men eines durch das Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Energie geförderten Projektes entstand, eine aufschlussreiche Lektüre.

Frank Jacob (ed.): Peripheries of the Cold War (= Globalhistorische Komparativstudien, vol. 3), Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann 2015, 365 S.

Reviewed by
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The viewpoint underlying this volume is that the Cold War was not only brought, but also pulled, into peripheries and there structured by national developments. This is not new, Jacob recognizes.[1] Still, "there are still plenty of national perspectives that might enlighten the global and transnational reading of the Cold War," including "the interrelationship between the centers and the peripheries" (p. 9). This is correct. But Jacob's volume could have been more effective. Editing and indexing are sub-optimal, and the Table of Content's pagination is annoyingly faulty. The Cold War is absent in Nathan McCormack's "Filastin: A Case Study of Intellectual Development in the Palestinian Resistance, 1965-1967" and present only shortly in Frank Jacob's "MacArthur's Legacy – Japan and the Early Years of the Cold War". Jacob sorted the chapters by places rather than themes, which would have compelled him to identify patterns. And his short introduction reflects only in the speediest of fashion on

his volume's key term, peripheries, and not at all on the chapters' synergies.

This, then, is the objective of what follows, for this volume's chapters do provide much fodder for thought. It is Jacob's service to have brought them together.

I start with "peripheries." One can use volume chapters to build two quite opposed arguments. One is that location matters. A first case is countries bordering communist Eurasia – "front-line participants" in the Cold War, to speak with Nikos Christofis' "Turkey and the Cold War" (p. 255) – which became early and again late in the Cold War sites of confrontation and tension not the least because they bordered communist Eurasia, making them matter to both Washington and Moscow. Think of Iran, Turkey, Greece, Korea, Iran, Afghanistan, and Vietnam; contrast most of Africa, which fully entered the Cold War – and truly globalized it, in result – from the late 1950s. Second, superpowers influenced others not like others influenced them. The former "direction," as it were, was often direct and bilateral, and methods ranged widely, from violence to active political constraints to decreasing another state's elbowroom to punish-ignore it, as Guilherme Casarões' "Between the U.S. and the Deep Blue See: Cold War Policies and the Political Breakdown in Brazil" (pp. 300-302) illustrates beautifully and as Luis Herrán-Avila's "Convergent Conflicts: The Cold War and the Origins of Counterinsurgency State in Colombia (1946-1964)" (p. 322) shows, too. By contrast, the latter direction was often indirect, and played just as often on a superpower's relationship with third parties as on that superpower itself, as Jeffrey Shaw's "The Ogaden War – A Case Study of Cold War Politics" (p.

101-113) demonstrates. Thus, in a sense, when we say that post-colonial countries, including Latin America, influenced the Cold War superpowers, and not only the reverse, we are in a way – and certainly regarding methods – comparing apples and oranges.

One may use two statements – Shaw's, that the Ogaden War "can be considered peripheral to the larger Cold War itself, but nonetheless had tremendous influence over the direction that the Cold War would take in the war's aftermath" (p. 101); and Zeyneb Tuba Sungur's, in "Acts of Mistranslation in the Cold War: Afghanistan under Soviet Occupation," that Afghanistan "moved from the 'periphery' of the Cold War into its 'core'" in the 1980s (p. 169) – as a foil against which to develop a second argument. The Cold War world was not dualistic: (a) center(s) here, peripheries there.

This had various reasons, which for brevity's sake are represented schematically here.

– the Cold War knew two political-ideo-logical-military power centers, the United States and the Soviet Union;
– these had sub-centers, in (the) West (Europe) as well as (the) East (Europe), which not unoften – and through time tendentially more and more – acted autonomously;
– from the late 1950s the Soviet Union had a real competitor, the PRC; and
– the post-colonial world, including Latin America, was not homogeneous, but many countries and actors interacted in the most varied fashions and sub-group-ings among themselves and with various "First" and "Second" world countries, as for example Casarões shows for Brazil-

ian economic ties with Japan, the FRG, and Italy, which mattered also politically (p. 303), or as Joseph Parrot's "Multi-polar Diplomacy: FRELIMO's Struggle for Independence in the Cold War" (p. 75) and Jason Morgan's "Namibian and South African Activism at the United Nations in the Early Cold War" (p. 99) illustrates for ties with Nordic countries.

Partially in consequence,

– the systems effect of these interactions played out globally, meaning that
– (the) Cold War competition(s) were affected by a wide variety of events and points, which in turn means that
– the distinction between a center – whether defined geographically or, topically, as the central (U.S.-Soviet) conflict – and peripheries does not hold water.

Furthermore, even if we would accept the notion of peripheries, we'd be confounded by the fact that

– some post-colonial arenas and/or countries influenced the Cold War much more than some First" and "Second" world countries, that is, "peripheries" does not equal "post-colonial countries;"
– dividing lines between the First/Second world and postcolonial countries are not clear-cut, and there are many contact and overlap zones, which on top are often historically rich and complex, like the Mediterranean[2]; and
– some networks straddled North and South and/or were present in both, as John Aerni-Flesser's "The Spectre of Communism and Local Politics in Leso-tho, 1952-1970" shows for the Catholic Church, whose priests were since the 1930s present also in the rural hinterland and by the 1960s helped lead an anticommunist charge (pp. 45, 49, 54).

A second underlying theme of this review concerns space(s). For one thing, Aerni-Flesser and Geoffrey Cain's "Sihanouk's Folly and the Second Indochinese War: The Decline of Cambodian Royalty and the Rise of the Military" show that subnational locales could influence a country's Cold War behavior. In Lesotho, leftist local newspapers mattered as some attended firmly to social issues, especially labor (p. 46); and Cambodia's Samlaut rebellion, at first a sub-national peasant revolt, ended up spreading through the country, supported by the left (pp. 197-199). For another thing, despite Jacob's declared focus on "national perspectives" (p. 9), no chapter is exclusively a country case study, and none can neatly divide between the national and the transnational and international. Take the United Nations. It is central to Morgan and makes an appearance in Parrot, in Achberger, as an arena in which Zambia could keep promises to the PRC (pp. 163-166), and in Charles Thomas' "Tanzania: Decolonization, the Cold War, and the Creation of a Nation, 1961–1979", who notes that "[I]n 1954, Nyerere bypassed the colonial authorities and courted the United Nations fact-finding mission within Tanganiyka … [and] appeared in 1955 before the Trusteeship Council of the United Nations" (p. 117). Reading these chapters side by side and together with other projects – for instance Jennifer L. Foray ongoing work on Indians in New York assisting Indonesians to claim independence at the UN in the late 1940s; David Stenner's forthcoming monograph on Morocco showing how Indonesians and others helped Moroccans in New York from the early 1950s; and Matthew Connelly's landmark monograph showing how Moroccans aided Algerians in New York from the mid-1950s[3] – one may inquire into cumulative patterns and expanding networks at the UNO used to gain independence. Also, could we retell this story as one blurring and complicating the boundary between traditional diplomats, activists, and revolutionaries? That is, could we write socio-cultural histories of "diplomating", as it were, in a time of decolonization, with attention to arenas including, but not limited to, the United Nations in New York? Such studies could draw inspirations from work done on the League of Nations.[4]

Still on space(s), Jessica Achberger's "Negotiating for Economic Development: Zambia in the Cold War" shows how Zambia has an "advanced" – and "diversified," we may add – "foreign relations policy" (pp. 149, 166). On a similar note, Parrot argues that FRELIMO was self-consciously and explicitly internationalist, indeed felt it had to be to survive the Cold War (pp. 69, 82). In Africa, it nurtured strong ties with Algeria and with its Tanzanian neighbor; and it sought to bypass the minefield of Cold War bipolarity by "forging strong linkages on both sides of the Iron Curtain" (p. 63) "to retain not only its independence but an international reputation for autonomy that would keep open future avenues of support" (p. 69). This included cooperating with progressive forces in the West (p. 73), not only sub-state actors but with "peripheral nations like non-NATO member Sweden and the other Nordic states" that were social-democratic (p. 75).[5] Could one, we may ask, splice such periphery-periphery ties with new views of the Cold War in Europe that crisscross the Iron Curtain, pointing to "multileveled in-

teraction?"[6] Meanwhile, Raquel Ribeiro's "The Cubans in Angola (1975–1991): A Cultural Overview" shows how Cuban *internacionalistas*, women and men deployed in Africa, "boosted a collective reflection about identity in Cuba" (p. 20). They used different transnationally lived South-South contexts doubling as Cold War arenas – think of Angola – to reenact and relive their revolution after it and its initial flavor and fervor had passed.[7]

A last underlying theme concerns time. Regarding periodization, Christofis (pp. 265, 269, 271, 276) on Turkey and Casarões (pp. 299-302) on Brazil agree in that while superpower behavior helped set rhythms, post-colonial grass-roots and elite actions mattered just as much if not more. This is an important angle from which to continue considering a foremost question in recent studies of the Cold War: intersections with decolonization.[8] On a related note, various authors show that many inter-state and inter-personal South-South relations that shaped the Cold War period within post-colonial countries have deep roots, some of which predated the Cold War. Ribeiro shows this for the relationship between Fidel Castro and Angola's Agostinho Neto (p. 13). Aerni-Flesser demonstrates how Lesotho's long labor history – especially nineteenth-century Basotho labor migration to South Africa, and the involvement of a few Basothos in the South African communist party from the 1920s – helped shape Lesotho's reception of communism after World War II (p. 42). Casarões notes Brazil's interwar relationship with the United States and its echoes in post-war policies and expectations (pp. 285-288). And Herrán-Avila mentions the roles, in Colombia's counterinsurgency, of

a U.S. ex-colonial police officer originally stationed in Manila and of a Colombian student of French counterinsurgency (pp. 329, 332 n154).

To conclude, Jacob could have curated this edited volume better and drawn analytical conclusions. But the geographical range, certain authors' arguments, and many events described and marginal notes allow one to employ this book to continue reflecting on the Cold War and its complex interplay with decolonization.

Notes:
1   Jacob inter alia cites (on pp. 7n15, 8n25, and 9n29, respectively) J. Suri, The Cold War, Decolonization, and Global Social Awakening. Historical Intersections, in: Cold War History 6 (2006), p. 353-363; O. A. Westad, The Global Cold War, Cambridge 2005; and R. McMahon, The Cold War on the Periphery. The United States, India, and Pakistan, New York 1996.
2   See e.g. Rinna Kullaa's RUSMED project, focusing on Russian and European relations with Mediterranean countries which became independent after WWII: Algeria, Syria, Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia, Libya, Cyprus and the former Yugoslavia.
3   J. Foray, Go Fight Us in New York. The United Nations and the Origins of Postwar Decolonization, lecture, Graduate Institute Geneva, 14 November 2017; D. Stenner, Globalizing Morocco, Monograph Manuscript; M. Connelly, A Diplomatic Revolution. Algeria's Fight for Independence and the Origins of the Post-Cold War Era, Oxford 2002.
4   See www.lonsea.de, the League of Nations Search Engine, which bundles information about thousands of people who networked at and through Geneva.
5   Stenner, Globalizing Morocco, makes a similar point.
6   S. Autio-Sarasmo, K. Miklóssy, Introduction, in: idem (eds.), Reassessing Cold War Europe, New York 2011, p. 1-15.
7   Philip Casula made a similar argument in "Soviet Travelers to the Middle East: Searching Modernity and a True Soviet Self during the Cold War," paper, conference "Transnational relations

between Eastern Europe/USSR and the Middle East," Geneva, 22-23 February 2018.

8   See e.g. the subtle changes Westad made from idem, Global Cold War to idem, The Cold War. A World History, New York 2017, which is somewhat more agnostic about the weight of decolonization in Cold War developments. See also e.g. P. Duara, The Cold War as a Historical Period. An Interpretive Essay, in: Journal of Global History 6 (2011), p. 457-480.

Rita Chin: The Crisis of Multicultura-lism in Europe. A History, Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press 2017, 363 p.

Reviewed by
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In this book, Rita Chin tries to understand what is behind the statement, frequently made by politicians across Western Europe especially since 2010, that multiculturalism has failed. In order to do so, she suggests that it is necessary to trace how multicultural societies emerged in Europe in the first place.

Chin's study places the beginning of multicultural Europe at the emergence of the post-World War Two political and social order with the first large-scale immigration of people of non-European origin. Following the introduction in which Chin situates her analysis in the context of ongoing political debates on immigration and diversity, the authors takes the reader on a huge interestingly journey through histories of immigration, the politics and economics that have shaped the different

phases of these histories as well as the political and larger public discourses whereby political actors have conceptualized immigration, nationhood, diversity and multiculturalism. Focusing on the UK, France, Germany and to a lower degree the Netherlands, Chin shows how immigration emerged from the different historical scenarios of these countries after World War Two forging two basic patterns: one in which imperial and colonial histories shaped routes of migration, institutional pathways of recognition and nascent forms of coexistence (Britain, France and the Netherlands); and another one in which immigration resulted from the need for labor (Germany). In many cases, politicians' attitudes towards questions of migration and integration had to do with their location within the political spectrum, with left-leaning politicians usually favoring policies that promoted immigrants' rights and conservatives arguing for tight immigration controls and promoting discourses that championed national cohesion and warned against national fragmentation. However, skillfully moving between different political and levels, historical periods and regional subnational scenarios, Chin shows that this was not always the case and that there was variation. In particular, leftist politicians' support for migration was sometimes qualified by concerns over workers' rights and social justice. Left-liberals, in turn, have become over the last decades more hesitant to support migration as discourses about the lacking support of migrants, in particular Muslims, for liberal values and rights became more entrenched.

While the book provides a welcome historical contextualization for many of the