The Neighbourhood Unit in Late Colonial Angola: Concentration Repertoires and Urban Policies (1950–1974)

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ABSTRACTS

Während der späten Kolonialzeit Angolas bemühten sich portugiesischen Eliten um zwei gegensätzliche Mittel sozialer Kontrolle: Repression und Wohlstand. Dorfentwicklungsprogramme waren vorherrschend in ländlichen Räumen. Zugleich wurden neue Formen urbanen Gestaltens in den suburbanen Regionen Luandas erprobt, den *musseques*. Der Beitrag befasst sich mit den Verbindungen zwischen strafrechtlichen Zielsetzungen, ländlicher Umsiedlung und Slum-Management. Er untersucht die politischen und professionellen Auseinandersetzungen um die „Nachbarschaftseinheit" in Angola und ihre koloniale Rezeption. Die koloniale Wiederbelebung eines Konzepts, das in der „entwickelten Welt" in Misskredit geriet, legitimierte die urbane Attraktivität einer ausbeuterischen ländlichen Institution – dörfliche Konzentration – und seine Anwendung im urbanen Milieu. In Angola wurde staatlicher Zwang für neues Wohnen und das damit verbundene soziale Wissen von wesentlicher Bedeutung.

During Angola's late colonial period, Portuguese elites tried to put forward and bring together two antagonist means of social control: repression and welfare. While villagization schemes were being deployed across the hinterland, a new form of urban management was taking place at the suburban areas of Luanda, the *musseques*. This article unearths the links between penal concentration, rural resettlement and slum management, by examining the colonial reception of and the political and professional struggles around the urban design notion of "neighbourhood unit" in Angola. The colonial revival of a concept that was falling into discredit in the "developed world" was critical to legitimize the urban appeal of a rural extractive institution – village concentration – and its deployment in the urban milieu. In Angola, state coercion became integral both to the development of permanent housing and the social knowledge the former entailed.

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1. Introduction

The final fourteen years of Portuguese colonial rule in Angola can be described as a wartime (1961–1974) attempt to put forward and bring together two antagonist means of social control: repression and welfare. While villagization schemes were being deployed across the rural hinterland of the colony, through the often-forced removal of populations and their concentration in special "welfare villages", a new form of urban management was taking place in the suburban areas of Luanda. In this article, I am concerned with the links between penal concentration, rural resettlement and slum management by Portuguese imperial elites, both at the higher ranks of ministerial policy-making and at the colonial planning levels. Recent evidence suggests that community development plans – drawn from a myriad of international discourses and epistemic communities postulating bottom-up initiatives, collective responsibility and local participation and information –, were designed in parallel with the creation of concentration camps and village-building in the countryside.[1] However, and despite their decisive role in counter-subversion strategies, urban slums have been given less careful historical attention. Apart from some notable exceptions, current studies dealing with Angola's capital economy, socioeconomic structure and change and, above all, its shantytowns – the *musseque*s – seldom take the war period serious enough.[2] When they do, though, the war is considered a fertile context wherein new agents experimented with innovative design and urban planning techniques.

One of those urbanistic novelties can be found in the import and local reworking of the inter-war urbanistic concept of the "neighbourhood unit". While there is still no consensus about its exact authorship and its institutional and ideological backgrounds, Clarence Perry is usually cited as the original promotor of the "neighbourhood unit" as a well-defined and programmatic planning concept.[3] Coined during the interwar years in

1 On the subject of "repressive developmentalism" and its application to the Portuguese imperial case see M. Bandeira Jerónimo / A. Costa Pinto, A Modernizing Empire? Politics, Culture, and Economy in Portuguese Late Colonialism, in: M. Bandeira Jerónimo / A. Costa Pinto (eds.), The Ends of European Colonial Empires London 2015, pp. 51–80; M. Bandeira Jerónimo, Repressive Developmentalisms: Idioms, Repertoires, Trajectories in Late Colonialism, in: A. Thompson / M. Thomas (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of the Ends of Empire, Oxford 2018, pp. 537–554. For an overview of the late colonial entanglements of repression and development professionals in Angola, see M. Bandeira Jerónimo, "A Battle in the Field of Human Relations": The Official Minds of Repressive Development in Portuguese Angola, in: M. Thomas / C. Gareth (eds.), Decolonization and Conflict: Colonial Comparisons and Legacies, London 2017, pp. 115–136. On the matter of concentration camps and warfare resettlements in Angola, B. Pinto da Cruz, The Penal Origins of Colonial Model Villages: From Aborted Concentration Camps to Forced Resettlement in Angola (1930–1969), in: Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 47 (2019) 2, pp. 343–371 and B. Pinto da Cruz / D. Ramada Curto, The Good and the Bad Concentration: Regedorias in Angola, in: Portuguese Studies Review 25 (2017) 1, pp. 205–231.

2 Unsurprisingly, their *state of the art* pays only lip service to simplified versions of *musseque* history, drawing on one of the leading colonial human geographers of the late 1960s and early 1970s, Ilídio do Amaral, who ultimately depended on – and contributed to – the making of the city's informal quarters as a target of psychosocial action. One of the exceptions is the late Juliana Bosslet's Lazer Em Luanda: O Controlo Do Tempo Livre Dos Trabalhadores e a Manutenção Da Ordem Colonial (1961–1975), in: Análise Social 52 (2017) 225, pp. 830–847.

3 C. A. Perry, The Neighborhood Unit, a Scheme of Arrangement for the Family-Life Community, in: Regional Survey of New York and Its Environs, Vol. 7, New York 1929, pp. 2–140. See also L. Mumford, The Neighborhood and

the United States, this conceptual tool provided a set of specific guidelines for the physical arrangement of ideal residential blocks within a city. It became a template of small-scale urban development and redevelopment and a framework for the (re)constitution of residential zones into physically bounded and socially cohesive parcels, with a population optimum ranging from five to nine thousand inhabitants (with enough children to maintain at least one primary school), its main commercial and economic amenities located within walking distance and an internal street system allowing for safe pedestrian circulation. As a normative diagram based on the functional distribution of spaces (including open spaces and gardens), routes and people, the neighbourhood unit prescribed the principle of internal unity, with communitarian institutions at its centre, automobile traffic pushed out of its inner circulation system to the perimeter and arterial streets serving as the unit's boundaries. A post-World War II French version of the concept, rewritten by Gaston Bardet and Robert Auzelle, travelled south with Portuguese architecture and urbanistic thinking into African colonies, including Angola, to the point of being taken today as a hallmark of twentieth-century Portuguese innovation in the tropics.
The latter has been labelled *tropical modernism* or *Luso-Africanism*, to convey a sense of novelty and local sensitivity brought by an internationally trained generation who applied the solutions divulged by London's Architectural Association (under the tutelage of Maxwell Fry or Otto Koenigsberger) to Portuguese Africa.[4] While so doing, so goes the main argument of current studies, they took more progressive stances away from the traditionalizing architecture of Lisbon's fascist New State regime (1933–1974), displaying architecture adaptability to African climates, geographies and peoples. According to some, it is possible to discern three distinctive moments or phases of Portuguese urban strategies in Africa in the post-war period: the first one (1945–1955), highly aesthetical with a manifest preference for the City Beautiful and City Garden models, but defined by clear segregationist *rationales*; the second, grossly corresponding to the 1960s, during which the City Garden premises were coupled with "more in-depth knowledge of indigenous settlements", applied in the plans of new popular neighbourhoods, and a third phase (1970–1974), characterized by an interrupted attempt to adopt quantitative methods, such as sociodemographic and economic enquiries.[5] It is thus widely held that, during the second and third phases, the so-called estrangement of that generation from

the Neighborhood Unit,in: The Town Planning Review 24 (1954) 4, pp. 256–70, and L. Lloyd Lawhon, The Neighborhood Unit: Physical Design or Physical Determinism?, Journal of Planning History 8 (2009) 2, pp. 111–132. Perry's single authorship, however, remains a contested topic in urban planning history. For example, Donald L. Johnson traces the concept's origins back to William E. Dummond in his article Origin of the Neighbourhood Unit, Planning Perspectives, 17 (2002) 3, pp. 227–245.

4 Research advocating this argument includes A. Vaz Milheiro, Nos Trópicos Sem Le Corbusier: Arquitectura Luso-Africana No Estado Novo, Lisboa 2012; S. Leiria Viegas, Urbanization in Luanda: Geopolitical Framework. A Socio-Territorial Analysis, in: 15th International Planning History Society Conference, 2012, pp. 1–20, and J. Venâncio, O Bairro Prenda Em Luanda: Entre o Formal e o Informal Universidade do Porto, 2013. But see also, F. Fiúza / A. Vaz Milheiro, The Prenda District in Luanda: Building on Top of the Colonial City, in: C. Nunes (ed.), Urban Planning in Lusophone African Countries, Silva, London 2016, pp. 93–100.

5 A. Vaz Milheiro, Construir Em África 1944-1974: A Arquitectura Do Gabinete de Urbanização Colonial Em Cabo Verde, Guiné-Bissau, São Tomé e Príncipe, Angola e Moçambique, Lisboa 2013.

metropolitan conservative views paved the way for an exceptional Portuguese synthesis, indebted, for instance, to Le Corbusier's guiding principles but against Le Corbusier in search for more nuanced, almost sociological approaches.

This article questions the validity of this evolutionist and racially progressive thesis. It does so by presenting a modernist project laid out for the outskirt informal neighbourhoods of Luanda. Despite its overt assimilationist pretentions, the plan's provision for class and status stratification into and around the notion of neighbourhood unit degenerated into tropical segregation. This project was unique for two reasons. On one hand, it reunited, in the same Commission, two of the leading experts in lusotropical architecture, both representing the second stage of a supposedly emergent Portuguese adaptability of the International Style to the African landscape and social customs: Vasco Vieira da Costa and Fernão Simões de Carvalho. Both were influenced by Le Corbusier's modernist programme, the former having trained at his studio in Paris, the latter with one of the Swiss-French master's closest, André Wogenscky. Because the project was inscribed in the colonial state's attempt to counteract subversive actions in the suburban areas of Luanda, it represents a clear-cut opportunity to describe the immediate and indirect links of the urban planning field to the military and political domains. Moreover, it allows us to reconsider the larger context of production of scaled-down plans which are today presented as strong evidence of the social sensitivity of these authors. I am referring to Simões de Carvalho's Neighbourhood Unit Nr 1 at the Prenda *Musseque*. This project is currently offered as the material testimony of Carvalho's reinterpretation of Le Corbusier in the tropics through his appropriation of Robert Auzelle's analytical method, more proximate to a social sciences approach. It is worth quoting a recent analysis of the Prenda scheme:

> *The beginning of the colonial war in the country (1961) and the will to minorate the existent segregation at the capital forced the architect* [Carvalho] *to take a very pragmatic approach, by applying the knowledge acquired at the Sorbonne, refusing the most diagrammatic aspects of the Athens Charter* […] *In this vein, Simões de Carvalho's proposal was innovative… an ideal habitat for the reordering and expansion of Luanda […] in a perspective that was humane rather than mechanic, anthropological rather than functionalist.*[6]

While studying the singular biography of Simões de Carvalho, the authors tend to reduce the Prenda project to the individual planning intentionality of a single agent, when it really was integral to the larger political agenda of countersubversion and social con-

6 A. Vaz Milheiro / S. Leiria Viegas, Uma Experiência Brutalista Nos Trópicos: O Bairro Prenda, in: X Seminário Docomo Brasil – Arquitectura Moderna e Internacional: Conexões Brutalistas 1955–1975, 2013, pp. 7–13. On Auzelle's plans and his close reliance on the urban sociologist Paul Henri Chombart de Lawe's research, see, for all, K. Cupers, The Social Project: Housing Postwar France, Minneapolis 2014; K. Cupers, Mapping and Making Community in the Postwar European City, in: Journal of Urban History 42 (2016) 6, pp. 9–28, at 10. But see also H. Jannière, Planifier le quotidien. Voisinage et unité de voisinage dans la conception des quartiers d'habitation en France (1945–1965), in: Strates 14 (2008), pp. 3821–3838.

trol. Here I draw on the bourdieusard plea for reinserting these biographical accounts back into the field of colonial power and their connections to the dominant colonial urban system as a means to overcome unreflected celebrations of lusotropicalism and colonial exceptionality[7]. Moreover, by itself, the neighbourhood unit technique was far from innovative, once we look at the villagization programmes that antedated or were coeval to Carvalho's and Vieira da Costa's layouts. One may argue that the influence of international urban and housing experiences and the participation of designers within the counter-subversive apparatus suggest a chronology far more complex than the one presented by the *tropical modernism* thesis. What is particularly interesting, however, is to acknowledge that, despite all the complexity and the dubious moral stance of these modernist architects and planners, the said shift towards a more statistical and sociological urban management did, in fact, occur during the very last years of Portuguese rule. Nonetheless, what were the costs of such a shift?

2. The *Musseque* Plan

While military and civil operations of countersubversion were taking place elsewhere in the country, Luanda itself was targeted as one of the pivotal warfare scenarios of Angola. After Luanda's prison riots of February 1961, following the first major revolt of the liberation movements earlier that year in the cotton-growing areas of Malange, it was only normal that top political officials turned their attention to the peripheric areas of the capital. Luanda's riots finally managed to put the 'problem of the *musseque*s' high on the political and technical agendas of the colonial government. The main intent was simple and its achievement urgent: to eliminate the informal settlements of Luanda. To do so, the Governor-General nominated a Commission charged with studying the low-income segments of the city's population.[8] The big question was then how to accomplish slum clearance on the short run without jeopardizing the Portuguese propaganda effort. This was the first institutional response to a couple of long-term structural shifts: the overpopulation of the capital city, with steadfast inward migratory movements from the countryside and the metropole, and the overcrowding of its prison facilities, already felt in the early 1930s, but aggravated after the outbreak of the colonial war.[9] In fact, from a structural viewpoint, the intersection of both these big demographic processes accounted for the massacres that took place after the February riots, precisely in the peri-urban areas of the city.

7 N. Domingos, Colonial Architectures, Urban Planning and the Representation of Portuguese Imperial History, Portuguese Journal of Social Science 14, (2015) 3, pp. 235–55. Without Domingos' straightforward critique, this enquiry about neighbourhood units and concentration schemes would have taken a very different direction.

8 Governor-General Order of 6-2-1962, in: Estudo Preliminar do Problema da Habitação em Luanda, Luanda: Laboratório de Engenharia de Angola, 1962.

9 From 1940 to 1960 the urban population in Angola rose an impressive 151.6 per cent. Just in Luanda, urban dwellers experienced an increase of 267.9 per cent during those two decades. Ilídio do Amaral, Contribuição Para o Conhecimento Do Fenómeno de Urbanização Em Angola, in: Finisterra XIII (1978) 25, pp. 43–83.

However, and contrary to what the social and political upheavals may lead us to think, late 1961 marked the beginning of a vibrant urban period in the city's history. After a short phase of economic decay, starting in 1957, with the collapse of world coffee and cotton prices, and of political insecurity with the first anti-colonial revolts, Luanda witnessed a quick upsurge in industrial investments and civil construction.[10] Such was the economic side of an urban revival that was also felt in the cultural domain, especially in the musical realm with the production of Angola's famous *semba*. As Marissa Moorman recalled, this was but a sign of Luandans taking advantage of Portuguese renewed tolerance towards African recreational activities.[11] This tolerance was representative of the new colonial policy of the 1960s, with political reformist and economic industrialist agendas. It was also the period during which the central government's capacity augmented, its infrastructural power reaching deeper into the territory and through the country's social fabric.[12]

It was thus within this ambivalent context of repression and economic dynamism that the Commission, reuniting engineers and architects from the local urbanization office, the geographical and cadastral services and Luanda's engineering laboratory, advanced one of the most radical proposals for tackling the suburban "problem". From the urbanistic standpoint, it quickly developed a scheme aiming at compartmentalizing the whole suburban population into three types of distinctly self-containing "modern neighbourhood units". Clearly, these urban planners devised a modern *sensitive* approach with regards to the matter of "elimination". As short-term eradication could only be achieved through demolition, relocation and preventive actions on informal housing construction around the city's centre, against this background all proposed measures gained an aura of *sensitiveness*. This is important because the former was the first urban plan to target the *musseque*s area as an autonomous object of study and policy intervention. By putting aside the option of immediate demolition and deportation, the Commission was forced to design an inner solution to the city's unstable and politically dangerous belt.

It became evident to the planners that the future neighbourhood units of Luanda were best suited to those segments of the African population already "prepared to urban life". This idea complicated the execution of the projects' main urbanistic highlights: carefully composed neighbourhood units, with a population volume ranging from five to six thousand inhabitants; multiracial social class heterogeneity, with at least 50 per cent economically vulnerable European and African families; and common public facilities prompting the social evolution of "detribalized individuals" through collective civic life. Since the majority of the families inhabiting the *musseques* were still maladjusted to proper city life, social services ought to lead "progressive preparation" campaigns while selec-

10 J. Paige, Agrarian Revolution: Social Movements and Export Agriculture in the Underdeveloped World, New York 1975, pp. 226–228. Amaral, Contribuição Para o Conhecimento Do Fenómeno de Urbanização Em Angola, p. 64.

11 M. Moorman, Dueling Bands and Good Girls: Gender, Music, and Nation in Luanda's Musseques, 1961–1974, in: The International Journal of African Historical Studies 37 (2004) 2, pp. 255–288.

12 R. Soares de Oliveira / Susan Taponier, „O Governo Está Aqui?" : Post-War State-Making in the Angolan Periphery, in: Politique Africaine 130 (2013) 2, pp. 165–187.

tion procedures determined rigorously which families to integrate immediately. From the Commission's perspective, the efficacy of new international guidelines in Luanda, in the form of overtly anti-segregationist neighbourhood units, implied a second-degree separation, based on a sound sociological classification of individuals and on the societal fabrication of new men and women at "social preparation schools". Indeed, sociological enquiries were called upon to study the structural conditions of the detribalized Africans dwelling in Luanda, to classify and place them on a scale of "gradual acculturation". Moreover, a community development framework was to guide sociologists in the terrain helped by the "direct collaboration of the interested population".

What were the results, one may ask, of such enquiries? In the absence of fine-grained sociological studies about Luanda, the Commission conducted a survey-sampling complemented by interviews with local officials and assimilated Africans, in order to collect data on the various household types, differing positions of ethnic groups in relation to each other, on the cohesion of informal settlements, degrees of sociability and stability. The aim was to quantitatively divide the ill-housed native population into distinct evolutionary groups and to rearrange them in a three-tiered scheme of socioeconomic strata. "Big numbers demand conceptions of the same scale", so went the thinking of the proponents, advocating the use of high-rise buildings in future neighbourhoods. Then again, such a solution was only appropriate for the first tier of the total population under study – 10,000 whites, 6,800 *mestiços* and 8.000 assimilated blacks. In fact, another significant aspect of the proposal was the diversification of housing types within the scheme. Depending on the target population's socioeconomic position, each unit comprised high-building blocks (1st tier) and single-family housing (2nd and 3rd tiers). The rigidness of the plan, despite the purported "maximum dissemination of all somatic types" across units, did not fit well the urban reality, for there was the obvious huge disproportion between the number of white Europeans living in informal settlements and the overwhelming majority of Africans in the same conditions. Out of a total of 30 projected neighbourhood units, only ten would house "multi-racial communities", that is, the first population echelon. It goes without saying that the bulk of the African population would fill the remaining 20 units, 17 of which with lower-class detribalized "blacks" – an unpleasant but inevitable unintended consequence of assimilationist efforts.

Highly rational urbanization along socioeconomic stratification lines crudely exposed to urban planners the race relations problem at the heart of Portuguese colonialism. A recent study suggests that the project eventually failed to be completely executed because it was deemed too multiracial. But the evidence tells us a different story. As some notable observers of the time had noticed, Western planning frameworks were the real problem. For instance, by the time Prenda was being devised, Peter Gutkind's research on Kampala, in Uganda, had led him to conclude that

> *ideas of neighbourhood planning as a device for controlled urban development cannot, in all likelihood, be implemented* […] *the pitfalls of such an approach – the transference of patterns of layout and design even after so-called adaptation to achieve harmony with*

> local *traditions – can be far reaching and result in the coercion to a way of life which brings in its wake, often unconsciously, all that is undesirable and has been found wanting. There is some evidence that this is taking place*.[13]

And it was certainly so in Luanda. Due to the conclusion of somatic imbalance within their own anti-segregationist plan, urban planners were straightforwardly advised to temper their modernist ambitions. One of the ways to solve the detribalization conundrum was to ponder the transplantation of the Mozambican experience of "native quarters". In Lourenço Marques (Maputo), "handicapped" African families were given previously demarcated terrains on the periphery, on the condition that self-built rudimentary houses would later be replaced by definitive, durable ones. The example was thought as a complementary technique to in-town "neighbourhood units", also on the grounds of empowering administrative authorities on the matter of police order and security. [14] This case of intra-imperial institutional circulation shows how a group of urban experts in western Africa could modify their initial modernizing plans by drawing on previous eastern experiences of slum management and still present them as ground-breaking experiments. They achieved this by placing their efforts under the principles of "racial and urban dissemination" and industrialization. Dissemination, which should be followed not only in Luanda across the 30 proposed units but also in the hinterland, professedly avoided segregation and induced industrial and urban decentralization. The creation of small to medium-sized settlements, also called "urban dissemination", should follow the installation of industrial facilities, thus enabling the dispersion of the suburban population across the countryside. [15] But this strategy, too, was far from unique.

3. The Neighbourhood Unit

A closer look at the rural uses of Clarence Perry's analytical notion of "neighbourhood unit" will allow us to grasp the real weight of innovation in the 1962 Plan for the *musseques* area and to understand the impact of rural sociology as the basis of urbanization plans. Even if both strategies were thought of as complementing each other – the creation of satellite camps and villages serving as crucial instruments in the fight against rural migration to Luanda – rural concentration also contributed to the urbanization of the countryside. Since the late 1940s, the acknowledgement of this paradox led to the appropriation of the "neighbourhood unit" concept as a tool of detribalization containment, usually as a milder instrument of controlling social disintegration. Ten years before the outset of the Prenda scheme, the engineer Eurico Machado, Head of the Repartition

13 Gutkind was thinking, first and foremost, on the notion of "neighbourhood unit". P. C. W. Gutkind, Urban Conditions in Africa, in: The Town Planning Review 32 (1961) 1, pp. 20–32.

14 Manuel Pereira dos Santos, Secretário Provincial do Governo-Geral de Angola, Order no. 25/L.E.A./962, 1-3-1962.

15 Estudo Preliminar do Problema da Habitação, pp. 9, 12.

of National Buildings and Monuments, conceived of medical services along with schools as permanent formations to be installed within "neighbourhood units":

> *In urban centres, as soon as the indigenous residential zones are chosen… it is imperative to organize those same zones. The structuration* [estruturação] *in residential units (neighbourhood units) is no less necessary or justifiable here than it is in civilized zones. Actually, it may be even more so.* [16]

According to Machado, the distribution patterns of the African masses, grouping around agricultural farms or industries forming "camps", imposed a new kind of rural space arrangement in the form of settlements or agricultural colonies that were to recreate the feelings of unity of the social group, through a strict regulation of the minimum and maximum limits of the number of inhabitants. The same principles should organize neighbourhood units in towns: small enough to "make life easier", while large enough to support social and recreational social security schemes. Each unit ought to be divided into clusters based on the regional origins and the professional occupations of the detribalized. However, these areas would have to be planned with an eye to their eventual assimilation, so as to enable a controlled civilization process without "structural changes". Eventually, the neighbourhood units would give rise to "civilized residential units".

One important aspect of Machado's suggestion lies on the double use he makes of the concept, applying it for administrating both rural and urban milieus. As later projects ended up replicating, it was a tool for managing peri-urban rural belts, indistinct zones where future African slums were imagined and feared by architects, designers, social workers and military and political officials. In this sense, the neighbourhood unit became a preventive measure inscribed within the renewed policy of *regedorias*. This happened, for instance, with the first civil regedoria plan, launched in 1962, contemporary to the Prenda scheme and, more importantly, tackling directly the village closest to the capital: Viana. Altogether similar to Eurico Machado's ideas around the notion of "neighbourhood unit", it aimed at concentrating African families scattered across a native reserve in a single satellite agglomerate. It is clear, now, that the rationale of neighbourhood units accompanied by native quarters, which was dear to the Prenda project, was precisely the same behind Luanda's regedoria schemes[17]: to provide provisory settlement at the outskirts of the urban centre or diffusion poles while projecting their long-term engulfment into the expanding city.

It was no coincidence that explicit references to the "neighbourhood unit" concept as applied to Angola made their first appearances during the 1950s. After all, this was the concept's golden age in the United States and in Europe, framing institutions and

16 E. Gonçalves Machado (Head of the National Buildings and Monuments Office), A habitação indígena em Angola: subsídios para o estudo do problema, Luanda 1952, pp. 15–16. Machado feels the need to refer directly to the original English term to convey the concept he has in mind.

17 Until now, the evidence about regedoria plans for Angola is scarce. Viana stands out as an exception to this. Other redevelopment projects for the outskirts of Luanda, such as the one for Mazozo, are still completely absent from historical (and sociological) literature, even though they are alluded to in official documents.

public/private policy following the post-war's large-scale homebuilding demand and the upsurge in the suburban housing industry.[18] However, colonial and postcolonial settings added a distinctive quality to this process of technical diffusion. What the factors were that made the neighbourhood unit so appealing, were all of them the result of an elective affinity between the concept's sociogenetic influences and colonial institutions and ideologies. In other words, the resemblance between the neighbourhood unit device and the policy of village-building did not go unnoticed by colonial agents. Three such factors deserve our scrutiny: the idea of urban village, the technique of subdivision and the moral stance behind the advocacy of the neighbourhood unit.

It was perhaps chiefly through its main western critics that the concept of "neighbourhood unit" and the practice of neighbourhood planning became so closely associated with the ideal village. For some, it amounted to a conservative, if not corporatist, and outdated attempt at recreating not only the physical layout, but also the social structure of rural villages within modern, increasingly heterogenous cities, while at the same time overlooking "the less attractive features of the village – its narrowness, gossip and intolerance".[19] A ferocious critic of the British post-war embracement of the concept, Peter Mann, could not "get away from the idea that the neighbourhood unit does hark back to an ideal of village life in the past, which may or more likely may not have ever existed".[20] In fact, by the late 1940s, the village-like nature of new urban units was considered a determinant of social stability, individual development and communitarian strength, features that Clarence Perry – the neighbourhood unit's father – had drawn from the then extremely influential Chicago school of sociology.

The dubious assumption that "primary groups" shaped individual personality and collective mores, exposed by Charles Cooley, along with Robert E. Park's explicit endorsement of the neighbourhood as the fundamental social unit or "moral region" that could prevent deviant behaviours, went deeply into the neighbourhood unit's original conception as a physical place that ought to produce or enable sound community interaction.[21] Criticized by some as an instrument of social homogeneity that induced "segregation by race, caste or income", other social engineering aspects of the neighbourhood units as urban villages were championed. Functionalist thinking went on advocating them as buttresses against disorganization and social disintegration, by decreasing heterogeneity and by stimulating face-to-face interaction, neighbourliness and civic life. The European experi-

18 See, for the British case, A. Homer, Creating New Communities: The Role of the Neighbourhood Unit in Post-war British Planning, in: Contemporary British History 14 (2000) 1, pp. 63–80.

19 P. Collison, Town Planning and the Neighbourhood Unit Concept, in: Public Administration 32 (1954) 4, pp. 463–469, at 464.

20 P. H. Mann, The Socially Balanced Neighbourhood Unit, in: Town Planning Review 29 (1958) 2, pp. 91–98, at 93; J. Brody, The Neighbourhood Unit Concept and the Shaping of Land Planning in the United States 1912–1968, in: Journal of Urban Design 18 (2013) 3, pp. 340–362, at 352.

21 On Cooley's and other communitarian movements influence, see Mumford, The Neighborhood and the Neighborhood Unit, pp 259–262. On Park's definition of the basic social unit and the religious origins of the social control function neighbourhoods could perform, see Johnson, Origin of the Neighbourhood Unit, pp. 239–240 and E. Talen, Social Science and the Planned Neighbourhood, in: Town Planning Review 88 (2017) 3, pp. 349–372, at 365.

ence of civil defence during the II World War was also brought into the debate about the beneficial outcomes of the new urban villages. Many hoped that the unit would propel a new form of political action within the city, enabling the selection of community leaders, reaching deliberative cross-class consensus and forging a strong sense of identity.

It is against this background that I think one should interpret the proliferation of model villages in colonial Angola (as in other colonial and ex-colonial cases) from the inter-war period on. We may recall that Perry had placed communitarian institutions, especially the school, at the centre of the idealized urban blocks, a premise welcomed by Machado's residential units proposal. But purely rural model villages, conceived earlier in the 1920s, had already followed the same rationale. For example, responding to larger shifts in International Health, from vertical disease eradication campaigns and individual curative medicine to horizontal and collective healthcare delivery based on prevention, plans were advanced that tentatively reordered African local densities through resettlement schemes along with hygienist and sanitary principles. But seldom were such medical models actually applied.[22] A different, but telling story happened in the penal domain. Prison reform impulses, from the 1930s up until the colonial war, all conceded a greater weight to penal village experiments that were legalized and made into official doctrine in 1954. As open camps, with residential, industrial and collective amenities, but no individual cells, prison villages designed for native criminals crossed inmate decongestion from the urban centres with the principle of re-education or, to put it bluntly, forced community development, that is, the compulsory modernization of detribalized individuals through the re-enacting of civic interaction and professional training.[23] By the time urban planners started using the neighbourhood unit as a malleable *rurbanization* tool (an urban socialization outside the urban space), within the *regedorias* policy, the symbolic village, as a utopian self-contained organism producer of sanitary behaviour, political solidarity and societal equilibrium, was firmly established in Portuguese colonial thinking.

Closely associated with the perks and the symbolism of the (urban) village scale is the technique of Euclidean zoning, the strict functional separation of zones within a city. If town planning in Africa, and the key-concept of Master Plan, integral to the disciplining of space and land distribution, appeared in the early twentieth century, urban zoning was an instrument that followed later unregulated experiences of segregation. Only after World War II were there significant movements towards the normalization of the "dual city", previously determined by the "sanitation syndrome".[24] This experience was linked

22 This was due to structural shortcomings such as the lack of financial investment, excessive dependency on underequipped local administrators and popular resistance, according to S. Coghe, Reordering Colonial Society: Model Villages and Social Planning in Rural Angola, 1920–45, in: Journal of Contemporary History 52 (2016) 1, pp. 16–44. Although I do not agree with the centrality of sanitary thinking in Coghe's analysis – neither do I follow his softer developmentalist thesis throughout – I do believe his is the best collection of villagization efforts in twentieth-century Angola up to date.

23 Pinto da Cruz, The Penal Origins of Colonial Model Villages.

24 A. D. King, Colonialism and Urban Development, in: F. Miraftab / N. Kudva (eds.), Cities of the Global South Reader, New York 2015, pp. 29–39; C. Coquery-Vidrovitch, The Process of Urbanization in Africa (From the Origins to the Beginning of Independence), in: African Studies Review 34 (1991) 1, pp. 1–98, at 67-70.

to the shift in colonial policy (and mentalities) from urban regulation as the control of migratory movements (with in-town passports) to permanent (even if self-aided) housing – a shift that testifies to the declining image of the African city dweller as a temporary rural individual in town. Only then did social and racial zoning become a functional social management tool. Supposedly multiracial cities engendered the kinds of anxieties that justified the technique. In the general plan of Nairobi (1945/46), for instance, a South African commission thus stated that "the more there are divergent and complex interests, the more will the municipal area be broken in separate specialized zones".[25]

But Angola may be one notable exception to this larger trend, racial and ethnic zoning being present in government-led villagization schemes since 1921. A Portuguese counterpart of the French policy of "association" was tested across Angola's hinterland during the High-Comissariat of Norton de Matos.[26] It was then that village regrouping, under the ostensible tenet of indigenous habits and customs' preservation, became mandatory. Zoning was central to the laws that enacted it, for they predicted the systematic division of larger ethnic groups into smaller ones.[27] Commenting on how this 1920s policy antedated the counterinsurgency resettlements of the 1960s, Basil Davidson underlined the fundamental issue at stake. From the colonialist standpoint, it really was a matter of combining micro-ethnicity with apartheid, since the law explicitly prohibited native construction outside said "indigenous concentrations" or villages and ordered the violent destruction of all huts found outside the new planned locations.[28]

Village *déguerpissement* went hand in hand with ethnical zoning within entirely racially segregated dwellings. As soon as it became available, it was all but normal that the neighbourhood unit would be applied, first and foremost, to these native settlements. And well into the 1960s, a period during which the neighbourhood unit was being dismissed in Europe, it still served to assuage strict zoning regulations, at least in theory. Tribal settlements posed lesser difficulties to the local chief or the local administrator when compared to the mixed tribal communities of the congested peri-urban belts. This was due to the simplification of codes that governed the conduct of the better-defined conglomerates and to the inner election of leaders or community elites that eased the politics of administration. Neighbourhood units applied in housing estates were thus seen as important instruments in the regimentation of congested mixed settlements, that is, in imposing spatial arrangements akin to tribal villages or at least to the settlement's social structure.[29] Whether this actually worked is an entirely different matter (and we

25 L. W. T White / L. Silberman / P. R. Anderson Williams, Nairobi: Master plan for a colonial capital, London 1948, quoted in: C. Coquéry-Vidrovitch, Racial and Social Zoning in African Cities from Colonization to Postindependence, in: E. Bogaerts / R. Raben (eds.), Beyond Empire and Nation: The Decolonization of African and Asian Societies, 1930s–1970s, Brill, 2012, pp. 267–286, at 276.

26 On the French colonial policies of assimilation and association in the field of urban planning, see, for all, G. Wright, Tradition in the Service of ModernityArchitecture and Urbanism in French Colonial Policy, 1900–1930, in: The Journal of Modern History 59 (1987) 2, pp. 291–316.

27 Portaria n.º 137, Boletim Oficial n.º 51/1921.

28 B. Davidson, In the Eye of the Storm: Angola's People, New York 1973, pp. 119–120.

29 Gutkind, Urban Conditions in Africa.

have seen that it usually failed). What is worth stating, nevertheless, is that the centrality of zoning coupled with the neighbourhood unit principle was further reaffirmed by detribalization sociology.

The latter shared many assumptions with the Chicago school, many of them providing the foundations of later community development frameworks: the village or the unit as incubator of communitarian spirit, the preservation or altogether invention of collective ways of life, the densification of grassroots associations and cooperatives, and, above all, the physical control of migratory movements. When villagization policy started being implemented by the military, first, and by welfare agencies afterwards, during the 1960s, detribalization discourses went into plans that not only aimed at surveying and tracing rural-urban migrants, but also at circumscribing them, in a mix of disciplinarian mechanisms and security *dispositifs*. Here, pre-war Belgian colonial thought exerted a decisive influence at Lisbon's Escola Superior Colonial (Colonial High School), mainly through the action of the Jesuit priest Pierre Charles. For the missionary, "in order to attain the progress of human society", it was not sufficient to ensure an exterior appearance of public order, by police regulations and sanitary prescriptions. There was an administrative obligation: the juridical framing of African settlements, which, left without a precise statute, would become "spots of anarchy and discontent".[30] This idea was mobilized to justify the Belgian policy of *centres extra-coutumiers* at the Brussels Colonial International Institute – also known as the Moral and Political Science Academy of the Colonies. Those centres, or suburban villages, designed to avoid population fluxes through the issuing of *passports de mutation*, were transposed as exemplary institutions to the Portuguese colonial thought only during the 1950s, when it was retaken by sociologists and political scientists newly graduated from the colonial school.

Among them, Amadeu Castilho Soares elaborated the most complete and lasting approach to the phenomenon of detribalization in Portugal, strongly influencing colonial civil servants due to its programmatic nature. Soares advocated a new state-led programme conducted by agents "with a solid Christian education and elementary sociological preparation". His proposal reflected the direct contact he had maintained with native Angolan populations during his internship at the Mission for the Big Cities and Rural Well-Being. The fabrication of a sociological gaze within the colonial state's bureaucracy is well felt in his project for the inauguration of an Identification and Statistical Service, in charge of classifying urban natives on a civilizational scale, by measuring sociological indicators, such as the duration of residency outside the rural zones and the degree of professional and family stabilities. In accordance, his approach aimed at knowing the *real* dimension of detribalization and at launching satellite centres of containment based, again, on "neighbourhood units":

> *The large concentration of houses and people in a true indigenous city is not a happy solution. On the contrary, it is rather preferable the small concentration in smaller areas,*

30 P. Charles, Le problème des centres extra-coutumiers et quelques-uns de ses aspects, Brussels 1936.

> *which not only brings sound advantages in the sanitary, administrative and police fields, but also makes the development of an authentic group spirit easier, allowing in turn a more efficient educational action and a smoother permeability to cultural contacts and acquisitions*.[31]

However, and unlike Prenda, but very much like Clarence Perry's preference for curvilinear pedestrian streets, these coeval projects placed a stronger emphasis on the need to avoid strict geometric patterns. Official statements, reproducing detribalization themes, warned against standardized gridded layouts, deemed artificial, stiff and inhuman when imposed on non-acculturated Africans. They devised, instead, more organic diagrams, seemingly inspired on native housing traditions.[32] Because this foreshadowed future critiques to the Prenda design, as we shall see, it sheds some light on the contested terrain on which these urban and village planners stood. The proponents of controlled assimilation, even after the abolition of the native's statute, with their *rurbanization* stages and *regedorias*, were also voicing against high-modernist designers such as Prenda's Simões de Carvalho, who did not consider himself to be – nor is he nowadays considered – an urban planner of a high-modernist quality. But his direct collaboration with military strategists, the enormous complexity of his Commission's project and the biased pre-sociological enquiries that he sponsored tell us otherwise.

While the Prenda Commission was set up, the policy of *aldeamentos* or strategic villages was initiated after the Portuguese razzia operations in the northern part of the country. Those northern villages would become the blueprint of later strategic hamlets within the counter-subversion effort. Civil authorities, then, had good reasons to advance milder forms of African settlements' layouts, the regedoria Viana and the Prenda scheme both standing at the forefront of the latter. After 1962, military planners started circulating civil rural settlement norms that prescribed the use of the neighbourhood unit's principles, such as wavy streets and more flexible designs. Central to this institutional learning were the commissions bringing together technical planners of all kinds, the military and the police, of which the one presiding over the Prenda *musseque* scheme was just one example. Usually, international discourses helped framing such knowledge circulation within civil-military working groups. Dialogues promoted by FAO around the comparability of the experiences of rural well-being implemented at a global scale gave economists, for instance, the possibility to locate colonial cooperative experiments on an ideological scale.[33] To them, military village experiments were the Angolan execution of the "colonies cooperatives divisées", extracted from the Israeli experience of the *moshav*, which consisted in the colonization of border areas based on the regime of land leasing

31 Amadeu Castilho Soares, Política de Bem-estar rural em Angola, Lisboa,1961, quoted in: PT/IPAD/MU/DGE/RPAD/1415/01931Junta Provincial de Povomento, Reordenamento Rural, 4.

32 For a description of that first study, see Cruz / Curto, The Good and the Bad Concentration: Regedorias in Angola. See also Junta Provincial de Povomento, Reordenamento Rural, 6-9.

33 Margaret Digby's paper "Co-operatives and land use", Rome 1957, prepared as a FAO report proved to be extremely influential on this matter among Portuguese economists.

to each family for an extended period of time and on free agricultural labour. Matter of fact, the Israeli case was the main source of inspiration for these northern Angolan *aldeamentos*, since it was the "most blatant case of the use of the cooperative system for dual ends" with economic and military objectives, that is. In the words of one leading economist, what was intended for northern Angola was comparable to the creation of a state "in a territory limited by hostile neighbours".[34] Moreover, community development themes were invoked to draw a rhetorical contrast between top-down, totalitarian economic and social planning and gradual modernization schemes. In a similar vein, the depiction of voluntary labour as a pragmatic and beneficial expedient for village-building and the opportunities local "community developments" opened up for recently trained social technicians also concurred to differentiate repressive military measures from welfarist rural reordering.[35] Since old and new villages, forming *regedorias*, were subject to varied exceptional military measures, and social workers were usually dependent on and played an active role in the social knowledge produced by the army, that is, in the policy of "mentalization", it is virtually impossible to distinguish civil from military regrouping experiences.

All the experiences described above were linked and contributed to the reorganization of Luanda's peripheries. They offered a strategic model on how to deal with the matter of population mobility within and out of the city. At the same time, they paved the way for the emergence of a new urban planning approach.

4. Auzelle Behind the Barbed Wire

The further one goes into the last years of Portuguese rule in Angola, the more one finds a more perfected integration of urban planners within the colonial structure of counter-subversion. Deliberative technical institutions on urban design and management became increasingly dependent on centralized appointments bringing together military officers, the political and public police, civil administrators and technical expertise. And this happened at all governmental levels. This does not mean that civil bureaucrats, some of them with coordinating and policy-making powers in Lisbon, were disinterested about the social and economic dimensions of urban planning in times of war. But when they turned their gaze to those dimensions, while carving out an autonomous field of urban management away from military rationales and security mentalities, they either reinforced older views on detribalization or focused on the precarious conditions of poor lower white classes living in Luanda.

Exactly how, then, had the subject of colonial urbanism evolved during this short period?

34 W. Marques, Povoamento em esquemas comunitários de soldados-colonos, Actividade económica de Angola: revista de estudos económicos, propaganda e informação, Luanda 1964, pp. 33–65.

35 For the historical appropriations of UN's community development techniques at this time, see, among others D. Curto / B. Pinto da Cruz / T. Furtado, Políticas Coloniais Em Tempo de Revoltas – Angola circa 1961, Porto 2016, pp. 17–57.

Firstly, the access to and the visibility of comparable international slum management experiences showed that the lack of housing, not insufficient family income, was the main determinant of coeval social upheavals, familiar disaggregation, juvenile delinquency and of a general "impossibility of the social recuperation of one's self".[36] Housing levels were much more than mere indicators of an overall development pattern: they actively shaped economic and social progress and should thus be considered before trying to raise the African standards of living through higher income generation. Residencies, however, ought to be modest: realism served better the extant populations, ameliorating everyday life and inducing adaptive, not radical, social change. Even the unfinished, minimal and provisory traditional huts should be accepted if correctly seconded by the efficient delivery of public goods. Secondly, urban planning stopped being understood as a subsidiary principle of housing programmes. The tradition of considering shelter above anything else, without proper sewage, water and electricity systems' groundwork was shattered. Housing and infrastructural planning had to go hand in hand. This was crucial to the representation of law and order as tangible public goods liable to rational distribution within space constraints. Policing and surveillance finally entered the calculus of Luanda's urban planners. Thirdly, the latter had to concede a greater weight to the social, economic and political variables while designing concatenating urban projects. Pleas for more accurate and reliable data were frequent. Accuracy was key to the general aim of urban design under budgetary discipline: adjusted funding required social needs be meticulously measured. Lastly, zoning techniques were especially suited to the reordering of high-density areas: in order to open up sufficiently large spaces for circulation, to discipline the constant mutation of informal settlement quarters and to ease authority surveillance.[37]

The notion of "positive urbanization", conveyed by the Secretariat des Missions d'Urbanisme et d'habitat, the French agency for technical assistance on housing in developing countries, was key to this dynamic. Translated into Portuguese colonial urban policies opposing so-called "negative planning", that is, urban management based solely on temporary prohibitions and sanctions, it prescribed pre-emptive calculus, consisting on prediction, anticipation and public-private partnerships, a strategy particularly suited to Luanda's clandestine housing situation. Clandestine or informal white settlements illicitly built on public lands had increased at exceptional rates, from 4 per cent in 1956 to 20 per cent in 1963. By the end of the decade, the case of white poverty in Luanda triggered as many anxieties as the ever-growing native quarters. To public officials at the ministerial level, covert operations of public land acquisition by Europeans, of house and building construction financed by major constructor companies and of real estate speculation with unbearable upsurges in rents – affecting both white and African urbanites – were encouraged by the shortage of state financial resources as well as by the

36 PT/IPAD/MU/DGOPC/DSUH/1973/09786, M. S. Teixeira de Sampayo, H. Novais-Ferreira, J. de Almeida Santos Jr., Habitação Social em Angola: Esboço de um programa de acção, Luanda 1968.

37 Ibid., pp. 208–212.

absence of updated master plans. Underfunding of state services stalled the execution of public goods infrastructures (water, sewage, electricity) and prevented the constitution of municipal land reserves, critical both to the regulation of the real estate market and to the provision of adequate space for urban expansion on strict guidelines. In addition, planning activities were fragmented and uncoordinated due to the lack of a recent master plan. The 1962 Commission's neighbourhood unit plan for Luanda fiercely supported the idea that future directive urbanization plans of Luanda should accommodate local arrangements tackling the problem of the *musseque*s, and not the reverse. Almost a decade later, top civil servants working at the Overseas Ministry would consider such an idea untenable and nefarious: neighbourhood units were important inasmuch as they complied with holistic city projects. In fact, it was acknowledged that the municipal Urbanization Office under the tutelage of Simões de Carvalho had done absolutely nothing to tackle the problem: local studies were mainly focused on the historical centre of the capital or addressed limited areas of the suburbs; and because there was no structural conception of the city on a larger scale, those plans were responsible for heterogeneity, lack of cohesion and urbanistic disorder. Central technical authorities also charged local architects and engineers for the successive phases of clandestine housing legalization, claiming that the absence of properly scaled habitational programmes spurred further rent increases. Demolition or the slow suffocation of extant informal quarters through public facilities' deprivation, such as schools, thus appeared as the only alternatives for imposing a certain degree of urban order.

Manifestations of field autonomy included an increasing polarization opposing high-modernist experts, such as Simões de Carvalho, and technocosmopolitan housing technicians of the late 60s around the subject of "social sensitiveness". "Who gets to monopolize Robert Auzelle's urbanism programme?" was the structuring issue of these years. Interestingly, Auzelle was used to criticize in explicit terms the subordination of holistic urbanization to dispersed, sometimes unsynchronized rehearsals of grandiose schemes like Prenda. In 1968, a new Commission on social housing programmes in Angola pointed out that for Auzelle:

> *l'urbanisme ne connaît guère, en effet, que des cas particuliers…* [Il] *apelle une intervention organisatrice. Cette intervention ne peut être arbitrairement laissée à l›inspiration éventuellement capricieuse d›un spécialiste. Elle doit être guidées par les Pouvoirs publics* […] *La carence de l'Etat en ce domaine aurait pu prendre les proportions d›une démission nationale.*[38]

This position was further legitimized by the participation of colonial officials in international meetings where one could clearly feel an unspoken clash between two schools of thought: the French *tecnicista* – which the Portuguese would call *dogmatic* – premised on abstract rationalism, idealized outlines and on a will to "mould a people" to fit their

38 Auzelle quoted in ibid., pp. 11–13.

schemes; another Anglo-Saxon *empiricist*, using the "people, the house, the city, just as they are". Accordingly, Angola had suffered enough from devotees of the first even when tempered with claims of local adaptability.

One of such meetings took place in Brazil, under the theme of Regional Planning and Housing, in 1967. It soon became a foundational event in the history of urban planning in Angola, for it allowed Portuguese representatives to import the conservative model of a "National Housing Bank" (NHB).[39] The appeal of the Brazilian experience rested on three interrelated reasons. First, the NHB was the central piece of Brazil's first National Housing Plan (1964), a landmark of the military dictatorship of Castello Branco, known for the implementation of orthodox macroeconomic policies aimed at drastically reducing inflation and public expenditure. The goal of the programmes was to stir self-sustained financial resources to the habitational sector of the lower classes, without increasing government spending. The NHB was the federal agency in charge of coordinating state-level CoHabs, housing companies that garnered financial resources and made real estate investments based on the active contribution of lower-class workers.[40] This suited the new colonial housing planners' dreams of a public coordinating branch that alleviated the state's budgetary burden on native housing. Second, as a means-tested approach using compulsory contributions, its application in Angola could instil domestic rigour and saving habits on the traditional economically weak populations. At the same time, the acquisition of houses would propel "social emulation" by creating superfluous consumerist needs of a western kind – an indirect technique for attaining controlled social progress in Africa. Third, the model had already been tested in Chile and Mexico (countries with a similar socio-economic structure to that of Angola's), that had imported it, with local variations, from the United States' housing system, thus attesting to its cross-country validity.

If Brazil offered a solution to the trade-off between centralized coordinated planning and low-cost housing construction to the poor, South Africa presented exemplary answers on the matter of urban design. Stripped of the inconvenient allusions to the role of urban planning under the apartheid regime, Southern African technical literature reached Angola indirectly, through the influence it exerted on Mozambique. The reference here was D. M. Calderwood's *Native Housing in South Africa* (1953), an influential graduate thesis concluded under the auspices of the South Africa National Building Research Institute. Because in Mozambique engineers were trying to articulate rural lifestyles at suburban areas within larger urbanization efforts, Calderwood's proposal of small private farmable lots surrounding Black residences was tempting. Moreover, Angolan and Mozambican technicians found the South African approach as encapsulating a synthesis between *tech-*

39 Cf. PT/IPAD/MU/DGOPC/DSUH/1973/09786, 2ªs Jornadas Luso-Brasileiras de Engenharia Civil, 6–19 August 1967.

40 M. Beckert Zappellini / J. Gomes Lima / M. Correia Guedes, Evolução Da Política Habitacional No Brasil (1967–2014): Uma Análise de Equilíbrio Pontuado, in: Revista Interdisciplinar de Gestão Social 6 (2017) 3, pp. 153–172; PT/IPAD/MU/DGOPC/DSUH/1973/01474 Relatório da Missão Oficial ao Brasil – Presidente do fundo dos Bairros Populares de Angola, 26 September 1967.

nicism and humanism, perhaps due to Calderwood's predilection for a social sensitive, survey-based approach drawn from Patrick Abercrombie and Lewis Mumford.[41]

Despite a growing awareness of shared transnational experiences of *bidonvillisation*, concerns about the definition of what was local precluded the import of radical experiences of urbanization and housing from "more advanced western countries". The latter represented the kind of machinist de-humanized urban conceptions inadequate to individuals undergoing a process of detribalization. But international knowledge also helped rationalise such a position. For instance, experts drew on the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa's recommendations to justify why Luanda's suburban population could hardly be sheltered in several floor-buildings – a veiled critique to the Prenda initiative: "one should notice", concluded the Survey of the Economics of Grouped Housing in Africa, "that the less educated the population, the less capable it is of adapting to certain aspects of urban life and the larger the space it needs for domestic activities".[42] Likewise, the same idea underpinned the noticeable absence of metropolitan urban solutions as exemplary: recently erected conglomerates for the housing of lower-class residents in Lisbon, at the neighbourhoods of Olivais Sul or Chelas, were only fitted to populations accustomed to century-long urban lifestyles, and, for that matter, "to high-rise buildings".[43] Psycho-social enquiries were similarly employed to underscore the irreconcilability between traditional and modern uses of the domestic space, by rendering some threshold values useful. Regarding the most appropriately covered areas per person in Africa, the French sociologist Chombart de Lauwe's binomial "dangerous limit" and "satisfactory limit" had to be reconsidered: if the interval of 8–10 square meters made up an unhealthy environment for the upbringing of French children, then in Angola the dangerous threshold had to be higher – not just due to geographical determinants, but social as well. Anxieties about infant pathological cases and maternal extreme fatigue gave the tone to this renewed discourse on detribalization.[44]

That these late-imperial reports served to collect and summarize a bulky set of state-of-the-art material on global urban and housing systems is a clear indication of how contentious the issue of urban planning was still in Angola on the eve of independence. We are far from the well-defined lusotropical synthesis put forward by such stellar figures as Simões de Carvalho in the early 60s and underscored by some recent scholarship on

41 On D.M. Calderwood's approach, see E. Haarhoff, Appropriating Modernism: Apartheid and the South African Township, in: 14th IPHS Conference, 2010, pp. 5–7; A.S. Marques, Primeiras Jornadas de Engenharia de Moçambique, 1965.

42 ECA, Survey of the Economics of Grouped Housing in Africa, in: Ekistics, 19 (1965) 112, pp. 172–181, quoted in: Teixeira de Sampayo, Novais-Ferreira and Santos Jr., Habitação Social em Angola, at 183.

43 Ibid., p. 180.

44 It is difficult to grasp the extent of psychological and socio-genetic knowledge acquired by Portuguese central and colonial urban/house technicians, and the exact influence of other international sources other than the French one. At least, reports took the latter seriously enough to parametrize low-cost house dimensions. Cf. M.-J. Chombart de Lauwe, Psychopathologie sociale de l'enfant inadapté. Essai de sélection des variables du milieu et de l'hérédité dans l'étude des troubles du comportement. Travaux du Groupe d'ethnologie sociale, Paris 1959.

the topic.[45] Moreover, from 1966 on, architect and engineer-only state commissions represented much more a collective effort of bibliographical collection, sorting out and appropriating vast arrays of international data, than actual decision-making players. The importance of an unequal access to universal knowledge, usually caused by the inexistence of official translations into Portuguese, can't be overlooked. To be sure, international meetings played a relevant role in model circulation, but printed sources contributed deeply to the period's urban planning framework. A strong dependence on Brazilian and French sources, with indirect and very limited contacts with the Anglo-Saxon world, may have curtailed the array of urbanistic choices.

Nevertheless, the fact that the major campaign for gathering informational capital on the topic began in 1967 testifies to the thesis that very little had been done in the matter of suburban infrastructural reordering and housing. The same year also witnessed the most impressive consequence of making colonial rural sociology the basis of urban policy: the import of emergency procedures from the hinterland warzone to Luanda. The northern experiences of concentration with barbed wire surrounding centric and peripheric residency zones of strategic hamlets were then explicitly projected to the *musseques*.[46] This fact alone indicates that, regardless of the relative importance of international learning, the decisive factor for the emergence and consolidation of a new planning approach was state violence. Pre-emptive and repressive actions laid the ground for the said shift towards a permanent housing policy. What made such a terrible complementarity possible? We may recall that proposals of neighbourhood units and villagization schemes in the late 1950s and early 1960s stated that detribalization containment could only be achieved through an adequate state knowledge of the population. The enquiries inspired by Auzelle's methodology that antedated the construction of Prenda multi-floor buildings were a small piece of this larger trend towards a socio-spatial cartography of Luanda. Simões de Carvalho survey was followed by a handful of studies that faced the same set of shortcomings.[47] All of them wanted to characterize the "interstitial areas" of the city, the transitional or deteriorating belt, as some observers had called the *musseques*. To do so, they had to rely on the reification of administrative neighbourhoods, a phenomenon that followed closely the ever-increasing volume of rural migrants living in the city, which in turn guaranteed geographers, sociologists and social workers their indispensable research framework and empirical evidence.

45 Milheiro, Nos Trópicos Sem Le Corbusier; Viegas, Urbanization in Luanda, and Venâncio, O Bairro Prenda Em Luanda.

46 PIDE/DGS, Del A, 14.14/B, NT 2042, Normas respeitantes ao serviço de controle e segurança na Vila do Ambrizete, elaborado pelo Comando Militar do Sector A, em colaboração com as autoridades policiais e administrativas locais, 12 March 1967.

47 These were conducted by the municipal sanitary services, the ITPAS, the labour and social assistance institute of the colony created after the war, and the Missões de Inquéritos Agrícolas, the Angolan agricultural agency. The latter provided the majority of the personnel to one of the most relevant studies of the musseques, the one conducted by Ramiro Monteiro, a chief of cabinet at the Angolan Services for Intelligence Centralization and Coordination (the SCCIA). See below.

Since 1956, Luanda was systematically split into a growing number of smaller administrative units in order to ease the herculean tasks of local administrators and their staffs.[48] But it was only in 1964, when the policy of population transference, regrouping and control was applied in the countryside, that the urban authorities undertook the first population census for police registration. This operation entailed, in turn, the division of each *musseque* into several *zonas de esquadra* (police station zones), covering a determined set of households. The need to register families and chiefs of families also implied the taming of the plastic, resilient-like nature of the slums. Police registration, therefore, depended on the inscription of two numbers and two letters on each door, representing the house, the zone and the initials of the *musseque's* designation.[49] If such procedures were new to the suburban populations, some of their long-distant relatives living in the countryside had felt them immediately after the beginning of the war. There, psycho-social actions of capture, recuperation and rehabilitation followed a very similar pattern: the separation of pseudo-homogenous communities into distinct neighbourhoods after local statistical rituals that were directed by the military. Covering everyone, the family, the group and the village, these files were often aggregated to convey psychological charts.[50] There is, of course, more than mere similarity and chronological accident to both these surveillance strategies. They were profoundly entwined by the very nature of population mobility across the country. The endeavour, as it became clear a few years later, was to achieve government monitoring through synoptic data, made up of evidence collected at distinct points of Angola. In the matter of "abnormal population movements" this allowed both biographic tracing and the finding of biopolitical patterns.[51] Since after the urban riots of February 1961, there was, in the words of the District Governor, an "absolute urgency in having duly controlled all the individuals… not only for security measures but even to avoid the fleeing of those who lack any identification card".[52] With the abolition of the Native Statute and with the enactment of the new labour code, the *cadernetas indígenas* (native identity cards) and their labour records were no longer usable, a situation that posed grave difficulties to the government of African masses. Legislative diplomas enacted in the mid-1960s tried to overcome the void left by those reforms. To achieve a reasonable degree of control over the freedom of movement, police

48 Portaria n.º 9585, de 19 de Dezembro de 1956; Decreto n.º 4257, de 23 de Dezembro de 1959; Diploma Legislativo n.º 3042, de 11 de Maio de 1960; Portaria n.º 13489, de 14 de Novembro de 1964 e Portaria n.º 14165 de 29 de Janeiro de 1966. See also AHU-ISAU, A2.49.004/53.00.397, D. Pires Velloso, Relatório de Inspecção ao 1.º Bairro Administrativo do Concelho de Luanda, 1969; AHU-ISAU, A2.49.004/53.00389, V. Telles da Gama, Relatório de Inspecção ao Concelho de Luanda, 2.º Bairro Administrativo, 1961.

49 For instance, 3 MO 155 meaning house 155, zone 3 of Musseque Mota. Ramiro Ladeiro Monteiro, A Família Nos Musseques de Luanda: Subsídios Para o Seu Estudo, Luanda 1973, p. 30.

50 3/C/II standing, in a village, for house 3, of Group C, from Conglomerate II. For a thicker description of the process, see Cruz and Curto, The Good and the Bad Concentration: Regedorias in Angola, pp. 14–19.

51 PIDE/DGS, Del A, 14.14/B, NT 2042, PIDE Malange, RSPI n.º 10/66, of 8 November 1966 and answer by the PIDE in Luanda.

52 PIDE/DGS, Del A, P Inf, 15.11.A, NT, 2084, GDLuanda, C. Oliveira Santos, Perintrel anual 1962, 17 July 963. For the Angolan cities or concelhos, see Governo-Geral de Angola, Diploma Legislativo n.º 3447 de 22 de Fevereiro de 1964; for the rural zones, Governo-Geral de Angola, Diploma Legislativo n.º 3819 de 4 de Abril de 1968.

officers had to keep track not only of travels, but most importantly of residence changes. This was mainly done through the disclosure of varied personal data before the issuing of a permit, enabling future comparisons of central categories: gender, provenience, new residency (quarters, streets and houses).[53] Police sources acknowledged that the system was "complex, expensive and insecure", but it remained useful, nonetheless, especially if accompanied by data collected from taxpayers and sanitary census, such as the campaigns against sleeping-sickness.[54]

Another issue at stake was the discipline of in-town populations. Here, the most pressing concern was connected to getting access to and prevent "terrorist" plans. The mass imprisonments of 1961, with at least three thousand African rebels arrested and detained in a matter of months, was hardly seen as a successful measure, for it left intact a vast majority of individuals that the secret police presumedly knew to be somewhat related to the liberation movements. The parallels to rural political conditions predating repression were striking. There, too, entire villages were depicted to be seditious, the suspects of terrorism mingling freely among the masses. This situation led the army to resort to open concentration repertoires, ranging from penal camps to *regedorias*. In the capital city, the probability of native escapes, when confronted with public authorities, had been exacerbated by military patrols within and around the periphery. Intelligence services noted that said "incidents" were usually physical assaults provoked by the army and that the fear of an eventual coercive dispersion was constantly felt. For example, in Prenda, Africans were "unmercifully punished" when found drunk on weekend evenings or holding "seldom recommendable meetings" in the annexes – annexes that had been reconstructed with bricks, a practice considered transgressional construction. Private justice, with physical reprimands and in-house imprisonment, was becoming normal, while signs of sedition, especially alleged communist propaganda, were found everywhere within the *musseques.*[55] Among the signs, one could find white hands painted on the settlements or the circulation of rumours about "how the city is for the European and the suburbs for the African".

Due to the difficulty of identifying certain individuals and of creating a reliable chain of informants, the rural policy of *enquadramento* (framing) had to be reinvented. From the state's perspective, one of the advantages of village reordering was the reduction of traditional collaborative elites and the duplication of a concatenated scheme of intelligence gathering that added a totalitarian quality to the bounded-neighbourhood system within each new village. In Luanda, the disorganization of settlements, the inexistence of "traditional authorities" and the lower densities of *enquadramento* (framing) agents mitigated such direct systems of forced collaboration.[56] However, in 1967, urban population *enquadramento* would be imposed on the exact same lines: public servants and household

53 A small sample of such files can be found in ANTT/ PIDE/DGS, Del A, 14.14.A, NT 2041.

54 PIDE/DGS, Del A, 14.14/B, NT 2042, SCCIA, Apontamento, 17 August 1966.

55 PIDE/DGS, Del A, P Inf, 15.11.A, NT, 2084, Inf. 7/2/1963; Inf. 393-180/964, de 4/6/64; Relatório 197/64 de 17/2/64.

56 Inspection reports of the city date the last traditional authority, Domingos António de Menezes, and his respective regedoria in the Cabo Island to 1961. V. Telles da Gama, Relatório; Duarte Pires Velloso, Relatório, p. 6.

chiefs were obliged to provide intelligence on the events of their residency area, to track the arrival of fluctuant individuals, to signal the presence of suspects or strangers and to report all the required identification data and household changes. "Mutatis mutandis", an intelligence secret report acknowledged, "the exact same competencies thought to be performed by traditional authorities" in rural villages.[57]

The idea that the *musseques* were fertile ground for subversive actions and terrorist plans was continuously evoked until the 1970s. Political police agents constantly conveyed an image of African thorough resistance, to which the informality of suburban settlements was essential: native Africans tried to build seeming traditional huts, "making paddocks and palisades" thus obstructing the native quarters and isolating themselves from the authorities. Cruel military beatings and police murders due to barrier building were notified[58]. Closely related to the image of a denser racial atmosphere in the slums was the situation of public police officials vis-à-vis the military. Police agents, in increasing numbers year after year until 1974, were seen as "soft" when compared to the "hard" armed forces patrols. White Europeans were particularly keen on commenting against "psychological actions", the majority of which carried out by the police:

> *It is rumoured that police elements fear the natives and try to avoid them* […] *since they do not feel supported by their superiors, who are still fanaticized by the* psico […] *invented as a balsam for the protection of the irresponsible and as acid for those who try to educate.*[59]

In fact, corporate measures had been taken to control punitive actions and violent impulses on the part of the police and civil administrators since 1961. But private commercial interests and Afro-European public opinion divulged the idea that policemen were falling in discredit. Moreover, this phenomenon, combined with the increasing influx of rural labour migrants to Luanda, who could not be absorbed by labour demand in the city, had two major consequences. For one, the frequency of surveillance rounds increased; those rounds began to be done at different times with inconstant patterns and surveillance and repression were exerted simultaneously across the *musseques*,

> *in order not only to instil a climate of insecurity in the respective zones, but also to better control the populations who, running from one* musseque *to another, would end up caught in the latter, or the other way around.*[60]

Second, urban planners were finally called upon to apply zoning techniques to the *musseques* in order to plan the demolition of some segments. In 1966, high political

57 PIDE/DGS, Del A, 14.14.A, NT 2041: SCCIA, Projecto de Diploma Legislativo sobre Controle de Populações, 16 August 1967.

58 PIDE/DGS, Del A, P Inf, 15.11.A, NT, 2084: Relato de notícia 1441-215/65, 26 August 1965.

59 PIDE/DGS, Del A, P Inf, 15.11.A, NT, 2084: Inf. 116/65 from José Manuel da Costa Marques to the public and military police, 15 January 65; Relato de notícia 1290-215/65, 25 July 1965.

60 PIDE/DGS, Del A, P Inf, 15.11.A, NT, 2084: Informação 40/66: Panorama político-subversivo nos musseques, 31 March 1966.

and military officials established multilateral countersubversion teams to deal directly with the problem of the peri-urban masses, thus resuming the programme of the 1961 Commission of Simões de Carvalho and Vieira da Costa.[61] The goal was to discipline the space, applying village reordering schemes through the division of informal conglomerates into parishes with local mayors and to buttress the pass system by enforcing campaigns of suburban census, police and social security enquiries. This urban subversive panorama, then, made colonial authorities increasingly more reliant on actual neighbourhood planning and permanent housing. As it happened in rural Angola, identification, fixation and surveillance depended very much on the real reordering of the human and natural environment. Police patrols, periodical hearings and crime management had engendered a vested interest in urban development.

Urban development, here understood as an outcome of civil and military strategies regarding detribalization management during the 1960s, was a contributing factor in the emergence of social science studies about the population of Luanda. The centrality of new habitational files in the development of behavioural science cannot be emphasized enough. They not only provided the largest amount of information on families (nuclear and extended) and isolated individuals that had ever since been collected in Luanda (one might rightly say in Angola). Resulting from the spatial rearrangement of the slum areas, they also delimited the universe of the sociodemographic research for the collection of empirical material. While doing so, the police mentality shaped the sources, the methods and the findings of those enquiries. Perhaps more importantly, it influenced the questions that researchers posed. That the two most influential sociohistorical monographs about Luanda were published in 1968 and 1971 is but a sign of this interplay: both studies were consciously dependent on the new administrative quarters, on police techniques and on networks of informers. Reversely, academic research helped the police and urban planners in defining more cautiously the collective identities and individual behaviours of future well-defined units.[62]

6. Conclusion

Histories of Portuguese architecture and urban planning in former African colonies have overlooked the role played by modernist designers in shaping colonial policies of social control, as well as the more immediate political and military contexts of production of new styles and techniques. Despite their welcoming attention to international epistemic

61 PIDE/DGS, Del. A, 14.13.A/3, NT 2040: SCCIA, Informação 1540/5, 31 July 1967.

62 Ilídio do Amaral, Luanda: Estudo de Geografia Urbana, Lisboa 1968, and Ramiro Monteiro, A Família Nos Musseques. Amaral's and Monteiro's research materials followed the same destiny: they informed and actually gave sociological life to the birds' eye-view of aerial surveys. Substantial portions of the raw data collected by Monteiro were used by the Omnium Téchnique d'Amenagement, the French agency contracted to produce the last colonial Master Plan of Luanda. Cf. PT/IPAD/MU/DGOPC/DSUH/1974/04961: Dossier sobre os bairros populares de Luanda, 1972. Monteiro. A Família, p. 31.

communities and their rediscovery of a luso-african contribution to the modernization of the Global South, those studies have stripped historical agents off their close involvement with dominant colonial institutions. While effacing this side of warfare collaboration and authoritarian partnership, biographical accounts also tend to emphasize the humanist dimensions of their projects. By questioning the novelty of the 1962 appliance of the neighbourhood unit technique to the Prenda *Musseque* at the outskirts of Luanda, I was able to bring the rural domain back into the urban picture, to qualify the more radical enthusiasm behind said forms of modernist sensitiveness and local empathy and to determine the relative autonomy of the urban planning field in late colonial Angola. In itself, such an approach – that the postcolonial history of Angola is still very much in need of – was not new, at least since Gwendolin Wright's enquiry on the political complementarity between the cultural-relativist strand of French twentieth-century colonial urbanism and military might.[63]

One of the most interesting questions about the Angolan case relates to how larger, international and global tensions were eventually mirrored at the imperial level, during the formative period of the postcolonial world. My guess is that struggles around the proper use of the neighbourhood unit, the humanity and the sensitivity of urban plans in Angola were local episodes of the global tension that opposed, during the exact same years, modernist agents and community development technicians at the UN assistance agencies. As Tobias Wolffhardt points out in this volume, in the matter of post-war housing in the Global South, modernization agents' expectations and mindsets were at odds with communitarian advocates, the latter proposing *softer* techniques based on aided self-help, active participation and state-society synergies. Both were anchored on two, very different, sociologies about African urban and rural ecologies: the first revolving around the strict dichotomy between the traditional rural African peasantry, immobile and static, and the city, the modern locus par excellence, displaying western-like heterogeneity and social mobility; the second, closer to the first adaptive theorists of the late 1950s and early 1960s, finding hybridity in urban configurations and looking at acculturative elements and institutions that mediated the transition – if any – from the tribal world to modernity. Amongst social scientists, there was, of course, an evolution in this thinking, with modernization theorists' rigid dichotomy and pattern-variables coming first, but being slowly replaced, during the 1960s, by more nuanced, empirically grounded analyses. "Detribalization", then, was not the equivalent of modernization, for urban growth could and did coexist with "traditional" values and behaviour. From this assumption, community development techniques specifically designed for the rural sphere started being tested at urban milieus.

Read in this light, the transference of the neighbourhood principle from the hinterland into the capital city of Angola cannot be disentangled from the more coercive goals it was purportedly applied to attain. Villagization efforts, clearly entrenched in a detribalization framework, shared an elective affinity with immigration anxieties that underpinned

63 Wright, Tradition.

some conservative Chicago school of sociology premises, the scientific foundations on which Clarence Perry's notion stood. By the early 1960s, its widespread use can be accounted for by the reinvigorated policy of village-building and population resettlement, civil and military, a tendency that culminated with the full-fledged conception of Luanda as an interdict, quarantine city. However, without the international debate on the extension of rural community development techniques to urban groups, the legitimacy of such authoritarian – not to say totalitarian – measures were unlikely to be secured among the Portuguese elite itself.

Regarding the matter of modernizing ambitions, Nils Gilman called attention to the ways multiple stances could coexist within a single author, the paradigmatic arch being that of Walt Rostow's ruthless high-modernist foreign policies turned into late developmental communitarianism.[64] The partial genealogy of the neighbourhood unit principle in Angola wards us against the simple reproduction of one's own position taking in the historical past: by unearthing conflictual moments, even if delayed in time, a greater degree of distance may be achieved. This cautionary perspective brought the international urban and housing experiences to the fore of the debate and allowed to broaden the canvas that currently depicts the Prenda project and its main author. But too far a look at international circulation and inter-imperial learning can cause scholarly farsightedness concerning the much more local subnational transferences of extractive institutions. In other words, the colonial urban planning field was not as autonomous as the transnational approach might suggest: urban developmental ideas and frameworks emerged out of a colonial warfare context. Counter-subversion commissions were the most important triggering moments of urban reform, while the police, the army and social scientists were critical actors in the making of *musseques*' history and physical evolution. Therefore, I tried to understand how urban planning across Angola became dependent on and actively contributed to the rationalization of colonial repression.

Even if the urban and house planning commissions of the late 60s reanimated the field around the definition of sensitivity, the uses of sociology and the limits of industrialization, such struggles did not prevent their ideas from being deployed to more prosaic ends. They were all too dependent on the military and police efforts of counter-subversion to achieve such "sensitiveness". In other words, demands for a more thorough socio-demographic knowledge about targeted urban populations were voiced much more *because* of military thinking rather than *against* it. Police and military manoeuvres of surveillance and mobility control, across the country and at the capital city, provided urban technicians and sociologists with the necessary infrastructural reach for attaining subjective and objective data about African urbanites. Quite paradoxically, the submission of the field of urban planning to the coercive branch of the state's apparatus was integral to the development of a new form of urban management based on permanent housing. Those coming from the recent labour and welfare agencies created after the war – with only

64 N. Gilman, Mandarins of the Future: Modernization Theory in Cold War America, Baltimore 2003.

an indirect interest in urban management and security – frequently expressed a truly reformist agenda, demystifying old notions of "detribalization" and "vagrancy" and unveiling the powerful economic interests on which they stood. But theirs was a lost cause: urban planners offered security agents more appealing and cost-effective images of social engineering, reinstating the principles of centralized planning and control.