

The Soviet Union's "Great Patriotic War" Invalids: The Poverty of a New Status Group

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RESÜMEE

Die Sowjetunion ging aus dem „Großen Vaterländischen Krieg“ als Sieger und zweite Supermacht neben den USA hervor. Doch der Preis für diesen Triumph war schrecklich hoch. Der Krieg kostete schätzungsweise 27 Mio. Menschen das Leben, Millionen Soldaten kehrten verstümmelt, blind oder chronisch krank von der Front zurück. Aufgrund rigider Anerkennungsverfahren wurden aber nicht alle dieser Kriegsoffer in die Statusgruppe der staatlich anerkannten Kriegsinvaliden aufgenommen, die Anspruch auf Rentenzahlung und andere Privilegien geltend machen konnten. Aus staatlicher Sicht war vor allem die schnelle Wiedereingliederung ins Arbeitsleben die beste Therapie gegen kriegsbedingte körperliche Leiden und wurde deshalb zum Hauptinstrument sowjetischer Sozialpolitik. Es fehlte allerdings an begleitenden Umschulungs- oder Ausbildungsprogrammen, medizinischen Rehabilitationsmaßnahmen und einer ausreichenden Zahl funktionstüchtiger Prothesen. Während die staatliche Propaganda „umfassende Fürsorge“ für die Kriegsversehrten in Aussicht stellte, erlebten sich diese selbst als „arme Sieger“.

1. Introduction

The question to what extent the Soviet Union was a welfare state, was first raised in the 1960s, however no thorough analytical response has yet been given.¹ The Soviet leadership granted the welfare idea a central place in its political propaganda from the very

1 A. Nove, Towards a Communist Welfare State? Social Welfare in the USSR, in: Problems of Communism 9 (1960) 1, 1–10; Ders., Is the Soviet Union a Welfare State, in: T. Riha (Hg.): Readings in Russian Civilization, Vol. III, Chicago 1964, 745–756; B. Q. Madison, Social Welfare in the Soviet Union, Stanford/California 1968 as well as the literature in the paper by Mark Edele in this volume (Notes 36 and 37).

beginning and declared that it wanted to create a new, just and content society in which exploitation would be abolished and the right to social security guaranteed. These guiding principles were upheld until the very collapse of the system.

This paper examines the pensions and benefits for disabled servicemen and asks to what extent the state lived up to the task it had set itself and fulfilled the expectations that had been aroused.² The ex-servicemen are an ideal object of study due to size and definition of the group; they also paid for the survival of the Soviet state with their health and, as invalids, had reason to expect special aid. First we will sketch the material and institutional conditions that the Bolsheviks inherited and then look at the recognition processes, the war-victim pensions and benefits, the reintegration of disabled soldiers into working life and their discontent with the Soviet social welfare system.

2. Background

In the closing years of tsarist Russia the entire welfare system was still in its infancy and the care for ex-servicemen and invalids lay primarily in the hands of private philanthropists.³ This changed, however, with the law of 25 June 1912,⁴ in which the Russian government laid the foundations for public-relief payments to war victims and, for the first time, recognised the entitlement of *all* war invalids to pensions and free prosthetic devices.⁵ An applicant's assets and family situation played no role – the degree of physical handicap alone determined the level of a pension. Nevertheless, as the payments did not cover the minimum income needed to exist, private charity remained important.⁶

Despite the immense costs involved, the Provisional Government (February–October 1917) continued the new course in social policy, further increasing the benefits for ex-servicemen⁷ and creating the Ministry of Public Welfare (*Ministerstvo gosudarstvennogo prizreniia*) – a novelty in Russian history. Thus the administrative foundations for the modern welfare state were laid down, which were set the task of overcoming the coun-

2 For the recognition of all former combatants as one status group and their combination into the category of veterans, see the paper by Mark Edele in this volume.

3 The development of pensions and benefits for war victims in the Russian Empire has yet to be studied systematically, but see: E. Pyle, *Village Social Relations and the Reception of Soldiers' Family Aid Policies in Russia, 1912–1921*. Ph. D. Dissertation, University of Chicago/Illinois, 1997.

4 *Pensii soldatam, ikh vdovam i sirotam. Zakon 25 iunia 1912 s izdannymi v dopolnenie ego instruktsiiami i raz'iasneniiami Pravitel'stvuiushchago Senata*, Petrograd 1915. Two days earlier, on 23 June, 1912, the Tsar endorsed the draft laws on workers' health and accident insurance. In practice, however, they only applied to about 20% of workers: V. L. Stepanov, *Die Sozialgesetzgebung Otto von Bismarcks und die russischen Arbeiter-versicherungsgesetze*, in: D. Beyrau, I. Čičurov und M. Stolleis (Hg.), *Reformen im Rußland des 19. und 20. Jahrhunderts. Westliche Modelle und russische Erfahrungen*, Frankfurt 1996, 109–138. For the precursors of the law, see: J. von Puttkamer, *Anfänge russischer Sozialgesetzgebung. Die Politik der Regierung und die Haltung der Industrie zur Haftung bei Arbeitsunfällen*, in: H. Haumann und S. Plaggenborg (Hg.), *Aufbruch der Gesellschaft im verordneten Staat*, Frankfurt/M. 1994, 186–216.

5 *Kak russkomu soldatu i ego sem'e poluchit' pensiiu i posobie*, Moskva 1915, 17.

6 D. N. Borodin, *Invalidnyj dom grafov Zubovykh*, Moskva 1915, 5–6; see also: I. I. Charnomskaia, *K voprosu o trudovoi pomoshchi uvechnym voinam*, St. Peterburg 1915, 9–10.

7 E. Pyle, *Village Social Relations*, 6.

try's backwardness in this field. At the same time the care for disabled ex-servicemen was declared to be a governmental task.⁸ A new goal was formulated: to replace the current concentration on material support for "help to self-help",⁹ which was essentially a reference to publically funded reintegration into working life.¹⁰ In addition, a fundamental reform of the private charity system was planned.

3. Invalid Welfare from the October Revolution to the First Five-Year Plan

The latter did not occur, however, because the Bolsheviks did away with all existing private philanthropic institutions after the October Revolution and by 1920 had brought the entire social-welfare field under public control. They assumed self-assuredly that the welfare institutions of the future Soviet state would render every kind of traditional charity redundant. In order to erase all memory of the pre-socialist period with its religiously inspired care for the poor and needy, on 17 April 1918 the public authority responsible for disabled servicemen was renamed the "People's Commissariat of Public Welfare" (*Narkomsobes*) and the customary, emotionally charged designation "maimed soldier" (*uvechnyi voyn*) was replaced by the neutral term "disabled serviceman" (*invalid voiny*). In practical terms, in view of empty coffers, it was only possible to pay an elementary, minimum level of income to *persons unable to work*. After all, the Constitution of 1918 established the *requirement to work* for every individual as a basic social principle: "He shall not eat who does not work", it stated succinctly.¹¹ Accordingly, a new concept of social welfare won ground: only persons who were completely incapacitated, unable to work, and who genuinely had no other means of subsistence (other income, support from family, etc.) would be able to benefit.¹² Since fulfilling the interests of the workers was also a priority, the emphasis of welfare policy shifted away from disabled servicemen. During the New Economic Policy (*NEP*) of the 1920s practically nothing remained of the tsarist government's care obligation of 1912 which had guaranteed *all* sick and wounded soldiers the right to a pension: the overwhelming majority of the 2.7 million

8 Soveshchanie pri Ministerstve gosudarstvennogo prizreniia po voprosam pomoshchi voenno-uvechnym, 4 June, 1917: GARF 6787/1/37, sheet 37; speech by the Minister of Public Welfare, Prince D. I. Shakhovskoi, at the 1st All-Russian Delegates' Meeting of Wounded Soldiers, Petrograd, 15 June, 1917: GARF 6787/1/28, sheet 10.

9 O zadachakh Ministerstva gosudarstvennogo prizreniia v oblasti okazaniia pomoshchi voennouvechnym. Doklad d-ra G. F. Melenevskago, 1917: GARF 6787/1/30, sheet 39.

10 Letter of the Minister of Public Welfare to various ministries requesting that all suitable positions be filled with disabled servicemen, 7 September, 1917: GARF 6787/1/30, sheets 81–82; circular of the Ministry of Agriculture on the allocation of workplaces to disabled servicemen, 19 September, 1917: GARF 6787/1/35, sheet 5; Zasedanie soveshchaniia po voprosu o trudovoi pomoshchi voenno-uvechnym so storony rabotodatelei i soiuzyv rabotodatelei, 22 September, 1917, 29 September, 1917, 6 October, 1917: GARF 6787/1/38a, sheets 1–6, 10–11.

11 Constitution of the RSFSR, adopted by the 5th All-Russian Congress of Soviets on 10 July, 1918, in: H. Altrichter (Hg.), *Die Sowjetunion. Von der Oktoberrevolution bis zu Stalins Tod*. Bd. 1: Staat und Partei, München 1986, 147.

12 Sotsial'noe obespechenie v Sovetskoj Rossii. Sbornik statei k s'ezdu Sovetov. Pod red. A. Vinokurova, Moskva 1919, 5.

invalids of the First World War and Russian Civil War – predominantly peasants – received no regular financial support from the Soviet government.

The top echelons of the Party and government pleaded for an as comprehensive as possible reintegration of disabled servicemen into working life instead of fostering their “sinecure mentality” with pensions.¹³ However given the high unemployment during the NĖP this was out of the question, so the abject poverty of the invalids remained a mass phenomenon throughout the 1920s; but it was at least discussed in public and recognised as a social problem. Efforts were also made to alleviate the veterans’ hardships through publically controlled fund-raising activities (donation appeals, lotteries, sale of commemorative stamps, calendars, etc.). Prints with depictions of begging invalids appealed to the population’s readiness to help.¹⁴ The state thus did not conceal that it was unable to meet its obligation towards the former soldiers alone, and was dependent on support from society.

This aid was increasingly sidelined in the course of the 1920s and the areas of responsibility of corresponding organisations were drastically curtailed. The government intended for the problem to be solved by public funds alone. Active reintegration into working life thus became the basic instrument of aid to war invalids, and a draft government resolution in 1930 declared it the “most practical form” of public welfare.¹⁵

4. The Stalinist Turnaround

The comparatively open and pragmatic approach to the issue of invalids ended abruptly in the 1930s. All existing societies and committees for aid to invalids were disbanded in 1935 as their activities had become “redundant”.¹⁶ This by no means corresponded to social reality, so other methods were chosen to bring wish and reality into agreement. Undesirable social phenomena were defined out of existence and the individuals were treated with corresponding rigour, where necessary with repression. Life in the Soviet Union had become “better, and happier too”, Stalin proclaimed in 1935, and by definition there was no longer any place for inadequately supported invalids. The police now combated outcasts and outsiders, including disabled servicemen who were begging and homeless, and allegedly posed a threat to the Soviet state.¹⁷ Social control and state security increasingly fused, and the concept of a “menace to society” spread like wildfire.

13 Letter from Trotsky to the Narkomsobes and the Vserokompom, 17 January, 1922: RGVA 4/4/207, sheets 71–72; letter of the Narkomsobes to Trotsky, 25 January, 1922: RGVA 4/4/207, sheets 79–80; Postanovlenie Narkomsobesa No. 115, 4 December, 1924: GARF 4347/1/219, sheet 9.

14 For example, see the poster “Don’t leave the Red Hero empty-handed, buy special-issue stamps!” (around 1920), in: M. Lafont, *Soviet Posters. The Sergo Grigorian Collection*, München u. a. 2007, 49.

15 GARF 4347/1/607, sheet 60.

16 GARF 1235/76/121, sheet 7.

17 D. Shearer, *Crime and Social Disorder in Stalin’s Russia. A Reassessment of the Great Retreat and the Origins of Mass Repression*, in: *Cahiers du Monde russe*, 39 (1998) 1/2, 139, 143; D. Shearer, *Social Disorder, Mass Repression, and the NKVD during the 1930s*, in: *Cahiers du Monde russe*, 42 (2001) 2/3/4, 526, 528, 534.

The campaigns of repression peaked in 1937/38 in the bloody “mass operations” of the Great Terror,¹⁸ which also had the objective of rooting out social disorderliness once and for all. Although they were certainly not the main target, unemployed and homeless war invalids were also among the victims of the purges.¹⁹

The “socialist offensive” in dealing with the disabled servicemen was pursued not only with repressive means but also through ideology. Heroic passion compensated for the lack of genuine public welfare and went hand in hand with the state’s terroristic practices. In order to mobilise the population – in particular young people – for the numerous new “fronts of industry”, the myth of the Civil War had to be popularised. Yet real disabled servicemen were not suitable as role models. They had learned the hard way what struggle meant and as a direct result were no longer able to fight the “battles to increase production”; their primitive wooden crutches and empty sleeves were a reminder that not all wounds and deformities could be “overcome” by energy and will-power. They were therefore condemned to be swept under the carpet of the 1930’s society committed to enthusiasm, optimism and heroism.

It was symptomatic and at the same time revealing of the condition of Soviet society in the early 1930s that a fictional, literary figure was stylised to be the glowing role model. The novel *How the Steel was Tempered*²⁰ (1932–1934) by Nikolai A. Ostrovskii furnished the “fitting hero” – Pavel Korchagin, a disabled serviceman who sacrificed himself, fighting to his last breath to build socialism. The book does not address the cruelty of war and the agony of the wounded but glorifies tireless struggle.²¹ It denies the existence of physical boundaries that cannot be mastered by human endeavour. Pavel Korchagin is the “victim hero” whose iron will keeps him in constant combat-readiness, despite his physical decline, and enables him to perform at peak level. From then on he occupied a central position in the pantheon of totalitarian heroes and became a powerful model for many people–invalids included.

Now the apparatus for dealing with invalidity was ready. No distinction was made between civilian and military invalids. Regardless whether the physical impairment resulted at work or in defending the country, public welfare was first and foremost to serve the “socialist offensive” and help increase production. The social legacy of two wars was thus to be “surmounted” without great expense: with ideological axioms, and if necessary backed up with violence. A mixture of minimal care, reintegration pressure, repression of the non-integratables and all-encompassing hero-worship, shaped public attitudes to disabled servicemen from the 1930s until long after the “Great Patriotic War”.

18 R. Binner und M. Junge: Wie der Terror „groß“ wurde: Massenmord und Lagerhaft nach Befehl 00447, in: Cahiers du Monde russe 42 (2001) 2/3/4, 557–614; Dies.: „S’etoj publikoj ceremonit’sja ne sleduet“. Die Zielgruppen des Befehls Nr. 00447 und der Große Terror aus der Sicht des Befehls Nr. 00447, in: Cahiers du Monde russe 43 (2002) 1, 181–228.

19 There is no knowledge as to what proportion of the victims they made up.

20 Published 1932–1934, German edition 1947.

21 H. Günther, Das Tauwetter als Prozeß der Entkanonisierung, in: D. Beyrau/I. Bock (Hg.), Das Tauwetter und die Folgen. Kultur und Politik in Osteuropa nach 1956, Bremen 1988, 149.

5. The Work-Related Concept of Invalidity and its Legal Consequences

The previous health-related view was superseded in 1932 by a concept of invalidity embedded in labour-supply considerations.²² Invalidity was now no longer recognised with physical impairment in general but only when it meant total or partial loss of the ability to work. The first category of invalidity under the new definition – the severely disabled – encompassed all persons completely unable to work and also dependent on constant care. The second group comprised those completely unable to work but not in need of care. Finally, the third category combined those still partially able to work, who could be employed under simplified conditions in low-qualified occupations, with correspondingly low income.²³ All those whose handicap did not force them to give up their profession were not recognised as invalids and had no pension entitlements at all – even when functional impairment was considerable.²⁴

This production-related view of invalidity was first applied on a large scale to the millions of those physically impaired in the “Great Patriotic War” (over 18 million wounded or serious ill soldiers), of whom 3.8 million were discharged from the Red Army as invalids during the war. In the post-war years only somewhere between 2.6 and 2.8 million of these were recognised as disabled servicemen and entitled to public benefits.²⁵ The doctors who undertook the classification were instructed by the Ministry of Social Affairs, in ever newer briefings, to apply extremely strict standards. The example was given of an accounts clerk with a prosthetic device for his amputated lower leg. He was considered fully fit for employment and thus not to be recognised as a disabled serviceman, even if his defect had led to his discharge from the army. The admission of such cases to the third category was only possible temporarily at best, the instructions said, where a wound needed to heal or to allow the person to adapt to new circumstances (using prosthetic devices, writing with the left hand, etc.).²⁶ As the welfare offices saw it, war wounds either represented no impairment at all, were considered curable (through work!), or were to be overcome through adaptation. The physical impairment itself was thus trivialised and its consequences for the individual downplayed. Following a government directive, the disabled servicemen were regrouped between 1942 and 1948 in such a way that the majority of them again became available as manpower for the war economy or post-war reconstruction:

22 Trudovoe ustroistvo invalidov v SSSR. Sbornik normativnykh aktov i metodicheskikh materialov, Moskva 1963, 56; S. M. Schwarz, Arbeiterklasse und Arbeitspolitik in der Sowjetunion, Köln 1953, 339.

23 Ibidem, 56.

24 Ibidem, 52–53.

25 G. F. Krivosheev, Soviet Casualties and Combat Losses in the Twentieth Century, London 1997, 92; C. Merridale, Iwans Krieg: Die Rote Armee 1939–1945, Frankfurt a. M. 2006, 395.

26 A. Ia. Averbakh / M. V. Shirokova (Red.), Spravochnik po vrachebno-trudovoi ekspertize invalidov otechestvennoi voiny, Moskva 1943, 14; see also: A. Ia. Averbakh, Sostoianie vrachebno-trudovoi ekspertizy v RSFSR i ee ocherednye zadachi, in N. M. Obodan (Red.): Vozvrashchenie k trudovoi deiatel'nosti invalidov, Leningrad 1945, 24, who even adduced the following example of full fitness for employment: an accounts clerk, blind in one eye, with fingers 3–5 of the right hand missing and his left lower leg amputated.

Table 1: Distribution of disabled servicemen in groups, RSFSR 1942–1948²⁷

	September 1942	October 1944	January 1945	April 1948
1st group:	1.6 %	1.53 %	1.5 %	1.9 %
2nd group:	52.7 %	35.4 %	33.9 %	21.1 %
3rd group:	45.7 %	63.1 %	64.6 %	77.0 %

It is particularly conspicuous that the percentage in the second category declined markedly in favour of the third. Whereas the second category made up the majority of all invalids (52.7%) in September 1942, the percentage declined to a third in January 1945 and to just 21.1% in April 1948.²⁸ Three years after war's end more than three quarters of all recognised Soviet disabled servicemen (77%) belonged to the third group and were thus required to work normal working hours. From then on they had to earn their living largely by themselves – and mostly without the promised retraining schemes. Many of them did not enjoy special sheltered workplaces but ended up in unqualified, poorly paid ones.

6. The Pension System

In the war years the political leadership of the Soviet Union was faced with the task of materially supporting a constantly growing group of the population who had lost either their ability to work or their breadwinner, and had nothing to offer in return. This called for a clear shift of emphasis compared to the previous decade and a half, in which public welfare had played only a minor role. Whereas state social policies in Stalin's "revolution from above" had focussed on the staff of enterprises, now classic *public welfare* was required for millions of disabled persons as well as widows and orphans. The state accepted the challenge, however sought to restrict the number of applicants to limit the period of entitlement and to keep the benefits as low as possible. At most, they covered the absolute basics, and in many cases not even that. The regime was not prepared to make greater material concessions or fundamentally reorient its social policy.²⁹

A fixed public pension irrespective of previous income or military rank was already being paid out to the invalids of the First World War (the "imperialist war") and the Civil War; with the latter receiving higher benefits—loyalty to the regime was financially rewarded.³⁰

27 GARF (filial') A-413/1/234, sheet 85; RGASPI 17/122/21, sheets 84–86; RGASPI 17/122/71, sheets 195–198; GARF (filial') A-413/1/460, sheets 2, 4; RGASPI 17/131/36, sheets 3, 10.

28 O rezul'tatakh proverki raboty organov sotsial'nogo obespecheniia po obsluzhivaniiu invalidov Otechestvennoi voiny, April 1943: GARF 5446/44/976, sheet 118; sheet 220ff; letter of the head of the Organisational-Instructional Section of the Central Committee of the VKP(b), Slepov, to the Secretary of the Central Committee, Malenkov, 1945: RGASPI 17/88/604, sheet 2; O sostoianii trudovogo ustroistva invalidov Otechestvennoi voiny na 1. 10. 1949: GARF 5451/29/330, sheets 19–22.

29 See also the paper by Mark Edele in this volume.

30 Postanovlenie SNK RSFSR, 19 March, 1935: „O normakh pensii invalidov voiny i semei lits, pogibshikh na voine“, in: Material'noe obespechenie, 176–177; Postanovlenie TsIK i SNK SSSR No. 86/162, 31 January, 1937: „O povyshenii

These pensions, on the whole very low, were raised by 50% on 16 July 1940.³¹ At the same time, considerably better pensions were introduced for those soldiers, sailors and non-commissioned officers of the Red Army and Soviet Navy who had become partially or completely unable to work in the course of military duty *after 1 January 1938*.³² From then on the level of their pension no longer depended solely on the degree of invalidity but also on their military rank and – as a new principle – on their previous income. This now had greatest influence on the level of pensions, and the degree of disability was a lesser determinant.³³ The maximum pension was 400 roubles.³⁴ As had been the case previously, too, peasants (and also students) as well as the rural population in general were disadvantaged. The following rates applied for the three invalidity groups:

Table 2

	Without connection to agriculture	With connection to agriculture
1st group	100 % of former wage	80 %
2nd group	75 %	60 %
3rd group	50 %	40 % ³⁵

Those who were peasants or students before enlistment only received a pension according to this fixed formula:

Table 3

	Without connection to agriculture	With connection to agriculture
1st group	150 roubles	120 roubles
2nd group	120 roubles	96 roubles
3rd group	90 roubles	72 roubles

As these tables show disabled soldiers of peasant origin were always disadvantaged compared to workers and administrative employees and thus received a lower pension.

On 28 January 1946, the minimum pensions for disabled servicemen of the first category

razmerov pensii invalidam grazhdanskoi voiny i voennoi sluzhby v riadakh RKKKA, byvshim Krasnogvardeitsam i Krasnym partizanam, a takzhe chlenam seme étikh lits". In: Sobranie Zakonov SSSR 9, (1937), No. 30. According to this decision, former Red Guards and Red Partisans of all invalidity categories were paid a 25% allowance on top of the above-mentioned pensions and were entitled to a better "personal pension" providing they had gained "particular merit": Ibidem. Corresponding requests were received by Voroshilov and others, see e.g. the letter of Disabled Serviceman of the Civil War, 2nd category, T. F. Agarkov of 25 January, 1948: GARF 5446/54/58, sheets 55–54.

31 Postanovlenie SNK SSSR No. 1269, 16 July, 1940: „O pensiiakh voennosluzhashchim riadovogo i mladshogo nachal'stvuiushchego sostava strochnoi sluzhby i ikh sem'iam, in: Sobranie Postanovlenii SSSR, 19 (1940), No. 465.

32 Ibidem.

33 Postanovlenie SNK SSSR No. 2291, 12 November, 1940, in: Sobranie Postanovlenii SSSR, 30 (1940), 729.

34 The original decision of 16 July, 1940 did not anticipate any deductions for persons on a wage-related pension who were engaged in agriculture. But the supplementary decision of the Central SNK of 12 November, 1940 cut the pensions of this group by 20%: Postanovlenie SNK SSSR No. 2291, 12 November, 1940: „O dopolnenii postanovleniia Sovnarkoma SSSR ot 16 iul'ia 1940", in: Sobranie Postanovlenii SSSR, 30 (1940), 729.

35 However, the pensions calculated according to this method were not allowed to fall below the rates of the fixed formula.

were raised from 150/120 roubles (city dweller / country dweller) to 300/250 roubles, i.e. they were doubled,³⁶ but they still did not reach subsistence level. The pensions for non-commissioned officers were 25% higher than the rates given above.³⁷ Officers received even more. Appreciable pension increases for all disabled servicemen did not come until the mid 1960s.³⁸

From early 1943 onwards the *requirement to work* applied to all invalids of the third category, and the “work-shy” risked losing their pensions. That proves once more the significance of work in the Soviet welfare system. Within the group of disabled servicemen entitled to a pension, those who worked were always considerably better off than those who were unable to. As a comparison shows, the pensions ranged from 72 to 400 roubles, allowing only an exceedingly meagre life to persons completely unable to work, whereas some disabled servicemen in employment could reach quite a decent income. Only a minority enjoyed the highest pension of 400 roubles. Despite being recognised by the state as war invalids, the social situation of the majority of disabled “Great Patriotic War” soldiers meant one thing: poverty. The pensions alone could in no way cover life’s necessities, and incentives for the recipients to work remained, especially since the reconstruction of the country demanded the commitment of every halfway employable worker. Whoever wanted to get by with alternative survival strategies (which were often more lucrative than wages and pensions) was able to do so in relative safety until the late 1940s, but from the early 1950s these inventive invalids were increasingly prosecuted as “anti-Soviet elements”.³⁹ Until then many disabled servicemen had preferred to beg or to live from small-scale black-market trading; others again plied the population with various skills (playing the accordion, singing, parading trained animals, etc.) for a small donation.⁴⁰

The pension system was meticulously graduated according to the “divide and rule” principle – this made great differences in benefits between the individual groups of disabled servicemen and also led to a certain erosion of solidarity. Instead of helping foster a collective mentality among “comrades in misfortune”, the “misplaced egalitarianism” (*uravnilovka*) much reviled at the time was subjected to all-out attack in the field of invalid pensions, too. The pensions of the “Great Patriotic War invalids” subsequently aroused the envy of the maimed soldiers of earlier wars, who were much less well off. Everyone eyed each other warily, suspecting the others of receiving more, and everyone was busy comparing and calculating, especially after all material bonuses connected with

36 Postanovlenie SNK SSSR No. 231, 28 January, 1946: „O povyshenii razmera pensii invalidam Otechestvennoi voiny 1-oi gruppy“, in: Sobranie Postanovlenii SSSR, 3 (1946), No. 35.

37 Sobranie Postanovlenii SSSR, 19 (1940), No. 465, point 7.

38 M. Edele, *Soviet Veterans of the Second World War. A Popular Movement in an Authoritarian Society, 1941–1991*, Oxford 2008, 86; see also his paper in this volume. The other privileges were then also constantly extended.

39 E. Zubkova, *S protjanutoj rukoj: Niščie i niščenstvo v poslevoennom SSSR*, in: *Cahiers du Monde russe*, 49 (2008) 2/3, 441–474.

40 For the manifold peculiarities of this subculture of disabled servicemen and other marginal social groups in the post-war years in Leningrad, see the autobiographical stories by E. Kotschergin, *Die Engelspuppe*, Mannheim 2009.

medals were abolished without replacement in 1948, and those who were not maimed therefore had no more privileges worth mention.⁴¹ Hardly a complaint to public offices went without denunciation of alleged "speculators" or the "work-shy". A man with an amputated hand demanded a higher pension than one with an amputated leg because the latter could work, after all, he wrote in his petition.⁴²

Despite all the instances of arbitrariness, obstinacy and red tape in the welfare offices, pension payments were the only aspect of public care for war victims that continued to function more or less smoothly. It also swallowed up the lion's share of expenditure on welfare.⁴³ Although the pension payments were low, they were supplemented by a seemingly arbitrary maze of one-off payments and non-cash assistance from various institutions (welfare offices, Party committees, Soviets, unions, the Komsomol, enterprises, churches, the Red Cross, etc.).⁴⁴ But these funds often benefitted not the neediest but the more mobile and resourceful of the disabled servicemen, who demanded them the most persistently – from all welfare offices at the same time. The professional thief and later fraudster Veniamin B. Vaisman pulled off the biggest coup. Fleeing from a penal camp in 1944, he got such severe frostbite that both legs and one hand had to be amputated. Soon, however, he was passing himself off as a disabled serviceman and twice-decorated "Hero of the Soviet Union". With a row of medals dangling from his chest he systematically visited the various ministries and presented himself as a former member of staff. Until his arrest on 30 May 1946 he obtained over 50,000 roubles in cash as well as goods to the value of 30,000–40,000 roubles from 32 ministers or their deputies, and also the Central Committee of the Communist Party itself. In addition, he was given letters of reference for a flat, for regular therapies and for state-of-the-art prosthetic legs.⁴⁵

41 For this topic, see the paper by Mark Edele in this volume.

42 Petition of Engineer Captain Svetaev: GARF 5446/48/3245, sheet 165.

43 According to figures of the Minister of State Control, 95% of the budget of the Ministry of Public Welfare in 1947 was spent on pension payments but only 5% on invalids' homes, vocational boarding schools, sanatoriums, prosthetic devices, etc.: letter of the Minister of State Control, Vasiliev, to the Secretary of the Central Committee, Malenkov, 16 December, 1948: RGASPI 17/121/680, sheet 160.

44 For the organisation of "Invalids' Sundays" and "Invalids' Aid Months" by Party bodies, wounded soldier aid committees, village communities, etc., see: RGASPI 17/122/145, sheet 36; 17/122/157, sheets 81–82; 17/88/470, sheets 77–83; 603/1/8, sheets 192–194; 603/1/13, sheet 80; W. Eggeling, *Das Sowjetische Informationsbüro. Innenansichten einer sowjetischen Propagandainstitution, 1945–1947*, in: *Osteuropa*, 50 (2000) 2, 210. Similar activities were also organised by the Red Cross: GARF 9501/2/869, sheets 83–90; 9501/2/1187, sheets 54–65; 9501/2/1195, sheets 10–19. The Orthodox Church also supported widows, orphans and invalids during the war: M. A. Vyltsan, *Prikaz i propoved': Sposoby mobilizatsii resursov derevni v gody voiny*, in: *Otechestvennaia istoriia*, 3 (1995), 69–80. For aid campaigns of the Jewish communities, see: G. Kostyrchenko (Intro): *From a Report Concerning the Jewish Religion in the USSR in 1946*, in: *Jews and Jewish Topics in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe*, 19 (1992) 3, 40; F. Grüner, *Jüdischer Glaube im Sowjetstaat. Zur Lage der jüdischen Religion in der Sowjetunion in den Kriegs- und Nachkriegsjahren*, in: *Glaube in der 2. Welt*, 30 (2002) 4, 13–19; K. Boeckh, *Fallstudie: Lemberg in Galizien. Jüdisches Gemeindeleben in der Ukraine zwischen 1945 und 1953*, in: *Glaube in der 2. Welt*, 30 (2002) 4, 24.

45 ("Top-secret") report of the Deputy Minister of the Interior of the USSR, I. Serov, 14 June, 1947 to I. V. Stalin, V. M. Molotov and A. A. Zhdanov: GARF 9401/2/170, sheets 65–69 as well as Serov's ("top secret") report of 21 June, 1947 to Stalin, Molotov, Zhdanov and L. P. Beria: *Ibidem* sheets 77–79; report of the Prosecutor General: GARF 8131/37/3874, sheets 60–61. For the phenomenon of imposture in Russia in general and in the Stalin period in particular, see: S. Fitzpatrick, *Making a Self for the Times: Impersonation and Imposture in Twentieth-Century*

The Soviet authorities never showed any such generosity towards bed-ridden, seriously disabled people. The neediest and the honest ones ultimately fell by the wayside, while imposters and defrauders were able to grab a large piece of the less-than-ample public welfare cake.

7. Reintegration into Working Life

From a purely quantitative point of view the return of disabled Soviet servicemen to working life turned out to be a great success. Work was ultimately considered the most important instrument of reintegration. In 1948/49, according to official figures, over 90% of all disabled servicemen had returned to regular work and thus at least were “off the streets”. But the problems connected to the integration of hundreds of thousands of disabled servicemen were still far from solved. Above all there was a scarcity of training opportunities. A total of 173,000 disabled servicemen are said to have undergone retraining between 1941 and 1945, and from 1941 to 1948 it was 350,500 *in the RSFSR alone*, which indicated a considerable intensification of qualification schemes after the end of the war.⁴⁶ But what do such figures really say? On the one hand the courses did not last very long, and on the other hand one should bear in mind that in 1948 more than half (53%) of all registered disabled servicemen⁴⁷ had not completed any training at all⁴⁸ and another large cohort could no longer practice their previous occupation. As such, around a million people would have needed retraining in Russia alone. This goal was never achieved – not even in *quantitative* terms. As far as the quality of the retraining schemes was concerned, most did not go beyond a brief introduction to the new job. Many of the war-disabled peasants returned to their villages with no training at all. Allegedly they often took on managerial posts in the administration of kolkhozes (collective farms). As may have been the case with *some* disabled servicemen, the bulk of them ended up at the lowest end of rural society. Agricultural work is physically strenuous, and as only few of the invalids were still capable, many worked as farm hands.⁴⁹ In 1950 just 28.7% of disabled servicemen living in the country performed qualified work.⁵⁰ Therefore the proportion of simple labourers and casual workers – and thus the penalty among

Russia, in: *Kritika*, 2 (2002) 3, 469–487; Dies.: *The World of Ostap Bender: Soviet Confidence Men in the Stalin Period*, in: *Slavic Review*, 61 (2002) 3, 535–557.

46 RGASPI 17/131/36, sheet 15. This figure may be greatly exaggerated like much of the Narkomsobes data, especially when one bears in mind that Sukhov stated for the war years alone: “Over 173,000 disabled servicemen have learned a new occupation”: *Itogi raboty organov sotsial'nogo obespecheniia za gody Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny*, 30 May, 1946: GARF (filial') A-413/1/753, sheet 6.

47 RGASPI 17/131/36, sheet 10.

48 *Ibidem*, sheet 10.

49 This stratum made up an average of 6.5% in the kolkhozes of the RSFSR: O. M. Verbitskaia, *Izmeneniia chislennosti i sostava kolkhoznoho krest'ianstva RSFSR v pervye poslevoennnye gody (1946–1950)*, in: *Istoriia SSSR 5 (1980)*, 137.

50 I. Kruchinin, *Trudovoe i bytovoe ustroistva pensionerov v RSFSR*: GARF (filial') A-413/1/1380, sheet 18.

disabled servicemen – must have been greatest in agriculture, given that the pensions there were among the lowest too.

Those invalids who had been employed in industry before the war generally tried to find work in their old enterprises.⁵¹ Despite the great shortage of labour even employees of long standing were often unable to return to their old collectives.⁵² Severely-disabled ex-servicemen were most frequently rejected since the factory managers considered them “cripples”,⁵³ or at least they feared that workers fit only for limited employment would prevent fulfilment of the planned production targets. This was the case due to the fact that industrial enterprises received no credit for employing disabled servicemen and the production goals were not lowered commensurately.⁵⁴ Many companies therefore did not want to employ any disabled servicemen at all: “I’d rather give the job to a prisoner than a disabled serviceman”, the manager of the *Dalstroï* construction directorate said, commenting on the application of a war invalid.⁵⁵ One manager informed the welfare offices in advance that he “didn’t need any disabled soldiers”.⁵⁶

For many disabled servicemen reintegration amounted to a demotion – even for those who were well qualified and had only a slight physical handicap. They complained to various authorities about this downgrading, which was manifest at all levels of industry. There is no way of telling how often the ex-servicemen were successful in their complaints. The problem remained unsolved and filled welfare-office files from the early 1940s until well into the 1950s. The invalids employed in unqualified jobs included many simple workers whose wounds prevented them from working in factories at the pace required to fulfil the production norms⁵⁷ – they had to switch to auxiliary jobs outside the actual production process, where hourly wages rather than piecework rates applied.⁵⁸ The Ministry of Public Welfare considered their employment as watchmen, gatekeepers, janitors, cleaners, cloakroom men, etc.⁵⁹ to be “appropriate” or a “legitimate

51 This is according to Nesterova, head of the Public Welfare Section of Moscow's Krasnogvardeiskii District, at a meeting of the Moscow staff of the Narkomsobes, April 1943: GARF 5446/44/976, sheet 131. The Narkomgoskon established, however, that in the Sverdlovsk region and in Moscow, at least, the overwhelming majority of the disabled servicemen employed in industry had found work independently: GARF (filial') A-339/1/1800, sheets 105, 125.

52 RGASPI 17/122/100, sheet 93: The applicants were stopped by the plant managers and not even allowed into the factory: Saratov, October 1942. Three years later the situation there had still not improved: 17/122/101, sheet 146; 17/122/100, sheet 150. Letter from Grishakova to the Central Committee of 11 October, 1942: RGASPI 17/122/21, sheets 76–77.

53 Stenograph of the meeting of Moscow public welfare staff, April 1943: GARF 5446/44/976, sheet 128; GARF (filial') A-413/1/359, sheet 26.

54 GARF 5446/44/976, sheet 133.

55 RGASPI 17/122/100, sheet 60.

56 Letter of the People's Commissar of State Security, Merkulov, to the Secretary of the Central Committee, Malenkov, 5 May, 1945: RGASPI 17/121/425, sheet 28. It gives further examples of unfounded rejections of disabled servicemen as workers.

57 For example, 25% of Leningrad disabled servicemen had only one arm (or only one that was fully functional). A commission therefore examined which industrial occupations they were still able to work in: Dokladnaia zapiska „O rasshirenii sfery primeneniia truda invalidov na proizvodstve“, 14 March, 1947: GARF 5451/29/242, sheet 212.

58 GARF 5451/29/128, sheet 4.

59 A. N. Sukhov, *Ocherednye zadachi organov sotsial'nogo obespecheniia v oblasti trudovogo ustroistva invalidov.*

tendency”⁶⁰ and it was not seen as a problem. Many highly qualified and experienced workers, engineers and technicians also ended up in such jobs, either because they were no longer able to work in their old occupation due to the war injury,⁶¹ but did not receive any retraining, or because the enterprises, welfare offices and army commissariats placed this group of people against its will at the lower end of the workplace hierarchy where they were perceived to belong.⁶² Then there were also many invalids who had been mobilised into the Red Army straight from school and had no occupational training at all. Once disabled servicemen found employment as unskilled assistants, no one attended to their advancement or the raising of their qualifications any more.⁶³ The public welfare offices filed the case away under “successfully referred”, and the enterprises were often not even informed about the number of disabled servicemen they employed.⁶⁴ For many disabled servicemen the reintegration into industry was therefore accompanied by a drop in professional status and a loss in income, while the goods and benefits they were supposed to have priority of access to (living space, heating material, additional food and clothing) – another privilege of this group – either existed only on paper or were given to those workers who were more important for fulfilling productions plans.⁶⁵ This conduct of the enterprises actually had less to do with conscious discrimination against disabled servicemen (although the ex-soldiers obviously saw this differently) than with fulfilling government demands and production targets – it was de facto imposed “from above”. Companies were under extreme pressure to produce maximum results for the front or for reconstruction of the country. Disabled employees with impaired health and without efficient prosthetic devices did not fit well into a production system oriented towards over-fulfillment of the norms and whose chaotic, dangerous operations demanded constant improvisation.

Doklad. In: *Ocherednye zadachi organov sotsial'nogo obespecheniia. Materialy Vserossiiskogo soveshchaniia rukovodiashchikh rabotnikov sotsial'nogo obespecheniia (mai 1945 goda)*, Moskva 1945, 18.

60 Ibidem 18; Sukhov, *Zadachi sotsial'nogo obespecheniia*, 1946: GARF (filial) A-413/1/753, sheet 27.

61 Ibidem, sheet 26: Sukhov spoke in this context of a “considerable percentage”. Reconstruction required mainly workers able to do heavy physical work: M. Hildermeier, *Geschichte der Sowjetunion 1917–1991. Entstehung und Niedergang des ersten sozialistischen Staates*, München 1998, 704.

62 RGASPI 17/122/100, sheets 173–174: Kurgan region, January 1945. In some factories of the Gorkii region in early 1945, according to Narkomsobes figures, 60–80% of the disabled servicemen were in unqualified posts: GARF 8131/22/221. A SNK decision of 10 July, 1945 prohibiting the employment of qualified disabled servicemen as watchmen and janitors was passed on from the trade-unions to the enterprises: letter of the head of the trade-unions' social-security section to the factory committees: GARF 5451/29/242, sheets 159–161. The Head of the People's Commissariat of Tank Construction also reacted and ordered that they be relocated to qualified positions: Order No. 552, 24 August, 1945: GARF 8131/22/103, sheet 86.

63 RGASPI 17/122/100, sheet 195: Rostov region, January 1945; sheet 138: Voronezh region, May 1944. Here not even all the available money for appropriate retraining schemes was spent; RGASPI 17/122/100, sheet 113: Novosibirsk region, January 1945; sheet 150: Kirov region, January 1945.

64 RGASPI 17/122/100, sheet 113: Novosibirsk region, January 1945; sheet 150: Kirov region, early 1945; sheet 71: Kuibyshev region, January 1945.

65 RGASPI 17/122/21, sheet 86: October 1942; 603/1/13, sheets 148–149, Novosibirsk 1943. Naturally the lion's share of goods for distribution within the enterprises went to the management and the technical specialists, and corruption was widespread. Workers as a social group were fundamentally disadvantaged in this arbitrary distribution system: D. Filtzer, *Soviet Workers and Late Stalinism. Labour and the Restoration of the Stalinist System After World War II*, Cambridge 2002, 70, 73.

The pressure to fulfill the plan weighed heavily on companies and the bold postulate of "all-encompassing care" did not square with reality. To be able to meet production goals, the enterprises resisted the expectation that they should also assume the function of welfare bodies, and not without justification; they had difficulty integrating hundreds of thousands of disabled servicemen into the production process. It was much easier to use them on and off as handymen, especially since the state's labour policy was primarily directed towards disciplining the workers through regular increases in job norms (without corresponding wage increases). Disabled servicemen were in no way exempted from this pressure but had to compete with healthy workers in everyday operations in the enterprise. It no longer counted that they had suffered their physical impairment in the struggle to defend their motherland. The less the war injuries could be offset with occupational qualifications and medical rehabilitation, the more negatively they impacted on the persons affected. Ironically, the political leadership gave little attention to this aspect of dealing with the social consequences of war. Retraining schemes and also the supply of prosthetic devices continued to be totally inadequate, both in quantitative and qualitative terms. Consequently the disabled servicemen not only had to cope with the trauma of lasting physical disfigurement but also with substantial occupational and social degradation.

Even fragile livelihoods such as these were put into jeopardy:⁶⁶ lay-offs of disabled servicemen increased dramatically towards the end of the war and even more so in the course of demobilisation, repatriation and re-evacuation, which saw over twenty million people join or rejoin the workforce.⁶⁷ For the individual this meant far more than the loss of his income. Redundancy meant that food-ration cards, (company-owned) accommodation and all other workplace-linked social benefits also evaporated, so the loss of one's workplace was a real existential blow.⁶⁸ Lay-offs increased markedly in the second half of the 1940s, especially since the state did little to counteract this development. In late 1947 the welfare offices observed blatant, large-scale displacement of disabled servicemen from enterprises, invalids' cooperatives and even from outwork. They were replaced by healthy workers, who were now available in great numbers since demobilisation.⁶⁹

66 RGASPI 17/122/21, sheet 76.

67 M. Hildermeier, *Geschichte der Sowjetunion*, 702–703.

68 Report by the head of the Social-Security Section of the Central Council of Trade-Unions, Gorbunov, and the head of the Section for Reintegration into Working Life and Care for Disabled Servicemen, Bezuglii, to trade-union secretary L. N. Soloviev, 1946/47: GARF 5451/29/242, sheets 1–4.

69 From the account of the Deputy Minister of Public Welfare, Nyrkov, at a meeting of the Invalids' Cooperative Insurance Funds, 26 November, 1947: GARF (filial) A-413/1/904, sheets 19–21. In Yaroslavl the wave of lay-offs of disabled servicemen lasted until 1950: „O vypolnenii profsoiuznymi organizatsiiami iaroslavskoi oblasti i iaroslavskim otdelom sotsial'nogo obespecheniia Postanovleniia Sekretariata VTsSPS ot 10 fevralia 1950 g., Ob obsluzhivanii invalidov voiny, truda, i semei poteriaevshikh kormil'tsev", Ministerstvom Sotsial'nogo Obespecheniia RSFSR": GARF 5451/29/397, sheet 112.

8. Heroes without a Voice: How the State Hindered a Collective Mentality

Soviet disabled servicemen's resentment about their poor pensions and benefits and the discrepancy between welfare-state rhetoric and their own experience of welfare grew, and in many cases it could hardly have been greater.⁷⁰ However collective protests did not occur in the first decade after the war. On the one hand, for political reasons, as the regime did not tolerate any social organisations (other than the Komsomol and the unions), and on the other hand as the invalids' committees threatened to cast a bad light on the quality of public pensions and benefits for war victims. The regime's almost paranoid fear of "unbridled associations", in particular those of veterans and disabled servicemen, had already led to the banning of all their organisations in 1920. There was therefore no living tradition and no example for the "Great Patriotic War" invalids to follow; there was no organisation that could have transformed the war victims' grievances through officially legitimated mediation processes – or through constant pressure from below – into political demands which could have led to specific social policies. Due to the enforced lack of social-policy debate, the public did not perceive the welfare problems of the disabled servicemen as particularly serious. Since the regime continued to present the pensions and benefits for war victims in the Soviet Union (which in reality were pathetically inadequate) as an achievement of socialism and to contrast this with "invalids' sad fate" in capitalist countries, the fiction of "all-encompassing care" was able to be perpetuated in broad sections of the population long after the war, and even after the collapse of the system.⁷¹ Since social reality lagged far behind the expectations created by the propaganda, the disabled servicemen who received this allegedly lavish care remained without a voice and were refused the opportunity of having their own organisations that could have infused them with a sense of common identity.

When all veterans' and invalids' associations were disbanded after the October Revolution it was a matter of consolidating Bolshevik rule; in 1945 the preservation of the Stalinist system had top priority. Many people cherished great hopes of a better life after Victory Day. They expected material improvements but also a political breath of fresh air. Particularly former soldiers felt they had gained self-confidence through their experience of war, and they did not hide it. After the victory they felt like "giants", as the veteran and writer Kazakevich put it.⁷² Stalin distrusted the ex-servicemen precisely because of their increased self-esteem and the ability to compare, that they had developed through their wartime stay abroad. He feared their claims to the "fruits of victory".

The traumatic memories of the war were not to be dealt with in public. Despite its war-weariness, Soviet society was not to succumb to a "helpless contemplation of its own

70 For the situation of disabled servicemen in the Ukraine, see: K. Boeckh, *Stalinismus in der Ukraine. Die Rekonstruktion des sowjetischen Systems nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg*, Wiesbaden 2007, 120–122.

71 E. Iarskaia-Smirnova and P. Romanov, *At the Margins of Memory. Provincial Identity and Soviet Power in Oral Histories, 1940–1953*, in: D. J. Raleigh (Ed.), *Provincial Landscapes. Local Dimensions of Soviet Power, 1917–1953*, Pittsburgh 2001, 308.

72 É. Kazakevich, *Slushaia vremia. Dnevnik, zapisnye knizhki, pis'ma*, Moskva 1990, 316; see also: V. Kondrat'ev, *Paradoks frontovoi nostalgii*, in: *Literaturnaia Gazeta*, 9 May, 1990, 9.

wounds"⁷³ but be mobilised, drilled and regimented anew, and thus return to the permanent state of emergency so typical of the 1930s: "It soon became clear that the term *RE*construction was to be taken literally in social terms as well: the new society was to be the same as before."⁷⁴ But it could not be quite the same because the demands made by the "Great Patriotic War" invalids on the Soviet state were not challenged as those of the veterans had been in 1947/48. In this respect the Pension Law of 1940 created a new status group, which was to enjoy a range of privileges in the long term. This gave rise to expectations that were only fulfilled at the lowest material level and on the whole were deeply disappointed. Some of the full-bodied propagandistic announcements concerning benefits remained pure propaganda—merely the pension payments were usually made punctually and smoothly. Being so low, however, they could not satisfy the hopes of the disabled servicemen. "Is this what we fought for?" was a common expression of exasperation in the post-war years. Since the paltry public benefits were not weighed up through additional symbolic recognition in the form of an invalids' organisation, frustration and resentment grew. This was expressed in a surge of petitions and letters of complaint to all conceivable official bodies, Party and government officials, magazine editorial boards and army commissariats.⁷⁵

The welfare situation of invalids and veterans began to gradually improve in the 1960s, but the specific concerns of the war-disabled were still not taken very seriously. In this respect the invalids of the "Great Patriotic War" were the first status group of ex-servicemen to be publically recognised, but even after the cult of the "Great Patriotic War" developed in the 1970s their physical and/or psychological wounds ensured that they continue to be its "poor victors".

73 I. Deutscher, *Stalin. Eine politische Biographie*, Reinbek b. Hamburg 1992, 726.

74 M. Hildermeier, *Geschichte der Sowjetunion*, 701.

75 See the author's professorial dissertation, *Die Invaliden des ‚Großen Vaterländischen Krieges‘ – Eine politische Sozialgeschichte 1941–1991*, Ruhr-Universität Bochum 2003; for the persistence of similar expressions of irritation until into the 1950s see: B. Fieseler, *Stimmen aus dem gesellschaftlichen Abseits. Die sowjetrussischen Kriegsinvaliden im ‚Tauwetter‘ der fünfziger Jahre*, in: *Osteuropa* 52 (2002) 7, 945–962.