

# **‘Faux Touristes’? Tourism in European Migration Regimes in the Long Sixties**

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## **RESÜMEE**

Das Verhältnis von Migration und Tourismus ist hochambivalent. In Zeiten, in denen Migration von staatlicher Seite überwiegend restriktiv diskutiert und kontrolliert wird, erscheinen sie als gegensätzliche Repräsentationen von Mobilität: Weitgehend unreguliert für die, die reisen, um Geld auszugeben; stark begrenzt für jene, die sich auf den Weg machen, um Geld zu verdienen. Bei hohem Arbeitskräftebedarf verschieben sich dagegen die vermeintlich eindeutigen Zuschreibungen. Der Beitrag untersucht dieses Verhältnis in historischer Perspektive am Beispiel Frankreichs, der Schweiz und der Bundesrepublik Deutschland während der sechziger Jahre. Dabei wird deutlich, dass das Migrationsregime der ‚Gastarbeit‘ eine weitaus größere Vielfalt an Mobilität kannte, als die einfache Dichotomie suggeriert. Migration und Tourismus sind in dieser Perspektive weit mehr als nur zwei rechtlich konstruierte Seiten der einen Medaille grenzüberschreitender Mobilität.

## **1. Prologue: Unforgettable Holidays**

It was an unforgettable holiday trip for the two young Ecuadorians Joana and Theresa in spring 2007.<sup>1</sup> They were on their way from Belgium to the romantic city of Heidelberg to visit the world famous castle and see a friend who had invited them to meet her family for the Easter weekend. However, their itinerary was changed and instead they spent the weekend in Ingelheim, a lovely medieval town situated in picturesque vineyards close to the UNESCO World Heritage Site Middle Rhine. Unfortunately, they did not enjoy the pleasures of a cosy hostel, but were accommodated in the local detention centre. What

1 The prologue is based upon the author’s personal experience. Names were changed.

had happened? The German friend had picked up the two women at the Belgium border by car, who had been working in Belgium as domestic workers without residence permits for several years, when they were stopped at a customs control near the border. Dressed up in traditional clothes for the Easter weekend, the Ecuadorians were asked for their papers and, being without a valid Schengen visa, they were arrested. To make things worse, they were detained for more than two months, so in addition to the changed itinerary and the extended length of the journey, they lost their jobs as they did not show up at work the next week. With North American passports or as members of a Japanese Bus Tour, they probably would have reached their destination without complications, but identified as irregular migrants by the border police, their touristic trip was harshly put to an end.

## 2. Ambiguous Mobilities

Migration and tourism correlate in an ambivalent manner.<sup>2</sup> The introductory example describes only one particular manifestation in the varied relationship of these two representations of human mobility. To name just a few further entanglements, tourist economies are highly dependent on seasonal migrant workers; touristic architecture, such as hotels or holiday camps, is used for refugee housing as well as for retirement migration; tourist boats and buses serve as transport for migrants; and long term travellers earn their travel funds by working during their journey.<sup>3</sup> A last example proving perfectly how interwoven migration and tourism can be is the phenomenon of *VFR-tourism* – tourism related to the visiting of friends or relatives: Usually, the latter emigrate and settle somewhere before they are visited by friends and relatives who come as tourists. Sometimes this visit leads to emigration decisions as well.<sup>4</sup>

While scientific research most often focuses on either tourism or migration exclusively, some efforts have been made to put these two forms of mobility into relation.<sup>5</sup> Yet attempts of definition, trying to differentiate one subject from the other in respect to geographical, temporal or motive-related terms, usually fail due to arbitrary criteria of space or duration. To manage this problem Hall and Williams convincingly place different manifestations of tourism and migration on the continuum of human mobility with

2 Cf. R. Lenz, *Mobilitäten in Europa. Migration und Tourismus auf Kreta und Zypern im Kontext des europäischen Grenzregimes*, Wiesbaden 2010; J. Reuter: Einführung: Tourismus und Migration, in: A. Karentzos/A. Kittner/J. Reuter (Ed.): *Topologien des Reisens. Tourismus, Imagination, Migration*, Trier 2010, pp. 13-18.

3 Cf. C. M. Hall/A. M. Williams (Ed.), *Tourism and migration. New relationships between production and consumption*, Dordrecht 2002; T. Holert/M. Terkessidis, *Fliehkraft. Gesellschaft in Bewegung – von Migranten und Touristen*, Köln 2006; R. Pehm, *Der andere Fremdenverkehr. Die Unterbringung Asylsuchender aus der Sicht von Tourismusverbänden am Beispiel Tirols*, in: *SWS-Rundschau*, 47 (2007) 2, 2007, pp. 186-208; R. Schmitt, *Travel, Tourism and Migration*, in: *Demography*, 5 (1968) 1, pp. 306-310.

4 S. Boyne/F. Carswell/D. Hall, *Reconceptualising VFR migration: friends, relatives and migration in a domestic context*, in: C. M. Hall/A. M. Williams (Ed.), *Tourism* (3), pp. 241-256.

5 Overview in: A. M. Williams/C. M. Hall, *Tourism, Migration, Circulation and Mobility: The Contingencies of Time and Place*, in: Idem (Ed.): *Tourism* (3), pp. 1-52.

the result of a broad distribution of both phenomena frequently overlapping each other along the scale.<sup>6</sup>

Administration usually is not so keen on such ambiguities, however. From the perspective of states trying to regulate migration, a sharp differentiation is desirable. The problem of distinction is dissolved by visa issuance, simulating a clear-cut difference between migrants and tourists. In times of restrictive migration control they appear as two dichotomist representations of mobility – quite liberal for those travelling to spend money, much more restricted for those travelling to earn money.<sup>7</sup> In case of doubt, the decision whether a person is seen as a migrant or as a tourist is made at the border control, resulting in the delivery or refusal of visa unless there are bilateral agreements on visa-free travel due to economic or political reasons in place.<sup>8</sup> A migrant might receive (or be denied) a visa including work permissions, whereas a tourist's visa is restricted to a temporary visit only. The decision is taken in view of the applicant's financial resources, compelling return plans proven by tickets and secure occupation in the home country, and other criteria of both administrative and public ascription, what makes 'a tourist'.

This article focuses on the representation of tourism in migration regimes. According to Jochen Oltmer, 'migration regimes point to the broad interdependency of state and migration.'<sup>9</sup> On the one hand, there are rules and institutional orders juridificated and enforced by the involved states. These rules are shaped by ideological and political principles as well as by the economic situation which stimulates or moderates migratory movements. On the other hand, there is the agency of the migrants themselves, who participate in recruitment programs or change their employers violating their contract, cross borders with or without permission and take their own decisions far beyond what administrative and corporate officials have chosen for them. Both sides interact constantly, one reacting to changes of the other.

Rules of entry determine the terms of cross-border mobility to a large extent. From the administration's point of view, 'migrant' and 'tourist' are set as categories for visa or residence and work permits. However, from a migrant's perspective, a tourist visa can enable him or her to gain access to the (grey) labour market or to live with family members even though these gates of migration are officially blocked. As a result, touristic motivations can be denied to 'false tourists' who are suspected of being irregular migrants by state officials – either because they come from countries with a high amount of labour surplus,

6 Ibid.

7 Cf. Zygmunt Baumann who juxtaposes tourists and vagabonds as human consequences of globalisation. Z. Bauman, *Globalisation. The human consequences*, Cambridge 1998.

8 This control is not restricted to the territorial border: Visas usually are issued at diplomatic missions and passport controls, as seen above, are also carried out in the interior of a country.

9 J. Oltmer, *Einführung: Europäische Migrationsverhältnisse und Migrationsregime in der Neuzeit*, in: *Geschichte und Gesellschaft*, 35 (2009), pp. 5-27, here p. 12. All quotes translated by the author.

or because they are seen as potential refugees.<sup>10</sup> In fact, denouncing travellers to be 'false tourists' corresponds to similar discourses on the 'real refugee'.<sup>11</sup>

The following sections will address the problem of 'false tourists' from a historical perspective on the Western European 'guest worker' regime of the sixties. I will argue that the boundary between migration and tourism, that theoretically seems so strict from the state's perspective, has been actively blurred in times of economic upturn by the multi-level state officials themselves. Taking examples from the French, Swiss, and German labour recruitment, it will be shown how the alleged clear-cut distinction was undermined both by migrants and by state authorities. The latter adjusted the degree of control to economic and political cycles: More flexible in boom times to gain migrant labour for the prospering post-war economies bypassing their own official rules of recruitment, and scandalising the entry of migrant workers as tourists in times of stricter regulation. When free movement was not appreciated due to economic or political reasons, this behaviour of migrants was denounced as illegal and travellers from typical emigration countries were even refused the right to travel as tourists. This will be exemplified by analysing the correlation of migration and tourism in France, Switzerland, and Germany from the mid-fifties to the early seventies. This was the period of guest worker recruitment, a migration regime which first is worth a closer look.

### 3. Guest Worker Recruitment

During the era of economic growth from the fifties to the mid-seventies the demand for foreign labour in the industrial centres of Western Europe rose significantly. More than 30 million male and female workers from Mediterranean countries came to the prospering industrial centres of Western Europe, especially to West Germany and France, but also to the Benelux countries and Switzerland.<sup>12</sup> While most of them returned after some time or moved on to another country, some migrant workers settled and started families or had family members come from their home countries. Coinciding with massive post-colonial migration movements, this resulted in the fact that, for the first time in modern history, immigration to Europe dominated emigration from Europe.

10 The last aspect is true for both immigration and emigration control as the historical examples from communist states as the German Democratic Republic or the People's Republic of China show. Cf. W.G. Arlt, *Entwicklung des Outbound Tourismus in China aus europäischer Sicht*, in: idem/W. Freyer (Ed.), *Deutschland als Reiseziel chinesischer Touristen. Chancen für den deutschen Reisemarkt*, München 2008, pp. 7-21; H. Wolter, 'Ich harre aus im Land und geh' ihm fremd'. Die Geschichte des Tourismus in der DDR, Frankfurt a. M. 2009.

11 Cf. V. Ackermann, *Der 'echte' Flüchtling. Deutsche Vertriebene und Flüchtlinge aus der DDR, 1945-1961*, Osnabrück 1995; M. Z. Bookman, *Tourists, Migrants & Refugees. Population movements in Third World development*, Boulder, CO 2006; R. Zetter, *Labelling Refugees: Forming and Transforming a Bureaucratic Identity*, in: *Journal of Refugee Studies*, 4 (1991) 1, pp. 39-62; idem, *More Labels, Fewer Refugees: Remaking the Refugee Label in an Era of Globalization*, in: *Journal of Refugee Studies*, 20 (2007) 2, pp. 172-192.

12 K. J. Bade, *Migration in European History*, Malden, MA, 2003.

To control this influx and to prevent settlement, the Western European states tried to frame the recruitment of foreign workers through bilateral agreements. Some reach back to the interwar period, but the zenith of these networks of institutionalised temporary labour migration were the sixties.<sup>13</sup> There are two understandings of what makes a guest worker system. In a stricter sense, it refers to the temporary recruitment of immigrant labour organised by the state and including contractually agreed rights and duties of all parties involved. This is also known as the ‘German guestworker model’<sup>14</sup>, which is sketched in section 6. In a wider understanding of the term, the aspects of organised recruitment and the legal guaranties to workers are neglected in favour of the core principle of the guest worker system: rotation. Migrant workers were meant to come for a certain amount of time – usually one to three years – and then return, to be replaced by new migrant workers. This wider understanding not only allows us to look behind the curtain of the ideal guest worker recruitment as fixed in bilateral contracts, but also highlights a common pattern of labour migration in and to Europe in the ‘Golden Age’<sup>15</sup> including labour migration from (former) colonies.

No doubt, the national migration regimes of Western Europe fundamentally differed according to historical migration systems, national self-perceptions and respective immigration rules, but there are certain commonalities in policing immigration and the corresponding tendencies of settlement since the late sixties that point to an Europeanisation of migration policy in the early seventies.<sup>16</sup> One is the state authorities’ deliberate circumvention of their own immigration control rules.<sup>17</sup> The scandalisation of this alternative path of immigration in times, when a stricter control was intended, is another scheme that can be found in all Western European states.<sup>18</sup>

#### 4. France – regularisation as official recruitment policy

The blurring of legal labour immigration and entry as a tourist is best exemplified in the French case. The official recruitment procedure in France was slow and complicated. The National Immigration Department (*Office Nationale d’Immigration* – *ONI*) had the

13 Cf. C. Rass, Temporary Labour Migration and State-Run Recruitment of Foreign Workers in Europe, 1919–1975: A New Migration Regime?, in: *International Review of Social History*, 57 (2012), pp. 191–224; C. Reinecke, Governing Aliens in Times of Upheaval. Immigration Control and Modern State Practice in Early Twentieth-Century Britain, Compared with Prussia, in: *International Review of Social History*, 54 (2009), pp. 39–65.

14 S. Castles/M. J. Miller, *The Age of Migration. International Population Movements in the Modern World*, Hounds-mills 2007, p. 72.

15 E. J. Hobsbawm, *Age of Extremes. The Short Twentieth Century, 1914–1991*, London 1994, passim, esp. pp. 257–286.

16 M. Berlinghoff, *Das Ende der ‘Gastarbeit’. Die Anwerbestopps in Westeuropa 1970–1974*, Paderborn 2013.

17 Cf. B. Sonnenberger, *Nationale Migrationspolitik und regionale Erfahrung. Die Anfänge der Arbeitsmigration in Südhessen (1955–1967)*, Darmstadt 2003; A. Spire, *Étrangers à la carte. L’administration de l’immigration en France (1945–1975)*, Paris 2005.

18 Cf. M. Berlinghoff, *Gastarbeit (16)*; M. Bojadžijev, *Die windige Internationale. Rassismus und Kämpfe der Migration*, Münster 2008; S. Karakayali, *Gespens der Migration. Zur Genealogie illegaler Einwanderung in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland*, Bielefeld 2008; C. Sanz Diaz, *‘Clandestinos’, ‘ilegales’, ‘espontáneos’... La emigración irregular de españoles a Alemania en el contexto de las relaciones hispano-alemanas, 1960–1973*, Madrid 2004.

monopoly on determining the employment of labour migrants.<sup>19</sup> Employers had to apply for foreign workers, before a national administrative request was made by the ONI whether there were appropriate candidates already available in France. If this was not the case, or if the requested jobs were on a confidential list of shortage occupations, the ONI mandated its foreign agencies in Italy or Spain to look for promising candidates. The selected workers were referred to their new employer – provided that the company assured minimal standards in working and housing conditions. In case that the initiative was taken by the labour migrant, he or she also had to apply for a work permit at the ONI by presenting a valid contract and passing a medical check-up. Again, the Department had to assess whether there was another applicant available in the national labour market. Migrants from the French overseas colonies were not affected by these procedures, as they enjoyed free movement inside the *Union Française*. Furthermore, up until Algerian independence in 1962, mobility between mainland France and Algeria was regarded as internal migration.<sup>20</sup>

The 'third way' of labour migration to France was to regularise immigration *ex post* by applying for a residence and work permit after immigration. What at first was thought only to be an exceptional way for potential migrants who did not need a visa or had a tourist visa to enter France, soon became the most important gate of entry to the French labour market. In the economic upturn of the mid-fifties at the latest, the ONI was far from meeting the employers' need for labour, so the French Ministry of Labour decreed that the regularisation of migrant workers should be treated as equal to the recruitment via the ONI.<sup>21</sup> In addition to the promotion of labour recruitment for economic reasons, the decree aimed to regulate the origin of migrant workers as well: People from the European Mediterranean countries should have at least the same chances to enter the French labour market as workers from the French colonies in Africa, who by then already made up a large share of the overall labour immigration. The result was a rise in the figure of regularised workers who entered the country as tourists or without a visa to more than 80 per cent of the immigrant workforce in France by 1968.<sup>22</sup> The 'spontaneous' entry as a tourist, search for employment and subsequent regularisation of residence and work had become the official way of French recruitment.

As in other Western European industrial countries, the recruitment of foreign labour during the fifties and sixties led to the unwanted settlement of 'guest workers', i.e. temporary migrant workers that were presumed to return to their countries of origin settled and were joined by their families. In the face of the excessive rate of regularisation and huge problems with a still continuing high rate of irregular immigration, French officials feared losing control on immigration. This was seen as a serious problem of state sove-

19 P. Weil, *La France et ses étrangers. L'aventure d'une politique de l'immigration de 1938 à nos jours*, Paris 2005.

20 Cf. G. Tapinos, *L'immigration étrangère en France. 1946–1973*, Paris 1975; M. Berlinghoff, *Gastarbeit* (16), pp. 275–279.

21 A. Spire, *Étrangers*, p. 107 (17). The circulaire du 18.4.1956 is printed in: *ibid.*, Annexe I.

22 G. Tapinos, *L'immigration* (20), pp. 99ff.

reignty of which control over entry to the national territory is an integral part. So by the end of the decade, the hitherto official way of regularising the entry of labour migrants as tourists was abandoned. Yet the 'third way' of regularisation continued to play a substantial part of labour immigration due to a bundle of exceptions concerning both specified occupations and countries of origin.

As in the other reluctant European immigration countries, this policy change had a racist motivation: It was not the settlement of labour migrants *as such* that was to be prevented as indicated by the free movement of persons inside of the European Community (EC) that came into effect at the same time for citizens of EC member states.<sup>23</sup> By contrast, the measure aimed particularly at migrants from the former francophone colonies in the Maghreb and sub-Saharan Africa.<sup>24</sup> For political and economic reasons citizens from these countries enjoyed free entry to the French *métropole* as tourists even after decolonisation while work permits officially had to be applied for. Against all official statements, the immigration of migrant workers as tourists remained a major gate of entry. Despite there still being considerable rotation within this group, the settlement of larger postcolonial communities led to a rise of social issues and racial tensions.<sup>25</sup>

The 'faux touristes' (false tourists), an expression which had appeared in the French immigration discourse by this time, symbolised both the unwanted immigration from the former African colonies and the loss of control over this migration movement. This led to the implementation of stricter border controls and stepwise tightening of entry regimes for postcolonial immigrants in the subsequent years. Otherwise, as the Head of the Department for Population and Migration of the French Ministry of Social Affairs predicted in 1973, the problem of the 'faux touristes' could not be solved and France would become 'the demographic valve of the third world'.<sup>26</sup> One year later, in July 1974, the French government decreed a complete immigration stop, even including family unification.

## 5. Switzerland – a fight against 'pseudo tourism', no matter the cost

Talking about 'false tourists' was common in Switzerland already in the mid-sixties. Due to the absence of war destruction in Switzerland, the Swiss economy had its first boom immediately after the end of the Second World War. As a small economy, recruitment of foreign labour was essential and Switzerland built on previous experiences from before the war according to a liberal model: State regulation of labour migration was based on

23 E. Comte, European Regionalism and Migration Global Governance, in: Les Cahiers Irice (2012) 9, pp. 117-137.

24 Portuguese workers as the largest European migrant group were excepted from the rule that should end regularisation of irregular entry. M. Berlinghoff, Gastarbeit (16), p. 284.

25 M. Silverman, Deconstructing the nation. Immigration, racism, and citizenship in modern France, London 1992.

26 Centre des Archives Contemporaines, Site Fontainebleau, 19960405, Art. 13, Note sur l'attitude des Etats membres de la C.E.E à l'égard des migrations de travailleurs originaires des Pays tiers, 6.2.1973. Cf. M. Berlinghoff, Gastarbeit (16), p. 312.

the control of settlement, while the recruitment itself was left to the labour market. The Law on Presence and Settlement of Aliens from 1931 claimed that the administration had to "consider the spiritual and economic interests as well as the degree of over-foreignisation (*Überfremdung*, *M. B.*) of the country"<sup>27</sup>, the latter being a constant factor in Swiss migration policy. Dating back to the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century this phobia has dominated both public discourse and alien policy since the interwar period (and is still influential today).<sup>28</sup> Already in the boom times of the sixties several referendums were announced in order to limit the number of aliens living in the Swiss Confederation. Since these could be repelled by governments' promises to fight the *Überfremdungsgefahr* ("danger of 'over-foreignisation'") several times, the debate culminated in highly controversial referendums in the seventies.<sup>29</sup>

The great majority of labour migration to Switzerland came from Italy. This was due to traditional migration paths and to the decision of the Swiss government to restrict the recruitment of labour migrants from 'More Distant Countries' (*Entferntere Länder*), which contained almost all countries without a common border to Switzerland.<sup>30</sup> An exception was made for Spanish migrants who had come clandestinely in larger numbers at the beginning of the sixties, resulting in a Swiss-Spanish recruitment agreement to control this irregular immigration. Further exceptions were made for special economic sectors with a high demand for labour, especially forestry, nursing, and tourism.

As a result, this approach did not completely restrict immigration from 'More Distant Countries', such as Yugoslavia, Turkey, or Greece, but pushed many migrants into illegality. To bypass the strict border regime, many of them tried to enter Switzerland as tourists in order to find employment.<sup>31</sup> To avoid this clandestine immigration via 'pseudotourism', the Swiss Government decreed in 1965 that employment of foreign workers was only possible if a residence permit had been granted before crossing the border.<sup>32</sup> Furthermore, the border police was instructed to reject persons who were suspected to be 'pseudo tourists'. Travellers who arrived at the Italian border station Chiasso without an official Swiss confirmation of a residence permit and who could not argue convincingly that they were 'real tourists' were forced to buy a return ticket and return to Milan with the next train.

Of course this procedure frequently affected 'real' tourists as well, but this risk was taken, as the vice director of the Swiss Federal Alien's Police (*Eidgenössische Fremdenpolizei*

27 Gesetz über Aufenthalt und Niederlassung der Ausländer (ANAG) Art. 16, 1.

28 P. Kury, *Über Fremde reden. Überfremdungsdiskurs und Ausgrenzung in der Schweiz 1900–1945*, Zürich 2003.

29 T. Buomberger, *Kampf gegen unerwünschte Fremde. Von James Schwarzenbach bis Christoph Blocher*, Zürich 2004.

30 M. Cerutti, *La politique migratoire de la Suisse 1945–1970*, in: H. Mahnig (Ed.): *Histoire de la politique de migration, d'asile et d'intégration en Suisse depuis 1948*, Zürich 2005, pp. 89–134.

31 O. F. Tezgören, *Von 'Pseudotouristen' zu 'Pseudoasylanten'. Die Einwanderung im Fokus schweizerischer Migrationsbehörden*, in: M. Ideli/V. Suter Reich/H.-L. Kieser (Ed.), *Neue Menschenlandschaften. Migration Türkei-Schweiz 1961–2011*, Zürich 2011, pp. 47–75.

32 Bundesratsbeschluss vom 19. Januar 1965 über die Zusage der Aufenthaltsbewilligung zum Stellenantritt, cf. O. F. Tezgören, *Pseudotouristen* (31), p. 58.



– EFP) Guido Solari noted: “Unfortunately, it would be unavoidable ‘that here and there real tourists would be taken for pseudo-tourists and treated accordingly.’”<sup>33</sup> Still, he admonished the border police to “control pseudo-tourism energetically”<sup>34</sup> at the risk of eventual mistakes. Moreover, this also concerned tourists who travelled to Switzerland by transit only. As the Swiss administration feared that migrants who were rejected, for example, at the German border and who did not have enough money to return to their home countries, would stay in Switzerland, there were even refoulements of (especially Turkish) travellers at the southern Swiss border whose destination was Germany. In order to transit Switzerland, they had to prove their travel plans convincingly by valid tickets and sufficient money.

As we can see from the Swiss example, the practice of false tourism is not limited to migration regimes, where it is officially promoted, as in the French case. It can also be found in recruitment regimes that focus on the control of settlement, as shown in the Swiss example. But how about migration regimes of states that engage deeply in both the process of recruitment and settlement control?

## 6. Federal Republic of Germany – a model case with all options reserved

As mentioned above, the German recruitment system was internationally regarded as the model case of a guest worker system.<sup>35</sup> Beginning in the mid-fifties, the West-German government made several bilateral recruitment agreements with sending states around the Mediterranean.<sup>36</sup> What made the German practice a model case was the high degree and depth of organisation. Companies that wanted to employ foreigners had to make a request for them at the Federal Labour Office (*Bundesanstalt für Arbeit*). This German public institution had recruitment offices in the sending countries and participated in the selection of candidates.<sup>37</sup> Successful applicants were offered a working contract and an accompanying residence permit usually valid for one year. The journey to the employer in Germany was organised and paid for and the employers had to offer housing opportunities. After the end of the agreed time, the migrant workers either could extend their work and residence permit if their working contract was renewed as well, or they had to leave the country.

In contrast to France, the German migration regime neither knew circular (post)colonial migration nor the official encouragement to irregular immigration and ex-post regularisation. Nonetheless, the West German migration regime foresaw several pathways of

33 Quoted from *ibid.*, p. 59.

34 Quoted from *ibid.*

35 S. Castles/M. J. Miller, *Age* (13), p. 72.

36 Italy 1955, Spain and Greece 1960, Turkey 1961, Morocco 1963, Portugal 1964, Tunisia 1965 and Yugoslavia 1968.

37 Candidates were chosen on vocational and medical criteria. Cf. R. Chin, *The guest worker question in postwar Germany*, Cambridge 2008; K. Hunn, ‘Nächstes Jahr kehren wir zurück ...! Die Geschichte der türkischen ‘Gastarbeiter’ in der Bundesrepublik, Göttingen 2005; B. Sonnenberger, *Migrationspolitik* (17).

labour recruitment. Next to the 'first way', the official recruitment through the foreign agencies of the Federal Labour Office, and the 'second way' with a work permitting visa, there was a 'third way' of labour immigration: Entry as a tourist, search for employment and subsequent regularisation of the residence with assistance by their employer.<sup>38</sup> Although the Principles of Alien's Policy<sup>39</sup> agreed by the Interior Ministers of the German Federal States in 1965 stated that foreigners abusing tourist visa for job search should be deported, the so-called 'spontaneous' labour immigration was a common practice.<sup>40</sup> It was fuelled by the desperate labour needs of the booming German economy and supported by local labour agencies that were more interested in helping the local industries than obeying the principles of domestic alien's policy. Therefore the Federal Labour Agency advised employers and their future employees to use the 'second way' of recruitment for personal recruitment by name. This procedure was suitable in case that the prospective employee had come in contact to its potential employer during a visit as a 'real tourist'.<sup>41</sup>

This ambivalence of priorities could be found not only at the local level, but also inside the federal government as a proposition by the Ministry of Social Affairs illustrates: Confronted with the problem of how to prove whether a migrant worker had entered on a tourist visa with the intention of working in Germany before his or her journey (and hence having misused the visa) or afterwards, the administration officials suggested counting the time between entry and taking up his work. According to this logic, the abuse was proven if the migrant started his work immediately after coming to Germany. If he or she had waited some time before taking employment, it was assumed that the tourist had developed the 'spontaneous' wish to work in Germany.<sup>42</sup> It is obvious that the government tried to keep all options to enable or restrict recruitment through unofficial pathways.

With the rise of social problems due to a poor response to immigration tendencies in terms of public investment in infrastructure since the late sixties, the entry of labour migrants as tourists was scandalised in West Germany as well. Turks, who had a growing share among the 'guest workers' and were soon regarded in the public as well as in political and administrative discourse as more 'foreign' than their colleagues from other European countries, especially came into focus.<sup>43</sup> For example, the Head of Alien's Affairs in the Hessian Ministry of Interior demanded to stop the issuance of tourist visa to Turks in general. It was obvious, he claimed, that real Turkish tourists did not de facto

38 Ibid.

39 Federal Archives Koblenz, B106 69872, Grundsätze der Ausländerpolitik. Beschlossen von der Ständigen Konferenz der Innenminister der Länder bei ihrer Sitzung in Berlin am 3./4. Juni 1965. See: M. Berlinghoff, *Gastarbeit* (16), pp. 151-155.

40 Cf. Ibid.; M. Bojadžijev, *Internationale* (18); S. Karakayali, *Gespensster* (18); K. Hunn, *Nächstes Jahr* (38); Sanz-Díaz, *Clandestinos* (18).

41 Federal Archives Koblenz, B149 59663, Bundesministerium für Arbeit an die Sozialattachés der Anwerbestaaten vom 15.3.1971.

42 M. Berlinghoff, *Gastarbeit*, p. 152 (16).

43 Cf. K. Hunn, *Nächstes Jahr* (37), pp. 261-275.

exist.<sup>44</sup> The Federal Ministry of Interior disagreed and insisted that visiting Germany or relatives in Germany had to be possible for Turkish citizens as well.

Taking the international oil crisis as a suitable opportunity, the German government stopped the recruitment of migrant workers in late 1973. This restriction of legal entry led to a further rise of irregular labour migration on tourist visas and unauthorised immigration through overstaying the three-months time limit. Although through the seventies and eighties the German government restricted family-unifying migration and controls of local settlement, tourist visas continued to be a major gate of entry.

## 7. Conclusion

Governments are not monolithic actors. The preceding examples of migration policy have already pointed to differing interests of multilevel actors. Especially in regions with a strong touristic sector, the interest in unhindered entry of tourists may conflict with dominating claims to control immigration. As the basic logic of immigration stops is still in force today in European migration policy, the suspicion of travellers being clandestine immigrants continues to impede tourism from accordant countries: Getting a tourist visa for the Schengen Area can be hard for potential tourists from many third countries. The case of the two Latin-American tourists without valid visas presented in the prologue is just a particular example. But as long as visa regulations are determined by the interior ministries' claim for migration control, it is this specific understanding of tourism that defines what entitles a traveller to receive a tourist visa: Social and economic status in combination with nationality seems to determine if he or she will return.

Thus, the study of the European guest worker regimes of the sixties has shown that migration and tourism correlate in a highly flexible manner. The administrative distinction between migration and tourism depended on both local and national economic and political cycles: In times of economic boom, tourist visas were deployed as a gate of entry to circumvent the official procedures of recruitment that proved to be too slow and inefficient to meet the industrial labour needs. In the French case, the regularisation of irregular labour immigration even became the major – and officially promoted – gate of entry to the labour market.

However, in times of claims for more control on migration, migrants entering the country as tourists were defined as 'illegal' and touristic motives of travellers from typical labour recruitment countries were generally questioned. This was clearly shown in the Swiss example. But even in Switzerland, where the administration was keener to fight 'pseudo-tourism' than in France or Germany, clandestine immigration via the entry as tourists did frequently occur. Yet the criteria to distinguish 'real tourists' from clandes-

44 Federal Archives Koblenz B106 39994, Protokoll der Besprechung der Ausländerreferenten der Innenminister am 15./16.10.1970.

tine migrants were never just economic, but also met ethnic-cultural and, hence, racist ascriptions.

On the other hand, migrants made use of the whole spectrum of opportunities to enter the destination country whatever the official recruitment scheme was. Especially in times when the official recruitment procedure took long, the so called 'spontaneous' and rather autonomous entry on a tourist visa was popular. But also after the sharp restrictions of the immigration and recruitment stops in the early 1970s (and beyond) the entry as a tourist continued to be a promising strategy for migration. For the sake of completeness one has to add that the case of truly spontaneous decision of tourists to take up a job opportunity and become a labour migrant existed as well, but this happened on a rather isolated basis.

As the study of the European guest worker regimes of the sixties has shown, the assumed administrative clear-cut distinction between migrants and tourists is even blurred by the administration itself in times when immigration is needed. So it is another evidence for the complex relationship between migration and tourism that spread over the continuum of mobility, dependent on time, space, motifs and context.