pus zurückzuführende) Reichtum, der es dem Leser stellenweise nicht ganz leicht macht, der Gesamtargumentation zu folgen. Abgesehen davon legt Yavuz Köse eine ausgezeichnet recherchierte, fundierte und informative Studie zur Konsum- und Unternehmensgeschichte des späten Osmanischen Reiches vor, die dem Leser die dynamischen Entwicklungen, denen die Konsumkultur in dieser Region und Epoche unterlag, kohärent vor Augen führt. Sie bietet nicht nur faszinierende neue Einblicke in wirtschafts- und kulturgeschichtliche Prozesse, sondern auch in sozialgeschichtliche Zusammenhänge und in die Wechselwirkungen von Nationalismus und Konsum.

Jeffrey G. Williamson: Trade and Poverty. When the Third World Fell Behind, Cambridge: MIT Press, 2011, 301 S.

Rezensiert von
Adrian Steinert, Freiburg

Which factors do account for the huge differences in incomes and living standards between the 'West' and the 'Rest' of the world? The scientific research on the reasons for this 'Great Divergence' has been flourishing for years.1 Recently, the economist and economic historian Jeffrey G. Williamson has joined it by writing "Trade and Poverty, When the Third World Fell Behind". While the Great Divergence-controversy mainly centers on the question whether institutions, geography or even culture constitute the fundamental causes of economic divergence, 'Trade and Poverty' brings back economics into the game.

Williamson's argument is straightforward: Rather than geographical endowments – i.e. the lack or the abundance of coal deposits – foreign trade, commodity specialization and trade patterns between the "rich industrial core and the poor pre-industrial periphery" (p. 1) explain why the "Third World fell behind". When did that happen according to Williamson? In short, the Great Divergence originated because of 'two key phenomena of the 19th century': the industrialization of Western Europe and the globalization of the emerging world economy (p. 231).

The book begins by illustrating the world economic order of 1960. Williamson writes that it was characterized by two facts: First, the wide gap in per capita income and standards of living between the Western and non-Western parts of the world were apparent. In 1960, income per capita in Asia and Africa was less than 14% of Western Europe's average income per capita while Latin America's relative distance to Europe was about 41% (p. 1). Secondly, the poor periphery has been exporting primary products, while the rich core traded manufactures. For instance, 85% of the poor periphery's exports were agricultural products2 while Western Europe's export figure from the primary sector was less than one third.

Thus, "trade, specialization in commodities, and poverty were closely correlated" (p. 1) as Williamson emphasizes. At this point at the latest, it becomes clear that Williamson's argument is influenced by the Dependency theory of the 1960s, the Marxian concept of 'unequal exchange' and, especially, the Prebisch-Singer hypothesis.3 Due to the secular decline of the 'Terms of Trade' for developing countries, the economists' Raúl Prebisch and Hans Singer independently argued in the 1950s that the established trade patterns were systematically discriminating against the Third World.

However, Williamson does not simply warm up those 'old hats'. On the contrary, he turns the Prebisch-Singer thesis upside down. While Prebisch and Singer proposed the degradation of the developing countries' terms of trade and its negative consequences for their economic catch-up, Williamson states just the opposite. He stresses that the poor periphery – except of East Asia – was affected by a substantial terms of trade boom, which lasted from the late 18th century to the 1870s. The terms of trade for the poor periphery soared from 40 in 1796 to 130 in 1870. During the same time period the British terms of trade decreased from 150 to 90. What does this mean? The terms of trade measure the ratio of the relative prices of imports and exports. An increase in the terms of trade in the primary-product specializing country – due to a price jump of cash crops on the world market – implies a fall in the relative prices of imported manufactures. Hence, the primary-product specializing country can afford more manufactured imports with the same amount of agricultural exports so long as its terms of trade continue ascending.

Which implications had the terms of trade boom for developing countries during the long 19th century? Contrary to intuitive logic, Williamson first and foremost identifies three negative effects. In the view of Williamson, that terms of trade boom was a poisoned chalice. Rather than benefiting the poor periphery, it led to its de-industrialization, to rising inequality within it and to higher price volatility of primary-product exports (p. 231-231). By executing three case-studies (India, Ottoman Turkey and Mexico), Williamson underlines his main argument that – through the terms of trade boom for the poor periphery – Western Europe's industrialization and the globalization of the 19th century world economy represented the root causes of the de-industrialization, and thus, the poverty, of today's global south.

The crux lies in the economic theory of comparative advantage. Instead of using the exports profits to invest in own industries (i.e. import-substitution industrialization), the terms of trade boom, due to comparative advantage specialization, induced the poor periphery to produce solely cash crops and raw materials. Around 1900 countries such as Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Mexico or Egypt basically exported only one or two commodities, which made up 90-100% of total exports. As a result, Europe and its Western offshoots became more industrial while Asia, Africa and Latin America got less. In addition to this, cash crops production further strengthened rent-seeking behavior of the landed elites of the poor periphery and contributed to primary-product volatility on the world market.

After reading the book, the reader is quite disillusioned. When neither a terms of trade decline (Prebisch-Singer hypothesis) nor a terms of trade boom (Williamson hypothesis) do benefit the poor periphery, what can developing countries do to transcend the poverty trap? Williamson provides only sketches of an answer to this question but – to be honest – doing so was not the intent of his book. To conclude: Although Williamson's monograph is not easy to read for those without econometric experience, it constitutes a significant contribution to the current Great Divergence debate, and it might stimulate new 'Neo-Dependency' theories, dealing with global trade structures and relations between the 'West' and the 'Rest' of the world. Economic and global historians as well as development economists will benefit from reading 'Trade and Poverty'.

Notes:
1 An excellent overview of the current state of debate provides P. Vries, The California School and beyond. How to study the Great Divergence?, in: Journal für Entwicklungspolitik / Austrian Journal of Development Studies 24 (2008) 4, p. 6-49.
2 Nearly 95% of sub-Saharan Africa's export consisted of agricultural or mineral exports.
3 Nonetheless, he does not refer to Dependency theorists such as Andre Gunder Frank, Immanuel Wallerstein or Arghiri Emmanuel. He does only quote the work by Raúl Prebisch, The Economic Development of Latin America and its Principal Problems, New York 1950 and Singer, The distribution of gains between investing and borrowing countries, in: American Economic Review 40 (1950), p. 473-485.

Jörg Gertel: Globalisierte Nahrungskrisen. Bruchzone Kairo, Bielefeld: Transcript Verlag, 2010, 470 S.

Rezensiert von
Maren Möhring, Potsdam

Einer der Auslöser für die Proteste in Nordafrika, die als „arabischer Frühling" in die Geschichte eingegangen sind, war die neuerliche Preiserhöhung für Grundnahrungsmittel. Ägyptische Demonstrantinnen und Demonstranten wiesen mit Brot in ihren Händen – im Ägyptischen das Synonym für Leben – auf diese Problemlage hin und knüpften damit an die Hungerrevolten des Jahres 2007/08 an, die mehr als 25 Länder in Afrika, Asien und Amerika erfasst hatten. Studien über diese neuen Nahrungskrisen haben allerdings herausgestellt, dass nicht Missernten das Hauptproblem darstellen. Harald Schumann hat in „Die Hungermacher", einer von der Verbraucherorganisation „Foodwatch" 2011 präsentierten Studie[1], die vollständige Einbindung der Rohstoffmärkte in den globalen Kapitalmarkt zum Auslöser der problematischen Preisschwankungen (Volatilität) erklärt. Angesichts der aktuellen Finanzkrise allein den verstärkten Spekulationen auf den Weltagrarmärkten die Schuld zu geben, greift jedoch zu kurz. Walden Bello identifiziert in „Politik des Hungers"[2] die seit den 1980er Jahren vorgenommene neoliberale Umstrukturierung der landwirtschaftlichen Produktion, wie sie der Internationale Währungsfond und die Weltbank forcieren, als Hauptursache für die ver-