

# Europe as a Model in International Relations? Representations of Europe in German and French Political Think Tanks, 1990–2000

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## RESÜMEE

Der Mauerfall ließ außenpolitische Beratungsinstitute in Deutschland und Frankreich nach neuen Deutungsmustern in den internationalen Beziehungen suchen. Der Artikel vergleicht die Europarepräsentationen in vier Institutionen (*Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik*, *Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik*, *Centre d'études et de recherches internationales*, *Institut français des relations internationales*). In den Arbeiten der Einrichtungen, die von 1990 bis 2000 die arabische Welt behandelten, spielen der Maghreb, die Euro-Mediterrane Partnerschaft und damit zusammenhängende Debatten zentrale Rollen. Wie legitimierten Institutsmitglieder hierbei Europa-konzepte? Der Vergleich reicht von gegenseitiger Abhängigkeit bis zum Empire *sans empereur* mit Mittelmeerachse und zeigt gemeinsame Entwicklungen und nationale Spezifika. In den Debatten machte sich eine zunehmende Konzentration auf die EU bemerkbar; die entscheidungsnahen Beratungseliten behielten ihren engen Bezug zu den nationalen Regierungen. Viele Quellen unterstrichen die Herausforderungen im Mittelmeerraum, andere sprachen der jüngsten europäischen Geschichte Modellcharakter zu – Europa wurde zur Handlungsressource.

The end of the Cold War did not usher in the end of history. Particularly with regard to the relations between Europe and the Islamic world, members of French and German political think tanks looked back beyond the age of European imperialism onto a millennium of reciprocal conceptions and developments. Rémy Leveau (1932–2005), an expert on the Maghreb associated with the *Centre d'études et de recherches internationales* (CERI) since the early 1990s and later also with the *Institut français des relations internationales* (IFRI), was also able to bring his reputation to bear in Germany, i.e. in the context of the *Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik* (SWP) and the *Deutsche Gesellschaft*

*für Auswärtige Politik* (DGAP).<sup>1</sup> In a working paper of the SWP, Leveau addressed the field of tension of European policy towards the Islamist movements; in an article for the DGAP he pointed out that dealing with the other had often served as a means to examine one's own, European development.<sup>2</sup>

In light of the scantily reflected upon role of the above-mentioned actors in this field of research, the question arises as to how representations of Europe were used to legitimize or propose particular actions.<sup>3</sup> The analysis draws its sources from various publications and documents from these institutions, which, in a socio-historical sense, can be described as actors of "scientification". This term refers to a process that once again began to change since the mid-1970s, mainly due to "changes in the scientific, political and economic parameters".<sup>4</sup> The working papers, conference reports, magazine articles and other sources under examination are mainly printed texts, of which some were published while others were only accessible for a limited circle of individuals. Questions about representations regard their contents and the contexts in which they were read and composed, disseminated and published. Unlike the subsequent decade, the source material for the 1990s still largely remained dedicated to paper rather than the screen.<sup>5</sup>

How did actors juxtapose the own (European) against the other (non-European) in the process? In the following, the core of the Maghreb – Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia – will be examined as this other. Did members of political think tanks distinguish between these countries, or were they included in a European order of the South-Western Medi-

- 1 The four mentioned institutes provide the case studies for this paper. Obituaries of Leveau exist in both contexts: G. Kepel, *Le Semeur: en hommage à Rémy Leveau*, in: *Politique étrangère*, 70 (2005) 2, 241–242; K. Mohsen-Finan, *Hommage à Rémy Leveau*, in: R. Leveau/K. Mohsen-Finan (Ed.), *Musulmans de France et d'Europe. en partenariat avec l'IFRI*, Paris, 2005, IX–X. The Maghreb expert spent three years in the mid-1990s working out of the French Institute for Social Sciences in Berlin; the Institute was eventually renamed Centre Marc Bloch: E. François, *Das Centre Marc Bloch: Ein Knotenpunkt wissenschaftlicher Forschung und Kommunikation zwischen Frankreich und Deutschland*, in: W. Engler (Ed.), *Frankreich an der Freien Universität: Geschichte und Aktualität. Beiträge zur Ringvorlesung „Frankreich an der Freien Universität, Geschichte und Aktualität“*, Wintersemester 1995/96, Stuttgart, 1997, 57–68.
- 2 The SWP working paper refers to Leveau's role as project manager at the Centre Marc Bloch in Berlin from March 1994 to July 1997. R. Leveau/G. E. Fuller, *Pflegebedürftige Nachbarschaft: Islam und westliche Politik* (SWP-AP, 3050), Ebenhausen, 1997, 9. His contribution made specific mention of Europe's interest in the Muslim world: "Seit gut einem Jahrtausend zeigt Europa – sei es aus Angst oder aus Faszination – ein Interesse an der muslimischen Welt." ["For almost a millennium, Europe shows – be it out of fear or fascination – an interest in the Muslim world."] R. Leveau, *Der Islam – eine Herausforderung für den Westen*, in: *Internationale Politik*, 52 (1997) 8, 25–32, 25.
- 3 This line of inquiry is based on my dissertation: J. Wagner, *Europa das Eigene, der Maghreb das Andere. Europa-repräsentationen in deutschen und französischen Beratungsinstituten, 1990–2000* (Humboldt-Universität Berlin, 2012). The nationally shaped institutes can best be juxtaposed through the different actors located within European-institutional contexts, which already comes to be expressed in references to potentially *diverse representations of Europe* rather than assuming the existence of *one* – institutionally underpinned – *representation of Europe*. Cf. the article by Andreas Weiß in this volume.
- 4 L. Raphael, *Die Verwissenschaftlichung des Sozialen als methodische und konzeptionelle Herausforderung für eine Sozialgeschichte des 20. Jahrhunderts*, in: *Geschichte und Gesellschaft*, 22 (1996), 165–193, 178.
- 5 "From a larger perspective, we must reinscribe the emergence of the printing press in the longterm history of the forms of the book or the supports of texts (from the *volumen* to the *codex*, from the book to the screen) and in the history of reading practices." R. Chartier, *Texts, Printing, Readings*, in: L. A. Hunt (Ed.), *The New Cultural History*, Berkeley, CA 2000, 154–175, 175. Emphasis in the original.

terranean? Representations become disputed in times of upheaval in particular, because we need them to understand the unknown.<sup>6</sup> The period between 1990 and 2000 serves as a suitable timeframe immediately after the end of the Cold War. What were the differences and the similarities between Germany and France; what significance did the expansion of constitutional Europe have at a time which even contemporaries did not consider the “End of History” but quite the opposite?<sup>7</sup>

The article breaks down into five sections. First a concrete actor will serve as an example with which to trace the possibility of points of reference between the German and the French sphere. The context within which the protagonists found themselves in the 1990s and personal or institutional references were shaped will be illustrated by drawing on the example of an eminent expert on the Maghreb. This will be followed by an examination of two exceptional cases of representations of Europe in the given context, which also contain points of reference between the institutes under investigation, namely a) representations of *Europe as a role model* and b) representations of *Europe as Empire*.<sup>8</sup> Fourth, a number of differences between the German and French policy think tanks will be highlighted. Fifth, three conclusions to be drawn from the similarities in the examined context will be presented, before a final summary seeks to determine the value of these findings.

## 1. Institutional Points of Reference

The political consulting scene in Germany and France in the 1990s found itself in a situation of increasing internationalization and Europeanization. While both processes can be understood as closely interconnected, they did not proceed in a linear or uniform manner.<sup>9</sup> In a situation of upheaval, it was possible for networks and alliance to positively affect their consolidation, both on an institutional and personal level, also with regard to representations of Europe and the non-European.

Making references was the simplest means for actors to establish such contacts. For one, such referrals meant comparing one's own particular context with the situation being

6 J. Baberowski, Afterword: Representations of the National on the Fringes of Europe, in: T. Darieva/W. Kaschuba (Ed.), Representations on the Margins of Europe. Politics and Identities in the Baltic and South Caucasian States, Frankfurt a. M./New York 2007, 337–344, 337.

7 Namely as a phase of historical transformation without an end in sight. N. Davies, Europe. A History, Oxford, 1997, 1127–1129. On the thesis of political science concerning the consensus over liberal democracy as a system of government cf. F. Fukuyama, Das Ende der Geschichte. Wo stehen wir?, München, 1992. On the concept of constitutional Europe and its relation to the “civic society”: J. Nielsen-Sikora, Europa der Bürger? Anspruch und Wirklichkeit der europäischen Einigung – eine Spurensuche, Stuttgart 2009, 402.

8 The employment of Europe as a resource for political action and a referential model for a putative European periphery offers interesting parallels to diachronic arguments in Tsarist Russia (cf. Benjamin Beuerle's article in this volume). On the other hand, imperial representations of European communality towards non-Europe played a similar role in other temporal and medial contexts (cf. the article by Christian Methfessel).

9 U. von Hirschhausen/K. K. Patel, Europeanization in History: An Introduction, in: M. Conway/K. K. Patel (Ed.), Europeanization in the Twentieth Century. Historical Approaches, Basingstoke, Hampshire 2010, 1–18.

referenced. On the other hand, there were also transfers of perceptions and bodies of knowledge. Within the reciprocal establishment of these connections, there were similarities and differences between individual actors and institutions. For example, in the working paper mentioned in the introduction, the Maghreb expert Leveau presented case studies on the significance of political Islam and Islamist movements in Algeria, Egypt and Turkey, before proceeding to link Algeria as a Maghreb-state to the Turkish question at the end of his article. The linkage between both lines of argumentation can in part be explained by the audience for which the working paper was intended. As it was aimed at a German readership, the possible expansion of the EU to include Turkey was an issue of particular relevance. The French scholar explicitly addressed a German public, which, like the French public, he claimed was not prepared for questions related to Turkish accession. This would inevitably revive the discussion about the candidacy of the three Maghreb states. In Leveau's view, a southern expansion of this kind would have positive effects in two areas in particular: For one, it would permit immigration and thereby curb radicalization. Furthermore, it would open up the possibility of taking influence on states bordering these countries in the future.<sup>10</sup> The connection between Turkey and the Maghreb meant that this was not just about the perception of random others or a free-floating international relationship. Moreover, such processes of self-description were not independent from regional and international observations – they specifically concerned the Maghreb.

In his concluding remarks, which contained a number of recommendations, Leveau used *the West* and *Europe* interchangeably within the context of the self-representations.<sup>11</sup> He argued that the “Western governments” should participate in promoting the development of regional sub-systems, e.g. in the Maghreb. Among the reasons cited by Leveau to support his argument, he claimed that this would counteract developments “against Europe”.<sup>12</sup> While the EU functioned as a model, criticism towards undemocratic orders was also severely restricted in this case, at times also by means of arguments drawing on historical comparisons. For example, with the regard to the Arab states, the expert wrote that in part they showed “a certain similarity with the enlightened despotism of the 18<sup>th</sup> century or the first half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century in Europe”.<sup>13</sup>

While the challenge of Islam was described as an issue concerning the entire Muslim world in an article by Rémy Leveau that was published in the journal of the DGAP in December, the author nevertheless drew on the examples of Turkey and Algeria under the sub-heading “perspectives”. In light of the upcoming Turkish parliamentary elections and a possible election victory of an Islamist party, Leveau's warning evoked the horrors

10 R. Leveau/G. E. Fuller, *Nachbarschaft* (note 2), 28.

11 The interchangeability of the West and (Western) Europe is not only characteristic for most recent conceptions of the role of Europe among European elites, but also the political debates in the late Tsarist Empire – cf. Benjamin Beuerle's article.

12 *Ibid.*, 30.

13 *Ibid.*, 13.

of the Algerian Civil War.<sup>14</sup> In both contributions to the debate about Europe and the Maghreb, he thus referred to Turkey as an example to underpin his interpretations due to its particular relevance for a German audience.

The representations of links, commonalities and differences were ambivalent for the actors in question, both individuals and organizations. In situations where upheaval or change was interpreted in relation to power, both forms of referencing brought their advantages and disadvantages. On the one hand, it was possible to heighten the reputation of the institute and its members by arguing on an *international* or *inter-sectoral* level, or in a *Europeanized* form. On the other hand, it was important to preserve particular features of distinction.<sup>15</sup>

## 2. Europe as a Disputed Model for Co-Operation, the Economy and Political Reform

The comparison between German and French institutes is insightful, as every culture needs other cultures to gain clarity about its representations.<sup>16</sup> Thus, beyond the initial question regarding Europe as a resource for action, it is necessary to examine the contexts of the objects under investigation and the relationship between representations of the own and the other. As representations of Europe are the common feature (*tertium comparationis*) in this particular comparison, the question arises regarding the role played by developments in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War, which were initiated at the conferences of the European Council in Dublin in the first half of 1990. The heads of state and government sought to “transform the Community from an institution mainly based on economic integration into a union with a political character”, which was also meant to have “a common foreign and security policy”.<sup>17</sup> What was the significance of this pre-ordained expansion of Constitutional Europe, which would come to define the decade? Are there also multiple forms within this expansion and consolidation, as they have already been described with regard to the multiple modernities within the first wave of modernity?<sup>18</sup>

14 Unlike the SWP paper, the article in the journal, which is older than the society itself, was accessible to the public. Leveau, Islam (note 2), 30.

15 Without the historically contingent polemic of Helmut Shelsky, one could speak of a type of *ruling knowledge* [*Herrschaftswissen*] that was to be preserved. Cf. G. Metzler, The Integration of Social Science Expertise Into the Political Process: Did It Actually Happen?, in: E. Kurz-Milcke/G. Gigerenzer (Ed.), *Experts in Science and Society*, New York u. a. 2004, 47–63, 61.

16 J. Baberowski, Afterword (note 6), 337.

17 Quoted in J. Elvert, *Die europäische Integration*, Darmstadt 2006, 120.

18 A historical example for this is found in the differing conceptions of the state on the continent and in Great Britain: “There was the strong homogenizing ‘laicization’ of France, or, in a different vein, of the Lutheran Scandinavian countries, as against the much more consociational and pluralistic arrangements common to Holland and Switzerland, and to a much smaller extent in Great Britain.” S. N. Eisenstadt, Multiple Modernities, in: S. N. Eisenstadt (Ed.), *Multiple Modernities*, New Brunswick, NJ 2002, 1–29, 10.

It is worth drawing attention to a *model within the model* beforehand. German-French cooperation served as a role model for future multilateral projects. Nevertheless, as an observer of such interwoven processes, one should be cautious of assuming a given automatism between close relations in a given area of society and political co-operation.<sup>19</sup> A closer examination of the examples enumerated below reveals that while Europe often featured as a role model, particular emphasis was placed on the German-French partnership within Europe itself. This interpretive pattern is steeped in a longer tradition, considering that Charles de Gaulle and Konrad Adenauer provided the legal foundation for a special relationship with the signing of the Élysée Treaty in 1963.<sup>20</sup> On the other hand, one could also begin to see clearly the multitude of national perspectives regarding different visions of a European future. The examples for representations of Europe will be analyzed in chronological order and not according to institutes so as to provide a better impression of the course of the discussion between 1990 and 2000.

Economic interweaving is one particular representation which, at a first glance, denied thinking in models and imitation/emulation. At a second glance, it becomes apparent that drawing connections between Europe and the Maghreb could imply both a stronger and a weaker side. In 1991, the political scientist Dieter Senghaas defined a model for the international division of labour and underlined the necessity for purposeful assistance from Western Europe; Eastern Europe was in need of capital (from the West) and an export market (in the East).<sup>21</sup> Senghaas had previously pointed out economic similarities between North-African Mediterranean accession candidates and Eastern Europe after it opened up to the West following the political upheavals.<sup>22</sup> But Senghaas' model only seemed to apply to the Maghreb with regard to aid from Western Europe, as the market potential of the Soviet Union – or, in case of “the Soviet Union's dismemberment”, Russia<sup>23</sup> – was not present to an equal measure in the Maghreb states.

Whenever there was talk of Europe as a model for reforms – i.e. processes of democratization – spatial perceptions came into play.<sup>24</sup> The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), whose positive effect on the largely peaceful end of the Cold War has been highlighted, presented a model for a similarly structured common political space around the Mediterranean region in the early 1990s.<sup>25</sup> The Munich-based politi-

19 H. Kaelble, Die sozialen und kulturellen Beziehungen Frankreichs und Deutschlands seit 1945, in: Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte (2003) 20.01.2003, 40–46, 46.

20 M. Sutton, France and the Construction of Europe, 1944–2007: The Geopolitical Imperative, New York/Oxford 2007, 4.

21 D. Senghaas, Europa, quo vadis? Neue Aufgaben für eine Politik der Friedensgestaltung (SWP-AP, 2679), Ibid., 1991, 50–51.

22 Ibid., 48–49.

23 Ibid., 48.

24 U. Engel/M. Middell, Bruchzonen der Globalisierung, globale Krisen und Territorialitätsregimes – Kategorien einer Globalgeschichtsschreibung, in: Comparativ, 15 (2005) 5/6, 5–38, 15–16.

25 The CSCE model for the Mediterranean ultimately failed for a number of reasons. These included the disparity amongst the partners, the so-called Gulf Crisis in August 1990 and an increasingly comprehensive spatial conception of the Mediterranean. A. Jünemann, Europas Mittelmeerpolitik im regionalen und globalen Wandel: Interessen und Zielkonflikte, in: W. Zippel (Ed.), Die Mittelmeerpolitik der EU, Baden-Baden 1999, 29–63, 43–45.

cal scientist Mir A. Ferdowsi wrote an article for the spring 1992 edition of the journal *Europa-Archiv* about the proposal to summon a conference for the Mediterranean region to deal with this issue; this would open up the possibility for a common political space.<sup>26</sup> Spatial perceptions also played a role when parallels were drawn between the East and the South; at the IFRI, which conceived of itself as an exceptional forum, German diplomats and politicians also drafted plans for Europe. Wolfgang Ischinger pointed out the importance of continued German-French cooperation for a political Europe. Regardless of the necessary weight for an expansion towards the East, Germany would have to make sure not to neglect France's close ties to the Mediterranean region – both would need to seek stability there together.<sup>27</sup> Ischinger thus challenged the position of seeing national projections at work at the southern periphery in particular, and also spoke out against neglecting the model of Europe as a *Global P(l)ayer*, which should underline its claims on the world stage through its common responsibility towards all border regions.

A Maghreb expert of the DGAP, Hartmut Kistenfeger, combined two concepts to devise a model in a 1994 assessment of the Arabian Maghreb Union (UMA). His recommendations regarding the relations between European states and the Maghreb Union clearly showed that cooperation should also have a positive impact on European structures.<sup>28</sup> The European structures, on the other hand, were implicitly exemplary for the Maghreb Union; Tunisia in particular had hoped for supranationality:

*It was the intention of Algeria and Morocco to give shape and stability to their dialogue by institutionalizing the Maghreb Union. Tunisia's hopes for a European Union-like structuring of the Union were dashed.*<sup>29</sup>

As a guest speaker at the IFRI in Paris, and out of a wholly different political context, the politician Jean-Pierre Chevènement argued in favour of opening up the European model towards the Mediterranean region.<sup>30</sup> Rather than Christianity, he considered the category of *laïcité* to be of greater importance; furthermore, it would be a geographical

26 The author cited a "strategy paper" of the Europe research group working under the supervision of Werner Weidenfeld, who became editor of the DGAP-journal from 1995 onwards. M. A. Ferdowsi, Die KSZE als Modell? Möglichkeiten und Grenzen der Anwendung in der Dritten Welt, in: *Europa-Archiv*, 47 (1992), 76–83, 76.

27 "[...] les Etats méditerranéens – actuels principaux bénéficiaires des fonds de solidarité –, peu enthousiastes par crainte de perdre leurs avantages, ont besoin à tout prix d'un interlocuteur. La France, à moitié méditerranéenne, s'avère la plus à même de répondre à leurs inquiétudes et favoriser la vocation globale de l'Europe. En effet, si l'aventure européenne se joue désormais à l'Est, il ne faut cependant pas ignorer les problèmes de stabilité dans la région méditerranéenne." A. Bonraisin, Conférence de M. Wolfgang Ischinger. La France et l'Allemagne dans la nouvelle Europe, 20 janvier 1994, in: IFRI conférences (1994) Dezember/Januar 1993/1994. Ischinger was head of planning in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in late 1993/early 1994.

28 "Maghreb und Golf nehmen unter den Interessen der deutschen Außenpolitik einen eher untergeordneten Rang ein. Deutsche Außenpolitik gegenüber den arabischen Staaten vollzieht sich fast immer im europäischen Rahmen. Es würde die Europäische Union stärken, wenn Deutschland sich intensiver der Probleme und Entwicklungen der beiden Regionen annähme." H. Kistenfeger, Maghreb-Union und Golf. Regionale Kooperation in der arabischen Welt, Bonn 1994, 187.

29 Ibid., 188. The quotation can be found in the English abstract of the publication.

30 A.-L. Jolivet, Conférence de M. Jean-Pierre Chevènement. La France et la Méditerranée : pour une diplomatie laïque, 2 mai 1995, in: IFRI conférences (1995) April/Mai 1995. He had already given a similar talk in 1992. Within the post-Maastricht context the IFRI scholar summarized Chevènement's talk from a related perspective (in

necessity to remain a key player in the Mediterranean region instead of pursuing an exclusively European dimension.<sup>31</sup>

A French-National interpretation was able to assert itself in connection with the Maghreb issue, which established a difference between the Mediterranean region (making particular mention of Algeria) and the European core. Even a critic of Maastricht such as Chevènement conceived of Europe as a role-model for the Mediterranean region, albeit paired with typically French models such as *laïcité*.<sup>32</sup> The demands for a strategy tailored towards the geographical conditions of the Mediterranean region exhibit a representation of Europe that differed from the notion of a small Europe. Along with Chevènement, Thierry de Montbrial, director of the IFRI and commentator for the conservative daily *Le Figaro*, was among the voices that also championed the French tradition in economic policy, perhaps not as vehemently, but certainly with verve.<sup>33</sup>

By the mid-1990s, Post-Maastricht-Europe<sup>34</sup> also gained in importance in German policy think tanks. After the re-conception of the in-house journal of the DGAP, which was now published under the name *Internationale Politik*, the new editor Werner Weidenfeld entered the debate. He posed the question of how Europe would shape its “southern flank” in the future. Europe would need to face the demands for European developmental aid, a just social order and the accommodation of cultures.<sup>35</sup> The article contained a detailed graphical depiction of European institutions;<sup>36</sup> the text was characteristic of a European self-conception that caused institutional differences to fade into the background by means of a seemingly definite representation. Weidenfeld thus spoke of Europe rather than individual organizations or states in the comparisons and requirements he discussed.

terms of context). Cf. J. Paolini, Conférence de Jean-Pierre Chevènement. L'identité de la France dans le monde de l'après-Yalta, 17 mars 1992, in: IFRI conférences (1992) April/Mai 1992.

31 “Pour Jean-Pierre Chevènement, l'évolution historique de la France conduit à définir sa diplomatie par rapport à la notion de laïcité, plutôt que par rapport à l'idée de chrétienté. La France a, par sa position géographique, une vocation d'ouverture sur la Méditerranée, donc vers l'Afrique et l'Orient. [...] Principale puissance de la Méditerranée, il serait dangereux pour la France de s'enfermer dans une dimension purement européenne, comme elle tend à le faire.” Jolivet, Conférence (note 30).

32 On laïcité as a French particularity in modernity see the aforementioned quote by Eisenstadt regarding the difference between the British Isles and continental Europe. S. N. Eisenstadt, Multiple Modernities (note 18), 10.

33 This also happened in order to strengthen Europe's role towards the United States and Japan. J.-H. Meyer, *The European Public Sphere. Media and Transnational Communication in European Integration 1969–1991*, Stuttgart 2010, 269.

34 Sutton justifiably views the concept of Post-Maastricht-Europe in close relation to the concept of Post-Yalta-Europe, as both reach beyond the dimension of the longtime successfully propagated formula *la construction européenne*. M. Sutton, France (note 20), 276–326.

35 W. Weidenfeld, Ernstfall Europa. Der Kontinent braucht konzeptionelle Klarheit, in: *Internationale Politik*, 50 (1995) 1, 11–19, 14.

36 The map listed the various membership structures of the EU, Western European Union (WEU), the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), the Council of Europe etc. The expansion of the community treaties to include a “common defence” policy and the association to the WEU was a triumphant success for German-French diplomacy. French President Mitterand's proposal for a European Confederation was essentially a spinoff of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE), albeit without Canada and the USA. This proposal ultimately led to a Paris Charter for a New Europe (November 1990), which in turn initiated the process towards the transformation of the CSCE into the OSCE (1994). M. Sutton, France (note 20), 266, 254.



A similar line of argumentation is found in an article on the Middle East that appeared soon thereafter, although in this particular case the main focus was on the self-image which implied that the integrative project of Europe in the shape of the EU could be positively implemented elsewhere. More to the point: EU-Europe was recommended as a model example. Aside from this representation of interweaving, Weidenfeld also came to address the highly distinctive role of the EU: Both in terms of Mediterranean policy as well as the question of identity, realism and orientation towards the future would have to be applied to an equal degree. Mediterranean policy was thus closely linked to future designs for a Union that was to become ever more closely connected. Against the backdrop of the prospect of progress in the Middle East peace process at the time, the Mediterranean came to be viewed as a single entity.<sup>37</sup>

The Barcelona Conference in late November 1995 marked a turning point with regard to conceptions of Europe as a role model for the Maghreb. By announcing elaborate and extensive goals for political, economic and social development, the European participants at this diplomatic event opened up a new avenue for debate, which included discussions surrounding Europe as an exemplary model. After a lengthy phase in which the Maghreb's co operational deficits<sup>38</sup> were examined less thoroughly, numerous SWP-publications dealt with this issue again after the Barcelona Conference. This can be explained by the institute's desire to partake in the dialogue on questions concerning cooperation and development. Papers which directly referred to economic developments in the Mediterranean region tended to focus on the Arab states and their position towards Israeli concepts. For example, in a working paper, Volker Perthes analyzed economic cooperation in the entire Arab region, and subsumed the North-African states under the term Middle East.<sup>39</sup> The Maghreb did not remain completely unconsidered, however, particularly when the Arab world was juxtaposed with the European Union. This became apparent in the area of economic cooperation, for example in the exchange of labour: Workers from the Maghreb tended to migrate to Europe in far greater numbers than to Arab states, and inner-Arabian migration for the Maghreb was not recorded.<sup>40</sup> The regional integration of the Maghreb countries – though European integration was not always explicitly mentioned as a model example – was increasingly viewed as an area with deficits in the papers of the SWP. In his assessment of the “economic and socio-economic

37 W. Weidenfeld, *Der neue Nahe Osten*, in: *Internationale Politik*, 50 (1995) 7, 1–2. This had previously become more common, as in the case of the Commission member Peter M. Schmidhuber. P. M. Schmidhuber, *Finanzpolitische Konsequenzen der Weiterentwicklung der Europäischen Gemeinschaften*, in: *Europa-Archiv*, 46 (1991), 487–492.

38 The implicit backwardness of the Maghreb within this representation formed an example for the problems of the entire Arab world. References not only to the Maghrebian but also the Mashreq countries in the Eastern Mediterranean were promoted through the Barcelona Declaration, which included both south-eastern and south-western neighbours.

39 V. Perthes, *Arab Economic Cooperation: A Critical View from Outside* (KA-SWP, 2943), Ebenhausen, 1996, 5.

40 *Ibid.*, 10–11. Labour migration was charted by means of a graphical representation which, aside from the Maghreb states Marrocco, Algeria and Tunesia, also included Mauretania and Libya, both members of the Maghreb Union (the graph indicated inward labour migration for Libya).

exchange”, Perthes concluded that one could only speak of regional integration in the Arab East, as there was no Maghreb state that exhibited a significant level of integration into its “Arab environment”.<sup>41</sup> Time and again, the peace process between Israel and the Arab states took centre stage in his texts, which also shone through in his assessment of inner-Arabian economic relations. In his concluding remarks, Perthes pointed out two arguments in conjunction with the peace process: for one, there were fears that Israel would be a divisive economic power in the Arab world in a new order of the region and thus separate the Arabian Mashreq from the Maghreb. Secondly, peace between Israel and the Arab world would be a necessary prerequisite for regional cooperation.<sup>42</sup> While the above-mentioned example certainly was hopeful in its outlook on the prospects for peace, the EU nevertheless appeared as the royal road behind the backdrop of the status quo and lacking economic integration. Perthes compared the average foreign trade ratio between individual EU member states (60 percent) against the statistically much lower amount between Arab states.<sup>43</sup> Security interests were another point where striking differences between the “soft” interests of the northern states and the “hard” interests of the southern states in the Mediterranean region were cited.<sup>44</sup>

In the area of security policy, this contrast was explicitly mentioned in conjunction with the project of a Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP), i.e. cooperation between EU-Europeans and the *other* Mediterranean neighbours. This antagonism was almost given more weight than that between Americans and Israelis and Arab conceptions of the future Middle East, which were also discussed. German and French representations of Europe could also be viewed as antagonistic, however, given their different paths of historical development.

### 3. Empire as Model?

Institute members also tended to approach the issue of relations between Europe and the Maghreb from a perspective that related to the Community. In French publications and texts there was not only talk of spaces, but also explicit references to empire. An essay by IFRI scholar Philippe Moreau Defarges on the EU that appeared in 1997 concluded with reflections on strategic and political developments in the Mediterranean region, and also dealt with the purported Europe-relatedness of Russia and the United States in

41 Ibid., 13.

42 Ibid., 24–25.

43 Ibid., 7.

44 “Der KSZE-Prozeß mag Europäern als gutes Modell erscheinen; der größere Teil der arabischen Führungseliten indessen hält schon den Gedanken an eine Übertragung dieses Modells für gefährlich: In ihren Augen steht es vor allem für die Unterminierung und für den Zusammenbruch der sozialistischen Regime Osteuropas, deren Schicksal sie ungern teilen möchten. Stabile nächstliche Arrangements werden sich aber nur treffen lassen, wenn die regionalen Führungseliten sie tragen und dabei auch ihre Sicherheitsinteressen gewahrt sehen.“ Id., Auf dem Weg zum Frieden? Elemente einer nächstlichen Sicherheitsarchitektur, in: Internationale Politik, 54 (1999) 7, 1–10, 10.

passing.<sup>45</sup> If we call into mind the ways in which Europe came to be used as an argument in the Russian reform debates examined by Benjamin Beuerle in this volume, references to historic or contemporary “civilized” states or regions seem to be steeped in a longer tradition. As Andreas Weiß demonstrates, the ideas of *realpolitik* in Europe (multipolar world) and the United States (imperial superpower) drifted apart after the end of the Cold War. Moreau Defarges however spoke of an empire without an emperor:

*L'Europe émerge dans la nuit du haut Moyen-Age, sur les ruines de l'Empire romain. Pendant des siècles, jusqu'aux deux guerres mondiales, elle ne cesse d'être hantée par cet Empire, sorte d'âge d'or à restaurer, quelques-uns (de Charlemagne à Charles Quint, de Napoléon à Hitler) imaginant de le reconstituer et finalement se brisant contre la résistance des Etats, des peuples. Au moment où ces ambitions semblent irrémédiablement anéanties et confisquées par d'autres empires, américain, russe – eux aussi obsédés par Rome –, voici que l'Europe, en s'unifiant, réinvente un Empire sans empereur et se trouve conduite à retrouver l'aire géographique de la Rome antique avec, pour l'axe, la Méditerranée.*<sup>46</sup>

Writing for the IFRI, Philippe Moreau Defarges made a prediction regarding this particular case that was similar to the one by Alain Minc in the early 1990s. Yet Moreau Defarges explicitly advocated a return to the Mediterranean, while in the summary of Minc's statement this merely resonated implicitly in the *empire* concept.<sup>47</sup> In contrast to Minc, the IFRI expert alluded to the *Imperium Romanum*. A possible explanation lies in the historical character of the Roman Empire.<sup>48</sup> Thinking in terms of spheres of influence and imperial dimensions had already featured in the French President Francois Mitterrand's plans for a confederation in January 1994 and the purported German plans for Eastern Europe.<sup>49</sup>

45 P. Moreau Defarges, *L'Union européenne: la fédération-nébuleuse*, Paris, 1997, 59. The term “nébuleuse” (originally employed within the context of astronomy to describe star clusters) came to be used for the description of human groups in scholarly circles that considered themselves part of the *Annales*-tradition of Bloch, Febvre and Braudel. P. Burke, *Die Geschichte der Annales. Die Entstehung der neuen Geschichtsschreibung*, Aktual. und um ein Nachw. erw. Neuaufl., Berlin, 2004, 147. Reflections on the role of political think tanks in the case of developments in the United States could also be found in France, cf. S. Boucher/M. Royo, *Les think tanks. Cerveaux de la guerre des idées*, Paris 2006, 13–28.

46 P. Moreau Defarges, *Fédération-nébuleuse* (note 45), 60.

47 C. Risset-Hemad, *Conférence de M. Alain Minc. Le retour du Moyen-Âge*, 24 november 1993, in: IFRI conférences (1993) Oktober/November 1993. The talk coincided with the book's publication. A. Minc, *Le nouveau Moyen Âge*, Paris, 1993.

48 In this region in particular, the *Imperium Romanum* did not feature a so-called barbarian border. H. Münkler, *Barbaren und Dämonen: Die Konstruktion des Fremden in Imperialen Ordnungen*, in: J. Baberowski, H. Kaelble/J. Schriewer (Ed.), *Selbstbilder und Fremdbilder. Repräsentation sozialer Ordnungen im Wandel*, Frankfurt a. M., New York, 2008, 153–189, 173–177.

49 He said to a select group of journalists, though his own interest in a confederation may have contributed to enhancing the inherent antagonisms: “As to the Germans, basically, they want a confederation, but for their own purposes. Their only thought is to reconstitute a sort of Austro-Hungarian Empire by reinforcing their domain in *Mitteleuropa* with Poland, Hungary, Bohemia and Slovakia, and Ukraine, as well as with Slovenia and Croatia. For this reason my confederation was a substitute for their imperialist ambition. Kohl was saying: ‘Why share the decisions about the future of these countries when they fall into our sphere, that belonging to the Germans?’”

When it came to the question of the model within the model, i.e. the role of German-French co-operation within European contexts, changes of government on a national level provided important points of fixation. Shortly after the change of government in Germany in 1998, Karl Kaiser (Director of the research institute DHAP) came to speak at the IFRI. His talk highlighted the circumstance that there were different concepts in France and Germany of how to approach the new balance of power in the post Cold War world. According to the summary report, Kaiser also came to address the new German government's position regarding the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). The Schröder Government intended to strengthen the European defence identity as well as co-operation between the EU and the WEU. However, Kaiser argued that Joschka Fischer's vision of a European power of new proportions" could come into conflict with the French concept of a more classical power-political approach.<sup>50</sup>

Whereas the assessments of economic integration and Europe's role as a model example in these processes generally tended to be positive at the beginning of the examined period, more critical voices began to multiply as a result of the raised expectations following the Barcelona Declaration. A CERI paper from 1998 is of particular relevance in this context. With a kind of "call for empire" the Maghreb countries were said to have compelled the Commission in Brussels in particular to consider a predominantly economic relationship with the region promising.<sup>51</sup> By citing the "appels d'Empire" the authors alluded to a book by the scholar Ghassan Salamé that appeared in 1996.<sup>52</sup> In this study, the eminent scholar sought to demonstrate a renationalization of security policy and simultaneously accord real-political foundations to the calls for empire, both in those countries demanding intervention as well as in the power centres capable of intervention.<sup>53</sup> As is highlighted by Christian Methfessel's article in this volume, it was also possible to find common ground in Europeanness despite distinctive representations, for example of empire, at the beginning of the twentieth century. The CERI paper substantiated the real-political interest of a "common space of peace and stability",<sup>54</sup> especially for the Maghreb countries:

Zit. n. M. Sutton, France (note 20), 312–313. Emphasis in the original.

50 "[...] la vision d'une puissance européenne développée par le ministre des Affaires étrangères allemand, Joschka Fischer, autour du concept d'autolimitation du pouvoir' [...]" D. Mugnier, Conférence de M. Karl Kaiser. La politique étrangère de l'Allemagne, 2 décembre 1998, in: IFRI conférences (1999) März 1999.

51 B. Hibou/L. Martinez, Le Partenariat euro-maghrébin: un mariage blanc ? (Les Études du CERI, 47 der Gesamtfolge), Paris, 1998, 6.

52 G. Salamé, Appels d'empire. Ingérences et résistances à l'âge de la mondialisation, Paris, 1996. Salamé was tied to the CERI himself.

53 On France, Salamé for example wrote with regard to the calls for interference: "Ces appels à l'ingérence musclée se marient avec une *Realpolitik* qui, plutôt que de se référer à quelque sentiment humanitaire, prône le recours à la force pour préserver les intérêts occidentaux dans le monde. En France, la 'menace islamiste' ou le sens des 'responsabilités particulières de la France en Afrique' en ont parfois été à l'origine." Ibid., 14. Emphasis in the original.

54 Europäische Kommission, Erklärung von Barcelona und Arbeitsprogramm, in: Bulletin der Europäischen Union, 1995, 153–164, 154.

*Dans ce contexte, on peut comprendre l'intérêt des signataires de ce Partenariat. Cet "appel d'Empire" exprime les craintes d'une marginalisation accrue de ces Etats et de la balkanisation de la rive Sud de la Méditerranée. L'idée d'instaurer une "zone de paix et de stabilité" ne peut que séduire les Etats du Maghreb qui cherchent désespérément à se distinguer du Moyen-Orient, comme l'attestent les réflexions sur un possible découplage Est/Ouest dans l'application des accords de Barcelone.<sup>55</sup>*

As this example illustrates, the authors worked with the assumption of a conceptual trap: A simplifying image of relations and orders in the Mediterranean region, which drew upon historical lines of development and was said to be reinforced in a kind of complicity between elites in Brussels and other capitals of the states involved. Following the generalist Salamé, the new generation of CERI members inverted the idea of empire, according to which the Maghreb states at the periphery compelled the central European states to adopt a model that ran counter to the representations of Europe espoused by Hibou and Martinez.<sup>56</sup> With their trenchant critique, the authors provide an ideal segue into the differing viewpoints in the case studies.

#### 4. Institutional Differences

Regarding the differences between the institutes in Germany and France, with particular focus on the unpublished texts, publications, events etc., it becomes apparent that every institute can be broken down into a multitude of individual actors. Not least the claim to scientificity and thus the claim to academic freedom speak for this individual view. Moreover, the lack of uniformity with regard to the source material – neither in the respective countries nor within each institute – represents a normal situation in historical comparative terms.<sup>57</sup> In this sense, when tracing institutional differences and commonalities, the results are bound to remain a mere approximation based on an interpretation of this polyphony. There are nonetheless factors which speak for retaining this institutional perspective, such as the hierarchies among various groups of protagonists. Directors for example could exert more influence by means of publication-related decisions, prefaces etc. than other institute members, also in fields far removed from their own particular area of expertise.<sup>58</sup> Furthermore, certain trends and tendencies can be made

55 B. Hibou/L. Martinez, *Partenariat* (note 51), 6.

56 The most substantial thesis to emerge from the discussions concerning these issues in the political sciences is the thesis of a neo-medieval empire, which established parallels between premodern forms of governance and the governing practices of the EU: "The rise of a neo-medieval empire does not need to herald the end of European integration. On the contrary, such an empire seems to be better suited than a Westphalian state to meeting some of the basic aims of integration. I have tried to show that a neo-medieval empire is in a good position to cope with the pressures of globalization because of its inbuilt flexibility and ability to learn." J. Zielonka, *Europe as Empire. The Nature of the Enlarged European Union*, Oxford 2006, 189.

57 H. Kaelble, *Der historische Vergleich. Eine Einführung zum 19. und 20. Jahrhundert*, Frankfurt a. M./New York 1999, 148.

58 For example, regarding the position of the Director of the SWP and the personnel matter of Stürmer, the political scientist Winand Gellner wrote: "Die heftig diskutierte Berufung des ehemaligen Kanzlerberaters Michael

more plausible by examining various publications produced by three institutes; finally the comparison between various institutes also serves to distinguish between overarching trends and individual developments.

In the texts of the SWP for example, the Maghreb was considered an important part of the Mediterranean region – the most important when it came to matters of migration – and was regularly characterized as a field of experimentation for a European Mediterranean Policy. Moreover, the arguments of the SWP members took a wide range of security-related aspects into consideration. They came to distinguish between more classical scenarios dominated by strategic military deliberations, and *softer* aspects such as migration or human rights violations (one example here was the situation in the most important Maghreb state, Algeria). Self-representations towards the Maghreb nevertheless remained closely tied up with security related issues. As has been mentioned, in light of the efforts of coming to terms with the end of the Cold War – which had also taken the experts by surprise – and the new perspectives in development policy and developmental co-operation, it came to a broader discussion within the institute regarding its own role and the role of others in the international order.

In many cases, a critique of and scepticism towards the sincerity of the rhetoric of responsibility within the EU is clearly recognizable among SWP authors. Volker Perthes, an expert on the Middle East, was an important advocate of a more critical perspective.<sup>59</sup> For one, this critique confirmed that the EU was of exceptional importance in the relations between Europe and the Maghreb, or that it had come to attain this role of importance. Secondly, it belonged to the advisory work of the experts, who criticized current and past circumstances in order to suggest future improvements. The SWP in Germany was the number one address when it came to practical security-related considerations related to Euro-Maghreb relations.<sup>60</sup>

In both the texts published and the events hosted by the DGAP over the course of the 1990s, the Mediterranean policy was conceptualized as a common area of interest among the member states of the European institutions time and again. Within this context the institutional diversity was summarized under the cipher *Europe* – similar in some cases to the Maghreb and the Middle East being referred to as the *Mediterranean*.<sup>61</sup> The portrayal

Stürmer zum Nachfolger von [Klaus] Ritter verdeutlichte, daß auch Ebenhausen [also die SWP, J. W.] nicht völlig frei von parteipolitischen Absichten und Interessen ist." ["The intense discussion surrounding the appointment of the former advisor to the Chancellor, Michael Stürmer, as the successor of Ritter made it apparent that Ebenhausen [i.e. the SWP, J. W.] is not completely free from party-political intentions and interests either."] W. Gellner, Ideenagenturen für Politik und Öffentlichkeit. Think Tanks in den USA und in Deutschland, Opladen 1995, 172.

59 Quite explicitly in V. Perthes, Ist der Barcelona-Prozeß der Nukleus für gemeinsame Sicherheit?, in: P. Pasch (Ed.), Sicherheit und Zusammenarbeit zwischen Europa und den Ländern des Nahen und Mittleren Ostens. Internationale Konferenz, 19. Juni 1998, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Bonn, Bonn 1999, 12–21.

60 This was also due to the personnel-related pre-eminence of the SWP in the area of expert information, which during the period of inquiry was only matched by a Hamburg based institute, the German Overseas Institute (now called German Institute of Global and Area Studies). Gespräch mit J. Rogalski, G. Weiher, Büro SWP, (4.8.2011).

61 Cf. the supplement "Brennpunkt Mittelmeer" ["Hot Spot Mediterranean"] to the DGAP-Journal Internationale Politik. Therein e.g. W. Weidenfeld, Herausforderung Mittelmeer, in: Internationale Politik, 51 (1996) 2, 1–2.

of the Mediterranean Policy as a common interest of constitutional Europe came to be represented in a number of variations in the publications of the DGAP. Three particular manifestations predominated: *firstly* the embedding of the Maghreb in this interest-based Mediterranean Policy, *secondly* a responsibility towards the region, and *thirdly* intense discussions during the months in which peace in the Middle East appeared to be within reach as well as around the time of the Barcelona Declaration in November 1995.

Within the DGAP, whose structure had been conceptualized as more of a forum, the Germany-France complex was accorded greater importance than within the SWP.<sup>62</sup> DGAP members and guests, but also politicians and journalists referred to the Mediterranean time and again with the frame of three European particularities during the examined period. Firstly, in connection with the supranational and potentially federative future structure of constitutional Europe. Secondly, when it came to processes of delimitation – particularly towards the United States. And thirdly, concerning the expansion of European institutions provided an occasion to consider setting limits to the European project of integration. On the whole, representations of a completed European project were increasingly strengthened through these different factors. The DGAP had a strong German-French emphasis, which left an indelible mark both in terms of personnel as well as in the discussions concerning Europe and the Maghreb within the institutional framework.

The CERI provides an example for how a regional-scientific bias had ceased to be *en vogue*. Regarding the question of the extent to which constitutional Europe played a role as an actor in CERI scholarship on the Maghreb, there was a notable increase with the development of the EU in particular. There is also evidence of an increased focus on the Maghreb's relations to South-European states or constitutional Europe as a whole; there were internal conflicts which were withheld from the public.<sup>63</sup> For example, CERI members would come to define the role of Europe (or Southern Europe) by assuming that European investors in the Maghreb would provide the impulse for qualitative improvements. Indeed, the authors often implicitly addressed the unequal level of commitment within the Community; explicit juxtapositions of the various interests in the East and South were much rarer, however. Rémy Leveau certainly made this distinction between German and French interests – not without offering a solution with France as the intermediary.<sup>64</sup>

Of course not all assessments of the European projects were positive – criticism was often combined with praise –, and yet when viewed from a different perspective, the internal

62 This was not least due to the initiative of the head of the German-French workgroup at the DGAP, the France historian Ingo Kolboom. I. Kolboom (Ed.), *Deutschland und Frankreich im neuen Europa. Referate – Berichte – Dokumente*. Berlin, Reichstag, 28.–30. Mai 1990, Bonn 1991.

63 For an example of internal conflicts over a European vs. global orientation of the institute see CERI, *Extrait du Compte rendu de la réunion du Conseil de laboratoire du 16 mai 1994*, in: CERI (Ed.), *Rapport scientifique*. Juin 1994–Juin 1996, Paris 1996.

64 R. Leveau, *L'Algérie au-delà de l'élection présidentielle, Réflexion – Notre collaborateur Rémy Leveau essaie de dégager des perspectives d'avenir pour le dossier algérien*, in: *La Croix*, (16.11.1995).



reports in particular show how the CERI leadership and individual scholars increasingly began to devote their attention to projects from Brussels in the West-Mediterranean or within the context of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP). One representation of Europe in the Maghreb region was that of a role to be criticized; this representation of Europe, which casts the EU in the role of an ambivalent actor in the Euro-Maghreb relationship, featured most prominently in the working paper on the “partenariat euro-maghrébin”.<sup>65</sup> It is closely associated with the assessments of the CERI’s Director, Jean-François Bayart, as well as with Béatrice Hibou and Luis Martínez, who received funding from Bayart and later became CERI members themselves. In terms of the sharpness in tone and poignancy of the attacks, these analyses differed from similar criticism as it was practiced in other institutes – with regard to the attacks on the network of the Euro Mediterranean Study Commission (EuroMeSCo) they were unique. This is not particularly surprising, considering that all other examined institutes were among the founding members of this network. Thus during the late 1990s CERI, arguing from the theoretical background of international political economy,<sup>66</sup> was harshest in its criticism of the EU as the most essential European actor.

Since the IFRI had come to establish itself as a gathering place for political actors and consultants, there were numerous points of contact, not only to other experts from the Paris microcosm (including the CERI) but also to other German institutes and circles with an interest in foreign policy. Representations emphasizing Europe’s responsibility towards the periphery also came to be employed in other institutional contexts, however the IFRI often also became more explicit when it concerned the responsibility of Western Europe towards the Maghreb. Furthermore, the point of view adopted by the speakers and IFRI members differed from the one of their German counterparts in their respective institutes. From the perspective required by this particular Parisian forum – the German actors were certainly not excluded in the process – French relations to the Maghreb and to Germany tended to remain separate areas of policy. Whereas there had already been instances in the early 1990s where both issues came to be discussed simultaneously – these could be considered both German-French as well as German-French-Maghrebian – in the German institutes, it would take until the Barcelona Process for the IFRI to follow suit. Besides this, the special role played by Italian partners in the creation of a network which predominantly focused on security policy matters and gained in importance as a result of the Europe Mediterranean Partnership (EMP), also becomes apparent in the statements relating to the Mediterranean.<sup>67</sup> The IFRI represented the strongest paradiplomatic actor in the relations between Europe and the Maghreb; the type of argumentation employed here was similar to the one on the official diplomatic

65 B. Hibou/L. Martínez, *Partenariat* (note 51).

66 International political economy places particular emphasis on the interplay between economic and political power. U. Lehmkuhl, *Theorien internationaler Politik. Einführung und Texte*, 3., erg. Aufl., München 2001, 308.

67 The Barcelona Conference brought the Iberian peninsula to the foreground in this regard. The institute newsletter for instance pointed out the foundation of the *Euro-Mediterranean Study Commission* (EuroMeSCo) in Portugal. M. Chartouni-Dubarry, *Autour de partenariat euro-méditerranéen*, in: IFRI informations (1997) April 1997.



stage – a circumstance which above all can be traced back to the influence of the IFRI's director, who had previously been head of strategic planning in the Foreign Ministry. Aside from these differences, whether they were financially related or pertaining to size or content, there were also common trends in all four examined institutions during the period in question.

## 5. Common Institutional Features

What catches the eye is that every institute and research centre mentioned the Maghreb in connection with new European developments. A variety of institutional options defined the debate. As its member states moved in the direction of a constitutional Europe, the EU and its initiative became an integral part of a European self-conception that placed emphasis on a common policy towards the Maghreb. The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) played a key role in this regard. Together with the *Euro-Mediterranean Study Commission* (EuroMeSCo), it acted as a network that decisively contributed to the growing interest of national think tanks in the EU's Mediterranean policy, as well as strategic positions towards institutions that specialized in the Mediterranean region or had been newly founded in the course of developments on a European level. All institutes increasingly concentrated on the EU as an actor, while the experts linked distinctions between their own and the other (third parties or states) with the changes denoted by *Maastricht* and *Schengen*. In the case studies, changing representations of Europe *spatialized* the political entity which claimed the term Europe for itself.<sup>68</sup> This was not a static, but rather a dynamic process, which can be observed in all examined case studies, even within the relatively short timespan of ten years. The EU and its initiatives could serve as models. This also applied to additional EU-like systems surrounding the EU, as well as the institutional treatment of complex structures.

Furthermore, in all the cases under examination, inner-European agreements, economic relations and questions of belonging defined representations of Europe in dealings with non-Europeans or the European periphery. What these dynamics thus had in common was that they were in a field of tension towards the national agenda.<sup>69</sup> Nevertheless, it is possible to trace a general trend on the development of representations in all four examined institutes. Their actions indicate an increase in divisive representations of Europe. Put simply, in an open situation of transformations, the Maghreb could be imagined as a future field of action, both for the EU member states as well as the research institutes

68 Cf. H. Siegrist, Perspektiven der vergleichenden Geschichtswissenschaft. Gesellschaft, Kultur und Raum, in: H. Kaelble/J. Schriewer (Ed.), Vergleich und Transfer. Komparatistik in den Sozial-, Geschichts- und Kulturwissenschaften, Frankfurt a. M./New York 2003, 305–339, 321.

69 This observation does not only apply in the German or French context. In more detail J. Grußendorf/A. Weiß, Europarepräsentationen. Spanien, Frankreich und Deutschland im Vergleich (Working Papers des Sonderforschungsbereiches 640, 3/2010), Berlin, 2010, <http://edoc.hu-berlin.de/series/sfb-640-papers/2010-3/PDF/3.pdf> (18.3.2012), 18.

themselves. This is congruent with an examination of the cultural dimension of international relations. In the run-up to the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, it was possible to show the emergence of the concept of a “common, connecting” Mediterranean region in the early 1990s.<sup>70</sup> After a phase of self-reflection, the model of a political Europe almost appeared like a shining example for the Mediterranean South. However, by the end of the period under investigation, critical voices and assessments were on the rise. This applied to the states of the Maghreb under consideration in particular, which generally tended to be viewed as a threat. In this regard, a purported realism gained ground in the course of the 1990s in one way or another, as contradictions between an ideal Europe (Europe as a role model) and the observed difficulties of European institutions and also French-German relations became evident.<sup>71</sup> There was an ever-growing impression of a fortress under siege<sup>72</sup> – not explicitly, but certainly implicitly – though Klaus J. Bade fittingly argued that this image is both true and false at the same time.<sup>73</sup> Three conclusions can be drawn from an overarching examination of the institutes with regard to the links between them, how they differed and what they had in common:

*First*, there was an ambivalent relationship between networking and a desirable prerogative of interpretation for the institutes and its members, as *Europeanized* expertise promised an elevated reputation on the one hand, while national policy matters in particular were to remain as exclusive as possible. *Second*, the comparison of institutes and courses of action shows that, in various contexts – be they security-related (SWP), German-French (DGAP), political-economical (CERI) or paradiplomatic (IFRI) – *Europe* increasingly became a collective term for one’s own side in the international game of powers. *Third*, *Europe* was the resource for representation and action under which initiatives and incentives of the EU could be negotiated by various actors in the institutional framework. Aside from the problem of national projections, there is also a clearly discernible trend towards divisive representations of Europe.

## 6. Concluding Remarks

Proceeding from the abovementioned conclusions, an inquiry informed by an expanded political history approach begs the question of the extent to which expertise infused the political process.<sup>74</sup> In this concrete case, there are recognizable efforts by the actors to connect across Europe or internationally in order to increase the legitimization of their own representations. In their own particular institutional way, the SWP, DGAP,

70 Cf. I. Schäfer, *Vom Kulturkonflikt zum Kulturdialog? Die kulturelle Dimension der Euro-Mediterranen Partnerschaft (EMP)*, Baden-Baden 2007, 112.

71 It is characteristic that at around the same time, the “new historiography” movement, the French *Annales*-School, began to dissolve. Cf. P. Burke, *Annales* (note 45), 132.

72 The image of “Fortress Europe” was strengthened by ambitions for a common foreign policy of the EU, which despite military operations was preeminently of a defensive nature. Cf. the article by Andreas Weiß.

73 K. J. Bade, *Migration in European history*. Translated by Allison Brown, Malden, Mass. 2003, 331–333.

74 G. Metzler, *Integration* (note 15).

CERI and IFRI were close to the German and French deciders. Furthermore, at least in the German case, the contents regarding the Maghreb show that the integration into the political process through advance knowledge towards the government, members of parliament etc. was probable.<sup>75</sup> But knowledge about the Maghreb was not substantially deeper in France either, as publications and projects from the French institutes, which generally contained rather basic information, suggest. Thus, in both national contexts, representations of Europe could serve as a mental point of departure for the unfamiliar territory when dealing with the Maghreb. At the same time, a scholar such as Rémy Leveau was able to use *Europe* in his argumentation when he established links – as in the German-French tandem, among others – that were simultaneously defined by several lines of development.

Europe featured as a model in all selected contributions from policy think tanks. *For one*, the institutes came to showcase Europe and its *mirrors* with various terms. The foil that was used to trace one's own model came to be referred to as the Mediterranean Region, the South, southern flank, Maghreb, or the Arab World (among others). For the *we*, the actors chose terms such as Western Europe, European dimension, new power, or even the idea of an *empire without an emperor* (in the French language). Despite the multitude of metaphors and concepts, there was nonetheless a stabilization of those representations that equated Europe with EU-Europe in the 1990s. *Secondly*, these terms implied particular notions of reform or even a civilizing effort; through representations of Europe, such designs for reform could also be geared to a national level. Actors would then point out different future designs for Europe, which were shaped by distinct national perspectives. Particularly with regard to the security-related aspects of relations to its surroundings in general and the Maghreb in particular, actors like Karl Kaiser came to exemplify such representations of the other Europe of the future.<sup>76</sup>

Generally speaking, representations of Europe lead to the relationship of one's own in the mirror of the developments of the other; the Maghreb was increasingly separated from Europe. Even the reading of a European empire, which came to be used by French scholars in a number of cases, was co-opted, for example, by Béatrice Hibou and Luis Martinez to draw attention to the errors of the Model Europe in the form of complicity between elites on both sides of the Mediterranean. In a similar vein, a German expert such as Volker Perthes practiced criticism as well, also towards the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. This partnership is a reminder of the significance of the development of a EU in the period under investigation that increasingly sought to monopolize not only the EU-acronym, but also the term *Europe*. In both national contexts, this transformation of the Community into a Union also had an impact on the political consulting

75 All the more considering that for example, most of the material collections, studies etc. at the SWP were above all created (and continue to be created) at the behest of the target audience, i.e. elites involved in the political decision-making process. Gespräch mit J. Rogalski, G. Weiher (note 60).

76 As the face of the DGAP, Karl Kaiser came to represent a "substantial degree of personal continuity", also within the German-French context. Cf. D. Eisermann, Außenpolitik und Strategiediskussion. Die Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik 1955 bis 1972, München 1999, 293.

sector. Examples such as the European Empire are evidence of separate, individual lines of development, which is not surprising, particularly in relation to the Maghreb. Nevertheless, there were also signs of rapprochement with regard to conscious or affirmative representations of Europe that emphasized a sense of belonging. Hence, from 1990 to 2000, there was a gradual concentration on *Europe* as a resource for action, even in political think tanks not primarily concerned with European institutions. In a working paper for the SWP, the French expert Leveau thus recommended the creation of regional systems – a recommendation which was also directed at “Europe” itself. He proposed organizing the Maghreb according to the European model.<sup>77</sup>

77 R. Leveau/G. E. Fuller, *Nachbarschaft* (note 2), 30. From a historical perspective, Leveau’s model conception thus drew on the model of institutional integration, according to which one goal is supranationality as it was created in Europe after the Second World War. Cf. J. Osterhammel, *Europamodelle und imperiale Kontexte*, in: *Journal of Modern European History*, 2 (2004) 2, 157–182, 165.