholars have often equated the interests of liberal-democratic governments to the interests of the capitalist classes, scholars of colonialism have had a tendency to assume that the interests of colonial states were the same as that of the imperialists in the home polity. The prevailing view in the literature is one where each empire possessed a distinct style of colonialism (derived from national traditions and/or geostrategic concerns), and any variation in outcome across colonial territories resulted from differences in the conditions found on the ground. The colonial state, as an actor, is analytically missing from this perspective. Instead, echoing Theda Skocpol and her collaborators' proclamation that we must "bring the state back in,"[19] I argue that we should place the colonial state in the middle.

17 M. Okamoto, Shokuminchi kanryō no seijishi: Chōsen, Taiwan sōtokufu to teikoku Nihon [The political history of the colonial bureaucracy: Imperial Japan and the Government Generals of Korea and Taiwan], Tokyo 2008.

18 A. Giddens, Studies in Social and Political Theory, London 1977, pp. 333-349.

19 P. B. Evans/D. Rueschemeyer/T. Skocpol (eds.), Bringing the State Back In, Cambridge 1985. See, in particular, Skocpol's introductory chapter.

2. The Colonial State and the Three Arenas

The notion that the colonial state was a central actor which navigated within three separate political arenas (foreign, home, and domestic) only serves as a starting point of a comparative analysis of empires. In order to explain variation in outcome, it is necessary to identify the precise causal mechanisms that systematically produced similarities or differences across the cases examined.[20] By doing so, it is possible to generalize from the particularities of the individual cases and advance broader theoretical interpretations.[21] To illustrate this, I draw upon the findings of the contributing essays in this volume and highlight some of the causal mechanisms that similarly structured interactions within each of the three arenas.

International arena: The primary mechanism in the international arena was that of competition. For example, one of the reasons why French policymakers in Indochina shifted their colonial policy from naked exploitation (cloaked in the language of 'assimilation') to that of colonial development (under the framework of 'association') was to guard against possible Japanese expansion into Southeast Asia.[22] Meanwhile, lingering threats (both real and imagined) from Russia and China led the Korean Government General to adopt repressive assimilatory policies, especially before 1919 and after 1937. The Governor General and his lieutenants reasoned that the only long-term solution to threats posed by the Chinese or the Russians was to forcefully transform Koreans into loyal subjects of the Japanese Emperor.[23] Furthermore, assimilation policy became a critical component of an ideological campaign to win the hearts and minds of the Asian people. As the Japanese competed in a global struggle against other imperialist powers, they sought to formulate a new and 'benevolent' system of imperial rule that would free Asia from European despotism.[24]

20 Charles Tilly argues that there are three types of mechanisms: environmental, cognitive, and relational. He writes, "Environmental mechanisms are externally generated influences on conditions affecting social life; words such as disappear, enrich, expand, and disintegrate – applied not to actors but their settings – suggest the sorts of cause-effect relations in question. Cognitive mechanisms operate through alterations of individual and collective perception, and are characteristically described through words such as recognize, understand, reinterpret, and classify. Relational mechanisms alter connections among people, groups, and interpersonal networks; words such as ally, attack, subordinate, and appease give a sense of relational mechanisms." See: C. Tilly, Mechanisms in Political Processes, in: Annual Review of Political Science, 4 (2001), p. 24. For more on mechanisms, see: P. Hedström / R. Swedberg, Social Mechanisms: An Introductory Essay, in: id. (eds.), Social Mechanisms: An Analytical Approach to Social Theory, Cambridge 1998.

21 A causal mechanism is like a food processor. If we put different fruits into a food processor, we will end up with different types of mixed juices. Nonetheless, the process through which these fruits are turned into various juices is the same no matter what the fruits are.

22 R. F. Betts, Assimilation and Association in French Colonial Theory, 1890–1914, New York 1961, pp. 157-158; B. Cummings, Parallax Visions: Making Sense of American-East Asian Relations at the End of the Century, Durham 1999, see chapter 3.

23 M. E. Caprio, Expansion and Comprehensive Security: Japanese and English Annexations of Contiguous Territories, in: The Journal of Pacific Asia, 9 (2003), pp. 79-104.

24 Regardless of the rhetoric, the Japanese were no less despotic compared to the Europeans, and their words of benevolence and co-prosperity hardly masked the cruelty of Japanese colonial rule.

However, as Heé argues, the Japanese were ultimately unable to reject Western colonial models, because the Japanese were themselves engaging in a 'self-civilizing' mission at home. Even if the Japanese sought to look within their own society for an alternative Asiatic model of colonialism, the problem was that the Meiji reformers were rapidly reconstituting Japan as a Western state.[25] Ironically, their attempt to overcome and roll back Western imperialism was hindered from the very fact that they accepted the superiority of Western models. Moreover, Japanese policymakers had much to gain by acknowledging the legitimacy of the Euro-centric imperialist system, for it provided them with the language to justify their territorial claims over Korea and elsewhere. By arguing that Korea was a protectorate under Japanese jurisdiction, and by indicating that they were helping to shoulder the "white man's burden",[26] Japanese imperialists convinced Western governments that their claims over Korea were legitimate.[27]

Furthermore, as the above examples suggest, imitation was also an important mechanism in the international arena. Indeed, as we see in the articles by Lindner, Schumacher, and Heé, colonial officials from different empires were in close communication. US Secretary of War Elihu Root (who was responsible for outlining America's colonial policies in the Philippines and Puerto Rico), and Chief Civil Administrator of Taiwan Gotō Shinpei (who laid the foundations of the Japanese colonial system in Taiwan), were both known to have extensively studied British colonial models. Also, German Colonial Secretary Wilhelm Solf (1911–1918) was thoroughly impressed with the British administrative system in West Africa and maintained correspondence with Governor General of Nigeria Frederick Lugard (1914–1919). Moreover, imitation did not take place only between the new colonial powers (such as, Germany, Japan, and the United States) and the old (such as, France, Britain, and the Netherlands). French, Dutch, and British academics and colonial officials actively studied one another's colonial policies and gathered in yearly conferences to exchange their ideas. In fact, it was through such interactions that French colonial officials began to adopt Britain's model of 'association'.[28]

Finally, administrators often traveled abroad to examine foreign colonial models firsthand. Mochiji Rokusaburō, Chief of Education Affairs in Taiwan (1903–1910), embarked on a journey across Southeast Asia in 1907 to learn about British, Dutch, and American colonial education systems.[29] Utsunomiya Tarō, Commander of the Chōsen (Korea) Army (1918–1920), had previously spent time in British India and Egypt, where he had a chance to study British infrastructures of control.[30] Ōtsuka Tsunesaburō, Chief of Home Affairs in the Korean Government General (1919–1925), was sent on an investigative

25 D. E. Westney, Imitation and Innovation: The Transfer of Western Organizational Patterns to Meiji Japan, Cambridge (Mass.) 1987.

26 Rudyard Kipling's The White Man's Burden was originally published in the magazine McClure's in 1899.

27 A. Dudden, Japan's Colonization of Korea: Discourse and Power, Honolulu 2005.

28 R. F. Betts, Assimilation and Association (footnote 22), see chapter 3.

29 P. E. Tsurumi, Japanese Colonial Education, (footnote 16), p. 47.

30 Y. Kira / M. Miyamoto, Taishō Jidai Chūki no Utsunomiya Tarō: Daiyonshidanchō, Chōsengun Shireikan, Gunjisangikan jidai, [Utsunomiya Tarō during the mid-Taisho era: the period as head of the 4th Infantry Division, Commander of the Chōsen Army, and Military Councilor], in: Utsunomiya Tarō kankei shiryō kenkyūkai (ed.), Nihon

mission to Britain and Ireland. It was partly through this experience that Ōtsuka came to favor the creation of a legislative body in Korea, where Koreans could partake in the formulation of domestic policy.[31]

Home arena: An important mechanism that structured interactions in the home arena was inter-bureaucratic politics. When countries annexed foreign territories as colonial possessions, it became necessary for the home government to devise a system of coordinating the policies of the various colonial administrations. Regardless of whether this was done through an existing bureaucratic organization or through the creation of a new colonial ministry, jurisdictional battles were unavoidable. After all, colonial policy was intricately linked to other areas of foreign and domestic policy.[32] Furthermore, the colonial state itself was a powerful actor that could disrupt the balance of power between the metropolitan ministries. The colonial state controlled vast human and natural resources that could be mobilized to pursue an independent agenda, or to advance the interests of some actor, be it the military or the foreign ministry.[33]

Moreover, given the diverging priorities of different bureaucratic organizations, the precise way by which these jurisdictional battles played out had important consequences on the long-term development of colonial territories. We see in Teichmann's essay, for example, that policymakers in Moscow sought to uniformly transplant Soviet institutions into Central Asia without taking into account the unique characteristics of this region. Had Central Asian Bolsheviks, such as Faizulla Khojaev, been given more autonomy in policymaking, the outcome of Soviet colonization efforts in Central Asia may have been considerably different.

rikugun to Ajia seisaku: Rikugun taishō Utsunomiya Tarō Nikki [Imperial Japanese Army and Asian policy: Diaries of General Utsunomiya Tarō], v. 3, Tokyo 2007, pp. 1-62.

31 H. S. Lee, Bunka tōchi shoki ni okeru Chōsen sōtokufu kanryō no tōchi shisō, [The governance ideologies of Korean Government General bureaucrats in the early period of cultural rule], in: Shigakuzasshi, 115 (2006) 4, pp. 68-93.

32 For an application of this dynamic to Korea, see: M. Katō, Seitō naikaku kakuritsuki ni okeru shokuminchi shihai taisei no mosaku: Takumushō secchi mondai no kōsatsu [Groping for the establishment of a colonial governance structure during the era of party rule: Examination of the debates over the creation of the Ministry of Colonial Affairs], in: Higashi Ajia Gendaishi, 1 (1998), pp. 39-58; S. Moriyama, Nihon no Chōsen tōchi seisaku (1910–1945) no seijishi teki kenkyū [Polito-historical research on Japanese policies of colonial rule in Korea (1910–1945)], in: Hōseiriron, 23 (1991) 3-4, pp. 66-111; M. Okamoto, Seitō seijiki ni okeru bunkan sōtokusei: Rikken seiji to shokuminchi tōchi no sōkoku [Civilian Governor General system in the period of party politics: conflict between constitutional politics and colonial government], in: Nihon shokuminchi kenkyū, 10 (1998), pp. 1-18; id., Sōtoku seiji to seitō seiji: Nidaiseitōki no sōtoku jinji to sōtokufu kansei, yosan [The politics of the Government General and party politics: Personnel affairs, bureaucratic system, and the budget of the Government General during the two-party system period], in: Chōsenshi kenkyūkai ronbunshū, 38 (2000), pp. 31-60.

33 In the Japanese Empire, this was not some hypothetical threat. During the Boxer Rebellion of 1900, the Taiwan Government General unsuccessfully plotted with the Army brass to establish Japanese control over the Amoy region in China. Although scholars disagree on whether the Army leadership or the Governor General took the initiative in this 'Amoy Incident', it is clear that this 'incident' could not have occurred without the autonomy and the resourcefulness of the Taiwan Government General. See: K. Kawamura, Amoi jiken no shinsō ni tsuite [The truth behind the Amoy Incident], in: Nihon rekishi, 309 (1974), pp. 46-53; S. Saitō, Amoi jiken saikō [Reconsideration of the Amoy Incident], in: Nihonshi kenkyū, 305 (1988), pp. 29-53; S. Takahashi, Meiji 33 nen Amoi jiken no ichi kōsatsu: Yamamoto Kaigun daijin no taido wo chūshin to shite [An examination of the Meiji 33 Amoy Incident: Placing the attitude of Navy Minister Yamamoto in the middle], in: Gunjishi gakkai, 8 (1973) 4, pp. 33-44.

Meanwhile, as Heé displays through her framework of the 'double bind', Japanese domestic debates, and in particular, concerns over Japan's international image, constrained the Taiwan Government General's efforts to design and implement penal codes. When Governor General Kodama Gentarō (1898–1906) officially reintroduced flogging in Taiwan, it was not without controversy, even within the Government General. Most significantly, Odate Koretaka (who was a member of the Taiwan Supreme Court) penned an internal memorandum criticizing the Governor General's policy. He argued that reintroduction of flogging contradicted Japan's stated goal of 'civilizing' Taiwan, and undermined the legitimacy of the Government General. Such objections took on importance, however, because they plugged into ongoing policy debates and power struggles within the home polity. A day after the reintroduction of flogging in January 1904, *Yomiuri shinbun* (a major Japanese daily) published a critique of Kodama's policy, helping to mobilize Japanese civil society against the colonial state in Taiwan. This in turn played into the jurisdictional battles by strengthening the hand of those who were already critical of the autonomy enjoyed by the Government General.[34]

Similarly, interventions by actors in the home polity are also significant to Schumacher's account of why American policy in the Philippines moved away from the indirect rule model of the British to one reproducing American institutions. Inspired by British practices in the Malay Straits, American colonial officials had initially intended to govern the Muslim population of the islands of Sulu, Mindanao, and Palawan through native laws and local power structures. However, this plan was quickly abandoned after a coalition of church leaders, progressive reformers, abolitionists, and imperialists exerted considerable pressure on the U.S. government to change course. It was simply unacceptable to the American public that the 'backward' and 'uncivilized' sultans, who practiced polygamy and slavery, should be vested with so much authority.

Domestic arena: This arena differs from the other two in that a dense system of extractive, distributive, and disciplinary institutions[35] regulated the interactions between the colonial state and the colonized society. As such, relationships of domination and resistance in the domestic arena were much more structured compared to the fluid relationships in

34 For the official record of the various exchanges between the representatives of the Taiwan Government General and parliamentarians in the Imperial Diet, see: Gaimushō jōyakukyoku hōkika, Taiwan ni shikō subeki hōrei ni kansuru hōritsu (Rokujūsanhō, Sanjūichihō oyobi Hōsangō) no gijiroku [Diet Records of laws governing the ordinances enforced in Taiwan (Law 63, Law 31, and Law 3)], Tokyo 1966. See also: M. Haruyama, Kindai Nihon no shokuminchi tōchi to Hara Takashi, [Colonial governance of modern Japan and Hara Takashi], in: M. Haruyama/M. Wakabayashi (eds.), Nihon shokuminchi shugi no seijiteki tenkai: Sono tōchi taisei to Taiwan no minzoku undō, 1898–1934 [The political development of Japanese colonialism: Its governance structure and nationalist movements in Taiwan, 1898–1934], Tokyo 1980; H. Meitetsu, Meiji kenpō taisei to Taiwan tōchi, [The Meiji Constitution and colonial rule in Taiwan], in: S. Ōe (ed.), Kindai Nihon to shokuminchi [Modern Japan and its colonies], v. 4, Tokyo 1993; M. Haruyama, Kindai Nihon to Taiwan: Musha jiken, shokuminchi tōchi seisaku no kenkyū [Modern Japan and Taiwan: Research on the Wùshè Incident and policies of colonial rule], Tokyo 2008.

35 Although there are often as many definitions of institutions as there are scholars who study them, my preferred definition is the one formulated by Avner Greif. He writes, "An institution is a system of rules, beliefs, norms, and organizations that together generate a regularity of (social) behavior." See: A. Greif, Institutions and the Path to Modern Economy: Lessons from Medieval Trade, Cambridge 2006, p. 30.

the foreign and home arenas.[36] However, the mere existence of formal institutions (such as health boards and school districts) did not guarantee that the target population would behave as the colonial state intended. For example, Schaper shows that German legal institutions in Cameroon, despite having clearly favored the interests of the white colonizers, were at times used by the Cameroonians to fight for their rights. The native society was indeed constrained by the institutions imposed upon them by the colonizers, but the colonized people still retained the ability to exercise agency. Moreover, opportunities to 'indigenize' colonial institutions varied depending on the structure of constraints governing state-society relations.[37] Therefore, when evaluating the effectiveness of colonial institutions in perpetuating violence, or the ability of the colonized people in blunting domination, mechanisms of enforcement and compliance become a central issue.[38]

A focus on enforcement and compliance mechanisms also helps to explain variation in the provision/imposition of 'outputs' across colonial systems. Unlike their European competitors, the colonial states in Taiwan and the Philippines similarly sought to directly govern over their respective colonized societies by building an extensive bureaucratic infrastructure. Nonetheless, in order to extract resources and discipline the behavior of the colonized people, they were compelled to forge collaborative relationships with local elites. The method through which Japanese and American colonizers structured these relationships, however, varied significantly. On the one hand, American colonial policymakers sought to sever the traditional clientelistic ties between Filipino elites and the local communities. The American strategy was to advance 'civilized' forms of political participation by integrating Filipinos, as individuals, into the newly created political and bureaucratic institutions. However, by excluding traditional sources of authority from the formal structures of the colonial state, the Americans left space for local bosses to behave autonomously. Meanwhile, taking the opposite approach, the Japanese incorporated traditional Taiwanese power structures into their colonial administration at the local level. Ultimately, by fusing traditional and legal-rational authority, this method proved to be far more effective in establishing a system of domination.

Finally, although the task of unmasking causal mechanisms is simplified by focusing on a single political arena, variation in outcome across colonial territories may sometimes be better explained through investigating how the three arenas intersected. Of the contrib-

36 Even in empires where a colonial ministry (or some other ministry) ostensibly supervised colonial policymaking, colonial states usually retained significant autonomy.

37 See for example: J. Go, American Empire and the Politics of Meaning: Elite Political Cultures in the Philippines and Puerto Rico during U.S. Colonialism, Durham 2008.

38 For discussions of enforcement and compliance from various institutional perspectives, see: A. Greif, Institutions and the Path (footnote 35), pp. 46-47; J. W. Meyer/B. Rowan, Institutionalized Organizations: Formal Structure as Myth and Ceremony, in: The American Journal of Sociology, 83 (1977) 2, pp. 343-347; D. C. North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance, Cambridge 1990, pp. 58-59; C. Offe, Designing Institutions in East European Transitions, in: R. E. Goodwin, The Theory of Institutional Design, Cambridge 1996, pp. 199-207; A. L. Stinchcombe, On the Virtues of the Old Institutionalism, in: Annual Review of Sociology, 23 (1997), pp. 5-6; W. Streeck/K. Thelen, Institutional Change in Advanced Political Economies, in: id. (eds.), Beyond Continuity: Institutional Change in Advanced Political Economies, Oxford 2005.

uting authors, Heé most clearly takes an institutional approach, as she investigates how systems of enforcement were structured in colonial Taiwan. Her analysis, however, does not remain within the bounds of the domestic arena. While Japanese colonial officials justified the reintroduction of flogging in Taiwan by arguing that it was the form of punishment most familiar to the Taiwanese, the way in which flogging was administered was distinctly Japanese. Both the 'punishment plate' that the prisoners were strapped onto, as well as the whips used to flog them, were Japanese modifications of mainland Chinese instruments. Moreover, these instruments were used in Japan itself during the early Meiji period, before the Japanese had adopted Western criminal codes.

3. Conclusion

In this essay, I have attempted to make a case for a colonial state-centric analysis of empires. I argued that different colonial territories could be systematically compared, if comparisons are structured around common sets of mechanisms that similarly regulated the behavior of actors across cases. However, I still have yet to discuss why we should compare different colonial territories in the first place. After all, the best works in the study of empires and colonial systems have been longitudinal analyses of single-case studies. By casting his or her net too widely, a researcher may be left with conclusions that are seemingly superficial. If so, why should we engage in comparative analyses in the first place? Is it not better for each scholar to study one case in depth, and leave it to editors of collected volumes to make the comparisons?

If two or more cases are compared simply to highlight interesting similarities or differences, then there is little gained, conceptually or theoretically, by engaging in comparisons within a single study. On the other hand, if comparisons are utilized as tools to explain causality, then there is an argument to be made for their use. The goal of comparative politics is not necessarily to reveal the richness of a case, but to formulate hypotheses regarding why some outcome resulted, given a multitude of possible alternative outcomes. Therefore, the purpose is similar to that of a counter-factual analysis. Structured comparisons allow us to imagine alternative realities by referencing actual cases.[39]

The comparative method remains underutilized in the study of empires and colonial systems, and for good reasons. However, insofar as a researcher seeks to understand why some outcome resulted rather than another, it may be a method worth trying.

39 On counterfactual analysis in the study of history, see: J. Bulhof, What If? Modality and History, in: History and Theory, 38 (1999) 2, pp. 145-168; M. Bunzl, Counterfactual History: A User's Guide, in: American Historical Review, 109 (2004) 3, pp. 845-858. For a discussion of counterfactuals by political scientists, see: G. Capoccia/R. D. Kelmen, The Study of Critical Junctures: Theory, Narrative, and Counterfactuals in Historical Institutionalism, in: World Politics, 59 (2007) 3, pp. 341-369; J. D. Fearon, Counterfactuals and Hypothesis Testing in Political Science, in: World Politics, 43 (1991) 2, pp. 169-195; R. N. Lebow, What's So Different about a Counterfactual?, in: World Politics, 52 (2000) 4, pp. 550-585; P. Tetlock/A. Belkin, Counterfactual Thought Experiments in World Politics: Logical, Methodological, and Psychological Perspectives, in: id. (eds.), Counterfactual Thought Experiments in World Politics, Princeton 1996.