

ers to notables. For these reasons, Charles Wilkins study should now be part of all bibliographies on Aleppo and on Ottoman urban societies.

**Davide Rodogno: Against Massacre. Humanitarian Interventions in the Ottoman Empire, 1815–1914. The Emergence of a European Concept and International Practice, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012, 391 S.**

Rezensiert von  
Hans-Lukas Kieser, Zürich

Davide Rodogno's "Against Massacre" explores European humanitarian interventions in the late Ottoman Empire, the principal site for such interventions. The interventions are part of a larger history of Ottoman-European interaction that came to its climax in the 'last and longest Ottoman century', in which time frame the book is placed. These efforts were launched in the name of a common humanity with victims of atrocities. The victims supported by armed intervention were, however, exclusively Christian groups; others, including Muslims and Jews, Alevis and Druze, could at best case profit from humanitarian aid or some diplomatic steps.

One reason for this was that Ottoman Christians possessed little or no military, political, and symbolic power in a Muslim empire and, once suspected as disloyal or in open revolt, were crushed by the state, regional lords, or armed locals. This was

not the case when Muslims – for instance, Kurdish chiefs – rebelled, because the Porte and provincial Muslims did not consider that the latter's acts fundamentally questioned Ottoman Muslim legitimacy. This larger asymmetry of power must be kept in mind when seeking 'balanced' accounts of massacres, and in such instances as when, as Rodogno rightly insists, British prime minister Benjamin Disraeli rhetorically reduced large-scale massacres to local disturbances in order to avoid the call to humanitarian intervention.

Another reason for pro-Christian intervention was cultural and religious. The Ottoman world, ruled by Muslims, was not considered to be part of the 'civilized', de facto culturally Christian family of nations that intervened in the 19th century in the name of humanity. Even when dire situations called for action, there was a fundamental problem of how to conceive of a common humanity; cultural and religious rifts penetrated modern humanitarian discourse. Rodogno is perspicacious in insisting on the centrality of the modern Eastern Question for understanding humanitarian intervention. He could even have elaborated further on the modern European projection of humanity "in negative" that pointed at foreign Ottoman "lèse-humanité" but remained unable to produce a positive global project of and for humanity.

In his first two chapters, Rodogno elaborates on the exclusion of the Ottoman world, the roots of and conditions for intervention in the Holy Alliance of 1815, the latter's notion of a Christian family of civilized nations, and the nineteenth-century context of humanitarian intervention in the Ottoman Empire. His analysis is

instructive but could have been more to the point. The Ottoman Reform Edict of 1856, in a somewhat utopian fashion, intended to empower and modernize (not to abolish, as Rodogno suggests p. 27) the aterritorial autonomy of the “millet”, that is Christian and Jewish communities, and to implement Ottoman supra-religious identity and individual equality.

Many Westerners set high expectations on a reformed Ottoman future after 1839, when the Tanzimât began. American missionaries who had been scandalized by the U.S. Indian Removal of the 1830s hoped for a bright future in a reformed Ottoman world, while they saw their homeland marked by slavery, inequality, and other injustices. Rodogno assimilates a bit too quickly missionary appeals to humanity and to elementary rights for non-Christians and non-Westerners with goals of expansion and imperialism (pp. 180–81). The notion of an ‘entire humanity’, individual and collective, was present and articulated in missionary, anti-slavery, and diplomatic circles. But politically, it was not operable. In 1856, with the end of the Holy Alliance, the Ottoman Empire became part of the European system of powers. By doing so, however, it had to embark in its interior towards a utopia of plurality cum equality that had nowhere else been realized, especially not if one includes the colonial realms of European states.

The intervention on behalf of the Ottoman Greeks (chap. 3), before the Tanzimât began is a good example of what was operable in Europe under Restoration: common nominal Christianity, the venerable heritage of ancient Greece, and, with this, half clichéd, half all-too-true descriptions of Greek Christian suffering and Ottoman

Muslim repression – in which, however, a number of anti-Muslim atrocities scarcely figured. Against the background of the end of the Holy Alliance, the Crimean War, and the Reform Edict, the intervention in Ottoman Lebanon of 1860–61 (chap. 4) differed markedly from its predecessors. Asymmetrical clashes between Maronites on the one side and Druze and Sunni Muslims on the other had taken place, and the local authorities had behaved poorly, remaining spectators to the events.

Although previous cultural factors were not obliterated, the Ottoman reformist emphasis now played a strong role. Mehmed Fuad, one of the foremost Tanzimât pashas, was sent from Istanbul to restore order and punish perpetrators. He was joined by French and British commissioners and expeditionary forces. Despite frictions, consensus could be established – in contrast to the late nineteenth century, when the European powers proved unable to give common responses to massacres of higher magnitude.

A significant reorganisation and fruit of the Tanzimât resulted from the turmoil in 1860–61. The *Règlement* for the Lebanon was based on local, central, and international procedures and participation. It provided Mount Lebanon a peace that lasted up to the First World War. This was not the case with a similar reorganisation for Crete (chap. 5) in the second half of the 1860s, when intercommunity tensions, the absence of reforms, and separatist Greek nationalism combined to inspire a rebellion, and European warships intervened to save Christian refugees before diplomacy found a solution. The grand-vizier Ali Pasha, however, architect of the Reform Edict of 1856, then felt abused, criticizing

a so-called humanitarian intervention that discriminated according to religion and, in his eyes, hindered the state in legitimately suppressing the rebellion in time.

Despite the notorious Bulgarian atrocities, humanitarian intervention became politically impossible during the Eastern crisis in the second half of the 1870s. Britain under Disraeli feared that Russia would profit and the Ottoman Empire be weakened. Although the sensibilities of the public at home and a pro-Bulgarian and, later, a pro-Armenian movement played an important role, these could not overcome basic considerations of foreign policy. Unsurprisingly, the balance of power on the peak of the Great Game weighed more than the interests of a common humanity; and, further, the notion of such humanity itself, in which to believe, was largely lost.

Once more an Eastern crisis became a historical watershed. It coincided with the end of the *Tanzimat* utopia; the ending 'concert' of the European powers; the beginning of German "Orientpolitik"; the rise of anti-Semitism; and, more generally, the triumph of ethno-religious and racial categories in European and late Ottoman political thinking. Rodogno does well to consecrate one chapter to this crisis (chap. 6) and another to the changed international context afterwards, during the Belle Époque (chap. 7).

In contrast to the 1860s, the "fin de siècle" saw the dizzying phenomenon of nonintervention and no sustained effort toward reform when 100,000 Armenians were murdered by mostly local protagonists in autumn 1895 in Anatolia (chap. 8). The Berlin Treaty, which humiliated the Russian victor of the preceding war with the Ottoman Empire, had called for reforms

in article 61, but Britain, its main promoter, was unable to enforce reforms in the Kurdo-Armenian eastern provinces. After 1895, under the British prime minister Viscount Cranborne, Marquess of Salisbury, Britain was even isolated as the only power then willing to intervene for manifestly humanitarian reasons.

Comparatively small interventions for peace enforcement and reform, but not massacre prevention, took place in Crete in 1896–1900 (chap. 9) and, on a diplomatic level, in Macedonia in 1903–8 (chap. 10). Only near the end of the twentieth century did a new international consensus again allow organizing armed interventions for mainly humanitarian reasons, and this time also for Muslims in the post-Ottoman world.

"Against Massacre" culminates by narrating the European aporia with regard to the Armenian massacres. It is a strength of this book that it shows in poignant detail how Belle Époque Europe failed to act according to its former basic notions, even in such a clear-cut case of mass murder (although the Ottoman state, against multiple evidences, denied crimes in order to delegitimize any call to intervention). Intervention in Anatolia would, however, have required important military means, a consensual international organization, and especially faith in common humanity. This last no longer existed after the former, implicitly Christian understanding of humanity and solidarity had largely vanished among European elites, and with rare exceptions, international socialism remained silent about what was going on in the Ottoman world. Thinkers in international law and human rights began to fill the void but were powerless. It is another strength of

the book to unearth such contemporary secular voices.

“Against Massacre” is a major contribution to a history of humanitarianism. Based on a multitude of Western sources, it profits from the new researches on late Ottoman history. It in 1914, before the final Ottoman cataclysm and the Armenian genocide, and also before the implementation of reform based on article 61 of the Berlin Treaty in spring 1914, when a core issue of the Eastern Question shortly seemed to be resolved. This final Ottoman drama and the input it gave to twentieth-century thinking about international law, the anti-genocide convention, and humanitarian intervention would be material enough for another book.

**Anna Kaminsky / Dietmar Müller / Stefan Troebst (Hrsg.): Der Hitler-Stalin-Pakt 1939 in den Erinnerungskulturen der Europäer, Göttingen: Wallstein Verlag, 2011, 566 S.**

Rezensiert von  
Anna Leidinger, Berlin

Der Hitler-Stalin-Pakt vom 23. August 1939 ist für die Gesellschaften Ostmitteleuropas einer der wichtigsten „lieux de mémoire“, während er in den Erinnerungskulturen Westeuropas weitgehend ignoriert wird. Somit fügt er sich ein in die Reihe erinnerungskultureller Phänomene, die immer noch von der Teilung Europas 1945–1989 bestimmt werden.

Im Einflussbereich der Sowjetunion durfte der Pakt bis 1989, wenn überhaupt, dann nur ohne Erwähnung des Geheimen Zusatzprotokolls thematisiert werden. Dieses aber stellt das zentrale Dokument in diesem Zusammenhang dar, teilte es doch die Staaten Mittel- und Osteuropas untereinander auf und antizipierte somit bereits den sicherheitspolitischen Einflussbereich der Sowjetunion nach 1945. Der Hitler-Stalin-Pakt stellt in diesem Kontext einen zentralen Kristallisationspunkt für die Erinnerungskulturen vieler Europäer dar. Dies liegt unter anderem daran, dass „mit dem Pakt [...] die Totalitarismustheorie ihren Anfang [...] nimmt“, wie die Autoren in der Einleitung (S. 11) bemerken. Bereits hier wird deutlich, dass der Sammelband, herausgegeben von Anna Kaminsky, Geschäftsführerin der Bundesstiftung Aufarbeitung sowie den beiden Leipziger Historikern Dietmar Müller und Stefan Troebst, ein zutiefst politisches Buch ist. Multiperspektivisch nähert sich die Publikation in 24 Beiträgen auf über 550 Seiten dem Hitler-Stalin-Pakt als Erinnerungsort im Sinne Pierre Noras. Es ist ein Erinnerungsort der nahezu idealtypisch die geschichtspolitischen Aushandlungsprozesse und Deutungskämpfe um die europäische Geschichte des 20. Jahrhunderts aufzeigt. Der Mehrwert dieses Bandes liegt vor allem in der Zusammenstellung unterschiedlicher nationaler europäischer Perspektiven auf das Ereignis und seiner Konstruktion in Erinnerungskultur und Geschichtspolitik – eine Multiperspektivität, die in der Erinnerungsliteratur bisher eher vernachlässigt wurde.<sup>1</sup> Weniger das Ereignis selbst, als vielmehr die Geschichtsschreibung über den Hitler-Stalin-Pakt sowie die staatliche Geschichtspolitik und Erinnerungskul-