

# **“A New Phase of Anti-Imperialist Cooperation”:<sup>1</sup> The Making of Liberation Alliances in 1960s’ (Unliberated) Southern Africa**

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## **ABSTRACTS**

Seit ihrem Beginn in den 1960er Jahren waren die Befreiungskämpfe im südlichen Afrika in ihrem Charakter transnational und transregional. Neben den Beziehungen zu den Mächten des Kalten Krieges gewannen gegen Ende der Dekade die Beziehungen der Befreiungsbewegungen untereinander an Bedeutung. Dieser Artikel untersucht die wichtigsten Kooperationsabkommen zwischen den Bewegungen und den Prozess, der 1969 in Khartum zur Konsolidierung einer Allianz der Befreiungsbewegungen des südlichen Afrikas führte. Diese „revolutionären Partnerschaften“ waren Ergebnis sowohl der Bemühungen externer Unterstützer wie auch der Führung der Befreiungsbewegungen, die sich mit Fragen von Repräsentation und Legitimation konfrontiert sahen. Obwohl es Bemühungen für eine stärkere militärische und politische Zusammenarbeit gab, zielte die Khartum-Allianz vor allem auf die Mobilisierung der internationalen öffentlichen Meinung und deren Unterstützung der „authentischen“ Befreiungsbewegungen des südlichen Afrikas.

Liberation struggles in Southern Africa were transnational and transregional since its inception in the early 1960s. Besides the involvement with Cold War powers and international actors, cooperation between liberation movements in the region became increasingly prominent towards the end of the decade. This article addresses the main cooperative arrangements and the process that led towards the consolidation of an alliance of Southern African liberation move-

1 Sechaba, Official organ of the African National Congress of South Africa, Commentary. The Khartoum Conference, March 1969, p. 3.

ments in 1969 in Khartoum. The forging of “revolutionary partnerships” was as much boosted by external supporters as pursued by the leadership of the liberation movements themselves, that sought to overcome hurdles of representation and legitimacy. Despite strategic aspirations for a stronger cooperation in the military and political realms, the Khartoum alliance was mainly oriented towards mobilizing the international public opinion in favour of this assemblage of “authentic” Southern African liberation movements.

The euphoria and optimistic expectations brought by the Wind of Change<sup>2</sup> in great part of the African continent in the early 1960s quickly transformed into mixed feelings and scepticism as the decade went by.<sup>3</sup> Despite growing claims for emancipation, decolonization was held in abeyance in the Portuguese colonies and white minority-ruled territories of Southern Africa. Nationalist oriented liberation movements emerged within each colony or territory as well as in exile. At different times, they engaged in armed struggles against the respective colonial and racist regimes. Although cooperation between the diverse liberation movements in the region might look like a *fait accompli*, their relations were in fact unsteady and informal until the very end of the 1960s and early 1970s. The reality of the armed struggle in each territory, internal conflicts or exile politics are some of the aspects that differentiated their trajectories and simultaneously had an impact in their coming together. This article traces the most significant forms of cooperation that existed among Southern African liberation movements over the decade and examines the agency of the movements themselves vis-à-vis the interference of international organisations in the creation of these alliances as well as their immediate outcomes.

Recent literature on the transnational dimensions of Southern African liberation movements has opened new avenues for investigation on their regional entanglements as well as their cooperation with Eastern bloc actors within a Cold War framework.<sup>4</sup> The study of more institutionalised attempts to consolidating the partnership between Southern African liberation movements in the long 1960s thus follows the lead of this emergent body of research in order to flesh out joint representational strategies that contributed to reinforce the rhetoric of a solid ensemble of Southern African liberation struggles.

## 1. Early Lusophone Interterritorial Fronts: United Against Portuguese Colonialism

The cooperation between anti-colonialists from the African territories under Portuguese rule dates back beyond the emergence of different national liberation movements.<sup>5</sup> Simi-

2 SAHO, Speech made to the South Africa Parliament on 3 February 1960 by Harold Macmillan. South African History Online, <<https://www.sahistory.org.za/archive/wind-change-speech-made-south-africa-parliament-3-february-1960-harold-macmillan>> (accessed 7 February 2020).

3 See also Engel in this volume.

4 J. Alexander / J. McGregor / B.-M. Tendi (eds.), *Transnational Histories of Southern Africa's Liberation Movements*, New York 2019; and L. Dallywater / C. Saunders / H.A. Fonseca (eds.) *Southern African Liberation Movements and the Global Cold War 'East': Transnational Activism 1960–1990*, Berlin / Boston 2019.

5 The author follows the broadly definition of national liberation movements (NLMs) as summarized by Samir

lar to histories of anticolonialism in other imperial frameworks, African Lusophone anticolonialism has its own debt with diaspora groups in the metropolis and across African borders. National liberation movements, such as the Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola MPLA) or the Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (Mozambican Liberation Front, FRELIMO), were the product of the mobilisation of an *assimilado*/urban-based population, whose leadership was mainly educated in Portugal, France, and the United States. They were first organised externally, mainly from Europe,<sup>6</sup> but once the first African countries gained independence, they started to relocate their operational bases closer to their respective territories with the support granted by newly independent states.<sup>7</sup> Based on published correspondence and memories,<sup>8</sup> it is possible to confirm the common origins and the high level of coordination that existed between the nationalist movements from Angola, Guinea-Bissau, and Mozambique operating externally. Indeed, a common agenda weighed upon separate nationalist undertakings well into 1960. Anticolonial activities in the last years of the 1950s were carried out under the flag of the Movimento Anticolonialista (Anticolonialist Movement, MAC), an interterritorial liberation front that gathered the main anticolonial activists in the diaspora and coordinated their representative actions at the international level.<sup>9</sup> According to its mission statement (1957), the main goal of the movement was in general terms "to stimulate, develop, and coordinate African unity

Amin as "diverse socio-political movements which share the aim of establishing an independent state for what they consider their nation within the borders of a territory recognized by the international community". S. Amin, National Liberation movements, in: N.J. Smelser/P.B. Baltes (eds.), *International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences*, 2nd edn, New York 2001, pp. 10309–10314, at p. 10309. The cases under consideration here are Southern African movements in the post-WW II context. Robert Young refers to this type of anticolonial resistance as "nationalist liberation struggles". R.J.C. Young, *Postcolonialism: An Historical Introduction*, New Jersey 2016, pp. 161–166. Drawing on these various conceptual interpretations, the term nationalist and national liberation movements are used interchangeably in this text.

- 6 On the European origins of Lusophone liberation movements see D.C. Mateus, *A Luta pela independência: a formação das elites fundadoras da FRELIMO, MPLA e PAIGC*, Lisbon 1999; E. Rocha, *Angola: Contribuição ao estudo da génese do nacionalismo moderno angolano, período de 1950–1964 (testemunho e estudo documental)*, Luanda 2003.
- 7 Several authors have contributed to enriching the literature on the African detours and external basis of Lusophone national liberation movements in the 1960s and early 1970s. See for instance G. Roberts, The assassination of Eduardo Mondlane: FRELIMO, Tanzania, and the politics of exile in Dar es Salaam, in: *Cold War History* 17 (2017) 1, pp. 1–19; E. Burton, Hubs of decolonization. African Liberation Movements and Eastern Connections in Cairo, Accra and Dar es Salaam, in: Dallywater et al. (eds.), *Southern African liberation movements*, pp. 25–56; E. George, *The Cuban Intervention in Angola 1965–1991: From Che Guevara to Cuito Canavale*, London 2005; F.A. Guimaraes, *The origins of the Angolan Civil War: Foreign Intervention and Domestic Political Conflict, 1961–76*, London 1998, pp. 58–82.
- 8 L. Lara, *Um amplo movimento, documentos e comentários para a história do MPLA (até fev. 1961) vol. I*, Lisbon 1999; L. Lara, *Um amplo movimento, Itinerário do MPLA através de documentos de Lúcio Lara, vol. II (1961–1962)*, Luanda 2006; L. Lara, *Um amplo movimento, Itinerário do MPLA através de documentos de Lúcio Lara, vol. III (1963–1964)*, Luanda 2008; M.P. de Andrade, *Uma entrevista dada a Michel Laban*, Lisbon 1997; E. Rocha, *Angola: Contribuição ao estudo da génese do nacionalismo moderno angolano, período de 1950–1964 (testemunho e estudo documental)*, Luanda 2003.
- 9 J.S. Sousa, Os movimentos unitários anti-colonialistas (1954–1960) O contributo de Amílcar Cabral, in: *Revista Estudos do Século XX. Colonialismo, Anticolonialismo e Identidades Nacionais* 3 (2003), pp. 339–341.

against Portuguese colonialism”.<sup>10</sup> Hence, the MAC members appealed to a certain extent to the Pan-Africanist tradition of a shared historical fate that forged the ties to resist and combat European imperialism, as it had been previously done but diasporic pan-African figures like Ghana’s President Kwame Nkrumah. No wonder then that Ghana’s government was among the first contacts of the MAC<sup>11</sup> at a time in which they were seeking support to establish representations in the African continent. At the same time, MAC activists strove for diversifying their networking strategies and used every possibility to engage in conversations with potential sponsors such as the Committee of African Organizations in London or the permanent committee of the Afro-Asian Peoples’ Solidarity Organization (AAPSO) in Cairo, Egypt.<sup>12</sup>

However, despite the collective endeavours of the MAC, the ‘nation’ and consequently nationalist denominations became predominant by the early 1960s. The Anticolonialist Movement shifted into the Frente Revolucionária Africana para a Independência Nacional (African Revolutionary Front for National Independence, FRAIN) after its participation in the 1960 All African People’s Conference (AAPC) in Tunis, Tunisia, clearly driven by the revolutionary mood set off by the Algerian war of independence. The general enthusiasm that followed after the non-violent decolonisation in Ghana in 1957 and that inspired the first AAPC, turned in Tunis into calls to direct action by any means. On this “historical occasion” that “opened the African doors”,<sup>13</sup> the representatives of the MAC encountered heads of state of independent African countries as well as members of liberation movements, political organisations and labour unions of the whole continent. But it was precisely the exchange with Cameroonian and Algerian freedom fighters that left the strongest and lasting impression as they were encouraged by the very self-same Frantz Fanon<sup>14</sup> to start the armed struggle in Angola without delay. Despite the invitations extended by the Algerian Front de Libération Nationale (National Liberation Front, FLN) to African freedom fighters “to join the struggle in Algeria and learn techniques for fighting their own battles”,<sup>15</sup> the FRAIN continued to stick to “nonviolent methods but civil disobedience”<sup>16</sup> in their fight for the liberation of the territories under Portuguese colonialism. Tunis meant however a turning point in their multinational anticolonial approach to liberation. The existing nationalist formations at that time – the Partido Africano para a Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde (African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde, PAIGC) and MPLA – had a more prominent role within the common front, and as recognized in its foundational

10 Lara, *Um amplo movimento* vol. I, p. 655.

11 *Ibid.*, pp. 116–121.

12 *Ibid.*, p. 271.

13 *Ibid.*, p. 334.

14 The Martinican born psychiatrist and writer set the intellectual cornerstone of bitter criticism against European colonialism in the 1950s with his book *Peau noire, masques blancs* (1952). Between the mid-1950s and the early 1960s he held several positions as FLN representative.

15 G. Houser, *No One Can Stop The Rain: Glimpses of Africa’s Liberation Struggle*, New York 1989, p. 74.

16 Lara, *Um amplo movimento* vol. I, p. 349.

charter, the revolutionary front became indeed "an alliance of political parties and mass organizations".<sup>17</sup>

In fact, the "nationalisation" of the liberation movements became quite obvious with the start of the armed struggle in Angola in 1961. The MPLA attacked several police stations in the capital, Luanda, while the União das Populações de Angola (Union of Populations of Angola, UPA) stirred up a revolt in the rural north. Both parties carried out their insurgency activities with little success on the attempts to unite against the Portuguese. Nevertheless, the MPLA found a basis of support and legitimacy in the common front with the liberation movements from other colonial territories. The old motto that "union makes for strength"<sup>18</sup> gained new life with the constitution of the Conferência das Organizações Nacionalistas das Colónias Portuguesas (Conference of the Nationalist Organizations of the Portuguese Colonies, CONCP) in April 1961 in Casablanca, Morocco. Unlike its forerunner, the FRAIN established in Tunis one year before, the Conference had a clear sponsor in the African chess of newly independent states – the Casablanca group<sup>19</sup> and, more precisely, the Moroccan monarchy –; a recognizable infrastructure with an advisory board and permanent secretariat in Rabat; as well as wider representation with ten different political organizations, among them, the Goa League or Goan People's Party, and labour movements like the National Union of Angolan Workers.<sup>20</sup>

The Conference's final declaration in 1961 stands out for its call to "unity, solidarity and cooperation", with a particular appeal to the nationalist organizations that had not taken part in the conference to "adhere immediately to its principles".<sup>21</sup> Although this implied reference to the Angolan UPA<sup>22</sup> left the door open for future negotiations with opposition groups and thus emphasized the flexible nature of their partnership, in practice the renewed alliance served as a sort of legitimizing instrument against the very same rivals. The institutionalization of the nationalist front brought along a visible enlargement of the international contacts and solidarity. The CONCP headquarters in Rabat became a "*carrefour des militants nationalistes*"<sup>23</sup> ("crossroads of nationalist militants") in the words of the Angolan Mário Pinto de Andrade, president of the CONCP advisory board. Ben

17 Ibid., p. 348.

18 A. Cabral, *Unity and Struggle: Speeches and Writings of Amílcar Cabral*, London 1979, p. 30.

19 The alliance, established in 1961, comprised the governments of Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Libya, Morocco and the United Arab Republic that advocated for a radical course of action to put an end on European colonialism and foreign interference in Africa. The Casablanca bloc was one of the three ideological and political families that merged within the Organisation of African Unity in 1963. In turn, the Monrovia group and the Brazzaville group kept moderate stances towards decolonization, favouring the negotiation with the respective colonial powers. See also Engel in this volume.

20 Lara, *Um amplo movimento* vol. II, pp. 63–64.

21 Ibid., p. 78.

22 The MPLA had previously made numerous attempts to create a united Angolan nationalist front, a reality that did not materialize despite the multiple external pressures that African leaders such as Nkrumah exerted.

23 Fundação Mário Soares, Arquivo Mário Pinto de Andrade, Mohammed V et L'Afrique – Témoignage. Statement from Mário Pinto de Andrade about Mohammed V (1987), <[http://hdl.handle.net/11002/fms\\_dc\\_83594](http://hdl.handle.net/11002/fms_dc_83594)> (accessed 7 February 2020).

Bella and other historical militants of the Algerian FLN as well as Nelson Mandela and Robert Resha from the South African African National Congress (ANC) were just some of the activists that visited its offices in 1962. The increasing alignment of the front with other African struggles for freedom, and particularly with those oppressed by the apartheid policy in South Africa and the Southern African territories of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, should not be reduced to simple rhetoric. With the commencement of the armed struggle in Angola and instability in Mozambique looming large, members of the CONCP were certainly aware of the interventionist threats posed by the regimes in the neighbouring minority-ruled territories and the real need for better cooperation with those fighting them. Yet, it was not until the late 1960s that solidarity and cooperation with the movements fighting across Southern African borders became a prominent issue of their mutual liberation agendas.

The relocation of operational centres southward that came along with an intensification of the conflict in Angola and the eruption of the struggle in Guinea-Bissau in 1963 and Mozambique in 1964, gave centre stage to the respective nationalist organizations and overshadowed the role of the CONCP. Rabat was “not a feasible meeting point any longer, either for reasons of political nature [...] or for issues of economic and pragmatic order”.<sup>24</sup> At a time of unrelenting political change in which several “hubs of decolonization”<sup>25</sup> emerged, together with the advent of the first African intergovernmental organisation, opportunities to engage in dialogue with a broader array of sponsors and collaborators multiplied. Notwithstanding the critiques about the inefficiency of the common front,<sup>26</sup> the CONCP and thus the willingness to coordinate the agendas of the different nationalist movements endured.

A second conference in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, in 1965 aimed at attuning the CONCP to broader schemes of continental collaboration. Home and rear-base to political refugees and liberation movements from all over Africa, the Tanzanian capital hosted also the headquarters of the Liberation Committee, a subsidiary organ of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), strongly promoted by President Julius Nyerere. Operating under the guidance of the governing board of member states, the Committee provided funding, logistic support, training and publicity to those movements officially recognized by the OAU. Hence, it seemed quite opportune for a feeble CONCP to close ranks around the decision centre of African liberation politics. Reinforcing the position of the interterritorial front with its participant organisations as a legitimate interlocutor vis-à-vis the OAU was a pressing need particularly for the MPLA, weakened by the internal dissensions among high ranks of the party and ostracized by the official recognition of the rival Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola/ Governo Revolucionário de Angola no Exílio (FNLA/GRAE) as the legitimate liberation movement of Angola. It was also crucial for all the members to display their strength as a united group in order to keep their own

24 Lara, *Um amplo movimento* vol. III, p. 320.

25 Burton, *Hubs of decolonization*, p. 26.

26 Lara, *Um amplo movimento* vol. III, pp. 391, 685 and 688.

autonomy with regard to the OAU's attempts to control the mobility and co-opt the external representations of the nationalist movements.<sup>27</sup> The CONCP members were, to say the least, sceptical about the plans orchestrated within the intergovernmental organisation for shaping the liberation paths of their own territories. The conference reports, published in Algiers a year later (i.e. in 1966), included an extensive review of the African political conjuncture, with enough space for critiques to

*certain African states engaged in broadening the internal contradictions for the African unity – contradictions about political regimes or development paths – that are in reality a weapon at the service of imperialists which aim at perpetuating the balkanisation of the continent.*<sup>28</sup>

In this context, and by framing their struggles of national liberation as “a focal point of the African unity”<sup>29</sup>, they launched an appeal to the OAU to be vigilant in order to avoid discrepancies and channel its support to their nationalist organisations for these claimed to be the exclusive and legitimate representatives of the people's will.

Bearing in mind the internal leadership crisis of some of the member organizations and the disadvantage this could create in face of their rivalry with other factions fighting for the liberation of the same territories, the CONCP tried to achieve by the mid-1960s an intermediary role between the individual nationalist movements and regional bodies of political decision-making. The common front was far from being a primary representational scheme, as it was the case with the original MAC and till a certain extent the FRAIN in the early 1960s, yet membership lent some sort of political legitimacy. The international projection as well as the social and political capital that figures such as Amílcar Cabral (Guinea-Bissau, Cape Verde) or Eduardo Mondlane (Mozambique) had cultivated over the years in the realm of revolutionary politics certainly benefited the public image of the common front. However, the old saying of “union makes for strength” gained different interpretations over time. For member organisations such as the MPLA, the CONCP carried a more pragmatic meaning, thus bringing it a step closer to the OAU and strengthening its basis of support against its rival, the officially recognized FNLA. For others like the PAIGC, with a successful record of guerrilla operations against the Portuguese and no real competitor in the struggle for independence, it had probably a symbolic value, a sort of commemoration of the common roots of their struggles. Still, these formats of coordinated action allowed the member organisations some room of manoeuvre for collective bargaining in a context of tighter arbitration in African liberation politics.

27 Ibid., p. 685.

28 Fundação Mário Soares, Arquivo Mário Pinto de Andrade, L'Afrique et la Lutte de Libération Nationale dans les Colonies Portugaises. Conférence de Dar-es-Salaam. Documents de base (1966), <[http://hdl.handle.net/11002/fms\\_dc\\_83618](http://hdl.handle.net/11002/fms_dc_83618)> (accessed 7 February 2020), p. 46.

29 Ibid., p. 47.

## 2. Enlarging the Partnership to “the Progressive Movements of Southern Africa”<sup>30</sup>

All through the early 1960s the liberation movements of the Portuguese colonies and those of other Southern African territories kept their relations at a low profile. The leaders of these movements occasionally exchanged at international conferences<sup>31</sup> and paid visits to each other’s external delegations in Algiers or Rabat.<sup>32</sup> Meanwhile, rank and file as well as high-level cadres met at training camps in Tanzania, Egypt, Algeria or the USSR.<sup>33</sup> Their shared exile experiences promoted personal friendships that fed a sort of informal solidarity between the movements.<sup>34</sup> Although the ANC recognized as early as 1962 the relevance of strengthening the relations with the CONCP movements,<sup>35</sup> there is no evidence of formal contacts in that regard until 1964. A report by the MPLA delegation to the Cairo Conference of Nonaligned Nations (1964) described a meeting between the Angolan nationalists and representatives of the ANC in which the latter “pointed the necessity for collaboration among the progressive movements of Southern Africa”.<sup>36</sup>

Alliances were though not to be built with whatever liberation movement. In the 1960s Southern African context, Angola was not the only territory whose liberation was disputed between competing groups. The rivalry in Southern Rhodesia between the Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU) and its splinter the Zimbabwean African National Union (ZANU),<sup>37</sup> in Mozambique between FRELIMO and the Revolutionary Committee of Mozambique (COREMO)<sup>38</sup> or in South Africa between the ANC and the

30 Lara, *Um amplo movimento* vol. III, p. 687.

31 I.e. the Pan-African Freedom Movement for East and Central Africa (PAFMECSA) Conference in 1962 in Addis Ababa. See Lara, *Um amplo movimento* vol II, p. 541.

32 For instance, the visit of Mandela and Resha to the CONCP in Rabat, see Fundação Mário Soares, Arquivo Mário Pinto de Andrade, Robert Resha, Marcelino dos Santos, Amália Fonseca, Nelson Mandela, Mário Pinto de Andrade e Aquino de Bragança, Rabat (1962), <<http://casacomum.net/cc/visualizador?pasta=07223.002.033>> (accessed 7 February 2020). For more information about the exchanges in Algiers, where several Southern African liberation movements kept permanent representations, see J.J. Byrne, *Mecca of Revolution. Algeria, Decolonization, and the Third World Order*, Oxford 2016, p. 249.

33 S. Ellis, *External Mission: The ANC in Exile, 1960–1990*, London 2012, p. 111; and A.R. Saúte Saúde, *Mozambique’s solidarity with the National Liberation Struggle in South Africa*, in: *The Road to Democracy in South Africa*, vol. 5, part 2, Pretoria 2014, p. 737.

34 Saúte Saúde points to the friendly relations of Joaquim Chissano and Oliver Tambo as well as connections between Marcelino dos Santos and several ANC representatives as a result of his marriage with the South African Pamela Beira in 1968. See Saúte Saúde, *Mozambique’s solidarity*, pp. 736–737.

35 T. Scott, *The Diplomacy of Liberation: The International Relations of the African National Congress of South Africa, 1960–1965*, PhD thesis, University of London 1989, p. 58. <<http://etheses.lse.ac.uk/1206/>> (accessed 7 February 2020).

36 Lara, *Um amplo movimento* vol. III, p. 687.

37 G.C. Mazarire, *ZANU’s External Networks 1963–1979: An Appraisal*, in: *Journal of Southern African Studies* 43 (2017) 1, pp. 83–106.

38 W.C. Opello Jr., *Pluralism and Elite Conflict in an Independence Movement: FRELIMO in the 1960s*, in: *Journal of Southern African Studies* 2 (1975) 1, pp. 66–82; and S.F. Jackson, *China’s Third World Foreign Policy: The Case of Angola and Mozambique, 1961–93*, in: *The China Quarterly* 142 (1995), pp. 388–422.

Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC),<sup>39</sup> led to intense fights for international recognition and support. However, it was the confrontation of Cold War antagonist forces that contributed to distinguish between authentic and unauthentic movements in the course of the 1960s. The Sino-Soviet split and the following competition between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China for being at the vanguard of national liberation in Africa<sup>40</sup> eventually dragged the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organisation (AAPSO) to the Soviet side. Thus, those considered pro-Chinese movements were outcasted,<sup>41</sup> while those with closer ties with the Soviet bloc were gradually imbued with recognition as the outright representatives of Southern African people's will.<sup>42</sup> Besides directly funding the activities of liberation movements throughout Africa, AAPSO also provided financial support for the OAU Liberation Committee, which had been acting as a sort of legitimacy grantor.<sup>43</sup> In that regard, labelling was not exclusively a matter of Cold War allegiance, but trickled down to pan-African politics and determined the very political and economic survival of liberation movements.

The interest and efforts by the ANC to break through the *cordon sanitaire*<sup>44</sup> around South Africa and consolidate cooperation ties with kindred liberation movements became evident after the military campaigns it conducted together with the ZAPU in Southern Rhodesia in 1967 and 1968.<sup>45</sup> Although these attempts to secure routes for infiltration into South African territory failed, they were recognized and transformed into a major milestone for the interrelation of regional liberation forces.<sup>46</sup> The leader of FRELIMO, Eduardo Mondlane, referred to it as "the best example" of the closer cooperation that was being achieved between the nationalist struggles in Southern Africa.<sup>47</sup> Although he still

39 A. Lissoni, The South African liberation movements in exile, c.1945-1970, PhD thesis, University of London, 2008, pp. 102 and 120. <[https://www.sahistory.org.za/sites/default/files/Arianna\\_Lissoni\\_PhD\\_thesis.pdf](https://www.sahistory.org.za/sites/default/files/Arianna_Lissoni_PhD_thesis.pdf)> (accessed 7 February 2020).

40 L. Lüthi, The Sino-Soviet Split: Cold War in the Communist World, New Jersey 2008, p. 223.

41 This included the abovementioned ZANU, PAC, and COREMO.

42 Drawing the line between authentic and unauthentic movements was not as simple and fast a process, and it was usually done on a case-by-case basis. In the first half of the 1960s, competing movements such as FRELIMO and COREMO were simultaneously receiving Chinese support. FRELIMO was nonetheless diversifying its portfolio of sponsors over the decade and towards the late 1960s the Chinese connections seem to have weakened. See D.H. Shinn / J. Eisenman, China and Africa: A Century of Engagement, Philadelphia 2012, p. 335.

43 M. Shaw, The international status of national liberation movements, in: Liverpool Law Rev 5 (1983), pp. 19–34; and Mazarire, ZANU's External Networks, p. 86.

44 During the 1960s, the South African government pursued a foreign policy informed by national security strategies that envisaged the protection of white-rule in South Africa from the advance of African nationalism through their support to buffer states controlled by white minorities (the Portuguese colonies, Southern Rhodesia, and South West Africa) and the British protectorates of Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland. See J. Miller, An African Volk: The Apartheid Regime and its Search for Survival, New York 2016, pp. 4 and 6.

45 A. Lissoni, Transformations in the ANC External Mission and Umkhonto we Sizwe, c. 1960–1969, in: Journal of Southern African Studies 35 (2009) 2, p. 298.

46 The declaration adopted at the ANC's Morogoro Conference (1969) extols the "historic ZAPU/ANC-Alliance [...] a unique form of cooperation [...] which unites the huge potential of the oppressed people in both South Africa and Zimbabwe", see ANC Historical Documents Archive, African National Congress 1969. Strategy and Tactics of the ANC, <<https://www.marxists.org/subject/africa/anc/1969/strategy-tactics.htm>> (accessed 7 February 2020).

47 E. Mondlane, The Struggle for Mozambique, London 1969, p. 211.

regarded the CONCP as the paramount alliance between “all forces fighting the same enemy”, he also acknowledged that “the next stage of unity must be (sic) unity between the members of the CONCP and the forces fighting in these countries [South Africa and Southern Rhodesia, Portugal’s most immediate allies]”.<sup>48</sup>

News on the inception of an “unholy alliance” between the regimes in power in Portugal, Southern Rhodesia and South Africa spread in the international press since the early 1960s and provoked the first coordinated reactions in the revolutionary milieu.<sup>49</sup> The idea that future survival of white-minority rule in Southern Africa rested on the success of Portugal in its colonial wars, led to stronger military and economic cooperation among the governments of these countries.<sup>50</sup> This translated in the late 1960s and early 1970s in effective collaboration and strategic assistance to the military campaigns conducted by the Portuguese army as well as the joint development of security projects to block the advance of liberation movements as epitomized by the contested construction of the Cabora Bassa dam.<sup>51</sup> FRELIMO and other CONCP member organisations engaged in public campaigns to denounce this infrastructure project and the overall cooperation schemes between the oppressor regimes.<sup>52</sup> The ANC picked up on the same issues and exhibited its full support to the liberation movements of the Portuguese colonies through its official information organ, *Sechaba*.<sup>53</sup> Yet, the strongest denunciation came from activist movements and campaigning pressure groups closely bound up to the liberation movements. The Unholy Alliance conference organised as early as 1962 by the British Anti-Apartheid Movement (AAM) together with the Movement for Colonial Freedom

48 Ibid.

49 A. Neves de Souto, *Relações entre Portugal, África do Sul e Rodésia do Sul e o Exercício ALCORA: Elementos fundamentais na estratégia da condução da guerra, 1960–1974*, in: M.P. Meneses/B. Sena Martins (eds.), *As lutas de libertação e os sonhos coloniais: Alianças secretas, mapas imaginados*, Coimbra 2013, p. 149.

50 Portugal was a founding member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and as such it also profited from the military support and political assistance of NATO allies like France and Western Germany. However, the support of European allies seemed to have diminish in the late 1960s and early 1970s due to international pressure that the Portuguese colonial question faced at the UN as well as a result of shifting Cold War politics (i.e. East and West Germany’s admission to the UN on 18 September 1973, etc.). Portugal’s lack of support from former European continental allies might have been determining to closing ranks with South Africa and Rhodesia as evidenced by the Alcora military exercise (1970). See A. Afonso, *Exercício Alcora: Um projeto para a África Austral*, in: Meneses/Sena Martins (eds.), *As lutas de libertação e os sonhos coloniais*, p. 112; and A. M. Fonseca/D. Marcos, *Cold War Constraints: France, West Germany and Portuguese Decolonization*, in: *Portuguese Studies* 29 (2013) 2, pp. 209–226.

51 “In 1965, Portugal, Southern Rhodesia and South Africa signed a secret agreement on the defence and security of ‘white Africa’ which provided for the organization of joint defence operations against nationalist and subversive communist groups”. Saute Saide, *Mozambique’s solidarity*, p. 734. See also A. F. Isaacman/B.S. Isaacman, *Extending South Africa’s Tentacles of Empire: The Deterritorialisation of Cahora Bassa Dam*, in: *Journal of Southern African Studies* 41 (2015) 3, pp. 541–560, at p. 542.

52 FRELIMO, *Armed struggle in Tete*, in: FRELIMO bulletin (April 1968); Fundação Mário Soares/Arquivo Mário Pinto de Andrade, *Le projet Portugal-Afrique du Sud pour l’Amenagement du Fleuve Kunene*. Departement d’Information et Propagande du MPLA, *Mission Permanente en Algérie*, s.d. <[http://hdl.handle.net/11002/fms\\_dc\\_83877](http://hdl.handle.net/11002/fms_dc_83877)> (accessed 7 February 2020).

53 Regular reports on the spread of South Africa’s influence and intervention in the neighbouring Portuguese colonies, the Lisbon-Salisbury-Pretoria alliance and calls for united revolutionary resistance featured on the magazine since the first number in 1967. See for instance: *Sechaba*, *Bastion of white supremacy*, Part II: *The Unholy alliance and resistance*, March 1967, pp. 7–8; *Sechaba*, *High stakes at Cabora Bassa*, December 1969, pp. 14–18.

and the Council for Freedom in Portugal and its Colonies<sup>54</sup> was a powerful expression of the coordination efforts envisaged by diverse support groups. The cooperation between the AAM and the committees for the liberation of the Portuguese colonies intensified towards the end of the 1960s with the "Support the Freedom Fighters" campaign<sup>55</sup> that brought together representatives of the ANC, ZAPU and MPLA in London or in the early 1970s with the "End of Alliance" campaign.<sup>56</sup> Considering the involvement of historic figures of the South African Communist Party/ANC with the AAM, such as Joe Slovo or Ruth First,<sup>57</sup> and that of Janet and Eduardo Mondlane or Marcelino dos Santos with the UK Committee for Freedom in Mozambique, Angola and Guinea Bissau (CFMAG),<sup>58</sup> is reasonable to assume that collaboration in the transnational activist milieu contributed to cement the relations between the different liberation movements and propelled them to work out a more tangible partnership.

While the white minority regimes organised its opposition to African nationalism, the liberation movements took the first steps towards the consolidation of their transnational cooperation. Although the group formed by the ANC, FRELIMO, MPLA, SWAPO, PAIGC and ZAPU was increasingly backed up by the Soviets and the AAPSO, the quest for international political legitimacy and genuine representation within intergovernmental decision-making arenas like the OAU or the UN was a pressing concern that called for the ultimate "revolutionary coalition". Several authors have put the emphasis on the driving role of the ANC in the process of coalition-building,<sup>59</sup> without careful consideration for the actions undertaken by other movements. However, the understudied common strategic plan devised by the CONCP 1968<sup>60</sup> is a concrete example of the efforts that the Lusophone liberation movements invested in the regional revolutionary context. Compiled by Mário Pinto de Andrade, MPLA's leader and member of the advisory committee of the CONCP, in 1968 in Algiers, the document seemed to have circulated widely at the time and even oriented a regional approach to the guerrilla training in Algeria.<sup>61</sup> This analysis foresaw the creation of an umbrella structure with a recog-

54 Forward to Freedom. The history of the British Anti-Apartheid Movement 1959–1994, The Anti-Apartheid Movement in the 1960s, <<https://www.aamarchives.org/history/1960s.html#click-here-to-read-more-about-the-aam-in-the-1960s>> (accessed 7 February 2020).

55 Ibid.

56 CFMAG/2 End of Alliance Campaign, Committee for Freedom in Mozambique, Angola and Guinea Bissau archives, Bishopsgate Institute London.

57 A. Wieder, Ruth First and Joe Slovo in the War Against Apartheid, New York 2013, pp. 145–146.

58 CFMAG/3/2/ correspondence between CFMAG and Mozambique Institute/Janet Mondlane and Polly Gaster. Committee for Freedom in Mozambique, Angola and Guinea Bissau archives, Bishopsgate Institute London.

59 M. Graham, The ANC and the Myth of Liberation Solidarity: 'Othering' in Post-Apartheid South(ern) Africa, in: Africa Insight 44 (2014) 1, pp. 176–190; and Scott, The Diplomacy of Liberation, pp. 57–70.

60 Fundação Mário Soares, Arquivo Mário Pinto de Andrade, La lutte de libération en Afrique australe. Éléments pour une stratégie, pour Mário Pinto de Andrade (1968), <[http://hdl.handle.net/11002/fms\\_dc\\_83644](http://hdl.handle.net/11002/fms_dc_83644)> (accessed 7 February 2020).

61 Byrne includes a reference to the document, obtained in the Algerian National Archives, in his book Mecca of Revolution (2016) to sustain the argument that Algerian instructors in charge of the training of southern African liberation guerrillas "stressed the need to form a progressive alliance" [...] "[t]hey faced a common multi-headed foe, and therefore they needed to unite their struggle too." Byrne, Mecca of Revolution, pp. 249 and 255.

nizable steering board responsible for operationalising the cooperation between Southern African liberation movements and harmonising their external policies.<sup>62</sup> Indeed, the proposal as a whole may be interpreted as an attempt to enlarge the existing CONCP with the integration of the other “authentic” Southern African liberation movements. By considering Southern Africa as “a single theatre of operations”, Andrade envisaged the mobilisation and engagement of each member beyond its own national borders. The essay is a revealing source of the level of commitment that the movements were willing to take in order to institutionalise their union and the potential role that such an alliance would have at multiple levels. The fight against the imperialist coalition of Portugal, South Africa and Southern Rhodesia was at the core of this joint strategy but it was far from being the only concern. The “contradictory power games”<sup>63</sup> that prevailed within the OAU, the ambiguous attitude of some progressive African countries with regard to liberation movements<sup>64</sup> and the need to mobilise broader international audiences across ideological divides were burning issues for all the potential front members.

Representational matters at the OAU became an unavoidable concern and urged the liberation movements to make their debut as a coalition at the 5<sup>th</sup> Ordinary Assembly of OAU Heads of State and Government held on 13–16 September 1968 in Algiers. The MPLA, FRELIMO, ANC, ZAPU, PAIGC and the South West African People’s Organisation (SWAPO) of Namibia used the occasion to bring some of their common proposals regarding the OAU’s proceedings to the table. Their Joint Statement was a clear call for more efficient aid and support from the pan-African organisation:

*The situation in the fighting zones is constantly changing. Africa must therefore find means to ensure that there are swift responses to requests for help and in the facilities provided. Delays and red-tape should not stand in the way of victory in the battles we are fighting.*<sup>65</sup>

This was accompanied by a strong appeal for shrinking bureaucracy when it came to differentiate between “real movements that are (sic) effective and have the support of the masses” and “those that are (sic) bogus and corrupt [...] sponsored by the imperialists to hamper established movements”. Their critique also extended to individual African states that “flouting or circumventing the obligations of the OAU Charter and by referring

62 Fundação Mário Soares, Arquivo Mário Pinto de Andrade, La lutte de libération en Afrique australe, p. 5.

63 According to Pinto de Andrade, these shaped the political decisions of the OAU and more particularly those of the Liberation Committee, that was responsible for the distribution of assistance to the liberation movements. Thus, the alliance of Southern African liberation movements “should focus on orienting its [the Liberation Committee] actions together with the progressive countries, with the aim of eliminating the antagonist movements that distort political and ideological choices; controlling its inner functioning and working to increase and reinforce the support to those movements really determined to fight against imperialism.” Fundação Mário Soares, Arquivo Mário Pinto de Andrade, La lutte de libération en Afrique australe, p. 7.

64 Pinto de Andrade refers to the case of Tanzania, that hosted and provided extensive support to FRELIMO but “contradictorily” refused to support other regional movements like ZAPU or ZANU. Fundação Mário Soares, Arquivo Mário Pinto de Andrade, La lutte de libération en Afrique australe, p. 5.

65 Sechaba, We shall win!, December 1968, p. 3.

to their problems and necessities"<sup>66</sup> maintained relations with the regimes in Portugal, Southern Rhodesia and South Africa. The coalition warned the leaders of independent Africa about the expansionist military, economic and political aims of the apartheid state and its allies that would eventually end up creating neo-colonialist traps. In this vein, the growing unity among the liberation movements of Southern Africa was presented as "a welcome development"<sup>67</sup> that would serve as the best defence for truly African freedom, both in the immediate neighbourhood as well as in the rest of the continent.

### **3. The Road to Khartoum: A United Southern African Front in the Global Struggle Against Imperialism**

The formation of a united front of Southern African liberation movements did not answer exclusively to the critical need of fighting a common enemy and getting the support of immediate neighbours. Acquiring international projection and anchoring the common front in "the progressive world movement against imperialism"<sup>68</sup> were goals already pursued externally by the supporting networks of the liberation movements<sup>69</sup> and thence became increasingly prominent in the public agendas of the movements themselves. The idea of consolidating the liberation struggles of Southern Africa as a united whole was the task at hand and received the encouragement of other "anti-imperialist world forces". The conference "Against Racism and Neo-Colonialism, for the Liberation of Southern Africa", organised in May 1968 in East Berlin, GDR, was a case in point. It gathered scientists, economists and sociologists from different socialist countries<sup>70</sup> as well as representatives of the ANC, ZAPU, FRELIMO, MPLA, PAIGC and SWAPO to address the ensemble of Southern African struggles from a "scientific approach". According to the conference declaration, the escalation of violence and exploitation in Southern Africa was a consequence of the intervention of international finance capital, directed by a number of states, among them West Germany, "which assigned to them an important role in their global strategy against the forces of democracy, of national liberation and socialism".<sup>71</sup> Representatives of the Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee of the GDR stressed the parallels between the menacing situations that the liberation movements and the socialist world faced by comparing the New Africa Policy with the New Eastern Policy of the West German government. For the conference hosts these two were "closely linked" and represented

66 Ibid., p. 2.

67 Ibid., p. 3.

68 Fundação Mário Soares, Arquivo Mário Pinto de Andrade, La lutte de libération en Afrique australe, p. 8.

69 A case in point is the Committee for Freedom in Mozambique, Angola and Guinea, that maintained "close relations with the Anti-Apartheid Movement, and encouraged a regional perspective for the future of Southern Africa", CFMAG finding aids 2014, p. 3. CFMAG archives, Bishopsgate Institute London.

70 Sechaba reports on participants from the GDR, the USSR, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Poland, and Hungary. Sechaba, Against Racism and Neo-colonialism, For the Liberation of Southern Africa, August 1968, p. 12.

71 Ibid., p. 13.

*attempts to “soften up” certain sections of independent Africa and of the socialist world – without however changing in the least their basic support for fascist Southern Africa and annexationist tendency towards the GDR.*<sup>72</sup>

By handling the threats of the socialist East and those of anti-imperialist Southern Africa as these were comparable issues and units, and vesting them with scientific recognition, the conference organisers endowed with legitimacy the joint regional approach of their guests. Likewise, they welcomed them as a building block in the group of progressive countries that fought fascism and imperialism, thus underscoring the blatant division between a socialist anti-imperialist front and a capitalist imperialist one. Such a discourse transcended the sheer ideological East/West divide and focused instead in the unequal and outrageous relations between the first and the second/third worlds. It is this anti-imperialist rhetoric what underpinned the collaboration between socialist countries and the liberation movements, with regard to the financial and material support the former provided to the latter<sup>73</sup> as well as the publicity and sponsorship for the Southern African revolution.

The 1969 Khartoum Conference of Solidarity with the Peoples of Southern Africa and the Portuguese colonies marked the culmination of several years of attempts to form a distinguishable united bloc of regional liberation movements. The fact that it was sponsored by the Afro-Asian People’s Solidarity Organization (AAPSO) and the World Peace Council (WPC) earned it careful consideration in specialist literature that tended to overstate Soviet intervention in formalising the coming together of the “Marxist-backed movements of Southern Africa”.<sup>74</sup> This focus on external driving forces neglects the interests of the liberation movements as well as the different efforts they invested over the years to bring the parties together, as described above.

This official meeting of the “authentic” liberation movements in Khartoum was a call to mobilise support beyond the socialist camp, which had already shown its commitment. It served as a wider appeal to all the anti-imperialist groups and individuals across the main ideological divide of the time. In the report submitted to the conference, the leader of the ANC delegation, Robert Resha, recognised the degree of internationalisation that Southern African struggles had obtained and praised the actions of anti-apartheid and activist movements, yet he called for new, concerted and intensified forms of support.<sup>75</sup> Similarly, the speeches delivered by Agostinho Neto (MPLA), Eduardo Mondlane (FRELIMO) and Amílcar Cabral (PAIGC) emphasized the need to strengthen the mobi-

72 Ibid., p. 12.

73 Pinto de Andrade referred in his plan for a joint regional strategy to the relations of a potential Southern African alliance with “the progressive world movement against imperialism” and advocated for restricting the sources of support to the forces in this field. The same anti-imperialist identifications that preceded socialist ones in the Berlin conference appear as well in his writing. Fundação Mário Soares, Arquivo Mário Pinto de Andrade, *La lutte de libération en Afrique australe*, p. 4.

74 Graham, *The ANC and the Myth of Liberation Solidarity*, p. 7; Scott, *The Diplomacy of Liberation*, pp. 64–65.

75 Sechaba, *Apartheid – The World Must Act*. Edited version of a report submitted to the Khartoum Conference by Robert Resha, leader of the ANC delegation, March 1969, p. 10.

lization of the world's public opinion.<sup>76</sup> By calling to "a new phase of anti-imperialist cooperation"<sup>77</sup> the liberation movements aimed at attuning the anti-imperial and anti-colonial traditions of the 1950s and early 1960s to deal with emergent challenges that resulted from the entanglement of global Cold War dynamics<sup>78</sup> with regional re-structuring processes and conflicts.

The global outreach of the conference's sponsors, AAPSO and the WPC, the latter with several western European committees and peace organisations on board, offered first and foremost a convenient infrastructure to spearheading a new wave of coordinated solidarity campaigns. Although Soviet positions and policies had an echo in these organisations, reducing their institutional and membership complexity to the label of Soviet front organisations prevents us from taking autonomous dynamics and cracks in their organisational fabric seriously. It was precisely the heterogeneity in their activist positions what allowed for a certain room of manoeuvre that connected the WPC with the Southern African struggles.<sup>79</sup> Besides members of the sponsoring organisations and the governments of socialist countries, a number of personalities from Western Europe and North America representing political parties and activist movements took part in this conference.<sup>80</sup> It would be an oversimplification assuming that all of the 200 delegates from 54 countries shared a homogeneous political agenda driven by Soviet interests.

The mobilisation committee organised at the conference delivered a set of practical measures to consolidate international support networks that included the formation of national committees and the establishment of an ad-hoc mobilisation board in Cairo, chaired on a rotation basis by the liberation movements, to coordinate the exchange of information between national groups.<sup>81</sup> An example that illustrates the response of Western European actors to the appeal made in Khartoum was the creation of the *Comité de Soutien à la Lutte contre le Colonialisme et l'Apartheid* in Waterloo (Belgium), that organised diverse conferences and debates, engaged in campaigns of humanitarian support

76 Fundação Mário Soares, Documentos Vítor Cabrita Neto, Agostinho Neto, Eduardo Mondlane, Amílcar Cabral (1970), <[http://hdl.handle.net/11002/fms\\_dc\\_152439](http://hdl.handle.net/11002/fms_dc_152439)> (accessed 7 February 2020).

77 Sechaba, Commentary. The Khartoum Conference, March 1969, p. 3.

78 O.A. Westad, *The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times*, New York 2005.

79 G. Wernicke, *The Unity of Peace and Socialism? The World Peace Council and a Cold War Tightrope between the Peace Struggle and Intrasystemic Communist Conflicts*, in: *Peace & Change* 26 (2001) 3, pp. 332–351, at p. 342. Günther includes an example of the internal tensions between national peace groups when it came to differentiate between just and unjust wars to support liberation movements in different parts of the world. Romesh Chandra, general secretary of the WCP and the All-Indian Peace Committee, moved away from "traditional WCP positions" to justify the support to Angolan, Mozambican or Zimbabwean liberation movements, while several Eastern European peace committees rejected this because it challenged official détente and disarmament approaches.

80 For instance: François Houtart, Professor at the University of Louvain (Belgium); Peter Hellyer, representative of the National League of Young Liberals (United Kingdom); Osmo Kock, MP at the Finnish Parliament; Benat Allan Ahlsen from the Swedish Social Democratic Party; or Wilfred Ussery, representative of the Congress of Racial Equality (United States). For the complete list of participants see Permanent Secretariat of the AAPSO, International Conference in Support of Portuguese Colonies and Southern Africa. Khartoum, 18–20 January 1969, Cairo 1970, International Institute of Social History Archives (Amsterdam), Bro 78/20.

81 Permanent Secretariat of the AAPSO, Bro 78/20, pp. 37–45.

to the populations living in liberated areas of Southern Africa and enabled the visits and encounters of representatives of liberation movements with national media, politicians and trade unions.<sup>82</sup> Similarly, it was possible to identify as a result of the orientations for solidarity work provided in Khartoum a higher degree of transnational cooperation between existing activist groups and newly created national committees across Europe, as epitomised by the participation of West and Eastern European organisations in conferences organised in the Netherlands, Sweden and the United Kingdom between 1970 and 1974.<sup>83</sup>

#### 4. Conclusion

The materialisation of an alliance of Southern African liberation movements as accomplished in Khartoum had mainly an impact in the realms of international representation and public diplomacy. Unlike previous attempts of transnational military cooperation as that of ANC and ZAPU in 1967–1968 or the strategy sketched by Mário Pinto de Andrade that envisioned more institutionalised forms of political collaboration among the progressive forces fighting for independence in the region, the outcomes of Khartoum are to be found in the solidarity infrastructures set up in the Western and Eastern worlds to mobilize public opinion, lobby in favour of the bloc of regional liberation movements and condemn the fascist and racist regimes of the unholy alliance.

The closer alignment of the Southern African liberation movements over the 1960s, from earlier informal contacts in exile to their own international conferences and declarations, was as much a product of the strategic interests of the liberation movements as the intervention of external networks and actors.<sup>84</sup> As the case of the early Lusophone interterritorial fronts shows, the union and belonging to a group with similar ideological leanings and ideas of post-colonial futures represented an opportunity for getting recognition and legitimacy against rival organisations as well as in the regional and international context. Thus, in a changing political setting, with the proliferation of friends and foes and the OAU thwarting the participation and aspirations of certain movements, anticolonial and anti-apartheid cooperation at a sub-regional level was a means for leveraging the trust and positive relations of individual movements and counterbalancing OAU's bottlenecks. As for the external encouragement to consolidate a visible assemblage of

82 Fundação Mário Soares, Arquivo Mário Pinto de Andrade, Première Conférence Internationale de Soutien à la Lutte de Libération des Peuples des Colonies Portugaises et de l'Afrique Australe, Khartoum janvier 1969 (1970), <[http://hdl.handle.net/111002/fms\\_dc\\_84489](http://hdl.handle.net/111002/fms_dc_84489)> (accessed 7 February 2020).

83 Afro-Asian solidarity committees from Eastern European countries were also invited to the solidarity conference that gathered representatives from support committees the UK, France, the Netherlands, Italy, etc. The documents include copies of telegrams asking for the visas of the Soviet Committee's representatives. CFMAG archives, Bishopsgate Institute London. CFMAG/1/6 Organisation of the Oxford Conference 1974.

84 Although the financial, material and diplomatic support of AAPSO and the OAU, as well as the Soviet Union and other Eastern European countries did certainly prove decisive to raised certain movements and backed them up as the authentic liberation movements of Southern Africa.

Southern Africa revolutionary struggles, this came both from the socialist countries that provided material assistance to the different movements as well as from the own activist networks formed around the liberation movements, which had already a certain degree of influence in their propaganda and lobby strategies.

Thus, the new phase of anti-imperialist cooperation announced at the Khartoum conference was not exclusively tied to the coming together of liberation movements but to a rapprochement between East and West activist movements, Afro-Asian solidarity committees and other anti-imperialist entities that found in the Southern African revolutionary alliance a strong action frame where domestic and international battles conflated.

This article traced the beginnings of the cooperation between Southern African liberation movements in the 1960s. However, the history of regional solidarity between Southern African liberation movements did not stopped there but lived through the political shifts of decolonisation and the end of apartheid and paved the ground for regional collaboration schemes of liberation movements in power in more recent decades.<sup>85</sup> Likewise, the legacies of their alliances in the 1960s and early 1970s linger in national discourses that mythicize the history of the movements and bestow them with the legitimacy for continuous tenure,<sup>86</sup> somehow echoing some of the demands for recognition they had during the liberation struggles.

85 After the formal independence of the Portuguese colonies of Angola and Mozambique in 1975, and with Zimbabwe achieving majority rule in 1980, these countries became known as frontline states (together with Botswana, Zambia, and Tanzania) for their joint opposition to minority-ruled South Africa. The collapse of Apartheid in South Africa and the advent of majority rule saw the rebranding of the frontline states into the Former Liberation Movements of Southern Africa (FMLSA) organisation of support between current liberation movements, all of which have been in power since independence (ANC, SWAPO, ZANU-PF, MPLA, FRELIMO, and CCM of Tanzania).

86 Graham, *The ANC and the Myth of Liberation Solidarity*, pp. 176–190.