

The *Homo Europaeus* as a Blueprint for International Organizations?

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RESÜMEE

Heute wird vor allem von internationalen Organisationen erwartet, dass sie die mit der „Globalisierung“ verbundenen Herausforderungen und Probleme angehen. In dem vorliegenden Aufsatz beabsichtige ich eine Übersicht zu verschiedenen Themenbereichen zu liefern, welche die Frage zu beantworten helfen soll, inwieweit ein konstruierter „Europäer“ den Grundentwurf für die Konzeption dieser Organisationen darstellte. Zunächst definiere ich den Begriff *Homo Europaeus*, welcher den vorgestellten Europäer widerspiegelt und in verschiedenen Bereichen und in unterschiedlichen historischen Perioden konstruiert wurde. Anschließend formuliere ich meine drei Hauptfragen, gefolgt von einer kurzen Übersicht zur Historiographie internationaler Organisationen. Ein Aufriss der Geschichte internationaler Organisationen soll diese Einrichtungen in der Globalgeschichte verorten. Abschließend behandle ich einige Eigenschaften von IO: die Dimension des Völkerrechtes, der Bürokratie und Standardisierung sowie die Politikbereiche Menschenrechte und Gesundheitspolitik.

Today, it is above all international organizations (IOs) that are expected to tackle the challenges and problems of “globalization” in an “effective”¹ way, while the very nature of these institutions has remained rather uncontested. In this article, I aspire to provide an overview of various subjects that promise to approach the question of to what extent a constructed “European” has been a blueprint for the conception of IOs, as well as a standard addressee of the latter’s policies. To operationalize this enormous endeavor, I will present a working definition of the term *Homo Europaeus* that reflects the imagined European, which has been constructed in different areas and in different historical peri-

1 C. N. Murphy, *Global Institutions, Marginalization, and Development*. Oxon (Canada)/New York 2005, p. 16.

ods. Then, I will outline my three major questions, followed by a short overview of the historiography of international organizations. A brief history of international organizations places these institutions in global history. Subsequently, I will address some features in this regard, namely the dimension of international law, bureaucracy and standardization for the prevailing image of man in IOs as well as the policy areas of human rights and medicine.²

Attempting a definition

Here, the “imagined European” figures only as an idealized model, which does not refer to an established concept and obviously differs from reality and the entirety of its hybrid forms. The notion of *Homo Europaeus* comprises both imagined Europeans as well as North Americans, or, generally the individuals broadly considered “Westerners.” However, whether Europeans themselves invented this imagined European is a different question. In accordance, this broad interpretation of *Homo Europaeus* does not refer to Europeans by birth but includes the “imagined European,” who can live in other parts of the world but at least shares the same patterns as this constructed “European.” No distinction is made between affiliations to different social classes, but as IOs can largely be regarded as elitist projects, although they also reflect various societies’ wishes for international management, the educated middle and upper classes are considered by this expression. The term shall help to distinguish the imagined individual implicitly or directly addressed in international organizations and their policies: To what extent can the cultural heritage – in this case European/Western – be identified as a dominant belief and reference system? The working definition of *Homo Europaeus* used for this article does not refer to a fixed construction but to an ever-progressing result of continuous mixings of Western and non-Western knowledge, values, assumptions and perceptions. Likewise, the terms “Western” and “non-Western” are rather working definitions that do not fully reflect the mutually influential negotiation processes that have had an impact in Europe and other world regions. Particularly since the beginning of the twentieth century, the European has been increasingly defined in cultural terms and progressively less determined as a biologically and phenotypically defined group of people; it is an ascription that has become gradually detached from territorial references. Hence, cultural patterns, values and norms as well as socio-economic conditions seem to have become more important for this group than genetic or racial questions.

2 Apart from reviewing the bibliography, IO publications and basic documents such as charters, statutes, and archive material, I have further conducted interviews with former and current IO employees, directors of human resources, academics and think tank experts in Geneva, Washington, New York and New Delhi. These expert interviews helped to organize and systematize my approach to the subject. As all the interviewees were granted anonymity, I only refer to them by providing the month, year and the location where the conversations took place.

The following questions will be addressed in this article: To what extent is the very conception of IOs based on an image of man dominated by the *Homo Europaeus*? Were the major policy areas covered by IOs designed after the *Homo Europaeus* as a blueprint and directed to the “European” as a standard addressee? Can we identify different phases of the *Homo Europaeus* in international organizations?

International organizations and the *Homo Europaeus*

Historians have, by and large, neglected international organizations as a field of research until recently. Besides the rather theory-based political science works and procedure-related law analyses, many historical studies still limit their approach to a more or less critical history of institutions at best. This can be partly explained by the fact that international organizations have long been regarded as merely venues for policy-making by states, not as actors themselves. However, there have also been some critical studies on specific organizations, which allow for the formulation of conclusions on the phenomenon of IOs in global history in general. Certainly, *Global Community* by Akira Iriye is a pioneering study, for it constitutes one of the first attempts to analyze the emergence of IOs from a global history point of view, although it can hardly be considered as critical on the Western role.³ Madeleine Herren’s introduction to a global history view of international organizations is highly valuable but needs to be followed up by more empirical studies.⁴ Mark Mazower’s *Governing the World* is certainly worth reading, as it focuses on the intellectual origins of internationalism and the corresponding institutions.⁵ In addition, there are other books that provide more or less useful overviews.⁶ The United Nations system and the preceding League of Nations have become subjects of more critical research in the past years. The United Nations Intellectual History Project (UNIHP), based at the Ralph Bunche Institute of the City University of New York, has published several monographs on topics related to this subject and thus promises interesting findings for the quest of the imagined European in international organizations.⁷

Commonly, scholars have explained the emergence of international organizations with the increase of international travel, trade, the extension of epidemic diseases and a general tendency of growing global networks – the developments that are usually referred to

3 A. Iriye, *Global Community. The Role of International Organizations in the Making of the Contemporary World*. Berkeley 2002.

4 M. Herren, *Internationale Organisationen seit 1865. Eine Globalgeschichte der internationalen Ordnung*. Darmstadt 2009.

5 M. Mazower, *Governing the World. The History of an Idea*. New York 2012.

6 B. Reinalda, *Routledge History of International Organizations. From 1815 to the Present Day*. London/New York 2009; D. MacKenzie, *A World Beyond Borders. An Introduction to the History of International Organizations*. University of Toronto Press 2010.

7 The UNIHP inquires the following global challenges: human rights, international trade and finance, international development strategies, the global commons, global governance, quantifying the world, transnational corporations, development assistance, the gender revolution, human security, and development perspectives from the regional commissions.

as “globalization.” According to this functionalist narrative, these processes of networks and intertwining required coordination, the standardization of global trade and communication flows or technical methods beyond bilateral agreements.⁸ The non-Western criticism on this dominant account can roughly be categorized into two groups. The first group of scholars reject the prevailing narrative of the Western origin of international law and organizations, hinting at bases of these in ancient civilizations in China, India, Egypt and Assyria, long before the Westphalian System was established in the seventeenth century. The second group of critical scholars maintains that IOs are of European origin, but argue that this is exactly the problem. In their view, modern IOs mirror the complex legacies of colonialism.⁹ This selective historical account of functional narratives must be corrected and, in addition, non-European perspectives should complement or relativize these accounts.¹⁰ In sum, there are some studies that help to question the role of the imagined European in IOs, but as of yet, no explicit research endeavor has been undertaken in this regard.

According to Stuart Hall, colonialism and postcolonialism refer to a field of force of power and knowledge. In fact, colonial discourse is based on a fixation of meaning, which finds expression in the construction and fixation of the “other.” The violent representation of the “other” as irrevocably different was the necessary element in the construction of sovereign, dominant European states.¹¹ Is this also true for the European as an imagined individual? In general, the *Homo Europaeus* has always needed a rather blurred “other,” tentatively labeled *Homo extra-europaeus*, but also, in specific cases, more concrete constructions of the *Homo americanus*, *africanus* or *asiaticus*; all European imaginations of the “regionalized” other.

After World War II, direct European control over their colonies appeared to be no longer justifiable, although it took the imperial powers up to two decades to accept this. As Young outlines, the new system was much more subtle, but still represented an indirect version of the old one.¹² Numerous theorizations of the postcolonial situation analyzed this post-war period from the left (neo-colonialism, dependency theory, world systems theory) and from the capitalist view (Keynesianism, monetarism and neoliberalism). “Development” somehow served as a sort of “mediator” between these groups since it was regarded as “... the way forward after the successful realization of the anti-colonial struggles.”¹³ Development, as defined by Young, represents “a way of describing the as-

8 For instance, A. Hopkins, *The History of Globalization – And the Globalization of History?*, in: A. Hopkins (ed.), *Globalization in World History*. New York/ London 2002, p. 38; I. L. Claude, Jr., *Swords into Plowshares. The Problems and Progress of International Organization*, New York 1971/4, p. 34.

9 See, for example, A. Anghie, *Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law*, Cambridge 2004; B. Rajagopal, *International Law from Below. Development, Social Movements and Third World Resistance*. Cambridge/New York 2003; A. Anghie/B. Chimni/K. Mickelson/O. Okafor (eds), *The Third World and International Order. Law, Politics and Globalization*. Leiden/Boston 2003.

10 J. Alvarez, *International Organizations as Law-Makers*, pp. 39sq.

11 M. do Mar Castro Varela/N. Dhawan, *Postkoloniale Theorie. Eine kritische Einführung*. Bielefeld 2005, p. 16.

12 R. C. Young, *Postcolonialism. An Historical Introduction*. Oxford/Malden (MA) 2001, p. 44.

13 Ibid.

sumed necessity of incorporating the rest of the world into the realm of modernity, that is, the western economic system, in which capitalism produces progressive economic growth.” The overall goal of development was modernization, which was equated with the “Westernization” (and nowadays read “globalization”) of the Third World.¹⁴

It is fair to say that European historicism had facilitated Europe’s domination of the world during the nineteenth century.¹⁵ The postcolonial turn in historiography led to a tremor of the totalizing approaches of Western historicism, its linear history of progress and its master narrative of the globally-encompassing European modern age. This master narrative has perpetuated the enduring exclusion of non-European cultures in dominant historiography and the insinuation of “peoples without history.” Concepts such as civil rights, the state, civil society, public space, human rights, the individual, a differentiation between public and private, the imagination of the subject, democracy, social justice, scientific rationality, etc., are all linked to European thoughts and history: “These concepts entail an unavoidable – and in a sense indispensable – universal and secular vision of the human”.¹⁶ Spivak spoke of the “worlding” (making of the world) in the former colonies as copies of the “mother country,” with which she sought to express both the “production” as well as the “violation” of the “Third World.”¹⁷ Consequently, postcolonial studies accomplished that for the first time, “... tricontinental knowledge, cultural and political practices, have asserted and achieved more or less equal institutional status with any other.”¹⁸

Benedict Anderson’s path-breaking work *Imagined Communities* certainly highlighted the construction of the nation-state and the corresponding “national identities.” Some of his critics, for instance Partha Chatterjee, disapprove of Anderson’s conclusion that in the process of nation-building, the former colonies simply copied the European model or that the resistance movements were shaped by European thoughts. Chatterjee speaks of an “ideological strainer” through which anti-colonial nationalists filtered European ideas. In accordance, Chatterjee holds that anti-colonial nationalism is not a copy of the Western model but represents the manifold imaginations of freedom and humanity developed throughout the period of the struggles for independence.¹⁹ The ideas of “tradition” and “culture” were continuously (re-) invented on both sides: the colonizers and nationalists. Dipesh Chakrabarty thus describes the process between European imperialism and Third World nationalisms as connected in the goal of the common achievement of an “universalisation of the nation-state as the most-wanted form of political community.”²⁰ In a way, postcolonial theory takes the challenge of a transnational historiography seriously. Consequently, it investigates imperialism as both a European, as well as

14 Ibid., p. 49.

15 D. Chakrabarty, *Provincializing Europe. Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference*. Princeton 2000, p. 7.

16 Ibid., p. 4.

17 M. Do Mar Castro Varela/N. Dhawan, p. 13.

18 R. Young, p. 63.

19 M. Do Mar Castro Varela/N. Dhawan, pp. 17-19.

20 Ibid., p. 19.

an extra-European, encompassing phenomenon.²¹ Nevertheless, can the assumption of a differentiated understanding of nations, identity, culture, etc., be translated into the context of international organizations and their prevailing image of man? Is this rather a homogeneously imagined *Homo Europaeus*, or the result of a continuous blending of concepts passed through an “ideological strainer”? The tentative concern of this article is to pave the way for such a new perspective.

Brief history of international organizations

Like other authors, global historian Bruce Mazlish distinguishes between two aspects of global history: the history of globalization and the investigation of processes at the global rather than the local, national or regional level.²² Here, a not entirely congruent analogy for the study of IOs may be helpful: the history of international organization (singular) as a likely element of and/or reaction to globalization and the development of international organizations (internal and external processes and intertwining) as a concrete subject of investigation of global history. Thus, it seems quite helpful to distinguish between international organization and organizations. The first term describes the global process, the latter the concrete institutions.²³

Although there were historical forerunners and ancient or colonial empires showed similar features, modern intergovernmental organizations, based on the very concept of the nation-state, and nongovernmental institutions did not emerge before the mid-nineteenth century. Usually, the International Telegraphic Union (1865) and the Universal Postal Union (1874) are named as the first IOs. The first IOs established the structural pattern of bureau, council, and conference that still serves more or less as the organizational blueprint for IOs.²⁴ After the First World War, the League of Nations and the International Labour Organisation, among others, were established more as a continuation of preceding tendencies than, what is widely believed, as an exclusive result of Wilsonian ideas. As a reaction to the human tragedy during the two world wars and in view of the crimes committed by the National Socialists, numerous new institutions were established after 1945, above all, the United Nations Organisation (UNO) and its specialized institutions. In contrast to the League of Nations, which was mostly composed of European countries and dominated by French and British officials, IOs after World War II “... were far more global in scope than before the war.”²⁵ Nevertheless, the League of Nations and the succeeding United Nations were still structured according to a European understanding not only of international law but also of administrative organization. Some further argue that

21 Ibid., p. 24.

22 B. Mazlish, Comparing Global History and World History, in: Journal of Interdisciplinary History, XXVIII:3 (1998), p. 389.

23 See A. J. R. Groom, The setting in world society, in: A. J. R. Groom and P. Taylor (eds), Frameworks for International Cooperation, London 1990, pp. 7-10; Herren, Internationale Organisationen seit 1865; Claude Jr., Swords into Plowshares, p. 4.

24 Ibid., p. 36.

25 A. Iriye, Global Community, p. 22.

both, the League and the UN perpetuated the concept of empire in an internationalised version.²⁶ The very concept of international organizations can thus be considered a truly European enterprise, supposedly taking the European individual as a standard.

After 1945, the establishment of the United Nations was highly influenced by the emergence of human rights as an important element of international relations (as result of the Holocaust and other atrocities of the Second World War – but not explicitly of crimes committed by colonial powers against “natives” in their “overseas” territories), the belief in economic growth and development as outlined in the modernization theory, and the necessity to avoid what were labeled “world wars.”

The European and international law

International law is comprised of the entirety of legal rules laid down in treaties or customary law, which regulate the rights and duties of states and other subjects of international law regarding their existence and integrity. Tracing back to the Roman *jus gentium* and Canon law (which referred to natural law), modern international law has its roots in the European Middle Ages where it developed with the establishment of sovereign territorial states, especially in the sixteenth and seventeenth century. Until the nineteenth century, it was binding as a regional Christian European law only for the European states, the Holy Sea and later also for the American states. With the Peace of Paris (1856), the Ottoman Empire was incorporated as the first non-Christian state. In the course of the creation of the League of Nations, its jurisdiction was expanded to almost all existing states on the globe. Through this expansion, it became universal international law.²⁷ Here, the extension of a European concept of law to non-European regions also suggests that the *Homo Europaeus* as the supposed standard of international law was transferred.²⁸ This implicit European image of man was accompanied by an implicit comprehension of “natives,” which refers to people living in colonized territories. The predominant natural law view was later replaced by positivism. Both law schools directed the philosophical debate on international law until the early twentieth century.²⁹ In the beginning of the twentieth century, international law mostly consisted of rules for the acquisition of territory, international law offences, maritime law, law of war and the right to neutrality. Since then, international law has started to cover all areas of inter-state relations including human rights, space law, international organizations, the prohibition of the use of violence, non-intervention and the right to self-determination. Besides the Westphalian Peace Treaty (1648) and the Final Act of the Vienna Congress (1815), the entry-into-

26 See M. Mazower, *No Enchanted Palace. The End of Empire and the Ideological Origins of the United Nations*. Princeton 2009; and M. Mazower, *Governing the world*.

27 See T. Buergerthal/H. G. Maier, *Public International Law in a Nutshell*, St. Paul/MN 1902.

28 Although there are other European jurists with merits in this regard, the Dutch scholar Hugo Grotius (1583-1645) is largely seen as the “father” of modern international law, particularly on the law of war and peace. Buergerthal/Maier, *Public International Law in a Nutshell* (see note 24), p. 13.

29 *Ibid.*, pp. 13-15.

force of the League of Nations' Covenant in 1920 could also be regarded as a landmark in the development of international law. The creation of the League of Nations was not only the first permanently established framework of (supra-regional) inter-governmental institutionalized cooperation but also resulted in the modern law of international organizations.³⁰

Inter-governmental organizations are defined as international institutions established by treaty and governed by international law with an international legal personality to perform the functions entrusted to them and, to that extent, represent subjects of international law.³¹ International organizations set standards and norms through political declarations or guidelines: "Such forms of IO-generated 'soft law'" is an oxymoron that seeks "unprecedented expansion of the concept of law into areas of normative regulation, which have never been considered as belonging to the law proper," risks "normative confusion and uncertainty," and "erodes the concept of legal obligation."³² Alvarez holds that international organizations claiming universal participation changed firstly, the processes by which international norms were generated, secondly, the character of the actors producing these rules, and lastly, the substance of a considerable part of public international law.³³

The previous view on the development of the international law system should be complemented by critical and postcolonial perspectives. Mohammad Bedjaoui, a prominent proponent of the New International Economic Order, already criticized international law in 1979 as it consisted of mostly European, Christian, mercantilist rules inspired by imperialist interests.³⁴ His criticism was fundamentally focused on the Western model, but strangely enough he also called for catching up on development in line with the western ideal. Balakrishnan Rajagopal identifies this contradiction as the probably symptomatic double identity of Third World lawyers in postcolonial times.³⁵ The final result, according to Rajagopal, is that institutions gained space and extended their activities, while the radical demands that helped these bodies to be established in the first place were contained. The initiative of the Third World radicalized the institutions by converting these into arenas of political and ideological struggle on matters of power, distribu-

30 Ibid., pp. 15-17.

31 Ibid., p. 36. Here, it seems helpful to mention critical voices (the so-called crits) from the Third World that refused the Western notion of international law as promoting particular ideologies, mostly those linked to Western capitalism: "These historical accounts serve to highlight the bias and blindspots of those Europeans and Americans 'present at the creation', as well as the ways their institutions and approaches to law have served the needs of their rich states of origin, and may even be perpetuating the colonist project through institutions with a global reach." J. E. Alvarez, 'Legal Perspectives'. In: T. G. Weiss/S. Daws (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook on the United Nations*. United Nations Association of the UK/United Nations Intellectual History Project, Ralph Bunche Institute for International Studies, The CUNY Graduate Center, Oxford/New York 2007, p. 73.

32 J. E. Alvarez, *International Organizations as Law-Makers*, New York 2005, p. 48.

33 Ibid., p. 17.

34 M. Bedjaoui, *Towards a new international economic order*. UNESCO, New York/London 1979, p. 50; cited by B. Rajagopal, *International Law from Below*, p. 90.

35 Ibid. p. 92.

tion and justice. On the other hand, the most radical currents of Third World criticism were tamed by concentrating on the reform of international institutions.³⁶

Article 22 of the League of Nations' Charter provides an illustrative example of the civilizing mission inherent in international law and put forward by IOs:

*To those colonies and territories which as a consequence of the late war have ceased to be under the sovereignty of the States which formerly governed them and which are inhabited by peoples not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world, there should be applied the principle that the well-being and development of such peoples form a sacred trust of civilisation and that securities for the performance of this trust should be embodied in this Covenant.*³⁷

This article held that former colonies should be governed by tutelage through developed states. Naturally, the social fabric and economic development in the newly independent states was considered fragile (by Western standards), but also, the non-European person was implicitly deemed unfit to run a country and build up a national economy (of Western design).³⁸ To both Westerners and many non-Western people, this "tutelage" seemed to be beneficial in the first place, as the European ideal remained largely uncontested despite sometimes-fierce struggles for independence from European rule.³⁹

Rajagopal concludes that the League's Mandate System significantly contributed to the controversial relationship between colonialism and the new paradigm of development in the interwar years as the system legitimized development and well-being of the "natives" as international principle, indicating the change from exploitative colonialism (imperialism) to cooperative colonialism (development).⁴⁰

Antony Anghie argues, "... colonialism profoundly shaped the character of international institutions at their formative stage and that, by examining the history of how this occurred we might illuminate the operations and character of contemporary international institutions." The colonial confrontation seemed utterly important for the making of international law. It was shaped according to European design and then became global and also applicable to the societies in Africa, Asia and the Pacific despite their different cultures, belief systems and differing political and economic institutions: "It was principally through colonial expansion in the nineteenth century that international law became universal in this sense."⁴¹ In Anghie's view, former colonies did not simply adopt

36 Ibid., p. 94.

37 Covenant of the League of Nations, Article 22.

38 "The phrase 'organized peoples' in the preamble to the Covenant of the League of Nations implied the existence of non-organized or less civilized peoples, whereas the UN Charter refers to the sovereign equality of all states." B. Reinalda, *Routledge History of International Organizations. From 1815 to the Present Day*. London/New York 2009, p. 290.

39 Article 22 further highlighted the prohibition of "military training of the natives for other than police purposes and the defence of territory," especially in middle Africa – apparently they were not considered sufficiently "mature," i.e., not as "cautious" and "wise" as the *Homo Europaeus* (particularly demonstrated between 1914 and 1945) in the use of weaponry.

40 Rajagopal, *International Law from Below*, p. 71.

41 A. Anghie, *Colonialism and the Birth of International Institutions: Sovereignty, Economy, and the Mandate Sy-*

“sovereignty” as the concept defined by Western countries, but rather a different form of “sovereignty” that maintained their dependence on their former colonial masters. For this, the Mandate System served to protect the “...interests of backward people, to promote their welfare and development, and to guide them toward self-government and, in certain cases, independence.”⁴²

The UN Charter did not challenge the “... fundamental tenets of legal positivism to which most international lawyers subscribed in 1945.”⁴³ However, this positivist credo of the United Nations has been subject to changes.⁴⁴ The Charter stresses the idea of development. In article 73, dealing with the “Declaration regarding non-self-governing territories,” the Charter employs a language that advocates modernization through the development of political institutions – supposedly following Western models of autonomous governance. Article 76 on the international trusteeship system also refers to the so-called trust territories (*i.e.*, the colonies) and calls for the promotion of “political, economic, social and educational advancement of the inhabitants”.⁴⁵

If we only take the League of Nations’ Covenant and the UN Charter as representative sources mirroring an image of man, we can easily identify that the language, the target group, the self-image and the intellectual-historical surrounding that encompassed the authors of these foundational documents reflect a European and North American, albeit internationalist, still genuinely Western perspective. The attempt to “humanize” the colonial system, to turn to socially acceptable rights and norms, and peaceful means for the international conduct of states, clearly refers to a truly European liberal understanding of world affairs, social relations and, last but not least, the very individual. Europeans and North Americans came to be accustomed to fixing the rights and duties of persons, entities and societies by (positive) law, which served as source of legitimation for a Western world order based on legal provisions benefiting the Westerners.

In general, international law was established by Europeans and has regarded the *Homo Europaeus* as both a basic understanding of the imagined individual and the standard addressee of international law that was then universalized as the desirable role model. In addition to the European-centered origins of international law, diplomacy as a concept and diplomatic etiquettes, rules, protocol provisions, etc., should also be reviewed with the aim to locate the imagined European.

stem of the League of Nations, in: New York University Journal of International Law and Politics, 34 (3), December 2002, p. 516.

42 Ibid., p. 523.

43 J. E. Alvarez, Legal Perspectives, p. 59.

44 Ibid., pp. 62/63.

45 Charter of the United Nations, signed on 26 June 1945, in San Francisco, at the conclusion of the United Nations Conference on International Organization.

International bureaucracies and norm-setting

The bodies of international organizations can be seen as "... first and foremost sovereignty-based institutions where rules, norms, principles, and procedures reflected and reinforced traditional Western statecraft."⁴⁶ Usually, international organizations consist of a permanent secretariat, which somewhat mirrors the executive at the national level of Western democracies, as well as a General Assembly, which to a certain extent resembles national parliaments.⁴⁷ Furthermore, a Secretary General or General Director heads the secretariat and serves as a principal official of the corresponding organization – sanctioned by the member states of the latter. An imagination of Western bureaucracy (and thus individual bureaucrats) seems to prevail that highlights rationality but also efficiency and effectiveness for the public servant; these concepts are clearly determined by European and North American standards, following a Weberian understanding of bureaucracy.

The bureaucracy is important, as IOs have a forceful norm-setting competence, which makes it more powerful than national bureaucracies due to the international (and thus potentially universal) field of application. Barnett and Finnemore hold that IOs as bureaucracies define norms and set standards, which influence the behavior of states⁴⁸ – here, I would add individuals, both within IO bureaucracies and those affected by their norms. For instance, the reports of the former UN Human Rights Commission, outlining shortcomings of governments and defining abuses and rights, exercised, at times, considerable impact as well as the "best practices" and "good governance" definitions shaping the policies of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank.⁴⁹ International organizations have facilitated the determination not only of the perpetrators of human rights violations, but have also defined human rights and measures to promote or protect them. In accordance, IOs form a model of how the world is composed and what the agendas for action are.⁵⁰ Another example are the structural adjustment policies of the IMF, which prescribed rigid liberalization programs on highly indebted Third World countries and thus implicitly imposed the Western notion of a *Homo economicus*⁵¹ in these regions. Another example is the construction of "economic rationality" by the World Bank and the attempt to "... transform existing institutions, attitudes, norms, and patterns of conduct."⁵²

46 D. J. Puchala/K. Verlin Laatikainen/R. A. Coate, *United Nations Politics. International Organization in a Divided World*. Upper Saddle River/ NJ 2007, p. 21.

47 See M. J. Peterson, General Assembly, in: Weiss and Daws (eds), *The Oxford Handbook on the United Nations*, p. 98.

48 M. Barnett and M. Finnemore, *Rules for the World. International Organizations in Global Politics*, Ithaca / London 2004.

49 Ibid., pp. 7, 9.

50 Ibid.

51 The *homo economicus* is the concept in several theories of the human as a rational-minded and self-interested actor who desires wealth, avoids unnecessary labor, and has the ability to make judgments towards those ends.

52 D. Williams, *Constructing the Economic Space: The World Bank and the Making of Homo Oeconomicus*, in: *Millennium, Journal of International Studies* 28 (1999), 1, pp. 97/98.

Barnett and Finnemore argue that the power of international organizations goes beyond regulation:

*IOs can also constitute the world as they define new categories of problems to be governed and create new norms, interests, actors, and shared social tasks. This constitutive power of IOs has not been explored or well understood by IR scholars but has profound consequences, among them a consistent tendency of IOs to create a world that subsequently licenses yet more intervention by IOs.*⁵³

Therefore, if the definitional and regulatory competences of IOs are much broader than usually recognized, and as bureaucracies they are both composed of and creators of rules,⁵⁴ is an image of man based on the constructed European the foundation of the standards and norms generated by international institutions?

Besides the internal rules making the bureaucracies work, there are rules that determine the bureaucrats' perception of the world: "Rules define, categorize, and classify the world."⁵⁵ Rational-legal authority accordingly represents IOs as it provides them with a form (bureaucracy) and enables them to proceed in specific ways (in general, "impersonal rule making").⁵⁶ One may argue that the standard international civil servant was supposed to internalize a conception of man that can be tentatively labeled the *Homo bureaucraticus*. The bureaucrats from the early IOs up through the personnel of the League of Nations were mostly inspired by a Western-liberal form of internationalism that sought to improve the world⁵⁷ and, thus, can be critically considered as driven by an "enlightened colonialism" or implicitly as a universal version of the "civilizing mission." Both the employee and the recipient of IO policies seem to be basically considered as a rational individual: rather obedient to rules set up at a higher level of hierarchy and seek to be efficient and effective. The human being, according to international organizations, must therefore ideally be respectful of human rights and basically be a *Homo economicus* – two essential concepts that are closely related to each other within the Western reference system based on market economy and democracy. For the Third World, these concepts should also turn into imperatives, which were linked to the concept of development.⁵⁸

53 Barnett and Finnemore, Rules for the World (note 48), p. 17.

54 Ibid., p. 18.

55 Ibid. "Their rules define shared tasks (like "development"), create and define new categories of actors (like "refugees"), and create new interests for actors (like "promoting human rights"). Ibid.

56 Ibid., p. 21.

57 See Herren, Internationale Organisationen seit 1865, pp. 43-48; A. L. S. Staples, The Birth of Development. How the World Bank, Food and Agriculture Organization, and World Health Organization Changed the World, 1945–1965, Kent/OH 2006, pp. 1-21.

58 See B. Rajagopal, International Law from Below'.

The international civil service and global standards

Designed after the British (League of Nations) and United States civil service (UN), the international civil service, first introduced by the League of Nations in 1919/20, mostly follows the Weberian ideal of the bureaucrat who establishes rules and norms for the imagined average citizen. Most literature on the so-called international civil service focuses on the employees' qualifications and capacities, the difficult question of independence from governments, their international status (including privileges and immunities), their efficiency and effectiveness, or the problem of corruption. No study seems to exist that inquires about the constructed "average" international civil servant as a supposedly Western concept. This is understandable as the information is hard to obtain and interviewees are very cautious about this subject.

The recruitment standards have differed among the various international institutions, although nowadays some common standards seem to prevail. In the earlier days, it was probably more difficult to hire people from non-Western regions, not only due to the lack of "appropriately qualified" candidates, but also simply because of deficient information on these opportunities in the corresponding regions. After the League of Nations' Covenant remained silent about the issue, the UN Charter states:

*The paramount consideration in the employment of the staff and in the determination of the conditions of service shall be the necessity of securing the highest standards of efficiency, competence, and integrity. Due regard shall be paid to the importance of recruiting the staff on as wide a geographical basis as possible.*⁵⁹

Here, we can identify the factors of efficiency and competence, obviously close to Weber's ideal bureaucrat, as the main criteria. The goal of geographical distribution is put into perspective twice, by the words "due regard" and "as wide as possible," while efficiency and competence seem to be uncontested core attributes of the international civil service. In the period after World War II, the UN system established a system of geographic distribution, which guaranteed optimal representation of the world's nations in the international civil service. This became increasingly important in the period of decolonization when newly independent countries demanded more say and better representation of their nationals in UN institutions. Later, the gender issue was added and quotas for women were established. In view of the lack of enough "qualified" candidates from some "less developed" countries, Honig held in 1954:

*While it may have been necessary to adopt the principle of equitable geographical distribution in order to secure the greatest possible universality of the organization, the principle itself is nevertheless one which may in practice militate against the attainment of that high degree of efficiency which is postulated in the Charter.*⁶⁰

59 UN Charter, article 101.3.

60 F. Honig, *The International Civil Service. Basic Problems and Contemporary Difficulties*, in: *International Affairs* (Royal Institute of International Affairs), 30 (1954), 2, p. 177.

In 1965, Winchmore emphasized that the

*... necessity to adapt the composition of the staff to the expanding membership of the United Nations has led since 1960 on the one hand to a greater emphasis on nationality on matters of recruitment and on the other hand to the more extensive use of the fixed-term contract as a means of ensuring greater flexibility in composition.*⁶¹

Thus, there seemed to be a conflict between the original core requirements (efficiency, competence, integrity) and geographical distribution. The need to introduce more Third World points of view seemed to prevail:

*For example, the Chairman of the Group of 77 for the [World Food] Conference, Edmundo Flores, was critical of the FAO's performance and proposed the use of more brown, black, and yellow functionaries instead of the Western Europeans who, he asserted, possessed an anachronistic world view...*⁶²

Besides the prevalence of European colonial languages (English, French and Spanish) in the UN system over Arabic, Chinese and Russian, changes of staff regulations, for instance, reflect debates on political correctness mainly discussed in Western societies ("best practice," for instance).⁶³ If we regard IOs as creators of global rules and standardization, the composition of the administration is noteworthy.

Akira Iriye accurately states that international cooperation emerged during the nineteenth century in order to establish common rules "... to standardize weights and measures, to adopt uniform postal and telegraphic rates, and to cope with the danger of communicable diseases."⁶⁴ Jürgen Osterhammel, however, correctly remarks that technical standardization took place but not everywhere; it was an extensive process, but not a global one as the individual function systems showed various levels of complexity and cultural and political resistance differed.⁶⁵ Above all, the first international organizations focused on the establishment of internationally valid norms regarding radio frequencies, shipping and air traffic routes, copyright, or health regulations. From the rather technical norms and standards set up in the nineteenth and early twentieth century on telecommunication, aviation frequencies or sea routes, which all addressed the interests of European customers, travelers, merchants, militaries or politicians, to the benevolent norms enshrined in human rights standards, gender equality, or good governance, Europeans were the driving force of these definitions, and the *Homo Europaeus* has always been at the center.

According to Ward, the establishment of a commonly accepted statistical system and of a universal framework for the collection and compilation of figures in conformity with the

61 C. Winchmore, *The Secretariat: Retrospect and Prospect*, in: *International Organization*, 19 (1965), 3, p. 626.

62 T. G. Weiss and R. S. Jordan, *Bureaucratic Politics and the World Food Conference*, in: *World Politics*, 28 (1976), 3, p. 429.

63 Interviews, New York City, September 2007.

64 Iriye, p. 10.

65 J. Osterhammel, *Die Verwandlung der Welt. Eine Geschichte des 19. Jahrhunderts*. München 2009, p. 731.

recognized professional standards at the international and national level was “one of the great and mostly unsung successes of the UN organization.”⁶⁶ The intellectual pioneers of the League of Nations, the International Labour Organisation, the UN Statistical Office and the UN system as such were confident that statistics served as the basis for decision-making. In order to “quantify the world appropriately,” it seemed crucial to set up general standards, homogeneous classifications and in particular generally accepted concepts to authorize the UN to assume an international mandate to gather global statistics.⁶⁷ In the early years of the UN, the US was a leading world power and seen as a “recognized statistical authority” with an impact on UN data policy: “The concepts of value added, growth, gross domestic product (GDP), and gross national product (GNP per capita) quickly became the hallmarks of economic progress.” Ward normatively concludes that the role of the UN regarding the international harmonization of statistical models and classifications “...has been impressive and invaluable.”⁶⁸ Rajagopal also refers to the collection of data and mentions two important innovations of the League of Nations Mandate System: First, these extensive data were *compared systematically* to draw lessons and formulate standards and principles in these areas. Comparative statistical and informational analysis, which is one of the essential prerequisites to global governance, was systematized in the Mandates. Second, as a corollary of this, a new “science of colonial administration” at the international level, based on a deductive and experimental method, was born.

This science of colonial administration can be regarded as the predecessor of what Rajagopal labels the “science of development,” which followed after 1945.⁶⁹

At the outset, when the UN consisted of only forty-six member countries, it inherited the priorities and agendas of the politically powerful and industrially advanced countries. It took time to shake off some of this influence and to turn more attention to providing statistical support to countries with weaker data capabilities.⁷⁰

Hence, the UN established its classification and statistical systems on the existing models of the richer and more politically influential countries – and the main task then seemed to be to bring the economically poorer countries to adopt these concepts, and less so to consider alternative classification schemes from the latter. Even before World War II, most national official data was collected in an incoherent manner, without much coordination and centralization. Likewise, there was no routine dissemination of the compiled data to the public.⁷¹ This made the UN’s task even more important to “quantify the world” – following a European model.⁷² In sum, it remains important to emphasize the

66 M. Ward, *Quantifying the World. UN Ideas and Statistics*. United Nations Intellectual History Project, Bloomington 2004, p. 2.

67 Ibid., pp. 5sq.

68 Ibid., p. 22.

69 Rajagopal, *International Law from Below*, p. 61.

70 Ward, *Quantifying the World*, p. 34.

71 Ibid., p. 35.

72 See Rajagopal, *International Law from Below*, p. 52.

role of IOs with regard to the facilitation of internationally comparative statistics on measurements, preferences, and cultural and political attributes.

Example: The Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the right to development

From a postcolonial standpoint, Rajagopal argues that the human rights system after 1945 had its roots in the petition right of the League's Mandate System, which allowed people in the colonies to file complaints, albeit with different results. Although the Permanent Mandates Commission (PMC) cannot be judged as the governor of colonialism, "[t]he key aspect of the PMC, which is to be found in all latter petition mechanisms, is this: that, disputes/grievances from the mandate-inhabitants get converted into questions of institutional self-preservation and identity at the PMC."⁷³

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), issued on December 10, 1948 in the course of the establishment of the United Nations, clearly defines the human rights of the individual. It is a telling sign that the UDHR was adopted as a non-binding declaration and not as a compulsory legal instrument for nation-states because national sovereignty was considered more important. In its preamble, the Declaration refers to the "acts of barbarism" committed during the Second World War, from which the authors derive the necessity to strengthen each individual's basic rights. While the Second World War, initiated by Germany and mostly affecting European countries, serves as a point of reference here, the crimes of colonial powers are merely indirectly addressed in the Universal Declaration. Normand and Zaidi clearly state that the sources for the first draft versions of the Declaration can be labeled "exclusively western, and the overall paradigm was based on the Western model of individual rights."⁷⁴ Furthermore, these authors hold that the Declaration was evidently based principally on "Western philosophical models, legal traditions, and geopolitical imperatives (although strangely enough, the conventional view of human rights has still not come around to acknowledge the full implications of this fact)." Background materials were almost exclusively in English and all derived from the "democratic West;" Accordingly, the ideological basis was Western, liberal und individualistic.⁷⁵

The UDHR has the individual at its center – obviously a very European philosophical and political concept. In accordance, it hardly mirrors other images of man besides the *Homo Europaeus*. Although economic, social and cultural rights entered into the Declaration too, these concepts also trace back to Social Democratic concepts and Socialist beliefs, which are predominantly of European origin. The Declaration implicitly excludes other concepts of man from non-Western cultures – a criticism often brought up in debates regarding cultural relativism. Cultural relativists contest the universality

73 Ibid., pp. 67, 70.

74 R. Normand/S. Zaidi, *Human Rights at the UN. The Political History of Universal Justice*, Bloomington 2008, p. 140.

75 Ibid., p. 195.

of the Western human rights ideal: The extreme antithesis to positive international law is that political behavior – and with it the interpretation of human rights – depends on culture. Largely simplified, the individualistic image of the Western man is contrasted with a group- and community-oriented mentality of several non-Western societies in order to legitimize deviations from the notion of human rights.⁷⁶

Article 2 vests every human being with human rights, independent of his/her race, skin color, gender, language, religion, political or other convictions, national or social background, fortune, or origin. Here, the Declaration contrasts with the upcoming modernization theory, which clearly identified the economically poorer countries and their peoples as “underdeveloped.” These countries (and their inhabitants) should be promoted to “develop,” *i.e.*, follow the Western path of modernization, particularly regarding the economic dimension (“growth”). Directly speaking, an individual of the so-called “underdeveloped” regions seemed to be not (yet) acknowledged (in reality) as equal with Europeans or other Westerners, although that person officially enjoyed the same basic rights.

Article 23 of the UDHR goes beyond the classic rights, which protect the individual from undue interventions of the state, as it formulates the right to work and other economic and social rights, such as the creation of labor unions. Here, as well as in the following articles, it becomes obvious that the labor movement and Socialist thought inspired this view. However, the right to holiday and a proper standard of living (articles 24 and 25) could not really be considered as realistic claims especially for people in many economically poorer, non-Western regions. For this, article 28 is of interest: It proclaims the right (of the individual!) to a social and international order in which the aforementioned rights and freedoms can be fully attained. This section seems to anticipate the later demand for the just New International Economic Order put forward by speakers of the Third World beginning in the early 1970s.⁷⁷

Since the 1970s, a third generation of solidarity rights was pursued; this struggle took place especially within the UN system. Rights subsumed under the third generation include the right to development, the right to self-determination, the right to peace, the right to communicate, the right to be different, the right to a healthy and balanced environment, the right to benefit from the common heritage of mankind and the right to humanitarian assistance.⁷⁸ Together with the solidarity rights approach published by UNESCO in 1977, the new conception was worked out during a UNESCO meeting of

76 L. Kühnhardt, *Die Universalität der Menschenrechte*. Bonn 19912, p. 135. For instance, the Indian caste (*varna*) system and the *dharma* duties contradict with the universal human rights of the individual. However, the Indian struggle for independence employed human rights to fight the colonial rulers. See *ibid.*, pp. 158-174.

77 United Nations General Assembly, Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order, Resolution 3201 (S-VII). Adopted without vote at the Sixth Special Session, 2229th plenary meeting, May 1, 1974. *The American Journal of International Law*, Vol. 68, No. 4 (Oct., 1974), pp. 798-801.

78 The precise origin of the third generation concept is indistinct, although it is believed to have been raised for the first time in 1971. The Senegalese M'Baye was the first who tried to define the right to development. See: K. M'Baye, *Le droit au développement comme un droit de l'homme*, in: *Revue des droits de l'homme: droit international et droit comparé* (1972), pp. 505-534.

experts (1978) and detailed in the report of the International Commission for the Study of Communication Problems; it was also the subject of an international colloquium in Mexico in 1980.⁷⁹ The right to be different and to development found expression in the Declaration on Race and Racial Prejudice adopted by the General Conference of UNESCO in November 1978.⁸⁰ Alston opposed the third human rights generation as it threatened to subordinate the first two, while he considered the rights of the third generation as, partly, already included in the previous generations:

*In many respects the concept of third generation rights smacks rather too strongly of a tactical endeavour to bring together, under the rubric of human rights, many of the most pressing concerns on the international agenda and to construct an artificial international consensus in favour of human rights by appealing to the 'favourite' concerns of each of the main geopolitical blocs. In this respect the concept could be viewed as the human rights equivalent of a caricature of Uncle Sam, looking like a bear, but dressed only in a Gandhian loin cloth.*⁸¹

Besides the criticism from international law on the concept, other concerns were also brought forward: A more important criticism holds that the third generation of solidarity rights represents an approach that is fundamentally detached from the idea of individual human rights. Kühnhardt finds that this results in an ideologization and new meaning of the human rights idea, which blatantly contradicts the latter's civil-liberal genesis.⁸² A new order of worldwide economic relations between industrialized and "developing" countries was regarded as the precondition to realize the right to development. In 1986, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution mentioning the right to development as a human right.⁸³ The Declaration on the Right to Development declares in article 2.1, "... the human person is the central subject of development and should be the active participant and beneficiary of the right to development." Besides building a bridge between Western individualism in the understanding of human rights and the solidarity rights of the third generation, the proponents of the right to development failed to design an alternative concept to the *Homo Europaeus*: Here, the individualism and Western-focused bias of the international economic system faces opposition, but the advocates of the right to development passed up the opportunity to question equally Western concepts as "development," thus implicitly aiming for an imagined individual according to the *Homo Europaeus*, whose main attributes here might be "wealthy" (in contrast to "poor") and "modern" (in contrast to "backward") (see article 1.2). In accordance, the declaration implicitly calls on economically rich countries to assist "developing

79 P. Alston, A third generation of solidarity rights: Progressive development or obfuscation of international human rights law?, in: Netherlands International Law Review, 29 (1982), p. 309.

80 Ibid., pp. 307-309.

81 Ibid., pp. 311, 322.

82 Kühnhardt, Die Universalität der Menschenrechte, pp. 250 sq.

83 Only the United States voted against this document, while Belgium, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Israel, Luxemburg, Malawi and Great Britain abstained. Ibid., p. 256.

countries” to “foster their comprehensive development” (article 4.2).⁸⁴ Here, the same tenor prevails as in the Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order in 1974, which also stressed the need for economically poorer countries to “develop” and the richer countries’ obligation to support their endeavors.⁸⁵ This strikes a chord with the idea of the redistribution of wealth rather than presenting an alternative to the existing system.

So the question remains, is the formulation of a third generation of human rights essentially the non-Western attempt to introduce something of their own into the European-dominated international (legal) system by which the Third World implicitly accepts the latter, or is it rather a clever way to use the West’s legal tradition to beat them with their own weapons? I think both explanations are partly true. The third generation is not a truly non-Western counter-concept, although the original aims targeted the *Homo Europaeus* and Western individualism (and the maintenance of the international status quo) as hitherto largely exclusive references.

Example: Health policy of the World Health Organization

In this section, I will inquire into the dissemination of powerful medicine models based on specific cultural conceptions of health and medicine. Besides a look at prevailing medicine concepts and practices, the question emerges as to what extent the health policy of the World Health Organization (WHO) and its predecessors focused on particular populations/sections of populations, or specific problems, and which interests formed the basis of this orientation.

I regard scientific or Western medicine as the dominant concept for international organizations. Western medicine can be associated with the concepts of hospital and laboratory, which together constitute the two elements of scientific medicine still dominating international health policies.⁸⁶ Here, the treatment of diseases is the priority; that is, Western medicine cherishes the idea of health, which largely defines health as the absence of disease. Furthermore, the academically trained physician as a scientific (*i.e.*, considered as rational and thus superior) expert is granted inherent authority. In accordance, we can interpret the Western physician as the prevailing *Homo Europaeus*. On the other side of the spectrum, concepts of non-Western (often also addressed as “traditional”) medicine that concentrate more on holistic approaches to health have often been disparaged by numerous representatives of Western medicine as “unscientific.”⁸⁷

84 United Nations General Assembly, Declaration on the Right to Development, Adopted by General Assembly resolution 41/128 of 4 December 1986.

85 United Nations General Assembly, Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order (1974). See articles 4(i), (l) and (r).

86 A. Cunningham/B. Andrews (eds.), *Western Medicine as contested knowledge*. Manchester 1997, p. 8.

87 See *Ibid.*, pp. 24-45.

The World Health Organization (WHO) was created in 1946 in the aftermath of World War II. Unlike its predecessors, the WHO was no longer an institution brought into line with European interests, but it maintained the orientation on Western medicine as the starting point for the organization's policy.⁸⁸ Due to the prevailing belief in modernization, the WHO favored the "doctrine" of technical assistance: The organization trained medical assistants in former colonies, sent out advisors and launched big campaigns to eradicate great plagues such as malaria or smallpox. According to Lee, the ideology and activities of the WHO between 1948 and the early 1970s mirrored the paternalistic views of colonial times. The organization was seen as at war with diseases; thus its task was to impart knowledge to guide the people in the former colonies towards a Western model of society.⁸⁹

In the 1960s, many newly independent African countries joined the WHO – the majority of which struggled with big economic, social and health problems.⁹⁰ The new elites saw themselves mostly aligned with the West and thus followed the prevailing paradigm of development. In contrast, the "indigenous way" was seen as "backward."⁹¹

The division of labor within the UN system resulted in a dissociation of health questions from the broader social and economic progress. Therefore, WHO and UNICEF (United Nations Children's Fund), FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization of the UN) and UNDP (United Nations Development Program) hardly cooperated.⁹² Due to the fact that the endeavors of WHO and UNICEF followed biomedical methods, the connection between health and social and economic development was rarely stressed. This narrow interpretation of health as merely the freedom from sickness seemed to contradict the definition contained in the WHO's Constitution:⁹³ "Health is a state of complete physical, mental and social well-being and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity."⁹⁴

During the WHO's first thirty years, Western or Western-trained/-oriented physicians dominated the knowledge order of the organization and controlled the practice of the health politics. As the Western concept of "world health" was not seriously challenged, Lee speaks of a process of adaptation at the international level for which the WHO served as a stage, an instrument and a regulator for the transfer of knowledge to non-Western countries.⁹⁵ It is important to stress the distinction made between Europeans and non-Europeans: In contrast to Europeans, the non-European peoples were rather

88 See *ibid.*, pp. 5sq.

89 S. Lee, WHO and the developing world: the contest for ideology, in: *Ibid.*, p. 26.

90 Y. Beigbeder, L'Organisation Mondiale de la Santé. Avec la collaboration de Mahyar Nashat, Marie-Antoinette Orsini et Jean-François Tiercy. Paris 1995, p. 35; Lee, WHO and the developing world, p. 26.

91 Lee, WHO and the developing world, p. 26.

92 R. M. Packard, Post-Colonial Medicine. In: R. Cooter/J. Pickstone (eds.), *Medicine in the Twentieth Century*. Amsterdam 2000, p. 103.

93 *Ibid.*, p. 104.

94 Constitution of the World Health Organization, Preamble, New York, 22 July 1946. See M. Brady, S. Kunitz, and D. Nash, WHO's definition? Australian Aborigines, conceptualisations of health and the World Health Organisation, in: L. Marks and M. Worboys (eds.), *Migrants, Minorities and Health. Historical and contemporary studies*. London/New York 1997, p. 272.

95 Lee, WHO and the developing world, p. 24.

dealt with as anonymous masses and, in case of doubt, also forced to mass vaccinations, for example.⁹⁶

In the 1970s, endeavors to challenge the Western dominance internationally, thus also within IOs, condensed. The consideration of the problem of poverty in non-Western societies became more important, although, as critics say, much remained rhetoric and it has always been added to reports or resolutions as an afterthought.⁹⁷ With regard to health politics, we can speak of a historical shift. The entry of the People's Republic of China into the WHO in 1973 and the popularity of the concept of "barefoot doctors" – health workers trained in traditional Chinese and biomedicine to serve the rural population⁹⁸ – figured as important factors that contributed to a re-orientation of the WHO's health policies.

In 1974, the first oil price shock occurred, which resulted in the demand of the UN General Assembly for a New International Economic Order to give the (economically) poorer countries a more just share of the world trade and wealth. More than ever before, the connection between health and development in all its forms was emphasized.⁹⁹ The role of the Soviet Union's leadership was decisive on the path to the Declaration of Alma Ata in 1978 ("Health for all in the year 2000"), which called for a primary health care.¹⁰⁰ The Declaration holds that the existing "crass inequality" of health conditions, particularly between "developed" and "developing" countries, as well as within countries, was seen as politically, socially and economically unacceptable. Economic and social development, based on a New International Economic Order,⁹⁸ was assigned fundamental importance for the fullest achievement of health for all and to reduce the gap of the health situation between "developed" and ¹⁰¹"developing" countries.¹⁰² In other words, a horizontal, basic health care model challenged the vertical, disease-centered approach. The *Primary Health Care* (PHC) approach called for investments in basic health infrastructure and at the local level. PHC strengthened the role of traditional medicine and also emphasized the necessary participation of the local population in poorer regions in health planning and the implementation of the corresponding policies. Finally, PHC recognized that it was essential to fight the social and economic causes for a bad health situation.¹⁰³ Therefore, we can regard the rise of a sort of *Homo extra-europaeus* – in contrast to the construction

96 See S. S. Amrith, *Decolonizing International Health. India and Southeast Asia, 1930-65*. Houndsmills/New York 2006; Interviews, New-Delhi, March 2008.

97 Interviews, New Delhi, March 2008.

98 See F. Bray, *The Chinese Experience*, in: R. Cooter/J. Pickstone (eds.), *Companion to Medicine in the Twentieth Century*. London/New York 2003, pp. 719-738, here: pp. 727, 729.

99 Beigbeder, *L'OMS*, p. 23. See, for instance, V.T. Heart Gunaratne, *Voyage Towards Health*. Regional Office for South-East Asia, The World Health Organization. New Delhi 1980, p. 5.

100 Lee, *WHO and the developing world*, p. 39.

101 Pannenberg discussed a New International Health Order, linked to the NIEO. See C. O. Pannenberg, *A New International Health Order. An Inquiry into the International Relations of World Health and Medical Care*. Diss., Groningen 1978.

102 Declaration of Alma-Ata. International Conference on Primary Health Care, Alma-Ata, USSR, 6-12 September 1978.

103 Packard, 'Post-Colonial Medicine', p. 108.

of “anonymous masses” of non-Europeans with a positive connotation – on the agenda of the WHO as a counter-concept to the imagined European as the main addressee of world health policies.

One key concept of the PHC approach was the (rural) health worker that implicitly weakened the elevated position of academically trained physicians. In a document from the WHO’s archives, a fitting comparison with regard to the basic health tasks to be offered in the country-side is provided: “If we take an analogy from transport we can say that we want bus drivers to drive buses and not professors of transportation.”¹⁰⁴ Although others, such as healers or midwives, were given a role, (Western) physicians seemed mostly to be eager to maintain their dominant position in the health area, despite the acknowledged need to adjust it to more basic health needs.¹⁰⁵ The selection of health workers in rural areas was difficult because no rigid and universally accepted rules could be set up. Here, a general problem of the PHC approach became visible: While emphasizing the local approach to local health needs, the model aspired to be accepted as a general concept on a global scale. This implied that PHC as a global conception always needed a regional and a local definition as circumstances and cultural, socio-economic conditions varied considerably. The main problem seemed to be that PHC as a challenge to universally applicable Western medicine also attempted to become a universal concept. This implicit contradiction was used by the PHC’s opponents, who then seemed to heed the WHO’s wishes for concrete rules and established main concerns with selective programs that, as such, went against the loosely defined PHC model by setting priorities.

Broader connections between health and the socio-economic general conditions found almost no consideration in practice during the 1980s – also as a consequence of the conservative tendencies in the course of the North-South and East-West conflicts.¹⁰⁶ Shortly after the meeting at Alma Ata, the idealism assigned with PHC was questioned and the concept was criticized as “unrealistic.” The discrediting process began in 1979 at a small conference in Bellagio (Italy), sponsored by the Rockefeller Foundation with support from the World Bank. The conference proposed a Selective Primary Health Care concept (SPHC), which comprised pragmatic, reasonable technical innovations that were limited in their field of application and were easy to observe and to evaluate. Thanks to UNICEF especially, this SPHC was operationalized under the abbreviation GOBI.¹⁰⁷ According

104 Second draft of the Brochure for the Conference in Alma Ata 1978 (?), without date (WHO files), p. 8.

105 Memorandum, From R.H. Strudwick, FHE, to Dr. A. El Bindari Hammad, PHC; Dr. S. Litsios, PHC; Dr. A. Benyoussef, PHC; Dr. A. Zahre, CDS; Dr. D. Tejada-de-Rivero, ADG. Subject: Primary Health Care Brochure, 8 August 1977 (WHO files).

106 Here we can refer to the conservative governments of US Presidents Reagan and Bush, the aggravation of the East-West conflict in the early 1980s, the oil crisis in 1979 as well as the new orientation of several non-Western countries after the outbreak of the debt crisis in 1982. The electoral victory of Margaret Thatcher in Great Britain, the revolutions in Nicaragua and Iran and the invasion of the Soviet army in Afghanistan also contributed to this change.

107 T. M. Brown/ M. Cueto/ E. Fee, The World Health Organization and the Transition from ‘International’ to ‘Global’ Public Health, JLI Working Paper 1-1, A Joint Learning Initiative: Human Resources for Health and Development, March 2004, pp. 11sq. GOBI means: Growth Monitoring, Oral Rehydration, Breast Feeding, Immunisation.

to Packard, similar to the campaigns of the 1950s and 1960s to eradicate Malaria and other epidemic diseases, SPHC did not consider the root causes of poor health. The stress on local participation of the PHC approach was abandoned. Socioeconomic causes for health problems were again – like in the first decades of the WHO's existence – mostly neglected: Health was once more defined as the absence of disease.¹⁰⁸ There were several factors that led to the restoration of Western models in the WHO's politics: Accompanying a general conservative change of atmosphere in the early 1980s and the diminishing solidarity among Third World countries in the wake of the debt crisis, there was a lack of support from Western donors, fierce opposition by the pharmaceutical industry and physicians' associations, as well as several problems with the implementation of PHC programs.

With regard to health policies of the WHO, the *Homo Europaeus* was thus challenged particularly in the 1970s and faced a modification benefiting non-Western images of man, but through the powerful and subtle intervention of Western countries seemed to have survived in a refined form.

Conclusions

In the introduction, the question was raised as to whether the assumption in postcolonial studies implying a differentiated understanding of nations, identity, culture, etc., can be transferred to the context of international organizations and their prevailing image of man. To a certain extent, this can be done. The main features (international law, diplomacy, bureaucracy, education, recruitment, concepts such as “good governance,” etc.) of international organizations implicitly refer to a certain type of idealized civil servant as an agent of progress. We can identify the *Homo Europaeus* as the Western *Homo bureaucratiscus*, who has to live (or at least respect) all the presupposed characteristics of an IO employee. It becomes clearer if we look at the concrete policies of IOs. The standard themes of the outgoing twentieth century illustrated the globally prevailing image of man: global governance, rule of law, democracy, human rights, intellectual property, etc. To a certain degree, all of these concepts refer to an internationalized and enlightened European. Although these ideas certainly contain achievements for large parts of the world's population, it can still be beneficial to review them from a postcolonial perspective.

In accordance, the universal claim of international law, human rights, Western medicine, etc., stem from the Western-liberal belief in social and economic progress, which implicitly perpetuates a form of “enlightened colonialism” as the “advanced” West is seen as the role model – despite the benevolent motives behind these endeavors.

To what extent is the very conception of IOs based on an image of man dominated by the *Homo Europaeus*? The conception of the initial IOs, but also to a certain extent the UN system, are clearly based on an image of man influenced by *Homo Europaeus*. However,

108 Packard, ‘Post-Colonial Medicine’, p. 109.

this view was expanded, although some “European” origins still prevail. One might further concede that many non-Western IO employees were trained in the “West” and thus became somehow “Westernized” – and implicitly the very concept of *Homo Europaeus* experienced a further deterritorialization. However, there is no clear-cut dichotomy separating non-Western and “Western” staff members, as both have modified the standard role model of the international public servant. Additionally, the “West,” *i.e.*, particularly Europe and North America, have also continued to adopt external influences. However, although the bureaucracy, diplomacy, staff regulations, etc., have been modernized, the *Homo Europaeus* as a blueprint is still visible. All the changes happened within the pre-defined model – postcolonial criticisms on Weberian bureaucracy, labor understood as “paid labor,” codes of conduct or the influence and bias of standards, norms and statistics have hardly had any serious impact on the very concept of international organizations. A consistent postcolonial counter-concept to the *Homo Europaeus*-based IO system as such has not been outlined. Although Western and non-Western cultures cannot be sharply separated, as most cultures rather progress(ed) through diffusion with others, one can note the maintenance of a more refined Western order organized through IOs.

Were the major policy areas covered by IOs also designed after the *Homo Europaeus* as a blueprint and directed to the “European” as a standard addressee? Development has not only served as an ideological umbrella to bring non-Western societies “progress,” but also to maintain a Western-dominated approach (and world order) and was hardly confronted with fundamental challenges. The concept of development implies a distinction between Western societies (“developed”) and “catching up” or “developing” societies, which by and large should follow Western models to reach (mostly economic) prosperity, but also other advances such as good health and human rights. The examples of human rights and health have shown that the *Homo Europaeus* used to be the blueprint of the original IO policies and then became challenged by alternative concepts – New International Economic Order, third human rights generation, and Primary Health Care. To some extent, a hybridization took place, although the Western model has always been the basis of changing imaginations.

It is a telling sign that alternative, non-Western concepts that challenged the “imagined European” as the dominant image of man for IO policies still moved within the reference systems that had originally produced the *Homo Europaeus*: The very concept of development/ modernization, based on markets and the *Homo economicus* was less questioned than the existing unfair conditions of the trade system; the third generation of human rights implicitly accepted the notion and thus also the first two rights generations; and the Primary Health Care approach did not dispute the “world health policy” fundamentally, although it challenged the prevailing Western dominance. To be clear, no alternative reference systems were set up in a coherent form.

Can we identify different phases of the *Homo Europaeus* in international organizations? In general, various phases of European domination can roughly be identified: The first phase is direct colonial rule in the nineteenth century during which IOs set norms and standards to facilitate European world trade. In the nineteenth century, the European

dominance and thus implicitly the *Homo Europaeus* as the prevailing image of man in IOs remained uncontested. This was also reflected in the predominant European membership of the initial organizations.

In the second phase, the first half of the twentieth century, the geographical diversity in international institutions increased, but the European still served as the largely undisputed main reference. The Mandate System of the League of Nations sanctioned the civilizing missions of European colonial powers. The colonies were no longer dominated for exploitation but rather to assist their populations towards self-government and to promote economic, political and social progress. The League of Nations and the United Nations Organization seemed to be new, but with regard to the image of man shaping its institutional “self-image,” the “imagined European” remained dominant.

In the third phase, the UN system internalized modernization theory and prescribed the development doctrine: The industrialized countries should help “developing countries” to become like rich countries through development aid. Thus the UN implicitly instructed non-Western countries to follow the economically successful Western way of life, including the behavior of a *Homo Europaeus* as *Homo modernus* and *Homo economicus*. Consequently, previous European endeavors to civilize the still barbaric “others” turned into a universal civilizing mission with IOs as the main civilizers.

Fourthly, after the decolonization phase in the 1960, non-Western criticism arose, but it was less a frontal opposition against Western values as such than it was a demand for a fairer (not an entirely different!) international economic system and for more financial support to build up nations after the Western model. The creation of UNCTAD in 1964 as the first IO established by Third World countries constituted a symbolic step, but despite some rhetoric, the Western orientation regarding concepts (development) and terminology persisted. The demand for a New International Economic Order in 1974, the call for a third generation of (solidarity) human rights (including the right to development) and the rise of the Primary Health Care concept that defied Western medicine can be regarded as challenges of Western predominance.

In the fifth phase, due to the conservative wave in the early 1980s and the debt crisis, the seemingly united front of Third World countries faced new challenges. The alternative approaches lost impact – also as a result of a more or less fierce opposition against these by Western countries. It was again the latter that had the most say in the Bretton Woods organizations on which many economically poorer and indebted countries depended, rather than on the UN institutions.

In sum, as regards some IO policy areas, we can state that the prevailing *Homo Europaeus* was challenged in the 1960s and 1970s, however this was not the case regarding the imagined European as a concept for the very IOs as such. I would argue that a more de-territorialized and “diversified” *Homo Europaeus* still functions as a basic reference system for the structure, the recruitment policies, the organization culture and the institutional “identity” or “management culture” of IOs in general. All the new concepts that have been introduced (gender mainstreaming, best practice, transparency obligations, anti-corruption policies, etc.) have their origin in Western societies. Although an intercultural

“filter” may have modified and adapted these to the international context, the very idea of the ideal IO employee – certainly not always corresponding to reality – is still an internationalized, inter-culturally adept public servant who speaks at least English, has a college degree and is able to “work” efficiently and effectively.

Is the *Homo Europaeus* still the central reference of IOs and their policies, or is it the result of a continuous blending of concepts passed through an “ideological strainer”? While standardization, the *Homo bureaucraticus*, *Homo economicus*, the belief in statistics, etc., have not been challenged fundamentally, in various policy areas non-Western countries have tried to alter the *Homo Europaeus* as the basic concept of man in IO policies. The outline of international organizations has changed, but a modified or “cosmopolitanized” *Homo Europaeus* is still implicitly at the center of their very conception. IO policies, however, have been more contested. Here, a finer “strainer” may have been in use; regarding the fabric of IOs as such, the ideological filter was rather wide-meshed.