

Resisting Modernisation? Two African Responses to the Kariba Dam Scheme in the Central African Federation

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RESÜMEE

Der Kariba-Staudamm an der Grenze zwischen dem heutigen Sambia und Simbabwe war ein Beispiel spätkolonialer Modernisierungspolitik und zugleich Symbol eines vielbeachteten Staatsbildungsexperiments: Die 1953 ins Leben gerufene Zentralafrikanische Föderation wurde von ihren politischen Vätern als „dritter Weg“ zwischen weißen und schwarzen Unabhängigkeitsbewegungen deklariert. Aus heutiger Sicht versinnbildlicht das Mammutprojekt sowohl das Scheitern der hochumstrittenen Föderation als auch die Verfehlungen großer Entwicklungsvorhaben insgesamt: Kariba nutzte der „weißen“ Industrie, brachte der verarmten indigenen Landbevölkerung jedoch Schaden. Lokale Akteure versuchten, diese Ungleichheiten zu korrigieren, wie der vorliegende Aufsatz anhand von Hezekiah Habanyama, einem Mitglied der lokalen afrikanischen Verwaltungselite, und Harry Nkumbula, dem Präsidenten des nordrhodesischen African National Congress aufzeigt. Die Positionen, die der „loyale Verwaltungsbeamte“ einerseits und der „Widerstandskämpfer“ andererseits einnahmen, entziehen sich allerdings einer einfachen Zuordnung in Für- oder Gegenstimmen, Opposition oder Kollaboration. Ihre vielfach verflochtenen Strategien und Ideen im Hinblick auf „Entwicklung“ verdeutlichen vielmehr die grundsätzliche Ambivalenz des spätkolonialen Doppelprojekts von Staatsbildung und Modernisierung.

Between 1955 and 1960, thousands of workers opened up “the dark jungle” of the middle Zambesi Valley on the border between today’s Zambia and Zimbabwe to “provide light and power for a nation”.¹ The Kariba hydroelectric dam, built to turn the recently

1 Note Gilmore to Kirkness, 6.5.1960, British National Archives/Public Record Office (PRO) DO 35/7719.

established Central African Federation into an industrial power, was a microcosm of late-colonial, state-making modernisation.² To Kariba's supporters, the dam and its massive reservoir constituted "a lasting impression of great Federal beginnings and a great future promise for our country".³ From today's perspective, however, the super-ambitious project rather seems to confirm historians' judgements of the Federation as a "quite extraordinary mistake"⁴ as well as general critiques of modernisation as a hubristic effort preserving existing material and power asymmetries.⁵ Not only was the expensive project narrowly targeted at the rapidly growing industrial sector in the region, mainly the multinational copper business, it also entailed the forced eviction of 57,000 Gwembe Tonga, who were shifted away from the rising waters in a "poorly conceived, and trauma-ridden, crash program".⁶

Local actors did not fail to see these imbalances and tried to redress them, as the following pages will show by employing the example of two prominent Northern Rhodesian Africans – Hezekiah Habanyama, the most influential member of Gwembe Valley's 'traditional' administrative council, and Harry Nkumbula, leader of the Northern Rhodesian African National Congress (NRANC).⁷ The 'loyal administrator' and the 'nationalist resister' perceived each other as antagonists. However, as this paper argues, their positions with respect to Kariba actually had much in common as both leaders struggled *with*, rather than *against*, development.⁸ Their perspectives therefore help to illustrate the fundamental ambivalence of nation-building modernisation.

1. Planning Kariba

Kariba's asymmetries were the outcome of a controversial planning process, initiated by the government of the Central African Federation and supported by British colonial

2 The Central African Federation, also known as "Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland", was an association of Northern Rhodesia (today's Zambia), Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) and Nyasaland (Malawi), which existed from 1953-1963.

3 Earl of Dalhousie, Governor-General of the Federation, Foreword, in: H. Andersen, Royal Occasion. The Kariba Project, Salisbury 1960, p. 5.

4 R. Hyam, The Geopolitical Origins of the Central African Federation. Britain, Rhodesia and South Africa 1948–1953, in: *The Historical Journal*, 30/1 (1987), pp. 145-172, here p. 145.

5 For a summary of development critiques, see: F. Cooper/R. Packard (2005) *The History and Politics of Development Knowledge*, in: M. Edelman/A. Haugerud (eds.), *The Anthropology of Development and Globalization. From Classical Political Economy to Contemporary Neoliberalism*, Malden/Oxford/Victoria 2005, pp. 126-139.

6 T. Scudder, *A History of Development and Downturn in Zambia's Gwembe Valley: 1901–2002*, in: C. Lancaster/K. Vickery (eds.), *The Tonga-speaking peoples of Zambia and Zimbabwe. Essays in honor of Elizabeth Colson*, Lanham 2007, pp. 307-343, here p. 311. The most central study on the Kariba resettlement is: E. Colson, *The Social Consequences of Resettlement. The Impact of Kariba Resettlement upon the Gwembe Tonga*, Manchester 1971.

7 This paper is based on a section of my PhD project "Light and Power for a Multiracial Nation: The Kariba Dam scheme in the Central African Federation", funded by the German Historical Institute London, the German Academic Exchange Service and the Cusanuswerk foundation.

8 In this article, I do not use 'modernisation' or 'development' as analytical concepts, but as terms used and given meaning to by the historical actors themselves. The terms are not set in inverted commas for reasons of readability.

authorities and the project's main financier, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD). The hydroelectricity scheme was the most central development investment of the Federation which was established in 1953 against fierce African opposition and broke apart only ten years later. This uneasy union between three very different territories – the British protectorates of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland as opposed to self-governing Southern Rhodesia with its strong settler community – was declared by its political fathers as a 'middle way' between black and white independence movements and was hoped to become a showcase of communal development in a 'multiracial' state.⁹ Industrialisation and economic expansion seemed like unpolitical panaceas for reconciling the black discriminated majority with the privileged settler minority. If the Federation's present economic growth was sustained, IBRD experts argued in their Kariba appraisal report, "then there should continue to be a margin for granting improvements to the Africans without cutting the European standard of living".¹⁰ At the same time, late-colonialism's initial development enthusiasm following the Second World War had already suffered a range of serious blows at that stage¹¹ and also Kariba's planners were aware of the risks involved in over-optimistic public spending. After a dramatic increase of cost estimates in early 1956, IBRD experts became even more nervous about the debt burden on the Federation's economy.¹² British authorities also realised that Kariba would consume a major part of the Federation's financial and labour resources at the expense of general development in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, which was effectively *African* development.¹³ Moreover, the Northern Rhodesian Governor predicted serious hardships, even casualties, resulting from the forced evictions of the Gwembe Tonga, the people who were living in the region.¹⁴ Despite the new state's professed dedication to 'racial reconciliation', the lopsided project was finally given green light. Fearing nationalist settlers' hostility as well as a power shortage in the copper industry, British authorities were anxious to see the Federation "get off to a good start".¹⁵ Moreover, economy-centred and universalistic concepts of modernisation which were gaining international ground at the time as well as the young state's new policy of 'multiracial partnership' provided a language to legitimise Kariba as a means of *African* development and to declare the scheme's drawbacks as necessary sac-

9 For an overview of the Federation's history, see: P. Murphy, Introduction, in: Ibid. (ed.), *British Documents on the End of Empire: Central Africa. Part I*, London 2005, pp. xxvii-cxvi.

10 IBRD, "The Economy of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland", Annex to Project Appraisal Report, 13.6.1956, PRO DO 35/5702.

11 A. Eckert, *Herrschen und Verwalten. Afrikanische Bürokraten, staatliche Ordnung und Politik in Tanzania, 1920–1970*, München 2007, p. 102.

12 Note of discussion with IBRD, Commonwealth Relations Office, 16.2.1956, PRO DO 35/4603.

13 Minute by Poynton, Colonial Office, 4.5.1956, PRO CO 1015/948.

14 Benson to Gorell Barnes, 31.12.1954, PRO CO 1015/944.

15 "Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. Hydro-Electric Schemes. Brief for discussions to be held with Sir G. Huggins", Treasury, ca. January 1955, PRO CO 1015/952 (quotation); "Brief for the Secretary of State", Colonial Office, ca. January 1955, PRO CO 1015/952. See P. Murphy, Introduction (footnote 9), pp. xlv, lxiv, on white settler pressure.

rifices to kick-start a broader development process.¹⁶ British Treasury officials identified the Federation's white business elite as the 'senior partners', predestined to spearhead the self-induced "industrial revolution" which would translate automatically into "the advancement of the native".¹⁷ Similarly, IBRD experts argued that an expanding industrial sector was the best means to "hasten the transition of the Africans to a money economy and a Western-type society".¹⁸ Also the Federal Prime Minister justified Kariba postulating that "[i]t is vital that we have this cheap power so that we can industrialise and employ our rapidly increasing African population".¹⁹ As a consequence, an international development agency committed to helping colonised peoples supported a regime which was dreaded by the indigenous majority. Despite their different motivations, Federal politicians, IBRD experts, and British officials thus agreed on a specific 'pecking order' of modernisation in which big business was prioritised while Africans had to wait for the expected trickle-down effects.

2. Contestations from within – Hezekiah Habanyama and the Kariba resettlement²⁰

Hezekiah Habanyama, however, was not prepared to wait. The chief councillor of the Gwembe Tonga Native Authority (GTNA), the administrative body of chiefs and councillors supposedly representing the 'traditional' leaders of Gwembe Valley, had been collaborating with the colonial government for several years to improve the standard of living in the area.²¹ These previous efforts, ranging from agricultural measures to an extension of primary schooling, were rendered obsolete when local 'advancement' had to be sacrificed for Kariba's national 'progress'. Moreover, Habanyama's own position among the population came under pressure. Being largely responsible for the resettlement, he and the other Native Authority members feared the hostility of their people as well as a revival of nationalist-inspired resistance, which had troubled them considerably earlier in the decade. At the same time, their crucial role in this difficult situation enhanced their status in front of the British officers.²² Especially Habanyama, thanks to

16 On modernisation theory, development economics, and colonial development see e.g.: H. Arndt, *Economic Development. The History of an Idea*, Chicago/London 1987; F. Cooper, *Modernizing Bureaucrats, Backward Africans, and the Development Concept*, in: F. Cooper/R. Packard (eds.), *International Development and the Social Sciences. Essays on the History and Politics of Knowledge*, Berkeley 1997, pp. 64-92. On 'multiracial partnership' in the Federation, see: R. Rotberg, *The Rise of Nationalism in Central Africa. The Making of Malawi and Zambia 1873-1964*, Cambridge 1971, chapter ix.

17 "Note on Visit to Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland", Rowan, Treasury, 12.7.1954, PRO CO 1015/944.

18 IBRD, "The Economy of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland", Annex to Project Appraisal Report, 13.6.1956, PRO DO 35/5702.

19 Hansard, *Parliamentary Debates Federal Assembly*, 7.3.1955, PRO CO 1015/946.

20 I concentrate on the Northern Rhodesian side of the Zambesi, where 32,000 people were resettled. The move in the south was managed independently by the Southern Rhodesian Government.

21 See: E. Colson, *Social Consequences* (footnote 6), pp. 17-19, 21 f.

22 See e.g.: Southern Province Intelligence Report, period ending 25.7.1953, NAZ SP 1/3/3; Memorandum "Influence of Congress on Native Authorities", Reeves, for Provincial Commissioner, 28.12.1955, NAZ SP 1/14/18; E. Colson, *Social Consequences* (footnote 6), p. 19.

his outstanding education, had made himself an indispensable mainstay of local administration.²³ During the years of resettlement, the chief councillor used these conflicting pressures strategically, bargaining with the government to get the best terms possible for the people. His position as a self-conscious mediator, as will be argued, defies such dichotomous categorisations as coloniser / colonised, collaboration / resistance.²⁴

The news of the Kariba resettlement in April 1955 came as a shock to the Native Authority. Members feared that the decision reflected the growing influence of the Federal Government, which they did not trust to be “particularly concerned with African problems”.²⁵ Realising that they had no choice but to accept the decision, however, they quickly adopted a pragmatic attitude and drew up a list of concessions in return for their cooperation. These so-called “24 Points”, which were eventually signed by the Northern Rhodesian Governor, would become an important point of reference throughout the resettlement and its aftermath.²⁶ Apart from securing some minimal conditions for the removal, the “24 Points” laid down that the Tonga, once the reservoir filled up, must be allowed to shift back to the shore to make use of the fertile drawdown area and to install fisheries. These concessions were crucial in retrospect, giving the Northern Rhodesian Gwembe Tonga a significant advantage over their southern counterparts, who were permanently barred from the lakeshore and its economic potential.²⁷

During the resettlement and the ‘rehabilitation’ phase, Habanyama assumed the role of a watchdog: He toured the valley, talked to the people and persistently pointed to the numerous shortcomings, reminding officers of their paramount responsibility towards the population.²⁸ Moreover, he used his insider position to make known people’s grievances. In his reports, which were passed on to the Governor and to the Colonial Secretary in London, he graphically described the Gwembe Tonga’s “feeling of hopelessness and frustration” and warned that the relocation programme was anything but “an easy road to glory”.²⁹

23 Habanyama had studied at Bristol University and attended a colonial summer school in Cambridge (Stubbs, NR Native Affairs Department, to Morgan, Colonial Office, 10.5.1956, PRO CO 1015/953; Gwembe District Newsletter No. 5, November 1960, National Archives of Zambia, Lusaka (NAZ) SP 4/1/65; Annual Report on African Affairs, Southern Province, 1953, NAZ SP 4/2/59).

24 See recent scholarship on African employees in colonial administrations: N. Lawrance/E. Osborn/R. Roberts (eds.), *Intermediaries, Interpreters, and Clerks. African Employees in the Making of Colonial Africa*, Madison 2006; A. Eckert, *Herrschen und Verwalten* (footnote 11).

25 Southern Province Intelligence Report, period ending 25.4.1955, NAZ SP 1/3/14.

26 See: Annexure to minutes of meeting, 26./27.7.1955 – questions asked by GTNA, NAZ SP 4/1/61; Replies of the Northern Rhodesian Government to questions asked by GTNA, 22.2.1956, NAZ SP 4/1/61; Minutes of District Team meeting, Gwembe Boma, 9.2.1962, NAZ SP 1/4/22; GTNA Annual Report, 1956, by Habanyama, NAZ SP 4/2/118; T. Scudder, *The Kariba Case Study*, in: California Institute of Technology, Social Science Working Paper 1227, Pasadena 2005, <http://www.hss.caltech.edu/~tzs/The%20Kariba%20Case2.pdf> (accessed on 26 November 2010), pp. 31–32.

27 T. Scudder, *Case Study* (footnote 26), p. 32.

28 See e.g.: Tour of Sinazongwe Area, by Chief Councillor, 12.2.1959, NAZ SP 4/4/27; Tour of Chief Simamba’s area, by Chief Councillor, 22.-24.7.1958, NAZ SP 4/12/82; Press Statement “Tranquility and Progress in the Gwembe Valley of Northern Rhodesia”, 11.6.1959, PRO CO 1015/1486; Minutes of District Team meeting at Gwembe Boma, 9.2.1962 NAZ SP 1/4/22.

29 GTNA Annual Report, 1956, by Habanyama, NAZ SP 4/2/118.

Most strikingly perhaps, the Native Authority later managed to prevent the formation of a joint company between Northern Rhodesia, Southern Rhodesia and the Federal Government that was meant to regulate business activities centred on the future Kariba Lake. Here, the chiefs and councillors asserted themselves against their superiors in the northern administration who would rather cooperate with than be outdone by the Southern Rhodesians.³⁰ In order to ensure that the Tonga profited as much as possible from this new asset, the Native Authority insisted that they would not allow “foreign powers” to have a say over their part of the lake.³¹

The Native Authority’s considerable impact on the move and its aftermath was the result of shifting micro-politics of consent and protest. Habanyama was determined to retain the solidarity of the British officers who he regarded as allies against land-grabbing settlers on the one hand and nationalist ‘troublemakers’ on the other. Similarly, he was courted by the officers, who realised the “difficulty of securing the services ... of people of Mr. Habanyama’s calibre”.³² Constantly declaring his willingness to cooperate and his loyalty towards British colonial rule, Habanyama was able to express, in his words, “constructive criticism” and exchange “frank and heated arguments”.³³ His position thus exemplifies how colonial mimicry was not only a tool of domination but also a menace as middlemen like Habanyama, who were actively encouraged to ‘mimic’ the rulers by adopting their language, cultural habits and education, threatened to blur the central distinction between colonisers and colonised. The councillor displayed considerable skill in using his ambivalent position strategically, navigating between being “almost the same but not quite”, ostensibly living up to his superiors’ expectations while also finding ways to assert himself.³⁴ Prepared to operate within the framework of British rule, whose salaried servant he was, Habanyama, however, also drew claims from his impeccable record of colonial role performance: “The Northern Rhodesia Government has a duty to develop us. It has an obligation to spend money on our benefit.”³⁵

On the one hand, this strategy was pragmatic. Even if he “did not appreciate the benefits” of the scheme itself, Habanyama realised that Kariba could not be stopped and instead tried to negotiate its ‘side effects’ to the Tonga’s benefit, seizing the opportunities arising from the fact that Gwembe now received governmental assistance to an unprecedented degree.³⁶ The once neglected Tonga “have gained a lot”, he found once the resettlement programme was in full swing: They profited from better medical services and additional

30 NR Governor Hone to Federal Prime Minister Welensky and SR Prime Minister Whitehead, 20.10.1960, NAZ SP 4/7/17.

31 GTNA to Kariba Development Officer d’Avray, 10.3.1960, NAZ SP 4/7/16.

32 Comment by District Commissioner, in: Tour Report No. 6 of 1956, Sigongo area, 9.5.1956 NAZ SP 4/2/125.

33 GTNA Annual Report, 1959, by Habanyama, NAZ SP 4/2/151.

34 H. Bhabha, *Of mimicry and man: The ambivalence of colonial discourse*, in: idem., *The Location of Culture*, London/New York 1994, pp. 121-131, here p. 122.

35 Record of views expressed at GTNA meeting, 1.4.1960, NAZ SP 4/7/17.

36 Report of the Commission appointed to inquire into ... the recent deaths and injuries caused by the use of firearms in the Gwembe District and matters relating thereto, Northern Rhodesian Government Printer, 31.10.1958 (hereafter: “Report of the Gwembe Commission”), NAZ SP 4/11/15.

schools, were taught to fish, advised on improved agricultural techniques and found employment with various contractors in the area.³⁷ On the other hand, Habanyama's strategies also need to be seen in connection with a hard and fast struggle over local influence. Fearing an erosion of their own authority, the chiefs and councillors had banned the Northern Rhodesian African Congress in Gwembe in 1953 and showed a firm hand in dealing with offenders.³⁸ 'Loyal administrator' Habanyama cast himself as the exact opposite to the "homeless, frustrated and failures in life [who] take the leading part in what would be called nationalist politics".³⁹ As an 'authentic' son of Gwembe Valley – well-versed in local drum music and dances, married to a Tonga wife, and shunning the cosmopolitan life that would have been open to a man of his qualification – he laid claims to know the "real grievances of the masses" better than "any outsider".⁴⁰ In government reports and in his own writings Habanyama was portrayed as an ideal broker of controlled change, sufficiently 'Westernised' to spearhead local 'advancement', nevertheless firmly rooted in the 'traditions' of the valley.⁴¹

Habanyama not only knew his place in the scripts of indirect rule, he also accepted the development schedule of a slow 'transfer of power' – postponing political change until socio-economic improvements had paved the way for it.⁴² His commitment to gradualism came under increasing pressure, however, when Gwembe ceased to be a "hidden spot on the map of the world".⁴³ He perceived his community to stand at a turning point of their history as the advent of modernity not only promised prosperity but also posed a threat of chaos. The chief councillor worried about the "terrible confusion" caused by technical development.⁴⁴ Gwembe was swarmed by experts, who sometimes went "out of their way to try their University theories, forgetting the human element in their method of approach".⁴⁵ The Tonga, forced to swap the natural resource of the Zambesi River for wells, boreholes and pumps, had to get used to a "mechanical world".⁴⁶ Different people – engineers, workers, businessmen – were "coming into Gwembe from many parts of Africa and abroad", who brought with them "good and bad habits". Moreover, "[r]oads

37 GTNA Annual Report, 1957, 15.1.1958, by Habanyama, NAZ SEC 2/143.

38 See e.g.: Tour of Chief Simamba's area, by Chief Councillor, 22.-24.7.1958, NAZ SP 4/12/82; Southern Province Intelligence Report, period ending 25.7.1955, NAZ SP 1/3/14; Annual Report on African Affairs, Southern Province, 1954, NAZ, SP 4/2/59; Annual Report on African Affairs, Southern Province, 1958, NAZ SP 4/2/59.

39 GTNA Annual Report, 1956, by Habanyama, NAZ SP 4/2/118.

40 Welcome address for Native Affairs Secretary's visit to Native Authority Headquarters, by Habanyama, 25.10.1956, PRO CO 1015/1484. More general information on Habanyama: Interview with Nancy Habanyama Hanchabila (his daughter), Northmeads, Lusaka, 29.1.2008; D. Howarth, *The Shadow of the Dam*. New York 1961, pp. 44-45.

41 Native Affairs Secretary Hall to Morgan, Colonial Office, 24.12.1956, PRO CO 1015/1491. On indirect rule and the policy of 'local government', see e.g.: R. Pearce, *The Turning Point in Africa*. British Colonial Policy 1938-1948, London 1982, chapters 6-8.

42 See e.g.: A. Eckert, *Spätkoloniale Herrschaft, Dekolonisation und internationale Ordnung*. Einführende Bemerkungen, in: *Archiv für Sozialgeschichte*, 48 (2008), pp. 3-20.

43 Welcome address for Native Affairs Secretary's visit to Native Authority Headquarters, by Habanyama, 25.10.1956, PRO CO 1015/1484.

44 GTNA Annual Report, 1957, by Habanyama, NAZ SEC 2/143.

45 Welcome Address to his Excellency the Governor, February 1960, NAZ SP 4/12/91.

46 GTNA Annual Report, 1957, by Habanyama, NAZ SEC 2/143.

are getting excellent which will mean easy travelling and easy transport. Cash economy is gaining its way at a terrific speed.”⁴⁷ All this might result in a corruption of morals and a loss of cultural ‘identity’, Habanyama warned. In order to not let the rapid social changes “get out of hand”, he strove to negotiate his own vision of development, which had nothing to do with electricity, industrialisation or universal economic rules, but was about schools, boreholes, medical facilities, agriculture and fishing.⁴⁸

3. Nationalist critiques – Harry Nkumbula and the Northern Rhodesian African National Congress (NRANC)

In official and public discourse, African nationalism embodied the very opposite of development: ‘Constructive administrators’ struggled against ‘destructive politicians’, who stirred up “personal hatred” at a time when “harmony is most essential”.⁴⁹ After the nationalist movement had suffered a serious blow in 1953 as the organised African resistance under the Northern Rhodesian African National Congress (NRANC) party had not been able to prevent the formation of the Federation,⁵⁰ Kariba was feared to become a new “spear-head of the Congress attack”.⁵¹ The few available scholarly assessments also suggest that NRANC leader Nkumbula *opposed* Kariba, treating his ‘anti-dam campaign’ as a successful case of nationalist mobilisation at the grassroots.⁵² However, Harry Nkumbula neither combated development, nor did he attempt “to wreck the Kariba Gorge scheme”.⁵³ Rather, as will be argued here, his position vis-à-vis Kariba was highly ambivalent, bespeaking the difficulty of ‘resisting’ a big-scale infrastructure project that promised to bring ‘light and power for a nation’.

A few months after the Federal Prime Minister had announced the Kariba decision in March 1955, the Congress president petitioned Queen Elizabeth II on behalf of the Gwembe Tonga.⁵⁴ In this central document, however, Nkumbula neither questioned

47 GTNA Annual Report 1956, by Habanyama, NAZ SP 4/2/118.

48 Ibid.; see also: GTNA Annual Report, 1959, by Habanyama, NAZ SP 4/2/151.

49 GTNA Annual Report, 1956, by Habanyama, NAZ SP 4/2/118; see also: Governor Benson to Colonial Secretary, 23.9.1955, PRO CO 1015/952; “Move of Africans from Kariba Area”, Federal Newsletter, 11.11.1955, PRO CO 1015/952; “Only political agitation can bedevil move of Africans from Kariba site”, Northern News, 3.11.1955, PRO CO 1015/952.

50 G. Macola, *Liberal Nationalism in Central Africa. A Biography of Harry Mwaanga Nkumbula*, New York 2010, p. 51.

51 Southern Province Intelligence Report, for the period ending 25.12.1955, NAZ SP 1/3/14. The NRANC was often simply referred to as “Congress”.

52 See: J. McGregor, *Crossing the Zambezi. The Politics of Landscape on a Central African Frontier*, Woodbridge/Harare 2009, pp. 109–111. Also Giacomo Macola, while providing an excellently nuanced revision of Zambian nationalism, only briefly mentions the Congress leader’s “anti-Kariba dam campaign” and his “numerous” “anti-Kariba writings” (G. Macola, *Liberal Nationalism* (footnote 50), pp. 70, 178 fn 84).

53 Reeves, for Provincial Commissioner, to Native Affairs Secretary, “Influence of Congress on Native Authorities”, 28.12.1955, NAZ SP 1/14/18.

54 This petition, of November 1955, was Nkumbula’s most visible and first comprehensive critique of the Kariba scheme. Before that, shortly after the Prime Minister’s announcement, he had already condemned the resettlement as an “infringement of constitution” in a telegram to the Colonial Secretary and submitted a first petition to Her Majesty’s Government, in which he referred to the resettlement to formulate a broader attack on the Fed-

the rationale behind the power project – improving living standards through planned industrialisation – nor categorically rejected the idea that the resettlement might be a justifiable measure for the sake of progress. Nkumbula’s challenge to Kariba’s modernisation lay in the realm of representation, ownership, and participation, aimed at including the Gwembe Tonga, or Africans generally, in the development process. Concretely, the petition asked that it be “determined *whether* it is just that the people should be dispossessed of their land” and whether the removal was for their “benefit”. If no less harmful alternatives, for instance a nuclear power scheme, were found, the Tonga had to be adequately compensated. Moreover, a commission of “a majority of Africans” and of independent “hydro-electrical engineers” should be appointed “to examine and to determine the points already raised”. Finally, the future power plant should not be in the hands of the Federal settler government, but be administered by a Northern Rhodesia-controlled corporation.⁵⁵

Nkumbula followed this line of approach – principally accepting high-tech modernisation but demanding African participation in it – throughout his ensuing Kariba-campaign directed at the colonial government in London. Here, the politician joined forces with a network of colonial-critical organisations, like the Anti-Slavery Society and the Fabian Colonial Bureau, as well as individuals, including famous writer Doris Lessing. Most of them he already knew from his time as student at the London School of Economics (LSE) in the late 1940s.⁵⁶ Now, during the heyday of international anti-colonialism, Nkumbula and his allies used Kariba to ensure that the ‘periphery’ spoke back to the metropolis. By disclosing harrowing local information, Nkumbula enabled his supporters to formulate a knowledgeable critique.⁵⁷ Through members of the Labour opposition party their protest reached the British parliament where a series of embarrassing questions exposed the Colonial Secretary’s ignorance and powerlessness regarding the Gwembe situation.⁵⁸ Moreover, the lobbyists challenged dominant discourse on Kariba in a range of publications, condemning the resettlement on humanitarian grounds and unmasking the hypocrisy of ‘multiracialism’.⁵⁹ Through these interventions, Kariba’s crit-

eration (Nkumbula to Colonial Secretary, 7.3.1955, NAZ HM 70/5; Petition to Her Majesty’s Government on the Kariba Gorge Decision, 4.3.1955, by Nkumbula, United National Independence Party Archives, Lusaka (UNIPA) ANC 7/90).

55 Petition Concerning the Evacuation of the People from the Zambezi Valley to Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II, 17.11.1955, by Nkumbula, UNIPA ANC 3/39.

56 G. Macola, *Liberal Nationalism* (footnote 50), pp. 20–23.

57 Most central was a substantial memorandum Nkumbula wrote for Labour MP Fenner Brockway: Nkumbula to Brockway, 17.2.1956, NAZ HM 70/5.

58 A few examples are: Question by Griffiths, 29.2.1956; Question by Swingler, 25.4.1956, Question by Rankin, 1.8.1956, Question by Rankin, 31.10.1956, Question by Swingler, 13.3.1957, Question by Stonehouse, 10.2.1959, in: Hansard, House of Commons Debates, quoted from: <http://hansard.millbanksystems.com> (accessed on 27.11.2010).

59 For instance: “Exodus with a Difference”, by Betts, Fabian Colonial Bureau, in: *Venture* 7/11, April 1956, Rhodes House Library, Oxford (RHL) MSS Brit. Emp. S 365, Box 102/1; “The Kariba Project”, by Lessing, in: *New Statesman and Nation*, 9.6.1956, School of Oriental and African Studies Library, London (SOASL) PPMS 6, Box 13, 6/7/3; “The Evictions from Kariba”, by Rex, in: *Manchester Guardian*, 9.2.1959, SOASL PPMS 6, Box 8, 6/6/3; Letter to

ics made concrete demands on behalf of the Gwembe Tonga – for technical assistance, compensation, rights to the lakeshore and participation in the reservoir’s economic development – while also taking their fate as an example of Britain’s failure to protect colonial subjects against the discriminating politics of Rhodesia’s settlers.

In later years, however, the well-coordinated alliance crumbled, mainly because of Nkumbula’s increasing isolation, both nationally and internationally, following the fall-out with his rival Kenneth Kaunda and the split of the nationalist movement in 1958.⁶⁰ Moreover, Nkumbula’s stance on Kariba, so stable and coherent in his metropolitan campaign, seemed significantly more nebulous from a local perspective. While British authorities had repeatedly been told that the Congress demanded fair treatment for the Tonga, but “does not condemn the Kariba scheme as a whole”⁶¹ and agreed “that these removals are necessary”,⁶² most people in Gwembe were under the impression that Nkumbula was fighting *against* Kariba.⁶³ This misapprehension certainly owed to the fact that communication with the Gwembe Tonga was severely restricted due to the Congress ban. At the same time, Nkumbula’s messages to them may have been deliberately obscure, especially since the people clearly entertained the forlorn hope that their political idol would prevent the removal.⁶⁴ Thus, the NRANC president was celebrated for his metropolitan intervention,⁶⁵ but remained vague with respect to the exact aims of the campaign. Regarding his petition, the impression created in party publicity and the local press was that the Queen had been asked to stop the move altogether.⁶⁶ Similarly, Nkumbula gave out ambivalent directives to the Tonga. In a circular letter, for instance, he claimed that the evictions had not yet been officially sanctioned and went on:

*So you can take it for granted that until and when the Secretary of State agrees to your moval [sic] you should resist any attempt to move you. But if and when they move you, you must ask for adequate land which is just as large and equal in value as the land you are being moved from. And you should ask for compensation ...*⁶⁷

When a group of people stubbornly resisted the move, leading to an open riot with eight fatalities in September 1958, colonial authorities were quick to blame the Congress leaders. Following the Northern Rhodesian Governor and the dominant press, the upheaval

editor “The Evictions in Kariba. Unfulfilled Promises”, by Fox-Pitt, in: Manchester Guardian, 22.9.1958, PRO CO 1015/1484.

60 On inner-party rivalry and the split, see G. Macola, *Liberal Nationalism* (footnote 50), pp. 53-72.

61 Note for record, meeting of Labour MPs with Colonial Secretary, 16.12.1955, PRO CO 1015/952.

62 Scott, Africa Bureau, to Colonial Secretary, 15.8.1956, PRO CO 1015/953.

63 See e.g.: Southern Province Intelligence Report, 25.1.1956-25.6.1956, NAZ SP 1/3/14; E. Colson, *Social Consequences* (footnote 6), pp. 39-40.

64 Southern Province Intelligence Report, 25.1.-25.6.1956, NAZ SP 1/3/14; Southern Province Intelligence Report, period ending 25.10.1956, NAZ SP 1/3/18.

65 See: Northern Rhodesia Intelligence Report, January 1956, PRO DO 35/4605; Nkumbula to Fox-Pitt, 13.1.1956, SOASL PPMS 6, Box 13, 6/7/4.

66 “Move of Africans from Kariba Area”, Federal Newsletter, 11.11.1955, PRO CO 1015/952; Congress Circular, 18.10.1955, SOASL PPMS 6, Box 13, 6/7/2.

67 Nkumbula to Gwembe Valley chiefs, 7.1.[1956], UNIPA ANC 2/1 (emphasis added).

had been instigated by Nkumbula and his fellow “evil men”, who had “told lies” to the “backward people”.⁶⁸ However, Nkumbula and Kaunda strongly refuted this allegation. Later investigations also concluded that local organisers themselves had used the name of the party “to reinforce their authority” without having been authorised by the headquarters.⁶⁹ At the same time, the NRANC’s ambiguousness may well have stimulated the spreading of certain rumours prior to the incident, which officers held accountable for people’s growing rebelliousness – for instance that the dam would break, that Nkumbula would stop the project and that he did not want the people to move.⁷⁰

Becoming a projection surface for the Tonga’s hopes was instrumental in Nkumbula’s endeavour to present himself as their spokesman and consolidate an important local support base at a time when his leadership in the nationalist movement came under attack. The Tonga’s frustration boosted Nkumbula’s popularity in the valley and also helped to fill the party’s coffers.⁷¹ How deeply his resettlement campaign was enmeshed in a struggle over authority emerges from numerous documents in which Nkumbula protested against the way Congress activity was repressed in the valley – an issue which often loomed larger than the more immediate concerns of the evacuations.⁷² Moreover, he did not tire of branding the Native Authority as stooges of government, who had irresponsibly given their consent to the removal with reckless disregard for the people. The politician thus seriously misjudged the nature of the Native Authority’s ‘consent’ and failed to see their efforts on behalf of the Gwembe Tonga.⁷³ Also Habanyama, in turn, did not appreciate how remarkably similar his own strategy was to the position adopted by the Congress, who he perceived to be “opposing” the resettlement “on principle”.⁷⁴ Therefore, possible synergies were, knowingly or unwittingly, sacrificed for the personal rivalry between two would-be representatives of the Gwembe Tonga.

68 “Gwembe Incident. Broadcast Statement by Governor of Northern Rhodesia”, 10.9.1958, PRO CO 1015/1484; also e.g.: Governor Benson to Colonial Secretary, 2.10.1958, PRO CO 1015/1484; “The evil people did their work too well”, Northern News, 11.9.1958, NAZ Northern News.

69 Report of the Gwembe Commission, Government Printer, 31.10.1958, PRO CO 1015/1485; Press Communique “Police absolved from criticism by Gwembe Commission”, 26.11.1958, NR Information Department, PRO CO 1015/1484.

70 Southern Province Intelligence Report, period ending 20.4.1958 and period ending 20.5.1958, NAZ SP 1/3/18; “Spearmen were ‘misguided or fantastically reckless’, says Commissioner”, Central African Post, 31.10.1958, SOASL PPMS 6, Box 8, 6/6/3; “Gwembe inquiry hears of plot to murder”, Central African Post, 31.10.1958, SOASL PPMS 6, Box 8, 6/6/3.

71 See: “Kaunda Claims 3,000 Congress Members in the Gwembe Area”, Central African Post, 4.11.1955, PRO CO 1015/952; Southern Province Intelligence Report, period ending 25.12.1955, NAZ SP 1/3/14; Southern Province Intelligence Report, period ending 20.5.1958, NAZ SP 1/3/18.

72 District Commissioner Sugg to NRANC, 19.1.1956, UNIPA ANC 9/15.

73 E.g.: Petition Concerning the Evacuation of the People from the Zambezi Valley to Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II, 17.11.1955, by Nkumbula, UNIPA ANC 3/39; Nkumbula to Brockway, 17.2.1956, NAZ HM 70/5; Draft “The Removal of Africans from the area flooded by the Kariba Scheme”, ca. November 1955, no author, certainly Nkumbula / Anti-Slavery Society, SOASL PPMS 6, Box 13, 6/7/4.

74 “The Evictions in Kariba. ‘Unfulfilled Promises’”, by Fox-Pitt, Manchester Guardian, 22.9.1958, SOASL PPMS 6, Box 8, 6/6/3.

4. Politics and development

While both men thus shared a concern for the Tonga's participation in Kariba's benefits, their underlying visions of modernisation appeared much less similar. In contrast to Habanyama's commitment to gradualism and 'un-political' advancement, Nkumbula's notion of development was closely intertwined with bolder visions of independent nation-building. Although the relevant literature and sources are rather patchy, it can be safely maintained that Nkumbula embraced the idea of development and talked about it in a way which was remarkably similar to contemporary technocratic paradigms.⁷⁵ Contradicting government's accusations, Congress claimed to be committed to the "promotion of the educational, political, economic, and social advancement of the Africans".⁷⁶ Moreover, as Giacomo Macola has recently shown, Nkumbula shared the views of many educated Africans, who regarded socio-economic development as the cornerstone of self-governed nation-building, and "subscribed to the ... basic evolutionary scheme – from tribe to nation".⁷⁷ Nkumbula's suggestions about how to overcome 'underdevelopment' bespeak his LSE-background and aligned him with prominent modernisation theorists of the time.⁷⁸ He advocated, for instance, state-planned "economic activity" for the sake of "market expansion" and pleaded for infrastructural improvements as well as an intelligent exploitation of natural resources with the help of scientific experts.⁷⁹ Even a large-scale hydroelectricity scheme had a place in the nationalists' plans for Central Africa's modernisation, as Nkumbula had argued already in 1953:

*Africans would have worked out a scheme for economic development in Central Africa. The Central African Council⁸⁰ ... could have been looked into and see whether it could have been given executive powers to effect major economic schemes such as the proposed Hydro-electrical Scheme at the Kariba Gorge. Such a plan would have been met with the least possible opposition by the Africans.*⁸¹

75 There is no comprehensive study on Nkumbula's views on modernisation. In the following, I use Macola's biography and several primary sources to draw out some of his ideas, but do not wish to suggest that Nkumbula developed a detailed and stable modernisation theory. In fact, his statements were in some cases even contradictory. Although Nkumbula generally advocated industrialisation (see below), he also advised people to 'return to the land' and protect it from greedy settlers during his anti-Federation campaign (G. Macola, *Liberal Nationalism* (footnote 50), pp. 39-42).

76 "Congress defines vote sought by N.R. Africans", *Northern News*, 21.8.1954, NAZ HM 70/11.

77 G. Macola, *Liberal Nationalism* (footnote 50), pp. 14-15, 18-19.

78 For instance one of LSE's most prominent teachers, Arthur Lewis (see: R. Tignor, W. Arthur Lewis and the Birth of Development Economics, Princeton/Oxford 2006, pp. 20-22).

79 "Immigration and progress of the Protectorate of N.R.", by Nkumbula, 1950, RHL MSS Brit. Emp. S 365, Fabian Colonial Bureau, Box 101/2. See also: "The Five Year Development Plan", by Kaunda, Congress Circular, 26.9.1954, UNIPA ANC 7/91; Nkumbula to all chiefs and people of Northern Rhodesia, 22.12.1952, UNIPA ANC 9/49; Chiefs and Delegates Conference, Kabwata African Welfare Hall, 19.8.-25.8.1952, UNIPA ANC 7/90.

80 The Central African Council was an advisory body, set up to make suggestions for the joint development of both Rhodesias and Nyasaland. The Council had discussed the possibility of damming the Zambesi already in 1945 (R. Rotberg, *Nationalism* (footnote 16), pp. 216-217).

81 Statement on the imposition of Federation, 6.3.1953, by Nkumbula, NAZ HM 70/5 (emphasis added).

And yet, this statement also exemplifies how Nkumbula's position differed from the strategy Kariba's planners pursued: Economic development could not be independent from political reform since "there is no economic stability without political stability".⁸² In collaborating with leftwing Fabian-Labour circles during his metropolitan Kariba-campaign, Nkumbula furthermore allied himself with the 'ultra-modern' fathers of the "second colonial occupation", who had initiated the greatly increased effort to develop the colonies after the Second World War.⁸³ Technological state-run development schemes featured in leftist grand visions too. However, Kariba's critics were not prepared to believe in automatic 'trickle-down' effects and demanded instead that the government make modernisation more inclusive. Within the current (settler-)colonial framework, they argued, the drastic changes were prone to produce further discrimination.⁸⁴ Furthermore, the Africans, having suffered from "the humiliations of the colour bar" all their lives, were not prepared to put off their legitimate demands for political participation and democratic rule for very much longer.⁸⁵

During the later stages of the project also Hezekiah Habanyama appears to have come to regard the "political kingdom" as a necessary prerequisite for Africans to rise from poverty.⁸⁶ After a series of broken promises and drawbacks in the resettlement process, shattered hopes and increasing frustration turned the Native Authority into a target of people's hostility. The 'loyal administrator' thus started to question his course of moderation.⁸⁷ In 1960 Habanyama served on the Monckton Commission, which had been set up to investigate into public attitudes towards the Federation and the state's future prospects.⁸⁸ Touring the three Central African territories to collect evidence, Habanyama connected his own disillusioning experiences in Gwembe with the rising tensions at the broader level at a time when the 'multiracial experiment' seemed on the verge of failure.⁸⁹ Disagreeing with the critical but not entirely condemnatory verdict of the Commission, Habanyama and his colleague W.M. Chirwa, a politician from Nyasaland, submitted

82 Statement on the imposition of Federation, 2.6.1953, by Nkumbula, UNIPA ANC 9/49.

83 D. Low/J. Lonsdale, Introduction, in: D. Low/A. Smith (eds.), *History of East Africa*. Vol. III, Oxford 1976, pp. 1-64, here p. 12. On colonial developmentalism under Labour (1945-1951) and on Labour's think-tank, the Fabian Colonial Bureau, see further: R. Hyam, Introduction, in: *ibid.* (ed.), *The Labour Government and the End of Empire, 1945-1951*, London 1992, p. xxiii-lxxviii; S. Howe, *Anticolonialism in British Politics. The Left and the End of Empire, 1918-1964*, Oxford 1993.

84 See e.g.: Memorandum on Gwembe resettlement report, 3.4.1956, by Betts, RHL MSS Brit. Emp. S 365, Fabian Colonial Bureau, Box 101/1; Fox-Pitt, Anti-Slavery Society, to Labour MP Brockway, 8.3.1956, UNIPA ANC 5/9.

85 D. Lessing, *Going Home*, New York/London 1996 (first 1957), pp. 179, 181-188.

86 This alludes to the famous proclamation of Ghana's first president Kwame Nkrumah: "Seek ye first the political kingdom, and all things shall be added unto you" (quoted from A. Mazrui, *Seek ye first the political kingdom*, in: A. Mazrui/C. Wondji (eds.), *Africa since 1935. General History of Africa, Volume VIII*, Paris/London/Berkeley 1993, pp. 105-126).

87 On people's hostility against the Native Authority: E. Colson, *Social consequences* (footnote 6), pp. 185-188.

88 P. Murphy, Introduction (footnote 9), pp. lxx-lxxvii; E. Windrich, *The Rhodesian Problem. A Documentary Record 1923-1973*, London/Boston 1975, pp. 32-40; Gwembe District Newsletter, November 1960, NAZ SP 4/1/65.

89 Tensions had risen considerably following the constitutional negotiations in Northern Rhodesia and, foremost, the Nyasaland Emergency in March 1959. This period of violent unrest and harsh governmental repression "marked a turning point for the Federation" (P. Murphy, Introduction [footnote 9], pp. lxxvii-lxxix, quotation p. lxxix).

a “Minority Report”.⁹⁰ Here, they discussed the Kariba Dam as a micro-study of the Federation’s discriminatory politics: All economic development currently taking place, they argued, was heavily biased towards the south, business and industry, that is, the white minority. Within the existing framework the “standard of life of the poor majority” would not improve; instead, development “helped most those who were already well-off”.⁹¹ Habanyama, previously praised for his willingness to draw “a clear distinction between politics and local government”,⁹² now postulated an urgent need for political change since “there can be no long-term and stable economic prosperity until the Africans, duly elected by their people, are in control of their own governments.”⁹³ How drastically the mediator’s course was shifting can furthermore be seen from the fact that Habanyama stood as candidate for Kaunda’s new United National Independence Party (UNIP) in 1962 – a party which was widely perceived as a more radical rival to Nkumbula’s Northern Rhodesian Congress.⁹⁴

Moreover, little was left of Habanyama’s previous gradualism and cultural conservatism when he debated with officers over the uses of the future Lake Kariba in the later 1950s. While Southern Rhodesian authorities started to turn their part of the reservoir into a magnet for white tourism and big business, arguing that the indigenous people lacked the potential to develop the area by themselves,⁹⁵ the Native Authority in the north insisted that the lakeshore, especially the fisheries, be managed by the Gwembe Tonga. If the people received exclusive fishing rights and sufficient funds, the Native Authority itself would “push on training and get boats and equipment at a rapid rate” so that “we can develop much faster”.⁹⁶ Since the new land would not sustain the Gwembe Tonga on agriculture alone, the maxim was now “fish or starve”.⁹⁷ At that stage, development had thus become a fierce competition over limited resources, in which the south threatened to outdo the north, blacks competed against whites, national interests jeopardised local ones. Questions of *how* to develop, paternalist gradualism or notions of ‘tradition’-based

90 On W.M. Chirwa, see: R. Segal, *Political Africa. A Who’s Who of Personalities and Parties*, New York 1961, pp. 56-57.

91 W. Chirwa/H. Habanyama, *Minority Report*, in: *Report of the Advisory Commission on the Review of the Constitution of Rhodesia and Nyasaland*, London 1960, pp. 139-156, here p. 144-145.

92 *Annual Report on African Affairs, Southern Province, 1960*, NAZ SP 4/2/59.

93 W. Chirwa/H. Habanyama, *Minority Report* (footnote 91), p. 149.

94 E. Colson, *Social Consequences* (footnote 6), pp. 189-190, 199.

95 UK High Commissioner Metcalf to Shannon, Commonwealth Relations Office, 23.5.1957, PRO DO 35/4606. The Southern Rhodesian government reserved a five kilometre-wide strip along the shoreline for tourism, barring the southern settlers from the economic potential of the lake (T. Scudder, *Case Study* (footnote 26), p. 15). Similarly, they invited commercial businesses to set up a fishing industry, arguing that “a full exploitation ... cannot be achieved by leaving the fishing entirely to the natives” (Memorandum on Dr. Hickling’s report, by Maar, SR fisheries adviser, ca. mid-1956, NAZ SP 4/3/13).

96 D’Avray, Kariba Development Officer, to Minister of Legal Affairs, 17.3.1960, NAZ SP 4/7/16 (first quotation); Record of views expressed at Native Authority meeting regarding the proposed Kariba Lake Development Company, 1.4.1960, NAZ SP 4/7/17.

97 Memorandum on discussions on the formation of a Kariba Development Company, office of Federal Prime Minister, 8.2.1960, NAZ SP 4/7/16.

advancement ‘from within’ took a back seat, as all actors’ primary concern was not to be out-developed by their competitors.

5. Conclusion

Late-colonial, state-making modernisation illustrates the complexity of colonial subjectivation processes. As the examples of Hezekiah Habanyama and Harry Nkumbula show, development was not a “drama with two actors” – the powerful planners against the oppressed subalterns.⁹⁸ Escaping clear-cut labelling like ‘resistance’ or ‘collaboration’, both cases demonstrate how colonial positions have to be located in the ‘in-between’, in reciprocal and dynamic negotiations, as is captured by the concepts of mimicry and hybridity.⁹⁹ Habanyama’s role as one of “Government’s ‘good boys’”¹⁰⁰ opened up “new possibilities of influence”, enabling him to have an impact on the resettlement.¹⁰¹ The middle man’s course, oscillating between privilege and responsibility, expediency and conviction, opposition and cooperation, complicates our understanding of colonial governance and modernisation.¹⁰² It was the promise of development itself that prevented it from becoming a “simple knowledge-power regime” as those who worked from within the system appropriated, redirected and challenged the concept, drawing claims for material prosperity and political participation from it.¹⁰³ At the same time, this very ‘attractiveness’ made it difficult to formulate alternatives. As the case of Harry Nkumbula demonstrates, industrialising hydroelectric schemes also worked for the “imagined communities” of (soon-to-be) African nation-states.¹⁰⁴ Therefore, state-making modernisation was a major locus of colonial ambivalence. Desiring a modern nation with industries and electric power as well as democracy, civil rights, the rule of law was, essentially, desiring the nation-state of the coloniser.¹⁰⁵

Modernisation’s ambivalence was the result of multiple and dynamic entanglements. Both Africans adopted strikingly similar positions in order to redress Kariba’s asymmetries. At the same time, they belonged to competing political alliances, which – for different reasons – came under pressure in the course of time. Regarding their broader ideas of development, both Nkumbula and Habanyama welded together ‘global’ dis-

98 F. Cooper, *Africa since 1940. The Past of the Present*, Cambridge 2002, p. 38.

99 Bhabha, *Mimicry* (footnote 34); H. Bhabha, *Signs taken for wonders: Questions of ambivalence and authority under a tree outside Delhi, May 1817*, in: idem, *The Location of Culture*. London/New York 1994, pp. 145-174.

100 GTNA Annual Report, 1956, by Habanyama, NAZ SP 4/2/118.

101 A. Eckert, *Cultural Commuters. African Employees in Late Colonial Tanzania*, in: N. Lawrance / E. Osborn / R. Roberts (eds.), *Intermediaries, Interpreters, and Clerks. African Employees in the Making of Colonial Africa*, Madison 2006, pp. 248-269, here p. 251.

102 See also: *Ibid.*, and A. Eckert, *Herrschen und Verwalten* (footnote 11).

103 F. Cooper / R. Packard, *Development Knowledge* (footnote 5), p. 130.

104 B. Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, London 1983.

105 See: B. Ashcroft / G. Griffiths / H. Tiffin, *Post-Colonial Studies. The Key Concepts*, London / New York 2007, pp. 138-139; on colonial ambivalence: H. Bhabha, *Interrogating identity: Frantz Fanon and the postcolonial prerogative*, in: idem (ed.), *The Location of Culture*, London / New York 1994, pp. 57-93.

courses and local experiences. The Congress president did not reject the technocratic rhetoric of Kariba's planners, but, in the light of his own discrimination, could not believe that politics and economics were neatly separable. Moreover, through his network of supporters Nkumbula ensured that the local realities of 'multiracial partnership' boomeranged on the colonial centre. Habanyama was also a cultural broker¹⁰⁶ who drew some of his concepts from the colonial service tradition, while also making his own suggestions for the Tonga's development. Witnessing colonial paternalism's failures on the ground, however, he came to modify his position considerably to arrive at a politicised, fast-track vision not dissimilar to that of his opponents.

On the one hand, it is important to appreciate that modernisation was thus not a money-knowledge-power monolith, but a complex negotiation among different actors.¹⁰⁷ On the other, notions of entanglement or ambivalence must not obscure Kariba's overall lopsidedness. Neither Habanyama nor Nkumbula were able to prevent the Federation's prestige project from becoming – and remaining – a prime case of asymmetrical, exclusive development. Even today, more than 45 years after Zambia's independence, many Gwembe Tonga do not have access to electricity and are food-aid dependent, having been driven from the lake by a multi-million fish industry and having lost even more land to those who could allegedly develop it better.¹⁰⁸

106 See: A. Eckert, *Cultural Commuters* (footnote 102).

107 See also: M. van Beusekom, *Negotiating Development: African Farmers and Colonial Experts at the Office du Niger, 1920–1960*, Portsmouth 2002.

108 That is, public and corporate actors, who invested in tourism and other commercial activities (T. Scudder, *History of Development* (footnote 6); J. Leslie, *Deep Water. The Epic Struggle over Dams, Displaced People and the Environment*, New York 2005, pp. 191–200).