Non-State Actors in European Integration in the 1970s: Towards a Polity of Transnational Contestation

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RESÜMEE

This special issue explores the role non-state actors played in European integration in the 1970s. Its goal is twofold. First, the articles will contribute to the growing debate on the

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1970s as a period of crisis, transition and major change within societies and at the international level, specifically in relation to the politics of the European Communities (EC). At the time, the experience (in the dollar and oil crises) of global economic interconnectedness convinced contemporary observers that they were living in a world of ‘interdependence’—a term that can be understood as the 1970s version of what we now call ‘globalization’. Thus, we seek to embed the notoriously secluded and inward-looking historiography of European integration within the global and national historiography of the period more generally, and to foster dialogue with international, transnational, and national historiographies.

The second goal of this special issue is to overcome the limitations of the predominantly state-centric historiography of European integration in the diplomatic history tradition and to shed light on the role of actors beyond state institutions like national governments and European supranational institutions. As the EC increasingly became involved in policy-making in multiple fields in the decade after the summit of The Hague in 1969 EC politics offered new opportunities for the growing participation of interest groups, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and other non-state actors. These actors frequently mediated between national societies and the EC as well as between the international level and the EC. By exploring these non-state actors’ twin roles of mediation between different levels of politics and participation in policy-making, we aim to contribute to a reformed historiography of European integration that systematically takes all relevant actors into account.

To provide the necessary context for the empirical contributions to this special issue, this introductory article will first give a brief overview of the most relevant dimensions of European and global developments in the 1970s that may have impacted on EC politics. Secondly, we will set out the rationale for considering the role of non-state actors in European integration, outlining their core characteristics and discussing their roles in EC politics. Thirdly, we will introduce the common research questions that we have asked the authors to take into consideration. We will also briefly set out the case studies in the four empirical articles before presenting a concluding comparative overview of their findings.

4 For a comprehensive discussion of this historiography see Wolfram Kaiser / Antonio Varsori (eds.), European Union History: Themes and Debates, Basingstoke 2010.
5 For an ambitious earlier attempt to address and overcome the limitations of the traditional historiography, see the contributions in Wolfram Kaiser / Morten Rasmussen/Brigitte Leucht (eds.), The History of the European Union. Origins of a Trans- and Supranational Polity 1950-72, Abingdon 2009.
A period of crisis, transition and change

The 1970s have frequently been characterized as a period of crisis, transition and major change.⁶ They have been understood as marking the origins of the world we live in today.⁷ Even though the political, societal and international contexts were very different, the analogies between our contemporary world and the pressing issues of the 1970s – not least the economic crises – are suggestive.⁸

At the global level, the world economy faced two major economic crises in the course of the decade, first in 1973 and again in 1979. In both cases, the economic crises followed a sharp rise in oil prices. However, these crises did not simply result from the conflicts in the Middle East, where most of the oil production was concentrated. They were also an unintended consequence of the end of the Bretton Woods System, which had provided monetary stability since the end of World War II. In the 1960s the system of fixed exchange rates based on the convertibility of the dollar into gold had come under pressure due to the excessive credit financing of the Vietnam War by the United States (US) administration and large US trade deficits. It came to an end with the Nixon administration’s revocation of convertibility on 15 August 1971. Attempts to maintain stable exchange rates at a newly-adjusted level had failed by 1973. The transition to floating exchange rates led to a devaluation of the US currency and the erosion of oil prices in real terms since oil was paid for in US dollars. Oil producers hence pushed for higher prices with the Yom Kippur War in October 1973 presenting them with a welcome opportunity to flex their muscles.⁹

The excessive reliance on oil as a source of energy combined with the steep rise in its price pushed Western economies into the first serious recession after a long period of unprecedented growth of almost thirty years, the *trente glorieuses*.¹⁰ Rising levels of unemployment, and a growing sense of economic insecurity contributed to what Konrad Jarausch has described as the ‘end of confidence’. The crisis put an end to the experience and optimistic expectation of continuously rising prosperity, which had increasingly come to be taken for granted in western Europe and the US.¹¹

The global economic crisis strengthened competitive pressures and exposed structural weaknesses in western Europe’s labour-intensive manufacturing economies. Millions of jobs in manufacturing were lost in the course of the 1970s as businesses moved produc-

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tion to places of cheaper labour or rationalized their production. At the same time, the US not only temporarily improved its competitiveness vis-à-vis the Europeans as a result of the devaluation of its currency; it also benefited from its strength in high technology. The increasing presence of the emerging Asian economies on the global market put additional competitive pressure on the European economies across a broad range of products. Japan became a major exporter of manufactured goods, profiting from new production methods (as in the car industry), high productivity and state support for exports, and making inroads into western European home and export markets in sectors such as consumer electronics. The growing awareness of global interdependence was not limited to economic matters, however. It also related to new problems that immediately became defined as issues of global concern. The suggestive contemporary imagery of the ‘blue planet’ or ‘spaceship earth’ set against a black infinity – which was popularized after the first landing on the moon in 1969 – resonated to some extent with everyday experience. In a series of first time international conferences on the environment (1972), oceans policy (1973), food security (1974), world population (1974) and women’s issues (1975), the UN and other international organizations raised awareness of the ‘Limits to Growth’, as the Club of Rome termed it, of the question of justice in the distribution of resources between North and South, and of gender issues. Non-state actors of various kinds played a growing role in these debates and agenda-setting processes. The EC – in particular the European Commission – was eager to have a voice in this emerging world of what is now often referred to as global governance.

Change was not limited to the international level, however. In the wake of 1968, western European societies underwent considerable social change. They saw new forms of political mobilization and new modes of political conflict and protest. The rise of new social movements – such as the women’s movement or the environmental movement – made new claims for global justice, gender equality and enhanced environmental protection. At the same time, these movements were frequently opposed to, or at least sceptical about, ‘old’ forms of representative parliamentary politics. Their prevailing attitudes have frequently been linked to changing values – from the materialism of the post-war.
generation to the post-materialism of the baby-boomers born after the war. As neo-Marxist ideas and Keynesian demand management continued to gain ground in debates among intellectuals and policy-makers, policy-making became more contentious and politicized. Change also affected more traditional policy fields via the activism of the youth organizations of political parties and labour unions. The articles in this special issue provide clear evidence for the at least partial mediation of these changes within and across national societies to the European level and into EC policy-making. Transnational linkages between social movement organizations that usually shared broadly internationalist attitudes may have been instrumental in this respect.

The 1970s have usually been characterized as the ‘dark ages’ of European integration following the so-called Luxembourg compromise of January 1966, which strengthened the consensus culture in the EC and made reaching decisions more cumbersome. More recent research has emphasized change in EC politics in the 1970s, however. Not only did the EC acquire its own finances in the Luxembourg Treaty of 1970; a number of important institutional reforms with long-term impacts were also made, including the informal institutionalization of intergovernmental coordination and decision-making in the new European Council of the Heads of State and governments from 1975 onwards, and the first direct elections to the European Parliament (EP) in June 1979. More importantly, the introduction of new policies – including development policy, the environment and political cooperation – helped transform the EC into something resembling a trans- and supranational polity rather than a mere system of intergovernmental bargaining.

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19 For a vivid account of the situation in Britain see, for example, Andy Beckett, When the Lights went out. What really happened to Britain in the Seventies, London 2009, pp. 53-59.


ing in a greater degree of integration that has often been overlooked.\textsuperscript{24} The establishment of the EC as a major site of policy-making induced a growing number of interest groups to try to gain access to the EC decision-making process. Such a development had in fact been predicted in broad outlines by the neo-functionalist theories that were fashionable in the late 1950s and 1960s, although they initially operated with simplistic assumptions about ‘spill-over’, the expansion of EU competences and the wholesale transfer of actors’ loyalties from the national to the European level.\textsuperscript{25}

\textbf{Contesting EC politics and policy-making}

Against the backdrop of these changes at the global, domestic and European levels, we assess the extent to which global and domestic changes were mediated to the European level by non-state actors. We also explore the extent to which changes at all three levels formed an environment conducive to the involvement of non-state actors in EC politics and decision-making. Put differently: to what extent did the emergence of a more developed European polity with a complex institutional setting, a multitude of actors and a much broader range of policies encourage the involvement of non-state actors? This question not only concerns the historical analysis of policy-making in the EC, but also problems of representation and democracy at the trans- and supranational levels – an issue that has played such a prominent role in contemporary political debates about the European Union (EU).

To date, the role of non-state actors has largely been overlooked in historical research on European integration. Traditionally, diplomatic historians have dominated EU historiography. Their concentration on the ‘default’ question of national governments’ policies towards ‘Europe’ (as if they were not part of this ‘Europe’), and their overreliance on government records, largely account for this lacuna. Due to their tacit ‘realist’\textsuperscript{26} assumption that governments dominate the process of European integration and act in order to realize given interests determined by the geographical position or economic situation of a country, studying non-state actors seemed irrelevant to them.\textsuperscript{27} Whenever historians of European integration have taken non-state actors such as business groups into account, due to the prevailing methodological nationalism in EU historiography these historians usually limited their research to the attitudes of national groups towards European issues.\textsuperscript{28} Economic historians likewise subscribed to methodological nationalism, assuming

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{24} Zampoli, I primi passi della Cooperazione politica europea (note 23).
\item \textsuperscript{25} Ernst B. Haas, The Uniting of Europe. Political, Social, and Economic Forces, 1950–1957, Stanford 1958; Leon N. Lindberg, The Political Dynamics of European Economic Integration, Stanford 1963.
\item \textsuperscript{26} In the sense of the classical ‘realist approach’ in International Relations represented e.g. by Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, New York 1948.
\item \textsuperscript{27} For a critique see Wolfram Kaiser, From State to Society? The Historiography of European Integration, in: Michelle Cini / Angela K. Bourne (eds.), Palgrave Advances in European Studies, Basingstoke 2006, pp. 190-208.
\item \textsuperscript{28} E.g. Werner Bührer, ‘Immer pro Europa’: Die Integrationspolitik des BDI in den siebziger und frühen achtziger Jahren, in: Franz Knipping / Matthias Schönwald (eds.), Aufbruch zum Europa der zweiten Generation: die europä-
\end{itemize}
that governments’ converging interests (shared with their national business and labour representatives) in achieving economies of scale and welfare gains was a major impetus for European integration. Potentially cross-cutting transnational interests and modes of organization of non-state actors were not part of their research agendas either.  

In contrast to these approaches, we conceptualize the EC as an incipient trans- and supranational polity that provided political opportunities for non-state actors of various kinds and at different levels of aggregation: sub-national, national and European. Recent attempts to analyse politics and policy-making in European integration from a network perspective indicate that a variety of non-state actors have been involved in the process, including political parties, experts, and NGOs. This research has also shown the substantial level of their often informal transnational cooperation. The extent to which actors actually cooperated across borders is thus also an important research question for the authors of this special issue.

The role of non-state actors in international politics was first highlighted by contemporary political science observers in the 1970s. At the time, neoliberal institutionalists like Karl Kaiser, Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye tried to come to grips with the new situation of economic interdependence. In opposition to the older realist paradigm, they emphasized the role of non-state actors such as multinational corporations and NGOs.

The definition of non-state actors we suggest here is a pragmatic one: non-state actors are individuals, groups or organizations which may be involved in politics and policy-making, but do not have the legal status or fulfil the legal functions of the state and its institutions. They pursue their objectives independently of the state and they mediate these interests, goals and ambitions to the state, EC institutions or international organizations. Although such non-state actors – especially NGOs – often claim to represent general public interests, what they advocate usually reflects the views and preferences of their leading activists and/or members and thus, those of more or less clearly delineated sections of society. Even private companies pursuing their business interests may also work towards larger goals such as ensuring the general competitiveness of national economies or of ‘Europe’. In contrast to the widespread political science conceptualization of ‘private’ (business) and ‘public’ (general) interests and actors, we prefer the functional differentiation into non-state and state actors. In this definition of non-state actors, political
parties qualify as non-state actors, as they have an independent legal status, even if they also play a key role in structuring state institutions and forming governments. Thus, this special issue’s goal is to address the previously neglected role of such actors beyond the state in EC politics in the 1970s as a period of crisis, transition and change. We have compiled the four articles to cover a broad spectrum of actors and their involvement in a variety of policy areas. One group of actors are socialist parties and party networks. Socialist parties had of course been involved in early European integration. However, they were much less influential than the networks of European Christian democrats in deciding the outlines of ‘core Europe’ integration in the first two decades after 1945. Their greater internal division over the institutional forms of integration and membership in the European Economic Community (EEC)/EC initially made it more difficult for them to cooperate effectively. In the 1970s, however, they enjoyed unprecedented electoral success throughout western Europe. The EP and the Socialist International also facilitated their transnational cooperation. In his article, Christian Salm analyses the changing nature of this cooperation and its importance for the field of development policy, which remained a national competence, but with increasing European dimensions in the context of the Lomé Conventions.

Similarly, the Labour unions and agricultural lobbies had been institutionally involved in European integration from the very beginning. Organized Labour was represented in the Consultative Committee of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) from 1953 onwards and in the EEC’s Economic and Social Committee (ESC) from 1958 onwards. Yet the growing grass-roots mobilization within the unions, combined with the consequences of the socio-economic crisis, at least had the potential to influence and change the unions’ involvement in EC politics, and especially in social policy-making – the focus of Thomas Fetzer’s article.

The European Commission, like the ECSC High Authority before it, remained sceptical about close links with business actors, which it believed could be detrimental for policy-making and for its own image as an institution independent of particular national or sectoral interests. In contrast, the Commission had fostered the Europeanization of agricultural interest representation from the beginning and throughout the formation of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) as the politically and financially most important EEC policy in the first half of the 1960s. In fact, the Commission took it for granted that the involvement and Europeanization of agricultural interests was crucial for the drafting of the EEC policy, and to ensure political support for it and its long-term legitimacy in the member-states. Once the CAP was set up, however, it became clear that it was turning into an increasingly wasteful policy as milk lakes and beef mountains grew in the 1970s, with massive repercussions also for the EC’s external trade relations. Against this background, Carine Germond analyses the Europeanization of agricultural interest

groups, their links with EC institutions and how they contributed to preventing a meaningful reform of the CAP until the Mac Sharry reforms of 1992.

Meanwhile, the venerable nature protection movement, which dated back to the turn of the nineteenth to the twentieth centuries in most European countries, went through a period of transition in the 1970s. With the rise of environmentalism, new organizations were founded and old ones modernized. The change in membership also led to growing politicization. The environmental movement was at the core of the new social movements during the 1970s, yet it was only the prospect of a supranational EC environmental policy of sorts which induced the environmentalists to go to Brussels for the first time. Their new engagement with EC politics, and their role in developing an EC approach to environmental protection, is the focus of Jan-Henrik Meyer’s article in this special issue.

These four non-state actors – socialist parties, labour unions, agricultural interest groups and the environmental movement – were involved in European policy fields old and new. By the 1970s, agricultural policy was a firmly established common EC policy. In contrast, while social policy issues had been present on the agenda of European integration from the early days, debate on an EC level social policy of some kind only really took off in the 1970s before the election of Margaret Thatcher in 1979 at least temporarily put a halt to these ambitions. The third policy, development policy, was to some extent an illegitimate child of the older colonialism of western European nations. In fact, in his declaration of 9 May 1950 the French foreign minister Robert Schuman had already mentioned generating common funds to develop Africa as a European mission as one of the objectives of the future ECSC. The idea of ‘Eurafrique’ as a third economic and political force in the world exerted a powerful influence for some time, especially in French politics. Subsequently, decolonization and the new discourse on global justice turned development policy into a highly innovative field in the 1970s, when it appealed to the political Left in particular, not just in France. Lastly, the environment as an area of policy-making only emerged in national and international politics in the 1960s and early 1970s. The European Conservation Year in 1970 and the UN conference on the environment in Stockholm in 1972 helped place the issue more firmly on domestic agendas and the EC agenda. The outlines of an EC level environmental policy emerged with the first Environmental Action Programme of 1973, followed by a series of ambitious legislative projects, although environmental policy only became an EC competence in the Single European Act of 1987, with majority voting introduced in the Maastricht Treaty.

All four articles consist of two parts. In the first part the authors focus on the actors: what motivated non-state actors to become (more) involved in European policy-mak-

ing? Did they pro-actively invest resources in EC policy-making, or were they induced to come to Brussels by the opportunities – from financial support to networking – offered by the European institutions, especially the European Commission? In short, to what extent did they push, and to what extent were they pulled into EC politics and policy-making?\textsuperscript{36} In this context, all authors also examine the conditions for cooperation and competition among non-state actors in the respective policy area, and the degree of their transnational cooperation.

In a second part, all four articles address the role of non-state actors in policy-making in a clearly delineated policy field. How did non-state actors seek to exert influence, which instruments did they use, and how successful were they? In this connection, to what extent did non-state actors function as transnational mediators of policy ideas between the national, the international and the European levels, and how important was this role of agenda-setting and policy formulation in the EC?

Covering a broad range of non-state actors and policies – both old and new – our ambition is to draw some initial comparative conclusions concerning the role of non-state actors in EC politics and policy-making in the 1970s. First, we hope to ascertain whether non-state actors actually did become more important in EC policy-making in the 1970s, as we assume. Secondly, if they did, we are keen to identify the main reasons for their growing involvement. Thirdly, we wish to know more about any similarities and differences across the different kinds of actors and policy areas – old and new –, and about the reasons for any such variation.

We have found considerable variation with respect to the transnationalization and Europeanization of their political activities among the four non-state actors discussed in the contributions to this special issue. European socialist parties were clearly influential actors in the 1970s. Social democrats were in government (as in Germany or Britain) or participated in governing coalitions (as in Italy) for a good part of the decade in a number of EC member states. Nonetheless, compared to their Christian democratic political competitors, the socialist parties were slow to formally Europeanize their cooperation. It was only in 1974 that they set up the Confederation of Socialist Parties in the EC in anticipation of the introduction of direct elections to the EP. Compared to the European People’s Party set up in 1976, this comparatively loose institutional arrangement – a ‘confederation’ – reflected the internal divisions on European integration within and across the socialist parties of the member states. After the first EC enlargement of 1973, these divisions became even more pronounced. A large number of Danish and British socialists were at least sceptical towards European integration, not least because they feared that it might compromise their own countries’ pursuit of socialist policies. Some of the British Labour Party’s leading politicians – including Cabinet ministers – campaigned

\textsuperscript{36} The concept of push and pull was originally developed in migration studies in the 1960s, but this suggestive analytical juxtaposition has since widely been applied in the social sciences. Everett S. Lee, A Theory of Migration, in: Demography 3 (1966) 1, pp. 47-57.
against continued British membership in the British EC referendum of 1975. Instead, they favoured broader international ties. In that respect, the socialists’ traditional focus on internationalism instead of regional economic integration may have hampered rather than facilitated European-level institutionalization. At the same time, these transnational ties that went beyond the smaller, more integrated, Europe of the six or nine member states of the EC – including the traditionally strong Scandinavian and Austrian socialists – formed the basis for a wider informal network of leading socialists, supported by social democratic think tanks like the Friedrich Ebert Foundation and the Vienna Institute for Development. This web of overlapping contacts formed the infrastructure for European opinion and preference formation with regard to those policies – like development policy – that were close to the heart of socialist/social democratic ideological commitments.

The Labour unions’ formal representation at the European level in the ESC, where they were routinely consulted on European legislation, had not immediately led to the Europeanization of their institutions. The European Trade Union Congress (ETUC) was only established in 1973, and remained internally divided. Ideological fragmentation, as well as fundamental differences of union organization, prevented this newly founded union umbrella organization from playing a more active role. While, for instance, in Germany and Britain, labour unions were united under one formally non-party political roof organization, in many other member states such as in France or Italy, union representation was fragmented along party lines into Christian democratic, socialist and communist unions. Whereas socialist and Christian democratic unions had already established a small European level organization in the 1950s to deal with the ECSC and a secretariat for the EEC, the Communist labour unions were initially opposed to western European integration. The Italian communist union joined the ETUC in the 1970s, once it had become more Eurocommunist. Generally, Christian democratic and socialist unions in the EEC were broadly supportive of European integration. The lack of commitment of the most powerful organizations like the German Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund (DGB), which – from a position of strength – feared that it could lose under too much European harmonization, limited the Europeanization of the unions’ engagement.

Agricultural pressure groups were long-established and probably the most deeply embedded in policy-making among the lobbying organizations at the European level. Not only had their European organization Comité des organisation professionnelles agricoles (COPA) been set up with the support of the European Commission, the farmers also enjoyed privileged access to what was considered the most advanced area of European policy-making which also made up in the region of 80 per cent of EC expenditure. At the same time, as Germond argues, it took a considerable amount of time for a more thorough transnationalization and Europeanization to take place, not least since agricultural interest groups also had privileged access to ‘their’ national ministries. As national governments continued to play the decisive decision-making role in the Council of Min-

isters, the national lobbying route remained crucial for them. In the face of Commission initiatives to reform the increasingly costly and wasteful CAP in the 1970s, however, transnationally organized lobbying via COPA in defence of the status quo became more important, leading to a more thorough Europeanization of agricultural interest representation.

In the novel area of environmental policy, the transnationalization and Europeanization of interest groups was relatively fast, even if not particularly thorough. The initial foundation of the European Environmental Bureau (EEB) in 1974 was largely coincidental and based on informal transnational ties between European environmentalists, as Meyer explains in his article. Commission support and encouragement for its establishment came from the Information and Communication Directorate General, rather than the Service of the Environment and Consumer Protection, which remained oriented towards national organizations and experts. In the 1970s, the EEB remained a small and weak organization, relying on the strength of its member groups and transnational cooperation for lobbying and expertise. However, in concrete policy-making in the context of the birds directive, both bird protection and hunting groups were able to Europeanize their lobbying and organize at the European level. For this purpose, they relied on pre-existing transnational ties from the older international bird protection and hunting organizations.

What explains this variation in transnationalization and Europeanization of non-state actors in the 1970s? Three main factors need to be taken into account. First – in line with historical institutionalist explanations in political science – non-state actors’ institutional structures, traditions and routines have an important influence on their propensity to Europeanize. Secondly – as argued by rational choice institutionalism – the European level’s actual competence in the respective policy area is crucial in determining the attractiveness of setting up shop at the EC level. Thirdly – in line with theoretical arguments advanced by sociological institutionalism – dominant ideologies shaping perceptions strongly influence the extent to which a European level solution is considered as an option at all. With different weight, and in different ways specific to each non-state actor and policy area, these factors could work against or in favour of the transnationalization and Europeanization of non-state actors’ political activities.

Organizational traditions and routines strongly oriented towards the nation state proved to be an important obstacle to non-state actors’ further transnationalization and Europeanization. Socialist parties’ and labour unions’ political activities, for instance, were heavily geared towards the national welfare state and its policies. The EC member states had almost exclusive competence in this area. Thus, socialist parties – frequently in national government in the 1970s – and unions that were traditionally close to them, looked towards member state governments in the first instance for the delivery of social policy. As the problems of global competition and national budgetary constraints had not yet become so obviously pressing, there appeared to be no need to shift attention from the national level, which seemed the natural place to go for these policy issues, to the EC level. Similarly, farmers’ unions had been closely connected to the nation states in (west-
ern) Europe since the late nineteenth century, when tariffs to protect national agriculture were increasingly (re-) introduced. Traditional ties with national parties and agricultural ministries – which also remained important players at the EC level – were well-established and institutionalized. Such structural traditions might initially have discouraged farmers’ organizations from investing more resources at the new European level, which was more remote and less predictable.

Moreover, in as much as they behaved like rational actors, non-state actors were more likely to Europeanize in those cases where the EC had competences in the policy areas in which they were most interested. Thus, the lack of EC competence in social policy to a large extent explains the hesitant attitudes of both the unions and the socialist parties, whose interests were strongly focussed on this policy area. In this context, the Commission’s attempts to gain a higher profile in these areas through the attempts to broaden European social policy in the 1970s were not really taken seriously by the unions or the socialist parties who thus refrained from allocating major resources to Brussels.

At the same time, ideological factors also mattered, since they shaped perceptions of interests and – in particular – the perception of ‘Europe’ as an arena for policy-making. Socialists and labour unions had long been committed to internationalism. However, unlike the Christian democrats, who had only begun to internationalize beyond western Europe in the mid-1950s and who shared a strong and more or less federalist commitment to European integration, socialists were much more divided over the formation and development of core Europe, which many initially perceived as too Catholic, conservative and capitalist. Thus they were also more sceptical towards Europe as an alternative or complementary level of policy-making. Similarly, many business actors initially opted for a much broader transatlantic Western world as their sphere of action when pushing for trade liberalization and market integration. Their assessment and activities changed progressively until the European Round Table of Industrialists (ERT) – formed in 1983 – singled out the EC as the appropriate primary place for market making. In political science, drawing upon ideological commitments to explain political behaviour is characteristic of sociological institutionalism. Similarly, Pierre Bourdieu’s sociological concept of ‘fields’ suggests that world views, belief systems and ideological commitments prevent actors from stepping outside of their routines, and – in this case – from starting to invest more resources into their Europeanization and the Europeanization of particular policies.

Under particular circumstances the very same factors – traditions, interests, and ideology – worked in favour of transnationalization and Europeanization. For instance, previous


ties via existing international organizations facilitated greater engagement at the European level and the investment of more resources into European transnational cooperation. This was the case, in particular, among bird protection and hunting groups when they established transnational cooperation in the EC. Bird protection organizations could build on their transnational linkages in the framework of the International Council for Bird Preservation (ICBP). The hunters who set up the European Federation of Hunting Associations (FACE) relied on existing connections via the International Council for Hunting and Game Conservation (CIC) and the German language international forum Internationale Jagdkonferenz. Similar forces were at work in the case of many non-state actors not treated in this special issue. When the EPP was founded in 1976, it immediately achieved a greater level of integration than the Socialist Confederation, not least because it could build on the long tradition of close transnational ties on European integration among European Christian democrats. Similarly, the founding of the ERT in the early 1980s benefited from previous transnational ties among Europe’s automobile industry to prevent the transposition of the more demanding and costly US safety standards to Europe in the 1970s.41

In many cases it was rational for non-state actors to invest resources at the European level. When the EC was the competent authority, it made sense for interest groups to try to shape supranational policies, even if this meant a departure from traditional routines. The European competence in agricultural policy and the pivotal role of the Commission from the early 1960s onwards forced even unenthusiastic farming organizations such as the Deutscher Bauernverband, the German Farmers Union, to get organized at the European level and cooperate transnationally or face losing influence on policy development.42 Similarly, the prospect of achieving the preferred kind of legislation at the European level that was unattainable at the national level encouraged bird protection organizations to join forces across borders and to lobby the EC. Shared interests in advancing the European supranational project in the area of environmental policy made the Commission a promising ally for these groups. The Commission financially supported European meetings in the framework of the EEB, thus further strengthening transnational cooperation among environmental groups. Likewise, the Commission paid out money for expert reports, research projects and the participation of experts in expert and advisory committees. Such financial incentives and other resources were particularly important for grassroots groups with limited funding who largely relied on membership fees. In the 1960s neo-functionalists had already stressed the importance of the new supranational institutions, their formal and informal powers, and their activism for attracting non-state actors to the EC, bringing in their expertise and also using these non-state actors as a resource to enhance their institutional legitimacy in policy-making – something the European Commission has attempted to do much more systematically.

41 Ramírez Pérez, Transnational Business Networks Propagating EC Industrial Policy (note 9).
Likewise their strong ideological commitment to European level solutions encouraged non-state actors to push towards the European level and invest resources there. The most prominent example is the demand for European liberalization to create a truly common market by the ERT in the 1980s, which helped pave the way for the Single Market Project.\footnote{Cf. Maria Green Cowles, Setting the Agenda for a New Europe: The ERT and EC 1992, in: Journal of Common Market Studies 33 (1993) 4, pp. 501-526.} In the 1970s, the radical bird protection groups addressed the European institutions, believing that only a European solution could solve the obviously cross-border problem of bird protection: the Italian authorities in particular seemed incapable of passing the appropriate legislation. The Commission has generally supported such demands as they are in line not only with its interest in enhancing its institutional role, but also with its overall preference for a more strongly integrated EC/EU. Recent literature on European lobbying has argued that non-state actors who give unconditional support to European level solutions can greatly enhance their influence with the supranational institutions.\footnote{For an introduction see Justin Greenwood, Interest Representation in the European Union, Basingstoke 2007.} Shared ideological preferences for supranational integration and particular policy solutions can create a solid basis for joint political action. In contrast, the more hesitant and sceptical actors find it harder to build fruitful cooperative ties with the institutions.

**Impact on EC politics and policy-making?**

What role did non-state actors play in EC policy-making? Non-state actors provided an important channel of interest intermediation between a variety of groups within European societies and the emerging European political system. They were facing a highly complex institutional system, with the European Commission at its centre as agenda setter and formally the only institution allowed to initiate legislation, a continued strong role of the member states and mainly consultative bodies such as the EP and the ESC. The incorrect usage of names of institutions in letters by non-state actors demonstrates that they initially struggled with understanding the complexity of the EC set-up. The introduction of new policies in the 1970s arguably paved the way for the further constitutionalization of the EC, with the Single European Act in 1987 and the Maastricht Treaty. Through their involvement, and their occasional pushing for new policies as in the case of environmental policy, non-state actors clearly contributed at a general level to the further evolution of the European polity.

At the same time, non-state actors who were getting involved at the EC level had to act as intercultural brokers in order to be successful. Not only did they have to deal with a multitude of languages, but they also had to grapple with institutional and legal as well
as attitudinal differences. Improving their own intercultural competence and enhancing intercultural communication in the larger political and decision-making system were of crucial importance for achieving those compromises on which European decisions were routinely based. Those who were most successful in Europeanizing their organization had ample experience in international work and transnational cooperation. The usually young academics in the environmental organizations clearly found their integration in EC politics much easier to achieve than older labour representatives who had risen from the shop floor through the ranks of their organization. The cultural barrier, we argue, thus has important normative implications for what kinds of interests can be organized at the EC/EU level.

An important role of non-state actors in the 1970s was to mediate issues across levels of policy-making. This inter-level mediation is most conspicuous in the case of the new policy issues of the 1970s. The European socialists’ transnational network performed a key agenda setting function – as Salm demonstrates – mediating the 0.7 per cent of GDP development aid target of the UN to the national governments and the EC at the same time. Similarly, in the area of environmental policy, a number of key concepts on habitats protection from international agreements were downloaded into European legislation through the involvement of transnationally cooperating policy advisers from the bird protection organizations at the EC level. The anti bird hunting issue was also discussed internationally. However, there were crucial variations in this debate between Northern and Southern Europe. Eventually, it was an issue from the mainstream of the Northern European discourse that was uploaded to the EC level. In the case of the CAP, COPA proved very effective in preventing the downloading of the important discourse on the negative effects of the CAP on developing countries, as well as the uploading of the discourses taking place in many of the member states, on the waste that characterized the CAP.

As the examples in the contributions to this special issue demonstrate, non-state actors in the 1970s used the same set of methods of interest mediation that are still practiced today. The environmental groups and COPA in particular engaged in direct lobbying of the European institutions and of the member states. They routinely stressed the representativeness of their interests – referring to the large numbers of their members or supporters – often in comparison with their opponents. Environmental groups were particularly strong in providing scientific expertise – on which credible legislation had to be based in the case of a complex issue such as the conservation of all wild birds of Europe. However, all of these methods were routinely applied across different levels as the member states retained exclusive control over formal decision-making in Council. The labour unions and the socialist parties, which were less interested in direct involvement with the EC and enjoyed direct ties with socialist national governments, tended to focus their action more on the member states.

Lastly, how successful were the non-state actors in influencing EC politics and policy-making? Success should be measured against the non-state actors’ own aims, of course, rather than some abstract normative definition of what was, or would have been, good
for ‘Europe’ and its citizens. Measured in these terms, COPA probably remained the most successful EC level non-state actor in the 1970s, given its effectiveness in blocking change. COPA managed to prevent any attempt to reform the CAP. The minimal co-responsibility levy that was introduced against the will of COPA demonstrates their success rather than their failure, since its small size prevented any noticeable effect. It took more than twenty years, until the 1990s, for COPA’s line of defence to collapse after pressures for reform mounted within the World Trade Organization and budgetary concerns over the costs of the CAP became greater and greater. For a long time, however, COPA had succeeded in establishing and fostering closely knit relations with DG Agriculture, dominating the consultation process, which has only recently begun to become more open to include consumers and environmental groups.\(^{45}\)

In a similar way, the DGB as a national non-state actor played an influential if ambiguous role in defining the nature of the emerging EC social policy during the 1970s. On the one hand, the German trade union was a key actor lobbying for the establishment of social policy as a new area of EC competence, which would complement national welfare states. On the other hand, the DGB was instrumental in defining the (modest) scope of that policy, in particular through its preferences for the coordination of national policies (rather than European harmonization) and for regulatory policies (rather than redistributive schemes).

Both the socialist and the environmental groups were successful in working towards change at the EC level, managing to frame their preferences – the 0.7% target and the need for transnational bird protection – and to place them on the EC agenda. Working with public opinion and putting moral pressure on the governments, they worked towards political measures, even though they could not control the intergovernmental negotiations at the end of the EC decision making process.

**Conclusion**

We can thus conclude that the rise of policy-making in the 1970s attracted more and new non-state actors to the EC and led to their greater involvement. The economic crises after 1973 and the relative institutional stagnation compared to the ambitious expectations of the summit of The Hague in 1969, actually proved beneficial to the involvement of non-state actors. The economic and integration crises, and the perception of crisis, opened up debates with regard to the EC’s future development, including issues such as the international competitiveness of EC business vis-à-vis the US and Japan and cross-border environmental problems.

The transnational organization and Europeanization of these non-state actors in policymaking in the EC varied a great deal, however. There are multiple reasons for this, which

require a multi-causal analysis sensitive to the different contexts. Theoretical approaches used in the social sciences – frequently with a mono-causal thrust – are useful in singling out relevant factors, but need to be combined to deal with the complexity of this issue appropriately. The most obvious variation is between older policies such as agriculture and social policy, where the crucial non-state actors were less interested in changing the level of decision-making. Conversely, concerning the novel issues such as development policy and environmental policy, non-state actors were very keen on change. Likewise, given the openness of the policy-making with the absence of existing EC competences and policy traditions combined with new opportunities for setting up transnational, partly informal network ties, these non-state actors were actually able to contribute to the shaping of policy change, and to the formulation of new policy issues and policies at the EC level. These comparative observations merely constitute a first attempt at exploring the issue of non-state actors in the EC in the 1970s. A variety of other non-state actors – such as business actors – could not be considered for the purpose of this special issue. Similarly, only a limited range of policy areas is addressed in the four articles. Provisional as these findings may be, however, we can conclude that in the 1970s there existed patterns of governance involving non-state actors that were astonishingly similar to what we are used to at the start of the twenty-first century. In fact, it seems that in many ways the 1970s mark the origins of non-state actors’ much greater engagement and new forms of informal policy-making involving them more systematically in the EC. Whether their greater role ever had, or at least has the potential to have, a beneficial effect on the democratic quality of EC/EU governance can be disputed and is another crucial question for future research and debate among historians and social scientists alike.