

dalenes eventuelle Liebesaffäre mit Sapis Onkel Mpangile; dann das Fortleben der Kolonialzeit in Erinnerungen und Objekten; und so weiter. Mit ihrem Buch zeigt Brockmeyer einen Weg, dieser Komplexität gerecht zu werden.

Anmerkungen:

- 1 Z.B. T. Sandkühler u.a. (Hrsg.), *Geschichtskultur durch Restitution? Ein Kunst-Historikerstreit*, Wien 2021, mit einem Beitrag Brockmeyers zu besagtem Zahn.
- 2 D. Chakrabarti, *Colonial Clerks: A Social History of Deprivation and Domination*, Kolkata 2005; B. N. Lawrance u.a. (Hrsg.), *Intermediaries, Interpreters, and Clerks: African Employees in the Making of Colonial Africa*, Madison, WI 2006; M. R. Moyd, *Violent Intermediaries: African Soldiers, Conquest, and Everyday Colonialism in German East Africa*, Athens, OH 2014; vgl. ferner z.B. D. Simpson, *Dark Companions: The African Contribution to the European Exploration of East Africa*, London 1975; S. Schaffer u.a. (Hrsg.), *The Brokered World: Go-Betweens and Global Intelligence, 1770–1820*, Sagamore Beach, MA 2009.
- 3 Dass die später von den Briten ausgewiesene Magdalene (von) Prince ironischerweise einen englischen Nachnamen trug, wird im Buch nicht erklärt – er stammte von dem britischen Vater ihres Mannes.

**Nicholas Mulder: *The Economic Weapon: The Rise of Sanctions as a Tool of Modern War*, New Haven/London: Yale University Press, 2022, 448 pp.**

Reviewed by  
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With the Ukraine war economic sanctions have again become a popular instrument in international politics. Nicholas Mulder's timely book examines the origins of economic sanctions in the aftermath of the First World War. Mulder argues that "the economic weapon reveals itself as one of liberal internationalism's most enduring innovations of the twentieth century and a key to understanding its paradoxical approach to war and peace" (p. 3). Mulder traces the history of sanctions from the First World War to the Second World War, demonstrating how the wartime blockade turned into a sanctions' regime after 1919. Part one deals with the blockade during the First World War, which Mulder describes as "one of the most consequential experiments in global economic governance" (p. 28). Rather than pursuing a law of blockade under international law, the Allies introduced various measures which supported an actual blockade, such as a rationing system, blacklists, licence schemes for imports and exports, bunker control, and from 1917 a financial blockade. As early as 1916, Lord Cecil, head of the Ministry of Blockade, contemplated how

to change the wartime blockade into a peacetime weapon to prevent future wars. As the Central Powers reacted to the Allied blockade measures with counter-measures, the Allies' decision to continue the blockade after the armistice laid the foundation for the "creation of modern economic sanctions as measures outside of war" (p. 64). Mulder discusses the Allies' various plans to implement sanctions in the post-war order, which resulted in Article 16 of the Covenant of the League of Nations becoming a "history-shaping weapon" (p. 57). Supporters of sanctions, who Mulder calls sanctionists, thought little about the decisiveness of the blockade in ending the war but the fear of blockade remained alive in European societies in the interwar period.

Mulder argues that the continuation of the Allied blockades after the peace treaties, using economic coercion against Germany, the Bolsheviks and the Hungarian Soviet Republic from 1919 to 1921 caused immense humanitarian catastrophes, and stirred debates about "the ethics of targeting civilians" (p. 89). The aim of the economic sanctions was to cause regime changes in Russia and Hungary, where Communists ruled. Mulder points out that sanctionists supported not only sanctions but also demanded humanitarian aid.

Part two deals with the legitimacy of the economic weapon and address the various avenues sanctionists pursued in strengthening it in the interwar years. Chapter four explores sanctions as an instrument of deterrence between 1921 and 1924. The deterrence worked in the Yugoslav-Albanian crisis of 1921, but in other incidents, such as the Ruhr occupation in 1923, and

the Italian invasion of Corfu in 1923, it did not, or the crisis was diplomatically solved.

Chapter five draws the attention to Geneva as "headquarters of a global sanctionist security order" (p.132). While Britain developed the idea of economic pressure, making it distinct from wartime blockade measures, France favoured "automatic sanctions procedures" (p.133). Turning the blockade into a weapon of peacetime was a challenge for strategists in the interwar period. Mulder describes several instances in 1925 and 1926 in which Britain considered economic sanctions against Turkey, China, Soviet Russia, Greece and Bulgaria as a threat to resolve border disputes or initiate regime change. Although sanctions were never used, Mulder argues that the "virtual dimension of the economic weapon" (p. 151) was effective. Chapter six examines sanctions in relation to neutrality in the period between 1927 to 1931. For sanctionists, neutrality had no place, and, thus, they developed the idea of a "positive economic weapon" (p. 158), by which they meant financial assistance to countries that were threatened by others.

Part three discusses major crises of the 1930s and explores how economic sanctions were used as an instrument to prevent the escalation of war. In the early 1930s, the League experienced major turmoil with Japan and Germany leaving and the Soviet Union joining. Mulder argues that "the problem with sanctions was less their inherent weakness than their considerable but unpredictable strength" (p. 180). The Japanese aggression against China in the early 1930s did not result in sanctions from the League against Japan because the

United States did not join them. The dispute between Bolivia and Paraguay led to an international weapon's embargo, initiated by Britain and France and joined by the Soviet Union. Yet, the US did not join the embargo, which weakened the sanctions' impact.

When Italy invaded Ethiopia in 1935, the League condemned Italy as aggressor. For sanctions to work, experience had shown that Britain and France needed the support of the United States and the Soviet Union. While imports and exports were stopped, a planned oil embargo was put on halt since the US did not join. Ideas such as the closure of the Suez Canal to Italian ships were discarded as waterways were neutralised under international law. Moreover, financial aid for Ethiopia did also not materialize in time. Mulder describes how Germany and Japan reacted to the sanctions against Italy with the development of counter-measures, which lead to autarky policies in those countries. Here, Mulder distinguishes between (independent enhancing) autarky and (self-sufficiency) autarky, based on the work of Luigi Einhaudi (p. 230).

In chapter ten, Mulder explores a range of sanctions employed during the Second World War. In the Russo-Finnish-War in 1939 the Americans financially assisted the Finns. An oil embargo against Spain in 1940 successfully prevented Spain from joining the Axis in 1940. The introduction of the Lend-Lease program in the United States meant it could give financial and material assistance to states without infringing its neutrality laws. Immediate beneficiaries were Britain, China, and Greece which received financial aid in support of their resistance against Nazi

Germany. Mulder concludes that "in the history of collective security and economic sanctions, Lend-Lease implemented the positive economic weapon of Article 16 on a vast scale" (p. 274). Finally, sanctions found their place in the post-war order of the United Nations.

Mulder concludes that although most sanctions in the interwar period did not work, "sanctions have become an accepted tool of liberal international institutions" (p. 292). Rather than examining the "successes" of sanctions, Mulder assesses sanctions as a tool distinguishing between efficacy and effects, which allows for a much more nuanced analysis of sanctions and sheds new light on the cases discussed in the book.

The book is lucidly written and well-researched. It is informative for a general reader and the extensive footnotes are a valuable source for those who want to know more. The book also holds caveats for the expert reader, addressing broader themes such as the crisis management of the League, the legal context of sanctions, or how liberal the economic weapon was. The only point of criticism is the lack of explanation of the entanglement between the state and the private economy and the role of collective security. Overall, Mulder convincingly explains the shift from the wartime blockade to a sanctions' regime during peacetime after 1919. He impressively demonstrates how difficult it was to impose sanctions amid political tensions and crises in the interwar period and the cases are a constant reminder of the unpredictable outcome of sanctions.