

had written home to the Federal Foreign Office that he was overjoyed to see that while with him there was also a representative of the GDR waiting to see Nkrumah, he was welcomed to the VIP waiting room, and did not had to sit like the other in the common waiting area and was also invited in to Nkrumah's office brief minutes after his arrival – walking past the GDR representative, as he still had to wait. What the diplomat did not know at the time the GDR representative did indeed have his conversation with the Ghanaian president later, but that it took far longer and was more detailed than anticipated and ended with a picture taken for the press of this visit; a detail that greatly annoyed the FRG delegation (p. 22).

Throughout the book such anecdotes illustrate the everyday diplomatic ramifications of the German-German rivalry in Accra and, as in this example, the consequences of the Hallstein-Doctrine of the FRG (that aimed at undermining any diplomatic or official recognition of the GDR). Small events and actions were interpreted at times very differently by the delegation of the two Germans as well as the Ghanaian politicians. Van der Heyden has a light-hearted way of telling these stories, that form part of a larger rivalry not just between the two Germans, but also – as emerging in those years – between the US and the Soviet Union. Yet, these manifestations of larger politics within day-to-day diplomatic affairs that seem almost comic, had very tangible consequences for the first independent African country and its president, who was still new to managing international politics.

As Jonathan Otto Pohl argues in his chapter on the 1966 coup and US's role in the

edited volume, this German-German foreign diplomatic rivalry was only one facet of a system of international politics. The other was the involvement in and rather active welcoming by the US government under President Johnson of the 1966 coup that ended Nkrumah's presidency. Within the context of the Lumumba assassination in Congo or the removal from power of Sukarno, the first president of independent Indonesia, it was just one of many foreign power interferences throughout post-colonial countries during the so-called Cold War, that turned hot in many of them. The superpower rivalry in the region was based on a narrow understanding of geopolitics as a zero-sum game, facilitating the scrambling for an Africa in the wake of independence. In this respect the two books are strong accounts of the myriad entanglements between local, national, transnational and international politics.

Ulf Brunnbauer / Klaus Buchenau:
Geschichte Südosteuropas,
Ditzingen: Reclam 2018, 511 p.

Reviewed by
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Textbooks in the Anglo-Saxon world do not bring tenure. They don't even figure as legitimate items in one's research profile. At best they can bring some money. They are almost always a de facto anonymous undertaking, collaborative but so standardized stylistically, that the authors' per-

sonal voices have all but disappeared. There were a few exceptions like Leften S. Stavrianos, who wrote his magnificent and magisterial “The Balkans since 1453” (1958), after which he retired in practice from active research (much to the chagrin of professional historians who admired his acute analytical gifts alongside his narrative talents). Following his best-selling “A Global History: From Prehistory to the 21st Century” (1970), he entirely turned to the textbook industry, producing respected world histories and collaborative cultural histories on practically every corner of the earth.

It was not always so. In the nineteenth century and until a few decades after the Second World War new courses introduced at universities were materialized in textbooks that counted as the culmination of one’s scholarly career. It is still the case in Europe where surveys and textbooks are still a respected individual or collaborative achievement. Not surprisingly, Germany, which houses the most important research institutions of the Balkans outside of the region, has produced a number of outstanding surveys. Only in the last few years, following a robust tradition, at least three excellent volumes have come out: the remarkable “Lexikon zur Geschichte Südosteuropas” (2016, over 1100 pages, reviewed by me in *Slavic Review*, 76, 3, Fall 2017), the equally distinguished “Geschichte Südosteuropas”, edited by Konrad Clewing and Oliver Jens Schmidt (2011, 835 pages in very small font), and the noteworthy “Südosteuropa: Weltgeschichte einer Region” (2016) by Marie-Janine Calic. The first two are compendia by the best experts in their respective sub-specializations, the third is a single-authored view

of the region through today’s fashionable lens of world history. All three belong to the genre of broad, and in the case of the first two, encyclopedic surveys. They are difficult, however, to adopt as textbooks.

It is against this background that one is to evaluate the reviewed work. What distinguishes the present volume is that it belongs to a slightly different genre: it is unabashedly a university textbook, and it is a good textbook. Buchenau and Brunnbauer are both professors at the University of Regensburg, the latter also director of the Leibniz Institute for East-and Southeast European Studies. The volume itself is much briefer (the circa 500 pages are in large font), readable and devoid of the usual academic apparatus, such as footnotes and exhaustive bibliography. The suggestions for further reading at the end are exclusively German with a few sprinkles in English.

The philosophical, theoretical and methodological premises, as outlined throughout, but summarized in the preface and introductory chapter “South-East Europe and its History,” are exemplary (especially insofar as this reviewer shares them). There is a spirited defense of regional history as *Beziehungsgeschichte* (history of relationships). The stated goal is the de-exoticization and thus normalization of the Balkans, its treatment as an integral element of European history. The attention to Southeastern Europe is justified by the belief that often general developments attain a greater clarity in the periphery. The choice of “Southeast Europe” over “the Balkans” is made because of the allegedly lesser burden of this designation, but also because of the choice to include Hungarian history. This makes sense given the

attention given to Habsburg influence. Welcome is also the inclusion of Modern Turkey. The volume follows throughout a thematic rather than country by country approach, allowing to emphasize typological similarities but also outline differences. The argument is developed in five consecutive parts. “The pre-modern legacy (to 1800)” – is a concise and useful overview of the several consecutive and contending imperial and state legacies in the region: ancient, the medieval heritage of Bulgarians, Croats, Serbs, Hungarians, Albanians and Romanians, Venetian and Habsburg legacies, and mostly the legacies of the Byzantines and the Ottomans. As a whole, a proper distinction is made between structural vestiges and memory but in the case of the millennial Byzantine legacy, it is depicted as a static model and there is a teleological opposition to a putative “Western model.” “The ‘long’ 19th century: state-building and new conflict constellation” focuses on the creation and structure of new states and convincingly weighs the internal motives of the new seceding elites against great power meddling. The formation of national identities is assessed through the most up-to-date theories of nationalism. The success of the societal transformations – urbanization and industrialization – proved much slower and more controversial. Still, even in this respect, the Southeast was not unique compared to other European peripheral regions. However, the authors point to a Balkan specificum, the popular distrust of the state and low acceptance of formal institutions. “World War One and interwar: the long war shadow” appropriately addresses the negative stereotypes, especially in the German space, about the putative

blame of the region and specifically Serbia for the outbreak of the Great War.

The last two parts, from the Second World War to the present, amount to almost half the coverage. “Fragile modernity: World War Two, postwar, and Cold war” appropriately begins with the 1944 Moscow percentage agreement. Since this is the most detailed section, it gives a country by country political overview. Solid is the treatment of the relationship between nationalism and communism, and the analysis of socialist industrialization, urbanization, education, women’s emancipation and rising consumerism is especially strong. “Precarious re-Europeanization?” deals with the transformations after 1989. “Return to Europe” was, of course, an emic call, but one would have expected a more deconstructive attitude. Was the era of communism non-European? The central aspect here is Yugoslav disintegration. It is delivered with praiseworthy balance if, at moments, with excessive detail. Yet, this is warranted not only because it is what continues to attract most interest (I can corroborate this from my own teaching) but also, given the ongoing debates about the alleged “guilt” of Germany, it needs (and is given) an informed reading. One cannot but agree with the gloomy verdict on the ambivalent results of the social and cultural transformations, the demographic crisis and post-communist nostalgia for the former socialist countries, as well as the catastrophic economic collapse for Greece and the rise of autocratic rule in Turkey. The epilogue “South-East European History and Future” ends on a melancholic note.

This is, in every respect, a successful survey of Southeast Europe. An excellent idea

is the inclusion of long quotes from contemporary primary sources which are often more evocative than any commentary. They are, however, unevenly distributed and more would have been welcome, especially if made to stand out typographically. If I hesitate to recommend it for translation, it is because it is specifically written for and explicitly addressed to a German-reading public (which is broader than Germany, Austria and Switzerland). But teachers of Balkan history should consult this volume with profit.

Robert W. Pringle (ed.): Historical Dictionary of Russian and Soviet Intelligence, 2nd ed., Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield 2015, 448 p.

Reviewed by
Zaur Gasimov, Istanbul

Russia matters! And its intelligence matters even more. Nowadays, when The Economist's cover page portrays the Russian president Vladimir Putin as an octopus spreading his arms in different directions and titles the caricature as "The Meddler. How Russia menaces Western democracies"¹, every well-researched publication on the history, evolution, goals and key actors of the Soviet and post-Soviet Russian intelligence community is welcomed.

Robert W. Pringle authored the second edition of his seminal "Historical Dictionary of Russian and Soviet Intelligence" in the prominent series "Historical Diction-

ary of..." with Rowman & Littlefield in 2015. The encyclopedically structured monograph offers an interesting introduction into the topic and several hundreds of notions related to the Soviet and Russian secret services, their home and abroad operations, failures and victories. Pringle himself is a retired CIA officer and is an expert on East European intelligence. He is not only a scholar working on Russian security sector but he has his own experience of work in the field of intelligence and counterintelligence. Perfectly aware of Soviet Russian history, the development of the ill-famed NKVD, KGB and of other organizations, Pringle succeeded in telling the history of the Russian intelligence community in the context of Soviet-Western interactions. The Historical Dictionary focuses not only on the key spymasters and defectors from Moscow engaged in the famous operations like Manhattan Project, TRUST a.o. but also on KGB's institutional and educational infrastructure like the Andropov Institute nearby Moscow as well as on the great Russian critics of Stalinism like the poetess Anna Akhmatova.

Pringle's book is of significance for students of Soviet history and of Russian politics. Those interested in the Stalinist period, would find biographical data on key personnel of Soviet secret services boosted and repressed by Stalin. In a detailed way, Pringle describes the Soviet practice of the so called "active measures" aimed at disinformation and spread of false news. The Soviet authorities disseminated "fake news" depicting U.S. and its European allies as particularly hawkish and themselves as peace-loving after the end of the World War II. In the 1980s, Moscow-backed