

Between Admiration and Transformation: Paths of Western Education into Early 20th Century China

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RESÜMEE

Die gegenwärtige Forschung zu Bildungstransfer beschäftigt sich zunehmend mit der Rolle von lokalen Akteuren in Transferprozessen und der damit verbundenen Wandelbarkeit von Bildungsmodellen und -konzepten. Der vorliegende Beitrag beleuchtet Akteure und Objekte von Bildungstransfer im China des ausgehenden 19. und frühen 20. Jahrhunderts, als China in wachsendem Maße als Teil einer Weltgesellschaft gedacht wurde. Nach einem Überblick über die unterschiedlichen chinesischen Rezeptionsphasen jener Zeit wendet sich der Beitrag der Frage zu, mit welchen semantischen Ressourcen chinesische Bildungsakteure agieren konnten und welche Rolle dabei vermittelnde Instanzen wie Übersetzungen oder „dritte“ Länder wie Japan spielten. Abschließend werden diese Phänomene unter Rückgriff auf theoretische Zugänge zu Rezeption und Aneignung konzeptualisiert.

Current research on ‘educational borrowing’ has not only led to a growing awareness of local agency but has also revealed the flexibility of educational models and concepts and their in-built capacity for change.¹ It took comparative educationists some time to acknowledge that attempts to copy educational models were futile endeavours, even if copying was the original intention of the actors involved. Earlier studies on educational transfer were still based on the assumption that models could be transplanted from one context to another, interpreting unexpected results as deviations, deformations, or even failures. Since transfer in education was closely linked to educational policy making, unintended outcomes were seen as resulting from insufficient policy design or lax implementation procedures. As Gita Steiner-Khamsi critically remarks in her study on edu-

1 See e.g. the inspiring volume *The Global Politics of Educational Borrowing and Lending*, ed. G. Steiner-Khamsi, New York 2004.

cational vouchers in Mongolia, 'the remedy would be to improve the design of policy;' processes of local reinterpretation and adaptation were largely ignored.²

More recent research on the emergence of an educational 'world culture' admits that many transfer processes do not lead to sameness but create 'differences'. However, according to this neo-institutionalist approach, these differences are seen as 'variation in local educational practices'³ rather than representing new cultural forms in their own right. While Francisco O. Ramirez does use the term 'creolisation'⁴ to describe the processes at the local level, it is worth asking what is meant by the term. In practice, many researchers who argue along the 'world culture' line treat creoles as variations of underlying commonalities. Thus, the outcome of educational transfer is simply regarded as the original model in some kind of 'cultural disguise'. However, 'creolisation' can be used more radically, as Ulf Hannerz and others have shown convincingly.⁵ This more radical usage reveals the transformative power of transfer or interaction. It means that the act of perceiving, selecting, and transferring a model occurs in a setting that not merely influences but transforms and thus recreates both the agents and objects of transfer. Furthermore, these agents and objects, even at the beginning of the transfer process under study, represent by no means unified, homogeneous cultural wholes but have themselves to be seen as the outcomes of previous processes of educational, or more broadly, cultural transfer.

In this contribution, I will look at these agents and objects of educational transfer in the virtual space of 'China and the world', which began to emerge among Chinese elites towards the end of the 19th century. The contribution will trace the paths that 'Western' educational ideas and models followed on their way into China in the early 20th century.⁶ It will be shown that educational borrowing took place both through individual actors and against the background of these actors' collective experiences, which were fed by 'traditional' world views as well as by the will to move their country into 'modernity'.

Both 'tradition' and 'modernity' were already highly hybrid concepts at the time. Tradition is understood here as the institutionalised (and repeatedly reconstructed) Confucian tradition, which in Chinese is also called the 'great tradition' (*da chuantong*) and is differentiated from the 'small tradition' (*xiao chuantong*), which encompasses the everyday lives of the non-elite population and is also shaped by Daoism and Buddhism. By modernity, I mean a largely imported modernity coined by Western ideas. This, however, does not preclude the existence or emergence of a Chinese modernity in the sense

2 G. Steiner-Khamsi, Vouchers for Teacher Education (Non) Reform in Mongolia: Transitional, Postsocialist, or Anti-socialist Explanations?, in: *Comparative Education Review* 49 (2005) 2, 149.

3 F. O. Ramirez, Toward a Cultural Anthropology of the World?, in: *Local Meanings, Global Schooling*, ed. K. M. Anderson-Levitt, New York 2003, 239–254, here 247.

4 Ibid.

5 See e.g. U. Hannerz, *Kokoschka's Return: or, the Social Organization of Creolization*, in *Transnational Connections: Culture, People, Places*, ed. Ulf Hannerz, London 1996, 65–78.

6 In this article, the 'West' depicts less a geographic entity than a Chinese category of perception. In the 19th and 20th centuries, these were mainly Germany, England, France, Russia/the Soviet Union, the USA, and, to a lesser extent, the Latin American countries. At a later stage, these were complemented by Australia and New Zealand. Therefore, the 'West' and 'Western' are largely to be read with quotation marks.

of Shmuel Eisenstadt's idea of multiple modernities. There were contesting visions of modernity, as much as there was no one 'genuine' tradition on which Chinese intellectuals could draw. Rather, in China – as in the rest of the world – 'modernity' and 'tradition' were open to interpretation and negotiation. There were no clear-cut boundaries: modernisers could be eclectically traditional, while traditionalists could be surprisingly modern. By highlighting specific Chinese reformers and educators, I will depict how these actors responded to and shaped the modernisation processes in China, how they mediated between local traditions and globally circulating ideas, and how they eventually transformed and appropriated these ideas within what they perceived as the Chinese context.

Transferring educational knowledge is a complex process. (By educational knowledge, I mean educational concepts and programmes as well as institutionalised knowledge, such as organisational models of modern education systems.) Not only is the background against which transfer occurs important for our understanding of the process, but also the language – or rather, the change of language – is a crucial issue when analysing transfer processes. How does 'imported' educational knowledge find its way into the new context, and how is it understood in its new environment? And what happens to this knowledge if it, on its long journey from the West to China, takes a detour in Japan? I will therefore progress in three steps. First, I will present, at a very general level, the various phases that Chinese intellectuals and reformers went through when adopting foreign knowledge. Second, I will shed light on the different perspectives of adoption: the semantic breeding-ground for new knowledge in the China of the late 19th and early 20th centuries on which the Chinese actors performed in various ways and with sometimes divergent interests;⁷ the changes in the vocabulary that hint at conceptual shifts when dealing with foreign knowledge; the role of translations, important paths of knowledge transmission, that can draw attention to interferences, transformations, and processes of appropriation taking place between language of origin and host language; and the crucial position of Japan as a mediator between China and the West. Third, in a short conclusion, I will approach the described phenomena from a more theoretical perspective by regarding them as instances of externalisation – gaining supplementary meaning by referring to external points of reference.⁸

7 The category 'reformers' should be understood in a broad sense. While traditional estate hierarchies became increasingly fuzzy towards the end of the 19th century, a new group emerged that was willing to modernise and to reform the country. Paula Harrell calls this group 'gentry-merchant-reformers': "... this was a new social elite, still prizing rank and privilege within the traditional power structure, yet actively engaged in the modernizing sector as well, and possessing a political independence born of economic self-sufficiency and a mastery of new skills and information." See P. Harrell, *Sowing the Seeds of Change. Chinese Students, Japanese Teachers, 1895–1905*, Stanford 1992, 3.

8 For a detailed elaboration of the concept of externalisation, see J. Schriewer, *The Method of Comparison and the Need for Externalization: Methodological Criteria and Sociological Concepts*, in *Theories and Methods in Comparative Education*, ed. J. Schriewer / B. Holmes, *Komparatistische Bibliothek*, vol. 1, Frankfurt am Main 1990, 25–86.

The Chinese Encounter with Foreign Knowledge

The opium wars and the forced opening of China in the 19th century are often associated with China's previous isolation from the rest of the world, which was only occasionally interrupted by China's relations to her tributary states. This isolation is thought to have ended abruptly and painfully through the advent of the West. However, as Tu Wei-ming has pointed out, this view of the 'Middle Kingdom' neglects all the repeated crises and anxieties which the country had gone through historically and were subsumed under the telling phrase *wang tianxia*, the 'demise of China' (literally: 'demise of the country beneath heaven').⁹ The Chinese experiences with foreign rule enforced this perception of crisis, such as during the last imperial dynasty, the Manchurian Qing dynasty, but also, and certainly more brutally, under the Mongols in the 13th and 14th centuries. Nevertheless, the encounter with the West from the second half of the 19th century onwards was novel in a particular sense. Suddenly, Chinese elites were confronted with alternative concepts of the world that profoundly questioned their own concepts or even replaced (parts of) them. This took place at a much higher speed than, for example, the import of Buddhism in the preceding centuries. The abolishment of the examination system in 1905 reveals how fundamental the conceptual changes of the time must have been. The examination system, which had been in place for centuries and had determined both education and the foundation of the Chinese state, was replaced by educational systems that drew their inspiration from Japan and the West.¹⁰

The adoption of the new in confrontation with the West took place in different phases, each displaying its own characteristics. I will give a brief overview over this development, drawing, firstly, on Marianne Bastid's analysis of how Chinese elites adopted foreign educational ideas and practices, and secondly, on how an actor of that time, the famous reformer Liang Qichao (1873–1929), characterised these phases.¹¹ In the first fifty years following the first opium war (1839–1842), the political actors in China were mainly interested in importing technological and military knowledge from the West. In doing so, they were following a practice that was already observable in the 17th century when dealing with the Jesuits: they sharply distinguished between knowledge in the natural

9 Cf. Tu Wei-ming, *The Enlightenment Mentality and the Chinese Intellectual Dilemma*, in *Perspectives on Modern China: Four Anniversaries*, ed. K. Lieberthal et al., New York/London 1991, 103–118. On the relations between China and the West prior to the opium wars, see also D. E. Mungello, *The Great Encounter of China and the West, 1500–1800*, Lanham etc. 1999.

10 On the decline of the Chinese examination system, see the seminal work by W. Franke, *The Reform and Abolition of the Traditional Chinese Examination System*, Cambridge, Mass. 1960; on the examination system as social practice and mechanism of ideological reproduction, see the excellent study by I. D. Man-Cheong, *The Class of 1761: Examinations, State, and Elites in Eighteenth-Century China*, Stanford 2004.

11 M. Bastid, *Servitude or Liberation? The Introduction of Foreign Educational Practices and Systems to China from 1840 to the Present*, in: *China's Education and the Industrialized World. Studies in Cultural Transfer*, ed. R. Hayhoe / M. Bastid, Armonk / New York 1987, 3–20; Liang Qichao, *A Broad Discussion of China's Evolution in the Last Fifty Years* [*Wushi nian Zhongguo jinhua gailun*], originally published in February 1923. The article can be found in Liang Qichao, *Collected Works from the Studio of the Ice Drinker* [*Yinbing shi heji*], vol. 5, article collection 2, Beijing 1989 [1936], 39–48. I am grateful to Xiaoqing Xu for drawing my attention to this article.

sciences and in technology, on the one hand, and, on the other, the concomitant doctrines of religion and ideology. This culminated in the famous maxim as coined by the reformer Zhang Zhidong (1837–1909), ‘Chinese essence and Western functions’ (in short: Zhongti Xiyong): certain elements which were thought to be useful should be selected and adopted, while the socio-cultural context where these elements originated was rejected or at best ignored.

Although the focus in this period was on Western (military) technology, the overwhelming presence of the Western world in China produced a shock nonetheless. Even in this first phase, more changes occurred than just the introduction of a few new technologies. At least beneath the surface, Chinese elites had to admit that the Western ‘barbarians’ did not only possess superior military technologies, but that they also embodied an alternative and competing vision of ‘civilisation’. Therefore, the motto ‘Chinese essence, Western functions’ did not just express the Chinese consciousness of being culturally and spiritually superior; it served also as a shield against these alternative representations of the world. There was the constant fear of losing supremacy in terms of civilisational achievement, as can be illustrated by the following event reported by Liang Qichao:

I remember that in the second year of the Guangxu Period [1876; BS], there was a diplomat with the name Guo Songtao serving in England. He kept a travel diary, in which there was a paragraph which read roughly as follows: ‘The barbarians today are not the same as in earlier times, they also have a civilisation that is more than two-thousand years old.’ Goodness gracious, when this book arrived in Beijing, it aroused the fury of the imperial officials, every day they presented complaints to the throne, until finally the printing plates were destroyed, and only then was it all settled.¹²

The strategies to implant Western knowledge into Chinese minds were threefold: firstly, new school subjects (mainly the natural sciences) were introduced. Secondly, special ‘modern’ institutions were established to transmit Western knowledge. However, these institutions did not replace the already existing schools, and at least initially, the graduates of these modern schools were denied access to elite networks and thereby to important political posts. Thirdly, and importantly, Chinese students were sent abroad – mainly to the United States, to England, France, and Germany (and later on to Japan). These overseas programmes constituted crucial steps towards the systematic adoption of foreign knowledge, and they were widely propagated by the reformers. According to Zhang Zhidong, one year of overseas study was equivalent to five years of studying Western books or to three years of study within China.¹³ As with the graduates from modern schools within China, the Chinese graduates from abroad had some difficulties with integrating themselves into the local Chinese networks upon their return. To leave

12 Liang, *A Broad Discussion*, 43.

13 Zhang Zhidong, *Overseas Study*, Second Part [Youxue di er], in Zhang, *Encouragement to Study* [Quanxue pian], part 2 (Waipian), ed. Xie Junmei, with critical comments by Li Zhongxing, Zhengzhou 1998 [1895], 116–119, here 116.

the country often meant to leave those circles that paved the way towards prestigious administrative or political posts.¹⁴ However, there is reason to assume that international mobility did not cut ties with the homeland for a long time. Actors who were educated along Western standards soon succeeded in building up their own social networks.¹⁵ According to Liang, in 1895, when the Chinese army was defeated by the Japanese troops, a second phase began. In this phase, administrative reforms were launched that were inspired by the West and were not only to transform the political system but also the foundations of economy, law, and education. In the educational sector, we can see the beginning of this phase with the establishment of the *Jingshi Daxuetang* in 1898, the predecessor of Beijing University and the first Chinese university to be modelled after Western standards. In regards to modern technical sciences and engineering, Shanghai was even earlier: in 1896, Sheng Xuanhuai (1844–1916), entrepreneur, pedagogue, and political consultant, founded *Nanyang College*, which became an important location for internationally mobile modernisers and reformers, and which was later to become the famous Jiaotong University.

According to Marianne Bastid, entire systems of education were ‘imported’ from abroad and put into operation during this second phase. Education thereupon was considered the foundation of a strong nation and as prerequisite for the nation’s survival. Thus, the function of education was seen in much more dramatic terms. While already the above-mentioned reformer Zhang Zhidong remarked that ‘knowledge alone can save us from destruction, and education is the means to secure knowledge,’¹⁶ reformers were now much more willing to discard Chinese knowledge altogether in favour of Western science. In their quest for suitable educational models, they were guided more by political than by pedagogical considerations: if there was a country that was particularly admired or particularly feared, the educational system of this country would be examined and ‘copied’. At the beginning of the 20th century, this was the Japanese education system, which exerted an immense influence until the 1920s. Then, following calls for more democracy and liberalisation, the US-American system was adopted, which was partially due to the effects of the May Fourth Movement. In this patriotic-revolutionary movement, students and intellectuals not only protested against the loss of national sovereignty, but also advocated a ‘new culture’ that rejected the Confucian tradition and that should be accessible for everyone both in terms of ideology and language. However, traditionalists were sceptical and mistrusted this new import of educational ideals. To them, these ideals looked too individualistic and too far away from the needs of society.

14 On this topic, see e.g. J. W. Sacca, *Like Strangers in a Foreign Land: Chinese Officers Prepared at American Military Colleges, 1904–1937*, in: *The Journal of Military History* 70 (July 2006), 703–742.

15 See N. Vittinghoff, *Social Actors in the Field of New Learning in Nineteenth Century China*, in: *Mapping Meanings. The Field of New Learning in Late Qing China*, ed. M. Lackner / N. Vittinghoff, Leiden 2004, 75–118.

16 Y. C. Wang, *Intellectuals and Society in China 1860–1949*, in: *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 3 (1961) 4, 395–426, here 396.

They could not see how these ideas could be integrated into the traditional alliance between education and politics.¹⁷

According to Liang's (probably exaggerated) characterisation of this second phase, the reformers of the time – including himself – were trained well in the classics, but did not know a single non-Chinese word:

*They [the reformers; BS] could not tell the people: 'What is this foreign knowledge, how can we get it,' they could only appeal to them every day: 'The old things are not enough, the many good things of the foreigners should be studied.'*¹⁸

While from Liang's point of view reforms at the political level completely failed, in the educational sector the reformers achieved some results by abolishing the examination system, designing a Western-oriented educational system, and establishing new schools and universities.

With the May Fourth Movement of 1919, Chinese society experienced profound transformations that went beyond the changes of the previous period. This is why Liang Qichao sees the May Fourth Movement as the beginning of the third phase – in contrast to Marianne Bastid, who lets this third phase commence a few years later. Liang's view can be supported by looking at the main actors of the time, whose constellation changed radically with the May Fourth Movement. Actors began to perform outside the spheres of direct political intervention and thus constituted and shaped a newly emerging, modern public: many modernisers became active in public education and in the media. Among them there were many who demanded a complete westernisation; Zhang Zhidong's maxim of the 19th century, 'Chinese essence, Western functions', was turned into a call for 'Western essence and Western functions'. These more radical demands were fuelled by the overt disappointment of many intellectuals: in their view, after the revolution of 1911 when the imperial dynasty was replaced by the Republic, most changes were not only extremely slow but also exceedingly superficial. As Liang complains, 'if you take the old psychology and wish to establish a new system on top of it, then this will not work, you have to gradually shake awake the whole character.'¹⁹

The diversification of actors, of modes of adoption, and of the corresponding arenas for discussion and implementation was typical of this third phase. For the educational arena, this is particularly true in the second half of the 1920s. During this time, we can find occasional copies of foreign ideas and models, but no more attempts at wholesale take-overs as was the case when the Japanese and the American system were adopted. Politicians and educators were no more subject to ready-made blueprints but felt free to experiment with different ideas. Therefore, this phase can be seen as the most creative

17 This was despite the fact that in American pedagogy the service to society enjoyed great attention. For instance, the child in the conceptions of John Dewey, who was widely heard and read in China, is an individual tightly integrated into society; see e.g. A. Ryan, *Deweyan Pragmatism and American Education*, in: *Philosophers on Education. Historical Perspectives*, ed. A. Oksenberg Rorty, London / New York 1998, 394–410.

18 Liang, *A Broad Discussion*, 44.

19 *Ibid.*, 45.

time of adoption and adaptation, whereas critics blame this period for its chaos and lack of principles, more or less for the same reasons.²⁰ Certainly, social unrest – caused by a starving population and by the civil war between the Nationalists and the Communists – as well as the external threat by Japan restricted the range and the ways how new ideas could be implemented. But at the same time, many Chinese intellectuals showed an increased patriotism and were fervently engaged in founding public schools, vocational schools, colleges, and universities. These new institutions were again influential for the further development of Chinese education.²¹

The Semantic Breeding Ground for New Knowledge

How were the actors able to process all the new ideas, concepts, and theories that virtually flooded China at the turn from the 19th to the 20th century? As is the case with any kind of semantic processing, the actors – decision-makers in (educational) politics and economy as well as those representing a broader public, such as journalists, writers, teachers, and students – did not establish completely novel categories of perceiving and understanding the world. Rather, while encountering the new, they drew first on existing, often ‘traditional’ concepts and gradually expanded them. This turned out to be an effective and highly flexible strategy to adopt and categorise the new without discarding the old altogether. Ideas and things that seemed rather new at first glance could thus be interpreted within a logical framework that was grounded in socio-cultural context. In what follows, I will present some examples to illustrate this strategy.

Many intellectuals experienced the second half of the 19th century as a chain of catastrophes and a period of humiliation and shame. How could they explain the rapid changes that they were witnessing? Which strategies did they choose to push through their own understanding of change? A prevalent figure of thought that reappeared again and again after the opium wars was the assumption that inner chaos leads to outer catastrophes (*nei luan wai huan*). The logics of this assumption can be traced back to the Confucian classic of *The Great Learning* (Daxue), which had been written at around 500 BC.²² According to this text, the country and the world can only be in order if every member – state, family, individual – had been self-cultivated. This logic was at this time reactivated: particular groups or constellations, such as the government, but also certain structural or institutional arrangements, could be made responsible for the obvious outer ‘disorder’. For example, reformers like Zuo Zongtang (1812–1885), Shen Baozhen (1820–1879),

20 E.g. Wu Junsheng, Chinese Education Needs a Kind of Philosophy [Zhongguo jiaoyu xuyao yi zhong zhexue], in: Wu Junsheng, Essays on Education and Culture: A Selection [Jiaoyu yu Wenhua Lunwen Xuanji], Taipei 1972, 45–54, originally published on November 5, 1934, in the educational supplement to the newspaper Dagongbao. I am grateful to Meiyao Wu for this reference.

21 See also R. Hayhoe, *China's Universities, 1895–1995. A Century of Cultural Conflict*, New York 1996.

22 See Daxue [The Great Learning] in: Wing-tsit Chan, *A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy*, Princeton 1963, 86–87.

and Ding Richang (1823–1882) used this thought figure to argue for ‘ordering’ measures like a more careful selection of government staff or a restructuring of the government, but also for a stronger emphasis on commerce, technology, or military.²³ Later reformers like Zhang Jian (1853–1926), Zheng Guanying (1842–1922), and the educators Cai Yuanpei (1868–1940) und Huang Yanpei (1878–1965) extended this argument to the educational sector and linked it with calls for vocational and mass education. Many of these reformers regarded themselves as good Confucians since they could draw on traditional arguments to put forward their reform agenda.

Morally, the reformers used the term ‘shame’ (*chi*) to express their feelings about China’s inferiority vis-à-vis the West and about the humiliating failure of an entire nation.²⁴ ‘Shame’, just like the concept of ‘inner chaos’, sought the reasons for China’s break-down not only in the foreign aggression but also in domestic patterns of behaviour and weaknesses – identified mainly as the population’s low level of education and the country’s military and economic instability. At the same time, the traditional concept of ‘shame’ implied change: change through ‘regeneration’ (*zizhen*) and ‘self-strengthening’ (*zhiqiang*) both of the individual and of the whole nation. These processes already inherent in the concept of ‘shame’ provided the ground for the ‘self-strengthening movement’, which sought to put China at eye-level with the other nations. Thus, ‘shame’ and ‘humiliation’ served as instruments of national mobilisation.²⁵

However, the attitude of many Chinese modernisers towards ‘tradition’ – particularly those of the closing 19th and beginning 20th century – was highly ambivalent. While many traditional thought figures might have helped to understand and tackle acute problems, the tradition as such was also an object of ardent attack, if not hatred. How did this two-fold approach towards ‘tradition’ take place, and how can we explain the underlying ambivalences?

The most severe attacks on the Chinese tradition by modernisers and reformers were linked to the question of practical use: of what use was a tradition that ignored, in the eyes of these reformers, the practical needs of the major part of the population? How legitimate were studies that were exceedingly concerned with moral and aesthetical issues? How helpful was the Confucian ignorance of, neglect of, or even contempt for the natural sciences and technology, economy and business, and any for-profit activities? This ‘tradition’, criticised as too detached from ‘reality’, was often held responsible for China’s stagnation in economic, technological, and military terms, and for its assumed inferiority regarding the West. At the same time, however, a Chinese tradition from the

23 See D. Pong, *The Vocabulary of Change: Reformist Ideas of the 1860s and 1870s*, in: *Ideal and Reality. Social and Political Change in Modern China 1860–1949*, ed. D. Pongy / E. S. K. Fung, Lanham 1985, 25–61.

24 *Ibid.*, 31 ff.

25 Even today, ‘shame’ and ‘humiliation’ enjoy high popularity when patriotic sentiments are in need. They can be part of a virtual ‘shame’ celebration which becomes evident in a number of recent book titles. William A. Callahan remembers how a Chinese colleague of his quoted from an *Atlas of Shame* (the correct title of which turned out to be *Atlas of the Century of National Humiliation in Modern China*); see W. A. Callahan, *National Insecurities: Humiliation, Salvation, and Chinese Nationalism*, in: *Alternatives: Global, Local, Political* 29 (2004) 1, 199–218.

17th century, the so-called ‘concrete studies’ (*shixue*), provided the actors with a highly useful, alternative concept. Within this strand of tradition, emphasis was placed on ‘practical use’. This practical outlook on the world was to help statesmen and elites to settle worldly matters pragmatically (*jingshi zhiyong*), and it was based on the assumption that any kind of knowledge should be useful for the community or the country (or, later on, the nation, to use this 19th century term). While the ‘wise man’ (*shengren*) had long been conceptualised as lending his ear to the people,²⁶ it was through this newly activated concept that elites and intellectuals could reconstruct themselves as being responsible *and* useful for society by judging things from the perspective of their ‘usefulness’.

Various reformers of the 19th century fell back on this concept of *jingshi zhiyong* and enlarged it by an additional dimension: a stronger orientation towards the outside by ‘opening one’s eyes and seeing the world.’²⁷ Accordingly, detailed descriptions of the non-Chinese, mostly Western world were published during this time, either as original works by Chinese authors or as translations from other languages. Two of the most known of these works are the *Gazetteer of the Four Continents* (*Si Zhou Zhi*), published in 1839 by the imperial minister Lin Zexu (1785–1850), and the *Illustrated Gazetteer of the Countries Overseas* (*Hai Guo Tu Zhi*), which was published a few years later by the reformer Wei Yuan (1794–1857) and consisted of initially fifty and eventually one hundred volumes.

This orientation towards regions outside China, alongside of the idea of ‘practical use’ (*yong*), made reform-minded intellectuals aware of inherent problems of the educational and economical systems – and of their intimate relationship with each other. In a communiqué issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1864, the reformer Li Hongzhang (1823–1901) stated that ‘what is needed is not studied, and what is studied is not needed.’²⁸ This phrase, which was reiterated numerous times by various reformers in the decades to follow, linked the idea of practical use to the problem of human resources, and to the potential exploitation of these resources through education. The relationship between the individual and the entire whole – country, culture, or nation – underwent a critical revision. While in the Confucian sense, it was above all the moral perfection of, first, the individual, then of the family and finally of the community which secured the order for Man and Heaven,²⁹ this logical chain was reevaluated, from a moral point

26 This is already evident in the Chinese character of *sheng*, which contains the characters for ‘ear’ and ‘mouth’.

27 See Wu Zukun, *Variations on Topics of Modern Patriotism: Saving the Home Country, Learning from the West, and the Movement of Overseas Students* [Jindai aiguo zhuyi de zhuti bianzou: Jiuwang tucun, xiang Xifang xuexi he liuxue yundong 9, in: Changbai Xuekan 1 (1995), 78.

28 Li Hongzhang, *Jiangsu xunfu Li Hongzhang yuanhan* [The Original Letter by Li Hongzhang, Provincial Governor of Jiangsu] [1864], in: Chouban Yiwu Shimo: Tongzhichao [Chronicle of Barbarian Matters from the Beginning to the End [of the Qing-Dynasty]: Tongzhi-Period], vol. 5, section 25, Taipei 1963, 621–625 (originally 4–12), here 624.

29 See e.g. the above-mentioned classic *Daxue* [The Great Learning], according to which world peace can only be achieved through a process of individual cultivation; see Chan, *A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy* (see note 22), 86–87.

of view: thereupon, to strive for personal profit, not for moral perfection, was, in an accumulated form, to bring benefit to the entire country.³⁰

A growing number of reformers joined in to value the idea of personal profit, which was embodied, above all, by the Chinese merchants. The argument of 'practical use' served as a central thread in the discourse of these modernisers. For example, in 1877, the reformer, philologist, and political consultant Ma Jianzhong (1844–1900) wrote a letter to the above-mentioned Li Hongzhang in which he advised to go against the 'tradition' and 'rank practical use first'.³¹ The reformer Wang Tao (1828–1897) even called commerce the basis of the Chinese state,³² and his contemporary Chen Chi (1855–1899) saw commerce as the origin of all things; the destiny of a country was dependent on the well-being of commerce.³³ For the above-mentioned reformer Zheng Guanying, commerce was the ideal instrument to control the West – in much more effective ways than through military action.³⁴ Zheng even reversed the traditional hierarchy of estates and professions – scholars, peasants, craftsmen, and merchants – by commenting that only flourishing commerce enabled the scholars to study, the peasants to cultivate their fields, and the craftsmen to work: without commerce, science would be without importance, the variety of food would be restricted, and the products from handicraft and industry would have no market.³⁵

Like many of his reform-minded contemporaries, Zheng projected the question of practical use on to the realm of education. It became more and more obvious that even if at the judiciary and technological level all requirements were met to advance commerce and industry, this was of only limited use if no qualified personnel was available to enhance productivity. Thus, Zheng linked the survival of the nation to the quality of its educational system – or to the question if 'relevant' education was offered at all: 'Whether the country flourishes or perishes, this depends on the supply of qualified personnel'.³⁶ This led to a debate about what kind of education was of practical use at all. At the same time, the traditional educational ideals of self-cultivation and of mastering aesthetical issues were increasingly criticised. Through the argument of 'practical use', the out-dated

30 This was the standpoint, for example, of the well-known diplomat Xue Fucheng (1838–1894); see Liu Guilin, *Zhongguo Jindai Zhiye Jiaoyu Sixiang Yanjiu* [Research on the Idea of Vocational Education in Modern China], Beijing 1997, 17.

31 Ma Jianzhong, *Shang Li Boxiang yan chu Yang gongke shu* [Letter to Li Boxiang on Studies Overseas] [Summer 1877], in: Feng Guifen & Ma Jianzhong, *Cai Xixue Yi: Feng Guifen Ma Jianzhong Ji* [The Debate on Using Western Science: Collected Writings of Feng Guifen and Ma Jianzhong], with comments by Zheng Dahua, Shenyang 1994, 155–160. See in particular the chapter *Shike zhai jiyuan* [Recorded Words from the Shike Quarter]. (Li Boxiang is a pseudonym of Li Hongzhang.)

32 Wang stated this in a letter from the beginning of the 1870s; see Wang Tao, *Dai shang Guangzhoufu Feng taishou shu* [A Letter to Feng Zili] [1870s], in: Wang, *Taoyuan Wenlu Waibian* [Complement to the Collection of Taoyuan], compiled by Chu Liu, Shu Jin & Feng Lei, ed. Zhang Dainian, Shenyang 1994, 390–401.

33 See Chen Chi, *Shangwu* [On Commerce] [1897], in: Chen Chi, *Chen Chi Ji* [Collected Works of Chen Chi], part *Yongshu* [Practical Words], ed. Zhao Shugui/Zeng Liya, Beijing 1997, 83–84, here 84.

34 See e.g. Zheng Guanying, *Shangzhan* [Commercial War] [1895], in: Zheng Guanying, *Shengshi Weiyan* [Words of Warning to a Prosperous Age], Zhengzhou 1998, 292–298.

35 Zheng Guanying, *Shangwu er* [On Commerce, Second Part] [1895], in: *ibid.*, 303.

36 Zheng Guanying, *Yiyuan shang* [On the Parliament, First Part] [1895], in: *ibid.*, 95–99, here 97.

examination system could be critically revised (and finally abolished), and new ways in education could be tested that had a stronger orientation towards ‚application‘ and ‚practical use‘. These were, in a first step, schools that were attached to newly founded factories or shipyards, the flagships of Chinese modernisation and industrialisation, and, in the following decades, genuine vocational schools.

The concept of *jingshi zhiyong* functioned as a perfect catalyser for those Western ideas that originated in Western utilitarianism and pragmatism.³⁷ Utilitarian and pragmatist ideas could, with the help of this concept, be understood and handled as a continuation of the Chinese tradition and could thus become anchored in the already present semantic world. The concept also helped to view education, that is, both knowledge acquisition and character formation, as something that could be useful – or not.³⁸ Consequently, Western utilitarianism and pragmatism as adapted through this filter exerted an enormous influence on the emerging Chinese modern pedagogy. It enabled the promoters of ‚practical‘ educational models, such as vocational schools, to gain wider acceptance for their ideas.³⁹ One of the most influential and ardent essays in favour of ‚utilitarianism‘ in Chinese education was written by the above-mentioned Cai Yuanpei, a former student at the University of Leipzig and Chinese Minister of Education upon the foundation of the Republic in 1912. In this article, which was published almost simultaneously in one newspaper and two journals, Cai emphasised the role of a strong economy for the country and its population, which he considered at least as important as military strength. Cai saw utilitarian education as a device to complement and support policies that ensured the welfare of the country. With references both to the United States and to Europe, he regarded utilitarianism (*shilizhuyi*) as the ideal solution for China's problems:

*The resources of our country are not exploited, the organisations in industry and commerce are still in their infancy, unemployment has reached a high rate, and the country is utmost poor. Therefore, it is our urgent task [to install; BS] a utilitarian education.*⁴⁰

Shortly after, from 1913 onwards, utilitarianism was conceptually modified and enlarged: the term used hence, *shiyongzhuyi*, concentrated less on personal profit but denoted an attitude that was oriented towards reality and that was concerned with applicable knowledge; it is close to the Western term of ‚pragmatism‘. In August of 1913, the above-mentioned Huang Yanpei, then director of the Educational Office in the province

37 There was another ‚traditional‘ method from the 18th century which paved the way for the reception of pragmatism: the *kaozhengxue* (literally: ‚learning on the basis of studying the evidence‘; evidential learning). Due to limited space, I will not elaborate on this.

38 This is also stated by Marianne Bastid; see M. Bastid, *L'argument économique dans les réformes de l'enseignement en Chine au XX^e siècle*, in: *Interchange* 19 (autumn/winter 1988) 3/4, 19–31.

39 Cf. Shu Xincheng, *Materials on the Chinese History of Modern Education* [*Zhongguo jindai jiaoyushi ziliao*], vol. 1, Beijing 1961.

40 See Cai Yuanpei, *Opinion about Progressive Education* [*Duiyu xin jiaoyu zhi yijian*], in: Cai Yuanpei, *Collected Works* [*Cai Yuanpei quanji*], vol. 2 (1911–1916), Hangzhou 1997, 9–19, here 10. The article was originally published in the following periodicals: on February 8, 9, and 10, 1912, in the newspaper *Minlibao*, on February 10, 1912, in the journal *Jiaoyu Zazhi* (vol. 3, no. 11), as well as in April 1912 in the journal *Dongfang Zazhi* (vol. 8, no. 10).

of Jiangsu and later on the founder of the *Chinese Association of Vocational Education*, published his famous essay 'Discussion about Using Pragmatism in School Education' in a supplement to the *Educational Journal (Jiaoyu Zazhi)*.⁴¹ In this essay, he criticised the traditional distance between learning at school on the one side and, on the other, reality and the professional world. He called for a greater applicability of the things learned at school and also for a more child-centred approach in teaching. Every primary school should use pragmatist materials and methods, and teachers should take as their starting point real-life situations: the 'education of [written] characters' (*wenzi de jiaoyu*) should be replaced by an 'education of [material] things' (*shiwu de jiaoyu*).⁴² This momentous stance had weighty consequences: Western pragmatism and traditional conceptions of 'practical use' formed a union to question the central position of writing (*wen*), which had lain at the heart of Chinese culture (*wenhua*) for many centuries.

Like Cai Yuanpei, Huang emphasised the importance of a strong economy and industry and even designed concrete plans for establishing industrial schools and for integrating 'industrial education' (the predecessor of 'vocational education') into the general school curriculum. Also like Cai, he referred to developments abroad to support his argument: he both drew on information about Western educational systems and on the advice given by the US-American pedagogue Paul Monroe (1869–1947), then director of the International Institute of Teachers College at Columbia University. In fact, after one year, Huang wrote rather favourably about the effects of his ideas on the primary schools in Shanghai and some other provinces: at these schools, 'pragmatism' was not just a word but had been deeply ingrained in the minds of the teachers.⁴³

What do these examples tell us? First and foremost, they show that the Chinese actors who promoted 'modernity' and who were engaged in changing their country were not simply on the receiving side. They did not just dismiss 'Chinese' ideas and replaced them by Western ones. Neither did they dress these Western ideas in Chinese costumes just to gain acceptance (though sometimes this might have been their motive). Rather, they handled their 'tradition' creatively and thus successfully sinicised the imported ideas. This is mirrored in most of the journal articles that deal with 'pragmatism'. To be sure, many authors drew on non-Chinese thinkers from Seneca to Spencer and ignored, or even discarded, the Chinese tradition in these passages.⁴⁴ However, often within the same article, they would explicitly refer to the Chinese classics in order to present these modern ideas as variations of the already existing, or at least to reveal parallels with the

41 Huang Yanpei, Discussion about Using Pragmatism in School Education [Xuexiao jiaoyu caiyong shiyongzhuyi zhi shangque], in: *Jiaoyu Zazhi* 5 (1913) 7 (supplement), 55–82.

42 Ibid., 59.

43 Huang Yanpei, *Shiyongzhuyi chanchu zhi di yi nian* [The First Year of Pragmatism], in: *Jiaoyu Zazhi* 7 (1915) 1, 14–18.

44 E.g. the article on pragmatism by a pedagogue and publisher of school books, Zhuang Yu (1876–1938). The article was published in the same issue as Huang's article; see Zhuang Yu, *Caiyong shiyongzhuyi* [Using Pragmatism], in: *Jiaoyu Zazhi* 5 (1913) 7, 87–95.

past.⁴⁵ The entire argument around ‘practical use’ and ‘applicability’ of the beginning 20th century can thus be set in relation to similar debates of the 19th century and can be traced back to even earlier philosophical precedents that placed ‘practical use’ above questions of moral and aesthetic self-cultivation and emphasised the elites’ moral and social responsibility within society. While one part of the Chinese tradition was certainly – and fervently – attacked, other traditions served as means to reflect upon, and argue for, an up to then Western-framed modernity. The traditional idea of ‘practical use’ was particularly apt to give voice to the experiences that the Chinese reformers had with foreign models in education and industry – which to them appeared much more effective and promising than their own out-dated models. Finally, the idea of ‘practical use’ turned out to be highly compatible with the patriotic concern with the welfare and survival of the nation. Marianne Bastid points out that this argument often went hand in hand with the argument of ‘wealth and strength’ (*fuqiang*). Both arguments were to help China to survive or even become stronger in an ‘âge de compétition intellectuelle internationale.’⁴⁶

How to Do Things with Words: Changing Vocabulary, Powerful Translations

If the Chinese tradition was a target – and a medium – of reform-minded intellectuals, the Chinese language was another. In this period of great political, economic, and conceptual upheaval, the Chinese language was profoundly transformed. Language is as much a mirror of reality and its changes, as it is a creator and transformer of these realities. Several factors and actors were part of this process.⁴⁷ In the following passage, I will concentrate on the efforts and strategies of the Chinese actors (although Western actors, among them missionaries, also contributed to the Chinese language change). Even before modern colloquial Chinese (*baihuawen*) was propagated in the course of the May Fourth Movement of 1919 and began to replace the classical style, many intellectuals were active in finding or coining new terms. This was done for mainly two reasons: Either the existing classical terms were considered as semantically bounded and thus not apt to transport any new meaning; or the respective terms were simply ‘missing’. Genuinely Chinese efforts of creating or finding words can be found, above all, in the early

45 Also Zhuang Yu (mentioned in the preceding note) quotes traditional phrases in some passages to illustrate the use of learning and action; see *ibid.*, 91.

46 Bastid, *L'argument économique* (see note 38), 20.

47 For an overview with some examples and bibliography, see B. Schulte, *Social Hierarchy and Group Solidarity: The Meanings of Work and Vocation/Profession in the Chinese Context and their Implications for Vocational Education*, in: *International Review of Education* 49 (2003) 1 (special issue), ed. Mark Bray, Dordrecht 2003, 213–239, in particular 215 ff.; detailed studies on this subject can be found in L. H. Liu, *Translingual Practice: Literature, National Culture, and Translated Modernity: China, 1900–1937*, Stanford 1995; *New Terms for New Ideas: Western Knowledge and Lexical Change in Late Imperial China*, ed. M. Lackner/I. Amelung/J. Kurtz, Leiden et al. 2001; *Mapping Meanings. The Field of New Learning in Late Qing China*, ed. M. Lackner/N. Vittinghoff, Leiden et al. 2004.

Chinese translations from Western languages, such as those by Yan Fu (1854–1921)⁴⁸ and Ma Xiangbo (1840–1939)⁴⁹ or generally by the *Tongwenguan*, a famous institution that translated Western works and that was founded in Beijing in 1861.

Spectacular word creations aside, changes in word usage can also give a hint at changed perceptions or new priorities. Words obtain an almost performative character if through their unusual or unexpected appearance, they help trigger change. For example, while in 1844 the situation of the country was characterised as a ‘changed situation’ (*bianju*),⁵⁰ only thirteen years later the Foreign Ministry called it a ‘completely new situation’ (*ch-uangju*). This could not only express the prevalent threat more vividly; such vocabulary also provided the reformers with an effective arsenal of instruments to legitimise their actions. A ‘completely new situation’ or ‘hitherto unknown changes’ clearly demanded completely new approaches and reform efforts. Among other things, these reform efforts aimed at the construction of shipyards and factories, and consequently at raising human resources through technical and vocational schools, with profound consequences for the educational landscape.

A further sign of change at the language level was the immense number of slogans that contained those messages that were thought most urgent and permeated the Chinese society. The slogans represent highly effective unions of old and new: while many words in the slogans and, even more so, their messages were new, their form drew on the typical four-character construction of the classic language, which was considered rhythmical and thus guaranteed the population’s attention and perhaps acceptance. (Even today they are a popular form of propaganda.) The propagated slogans reveal which topics were considered particularly relevant and necessary to transmit. One set of topics was concerned with the survival of China as a nation: ‘save the nation and secure its existence’, ‘outfox the enemy in a bout’ (i.e. to win through diplomatic procedures), or ‘strive for sovereignty with all means’. Furthermore, there were topics which centred around the importance of (Western) science and industry: ‘open the path to knowledge to the people’, ‘education to save the country’, ‘study abroad’, ‘import new knowledge’, or ‘industry to save the country’. Also, many slogans appealed to the re-education of the (rural or poor) population that was considered rude, uncivilised, and in bad physical condition: ‘change customs and habits’, ‘spur on the martial spirit of the people’, ‘engage in physical education’, or ‘eradicate superstition’.⁵¹

48 Yan Fu translated e.g. works by Adam Smith, John Stuart Mill, and Charles Darwin. See B. I. Schwartz, *In Search of Wealth and Power: Yen Fu and the West*, Cambridge, Mass. 1964; David Wright, *Yan Fu and the Tasks of the Translator*, in: Lackner / Amelung / Kurtz, *New Terms for New Ideas* (see preceding note), 235–255.

49 Ma Xiangbo suggested, for example, a new system of nomenclatures for the modern sciences that was based on the Latin roots of the Western terms; see J. Kurtz, *Coming to Terms with Logic: The Naturalization of an Occidental Notion in China*, in: Lackner / Amelung / Kurtz, *New Terms for New Ideas* (note 47), 147–175, here 165. See also Ma Xiangbo and the *Mind of Modern China: 1840–1939*, ed. R. Hayhoe / Yongling Lu, Armonk / New York 1996.

50 The expression was coined by the scholar Huang Junzai; the observation was made by Pong, *The Vocabulary of Change* (note 23), 28 f. (without further references).

51 See Wu Zukun, *Variations on Topics of Modern Patriotism* (note 27).

The greatest influence on the Chinese language – in particular, on its modern vocabulary, which coined the language of modern science – came from Japan. This happened primarily through Chinese students who studied in Japan and, often for reasons of convenience, adopted the Japanese terms directly since they were written in Chinese characters. It has been repeatedly criticised that Chinese translators lacked creativity and sensitivity (towards their own language) by simply and massively taking over all these Japanese terms.⁵² However, these so-called ‘return graphic loans’ had a great advantage: since these terms that were now re-imported from Japan were originally Chinese and were based on Chinese syllables and characters, they could convey the new and the modern without over-stretching the Chinese language phonetically or graphically – and nonetheless made the adopted terms appear new and modern! Therefore, it is no real surprise that most intellectuals would resort to this possibility.⁵³ Moreover, the modernisation of the Japanese language had been, according to Michael Lackner, much more systematic and centralised so that the new set of neologisms seemed much more coherent than their Chinese counterparts (if they existed), which were based on rather uncoordinated efforts of individuals and often controlled by Western institutions.⁵⁴

The Japanese influence was so overwhelming that even the name for China was at times borrowed from the Japanese although, without doubt, the Chinese possessed a name for their own country: instead of *Zhongguo*, ‘Middle Land’, some writers would use the term *zhina*, Japanese *shina*, which originated in Sanskrit and which probably reflects the phonetic sounds of the Qin Dynasty, just like the English term *China*. While later on the term *zhina* or *shina* became a token for Japanese aggression and humiliation to many Chinese, the associations with this term were different at that time. It was above all the perceived scientific and neutral character of the term which made it attractive to the Japanese speakers: *shina* did not, like *middle land*, attribute a certain (central) status to the country, nor did it refer to a specific Chinese government or dynasty as had been the case with many Japanese names for China in the past. Rather, in the eyes of many Japanese and, occasionally, Chinese, *shina* represented a correct, scientific name for the geographical entity of China.⁵⁵ This example illustrates how far some Chinese intellectu-

52 Already in the 1930s, the Chinese philosopher Zhang Dongsun (1886–1973) complained about the ‘loss of creativity in the Chinese language’; see M. Lackner, ‘Wortfindungsmühen der Chinesen. Integration westlicher Wissenschaft’, in: *Gegenworte. Zeitschrift für den Disput über Wissen* 7 (2001), 75. See also the analysis in Sun Jianguo, *Investigations on Questions of Chinese Translations from the Japanese at the End of the Qing and the Beginning of the Republic and on the Diffusion of Western Science* [Qing mo Min chu Riwen Zhongyi yu zhuanfan xixue wenti yanjiu], in: *Henan Daxue Xuebao* (Shehui Kexueban) 6 (2001), 59–64.

53 On Japanese neologisms, see the detailed analysis in: Liu, *Translingual Practice* (note 47).

54 See Lackner, *Wortfindungsmühen der Chinesen*, 74 (note 52); see also the article by Viviane Alleton, who emphasises the democratic character of the Japanese translation processes: V. Alleton, *Chinese Terminologies: On Preconceptions*, in: Lackner / Amelung / Kurtz, *New Terms for New Ideas* (note 47), 15–34.

55 There is a detailed analysis of the term *shina* in the chapter: *The Sino-Japanese Controversy over Shina as a Toponym for China*, in: J. A. Fogel, *The Cultural Dimension of Sino-Japanese Relations. Essays on the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries*, Armonk/New York/London 1995, 66–76. Fogel mentions an article written by Su Zhongxiang (without further references), according to which *zhina* was not derived from the Qin Dynasty but from the name of the old model state Jing.

als were prepared to go in order to keep abreast of changed realities: for them, China was now a nation among others, engaged in the 'survival of the fittest' and in need of a new name that was able to convey this new situation.

Translations signified a changed perception of (changed) realities, and they provided useful tools to integrate and appropriate foreign knowledge. However, it would be erroneous to assume that there was some kind of 'master plan' for all these translation activities.⁵⁶ At the beginning of the 'translation boost', a great thirst for knowledge was facing a rather meagre number of translated works. For example, the reformer Kang Youwei (1858–1927) complained that what had been translated so far was by no means enough to transmit the knowledge that was needed to modernise the country.⁵⁷ In order to fill this gap, many reform-minded intellectuals started to translate anything that they came across at an astonishing speed. In Chinese, these somewhat hectic translation activities were known as 'Liang Qichao style', referring to the above-mentioned reformer Liang Qichao whose translation maxim read: 'it's alright as long as it's much and fast.' Liang was convinced that, when studying the Japanese language, the first good results would show only after a few days, and after a few months the language could be mastered.⁵⁸ But not only at the level of style, but also with regard to the chosen topics, rather disparate ideas were rendered interchangeable in these rather foggy translation activities: constitutional monarchy and revolutionary ideas, Marxism and anarchism or nihilism etc. Often, the considerations, ideas, or ideals of the translator were more important than the original text, which frequently provided just some kind of trigger for the 'translation' work.

What seems rather chaotic from the present point of view might have just been due to the laws of the translation and book market of the time. This market was highly profitable and produced its own dynamics. Between 1896 and 1911, after the Japanese victory over the Chinese army and prior to the Republic, there were ninety-five publishing houses which were specialised solely on translations from the Japanese. Most of the books that were translated at this time were about politics, economy, or social sciences, followed by books about world history and language.⁵⁹ Anything that could be sold would be translated. In particular, these were books that fuelled the awakening national consciousness in China. Therefore, as it is often the case, it was less the scientific criteria than the laws of the market which ruled the translation of Japanese books. In addition, the educational reforms of the Qing government further stimulated the translation market through a decree to translate Japanese textbooks. (This also guaranteed the

56 On the topic of translations, see in particular Sun, *Investigations on Questions of Chinese Translations* (note 52).

57 *Ibid.*, 60.

58 He contrasted this to the English language; to master the English language, one would need five or six years of study. See Liang Qichao [here under the pseudonym Ai Shike], *On the Advantage of Studying Japanese* [Lun xue Ribenwen zhi yi], in: *Qingyibao* 8, 10 (February 21, 1900), 579–581, here 580.

59 See Sun, *Investigations on Questions of Chinese Translations* (note 52). According to statistical data provided by Tan Ruqian, about sixty per cent of all translated books until 1925 were translations from the Japanese; see *Comprehensive Index of Japanese Books Translated in China* [Zhongguo yi Riben shu zonghe mulu], ed. Tan Ruqian, Hongkong 1980. I am grateful to Xiaoqing Xu for this reference.

predominant role of Japanese knowledge – or Western knowledge transmitted via Japan – at Chinese schools.)

As a result of these market dynamics, exactness or linguistic subtleties of translations were of minor importance. Rather, the publishers were looking for translation styles that could catch the readers' attention. It was for this reason that publishers often preferred well-known writers, even if they were no professional translators. There is an illustrative anecdote by Zhang Xichen (1889–1969), founder of the women's journal *The New Woman* (*Xin Nüxing*) and at times writer for the renowned *Journal of the East* (*Dongfang Zazhi*):

When I went to Mr. [Du] Yaquan [chief editor of the Journal of the East], he asked me if I knew a bit of Japanese. I replied that I had studied it a little in the past, but that I had never been good at it, and now I was out of practice and it had all been such a long time ago that I had forgotten a lot. What a surprise when the first piece he gave me after I had joined the company was something from a Japanese journal, with the task to translate a biography about the discoverer of radium, Madame Curie.⁶⁰

However, even if translators devoted much time and energy to issues of translation, the process of translation was still an act of re-presenting and re-framing things in a new context – a context with home-grown semantic valencies, which provided no simple equivalences; it would not just mirror but transform the translated knowledge. This was particularly the case with issues that to many Chinese seemed semantically incongruous, such as the idea of 'industrial education' or, later on, 'vocational education'. To link two separate semantic worlds – education and work – required innovative word creations. Until the beginning of the 20th century, *shiye jiaoyu* (literally: 'education for the real and concrete professions')⁶¹ was generally used to translate *industrial education*, although a direct translation (*gongye jiaoyu*) would have existed, but was rarely used. Why did translators choose this term? One reason might have been, again, the Japanese reception of *industrial education*. Japanese translators were hesitant to make use of a literal translation since they wanted to emphasise the agrarian character of Asian countries. Another reason, however, was specific to the Chinese situation: the components 'real' or 'concrete' as contained in *shiye jiaoyu* offered a semantic bridge to the earlier discussions about 'concrete studies' and 'practical use'. Thus, the term could evoke associations that made the idea appear more compatible than a literal translation might have achieved.

Other terms that were chosen to translate 'vocational' or 'industrial education' reflected similar efforts to ground the idea in cultural context. Liang Qichao used both *shixue*

60 Sun, Investigations on Questions of Chinese Translations (note 52), 63. The article was in fact published, with the cooperation with Zhang Xichen, notwithstanding his lacking knowledge of Japanese; see Gao Lao [pseudonym of Du Yaquan], A Short Biography of Madame Curie, the discoverer of radium [Leiding famingzhe Juli Furen xiaozhuan], in: *Dongfang Zazhi* 8, 11 (May 1912), 11.

61 *Shiye* was then often used as synonym for 'industry', but encompassed much more; for a detailed discussion of this and related terms, see the chapter Begriffsklärung: "Industriebildung" und "Berufsbildung", in: B. Schulte, Zur Rettung des Landes: Bildung und Beruf im China der Republikzeit, Frankfurt a. M. 2008.

(‘concrete studies’) and *yixue* (‘the study of the arts’), thus referring not only to the Chinese pragmatist tradition but also to the tradition of manual arts and techniques. The above-mentioned Yan Fu, on the other hand, coined the term *nonggongshangxue* (‘the study of peasants, craftsmen, and merchants’), keeping the traditional hierarchy of professions and estates alive. Eventually, and after intensive fights about the proper position of ‘vocational education’ within the Chinese society, *shiye jiaoyu* was replaced by *zhiye jiaoyu*, the modern translation for ‘vocational education’. This signified a shift in priority: while the former term focussed on the education of expert personnel vis-à-vis the international competition of industries and technologies, the latter term concentrated on the education of the uneducated, unemployed (or unemployable) masses that were facing ‘existential problems’ (*shengji wenti*).

Thus, translation can be seen as both mirror and means of re-orientation that was taking place among certain actors at certain times. In no way was it a uniform process: market forces and coincidences governed translation processes, as did the contesting visions of the actors engaged. One could even go so far as to argue that translation work constituted a somewhat hidden battlefield of modernity – hidden because the processes of re-presentation and appropriation that accompany translation have often been underestimated or neglected.

Bridging China and the West: Japan

While from a Chinese point of view, Japan was facing a similar oppressive situation as did China at the time of the opium wars, this perspective changed dramatically with the Japanese victory over China in 1895. The former student of China had evidently become a model student of Western modernisation and a teacher for a China that was lagging increasingly behind. ‘Japan as teacher’ (*yi Ri wei shi*) was therefore a motto that was frequently propagated by many actors, among them the above-mentioned reformers Zhang Zhidong, Li Hongzhang, Kang Youwei, and Liang Qichao, but also renowned (and politically diverse) figures such as Sun Yatsen (1866–1925), Jiang Kaishek (1887–1975), and Chen Duxiu (1879–1942), the latter a co-founder of the Communist Party.⁶² Following this motto, at least 25,000 Chinese students travelled to Japan between 1898 and 1911. This has been characterised as ‘the first truly large-scale modernization-oriented migration of intellectuals in world history’ and as ‘probably the largest mass movement of students overseas in world history up to that point.’⁶³ Prior to the Japanese victory, hardly any Chinese would have had the idea to go to Japan for study.

62 See Li Xisuo, *The View on Japan of the Chinese Students in Japan in the Fifty Years Following the Sino-Japanese War and its Influences* [Jiawuzhan hou 50 nian jian liu Ri xuesheng de Ribenguan ji qi yingxiang], in: *Shehui Kexue Yanjiu* 1 (1997), 102–109, here 103.

63 The quotations are from M. B. Jansen, *Japan and China. From War to Peace, 1894–1975*, Chicago 1975, 149; and Jansen, *Japan and the Chinese Revolution of 1911*, in: *The Cambridge History of China*, vol. 11: *Late Ch’ing, 1800–1911*, Part 2, ed. J. K. Fairbank/Kwang-ching Liu, Cambridge 1980, 339–374, here 348. Quoted by D. R.

At the time of this massive student migration, more than fifty reports on Japan were published by the returnees,⁶⁴ who thus shared their experiences with a broader public. In this way, the returned students did not only serve as transmitters of ideas, but they themselves put these ideas – or rather, their appropriated forms – into action by taking over posts in the government. The educational sector was of particular importance in the accounts of the returnees. For example, almost every Chinese who intended to go to Japan read the diary about the *Journey to the East* (*Dong You Riji*) by the above-mentioned Zhang Jian. In this account, Zhang underlined the utmost importance of education in the global competition of civilisations. Zhang saw the key to Japan's strength in its successful performance in the global competition. As the most important factor that would advance the national self-strengthening of the country, he identified education, followed by industry and handicraft, and, thirdly, the military.⁶⁵ By his influential account and through his reference to the successful example of Japan, Zhang Jian linked education with industry and handicraft and thus paved the way for a revised understanding of the tasks of education and a broader acceptance of vocational education.

National strength was one of the main motivations to look at Japan – which became evident in the popular phrase 'study in Japan to strengthen the country' (*liu Ri er qiang guo*). Reformers liked to dramatise the disastrous consequences if one did not follow this maxim: if one did not learn from Japan, one was destined to fail. For example, Liang Qichao saw the reasons for the weakness of the Qing government in the lacking knowledge of the Japanese situation.⁶⁶ Yan Fu even made the survival of the country dependent on whether sufficient attention was paid to Japan: 'The path to survival or extinction depends on this, striving for self-strengthening depends on this.'⁶⁷ The Japanese example was so impressive mainly for one reason: it raised the (at first glance) incomprehensible and painful question how such a small country like Japan, which until recently had been looked down upon by the Chinese, could have become so strong, while China seemed to be in constant agony. To be sure, there were also basic doubts as to whether the 'yellow race' was capable at all to keep pace with the 'white' one.⁶⁸ However, the Japanese example revealed to the Chinese that it was possible after all to come to strength on one's own account – through mastering the relevant knowledge. Thus, Zhang Zhidong argued that

Reynolds, China, 1898–1912. The Xinzhen Revolution and Japan, Cambridge, Mass., 1993, 42. Of course, many Chinese went to Japan not just for knowledge acquisition but also for political reasons: numerous political activists against the Qing government chose Japan as temporary exile.

64 See Li, *The View on Japan* (note 62), 103.

65 *Ibid.*, 103–104.

66 Liang Qichao, Epilogue to the Notes on Japan [*Riben guozhi houxu*], in: Liang, *Collected Works*, vol. 1, article collection 2 (note 11), 50–51.

67 Quoted in: Li, *The View on Japan* (note 62), 103.

68 Of course, this was heavily influenced by Western conceptions of 'race'. On the Chinese and Japanese reception and adaptation of Western racial ideologies, see *The Construction of Racial Identities in China and Japan*, ed. F. Dikötter, London 1997.

*Japan is a small country. So how could it rise so swiftly to power? Some twenty years ago, Itō [Hirobumi], Yamagata [Aritomo (1838–1922)], Enomoto [Takeaki (1836–1908)], and Mutsu [Munemitsu (1844–1897)] went overseas as students. They were followed to Germany, France, and Britain by more than a hundred others who, like themselves, were incensed by Western intimidation of their country. Some studied politics and administration, or industry and commerce, while others undertook naval or military training. Upon completing their studies and returning home, they were employed as generals and government ministers. Once political changes had taken hold, Japan emerged as the greatest power in the East.*⁶⁹

Within a short period of time, Japan had become an important bridge between China and the West as well as the main transmitter of Western knowledge. From now on, translations of Western works almost always took the detour via Japan – in contrast to the situation prior to the Sino-Japanese war. This detour was seen as a practical path towards Western knowledge that saved time and money, as Zhang Zhidong explained:

*Study should be in Japan (Dongyang) rather than in the West: 1) Japan's closeness would save on our costs, allowing more persons to be sent. 2) Its proximity to China would facilitate the supervision of our students. 3) Japanese writing (Dongwen) is similar to Chinese writing (Zhongwen), making it easier to understand. 4) The number of Western books is enormous, not all of them essential to Western learning. The Japanese (Dongren), who have sifted through these, have weeded out the less important works. [...] Since China and Japan have similar circumstances and customs, this would facilitate our imitation [of the West]. We can reap twice the results with half the effort (shi ban gong bei). What could be better than that?*⁷⁰

The – albeit hesitant – admiration of Japan went hand in hand with the fear of the increasingly aggressive Eastern neighbour. Japan's strength and belligerence were connected to its 'healthy Japanese national spirit'. This stood in sharp contrast with the weak, sick, and retarded character which the Chinese intellectuals attributed to the Chinese nation and which in their eyes impeded the application of useful knowledge.⁷¹ In this discourse, China became 'the sick man of Asia' (*Dongya bingfu*)⁷² – just as Turkey was 'the sick man of Europe'. Keys to regeneration from this bad state of health were the formation of a 'military spirit' or even militarisation of the society, physical education and hygiene,⁷³

69 Zhang, *Overseas Study* (note 13), 116; the translation is taken from Reynolds, *China, 1898–1912* (note 63), 43–44.

70 Ibid., 117; the translation is taken from Reynolds, *China, 1898–1912* (note 63), 44.

71 These Chinese projections on Japan are analysed in Li, *The View on Japan* (note 62), 104 ff.

72 See e.g. Callahan, *National Insecurities* (note 25), 202 ff.

73 Hygiene and physical strength played an important role in the intellectual discourse of Chinese educators in the early 20th century. For more information, see B. Schulte, *Zum Schutz von Körper und Land: Repräsentationen von Hygiene auf der Reise durch chinesische Köpfe und Körper*, in: *Dem Anderen begegnen. Eigene und fremde Repräsentationen in sozialen Gemeinschaften*, ed. J. Baberowski/D. Feest/M. Lehmann, Frankfurt a. M. 2008 (in print).

and education. All these measures were considered 'Western' instruments that were successfully mastered by the Japanese.

Thus, Japan was not just a model by itself, but became an instrument for westernisation. By way of this argument, Zhang Zhidong and many other intellectuals ignored the relativity and contingency of knowledge. For them, (Western) knowledge was an absolute variable whose essential elements could be selected and digested according to objective criteria, irrespective of the 'receiving' context. In his blind confidence in the Japanese success in translating and transferring foreign knowledge, Zhang anticipated later Chinese arguments that would propagate the Soviet way. Chen Boda (1905–1989), Communist chief ideologue and expert on propaganda, used an almost identical argument in 1953 to legitimise the Chinese reference to the Soviet Union:

*...when we advise studying the Soviet science, we do not mean to say that the works of British and American scientists may not be used as reference, they may and should be. However, generally speaking, the good things in British and American science have already been absorbed by the Soviet scientists; hence, the quickest and best way is to learn from the Soviet Union.*⁷⁴

This view on knowledge as some kind of recipe with concrete prescriptions and concrete effects not only resulted in disappointment and perceived 'failures' on the Chinese side if the knowledge acquired was not as effective as was expected; it also exerted an enormous pressure on the side of the 'donor' who in the Chinese eyes had to be 'a sort of magician', 'capable of giving them the one current answer to all sorts of complex problems in pure and applied science in a few minutes'.⁷⁵

Interestingly enough, the transformative power of travelling knowledge has not been fully acknowledged. It has been researched only insufficiently what Japan and the Soviet Union contributed to the Chinese path towards Western knowledge, although such an analysis would shed light on the Chinese specificity of this process. Even within China, where, at times, there is increased emphasis on the specifically Chinese and distinctly non-Western path towards modernisation,⁷⁶ analyses are missing that take into account the various forces that, in the end, produced 'Western knowledge in China'. The Japanese creativity in adopting and adapting Western knowledge has been as much neglected as the question of how 'Western' this knowledge was when it arrived in China. This neglect of the Japanese contribution is all the more astonishing – but perhaps also understandable – if one considers the fact that even socialism was discovered in Japan (by the end of the Qing dynasty) and that it was via Japan that the Communist Manifesto and

74 Quoted in R. F. Price, *Convergence or Copying: China and the Soviet Union*, in: *China's Education and the Industrialized World* (note 11), 158–183, here 161.

75 Thus characterised by Klochko, a Soviet chemist who had taken flight to Canada in 1961; quoted in L. A. Orleans, *Soviet Influence on China's Higher Education*, in: *China's Education and the Industrialized World* (note 11), 184–198, here 188.

76 Among others, Mao Zedong (1893–1976) was a convinced advocate of 'Chineseness'.

other writings by Marx and Engels found their way into China (towards the beginning of the Republic).

Why look abroad?

Much has been written about why countries look at one another, and what makes them adopt (or reject) conceptual, institutional, or policy models from the outside. In this concluding section, I will not present yet another theory to explain these phenomena, but I will discuss the processes that have been analysed so far within the existing theoretical frameworks. Frank Dobbin et al. have summarised diverse theoretical approaches towards what they call 'policy diffusion' across the world.⁷⁷ They distinguish between four different approaches, which focus on social construction,⁷⁸ coercion,⁷⁹ competition,⁸⁰ and learning.⁸¹ Each of the approaches asks important questions; but it is hard to understand why one would have to decide between, say, the perspective of coercion (of states to adopt a policy) or the focus on competition (between states to adopt a policy) since both may take place at the same time. (The authors come to a somewhat similar conclusion.) Moreover, other important questions are marginalised or even missing in these approaches. Firstly, the perspective of the actors themselves – those persons that operate what is called, perhaps diffusely, 'diffusion' – is underexplored. How do actors perceive and construct the 'need' of their society or their nation (given that 'need' can never been objective)? What are their private, business, or career interests in promoting change (or non-change), and how are these interests intertwined with broader 'cultural' or 'societal' options? What are the power relations between these actors (irrespective of the power relations between the respective countries)? What are their social networks?⁸² Secondly, all four approaches may explain why a certain policy becomes 'hegemonial' so that it enjoys wide diffusion; but they are much less able to explain why certain other policies or models enjoy, at certain times and in certain regions, a popularity that super-

77 F. Dobbin/B. Simmons/G. Garrett, *The Global Diffusion of Public Policies: Social Construction, Coercion, Competition, or Learning?*, in: *Annual Review of Sociology* 33 (2007), 449–472.

78 'Constructivists' investigate why certain policies become socially and globally accepted; they assume that followers of certain policies are principally willing. For education, see e.g. the seminal study by J. W. Meyer/F. O. Ramirez/R. Robinson/J. Boli-Bennett, *The World Educational Revolution, 1950–1970*, in: *Sociology of Education* 50 (1977) 4, 242–258.

79 This approach is based on the assumption that policy change is seldom voluntary, but a result of (political, economic, military etc.) coercion.

80 'Competition' theorists maintain that states adopt the policies of their direct competitors in order to keep pace with them.

81 'Learning' theorists argue that decisions for certain policies are taken on the basis of previous experiences and their evaluation (which does not preclude a posteriori 'wrong' decisions).

82 Dobbin et al. attribute "social network connections" to "early sociological accounts of diffusion", while "constructivists point to the cultural theorization of practices." Why one should be replaced (and not complemented) by the other remains unclear. In another passage Dobbin et al. do mention the role of "simple network connections" and note their importance for the "learning" theorists. See Dobbin et al., *The Global Diffusion of Public Policies* (note 77), 451, 453, 461.

sedes that of the ‘hegemonial’ model. Can this be simply explained by ‘local variation’, ‘psychological proximity’ of certain regions, or ‘retarded development’? Moreover, it is even more difficult to explain why international models are sometimes dismissed altogether. Rejection or even resistance are given only scant consideration in these theoretical approaches (for example, as some kind of temporary situation). Thirdly, theories of ‘diffusion’ (as well as many on ‘transfer’) talk about the diffused ‘object’ as if it was solid and remained unchanged in the process; or, to put it differently: as if actors throughout the world thought about and handled these ‘objects’ in the same way. We have seen that this is seldom the case. This observation is crucial since different handling transforms the ‘object’ fundamentally. Finally, and shortly: there is no space for coincidence.

Jürgen Schriewer’s elaboration of the concept of externalisation (based on Niklas Luhmann’s theory of self-referential systems) provides an important complement in this regard.⁸³ The concept is based on the assumption that there are times when the available semantic resources are felt to be not sufficient to make one’s thinking and acting *meaningful*. In such a situation, actors *externalise* to things that lie outside their present horizon – to foreign societies, i.e. ‘world situations’, or to things of the past, i.e. ‘tradition’ – in order to gain supplementary meaning. In a case study on the Soviet Union, Spain, and China, Schriewer and Martinez make it clear that

*externalizations to ‘foreign examples’ or to ‘world situations’ do not aim primarily at a social scientific analysis of cultural configurations; they instead involve the discursive interpretation of international phenomena for issues of educational policy or ideological legitimization. Similarly, externalizations to ‘tradition’ are not directed at historicizing educational theory traditions or experiences, but rather react to the need to reinterpret and actualize these traditions’ theoretical and/or normative potential in the face of urgent present-day concerns.*⁸⁴

The concept of externalisation is complementary to the approaches discussed above because it does not negate global mechanisms of diffusion and transfer. However, it changes the perspective: now, ‘diffusion’ is not something that takes place for (exclusively) this or that reason; it might take place for any of the reasons discussed above, but its actual contents, forms, and meanings are shaped by the needs of the ‘receiving’ system, with all its real-world consequences for policy making, institution building, and social practices. Schriewer and Martinez use Luhmann’s metaphor of the ‘floodgate’ to illustrate how externalisation works, and how this results in a high degree of autonomy of each system, irrespective of actual global power constellations. Such floodgates, or externalisations,

‘filter’ the reception and description of an international environment according to the changing problem configurations and reflection situations internal to a given system. Their potential for selection and interpretation disrupts the seemingly objective order of

83 See J. Schriewer, The Method of Comparison and the Need for Externalization (note 8).

84 J. Schriewer/C. Martinez, Constructions of Internationality in Education, in: The Global Politics of Educational Borrowing and Lending, ed. G. Steiner-Khamsi, New York 2004, 29–53, here 32.

standing involved in an 'integrated world stratification system', as it is stated by world system models, and rearranges it according to a given system's internal needs for 'supplementary meaning'.⁸⁵

Schriewer and Martinez further observe that this need for 'supplementary meaning' does not only vary across societies but also, within one and the same society, over time – and I believe also across actors (or factions of actors). Looking back at the Chinese references to 'world situations' and 'tradition(s)', we can observe clear shifts in the externalising strategies. Chinese educators and reformers externalised both to 'world situations' and 'tradition', but differently at different times. As we have seen, Chinese externalisation towards 'world situations' (in particular those of the West) began when the actors were dissatisfied by what the Chinese tradition could offer them. However, the 'West' was not uniform: Chinese references to the situation abroad clearly showed certain conjunctures – depending on what was regarded as the 'fitting supply' for the respective 'demand' for supplementary meaning. Thus, one might talk of 'psychological proximity' between certain societies at certain times, but only if one accepts the premise that this 'proximity' is being constantly re-constructed according to the internal configuration within a given society.⁸⁶ Chinese actors chose Western powers like the United States, England, France, or Germany, as well as Japan (and to a lesser extent the Philippines) as reference societies in order to make their new situation or new ideas meaningful (and in order to legitimise them).

Again, vocational education is a good example. The United States were utilised as well as France or Germany to fill this concept with meaning – but with different meaning each time. While the United States served mainly to argue for a type of vocational education that was integrated into secondary schools, France was used to promote polytechnic schools; Germany, in contrast, showed that it was possible to pass on traditional, strongly profession-oriented modes of vocational education within a modern education system. Both Germany and Japan would sometimes serve as models that could provide alternatives to the United States – Japan because it was a (successful) East Asian nation with strong Chinese influences, Germany because it was regarded, just like China, as a 'cultural nation' which nonetheless showed (military, political) strength. So in a way, both reference societies represent some kind of constructed 'psychological proximity'. Often, these utilisations of other countries were highly contested among actors, who had their own interests to promote a certain model and discard another. Sometimes, non-Chinese actors would intervene to promote 'their' model and outplay it against other models (such as comprehensive schools vs. vertically tiered schools).

Here is also where the networks come in: if certain institutions were made strong among Chinese intellectuals through social networks, then the ideas and concepts from these

⁸⁵ Ibid.

⁸⁶ Equally, the constructivist view point – some countries 'appear to be doing best', therefore they are copied – is acceptable if one assumes that 'good performance' is construed upon the discourse of the observing ('copying') actors.

institutions were much more likely to become accepted within the Chinese intellectual community. A good case in point is Teachers College at Columbia University. In a case study on the members of the Chinese Vocational Education Society, it turned out that almost sixty per cent of those who studied in the United States chose Teachers College as their place of study.⁸⁷ The dominance of this institution among Chinese intellectuals even led the Prussian minister of education, Carl Heinrich Becker, who in 1931 was heading the League of Nations educational mission to China, to complain about 'the influence of American pedagogy on China, in particular the dissolution of all real knowledge in chitchat about the methods and the psychology of education.'⁸⁸ Becker judged the effect of Teachers College on Chinese education to be 'simply devastating.'⁸⁹

Shifting the focus back to the 'receiving' system also opens space for seeming 'coincidences'. In her analysis of how the Soviet star was appropriated in Mongolia, Ines Stolpe illustrates how the five edges of the star coincided with the Mongolian concept of the five different kinds of grazing cattle, thus producing a highly successful new symbol.⁹⁰ As this very visual example reveals, it is important that ideas and concepts can *resonate* within their new environment to be successful in the long run. Deweyan pragmatism found a friendly environment in China not only because there were personal connections between Dewey and many Chinese educators, but also since traditional resources offered a specifically Chinese, and therefore culturally accessible, way to understand pragmatism. The concept of 'vocational guidance' found its advocates in China not only because of the global triumph of psychology or because of some general American influence, but also because it coincided with the Chinese wish to define each person's place in society; vocational guidance looked like an efficient instrument to do exactly this, thus emphasizing more the needs of the society rather than those of the individual.

While a perceived internal stagnation made it more likely that global trends or popular export models would find their way into Chinese education, more differentiated evaluations of non-Chinese models – or even disappointment with them – increased the visibility and the value of traditional references. Thus, there is no linear development from 'reference to tradition' to 'reference to world situations', but the pendulum seems to swing back and forth. Beginning in the 1920s, Chinese intellectuals increasingly referred to the 'tradition' as providing a solution to China's problems of modernisation. However, this was no simple revisionism or a step back into the past, but a reflection of the present, acute problems of Chinese society, which it shared, according both to Chinese and non-Chinese intellectuals, with many modern societies: the lack of spiritual values in a world

87 See Schulte, *Zur Rettung des Landes* (note 61), 105 f.

88 C. H. Becker: Carl Heinrich Becker in China. Reisebriefe des ehemaligen preußischen Kulturministers 1931/32, Münster 2004) (= Berliner China-Studien/Quellen und Dokumente), 133 (seventh letter).

89 Ibid., 151 (eighth letter).

90 See I. Stolpe, *Die Mongolisierung des Sowjetsterns. Ein Beispiel für die Rolle des Zufalls beim Transfer von Symbolen*, in: *Transfer lokalisiert. Konzepte, Akteure, Kontexte*, ed. B. Schulte, Leipzig 2006, 30–43.

overtly determined by material and technological criteria.⁹¹ These critical reflections on the nature of Western modernity gave rise to Contemporary Neo-Confucianism, which is – paradox as it may sound – a highly modern tradition. Coming back to the concept of ‘creolisation’, this means that creolisation works both ways: ‘imported’ ideas, concepts, and institutions are surely domesticated; but local traditions are equally transformed through their interaction with global trends. The latter are as little ‘authentic’ as the former are simply ‘global’ or ‘international’.

91 One of the best known Chinese intellectuals of the time was Carsun Chang (1887–1969) who together with Rudolf Eucken wrote *Das Lebensproblem in China und in Europa*, Leipzig 1922.