

schiedenen Generationen transnationaler Akteure aufzeigen?

Die Nachrichtenstelle verknüpfte Netzwerke in Nachrichtensälen im Osmanenreich und Zweigstellen im Kaukasus, in Tiflis, Täbris, Misrata Tripolitanien und Vertriebsstellen in Zürich, Absatzstellen im Buchhandel in Lausanne, Amsterdam, Rotterdam, Haag, Stockholm, dazu gehörte auch Bahnhofsp propaganda an Kiosken. Wie der Autor zeigt, übernahm sie der Deutsche Überseedienst. Ungeachtet der Monita hat Samuel Krug der Forschung einen Sonderdienst und seine Begabungen erwiesen, unüblich neue Inhalte zu bearbeiten und neue Wege zu gehen.

Anmerkungen:

- 1 M. Bragulla, Die Nachrichtenstelle für den Orient. Fallstudie einer Propagandainstitution im Ersten Weltkrieg, Saarbrücken 2007.
- 2 G. Höpp, Arabische und islamische Periodika in Berlin und Brandenburg, Berlin 1994, S. 5–58.
- 3 Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts, PAAA, R20938, Denkschrift, Die Revolutionierung der islamischen Gebiete unserer Feinde, Berlin 28.10.–14.11.1914.
- 4 PAAA, R1535, Berlin 09.08.1918, An Wesendonk, Bericht über die Nachrichtenstelle für den Orient, Herbert Müller, 1914–1918.
- 5 Ebd.
- 6 Ebd., S. 8.
- 7 PAAA, R 21261 Wesendonk, Notiz, PAAA, R21261, Berlin 07.12.1916, 37–40: General Hoffman, Kriegsministerium: im Konsens mit der Obersten Heeresleitung soll Propaganda für den Heiligen Krieg in Zossener Sonderlagern beendet werden. Die Lagerzeitung „El-Djihad“ soll eingestellt werden; Vermerk: sie soll weiter erscheinen. Dies stützt nicht Krugs These (S. 281), dass Jihad-Rhetorik nach 1916 keine Rolle mehr spielte.
- 8 PAAA, R1531, Notiz Perzynski, Vertrieb 4.000x Propaganda-Atlas, Berlin 25.09.2017.

**Robert Niebuhr: The Search for a Cold War Legitimacy. Foreign Policy and Tito's Yugoslavia, Leiden: Brill Publisher, 2018, 248 pp.**

Reviewed by  
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During the last 30 years, scholarship on the former Yugoslavia has shown a clear tendency to concentrate solely on the wars of the 1990s as a kind of eventual catastrophe of the failed “experiment of a state” (Holm Sundhaussen). Such interpretations link the contesting nationalisms to the legitimacy crisis of socialist Yugoslavia after Marshall Josip Broz Tito's death in 1980, with only brief references to earlier political controversies and conflicts that contributed to the mass violence and ethnic cleansing of the 1990s. Notable exceptions are the ambitious historical syntheses on both Yugoslav states by Sabrina P. Ramet,<sup>1</sup> the late Holm Sundhaussen,<sup>2</sup> and Marie-Janine Calic.<sup>3</sup> Since the late 2000s and especially the last years, multiple scholars have taken over this different approach, describing and assessing the fate of Yugoslavia as an open-ended historical process with several possible outcomes (p. 3).

This is also one of the main arguments made by Robert Niebuhr's study on the entanglement of Titoist Yugoslavia's foreign policy and the search for legitimacy beyond communist ideology. Based on his dissertation (completed in 2009), Niebuhr wrote a compelling piece on the very na-

ture of socialist Yugoslavia and its role in the world. While less concerned with the actual political events and tangible impact of Yugoslavia as part of the Non-Aligned Movement, Niebuhr's book rather focuses on why an alliance with emerging post-colonial powers made sense in a divided world dominated by two nuclear superpowers. With a focus on diplomatic, ideological, and military aspects of Tito's search for legitimacy among the peoples of his socialist federation, the book covers different aspects of this phenomenon, however not all of them with the required attention to or focus on details.

Historical studies on the global phenomenon of non-alignment, largely conceived as a third option or a "third world" in the original meaning, are still scarce, as most accounts are contemporary ones, with little focus on Yugoslavia's role.<sup>4</sup> Therefore, Niebuhr's book must be counted among the pioneers of a renaissance on non-alignment scholarship, along with those books by Tvrtko Jakovina (though with a clear Yugoslav angle),<sup>5</sup> Jürgen Dinkel,<sup>6</sup> or Nataša Mišković et al.<sup>7</sup> Other current publications tend to look beyond the political history and key figures of non alignment – like Niebuhr's book, focusing on the interior level of legitimizing power through an active foreign policy<sup>8</sup> – or on the normative footprint of non-aligned actors, especially in terms of international law.<sup>9</sup>

After an insightful, though sometimes overly detailed, outline of Niebuhr's use of language, translations, and sources, including some photos and illustrations from the main period of his account (late 1950s to early 1970s), the introductory chapter lays out the "roadmap" (p. 13) of his book, relying on Max Weber's theory

of legitimacy and its constant challenge by external and internal factors, especially by the ideological leader of Moscow. Niebuhr considers the Partisan movement and the narrative of self-liberation to form the core of Tito's legitimacy and state-(re)building power after World War II. The break with Joseph Stalin's Soviet Union in 1948 led to the first major crisis; however, Niebuhr's study exemplifies how an independent and active foreign policy helped mend this crisis, contributing largely to the appearance of non alignment (pp. 14f). Although initially based on a policy of regional power and brinkmanship, which Niebuhr supports with a wide array of examples (pp. 20–50), Yugoslav foreign policy had to be completely reconceptualized after 1948. Niebuhr describes the ideological shifts and the constant drive for reform as vital to the survival of Tito's communist rule outside the Soviet camp, which became what was later called "socialist self-management", or Titoism (pp. 53–58 and p. 68f). He very convincingly argues that they went hand in hand with the shift to a neutralist, later non-aligned, foreign policy that sought partners in the Global South and the post-colonial world without any regard for the political or social system of these largely newborn or reborn states (pp. 92–115). He places the climax in the 1960s and even locates the end of political non-alignment, at least from a Yugoslav point of view, as early as 1968 to 1970, following the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, when Tito allegedly refocused the state's foreign engagement on Europe and its security (pp. 116–120). He elaborates on this element only in the fifth part, mostly by restricting Yugoslav foreign policy to the Helsinki process (pp. 193–207).

The fourth part completely departs from foreign policy and the international entanglements of Yugoslavia and argues how the military served as a warrant and pillar of Tito's rule (pp. 131–170). The Yugoslav People's Army (Jugoslovenska Narodna Armija, JNA), as a direct offspring of the Partisan movement, embodied the historical founding myth and formed the core of Tito's legitimacy. Niebuhr argues how constant ideological and administrative reform both influenced and spared the JNA. As a traditionalist institution, strongly intertwined with the party leadership, it was not subject to self-management reforms (p. 134f) but had to find a new role when constitutional reform saw further federalization of Yugoslavia. The ethnic element in the army became paramount to the stability of the system, with every republic now employing their own Territorial Defence (Teritorijalna odbrana, TO) units. Niebuhr touches upon the events of the Croatian Spring and ensuing turmoil, explaining the danger of these developments. However, he fails to link this back to the broader picture of the study.

The fifth chapter takes up these missing pieces by emphasizing the role of constitutional reform on the survival of the common state (pp. 171–191) before Tito's Yugoslavia could play the important role as a mediator during the Helsinki process – as exemplified by the follow-up summit of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) in 1977 in Belgrade (pp. 202ff).

The conclusive chapter and the epilogue take up the main arguments and convincingly present the breakup of Yugoslavia as an outcome of both Tito's death and the end of the Cold War. Both events/develop-

ments led to a power vacuum and a loss of legitimacy of the regime that neither constant reform of the existing ideological frame nor administrative setup could mend. Nationalism filled the gap and served the disenchantment of the younger generations in Yugoslavia (pp. 218–224).

While the whole account and most lines of arguments are basically plausible, Niebuhr has widened the perspective on socialist Yugoslavia's quest for legitimacy and subsequent crisis by highlighting important aspects of foreign policy and the role of the military. However, one of his major assertions, which he also concluded with, is far from being a novelty – that is to say, both the legitimacy crisis and the economic turmoil could have been overcome, and the breakup along ethnic lines was only one of several possible scenarios. This is, for example, the key message of Dejan Jović's extensive study of socialist Yugoslavia's political system.<sup>10</sup> Besides this rather unsatisfactory outcome that undoubtedly proves his assumptions from the introduction, but adds little more, Niebuhr tends to make bold assertions that cannot be entirely proven in the end, as they are not plausibly explained in detail or through sources.

For example, he states that “non-alignment allowed the Yugoslavs and other participants to avoid pressing questions and tense foreign-policy dilemmas” (p. 103). Such a rather blunt statement completely neglects the overall impact of the non-aligned states on global politics despite the superpower competition, particularly in forming alliances in order to get the demands of the emerging Global South met through the United Nations and their organs. In consequence, Niebuhr treats

Yugoslavia's non-aligned policies as a mere piece in the quest for legitimacy, failing to see the wider scope and impact it had.

While successes on the international stage and the good relationship with such a high number of states from all over the world certainly helped the system's and Tito's personal legitimacy, this is only part of the story. Yugoslav foreign policy used non-alignment as an important tool to influence the Cold War arena and to create a normative framework through the United Nations, serving both national and international security and stability.<sup>11</sup> I would also argue that the year 1968 does not mean the "beginning of the end for political non-alignment" (p. 115), but rather a general impetus for more non-aligned co-operation, at least from an impact-based perspective on the phenomenon.<sup>12</sup> As Niebuhr did not focus on these aspects, one may leave these points of criticism aside.

In general, the whole study suffers from a tendency to sacrifice source-based analysis for the sake of bold assertions and arguments. Niebuhr exposes a clear lack of detail, especially not only in the chapter on the history of Yugoslavia's path to non-alignment but also in the sections on ideological, economic, and administrative reform. This is deplorable for a study that intends to explain so many aspects of Yugoslavia's legitimacy problem. However, the chapter on the role of the military and on the intertwined question of ethnic balance in the regime's parts shows that Niebuhr is capable of investing the required attention. The author engages in a detailed analysis of ethnicity-based clashes, especially in his micro-study on the case of Donji Karin in 1971 (pp. 158–164) and on the rising competition between the

nation-wide JNA and the republic-based TO, following the further federalization after 1974 (pp. 149–157).

In contrast to the title of the book, the foreign political aspect is either subsumed under the overall narrative of legitimacy or seems to be completely absent in certain sections. For instance, Niebuhr only superficially describes the role of an independent foreign policy as a stabilizing factor for Tito's rule in the 1950s and 1960s. He fails to link this back to the problems of nationalism and ethnic elements. However, even an encyclopaedic study on Yugoslav history like that of Calic manages to explain this in just two sentences – that is to say, non-alignment accommodated different civilizational/religious "senses of belonging" of the largest ethnic groups.<sup>13</sup>

In terms of methodology and sources, the whole account is wholly centred on Tito, particularly concerning foreign policy and non-alignment while ignoring the pivotal role of foreign secretaries of state, the Yugoslav delegation in the United Nations, or other top diplomats and scholars. Niebuhr extensively cites just one diplomat, Nijaz Dizdarević, and completely fails to see the importance of figures like Leo Mates, Koča Popović, Marko Nikezić, Đuro Ninčić, or Danilo Lekić, to name just a few. All these Yugoslav officials influenced and shaped Yugoslavia's non-aligned foreign policy. Although the author seemingly used a wide array of sources, one wonders why he did not come across any material dealing with one of the aforementioned persons.

Despite all these shortcomings, Niebuhr has written a solid study on Titoist Yugoslavia's legitimacy problems and the entanglements of domestic and international politics in the Cold War era. The study

unfortunately has only little value for readers who are interested in the actual Non-Aligned Movement – which was formed only at the Lusaka summit in 1970, much in contrast to Niebuhr’s anachronistic use of the term ‘non-alignment’ – and the global impact of it. Nonetheless, Niebuhr’s book complements the existing scholarship on socialist Yugoslavia on certain aspects of legitimacy and state-building. In this regard, Niebuhr wrote a compelling piece of South-Eastern European and Cold War history.

#### Notes:

- 1 S. P. Ramet, *The Three Yugoslavias. State-building and Legitimation. 1918–2005*, Bloomington 2006.
- 2 H. Sundhaussen, *Experiment Jugoslawien. Von der Staatsgründung bis zum Staatszerfall*, Mannheim 1993.
- 3 M.-J. Calic, *Geschichte Jugoslawiens im 20. Jahrhundert*, Munich 2010.
- 4 For example, R. L. Jackson, *The Non-Aligned, the UN and the Superpowers*, New York 1986; V. Matthies, *Die Blockfreien. Ursprünge, Entwicklung, Konzeptionen*, Opladen 1985; R. Allison, *The Soviet Union and the Strategy of Non-Alignment in the Third World*, Cambridge 1988.
- 5 T. Jakovina, *Treća Strana Hladnog Rata* [The Cold War’s Third Side], Zagreb 2011; T. Jakovina, *Tito’s Yugoslavia as the Pivotal State of the Non-Aligned*, in: O. Manojlović Pintar et al. (eds.), *Tito – viđenja i tumačenja: zbornik radova* [Tito – Perspectives and Interpretations: a compendium], Belgrade 2011, pp. 389–404.
- 6 J. Dinkel, *The Non-Aligned Movement. Genesis, Organization and Politics (1927–1992)*, Leiden 2018.
- 7 N. Mišković et al. (eds.), *The Non-Aligned Movement and the Cold War*. Delhi – Bandung – Belgrade, London 2014.
- 8 M. Halder, *Der Titokult. Charismatische Herrschaft im sozialistischen Jugoslawien*, Munich 2013.
- 9 A. Trültzsch, *Sozialismus und Blockfreiheit. Der Beitrag Jugoslawiens zum Völkerrecht*, Göttingen 2021 [forthcoming].
- 10 D. Jović, *Yugoslavia: A State That Withered Away*, West Lafayette 2009.
- 11 A. Trültzsch, *An Almost Forgotten Legacy. Non-Aligned Yugoslavia in the United Nations and in the Making of Contemporary International Law*, in: *VOICES from the Sylff Community* 6 (2018), pp. 129–134.
- 12 Ibid.
- 13 Calic, *Geschichte Jugoslawiens*, p. 202.

**Steffen Dörre: Wirtschaftswunder global. Die Geschichte der Überseemärkte in der frühen Bundesrepublik, Stuttgart: Steiner, 2019, 394 S.**

Rezensiert von  
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Der Aufstieg der Bundesrepublik zu einer der führenden Wirtschaftsmächte der Welt ist eng verbunden mit der Wiedereingliederung des Landes in globale Handelsströme nach dem Ende des Zweiten Weltkrieges. Auch in der populären und medialen Wahrnehmung der Bundesrepublik der Gegenwart scheint die Prosperität des Landes davon abzuhängen, wie viele Erzeugnisse der Industrie sowohl in den Nachbarländern als auch auf geographisch fernen Märkten wie der Volksrepublik China oder Japan nachgefragt werden. Der Aufstieg zum „Exportweltmeister“ war kein Vorgang vergleichbar dem planmäßigen, raschen Wiederaufbau einer zerstörten westdeutschen Innenstadt. Vielmehr handelte es sich um einen äußerst mühsamen Prozess der Internationalisierung und des Abtastens ausländischer