In sum, this is a very good read for everyone trying to understand China's identity struggles and where the Middle Kingdom may be heading in the 21st century.

Notes

1 S. P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, New York 1996, pp. 9–19.

2 See S. Harrell, Introduction: Civilizing Projects and the Reaction to Them, in: St. Harrell (ed.), Cultural Encounters on China's Ethnic Frontiers. Seattle 1995; P. Nyíri, The Yellow Man's Burden: Chinese Migrants on a Civilizing Mission, in: The China Journal 56 (2006); T. Heberer, The Contention between Han "Civilizers" and Yi "Civilizees" over Environmental Governance: A Case Study of Liangshan Prefecture in Sichuan, in: The China Quarterly 219 (2014), pp. 736–759; H. R. Clark, The Sinitic Encounter in Southeast China Through the First Millennium CE, Berlin 2015; J. Schneider, Missionizing, Civilizing, and Nationizing. Linked Concepts of Compelled Change, in: Chen-tian Kuo (ed.), Religion and Nationalism in Chinese Societies. Amsterdam 2017.

3 See, for instance, Y. Xuetong, Ancient Chinese Thought, Modern Chinese Power, ed. by D. A. Bell, S. Zhe, translated by E. Ryden, Princeton 2011; G. J. Ikenberry, W. Jisi, Z. Feng (eds.), America, China, and the Struggle for World Order. Ideas, Traditions, Historical Legacies, and Global Visions, New York 2015; D. Shambaugh, China Goes Global, Oxford 2013; B. Wang (ed.), Chinese Visions of World Order. Tianxia, Culture and World Politics, Durham 2017; K. Brown, China's World. What does China want?, London 2017; W. A. Callahan, E. Barabantseva (eds.), China Orders the World. Normative Soft Power and Foreign Policy, Washington 2011; F.-L. Wang, The China Order. Centralia, World Empire, and the Nature of Chinese Power, Albany 2017.

David C. Engerman: The Price of Aid: The Economic Cold War in India, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 2018, 501 pp.

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For a long time, studies of the Cold War reflected two theoretical currents buried deep in the foundations of Cold War historiography. The first was an aversion to the use of interpretive frameworks born of political economy, particularly after the bitter fight that banished the so-called revisionists – in fact the first generation of historians – from the field. The second current was the international relations theory of realism that in effect engendered and became part of the genetic code of Cold War studies. This theory accommodated many contending arguments but generally saw the state as monolithic, and acting in an international arena according to a set of established interests. Because states were unitary actors, policies such as international aid were seen to be coherent expressions of these predetermined state interests, and therefore they could be analysed as easily understood expressions of the ideological competition that organized the Cold War world. Other fields of historical study, meanwhile, were busy producing historiographical innovations. Studies in British imperial history fragmented the state, seeing in it a conglomerate of diverse constituents, visions, purpose and outcomes. Postcolonial studies provincialized Euro-

centric perspectives and gave agency to a Global South that Cold War tracks too often depicted – echoing US documentary sources – as empty, infantilized vessels susceptible to superpower tutoring. After the 1990s, these conceptual frameworks slowly migrated to the field of Cold War studies, starting in particular with treatments of US Cold War policies in Latin America. This process was still young two decades ago in the Cold War field, but is now well advanced. Engerman's new study, *The Price of Aid*: *The Economic Cold War in India*, is both a welcome new addition to this general development, and a model for how to write a Cold War narrative without assuming a unitary state.

The book examines superpower aid policies in India from the late 1940s to the early 1970s. It covers what Engerman calls the heyday of aid politics – from the mid-1950s to the mid-1960s – until what he sees as its corrosive denouement a decade after that. In approaching this general narrative arch, Engerman makes two assumptions that continuously pay insightful dividends. The first is to assume that state agents are rather more entrepreneurial than their usual portrayal as spokespersons representing a coherent state project – i.e. he disaggregates the state. The second assumption is of a kind of historical dynamism that views practice as constitutive of policy, rather than the mere outcome of pre-established policy choices. This approach, for example, views India not just as the subject of aid policies generated by fixed ideological approaches, but rather as the generator of those approaches in both East and West, and a fluid arena for the changes these policies underwent over time. To illustrate, Engerman proposes the interesting hypothesis that the Soviet aid agency, GKES, was appreciably fashioned out of negotiations for aid to India – or in the author's words, "the case of India […] expanded […] the concept of Soviet 'economic cooperation' efforts" (p. 84).

The statistician Prasanta Chandra Mahalanobis is Engerman's paradigmatic model of a bureaucratic impresario. From his position in the innocuous Indian Statistical Institute (ISI), Mahalanobis emerges as an influential agent who used foreign advisors from East and West to further his own political project. The second five-year plan, in Engerman's narrative, is not merely the consequence of Soviet inspiration, but the outcome of what he calls "development politics," which decentres the Cold War struggle away from the epic ideological narratives of the superpowers, and views the struggle from the perspective of Indian economic officials, for whom "superpower sponsors were a weapon for fighting internal battles to advance their own economic interests and visions" (p. 119). At this more empirical level of analysis, the most important external influence in the implementation of the second five-year plan was not Soviet ideological example and subversion, but the humble work of Norwegian econometrician, and first Nobel-prize co-recipient, Ragnar Frisch.

Mahalanobis and "development politics" are the main subject of the third chapter, after which Engerman moves on to the actual practice of development aid. It begins with the building of the Bhilai Steel Plant, the project that inaugurated Cold War development politics. Engerman argues that these kinds of large projects were a propagandistic coup for the Soviets that the US had a hard time countering, even if Soviet

inefficiencies meant the actual plant became a Cold War hybrid: A Soviet exterior with important Soviet technological input patched together by Western equipment (elevators, air conditioners, cranes and PR work, all from Western firms). Engerman here challenges newly proliferating work that insists in seeing socialist aid as peculiarly socialist, and confirms work done from the perspective of recipient countries, where factories and other aid projects were seen as neither socialist nor capitalist, or in Engerman's bon mot: "While the Soviets pursued steel as a path to friendship, those Indians who supported the project pursued Soviet friendship, in large part, as a path to steel" (p. 34). As he moves to discuss other aid projects, Engerman establishes that successful projects were sustained not by abstract ideological commitment from both sides, but when they found constituencies among givers and recipients – here Engerman juxtaposes Bhilai's resounding success with a Soviet failure to promote mechanized farming in Suratgarh, and the success of American grain deliveries under the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act with the failure of the Community Development projects the US pushed in villages throughout India.

As development politics themselves developed, aid moved in directions that would become detrimental to India's political and economic vitality. Soviet aid became militarized, which is to say, rather than borrowing money from the Soviet Union to make productive investments, India developed a foreign debt with the East on the back of unproductive weapons purchases. Moreover, the public sector the Soviets had nurtured came under criticism from all sides, including from the Soviets themselves, which undermined the ability of Indian economic organs to course correct. Meanwhile, US aid became financialized, moving away from negotiating and managing specific projects and toward financing other people's projects, all within the context of a general disenchantment on both sides that reduced the scale and stakes of American aid to India.

Aid in Engerman's telling had an ultimately corrosive influence on India. Likewise, the author's framing devices have a corrosive effect to some of the very foundations upon which the book itself is premised. For example, the author erodes the insistence, still so prevalent in the field, in the absolute, structuring power of the ideological bipolarity that organized international relations during the Cold War. This is not quite intended; there is a constant tension between Engerman's evidence-based narrative, and the expressly bipolar framework of the study. The author begins the book by making a case about the structuring power of ideas. But he proceeds by making a call for the study of aid as it was practiced on the ground, which, he argues, had often little to do with commonly held ideological visions, as we have seen. In fact, Engerman seems more interested in the fate of the Indian state than in the Cold War itself. He does not just want to argue that states should be disaggregated in order to analyse them better, but that aid itself had a disaggregating effect on the state. Aid allowed for forms of political entrepreneurship that circumvented democratic state institutions, created bureaucratic power bases and fractured state unity of vision and action. This contrasts with the goal professed by both the US and USSR that

aid aimed to generate Indian economic independence and prosperity.

Engerman is only able to sustain a measure of coherence for the bipolar framework by eliding the question of scale. He only briefly addresses the fact that Soviet aid amounted to a fraction of Western aid, instead levelling the difference by arguing that the Soviets used fewer resources to much bigger propagandistic effect (pp. 121–22). This, however, is difficult to square with the more material argument at the core of the concept of "development politics." In the struggle to enlist international resources to fight domestic battles, Engerman gives little indication of the scale of these resources, or the ways in which these differences materially mattered to the bureaucratic struggles at the centre of the analysis. The constant retreat to Cold War bipolarity badly simplifies what Engerman has already shown to be complex.

If statistical evidence is lacking to uphold the bipolar framework, Engerman proves beyond doubt that bilateral and multilateral studies of the Cold War would do well to start from an assumption of fragmented states. *Price of Aid* also shows the benefits of assuming historical dynamism, rather than the older insistence in assigning an established logic to a country's foreign policy and seeing it applied unchangingly throughout the Cold War. The book will leave a stamp on its readers and on the field as a whole.

Günther Pallaver / Michael Gehler / Maurizio Cau: Populists, and the Crisis of Political Parties. A Comparison of Italy, Austria and Germany 1990–2015 (= Jahrbuch des italienisch-deutschen historischen Instituts in Trient, Beiträge 34), Berlin: Duncker & Humblot 2018, 338 S.

Rezensiert von
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Neben gesellschaftlichem Zusammenhalt ist Populismus der wohl mittlerweile am häufigsten verwendete Begriff in den Sozialwissenschaften und der Zeitgeschichte. Dies kommt nicht von ungefähr. Spätestens seit 2015 ist ein Aufschwung und Bedeutungsgewinn von populistischen Argumenten und Akteuren nicht mehr zu leugnen. Zwar ist nicht immer jedem klar, was Populismus von verwandten Phänomenen, wie beispielsweise Extremismus, unterscheidet, gänzlich unbestimmt ist es allerdings nicht, wer ein Populist bzw. eine Populistin ist und wer nicht.[1] Gleichzeitig besteht Informationsbedarf über die Gründe des Aufkommens populistischer Akteure und deren Ziele.[2] Dies gilt vor allem vor dem Hintergrund ihrer Erfolge seit 2015 in den Parlamenten der Länder Europas.

Der 2018 erschienene Herausgeberband von Günther Pallaver und Kollegen beschäftigt sich genau mit diesen Fragestellungen. Was das Buch von der steigenden Publikationsbreite zum Thema Populismus abhebt, ist der Einbezug einer ver-