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Ordering the Colonial World around the 20th Century

Global and Comparative Perspectives

**Herausgegeben von
Sebastian Conrad, Nadin Heé und Ulrike Schaper**



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Introduction: Approaching Different Colonial Settings

Nadin Heé / Ulrike Schaper

Historical research on colonialist enterprises in different parts of the world is *en vogue*. One reason for this attention is a new search for the origins of today's globalising processes, of which colonialism is seen as one of the starting points. Having long been designed within the analytic framework of the nation state, historical research has recently suggested that solely national approaches are insufficient to analyse these potentially global relations and has consequently drawn its attention to the exchanges and interactions between colonial regimes, colonising and colonised societies and the common context of a colonial global order. This attention to global entanglements and the search for their early manifestations thus resulted in an adaptation of transnational approaches to the history of colonialism, approaches that try to overcome the nation state as the organising principle of historical narratives.¹ The methodological debate on how transnational histories of colonialisms should be written drew attention to comparisons, transfers and intertwinements between colonies and colonising powers.²

1 S. Conrad / G. Budde / O. Janz (eds.), *Transnationale Geschichte. Themen, Tendenzen und Theorien*, Göttingen 2006.

2 S. Randeria, *Geteilte Geschichten und verwobene Moderne*, in: J. Rüsen / H. Leitgeb / N. Jegelka (eds.), *Zukunftsentwürfe. Idee für eine Kultur der Veränderung*, Frankfurt am Main 1999, pp. 87-96; S. Conrad / S. Randeria, *Einleitung. Geteilte Geschichten – Europa in einer postkolonialen Welt*, in: S. Conrad / S. Randeria (eds.), *Jenseits des Eurozentrismus. Postkoloniale Perspektiven in den Geschichts- und Kulturwissenschaften*, Frankfurt am Main / New York 2002, pp. 9-49; J. Osterhammel, *Geschichtswissenschaft jenseits des Nationalstaats. Studien zu Beziehungsgeschichte und Zivilisationsvergleich*, Göttingen 2001.

Only reluctantly do historians try to realise such programmatic demands in empirical case studies. The new methodological challenges are accompanied by many practical and institutional problems: Research requires the ability to read several different languages, the knowledge of a broad historical context (in the worst case the whole world), and familiarity with the different local histories and cultures of the regions incorporated in the analysis. Expensive and time-consuming archival sojourns in different countries can be necessary to find the relevant sources and literature. Moreover, the outline of the research agendas is often structured by disciplinary limitations. Research on non-European history is – at least in Germany – often still left to Area Studies and not situated within History departments.

Nevertheless, in colonial history first attempts have been made to include comparative, transnational approaches. Such studies, for example, compare different colonial powers or the effects of colonialism in different areas³ or inquire into relations between metropole and the periphery.⁴ The attention to transnational processes has also sharpened the awareness of interactions between colonial powers and knowledge transfers between colonising and colonised cultures, as well as between colonising powers.⁵

To address the concerns of such works and reconcile methodological demands and empirical research, this collection – as an intermediate step – uses the expertise of researchers who study different colonial systems. To contribute on the one hand to the comparison of different colonial powers and on the other hand to shed light on the entangled nature of colonial histories, this volume assembles several case studies on the organisation of colonial rule. It thus unites perspectives on different colonial settings (Germany, imperial Russia, Japan, the United States, Great Britain), in the late 19th and early 20th century, the era which C. A. Bayly describes as “New Imperialism”.⁶ To prepare the ground for further comparisons and analogies, all case studies pose similar questions about the structure and organisation of colonial rule and the policies concerning the colonised popu-

3 Matthew Lange, James Mahoney and Matthias vom Hau examine the British and Spanish colonialism in economic perspective, see: M. Lange / J. Mahoney / M. v. Hau, *Colonialism and Development: A Comparative Analysis of Spanish and British Colonies*, in: *The American Journal of Sociology*, 111 (2006) 5, pp. 1412-1462. For a comparison of Russian domination in Samarkand and the British colonialism supplies, see: A. Morrison, *Russian Rule in Samarkand 1868–1910: A Comparison with British India*, New York 2008; Crawford Young compares colonialisms of different European powers in Africa, see: C. Young, *The African Colonial State in Comparative Perspective*, New Haven (Conn.) 1994.

4 A. L. Stoler / F. Cooper, *Between Metropole and Colony: Rethinking a Research Agenda*, in: id. (eds.), *Tensions of Empire: Colonial Cultures in a Bourgeois World*, Berkeley 1997, pp. 1-57; B. Ashcroft / G. Griffiths / H. Tiffin, *The Empire Writes Back: Theory and Practice in Post-Colonial Literatures*, London 1989; A. Thompson, *The Empire Strikes Back? The Impact of Imperialism on Britain from the Mid-Nineteenth Century*, Harlow 2005.

5 One example, in which the German Empire is examined in a transnational perspective: S. Conrad / J. Osterhammel (eds.), *Das Kaiserreich transnational. Deutschland in der Welt 1871–1914*, Göttingen 2004. With the example of the East-Chinese railway, Urbansky analyses the colonial competition, exchanges and interactions of the three powers Russia, China and Japan, see: S. Urbansky, *Kolonialer Wettstreit. Russland, China, Japan und die Ostchinesische Eisenbahn*, Frankfurt am Main 2008. For the British Empire in India, see: B. S. Cohn, *Colonialism and Its Forms of Knowledge: The British in India*, Princeton 1996.

6 C. A. Bayly, *The Birth of the Modern World 1780–1914: Global Connections and Comparisons*, Victoria 2004, especially pp. 227-234.

lation. Within recent debates on the heuristic use and value of the term “colonialism” concerning forms of domination not only in overseas territories but also in the margins of empires, scholars have drawn attention to different forms of colonial rule and structural similarities in various colonial situations.⁷ In order to stimulate such discussions on the similarities and differences of colonialisms, this volume brings together various colonial settings which have not always been subsumed under the label of colonialism.⁸ All cases presented include at least the occupation of alien territories as well as a notion of ethnic difference. Especially the case of the Soviet Union, whose classification as colonial is not clear and heavily debated in historiography, generates these questions.⁹ By using the example of Great Britain, this collection includes one of the older colonial powers with a long colonial experience, which often functioned as a model of colonial rule for other imperial powers. In contrast, Germany, the United States, Russia and Japan, are examples of “late comers” to the colonial enterprise. Within the mutual perceptions and assessments of the colonial powers, the United States and Japan tried to develop a counter-model, thus distinguishing their colonial endeavours from the European form of colonialism, which they judged as immoral. Quite similarly, the Soviet Union criticised colonialism by linking it to the former Tsarist Empire and officially tried to overcome its colonial legacies.

All articles in this volume focus on state colonialism, administrative and governmental actors, and the different processes of establishing and maintaining colonial order. They examine different concepts, justifications and practices of dealing with the indigenous population. Policies that range from creating difference, conserving legal customs, and attempting to create a dual legal system, to abolishing ‘uncivilised’ customs, re-organising agricultural methods, and fostering education and modernisation can be subsumed under two basic strategies: a strategy of separation and a strategy of convergence. Separation as a concept of dealing with the colonised population was closely connected to the constitution and construction of difference between the colonisers and the colonised. It stressed the necessity to distance the two groups in order to maintain colonial rule and culminated in segregational plans and actions. By the end of the 19th century

7 For a discussion on the definition of the terms colonialism and imperialism, see: R. J. C. Young, *Postcolonialism: An Historical Introduction*, Oxford 2001, pp. 15-43; already Geyer for example describes the constitution of tsarist Russia as a form of colonialism, see: D. Geyer, *Der russische Imperialismus. Studien über den Zusammenhang von innerer und auswärtiger Politik 1860–1914*, Göttingen 1977, especially pp. 238-240; for the Japanese case some studies discussed the question whether the annexation of Hokkaido and Okinawa can already be considered as colonialism, see for example: T. Komagome, *Shokuminchi teikoku nihon no bunka tōgō* [The cultural unification in the Japanese colonial empire], Tokyo 1996.

8 For a definition of colonialism, see: J. Osterhammel, *Kolonialismus. Geschichte – Formen – Folgen*, München 1995, especially pp. 19-22; for a definition of imperialism versus colonialism, see pp. 26-28.

9 K. Adeeb, *Backwardness and the Quest for Civilization: Early Soviet Central Asia in Comparative Perspective*, in: *Slavic Review*, 65 (2006) 2, pp. 231-251; D. Kandiyoti, *Post-Colonialism Compared: Potentials and Limitations in the Middle East and Central Asia*, in: *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 34 (2002) 2, pp. 279-297.

such measures were often motivated by racial theories and differences between the colonisers and the colonised related to the categories of biology and race.¹⁰

Convergency, in contrast, aimed in a broad sense at a decrease of perceived differences between colonisers and colonised. The attempted transformation was always conceptualised as a reduction of the colonised's inferiority. Disciplinary, educational and civilising measures were thus seen as part of 'uplifting' the colonised. Most consistently realised, convergency resulted in policies of assimilation.¹¹ Transformational approaches were embedded in the discourse of a civilising mission. The idea of 'civilising' was one of the key concepts in modern colonial discourse and formed an important often legitimating point of reference within the negotiations on dealing with the colonised population.¹² The contributions in this volume discuss how both converging and separating tendencies were inscribed into 'native policies' and the various ways to deal with the indigenous populations. This volume tries to explore the tense relation between these two concepts, which nevertheless are both based on a hierarchical difference between the colonisers and the colonised in which the latter is devalued. Various explanations and scientific models rationalised the inferiority of the colonised in relation to their development, state of civilisation and 'race'. Such explanations had an impact on both separating and converging measures. The connection between racial differentiation and segregating policies are evident and well researched.¹³ However, the question remains as to how these ideological distinctions were undermined by political necessities and as to how the sharp distinction between colonisers and colonised was blurred in the colony, for example in respect to local elites or indigenous employees of the colonial administration.¹⁴ In contrast, the interference of civilising attempts with other aspects of 'native policy' has not been examined to a satisfactory extent, even though the topic of the civilising mission has attracted much attention in recent historiographical debate.¹⁵ Particularly the often mutual constitutive relationship of civilising missions and racisms needs to be explored further.

10 M. Adas, *Machines as the Measure of Men: Science, Technology, and Ideologies of Western Dominance*, Ithaca/London 1989, p. 339.

11 Two examples for assimilation policies that are not included in this volume are the cases of French and Portuguese colonialism.

12 J. Osterhammel, *Kolonialismus* (footnote 8), 1995, p. 20.

13 See for example: C. Anderson, *Legible Bodies: Race, Criminality and Colonialism in South Asia*, Oxford 2004; D. Thomas, *Black France: Colonialism, Immigration, and Transnationalism*, Bloomington 2006; A. Warwick, *Colonial pathologies: American tropical medicine, race and hygiene in the Philippines*, Durham 2006.

14 F. Cooper, *Conflict and Connection: Rethinking Colonial African History*, in: *The American Historical Review*, 99 (1994) 5, pp. 1516-1545; M. M.-C. Lo, *Doctors within Borders: Profession, Ethnicity, and Modernity in Colonial Taiwan*, Berkeley Los Angeles London 2002; W. Ernst, et. al. (eds.), *India's Princely States: People, Princes and Colonialism*, London/New York 2007.

15 M. Adas, *Machines as the Measure* (footnote 10); L. Pyenson, *Civilizing Mission: Exact Sciences and French Overseas Expansion, 1830-1940*, Baltimore 1993; B. Barth/J. Osterhammel (eds.), *Zivilisierungsmissionen. Imperiale Weltverbesserung seit dem 18. Jahrhundert*, Konstanz 2005; H. Fischer-Tiné/M. Mann (eds.), *Colonialism as Civilizing Mission: Cultural Ideology in British India*, London 2004; A. Conklin, *A Mission to Civilize: The Republican Idea of Empire in France and West Africa, 1895-1930*, Stanford 1998; S. Malinowski, *Modernisierungskriege. Militärische Gewalt und koloniale Modernisierung im Algerienkrieg (1954-1962)*, in: *Archiv für Sozialgeschichte*, 48 (2008), pp. 213-248; N. Berman, *Impossible Missions? German Economic, Military, and Humanitarian Efforts in Africa*, Lincoln/London 2004.

Some historians see a civilising mission which builds on potential equality as logically incompatible with racism, because the latter is based on indelible biological difference.¹⁶ Others judge racism as a phenomenon which is integrated into civilising practices in the colony but is not part of the essence of the civilising mission. Racism, in this view, undermines the civilising mission.¹⁷ Furthermore, excessive violence in this perspective is seen as a reaction to the failure of civilising attempts rather than a part of them; a “change” takes place in which liberation transforms into force, a conversion from exercising benevolent influence to using physical violence. But this is only convincing if a very narrow concept of biological racism based on the idea of immutability of different polygenetic human races and a concept of civilising with the concrete goal of complete equality are taken for granted. But the empirical material shows complex connections between civilising attempts and racialisation, which are, in regard to the historical situations, fairly unidimensional. Such definitions distract the attention from the question of how civilising efforts were intertwined with racialisations which manifested in processes of defining and signifying characteristics and actions of certain groups in relation to the concept of race,¹⁸ categorisations of human beings, social Darwinist ideas and concepts of relative development.

By simply opposing racism and civilising mission, and herewith stressing the mutual exclusiveness of these two concepts, one could fail to acknowledge the specific relation of the different racialising, devaluating, deviating, segregating efforts and the educational, ‘uplifting’, developing efforts. In analysing these ambiguous attempts, it is necessary to conceptualise their relation as more complex than simply a binary opposition. Moreover, the question arises whether intellectual processes and social practices which rest on essentialised cultural and ethnic categories and reassign inferiority to the colonial other should be called racist, in a wider sense. In his work on concepts of racism, Robert Miles sees race thinking and ideas of civilisation in the 19th century as mutually developing. Concepts of civilisation and barbarism, he states, pre-shaped the space for racialised thinking. At the same time racialisations actualised and nurtured the concepts of civilisation and barbarism.¹⁹ As empirical studies have shown, the lack of understanding of the political strategies of the colonised could even lead to an increase in biologicistic explanations of cultural differences as a consequence of the frustration toward the invincible ‘natives’.²⁰

16 B. Barth, *Die Grenzen der Zivilisierungsmission. Rassenvorstellungen in den europäischen Siedlungskolonien Virginia, den Burenrepubliken und Deutsch-Südwestafrika*, in: B. Barth/J. Osterhammel (eds.), *Zivilisierungsmissionen* (footnote 15), pp. 201–228, here p. 203.

17 J. Osterhammel, “The Great Work of Uplifting Mankind” *Zivilisierungsmission und Moderne*, in: B. Barth/J. Osterhammel (eds.), *Zivilisierungsmissionen* (footnote 15), pp. 363–425, here p. 371; J. Osterhammel, *Europe, the “West” and the Civilizing Mission*, London 2006, p. 31.

18 See: R. Miles, *Racialization*, in: E. Cashmore, *Encyclopedia of Race and Ethnic Studies*, London 2004, pp. 348–349.

19 R. Miles, *Rassismus. Theorie und Geschichte eines Begriffes*, Hamburg/Berlin 1999 [1991], p. 46.

20 C. Marx, *Kolonialkrieg und rassistische Dämonologie – Das südliche Afrika im 19. Jahrhundert*, in: M. Dabag/H. Gründer/U.-K. Ketelsen (eds.), *Kolonialismus: Kolonialdiskurs und Genozid*, München 2004, pp. 167–184, here p. 184; J. Osterhammel, *Europe* (footnote 17), p. 31, stresses that civilising missions were undermined by racism

However, the possible inclusion of racisms into civilising efforts does not say that the attempt to civilise was always built on strict biological race thinking.²¹ As different works on civilising missions have pointed out, biologicistic racism was not the only, and sometimes not even, an important factor in establishing the superiority of the colonial powers over the colonised.²² Devaluation of the ‘other’, which referred to cultural or ethnic differences within the civilising discourse, can only be included in a wider concept of racism.²³ On the other hand, widening the term of racism too much endangers its value as an analytic tool. If every devaluation is automatically called racism, then there is no possibility of differentiating between various explanations for difference when referring to culture as well as biology. In addition, too wide a concept of racism leaves no opportunity to distinguish between racialisation as a concept of difference and discriminating practices. Rather than excluding racisms from civilising attempts, it is more fruitful for historical analysis to differentiate between various racisms and analytically specify if racist thought or racist practices are relevant for the civilising context. To draw attention to various forms of racism is even more important since at the end of the 19th century different forms of racial thinking existed and the usage of the term “race” was incoherent and contradictory.²⁴ Civilising missions were not always directed towards people that were defined as racially different (see Teichmann, Heé in this volume). In the Japanese case, however, the objective of the self civilisation as well as the civilisation of the colonised was to achieve the level of civilisation of the ‘white race’, and therefore was linked with ideas of racial categorisation. Especially where civilising missions were not only directed towards the colonies but also towards the metropole, racial difference as a motive for transformation played an inferior role. These cases, which included the transfer of civilising concepts to the underdogs of the colonising societies, are at the same time persuasive examples of how colonialism shaped both the colonised and the colonising societies and how impulses went in both directions.²⁵

Following such considerations it becomes clear that the relation of racialisation and segregation, indirect rule, and the necessity for the colonisers to create governable colonial subjects remains an important task of historiographical research. Closely connected to

because of the perceived unalterable inability of the people in need of civilisation.

- 21 Adas, for example, states the role of “racism in its more restricted sense” in the intellectual discourse has to be re-evaluated, see: M. Adas, *Machines as the Measure* (footnote 10), p. 274.
- 22 See: M. Mann, *Torchbearers upon the Path of Progress: Britain’s Ideology of a ‘Moral and Material Progress’ in India: An Introductory Essay*, in: H. Fischer-Tiné / M. Mann (eds.), *Colonialism as Civilizing Mission* (footnote 15), pp. 1-26, here p. 22; M. Adas, *Machines as the Measure* (footnote 10), pp. 338-339. Nina Berman has pointed out, that actions which were motivated by the wish to ‘help’ and ‘develop’ often produced similar domination to those actions motivated by openly racist concepts, see: N. Berman, *Impossible Missions* (footnote 15), p. 3.
- 23 For an overview on debates on the definition of racism, see: R. Miles, *Rassismus* (footnote 19).
- 24 Adas has pointed out, that in the civilising discourse race was a vague category that was used in different ways sometimes even by the same author, see: M. Adas, *Machines as the Measure* (footnote 10), pp. 272-273; for the development of racial thinking, see: W. Conze, *Rasse*, in: O. Brunner / W. Conze / R. Koselleck, *Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe*, v. 5, Stuttgart 1984, pp. 135-178.
- 25 S. Conrad, “Eingeborenenpolitik” in *Kolonie und Metropole. “Erziehung zur Arbeit” in Ostafrika und Ostwestfalen*, in: S. Conrad / J. Osterhammel (eds.), *Das Kaiserreich* (footnote 5), pp. 107-128; M. Mann, *Torchbearers* (footnote 22), pp. 14-17.

this problem remains the question of violence and its entanglement with the ideology and practise of civilising. Gyan Prakash states in his work on (post)-colonial relations that the “myth of the civilising mission” found its “perverse expressions” in “racist stereotyping and exploitation of blacks” and the spread of “civic virtue with military power”.²⁶ The claim of universality was qualified in the colonies “due to a functioning of colonial power as a form of transaction and translation between incommensurable cultures and positions”.²⁷ Violence thus does not appear as a degeneration of the civilising thought but can be seen as closely connected and partly consequential to civilising missions.

Following these reflections the articles in this volume address violence in the colonial setting, mainly in the form of penalisation through corporal punishment. Violence was used for the purpose of maintaining colonial order and disciplining the colonised. Delving deeper, the articles ask whether such violence should be understood as a substantial transformation of the idea of civilising or whether devaluations should be conceptualised as inherent to the civilising mission. Violence is included in the context of the civilising mission, which evolves out of a chauvinistic universalisation of one’s own cultural values and practices. Physical violence in this sense could be understood as the transformation of disrespect for the ‘other’, and subordination and actual violent acts could be assessed as a consequence of the latent epistemic violence.²⁸ Colonial powers interpreted resistance against civilising attempts as a legitimisation to use violent means to punish people who did not embrace the, in the eyes of the civiliser, benevolent civilisation and then to force them under it. Violent actions against the colonised thus could be read as the consequence of the epistemic violence of devaluating the ‘other’.

Another crucial aspect in the concept of civilising was the idea of a gradual development of cultures in reference to evolutionistic ideas, which brought the consideration of long periods of human history into perspective. In the case of colonialism ‘civilisation’ often served as a justification of colonial expansion and was reduced to a rhetoric figure.²⁹ The civilising mission is characterised by an ambiguous tension between rhetoric and realisation which can also be addressed in order to pose questions about the relationship of discourse and practices. Some articles in this volume address this issue in discussing how abstractly the goal of the civilising mission was formulated and how far the moment of realising civilisatory ideas was postponed to the future (especially Schaper, Schumacher).

As Matsuzaki shows in his reflections on comparative analysis of colonial states, functions of law mark a difference between the nation state and the colonial state. The importance of law for the institutionalisation of colonial rule, as well as its interference with ideas of civilising legal questions, is taken up by Schaper, Heé, and Lindner. They

26 G. Prakash, Introduction: After Colonialism, in: id. (ed.), *After Colonialism: Imperial Histories and Postcolonial Displacements*, Princeton 1994, pp. 3–17, here p. 4.

27 Ibid., p. 3.

28 S. Hofmann, *Die Konstruktion kolonialer Wirklichkeit. Eine diskursanalytische Untersuchung französischer Karibiktexte des 17. Jahrhunderts*, Frankfurt am Main 2001, p. 79.

29 M. Mann, *Torchbearers* (footnote 22), pp. 5–10.

explore transcultural processes of the transformation of law in the context of civilising discourse, reflecting on the attempts to enforce cultural transformation with the help of legal regulations and the abolishment of 'uncivilised' practices ranging from marital regulations to practices of punishment. They also show that law was not only an instrument of transformation; laws also appeared as an instrument of governance upon which racialisations were inscribed. Thus, law and legal practices functioned to transport and implement devaluations of the colonised and civilising efforts and converted abstract concepts into practices of governance.

The shape of colonial rule was determined by national as well as local factors and their specific interplay. Some of the articles examine the significance of such national and local factors including transfer processes of knowledge, mutual imitations between colonising powers and refinements of each other's concepts (see Lindner, Schumacher, Heé). In this context, the contribution of the local populations and elites to the process of shaping the case-specific constitution of colonial domination is an important aspect, to which Schaper pays special attention.

Another important factor for the self-definition of colonial rulers has been the policies concerning the colonised population, a topic which will be addressed in all contributions. The development of a counter-model of colonialism in the United States, Russia and Japan was, for example, centred on the idea of a more benevolent treatment of the colonised population than in European colonialism. Especially the Japanese case shows how the counter-model to European colonialism resulted into a double-bind civilising mission towards the in- and outside. The search for an alternative colonialism has to be seen within the context of debates on a specific Japanese way of modernisation.³⁰ However, the Japanese as well as the Russian case demonstrates the twisted ways in which the political elites and colonial planners perceived the entanglement of Western modernisation with colonial expansionism.³¹ The search for a counter-model remained captive within the Western discourse of modernisation against which it was directed (Heé, Schumacher and Teichmann). In reciprocal assessments of colonial powers, Great Britain appears to have been the most prominent role model for all later colonial enterprises. Even the United States and Japan, who tried to distinguish their practices from European colonialism, still followed the British example.

A theoretical contribution to this volume (Matsuzaki) takes up the question of defining characteristics of colonial rule by reflecting on the areas of political negotiation which shape the colonial state in the specific historical setting. Building on the findings of the case studies, he contributes to the methodological discussion on comparative colonial history.

30 For the concept of multiple modernities, see: S. N. Eisenstadt, *Vielfältige Modernen*, in: *Zeitschrift für Weltgeschichte*, 2 (2001), pp. 9-33.

31 For Russia and the Soviet Union, see: W. Sunderland, 'The "Colonial Question": Visions of Colonization in Late Imperial Russia', in: *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas*, 48 (2000) 2, pp. 210-232; A. Edgar, *Bolshevism, Patriarchy, and the Nation. The Soviet "Emancipation" of Muslim Women in Pan-Islamic Perspective*, in: *Slavic Review*, 65 (2006) 2, pp. 252-272, for the Japanese case there are no studies focusing on this question.

The case studies of this volume discuss the questions of convergency and separation through the following specific issues:

Ulrike Schaper in her article on German colonialism examines legal discussions and practices surrounding the 'native law' and 'native courts' in Cameroon from 1884 until 1914. She shows how law and jurisdiction were understood as a means of 'native policy'. Political measures were shaped by the tension between the alignment of indigenous legal customs towards European values and the maintenance of order, which included the conservation of local customs. In her analysis she asks how the colonised undermined legal measures and how far the colonial legal policy in Cameroon was shaped by their interventions and actions. She elaborates upon how within the rhetoric of civilising a long term perspective which postpones the civilising to a vague future appears as a sign of the discrepancy between discourse and practice.

Christian Teichmann poses the question if and for what period politics in Russian Central Asia can be understood as colonial. Focusing on prominent Bolshevik leaders of the 1920s and 1930s he examines the Soviet policy in Central Asia as a 'civilising mission' to overcome Russian colonial racism, on the one hand, and destroying Central Asian 'traditional' lifestyle and economy, on the other hand. To this end, the re-structuring of cotton production as a means to centralise economic control and to force collectivisation is identified as a civilising mission. As widely known, collectivisation and monoculture were main characteristics of the Soviet economy throughout the country (and not only Central Asia) – it is in this context that the question arises whether 'colonialism' is the appropriate label to describe the Soviet endeavour.

In the next contribution *Nadin Heé* examines the penal system in Japan as well as different forms of punishment in the Japanese colony of Taiwan. In this context she draws attention to a civilising mission, which is both directed towards the outside (the colony) and the inside (Japanese society) between the 1850s and 1900s. Heé highlights attempts of self-civilisation and self-modernisation by the Japanese government which aimed at a reform of the Japanese penal code and first followed Chinese and later European law in order to prove Japanese 'civilisation' to Western powers. In particular, she assesses the prohibition and reintroduction of the penal practice of flogging in Taiwan in relation to debates on civilising the Taiwanese. Finally, she explores the construction of prisons in Taiwan and Japan as a marker to prove the degree of the state's civilisation.

Frank Schumacher argues that the American way of colonial empire in the early 20th century was strongly shaped by the appropriation of European, in particular British, models of colonial governance. His analysis of U.S. colonial state-building in the Philippines questions the notion of exceptionalism and demonstrates the intensity and depth of this transatlantic inter-imperial dialogue in which the British experience of empire provided an intellectual framework for emerging American discourses on the intricacies of colonial rule.

Ulrike Lindner compares British and German concepts and practices of colonial rule in Africa. She examines the similarities and differences in the colonial concepts of the two colonial powers in respect to national characteristics and local conditions. Under

the focus of debates on “mixed marriages” she examines race policies in German and English colonies. In tracing the mutual perceptions and the beginning cooperation and exchanges of knowledge between colonial powers, for example the excursions of members of the colonial government to other colonies, she finally draws the picture of the formation of a European colonial archive and system of collaboration in colonial rule before World War I.

Finally, *Reo Matsuzaki* deepens the methodological discussion on the comparison of different colonial settings. He argues that researchers should move away from empires as the primary units of analysis and instead place the colonial state in the centre of their investigations; in doing so, the diverse conditions and histories of colonised territories can be related. Second, he discusses how we can take the concrete examples of individual cases to a more conceptual level by comparing three different political arenas of the colonial state in order to identify the mechanisms that structured the interactions between the colonial state and other key players within each arena. To develop and strengthen his theoretical analyses he incorporates the results of the other authors and thus draws the first comparative conclusions.

This volume explores determining factors for the concept and implementation of colonial rule and exchanges between and entanglements of colonising powers. The different contributions come to new results within the historiographical discussions of their respective fields. They occasionally also highlight relations and knowledge transfers between the colonising powers, which are examined in this volume. Between the contributions, connections and entanglements of colonising powers become apparent. By focusing on one aspect of colonial policies, this volume thus strives to stimulate attempts to relate and synthesise findings on different colonial settings as well as methodological reflections on comparative and transnational approaches on colonialisms and empirical research.

It now remains for us to thank the German Research Foundation (*Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft*), who enabled our archival sojourns in Japan, Taiwan and Cameroon and financially supported this publication. Only through the excellent cooperation of all the authors, however, could this volume be realised in such an unproblematic manner. Last but not least, we would like to thank Ilka Eickhof, Ruben Marc Hackler, Tomoko Mamine, and Sarah Seidel for their diligence and commitment to the editing process, for polishing the manuscripts linguistically and formally, all of which we are deeply grateful for.

Law and Colonial Order: Legal Policy in German Cameroon between Civilising and Public Peace

Ulrike Schaper

RESÜMEE

Der Artikel untersucht Recht und Gerichtsbarkeit als Instrumente deutscher Kolonialherrschaft in Kamerun. Rechtspolitische Maßnahmen bewegten sich in einem Spannungsfeld zwischen Zivilisierungsbestrebungen und dem vor Ort für die Kolonialregierung weitaus wichtigeren Bedürfnis nach der Aufrechterhaltung von Ordnung. Die indigene Bevölkerung gestaltete die Umsetzung der rechtspolitischen Maßnahmen durch ihre Re- und Interaktionen mit und setzten Recht in beschränktem Maße als Mittel zur Selbstbehauptung ein. Recht bildete so ein Instrument, das von unterschiedlichen Gruppen für ihre Interessen genutzt werden konnte. Der Konflikt zwischen den kolonialpolitischen Zielen einer ‚Zivilisierung‘ und der Aufrechterhaltung der Ordnung wurde durch das Aufschieben zivilisatorischer Maßnahmen in eine unbestimmte Zukunft gelöst.

Especially the criminal part of the colonial judicature is, in an eminent sense, a political task of the colonising people. One has to mediate wisely between on the one hand the will to implant European ideas of common decency and morality into the population, the will to maintain law, public peace and order in the country, and on the other hand the irrefutable demand to consider at all times the actual power relations, and, through wisely protecting what the natives hold right and holy, to not force them under German rule, but to win them for it.¹

As this quote from an article on criminal jurisdiction over the natives in the German colonies from 1905 shows, the importance of law within the process of colonisation is a subject that has not only recently attracted the attention of historians and legal anthro-

1 P. Bauer, Die Strafrechtspflege über die Eingeborenen der deutschen Schutzgebiete, in: Archiv für öffentliches Recht, 19 (1905) 1, pp. 32-86, here p. 70. (All translations from German are my mine.)

pologists,² but was also already seen as an important issue by contemporaries. In these few lines the author brings together two fundamental aims of colonial legal policy: the transfer of European ideas and the maintenance of order. The author implies that the power basis of German rule was fragile, and that the “actual power relations” needed to be considered “at all times”. Thus he implicitly warns that the indigenous might react with opposition to measures in pursuit of this aim. He proposes that the indigenous population should consent to rather than be forced under German rule, and that law, or moreover the conservation of legal customs, of “what the natives hold right and holy”, will contribute to win them over for new masters.

Studies that deal with law within German colonialism are often, but not always, written by jurists. One part of the literature focuses on historical legal debates over colonial law and the structure and functioning of the colonial jurisdiction with an emphasis on criminal law.³ They primarily address these topics without contextualising the historical debates or considering the negotiation of legal processes between the colonial administration and the population of the colonies. Another set of works examines law within the larger frame of political discourses in the metropole. Questions of ‘mixed marriages’ and ‘nationality’, as well as the political position of the parliament in the colonial legislation, form the main objectives of such studies.⁴

Still neglected within German colonial historiography is the question of how German colonial law and jurisdiction functioned within the establishment and maintenance of colonial power. Similarly, studies about the effects of German colonial rule on the laws of the colonised and the question of how the colonial law was itself shaped by interactions with the colonised are still a neglected part of German colonial historiography.⁵

This article contributes to filling in these gaps by analysing how legal policy was discussed and used as a means of native policy. It shows that the reactions of the colonised to colonial law were part of the elaboration and implementation of legal political measures and that the outcomes of these measures were shaped by their reactions and interactions.

2 As a few examples among many which deal with the relation of colonialism and law and the interactions of state law and the law of the colonised and their mutual modifications, see: K. Mann/R. Roberts (eds.), *Law in Colonial Africa*, Portsmouth (N. H.)/London 1991; W. J. Mommsen/J. A. d. Moor (eds.), *European Expansion and Law: The Encounter of European and Indigenous Law in 19th- and 20th-century Africa and Asia*, Oxford 1992; L. A. Benton, *Law and Colonial Cultures: Legal Regimes in World History, 1400–1900*, Cambridge 2002.

3 For example: H.-J. Fischer, *Die deutschen Kolonien. Die koloniale Rechtsordnung und ihre Entwicklung nach dem ersten Weltkrieg*, Berlin 2001; N. B. Wagner, *Die deutschen Schutzgebiete. Erwerb, Organisation und Verlust aus juristischer Sicht*, Baden-Baden 2002; R. Schlottau, *Deutsche Kolonialrechtspflege. Strafrecht und Strafmacht in den deutschen Schutzgebieten 1884 bis 1914*, Frankfurt am Main 2007; R. Voigt/P. Sack (eds.), *Kolonialisierung des Rechts. Zur kolonialen Rechts- und Verwaltungsordnung*, Baden-Baden 2001; G. Walz, *Die Entwicklung der Strafrechtspflege in Kamerun unter deutscher Herrschaft 1884–1914*, Freiburg 1981; M. Schröder, *Prügelstrafe und Züchtigungsrecht in den deutschen Schutzgebieten Schwarzafrikas*, Münster 1997.

4 D. Nagl, *Grenzfälle. Staatsangehörigkeit, Rassismus und nationale Identität unter deutscher Kolonialherrschaft*, Frankfurt am Main 2007; B. Kundrus, *Moderne Imperialisten. Das Kaiserreich im Spiegel seiner Kolonien*, Köln/Weimar/Wien 2003; M. Grohmann, *Exotische Verfassung. Die Kompetenzen des Reichstags für die deutschen Kolonien in Gesetzgebung und Staatsrechtswissenschaft des Kaiserreichs (1884–1914)*, Tübingen 2001.

5 An example of the development of ‘customary law’ under German colonialism is supplied by: S. F. Moore, *Facts and Fabrications: “Customary” Law on Kilimanjaro, 1880–1980*, Cambridge 1986, pp. 95–109.

Finally, the article presents some thoughts on how contradictions that appeared between the attempt to civilise and the need to sustain public order were 'solved'. It proposes that these contradictions were resolved by prioritising and subsequently addressing them based on the different 'urgencies' assigned to them. The article argues that legal policy was used as an important means to governing the indigenous population of the German colony of Cameroon, and that law and jurisdiction were a crucial factor within the exercise of colonial rule. Yet, law was also utilised by the colonised to pursue their interests, which were often contrary to the colonial government's goals.

1. Law as a servant of civilisation and order

When Germany took over the rule of her colonies, the government had no elaborated concept of the legal arrangement in the colonies.⁶ In the time following, orders were enacted mainly as a reaction to certain problems and necessities. German laws were introduced for all Europeans, but the population of Cameroon was excluded from these laws because they were thought to be too 'uncivilised' to fall under German law.⁷ Their legal cases, especially those which concerned what German law understood as criminal law, were decided by the local administrative officials. The substantive law was not fixed, and only some regulations concerning criminal procedure were enacted.⁸ As late as 1902 a manual stated that a criminal procedure could only be opened for those actions that were forbidden by German law or decrees.⁹ The local officials' list of punishments, which they had to hand in regularly to the Gouvernement, as well as the constant correction of non-existing offences by the Gouvernement or the Colonial Office (*Reichskolonialamt*, before 1907 *Kolonialabteilung des Auswärtigen Amtes*) in Berlin, show however that this principle was not implemented on the spot, and that the disregard for this principle had no consequences for the officials.¹⁰ Until 1916 neither criminal law was properly introduced nor were the sentences for the offences fixed. In addition to the colonial jurisdiction of the officials, the Germans empowered Cameroonian chiefs to preside over cases. This was perceived as a continuation of earlier practices. Both the colonial jurisdiction and the 'native courts' were utilised as instruments of native policy.

6 D. Nagl, Grenzfälle (footnote 4), p. 23.

7 Gerstmeier, Eingeborenenrecht, in: H. Schnee (ed.), *Deutsches Kolonial-Lexikon*, 3 vol., Leipzig 1920, v. I, pp. 507-514, here p. 508.

8 The regulations can be found in: J. Ruppel (ed.), *Die Landesgesetzgebung für das deutsche Schutzgebiet Kamerun*, Berlin 1912, no. 400-421.

9 Dienstvorschrift des Gouverneurs, betreffend die Ausübung der Strafgerichtsbarkeit gegenüber den Eingeborenen, vom Mai 1902, in: J. Ruppel (ed.), *Die Landesgesetzgebung* (footnote 8), no. 403.

10 The central colonial authorities often remarked upon the listing of incorrect offences, see: Auswärtiges Amt, Kolonialabteilung to Gouverneur, 22 May 1903, in: Archives Nationales du Cameroun, Yaoundé (ANY) FA 1/292, sheets 89-91; Gouverneur to Station Johann-Albrechts-Höhe, 22 May 1898, in: ANY FA 4/1066 without page-numbers; Gouvernement to Bezirksamt Edea, 9 March 1909, in: ANY FA 1/618, sheet 13.

1.1. On uplift and development: Law as an object and instrument of civilising efforts

Germany as a colonising power is generally not assessed as having put a strong emphasis on the civilising mission, especially when compared to Great Britain or France.¹¹ Contemporaries as well as historians stress that the purpose of the German colonial project lay primarily in contributing to Germany's prosperity and international importance.¹² However, although a civilising mission was not drawn upon as an official ideology by the government, the conviction of one's own superiority as being 'civilised', a conception of a universal progress of civilisation and a notion of developing the colonised cultures, nevertheless formed the core of the attitude towards the indigenous population and a self-legitimation of the colonial expansion.¹³ It corresponded with a wide acceptance of Social Darwinism around the turn of the century and a tendency within legal anthropology to focus on the development of primitive societies into civilised states.¹⁴ Consequently, in the discussion of the policy concerning the colonised population, the transformation of the colonised cultures into the ideal of the Western civilisation appeared as one aim. The assumed fundamental inferiority of the colonised helped to construct the necessity for paternalistic guidance and the liberation from 'despotism', 'superstition' and 'barbarism'. This article uses a wide concept of 'civilising', including sometimes contradicting educational purposes, disciplinary efforts, and concepts of relative as well as absolute development, which build on the supposed superiority of the Germans to the colonised. All measures, which in a context of hierarchal cultural difference aimed at some sort of change towards 'civilised' standards, are in the following subsumed under the term of 'civilising'.

As much of the literature on the civilising mission pointed out, proposing to introduce civilised standards into the law served to justify the colonial expansion. But not all of

11 For Great Britain and France, see: M. Mann/H. Fischer-Tiné (eds.), *Colonialism as Civilizing Mission: Cultural Ideology in British India*, London 2004; L. Pyenson, *Civilizing Mission: Exact Sciences and French Overseas Expansion, 1830–1940*, Baltimore/London 1993; M. Adas, *Machines as the Measure of Men: Science, Technology, and Ideologies of Western Dominance*, Ithaca/London 1989.

12 K. Hausen, *Deutsche Kolonialherrschaft in Afrika. Wirtschaftsinteressen und Kolonialverwaltung in Kamerun vor 1914*, Zürich 1970, pp. 175–176; H. R. Rudin, *Germans in the Cameroons, 1884–1914: A Case Study in Modern Imperialism*, Hamden (Conn.) 1968 [1938], pp. 297–298; B. Barth, *Die Grenzen der Zivilisierungsmission. Rassenvorstellungen in den europäischen Siedlungskolonien Virginia, den Burenrepubliken und Deutsch-Südwestafrika*, in: B. Barth/J. Osterhammel (eds.), *Zivilisierungsmissionen. Imperiale Weltverbesserung seit dem 18. Jahrhundert*, Konstanz 2005, pp. 201–228, here p. 202.

13 Nina Berman has shown that 'development' and 'modernisation' are ideas with a long history in the German encounters with Africa. In several case studies she elaborates that the ambition to modernise and the belief of helping the Africans have influenced the actions of individuals and continue to do so. N. Berman, *Impossible Missions? German Economic, Military, and Humanitarian Efforts in Africa*, Lincoln/London 2004, esp. pp. 2–3.

14 Before 1900 German anthropology constructed a difference between civilised people ('Kulturvölker') and primitive people who remained as a part of nature ('Naturvölker'). In contrast to evolutionary theories, these people were less likely to be included in the general narrative of progress. A. Zimmerman, *Anthropology and Antihumanism in Imperial Germany*, Chicago/London 2001, pp. 49–51, 214–215; F. v. Benda-Beckmann, *Rechtsethnologie*, in: K. F. Röhl (ed.), *Ergänzbare Lexikon des Rechts*, Neuwied 1986, Gruppe 3/160, pp. 1–7, here p. 2.

these proposals can be seen as mere strategy or rhetoric.¹⁵ A notion of ‘uplifting’ and ‘improving’ built a frame of reference for the policy concerning the colonised. It resulted in different measures that included educational programmes (although limited in content and scope and mainly supplied by the missions), medical care, christianisation, introduction of modern technology and infrastructure and a disciplination of the indigenous population often discussed under the slogan of “education to work” (*Erziehung zur Arbeit*), which in the German case was a dominant topic in the debate over civilising. Some local legal customs were discussed as an object of civilising processes. The laws in the colonies were perceived as ‘primitive’, of a lower state of development. The highest end of this hierarchy was equated with European civilisation.¹⁶ Although it was believed that in general the local customs should be kept, the introduction of ‘civilised’ principles into the legal system included the abolishment of any customs which were seen as “repugnant to culture” (*kulturfeindlich*) – meaning they contradicted European ideas. In this view, observed customs like polygamy, communal property and feuds formed the object of the civilising efforts. The realisation often failed, and in respect to practicability certain practices were excluded from these civilising efforts, as I will show later. But law was not only seen as an object, but also as an instrument of civilising efforts. Jurisdiction was discussed as an effective instrument to transform the indigenous populations’ customs and sense of justice, for example through the control of the so-called native courts.¹⁷ More importantly, the criminal law in the hands of local officials was understood as an instrument of ‘education’.¹⁸ Through strict prosecution the Cameroonians were to be acquainted with what was understood as ‘civilised law’. They were to be taught European conceptions of property, to be transformed into useful wage labourers and to incorporate European moral standards. As the judge of the district Duala (*Bezirksrichter*) reports to the Gouvernement in 1901:

*[In the colony] the criminal jurisdiction should above all have an educational effect. It should teach the native respect for other people's person and property, it should get them used to obeying a state's precepts and interdictions, a demand formerly unknown to them.*¹⁹

Contrary to the general pretension to introduce more rational principles into the law in the colonies, the lack of control over local officials often resulted in maltreatment and abuses within the jurisdiction. Some of the abuses which became known in Ger-

15 W. Mommsen, Introduction, in: W. J. Mommsen / J. A. de Moor (eds.), *European Expansion* (footnote 2), pp. 1-14, here p. 8.

16 M. Adas, *Machines as the Measure* (footnote 11), p. 203.

17 Annual Report of the Station in Jabassi 1907 in: ANY FA 1/70, sheets 50-64, here sheet 53, Gouverneur to Reichskanzler, 16 September 1893, in: Bundesarchiv, Berlin-Lichterfelde (BAB) R1001/5003, sheets 60-61, here sheet 60; Copy Gouverneur Seitz, 21 July 1896, in: BAB R1001/5003 sheets 155-157, here sheets 155-156.

18 P. Bauer, *Die Strafrechtspflege über die Eingeborenen* (footnote 1), p. 80; F. Doerr, *Die Entwicklung des materiellen und formellen deutschen Kolonial-Strafrechts seit 1907*, in: *Zeitschrift für Kolonialpolitik, Kolonialwirtschaft und Kolonialrecht*, 12 (1910) 2, pp. 69-72, here p. 71.

19 Bezirksrichter in Duala to Gouvernement, 15 July 1901, in: ANY FA 1/292, sheets 52-87, here sheet 57.

many underwent severe criticism in the German parliament and the German public.²⁰ The German government reacted to these incidences with attempts to regulate criminal jurisdiction and thus prevent abuse.²¹ But in general brutal punishments, even corporal punishment or chaining, which had already been abolished in Germany, were justified by the concept of the Cameroonians' low state of development and by racist stereotypes of lazy and childish black people who needed to be treated with astringency.²²

1.2. Law and colonial order: Keeping the colony governable

The second aim of legal policy discussed in this article was much more relevant to the present situation within the colony: The necessity of keeping public peace and order was vital for the upkeep of colonial governmental power. German authority had to be maintained, and the safety of the Germans in the colony secured. Public peace formed the basis for keeping up trade and economy and for governing the colony.

Contrary to civilising attempts, which at their core aimed at reducing cultural difference, attempts at order were mainly to be achieved by establishing and maintaining difference between the colonising and the colonised. In contrast to civilising demands, these segregating practices played a crucial role not only in the debates, but also in the political measures in the colony. Colonial order was constructed around the segregation of Germans from the population of the colony.²³ Law was one area in which the establishment of a clear division between the coloniser and the colonised was attempted. Historiography on colonial law, which examines connections between German colonial history and the developments under National-Socialism, has pointed out that race played a crucial role in German colonial law.²⁴ Although the legal term of 'the native' was disputed and never universally defined by law,²⁵ in practice the division of those who fell under Ger-

20 For example the cases of vice Gouverneur Leist 1893 and assessor Wehlan 1896, see: Stenographische Berichte über die Verhandlungen des Reichstags, 9. Leg. Per., 4. Sess. 1895/1897, v. 144, sessions 59 and 60, 13 and 14 March 1896, pp. 1419-1475; Resolution der Kommission für den Reichshaushaltsetat, in: Drucksachen des Reichstags, 9. Leg. Per., 4. Sess. 1895/1897, v. 3, no. 157, p. 3.

21 Stenographische Berichte über die Verhandlungen des Reichstags, 9. Leg. Per., 4. Sess. 1895/1897, v. 144, sessions 59 and 60, 13 and 14 March 1896, pp. 1425, 1455.

22 M. Schröder, Prügelstrafe und Züchtigungsrecht (footnote 3), pp. 9, 30-33; for advice of astringency in the treatment of the colonised, see also: R. v. Usler, Die Entwicklung des Kamerun-Schutzgebietes unter der deutschen Schutzherrschaft (IV), in: Beiträge zur Kolonialpolitik und Kolonialwirtschaft, 1 (1899) 10, pp. 302-314, here p. 311; G. G., Strafrechtspflege in deutsch-afrikanischen Schutzgebieten, in: Deutsche Kolonialzeitung, 9 (1896) 36, pp. 282-283, here p. 283.

23 See: G. Balandier, Die koloniale Situation: ein theoretischer Ansatz, in: R. v. Albertini (ed.), Moderne Kolonialgeschichte, Köln/Berlin 1970, pp. 105-124, here p. 117.

24 For a discussion of the racist elements and the relation of the colonial laws to the Nurnberg Laws: C. Essner, "Border-line" im Menschenblut und Struktur rassistischer Rechtsspaltung. Koloniales Kaiserreich und "Drittes Reich", in: M. Brumlik (ed.), Gesetzliches Unrecht. Rassistisches Recht im 20. Jahrhundert, Frankfurt am Main 2005, pp. 27-64.

25 D. Nagl, Grenzfälle (footnote 4), pp. 53-61. The only German colony which decreed a definition of the term was German Southwest-Africa in 1893, see: Verfügung zur Ausführung der Kaiserlichen Verordnung, betreffend die Eheschließung und die Beurkundung des Personenstandes für das südwestafrikanische Schutzgebiet vom 8.11.1892, 1.12.1893, in: A. Zimmermann (ed.), Die Deutsche Kolonialgesetzgebung, v. II, (1893-1897) no. 55, Berlin 1898.

man law and those who fell under so-called “native law” (*Eingeborenenrecht*) was drawn in reference to racialising concepts. A memorandum in the Colonial Department of the Foreign Office (*Kolonialabteilung des Auswärtigen Amtes*) about the question of who was to be seen as ‘a native’ in a legal sense in the German colonies stated: “In Cameroon, the members of all the native tribes in the protectorate, as well as all other coloured people who are present in this area, fall under the class of natives”.²⁶ This implied a distinction between the potential master and the potential dominated on the basis of a racialising division into ‘white’ and ‘non-white’ people.²⁷ Through the repeated subjection of the colonised to separate laws and separate jurisdictions, this legal dualism was part of the performative process of (re-)producing the colonial order of segregation.

On a more instrumental level the conservation of local customs and the inclusion of ‘chiefs’ as judges were seen as serving some of the pragmatic needs of governing the colony. First of all, local customs were conserved in order to prevent resistance which the intervention into the social structure might provoke.²⁸ Through establishing continuity a peaceful development was to be guaranteed and acceptance for the German government generated. At a congress organised by the German colonial society in Berlin in 1902 a presentation expressed this thought as follows: “Nothing makes a fruitful and peaceful colonisation easier than the conservation of the old and familiar customs and legal concepts.”²⁹ For the sake of stability even customs considered as ‘repugnant to culture’, which were at the same time rooted too deeply in the social organisation and religious beliefs, like polygamy, should be kept at least for the moment.³⁰ Second, through the nomination of local leaders as judges, the colonial government tried to create a loyal elite. Through their support the colonisers hoped to maintain colonial domination. The right to judge was an eligible position, because it included the collection of fees. It was linked with the position of a chief (*Häuptlingswürde*) and secured influence over the political community. The appointment of judges thus distributed privileges in order to secure their support. These intermediaries functioned as concrete addressees for the administration; they had to pass on and assist in implementing administrative orders. The district office Buea wrote to the Gouvernement in 1905: “The chiefs are the main organs given to support the government. They have to be developed into functionaries

26 Memorandum on the question, who is counted as native, 1896, in: BAB R1001/5543, sheets 2-15, here sheet 7, see: J. Ruppel (ed.), *Die Landesgesetzgebung* (footnote 8), no. 403.

27 M. Pesek, *Die Grenzen des kolonialen Staates in Deutsch-Ostafrika 1890–1914*, in: A. Chatriot/D. Gosewinkel (eds.), *Figurationen des Staates in Deutschland und Frankreich 1870–1945 / Les figures de l’Etat en Allemagne et en France*, München 2006, pp. 117–140, here pp. 133–134.

28 See for example: Gouvernement to Staatssekretär des Reichskolonialamts, 21 September 1907, in: BAB R1001/5004, sheets 2-3, here sheet 2; Attachment to the report of the Station Akoloniga, 21 August 1912, in: ANY FA 1/622, sheet 106; v. Schreiber, *Die rechtliche Stellung der Bewohner der deutschen Schutzgebiete*, in: *Zeitschrift für Kolonialpolitik, Kolonialwirtschaft und Kolonialrecht*, 6 (1904) 10, pp. 760–775, here p. 768.

29 Köbner, *Die Organisation der Rechtspflege in den Kolonien*, in: *Verhandlungen des Deutschen Kolonialkongresses 1902*, Berlin 1903, pp. 331–376, here p. 336.

30 For example: v. Schreiber, *Rechtsgebräuche der Eingeborenen der deutschen Schutzgebiete in Afrika*, in: *Beiträge zur Kolonialpolitik und Kolonialwirtschaft*, 5 (1903/1904) 8, pp. 237–256, here p. 238; see also the file concerning regulations of the native marriage 1908–1914, in: ANY FA 1/622.

of the government [...]”.³¹ Third, the chiefs’ jurisdiction was designed to disburden the colonial administration from the many cases which were taken to them.³² Integrating local authorities into the judicature was intended to secure an efficient and economic provision of jurisdiction in Cameroon.

The jurisdiction of the colonial officials was supposed to contribute to the maintenance of public peace as well. Colonial order subjected the indigenous population to the Germans. To secure this hierarchy, law was used as an instrument to punish any lack of respect for colonial authorities, even if they were only assumed by the Germans. In 1911, for example, a Cameroonian was punished with two weeks prison for not greeting the district officer. The district officer himself was the judge for this case.³³ This demonstrates to what extent the local officials used jurisdiction as a means of suppression and power in direct contact with the colonised.

Within this exercise of power punishment played a crucial role. It served to assert the absolute power of the local officer and the futility of opposition. Drawing on racist stereotypes such as the African’s lack of a sense of freedom and the inability for abstract thinking, corporal punishment was presented as the most adequate penalisation for them. Arguments in favour of corporal punishment stated that it could quickly follow the deed and allow the person to return to work quickly, and they presented it as a traditional punishment, as a punishment the Africans understood best.³⁴ Imprisonment on the other hand was seen as unproductive, because Africans were held as unimpaired by the loss of personal freedom and as rather enjoying the free food and shelter.³⁵ For that reason, imprisonment as a punishment was combined with forced labour.

Corporal punishment functioned as an instrument of forceful subjection to the colonial order. The powerlessness of the beaten person gave the beating official a feeling of power and control.³⁶ Through the trials violence against the colonised was legitimised, establishing among others the distinction between the colonised, the body that could be beaten, and the coloniser, who was ‘too civilised’ to undergo such a punishment. The

31 Bezirksamt Buea to Gouvernement, 4 July 1905, in: ANY FA 1/614, sheets 22-25, here pp. 23-24.

32 See: Gouvernement to Bezirksamt Edea, 31 January 1906, in: ANY FA 1/614, sheets 28-29, here sheet 28; Gouverneur to Reichskanzler, 16 September 1893, in: BAB R1001/5003 sheets 60-61, here sheet 60; Gouverneur to Auswärtiges Amt, Kolonialabteilung, 23 April 1904, in: BAB R1001/5003, sheets 168-169, here sheet 168.

33 Edimo Ekwe to the Gouvernement, 19 August 1911, in: ANY FA 1/616, sheets 31-32, statement of the Colonial Officer, in: ANY FA 1/616, sheets 34-35.

34 Weickmann, Ueber die Frage der Schaffung eines selbständigen kolonialen Strafrechts, in: Verhandlungen des Deutschen Kolonialkongresses 1910, Berlin 1910, pp. 470-492, here p. 475; H. Hesse, Strafgewalt über die Eingeborenen in den Schutzgebieten, in: Zeitschrift für Kolonialpolitik, Kolonialwirtschaft und Kolonialrecht, 6 (1904) 2, pp. 122-125, here p. 125; R. Hermann, Die Prügelstrafe nach deutschem Kolonialrecht, in: Zeitschrift für Kolonialpolitik, Kolonialwirtschaft und Kolonialrecht, 10 (1908) 2, pp. 72-83, here p. 73; for legal debates on the necessity and educational function of corporal punishment, see also: M. Schröder, Prügelstrafe und Züchtigungsrecht (footnote 3), pp. 29-33.

35 Drucksachen des Reichstages, 9. Leg. Per., 4. Sess. 1895/1897, v. 7, no. 624, p. 46; Kölnische Zeitung, no. 683, 27 July 1896, morning edition, in: BAB R1001/5530, sheet 56.

36 T. v. Trotha, “One for Kaiser” – Beobachtungen zur politischen Soziologie der Prügelstrafe am Beispiel des “Schutzgebiet Togos”, in: P. Heine / U. v. d. Heyden (eds.), Studien zur Geschichte des deutschen Kolonialismus in Afrika. Festschrift zum 60. Geburtstag von Peter Sebald, Pfaffenweiler 1995, pp. 521-551, here p. 531.

colonial officials' wide-spread use of violence can be seen as a product of the colonial state's weakness, its fragile power basis and its lack of legitimation through the African population.³⁷ In the face of this instability, anything which might threaten the colonial order had to be punished, and corporal punishment was part of the violent maintenance of order. It was a sign of the local officials' despotic domination, and the concentration of power in their person.³⁸

1.3. Might is right: The subordination of law to colonial politics

The integration of local institutions was used to stabilise the political situation. The strength of the jurisdiction as a means of subjection followed from the lack of legal security for the colonised. This can be illustrated by the debate on the codification of native law (which included local customs and German colonial law). Codification was discussed as one means of modernising the traditional legal systems by introducing fixed and guaranteed laws for the colonised. From the 1890s onwards the Colonial Department in Berlin showed some efforts to codify a penal code for the colonies. These efforts can be interpreted as a reaction to the demands of the parliament. As a consequence to the abuses in the jurisdiction it requested greater securities for the colonised in the trials.³⁹ But codification also had many opponents. Critics put forward that the political situation and the state of development in the colonies did not allow for the enforcement of rigid regulations.⁴⁰ The officers were supposed to have enough freedom to react to any event that threatened order. Many opponents of codification argued that in the colony law had to be subjected to politics. An author of an article on the struggle of 'white' against 'black' stated frankly,

*[...] if we want to keep to the premise made above that we want to stay the masters of the country, we have to continue to violate the basic rights. [...] In the struggle for life, might is right.*⁴¹

Gyan Prakash has pointed out that in the colonies the rhetoric of civilisation was put into action by a quite different practice, one which drastically qualified 'Western' values proclaimed as universal. He states that the exceptional circumstances of the colonies were cited to justify the overthrow of principles that were pronounced to underlie civilising or

37 Similar interpretations give for example T. v. Trotha, Zur Entstehung von Recht. Deutsche Kolonialherrschaft im "Schutzgebiet Togo", 1884–1914, in: Rechtshistorisches Journal, 7 (1988), pp. 317–346, here pp. 318–326; M. Pesek, Die Grenzen des kolonialen Staates (footnote 27), pp. 124, 138. See also the article by Ulrike Lindner in this volume.

38 T. v. Trotha, Zur Entstehung von Recht (footnote 37), p. 324.

39 Drucksachen des Reichstages, 9. Leg. Per., 4. Sess. 1895/1897, v. 3, no. 157; Verhandlungen des Reichstages, Sten. Ber., 9. Leg. Per., 4. Sess. 1895/1897, v. 144, sessions 59 and 60, 13 and 14 March 1896, pp. 1419–1475.

40 W. Schütze, Farbe gegen Weiß in Afrika, in: Zeitschrift für Kolonialpolitik, Kolonialwirtschaft und Kolonialrecht, 8 (1906) 10, pp. 727–740, p. 728; Gouverneur v. Zimmerer to Reichskanzler Caprivi, 4 May 1894, in: ANY FA 1/292, sheets 2–6, here sheet 3.

41 W. Schütze, Farbe gegen Weiß (footnote 40), pp. 727–728.

colonising actions.⁴² The picture drawn of the arbitrariness of the jurisdiction, its inconsistency and brutality, also stood in extreme contrast to the rhetoric of civilisation. But these grievances should not be seen as failures in realising the civilising mission; they are not a 'degeneration' of the idea of civilising which occurs on the spot. Such contradictions have to be seen as inherent to the concept of civilisation. They were the product of a complex system of thought that transformed cultural difference into a hierarchy of levels of culture and into a question of development.⁴³

The lack of fixed regulations, the actual unity of judiciary, administrative and quasi-legislative functions in the person of the colonial officer, the Gouvernement's and Colonial Office's little or lacking opportunities to control the local officials all contributed to enabling arbitrary punishments. Very likely, one reason why the codification of a penal code was not achieved was because it would have reduced the officials' power.⁴⁴ The large manoeuvring room made criminal law a strong instrument for enforcing obedience. Thus it was not always law itself, but quite often the fact that legal regulations did not exist, that specifically made criminal jurisdiction such a brutal instrument of oppression.

2. Adapting legal policy: Cameroonian interactions with law and jurisdiction

Recently, reflections of post-colonial theory on the agency of the colonised, as well as the interpretations of colonial rule, which emphasize disorder, lack of colonial presence and scarce penetration in the colony, have given new weight to the question in howfar certain individuals from the colonised population influenced the realisation of colonial rule on a daily basis. Following such approaches an analysis of legal policy has to ask how the transition from the idea into the immediate local legal means was shaped by the colonised themselves. The following section will therefore focus on the colonised as acting subjects who contributed to forming political processes and on the implementation and outcome of legal policy in Cameroon.

As seen above, the fear of potential resistance was an important factor within legal policy and was the main reason to reduce interference with the local laws. This is one example of how the colonial legal politics developed in relation to the expected reactions of the

42 G. Prakash, Introduction: After Colonialism, in: id. (ed.), *After Colonialism: Imperial Histories and Postcolonial Displacements*, Princeton 1994, pp. 3-17, here p. 3.

43 For the mechanism of transforming spatial or cultural difference into temporal difference, see: J. Fabian, *Time and the Other: How Anthropology Makes Its Object*, New York 1983, esp. pp. 15-18, 25-31.

44 T. Kopp, Theorie und Praxis des deutschen Kolonialstrafrechts, in: R. Voigt/P. Sack (eds.), *Kolonialisierung des Rechts* (footnote 3), pp. 71-92, here pp. 81, 87. Some works on the studies of Rudolf Asmis in Togo come to a similar conclusion: A. J. Knoll, An Indigenous Law Code for the Togolese: The Work of Dr. Rudolf Asmis, in: R. Voigt / P. Sack (eds.), *Kolonialisierung des Rechts* (footnote 3), pp. 247-269, here pp. 263-264; R. Erbar, *Kolonialismus, Rassismus und Recht. Die versuchte Kodifizierung afrikanischer Gewohnheitsrechte und deren Konsequenzen für das Kolonialrecht in der deutschen Kolonie Togo*, in: W. Wagner / U. van der Heyden (eds.), *Rassendiskriminierung, Kolonialpolitik und ethnisch-nationale Identität*, Berlin / Münster 1992, pp. 134-144, here p. 140.

colonised. The fragile position of the officials and their dependence on the support the local population limited the legal political concepts.

The colonised's encounters with the colonial jurisdiction can also be connected to resistance to colonial rule. As much as brutal punishments were intended to suppress attacks on the German authorities, they held the potential of provoking or confirming the colonised to act out their opposition to the colonial government. For example, in 1893, police-soldiers, which the government had bought from the King of Dahomey, started an armed rebellion as a reaction to the brutal and humiliating punishments of the chancellor of the colony and vice governor Leist. Leist had ordered to flog several of the soldiers' wives under the eyes of their husbands. This flogging induced an armed attack on the station.⁴⁵ Such acts of resistance severely questioned German authority and could often only be suppressed by more violence.⁴⁶

Another extraordinary example of opposition to the practice of punishment is provided by the Duala – a group from the coast who mainly lived on trade with the inner country. They submitted petitions to the Gouverneur and to the German government and parliament (*Reichstag*) that criticised among other things the use of flogging and the different treatment of black and white people before the law. They denounced the grievances of the colonial jurisdiction and demanded to sentence the responsible officials in a just trial.⁴⁷ With the petitions they adopted practices of political expression that met principles, which were proclaimed to be introduced within a rationalisation of the native law – like formal procedures. In doing so, the Duala assumed the role of equal political subjects, of subjects of the German Reich. They undermined the racist image of a 'savage' and 'primitive' Africans. These petitions to the German Government and parliament in Germany also questioned the authorities in the colony by taking their political demands to the metropole. This questioned the competence of the institutions in the colony and drew attention to their practices. In order to avert this attack, the colonial authorities, resorted again to law for suppressing such threatening actions. The Akwa chiefs – the Akwa being one of the important Duala families – who signed a petition in 1905, were prosecuted for slander.⁴⁸ The harsh prosecution aroused a debate in the parliament. The trial was reviewed, and most of the objects of complaint were confirmed to be true. But although the second judge stated in his reasons a right to complain despite "the recognition of the necessity of masterhood (*Anerkennung des Herrenstandpunkts*) of the white

45 A. Rüger, *Der Aufstand der Polizeisoldaten* (Dezember 1893), in: H. Stoecker (ed.), *Kamerun unter deutscher Kolonialherrschaft*, 2 vol., v. 1, Berlin (East) 1960, pp. 97-147; M. Schröder, *Prügelstrafe und Züchtigungsrecht* (footnote 3), pp. 35-38.

46 A.-P. Temgoua, *Résistances à l'occupation allemande du Cameroun 1884-1916*, Thèse pour le doctorat d'état ès lettres, Yaoundé 2004/2005; V. Ngoh, *History of Cameroon since 1800*, Buea 1996, pp. 100-119.

47 Chiefs of Duala to Gouverneur, 29 October 1892, ANY FA 1/37, sheets 211-217; Manga Bell to Auswärtiges Amt, Kolonialabteilung, 13 August 1902, BAB R1001/4299 sheets 53-56, here sheets 54-55. Petition der Akwa-Häuptlinge, Drucksachen des Reichstages, 11. Leg.-Per., II. Sess. 1905/1906, no. 294, esp. pp. 11-12, 23, 25-26, 29-30, 38, 46. See: A. Eckert, *Die Duala und die Kolonialmächte. Eine Untersuchung zu Widerstand, Protest und Protonationalismus in Kamerun vor dem zweiten Weltkrieg*, Hamburg/Münster 1991, pp. 124-130, 136-159.

48 For the two trials, see: G. Walz, *Die Entwicklung der Strafrechtspflege* (footnote 3), pp. 133-146.

race over the black, as long as they have not achieved an equal or near to equal cultural level”,⁴⁹ some statements of the petition were still assessed to be slander. The judgement was attenuated, but not repealed. This shows one important mechanism through which the officials used law to deal with colonised reactions: By classifying acts that were assumed to undermine German authority as treason, civil disorder, and riot, which appear in large number on the reports on the punishments of the stations and district offices,⁵⁰ they were transferred into the legal sphere and thereby criminalised. In consequence political resistance became a crime and could simply be met by punishment.

As shown above, interference with the laws of the colonised were justified by a mission to modernise and civilise them. However, as the debate on the codification has shown, the claim to increase legal security, to introduce a rational, uniform legal system was never met. Nevertheless, if only to some extent, trials could be and were used by Cameroonians to fight for their rights. Cameroonians for example sued Europeans for wages or because of bodily injury. Yet, asymmetrical power relations reduced the power of law in the hands of the Cameroonians. A draft-decree concerning the legal representation of Africans in trials between Europeans and Africans assessed the position of the colonised:

*Under the present-day conditions, in consequence of the ignorance of the court language, of the law and the procedures, as well as in consequence of illiteracy and the factual impossibility of defending one's interests with an advocate who is familiar with the law and the procedures, for the natives it is extremely complicated to undertake a trial against a European.*⁵¹

In addition, the wide-spread racist conviction that Africans had a tendency to lie⁵² weakened the position of the Cameroonian litigant. One manifestation of this conviction was the fact that Cameroonians were not sworn in as attestors. This practice was presented as a protection of the Cameroonians, who were seen as not capable of estimating the consequences of testifying under oath.⁵³ The missing oath weakened the statements. Standing against statements of a sworn-in European, statements of Cameroonians thus often did not suffice to sentence or recognise a claim against the European.⁵⁴ But even reduced to a minimum, the fact that Cameroonians could take their cases before a court had the potential to shake the fundamentals of colonial order. This can be seen in the complaints

49 Drucksachen des Reichstages, 12. Leg. Per., 1. Sess. 1907/1909, no. 323, pp. 1-72, here p. 67.

50 See for example the reports on punishments of the stations Duala 1913/1914, in: ANY FA 1/617 and Edea 1908, in: ANY FA 1/618; Walz also connects criminal offences to acts of resistance when he explains the decline of the number of death penalties for offences against the state as a reflection of the pacification of the colony, G. Walz, Die Entwicklung der Strafrechtspflege (footnote 3), p. 273.

51 Copy of a draft-decree concerning the representation of natives by attorneys in mixed trials designed by the court in Kribi, 24 January 1910, in: BAB R1001/5517, sheets 249-252, here sheet 250.

52 See for example: P. Bauer, Die Strafrechtspflege über die Eingeborenen (footnote 1), p. 45; Drucksachen des Reichstages 12. Leg. Per., 1. Sess. 1907/1909, no. 323, pp. 1-72, here p. 8; Schwörende Neger, in: Hamburger Nachrichten, no. 38, 21 March 1909, in: BAB R1001/5544, sheet 30; see also: G. Walz, Die Entwicklung der Strafrechtspflege (footnote 3), p. 294.

53 G. Walz, Die Entwicklung der Strafrechtspflege (footnote 3), pp. 291-293.

54 Memorandum on the question of native attestors, in: BAB R1001/5544, sheets 21-23, here sheet 21.

of European tradesmen about a judge who supported Cameroonians' legal proceedings against Europeans. The judge assessed: "The Imperial district court of Lomie has always been troublesome for the tradesmen, and it has caused even more trouble since the natives have recognized its significance."⁵⁵ This demonstrates that Cameroonians took the opportunity to use law as a means of self-assertion. They did not only bring Europeans to court, but also used the 'native courts' in the following way.

In 1904 a 'native court' which had been appointed by the Germans, fined a chief because he had executed the station's order to deliver workers to clean the river. The court judged this ordered duty to work as a deprivation of personal freedom.⁵⁶ Although the station quickly revised this decision, it still forms an extreme example in which Cameroonians used the legal means the German colonial government had introduced to stand up to the local officers' orders.

As the last example already shows, the Germans could barely control all of the effects of the intermediaries' actions. Chiefs who were entrusted with certain functions could relieve the colonial government and build a link to the population. Nevertheless, for the Germans they also formed an uncertain factor within the power structure. The chiefs used the power their position held to pursue their own interests and did not act as passive instruments of the government. In the colonial documents such cases appear as problems, as a misuse of delegated powers or as mistaken decisions. The judges, for example, often tried to make money with their position, an action the colonial government tried to fight with intensified control.⁵⁷ The chiefs also used their position to secure political influence. For example, a report on an expedition from Jaunde to Duala in 1907 sorrowfully observed that the Akwa made use of the native courts and their intermediary position contrary to the German interests. They used

*the native courts and the empowerment of some Bakoko-Chiefs, with whom they had negotiated [...] to act as masters of this region. Moreover, as a link to the colonial government, because of their ability to write and because of the lack of control over their still unknown trade routes to the East, they actually exercised a kind of rule.*⁵⁸

In addition to the deliberate undermining of the colonial government's interest, the intermediary position itself was fragile.⁵⁹ As much as their position was strengthened through the competences the colonial government transferred to them, it was also weakened because they had to carry out orders against the will of their people, and because they were dependent upon the colonial government. The inevitable tension in the role

55 Copy of a report of the judge Schuhmacher in Lomie, 9 August 1913, in: ANY FA 1/299, sheets 20-21, here sheet 21.

56 Station Jabassi to Gouvernement, 24 September 1904, in: ANY FA 1/615, sheet 1-4, here sheets 2-3.

57 Criticism of native courts which defraud money, in: ANY FA 1/613, sheets 26, 28.

58 Expedition of Stein-Lausnitz 1907, Copy in: ANY FA 1/94, sheet 41.

59 T. v. Trotha, *Koloniale Herrschaft. Zur soziologischen Theorie der Staatsentstehung am Beispiel des "Schutzgebietes Togo"*, Tübingen 1994, pp. 294-316; K. Hausen, *Deutsche Kolonialherrschaft* (footnote 12), pp. 166-167; J. Osterhammel, *Kolonialismus. Geschichte – Formen – Folgen*, München 2006, p. 76.

of the intermediary lay in the fact that his power to fulfil the orders of the colonial government relied on his independent authority, and at the same time, this authority was undermined by the connection with the colonial government.

These examples show that in the colonial situation law could yield manifold effects. Different individuals and groups took legal actions in order to try fighting for their rights. The integration of certain 'chiefs' into the legal structure was itself partly a reaction to the fact that many people took their cases to the colonial officials. It gave the empowered chiefs space to adapt the input of the colonial administration and thus to shape how the legal system in the colony worked. As shown, this had conflicting consequences for the stability of German rule. Sometimes local officials even questioned the chiefs about draft decrees.⁶⁰ These representatives thus participated in the process of developing legal regulations, if only in a commenting and advising role. These examples give only the first broad idea of how the legal order was negotiated not only between the metropole and the colony, but also between the colonial government and the indigenous population.

3. Different urgencies: Postponing the civilising mission

As shown above, the attempt to 'civilise' and the means to maintain public order often conflicted with each other. The emphasis on the different goals varied depending upon the concerns of the groups that formulated them. Especially with regard to academics, the colonial administration in Berlin and the Gouvernement of Cameroon emphasized that legal policy had to contribute to civilising the colonised. The differences partly resulted from a clash between on the one hand, theory, civilising claims from the legal profession or the colonial office in Germany, and on the other hand practice, the immediate need of the men on the spot to sustain order – the limited impact of civilising efforts in Cameroon itself have to be seen in this context. But the contradiction cannot be fully explained by dividing the aims into theory and practice. The conservation of local customs – propagated and praised by many jurists who had never been in the colonies and ordered by the colonial office in Berlin – stood in contrast to the civilising process of law.⁶¹ Jurists as well as the colonial office were extremely concerned that the abolishment of certain customs would disturb the social and economic structure, cause resistance, and thus destabilise the colony. On the other hand, the local officials, although primarily confronted with the practicability of measurements and the shortcomings of colonial governance, nevertheless perceived the treatment of the indigenous population as a mat-

60 See for examples the comments of the local authorities to the draft decree concerning the marriages of the natives in 1908–1909, in: ANY FA 1/622, Ossidinge: sheet 27, Jabassi: sheet 30, Buea: sheet 39, Johann-Albrechts-Höhe: sheet 50.

61 E.g. J. Friedrich, Eingeborenrecht und Eingeborenpolitik, in: Zeitschrift für Kolonialpolitik, Kolonialwirtschaft und Kolonialrecht, 11 (1909) 6, pp. 466–480, here p. 478; H. Wick, Das Privatrecht der Farbigen in den deutschen Schutzgebieten, Diss. Münster 1913, p. 3; Gouverneur to von Bismarck, 21 December 1885, in: BAB R1001/5003, sheets 4a–6, here sheet 4a.

ter of development, even when this idea was reduced to the complaint about the low cultural level of the colonised.

One strategy for solving this conflict between the will to ‘civilise’ the Cameroonian population and the need to sustain order was to establish priorities and attach different time frames and levels of urgency to the aims of legal policy. The civilising mission remained a general vanishing point, but it was seen as more of a long term goal; the “purification of the tribal law” (*Läuterung des Stammesrechts*) should find an end “over the years”.⁶² It was not seen as a short term project. For the present situation, political necessities eclipsed the civilising mission as soon as its pursuit seemed to endanger colonial rule. In view of the fragility of the colonial state, order was the more pressing achievement. Civilising in a concrete and short term sense was rather seen as a task to create governable colonial subjects.

Apart from the allusions to civilising efforts made in order to justify the punishments, civilising aspects played a very minor role in the jurisdiction over Cameroonians. In the preparation of new decrees, it was however part of the discussion – as an ideal and general guideline, but not necessarily relevant for the moment. Most often the local officials responded that the proposed measures were too early and the actual condition in their district did not meet the necessary standards.⁶³ The will to reconcile both goals sometimes yielded peculiar results. The implementation of a decree concerning the registration of Cameroonian marriages caused a debate as to whether only the first marriage or all marriages could be registered. The wish to reduce the number and length of trials by clarifying and documenting legal relations was confronted with the civilising intention to abolish polygamy. The circular accompanying the decree expresses this tension. It also shows how absurdly the two aims were put together as a compromise. The circular advised that more than one marriage could be registered, but only the registration of the first marriage should be supported. The registration of more than four marriages was not allowed.⁶⁴

Often, as a first step, civilising attempts were reduced to formalities. The above mentioned circular declares that the registration of marriages should adjust the marital customs to European law, at least “in form” for the time being.⁶⁵ The same emphasis can be found when the native courts were requested to write transcripts of their proceedings. This emphasis on formality and the dominance of the “education to work” concept in the German civilising discourse can also be seen as an example that measures discussed under the label of ‘uplifting’ were at the same time directed toward meeting the requirements of the colonial administration. The value of such measures for governing

62 Bezirksamt Jaunde to Gouverneur, 13 November 1913, in: BAB R1001/5490, sheets 22-23, here sheet 22, my emphasis.

63 See for example responses in the files concerning regulations of the native marriages 1908–1914, in: ANY FA 1/622 and concerning general regulations on exercising jurisdiction over the natives 1894–1909, in: ANY FA 1/292.

64 Runderlass no. 27, 11 April 1914, in: ANY FA 1/622, sheets 147-151, here sheet 147.

65 Ibid.

the colony already gave them significance for the present situation. Neither reducing 'civilisation' to rationalisation and governability nor postponing civilising efforts were German specialities.⁶⁶

But what has to be taken in to account while reflecting on the timescale of the German colonial policy is that the Germans did not anticipate the impending loss of their colonies. They were thinking in very long periods. Measures were seen as "for now still too early", for such actions "time had not come", they "were not due", or the situation "was not ripe".⁶⁷ These were the variations of the general tenor of the opinion towards most of the proposed measures. They all implied a development that would allow such measures in the future. For the moment, the state of development in the colonies was seen as too low.⁶⁸ Even just before World War I, after which Germany lost its colonies, the state of the colonies was seen as a starting point in a transitory, constantly changing situation (*dauernder Wechsel, Zustand der Entwicklung*) in which civilisation was steadily proceeding (*fortschreitende Zivilisation*).⁶⁹

Within this slow process of development little steps were to be taken one after another. "Gradually"⁷⁰ was a keyword in the advice for and description of the legal policy. Law should develop organically without ruptures or radical changes.⁷¹ The slow transformation of local customs should prevent ruptures in the everyday social and economic life. If and when fixed laws could be guaranteed for the population of the colony was left unclear. Since order and stability were the main and most pressing concerns, other aims had to be subjected to them. The vague aim of civilisation was postponed. The stabilisation of German rule and the general cultural 'uplift' of the colonised population were seen as pre-conditions for the full transference of European laws.

66 Wolfgang Mommsen states that none of the European colonial authorities intended a far-reaching politics of modernisation, but rather tried to rationalise customary law in order to run their colonies smoothly. W. Mommsen, Introduction, in: W. J. Mommsen / J. A. de Moor (ed.), *European Expansion* (footnote 2), pp. 1-14, here p. 11.

67 Drucksachen des Reichstages, 11. Leg. Per., 1. Sess. 1903/1905, v. 1.2, no. 54, p. 48; Drucksachen des Reichstages, 9. Leg. Per., VI. Sess. 1895/1897, v. 3, no. 88, p. 42; Bezirksamt Duala to Gouverneur, 2 January 1914, in: BAB R1001/5490, sheet 27; Copy, statement of Referat A5 (legal administration and native jurisdiction), in: BAB R1001/5529-1, sheet 9.

68 Bezirksamt Kribi to Gouverneur, 4 January 1914, in: BAB R1001/5490, sheet 29.

69 Bezirksamt Duala to Gouverneur, 2 January 1914, in: BAB R1001/5490, sheet 27; Bezirksamt Jaunde to Gouverneur, 13 November 1913, in: BAB R1001/5490, sheets 22-23, here sheet 22.

70 For a few of many examples, see: K. Perels, *Eingeborenenrecht in den deutschen Kolonien*, in: *Die Grenzboten*, 71 (1912), pp. 5-12, here p. 11; Gouverneur's announcement concerning the introduction of the decree concerning the marriages of Cameroonians, 11 April 1914, in: ANY FA 1/622, sheets 147-151, here sheet 147; Jahresbericht über die Entwicklung der Schutzgebiete in Afrika und der Südsee im Jahre 1906/07 (as supplement to *Deutsches Kolonialblatt*), Berlin 1908, p. 6.

71 H. Hesse, *Eingeborenen-Schiedsgerichte in Kamerun*, in: *Deutsche Kolonialzeitung*, 9 (1896) 38, pp. 299-300, here p. 299; F. Meyer, *Die Erforschung und Kodifikation des Eingeborenenrechts*, in: *Zeitschrift für Kolonialpolitik, Kolonialwirtschaft und Kolonialrecht*, 9 (1907) 11, pp. 847-869, here p. 848.

4. Conclusion

In the process of colonisation law played several conflicting roles. It could be used by different groups to pursue their interests. In the hands of the local officials it functioned as an instrument of subjection and legitimized the use of violence. In the case of the chiefs it secured income and political influence. And it was used, if only to some extent, as a means of self-assertion by Cameroonians. The colonial government used legal policy as native policy. In designing this policy the assumed reactions of the colonised played an important role. The Gouvernement could only partly control the effects of their measures, which were also shaped by actions and adaptations by the colonised subjects. The conflict between the aims of legal policy was mainly solved in establishing stability as a priority and in subjecting the more abstract and idealised aim of civilisation to the upkeep of order. Postponing the civilising mission also followed the logic of the justification of colonialism: The civilising mission was never allowed to be completed, because in that case colonialism – or at least the justification for colonial enterprises – would have vanished.⁷² The ambivalence of the civilising mission, which in the colonisers' logic could and were never to be completed, can be seen in the contempt for such colonised subject, who in the eyes of the Germans assumed too much of a 'white' lifestyle and habitus. The so-called negro in trousers (*Hosenneger*) attracted derision for his assumed hubris to think himself equal with the 'whites'.⁷³ The narrow limitations of the civilising mission also affected the Duala. In a similar manner to the '*Hosenneger*', their undertaking was punished because it was based on the assumption of a position of equality. As another presentation at the colonial congress of 1902 demanded:

*[...] those, who see in the Negroes only the human and a member of humankind who is called to participate in the full human dignity, have to admit that we have to lead the Negro to the full consciousness of this dignity, to bring him to the consciousness of the servant to the state, before we can make him a free citizen.*⁷⁴

Following this logic, the population of the colonies needed paternalistic guidance until they were civilised enough to be free citizens and gain equal rights. From this argument the need for different laws was derived and brutal punishments defended as the necessary way to achieve this goal, a goal which was at the same time postponed to a vague and far distant future.

72 M. Mann, "Torchbearers Upon the Path of Progress": Britain's Ideology of a "Moral and Material Progress" in India: An Introductory Essay, in: H. Mann/H. Fischer-Tiné, *Colonialism as Civilizing Mission* (footnote 11), pp. 1-26, here pp. 5, 24; G. Balandier, *Die koloniale Situation* (footnote 23), p. 117.

73 A. Eckert, "Der beleidigte Negerprinz". Mpundu Akwa und die Deutschen, in: *Etudes Germano-Africaines*, 9 (1991), pp. 32-38, here p. 32.

74 Leo, *Die Arbeiterfrage in unseren afrikanischen Kolonien*. Vortrag in der Abteilung Kassel der Deutschen Kolonialgesellschaft am 14. Februar 1902, in: *Beiträge zur Kolonialpolitik und Kolonialwirtschaft*, 4 (1902-1903) 2, pp. 44-53, here p. 44.

Cultivating the Periphery: Bolshevik Civilising Missions and ‘Colonialism’ in Soviet Central Asia*

Christian Teichmann

RESÜMEE

Exzeptionalismus und die proklamierte historische Sonderrolle waren die ideologischen Fundamente, auf denen die Bolschewiki nach 1917 ihre zivilisatorische Mission in den Randzonen des sowjetischen Herrschaftsbereichs aufbauten. ‚Westliche‘ koloniale Herrschaftsmodelle bildeten die Negativfolie für ihre revolutionären Neuansätze. Trotzdem kann die Frage nicht eindeutig beantwortet werden, ob es sich bei der Sowjetunion um einen Kolonialstaat gehandelt habe. Vielmehr gilt es, die innere Dynamik der Herrschaftsinstitutionen und ihrer Akteure genauer zu untersuchen, um Schlussfolgerungen über die Vergleichbarkeit des sowjetischen Sonderwegs zu ziehen und den ‚Kolonialismus‘ in diesem Prozess genauer zu verorten. Dazu werden nach einer Schilderung der aktuellen Forschungsdiskussion die Biographien dreier führender Bolschewiki untersucht, die die Geschicke des sowjetischen Zentralasien zwischen 1924 und 1941 prägten.

Exceptionalism was not an empty phrase but the founding principle of the Soviet Union. The Bolsheviks were not only fighting the basic mechanisms of the capitalist world economy but were trying to fundamentally reverse the ‘West-European’ political standards of their time:

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*The Soviet Union gave to the world new models to solve the problems of the nation-state. Everything in this area known from Western-European practice – and, on the whole, the experience of the bourgeois democratic countries – can in no way be compared to the foundational principles which the USSR, and the policies of the leading Communist Party, applied and are applying to solve one of the most difficult social questions – the question of peaceful coexistence of different nationalities on the basis of true equality.*¹

The pursuit of national 'equality' through the political instruments of the 'dictatorship of the proletariat' served as the foundation of Bolshevik rule in Soviet Central Asia.² In marked difference from Western countries, as well as from their Tsarist predecessors, the Bolsheviks proclaimed an anti-colonial agenda of national 'liberation'. With this agenda, their policies caused much debate in the Western capitals.³ Additionally, as before 1917 – when Tsarist rule in Turkestan had served as a model for German colonial planners and was closely watched by British observers in nearby India⁴ – Soviet rule in Central Asia informed Western judgments of the Bolshevik's political and economic performance. Certainly, analysts in the Western world (and Soviet ideologues alike) understood the politics of Soviet 'socialist development' in Central Asia as global colonial politics.⁵ The question this article tries to approach is in which ways the techniques of a 'civilising mission' became intertwined with genuine attempts by the Soviet leadership to forge cultural, social and economic change in an age of modernising dictatorships and worldwide ideological competition. It argues that the rubrication of the Soviet Union as a 'colonial' enterprise could in fact be a hindrance to understanding precisely how the renewal of the Russian empire was achieved by the Bolsheviks after 1917.⁶ To prove this, the article takes as a point of departure a short review of recent historiographical and political debates on Russian and Soviet 'colonialism'. It then moves on to describe the legacy that the Bolsheviks were rejecting: Tsarist 'colonial' rule in the Turkestan between 1865 and 1917. Focusing on the question of Russian racism, the third part of the article then traces the struggle to overcome the Tsarist 'colonial' legacy with a programme to promote 'equality' and 'national self-determination'. The last sections examine two key

1 M. Burov, *Ekonomicheskaia storona problemy natsional'nogo razmezhvaniia Srednei Azii* [The economic aspect of national delimitation in Central Asia], in: *Narodnoe khoziaistvo Srednei Azii* [The Economy of Central Asia], (1925) 2-3, pp. 14-25, here p. 14.

2 V. I. Lenin, *Pol'noe sobranie sochinenii* [Complete collected works], v. 43, Moscow 1963, pp. 241-247. For an opposing view of a disappointed former Bolshevik sympathiser, see: M. Chokai-ogly, *Turkestan pod vlast'iu Sovetov. K kharakteristike diktatury proletariata* [Turkestan under Soviet power. On the character of the proletarian dictatorship], Paris 1935.

3 M. Thomas, Albert Sarraut, French Colonial Development, and the Communist Threat, 1919–1930, in: *Journal of Modern History*, 77 (2005) 4, pp. 917-955.

4 W. Busse, *Bewässerungswirtschaft in Turan und ihre Anwendung in der Landeskultur*, Jena 1915, esp. pp. iii-v; A. Morrison, *Russian Rule in Samarkand, 1869–1910. A Comparison with British India*, Oxford 2008, pp. 5-8.

5 R. Asmis, *Als Wirtschaftspionier in Russisch-Asien. Tagebuchblätter*, Berlin 1926 [1924]; O. Caroe, *Soviet Empire: The Turks of Central Asia and Stalinism*, London 1967 [1954]; A. G. Park, *Bolshevism in Turkestan, 1917–1927*, New York 1957. For more references, see below, footnotes 15-18.

6 On a thorough discussion of this issue, see: A. Khalid, *Backwardness and the Quest for Civilization: Early Soviet Central Asia in Comparative Perspective*, in: *Slavic Review*, 65 (2006) 2, pp. 231-251.

features of alleged Soviet ‘colonial’ rule in Uzbekistan – the economically most viable of the newly formed national republics of Tsarist Turkestan – namely, cotton production and mass mobilisation for large-scale irrigation construction. It will be argued that the Bolsheviks understood their forceful and disruptive ‘modernisation’ of cotton cultivation as their main instrument to inflict ‘progress’ as well as a new ‘national’ culture upon the heterogeneous populations of Uzbekistan.

The violent ‘modernisation’ of society and economy was at the core of Bolshevik ‘civilising mission’ in Central Asia. But the Bolshevik agenda for change was broad and therefore also quite vague. Contrary to the assertion that the ‘general party line’ trumpeted the ideas and actions of individual party members, policies in Central Asia were shaped to a large extent by the personal opinions and biographical experiences of top level Bolsheviks. The geographical distance, a poor communications infrastructure, and the Bolshevik system of government that relied on personal networks and patronage, all suggest a biographical approach.⁷ Rather than focusing on individual Soviet campaigns – such as the unveiling of women or the struggle against pre-arranged marriages and bride price⁸ – the biographical approach allows us to take a closer look at the changes that Soviet ‘civilising missions’ underwent in the period between 1924 and 1941.

To that end, three biographies of high-level Bolshevik representatives will be examined more closely and will be paralleled with the different ways in which the Soviet ‘civilising mission’ was practically implemented. These biographies are indicative of how and at what price the Russian empire could be renewed after the watershed of 1917, but they also demonstrate how Soviet ‘civilising missions’ shaped the personal and political experience of key members of the Soviet elite – whether they were emissaries from Moscow to implement central policies (Isaak Zelenskii), Bolsheviks stemming from the former native ‘colonial’ elite (Faizulla Khojaev), or Uzbek party careerists who were able to fundamentally reshape centre-periphery relations in the context of the Stalinist system after 1937 (Usman Iusupov). Their biographies demonstrate, firstly, how Soviet ‘nationalism’ replaced the ‘colonial’ inequality and racism of the revolutionary period as a dominating political factor and, secondly, how the Uzbek native Bolshevik leadership was instrumental in implementing the Soviet ‘civilising mission’.

1. Soviet ‘Colonialism’?

Applying the concept ‘colonialism’ to the history of the Russian empire and its heir after 1917, the Soviet Union, has been and remains a bone of contention: Historians continue to struggle with the “confused nature of Russian colonialism”, as one recently characterised Russian rule in Central Asia between the first conquest in 1865 and the Bolsheviks’

7 G. M. Easter, *Reconstructing the State: Personal Networks and Elite Identity in Soviet Russia*, Cambridge (Mass.) 2000; T. H. Rigby, *Early Provincial Cliques and the Rise of Stalin*, in: id., *Political Elites in the USSR: Central Leaders and Local Cadres from Lenin to Gorbachev*, Aldershot 1990, pp. 43–72.

8 See e.g.: D. Northrop, *Veiled Empire: Gender and Power in Stalinist Central Asia*, Ithaca/London 2004.

renewed conquest of the territories between 1919 and 1923.⁹ Likewise, the events and developments of the early period of the Bolshevik regime in Central Asia between 1924 and 1941 seem to be beset with contradictions and conflicts. On the one hand, the creation of new Soviet national republics and the promotion of indigenous leadership would hardly fit into the framework of European colonial rule; on the other hand, the overextension of cotton cultivation in Central Asia and the over-centralisation of the planned economy led historians to muse about 'Soviet colonialism', concluding that the Soviet Union was distinctive in its "state-sponsored effort to turn so-called backward peoples into nations [...] within the context of a unified state with a colonial-type economy and administrative structure".¹⁰

These difficulties of categorisation could be discarded without ceremony as intellectual gymnastics if they did not touch upon certain sensitive issues concerning recent reinterpretations of the post-Cold War political order. Today, alleged 'Russian colonialism' serves as a cornerstone of ongoing debates about history and national identity in the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union. Take the example of Georgia: In his 1991 memoirs *The Future Belongs to Freedom*, Eduard Shevardnadze presented the view that his country of birth had been a Russian colony since 1801, when in a process of annexation and invasion, Georgia was piece by piece swallowed up by Tsarist Russia. Shevardnadze – serving as the Georgian First Secretary during the Brezhnev period, and thereafter as Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR under Gorbachev – maintained in his version of the imperial history that Russia had brought Georgia under the "imperial yoke" and had exercised "typical colonial politics".¹¹ On the other hand, centre-periphery relations during the Soviet period were, in his view, characterised by over-centralisation of planning and decision making, a mechanism of rule that in the long run proved as destructive for Georgia as the Tsarist 'colonial politics' had been prior to 1917.¹² Unsurprisingly, as a former member of the Soviet elite, Shevardnadze had few things to say about 'Soviet colonialism'. But notably, his version of the role of 'colonialism' in Russian history has become the most prominent understanding of the past in Georgia, as well as in other post-Soviet states (the authoritarian rulers of these states having endorsed it, and their historians having followed suit).¹³

9 J. Sahadeo, *Russian Colonial Society in Tashkent, 1865–1923*, Bloomington (In.) 2007, p. 233.

10 F. Hirsch, *Toward an Empire of Nation: Border-Making and the Formation of Soviet National Identities*, in: *Russian Review*, 59 (2000) 2, pp. 201–226, here p. 204.

11 E. Shevardnadze, *The Future Belongs to Freedom*, London 1991, p. 5.

12 *Ibid.*, pp. 23–26, 30–33.

13 See e.g.: *Turkestan v nachale xx veka. K istorii istokov natsional'noi nezavisimosti* [Turkestan at the beginning of the twentieth century. On the history of the sources of national independence], Tashkent 2000; N. Abdurakhimova, *The Colonial System of Power in Turkestan*, in: *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 34 (2002) 2, pp. 239–262. On the political framework, see: M. Laruelle, *Wiedergeburt per Dekret. Nationsbildung in Zentralasien*, in: *Osteuropa*, 57 (2007) 8–9, pp. 139–154.

In Western academic discussion, Russia and the Soviet Union is largely absent from debates about colonialism.¹⁴ There seem to be few doubts that this absence is an outcome of Cold War science (where, under the heading 'colonialism', power relations between the First and the Third Worlds, Europe, Asia and Africa, were in the centre of interest). While during the 1950s the Soviet enemy behind the Iron Curtain figured decidedly as a 'colonial empire' which deliberately oppressed its subject nations,¹⁵ with the decolonisation crisis of the 1960s, more nuanced approaches were developed as sociological methods entered historical analysis. Subsequently, the conceptual framework of the 'colonialism' argument was shifted away from the issue of 'national oppression' towards the study of 'economic development' and 'modernisation'.¹⁶ The research was set apart from inquiries into colonialism and decolonisation, and the rise of Soviet Studies as a separate academic discipline largely prevented comparative studies of the Second and the Third Worlds, the focus of research instead resting upon arguments over the internal workings of totalitarian dictatorships.¹⁷

After 1991, when the growing influence of post-colonial theory seemed to pave new ground for portraying Soviet rule in Central Asia as 'colonialism',¹⁸ the break-up of the Soviet Union instead gave rise to a fast growing literature on Soviet nationality policies and nationality relations, a framing of the question apparently more suited to addressing the historical background of the sudden and unexpected disintegration of Europe's 'last empire'.¹⁹ Thus, the dispute over the role of 'colonialism' in Soviet history has had and continues to have firm institutional and ideological restrictions with which historians have to deal. Nonetheless, in the wake of the 'cultural turn' and inspired by the inquiries into post-colonialism, historians of Central Asia unearthed the decisive role of custom and religious practices, lifestyle and differing views of reality that played a role in the encounter between Russians and the native populations of Central Asia. One key element of this encounter was the desire of government officials to impose the norms and standards of European 'civilisation' on Central Asian societies. Russian and Soviet 'civilising missions' relied on the assumption that a perceived religious and ethnic difference of cultural forms and economic behaviour could be overcome by defining 'European'

14 J. Osterhammel, *Russland und der Vergleich zwischen Imperien. Einige Anknüpfungspunkte*, in: *Comparativ*, 18 (2008) 2, pp. 11–26.

15 A representative work is: W. Baczkowski, *Russian Colonialism: The Tsarist and Soviet Empires*, in: R. Strausz-Hupé/H. W. Hazard (eds.), *The Idea of Colonialism*, New York 1958, pp. 70–113. For a political application, see: R. F. Kennedy, *The Soviet Brand of Colonialism*, in: *New York Times Magazine*, 8 April 1956, p. SM15.

16 A. Nove/J. A. Newth, *The Soviet Middle East: A Model of Development?* London 1967; S. P. Dunn/E. Dunn, *Soviet Regime and Native Culture in Central Asia and Kazakhstan: The Major Peoples*, in: *Current Anthropology*, 8 (1967) 3, pp. 147–208; A. Bennigsen, *Colonization and Decolonization in the Soviet Union*, in: *Journal of Contemporary History*, 4 (1969) 1, pp. 141–151; W. K. Medlin/W. R. Cave/F. Carpenter, *Education and Development in Central Asia: A Case Study on Social Change in Uzbekistan*, Leiden 1971.

17 W. Myer, *Islam and Colonialism: Western Perspectives on Soviet Asia*, London 2002. For a rare exception, see: A. W. Gouldner, *Stalinism: A Study of Internal Colonialism*, in: *Telos*, 34 (1977/1978), pp. 5–48.

18 D. Kandiyoti, *Post-Colonialism Compared: Potentials and Limitations in the Middle East and Central Asia*, in: *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 34 (2002) 2, pp. 279–297.

19 J. L. H. Keep, *Last of the Empires: A History of the Soviet Union, 1945–1991*, Oxford 1995; R. G. Suny, *The Revenge of the Past: Nationalism, Revolution, and the Collapse of the Soviet Union*, Stanford 1995.

norms of conduct that, if widely accepted by the population, would create 'progress' and 'modernity' in regions geographically distant from the Russian European heartland.²⁰ The distinctive feature of the Russian imperial and Soviet 'civilising missions' – setting them apart from the Western colonial states – seems to be the observation that they were always applied to the 'colonial' periphery *and* to the Russian heartland alike with equal force.²¹ From the state elite's point of view, the Turkmen tribes of the Karakum desert and the Russian peasants of the Tambov region alike defied the standards of Western civilisation that Russia had to achieve. Intellectual and political debates about '*kul'turnost*' ('culturedness') were both indicator and shorthand for the disconnect between the elite's idea of how the population should live and the population's continual shortfall of these expectations.²² Moreover, the ideology of European socialism was a vehicle for the Bolsheviks to demand 'progress' and 'modernisation' from the populations of the Soviet Union (especially the peasantry) which to them seemed 'dark' and 'backward'.²³ The enormous gulf between the ruling elites of Russia and the Soviet Union (and their representations of state, culture, and future), on the one hand, and the everyday life experience of ordinary people, on the other hand, was a continuous source and motive for attempts to promote 'civilisation'.

2. 'Russian' Central Asia before and after 1917

Tsarist officials in Central Asia before 1917 presented themselves as carriers of 'European civilisation'. Nonetheless, they by and large refrained from active campaigns to change customs and traditions of the native populations of Turkestan, because the stability of their fragile regime was their main objective.²⁴ Subsequently, if one stresses fragility, under-government and indirect rule as defining features of 'colonialism', Russian Turkestan was indeed a 'colony'. The region had come under Russian control in the course

20 J. Baberowski, *Auf der Suche nach Eindeutigkeit. Kolonialismus und zivilisatorische Mission im Zarenreich und in der Sowjetunion*, in: *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas*, 47 (1999) 4, pp. 482–503.

21 D. Geyer, *Der russische Imperialismus. Studien über den Zusammenhang von innerer und auswärtiger Politik*, Göttingen 1977, p. 239; V. Kaganskii, *Kul'turnyi landschaft i sovetskoe obitaemoe prostranstvo* [Cultural landscape and Soviet inhabited space], Moscow 2001, pp. 143–144.

22 S. P. Frank, *Confronting the Domestic Other: Rural Popular Culture and Its Enemies in Fin-de-Siècle Russia*, in: S. P. Frank / M. D. Steinberg (eds.), *Cultures in Flux: Lower-Class Values, Practices, and Resistance in Late Imperial Russia*, Princeton 1994, pp. 74–107; W. Sunderland, *The 'Colonial Question': Visions of Colonization in Late Imperial Russia*, in: *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas*, 48 (2000) 2, pp. 210–232; V. Volkov, *The Concept of kul'turnost': Notes on the Stalinist Civilizing Process*, in: S. Fitzpatrick (ed.), *Stalinism: New Directions*, London / New York 2000, pp. 210–230; A. Edgar, *Bolshevism, Patriarchy, and the Nation: The Soviet 'Emancipation' of Muslim Women in Pan-Islamic Perspective*, in: *Slavic Review*, 65 (2006) 2, pp. 252–272.

23 L. Viola, *Peasant Rebels under Stalin: Collectivization and the Culture of Peasant Resistance*, New York / Oxford 1999, pp. 13–44; Y. Slezkine, *From Savages to Citizens: The Cultural Revolution in the Soviet Far North, 1928–1938*, in: *Slavic Review*, 51 (1992) 1, pp. 52–72.

24 A. Morrison, *Russian Rule* (footnote 4), pp. 30–36. See also: S. N. Abashin / D. I. Arapov / N. E. Bekmakhanova (eds.), *Tsentrāl'naia Aziia v sostave Rossiiskoi imperii* [Central Asia as a component of the Russian empire], Moscow 2008.

of the 'Great Game' – an attempt to delimit spheres of interest between the British and Russian empires in Central Asia during the 1860s and 1870s. Military interests, foremost, dictated the Russian administration's actions in Turkestan. Therefore it took the government more than twenty years after the conquest before officials actively began to pursue the region's economic development, especially in the area of cotton cultivation.²⁵ In the capital St. Petersburg, the southward extension of the borders in Central Asia was discussed with much controversy, and it was only a very small group within the military elite that consequently pushed forward an agenda to transform the Russian empire into a 'colonial state'.²⁶

At the time of the conquest of Central Asia, a system of administration of non-Russian and non-Orthodox populations within the empire was firmly in place, although the territories of the heterogeneous state were governed in various and widely differing ways.²⁷ An overarching strategy of the bureaucrats in St. Petersburg was to include new populations by guaranteeing religious toleration under the auspices of the rule of the Tsar. This strategy was likewise applied to Turkestan and its Muslim population: Orthodox proselytising was not permitted in the newly gained territories, Shari'a courts continued to function, and religious authorities retained their positions.²⁸ Although Muslim judges and imams played an instrumental role in strengthening Russian administration, the governors of Turkestan proclaimed a policy of so-called '*ignorirovanie*' of Islam. They hoped that the Muslim population would recognise their 'backwardness', 'stubbornness' and 'prejudice', and eventually convert to Christianity.²⁹ Thus, if one determines cultural and economic penetration of a territory by a strong 'colonial state' to be colonialism's main characteristic, Tsarist Russia did not qualify as a 'colonial' empire. Russian rule affected the broad population of Central Asia and its way of life only marginally. This system of 'weak' imperial inclusion became porous as Russia entered the revolutionary period. When social unrest spread throughout the vast country in 1905, the Russian elite began to alter its minority policies in fundamental ways. Russian nationalism, Islamophobia and anti-nomad policies (aiming at their sedentarisation) came to dominate government policy and rapidly reshaped the situation in the Central Asian territories: In the towns, Russian workers (especially on the strategically important railroads) were systematically provided with better conditions and given higher wages than their Central Asian counterparts. By granting privileges, the local government in Turkestan aimed at guaranteeing their loyalty to and support of the Tsarist regime. Workers responded

25 D. Mackenzie, Turkestan's Significance to Russia (1850–1917), in: *Russian Review*, 33 (1974) 2, pp. 167–188.

26 A. Marshall, *The Russian General Staff and Asia, 1800–1917*, London 2006, pp. 34–45. See also: J. Sahadeo, *Russian Colonial Society* (footnote 9), pp. 152–153.

27 A. Kappeler, *Rußland als Vielvölkerreich. Entstehung, Geschichte, Zerfall*, München 2001 [1992], pp. 134–138 passim; A. J. Rieber, *Sedimentary Society*, in: E. W. Clowes / S. D. Kassow / J. L. West (eds.), *Between Tsar and People: Educated Society and the Quest for Public Identity in Late Imperial Russia*, Princeton 1991, pp. 343–366, esp. pp. 348–350. See also: J. Baberowski / D. Feest / C. Gumb (eds.), *Imperiale Herrschaft in der Provinz. Repräsentationen politischer Macht im späten Zarenreich*, Frankfurt am Main 2008.

28 R. Crews, *For Prophet and Tsar: Islam and Empire in Russia and Central Asia*, Cambridge (Mass.) 2006, pp. 241–292.

29 A. Morrison, *Russian Rule* (footnote 4), pp. 55–58, 152–156.

favourably to this change of circumstances and adopted strategies of exclusion and segregation toward Muslim town dwellers.³⁰ In the countryside, a massive programme of the St. Petersburg government was started to resettle peasants from the Russian heartland in the Semireche province of Turkestan in order to ease social tensions and 'overpopulation' in the Russian villages. Much to the dismay of local Tsarist administrators in Turkestan, Russian peasants settled in great numbers on nomad pastures. The settlement campaign organised by the central government after 1905 led to a dramatic increase of conflicts between nomads and settlers, and tensions erupted violently in a large-scale uprising of Kazakh nomads in 1916.³¹

During the Civil War from 1918 to 1923 – when devastating famine struck the region and tens of thousands of Central Asians died of starvation – the Russian-dominated revolutionary workers' councils (*soveti*) distributed the available food deliveries exclusively to Russians. The ethnically divided economy spurred armed clashes, pogroms and settler-nomad conflicts that led to general breakdown. Central Asians were systematically excluded from participation in the government.³² Ethnic tension on the ground was therefore not, as the Bolsheviks tried to convince themselves and others, the result of 'century-long Tsarist oppression' but rather a short-term outcome of the revolutionary unrest since 1905. Thus, the 'colonialism' that the Bolsheviks were fighting was not so much a consequence of the Tsarist elites' self-fashioning as representatives of a 'European colonial power', but rather the result of a severe economic crisis that triggered racist worker politics in the Soviet revolutionary councils and violent ethnic competition for survival.³³

To the Bolsheviks, overcoming the 'colonial relicts of the Tsarist regime' in Central Asia meant the destruction of the old traditional society and the building of a new and 'modern' Soviet civilisation in its place.³⁴ The revolutions and the Civil War brought significant changes to the way in which Central Asia was governed. However, the elites' insistence on 'civilising missions' signifies a continuity arching over the divide of 1917 which

30 J. Sahadeo, *Russian Colonial Society* (footnote 9), pp. 188–190.

31 D. Brower, *Turkestan and the Fate of the Russian Empire*, London/New York 2003; Die Kolonisation Sibiriens. Eine Denkschrift von P. A. Stolypin und A. W. Kriwoschein, Berlin 1912, pp. 108–115; C. Steinwedel, *Resettling People, Unsettling the Empire: Migration and the Challenge of Governance, 1861–1917*, in: N. B. Breyfogle/A. Schrader/W. Sunderland (eds.), *Peopling the Russian Periphery: Borderland Colonization in Eurasian History*, London/New York 2007, pp. 128–147; J. Sahadeo, *Russian Colonial Society* (footnote 9), pp. 146–151. A recent article states that at least 3,828 Russians died during the fighting in 1916–17: A. V. Ganin, *Poslednaia poludennaia ekspeditsiia imperatorskoi Rossii. Russkaia armia na podavlenii Turkestanskogo miatezha 1916–1917* [The last southern expedition of imperial Russia. The Russian army and the elimination of the Turkestan uprising 1916–1917], in: *Russkii sbornik* [Russian Anthology], 5 (2008), pp. 152–214, here p. 188.

32 R. Vaidyanath, *The Formation of the Soviet Central Asian Republics: A Study in Soviet Nationalities Policy*, New Delhi 1967, pp. 76–77; P. Bergne, *The Kokand Autonomy, 1917–18: Political Background, Aims and Reasons for Failure*, in: T. Everett-Heath (ed.), *Central Asia: Aspects of Transition*, London/New York 2003, pp. 30–44.

33 M. Buttino, *La rivoluzione capovolta. L'Asia centrale tra il crollo dell'impero zarista e la formazione dell'URSS*, Naples 2003 [Russian edition: *Revoliutsiia naoborot. Sredniaia Aziia mezdu padeniem Tsarskoi imperii i obrazovaniem SSSR*, Moscow 2007]; J. Sahadeo, *Russian Colonial Society* (footnote 9), pp. 193–207.

34 G. Safarov, *Kolonialnaia revoliutsiia. Opyt Turkestana* [Colonial revolution. The experience of Turkestan], Moscow 1921, esp. pp. 8–9.

in light of the recent ethnic conflict became even more radicalised. Moreover, in stark contrast to the Tsarist administrators, the Bolsheviks stuck to their word: they generated unprecedented activity and a flurry of campaigns to achieve their aim to thoroughly transform the Russian settler community as well as the native Central Asian peasant and nomad societies. Drawing new internal state borders, pushing for higher cotton outputs and campaigning for mass mobilisation of the population were three areas where the new Soviet 'civilisation' was to be put into practice after 1924.

3. Civilising the 'Colonial Self'

The Central Asian Bureau of the Central Committee of the All-Russian Communist Party (*Sredneaziatskoe Biuro Tsentralnogo Komiteta RKP(b)*), or in short *Sredazbiuro*) was one of several subsections of the Bolshevik Party's central apparatus which dealt with the regions far away from Moscow, where (in some cases) ethnic Russians made up only a minority of the population. While the Central Committee's regional bureaus in the Caucasus, the Urals, Siberia, the Far East and the North West were dissolved between 1922 and 1927, *Sredazbiuro* remained in place and functioned until the end of 1934 when it was finally closed. After its establishment in 1922, the Bureau oversaw all party activity and economic life in Central Asia. It gained its institutional shape in 1924 when the borders of the former Tsarist 'colony' of Turkestan were redrawn and new territories emerged on the map in Central Asia.³⁵

The newly founded Soviet republics of Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan as well as the Autonomous Regions of the Tajik, the Kyrgyz and the Karakalpak fell under the jurisdiction of the Central Asian Bureau under the leadership of its First Secretary, Isaak Zelenskii. It was only in 1930, when the number of its formal members had risen to thirtyfive, that the Bureau gained an organisational strength that allowed a more systematic monitoring of the region, including extensive travelling of inspectors.³⁶ Before 1930, members of the Bureau were spending most of their time in their Tashkent offices and only occasionally travelled to major party meetings and conferences in the regions. The main source of power of the Central Asian Bureau did not derive from its competence in understanding local affairs or its organisational efficiency, but in its institutional control over communications with Moscow.³⁷

35 On the early years of *Sredazbiuro*, see: S. Keller, The Central Asian Bureau, an Essential Tool in Governing Soviet Turkestan, in: Central Asian Survey, 22 (2003) 2-3, pp. 281-297. Its dissolution in 1934 is documented in: R. W. Davies et al. (eds.), The Stalin-Kaganovich Correspondence, 1931-36, New Haven/London 2003, pp. 266-267.

36 M. F. Anderson, Iz istorii partiinogo stroitel'stva v Srednei Azii [From the history of party construction in Central Asia], Dushanbe 1966, pp. 20-21, 32.

37 Iusup Abdrakhmanov, Chairman of Kyrgyzstan's Council of People's Commissars, complained in a 1929 letter to Stalin about the "threefold 'subservience' [troinoe 'poddanstvo']" of this autonomous territory within the Soviet administrative structure – firstly to the Russian Federative Republic, secondly to the *Sredazbiuro*, and thirdly to the all-Union bureaucracy, see: Iu. Abdrakhmanov, Izbrannye trudy [Selected works], Bishkek 2001, p. 183. On

Isaak Abramovich Zelenskii (1890–1938) was an individual capable of dealing with the powerful position he gained as the First Secretary of the Sredazbiuro. The son of a former soldier-turned-tailor and born in Saratov, he learned the hatter's trade and became involved in the revolutionary movement at the early age of sixteen. Because of his political activities he was exiled twice, to Naryn in 1912 and to Irkutsk in 1915. After escaping from Irkutsk, he found himself in Moscow in January 1917 where he was one of the leading figures of the revolution and became chairman of Moscow's Basmannyi district Soviet committee. During the Civil War, Zelenskii was involved in one of the most violent and deeply anti-peasant Bolshevik revolutionary organisations, the People's Commissariat of Food Supplies (*Narkomprod*) where he worked between 1918 and 1920. After a brief dispatch to Siberia in late 1920, he returned to the capital in March 1921 to become one of the Moscow Party secretaries. In 1922, he was elected member of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party and in this position was transferred to Bukhara in 1923.³⁸

The political dilemma that Isaak Zelenskii encountered during his time of service as the Chairman of the Central Asian Bureau in Tashkent from November 1924 until February 1931 subsequently became his personal dilemma: When the Soviet Union was founded in 1922, one of the top priorities of the Bolshevik leadership was to 'solve the nationality question' in the empire's peripheries. The Soviet state's goal was twofold and contradictory – to become a political federation of national republics or territories on the one hand, and to form a union-wide integrated and supra-national economy on the other hand.³⁹ The Bolsheviks found a purely ideological solution to the dilemma of nationality policies versus economic integration when they decided to fight in two directions at the same time – against Russian 'great power chauvinism' and against 'nationalism at the local level'.⁴⁰ To forge commitment and broaden the social foundation of their regime, the Bolsheviks further introduced a policy that promoted the culture and language of local nationalities as well as native cadres in order to 'root in' Soviet power in minority regions and the periphery (in Russian termed '*korenizatsiia*').⁴¹

In Central Asia, Zelenskii first became involved in nationality problems when he participated in the redrawing of the borders in 1924–1925. While the general decision to

Abdrakhmanov's activities in Kyrgyzstan, see: B. H. Loring, *Building Socialism in Kyrgyzstan: Nation-Making, Rural Development, and Social Change, 1921–1932*, Ph.D. dissertation, Brandeis University 2008.

38 Zelenskii's autobiography can be found in *Deiateli Soiuza Sovetskikh Sotsialisticheskikh Respublik i Oktiaбрьskoi Revoliutsii* [Activists of the USSR and the October Revolution], v. 1, Moscow 1929, cols. 141–143. On Zelenskii's revolutionary activities in 1917, see: *Slovo starykh Bol'shevikov (iz revoliutsionnogo proshlogo)* [The word of the old Bolsheviks (from the revolutionary past)], Moscow 1965, pp. 240–244.

39 F. Hirsch, *Empire of Nations: Ethnographic Knowledge and the Making of the Soviet Union*, Ithaca 2005, pp. 62–98.

40 G. Simon, *Nationalismus und Nationalitätenpolitik in der Sowjetunion. Von der totalitären Diktatur zur nachstalinischen Gesellschaft*, Baden-Baden 1986 [English edition: *Nationalism and Policy toward the Nationalities in the Soviet Union: From Totalitarian Dictatorship to post-Stalinist Society*, Boulder 1993], pp. 83–106; Y. Slezkine, *The USSR as a Communal Apartment, or How a Socialist State Promoted Ethnic Particularism*, in: *Slavic Review*, 53 (1994) 2, pp. 414–452.

41 T. Martin, *The Affirmative Action Empire: Nations and Nationalism in the Soviet Union, 1923–1939*, Ithaca/London 2001, pp. 1–27.

dissolve the ‘colonial’ borders between Turkestan and the former Russian protectorates Bukhara and Khiva was made by the party leadership in Moscow, the actual redrawing of the borders was accomplished in Tashkent. Here, emissaries from Moscow presided over border commissions where Central Asian Bolsheviks agreed amongst themselves how the borders between Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan should be delimited.⁴² Ethnic principles overrode other determinants (namely the economic) more often than not, because the process of border drawing and the division of territory “had transformed everyone into nationalists”, as one of the Central Asian Bolsheviks observed.⁴³ During this process, native Bolsheviks from Turkestan, Bukhara and Khiva changed and redefined at a breathtaking pace their personal national belonging along the lines of loyalties, career choice, and opportunity.⁴⁴

Moscow’s intention in redrawing the state borders in Central Asia was both ‘overcoming colonialism’ and demonstrating the sincerity of ‘*korenizatsiia*’ policy. More generally, it aimed at political ‘modernisation’ according to European standards, where in the wake of World War I large political units had been dissolved and redefined along ethnic lines. In Central Asia, however, the new borders not only produced new conflicts during the actual process of border drawing, but they had a deep and lasting effect: constant clashes among the leaderships of the Central Asian republics over the distribution of economic resources (especially water allocations and central financial subsidies) became a structural constraint to decision making.⁴⁵ This experience made Zelenskii aware of the difficulties that arose from reconciling national antagonisms within Central Asia with the demands of the all-Union economy, but he also experienced these complications as a part of his day-to-day work with Bolsheviks who came from Central Asia.⁴⁶

In his position as the head of the Central Asian Bureau, Isaak Zelenskii actively pursued an agenda that was labelled ‘*dekolonizatsiia*’ during the early 1920s.⁴⁷ He supported the 1921–22 deportation from Central Asia of thousands of Russian peasants who had set-

42 A. Haugen, *The Establishment of National Republics in Soviet Central Asia*, Houndmills/Basingstoke 2003, pp. 180–210; A. Sengupta, *The Formation of the Uzbek Nation-State: A Study in Transition*, Lanham 2003, pp. 81–131; A. Farrant, *Mission Impossible: The Politico-geographical Engineering of Soviet Central Asia’s Republican Boundaries*, in: *Central Asian Survey*, 25 (2006) 1–2, pp. 61–74.

43 A. Dzhumashev, Allaia Dosnazarov i politika natsional’no-territorial’nogo razmezhevanii Srednei Azii [Allaia Dosnazarov and the politics of national delimitation], in: *Vestnik Karakalpakskogo Otdeleniia Akademii Nauk Respubliki Uzbekistan* [Proceedings of the Karakalpak branch of the Academy of Science of the Republic of Uzbekistan], (2007) 2, pp. 57–61, here p. 59.

44 One of the most prominent examples for this process was Faizulla Khojaev, see footnotes 56–57.

45 For an elaboration of this argument, see: C. Teichmann, *Canals, Cotton, and the Limits of De-colonization in Soviet Uzbekistan, 1924–1941*, in: *Central Asian Survey*, 26 (2007) 4, pp. 499–519, esp. pp. 503–506.

46 I. Vareikis/I. Zelenskii, *Natsional’no-territorial’noe razmezhevanie Srednei Azii* [The national delimitation of Central Asia], Tashkent 1924; A. Haugen, *The Establishment* (footnote 42), p. 80.

47 For the contemporary use of the term ‘*dekolonizatsiia*’, see: *Tainy natsional’noi politiki TsK RKP. Chetvertoe soveshchanie TsK RKP s otvetstvennymi rabotnikami natsional’nykh respublik i oblastei v g. Moskve 9–12 iunია 1923 g.* [Secrets of the nationality policies of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party. The fourth meeting of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party with leading party workers of the national republics and regions, Moscow June 9–12, 1923], Moscow 1992, p. 44. On the ambivalence of Soviet ‘decolonisation’, see: G. Simon, *Nationalismus und Nationalitätenpolitik* (footnote 40), pp. 17–18; A. Sengupta, *The Formation* (footnote 42), pp. 83–85.

tled on nomad pastures before 1917.⁴⁸ Zelenskii also actively battled negative attitudes of Russians toward natives. In 1925, he told a meeting of Russian workers in the cotton sector that maltreatment and abuse of Uzbek peasants, embezzlement and racism would not be tolerated at the cotton collection points:

Crudeness – this is the debasement of the native population as if they were representatives of a lower race. Shamefully, this is the conduct of many of our workers, who think of themselves as enlightened and progressive-minded people; there is an insufficient awareness that the work of peasants has the same value as any other kind [of work]. [...] If we can apply the death penalty to some county chairman, then, if we see a person who sits at a cotton collection point and weighs the delivered cotton to his own [financial] advantage, who steals, who teases the native peasantry – [what] in your opinion [should we do], should we fondle his head? No, for somebody like this there is nothing else but the death penalty.⁴⁹

The 'decolonisation' dilemma that Zelenskii faced was common to many of the formerly 'colonised' regions: workers, specialists and experts who managed all of the economically important ventures openly exhibited racist attitudes, whereas the native peasantry remained aloof to Bolshevik rule and rejected attempts to reform their way of life, to redistribute land, to unveil, or to overcome 'religious prejudice'. Still, Soviet 'civilising mission' aimed at both at the same time, the fight against local traditions of the 'backward' populations in Uzbekistan as well as the 'colonial' attitudes exhibited by Russian workers. Within this dual agenda, Zelenskii's use of the term 'race' can therefore also be read as pure political rhetoric that targeted local power structures within the Russian settler community.

In the same vein, despite the indigenisation agenda that Moscow promoted, '*korenizatsiia*' was stunningly unsuccessful in Central Asia as compared to the Caucasus, Tatarstan, Bashkiria or Ukraine.⁵⁰ This was due to Zelenskii's efforts to centralise political and economic power in the Sredazbiuro and his continued policy to assign important positions to so-called 'European party workers' (i.e. Russians, Tatars and Jews, Armenians and Azeris). Zelenskii was habitually distrustful of Central Asian native Bolsheviks. His general perception of them was guided by an obsessive attention to their feuds and disagreements.⁵¹ Even 'Europeans', he feared, could become caught up in these power strug-

48 On this complex, see: RGASPI f. 62, op. 2, d. 86, ll. 5-6; V. Genis, *Deportatsiia russkikh iz Turkestana* ("Delo Safarova") [The deportation of Russians from Turkestan (The "Safarov Case")], in: *Voprosy istorii* [Questions of History], (1998) 1, pp. 44-55; RGASPI f. 62, op. 2, d. 9, ll. 5-7; R. Vaidyanath, *The Formation* (footnote 32), pp. 112-113.

49 GARF f. 374, op. 27, d. 612, ll. 64, 67. For more examples of racist attitudes of Russians in Central Asia during the 1920s, see: C. Cavanaugh, *Acclimatization, the Shifting Science of Settlement*, in: N. Breyfogle/A. Schrader/W. Sunderland (eds.), *Peopling the Russian Periphery* (footnote 31), pp. 169-188.

50 A. Edgar, *Tribal Nation: The Making of Soviet Turkmenistan*, Princeton 2004, pp. 70-128; T. Martin, *The Affirmative Action Empire* (footnote 41), pp. 125-181.

51 See e.g.: Zelenskii's letter to Stalin from 29 April 1928, RGASPI f. 558, op. 11, d. 735, ll. 32-34.

gles which sabotaged the party's political goals.⁵² Hardly hiding his distrust, Zelenskii's position was characterised by differences of opinion on this question, even with other 'European' comrades in Tashkent who were better able to relate to the native Bolsheviks. One of Zelenskii's Russian colleagues in Uzbekistan, Vladimir Ivanov, quipped at him during a 1926 party meeting because in the former's view group feuds and disagreements "took on a real form – but we disagree on this issue."⁵³ Thus, Zelenskii was personally unable to overcome his distrustful attitude towards native Central Asian Bolsheviks, and it was this distrust that prevented any solution to the dilemmas of decolonisation during the 1920s.

4. Cotton and the Ambiguities of 'Liberation'

The Bolsheviks assessed the success of their nationality policy by its ability to ease ethnic conflicts on the ground. Judging by their own standards and expectations, their endeavours had resulted in complete failure in Uzbekistan by 1929. Ethnic tensions were prominent in all aspects of everyday life. Visitors from Moscow expressed surprise at the "very strange classification of the population into 'Europeans' and Uzbeks. This classification was a leitmotif in all conversations I had with workers and peasants." 'European' Soviet workers in Bukhara complained that for them, being "cultured and civilised people, it is very hard to work with the uncultured Uzbeks, and that the mission [*zadachi*] of the Europeans is great, overwhelming". Disturbed by the ruthless treatment that Uzbeks received from street car drivers and railway personnel, the observer from Moscow compared the everyday situations he witnessed in Uzbek towns to the then contemporary racial segregation in the United States and scenes from colonial India.⁵⁴

Uzbek nationalist intellectuals, on the other hand, were expressing their discontent with Bolshevik rule in a similar language, remarking the 'colonial' character of economic and cadre decisions: "All Russians and foreigners are strangers to us. One should not give them their head; one should expel [*vychit*] them from Turkestan. The damn Europeans attained culture and now they even oppress China." The main problem was the continuing in-migration of poor Russians to Uzbekistan: "The revolution did not give us anything; everything is the same as it used to be in Tsarist times, and only the flag has changed. Under the flag of joblessness the [Russian] settlement of our region continues." Even the Uzbek First Party Secretary, Akmal Ikramov, recognised in 1929 that "they

52 RGASPI f. 62, op. 2, d. 86, l. 18; GARF f. 5446, op. 71, d. 74, ll. 5, 8; A. Edgar, *Tribal Nation* (footnote 50), p. 112; A. Haugen, *The Establishment* (footnote 42), pp. 102-105.

53 RGASPI f. 17, op. 69, d. 58, l. 20. From 1925 to 1927, Vladimir Ivanovich Ivanov (1893–1938) served as a Secretary of the Uzbek Communist Party organisation.

54 GARF f. 374, op. 27, d. 1708, ll. 206-207. For more negative reports: "Sovershenno sekretno". Lubianka – Stalinu o polozhenii v strane ["Top secret". Lubianka to Stalin on the state of the nation], v. 6: 1928, Moscow 2002, pp. 453-454 *passim*.

come to our region [*k nam*] from other parts of the Union as to a warm country, but from our side we have to cope with our shortage of land and overpopulation".⁵⁵

Faizulla Khojaev (1896–1938) was an important figure at the centre of these political and social tensions. He was in a powerful position after a brilliant career, but he was also vulnerable because of his personal past: Khojaev was born into the family of a rich merchant from Bukhara. Accordingly, he received a good education, studied in Moscow between 1907 and 1912, and subsequently became involved in the Muslim reform movement (Jadidism) after his return to Central Asia. The Young Bukharan movement – which was partly financed through the fortune that Khojaev inherited after the death of his father – aimed at the indigenous self-reform of society, education and economy following the path of European modernisation. Subsequently, Khojaev's position in the Emirate of Bukhara was jeopardised when he was persecuted because of his 'revolutionary' activities after 1917.⁵⁶ But eventually, in September 1920 (shortly after the Red Army invaded Bukhara and overthrew the Emir's government) Khojaev became one of the leaders of the Bukharan People's Soviet Republic at the age of twenty four. When the borders in Turkestan were redrawn in 1924 and Uzbekistan emerged as a new state on the map, Khojaev moved on to become head of the Uzbek Council of Ministers, a position he retained until his arrest during the Great Purges in 1937.⁵⁷

Precisely because of this ambiguous image, it was he – being the head of the Uzbek state – who was chosen by the leadership in Moscow to put the Soviet program of 'cotton independence' into effect.⁵⁸ 'Cotton independence' meant that production in Uzbekistan had to rise exponentially in the short span of the Five Year Plan. According to the upgraded version of the Plan in the summer of 1929, the Soviet republics of Central Asia and Kazakhstan were given the assignment to produce 44.5 million poods of raw cotton by 1932 (instead of 18 million poods harvested in 1929). This increase in production was to guarantee Soviet independence from cotton imports coming from the U.S. and Egypt. 'Cotton independence' had a cultural dimension as well. It functioned as a version of 'civilising mission' since its thrust was to enforce state control, to forge collectivisation, and to spread industrialised methods and 'socialist working habits' (such as working in brigades) in the agricultural sector.⁵⁹

55 TsK RKP(b)-VKP(b) i natsional'nyi vopros [The Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party and the nationality question], v. 1: 1918–1933 gg., Moscow 2005, pp. 574–575; RGASPI f. 17, op. 113, d. 725, l. 13.

56 A. Khalid, Society and Politics in Bukhara, 1868–1920, in: Central Asian Survey, 19 (2000), pp. 367–396; R. Kangas, Faizulla Khodzhaev: National Communism in Bukhara and Soviet Uzbekistan, 1896–1938, Ph.D. dissertation, Indiana University 1992, pp. 180–240.

57 On the early career, see also: C. Obiya, When Faizulla Khojaev Decided to Be an Uzbek, in: S. Dudoignon/H. Komatsu (eds.), Islam in Politics in Russia and Central Asia, London 2001, pp. 99–118; G. Fedtke, Wie aus Bucharern Usbeken und Tadschiken wurden. Sowjetische Nationalitätenpolitik im Lichte einer persönlichen Rivalität, in: Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft, 54 (2006) 3, pp. 214–231.

58 A. G. Abdunabiev, Iz istorii razvitiia irrigatsii v Sovetskom Uzbekistane [From the history of irrigation development in Soviet Uzbekistan], Tashkent 1971, pp. 92–97.

59 F. Khojaev, Khlopok [Cotton], in: Revoliutsiia i natsional'nosti [Revolution and the nationalities], (1930) 6, pp. 27–32, esp. p. 28.

The cotton campaign, combined with collectivisation of agriculture and state terror against the peasantry, which included the deportation of thousands of ‘rich peasants’ (named ‘*kulaki*’ or ‘*bai*’) from the countryside, had a devastating impact on the agriculture of Uzbekistan. Social disruption, out-migration and mass starvation accompanied the extension of cotton production during the years between 1929 and 1934.⁶⁰ But although the situation remained precarious, peasants in Uzbekistan developed coping strategies after overcoming the initial onslaught of the state. Government reports emphasise the peasants’ passivity and rejection of a system of agricultural labour that fully exposed them to the will of state agencies as well as the dependence on government loans and centralised food supplies: “In many of the kolkhozes of the [Uzbek] republic working discipline is very low, absenteeism is high, and the non-fulfilment of the working norm has taken on a mass character.”⁶¹

The impact of this ‘civilising mission’ under the veil of Soviet ‘modernisation’ was socially and economically destructive in its outcome, but Uzbek Bolsheviks such as Khojaev understood ‘cotton independence’ as a way to aggressively achieve ‘progress’ and to find a new foundation for ‘modernity’. Khojaev noted in an article published in 1930:

*All this helps to fully unfold the realisation of cultural revolution in Uzbekistan. The material and cultural inequality that stems from the historical conditions here – being the result of the Tsar’s and the capitalists’ oppression – should be finally liquidated in the shortest period of time. Cotton – the cultivation of which happened through inhuman exploitation of the broad masses of the poor and middle peasantry under the Tsar and the capitalists – under Soviet power, thanks to the correct policy of our party, turned into a lever of the utmost strength in the fight for the liquidation of all and every relict of the former order, of inequality and national oppression.*⁶²

In compliance with and submission to Stalinist economic policy, Khojaev unfailingly defended the rapid expansion of cotton acreage. In public and in closed party sessions he advocated violent methods to be used to push peasants towards higher cotton output.⁶³ It was his tirelessly voiced opinion that the increase of cotton acreage would prove fruitful to economic development and the extension of infrastructure to rural areas. Even in internal correspondence he did not criticise, as other government members did, the damaging consequences of ‘cotton independence’ for agriculture in Uzbekistan.⁶⁴

60 M. Thurman, The ‘Command-Administrative System’ in Cotton Farming in Uzbekistan, 1920s to Present, Bloomington (In.) 1999, esp. pp. 14–22, 30–34.

61 RGANI f. 6, op. 6, d. 666, l. 22.

62 F. Khojaev, Khlopok (footnote 59), p. 29.

63 State Archive of the Republic of Uzbekistan, Tashkent, f. 837, op. 26, d. 289, ll. 25–27ob. and 249–260. For a similar argument concerning the land reforms of the 1920s, see: J. Critchlow, Did Faizulla Khojaev Really Oppose Uzbekistan’s Land Reform? in: Central Asian Survey, 9 (1990) 3, pp. 29–41.

64 For a critique of cotton expansion and the negative consequences of irrigation, see: Abdullah Rakhimbaev’s 1933 report at the Russian State Archive of Economic History, Moscow, f. 8378, op. 1, d. 99, ll. 330–336.

Faizulla Khojaev typically exhibited the political and personal tensions that evolved within the Uzbek elite during the 1930s. He was susceptible because of his Bukharan 'nationalist' past, but also instrumental to introducing the cotton 'civilising mission'. His biography nevertheless provided a more ambiguous account of Russia's 'colonial' past because he embodied the 'nationalist' version of history that had understood Soviet 'progress' as a path to evolutionary, not revolutionary, 'modernisation'. Khojaev based this assessment of 'colonial' history on the idea of the Jadid reformers that successful social change in Central Asia had to be initiated by the Muslim community itself.⁶⁵ It was precisely this idea that rallied sharp criticism against him.⁶⁶ In contradiction to his criticism of Tsarist attempts before 1917 to forge "cultural mission' of the Russian bourgeoisie in Turkestan",⁶⁷ he helped to enforce a new form of Soviet 'civilising mission' specifically because of his 'nationalist' convictions on how to successfully achieve Muslim 'modernity'. However, this could not save him from being purged from his prominent post in the summer of 1937. As one of the defendants of the Third Moscow show trial (the 'Bukharin trial') he was sued and shot in early 1938.

5. Permanent Mass Mobilisation

Unlike Faizulla Khojaev and other early Bolshevik leaders originating from Central Asia, Usman Iusupov (1900–1966) descended from a peasant family and was not a highly educated man. Quite in contrast, he was rude, bold, bull-necked, and inarticulate.⁶⁸ It is not hard to imagine that the circle around Stalin – whose speeches and comments at party meetings were a mix of meaningless ideological debris, strong words and the call of radical measures – favoured persons like Iusupov who copied Stalin-style behaviour in his political habitus. Additionally, Iusupov unconditionally supported the central government's agenda to further extend cotton agriculture. Iusupov made Soviet 'civilising mission' the overarching project of his political as well as his personal life. His choice to marry the daughter of a Tashkent railroad worker of Ukrainian origin underlines how much self-cultivation according to Soviet standards and the Stalinist transformation of Uzbekistan went hand in hand. His marriage to Iulia Logvinovna Stepanenko in 1929 provided Iusupov with the necessary cultural knowledge and prestige to rise higher in the party organisation, and as a result, in the cultural hierarchy of the Soviet Union.⁶⁹ After working in the Sredazbiuro from 1931 until late 1934, Iusupov and his wife Iulia moved to Moscow where he took up studies in the Central Committee's Marxism courses. He

65 F. Khojaev, *Dzhadidy [The Jadids]*, in: *Ocherki revoliutsionnogo dvizheniia v Srednei Azii [Sketches from the revolutionary movement in Central Asia]*, Moscow 1926, pp. 7–12.

66 F. Khojaev, *Izbrannye trudy [Collected works]*, v. 1, Tashkent 1970, pp. 450–451,

67 F. Khojaev, *Izbrannye trudy [Collected works]*, v. 2, Tashkent 1972, p. 120.

68 For an example see a 1931 speech of Iusupov, cited in: B. Reskov/G. Sedov, *Usman Iusupov*, Moscow 1976, p. 84.

69 *Ibid.*, pp. 68–77. On the importance of intermarriage within the Central Asian Bolshevik elites, see: A. Edgar, *Marriage, Modernity, and the 'Friendship of Nations': Interethnic Intimacy in Post-War Central Asia in Comparative Perspective*, in: *Central Asian Survey*, 26 (2007) 4, pp. 581–599, esp. pp. 584–585, 593.

stayed there until early 1937 and – unlike Faizulla Khojaev – made some powerful and influential friends in this key institution of the Bolshevik party.⁷⁰ From 1937 to 1950 he chaired the Uzbek Party Organisation. In 1950, he became the first Uzbek ever to serve as a Minister of Cotton Production in the Moscow Council of Ministers.

Working in local trade union organisations in the Ferghana valley during the 1920s, he was a grass-roots '*praktik*' in 'building socialism'. In 1929, only three years after Iusupov's entry into the party, his person was already discussed. In an atmosphere of distrust between Moscow and the Uzbek party leadership on the eve of the cotton campaign and collectivisation that severely shook the Uzbek party leadership, First Secretary Akmal Ikramov attacked young social climbers within the Uzbek party like Iusupov, doing nothing to hide his distrust towards them. In a May 1929 Moscow Orgburo session Ikramov told the audience that

there is a number of comrades-climbers, and under their auspices, act right-leaning elements [i.e. 'nationalists' in the Bolshevik parlance]. In Samarkand, for instance, there were not only rightists, but also a pan-Turkish element [...]. What kinds of people were promoted by us? Iusupov, Altabaev and others.

The Moscow leadership had a very different assessment of this group, and Lazar Kaganovich, in response and opposition to Ikramov, noted: "A cadre of Uzbek [party] workers has matured. I should say straightforwardly that this is the best we have there. This cadre grew up fighting nationalism and chauvinism." When Iusupov came to Moscow for the first time in July 1930 as member of a Sredazbiuro delegation (headed by Isaak Zelenskii), he quickly recognised where his allegiance should lie and began denouncing Ikramov and his old-school 'nationalist' friends.⁷¹

As soon as Usman Iusupov ascended to the highest party post in September 1937, mass mobilisation to build irrigation canals became the main theme of Soviet 'civilising mission' in Uzbekistan. Backed by his powerful protectors in Moscow, Iusupov was able to launch construction projects in Uzbekistan of hitherto unimaginable dimensions. Unlike the post-collectivisation period under Khojaev's leadership between 1932 and 1937 – during which such large-scale infrastructure construction was not undertaken – beginning in 1938 new construction sites were opened throughout Uzbekistan. In 1939, fifty two irrigation canals and dams were built with an overall length of 1.332 kilometres.⁷² The biggest and most publicised irrigation construction was the building of the Great Ferghana Canal during the winter months of 1939–40. The canal with a length of 250

70 These were Anastas Mikoian [see: B. Reskov/G. Sedov, Usman Iusupov (footnote 68), pp. 92–94] and, more importantly, Andrei Andreev [RGASPI f. 558, op. 11, d. 57, ll. 94–95; RGANI f. 6, op. 6, d. 665, ll. 46–50].

71 RGASPI f. 17, op. 113, d. 725, ll. 33, 60. A 1931 denunciation letter of Iusupov (who had just been fired by Ikramov from his post of Party secretary in Tashkent) is preserved at RGASPI f. 82, op. 2, d. 154, ll. 79–92.

72 RGANI f. 6, op. 6, d. 662, l. 254. For a more detailed account of irrigation construction during the late 1930s, see: C. Teichmann, Canals, Cotton, and the Limits (footnote 45), pp. 509–513.

kilometres was built in only a few weeks by up to 160 thousand people from all over Uzbekistan.⁷³

These building projects ('*narodnye stroiki*') relied on the constant mobilisation of the population. Thousands of peasants, urban youths and prisoners worked to construct canals that changed the hydrological setup of whole agricultural regions. Moreover, as part of the continuous revolutionary progress towards 'communism', the construction of the new canals was advertised with a strong nationalist message, as an 'Uzbek' way to boost the 'Uzbek' economy. Iusupov told a conference audience in 1939:

*I do not know if you could find any person that would say the Uzbek people are a backward and poor people. The Uzbek people have a right to reveal to the whole world that they are [...] a revolutionary and powerful people. On the basis of the upsurge of industry, agriculture, and culture, we have ended the first phase of building communism and have founded a socialist society.*⁷⁴

By 1939, mass mobilisation for canal construction had become the main activity of the Uzbek party leadership, the government and the population under its auspices. Regardless of this, the mobilised people lived in such deprived material conditions that escapes back home and 'desertions' were common occurrences.⁷⁵ More and more it emerged that the canals were Iusupov's 'personal ideology' and part of his desire to 'lift the people up [*podnjat' narod*]' as he understood it.⁷⁶ Seen from this perspective, the 'colonial period' had become a distant past. Bolshevik empire building had proven to be a valid project as it was enacted by strong and violent native leaders who were able to capture the imagination of the Soviet leadership, and especially Stalin, in order to mobilise resources for canal construction and permanent mass mobilisation. Forging 'modernisation' and Soviet 'civilisation' in Uzbekistan had ultimately ended in the steady forced recruitment of the population to dig canals using only spades, if they were lucky, or with their bare hands, if they were not.

6. Conclusion

For the Tsarist elites and the Bolsheviks alike, the territories and societies to be cultivated, gardened, and civilised began right outside the front doors of their homes and offices, regardless of whether they lived in St. Petersburg or Tashkent. The common denominator of their 'civilising missions' was the declared intention to forge popular acceptance

73 L. U. Iusupov, *Sotsializm i tvorcheskaja iniciativa mass. Narodnoe stroitel'stvo v respublik Srednei Azii v 1938–1950* [Socialism and the creative initiative of the masses. People's construction projects in the republics of Central Asia], Tashkent 1977, pp. 19–20.

74 U. Iusuopv, *Izbrannye trudy* [Selected works], v. 1, Tashkent 1982, p. 163.

75 RGANI f. 6, op. 6, d. 668, ll. 148–156 and d. 663, ll. 4–5, 12.

76 RGANI f. 6, op. 6, d. 662, ll. 197–199; RGANI f. 6, op. 6, d. 667, l. 42–43. See also: P. Stronski, *Fonder une cité soviétique en Asie centrale: Le plan pour la culture à Tachkent 1937–1941*, in: *Communisme*, 70/71 (2002), pp. 109–129, esp. pp. 122–123.

of 'European' standards in everyday life and public behaviour. Especially since 1929, mobilisation was coupled with state violence against 'backward' populations and 'traditional' working habits to achieve this aim. Between 1924 and 1941, this process was constitutive of the biographies and careers of Central Asian Bolsheviks: Isaak Zelenskii tried to monopolise power in the Sredazbiuro with its majority of 'European' party workers; Faizulla Khojaev had to come to terms with a Bolshevik version of Central Asian 'colonial' history that repressed autochthonous features of the Muslim reform movement (Jadidism); and Usman Iusupov was intimately drawn into the realm of Russian-Soviet culture through marriage and political habitus. Nevertheless, the subjugation of the population to modernising 'civilising missions' was a common feature of the Stalinist Soviet Union and by no means particular to historical developments in Central Asia.

The global discussion on 'colonialism' played a part in this development. Although 'civilising missions' were applied to all parts of the population regardless of whether their place of living was close to the centre or on the edges of the periphery, the existence of a (revolutionary, short-lived and popular) Russian 'colonial state' in Central Asia can help to understand the rise and endurance of racial hierarchies among the empire's populations. Even if there were emissaries from the centre who forged 'equality' in the periphery and native 'nationalists' who were willing to violently transform their country according to the wishes of the centre, the tensions of the 'civilising mission' persisted, as the goal of 'liberation' was not achievable. The Soviet case is remarkable in that it unhinged the connection between 'civilising mission' and the 'colonial state' and structurally replaced 'colonialism' with 'nationalism' and totalitarian state-driven 'modernisation'.

Thus, the ambiguity of promise and fulfilment came full circle only in the world of Soviet propaganda: The main characteristic of the Bolshevik state and its ideology rested upon the juxtaposition of 'true' socialism and 'untrue' capitalism, righteous inside and unjust outside, clean self and unclean other. When 'equality of all Soviet nations' was officially proclaimed and propagandised, peasants suffered the terrors of collectivisation and the famine of 'cotton independence'. When 'communism' was proclaimed, mobilised native masses in Uzbekistan dug canals into deserts, dirt and swamps. This condition was before everyone's eyes. Still, a global frame of reference pointed to what made Soviet policies unique and mendacious, as one anonymous letter writer noted when he told the government in 1932: "Generally, dear comrades, don't write about India, just take a closer look at yourselves".⁷⁷

77 Tragediia sovetskoi derevni. Kollektivizatsiia i razkulachivanie [The tragedy of the Soviet countryside. Collectivisation and dekulakisation], v. 3: Late 1930–1933, Moscow 2001, p. 313.

The American Way of Empire: The United States and the Search for Colonial Order in the Philippines

Frank Schumacher

RESÜMEE

Der Erwerb kolonialer Besitzungen der USA im Pazifik und der Karibik wird oft als temporäre Abweichung von einer grundsätzlich anti-kolonialen nationalen Tradition gedeutet, und dabei betont, dass die Kolonialherrschaft der USA weder in Anlage noch Ausprägung mit den europäischen Imperien vergleichbar sei. Dieser Aufsatz zur US-Kolonialpolitik in den Philippinen hinterfragt diese Sichtweise und skizziert das Interesse amerikanischer ‚Kolonialexperten‘ an administrativem und militärischem ‚know-how‘, das aus europäischen Erfahrungen gewonnen wurde. Nach einem Jahrzehnt intensiver Transfers gewann jedoch die Deutung vom „Sonderweg“ amerikanischer Kolonialbestrebungen die diskursive Oberhand. Die Vorstellung von der vorgeblichen Einzigartigkeit und Benevolenz des amerikanischen Kolonialprojekts auf den Philippinen speiste sich einerseits aus dem Stolz über die dort durchgeführten sozialtechnischen Steuerungsmaßnahmen und andererseits aus dem an die Kolonisierten gerichteten Versprechen politischer Partizipation und letztendlicher Unabhängigkeit.

1. Imperial Sonderweg or “Transnational Nation”?

The field of U.S. history is currently undergoing a fundamental transformation as the traditional historiographical claim to an exceptional national development of the United States has received increasing scrutiny by scholars who advocate the internationalization of American history.¹ Recent transnational histories of the United States as well as

1 This tendency is analyzed in: K. K. Patel, Transatlantische Perspektiven transnationaler Historiographie, in: Geschichte und Gesellschaft, 29 (2003) 4, pp. 625-647; for a programmatic statement, see: D. Thelen, The Nation

path-breaking work on transatlantic ideational transfers during the era of progressivism have shed new light on the international dimension of American history and helped to contextualize the nation's historical development.²

Despite highly innovative work on the historical configurations of U.S. expansionism, however, much analysis of the American empire still remains largely shaped by the powerful and enduring legacy of exceptionalist thought.³ At the core of this teleological world view rests the thesis of the exceptional position and promise of the United States as chosen nation and successful democratic experiment.⁴ The missionary dimension of this world view is saturated with a pronounced anti-European thrust in which the new world is transfigured as a counter-model of historical development to the old world. As a consequence, American and European approaches to colonial empire are seen by many as incompatible, despite their temporal simultaneity largely unrelated.

The following essay on American rule in the Philippines questions such assertions and documents the intense interest of the United States in the colonial knowledge of European powers, in particular Great Britain. In contrast to the assertion that contemporaries interpreted the U.S. colonial empire as a counter-model to European approaches, a closer look at the Philippine case demonstrates the initial intensity with which transfers of British colonial 'know-how' informed American approaches to colonial warfare and governance.

2. Colonial Order I: the Quest for Military Control

After victory in the Spanish-American War of 1898, the United States acquired colonies in the Caribbean and the Pacific Ocean and entered a phase in its national history in which empire and colonial state-building were equated with international stability, progress, and civilization.⁵ The Philippine Islands constituted America's largest colony. The Filipinos had struggled against the Spanish crown, which had colonized large parts

and Beyond: Transnational Perspectives on United States History, in: *Journal of American History*, 86 (1999), pp. 965-975.

- 2 I. Tyrell, *Transnational Nation. United States History in Global Perspective since 1789*, New York 2007; T. Bender, *A Nation among Nations: America's Place in World History*, New York 2006; on transatlantic exchange during the progressive era, see: A. R. Schäfer, *American Progressives and German Social Reform, 1875-1920: Social Ethics, Moral Control, and the Regulatory State in a Transatlantic Context*, Stuttgart 2000; D. T. Rodgers, *Atlantic Crossings: Social Politics in a Progressive Age*, Cambridge (Mass.) 1998.
- 3 Exceptions to this trend with particular relevance to our understanding of the U.S. colonial project in the Philippines are: P. A. Kramer, *The Blood of Government: Race, Empire, the United States, and the Philippines*, Chapel Hill 2006; J. Go/A. L. Foster (eds.), *The American Colonial State in the Philippines: Global Perspectives*, Durham 2003.
- 4 As introduction to the concept of exceptionalism, see: E. Glaser/H. Wellenreuther (eds.), *Bridging the Atlantic: The Question of American Exceptionalism in Perspective*, Cambridge (Mass.) 2002; D. T. Rodgers, *Exceptionalism*, in: A. Molho/G. S. Wood (eds.), *Imagined Histories: American Historians Interpret the Past*, Princeton 1998, pp. 21-40; D. L. Madsen, *American Exceptionalism*, Jackson 1998; D. K. Adams/C. A. v. Minnen (eds.), *Reflections on American Exceptionalism*, Staffordshire 1994.
- 5 As introduction see: F. Ninkovich, *The United States and Imperialism*, Malden 2001.

of the archipelago since the mid-16th century, and after the defeat of Spain by the United States an indigenous liberation movement under the leadership of Emilio Aguinaldo hoped for independence, proclaimed the Philippine Republic, and formed a provisional government.⁶

The administration of William McKinley ignored such aspirations and dispatched expeditionary forces against the remaining Spanish troops on the islands. In December of 1898, Madrid transferred control over the Philippines to the United States in the Treaty of Paris. Simultaneously, Washington rejected the drive for Filipino independence and war between Aguinaldo's poorly equipped troops and the U.S. Army commenced in February of 1899.⁷

More than 125,000 U.S. troops were deployed during the military conquest of the islands between 1899 and 1913. More than 4,200 U.S. soldiers were killed and 3,500 wounded. The Filipino forces lost at least 20,000 soldiers, and estimates of the number of civilian casualties range from 250,000 to 750,000, approximately ten percent of the pre-war population.⁸

Despite the strong U.S. military presence and technological superiority, the United States encountered great difficulties in breaking Filipino resistance. In addition, the environmental and climatic conditions in the colony posed a severe challenge to troops unaccustomed to the tropics and drastically increased the soldier's disease susceptibility. While about ten percent of U.S. troops were wounded in battle, some regiments reported a fifty percent loss due to tropical diseases.⁹

The political and military leadership in Washington assigned the improvement of health conditions among soldiers a top priority, and U.S. military surgeons soon explored the experiences of neighboring European colonial armies in the tropics in the quest for transferable know-how. The British case soon emerged as the most trusted and relied on reference point for improvements to America's colonial army.¹⁰

6 The Filipino independence struggle and the role of Aguinaldo are analyzed in: P. S. d. Achutegui/M. Bernad, *Aguinaldo and the Revolution of 1896: A Documentary History*, Quezon City 1972; J. H. Schumacher, *The Propaganda Movement, 1880-1895: The Creation of a Filipino Consciousness, The Making of the Revolution*, Quezon City 1997.

7 Most recently: D. J. Silbey, *A War of Frontier and Empire: The Philippine-American War, 1899-1902*, New York 2007; F. Schumacher, 'Niederbrennen, plündern und töten sollt ihr'. Der Kolonialkrieg der USA auf den Philippinen, 1899-1913, in: T. Klein / F. Schumacher (eds.), *Kolonialkriege. Militärische Gewalt im Zeichen des Imperialismus*, Hamburg 2006, pp. 109-144.

8 Michael Adas estimates the civilian casualties at more than 700,000, see: M. Adas, *Dominance by Design: Technological Imperatives and America's Civilizing Mission*, Cambridge (Mass.) 2006, p. 134; see also: J. M. Gates, *War-Related Deaths in the Philippines, 1898-1902*, in: *Pacific Historical Review*, 53 (1984), pp. 367-378; G. A. May, *150,000 Missing Filipinos: A Demographic Crisis in Batangas, 1887-1903*, in: *Annales de démographie historique* (1985), pp. 215-243.

9 Data in: M. Gillett, *The Army Medical Department 1865-1917*, Washington D. C. 1995, p. 216.

10 Climatic induced health concerns remained foremost on the minds of military planners during the first decade of the 20th century even after medical research and social engineering had improved conditions for American soldiers and civilians in the Philippines. The Philippine Commission, America's colonial executive council reported in 1901: "While it may be confidently anticipated that the establishment of a well-organized department of public health in these islands will lead to a general improvement in sanitary conditions, it will doubtless remain true that troops which are forced to campaign in the damp lowlands, or to garrison towns which have

This ironic twist, that an ex-colony turned empire now relied on advice from its former imperial center from which it had separated in a bloody war for independence, was the latest manifestation of a fundamental transformation in Anglo-American relations in the second half of the 19th century.¹¹ This “great rapprochement” (Bradford Perkins) was fostered and accompanied by and accelerated through the transfer of power in the international system from British dominance to American primacy.¹² It was mainly characterized by peaceful crisis management (i.e. the Venezuela Boundary Crisis 1895/1896), the extension of mutual support in international affairs (i.e. during the Spanish-American War of 1898 and the Anglo-Boer War of 1899–1902), intensified transnational relations, and the development of a strong sense of kinship between Britain and the United States.¹³ American entrance into the club of colonial powers benefited from and simultaneously contributed to the intensification of this rapprochement process.

Only months after the U.S. victory in the Spanish-American war, Lt. Colonel Robert O'Reilly, designated chief surgeon for the American occupation force in Cuba and later surgeon general of the United States, embarked on an inspection tour of Jamaica to study the lessons learned by the British with regards to the housing, clothing, and feeding of soldiers stationed in the tropics.¹⁴

O'Reilly's recommendations had far reaching consequences for the U.S. Army's sanitary and medical policies. His report facilitated the introduction of new khaki colored uniforms and tropical helmets. It also supported the development of procedures for food hygiene and the prohibition of liquor. Finally, the insights gained from O'Reilly's inspec-

sprung up in situations where towns should never have been built, will suffer more or less severely from diarrhea, dysentery, and malaria.” U.S. Department of War, Report of the Philippine Commission, 1901, v. 1, pp. 63–64; on American public health policies and tropical medicine in the Philippines: W. Anderson, *Colonial Pathologies: American Tropical Medicine, Race, and Hygiene in the Philippines*, Durham 2006; W. Anderson, *Immunities of Empire: Race, Disease, and the New Tropical Medicine, 1900–1920*, in: *Bulletin of the History of Medicine*, 70 (1996) 1, pp. 94–118.

11 W. N. Tilchin, *Theodore Roosevelt and the British Empire: A Study in Presidential Statecraft*, New York 1997; H. C. Allen, *Great Britain and the United States, 1783–1952*, London 1954; K. Bourne, *Britain and the Balance of Power in North America, 1815–1908*, London 1967; A. E. Campbell, *Great Britain and the United States, 1895–1903*, London 1960; C. S. Campbell, *Anglo-American Understanding, 1898–1903*, Baltimore 1957; R. G. Neale, *Britain and American Imperialism, 1898–1900*, Brisbane 1965; B. Perkins, *The Great Rapprochement: England and the United States, 1895–1914*, New York 1968.

12 A. E. Eckes, Jr./T. W. Zeiler, *Globalization and the American Century*, Cambridge 2003, pp. 9–37; P. K. O'Brien/A. Clesse (eds.), *Two Hegemonies: Britain 1846–1914 and the United States 1941–2001*, Aldershot 2002.

13 This sense of kinship was most evident on the level of popular reactions to Queen Victoria's death and President McKinley's assassination. Americans, although staunchly republican, had come to regard Victoria as a model ruler. Her death in 1901 created enormous attention in the United States and inspired an outpouring of pro-British sentiment. Those sympathies were reciprocated when President McKinley was shot in September 1901 with strong expressions of British affection for and sympathy with the United States. See: C. S. Campbell, Jr., *Anglo-American Relations, 1897–1901*, in: P. E. Coletta (ed.), *Threshold to American Internationalism: Essays on the Foreign Policies of William McKinley*, New York 1970, pp. 221–255; see also: M. Sewell, 'All the English-Speaking Race is in Mourning': The Assassination of President Garfield and Anglo-American Relations, in: *The Historical Journal*, 34 (1991) 3, pp. 665–686; M. Sewell, *Queen of Our Hearts*, in: S. Ickin/S. Mills (eds.), *Victorianism in the United States: Its Era and Legacy*, Amsterdam 1992, pp. 206–234.

14 Will Study British Methods, in: *The New York Times*, December 6, 1898, p. 14; also: *Troops in the Tropics*, in: *The Washington Post*, December 6, 1898, p. 9.

tion tour provided pragmatic arguments for the improvement of military barracks and the building of the highland-sanatorium “Camp John Hay” as part of the construction of a summer-capital in Baguio, two-hundred and sixty kilometers north of Manila.¹⁵

The construction of this sanatorium was part of a new approach to troop rotation developed by army surgeons in close collaboration with their British counterparts. From a medical point of view, the climatic conditions in the Philippines were deemed detrimental to the health, and consequently the fighting performance, of U.S. soldiers. Many surgeons thus recommended frequent rest and recuperation in non-tropical climate zones, ideally in the United States.

As the temporary return to the United States for large amounts of troops was deemed too costly and logistically inefficient, regiments would rotate between high- and lowlands to allow for recuperation and tropical acclimatization and thus serve an important military function. As the head surgeon for the Philippine Department argued:

*Camp John Hay is as necessary to U.S. troops as the hill stations of India are to English troops [...] Without Baguio, in the present lengthened tropical tour of service, a decided increase in insanity, in border line cases of various psycho-neuroses, and in tuberculosis would be inevitable.*¹⁶

In the ‘battle’ against the degenerative impact of tropical conditions, O’Reilly had also recommended the recruitment of troops deemed accustomed to such environmental challenges. He specifically suggested the creation of African-American regiments, a policy which was begun in 1899.¹⁷ The logical next step was to follow the British approach completely and to raise indigenous colonial support troops in the Philippines.¹⁸

His recommendation, however, encountered initial resistance. In March of 1899, the *Washington Post* printed the headline “Not to have a Native Army: Methods of Imperialistic England not to be followed.” The paper reported:

15 On American urban planning in the colonial Philippines: F. Schumacher, *Creating Imperial Urban Spaces: Baguio and the American Empire in the Philippines, 1898–1920*, in: A. Ortelpp / C. Ribbat (eds.), *Taking Up Space: New Approaches to American History*, Trier 2004, pp. 59–75; D. Brody, *Building Empire: Architecture and American Imperialism in the Philippines*, in: *Journal of Asian-American Studies*, 4 (2001) 2, pp. 123–145; T. S. Hines, *The Imperial Facade: Daniel H. Burnham and American Architectural Planning in the Philippines*, in: *Pacific Historical Review*, 41 (1972) 1, pp. 33–53; R. R. Reed, *City of Pines: The Origins of Baguio as a Colonial Hill Station and Regional Capitol*, Baguio City 1999.

16 Major P.C. Field, Medical Corps, n.d. untitled report extract, in: Dean Worcester Papers, Papers and Documents, v. 3, Special Collections Library, University of Michigan.

17 W. B. Gatewood, Jr., *Black Americans and the White Man’s Burden 1898–1903*, Urbana 1975, pp. 261–292.

18 On native troops in American service: U.S. Department of War, Adjutant General’s Office, Military Information Division, *Colonial Army Systems of the Netherlands, Great Britain, France, Germany, Portugal, Italy, and Belgium*, Washington D. C. 1901; see also: J. R. Wollard, *The Philippine Scouts: The Development of America’s Colonial Army*, Ph.D. dissertation, The Ohio State University 1975; B. McAllister Linn, *Cerberus’ Dilemma: The U.S. Army and Internal Security in the Pacific, 1902–1940*, in: D. Killingray / D. Omissi (eds.), *Guardians of Empire: The Armed Forces of the Colonial Powers, c. 1700–1964*, Manchester 1999, pp. 114–136; G. Y. Coats, *The Philippine Constabulary, 1901–1917*, Ph.D. dissertation, The Ohio State University 1968.

*Although authorized by the new army law to recruit an army of 35,000 in the colonial possessions, the President will not avail himself of the opportunity. The real reason for this decision is said to be a desire to avoid as much as possible all appearance of imitating imperialistic England. In other words, the native troops of India are to have no counterpart in the United States.*¹⁹

There were several reasons for President McKinley's initial hesitancy to appropriate the tested British model, all of which were less informed by an American desire to stay aloof of European colonial models than by political maneuvering. For one, the Democratic Party, whose platform remained strongly opposed to empire, had suggested a congressional amendment to the 1899 Army Organization Bill to allow the replacement of homeward bound American troops with native soldiers. The opposition thus envisioned that the re-organization of the colonial army along British lines would ease a future withdrawal from the islands and eventually end America's 'adventure' of colonial empire. In addition, the presidential hesitancy was also a response to reservations about arming the colonized, expressed by a number of congressional and military leaders in Washington. In this context, the British experience served as a negative foil for imagined and anticipated disastrous consequences of arming Filipinos. In this discursive context, the British example was used as a warning with frequent references to the 1857 Sepoy Rebellion. As Augustus Bacon of Georgia argued on the floor of the U.S. Senate:

*[...] I shall never forget the impression made upon me in looking at the pictorial newspapers [...] with the pictures of the sepoys bound to the mouths of cannon and blown to pieces [...] I do not want any such transactions under the American flag.*²⁰

This negative disposition was not uncommon, as long as the assumption prevailed that the U.S. Army would quickly and decisively end the war in victory. As the campaigns dragged on and as the numbers of American casualties increased, military and civilian resistance to a colonial support army all but vanished. The British model of arming large numbers of natives in the colonies now became the order of the day in the American Philippines. By 1901 the first native regiments were founded which would ultimately grow close to 10,000 native soldiers in the Philippines and another 7,000 in Cuba and Puerto Rico. They formed an important part, in some parts of the Philippines certainly the backbone of the colonial army.

In addition to the continuous inter-imperial ideational exchanges on military matters, the Anglo-Boer War (1899–1902) afforded the American military an unprecedented opportunity to compare its actions in the Philippines with British colonial warfare in South Africa. This war was an important milestone on the way to the close association between both nations, and America's 'benevolent neutrality' during the war accelerated

19 Not to have a Native Army, in: The Washington Post, March 7, 1899, p. 1, my emphasis.

20 Quoted in: P. A. Kramer, Empires, Exceptions, and Anglo-Saxons: Race and Rule between the British and United States Empires, 1880–1910, in: Journal of American History, 88 (2002) 4, pp. 1315–1353.

the rapprochement between both powers and utilized the conflict as a platform for the celebration of Anglo-Saxon unity.²¹

Yet, American support for the British cause in South Africa and the nation's infatuation with British colonial 'know-how' was widely debated in the United States. The anti-imperialists who had failed to prevent the creation of an American overseas empire utilized the South African War to condemn their own nation's imperial policies.²² Nationally acclaimed journalists and publicists and many members of Congress, particularly from the Democratic Party, portrayed the Boer War as a struggle for independence of a heroic people against the commercial interests of an unjust empire. British strategy in South Africa, in particular the introduction of the concentration policy, did much to damage the image of the Empire in substantial segments of the American public.

In December 1900, American writer and social commentator Mark Twain emphasized this downside of Anglo-Saxon cooperation with his scathing critique of the British and American colonial wars. At a dinner in the Waldorf-Astoria Hotel in New York he introduced Winston Spencer Churchill with the words:

*For years I've been a self-appointed missionary to bring about the union of America and the motherland. [...] Yes, as a missionary I've sung my songs of praise. And yet I think that England sinned when she got herself into a war in South Africa which she could have avoided, just as we sinned in getting into a similar war in the Philippines. Mr. Churchill, by his father, is an Englishman; by his mother he is an American – no doubt a blend that makes the perfect man. England and America; yes we are kin. And now that we are also kin in sin, there is nothing more to be desired. The harmony is complete, the blend is perfect.*²³

The supporters, on the other hand, activated the sentiment of Anglo-Saxonist kinship and portrayed the Anglo-Boer War as an example for the advance of civilization.²⁴ In this discourse the Boers appeared as backward looking people who stood in the way of progress and would benefit from the uplifting effects of British colonial rule. For the supporters of an American empire, Anglo-American solidarity and lesson-learning from the British, such as Theodore Roosevelt, Henry Cabot Lodge, Albert J. Beveridge, John Hay,

21 T. J. Noer, *Briton, Boer, and Yankee: The United States and South Africa, 1870–1914*, Kent 1978; R. B. Mulanax, *The Boer War in American Politics and Diplomacy*, Lanham 1994; W. N. Tilchin, *The United States and the Boer War*, in: K. Wilson (ed.), *The International Impact of the Boer War*, New York 2001, pp. 107–122; S. E. Knee, *Anglo-American Understanding and the Boer War*, in: *Australian Journal of Politics and History*, 30 (1984) 2, pp. 196–208; B. Farewell, *Taking Sides in the Boer War*, in: *American Heritage*, 27 (1976) 3, pp. 20–25, pp. 92–97; W. B. Gatewood, Jr., *Black Americans and the Boer War, 1899–1902*, in: *South Atlantic Quarterly*, 75 (1976) 2, pp. 226–244.

22 On anti-imperialism: R. E. Welch, Jr., *Response to Imperialism: The United States and the Philippine-American War, 1899–1902*, Chapel Hill 1979; E. B. Tompkins, *Anti-Imperialism in the United States: The Great Debate, 1890–1920*, Philadelphia 1970; R. L. Beisner, *Twelve Against Empire: The Anti-Imperialists, 1898–1900*, New York 1968; P. Foner / R. C. Winchester (eds.), *The Anti-Imperialist Reader: A Documentary History of Anti-Imperialism in the United States*, New York 1984.

23 M. Twain, *Mark Twain's Speeches*, Whitefish 2004, p. 65.

24 S. Anderson, *Racial Anglo-Saxonism and the American Response to the Boer War*, in: *Diplomatic History*, 2 (1978) 3, pp. 219–236.

and Alfred Thayer Mahan, Anglo-Saxonism provided a powerful impetus and reassuring racialized ideological framework.

The concept advanced the argument that the civilization of the English-speaking nations was superior to that of any other nation because of allegedly inherited racial traits and characteristics, in particular industry, intelligence, adventurousness, and talent for self-government. Those abilities were contrasted with the accomplishments of other races in a hierarchy of racial success.²⁵ Advocates emphasized that Anglo-Saxonism had provided the basis for the perfection of democratic government and that Britain and America were consequently ideally suited for the civilizational uplift of the imperial mandate. In addition, Anglo-Saxonism fused with a social-Darwinist conception of international relations turned colonialism into a racial mission and obligation for the betterment of global conditions.

Such racial interpretations of Anglo-American cooperation and the South African War were complemented by a number of less mundane and very pragmatic considerations. The simultaneity of America's colonial war in the Philippines and Britain's war in South Africa offered multiple connections for those Americans charged with the military security of the empire. The U.S. government sent observers to South Africa to study British military tactics, military hardware and medical progress for applicability to America's own colonial war in the Philippines.²⁶ Most importantly, the simultaneous military blunders of both nations resulted in an intensive Anglo-American discourse on improving the professionalism of the armed forces and enabled close collaboration on military reform which laid the foundations for the long-lasting defense cooperation of Britain and America.²⁷

In addition, the simultaneity of events enabled American advocates of empire to frame their support and their understanding of American actions in the Philippine theater through reference to British experience and behavior. This discursive strategy, the British Empire as reassuring reference point for the moral propriety of American actions, became widespread after the American military conduct in the archipelago came under close scrutiny and public criticism in the United States. In particular the so-called concentration zones designed to isolate Filipino resistance and the widespread use of torture

25 On Anglo-Saxonism and the American empire, see: P. A. Kramer, *Empires, Exceptions, and Anglo-Saxons* (footnote 20); R. Horsman, *Race and Manifest Destiny: The Origins of American Racial Anglo-Saxonism*, Cambridge (Mass.) 1981; A. M. Martellone, *In the Name of Anglo-Saxondom, for Empire and for Democracy: The Anglo-American Discourse, 1880–1920*, in: D. K. Adams / C. A. v. Minnen (eds.), *Reflections on American Exceptionalism* (footnote 4), pp. 83–96; S. Anderson, *Race and Rapprochement: Anglo-Saxonism and Anglo-American Relations, 1895–1904*, Rutherford 1981.

26 For example: U.S. Department of War, Adjutant-General's Office, Military Information Division, *Reports on Military Operations in South Africa and China, July 1901*, Washington D. C. 1901.

27 As one historian has observed: "The weaknesses exposed in the American and British armies in the Spanish-American War and Boer War produced closer collaboration between the two states on military reform." See: R. J. Barr, *The Progressive Army: US Army Command and Administration, 1870–1914*, New York 1998, p. 59; see also: T. K. Nenninger, *The Leavenworth Schools and the Old Army: Education, Professionalism, and the Officer Corps of the United States Army, 1881–1918*, Westport 1978.

(the so-called 'water-cure') by American soldiers interrogating Filipino prisoners of war, were in part legitimized by reference to British tactics during the Boer War.²⁸

The executive and the military leadership's approach at first questioned the credibility of the charges. But after more and more witnesses of torture and abuse came forward, the government argued that American actions had been an appropriate response, morally justified by the brutality of the guerilla war waged against the colonizers by the independence movement. In a third and final step and in response to increasing Congressional demand for the court-martial of important commanders in the Philippine campaign, advocates of imperial expansion responded with frequent references to British actions in South Africa and claimed the moral superiority of the Anglo-American cause in taking up the "White Man's Burden". The analogies drawn from the empire's war against the Boers were to contextualize American actions as 'natural' and 'legitimate' responses by an army confronted with a guerilla enemy. "So we see," the *Washington Post* argued, "that the United States does not stand alone in having furnished isolated cases of bad conduct toward an inferior people or in exposing and punishing them. Human nature is very much alike everywhere."²⁹

The army in the Philippines had followed the example set by its British cousins in Africa, so the argument went. And because the empire was considered the most enlightened imperial power of all, American actions that followed the British example could not be considered indicative of a break-down of moral order. War was hell, and moral scruples about the conduct of troops, in South Africa or in the Philippines, were, according to many enthusiasts of empire, simply out of place as they irresponsibly delayed victory and thus slowed down the march of civilization:

*There is nothing easier than to criticize army movements from the comfortable seclusion of a library chair. [...] war is stern and cruel, and cannot reasonably be anything else [...] War means fighting and fighting means killing.*³⁰

The analogies of the South African and Philippine-American wars utilized the Anglo-Saxonist rhetoric of racial solidarity. The common war experience fostered not only an intense inter-imperial discourse on the applicability and transferability of colonial 'know-how' but fermented a widely held sense of common destiny which left a deep cultural imprint.³¹

28 On torture during the Philippine-American War: F. Schumacher, "Marked Severities": The Debate over Torture during America's Conquest of the Philippines, 1899–1902, in: *Amerikastudien / American Studies*, 51 (2006) 4, pp. 475–498.

29 A Few African Parallels, in: *The Washington Post*, July 27, 1902, p. 18.

30 Guerilla Warfare, in: *The Los Angeles Times*, January 20, 1901, p. B6.

31 For example, Elbridge Brooks, famous author of juvenile literature, introduced his popular *With Lawton and Robert* (1900), in which an American boy volunteers in the Philippine War and fights for Britain in the Boer War, with the theme of imperial 'brotherhood': "[...] the Stars and Stripes in the Philippines, and the Union Jack in South Africa, are advancing the interests of humanity and civilization [...]" E. S. Brooks (with Lawton and Roberts), *A Boy's Adventure in the Philippines and the Transvaal*, Boston 1900, p. 1.

3. Colonial Order II: the Quest for Administrative Control

The military conquest of the Philippines was accompanied by the American search for an appropriate model of colonial governance for the islands. In the government's program of research and fact-finding on all matters colonial, the British Empire quickly emerged as the leading reference point as it had in colonial military affairs. Many contemporary American analysts and observers praised the advantages of British rule, the efficiency of its colonial administration, and its enlightened approach to colonial state building.

In part, this pro-British Empire attitude was enabled by a discursive conceptual differentiation between what contemporaries described as 'negative' and 'positive' forms of imperial control.³² 'Negative' imperialism was characterized by conquest, the mere desire for profit and the resulting exploitation of the indigenous population. 'Positive' imperialism on the other hand aimed at order out of chaos and placed great emphasis on fostering the development and civilizational 'uplift' of the colonized. This distinction and the accompanying re-interpretation of British rule in India in particular, enabled many American proponents of overseas expansion to openly praise the accomplishments of the British Empire.³³

In December of 1899, Secretary of War, Elihu Root, the chief architect of America's colonial policies, described the mechanics of inter-imperial knowledge transfer in a letter to a friend:

*The first thing I did after my appointment was to make out a list of a great number of books which cover in detail both the practice and the principles of many forms of colonial government under the English law, and I am giving them all the time I can take from my active duties.*³⁴

The secretary kept a reference library of mostly British texts on colonial law and administration in his office and considered the systematic evaluation of the activities of other colonial powers an essential guide to American decision-making. So did the State Department under Secretary of State John Hay who instructed American diplomats in Great Britain, France, the Netherlands, and Germany, to collect and forward comprehensive analyses of those nations' colonial policies.³⁵

32 John M. Coski suggested this discursive conceptual differentiation, see: J. M. Coski, *The Triple Mandate: The Concept of Trusteeship and American Imperialism, 1898–1934*, Ph.D. dissertation, College of William and Mary 1987, pp. 60–62.

33 For many American advocates of imperial expansion Britain's brutal suppression of the Sepoy Mutiny in India, 1857/58, had been a watershed in London's administration of the subcontinent, after which enlightened, selfless, and impartial civil servants were trusted with the administration and the East India Company abolished; for the impact of British actions in India on American anti-imperialists: A. Raucher, *American Anti-Imperialists and the Pro-India Movement, 1900–1932*, in: *Pacific Historical Review*, 43 (1974) 1, pp. 83–110.

34 Letter Root to Samuel L. Parish, December 1, 1899, in: Elihu Root Papers, Library of Congress Manuscript Division.

35 Hay to Samuel Porter (France) No. 613, Hay to Choate (Great Britain) No. 111, Hay to Stanford Newell (Netherlands) No. 217, Hay to Henry White (Germany) No. 858, May 2, 1899, in: RG 59, Diplomatic Instructions, Microfilm Series M77.

President William McKinley followed a similar direction and ordered the First Philippine Commission, a fact-finding committee under the direction of Cornell University president Jacob Gould Schurman, to collect information on modes of colonial governance in preparation for American rule in the Philippines. This commission carefully studied the situation in the archipelago and compiled substantial data and analyses on the colonial practice of other powers in the region. In this context, Montague Kirkwood, a British lawyer who had already served as an advisor to the Japanese colonial administration of Formosa, prepared a thorough analysis of the administrative, judicial, social, and military dimensions of British rule in India, Burma, Ceylon, the Federated Malay States, and the Straits Settlement. This analysis "Administration of British Colonies in the Orient" was included in the final four-volume *Report of the Philippine Commission to the President* officially presented on January 21, 1900.³⁶

The recommendations of colonial experts were accompanied by the massive research program initiated by the Library of Congress and a number of government departments to collect information from all colonies and dependencies worldwide.³⁷ Some of the results, such as the Treasury Department's report *The Colonial Systems of the World* received widespread distribution and remained in use for years as standard reference texts in executive as well as legislative deliberations on colonial policies.³⁸ Its conclusions confirmed the McKinley administration's particular interest in the emulation of British models:

*The most acceptable and therefore most successful of the colonial systems are those in which the largest liberty of self-government is given to the people. The British colonial system, which has by far outgrown that of any other nation, gives, wherever practicable, a large degree of self-government to the colonies.*³⁹

Advocacy of learning from the British Empire was not limited to governmental decision-making circles but was complemented by a widespread public discourse, carried out in the nation's magazines and newspapers. Their contributions often extensively praised the accomplishments of British colonial rule as the American public was introduced to the intricacies of colonial law, administration, and comparative colonial trade. The crown's representatives in Egypt, the Malay Straits, India, and Hong Kong became icons of popular reference and Anglo-American solidarity.

36 U.S. Congress, Senate, Report of the Philippine Commission to the President, S. Doc. 138, 56th Congress, 1st Session, 1900.

37 The Library of Congress became an initial clearing house for information on other colonial systems and information on America's colonial possessions. On request by Henry Cabot Lodge, chairman of the Senate Committee on the Philippines, it compiled extensive bibliographies on material available to colonial decision-makers. For example: A. P. C. Griffin, A List of Books relating to the Theory of Colonization, Government of Dependencies, Protectorates, and Related Topics, Washington D. C. 1900.

38 Department of the Treasury, Colonial Administration, 1800–1900: Methods of Government and Development adopted by the Principal Colonizing Nations in their Control of Tropical and other Colonies and Dependencies, Washington D. C. 1901, p. 1199.

39 Ibid., p. 1407.

During this period of intense search for colonial models, universities, professional organizations, and scholarly journals also placed themselves at the service of empire. In particular, historians, sociologists, political scientists, and economists advanced the call for close inter-imperial learning and initiated numerous research projects into a wide variety of colonial issues.⁴⁰ The nation's universities established courses in comparative colonial administration and economy relying heavily on British expertise.⁴¹ The University of Chicago even appointed a Colonial Commissioner, Alleyne Ireland, who gained prominence as a prolific writer, government advisor, and ardent proponent of transplanting British colonial methods to America's new overseas territories.⁴² On the colonial frontier, Americans also tapped into the resources of British imperial experience. They devoured the writings and reminiscences of imperial administrators such as Lord Cromer, frequently visited British colonies in the neighborhood, conducted inspection tours in Egypt and India, and traveled halfway around the world to meet top-level officials of the Empire's colonial civil service.⁴³ Or they simply visited the colonial office in London like Captain George Langhorne, who recalled later:

*[...] in 1899, en route to the Philippines for the first time, I passed through London and went to the colonial office there, and [...] asked the officials if they had any colony where the people were similar to those in these islands. They then told me of the Malay States and gave me a number of blue books, reports, etc [...] They were of much use in the associations I had with the Filipinos during my first tour in Luzon.*⁴⁴

Despite their enthusiasm for the British record of colonial empire, those charged with the development of American colonial state-building emphasized that the appropriation of European, and in particular British, models would strive for a balance between outside input and national traditions. For Secretary Root for example it was imperative:

- 40 G. Marotta, The Academic Mind and the Rise of U.S. Imperialism: Historians and Economists as Publicists for Ideas of Colonial Expansion, in: *American Journal of Economics and Sociology*, 42 (April 1983) 2, pp. 217-234. F. C. L. Ng, *Governance of American Empire: American Colonial Administration and Attitudes, 1898-1917*, Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago 1975; B. C. Schmidt, *The Political Discourse of Anarchy: A Disciplinary History of International Relations*, Albany 1998, see chapter 4.
- 41 A number of British authors on colonialism reached fame as standard textbooks and reference works: John R. Seely, *The Expansion of England*, Boston 1898; C. W. Dilke, *Greater Britain*, New York 1869; E. G. Wakefield, *A View of the Art of Colonization with Present Reference to the British Empire*, London 1849; A. R. Colquhoun, *The Mastery of the Pacific*, New York 1899; highly influential were also works by famous British colonial administrators such as E. B. Cromer, *Modern Egypt*, New York 1908; G. N. Curzon, *Lord Curzon in India*, New York 1906.
- 42 F. C. L. Ng, *Governance of American Empire* (footnote 40), pp. 75-87; for a selection of Ireland's writings, see: A. Ireland, *Tropical Colonization: An Introduction to the Study of the Subject*, New York 1899; id., *The Anglo-Boer Conflict: Its History and Causes*, Boston 1900.
- 43 We have for example detailed descriptions of at least five meetings between W. Cameron Forbes, Governor General of the Philippines and Lord Cromer in London. Descriptions are to be found in Forbes' excellent diaries, i.e.: *Journals of W. Cameron Forbes*, First Series, v. III, January 1909 [there is only one long entry for the month] LC Manuscript Division; First Series, v. V, June 1, 1912; First Series v. V, November 17, 1913; Second Series, v. I, April 17, 1915.
- 44 Langhorne quoted in: D. J. Amoroso, *Inheriting the "Moro Problem": Muslim Authority and Colonial Rule in British Malaya and the Philippines*, in: J. Go/A. L. Foster (eds.), *The American Colonial State* (footnote 3), pp. 118-147, p. 118.

*To take the lessons we could get from the colonial policy of other countries, especially Great Britain, and to apply it to the peculiar situation arising from the fundamental principles of our own government, which lead to certain necessary conclusions which don't exist in Great Britain or Holland, notwithstanding the spirit of liberty and freedom in both those countries.*⁴⁵

This flexible approach resembled what theorists of cultural transfer have described as appropriation and rejection. Information is borrowed freely from the experience of others, reconfigured, and applied to a new context.⁴⁶ The British experience of empire thus provided an intellectual framework within which Americans could discuss their own ideas about colonial rule.⁴⁷ The insights from inter-imperial exchanges were pitted against the nation's core values and earlier experiences with continental expansion.

Those experiences suggested the evolutionary nature of the American system of progression from territory to statehood as exemplified by the Northwest Ordinance of 1787 and the administration of the Louisiana Territory.⁴⁸ Territories would pass through a state of preparation during which the inhabitants would acquire basic experience and training for self-government. It was this sense of progression that inspired the tendency to differentiate between American and British approaches to colonial administration. While London focused on the development of colonial infrastructures, Americans would focus on the preparation of the colonized for self government and eventual independence.

For the Philippines this produced a dual approach. The administrative framework for the northern half of the archipelago resembled that of a British crown colony. The sovereign power retained complete legislative and executive authority over the islands, as the Filipinos were deemed largely unfit for popular participation in government and because the continued war in the archipelago made it impossible for American government to give too much power to locally elected representatives before not total control had been established. Indigenous political participation was postponed until an unspecified later date.

45 P. C. Jessup, Elihu Root, Binghampton 1938, p. 345; in an interview with Jessup in September 1930, Root elaborated this theme further, see: P. C. Jessup Papers, LC Manuscript Division, Part I: Elihu Root Material, 1600–1939, interview September 20, 1930, box 227.

46 As introduction to the concept of cultural transfer: C. Eisenberg, Kulturtransfer als historischer Prozess. Ein Beitrag zur Komparatistik, in: H. Kaelble / J. Schriewer (eds.), Vergleich und Transfer. Komparatistik in den Sozial-, Geschichts- und Kulturwissenschaften, Frankfurt am Main 2003, pp. 399–417; J. Paulmann, Internationaler Vergleich und interkultureller Transfer. Zwei Forschungsansätze zur europäischen Geschichte des 18. bis 20. Jahrhunderts, in: Historische Zeitschrift, 267 (1998), pp. 649–685; J. Paulmann, Interkultureller Transfer zwischen Deutschland und Großbritannien. Einführung in ein Forschungskonzept, in: R. Muhs / J. Paulmann/W. Steinmetz (eds.), Aneignung und Abwehr. Interkultureller Transfer zwischen Deutschland und Großbritannien im 19. Jahrhundert, Bodenheim 1998, pp. 21–43.

47 A. Iriye, Intercultural Relations, in: A. DeConde (ed.), Encyclopedia of American Foreign Policy: Studies of the Principal Movements and Ideas, New York 1978, pp. 428–441.

48 For example: H. K. Carroll, The Territorial System of Our New Possessions, in: Outlook, 63 (December 23, 1899), pp. 966–968; this positive identification with America's past was not undisputed. Some critics decried the incompetence and the lack of professionalism in previous territorial administration. For critique and the demand for a professional civil service: D. S. Jordan, Colonial Lessons of Alaska, in: Atlantic Monthly, 82 (1898), pp. 577–591; A. L. Lowell, Colonial Civil Service: The Selection and Training of Colonial Officials in England, Holland, and France: With an Account of the East India College at Haileyburg (1806–1857), New York 1900.

In the southern half of the islands, in Sulu, Mindanao, and Palawan populated by Muslim ethnic groups described by the Spaniards as *Moros*, Washington at first followed the indirect rule model established by Britain in the Malay Straits, where British officials governed in the name of Malay sultans. Americans perceived this framework of colonial rule as a system that preserved indigenous structures of authority while securing strict British control over revenues and expenditures.

In July of 1899, Brigadier-General John Bates negotiated a treaty with the *Moros* in which indigenous rulers recognized the supreme authority of the United States and promised to suppress piracy in exchange for economic subsidies and relative freedom of action.⁴⁹ The main goal of this agreement was to prevent the southern islands from joining the independence struggle of the North led by Emilio Aguinaldo. Once the independence army had been defeated by the summer of 1902, the Bates-Treaty and its concept of indirect rule was increasingly seen by the colonial government as an obstacle to colonial state-building in the Philippines.

This process aimed at integrating the various components of the Philippines into one colony under complete American control. The widespread practices of polygamy and slavery among the *Moros* defined them as backward and uncivilized in American eyes and resulted in the preferential treatment of the northern Christian Filipinos over the Muslim South. A heterogeneous alliance of church leaders, abolitionists, progressive reformers, and staunch imperialists exerted increasing pressure on the U.S. government to abandon the British model of indirect rule which was increasingly considered a liability. As Leonard Wood, first governor of the Moro Province wrote to an English friend:

*You are quite content to maintain rajahs and sultans and other species of royalty, but we, with our plain ideas of doing things, find these gentlemen outside of our scheme of government, and so have to start at this kind of proposition a little differently.*⁵⁰

Such an approach, Wood admitted, might work within the British system but would be counterproductive to America's long-term plans. Wood and other colonial officials became more assertive in their suggestion that the history of Indian-white relations during the Euro-American conquest of the American West provided ample guidance for an effective system of governance for the southern Philippines.⁵¹ The Bureau of Insular Affairs, the American equivalent to the colonial office in London, devised removal plans while the U.S. Army launched a war on the Filipino Muslims which lasted up to World

49 On American policies in the southern Philippines: P. G. Gowing, *Mandate in Moroland: The American Government of Muslim Filipinos, 1899–1920*, Quezon City 1983.

50 Wood quoted in: D. J. Amoroso, *Inheriting the "Moro Problem"* (footnote 44), p. 139.

51 P. G. Gowing, *Moros and Indians: Commonalities of Purpose, Policy, and Practice in American Government of two Hostile Subject Peoples*, in: *Philippine Quarterly of Culture and Society*, 8 (1980), pp. 125–149; for the application of Indian stereotypes and experiences beyond the southern Philippines: W. L. Williams, *United States Indian Policy and the Debate over Philippine Annexation: Implication for the Origins of American Imperialism*, in: *Journal of American History*, 66 (1980) 4, pp. 810–831; A. Paulet, *The Only Good Indian is a Dead Indian: The Use of United States Indian Policy as a Guide for the Conquest and Occupation of the Philippines, 1898–1905*, Ph.D. dissertation, Rutgers University 1995.

War One to subjugate the Moros and militarily prepare their assimilation into mainstream colonial society.⁵²

4. Epilogue: The Renaissance of Exceptionalism

The St. Louis world's fair, officially called *Louisiana Purchase International Exposition*, opened its gates to the public on April 30th, 1904.⁵³ Visitors were introduced to a dazzling spectacle of revolutionary technologies, such as new modes of transportation and communication. In addition, the fair also developed a coherent vision of America's new empire through presentations of the colonial 'other'. Ethnographic displays were an integral feature of world's fairs and international expositions. The display of 'exotic' races typically emphasized their backwardness and state of savagery and thus provided imperial self-assurance and entertainment in the colonial metropolis often under pseudo-scientific disguises.

At the St. Louis World's Fair anthropological exhibits reached unknown highs with the largest ethnographic shows ever. More than 2,000 natives were brought to the fair from all corners of the globe and displayed in large supposedly natural and indigenous habitats, much like a human zoo. To be sure, as at other fairs, the display of the 'exotic' served the colonial propaganda also in St. Louis. But the Louisiana Purchase Exposition also provided a radical departure in the tradition of ethno-shows and ethnographic displays by outlining the possibility of inclusion through educational uplift.

So far, the 'exotic other' had simply provided a static backdrop for the social Darwinist ideology of colonial supremacy. The nations of the 'civilized world' were supposedly engulfed by a world of darkness in which dangerous and benighted races threatened the course of progress. Their fate was extinction, their potential for change negligible. The St. Louis world's fair gave those colonial discourses a distinct American accent by insisting on the dynamic nature of progressive evolution. In a paternalistic ideology of uplift, progress and inclusion into the one world was to be achieved through benevolent assimilation. The process was deemed difficult and tedious, and not everyone would succeed. This emphasis on the possibility of change, of progress through enlightenment, permeated the entire fair and reflected its emphasis on education. With this focus the United States

52 On the so-called 'Moro-War': A. J. Bacevich, Jr., Disagreeable Work: Pacifying the Moros, 1903–1906, in: *Military Review*, 62 (1982), pp. 49–61; D. S. Woolman, Fighting Islam's Fierce Moro Warriors, in: *Military History Magazine*, 19 (2002), pp. 34–40; D. Smythe, *Guerrilla Warrior: The Early Life of John J. Pershing*, New York 1973; W. W. Thompson, *Governors of the Moro Province: Wood, Bliss, and Pershing in the Southern Philippines, 1903–1913*, Ph.D. dissertation, University of California at San Diego 1975; G. Jornacion, *The Time of the Eagles: United States Army Officers and the Pacification of the Philippine Moros, 1899–1913*, Ph.D. dissertation, University of Maine 1973.

53 As introduction to the St. Louis world's fair: W. Kretschmer, *Geschichte der Weltausstellungen*, Frankfurt am Main 1999, pp. 157–165; Y. M. Condon, *St. Louis 1904 – Louisiana Purchase International Exposition*, in: J. E. Findling / K. D. Pelle (eds.), *Historical Dictionary of World's Fairs and Expositions, 1851–1988*, Westport 1990, pp. 178–186; R. W. Rydell, *All the World's a Fair: Visions of Empire at American International Expositions, 1876–1916*, Chicago 1984, pp. 154–183.

attempted a new outlook, in conscious contrast to Europe, on the colonial system, the predominant system of order for large parts of the world in the early 20th century. As a colonial power, it suggested that progress and civilization could flow to even the remotest corners of the earth and rejected those who insisted on fixing the current division of the one world for eternity.

The fair's most popular ethnographic display, the Philippine exposition, reflected this conceptual departure from what Americans perceived to be the European way of colonial rule. At the displays' center was a gigantic habitat onto which more than 1,200 members of various ethnic groups from the archipelago were temporarily resettled. This 'human zoo' became the unrivalled attraction of the fair.⁵⁴

The 'Philippine Reservation', as it came to be called, had several goals: it was to disseminate information about America's largest colony, project the image of a pacified possession, contain anti-imperial critique during the elections of 1904, discursively integrate the colonization of the islands into a national narrative of progress and expansion, and firmly establish the United States as a benevolent alternative to European approaches to colonial empire in the public mind.

The fair organizers reflected the importance which colonial state-building in the Philippines afforded social engineering projects. The civilizational potential of the colonized and the 'benevolence' of the colonizer found its symbolic unity in the model school of the Philippine habitat in which 40 Filipinos received daily elementary instruction in front of more than 2,000 visitors.⁵⁵ Educational reform in the Philippines was indeed an important project of American colonial governance.⁵⁶ It was intended to prepare the colonized for eventual participation in administration, military, or educational roles. The small model school on the exhibition grounds was to convey this message including its rhetorical return of the colonial discourse to the idea of exceptional mission and to a tendency of discursive demarcation from European models of colonial governance. The message appeared to have resonated with the audience, as one visitor remarked: "Other countries fear the education and enlightenment of the people over whom they exercise sovereignty. The United States fears ignorance."⁵⁷

As the recruitment of Filipinos for the colonial bureaucracy accelerated, such pronounced demarcation from the old world strongly shaped debates over the appropriate

54 The Philippine exposition is described in: J. D. Fermin, 1904 World's Fair: The Filipino Experience, Quezon City 2004; N. J. Parezo/D. Fowler, *Anthropology Goes to the Fair: The 1904 Louisiana Purchase Exposition*, Lincoln 2007, pp. 164-193; R. W. Rydell, *All the World's a Fair* (footnote 53); S. L. Vostral, *Imperialism on Display: The Philippine Exhibition at the 1904 World's Fair*, in: *Gateway Heritage*, 13 (1993) 4, pp. 18-31; P. Kramer, *Making Concessions: Race and Empire Revisited at the Philippine Exposition, St. Louis, 1901-1905*, in: *Radical History Review*, 73 (1999), pp. 74-114.

55 The school is described in: S. L. Vostral, *Imperialism on Display* (footnote 54), p. 29; N. J. Parezo/D. Fowler, *Anthropology Goes to the Fair* (footnote 54), pp. 174-175.

56 M. Adas, *Dominance by Design* (footnote 8), pp. 129-182; G. A. May, *Social Engineering in the Philippines: The Aims and Execution, and Impact of American Colonial Policy, 1900-1913*, Westport 1980.

57 Quoted in: A. Paulet, *To Change the World: The Use of American Indian Education in the Philippines*, in: *History of Education Quarterly*, 47 (2007) 2, pp. 173-202, here p. 179.

approach to colonial governance. Americans increasingly transfigured their country's colonial enterprise into a mission for nation-building as they simultaneously began to question the model character of the British Empire. Many observers in the United States suggested that while the European colonial powers were by and large interested in the retention of their power, Washington's colonial policies remained mostly interested in the preparation of the colonized for ultimate self-government and independence. Within this interpretive framework, the U.S. colonial empire aimed at 'benevolent assimilation' and civilization 'uplift' and not colonial rule and even exploitation *ad infinitum*. In his State of the Union Address of December 1902, President Theodore Roosevelt had already outlined the core idea for this argumentative thrust:

*Not only does each Filipino enjoy such rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness as he has never before known during the recorded history of the islands, but the people, taken as a whole, now enjoy a measure of self-government greater than any granted to any other Orientals by any foreign power. [...] Taking the work of the army and the civil authorities together it may be questioned whether anywhere else in modern times the world has seen a better example of real constructive statesmanship than our people have given to the Philippine Islands.*⁵⁸

This self-transfiguration of the new colonial masters into anti-colonial agents of development, who aimed at turning the Philippines into: "[...] a sort of glorified Iowa,"⁵⁹ quickly took hold and began to shape and define the parameters of the U.S. colonial discourse. Francis Burton Harrison, the governor general of the islands from 1913–1921, even went so far as to re-interpret the U.S. approach to the Philippines as an anti-colonial model which had irritated the established European colonial powers and created distress for their justifications of rule:

*The result of our heresy have been far-reaching, and have shaken seriously the colonial offices of Great Britain, of France, and of Holland; they have also brought hope and inspiration to millions of patient brown and yellow men who find in the new ideas of America a promise for the future.*⁶⁰

This discursive location of the colonial project as anti-colonial civilizing mission was designed to rhetorically bridge the national divide on the compatibility of republic and empire and simultaneously seal the ideological and moral super-elevation of the nation in demarcation from the old world. In the long run, this tendency has fostered a sense of colonial amnesia and a simultaneous renaissance of the notion of American exceptional-

58 Theodore Roosevelt, State of the Union Address 1902, see: <http://www.presidential-speeches.org/State-of-the-Union-1902-Theodore-Roosevelt.php> (accessed on November 22, 2008).

59 "A sort of glorified Iowa" from diplomat and journalist Nicholas Roosevelt's book *The Philippines: A Treasure and a Problem* (1926), quoted in: M. Adas, *Dominance by Design* (footnote 8), p. 166.

60 Harrison quoted in: M. Adas, *Improving on the Civilizing Mission? Assumptions of United States Exceptionalism in the Colonization of the Philippines*, in: *Itinerario*, 22 (1998) 4, pp. 44–66, here p. 47.

ism.⁶¹ It has masked the memory for a time in which the British Empire served the United States as an admired and trusted reference point, worthy of emulation, a model for the American way of colonial empire; a time in which American colonial planners sought British advice in many areas from tropical medicine to colonial governance and colonial urban planning to colonial warfare. In this inter-imperial discourse on the transfer of colonial 'know-how' in the early 20th century, many American contemporaries perceived their empire not as exceptional but connected their colonialism to what they understood to be a much larger, world-encompassing Anglo-Saxon mission.

61 On the pervasive sense of colonial amnesia: A. Kaplan, *Violent Belongings and the Question of Empire Today: Presidential Address to the American Studies Association, October 17, 2003*, in: *American Quarterly*, 56 (2004) 1, pp. 1-18.

Japan's Double Bind: 'Civilised' Punishment in Colonial Taiwan

Nadin Heé

RESÜMEE

Der Beitrag geht davon aus, dass eine sowohl gegen innen (die japanische Gesellschaft) als auch gegen außen (die Kolonie Taiwan) gerichtete Zivilisierungsmission die Strafrechtsreformen in Meiji-Japan und die Bestrafungen in der Kolonie Taiwan prägte. Als Teil von Selbstzivilisierungsbestrebungen erneuerte Japan sein Strafrecht erst nach chinesischem und dann nach europäischem Vorbild, um den ‚Westen‘ von der eigenen ‚Zivilisiertheit‘ zu überzeugen. Nach der Annektierung Taiwans standen die japanischen Politiker vor dem Dilemma, ein nicht-westliches und benevolenteres asiatisches Imperium schaffen zu wollen, sich aber trotzdem auf europäische Modelle zu beziehen. Die Untersuchung der Prügelstrafe in Taiwan zeigt, wie sich im Diskurs um die ‚Zivilisierung‘ der Taiwaner die Konnotationen der chinesischen Rechtspraktiken von ‚zivilisiert‘ zu ‚barbarisch‘ verkehrten und welche Konsequenzen dies für die koloniale Herrschaftspraxis hatte.

After the coerced opening of Japan through American gunboats in 1853,¹ several unequal treaties between the Tokugawa Regime, the United States, and some European powers, respectively, were negotiated in the 1850s.² In order to revise these treaties some years later, after the Meiji Revolution in 1868 and in the course of efforts to establish a nation state after a ‘Western’ model, the Japanese government enforced so-called “civilisation

1 For a detailed description on the coerced opening by Commodore Perry, see for example: G. Feifer, *Breaking Open Japan: Commodore Perry, Lord Abe, and American Imperialism in 1853*, New York 2006.

2 M. R. Auslin, *Negotiating with Imperialism: The Unequal Treaties and the Culture of Japanese Diplomacy*, Cambridge (Mass.) 2006.

and enlightenment”³ policies. They were pushed by the elites, who feared becoming colonised by ‘Western’ powers. The term *bunmei kaika* (civilisation and enlightenment), a key phrase of Early Meiji Japan and the slogan of the implemented modernisation programs, was a translation of ‘Western’ concepts like ‘civilisation’ and ‘enlightenment’ and was created in the years of the Meiji Revolution. It also included connotations of “subduing land” and “to become like the West”.⁴ The translation and adaption of these concepts were assigned with the goal of reaching ‘Western civilisation’.⁵ In this sense, Nishi Amane, a member of the famous Meiji-Six-Society, a group of intellectuals regularly discussing issues of ‘modernisation’, had already announced in 1874 the need to “civilise common people” and uplift them to the level of the civilisation of ‘Western’ nations.⁶ With the transfer of the idea of enlightenment, its ambiguity was also taken over,⁷ a matter which will be discussed later in detail. The term *mission civilisatrice*, used by the French especially in the second half of the 19th century as a doctrine in their colonies, as well as the adapted English phrase, civilising mission,⁸ were later also used by Japanese colonial politicians.⁹

Part of the modernisation policies was the objective of the Japanese government to become an empire just like the ‘Western’ ones. This goal was first achieved in 1895 with the annexation of Taiwan after the Sino-Japanese war. Thereby, the Japanese politicians saw themselves faced with the dilemma that they wished to create an Asiatic form of colonial rule better than the ‘despotic’ ‘Western’ one, but at the same time, could not help implementing a colonial rule that was based upon ‘Western’ models. Japanese politicians were caught in the dilemma between the model of Western colonialism and the counter model of a benevolent Asian colonialism, one which had still to be invented. In this paradoxical situation not only were notions of the ‘West’ ambivalent, but also within this dilemma, intertwinement with China gained importance. China had been the epitome of ‘civilisation’ for Japan for centuries, but the colonial enterprises of Japan were accompanied by a completely new connotation of a ‘backward’ and ‘barbarous’ China. These notions, however, stood in contrast to the idea of creating an Asian counter model to ‘Western’ colonialism. Moreover, it was always connected with the implementation of

3 *Bunmei kaika*.

4 Y. Hida/M. Sōgō, *Meiji no kotoba jiten* [Dictionary of Meiji semiotics], Tokyo 1998, p. 520.

5 T. Yokota-Murakami, *Translating Literature, Love, and Sexuality: Negotiation of the Ideologies in Early Modern Japan*, in: T. Hyun / J. Lambert (eds.), *Translation and Modernization*, Tokyo 1995, pp. 71-80, and H. H. Hahn, *Historische Stereotypenforschung. Methodische Überlegungen und empirische Befunde*, Oldenburg 1995, pp. 11-12, and S. Shimada, *Identitätskonstruktion und Übersetzung*, in: A. Assmann/H. Friese (eds.), *Identitäten*, Frankfurt am Main 1998, pp. 138-165, here pp. 138-140.

6 A. Nishi, *Yōji wo motte kokugo wo sho suru no ron* [Argument for writing Japanese in western script], in: *Meiro-kuzasshi*, 1 (1874) 1, p. 1. (All translations from Japanese are mine.)

7 For an analysis of the ambivalences of enlightenment for the European context, see: T. W. Adorno/M. Horkheimer, *Dialektik der Aufklärung. Philosophische Fragmente*, Frankfurt am Main 2001.

8 H. Fischer-Tiné/M. Mann (eds.), *Colonialism as Civilizing Mission: Cultural Ideology in British India*, London 2004, p. 4.

9 In Japanese: *Bunmei no shimei*. See for example: S. Gotō, *Nihon shokumin seisaku ippan* [The colonial policy of Japan], Tokyo 1914, p. 47.

'civilisation' in Japan itself. This situation can be seen as a double bind¹⁰ situation because of its insurmountable dilemma and intertwinement on several levels. It is reflected in a kind of double civilising mission: a 'self civilisation' in Japan and a *mission civilisatrice* in Taiwan.

Using the term double bind as an analytic framework, I will investigate some new aspects of this historical constellation, paying special attention to the penal reforms in Japan and Taiwan within the two civilising missions. Doing so, I will focus on three neglected aspects in historiography. First, I am concerned with the consequences that Japan's encounter with the 'West' had on the history of the country after its opening in the 1850s, but not in the sense of a binary opposition between Japan and the 'West' as it is still often described. Conventional scholarship in the field of colonial historiography tends to construct the narrative of a modern Japanese nation state overcoming the moment of crisis brought by 'Western' impact and finally 'caught up' with these 'Western' countries.¹¹ But the ongoing process of transferring knowledge as well as actors is still neglected. Second, I address the claim of postcolonial studies to overcome the dichotomy of metropole against colony,¹² a dichotomy which has been considered in recent colonial historiography on Japan around the turn of the 20th century.¹³ The entanglement of the reforms in the centre and the periphery of Japan's civilising missions will be part of my article, but I will argue that the relation between metropole and colony has sometimes been overemphasised by recent postcolonial studies. Especially in the case of Japanese colonisation, it is crucial to place this relation within a wider global interplay of power relations which can by no means be reduced to only the interaction between metropole and colony or to simply the connection to the 'West'. This leads to the third aspect: it is not enough to write an entangled history of modern Japan or Japanese colonialism describing the historical situation as a tripartite constellation of Japan, its colonies and the 'West'. In doing so another important point of reference, China, is neglected. Specifically the idea

10 I borrowed the term from anthropology, but am only using it as a heuristic instrument and not in the originally intended meaning. See: G. Bateson, et al., *Toward a Theory of Schizophrenia*, in: *Behavioral Science*, 1 (1956), pp. 251-264, esp. pp. 251-253.

11 For a problematisation of these tendencies, see: A. Schmid, *Colonialism and the 'Korea Problem' in the Historiography of Modern Japan: A Review Article*, in: *Journal of Asian Studies*, 59 (2000), pp. 951-976. For a recent critique on Benedict Anderson's "Imagined communities" as one of the most prominent and influential examples of such scholarship, see: N. Umemori, *Modernization through Colonial Mediations: The Establishment of the Police and Prison System in Meiji Japan*, Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago 2002, pp. 14-15.

12 A. L. Stoler / F. Cooper, *Between Metropole and Colony: Rethinking a Research Agenda*, in: id. (eds.), *Tensions of Empire: Colonial Cultures in a Bourgeois World*, Berkeley 1997, pp. 1-57.

13 For an overview of recent tendencies, see: T. Komagome, "Teikokushi" kenkyū no shatei [The range of research on imperialism], in: *Nihonshi kenkyū*, 452 (2000), pp. 224-231; or R. Narita, *Teikoku shugi, Shokuminchi shugi, Nashonarizumu* [Imperialism, colonialism, nationalism], in: *Sekai*, 640 (1997), pp. 98-102, or H. Takaoka, "Jūgonen sensō", "sōryōkusen", "teikoku" Nihon ["Fifteen Years War", "Total war", "Imperial" Japan], in: *Rekishigaku kenkyūkai* (ed.), *Rekishigaku ni okeru hōhōteki tenkai. Gendai rekishigaku no seika to kadai I* [Methodological turns in historical thinking. Historical studies in Japan from 1980 to 2000: Trends and perspectives I], Tokyo 2002, pp. 37-55. Representative for case studies is the following 8 volume series: A. Kurasawa, et al., *Iwanami kōza: Ajia – Taiheiyōsensō* [Iwanami lecture: Asia – Pacific war], Tokyo 2006, or E. Oguma, *Nihonjin no kyōkai* [The boundaries of the Japanese], Tokyo 1998, and also the 8 volume series: T. Yamamoto / T. Sakai, et al. (eds.), *Iwanami kōza: Teikoku nihon no gakuchi* [Iwanami lecture: The knowledge of "Imperial" Japan], Tokyo 2006.

of an Asian counter model cannot be explained as the backflow from Asian colonies to the Japanese metropole coming up against 'Western' influence, but only within the context of the alternative of a Chinese notion of civilisation. Therefore, schematised, it could be said that in the historical constellation four points are important and in constant, dynamic interaction. One is the mainland of Japan, another is Taiwan (or more generally the Japanese colonies), a third the 'Western' imperial powers and the last, China. Japan forms my point of view within the constellation – a double bind situation, which results in a triple bind connection to the three other points. The interactions within the network are not equilateral or balanced, but constantly moving and under incessant tension and pressure. Knowledge and practices were transferred between the Japanese metropole, Japanese colonies, the 'West', and also China. As the shape of the intertwinement within these points and their complex asymmetric power relation changed, the characteristics of the self civilisation in Japan and civilising mission in Taiwan changed with them. I would argue that it is also a question of position: Changing the viewpoint from Japan to the 'West', for example, would give us a very different perspective. In this article however the main point of view will be from Japan, focusing especially on the interactions between Japan and its colony, Taiwan.

First, I will focus on the reforms of the penal system in Early Meiji Japan within the framework of the modernisation policies that were used for self civilisation. I will shed light on the phenomenon that even if the reform of legal codes and also the practical execution of punishments were based on Chinese ones, in the context of self civilisation, simultaneous efforts to civilise 'the other' in Taiwan had already emerged in the Early Meiji period (1868–1880). Second, I will discuss the reintroduction of flogging in Taiwan in 1904, which was seen as a 'civilising punishment' for Taiwanese and Chinese by the Japanese Colonial Government. I will describe, on the one hand, the contradictions in the disputes and discourse on the implementation of this form of punishment with its ideal of a civilising mission; and on the other hand, I will examine the often even more outstanding ambiguity emerging between practices and rhetorics. The last chapter analyses the role of the newly built 'modern' prison in Taipei (Taihoku) and its function as signifier of the double bind structure, in which Japan's civilising mission was imbedded.

1. Reforms of the Penal System in Meiji-Japan: Self Civilisation after Chinese and British Colonial Models

The unequal treaties between the Tokugawa Regime and the United States, and some European powers, respectively, allowed permanent enclaves of foreign people, especially in Yokohama close to Tokyo. 'Western' diplomatic representatives were convinced that the Japanese penal system was too cruel to subject their citizens to it. Therefore 'Westerners' in Japan had the right of extraterritoriality.¹⁴ The Japanese intellectual and political

14 M. R. Auslin, *Negotiating with Imperialism* (footnote 2), pp. 40-41 and p. 173.

elite realized quite soon after the opening that the penal practice of a country was one of the markers of the boundaries between, on the one hand, the 'civilised West', and on the other hand, the colonial space, which was associated with 'backwardness' and 'barbarism' in the eyes of most of the American or European politicians and intellectuals.¹⁵ Therefore, the new Meiji government pushed forward with its 'modernizing' programs,¹⁶ especially those which concerned legal codes: Within a month after the "Restoration of Imperial Rule" in 1868 the new rulers had already compiled provisional penal regulations, the so-called *kari keiritsu*.¹⁷ They announced the strict limitation of crucifixion and the complete abolishment of burning alive within the next year.¹⁸ Over the last century there had already been domestic debate and criticism of the old penal system as well as studies of Chinese legal codes as alternatives to the traditional legislation in each domain. Therefore, scholars trained in Chinese law, most of them coming originally from southern domains where adapted Chinese codes had already been used, were integrated into the first Office of Criminal Law under the Ministry of Punishments (*gyōbusho*). Their main task was to compile the first provisional code. Soon after these measures, the Meiji government's first national criminal code was completed in early 1871.¹⁹ Usually it is argued in historiography that the Meiji government revised its legal codes with respect to the Chinese ones, because they did not yet know 'Western' law.²⁰ Even if 'Western' legal codes had not been well known in the 1860s, it has to be taken into account that the Early Meiji leaders were deeply influenced by British colonial legal practices – as we will see later – in the revision of the prison system which occurred in 1871.²¹ For the revision of these unequal treaties, a group which was to travel to the United States and Europe was formed. The so-called Iwakura Mission included the most powerful leaders of the new regime, and one of its main objectives was to convince the 'Western' powers to open treaty negotiations.²² In conjunction with this goal the Ministry of Foreign Affairs distributed copies of the "Outline of the New Code" to representatives of the treaty powers in early 1871. The leaders hoped that providing proof that significant legal reforms had already been established would convince the foreign nations to give up their claims to extraterritoriality. But the members of the Iwakura Mission learned

15 D. Botsman, *Punishment and Power in the Making of Modern Japan*, Princeton 2005, p. 5.

16 L. G. Perez, *Revision of the Unequal Treaties and Abolition of Extraterritoriality*, in: H. Hardacre / A. L. Kern (eds.), *New Directions in the Study of Meiji Japan*, Leiden 1997, pp. 320-335.

17 Y. Tezuka, *Meiji keihōshi no kenkyū* [Studies of the history of Meiji criminal law], 3 vol., Tokyo 1986, here v. 1, pp. 3-31.

18 Y. Kobayashi, *Meiji ishin to keihō no sentei* [Meiji Restoration and the selection of criminal law], in: *Hōgaku ronsō*, 48 (1943) 5, pp. 810-848, here pp. 820-821.

19 P. H.-C. Chen, *The Formation of the Early Meiji Legal Order: The Japanese Code of 1871 and Its Chinese Foundation*, Oxford 1981, p. 8 and pp. 40-48.

20 *Ibid.*, p. x, and also: T.-S. Wang, *Legal Reform in Taiwan under Japanese Colonial Rule: 1895-1945: The Reception of Western Law*, Seattle 2000, pp. 27-28.

21 N. Umemori, *Modernization through Colonial Mediations* (footnote 11), p. 130.

22 For a discussion of literature on the Iwakura Mission, see for example: A. Tanaka, *Meiji ishin to seiyō bunmei. Iwakura shisetsudan wa nani wo mita ka* [Meiji Restoration and Western civilisation. What has the Iwakura Mission seen?], Tokyo 2003, pp. 13-19.

on their journey that the treaty powers judged the Chinese penal code, on which Japan's provisional code was based, as the epitome of 'Oriental despotism'. Ironically the right of extraterritoriality had been introduced to Asia in order to protect British citizens from Chinese laws. Based on racial arguments the 'West' judged the Chinese laws, which were used in the new code, as uncivilised.²³ This judgement gave the Japanese reforms another dimension. The Meiji Regime realized that in order to revise the treaties they would have to make additional efforts to reform the penal codes beyond basing them on Chinese laws. The reform also had to be positioned within a totally new framework of human categorization in the enlightenment and civilisation movement. And it was exactly this pattern of categorization which remained an insolvable problem for the early generation of intellectuals, enthusiastic maintainers of the modernisation and westernisation programmes. How these racial categories were directly linked to the penal reforms in order to elude the semicolonialized status of the country is shown in an essay by Tsuda Mamichi in the *Meirokeuzasshi*, named after the already mentioned Meiji-Six-Society. Tsuda demanded a reform of the criminal justice and penal systems. He had been studying Dutch legal codes even before the Restoration and had been in Holland to study during the Tokugawa Regime. He was also a member of the new Office of Criminal Law.²⁴ Already in 1874 he had called for the abolishment of torture. After arguing that there was nothing more evil in the world than torture, he explained the different human races, grouping them along the Himalayan mountains. This rock mass symbolized the border between the 'civilised' and 'barbarian' races. He wrote:

*There is now no torture in countries of German race, but Mongolian races have not yet escaped torture in general. What a wonderful dividing barrier the Himalayas are! If you imagine that there are such happy people as the Germans and such unhappy people as the Mongolians among the world's men!*²⁵

In another article he suggested the abolishment of torture as a means to revise the unequal treaties.²⁶ The direct connection to the treaties most likely had a significant impact on the policies of the Meiji government. Soon afterwards torture was limited.²⁷ A new criminal code was not implemented though until 1882 under the French legal expert

23 I. Neary, *The State and Politics in Japan*, Cambridge 2002, p. 14. See also: M. R. Auslin, *Negotiating with Imperialism* (footnote 2), pp. 192-194, or: D. Botsman, *Punishment and Power* (footnote 15), pp. 144-145. For a discussion of the reception and discussion of the idea of 'race', see: A. Tanaka, *Meiji ishin to seiyo bunmei* (footnote 22), pp. 112-119.

24 D. Botsman, *Punishment and Power* (footnote 15), p. 167.

25 M. Tsuda, *Gōmonron, sono ichi* [On torture, part I], in: *Meirokeuzasshi*, 7 (5 May 1874), Essay 5, reprinted in: S. Yamamuro, et. al. (eds.), *Iwanamibunko gendaiyaku Meiroku zasshi* [Iwanami collection: Meiroku zasshi in modern Japanese], Tokyo 1999, p. 262.

26 This article is also mentioned and cited in: D. Botsman, *Punishment and Power* (footnote 15), p. 167.

27 Y. Tezuka, *Meiji shonen no gōmon seido* [The torture system of Early Meiji], v. 3, pp. 17-18, in: id., *Meiji keihōshi no kenkyū* (footnote 17).

Gustave Emile Boissonade de Fontarabie, and in fact, the validity of the codes of *shinritsu kōryō*, influenced extensively by Chinese legal tradition, continued to stay in force.²⁸

Another example of the extent to which the dichotomies of 'civilised' and 'barbarous' in conjunction with the framework of 'race' were internalized by the Japanese officials is the study trip led by Ohara Shigeya (also a member of the Office of Criminal Law) to the British colonial prisons in Hong Kong and Singapore in 1871.²⁹ Seeing themselves as not on the side of the "happy races", to cite Tsuda again, the Japanese officials felt – consciously or not – that it would be appropriate to use the British colonial prisons as a model for the punishment of the Japanese, a measure in which they were actually 'colonising themselves'. The idea that a colonial unconsciousness underlay Japanese modernity was formulated by Komori Yichi in his studies on Japanese modern history. He has described the phenomenon as 'self colonisation', in the sense that the elite forced a civilisation program on the Japanese subjects.³⁰ Ohara, who had been imprisoned for political reasons during the Tokugawa Regime, advocated the abolition of flogging and envisioned 'benevolent rule' in Japan's new prisons. Researchers have interpreted his position as a manifestation of his sympathy with the prisoners resulting from his own experience. However, according to Umemori Naoyuki's study on prison reforms in Meiji Japan, Ohara's position should be problematised in the colonial context. He claims that Ohara could identify himself neither with the ruler nor the ruled and therefore exemplifies the "very figure of the divided subject". Referring to Homi Bhabha, Umemori describes this phenomenon as "epistemic violence" resulting from a doubleness in colonial enunciation which arises from the conflicting demands for stable identity and historical reform, both inherent features of the civilising mission.³¹

This uncertain position of the leading Japanese politicians during this process of 'self colonisation' can also be connected to Japan's efforts to colonise other parts of Asia as early as the first decade after the Meiji Revolution. The official explanation for an 1874 'expedition' to Taiwan was the punishment of the 'barbarous' murder of a group of fishermen from the Ryūkyū Island, today's Okinawa. The story told in the Japanese newspapers was that 'civilised' Japanese soldiers had come to Taiwan to bring civilization to 'barbarians': "This expedition to punish the barbarians is the first step to diffuse civilisation on this island".³² These explicit words are accompanied by a woodcut print showing a Japanese

28 M. R. Auslin, *Negotiating with Imperialism* (footnote 2), p. 198, and for the validity of the *shinritsu kōryō* [outline of a new legal code], see: P. H.-C. Chen, *The Formation of the Early Meiji Legal Order* (footnote 19), p. 30.

29 In scholarship and in the archives, there seems to be confusion on the name of Ohara, with Daniel Botsman writing Shigechika (*Punishment and Power*, footnote 15), and Umemori naming him in one study Shigeya (*Spatial Configuration*, footnote 90) and in another study Shigechika (*Modernization through Colonial Mediations*, footnote 11). In references to him in works at the National Diet Library in Tokyo he is found under these different versions, and also as Obara Shigechika. The Kyōsei Library even contains sources naming him Ohara Jūsai or Obara Jūsai. Since the majority of works lists him as "Shigeya" I will follow this and use "Shigeya".

30 See: Y. Komori, *Posuto koroniaru* [Post colonial], Tokyo 2001; and also: id., *Nihon no shokuminchishugi, teikokushugi no kōzōteki hihan* [Criticism of Japanese colonialism and imperialism], in: S.-J. Kang (ed.), *Posuto koroniarizumu* [Post colonialism], Tokyo 2001, pp. 56-61.

31 N. Umemori, *Modernization through Colonial Mediations* (footnote 11), pp. 140-141.

32 *Tokyo nichichi shinbun*, no. 753, October 1874, picture by Ochiai Yoshiiku. Also mentioned in: R. Eskildsen,

man with white skin and a short haircut. Just two years ago there had been a prohibition of long hair in Japan, part of the modernising efforts.³³ Two ‘barbarians’ signified by dark brown skin and long hair are kneeling in front of the soldier. The adoption of this European scientific concept combined physical differences and race categorizations with the inner character of human beings and attributes like ‘civilised’ or ‘barbarous’. It was not only internalised after the Meiji revolution and implemented in Japan, but it was also applied to others. The inner ‘mission’ for civilisation was intertwined with Japan’s external ‘mission’ towards their neighbours as early as in 1874, an entanglement beginning even before the Sino-Japanese or Russo-Japanese war. These colonising efforts in Taiwan show the conjunction of modernizing efforts and imperial expansion already in Early Meiji Japan. These attempts to colonise Taiwan initially failed because of major pressure from the ‘Western’ imperial powers, but the goal was reached in 1895 after a victory in the Sino-Japanese war.

Simultaneous efforts to civilise ‘the other’ in Taiwan – at that time a part of China – were promoted as a part of self civilisation in Early Meiji, despite using Chinese law as a model for both the reform of legal codes and the practical execution of. This phenomenon alludes to shifting notions of civilisation within Japanese politics and their dilemma in conceptualising either the ‘East’ or the ‘West’ as the embodiment of civilisation.

2. Reintroducing Flogging in Taiwan: Struggling between ‘Civilised’ and ‘Barbarous’ Punishment

Soon after the annexation of the island in 1895 the Japanese General Government abolished the practice of flogging, part of the law under the Qing Empire, for its ‘barbarous’ nature. But the practice was reintroduced after just a few years: In January 1904 the Japanese General Governor Kodama Gentarō proclaimed the so-called “Fines and Flogging Ordinance”, to which only “Chinese” and “Insulars” were subjected. To justify the measure, he stated the overcrowded prisons in Taiwan and the General Government’s shortage of funding for implementing a system of punishment for the Taiwanese people.³⁴ Chief Procurator of the Taiwan Supreme Court Odate Koretaka, already having a draft law of the ordinance on hand in March 1903,³⁵ criticised this in an internal memorandum. In

Of Civilization and Savages: The Mimetic Imperialism of Japan’s 1874 Expedition to Taiwan, in: *The American Historical Review*, 107 (2002) 2, pp. 388–418, here p. 411.

33 Y. Komori, *Sōsetsu: Sabetsu no kansei* [Introduction: Sensitivity of discrimination], in: id. (ed.), *Iwanami kōza: Kindai nihon no bunka shi: kansei no kindai: 1870–1910 nendai* [Iwanami lecture: Cultural history of modern Japan: Modernity of sentimentalism. 1870–1910’s], v. 2, Tokyo 2002, pp. 1–46, here p. 5.

34 A. Washizu, *Taiwan keisatsu yonjū nen shiwa* [Forty years history of Taiwan police], in: id., *Washizu Atsuya chosakushū* [Washizu Atsuya. Collected works], v. 2, Tokyo 2000 [1938], pp. 269–273, pp. 822–823, or also: H. Tejima, *Taiwan no bakkin oyobi chikei shobun rei happu ni tsuite* [About the proclamation of the Fine and Flogging Ordinance in Taiwan], in: *Taiwan jihō*, 20 February 1904, pp. 337–342, here p. 340.

35 See: *Bakkin oyobi chikei shobun rei sei tei no ken* (Fukushin hōin chō) [About the enactment of the Fine and Flogging Ordinance (President of the Court of second instance)], March 1903, 2504/23, unpaginated, in: *Taiwan*

response to the argument of overcrowded prisons he stated that the number of prisoners had, on the contrary, drastically declined after the 1901 policy of "eradicating the bandits".³⁶ He explained that the Japanese government had abolished flogging because of its 'barbaric' nature just a few years ago, and that reintroducing it would, against the Emperor's will, treat Taiwan as a "colony", thus contradicting the policy of Taiwan as the "extension of the inner country". With this statement he placed himself in the long lasting debate over if Taiwan should be treated as an "extension of the inner country", an "outer country" or even a "colony", and he confronted the current rule of difference promoted by the General Government with the ideas of assimilation politics.³⁷

Even though Odate's memorandum could not prevent the proclamation of the ordinance, he did not remain the only critic. Only a day after its proclamation an article in the high-circulation newspaper, *Yomiuri shinbun*, in Japan entitled "The Degeneration of the Criminal Law: Taiwan's Flogging Ordinance"³⁸ argued against the promulgation, an argument remarkably similar to the ones of Odate. But there was another point made in the article: the term 'degeneration' not only means the fear of a degeneration of the Japanese criminal law, but was also concerned with the degeneration of the 'barbarous' Chinese and Taiwanese, because they would degenerate even more by being punished in a 'barbarous' way, and would therefore never manage to become a 'civilised race'. One of Japan's leading penologists, Ogawa Shigejirō, interpreted the attack on the "Flogging Ordinance" as making this same argument.³⁹ Although they represent completely different opinions, both sides adhered to social Darwinist gradualist ideas. In Taiwan, Civil Governor Gotō Shinpei had promoted a continuous and persistent state of difference between the populations in Japan and Taiwan, but also within the Taiwanese population since his assumption in 1898: this occurred due to the connection of physical and psychological attributes with so-called racial characteristics, which at the same time were linked with ascriptions such as 'barbarous' or 'civilised'. Thereby, having a timely and straightforward axis along which to civilise individual races was central. The temporal backshift and positioning of different countries and cultures in a continuously progressing line of development did not only shape the colonial policies in Taiwan, but was also a widespread phenomenon in the process of constituting 'the other' as part of the produc-

sōtokufu kōbun ruisan [Collection of the Archives of the Japanese General Government in Taiwan], in: Guoshi taiwan wen xian guan [Taiwan Historical], Nantou, Taiwan. (The archives are hereafter cited as TSKR.)

36 Memorandum by Odate Koretaka, see: K. Odate, Chijōkei fukkō sono ta ni kan suru iken [Opinion on the revival of flogging and other forms of punishment], 31 July 1903, in: S. Goto, Gotō Shinpei bunsho [Documents by Gotō Shinpei] R 25. 7-81, cited in: D. Botsman, Punishment and Power (footnote 15), pp. 212-213, and p. 277, footnote 40.

37 For a legal perspective, see: E. Chen, The Attempt to Integrate the Empire: Legal Perspectives, in: R. H. Myers (ed.), The Japanese Colonial Empire, 1895-1945, Princeton 1984, pp. 240-274, here pp. 242-247. For a cultural historical point of view, see: T. Komagome, Shokuminchi teikoku nihon no bunka tōgō [The cultural unification in the Japanese colonial empire], Tokyo 1996, pp. 33-34.

38 Kōdō, *Keihō no taika: Taiwan no chikei* [The degeneration of the criminal code: Flogging in Taiwan], in: *Yomiuri shinbun*, 26 January 1904.

39 S. Ogawa, Chikei ron [On flogging], in: *Hōgaku kyōkai zasshi*, 22 April 1904, pp. 511-532, and 22 May 1904, pp. 697-719.

tion of colonial knowledge.⁴⁰ Gotō had the vision of a “Hundred-Year-Plan”⁴¹ within the “civilising mission”, a plan that would improve the Taiwanese population through a gradual evolution.⁴² This point matches the plea for the ‘civilisation’ of the ‘barbarous’ Taiwanese in “Degeneration of the Criminal Law”, which criticises his flogging politics. ‘Civilised’ and ‘barbarous’ remained pivotal in the controversy on the “Fines and Flogging Ordinance”.⁴³ Suzuki Sōgen, the Chief Procurator of the Supreme Court of Taiwan, as well as Tejima Heijirō, the head of the law department of the colonial General Government, were in charge of the General Government and attacked the voices criticizing the implementation of the “Fines and Flogging Ordinance” Responding to Ogawa’s argument that barbarous punishment would provoke “barbarous behaviour”, Suzuki objected that the punishment would be very “modern” and “civilised” in the newly adapted form and pointed out the disciplining and educative function of it.⁴⁴ As a proof of its civilising effects Suzuki also proposed that ‘Western’ powers might consider reintroducing flogging, not only in the colonies, but also in their metropolises and in doing so realise its benefits. Benefits, he went on to say, the Japanese had always known in their tradition.⁴⁵

Even if Suzuki is arguing with “tradition”, he is doing it within the framework of modern concepts of punishment and civilisation: The idea of disciplining was not a genuine Japanese idea, but was rather, I argue, a modern one.⁴⁶ His attempt to undermine the stable notion of the ‘civilised West’ against the ‘backwards East’ is at the same time a response to modernity, described by Harry Harootunian as the “consciousness that oscillated furiously between recognizing the peril of being overcome by modernity and the impossible imperative of overcoming it”.⁴⁷ This phenomenon, which Harootunian points out in the Taishō (1912–1926) and Shōwa (1926–1989) eras, can already be seen here. The concept of disciplining matched, on one hand, the idea of the “civilising mission” of the General Government, but on the other hand, aimed at the control of each individual.

40 J. Fabian, *Time and the Other: How Anthropology Makes its Object*, New York 1983, here esp. pp. 13–21.

41 On the “Hundred-Year-Plan”, see: P. E. Tsurumi, *Japanese Colonial Education in Taiwan, 1895–1945*, Cambridge (Mass.) 1977, p. 51, or: M. R. Peattie, *Japanese Attitudes Toward Colonialism, 1895–1945*, in: R. H. Myers (ed.), *The Japanese Colonial Empire* (footnote 37), p. 95.

42 See: S. Gotō, *Nihon shokumin seisaku ippan* (footnote 9), p. 47.

43 The debate on flogging especially the dispute between Suzuki and Ohara, to be mentioned later, is analyzed also in: D. Botsman, *Punishment and Power* (footnote 15), pp. 211–220, and: N. Umemori, *Hensō suru tōchi (gawāmento) nijū seiki shotō ni okeru Taiwan to Kankoku no keibatsu – chianikikō* [Varying governance – Punishment in Taiwan and Korea at the beginning of the 20th century – a machinery for public safety], in: T. Sakai (ed.), *Iwanami kōza: Teikoku nihon no gakuchi*, v. 2: *Teikoku hensei no keifu* [Iwanami lecture: The knowledge of “Imperial” Japan, v. 2: The genealogy of organizing the “Empire”] (footnote 13), pp. 43–82, pp. 52–57. Both of these studies have an emphasis on the discourse on flogging measurements in Taiwan, not the practices.

44 S. Suzuki, *Ogawa shi no chikei ron wo hyō suru*, 3 [Commenting on Mr Ogawa’s view on flogging, 3], in: *Taiwan nichinichi shinpō*, 25 March 1904.

45 Id., *Ogawa shi no chikei ron wo yomu* [Reading Mr Ogawa’s view on flogging], in: *Kangokukyōkai zasshi*, 17 (August 1904) 8, pp. 31–34.

46 For the idea of discipline as a phenomenon of modern times, see: M. Foucault, *Surveiller et punir. La naissance de la prison*, Paris 1975.

47 H. Harootunian, *Overcome by Modernity: History, Culture, and Community in Interwar Japan*, Princeton 2000, p. x.

The situation of militant violence in the first years of colonial rule had changed Taiwan to a disciplinary society, and if we draw on Michel Foucault,⁴⁸ a society in which 'Western' science established itself more and more as a frame of reference. A striking example is Tejima Heijirō, who entitled one chapter of a pro-flogging article, "scientific evaluation". To give his arguments more weight, he refers to European criminal law experts,⁴⁹ just as Suzuki does.⁵⁰ Tejima also describes parallels between the British colonial criminal codes and some of the articles of the "Fines and Flogging Ordinance".⁵¹

This raises the question of whether the Japanese Colonial Government followed a British colonial model. Daniel Botsman argues in favour of the argument that they did, and draws upon the wording of a paragraph of the ordinance, reasoning that the Japanese did not beat on the back, as one was traditionally beaten in Japan or China, but on the buttocks.⁵² He assumes that beating on the buttocks was the usual practice in Britain's colonies.⁵³ The writings of Gotō Shinpei's son-in-law and friend, Tsurumi Yūsuke, also support this thesis, emphasising that the inspiration for the implementation of flogging was Lord Cromer, the first British General Consul of Egypt.⁵⁴ But contrary to this, the "History of the Japanese Colonial Police", compiled between 1933 and 1944, states that reliable sources for the reconstruction of the reasons for the Flogging Ordinance are lacking.⁵⁵ Umemori Naoyuki, who consulted additional sources in his research, also concludes that the connection to Cromer and to the motives for the introduction of flogging are only partly reconstructable.⁵⁶

Contrary to the common interpretation in historiography, I will show that the introduction of flogging in Taiwan did not rely on a direct transfer of knowledge or practices from the British colony in Egypt. In this regard, consulting sources of the "Commission for the Investigation of Laws and Customs" will bring new results. As we will see, within these investigations the idea of a civilising mission was crucial as well.

The aim of this commission, established in 1901, was namely one of a political nature.⁵⁷ Okamatsu Santarō, jurist and chief of the organisation, wrote in the introduction of the first scientific report: "The object of this work, which has been undertaken by or-

48 M. Foucault, *Surveiller et punir* (footnote 46), here for example p. 196, or pp. 226-267.

49 H. Tejima, *Taiwan no bakkin oyobi chikei shobun* (footnote 34), p. 337.

50 S. Suzuki, *Ogawa shi no chikei ron wo hyō suru* (footnote 44).

51 H. Tejima, *Taiwan no bakkin oyobi chikei shobun* (footnote 34), pp. 338-339, and for the articles of the ordinance, see: *Bakkin oyobi chikei shobunrei* (Meiji 37 nen ritsuryō dai 1 gō) [Fine and Flogging Ordinance (Meiji year 37, criminal and administrative law no. 1)], promulgation on 25 January 1904, implementation on 1 May 1904, see the archive of Nakano bunko: <http://www.geocities.jp/nakanolib/etc/colony/rrm37-1.htm> (accessed 21 January 2009).

52 Ibid.

53 D. Botsman, *Punishment and Power* (footnote 15), p. 212.

54 Y. Tsurumi, *Seiden Gotō Shinpei, 3: Taiwan jidai 1898-1906* [Authentic biography of Gotō Shinpei, v. 3: Taiwan period 1898-1906], Tokyo 2004, pp. 200-202. For Lord Cromer, see also Frank Schumacher's article in this volume.

55 *Taiwansōtokufu* (ed.), *Taiwan sōtokufu keisatsu enkaku shi* [Journal on the history of the governmental police in Taiwan], 5 vol., Tokyo 1986 [1933-1944], v. 4, p. 901.

56 N. Umemori, *Hensō suru tōchi* (footnote 43), pp. 49-50.

57 For general information on this institution, see for example: T. Y. Tsu, *Japanese Colonialism and the Investigation of Taiwanese 'Old Customs'*, in: J. v. Bremen (ed.), *Anthropology and Colonialism in Asia and Oceania*, Richmond

der of the Governor General of Formosa, is to set forth the general aspect of old laws and customs of Formosa, in the hope that something may thereby be done to improve the administration of the island”.⁵⁸ Soon after the promulgation of the ordinance, the scientist Kobayashi Rihei, who was working for the commission, published a detailed investigation of flogging practices in China in a journal entitled “Reports on Old Customs of Taiwan”.⁵⁹ He finally submitted a proposal to Gotō Shinpei with “instruments for flogging”.⁶⁰ These “instruments” were described by Kobayashi in an article, published shortly after the handing in of the proposal, as an adaption of the methods of the Qing for the situation in Taiwan, nowadays.⁶¹ Such investigations and resulting instructions of practice arose from the immediate need to have directions for the execution of flogging or to have precise rules before the enactment of the ordinance at the beginning of May.⁶²

One of the two instruments the scientists presented to the General Governor was a sort of whip, which they had, to use the words of the scientists, “modernised” and “scientified” from three models of the Qing dynasty.⁶³ In doing so, they defined contemporary Chinese forms of punishment as backward – here you can again observe the phenomenon of displacing ‘the other’ into the past.⁶⁴ The second instrument was a cruciform wooden construction upon which the victim was strapped during the execution of flogging. It is accurately sketched how the body is to be placed on the wood, and in the sketch, the long hair of the victim is prominent, a signifier for ‘barbarism per se’. Exactly for that reason Meiji politicians had already prohibited long hair for men in 1872 in Japan, as mentioned above.⁶⁵ It was also prohibited in Taiwan shortly after the annexation.⁶⁶ Remarkably, the construction of this “punishment plate”⁶⁷ had already been implemented following Chinese models for the *shinritsu kōryō* in 1871 in Japan itself after intense investigations by a team of scientists who were appointed for that purpose.⁶⁸

The implementation of flogging did not only precede a knowledge transfer, in a transnational or transcontinental sense, of the diffusion of concepts from the ‘West’ towards

1999, pp. 197-217, or G. Dai, *Nihonjin ni yoru taiwan kenkyū: Taiwan kyūkan chōsa ni tsuite* [Research on Taiwan by the Japanese: About the research on old customs in Taiwan], in: *Kikan tōa*, 4 (1968), pp. 67-80.

58 S. Okamatsu, Provisional Report on Investigations of Laws and Customs in the Island of Formosa, compiled by order of the Governor-General of Formosa by Santaro Okamatsu, Kobe 1902, p. 1. For the Japanese version, slightly differing from the English one, see: *Taiwansōtokufu, Rinji Taiwan tōchi chōsa kyoku: Taiwan kyūkan seido chōsa ippan*, Taipei 1901.

59 R. Kobayashi, *Shina reiritsu ni okeru chikei shi* [History of flogging in Chinese law], in: *Taiwankanshūki*, 4 (23 March 1904) 3, pp. 10-26.

60 *Chikei shikō kigu kettei no ken* [About instruments for the execution of flogging], 25 February 1904, 998/18, unpaginated, in: TSKR.

61 R. Kobayashi, *Shina reiritsu ni okeru chijōkeishi* (footnote 59), pp. 23-26.

62 *Bakkin oyobi Chikei shobunrei* (footnote 51).

63 R. Kobayashi, *Shina reiritsu ni okeru chijōkeishi* (footnote 59), p. 24.

64 *Chikei shikō kigu kettei no ken* (footnote 60).

65 Y. Komori, *Sōsetsu: Sabetsu no kansei* (footnote 33), p. 5.

66 This Japanese law was also implemented in Taiwan.

67 Japanese term: *keiban*.

68 Anonymous, *Chikei zakki* [Flogging chronicles], in: *Taiwankanshūki*, 4 (23 April 1904) 4, pp. 43-56, here p. 46.

the 'East', as is often conventionally described in historiography. The Japanese Colonial Government did not simply take over the flogging model from the British colonies in Egypt or India, nor did they modify British knowledge on flogging. Rather, the General Government undertook the strategy of the British of legitimizing certain punishment modes through the adaption and 'civilisation' of "native punishment practices". But in the practical implementation, the executors in Taiwan obviously often went back to the practice of "beat on the back",⁶⁹ which was mostly in use in Japan around the Meiji Revolution (1868), even though the ordinance had explicitly specified it to be carried out differently. The adaption of 'Chinese' knowledge into 'Japanese' concerning the "punishment plate" leads back to the compilation of the *shinritsu kōryō* in 1871 in Japan itself. Some years later it again came back to Taiwan in a modified version. From their studies of whips in the Qing Empire, models most likely used on the Chinese mainland and not in Taiwan, Japanese scientists created a new "scientific" whip. In doing this, however, they consulted "Western science", which for them was the epitome of 'civilisation', and thus on the subject of flogging, a merging of different layers of knowledge took place.

If we take a closer look into how the "punishment instruments" were implemented, it becomes even clearer that practices were probably similarly executed in Japan before the abolition of flogging. Therefore, they can be seen as an insurmountable antagonism between the discourse of self civilising within Japan, on one hand, and on the other, the discourse of the civilising mission towards the Taiwanese. The General Government looked for suitable training personnel who could teach the correct practice of flogging to the supervisors of prisons and to police officers. They found Japanese experts who provided instruction in several prisons and police stations for groups of around 250 persons.⁷⁰

An old man from the time of the Tokugawa government received an appointment in the prison in Taipei and was assigned with the production and construction of the "instruments". Likewise his duties included the instruction of the personnel in the execution of flogging.⁷¹ But two thirds of the flogging did not even take place in the prisons, but rather was executed through the police forces adapted by the Colonial Government from police structures dating back to the former Qing Regime.⁷² Many offences which fell under the "Fines and Flogging Ordinance" were immediately regulated by the police instead of the justice department.⁷³ So-called auxiliary policemen, mainly recruited from the male, indigenous population with the attribute 'Chinese', received this 'scope of action' in attending instruction by Japanese specialists on an adequate execution of flogging.⁷⁴ This 'scope of action' was not really a contradiction to the rule of difference pushed by the General Government, but neither did it introduce much hybridity into

69 Taiwansōtokufu, Taiwan sōtokufu keisatsu enkaku shi (footnote 55), v. 4, p. 933.

70 Ibid., p. 907.

71 Anonymous, Chikei zakki (footnote 68), p. 49.

72 T.-S. Wang, Legal Reform in Taiwan (footnote 20), pp. 120-121.

73 Taiwansōtokufu, Taiwan sōtokufu keisatsu enkaku shi (footnote 55), v. 2, pp. 359-360.

74 Taiwansōtokufu, Taiwan sōtokufu keisatsu enkaku shi (footnote 55), v. 4, p. 907.

the power structure. As Trutz von Trotha pointed out in his study on flogging practices in the German colonies,⁷⁵ it was probably the fear of “degeneration” as a consequence of personally executing the flogging as the coloniser rather than a delegation of power. In the newspaper published by the General Government, a description of the first executed flogging in Taiwan complains that the auxiliary policemen had not beat hard enough and the punished had not even felt pain. The article also points out that the beating is executed under the surveillance of the Japanese supervisor.⁷⁶ To avoid such problems of power relations and an infiltration of hegemony, a Japanese scientist even suggested constructing machines which would take over the execution of flogging and make it even more ‘modern’.⁷⁷

In order to maintain power, anguish was a key issue for the Colonial Government. They ordered a special investigation to analyse the fear of the victims of corporal punishment. Their findings especially stress the anxiety of the victims in the moment of being strapped on the “punishment plate”.⁷⁸ But the feeling of fear did not only occur on the side of the punished; the Colonial Government also felt menaced, a striking antagonism to the claim of civilising.⁷⁹ Several colonial officers or scientists wrote about the same anecdote in which Taiwanese were ridiculing the punishment measures of the Government. In the anecdote Taiwanese people prefer to go to prisons rather than live a reputable life, because the prison is like a “palace” and once inside, they do not have to work hard and can now eat better food than ever before.⁸⁰ The acting of the “islander” in this anecdote is explained by the evil character of the “Chinese race” and the necessity of not only punishing their bodies, but also their souls in order to civilise them. For this purpose the practice of flogging was estimated to be the best.⁸¹ Within his discourse on flogging, Suzuki, for example, used a criminological vocabulary in alluding to Cesare Lombroso,⁸² the founder of criminology in Europe.⁸³

Besides the emotional implications of flogging, the physical ones certainly remained virulent. Gotō issued rules to protect the health of the criminals. Physicians had to ex-

75 T. v. Trotha, “One for Kaiser” – Beobachtungen zur politischen Soziologie der Prügelstrafe am Beispiel des Schutzgebietes Togós, in: P. Heine/U. v. d. Heyden (eds.), *Studien zur Geschichte des deutschen Kolonialismus in Afrika. Festschrift zum 60. Geburtstag von Peter Sebald*, Pfaffenweiler 1995, pp. 521–551, here p. 531.

76 Taiwan nichichi shinbun, 17 May 1904.

77 Taiwansōtokufu, Taiwan sōtokufu keisatsu enkaku shi (footnote 55), v. 4, p. 938.

78 Ibid., p. 907.

79 Michael Mann showed for British India, to which extent an acute threat scenario led to drastic violence measures: M. Mann, *Das Gewaltdispositiv des modernen Kolonialismus*, in: M. Dabag/H. Gründer/U.-K. Ketelsen (eds.), *Kolonialismus. Kolonialdiskurs und Genozid*, München 2004, pp. 111–135, esp. p. 134.

80 H. Tejima, Taiwan no bakkin oyobi chikei shobun (footnote 34), p. 340.

81 Ibid.

82 For the theory of Lombroso, see: S. J. Gould, *Der falsch vermessene Mensch*, Basel/Boston/Stuttgart 1983, pp. 129–142, or G. D. Horn, *This Norm Which Is Not One: Reading the Female Body in Lombroso's Anthropology*, in: J. Terry/J. Urla (eds.), *Deviant Bodies: Critical Perspectives on Difference in Science and Popular Culture*, Bloomington 1995, pp. 109–114.

83 S. Suzuki, Bakkin oyobi chikei shobun rei ni tsuite [On the Fine and Flogging Ordinance], in: *Taiwankanshūkiji*, 4 (23 April 1904), 4, pp. 1–17, esp. p. 8.

amine the victims and decide the number of strokes.⁸⁴ Though in theory it claimed not to be dangerous to health, it turned out to be different in practice: often the death of the punished occurred during or after the execution of the sentences.⁸⁵

This gap between practice and theory also existed in Japan, at least until 1882. Even though flogging had been prohibited by Ohara in 1871, and torture abolished in 1879, there were still several cases of flogging. In reality, it was not abolished until 1882, because the *shinritsu kōryō* was still widely in use until then. For example, in 1880 an incidence of a flogging of a Japanese criminal who escaped from a prison was reported in an article without any discussion of the proceeding as 'barbarous' punishment.⁸⁶

3. Taihoku's New Prison: Representation of Modernity and Symbol of the Double Bind Civilising Mission

Another crucial aspect of the modernisation of criminal law in Japan as well as in Taiwan were the prison reforms. I will first take another look at the metropole and will go into some detail about the jail modernisations in Japan. Although the reforms of the "surveillance jails" had been made by Ohara in the early 1870s, his prison, finally built in 1872, because of financial restraints, could only be constructed out of wood and not in stone as suggested in his "Prison Rules".⁸⁷ Daily newspaper articles from the early 1880s show that in general the surveillance principles did not work well. The daily newspaper *Yomiuri shinbun* regularly reported that prisoners had escaped from the new jails. In addition to the issue of the precarious security of the prisons, the issue of hygiene in the jails was widely and controversially discussed. One article from October 1877 proudly states that there was not a single case of cholera in the Tsukujima prison.⁸⁸ But five years later there were several articles complaining about the widespread transmission of cholera within prisons, in the Tsukujima jail among others.⁸⁹ Contemporaries in the 1880s also complained that the current penal codes were based exclusively on the spirit of Chinese penal codes, and that therefore, the treatment of the criminal was only superficial and did not touch his mind.⁹⁰ Finally in 1894, the Japanese Government decided to build a new "modern" "international prison", the Sugamo prison. An American trained architect, Tsumaki Yorinaka, designed the prison which took four years to build. After its completion it was one of the three largest buildings in the country, competing only with

84 Taiwansōtokufu, *Taiwan sōtokufu keisatsu enkaku shi* (footnote 55), v. 4, pp. 906-907.

85 Ibid., p. 935.

86 *Yomiuri shinbun*, 1 August 1880.

87 D. Botsman, *Punishment and Power* (footnote 15), p. 162.

88 *Tsukujima gankoku ni wa Byōjin zero* [No invalids in the prison of Tsukujima], in: *Yomiuri shinbun*, 9 October 1877.

89 *Yomiuri shinbun*, for example: 23 June 1882, 26 July 1882, 20 August 1882, 28 September 1882, 21 October 1882, 22 November 1882, or 25 November 1882.

90 N. Umemori, *Spatial Configuration and Subject Formation: The Establishment of the Modern Penitentiary System in Meiji Japan*, in: H. Hardacre / A. L. Kern (eds.), *New Directions* (footnote 16), pp. 724-767, here p. 747.

the Bank of Japan and the National Armory. The perimeter of the prison was over 1.6 kilometres long and bound by a massive five meter high brick wall.⁹¹

The General Government built three modern surveillance jails (*kangoku*) in Taiwan soon after the takeover in order to meet the immediate need for prisons to incarcerate the so-called “bandits”, leaders of uprisings, and criminals. One of these surveillance jails, the one in Taihoku (Taipei), was the above-mentioned palace, and was often described as such by contemporaries. The politician and writer Takekoshi Yosaburō described the prison in the English language edition of the 1905 survey on Japanese rule in Formosa with the following words:

*Many people, even in Tokyo, must be surprised that the Sugamo Prison or the other prisons in Tokyo are such fine, lofty, brick buildings. But in Taihoku the prison is built of stone, which is superior even to brick.*⁹²

The point of comparison in the passage was of course the Sugamo prison in Tokyo, as one of the three largest new buildings and one of the symbols of Japan’s modernity. But as Takekoshi highlights in his statement, the prison in Taipei was made from stone, an even more modern material than the Sugamo prison, which was ‘only’ made from brick. Tejima proudly presented photographs of the Taihoku prison in a lecture to other penologists on his visit to Tokyo in 1905. His fascination with stone as a material was also demonstrated when he told the audience that even the canalisation was made from stone. He concluded enthusiastically: “I am not overdrawing, if I tell you that the architecture is so felicitous, that it is the most beautiful building in all of Taipei now”.⁹³ Stone buildings were an important representation of modernity in Japan, where before the Meiji-Revolution almost everything had been built in wood. The prison’s stone structure and its eternal character both served as a representation of Japan’s modernity already established in Taiwan after some years of colonial rule. The objective was not only to civilise ‘barbarous’ Taiwanese within these stone walls, but also to spread outwards as a symbol of the high level of civilisation in the colonies, and therefore, as Tejima’s speech illustrates, also on the mainland to the Japanese population. These inner and outer efforts to civilise were coeval and intertwined with the encounters of other imperial powers, as is demonstrated in the English statement written by Takekoshi clearly meant for a ‘Western’ audience. This simultaneous dispersion of certain notions of civilisation and modernity to the centre as well as the periphery, and also to the ‘West’, perfectly illustrates the double bind situation in which the civilising missions were embedded. Being constrained by the idea

91 D. Botsman, Punishment and Power (footnote 15), pp. 197-198.

92 Y. Takekoshi, Japanese Rule in Formosa, London 1907, p. 194, see in the Japanese edition: id., Taiwan tōchi shi, Tokyo 1905, p. 319.

93 H. Tejima, Taiwan kangoku dan 1 [Stories from prisons in Taiwan 1], in: Kangokukyōkai zasshi, 18 (1905), 4, pp. 23-30, here p. 28.

of the 'West' as the epitome of civilisation, Chinese legal codes, in this context, were degraded as only superficial and not affecting the criminal's mind.⁹⁴

4. Conclusion

After the coerced opening of the country, the Japanese struggled against colonisation under the constant pressure to become 'civilised' and 'modern'. This situation led to the phenomenon of 'self civilisation'. As one part of this 'self civilisation', 'Western' categories such as 'race' were adapted. To what extent the dichotomies of 'civilised' and 'barbarous' in conjunction with the framework of 'race' were internalised is shown by Ohara Shigeya in his excursion to the English colonial prisons and in his observation of a "colonial unconsciousness" underlying Japanese modernity.

But the inner mission for civilisation was also entangled with Japan's external mission towards their neighbours. This was already apparent in their effort to colonise Taiwan in 1874, an effort which also sheds light on the ambiguities within the civilising efforts. Domestically, the reform of legal codes and also the practical execution of punishments were based on Chinese practices, while simultaneously there was an effort to civilise 'the other' in Taiwan – a former part of China. This phenomenon alludes to shifting notions of civilisation within Japanese politics and their dilemma in establishing either the 'East' or the 'West' as the embodiment of civilisation, and therefore characterizes the double bind situation resulting in Japan's civilising missions.

The dispute on flogging measures in Taiwan illustrates that there was no escape from the concept of modernity itself. I argued that the recognition of the peril of being overcome by discourse on modernity and the impossible imperative of overcoming it, as Harootunian has described it for the decades after 1912, can already be seen in the controversy on flogging regulations in Taiwan. And it was this dilemma which led to the ruptures and ambiguities of civilising missions, both on the level of discourse as well as on the level of practice within the implementation of flogging in Taiwan.

The new Taihoku prison as a symbol of modernity demonstrates another dimension of the entangled aspect of the civilising missions. It exemplifies how certain notions of civilisation and modernity had been coevally dispersed to the metropole and the colony, and how this phenomenon was intertwined with the similarly ongoing self-assertion discourse towards 'Western' powers. Therefore it functions as a signifier of the double bind structure in which the civilising missions were imbedded.

Using an analytical framework of the concept double bind combined with the idea of a quadripartite constellation enabled me to bring to light the intertwined character of the two civilising missions and to shed light on specific tensions, as well as mechanisms of knowledge transfer, on which the penal reforms in the Japanese Empire were based.

Colonialism as a European Project in Africa before 1914? British and German Concepts of Colonial Rule in Sub-Saharan Africa

Ulrike Lindner

RESÜMEE

Der Artikel untersucht das deutsche und britische Kolonialengagement in Afrika vor dem Ersten Weltkrieg. Er analysiert, in welchem Maße unterschiedliche nationale Kolonialkonzepte identifiziert werden können, wie sich die Kolonialmächte gegenseitig wahrnahmen und inwiefern gemeinsame Formen der Kolonisation oder der Kooperation in Afrika bestanden. Außerdem wird gezeigt, wie sehr die afrikanische Bevölkerung in Interaktion mit den Kolonisierenden koloniale Herrschaftsformen prägte und wie diese auch von den jeweiligen geographischen und klimatischen Bedingungen abhingen. Die Autorin arbeitet Charakteristika deutscher und britischer Kolonialherrschaft heraus und illustriert dabei, dass die oberste Maxime der Kolonisierenden, eine „weiße Vorherrschaft“ über die schwarze afrikanische Bevölkerung zu erhalten, Kooperation und Wissensaustausch in Afrika trotz europäischer Rivalitäten förderte.

British and German colonial rule in Africa developed during the period of European imperialism before WWI. At the time, almost all European powers were engaged in the scramble for Africa and were trying to evolve forms of colonial rule, even though “islands of rule” may be a more appropriate term for these early colonial attempts in Africa.¹

1 For the useful term “islands of rule”, see: M. Pesek, *Koloniale Herrschaft in Deutsch-Ostafrika. Expeditionen, Militär und Verwaltung seit 1880*, Frankfurt am Main / New York 2005, p. 190; for the partition of Africa, see: H. L. Wesseling, *Divide and Rule: The Partition of Africa 1880–1914*, Westport / London 1996.

The process of evolving colonial rule was full of tensions and contradictions; the development of a self-definition as colonial ruler in the African environment was first and foremost connected with a concept of white racial superiority. Black Africans became a primary means of defining European colonisers and a way of creating a unity for the latter beyond class and wealth differences.² Furthermore, it should be stressed that almost everywhere in Africa the various forms of colonial rule were imposed with violence and brutality, a fact highlighted by the many wars and battles between the indigenous populations and the European colonisers during the 1880s and 1890s.³

Within this context, different national concepts of colonial governance and modes of administration were being developed. They were adapted to the various indigenous populations and adjusted to local circumstances, but they were also shaped by different ideologies emanating from the respective motherlands and influenced by neighbouring colonial powers that were observed with great attention. Even if the European colonial states shared most of the challenges that the African people and environment posed for them, and even if they developed similar attitudes towards their 'new mission', there were also significant contrasts between national approaches.⁴ In the case of German and British colonialism, the long experience of the British Empire in colonising foreign territories and people remained a salient difference between the two.⁵ Even in Africa, British colonisers had a precedent for their involvement in the new colonies, with their presence at the Cape Colony and in Sierra Leone since the end of the 18th century.⁶ In contrast, the Germans were complete newcomers to the colonial sphere and could not rely on their own experience in that field. Thus, they were keenly interested in the knowledge and experience of other colonising nations. Before issuing new colonial decrees, the German colonial administration usually discussed the regulations of other European empires.⁷

2 S. Conrad/S. Randeria, *Einleitung. Geteilte Geschichten – Europa in einer postkolonialen Welt*, in: id. (eds.), *Jenseits des Eurozentrismus. Postkoloniale Perspektiven in den Geschichts- und Kulturwissenschaften*, Frankfurt am Main/New York 2002, pp. 9–49, pp. 25–27.

3 As an example, between 1891 and 1897, there were 60 military expeditions against the indigenous population in German East Africa, see: H. Gründer, *Geschichte der deutschen Kolonien*, Paderborn 2004, p. 154; in British East Africa, Berman and Lonsdale find 20 military expeditions alone in the highlands of Kenya between 1893 and 1905 to establish British rule, see: B. Berman/J. Lonsdale, *Unhappy Valley: Conflict in Kenya and Africa*, v. 1: *State & Class*, London 1992, pp. 28–29.

4 C. Young, *The African Colonial State in Comparative Perspective*, New Haven 1994, p. 79; George Steinmetz recently stated that it would not be possible to identify a German colonial style, given the variability of colonial rule in different German colonies, see: G. Steinmetz, *The Devil's Handwriting: Precoloniality and the German Colonial State in Qingdao, Samoa and Southwest Africa*, Chicago/London 2007, p. 5. Since Steinmetz studies three German colonies, one in Africa, one in China and one in the South Sea, the differences clearly prevail. However, I propose that when concentrating on colonies in sub-Saharan Africa, which were ruled by different European imperial powers, one can identify significant national features of colonial rule.

5 See: J. Osterhammel, *Symbolpolitik und imperiale Integration. Das britische Empire im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert*, in: R. Schlögel (ed.), *Die Wirklichkeit der Symbole. Grundlagen der Kommunikation in historischen und gegenwärtigen Gesellschaften*, Konstanz 2004, pp. 397–420, here p. 400.

6 T. Rodney/H. Davenport/C. Saunders, *South Africa: A Modern History*, Houndmills/Basingstoke 2000, pp. 101–113.

7 See: *Die Behandlung der Asiaten in fremden Kolonien, 1912*, in: Bundesarchiv Berlin-Lichterfelde (BAB) R 1001/8731. For the German interest in British colonial work and British colonial reports, see: Cape of Good Hope,

Often, the British Empire was referred to as a role model, particularly by German colonial secretaries Bernhard Dernburg (1906–1910) and Wilhelm Solf (1911–1918) who both stressed the importance of British examples when looking for solutions to colonial problems.⁸

The ensuing period 1880–1914, the period of focus for this article, was a phase of growing interconnectedness and globalisation throughout the world, economically, technically and socially. Christopher Bayly has aptly called it a period of “great acceleration”.⁹ Steamships and telegraphs were now connecting colonies and motherlands, often in co-operation with other European imperialist nations. Also, German and British colonisers used the same ships and sometimes the same telegraphs for transport and communication in Africa. For example, the telegraphs between German South West Africa and the Cape were connected in 1910.¹⁰ On the one hand, this new connectedness in Europe and overseas created growing transnational networks and enabled the European states to perceive each other’s colonial policy more directly and to exchange knowledge. This was also the case on the British side, where from 1900 onwards a great interest in other empires and their methods began to flourish, even in the small German Empire: Colonial journals reported about German colonies, translated articles from German journals, and German colonial experts gave talks in colonial societies in London.¹¹ On the other hand, the increased exchange of knowledge led to a growing desire to define a trademark national style as an imperial and colonial power.

This article will analyse different approaches of British and German colonisers towards colonial rule and race policies in sub-Saharan Africa and assess to what extent different national concepts can be identified, how they were mutually perceived by the colonisers and to what extent common forms of colonising Africa before WWI prevailed.¹² The paper refers to German and British colonisers and focuses mainly on administrative colonial elites as well as on concepts of state colonialism. There were of course various factions within the group of white colonisers (settlers, planters, missionaries) that had quite different notions of colonialism – John Comaroff called them competing models of

Blue Book of Native Affairs 1891, in: BAB R 1001/8739; Das Swaziland, nach dem Colonial Report No. 559, Cd. 3729/23, 1908, in: BAB R 1001/8729.

8 Dernburg to Kaiserliche Gouverneure der deutschen Schutzgebiete, 17 November 1906, in: BAB R 1001/6882/1, pp. 36–37; Anon., Staatssekretär Dernburg in England, in: Deutsche Kolonialzeitung, 13 November 1909. See also: P. H. S. Hatton, Harcourt and Solf: the Search for an Anglo-German Understanding through Africa, 1912–1914, in: *European Studies Review*, 1 (1971), pp. 123–145.

9 C. A. Bayly, *The Birth of the Modern World, 1780–1914: Global Connections and Comparisons*, Oxford 2004, pp. 451, 461; S. Conrad, *Globalisierung und Nation im Deutschen Kaiserreich*, München 2006, pp. 38–44.

10 Office of the Governor-General of South Africa, *Postal Telegraphs, Linking up of Cape colony and German South West Africa Telegraphs*, Report, 2 July 1910, in: National Archives of South Africa, Pretoria, GG 1391 43/6.

11 See: Anon., *The Economic Development of German East Africa*, in: *Bulletin of the Imperial Institute*, 1 (1903), pp. 124–142; Anon., *German View on Colonisation: Extracts from German Sources*, in: *Journal of the African Society*, 14 (1914), pp. 40–52.

12 The paper is part of the project “Colonial encounters: Germany and Britain as European imperial powers in Africa 1890–1914”; the research was conducted with help of the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation and the German Historical Institute London. I would like to thank them for their support.

colonialism. The following arguments however will mainly concentrate on administrative concepts.¹³

1. Concepts and Characteristics of British and German Colonial Rule

When looking at concepts of colonial rule in Africa, German and British colonies seem to have had several features in common. Neither British nor German colonisers used the concept of assimilation in their sub-Saharan colonies. This notion was mainly prevalent in French colonies in Northern Africa; it was connected with the French concept of a *mission civilisatrice* and with the will to promote a universal French republicanism, whereas in the German and British context, colonial rule was linked to ideas of guidance and rule over racially diverse and inferior people.¹⁴ Both colonial rulers also distanced themselves from the approaches employed in the Portuguese colonies, where the racial distance between black and white was not upheld in a way German and British colonisers considered appropriate. Furthermore, Portuguese colonial rule was perceived as corrupt and weak.¹⁵ Both British and German colonial administrations also developed dual systems of law in many of their new African colonies: native and customary law that dealt with the indigenous population contrasted with British or German law that was only appropriate for the European inhabitants of the colonies.¹⁶ In addition, both colonisers certainly aimed at the economic exploitation of their new territories. The colonies should prove at least self-sufficient within a certain period of time.¹⁷

Besides these similarities, there are some distinct national features to be found. For British colonies in Africa, the concept of state colonialism was associated with the notion of *Pax Britannica*: British rule should bring peace to the 'tribes' in Africa, should be just

13 J. L. Comaroff, Images of Empire, Contests of Consciences: Models of Colonial Domination in South Africa, in: F. Cooper / A. L. Stoler (eds.), *Tensions of Empire: Colonial Cultures in a Bourgeois World*, Berkeley 1997, pp. 163-197, here pp. 179-180.

14 A. Eckert, Die Verheißung der Bürokratie. Verwaltung als Zivilisierungsagentur im kolonialen Westafrika, in: B. Barth / J. Osterhammel (eds.), *Zivilisierungsmissionen. Imperiale Weltverbesserungen seit dem 18. Jahrhundert*, Konstanz 2005, pp. 269-284, p. 270; J. Osterhammel, "The Great Work of Uplifting Mankind". Zivilisierungsmission und Moderne, in: B. Barth / J. Osterhammel (eds.), *ibid.*, pp. 269-284, p. 372; for the French concept of a civilising mission, see: A. L. Conklin, *A Mission to Civilize: The Republican Idea of Empire in France and West Africa, 1895-1930*, Stanford 2001, pp. 11-37.

15 R. Hyam, The British Empire in the Edwardian Era, in: J. M. Brown / W. R. Louis (eds.), *The Twentieth Century: The Oxford History of the British Empire*, v. IV, Oxford 1999, pp. 47-63, here p. 61; W. R. Louis, Great Britain and German Expansion in Africa 1884-1919, in: P. Gifford / W. R. Louis (eds.), *Britain and Germany in Africa: Imperial Rivalry and Colonial Rule*, New Haven / London 1967, pp. 3-46, here pp. 38-39.

16 For the German law system, see: H. Sippel, Typische Ausprägungen des deutschen kolonialen Rechts- und Verwaltungssystems in Afrika, in: R. Voigt / P. Sack (eds.), *Kolonialisierung des Rechts. Zur kolonialen Rechts- und Verwaltungsordnung*, Baden-Baden 2001, pp. 351-372; for Britain, see: K. Mann / R. Roberts, Introduction: Law in Colonial Africa, in: *id.* (eds.), *Law in Colonial Africa*, Portsmouth (N. H.) 1991, pp. 3-60, here pp. 18-23; the dual law system did not apply in the Cape colony; here the law did not make racial distinctions for defendants or witnesses, see: L. A. Benton, *Law and Colonial Cultures: Legal Regimes in World History, 1400-1900*, Cambridge 2002, p. 175; see also Ulrike Schaper's article in this volume.

17 M. Pesek, *Koloniale Herrschaft* (footnote 1), p. 17.

and fair.¹⁸ Empire in that sense was seen as a “shelter from anarchy for hundreds of millions of human beings”, as F. W. Moneyppenny, a journalist writing for the Times, put it in 1905.¹⁹

Formally, British African colonies were under the administration of the long-established Colonial Office. The administration would draw from Indian experiences, especially when establishing colonial rule in East Africa.²⁰ The Colonial Office was a sturdy machinery that could incorporate the new territories within the administration of older colonies. Moreover, colonial careers were perceived as quite prestigious in the context of the British Empire.²¹

During the 19th century, British colonialism had been influenced by humanitarian ideas and had developed a strong notion of its civilising mission. In Africa this notion was mainly connected with the aim to suppress the slave trade and to end slavery.²² However, contrary to its outspoken aims, the British government de facto tolerated slavery in many colonies in East and West Africa during the first decades of colonial rule and was anxious about disrupting the economic system.²³

The general ideal was to achieve British supremacy mainly via trade and treaties with local rulers or with the leaders of local ‘tribes’, and this with a minimum of state intervention by superimposing a low-cost, minimal form of British rule upon an extant so-called ‘native administration’.²⁴ Uganda is often cited as an example in this context, since only 25 British officers ruled over an indigenous population of three million before WWI.²⁵ Another example is the island of Zanzibar in East Africa where during the 1870s the Sultan of Zanzibar became completely dependent on the British Empire, which was represented locally by only a few officials. And it was not only commerce that was primarily in British hands in Zanzibar; in 1872 the Sultan also signed a treaty to abolish the slave trade in his territory.²⁶

Frederick Lugard, who served in Uganda from 1890 to 1892 and was later High Commissioner and Governor of Nigeria (1902–1906, 1912–1918), later developed such concepts of indirect rule into an African policy in his famous book *Dual Mandate in British*

18 J. L. Comaroff, *Images of Empire* (footnote 13), pp. 179–180.

19 W. F. Moneyppenny, quoted after Hyam, *The British Empire* (footnote 15), p. 49.

20 See: G. H. Mungeam, *British Rule in Kenya, 1895–1912: The Establishment of Administration in the East Africa Protectorate*, Oxford 1966. Many colonies in Africa were first under the administration of the Foreign Office before being transferred to the colonial office. This was also the case in British East Africa, which came under the Colonial Office in 1905.

21 The careers were prestigious, even if the recruiting system for colonial careers seems to have been somewhat eccentric; for the memoirs of the most eminent recruiting officers for the colonial service, see: R. Furse, *Acuparius: Recollections of a Recruiting Officer*, London 1962.

22 J. Osterhammel, “The Great Work” (footnote 14), p. 402.

23 K. Mann/R. Roberts, Introduction (footnote 16), p. 28; F. Cooper, *From Slaves to Squatters: Plantation Labor and Agriculture in Zanzibar and Coastal Kenya, 1890–1925*, New Haven 1980.

24 C. Young, *The African Colonial State* (footnote 4), p. 82.

25 D. A. Low, *Uganda: The Establishment of the Protectorate, 1894–1919*, in: V. Harlow/E. M. Chilver (eds.), *History of East Africa*, v. 2, Oxford 1965, pp. 57–122.

26 L. W. Hollingsworth, *Zanzibar under the Foreign Office 1890–1913*, Westport 1975, pp. 13–15.

Tropical Africa, published in 1922.²⁷ However, research has revealed that his actual style of government in Northern Nigeria was extremely authoritarian and not at all successful. Nevertheless, mainly thanks to his journalist wife Flora Shaw and his biographer Margery Perham, Lugard succeeded in styling himself as the designer of *the* concept of British rule in Africa – in contrast with Portuguese and French concepts of assimilation and as opposed to concepts of segregation prevalent in the Boer colonies. Indirect rule became the reference point for British colonial government in Africa until the 1940s and was generally seen as a benign form of colonialism by the British ruling class.²⁸ Furthermore, the ideology of indirect rule allowed for various forms of leeway and flexibility in colonial decisions as well as for self-stylisation as a liberal coloniser. It also proved to be a highly cost-effective system. However, research has convincingly pointed to the huge problems generated by this concept with its reliance on corrupt rulers and chiefs that were arbitrarily chosen by the colonisers and with its negligence towards a growing educated African class. Furthermore, for the African population it usually meant equally high taxes and burdens, even if these were not collected by British officials but by their own chiefs.²⁹

Another important feature of British rule in Africa remained the small number of administrators from the metropolis.³⁰ This was also a point frequently emphasised when observing the German administration in neighbouring colonies, as aptly described in the following quote:

*There is no British territory in South Africa which is so little developed as this colony, but it is burdened with more official ordinances and revelations than would be required to run an Empire. [...] There is far too much government. There is one official out of every three in the population and it is a great burden on the country. Take a place like Keetmanshoop [in German South West Africa]. The town and country around can be compared with Upington [in the Cape Colony] and the district where they probably have a magistrate and one or two clerks. At Keetmanshoop they have a Deputy Governor with a secretary and about half-a-dozen policemen who are also largely engaged in clerical work. Then there are the law courts, with two judges, a secretary, and another half-dozen clerks.*³¹

Initially, Germany hardly had any concept of colonial rule, as its colonial expansion happened quite unexpectedly in the 1880s. German colonial rule thus often developed

27 F. Lugard, *Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa*, Edinburgh, London 1922; for the Lugard myth, see: M. Perham, *Lugard. The Years of Adventure*, London 1956; for a more critical view on Lugard, see: J. E. Flint, *Frederick Lugard: The Making of an Autocrat, 1858–1943*, in: L. H. Gann / P. Duignan (eds.), *African Proconsuls: European Governors in Africa*, New York 1978, pp. 290–312.

28 J. W. Cell, *Colonial Rule*, in: J. M. Brown / W. R. Louis (eds.), *The Twentieth Century* (footnote 15), pp. 232–254, here pp. 240, 247.

29 K. Mann / R. Roberts, *Introduction* (footnote 16), pp. 20–21.

30 J. W. Cell, *Colonial Rule* (footnote 28), p. 233.

31 A. F. Calvert, *South West Africa during the German occupation 1884–1915*, London 1915, p. 7.

in an experimental fashion.³² A civilising mission was barely detectable when German colonies were established and economic interests clearly prevailed.³³ Later, when the colonies turned out to be more or less an economic failure, the prestige argument certainly became the main issue guiding German colonialism.³⁴ Administrative problems shaped German colonialism from the beginning. The Colonial Office developed out of a subdivision of the Foreign Office and had an ambivalent status in the German administrative hierarchy.³⁵ Careers in the Colonial Office, and even more so in the colonies themselves, were never perceived as prestigious – in contrast with British colonial careers. It was thus difficult to recruit adequate personnel. A more elaborate educational system for colonial personnel was only implemented during the last years of German colonial rule.³⁶ In the 1890s, one can hardly speak of colonial rule in the German African colonies since very few officials were present at all. This changed around the turn of the century when a colonial administration was more widely established. However, there were huge differences, for example, between the only settler colony in South West Africa with an increasing white population as well as a fast-growing administration and a colony such as Cameroon where, in 1914, only 90 civil servants were to be found in the whole country.³⁷ Generally though, the aim in the German context was to develop a more rigid form of colonial management than in British colonies, a management which was also labelled as a ‘better way’ of colonising than the far too liberal and uncoordinated British style: “The fiasco of British liberalism in South Africa and the lack of any uniformity in questions of native policy are results of a general policy of bumbling through from case to case”.³⁸ One should also stress the highly militarised form of administration in German colonies. In the interior of the colonies, German rule consisted mainly of military stations, and personnel were often recruited amongst officers or ex-officers of the German colonial troops.³⁹ This was perceived critically by the British neighbours and seen as a major reason for German colonial problems and administrative mistakes:

32 W. Speitkamp, *Deutsche Kolonialgeschichte*, Ditzingen 2005, p. 45.

33 K. J. Bade, *Imperial Germany and West Africa: Colonial Movement, Business Interests and Bismarck's 'Colonial Policies'*, in: S. Förster/W. J. Mommsen/R. Robinson (eds.), *Bismarck, Europe, and Africa: The Berlin Africa Conference 1884-1885 and the Onset of Partition*, Oxford 1988, pp. 121-147; see also: H. Pogge von Strandmann, *Imperialismus vom Grünen Tisch. Deutsche Kolonialpolitik zwischen wirtschaftlicher Ausbeutung und "zivilisatorischen" Bemühungen*, Berlin 2008.

34 For colonies as objects of prestige, see: B. Kundrus, *Die Kolonien – "Kinder des Gefühls und der Phantasie"*, in: id. (ed.), *Phantasiereiche. Zur Kulturgeschichte des deutschen Kolonialismus*, Frankfurt am Main/New York 2003, pp. 28-30.

35 John Iliffe's view on the problems of the German colonial administration is still quite instructive, see: J. Iliffe, *Tanganyika under German Rule 1905-1912*, London 1969, pp. 30-34.

36 See for example the colonial institute in Hamburg that was founded in 1908: J. Ruppenthal, *Kolonialismus als "Wissenschaft und Technik". Das Hamburgische Kolonialinstitut 1908 bis 1919*, Stuttgart 2007.

37 For Kamerun, see: K. Hausen, *Deutsche Kolonialherrschaft in Afrika. Wirtschaftsinteressen und Kolonialverwaltung in Kamerun vor 1914*, Zürich/Freiburg 1976.

38 G. Hartmann, *Gedanken über die Eingeborenfrage in Britisch-Südafrika und Deutsch-Südwestafrika*, in: *Koloniale Rundschau*, 1910, pp. 26-43, p. 42 (my translation).

39 For East Africa, see: M. Pesek, *Koloniale Herrschaft* (footnote 1); for South-West Africa: J. Zimmerer, *Deutsche Herrschaft über Afrikaner. Staatlicher Machtanspruch und Wirklichkeit im kolonialen Namibia*, Münster 2002.

*The numerous German officials and soldiers in the colonies who, far from Germany's effective control, live in laborious idleness and consequent ennui, frequently fall a prey to their worst instincts or they busy themselves by wantonly interfering with the civil part of the population or by trying to earn military laurels by making unnecessary expeditions into the interior for 'punishing' natives.*⁴⁰

This style of colonial rule was also characterised by a form of daily violence that became one of the characteristic marks of German colonies in Africa, not only in South West Africa with the establishment of an extremely brutal racial order after 1905, but also in East Africa with the ubiquitous whip in every planter's and official's house.⁴¹ In British colonies, flogging had also become a widespread measure to coerce Africans. In most of their colonies – excepting the Cape Colony – it was part of the criminal code and could be used as a penalty for delinquents. In the Cape Colony, flogging was still routinely carried out in prison.⁴² Thus, corporal punishment was practised by all British colonial regimes in Africa.

But in the German colonies it seemed to be virtually omnipresent and was far more openly implemented. For example, the indigenous population of neighbouring colonies referred to Togo as “the twenty-five country” since even low-ranking officials could sentence Africans to twenty-five lashes without any court decision.⁴³ When Africans from the Cape Colony came to German South West Africa as working migrants after 1904, these differences became obvious. The migrant workers complained regularly about the flogging they had to endure in the German colony that differed considerably from their experiences at home.⁴⁴ Even the Governor of German South West Africa, Theodor Seitz, said in 1911 that the Cape workers were obviously “not used to flogging”.⁴⁵ Furthermore, a major problem in German colonies remained the “parental chastisement” right that the farmers and planters exercised over their indigenous workers and servants. Colonial secretary Bernhard Dernburg tried to reform this indiscriminate flogging and to introduce stricter regulations. However, his endeavours do not seem to have proved very successful since statistics document increasing numbers of flogging cases until 1914.⁴⁶

40 O. Etzlbacher, The German Danger to South Africa, in: *The Nineteenth Century*, 58/60 (1905/1906), pp. 524–538, here p. 527.

41 For a detailed account of the *Prügelstrafe* in German colonies, see: M. Schröder, *Prügelstrafe und Züchtigungsrecht in den deutschen Schutzgebieten Schwarzafrikas*, Münster 1997.

42 Dr. Ernst Feder, Die Prügelstrafe in den englischen und französischen Kolonien, 30 April 1904, in: BAB R 1001/5379.

43 H. Stoecker, The Position of Africans in the German Colonies, in: A. J. Knoll/L. H. Gann (eds.), *Germans in the Tropics: Essays in German Colonial History*, New York 1987, pp. 119–128, pp. 123–124; see also: T. v. Trotha, “One for Kaiser” – Beobachtungen zur politischen Soziologie der Prügelstrafe am Beispiel des “Schutzgebietes Togo”, in: P. Heine/U. v. d. Heyden (eds.), *Studien zur Geschichte des deutschen Kolonialismus in Afrika. Festschrift zum 60. Geburtstag von Peter Sebald*, Pfaffenweiler 1988, pp. 521–551.

44 See: J. Abramse to Consul Müller, 25 December 1910, in: National Archives of Namibia, BCL 17.

45 Kaiserlicher Gouverneur von Deutsch-Südwestafrika, Seitz, to Reichskolonialamt Berlin, 12 April 1911, in: BAB R 1001/1231.

46 M. Schröder, *Prügelstrafe und Züchtigungsrecht* (footnote 41), p. 94.

During the last years of German rule, civil administration became more widespread. Particularly under Dernburg, who aimed for thorough reforms within the German colonial system, the British example of indirect colonial rule (even if the term 'indirect rule' was not used) became an important model for the development of the German tropical colonies. This was especially true in German East Africa, even if his ideas were heavily combated by colonial settlers and by the more conservative factions of the German colonial movement.⁴⁷

A quite distinct feature of German colonialism was their scientific approach towards the colonies, which developed particularly after 1900 with the German colonial congresses of 1902, 1905 and 1910, the establishment of various colonial research institutes in Germany as well as in the colonies themselves (e.g. the Amani-institute in German East Africa which became an internationally leading place for agrarian and botanical research), and a growing range of journals discussing colonial sciences.⁴⁸ The German dedication to these issues was even admired by the British colonial experts, as is obvious in the following excerpt drawn from the *Journal of the African Society* in 1914:

*In other directions, however, Germany's progress during thirty years of Colonial policy has been nothing short of phenomenal. She has thrown herself heart and soul into the Colonial problem with extraordinary thoroughness and energy. Expedition after expedition has been sent out to investigate on the spot every conceivable aspect of the subject. No stone has been left unturned, and for much information of a scientific kind about Africa, German literature is almost the only available source of supply.*⁴⁹

2. Local Conditions of Colonial Rule in Africa

Besides these national characteristics, Africa consisted of many different colonies, and colonial rule was of course shaped by various local conditions – first and foremost by the populations that had lived there for centuries and had developed certain social and economic structures. Obviously, the new colonisers had to interact with the colonised peoples when they entered their territories, and during these exchanges representations and imaginations could change, and new forms of culture could evolve within the zones of colonisation.⁵⁰

Colonies were also structured by different geographical surroundings, different durations of colonial rule and the different degrees of its enforcement, as well as by the interests

47 F.-J. Schulte-Althoff, Koloniale Krise und Reformprojekte. Zur Diskussion über eine Kurskorrektur in der deutschen Kolonialpolitik nach der Jahrhundertwende, in: H. Dollinger / H. Gründer / A. Hanschmidt (eds.), *Weltpolitik – Europagedanke – Regionalismus. Festschrift für Heinz Gollwitzer zum 65. Geburtstag*, Münster 1982, pp. 407-426.

48 P. Grosse, Die deutschen Kolonialkongresse in Berlin 1902, 1905 und 1910, in: U. v. d. Heyden / J. Zeller (eds.), "... Macht und Anteil an der Weltherrschaft". Berlin und der deutsche Kolonialismus, Münster 2005, pp. 95-101; J. Ruppenthal, *Kolonialismus* (footnote 36).

49 W. A. Crabtree, German Colonies in Africa, in: *Journal of the African Society*, 14 (1914), pp. 1-14.

50 H. Bhabha, *The Location of Culture*, London 1994, pp. 37-38; R. Young, *Colonial Desire: Hybridity in Theory, Culture and Race*, London / New York 1995, pp. 21-27.

of various groups of colonisers and especially by the ever-growing interest of Europeans in cheap African labour. A 'West Coast' African policy of cash crop production combined with an African farmer agriculture, a 'South African' concept of European settlement, and a planter's economy in 'East Africa' were normally identified as alternatives of colonial rule in Africa.⁵¹ In the Cape and later in Rhodesia and German South West Africa, with their substantial white minorities and settler structures, colonial rule took on a very different character, distinguishable from the East and West African colonies. Settlers occupied an important intermediary position between the colonial government and the colonised. They could exercise political pressure on the colonial government; they saw themselves as entitled to a key position within the colonial administration and substantially influenced decisions in the colony.⁵² Often these types of rule did not lack ambiguity; they were a product of struggles and negotiations between different groups within the colonies and with the metropole, as could be observed especially in East Africa. Whereas the governments in both British and German East Africa tended towards a cash crop policy which would reap more benefits for the colonial government, the growing settler population and several colonial groups in the metropole opposed these goals and aimed for a planter economy. British East Africa finally developed into a white settler and planter colony after 1905.⁵³

A second aspect worthy of note is the fact that colonial rule changed over time. It produced more forms of regulation and often turned into a rather direct rule with a decisive impact on the indigenous population. At the beginning, the new European colonial states were weak and fragile and had to rely heavily on the structures they found in the subjugated countries. Symbols of rule were thus a major instrument of power.⁵⁴ In the beginning of colonial occupation European rule hardly affected the majority of the African population, especially in areas far away from the European centres. This can be clearly illustrated by the situation in German East Africa, a territory of approximately one million km² without significant infrastructure that had to be supervised by few German officials. Only in 1903, almost 20 years after the occupation of the colony, was a sort of colonial administration established in the Western regions of the East African colony.⁵⁵ In such surroundings, Africans still had room to negotiate, since the colonisers were dependent upon their support. Later on, infrastructure and especially railways were established within the colonies and made administration easier for the colonisers; the territories were mapped, sometimes a census was undertaken, and knowledge about the territory and the indigenous population was accumulated.⁵⁶ Generally, in British as

51 J. Iliffe, *Tanganyika under German Rule* (footnote 35), p. 50.

52 C. Young, *The African Colonial State* (footnote 4), p. 102.

53 G. H. Mungeam, *British Rule* (footnote 20); D. Kennedy, *Islands of White: Settler Society and Culture in Kenya and Southern Rhodesia 1890–1939*, Durham 1987; J. Koponen, *Colonial Racism and Colonial Development: Colonial Policy and Forms of Racism in German East Africa*, in: W. Wagner (ed.), *Rassendiskriminierung, Kolonialpolitik und ethnisch-nationale Identität*, Münster/Hamburg 1992, pp. 89–107.

54 R. Hyam, *Britain's Imperial Century, 1815–1914: A Study of Empire and Expansion*, Basingstoke 2002, pp. 301–303.

55 M. Pesek, *Koloniale Herrschaft* (footnote 1), pp. 17–18.

56 *Ibid.*, pp. 310–311.

well as in German African colonies, taxation was increased, and taxes were collected with growing efficiency. This meant far less leeway for the indigenous population. In the Cape Colony – under British rule since 1806 and thus the oldest British colony on the continent – these processes had already taken place during the 19th century, and many frontier wars had been fought against the indigenous populations.⁵⁷ In most of the new African colonies, this occurred around the turn of the 20th century. The enforcement of colonial rule actually led to devastating wars during the first decade of 1900, such as the Herero-and-Nama War in German South West Africa, the Maji-Maji War in German East Africa, the Ndebele and Shona risings in Rhodesia and the hut tax wars in Sierra Leone.⁵⁸ These wars also shaped the future of the colonies and intensified the demarcation lines between colonised and colonisers, between black and white. Specifically the exceedingly brutal Herero-and-Nama War in German South West Africa led to a racial radicalisation of the German colony with the introduction of a radical segregation policy.⁵⁹ Thirdly, since neither the settlers nor planters in Africa undertook any manual labour themselves, the control of ‘native labour’ became the paramount issue of colonisation in Africa. European colonisers were thus extremely dependent on cheap African labour. This was even more obvious in the mining industry in British Southern Africa and, during the last years before WWI, in the diamond industry in German South West Africa as well. In almost all British and German African colonies, forms of hut or head taxes were established, taxes which had to be paid in cash in order to force the indigenous population to take on paid labour and to migrate to the places where the workforce was needed, and thereby disrupting African societies all over the continent.⁶⁰ In many African colonies – under British, German, Portuguese or French rule – the colonial administrators even developed systems of unpaid forced labour that the indigenous population had to provide. In German Togo, for instance, this was essential for building up an infrastructure in the interior of the colony, as Trutz von Trotha has shown in his research.⁶¹ Generally for the African population, developments before WWI meant shrinking room for manoeuvre, diminishing possibilities of negotiation, growing financial burdens, more coercive measures and an increasing penetration of their living spaces.

3. Race Policies

Concepts of colonial rule in Africa during the imperialist period were always connected with the notion of ruling over inferior races. Theories of race were developed in all Euro-

57 Cf. the many conflicts between the colonists and the Xhosa in the Cape territory, see: T. Rodney / H. Davenport / C. Saunders, *South Africa* (footnote 6), pp. 132-149.

58 C. Young, *The African Colonial State* (footnote 4), p. 99.

59 J. Zimmerer, *Deutsche Herrschaft* (footnote 39), pp. 56-109.

60 For this growing penetration of the colonies, see: R. Hyam, *British Empire* (footnote 15), p. 59; K. Mann / R. Roberts, *Introduction* (footnote 16), pp. 30-31.

61 T. v. Trotha, *Koloniale Herrschaft. Zur soziologischen Theorie der Staatsentstehung am Beispiel des "Schutzgebietes Togo"*, Tübingen 1994, pp. 349-350; for an account on coerced labour in general, see for example: F. Cooper / T. C. Holt / R. Scott, *Beyond Slavery*, Chapel Hill 2000, p. 131.

pean countries at the end of the 19th century, expounding on concepts of higher and lower races that were allegedly based on natural science. Biological racism, with its ideology of the “right of the fittest”, was dominant and had a strong impact on the formation of colonial rule.⁶² Generally, the mixing of races was viewed as a danger for the white race, and the increasing mixed populations in Africa were viewed with apprehension.⁶³ Both British and German colonisers adhered to the concept of dissimilation in colonial administration, even if their racial theories and practices differed in several ways. The British discussion on racism and colonialism seemed to allow for a greater diversity of opinions. There was a growing group of colonial experts at the end of the 19th century who were strongly influenced by eugenic and social Darwinist ideologies and supported concepts of dissimilation and separation between colonisers and colonised. Colonial policy was increasingly influenced by this current, as particularly obvious in the Crewe directive from 1909. For the first time, the directive, named after the secretary of state for the colonies, provided a general rule discouraging concubinage for members of the colonial service, as it would endanger the authority of the colonial administration in the British colonies.⁶⁴ However, it should be stressed that these new trends at the end of the 19th century were only one phase within a long tradition of colonial rule. Other convictions had been predominant earlier, as could be witnessed especially in the Cape Colony, where a more liberal, less racial form of colonial government had been introduced during the 19th century. Voting rights in the Cape Colony were not organised on racial, but on economic terms: voters had to prove a certain income or display possessions. Moreover, the law was explicitly extended to persons of colour in the 1820s. It was only at the end of the 19th century, as Vivian Bickford-Smith has shown in his research, that a more rigid racial hierarchy was introduced in many fields of politics and daily life. Voting rights for black people were restricted by various bills, but African and coloured people still represented between 15 and 16 percent of all voters between 1892 and 1910.⁶⁵ The notion of a civilising mission, of a humanitarian duty towards the indigenous population, remained a strong impulse within British colonialism. And abolitionist associations, who had fought against slavery at the beginning of the 19th century, endured in a different form, seeing themselves as the defenders of the colonised.⁶⁶ The *Aborigines Protection Society* in particular tried to strengthen the rights of the indigenous populations in

62 A. L. Stoler / F. Cooper, *Between Metropole and Colony: Rethinking a Research Agenda*, in: id. (eds.), *Tensions of Empire* (footnote 13), pp. 1–56, p. 7; J. Osterhammel, “The Great Work” (footnote 14), p. 387; B. Barth, *Die Grenzen der Zivilisierungsmission. Rassenvorstellungen in den europäischen Siedlungskolonien Virginia, den Burenrepubliken und Deutsch-Südwestafrika*, in: B. Barth / J. Osterhammel (eds.), *Zivilisierungsmissionen* (footnote 14), pp. 201–228, here p. 203.

63 S. Gilman, *Rasse, Sexualität und Seuche*, Hamburg 1992, p. 147.

64 R. Hyam, *Empire and Sexuality: The British Experience*, Manchester 1990, p. 157.

65 D. R. Edgecombe, *The Non-racial Franchise in Cape Politics 1853–1910*, in: Kleio, 10 (1978), pp. 21–37; V. Bickford-Smith, *Ethnic Pride and Racial Prejudice in Victorian Cape Town*, Cambridge 1995, p. 10; L. A. Benton, *Law and Colonial Cultures* (footnote 16), pp. 175–176.

66 P. Grosse, *Kolonialismus, Eugenik und bürgerliche Gesellschaft in Deutschland 1850–1918*, Frankfurt am Main / New York 2000, p. 26.

the African colonies.⁶⁷ Furthermore, the common notion of an evolutionary “Family of Man”, which was more widespread in Britain than in Germany, even though it assigned an inferior position to the black population, still seemed to leave more room for upward mobility and the education of the “lower races”.⁶⁸ Additionally, there were more voices within the British racial/colonial discourse than within the German discourse that stressed the beneficial effects of race mixing, which could lead to an uplifting of the inferior races.⁶⁹ In general then, state racism concepts were largely unpopular in British colonial thought.

In the German colonial and racial discourse, other tendencies came to the fore. First of all, the German Empire was a latecomer to colonisation and entered the field exactly when racial considerations became paramount in European colonial policies. Thus, earlier phases of colonisation were not experienced by the Germans. When they began their colonial experiment, the biologisation of politics and society had already reached a high point. Therefore, it should not come as a surprise that concepts of dissimilation and segregation were prevalent in Germany and that there was a consensus to class the black population of Africa as ultimately inferior. Furthermore, ever since the wars in German East Africa and German South West Africa, the relationship between the colonised and the colonisers had become greatly strained. From that point onwards, colonial concepts focused strongly on separation and on the harmfulness of race-mixing, which would ultimately lead to the ruin of a colonial society.⁷⁰ The exaggerated discussion of the few mixed marriages found in German colonies can be seen as a prominent example of these notions.⁷¹ In German South West Africa – the only German settler colony – racial concepts of dissimilation were used to introduce an atrociously suppressive regime that would degrade the black population into mere working slaves. The native ordinances of 1907 forbade ‘natives’ to hold land or enjoy freedom of movement; they had to wear identification badges, and their lives and movements were strictly regulated.⁷² Generally, racial concepts in German colonial thought seem to have been less varied than in the British context. Additionally, the enforcement of racial regulations was viewed as a task for the colonial state, to a much greater extent than in the British colonies.

In a colonial sphere largely influenced by racist ideas, mixed marriages, forms of concubinage and generally miscegenation were the most important areas illustrating the com-

67 C. A. Cline, E. D. Morel, 1873–1924: The Strategies of Protest, Belfast 1980.

68 A. McClintock, *Imperial Leather: Race, Gender and Sexuality in the Colonial Contest*, London / New York 1995, pp. 49–52.

69 Cf. J. Lubbock Avebury, *Inter-racial Problems*, in: *Fortnightly Review*, 90 (1911), pp. 581–589; J. R. Maxwell, *The Negro Question, or Hints for the Physical Improvement of the Negro Races*, London 1892, pp. 88–96.

70 See: M. Schubert, *Der schwarze Fremde. Das Bild des Schwarzafrikaners in der parlamentarischen und publizistischen Kolonialdiskussion in Deutschland von den 1870er bis in die 1930er Jahre*, Stuttgart 2003, pp. 227–305.

71 B. Kundrus, *Moderne Imperialisten. Das Kaiserreich im Spiegel seiner Kolonien*, Köln 2003, pp. 219–280. For the contemporary discussion, see for example: J. Friedrich, *Die rechtliche Beurteilung der Mischehen nach deutschem Kolonialrecht*, in: *Koloniale Rundschau*, 1 (1909), pp. 361–368; M. Fleischmann, *Die Mischehen in den deutschen Schutzgebieten vom Rechtsstandpunkte*, in: *Verhandlungen des deutschen Kolonialkongresses*, Berlin 1910, pp. 548–567.

72 J. Zimmerer, *Deutsche Herrschaft* (footnote 39), pp. 77–83.

plex processes of separation and transgression between colonised and colonisers.⁷³ Racial separation from the colonised had always been a matter of sexual definition. Gender-specific sexual sanctions developed into important mechanisms of inclusion and exclusion for colonial societies.⁷⁴ In contrast with the widespread theories of race segregation, mixed-race relations were an everyday phenomenon in all African colonies.⁷⁵ During the early colonial endeavours of the European imperial powers on the African continent, it was chiefly men who came to the new African colonies and initiated sexual relations with indigenous women. This was linked to the idea of colonial manliness which celebrated the roles of conqueror and "imperial patriarch".⁷⁶ The relations between a colonised woman and a coloniser did not affect the racial and sexual balance of power. They just confirmed the established type of rule in the colonies.⁷⁷

From the turn of the century on, mixed-race relationships were increasingly regarded as a problem. The growing colonist societies and the arrival of white women in those colonies with farm and plantation economies (e.g. in German South West Africa and British and German East Africa) meant that the question of a greater separation between colonisers and colonised came to the fore. The regulation of sexual relations between indigenous people and colonisers became one of the most important everyday issues in the colonies. White wives following their husbands were explicitly chosen to convey a European way of life to the colonies. These women were particularly intent on a strict separation of interracial sexual contacts in order to protect their own status.⁷⁸ Sexual relations between black men and white women were considered to be even more problematic: not only were they said to cause racial degeneration, they also questioned the whole colonial and sexual hierarchy.⁷⁹ In many colonial societies, such as various British colonies and the Dutch East Indies, these sexual relations were forbidden at the turn of the 20th century. On the German side, the issue of separating the Europeans from the black Africans and from mixed-race people became more important, especially after the wars in the East

73 For a detailed account of mixed marriages in German and British colonies, see: U. Lindner, Contested concepts of "white" and "native". Mixed marriages in German South-West Africa and the Cape Colony, in: BAB Working Paper 2008:06, http://www.baslerafrika.ch/d/bab_working_papers.php (accessed on 13 January 2009).

74 C. Hall, Of Gender and Empire: Reflections on the Nineteenth Century, in: P. Levine (ed.), *Gender and Empire*, Oxford 2004, pp. 46-76, here p. 50.

75 F.-J. Schulte-Althoff, Rassenmischung im kolonialen System, in: *Historisches Jahrbuch*, 109 (1985), pp. 52-94, here p. 53.

76 L. Wildenthal, *German Women for Empire 1884-1945*, Durham/London 2001, p. 80; S. Maß, *Weißer Helden, schwarze Krieger. Zur Geschichte kolonialer Männlichkeit in Deutschland 1918-1964*, Köln 2006, p. 121; H. Callaway, *Gender, Culture and Empire: European Women in Colonial Nigeria*, Urbana/Chicago 1987, p. 4.

77 P. Levine, *Sexuality, Gender and Empire*, in: id. (ed.), *Gender and Empire*, Oxford 2004, pp. 134-155, here p. 140.

78 For a contemporary account of the role of white women in the German colonies, see: L. Niessen-Deiters, *Die deutsche Frau im Auslande und in den Schutzgebieten*, Berlin 1913; cf. also K. Walgenbach, "Die weiße Frau als Trägerin deutscher Kultur". Koloniale Diskurse über Geschlecht, "Rasse" und Klasse im Kaiserreich, Frankfurt am Main/New York 2005, pp. 125-126; L. Wildenthal, *German Women* (footnote 76), pp. 131-171.

79 F. El-Tayeb, *Dangerous Liaisons: Race, Nation, and German Identity*, in: P. Mazon/R. Steingröver (eds.), *Not so Plain as Black and White: Afro-German Culture and History 1890-2000*, Rochester 2005, pp. 27-60, here p. 48; A. L. Stoler, *Sexual Affronts and Racial Frontiers: European Identities and the Cultural Politics of Exclusion in Colonial Southeast Asia*, in: F. Cooper/A. L. Stoler (eds.), *Tensions of Empire* (footnote 13), pp. 198-237, here pp. 218-219.

African and South West African colonies, culminating in the regulations banning mixed marriages.⁸⁰ These ordinances were introduced in German South West Africa in 1905, in German East Africa in 1906 and in Samoa in 1912.⁸¹ Miscegenation was prevalent, and there was a growing mixed-race population, but only low numbers of actual mixed marriages; still, German legislation concentrated on mixed marriages. The aim was to prevent a growing number of “bastards” with German citizenship. In German South West Africa, not only were new mixed marriages forbidden, but also existing mixed marriages were denied legal status from 1907 onwards, and children from these marriages were declared to be “natives”. These measures led to huge problems and many contested cases, as formerly “white” people were suddenly degraded to “natives” having hardly any rights according to the newly issued native ordinances of 1907.⁸²

In the British African colonies there were no official laws banning mixed marriages and no new legal definition of white versus native before WWI.⁸³ Laws and decrees issued at the beginning of the 20th century aimed more at relationships between white women and black men, the ultimate danger of colonial rule in the eyes of contemporaries. In 1903 Rhodesia forbade the cohabitation of white women and black men, and similar regulations followed in Natal and the Cape Colony at the same time. These decrees intended to suppress the relationships between poor white women, white prostitutes and black men. They thus aimed at persons of low status who would endanger the superiority of the white race.⁸⁴ Mixed marriages between white men and black/coloured women were of course socially banned in the higher circles of both the old and new settler communities. Generally, racial exclusion and inclusion in British colonies was established by using social mechanisms rather than by introducing new legal regulations. An important focus of these negotiations of race boundaries were the clubs that existed in all British settler colonies and that became the focal points for defining a white identity as coloniser.⁸⁵

In comparison, German racial policies in the colonies were more rigid; the administration of racial policy through the state was a strong focus of German colonial policy, particularly in German South West Africa.⁸⁶ In British colonies similar concepts of racism prevailed, but were rather implemented via social exclusion. Thus, there seemed to

80 F.-J. Schulte-Althoff, *Rassenmischung* (footnote 75), p. 86.

81 B. Kundrus, *Moderne Imperialisten* (footnote 71), p. 219.

82 H. Bley, *Kolonialherrschaft und Sozialstruktur in Deutsch-Südwestafrika 1894–1914*, Hamburg 1968, pp. 249–256.

83 The Transvaal with its tradition of Boer native policy was the only exemption; here, mixed marriages were illegal since 1898. On the regulations concerning mixed marriages and miscegenation in British African colonies, see: M. Chanock, *The Making of South African Legal Culture, 1902–1936*, Cambridge 2001; see also: P. Scully, *Rape, Race, and Colonial Culture: The Sexual Politics of Identity in the Nineteenth-Century Cape Colony, South Africa*, in: *American Historical Review*, 100 (1995), pp. 335–359.

84 G. Cornwell, George Webb Hardy’s ‘The Black Peril’ and the Social Meaning of ‘Black Peril’ in Early Twentieth-Century Africa, in: *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 22 (1996), pp. 441–453, here pp. 443–444; E. B. v. Heyningen, *The Social Evil in the Cape Colony 1868–1902*, in: *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 10 (1984), pp. 170–197.

85 R. Hyam, *Britain’s Imperial Century* (footnote 54), p. 302.

86 I would therefore not agree with Boris Barth’s thesis that strict race policies, as in German South-West Africa and the Boer republics, were always connected with the absence of state interventionism. I think quite the contrary was the case in German South-West Africa, see: B. Barth, *Die Grenzen der Zivilisierungsmission* (footnote 62), p. 227.

be much more leeway in the British colonies, even if the actual social demarcation lines of race became almost equally strict as in the German colonies at the beginning of the 20th century.

4. Mutual Perceptions and Co-operations

When seen in context, British and German concepts of colonial rule differed in several ways; however, often the differences seemed to be rather a matter of degree. If one looks at the mutual perceptions of the two neighbouring colonisers as I have done extensively in my research, one could roughly conclude that British observers (e.g. consuls in German colonies or governors of neighbouring colonies) often pointed to overstaffing and the military character of German rule, on which they blamed the failures and problems of German colonialism and in which they saw the reasons for the wars in German South West Africa and East Africa. The state racism of German South West Africa with its 'over-regulation' was also perceived with concern. Such criticism was often made by observers in a transnational way to stabilise and demarcate their own position as good and benign colonisers. Only during the last years can one observe a growing admiration for German achievements in the colonies.

German observers, as colonial newcomers, had ambivalent positions from the beginning: on the one hand, they criticised the "superficial" style of British colonisation and the "mild" politics towards the indigenous population, which they identified in turn as the reasons for British colonial problems:

*It is the tragic fate of the well-intentioned British method of colonisation which originates from the noblest motives, that the native question cannot be solved by using erroneous preconditions and subjective assumptions and it will not be solved in that way.*⁸⁷

On the other hand, they referred to British colonial concepts as role models for their own colonial engagement. One sees thus a complex international network of mutual influence and observation.

During the last years before WWI an important third element emerged: co-operation and exchange of knowledge became more important points of colonial rule in Africa for both colonisers. This can be observed in the colonial discourse in the metropole, with conferences and talks in each other's colonial societies and a growing number of articles on each other's colonial journals, and with British administrators visiting for example the agrarian Amani Institute in German East Africa and German colonial secretaries travelling through British African colonies.⁸⁸ Particularly under the colonial secretaries

87 G. Hartmann, Eingeborenenfrage in Britisch-Südafrika, in: Koloniale Rundschau, 1909, pp. 750-761, here pp. 759-760 (my translation).

88 O. Bongard, Staatssekretär Dernburg in Britisch- und Deutsch-Süd-Afrika, Berlin 1909; for Solf's journey cf. Solf Wilhelm, Afrikareise, 1912, in: Bundesarchiv Koblenz, N 1053/34.

Dernburg and Solf, British concepts of colonial rule in Africa became an essential role model for Germany. Furthermore, German colonialism was now to bring Pax Germanica to Africa just as British colonialism had brought Pax Britannica, as Bernhard Dernburg explicitly said in a talk he gave in London in 1909 in front of the British Colonial Society.⁸⁹ On the British side as well, the exchange of colonial knowledge turned into an important aspect of colonial rule. Programmatically, an article in the *Bulletin of the Royal Colonial Institute* of 1912 stated: “The Germans are willing to learn where they can from us: let us be equally open-minded and learn where we can from them”.⁹⁰

In East Africa especially, German and British colonisers had reached a high degree of understanding, as can be seen for example in publications of the British press praising German East Africa as the ideal destination for safaris, introducing the notable persons of the colony and admiring the infrastructure of the country. The reports of the British vice-consuls in Dar-es-Salaam, Dundas and King are favourable as well. British administrators and engineers from the neighbouring colony tended to admire the beauty of Dar-es-Salaam as a colonial city in contrast to Mombasa and to admire the German railway.⁹¹ Generally, there are also laudatory words about the German colonies, as this article from the journal *United Empire* of spring 1914 shows:

*[...] that the German colonies have entered upon a period of increasing prosperity, and that the work undertaken by the mother country has aimed at opening up the colonies, establishing order and peace, improving the conditions of the native and, in short, setting them on their feet, and giving them a chance to continue along the path of prosperity that is being prepared for them.*⁹²

At the highest level, a co-operation between the two colonisers in regards to their African colonies can be observed as well. Colonial secretary Solf visited British Nigeria on a journey to West Africa in 1913 and maintained an ongoing correspondence with governor Lugard, the ‘inventor’ of indirect rule, who had published widely on the theory and practice of colonialism. The letters point to a significant amount of knowledge exchange between the European powers concerning colonial issues, not only in the colonies but also between the administrations of the motherlands. The last letters between the two colonial administrators were exchanged in June 1914. Solf wrote on June 16th:

You very likely have gathered from the reports on colonial debates in the Reichstag that at various occasions I have quoted Nigeria in connection with the future development of the Cameroons and pointed out the wonderful achievements of your work in West Af-

89 The Times, 6 November 1909.

90 L. Hamilton, *The German Colonies 1910–1911*, in: *United Empire*, 3 (1912), pp. 969–972, here p. 970; R. Hyam, *The Road to Decolonisation, 1918–1968*, Cambridge 1968, p. 429.

91 *African World*, Special Edition German East Africa, 15 November 1913, in: *Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes*, Berlin, R 14817; see also: C. C. F. Dundas, *History of German East Africa, 1914* (manuscript), in: Rhodes House, Oxford, Dundas Papers, MSS Afr. p. 948.

92 L. Hamilton, *The German Colonies 1912–1913*, in: *United Empire*, 5 (1914), pp. 493–497, here p. 493.

*rica. I think I have profited a great deal from the valuable information received during my interesting stay in your colony and have already put into practise in several instances of your westafrican administration.*⁹³

5. Conclusion

Shaped by African environments, by the distinct development of each colony, by British and German policies and by a general concept of European superiority, one thus finds different forms of colonial rule based on diverging interests and to some degree contradictory to each other. Still, some distinct national features seem to prevail, especially in the implementation of racial policies.

Seen in a broader perspective, some of the identified national features of colonial rule also correspond with general issues judged as key elements of German or British national identity at the end of the 19th century. The British view on German “scientific colonialism” reflects general stereotypes in German-British relations. German scientific education and German excellency in technical fields were generally points of envy and admiration on the British side. Furthermore, the more rigid systems introduced in German colonies in Africa mirrored the general British critique on the inflexibility of German bureaucracy. On the German side, the critique of too flexible and too lenient forms of colonial rule also corresponds with a general assessment of British policy at that time.⁹⁴ One could also argue that the strict racial policies in German colonies reflect to some extent the insecurity of a new colonial power, whereas the more flexible British approach may point to the confidence of extensive experience in colonial policies, thereby reviving the image of forerunner and latecomer in British-German relations.⁹⁵

In a wider context of geopolitics, Germany and Great Britain were major and competing European powers with a growing rivalry, particularly regarding naval policy.⁹⁶ Still, the African colonies seem to be a field where these developments were of less importance, as the examples of co-operation and knowledge transfer have shown.

There remains an overarching tension between the demarcating of national colonial styles, and the aim to defend European rule and interests against a black African majority with violence, coercion and methods of racial exclusion. Mostly, the sharing of the

93 Solf to Lugard, 16 June 1914, in: Bundesarchiv Koblenz, N 1053/41.

94 On mutual perceptions and stereotypes, see: R. Muhs/J. Paulmann/W. Steinmetz (eds.), *Aneignung und Abwehr. Interkultureller Transfer zwischen Deutschland und Großbritannien im 19. Jahrhundert*, Bodenheim 1998; for the admiration of German technology and science, see: J. Paulmann, *Interkultureller Transfer zwischen Deutschland und Großbritannien. Einführung in ein Forschungskonzept*, pp. 21-43, here p. 38.

95 For the image of forerunner and latecomer, see: H. Berghoff/D. Ziegler, *Pionier und Nachzügler. Kategorien für den deutsch-britischen Vergleich?*, in: id. (eds.), *Pionier und Nachzügler? Vergleichende Studien zur Geschichte Großbritanniens und Deutschland im Zeitalter der Industrialisierung*. Festschrift für Sidney Pollard zum 70. Geburtstag, Bochum 1995, pp. 15-28.

96 For German-British rivalry, see: the standard work by P. M. Kennedy, *The Rise of Anglo-German Antagonism 1860–1914*, London 1980.

“white man’s burden” to colonise and civilise Africa seemed to overcome most of the differences.⁹⁷ These trends could be interpreted as the creation of pan-European colonial concepts; they could also be seen as proof of the need for developing a common imperial archive. Such a European imperial archive would allow exchanges of colonial knowledge between European imperial states consisting of information about techniques of rule and suppression with the ultimate aim of a better ‘management’ of the indigenous populations.⁹⁸ Even if the outbreak of WWI ended co-operations between British and German colonisers, in my view, the aspects of mutual support and exchange of colonial knowledge dominated at least the decade before 1914, thereby transforming colonial rule in Africa into a European project.⁹⁹

97 For the aspect of the common imperial project, see: D. v. Laak, *Kolonien als ‘Laboratorien der Moderne’?*, in: S. Conrad/J. Osterhammel (eds.), *Das Kaiserreich transnational*, Göttingen 2004, pp. 257-279, here p. 257. The Brussels Institut Colonial International, with many German and British colonial politicians as members, is also an important example for imperial co-operation.

98 In a more literary context, see: T. Richards, *The Imperial Archive: Knowledge and the Fantasy of Empire*, London 1993; see also: A. L. Stoler, *Colonial Archives and the Art of Governance*, in: *Archival Science*, 2 (2002), pp. 87-109.

99 Also, one has to add that co-operation between Germany and other European states in the field of African Studies re-emerged already in the 1920s, see: H. Stoecker, *Afrikawissenschaften in Berlin von 1919 bis 1945: Zur Geschichte und Topographie eines wissenschaftlichen Netzwerkes*, Stuttgart 2008.

Placing the Colonial State in the Middle: The Comparative Method and the Study of Empires

Reo Matsuzaki

RESÜMEE

Reo Matsuzaki fragt in seinem Beitrag nach Umsetzungsmöglichkeiten der vergleichenden Kolonialismusforschung. Dabei basieren seine methodischen Überlegungen auf den Ergebnissen der Fallstudien des vorliegenden Bandes. Er schlägt vor, nicht die einzelnen Imperien oder Kolonien miteinander zu vergleichen, sondern stattdessen als Vergleichskategorie den Kolonialstaat heranzuziehen. Damit gelänge es, verschiedene Bedingungen und Geschichten der Kolonisierten in Relation zu einander zu setzen. Um vom Einzelnen und Spezifischen zu abstrahieren und die Mechanismen herauszuarbeiten, welche die Interaktionen zwischen den einzelnen Regimes prägen, unterscheidet er drei politische Arenen des Kolonialstaates („International“, „Home“, „Domestic“ arena). Dies ermöglicht es, auch Akteure in den einzelnen Arenen spezifisch untersuchen.

In the study of empires, structured comparisons are rarely employed as a means of understanding variation in policy outcome. The reason lies in the very nature of the subject matter: Empires are vast and complex political systems comprised of sub-units that often have little in common. As a result, it is difficult to devise a method of measurement that can be used to systematically compare outcomes across the sub-units. For example, the pre-World War II Japanese Empire, small relative to the vast British and French empires, included the settler colonies of Hokkaido and Karafuto; the ‘leased’ territory in the southern portion of Liaodong Peninsula; the highly authoritarian and largely autonomous government generals of Taiwan and Korea; the fully incorporated and semi-colonial province of Okinawa; the League of Nations mandate of Nan’yo (South Sea);

and finally, the ostensibly sovereign puppet regime of Manchukuo. Given this diversity, how is one to evaluate the relative ‘successes’¹ or ‘failures’ of Japanese colonial efforts in Taiwan versus Korea, let alone Okinawa versus Manchukuo? Conversely, how are we to compare the struggles of the colonized people against Japanese coercion?

In this concluding essay, I continue the methodological discussion begun by Heé and Schaper by drawing upon the contributing articles in this volume. My proposition comes in two parts. First, we should move away from empires as the primary units of analysis. Instead, the colonial state, as a corporate actor with its distinct set of interests, should be placed at the center of our investigations. By making this conceptual move, we can treat the diverse background conditions and histories of colonized territories, as well as national traditions and geostrategic concerns of imperial metropolises, as variables that determined the development of colonial systems. Second, our attempts to analytically compare empires can be bolstered by specifying the political arenas in which the colonial state participated, as well as by identifying the mechanisms that structured interactions between the colonial state and other key players within each arena. My aim is to discuss how we can generalize from the uniqueness of the individual cases, and explain variation in outcome by systematically comparing interactions between similar types of actors across vastly different colonial environments.

1. The Comparative Method and the Colonial State

The comparative method, unlike commonplace comparisons, employs explicit rules when selecting cases in order to ‘uncover’ causal relationships, which are then generalized across a population of cases. Therefore, the goal is not necessarily to highlight interesting similarities or differences in the cases examined, but rather, to use these similarities or differences to support one’s theoretical interpretation of the cases. The rules employed to select cases depend on the research question. Nonetheless, case selection criteria tend to conform to one of two methods developed by John Stuart Mill: the method of agreement or the method of difference.² In the method of agreement, two very different cases (in terms of possible causal factors) with similar outcomes are selected for comparative study. The task of the investigator is to expose the common set of factors that produced similar outcomes in two very different situations. The method of difference takes the opposite

1 By ‘success’, I mean the extent to which the colonizers were able to achieve their goals. I do not imply that Japanese colonization was (or could have been) good for the colonized people.

2 J. S. Mill, *A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive: Being a Connected View of the Principles of Evidence and the Methods of Scientific Investigation*, New York 1848. For elaborations and modifications of Mill’s methods, see: A. L. George/A. Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*, Cambridge (Mass.) 2005; G. King/R. O. Keohane/S. Verba, *Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research*, Princeton 1993; A. Lijphart, *The Comparable-Cases Strategy in Comparative Research*, in: *Comparative Political Studies*, 8 (1975) 2, pp. 158-177; A. Przeworski/H. Teune, *The Logic of Comparative Social Inquiry*, New York 1970; C. C. Ragin, *The Comparative Method: Moving Beyond Qualitative and Quantitative Strategies*, Berkeley 1987.

approach by comparing two similar cases with different outcomes. By holding many of the likely causal factors/variables 'constant', the researcher investigates the validity of his or her theoretical claims and hypotheses.³

The application of both the method of difference and the method of agreement (or any other comparative technique) begins by measuring variation in outcome of some political phenomena. In the study of empires, this may be best accomplished by focusing on a colonial territory as the unit of analysis. After all, while colonies are exploited to advance the goals of metropolitan rulers, violence itself is perpetrated within the colonized societies. Resistance to oppression also takes place on the ground and in the localities, even if resistance involves external allies. Insofar as the outcomes we care about occur at the local level, measurement of variation should also be localized.

Although there are various outcomes (such as, degree of political racialization, extent of armed resistance, etc.) that could be measured and studied in comparative analyses of colonial territories, the effectiveness of a colonial state in providing/imposing 'outputs' serves as an analytically convenient starting point. In their study of political systems, Gabriel Almond and G. Bingham Powell argue that a functioning state engages in the following 'output' producing/imposing activities: (i) extraction of resources, such as money, goods, persons, or services; (ii) distribution of goods and services, such as education, health, sanitation, recreation, and safety; (iii) regulation of human behavior; and (iv) instillation of meaning and identity.⁴ The outcomes of some of these activities are more quantifiable than others. Nonetheless, even if it is difficult to attach a precise numerical value to all of a state's 'outputs', by conceptualizing what an ideal-typical⁵ state should be able to do, Almond and Powell provide a standard of evaluation that can be used to select and compare the performance of various political systems, including colonial states.

This is not to suggest that colonial states sought to provide/impose these 'outputs' in the same way or with the same intentions as modern nation-states. We find that many colonial states purposely limited the availability of educational opportunities to native inhabitants, for education helped unmask the injustices inherent to the colonial system. Colonial states also heavily taxed the colonized people, thereby intentionally destroying local communities and forcing people to live in slave-like conditions. Moreover, even

3 For critiques of Mill's methods, see B. Geddes, *How the Cases You Choose Affect the Answers You Get: Selection Bias in Comparative Politics*, in: *Political Analysis*, 2 (1990) 1, pp. 131-150; S. Lieberman, *Small N's and Big Conclusions: An Examination of the Reasoning in Comparative Studies Based on a Small Number of Cases*, in: *Social Forces*, 70 (1991), pp. 307-320. Lieberman lists the following problems with Mill's methods: (i) they do not take into account interaction effects between different causal variables; (ii) they do not provide any external validity of the argument; and (iii) conclusions that are reached using Mill's method are extremely volatile, since increasing the number of cases can lead to completely new and different variables becoming significant. Lieberman also questions the scientific validity of any research that examines only a small number of cases. He argues that (i) the severity of measurement error bias is inversely related to the number of observations; and (ii) the smaller the number of cases, the greater the danger of omitting important variables.

4 G. Almond / G. B. Powell, Jr., *Comparative Politics: Systems, Process, Policy*, Boston 1978, p. 286.

5 An ideal type is a conceptual tool that describes what an object should look like in its theoretically purest form. It does not mean that an object is good or desirable.

when a colonial state provided/imposed the above 'outputs', it was for the purpose of deepening its domination.⁶

Nonetheless, every colonial state, to a lesser or greater degree, extracted resources, distributed goods and services (albeit in a highly discriminatory manner), regulated and disciplined the behavior of the colonized people, and sought legitimation of its rule by controlling discourse and symbols. Therefore, while we should not forget that colonial states also engaged in other unambiguously destructive endeavors, by focusing on Almond and Powell's 'outputs', it is possible to compare vastly different colonial systems. Moreover, the uniqueness of each colonial territory is not lost in such an analysis. The differences across colonial territories in terms of culture, history, and geography, as well as differences in the aims and goals of colonizers, become an integral part of explaining variation in the provision/imposition of 'outputs'.

Unique background conditions, however, were not the only source of variation. The internal structure of the colonial state – which is seen here to be comprised of the various administrative, legislative, and judicial organizations within a specific colonial territory, as well as the individuals who staff these organizations – also varied across territorial units. As Max Weber argues, the most effective states were supported by efficient bureaucracies.⁷ He writes:

*[T]he purely bureaucratic type of administrative organization [...] is, from a purely technical point of view, capable of attaining the highest degree of efficiency and is in this sense formally the most rational known means of exercising authority over human beings. It is superior to any other form in precision, in stability, in the stringency of its discipline, and in its reliability.*⁸

Furthermore, efficiency is increased when the state is autonomous from society. Like other corporate actors, such as trade unions and businesses, successful states are those that can single-mindedly pursue well-defined agendas without distractions or interferences.⁹ Quite unlike the ideal-typical Weberian state, however, Joel Migdal finds that many colonial states were permeated by society. Overrun by the interests of local collaborators, businessmen, settlers, and missionaries, the colonial state was often hindered from

6 For example, the policy of the Korean and Taiwanese colonial states to rapidly increase educational 'opportunities' in the late 1930s was part of the strategy of "imperialization" (kōminka), where the goal was to eradicate Korean and Taiwanese national identities. See: L. T. S. Ching, *Becoming Japanese: Colonial Taiwan and the Politics of Identity Formation*, Berkeley 2001; W. Y. Chou, *The Kominka Movement in Taiwan and Korea: Comparisons and Interpretations*, in: P. Duus / R. H. Myers / M. R. Peattie (eds.), *The Japanese Wartime Empire, 1931–1945*, Princeton 1996; T. Komagome, *Shokuminchi teikoku Nihon no bunka tōgō* [Cultural integration of the Japanese colonial empire], Tokyo 1996.

7 M. Weber, *Politics as a Vocation* (pp. 77–128) and, *Bureaucracy* (pp. 198–244), in: H. H. Gerth / C. W. Mills (eds.), *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*, Oxford 1946.

8 M. Weber, *Economy and Society*, v. 1, Berkeley 1978, p. 223.

9 For further discussion, see: P. B. Evans, *Embedded Autonomy: States and Industrial Transformation*, Princeton 1995; A. Stepan, *The State and Society: Peru in Comparative Perspective*, Princeton 1978.

pursuing its own agenda.¹⁰ Meanwhile, lacking discipline and training, some colonial bureaucrats sought self-aggrandizement and sabotaged the colonial state's efforts to provide/impose 'outputs'. Moreover, even 'honest'¹¹ bureaucrats harbored personal interests and concerns that at times conflicted with their role as agents of the colonial state. Therefore, although most colonial states excelled at extracting and exploiting resources, they were often unable to monitor and discipline the colonized people.¹² Even in places such as the Philippines, where the American colonizers invested much time and money in an effort to construct a Weberian state, the colonial bureaucracy conformed more or less to this unflattering norm.¹³ The image of a typical colonial state that thus emerges is one of a highly coercive actor that nonetheless exhibited extreme weaknesses.

Several of the authors in this volume focus squarely on these intra-state dynamics that produced variation in the effectiveness of the colonial state (as a corporate actor). In his essay on the Soviet empire, Teichmann traces early Soviet state-building efforts in Central Asia through the perspectives of three local administrators: Isaak Abramovich Zelenskii, Faizulla Khojaev, and Usman Iusupov. In their stories, we see how class and ethnic tensions within the local administration disrupted the operation of the colonial state. For example, while Zelenskii was sent to Central Asia by Moscow to solve the problem of inter-ethnic animosity, he was unable to overcome his own prejudices against Central Asian Bolsheviks. Meanwhile, Khojaev and Iusupov, both originating from Central Asia, were sandwiched between their identity as Central Asian Bolsheviks and their role as executioners of Stalin's ambitious nationality policies. They had to engage in a delicate balancing act, as they were easily suspected of treason both from above (Moscow) and from below. Indeed, Khojaev was purged in July 1937, partly due to his staunch insistence that Central Asian Muslim communities could 'reform' themselves from within. While Teichmann's focus is largely on the interests and actions of specific colonial agents, Lindner draws our attention to the formal rules and structures of colonial bureaucracies, as well as to characteristics of the individuals who staffed these organizations. She notes that when German colonial expansion in Africa began quite suddenly and unexpectedly in the 1880s, a formal system for educating and training civilian colonial agents had not yet been devised; as a result, German colonial presence in Africa was maintained (particularly in the rural regions) through a network of military outposts. Meanwhile, the lack of competent civilian bureaucrats led to a situation where a large portion of the civil

10 J. S. Migdal, *Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World*, Princeton 1988, pp. 28-31.

11 That is, from the perspective of the colonial authorities.

12 C. Young, *The African Colonial State in Comparative Perspective*, New Haven 1994.

13 See: W. Anderson, *Colonial Pathologies: American Tropical Medicine, Race, and Hygiene in the Philippines*, Durham 2006; M. Cullinane, *Illustrado Politics: Filipino Elite Responses to American Rule, 1898-1908*, Manila 2005; W. C. Forbes, *The Philippine Islands*, Boston 1928; P. D. Hutchcroft, *Colonial Masters, National Politicos, and Provincial Lords: Central Authority and Local Autonomy in the American Philippines, 1900-1913*, in: *The Journal of Asian Studies*, 59 (2000) 2, pp. 277-306; G. A. May, *Social Engineering in the Philippines: The Aims, Execution, and Impact of American Colonial Policy, 1900-1913*, Westport 1980.

administration was staffed by present and former officers of the colonial corps.¹⁴ Consequentially, although violence was commonplace throughout colonized Africa, German colonial states were exceptionally feared for their brutality. For example, the German colony of Togo was popularly known as the 'twenty-five country', for even low-ranking colonial officials were authorized to dole out sentences of twenty-five lashes for natives without any court order.

The structure of indirect rule, which was the most prevalent form of colonial administration in Europe's African colonies, also had an adverse effect on the cohesiveness of the colonial state. By bestowing upon native chiefs the power to distribute resources, collect revenue, and interpret customary laws, Europeans sought to create loyal allies in the localities. It was also a strategy born out of necessity, as Europeans were unable or unwilling to invest significant resources and manpower into their African colonies.¹⁵ However, as Schaper displays, while this system allowed colonizers to govern over vast territories with minimal European presence, it also provided opportunities for African chiefs to pursue their own independent agenda. Ultimately, indirect rule blurred the boundaries between state and society, thereby weakening the colonial state's identity as a unified corporate actor. As bureaucratic efficiency was lost, so too was the colonial state's ability to provide/impose 'outputs'.

Nonetheless, there were important exceptions to this general trend. In contrast to most other colonial states, Taiwan developed into a modern (and despotic) Weberian state. Highly autonomous and disciplined, Taiwanese colonial bureaucrats were able to build an extensive network of roads and rail, eradicate the plague, minimize the outbreak of cholera, rapidly expand educational opportunities, and create an export economy that turned Taiwan into a highly profitable colonial possession.¹⁶ In part, the Taiwan 'exception' can be explained by the single-minded obsession of Japanese policymakers to construct legal-rational authority in Taiwan. By minimizing the political participation of the Taiwanese, and even that of the Japanese settler community, the Government General of Taiwan ensured internal cohesion. The colonial state also paid salaries that were much

14 Although an extreme example even for a German colony, Lindner notes that as late as 1914, there were only ninety civilian administrators in the entire colony of Cameroon.

15 S. Berry, *No Condition Is Permanent: The Social Dynamics of Agrarian Change in Sub-Saharan Africa*, Madison 1993, see chapter 2; M. Mamdani, *Subject and Citizen: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism*, Princeton 1996, pp. 16-23.

16 G. W. Barclay, *Colonial Development and Population in Taiwan*, Princeton 1954; E. I. Chen, Goto Shimpei, *Japan's Colonial Administrator in Taiwan: A Critical Reexamination*, in: *American Asian Review*, 13 (1995) 1, pp. 29-59; H. Y. Chang / R. H. Myers, *Japanese Colonial Development Policy in Taiwan, 1895-1906: A Case of Bureaucratic Entrepreneurship*, in: *Journal of Asian Studies*, 22 (1965) 4, pp. 433-449; C. M. Ka, *Japanese Colonialism in Taiwan: Land Tenure, Development, and Dependency*, Boulder 1995; Y. Takekoshi, *Japanese Rule in Formosa*, translation by G. Braithwaite, London 1907; P. E. Tsurumi, *Taiwan Under Kodama Gentaro and Goto Shimpei*, in: *Papers on Japan*, Harvard University, East Asian Research Center, 4 (1967), pp. 95-146; id., *Japanese Colonial Education in Taiwan, 1895-1945*, Cambridge (Mass.) 1977.

higher than in the metropolitan bureaucracies, in order to attract competent Japanese administrators to Taiwan.¹⁷

However, analyses that focus exclusively on the internal composition of the colonial state tell, at best, only half the story. Whether a colonial state was able to provide/impose 'outputs' was also a function of the various interactions between the colonial state and other actors, both within and outside the colonial territory. It was indeed the case that the colonial state, irrespective of its cohesion or autonomy, was the dominant actor within a specific territory. Yet, even in the most unequal of relationships, the weaker player retains some ability to exert agency.¹⁸ Therefore, for a more complete analysis, we must look beyond the internal characteristics of the colonial state and examine the interactions between the colonial state and other key players in three distinct political arenas: international, home, and domestic. By 'international', I refer to the relationships between the colonial state and foreign policymakers, missionaries, businessmen, and representatives of international organizations. 'Home' refers to the colonial state's interactions with the central government and bureaucracies, as well as with private individuals and organizations from the metropolitan region of the empire. Finally, 'domestic' is comprised of the intricate links between the colonial state and the colonized society.

At this point, my argument comes full circle. I began this concluding essay with a methodological discussion: I argued that a focus on the colonial state would allow researchers to compare seemingly different colonial territories. Yet, methodology is not the only reason why one might choose to focus on the colonial state, and its attempts to provide/impose 'outputs'. As the discussion of the three arenas displays, there are theoretical reasons as to why it may be advantageous to place the colonial state in the center of one's analysis. The colonial state, with its distinct identity, agenda, and interests, lies in the middle of all interactions within, and concerning, the colonial polity.

However, the tendency in the literature has been to ignore (often unconsciously) the role of the colonial state as a distinct corporate actor. Similar to how Marxist scholars have often equated the interests of liberal-democratic governments to the interests of the capitalist classes, scholars of colonialism have had a tendency to assume that the interests of colonial states were the same as that of the imperialists in the home polity. The prevailing view in the literature is one where each empire possessed a distinct style of colonialism (derived from national traditions and/or geostrategic concerns), and any variation in outcome across colonial territories resulted from differences in the conditions found on the ground. The colonial state, as an actor, is analytically missing from this perspective. Instead, echoing Theda Skocpol and her collaborators' proclamation that we must "bring the state back in,"¹⁹ I argue that we should place the colonial state in the middle.

17 M. Okamoto, *Shokuminchi kanryō no seijishi: Chōsen, Taiwan sōtokufu to teikoku Nihon* [The political history of the colonial bureaucracy: Imperial Japan and the Government Generals of Korea and Taiwan], Tokyo 2008.

18 A. Giddens, *Studies in Social and Political Theory*, London 1977, pp. 333-349.

19 P. B. Evans/D. Rueschemeyer/T. Skocpol (eds.), *Bringing the State Back In*, Cambridge 1985. See, in particular, Skocpol's introductory chapter.

2. The Colonial State and the Three Arenas

The notion that the colonial state was a central actor which navigated within three separate political arenas (foreign, home, and domestic) only serves as a starting point of a comparative analysis of empires. In order to explain variation in outcome, it is necessary to identify the precise causal mechanisms that systematically produced similarities or differences across the cases examined.²⁰ By doing so, it is possible to generalize from the particularities of the individual cases and advance broader theoretical interpretations.²¹ To illustrate this, I draw upon the findings of the contributing essays in this volume and highlight some of the causal mechanisms that similarly structured interactions within each of the three arenas.

International arena: The primary mechanism in the international arena was that of competition. For example, one of the reasons why French policymakers in Indochina shifted their colonial policy from naked exploitation (cloaked in the language of ‘assimilation’) to that of colonial development (under the framework of ‘association’) was to guard against possible Japanese expansion into Southeast Asia.²² Meanwhile, lingering threats (both real and imagined) from Russia and China led the Korean Government General to adopt repressive assimilatory policies, especially before 1919 and after 1937. The Governor General and his lieutenants reasoned that the only long-term solution to threats posed by the Chinese or the Russians was to forcefully transform Koreans into loyal subjects of the Japanese Emperor.²³ Furthermore, assimilation policy became a critical component of an ideological campaign to win the hearts and minds of the Asian people. As the Japanese competed in a global struggle against other imperialist powers, they sought to formulate a new and ‘benevolent’ system of imperial rule that would free Asia from European despotism.²⁴

20 Charles Tilly argues that there are three types of mechanisms: environmental, cognitive, and relational. He writes, “Environmental mechanisms are externally generated influences on conditions affecting social life; words such as disappear, enrich, expand, and disintegrate – applied not to actors but their settings – suggest the sorts of cause-effect relations in question. Cognitive mechanisms operate through alterations of individual and collective perception, and are characteristically described through words such as recognize, understand, reinterpret, and classify. Relational mechanisms alter connections among people, groups, and interpersonal networks; words such as ally, attack, subordinate, and appease give a sense of relational mechanisms.” See: C. Tilly, *Mechanisms in Political Processes*, in: *Annual Review of Political Science*, 4 (2001), p. 24. For more on mechanisms, see: P. Hedström/R. Swedberg, *Social Mechanisms: An Introductory Essay*, in: id. (eds.), *Social Mechanisms: An Analytical Approach to Social Theory*, Cambridge 1998.

21 A causal mechanism is like a food processor. If we put different fruits into a food processor, we will end up with different types of mixed juices. Nonetheless, the process through which these fruits are turned into various juices is the same no matter what the fruits are.

22 R. F. Betts, *Assimilation and Association in French Colonial Theory, 1890–1914*, New York 1961, pp. 157–158; B. Cummings, *Parallax Visions: Making Sense of American-East Asian Relations at the End of the Century*, Durham 1999, see chapter 3.

23 M. E. Caprio, *Expansion and Comprehensive Security: Japanese and English Annexations of Contiguous Territories*, in: *The Journal of Pacific Asia*, 9 (2003), pp. 79–104.

24 Regardless of the rhetoric, the Japanese were no less despotic compared to the Europeans, and their words of benevolence and co-prosperity hardly masked the cruelty of Japanese colonial rule.

However, as Heé argues, the Japanese were ultimately unable to reject Western colonial models, because the Japanese were themselves engaging in a 'self-civilizing' mission at home. Even if the Japanese sought to look within their own society for an alternative Asiatic model of colonialism, the problem was that the Meiji reformers were rapidly reconstituting Japan as a Western state.²⁵ Ironically, their attempt to overcome and roll back Western imperialism was hindered from the very fact that they accepted the superiority of Western models. Moreover, Japanese policymakers had much to gain by acknowledging the legitimacy of the Euro-centric imperialist system, for it provided them with the language to justify their territorial claims over Korea and elsewhere. By arguing that Korea was a protectorate under Japanese jurisdiction, and by indicating that they were helping to shoulder the "white man's burden",²⁶ Japanese imperialists convinced Western governments that their claims over Korea were legitimate.²⁷

Furthermore, as the above examples suggest, imitation was also an important mechanism in the international arena. Indeed, as we see in the articles by Lindner, Schumacher, and Heé, colonial officials from different empires were in close communication. US Secretary of War Elihu Root (who was responsible for outlining America's colonial policies in the Philippines and Puerto Rico), and Chief Civil Administrator of Taiwan Gotō Shinpei (who laid the foundations of the Japanese colonial system in Taiwan), were both known to have extensively studied British colonial models. Also, German Colonial Secretary Wilhelm Solf (1911–1918) was thoroughly impressed with the British administrative system in West Africa and maintained correspondence with Governor General of Nigeria Frederick Lugard (1914–1919). Moreover, imitation did not take place only between the new colonial powers (such as, Germany, Japan, and the United States) and the old (such as, France, Britain, and the Netherlands). French, Dutch, and British academics and colonial officials actively studied one another's colonial policies and gathered in yearly conferences to exchange their ideas. In fact, it was through such interactions that French colonial officials began to adopt Britain's model of 'association'.²⁸

Finally, administrators often traveled abroad to examine foreign colonial models firsthand. Mochiji Rokusaburō, Chief of Education Affairs in Taiwan (1903–1910), embarked on a journey across Southeast Asia in 1907 to learn about British, Dutch, and American colonial education systems.²⁹ Utsunomiya Tarō, Commander of the Chōsen (Korea) Army (1918–1920), had previously spent time in British India and Egypt, where he had a chance to study British infrastructures of control.³⁰ Ōtsuka Tsunesaburō, Chief of Home Affairs in the Korean Government General (1919–1925), was sent on an investigative

25 D. E. Westney, *Imitation and Innovation: The Transfer of Western Organizational Patterns to Meiji Japan*, Cambridge (Mass.) 1987.

26 Rudyard Kipling's *The White Man's Burden* was originally published in the magazine *McClure's* in 1899.

27 A. Dudden, *Japan's Colonization of Korea: Discourse and Power*, Honolulu 2005.

28 R. F. Betts, *Assimilation and Association* (footnote 22), see chapter 3.

29 P. E. Tsurumi, *Japanese Colonial Education*, (footnote 16), p. 47.

30 Y. Kira / M. Miyamoto, *Taishō Jidai Chūki no Utsunomiya Tarō: Daiyonshidan chō, Chōsengun Shireikan, Gunjanshikan jidai*, [Utsunomiya Tarō during the mid-Taishō era: the period as head of the 4th Infantry Division, Commander of the Chōsen Army, and Military Councilor], in: Utsunomiya Tarō kankei shiryō kenkyūkai (ed.), *Nihon*

mission to Britain and Ireland. It was partly through this experience that Ōtsuka came to favor the creation of a legislative body in Korea, where Koreans could partake in the formulation of domestic policy.³¹

Home arena: An important mechanism that structured interactions in the home arena was inter-bureaucratic politics. When countries annexed foreign territories as colonial possessions, it became necessary for the home government to devise a system of coordinating the policies of the various colonial administrations. Regardless of whether this was done through an existing bureaucratic organization or through the creation of a new colonial ministry, jurisdictional battles were unavoidable. After all, colonial policy was intricately linked to other areas of foreign and domestic policy.³² Furthermore, the colonial state itself was a powerful actor that could disrupt the balance of power between the metropolitan ministries. The colonial state controlled vast human and natural resources that could be mobilized to pursue an independent agenda, or to advance the interests of some actor, be it the military or the foreign ministry.³³

Moreover, given the diverging priorities of different bureaucratic organizations, the precise way by which these jurisdictional battles played out had important consequences on the long-term development of colonial territories. We see in Teichmann's essay, for example, that policymakers in Moscow sought to uniformly transplant Soviet institutions into Central Asia without taking into account the unique characteristics of this region. Had Central Asian Bolsheviks, such as Faizulla Khojaev, been given more autonomy in policymaking, the outcome of Soviet colonization efforts in Central Asia may have been considerably different.

rikugun to Ajia seisaku: Rikugun taishō Utsunomiya Tarō Nikki [Imperial Japanese Army and Asian policy: Diaries of General Utsunomiya Tarō], v. 3, Tokyo 2007, pp. 1–62.

- 31 H. S. Lee, *Bunka tōchi shoki ni okeru Chōsen sōtokufu kanryō no tōchi shisō*, [The governance ideologies of Korean Government General bureaucrats in the early period of cultural rule], in: *Shigakuzasshi*, 115 (2006) 4, pp. 68–93.
- 32 For an application of this dynamic to Korea, see: M. Katō, *Seitō naikaku kakuritsuki ni okeru shokuminchi shihai taisei no mosaku: Takumushō secchi mondai no kōsatsu* [Groping for the establishment of a colonial governance structure during the era of party rule: Examination of the debates over the creation of the Ministry of Colonial Affairs], in: Higashi Ajia Gendaishi, 1 (1998), pp. 39–58; S. Moriyama, *Nihon no Chōsen tōchi seisaku (1910–1945) no seijishi teki kenkyū* [Polito-historical research on Japanese policies of colonial rule in Korea (1910–1945)], in: *Hōseiriron*, 23 (1991) 3–4, pp. 66–111; M. Okamoto, *Seitō seijiki ni okeru bunkan sōtokusei: Rikken seiji to shokuminchi tōchi no sōkoku* [Civilian Governor General system in the period of party politics: conflict between constitutional politics and colonial government], in: *Nihon shokuminchi kenkyū*, 10 (1998), pp. 1–18; id., *Sōtoku seiji to seitō seiji: Nidaiseitōki no sōtoku jinji to sōtokufu kansei, yosan* [The politics of the Government General and party politics: Personnel affairs, bureaucratic system, and the budget of the Government General during the two-party system period], in: *Chōsenshi kenkyūkai ronbunshū*, 38 (2000), pp. 31–60.
- 33 In the Japanese Empire, this was not some hypothetical threat. During the Boxer Rebellion of 1900, the Taiwan Government General unsuccessfully plotted with the Army brass to establish Japanese control over the Amoy region in China. Although scholars disagree on whether the Army leadership or the Governor General took the initiative in this 'Amoy Incident', it is clear that this 'incident' could not have occurred without the autonomy and the resourcefulness of the Taiwan Government General. See: K. Kawamura, *Amoi jiken no shinsō ni tsuite* [The truth behind the Amoy Incident], in: *Nihon rekishi*, 309 (1974), pp. 46–53; S. Saitō, *Amoi jiken saikō* [Reconsideration of the Amoy Incident], in: *Nihonshi kenkyū*, 305 (1988), pp. 29–53; S. Takahashi, *Meiji 33 nen Amoi jiken no ichi kōsatsu: Yamamoto Kaigun daijin no taido wo chūshin to shite* [An examination of the Meiji 33 Amoy Incident: Placing the attitude of Navy Minister Yamamoto in the middle], in: *Gunjishi gakkai*, 8 (1973) 4, pp. 33–44.

Meanwhile, as Heé displays through her framework of the ‘double bind’, Japanese domestic debates, and in particular, concerns over Japan’s international image, constrained the Taiwan Government General’s efforts to design and implement penal codes. When Governor General Kodama Gentarō (1898–1906) officially reintroduced flogging in Taiwan, it was not without controversy, even within the Government General. Most significantly, Odate Koretake (who was a member of the Taiwan Supreme Court) penned an internal memorandum criticizing the Governor General’s policy. He argued that reintroduction of flogging contradicted Japan’s stated goal of ‘civilizing’ Taiwan, and undermined the legitimacy of the Government General. Such objections took on importance, however, because they plugged into ongoing policy debates and power struggles within the home polity. A day after the reintroduction of flogging in January 1904, *Yomiuri shinbun* (a major Japanese daily) published a critique of Kodama’s policy, helping to mobilize Japanese civil society against the colonial state in Taiwan. This in turn played into the jurisdictional battles by strengthening the hand of those who were already critical of the autonomy enjoyed by the Government General.³⁴

Similarly, interventions by actors in the home polity are also significant to Schumacher’s account of why American policy in the Philippines moved away from the indirect rule model of the British to one reproducing American institutions. Inspired by British practices in the Malay Straits, American colonial officials had initially intended to govern the Muslim population of the islands of Sulu, Mindanao, and Palawan through native laws and local power structures. However, this plan was quickly abandoned after a coalition of church leaders, progressive reformers, abolitionists, and imperialists exerted considerable pressure on the U.S. government to change course. It was simply unacceptable to the American public that the ‘backward’ and ‘uncivilized’ sultans, who practiced polygamy and slavery, should be vested with so much authority.

Domestic arena: This arena differs from the other two in that a dense system of extractive, distributive, and disciplinary institutions³⁵ regulated the interactions between the colonial state and the colonized society. As such, relationships of domination and resistance in the domestic arena were much more structured compared to the fluid relationships in

34 For the official record of the various exchanges between the representatives of the Taiwan Government General and parliamentarians in the Imperial Diet, see: Gaimushō jōyakukyoku hōkika, Taiwan ni shikō subeki hōrei ni kansuru hōritsu (Rokujūsanhō, Sanjūichihō oyobi Hōsangō) no gijiroku [Diet Records of laws governing the ordinances enforced in Taiwan (Law 63, Law 31, and Law 3)], Tokyo 1966. See also: M. Haruyama, Kindai Nihon no shokuminchi tōchi to Hara Takashi, [Colonial governance of modern Japan and Hara Takashi], in: M. Haruyama/M. Wakabayashi (eds.), Nihon shokuminchi shugi no seijiteki tenkai: Sono tōchi taisei to Taiwan no minzoku undō, 1898–1934 [The political development of Japanese colonialism: Its governance structure and nationalist movements in Taiwan, 1898–1934], Tokyo 1980; H. Meitetsu, Meiji kenpō taisei to Taiwan tōchi, [The Meiji Constitution and colonial rule in Taiwan], in: S. Ōe (ed.), Kindai Nihon to shokuminchi [Modern Japan and its colonies], v. 4, Tokyo 1993; M. Haruyama, Kindai Nihon to Taiwan: Musha jiken, shokuminchi tōchi seisaku no kenkyū [Modern Japan and Taiwan: Research on the Wūshè Incident and policies of colonial rule], Tokyo 2008.

35 Although there are often as many definitions of institutions as there are scholars who study them, my preferred definition is the one formulated by Avner Greif. He writes, “An institution is a system of rules, beliefs, norms, and organizations that together generate a regularity of (social) behavior.” See: A. Greif, *Institutions and the Path to Modern Economy: Lessons from Medieval Trade*, Cambridge 2006, p. 30.

the foreign and home arenas.³⁶ However, the mere existence of formal institutions (such as health boards and school districts) did not guarantee that the target population would behave as the colonial state intended. For example, Schaper shows that German legal institutions in Cameroon, despite having clearly favored the interests of the white colonizers, were at times used by the Cameroonians to fight for their rights. The native society was indeed constrained by the institutions imposed upon them by the colonizers, but the colonized people still retained the ability to exercise agency. Moreover, opportunities to 'indigenize' colonial institutions varied depending on the structure of constraints governing state-society relations.³⁷ Therefore, when evaluating the effectiveness of colonial institutions in perpetuating violence, or the ability of the colonized people in blunting domination, mechanisms of enforcement and compliance become a central issue.³⁸

A focus on enforcement and compliance mechanisms also helps to explain variation in the provision/imposition of 'outputs' across colonial systems. Unlike their European competitors, the colonial states in Taiwan and the Philippines similarly sought to directly govern over their respective colonized societies by building an extensive bureaucratic infrastructure. Nonetheless, in order to extract resources and discipline the behavior of the colonized people, they were compelled to forge collaborative relationships with local elites. The method through which Japanese and American colonizers structured these relationships, however, varied significantly. On the one hand, American colonial policymakers sought to sever the traditional clientelistic ties between Filipino elites and the local communities. The American strategy was to advance 'civilized' forms of political participation by integrating Filipinos, as individuals, into the newly created political and bureaucratic institutions. However, by excluding traditional sources of authority from the formal structures of the colonial state, the Americans left space for local bosses to behave autonomously. Meanwhile, taking the opposite approach, the Japanese incorporated traditional Taiwanese power structures into their colonial administration at the local level. Ultimately, by fusing traditional and legal-rational authority, this method proved to be far more effective in establishing a system of domination.

Finally, although the task of unmasking causal mechanisms is simplified by focusing on a single political arena, variation in outcome across colonial territories may sometimes be better explained through investigating how the three arenas intersected. Of the contrib-

36 Even in empires where a colonial ministry (or some other ministry) ostensibly supervised colonial policymaking, colonial states usually retained significant autonomy.

37 See for example: J. Go, *American Empire and the Politics of Meaning: Elite Political Cultures in the Philippines and Puerto Rico during U.S. Colonialism*, Durham 2008.

38 For discussions of enforcement and compliance from various institutional perspectives, see: A. Greif, *Institutions and the Path* (footnote 35), pp. 46-47; J. W. Meyer/B. Rowan, *Institutionalized Organizations: Formal Structure as Myth and Ceremony*, in: *The American Journal of Sociology*, 83 (1977) 2, pp. 343-347; D. C. North, *Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance*, Cambridge 1990, pp. 58-59; C. Offe, *Designing Institutions in East European Transitions*, in: R. E. Goodwin, *The Theory of Institutional Design*, Cambridge 1996, pp. 199-207; A. L. Stinchcombe, *On the Virtues of the Old Institutionalism*, in: *Annual Review of Sociology*, 23 (1997), pp. 5-6; W. Streeck/K. Thelen, *Institutional Change in Advanced Political Economies*, in: id. (eds.), *Beyond Continuity: Institutional Change in Advanced Political Economies*, Oxford 2005.

uting authors, Heé most clearly takes an institutional approach, as she investigates how systems of enforcement were structured in colonial Taiwan. Her analysis, however, does not remain within the bounds of the domestic arena. While Japanese colonial officials justified the reintroduction of flogging in Taiwan by arguing that it was the form of punishment most familiar to the Taiwanese, the way in which flogging was administered was distinctly Japanese. Both the 'punishment plate' that the prisoners were strapped onto, as well as the whips used to flog them, were Japanese modifications of mainland Chinese instruments. Moreover, these instruments were used in Japan itself during the early Meiji period, before the Japanese had adopted Western criminal codes.

3. Conclusion

In this essay, I have attempted to make a case for a colonial state-centric analysis of empires. I argued that different colonial territories could be systematically compared, if comparisons are structured around common sets of mechanisms that similarly regulated the behavior of actors across cases. However, I still have yet to discuss why we should compare different colonial territories in the first place. After all, the best works in the study of empires and colonial systems have been longitudinal analyses of single-case studies. By casting his or her net too widely, a researcher may be left with conclusions that are seemingly superficial. If so, why should we engage in comparative analyses in the first place? Is it not better for each scholar to study one case in depth, and leave it to editors of collected volumes to make the comparisons?

If two or more cases are compared simply to highlight interesting similarities or differences, then there is little gained, conceptually or theoretically, by engaging in comparisons within a single study. On the other hand, if comparisons are utilized as tools to explain causality, then there is an argument to be made for their use. The goal of comparative politics is not necessarily to reveal the richness of a case, but to formulate hypotheses regarding why some outcome resulted, given a multitude of possible alternative outcomes. Therefore, the purpose is similar to that of a counter-factual analysis. Structured comparisons allow us to imagine alternative realities by referencing actual cases.³⁹

The comparative method remains underutilized in the study of empires and colonial systems, and for good reasons. However, insofar as a researcher seeks to understand why some outcome resulted rather than another, it may be a method worth trying.

39 On counterfactual analysis in the study of history, see: J. Bulhof, What If? Modality and History, in: *History and Theory*, 38 (1999) 2, pp. 145-168; M. Bunzl, Counterfactual History: A User's Guide, in: *American Historical Review*, 109 (2004) 3, pp. 845-858. For a discussion of counterfactuals by political scientists, see: G. Capoccia/R. D. Kelmen, The Study of Critical Junctures: Theory, Narrative, and Counterfactuals in Historical Institutionalism, in: *World Politics*, 59 (2007) 3, pp. 341-369; J. D. Fearon, Counterfactuals and Hypothesis Testing in Political Science, in: *World Politics*, 43 (1991) 2, pp. 169-195; R. N. Lebow, What's So Different about a Counterfactual?, in: *World Politics*, 52 (2000) 4, pp. 550-585; P. Tetlock/A. Belkin, Counterfactual Thought Experiments in World Politics: Logical, Methodological, and Psychological Perspectives, in: id. (eds.), *Counterfactual Thought Experiments in World Politics*, Princeton 1996.

BUCHBESPRECHUNGEN

**Bernd Stöver: Der Kalte Krieg
1947–1991. Geschichte eines
radikalen Zeitalters, München:
Verlag C. H. Beck 2007, 528 S.**

Rezensiert von Bernard
Wiaderny, Frankfurt / Oder

Der Kalte Krieg gehört zu den Arbeitsschwerpunkten des Potsdamer Historikers Bernd Stöver, der sich bereits in seiner Habilitationsschrift mit der amerikanischen ‚Liberation Policy‘ beschäftigte.¹ Die dort vorhandenen Forschungspräferenzen und -ergebnisse sind auch in der vorliegenden Synthese sichtbar.

Bei der Annäherung an die Geschichte des Kalten Krieges trifft der Vf. mehrere methodische Annahmen (S. 19-25). Es sei notwendig, diese Epoche einheitlich zu schildern und sich auf diesem Wege der in der Forschung vorhandenen Neigung zur fragmentarischen Darstellung entgegenzusetzen. Der Kalte Krieg müsse in den Verlauf des Ost-Welt-Konflikts eingebettet werden, dessen Wurzeln bis in die Mitte des 19. Jh. zurückreichen. Er war durch

einen totalen und allumfassenden Charakter gekennzeichnet und wirkte sich auf die beteiligten Gesellschaften bis in den Alltag hinein aus. Dieser Auseinandersetzung war nicht nur die Bipolarität, sondern auch die Multipolarität eigen – jenseits der Politik der beiden Großmächte wurde auch innerhalb diverser supranationaler Subsysteme gehandelt. Schließlich zeichnete sich der Kalte Krieg durch Differenzierung und Pluralität aus, woraus laut dem Autor die Notwendigkeit resultiere, seine Geschichte so zu schildern, dass sich „alle Beteiligten in angemessener Weise erkennen können“ (S. 27), eine Aussage, der m. E. nur mit Vorbehalt zugestimmt werden kann.

Nach dieser methodischen Verortung wird auf mehr als 400 Seiten der Verlauf des Kalten Krieges geschildert. Dies geschieht entlang der gängigen Linien dieses Konflikts, der sich bis 1961 vor allem in Europa abspielte, danach in die Dritte Welt verlagert wurde, um in den 1980er Jahren wieder in den alten Kontinent zurückzukehren. Ergänzend dazu werden in einzelnen Kapiteln die Haltung der jeweiligen Gesellschaften, der Stellenwert der Kultur – dieser „universalen Waffe im Kalten Krieg“ (S. 278), worunter auch die Religionen subsumiert werden – thematisiert sowie die Sozialpolitik als „einer der Schauplätze der Systemkonkurrenz“ (S. 305) besprochen.

Dabei ist vieles von dem, was dargeboten wird, dem kundigen Leser bekannt. Offensichtlich fühlte sich der Vf. verpflichtet, Einzelheiten über die Gründung zahlreicher militärischer Pakte resp. Organisationen wiederzugeben, die Entstehung der jeweiligen Waffengattungen zu schildern und an den Verlauf einzelner Krisen zu erinnern. Leider gerät dadurch die Darstellung streckenweise zu einem trockenen Aneinanderreihen von Fakten und Daten. Lesenswert wirkt das Buch dagegen bei der Schilderung der Entwicklung jenseits des europäischen Schauplatzes – etwa im Mittleren Osten oder in Afrika. Hier gelingt es dem Vf., überzeugend das Wechselspiel der beiden Supermächte und das Lavieren der kleineren Staaten zwischen den Fronten des Kalten Krieges zu zeigen, so zum Beispiel im Falle des Irak (S. 413 ff.). Das Gleiche gilt für die Beschreibung der langfristigen Folgen der Intervention der Sowjetunion in Afghanistan und der darauf folgenden Unterstützung der Amerikaner für die Mudschaheddins (S. 410 ff.), die vor allem in der Feindschaft der dortigen Machthaber sowohl dem Osten als auch dem Westen gegenüber sichtbar wurden. Auf einige Deutungen bzw. Interpretationen sollte an dieser Stelle näher eingegangen werden. Als gelungen kann die Schilderung des atomaren Wettlaufs zwischen den Großmächten bezeichnet werden, bei der mit Recht auf die Jahre nach 1958, als die Sowjetunion sich „so stark wie nie zuvor“ präsentierte (S. 132), verstärkt eingegangen wird. Ergänzend dazu wird auf breitem Raum der Umgang der einzelnen Gesellschaften mit den Gefahren und dem Nutzen der Nuklearenergie thematisiert (Kap. 6). Des Weiteren ist die Bewertung der so genannten Entwicklungshilfe

erwähnenswert, die laut Vf. aus machtpolitischen Erwägungen resultierte und eine „schlagkräftige Waffe“ der Akteure im Kalten Krieg darstellte (S. 105, ähnlich S. 314). Dementsprechend bedeutete das Ende des Konflikts ihre Einstellung, was gravierende Folgen für die armen Regionen der Welt hatte: Die 1990er Jahre wurden zu einem „Jahrzehnt einer verheerenden Armutskrise“ (S. 473). Schließlich war die von den beiden Blöcken zeitweise betriebene Entspannungspolitik nie ein Selbstzweck, sondern immer ein Versuch, die verlorene Balance wiederzuerlangen und die Zeit für den Ausbau der zugelassenen Waffengattungen zu nutzen (S. 465).

Mit der Machtergreifung Gorbatschows begann die Endphase des Kalten Krieges. Dabei bewertet Stöver den außenpolitischen Rückzug der Sowjetunion als „eine finanzpolitische Entlastungsmaßnahme“, die das System lediglich regenerieren sollte (S. 441). Das Ende des Ostblocks sieht der Vf. im Zusammenspiel von internen Schwächen der kommunistischen Staaten, externen militärischen Herausforderungen und der im Zuge der Entspannungspolitik durch den Westen betriebenen kulturellen Infiltration (S. 467 f.). Letztendlich war das glückliche Ende des Kalten Krieges „ein historischer Zufall“ (S. 470) und basierte zum großen Teil auf der Bereitschaft der Hauptakteure, die gegenseitige verzerrte Wahrnehmung zu revidieren (ebd.). Umfassend beschäftigt sich der Vf. ebenfalls mit den Folgeerscheinungen des Kalten Krieges. Zu ihnen gehören die politische Neuordnung der ehemaligen Zentren des Konflikts (vor allem Ostmitteleuropas), die militärische Neuorganisation, neue Positionierung der ehemaligen Peripherien (vor allem der Staaten in Asien) und der

Versuch der USA, eine neue Weltordnung zu schaffen (S. 471 ff.).

Auf einige Defizite der Arbeit ist hinzuweisen. Beunruhigend wirkt das Fehlen einer klaren Aussage, dass der Kalte Krieg einen Konflikt zwischen freiheitlichem Lebensentwurf und Diktaturen darstellte. Stattdessen ist die Neigung des Vf. sichtbar, die Unterschiede zwischen den beiden Blöcken, insbesondere zwischen West- und Ostdeutschland, zu nivellieren. Darüber hinaus treten in der Arbeit Sachfehler auf. So wurde z. B. 1946 in der Sowjetunion nicht die Katholische Kirche durch die Zwangsvereinigung mit der Russisch-Orthodoxen Kirche aufgelöst (S. 292), sondern die Ukrainische Griechisch-Katholische Kirche zur Fusion mit der Russisch-Orthodoxen Kirche gezwungen. Der Vf. erwähnt nicht, dass den unmittelbaren Auslöser für die Gründung des Warschauer Pakts die Aufnahme Westdeutschlands in die NATO bildete (S. 100); Edward Gierek war nicht der polnische Premierminister (S. 426 f.), sondern Erster Sekretär der Kommunistischen Partei. Auf den 26. Oktober 1989, den Tag, an dem sich Ungarn zur Republik erklärte, fiel nicht der Jahrestag des sowjetischen Einmarsches 1956, sondern der Jahrestag des Volksaufstandes vom selben Jahr.

Insgesamt hinterlässt die Arbeit einen zwiespältigen Eindruck. Sie beeindruckt durch die globale Sichtweise und die Fähigkeit, aus den zahlreichen Aspekten des Weltgeschehens diejenigen herauszudestillieren, die mit der Auseinandersetzung der beiden Großmächte zu tun hatten. Auch die Verortung der Vorgeschichte vieler heutiger Konflikte in den Gegebenheiten des Kalten Krieges gehört zu ihren Stärken. Andererseits werden gerade die zentralen

Aspekte der Auseinandersetzung in einer wenig innovativen und ansprechenden Art und Weise präsentiert.

Anmerkung:

- 1 B. Stöver, Die Befreiung vom Kommunismus. Amerikanische Liberation Policy im Kalten Krieg 1947–1991, Köln 2002. Zur Bewertung des Buches siehe meine Rezension in: Osteuropa (2006) 5, S. 176–178.

Jonathan D. Smele / Anthony Heywood (Hrsg.): The Russian Revolution of 1905. Centenary perspectives (= Routledge Studies in Modern European History, Bd. 9), London: Routledge 2005, 284 S.

Rezensiert von
Lutz Häfner, Bielefeld / Gießen

Dieser aus Anlass des einhundertjährigen Jubiläums der Russischen Revolution von 1905 erschienene Sammelband enthält vierzehn Beiträge von Autoren aus sechs Ländern. Sie thematisieren eine beträchtliche Bandbreite: Angefangen von den Aspekten Terror und Gewalt über die bedeutende Agrarfrage in den europäischen Gouvernements, die Loyalitätsprobleme und Meutereien der russischen Armee in der Mandschurei, die nationale Frage unter den Tataren in Kazan' und Ufa bis hin zur großen historischen Persönlichkeit in ihrem Verhältnis zur Revolution von 1905 am Beispiel von Lenin und Trockij. Ähnlich vielfältig sind die methodischen Ansätze: Psychohistorisch im Beitrag von Anna Geifman über Radikalismus und

Terrorismus 1905, sozialhistorisch z.B. bei Antti Kujala oder Franziska Schedewie, die ethnokonfessionelle Dimension untersuchend wie in Michael Hamms Artikel über „Jews and revolution in Kharkiv: how one Ukrainian city escaped a pogrom in 1905“, politikgeschichtlich bei Shmuel Galais' Erörterung der Rolle der Konstitutionellen Demokraten in der I. Staatsduma und historiographisch bei Ian D. Thatchers Aufsatz über Trockij und das Jahr 1905. Der zeitliche Rahmen beschränkt sich keineswegs ausschließlich auf die revolutionären Ereignisse, sondern reicht vom ausgehenden 19. Jh. bis zur Russischen Revolution 1917. Geographisch erfassen die Beiträge Finnland und das Baltikum im Norden, Voronež, Char'kov und Kiev im Süden, Kazan' und die Mandscherei im (Fernen) Osten und im Westen sogar die Auswirkungen der russischen Revolution auf die Bevölkerung Englands (David Saunders „The 1905 Revolution on Tyne-side“).

Die zentralen Akteure der Revolution von 1905 werden gebührend gewürdigt. Die Beiträge von Beryl Williams („1905: the view from the provinces“) und Franziska Schedewie („Peasant protest and peasant violence in 1905: Voronezh province, Ostrogozhskii uezd“) thematisieren die Bauernschaft. Williams nimmt einen „optimistischen“ Standpunkt ein und verdeutlicht, dass Agrarunruhen keineswegs durch blanke materielle Not motiviert waren. Vielmehr folgten die Bauern der Ratio eines „bargaining by riot“, das sich aus ihrer Sicht lohnte, da der Staat 1902/3 auf eine Begleichung der Steuerrückstände verzichtet und in den beiden folgenden Jahren die Loskaufzahlungen beendet hatte. Zwar spielten steigende Getreidepreise

auf dem Weltmarkt eine Rolle, an denen der russländische Adel partizipieren wollte und deshalb weniger Land verpachtete. Dadurch wurde die den Bauern zu Verfügung stehende Anbaufläche verkleinert, doch nutzten die Bauern in der Revolution die Schwäche des Staates aus und erreichten eine Reduktion der Pachtpreise (S. 35-40). Diese „revisionistischen“ Überlegungen greift Schedewie auf, die aufgrund der detaillierten, mikrohistorischen Analyse zu dem Ergebnis kommt, dass die bäuerlichen Unruhen 1905 nicht auf revolutionären Motiven basierten. Vielmehr seien ihre Aktionen ein sozialer Protest gegen die Folgen der Modernisierung gewesen (S. 138, 144-148).

Einem zentralen kollektiven Akteur, der Armee, ist der Beitrag Oleg Ajrapetovs gewidmet. Er beschäftigt sich mit dem Desintegrationsprozess der russischen Streitkräfte in der Mandscherei im Frühjahr 1905, insbesondere im Kontext der Schlacht von Mukden. Zwar spielte die Demoralisierung der Armee eine entscheidende Rolle in der politischen Krise im Herbst des Jahres. Doch erwies sich die Armee, wie die Ereignisse des Jahres 1906 zeigen sollten, letztlich als Garant des Ancien régime, weil es energischen Generälen wie A. N. Meller-Zakomel'skij oder P. K. fon Rennenkampf gelang, mit ihren brutalen Strafexpeditionen Erfolge gegen den „inneren Feind“ zu erringen, die ihnen gegen den äußeren versagt geblieben waren. Drei Beiträge thematisieren am Beispiel des Baltikums, Finnlands und des Wolga-Uralgebiets die ethnokonfessionellen Minderheiten des Imperiums in der Revolution. Christian Noack („Retrospectively revolting: Kazan Tatar „conspiracies“ during the 1905 Revolution“) betont, dass die

Tataren in Kazan' und Ufa während der Revolution kein systemdestabilisierendes Potential dargestellt und keine separatistische Bestrebungen verfolgt hätten. Ihr politisches Engagement habe sie in aller Regel dem liberalen Lager zugeführt. Erst die Politik Stolypins, seine beharrliche Weigerung politischer Zugeständnisse, vor allem aber eine von den zarischen Behörden konstruierte panislamistische Verschwörungstheorie habe die Muslime dem Zarenreich entfremdet und – wie die Ereignisse von 1917 lehren sollten – radikalisiert. Ähnlich argumentiert auch Kujala in seinem Aufsatz "Finland in 1905: the political and social history of the revolution". Erst die Beschränkung angestammter gesellschaftlicher und politischer Freiräume sowie eine damit einhergehende Russifizierungspolitik unter der Ägide des Generalgouverneurs N. I. Bobrikov seit 1899 habe den Widerstand der finnischen Bevölkerung gegen das Ancien régime hervorgerufen. Allerdings verdeutlicht der Verfasser, dass die soziale und nationale Bewegung keinesfalls identisch gewesen seien. Komplexer gestaltete sich, wie James D. White in seinem Aufsatz „The 1905 Revolution in Russia's Baltic provinces“ ausführt, die Lage in den drei nordwestlichen Gouvernements. Hier handelte es sich nicht um eine bipolare Konstellation, waren doch neben den Russen sowie den drei Titularnationen, Esten, Letten und Litauer, auch noch die jeweiligen regionalen Eliten, Deutsche und Polen, involviert. Hinzu kam, dass die soziale und nationale Bewegung eng mit einander verknüpft waren. Allerdings gilt es hier, zwischen den drei Gebieten zu differenzieren. Die Politisierung durch die sozialistische Bewegung war unter den Letten deutlich weiter ent-

wickelt als unter den Esten, während der Katholizismus in Litauen eher mäßigend auf revolutionäre Tendenzen wirkte. Während Kujala für Finnland hervorhebt, dass es hier einer politischen Partei gelungen sei, die Revolution zu steuern (S. 88), dekonstruiert der Beitrag von Williams (S. 41) die Bedeutung politischer Parteien in der Revolution von 1905.

Eine bemerkenswerte archivalische Quelle lag dem Beitrag von Anthony Heywood „Socialists, liberals and the Union of Unions in Kyiv during the 1905 Revolution: an engineer's perspective“ zugrunde. Im Mittelpunkt seiner Betrachtungen stehen die Erinnerungen des russischen Professors am Kiever Polytechnikum Ju. V. Lomonosov, dessen Nachlass sich im russischen Archiv der Universität Leeds befindet. Wenngleich erst aus der Retrospektive des westeuropäischen Exils geschrieben, betrachtet Heywood ihn selbst in zahlreichen Details als einen sehr verlässlichen Augenzeugen der Kiever revolutionären Ereignisse. Der 1905 erst relativ spät konstituierte lokale „Verband der Verbände“ [Sojuz sojuzov] habe eigentlich keine führende Rolle gespielt und sich durch die geringe Radikalität seiner Forderungen deutlich von der St. Petersburger Organisation unterschieden. Taktische Differenzen, insbesondere seine Ablehnung der Gewalt schon vor dem Oktobermanifest 1905, habe in Kiev eine gedeihliche Zusammenarbeit zwischen Liberalen und Sozialisten erschwert, obwohl sich beispielsweise der Führer der Kiever bol'seviki, A. G. Šlichter, wiederholt um eine Allianz bemüht habe (S. 186-191).

Konzeptionell ähnlich unbefriedigend wie seine Monographie über die Stadt Kiev ist M. F. Hamms Beitrag zur Stadt Char'kov,

die im Gegensatz zu vielen anderen Städten Russlands und insbesondere der Ukraine nach dem Oktobermanifest 1905 keinen Pogrom erlebte. Wohl zeigt er die Entwicklung der jüdischen Gemeinde von ihren Anfängen zur Mitte des 19. Jahrhunderts bis zum Ersten Weltkrieg. Ebenso behandelt er die politische Ausdifferenzierung der städtischen Bevölkerung, würdigt die Bedeutung der Eisenbahner und der sozialistischen Parteien für die Organisation der Selbstverteidigungseinheiten. Hamm verlässt dann jedoch die städtische Mikroebene um sich in komparatistischer Perspektive über strukturelle Elemente ethnisch motivierter Gewalt von Indien über die USA sowie den ukrainischen Städten Kiev und Odessa auszulassen, ohne aber deutlich zu analysieren, aus welchen Gründen hier ein Pogrom abgewendet wurde: Wie war es zu erklären, dass es Soldaten und Arbeitermilizen gelang, die Pogromaktivisten zu zerstreuen? Offen bleibt, wie und warum es zu dieser Kooperation kam. Hamm erweckt den Anschein, dass vieles der großen historischen Persönlichkeit, vor allem dem Generalgouverneur K. S. Starynkevič geschuldet gewesen sei. Leider versäumt er es, dem Leser zu erklären, warum Starynkevič inmitten der Oktoberereignisse 1905 abberufen wurde. Insgesamt stellt der vorliegende facettenreiche Sammelband mit seiner gelungenen Balance einerseits zentraler, andererseits auch vermeintlich „exotischer“ Beiträge – z. B. von David Saunders – eine willkommene Ergänzung des Schrifttums zur Russischen Revolution dar.

Christine Haug: Reisen und Lesen im Zeitalter der Industrialisierung. Die Geschichte des Bahnhof- und Verkehrsbuchhandels in Deutschland von seinen Anfängen um 1850 bis zum Ende der Weimarer Republik (= Schriften und Zeugnisse zur Buchgeschichte, Bd. 17), Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag 2007. 415 S.

Rezensiert von
Martin C. Wald, Braunschweig

Hertel erlebte. Er griff nach seiner Brust, nach seiner Brieftasche. Sie war fort. Er fühlte sein Herz nicht mehr schlagen, und griff noch einmal nach der Stelle, wo die Brieftasche, wo die zwanzigtausend Taler sein mußten. [...] Der Fremde war fort [...] Der Zug hielt; die Schaffner und Wärter sprangen an die Schläge der Coupés, rissen sie auf und riefen: „Station K, fünfzehn Minuten Aufenthalt!“ In den jungen Kaufmann kehrte das Bewußtsein zurück. [...] „Dieser zweite Passagier, Wärter –“ „Er ist nicht mehr da – Teufel – er kann noch nicht ausgestiegen sein. Der Zug hält ja erst in diesem Augenblicke. Wo ist er geblieben?“¹

Im selben Moment, als die Eisenbahn die Aura des Neuen und Sensationellen verlor, trat die Reiselangeweile in die Welt. Und mit ihr eine „besondere, stimulierende Angstlust“ (S. 116), die Walter Benjamin viel später in einem kleinen Essay zum Kriminalroman beschreiben sollte.² Und mit den ersten speziellen durch den Bahnhofsbuchhandel verkauften Literaturprodukten für die Eisenbahn traten sofort die

Wächter im Kampf gegen „Schmutz und Schund“ auf den Plan, die hierin, „auf die große Masse des kaufenden Publicums speculirend“ (Ernst Eckstein 1876, S. 65), eine besondere Gefahr für die Sittlichkeit erkennen wollten. Unwissentlich reproduzierte selbst ein Sigmund Freud diese Stereotype, wenn er in seinem Beitrag „Die infantile Sexualität“ (1904/05) von einem Zusammenhang zwischen rhythmischer Erschütterung in der Eisenbahn und sexuellen Fantasien ausging. Der hohe Absatz pornografischer Literatur im Bahnhofsbuchhandel ließ sich auf diese Weise trefflich erklären.

Die Kulturgeschichte der Reiselektüre ist spannend, aber nur ein Teilaspekt von Christine Haugsbuchgeschichtlicher Mainzer Habilitationsschrift von 2003, die einen Bogen spannt von der Geschichte des Reisens (Kap. 2) und der sich wandelnden sozialen Praxis des Lesens auf Reisen (Kap. 3) über eine Rekonstruktion reisespezifischer Publikations- und Vertriebsformen (Kap. 4) bis hin zur Geschichte des Bahnhof- und Verkehrsbuchhandels bis 1914 (Kap. 5), im Ersten Weltkrieg (Kap. 6) und in der Weimarer Republik (Kap. 7), sowie zum Zensurgeschehen, das im 8. Kapitel am Beispiel der gelegentlich von der Eisenbahnverwaltung ausgehenden Verweise des „Kladderatsch“ und des „Simplicissimus“ vom Bahngelände sowie der Auseinandersetzungen der Branche mit dem sittlichkeitsbewegten „Dürerbund“ beschrieben wird.

Das zweite Kapitel stellt knapp einführend nicht nur die Expansion des Eisenbahnverkehrs im 19. Jh., sondern auch der Tourismusbranche – vor allem des Bäderbetriebes – in Deutschland dar. Um 1900 wurde der Dampfschiffbetrieb wichtiger

– speziell auf den Transatlantikklinien auch als zweites Standbein des Verkehrsbuchhandels.

Die Entwicklung von der Außergewöhnlichkeit zur Gewöhnlichkeit des Reisens im 19. Jahrhundert ist, so Haug im faszinierenden dritten Kapitel, notwendige Voraussetzung für die Erfolgsgeschichte des Lesens auf Reisen. Glasscheiben lösten allmählich in allen Klassen die schweren, verdunkelnden Ledervorhänge über den Fensteröffnungen ab, Wachskerzen und Rüböllampen wurden in den 1860er Jahren durch die zehnmal helleren Gaslampen, in den 1890er Jahren durch das beständigere und ruhigere Licht elektrischer Glühbirnen ersetzt. Mit zunehmender Geschwindigkeit der Züge verlor nicht nur der Blick auf die Landschaft seinen Reiz, es bildeten sich auch nicht mehr wie in der Postkutsche Reisegesellschaften. Vielmehr hatte man es mit von Station zu Station wechselnden Mitreisenden zu tun: Dies bedeutete das Ende der Reiseunterhaltung. In erster Linie feuilletoneske – „flüchtige“ – Lektüre füllte die Lücke. Bis in den 1870er Jahren der in den USA längst übliche Durchgangswagen eingeführt wurde, verbrachten die Passagiere die Fahrt in gänzlicher Abgeschiedenheit in Coupés nach dem Vorbild der Postkutsche. Es entstand die lustvolle Angst vor dem Eisenbahnmörder. Erich Kästners Emil Tischbein hatte 1929 wenigstens schon die Möglichkeit, seine 140 Mark angesichts seines wenig Vertrauen erweckenden Mitreisenden Herrn Grundeis auf der Zugtoilette an das Anzugfutter zu nähen³, der bleiche Kaufmann Hertel in der eingangs zitierten beliebten Kriminalerzählung des Politikers und Kriminalautors J. D. H. Temme hatte dieselben

Vorsichtsmaßregeln für seine 20.000 Taler bereits im Voraus treffen müssen – beide wie bekannt umsonst.

In der Geschichte der Eisenbahn- und Reiselektüre sind, wie aus dem vierten Kapitel hervorgeht, drei Phasen zu unterscheiden: Bis in die 1870er Jahre thematisierte die Reiselektüre meist die Reise selbst, so in Form von Reisebeschreibungen oder Reisegeschichten. Die vom Verlag Gregor Heinrich Albert Hoffmann in Berlin dem Kladderadatsch für die „Humoristische Eisenbahn- und Reise-Bibliothek“ entnommenen Figuren Schultze und Müller, die ihre Abenteuer am Rhein, in Paris, Wien oder „unter den Zulu-Kaffern“ erlebten, waren so erfolgreich, dass sie vielfach plagierte wurden. Das Programm der bei Brockhaus verlegten „Reisebibliothek für Eisenbahn und Dampfschiffe“ enthielt Titel wie Levin Schückings „Eine Eisenbahnfahrt durch Westfalen“ oder Willibald Alexis' „Reise-Pitaval“. „Reihen“ waren insgesamt kostengünstiger zu bewerben und durch einheitliche, auffällige Einbandgestaltung von den Reisenden besser wiederzuerkennen. In einer zweiten Phase bis etwa 1900 wurden diese Reisereihen ganz allmählich durch allgemeine belletristische Reihen abgelöst, die auch an Nichtreisende das Angebot machten, sich eine kostengünstige, praktische Unterhaltungsbibliothek für den Hausgebrauch zusammenzustellen. Führend waren hier die Verlage Adolf Kröner in Stuttgart mit der Reihe „Sorgenlose Stunden im Kreise beliebter Erzähler“ und das Leipziger Unternehmen Reclam, dessen offene und in einzelnen Heften verkaufte „Universal-Bibliothek“ sich sowohl für den Sortiments- als auch für den Bahnhofsbuchhandel eignete. Eine eigene Reclam-Reiseserie „Unterhaltungs-Bibli-

othek für Reise und Haus“ (1899–1901) rentierte sich gegenüber dieser bereits erfolgreich eingeführten Marke nicht mehr. In einer dritten Phase schließlich lösten die Zeitungen und Zeitschriften (vor allem die „Illustrierten“) die Bücher als Leitmedien auf Reisen – und zunehmend auch in den Vorortzügen und Untergrundbahnen – ab. Erst mit der Verdrängung des Zeitungsabonnements durch den Einzelverkauf um 1900 konnte der Bahnhofsbuchhandel an dieser rasanten Entwicklung teilhaben.

Der Hauptteil des Buches (S. 135–323) gehört der Darstellung der Bahnhofs- und Verkehrsbuchhandelsgeschichte. Haug dehnt die „Gründungsphase“ der Branche weit bis etwa 1905 aus. In dieser Phase dominierten die Auseinandersetzungen mit dem etablierten Sortimentsbuchhandel vor allem um die Ladenöffnungszeiten, nach Haug ein „unlösbarer Konflikt“ zwischen den Teilbranchen (S. 183). Die Regelungen waren von Teilstaat zu Teilstaat und von Bahnhof zu Bahnhof diffizil und uneinheitlich, aber die Tendenz ging eindeutig vom Verkauf innerhalb zum Verkauf auch außerhalb der Bahnsteigsperrre und an Sonntagen. Eine noch weitergehende Öffnung ließ aber, als nach 1920 der durch Invaliden und Erwerbslose ausgeübte Straßenhandel auf Bahnhofsvorplätzen von den Stadtoberen zunehmend geduldet wurde, den Verkehrsbuchhandel selbst unter Druck geraten. Die Gründungsphase sah auch den Aufstieg größerer Verkehrsbuchhandelsunternehmen in Deutschland. Der Berliner Buchhändler Georg Stilke war mit seinem Imperium, zu dem bald auch Bücherautomaten, Schiffsbuchhandlungen, Kioske im Nahverkehr und an Straßenkreuzungen sowie ein Verlag (in dem Maximilian Hardens

„Zukunft“ erschien) gehören sollten, eine „prototypische Unternehmerpersönlichkeit der Jahrhundertwende“ (S. 162). Sein Sohn Hermann expandierte 1924 sogar in die Vereinigten Staaten. Entsprechend der föderalen Gliederung Deutschlands war auch die Organisation des Bücher- und Presseverkaufs dezentral organisiert, und doch konnte Stille seine wirtschaftliche Stellung durch Kooperationen mit ähnlich operierenden Unternehmen wie Jacques Bettenhausen (in Sachsen) und Bangel & Schmitt (in Baden) kontinuierlich ausbauen. Bis zum Ausbruch des Ersten Weltkrieges folgte eine kurze „Konsolidierungsphase“ der Branche, die durch solche Monopolbildungen und den brancheninternen Widerstand gegen die jene bevorzugende Ausschreibungspraxis der Eisenbahnverwaltungen gekennzeichnet war. 1905 wurde in Leipzig eine Ständesvertretung der Verkehrs- und Bahnhofsbuchhändler und das Fachorgan „Der Bahnhofsbuchhandel“ gegründet, dessen Redakteur im Abstand von zwei Wochen kaum immer über Neues zu berichten wusste, „denn der Beruf des Bahnhofsbuchhändlers ist an sich und für sich ein ruhiger, allen Emotionen abgeneigter“ (S. 171). Aus dieser Ruhe schreckte der Erste Weltkrieg auf, und doch gelang es den größeren Unternehmen, die massiven Verluste des Bahnhofsbuchhandels durch die Einrichtung von Feldbuchhandlungen weitgehend aufzufangen. Die Branche war einer ökonomischen Stagnation erst in der folgenden „Phase einer fortschreitenden Professionalisierung und Internationalisierung“ ausgesetzt, die außerdem von Lohnstreit und Sozialisierungsplänen auf der einen und einer Reform der als unberechenbar empfundenen Pachtbestim-

mungen hin zum dynamischen Pachtzins auf der anderen Seite gekennzeichnet war. Gabriele Haug ist die definitive Gesamtdarstellung zum deutschen Bahnhof- und Verkehrsbuchhandel bis 1933 gelungen. Das Buch füllt damit eine Lücke, die von buchwissenschaftlich einschlägigen Forschungen zu literarischen Produktionsbedingungen und Distributionsstrukturen im Lese-Zeitalter noch gelassen worden war.⁴ Zahlreiche Anknüpfungspunkte bieten Haugs Ansätze zu internationalen Vergleichsperspektiven (S. 75–80; S. 139–144; S. 162–170). Wann und inwieweit ein von Haug (S. 366) vorgeschlagenes Folgeprojekt zur bibliographischen Erfassung des Textkorpus „Reiselektüre“ umgesetzt werden kann, sollte mit Spannung und Unterstützung verfolgt werden.

Anmerkungen:

- 1 J. D. H. Temme, Auf der Eisenbahn (1857), in: H.-O. Hügel (Hrsg.), Die Leiche auf der Eisenbahn. Detektivgeschichten aus deutschen Familienzeitschriften, Darmstadt 1981, S. 7–69, hier: S. 15 f.
- 2 W. Benjamin, Kriminalromane auf Reisen, in: ders., Gesammelte Schriften, Bd. IV/1, Kleine Prosa, hrsg. von R. Tiedemann, H. Schweppenhäuser, Frankfurt am Main 1980, S. 381–383.
- 3 E. Kästner, Emil und die Detektive, 3. Kapitel.
- 4 Zu nennen wären u.a. A. Martino, Die deutsche Leihbibliothek, Wiesbaden 1990; G. Scheidt, Der deutsche Kolportagebuchhandel 1869–1905, Stuttgart 1994; G. Jäger (Hrsg.), Geschichte des deutschen Buchhandels im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert, bislang 2 Teilbände (zum Kaiserreich) Frankfurt am Main 2001, 2003. Weitere Bände des im Auftrag des Börsenvereins des Deutschen Buchhandels von der Historischen Kommission herausgegebenen Handbuchs sind in Vorbereitung.

**Volker R. Berghahn / Sigurt Vitols
(Hrsg.): Gibt es einen deutschen
Kapitalismus? Tradition und globale
Perspektiven der sozialen Markt-
wirtschaft, Frankfurt am Main:
Campus 2006, 229 S.**

Rezensiert von
Manuel Schramm, Chemnitz

Manche Bücher veralten schnell. Dieser Vorwurf, den frühere Historiker gern sozialwissenschaftlichen Publikationen machten, scheint nun auch Teile des historischen Büchermarktes zu treffen. Der vorliegende Sammelband beispielsweise geht auf ein Kolloquium von Juni 2005 zurück und wirkt auf den ersten Blick dennoch etwas angestaubt. Er spiegelt selbst in den optimistischeren Beiträgen über die Zukunft des „rheinischen Kapitalismus“ die damalige als krisenhaft wahrgenommene ökonomische Situation der Bundesrepublik wider, die danach zwischenzeitlich einem überraschend starken Aufschwung Platz gemacht hatte.

Gleichwohl ist natürlich die zugrunde liegende Frage nach den strukturellen Stärken und Schwächen des „deutschen Modells“, wenn es denn eines gibt, von großem wissenschaftlichem und politischem Interesse. Die Titelfrage dürfte ohne weiteres zu den Top Ten der FAQs (frequently asked questions) in der deutschen Wirtschaftsgeschichte gehören. Beantwortet wird sie freilich nicht, und es wäre wohl auch vermessen, dies von dem vorliegenden Band zu erwarten. Manche Beiträge kommen immerhin der Erkenntnis ziemlich nah,

dass die Frage falsch gestellt ist – und das ist schon viel.

Doch der Reihe nach. Das erwähnte Kolloquium des Wissenschaftszentrums Berlin hatte sich zunächst das Ziel gesetzt, Historiker und Sozialwissenschaftler aus verschiedenen Ländern in einen Dialog zu bringen, um damit disziplinäre wie nationale Mauern abzubauen, eine gerade in Berlin beliebte Aufgabe. Der Band versammelt 14 Autoren aus der Geschichtswissenschaft, Soziologie, Politikwissenschaft und den Wirtschaftswissenschaften, darunter so bekannte Namen wie Volker Berghahn, Jürgen Kocka, Mary Nolan, Werner Abelshauser und David Soskice. Im Kern geht es in allen Beiträgen erstens um die Frage, ob und inwieweit sich die bundesdeutsche Wirtschaft nach 1945 amerikanisierte, oder ob sie ihre institutionellen Besonderheiten konservierte, und zweitens ob sie den aktuellen Herausforderungen (Stichwort Globalisierung) noch gewachsen ist. Hier lassen sich „Optimisten“ und „Pessimisten“ unterscheiden und in der Tat liegen die Positionen teilweise weit auseinander, wie Jürgen Kocka in seiner Einleitung ebenso irritiert wie treffend konstatiert (S. 13). Allerdings ist diese Debatte nicht neu und auch die meisten der hier versammelten Autoren haben sich an anderer Stelle ausführlich dazu geäußert.

Warum ist dem Band dennoch eine zahlreiche Leserschaft zu wünschen? Aus drei Gründen: Erstens fassen hier wichtige Protagonisten der Debatte ihre Grundpositionen noch einmal zusammen (z. B. Abelshauser, Berghahn, Soskice). Zweitens versuchen einige Beiträge, die Frage zu differenzieren, indem sie die zugrunde liegenden Modelle historisieren (z. B. Nolan, Vitols). Drittens schließlich ist

der Versuch originell und lobenswert, die neueren Forschungen über Konsum einzubeziehen, was zu gemischten Ergebnissen führt. Während z. B. Michael Prinz die langfristigen Annäherungsprozesse zwischen Deutschland und den USA betont, sieht Christian Kleinschmidt in der von staatlicher Seite angestoßenen Institutionalisierung des Verbraucherschutzes in der Bundesrepublik ein typisches Beispiel für „rheinischen Kapitalismus“. Hier besteht noch Forschungsbedarf.

So bleibt am Ende nur ein Wunsch offen, nämlich dass die Debatte in Zukunft neben der mittlerweile unbestrittenen Prozesshaftigkeit der Amerikanisierung und Globalisierung auch die Historizität des „deutschen Modells“ in Rechnung stellen und konsequenterweise nicht von einem starren Modell, sondern von flexiblen Prozessen der Nationalisierung sprechen möge, die mit Amerikanisierungs- und anderen Transnationalisierungsprozessen in sehr unterschiedlicher Weise interagierten. Diese Erhöhung des Reflexionsniveaus täte der Debatte gut und wäre geeignet, voreilige pauschale Schlüsse zu vermeiden, von denen leider auch der vorliegende Band nicht immer frei ist.

**Luke Springman: Carpe mundum.
German Youth Culture of the
Weimar Republic (= Kinder- und Ju-
gendkultur, -literatur und -medien,
Bd. 50), Frankfurt am Main:
Peter-Lang-Verlag 2007, 299 S.**

Rezensiert von
Friedemann Scriba, Berlin

Der Band versammelt acht eigenständige, essayhafte Kapitel, die einzelne Phänomene der Jugenddiskurse der Weimarer Zeit berühren, aber eher locker miteinander verknüpft sind und im Leser eher assoziative Überschneidungen wecken. Leitmotivisch tritt eine holistische deutsche Naturphilosophie als mentalitätsgeschichtliche Grundstruktur sowohl bei Erwachsenen als auch bei Jugendlichen der Epoche immer wieder auf.

In der Einleitung hebt Springman das Zensurgesetz von 1926 hervor, in dem sich der Kanon des erzieherischen Denkens für die Jugend und vor-faschistischer Regulierungsdrang trafen. Vor diesem Hintergrund spielten sich auch die – industriell z. T. unterstützen – Bestrebungen Jugendlicher nach einer eigenen, vermeintlich altersgerechten „Welt“ ab. In der Weimarer Zeit seien erziehende Erwachsene mit einer Prägung noch durch das 19. Jh. und Jugend als erste wirklich moderne Generation zusammengetroffen. Drei Hauptmerkmale konturierten die Situation von Jugend in der Weimarer Zeit: 1. Das Aufwachsen in definierten politischen bzw.

ideologischen Lagern, 2. ein durch die Naturphilosophie des 19. Jahrhunderts geformter und weitergeführter holistischer Denkstil und 3. das erstmalige Entstehen einer eigenen Jugendsphäre mit neuen Formen intergenerationeller Interaktion. In den ersten drei Kapiteln agieren Erwachsene gegenüber Jugendlichen. Die klassengesellschaftliche Perzeption von Sexualität im späten Kaiserreich habe zu Publikationen geführt, die ein „preußisches Körperideal“ (heroisch, aber asketisch) propagiert hätten, ehe in der Weimarer Zeit durch Impulse der Reformpädagogik und der Abtreibungsdiskussion die politisch gegensätzlichen Positionen in der öffentlichen Diskussion sichtbar geworden wären. Von Wedekinds „Frühlings Erwachen“ bis zu Wilhelm Reichs „Der sexuelle Kampf der Jugend“ reicht die Palette der angesprochenen Titel. Diese zeigt den literarischen Trend, in dem sich solche Diskurse weg von der Familien- und Sittenorientierung hin zu Jugendlichen und ihren Befindlichkeiten selbst verlagert hätten. Im zweiten Kapitel interpretiert Springman die Schmutz-und-Schund-Kampagne von 1926, indem er die Zensur in Diskurse der Pädagogisierung einordnet und auf das preußisch-kaiserzeitliche Erbe sowie auf die konsequente Weiterführung der Zensurpolitik einschließlich der anti-amerikanisch-kulturkritischen Stoßrichtung verweist. Im dritten Kapitel fußt er auf Habermas' normativer und holismus-kritischer „Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns“ und analysiert Werke wie Flex' „Der Wanderer zwischen beiden Welten“, Bonsels' „Die Biene Maja“ und Löns' „Der Wehrwolf“ auf unterschiedlichen Methoden der Pädagogisierung des Kriegserlebnisses als mentale Militarisierung hin.

In den folgenden Kapiteln stellt Springman bewusst auf Jugendliche und ihre Lebenswelt bezogene Publikationen in unterschiedlicher Intensität dar. In Kapitel 4 konstatiert er das Fehlen jüdischer Identitätsdiskurse und die Dominanz organisistischer Topoi in den historischen Jugendbüchern der deutsch-jüdischer Autoren Speyer, Zweig und Lask. In Kapitel 5 werden verschiedene Jugendmagazine diskutiert, wobei der modernere „Der heitere Fridolin“ (1921-1928) sich vom reinen Erzählen von Geschichten für Kinder löste und modernere Präsentations- und Kommunikationsformen wagte – welche Ende der 1920er Jahre von technikorientierten Jungenzeitschriften übernommen wurden. Die zeitgenössische Diskussion über Jugendmagazin sei der seit dem 18. Jahrhundert stabilen Linie „wertvoll“ vs. „Schund“ gefolgt. Einige Abbildungen illustrieren die Thesen. Im 6. Kapitel widmet sich Springman der Science Fiction – einem nicht als Jugendliteratur rubrizierten, aber von Jugendlichen gelesenen Genre. Er bettet sie ein in die lebensweltlich erfahrbare technische Veränderung, in eine gattungsgeschichtliche Weiterführung von Kriegsliteratur und in die totalisierende Radikalisierung holistischer Topoi der deutschen Naturphilosophien des späten 19. und frühen 20. Jahrhunderts. Abseits gattungsinterner Kontroversen würden die Werke Hörbigers und Blodes futuristische Allmachtsphantasien kultivieren und so erneut das deutsche Volk als Träger einer Weltherrschaft stilisieren. Im 7. Kapitel schließt sich an eine Reflexion über die Natur von Radio im Vergleich zu Jugendmagazinen eine Betrachtung der Sendungen „Dr. Überall“ (eigentlich Ernst Bulowa) im Rahmen des unpolitischen deutschen

Rundfunkwesens unter Hans Bredow an, wobei das Radio selbst als Teil des Technikultes erscheine und – auch bei konservativen Sendern – kreativ und experimentell an die Jugendlichen heranzukommen suche. Der Lancierung neuer Körper- und Identitätsideale v. a. für Mädchen widmet sich das 8. Kapitel auf der Linie von Foucault; die Rollenveränderung der Mädchen in der Weimarer Zeit (und in anderen, dem westlichen Modernisierungsprozess unterworfenen Gesellschaften) werde fassbar in der sog. „Backfischliteratur“, z. B. über die sportbegeisterte Tennis-Hansi.

Aus Sicht einer komparatistisch orientierten Geschichtswissenschaft haften dem anregenden Essay-Band gewisse Probleme an: Springman beschränkt sich weitgehend auf eine phänomenologische Betrachtung der Werke, ohne die Frage der Rezeptionsintensität hinlänglich auszuleuchten. Er unterliegt damit zwar teilweise dem untrennbaren Dilemma jeder historischen Rezeptionsforschung, er könnte aber unter Hinweis auf Auflagenzahlen von Verlagen, ggf. auf Ausleihzahlen in öffentlichen Bibliotheken oder auf die Verbreitungsdichte von Radiogeräten einen Möglichkeitsraum zur Rezeption ausloten, seine Thesen zu einer Bindung an Klassen oder Milieus besser untersetzen und somit seine Thematik an großflächigere Erzählungen zur Weimarer Republik anschließen. Ebenfalls fehlen Hinweise auf vergleichbare oder andersartige Entwicklungen in Jugendkulturen beispielsweise angelsächsischer Länder. Manche Kurzreferate von Werken oder Magazin-Ausgaben erscheinen für den Zweck einer Literatur- bzw. Medieninterpretation zu oberflächlich, für eine Einbettung in eine Theorie zur Mentalität von Jugendlichen in der Weimarer Repu-

blik zu zufällig. Auch dank der diversen Abbildungsteile erweist sich das Buch als ein interessanter Tür-Öffner für Leser, die einen materialgestützten Zugang zur Thematik suchen.

James Kynge: „China. Der Aufstieg einer hungrigen Nation“, Murmann Verlag, Hamburg 2006, 294 S.

Rezensiert von
Katrin Buchta, Leipzig

China ist in aller Munde und uns so nahe gerückt wie niemals zuvor. Bis ins 16. Jh. die fortschrittlichste Zivilisation der Welt, scheint China an diese Zeit anknüpfen zu wollen. Dank ihres ununterbrochenen Wirtschaftswachstums ist die Volksrepublik China seit Beginn der Reform- und Öffnungspolitik zu einer Großmacht mit unübersehbar wachsendem Selbstbewusstsein und globalen Ambitionen geworden. Im Jahr 2008 wird das kommunistische Land nach den USA und Japan wohl zur drittgrößten Volkswirtschaft aufsteigen. Es ist nicht neu, über die Dynamik der Entwicklung, die Geschwindigkeit der Veränderungen und die wachsende Bedeutung Chinas in der Weltpolitik zu lesen. Bücher mit Titeln wie „China. Die neue Weltmacht“, „Schauplatz China. Aufbruch zur Supermacht“, „Der Kampf um die Zukunft. Die Welt im chinesischen Würgegriff“ oder „Globale Rivalen. Chinas

unheimlicher Aufstieg und die Obermacht des Westen“, die den wirtschaftlichen Aufschwung Chinas beschreiben und Spekulationen über die Folgen der weiteren Entwicklung für den Rest der Welt anstellen, verkaufen sich in den letzten Jahren sehr gut. Im Vergleich zu vielen anderen Autoren verfügt der Brite James Kyng über langjährige China-Erfahrungen: 1982 als Student der Sinologie in der Provinz Shandong, später, von 1998–2005, als Leiter des Büros der Financial Times in Peking. Heute arbeitet er als Hauptrepräsentant der Pearson Group, eines internationalen Medienkonzerns, in China. Bereits seit zwei Jahrzehnten analysiert Kyng Chinas Hunger nach Energie, Rohstoffen, Technologien, Know-how und neuer Lebensqualität.

„China Shakes the World“, so der englische Originaltitel des Buches, hat es auch in Japan und Taiwan im Jahr 2007 auf die Bestsellerlisten geschafft. Leider ist in der deutschen Übersetzung des Titels etwas von der Brisanz der Überlegungen Kyngs verloren gegangen.

Um den Auswirkungen des chinesischen Aufstiegs nachzugehen, ist Kyng nicht nur durch China sondern auch in westliche Länder gereist. Das Buch beginnt, überraschenderweise für den deutschen Leser, in Dortmund-Hörde – Kyng beschreibt die Demontage eines ganzen Stahlwerkes, das, zum Almetallpreis gekauft, im 9000 km entfernten China wieder aufgebaut zur Konkurrenz für deutschen Stahl wird. Die chinesische Herausforderung rückt immer mehr ins Bewusstsein der Europäer, wie auch die Übernahme europäischer Firmen durch neue chinesische Mitbewerber. Als weiteres Beispiel für den Abfluss von Arbeit und Wohlstand nennt Kyng die

italienische Stadt Prato, bekannt für ihre traditionsreiche Textilindustrie. Aus illegalen chinesischen Einwanderern wurden Unternehmer, die dafür verantwortlich zeichneten, dass ganze Produktlinien nach China ausgelagert wurden. Das dritte Beispiel führt den Leser nach Rockford in den Mittleren Westen der USA, einst Zentrum der Werkzeugmaschinenindustrie, wo alteingesessene Betriebe der chinesischen Konkurrenz nicht standhalten können. Es scheint, als sei der Westen der chinesischen Herausforderung nicht gewachsen.

Immer wieder zieht Kyng Parallelen zwischen den Industrialisierungs- und Urbanisierungsprozessen in China und jenen in Großbritannien und den Vereinigten Staaten im 19. Jh. Allerdings verweist er darauf, dass solche Vergleiche ihre Grenzen haben, mögen sie noch so anschaulich sein. Allein aufgrund seiner Größe sowie der Geschwindigkeit und des Ausmaßes seiner Entwicklung gehöre China in eine eigene Kategorie. Chinas Aufstieg zur wirtschaftlichen Großmacht ist nicht neu, er begann 1978 mit den Reformen unter Deng Xiaoping. Kyng argumentiert, dass der Reformerfolg nicht geplant, sondern Ergebnis einer Reihe von Zufällen war. „Kreativer Ungehorsam“ (S. 22), als Reaktion auf die Lockerung von Restriktionen in der Landwirtschaft, von Deng auf der Suche nach Wachstumsquellen angeordnet, stand am Beginn des wirtschaftlichen Aufschwungs und weniger Dengs Qualitäten als Reformers.

Kyng stellt dem Leser in anschaulichen Geschichten mit starken Reportageelementen die Träger des chinesischen Wirtschaftswachstums, Gewinner und Verlierer der Reform- und Öffnungspolitik vor: Vom Unternehmer, der nach der Kultur-

revolution seine Firma aus dem Nichts aufbaute, über die Tochter einer Familie von Wanderarbeitern, die in Großbritannien als Au-pair-Mädchen ein kleines Vermögen ansparte, und den Gründer des Computerherstellers Lenovo, der als Überlebensstrategie Teile von IBM kaufte, bis hin zur Schülerin, deren Identität von einer Klassenkameradin gestohlen wurde. Anhand dieser Beispiele gibt Kynges Einblicke aus erster Hand in die chinesische Gesellschaft und das Wirtschaftssystem, das trotz seiner offiziellen Bezeichnung als sozialistische Marktwirtschaft und Chinas Beitritt zur WTO im Jahr 2001 noch weit von einer Marktwirtschaft nach westlichem Verständnis entfernt ist.

Die schnelle Modernisierung Chinas geht mit einer Verschärfung bestehender innerer Widersprüche einher. Die sozialen, politischen, ökonomischen und ökologischen Konsequenzen des Wachstumshungers, die Kynges aufzeigt, wirken äußerst bedrohlich. Dennoch will sich der Autor nicht als Unheilsverkünder verstanden wissen. Kynges, der für sein Buch den „Goldman Sachs Business Book of the Year Award“ erhielt, verweist am Ende seines Werkes auf die Flexibilität und den Pragmatismus der Chinesen. Diese lieferten seiner Meinung nach das Gegenargument für düstere Zukunftsszenarien.

In einem Interview in der Financial Times im Mai 2006¹ verglich Kynges China mit einem Hummer: Seine Scheren sind kräftig, seine Hinterbeine schwach und dünn. Chinas Produktionspotential (die Scheren) ist Furcht einflößend, aber dadurch, dass sich China auf die Produktion konzentriert, wird die Entwicklung anderer Bereiche vernachlässigt. Chinas Schwächen wie das Umweltproblem, die Last der

großen Bevölkerung, das marode Finanzsystem, die Ein-Parteien-Herrschaft sind nach Meinung Kynges fast ebenso grundlegend wie seine Stärken und genau dort bieten sich unzählige Möglichkeiten für westliche Unternehmungen. So bedrohlich der Titel des Buches also klingen mag, Kynges ist bemüht, Befürchtungen, die der rasche Aufstieg Chinas bringt, auszuräumen. Wie die westlichen Industriestaaten allerdings konkret damit umgehen sollen, dafür hat auch Kynges keine Lösungsmuster.

Kynges Darstellungen sind präzise und unvoreingenommen, untermauert durch persönliche Erfahrungen. Auch wenn Kynges Buch keine neuen Ansätze bietet, macht es die Fülle des gut recherchierten Materials zu einer spannenden Lektüre nicht nur für China-Kenner.

Anmerkung:

- 1 Financial Times: <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/2/4a5074e6-e408-11da-8ced-0000779e2340.html> (Zugriff 28.10.2007).

**Thoralf Klein: Geschichte Chinas.
Von 1800 bis zur Gegenwart (= UTB,
Bd. 2838), Paderborn: Ferdinand
Schöningh 2007, 400 S.**

Rezensiert von
Kai Vogelsang, München

Thoralf Kleins ‚Geschichte Chinas‘ ist eigentlich ein „Handbuch zur Geschichte Chinas“, wie der Autor selbst schreibt (S. 9). Sie bietet keine chronologisch voran-

schreitende narrative Darstellung der letzten 200 Jahre, sondern folgt einem „multiperspektivischen Ansatz“ (S. 10). Thoralf Klein trägt der unhintergehbaren Perspektivität von Geschichtsschreibung dadurch Rechnung, dass er nicht einen Standpunkt wählt, sondern drei „Meistererzählungen“ zu kombinieren versucht, welche die Darstellung der neueren chinesischen Geschichte dominieren: Revolution, Modernisierung und Nation. In einem einführenden Kapitel (S. 22–30) gibt Klein einen lesenswerten Überblick über diese Paradigmen (wenn auch Shmuel Eisenstadts Konzept der „multiple modernities“, das in Bezug auf China sehr fruchtbar wäre, leider fehlt). Es folgen, nach einem konzisen ereignisgeschichtlichen Überblick (S. 31–63), eine Vielzahl gesonderter Abhandlungen: anhand von Themen wie Ideologie, Verfassungen, informelle Netzwerke, Gesellschaftsstruktur, Verstärkung, Imperialismus und internationale Verbindungen wird der Leser immer wieder durch die Zeitschleife von der mittleren Qing-Zeit bis zur Gegenwart geführt. Auf diese Weise soll „die Mehrdeutigkeit einzelner historischer Sachverhalte erkennbar und zugleich die Vielschichtigkeit und Interdependenz des historischen Prozesses verdeutlicht“ werden (S. 10).

Doch auch bei Thoralf Klein ergibt sich aus der Kombination verschiedener Perspektiven wiederum nichts anderes als: eine Perspektive. Diese ist durchweg vom Primat der Politik bestimmt. Besonders deutlich wird das im zweiten Kapitel (S. 31–63), das einen einführenden Überblick der Geschichte Chinas von 1800 bis zur Gegenwart gibt, und zwar der politischen Geschichte. Es geht vor allem um Kriege, Verträge, Edikte, Reformen und politische

Strategien. Hier wie in den übrigen Kapiteln ist stets der Staat für „Kontrolle und Mobilisierung der Gesellschaft“ (S. 209) oder „gesellschaftliche Neuorganisation“ (S. 147) zuständig; er mag allenfalls Freiräume gewähren (S. 203) und Funktionen delegieren (S. 207), definiert aber stets die Möglichkeiten einer „weitgehend vom Staat gelenkten Zivilgesellschaft“ (S. 224). Der kühle, detachierte Blick aus der Höhe der Staatspolitik verliert das menschliche Leben und Leiden weitgehend aus dem Auge: Zum Korea-Krieg erfährt man, dass China „eine 250.000 Mann starke ‘Freiwilligenarmee’ in den Kampf“ schickte, die nach Anfangserfolgen „vor einem heftigen Gegenangriff ihres technologisch überlegenen Gegners wieder zurückweichen“ musste (S. 55) – aber nichts über den furchtbaren Aderlass dieses Feldzugs, in dem Hunderttausende von primitiv ausgerüsteten Soldaten in ‘menschlichen Wellen’ regelrecht verheizt wurden. Wenn im Zusammenhang mit der jahrzehntelangen Exilierung von Intellektuellen nach der Hundert-Blumen-Bewegung harmlos von „Disziplinieren“ die Rede ist (S. 155), wenn das blutige Massaker auf dem Tiananmen-Platz mit dem Hinweis auf „den Einsatz von Panzern und Soldaten mit Sturmgewehren“ abgehandelt (S. 222) oder das unsäglich schmerzhaftes Fußbebinden in einem nüchtern-diagnostischen Halbsatz beschrieben wird (S. 165), dann verschwindet die ganze menschliche Tragödie aus dem Blick, die in der Geschichte Chinas steckt. ‘Revolution, Modernisierung und Nation’, das bedeutet vor allem Namen, Zahlen und Fakten. An der „Entstehung der modernen Stadt“ (S. 250 ff.) interessieren vor allem Einwohnerzahlen, Industrie und Regierungssitze, nicht aber

die verschiedenen Lebensformen, deren Zusammenkunft Städte zu Laboratorien der Moderne machen; die „Dynamik der Gesellschaft“ (S. 133–173) wird beschrieben durch Bevölkerungszahlen und Klassenstruktur, nicht aber anhand von Freizeitgestaltung, Liebesleben oder Essgewohnheiten der Menschen; an der Wirtschaft (S. 233–241) interessieren Geldströme und Produktionspläne, nicht aber die Lebensbedingungen der Fabrikarbeiter und der immense Raubbau an der Natur. Man mag all das vermissen in Thoralf Kleins ‚Geschichte Chinas‘; doch gerade der Verzicht auf die herkömmlichen Aspekte macht letztlich die Stärke dieses Buches aus. Wenn man nämlich die Entscheidung des Autors akzeptiert und sich auf die Perspektive des Buches einlässt, wird man vieles finden, das anderswo nicht geboten wird. Die einzelnen Kapitel bieten durchweg konzise, gut informierte Überblicke, verbunden mit einer Auswahl an weiterführender Literatur, die Studierenden einen ausgezeichneten Einstieg in Themen verschaffen, die sonst meist disparat und schwer zugänglich dargestellt werden. Wer den chinesischen Nationalismus verstehen will, erhält bei Thoralf Klein nicht nur eine Zusammenfassung der wissenschaftlichen Diskussion (S. 28 ff.) und einen historischen Abriss, sondern auch eine feine Analyse von fünf Spielarten des Nationalismus sowie eine pointierte These, an der weitere Forschung ansetzen kann: nämlich dass der chinesische Nationalismus seit je „vorwiegend defensive[n] Charakter“ habe (S. 79). Ebenso gelungen sind die Abschnitte über Sunyatsenismus (S. 79–84; weniger überzeugend erscheint mir der folgende über den frühen Sino-marxismus, der allzu einseitig auf die Per-

son Maos fokussiert ist), die ausführliche Diskussion von Chinas Verfassungen (S. 90–109), die Analyse korporativer Strukturen (S. 140–151) und moderner chinesischer Religionen (S. 272–290) sowie viele weitere. Diese Darstellungen werden ergänzt durch zeitgenössische Fotografien und geschickt ausgewählte, oft vom Autor selbst übersetzte Quellenexzerpte. An diesen Stellen kommen denn auch die Menschen zu Wort, die sonst so stumm bleiben; und wiederum sind es nicht die üblichen Stimmen, die Thoralf Klein zitiert, sondern periphere, oft vernachlässigte Persönlichkeiten wie der Unternehmer Zhang Jian (S. 156 f.), der Rebell Zhong Renjie (S. 205 f.), der Überseechinese Yang Jinhui (S. 356 f.), oder der mongolische Kommunistenführer Ulanhu (S. 378 f.). Diese Exkurse halten auch für Fachleute einige schöne Trouvaillen bereit.

Die primäre Orientierung an Problemen statt an den Zufälligkeiten des historischen Ablaufs bringt es mit sich, dass viele Ereignisse mehrfach aus unterschiedlichen Perspektiven behandelt werden. Etwa ein Dutzend Mal begegnet der Leser etwa dem „radikalen Einschnitt“ (S. 216), den die Machtübernahme der KP China bedeutete; viel öfter aber weist der Autor historische Kontinuitäten und Parallelen nach: zwischen der 4.-Mai-Bewegung und den anti-amerikanischen Protesten von 1999 (S. 79), den Protestbewegungen der Bauern (S. 217) und immer wieder dem Spannungsverhältnis zwischen staatlicher Kontrolle und gesellschaftlichen Freiheiten. Auch das ist eine Stärke von Thoralf Kleins ‚Geschichte Chinas‘: dass sie, weitaus stärker als eine chronologische Darstellung es könnte, auf historische Zusammenhänge aufmerksam macht, dass sie den Leser stets

zum Vor- und Zurückblättern anregt, zur wiederholten Lektüre und vor allem zum vertieften Studium der komplexen Problemfelder, die das Buch vorstellt. Insofern ist es ein „Handbuch“ im besten Sinne: Man wird es immer wieder zur Hand nehmen, wenn man sich problemorientiert, theoretisch reflektiert, forschend mit der neueren Geschichte Chinas befassen will.

Hartmut Rosa: Beschleunigung. Die Veränderung der Zeitstrukturen in der Moderne, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Taschenbuch Verlag 2005, 537 S.

Rezensiert von
Malte Schulz, Leipzig

Hartmut Rosa schreibt sein Buch mit einem Anspruch, der von Manchem als anmaßend, von den meisten anderen zumindest als bemerkenswert bezeichnet werden muss. Es geht ihm nach eigener Aussage darum zu beweisen, dass „Zeitmuster und -perspektiven somit also den paradigmatischen Ort der Vermittlung von Struktur und Kultur, von System- und Akteursperspektive und damit auch von systematischen Notwendigkeiten darstellen“ (S. 38). Rosa behauptet den fehlenden Baustein gefunden zu haben, welcher in der Lage ist, handlungstheoretisch fundierte Ansätze mit Ansätzen der Systemtheorie zu verknüpfen. Die Kategorie der Beschleunigung, welche der Autor in umfassender Tiefe beleuchtet, soll die theoretische Diskussion revolutionieren und aus der Sackgasse führen.

Rosa geht dabei zunächst sehr hart mit der bisherigen Analyse von Zeit- und Temporalstrukturen ins Gericht. Er wirft sowohl Luhmann als auch Giddens die Nicht-einlösung ihres Versprechens vor, Zeit zu einem zentralen Begriff der soziologischen Perspektive zu machen. Weiterhin hält er der Soziologie vor, zwischen theorieloser Akzeptanz der Zeit als empirisch existent und einer Überhöhung der Zeit als Enigma, als nicht greifbares Phänomen zu pendeln ohne eine tatsächliche Würdigung im theoretischen Kontext vorzunehmen. Er bringt das Ergebnis der bisherigen Diskussion um die Beschaffenheit der Zeit auf das Zitat von Augustinus: „Was ist Zeit? Wenn Niemand mich fragt, weiß ich es. Will ich es einem Fragenden erklären, weiß ich es nicht“ (S. 23).

Zu diesem Zeitpunkt hatte ich die Befürchtung, der Autor würde nach diesem Kahlschlag mit den bisherigen Erkenntnissen brechen, seine Gedanken isoliert davon entwickeln und ihnen dann unkommentiert gegenüberstellen. Dass er dies gerade nicht tut, ist ein erstes Indiz für die Qualität des Buches. Entgegen der zu befürchtenden eigenen Theorielosigkeit beginnt Rosa sogleich, in den verschiedensten renommierten Ansätzen der Gesellschaftstheorie ein ihnen inne liegendes Beschleunigungsmoment auszumachen. So wohne Luhmanns funktionaler Differenzierung eine Logik der zunehmenden Bewegung inne, welche ohne eine Beschleunigung der Temporalstrukturen der Systeme nicht zu denken sei. Marx' Steigerungsprinzip des Wachstums sei ein Phänomen der Beschleunigung, das sowohl kulturprägend als auch strukturbildend für die Moderne genannt werden müsse und Webers Rationalisierung sei mit ih-

rem „mehr in kürzerer Zeit zu geringeren Kosten“ ebenso als Beschleunigungsphänomen zu denken.

Neben einem anschaulichen Theorieüberblick erschließt sich dem Leser ganz nebenbei sehr plausibel, wie sehr verschiedene sogenannte „Klassiker“ der Soziologie von einer temporalen Perspektive profitieren können.

Was aber ist nun die temporale Perspektive, die Rosa selbst anbietet? Seine Arbeit ist dahingehend sehr klar strukturiert. Im ersten Teil geht es ihm darum, das Verhältnis von Beschleunigung und Beharrung zueinander präzise zu erfassen. Es ist sehr einleuchtend, dass von einer tatsächlichen Beschleunigung der Gesellschaft als Kernelement einer Theorie der Moderne nur dann gesprochen werden kann, wenn die Tendenzen von Beschleunigung innerhalb der Gesellschaft die Tendenzen der Beharrung und Bewahrung überwiegen, welche ihr offenkundig ebenso inne wohnen. Rosa stellt deshalb seinen aus den Klassikern herausgearbeiteten Beschleunigungsbefunden verschiedene Kategorien der Beharrung gegenüber. Er nennt im Einzelnen natürliche Barrieren, wie die physikalische Grenze der Lichtgeschwindigkeit oder das eingeschränkte Fassungsvermögen des menschlichen Gehirns. Dysfunktionale Nebeneffekte erläutert er am Beispiel von Verkehrsstaus, welche in Ballungsräumen mit hohem Verkehrsaufkommen deutlich schneller deutlich länger werden. Eine Ideologie der Entschleunigung in Form einer generellen Kritik an der Moderne, welche vor allem „Modernisierungsoffer“ hinter sich zu versammeln sucht, macht Rosa in verschiedenen Teilen der Gesellschaft aus. Seiner Meinung nach rekrutiert sich diese wachsende Gruppe der Beschleuni-

gungsgegner aus „sehr unterschiedlichen religiösen, tiefenökologischen, ultrakonservativen und anarchistischen Quellen“ (S. 147).

Rosa legt an verschiedenen Beispielen plausibel dar, dass Kräfte der Beharrung, welche es in jeder Zeitepoche gegeben hat, allerhöchstens kurzfristige Entschleunigungseffekte bewirken, während langfristig der Widerstand gegen die Beschleunigungsforderungen und -Folgen der Moderne jeweils ins Leere läuft. Er nennt als Beispiele die 68er und die Hippie-Bewegung, welche insbesondere in diesem Punkt letztlich gescheitert seien. Rosa versucht in seinem Werk allerdings nicht, die von ihm postulierten Zusammenhänge empirisch nachzuweisen. Als Beitrag zu einer empirisch gehaltvollen Gesellschaftstheorie versucht er stattdessen, empirische Phänomene zu ordnen indem er strukturelle Zusammenhänge postuliert, welche der späteren empirischen Überprüfung ausgesetzt sind. Er verweist zudem im Kontext seiner Arbeit wiederholt auf Werke, welche sich der empirischen Erfassung von Beschleunigung widmen. Die bisher gefundenen Zugriffe erachtet er jedoch als zu eng, um die strukturellen und kulturellen Zusammenhänge nachweisen zu können, welche er postuliert.

Er entwickelt in seinem Buch drei zentrale Dimensionen der Beschleunigung. Die technische Beschleunigung, die Beschleunigung des sozialen Wandels und die Beschleunigung des individuellen Lebenstempos. Diese drei Dimensionen stehen miteinander in Wechselwirkung und bilden einen sich selbst immer weiter beschleunigenden Zyklus.

Zusätzlich beschreibt der Autor für jede Dimension ein ihr innewohnendes An-

triebsprinzip. So ist der primäre Akzele-
rator der technischen Beschleunigung die
Beziehung von Zeit und Geld, welche im
Gedankenmodell von Simmel verankert
ist. Die Beschleunigung des sozialen Wan-
dels speist sich aus Luhmanns funktionaler
Differenzierung. Die Beschleunigung des
Lebenstempos stützt sich auf die Verhei-
ßungen der Beschleunigung, die Rosa
unter anderem aus der von Weber und
seinen Nachfolgern beschriebenen pro-
testantischen Ethik entwickelt. So verwebt
er unterschiedliche Denktraditionen in
einem gemeinsamen Modell.

Rosa sieht zwei Institutionen, welche er für
die Entstehung dieses Kreislaufes der Be-
schleunigung verantwortlich macht. Staat
und Militär sind nicht zuerst von Rosa als
treibende Kräfte der Moderne bezeichnet
worden und es ist leicht nachvollziehbar,
welche der zentralen Innovationen der
letzten Jahrhunderte auf das Militär oder
den Staat zurückzuführen sind. Rosa be-
gründet dies mit der Konkurrenz der ver-
schiedenen Staaten auf militärischer, wie
auch indirekt auf ökonomischer und kul-
tureller Ebene.

Zum heutigen Zeitpunkt hält der Vf. die
beiden Verursacher der Beschleunigung al-
lerdings längst nicht mehr für zentral und
begegnet damit einer möglichen Kritik:
Weder Staat und Bürokratie noch mili-
tär können heute für besondere Innova-
tionsträger gehalten werden. Hier greift
das Prinzip der Desynchronisation im Be-
schleunigungsprozess, welche Rosa früh in
sein Modell einführt. Diese tritt auf, wenn
Zeitmuster und -perspektiven von Indi-
viduen und/oder Institutionen auseinander
laufen. In diesem Falle wurden Staat und
Militär vom Beschleunigungszyklus abge-
hängt, was sie im Auge der handelnden

Subjekte und anderer Institutionen als trä-
ge und ineffizient erscheinen lässt.

Was ist also nach Rosa die Folge von Be-
schleunigung? Rosa macht in seinem um-
fangreichen Schlussteil verschiedene Kon-
sequenzen der Beschleunigung aus. Zu
Beginn beleuchtet er nochmals den Dis-
kurs um Globalisierung und Postmoderne
und stellt diesem eine Neuformulierung
der Postmoderne gegenüber. Er bringt
diese auf den interessanten Nenner, dass
der aus der Beschleunigung resultierende
Wandel die Generationszyklen überschrei-
tet. Dies führt nach Rosa zu einer Verzeit-
lichung der Zeit. Das Individuum verliert
seine planbare Perspektive und wird, mit
allen Konsequenzen, situativ abhängig.
Ähnlich ergeht es der politischen Elite.
Das politische System, welches desyn-
chronisiert von der sich immer weiter
beschleunigenden Gesellschaft, den Er-
wartungen, welche ihm entgegengebracht
werden, nicht mehr gerecht werden kann,
versucht durch politische Entscheidungen
Handlungskompetenz in andere Systeme
abzuschieben.

Beschleunigung ist kein neuer Begriff in der
Debatte um die Moderne. Rosa behauptet
jedoch, dass die von ihm als beschleuni-
gungstheoretisch informierte Perspektive
bezeichnete Argumentationsweise das Po-
tential birgt, den Bruch zwischen Moder-
ne und Spätmoderne präzise zu erfassen.
„Danach kommt es zu einem Umschwung
innerhalb der Moderne durch das Errei-
chen kritischer Geschwindigkeitsgrenzen,
jenseits deren Gesellschaft eine neue Qua-
lität gewinnt, ohne dass sich im Ensemble
der Modernisierungsprinzipien (Beschleu-
nigung, Differenzierung, Rationalisierung,
Individualisierung, Domestizierung) etwas
grundlegendes geändert hätte.“ (S. 476)

Zusammenfassend beschreibt der Autor also keine neue Moderne, sondern ein theoretisches Modell für die Erfassung eines qualitativen Wandels innerhalb derselben. Implizit geht er damit von der Existenz eines solchen aus und bezieht so Position in der Debatte um verschiedene Konzepte von Moderne und deren Weiterentwicklung.

Das Buch wendet sich damit jedoch keineswegs ausschließlich an eben jene, welche unmittelbar an dieser Diskussion mitwirken. Ich halte es ebenso für einen geeigneten Einstieg. Aus der Perspektive des Autors werden unterschiedlichste Denktraditionen beschrieben und in das eigene Modell eingebaut. Diese Herangehensweise hilft dem Leser im Zusammenspiel mit den zumeist sehr ausführlich gehaltenen Zitaten zu einem tieferen Verständnis für die Denkweise der zitierten Autoren. Es ist also eindeutig auch und gerade für Studenten geeignet, welche sich im theoretischen Diskurs positionieren oder diesen verstehen möchten.

Betrachtet man die Argumentationslinie aus soziologischer Perspektive, so muss man feststellen, dass Rosa ein interessantes Angebot zur Zusammenführung der verschiedenen Denktraditionen soziologischer Theorie bereithält. Dieses Angebot werden die einzelnen Vertreter dieser Traditionen selbstverständlich unterschiedlich scharf ausschlagen. Um die eigene Blöße im Bezug auf Temporalstrukturen nicht all zu offensichtlich werden zu lassen, werden sie dabei jedoch gezwungen sein, ihr Modell um einen, selbstverständlich immanent längst vorhandenen, Begriff von Beschleunigung zu erweitern. Die Ernsthaftigkeit dieser Korrekturen wird den Effekt des Werkes auf die soziologische Theorie be-

stimmen und ich möchte behaupten, dass es Potential für einen großen bereithält. Bliebe er klein, so wäre er in Rosas Worten wohl ein Beleg für die Desynchronisation der institutionalisierten sozialwissenschaftlichen Forschung von der beschleunigten Gesellschaft welche erstere zu beschreiben versucht.

Jochen Burgtorf/Helen Nicholson
(Hrsg): **International Mobility in the Military Orders (Twelfth to Fifteenth Centuries). Travelling on Christ's Business, Cardiff: University of Wales Press 2006, 218 S.**

Rezensiert von
Pierre-Vincent Claverie, Rennes
(übersetzt von Thomas Höpel)

Dieser kleine Band versammelt 15 Studien zur Mobilität der Militärorden im Mittelalter. Mehrere originelle Schlussfolgerungen durchziehen die einzelnen Kapitel, die unter institutionellen, individuellen oder regionalen Gesichtspunkten konzipiert wurden. Der einleitende Aufsatz von Jochen Burgtorf untersucht detailliert und scharfsinnig den Weg von 226 Baillis des Templerordens und des Hospitalordens, wenngleich seine Bibliographie eine wichtige Studie von Edouard Rey über den Großkomtur des Templerordens, Geoffroy Foucher, ignoriert (S. 11-24). Einige seiner Identifizierungen sind gewagt, betrachtet man einmal den Fall der Templer Hugues Salomon du Quiliou und Étienne

de Sissy, die ungeschickt als „Hugh Salomonis of Quily“ und „Stephen of Cissey“ geführt werden (S. 22 und 17). Seine Identifizierung des Marschalls Cimbeldardus mit dem ehemaligen Komtur von England, Amblard de Vienne, ist dagegen überzeugender. Christian Vogel tritt in seine Fußstapfen mit dem Kapitel über die Mobilität der provenzalischen Tempelritter, das unter der schlechten Kenntnis der lokalen Toponymie und der jüngsten Arbeiten von Damien Carraz leidet (S. 114-129). Trotz dieser Ungenauigkeiten unterstreicht der Autor die chaotische Dimension der absolvierten Werdegänge der provenzalischen Tempelritter beiderseits des Mittelmeeres. Diese Beobachtungen treffen sich mit den von Judith Bronstein formulierten zur Mobilisierung der Arbeitskräfte des Hospitalordens im Jahrhundert des Heiligen Ludwigs (S. 25-33). Ein starker Regionalismus scheint sich in den westlichen Komturen durchgesetzt zu haben, die aufgerufen waren, den Osten beim geringsten militärischen Misserfolg mit Männern und Material zu versorgen. Im 14. Jahrhundert brachen die Einnahmen der Hospitaliter unter dem Einfluss struktureller wie auch punktueller Probleme zusammen. Theresa Vann zeigt in einem anregenden Essay, dass sich diese Situation im darauf folgenden Jahrhundert trotz der Bemühungen des Papsttums, die Schulden des Ordens zu beseitigen, weiter verschlechterte (S. 34-47). Diese Verschuldung hatte kaum Rückwirkungen auf das Lebensniveau der Ritter, das von Jürgen Sarnowsky brillant geschildert wird (S. 48-58). Im 15. Jahrhundert begann man damit, die von den einzelnen Rittern erworbenen Güter zu vererben. Sie wurden im Rahmen einer beispiellosen Ent-

wicklung von Kaperoperationen erworben.

Das Kloster von Rhodos beherbergte eine bedeutende Zahl von Auvergnaten und Katalanen, deren Aufstieg zur Macht Pierre Bonneaud mit der Großmeisterwürde des aktiven Antoni de Fluvià verbindet (S. 155-166). Die Mobilität der Katalanen sticht ab von der Unterrepräsentation der englischen Templer und Hospitaliter an der Wende zum 13. und 14. Jh. Eine kurze Bestandsaufnahme von Helen Nicholson erklärt diesen Mangel mit dem Misstrauen der Plantagenets gegenüber den Militärorden und ebenso mit der beherrschenden Stellung der Franzosen in ihren Führungsspitzen (S. 87-101).

Ein Aufsatz von Zsolt Hunyadi zeigt, dass diese Vormachtstellung in der Prioratskirche der Hospitaliter von Ungarn und Slawonien in den 1310er Jahren begründet wurde (S. 142-154). Dieser Prozess scheint früher in der Templerprovinz Lombardei begonnen zu haben, die von Elena Belomo untersucht wird (S. 102-113). Der Band von J. Burgstorf und H. Nicholson vereint weitere Studien zur Mobilität der limousinischen Templer und der Ritter des Ordens des Avis zwischen dem 12. und 14. Jh. (S. 130-141 und 190-201). Diese prosopographischen Studien betrachten das Schicksal einiger bedeutender Kämpfer, die in den Okzident zurückgeschickt wurden, wie des Tempplers Géraud de Saint-Martial, der von der Inquisition im Jahr 1308 befragt wurde. Reichhaltige Archivbestände erlauben es, die Lebensläufe einiger Würdenträger über mehrere Jahre zu verfolgen. Das ist der Fall für den Komtur von Katalonien, Berenguer de Cardona (1291-1307), dessen zweite Überfahrt in den Osten Alain Demurger nachzeich-

net (S. 65-749), und des Kaplans des Deutschritterordens Johannes Malkaw, der sich während des Großen Schismas des Abendlandes gegen den Papst in Avignon positionierte. Axel Ehlers widmet diesem pontificalen Kaplan, der eine Zeitlang im

Visier der Inquisition stand, einen Überblicksartikel, der an die spirituelle Dimension der Militärorden erinnert (S. 75-84). Diese Beispiele offenbaren durch ihre extreme Verschiedenartigkeit das Ausmaß der *mobilitas loci* während der Kreuzzüge.

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