

# **“The Reign of Terror at Tabriz”: The Circulation of Photographs of Atrocity and Russia’s Performance of Power at the End of the Iranian Constitutional Revolution (1905–1911)**

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## **ABSTRACTS**

This article examines photographs of atrocity and their changes of meaning and function. It focuses on a series of violent events, which took place in northern Iran at the end of 1911, when the Russian army invaded the cities of Urmia and Tabriz and tortured and killed many of its inhabitants. In Tabriz, the Russians, together with the former governor Samad Khan Shuja’ al-Saltana, publicly executed 23 men who had played important roles during the events of the preceding revolution. The executions were made into public spectacles and photographically documented. This almost forgotten episode of Iranian-Russian history is an example of the complex transnational networks of photographic circulation at the beginning of the twentieth century, and of the diverse attempts of resistance against the violent and quasi-colonial behaviour of the Russian army. The article contributes to the ongoing debate on how to responsibly handle sensitive imagery and underlines the importance of using visual sources in historiography.

In diesem Artikel werden Fotografien von Gräueltaten und deren Bedeutungs- und Funktionswandel untersucht. Er konzentriert sich auf eine Reihe von gewalttätigen Ereignissen, die sich Ende 1911 im Nordiran ereigneten, als die russische Armee in die Städte Urmia und Täbris eindrang und viele ihrer Einwohner folterte und tötete. In Täbris ließen die Russen zusammen mit dem ehemaligen Gouverneur Samad Khan Shuja’ al-Saltana 23 Männer öffentlich hinrichten, die während der Ereignisse der vorangegangenen Revolution eine wichtige Rolle gespielt hatten. Die Hinrichtungen wurden als öffentliches Spektakel inszeniert und fotografisch doku-

mentiert. Diese fast vergessene Episode der iranisch-russischen Geschichte ist ein Beispiel für die komplexen transnationalen Netzwerke der Fotozirkulation zu Beginn des 20. Jahrhunderts und für die vielfältigen Versuche des Widerstands gegen das gewaltsame und quasi koloniale Verhalten der russischen Armee. Der Artikel leistet einen Beitrag zur laufenden Debatte über den verantwortungsvollen Umgang mit sensiblen Bildern und unterstreicht die Bedeutung der Verwendung visueller Quellen in der Geschichtsschreibung.

## 1. Introduction

At the end of 1911, in the city of Urmia, an Iranian man was hiding from the Russian army which had entered the north of Iran and massacred many of its inhabitants. Intending to inform the public about the massacre, he contacted a Turkish newspaper, which published his words just a few weeks later, in February 1912. In the short article, the anonymous author implored the European public to pay attention and to not let this violent event wash over them. His cry for help compared the Russian army to an unstoppable “soulless machine”. His passionate words were soon also published in Britain:

*They [the Russians] break us in pieces just as a soulless, senseless, cold machine crushes a man and reduces his bones to powder. I wonder what the public opinion of Europe [...] thinks about these heart-breaking spectacles? Nothing! Nothing at all!*<sup>1</sup>

In the nearby city of Tabriz, these “heart-breaking spectacles” included twenty-three public executions of leaders of the community (politicians, clergymen, teacher, journalists, philanthropists) on gallows decorated with ribbons in the colours of the Russian flag.

## 2. The Political and Historical Context

Even though Iran was a sovereign nation, Russia had acted as a de facto colonial power in the Iranian province of Azerbaijan since the summer of 1907. The Anglo-Russian agreement had practically resulted in a partition of the country and in a strengthening of the Russian position, even though its text had stated that the integrity of Iran would not be compromised.<sup>2</sup> The north of Iran had been assigned to Russia and the south-east of the

1 The article was published in the Turkish newspaper *Tarjuman-i Haqiqat* on Sunday, 4 February 1912, it was translated by E. G. Browne, who intended it to be reproduced in his book *Letters from Tabriz*. The book, which Browne had prepared as a sequel to his book *The Persian Revolution* from 1910 to discuss the aftermath of Constitutionalism in Iran, was intended to be published in 1914. A note attached to the book's manuscript in the Cambridge University Library reads: “The outbreak of the war in August of that year rendered their publication inexpedient for the time being” (C.U.L., MS. DE3). The book was not published in Browne's lifetime. In 1973, a first edition of the letters was published in the original Persian by Hasan Javadi as *Nāmah-i az Tābriz* (Letters from Tabriz) and the same editor published an English version of Browne's manuscript in 2008 (E. G. Browne, *Letters from Tabriz: The Russian Suppression of the Iranian Constitutional Movement*, ed. by H. Javadi, Washington, D.C. 2008). The article quoted above appears in it on p. 91.

2 On the Russian involvement in Iranian politics during the time of the Iranian Constitutional Revolution, see M. Deutschmann, *Iran and Russian Imperialism: The Ideal Anarchists, 1800–1914*, London 2016, and F. Kazemzadeh,

country to Britain; the part in-between was treated as a buffer zone. The north of Iran, especially the Iranian province of Azerbaijan, had a history of engagement with social, political, and educational reform.<sup>3</sup> The city of Tabriz was both an economic hub and an ethnic melting pot. It was also the place in Iran where printing and photography had both been introduced for the first time.<sup>4</sup>

During the events of the Iranian Constitutional Revolution (1905–1911), Iran's first revolution, which resulted in transforming the absolute monarchy of the Qajar rulers into a constitutional monarchy, Azerbaijan and its citizens had been particularly active in the revolutionary events. In 1909, when the then-ruler Muhammad 'Ali Shah (r. 1907–1909) challenged the constitutional regime in Tehran, it was the forces of *mujahidin* (Persian: freedom fighters) from the provinces, including the north, that marched towards the capital and enforced the reinstallation of the constitution and the abdication of the shah.<sup>5</sup>

In 1911, the Russian government had given the weakened constitutionalist government of Iran an ultimatum to fire the popular American financial advisor Morgan Shuster, who had been hired by the *majlis* (Persian: parliament) to get the country's poor finances in order.<sup>6</sup> If Shuster had been successful, this would have made Iran independent from its Russian and British creditors. The Iranian government and the country's political organizations directly protested against the Russian ultimatum to terminate Shuster. One example of this is the following telegram from 5 December 1911, sent by the Central

Russia and Britain in Persia, 1864–1914: A Study in Imperialism, New Haven 1968 (repr. London/New York 2013). On Russian-Iranian relations in the modern period more broadly, see S. Cronin (ed.), *Iranian-Russian Encounters: Empires and Revolutions since 1800*, Milton Park/New York 2013, and R. Matthee/E. Andreeva (eds.), *Russians in Iran: Diplomacy and Power in the Qajar Era and Beyond*, London/New York 2018.

- 3 'Abbas Mirza (1789–1833), the son and designated heir of Fath 'Ali Shah, initiated an unprecedented reform programme, which included *nizām-i jadīd* (Persian: new army), modern schools, and the sending of students to Europe. "Abbas Mirza and his prime minister also recognized that structural problems impeded substantive military reform; they attempted to improve the taxation system and strengthen the central administration." M. Ringer, *Education, Religion, and the Discourse of Cultural Reform in Qajar Iran*, Costa Mesa 2001, p. 38.
- 4 On the early history of printing in Iran, see: P. Avery, *Printing, the Press, and Literature in Modern Iran*, in P. Avery/G. R. G. Hambly/C. Melville (eds.), *The Cambridge History of Iran*, vol. 7, Cambridge 1991, pp. 815–822; F. Emami, *The Lithographic Image and Its Audiences*, in: D. J. Roxburgh/M. McWilliams (eds.), *Technologies of the Image: Art in 19th-Century Iran*, Cambridge 2017, pp. 55–79. On the introduction of photography in Iran, see I. Afshar, *Some Remarks on the Early History of Photography in Iran*, in: C. E. Bosworth/C. Hillenbrand (eds.), *Qajar Iran: Political, Social and Cultural Change, 1800–1925*, Costa Mesa 1983, pp. 261–290; M. X. Schwerda, *Iranian Photography: From the Court, to the Studio, to the Street*, in: Roxburgh/McWilliams (eds.), *Technologies of the Image*, pp. 81–106.
- 5 On the history of the Constitutional Revolution, see N. Sohrabi, *Revolution and Constitutionalism in the Ottoman Empire and Iran*, Cambridge 2011; H. Chehabi/V. Martin (eds.), *Iran's Constitutional Revolution: Popular Politics, Cultural Transformations and Transnational Connections*, London/New York 2010; A. Amanat, *Iran: A Modern History*, New Haven 2017.
- 6 William Morgan Shuster (1877–1960) was an American lawyer, who had been employed as treasurer-general by the Iranian Majlis from May to December 1911 on the recommendation of the American government. After Shuster had asked Shuja' al-Saltana, the former governor of Tabriz, who had been ousted by the Constitutionalists and who had aligned himself with Tsarist Russia, to surrender his assets, Russia issued the ultimatum. After his return to the United States, he wrote about the destruction of Iran's government and published a book titled *The Strangling of Persia: The Story of the European Diplomacy and Oriental Intrigue that Resulted in the Denationalization of Twelve Million Mohammedans: A Personal Narrative*, London 1913; repr. Washington, D.C. 2005. His papers are in the Library of Congress, Washington D.C.

Committee of the Iranian Democratic Party to the International Socialist Congress in Paris:

*We protest vividly against the freedom robbing barbarism of Anglo-Russian diplomacy, which has brought the tyrant Muhammad 'Ali back to Iran [...] At present, in their ultimatum, they wet their hands in the blood of the Iranian people by taking their independence away from them and stamping with their feet on the constitution, against the laws of civilization. Unite with us to protest against this theft!*<sup>7</sup>

After the failed attempts to attract hope and support, the Iranian government complied with the ultimatum and Shuster returned to the United States. Nevertheless, the Russian army moved thousands of soldiers into the country and entered Tabriz, the city which had been a centre of the Constitutional Revolution and a symbol of resistance.<sup>8</sup> In Tabriz, the Russian troops disturbed the city's peace under the pretext of having to lay new telephone wires and sent men into private houses and gardens, purposefully breaking social rules.<sup>9</sup> Later, they would further violate the city's social code by taking photographs. The Russian behavior led to protest and resistance by the Iranian police, resulting in the death of two police officers. After this initial uproar, fighting ensued on 21 December 1911, and "the Russian reign of terror" broke loose: Russian soldiers and members of the Russian consulate killed women, men, and children, plundered houses, and caused damage to historical monuments, including the citadel (*arg*) of Tabriz, which was damaged by fire. The destruction of the citadel, which was the main building housing the government of Tabriz, symbolized the forced transfer of power to the invading

7 "Téhéran, 5 décembre 1911. "Nous protestons vivement contre la barbarie liberticide de la diplomatie anglo-russe (sic), amenant en Perse le tyran Mahomed Ali [...] A présent, par leur ultimatum, ils trempent leurs mains dans le sang du peuple persan en lui enlevant son indépendance, en foulant aux pieds sa constitution, au mépris des droits de la civilisation. Unissez-vous avec nous pour protester contre ces bragandages (sic). Le Comité central du parti démocrate persan." (Circular letter no. 20, this document is part of Houghton Library's archive of socialist materials: International [Second] Congress documents, Harvard University, Houghton Library, bMS Fr 224 [43–47], document 62).

8 "[Russia] sent Persia an ultimatum [on 29 November 1911] threatening to bring more troops into Persia unless Mr. Shuster was dismissed, notwithstanding the opposition of the Persian Parliament, and that a previous ultimatum of a most unjust and humiliating character presented on November 2 had also been accepted under pressure of similar threats, Russian troops were none the less poured into Persia to the number of some 25,000, and deeds of horrible ferocity and barbarity [...] were committed by them at Tabriz, Anzali, Rasht, and Mashhad" (Browne, Letters from Tabriz, p. 9). An official Iranian dispatch from February 1912 provides the number 21,700 for the number of Russian troops active in the north of Iran at the end of 1911. See Browne, Letters from Tabriz, p. 128.

9 "In three [...] cities, Tabriz, Rasht, and Anzali, fighting broke out almost simultaneously on December 20 and 21, 1911. How it actually began in each case is not yet known in full detail. The Persians assert that the Russians provoked it at Tabriz by entering private houses and mounting on their roofs (a thing repugnant to all Muhammedans on account of the seclusion in which their women live) on the pretext of laying telephone-wires, by molesting inoffensive citizens, both men, women and children, and by disarming or attempting to disarm the National Volunteers (or *mujáhidín*) who, since the preceding August, had been compelled to defend the city against Shujá'u'd-Dawla, the ex-Sháh's notorious partisan, and now, under the Russian aegis, the tyrant of Tabriz," *ibid.*, p. 31. Also see Shuster, *Strangling of Persia*, p. 203. In April 1909, the Russians had already once committed similar provocative acts in Tabriz to establish a pretext for repression. See the detailed report by N. Tardof, the Russian correspondent of the Moscow newspaper *Russkaya Slovo*, on these events, translated and reproduced in E. G. Browne, *The Persian Revolution of 1905–1909*, Cambridge 1910; repr. Washington, D. C. 2006, pp. 274–291.

Russian troops. The billowing could be seen from far away as the photograph taken by an unidentified, potentially European, photographer demonstrates (fig. 1).<sup>10</sup>

Fig. 1: *The destruction of the citadel through fire* (unidentified photographer).



The Russian army invited Samad Khan Shuja' al-Saltana (1853/54–1914/15), Tabriz's former governor, who was known as a staunch ally of the ex-Shah, to return.<sup>11</sup> Shuja' al-Saltana's acts of revenge against the Constitutionalists, who had months earlier forced him out of the city, surpassed the Russians in cruelty.<sup>12</sup> He demonstrated his complete

10 Reproduced from: E. G. Browne, *The Reign of Terror at Tabriz. England's Responsibility. With Photographs and a Brief Narrative of the events of December, 1911, and January, 1912.* Compiled for the use of the Persia Committee by Edward G. Browne, M.A., F.B.A., F.R.C.P., Manchester, October 1912 (from the unpaginated, second part of the pamphlet). All following images are reproduced from the same source. – This photograph was sent to Browne by a European resident. The origin of the photographs is examined in more detail at a later point in the article.

11 Shuja' al-Dawla has, despite or maybe because of his severe yet horrific impact on Iranian history, so far received relatively little attention in academic studies. Kasravi's study of the history of Iranian Azarbaijan, which is a sequel to his history of the Constitutional Revolution illuminates his behaviour in Azarbaijan at the end of the Constitutional Revolution (A. Kasravi, *Tārikh-i Hijdah Sālah-i Āzarbāyjān, Bāzmāndat Tārikh-i Mashrūṭah-i Irān* [A Eighteen Year-History of Azarbaijan], Tehran 2013); a photo of Shuja' al-Dawla can be found on p. 555 of the book. In addition to this, an edited version of his correspondence has recently been published: M. Ghulāmiyah/Y. Bayg (eds.), *Asnād-i Šamad Khān Shujā' Al-Dawlah* [The Documents of Samad Khan Shuja Al-Dawlah], Qum 2012.

12 "The worst atrocities, however, were committed by *Shujā'ud-Dawla*, the notorious partisan of the ex-Shāh, who, having vainly besieged Tabriz since August, 1911, and created a great scarcity and dearth of food, entered the town on January 2, 1912, when the resistance of the National Volunteers had been completely broken down by the Russians, and under the Russian aegis, established himself as Governor, and proceeded to indulge in a carnival of extortion and cruelty [...] He imprisoned, tortured, hanged, strangled, and stabbed; he cut men in two like sheep (as is shown in one of the photographs) and hung their bodies up in the bazaar; he sewed up the mouths of those suspected of a love for the Constitution; he nailed horse-shoes on to their feet and drove them through the streets; he cut out their tongues and plucked out their eyes. One of his favourite punishments is to throw the victim into a large tank round which are stationed men armed with sticks, who strike at the sufferer's

loyalty to the Russians by dressing his soldiers in Russian uniforms and forcing the inhabitants of Tabriz to celebrate the Romanov dynasty's 300<sup>th</sup> anniversary of rule.<sup>13</sup>

### 3. Pictures of Atrocity

The atrocities committed in Tabriz and Urmia at the end of 1911 and beginning of 1912 were described in imploring words by Iranian eyewitnesses and by E. G. Browne, a Cambridge professor of Persian literature, who attempted to direct public and political attention to the events in Iran in order to exert pressure on Russia.<sup>14</sup> In October 1912, Browne published a written account of the events accompanied by graphic photographs and titled "The Reign of Terror at Tabriz".<sup>15</sup> While Browne employs words and describes the horrific events in detail to awaken his European readers, he relied on photographs to corroborate this information ("as is shown in one of the photographs").<sup>16</sup> There is no doubt in his account that these images will aid him in persuading the public of Russian cruelty. Besides the photograph of the destroyed citadel, he included photographs of public executions and their audiences as well as much more graphic images, which illustrate in nauseating detail the atrocities committed by Shuja' al-Saltana and his soldiers. While Browne did not question the reproduction of these images in 1911 as they presented visual proof of the written accounts, let us pause here and contemplate how we confront this topic – the reproduction and viewing of photographs of atrocity – more than a century later. This has been a subject of continued debate for historians of photography, especially since the Covid-19 pandemic, which forced us to further reflect on the role photographs play in traumatic situations.<sup>17</sup> As historians of photography, how do we responsibly treat images such as these? Do we reproduce them, modify them, or omit them? A large number of historians of photography avoid this problem by simply not working on problematic images such as these (it is no coincidence that these photographs have not been discussed by a photo historian until now even though Browne's book from 1912 is available in most major research libraries and online, and has received new attention after Javadi's publication of related letters in 2009). However, this is no

head whenever it shows itself above the water, until he dies either from drowning or from loss of blood" (Browne, *Letters from Tabriz*, pp. 39–40).

13 Browne, *Letters from Tabriz*, pp. 81, 98, and 274.

14 E. G. Browne was a professor of Persian literature at the University of Cambridge and a supporter of the Iranian Constitutional government. He also wrote one of the first narratives of the Iranian Constitutional Revolution based on his communications with Iranian politicians and intellectuals during the events. See Browne, *The Persian Revolution*, 1910, and E. G. Browne, *The Persian constitutional movement*, From the proceedings of the British Academy, vol. VIII, London 1918. On the role of Browne, see, M. Bonakdarian, Edward G. Browne and the Iranian Constitutional Struggle: From Academic Orientalism to Political Activism, in: *Iranian Studies* 26 (1993) 1–2, pp. 7–31.

15 Browne, *The Reign of Terror at Tabriz*.

16 *Ibid.*, p. 39.

17 One example for this discussion is Sarah Lewis's op-ed in the *New York Times*, which argues that photographs depicting death are crucial in order to understand the severity of the situation. See S. Lewis, *Where are the photos of people dying of Covid?*, in: *New York Times*, 1 May 2020, <https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/01/opinion/coronavirus-photography.html>.

solution, especially not during a time when parallels between the 1911/12 incident in Iran and the current fighting taking place in Ukraine are apparent. Our time is an age of visibility, not just in print, but also virtually, and it is impossible to avoid images of death and violence as they appear to be everywhere. The question therefore is not "Why look at photographs of death or pictures of violence?" as in previous discourse,<sup>18</sup> but rather "How do we read, process, and teach such images?" What is the responsible thing to do? As Jay Prosser writes, "To not picture atrocity is therefore to omit what's there, to fail the truth of a situation, to withhold that proof. Equally, not to look at pictures of atrocity is to deny its existence, not only when atrocity happens at a distance but also when it's there on our doorsteps, in front of us."<sup>19</sup> Fully withholding these photographs would make it 'easier' to bear the events of 1911 and 1912, yet reconstructing and understanding these events can and should never be an 'easy' task. Is the refusal to look at these images really a sign of respect as has been stated previously or should we rather ask, as Suzie Linfield does, "What does it mean to acknowledge another's suffering, knowing full well that to embrace it is impossible?"<sup>20</sup> Yet, undoubtedly, cases exist where the non-reproduction of photographs is either mandated or preferable, depending on the context and content of the image, whereas other cases are not as clear cut.<sup>21</sup> The photographs in this article are not displayed for shock value, they are included because they are an essential part of the story that is being told. An exclusion of these photographs, the focus of the article, would minimize their significance. However, at the same time not all photographs are needed to convey the importance of this event and the role photographs played in it. I have therefore carefully selected a single photograph depicting one of the many executions, which I will analyze in this article, standing in for the others. I have moved other more graphic examples depicting Shuja' al-Saltana's atrocities into the appendix, allowing the reader themselves to decide to view or not view these images (figs. 8; 9; 15; reproduced in the appendix).

#### 4. The Tabriz Executions as Public Spectacles and Visual Displays of Power

The Tsarist regime was unable to fully silence the cries for reform in their home country and worried that this kind of resistance would continue to grow globally. It therefore deliberately decided to violently suppress political and social reform in Iran, which was adjacent to the Caucasus and thereby to the Russian Empire. The uncurbed massacres of the local population in northern Iran, which induced fear and panic, and the strategic

18 See S. Sontag, *Regarding the Pain of Others*, New York 2003.

19 J. Prosser, Introduction, in J. Prosser et al. (eds.), *Picturing Atrocity: Photography in Crisis*, London 2012, p. 7.

20 S. Linfield, *The Cruel Radiance: Photography and Political Violence*, Chicago/London, 2012, p. xvi.

21 An example for the latter is Eugene Smith's portrait *Tomoko in the Bath* from 1971, which recorded the Minamata disaster in postwar Japan. While Smith's photographs helped to draw attention to the tragedy, after the subject of the image had passed away, her family requested for the image not to be further circulated. See N. Kunimoto, *Photography of the Minamata disaster*, in: E. Duganne et al. (eds.), *Global Photography: A Critical History*, London/New York, 2020, pp. 70–74.

executions of the local elite and known Constitutionalists performed as public spectacles, left the town defenseless. This substantially weakened the Iranian reform movement and the Tehran-based Constitutionalist government. The executions in Tabriz were meticulously planned – and, as we will see later, also documented – invoking deep symbolism and resulting in extreme humiliation and loss of dignity. Photography communicated this more than any other medium.

The dates chosen for the executions were important religious holidays: the Muslim victims of highest social standing were killed on “Ashúrá or 10<sup>th</sup> of Muharram, which is comparable to the Good Friday of the Christians” and the Iranian-Armenian victims were killed on Christian-Orthodox New Year.<sup>22</sup> The Russians placed their flags on public buildings, such as the citadel, and erected gallows decorated in Russian colours in the main public places of Tabriz (fig. 2). This was a visual demonstration of power. Moreover, the dressing of the gallows in ribbons as if this were indeed a holiday celebration further emphasized the purposeful selection of days of religious and familial importance for the execution, which had now been turned into days of mourning.

Fig. 2: *The gallows, surrounded by crowds* (unidentified photographer).



The victims selected were the pillars of the community, including the well-known Mullah Thiqat al-Islam, who had also been in charge of negotiating an armistice with the Russians, the Armenian-Iranian Bedros Andreasian, who had been working for the city's tax administration and was the local liaison for the Armenian revolutionary Dashnaksu-

22 Ibid., pp. 37–38.



tiun party, whose members were involved in both the Ottoman and the Iranian Constitutional revolutions, and Hajji 'Ali Dawafurush, an educational reformer and founder of schools, among many other important and well-known figures.<sup>23</sup> The selection clearly intended to impact the future of the city, which had been well-known for its interest in technological and educational innovation and its thriving economy.

Others were selected for execution mainly because of their role in the city's previous support for reinstating the Constitution, or because they were related to people who played a significant role.<sup>24</sup> Examples include the public executions of the two young nephews and the brother of Sattar Khan, the hero of the march against Tehran to reinstall the constitution (fig. 4, see appendix).<sup>25</sup> In a reversed symbolism, the highest-standing members of society were hung the lowest on the gallows. This can be seen in the first photograph that Browne published in his booklet, a graphic close-up shot of a group hanging, where the mullah Thiqat al-Islam is placed in the middle of the gallows, lower than everyone else (fig. 5, see appendix). The public executions were marked by especial cruelty:

*the victims were neither pinioned nor blind-folded, and had to watch the sufferings of their fellow-sufferers while awaiting their own turn. In many cases they continued to struggle for ten minutes or more after they were hanged, and in several cases the rope broke. Thus in the case of Bedros Andreassian, a highly respected Armenian citizen who was hanged by the Russians on the Armenian New Year's Day, the rope broke twice, and a young Russian officer who protested against the unfortunate man's being hanged a third time was reprimanded and punished for his humane attempt at intervention.*<sup>26</sup>

Following the execution, which took place in the early morning, the bodies were left on the gallows for the whole day. Putting dead bodies of important members of the community on display at a central place caused further humiliation and was a deliberate provocation, as it contravened the Muslim rules of direct burial upon death. Anyone attempting to remove the bodies was punished. The display of the bodies therefore emphasized the Russians' total power.

23 On Thiqat al-Islam, see his obituary written by Taqizada and published in *Revue du Monde Musulman* 18–19 (June 1912), pp. 294–301, and the obituary published in *Habl al-Matin* (Calcutta edition from 9 September 1912), which is reproduced in English translation in Browne, *Letters from Tabriz*, pp. 249–258. On Andreassian, who had taken part in the Constitutionalist reconquest of Tehran together with Yiprim Khan, see H. Berberian, *The Love for Freedom Has No Fatherland: Armenians and the Constitutional Revolution of 1905–1911*, Boulder 2001, p. 172; and Kasravi, *Tārikh-i Hijdah Sālah-i Āzarbāyjan*, pp. 356–367.

24 After a constitution and a parliament had been introduced in 1907 under Muzaffar al-Din Shah (r. 1896–1907), his son Muhammad 'Ali Shah (r. 1907–1909) unsuccessfully attempted to return to an absolute monarchy by abolishing the constitution and bombarding the parliament. However, supporters of the Constitutionalist government from outside Tehran travelled to the city and forced Muhammad 'Ali to abdicate and leave the country.

25 On Sattar Khan, see A. Pistor-Hattam, *Sattār Khan*, in: *Encyclopædia Iranica*, London/Boston 2009, <http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/sattar-khan-one-of-the-most-popular-heroes-from-tabriz-who-defended-the-town-during-the-lesser-autocracy-in-1908-09>.

26 Browne, *Letters from Tabriz*, p. 38.

## 5. Communication Networks

The power of the Russian invaders and of Shuja' al-Saltana was not only apparent from what they were doing, but also from what they were hindering from happening. They attempted to completely control the narrative of what had taken place in Tabriz. The Russians cut the telegram wires and censored the post, hoping that news of the events would not spread. Morgan Shuster pointed to the consequences of this already in 1912: "It is safe to say that the horrors of Tabriz will never become fully known. The Russians saw well to that."<sup>27</sup> Yet, while communication was hindered, this also was recognized and stated by the international media. Already on 28 December 1911, the *New York Times* published an article under the headline "Persians Describe Russians' Butchery: Telegram from Tabriz Assembly Tells of Slaughter of Women and Children – Russia orders 'punishment'."<sup>28</sup> Regarding the difficulty of receiving reports from Tabriz, the newspaper stated:

*All communication with Teheran and Tabriz by means of the Indo-European Telegraph Company's wires, which is the usual route for telegrams, has been cut off since Monday. Messages coming from those two cities, except those passing through St. Petersburg, are very brief. They are forwarded first to Bombay, and from there to London over the cables of the Eastern Telegraph Company. The dislocation of the telegraph lines makes it impossible to get a reliable narrative of the outbreaks in Persia, yet it cannot be doubted that a situation of the gravest complexity has arisen.*<sup>29</sup>

In his letters to Browne, the Iranian reformer and former parliamentarian Hassan Taqizada, who had escaped to Istanbul, described how the telegraph was on the one hand the most important means of communication for the Constitutionalists, yet on the other hand he voiced many frustrations with difficulties accompanying the medium. Taqizada wrote to Browne that those who escaped Tabriz to the Ottoman territories kept sending telegrams to Tehran, however, the Iranian Government did not dare to intervene.<sup>30</sup> The topic of helplessness and frustration in regard to telegrams also appears in other sources repeatedly: "these poor people [fleeing Constitutionalists] are left at Van and Básh-qala', where they are continually telegraphing for help, and no one answers them".<sup>31</sup> Taqizada also described how those in the diaspora learned about the horrific events *peu à peu* leading to a different frustration and helplessness: "Yesterday [27 January 1911] the telegraph brought news of the execution of eighteen more."<sup>32</sup>

27 Shuster, *The Strangling of Persia*, p. 220.

28 Anonymous author, *New York Times*, 28 December 1911, p. 2.

29 Ibid.

30 From a letter by Hassan Taqizada to E. G. Browne, dated 28 January 1912, reproduced in Browne, *Letters from Tabriz*, p. 70.

31 From the article in *Tarjuman-i Haqiqat* quoted earlier (Browne, *Letters from Tabriz*, p. 97).

32 Ibid., p. 73.

The Anjuman-i Sa'adat, the Iranian Constitutionalist Organization based in Istanbul, which had among its members many Constitutionlists who had to leave Iran involuntarily, consistently transmitted updates on the situation via telegram to international media outlets and political institutions.<sup>33</sup> Their telegram from 1 January 1912 described the public executions of important community members and the massacres of the population and asked for this information to be circulated broadly.<sup>34</sup> Short verbal descriptions of the massacres in Tabriz were published abroad almost directly: *The Los Angeles Herald*, for example, published a short article under the heading "Cossacks on Persian Raid Slaughter 2500" already on 26 December 1911. The article stated that "Twenty-five hundred persons, many of them women and some of them children, are estimated to have been slain in different parts of Persia, during the twenty-four hours ending at 6 o'clock this morning."<sup>35</sup> The news appeared in Australian newspapers at the beginning of January 1912: Under the headline "Russia and Persia. Executions in Tabriz," the newspaper *The Mercury*, based in Hobart, Tasmania, reported:

*Following the execution in the public square of Tabriz of eight innocent people by the Russians, three other Persians have been sentenced to be hanged, and four houses, from which it is alleged shots were fired upon the Russians in their advance on the town, have been blown up.*<sup>36</sup>

Over the following months more information regarding the massacres was published in European and North American newspapers bit by bit.<sup>37</sup> In Britain the publication of these news appears to have been slower and more cautious due to British entanglement in the Anglo-Russian Agreement and the related, often fragile strategic partnership with Russia. The Russians' attempted complete censorship of letters and telegrams therefore did not entirely succeed.

## 6. The Taking of the Photographs of the Events

In addition to the circulation of textual witness accounts, the refugees from Tabriz also brought photographs with them to Europe and the Ottoman territories (figs. 1–16). These

33 "Anjoman-e Sa'adat (The Association of Felicity), an organization of Iranians resident in Istanbul, devoted to furthering the cause of the Iranian constitution between 1908 and 1912. It appears to have begun its activity after the absolutist coup of Jomāda I, 1326/June, 1908 by transmitting to Europe information collected from various *anjomans* about events in Iran." See H. Algar, Anjoman-e Sa'adat, in: *Encyclopædia Iranica*, vol. 2, fasc. 1: 89, <http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/anjoman-e-saadat>.

34 Copies of some of these telegrams are in the Archive of the International Social Organization at Houghton Library, Harvard.

35 *The Los Angeles Herald*, Vol XXXVIII, no 78, 26 December 1911, title page.

36 *The Mercury* (Hobart, Tasmania), 8 January 1912, p. 5.

37 One example for a much later discussion in the British press: "Mr. G. D. Turner, in his letter in the Manchester Guardian of September 12, 1912, confirms the fact that many women and children were killed, especially on December 27, and non-official European residents at Tabriz, though they dare not write freely for fear of Russian censorship, speak with evident horror of the events of those days" (Browne, *Letters from Tabriz*, p. 39).

photographs had not been taken by them, but by a photographer, or photographers, approved by the Russian authorities. The Russians did not intend for the images to be circulated, but rather took them in order to be shared with the government and army in Russia as proof of the events. While in other cases, photography has been used to extend the display of death in time and space, this does not appear to be the case here. At least not in the sense that the images were meant to extend this display by circulating in public. While on the one hand the Russians had wanted everyone in Tabriz to see how powerful they were, on the other hand they had not wanted the world to see how they behaved. How important it was for the Russian military that everyone in Tabriz “saw” how powerful they were becomes apparent from the emphasis on visual symbols of political power: flags and ribbons; the executions being public with large audiences in attendance; those to be executed having to watch others being killed;<sup>38</sup> the bodies being put on display afterwards; before the executions, the Russian soldiers’ intrusion into private spaces, where they were neither supposed to be seen nor supposed to witness; their destruction of buildings symbolizing the history and heritage of the city including the citadel but also the house of Sattar Khan;<sup>39</sup> and the forceful shaving of hair and changing of clothes of citizens, who were not killed. Many of these points become apparent in the photograph showing the gallows near the citadel (fig. 6). The gallows were installed on the roof of a historical building in the central *Maydan-i Mashq* (Drill or Military Training Square). Its elevation made it visible from all sides and from afar, while also being a clear symbol of Russian dominance.

This emphasis on demonstrating political power through visual means is further stressed by the use of the camera to document the executions. Twelve of the sixteen photographs of the events in Tabriz were apparently taken by a Russian officer.<sup>40</sup> It is unclear who took the other four photographs. The photographs themselves show that their taking was officially sanctioned: Russian soldiers pose for the photographer on several of the images, showing awareness of the camera, while in others Iranian boys and men dressed


38 “Now they compassed the death of these poor people in the most savage manner in the world; for while those who claim to be civilized do not slaughter even sheep in sight of one another, they kept these poor victims standing in a row while they put them to death one by one in succession with slow deliberation, in the presence and before the eyes of their fellow-sufferers” (From a letter by Hasan Taqizada to E. G. Browne, 28 January 1912, reproduced in Browne, *Letters from Tabriz*, p. 69).

39 Around the same time, the Russians deliberately desecrated and destroyed the Shrine in Mashhad: “The wanton bombardment by the Russians of the sacred Shrine of Mashhad in April 1912 (this is on the pretext of dispersing those who were agitating in favour of the ex-Shāh) was, however, an act of barbarous sacrilege and vandalism calculated to outrage the religious feeling of all Muhammadans as much as the circumstances attending the execution of the *Thiqatu’l-Islām* at Tabriz. It can hardly be supposed that such outrages to Muhammadan sentiment were not deliberate on the part of the Russians, as is indeed suggested in the White Book (Cd. 6264), No. 52, p. 18, and it must be assumed that the object was either to bring about armed risings of the Persians which might afford an excuse for further and fuller military occupation of the country, or so to violate their religious feelings as well as their patriotic aspirations as utterly to cow them and break their spirit.” (Browne, *Letters from Tabriz*, pp. 44-45).

40 “Twelve of these photographs [...] reached this country, through a channel which cannot be indicated, about July, 1912, and are believed to have been taken by a Russian officer who allowed copies of the original negatives to pass into other hands” (Browne, *Letters from Tabriz*, p. 35).

like servants look directly at the camera (figs. 4, 5, 7, 11–14, 16). The photographer(s) had direct access to otherwise cordoned-off areas (figs. 5 and 7).

Fig. 3: *The citadel with the Russian flag on it* (unidentified photographer).



The photographs, which depict crowds looking at the gallows, show people turning around or posing for the camera, some of them dressed in Russian clothing (figs. 2 and 6). Browne states that copies of the photographs, which were taken by a Russian officer ended up being clandestinely sold in Tabriz. He received two sets of the same photographs from first Hassan Taqizada, who mailed them from Istanbul, and then from George D. Turner, who had visited Tabriz shortly after the massacres.<sup>41</sup> Turner also sent Browne additional photographs taken by European residents, which include the images of the citadel (figs. 1 and 3).<sup>42</sup>

## 7. The Circulation of the Photographs from Tabriz in the Ottoman Empire and in Britain

While written news of the events in Iran reached a global audience swiftly despite the censorship attempts by the Russians, this was not the case for the photographs. Even though they were successfully smuggled out and reached the Iranian diaspora abroad, it

41 "A second set of the same twelve photographs was bought in a shop in Tabriz early in August, 1912, by Mr. G. D. Turner, and brought by him to this country. Both sets were inscribed on the back with the names of the victims, of whom 23 in all are shewn in the twelve photographs, and, save in two or three cases of the more obscure victims, the independent inscriptions exactly tallied." Ibid., p. 35.

42 "A second series of photographs [...] taken by European residents in Tabriz, was also brought to this country by Mr. G. D. Turner." Ibid., p. 36.

appears that the images were not directly reproduced in European or North American newspapers. However, we can see them being reproduced in Ottoman illustrated journals almost directly after the events. Three of the photographs (in this article numbered as figs. 4, 7, 16) were reprinted on a double page of the journal *Resimli Kitap*, published already in February 1912, just weeks after the events (fig. 17). The photographs chosen for inclusion include a group photograph depicting soldiers in Russian military coats standing in front of a gallows with hanging Iranian corpses, a photograph that would have been easy to interpret.

The other photograph reproduced in *Resimli Kitap* was reproduced by Browne as two separate images, as close-ups of the dead nephews of the Constitutionalist heroes Sattar Khan and Baqer Khan, figures with whom the Ottoman audience would have been familiar. The fast publication of these photographs in Istanbul underlines the Ottoman interest in the Iranian developments and the connections Iranian refugees had to the media in Istanbul. However, the images were not as eagerly taken up by the European and North American press, likely for political reasons. Even though illustrated journals such as the *Illustrated London News* were invested in publishing photographic images of violent conflict abroad, the British press followed the foreign ministry's guidance and did not publish criticism of Russian politics in Iran. In 1912, when we would have expected to see photographs of the violence in Iran, the readers of the *Illustrated London News* instead regularly saw photographic images from the Italian-Ottoman War in Libya or the Chinese revolution. How closely the *Illustrated London News* followed the British appeasement policy towards Russia becomes apparent from the kind of article on Iran that was finally published in the journal in September 1912, a month before Browne published his booklet on the reign of terror at Tabriz, but many months after the news of the continued Russian atrocities had been broadcast. The coverage of Iran in the journal consisted of three illustrated pages with an individual heading on each page. The derisive headline "Why Europe is concerned about Persia: Signs of slackness" was followed by the fearmongering headline "Ruler of a land which may be a danger to the world's peace" focusing on the young Persian shah.<sup>43</sup> The page titled "In a welter of anarchy: Persian troops and revolt-preachers" presented two images of men gathering around a preacher in a mosque.<sup>44</sup> As the images in themselves were ambiguous, the journal explained to its readers that the pictures depicted "preaching against the constitution," a claim that of course could not be proven by the image. The coverage was sparked by the visit of M. Sazonoff, the Russian minister of foreign affairs, to Britain. The content and images represented Iran as a chaotic and poor country that regretted the recent political reforms, this uncritically mirrored Russian propaganda about Iran without providing any clarifications or contrasting sources. The events in Tabriz or Urmia were not even mentioned. Unlike in the Ottoman Empire, the photographs were either not published at all in the British press or appeared with a long delay. Therefore, Browne published the entire set

43 *Illustrated London News*, 28 September 1912, pp. 458–459.

44 *Ibid.*, p. 461.

of the photographs in a pamphlet in October 1912 and also reproduced letters and reports from Tabriz, hoping to raise awareness of the events in Britain.<sup>45</sup> Browne regarded Britain as being partially responsible for the massacres since the Foreign Office had done nothing to stop them from happening.<sup>46</sup> He believed that photographs would convey the cruelty of what had happened more than words could:

*These frightful photographs, though they do not represent the worst horrors perpetrated in Tabriz since New Year's Day, 1912, on which the Russian executions began, are calculated to bring home to the people of this country, in a way that nothing else can do, the results of that subservience to Russia which is the outstanding feature of Sir Edward Grey's foreign policy, and the terrible responsibility which we as a nation have incurred.*<sup>47</sup>

He further regarded the photographs as historic sources and "evidence":

*It is in order that the British representatives and the British people may clearly realize for what crimes against humanity our foreign policy has made us responsible that the following Letters from Tabriz with the photographs which serve as part of the evidence for the truth of their statements are now published.*<sup>48</sup>

While valuing photographs and their unique way of conveying what has been, Browne also knew that what they showed is only a limited depiction of the events: "The worst atrocities, however, were committed by *Shujá'u'd-Dawla* [...] of which *some of the photographs here published give a faint idea, but which cannot be described in this place.*"<sup>49</sup>

A writer in the Ottoman press expressed similar thoughts as Browne: "Neither my pen nor my tongue is able to indicate or describe the vehement grief and affliction of the populace, of the degree of this detestation and enmity towards the Russians which they entertain in their hearts."<sup>50</sup> Browne, in his understanding that the photographs of political violence might awaken the conscience of his readership, while nevertheless being unable to fully convey what happened, mirrors Susan Sontag's discussion of war photographs in her book *Regarding the Pain of Others*. She implores: "Such images cannot be more than an invitation to pay attention, to reflect, to learn, to examine the rationalization for

45 "the series of photographs published in October, 1912, and now appended to this book (some of which first appeared in the Sphere, the Graphic, the Anglo-Russian, Free Russia and Egypt) have conveyed to the people of this country some idea of what the unhappy city of Tabriz...has endured and is still enduring at the hands of the Russians and their chosen tool Shujá'u'd-Dawla." Browne, Letters from Tabriz, pp. 34–35. "They were published by Messrs. Taylor, Garnett, Evans and Co., Ltd., Blackfriars Street, Manchester in a pamphlet entitled The Reign of Terror in Tabriz: England's Responsibility with photographs and a Brief Narrative of the events of December 1911, and January 1912, price six pence" (ibid., p. 34).

46 The foreign minister Edward Grey's anti-German and therefore pro-Russian stance dominated Britain's foreign politics at the time. On Grey's "Persia politics" and the events in Tabriz, see Bonakdarian, Britain and the Iranian Constitutional Revolution, pp. 297–352.

47 Ibid., p. 36. Emphasis added.

48 Ibid., p. 44. Emphasis added.

49 Ibid., pp. 39–40. Emphasis added.

50 From an article, which appeared in the Ottoman newspaper *Yeni İqdam* (New Progress), no. 667, 27 January 1912, reproduced in Browne, Letters from Tabriz, p. 64.



mass suffering offered by established powers.”<sup>51</sup> She ends her book with the following words, as if answering the Ottoman writer who declared himself unable to fully convey his grief through words: “We don’t get it. We truly can’t imagine what it was like. We can’t imagine how dreadful, how terrifying war is; and how normal it becomes.”<sup>52</sup> However, while Sontag’s work has often been interpreted as requesting that photographs of conflict should neither be taken nor ‘consumed,’ this is not what Browne and his Iranian contacts demanded – they regarded the circulation and reproduction of the photographs as crucial to raise awareness and gather international support.

## 8. Photographs of Executions Organized by the Iranian Constitutionalist Government

Even though the photographs from occupied Tabriz were singular in their depiction of political violence, they were not the only photographs of executions circulating in Constitutionalist Iran. Photographs of the execution of Mirza Riza Kirmani, the assassin of Nasir al-Din Shah, which had retroactively been interpreted as a precursor of the Constitutional Revolution, were being circulated again – this time as picture postcards.<sup>53</sup> In addition to that, photographs of executions, which took place in 1909, during the second half of the Constitutional Revolution, circulated. These outbreaks of institutionalized violence, which intended to emphasize the regime’s strength but also its ruthlessness regarding attempts at counter revolution, mark the later part of the revolution.

The best known and most contested of these events is the execution of the conservative Mulla Fazl Allah Nuri (1843–1909), who besides Muhammad ‘Ali Shah, had become the epitome of reactionary resistance (fig. 18). For a while Nuri had been a hesitant supporter of political reform, but in 1907 he formed an alliance with the newly crowned Muhammad ‘Ali Shah.<sup>54</sup> He criticized the Constitutionalist government and symbol of

51 S. Sontag, *Regarding the Pain of Others*, New York 2003, p. 117.

52 Ibid., p. 126.

53 These photographs had first circulated as albumen prints directly after the assassination and were then reprinted as picture postcards during the Constitutionalist period. See Schwerda, *Death on Display*.

54 From the 1880s on, after having studied and worked in Iran and in the shrine cities in Iraq, Nuri became interested in politics and he participated in the protest against the Tobacco Concession in 1890–91. In 1902 he opposed the foreign loans undertaken by the Prime Minister Amin al-Sultan and he became a close advisor of his successor ‘Ayn al-Dawla, who was on bad terms with Bihbahani. During this time his influence began to rise and he became better known. Yet, once he had made a name for himself he disengaged from any criticism of the government. When he was asked to join the *bast* [sit-in protest] of the ulama in the shrine of Qum, which took place around the same time as the *bast* in the British Legation, he delayed his departure by three days until he realized the protest movement’s popularity and likely feared that he might lose influence, if he did not join the *bast*. He then became a hesitant supporter of the burgeoning Constitutionalist movement: “he acquiesced to the demand not only for reform but also for the establishment of a *majles*, but on the understanding, like most of the ulama, that it was to be an Islamic institution. He cooperated with Sayyed ‘Abd-Allāh Behbahāni and Sayyed Moḥammad Ṭabāṭabā’i, and they were all agreed that a *majles* should protect Islam, particularly Shi‘ism in Iran, from foreign domination. Shaikh Faḏl-Allāh believed at this point that *mašru‘a* had significant implications for limiting the power of the shah and his ministers, but he was concerned about demands for full freedom, which he considered infidelity in Islam. He was also unhappy about references to a boundary in legal affairs, stating that there was no boundary for the *ṣari‘a*” (Martin, Nuri, n.p.).



conservative religious resistance to political reform. He publicized his protests by sending telegrams to the shah and to the main cities declaring himself the protector of the laws of Islam. He also set up a printing press and began to publish a small, lithographed journal, which featured his speeches against the Constitutionalist movement:

*In particular [...] he attacked the constitutionalist concept of liberty, which term he defined as existing only in the sense of being confined by the principles of the šari'a, and which, in the form of freedom of the press, he perceived it as anarchic and seditious. He strongly objected to the notion of equality before the law, and numbered among the iniquities of the Majles the fact that it gave the Zoroastrians the freedom to propagate their faith.<sup>55</sup>*

It was widely believed that his *bast* [sit-in protest] was supported and subsidized by the reactionary Muhammad 'Ali Shah. In December 1907 the shah organized a more than one-week-long anti-Constitutionalist protest in Tehran's *Tupkhana* Square (Persian: Canon Square), which was joined by Nuri. As a result, the ulema of Najaf declared Nuri a source of sedition. After the bombing of the *majlis* in 1908, Nuri wrote a treatise justifying the act and provided Muhammad 'Ali Shah with religious legitimation. Nuri's arguments were strongly contested by the ulema of Najaf, particularly Mulla Muhammad-Kazim Khurasani. After the coup failed and the Constitutionalist forces had entered Tehran in July 1909, Nuri declined to take refuge in the Russian Legation. He was arrested, tried, and publicly executed on 31 July 1909.

Nuri's execution took place at Tupkhana Square in the centre of Tehran, the same place where Nuri had participated in the anti-Constitutionalist protest organized by the shah in December 1907. His hanging, like those later in Tabriz, was turned into a spectacle and was attended by large crowds as can be seen in the photograph (fig. 18). While the Constitutionalist regime demonstrated its power over a vocal enemy by hanging him in public, its conflicted stance towards the execution of a cleric is visible even from the photograph: Nuri was hung in his clerical robes, he was not stripped down to his underwear or dressed in a prisoner's uniform like many others, including the assassin Mirza Riza Kirmani and all of those hung in Tabriz. However, his turban, the symbol of his learnedness and his high standing was taken off. The decision to execute him was and remains a contested one and he is regarded as a martyr by the current Iranian regime.<sup>56</sup>

## 9. Conclusion

The Iranian Constitutional Revolution, including its gruesome aftermath in Tabriz, was informed by the interplay of new forms of media: the telegraph, the printing press, and photography. Many of the photographs taken at the beginning of the twentieth century

<sup>55</sup> Ibid.

<sup>56</sup> For a discussion of the reaction of the British press to Nuri's execution, see Bonakdarian, Britain and the Iranian Constitutional Revolution, pp. 203–204.

in Iran were depictions of violence as well as of political power, visualizing executions, corporal punishment and torture, as well as prisoners. These photographs were commissioned by the court, reactionary rulers, or by pseudo-colonial powers such as Russia. Often, a reproduction with a simple change of the caption of the image allowed the Constitutionalist opposition to reuse the image for a different purpose, changing its function from a demonstration of power to rallying support against the violent use of political power. One example of this are the photographs of Mirza Riza Kirmani from 1896, another example is the group portrait of the imprisoned parliamentarians at the Baharistan. These reinterpretations and changes in meaning for the photographs stressed the ambiguity and malleability of the photographic image, which despite this still functioned as “truthful photographic evidence”. Yet, despite the common and active practice of the reinterpretation of photographs, the Constitutionalist government itself commissioned or at least sanctioned photographs of violence in 1909 as part of its counterrevolution. The execution of Nuri and the hangings of other enemies of the government were photographed and then reproduced as postcards. Against this background it becomes clear how complex the context of the Russian photographs is. The leaked photographs were used to draw attention to Russian atrocity by individuals with ties to the Iranian government, yet the same government had organized similar executions two years earlier and had them photographically recorded. Unlike the Iranian photographs of the executions of enemies of the regime, which were widely circulated as postcards, the Russian photographs of the executions in Tabriz were never circulated as postcards. After they had been reproduced by Browne and others, they were mostly forgotten.

Without the publication of the photographs of the atrocities in Tabriz the Iranian events would have likely remained just a minor headline on the newspaper page. The British public demonstrated against foreign minister Grey's Iran politics after learning about the Tabriz massacres in word and image, yet unfortunately this resulted only in a limited change in his support of Russia. With Russian backing, Shuja' al-Saltana remained in power in Tabriz until 1914, despite the attempts of the Constitutionalist government to replace him. Only the coming of a different revolution completely changed the power balance in northern Iran: Russia's February Revolution, which coincided with the Iranian Nawruz festivities in 1917, was celebrated in Tabriz by Iranians and (some) Russians alike. They jointly visited the graves of the victims of the 1911/1912 executions, recited and printed commemorative poems, sang songs dedicated to the victims' memory, decorated the town with flags, and erected a copy of the gallows in the same spot where the original had stood. The song recited at the commemoration ended with the lines: “O you who sacrificed your lives for this land [...] Your names will not be forgotten.”<sup>57</sup> While the Russian photographs might have been intended to reduce their victims' dignity, they also memorialized the events and victims, contributing in that sense – like the poems and the cited songs – to keeping their memory alive.

57 On the celebration of the February Revolution in Tabriz and the commemoration of the victims, see Kasravi, *Tārikh-i Hijdah Sālah-i Āzarbāyjān*, pp. 681–687. The song is quoted on p. 682.

## Appendix

Fig. 4: *The bodies of the nephews of Sattar Khan* (unidentified photographer).



Fig. 5: *The first execution of Constitutionalists in Tabriz*. Thiqat al-Islam is the fourth body from left, marked with an Arabic '5' (unidentified photographer).



Fig. 6: *The position of the gallows close to the citadel in the very centre of town* (unidentified photographer).



Fig. 7: *Russian soldiers and a Persian servant with four executed men* (unidentified photographer).



Fig. 8: *The first part of a man's body, which was treated like a dead sheep* (unidentified photographer).



Fig. 9: *The second part of the body* (unidentified photographer).




Fig. 10: *A Constitutionalist executed by Shuja' al-Dawla* (unidentified photographer).



Fig. 11: *A Constitutionalist executed by Shuja' al-Dawla* (unidentified photographer).





Fig. 12: *The display of a strangled corpse* (unidentified photographer).



Fig. 13: *A dead body surrounded by soldiers of Shuja' al-Saltana* (unidentified photographer).



Fig. 14: *Two dead bodies surrounded by a crowd of people, including young boys* (unidentified photographer).



Fig. 15: *A body, stabbed through the chest with a dagger* (unidentified photographer).






Fig. 16: *A boy standing in front of two hung men* (unidentified photographer).



Fig. 17: *Reproduction of figs. 4, 7, 16 in the Ottoman journal "Resimli Kitap"* 7 (1912) 37, pp. 70–71 (British Library).




Fig. 18: *Studio portrait of Fazl Allah Nuri* (right); *the execution of Nuri in Tehran* (left), pp. 75–76 (Kimia Collection, Los Angeles).

