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Remodelling Social Order through the Conquest of Public Space: Myths, Ceremonies and Visual Representations in Revolutionary Societies

**Edited by
Jürgen Schriewer**



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“Ceremonial Pedagogy” in Revolutionary Societies: Public Staging and Aesthetic Mass Inculcation in Meiji Japan, the Early Soviet Union and Post-1910 Mexico

Jürgen Schriewer

RESÜMEE

Begriff und Sachverhalt „zeremonieller Pädagogik“ gehören nicht gerade zum Kernbestand historisch-sozialwissenschaftlicher Forschung. Der Artikel unternimmt zunächst eine Klärung des Konzepts im Verweis auf vormoderne Traditionen des Zeremonialwesens und deren radikale Uminterpretation in der Französischen Revolution. Die damit gegebenen Bestimmungsstücke machen deutlich, dass „zeremonielle Pädagogik“ weit über den Raum von Schule im engeren Sinne hinausgeht. Sie bezieht sich vielmehr auf (kontextabhängig durchaus variierende) Formen einer *ästhetisch-medial* – durch öffentliche Feste, Raumarchitektur, symbolische Inszenierungen oder kollektive Rituale – *vermittelten Repräsentation* von Programmen für die Neuordnung ganzer Staaten und Gesellschaften, wie sie typischerweise im Zusammenhang mit revolutionären Umbrüchen entworfen werden. Konstitutiv für das Konzept ist überdies eine mit „zeremonieller Pädagogik“ verbundene *instrumentelle Absicht*: Sie ist darauf angelegt, auf die breite Masse der jeweiligen Bevölkerung bewusstseinsformend einzuwirken und die revolutionären Neuordnungsprogramme sozialisatorisch zu verankern. Als fruchtbare Fälle für eine historisch-vergleichende Analyse „zeremonieller Pädagogik“ bieten sich an: Japan im Gefolge der Meiji-Revolution von 1868, die frühe Sowjetunion der 1920er und 1930er Jahre sowie Mexiko nach der Revolution von 1910. Diese Vergleichsfälle stehen im Zentrum eines Forschungsprojekts zum Thema, das als Teilprojekt des Sonderforschungsbereichs 640 an der Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin durchgeführt wird und dem die Beiträge dieses Sonderheftes entstammen. Unter Stichworten wie „nationale Integration“, „kulturelle Homogenisierung“ und „Modernisierung“ werden schließlich die theoretischen Perspektiven entwickelt, die diese Forschungen konzeptionell anleiten.

1. From "Ceremonies" to "Ceremonial Pedagogy"

The concept and subject matter of "ceremonial pedagogy" are not necessarily a core topic of study in education or the social sciences. In fact they point to a research landscape which is still largely open. This remains true even despite a recent increase in the number of individual studies covering issues such as festival culture in the early Soviet Union or the consciousness-shaping messages of the Mexican *murales*.¹ Accordingly, it will be some time before entries for "ceremonial pedagogy" are found in encyclopaedias, handbooks or equivalent reference works either for political science and sociology or for education and educational history. The *Historisches Lexikon zur politisch-sozialen Sprache in Deutschland* [Historical Lexicon of Political and Social Language in Germany] has nothing to say on this subject, and nor does the *Fontana Dictionary of Modern Thought*.² The *Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie* [Historical Dictionary of Philosophy] is of some assistance, however. The entry for "ceremony; ceremonial studies" begins with definitions which are of immediate relevance for our topic. It states that ceremonies consist of "sequences of human actions which symbolically represent an order (representation) and aestheticize this order for their audience". The entry continues by stating that more complex political or religious systems of order in particular are scarcely conceivable without such self-presentation through a medium of "sensuous contemplation". Above all, this is the case

*where (a) great significance is attached to formal social interaction in order to reflect certainty of expectation and exclude variation, (b) an address to the senses is deemed legitimate, (c) there is a high level of confidence regarding the truthfulness of the visible, (d) there is a trend towards hierarchizing concepts of order and (e) the procedural is assigned a symbolic value of its own.*³

While these explanations are still strongly focused on the pre-modern period, they already introduce key defining elements to what will subsequently manifest itself in specific historical contexts in practices of "ceremonial pedagogy". These defining elements emphasize aspects such as the media-conveyed representation of patterns and concepts of socio-political order; the translation of such patterns and concepts of order into sensuously tangible and procedural forms of expression seeking to establish the social acceptance and consciousness-shaping internalization of the former; and thus an aestheticization and staging of socio-political forms of authority and meaning contexts which, at its core, is deemed to be instrumental, i.e. seeking social influence. Ceremonial practices

1 See, e.g., Malte Rolf, *Das sowjetische Massenfest*, Hamburg 2006, or Desmond Rochfort, *Mexican Muralists: Orozco-Rivera-Siqueiros*, London 1993.

2 Otto Brunner/Werner Conze/Reinhart Koselleck (eds), *Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe. Historisches Lexikon zur politisch-sozialen Sprache in Deutschland*, 8 vols, Stuttgart 2004 (rev. edition); Alan Bullock/Stephen Trombley (eds), *The New Fontana Dictionary of Modern Thought*, Hammersmith 2000.

3 Miloš Vec, "Zeremonie; Zeremonialwissenschaft", in: Joachim Ritter et al. (eds), *Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie*, vol. 12, Basel 2004, columns 1301-1305, quote in column 1301.

of this type are rooted in rituals which reach far back to antiquity and to ecclesiastical traditions. However, already in the early modern period, in congruency with the rise of the modern state, they become the subject matter of more differentiated elaboration and theoretical reflection.⁴ In his *Einleitung zur Ceremoniel-Wissenschaft* [Introduction to Ceremonial Studies] of 1733 Julius Bernhard von Rohr, for instance, underlines the instrumental status of ceremonies when he remarks that they “are to be considered means through which a sovereign achieves a certain ultimate aim by prompting subjects’ special respect and reverence towards their sovereign”. Rohr also emphasizes that in the pursuit of this “ultimate aim” it is the appeal to the senses which predominates. For “the common man who is merely dependent on his external senses [...] cannot on his own imagine the majesty of the king, but through the objects which catch his eye and move his other senses he receives a clear notion of the latter’s majesty, power and authority”.⁵ At the close of the eighteenth century, and particularly in the aftermath of the French Revolution, the patterns of order to which the ceremonially communicated messages refer changes though the intended effect remains the same. The aim is no longer to visualize monarchical authority guaranteed by tradition and to glorify this authority through impressions of “dignity and grandeur”, “higher significance” or “venerableness”, as the *Staats-Lexikon* [Encyclopaedia of the State] of the 1830s comments with retrospective detachment.⁶ What now prevails through extensive staging for the broad masses is the symbolization of a radically new socio-political order and of its underlying concepts of order founded on the principle of equality. In this sense, historical studies of the French Revolution – studies, incidentally, in which the concept of “ceremonial pedagogy” originates – have traced the pedagogical application of spatial arrangements and visual media for purposes of state-controlled mass inculcation and consciousness-shaping.⁷ They have forcefully presented the attempt made by the revolutionaries of 1789 to deliberately stage public festivals, spatial architecture and collective rituals and instrumentalize these for purposes of far-reaching ideological re-education.⁸ As is frequently the case, the goals

4 Cf. the detailed study, undertaken from the vantage point of legal history, by Miloš Vec, *Zeremonialwissenschaft im Fürstentum: Studien zur juristischen und politischen Theorie absolutistischer Herrschaftsrepräsentation*, Frankfurt am Main 1998.

5 Julius Bernhard von Rohr, *Einleitung zur Ceremoniel-Wissenschaft der großen Herren*, Berlin 1733. Reprint edition Leipzig 1990, p. 2.

6 Carl von Rotteck, “Ceremoniel; Etikette”, in: Carl von Rotteck/Carl Welcker (eds), *Staats-Lexikon oder Encyclopädie der Staatswissenschaften*, vol. 3, Altona 1836, pp. 392–398.

7 See the standard-setting study by Mona Ozouf, *La fête révolutionnaire. 1789–1799*, Paris 1976. More specific aspects are highlighted by Hans-Christian Harten, *Elementarschule und Pädagogik in der Französischen Revolution*, Munich 1990, as well as *Transformation und Utopie des Raums in der Französischen Revolution. Von der Zerstörung der Königsstatuen zur republikanischen Idealstadt*, Brunswick 1994. Cf. also James A. Leith, *Space and Revolution: Projects for Monuments, Squares, and Public Buildings in France 1789–1799*, Montréal/London 1991.

8 In contrast to the frequently exclusive emphasis given to the French Revolution in this regard, Jürgen Heideking refers to the style-setting predecessor role played by the public constitutional ceremonies and “federal processions” in North American East Coast towns following the American Revolution, particularly in the period from 1787–1789. This is all the more applicable as they referred to the same Greco-Roman examples and were designed with the key involvement of well-known French architects and artists. These figures include, in particular,

of such practices find expression not in the grand manifestos of the greats – such as the impressive outline of a public education system put forward by the Marquis de Condorcet in April 1792 – but instead in lesser programmatic proclamations. One such example is the *Projet d'éducation nationale*, which the Protestant pastor Jean-Paul Rabaut Saint-Etienne presented in December 1792 to the French National Convention to enthusiastic applause. While he duly underlines the significance of methodical instruction for the progress of the Enlightenment and the role of the Enlightenment in the revolution's success, he does so not without the following qualification:

The results of all these projected teaching institutions, however, will make themselves felt only in posterity, whereas you – Citizens [Members of this Assembly] – desire institutions for our own generation. You wish to raise instantaneously our morals to the level of [political awareness and enlightened justice which has already been reached by] our laws, and to trigger a revolution in the hearts and minds of the people just as the political Revolution has changed our social condition and form of government. However, does any method exist which is infallibly suited to convey to all Frenchmen, without any delay or exception, those uniform and universally shared impressions and sensations whose effect would make them collectively worthy of the Revolution, freedom [...] and equality [...] ?⁹

Naturally, Rabaut Saint-Étienne has an answer at hand to his somewhat rhetorical question. This answer initially refers to the institutions of Greek antiquity as well as the visualizing representations, rituals, and ceremonies defined by the Church of Rome in the wake of the Counter-Reformation. Moreover, Rabaut underscores the practice, allegedly current in these contexts, of moulding "the citizens of all ages and in all places by imparting to them, on the same day and at the same moment, the same impressions – through the senses, through imagination, through memory, through reasoning, in fact through all the faculties of the human being".¹⁰ In doing so, he clearly refers to anthropological ideas, widespread in the eighteenth century, which state that it is the senses, the passions, the psycho-physical emotivity of Man in general that, well beyond reason, are to be considered as points of departure for the process by which he is influenced and moulded. Finally, Rabaut makes plain his answer to his sham question by introducing a distinction that could hardly be more indicative of the French revolutionary context and of the radical restructuring of the country's social and political order which his contemporaries are

Pierre l'Enfant – who later developed the urban plan for the capital, Washington, and Jacques Louis David who, back in France, contributed to the glorification of the French Revolution through his monumental paintings. Cf. Jürgen Heideking, *Die Verfassungsfeiern von 1788. Das Ende der Amerikanischen Revolution und die Anfänge einer Nationalen Festkultur in den Vereinigten Staaten*, in: *Der Staat. Zeitschrift für Staatslehre, Öffentliches Recht und Verfassungsgeschichte* 34 (1995), 3, pp. 391-413; as well as Jürgen Heideking/Geneviève Fabre (eds), *Celebrating Ethnicity and Nation: American Festive Culture from the Revolution to the Early Twentieth Century*, New York/Oxford 2001.

9 Jean-Paul Rabaut Saint-Etienne, *Projet d'éducation nationale*, Paris 1792. Reprint in: Bronislaw Baczko (ed.), *Une Education pour la Démocratie. Textes et projets de l'époque révolutionnaire*, Paris 1982, pp. 295-301, quote p. 296.

10 Ibid., p. 297.

striving for. This is the distinction between “public schooling” (*instruction publique*) and “national education” (*éducation nationale*):

The former is meant to spread enlightened knowledge, the latter is designed to instil virtues; the former is to provide a society's prestige, the latter to guarantee its strength and cohesion. Public instruction requires academies, colleges, schools, books, calculating machines, and teaching methods; it secludes itself behind walls. National education [by contrast] requires circus games, halls for physical training, weapons, public games, national celebrations, fraternal interaction between all age groups and both sexes, and the impressive and charming spectacle of assembled society. It requires large spaces, the spectacle of the open fields and of nature; national education is nurture indispensable to society at large; public instruction matters only to parts of it. The two are sisters, to be sure, but national education is the older. More than this, national education is the mother common to all citizens, she breast-feeds them, raises them, treats them as siblings, and, through the commonality of care dispensed to them, imprints on them a certain family resemblance that distinguishes a nation raised in this way from all other nations on earth. The whole doctrine of national education consists, then, in captivating man from his cradle onwards, and even prior to his birth; for even the unborn child belongs to his or her mother country. National education captivates man in his entirety without ever releasing its hold on him; it is consequently not just an institution for children, but for one's entire life.¹¹

Rabaut Saint-Etienne's distinctions and explanations are significant in several respects. First of all, he clearly spells out the intentions associated with “ceremonial pedagogy” – for it is nothing other than “ceremonial pedagogy” he has in mind in expounding his ideas for “national education”. These intentions are directed not so much towards intellectual understanding but rather towards influencing the masses and thus reshaping their consciousness. Rabaut's “national education” is conceived, in other words, as a particular means of non-scholastic mass inculcation aimed at shaping the beliefs and behaviour patterns of man and, ultimately, the very core of human personality. With no less emphasis – and in terms unmistakably reminiscent of the theoretical programmes published by France's so-called “revolutionary” architects at this time¹² – Rabaut Saint-Etienne also focuses on the means of realizing such intentions. Through moulding the “hearts” and “minds”, the “impressions” and “sensations” as well as the “senses” and “imagination” of man, his “national education” seeks to visually impress, to emotionally overwhelm and thus to holistically affect the consciousness of the newborn “citizens”. Above all it is the great “spectacles” – of nature as well as public gatherings, national celebrations, open arenas and amicable competition – that are seen as the most suitable means of deeply

11 Ibid., p. 297–298; cf. also Ozouf, *La fête révolutionnaire* (footnote 7).

12 Cf. in particular Étienne-Louis Boullée, *Architecture, essai sur l'art* (1796–1797). Published from the original manuscript as Helen Rosenau (ed.), *Boullée's Treatise on architecture: a complete presentation of the "Architecture, essai sur l'art"*, which forms part of the Boullée papers in the Bibliothèque nationale, Paris/London 1953.

embedding in the popular consciousness the ideas of a novel political order and the principles of republican morality. Moreover, Rabaut Saint-Etienne emphatically refers to the exceptional situation that was created by the Revolution – and to which his *Plan for a National Education* owes its emergence – viz the radical changes in the societal and political order brought about from 1789 onwards and the attendant necessity of resocializing the masses in accordance with ideas directly opposed to France's feudal and monarchical past and the theological legitimization of that past. Finally, it is characteristic of the rather ambiguous modernity of Rabaut's *Plan for a National Education* that he not only takes up traditional ceremonial practices and transmutes them into secularized contemporary forms, he also tries to make these forms all-inclusive, demographically as well as biographically. In fact, the "national education" he advocates is meant both to seize hold – *s'emparer* as his French term reads – of *all* citizens and to keep hold of them *for their entire life-time*. Not least by thus extending "ceremonial pedagogy" to France's *population as a whole* and every Frenchman's *entire life-cycle*, Rabaut Saint-Etienne in a sense anticipates the totalitarian aspects associated with conceptions of ceremonial re-education or counter-education. He anticipates, in other words, the totalitarian aspects not only of the French Revolution – especially during the "Reign of Terror" years from 1793 to 1794 – but also of subsequent scenarios of revolutionary upheaval and "ceremonial pedagogy", leading to systems of government which have sometimes been characterized as "inculcating states".¹³

2. The "Revolutionary" Character of "Revolutionary Societies"

Japan in the wake of the Meiji Revolution of 1868, the Soviet Union following its inception as well as revolutionary Mexico churned up by successive upheavals and rival factions from 1910 onwards represent such scenarios. They therefore serve as fruitful cases for broader comparative studies which – located at the intersection of political history, history of education and media history – seek to describe particular manifestations of "ceremonial pedagogy" in various socio-political contexts.¹⁴ These studies are aimed, moreover, at analyzing the functions fulfilled by such media-based – and, in this sense, aesthetic – forms of representing novel conceptions of social order and patterns of social meaning. They therefore focus primarily on the instrumental status of "ceremonial pedagogy", analyzing its workings with respect to the dissemination of the programmes of revolutionary restructuring and of the underlying legitimating myths and ideologies, and the establishment of these programmes, myths and ideologies by way of a virtual

13 Cf. the comparative case-studies collected in Dietrich Benner / Jürgen Schriewer / Heinz-Elmar Tenorth (eds), *Erziehungsstaaten. Historisch-vergleichende Analysen ihrer Denktraditionen und nationaler Gestalten*, Weinheim 1998.

14 Reference is made here to the research project on "Ceremonial Pedagogy in Post-Revolutionary Societies" coordinated by Jörg Baberowski and Jürgen Schriewer. This research is a component project of the Collaborative Research Centre on Representations of Changing Patterns of Social Order – Cross-temporal and cross-cultural studies which was established at Humboldt University, Berlin, on the basis of substantial research funds granted by the German Research Agency. For more information, cf. <http://www.sfb-repraesentationen.de>.

resocialization of the people. “Ceremonial pedagogy” is thus analyzed as a practice which is as much cultural (making use of a broad array of symbolic structures, visual representations, public stagings and spatial arrangements) as it is social (performed by individual and collective actors committed, for their part, to varying – and sometimes even antagonistic – values, world-views, beliefs or ideologies).

A closer look at these studies’ units of comparison reveals that historical research into the *Russian Revolution* of October 1917 widely concurs in regarding it as the paradigm of modern social revolutionary movements, comparable only to the French Revolution of 1789.¹⁵ Criteria justifying such a categorization include the spatio-temporal connections between the revolutionary coup d’état, subsequent civil wars, and the attempts to radically restructure state and society in circumstances of totalitarian violence.¹⁶ The revolutionary character is underscored, moreover, by well-grounded structural characteristics. Historical-*cum*-comparative research has identified such characteristics with reference to a twofold coincidence, viz “the coincidence of societal structural change with class upheaval; and the coincidence of political with social transformation”.¹⁷ Last but not least, the Russian Revolution was a prime example of a deliberate use of “ceremonial pedagogy” to reshape popular consciousness. This pedagogy’s manifestations characteristically included mass parades, public celebrations, monumental architecture as well as the use of a language of symbols which was intended to have a broad impact on the populace and was put into practice in a broad range of objects of art and everyday devices.¹⁸ For just as the universalist claim of the American Revolution had inspired the revolutionaries of 1789,¹⁹ the radical concepts of new order and the enforcement strategies of the French Jacobins were likewise reflected in the ideas of the early leaders of the Russian Revolution.²⁰

What is less clear, in contrast, is the revolutionary character of the radical changes and thorough-going modernization which *Japan* underwent in the years after 1868. For a long time, following the self-stylizations of the protagonist elites, this reshaping process was referred to as the “Meiji Restoration”. For these elites had sought to avoid the term “revolution” which bore negative connotations in the Confucian imagination. Their aim was instead already to symbolically underline the continuity of political authority through use of the term “Meiji Restoration”. In contrast, recent scholarship has tended to use the term “Meiji Revolution” to describe the entire process of Japanese modernization from the late Edo period (1854–1867) through the coup of 1867–1868 and up to

15 Theda Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions. A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia, and China*, Cambridge etc. 1979, pp. 206 ff.

16 Jörg Baberowski, *Der rote Terror. Die Geschichte des Stalinismus*, Munich 2003.

17 Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions* (footnote 15), p. 4.

18 See, inter alia, Rolf, *Das sowjetische Massenfest* (footnote 1), as well as Klaus Klemp/Karl Weber (eds), *Die Tafel der Zaren und das Porzellan der Revolutionäre. Porzellan als Kunst und Instrument in Diplomatie, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*, Frankfurt am Main 2008.

19 Cf. footnote 8 above.

20 This holds true particularly for Lenin himself, cf. among others Robert Service, *Lenin – A Political Life*, vol. 1–3, Basingstoke etc. 1985–1995.

the proclamation of the Meiji constitution and the supplementary "Imperial Rescript on Education" in the years 1889 and 1890, and thus to emphasize the radicalness of the change in the political, economic and social system:²¹ The shogunate was replaced with a bureaucracy-based central government; the traditional feudal economy gave way to a western-style capitalist economic system; and social structures granting the nobility, samurai and other citizens equality, at least by law, were superimposed on the feudal estates system. Unlike in France and Russia, however, in the case of Japan, notwithstanding isolated revolts, there was no national peasants' uprising which had actually contributed to the "Meiji Revolution". Accordingly, this "revolution" does not easily fit with Skocpol's key criteria for "real", i.e. socio-revolutionary upheaval. The transformations of the Meiji era should instead be seen as "a centralizing and nationalizing political revolution without landed upper-class obstruction and without class-based revolts from below", in other words a "revolution from above".²² The national-*cum*-political character of the revolutionary reshaping of the country from 1868 on is made particularly clear through the virtual *volte-face* in the Japanese population's collective identity. While before 1868 the popular masses largely identified with the given local and regional framework, with either the village environment or the feudal fiefdom (*daimyat*), after 1868 the oligarchies willing to modernize deliberately pursued the transformation of "peasants into Japanese" – to adapt Eugen Weber's pithy title²³ – and thus the creation of the modern nation. The figure of the Japanese emperor, the tennō, played a key role in this process. He functioned equally as a symbol of national unity and as the highest religious figure in Shintō. In accordance with this dual function, his appearance fluctuated between mass public staging (as the supreme military commander and the holder of ultimate political sovereignty) and a concealing sacralization (through phases of invisibility behind the palace walls and the ceremonial veneration of his portrait in schools and public buildings). The development of this tennō cult required the increasing homogenization and centralization of the previously extremely heterogeneous Shintō religion.²⁴ At the same time, the religious concepts embodied in it were instrumentalized for nationalistic political purposes and associated with state representational functions. If the idea of "Japan" as a homogenous nation had only vague contours at the beginning of the Meiji period, in the space of a few decades up to the death of the Meiji tennō in 1912 it had become firmly entrenched in the popular consciousness. This project of establishing a nation conscious of its unity – which, in connection with the establishment of State Shintō, has been

21 Sven Saaler, Die Bedeutung der Epochenmarke 1868 in der Japanischen Geschichte: Restauration, Revolution, Reform ["The Significance of 1868 as a Caesura in Japanese History: Restoration, Revolution, Reform"], in: Saeculum. Jahrbuch für Universalgeschichte 56 (2005), pp. 69-104. Cf. also the discussion of recent scholarship on the "Meiji-Ishin" by Daniel Hedinger at the beginning of his article in this volume, pp. 78 ff.

22 Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions (footnote 15), p. 102 f.

23 Eugen Weber, Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural France 1870–1914, London 1977.

24 Cf. among others Klaus Antoni, Shintō und die Konzeption des japanischen Nationalwesens (Kokutai). Der religiöse Traditionalismus in Neuzeit und Moderne Japans (= Handbuch der Orientalistik, Bd. 8), Leiden etc. 1998; Ernest Satow / Karl Florenz, Ancient Japanese Rituals and the Revival of Pure Shintō, London etc. 2002.

characterized as “most daring social engineering”²⁵ – could only succeed in such a short period of time through the use and establishment in public space of manifold forms of “ceremonial pedagogy” for purposes of social integration. These integration rituals with mass appeal included national holidays, a national flag and anthem, national heroes (on bank notes or stamps), monuments and statues as well as national rites and ceremonies closely interwoven with Shintō religious practices.²⁶ Central to these efforts was the attempt to enforce personified representations of the nation in public space which enabled the establishment in the general consciousness of the abstract idea of the Japanese nation while largely levelling previously existing regional and social ties.

The trajectory and significance of the revolutionary movement which shook *Mexico* from 1910 onwards are different once again. To a very considerable degree, this movement was split into heterogeneous currents. Historiography therefore tends to characterize it as a scenario of multiple – regionally, politically, socially or culturally determined – sub-revolutions featuring rapidly changing fronts and varying coalitions. The liberal groupings around Francisco Madero, for instance, and the industrial middle classes of northern Mexico associated with these groupings primarily sought a widening of the opportunities for political participation and a basic reorganization of a political system which had hardened into dictatorship under the long-lived presidency of Porfirio Díaz (1876–1880 and 1884–1911). In contrast to such constitutional objectives, the peasant agrarian revolutionaries around Emiliano Zapata – the “revolution of the south” – were primarily concerned with a social reform programme comprising the restitution of their hereditary land (which had undergone widespread expropriation under Díaz). Finally, a conglomerate of small peasants, agrarian workers and a homeless lumpenproletariat led by Pancho Villa – which revolted against the concentration of land in major estates and against large American land-holdings in particular – formed temporary allies of the Zapatistas. However, all these groups were in themselves too heterogeneous to formulate a binding political and ideological programme, let alone jointly pursue one. In fact, for the origins and changing trajectory of the revolution a variety of ethnic, legal, religious and cultural factors were just as important as entirely personal ambitions, affinities or aversions. Thus in overall terms the Mexican revolution can be interpreted as an extremely violence-ridden redistribution of positions of power at every level – at that of the Federation as well as that of individual states, municipalities, cultural institutions and social groups. Yet the revolutionary process simultaneously revealed acute crises of integration, in at least two different senses. On the one hand, the disputes between the revolutionary factions themselves took an exceedingly conflict-laden course and even intensified into internal civil wars, military rebellions and popular uprisings. It was only towards the end of the 1920s that these factions were brought together in a united revolutionary party under the leadership of the ultimately victorious “Jacobin” faction of the Constitutionalists. Henceforth factional struggles were fought within the new party

25 Helen Hardacre, *Shintō and the State, 1868–1988*, Princeton etc. 1989.

26 See the chapters authored by Sven Saaler and by Shin'ichi Suzuki and Kazuhiko Yamaki in this volume.

formation but thus became controllable. The organization of this party – which was founded in 1929 as the *Partido Nacional Revolucionario* and via several interim stages evolved into today's *Partido Revolucionario Institucional* – was without doubt one of the most far-reaching measures in a subsequently extraordinarily effective strategy of mass mobilization. Bound by a corporatist model of state and society, this united party saw itself as a hegemonic force which was to reconcile the interests of state and society as well as those of business and administration. At the same time, it represented the myth of the revolution, which was subsequently to be called upon as an ever renewable source of legitimation for various political programmes and personalities.²⁷ On the other hand, manifest integration problems existed in view of the permanent threat of US interference in Mexico's revolutionary turmoil. Short-term interventions such as the occupation of Veracruz harbour in 1914 or General Pershing's "punitive expedition" to northern Mexico in the winter of 1916–1917 had dramatically illustrated this danger. In this context, the "Jacobin" revolutionary generals around Álvaro Obregón who had ultimately prevailed in the recurrent sub-revolutions and internal Mexican disputes rapidly realized that they could only be sure of consolidating their victory through sufficiently broad-based social support, preferably in the form of nationalistically-tinted mass mobilization. Accordingly, the programme of offensively linking modernization with internal nation-building primarily developed in response to the perceived national threat from the north. While a project of this sort had enjoyed hardly any significance in the early years of the revolution, it now became the victorious faction's explicit programme. Nonetheless, its enactment was not possible without conflicts. First of all, the integration of the indios in a national space which was to be homogenized proved highly problematic, as the strategies drafted by Mexican intellectuals for the indios' cultural and political inclusion clashed with the extraordinary social, ethnic and linguistic complexity of the highly heterogeneous indio populations between the north of the country and the federal states of the south east, as for instance between the Yuki and the Maya. The new nation-building policy also clashed with the traditional influence of the Catholic Church and the still lively popular religion, however; in other words, with deeply-rooted cultural factors which had often enough been employed for reactionary aims and the reinforcement of traditional loyalties. Accordingly, the effects of the secularization policy promoted under the constitution of 1917 triggered off the Catholic peasants' uprisings in the north west, the so-called Cristeros wars of the 1920s and 1930s, which strongly signalled the level of opposition to the revolutionaries' modernization and nationalization policies.²⁸ In view of such external and internal challenges the task was increasingly to realize social mobilization and national integration through new means and persuasive forms of expression such as the occupation of public space and the reinterpretation of identity-forming ritu-

27 Under the well-known abbreviation "PRI", this party was to dominate political life in Mexico largely unchallenged right up to the 1990s.

28 Peter L. Reich, *Mexico's Hidden Revolution: The Catholic Church in Law and Politics since 1929*, Notre Dame/London 1995.

als. This task was assigned to the education ministry which had been newly established in 1921, the *Secretaría de Educación Pública*. This ministry – which, under the dynamic leadership of the writer and philosopher José Vasconcelos Calderón, was for a time one of the country's most influential governmental authorities, both in terms of shaping the dominant ideologies and translating them into actual policies – took on not only the reorganization of the public school system and eradication of the illiteracy still widespread among the rural population but also the public and cultural representation of the victorious Constitutionalists' visions for the new political and social order.²⁹ Notwithstanding considerable material limitations, over a period of decades the executives in this ministry attempted to implement a policy of continuous modernization with the goals of cultural consciousness-shaping (through the development and maintenance of visually memorable national myths of origin and visions of the future), social mobilization and imposition of discipline (through hygiene, labour and social education) and national integration (through linguistic homogenization, civic instruction and the comprehensive integration of women). It is here that the large-scale frescos (*murales*) on many government buildings and town halls – which immortalized a stylization and mythicization of Mexican history spanning the historical ruptures and political fragmentations – as well as the public *fiestas* and the *misiones culturales* had their place.

3. Integration, Homogenization, Modernization: Problem Configurations in Revolutionary Contexts and the Role of “Ceremonial Pedagogy”

To be sure, the range of units of analysis of possible relevance for the comparative studies in question is not limited to Meiji Japan, the young Soviet Union and post-revolutionary Mexico. Quite apart from historical precedents such as the French Revolution, the radical transformation of the multi-ethnic Ottoman Empire into a highly centralized and culturally and linguistically homogenized nation-state – first by the Young Turks (1908) and conclusively by Kemal Atatürk (1923) – might well represent another case worthy of detailed examination from the vantage point of “ceremonial pedagogy”.³⁰ Accordingly, whatever the number of potentially fruitful cases it is also crucial to identify the points of reference which are indispensable for meaningful comparisons. The common features of the revolutionary contexts outlined above – which facilitate their comparison – are typical problems or problem configurations that may hypothetically be described as follows:

29 Engracia Loyo Bravo, *Gobiernos Revolucionarios y Educación Popular en México, 1911–1928*, México, D.F. 1999.

30 Cf. among other works, Rezan Benatar, *Producing and Reproducing the Nation: Kemalist Turkey as an Education State*, in: Benner / Schriewer / Tenorth (eds), *Erziehungsstaaten* (footnote 13), pp. 287–304.

(i) *Resocializing the masses in exceptional circumstances*

Processes of "ceremonial pedagogy", pursued with a view to affecting and reshaping mass consciousness, are implemented only in exceptional circumstances in the context of the social life of modern states and societies. Conceived as a kind of "comprehensive scheme for popular instruction intended to promote the masses' graphical and profound understanding of the nature of the Revolution" – as a book published to mark the tenth anniversary of the Russian Revolution significantly states³¹ – they are not to be equated with the generally accepted forms of institutionalized schooling, nor can such forms of socialization be maintained over time without losing their socializing power. They are therefore typically linked with the exceptional political and societal scenarios arising in contexts of revolutionary transformation and not in the normal course of historical events.

(ii) *Social mobilization and cultural homogenization*

As the French Revolution had conspicuously demonstrated, transformations of this kind were typically associated with a self-defined imperative for the modernization – and even the more or less wholesale rebuilding – of state and society. This imperative involved, first of all, the mobilization of large segments of the population in the societies in question. It also entailed the goals – differently weighted in each particular context – of political integration, and homogenization along the lines of a single national culture, of societies that still were strongly tradition-bound and highly segmented, whether through estates and regional divisions or through ethnic affiliations or religio-cultural orientations.³² These were societies, in other words, such as the semi-feudal and territorially and communicatively fragmented Japan under the Tokugawa shogunate, the socially, ethnically and culturally segmented Mexico of the late nineteenth century and multi-ethnic tsarist Russia. In this context, therefore, cultural homogenization meant, in the Japanese case, the realization of a nation-state steeped in nationalism (represented by the tennō and the State Shintō religion centred on the tennō); in the Mexican case, the fusing of ethnically and socially extremely heterogeneous population groups into an overarching "cosmic race" (represented by historical myths and, in a certain sense, a permanently "institutionalized revolution");³³ and, in the case of the Soviet Union, finally, the construction of a classless society (represented by the Communist Party and its ideology). As this last example makes clear, however, homogenization did not simply imply fully realized inclusion; instead, all three cases entailed varying degrees of inclusion and exclusion. Thus in the Japanese case ethnic groups such as the Ainu, who did not share the com-

31 Orest V. Tsekhnovits, *Demonstratsia i karnaval: K desiatoi godovshchine Oktriabr'skoi revoliutsii* [Demonstration and Carnival: On the Tenth Anniversary of the October Revolution]. Leningrad 1927, p. 7. I am grateful to Malte Rolf who drew my attention to this phrase.

32 See the succinct discussion by Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*, Oxford 1983, of the connections between nation-building and cultural homogenization.

33 Cf. the utopian programme drafted by José Vasconcelos, *La raza cósmica: misión de la raza iberoamericana*, París/Madrid etc. 1925.

mon ancestry of the Japanese nation derived from the mythic sun goddess Amaterasu, remained excluded. Similarly, in Mexico foreign – especially North American – entrepreneurs and large landowners as well as natives who clung to autochthonous lifestyles and cultural patterns and, later on, all those who opposed the “institutionalized revolution”, including the Catholic Church, were deemed incapable of integration. The relationship between inclusion and exclusion assumed particularly drastic forms in post-revolutionary Russia. Massive homogenizing pressure imposed on the majority of the population went hand in hand with the mass elimination of all groups even merely imaginarily identified as “bourgeois” or incriminated as “former”: landowners and kulaks, nobles and tsarist officers, civil servants and salaried employees, teachers and professors, priests and tribal leaders, and even the erstwhile “national communists” and Cossacks. To put it in paradoxical terms: “The more definite the systems of order the Bolsheviks dreamed of, the greater the number of those forced to remain excluded from them.”³⁴ Moreover, in all three cases here under discussion the general goals of modernization and homogenization were concretized in a cluster of complementary policies whose enactment was attempted – once again, with varying priorities in individual cases – within a highly compressed period of time. This included an infrastructure policy designed to achieve the rational reorganization of national territory and the development of a national transport system. This also laid the foundations for an economic and industrialization policy pursued with voluntaristic resoluteness. In parallel, an ideological and commemorative policy pursued with the utmost commitment aimed to realize society-wide acceptance of myths of origins, grand narratives and binding visions of history and the future.³⁵ Finally, cultural homogenization focused directly on language policy (in view of the binding enforcement of a standard national language) and general education policy (in view of the inclusive reorganization and modernization of institutionalized schooling).

(iii) Imperatives of modernizing under “compressed” time horizons

The drama of the revolutionary reorganization policies went hand in hand with a particular relationship to time. Not only did the self-imposed programme of modernization – as in the case of Meiji Revolution Japan – extend to the homogenization of time through calendar reform and reorganization of the entire nation’s time system.³⁶ In many cases the key protagonists acted under the impression of a shortening of the available time horizon, which was clearly perceived as such. This perception was determined in equal measure by external dispositions in the international state system and by self-imposed

34 Jörg Baberowski / Anselm Doering-Manteuffel, *Ordnung durch Terror*, Bonn 2006, p. 55. Cf. also Baberowski, *Der rote Terror* (footnote 16), pp. 36 ff, where the inhuman dictum of Grigorii Zinov’ev – a member of the Bolsheviks’ innermost leadership circle – of September 1918 is quoted: “Of the one hundred million-strong population of Soviet Russia we must get 90 million on our side. As for the rest, we have nothing to say to them. They must be destroyed”.

35 Cf. for general information Helmut König, *Politik und Gedächtnis*, Weilerswist 2008.

36 Cf. Reinhard Zöllner, *Zeit und die Konstruktion der Moderne im Japan des 19. Jahrhunderts*, in: *Historische Anthropologie. Kultur – Gesellschaft – Alltag* 11 (2003), 1, pp. 47-71.

– and partially utopian – visions of the future. In all three compared contexts, what predominated was an awareness of a relative lateness in the process of modernization and industrialization and a concomitant backwardness in relation to more advanced powers or rivals with superior military technology in the international state system.³⁷ This awareness grew into the realization of an acute threat from the imperialist powers of the West, a threat which it was thought could only be countered through energetic action and the broadest possible mobilization. This had been the situation in Japan since the forced opening-up of the country and the "unequal treaties" concluded with the western powers. But the same situation also applied in the Soviet Union during the eventful Civil War years and in view of the interventions of the Entente powers who had landed in the Far North, in the Black Sea ports of the south and in the Far East. And the situation in Mexico was largely analogous, as a consequence of humiliating defeats at the hands of the north American invaders and economic dependency on foreign (mainly US) large-scale companies and investors. Finally, the insistence on the rapid realization of utopian visions of society – where notions of lateness and threats were not insignificant – was a further factor in the compression of the political timeframe. Such forms of political anticipation of the future were particularly true of the Soviet Union, but to a lesser extent they also characterized certain elements of the Mexican revolutionary movement. In all these cases, then, it was the awareness of time deemed to be, in a sense, accelerated or "compressed" that spurred on voluntaristic activities utilizing extraordinary means, in a variety of different political fields.

(iv) Multiple motivations for the use of "ceremonial pedagogy"

The exceptional situation of revolutionary rearrangements outlined so far, the range of self-imposed modernization and homogenization imperatives and, not least, the awareness of an external threat and accelerated time horizons also determined the motivations of the revolutionary regimes for relying on extraordinary techniques for the extensive representation and communication of their programmes. This was particularly so in that, in all three countries under consideration, the occupation of public space which had for a time been fiercely contested and the displacement of competing systems of references and symbols – such as those of the church and the monarchy, the feudal daimyo or the bourgeois republic – played a key role. The use precisely of visual media and procedural forms of representation (public ceremonies, mass parades and rituals as well as an "architecture parlante", myth-narrating murals and symbol-saturated monuments) had a twofold motivation. On the one hand, in the Soviet Union and Mexico in particular – though less so in Japan – in the context of high levels of illiteracy there was a quite pragmatic need for increased use of highly expressive, non-written media for purposes

37 This was, incidentally, a realistic assessment according to Alexander Gerschenkron, *Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective*, Cambridge, Mass. 1962; cf. also Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions* (footnote 15), pp. 19 ff., 47 et passim.

of social mobilization and persuasion in relation to the mass adult population. On the other hand, the goal was the visual and auditory monopolization of public space and its penetration with a canon of core symbols which were suitable in order to superimpose, reinterpret or replace the representations of the *ancien régime* and its systems of order.³⁸ However, the aim was more than just to replace the old systems of order and their symbols – as clearly expressed for all to see, for instance, in the campaigns to remove women's veils in the Muslim Soviet republics, the secularization of ecclesiastical symbols in Mexico or the conversion of Buddhist temples into exhibition halls or schools in Meiji Japan. Many cases also involved a transfer of sacrality. In other words, the shattering of the established systems of order – whether ecclesiastical or political in nature – was associated with the virtually sacral glory of new kinds of civil religions, identity-forming ruler figures or charismatic leaders.³⁹ It was precisely here that the staging and influencing techniques of “ceremonial pedagogy” had their place. They represented a key instrument in the enterprise of communicating the visions of a radical transformation and reorganization of state and society through forms of emotionally overwhelming aestheticization and staging and of embedding these visions in hearts and minds. While the protagonists of the French Revolution had already been aware of such potential forms of influence, the same was also true in principle for the new political elites in the post-revolutionary societies examined here. In Japan, for instance, the director of the newly established Imperial Museum defended the significance of erecting in public space bronze statues depicting heroes both of ancient times and of the Meiji Revolution as an important means of “public education”.⁴⁰ As already noted, the political intellectuals of the early Soviet Union likewise deliberately employed non-scholastic forms of mass education and inculcation – such as mass processions, open-air theatre, public festivals and decorative presentations of urban space – which were suitable “to promote the masses’ graphical and profound understanding of the nature of the Revolution”.⁴¹ In the same spirit, as early as 1918 the People’s Commissariat for Enlightenment organized a competition with the goal of identifying and selecting from among the works of well-known writers and revolutionary intellectuals “brief, expressive and profound quotations inspiring reflection, stimulating positive thought and unleashing strong revolutionary feelings in the soul”.⁴² And the programme which the Mexican *Secretaría de Educación Pública* – which was at

38 Examples of this are the complementary movements of destruction and redesign in architecture and urban planning – frequently enlarged into oversize ideal cities – both in the French Revolution and in early Soviet Moscow; cf. Harten, *Transformation und Utopie des Raums in der Französischen Revolution* (footnote 7); Janina Urussowa, *Das neue Moskau: Die Stadt der Sowjets im Film 1917–1941*, Cologne etc. 2004.

39 For the American and French Revolutions, cf. Heideking, *Die Verfassungsfeiern von 1788* (footnote 8), p. 405, and Ozouf, *La fête révolutionnaire* (footnote 7), pp. 441 ff. On the sacralization of the charismatic ruler as the epitome of the revolutionary new order in Japan and Mexico cf. the articles by Shin’ichi Suzuki and Kazuhiko Yamaki and by Eugenia Roldán Vera and Carlos Martínez Valle in this volume.

40 Cf. the article by Sven Saaler in this volume, p. 34, footnote 29.

41 Tsekhnovitsker, *Demonstratsia i karnaval* (footnote 31), p. 7.

42 Quoted in Klemp/Weber (eds), *Die Tafel der Zaren und das Porzellan der Revolutionäre* (footnote 18), p. 262.

the forefront on all issues of intellectual and cultural policy – announced in 1934 looks like a late reply to Rabaut Saint-Etienne:

Two kinds of educational influence have an impact on peoples and individuals: first, the influence of the school and, second, an influence which is more extensive, longer-lasting, and perhaps more direct, viz the influence of the social environment. [...] The influence of the school is subject to multiple contingencies and vanishes as soon as it ceases to be exercised directly. By contrast, the complex fabric of social life – comprising customs, common usages, daily examples of action and reaction, general means of discussing the exciting present as well as prejudices, conversations and many other aspects – continuously influences children, adults and old people just as it affects both the educated and the uneducated. It pervades all social classes and determines the collective character of the population. Social life at large, then, is the school without walls which relies on indirect and yet effective means. Accordingly, the state, heavily committed to educating the people, must – and indeed does – take care to have an impact, without neglecting the fundamental role of schooling proper, on the educational forces of the social environment so as to move beyond prejudice or ideology all those potentially seductive institutions – such as taken-for-granted habit, spectacle or fashion – that impinge on the spirit of a nation [...] In this sense, the Mexican State pays great heed to its duties as an educator.⁴³

(v) *Actors, levels of actors and "clash of representations"*

However, the far-reaching expectations and intentions outlined so far only describe *one* aspect of the use of "ceremonial pedagogy" in situations of historical and social upheaval. This does not yet cover the implementation of such intentions in practised forms of media-based resocialization or even the actual effects which they realized (or failed to realize). Yet it would not be wrong to assume that the representations of the generally urban political elites, on the one hand, and, on the other, the ideas founded on tradition, religion and habit of a largely peasant, if not mostly illiterate, population collided in a manner revealing all possible forms of mutual misunderstanding, stubborn rejection and open conflict. Just as the political elites had only learned to perceive their own societies as "traditional" through their confrontation with the "West", the imperialist powers or "enlightened" Europe, the encroachment of secular visions of society, abstract legal norms, thoroughly rationalized systems of knowledge and western technology into the lifeworlds of agrarian populations were generally experienced by these populations as a rupture and conflict which they responded to with persistent resistance. In other words – to adapt another much cited book title⁴⁴ – the situation of upheaval at the level of macro-structural policies and transformations corresponded to a "clash of representations"

43 Memoria de la Secretaría de Educación Pública 1934, vol. II, México, DF 1934, pp. 539 f.

44 I am referring to Samuel P. Huntington's book *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, New York 1996.

at the level of the actors concerned. These actors should be pictured at a wide variety of different levels, with varying statuses, fields of action and intellectual horizons. The key protagonists first of all consisted of the chief ideologues and guiding intellectuals with political responsibility in ministries and propaganda institutions. At the level below this executive stratum were technical specialists who conceived the changing programmes and organizational forms of “ceremonial pedagogy”. Hardly less important were the local organisers charged with interpreting the directives of the central government authorities and guiding intellectuals, refracting these in line with the horizon of their own particular – and highly individual – experience and ideas and enforcing them in the regional and local organizational committees and bodies. Last of all there were the recipients, in other words the broad “public” which formed the object of the re-educational intentions – couched in terms of aesthetics, appeal or agitation, depending on the initial situation. Yet the political initiators found in and through their interactions with the nearly unforeseeable variety of this public’s currents, groups, loyalty ties and educational and life experience – if not before – that the opportunities for enforcing their intentions became uncontrollable. Likewise, it is hard for present-day scholarship as well to control – both in methodological terms and with regard to the sources – the establishment of both collective and individual identities in such processes of interaction.

4. Different Contexts and Varying Manifestations of “Ceremonial Pedagogy”

Under these circumstances, comparative studies examining forms of “ceremonial pedagogy” in connection with the exceptional conditions and problem scenarios of post-revolutionary societies will not be able to limit themselves to consistently identifying identical phenomena. Founded in historical sociology, they have “no fear of comparisons or context”;⁴⁵ on the contrary, they emphasize politico-cultural contexts and context-determined deviations. They are therefore not focused on invariant causal relationships but instead assume the functional equivalence of different manifestations of “ceremonial pedagogy” in relation to structurally similar reference problems of far-reaching mobilization and consciousness-shaping.⁴⁶ The task of such comparative historical analyses is then to indicate a differentiated spectrum of various forms of “ceremonial pedagogy” whose selection and effectiveness are equally attributable to problem perceptions which vary according to context, to tradition-determined – and in this sense, path-dependent – social meanings, and to different collective and individual historical actors. By way of an initial summary, the forms of “ceremonial pedagogy” whose application in the context

45 Lars Mjøset, No fear of comparisons or context: on the foundations of historical sociology, in: Jürgen Schriewer (ed.), *Comparative Methodologies in the Social Sciences – Cross-Disciplinary Inspirations* (= *Comparative Education*, special issue no. 32, August 2006), pp. 337-362.

46 Cf. Jürgen Schriewer, *Comparative Education Methodology in Transition: Towards a Science of Complexity*, in: Jürgen Schriewer (ed.), *Discourse Formation in Comparative Education*, 3rd revised edition, Frankfurt am Main etc. 2009, pp. 3-52.

of post-revolutionary societies is analysed in detail in the following case studies may be arranged in three different groups:

Nationwide tours by the *key representatives* of the new revolutionary system of government and society played a key role in all the above-mentioned units of analysis. Just as the Meiji emperor travelled across unified Japan, president Lázaro Cárdenas travelled through post-revolutionary Mexico (and – it should be added for the sake of completeness – the Azerbaijani revolutionary leader Nariman Narimanov travelled through his new zone of influence). Each of these journeys was intended to provide a clear contribution to spreading the message of the enacted revolution or reorganization of the state and nation from the respective capitals – Tokyo, St. Petersburg / Moscow or Mexico City – throughout the country, including its peripheral parts. But as well as demonstrating power and symbolizing unity, these journeys were also intended to enhance the legitimacy of the new rulers by staging their physical presence. Prompted on the one hand by concrete occasions such as military parades, openings of parliament or the dedication of monuments or schools, on the other hand these journeys also represented an attempt to consolidate the new order which had been brought about by revolutionary means. The article by Shin'ichi Suzuki and Kazuhiko Yamaki on Japan articulates the tours made by the Meiji tennō with deeply symbolic intention just as the article by Eugenia Roldán Vera and Carlos Martínez Valle analyzes the reiterated travels of the Mexican president Lázaro Cárdenas across the country.

A second, highly characteristic group of forms of "ceremonial pedagogy" – the *construction of monuments* and the *cultivation of rituals* – was tied to traditions which can be traced back to distant historical origins. Both these forms are linked, on the one hand, with the intentions associated with deliberate commemorative policy and, on the other, with the attempted transfer of sacral dignity and legitimacy. The first of these aspects is at the heart of Sven Saaler's article on the mythical and the contemporary founding figures of Japan who were immortalized by the oligarchies of the Meiji period at highly symbolic locations as "men in metal". On the other hand, in their extensive essay Shin'ichi Suzuki and Kazuhiko Yamaki not only consider the transfer of the sacral aura, dignity and morally binding nature of the Buddhist temple to the western-inspired modern school building; they also analyze the ritual of honouring the emperor's portrait which was regularly practised until 1945 in Japanese elementary schools and of reciting, in an elevated tone of voice, the deeply Confucian "Imperial Rescript on Education".

Finally, a third form of "ceremonial pedagogy" – a form which was given special weight in all three comparative scenarios – was the practice of *campaigns* and *exhibitions* which were specially linked with the symbolization of modernity and progress. This is true of the national exhibitions in Japan which were initially tentatively improvised in what had previously been temples but increasingly followed Western patterns, and which thus expressed in visible form – and hence as an "aesthetic" staging – new types of knowledge systems as well as the political resolution to fuel industrial progress. Far more strongly than in imperial Japan, the Soviet campaigns expressed the opposition between peasant tradition and Soviet modernity, between "disease" and "hygiene", and thus also between

supposed dilapidation and health (including in intellectual terms). This is illustrated on the one hand by Matthias Braun's article on hygiene campaigns in Soviet Russia. On the other hand, with his analysis of unveiling campaigns in the Muslim Soviet republics, Jörg Baberowski establishes the extreme degree of conflict which was associated with the collision of different – yet equally exclusive – religio-cultural and ideological world-views. He also provides emphatic proof – if such proof were necessary – that the use of “ceremonial pedagogy” in the exceptional conditions of revolutionary upheavals and in connection with the voluntaristic modernization policies of post-revolutionary regimes always entailed a serious “clash of representations”.

Men in Metal: Representations of the Nation in Public Space in Meiji Japan, 1868–1912

Sven Saaler

RESÜMEE

Die Gründung der „Nation“ im Japan der Meiji-Zeit (1868–1912) erforderte neue Methoden des „social engineering“ und führte zu neuartigen Inszenierungen politischer Macht, Autorität und Legitimität im öffentlichen Raum. In diesem Beitrag soll skizziert werden, wie die junge Meiji-Regierung überhaupt erst einen öffentlichen Raum schuf und diesen dann zum Zwecke einer national-integrativen Politik nutzte, indem sie ihn mit personalisierten nationalen Symbolen besetzte. Im Vordergrund steht dabei das Medium der Bronzestatue. Fast eintausend Statuen von historischen Persönlichkeiten wurden in Japan bis zum Beginn des japanisch-chinesischen Krieges im Jahre 1937 im öffentlichen Raum errichtet. Das Medium der Statue spielte damit eine wichtige Rolle im Rahmen der nationalen Indoktrinationspolitik und der Schaffung eines nationalen Bewusstseins in der japanischen Bevölkerung.

1. The *Meiji-ishin* and the Issue of National Integration in Modern Japan

The Meiji Restoration (*Meiji-ishin*) of 1868 brought about revolutionary changes in Japan's political, social and economic systems and was accompanied by gradual changes in everyday life and culture. The extent to which these changes amounted to a “revolution” depends on the definition of revolution adopted and on the aspects given emphasis in any analysis. At any rate, as part of a general trend in historiography, recent writings have increasingly tended to characterize the changes that followed the *coup d'état* of 1868 as a revolution¹ – though with this revolution being variously emphasized as an

1 Kenneth B. Pyle, *Japan Rising. The Resurgence of Japanese Power and Purpose*, New York 2007, p. 24; Andrew

“aristocratic revolution”,² a “nationalist revolution”,³ a “samurai revolution”,⁴ a “revolution from above”,⁵ or the prototype of an “Asian revolution”.⁶ In this context, the Meiji Revolution or Meiji Renovation⁷ is increasingly defined not exclusively as the *coup d'état* of 1868, but more broadly as an era that lasted until the suppression of the last violent uprisings against the new government in 1877–78, or even until the new state took its final form with the proclamation of the Meiji Constitution in 1890.

The most important change in this context of a “long revolution” was the transformation of the Japanese archipelago from a politically decentralized system of 260 mainly independent feudal domains (*han*), usually called “countries” (*kuni*), featuring a politically irrelevant and alienated majority population – the peasants – into a strongly centralized nation-state (*kuni* or *kokka*) with a populace that could be mobilized by the state authorities. “Prior to 1853, there was no Japan,” as Kevin Doak puts it rather provocatively in his recent work *A History of Nationalism in Modern Japan*.⁸ And further: “Japan’, as the national signifier we understand it today, was for all practical purposes irrelevant to the dominant forms of politics and to everyday life in the archipelago.”⁹ While the process of political centralization was achieved within one or two decades after 1868, the creation of the “nation” from a population consisting overwhelmingly of peasants proved much more difficult to achieve and remained the most pressing task of the new government. To mobilize the population for the purposes of the nation-state – modernization, industrialization and war – it was necessary to generate a new type of loyalty to the newly created nation-state. Out of the sum of individuals inhabiting the Japanese islands there thus evolved the Japanese “nation” through the ubiquitous elements of the nationalization process identified by Antony Smith: “the growth of myths and memories of common ancestry and history (...); the formation of a shared public culture based on an indigenous resource (...); the growth of common codes and institutions of a single legal order,” as well as “the unification of local economic units into a single socio-economic

Gordon: *A Modern History of Japan. From Tokugawa Times to the Present*, New York / Oxford 2003, p. 61; James McClain, *Japan. A Modern History*, New York 2002; Marius B. Jansen, *The Making of Modern Japan*, Cambridge, Mass. / London 2000, pp. 333 f.; Peter Duus, *Modern Japan*, Boston 1998, p. 85 (Duus, however, like many historians of modern Japan, continues to use the established term “Meiji Restoration”, notwithstanding his characterization of this event as “revolutionary”).

2 Thomas C. Smith, *Japan's Aristocratic Revolution*, in: *The Yale Review* 50 (1961) 370–383.

3 William G. Beasley, *The Meiji Restoration*, Stanford 1972, p. 424; Pyle, *Japan Rising* (footnote 1), p. 27.

4 Gordon, *A Modern History of Japan* (footnote 1).

5 Duus, *Modern Japan* (footnote 1).

6 Mitani, Hiroshi: *Meiji-ishin to Nashonarizumu. Bakumatsu no gaikō to seiji hendō* [The Meiji Restoration and Nationalism. Changes in Diplomacy and Politics at the End of the Edo Period], Tokyo 1997; Nakamura, Tetsu: *Meiji-ishin* [The Meiji Restoration], Tokyo: Shūeisha (Shūeisha Nihon no Rekishi 16), 1992, p. 14; cf. also Sven Saaler, *Die Bedeutung der Epochenmarke 1868 in der Japanischen Geschichte: Restauration, Revolution, Reform*, in: *Saeculum. Jahrbuch fuer Universalgeschichte* 56 (1 / 2005), pp. 69–104.

7 Richard Sims prefers the term “renovation” (Richard Sims, *Japanese Political History since the Meiji Renovation, 1868–2000*, New York 2001).

8 Kevin M. Doak, *A History of Nationalism in Modern Japan. Placing the People*, Leiden 2007, p. 36.

9 *Ibid.*

unit.”¹⁰ Such developments, naturally, took time. However, the Meiji elite was aware of the urgency of the task and actively promoted “the growth of myths and memories of common ancestry and history” as well as the “formation of a shared public culture” through various strategies of social engineering and diverse forms of social education.¹¹ Modern Japan since the Meiji period imported and, in part, developed an array of new techniques of social education and social engineering – new ways of constructing national myths, national history and national symbols and displaying them in public space using, above all, visual strategies. As part of these efforts, a particularly strong emphasis was placed on the creation and the commemoration and memorialization of *personalized* representations of the nation. For most Japanese at the end of the nineteenth century (and probably long afterwards), the idea of “the nation” was highly abstract and remote. By presenting newly constructed national heroes – but also popular (or popularized) figures from Japanese history and ancestors of the nation derived from Japanese mythology as well as the founding figures of modern Japan – in powerful visual terms to serve the politics of national integration, the otherwise highly abstract and remote idea of the “nation” could be rendered more concrete. By displaying popular national heroes and founding figures in public space, the nation was given “a face” and thus popular identification with the nation – in the form of personalized symbols which evoked feelings of proximity, kinship¹² and a personal bond – was facilitated.

While personified representations of the nation are found in a wide array of media in modern Japan – such as school textbooks, lithographs, woodblock prints and illustrated newspapers and journals – they are especially noticeable in the form of prominently located visual representations in public space. Particularly conspicuous are the large number of *statues*, mostly bronze (*dōzō*), of historical figures, which were erected from the Meiji period (1868 – Japan, bronze statues of *historical* (and pseudo-historical) figures appeared for the first time in the 1880s and were erected in large numbers in the Meiji and Taishō (1912–1926) periods. Between 1880 and 1928, more than 800 of these statues were erected throughout Japan.¹³ They must be seen as part of the policy of social engineering adopted by the Meiji government, aiming at the creation of a nation and strengthening of Japanese national consciousness. We will see how this was achieved by examining the context of the statue-building trend and reviewing several case studies that reveal the forces – both ideological and personal – behind the building of bronze statues in this period.

10 Antony D. Smith, *Myths and Memories of the Nation*, Oxford 1999, p. 104.

11 On the concepts of “social engineering” and “social education” in the context of modern Japanese history and the multiple objectives of these policies cf. McClain (footnote 1), ch. 8; Helen Hardacre, *Shinto and the State, 1868–1988*, Princeton 1989; Sheldon Garon, *Molding Japanese Minds. The State in Everyday Life*, Princeton 1997 (Garon uses the concept of “social management”). On “social engineering” in modern nation-states in general cf. Shmuel N. Eisenstadt, *Die Vielfalt der Moderne*, Weilerswist 2000, p. 29 f.

12 On the importance of kinship as a basis of national consciousness, see Antony D. Smith, *Nationalism and Modernism*, London/New York 1998, p. 46; Smith, *Myths and Memories* (footnote 10), ch. 4; Connor Walker, *The Nation and its Myth*, in: *International Journal of Comparative Sociology* 33/1–2, 1992, pp. 48–57.

13 Arai, Fusatō: *Ijin no omokage* [The Countenance of Great Men], Tokyo 1929.

2. Statue-Building in the Context of the Nation-Building Process

Before analyzing the process leading to the erection of the first statues, a few remarks seem necessary on the reasons why there were no statues of historical personalities in public space *before* 1880. First of all, the issue of whether public space even existed in pre-Meiji Japan is obviously open to question. Certainly, the typical locations for the erection of statues – public parks, squares and stations – did *not* exist. Public buildings were rather remote from the eye of the general public, and there was no sense of statue-building for reasons of political propaganda. Some wooden statues of historical figures were found in burial grounds in premodern Japan, such as statues of Shoguns from the Ashikaga and Tokugawa families and of the sixteenth-century warlord Toyotomi Hideyoshi. However, these statues were ill-fated.¹⁴ But with the advent of the Meiji era, we can observe an increase in statue-building. The nation now needed an outlet to display its glory to the general public. Above all, however, the exigencies of modern warfare – mobilization of the entire population and almost all the country's economic resources – contributed to an acceleration of social policies strengthening an attachment to the nation and readiness for sacrifice. To this end, the display of national heroes who had devoted their lives to “the nation” came to be considered an important method of social engineering from the 1880s onwards.

The first thoughts of building a statue for a historical figure in Meiji Japan can be dated to 1878. In April of that year, the national newspaper *Yomiuri Shinbun* for the first time reported rumours that a statue was to be built in Tokyo.¹⁵ The statue was to be built in Ueno park and would depict Kido Takayoshi (or Kōin), one of the most important and influential statesmen of the early Meiji period who had died only one year previously. We do not know how substantial these plans were, but they were never realized. This may have had to do with the fact that it was of course difficult to display a “normal” politician in public space while the imperial house and the Japanese emperor, the Tennō – *the* symbol of national unity in the ideology of the Meiji state – were still largely invisible. As is well known, in the 1870s and 1880s the emperor undertook several trips throughout Japan during which he appeared in person in front of his subjects, but clearly few of these subjects would have actually seen the emperor at close distance. The emperor's trips through Japan remained limited in time and space. Equally, the portrait of the emperor which had been distributed to official institutions since the 1880s was unable to compensate for the lack of *permanent* visual representations of the emperor in public space, since it was usually shown only on special occasions and so was not constantly visible in public space.¹⁶ Some reproductions of the emperor's portrait were sold on the black

14 On the fate of the statues of Ashikaga Shoguns see Ann Walthall, *Off With Their Heads! The Hirata Disciples and the Ashikaga Shoguns*, in: *Monumenta Nipponica* 50/2, 1995, pp. 137-170; and on that of the memorial institutions commemorating of Toyotomi Hideyoshi see Kitai, Toshio: *Shinkokuron no keifu* [Discourses on the Land of the Gods], Tokyo 2006, p. 155.

15 *Yomiuri Shinbun*, 2 April 1878, p. 3.

16 On the portrait of the emperor and the regulations regarding its display and distribution see the standard work

market and used for decorative purposes in private space but, strictly speaking, sale of the emperor's portrait was banned throughout most of the Meiji period. Bronze statues of historical figures therefore filled a vacuum in public space, where the emperor's invisibility had become an obstacle to policies of social integration. Before it was deemed possible to depict a "normal" politician in public space, a number of statues of figures from the imperial house were built. The first bronze statue to be built in Japan was of Yamato Takeru, an imperial prince and mythic hero from the ancient Japanese myths recorded in the eighth-century chronicles *Nihon Shoki* and *Kojiki*. Of course, these myths are no longer regarded as history, their authenticity is very much contested and it is debatable whether Yamato Takeru can be considered an historical personality in any real sense. However, in the Meiji era these myths were considered historical fact¹⁷ and Yamato Takeru an historical personality. For the establishment of nationhood in modern Japan – just as in other nations – a connection to these myths was extremely important, as they made a strong contribution to the creation of a sense of kinship and consanguinity¹⁸ – notwithstanding the unhistoricity of modern nations' supposed links with prehistoric mythology (such as European nations' connections to the "history" of Troy, one of the "ten lost tribes of Israel" and even Atlantis).¹⁹

The statue of Yamato Takeru was built in 1880 in Kenrokuen, a park in the city of Kanazawa, which was then one of the five largest cities in Japan. Up until the 1860s, this park was attached to Kanazawa castle and only the castle's residents were allowed to use it – in particular, the feudal lord (*daimyō*) provided by the Maeda family. It was not until 1873 that a government decree mandated the creation of public parks and that Kenrokuen became one of the first of these public parks in Japan.²⁰ This new "public space", which was also being created in other cities around this time, has remained the main theatre for statue-building in Japan right up to the present day. More than a third of all statues built in Japan both before and after the war were erected in parks.²¹ The statue of Yamato Takeru in Kenrokuen was erected at the initiative of the imperial army, one of the central institutions of a then still young and fragile nation-state whose unity had been shaken by a civil war in 1877, the Satsuma Rebellion or Southwestern War (*seinan sensō*).²² The commander of the units of the imperial army stationed in Kanazawa first applied to build a statue of the Meiji emperor, but this was rejected by

by Taki, Kōji: Tennō no shōzō [The Portrait of the Emperor], Tokyo 2002 (Iwanami Gendai Bunko vol. 76; 1st edition 1988) as well as the article by Suzuki Shin'ichi and Yamaki Kazuhiko in this volume.

17 Cf. John S. Brownlee, *Japanese Historians and the National Myths, 1600–1945. The Age of the Gods and Emperor Jinmu*, Vancouver/Tokyo 1997.

18 Connor (footnote 12), pp. 51–55; Smith, *Nationalism and Modernism* (footnote 12), p. 46; Smith, *Myths and Memories* (footnote 10), ch. 4.

19 Connor (footnote 12), pp. 48 f; Smith, *Myths and Memories* (footnote 10), pp. 71–82.

20 The foundation for the creation of the first park was the Dajōkan government's decree no. 16 in 1873 which required the establishment of public parks and assembly places for the people; cf. Shirahata, Yōzaburō: *Kindai toshi kōen no kenkyū* [Studies on Parks in the Modern City], Kyoto 1995, pp. 178–81.

21 According to the author's database of bronze statues in modern Japan.

22 James Buck, *The Satsuma Rebellion of 1877. From Kagoshima through the Siege of Kumamoto Castle*, in: *Monumenta Nipponica* 28/4 (1973), pp. 427–446.

the imperial household ministry, the Kunaishō. Obviously, the Meiji emperor was considered too sacred for depiction in *public* space in the form of a statue. Notwithstanding several attempts by a number of individuals and institutions, *not one statue* of the Meiji emperor was erected in public space in prewar Japan. However, the Kunaishō approved the request to build a statue of Yamato Takeru (and later also for the erection of further statues of various figures of the imperial house, as we shall see below) and even donated a considerable sum from the emperor's private treasury to finance this statue.²³



Figure 1:
Statue of Yamato Takeru in
Kanazawa (author's photograph)

The statue showed Yamato Takeru as an ancient *progenitor* of the Japanese nation and also, sword in hand, as a symbol of the “tradition” of the imperial house's *supreme command of the military* (Figure 1).

As a forefather of the Japanese nation, Yamato Takeru represented the unity of the nation – which had been challenged during the Satsuma Rebellion – while as a symbol of the emperor's supreme command of the military he also contributed to a reaffirmation of the army's unity. This goal was further promoted through the commemoration – in the form of various memorial stones placed next to the statue (see Figure 1) – of the soldiers of the Kanazawa region who had lost their lives during the suppression of the Satsuma Rebellion. This commemoration of civil-war dead sought to provide comfort to the de-

23 Motoyasu, Hiroshi: *Gunto no irei kūkan. Kokumin tōgō to senshishatachi* [The Commemorative Space in the Military City. The People and the War Dead], Tokyo 2002, ch. 2.

scendents of these young soldiers by giving retrospective meaning to their deaths, which were remembered as honourable deaths “for the unity of the nation”.²⁴

The process leading to the erection of the statue of Yamato Takeru clearly demonstrates the desire of various groups to strengthen Japan’s national unity after the civil war of 1877. Besides the emperor, the former lord of the feudal domain of Kaga, Maeda Yoshiyasu, donated a considerable sum towards the statue’s construction, thus demonstrating his commitment to the new political and social order after the abolition of feudalism. Various religious associations also contributed to the project. A fundraising campaign, which was mainly organized by the imperial army, obtained donations from commoners not only in the prefecture of Ishikawa itself, but also in neighbouring prefectures as well as in the capital city, Tokyo. The statue was constructed in the traditional bronze-casting centre of Takaoka, a small city close to Kanazawa famous for its tea-ceremony kettles.²⁵ Along with representatives from politics and the military, members of religious organisations attended the unveiling ceremony – including representatives of the Buddhist *Jōdo Shinshū* (literally “True Pure Land School”) which is particularly strong in Ishikawa prefecture. Large numbers of commoners also attended, giving the ceremony a highly festive character as contemporary illustrations attest.²⁶

The construction of the statue of Yamato Takeru in Kanazawa was the starting point of a boom in statue-building during the late Meiji and the Taishō eras. Dozens – later hundreds – of monuments of historical or mythical figures were erected, amounting to more than 800 statues throughout the country by around 1928.²⁷ In 1894 the Tokyo School of Fine Arts (*Tōkyō Bijutsu Gakkō*) – with which many of the sculptors and casters of statues were affiliated – was said to have received orders for 78 statues from various parts of the country.²⁸

The next statues after that of Yamato Takeru (of whom a second statue was built in 1890 in Gunma) were of Keitai Tennō, a sixth-century emperor (a stone statue was erected in 1883 near his birthplace in Fukui); Oda Nobunaga (1888 in Gifu); Ōmura Masujirō (1893 at the Yasukuni shrine in Tokyo); war god Uma Shimade (1894 in Tokyo); the legendary first emperor Jimmu (1896 in Tokushima and 1898 in Toyohashi); entrepreneurs Kawada Shōichirō (1896 in Tokyo), Motoki Shōzō (1898 in Osaka) and Hirose Saihei (1898 in Ehime); Meiji Revolution hero Saigō Takamori (1898 in Ueno park in Tokyo); politicians and army officers Yamada Akiyoshi (1898 in Tokyo) and Yamagata Aritomo (1898 in his hometown of Hagi) and imperial house advisor and Nishōgakusha

24 This, of course, is a very common function of memorials, as the studies of Reinhard Koselleck and others have demonstrated (cf., for example, Reinhard Koselleck/Michael Jeismann (eds.), *Der Politische Totenkult. Kriegerdenkmäler in der Moderne*, Munich 1994; Reinhard Koselleck, *Die Transformation der politischen Totenmale im 20. Jahrhundert*, in: Martin Sabrow/Ralph Jessen/Klaus Große Kracht (eds.): *Zeitgeschichte als Streitgeschichte. Große Kontroversen seit 1945*, Munich 2003, pp. 205–228.

25 Motoyasu, *Gunto no irei kukan* (footnote 23), p. 134.

26 See the 1880 woodblock print on the author’s homepage: <http://www.japanesehistory.de/fotos/Holz-drucke-Douzou/>.

27 According to the publication by Arai: Ijin no omokage (footnote 13).

28 Yomiuri Shinbun, 6 September 1894, p. 3.

University founder Mishima Takeshi (1899 in Tokyo). As we can see, several of these statues depict figures from or closely linked with the imperial house. Statues of historical figures from the imperial house were a means of emphasizing the new regime's sense of continuity with the ancientness of Japanese history and thus strengthen the legitimacy of the new government, whose authority was heavily reliant on the emperor and the imperial house.

Not everybody in Japan welcomed the new fashion of statue-building, as we can see, for example, in the discussion between the conservative court noble Higashikuze Michitomi (1834–1912) – who criticized and opposed “the imitation of the Western custom of building bronze statues of historical figures” – and Kuki Ryūichi (1850–1931), director of the imperial museum (Teishitsu Hakubutsukan), who stressed the significance of statue-building as an important means of “public education”.²⁹ There was also hostility from national newspapers: the daily *Yomiuri Shinbun* (though this was not then the leading media organ it is today) warned as early as 1893 in an editorial of the practical dangers inherent in obsessive and thoughtless statue-building:

The statue to Ōmura Masujirō stands boldly at the Shōkon Shrine;³⁰ the statue of Lord Kusunoki (Nankō) stands outside the entrance to the imperial palace; a statue for Lord Mōri is being planned; we hear that the disciples of the venerable Fukuzawa [Yūkichi] plan a statue for their teacher; previously cancelled plans for a statue to Saigō Takamori have been revived; and recently plans have emerged to build a statue of the imperial forefather Jimmu Tennō. The recent bronze-statue fever (dōzō-netsu) is indeed tremendous! Statues of saints, wise ministers, famous generals and great men (ījin) are being built in large numbers throughout the country. (...) Is the objective of those who commission such statues really commemoration (kinen) (...) or is it worship (sūhai) of that [deceased] person? Such a medium may very well have the opposite effect from that intended. (...)

The wooden pillow beneath the head of Taira no Kiyomori was, during his lifetime, kicked by his sworn enemies, and the wooden statue of Ashikaga Takauchi was decapitated and the head displayed next to the Yonjō bridge [in Kyoto].³¹ If the person depicted in a statue is guilty of wrongdoing, there will be people in the future who will desecrate the statue or even destroy it”.³²

Notwithstanding such warnings, Japan's statue-building boom had not yet reached its peak. This came in the late Meiji and early Taishō periods, i.e. in the 1910s and 1920s. How should we account for the popularity of bronze statues in the context of national integration policies in late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Japan?

29 Haga, Shōji, *Dōzō kinenhi kō* [Some Thoughts on Bronze Statue Memorials], in: IS 82 (1999), pp. 45–49.

30 Actually Yasukuni Shrine, whose name until 1879 was Shōkonsha.

31 See Walthall, *Off With Their Heads!* (footnote 14) on this incident.

32 *Yomiuri Shinbun*, 9 May 1893, p. 1.

3. Mitigating Social Tensions: The Statues of Kusunoki Masashige, Ii Naosuke, Saigō Takamori and the Feudal Lords of the Mōri Family

We started this article with the assumption that most statues of historical figures in Japan were created within a context of intensified nation-building and were accordingly conceived as a means of social education with the objective of strengthening national consciousness and, ultimately, loyalty to the nation-state. These statues were indeed able to fulfil this objective since they were an ideal means of mitigating social tensions and connecting *national* identity with *local* or *regional* identities which remained strong in Japan long after the foundation of the unified and centralized nation-state. Even clearly local figures such as lords of regional feudal domains were not exclusively presented as “hometown heroes” (*kyōdō no eiyū*) but were also framed in a national context when they appeared in public space in form of a statue. In almost every instance of statue-building the objective of strengthening national consciousness is explicitly mentioned – even in prospectuses for statues of persons with somewhat local profiles.

This does not mean that every statue implied an *acknowledgement* or affirmation of the current state of political affairs. Some are intended more or less overtly in contrast to the current political situation and express a national consciousness removed from the state and from state-sanctioned versions of nationalism (*kokkashugi*). But almost all affirm the nation and the values which its representatives were said to embody – above all, loyalty to the nation and emperor and, often, self-sacrifice. Particularly during the era of Taishō democracy (usually defined as the period from 1905 to 1932, in contradistinction to the reign of emperor Taishō), when conservative circles feared the influx of “new ideologies” into Japan, building of statues was explicitly undertaken not just to commemorate the person depicted but to venerate the values he or she³³ embodied, to strengthen “healthy thought” and to prevent the spread of “dangerous ideologies”, i.e. communism, socialism and, in some cases, liberalism. Almost all of the statues which I have analysed to date demonstrate a positive, affirmative connection between the person depicted and the Japanese nation; and certainly, with not one of these statues is there any sense of criticism, let alone rejection, of the idea of the nation.

The broad variety of approaches to the “nation” which were realized in statue-building also explains why state agencies never saw a need for tight control over statue-building. Instead of a grand scheme for a network of statues of national heroes all over Japan, mechanisms of approval existed which were loose and decentralized. In many cases, ministries such as the imperial household ministry (*Kunaishō*), the army ministry (*Rikugunshō*) and the home ministry (*Naimushō*) were involved, but often approval at a local level was deemed sufficient in the absence of intervention by a higher-level authority. Conflicts only arose in rare cases such as statues of historical or pseudo-historical personalities related to the imperial family and where statues of foreigners were planned.

33 The vast majority of statues built in Japan (in the prewar and postwar periods) depict men. According to the author’s database, only five percent of Japanese bronze statuary is dedicated to female figures.

While there was no central control over statue-building a strong social dynamic evolved, with increasing numbers of social groups and institutions engaging in individualized forms of memory politics with the objective of pursuing social integration – frequently, integration of their individual group (family, locality or former social class) into the new community of the nation. In such cases, statue-building could be seen more as a *symptom* of the increasing importance of national consciousness than as an *effect* of the intention to strengthen this consciousness. However, once erected these statues helped to promote national consciousness and to strengthen national identity. The famous statue of Kusunoki Masashige, a medieval example of a warrior loyal to the emperor, is a case in point. This statue – which still can be seen today outside the main gate of the imperial palace – was one of the best-known statues in prewar Japan.³⁴ The initiative for its erection had come from an industrial conglomerate (*zaibatsu*) that, above all, aimed to consolidate its own position in Meiji society – the Sumitomo *zaibatsu*. Sumitomo wished to demonstrate loyalty to the imperial house at a time of increasing criticism of the “selfishness” and “greediness” of industrialists.³⁵ For Sumitomo, strengthening national consciousness was, at best, of secondary significance. But a statue of an imperial loyalist from the Japanese middle ages – who had been of central significance in the establishment of the cult of loyalty to the emperor and patriotic education since the first years of Meiji – could hardly fail to impress the public of Meiji Japan.

Statues were made of an ever-growing multitude of “heroes” and “idols” in the late Meiji period and the Taishō era and they were all displayed in an affirmative national context. This is true even in the case of figures who before the Meiji Restoration of 1868 – i.e. before the foundation of the nation-state – had numbered among the *fiercest adversaries* of the later Meiji oligarchy. In 1909, for example, a statue of Ii Naosuke was erected in Yokohama. Ii had been appointed Shogunate regent (*tairō*) in 1858 and had enforced the signing of the so-called Unequal Treaties – treaties of “Friendship and Commerce” concluded between Japan and the Euro-American powers – in the same year. For decades afterwards these Unequal Treaties were considered a national disgrace for which Ii was considered responsible. Moreover, not only had Ii ignored the imperial court when enforcing the signing of these treaties, in the Ansei purges of the same year he had also brutally suppressed the adversaries of his policy. Yet these people were the very same figures who later became the leaders of Meiji-era Japan. Accordingly, in the Meiji state the reputation of Ii Naosuke was naturally unfavourable and he was remembered, above all,³⁶ as the villain who had signed the shameful Unequal Treaties of 1858 and been responsible for suppressing the anti-Shogunate movement. It therefore comes as no

34 See the author's homepage for a number of historical and contemporary photographs of this and other statues: <http://statues.japanesehistory.de>.

35 Conveniently, one of the central activities of Sumitomo was the mining of copper, whose uses include that of an alloy for casting bronze. Accordingly, the statue did not represent a significant financial burden for Sumitomo.

36 Interestingly, Ii's image as a supreme master of the tea ceremony did not suffer on account of his political activities; he is still today considered one of the greatest ever “tea masters”.

surprise that plans for the erection of a monument to Ii provoked heated debates in the Meiji era and were bitterly opposed by the Meiji leadership.

Initial plans in the 1880s for a monument to Ii excited little enthusiasm among the authorities and came to nothing. Renewed preparations for a statue of Ii were made on the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the signing of the Unequal Treaties – which had been gradually revised since 1894 – but these were apparently obstructed by the central government³⁷ and were ultimately realized only in 1909, when a statue of Ii was erected in Yokohama – Japan's gateway to the world which owed its very existence to the treaties which Ii had signed. As a consequence of the 1858 treaties Yokohama became the main port for intercourse with the Western powers. Approval for the erection of the statue was given by local authorities: the prefecture of Kanagawa and the city of Yokohama.³⁸ The central authorities maintained a low profile and failed to attend the opening ceremony in July 1909 – as the statue-builders' report made sure to mention.³⁹



Figure 2:
Unveiling ceremony (jomakushiki)
of the statue for Ii Naosuke in Yokohama in 1909. Source: The weekly journal *Taiyō* [The Sun], vol. 15/11, 1 August 1909.

37 Ōtorii, Masahi (ed.): *Ko Ii Naosuke chōjin dōzō jomakushiki no ki* [Record of the Unveiling Ceremony of the Bronze Statue of the Late Ii Naosuke], Tokyo 1909, pp. 40–45.

38 Ibid.

39 Ibid.

This absence of representatives of the central authorities at the unveiling ceremony is in stark contrast to the unveiling ceremony of the statue of Saigō Takamori in 1898, which was attended by a large number of aristocrats as well as high-ranking politicians.⁴⁰

Faced with strong criticism of the plans to erect a statue of Ii, the statue's supporters tirelessly emphasized during the preparations and at the unveiling ceremony (Figure 2) that Ii had taken the right decision for the Japanese *nation* in the historical situation in which he acted. Though it was unpopular in Ii's day, without the regent's decision present-day Japan (i.e. Japan in 1909) would not be among the so-called first-rate powers (*ittōkoku*), a status granted to Japan after her victory over Russia in 1904-05. It was Ōkuma Shigenobu – originally a member of the anti-Shogunate movement but by 1909 a strong critic of the Meiji oligarchy – who gave the first speech at the unveiling ceremony on 11 July 1909. Ōkuma had been an ardent critic of the oligarchy following his exclusion from the government in 1880 and was a leader of the opposition in the imperial Diet. Ii's suppression of the anti-Shogunate movement in 1858 now seemed forgotten; Ōkuma presented Ii as the representative of the “true Japan” and a patriot:

It is an honour for me to speak on the occasion of the unveiling of the statue of this great man who did so much for this country. [...] Japan had always been open towards foreign countries, it was not until the introduction of Chinese ideology⁴¹ to Japan that foreigners were despised and labelled as non-humans. [...] By contrast] Ii Naosuke demanded the opening-up of the country; he thereby proved himself as a patriot (aikokusha). He did not strive for peace at the price of vilification [of Japan by other countries], but rather acted in a responsible manner as was appropriate for his position.⁴²

Throughout the ceremony, Ii was praised for his “merits” in “having opened Japan up to the world” and was presented as a “patriot”. Of course, the construction of Ii's statue also meant an at least partial rehabilitation of the Shogunal politician who had been previously branded an “enemy of the imperial court” (*chōteki*). But due to the absence of his former opponents, the representatives at the ceremony did not see the erection of the statue as representing a truly successful reconciliation.⁴³ All the same, the statue's erection is evidence of a social dynamic that led to the presentation of representatives of various political groups, parties and figures from different social backgrounds as *representatives of the nation* in public space in Meiji Japan, with the objective of their integration into the new social order. This is particularly true in relation to the founding event of modern Japan: the Meiji Revolution. Not only were the revolutionary samurai who strived to bring about the fall of the Shogunate presented as founding figures of the Japanese nation-state, their former adversaries were depicted as “true patriots” wherever possible and

40 Yomiuri Shinbun, 19 December 1898, p. 3.

41 Ōkuma alludes here to the Sinocentric world order whereby all states wishing to trade with China had to offer a tribute to the Chinese emperor. China banned trade and contact with other peoples and states.

42 Ōtori, Ko Ii Naosuke (footnote 37), pp. 4-8.

43 Ibid., pp. 40-45.

were thus rehabilitated and exploited as a vehicle for social integration. Only very rarely was a statue *not* built due to state intervention.⁴⁴

The statue of Saigō Takamori, who had been a revolutionary hero but was later a rebel against the Meiji regime during the Satsuma Rebellion of 1877,⁴⁵ remains one of the most intriguing cases of statue-building. As an opponent of the Meiji state, Saigō hardly seems predestined to become a focal point or symbol of devotion or loyalty to the nation or the emperor. Yet in the aftermath of Saigō's imperial pardon in 1889 he evolved into a leading national hero. Saigō's statue, built in 1898 in Ueno park, became one of the most popular and best-known statues in prewar Japan.⁴⁶ Plans to build a statue of Saigō were initially mooted in 1889 by Yoshii Tomozane, an old comrade-in-arms, following his political rehabilitation in the form of an imperial pardon:

*The venerable Saigō (Saigō-ō) at all times worked with the men of purpose (shishi), leading to the major achievement of the restoration of imperial rule (ōsei fukko). He then humbly worked for the imperial court and was appointed an army general. (...) As a token of its appreciation, the imperial court has now restored [Saigō's] court rank and titles (shakui). (...) Furthermore, to commemorate the great man's contribution to national affairs (...) a number of influential personalities now wish to build a statue in Ueno park or in the vicinity of the imperial palace.*⁴⁷

Nevertheless, these plans met with heated discussions and widespread resistance in Japanese politics and society. While applauding the erection of a memorial in Fukuoka commemorating Japan's successful defence against the Mongol invasions in the thirteenth century, in an editorial in 1892 the newspaper *Yomiuri Shinbun* criticized the erection of a statue of Saigō close to the imperial palace:

What is the relationship between the Mongol Invasion Memorial (genkō kinen-hi) and the statue of Saigō Takamori? (...) In an era of frequent negotiations with the [Western imperialist] powers, in a time of weakening morale (shiki suijaku), the Mongol Invasion Memorial is not only an adequate means of strengthening the people's spirits (jin'i), it also stimulates the fighting spirit of our Yamato Race (yamato minzoku). [...] The building of a statue of Saigō Takamori certainly has many advantages and disadvantages. But if the statue is erected where the persons commissioning it now envisage, it will undoubt-

44 A statue was even built for a figure who was probably the fiercest enemy of the later Meiji elite, Oguri Tadamasa (also Kōzukenosuke), in Gumma in 1922 (i.e. after the end of the Meiji era, which is an important difference in relation to Ii's case). Oguri belonged to the last defenders of the Shogunate until the Meiji Restoration in 1868 and was decapitated as "enemy of the imperial court" (*chōteki*) in April 1868 in the final days of the civil war. His symbolic power as a former adversary of the Meiji elites is even stronger than that of Ii because of his resistance until death.

45 See Buck, "The Satsuma Rebellion" (footnote 22).

46 See Sven Saaler, *Personenkult im Modernen Japan: Repräsentationen der Nation im Öffentlichen Raum, 1880 bis 2007*, in: Verena Blechinger (ed.): *Grenzgänge. Festschrift für Irmela Hijiya-Kirschner*, Frankfurt am Main / New York (forthcoming).

47 *Yomiuri Shinbun*, 5 December 1889.

*edly not only have grave effects on public morals (sedō jinshin). [...] [Having already been cancelled once,] the plans to erect a statue of Saigō outside the imperial palace are now once again being pursued. But differences of opinions (iron) have emerged among the supporters of the statue, as we have heard, and, without discussing these opinions in detail here, we hope for the victory of the statue's opponents and for the suspension of the plans.*⁴⁸

As the main reason for its opposition to the statue of Saigō, *Yomiuri* emphasized that despite his imperial pardon Saigō's "historic guilt" (*zaiseki*) – namely "allowing himself to be overcome by emotion and rush into incorrect actions", i.e. rebellion – had not been erased.⁴⁹ "We do not know what kind of feelings will be aroused among the people (*kokumin*) when they see [the statue] standing outside the imperial palace."⁵⁰ One year later, *Yomiuri* stated even more directly that Saigō had "been mistaken in his direction [when he rushed to rebellion] and was branded a traitor. As such, he is not a figure who should be displayed for all time as a model (*mohan*) for the subjects of our country (*waga-kuni shinmin*)."⁵¹ Since a large number of politicians and officials supported the idea of a statue, the plans were eventually realized in spite of the delay. The profile of the statue's supporters was certainly impressive – it was a near-comprehensive list of influential aristocrats, military officers and government members.⁵² All these persons were former prime ministers, foreign ministers, home ministers, other cabinet members and high-ranking military officers. The imperial court had also signalled its support for a Saigō statue and eventually donated 500 yen towards its construction.⁵³

However, due to criticism in the media realization of the Saigō statue had to wait almost ten years, until 1898. Before Saigō a statue of a "real" (and undisputed) symbol of loyalty to the imperial house – that of Kusunoki Masashige – was first necessary (it was completed in 1898 but was not erected until 1900). This statue was erected at the main entrance to the imperial palace, where it still stands today. The Saigō statue, which was initially to be placed at that very same spot, was erected in Ueno Park – a public space which was administered by the imperial household ministry but was still at a safe distance from the palace. Moreover, unlike Kusunoki Saigō "lost his horse" as a daily newspaper put it:⁵⁴ initial plans envisaged a statue of Saigō in parade uniform on horseback, but he was ultimately depicted walking his dog, dressed in a *yukata* (a casual summer garment). With

48 *Yomiuri Shinbun*, 24 April 1892, p. 1.

49 *Ibid.*

50 *Ibid.*

51 *Yomiuri Shinbun*, 1 July 1893, p. 1.

52 *Yomiuri Shinbun* (5 December 1889, p. 2) lists as supporters: Sanjō Sanetomi; Itō Hirobumi; Inoue Kaoru; Itagaki Taisuke; Ōkuma Shigenobu; Kuroda Kiyotaka; Hijikata Hisamoto; Yamada Akiyoshi; Yamagata Aritomo; Matsukata Masayoshi; Enomoto Takeaki; Gotō Shōjirō; Katsu Kaishū; Ōgi Takatō; Kabayama Sukenori; Tani Tateki; Takashima Tomonosuke; Yoshii Tomozane; Soejima Taneomi; Terashima Munenori; Kuki Ryūichi; Nozu Michitsura; Nire Kagenori; Iwakura Koresada; Nagaoka Moriyoshi; Sasaki Takayuki; Shimazu Tadayoshi; Shinagawa Yajirō; Mōri Motonori and others.

53 *Yomiuri Shinbun*, 19 December 1898, p. 3.

54 *Yomiuri Shinbun*, 1 July 1893, p. 1.

the building of the Saigō statue in 1898, Saigō Takamori was finally re-established as a symbol of *loyalty* and unblemished devotion to the imperial cause, and Saigō became one of the central figures of national identification in prewar Japan. Even today, his popularity as a national hero is hardly diminished.

While former opponents of the Meiji state's elite such as Ii and Saigō also came to be represented in the form of statues in public space, and sometimes as the nation's most glorious representatives in order to reduce *social* tensions, most statues functioned, above all, as a means of mitigating tensions between *localities and the nation*. In the case of many figures represented in the form of bronze statues in public space in Meiji Japan, it is difficult to tell whether these figures are shown in a national context or a local one. However, on examining the prospectuses of statues built for clearly "local heroes" or the "heroes of the home village" (*furusato no ijin*) and their inscriptions, we usually find references (with varying degrees of emphasis) to these figures' service to the *nation*. In general, local heroes were always presented as national heroes too.⁵⁵

A salient example is the erection of five statues of regional feudal rulers from the Mōri clan which had controlled western Japan since the sixteenth century and whose feudal domain of Chōshū had played a key role in the Meiji Revolution of 1868. The erection of these statues in a park in the city of Yamaguchi in 1899 clearly had a national objective, as indicated by the numerous national flags at the unveiling ceremony.⁵⁶ These statues were built to praise the Chōshū feudal lords' devotion to the emperor and the unification of "the nation". The prospectus for the statues – signed by such important figures as the former prime minister Itō Hirobumi and privy council member Hayashi Tomoyuki,⁵⁷ both natives of Chōshū and key figures within the Meiji oligarchy – also emphasizes the national context. The feudal lords who were clearly *local* in origin were re-interpreted within the framework of national Meiji-era politics:

*In a time of chaos (dōran), [the feudal rulers] were the only ones to prove themselves as loyalists [to the emperor] and they pacified (heitei) more than ten provinces in the regions of San'yō and San'in. [...] Later they proved their loyalty to the imperial family again and contributed considerably to the successful restoration of imperial power.*⁵⁸

It is hardly surprising that this depiction of these rulers from the era of (premodern) feudalism as defenders of imperial power, and thus as national heroes, omits any mention of the fact that in the "Time of Chaos" – i.e. the "period of the warring states" (*sengoku jidai*) in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries – these feudal lords hardly cared about the

55 Ichinose, Shun'ya: "Nichiro sengo – Taiheiyō sensō-ki ni okeru senshisha kenshō to chiiki. 'Kyōdo no gunshin' Ōgoshi Kenkichi rikugun hohei chūsa no jirei kara" [Commemoration of War Dead between the Russo-Japanese War and the Pacific War. The Example of the 'War God of the Home Village' Lt. Colonel Ōgoshi Kenkichi], in: Nihonshi Kenkyū 501, 2004, pp. 149–175.

56 See the photograph of the unveiling ceremony in the monthly journal *Taiyō* [The Sun], 1 August 1899.

57 Itō, Hirobumi & Hayashi, Tomoyuki: Shuisho [Prospectus]. Unpublished document, 1891, author's collection; accessible at statues.japanesehistory.de/sources.html.

58 Ibid.

imperial court and the emperor (who lived in obscurity) and were mainly interested in strengthening their *local* autonomy and enlarging their feudal domains and lands. But the image of the Mōri daimyō as national heroes and imperial loyalists became known all over Japan, not only to visitors to Kameyama park in Yamaguchi: the national press⁵⁹ and journals and illustrated magazines⁶⁰ reported the erection of new statues and their unveiling ceremonies, providing illustrations, and thus raised awareness of the “historical achievements” of the Mōri lords as well as awareness of the statues at a national level. The Mōri lords became more than an object of merely local hero-worship; they became part of the national personality cult of modern Japan.

4. Conclusion

In the modern era Japan engaged intensively in the politics of national integration using, among other techniques, statue-based visual staging (*mise-en-scène*) in public space of national heroes, popular figures from Japanese history, the ancient ancestors of the nation and the founding fathers of modern Japan. Such statues constituted a visual expression of the four elements defined by Antony Smith as central to the construction of modern national identities:⁶¹ (a) the (cultural) *memory* of the nation (above all, idealized memories of a “golden age” of virtue, heroism, beauty, learning, holiness, power and wealth); (b) national *myths* and related religious beliefs; (c) national *symbols* and rituals, and (d) national *values* (or traditions) connected to the “ancestral homeland”. But Japanese statuary developed into more than a mere *expression* of national identity or a means of commemorating dead heroes in the context of the politics of collective memory. It evolved into an important visual strategy in the effort to *strengthen* the general population’s national consciousness through social education, and to establish awareness, above all, of the Japanese nation’s actual existence. While there was no centralized control over statue-building, central authorities and institutions were deeply involved in commissioning and financing public statues – particularly in the approval process – and therefore exerted indirect control over this form of visualization of the nation.

Previous research has emphasized the role of the print media (newspapers in particular) in generating a feeling of nationhood and in the development of nationalism in territories encompassing people who are not tied to one another through direct contact and social interaction.⁶² However, apart from the fact that newspapers were inaccessible to most of

59 Yomiuri Shinbun, 23 and 28 September 1891, p. 2; 26 July 1892, p. 2.

60 Taiyō [The Sun], 1 August 1899; Fūzoku Gahō [Illustrated Customs], 15 May 1899.

61 Antony D. Smith, LSE Centennial Lecture. The resurgence of nationalism? Myth and memory in the renewal of nations, in: The British Journal of Sociology 47/4, 1996, pp. 575–598, here 583–591; Smith, Nationalism and Modernism (footnote 12), pp. 41, 45f.

62 Lucian Pye (ed.), Communication and Political Development, Princeton 1963; Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities, London 1983; Yamamuro, Shin’ichi: Kokumin kokka keisei-ki no genron to media [Public Opinion and Media in the Formative Period of the Nation-State], in: Matsumoto, Sannosuke/Yamamuro, Shin’ichi (eds.), Genron to media [Public Opinion and Media], Tokyo 1990, pp. 477–540.

the population of prewar Japan, in the print media the idea of the nation remained vague and remote. It was therefore essential to utilize *visual media* such as the bronze statue – a medium that was reproducible, of course, in two-dimensional form in the *illustrated print* media (woodblock prints or *nishikie*, lithographs or *sekihanga* and early illustrated newspapers and journals) – so that a more personal and tangible idea of the nation could be conveyed to a larger segment of the population and create an emotional attachment. The new public monuments literally “gave a face” to the abstract and remote concept of the nation. As a consequence, they also facilitated the identification of “Japanese” with the nation: with *their* nation.

These representative symbols of the nation and the associated historical memory evoked a sense of proximity and identity, and thus their staging in public space as a means of public education strengthened *loyalty* to the nation-state and its institutions. Through the medium of the statue in public space, segments of the population could be reached which did not read newspapers and were beyond the reach of the national education offered by the newly created school system. Thus the bronze statue played an important role in the process of consolidating national consciousness. To adapt Eugene Weber’s famous phrase,⁶³ the expansion of public statuary into the countryside and, eventually, to every corner of Japanese territory – including the colonial territories⁶⁴ – made a strong contribution to the process of turning “peasants into Japanese”, of creating the Japanese nation and fostering awareness of its actual existence among its members.

63 Eugen Joseph Weber, *Peasants into Frenchmen: the Modernization of Rural France, 1870–1914*, Stanford 1976.

64 Sven Saaler, *Shokuminchi tôchi to ningen sùhai. Nihon to Doitsu no shokuminchi ni okeru dôzô* [Colonial Rule and Personality Cult. Statues in Japanese and German Colonial Territories], in: Gotô Shinpei no kai kaihô, no. 2 (2006), pp. 51–59.

Transforming Popular Consciousness through the Sacralisation of the Western School: The Meiji Schoolhouse and *Tennō* Worship

Shin'ichi Suzuki / Kazuhiko Yamaki

RESÜMEE

Im Zentrum der ideenpolitischen Bemühungen, die die japanischen Eliten der Meiji-Ära (1868–1912) unternahmen, um das Land in modernem Gewand, doch auf traditionellen Grundlagen zur Nation zu formen, standen der Tennō-Kult und die allgemeine staatliche Pflichtschule. Zwischen der Verabschiedung der Verfassung des Kaiserlichen Japan im Jahr 1889 und dem Erlass des Kaiserlichen Erziehungs-Edikts im Jahr 1890 bestand insofern ein enger politisch-ideeller Zusammenhang. Der Artikel verfolgt die konflikthafter Auseinandersetzungen, die im letzten Drittel des 19. Jahrhunderts zwischen den Verteidigern altjapanischer Bildungstradition und den Anhängern westlicher Aufklärung, zwischen konfuzianischen Intellektuellen und westlich orientierten Demokraten, ausgetragen wurden. Er entwickelt vor diesem Hintergrund die weder selbstverständliche noch einlinige Genese der normativen Grundlagen des modernen Japan. Die Autoren beschreiben die wechselnden Inszenierungen, die in diesem Zusammenhang dem Tennō zuteil wurden: von seiner anfänglichen Rolle als öffentlich sichtbarem Symbol der Einheit der Nation (auf landesweiten Rundreisen oder Militärparaden) über den völligen Rückzug hinter die Palastmauern (in Konsequenz seiner Sakralisierung durch den erstarkenden Staats-Shintō) hin zu seiner indirekten Rückkehr in den öffentlichen Raum (in Form eines hochstilisierten und kultisch verehrten Konterfeis). Und sie schildern – unter Einbezug auch autobiographischer Reminiszenzen – sowohl die aus buddhistischer Tradition übernommene sakrale Überhöhung der modernen Schule wie die zeremoniellen Präsentationsformen des kultisch verehrten Tennō-Bildes und die von ihm ausgehenden sozialintegrativen und loyalitätsstiftenden Wirkungen.

1. Tracing the Visibility and Invisibility of the Meiji Emperor¹

In the aftermath of *Meiji ishin* (1868) – the “revolution / restoration that combined social forces in such a way as to instill the contradictory impulse of both revolution and restoration”² – the political leaders of the day felt an urgent need for the people to acknowledge the new system of Japanese governance. Before 1868, the Tokugawa shogunate was able to display the rulers to the masses by way of the system of *sankin kōtai* (literally “duty of alternate attendance”) which prevailed in the period from 1638 to 1867 and entailed frequent travel by the feudal lords (the *daimyō*) to and from Edo, the seat of the shogunate, and thus their appearance in public. People watched or heard about the feudal lords’ processions, and though they seldom observed the shogun directly it was easy for them to imagine a network of political and administrative authority, with the shogun at the top and represented by the local feudal lords witnessed at the processions. However, it should be noted that each time the people encountered a feudal lord in public, they were required to sit down on the soil and prostrate themselves. They were not permitted to look at the feudal lord but heard the sounds and voices and sensed the atmosphere of these processions.

While political authority was not always strongly visible, the population was aware of the revolutionary strife over the legitimacy of power as well as the series of civil wars and confrontations with foreign powers before and after the revolution. When news of the restoration of imperial rule (*taisei hōkan*) reached the people, it was quickly understood that the new system would replace the Tokugawa family who had ruled Japan during the Edo period from 1603 to 1868. Most people – in all social strata – were familiar with the shogun as a symbolic figure and with the concept of the shogunate. But the new ruler, the emperor (the *tennō*), was not well-known since during the shogunate period almost all the emperors had been kept in seclusion in the imperial palace at Kyoto (the *gosho*) which was off limits for commoners. The people therefore began to idiosyncratically imagine the emperor in the light of their own political experience.

Printing developed during the Edo period and printed materials were widely circulated among the population, both urban dwellers (*chōnin*) and the peasantry. Of these printed materials, coloured woodblock prints – which originated in the eighteenth century – were the people’s preferred source of news and anecdotes. In the wake of the Meiji Revolution, the earliest depictions of the Meiji emperor (*Meiji Tennō*) appeared in woodblock prints in the very first years of the Meiji era, i.e. between 1868 and 1870, showing his first trip to Edo which had been renamed Tokyo – “eastern capital” – in late 1868. These prints carried a political message, telling the people of the transfer of the capital from Kyoto to

1 Japanese names in this article follow the Japanese practice of writing the surname first followed by the first name.

2 Such is the well-balanced characterisation provided by Harry D. Harootunian, *Overcome by Modernity. History, Culture, and Community in Interwar Japan*, Princeton 2000, p. 301.

Tokyo and that the emperor now resided in the East, in the former shogun's castle at Edo which had now been renamed the "imperial palace".

Curiously enough, the woodblock print of the emperor published in 1868 was entitled Jimmu Tennō, in reference to the legendary first emperor of Japan who, according to Japanese myth, had founded the country in 660 B.C. Sasaki Suguru has analyzed fifty-one different woodblock prints depicting the emperor and found that all but one provide general views and scenes but show the emperor only indirectly.³ Forty-seven of these fifty-one woodblock prints show him in military uniform. In reality, the emperor was invisible to all but a few political leaders and soldiers who had led the revolution. Such a political situation was seriously risky for the Meiji regime since it needed to build a modern Japan which was sufficiently strong and independent to withstand the challenge of the western powers. Its task was to firmly establish a central system of government. Accordingly, in the first period of its seizure of power it reintroduced rather conventional administrative arrangements within the cabinet office, thus restoring the old system. But already in 1869 the Meiji government established the core of a centralised armed force; ordered all local governmental authorities (which still enjoyed a fairly strong degree of autonomy) to create a representative agency in the capital; set up a court of justice; and introduced new codes for public service and personnel management. In the following year, the Meiji government created government ministries, thus replacing the old-fashioned arrangements which it had initially reintroduced. In 1871 a gold-standard currency system was introduced as the basis for a modern economy and the Ministry of Education (*monbushō*) was created. In 1872 the government issued its "School Ordinance", introducing a modern national education system consisting of three tiers – primary schools, secondary and vocational schools and various types of higher education institutions – which was patterned upon French, Dutch and American models. All Japanese children were encouraged to attend school. The lack of financial resources and the government pressure which local education authorities faced often led to unrest over compulsory schooling in the regions. And people not seldom resisted compulsory school attendance because it deprived them of their children's labour capacity, so that the Meiji government experienced frequent disturbances. In response, in 1879 the School Ordinance was replaced by a revised Law of Education.

Prior to completing its modernisation of central and local government, the Meiji government firmly intended to consolidate its power, politically as well as symbolically. One means to achieve this goal was to increase the emperor's visibility to commoners and foreigners alike, thus bolstering domestic rule and achieving international recognition of the sovereignty of the new Meiji polity. The key individual who promoted the establishment of the emperor as a national symbol was Ōkubo Toshimichi (1830–1878), a central figure in the new Meiji government. Ōkubo endeavoured to bring the emperor out of his palace into the public sphere. In 1868, he proposed that the emperor should move

3 Sasaki Suguru, *Tennō-zō no keisei katei* [The Process of Constructing the Emperor's Portrait], in: Asukai Masamichi (ed.), *Kokumin bunka no keisei* [The Creation of a National Culture], Tokyo 1984, p. 188.

from Kyoto to Osaka and then to Tokyo. These proposals were put into practice. Ōkubo was quick to realise the importance of making the new ruler visible to the masses. He recognised the shortcomings inherent in the old closed-off palace system and understood the significance for the regime of making use of aesthetic and performative techniques of representation.⁴ Ōkubo and his colleagues had studied European political history and science. Moreover, they travelled abroad with the famous Iwakura Mission from 1871 to 1873 and had ample opportunity thus to learn how European absolutist monarchs had consolidated their rule by making themselves visible to their subjects.

The Meiji government's response to Ōkubo's suggestions was twofold: it enhanced the visibility of the emperor in his military function while also pursuing a political agenda. The emperor left his seclusion in the imperial palace on his first visit to Edo-Tokyo in 1868. In 1870, he inspected his army and navy and was visible to all of his troops. His soldiers saw the emperor as their supreme commander. In the period between 1868 and 1889, the emperor visited various military bases and institutions, see Table 1 which indicates the frequency of his inspections of the army, navy and other military institutions:⁵

Table 1: Frequency of the emperor's attendance at military events⁶

Year	Month	Frequency	Year	Month	Frequency
1868	3, 4, 8, 11	7	1880	1, 2, 3, 5, 7, 11, 12	11
1869	5, 6, 10	3	1881	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 10, 11, 12	14
1870	1, 2, 4, 9	5	1882	2, 3, 6, 7, 11, 12	12
1871	1, 9, 11, 12	5	1883	1, 4, 5, 6, 7, 10, 12	11
1872	1, 4, 9, 10	9	1884	4, 7, 9, 11, 12	9
1873	1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 11, 12	19	1885	3, 5, 6, 7, 10, 11, 12	9
1874	1, 4, 6, 9, 11, 12	12	1886	1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 11, 12	9
1875	1, 3, 5, 6, 12	6	1887	1, 3, 4, 5, 7, 10, 11, 12	11
1876	11	1	1888	1, 2, 6, 7, 11,	9
1877	1, 8, 10, 11, 12	8	1889	1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 11	9
1878	1, 3, 4, 7, 8	7			
1879	1, 3, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 12	10			

In the period from 1867 to 1873, the emperor received a military education including riding exercises whose purpose was for the emperor – then still a young man – to develop a more imposing physique.⁷ On 27 December 1867, the young Meiji left the imperial

4 Taki Kōji, *Tennō no shōzō* [The Portrait of the Emperor], Tokyo 2002 (Iwanami Gendai Bunko vol. 76; 1st edition 1988), p. 3.

5 Imperial Household Ministry (ed.), *Meiji Tennō-ki* [The Itinerary of Emperor Meiji], Tokyo, Yoshikawa Kōbun-kan, no. 3.

6 Sasaki Suguru, *Tennō-zō no keisei katei* (footnote 3), pp. 208-214.

7 Imperial Household Ministry (ed.), *Meiji Tennō-ki* (footnote 5), no. 2, p. 636.

palace to observe military drills performed by the troops of four former feudal domains (Kagoshima, Yamaguchi, Hiroshima and Kōchi). Within a period of six to seven years he had completed his military education and conducted manoeuvres such as those mentioned above. The emperor attended military events including New Year's inspections of the army and navy; military drills of his forces; inspections of troops and meetings of the office of general staff; and graduation ceremonies at military schools and colleges. In April 1872, the emperor personally directed manoeuvres of his guards at Owada in Chiba prefecture, preparing the manoeuvre plans in consultation with Saigō Takamori (1827–1877), the central figure in his military forces at that time.⁸ In 1873, the emperor directed more than three thousand soldiers at Hasunuma in Musashi prefecture and once again led manoeuvres involving multiple divisions. This, however, was the last time that he would supervise manoeuvres personally.

The Meiji government hurried to establish a strong system of military governance over Japan to counter both external invasions and domestic rebellion. Symbolically, the emperor held the supreme position of power in the nation's armed forces. Despite the various draft constitutions proposed by civil-society activists – driven by a desire for democratic participation by the mass of the population – many of these figures such as Ueki Emori (1857–1892) nonetheless regarded the emperor as the *generalissimo* of the Japanese military forces.⁹

On the other hand, the emperor's travels throughout the islands of the Japanese archipelago increased his visibility for commoners. These travels began in 1872 and ended in 1885. Table 2 provides a list of these journeys:¹⁰

Table 2: The travels of the Meiji Emperor in Japan

Year	Duration	Regions visited	Vehicle
1872	51 days	Kinki-chihō, Chūgoku-chihō, Shikoku-chihō, Kyūshū-chihō	warship
1876	50 days	Tōhoku-chihō	carriage & warship
1878	71 days	Hokuriku-chihō, Tōkai-dō	carriage
1880	41 days	Chūō-dō	carriage
1881	103 days	Tōhoku-chihō, Hokkaidō	carriage & warship
1885	18 days	Sanyō-dō	carriage & warship

8 Saigō was the leader of the 1877 Satsuma rebellion who, after being defeated, committed suicide.

9 Ienaga Saburō, *Nihon Kindai kenpō shisō-shi kenkyū* [Historical Studies on Constitutional Thought in Modern Japan], Tokyo 1967, p. 70.

10 Nagahara Keiji et al. (eds), *Nihon-shi nenpyō* [Chronological Tables of Japanese History], Tokyo 2001, pp. 236–246. The reader should keep in mind that Shikoku, Kyūshū, Honshū and Hokkaidō are the Japanese main islands, whereas Kinki, Chūgoku, Tōhoku and Hokuriku are particular regions located on Honshū, i.e. the largest of Japan's main islands; -dō denotes the main road leading from Edo-Tokyo to local regions except Hokkaidō, and -chihō denotes local regions and districts.

Overall, the emperor devoted roughly a whole year to these travels. The reasons for his protracted journeys around Japan were complex and multifarious included, among other issues, local disturbances provoked by impoverished groups of the population; unemployed former samurai; new tax regulations; and the system of conscription introduced in 1872 which resulted in an acute shortage of labour for peasants and small shopkeepers. The emperor's leading officials saw these journeys as a useful way for the Meiji government to bring the emperor out of his palace: not only to assuage popular feeling and social unrest but also to impress the new regime's symbolic authority upon the public mind. These officials also envisaged that the problems both between the central and local government authorities and between these authorities and the population at large might be solved by establishing a sense of national unity through the masses' identification with the emperor.

The emperor's travels were indeed remarkably impressive. They encouraged popular awareness of the power at the heart of the new political regime. Many schoolchildren welcomed his visits with the national flag, the *Hinomaru*, in hand and stood in a row like members of the army or navy, in turn encouraging adults' respect for the emperor as the nation's supreme political authority. Such phenomena were observable everywhere he visited. Wherever a visit by the emperor was announced schoolteachers were asked to instruct their pupils to welcome him courteously, so as to demonstrate the loyalty of his subjects. These long journeys meant that the emperor became well-known as the supreme authority of Meiji Japan who had replaced the Tokugawa shogunate, while the places which the emperor visited were seen as sacred and set apart from ordinary life. More than this, a unique form of communication developed between the emperor and people in general, viz a reciprocal cycle of the "observer" and "observed". Not only was the emperor seen by the people, the emperor himself actively gazed at the people, demonstrating his power.¹¹ The emperor and his courtiers realised that this was the most effective means for them to encourage popular devotion to the nation's ruler.

However, the possibilities for bringing the emperor into play as a tangible symbol of national unity were limited. When the newly established Japan Mint proposed in 1872 for the first time to manufacture coins featuring the emperor's profile, the Imperial Household Ministry (*kunai-shō*) rejected this suggestion since it considered that coins were dirty and would thus render the profile of the emperor impure. The Imperial Household Ministry and the Meiji government opted instead to keep the emperor's image free from such disfigurement and to control his visibility. The Ministry tried to uphold the emperor's pureness and deity which was founded upon the historical background and unbroken lineage of the imperial family. This decision was closely associated with the emperor's image as a political symbol based on a worldview embracing as fact the mystical and mythical origins of the imperial system – which meant that political and religious matters were not open to rational discussion. This was the reason for the Impe-

11 Cf. Takashi Fujitani, *Splendid Monarchy. Power and Pageantry in Modern Japan*, Berkeley et al. 1996.

rial Household Ministry's rejection of any possible tainting of the empire's image, arguing that it should be kept pure and sacred, as it were. Accordingly, the Meiji Emperor suddenly retreated from initial visibility to a position of sustained invisibility within the modern Japanese empire

2. The Struggle to Establish the Japanese "Education State"

2.1. The Secular Background of the Struggle towards a System of National Education

Japan's more enlightened officials who had studied abroad realised the importance of western civilisation, including technical advances in industry and the military. They saw the development of a system of national education as a key priority for the emergence of a new nation in the aftermath of the Meiji Revolution, since any nation-state requires a clearly defined territory and populace. Education was seen as the most efficient means for the state to establish its citizens' sense of national unity.

In line with this thinking, the Tokugawa government had already sent selected individuals abroad to study western civilisation. In a similar vein, the post-1868 Meiji government also sent government representatives and interested students to America and Europe. In 1871, the first group of an important exploratory mission led by Iwakura Tomomi and comprising forty-six members set sail for America. Other groups followed. All in all, 126 persons were sent to America and Europe within the framework of this Iwakura mission, including five women, one of whom was Tsuda Ume (then seven years old) who was sent to America and later founded the Tsuda Women's College upon her return to Japan. The average age of the members of this mission was twenty-nine, with the oldest member being forty-seven and the youngest eighteen years old. Kido Kōin (Takayoshi), Ōkubo Toshimichi and Itō Hirobumi – all of whom were high-ranking ministers in the recently established government – were the central members of the first group. They visited twelve countries with which the Tokugawa shogunate had concluded treaties in the 1850s and 1860s. The Iwakura Mission's journey lasted one year and nine months. The countries it visited included the United States of America and the United Kingdom, France, Belgium and the Netherlands, Germany, Austria and Switzerland, Denmark and Sweden as well as Italy and, finally, Russia.¹² The members of the Mission learned many lessons from their study of western countries, which encouraged them to embark upon

12 The official report of the Mission compiled by Kume Kunitake dates from 1878; a modern reprint edition was published as: Kume Kunitake, *Tokumei Zenken-taishi bei-ō kairan jikki* [A True Account of the Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary's Journey of Observation Through the United States of America and Europe], Tokyo 1975. This report is also available in English translation by Graham Healey/Chushichi Tsuzuki (eds.), *The Iwakura Embassy, 1871–1873: A True Account of the Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary's Journey of Observation Through the United States of America and Europe*, compiled by Kume Kunitake, while a partial translation into German was published by Peter Pantzer, Matthias Eichhorn et al. (eds.), *Die Iwakura-Mission. Das Logbuch des Kume Kunitake über den Besuch der japanischen Sondergesandtschaft in Deutschland, Österreich und der Schweiz im Jahre 1873*, Munich 2002.

discussions of the future of Japan. One key point was the urgent imperative to establish Japan as a rich and strong country that might discuss and cooperate with the developed countries of the West on equal terms. A second issue was the need for a balanced assessment of the dual outcomes of western industrialisation, the positive and negative aspects of this developmental process. The members of the Mission had seen that the industrial revolution had led to a sharp gulf between rich and poor and were troubled, for instance, by the child poverty which they witnessed in some areas of London and Manchester.¹³ The Mission also noted the significance of Christianity for western countries as a means of maintaining political unity among the populace.

Some of the students who had been sent to European countries under the Tokugawa regime returned home after the Meiji Revolution, bringing new knowledge, skills and technology to Japan. For example, Fukuzawa Yukichi (1834–1901) disseminated new ideas of civil society and citizenship; Toyama Masakazu (1848–1900), Nakamura Manasano (1832–91) and Kikuchi Dairoku (1855–1917) brought modern mathematics, political and legal science and social philosophy to Japan; while Nakae Chōmin (1847–1901) – who was sent abroad by the Meiji government – introduced Jean-Jacques Rousseau to the Japanese public. Owing to the rich insight gained by these scholars and intellectuals, European knowledge and technology became increasingly important. The School Ordinance issued in 1872 led to the publication of new schoolbooks, most of which were translations of American or European textbooks. Before 1868, *Selection of 1000 Chinese Characters* had been the most popular basic textbook for children and adolescents. Various versions of it were published, revising the original edition which had appeared in China many years previously,¹⁴ but its antiquated contents were clearly incompatible with the modern system of knowledge inspired by western civilisation.

The conservative faction in the Imperial Household Ministry regarded accelerated westernisation policies with some anxiety and was keen to preserve traditional ideas on education. But the modernisers were in a dominant position in the Ministry of Education, particularly under the tenure of Mori Arinori (1847–1889) as Minister of Education. Mori had already published books on Japan and Japanese religions during the time which he had spent in America. In 1879 he had been appointed Japan's envoy to the United Kingdom, and in 1882 Mori discussed education with Itō at Paris and later sent him a memorandum.¹⁵ On his return to Japan in 1884, Mori was appointed an inspector of schools and travelled widely in this capacity. After being made Minister of Education in 1885, he introduced the Law of School Education (*gakkō-rei*) in 1886. He also intro-

13 Matsumura Masaie, *Bakumatsu ishin shisetsudan no igirisu ōkan-ki* [Records of the Late Tokugawa Era Mission to United Kingdom; The Influence of the Victorian Empire], Tokyo 2008, pp. 174–6, 286–9.

14 Cf. Ogata Hiroyasu, *Kindai Nihon ni okeru senjimon-gata kyōkasho no kenkyū* [Studies of Textbooks of Thousand Square Letter Verse in Modern Japan], Tokyo 1978, pp. 30–57, 59–92, who classified all schoolbooks which were translations and also provided a detailed summary of the publishers of translated schoolbooks. See also Isabella L. Bird, *Unbeaten Tracks in Japan*, London 1880, pp. 128–130, who noted the kinds of schoolbooks used in primary schools in the 1880s.

15 Mori Arinori, *Gakusei hengen* [Fragments on Education], letter to Itō Hirobumi, London Office, 1882, Waseda University Library, to 03 01796.

duced four other laws which constituted the foundations of Japan's modern educational system and whose basic outlines were retained until 1946, i.e. the law establishing the imperial universities; the law establishing a network of normal schools; the law regulating secondary schools; and the law establishing generalized primary schools. In this overall scheme, the main aims of university education were defined as academic inquiry and the education of civil servants, with the second of these objectives seen as particularly significant. Mori also specified the characteristics of the normal schools, of which there were two different types: higher normal schools and other normal schools. The latter type of normal school was established on the basis of the principle of one school per prefecture and was managed by the local authorities. Martial arts, military gymnastics and physical training were defined as key features of their curriculum. Higher normal schools for boys were established first at Tokyo and later at Hiroshima, while higher normal schools for girls were located at Tokyo and Nara. The law regulating secondary schools established two types of these schools – academic and vocational secondary schools – while creating three types of high schools for girls providing academic, vocational and home economics-based studies. The overall effect of this legislation was to establish a hierarchical system of national education with an essentially dualistic structure: elementary education for the mass of the population and higher education for the select few. The former was militaristic in outlook, the latter bureaucratic and technocratic.

The Law of School Education had been preceded by a series of debates on national education conducted by the leading officials of the Imperial Household Ministry. While some kind of schools – including small and private institutions – had existed in every era of Japanese history, during the Tokugawa shogunate for the first time a country-wide network of “school learning” had emerged which was geared to inculcating Confucian ideas in the younger generation of the *samurai* (or *bushi*) class. Some of the schools of the feudal domains (*han-kō*) are said to have been opened up even to young male commoners and were thus no longer restricted to the offspring of the aristocracy. Confucianism provided the ideological framework for these domain schools, though with some significant changes over time. Tsujimoto explains that initially, i.e. in the period before 1761, small private schools, the *juku*, served as the Chu-tzu teaching Confucian scholar's personal academy within his own home. *Juku* were small in number and size but subsequently, in the period from 1716–1789, became more widespread and were to provide an education which was based on the doctrines of Japanese Confucianism and was intended for domain officials, their children and also commoners. Finally, in the period from 1830–1872, *juku* provided elementary instruction for children of officials, whose attendance became compulsory. Increasingly, Western knowledge and military training were taught. Most *juku* accommodated commoners' children while nevertheless serving as a means of indoctrinating feudalistic values in residents of the domain.¹⁶

16 Tsujimoto Masato, *Han-kō* [Schools provided by the feudal local governments], in: Koyasu Nobukuni (ed.), *Dictionary of Japanese Thought History*, Tokyo 2002, pp. 447–448. Cf. also Unabara Tōru, *Gakkō* [Schools], in: *Nihon-shi shō-hyakka* [Mini Encyclopaedia], vol. 15, Tokyo 1979.

Thus, judging by the historical surveys of schools and patterns of schooling for children and adolescents, a comparatively wide network of domain schools and temple schools (*terako-ya*) existed prior to the School Ordinance of 1872. While this network provided the basis for the conventional education of children as encouraged by conservative officials, progressive officials sought to utilise it for the development of the new schooling system. This was the purpose of the 1872 School Ordinance. While it provided the outline of a hierarchical system of education patterned on the French model, the government's idea was to establish this system on the basis of the network of schools which already existed at a local level by 1868.

While all those concerned with the idea of education for the general population agreed on the urgent need to create a national education system, there were at least four groups of scholars who had their own particular ideas on the nature of mass education: a group of resolute modernisers, a group of Confucian scholars, a Buddhist group and a group of scholars heavily committed to the traditions of "National Learning" – essentially the textual and interpretive study of Japanese classical literature and writings – (*kokugaku*). The fundamental ideas underlying the conception of each of these groups should be understood as part of a basic dichotomy between progressivism and conservatism. The progressive group followed European traditions of learning, adhered to the concepts of rights and individual duty, affirmed Christianity, pursued a human-centred and centripetal approach and adopted an "Enlightenment" philosophy; whereas the conservative group preferred endogenous learning, stressed subordination and collective duty, affirmed Shinto and Buddhism, prioritised an authority-centred and centrifugal approach and preferred Confucian philosophy. The struggle to establish a state education system unfolded in the context of these conflicting anthropological, social and philosophical paradigms. It originated within the intellectual groups inside and outside the Meiji government and was closely related to the struggle for a constitution. For in the new Japanese society, a person's political identity went hand in hand with his education-based identity. As has already been noted, the groups dispatched to western countries found positive and negative aspects in the developed civilisations and rapidly understood that modernisation inevitably uprooted people from communities in which they had been deeply embedded and implied a radical reorganisation of political and administrative processes within these communities.

In the Japanese context, similar modernisation processes and their consequences would shake the foundations of governance, whether under the shogunate or the revolutionary government set up by *Meiji ishin*. In the light of discussions over the meaning of the Meiji Revolution, spontaneous popular movements emerged which favoured a constitution and a parliament, reflecting a sense of crisis which led some activists to call for a second revolution. The "Freedom and People's Rights Movement" (*jiyū minken undō*, see below) demanded a radical reorganisation of central government power which rested in the hands of a few revolutionary leaders who were now accused of being oligarchs and excluding others from power. At the same time, however, the educated elite urgently wished to industrialise Japan and enlighten the masses. Both the progressive and the

conservative group agreed on the exigency of this task. The key point of contention was how to deal with foreign threats and domestic instability, both of which jeopardised the development of national unity. There was an ever wider gulf between the views of the elite and the masses on the future of Japanese society. Again, there was a basic dichotomy here between progressive and conservative views. While the former were committed to the ideals of democratic sovereignty, a constitutional monarchy, industrialisation, a combination of Japanese and western culture and an individualistic ethic, the latter continued to adhere to the traditions of authoritarian sovereignty, an absolutist constitution, the pre-eminence of Japanese and Chinese culture and a collectivistic ethic.

In essence, then, the pertinent issues were constitutional government, industrialisation of the Japanese economy, renewal of communal norms in line with the changes in society and improvement of literacy. All these issues demonstrated the major differences and sharp contradictions between the two groups with regard to a system of constitutional government for Japan. Basically, three different views on a constitution for Meiji Japan co-existed in a period of tempestuous debates: the conception of a progressive constitutional democracy, of a constitutional monarchy and ideas favouring an absolutist imperial regime based upon Japan's indigenous Shinto religion. Movements favouring a democratic constitution resulted in a number of violent local rebellions, while at the same time Japanese intellectuals closely observed the rise of class conflict and radical controversy in the western countries.

The discussion of educational policy thus took place in the context of plans for a new constitution. The liberal groups differed in some cases in their views of constitutional doctrines. For example, Fukuzawa Yukichi proposed parallel social institutions – a public and private sector – while Mori Arinori argued that these should be unified. Both of these figures were members of an independent intellectual society which was known as the *Mei roku-sha* (“Sixth Year of Meiji Society”) since it was established in 1873, in the sixth year of the Meiji era. The *Mei roku-sha* had ten founding members, eight of whom were scholars who had studied European learning in the final years of the Tokugawa shogunate. Membership of the *Mei roku-sha* gradually grew and monthly discussions and magazines influenced people's opinions of constitutional affairs. For example, the “Freedom and People's Rights Movement” (*jiyū minken undō*) was much influenced by the *Mei roku-sha*: this was a movement which criticised the Meiji government bureaucracy and asserted the need for a modern system of local government based on a new constitution. The constitutional movement grew and peaked in 1880 with an “Alliance to Establish a Parliament” whose 114 representatives were drawn from fifty-nine associations in twenty-four local government authorities. They vociferously demanded the rapid introduction of a parliamentary system of government and collected more than 87,000 signatures from people in favour of this aim.¹⁷ This movement also led to further

17 Imanishi Hajime, *Jiyū minken undō* [Freedom and People's Rights Movement], in: Koyasu Nobukuni (ed.), *Dictionary of Japanese Thought History* (footnote 16), pp. 245-247. Cf. also Imanishi Hajime, *Kindai Nihon seiritsu-ki no minshū undō* [Popular Movements in the Era Establishing Modern Japan], Tokyo 1991.

constitutional debates, and at the Osaka convention of local governors held in 1875 the Meiji government promised to create a constitution. Various draft constitutions subsequently appeared simultaneously. The councillors of the Meiji government faced with the various demands for a constitution again were divided into two different camps: a progressive group supporting the civic movement and a conservative group opposing the rapid introduction of a constitution. The government responded with an imperial decree on constitutional monarchy and the swift establishment of a Senate – or Council of Elder Statesmen – (1875) and enacted three new laws on local government concerning local prefecture organisations, local taxation and rules on prefecture councils (1879). In relation to a system of national education, some of the enlightened government councillors who had studied abroad or witnessed the emergence of universalised educational systems in the USA or European countries had negative views of the existing patterns of schooling in Japan while simultaneously criticising the idea of excessively westernising the Japanese school. The key point of discussion for the conservative groups was the so-called “issue of mind” (*kokoro*). Motoda Nagazane (also called Eifu, 1818–1891), the Confucian scholar who had taught and attended to the young Meiji emperor at the imperial palace and still remained a close member of the emperor’s household, remarked in this connection:

*No boy denies the importance of national education. They say that education should be well organised to embrace intelligence, aesthetical sentiment and volition. However, such assertions are solely based on western modes of thought. The doctrines of education for our country should be based on the doctrines of Confucius.*¹⁸

It is essential for an adequate understanding of the academic discourses seeking to define a system of national education in the Meiji era to clearly distinguish the groups of scholastic learning which influenced the political actors. Three such types of learning existed in the Tokugawa era: viz the “National Learning” (*kokugaku*) tradition, the adherents of the native Shinto religion, and Confucianism.

2.2. The Academic and Religious Context of the System of Learning prior to the Meiji Revolution

The National Learning (*kokugaku*) tradition encompassed several areas of traditional scholarship, among which philosophical thought – such as that of Motoori Norinaga (1730–1810) and Hattori Nakatsune (1757–1824) – and scholarship heavily committed to the interpretive study of Japanese classical literature, poems, myths and language featured prominently.¹⁹ In addition, *kokugaku* scholars were deeply concerned with the

18 Motoda Nagazane, quoted by Taki Kōji, *Tennō no shōzō* (footnote 4), p. 58, (transl. by the author Suzuki). Cf. also Numata Satoshi, *Motoda Nagazane to Meiji kokka* [Motoda Nagazane and the Meiji State], Tokyo 2005.

19 Omote Tomoyuki, *Sandaikō ronsō* [Discussions on the Three Dimensions of the Universe], in: Koyasu Nobukuni (ed.), *Dictionary of Japanese Thought History* (footnote 16), pp. 218–219; cf. also Omote Tomoyuki, *Katarareru*

Japanese polity, and with the history of the imperial system (*tennō-sei*) in particular. They reviewed the Japanese classics, concentrating on politics but also referring to the ancient *Nihongi* and *Kojiki* myths which had been compiled in the early eighth century as the official annals of the imperial family. According to these myths, the imperial family had reigned over Japan without interruption from the foundation of Yamato – the oldest name for Japan – and the imperial dynasty in 660 B.C., when Jimmu was enthroned as the first emperor. Discourses on *kokutai* – Japan's "national polity", "national body" or "national essence" – were thus a common theme of these scholars, who were eager to distinguish the endogenous Japanese polity from concepts deriving from Korean and Chinese political history. Somewhat ironically, the term *kokutai* – literally "country-body", from *koku*, meaning "country", and *tai*, meaning "body" – is originally a Chinese word which can be found in the classical literature of China. But from the mid-eighteenth century up to the Meiji Revolution this concept, which asserted the uniqueness of the Japanese polity, was redefined in Japan. Aizawa Yasushi (1782–1863), an ideologue of the Mito school which formed part of the *kokugaku* movement, discussed *kokutai* through a reinterpretation of classical Japanese literature using Confucian terminology. In his collection of essays known as "New Theses" (*Shinron*, 1825),²⁰ Aizawa constructed a grand plan for national reform in response to western influence on Japanese identity and the country's independence. In the first part, his "New Theses" – on *kokutai* – deal extensively with the Japanese polity, with political concepts, belief systems and national unity as well as with Shinto. These essays also explore the history of the Japanese military and agriculture and economic institutions. Subsequent parts examine broader world trends, the international environment and the threat of Russia. They evoke the necessity of morality and the threat of Christianity to Japanese unity. Finally, Aizawa also expounded on defence plans for the protection of Japan against foreign countries. The book's overarching goal was to establish a grand hierarchy of State Shinto led by the imperial family, with a basic standpoint of "withstanding internal unrest and external threats". Aizawa's book was widely read among learned people and had a lasting influence upon the officials of the Meiji government.

Closely linked with the ideas of National Learning (*kokugaku*) and the National Polity (*kokutai*) was the instrumentalisation of Japan's Shinto religion. While Shinto lacked a founder who systematised a collective faith and belief-system before and after the Kofun period (from the late third to the seventh century A.D.), its creeds were systematically arranged in a body of myths which appeared under the title of *Kojiki* in 712 and as *Nihon Shoki* or *Nihongi* in 720.²¹ These mythological accounts are the earliest histories of Japanese rulers. The latter volume in particular attempted to define the imperial system's

"kamiyo" to "gen" – Sandaikō ni okeru "katari" no kōzō tenkan [Kamiyo and the Present in Utterances – Structural Shifts in Narratives on the Three Dimensions of the Universe], *Studia Japonica*, 12, 1993, Osaka.

20 Wakabayashi Bob Tadashi: *Anti-Foreignism and Western Learning in Early Modern Japan: the New Theses of 1825*, Cambridge, Mass. 1986.

21 Cf. the translations into English and German by Donald L. Philippi (trans.), *Kojiki*, Tokyo 1968, and Iwao Kinoshita (Übers.), *Kojiki: aelteste japanische Reichsgeschichte*, Fukuoka 1976, respectively. As for the *Nihongi* myth, see W.

self-understanding as an authentic polity in the East Asian context, with Shinto providing the underlying political myth. In Shinto, something supernatural which causes and controls natural phenomena is called *chi*, *mi*, *tama* or *nushi*. With the advent of Chinese letters, the Chinese *kami* – usually translated as “gods” – spread throughout the population and gradually came to be used to describe natural phenomena as well as personal situations. Japanese *kami* did not convey a sense of substantive entity by way of an explanation of natural and human phenomena, however, and were historically and geographically specific. They became guardians of individual families in the sense that the *kami* accepted by a given family were considered primordial to this family. For example, the imperial family made the sun goddess *Amaterasu-Ōmikami* its progenitor and the influential Fujiwara noble family enshrined its *kami* at the Kasuga shrine. By the end of the sixteenth century most *kami* were those of local villages and *ujigami* those of these communities’ inhabitants. The other aspect of *kami* – the element which may cast an evil spell on people – remained unchanged and appeared in various forms in people’s everyday life.

Over the centuries Shinto had evolved in various syncretistic amalgamations with Buddhism and Confucianism,²² but the situation changed during the Edo period when the Tokugawa shogunate began to repress Buddhist temples and to advocate Confucianism as a state doctrine, thus calling into question the syncretistic relationship between Shinto and Buddhism. A school known as *jūka shintō* emerged, which explained Shinto from the perspective of Confucian doctrines of *Chu-tzu*. For example, Yamazaki Ansai (1618–1682), an outstanding scholar of both Confucianism and Buddhism, provided a quite different view of Shinto’s potential meaning. Referring to Ise Shinto, he recognised a metaphysical structure of “living being”. Prayer would prove the existence of “something invisible but mighty” whose meaning was to be established for people. Believers should thus disclose their “own being” to this “invisible but mighty” entity in dimensions permitting the survival of *kami* and *hotoke* – with *kami* being accepted as embodiments of Buddha – within the reciprocal chains of “living being”. In contrast, the Confucian scholar Hayashi Razan (1583–1657), one of the pillars of scholarship during the early Tokugawa shoguns, rejected any syncretistic relationship between Buddhism and Shinto and asserted that Shinto was to remain consistent with Confucianism. Both Yamazaki and Hayashi interpreted Shinto from a perspective of Confucianism as the official doctrine of the shogunate. Confucianism was definitely established in Japan as a social theory during the Edo period. The Tokugawa shogunate banned Christianity and placed Buddhists under strict control. Confucianism then recovered its standing among the ruling samurai class (*bushi*), who accepted it as the leading doctrine of moral education and conduct. Increasingly, however, during the Edo period (1603–1868) it became

G. Aston (trans.), *Nihongi: chronicles of Japan from the earliest times to A.D. 697*, London 1956, and Karl Florenz (Übers), *Nihong oder Japanische Annalen*, Tokyo 1892–1897.

22 Satō Masato, *Shinbutsu shūgō* [The Amalgamation of Kami and Buddha], in: Koyasu Nobukuni (ed.), *Dictionary of Japanese Thought History* (footnote 16), pp. 287–288. See also Sugawara Shinkai, *Shinbutsu shūgō shisō no kenkyū* [Studies in Ideas of the Amalgamation of Buddha and Kami], Tokyo 2005.

open to most classes – including merchants, peasants and others – and was encouraged by the shogunate for the control of popular morals and ethics. Thus, in the course of the nineteenth century, Confucianism gained in popularity through an internal renewal of its scholastic framework as well as through the application of diverse strands of thought to the clarification of its terminology and doctrines. Amateur scholars from peasant and merchant families promoted its progress and Confucian narratives and discourses on social philosophy became widespread concurrently with the growth of temple schools (*terako-ya*) and private schools (*juku*). Confucianism also paved the way for the incorporation of popular knowledge in the system of national education which was subsequently institutionalised by the Meiji government.

2.3. The Imperial Rescript on Education or *Kyōiku chokugo*

All histories of Japanese education note that the Imperial Rescript on Education – the *Kyōiku chokugo* or, more precisely, *Kyōiku ni kan-suru chokugo* – was issued on 30 October 1890. This occurred amid incessant disputes on popular education between the progressive and conservative groups even at the highest levels of government. In a context of increasing agitation for a constitution by groups such as the “Freedom and People’s Rights Movement”, the local governors, on the occasion of their Conference of February 1890, asked the government to issue an ordinance on the principles of moral education. In response to this demand, the government decided to issue such an ordinance. The Prime Minister Yamagata Aritomo (1838–1922) had Yoshikawa Akimasa, the then Minister of Education, prepare an Imperial Rescript on Education. The first draft was written by Nakamura Masanao (1832–1891) but was rejected by Inoue Kowashi (1844–1895), the director of the cabinet’s legal office. Inoue for his part authored a further draft and presented it to Motoda Nagazane, the highly regarded Confucian scholar who served as an adviser to the emperor and as a member of the House of Peers. After much debate the draft was completed and the emperor granted his approval.²³

Obviously, the differing views on education policy held by the leading officials of the Meiji government reflected their own educational backgrounds. A comparison of the intellectual frames of reference of Nakamura Masanao and Inoue Kowashi reveals the possible political motives underlying their respective draft versions for the ordinance on social and moral education. Nakamura was born in Edo, received a basic education focused on the Chinese classics and pursued advanced studies both in the Confucian classics and in British learning, since he studied in the United Kingdom from 1866–1868. He became a professor at Tokyo University from 1881 and was appointed to the House of Peers in 1890. Inoue, in contrast, was born in Kumamoto and studied the Chinese classics and, afterwards, Confucian learning at a domain school and French learning at Nagasaki and Edo, followed by legal studies in France and Germany in 1872. He

23 Yoshikawa Akimasa, Tokukyō ni kansuru chokuyū no gi [On the Emperor’s Rescript for Moral Education], an official letter to the Prime Minister Yamagata Aritomo, on 20 September, 1890, in: Satō Hideo (ed.), Kyōiku [Education], no. 1, Zoku gendai-shi shiryō [Second Series of Modern History Resources], vol. 8, Tokyo 1994, p. 37.

served as Minister of Education from 1893, submitting “Notes on education” to the then Prime Minister Itō Hirobumi in which he emphasised *kokutai* and sought to replace the English model of scholarly learning with the German one in the universities. Thus, Nakamura, owing to his education in London, where he had studied, among others, John Stuart Mill and the Scottish writer and reformer Samuel Smiles, was inclined to follow the models of British industry and democracy and the British system of constitutional monarchy. Inoue, on the other hand, compared France and Germany under the chancellorship of Otto von Bismarck; he saw the German constitution as a possible model for Japan and criticised the British and American parliamentary systems and their underlying political philosophy.

The educational policy trends of the 1870s and 1880s had all been inspired by European Enlightenment philosophy. Fukuzawa, Nakamura and Mori were all founders of the above-mentioned “Sixth Year of Meiji Society” (*Mei roku-sha*). Their basic perspective was individualistic in the sense that a person was to be educated not only in order to achieve the level of wealth necessary to sustain his family but also to be sufficiently independent as a citizen. Through such independent and well-educated citizens the country would develop and become wealthy and strong enough to cope with any external threat. The study of European learning was encouraged and the plans for a national education system and a constitutional political system were to be based on this individualistic “canvas”. Fukuzawa discussed the relationship between men and women whereas Nishimura Shigeki (1828–1902) examined in particular detail the role of women in society (see below for details). The School Ordinance of 1872 was based on this vision of individual growth and improvement. In contrast to the *Mei roku-sha*’s designs for civil society, however, the plans of the conservative groups were motivated more by the impetus towards a system of national education and national unity and the associated collectivistic school of thought. These groups maintained that the arguments of the progressive philosophers and educationalists failed to clearly identify the core values for the education of children and young people who were to provide the necessary support for the Meiji imperial state in the future. In essence, the conservatives had severe doubts as to whether the Japanese people could achieve collective progress through individual awakening in the Enlightenment sense.

Finally, divergent interpretations of *kokutai* – the core concept assuming an uninterrupted lineage of the imperial family as the authentic rulers of the polity known as Yamato or Nippon or, later, Japan – played a decisive role. While all scholars and intellectuals in principle agreed on *kokutai* as a basis for the debates over a constitution, the progressives and conservatives nevertheless differed on how *kokutai* was to be preserved and developed. The progressive group thought that westernisation could provide a shortcut towards a new *kokutai* for the nation, while the conservative group preferred a more traditional view of *kokutai*. After much debate on the appropriate system of moral education for future generations, the Imperial Rescript on Education was issued one year after the publication of the Constitution of Imperial Japan in 1889. The first chapter of the constitution defined *kokutai*, stating that Japan was governed by the emperor in an

unbroken line of sovereignty (article 1), the emperor was sacred and his authority not to be defied (article 3) and the emperor was to command his army and navy (article 13). In terms of its key elements the Imperial Rescript on Education precisely matches the constitution, the first paragraphs of the former reading just like the first article of the latter.²⁴

The Imperial Rescript on Education was sent to all prefecture governors, and copies were made for it to be distributed to all the nation's schools. While the struggle towards a state education system in Japan eventually resulted in a compromise between the progressive and the conservative socio-political schools of thought, the Imperial Rescript was nevertheless enormously influential in establishing an emperor-centred national education system. Founded on Confucian morality, it required the people's loyalty to the emperor and service to the nation. It also reflected the ideas shared by the leading members of the Meiji government: While western countries' systems of national values were based on Christianity, Japan lacked an equivalent religion. Moreover, many great countries in history had endured through a concentration of political and religious power in the king. For all these reasons, Japan should also adhere to a system of religio-cultural values, one that was based on an unbroken imperial lineage. Accordingly, the English translation of the *Kyōiku Chokugo* authorised by the Ministry of Education in 1890 reads as follows:

Know ye, Our subjects:

Our Imperial Ancestors have founded Our Empire on a basis broad and everlasting and have deeply and firmly implanted virtue.

Our subjects ever united in loyalty and filial piety have from generation to generation illustrated the beauty thereof. This is the glory of the fundamental character of Our Empire, and herein also lies the source of Our education.

Ye, Our subjects, be filial to your parents, affectionate to your brothers and sisters: as husbands and wives be harmonious, as friends true; bear yourselves in modesty and moderation; extend your benevolence to all; pursue learning and cultivate arts, and thereby develop intellectual faculties and perfect moral powers; furthermore advance public good and promote common interests; always respect the Constitution and observe the laws; should emergency arise, offer yourselves courageously to the State; and thus guard and maintain the prosperity of Our Imperial Throne coeval with heaven and earth. So shall ye not only be Our good and faithful subjects, but render illustrious the best traditions of your forefathers.

The Way here set forth is indeed the teaching bequeathed by Our Imperial Ancestors, to be observed alike by Their Descendants and the subjects, infallible for all ages and true in all places.

24 Inoue Kowashi, *kenpō gige* [Introduction to the Principles of a Constitution], in: Itō Hirobumi (ed.), *kenpō shiryō* [Drafts and Notes on Constitutions], vol. 2 (of 3), compiled by Kaneko Kentarō and Hitsutsu Atsushi, Tokyo 1934, pp.1-2.

It is Our wish to lay it to heart in all reverence, in common with you, Our subjects, that we may all thus attain to the same virtue.

The 30th day of the 10th month of the 23rd year of Meiji (1890)
(Imperial Sign Manual. Imperial Seal)

3. Media-Based Visualisation of the Meiji Emperor and its Significance for School Education

3.1. Re-constructing the Portrait of the Emperor

By the late nineteenth century it had become an international custom for dignitaries to exchange photographs and portraits with their counterparts, whether an emperor, a king or a military commander. Portraits were exchanged in the same way as we nowadays exchange visiting cards. Exchanging the photograph of a sovereign was seen internationally as a way of strengthening claims of sovereignty. By the time of the Meiji Revolution photographs were seen a powerful means for people to have knowledge of their rulers, while also enabling them to see the world in which they lived and witness national and international political events.

Photography had been invented thirty years prior to the Meiji Revolution and photographs rapidly spread worldwide, reaching Japan just three years after their invention. Before anyone had noticed, photographs had changed the ways people observed and understood their surroundings.²⁵ Accordingly, the Meiji government required a photograph of Japan's emperor. It is reported that the first photograph of Meiji Tennō was taken in 1873.²⁶ Surviving pictures show him as a young person, wearing conventional Kyoto palace dress. Photographs taken later in 1873, which show him in European-style military uniform, were circulated among the higher officials of the government and sent to foreign countries. The gift of a photograph to an officer indicated a close relationship between this officer and the emperor. The Meiji government strictly prohibited public display of photographs of the emperor and their duplication or sale was a crime. Photographs of the emperor were not made available to the general public until 1888.

In 1888 the emperor was once again captured, this time in military uniform, but in a photograph of a western-style painting by the Italian painter and copperplate engraver Eduardo Chiossone (1833–1898). Chiossone had been invited to Japan as early as 1874 to serve in the Japan Mint at Ōsaka, since the Meiji government needed the support of foreign experts to protect the country's currency against counterfeit. He was subsequently employed at the government's printing bureau (*insatsu-kyoku*) which was part of the Ministry of Finance and where the introduction of modern machinery and technology was envisaged. Chiossone was entrusted with the practical execution of these plans and

25 On early photography in Japan, see Japan Photographers Association, *A Century of Japanese Photography*, New York 1980.

26 Taki Kōji, *Tennō no shōzō* [The Portrait of the Emperor] (footnote 4), pp. 102–107.

he trained the Japanese employees regarding printing techniques, designed official paper currencies and stamps, taught the art of making printing ink and paper with watermarks and demonstrated how to make multiple copies from a single plate. Chiossone also became known for his portraits of a number of high government officials. His portraits, for instance, of Sanjō Sanetomi, Kido Kōin and Iwakura Tomomi can still be seen today.²⁷ When he was asked to create a portrait of the emperor, Chiossone first prepared a series of model portraits: one of a figure standing in military uniform, another of a figure seated on a chair in military uniform, a third one of a figure standing in civilian clothes and a fourth in profile. These served as models for Chiossone's portrait of the emperor himself. In January 1888, he was ordered to make a portrait and a copperplate engraving of the emperor in military uniform. It is said that he sketched the emperor without even being noticed by him. In August of that year, the photographer Maruki photographed Chiossone's paintings of Emperor Meiji and Empress Shōken in conté-crayon. These photographs, which were later reproduced in large numbers, were to become known as *Go-Shin'ei* – literally the “honourable real picture” – i.e. the official portrait of Meiji Tennō and his wife.²⁸ Chiossone also made portraits of the legendary Empress Jingū which would appear on Japan's currency. It is said that Chiossone sketched some beautiful girls who worked at the bureau.²⁹ But the portrait of Empress Jingū shown on the currency resembled a European woman, suggesting that leading government officials preferred something akin to a European skin tone and physique in seeking to establish the public visibility of the emperor and the members of his court.

Thus, after making his appearance as the supreme commander of the military and the highest political authority in 1868 and subsequently returning to a position of invisibility vis-à-vis the general population in the 1880s, the emperor reappeared in the political sphere in a highly symbolic form. The Meiji government needed to demonstrate to the masses the emperor's grandeur and nobility and sought to utilise his symbolic photograph to convey to foreign countries the processes of modernisation which were unfolding in Japan. Since the emperor himself would no longer appear to a national or international audience in person, it was his socially invented – and, in a sense, artificially constructed – image which was to symbolise the supreme sovereignty of the Meiji state.³⁰

Moreover, there were other – no less political – reasons for proceeding in this way. The Meiji government urgently needed to provide young men with physical training. Young Japanese appeared to be of a more slender and weaker build than westerners. Apart from the *samurai*, few Japanese underwent physical training in the period prior to the

27 Meiji Bijutsu Gakkai (ed.), *Oyatoi gaikokujin Kiyosone kenkyū* [Studies on Chiossone during his Employment by the Japanese Government], Tokyo 1999; cf. also Ellen P. Conant, *Chiossone: his Professional and Cultural Milieus*, Meiji Bijutsu Gakkai, 1999, pp. 19–60.

28 Lia Beretta, “Chiossone e la Banca Nazionale nel Regno”, in: Meiji Bijutsu Gakkai (ed.), *Oyatoi gaikokujin Kiyosone kenkyū* (footnote 27), pp. 1–17.

29 Uemura Takashi, *Okura-shō Insatsu-kyoku ni okeru Kiyosone no gyōseki* [Chiossone's Contributions to the Printing Bureau of the Ministry of Finance], in: Meiji Bijutsu Gakkai (ed.), *Oyatoi gaikokujin Kiyosone kenkyū* (footnote 27), pp. 56–8.

30 Taki Kōji, *Tennō no shōzō* [The Portrait of the Emperor] (footnote 4), pp. 148–150.

Meiji Revolution. Enlightened officials who had studied abroad saw Japanese people as physically weak, which was a disadvantage both for military purposes and for day-to-day encounters with foreigners. Improving young men's physiques was a necessary condition for the process of modernising Japan which began with an improvement of people's bodies. The emperor, as depicted in the photograph of his painted portrait, conveyed an impression of physical strength, as an ideal model of manhood which might be emulated in the new era. Another point worth noting is that of clothing. Western-style clothing and uniforms replaced traditional kimono and the conventional imperial palace dress often known as *I-kan-soku-tai* – i.e., the gown worn by Shinto priests or old-style full court dress – so that the process of modernisation in Japan was associated with a concomitant “clothing revolution”. Japanese people were to be radically new in both their physique and appearance. In this sense, Western-style military uniform played a unique social, educational and political role by cultivating the resolve of adult men, i.e. their utmost commitment to the emperor and the state.



Figure 1: The Go-Shin'Ei: “Meiji Tennō and Kōgo”.

Source: Sato Hideo (ed.), *Kyōiku, Go-Shin'Ei to Kyōiku-Chokugo I* [Education, Go-Shin'Ei and Kyōiku-Chokugo I], *Zoku-Gendai-Shi Shiryō* 8 [Second Series of Modern History Resources, vol. 8], Tokyo, Misuzu-Shobō, 1994. With kind permission by the publisher and by the Imperial Household Ministry.

3.2. Go-Shin'Ei – The Official Portraits of the Emperor and Empress

The term for the official portraits of the emperor and empress – *Go-Shin'Ei* – originally referred to depictions of the founders of new Buddhist schools. It was customary for adherents of Buddhism to create images of the schools' founders after their deaths. Temples would frequently select something that was sacred or special for Buddhist disciples and then hide this away, and these portraits were often kept hidden away deep within the temples. The Meiji government initially offered the official portraits of the emperor and empress to the schools which it founded and managed, at first only granting them to selected institutions which had close links with the imperial family or leading government officials. Around 1882, it became customary for the Meiji government to send these portraits to public authorities and educational institutions, and from 1889 onwards they were delivered to primary schools throughout the country. It is important to note, however, that every school, whether public or private, initially had to apply to be granted the portraits. Despite the Meiji government's intention to distribute the portraits throughout the country, it required all educational institutions to apply to the Minister of Education, who examined these applications and then advised the Imperial Household Ministry (*kunaishō*) to either grant the portraits to the selected institutions or reject the petitioners' requests.

The volume of applications from primary schools failed to live up to expectations, however. The 1890 annual report of the Ministry of Education lists 28 universities and higher colleges, 49 normal schools, 59 secondary schools for boys and girls, 1,471 higher-grade primary schools and 23,811 common primary schools. The number of common primary schools is approximately fifteen times the total number of all other schools and higher education institutions, which is a significant factor behind the portraits' slow distribution. As a consequence, in 1914 the central government permitted local authorities to duplicate the photographs and make them available to all primary schools under their administrative control without the need for a recommendation from the Minister of Education. From 1916 onwards, it was decided that the photographs would be sent to primary schools and kindergartens managed by the local authorities at the lowest rung in the administrative hierarchy.³¹ The Meiji government also intended to send the portraits to private schools including mission schools, though most of these schools were reluctant to apply to the Minister of Education to receive the portraits. It was natural for such schools – whether Christian or Buddhist – to decline the governmental proposal of displaying the portraits of the emperor and the empress within their precincts since they saw this as apostasy. In the 1930s, however, most private schools accepted this practice. Regarding the photograph of Empress Shōken, the Meiji government pursued a different set of objectives than those for the emperor. In the early Meiji period, the ideal adult woman was to be a good wife and wise mother, and those who met the empress

31 Satō Hideo, *Kaisetsu* [Explanatory Notes on the Volume], *Kyōiku* [Education], no. 1, Second Series of Modern History Resources, vol. 8, 1994, pp. 12-15.

reported that she was both beautiful and wise. In 1878, the empress personally ordered the publication of books on morals and ethical values for adult women. Thus, Kondō Yoshiki edited four volumes entitled “Records of Ideal Moral Life in the Meiji Era” (*Meiji Kosetsu-roku*) in consultation with a scholar of Shinto. Motoda Nagazane, the Confucian scholar and personal adviser to the emperor who has already been mentioned several times above, wrote a preface to each of these books. The values espoused in these volumes were those of a traditional morality for women that had long been cherished by men and women and passed on from one generation to the next in the pre-Meiji Revolution period. The women described in these books were brave enough to withstand the hardest challenges. They worked hard, protected the weak through self-sacrifice and were faithful to their husbands. Summarising these traditional views, Wakakuwa Midori asserts that such values were expected of women in relation to men within the family unit, whereas independent personality and individuality were not seen as being of significance for women.³² In 1887, the empress had Nishimura Shigeki (1828–1902) edit another set of books on female morality. The six volumes entitled “Examples of Refined Women” (*Fujo-Kagami*) were first made available to the School for Noble Girls and went on sale only in 1888. In the following years, most girls’ schools adopted the books as textbooks on moral education. The illustrations of refined women were selected from national and international depictions. Of the 120 illustrations provided in the six volumes, thirty-six were Japanese and fifty European. These books once again emphasise a femininity based on Confucianism but also encompass other areas of women’s education such as book-keeping, housekeeping, child-rearing and the passing-on of cultural values. These female abilities are in keeping with the personal characteristics of bourgeois European women, and it is clear that the books were intended as a source of education for Meiji Japan’s growing female middle class.

In this sense, Empress Shōken’s photograph symbolises maturity and morality for women whose femininity was closely associated with the conventional family system based on Confucian values and embedded in local communities. In relation to the overall process of Japanese modernisation, the goal was to promote an awareness of traditional morality alongside the nascent sense of national unity. The official portraits of Emperor Meiji and Empress Shōken – the *Go-Shin’Ei* – were to serve as models for Japanese men and women who were to cultivate their minds, train their bodies and wear European clothes. Likewise, select sectors of the population, such as members of the military forces, civil servants, employees in trade and industry or the banking sector as well as teachers were those who were in this sense modern and exemplified the ideals of a modern Japan. Their mode of living gradually became prevalent among urban dwellers but it took longer for the inhabitants of rural areas to become accustomed to it. In sum, the photographs of Emperor Meiji and Empress Shōken were effective in promoting the new way of life and its norms and were a strong symbolic expression of an ethical and religious model for

people to adhere to. The role which the *Go-Shin'ei* was supposed to play was all the more important as even in the Meiji era (1868–1912) people continued to adhere to their old habits which were deeply rooted in conventional rituals and defied general or objective description because they were the products of natural environments and hidden personal sensitivities.

The photographs of the emperor and empress captured such popular sentiment by means of an artificial political-*cum*-cultural construct along a space-time continuum whose basic axes were at least three-dimensional. This continuum organised popular sentiment along dimensions comprising “power-subordination”, “knowledge-experience” and “profanation-sacredness”. Accordingly, the visibility of the emperor and empress brought in its train a redefinition of the notion of *kokusui*, which involved an indescribable, indivisible combination of ordinary people’s sensory physical behaviour and day-to-day activities in their natural and cultural environments while also entailing an abstract political concept. *Kokusui* referred to the idea of a primordial national character, but its vagueness as a concept helped people to maintain organic institutions in local communities which could provide support for the new imperial system.

4. The Meiji Schoolhouse – A Sacred Place

Given the political-*cum*-ideological significance of education in Meiji Japan, it will be readily understood that the new primary-school buildings erected by the Meiji government were deliberately assigned a sacred character and were constructed as “sacred places” (*shinden*). A typical example of this transference of sacrality onto the state primary school is a schoolhouse built in Yamanashi prefecture in the early Meiji period. The Yamanashi region was a territory which had been under the direct control of the Tokugawa shogunate throughout the Edo period. Accordingly, in 1873 when Fujimura Shirō was appointed governor of the newly established prefecture – i.e. the regional administrative body which the revolutionary government founded on the French model – he was ordered to implement the Meiji government’s policies as strictly as possible. In the field of educational policy Fujimura was thus strongly committed to putting into practice the ideal expressed by the government’s declaration: “in future, there shall be no community which includes an illiterate family, nor any family which includes an illiterate person”. Fujimura clearly advocated western-style buildings for primary schools and succeeded in constructing more than thirty schoolhouses of this style at various locations in his prefecture. In most cases, the buildings’ roofs featured towers and their overall design was extremely innovative for their time. Undoubtedly, therefore, such unusual buildings must have made an overwhelming impression on the people living in the villages scattered in the Yamanashi mountains. Even today in the Yamanashi area they are known as “Fujimura schools” and meet with general affection. Figure 2 shows a characteristic example of the Fujimura-style school buildings, viz Tsugane Primary School which was completed in 1875. The building was restored to its original condition in recent years

and is now used as a local museum. As Figure 2 shows, the school is located on a sloping hill with the villagers' houses spread out at the foot of this hill. Even today, Tsugane remains an isolated village which is lost in the mountains; bearing in mind the fact that this isolation was much more pronounced in the late nineteenth century, one can easily imagine how overwhelming it was for the villagers to see such a western-style school building at the time of its construction, over a hundred years ago.

But the Meiji schoolhouse was overwhelmingly impressive for another reason too. Given the drastic lack of financial resources in the 1870s and 1880s – both at the level of the central government and that of the prefectural administration – each inhabitant of the village had to contribute according to his family's means towards the construction of the school. Accordingly, the local population covered most of the expenses for school-building projects.³³ The villagers must therefore have taken great pride and pleasure in the fact that they had funded the new school building, whose western-style modernity was so different from their own houses. This must have played an important role in promoting the public's rapid acceptance of the Meiji government's new educational policies.



Figure 2: Fujimura-Style Schoolhouse (Author's own photograph)

Yet Fujimura's emphasis on the western style of primary-school buildings reflected more than just his personal preferences, it also involved more substantial reasons linked to the overall goal of unifying the nation by reshaping popular consciousness. In the early

33 In Yamanashi prefecture many documents survive of villages which show that village dwellers were willing to contribute to the building of their schools in various ways, including money, labour and products such as straw sandals and straw ropes. This shows the intensity of support for the Meiji Revolution among the common people at this time.

Meiji period, a considerable number of privately-run traditional educational institutions still existed, such as the above-mentioned temple schools (*terako-ya*) and private schools (*juku*). The Meiji Revolution and the collapse of the shogunate system strengthened popular enthusiasm for the establishment of further schools, and immediately after the revolution many feudal domains created another type of school which was known as the *gogaku*. However, the curriculum taught in both the traditional institutions and the *gogaku* was restricted to reading, writing, the abacus and a modest amount of study of Chinese classical literature and thus did not differ from what was taught in the Edo period. In its “School Ordinance” the government thus deliberately sought to differentiate the new state education institutions from traditional schools by naming the former “state schools” (*gakkō*). Yet it proved quite difficult to increase rates of enrolment in the state schools – even though this was now compulsory – since these schools imposed greater obligations on parents than the traditional system of private education had done. The new system required children – both boys and girls – to attend school for at least four years from the age of six. Villagers, who were mostly peasants, thus lost a significant source of labour, whereas the traditional system left it up to parents’ discretion at what age and for how long their children would attend school. Governor Fujimura was thus obliged to repeatedly prohibit attendance of the private educational institutions.



Figure 3: Location of the Fujimura-Style Schoolhouse Close to a Temple
(Author's own photograph)

Under such circumstances, then, the overwhelming impression which western-style schoolhouses made on rural populations must have been instrumental in convincing both parents and children that the curriculum taught in these schools – though different from the traditional one – was appropriate and necessary for the future of their society.

Attending the *gakkō* with its impressive building must have been all the more attractive to school-age children as classes in traditional *terako-ya*, *juku* and other private schools of the era were usually held in rooms in temple buildings or private houses whose facilities were obviously inferior to those of the new state school buildings. Moreover, and perhaps even more importantly, not only did the western-style state school buildings feature innovative architecture, they were also granted the privilege of displaying the *Go-Shin'ei* within their walls. This privilege meant that the state school began to assume a strongly sacred quality. The portraits of the Emperor and the Empress were not granted to all of the new primary schools unconditionally: schools unable to provide for the portrait's safekeeping were refused it. Citizens thus sought to improve the material and structural condition of their district's primary school in order to receive the portrait, which was considered a great honour. Records from all over the county show that when a school received the portrait a ceremony was held in which the entire village participated. The almost sacred quality of the public primary school was strengthened even further by its location. As Figure 3 clearly shows, the schoolhouse was quite often located close to a local shrine on top of a hill. Villagers would thus "look up" at their school, in the same way as they were accustomed to "looking up" at the shrine or temple. Many other cases testify to the practice, current in Meiji Japan, of a certain degree of sacralisation of the state school through the transformation of former shrine and temple buildings into schoolhouses or the construction of schoolhouses close to shrines or temples. One possible reason for the preferential use of such sites is that they were deemed public land and therefore not subject to purchase costs. Besides this pragmatic consideration, however, the state school's participation in the aura of sacrality attached to these places was also a significant factor.

There is another characteristic feature of the western-style Meiji school that requires explanation. The new type of schoolhouse was designed to play the role of a "time instructor", for which purpose a traditional bass drum was placed in the tower constructed on the roof of the building (as shown in Figures 2 and 3). The bass drum indicated the time according to the western twenty-four hour time system which was introduced on New Year's Day in 1873 when Japan changed over to the solar calendar.³⁴ Consequently, not only schoolchildren but also their parents working in the fields or in the village would hear the sound of the drum and become accustomed to the new time system. Physically and acoustically, the contrast between the Edo era – when the ringing of bells in Buddhist temples had normally announced the time – and the period of the Meiji reforms – when the drum which had traditionally been used in Shinto shrines assumed this task – could not have been more conspicuous.³⁵ This aesthetic contrast – "aesthetic" in its

34 A famous English traveller, Isabella L. Bird, *Unbeaten Tracks in Japan*, London 1880, p. 129, reported on her own experience of a school drum in Nikko, Tochigi prefecture, in 1878: "At 7 a.m. a drum beats to summon the children to a school whose buildings would not discredit any school board at home. Too much Europeanised I thought it, and the children looked very uncomfortable sitting on high benches in front of desks, instead of squatting, native fashion. The school apparatus is very good, and there are fine maps on the walls".

35 Since the last days of the shogunate a widespread movement directed against Buddhism had emerged whose

original meaning of “relating to perception by the senses” – reflected not only the contrast between Japan’s traditional way of structuring time by the lunar calendar and the Gregorian calendar imported from the West, but also the far more fundamental contrast between traditional Buddhism and a Shintoism which was undergoing redefinition as a religio-cultural doctrine suited to granting virtually sacred legitimisation both to the nation and to the emperor at its apex. At the same time, however, the revolutionary government in faraway Tokyo manifested itself as the lord and master not only of the new schools, their rules and curricula, but also of the new system of defining time.

Logically enough, careful cleaning of the school building every day by the students was mandatory to guarantee its purity at all times. This involved both sweeping and scrubbing the floor of the entire building, akin to the temple training which Zen monks receive even today. As a result of all these improvements to the primary schools’ outward appearance and the symbolic measures that accompanied implementation of the revolutionary government’s policies, Japanese schools took on a virtually sacred quality. Some of the terms typically used with regard to schooling reflect this sacralisation of state schools. A salient example is the fact that, in Japanese, going to school to study is known as *tōkō*, a term which literally means “going to school as a higher place” but also has an implicit meaning of “going to a place of higher value”. The opposite term – returning home after attending school – is *gekō* which literally means “going down from a higher place to a lower place” but also implies “returning from school as a place of higher value to one’s home as a place of lower value”. This reading is clearly supported by the traditional Japanese understanding of the antonyms *tō* and *ge* as used, for example, in the words *tōzan* and *gesan*. The former means “joining a temple for training or schooling” whereas the latter refers to “returning home after spending a certain period of time in the temple for training”. These antonyms must have been convenient in providing the meaning which the Meiji government was trying to attach to the *gakkō* system of schooling. Scholars of historical semantics assume that the words *tōkō* and *gekō* were created from these antonyms. And it is highly instructive to note that both terms have remained in common use in the Japanese language up to the present day.

Another no less prominent example is an expression which people use when referring to a “teacher”, particularly in terms of the occupation of teaching, viz *seishokusha*, i.e. “a person engaged in the sacred profession of teaching and guiding people”. Historically, this word referred to monks and Shinto priests but since the Meiji period schoolteachers have also been referred to as “sacred professionals”. The headmaster who managed a group of sacred professionals played a role similar to that of the chief priest of a temple known as a *gakkō*. This role of the headmaster was vividly demonstrated, especially on the occasion of special ceremonies such as “Empire Day”, *kigensetsu*, which referred to the mythological foundation of Japan by Emperor Jimmu, was abolished after World War II and reintroduced in 1966 as “National Foundation Day”, or the emperor’s birth-

day. The “Empire Day” ceremony was attended by all the pupils of a school and individuals selected from the general public, including school personnel but also senior administrative officials and police officers. Every participant had to wear full dress. The headmaster opened a scroll of the Imperial Rescript on Education wearing white gloves and read it aloud solemnly, and the participants bowed their heads while listening to him. Following the reading of the Imperial Rescript, the headmaster and some eminent guests attending the ceremony gave speeches that heavily emphasised traditional Confucian morality. At the end of the ceremony the participants together sang an Empire Day song and on leaving the event each participant received a set of red and white *manjū*, i.e. Japanese-style buns.³⁶

Thus, in the early Meiji period, not only did Japanese state primary schools fulfil their normal role just as in other countries, they were also granted an additional meaning resulting from the transference of sacred symbols and values onto the modern school-house and its western-style building. This virtual sacralisation enabled Meiji state schools (*gakkō*) to become places for effective performance of ceremonial pedagogy with a view to inculcating the national ideology of the Meiji Revolution not only in students but also in their parents and other adults. To a certain degree, this continued up to the end of World War II.

5. The Social Impact of Tennō Worship as Reflected by Personal Experience

Analyzing with some degree of precision the long-term social impact of specific institutional arrangements or political reforms has always been a difficult task for historical research. This is particularly true of “ceremonial pedagogy”, whose impact can be reconstructed with regard to the political-*cum*-ideological goals which corresponding activities were meant to promote, but less so with respect to the actual effects of corresponding forms of symbolic visualisation, public staging or aesthetic representation.

The vivid memory of one of the two authors of this essay is most instructive in this regard, however. This author, Suzuki, was born in 1933 at Changchun, an old city in north-east China which had been renamed Hsingking – in Japanese “Shinkyō” which means “new capital” – in 1932. In that same year, the Japanese-controlled pseudo-independent state of Manchukuo was established. It is well-known that the major international powers did not recognise Manchukuo as a state because Japan treated it as a virtual colony. The Manchukuo government controlled educational policy when the young Suzuki entered the Asahi-Jinjo Primary School at Chilin (Jilin) in 1938 and enacted various education laws, making schooling compulsory for children of every ethnicity from the age of six and up to the age of eleven. Throughout Manchukuo, the government established new

36 A combination of the colours red and white is a traditional symbol of celebration in Japan. Incidentally, the similarity between the ritual of this ceremony and some aspects of the Christian mass is noteworthy.

schools and reorganised existing ones in line with the new Manchurian education system.

The Asahi-Jinjo Primary School was a new school built for children of Japanese employees working at the Chilin office of the South Manchuria Railway Company (SMRC), the Chilin railway station and other organisations. Most of the teachers were recent graduates of Japanese normal schools. When the young Suzuki enrolled at the school it had just sent its first graduates to secondary schools or to enter the world of work. The school was located close to the blocks of flats set aside for the employees of the above-mentioned institutions and was built by the Manchurian local government and the South Manchuria Railway Company. There were two primary schools for the Japanese and separate schools for Chinese, Koreans and Mongolian pupils.

The school day began with a morning session which was normally held in the playground except in the winter. Pupils assembled in the playground, hoisted the Japanese flag (*Hinomaru*), sang the Japanese national anthem (*Kimigayo*) in unison and bowed in the direction of the imperial palace in Tokyo (the *Kyūjō*). After this ceremony the pupils listened to the headmaster's address. Before the morning session, all the children recited the Imperial Rescript on Education in their classrooms. The young Suzuki recited entire sentences composed of classical terms and phrases, most of which were beyond his power of understanding.³⁷ It is important to note that the more difficult the passages, the more effective they were in dominating pupils' hearts and minds. The abstract concepts and the sound of the author's own voice heightened the effect of inculcating in him the ideas of the Imperial Rescript on Education.

Following the enactment of the Law of National Schools (*kokumin-gakkō*) in 1941, a copy of the official portraits of Emperor Shōwa (who reigned 1926–1989) and the Empress was brought into his classroom and hung up high on the wall above the blackboard. The eyes of the emperor and empress continually monitored the author and his classmates during their lessons, and the author felt as if he was being observed by them and found their gaze unavoidable whenever he was sitting in the classroom.³⁸ In the past, Meiji Tennō had communicated strong political and religious messages to the commoners whom he met on his journeys, and the “honourable real picture” (*Go-Shin'Ei*) of the Meiji Emperor and Empress Shōken continued to convey these messages even after their travels had come to an end. While twenty-nine years had elapsed since the death of Emperor Meiji when the young Suzuki saw the portraits of Emperor Shōwa and the Empress, these portraits conveyed to him and his classmates the very same messages that had been imparted to those who had seen Emperor Meiji several decades previously.

37 Cf. the full-length text quoted at the end of section 2.3 above.

38 It is said that in some British pubs an eye was hung from the ceiling or on the wall. This eye was God's eye which warned the guests not to drink too much.



Figure 4: The Go-Shin'Ei granted to schools: "Shōwa Tennō and Kōgi".

Source: Sato Hideo (ed.), *Kyōiku, Go-Shin'Ei to Kyōiku-Chokugo I* [Education, Go-Shin'Ei and Kyōiku-Chokugo I], *Zoku-Gen-dai-Shi Shiryō* 8 [Second Series of Modern History Resources, vol. 8], Tokyo, Misuzu-Shobō, 1994. With the kind permission of the publisher and the Imperial Household Ministry.

The school curriculum was revised in line with the new doctrine embodied in the Law of National Schools which was termed "training and discipline" (*rensei*). Besides general school subjects, military training and traditional martial arts were made compulsory for boys and girls above grade four. Ceremonies were held at the beginning and end of every term (there were three terms in each school year). At the ceremonies held at the end of term some of the highest achievers in each class, in all six grades, were praised for their achievements, while pupils sang the national anthem and listened to the headmaster's recital of the Imperial Rescript on Education. The ceremony closed with an address by the headmaster and pupils' singing of the school song. On national holidays, school ceremonies were even more solemn, normally consisting of the singing of the national anthem; recital of the Imperial Rescript on Education; bowing in the direction of the imperial palace in Tokyo; singing contemporary songs; addresses by invited guests and the headmaster; and singing of the school song. Such ceremonies were held in the school's assembly hall and the official portraits of the emperor and empress were mandatorily hung on its wall.

In 1942, the author moved to an old town, Lin Jiang Xian, following his father's appointment as the station master there. The town lay by the river Yalu and was surrounded by high mountains on either side. The south bank of the river was Chosen – as Korea

was known while it formed part of the Japanese Empire (1910–1945) – while the town was situated on the north bank and surrounded by rich nature. The author enrolled at a school in the old district of the town. The school was an old building with a square garden and two wings on either side of the garden. The right wing was for Chinese and Korean pupils and the left for Japanese children. At that time it was quite rare for a school to accommodate children of different ethnicities. There were not many Japanese children and the author remembers just two rooms which were set aside for Japanese children from a wide range of age groups. The class was therefore a mixed one for pupils of various ages. The school building was an old, single-storey house and may be assumed to have been an old type of school which had once served as a traditional institution of learning for gifted young men in China. Here again, the pupils assembled in the garden in the morning session. There were poles for two national flags, the Japanese flag and the flag of Manchukuo. Manchukuo also had its own national anthem. The schoolchildren sang the two national anthems, with the Japanese children singing the Manchurian anthem in Chinese and vice versa. All the children bowed in the direction of the imperial palace in Tokyo, irrespective of ethnic differences. This ceremony was introduced in the schools for Chinese and Manchurian children after 1937, following the introduction of a new school system based on the laws enacted by the Manchurian government that was led by Japanese officers.

When he was a fifth-grade pupil, the Japan Club decided to establish a Shinto shrine on the low hill at the foot of Mount Mao Er. At that time Japan intended to convert Chinese, Korean and Manchurian people to the idea of “One World Under One Roof” (*Hakkō Ichiu*), an ideal of universal brotherhood which was to be realised through the Japanese language and the Shinto religion. Japanese was made one of the official languages in Manchukuo and Shinto shrines were built throughout the Japanese Empire. By 1945 nearly 300 Shinto shrines had been built in Manchuria and the regions occupied by Japan. People ruled by Japan were forced to learn Japanese and convert to Shinto – the same policy which Japan pursued following its colonisation of Taiwan after the Sino-Japanese War (1894–1895).

In 1944, Japan's imminent defeat was clear to most Japanese people living in Manchuria. As a reflection of this social climate, school education focused on providing pupils with an account of the origins of the war and promoting enthusiasm for it. All the children born in 1930s were known as the “child nation” (*Shō-Kokumin*) and many of them became highly loyal and patriotic with regard to the Japanese *kokutai*. Following Russia's invasion of Manchuria in August 1945, Suzuki's father was asked to move to the province of Tong Hua in order to set up a base from which to resist the Russian troops. The entire Suzuki family along with the families of high officers of the South Manchuria Railway Company left Changchun – the place where the young Suzuki had entered secondary school just a couple of months previously – by bus. On the third day of their bus journey to Tong Hua, 15 August 1945, they heard the emperor announce on the radio that the war was over. Emperor Shōwa could be seen in newspapers and monthly magazines, always on horseback and in military uniform. This was the very first time that Japanese

people had ever heard the emperor speak. In unusual language, the emperor stated that he intended to bring to a close the war which he had started. Many adults cried over the defeat but Suzuki felt a sense of liberation from the threat of the war which he had come to know during the few months he had attended a secondary school.

In the aftermath of Japan's surrender and the collapse of Manchukuo there was no formal system of education for Japanese or any other pupils. Mr. Ōta, the former headmaster of a secondary school for girls in a city far to the north of Changchun, had come to Changchun to escape the regional unrest and invited Japanese secondary students, both boys and girls, to attend classes in a hall belonging to the South Manchuria Railway Company. Suzuki attended Mr. Ōta's mathematics class where mathematical reasoning helped him to develop his powers of rational thought and encouraged him to reflect upon the beliefs which had been inculcated in him at his primary schools. This was a kind of liberation for him from various forms of indoctrination, providing him with a new framework for his educational development. He spent only a short period of time at Ōta's seminar, however, as from July 1946 onwards many Japanese people in Changchun were collectively repatriated to Japan, including Mr. Ōta.

Suzuki and his family stayed on in Manchuria for another period of one year and three months following the end of the war. His father's company was closed down but Suzuki's father remained behind to complete its liquidation. It was not until the end of October 1946 that Suzuki's family was ordered to return to Japan. After spending a week at Sasebo in Kyūshū they moved to a village in Fukushima prefecture. On his way from Sasebo to Fukushima, the adolescent Suzuki witnessed the completely destroyed city of Hiroshima and saw the national flag (*Hinomaru*) at most railway stations since the new constitution had been promulgated on this day, i.e. 3 November 1946. Suzuki inevitably felt somewhat conflicting sentiments on his train journey to Fukushima whenever he passed through railway stations, seeing both destroyed cities and the hoisted national flag. On arriving at his destination, he enrolled at the local Hobara Secondary School, a state secondary school administered by Fukushima prefecture. Unlike in his previous schools he found no official portraits of the emperor and empress in his new classroom, but there was an altar (*hoan-den*) on the left-hand side of the garden in front of the main entrance to the school. This altar was subsequently destroyed and a small monument erected there which was dedicated to the school's alumni who had died on the battlefield. The school's initiation and graduation ceremonies no longer featured the Imperial Rescript on Education.

6. Concluding Remarks

The political leaders of the period following the 1868 *Meiji Ishin* skilfully and carefully staged the visibility of Emperor Meiji and Empress Shōken. At the same time, they developed national systems for the inculcation of values chosen in accordance with State Shinto ideology. The Imperial Rescript on Education was a typical example of this. Sys-

tems of knowledge such as *kokugaku*, Confucianism and Buddhism were used to fuse the imperial family's Shinto with popular systems of values which had been cherished, cultivated and formalised over centuries. Western learning and technology were amalgamated with traditional beliefs and norms. The Meiji government introduced a system of national education with reference to foreign procedures, methods and curricula while also drawing on Japanese educational traditions. Despite local variations in the establishment of an education system inculcating a sense of national unity and unequal educational opportunities for children from the poorest areas of society and the most deprived regions, most schools succeeded in indoctrinating state values in children, parents and other members of the community. At the centre and at the periphery, schools and schoolteachers performed the roles which the political authorities required of them.³⁹ State schools' role as minor State Shinto shrines meant that the central government had an increasingly clear overview of the field of education, and few people criticised the educational goals of developing a strong physique, military strength, loyalty and fidelity towards one's parents and ancestors, the virtues of being a good wife and wise mother, and a patriot devoted to the emperor and his state. This education policy naturally gave rise to an enthusiasm throughout the country for military totalitarianism.

The visibility and, at the same time, invisibility of the emperor and the empress – during the Meiji and Shōwa periods – helped the Japanese people to adjust to a new culture founded upon the principles of an imperial system which had been reinvigorated by the Meiji Revolution. The Meiji government borrowed foreign policies and adapted these to its own requirements. Likewise, by means of an approach linking society and politics with religion, it merged traditional rituals with new ones that were invented and controlled by the state. The concept of *kokutai*, for instance, largely predated 1868, but was revived and re-interpreted in the wake of the Meiji Revolution.

A number of socio-psychological instruments promoted structural changes such as, for instance, the establishment of the national education system. The Imperial Rescript on Education transported children, adolescents and adults to a separate acoustic realm whenever it was recited either by themselves or by other people, such as the headmaster, with permanent cycles of utterance and listening. The assembled pupils formed a collective acoustic sphere which was at once personal and ceremonial and where the Imperial Rescript on Education symbolised traditional values derived from both Confucianism and *kokugaku*. *Kokugaku* was inculcated in people's minds through a vocalisation of symbolic meanings, supplemented by school songs approved by the Ministry of Education and verses written for ceremonial recital on national holidays. Through this combination of acoustic and visual approaches, the internal organisation of schools perfectly complemented the inculcation of the political symbols of Meiji Japan. The school ceremony was a sacred event, and the official portraits of the emperor and empress represented an alternative version of the symbolic *kokutai* entity of Japan. Self-sacrifice was required of

39 Yamamoto Nobuyoshi & Konnō Toshihiko, *Kindai kyōiku no Tennō-sei ideorogī* [Tennō-sei or Emperor System Ideology in Modern Education], Tokyo 1987, p. 88.

all those concerned to keep these portraits safe from deterioration or loss. If a fire were to break out, for example, the headmaster would frequently sacrifice himself to protect the portraits from destruction. In other words, with the portraits of the emperor came responsibility for people to protect them and this responsibility extended to every corner of society. The emperor and his political representatives were able to develop this network throughout the country on account of the transparency of the relationship between themselves and the population as a whole, which was a relationship of the “watchers” and the “watched”.

In political and moral terms, schools, communities and society in general were reorganised so as to make up a hierarchy consisting of multiple levels of responsibility. A person belonging to a particular level in this hierarchy was a “mini-emperor” to those at lower levels in the hierarchy. Schoolteachers were “mini-emperors” in relation to their pupils, while in the family context the father or adult man was a “mini-emperor” and the mother or adult woman a “mini-empress” to the children. However, responsibilities seemed to be less onerous at higher levels in the hierarchy, with the emperor having no responsibilities at all since he was at the top of the hierarchy. Together with the Imperial Rescript on Education the *Go-Shin’Ei* of the successive emperors and empresses promoted the consolidation of a religio-socio-political system the underlying axiology of which has sounded as a *basso continuo* throughout Japanese political and cultural history.

Showcases of Revolutionary Transformation: Exhibitions in the Early Meiji Period

Daniel Hedinger

RESÜMEE

Auf den – gemeinhin als *Meiji ishin* bezeichneten – politischen Umbruch vom Frühjahr 1868 folgte ein Jahrzehnt revolutionären Wandels, der die japanische Gesellschaft von Grund auf umgestaltete. Ohne die Berücksichtigung kultureller Praktiken jedoch lassen sich die Stoßrichtung und Tragweite dieser „Meiji-Revolution“ nicht erfassen. Der Beitrag untersucht daher den Wandel anhand des Mediums öffentlicher Ausstellungen. Die Institution der Ausstellung offenbarte die revolutionären Ansprüche und Praktiken der neuen Eliten sowie die Reaktionen der Bevölkerung auf diese Ansprüche und Praktiken mit besonderer Deutlichkeit, denn es gab während der Meiji-Zeit keine andere Veranstaltungsform, die so viele Menschen an einem einzigen Ort hätte zusammenbringen können. Es wird gezeigt, dass Ausstellungen weniger Abbilder als vielmehr Träger des Wandels waren: Mit ihnen und durch sie ließen sich politische Ambitionen artikulieren, welche die im Entstehen begriffene Nation repräsentierten, Ordnungen des Wissens verhandelten und neuartige Konsumkulturen erprobten. Ihre Durchführung ließ dabei stets unterschiedliche, ja, entgegengesetzte Tendenzen hervortreten: Kontinuitäten und Brüche, wobei, längerfristig betrachtet, letztere dominierten.

1. On the use and abuse of examples

The power of example may serve as a useful means of legitimation for a bold undertaking. A group of Kyoto businesspeople planning an exhibition in 1871 had in mind a clear model, for in their public announcement they declared:

*The western countries have something they call 'exhibitions'. These are used to display to people both newly invented machines and ancient equipment with the aim of promoting knowledge, making discoveries and realizing profits. In imitation of this outstanding method we intend [...] to hold such a meeting.*¹

At that time just three years had passed since the palace coup in Kyoto which had turned the system of political power in Japan on its head and formally re-established the emperor's supreme authority.² The upheaval which took place in the spring of 1868 – referred to as the Meiji Restoration [in Japanese: *Meiji ishin*] – marked the beginnings of radical change in Japanese society. The term *Meiji* [enlightened rule] served to designate the entire period of the emperor's reign (1868–1912) but also functioned as a motto for the government which represented, in particular, the reform efforts of the new rulers in the first decade after 1868. Within the framework of these reforms these rulers had few inhibitions about making repeated reference to their models. For a Tokyo exhibition held in 1877 they wrote in an English-language catalogue intended for western visitors:

*The good results, which have followed the various European exhibitions, have not only induced our nation to take part in these rendezvous, but also have produced a desire of cultivating equally valuable fruits for the benefit of the country at large.*³

Early Meiji-period Japan did not limit itself to such rhetorical genuflections before western models. Both of the above-mentioned exhibitions took place. The Kyoto exhibition of 1871 marked the beginning of a boom in exhibitions held in Japan in the first decade of the new era. The Tokyo exhibition of 1877 stood at the start of a long series of national industrial exhibitions. Many of the early domestic Japanese exhibitions were unable to fulfil the hopes placed in them and met with criticism. But this criticism referred to Japanese attempts and virtually never to the western models which – as we shall see – almost no one seriously dared call into question.

Yet foreign examples are sometimes of limited use and references to them at least open to question. This is doubly true for the upheavals in the wake of *Meiji ishin* and its potential models and precursors, the great western revolutions that occurred toward the end of the eighteenth century. On the one hand, Japan's new elites soon came to see these examples as unsuitable models for their own reform projects. On the other, however, scholarship on the Meiji period has repeatedly cited the western revolutions as a model by which to evaluate the change which took place in Japan after 1868.

1 Translated from the quotation in Hiroshi Maruyama, *Meiji shoki no kyōto hakurankai* [The Kyoto exhibitions in the early Meiji period], in Mitsukuni Yoshida (ed.), *Bankoku hakurankai no ken'yū* [Studies on the world exhibitions], Tokyo 1986, pp. 221–248, here p. 228. Cf. Kyōto Hakurankai Kyōkai (ed.), *Kyōto hakurankai enkakushi* [A history of the Kyoto exhibitions], Kyoto 1903, esp. p. 27.

2 On the events in Kyoto in the spring of 1868 see Jun Suzuki, *Ishin no kōsō to tenkai* (Nihon no rekishi 20) [The development of Meiji ishin and its guiding idea (Japanese History 20)], Tokyo 2002, pp. 12–30. John Breen, *The Imperial Oath of April 1868. Ritual, Politics, and Power in the Restoration*, in: *Monumenta Nipponica*, vol. 51, no. 4 (winter 1996), pp. 407–429.

3 Exhibition Bureau (ed.), *National Exhibition, 1877. Official Catalogue of the National Exhibition of Japan*, Tokyo 1877, p. III.

On the first point, it should be noted that Japan's new rulers did not identify with the leitmotifs of the French and American revolutions. They were deeply troubled by demands for freedom or equality and thus rejected these western political and social revolutions as models for their reform efforts. The industrial revolution met with much less hostility, however, and the new elites rapidly adopted its agenda. But they did so without reference to the concept of "revolution" and instead embraced slogans of "progress" and "civilization" which were more innocuous in the second half of the nineteenth century. The reformers' distrust of the western revolutions can be traced in terms of changing language. The upheavals in the wake of 1868 soon came to be known as *Meiji ishin* (明治維新). *Ishin* originally meant "renewal",⁴ but a comparison of dictionaries of the Meiji period shows how the backward-looking character of *ishin* became increasingly prominent; this is particularly so for translations into European languages, where "restoration" became the standard translation.⁵ There was also an increasingly sharp conceptual distinction between "restoration" and "revolution", i.e. between *ishin* and *kakumei* (革命). At the same time, *kakumei* ("revolution") gradually vanished from the reformers' vocabulary. While in 1876 in an English-language brochure for the world exhibition held in Philadelphia, for instance, the Japanese ministry of education characterizes the events around 1868 as a "revolution", eight years later in a similar source – this time for the "Health and Education Exhibition" held in London – the same authorities now merely speak of a "restoration".⁶ The political and social revolutions of the West were not permitted as an official model for the epochal upheavals which marked the early Meiji period.

On the second point, it should be pointed out that scholarship on Japan has made repeated use of the western revolutions as models by which to evaluate *Meiji ishin*.⁷ It has thus arrived at quite different – and frequently contradictory – findings whose proponents can in broad terms be classified in accordance with three different groups. The first of these groups denies the upheavals in the decade after 1868 any revolutionary character whatsoever. By comparison with the European revolutions, Japanese representatives of this group in particular have emphasized the restoration of imperial rule and

4 On the complex etymology of *Ishin* and its Chinese origin, see George M. Wilson, Reviewed work(s): *Meiji Ishin. Restoration and Revolution* by Nagai Michio, Miguel Urrutia, in: *Journal of Japanese Studies*, winter 1990, p. 173.

5 Masaaki Sōgō/Yoshifumi Hida (ed.), *Meiji no kotoba jiten* [Dictionary of the Meiji Period], Tokyo 1998, pp. 15–16.

6 Monbushō (ed.), *Outline History of Japanese Education*. Prepared for the Philadelphia International Exhibition, 1876, New York 1876, e.g. p. 6 and Monbushō, *A Catalogue with explanatory Notes of the Exhibits from the Department of Education, Empire of Japan, in the International Health and Education Exhibition, Held in London, 1884*, London 1884, p. 19 et al.

7 For a comparison with the French Revolution, see e.g. Tadami Chizuka, *Furansu kakumei to meiji ishin* [The French Revolution and Meiji ishin], in: Akira Tanaka (ed.), *Meiji ishin (Kindai nihon no kiseki 1)* [Meiji ishin (Remnants of a Japanese Modernity 1)], Tokyo 1994, pp. 244–266. An English-language guide to the scope of research on Meiji ishin may be found in Michio Nagai/Miguel Urrutia (ed.), *Meiji Ishin. Restoration and Revolution*, Tokyo 1985. See also Sven Saaler, *Die Bedeutung der Epochenmarke 1868 in der Japanischen Geschichte. Restauration, Revolution, Reform*, in: *Saeculum. Jahrbuch für Universalgeschichte* 56 (1/2005), pp. 69–104.

the uniqueness of *Meiji ishin*.⁸ The comparison with western models has meant that even today Japanese scholarship refrains from using the term “revolution” (*kakumei*) in reference to the change which occurred after 1868.⁹ Large swathes of western scholarship long followed such a reading, giving the upheavals a backward-looking character through their use of the term “Meiji restoration”.¹⁰ However, the mere fact that it was not the emperor who governed the country and instead a handful of ascendant oligarchs who controlled the reforms and the business of state means that the simple reestablishment of the old order – the emperor’s supreme authority – which is implied by the term “restoration” is implausible.

A second, highly heterogeneous group sees *Meiji ishin* as a revolution which got stuck half-way.¹¹ Those who invoke political and sociological arguments criticize the fact that an independent civil society failed to emerge in Meiji-period Japan which might have countered the state’s centralising tendencies.¹² Economically-oriented attempts at explanation are more strongly focused on the issue of whether a middle class arose in Japan in the second half of the nineteenth century.¹³ Approaches devoted to the history of ideas

8 Such an interpretation of Meiji ishin extends far back beyond 1945. For a summary of the scholarship see Yasushi Toriumi, Masahito Masao/Hidemasa Kokaze (ed.), *Nihon kingendaishi kenkyū jiten* [Dictionary of Historical Research on Japanese Modernity], Tokyo 2004, pp. 15-19.

9 Japanese historians continue to use the term Meiji ishin almost exclusively. See, for example, Akira Tanaka, *Meiji ishin* [Meiji ishin], Tokyo 2003 and Jun Suzuki, *Ishin no kōsō to tenkai* (Nihon no rekishi 20) [The development of Meiji ishin and its guiding idea (Japanese History 20)], Tokyo 2002.

10 Recently some English-speaking historians of Japan have begun to criticise this choice of phrase and refer instead to the “Meiji Revolution”. For example, Marius Jansen entitled a chapter of his well-known book *The making of modern Japan* “The Meiji Revolution”. (Marius B. Jansen, *The making of modern Japan*, Harvard 2000). Andrew Gordon also consistently uses the term “revolution”: Andrew Gordon, *A modern History of Japan. From Tokugawa Times to the Present*, New York/Oxford, 2003, e.g. pp. 61-62 and p. 75.

11 Such as Harry D. Harootunian, who refers to a “a passive revolution, a revolution/restoration that combined social forces in such a way as to install the contradictory impulse of both revolution and restoration” (Harry D. Harootunian, *Overcome by Modernity. History, Culture, and Community in Interwar Japan*, Princeton 2000, p. 301).

12 See for example Shmuel N. Eisenstadt, *Japanese Civilisation. A Comparative View*, Chicago 2006. This line of argument reaches back to Masao Maruyama in particular, who shortly after the Second World War published a series of highly influential essays on the issue of the origins of Japanese ultra-nationalism and identified as one of these the lack of a bourgeois revolution in the nineteenth century (see also Tino Schölz, *Faschismuskonzepte in der japanischen Zeitgeschichtsforschung*, in: Hans Martin Krämer/Tino Schölz/Sebastian Conrad (ed.), *Geschichtswissenschaft in Japan. Themen, Ansätze und Theorien*, Göttingen 2006, pp. 119-120). Several of these writings can be found in Masao Maruyama, *Freiheit und Nation in Japan. Ausgewählte Aufsätze 1936–1949*, Band 1, Munich 2007.

13 They primarily examined the role of the samurai and the merchants in Meiji ishin and the extent to which they contributed to the emergence of a middle class. For the classic analysis, see E. Herbert Norman, *Japan’s Emergence as a Modern State. Political and Economic Problems of the Meiji Period*, New York 1940. See also Douglas R. Howland, *Samurai Status, Class, and Bureaucracy: A Historiographical Essay*, in: *The Journal of Asian Studies*, vol. 60, no. 20 (May 2001), pp. 353-380, esp. pp. 353-354. The role of the peasants has also been repeatedly examined, however: the historian Jūn’nosuke Sasaki maintained that the social movements of the 1860s had failed and that Japan’s rich peasants were unable to develop into a bourgeoisie (cf. on this point Irwin Scheiner, *The Japanese Village. Imagined, Real, Contested*, in: Stephen Vlastos (ed.), *Mirror of Modernity. Invented Tradition of Modern Japan*, Berkeley/Los Angeles/London, 1998, pp. 67-78, here pp. 74-75. On the concept of a “bourgeois revolution” from the Japanese point of view see Germaine A. Hoston, *Conceptualizing Bourgeois Revolution. The Prewar Japanese Left and the Meiji Restoration*, in: *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, vol. 33, no. 3 (Jul. 1991), pp. 539-581.

for their part emphasize the conservative, backward-looking and traditional character of Meiji-period ideologies.¹⁴

In many ways closely connected with this second interpretation is a third line of argument which – always with a view to revolution in the West – refers to a “revolution from above” in the case of Japan. This includes scholars of quite different backgrounds such as William G. Beasley, Theda Skocpol, Ellen Kay Trimberger, E. Herbert Norman, Eric Hobsbawm and, most recently, Jürgen Osterhammel.¹⁵ The assumption is that the social movements and restructuring of society which marked the western revolutions are missing in Japan in the aftermath of *Meiji ishin*. Such a reading is founded above all on the construction of the samurai as a closed-off class which had already ruled during the Edo period and then implemented the Meiji reforms, thus continuing to provide the country’s elite.¹⁶ This thesis is scarcely tenable in view of the diversity of the material, social and cultural circumstances of the samurai class in the Edo period. In fact, in 1868 a group of figures deriving almost exclusively from lower-status samurai families and Japan’s periphery was able to supersede the power elite of the Edo period (1603–1867) which consisted of the shogunate and the daimyōs. In overall terms it is clear that the protagonists of the political upheaval and the civil war of the 1860s had entirely new opportunities for advancement.

A common feature of the interpretative approaches belonging to the second and third groups is their authorship of narratives emphasizing deficiency in one form or another. They either see *Meiji ishin* as an ideologically backward-looking reform process seeking to restore the emperor’s “original” system of rule, or they interpret it as an uncompleted bourgeois or capitalist revolution or else as a purely political revolution from above. Their consistent conclusion is that by comparison with the implicit models – the major revolutions of the West – *Meiji ishin* remained incomplete or unfinished. These approaches are as normative as they are Eurocentric. They are normative in that they make individual models a norm which the rest of the world is to follow, simply negating the openness of the historical outcome entailed in the process of change which they describe. And they

14 For instance, Jack A. Goldstone, *Revolution and Rebellion in the Early Modern World*, Berkeley, 1993, p. 458. On Meiji-period ideologies see also Carol Gluck, *Japan’s Modern Myths. Ideology in the Late Meiji Period*, New Jersey 1985.

15 William G. Beasley, *The Meiji Restoration*, pp. 7–8. Theda Skocpol, *Social Revolutions in the Modern World*, New York, 1994, e.g. p. 125. Ellen Kay Trimberger, *Revolution from above. Military Bureaucrats and Development in Japan, Turkey, Egypt, and Peru*, New Brunswick, 1978. E. Herbert Norman, *The Meiji Restoration*, in: Ulrich Menzel (ed.), *Im Schatten des Siegers: Japan. Band 2. Staat und Gesellschaft*, Frankfurt a. M. 1989, pp. 9–76, here p. 50. Eric J. Hobsbawm, *Die Blütezeit des Kapitals. Eine Kulturgeschichte der Jahre 1848–1875*, Munich 1977 [English edition: *The Age of Capital: 1848–1875*, London 1975], p. 186. Jürgen Osterhammel / Niels P. Petersson, *Ostasiens Jahrhundertwende. Unterwerfung und Erneuerung in west-östlichen Sichtweisen*, in: Ute Frevert (ed.), *Das Neue Jahrhundert. Europäische Zeitdiagnosen und Zukunftsentwürfe um 1900*, Göttingen 2000, pp. 265–306, here p. 272.

16 This line of interpretation reaches back in particular to the Marxist historiography which was long dominant in Japan after 1945: Yasushi Toriumi / Masahito Masao / Hidemasa Kokaze (ed.), *Nihon kingendaishi kenkyū jiten* [Dictionary of Historical Research on Japanese Modernity], Tokyo 2004, pp. 15–16.

are Eurocentric in that the western revolutions of the late eighteenth century serve as their absolute models.

This permanent comparison with the European revolutions has also meant that, up to the present day, the change resulting from *Meiji ishin* has mainly been described from a political, sociological or economic point of view. The change in cultural practices in the first decade after 1868 has received far less attention, as indeed has the question of how this change in cultural practices – if such a change did in fact take place – affected the society and the economic and political order of Meiji-period Japan. In relation to the French Revolution, cultural practices – such as festivals or ceremonies – have been receiving increasing attention for some time now but have never been a topic of key interest to historiography on Japan.¹⁷ Where they have been considered, this has been more as a reflection of the process of upheaval and not as an agent of this change.

With reference to exhibitory and representational practices, the following study analyzes the extent to which Japan's social order underwent a radical transformation in the decade following 1868. As we have seen, the western revolutions of the eighteenth century are simply the wrong models to describe the scope of change in Japan in the second half of the nineteenth century. They obfuscate more than they answer the question of the extent to which the upheavals in post-1868 Japan were revolutionary in nature. Accordingly, for once the western revolutions will not be used as a template or model to interpret this change; instead, the sources and the models which the sources refer to will be taken seriously. Instead of focusing on the models of the American and French revolutions which Japanese contemporaries refused, my study is centred on a model of activity readily embraced by the relevant elites: the cultural practices of exhibition.

Why exhibitions? During the Meiji period no other type of events brought together so many people in a single place. The fascination with these events resulted not least from the fact that, from a global perspective, the second half of the nineteenth century was the age of (world) exhibitions. They were a phenomenon to which even a Japan which had only recently opened up was unable to remain immune. In 1867 the country – which was then still under the shogunate government – first participated in a world exhibition. Overseas participation was followed from the early 1870s by the first domestic Japanese exhibitions which deliberately followed western models. In the first decade after 1868, domestic exhibitions became a central instrument of popular education, cultural homogenization and the consolidation of political power. They thus illustrate with particular clarity the revolutionary aims and practices of the new elites and the reactions of the populace. Where the West's exhibitions served as a model, their realization in Japan gave rise to two different – apparently contradictory – reactions: ruptures and continuities. Leaving aside for the time being the issue of which of these predominated, my article

17 On the French Revolution see Roger Chartier, *Les origines culturelles de la Révolution française*, Paris 1990. And, above all, Mona Ozouf, *La fête révolutionnaire. 1789–1799*, Paris 1976. Cultural history studies of Japan may be found in Daikichi Irokawa, *Meiji bunka* [Meiji Culture], Tokyo 1997 and Takashi Fujitani, *Splendid Monarchy. Power and Pageantry in Modern Japan*, Berkeley/Los Angeles/London 1998.

describes the reciprocal relationship between the two, with this pattern of ambivalence between continuities and ruptures reflected in its structure. The first part of the article describes aspects indicating continuity in exhibition practice between the late Edo period (1800–1867) and the first decade of the new era. The second part then examines the ruptures occurring in the same period.

2. Continuities

In the period of the 1860s and 1870s which was so crucial for Japanese exhibition culture two different types of continuity can be identified: on the one hand, the continuity between the exhibition practices of the Edo and Meiji periods and, on the other, a continuity in the first decade after 1868 between the early, generally small and local exhibitions held immediately after 1868 and the first “national industrial exhibition” in the tenth year of the Meiji period. The former has been frequently described in the scholarship, the latter seldom.¹⁸

Traditional exhibition practices: continuities between the Edo and early Meiji periods

In what context is it possible to speak of a continuity between Japanese exhibition practices in the first half of the nineteenth century and the early Meiji period? *Meiji ishin* was followed by a full-blown boom in exhibitions. From 1871 such events were held throughout Japan; at regular intervals in the major cities of Tokyo and Kyoto and sporadically in provincial centres such as Wakayama, Matsumoto and Kanazawa. Between 1871 and 1876 more than half a dozen exhibitions were held each year on average.¹⁹ A list from 2004 – which only includes events for which catalogues are extant – refers to a total of 42 exhibitions for the period.²⁰ Another even mentions 51 events in the years 1871 to 1877.²¹ But while the former lists fifteen exhibitions for 1874, the latter notes just five in that year. Exact estimates of the number of exhibitions held in the first decade

18 On the former see in particular Peter Kornicki, *Public Display and Changing Values. Early Meiji Exhibitions and Their Precursors*, in: *Monumenta Nipponica* 49 (1994) no. 2, pp. 167–196, but also Angus Lockyer, *Japan at the Exhibition, 1867–1877. From Representation to Practice*, in: Tadao Umesao (ed.), *Japanese Civilization in the Modern World. XVII Collection and Representation (Senri Ethnological Studies 54)*, Osaka 2001, pp. 67–75, here p. 73.

19 Cf., for example, Kornicki, *Public Display and Changing Values* (footnote 18), p. 189, Shinzō Ogi, Ai Maeda, Tōru Haga (ed.), *Meiji taishō zushi. Dai ikkan Tokyo* [Illustrations of the Meiji and Taishō Periods. First Volume, Tokyo], Tokyo 1978, p. 152, Maruyama, *Meiji shoki no kyōto hakurankai* (footnote 1), pp. 223–224 and Shunya Yoshimi, *Hakurankai no seijigaku. Manazashi no kindai* [A Political Science Analysis of Exhibitions. The Modernity of the Glance], Tokyo 1992, p. 122.

20 Cf. Bunkazai Kenkyūjo Tokyo Bunkazai Kenkyūjo (ed.), *Meijiki fukun hakurankai shuppin mokuroku. Meiji 4 nen – 9 nen* [Exhibition Catalogues of the Prefectures of the Meiji Period. Meiji 4 to Meiji 9], Tokyo 2004. It is not improbable that the sources for many smaller, provincial exhibitions are either not extant or else still slumbering in the archives.

21 Tsunoyama Yukihiro, *Win bankokuhaku no kenkyū*, [Studies on the Vienna World Exhibition], Suita 2000, pp. 180–181.

of the Meiji period are thus scarcely possible. The problem is not just that existing lists are incomplete and strongly differ, it must also be assumed that many smaller, provincial exhibitions are undocumented or else the relevant sources are yet to be discovered in the archives.²² But in overall terms a far higher total figure should be assumed. While in the provinces it was generally local authorities which took the initiative, in Kyoto – where a strict annual rhythm was observed from 1871 onward – rich businesspeople cooperated with the city authorities, and in Tokyo officials of the “exhibition bureau” acted as organizers. Temples and shrines often served as sites, and sometimes so did castles, as in 1873 in Matsumoto and three years later in Hikone.²³

Exhibitions in shrines and temples mark obvious continuities in relation to the pre-1868 period. For centuries there had been a practice in Japan of opening a temple’s treasure vault to the general public several days a year. At these *kaichō* (開帳: [open exhibitions of temple and shrine relics]) religious artefacts and temple treasures could be viewed, including Buddhist sculptures. They were sometimes even sent on tours of the country (*degaichō* [出開帳: [carrying of the temple and shrine relics])).²⁴ For many people, it was not unusual to visit temples and shrines on special occasions to view interesting or lucky objects there, things which were normally concealed from their view. But their motives were more than mere curiosity and were also religious in nature.

There was also a whole series of further presentational forms which should all be considered precursors of the exhibition boom that occurred in the first decade after 1868. This includes the so-called *shogakai* (書画会: [society for painting and calligraphy]) society for painting and calligraphy), exhibitions of pictures and examples of calligraphy which were normally displayed in private to a group of experts. In this case, a considerable continuity is apparent at the level of the protagonists, as many of the key exhibition organizers in the early Meiji period belonged to such elite circles of connoisseurs and art-lovers. Tanaka Yoshio, for instance, who – in the service of the government – was one of the central figures involved in the renewal of exhibition culture in the Meiji period, had regularly participated at such meetings in the period since the late 1850s.²⁵

22 For example, the archive materials of Tanaka Yoshio contain references to previously unknown exhibitions (Yoshio Tanaka, Kunshōjū, Main Library of Tokyo University, A 10: Volumes 12–15 [from 1871]).

23 See the relevant newspaper articles in Meiji Nyūsu Jiten Hensan linkai (ed.), Meiji nyūsu jiten. Dai ikkan. Keiō 4 nen-meiji 10 nen [Encyclopedia of News in the Meiji Period. Volume 1. Keiō 4 to Meiji 10], Tokyo 1985 (4th edition), p. 565.

24 Between 1590 and 1870 in Edo – today’s Tokyo – alone more than 1,500 *degaihō* are said to have taken place (Tadao Umesao, “Keynote Address: The Comparative Study of Collection and Representation”, in: idem (ed.), Japanese Civilization in the Modern World. XVII Collection and Representation (Senri Ethnological Studies 54), Osaka 2001, pp. 1–11, p. 8). On the *kaichō* see also Kornicki, Public Display and Changing Values (footnote 18), p. 175.

25 Throughout his life, Tanaka collected all types of material associated with the organization of exhibitions: exhibition plans, invitations, correspondence and also product descriptions. This archive material, comprising roughly one hundred volumes, shows that the young Tanaka was interested in *shogakai*. The first two volumes from the period from 1858 to 1859 include a large number of event announcements and invitations kept by him (see Yoshio Tanaka, Kunshōjū, Main Library of Tokyo University, A 10: 6010, Volume 1 (1858–1859) and Volume 2 (1858–1859), no page numbers).

His amusements in this period included attending so-called *bussankai* (物産会: [society for products]).²⁶ These were a type of product show which had its origins in the mid-eighteenth century and in formal terms probably most closely resemble the exhibitions of the Meiji period.²⁷ In 1757 a group led by Hiraga Gennai (1728–1779) in Edo, today's Tokyo, had organized a show of various medicines for the first time. From the early nineteenth century in particular such exhibitions – which were soon widened to include botanical materials – were held with astonishing regularity: in the period from 1832 to 1862 in only two years was not a single exhibition held.²⁸ The continuity in relation to the Meiji period is once again obvious at the level of the protagonists: like many of the scholars who organized the early *bussankai*, Hiraga Gennai stood at the beginnings of a blossoming “Holland science” (*rangaku*). In the final decades of the Edo period, the schools subsequently founded by the “Holland scholars” (*rangakusha*) brought forth a large number of experts in western scientific disciplines, especially medicine. Besides Tanaka Yoshio, practically all those who had a hand in developing exhibition culture in the years of *Meiji ishin* – including Fukuzawa Yukichi, Sano Tsunetami and Machida Hisanari – derived from a *rangaku* background.²⁹ Through their training such figures were already familiar prior to 1868 with practices such as collecting, categorizing and exhibiting botanical objects and medical products.

With regard to these “product shows”, notable continuities are also apparent in terms of the sites of exhibitions. Up to the end of the Edo period, *bussankai* were held in provincial cities such as Kumamoto but also in Kyoto, Nagoya and Edo – all centres of the post-1868 exhibition boom. The sites frequently even remained the same: in 1872, for one of the very first exhibitions organized by the government, the newly established ministry of education chose the Yushima shrine in Tokyo.³⁰ This was where the first *bussankai* had taken place exactly 125 years previously. This shrine – which honours Confucius – was constructed in the seventeenth century and is situated in central Tokyo. From the late eighteenth century onward the shrine grounds accommodated what was probably the most significant seat of shogunal learning and was a precursor of today's University of Tokyo.

Continuities in exhibition practices between the Edo period and the early Meiji period are not limited to the sites, origins and educational backgrounds of the protagonists, however, they also encompass the selection of exhibition items and their presentation

26 For example, volume 3 (1860) includes an announcement of an exhibition of medicines (Yoshio Tanaka, *Kunshōjū*, Main Library of Tokyo University, A 10: 6010, Volume 3 (1860), no page numbers).

27 On this point see Hideo Seki, *Hakubutsukan no tanjō. Machida Hisanari to Tokyo teishitsu hakubutsukan* [The Birth of the Museum. Machida Hisanari and the Imperial Museum in Tokyo], Tokyo 2005, pp. 44–46.

28 Kornicki, *Public Display and Changing Values* (footnote 18), p. 174. On *bussankai* in general see Umesao, *Key-note Address* (footnote 24), p. 7.

29 On the master-pupil relationships between *rangaku* scholars and botanists, which can be traced far back into the 18th century, see Shiina, *Nihon hakubutsukan seiritsushi*, p. 11.

30 Shiina, *Nihon hakubutsukan seiritsushi*, p. 11. The official announcements for this exhibition and further unpublished sources for it can be found in Yoshio Tanaka's 12th volume (Yoshio Tanaka, *Kunshōjū*, Main Library of Tokyo University, A 10: 6010, Volume 12 (from 1871), no page numbers).

and arrangement. So-called *misemono* shows (見世物: [things which are displayed]) had long been highly popular in Japan. *Misemono* included all kinds of commercial shows and displays; they were a vulgar entertainment featuring all manner of astonishing or absurd things.³¹ The first exhibitions of the Meiji period frequently retained the *misemono* shows' sensational character and the transitions were generally fluid. At an exhibition held in Tokyo in 1871 besides plants and animals all kinds of curios could be viewed. As late as 1874 the *Yomiuri* newspaper wrote that a "beast with a face resembling a cat's or a monkey's" was to be displayed at an exhibition.³² A glance at the catalogues of the early exhibitions shows that exhibition items continued to comprise curious, strange and rare objects.³³ It is thus hardly surprising that visitors frequently expressed difficulties in distinguishing between the conventional *misemono* (shows) and the new *hakurankai* (exhibitions).

"Progress" in jeopardy: undesired continuities in the first decade of the Meiji period

This continuity in exhibition culture irritated Japan's new rulers – above all Ōkubo Toshimichi, who may be considered the key figure in the new government in the period from 1874 to 1877 which is central to our analysis. His ministry of internal affairs began to sharply criticize the local exhibitions held in Kyoto, Wakayama, Nara etc. In 1876 it announced: "An exhibition of this sort displays only old objects and conventional knowledge while neglecting what is useful and practical. This situation has to change."³⁴ The ministry of internal affairs also asserted that from now on exhibitions were to serve the goals of progress, civilisation and industrialisation in Japan, and not than of entertainment.

A primary objective of the minister of internal affairs was to balance Japan's serious trade deficit. To Ōkubo's way of thinking, this required an improvement in the quality of products. To achieve this he planned national industrial exhibitions enabling the comparison of products from all over the country. The first industrial exhibition under Ōkubo's direction was finally held in 1877 in the newly-opened Ueno park in Tokyo.³⁵ The English-language brochure for this exhibition cited at the beginning of this study – which was specially published for the foreign public – commented critically on the boom in exhibitions that had occurred in the first few years after 1868:

31 On *misemono* in the Edo period, see Andrew L. Markus, *The Carnival of Edo. Misemono Spectacles From Contemporary Accounts*, in: *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies*, vol. 45, no. 2 (Dec. 1985), pp. 499–541.

32 *Yomiuri Shinbun*, November 24, 1874, p. 1.

33 A collection of many exhibition catalogues of the early Meiji period can be found in the library of the Japanese parliament (no author, *Hakurankai shuppin mokuroku* [Catalogues of the Exhibitions], n.p., 1873–1877).

34 *Naimushō Kangyōryō, Kyū kangyōryō nenpō satsuyō. Dai ikkai*, [Outline Annual Report on the Former Promotion of Industry. Volume 1], Tokyo, 1876, pp. 74–75.

35 Exhibition Bureau (ed.), *National Exhibition, 1877. Official Catalogue of the National Exhibition of Japan*, Tokyo 1877, pp. III–IV. On the role played by Ōkubo in the organization of the first national exhibition see also Seki, *Hakubutsukan no tanjō*, pp. 129–130.

*Although several periodical exhibitions have thus taken place, yet the methods and systems of collecting and arranging the articles, together with the management of the affairs of the exhibitions, not being the result of a long experience, but rather the first steps upon a new course, it may fairly be asserted that these exhibitions did not produce all the happy results that had been anticipated.*³⁶

The central authorities thus complained of the lack of modern selection systems and exhibition methods in Japan. In their eyes, the problem also related to the selection of objects. It was therefore only consistent to prohibit the display of “old objects” at the first national industrial exhibition.³⁷ To achieve this goal the ministry of internal affairs’ “exhibition bureau” collected items from all over Japan and assessed their suitability for exhibition. This centralized form of organization yielded notable results: the government displayed more than 80,000 objects in Ueno park and Japan’s first national exhibition drew almost half a million visitors in the three months that it was open.

Yet despite the official discourses and regulations it was not so easy to banish traditional presentation practices from the exhibitions, not even at the national industry exhibition of 1877. Well-known satirical magazines openly mocked the exhibition boom of the early Meiji period, and the first national exhibition in particular. One criticism was that the exhibitions organized by the new rulers continued to display items that were merely meaningless or peculiar, as at the earlier *misemono* shows. At the time of the first national industrial exhibition in 1877 *Marumaru Chinbun* published an extended series entitled *Naikoku takurankai shuppin* (内告宅覧会出品) which roughly translates as “Exhibition of the interior of a house”. This is a play on words in reference to the tradition of homonym-based puns in Japanese satirical poems: the chosen title sounds almost exactly like the official title for the “national industrial exhibition” – *Naikoku hakurankai shuppin*.³⁸ This series showed caricatures of comical exhibition items. Four years later, on the occasion of the second national industrial exhibition, another satirical magazine named *Kibidango* published a series of articles with the title “Exhibitions to laugh about”. They include “Newton’s apple” as an exhibition item – a clear swipe at the new government’s discourse of civilization and enlightenment.³⁹ The foreign press also complained of the (in its view) antiquated character of the first Japanese industrial exhibition. The *Tokyo Times* wrote of incongruous gothic buildings, unlabelled objects and the poor quality of many exhibition items.⁴⁰ For the *New York Times*, too, Japan’s first industrial exhibition was no match for its western models:

36 Exhibition Bureau (ed.), National Exhibition, 1877. Official Catalogue of the National Exhibition of Japan, Tokyo 1877, p. III.

37 Exhibition Bureau (ed.), National Exhibition, 1877. Official Catalogue of the National Exhibition of Japan, Tokyo 1877, p. V. And see the more detailed regulations published in Japanese in: No author, Meiji jūnen naikoku kangyō hakurankai shoki soku, Tokyo, 1876.

38 For example, the series may be found in issues nos. 7, 24 and 25 of *Marumaru chinbun* in 1877.

39 *Kibidango*, no. 120, February 16, 1881, p. 1931.

40 *Tokyo Times* of October 6, 1877, quoted from Sidney Devere Brown, Ōkubo Toshimichi: His Political and Economic Policies in Early Meiji Japan, in: *The Journal of Asian Studies*, vol. 21, no. 2 (Feb. 1962), pp. 183–197, p. 196.

*The Machinery Hall reminds one of its Philadelphia [world exhibition of 1876] name-sake mainly by contrast; it is by no means large, and the most of its limited space is filled [...] with emptiness.*⁴¹

All in all, between the Edo period and the development of modern Japanese exhibition culture in the decade after 1868 a notable continuity is apparent, both in terms of localities and protagonists and also certain exhibition practices. But is this enough to agree with Peter Kornicki's view that the domestic Japanese exhibitions in the early Meiji period "did not make any fundamental changes to the displays"?⁴²

3. Ruptures

Analogously to the continuities, two successive ruptures are apparent in the exhibition practices of the early Meiji period. An initial rupture occurred immediately after 1868 – the early Meiji-period exhibitions entailed an entire series of revolutionary changes relating to their ambitions, organizational forms and look, which clearly distinguished them from their late Edo-period predecessors. The "First National Industrial Exhibition" of 1877 marked a second and – at first glance – more obvious rupture. It generated entirely new forms of organization for exhibitions held in Japan and made its immediate predecessors look old. Unlike in the case of the continuities, however, the scholarship has consistently emphasized this second, subsequent rupture while largely negating the former.⁴³

The revolutionary change in exhibition culture in the first few years after 1868

With regard to the choice of localities for the early exhibitions, instead of continuity one might just as well emphasize change. While on the one hand exhibitions were held in hitherto unusual sites, on the other conventional exhibition sites were suddenly used quite differently, as in 1872 when the ministry of education organized a first major exhibition at the Yushima shrine. The ministry – which had only been established shortly beforehand – used for this event the sacred inner halls of the shrine which were dedicated to Confucius. This was a symbolic provocation which drew protests from Confucian scholars.⁴⁴ And this at a moment where, for a brief period of time, it still seemed unclear whether the newly-established educational institutions would teach Chinese-Confucian

41 New York Times, "The Japanese exhibition. First national fair. Ueno Park, the exhibition grounds, opening ceremonies, the Emperor and Empress in attendance, display of national productions, Japanese fine Art" (October 21, 1877), p. 2.

42 Kornicki, *Public Display and Changing Values* (footnote 18), p. 195.

43 For example, by comparison with the first national industrial exhibition Maruyama referred to the provincial exhibitions held in the period up to 1877 as "exhibitions of curios" (Maruyama, "Meiji shoki no kyōto hakurankai", p. 227).

44 Masato Miyachi (ed.), *Bijuaru waido meiji jidaikan* [A Broad, Visual Museum of the Meiji Period], Tokyo 2005, p. 151.

or western learning. The manner in which the ministry of education's exhibition bureau used the locality not only signified a confrontation with the old, Confucian system of knowledge but also marked a rupture with it.

The use of castles as a location for exhibitions was even more unprecedented. For the population of the castle towns, this symbolized the end of the old regime and the beginning of a new state and social order. A newspaper report on the exhibition held in Hikone castle wrote of the "extraordinary blessing of visiting the former prince's living quarters."⁴⁵ But Kyoto is surely the most impressive example of the use of new localities. From 1873 the Kyoto imperial palace – a place which had previously been closed to the outside world for a millennium – served as exhibition grounds.⁴⁶ It was the opening-up of the imperial palace that made the Kyoto exhibitions a success with the general public. The level of interest in and the bustle at the exhibition in the first few years after 1868 is scarcely explicable without consideration of the appeal of these previously closed-off sites. But the activities of the Kyoto organizers were also motivated by a further factor which likewise heralded the collapse of the old order. In the aftermath of *Meiji ishin* it was unclear which city would serve as Japan's capital – Kyoto, the venerable old capital (since 794) or Edo, the upstart which had served as the shogunate's administrative headquarters. An imperial edict of 1868 merely stated that Edo was now to be known as "Tōkyō" – i.e. "eastern capital".⁴⁷ Kyoto was considered the "western capital" (*Seikyō*) for a time, so that the two cities were in direct competition with one another. The exhibition culture which emerged at the same time in Kyoto and Tokyo in the 1871-72 period can only be understood in this context. The exhibitions were intended to be something entirely new and were held in each city in order to present it as the country's cultural capital. But while this is particularly clear in terms of the relationship of competition between Tokyo and Kyoto, it is also true of Japan as a whole. In 1871 the old feudal principalities were broken up and transformed into (a much smaller number of) provinces. The abolition of the feudal principalities was one of the factors behind the boom in exhibitions in the early Meiji period: this administrative reform led provinces, prefectures, regions and cities to attempt to distinguish themselves from one another and to present themselves. Intensifying competition between Japan's centres, at a time when a new order was still emerging, was thus a direct consequence of *Meiji ishin*. This competition unfolded through the use of cultural practices such as exhibitions.

Upheavals are also obvious in terms of the protagonists: less on account of individuals' origins and educational backgrounds and more in terms of their ambitions and oppor-

45 See the newspaper article of June 3, 1876 in Meiji Nyūsu Jiten Hensan linkai (ed.), Meiji nyūsu jiten. Dai ikkan. Tokyo 1985, p. 565.

46 Up to the 1880s exhibitions were recurrently held in buildings of the imperial palace. The general public was granted access not only to the imperial palace itself but also to culturally significant outbuildings such as the Sentō-gosho and Ōmyia-gosho which had once served as a residence for abdicated emperors and emperors' widows (Fujitani, Splendid Monarchy, p. 60). On the Kyoto exhibition see in particular Maruyama, "Meiji shoki no kyōto hakurankai".

47 Hida Yoshifumi, Meiji umare no nihongo [Japanese Language Born in the Meiji Period], Tokyo 2002, p. 18.

tunities. For while the *rangakusha* still acted in semi-legality on the periphery of society, there were now entirely new opportunities for the rise of a new generation of experts in western learning. Figures such as Tanaka Yoshio, Fukuzawa Yukichi, Machida Hisanari and Sano Tsunenami had all attended world exhibitions in the 1860s and, following *Meiji ishin*, sought to put into practice in Japan what they had seen. These figures owed their rapid careers after 1868 to their knowledge of western languages. But not only did they command the vocabulary of the new age, they had frequently created it themselves: in 1866, following his return from overseas, Fukuzawa Yukichi had in *Things Western* introduced the concept of western exhibitions to the Japanese public. He coined *hakurankai* – a word still used today – as a new term for exhibitions on the western model.⁴⁸ Fukuzawa makes no reference to the traditional Japanese forms of presentation outlined above. It is as if they had never existed. In view of the novel exhibition practices which Fukuzawa saw in Europe and which he now described, Japan's presentation techniques simply seemed irrelevant to him. His book was highly successful, with a print run of several hundred-thousand copies in the years around 1868. It may be assumed that those responsible for the Kyoto exhibition – who deliberately used the term *hakurankai* to characterize their event – were familiar with Fukuzawa's work. *Things Western* was so well-known in Japan that, on the occasion of a smaller exhibition held in 1874 in Kanazawa, in the public announcement of their aims the organizers copied entire passages from it verbatim: for example, this announcement states that “consideration of products old and new from a variety of countries will enable recognition of peoples’ wisdom and folly and of these countries’ customs and level of development.”⁴⁹ These are the very same words with which Fukuzawa had a few years previously introduced the West's world exhibitions to the Japanese public. The exhibition organizers in Kanazawa now used them to advertise their small local exhibition. The vocabulary established by Fukuzawa thus enabled the organizers of the first exhibitions held in the aftermath of the political upheaval of 1868 to realize a clear discursive rupture with older types of exhibition. But in the early Meiji period these ruptures were not merely linguistic: the above-mentioned “Holland scholars” forged careers in newly established institutions such as the “exhibition bureau” which was initially directly subordinate to the ministry of education and later to the ministry of internal affairs under Ōkubo Toshimichi.

It was not only the localities and the social status of the exhibition organizers which changed as a direct consequence of 1868, the items exhibited did too. The political upheaval is in some cases already clearly evident in the early exhibitions in terms of individual objects displayed: the principal attraction at the exhibition held in the Yushima shrine was a gold-plate dolphin sculpture, which was three meters tall and weighed 300

48 The word *hakurankai* had already made a brief appearance elsewhere so it is not a calque created by Fukuzawa. But it was Fukuzawa who in *Things Western* gave it a detailed definition and mass appeal.

49 The announcement from Kanazawa may be found in Yoshio Tanaka, *Kunshōjū*, volume 14 (from 1872), no page numbers. Save for a few characters, this passage is also present verbatim in *Seiyō jiyō*. Cf. Yukichi Fukuzawa, “*Seiyō jiyō*” [*Things Western*], in: Marion Saucier & Nishikawa Shunsaku (ed.), *Fukuzawa Yukichi chosakushū*. Daiik-kai [The Collected Works of Fukuzawa Yukichi. Volume 1], Tokyo 2002 [first edition 1866–1870], p. 50.

kilograms. Pairs of golden dolphins or fish are one of the eight treasures of Buddhism and were placed on the gables of castles from the 16th century onward to confer protection against fire upon the fortification and the castle city below.⁵⁰ The pair displayed at Yushima was the largest and most renowned in all Japan. They had once adorned the castle at Nagoya, a city which in the Edo period had been the central junction for traffic between Kyoto and Edo and was under the direct control of a branch family of the Tokugawa shoguns. From its highest point the two golden dolphins watched over Japan's most significant castle city, symbolizing the ruling family's authority and wealth. Following the revolution, the new government brought the dolphins down from the roof and displayed them not only at Yushima but also as the main attraction in Japan's contribution to the Vienna world exhibition in 1873. The two dolphins were exhibited as artefacts from a bygone era. Their display at Yushima brought home to the inhabitants of Tokyo the recent abolition of the old feudal order.⁵¹

Alongside such political representations of the new order, modern exhibition objects and new inventions could be seen. For instance, Kyoto in 1872 featured Swiss watches and other foreign technical devices, while one year later a newspaper referred to "novel machines" at an exhibition in Matsumoto.⁵² But the central ruptures in the first few years after *Meiji ishin* related less to the choice of individual objects and more to the manner of their collection, registration and presentation. Once again, this is particularly clearly demonstrated by the Yushima exhibition. During its preparations for the exhibition the ministry of education focused on producing a collection which would subsequently be housed in a permanent museum yet to be constructed.⁵³ While collecting activities were certainly already known of in Edo-period Japan, the situation is similar to that in Europe. As Tony Bennett has convincingly demonstrated for the West, even before the "birth of the museum" princely collectors accumulated cabinets of curios and similar objects; but their exhibition practices were quite different from those that were later to emerge with the modern museum and its collection and presentation practices.⁵⁴

The establishment of an institutional network was directly associated with the attempts to systematize collectors' activities. From 1871 a whole series of offices and agencies were established which were intended to enable the creation of a national system of exhibitions and museums. In subsequent years, control of these institutions alternated between

50 On the symbolic significance of fish in Japanese art, see Merrily Baird, *Symbols of Japan. Thematic Motifs in Art and Design*, New York, 2001, pp. 136-140.

51 A more detailed studies of the golden dolphins from Nagoya may be found in: Naoyuki Kinoshita, *Meiji ishin to nagoyajō [Meiji Ishin and the Castle at Nagoya]* in: idem (ed.), *Bijutsu o sasaeru mono. (Kōza nihon bijutsushi. 6) [Objects Promoting Art (Lecture on Japanese Art History. Volume 6)]*, Tokyo 2005, pp. 13-44.

52 On Kyoto see Maruyama, "Meiji shoki no kyōto hakurankai", pp. 235-236. On the Matsumoto exhibition, see the newspaper article of December 1873 in *Meiji Nyūsu Jiten Hensan linkai* (ed.), *Meiji nyūsu jiten*, Dai ikkan, Tokyo 1985, p. 565.

53 On the organization of collecting activities for the Yushima exhibition, see the ministry of education's announcements published in Tanaka, *Kunshōjū*, volume 12 (from spring 1872), no page numbers.

54 On the creation of museums in the West, see in particular Tony Bennett, *The Birth of the Museum: History, Theory, Politics*, London 1995.

the supreme state council, the ministry of education and the ministry of internal affairs; in some cases there were considerable disputes between these various ministries over their respective competences. The “exhibition bureau” proved to be central to the planning and execution of exhibitions, with branch offices established throughout Japan. For example, as early as the Matsumoto exhibition of 1873 the local authorities felt themselves compelled to obtain permission from the Tokyo exhibition bureau.⁵⁵ The “exhibition bureau” not only sought to bring local events under control by issuing exhibition regulations, it also coordinated Japan’s participation in world exhibitions. Many of the exhibitions held in Japan were used for the selection of objects which were then transported overseas from Tokyo as elements of Japan’s contribution to world exhibitions. This is true both of the ministry of education’s Yushima exhibition and of the local variations: in 1872 the organizers of the Wakayama exhibition cited the government’s order “to assemble from the empire rare and peculiar objects for the impending exhibition in Austria”.⁵⁶ It would thus be mistaken to view the early provincial exhibitions as isolated, local events: in many cases they were integrated in an emerging national network whose declared goal was to represent Japan as successfully as possible at the world exhibitions held overseas.⁵⁷ The concomitant tendency toward centralization was associated with an increasing professionalization of exhibition culture. The Japanese public was able to learn about the form and look of western exhibitions long before the first national industrial exhibition: from Vienna in 1873 and Philadelphia in 1876 the newly-founded daily newspapers carried detailed reports on the world exhibitions.⁵⁸ Accordingly, for newspaper readers at any rate expectations of what an exhibition looked like had surely already begun to undergo radical change prior to 1877.

Ruptures between the early exhibitions and the first national exhibition

In many ways, however, the full scope of the reform programmes only made itself felt through the planning, preparation and execution of the first “national industrial exhibition”. Compared to earlier exhibitions the first national exhibition, held in 1877, marked a rupture at three different levels: firstly, at the level of cultural systems of knowledge, i.e. a level concerning the selection, presentation and arrangement of exhibition items. Secondly, at an economic level in relation to the economic system and viewers’ consumption behaviour. And, thirdly, at a political level since – as we shall see – representation of a unified nation was a key goal of the first national exhibition.

Apropos of the knowledge dimension first of all: in mid-1876 the ministry of internal affairs had announced that it would next year stage the first national industrial exhibi-

55 See the newspaper article of December 1873 in Meiji Nyūsu Jiten Hensan linkai (ed.), *Meiji nyūsu jiten*, Dai ikkan, p. 565.

56 See the newspaper article of June 1872 *ibid.*, p. 564.

57 Seki, *Hakubutsukan no tanjō*, p. 52-53.

58 On Japan’s participation at Vienna and Philadelphia, see Daniel Hedinger, *Fighting a Peaceful War. Japan at World Exhibitions in the 1860s and 1870s*, in: *Bureau International des Expositions (Bulletin 2006)*, pp. 71-94.

tion.⁵⁹ Even during its preparations the competent “exhibition bureau” directed by the minister of internal affairs, Ōkubo Toshimichi, left nothing to chance:

*At the first, an order from the Minister of the Home Department was given to each Fu and Ken-local government to send an officer especially in charge of the measures for the promotion of agriculture and industry, in order to receive information and advice from the Exhibition Bureau, and to consult with it about the collecting and arranging of the articles. In the mean time the local authorities also were instructed to do their utmost to induce the people to send as many articles as possible, and to encourage and assist them in coming to Tokyo [sic!].*⁶⁰

Centralized planning of this sort, involving local authorities, was new. From mid-1876 the ministry of internal affairs published announcements and regulations for the exhibition on the front pages of daily newspapers.⁶¹ One of the published rules stated that exhibitors were to handle transportation of permitted products and their arrangement and presentation in suitable glass boxes entirely at their own expense.⁶² The government not only published in newspapers, but also circulated throughout the country in flyers details of exactly how the objects were to be sent in for inspection and how they were to be labelled and packaged for this purpose.⁶³ To mark a rupture in relation to the earlier exhibitions which had been organized by the ministry of education, the ministry of internal affairs categorically excluded objects from earlier periods.⁶⁴ So extensive and complex were the regulations that their meaning was not immediately clear to all those concerned. The rules’ manifold publication in a wide range of media demonstrates both the novelty of a national exhibition for the Japanese public and the government’s goal of reaching the entire population if at all possible.

When the exhibition was finally held in the summer of 1877 – after more than a year of planning and preparation – a good 80,000 objects from more than 10,000 exhibitors could be seen in Ueno park in seven halls specially constructed for the event.⁶⁵ The products’ allocation to different halls – including a brick art hall, two wooden main halls, a machinery hall and an agriculture hall – was intended to provide visitors with an overview. This classification followed western models. Tokyo in 1877 thus essentially mimicked the pavilion layout for the world exhibition at Philadelphia, where the Japa-

59 For secondary literature on the first national exhibition and Ōkubo’s role see Takeyuki Kuni, *Hakurankai no jidai, Meiji seifu no hakurankai seisaku* [The Age of Exhibitions: The Meiji Government’s Exhibitions Policy], Tokyo 2005, esp. p. 56.

60 Exhibition Bureau (ed.), *National Exhibition, 1877. Official Catalogue of the National Exhibition of Japan*, Tokyo 1877, p. IV.

61 Cf. the *Yomiuri* newspaper for the years 1876 and 1877.

62 Exhibition Bureau (ed.), *National Exhibition, 1877*, p. V.

63 Shin’ya Hashizume, *Nihon no hakurankai. Terashita Tsuyoshi korekushon*. (Bessatsu taiyō nihon no kokoro 133) [Japanese Exhibitions. The Terashita Tsuyoshi Collection (Special Volume from Taiyō, Japan’s Heart 133)], Tokyo 2005, pp. 16–17.

64 Exhibition Bureau (ed.), *National Exhibition, 1877. Official Catalogue of the National Exhibition of Japan*, Tokyo 1877, p. V. See also Kuni, *Hakurankai no jidai*, p. 54.

65 On the halls, see also Exhibition Bureau, *National Exhibition, 1877*, p. V.

nese empire had been a highly successful participant one year previously. The placing of exhibition objects in clearly definable categories such as “art”, “agricultural goods” or “machines” and their corresponding allocation to individual pavilions was new for Japan. But unlike categorization, free-standing pavilions were also a new trend at the world exhibitions in the West. Up to the Paris *Exposition Universelle* of 1867 exhibitions had sought to present all the objects in a single giant hall whose space was broken up according to the relevant categories. This undertaking increasingly proved impractical in view of the variety of exhibition objects combined with the growing number of participant nations.

The Japanese exhibition organizers likewise faced the problem of dual sub-classification – by product categories and places of origin – which it was impossible to fully resolve in spatial terms: on logistical and practical grounds the exhibition items had to be classified not only by categories but also by provinces of origin.⁶⁶ The organizers divided up the interiors of the individual pavilions – which were generally devoted to overarching categories – by provinces. This entailed a crucial disadvantage, however: direct comparison between the countless, intricate sub-categories was impossible and viewers were forced to inspect multiple collections of innumerable products from individual provinces. Internal sub-classification by place or province of origin was a further innovation taken over from the West which had not yet been present five years earlier at the Yushima exhibition, for instance. Japanese visitors to the first national exhibition thus saw an arrangement of rooms which was entirely new and accordingly alien to them. For those unable to visit the exhibition this new spatial order was recorded on plans, maps and colour woodcuts and distributed throughout the country.⁶⁷

In addition, the categorisation of goods also followed western models, with six main categories: 1. mining and metallurgy; 2. products; 3. art; 4. machines; 5. agricultural goods; 6. horticulture. Each of these main categories was divided up into a large number of sub-categories. The significance of this categorization work for the “exhibition bureau” for outward representation is indicated by the “Official Catalogue”. In this, the only known English-language guide to the first national exhibition, the individual sub-categories are described in great detail over 25 pages. The six main categories precisely matched Philadelphia’s categorization,⁶⁸ save for one interesting exception: Philadelphia’s

66 Cf. e.g. the exhibition catalogue in: Meiji Zenki Sangyō Hattatsushi Shiryō Kangyō Hakurankai Shiryō, Meiji jūnen naikoku kangyō hakurankai shuppin mokuroku (Kangyō hakurankai shiryō, 178) [Exhibition Catalogue of the National Industrial Exhibition of 1877 (Sources for the Industrial Exhibitions, Volume 178), Tokyo 1975, first few pages (no page numbers).

67 A coloured overview can be found in the official guide to the first national exhibition: Naikoku Kangyō Hakurankai Jimukyoku, Meiji 10 nen naikoku kangyō hakurankaijō annai [Guide to the Exhibition Grounds of the National Industrial Exhibition in the 10th Year of the Meiji Period], Tokyo 1877, no page numbers. Colour woodcuts of the first national exhibition documenting this novel use of space may be found in Kokuritsu Shiryōkan (ed.), Meiji kaika ki no nishiki e [Colour Woodcuts of the Period of Meiji Civilisation], Tokyo 1989, pp. 27–28.

68 Cf. the table in Kuni Takeyuki, Hakurankai jidai no kaimaku [The Beginning of the Age of Exhibitions], in: Matsuo Masahito (ed.), Meiji ishin to bunmei kaika (Nihon no jidaishi 21), [The Meiji Restoration and “Civilisation and Enlightenment”] (Japanese Contemporary History 21)], Tokyo, 2004, pp. 246–274, here p. 257.

“knowledge and education” category. Tokyo in 1877 made do without this. It is quite possible that the ministry of internal affairs – the exhibition’s organizer – thus sought to keep its rival, the ministry of education, away from the grounds: after criticism had been voiced regarding the internal arrangement of the early exhibitions organized by the ministry of education and Ōkubo had sought to make increased use of the medium to promote industry, the government had removed the “exhibition bureau” from the ministry of education and placed it under the purview of the ministry of internal affairs.⁶⁹ The transfer of exhibitions to the ministry of internal affairs – which in this period had through Ōkubo become the key government agency – shows that this was considered one of the government’s central tasks.

When the first national industrial exhibition – which drew almost half a million visitors – ended 102 days later, the work of the “exhibition bureau” was not yet over. New forms of publication emerged with the first national industrial exhibition. As a follow-up to the exhibition the bureau published an entire series of written works: thousand-page catalogues, reports, evaluations of all the exhibited products and lists of awards.⁷⁰ While earlier exhibitions had also featured catalogues, a comparison with those of 1877 reveals the depth of changes. These relate not only to the scope, but also the systematization and internal arrangement of the lists: the catalogues now consisted of the categories described above; followed by sub-categories; with the province of origin constituting the lowest level of classification. In broad terms the Japanese exhibition catalogues thus corresponded to their western models and – linguistic challenges aside – were easily comprehensible for European exhibition experts in terms of their internal logic. Foreigners commissioned by the ministry of internal affairs, such as the German Gottfried Wagner (1831–1892), evaluated the quality of individual exhibition areas and wrote detailed reports.⁷¹ Also new was the system by which the jury awarded prizes to outstanding products in accordance with the specified method of categorization, which was a measure intended to promote industry. In 1873 at the Vienna world exhibition the Japanese empire had gained a favourable impression of the jury system and won a large number of awards.⁷² Now, for the first time, a similar system was adopted for Japan. Following the first national exhibition the newspapers reported in detail on the winners of the various categories and popularized and thus naturalized the new system of products throughout the country.

69 Shiina, *Nihon hakubutsukan seiritsushi*, p. 232.

70 For example, the five-volume official list of exhibition objects published by the exhibition bureau: Naikoku Kangyō Hakurankai Jimukyoku, *Meiji jūnen naikoku kangyō hakurankai shuppin mokuroku* [Exhibition Catalogue of the National Industrial Exhibition of 1877], Tokyo, n.y. The assessment of the first national exhibition can be found in: Naikoku Kangyō Hakurankai Jimukyoku, *Meiji jūnen naikoku kangyō hakurankai shinsa hyōgō* [Critical Observations Apropos of an Assessment of the National Industrial Exhibition of 1877], Tokyo, 1877.

71 A report by Wagner in Japanese can be found in Zenki Sangyō Hattatsushi Shiryō, *Meiji jūnen naikoku kangyō hakurankai shuppin hōkoku*. Daihasshū [Report on the National Industrial Exhibition of 1877. Volume 8], Tokyo 1964.

72 On the exhibitions held in Vienna, see Hedinger, *Fighting a Peaceful War* (footnote 58), p. 85.

Insofar as the newly created system of prizes followed a western-inspired systematization of knowledge, it simultaneously revolutionized Japan's economic order. For in the long term the national publication of lists of awards in newspapers and reports had significant economic effects. The industrial exhibitions enabled the establishment of a national market in which the individual provinces began to compete with their best industrially manufactured products. At the first national industrial exhibition, visitors were able for the first time to directly compare a large number of modern products from the various provinces. It was not long before the *New York Times*' observation at the time of the national exhibition no longer held true:

*The affair, or rather the fair, is purely industrial, with a two-fold object – to show foreigners what is made in Japan, and to show the natives what is made in their own country. Doubtless, the latter will receive the most instruction, as the Japanese are not very well informed about the products of the country in general. A native can tell you what his own district or province produces, but he is often lamentably ignorant of the resources of other provinces.*⁷³

The exhibitions made domestic Japanese competition visible for all, not only for visitors to the exhibition site. The daily newspapers provided detailed reports on the products honoured and the winners and losers, while manufacturers frequently advertised awards they had received.⁷⁴ Through their presence at exhibitions and the awards they received shrewd producers gained access to the nascent national and international market. Only thus can voluntary, large-scale and costly private participation in national exhibitions be understood. In the aftermath of the national exhibitions for the first time something resembling national brands arose, mainly for products of the emerging industrial system of mass production such as toiletries and tinned foods. Tanaka Yoshio, for example, collected the packaging of these nationally distributed products, all of which bore their medals from individual exhibitions. Exhibitions thus gave rise to an imaginary topography of national products, a map of economic competences.

A key issue here is not just the supply side – commerce – but also the demand side – consumption. For it were precisely the industrial exhibitions which triggered consumer visions among visitors. Consumer visions here means representations of possible consumption, whether western clothing, fashionable drinks such as beer or new practices such as the tourist travel which attendance of an exhibition entailed. This was frequently a form of consumption which, though as yet unrealizable, was nonetheless able to predetermine the shape of a future consumer culture. For consumer visions create expectations and generate needs.⁷⁵ The commercialization of the Japanese exhibitions is already

73 New York Times, "The Japanese exhibition", p. 2.

74 See e.g. Yūbin Hōchin Shinbun, volume 12, May 1877–August 1877, p. 432, and also Kanayomi Shinbun, volume 3, from July 4, 1877, p. 202.

75 Martina Hessler, Visionen des Überflusses. Entwürfe künftiger Massenkonsumgesellschaften im 20. Jahrhundert, in: Hartmut Berghoff (ed.), Wirtschaftsgeschichte als Kulturgeschichte. Dimensionen eines Perspektivenwechsels, Frankfurt a. M./New York 2004.

visible in the first national exhibition of 1877. Immediately after it had closed, unsold products – whose return-transportation to the provinces would have been too expensive – were offered for sale in so-called *kankōba* (勧工場). The *kankōba* soon developed into Japan's first department stores.⁷⁶

Closely associated with the presentation of products from all over the country was the representation of a unified nation which was made possible through a national exhibition. A comparison of the colour woodcuts from the first national exhibition with those of the Yushima exhibition indicates a rupture here. While the artists were still the same individuals and the technology had not changed radically in the intervening five years, the pictures of 1877 display a new kind of iconography and unfamiliar pictorial motifs. Symbols of the nation state suddenly appear: hi-no-maru flags; chrysanthemum coats of arms; the protagonists of *Meiji ishin* together with the emperor who, in the company of Ōkubo Toshimichi, had personally opened the exhibition at a ceremony attended by the country's entire political elite, the empress, the court aristocracy, the western powers' diplomatic corps, several handpicked exhibitors, journalists and guests. While it is documented that the emperor attended the Yushima exhibition with members of the government, there were no public opening ceremonies or accounts of the emperor at the 1872 exhibition. In fact the exhibition was closed to the general public during his visit.⁷⁷ This in particular marks a far-reaching rupture in relation to previous exhibitions. In 1877 newspapers printed the full details of the ceremony, frequently featuring schematic plans of the seating arrangements.⁷⁸ Colour woodcuts of these national events proved highly popular and sold in large numbers throughout the country.⁷⁹ That this event was aimed at the general public and the nation is also indicated by the words with which the emperor had opened the exhibition:

*Through the good quality of the exhibition objects and the careful preparation of the grounds we shall advance our civilisation. Through the (sun of) wisdom and the (moon of) the fine application of craft [...] industry will blossom and bring wealth to our entire country/nation (zenkoku).*⁸⁰

To the emperor's words Ōkubo had replied:

*[...] Through the expansion of trade and the progress of knowledge the nation/state (kokka) will prosper [...] Your majesty is promoting this progress through his felicitous visit to the exhibition grounds and his inspection of the list of exhibited objects.*⁸¹

76 Tōru Hatsuda, *Hyakkaten no tanjō* [The Birth of the Department Store], Tokyo 1999, esp. pp. 9–39.

77 Shiina, *Meiji hakubutsukan koto hajime*, pp. 63–64.

78 See *Yomiuri Shinbun* of August 20 and 21, 1877, 1st page, and *Yūbin Hōchin Shinbun*, volume 12, May 1877–August 1877, p. 382.

79 On the function of colour woodcuts in the Meiji period and their contents, prices and circulation etc. see Julia Meech-Pekarik, *The World of the Meiji Print. Impressions of a new Civilization*, New York/Tokyo 1986.

80 For the Japanese original, see Yūnosuke Shibata, *Meiji shōchoku zenshū* [The Collected Imperial Edicts of the Meiji Period], Tokyo 1907, p. 10 (chapter on *kangyō*/industry).

81 For the original see: Yūnosuke Shibata, *Meiji shōchoku zenshū*, Tokyo 1907, p. 11 (chapter on *kangyō*/industry).

In his speech the emperor used the word *zenkoku* and Ōkubo the word *kokka* in his response. Both terms designate in this context a concept which can be translated as “nation”. It is precisely through the figure of the emperor – who formed the centre-point of this event – that the changing forms of presentation and exhibition – but also viewing – are especially clear in the first decade of the Meiji period. In the first decade after 1868 an entirely new system for the representation of political power developed, one which remained in existence well into the twentieth century.⁸² Clearly this has to do with government representations of a unified nation which were certainly not always so palatable to the population. Nonetheless, the major national exhibitions offered the country’s rulers an ideal platform by which to propagate this idea of the nation which was new for Japan, and they made frequent use of it over the next few decades. From the opening ceremonies rituals of power developed which not only reflected national hierarchies but could also potentially bolster or even establish them outright. As well as opening ceremonies, in time these events centred on the emperor also came to include awards and closing ceremonies. All these festivities simultaneously included and excluded people, created a sense of community and provided the possibility of nationally conceived participation. To be a part of this it was not essential to actually be there: colour woodcuts and newspapers enabled thousands of people to participate. They provided the media which were a prerequisite for a sense of national simultaneity which, together with all the national symbols and acts realized at the national exhibitions provided a basis enabling the experience of the nation as an imagined community.⁸³

4. Epilogue

What is therefore ultimately more significant: the ruptures or the continuities? Which of the two characterizes the exhibition practices of the early Meiji period? The question cannot be unequivocally answered, since continuities and ruptures alternated and reciprocally influenced one another. Seen at close range, even the seemingly clearest ruptures become less unequivocal. In fact, for the change in exhibition practices in the first decade after 1868 four different – and partially contradictory – scenarios can be identified: first of all, a continuity between the exhibition practices of the late Edo period and the early Meiji period. This is a constant which is described in the scholarship time and again in order to avoid a Eurocentric view of the reforms of the Meiji period. Yet a strong emphasis on this continuity leads almost inevitably to an essentialization of Japan’s case. Contemporaries – not only exhibition experts but journalists and visitors too – already

82 On the nation-state function of exhibitions during the war years 1931–1945 see: Daniel Hedinger, „Keines unserer Leben ist verschwendet, wenn wir auf dem Schlachtfeld sterben.“ Militärausstellungen und Erinnerungsfest im Japan der frühen Shōwa-Zeit, in: *Journal of Modern European History*, vol. 4, no. 1 (2006), pp. 114–132.

83 On the “imagined community” see Benedict Anderson, *Die Erfindung der Nation. Zur Karriere eines folgenreichen Konzepts*. Erweiterte Neuausgabe [English edition: *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (rev. ed.). London 1991], Frankfurt a. M./New York, 1996.

criticized this continuity which, as a symbol of Japan's backwardness, was deeply repugnant to many. This criticism is one of the factors behind the organization of the first national industrial exhibition which for many scholars marks the decisive rupture in Japanese exhibition culture – in stark contrast to the continuity outlined above. However, such a line of interpretation – first continuity, then a clear rupture – largely follows the perspective of contemporaries and lapses into the omnipresent progress-and-civilization discourses of the era. This overlooks two things: first of all, a notable continuity between the early exhibitions of the Meiji period and the first industrial exhibitions, a continuity which ran counter to the plans of the organizers – particularly those at the ministry of internal affairs charged with responsibility for the exhibitions – and therefore found no mention in the official reports. Secondly, and more importantly, one thus negates the last of the four scenarios identified: the radical rupture which clearly differentiated the first post-revolution exhibitions from their Edo-period precursors. This was a rupture which had already occurred in Japanese exhibition culture before the first industrial exhibition of 1877.

Thus in overall terms it might also be said that the character of the exhibitions in the first decade of the Meiji period was highly ambivalent. In other words: scenarios marking both ruptures and continuities were intertwined at these events. But there is a need for caution here insofar as ambivalence might be interpreted as the outcome of the change following 1868. For the ambivalence was not at the end but at the beginning, it was more of a cause than a result. Its point of departure was the new practices of ordering and classification which had already been developed in the first decade after 1868. Zygmunt Bauman has correctly noted that ambivalence is always a by-product of the work of classification.⁸⁴ And the relationship between order and ambivalence is analogous to that between ruptures and continuities. That is to say, the change outlined above in the exhibition practices which followed the Meiji Revolution ultimately indicates one thing above all else: the ruptures should not be played off too strongly against the continuities. For in their interaction they provided the foundations of the change. For instance, it was the government's problematisation of the continuities which catalysed the upheavals in the first place. It was the permanent conflict between traditional practices and new goals which brought about this change.

Seen from some historical distance, however, ultimately it was the ruptures which predominated in exhibition culture in the early Meiji period. For in overall terms, Japanese exhibition culture and its practices underwent revolutionary changes in the period roughly between 1860 and 1880. While Japan had felt unable to participate at the world exhibition held in London in 1862, its subsequent attendance at Vienna, Philadelphia and Paris in the 1870s secured international triumphs for the new government in the first decade after the Meiji Revolution. These successes only became possible through fundamental changes in domestic Japanese exhibition practices, whether in terms of the

84 Zygmunt Bauman, *Moderne und Ambivalenz. Das Ende der Eindeutigkeit* [English edition: *Modernity and Ambivalence*. Ithaca, N.Y. 1991], Frankfurt a. M., 1995, p. 15.

organization of exhibitions or their economic and political focus. Certainly no later than the first national industrial exhibition the medium could be used to represent a unified nation. At the same time, the exhibitions simulated an emerging national economic and consumer realm – or rather prepared the ground for this. Some scholars see the first national industrial exhibition as already marking the end of the “exhibition boom” of the early Meiji period.⁸⁵ But this is surely inaccurate. The medium remained as alive as it was flexible: in the period up to 1903 four further national industrial exhibitions were held, as well as a large number of minor events, with a wide variety of methods of organization. For example, specialist exhibitions for individual branches of industry – which were frequently known as *kyōshinkai* (共進会) – were highly popular. And nor did the major national exhibitions evidently lose any of their appeal up to the end of the Meiji period. The constantly increasing numbers of visitors suggest the opposite: the Osaka national exhibition of 1903 was seen by a good four million people, the Tokyo industrial exhibition four years later by almost seven. In addition, the exhibition practices introduced in the 1870s played a key role in the establishment of Japan’s first museums and also its department stores. In overall terms, though, in view of the revolutionary ruptures in exhibition, display and representation practices during the first decade of the Meiji period it is the continuities which sooner predominate for the remainder of the era.

But what does the conclusion that exhibition culture in Japan underwent revolutionary change in the first decade after 1868 tell us about the character of *Meiji ishin*? What does it mean for the question raised at the outset regarding the Meiji Revolution and its models? It is *firstly* notable that, through their recourse to western exhibition practices, ultimately the Japanese elites very much adopted cultural practices of the western revolutions as a model. On the one hand, national industrial exhibitions reached directly back to the French Revolution,⁸⁶ while on the other they were a product of the industrial revolution in general. And yet industrial exhibitions’ French Revolution origins were evidently unknown to the Japanese exhibition organizers of the early Meiji period. *Secondly*, the interaction between ruptures and continuities demonstrated with reference to exhibitions is characteristic of the Meiji Revolution as a whole. It is only the new elites’ fight against seemingly harmful continuities vis-à-vis the old order which lays the foundation for revolutionary ruptures. This is probably part of the essence of revolutions *per se* which, as Reinhart Koselleck noted, always remain prone to the influence of the opposing tendency of reaction.⁸⁷ *Thirdly*, in the exhibitions held in the first decade after 1868 the end of the old order manifested itself. This was perhaps most evident at the first Kyoto exhibition. Not only was the imperial palace opened to visitors in 1873, one year previously foreigners had been permitted to enter the imperial city for the very first

85 Kornicki, *Public Display and Changing Values* (footnote 18), p. 195.

86 In 1798 François de Neufchâteau – at that time France’s minister of internal affairs, had organized a first national industrial exhibition. The venue and timing of the exhibition reflect its significance for post-revolutionary France. It took place on the Champ de Mars, during the key days of the revolutionary festival calendar, the so-called *jours complémentaires* and the 1er vendémiaire.

87 Reinhart Koselleck, *Vergangene Zukunft. Zur Semantik geschichtlicher Zeiten*, Frankfurt a. M. 1995, p. 35.

time. Foreigners wandering through the interior of the holy palace to view an exhibition – what clearer symbol could there be of the rupture with the old order? Only a few years previously many of the insurgent samurai would surely have been ready to die to prevent such blasphemy. But just a few years after the revolution the new government presented this measure self-confidently and aggressively.⁸⁸ *Fourthly*: the change which unfolded in the exhibition culture contradicts the thesis that *Meiji ishin* was a “revolution from above”. It is precisely the exhibitions which demonstrate increasingly complex interaction between local protagonists and centralized authorities. Many of the small early exhibitions which – at least in terms of their goals – were frequently new and revolutionary were the products of local initiatives, such as in Kyoto. Nor would the largely centrally planned national industrial exhibitions have taken place without the voluntary participation of more than 10,000 private exhibitors. This brings us to the *fifth* and final point: as the exhibitions demonstrate, the scope of changes in the 1870s is particularly evident in terms of cultural practices. Changing exhibition practices entailed new kinds of power technologies. Michael Foucault noted for Europe that the bourgeois revolution did not simply represent the appropriation by a new social class of the monarchy’s apparatus of state. On the contrary: “The bourgeois revolution of the eighteenth century and the beginning of the nineteenth century was the invention of a new technology of power [...]”⁸⁹ But this first required places to be established where these technologies could be implemented. In the nineteenth century exhibitions were such places and this is also true of post-*Meiji ishin* Japan. The novel exhibition practices which emerged in the first decade after 1868 enabled entirely new, more complex technologies for the exercise of power which had been previously unknown in Japan. The described ruptures in exhibition culture were thereby less a product and more an agent of this process of change: in this first decade cultural change tended to anticipate social, political or economic upheaval, as the example of exhibition, display and representation practices makes clear.

88 On the admission of foreigners to the 1872 exhibition, see e.g. the newspaper article of March 1872 in *Meiji Nyūsu Jiten Hensan linkai*, *Meiji nyūsu jiten*, p. 564. Some foreign diplomats had already visited Kyoto in the 1860s. Accounts of their experience and reports on the first Kyoto exhibition may be found in Hugh Cortazzi, *Victorian in Japan*. In and around the Treaty ports, London 1987, pp. 188–191.

89 Michel Foucault, *Die Anormalen*. Vorlesung am Collège de France (1974–1975). Aus dem Französischen von Michaela Ott, Frankfurt a. M. 2003 [Paris 1999], p. 117.

Bolshevik Modernity in Collision with Islamic Culture: Representations of Exclusiveness in the Soviet “Orient”

Jörg Baberowski

RESÜMEE

Die Bolschewiki versuchten in den zwanziger und dreißiger Jahren des 20. Jahrhunderts, die analphabetische Bevölkerung des sowjetischen Imperiums durch Praktiken der zeremoniellen Pädagogik zu erreichen und zu disziplinieren. Voraussetzung aller Integration aber war die Indigenisierung der lokalen Herrschaftsverhältnisse. Sie führte zu einer kulturellen Nationsbildung, die am Ende in einen Konflikt mit der sozialistischen Ordnungsstrategie geriet. Als die Bolschewiki im Kaukasus und in Zentralasien damit begannen, die lokalen Gesellschaften durch Erziehungskampagnen zu verändern, wurden die nationalen Eigenschaften der lokalen Gesellschaften in Frage gestellt. Der Konflikt um Souveränität und Deutungshoheit entzündete sich an der Frage, welche Funktion die Frauen in der neuen Gesellschaft spielen sollten. Sie sollten befreit werden, sagten die Bolschewiki. Sie sollten bleiben, was sie waren, sagten die Dorfbewohner, weil bolschewistische Frauen aufgehört hätten, Muslime zu sein. Der Tschador wurde zum symbolischen Streitobjekt der Kontrahenten, und in der Auseinandersetzung wurde er für die einen zu einem Symbol der Rückständigkeit und für die anderen ein Symbol nationaler Eigenständigkeit. In z. T. dramatischer Zuspitzung demonstrieren die Ereignisse im sowjetischen Orient, wie Repräsentationen die Welt nicht nur abbilden, sondern sie so verändern, daß nichts mehr ist wie zuvor.

On the night of September 8, 1925, in an *aul* (village) in the district of Dzharkent in Kyrgyzstan a murder took place which might have occurred in any other region of the Soviet East at that time: two members of the community strangled their sister-in-law for her refusal after her husband's death to marry his older brother as was plainly the

custom.¹ The *aul's* inhabitants kept silent about the deed and the elders – who also controlled the local soviet – were rewarded by the murderers for their silence with a gift of a camel and a horse. The dead woman was hurriedly buried and spoken of no more. It was as if she had never lived.

Eventually, however, the authorities learned of what had occurred and in early October 1925 an investigative commission of the GPU appeared in the *aul*. The murderers and their accessories were arrested and brought before a court. Shortly afterwards the GPU's leadership in Moscow took up the case, albeit with an unconventional interpretation. The head of the GPU's information department, Georgii Evgen'evich Prokof'ev, did not see murderers who needed to be called to account under criminal law for their deed; he instead saw class enemies who assaulted women who were enslaved and deprived of their rights. "If a woman will not agree to marry a *bey*, then without much ado she gets a rope around her neck and it's off to the grave for her."

The perpetrators had only remained unpunished because the "power of the *bey's*" held sway in the *aul*. This power must be broken to prevent "such cases happening again," Prokof'ev added.² The GPU thus intended not just to punish the murderers and their protectors, it wished to be rid of them and the representations by which the perpetrators rationalized and justified their violence.

This statement was evidently nothing unusual for the GPU's leadership: in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Adzharistan, Azerbaijan and the North Caucasus too members of the secret police worked on bringing such crimes to light. Where women were kidnapped or murdered and where underage girls were married off, where polygamy, bride money (*kalym*) and alien rules on clothing symbolized the relationship between the sexes, the agents of the secret police immediately became active. In 1925 alone, dozens of reports were compiled in the GPU's Moscow headquarters on "crimes against the socialist way of life".³ What in the Soviet Union's European regions would have been a case for the criminal police was treated as a political crime in the Soviet East. For the communists from the centre, the murder of a Kyrgyz woman was a counterrevolutionary act, a deed perpetrated by class enemies against oppressed women. This was why a woman's murder became a matter for the political police. But for the local society too there was more at stake here than first seemed the case: the elders, who were supposed to represent the interests of government power in the *aul*, took the side of the perpetrators, while all the other inhabitants of the nomadic settlement said nothing. Through their collective silence concerning the murder the *aul's* inhabitants made it plain to the Bolsheviks that they did not

1 This is the English version of an article already published in German as: Jörg Baberowski, Repräsentationen der Ausschließlichkeit. Kulturrevolution im sowjetischen Orient, in: Jörg Baberowski/Hartmut Kaelble/Jürgen Schriewer (eds), Selbstbilder und Fremdbilder. Repräsentationen sozialer Ordnungen im Wandel, Frankfurt a. M./New York 2008, pp. 119-137.

2 Rossiiskii Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Sotsial'no-Politicheskoi Istorii [Russian State Historical Archive, subsequently referred to as: RGASPI], Fond 17, opis' 10, delo 138, p. 45.

3 Ibid., pp. 5-51. Cf. on this point for general information Jörg Baberowski, Der Feind ist überall. Stalinismus im Kaukasus, Munich 2003, and also Douglas Northrop, Veiled Empire. Gender and Power in Stalinist Central Asia, Ithaca, N.Y. 2004.

wish the government to get involved in their affairs. They demonstrated their sovereignty and cultural autonomy in relation to the communists from the city. The murderers had done more than merely kill a disobedient woman, the “eternal” rules structuring life in the *aul* had also been re-established on their account.

This confrontation evinced less of Islam and old traditions than might have been presumed from the perpetrators’ self-presentation. But nor were the Bolsheviks fighting for communism here, despite their rhetoric giving the impression that the cultural revolution in the East was a crusade for socialism. From this perspective, the dispute over the perpetrators’ punishment was an argument over cultural sovereignty of interpretation. The sole victor in this dispute would be the one who made the other silent, thereby overcoming his own speechlessness. Opponents thus became others, in responding to the changes which had taken place in their world.

For the Bolsheviks, the point was for their worldview to become everyone’s worldview. This was why they not only had to punish the murderers but also eliminate those who represented and justified the murder with an appeal to tradition. The murderers and their helpers also sought acknowledgement – by flinging their interpretation of the world at the Bolsheviks and thus reinventing themselves as custodians of apparently old customs. Through resistance against others murders thus became “eternal” traditions.

What was one’s own and what was other? How could one’s own kind be distinguished from others? In the present case, the answer was the relationship between the sexes and the cultural orders in which men and women moved. For both sides, women became a symbol of “true” life and the woman’s representation reflected the combatants’ identity. For this reason, the cultural revolution in the Soviet East was above all a confrontation over the “correct” way of life, which women were to vicariously exemplify for society at large.

How can the episode described above be made comprehensible for us and for others? What is a historian to make of it who wishes to do more than merely retell the contents of the documents? He might address material living conditions, geographical, climatic and economic circumstances so as to present historical individuals as creatures of their environment. But what would be the point of that? The world is not simply there, it is there only as a world which is comprehended and mediated. Reality is interpretation, and this interpretation refers to nothing but other interpretations. Man only ever has to do with various interpretations of the world, and within these interpretations with himself alone. Whatever he may do, the understanding of meaning figures in everything. We would have nothing to say to ourselves if our actions were not fraught with meaning, we would have to remain silent.⁴ But what we give one another to understand moves in networks of significance which are already there before one seeks to make oneself understandable – and to understand oneself. Clifford Geertz called this culture. Before

4 Ernst Cassirer, *Versuch über den Menschen. Einführung in eine Philosophie der Kultur*, Frankfurt a. M. ²1990 [English edition: *An Essay on Man*, New Haven 1944], p. 50; Wilhelm Dilthey, *Der Aufbau der geschichtlichen Welt in den Geisteswissenschaften*, Frankfurt a. M. 1981, pp. 178–180.

we understand how to do something, we have always already understood. One might say that it is not without preconditions that we are what we are. "It is always against a background of the *already begun* that man is able to reflect on what may serve for him as origin," as Foucault says.⁵ But not only do people live in a universe of significance, they also maintain a relationship with this universe. And they are challenged by others' interpretations. "All cultures are involved in one another."⁶ This is why they are not rigid and immutable copies of the world. Culture happens, it happens in a constant exchange with the worlds of meaning in which people move. If we were to live in sealed-off and rigid systems of meaning then we would no longer be able to communicate with others, we would discover no meaning in others' signs of life and lose our capacity for surprise. Everywhere where actions and interpretations take place is culture.

Our experiences are available to us only as we apprehend them, we understand the world by apprehending it. We simplify and order it lest sensory impressions overwhelm us, and it is only thus that we are capable as cultural beings of making this understanding of ours understandable for others. What for us no longer belongs to the realm which we take for granted, we ascribe to a culture: the culture of Muslims, Russians, workers etc. In defining others and inscribing them in seemingly unchanging cultures, we become conscious of ourselves as persons who are different. We are not ourselves from the outset, we become this only through rationalising our experiences of others. We become subjects by making others into others. We thus appropriate the world of others on our own terms. One might also say that stereotyping of one's environment is a function of the event of culture.⁷

However, historians cannot make do with imputing eternal qualities to cultures, as happens in everyday life. They cannot stubbornly remain deaf to the interpretations which are called out to them. To be sure, they too are speaking from a location in describing the lives of historical subjects – and thereby, above all, telling their readers about themselves – but they know that this is how things work. This is why cultural historians speak of the representations through which people communicate their worldviews but not of a world which lies hidden behind the communication. The "mirror of nature" has been shattered, and historians are instead merely concerned with the forms in which reality is presented, with representations.⁸

Representations are organisational forms of knowledge, symbols and rituals through which people apprehend the world. Description of the symbolic content of a representa-

5 Michel Foucault, *Die Ordnung der Dinge. Eine Archäologie der Humanwissenschaften*, Frankfurt a. M. 1999 (15th edition), p. 398.

6 Edward W. Said, *Kultur und Imperialismus. Einbildungskraft und Politik im Zeitalter der Macht*, Frankfurt a. M. 1994 [English edition: *Culture and Imperialism*, New York 1993], p. 30.

7 Oswald Schwemmer, *Die kulturelle Existenz des Menschen*, Berlin 1997, p. 137; Amin Maalouf, *Mörderische Identitäten*, Frankfurt a. M. 2000, p. 26 f.

8 Richard Rorty, *Der Spiegel der Natur. Eine Kritik der Philosophie*, Frankfurt a. M. 1981 [English edition: *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature*, Princeton 1979]; Peter Burke, *Zwei Krisen des historischen Bewußtseins* in: Peter Burke (ed.), *Kultureller Austausch*, Frankfurt a. M. 2000, pp. 68-71; Eberhard Berg/Martin Fuchs (eds), *Kultur, soziale Praxis, Text. Die Krise der ethnographischen Repräsentation*, Frankfurt a. M. 31999.

tion and analysis of a culture are performed in the same way as the reading of a text. As Clifford Geertz says, “Societies, like lives, contain *their own interpretation*. One has only to learn how to gain access to them.”⁹ In other words, it is the collective unconscious – the life which is admitted to habits and ways of speaking which we take for granted – that provides historians with their true impetus. It is only in the collective unconscious that the mentality of a human society becomes apparent.¹⁰ What is one’s own and what is other becomes visible at the borderlines between mentalities, where one no longer knows oneself to be in the realm of the self-evident. It is these borderlines which enable historians to describe culture and thus make visible perspectives which differ from their own worldview. This is also the case with the confrontation between the Bolsheviks and the inhabitants of the *aul* mentioned at the beginning of this text.

Bolshevism was a European project whose interpreters were drawn from the cities of European Russia. Lenin’s socialism was a synonym for the Europeanization of the old Russia, and in this sense it was an affair of intellectuals and educated city-dwellers who claimed to be speaking on behalf of workers. The Bolshevik leaders had only vague notions of peasant Russia and the Asian periphery of the empire and only after the revolution of 1917 did they come into contact with Muslims and nomads at all. Muslims and communists encountered one another as unknowns. But socialism as the Bolsheviks understood it – as a homogenous social order of “civilized” city-dwellers living in affluence – was a fiction. For what the Bolsheviks took to be a precondition for socialism existed neither in Russia nor at the periphery. The empire was socialism’s refutation, it was a perpetual challenge through which the Bolsheviks’ project had to prove itself. Revolutionaries who deemed cultural difference a potential threat were thus unable to overlook the empire’s heterogeneity.¹¹

When the Bolsheviks won back the multinational empire at the end of the civil war socialism was transformed into an imperial project, for the rulers as much as for their subjects. At the 8th party congress of the RCP in March 1919 Nikolai Bukharin, the European Bolsheviks’ leading theorist, had already stated that it was not the task of the revolution to classify its subjects in terms of national collectives. Such attributions were reasonable for “Hottentots, negroes, bushmen and Indians” at most, societies without social differentiation. But in Russia class had to prevail over the nation.¹²

9 Clifford Geertz, „Deep Play“: Bemerkungen zum balinesischen Hahnenkampf, in: Clifford Geertz (ed.), *Dichte Beschreibung. Beiträge zum Verstehen kultureller Systeme*, Frankfurt a. M. 1994 [English edition: *The Interpretation of Cultures*, New York 1973], p. 260; Frank R. Ankersmit, *Die drei Sinnbildungsebenen der Geschichtsschreibung*, in: Klaus E. Müller/Jörn Rüsen (eds), *Historische Sinnbildung. Problemstellungen, Zeitkonzepte, Wahrnehmungshorizonte, Darstellungsstrategien*, Reinbek b. Hamburg 1997, pp. 98–117, esp. p. 105.

10 Philippe Ariès, *Geschichte der Mentalitäten*, in: Jacques Le Goff/Roger Chartier/Jacques Revel (eds), *Die Rückeroberung des historischen Denkens. Grundlagen der Neuen Geschichtswissenschaften*, Frankfurt a. M. 1990, p. 162 f.

11 Terry Dean Martin, *The Affirmative Action Empire: Nations and Nationalism in the Soviet Union 1923–1939*, Ithaca, N.Y. 2001; Gerhard Simon, *Nationalismus und Nationalitätenpolitik in der Sowjetunion. Von der totalitären Diktatur zur nachstalinischen Gesellschaft*, Baden-Baden 1986; Baberowski, *Der Feind ist überall* (footnote 3).

12 *Vos'moi s'ezd RKP(B). Mart 1919 goda. Protokoly* [The Eighth Party Congress of the RCP. March 1919. Minutes], Moscow, 1959, p. 47.

Bukharin's reality was provided by the texts of Marxism; he understood the world surrounding him by calling to mind Marx's interpretation of the French Revolution. But these interpretations were challenged by the representations of others: during the civil war Lenin and his supporters found that the class model was an inadequate description of the realities in which their subjects lived. Polish and Finnish workers were proletarians, but they also saw themselves as Poles and Finns who did not associate the social conflict with the fate of the Bolshevik empire. Baku in 1918 saw bloody confrontations between Armenian and Turkish workers, in central Asia nomads were expelled by Russian settlers and workers, in Ukraine the peasant armies of the Whites and the Reds carried out pogroms of the Jews. At the fringes of the empire, in the Caucasus, in central Asia and in the western regions the Bolsheviks met with resistance not only from the adherents of the old regime. Wherever resistance appeared, it manifested itself collectively: in Baku the counterrevolution was a rebellion of Muslim city-dwellers, in the North Caucasus and in Georgia popular uprisings took place in the early 1920s and in central Asia Muslims and nomads rebelled against the Russian settlers and soldiers who had gained power in the soviets.¹³

For Stalin, Mikoyan, Kaganovich and all the Bolsheviks drawn from the multiethnic areas of the empire who were themselves members of an ethnic minority, the significance of a person's national identity was in any case never in doubt. For in their experience social conflicts had always also been ethnic in nature. Even for those Bolsheviks who assigned no significance at all to the national question this truth was unavoidable.

We have Bashkirs, Kyrgyz, a number of other peoples, and in our relationship with them we cannot deny them acknowledgment. We cannot deny this to any of the peoples living within the borders of the former Russian Empire, as Lenin shouted at his critics at the 8th party congress. Only "people without national characteristics" might make do without self-determination, "[b]ut such people do not exist."¹⁴

Every person belonged to a class and a nation. Stalin and the Bolshevik leaders from the provinces who assumed power in the party in the mid-1920s and transformed it into a multiethnic institution certainly did not doubt this. It was they who ethnicized the Soviet Union and transformed it into a state of nations where peoples lived not with but alongside one another. Stalin's "socialism in one country" was a socialism in nations. Revolutionaries seeking to stir class conflict and be rid of their supposed enemies had to avail themselves of the opportunities afforded them by language and tradition. People understand one another through language, rituals and conventions. A person wishing to communicate something to others must adopt the language and habits of those whom

13 B. Bajkov, *Vospominaniia o revoliutsii v Zakavkaz'e (1917–1920 gg.)* [Memories of the Revolution in Transcaucasia], in: *Arkhiv Russkoi Revoliutsii* 9 (1923), pp. 91–194; Richard Pipes, *The Formation of the Soviet Union. Communism and Nationalism 1917–1923*, Cambridge 1964; Adeeb Khalid, *Tashkent 1917: Muslim Politics in Revolutionary Turkestan*, in: *Slavic Review* 55 (1996), pp. 270–296; Peter Holquist, *Making War, Forging Revolution. Russia's Continuum of Crisis, 1914–1921*, Cambridge, Mass. 2002.

14 *Vos'moi s'ezd* (footnote 12), p. 53, 107. Cf. Alfred Rieber, *Stalin, Man on the Borderlands*, in: *American Historical Review* 106 (2001), pp. 1651–1691; Baberowski, *Der Feind* (footnote 3), pp. 184–214.

he addresses. But the state of nations was also a representation of the dream of the modern world dreamed by Stalin and his entourage. They conceived a Soviet Union which matched their images of the world and gave it an order in which they recognized themselves.¹⁵

Its subjects now no longer lived in a multiethnic empire but in national republics and regions. They were governed in the name of their titular nation and in their native tongue, and they enjoyed privileges where they belonged to a “backward” nation. In short, not only did the natives belong to the party and state apparatuses, they were also granted privileges in the factories and universities where they belonged to a “backward” nation. “Putting down roots” (*korenizatsiia*) was the name the Bolsheviks gave to this strategy of indigenising socialism. In the Caucasus and in central Asia it served the goal of transforming “backward” peoples into modern nations and of communicating the socialist project in the language and traditions of the natives. But without the help of native interpreters the Bolsheviks at the centre would have been unable to realize any of their goals at the periphery. They would have remained mute and thus shared the fate of the tsar’s colonial officers in the Caucasus and central Asia.¹⁶

Indigenisation changed the imperial terms of communication. Between the Bolsheviks at the centre and the Islamic Enlightenment movement and national communists at the periphery a dialog unfolded on the possibilities for the Soviet education project in which the local elites who were to realize the centre’s programme in the villages ultimately also participated. But this dialog between communists and subjects proved to be a conversation between deaf-mutes for whom the other’s representation only ever confirmed the superiority of one’s own worldview. Yet the Bolsheviks had themselves empowered tradition by legitimating the customs of Muslims and nomads. One might also say that the Bolsheviks nationalized whatever they found to be backward.¹⁷ For the Tatar national communist Sultan-Galiev, the empire’s Muslims belonged to the proletarian peoples because they were oppressed by the colonial powers. He spoke of a “dictatorship of the

15 Terry Dean Martin, *The Affirmative Action Empire* (footnote 11), pp. 2-25; Yuri Slezkine, *The USSR as a Communal Apartment, or how a Socialist State Promotes Ethnic Particularism*, in: *Slavic Review* 53 (1994), pp. 414-452; Eric Weitz, *A Century of Genocide. Utopias of Race and Nation*, Princeton 2003, pp. 63-68; Jörg Baberowski, *Diktaturen der Eindeutigkeit*, in: Jörg Baberowski (ed.), *Krieg und Revolution im 20. Jahrhundert*, Göttingen 2006.

16 Boris Zasukhin, *Po bol'shevistskij vziats'ia za korenizatsiiu gosudarstvennogo apparata* [We Attend to Putting Down Roots for the Apparatus of State in the Bolshevik Manner], in: *Revoliutsiia i Natsional'nosti* (1933) no. 12, pp. 73-75; S. Akopov, *K voprosu ob uzbekizatsii apparata i sozdanie mestnykh kadrov promyshlennosti Uzbekistana* [On the Question of the Uzbekization of the Apparatus and the Creation of Local Cadres in the Industry of Uzbekistan], in: *Revoliutsiia i Natsional'nosti* (1931) no. 12, p. 27 f.; Martin, *The Affirmative Action Empire* (footnote 11), pp. 125-146; Terry Dean Martin, *Modernization or Neo-Traditionalism? Ascribed Nationality and Soviet Primordialism*, in: Sheila Fitzpatrick (ed.), *Stalinism. New Directions*, London 2000, pp. 348-367; Baberowski, *Der Feind* (footnote 3), pp. 314-349.

17 Douglas Northrop, *Nationalizing Backwardness: Gender, Empire, and Uzbek Identity*, in: Ronald Grigor Suny / Terry Dean Martin (eds), *A State of Nations. Empire and Nation-Making in the Age of Lenin and Stalin*, Oxford 2001, pp. 191-222.

colonies and semi-colonies over the metropolis", by which he meant a privileging of the Islamic nations of the empire over its European ones.¹⁸

But Muslim peoples were not just proletarian peoples who were oppressed and exploited by colonial powers. They were "backward" because they lived in past centuries and adhered to outmoded traditions which were no longer in keeping with the modern world as the Bolsheviks understood it. It may appear paradoxical, but for the Bolsheviks too what a Kyrgyz or an Azerbaijani was manifested itself in the customs which they had declared backward: the way of life stipulated in the Koran, the separation of the sexes and the veiling of women.¹⁹ For the national communists and the Islamic Enlightenment movement too, the Muslims' customs were national representations. Communism did not contradict Islam, in fact it enabled the mullahs to interpret the teachings of the Koran in a new way, as the head of the government of Soviet Azerbaijan, Nariman Narimanov, declared in the early 1920s:

*Our mullah can be won over through references to the Koran, which does not contradict communism. If one obliges the mullah thus and tells him what communism means and explains this idea to him in the right way, he will himself believe: "Yes, that was written long ago."*²⁰

In the late 1920s the Bolsheviks would hear no more of such declarations of faith as they were put forward by the Muslim national communists in reference to the indigenisation of socialism. They now spoke of the Cultural Revolution and of new people and new ways of life. The Cultural Revolution created new people, established monopolies of representation and reduced competing interpretations to silence. It delegitimized others because it placed supposedly "old" and "uncivilized" ways of life at the empire's Islamic periphery under suspicion of barbarism. But the Bolsheviks not only thus dismantled their own nationalisation concept, they also deprived themselves of the indigenous communicators for their project of civilisation. For a Kyrgyz who was not a nomad and an Azerbaijani who was not a Muslim was no longer a Kyrgyz or Azerbaijani. This was the point made by Valerian Kuibyshev at a meeting of the central committee in June 1923 in stating that national characteristics would disappear if the Bolsheviks succeeded in overcoming the empire's social and cultural variety. "When there is no longer any inequality the Kyrgyz communist produced by this milieu will no longer speak specifically of the Kyrgyz, as all will be equal."²¹ The point was thus for the Muslims to banish Islam from their world and become sedentary and modern Europeans. The Muslims must be liber-

18 Quoted in: A. Arsharuni/Ch. Gabidullin, *Ocherki panislamizma i panturkizma v Rossii* [Characteristics of Panislamism and Panturkism in Russia], Moscow: Bezboznik, 1931, p. 78 f.

19 Northrop, *Veiled Empire* (footnote 3), p. 34; Yuri Slezkine, *Arctic Mirrors. Russia and the Small Peoples of the North*, Ithaca, N.Y. 1994, pp. 187-246.

20 Nariman Narimanov, *Izbrannnye proizvedeniia* [Collected Works], vol. 2, 1918-1921, Baku 1989, p. 392.

21 *Tainy natsional'noi politiki TsK RKP. Stenograficheskii otchet sekretnogo IV soveshchaniia TsK RKP 1923 g.* [The Secrets of the Nationalities Policy of the Central Committee of the RCP. Stenographic Report on the Secret, Fourth Meeting of the Central Committee of the RCP in 1923], Moscow 1992, p. 26.

ated from “the pall of medieval culture”, as the national communist Safarov put it.²² The new person of whom the Bolsheviks spoke wore European clothing, subjected himself to the rhythm of modern working life and held religion in contempt. He could not be a Muslim. For this reason, the Cultural Revolution was a negation of national “putting down roots”.

In the Soviet East too, the Cultural Revolution was a fight for people’s souls. The aim of the Bolsheviks at the centre was to empty their subjects’ consciousness of the old and fill it with the new. The new person was one who only lived in such pasts as the Bolsheviks had specially conceived for him. He forgot. For this purpose churches and mosques were to be closed, old holidays replaced with new, revolutionary ones, books banned and clerics and members of the local elites arrested and deported. Only when the communists’ interpretations had become the interpretations of all and no longer faced any challengers could the revolution prevail.²³

But in the Soviet East the new person was a woman. For the Bolsheviks, women’s lives reflected the lack of liberty and backwardness from which Islamic societies were unable to free themselves. Women bore a heavy burden imposed on them by Islamic society because men kept them in a state of ignorance and excluded them from the public realm of politics. But women too were representatives of the order which the Bolsheviks considered barbaric. For as mothers and educators, women passed on to their offspring the traditions which apparently enslaved them. They alone bore the key which would enable the Bolsheviks to obtain access to the societies at the Islamic periphery. Women were the proletariat of the East, they liberated themselves vicariously for humanity as a whole and in this they became natural allies for the Bolsheviks.²⁴ Yet on this issue the view of the traditional elites, clan and tribal leaders and Islamic clerics hardly differed from that of the communist leaders, albeit with the difference that they too believed women to be on their side. For they saw women as custodians and preservers of tradition: those who assaulted them also called into question the social order which they represented. For this reason the Cultural Revolution faced bitter resistance in the Soviet East. When the conflict ultimately escalated, the Bolsheviks lost control of events and took refuge in terror. In the early 1920s the regime had still trusted in the effect of laws and ordinances. It reformed family law, forbade the marrying-off of underage girls and prohibited polygamy.

22 Desiatyi s’ezd RKP (B). Mart 1921 goda. Stenograficheskii otchet, [The Tenth Party Congress of the RCP. March 1921. Stenographic Report] Moscow 1963, p. 198f. Cf. the arguments of G. I. Broido, “Nasha natsional’naia politika i ocherednye zadachi Narkomnatsa” [Our Nationalities Policy and the Next Tasks for the Commissariat of Nationalities], in: Zhizn’ Natsional’nostei (1923) no. 1, p. 5 f., and Sergei Dimanshtein, Pis’mo tov. Stalina i bor’ba s Liuksemburgianstvom v nats. voprose [The Letter of Comrade Stalin and the Struggle against Luxemburgism in the Nationalities Question], in: RiN (1932) no. 1, pp. 1–16, esp. p. 7.

23 David Hoffman, *Stalinist Values. The Cultural Norms of Soviet Modernity 1917–1941*, Ithaca 2003, pp. 15–56; Jörg Baberowski, *Der Rote Terror. Die Geschichte des Stalinismus*, Munich 2004, pp. 94–108; Sheila Fitzpatrick, *Everyday Stalinism. Ordinary Life in Extraordinary Times: Soviet Russia in the 1930s*, Oxford 1999, pp. 67–88.

24 Gregory Massel, *The Surrogate Proletariat. Moslem Women and Revolutionary Strategies in Soviet Central Asia, 1919–1929*, Princeton 1974; Northrop, *Veiled Empire* (footnote 3), pp. 33–68; Baberowski, *Der Feind* (footnote 3), pp. 442–478.

With the introduction of state civil marriage the Bolsheviks attempted to curtail the mullahs' influence over the Muslims' lifeworld. But the government lacked the means by which to enforce its goals. The women's departments of the central committee – which opened branch offices in all the party organisations in the provinces in the early 1920s – served this purpose. In the larger cities of the Caucasus and central Asia women's clubs arose which generally had to be maintained by the local soviets. Their task was to free women from domestic seclusion, to instruct them in reading and writing and to familiarize them with the modern, socialist world of work. Some clubs offered women vocational training while others confined themselves to disseminating the regime's antireligious propaganda. The women's departments and women's clubs were places where the revolution's female representatives exemplified the new way of life in the hope that its superiority would be immediately apparent to all those capable of paying close attention.²⁵

The experiment already failed in its first phase, however. In the larger cities of Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan the women's clubs were normally led by the wives of the communist leaders and by Christian immigrants, and where no women were present the party committees nominated men to chair the women's departments. But nowhere did the activists succeed in gaining a place in the women's lifeworld, and where they showed themselves to be subversives they met with rejection from the village inhabitants. When members of the Baku women's department visited the region of Nakhichevan on the Persian-Azerbaijani border in the autumn of 1922 to see how women's emancipation was progressing there, they met with disappointment. Whatever they attempted to explain to the women it was always the same: they understood "but a little" and feared the mullahs who threatened them with punishments of hell. "They particularly feared people forcing them to remove the chador, enrolling them as party members and turning them into Russians."²⁶

It was not least the male communists who conspired against their own party leadership on this question. A man who had presented his wife in public as the member of a club would have lost his standing in his village. This was especially true of the communist office-bearers. When the head of the Azerbaijani party, Ali Heidar Karaev visited the border region of Nakhichevan in July 1925, he asked the local functionaries their attitude towards women's emancipation. He learned that the communists prohibited their women from attending political assemblies. They had refused to open a women's club in Nakhichevan. "The members of the regional committee only call to mind the 'work among women' when one of them thinks of marrying, when the women's department serves as a venue for him to choose his fiancée," he later complained on reporting his

25 RGASPI, Fond 17, opis' 10, delo 346, p. 4; RGASPI, Fond 64, opis' 1, delo 217, p. 128; Aina Sultanova, *Shchastlivye zhenshchiny sovet'skogo Azerbaidzhana*, [The Happy Women of Azerbaijan], Baku 1964; Fannina W. Halle, *Frauen des Ostens. Vom Matriarchat bis zu den Fliegerinnen von Baku* [Women of the East: From Matriarchy to the Female Pilots of Baku], Zürich 1938.

26 RGASPI, Fond 64, opis' 1, delo 222, p. 10.

experience to the central committee in Baku. He had gained the impression that it was “as if Sovietisation only concerns men and has passed women by.”²⁷

Nor did the family laws of the Soviet state have any effect in such environments. In the spring of 1927, even in the district of Lenkoran in the immediate vicinity of Baku activists of the women’s department found nothing which was consistent with the new way of life. “Most of the population, particularly the women” followed the religious commandments and consummated marriage in the traditional way. The ban on polygamy was ignored. No one was interested in the Soviet holidays or the laws enacted by the government.²⁸ The village inhabitants – men and women – did not desire changes which called their lives into question, they instead sought answers which gave meaning to the existing ways of life. But the communists were unable to provide them with such answers. This was why the “authority of the clergy” was “extremely strong in women’s eyes”, as the women’s department of the Azerbaijani communist party put it in 1927.

They consider it their duty to consult the mullah on all matters concerning their lives and, even though the mullah’s answer is frequently unsatisfactory, they all believe him and are open in relation to him alone. That is to say, for them the mullah is a judge, doctor and much more besides.²⁹

Where the Bolsheviks saw religious communities such as the Bahais in Azerbaijan, the Sunni reformist movements in Tatarstan or the Mennonites and Baptists in Siberia as sources of competition or as an alternative no one was spared violence, whether rich or poor. In Kazan’ and in Ufa Islamic clerics had taken over from the Bolsheviks the project of women’s emancipation. The Tatar mullahs and their congregations had turned to “face the woman” (*litsom k zhenshchine*), as a report of the GPU from 1925 stated. The Bolsheviks could bear this marginalisation no longer. Where failures had occurred persons whom the Bolsheviks deemed enemies were at work: nationalists, tribal leaders and mullahs who deadened their subjects’ consciousness and obstructed the Bolsheviks’ access to Muslims. In the quarrel over the “correct” way of life, the sole winner would be the one who silenced competing interpretations. At the peak of the Cultural Revolution, in the years 1927 and 1928, the regime had clan leaders removed from their homelands and deported; former members of national parties and Islamic clerics were arrested and Sufi preachers were expelled from the Soviet Union.³⁰

27 RGASPI, Fond 17, opis’ 16, delo 255, p. 95 f.

28 Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Noveishei Istorii Azerbaidzhanskoi Respubliki [State Archive for the Modern History of the Republic of Azerbaijan, subsequently referred to as: GANI], Fond 379, opis’ 6, delo 51, p. 1; RGASPI, Fond 17, opis’ 17, delo 24, pp. 260–263.

29 GANI, Fond 379, opis’ 6, delo 51, p. 4 f.

30 RGASPI, Fond 17, opis’ 85, delo 214, p. 17. Cf. A. B. Junusova, *Islam v Bashkirii 1917–1994* [Islam in Bashkiria 1917–1994], Ufa, 1995, pp. 41–47; Andrej S. Savin, “Obraz vraga. Protestantskie tserkvi v sibirskoi presse, 1928–1930” [The Enemy’s Picture. The Protestant Church in the Siberian Press 1928–1930], in: Sergei A. Papkov (ed.), *Ural i Sibir’ v Stalinskoi politike* [The Urals and Siberia in Stalinist Politics], Novosibirsk: Sibirskii Khronograf, 2002, pp. 57–80; Irina Korovushkina Paert, *Popular Religion and Local Identity During the Stalin Revolution: Old Believers in the Urals, 1928–1941*, in: Donald J. Raleigh (ed.), *Provincial Landscapes. Local Dimensions of Soviet Power 1917–1953*, Pittsburgh 2001, pp. 171–193; Baberowski, *Der Feind* (footnote 3), pp. 561–586.

This act of violence also made use of a simulation of the popular will. In the villages, the Bolsheviks staged artificial conflicts between the peasants during the soviet elections. Under the supervision of urban communists not only were deputies to be elected to the village soviet, in each village the assembly of peasants was to nominate enemies who were then excluded from the elections and entered in “blacklists”. But how was a class enemy recognizable? For the Bolsheviks the class enemy was chiefly a cultural category. The class enemy was a man who had conspired against the new way of life and prevented others from becoming what they might have been. The Bolsheviks opposed him through the woman who rose up against him during the soviet elections and revealed him as an oppressor. In December 1927, before the committee of the Nationalities Soviet in Moscow the chairman of the Central Executive Committee of Azerbaijan, Samed Aga Agamaly Ogly, explained the feminisation of the class struggle in stating that the woman behaved “more honourably in relation to the cause than the man” and for this reason enjoyed “respect” among the population at large.³¹

In symbolic terms, the simulated class struggle was aroused by the clothing worn by Muslim women. It was the veil which offended the Bolsheviks because it symbolized for them the despotism and backwardness of the social order in which Muslim women lived. Women who wore the chador or parandzha not only resisted the gaze of unfamiliar men, they also failed to join the staged public which the Bolsheviks required in order to mobilize their subjects for their cause. It was not even possible to speak to them. Women’s shawls, headscarves and facial veils prevented them from performing physical work and sport and concealed ungroomed bodies. The chador also symbolized the dirt which the cultural revolutionaries associated with the Islamic ways of life.³² Accordingly, only a veilless woman could be a modern person. In this the Bolsheviks felt themselves to be in agreement with the national communists and the Islamic Enlightenment movement. For the nation would only take shape where the realms of men and women were no longer distinct from one other. In central Asia the local Islamic reformers pointed to the Muslim Tatar women who no longer wore the veil and also went bareheaded on the streets of Bukhara and Tashkent. As early as April 1917 the Azerbaijani nationalist leader Rasulgade had publicly declared that women were no longer to be excluded from political life since a nation of men could not exist.³³ But the practice of veiling visualized this separation, for the Bolsheviks as for the national communists. This was why the chador and communism were “as irreconcilable as dark night with the day’s bright sunshine,” as

31 Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Rossiiskoi Federatsii [State Archive of the Russian Federation, subsequently referred to as: GARF], Fond 3316, opis’ 20, delo 201, p. 323. On the marginalisation of the *lishentsy* cf. Golfo Alexopoulos, *Stalin’s Outcasts. Aliens, Citizens, and the Soviet State, 1926–1936*, Ithaca, N.Y. 2003, pp. 45–75.

32 Northrop, *Veiled Empire* (footnote 3), p. 62 f.

33 Kaspîi (April 23, 1917). Cf. Adeeb Khalid, *Politics of Muslim Cultural Reform. Jadidism in Central Asia*, Berkeley 1998, pp. 222–228; Edward J. Lazzerini, *Beyond Renewal: The Jadid Response to Pressure for Change in the Modern World*, in: Jo-Ann Gross (ed.), *Muslims in Central Asia. Expressions of Identity and Change*, Durham 1992, pp. 151–166.

an Uzbek communist put it. In this sense, the removing of women's veils was a "victory of culture and light" over the gloomy past.³⁴

But the veil was also a representation of power. The removal of women's veils also meant destroying the symbols of the traditional order. "We are depriving the mullahs of yet another emblem" was how Agamaly Ogly explained the purpose of the veil-removing campaign in June 1928.³⁵ An unveiled woman had fallen out of the existing order and could no longer return to the bosom of the community. She was at the mercy of the Bolsheviks come what may, since she had to reinvent herself in her own environment as an alien person, and the cultural revolutionaries thus demonstrated their power over the local society.

The unveiling campaign which began in the spring of 1927 and continued up to the end of 1928 was a fiasco, in Uzbekistan just as much as in Azerbaijan. While thousands of women publicly cast off their veils, trampled them into the dirt or threw them onto fires, the campaign collapsed once the urban communists who were supposed to instigate the unveiling had left the villages. But it nonetheless left a deep trace on the local societies at the empire's Islamic periphery.

If I have the feeling that my language is held in contempt, my religion mocked, my culture disparaged, then I will react by making a demonstrative display of the attributes of my difference.

This was the Arab essayist Amin Maalouf's recent verdict on the modern striving for cultural homogeneity. "If one feels at every turn that one is betraying one's people and denying one's own self, this reduces one's readiness to reach out to the other person."³⁶ This is exactly how it was in this case. The cultural revolutionaries met with rejection not only from the mullahs, tribal leaders and village elders, but also from the women affected who had no perspective of a life outside their families and villages. There were not even any dresses and coats which might have replaced the chador or the Uzbek *parandzha*.³⁷ What sort of life might an unveiled woman have lived in the village? She would have become a laughing stock for the village's inhabitants and undermined her family's reputation. This was also the reason why even the village communists ultimately upheld the practice of veiling. If they had agreed to the removal of the veil they would have lost their authority in the village, which resided not least in the fact that they protected their wives and daughters from the importunate advances of other men. An unveiled woman dishonoured her husband and family because in the eyes of the local society she was transformed into a prostitute on whom anyone might inflict violence.³⁸

Women who had cast off the veil forever, who left their husbands or refused to marry men whom their parents had selected for them incurred the wrath of the local society.

34 Quoted in: Northrop, *Veiled Empire* (footnote 3), p. 64.

35 RGASPI, Fond 17, opis' 17, delo 20, p. 248.

36 Maalouf, *Mörderische Identitäten* (footnote 7), p. 42 f.

37 GANI, Fond 379, opis' 6, delo 94, p. 23; GARF, Fond 3316, opis' 20, delo 995, p. 39.

38 Baberowski, *Der Feind* (footnote 3), pp. 650-652, with references to sources.

Any slight deviation in one's way of life now came under suspicion of being the work of the godless Bolsheviks. Wherever the unveiling campaign left its mark, women who had "dishonoured" their families suffered violent attacks. In the spring of 1929 armed Kom-somol members patrolled the streets of Baku to protect unveiled women from attacks by angry men. In 1928 and 1929 alone, 368 women were murdered in Uzbekistan.³⁹

In this violent confrontation, Muslims and Bolsheviks became others and changed themselves and their worldview. The veil, polygamy and the separation of the sexes – all this now became a national symbol of dissociation. Following the unveiling campaign, men and women no longer found themselves in the realm of what could be taken for granted. What others declared to be barbaric and backward now had to be defended as a tradition and preserved. In Bukhara, Tashkent and even Baku the number of veiled women actually increased. The communists' wives in particular set a positive example and made a demonstrative and public show of their veiledness. Following the unveiling campaign more than ninety percent of women in Azerbaijan had newly donned their chadors, as the prominent Soviet women's activist, Antonina Nukhrat, indignantly noted during a speech in Moscow in October 1929. In some districts the Muslim party secretaries even forced Russian women to cover their hair.⁴⁰ "Eternal" traditions now existed. While the facial veil had not been introduced in Uzbekistan until the nineteenth century, following the Russian conquest of central Asia, in the late 1920s the natives considered it an "old" and Islamic tradition.⁴¹

For the Bolsheviks this was nothing other than a confrontation between oppressed women and malevolent kulaks. Men who killed or abused women were kulaks irrespective of their social class. At the All-Union Congress of the "League of the Militant Godless" in June 1929 the murdered women were celebrated as martyrs. In Tashkent the party organized exhibitions where photographs of killed women were presented to visitors. These martyrs had not been murdered, they had "fallen in the struggle".⁴² Even during the unveiling campaign the regime already staged show trials against men who had killed women or forced them to wear the veil in public. In 1928 in Uzbekistan alone the Supreme Court passed death sentences on 73 perpetrators, while over a hundred were sent to a work camp for a period of ten years. In February 1930, at the peak of collectivisation when more women were killed in a single month than in the whole of 1929, the central government in Moscow enacted a law classifying the murder and abuse of emancipated

39 GARF, Fond 3316, opis' 21, delo 680, pp. 93-96; S. Akopov, *Bor'ba s bytovymi prestupleniiami* [The Struggle Against Crimes Against Customs and Traditions], in: *Revoliutsiia i Natsional'nosti* (1930) no. 4/5, pp. 58-69, esp. p. 66; A. Polianskaia, *Rabota po uluchsheniui truda i byta zhenshchin* [Work on Improving Women's Labour and Way of Life], in: *Revoliutsiia i Natsional'nosti* (1930) no. 3, pp. 91-96, esp. p. 93; Marianne Ruth Kamp, *Unveiling Uzbek Women: Liberation, Representation and Discourse 1906–1929*, University of Chicago, Ph.D. diss., 1998, pp. 297-313.

40 GARF, Fond 6983, delo 5, p. 125; RGASPI, Fond 613, opis' 3, delo 41, p. 7; Northrop, *Veiled Empire* (footnote 3), p. 179.

41 Northrop, *Veiled Empire* (footnote 3), p. 43 f.

42 *Pravda* (June 12, 1929); Halle, *Frauen* (footnote 25), p. 174.

women as a counterrevolutionary act.⁴³ This also applied to the men who had murdered their sister-in-law in 1925 in a Kyrgyz *aul* for her refusal to submit to their will. The GPU saw in this the work of class enemies and spoke of a counterrevolutionary act, while in maintaining silence over the murder the *aul's* inhabitants insisted on their difference. The Cultural Revolution's campaigns continued at intervals into the late 1930s, but the Bolsheviks were unable to culturally subjugate the Soviet Union's Islamic periphery. All attempts at violent encroachment on the Muslims' lifeworlds – including once again in the years of the Great Terror – were frustrated through the defiance of the local elites which had come to power under the Bolshevik policy of indigenisation. And as the national communist leaders in the republics were unable to do anything to counter this defiance and allied themselves with the local communists in opposition to the centre, they came under suspicion of disloyalty. With each failed Cultural Revolution campaign, doubts over the national communists' reliability in the Islamic republics grew until Stalin came to see in them nothing but foreign spies and enemies of the people and they perished in the maelstrom of terror. Except for the Azerbaijani party leader Mir Dzhafar Bagirov not a single Muslim national communist survived the year 1939.⁴⁴ The idea of the new person thus died in bloody terror.

How can what has been described be linked with the aim of tracing representations of changing social orders? If representations were nothing more than a reflection of the orders in which people live, the history related here would be of no account. It would point to an order existing beyond representations, in which people might act only as prescribed for them by the orders which they reproduce. Bolsheviks and Muslims would be representatives of orders and no historian would be able to overcome the abyss separating consciousness and reality.

But actuality only offers the norms which we ourselves establish.⁴⁵ We must abandon the notion of representations as media bridging consciousness and actuality and interposing themselves between ourselves and reality, as Ernst Cassirer asserts. Philosophers have since abandoned the futile quest for congruence of reality and its reproduction in consciousness. They no longer consider representations as copies of reality or tools by which we access objective reality. Representations enable us to find our way in the world which we have created ourselves and to influence this world. Just as we invent ourselves in apprehending the world, we also invent the others with whom we exist in the world: we do so through the practices by which we give one another to understand who we are. At the same time, others are also involved in creating our world as they make their view of things known to us. Accordingly, the production of representations is not an ability, a

43 GARF, Fond 6983, opis' 1, delo 5, pp. 107–109; Sultanova, *Shchastlivye zhenshchiny* (footnote 25), p. 104.

44 Baberowski, *Der Feind* (footnote 3), pp. 777–830; Northrop, *Veiled Empire* (footnote 3), p. 240 f.

45 Richard Rorty, *Wahrheit und Fortschritt*, Frankfurt a. M. 2000 [English edition: *Truth and Progress: Philosophical Papers*, Volume 3, Cambridge 1998], p. 198.

special capacity which man has at his disposal, it is rather a practice by which he continually re-invents his reality.⁴⁶

Therein lies the significance of representations for the work of the student of culture: they refer us not to a world beyond significance but instead to the various ways of inhabiting worlds which we ourselves create. Accordingly, the conflict of representations which unfolded in the 1920s and 1930s between communists and Muslims at the periphery of the Soviet Union is no mere triviality: in this conflict the protagonists invented a world which no longer had any space for others. Yet in the light of representations historians become aware of more than just the peculiarities of Stalinism in the Soviet Union. In turning to alien contexts in which alien people saw different truths, they themselves become others. This will unsettle them. But they will no longer maintain that it is they who live in the right world and others in the false one.

46 Johannes Fabian, *Präsenz und Repräsentation. Die Anderen und das anthropologische Schreiben*, in: Eberhard Berg/Martin Fuchs (eds), *Kultur, soziale Praxis, Text. Die Krise der ethnographischen Repräsentation*, Frankfurt a. M. 1999, pp. 335-364, esp. pp. 335-339; Michel Foucault, *Die Anormalen*, Frankfurt a. M. 2003.

Epidemics and Revolution: Concepts of Hygiene in the Soviet Union, 1917–1941

Matthias Braun

RESÜMEE

Die Machbarkeitsphantasien der bolschewistischen Revolutionäre trafen 1917 auf die russische Wirklichkeit. Die Hygienepolitik bildete hierbei keine Ausnahme. Die Bolschewiki versuchten in den 1920er und 1930er Jahren, ihre Vorstellungen von sauberen Lebensweisen und gesäuberter Umwelt massenwirksam zu vermitteln. Sie bedienten sich dabei verschiedener Methoden zeremonieller Pädagogik. Die Medialisierung hygienepolitischer Imperative erfolgte mittels spezifischer Bildersprachen und Praktiken. Der Artikel fragt nach den Wurzeln bolschewistischer Hygienepolitik. Er beschreibt die Entwicklung hygienepolitischen Denkens nach der Revolution. Und er zeichnet nach, wie die Repräsentationen bolschewistischer Hygienepolitik kontextabhängig angeeignet wurden.

In the summer of 1932 the former senior consultant at John Hopkins Hospital in Baltimore, Lewellys F. Barker, embarked on a journey to the Soviet Union.¹ He turned a deaf ear to friendly advice that travel to the country of revolution was too dangerous and had nothing of interest to offer. Barker and his wife entrusted themselves to the care of Soviet tour guides and spent a month among the Bolsheviks. The couple visited Moscow, Leningrad and several major cities along the Volga. They spent evenings dining with members of the Academy of Sciences, drank black tea with young doctors and nurses and gazed in wonder at all manner of sights.

1 The author would like to thank his colleagues and research fellows at the Collaborative Research Centre on "Representations of Changing Social Orders" based at Humboldt University Berlin, for numerous thoughtful comments on earlier drafts of this paper.

Lewellys F. Barker had scarcely returned to Baltimore when he published a report in *The Scientific Monthly*.² In an article he regaled America's scholarly public with humorous observations from the country of the Bolshevik revolution. He described the food ("sometimes monotonous and not always attractively served"), commented on the means of transport ("very different from those to which we are accustomed in America") and generalized his impressions so as to provide an assessment of "medical and other conditions in Soviet Russia".³

The backward Soviet Union not only had adopted the hygiene measures of developed countries, Barker wrote. The first Soviet People's Commissar for Public Health, Nikolai Semashko, had introduced a series of "unique" measures with a "certain appeal" for countries in which "cultural development [...] has reached a far higher stage," the medic noted.⁴ Evidently, the nationalized public health system, a medical profession committed to educating the general population and extensive sanitary propaganda had made a lasting impression on the American guest (cf. Figure 1).⁵

For Barker as for many of his contemporaries, the Russian Revolution represented a unique phenomenon. He understood the Bolshevik revolution to be an event whose manifold ramifications and long-term consequences were scarcely foreseeable. He found revolutionary Russia to be a "moving target" of whom no one could quite say which form it had and where it was heading. However, comparative scholarship of revolutions has all too often failed to recognize contemporaries' uncertain perception of revolutionary events. It has sought to establish the comparability of a large number of revolutionary upheavals by examining the structural causes and long-term effects of revolutions. The revolutionary event and the person of the revolutionary have been pushed into the background. According to a widely held view, revolutions "come", they *are not* "made".⁶

The following article asserts the opposite: revolutions are made. It examines revolution as a process by describing the hygiene concepts of leading public health experts in the Soviet Union of the interwar period. Furthermore, it demonstrates how these programmes gave rise to measures for combating disease. In keeping with the aims of the present volume this article seeks to describe a field of research enabling a comparison of revolu-

2 L. F. Barker, Medical and Other Conditions in Soviet Russia, in: *The Scientific Monthly*, 35 (1935) 1, pp. 5-33.

3 During the interwar period, Western experts closely monitored the Soviet healthcare system, cf. Anonymous, Health Activities in Russia to Be Surveyed in a Forthcoming Book, in: *The Millbank Memorial Fund Quarterly Bulletin*, 11 (1933) 4, pp. 256-72; A. Abramson, Social Insurance in Soviet Russia, in: *The Journal of Political Economy*, 37 (1929) 4, pp. 377-99; J. H. Gorvin, Soviet Russia: Some Observations, in: *Journal of the British Institute of International Affairs*, 5 (1926) 2, pp. 61-78; A. J. Haines, Health Work in Soviet Russia, New York 1928; A. Newsholme et al., Red Medicine: Socialized Health In Soviet Russia, London 1934; M. I. Roemer, Rural Health Programs in Different Nations, in: *The Millbank Memorial Fund Quarterly*, 26 (1948) 1, pp. 58-89, pp. 68-9; A. A. Troyanovsky, Progress in Medical Training and Research in the U.S.S.R., in: *Science*, 82 (1935) 16, pp. 137-42. On the monitoring of Russia by American experts, cf. D. C. Engerman, *Modernization from the Other Shore: American Intellectuals and the Romance of Russian Development*, Cambridge 2003.

4 L.F. Barker, Conditions (cf. note 2), pp. 5-7.

5 Ibid., pp. 20-22, pp. 25-29.

6 The phrase is credited to Wendell Phillips, cf. T. Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia, and China*, Cambridge 1979, p. 17.

tions, since communication of revolutionary goals is a key characteristic of all modern revolutions.



Figure 1:
A doctor-brigade visits a collectivized smallholding, Azerbaijan ca. 1930⁷

1. Revolution and revolutionaries

Revolutionary experience is not a privilege unique to modern man.⁸ Political upheaval is as old as political man himself. Nonetheless, in nowadays speaking of revolution we are referring to a phenomenon of modernity and using a concept whose current meaning was established as a result of the French Revolution.

Unfortunately, scholarship has often misunderstood the modernity of revolutions in seeking to encapsulate the manifold radical upheavals of the past in a single theory.⁹ There are important questions to be addressed: How do revolutions arise? How do they

7 Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Kinofotodokumentov Azerbaidzhanskoi Respubliki (GAKAR) [State Archive of the Republic of Azerbaijan for Cinema Documents] 2-6413.

8 R. Koselleck, *Revolution, Rebellion, Aufruhr, Bürgerkrieg*, in: O. Brunner et al. (eds), *Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe: Historisches Lexikon zur politisch-sozialen Sprache in Deutschland*, vol. 5, Stuttgart 1974, pp. 653-788, pp. 653-55.

9 Most recently: S. N. Eisenstadt, *Die großen Revolutionen und die Kulturen der Moderne*, Wiesbaden 2006; J. DeFronzo, *Revolutions and Revolutionary Movements*, Boulder ²1996; J. Dunn, *Modern Revolutions: An Introduction to the Analysis of a Political Phenomenon*, Cambridge ²1994; F. Halliday, *Revolution and World Politics: the Rise and Fall of the Sixth Great Power*, Durham 1999; N. R. Keddie, *Debating Revolutions*, New York 1995; J. Krejčí et al., *Great Revolutions Compared: The Outline of a Theory*, New York 1994.

unfold? Why they succeed in some places and fail in others? There is a wealth of historical material at hand, too: France in 1789, Russia in 1917, China in 1966, Iran in 1979 and eastern Europe in 1989.¹⁰ And the diachronic and intercultural method of comparison seems the royal road for theorisation of revolutions.

But travellers on this road have run the risk of going blind: in search of a *single* theory to explain *many* different revolutions, scholarship has not seldom lost sight of the revolutions and the revolutionaries.¹¹ “The peculiar ‘cultural’ traits [...] of the revolutionaries are very unlikely ever to tell us why a revolution occurred,” Timothy Wickham-Crowley wrote in the mid-1990s, when older theories of revolution were being revised in view of the revolutionary events in eastern Europe.¹² He defended the structuralist theory of revolution which inquired into the causes of revolutions, whose best-known proponent is Theda Skocpol. Back in the 1970s, Skocpol asserted that the activity and the intent of core groups do not make revolutionary processes comprehensible.¹³ To explain social revolutions it is necessary to examine the origins of revolutionary situations within the *ancien régime* and the objectively determined and complexly intertwined activities of various social groups, she wrote.¹⁴

In the 1980s, the structuralist theory of revolution came in for criticism. Beside the long-term causes and effects of the upheaval the revolutionary event had received insufficient consideration, Lynn Hunt argued in her classic study of the culture of the French Revolution.¹⁵ Revolutionaries’ programmes play a role in influencing the outcome of a revolution, even if this outcome is not generally contained within such programmes, she wrote. Hunt’s argument remains topical. “The focus needs to be on what options populations consider available to them when they seek redress of their grievances,” Eric Selbin wrote in the 1990s.¹⁶ He recommended an examination of the extent to which popular political culture and its instruments are able to keep alive and glorify people and processes which can serve as latent forms of empowerment. Radical upheavals, according to Selbin, are “made”, they do not just “come”.

10 A summary is provided in: S. N. Eisenstadt, *Revolutionen* (cf. note 9), pp. 11–2.

11 On theories of revolution, cf. J. DeFronzo, *Revolutions* (cf. note 9), pp. 22–5; J. Foran, Introduction, in: J. Foran (ed.), *Theorizing Revolutions*, London 1997, pp. 1–7; L. Hunt, *Politics, Culture, and Class in the French Revolution*, Berkeley 1984, pp. 3–10; N. R. Keddie, Introduction, in: N. R. Keddie (ed.), *Debating Revolutions*, New York 1995, pp. vii–xiii; T. P. Wickham-Crowley, *Structural Theories of Revolution*, in: J. Foran (ed.), *Theorizing Revolutions*, pp. 38–72, pp. 38–40.

12 *Ibid.*, p. 64.

13 T. Skocpol, *States* (footnote 7), p. 18; J. N. Wasserstrom, *Bringing Culture Back in and Other Caveats*, in: Keddie (ed.), *Debating Revolutions* (footnote 11), pp. 155–77, pp. 161–68.

14 On the Russian Revolution in the structuralist theory of revolution, cf. J. DeFronzo, *Revolutions and Revolutionary Movements* (footnote 9), pp. 29–71; J. Dunn, *Modern Revolutions* (footnote 9), pp. 24–47; J. Krejčí et al., *Great Revolutions Compared* (footnote 9), pp. 111–45; T. Skocpol, *States* (footnote 7), pp. 81–99, pp. 128–40, pp. 206–35.

15 L. Hunt, *Politics* (footnote 11), pp. 9–10; T. P. Wickham-Crowley, *Structural Theories of Revolution* (footnote 11), pp. 40–4.

16 E. Selbin, *Revolution in the Real World: Bringing Agency back in*, in: J. Foran (ed.), *Theorizing Revolutions* (footnote 11), pp. 123–36, p. 133; R. Lachmann, *Agents of Revolution: Elite Conflicts and Mass Mobilization from the Medici to Yeltsin*, in: J. Foran (ed.), *Theorizing Revolutions* (footnote 11), pp. 73–101, pp. 93–6.

In other words, the fact that historical actors attribute their own individual meaning to events and attempt to communicate this meaning opens up a field of research which enables theorisation of revolutions.

Historical writing on the Russian Revolution has passed through a similar developmental process.¹⁷ The scholarly literature which was produced close in time to 1917 gave broad scope to the revolutionary events and provided a narrative of the history of the revolution from the point of view of prominent historical actors. In the 1960s, historians began to be interested in social groups, institutions and structures. As a consequence, the revolution was pushed into the background in favour of its prehistory and consequences. The “cultural turn” occasioned a further paradigm shift. Historiography once again explored the world of the revolutionaries. It understood the revolution as a communicative act and granted increased attention to the revolutionaries’ various statements and public responses to these. The revolutionary struggle to occupy public space thus became a frequently examined subject.¹⁸

In this context, the present article investigates how Bolshevik public health experts in the Soviet Union of the interwar period linked concepts of hygiene with concepts of social order. It demonstrates how the “fight against epidemics” (*bor’ba s epidemiiami*) was gradually incorporated into the communication of revolutionary goals. The article initially outlines the rise of social hygiene to the position of a leading science within the field of regulatory policy in the European context. It subsequently considers early concepts of hygiene adopted by the first People’s Commissar for Public Health, Nikolai Semashko. The article finally examines how Semashko linked the categories of “hygiene” and “consciousness” in the late 1920s and outlines the measures which resulted from Semashko’s concepts.

This article maintains that the linkage of “hygiene” and “consciousness” was at the core of post-revolutionary hygiene policy in the Soviet Union of the 1930s. The overlapping nature of concepts of infectious disease and revolutionary order transformed the Bolshevik “struggle against epidemics” into a struggle for a new social order. The stylisation of the physician as educator and the enactment of specific disease-combating measures formed the cornerstones of a communicative act through which revolutionary society was made visible and established.

17 B. Bonwetsch, *Die Russische Revolution 1917: Eine Sozialgeschichte von der Bauernbefreiung 1861 bis zum Oktoberumsturz*, Darmstadt 1991, pp. 1–7; M. Hildermeier, *Die Russische Revolution, 1905–1921*, Frankfurt a.M. 1989, pp. 7–13; D. Koenker, *Moscow Workers and the 1917 Revolution*, Princeton 1981, pp. 3–11.

18 C. Chatterjee, *Celebrating Women: Gender, Festival Culture, and Bolshevik Ideology, 1910–1939*, Pittsburgh 2002; K. Clark, *Petersburg: Crucible of Cultural Revolution*, Cambridge 1995; M. David-Fox, *What is Cultural Revolution?*, in: *Russian Review*, 58 (1999) 2, pp. 181–201; O. Figes et al., *Interpreting the Russian Revolution: The Language and Symbols of 1917*, New Haven 1999; M. Rolf, *Das sowjetische Massenfest*, Hamburg 2006; K. Schlögel, *Jenseits des Großen Oktobers: Das Laboratorium der Moderne*, Petersburg 1909–21, Berlin 1988; M. Braun, „Sozial gesehen sind die Bauern wie Kinder“. Zwischen Didaktik, Repräsentation und Traditionalisierung: Der Erste Mai im zentralrussischen Dorf, in: *Journal of Modern European History* 4 (2006) 1, pp. 75–89.

2. European developments and Russian revolution

The Bolsheviks' concepts of hygiene are only comprehensible in the light of overall European developments. In the second half of the nineteenth century, the view gained currency amongst the governments of European nation-states that planned regulation of the health of entire populations was scientifically justified, administratively viable and politically desirable.¹⁹ Individuals, who had previously borne responsibility for their personal health, were now relieved of this concern by the state. The major epidemics of the nineteenth century and Europe's rapid urbanisation prompted by industrialisation promoted a blossoming European culture of preventative healthcare. State authorities and philanthropic associations began to make regulatory interventions into the everyday world of the lower classes.²⁰ The discipline of public health was born.

European nation-states promoted public health programmes based on economic, social and medical considerations. Manifold experience of epidemics, urbanisation and the medicalisation of social phenomena led to the re-formation of an old scientific complex: hygiene. The simultaneous admission to the field of science and popularisation of purity and cleanliness gave rise to a field of action where regulatory policy became conceivable and viable.²¹

Scientific mother disciplines determined which particular school of hygiene was acted upon at the political level. "Auslösungshygiene" ("Trigger hygiene") was based on the methods of a new leading discipline in the natural sciences, bacteriology, and led to an interventionist policy.²² Social hygiene – a healthcare science discipline which made do

- 19 P. Weindling, *From Germ Theory to Social Medicine: Public Health, 1880–1930*, in: D. Brunton (ed.), *Medicine Transformed: Health, Disease and Society in Europe, 1800–1930*, Manchester 2004, pp. 239–65; A. Bashford, *Imperial Hygiene: A Critical History of Colonialism, Nationalism and Public Health*, New York 2004; U. Frevert, *Krankheit als politisches Problem: Soziale Unterschichten in Preußen zwischen medizinischer Polizei und staatlicher Sozialversicherung*, Göttingen 1984; C. Hudemann-Simon, *Die Eroberung der Gesundheit, 1750–1900*, Frankfurt a./M. 2000; A. Labisch, *Homo Hygienicus: Gesundheit und Medizin in der Neuzeit*, Frankfurt a./M. 1992; J. Lane, *A Social History of Medicine: Health, Healing and Disease in England, 1750–1950*, New York 2001.
- 20 M.-P. Jungblut, *Öffentliche Gesundheitsvorsorge in Europa: Private Initiative und nationale Reglementierung*, in: M.-P. Jungblut et al. (eds), *Sei Sauber! Eine Geschichte der Hygiene und öffentlichen Gesundheitsvorsorge in Europa*, Cologne 2004, pp. 279–85; A. Labisch, *Doctors, Workers and the Scientific Cosmology of the Industrial World: The Social Construction of „Health“ and the „Homo Hygienicus“*, in: *Journal of Contemporary History*, 20 (1985) 4, pp. 599–615. On healthcare and welfare, cf. P. Baldwin, *The Politics of Social Solidarity: Class Bases of the European Welfare State 1875–1975*, Cambridge 1990; G. A. Ritter, *Der Sozialstaat: Entstehung und Entwicklung im internationalen Vergleich*, Munich 1991; A. D. Swaan, *In Care of the State: Health Care, Education and Welfare in Europe and the USA in the Modern Era*, Oxford 1988.
- 21 A. Labisch, *Sozialhygiene: Gesundheitswissenschaften und öffentliche Gesundheitssicherung in der zweiten Hälfte des 19. Jahrhunderts*, in: M.-P. Jungblut et al. (eds), *Sei Sauber!* (footnote 20), pp. 258–67, pp. 260–4; M.-P. Jungblut, *Öffentliche Gesundheitsvorsorge* (footnote 20), p. 283; R. J. Evans, *Tod in Hamburg: Stadt, Gesellschaft und Politik in den Cholera-Jahren 1830–1910*, Reinbek 1991, pp. 330–8; G. Rosen, *Approaches to a Concept of Social Medicine: A Historical Survey*, in: *The Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly*, 26 (1948) 1, pp. 7–21, pp. 9–15.
- 22 P. Sarasin et al., *Bakteriologie und Moderne*, in: P. Sarasin et al. (eds), *Bakteriologie und Moderne: Studien zur Biopolitik des Unsichtbaren, 1870–1920*, Frankfurt a./M. 2007, pp. 8–43, pp. 18–9; F. Delaporte (ed.), *A Vital Rationalist: Selected Writings from Georges Canguilhem*, New York 2000, p. 145; R. J. Evans, *Tod in Hamburg* (footnote 21), pp. 344–9.

without a grounding in the natural sciences – entailed preventative measures.²³ It used statistical methods to identify the causes of infectious diseases in the living conditions of population groups, bearing the promise that social change would enable biological regulation.

In the early twentieth century, the two doctrines determined European nation-states' concepts of hygiene.²⁴ Most scientists and public health experts considered both paradigms to be relevant: the existence of pathogens which could be isolated in the laboratory *and* their increased prevalence in the everyday worlds of the lower social classes. Any variations between national hygiene policies resulted from the differently weighted approaches pursued by healthcare administration agencies. At any rate, nation-states' hygiene policies largely coincided in terms of their objectives. As part of a comprehensive welfare system they sought the social pacification of poorer sections of the population and to preserve their capacity for work. The institutions implementing hygiene measures were concerned with the reorganisation of urban infrastructures as much as with quarantine measures. The democratisation and national movements of the 1910s provided a lasting stimulus toward the institutionalisation of the new hygiene approaches.²⁵

Urbanisation, industrialisation and the experience of epidemics also played a key role in the formulation of concepts of hygiene in the Tsarist empire. While the medical administration system initially developed out of the welfare system for the poor, in the nineteenth century hygiene moved centre-stage.²⁶ A large number of epidemics raised medical, economic and social issues. Cholera in particular had a key influence. Between 1823 and 1910 around five million people fell sick with cholera, two million of whom died the miserable *mort de chien*.²⁷ The reform of the Tsarist public health system during the Great Reforms of the 1860s was strongly influenced by the experience of cholera. The disease also dominated the dispute on hygiene policy between the Petersburg civil servants and the *zemstva*, the rural organs of self-administration established in 1864. The

23 D. Brunton, *Dealing with Disease in Populations*, in: D. Brunton (ed.), *Medicine Transformed: Health, Disease and Society in Europe, 1800–1930*, Manchester 2004, pp. 180–210, pp. 182–4; A. Labisch, *Homo Hygienicus* (footnote 19), pp. 146–7; A. Labisch, *Sozialhygiene* (footnote 21), pp. 263–4; G. Rosen, *Approaches* (footnote 21), p. 9; P. Weindling, *Germ Theory* (footnote 19), p. 250.

24 D. Brunton, *Disease* (footnote 19), p. 188; R. J. Evans, *Tod* (footnote 21), p. 638; J. Goudsblom, *Public Health and the Civilizing Process*, in: *The Milbank Quarterly*, 64 (1986) 2, pp. 160–88, p. 182; C. Hudemann-Simon, *Eroberung* (footnote 19), p. 230; P. Weindling, *Germ Theory* (footnote 19), p. 250.

25 *Ibid.*, p. 259.

26 W. Benecke, *Militär, Reform und Gesellschaft im Zarenreich: Die Wehrpflicht in Russland, 1874–1914*, Paderborn 2006, pp. 119–126; H. Jahn, *Health Care and Poor Relief in Russia, 1700–1856*, in: A. Cunningham et al. (eds), *Health Care and Poor Relief in 18th and 19th Century Northern Europe*, Aldershot 2002, pp. 157–71, pp. 168–9.

27 K. A. Bogdanov, *Vrachi, patsienty, chitateli: patograficheskie teksty russkoi kul'tury XVIII–XIX vekov* [Doctors, Patients, Readers: Pathographic Texts of Russian Culture of the 18th and 19th Centuries], Moscow 2005, p. 345; E.I. Lotova, *Russkaia intelligentsiia i voprosy obshchestvennoy gigieny: pervoe gigienicheskoe obshchestvo v Rossii* [The Russian Intelligentsia and Questions of Social Hygiene: The First Hygiene Society in Russia], Moscow 1962, p. 51. The “dog’s death” characterised perceptions of cholera in 19th-century Europe, in contrast to the “beautiful death” described in the Romantic literature, cf. K. A. Bogdanov, *Vrachi* (footnote 27), p. 376; R. J. Evans, *Tod* (footnote 21), pp. 296–9.

zemstva generally favoured a local approach in combating epidemics, while the Petersburg civil servants preferred centralization.²⁸

Politics and science overlapped in the disputes on hygiene policy between Petersburg civil servants and local *zemstvo* medics. The learned argument on the causes of diseases which reached its summit before the turn of the century influenced important political decisions. The miasma theory – which had characterized thinking on prophylactic hygiene since antiquity – was challenged by bacteriology from the 1880s onwards. While the miasma theory assumed that the causes of infectious diseases lay in harmful soil vapours, bacteriology established the existence of pathogenic microorganisms.²⁹ The *zemstvo* medics initially tended to favour the miasma theory, but abandoned their scepticism regarding bacteriology when they recognized that the principle of local prophylaxis could be reconciled with the doctrines of the new science. As a result of their rivalry with the *zemstva* the Petersburg civil servants accepted bacteriology only hesitantly.³⁰ When they saw during the revolution of 1905 how the *zemstvo* medics formed a hotbed of political opposition to the tsar's rule, they drew back from active support of bacteriology. The final, doomed attempt to establish a central health authority in Petersburg had to make do without the bacteriologists' expertise.³¹ In Tsarist Russia it was left to a dedicated public and private donors to provide public forums and scientific institutions for bacteriology.³²

The dispute between bacteriologists and miasma theorists, between the supporters of preventative and interventionist policies, between local and centralized hygiene unfolded in an international arena, too. The Tsarist empire's public health policy was linked with the discussions unfolding in other European states. Russian hygiene experts and health officials were integrated in a European network.³³ In 1886, the world's second bacteriological research institute after Paris was established in Odessa. Philanthropic societies sponsored the training of Russian scientists in western European cities. In 1897, Petersburg responded to international agreements through the establishment of a government commission "for the prevention of and the fight against plague". Moreover, individuals who would later become people's commissars for public health acquired experience in

28 J. F. Hutchinson, *Politics and Public Health in Revolutionary Russia, 1890–1918*, Baltimore 1990, pp. 4–9, pp. 50–77; M.B. Mirskii, *Meditsina Rossii X–XX vekov: ocherki istorii* [Medicine in Russia from the 10th to 20th Centuries: Historical Essays], Moscow 2005, pp. 306–26; A. P. Zhuk, *Razvitie obshchestvenno-meditsinskoi mysli v 60–70 gg. XIX veka* [The Development of Social-Medical Thought in the 1860–1870s], Moscow 1963, pp. 92–109.

29 R. J. Evans, *Tod* (footnote 21), pp. 307–9, pp. 312–4, pp. 344–9; P. Sarasin et al., *Bakteriologie* (footnote 22), pp. 18–9.

30 J. F. Hutchinson, *Politics* (footnote 28), pp. 35–38, pp. 43–9; K. A. Bogdanov, *Vrachi* (footnote 27), pp. 403–4.

31 J. F. Hutchinson, *Politics* (footnote 28), pp. 78–107.

32 E. A. Hachten, *In Service to Science and Society: Scientists and the Public in Late-Nineteenth-Century Russia*, in: *Osiris*, 17 (2002), pp. 171–209, pp. 196–207; J. K. Pratt, *The Free Economic Society and the Battle against Smallpox: A "Public Sphere" in Action*, in: *Russian Review*, 61 (2002) 4, pp. 560–78, pp. 576–8. For an opposing view, cf. A. Melikishvili, *Genesis of the Anti-Plague System: The Tsarist Period*, in: *Critical Reviews in Microbiology*, 32 (2006), pp. 19–31, pp. 27–30.

33 E. I. Lotova et al., *Bor'ba s infektsionnymi bolezniami v SSSR 1917–1967* [The Fight against Infectious Diseases in the USSR, 1917–1967], Moscow 1967, p. 21, p. 27; E. A. Hachten, *Service* (footnote 32), pp. 196–207.

western Europe.³⁴ Nikolai Semashko and Mikhail Vladimirskii numbered among the Russian revolutionaries who had been acquainted both with the Tsarist secret police and the waiters of European coffeehouses. During his time in exile Semashko read the German authors of social hygiene, while Vladimirskii worked in French hospitals. “There is no less nonsense [in the healthcare system] here than in our country,” the latter wrote to his wife in a letter from French exile.³⁵

3. Hygiene and revolution

The history of the implementation of Bolshevik hygiene concepts began in 1918. In July of that year the Council of People’s Commissars established the People’s Commissariat for Public Health (*Narkomzdrav*). It was Lenin who appointed his companion in exile of many years, Nikolai Semashko, to manage this body. Lenin and Semashko had got to know one another in 1908 in Geneva³⁶ and forged a close political and personal relationship in Switzerland. Lenin had helped Semashko when the doctor had been accused of involvement in a spectacular armed robbery in Tbilisi, Georgia.³⁷ Semashko had subsequently accompanied his role model on cycling tours around Lake Geneva and temporarily managed the exiled revolutionaries’ war funds. After Lenin suffered several strokes in 1922 it was Semashko who looked after the medical supervision of the ailing leader of the revolution.³⁸ Semashko remained a loyal disciple of Lenin to the end of his life, expressing this in many writings.

The new health commissar was immediately granted the opportunity to prove his mettle, since his authority had been established in the face of raging epidemics. Following the breakup of the Tsarist government the Russian empire had not only descended into the chaos of a civil war, it had also provided fertile soil for bacteria and viruses. Cholera and typhus claimed many victims amid conditions of military conflict and ethnic violence, flight and expulsion.³⁹ Considerably more than two million people suffered from typhus in 1919 and 1920. A cholera epidemic peaked in 1921 with almost 200,000 sufferers. In the years immediately after the Bolshevik revolution, the health commissariat received

34 H. Harmsen, Semashko, der Schöpfer des neuen Gesundheitswesens Sowjetrusslands in seiner geschichtlichen Abhängigkeit und Bedeutung [Semashko, the Creator of the New Healthcare System of Soviet Russia: His Historical Context and Meaning], Hamburg 1962, pp. 14–15; Anonymous, Semashko, Bol’shaia Sovetskaia Entsiklopedia [Large Soviet Encyclopaedia], vol. 50, Moscow 1944, p. 738; E. D. Petrov, Semashko, Bol’shaia Sovetskaia Entsiklopedia, vol. 23, Moscow 1976, p. 659; I. A. Slonimskaia, M. F. Vladimirskii, Moscow 1967, pp. 20–23.

35 I. A. Slonimskaia, Vladimirskii (footnote 34), p. 21.

36 H. Harmsen, Schöpfer (footnote 34), p. 14.

37 Ibid., p. 14; S. S. Montefiore, Der junge Stalin, Frankfurt a./M. 2007, pp. 33–49.

38 L. Fischer, The life of Lenin, London 2001, pp. 597–600; R. Service, Lenin: eine Biographie, Munich 2000, pp. 571–73; D. A. Volkogonov, Lenin: Utopie und Terror, Düsseldorf 1994, pp. 481–497.

39 E. I. Lotova et al., Bor’ba (footnote 33), pp. 63–77; G. N. Sevostianov et al., Sovershenno sekretno: Lubianka – Stalinu o polozenii v strane, 1922–1934 gg. [Top Secret: Lubianka to Stalin on the State of the Nation, 1922–1934], vol. 10, Moscow 2001, p. 97, p. 99, p. 100, pp. 104–5, p. 110, p. 113, p. 117, pp. 118–9, p. 134, pp. 144–5, p. 162; N. B. Weissman, Origins of Soviet Health Administration, in: S. G. Solomon et al. (eds), Health and Society in Revolutionary Russia, Bloomington 1990, pp. 97–120, p. 102.

dozens of reports each month of outbreaks of epidemics. Unsurprisingly, the only disease mentioned by name in the founding document of the new People's Commissariat for Public Health was an infectious one: cholera.⁴⁰ Hygiene thus became a central field of action for Semashko. "Either the lice will vanquish socialism, or socialism will vanquish the lice," ran a slogan of the period.⁴¹

Of the various schools of hygiene Semashko clearly favoured social hygiene. In theoretical pamphlets and practical directives the people's commissar referred to western European role models, mainly German ones.⁴² He made use of the discoveries of bacteriology as naturally as he quoted from the writings of German social hygienists. It was only the German fascination for race and heredity which he did not share. Western Europe had a dual significance in Semashko's world. On the one hand, western Europe's hygiene literature provided the people's commissar with intellectually usable insights and ideas. On the other, Semashko used the western European nation-states as a foil for his development of the Bolshevik healthcare system.

Semashko expected the ideas of social hygiene to provide the key contribution in the fight against disease. He subscribed to the view that the regulation of public health required interventions more in terms of social policy than of natural science. He wrote:

*The relationship between capitalist exploitation and the frequency with which those exploited succumb to illness can be demonstrated for all illnesses; but it is markedly clear [...] in the case of the infectious diseases.*⁴³

Semashko here cites the argument of the social hygienists for whom the occurrence of disease was associated with the living conditions of lower social classes. The lower a person's social status, the greater the probability of illness. In addition, the people's commissar considered the relationship between poverty and illness to be a characteristic of capitalism. In his view, the biological and the social were linked in capitalist society to the detriment of the poor.

It was the nature of this linkage which made poverty and resulting illness appear avoidable. The doctrines of social hygiene not only pointed out the problem, they also indicated a solution: combating poverty meant doing something against disease. Semashko wrote:

*We define social hygiene as a discipline which examines the harmful influence of social factors on the health of the population as a whole and of individual groups and which elaborates practical measures to eliminate or reduce the influence of social factors.*⁴⁴

40 Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Rooskiiskoi Respubliki (GARF), f. 130, op. 2, d. 66, ll. 108.

41 W. I. Lenin, "Politischer Bericht des Gesamtrussischen Zentralexekutivkomitees und des Rates der Volkskommissare", 5. Dezember 1919, in: Lenin: Werke, vol. 30, Berlin 1961, pp. 195-224, p. 217.

42 S. G. Solomon, Social Hygiene and Soviet Public Health, 1921-1930, in: S. G. Solomon et al. (eds), Health and Society (footnote 39), pp. 175-199, p. 178; G. Rosen, Approaches (footnote 21), p. 18. On Semashko's publications, cf. I. A. Slonimskaja et al., Ukazatel' pechatnykh rabot Nikolaia Aleksandrovicha Semashko [A Guide to the Printed Works of Nikolai Aleksandrovich Semashko], Moscow 1947.

43 N. A. Semashko, Osnovy sovetskoi meditsiny [The Foundations of Soviet Medicine], Baku 1920, p. 3.

44 N. A. Semashko, Politika sovetskoi vlasti i sotsial'naiia gigiena, 1927 [The Politics of Soviet Power and Social Hy-

The people's commissar saw social hygiene as a discipline which collected knowledge of the living conditions of groups and used this knowledge to draw up practical measures to combat disease. In other words, social hygiene made the biological a function of the social.

Where disease was thus linked with social order, it was clear to Semashko that infectious disease should be combated by means of social regulation. The people's commissar assumed that the goals of social hygiene could only be realized through fundamental social change. He wrote:

*Neither in Europe nor in Russia have doctors drawn the obvious conclusion: [...] whichever basic requirement of 'social hygiene' one takes, one always reaches the same conclusion: it can only be fully realized through the conditions of the communist system.*⁴⁵

In the first few years following the revolution Semashko's concept of hygiene was characterized by an assumption that the social change which overcame the capitalist model would, as it were, inevitably lead to reduced incidence of infectious diseases. In his view, the promises of social hygiene could only be fulfilled by means of a revolution. Yet the people's commissar later realized that the abolition of capitalism would not inevitably mean the end of disease. From the mid-1920s a reconceptualisation of Bolshevik disease policy is evident.

4. Hygiene and consciousness

4.1 Semashko's people's commissariat

Semashko's early concept of hygiene was frustrated by reality. While the people's commissar daydreamed of society being returned to good health as a result of the revolution, his ministry was faced with coping with hygiene crises and resisting political intrigues. The People's Commissariat for Public Health was forced to defend itself against attacks from other commissariats. The Commissariat for Labour in particular campaigned against Semashko's ideas. The opponents of social hygiene – the supporters of insurance-based medicine – had assembled in *Narkomtrud*. They demanded a healthcare system which privileged workers over other professional groups,⁴⁶ and wanted the Soviet healthcare system to benefit not those who were considered “poor” but those who worked. They spoke out in favour of making access to medical care dependent on class membership, citing the revolutionary tradition of the proletarian insurance movement and the fact that the insurance funds were one of the key sources of financial resources for the Soviet

giene, 1927], in: N.A. Semashko (ed.), *Izbrannye proizvedeniia* [Selected Works], Moscow 1967, pp. 135–144, quote on p. 135.

45 N. A. Semashko, *Osnovy* (footnote 43), pp. 7–8.

46 S. Ewing, *The Science and Politics of Soviet Insurance Medicine*, in: S. G. Solomon et al. (eds), *Health and Society* (footnote 39), pp. 69–96, pp. 77–84.

healthcare system in the 1920s.⁴⁷ Semashko emerged victorious from the ministries' intrigues. The commissar for public health largely succeeded in preventing the emergence of a class-based medical system. He defended his ministry's prerogative to manage medical facilities and – even more importantly – to use his own criteria for the allocation of income from the insurance funds. Where Semashko referred to the benefits of “uniform management” of the healthcare system⁴⁸ and mentioned the “workers’ outstanding role”⁴⁹ in this system, this was to be understood as a response to the insurance medicine concept.

However, in the 1920s the financial resources of the People's Commissariat for Public Health were not sufficient for the establishment of efficient structures in the regions. When the Moscow headquarters entirely discontinued its financing of the regional offices in 1922, the weak regional structure completely fell apart.⁵⁰ The medical profession also created difficulties for the people's commissar. Russian medics, who generally preferred a locally based hygiene policy, resisted centralisation.⁵¹ Following a doctors' congress in 1922 Semashko found himself compelled to ask Lenin to support him against the rebellious medics.⁵² The people's commissar was only granted his chair for social hygiene at the medical faculty of Moscow university in the teeth of resistance from his professorial colleagues. He subsequently taught students but these new experts were mocked as “specialists for bazaars, backyards and toilets”.⁵³ Social hygiene had a poor reputation, due to its institutional weakness and to the fact that its representatives frequently researched

47 In the period from 1924 to 1930 the workers' insurance funds contributed 40 to 50 per cent of the overall healthcare budget of the Soviet Union, cf. C. Davis, *Economic Problems of the Soviet Health Service: 1917–1930*, in: *Soviet Studies*, 35 (1983) 3, pp. 343–61, p. 348; C. Davis, *Zur Ökonomie des sowjetischen Gesundheitssystems: I. Ökonomische Probleme des Sowjetischen Gesundheitsdienstes, 1917–1930. II. Die Ökonomie des sowjetischen Gesundheitssystems, 1965–1980*, in: *Berichte des Osteuropa-Instituts an der Freien Universität Berlin*, vol. 134, Berlin 1984.

48 N. A. Semashko, *Osnovy* (footnote 43), pp. 11–5; N. A. Semashko et al., *Rabotnitsa i krest'ianka, beregi zdorov'e!* [Female Peasants and Workers, Take Care of Your Health!], Moscow 1928, pp. 9–12; N. A. Semashko, *Ocherki po teorii organizatsii sovetskogo zdavookhraneniia* [“Essays on the Organisational Theory of Soviet Healthcare”], in: N. A. Semashko (ed.), *Izbrannye proizvedeniia* [Selected Works], Moscow 1967, pp. 55–96, pp. 59–61.

49 N. A. Semashko, *Nauka o zdorov'e obshchestva (sotsial'naia gigiena): rukovodstvo dlia prepodavatelei shkol 2-oj stupeni i dlia samoobrazovaniia* [The Science of Social Health (Social Hygiene): A Guide for Second-Division School Teachers and for Self-Education], Moscow 1922, pp. 49–53; N. A. Semashko et al., *Rabotnitsa i krest'ianka* (footnote 48), pp. 22–25; N. A. Semashko, *Ocherki* (footnote 48), pp. 84–7.

50 E. I. Lotova et al., *Bor'ba* (footnote 33), pp. 125–140; N. B. Weissman, *Origins* (footnote 39), p. 108. The workers' insurance funds exploited the desperate situation in the regions for their own advantage, cf. S. Ewing, *Science* (footnote 46), p. 80. The organisation of a regional healthcare system was one of the issues most discussed by healthcare administrators in the 1920s, cf. S. D. Gribanov, *Vserossiiskie s'ezdy zdavotdelov i ikh znachenie dlia praktiki sovetskogo zdavookhraneniia* [All-Russian Conferences of Health Departments and their Meaning for Soviet Healthcare], Moscow 1966, pp. 184–9.

51 N. B. Weissman, *Origins* (footnote 39), p. 101; S. G. Solomon, *Social Hygiene* (footnote 42), p. 190; D. A. Volkogonov, *Lenin* (footnote 38), p. 385.

52 *Ibid.*, p. 385.

53 H. Harmsen, *Schöpfer* (footnote 34), p. 35; S. G. Solomon, *Social Hygiene* (footnote 42), p. 190; N. B. Weissman, *Origins* (footnote 39), p. 115.

politically sensitive topics. At the periphery, the hygiene initiatives were in any case seen as a necessary political tribute to the centre.⁵⁴

In this context Semashko reformulated his concept of hygiene, abandoning the idea that the revolution would make everything better. The people's commissar began to seek a new model which better reflected reality. He found points of departure in two developments in the late 1920s. First of all, the concept of "cultural revolution" was given a new, missionary meaning. Secondly, the Bolshevik leadership began to urge a confrontational solution to the "peasant question".

The complex of issues surrounding "culture and revolution" underwent reinterpretation from the mid-1920s onwards. Bolsheviks now referring to "cultural revolution" used the phrase to express the need for the forced civilisation of population groups at odds with the revolution.⁵⁵ The targets of the new imperative were those whom the Bolsheviks deemed thus far to have remained aloof from the revolutionary events: peasants, women and the national minorities. The Bolsheviks considered that these groups now required external prompting to encourage their affiliation with revolutionary goals.⁵⁶ To raise the cultural level of all, it was necessary to deal with those who had failed to keep abreast of developments. Simultaneously with the new understanding of cultural revolution a language developed which communicated the sense of backwardness prevailing in the language of hygiene.⁵⁷ The concepts of hygiene expanded into realms where political and cultural deviations were discussed. Cultural deficiency and illness became synonyms.

At about the same time, a new tone also held sway in the "peasant question" which had kept the Bolshevik leadership continually on its toes since the revolution. The peasant-friendly "Facing the village" ("Litsom k derevne") policy was largely abandoned in late 1925 after just one year.⁵⁸ Under the growing influence of Stalin and his circle, economic policy sought to achieve forced industrialisation at the expense of the village.⁵⁹ The collectivisation programmes which had briefly been forgotten were back on the table. The party leadership adopted a class-based policy in its dealings with the rural population. The dynamism which the process assumed resulted not least from the pathological aversion which the leading Bolsheviks felt towards the peasant milieu from which they them-

54 S. G. Solomon, *Social Hygiene* (footnote 42), pp. 191–2; N. B. Weissman, *Origins* (footnote 39), p. 115.

55 M. David-Fox, *Cultural Revolution* (footnote 18), p. 191.

56 The entry for "social hygiene" in the first edition of the *Large Soviet Encyclopaedia* emphasises the importance of social hygiene for the cultural development of a country: Anonymous, *Gigiena sotsial'naia, Bol'shaia Sovetskaia Entsiklopediia*, vol. 16, Moscow 1929, pp. 609–19, p. 613.

57 M. David-Fox, *Cultural Revolution* (footnote 18), p. 193, p. 196; A. Weiner, *Nature, Nurture, and Memory in a Socialist Utopia: Delineating the Soviet-Socio-Ethnic Body in the Age of Socialism*, in: *The American Historical Review*, 104 (1999) 4, pp. 1114–55, p. 1121.

58 Cf. M. Wehner, *Bauernpolitik im proletarischen Staat: die Bauernfrage als zentrales Problem der sowjetischen Innenpolitik, 1921–1928*, Cologne 1998, p. 265; J. W. Heinzen, *Inventing a Soviet countryside: state power and the transformation of rural Russia, 1917–1929*, Pittsburgh 2004; S. Merl, *Sowjetmacht und Bauern: Dokumente zur Agrarpolitik und zur Entwicklung der Landwirtschaft während des Kriegskommunismus und der Neuen Ökonomischen Politik*, Berlin 1993.

59 M. Wehner, *Bauernpolitik* (footnote 58), pp. 363–6.

selves derived.⁶⁰ In their eyes, the “backward” village and its “uneducated” and “dirty” inhabitants represented an obstacle to the establishment of the Soviet Union.

4.2 Semashko’s turning-point

In this context Semashko reconceptualized his views. In 1927, he published a brochure summing up the Bolshevik healthcare measures in which he medicalized deviant behaviour with reference to the example of the village:

*The issue of restoring health to the village leads to the issue of restoring health to the way of life [...] Restoring health to the rural population’s old, unhealthy way of life – which in many respects is that of their great-grandfathers – will be one of the most important tasks for the Soviet healthcare system.*⁶¹

While in the early 1920s Semashko had referred to “social factors”, he now cited “ways of life”. The biological no longer appeared to be a function of the social, but of culturally determined forms of behaviour. The formulae “ill equals cultureless” and “healthy equals culturally rich” provided the framework for the new semantic structure.⁶²

However, the reference to the social did not disappear outright. Semashko merely placed it in a different context. What was the relationship between the social and culture? In his brochure “For a healthy village”, which was also published in 1927, Semashko wrote:

*It is true that poverty frequently prevents things from being resolved [...] as they should be. This is why the number of illnesses and deaths among poor peasants is far higher than among rich ones. But it is also true that poverty is often referred to even where this is not the cause. Poor people in particular must give heed to cleanliness and tidiness.*⁶³

The people’s commissar stuck to the view that poverty caused illness. The biological and the social remained linked. But Semashko added a new component to the formula, the view that “social factors” were not a sufficient cause of an “unhealthy way of life”. Those who were poor had to prove their willingness to adopt the Bolshevik way of life.

The key phrase marking this conceptual shift was “consciousness”. In his brochure “For a healthy village” Semashko thus also remarked: “Illness and death very frequently spread due to false consciousness, owing to the darkness in which the peasants live.”⁶⁴

The people’s commissar established a causal chain in which illness originated in “false” consciousness which in turn resulted from insufficient education. Those who adjusted their way of life in line with the requirements of the revolution would attain true con-

60 J. Baberowski, *Der Feind ist überall: Stalinismus im Kaukasus*, Munich 2003, pp. 669–670.

61 D. Gorfin, *Okhrana zdorov’ia krest’ianstva za desiat’ let* [“Peasant Healthcare Ten Years On”], in: N.A. Semashko (ed.), *Desiat’ let oktiabria i Sovetskaia meditsina* [Ten Years of October and Soviet Medicine], Moscow 1927, pp. 89–144, p. 129.

62 “An unhealthy way of life is not culturally rich”, Semashko wrote, cf. N. A. Semashko, *O svetlom i temnom v rabochem bytu* [On the Radiant and Benighted Aspects of the Worker’s Life], Moscow 1928, pp. 46–7.

63 N. A. Semashko, *Za zdorovuiu derevniu* [For a Healthy Village], Moscow: Narkomzdrav RSFSR, 1927, pp. 11–13.

64 *Ibid.*, p. 24.

sciousness. This meant that illness no longer lurked where the social goals of the revolution had been missed and was instead to be found where individuals refused to undergo a process of transformation and purification.

The new concept also produced new tasks for the healthcare system, which was to provoke, monitor and verify the individual's change of consciousness. Semashko wrote: "As we see, by and large education represents the royal road to the peasants' health. Health illiteracy requires liquidation in the same way as illiteracy in general."⁶⁵

He assigned to hygiene experts the task of encouraging the transformation of the peasants' consciousness. Where they were successful, this produced what Semashko called "hygiene literacy".⁶⁶ The people's commissar thus aligned the healthcare system with other institutions which had taken up the cause of civilising the Russian village and non-Russian ethnic groups.

Semashko largely prevailed with his ideas of social hygiene in the 1920s. While they remained controversial in the administrative institutions and the universities, the health commissar often enough managed to weave the right plot at the right moment. But Stalin's assumption of power spelled his political doom, for which an internal factional dispute within the ministry provided the occasion.⁶⁷ At several planning conferences between April 1928 and January 1930 the People's Commissariat for Public Health drew up a Five-Year Plan. During the deliberations open conflict broke out between the adherents of social hygiene and the proponents of a class-oriented healthcare system.

Semashko sought to achieve a moderate and even widening of medical care in line with expected requirements and available resources. His critics argued in favour of rapid expansion wherever collectivisation of agriculture and industrialisation of the economy were underway. They wished to achieve a system of medical care benefiting the population groups integrated in the Bolsheviks' industrialisation and collectivisation programme. Semashko's antagonists triumphed in this dispute⁶⁸ and in January of the following year Semashko lost his post.

4.3 Semashko's successor

Semashko's successor was Mikhail Vladimirkii,⁶⁹ a qualified doctor who had spent the 1920s working for the secret service as well as the state planning and party control departments and was seen as one of Stalin's men. On assuming office, in several brochures he outlined his hygiene policy, the key feature of which was its compatibility with the

65 Ibid., p. 26.

66 For a detailed definition, cf. N. A. Semashko et al., *Rabotnitsa i krest'ianka* (footnote 48), pp. 30–31.

67 C. M. Davis, *Economics of Soviet Public Health, 1928–1932*, in: S. G. Solomon et al. (eds), *Health and Society in Revolutionary Russia*, Bloomington 1990, pp. 146–72, p. 147; C. M. Davis, *Economic Problems* (footnote 47), p. 354.

68 C. M. Davis, *Economic Problems* (footnote 47), p. 355.

69 I. A. Slonimskaia, Vladimirkii (footnote 34), p. 23–29; C. M. Davis, *Economics* (footnote 67), p. 156; C. M. Davis, *Economic Problems* (footnote 47), p. 356. Semashko survived the purges of the 1930s at university, cf. H. Harmsen, Schöpfer (footnote 34), pp. 38–9; S. G. Solomon, *Social Hygiene* (footnote 42), p. 189.

exigencies of forced industrialisation. In a brochure on “The next tasks for the public health system” the health commissar wrote in 1930:

*Amongst the means for improving production and all the resources for building socialism we have a rich and scarcely used means for increasing work productivity and decreasing prime costs: the reduction of the frequency of illness among industrial workers.*⁷⁰

Vladimirskii linked the goals of the healthcare system with those of the economy. His hygiene agenda placed “improving health” in the service of “improving production”. Vladimirskii was only secondarily interested in illness as a consequence of “social factors” or “false consciousness”.

But the newly appointed commissar did not fully break with his predecessor’s concept and borrowed key elements of this, with the linkage between illness and culture among the most significant. Vladimirskii wrote:

*[T]he reorganisation of the economy, the establishment of new areas of industry, the growth in enterprises with large numbers of employees [mean that] increasingly the healthcare system not only forms part of the cultural revolution unfolding in the country but is also significant as an economic factor [...] Improvements in workers’ health primarily require the implementation of broad culturo-social, health-promoting hygiene measures.*⁷¹

The new health commissar continued to emphasize the healthcare system’s cultural significance. He still linked hygienisation with cultural change. The transformation of people’s consciousness remained an objective.

Yet Vladimirskii maintained that hygiene measures should be restricted to core groups. In his brochure “Public Health on the Road to Production” he wrote:

*Broad-based sanitary and hygiene work in factories, the fight against dirt in workers’ apartments and hostels, the fight for cleanliness in public dining establishments should be assigned a key role in the work of the healthcare authorities.*⁷²

Vladimirskii focused his ministry’s activities on the work and living quarters of those included in the Bolshevik programme. For example, this was reflected in the rationing of access to the public healthcare services:⁷³ access to free medical care was to be limited to workers and collectivized peasants.

70 M. Vladimirskii, *Ocherednye zadachi zdavookhraneniia* [The Next Tasks for the Healthcare System], Moscow 1930, p. 10.

71 Ibid., pp. 13–4.

72 M. Vladimirskii, *Zdavookhranenie na puti k proizvodstvu* [Healthcare on the Road to Production], Moscow ²1931, p. 8.

73 C. M. Davis, *Economic Problems* (footnote 47), p. 356.

5. Doctors and educators

The people's commissar Semashko did not survive the era of the great turning-point (*velikii perelom*), with the Stalinist “revolution from above” costing him his office. However, concepts of hygiene under his successor Mikhail Vladimirskii remained linked with the struggle for a revolutionary consciousness. The example of the Transcaucasian Soviet Republic of Azerbaijan illustrates that issues of hygiene were always linked with negotiations over the revolutionary order.

In Azerbaijan a new generation of doctors graduated from the republic's medical faculties in the years of the First Five Year Plan. They formed a social group which communicated the Bolsheviks' concepts of hygiene at the southern periphery. The number of doctors trained at state universities increased ten times over in the period between 1926 and 1957.⁷⁴ The number of medical institutions under the supervision of the People's Commissariat for Public Health likewise multiplied. The doctors' professional self-image was essentially based on the role of communicator which Semashko had envisaged. The official concept for their work was described in a large number of brochures and articles in the early 1930s.

Medical personnel in the village are to be a source of knowledge on healthy living [...] a source of basic knowledge on the rational, hygienic way of life and proper notions as regards the ideas of biology,

the magazine *Kul'turnyi front* stated in January 1930, for instance.⁷⁵ And this was true not only at the peak of the Cultural Revolution. The doctor as educator remained a frequently-cited metaphor up to the end of the decade. The country physician performing his service in the village was at the “front of cultural construction,” the newspaper *Bakinskii rabochii* noted as late as 1937.⁷⁶ According to the paper, the country physician not only healed, but also “taught the peasants to lead a new life”. He travelled to the villages and *kolkhozy* where he dealt with the “smallest details of rural life”. His “preeminent task” was the “fight against superstition”. It was thus a young generation of doctors who, through their contact with the population, opened up communicative spaces where a revolutionary order was negotiated by raising issues of hygiene.

The doctor-educators fulfilled their assigned duty by organizing campaigns. Initially, however, the struggle for hygiene was a war of images. Even before 1917 revolution posters had played an important role in the dissemination of the Bolsheviks' revolutionary programme.

74 M. A. Ibragimov, *Zdravookhranenie sovetskogo Azerbaidzhana* [Healthcare in Soviet Azerbaijan], Moscow 1967, p. 153; Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Azerbaidzhanskoi Respubliki (GAAR) [State Archive of the Republic of Azerbaijan] f. 57, op. 1, d. 1193, l. 100 (Svedeniia o sostave uchebnykh zavedeniia AzSSR, 1935).

75 B. M. Bekker, *Uchitel' i vrach na fronte kul'turnogo stroitel'stva derevni* [The Teacher and Doctor on the Front of Cultural Construction in the Village], in: *Kul'turnyi front*, 1 (1930), pp. 43–7, p. 44.

76 Anonymous, *Sovetskii vrach* [The Soviet Doctor], in: *Bakinskii rabochii* [The Baku worker], May 17, 1937, p. 1; Anonymous, *Sel'skii vrach* [The Country Doctor], in: *Bakinskii rabochii*, August 5, 1940, p. 1.

In general, the peasants, just like the workers in their mass, think much more in terms of images than abstract formulas; and visual illustration, even when a high level of literacy is reached, will always play a major role for the peasant,

Nadezhda Krupskaya, an icon of the early years of the revolution, had commented on the use of images.⁷⁷ She had justified her opinion with reference to the need to communicate revolutionary messages to a largely illiterate and in many cases non-Russian-speaking population. While the volume of posters published had fallen during the period of the New Economic Policy, it reached new peaks during the First Five Year Plan and the Cultural Revolution.⁷⁸ The numbers remained high in the 1930s, with important posters produced in runs of 100,000 to 250,000 copies. Posters were widely distributed in Azerbaijan too.⁷⁹

Hygiene posters addressed the issue of transforming consciousness. They promoted “correct” consciousness as the acknowledgment of scientific and medical authority and as a self-commitment to maintain the health of one’s own body as well as of society at large.⁸⁰ Hygiene posters also visualized the opposition between old and new ways of life by contrasting darkness and light and “below” and “above”. The iconography of the 1920s thereby differed from that of the 1930s: while early hygiene posters staged the opposition between the old and new orders, later ones anticipated an imagined disease-free and hygienic future.⁸¹

However, visual representations of revolutionary order were only effective where they were communicated with mass appeal. The key instrument of communication for the Azerbaijani doctor-educators of the 1930s were the campaigns which temporarily foregrounded issues enabling public staging of the relationship between hygiene and revolution.

One of the most important campaigns initiated by the Azerbaijani Council of People’s Commissars (*sovet narodnykh komissarov*) was the “Months of the Fight against Malaria” (*mesiachniki po bor’be s malariiei*).⁸² The campaigns were organized by a central malaria committee consisting of the People’s Commissar for Public Health, representatives of the *Gosplan* planning ministry and scientists. It called for strong action in the summer months against the malaria vector, the *Anopheles* mosquito. Ponds were to be filled in,

77 V. E. Bonnell, *Iconography of Power: Soviet Political Posters under Lenin and Stalin*, Berkeley 1999, p. 5.

78 Ibid., p. 6; R. Rosenthal, *Visual Fiction: The Development of the Secular Icon in Stalinist Poster Art* in: *Zhe, 1* (2005) Spring, pp. 1-13, pp. 3-4.

79 GAKAR (cf. footnote 6) 100231; GAKAR 100171; GAKAR 2200; GAKAR 2226; GAKAR 2227; GAAR (cf. footnote 74) f. 57, op. 1, d. 1258, l. 20 (Protokol’ zasedanii zavov u massovnikov krasnykh palatok pri upravlenii klubov i izbital’n Narkomprosa AzSSR, 31.5.1938).

80 F. L. Bernstein, *The “Dictatorship of Sex”: Lifestyle Advice for the Soviet Masses*, DeKalb 2007, pp. 106-28.

81 V. E. Bonnell, *Iconography* (footnote 77), pp. 186-241.

82 M.N. Kadirli, *Problema bor’by s malariiei v Azerbaidzhanskoi SSR* [The Fight against Malaria in the Azerbaijan SSR], Baku 1937, pp. 26-48; GAAR f. 411, op. 11, d. 1, ll. 1-2 (Protokol’ plenarnogo zasedanii maliariinogo komiteta pri SNK AzSSR, 10.5.1935); GAAR f. 411, op. 11, d. 3, ll. 32, 36-38, 74-7 (Dokladnaia zapiska predsedateliu Azerbaidzhanskogo maliariinogo komiteta pri SNK AzSSR, 1935); GAAR f. 411, op. 11, d. 8, ll. 1-36 (Protokol’ soveshchaniia maliariinogo komiteta s uchastiem predsedatelei raionnykh ispolnitel’nykh komitetov AzSSR, 22.2.1936).

petrolized or treated with copper arsenite, while reeds were to be removed from river banks, mosquitofish released and houses secured with mosquito nets. At the same time, doctors and scientists were obliged to give public lectures on malaria and newspapers and radio stations were to encourage the fight against the mosquito. The malaria committee had posters, brochures, instructions and sample plans printed which were then distributed to local malaria committees, *kolkhoz* chairmen and medical cadres, and it had envoys verify whether measures had been implemented.

The *mesiachniki* thus combined theoretical instruction and practical work, staging revolutionary order in at least two senses. They first of all demonstrated that man was intended and able to control nature: the transformation of impure into pure nature by means of chemical and technical interventions showed that nature could be adapted in line with economic and social requirements. The *mesiachniki* also demonstrated the extent to which the population had accepted the Bolshevik agenda. Those who were receptive to information on the causes and consequences of malaria and participated in the practical struggle against the mosquito had developed an affiliation with the Bolshevik utopia, while those who refused had not. However, all too frequently the *mesiachniki* of the 1930s brought home to the Azerbaijani Bolsheviks how little the revolutionary order had been established at the periphery of the multinational Soviet empire.⁸³ The leading cadres of Azerbaijan's collectivized agriculture sector ignored the hygiene directives from Baku, while the personnel charging with investigating tropical diseases stayed away from malaria foci. There was certainly no question of mass participation in the prescribed campaigns.⁸⁴ Not infrequently the "fight against malaria" rested almost exclusively in the hands of young doctors who attempted to spread sanitary enlightenment.

Further hygiene campaigns of the 1930s concerned semi-nomadic livestock breeders and the peasant-workers who excavated the bed of the Samur-Divichi canal. In the summer months the Azerbaijani health ministry regularly assembled so-called "doctor brigades"⁸⁵ tasked with visiting semi-nomadic livestock breeders at their pastures. Collectivized smallholdings moved their livestock into the mountains during the warm season. The summer pastures were often many kilometres from inhabited areas. The shepherds lived in the open and ate the food they had brought with them. The doctor-brigades drove, rode and walked for a period of days to reach the shepherds' camps, carrying posters and brochures, diagrams and radios as well as medical instruments and medicines. Once they had arrived, they summoned the shepherds to attend meetings and sought to familiarize

83 GAAR (cf. footnote 74) f. 411, op. 11, d. 17, ll. 5-19 (Dokladnaia zapiska otvetstvennomu sekretariu maliariinogo komiteta pri SNK AzSSR, 1937).

84 GAAR f. 411, op. 11, d. 17, ll. 25-6 (Protokol' obshchego sobraniia rabochikh i sluzhashchikh sovkhoza imeni Narimanova, 28.10.1937); GAAR f. 411, op. 11, d. 17, l. 25 (Dokladnaia zapiska otvetstvennomu sekretariu maliariinogo komiteta pri SNK AzSSR, 1937).

85 G.E. Gurevich et al., Sanitarnoe prosveshchenie na eilagach (gornyykh pastbishchakh) [Medical Education on the Eilags (Mountain Pastures)], in: Tsentral'nyi Institut Sanitarnogo Prosveshcheniia Narkomzdrava SSSR (ed.), Sanitarnoe prosveshchenie: sbornik po voprosam organizatsii, soderzhaniia i metodiki sanitarno-prosvetitel'noi raboty [Medical Education: Collection of Articles on Issues of Organisation, Contents and Methods of Medical Education Work], Moscow 1941, pp. 127-34; GAAR f. 57, op. 1, d. 1258, ll. 20-23 (footnote 79).

them with the ideas of microbiology and hygiene, attempting to refer to the shepherds' everyday world. The doctors described syndromes and symptoms and explained causes and methods of prevention, not infrequently demonstrating how laboratory equipment and medical instruments functioned. The nomad campaigns had mixed results: while the shepherds showed an interest in their visitors, they refused to cooperate with practical measures.



Figure 2
Medical personnel supervising workers on the construction site of the Samur-Divichi canal, Azerbaijan 1939

The doctor-educators also played a role in the construction of the Samur-Divichi canal. Toward the end of the 1930s the Azerbaijani leadership called on around 40,000 peasants to excavate the bed of a 140-kilometre canal using pickaxes and spades.⁸⁶ Around 200 doctors, epidemiologists, malaria experts, nurses and assistant physicians worked on this large-scale construction site.⁸⁷ They not only attended to injured peasants, they also organized hygiene campaigns on the construction site and in the surrounding villages. At the roll calls the doctors addressed the peasant-workers and organized mass readings. They planned radio programmes, showed cinema films and verified compliance with hygiene requirements. Not the least of their activities was their inspection of living quarters

86 Anonymous, Na Samur-Divichinskom kanale imeni Stalina pushchena voda [There is Water in the Samur-Divichi Stalin Canal], in: Bakinskii rabochii, May 8, 1940, p. 1; I. Chanukov, Kanal Samur-Divichi: Na shestem uchastke sooruzhenii [The Samur-Divichi Canal: On the Sixth Construction Zone] in: Bakinskii rabochii, January 8, 1940, p. 1; I. Chanukov, Kanal Samur-Divichi: gidrotehnicheskie sooruzheniia postroit' v srok [The Samur-Divichi Canal: Building the Hydrotechnical Installations on Time], in: Bakinskii rabochii, January 5, 1949, p. 1.

87 V. G. Andris, Zdravookhranenie – na sluzhbu naroda [Healthcare at the Service of the People], in: Bakinskii rabochii, January 12, 1940, p. 1; G. E. Gurevich et al., Sanitarnoe prosveshchenie na stroitel'stve kanala Samur-Divichi [Medical Education in the Construction of the Samur-Divichi Canal], in: Tsentral'nyi Institut Sanitarnogo Prosveshcheniia Narkomzdrava SSSR (ed.), Sanitarnoe prosveshchenie (footnote 85), pp. 101-10.

and tea rooms and decisions on the disinfection of clothing and accommodation. In case of violations of sanitary rules the medics were able to impose disciplinary sanctions (cf. Figure 2)⁸⁸.

The examples of the livestock breeders and the peasant-workers show that the goal of establishing a revolutionary order overlapped with the goal of imposing hygiene on ways of life. The doctors appeared on the summer pastures and the canal construction sites with administrative and scientific authority. In the persons of the doctor-educators the political objective of a central health administration was combined with the scientific objective of enforcing hygiene informed by microbiology.

6. Conclusion

In the Soviet Union of the interwar period, concepts of hygiene were linked with social reorganisation. The communication of infectious disease concepts overlapped with the communication of concepts of social order. This relationship becomes visible in terms of the self-image of cadres, the hygiene posters and the sanitary practices at the periphery of the Soviet empire.

The professional self-image of the state-employed doctors went beyond mere communication of sanitary knowledge. The doctor-educators opened up communicative spaces where the construction of a post-revolutionary society could be negotiated. The hygiene posters visualized scientific knowledge while also propagating social hierarchies. The practices of the “fight against epidemics” were intended to establish the new social order in everyday life. Together, the cadres, posters and practices formed the cornerstones of a communicative programme through which revolutionary society was made visible and established.

But Bolshevik concepts of hygiene were not a product of chance. They developed in several phases which by no means inevitably followed on from one another. They originated in European developments of the nineteenth century, when the governments of European nation-states asserted that planned regulation of the health of entire populations was scientifically justified, administratively viable and politically desirable. In the late 1920s, the concept of hygiene of the first Bolshevik People’s Commissar for Public Health, Nikolai Semashko, referred to the ideas of social hygiene; Semashko linked “hygiene” with “consciousness” on the basis of its doctrines. He thus conceived hygienisation as a communicative act, considering the transmission of theoretical principles and the implementation of everyday hygiene practices to be a precondition for gradual hygienisation. Having said this, there is still the question of what an assessment of Bolshevik concepts of hygiene in the interwar period means for theorisation of revolutions. There are two answers to this. First of all, the above example has shown that theorisation of revolutions is inadequate where it disregards revolutionary events and individuals. Structuralist

revolution scholarship is correct in seeking the preconditions for revolution in the *ancien régime*. But it is mistaken in its assumption that it need not examine the revolutionary processes and actors. The second response is that the study of revolutions as a process is no impediment to the comparability of various revolutions. A common characteristic of all modern revolutions is that the communication of scientific, cultural and political messages overlapped with the communication of a new social order.

The exhibitions organized by Japan's ministries in the aftermath of the Meiji Revolution not only presented visitors with concepts of a modernity due for import, they also gave them a position in the revolutionary order.⁸⁹ The journeys undertaken by the Mexican presidents not only served to demonstrate political authority, they also provided spectators with an impression of the revolutionary order.⁹⁰ Thus, revolutionary concepts of hygiene in the early Soviet Union, exhibitions in Meiji Japan and the presidents' travels in revolutionary Mexico exceeded their intrinsic purposes by also communicating new social orders.

It might be objected that the specific features of revolutionary developments in different contexts hamper comparative statements. This objection relates not least to the relationship between generalists and specialists.⁹¹ While scholars of revolution pursuing a comparative approach not infrequently lack a sense of key details, regional experts all too commonly make do without a comparative glance beyond the end of their noses. Both suffer. Past scholarship of revolution shows that neither theory-obsessed comparative studies nor detail-crazed regional sciences can plausibly claim a monopoly of interpretation regarding revolutions. In contrast, the present volume demonstrates the fruits of regional studies stimulated by the comparative approach. The examples collected in this volume illustrate that revolutionary upheavals develop dynamics of their own which quite definitely demonstrate analogies. The communication of revolutionary goals with mass appeal is one of these analogies.

Finally, to understand revolutions as a process means taking the historical actors seriously. This is necessary since we owe our knowledge of past revolutions exclusively to contemporaries. We are able to describe concepts of hygiene in revolutionary Russia because revolutionaries such as Nikolai Semashko and observers such as Lewellys F. Barker provided us with texts. Though they may sometimes maintain otherwise, these texts are written without an awareness of later developments. Accordingly, to allow for the openness of revolutionary developments is to have understood something of the essence of revolutions.

89 Cf. Daniel Hedinger's article on "Showcases of Revolutionary Transformation" in this volume.

90 Cf. Eugenia Roldan-Vera's and Carlos Martínez Valle's article on "The Triumphal March of the Revolution" in this volume.

91 J. N. Wasserstrom, *Culture* (footnote 13), pp. 156-161, p. 172.

“The Triumphal March of the Revolution”: The Travels of Lázaro Cárdenas as President of Mexico, 1934–1940

Eugenia Roldán Vera / Carlos Martínez Valle

RESÜMEE

Der Artikel unternimmt eine Analyse der innermexikanischen Besuchs-, Erkundungs- und Kontrollreisen, die Lázaro Cárdenas zwischen 1934 und 1940 in seiner Eigenschaft als Präsident von Mexiko unternommen hat. Grundlage der Untersuchung sind die Darstellungen der präsidentiellen Reisetätigkeit in der mexikanischen Presse. Die Reisen werden sowohl unter Gesichtspunkten der Repräsentation der persönlichen und institutionellen Macht des Präsidenten als auch im Hinblick auf die Konstruktion von Herrschaft untersucht. Im Ergebnis schälen sich drei Aspekte heraus, die mit den Präsidentenreisen politisch und symbolisch aufs Engste verknüpft waren: Zum einen waren es Intentionen der nationalen Integration, die – nicht anders als im Fall der Reisetätigkeit des japanischen Tennō zum Beginn der Meiji-Ära – beim Arrangement der zum Teil landesweiten Reisen im Vordergrund standen. Zum anderen erzeugten diese Reisen, gerade weil sie mit direkten Interventionen eines moralisch unanfechtbaren Präsidenten in lokale Angelegenheiten verknüpft waren, eine Aura charismatischer Führungsstärke und Autorität. Und schließlich wirkte insbesondere die Presseberichterstattung über diese Reisen daran mit, die Menschenmengen, die der Präsident traf und mit denen er interagierte, als „Massen“ zu konstruieren. Der Artikel endet mit dem Befund, dass diese Reisen, auch wenn sie für die Stärkung von Cárdenas' Herrschaft ungemein erfolgreich waren, gleichwohl nicht-intendierte Folgen hatten. Denn in eben dem Maße, wie Cárdenas nachgerade zur „personifizierten Repräsentation“ der Revolution avancierte, wurden die post-revolutionären Institutionen, welche seine Regierung zum Zwecke der weiteren politischen Konsolidierung aufgebaut hatte, wiederum unterminiert.

In the 1920s and 1930s, the Mexican state advanced a wide range of significant social, political and economic reforms that were intended to “institutionalize” the revolution of the previous decade. Although the struggles that formed the revolutionary movement had mobilized large sections of the population all over Mexico, the implementation of the post-revolutionary reforms was set up in such a way as to signify that the Revolution itself was being mobilized from the capital outwards, especially towards the rural areas. A number of salient social and cultural projects indicative of this mobility were then carried out: the *misiones culturales* (“cultural missions”, expeditions of teachers that spent short periods of time in rural communities teaching handicraft skills), the *brigadas médicas* (“medical brigades”, expeditions of medical doctors and nurses aimed at vaccinating and instilling basic notions of hygiene), the *bibliotecas ambulantes* (“itinerant libraries”), and the *carros escuela* (“railway schoolrooms”, moving schools set up in railway wagons for the families of the railway workers). It is thus not surprising that the 1930s, the decade when this process of institutionalisation reached its peak, produced also the most itinerant president that Mexico has seen in peaceful times – Lázaro Cárdenas del Río.

1. The Travelling President

In what follows, we shall analyse in greater detail the travels Lázaro Cárdenas undertook during the period he held the office of President of Mexico, i.e. between 1934 and 1940. Having been a highly-mobile general during the revolution, an active traveller during his term of office as governor of the state of Michoacán, and having won the presidency after an intense electoral campaign throughout the whole of the country, travelling was a central component of Cárdenas’ governing style. During his presidency, he was on tour at least thirty times for periods of one to six weeks in all regions of the country and took short trips (one to three days), once or more per month, to locations around Mexico City (excluding his leisure trips).

In previous scholarly literature about Cárdenas, little attention has been paid to the nature of his travels and to the ways in which the presidential power was constructed throughout them.¹ We stand from the premise that this power was constructed both through the pragmatic political dimensions and surrounding symbolic elements of the trips. With Clifford Geertz’s investigation on the symbolics of power in mind, we aim to show in our study how the symbolic aspects of these travels shaped and gave sense to the trips as a form of exercising rule and consolidating power.² We explore some of

1 Among the most influential studies about Lázaro Cárdenas are those of A. Córdova: *La política de masas del cardenismo*, México 1974, and A. Gilly, *El cardenismo: una utopía mexicana*, México, D. F. 2001. An overview of recent scholarly literature and current debates around the figure of Cárdenas and his government can be found in D. Spenser/B. A. Levinson, *Linking State and Society in Discourse and Action: Political and Cultural Studies of the Cárdenas Era in Mexico*, in: *Latin American Research Review* 34 (1999) 2, pp. 227-245.

2 Cf. C. Geertz, *Centers, Kings, and Charisma: Reflections on the Symbolics of Power*, in: C. Geertz, *Local Knowledge: Further Essays in Interpretive Anthropology*, New York 1983, pp. 121-146.

the following questions: How were Cárdenas' travels staged *in situ* and reported in the daily press? What did this staging mean for the style of political negotiation and conflict resolution developed in Cárdenas' time (and after)? What kinds of bonds were created between the president and the people throughout these travels? Our study is largely based upon the reports and visual materials of two daily national newspapers, namely the *Excelsior* – largely of commercial orientation – and *El Nacional* – mouthpiece of Mexico's united party, the highly official *Partido Nacional Revolucionario* (PNR). In addition, we analyse the personal diary of Lázaro Cárdenas himself, and a handful of personal memoirs and municipal official history records.

The president's travels had a particular educational function both for those who travelled and for those being visited. Cárdenas himself wrote in his personal diary (1933) about the educational value of a journey on an excursion to a nearby volcano with some members of the Ministry of War (which he headed at the time):

Talking [with a number of generals] about the country's topography and landscapes, we decided to make an excursion to the Ixtlacihuatl the first Saturday of next month. It will be extended to the military men of the War Ministry. I will make use of this excursion to make evident to the compañeros the need for more spiritual and material exercise. That is, more spiritual exercise that leads them to organize collectively, and more material exercise that teaches them what their effort might accomplish... Collective organisation gives impulse and forms the character; on the contrary, isolation weakens the person, killing his individual strength".³

If travelling taught travellers lessons in "collective organisation" and formed "character" (the probable reason why Cárdenas always took a number of ministers and governors with him in his extended travels as president), those travels were also educational for those who witnessed and welcomed the travellers. Indeed, as Jürgen Schriewer has pointed out in the introductory article to this volume, in this period the social environment was perceived to have a powerful educational influence over the people – an influence that was much greater than that of any school – and the state had taken upon itself the obligation of giving some "direction" to that influence as part of Cárdenas' task of social reform.⁴ In this sense, the presidential travels were "educational" for both those who interacted with the travellers and for those who read about the travels in the newspapers. Participants, direct witnesses, and readers of the president's travels experienced a par-

3 L. Cárdenas, *Apuntes 1913–1940*, in: *Obras*, vol. 1, México 1972, Note on 5 May 1933, p. 222.

4 A report from the Ministry of Education in 1934 expressed clearly: "[In contrast to schools as such] social life at large is the school without walls which relies on indirect and yet effective means. Accordingly, the state, heavily committed to educating the people, must – and indeed does – take care to have an impact, without neglecting the fundamental role of schooling proper, on the educational forces of the social environment so as to move beyond prejudice or ideology all those potentially seductive institutions – such as taken-for-granted habit, spectacle or fashion – that impinge on the spirit of a nation [...] In this sense, the Mexican State pays great heed to its duties as an educator." Cf. *Memoria de la Secretaría de Educación Pública 1934* [1934 Report of the Public Education Ministry], vol. II, México, D. F. 1934, pp. 539 f., quoted in greater detail in the introductory article by Jürgen Schriewer in this volume, pp. 23, footnote 43.

ticular form of government that would shape the future relationship between state and society in post-revolutionary Mexico.

Travelling as a practice of state rule has a long history and has received a good deal of attention by the European scholarly literature. Itinerant courts were common in Europe and in the Islamic world prior to the centralisation of the nation-states, primarily as a means to maintain the bonds of allegiance and consolidate the authority of the king over other ruling lords. By contrast, the travels of European kings in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, according to some authors, were meant to create a kind of emotional bond between the people and the royalty, a bond that enabled the identification of the abstract concept of nation with the physical figure of the king. This was an association typical of constitutional monarchies in which the monarch held the role of a political mediator with a remnant of divine charisma. This political form was characteristic of periods of consolidation of the nation-states, when the end of the estate society and the development of differentiated bureaucratic institutions had dissolved or softened the formal political links between the people and their local and regional lords, and when the feelings of national belonging could be fostered with regard to a central authority.⁵

But what was the function of Cárdenas' travels in republican, post-revolutionary Mexico? Although the scholarly literature about the function of travelling heads of state in Europe is rather comprehensive, this topic has been rarely researched in Mexican historiography and not at all in the context of the post-revolutionary period. In this first attempt to analyse this phenomenon, let us begin by considering the purposes and characteristics of Cárdenas' trips.

During his travels Cárdenas carried out a number of different tasks. Some of them were related to boosting infrastructure works: he inaugurated roads, railways, dams or schools – sometimes he visited them while they were still under construction in order to accelerate the works – and he opened agricultural and industrial exhibitions. Other activities were clearly political and organisational, such as presiding over meetings of the *Partido Nacional Revolucionario* (PNR), the official party which had been founded in 1929 as a consensus body to unite all political factions throughout the country (predecessor of the later *Partido Revolucionario Institucional*). He also held regular meetings with state governors, regional leaders of the PNR, local authorities, representatives of labour unions,

5 Cf., among others, J. Paulmann, *Pomp und Politik. Monarchenbegegnungen in Europa zwischen Ancien Régime und Erstem Weltkrieg*, Paderborn 2000; J. Paulmann, *Peripatetische Herrschaft, Deutungskontrolle und Konsum: zur Theatralität in der europäischen Politik vor 1914*, in: *Geschichte in Wissenschaft und Unterricht* 53 (2002), pp. 444-461; B. Preisendörfer, *Staatsbildung als Königskunst. Ästhetik und Herrschaft im preußischen Absolutismus*, Berlin 2000; R. Wortmann, *Rule by Sentiment: Alexander II's Journeys through the Russian Empire*, in: *American Historical Review* 95 (1990), pp. 745-771. The symbolic functions of the travels of the Tennō have also been widely studied in the case of Meiji Japan, see, among others, J. Traganou, *The Tokaido Road: Travelling and Representation in Edo and Meiji Japan*, London 2004; C. N. Vapori, *Breaking Barriers: Travel and State in Early Modern Japan*, Cambridge 1994. N. Hée, *Von der Inszenierung des Unsichtbaren zur Repräsentation der Nation: Herrscherreisen im Japan des 19. Jahrhunderts*, in: S. Baller/M. Pesek/R. Schilling/Stolpe (eds), *Die Ankunft des Anderen: Repräsentationen sozialer und politischer Ordnungen in Empfangszeremonien*, Frankfurt a.M. 2008, pp. 64-81; S. Shizuko, *Meiji ten'nō gyōkō to chihō seiji* [The travels of the Meiji Emperor and provincial politics], Tokyo 2005. See also the chapter by Shin'ichi Suzuki and Kazuhiko Yamaki in this volume.

and commissions of peasants; in those meetings he often mediated in problems between local and state authorities. In some occasions Cárdenas' presence in a particular city was intended to solve a strike, for which he arbitrated between workers and employers. Some of what he did was directly related to the so-called "promises" of the revolution; for example, the highly symbolic bestowal of communal lands to peasants who had until then worked for the big landowners, speeches to landowners to convince them of complying with their "revolutionary duty" of giving up their properties, and sermons urging the workers and peasants to unite their various organisations into a single organization in order to better defend their rights and interests. However, regardless of the specific purpose of each trip, most of Cárdenas' travels were articulated in a "revolutionary" rhetoric and were loaded with the symbolism of the revolution: they were presented in such a way as though they were finally "delivering" the awaited promises established in the 1917 Constitution and subsequent post-revolutionary laws.

Most of the presidential journeys had a regular structure. A trip usually began with Cárdenas' departure in the early morning from his modest house near the former presidential palace of Chapultepec in Mexico City. He made his way to the train station, where the presidential train *El Olivo* (The olive tree), according to the press, was "always ready" for leaving. At the station the president was joined by the cabinet members who accompanied him during the trip and with whom Cárdenas handled the daily administrative work during the train journey. Reaching its destination, the train was welcomed by an official committee and a popular crowd, who, together with the sound of ringing bells of the local parish, walked with him to the building of the town council or of the official party. (However, when the president arrived too early in the morning there was occasionally no welcoming ceremony and he walked directly to meet with the local authorities). When he travelled to more difficult to reach destinations, Cárdenas combined railway or airplane journeys with travels by car; however, travelling on horseback between peasant villages with no roads for modern vehicles was also common in these trips.

The president usually entered the town passing through a rudimentary triumphal arch, made of branches and flowers, which gave his presence a connotation of sacredness and an implicit association with the welcoming ceremonies traditionally offered to victorious military leaders, the governors of the federal states, bishops – and, in a distant past, viceroys. This entrance was, therefore, a traditional ritual endowed with a new meaning created through the accent placed upon the material infrastructure that the president was to inaugurate (and that was attributed to "the revolution"), the close contact of the president with the population, and the government's attempt to organize the whole of the population into a homogeneous "mass". After meeting the local authorities, Cárdenas went with them to inaugurate works of infrastructure or see the progress in their construction. There he gave a speech, after which he talked with the workers, and closed the morning with a frugal meal with all. The afternoon and evening were filled with diverse meetings with officials and long hours in audiences with common people: standing up or sitting at a table, with his personal secretary on one side and a Cabinet member on the other, he talked to every individual queuing to see him – usually leaders of peasant or

workers' organisations, as well as people in general, including elderly and women. These petitions were of two kinds: material improvements such as schools, drinking water, roads, and electricity on the one hand, and conflict resolution on the other, especially related to the possession of the land, unfair treatment from entrepreneurs or mine owners to their workers, problems with local or state authorities, problems related to the administration of natural resources, or problems derived from the arbitrary implementation of an existing law. The government officials recorded everything that was said and Cárdenas promised to study and resolve the situation as soon as he got back to Mexico City, a promise that indeed he often fulfilled. Finally, the end of the day was marked by another speech addressed to the whole population, followed by fireworks and music. There was sometimes free food for everybody, but no alcohol. The president and his companions either spent the night in the town or in the presidential train, and it was often said that Cárdenas had little time to rest before starting a new journey.

As we can see, the presence of Lázaro Cárdenas in a particular place was not a mere interruption of daily life of the visited, but was a considerable event which involved a whole staging process and which had a definite impact upon the lives of the visited. Cárdenas' visits often had consequences for the city or community visited; as a result of them, a school was opened, communal lands were allocated or a power dispute was solved. Moreover, as we shall argue in the following sections of this article, at a more general level his travels gave shape to a distinct form of government. Thus, in the course of these travels, a certain form of national integration was constructed (section 2), a particular kind of leadership and authority was developed in which the direct intervention of a highly virtuous president was the primary method to implement reforms and resolve conflicts (section 3), and the people with whom the president interacted were constructed as "the masses" by the daily press (section 4). With focus in particular on these three aspects, we see president Cárdenas' travels as both representing and constructing his particular nature of governing style.

2. National integration

At the beginning of the twentieth century, Mexico was still a conglomeration of poorly connected territories in which the geographic and economic differences underlined the political, cultural, and ethnic diversity. Through his travels Cárdenas had to deal with a country riddled by conflicting interests, personal affiliations, and divergent political cultures. Indeed, the Mexican revolution had been the sum of many different struggles with different purposes. The eventual creation of an official revolutionary party in 1929 – the aforementioned *Partido Nacional Revolucionario* (PNR) – to which Cárdenas actively contributed, was meant to constitute a political body into and through which all divergent interests could be channelled. Thus, it is not surprising that even decades after the independence wars and the wars against the French and US invasions, the people's feelings of belonging were still not strongly connected even to their own state, let alone

the Mexican Federation. Rather, feelings of belonging were connected much more to minor geographical units like the own town or region, the so called *patria chica* (the little fatherland). As the iconographic representations of the president's travels in *El Nacional* suggest, one purpose of the visits of president Cárdenas was the fostering of the feelings of national belonging and national unity (cf. Figure 1). In this regard, the trips seemed to have had a high degree of success.

There is much evidence that suggests that the people visited by Cárdenas did develop a sense that their village or town was becoming part of the nation. A head of state travelling so much and visiting rural areas – particularly in peaceful times – was remarkable and without precedent, and made Cárdenas a very different president in the eyes of the people. As the mayor of Tetelcingo, Morelos, mentioned in an oral interview,

*no ruler of the whole of Mexico had visited the pueblos to see what needs they had... if one of them visited a state, he did so with a big escort because he did not trust the pueblos. By contrast, Cárdenas was different; he did not distrust the pueblos.*⁶




Figure 1: "36,801 km throughout Mexico".

Source: *El Nacional*, 12 September 1937 (Biblioteca Pública Miguel Lerdo de Tejada, Secretaría de Hacienda y Crédito Público, México, D.F.)

6 M. N. Méndez Huacuatitla, *Āmatlapohualistli de Don Lázaro Cárdenas: Un relato de Don Lázaro Cárdenas* [A story about Lázaro Cárdenas], manuscript in mösiehual language, translated by the Instituto Lingüístico de Verano. In: <http://www.sil.org/~tuggyd/Tetel/F001e-Cardenas-NHG.htm#Visita1>.

In this utterance the mayor of Tetelcingo was using the old, monarchical concept of *pueblos* in the plural as the natural political and juridical units – villages, cities, states – which make up the nation but always have to be on guard *vis à vis* the central government against which the *pueblos* had often rebelled since independence. Morelos thus was pointing at a significant trust-based rapprochement between the *pueblos* and the central government embodied in the figure of the president.⁷

Other reports suggest that the presence of the president meant that some regions did indeed come to feel linked to other parts of the country – sometimes in the most literal sense. For example, in 1940, Cárdenas, while staying in Pátzcuaro, made an unexpected trip to the town of Tacámbaro in the state of Guanajuato, where he visited a local school. Pleased with the state of the institution, he donated 2000 pesos as “souvenir” for the improvement of its material conditions and promised the whole school a trip to the port of Veracruz so that the children could behold the sea.⁸

Moreover, through his travels Cárdenas involved *de facto* even the smallest towns in affairs of national and international policy, both by showing the towns with his presence that they were as important as the affairs he dealt with at the capital, and by politically using his absence from Mexico City to give strength to some decisions. For example, in April 1938, at the height of the international conflict provoked by Mexico’s nationalisation of the oil industry, Cárdenas organized a trip to the states of Chiapas and Oaxaca, and did not make an early return to the capital when the president of the USA – in defence of the North American oil companies affected – demanded an international arbitration on the issue. Instead, and contrary to the pleas of the official and non official press, Cárdenas extended his trip to visit small peasant communities in the state of Guerrero, cunningly delaying an answer to his North American counterpart and winning more popular support for his measure. He finally arrived back in Mexico City, in perfect time to lead a powerful demonstration in support of that nationalisation; by then a sense

7 The term *pueblos* in this case refers both to the Spanish word for “villages” and to the old concept of political and juridical units inherited from colonial times by opposition to a central government. The countless pronunciamientos (military revolts) that impeded any sort of political stability in Mexico during much of the nineteenth century were usually made in the name of the *pueblos* versus the national government, under the argument that the government had “betrayed” the sovereignty endowed to him by the *pueblos* – a sovereignty which, according to the old monarchical plural conception of the country as an association of natural political bodies, the *pueblos* were entitled to claim back for themselves. Cf. F. X. Guerra, *El pronunciamiento en México: prácticas e imaginarios*, in: *Traces* 37 (June 2000), pp. 15–26, and E. Roldán Vera, “Pueblo” y “pueblos” en México, 1750–1850: un ensayo de historia conceptual, in: *Araucaria: Revista Iberoamericana de Filosofía, Política y Humanidades* 17 (2007): http://www.institucional.us.es/araucaria/nro17/monogr17_13.htm. The term *pueblo* in the singular as a way to denote the whole of the population of the country, i.e., the idea of a nation made of equal individual citizens, began to be used in the liberal vocabulary of the nineteenth century, although the old plural usage of the term persisted. This transformation was similar to that experienced by the Japanese concept of *Kuni*, which, in the course of the Meiji restoration, changed from meaning an administrative unit or domain to meaning the entire country.

8 *El Nacional*, 21 April 1940. We do not know for sure whether the money was actually given and the trip actually carried out or not, but the president’s promises were usually fulfilled.

of "urgency" had built up in such a way that the president had to be backed by the whole of the population in his "struggle against imperialism".⁹

On the other hand, Cárdenas' travels also displayed the "modernity" of the government as a showcase of a promised (and soon to be realized) developed future. Not only was the figure of Cárdenas strongly associated with the inauguration of works of infrastructure, but his travels also highlighted the modern means of communication that linked the country, especially the railway. Trains had been a symbol of capitalist development of the late nineteenth century, and had been perceived as instruments of control by the foreign investors allied with the monopolistic elite of the pre-revolutionary government of the dictator Porfirio Díaz. Yet the railway lines had been built mainly for the transportation of raw materials to the sea ports, so they did not contribute to fostering an internal market and did not respond to any particular needs of the Mexican state and society. This image changed when railways became one of the most intensely used transportation means for the mobilisation of revolutionary troops in the 1910s; a photograph of a girl *soldadera*, a woman soldier, descending from a running locomotive is still one of the icons of the revolution, and Francisco Villa's contracts with Hollywood companies for the filming of the military operations on trains contributed to spread this motive.¹⁰



Figure 2: Cárdenas "preaching" to peasants from the rear of the presidential train.

Source: *El Nacional*, 17 January 1937 (Biblioteca Pública Miguel Lerdo de Tejada, Secretaría de Hacienda y Crédito Público, México, D.F.).

9 *El Nacional*, 9 April 1938.

10 M. C. Anderson, *Pancho Villa's Revolution by Headlines: Mass Media in the Foreign Policy of Francisco "Pancho" Villa*, Norman 2000; M. de Orellana, *Filming Pancho Villa: How Hollywood Shaped the Mexican Revolution*, New York 2004.

Drawing upon these revolutionary associations, the official party press showed many photographs of the presidential train, so as to suggest that Cárdenas was “taking the revolution” to all corners of the country. Some of these photographs portrayed Cárdenas speaking to the people from the rear of his train, images that conspicuously resemble those of Lenin indoctrinating the revolutionary masses (see Figure 2).

The construction of new railway lines – together with the construction of roads – was prominently portrayed in the reports of Cárdenas’ travels as a means to unite the whole country, especially in the case of territories distant from the centre. The caption of a photograph of the construction of a railway line in Baja California published in *El Nacional* reads: “One of the many railway tracks which, crossing deserts and linking faraway locations of the Mexican Republic, have been built during the Government of Lázaro Cárdenas. [Baja] California and the South East are no longer faraway and forgotten territories.”¹¹

Although the construction of new lines did not considerably enlarge the existing railroad network, the symbolic elements associated to the railway journeys of the president served to reinforce Cárdenas’ project of national integration. The presidential train itself, for example, played a particular role as visible carrier of the central state to all regions of the country. *El Olivo* was clearly recognisable from the villages and towns it passed through, not only because of its distinct olive green colour, but also thanks to the big national flag hanging at the rear of the train. The train itself was a symbol of modernity, for it was rather new – built only in 1926 – and was fully-equipped with telegraph and telephone through which the president was always in touch with the capital and through which the reports of his journeys could reach the press.¹² Not surprisingly, in the official party press trains were also used to allegorically represent Cárdenas’ government as a link between the past and the present or between the past and the future. Thus, in more than one photomontage, the image of a locomotive appeared to represent this link by combining images from an ancient indigenous past and a characteristic element of modernity such as literacy (cf. Figure 3).¹³

11 *El Nacional*, 1 December 1939.

12 The presidential train, ‘El Olivo’ had been bought by president Plutarco Elías Calles in 1926 and was said to be extremely luxurious – “only second to the papal train”, according to vox populi. It was equipped with offices, dormitories, kitchen, dining room, radio and telephone. It remained in use until 1960. Cf. “Tren presidencial El Olivo” [“The Presidential train ‘The Olive’”], in: *México desconocido* [Unknown Mexico]: <http://www.mexicodesconocido.com.mx/notas/3837-Tren-presidencial-El-Olivo>.

13 The technique of photomontage, consisting in making a composite photograph by cutting and joining a number of other photographs, was developed by Dada artists Hannah Höch and John Hartfield. By taking photographic fragments out from their context to create something new, they wanted to challenge the alleged unity of the photographic space, thus stressing the symbolic character of photography. See R. E. Krauss, *The Originality of the Avant-Garde and Other Modernist Myths*, Boston 1985. On the uses of photomontage in post-revolutionary Mexico, see R. González Mello, *Der Populismus des Anderen: Die politischen Bilder* [The populism of the other: political images], in: J. Baberowski/H. Kaelble/J. Schriewer (eds), *Selbstbilder und Fremdbilder: Repräsentationen sozialer Ordnungen im Wandel* [Self-images and images of the Other: Representations of Changing Patterns of Social Order], Frankfurt a.M. 2008, pp. 331–364.

As we can see, the symbolism associated with Cárdenas' travels, both *in situ* and in its representations in the press, suggested that through his government the revolution was moving outwards – from the centre to the peripheries – and forward – towards a better future. Cárdenas, embodying the centre of the national government, was both the carrier of the revolution and the fulfiller of its promises. On the occasion of his journey through the Mexican South East in 1939, the president's spokesman José Muñoz Cota summarized it in an enthusiastic speech: "The Revolution shall never stop its triumphal march as long as your children have not inherited its benefits".¹⁴



Figure 3: The train as link between the past (an ancient Aztec sculpture) and future (a literate child reading the section "Socialist education" of the newspaper El Nacional).

Source: El Nacional, 16 September 1936 (Biblioteca Pública Miguel Lerdo de Tejada, Secretaría de Hacienda y Crédito Público, México, D.F.). The photomontage was published on the occasion of the Mexican Independence Day, and it was also to symbolize the progress achieved over more than a century, from the first struggles for independence in 1810 (the photo is cut due to the binding) up to the year 1936.

3. Charismatic leadership

But what did “the triumphal march of the Revolution” actually mean? As the official chronologies of hundreds of towns and villages show, the visit of the president was an enormous act of deference towards them.¹⁵ Furthermore, the physical presence of the head of state also meant the concrete realisation of some demands or the practical possibility to resolve certain political or social conflicts. Indeed, Cárdenas developed a form of government in which direct intervention of the President made a reform or the resolution of a problem possible, often bypassing the regular institutions or local authorities established for that purpose. For the beneficiaries of these policies, this was the best and fastest solution and such a direct style of governing contributed to creating a special bond between the president and the people with the simultaneous effect of reinforcing Cárdenas’ authority.

Wherever he went, Cárdenas solved particular contingencies and disputes. Sometimes they were problems of the workers with a particular law such as in the town of Mexicapa, state of Morelos, in December 1935; there he consulted with the small-scale wood cutters who saw their source of living threatened by new laws that prevented the exploitation of their lands and at that time promised them that they would not be affected. In other occasions he helped producers facing a difficult economic situation: In Soconusco, Chiapas, for instance, he listened to a group of banana producers who, facing unfavourable international market conditions, pleaded for a government subsidy for the export of their products.¹⁶ Cárdenas offered to help and one day after leaving the region, on 11 April 1940, the group of banana producers received a subsidy for their products given by “a resolution of the (Ministry of) Economy”. In other cases, Cárdenas was not able to offer an immediate solution but only a promise: the property titles of a piece of communal land, a water pump, an ox or a school. This promise was – at least in most of the testimonies read – usually fulfilled; sometimes the president returned to the same place months or years later to personally deliver what he had promised.¹⁷

In other cities the visit of the president was motivated by his intention to mediate in strikes. Thus, in Monterrey, in February 1936, the president exhorted the industrialists to accept the resolution of the strike-mediating organ, the *Junta Central de Conciliación y Arbitraje*,¹⁸ in favour of the workers so that they would put an end to their strike. According to the press, Cárdenas’ presence served to calm down the “fear of communism” of the

15 The websites of hundreds of municipios (town councils) list the visit of president Cárdenas as one of the remarkable facts of their history. These lists of historical facts also indicate that Cárdenas was in the majority of the cases the only head of state who ever visited those places.

16 *El Nacional* 5 April 1940, p. 1.

17 For example, he promised an ox and a cow to the town of Tetelcingo, and a few days later these two animals arrived; he promised a water pump for the communal lands of the town of Tequixquiaca, and one year later he went back there to hand in the pump. Cf. Méndez Huaxcatitla, Ámatlapohualistli de Don Lázaro Cárdenas (footnote 6).

18 The *Juntas de Conciliación y Arbitraje* were organs created after the revolution for the mediation in strikes; they were made up of representatives of workers, industrialists, and the state or national government.

city's upper classes, even though, in reality, the president's siding with the workers at first deepened the conflict.¹⁹ Cárdenas also visited Orizaba, in January 1938, during a violent conflict between two labour organizations and the following strike in the textile industry of Veracruz, with the purpose of assisting in the resolution of the dispute. And more than once the non-official press claimed that the return of the president from his journeys to Mexico City was the only way a number of workers' strikes and other problems affecting the capital could be solved. If it is true that in the post-revolutionary configuration of the different social groups the state had become a *de facto* referee in the structural conflicts between workers and industrialists, this mediating role was directly associated to the physical presence of president Cárdenas himself, a presence that no other president ever had, neither before nor after him.²⁰

Moreover, this referee role was not only active in the realm of strikes and economic protests of certain groups but also in place in the realm of regional and local politics. For example, in the state of Tamaulipas, in February 1936, Cárdenas mediated a political conflict of the local authorities, which had constituted two parallel municipal councils in two of the main cities of the state. In other occasions the direct intervention of the president in local affairs led to a conflict of political jurisdiction. For example, whereas Cárdenas himself orally handed in communal land in the Zapatista region of Anenecuilco and Villa Ayala in 1935, a year later the legal resolution of the state authority, which validated the presidential resolution, also included some changes which implied that one of the *municipios* had land that the president had given to the other. Protests followed and one of the parts refused to acknowledge the earlier presidential resolution.²¹

All, these cases show that problems and social demands were solved in a rather casuistic way through the presence and direct intervention of the president. Sometimes it appeared as if only through his initiative could an existing law be effectively enforced. In cases of controversy about a law, Cárdenas appeared to know better than state or local authorities how it should be applied, as the report of the encounter between the president and the wood cutters in Mexicapa illustrates:

LC: How many heads of family are there in this place?

— We are thirty-four.

LC: I am here to serve you. What are your needs, your problems?

— Sir, we don't want our Mountain taken away from us... At the entrance of the cities we're being charged for our small loads of coal and wood, which sometimes are even confiscated...

19 For more on this episode, see M. Snodgrass, *Deference and Defiance in Monterrey: Workers, Paternalism and Revolution in Mexico, 1890–1950*, Cambridge 2003, p. 1-2.

20 M. del R. Guadarrama, *Los sindicatos y la política en México: la CROM [Confederación Regional Obrera Mexicana] (1918–1928)*, México 1981.

21 Mentioned in E. Krauze, *General misionero*, in: E. Krauze, *Biografía del poder: caudillos de la Revolución Mexicana (1910–1940)*, México 2006, pp. 111-112 and 389-483..

[Reporter:] *The law, that double-edged sword, usually wounds the poor and leaves the powerful intact. The complaint was unanimous: let the law be rigorously applied to the strong ones, let it protect the weak ones; the law shall not be fierce against the poor.*

[LC listens to several individual complaints, then he interrupts:]

– LC: *You will have your mountain. You will have the wood and the coal you need for your livelihood. You won't be charged any more taxes and your loads won't be confiscated.*

[Then, speaking to the Chief Officer of the Forest Department:] *It is not the communities who destroy the forests. They want to preserve them for they have lived off them since ancient times. It is the large sawmills which destroy the forests and don't replant them. Those are the ones that are to be controlled and made to comply with the law...*

[Back to the Indians:] *Take care of your forests, don't destroy them. The government does not want the forests for itself; it wants their wealth to be preserved so that you can have a patrimony, a means of subsistence. Make use of the 'dead wood', make all the coal you need, but don't cut down young trees and plant as many new ones as you can.*²²

From a position of moral superiority, Cárdenas was acting as a supreme judge, situating himself above the institutions that were supposed to decide about the application of a law. This was more obvious in individual justice cases, in a way that was reminiscent of the granting of indulgence as practised in the monarchico-colonial tradition.²³ In the same town of Mexicapa, an old woman approached the president and told him: “Sir, yesterday my son was taken to Ocuilan, allegedly because he cut some wood”, to which the president replied: “Within a few hours your son will be back here”.²⁴

The form of leadership and authority developed by Cárdenas throughout his journeys contained some elements of what Max Weber characterized as “charismatic”. By contrast with the “traditional” and the “legal” forms of rule, a charismatic leader governs neither through relations of patronage and patrimonialism (“traditional” rule) nor exclusively through the bureaucracy and power division of the modern state (“legal” rule); instead, he makes use of familial and religious associations to consolidate his power and authority, and his government must be constantly confirmed by his individual acts – otherwise he might lose his “charisma”. This charisma is, therefore, not an “image” portrayed by some media, but a virtue that must be continuously reaffirmed – constructed and re-constructed – in the experiences of the people.²⁵

Cárdenas’ charisma was thus constructed through his regular intervention in the lives of the people in the course of his travels and further reinforced through the highly symbolic elements that shaped his travels, elements that can be seen both as deliberate strate-

22 El Nacional, 13 December 1935.

23 Cf. G. López González, *Cultura jurídica e imaginario monárquico: las peticiones de indulto durante el Segundo Imperio*, in: *Historia Mexicana* 55/4 (2006), pp. 1289-1351.

24 El Nacional, 13 December 1935.

25 Cf. M. Weber, “The Types of Legitimate Domination”, chapter 3 of M. Weber, *Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology*, New York 1968 [1925]; M. Weber, *The Three Types of Legitimate Rule*, Berkeley 1958. It should be noted that the original German expression *charismatische Herrschaft* has indistinctly been translated into English as “charismatic rule” or as “charismatic domination”.

gies of portrayal used by the press and as spontaneous associations emerging from the popular culture. One of these elements was his fashioning of Cárdenas' providing power. Wherever he inaugurated infrastructure works, even if they had been built by the local population or with the aid of the state government, the president was always portrayed by *El Nacional* as the source of the improvement, with expressions such as: "the president continues pouring benefits in the towns he visits", or "the president solves immediately the problems of the inhabitants of each of the places he visited during his journey".²⁶ Drawing a lineage between the figure of Cárdenas and the defunct leaders of the most popular wing of the revolution was another strategy that served to reinforce the president's authority. During the revolution Cárdenas had fought against the remnants of the government of Porfirio Díaz, to be sure, but he then had sided with the ultimately victorious faction of the northern Constitutionalists, who from some point onwards fought against the popular movements led by Emiliano Zapata and Francisco Villa. It was all the more conspicuous, then, that one of his first presidential travels was to the Zapatista region in the state of Morelos, which suggests he was trying to strengthen his legitimacy through the support of social groups that once had fought with Emiliano Zapata. Reporting that tour, the newspaper *El Nacional* compared the loyalty of the peasants of the region for their defunct revolutionary leader Zapata with the loyalty they displayed towards Cárdenas. Moreover, his arrival in Ocuilan was compared with a triumphal entry of Francisco Madero, the initiator of the revolution. "How much, indeed, this tour of the president is a full representation of the Mexican Revolution", wrote the reporter of *El Nacional* on December 13, 1935. And three weeks later, when Cárdenas went back to the region to hand in the property titles of the communal land, newspapers described his visit as the "fulfilment" of what Zapata had begun. These were the actions that reinforced the president's "revolutionary" charisma: His presence in those places gave way not only to an image that linked him to revolutionary leaders, but he was also delivering results that the people could interpret as "revolutionary".

Other representations of Cárdenas combined republican with quasi-religious symbols. Although the separation of state and church had been established in Mexico since the 1860s, and even though anticlerical reforms were reinforced in the late 1920s, the Mexican society remained deeply Catholic and the civic and religious referents were easily interchangeable. As already mentioned, Cárdenas was received in the Mexican countryside with events and celebrations that resembled those of the reception of Catholic bishops, virtually the only high ranking individuals that ever visited such rural communities. Moreover, Cárdenas enjoyed "preaching" about the future of the revolution and the necessity for everyone to work together to advance the reforms, and some of his gestures did have a resonance like those of a religious leader (see Figure 2 above). Popular acclamations such as "Long live Cárdenas!" and "Long live the father of the Indians!" suggest that Cárdenas was taken with a sort of missionary paternalism.²⁷ The title given to him

26 *El Nacional*, 7 April 1940.

27 *El Nacional*, 13 December 1935.

by the Indians, “Tata Lázaro” (father Lázaro), was reminiscent of another *Tata*, viz. “Tata Vasco”, i.e. Vasco de Quiroga, one of the first Spanish missionaries in the early colonial times, and it was a title that no other president before or after Cárdenas was ever given by the people.²⁸ Accordingly, one of Cárdenas’ biographers has called him “the missionary president”, making reference to two different meanings: the so called “cultural missionaries”, or ambulant teachers, of the twentieth century and the religious missionaries of the sixteenth century.²⁹

Moreover, the act of people physically touching the visiting president resembled the touching a sacred person or a sacred object – it was a means of obtaining a benefit from the sanctity of what was being touched. One mother is said to have told her young daughter: “Look at him! Touch him! He’s the one who gave us the land!” The fact that Cárdenas used to share simple meals with the locals meant much more than an idea of humility of the president coming down to eat what the common people ate, i.e. *tortillas*, chilli and beans. In a deeply Catholic country, this image drew an immediate association with Christ sharing the bread with his disciples; a kind of communion of the president with the people in their poverty. Such a religious overtone was emphasized in the newspaper articles that described “how little” the president rested after a long journey, how many hours he spent listening to the people, or “how long” the president managed to travel on horseback, as if the president had supernatural powers to be able to do such things. Here, one has to remember that self-denial was a virtue of Christ and of true clergymen. A man famously described the experience of Cárdenas’ visit in his town with the words: “it was as if Jesus walked on Earth”.³⁰

In the novel tradition of occupying churches for secular purposes and of carrying out secularising rituals in them, the moderate anticlerical Cárdenas used both churches and sacred rooms of a much older tradition, such as indigenous ceremonial sites to preach the new redemptory message of the revolution. He visited indigenous ruins in Michoacán, Oaxaca, and Yucatán, sites that represented the past splendour of the ancient Mexicans and became associated with the sacred symbols of indigenous mythology (see Figure 5). As mentioned above, other representations suggested that Cárdenas’ government – often symbolized as a steam locomotive – constituted the link between the indigenous glorious past and the prosperous future of Mexico (cf. Figure 3 above).

In short, Cárdenas’ charismatic role in the construction of the post-revolutionary Mexican state was more than just one more episode in the *caudillo* tradition of post-independent Latin America, i.e., a tradition of strong political-military leaders heading au-

28 *Tata* is an old Spanish, affectionate term for “father, sometimes also “grandfather”, adopted in various indigenous languages of Mexico (*tatl* in Náhuatl – the indigenous language of central Mexico – *tatic* in tzotzil und tzeltal – two of the indigenous languages of Chiapas – *tata* in Tarasco – the dominant indigenous language of Cárdenas’ home state Michoacán). The term is also used to refer to a person or a being of high rank who is also loved, for example Tatic Samuel Ruiz, Bishop of San Cristóbal de las Casas from 1959 to 2000, or *Tata Dios*, i.e. Father God.

29 E. Krauze, *General misionero* (footnote 21).

30 A. Gilly, *Cartas a Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas*, México: ERA, 1989, p. 238. See also A. Bantjes, *As If Jesus Walked on Earth*, Wilmington 1998.

thoritarian governments.³¹ Thanks to the constant construction and reaffirmation of his charisma, his style of government was a unique combination of the process of "taking the revolution" to large parts of the country and personally intervening in the application of laws for the advancement of social reform or in the resolution of social and economic problems. This course of action meant that Cárdenas was acting as a catalyser of the institutions that the revolution was said to have put into place; yet at the same time, by intervening so directly at the local level, Cárdenas bypassed the judiciary and regional authorities thus undermining the division of powers defended in the 1917 Constitution. This situation contributes to explain the lack of continuity of many of the "revolutionary" social reforms advanced by Cárdenas once he left the presidency.



Figure 4: Cárdenas' travels and indigenous symbolism. Photomontage about Cárdenas' travels in Yucatán. Source: *El Nacional*, 22 August 1937 (Biblioteca Pública Miguel Lerdo de Tejada, Secretaría de Hacienda y Crédito Público, México, D.F.).

31 The cultural roots of the "*caudillismo*" tradition in Latin America have been exacerbated in the non-Mexican historiography; see, for example, the collection of essays edited by H. M. Hamill, *Caudillos: Dictators in Spanish America*, Norman/London 1992. A sounder historical approach to this topic, which considers the contingent power structures that gave way to this particular form of leadership, can be found in J. Lynch, *Caudillos in Spanish America, 1800–1859*, Oxford 1992.

4. The president and “the masses”

Beyond the contents of what was discussed and solved in the meetings between Cárdenas, local officials and the population, the physical encounters of the president with the people throughout his journeys constituted in themselves a visual performance, a public representation of a particular form of governing. These visits were not just a powerful experience for those who directly participated; their diffusion in the printed press to larger sections of the population also contributed to constructing the authority and leadership of president Cárdenas. The construction of “the mass” and its binding to the leader in the course of the president’s travels is the subject of this section.

From early on in his mandate, Cárdenas was represented as “the president of the masses”, a designation that would become stronger over time. Two things were referred to by this label. First, that he was close to the common people, i.e. to workers, peasants or Indians. “Everywhere he has established direct contact with the popular masses, so that they can present him their problems; he wants to reach out to the humblest workers, for they cannot always be near to him”, reported the *Excelsior* on 23 February 1935. Second, that Cárdenas was able to summon crowds of people who turned up at every public appearance, thus showing support for his government, as a number of photographs and photo-montages suggest. A good deal of the historiography about Cárdenas’ presidency has for a long time discussed this characterisation, seeking to establish either the “convergence” or the “divergence” between Cárdenas’ project and the social and political “demands” of those masses that emerged from the revolution.³² However, little attention has been paid at the ways in which the concept of “the masses” was given a new meaning during Cárdenas’ government. In the 1920s and early 1930s, under the mixed ideological influence of European social democracy, anticlericalism, fascism and bolshevism, “the masses” had been conceptualized as the social and political actor who had carried out the revolution, and in this protagonist role they were materialized in the post-revolutionary mural painting.³³ Yet this characterisation would change during the Cárdenas period, in part as a result of the president’s attempt at “organising the masses”, and in part due to the form in which “the masses” began to be represented in the printed press in the course of the president’s travels.

Cárdenas’ own ideas about how to “organize the masses” were interestingly stated in his diary some months before he became president. Visually impressed by a demonstration organized on the occasion of the *Día del Trabajo*, the Labour Day, on the central square of Mexico City, in 1933, in which the workers’ organisation CROM (*Confederación Regional Obrera Mexicana*) marched while divided in three different groups, that evening he wrote a few lines about the manipulability of the people by factious leaders:

32 On the first of those positions, see for example the classic works of A. Córdova, *La política de masas* (footnote 1); among the works that point at the “divergence”, see R. Sosa, *Los códigos ocultos del cardenismo: un estudio de la violencia política, el cambio social y la continuidad institucional*, México 1996.

33 Cf. B. Urías Horcasitas, *Retórica, ficción y espejismo: tres imágenes de un México bolchevique (1920–1940)*, in: *Relaciones: estudios de historia y sociedad* 26/101 (2005), pp. 261–300.

*The division of the urban workers and the presence of a deeply divided League of Peasants indicate once again the need for the workers not to be subject to the passions of a handful of quarrelling individuals. For the good of the working class, its culture and economic improvement, a united workers' front is needed to prevent the local organisations from continuing to be divided by political interests. It is the revolutionary duty of the government to stimulate the formation of such a united front, supporting it so that it is created with positive autonomy and is not subject to the political ups and downs.*³⁴

Cárdenas' modernising ideology followed a *sui generis* way between different, and sometimes contradictory, political options ranging from communism and communalism to state corporatism and populism.³⁵ One of the ways in which he linked these disparate ideologies was the idea of the need to create new individual and collective identities that integrated "modern" social ascriptions. Thus, Cárdenas' government aimed to organize new social bodies in order to educate, mobilize, indoctrinate and socialize the Mexicans who were traditionally considered as "lazy" and "individualistic". In a mixture of revolutionary presidentialism, caciquism and state corporatism, Cárdenas' government intended the creation of intermediate social bodies or "corporations", in particular the integration of all agrarian and industrial workers in semi-official unions,³⁶ thus virtually reducing all social and cultural disparities of the Mexicans under the concept of "the masses". In practice this meant, in the first place, the promotion of a single workers' organisation with which the government could easily negotiate – and which it was able to better control – namely the *Confederación de Trabajadores de México* (CTM). This single strong organisation also proved to be a good support of the government in its policies of nationalisation and collectivisation of certain industries, such as railways, oil and electricity. However, as we will suggest here, the charismatic form of leadership and authority developed by Cárdenas impinged upon the ways in which the simple people felt related to the president and, in a way, undermined the corporatist ideal. Symbolically, the constitution of such a unified front of workers corresponded with the visual representations in the press which tended to portray the large crowds of people summoned by president Cárdenas in his travels (cf. Figures 1, 3 and 4); however, what these representations seem to stress is the unity and cohesion of the people around the presidential figure in the first place, but not the ideal of organized bodies of people working together for their rights and for the achievement of certain goals. Indeed, every time Cárdenas arrived in a new place, a large number of people turned up to cheer the president. The receptions given to him were a massive outpour of enthusiasm: crowds of people at the train stations, triumphal arches, ringing bells, the national anthem, confetti, flowers, parades, banquets, and

34 L. Cárdenas, Apuntes (footnote 3), p. 222.

35 Cf. F. Katz, Un intento único de modernización en México: el régimen de Lázaro Cárdenas, in: G. Maihold (ed.), Modernidades en México, México 2004, pp. 11-22.

36 Cf. I. Semo, El Cardenismo: gramática del sobreviviente, in: Historia y Grafía 3 (1994), pp. 77-95; F. J. Rodríguez Garza, Luces y sombras del corporativismo en el México de entreguerras, in: M. T. Águila M./A. Enríquez Perea, Perspectivas sobre el cardenismo: ensayos sobre economía, trabajo, política y cultura en los años treinta, México 1996, pp. 325-356.

dances were part of the welcoming ceremonial. To arrange that, certainly a good deal of organisation and preparation was needed. The PNR was in charge of organising the receptions and local party committees, and *agrарista* organisations – organisations formed to support the process of land distribution – were responsible for gathering the people and provide them with flags and banners in every place; state governors, local authorities and the local schools also participated in the arrangements of the different meetings. For all these actors, the visits of the president represented a huge organisational effort, which sometimes involved preparing free food for thousands of people who came for the occasion or arranging special train services to bring people from nearby towns.³⁷ In addition, at least by the end of his term, Cárdenas was accompanied by a “chief of ceremonial” in his journeys who made sure that everything in the organisation was in place.³⁸ However, even if the visits of the President virtually led the inhabitants into an exercise of collective organisation, the press seemed to portray the welcoming of the president as a highly spontaneous event, as something provoked by his mere physical presence in a certain place. That doesn’t mean either, though, that everything was staged; many people turned up also in the case of unexpected visits due to sudden itinerary changes.

An important element in these representations of the presidential visits was the absence of physical barriers between Cárdenas and the common people. Newspapers stressed the fact that the president travelled without any special security measures or bodyguards – a remarkable fact in a country that suffered armed revolts and disturbs well into Cárdenas’ term of office, the last military putsch being that of Saturnino Cedillo in 1938. Also, no kind of violent reaction against the presence of the president or attacks against him were mentioned in the press. Whether this was due to the fact that there was a continuous presence around the figure of the president or that the pacification of the country had come to a successful end, at any rate this lack of visible security measures contributed to create the sense of “trust” between Cárdenas and the *pueblos*, as the above-mentioned mayor of Tetelcingo put it. This also suggests that Cárdenas was perceived as the man who brought the end of violence to many regions; his figure represented a sense of safety, he was both a peacemaker and someone who irradiated security. Thus the president appeared as a man who was very close to “the masses”.

As a result of this apparently unhindered and direct relation between Cárdenas and the people, a particular bond between both actors was constructed in the course of the president’s travels. As hundreds of oral histories have testified, the people visited by Cárdenas developed a powerful emotional connection with their president, a connection that was particularly strong in Cárdenas’ home state and in those towns and villages he visited

37 In Pátzcuaro, for example, a special train was arranged to bring the loads of people from nearby Uruapan who wanted to see the president and his wife, and people queued for hours to stretch their hands; cf. *El Nacional*, 2 June 1935.

38 The “chief of ceremonial” Salvador Armendáriz del Castillo is mentioned in *El Nacional*, 3 April, 1939. The presence of such a figure might have been due to the fact that in this particular trip to the Southeast of the country Cárdenas visited the border with Guatemala.

more than once.³⁹ The bond was constructed not only in the experience of being part of a large crowd gathered to see the president in person, but also in the individual encounters and dialogues that the president had with the people. As already pointed out, Cárdenas was willing to talk face to face with every person who wanted to see him. It was customary for him to initiate the series of personal audiences with the following utterance:

*I am here for you. I am here to listen to your problems and needs. I will be here the whole afternoon to listen to the persons or to the commissions who may want to speak with me.*⁴⁰

The dialogue, however, was obviously not one set in equal terms. Cárdenas' attitude had a strong paternalistic overtone; although he asked and listened, he already seemed to have knowledge of the problems and he knew best what the best solution was as the above-mentioned example of the forest of Mexicapa shows. Moreover, and contrary to what other presidents would do in the future, Cárdenas always distinguished himself from the common people by means of his outfit; he was always wearing his three-piece suit, even in the hottest parts of the country (cf. Figure 5 above). These strategies served to reinforce the "other-worldliness" character of the charismatic president and to signal his role of leader. The official party press, using a rhetoric that was uncommon for post-revolutionary presidents but resembled a discourse of colonial times, insisted that these were moments of "intimacy" between the president and the people.⁴¹ These situations were described in highly emotional terms, with phrases such as "Morelos offers his heart" to the president, the town shows "sincere friendship" for Cárdenas, or with the following caption of a sheet showing photographs of Cárdenas' tour throughout the state of Mexico:

*This page full of photographs gives a testimony of the enthusiasm of the peasants. They, together with their wives and children, were leaving their poor homes to go in search for comfort and remedy from the Chief of the Nation. These moments of intimacy between a ruler and its people speak of the strength of a regime consolidated at the very heart of the masses.*⁴²

This should not be read as mere official propaganda, for personal witness accounts also refer to their encounter(s) with president Cárdenas in emotional terms.

39 Cf., for example, a series of personal testimonies in R. Ramírez Heredia, *Cárdenas en la Tierra Caliente: Historia Oral*, México 1997.

40 *El Nacional*, 13 December 1935.

41 See, for example, the study of the manifestations of "love" of the people for the Spanish King Ferdinand VII who was abducted by the French in 1808 in M. A. Landavazo, *La máscara de Fernando VII: discurso e imaginario monárquicos en una época de crisis*. Nueva España, 1808–1822, Morelia 2001.

42 Visit to Ocuilán, state of Mexico, in *El Nacional*, 13 December 1935.

*Cárdenas opened his heart to all his fellowmen [...] For his good heart, all peasants considered him a treasure [...] Cárdenas gave his heart to the people and the people gave their heart to Cárdenas.*⁴³

Certainly these expressions suggest an *a posteriori* elaboration of the people with respect to the president who gave them more material improvements than any other president after him. However, what is important to notice here is precisely the emotional framework within which the relationship between Cárdenas and “the masses” was conceptualized. And given that the bond was reinforced by the bestowal of practical improvements directly from the president and not through regular processes, it was a bond that *de facto* located the president above all other powers and almost above the law. Although former viceroys and other presidents had also developed practices of giving audiences to common people in their palaces, this was the first time that a president made travelling to reach the people in their towns and villages a government policy. For once, the people did not have to reach out to the power holder, as the power holder came to the people. On the other hand, the visual representation of crowds around the charismatic figure of the president served to reaffirm the unconditional support he had from his people and was amply used in the printed press in delicate political moments such as when the nationalisation of the oil industry was announced. These representations were further magnified thanks to the technique of photomontage, which often involved placing duplicates of the same photo of a group on the same page, thus creating the illusion of a much larger crowd (cf. Figures 1 and 4 above).

These visual representations are particularly telling when they are contrasted with the representations of parades such as those regularly organized on the 1st of May, on September 16th – the Mexican Independence Day – or November 20th – the anniversary of the Revolution. Whereas the photographs and paintings of these events tended to emphasize the order displayed by the participants, representations of the popular support for Cárdenas emphasized the sheer size of the crowd.⁴⁴ Whereas the iconographic and textual representation of parades pointed at a sense of self-discipline and restraint – both in the participants and in the spectators – the representations of Cárdenas’ “masses” seemed to stress the emotional bond that linked them with the president (cf. Figure 6). And instead of portraying the demonstration as a gathering of different groups coming from different places and representing different kinds of people, these photographs and photomontages showed the compact unity of the “mass”.⁴⁵ Moreover, the “masses” portrayed in *El Nacional* have a rather pacific, even submissive attitude – one sees mostly a sea of hats, as if the people were bowing their heads down – which makes them look far

43 Méndez Huacuatitla, *Āmatlapohualistli de Don Lázaro Cárdenas* (footnote 6).

44 See, for example, the photographs included in the article by Carlos Martínez Valle and Dafne Cruz Porchini on “New Bodies, New Order: Sport and Spectacle in the Institutionalisation of the Army and the Police in Post-Revolutionary Mexico, 1924–1931” in this volume.

45 For a study of the iconography of military parades in post-revolutionary Mexico, cf. E. Plasencia de la Parra, *Desfiles militares y política de masas*, in: *Discurso visual: revista digital Cenidiap*, May-August 2006: <http://discursovisual.cenart.gob.mx/antteriores/dwwebne06/entorno/entplasencia.htm>.

from the threatening popular forces who carried out the revolutionary struggle. In this way, the emotionally loaded direct link between the president and the people left the notion of the "organisation of the masses", at least symbolically, to a second plane. Instead, the "masses" were conceptualized in such a way that they lost some of the revolutionary force with which they had been characterized before and became the natural complement of the presidential figure.

5. Conclusion

The travels of Lázaro Cárdenas were central to his governing, not only in terms of pragmatic politics but also because of the surrounding symbolic elements that served to consolidate both his power and the myth of the Mexican Revolution. In this article we have shown how Cárdenas' leadership and authority were constructed and reaffirmed in the interaction of the symbolic with the political in the course of those travels. This articulation was in part deliberately sought by the president and by the official press; however, in some respects the travelling president evoked unintended traditions and crafted meaning that went beyond the control of the governmental actors.

As we have shown here, Cárdenas' travels were successful in conveying an identification of the people with the figure of the president and with the project – and the perceived achievements – of the revolution. The travels were a means and an instrument for the creation of feelings of national integration around the figure of the president and for the construction of a charismatic form of leadership and authority. This form of leadership and authority involved the development of an emotional bond between the president and "the masses", a bond that not only served to consolidate the charismatic power of the president but also led to a transformation of the "masses" as the social actors of the revolution. In being "visited" by the president and in being represented as the subject of the president's attention, the "masses" began to be portrayed as "tame" actors and not as the fierce crowds that had brought about the revolution. Moreover, the form of leadership and authority developed in the course of the president's travels suggested that the process of governing implied a constant negotiation between the president and the whole scale of political power in the entire country, while at the same time it concealed the difficulties of that negotiation. The elements here discussed were means for Cárdenas to form alliances with local power structures, to strengthen personal relationships with party leaders and governments, to reinforce one or the other side in places of conflict and to unify separate workers' and peasants' organisations.

If Cárdenas' travels were a representation of a particular form of government, this was a representation that, at least in the eyes of the president and of the editors of the official party press, had an educational function. For the local authorities and political and labour organisations of the places visited by Cárdenas, these travels were meant to show, among other things, their inclusion in the national policies and the power of collective organisation. The president's visits were an opportunity for people coming together to

meet the head of state, to form commissions to expose their needs, and show their support for him. This was what the editors of *El Nacional* called *voluntad de acción*, the definite intention to act. For indirectly involved newspaper readers, reading about the activities of the president supposedly developed a feeling of national unity. In the ideal view of *El Nacional*, which defined itself as “a teacher of the masses”, learning about “the moral and material progress of the country” would transform the readers’ minds in such a way that “the passivity of reading” similarly became “definite intention to act”.⁴⁶ The idea was that by developing an awareness of the progress of the country people would begin to realize the necessity to improve their lives and begin to search for the means to achieve such a task.

However, despite the strength with which this representation of government was imprinted in the collective memory of Mexico, the travels and their popularisation in the printed press reinforced the paradox of Cárdenas’ government. That is, his charismatic way of case-oriented problem solving contradicted the process of the “institutionalisation” of the revolution. The particular way in which Cárdenas consolidated his power in the course of his travels led him to become the personification of the revolution itself. This was such a powerful identification that, when the terms of his office had come to an end, in 1940, and the practice of reaching out to the people to “bring” them the promises of the Revolution ended, the perception of significant portions of the population – still present in the collective memory of many – was that the Revolution itself had come to a halt. Learning about the “moral and material progress” of the country and developing a feeling of national integration through the travels of the president and their representation in the press proved to be insufficient to realize the promises of the revolution.

46 On the educational concerns of *El Nacional*, cf. J. Covo, *El periódico al servicio del cardenismo: El Nacional, 1935*, in: *Historia mexicana* 46 (1996), 1, pp. 133-161.

New Bodies, New Order: Sport and Spectacle in the Institutionalisation of the Army and the Police in Post-Revolutionary Mexico, 1924–1931

Carlos Martínez Valle / Dafne Cruz Porchini

RESÚMEE

Der Artikel untersucht die Wirkungsmöglichkeiten, die im post-revolutionären Mexiko dem Sport – verstanden als körperliche Betätigung wie als öffentliches Schauspiel – seitens der politischen und militärischen Eliten zugeschrieben wurden. Der Artikel skizziert dabei die Zusammenhänge mit den im zeitgenössischen Kontext verbreiteten evolutionstheoretischen Annahmen lamarckistischer Prägung; er unterstreicht die Rolle des Sports als einer Betätigung, die sich durch spezifische Räume, ein eigenes Ethos und besondere Rangordnungen von allem Bekannten und Geläufigen abhob; und er verweist auf die Rolle des Sports als Bindeglied zwischen einer militarierten Schule und einer Armee, die ihrerseits als zentrale Erziehungsinstanz und Medium der Modernisierung angesehen wurde. Die in Streitkräften und Polizei praktizierten unterschiedlichen Turnübungen und Sportarten – von der Bildung menschlicher Pyramiden mit ihrer rigiden Eingliederung des Einzelnen in gestufte Ordnungen bis zum Mannschaftssport und seinen Erfordernissen, das Handeln individueller Akteure zur Erreichung gemeinsamer Ziele aufeinander abzustimmen – wurden nicht nur im Hinblick auf explizit angestrebte Ziele der Disziplinierung gefördert. Sie erfuhren Förderung auch wegen der indirekten Wirkungen, die ihnen zugeschrieben wurden: nämlich als Alternativen zu religiösem Fanatismus oder zum Abgleiten in Prostitution und Alkoholmissbrauch zu fungieren. Schließlich kommt im Artikel zum Ausdruck, welche Rolle der Sport bei der „Institutionalisierung“ der revolutionären Heere in einer „Nationalarmee“ und einer nationalen Polizei spielte, sei es in Form der politischen Inszenierung des Bildes einer disziplinierten und der zivilen Regierung untergeordneten Armee, sei es als Instrument zur Ermittlung und Aussonderung derjenigen Elemente, welche dem postrevolutionären Regime und seinem Programm mit Ablehnung oder Feindseligkeit begegneten.

Wandering through a flea market in Mexico City, James Oles¹ found in 1997 a photo album that caught his attention. The album was remarkable both because of its dedication – to General Joaquín Amaro, Mexico’s Minister of War and Navy and an outstanding character in Mexico’s military history – and because of its content – 89 photographs of sportive-military events. The history of this album, dated from 1931 and entitled *Festival Militar y Deportivo* (“Military and Sportive Festival”), epitomize those of the study of sport in post-revolutionary Mexico. Although studies of the popular and political culture of the period point to the importance of sport both as practice and as spectacle, they do not examine the phenomenon with a depth correspondent to its given importance.² The scarcity of studies in this field and the significance of the topic have compelled us to analyse the album as part of a major work in progress about the relationship between sport and the armed and police forces. By extension, this is also a discussion of the relationships between sport, culture and politics in the post-revolutionary period. The centrality of the album in our article derives not only from its novelty, but also from the fact that it documents in great detail the staging of two sport festivals, thus complementing the limited descriptions of such events available in the printed press and giving us access to the festivals’ “grammar”. Moreover, the dedication to General Amaro set this piece against the backdrop of personal power relationships of crucial political importance of the time.

In our analysis we first contextualize the festivals documented in the album and the figure of Amaro, especially in regards to his role in the so-called “institutionalisation”³ of the army. Then we consider the ideas and objectives associated to sport circulating at the time in Mexico and follow with a discussion about how these ideas and objectives were articulated in sport and festive practices of the forces of defence and of public order. We pay particular attention to the ways in which these ideas related to the iconographic conventions through which the festivals were documented. Before reaching the conclusion, we briefly explore the role of the album and the festivals documented by it in the political affairs of the time. Throughout the article, we argue that the practice and spectacle of sport were seen by the military authorities as instruments to reinforce hierarchy and self-control, to “incorporate” Indians and women into mainstream society, to maintain the cooperation of the troops, and to channel both collective and sexual violence. Moreover, behind this discourse about their positive effects, sport and spectacle were encouraged by the military authorities for their indirect negative effects as well, which made them powerful disciplinary instruments. This could be called the “hidden curriculum” of the promotion of sports.

1 J. Oles, *Policía, deporte, espectáculo*, in: *Luna córnea*, 18 (September-December 1998), pp. 58-69.

2 For instance, M. K. Vaughan, *Cultural Politics in Revolution*, Tucson 1997; A. Knight, *Popular Culture and the Revolutionary State in Mexico, 1910–1940*, in: *The Hispanic American Historical Review* 74, 3 (August 1994), pp. 393-444; pp. 409-10.

3 P. E. Calles, *Informe Presidencial de 1 de Septiembre de 1928*, in: *Los presidentes de México ante la Nación*, vol. 3, México 1966, pp. 805-812.

1. The Álbum Festival Militar y Deportivo de 1931: Sport and Spectacle

The *Álbum Festival Militar y Deportivo* was given as a present to General Amaro by General Mijares Palencia, Chief of the Central Department (of the Governor of Mexico City). The *Album* is a collection of photographs of two different events that took place on two different dates. It begins with the photographs taken by journalist Enrique Díaz of the “gymnastic games” on 16 September 1931, Independence Day. A number of pictures were taken on the avenue *Paseo de la Reforma* (“Reform Promenade”) next to the *Niké* column (better known as “Independence Angel”), a central landmark in the iconographic representation of Mexican history displayed along the avenue: some photographs were taken from the top of the column; others have the column as their vanishing point. These photos show, for example, a synchronized staging of martial arts or groups of gymnasts in organized formations making the insignia of the police and the words “Mexico” and “Policía” (Figure 1). Other photographs have the *Zócalo* (the central square) as their background and show the parade of the fire brigades and the police.




Figure 1: Gymnastic Games

Source: Gymnastic Games of 16 September 1931 (*Álbum Festival Militar y Deportivo*, Museo Nacional de Arte, México, D.F.)

The album also documents the *Magno Festival Militar y Deportivo de la Policía Capitalina* (“Great Military and Sportive Festival of the Capital’s Police”), which was celebrated on 7 June 1931 at the Polo Club of the Army in honour of President Pascual Ortiz Rubio and General Amaro. There a number of female and male officers and employees of the police departments and fire brigades of Mexico City participated in the festival. A newspaper article reported that “both guardians of the public order, properly uniformed and carrying their new weapons, and other guardians wearing their athletic or sportive outfit with equal poise”, could be seen parading.⁴ Throughout the festival, “demonstrations of pole vaulting, personal defence, jiu-jitsu, rifle and pistol shooting, fencing, soccer, volleyball”, American football, baseball, gymnastics, polo, and cycling were held.⁵ Police-women and the female administrative staff gave demonstrations of “shooting, personal defence, and basketball”. The event was closed with an acrobatics show of the mounted police, a concert by the music band of the fire brigades, and a banquet with a speech by the President.⁶ The combined “sportive” and “military” character of the two festivals documented here was an always present component of all military and police festivals of the post-revolutionary period, which indicates the importance given to sport both as disciplinary practice and edifying spectacle.⁷

In contrast to the parade of 16 September 1931, which was held in a public place, the second festival documented in the album was witnessed by “government officials, army officers, national and international journalists, and diplomats”.⁸ Although the organizers could have chosen a public site for the festival, such as the National Stadium, the private character of the premises points to a restriction in the audience. This suggests that not all rituals of post-revolutionary societies served as pedagogical instruments for the indoctrination of the masses; some of them had as their preferred targets the elites who the new state wanted to integrate or to instruct in the government’s ideological programme. Just as the assumption that post-revolutionary mural painting was a mere means of popular indoctrination has recently been questioned by art historians – who draw attention to the confinement of those paintings to non-public buildings, the abundance of cryptic iconography in them, and the interest of the Ministry of Education to separate and keep the painters busy to avoid conspiracies⁹ – sportive and military festivals also need to be examined in such a way that reveals the hidden curriculum behind the apparently public celebration of sport as a means of improvement for firemen, the police, the army and the whole population.

4 Un festival militar y deportivo organiza hoy la policía local, in: *El Nacional*, 7 June 1931, p. 6.

5 Ibid.

6 El festival de la policía metropolitana, in: *Revista del Ejército y la Marina* [in what follows: REM] 11, 6 (June 1931), pp. 490-91.

7 D. Lorey, The Revolutionary Festival in Mexico: November 20th Celebrations in the 1920s and 1930s, in: *The Americas* 54, 1 (1997), pp. 39-82.

8 Un festival militar y deportivo (footnote 4), p. 6.

9 R. González Mello, El régimen visual y el fin de la Revolución, in: E. Acevedo (ed.), *Hacia otra historia del arte en México. T. III. La fabricación del arte nacional a debate (1920–1950)*, México 2002, pp. 275-309.

2. General Amaro and the institutionalisation of the revolutionary army

An article published in the *New York Times* on 7 December 1930 entitled “The Indian Who Sways Mexico’s Destiny” portrays the life of General Amaro as a metonymy of the Mexican revolution: the ascent of a poor “pure Indian” boy¹⁰ to chief of the army; from a combatant of the Revolution wearing amulets (an earring) to reorganizer of the national army. Amaro was appointed Minister of War and Navy by President Plutarco E. Calles (1924–1928), a post which he held until 1931 given his success in disciplining the army. But Amaro, according to his biographers, was the opposite of a typical revolutionary leader. Compared to the excess-driven Emiliano Zapata or Francisco Villa, Amaro – who was involved in planning Villa’s assassination – lived a “rigorous, abstemious life” and had “an omnivorous desire to extend his education”. He had a great organisational ability, and was hard-working and withdrawn from the mass media. Though “in ordinary intercourse he was mild, quiet, gentle”, he was often quick-tempered and violent with other military men. This was perhaps the type of character necessary to “institutionalize” the revolutionary armies, that is, to “unite the various feudal armies of the revolution under personal leadership and move towards a national institution based on loyalty to the State”. To do this Amaro had to impose a chain of command on a military composed of “violent and unruly spirits accustomed to graft, plunder, and the satiation of every human desire and lust”. He had to discipline the revolutionaries who were always ready to “betray their friends and their country” and “whose only law had been their own caprice”.¹¹ As the title of the article stated, Mexico’s destiny was in Amaro’s hands, for Calles considered that the most pressing task of his government, even more important than a fiscal reform, was the reform of the army. Towards the end of 1931 Calles, who still held the power behind the presidency, obliged Amaro to leave the Ministry, making him director of the *Colegio Militar* (Military Academy), where he would have the job of “improving and perfecting the soldier”.¹²

The process of “institutionalisation” of the army and police involved also certain image politics by which both organisations had to be shown as disciplined and obedient to the established order. Thus, in spite of his shyness towards the media, Amaro started a programme of symbolic acts aimed at showing the public the discipline of the armed and public order forces, their loyalty to the constitutional governments and, consequently, the power of those governments. The above-mentioned *New York Times* article was published on the occasion of an inspection of “35,000 troops equipped and drilled as no troops have ever been trained in Mexico”.¹³ In contrast to other generals, Amaro was, since the early 1920s, already organising celebrations with military programmes that dis-

10 J. A. Lozoya, *El ejército mexicano: 1911–1965*, México 1970, pp. 44–45.

11 C. Beals, *The Indian Who Sways Mexico’s Destiny*, in: *The New York Times* 7 December 1930, p. 9–10; M. B. Loyo Camacho, *Joaquín Amaro y el proceso de institucionalización del ejército mexicano, 1917–1931*, México 2003, p. 122; Lozoya (footnote 10).

12 Loyo (footnote 11); Lozoya (footnote 10).

13 Beals (footnote 10), p. 9.

played the merits of training and obedience to superiors.¹⁴ Festivals and parades became later central elements of this image politics, for they, according to the press, showed the “improvement and progress of the army” in the service of guaranteeing order, protecting institutions, and defending the nation.¹⁵ Yet such image politics were not only aimed at public opinion: if festivals showed the “discipline and good organisation that has been instilled in this modern force of social service”, it was believed that by displaying such “degree of improvement and discipline”, the police themselves were becoming “zealous and conscious of their duty”.¹⁶ In the eyes of some contemporary analysts, those early parades and festivals had a performative character, by virtue of which the soldiers internalized, in inspections and celebrations, the values they were displaying. Sport was a central element in these festivals and parades. Himself sporty – being fond of horse-riding and pelota – Amaro had a key role in the promotion of sport in the civil realm as well, for example during his brief presidency of the Mexican Olympic Committee. The most general and obvious aim of Amaro’s interests in sports was the physical enhancement of each soldier, policeman or fireman, which was to improve the efficiency of all the forces of defence and of public order.

3. Sport in post-revolutionary Mexico

The generalized realisation of Mexico’s backwardness *vis à vis* the United States, which had seized half of Mexico’s territory and interfered continuously in its affairs, gave way at the end of the nineteenth century to a number of vague movements and languages of “renewal” or “regeneration”, similar to others that took place in Latin America. These “developmentalist” ideas,¹⁷ which constituted the ideological nucleus of some factions of the Mexican revolution,¹⁸ had their roots in republicanism – the reason why many of their proponents have been considered as “liberals”¹⁹ – but they could approach socialism, some forms of corporatism and even anarchism. The republicanism of these languages was evident in the attention they paid to virtue, manners and customs in educational reform. These developmental languages adopted the social psychology diagnoses of the causes of the decadence of the Latin-Catholic societies with respect to *WASP* societies: they considered that one of the reasons for that decadence lay in distinctive features of

14 Loyo (footnote 11), p. 98; F. Suárez Gómez, La importancia de la carrera profesional militar, in: REM 4, 2 (November 1925), pp. 941-942.

15 L. Segovia/R. Segovia, Los inicios de la institucionalización y los años del maximato (1932–1934), México 1977, p. 148.

16 Un festival militar y deportivo (footnote 4), p. 6.

17 Knight (footnote 2), p. 396.

18 For the views on regeneration and Swedish gymnastics in Bolivia, see F. Martínez, Que nuestros indios se conviertan en pequeños suecos, in: Boletín del Instituto Francés de Estudios Andinos 28, 3 (1999), pp. 361-386. In Mexico it was Luis N. Morones who took on the idea through his magazine *Regeneración*.

19 M. E. Romos, Los militares revolucionarios: un mosaico de reivindicaciones y de oportunismo, in: Estudios de Historia Moderna y Contemporánea de México 16 (1993), pp. 29-52, <http://www.iih.unam.mx/moderna/ehmc/ehmc16/206.html>.

the national character of the former: superstition, fatalism, indolence, and individualism, among others.²⁰

However, the threat poised by the USA and internal reactionary forces was not the only reason for the launching of a comprehensive programme of “psychological revolution”, as President Plutarco Elías Calles called it. Popular evolutionism, which did not distinguish between the theories of Darwin, Spencer, Lamarck or even the quasi-mystical theories of Bergson, also informed the ideas of the new political and intellectual elites. This popularized evolutionism considered that, whereas competition for survival had begun as a physical and material struggle, in modern human societies the struggle was an individual and moral one; the ‘fittest’ in this context were the most virtuous and intelligent people. However, for these elites the problem arose considering environment: if the environment was not morally adequate – as was the case in underdeveloped societies – adaptation would not lead to the selection of modern and exemplary individuals. Therefore the social environment as a whole had to be targeted, transformed and used as an educational instrument by the educational offensive.

The catalogue of prescribed remedies to these diseases ranged from physical and mental eugenics,²¹ anticlericalism and educational activism to vitalist attempts to foster the *élan vital*²² and socialist and corporatist models of social organisation.²³ The post-revolutionary governments defined their all-encompassing educational strategies along those lines, with the purpose of “redeeming”, disciplining, and mobilising the new Mexicans, and ultimately transforming the country. They started a programme of “social engineering”, a crusade for hygiene, health, and morality to eradicate disease, bad habits, and crime. This programme was to lead to the development of a healthy, stronger and homogenous population; a requirement for the forming of a single social body.²⁴ Everything hindering modernisation was to be exorcized.

These programmes conceived of both the army and the school as modernising agents that should educate and collaborate in the defence of the country. President Ortiz Rubio decreed on 23 June 1931 that primary schools should be established in military units²⁵, and ordered on 6 October that “military instruction should be provided in all public and private schools of the country”.²⁶ The promoters of these measures did not hide their objectives:

20 G. Le Bon, *Leyes psicológicas de la evolución de los pueblos*, Madrid 1912; C. O. Bunge, *Nuestra América*, Barcelona 1903.

21 J. Bayer, *El laboratorio fisiológico del ejército francés*, in: REM 2, 2 (November 1923), pp. 269–274, p. 269.

22 E. J. Marteau, *El papel del instructor de cultura física*, in: REM 4, 2 (November 1925), pp. 982–85. D. M. Vélez, *Discurso del 4 de julio de 1929 dedicado al Gral. Amaro*, in: REM 9, 1 (January 1930), pp. 137–139.

23 E. Krauze, *Los caudillos culturales en la revolución Mexicana*, México 1981; V. Díaz Arciniega, *Querella por la cultura revolucionaria: 1925*, México 1989; C. A. Hale, *The Transformation of Liberalism in late Nineteenth-Century Mexico*, Princeton 1989; D. Cosío Villegas, *Historia moderna de México*, México 1974.

24 B. Urías, *Eugenesia e ideas sobre las razas en México, 1930–1950*, in: *Historia y grafía* 17 (2001), pp. 194–283; B. Urías, *Utopía no utopía. La arquitectura, la enseñanza y la planificación del deseo*, México 2005.

25 *La organización de la enseñanza primaria. Decreto para que se haga en el ejército*, in: *El Universal* 26 June 1931, pp. 7, 9.

26 Presidential agreement num. 697, 29 July 1931.

*Military instruction at school creates habits of discipline and inculcates the feeling of hierarchy, which is indispensable for social functioning. Disregard for that hierarchy in political, civil, and intellectual realms is the reason why in twenty years we have not been able to at least go back to the point where we were when the Revolution caught us by surprise.*²⁷

Such legislation followed, among others, the ideas of the popular social psychologist Gustave Le Bon. The *Revista del Ejército y la Marina* ("Journal of Army and Navy", short: *REM*), the official bulletin of the Ministry for Army and Navy, published in 1922 an article by Le Bon in which he suggested that the army was the "prime educational centre, the efficient agent for the improvement and regeneration of the French (Latin) race, which had been degenerated by the university". Compulsory military service should instil in all recruits the victorious Anglo-Saxon character, which was characterized by "discipline, solidarity, resistance, energy, initiative, and feeling of duty".²⁸ However, in Mexico, compulsory military service had additional aims. Referring to the Indians who learned the "national language" in the army, Amaro himself said that enrolment was "the true campaign against illiteracy".²⁹

The army was turned into the experimental field for the global reform of Mexican society, with similar ideological emphasis and instruments as those advocated for civil education: teaching of basic literacy, moralisation, mobilisation, revolutionary indoctrination, and anticlericalism. Sport was promoted both for military and civil education and constituted a link between both systems.³⁰ Thus in the "Organic Law of the Army", written by Amaro's spokesman (General Álvarez), sport was put at the centre of military instruction in schools, and this was deemed as preparation for compulsory military service.³¹

By contrast with the social evolutionism that characterized the dictatorship preceding the Revolution, the post-revolutionary discourse on sport turned back to the common ideas derived from Lamarckism about the relationship between the transformation of individuals (ontogenesis) and the evolution of the species (phylogenesis).³² This parallel between the individual and the social body enabled the post-revolutionary elites to maintain that the large-scale practice of sport would lead not only to a physical regeneration but also to the moral regeneration of the whole race and nation.³³ An article entitled "The practice of sport is the best means to build the Fatherland", published in 1931 in the officialist newspaper *El Nacional*, presented the view of the leaders of the National Revolutionary Party (the ruling party, PNR) about sport and patriotism:

27 Educación militar, in: La Prensa, 6 October 1930.

28 G. Le Bon, La Educación por el Ejército, in: REM 1, 7 (July 1922), pp. 797-801.

29 Loyo (footnote 11), p. 104.

30 M. Velázquez Andrade, Tópicos sobre educación. Educación Militar y Previsión, in: El Nacional, 28 June 1930, p. 11; Proyecto de adiestramiento patriótico-militar a todos los jóvenes en nuestro país, in: Excelsior, 24 September 1931, p. 10.

31 Loyo (footnote 11), p. 133.

32 Aristóteles, De generatione animalium. S. J. Gould, Ontogeny and Phylogeny, London 1977, p. 13ff.

33 C. Juarros, El valor práctico del deporte, in: REM 3, 9 (September 1924), p. 627f.

*Through the promotion of sports all children and young people will attain sound physical development and will receive all the benefits of these kind of activities, improving in the three orders of the triangle of racial improvement, that is, the intellectual, the physical and the moral orders... For the widespread dissemination of sport we need to create a special body that controls all sport-related activities.*³⁴

The need for sport and its benefits for the individual and the race was a recurring topic in the articles of the section “Physical Education” of the *REM* during the 1920s. Most of the articles regretted the lack of a sport tradition in modern Mexico,³⁵ and eulogized sport as an instrument for social reform because of its ability to promote “discipline, drive out indolence and encourage activity, develop team spirit, and improve the intellectual faculties”.³⁶ Sport also served to encourage an ethos of subordination to superiors, to the government, and to the nation as well as to channel individual violence and educate the character.³⁷

Moreover, as the head of the Sport Committee of the PNR put it, sport was not only to form the new Mexican according to the “archetype of the man of the future, of strong muscles and healthy spirit”; sport was “*a religion* that would save humans from the tentacles of bad habits and evil, creating character and strengthening the fortitude of the people”.³⁸ Therefore sport was the means for the “redemption” of the country.³⁹ As such, it should become “an important weapon in the struggle against the Church and social vices” such as gambling and alcohol.⁴⁰ The anticlerical post-revolutionary elite considered that the Church and its doctrines were responsible for the superstition, submission, indolence, and injustice of the Mexican society, and thereby hindered the modernisation of the country. In their view, the Church had monopolized popular recreation by imposing a large number of religious festivities which fostered alcoholism.⁴¹ In order to reduce the presence of the Church in public life, religious festivities and public religious representations were banished and substituted with secular and “hygienic” activities not linked to popular religious celebrations. Amaro, who became famous for ordering his

34 El cultivo del deporte es el mejor medio para hacer patria, in: *El Nacional* 7 June 1931, p. 6 (our emphasis). See also: I. Muñoz, El aseo y la gimnasia como medios de la regeneración del ejército, in: *REM* 5 (May 1922), pp. 581-583.

35 D. Betancourt, La gimnasia y los deportes base de la salud, in: *REM* 4, 10 (October 1925), pp. 915-917; p. 916.

36 Marteau (footnote 22). La guerra y el deporte, in: *REM* 2, 1 (January 1923), p. 91 ff.; Juarros (footnote 33), p. 627. El deporte en la educación por la acción, in: *REM* 4, 1 (January 1925), pp. 627-630; Ideas modernas de educación física en Latinoamérica, in: *REM* 2, 10 (October 1923), pp. 1167-1171; p. 1969.

37 Loyo (footnote 11), pp. 55, 65.

38 El actual presidente del PNR estimula los deportes en bien de la futura generación mexicana, in: *El Nacional* 14 June 1931, p. 6.

39 This diagnosis was shared by General Tirso Hernández, head of Physical Education of Mexico City and member of the Mexican Olympic Committee. Hernández was a decided promoter of physical education and in 1929 he set up the so-called “National Committee for the Struggle against Alcoholism”.

40 F. Rojas González, Estudio Histórico-Etnográfico del Alcoholismo entre los Indios de México, in: *Revista Mexicana de Sociología* 4, 2 (1942), pp. 111-125.

41 According to rural teacher B. Avilés, the “extended religious festivities were nothing but pretexts for scandalous drunkenness and other immoral excesses”. Cit. in: Knight (footnote 2), p. 405.

troops to desecrate churches during the *Cristero* war, shared the deep anticlericalism of the governments of the so-called *Maximato* – that is, the period in which Calles ruled *de jure* or *de facto*, 1928–1934.⁴²

In the eyes of the post-revolutionary elites, sport, then, did not only have a positive and direct impact, but also very important indirect effects. Sport could counteract the influence of the Church as it introduced a new ethos, new spaces for socialisation, new leaders, and alternative role models.⁴³ In this last respect, for instance, an article published in the *REM* described the physical instructor as a counsellor and moral example.⁴⁴ That the *Festival Militar y Deportivo* of the police took place on a Sunday (7 June 1931), suggests, as in the case of other festivals, that organizers wanted to drive people's attention away from mass and draw it towards secular activities, namely sports. The practice of sports on holidays distinguished and separated the revolutionary believers in the redemption of the individual and social body from the reactionary faithful of the Church.

The role of sport as an instrument of negative selection continued in the over-sized constitutional army, which was full of soldiers enlisted for lack of job alternatives or recruited forcefully during the war. An article calling for reform in the army and the need for discipline to best face external enemies and prevent internal struggle, announced that the army would get rid of soldiers who were “apathetic and indolent”. Participation in sport served as an instrument to single out and purge the troops of those who were lazy and reluctant.⁴⁵

That sport not only was promoted for its positive direct effects was clearly articulated in the June festival documented in the album, a festival that was conceived of as part of a “moralising” campaign for the police launched in May 1931 by General Mijares. Sport and instruction were not only intended to physically prepare the police for their job, but also to occupy time that could be used for unhealthy, immoral, criminal, or conspiratory activities. Amaro had already since 1922 imposed on his division an exhausting 15 hour daily program of horse-riding, gymnastics, basic literacy, and military lectures which left soldiers only a few hours free on Sundays. As Loyo points out, “Amaro insisted on the promotion of sport [...] to reduce the rate of endemic diseases among the soldiers”.⁴⁶ Their main disease after years of war was syphilis, which also affected a large number of the population.⁴⁷ According to the *REM*, seven out of ten soldiers suffered from it.⁴⁸ Sport was not only to channel their sex drive but intended also to reduce the time in which they could engage in activities liable to contract the disease or pass it on.

42 J. Meyer, *La Cristiada*, México 1993.

43 M. K. Vaughan, *The Construction of Patriotic Festival in Tecamachalco, Puebla, 1900–1946*, in: W. Beezley et al. (eds), *Rituals of Rule, Rituals of Resistance*, Wilmington 1994, pp. 213–246.

44 Marteau (footnote 22), p. 985.

45 Suárez Gómez (footnote 14), p. 941 ff.

46 Ibid.

47 T. Arteaga, *Nueva Italia*, 20 November 1939, estimates that three quarters of the agricultural labourers of the Hacienda “Nueva Italia” had syphilis.

48 M. F. Gaona, *Medicina Militar. La sífilis*, in: *REM* 4, 2 (February 1925), p. 151.

Troop inspections, manoeuvres, and demonstrations served also as examination for the lower levels of the army and a means to prove their loyalty to their commanders. Through them officers ensured that time was not used for conspiracies but for training. Parades and shows were, then, to the outside, displays and reaffirmations of the power of the high commanders and confirmations of their being in control.

4. Sport in the army and police through the album of General Amaro

The *Álbum Festival Militar y Deportivo* documents the different kinds of sports and military exercises practised by the Mexican army and police. In this section we analyse these visual representations, paying attention to the variety of iconographical conventions used in them to further develop the discussion of the aims and objectives of the different kinds of sports and military practices.

The album shows images of a military adaptation of French gymnastics and the German *Turnen* (vault jump, somersaults, and the like). In the 1920s several articles of the *REM* were devoted to different types of gymnastics, focusing in particular on the French and German ones – that is, the two kinds that had the most nationalistic and militaristic contents. However, if these schools had developed exercises that symbolically and practically gave precedence to the infantry – representing *la Nation* or *das Volk* – over the cavalry, the adaptation of their exercises for the Mexican army inverted that common feature by glorification of the cavalry and the establishment of rigid hierarchies. In this sense, many figures consist of human pyramids with bases of soldiers kneeling down “on all fours”; this is almost a metaphor of animal-like submission (Figure 2). Such a submission to hierarchy and to the group was the topic of an *REM* article entitled “The importance of the professional military career”, which stated that military life involved “giving up the free and individual will in the face of command”.⁴⁹ In the language of natural law, omnipresent in Spanish America well into the twentieth century, free will denoted deliberate action, the quality which distinguished human beings from animals.

Animal-like (or machine-like) submission of the soldiers in the gymnastic pyramids was reinforced by similar exercises in which the basis of the pyramid consisted of horses, motorcycles or bicycles. The photographic language used to describe these exercises is based upon an objectifying distance of very general shots which convey the idea of the social pyramid as a natural and therefore necessary concept.

The album also shows examples of so-called “mass ornaments”, in which large groups of bodies moved together forming figures or choreographies (as shown by Figure 1). These movements largely drew from Swedish gymnastics, which paradoxically had emerged as a reaction against the militarism and nationalism of the French and German schools of gymnastics. Swedish gymnastics had as their guideline a notion of equality, aiming at the body’s self-control without external instruments rather than at action.

49 Suárez Gómez (footnote 14).




Figure 2: Human pyramid

Source: Gran festival militar y deportivo de la policía metropolitana, 7 June 1931. Polo Club, Mexico (Álbum Festival Militar y Deportivo, Museo Nacional de Arte, México, D.F.)

But the meaning of this form of gymnastics was transformed when it was applied to large groups of athletes and combined with military exercise routines. It is important to mention that Swedish gymnastics and callisthenics were introduced in the army only for synchronized team floor callisthenics and “mass ornaments”, whereas in regular schooling they had already been in use before the revolution. In this kind of exercises, the participants form large collective geometric shapes or letters, thus losing their own individuality. Individual wills and bodies join in a general design which, given its complexity, might remain unnoticed to the performers. These choreographies eloquently showed worship of the controlled movement of the social organism. Through their emphasis on individual submission to a superior design, they invoked the dream of an ordered and uniform “mass” which rejected individualism and could be (de)mobilized in a short period of time. This is why they were so appealing to authoritarian and totalitarian systems. Their introduction in Mexico might have had to do with an admiration for the political and educational policies of the Soviet Union at the time.⁵⁰

The above-mentioned features were reinforced by the iconographic conventions used in their representation. For their design, deciphering, and photography, “mass ornaments” had to be seen from an almost zenith bird’s eye view that portrayed the “mass” – therefore these exercises were made especially for the public on the stands and for the mass

50 B. Uñas, *Retórica, ficción y espejismo: tres imágenes de un México bolchevique (1920–1940)*, in: *Relaciones* (Winter 2005), pp. 261–300.

media. Such a photographic formula, which had become a convention with Aleksandr Rodchenko, is the most avant-garde of the album.⁵¹ The private character of the album, almost a professional document intended as a record of efficiency, made difficult the use of more avant-garde forms of representation (which were being used at the time in Mexico). Neither are there prime shots of the athletes in the album, such as those common in Nazi Germany which glorified the perfection of the athletic body.

The “mass ornament” had some affinity with the Taylorist principles of mechanized production: within the ornament, the individual performs prescribed routine movements as a piece of the machinery, the whole of which he does not know. Just as in the “Soviet physical culture” where the strength of the population was supposed to guarantee industrial development and military success,⁵² in Mexico the promotion of this kind of gymnastics and collective exercises was justified with the notion that they improved attention and increased enthusiasm for repetitive work tasks.⁵³ Sport practice as a guarantee of productivity thus became a sort of civic commitment required of every individual; within the army, it was a sign that this institution wanted to “give back to society productive citizens”.⁵⁴

A significant number of the album's photographs are devoted to basketball, which together with other Anglo-Saxon team sports were promoted during the 1920s and 1930s in all educational institutions in Mexico.⁵⁵ Team sports were favoured by the movements of educational and social reform in the USA. Moisés Sáenz, the Mexican Minister of Education in 1928, was a pupil of John Dewey⁵⁶ and might have been a main promoter of sports in the state sphere, even within the troops given the proximity between school and army.⁵⁷ The dominant activist pedagogical literature of this time stated that team sports promoted strong links of solidarity and cooperative personalities. This view was particularly appealing to the Mexican authorities in light of the sociological and social psychological theory that modern societies led to anomy and a loss of community integration. Moreover, if the individualism of Latin-Catholic societies was believed to have been one cause for Mexico's decline, then it was natural that the intellectual elite looked for instruments that counteracted that negative trait. In any case, the promotion of team sports paralleled the revolutionary state's attempt to foster (and control) associations and

51 S. Kracauer, *The Mass Ornament*, Cambridge, Mass. 1995, pp. 75-86.

52 M. O'Magony, *Sports in the USSR. Physical Culture-Visual Culture*, London 2006, p. 16.

53 Juarros (footnote 33), p. 627.

54 Vélez (footnote 22), p. 143.

55 A. Knight, *Estado, revolución y cultura popular en los años treinta*, in: Marcos Tonatiuh Águila/A. Enríquez Perea (eds), *Perspectivas sobre el cardenismo*, México 1996, p. 308; Joseph Arbená (ed.), *Sport and Society in Latin America*, New York 1988.

56 E.g. J. Dewey, *Educational Lectures before Brigham Young Academy*, in: *The Later Works of John Dewey, 1925-1953*, vol. 17, Carbondale 1981, pp. 260-261; J. Dewey, *The School and Society*, *School and social progress*, in: *The Middle Works of John Dewey, 1899-1924*, vol. 1, Carbondale 1971, p. 10.

57 The collaboration between both Ministries extended to the (re)foundation of military schools and academies including the Military School of Medicine and of the Military School of Engineering.

corporatist integration.⁵⁸ The official project also intended to appropriate those sports which were so far the monopoly of private sponsored or owned clubs – of immigrants, the YMCA or newspapers – and to make them part of the government programme of social reform and nationalisation of popular culture.⁵⁹ Not only did the *REM* insist on the creation of non-military sports teams,⁶⁰ but it also argued that “all sports” should be practised in the army, for they “prepare us for the *struggle for our own life* and for the fulfilment of our duties”.

With respect to basketball, it stated that this sport was “favoured by the *citizen* President of the Republic and by the *citizen* Minister of War and Navy”.⁶¹ This support stems from its recommendation by Protestant activism,⁶² and plausibly from the view that it was a sport which demanded a great deal of skilfulness and fast reflexes – and was thus a good mobilisation instrument. However another reason for this preference might have been precisely the reason why it was unpopular in the army. The article contradicts the common belief, that “it is not a masculine sport but one for girls” by affirming that “all sports may be practised by both men and women”.⁶³ Therefore basketball was fostered plausibly because it was thought less masculine (that is, less violent) than, for example, football. The rejection of “feminine sports” by the troops was part of a larger resistance to physical exercise, which was often justified with less subtle arguments such as injuries or illness. To deal with that resistance, the authorities had to try different strategies: promoting various kinds of sports to attract different preferences, participating themselves, rewarding exemplary participation, and separating the lazy and reluctant soldiers into special units.⁶⁴ As mentioned before, sport was used as a mechanism of negative selection. In contrast to the rigid hierarchies and formations displayed in military gymnastics, team sports strengthened individual decision-making and action within the general rules of the game and in interaction with the group. Team sports were therefore a more modern means of instruction for the army that presupposed responsible and educated individuals and groups, with a high degree of autonomy and discipline. The *REM* mentioned that there were around eleven basketball teams in the Ministry of Army and Navy, which made together an internal league.⁶⁵ This suggests that much of the sport policies were addressed at the military elites. It remains a subject of further investigation whether the promotion of team sports in the army was more adamant for the higher ranks, who had

58 F. Katz, Un intento único de modernización en México: el régimen de Lázaro Cárdenas, in: Günther Maihold, Modernidades en México [Mexican Modernities], México: Porrúa, 2004, pp. 11–22.

59 R. V. McGehee, The Impact of Imported Sports on the Popular Culture of Nineteenth- and Twentieth-Century Mexico and Central America, in: I. Efev / K. Racine, Strange Pilgrimages: Exile, Travel, and National Identity in Latin America, 1800–1900s, Wilmington 2000, pp. 95–112, p. 97 ff. M. Quiroz Cortés, La educación física en el ejército, in: *REM* 10, 4 (September 1930), pp. 692–695.

60 Team de basse-ball (sic) de los Talleres Gráficos de la Nación, in: *REM* 2, 10 (October 1923), p. 1173.

61 J. I. Fortunat, El basket ball, in: *REM* 4, 10 (October 1925), pp. 919–920 (our emphasis).

62 R. V. McGehee, Sports and recreational activities in Guatemala and Mexico, late 1800 to 1926, in: *Studies in Latin American Popular Culture* 13 (1994), pp. 7–32, p. 16.

63 Ibid.

64 M. Quiroz Cortez, Anales de la educación física en el 25 batallón, in: *REM* 11, 1 (January 1931), pp. 19–30.

65 Fortunat (footnote 61).

to work responsibly and in a group, than for the privates, who were expected to obey without exercising free will.

The album's photographs emphasize the informal character of team sports as well as the bonds of solidarity and camaraderie created by them. It is not surprising that one of the most relaxed pictures is one that shows the female basketball team during a break: the players crowd together and smile at the photographer, thereby following an iconographic convention established in Anglo-Saxon countries. It is an image that reinforces the idea of a supportive and united team even beyond the match itself. The very performative process of posing like a team for the picture was intended to strengthen that ethos.⁶⁶ The frame of the group in which the athletes' facial expressions can be appreciated reinforces this impression. But, like Mosse points out for German athletic festivities, "spontaneity was never a fact; all festivals were planned, yet an illusion of a carefully constructed spontaneity makes them more meaningful".⁶⁷

Alongside these forms of gymnastics and sports the album contains images of physical activities traditionally associated with the army and police, such as horse-riding, fencing, Greek-Roman wrestling, and jiu-jitsu. The latter exhibits the Mexican interest in the Japanese army, of which the encounters between the representatives of both armies and some *REM* articles further indicate.⁶⁸

All these different forms of sports conveyed different ethos, therefore, the practice and spectacle of sport in the police and the army was above all characterized by eclecticism. The parades of army and police forces practising sport and dressed in sports outfit contrasted strongly with the traditional conceptions of military virtues as opposed to civil ones. Continuous participation of army and police forces in sport competitions in which good civilian players were also put on the teams was considered means for the former to socialize with the "popular masses" (a practice that was then abandoned when it was discovered that it put off many in the military⁶⁹). The sportive events documented in the album precluded the conformation of November 20th, the anniversary of the Revolution, as a plainly sportive celebration lead by military units in sport outfit.⁷⁰ The message of this form of official celebration of the 20th November was clear: more than the fulfilment of agrarian and economic demands and more than democracy and elite change, for the winning faction of the revolution the true objective was the modernisation of the social body through the mobilisation and hygienisation of individuals and through their integration into a country which was productive, detached from the Catholic Church, and able to defend its sovereignty against its Northern neighbour. Such representations and the growing importance given to sport highlighted the growing demobilisation and

66 C. Wulf et al., *Das Soziale als Ritual. Zur performativen Bildung von Gemeinschaften*, Opladen 2001.

67 G. L. Mosse, *La nacionalización de las masas*, Madrid 2005, p. 126.

68 J. C. Ballet, *Japón: El entrenamiento en las escuelas públicas*, in: *REM* 4, 2 (November 1925), p. 944; p. 965.

69 Quiroz Cortez (footnote 64), p. 25.

70 INEHRM, *Celebración del 20 de noviembre: 1910–1985, México 1985*; Lorey (footnote 7); K. Brewster, *Redeeming the 'Indian': Sport and Ethnicity in Post-Revolutionary Mexico*, in: *Patterns of Prejudice* 38, 3 (September 2004), pp. 213–231.

demilitarisation of the armed and public order forces, the channelling of their violence, and openness to a more civil ethos that was to support its transformation into a guardian of a civil and civilized order. The armed forces dressed in sport outfit promised a more peaceful and healthier future.

However, this openness to a more civil conception of the army ran parallel to a process of *disciplining* or militarising the whole of the citizens. Some participants in the parades wearing military uniform performed the Roman salute to the state leaders in the podium, a visual and corporal exchange that expressed allegiance and commitment to national unity.⁷¹ Practised by the Olympic movement, during the first half of the twentieth century the Roman salute became a symbol of loyalty and compliance in strong authoritarian and nationalist movements, like the Nazi-fascist rituals or the “Pledge of Allegiance”. In Mexico, its coexistence with the traditional military and police salutation indicates the growing influence of sport in the army and the militarization of civil realm.

Uniformity provided by military and sport conveyed the ideas of classless uniformity and equal citizenship. This became an important meaning for marginalized groups as Indians and women. Festivities and their representation in the album also reflect the post-revolutionary project of the so-called “incorporation of the masses”, which referred especially to women and Indians. The album also reveals the deeply contradictory character of that project, for “incorporation” – later called “integration” – implied the acculturation of the Indians and their mixture with the white society. Military and sport activities and outfits uniformed all Mexicans, allowing the Indians to excel in those activities for which it was believed they were by nature more gifted than other groups, but they imposed Western clothing and activities. As many articles in the REM show, the top army ranks were aware of the relationships between gymnastics, compulsory military service, and colonisation in the French empire. All these topics join together in some articles in the REM devoted to the civilising mission and the internal colonisation carried out by the Mexican army.⁷²

One of the main themes of the album – in terms of the number of photographs devoted to it and of their position in the middle part of the work – is the participation of women in the festivities. Indeed two gender discourses may be identified in the album: one about virtuous virility, focused not so much on the perfect masculine body as repository of virtues but rather on the values of cooperation, order, and compliance; the other, about feminine emancipation. This discourse reproduces the contradictions of discourses on the integration of women: to achieve a similar status to men they are supposed to adopt masculine values and abilities such as physical strength, the use of violence, the ability to defend themselves, and the wearing of uniforms. Particularly revealing are the shots of women doing jiu-jitsu locks to their male colleagues. Some of these photos show a row of women pulling down men to the floor which gives a diagonal to the shot's framing

71 Mosse (footnote 67), p. 168.

72 Le Bon (footnote 28); Proyecto para colonias militares en el norte de la república, in: REM 1, 7 (July 1922), pp. 800-804; p. 801.

with a vanishing point located outside of it, thus helping to reinforce that discourse by creating the illusion of a repeated, endless sequence. The photographs become a general statement about women's skills.

The creation of new public spaces and forms of socialisation alternative to the existing ones (especially to those provided by the Church) was highly significant for women, for whom sport meant a space of freedom and interaction that preceded or accompanied paid labour outside the home. The contradictions and eclecticism of the modernization programme were shown even in the outfit of the athletes. Differences were particularly evident with regard to the female outfit, which ranged from the long skirt worn in fencing and the culottes for Greek-Roman wrestling to the short pants of the basketball players. However, the photograph of the female basketball players parading in short pants ahead of other male athletes has clear connotations (Figure 3). It is a message that women may partake in public activities and even take precedence over men; it tells of a modern morality of hygienic decency of built-up bodies and of comradeship between the sexes, in which sport serves to channel and restrain the instincts. After a revolution in which so many Mexican women were raped, and considering the traditional values associated with rape in Mexican culture,⁷³ the photograph of female athletes in shorts guiding policemen proclaims the end of sexual violence – the epitome of all violence – by showing a decidedly sexually-content and peaceful police.



Figure 3:
Female basketball players. Source: Gran festival militar y deportivo de la policía metropolitana, 7 June 1931. Polo Club, Mexico City (Álbum Festival Militar y Deportivo, Museo Nacional de Arte, México, D.F.)

5. Sport spectacle and image campaign

The post-revolutionary government encouraged the practice and spectacle of sports through their diffusion in the media (printed press and radio). This promotion follows to a large extent the strategy of education through models and vicarious learning so dear to the Catholic Church and the Hispanic American tradition. In contrast to official historiography which portrayed the independence, the wars against foreign invaders, and the revolution through a vast catalogue of heroes and martyrs who served as role models,⁷⁴ sport provided images which offered a more civil and demilitarized ethics. The athlete was elevated to the category of *exemplum* to be imitated; his very presence was supposed to encourage sports practice.⁷⁵ More than a mere activity or spectacle, sport became a symbol, a metonymy of all revolutionary values and politics, a model to identify with or to reject.

Towards the end of the 1920s Mexico was in turmoil. Apart from a number of political and military revolts (the *Cristero* war, the rebellion of the Yaqui Indians, various military uprisings), an economic crisis broke out in 1926 anticipating the 1929 crash. In a period when criticism of the government and the revolution at whole was at its highest, “the new virility of the police was living proof that the nation had vigorously re-emerged after the violent civil war”.⁷⁶ Military and police parades were a form of publicity for the efficacy of both forces, and if the “success in sports guaranteed [...] the strengthening of an identity, [...] and even the legitimacy of a political regime”,⁷⁷ the brilliance of the sport spectacle was intended to boost the public image of the government. However, parades and sportive-military shows were also just that, spectacle and public amusement in times of crisis.⁷⁸

Moreover, the public presentation of the guardian of public order as a sportsman (or sportswoman) was the nicest face of an intensely nationalist campaign which intended to make “a noisy propagandist projection of the *national values*”.⁷⁹ And if sport demonstrations tried to show the “chance for self-improvement in the struggle against vices and atavistic behaviour which undermined the greatness of the Mexican race”, they also served to mask, under the banner of the hygienic regeneration of the race, the purge of drug addicts and prostitutes, the repression of the Mexican Communist Party, and the attacks on the Chinese and Jewish minorities.⁸⁰

74 I. O'Malley, *The Myth of the Revolution*, New York 1985; S. Brunk, *Remembering Emiliano Zapata*, in: *The Hispanic American Historical Review* 78, 3 (August 1998), pp. 457-490; L. Mayer, *El proceso de recuperación simbólica de cuatro héroes de la revolución mexicana de 1910*, in: *Historia Mexicana*, XLVIII, 2 (1998), pp. 353-381.

75 O'Magony (footnote 52), p. 69.

76 Oles (footnote 1).

77 P. Arnaud, *El deporte, vehículo de las representaciones nacionales de los estados europeos*, in: T. González Aja (ed.), *Sport y autoritarismos*, Madrid 2000, pp. 21-42. p. 24.

78 R. Gallo, *Mexican Modernity: the Avant-Garde and the Technological Revolution*, Cambridge, Mass. 2005, p. 210.

79 R. Pérez Montfort, *Estampas del nacionalismo popular mexicano (Images of Mexican popular nationalism)*, México 2003, p. 144.

80 J. M. López Victoria, *La campaña nacionalista*, México 1965, p. 193.

6. The album in the networks of political intrigue

What were Mijares' intentions in dedicating to Amaro both the demonstration here described and its commemorating album? A key to the answer is provided by the date chosen for Amaro's homage. All those involved in the event knew that precisely on that day the supporters of former President Calles – who intended to remain in power from the shadows – had plotted in the city of Querétaro to discredit Amaro and to force him to leave the cabinet – thereby weakening President Ortiz Rubio. Whereas the real power games were being held in Querétaro, the power of image was being displayed at the Polo Club in the capital. Most of the photographs of Amaro and the President taken on that day highlight their relaxed, almost informal attitude. Ortiz Rubio, who in his speech praised the purge and discipline of the police and its moralising task, stated:⁸¹ “*The higher police command staff is worthy of the trust of the authorities and of the Presidency of the Republic*, for the bad elements in the police have been punished and purged.”⁸²

Ortiz Rubio's speech reflects two purposes of the festivals: the cleansing of the public image of the police and the display of the police as a healthy body able to guarantee social order and civil welfare. However, as is the case with any disciplining programme, its ultimate goal was the establishment of a hierarchical, efficient order. The festival was therefore, above all, a public demonstration of Mijares's loyalty to both Ortiz Rubio and Amaro and consequently a display of the strength of Rubio and Amaro *vis à vis* Calles. The show and the album celebrate Amaro's achievements in the “institutionalisation” of the police and the police's allegiance to him. Therefore, the political situation discouraged the presence of the public, who might make an attempt on the lives of the top leaders or ruin the event. Calles had always acknowledged Amaro's strong character and especially his ability to “dismantle personal loyalties and form bonds of full obedience to the Ministry of War and Navy”.⁸³ Yet it was precisely Amaro's “institutionalisation” programme which involved loyalty to the official power, together with the accumulated power in the Ministry of War, which made him a potential enemy for the real power holder in the shadows. Even if they are of sportive nature, police or military demonstrations are always displays of power.

7. Final remarks

General Amaro's album is an idealized representation of post-revolutionary cultural policies and the process of “institutionalisation” of the forces of public order and defence; yet it veils the contradictory character of that transformation (and in general of the policies of forced modernisation to which it belonged). The album shows disciplined, efficient, and

81 El festival de la policía metropolitana, in: REM 11, 7 (June 1931), p. 490-491. We are grateful to Enrique Plasencia for generously sharing this information with us.

82 Un festival militar y deportivo (footnote 4), p. 6.

83 Loyo (footnote 11), p. 176.

submissive armed and police forces, which are yet tamed by sport so as not to represent a danger to the established power. However, the “sportivisation” of the army required as its counterpart the mobilisation and militarisation of the whole of society by means of militarized sport. To achieve that, the *Maximato* governments attempted to turn the army and the school into agencies of both education and defence, with interchangeable roles, thus constructing the moralising global environment needed for the “psychological revolution” of the Mexicans. Sport and sport spectacle were essential instruments of this policy. The album presents the state’s attempts at mobilising and instilling collective values in the armed and police forces (and, by extension, in the whole of society) through sport, but only to promote their obedience and corporate control. It documents the integration of women and Indians in those organisations but at the price of acculturation and acceptance of the values of virile virtue. The album is a kind of mirror of the Mexican cultural policies for which those forces served as an experimental field.

Yet this is an idealized reflection. The friendly promotion of sport as both civic activity and spectacle hides not only the project of a militarized society, but also a repressive nationalist policy. In the context of the intolerant hygienic-nationalistic campaign, the models to follow were not so much the athletes but the disciplined police and army in charge of guarding public order and maintaining respect for the institutions. Even discipline and modernisation were nothing but a dream, judging from the political situation of the time.

In Amaro’s disciplinary project, the main feature of sport practice was its eclecticism, the use of several forms of sport entailing different, even contradictory, ethos. This eclecticism might be linked to the second characteristic of sport and the military in Mexico, namely that sport and sport demonstrations, as many other forms of ceremonial pedagogy, were fostered not so much for their direct positive effects as instruments of improvement, but for their indirect negative results. The practice of sports and their public demonstrations were intended to occupy the time and energy of soldiers and their commanders and divert them away from drinking, prostitution, gambling, religion, crime, and subversion. As an activity and a symbol of a whole programme of moral reform, sport aided in the identification and removal of the lazy and reluctant elements of the armed and police forces. In any case, that eclecticism, typical of all the cultural policies of the period, makes further research necessary, so as to determine, for example, if different kinds of sports were promoted for the different ranks of the army.

The same literature that has considered Amaro as a central agent in the “institutionalisation” of the army has shown the weakness of his work. The lack of means, the fear of uprisings, and the persistence of the informal power networks made a total reform of the army impossible. Amaro’s fate is the best proof of his limitations. He permitted corruption and only weakened the informal networks of the factions who opposed the government. Rather than the positive measures taken in favour of physical and moral health,

it was the foundation of the National Revolutionary Party,⁸⁴ the purges after the uprisings and the creation of an effective military justice that institutionalized the army and transformed it into a more disciplined organisation.⁸⁵ Sport had in this cleansing process only a secondary though nevertheless important role, for it enabled the commanders to identify the undesirable elements and facilitated the expulsion of these elements.

The very concept of “institutionalisation”, might owe part of its plausibility to Amaro’s image politics: the sport spectacle was a central piece in the construction of the image of “civil” and “civilized” armed and police forces, which as one strong and healthy body (physically and metaphorically) was a model for the whole of the social body. The concept should be valued taking into account the bias introduced by this rhetorical exercise, brilliantly presented in the album, which was able to prevent neither future uprisings nor the fall of the one who had most struggled to make it a reality.

The discourse and practice of sport as instruments for legitimating the army and the police were quickly worn out. Already by the time of Lázaro Cárdenas’ presidency (1934–1940) when the revolutionary cultural policies reached their highest point, some questioned the formula of the sportive-military parade in the non official media:

*[The athletes] give the parades a splendour that is not sportive, but rather makes them look like a zarzuela. The sport parade becomes a display of bright and colourful costumes, sometimes a little grotesque. It becomes, thus, a parade of ridicule.*⁸⁶

Gradually, the military was substituted by other groups – such as representatives of the trade unions or of primary schools – in the sport parades. In the symbolic and emotional economy of the cultural policies, the use of programmes of ceremonial education is something exceptional, and eventually their insistence and large scale lead to their own exhaustion.

84 Lozoya (footnote 10), p. 48 ff.

85 E. Portes Gil, Distribución de premios a los cadetes de la escuela militar, in: REM 9, 2 (February 1930), pp. 168–172, p. 171.

86 R. Salazar Mallén, La parada del ridículo, in: Hoy (“Today”) 10 December 1938, pp. 17, 94.

FORUM

Sklavenhandel als Verbrechen gegen die Menschlichkeit – Geschichtskultur, Gedenken und Geschichtswissenschaft in Europa

Konrad J. Kuhn / Béatrice Ziegler

Summary

This essay focuses on the consequences that new perspectives on slavery and slave trade as well as the political functionalising of the past are having on historical sciences, addressing the recent forms of public commemoration of slavery and slave trade in European countries.

This debate is especially fostered by the global discourse on coming to terms with the past and the UN-declaration of slavery as a crime against humanity. The differing narratives on slavery from governments, museums, victims, historians and NGOs are shaping the historical awareness within European societies. The breaking of silence on slave trade is resulting in various commemoration activities, exhibitions, slavery monuments and new research institutions. Thus the need for specific attention and research in the field of politicized public history and the upholding of their scientific standards against a normative history narrative is emerging within historical sciences. Only in this way can history produce insight in the mechanisms of guilt, responsibility and historical injustice.

Am Beispiel der Thematisierung von Sklaverei und Sklavenhandel in der Weltöffentlichkeit in den letzten Jahren wirft dieser Aufsatz die Frage auf, welche Konsequenzen sich für die Geschichtswissenschaft aus der Problematisierung eines historischen Gegenstandes durch geschichtskulturelle Akteure, aus der geschichtspolitischen Funktiona-

lisierung und der zeitgleichen geschichtswissenschaftlichen Neukontextualisierung des Themas ergeben und wie die geschichtswissenschaftliche Forschung mit diesen spezifischen Rahmenbedingungen ihrer Arbeit umgeht.¹ Da damit Geschichtswissenschaft als ein spezifischer Teil von „Geschichtsbewusstsein in der Gesellschaft“ und somit von Geschichtskultur verstanden wird, ist eine Klärung dieser Begrifflichkeiten notwendig. Der erste Teil der Ausführungen richtet sich auf die geschichtswissenschaftliche Neukontextualisierung des historischen Gegenstandes Sklaverei und Sklavenhandel. Darauf folgt eine Erörterung der „Wiedergutmachung vergangenen Unrechts“, die als weltweit wirksames Konzept diskutiert wird. Schliesslich wird nach der erwähnten Begriffsdiskussion dargestellt, wie unterschiedliche Akteure in Europa Sklaverei und Sklavenhandel als Verbrechen gegen die Menschlichkeit fokussieren, um dann die Konsequenzen der dargestellten Konstellation für die Wissenschaft sowie für die Beziehung zwischen Forschung und Geschichtskultur zu analysieren.² Daran schliessen sich Überlegungen an, wie sich die Geschichtswissenschaft in dieser neuen Konstellation verhalten kann, um das disziplinäre Forschungsinteresse und -ethos mit den aktuellen Orientierungsbedürfnissen in Übereinstimmung zu bringen.

1. Neukontextualisierungen von Sklavenhandel und Sklaverei

Die Sklaverei und der Sklavenhandel als historische Phänomene sind in den letzten Jahren in der Wissenschaft in neuen Kontexten gefasst worden. Drei der wichtigen neuen Perspektiven auf ein Thema, das seit Jahrzehnten Gegenstand der internationalen wie der regionalen historischen Forschung ist, können als Reaktion auf aktuelle Entwicklungen und auf politische Orientierungsbedürfnisse verstanden werden. Die eine dieser Entwicklungen wird mit dem Begriff „Globalisierung“ gefasst und versetzt der historischen Forschung auf der ganzen Welt Impulse.³ So werden Traditionslinien übernationaler

1 Wir danken Bernhard C. Schär und Stephan M. Scheuzger für kritische Hinweise und Anregungen.

2 Die Frage der Sklaverei und des Sklavenhandels wird im Bezug auf eine europäische Perspektive auf vergangenes Unrecht bisher kaum thematisiert, vgl. kürzlich dazu ohne Bezug B. Nietzel, Business finished? Transnationale Wiedergutmachung historischen Unrechts in Europa seit 1989, in: Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft 1 (2009), S. 26-50. Vgl. aktuell hingegen das Themenheft „Europe, Slave Trade and Colonial Forced Labour“, in: Journal of Modern European History 7 (2009), H. 1.

3 Vgl. dazu den Überblick von U. Mücke, Der atlantische Sklavenhandel. Globalisierung durch Zwang, in: F. Edel-mayer/E. Landsteiner/R. Pieper (Hrsg.), Die Geschichte des europäischen Welthandels und der wirtschaftliche Globalisierungsprozess, München 2001, S. 77-103. M. Zeuske, Sklaven und Globalisierungen. Umriss einer Geschichte der atlantischen Sklaverei in globaler Perspektive, in: Comparativ 13 (2003), H. 2, S. 7-25. Die Sklaverei wird dabei als erste Globalisierung Europas 1440–1620 in einer Vielzahl von Mikrosystemen im atlantischen Raum gesehen, vgl. u. a. P. D. Curtin, The Atlantic Slave Trade. A Census, Madison 1969. J. E. Inikori/S. L. Engerman (Eds.), The Atlantic Slave Trade. Effects on Economies, Societies, and Peoples in Africa, the Americas, and Europe, Durham und London 1992. R. Blackburn, The Making of New World Slavery. From the Baroque to the Modern 1492–1800, London 1997. H. Thomas, The Slave Trade. The Story of the Atlantic Slave Trade 1440–1870, New York 1997. H. S. Klein, The Atlantic Slave Trade, Cambridge 1999. S. Drescher, From Slavery to Freedom. Comparative Studies in the Rise and Fall of Atlantic Slavery. London 1999. Allgemeiner zum Globalisierungs-Paradigma und seinen Auswirkungen auf die Geschichtswissenschaft S. Conrad/A. Eckert, Globalgeschichte, Globalisierung,

Entwicklungen und damit der „Transfer“ von Wissen, Fähigkeiten und Sichtweisen von einem Land in ein anderes und deren Aneignung stärker betont, wobei die Vor-Moderne und damit die vor-nationale Vergangenheit von Gesellschaften wieder stärker ins Blickfeld geraten. Zudem strukturiert die Perspektive von „Opfern“ kolonialer Geschichte die geschichtswissenschaftliche Erkenntnis mit. Im Fokus steht damit „die eine Welt“, deren Strukturierung, zunehmende Vernetztheit und die in ihr gemachten vielfältigen sich ergänzenden und widersprüchlichen historischen Erfahrungen in den Blick genommen werden.

Die zweite Entwicklung dokumentiert einen Prozess, in welchem Forscherinnen und Forscher neuen Perspektiven zum Durchbruch zu verhelfen versuchen bei Themen, die bis anhin – wenn überhaupt – praktisch ausschliesslich zwischen Forschenden der westlichen *scientific community* in – oft nicht expliziter – Weiterführung kolonialer Perspektiven diskutiert worden sind. Im Rahmen der *postcolonial studies* wird der bisher hegemoniale Geschichtsdiskurs mit den Aussagen von Unterdrückten konfrontiert. Forschende tragen dabei der *agency* einer Vielfalt sozialer Akteure in der kolonialen Situation Rechnung.⁴

Die dritte Entwicklung ergibt sich aus dem Prozess der europäischen Integration. Diese reorganisiert historische Narrationen im europäischen Raum, indem sie das Erkenntnispotential nationalgeschichtlicher Perspektiven in Frage stellt und als solche relativiert.⁵ Sowohl auf die Globalisierung wie auf die europäischen Einigungsbewegungen reagiert die geschichtswissenschaftliche Forschung zum einen mit der Frage nach den Traditionslinien dieser Entwicklungen und deren strukturellen Einbettungen. Zum anderen stärkt sie Denkansätze, quellengestützte Befunde und systematische Hervorhebungen von Strukturen, Kategorien und Fragestellungen, die „immer schon“ geeignet waren, nationalgeschichtliche Grenzen und Orientierung zu durchqueren, zu überschreiten und zu konterkarieren. Sie wird dabei unterstützt von historischen Erklärungsansätzen wie

multiple Modernen. Zur Geschichtsschreibung der modernen Welt, in: S. Conrad / A. Eckert / U. Freitag (Hrsg.), Globalgeschichte. Theorien, Ansätze, Themen, Frankfurt a. M. und New York 2007, S. 7-49.

- 4 Als Überblick mögen dienen L. Ghandi, *Postcolonial Theory*, New York 1998. R. Young, *Postcolonialism. An historical introduction*, Oxford 2001. Für den deutschsprachigen Raum S. Conrad / S. Randeria (Hrsg.), *Jenseits des Eurozentrismus. Postkoloniale Perspektiven in den Geschichts- und Kulturwissenschaften*, Frankfurt a. M. 2002. Der Bezug zur jeweiligen *agency* von kolonialen bzw. lokalen Akteurinnen und Akteuren ist im Rahmen der Studien zur Sklaverei verschiedentlich anzutreffen, so etwa ein Teil der Arbeiten, die bei Zeuske, *Sklaven* (wie Anm. 3), S. 8 unter der „Serie von Mikrosystemen“ zitiert werden. Vgl. als Beispiel auch B. Ziegler, *Sklaven und Moderne – Eine unerträgliche, aber nicht unverträgliche Kombination*, in: P. Fleer / S. M. Scheuzger (Hrsg.), *Die Moderne in Lateinamerika. Zentren und Peripherien des Wandels*, (Festschrift für Hans-Werner Tobler), Vervuert, Frankfurt a. M. / Madrid 2009 (im Erscheinen).
- 5 Der Begriff der „europäischen Einigungsbewegungen“ wird ohne präzise Konturierung verwendet, was in diesem Zusammenhang auch als unnötig erscheint. Vgl. zu dieser Diskussion A. Eckert, *Der Kolonialismus im europäischen Gedächtnis*, in: *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte* 1-2 (2008), S. 31-38. S. Hobuss / U. Lölke (Hrsg.), *Erinnern verhandeln. Kolonialismus im kollektiven Gedächtnis Afrikas und Europas*, Münster 2007, hingegen verbleibt – für die Fallstudien berechtigterweise – noch weitgehend in den nationalen Narrativen.

etwa der Transnationalen Geschichte⁶, von der Transfergeschichte⁷ oder vom Konzept von „Histoire Croisée“⁸.

Sklaverei und Sklavenhandel erscheinen dabei als historische Phänomene, die weiträumige Systeme der Arbeitskraftbeschaffung und -ausbeutung schufen. Deren Errichtung und Organisation können damit als zentrales Element und Agens der Globalisierung im kolonialen Kontext interpretiert werden. In der Herausbildung eines transatlantischen Geschäftsnetzes im Kontext des Sklavenhandels sowie im dadurch entstandenen Denk- und Handlungshorizont werden heute zentrale und weit zurückreichende Stränge der weltweiten Vernetzung gesehen. Diese gilt es auch dann im Auge zu behalten, wenn Sklaverei und Sklavenhandel als Grundlage regionaler Gesellschaften in ihren spezifischen Ausprägungen untersucht werden. Umgekehrt treten unter der Perspektive eines „europäischen Systems“ auch die Bezüge und Grundlagen regionaler oder gar lokaler Gesellschaften in den Blick, die vordergründig keinen Anteil hatten am Geschäft mit der Versklavung von Afrikanerinnen und Afrikanern.⁹ Im Zusammenhang einer Geschichtsschreibung, die die (europäische) Geschichte als eine über nationale Narrationen hinausgreifende konzipiert, erhalten Sklaverei und Sklavenhandel die Stellung einer Jahrhunderte dauernden Struktur, die über fürstenhoheitliche und nationale Grenzen hinweg globale Wirtschaftsbeziehungen, auch zwischen sich zunehmend arbeitsteilig verhaltenden Regionen, herstellte und regelte und dabei zugleich politisches wie kriegsgerisches Geschehen beeinflusste sowie das europäische Denken zutiefst prägte.¹⁰

Diese Sicht, die vorhandene Forschungsergebnisse reorganisiert und neue Forschungsfragen konzipiert, stellt eine erhebliche Herausforderung für die Geschichtswissenschaft dar. Sie stellt einige nationale Forschungsgemeinschaften vor das Problem, dass die bis-

6 G. Budde/S. Conrad/O. Janz (Hrsg.), *Transnationale Geschichte. Themen, Tendenzen und Theorien*, Göttingen 2006.

7 Als wichtiger Vertreter des deutschen Sprachraums sei hier Jürgen Osterhammel genannt, dessen Arbeiten im Zusammenhang mit Transfer und Kolonialismus bedeutsam sind, auch wenn er sich vorrangig mit dem ostasiatischen Raum befasst, vgl. J. Osterhammel, *Geschichtswissenschaft jenseits des Nationalstaats. Studien zur Beziehungsgeschichte und Zivilisationsvergleich*, Göttingen 2001.

8 M. Werner/B. Zimmermann, *Penser l'histoire croisée. Entre empirie et réflexivité*, in: *Annales* 58 (2003), S. 7–36. Auch M. Werner/B. Zimmermann, *Vergleich, Transfer, Verflechtung. Der Ansatz der *histoire croisée* und die Herausforderung des Transnationalen*, in: *Geschichte und Gesellschaft* 28 (2002), S. 607–636. Hinweise zur Diskussion der unterschiedlichen Konzepte und Positionen im deutschen Sprachraum liefert auch H. Kaelble, *Die Debatte über Vergleich und Transfer und was jetzt?* In: *Fachforum geschichte.transnational*, <http://geschichte-transnational.clio-online.net/forum/id=574&type=diskussionen> (08.02.2009).

9 Vgl. als aktuellste Übersichtsdarstellung auch mit Fokus auf die europäischen Beteiligungen und die regionalen Auswirkungen J. Meissner/U. Mücke/K. Weber, *Schwarzes Amerika. Eine Geschichte der Sklaverei*, München 2008. Dabei wird deutlich, dass gerade die mitteleuropäischen Peripherien der westeuropäischen Kolonialmächte, die Regionen in der heutigen Schweiz, in Schlesien und Westfalen, die wichtigste Tauschware des Sklavenhandels, Baumwoll- oder Leinentextilien, äußerst konkurrenzfähig herstellen konnten. Diese Regionen haben daher auch von dieser frühen Industrialisierung profitiert, vgl. S. 93–98. Vgl. dazu u. a. B. Veyrassat, *Négociants et fabricants dans l'industrie cotonnière Suisse 1760–1840. Aux origines financiers de l'industrialisation*, Lausanne 1982. Die Varietät und das Ausmass der Beteiligung und des Nutzens am Sklavengeschäft, die die Gesellschaften prägten, gilt es zu beachten, wenn nicht einer neuen Meistererzählung, derjenigen der Sklaverei als Grundlage der Weltwirtschaft nämlich, Vorschub geleistet werden soll.

10 Der Einfluss beschränkt sich selbstverständlich nicht auf das europäische Denken. Dieses steht im Kontext nun aber im Vordergrund.

herige Thematisierung des historischen Phänomens ungenügend und einseitig war. So konzentrierte sich bis anhin in Frankreich die Auseinandersetzung mit der Sklaverei und dem Sklavenhandel etwa einseitig auf die Abolition, während die vorangehenden Phasen und die parallel dazu verlaufenden Nutzniessungen und Wirkungen der Verwicklung in den Sklavenhandel kaum thematisiert wurden.¹¹ Oder es zeigt sich im Falle von Ländern ohne eigene Kolonien, dass Wissenschaftler sich an der Erkundung fremder Räume und Gesellschaften unter den europäischen Paradigmen des Rassismus und der Entwicklungsmission „der Europäer“ mit relevanten Beiträgen beteiligten und dass zahlreiche Akteure zudem wirtschaftlich eng verknüpft waren mit dem transatlantischen Sklavenhandel.¹² In der Konsequenz des Bemühens in der Geschichtswissenschaft, kollektive Täter- und Opferidentitäten zugunsten individueller und gruppenspezifischer Akteure und Akteurinnen in jeweils zu bestimmenden Handlungskontexten aufzulösen, entwirft sich für die Gesellschaften des europäischen Kontinents (genauso wie für diejenigen ausserhalb dieses Erdteils) in dieser Perspektive ein komplexes und erheblich vielschichtigeres Bild unterschiedlichster Beteiligung und Teilhabe an Sklaverei und Sklavenhandel. Parallel zu den angesprochenen Neukontextualisierungen von Sklavenhandel und Sklaverei innerhalb von Forschungskonzepten in den historischen und Kulturwissenschaften vollzog sich eine Entwicklung, die im Gefolge der stark zunehmenden internationalen Bedeutung des Menschenrechtsdiskurses und der Benennung von Verbrechen gegen die Menschlichkeit auch auf die Thematik von Sklavenhandel und Sklaverei griff.

2. Das Konzept der „Wiedergutmachung“ – Die Verurteilung des Sklavenhandels und der Sklaverei in Durban 2001

An der UNO-Weltkonferenz gegen Rassismus, Rassendiskriminierung, Fremdenfeindlichkeit und damit zusammenhängende Intoleranz vom 31. August bis zum 8. September 2001 wurde deutlich gemacht, dass Sklaverei und Sklavenhandel ein Verbrechen gegen die Menschlichkeit sei und zu allen Zeiten als solches hätte gelten sollen. Der transatlantische Sklavenhandel wurde dabei speziell hervorgehoben und Sklaverei und Sklavenhandel als Ursachen und Erscheinungsform von Rassismus, verstanden als Sichtweise und Praxis, eingeschätzt. Afrikaner, Afrikanerinnen und Personen afrikanischer Abstammung sowie Angehörige anderer Völker wurden als Opfer von Rassismus anerkannt und Kolonialismus als ein historischer Sachverhalt eingeschätzt, der für historisches Leid im Kontext von Rassismus und Sklaverei ursächlich sei.¹³ Diese unmissverständlichen

11 So das Gedenken im Jahre 1998, das zwar der Abolition, nicht aber der Verwicklung in den Sklavenhandel galt, vgl. dazu weiter hinten in diesem Aufsatz. Vgl. für den französischen Fall u. a. F. Federini, *L'abolition de l'esclavage 1848. Une lecture de Victor Schoelcher*, Paris 1998.

12 Vgl. für die Schweiz dazu jüngst J. Dewulf, *Brasilien mit Brüchen. Schweizer unter dem Kreuz des Südens*, Zürich 2007. Trotz überaus ärgerlichen Umgangs mit Zitationen und mangelnder Sichtbarmachung von ideologischen Distanzierungen bietet das Buch eine Fülle von wertvollen Informationen.

13 Weltkonferenz gegen Rassismus, Rassendiskriminierung, Fremdenfeindlichkeit und damit zusammenhängende Intoleranz, Durban, 31. August bis zum 8. September 2001. Erklärung zum Abschluss der Konferenz, <http://www.un.org/depts/german/conf/ac189-12.pdf> (15.4.2009).

Aussagen in der Schlussklärung waren das Ergebnis eines intensiven politischen Prozesses und einer seit den neunziger Jahren verstärkten Aktivität gegen Rassismus und Fremdenfeindlichkeit insbesondere auf der Grundlage der Menschenrechtsdeklaration der UNO und ihrer Erklärung von 1960 über die „Gewährung der Unabhängigkeit an koloniale Länder und Völker“¹⁴. Diese politische Aktivität war sowohl von Protagonisten und Vertreterinnen afrikanischer Organisationen und Staaten als auch von Diplomaten und Politikerinnen der ehemaligen Kolonialmächte getragen worden.

Die Tatsache, dass an der Konferenz eine Schlussklärung zur Frage von Rassismus, Sklaverei und Sklavenhandel möglich wurde, wurde als grosser Erfolg gewertet, da ein Weg gefunden worden sei, historisches Unrecht und seine Folgen zu benennen, ohne dass daraus unmittelbare rechtliche Ansprüche abgeleitet wurden.¹⁵ Sie kann auch in Verbindung mit der US-amerikanischen Diskussion gesehen werden, in der ganz gegenteilig ein Eingeständnis historischen Unrechts in einer vergleichsweise heftigen und breiten Debatte abgewehrt wurde.¹⁶

Die Erklärung von Durban knüpfte so an einen Diskurs an, der sich insbesondere seit der Wende 1989/91 im Umgang mit der Shoa entwickelt und auf immer weitere historische Ereignisse und Entwicklungen übertragen hat, den Diskurs der Wiedergutmachung vergangenen Unrechts. Er zielt, wie die politischen Deklarationen und Massnahmen, auf die Gegenwart und Zukunft und enthält eine hoch normative Botschaft, die mit der Hoffnung verbunden ist, als Unrecht und menschenfeindliche Haltungen deklarierte Einstellungen und Verhaltensweisen in gemeinsamer Anstrengung zu ächten, einzudämmen und letztlich zu verunmöglichen.¹⁷ Dabei kommt dem Gedenken eine besondere Bedeutung zu, indem dessen Inszenierung bei Jubiläen, an Erinnerungsorten, bei Umzügen, in der Gestaltung von Gedenkstätten oder Stadtführungen einerseits der

14 Resolution 1514 (XV) der Generalversammlung der Vereinten Nationen, 14. Dezember 1960, in: Vereinte Nationen 33 (1985), H. 5-6, S. 172, <http://www.vilp.de/Depdf/d209.pdf> (15.4.2009).

15 Vgl. die Einschätzung der schweizerischen Delegationsleiterin, Claudia Kaufmann, in ihrem Bericht „Nach der UNO-Weltkonferenz gegen Rassismus vom September 2001 in Durban, Südafrika. Erwartungen und Möglichkeiten“, referiert an der Nationalen Tagung der Eidgenössischen Kommission gegen Rassismus, 20. März 2002, S. 2; http://www.ekr-cfr.ch/ekr/themen/00101/00234/00323/020320_tagung_claudia_kaufmann_de.pdf (15.4.2009). Die Ausklammerung der Frage der finanziellen Reparationen hat allerdings auch zu erheblicher Kritik geführt, die ihren Ausdruck im Slogan des „Cheap Talk“ finden, vgl. dazu aus der Sichtweise engagierter NGOs M. Eglí/M. Madörin (Hrsg.), *Entschädigung ist ein Menschenrecht. Konzepte und Analysen zur Debatte um Wiedergutmachung bei Menschenrechtsverletzungen*, Zürich 2001.

16 Vgl. dazu die Diskussion der Positionen durch M. Berg, *Historical Continuity and Counterfactual History in the Debate over Reparations for Slavery*, in: M. Berg/B. Schäfer (Eds.), *Historical Justice in International Perspective. How Societies Are Trying to Right the Wrongs of the Past*, New York 2009, S. 69-91.

17 Vgl. dazu J. Torpey, *Making Whole What Has Been Smashed. On Reparations Politics*, Cambridge (USA) und London 2006. J. Thompson, *Taking Responsibility for the Past. Reparation and Historical Justice*, Cambridge 2002. Grundlegende Aufsätze sind enthalten in J. Torpey (Ed.), *Politics and the Past. On Repairing Historical Injustices*, Lanham, Boulder, New York/Oxford 2003. Grundlegend auch E. Barkan, *Völker klagen an. Eine neue internationale Moral*, Düsseldorf 2002 und R. L. Brooks (Ed.), *When Sorry Isn't Enough. The Controversy over Apologies and Reparations for Human Injustice*, New York 1999. Für Fallstudien vgl. J. Zimmerer (Hrsg.), *Schweigen – Erinnern – Bewältigen. Vergangenheitspolitik in globaler Perspektive*, Leipzig 2005. Vgl. mit einem Blick auf die transitionale Justiz J. Elster, *Die Akten schliessen. Recht und Gerechtigkeit nach dem Ende von Diktaturen*, Frankfurt a. M./New York 2005.

Opferperspektive eine öffentliche Anerkennung zukommen lässt, andererseits von der Erwartung getragen ist, durch das Wachhalten der Erinnerung an vergangenes Unrecht präventiv gegen zukünftiges vergleichbares Unrecht zu wirken.

Im Rahmen dieser politischen Stellungnahmen zu Handlungen, Einstellungen, Ereignissen und Entwicklungen in der Vergangenheit findet nicht nur eine Verknüpfung zwischen Vergangenheit, Gegenwart und Zukunft unter dem Primat der letzteren statt: Vergangenheit wird so auch im Interesse gegenwärtiger politischer Positionierung und Aktivität gedeutet und Geschichte in dieser Perspektive erzählt. Damit wird Geschichtspolitik, im Sinne von Politik mittels historischer Narration, betrieben.¹⁸ Berg weist darauf hin, dass kritische Stimmen in der US-amerikanischen Diskussion zu solcher Politik im Kontext der Wiedergutmachung von Sklaverei und Sklavenhandel – nicht ohne politische Hintergedanken – eine ganze Reihe von Einwänden geltend machten, von denen manche historisch oder ethisch äusserst fragwürdig sind. Dabei wurde aber auch gerade die Ursächlichkeit zwischen Kolonialismus und aktuellem Rassismus, die in Durban postuliert wurde, als kurzschlüssige Geschichtsschreibung kritisiert. Die Legitimierung des Anspruchs auf Wiedergutmachung von Sklaverei und Sklavenhandel im Rekurs auf entgangene oder eingeschränkte Lebensperspektiven von Generationen von Schwarzen wurde als problematisch bezeichnet, weil dahinter eine ahistorische Vorstellung von vollständiger Gleichheit, Besitz und Möglichkeiten stehe.¹⁹ Es handelt sich bei den Äusserungen zur Sklaverei und zum Sklavenhandel in einer Deklaration wie derjenigen von Durban 2001 zweifellos um einen spezifischen Fall von Geschichtspolitik. Die Deutung von Geschichte erfährt ihre bewusste Ausrichtung durch die politische Positionierung – in diesem Fall durch eine hoch normative, letztlich auf den Menschenrechtsdiskurs verpflichtete. Auch wenn man gegenüber der Stossrichtung der Perspektivierung keine Einwände hat, stellt sich bei der damit folgerichtig eintretenden Funktionalisierung von Geschichte für das politische Anliegen ein wissenschaftspolitisches bzw. wissenschaftsethisches Problem. Dieser Sachverhalt hat die Geschichtswissenschaft zu beschäftigen. Denn einerseits werden Historikerinnen und Historiker im Kontext solcher Deutungs-bemühungen zu Expertinnen und Experten, die mit ihren Narrativen die Indienstnahme von Geschichte durch die Politik ermöglichen. Andererseits sind sie gezwungen, ihre auf Vergangenheit und Geschichte gerichteten wissenschaftlichen Narrative als möglicher-

18 Zum Begriff der Geschichtspolitik und zur Diskussion der funktionalen Beziehungen zwischen Vergangenheit, Gegenwart und Zukunft: Politische Bildung und historisches Lernen. Kategoriale Möglichkeiten der Zusammenarbeit zwischen den Fächern Geschichte und Politik, in: T. Arand/B. von Borries/A. Körber/W. Schreiber/A. Wenzl/B. Ziegler (Hrsg.), *Geschichtsunterricht im Dialog. Fächerübergreifende Zusammenarbeit*, Münster 2006, S. 122-131. C. Lenz, *Erinnerungskultur und Geschichtspolitik – politische Autorisierung, Hegemoniebildung und Narrationen des Widerstandes in Norwegen*, in: C. Fröhlich/H. A. Heinrich (Hrsg.), *Geschichtspolitik. Wer sind ihre Akteure, wer ihre Rezipienten?* Stuttgart 2004, S. 81-94. A. Assmann, *Der lange Schatten der Vergangenheit. Erinnerungskultur und Geschichtspolitik*, München 2006. Zur Geschichtspolitik als Spannungsverhältnis zwischen Wissenschaft und Politik vgl. grundlegend E. Wolfrum, *Geschichtspolitik in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1949–1989. Phasen und Kontroversen*, in: P. Bock/E. Wolfrum (Hrsg.), *Umkämpfte Vergangenheit. Geschichtsbilder, Erinnerung und Vergangenheitspolitik im internationalen Vergleich*, Göttingen 1999, S. 55-81.

19 Berg, *Continuity* (wie Anm. 16), hier S. 73-80.

weise sperrige Geschichten vor einer allfälligen vorschnellen Be- und Verurteilung durch die Politik zu schützen. Sie müssen dabei im Sinne einer differenzierten und vielschichtigen Forschung ein umfassenderes Erkenntnisinteresse wach halten, um auch späteren differierenden Deutungsbedürfnissen gerecht zu werden.

Jedenfalls aber haben diese Prozesse der Perspektivenwechseln in der Geschichtswissenschaft und der Bedienung der Geschichtspolitik die Abkehr der Geschichtswissenschaft von hegemonialer Geschichtsinterpretation befördert, die sich seit der Aufklärung als „allgemeine Geschichtswissenschaft“ deklariert hatte und die darin ein Programm des Fortschritts der Zivilisation beschrieben hat. Darin sei, so Hausen als Kritikerin dieses Konzepts, der Gruppe der „Menschen weisser Rasse, abendländisch-christlicher Zivilisation und männlichen Geschlechtes“ privilegierte Aufmerksamkeit zuteil geworden und durch die zunehmende Verengung des Konzeptes im 19. Jahrhundert auf Nationalgeschichten sei die Bedeutung der 'erfolgreichen' imperialistischen Staaten noch gesteigert worden.²⁰ Ehemalige Opfer und Objekte dieser Fortschrittsgeschichtsschreibung stellen zunehmend den Anspruch, ihre Sicht in die „Globalgeschichte“ oder „Transfergeschichte“ einzubringen oder zumindest die Varietät der Deutungsmuster einzuklagen.²¹ Dass deren Stimme nun doch wahrgenommen wird – wie etwa mit dem Beschluss von Durban –, hat sehr viel damit zu tun, dass gegenwärtig die Kräfteverhältnisse und der Anteil an der Deutungsmacht im Kontext von globalisierter Wirtschaft und Öffentlichkeit sehr starken Veränderungen unterworfen sind.²²

Neben der Tatsache, dass innerhalb der Geschichtswissenschaft die Deutungshoheit bisheriger hegemonialer Geschichtsschreibung beseitigt worden ist und dass politische Akteure die Autonomie der geschichtswissenschaftlichen Forschung einzuengen drohen, begegnet die Geschichtswissenschaft einer bedeutsam werdenden zivilgesellschaftlichen Beschäftigung von „Opfergruppen“ und Aktivistinnen und Aktivisten mit Geschichte.

3. Geschichtspolitik, Geschichtskultur und Geschichtswissenschaft

Die Indienstnahme von Geschichte für die Legitimation politischer Anliegen durch politische Akteurinnen und Akteure dokumentiert nicht nur die durchaus nicht neue labile Beziehung zwischen Herrschaft und historischer Erzählung, sie zeugt auch von einem sich gegenwärtig ausserordentlich stark manifestierenden gesellschaftlichen Bedürfnis, sich mithilfe von Vergangenem, Geschichte, Tradition oder Traditionskritik zu

20 Die knappe Charakterisierung der allgemeinen Geschichte nimmt Hausen im Kontext einer Diskussion um die Bedeutung der Geschlechtergeschichte vor, vgl. K. Hausen, Die Nicht-Einheit der Geschichte als historiographische Herausforderung. Zur historischen Relevanz und Anstössigkeit der Geschlechtergeschichte, in: H. Medick/C. Trepp (Hrsg.), Geschlechtergeschichte und Allgemeine Geschichte. Herausforderungen und Perspektiven, Göttingen 1998, S.15-55, hier S.28-29.

21 Vgl. dazu zum Beispiel S. Randeria, Geteilte Geschichte und verwobene Moderne, in: J. Rüsen et al. (Hrsg.), Zukunftsentwürfe. Ideen für eine Kultur der Veränderung, Frankfurt a. M. 1999, S. 87–96.

22 Vgl. dazu auch Kaelble, Debatte (wie Anm. 8). Zur Globalgeschichte vgl. das European Network in Universal and Global History, <http://www.eniugh.org> (15.4.2009), in dessen Kontext gerade auch die Frage von Definitionsmacht über Geschichte und globaler Herrschaft diskutiert werden.

definieren und zu orientieren. Das sich so manifestierende Geschichtsbewusstsein, die zentrale Kategorie der Geschichtsdidaktik, die „den Zusammenhang von Vergangenheitsdeutung, Gegenwartsverständnis und Zukunftsperspektive ... umgreift“²³, ist der Bearbeitung und der kritischen Befragung und damit auch dem Wandel zugänglich. Das Verfügen über ein Geschichtsbewusstsein erlaubt es Individuen, gegenüber Geschichte aus dem Status des Objekts herauszutreten und sich eigenständig mit Zeitlichkeit auseinanderzusetzen.

Dieser Umgang, diskursiv beeinflusst und Lenkungsversuchen in geschichtspolitischen Zusammenhängen unterworfen, ist ein gesellschaftlicher, insofern Individuen sich stets in sozialen Zusammenhängen bewegen und mit ihrem Geschichtsbewusstsein in der (gesellschaftlichen) Geschichtskultur eingebettet sind.²⁴ Der Umgang mit Vergangenem und die dazu erzählten Geschichten korrespondieren geschichtsdidaktischer Theoriebildung zufolge²⁵ mit einem hohen Bedürfnis, gesellschaftlich und individuell relevante Fragen an die Gegenwart und Zukunft – in unserem Fall der aktuelle Rassismus – über die Thematisierung von und die Herstellung zu Vergangenheit – hier den Kolonialismus und die Sklaverei – anzugehen. Die lebhaft Teilhabe an Geschichtskultur erzeugt damit unmittelbare Resonanz für historisch begründete politische Positionierungen. Die Darstellung bzw. Glaubhaftmachung von in der Vergangenheit erlittenem Unrecht wie der Versklavung macht das Verhältnis von Schuld und Sühne, Täter und Opfer einsichtig und verbindet im gemeinsamen Gedenken. Es kann aber diese Positionen auch fortschreiben, wenn Betroffene vergangenen Unrechts darauf verzichten, kompromisslos das Gedenken in den Dienst der Subjektwerdung zu stellen und einen wie auch immer definierten Emanzipationsprozess einzuleiten. Demgegenüber beinhaltet die Fortschreibung der Objekt-Subjekt-Beziehung und des Opfer-Täter-Schemas die Gefahr der Zementierung vergangenen Unrechts, was Kritiker der Anerkennung des Unrechts der Sklaverei in den US-amerikanischen Wiedergutmachungsforderungen als gegeben zu erkennen glauben.²⁶

4. Transatlantischer Sklavenhandel und Geschichtspolitik in Europa – aktuelle Entwicklungen

In diesem Abschnitt werden die differierenden geschichtspolitischen Wege und öffentlichen Debatten diskutiert, die gegenwärtige europäische Gesellschaften gehen, wenn sie

23 Mit Geschichtsbewusstsein als „mentaler Struktur der Verarbeitung von Zeitlichkeit“ (S. Schreiber et al. (Hg.), *Historisches Denken. Ein Kompetenz-Strukturmodell*, Neuried 2006, S.13) hat sich im deutschen Sprachraum die noch junge Geschichtsdidaktik wesentlich früher und intensiver beschäftigt als die Geschichtswissenschaft selbst. K. E. Jeismann, *Geschichtsbewusstsein*, in: K. Bergmann/A. Kuhn/J. Rüsen/G. Schneider (Hrsg.), *Handbuch der Geschichtsdidaktik*, Bd. 1, Düsseldorf 1980 (erstmalig 1979), S. 42–45.

24 J. Rüsen, *Geschichtskultur*, in: *Geschichte in Wissenschaft und Unterricht* 46 (1996), S. 513–521, hier S. 513.

25 B. Schönemann, *Geschichtskultur als Forschungskonzept der Geschichtsdidaktik*, in: *Zeitschrift für Geschichts-didaktik* 2002, S.78–86. M. Barricelli, *Schüler erzählen Geschichte. Narrative Kompetenz im Geschichtsunterricht*, Schwalbach 2005.

26 Berg, *Continuity* (wie Anm. 16), S. 85.

sich mit ihren Beteiligungen am transatlantischen Sklavenhandel und an der Sklaverei auseinandersetzen und diese in ein kollektives Gedächtnis zu integrieren suchen. Auf diese Weise brechen sie das „Schweigen“ über eine Institution und eine Geschäftstätigkeit, wie es der französische Historiker Jean-Michel Deveau als Mitglied des *UNESCO Committee of the Slave Route* genannt hat, das sich seit Jahrzehnten über diese Tragödie gelegt hatte.²⁷ Das seit 1994 bestehende *UNESCO Slave Route Project* hat bei der schrittweisen Auflösung des komplexen Zusammenspiels von Verdrängung und Nichtwahrnehmung sowie für die Zunahme der Aktivitäten generell, aber auch in der Forschung eine zentrale Rolle gespielt. So hat es für nationale Projekte der Erinnerungskultur und der Geschichtspolitik unterstützend gewirkt und im Rahmen seiner transnationalen Aktivitäten über Forschung, mit weltweiten Ausbildungsprogrammen in 7000 Schulen, über Quellensicherung und durch Bewahrung des kulturellen Erbes – beispielsweise der Sklavereiforts an der Küste Westafrikas – Kontinuität hergestellt und den Austausch gefördert.²⁸ Eine wichtige Rolle auch für die europäische Debatte spielen die bereits angesprochenen Diskussionen um Reparationen für das durch die Sklaverei erlittene Unrecht, die von den Vereinigten Staaten ausgingen, so wie generell Sklaverei und Sklavenhandel in den USA zu zentrale Themen sowohl im wissenschaftlichen als auch im öffentlichen Diskurs gehören.²⁹ Im Folgenden wird am Beispiel der zivilgesellschaftlichen Aktivitäten in einigen europäischen Staaten – darunter bedeutende Sklavenhandelsnationen wie Grossbritannien, die Niederlande oder Frankreich, aber auch kleinerer Akteure wie Schweden, Dänemark-Norwegen, die Schweiz oder Brandenburg-Preussen – den Bedeutungen nachgegangen, welche der Sklavenhandel und die Sklaverei in der Gegenwart

27 J. M. Deveau, Silence and reparations, in: *International Social Science Journal* 188 (2006), S. 245-248, sieht das „Schweigen“ in einer doppelten Scham über den Sklavenhandel begründet, in der Scham der europäischen Nachkommen der Sklavenhändler, ebenso aber auch in der Scham der afrikanischen Opfer und ihrer Nachkommen über das ihnen angetane Leid. Zum „Schweigen“ als Strategie der Verdrängung Assmann, Schatten (wie Anm. 18), S. 176-179.

28 Das Unesco Slave Route Project wurde 1994 in Ouidah (Benin) gestartet, Höhepunkt seiner bisherigen Aktivitäten war das UNO-Gedenkjahr zur Abschaffung der Sklaverei 2004, vgl. für einen kurzen Überblick „The UNESCO slave route project“, in: *International Social Science Journal* 188 (2006), S. 191-194. Weiterführende Informationen auf <http://www.unesco.org/culture/slaveroute> (15.4.2009). Zum aktuellen „Pilgertourismus“ von Afroamerikanern zu afrikanischen Sklavenstätten in Westafrika, vgl. K. Schramm, Das Joseph-Projekt. Sklavenhandel, Diaspora, Erinnerungskultur, in: *Historische Anthropologie* 16 (2008), H. 2, S. 227-246.

29 Ein Überblick über die Entwicklung in den USA bei T. McCarthy, Vergangenheitsbewältigung in the USA. On the Politics of the Memory of Slavery, in: *Political Theory* 5 (2002), S. 623-648. Vgl. auch M. Berg, Vergangenheitspolitik und Restitutionsbewegung in den USA, in: *Comparativ* 14 (2004), H. 5/6, S. 146-162 und I. Berlin, American Slavery in History and Memory and the Search for Social Justice, in: *Journal of American History* 90 (2004), H. 4, S. 1251-1268. Grundlegend zur Thematik der Entschädigungen für Sklaverei D. Horowitz, *Uncivil Wars. The Controversy over Reparations for Slavery*, San Francisco 2002. Eine gute Übersicht über die US-Debatte über Reparationen bei T. McCarthy, Vergangenheitsbewältigung in den USA. Zur Moral und Politik der Reparationen für Sklaverei, in: *Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie* 6 (2004), S. 847-867. Für die USA als politisches Plädoyer, vgl. R. Randall, *The Debt. What America owes to Blacks*, New York 2000. Zu den unterschiedlichen Zahlen und den ihnen zugrundeliegenden Überlegungen D. Conley, *Calculating Slavery Reparations. Theory, Numbers, and Implications*, in: Torpey (Ed.), *Politics* (wie Anm. 17), S. 117-126. Zur Debatte über generelle Reparationen für Afroamerikaner für erlittenes Unrecht, auch über die Sklaverei hinaus, vgl. A. Valls, *Reconsidering the Case for Black Reparations*, in: J. Miller/R. Kumar (Eds.), *Reparations. Interdisciplinary Inquiries*, Oxford 2007, S. 114-129. Kritisch zu den Forderungen nach Reparationen für die Sklaverei Berg, *Continuity* (wie Anm. 16).

des jeweiligen Landes spielt. Dabei steht die Frage im Zentrum, wie sich das komplexe Wechselspiel zwischen den unterschiedlichen Akteuren, die an dieser Vergegenwärtigung von Vergangenem beteiligt sind und die das spezifische Wissen im Gedächtnis der jeweiligen Gesellschaften wach halten, im Feld der Geschichtspolitik gestaltet und welche Funktion und Position die Geschichtswissenschaft darin einnimmt. Diese Darstellungen behandeln die Diskussionen in den nationalstaatlichen Rahmungen, die vor dem Hintergrund der Globalisierung als limitierend verstanden werden. Gleichwohl aber ist diese nationale Perspektive berechtigt, da sich die erinnerungskulturellen und geschichtspolitischen Vorgänge im jeweiligen nationalen Kontext abspielen und die Frage nach der Beteiligung am Sklavenhandel in nationalen Kategorien gestellt worden ist. Zudem sind die Adressaten diesbezüglicher Forderungen bisher Instanzen des Nationalstaates.³⁰ Bei den Akteuren handelt es sich um so unterschiedliche Gruppen wie „Nachkommen“ von ehemaligen Sklaven und Sklavinnen, universitäre Historikerinnen und Historiker, Parlamentarier und Parlamentarierinnen, staatliche Stellen und Ämter, Aktivistengruppen und zivilgesellschaftliche Nichtregierungsorganisationen oder Museumsfachleute, die sich auf diesem vieldiskutierten Feld der Geschichtspolitik bewegen. Dabei kommt dem jeweiligen Nationalstaat eine wichtige Funktion zu, indem er gewissen Geschichtsnarrativen eine offizielle Akzeptanz verleihen kann. Deutlich wird auf den ersten Blick, dass sich in Europa äusserst unterschiedliche Ausprägungen des geschichtskulturellen Umgangs mit dem Sklavenhandel und der Sklaverei und der damit verbundenen Absichten, Leistungen und Funktionen zeigen und dass dies in ebenso variablen geschichtspolitischen Handlungen, Debatten und Erinnerungspraktiken seinen Ausdruck findet. Auch die Einflussnahme der Geschichtswissenschaft in dieses Feld ist in den unterschiedlichen Erinnerungsgemeinschaften verschieden. Dies sagt zugleich etwas über den Ort der Wissenschaft in der jeweiligen Gesellschaft, wie über die innerwissenschaftliche Bedeutung gegenwartsbezogener Forschung aus. Generell kann die öffentliche Auseinandersetzung mit den Gräueln und den Ungerechtigkeiten des Sklavenhandels in Europa als Fortschritt für die Menschenrechte gewertet werden, wenn wir mit Elazar Barkan davon ausgehen, dass sich mit dieser und ähnlichen Debatten die Werte der Aufklärung weltweit ausbreiten.³¹ Die zunehmende Thematisierung wird im Wesentlichen durch die Aktivitäten der „Nachkommen“ von Sklaven und Sklavinnen und ihrer Interessengruppen bewirkt, die das Thema seit Beginn der 1990er Jahre öffentlich akzentuiert haben, deren disparate Forderungen allerdings von der Anerkennung der Beteiligung, über die Errichtung von

30 Dabei spielen transnationale Verflechtungszusammenhänge eine Rolle, die einerseits über internationale Organisationen (beispielsweise die Unesco), aber auch über die Verbindungen zwischen zivilgesellschaftlichen Akteuren und Nichtregierungsorganisationen verschiedener Länder wirksam werden. Gleichwohl akzentuiert sich die Debatte über Sklaverei in Europa in den jeweiligen nationalstaatlichen Kontexten. Eine ähnliche Situation lässt sich im Bezug auf die Debatten über die koloniale Vergangenheit europäischer Staaten beobachten, worauf Eckert, *Kolonialismus* (wie Anm. 5), S. 31-38, hingewiesen hat.

31 Barkan, *Völker* (wie Anm. 17), hier S. 350-395. Diese Meinung findet sich beispielsweise bei G. Oostindie (Hrsg.), *Facing up to the Past. Perspectives on the Commemoration of Slavery from Africa, the Americas and Europe*, Kingston 2001, S. 12. Eine gegenteilige Position vertritt Torpey, *Making Whole* (wie Anm. 17), S. 5-7, der in diesen Debatten vielmehr einen postutopischen Ersatz für eine fortschrittliche Politik sieht.

Monumenten, Museen und Forschungszentren über die Revision von Schulbüchern bis zu Entschädigungszahlungen reichen. Eine knappe Übersicht über die gegenwärtig zu beobachtenden Entwicklungen und Praktiken³² ermöglicht aufschlussreiche Aussagen bezüglich der symbolischen Vergegenwärtigung dieser Vergangenheit in Europa und der geschichtspolitischen Auswirkungen bis in die Gegenwart, schärft aber zugleich den Blick für die damit einhergehenden Gefahren einer Instrumentalisierung der Opferrolle einerseits und andererseits der Etablierung eines hegemonialen Deutungsnarrativs zum Sklavenhandel und der Sklaverei, das durch die europäischen Nationalstaaten Förderung erfährt.

In Grossbritannien ist die Debatte über den britischen Sklavenhandel aktuell äusserst lebendig und beinahe unüberblickbar. Sie gliedert sich ein in die breit geführten Diskussionen um die Rück- und Nachwirkungen der imperialen Vergangenheit des britischen Weltreichs. Dabei spielt in den öffentlichen Debatten auch die Frage der Multikulturalität der britischen Gesellschaft als Folge des imperialen Projektes eine hochpolitische Rolle. Obwohl die Historikerschaft seit Jahrzehnten die Beteiligung Grossbritanniens am Sklavenhandel dokumentierten, erlangte das diesbezügliche Wissen bis in die 1980er Jahre kaum öffentliche Aufmerksamkeit, vielmehr lag der Fokus auf der Abolition und dem damit verbundenen stolzen nationalen Selbstverständnis.³³ Das Schweigen über die der Abolition vorangegangenen Jahrhunderte des Handels mit Sklaven und Sklavinnen wurde durch Filmemacher und Romanautoren aufgebrochen, die so auf die Realität einer multikulturellen Gesellschaft Grossbritanniens reagierten. In der Folge entwickelten sich in einzelnen städtischen Gedenkkulturen erste Auseinandersetzungen mit der Thematik. Die Hafenstadt Liverpool nahm diesbezüglich eine Pionierrolle ein, indem das städtische Museum bereits 1994 den Sklavenhandel thematisierte, der Bürgermeister sich für die Beteiligung seiner Stadt am Sklavenhandel entschuldigte und zwei Jahre später eine permanente Ausstellung im *National Maritime Museum* eröffnete.³⁴ In Bristol wurde 1996 innerhalb der Stadtregierung eine *Bristol Slave Trade Action Group* eingerichtet, die sich mit der Umsetzung von zwei erfolgreichen und beim Publikum beliebten Ausstellungen über den Sklavenhandel beschäftigte und einen *Bristol Slave Trade Walk* konzipierte, der zu städtischen Erinnerungsorten – Gebäuden, Monumenten, Plätzen, Hafenanlagen und Friedhöfen – führt, die mit der Vergangenheit des wichtigen Sklave-

32 Wir sind uns bewusst, dass wir hierbei zahlreiche Fragen nicht behandeln; so lassen wir die Akteure in Portugal und Spanien komplett unbeachtet und gehen auch nicht weiter auf die Forderungen nach materieller Entschädigung ein, die auch in Europa, wenn auch ungleich weniger als in den USA, die Debatten begleiten. In Grossbritannien fordert beispielsweise das Africa Reparations Movement eine offizielle Entschuldigung und finanzielle Entschädigung für Sklavenhandel und Kolonialismus, vgl. Barkan, *Völker* (wie Anm. 17), S. 239-240.

33 Den Fokus auf die britischen Abolitionisten legt auch noch das zum 200-Jahre-Jubiläum erschienene Werk von A. Hochschild, *Sprengt die Ketten*. Der entscheidende Kampf um die Abschaffung der Sklaverei, Stuttgart 2007.

34 Die verschiedenen Formen der Geschichtspolitik in den beiden Städten Liverpool und Bristol werden exemplarisch an der Ausstellung im Merseyside Maritime Museum in Liverpool und am Bristol Slave Trade Walk thematisiert in E. Kowaleski Wallace, *The British Slave Trade and Public Memory*, New York 2006, S. 25-65. Vgl. allgemein zu Grossbritannien auch S. Farell/M. Unwin/J. Malwin (Eds.), *The British Slave Trade. Abolition, Parliament and People*, Edinburgh 2007.

reihafens verbunden sind.³⁵ Ebenfalls seit Ende der 1990er Jahre bestehen in Liverpool, Lancaster und Bristol öffentliche Denkmale zur Erinnerung an den Sklavenhandel als Basis des städtischen Reichtums. London befasste sich 2003 umfassend mit seiner Vergangenheit und veranstaltete in den Stadtteilen Brixton und Greenwich ein viertägiges Programm mit Ausstellungen, Debatten und Veranstaltungen.³⁶ Im Gedenkjahr 2007, als der Abschaffung des Sklavenhandels 1807 mit einer von der britischen Regierung geförderten Kampagne in zahlreichen Ausstellungen gedacht wurde – unter anderem im *British Empire & Commonwealth Museum* in Bristol, im neugegründeten *International Slavery Museum* in Liverpool oder im neuen *Museum London, Sugar & Slavery* in den Docklands der Hauptstadt –, war ein vorläufiger Höhepunkt erreicht. So erschienen zahlreiche Medienberichte und mehrere Biographien des Abolitionisten Wilberforce, TV-Filme wurden produziert, Gedenk-Briefmarken und -Münzen herausgegeben und es fanden in mehreren Städten öffentliche Paraden statt, in Liverpool beispielsweise mit der Nachbildung eines Sklavenschiffes. Am 28. März 2007 wurde zudem ein nationaler Gedenkgottesdienst in der Westminster Abbey in Anwesenheit der Königin, des Premierministers Tony Blair und des Erzbischofs von Canterbury gehalten. Dabei lag der Fokus allerdings nach wie vor stark auf der Abschaffung des Sklavenhandels und der britischen Pionierrolle, und damit auch auf der demonstrativen Zurschaustellung von Demokratie und Toleranz als vermeintlich britischer Werte.³⁷ Dies führte zur Kritik, statt der weissen Abolitionisten sei den Millionen von Opfern zu gedenken.³⁸ In der Debatte über die unterschiedlichen Zugänge des Gedenkens an den britischen Sklavenhandel und die Sklaverei zeigen sich denn auch zwei Tendenzen konkurrierender Deutungsansprüche; eine traditionelle, britische, eurozentrische Geschichte der Abolition steht einem multiethnischen Fokus auf die versklavten Menschen und der Nachkommen gegenüber.³⁹ Die britische Geschichtspolitik der Erinnerung an den Sklavenhandel, so weit fortgeschritten sie mit musealen Ausstellungen und öffentlichen Erinnerungsorten sein mag, ist aktuell allerdings in der sogenannten „Apology Debate“ gespalten; der Frage also, ob und allenfalls wer sich für den Sklavenhandel öffentlich entschuldigen soll.⁴⁰

35 Vgl. Ch. Chivallon, *L'émergence récente de la mémoire de l'esclavage dans l'espace public. Enjeux et significations*, in: *Revue d'histoire moderne & contemporaine* 52-4bis (2005), S. 64-81. Die Autorin vergleicht die unterschiedliche Geschichtspolitik der Städte Bristol und Bordeaux.

36 B. Herzfeld, *UK London Festival Targets Capital's Slavery Past*, in: *New African* 421 (2003), S. 52-53.

37 Eckert, *Kolonialismus* (wie Anm. 5), hier S. 34-35.

38 Die grossen Feiern 2007 haben so auch zu einer Spaltung des Landes geführt und den Forderungen nach Entschädigungen oder zumindest Entschuldigungen Auftrieb gegeben, zugleich aber das kollektive Gedächtnis Grossbritanniens als traditionsreiches und stolzes Land humanitärer Intervention nachhaltig erschüttert. Vgl. dazu J. Oldfield, *Introduction. Imagining Transatlantic Slavery and Abolition*, in: *Patterns of Prejudice* 41 (2007), S. 239-243. Als Überblick über die Aktivitäten vgl. A. Tibbles, *Facing Slavery's Past. The Bicentenary of the Abolition of the British Slave Trade*, in: *Slavery & Abolition* 29 (2008), H. 2, S. 293-303.

39 Vgl. dazu J. Oldfield, *„Chords of Freedom“. Commemoration, Ritual and British Transatlantic Slavery*, Manchester / New York 2007. Oldfield befasst sich mit den verschiedenen Formen der kulturellen Produktion von Erinnerung an die Sklaverei im Bereich von Kunst, Literatur, Ritualen und Ausstellungen und warnt vor den Gefahren einer fragmentierten Erinnerung entlang rassistischer Kriterien in Grossbritannien.

40 Zur Symbolik der öffentlichen Entschuldigung für vergangene Verbrechen und zur Zunahme diesbezüglicher „Bußrituale“ in der internationalen Politik finden sich bei H. Lübke, *„Ich entschuldige mich“*. Das neue politische

Die Städte London und Liverpool und die anglikanische Kirche haben dies bereits formell getan, die Regierung hingegen hat zwar ihr Bedauern über die britische Beteiligung am Sklavenhandel ausgedrückt, sich aber nicht entschuldigt, weil befürchtet wird, dies könnte individuelle oder kollektive Entschädigungsforderungen auslösen.

Die Auseinandersetzung auf dem Feld der Geschichtspolitik um die französische Beteiligung am transatlantischen Sklavenhandel begann ähnlich spät wie in den britischen Hafenstädten und wurde zu Beginn in lokalen Initiativen von privaten Vereinen und Aktivisten betrieben.⁴¹ So wurde in den Jahren 1992 bis 1994 in Nantes, einem der wichtigsten französischen Atlantikhäfen im 18. Jahrhundert, durch den lokalen Geschichtsverein *Les Anneaux de la Mémoire* die erste grosse Ausstellung zum Sklavenhandel gezeigt, die sich mittlerweile überarbeitet und erweitert im *Musée d'histoire* von Nantes befindet. Davon angeregt entstanden an den Universitäten zahlreiche Studien zum Sklavenhandel⁴² und die jährliche Publikation *Cahiers des Anneaux de la Mémoire* ist als Forum für den Austausch zwischen Forschern und einem interessierten Publikum geschaffen worden. In Bordeaux hingegen tat man sich lange schwer mit der Erinnerung an die Vergangenheit, erst mit dem Erscheinen von „Bordeaux port négrier: Chronologie, économie, idéologie“ im Jahre 1995 hat sich dies mit Ausstellungen und Gedenkveranstaltungen geändert, wenn auch die Stadtregierung bis heute eher zurückhaltend auf die Korrekturen am lokalen Geschichtsbewusstsein reagiert.⁴³ Auf der nationalstaatlichen Ebene wurde weniger an den Sklavenhandel oder die Sklaverei in den ehemaligen Kolonien erinnert als vielmehr an die Abschaffung derselben, die über eine höhere Anschlussfähigkeit an die republikanische Meistererzählung des Landes verfügte als die Erinnerung an den Handel, die Rivalität unter den Sklavereinationen, den Widerstand oder die Revolten der Sklaven und Sklavinnen. So wurde 1998 der 150. Jahrestag der definitiven Abschaffung der Sklaverei mit einem Schweigemarsch von 40'000 Personen durch Paris begangen. Gerade die Kritik von Seiten der Gemeinschaften aus den französischen Überseedepartementen an der Einengung der sinnstiftenden Erinnerung auf die „abolition“ führte dazu, dass seither der transatlantische Sklavenhandel und die Institution Sklaverei von der Öffentlichkeit, aber auch von der Wissenschaft, vermehrt wahrgenommen werden.⁴⁴ Nach intensiven Debatten wurde am 21. Mai 2001 ein nach der aus der Karibik

Ritual, Berlin 2001, interessante Beobachtungen, wenn auch die Erklärungskraft des Essays für das Phänomen begrenzt bleibt, weil sie in einer „Zivilreligion“ (S. 34) gesucht wird.

41 Vgl. für eine Übersicht zu den Aktivitäten und weiterführend zu den Gründen für die späte Beschäftigung Frankreichs mit der Thematik u. a. F. Vergès, *Les troubles de la mémoire. Traite négrière, esclavage et écriture de l'histoire*, in: *Cahiers d'Etudes africaines* 179-180 (2005), S. 1143-1178.

42 Im Zeitraum 1995–2005 sind über 70 universitäre Qualifikationsarbeiten zu den Themenfeldern „esclavage“ und „traite“ geschrieben worden, daneben wurden zahlreiche Tagungen zur Thematik abgehalten, vgl. M. Cottias, *Et si l'esclavage colonial faisait histoire nationale?*, in: *Revue d'histoire moderne & contemporaine* 52-4bis (2005), S. 59-63, hier S. 61.

43 Der Autor selber referiert die Aktivitäten der Stadt Bordeaux seit dem Erscheinen seines Buches in E. Saugera, *Question(s) de mémoire: le souvenir négrier à Nantes et Bordeaux*, in: *Cahiers d'histoire – Revue d'histoire critique* 89 (2002), S. 61-68.

44 Vgl. zur Entwicklung der Erinnerung an die Sklaverei in der französischen Karibik J.-L. Bonniol, *Les usages publics de la mémoire de l'esclavage colonial*, in: *Matériaux pour l'Histoire de Notre Temps* 85 (2007), S. 14-21. Der

stammenden Abgeordneten Christine Taubira benanntes Gesetz zur Anerkennung des Sklavenhandels und der Sklaverei als „Verbrechen gegen die Menschlichkeit“ verabschiedet, noch bevor dies die UNO an der Weltkonferenz gegen Rassismus im August 2001 in Durban tat. Dieses Gesetz kann, bei aller berechtigten Kritik, die es von Seiten namhafter französischer Historiker erfahren hat, als definitiver Bruch der Republik mit der kolonialen Vergangenheit gesehen werden und hat damit erneut produktiv auf die historische Forschung gewirkt und gleichzeitig die öffentliche Debatte verstärkt, gerade auch weil es die öffentliche Vergegenwärtigung dieser Verbrechen über Erinnerungsorte regelt.⁴⁵ Die Loi Taubira steht in Frankreich in einer Reihe weiterer „Lois mémorielles“, beispielsweise zur Leugnung des Holocaust und zum Genozid an den Armeniern. Am meisten Aufsehen erregte das 2005 von der Nationalversammlung verabschiedete Gesetz über die Kolonisierung der französischen Siedler in den Überseekolonien, speziell in Nordafrika, das die „positive Rolle“ des französischen Kolonialismus festschrieb und auf diese Weise eine bestimmte Wertung verbindlich machte. Dagegen machte sich bald heftiger Widerstand einer Gruppe französischer Historiker, die sich seither im von Pierre Nora präsierten Verein „Liberté pour l'histoire“ organisiert haben und die sich generell gegen Eingriffe in die Forschungsfreiheit und gegen Behinderung von historischer Forschung und Reflexion zur Wehr setzten. Auch das Feld der Erinnerungspolitik bezüglich Sklaverei und Sklavenhandel ist dabei umstritten, was sich an der Klage von Aktivisten von den Antillen, aus Guyana und von Réunion gegen den Historiker Olivier Pétré-Grenouilleau zeigte. Dieser hatte in seiner Studie „Les traites négrières – Essai d'histoire globale“ den transatlantischen Sklavenhandel vergleichend neben den transsaharischen gestellt und auf die Tatsache hingewiesen, dass auch Afrikaner als Sklavenhändler an der Küste tätig waren.⁴⁶ Dies war für das „Collectif des Antillais, Guyanais, Réunionnais“ eine Relativierung der Schrecken des Sklavenhandels, gegen die sie bei einem Pariser Gericht auf der Basis der Loi Taubira eine Klage einreichten, die inzwischen jedoch zurückgenommen worden ist.⁴⁷ Am 20. Mai 2006 wurde erstmals ein nationaler Gedenktag zur Abschaffung der Sklaverei mit einer Rede des Staatspräsidenten Jacques Chirac begangen, der nun jährlich stattfinden soll und auf einen Vorschlag eines Komitees für

Rolle der Sklaverei für das politische Bewusstsein von „Nachkommen“ von Sklaven thematisiert J.-Y. Camus, *The Commemoration of Slavery in France and the Emergence of a Black Political Consciousness*, in: *European Legacy* 11 (2006), H. 6, S. 647-655.

45 Symptomatisch für das breite Interesse die Themenhefte der populären Geschichtszeitschriften *Historia Thématicque* 80 (Nov./Dez. 2002): *L'Esclavage, un tabou français enfin levé* und *L'Histoire* 280 (Okt. 2003): *La Vérité sur l'esclavage*. Als Indiz für die intensivierte wissenschaftliche Beschäftigung einerseits mit dem französischen Sklavenhandel andererseits mit der Geschichtspolitik mögen die Hinweise auf die im Jahre 2002 dem Thema „Les enjeux de la mémoire: esclavage-marronnage-commémorations“ gewidmete Ausgabe 89 der *Cahiers d'histoire – Revue d'histoire critique* und auf die renommierte *Revue d'histoire moderne & contemporaine* genügen, die in der Nr. 52-4bis (2005) die Thematik „*Traites, esclaves: La trace et l'histoire*“ behandelte. Vgl. zu den aktuellsten Entwicklungen F. Vergès, *Traite des Noirs, esclavage colonial et leurs abolitions. Un conflit d'interprétation*, in: P. Blanchard / I. Veyrat-Masson, *Les guerres de mémoires. La France et son histoire, enjeux politiques, controverses historiques, stratégies médiatiques*, Paris 2008.

46 O. Pétré-Grenouilleau, *Les traites négrières – Essai d'histoire globale*, Paris 2003.

47 Vgl. dazu Eckert (wie Anm. 5), S. 32-33.

die Erinnerung an die Sklaverei unter dem Vorsitz der Politologin Françoise Vergès zurückgeht.⁴⁸ Seinen Ursprung ebenfalls in diesem Komitee hat das projektierte nationale Zentrum für die Erinnerung an die Sklaverei und deren Abschaffung unter der Leitung des kreolischen Schriftstellers Edouard Glissant, dessen Realisierung im Zusammenhang mit dem neuen staatlichen Museum *Cité nationale de l'histoire de l'immigration* für die nächsten Jahre geplant ist. Monumente und geschichtspolitische Erinnerungsorte an den Sklavenhandel sind in Frankreich bislang rar, immerhin wurde im Jardin du Luxembourg in Paris im Beisein des Staatspräsidenten ein Kunstwerk zur Erinnerung an den Sklavenhandel eingeweiht und in Nantes wurde 2008 ein Monument an den Ufern der Loire errichtet, das sich die Stadtverwaltung gegen 10 Millionen Euro kosten liess. Trotz dieser Aktivitäten ist die Thematik bisher weder im öffentlichen Bewusstsein Frankreichs breit verankert noch ist sie Bestandteil des kollektiven Erinnerung, hierzu mag auch beitragen, dass der Sklavenhandel in den Schulbüchern bisher kaum Thema ist und an den Universitäten zwar viel geforscht wird, meist aber aus persönlichem Engagement und ohne den institutionellen Rahmen, den beispielsweise ein entsprechender Lehrstuhl bieten würde. Dies könnte sich mit dem im Aufbau befindlichen nationalen Forschungs- und Bildungszentrum ändern.⁴⁹

In den Niederlanden war der 350 Jahre dauernde Sklavenhandel der 1621 gegründeten *Vereinigten Westindische Compagnie (WIC)*, der erst 1863 auf Druck britischer und niederländischer Abolitionisten abgeschafft wurde, seit spätestens 1998 ein öffentliches Thema.⁵⁰ Mit einer Petition wurde damals, unterstützt von Wissenschaftlerinnen und Wissenschaftler und einzelnen Angehörigen des Parlaments, durch einen Zusammenschluss von gegen 20 surinamischen, afrikanischen und karibischen Organisationen von der Regierung gefordert, die koloniale Vergangenheit mit einem Monument im Alltag sichtbar werden zu lassen. Dies stiess auf gute Resonanz, obwohl sich diese Vergangenheit schlecht in das niederländische Selbstbild als einer modernen und toleranten Nation einfügte. Zeitgleich befassten sich erstmals mehrere historische Werke mit der niederländischen Sklaverei. Grosse Aufmerksamkeit erhielt das vom Linguisten und Anthropologen Gert Oostindie veröffentlichte Buch „Het verleden onder ogen“, in dem

48 Die Aktivitäten dieses Comité, das seit 2004 existiert und einer Forderung der Loi Taubira nachkommt, sind auf <http://www.comite-memoire-esclavage.fr> (15.4.2009) dokumentiert. Das Komitee erstattet dem Premierminister jährlich Bericht und koordiniert die zahlreichen Aktivitäten zur geschichtspolitischen Erinnerung an den Sklavenhandel in Frankreich in den Bereichen Museum, Forschung, Bildung.

49 Vgl. dazu den Stand bei E. Glissant, *Mémoires des esclavages*. La fondation d'un centre national pour la mémoire des esclavages et de leurs abolitions, Paris 2007. Darin findet sich auch ein Vorwort des ehemaligen Premierministers Dominique de Villepin. Wie sich die Politik der Regierung Sarkozy auf die geschichtskulturelle Auseinandersetzung mit dem französischen Sklavenhandel auswirkt, bleibt abzuwarten. Vgl. zum Forschungszentrum <http://www.esclavages.cnrs.fr> (15.4.2009).

50 Vgl. T. Müller, Warum der Zucker billig war. Die niederländische Debatte um die Verantwortung für Sklaverei, in: *iz3w* 296 (2006), S. 19–21, und Schattenseite der niederländischen Kolonialzeit. Gedenken an die Abschaffung der Sklaverei, in: *NZZ* 150, 2. Juli 2003. Vgl. zu den aktuellen Entwicklungen in den Niederlanden, aber auch zur Rolle der US-amerikanischen Debatte für die Niederlande, J.-O. Horton / J. C. Kardux, *Slavery and Public Memory in the United States and the Netherlands*, in: *New York Journal of American History* 66 (2005), H. 2, S. 34–52. Die historischen Fakten waren spätestens seit 1990 bekannt, vgl. J. M. Postma, *The Dutch in the Atlantic Slave Trade 1600–1815*, Cambridge 1990.

sich zahlreiche Autoren, auch aus der grossen Gemeinschaft der Nachkommen aus den ehemaligen Kolonien in Surinam und den Antillen, mit dem unterschiedlichen Gedenken an die Sklaverei auseinandersetzen, mit dem expliziten politischen Ziel, der niederländischen Gesellschaft ihre „forgotten, blood-curling and shameful pages in its history“ in Erinnerung zu rufen.⁵¹ Dieses Buch wurde aus dem Fonds des Prinzgemahls Prince Claus finanziert und dem niederländischen Parlament vorgelegt, das in der Folge beschloss, ein Denkmal und eine Forschungseinrichtung zu gründen, was 2002 mit der Einweihung des *Nationaal Monument Slavernijverleden* im Oosterpark in Amsterdam im Beisein von Königin Beatrix und des Ministerpräsidenten geschah.⁵² Das ein Jahr später eröffnete Forschungs-, Erinnerungs- und Bildungsinstitut *NiNsee* hat sich mit seinen Aktivitäten zum zentralen Akteur im Feld entwickelt und forscht gegenwärtig zu so unterschiedlichen Bereichen wie den genealogischen Verbindungen von Nachkommen ehemaliger Sklaven und Sklavinnen nach den Antillen, den Möglichkeiten der Integration der Vergangenheit als Sklavenhandelsnation in den schulischen Geschichtsunterricht, aber auch gegenwärtigen Formen von Rassismus und Ausgrenzung.⁵³ Obwohl die offiziellen Niederlande mit dem Monument und dem Informationszentrum im europäischen Vergleich bereits früh eine Pionierrolle einnahmen und die Verwirklichung dieser beiden Institutionen ein grosser Fortschritt darstellt in einem Bereich, der vor zehn Jahren noch kaum jemand beschäftigte, bestehen gegenwärtig doch auch kritische Stimmen, die auf die Gefahr dieser Geschichtspolitik der Regierung hinweisen, mit der Errichtung des Monument einen schnellen Schlussstrich ziehen zu wollen, um gar nicht erst Diskussionen um Entschädigungen und um die gegenwärtige Beziehungen zu den ehemaligen Kolonien aufkommen zu lassen.

In Schweden spielen die zivilgesellschaftlichen Akteure wie Anti-Rassismus-Nichtregierungsorganisation oder Organisationen afrikanischer Migranten und Migrantinnen bei der Thematisierung der Sklaverei in der Öffentlichkeit eine zentrale Rolle. Seit dem UNO-Gedenkjahr 2004 wird von diesen Aktivistinnen und Aktivisten versucht, die Regierung über parlamentarische Anfragen und Motionen dazu zu bewegen, eine Entschuldigung für die schwedische Beteiligung am Sklavenhandel zu formulieren und weitere diesbezügliche Forschungen zu fördern, bisher allerdings weitgehend erfolglos. Im Spätherbst 2007 kam es zu einer intensiv geführten Debatte, die das aktuelle Verhältnis zwischen Geschichtswissenschaft und zivilgesellschaftlichen Akteuren im Feld der Geschichtspolitik deutlich macht. Nach der Veröffentlichung der ersten beiden Bü-

51 Der originale Sammelband G. Oostindie (Hrsg.), *Het verleden onder ogen. Herdenking van de slavernij*, Amsterdam und Den Haag 1999, ist 2001 überarbeitet und erweitert in Englisch erschienen: Oostindie (Ed.), *Facing up* (wie Anm. 32), hier S. 13.

52 Dieser Prozess war keineswegs konfliktfrei und einfach, sondern von Legitimitätsproblemen der mit der Regierung verhandelnden Plattform schwarzer Organisationen geprägt, vgl. dazu A. van Stipriaan, *The Long Road to a Monument*, in: Oostindie (Ed.), *Facing up* (wie Anm. 32), S. 118–122.

53 Die Homepage des Nationaal instituut Nederlands slavernijverleden en erfenis (NiNsee) liefert Bildungsmaterial, Forschungsprojekte und Zugänge zu Quellen und Literatur, vgl. <http://www.slavernijverleden.nl> (15.4.2009). Den aktuellen Wissensstand zur niederländischen Beteiligung an Sklavenhandel und Sklaverei bei P. C. Emmer, *The Dutch Slave Trade 1500–1850*, New York/Oxford 2006.

cher einer Trilogie zur Sklaverei durch den Geschichtsprofessor an der Universität Lund, Dick Harrison, wurden seine Thesen einer afrikanischen Schuld an der Versklavung öffentlich heftig kritisiert.⁵⁴ So haben sich Vertretungen schwedisch-afrikanischer und antirassistischer Organisationen in einer Debatte in der grössten schwedischen Tageszeitung *Dagens Nyheter* gegen die postulierten Auffassungen gewehrt und auf die darin nicht erwähnten schwedischen Beteiligungen am Sklavenhandel hingewiesen, die bisher kaum öffentlich bekannt sind.⁵⁵ Schweden hat nämlich von der durch den europäischen Sklavenhandel gesteigerten Nachfrage nach Eisen als Tauschgut und zur Herstellung der Fussfesseln profitiert und direkt sogenanntes Reise-Eisen – „voyage-järn“ – in Stangenform nach Grossbritannien geliefert. Zudem war Schweden ebenfalls direkt über staatliche Handelskompagnien im Sklavenhandel beteiligt und bot mit seiner Karibikinsel St. Barthelemy zudem Gelegenheit zum illegalen Sklavenhandel, den es erst auf massiven englischen Druck hin 1847 definitiv abschaffte. Bisher hat sich das Land der Forderung nach Entschuldigung verweigert und seine Beteiligung am Sklavenhandel erst unwillig eingestanden. Als zu resistent erweist sich der nationale Mythos, wonach Schweden weder Kolonien besessen noch etwas mit dem Sklavenhandel zu schaffen gehabt habe. Dabei wird der Geschichtswissenschaft von Aktivistenseite vorgeworfen, sich generell zuwenig für die Thematik zu interessieren, so dass Forschungslücken bestehen bleiben. Als 1974 vor der Küste Südnorwegens das Wrack des Sklavenschiffes *Fredensborg* gefunden wurde, gab dies den Anstoss zur Beschäftigung mit dem ab Mitte des 17. Jahrhunderts bis 1802 dauernden Sklavenhandel des Königreiches Dänemark-Norwegen.⁵⁶ Dank intensiver Recherchen und mehrerer Ausstellungen, unter anderem auch auf der Antilleninsel St. Croix, wohin die von Dänemark-Norwegen gefangenen Sklaven und Sklavinnen gebracht wurden, ist die *Fredensborg* heute das am besten dokumentierte Wrack eines Sklavenschiffes weltweit, wobei auch zahlreiche Aussagen über die Lebensbedingungen an Bord möglich wurden.⁵⁷ Trotz dieser frühen Thematisierung der Vergangenheit als Sklavenhandelsnation wurde in den folgenden Jahren die Auseinandersetzung mit dem Sklavenhandel von einer breiten Öffentlichkeit sowohl in Dänemark als auch in Norwegen ignoriert. Dies änderte sich erst durch die Ausstrahlung der Dokumentarserie

54 D. Harrison, *Slaveri – Forntiden till renässansen*, Stockholm 2006 und D. Harrison, *Slaveri – en världshistoria om ofrihet 1500–1800*, Stockholm 2007. Die beiden Bücher sind, wie andere Bücher von Harrison auch, populär geschrieben, erleben aber hohe Auflagen. Kritisiert werden fehlende Quellenbelege, sachliche Fehler und Zitate, die aus dem Zusammenhang gerissen sind. Zudem beziehe sich Harrison kaum auf eigene Forschungen.

55 Die mit Verve ausgefochtene Debatte im Oktober / November 2007 (Harrison spricht von einer Schlammschlacht gegen ihn und bezeichnet die Aktivisten als Geschichtsverfälscher und die Afrikaner pauschal als „gierig und skrupellos“). Diese wiederum werfen ihm Unwissenschaftlichkeit, Missachtung der afrikanischen Menschen und Rassismus vor) findet sich dokumentiert unter <http://www.hlfstockholm.se/deb.htm> (Debatt-Slaveriets historia, 15.4.2009). Dank an Franziska Kreis für die Hilfe bei der Lektüre der schwedischen Texte.

56 Bereits früh waren einige Fakten bekannt, wurden aber kaum zur Kenntnis genommen, vgl. S. E. Grenn-Pedersen, *The Scope and Structure of the Danish Negro Slave Trade*, in: *Scandinavian Economic History Review* 19 (1971), S. 186–193. Vgl. zur Forschungsliteratur A. R. Highfield / G. F. Tyson, *Slavery in the Danish West Indies*. A Bibliography, St. Croix 1994.

57 Die Forschungsergebnisse sind im Buch von L. Svalesen, *The Slave Ship Fredensborg*, Bloomington 2000, dokumentiert. Zusätzlich bietet die norwegische Unesco-Website <http://www.unesco.no/fredensborg/> (28.6.2008) in Zusammenarbeit mit dem Slave Route Project zahlreiche Informationen über das Wrack.

„Slavernes Slaegt“ (Slaves in our families) im Frühjahr 2005 am dänischen Fernsehen. Erstmals wurde damit einer breiten dänischen Öffentlichkeit bewusst, dass Dänemark über 200 Jahre lang sowohl am Sklavenhandel mit Handelskompagnien und Sklavenshiffs in Westafrika als auch an der Plantagensklaverei auf den westindischen Inseln beteiligt gewesen war. Um diesen Umstand im Geschichtsbewusstsein zu verankern, ist ein Forschungs- und Ausstellungszentrum in Kopenhagen geplant, das die Beziehungen Dänemarks zu den Tropen thematisieren soll.⁵⁸

Auch die Schweiz pflegte lange das Selbstbild, als Land ohne Kolonien mit dem transatlantischen Sklavenhandel nichts zu schaffen gehabt zu haben. Dies obwohl vereinzelte Historiker bereits seit den 1960er Jahren auf geschäftliche Verbindungen von Kaufleuten und Finanzinstitutionen aus der alten Eidgenossenschaft vor allem in die französischen Sklavereihäfen aufmerksam gemacht hatten.⁵⁹ Noch im Jahre 2001 hatte der diplomatische Vertreter der Schweiz an der UNO-Konferenz in Durban in völliger Unkenntnis der historischen Forschungen formuliert, die Schweiz habe „mit Sklaverei, dem Sklavenhandel und dem Kolonialismus nichts zu tun“⁶⁰ gehabt. Dies führte in der Folge zu zahlreichen parlamentarischen Vorstössen im schweizerischen Nationalrat und in verschiedenen Kantons- und Stadtparlamenten, die die Aussage kritisierten und entsprechende Forschungen forderten. Die schweizerische Beteiligung an Sklavenhandel und Sklaverei rückte so in den Forschungsfokus, begünstigt durch den Wegfall der Denkblockaden, die der Kalte Krieg verursacht hatte und durch den internationalen Druck afrikanischer und karibischer Organisationen sowie durch die weltweiten Debatten um Vergangenheitsbewältigung und Wiedergutmachung. Gleichwohl hielt die offizielle Schweiz vorsichtig Distanz zum UNO-Jahr zur Sklaverei 2004 und unternahm keinerlei Aktivitäten. Die Geschichtswissenschaft befasste sich aber verstärkt mit der Thematik und publizierte Forschungsergebnisse, die eine Beteiligung der Schweiz und zahlreicher Einzelunternehmen und -personen deutlich werden liessen.⁶¹ Zugleich erschien das breit rezipierte Buch

58 Vgl. zum Stand der Diskussion die Konferenz „Denmark and the Black Atlantic“ (Universität Kopenhagen, Mai 2006), die alle Forscherinnen und Aktivisten, die sich mit der Thematik beschäftigen, versammelte. <http://blackatlantic.engerom.ku.dk/> (15.4.2009). Vgl. auch die Informationen zu den Aktivitäten der zivilgesellschaftlichen Akteure und zur Dokumentarserie „Slavernes Slaegt“ auf der Homepage http://www.tropiskarv.dk/31_default.htm (15.4.2009).

59 Hinweise finden sich beispielsweise bei A. Wirz, *Sklaverei und kapitalistisches Weltsystem*, Frankfurt a. M. 1984, S. 35 („Aus der Schweiz und dem Elsass zugewanderte protestantische Händler in Nantes wie Riedi et Thurninger oder Pelloutier, Bourcard & Co nutzten ausserdem konfessionelle und herkunftsgebundene Kontakte, was sie, wie vorn erwähnt, zu Schweizer Bankherren führte, die schon damals gute von schlechten Geschäften zu unterscheiden wussten.“) und bei H. Lüthy, *La Banque Protestante en France – De la Révocation de l'Edit de Nantes à la Révolution*. 2 Bde. Paris 1959–1960.

60 Aussage von Jean-Daniel Vigny, Vertreter der Schweiz an der UNO-Konferenz in Durban, zit. nach T. David/B. Etemad/J. M. Schaufelbuehl, *Schwarze Geschäfte. Die Beteiligung von Schweizern an Sklaverei und Sklavenhandel im 18. und 19. Jahrhundert*, Zürich 2005, S. 9.

61 Den Anfang machten N. Stettler/P. Haenger/R. Labhardt, *Baumwolle, Sklaven und Kredite. Die Welthandelsfirma Christoph Burckhardt & Cie. in revolutionärer Zeit 1789–1815*, Basel 2004, deren Forschungen detailliert den Nachweis einer Beteiligung erbrachten. Umfassend und wissenschaftlich fundiert beleuchteten David/Etemad/Schaukelbuehl, *Schwarze Geschäfte* (wie Anm. 61), die verschiedenen Formen der Schweizer Beteiligung am Sklavenhandel, an der Plantagensklaverei in der Karibik und den beiden Amerikas, aber auch die Rolle von schweizerischen Gruppierungen in der internationalen Abolitionsbewegung. Als Überblick über die schweize-

„Reise in Schwarz-Weiss“ des Aktivisten Hans Fässler, der 2003 im Rahmen eines kabarettistischen Programms auf die Verbindungen der Schweiz zum transatlantischen Sklavenhandel und zur Plantagensklaverei gestossen war.⁶² In der Folge erlangte das Thema einige Aufmerksamkeit in der Schweizer Presselandschaft, von offizieller Seite sind die Reaktionen bislang jedoch verhalten abwartend geblieben.

Demgegenüber steht die Beschäftigung mit der Thematik in Deutschland an einem deutlich anderen Punkt. So sind bisher kaum Parlamentarierinnen und Parlamentarier oder zivilgesellschaftliche Akteure involviert, vielmehr ging der Impuls einerseits von wissenschaftlichen Forschungen aus, andererseits wurde die Thematik bereits früh auch museal umgesetzt.⁶³ Seit den 1980er-Jahren sind Bücher und Aufsätze mit Forschungen erschienen, die auf die Tätigkeiten der 1680 gegründeten *Brandenburgisch-Africanischen Compagnie* hinweisen.⁶⁴ Ab Beginn der 1990er-Jahre wurde dieses Wissen über die frühkolonialen Abenteuer des Grossen Kurfürsten Friedrich Wilhelm von Brandenburg an der Küste Westafrikas und der Beteiligung am transatlantischen Sklavenhandel durch populäre Bücher, Zeitungsartikel und eine Fernsehdokumentation zunehmend bekannt.⁶⁵ Erneute Aufmerksamkeit erhielt diese koloniale Vergangenheit Brandenburgs im Preussenjahr 2001, als im Zusammenhang mit den Feierlichkeiten zum 300jährigen Krönungsjubiläum Friedrichs II. von Preussen die Beteiligung am transatlantischen Sklavenhandel von der Presse Berlins und Brandenburgs breit wahrgenommen wurde.⁶⁶

rische Debatte und Forschung K. J. Kuhn/B. Ziegler, Die Schweiz und die Sklaverei. Zum Spannungsfeld zwischen Geschichtspolitik und Wissenschaft, in: *Traverse – Zeitschrift für Geschichte* 16 (2009), H. 1, S. 116-130.

62 H. Fässler, *Reise in Schwarz-Weiss*. Schweizer Ortstermine in Sachen Sklaverei, Zürich 2005. Fässler war es auch, der die Parlamentarier und Parlamentarierinnen mit Material für ihre Anfragen alimentierte. Die daraus entstandenen Debatten (sowie Material zum Kabarettprogramm) sind dokumentiert unter <http://www.louverture.ch> (15.4.2009); sie haben dazu geführt, dass der Bundesrat die Beteiligung von Schweizern am Sklavenhandel offiziell „bedauert“ hat und die Stadt Zürich ihren Verbindungen zum Sklavenhandel in einem kleinen Forschungsauftrag nachgegangen ist.

63 Trotz dieser frühen Thematisierungen war die Frage der Mitbeteiligung an Sklavenhandel in Deutschland kaum öffentlich präsent, vgl. dazu S. Broeck, *Traveling Memory. The Middle Passage in German Representation*, in: *The Massachusetts Review* 1+2 (2003), S. 157-166.

64 Vgl. hierzu A. Jones, *Brandenburg-Prussia and the Atlantic Slave Trade 1680–1700*, in: S. Daget (Hrsg.), *De la traite à l'esclavage*, Bd. 1, Nantes/Paris 1989. Im Schulbuch von M. Mögenburg/H.-P. Rauckes, *Sklaverei und Dreieckshandel. Menschen als Ware*, Frankfurt a. M. 1988, wurde bereits früh auf eine „deutsche“ Mitbeteiligung hingewiesen. Vgl. auch M. Vogt, *Brandenburg in Übersee. Kolonialpläne deutscher Fürsten im 17. Jahrhundert*, in: C. Dipper/M. Vogt, *Entdeckungen und frühe Kolonisation*, Darmstadt 1993, S. 345-379. J. Nagel, *Die Brandenburgisch-Africanische Compagnie. Ein Handelsunternehmen*, in: *Scripta Mercaturae* 30 (1996), H. 1, S. 44-94. Die Forschungen haben auch Eingang in englischsprachige Übersichtswerke gefunden, vgl. H. S. Klein, *The Atlantic Slave Trade*, Cambridge 1999, zu Brandenburg-Preussen, hier S. 74-80.

65 U. van der Heyden, *Rote Adler an Afrikas Küste. Die brandenburgisch-preussische Kolonie Grossfriedrichsburg in Westafrika*, Berlin 1993. Der Film wurde vom Ostdeutschen Rundfunk Brandenburg (ORB) unter der Regie von Johannes Unger gedreht. Zusätzlich wurde ein Verein gegründet, um dem ehemals brandenburgisch-preussischen Küstenabschnitt (heutiges Städtchen Princes Town) mit Entwicklungsprojekten, Schulpartnerschaften und Tourismusförderung zu helfen, heute befasst sich ein kleiner Nachfolgeverein mit ähnlichen Projekten, vgl. <http://abc-bruecke.de> (15.4.2009). Vgl. hierzu das Nachwort zur 2. Auflage: U. van der Heyden, *Rote Adler an Afrikas Küste. Die brandenburgisch-preussische Kolonie Grossfriedrichsburg in Westafrika*, Berlin 2001, S. 104-105. Ulrich van der Heyden sei für die entsprechenden freundlichen Hinweise (Email vom 14.11.2007) gedankt.

66 Dazu erschien auch eine Neuauflage des Buches von van der Heyden, *Adler* (wie Anm. 66). Die Neuauflage stiess auf ein breites Echo bei Zeitungen und diente teilweise undeklariert als Basis für Artikel von Journalisten und Journalistinnen. Eine Liste einiger Titel mit Bezug zum Buch (neben weiterführenden Informationen zur

Zusätzlich machten sich innerhalb der Geschichtswissenschaft erneute Anstrengungen bemerkbar, dass Thema zu bearbeiten.⁶⁷ Bereits im Jahre 1986 fanden sich in der kleinen Schifffahrtsausstellung des Deutschen Technikmuseums in Berlin einige Informationen über die Beteiligung Brandenburgs am Sklavenhandel, eine bemerkenswerte Pionierleistung auch im europäischen Vergleich. Seit Dezember 2003 nun wird der brandenburgische Sklavenhandel in der neu gestalteten Schifffahrtsabteilung breit thematisiert. Das entsprechende Modul „Brandenburgischer Sklavenhandel“ ist in der neuen Ausstellung eine Inszenierung mit künstlerischen Styroporfiguren ohne museale Objekte, die durch ihre Stapelung in einem modernen Regallager den Warencharakter der Sklaven deutlich machen.⁶⁸ Dieses Modul zweigt, symbolisiert durch ein Modell eines brandenburgischen Sklavenhandelsschiffes, von einer chronologischen Schifffahrtsachse ab. Informationen zur Bedeutung der brandenburgischen Aktiengesellschaft für den Dreieckshandel, den Sklavenhandel, Zahlen und Daten können über eine Medienstation in der Ausstellung abgerufen werden. Neben diesen auf Brandenburg-Preussen fokussierten Aktivitäten entzündete sich in Hamburg eine Debatte an der im Jahre 2006 im Bezirk Wandsbek aufgestellten Bronzebüste des Fabrikanten, Händlers und Plantagenbesitzers Heinrich Carl Schimmelmann (1724–1782), der sowohl selber zahlreiche Sklaven und Sklavinnen auf Plantagen besass, als auch am Sklavenhandel beteiligt war.⁶⁹ Versuche zivilgesellschaftlicher Organisationen, die Büste auf politischem Weg zu entfernen, scheinen erfolgreich zu sein, während die Forderungen nach einer offiziellen Entschuldigung und der Beschäftigung mit den Verbindungen Hamburgs zum Sklavenhandel bis heute nicht erfüllt wurden.⁷⁰ Die Thematik der Beteiligung an Sklaverei und Sklavenhandel wurde in Deutschland auf der Basis von wissenschaftlichen Forschungen und musealen Thematisierungen, in die Öffentlichkeit getragen, die dabei aber stets lokal begrenzt blieb.⁷¹

ehemaligen brandenburgischen Sklaven-Festung an der Küste des heutigen Ghana) findet sich auf <http://www.grossfriedrichsburg.de> (15.4.2009).

67 Symptomatisch dafür ist auch der Anstoss zur Beschäftigung mit der Thematik, die von J. Osterhammel, Aufstieg und Fall der neuzeitlichen Sklaverei. Oder: Was ist ein weltgeschichtliches Problem?, in: Osterhammel, Geschichtswissenschaft (wie Anm. 7), S. 342–369, ausging.

68 Die Informationen verdanken wir Claudia Schuster (Leiterin Abteilung Schifffahrt, Deutsches Technikmuseum Berlin, Email vom 14.11.2007). Bewusst wurde im Modul auf die Ausstellung von Objekten verzichtet, da über den Weg der künstlerischen Inszenierung die Empfindungen der damaligen versklavten Menschen und der heutigen Nachfahren unanmassend und unmoralisch dargestellt werden kann. Die neue Dauerausstellung (Eröffnung Dezember 2003, 6600 m²) geht auf den damaligen Leiter der Schifffahrtsabteilung, Dirk Bönzel, zurück, der auch bereits die kleine Ausstellung von 1986/1987 (ca. 200 m²), konzipiert hatte.

69 Zahlreiche Informationen zur Schimmelmann-Büste bietet die Textsammlung Bündnis 90/Die Grünen (Hrsg.), Hamburg und Kolonialismus. Kolonialspuren und Gedenkkultur im Selbstverständnis der Handelsstadt, Hamburg 2007, bes. S. 26–38. Vgl. zu Schimmelmann das nach wie vor gültige Werk von C. Degn, Die Schimmelmanns im atlantischen Dreieckshandel. Gewinn und Gewissen. Neumünster 1974.

70 Unter <http://www.black-hamburg.de> (15.4.2009) findet sich Material zur Kampagne, die mit den Mitteln der parlamentarischen Anfragen, offenen Briefen, Protestkundgebungen und Strafanzeigen gegen verantwortliche Personen seit 2006 geführt wird, und damit erfolgreich geworden ist. Die Verbindungen deutscher Kaufleute zum Sklavenhandel thematisiert K. Weber, Deutsche Kaufleute im Atlantikhandel 1680–1830. Unternehmen und Familien in Hamburg, Cadix/Bordeaux, München 2004.

71 Meissner/Mücke/Weber, Schwarzes Amerika (wie Anm. 9), S. 91–95, weisen auch auf die weit ins Hinterland reichenden wirtschaftlichen Verflechtungen mit Sklavenhandel und Sklaverei hin, vor allem im Bereich der Textilproduktion.

Debatten über nötige Forschungen, weiterführende Erinnerungsorte oder über Entschuldigungen oder gar Wiedergutmachungen existieren in Brandenburg kaum, ganz im Gegensatz zur Situation in Hamburg, wo das Thema sich aber erst an einem neu geschaffenen Denkmal öffentlich kristallisierte.

Generell zeigen sich als zentrale Akteure auf dem Feld der Geschichtspolitik einerseits staatliche Instanzen, etwa Regierungen und Staatspräsidenten, andererseits die zivilgesellschaftlichen Gruppierungen und Aktivisten. Letztere versuchen ihre Geschichtsnarrative über den Sklavenhandel entweder als korrigierende Alternativen zu den bisherigen nationalen Verdrängungs-Erinnerungen zu etablieren. Der Nationalstaat reagiert auf diese Bemühungen in den untersuchten nationalen Kontexten unterschiedlich: einerseits finden sich Fälle der Aufnahme dieser Diskurse in das offizielle Geschichtsbild, ablesbar an der Etablierung von Forschungszentren, Denkmälern, nationalen Gedenktagen und der Unterstützung von Ausstellungen und Museen. Andererseits bestehen teilweise auch erhebliche Resistenzen gegenüber der Integration dieser konfliktiven Vergangenheit in das nationale kollektive Gedächtnis. Die Geschichtswissenschaft greift in dieses umstrittene Feld an verschiedenen Punkten ein, in einzelnen nationalen Kontexten unterstützt sie geschichtspolitische Forderungen von „Opfergruppen“, liefert die wissenschaftlichen Einschätzungen und Aufarbeitung von Fragestellung und trägt – im Verbund mit Museen und Bildungseinrichtungen – zur Verbreitung diesbezüglichen Wissens bei, teilweise reagiert sie aber auch ignorierend und setzt das jahrhundertlange Schweigen und die Verdrängung auch innerhalb der Wissenschaft fort. Wenn eine Typologie der europäischen Geschichtspolitik im Umgang mit Sklaverei und Sklavenhandel versucht werden sollte, könnte eine Unterscheidung in diejenigen Länder erfolgen, die sich mittlerweile seit Jahrzehnten mit ihrer nationalen Vergangenheit als Sklavereination auseinandergesetzt haben, wo die Debatte darüber weit fortgeschritten ist und diese durch offizielle staatliche Aktivitäten unterstützt wird. Darunter würden sich Grossbritannien, Frankreich und die Niederlande einreihen, allerdings bestehen hier noch erhebliche Diskrepanzen bezüglich geschichtswissenschaftlicher Forschung zum Thema und deren institutioneller Etablierung. Generell stellt sich bei allen drei Staaten die Frage nach der zukünftigen Verankerung dieses Themas sowohl im öffentlichen Bewusstsein, als auch in der kollektiven Erinnerung. Auf der anderen Seite stehen diejenigen Länder, die sich aktuell mitten in der Debatte über die Beteiligung am transatlantischen Sklavenhandel befinden. So besteht zwar in der Schweiz, in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und in Dänemark und Norwegen – in Schweden nur mit Einschränkungen – ein Konsens zwischen Aktivisten und der Geschichtswissenschaft über Ausmass und historische Mitverantwortung, allerdings zeichnet sich im Bezug auf die daraus abzuleitenden geschichtspolitischen Forderungen an die staatlichen Instanzen noch keine Einigkeit ab.

5. Ausblick

Die Frage nach der geschichtspolitischen Stellung der Sklaverei in nationalstaatlichen Narrativen Europas, nach den Ausformungen des Geschichtsbewusstseins und des kol-

lektiven Gedächtnisses an den europäischen Sklavenhandel und danach, wie die Geschichtswissenschaft auf diese Entwicklungen reagiert, führt uns zu einigen generalisierenden Beobachtungen.

Zum einen war bedingt durch den starken Fokus des Erinnerns der Abolition in Europa die Sklaverei als wirtschaftliche Institution und als Prozess marginaler sozialer Eingliederung in die Gesellschaft⁷² lange kaum öffentlich präsent und wird auch in den beobachteten aktuellen geschichtspolitischen Aktionen bisher noch wenig reflektiert.⁷³ Darüber hinaus werden in den Debatten, abgesehen von einzelnen nationalen Spezifika, heterogene Akteursgruppen mit unterschiedlichsten Motivlagen sichtbar, die sich in diesem Feld der Geschichte bewegen und damit die etablierte Trägerschaft von Geschichtswissen herausfordern und konkurrenzieren.⁷⁴ Die dabei artikulierten Gegenerinnerungen, die deutlich abweichen vom offiziellen Geschichtsbild sind insofern zu begrüßen, als sie Ausdruck einer zunehmenden Einsicht auch in die Widersprüchlichkeiten von Geschichte und damit eines Zulassens von abweichenden Deutungen sind. Demgegenüber besteht in diesen Praktiken die Gefahr, dass eine auf Partikularismus zielende ethnische Exklusivität etabliert durch das je besondere Verhältnis zu Sklaverei und Sklavenhandel hergestellt bzw. gefördert wird, die für die friedliche und demokratische Verfasstheit von Gesellschaften eine Belastung darstellt.

Zum andern lässt sich in verschiedenen europäischen Staaten die Etablierung neuer hegemonialer Geschichtsnarrative in Bezug auf den Sklavenhandel beobachten. Indizien dafür sind sowohl die Errichtung von Denkmälern, das Begehen von Gedenktagen oder die Institutionalisierung in spezifischen staatlichen Instituten und Museen. Dagegen bestehen aus geschichtswissenschaftlicher Sicht erhebliche Bedenken, wird damit doch die erreichte Deutungsoffenheit von Vergangenheit prinzipiell erneut in Frage gestellt. Zudem wird dabei, verstärkt durch die Quellenlage, die Täterseite erheblich überbetont und zugleich die Opferrolle für gewisse Gruppen zementiert und allenfalls ethnisiert. Durch die Gedenkrituale wird der Opferstatus der Sklaven und Sklavinnen als Erduldende von Geschichte fortgeschrieben, was zu einer Neuauflage von rassistischen Ressentiments in den ebenfalls in ihren Subjektpositionen gefangenen „Tätergesellschaften“ Europas führen kann. Statt auf der Perpetuierung der Erinnerung an die Gräueltaten der Sklaverei sollte hier zukünftig der Schwerpunkt stärker auf der *agency* von Sklaven und Sklavinnen und damit auf ihren widerständigen und variablen Ausdrucksformen in Musik, Tanz, Sprache, Kunst, Kulinarik und Architektur liegen. Zudem wären zukünftig Fragen zu den Rückwirkungen der Sklaverei auf die europäischen Metropolen und Gesellschaften

72 Die Definition von Sklaverei folgt hier Wirz, Sklaverei (wie Anm. 60), S. 9.

73 Vergès, *Troubles de la Mémoire* (wie Anm. 42), hier S. 1144.

74 Dieses Feld der Geschichte ist in zunehmendem Masse auch für nichtwissenschaftliche Akteure interessant; ein Interesse, das durchaus Marktformen annehmen kann. Ob dieser „Geschichtsmarkt“ (nach D. Langewiesche, *Die Geschichtsschreibung und ihr Publikum. Zum Verhältnis von Geschichtswissenschaft und Geschichtsmarkt*, in: D. Hein / K. Hildebrand / A. Schulz (Hrsg.), *Historie und Leben. Der Historiker als Wissenschaftler und Zeitgenosse*, München 2006, S. 311-326) ein Symptom für eine Stärkung der Demokratie und des Deutungspluralismus ist, bleibt zukünftig zu bestimmen, ist jedoch nicht a priori anzunehmen.

zu stellen, um mit diesem interaktionistischen Ansatz den Blick auf die vielfältigen Verflechtungen zu öffnen.⁷⁵ In dieser Hervorhebung der vielfältigen Wechselwirkungen zwischen Sklavenhandel und Sklaverei und den Strukturen der involvierten Gesellschaften liegt auch eine der größten Chancen für zukünftige Debatten, in denen auf eine geteilte Geschichte hingearbeitet werden kann, die integrativ wirken kann, ohne dabei die trennenden Erfahrungen zu vergessen.

Wird Gedenken durch einen normativen Diskurs in öffentlichen Aktionen eingefordert, stellt sich die Frage nach der Trivialität der Gedenk-Rituale. Erinnerungspraktiken, die nun statt der Verehrung von Helden das Gedenken an Opfer fortschreiben, ohne dabei die Frage nach der Bedeutung des Gedenkens für die eigene Gegenwart und Zukunft zu stellen, eröffnen keine Handlungsoptionen für die Gegenwart. Richtet sich der Fokus des Gedenkens nämlich ausschliesslich auf die Vergangenheit, folgt die Gesellschaft nicht einer Durchsetzung der Aufklärungsideale, wie dies Elazar Barkan hoffnungsvoll postuliert. Vielmehr greift sie aus der Hilflosigkeit gegenüber den Anforderungen der Gegenwart auf den Umgang mit – nicht mehr veränderbarem – Vergangenen zurück. Sie erweist sich auf diese Weise gegenüber der Herausforderung unfähig, Perspektiven auf die Zukunft aus der Auseinandersetzung mit Vergangenen zu entwerfen. So ist nicht jedes Gedenken an sich auch schon Prävention. Gedenken erzeugt nur dann Zukunftsperspektiven bzw. eine Hoffnung auf die Vermeidung weiteren Unrechts, wenn das vergangene Leid und die vergangenen Untaten in die unmittelbare Relevanz hinsichtlich der eigenen Gegenwart und Zukunft gestellt werden können und diesbezügliche Handlungsperspektiven eröffnen.

Der Geschichtswissenschaft kommen im Kontext geschichtskultureller Aktivität und insbesondere des Gedenkens geschichtskultureller Akteure besondere Rollen zu. Zum einen ist es die methodisch abgestützte, theoretisch reflektierte und nicht primär normativen Vorgaben folgende Wissenschaft, die allfällige geschlossene Deutungen mit zugewiesenen Opfer-Täter-Schemata, zu denen geschichtspolitisch motivierter Umgang mit Vergangenen neigt, durch ihre Forschung erneut der Befragung und Diskussion aussetzt und damit neue Perspektiven des gedenkenden Umgangs eröffnen kann. Dafür hat sie sich aber gerade mittels ihrer geschichtswissenschaftlichen Standards der Manipulierung zu entziehen, muss also die nicht verpflichtete Position ihres Handelns als Gewinn für die Gesellschaft deutlich machen und zugleich von dieser einfordern. Zum andern wird sich die Geschichtswissenschaft aber auch den Perspektiven auf Vergangenes, die im Kontext geschichtskultureller Bedürfnisse definiert werden, zu stellen haben und sich als ein Teil der Geschichtskultur begreifend mit ihrer Kompetenz dem Anliegen zur Verfügung stellen, diese Perspektiven verlässlich und theoretisch-methodisch kompetent zu verfolgen und Geschichte aufzubereiten. Dabei muss sie allerdings die Verantwortung wahrnehmen, sich Narrativen zu verweigern, die in historisch unzulässiger Weise Sinn stiften, etwa indem sie einzig dem Druck des normativen Diskurses geschuldet sind. So ist eine

75 Vgl. dazu auch F. Cooper/A. L. Stoler, *Between Metropole and Colony. Rethinking a Research Agenda*, in: F. F. Cooper/A. L. Stoler (Eds.), *Tensions of Empire. Colonial Cultures in a bourgeois World*, Berkeley 1997, S. 1-57.

heutige Wertung des Erzählten im Zusammenhang mit Sklaverei und Sklavenhandel zweifellos dem Bezug auf die Menschenrechte verpflichtet, aber die sachanalytische Aufarbeitung vergangenen Unrechts wie etwa des Sklavenhandels und der Sklaverei hat auch zu beachten, dass Wertvorstellungen und -urteile historischem Wandel unterworfen sind. Gerade die sachanalytische Einschätzung des Handelns von Menschen in ihrer Zeit hat die damaligen Prinzipien und Wertvorstellungen einzubeziehen. Eine solche Auseinandersetzung dient nicht der Verharmlosung des Geschehenen, sondern schärft die Einsichten bezüglich der Bedingungen und Haltungen, die es möglich machten. Damalige Wertvorstellungen sind Teil der *agency* von Handelnden. Ihr Einbezug bildet damit eine Grundlage für den historisch triftigen Umgang mit Verantwortung und Schuld. Nur diese Analyse verschafft letztlich Einsicht in die Mechanismen von Täterschaft und erlittenem Unrecht.

BUCHBESPRECHUNGEN

Peter Garnsey: Thinking about Property. From Antiquity to the Age of Revolution, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2007, 267 S.

Rezensiert von
Volker Heins, Frankfurt am Main

„Eigentum“ ist ein schwieriger Begriff. Bis heute fragt man sich: Ist Eigentum eine Sache oder ein soziales Verhältnis, eine Quelle von Ungerechtigkeit oder ein Menschenrecht, eine moderne Institution oder etwas sehr Altes, eine westliche Erfindung oder etwas Universalgeschichtliches? Peter Garnsey, Professor für Geschichte an der Universität Cambridge, England, behandelt alle diese Fragen, indem er sich auf zwei Aufgaben konzentriert: erstens möchte Garnsey eine Vielzahl von antiken und mittelalterlichen Quellen zum Eigentumsbegriff beleuchten; und zweitens möchte er zeigen, in welchem Maße noch das moderne Nachdenken über Eigentum von jenen alten Quellen geprägt wird. In beiden Hinsichten setzt das Buch neue Standards und bietet eine Vielzahl teilweise überraschender Einsichten und Thesen.

Die erste Aufgabe der Arbeit an den Quellen besteht für Garnsey darin, das antike Eigentumsdenken aus dem Netz moderner Projektionen herauszulösen und in seiner Originalität anzuerkennen. So sind gleich die ersten beiden Kapitel dem angeblichen „Kommunismus“ von Platon gewidmet. Tatsächlich ist das platonische Staatsideal durch eine Reihe ganz unmoderner Besonderheiten gekennzeichnet. So gilt das Verbot von Privateigentum nur für Platons Wächter, nicht für die arbeitenden Massen – ein wichtiger Punkt, der schon von Aristoteles übersehen wurde. Außerdem plädiert Platon keineswegs für kollektives Eigentum, sondern radikaler für die Idee des Nicht-Besitzes an Gütern, die zudem noch auf die Frauen der Wächter ausgedehnt werden soll. Nur die Bauern kennen bei Platon das Konzept einer „eigenen“ Frau und Familie. Gegen die Intentionen des großen Philosophen wurde dieser Vorschlag rasch anarchistisch uminterpretiert, etwa von dem Komödianten Aristophanes, der in Athen die allgemeine Promiskuität ausrief.

Bereits Aristoteles wies Platons Eigentumskonzeption zurück und begründete eine lange Tradition der Verteidigung des Privateigentums an Gütern sowie an „Affekten“ gegenüber den eigenen Geliebten und Familienangehörigen. Doch Garnsey beschränkt sich keineswegs darauf, ohne

hin bekannte Werke noch etwas genauer zu ergründen und von Fehldeutungen zu befreien. Vielmehr zeichnet er die Spuren von Platons Eigentumskonzeption auch in Jahrhunderten und bei Autoren nach, über die nur wenige Leser Bescheid wissen dürften. Wir hören nicht nur von Averroes und anderen islamischen Gelehrten in Cordoba und Bagdad, sondern auch von diversen mittelalterlichen Neoplatonikern in Alexandria und Damaskus, die sich um eine korrekte Interpretation von Platons Eigentums- und Gemeinschaftskonzeption bemühten, bevor sich später christliche Humanisten im Italien der Renaissance dieses Themas erneut annahmen. Es überrascht nicht, dass christliche Kommentatoren wie Peter Abelard ein besonderes Problem mit der fälschlicherweise Platon zugeschriebenen Idee des „wife-sharing“ hatten, wie Garnsey mit trockenem Humor ausführt.

Nach Platons „Kommunismus“ bildet die variantenreiche christliche Eigentumskonzeption den Gegenstand der Kapitel 3 bis 5. Am Anfang steht hier Thomas von Aquin, ein eigentlich recht unorigineller Aristoteliker, der dann aber doch einige interessante neue Argumente in die Eigentumsdebatte eingeführt hat. Vor allem insistiert Thomas darauf, das nur derjenige, der etwas privat besitzt, auch persönlich großzügig sein und damit christliche Nächstenliebe zeigen kann. Eigentum ist nicht Diebstahl, sondern ein Geschenk Gottes, so auch bereits Augustinus, und man tut gut daran, es weiter zu schenken. Neben diesem Gedanken nimmt Thomas außerdem das moderne Argument vorweg, demzufolge das Privateigentum den Verantwortungssinn der Eigentümer steigert und damit eine effizientere Nutzung von

Ressourcen befördert. Der vielleicht größte Wert des Buches liegt in Garnseys Rekonstruktion der gewaltigen innerchristlichen Dispute um den moralischen Status des Privateigentums und seinen Platz in der Gesellschaft, in denen sich beide Seiten regelmäßig als Spinner, Verrückte und Gotteslästerer beschimpften. Die Kirche hat vergeblich immer wieder versucht, diese Dispute stillzustellen – bis hin zu Papst Leo XIII, der im späten 19. Jh. das Privateigentum buchstäblich zum Dogma erklärte. Faszinierend und bis heute wegweisend an den christlichen Kontroversen ist nicht zuletzt die enge Verknüpfung des Eigentumsthemas mit den Themen der „Freundschaft“ und „Barmherzigkeit“, die man ohne allzu große Anstrengung in ein moderneres Vokabular von Gerechtigkeit und Anerkennung übersetzen kann. Auch der Papst konnte nichts daran ändern, dass sich schon bei den Evangelisten Lukas und Matthäus deutliche Hinweise auf den Zusammenhang von Eigentumsverzicht und Heilsversprechen finden (etwa in Matthäus 19, 21). Die Urkirche pflegte den Gedanken des Gemeineigentums als Ausdruck und Vehikel brüderlicher Liebe und fester Gesinnung. Zahlreiche Autoren haben zudem über die Jahrhunderte hinweg Christus selbst als ein Modell freiwilliger individueller Armut repräsentiert und idealisiert. Zentral für die Herstellung eines engen Zusammenhangs zwischen den Ideen über Eigentum und neuen Institutionen war dabei das florierende asketische Mönchswesen.

Vor allem die Franziskaner-Mönche waren Pioniere einer folgenreichen Kombination von Eigentumskritik und asketischer Lebensreform. Franz von Assisi und sein Orden gingen über das Ideal der Urkirche

hinaus, indem sie nicht länger nur auf das Privateigentum zugunsten einer durch gemeinsames Eigentum gefestigten erweiterten Freundschaft von Gleichgesinnten verzichten wollten; stattdessen wurde nunmehr jegliches Eigentum zugunsten einer individuellen Lebensführung kritisiert, die sich streng an Christus selbst und den Aposteln orientierte. Parallel zu dieser Radikalisierung und Individualisierung einer praktischen Eigentumskritik entwickelte sich seit dem 12. Jh. die Idee eines spezifischen Rechts auf Eigentum sowie eines Rechts der Armen auf einen Anteil am Eigentum anderer. Konsequenterweise haben die Franziskaner nicht nur auf Eigentum verzichtet, sondern darüber hinaus auch auf ihr Recht auf Eigentum. Die Pointe dieses Gedankens lag darin, wie William von Ockham zeigte, dass es von nun an denkbar und legitim war, Dinge zu nutzen und zu verbrauchen, ohne einen Eigentumstitel zu haben.

Garnseys These ist, dass der Begriff des Eigentumsrechts deutlich älter ist als wir gemeinhin glauben. Das 12. Jh. ist ein Einschnitt, aber in einer noch etwas rohen Form gab es einen Begriff des subjektiven Rechts auf Eigentum schon zur Zeit der römischen Republik. Eigentlich umstritten waren im Laufe der Jahrhunderte nur die Herkunft von Eigentumsrechten sowie ihr relativer Status als entweder abgeleitetes oder fundamentales Recht. Diesen Fragen sind die abschließenden Kapitel 6 bis 8 gewidmet. Den Ausgangspunkt der modernen Kontroversen bildet Locke, der argumentierte, dass Eigentumsrechte nicht von Gott kommen, sondern von der Arbeit, die Menschen in Erfüllung göttlicher Gebote in Land und andere Gegenstände stecken. Wie immer zeigt Garnsey auch hier den

weiteren geistesgeschichtlichen Kontext der Debatte, in dem Grotius, Pufendorf und viele andere eine Rolle spielen. Während Locke einen wichtigen Markstein auf dem Weg zur Säkularisierung der Eigentumsdebatte darstellt, geht erst Hegel den entscheidenden Schritt, indem er das Eigentum aus der monologischen Beziehung von Eigentümer und bearbeitetem Land löst und in eine Kategorie interpersonaler und gesellschaftlicher „Anerkennung“ verwandelt. Eigentum wird nicht mehr mit Freundschaft und Barmherzigkeit verknüpft, sondern schützt wie alle Rechte die individuelle Freiheit. Zugleich lädt es jedoch auch zur Kooperation mit anderen ein.

Das achte und letzte Kapitel behandelt den logischen Endpunkt der modernen Debatte: die Erhebung des Eigentums zu einem „Menschenrecht“, die in gewisser Weise analog ist zur Vorstellung von Papst Johannes XXII, der im Jahr 1328 verkündete, dass es schon im Paradies Eigentumsrechte gab. Garnsey diskutiert vor allem die interessante Differenz zwischen der französischen und der amerikanischen Revolution. Während die französische Erklärung der Menschen- und Bürgerrechte von 1789 das Eigentum zu einem ebenso „natürlichen“ wie „heiligen“ Recht erklärte, äußerten sich die amerikanischen Verfassungsväter weitaus zurückhaltender. Teilweise war der Grund für diese Zurückhaltung pragmatischer Natur. Thomas Jefferson und andere hatten ein notorisch „schizophrenes“ Verhältnis zur Sklaverei wie auch zu den Rechten der Indianer. Das Eigentum als Menschenrecht schien aus ihrer Sicht die Sklaverei zu verewigen und zugleich die Verfügung der Ureinwohner über „ihr“ Land ungebührlich zu verfesti-

gen. Der eigentliche Grund für die amerikanische Skepsis gegenüber dem Eigentum als Menschenrecht lag jedoch tiefer. Jefferson stand nämlich unter dem Einfluss von Schülern von Grotius und Pufendorf, die eine deutliche Unterscheidung getroffen hatten zwischen „natürlichen“ Rechten und solchen, die „erworben“ waren und folglich auch verloren gehen können. Und Eigentum war ihr Musterbeispiel für genau diese, bis heute wichtige Unterscheidung. Mein Fazit: Garnseys Buch verleiht vielen fachbornierten Diskussionen unter Sozialwissenschaftlern und Juristen eine dringend notwendige geistesgeschichtliche Tiefendimension. Darüber hinaus beeindruckt es durch eine besonders in Deutschland seltene Verbindung von Gelehrsamkeit und Leichtigkeit, Gründlichkeit und Witz.

John H. Pryor (Hrsg.): Logistics of Warfare in the Age of the Crusades, Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Company 2006, 365 S.

Rezensiert von
Pierre-Vincent Claverie, Rennes
(übersetzt von Thomas Höpel)

Der Band vereint zwölf Artikel über die Logistik, die von Christen und Muselmanen während der Kreuzzüge entfaltet wurde. Man könnte dieses Konzept problemlos auf die Mongolen ausweiten, deren Versorgungsschwierigkeiten in Syrien Reuven Amitai in einer Studie untersucht, die um die Schlacht von Homs im Jahr

1299 zentriert ist (S. 25-42). Seine Argumentation fügt sich in gerader Linie in die Neubewertung des Sieges von Ayn Djälüt, der von den Mamelucken im Jahr 1260 über 10.000 Mongolen errungen wurde, die von ihrer Basis abgeschnitten waren.¹ Ohne die gekonnten Berechnungen John Haldons über die Logistik der byzantinischen Armee (S. 131-158) könnte man den Hinweis auf die 50.000 Kamele, die von den Tataren 1299 eingesetzt wurden, anzweifeln. Es scheint tatsächlich so, dass ein 10.000-Mann-Heer sich ohne die Unterstützung von 9000 bis 13.000 Lasttieren nicht dauerhaft von seiner Ausgangsbasis entfernen konnte.

Diese Statistiken erklären das Interesse, das die Historiker der noch in ihren Anfängen steckenden Logistik während des ersten Kreuzzuges zuwenden. Charles Glasheen verdanken wir eine Studie über die Schwierigkeiten, die Pierre l'Ermite auf seinem Marsch nach Konstantinopel im Jahr 1096 hatte (S. 119-129). Die Armee von Bohémond von Tarent scheint diese Versorgungsprobleme mühelos überwunden zu haben, wie die parallele Studie dazu zeigt (S. 1-24). Die Reise der Kreuzfahrer erforderte den Transfer von großen Geldsummen in den Osten, die Alan Murray in einem Artikel zu ermitteln trachtet, der am Schnittpunkt von Numismatik und Historie liegt (S. 229-249). Sein Text macht die Anstrengungen des Papsttums deutlich, mit denen es die Prägung von Silber- und Kupfermünzen am Vorabend des ersten Kreuzzuges zu begünstigen suchte. Ein Aufsatz von Bernard Bachrach unterstreicht indessen die völlige Abhängigkeit der Kreuzfahrer von der byzantinischen Logistik bei ihrer Überfahrt von Anatolien im Jahr 1097 (S. 43-62). Dieser

Klarstellung folgt eine Reihe von Studien über den Warenumschlag in die Levante. Ruthy Gertwagen entwirft ein gutes Bild von den wichtigsten Routen der abendländischen Seefahrt. Dabei stellt sie den Beschreibungen der mittelalterlichen Pilger die aktuellen Schifffahrtsabhandlungen gegenüber (S. 95-119). Ein Aufsatz von John Dotson versucht die Zunahme von Galeeren in den italienischen Kriegsflotten im 13. Jh. zu bewerten (S. 63-75). Segelschiffe scheinen die ersten Opfer dieser Entwicklung gewesen zu sein, trotz ihres weiteren Gebrauchs bei Kaperoperationen.

Es wäre illusorisch, diese Schlussfolgerungen auch auf die Flotten aus dem Nord- und Ostseeraum anzuwenden, die Richard Unger untersucht (S. 251-273). Der Autor unterstreicht die Bandbreite der von den nordischen Flotten genutzten Schiffstypen. Mit Drakkaren, Koggen, Segelschiffen und Snekkys wollten sie sich im Mittelmeerhandel durchsetzen. Die Mietverträge für Schiffe der Zeit offenbaren eine ganze Reihe logistischer Probleme, deren Einfluss auf die Umlenkung des 4. Kreuzzuges Thomas Madden zu bestimmen sucht (S. 209-228). Seine Studie arbeitet den Willen des Papstes heraus, die Kontrolle über die Expedition im Jahr 1203 zurückzugewinnen, indem er kommerzielle Verhandlungen mit den byzantinischen Machthabern einleitete.

Das Verhalten der Kreuzfahrer kann aufgrund der vielfältigen Faktoren, die über den Ausgang einer Expedition entscheiden, nicht ausschließlich unter dem Gesichtspunkt der Verpflegung analysiert werden. Ein Aufsatz von John France erinnert an das Ausmaß der deutsch-französischen Rivalitäten, die für das Scheitern

des 2. Kreuzzuges im Jahr 1148 verantwortlich waren (S. 77-94). Eine soziale Dimension zeigt der Text von Yaacov Lev über die muselmanischen Fußkämpfer, die im Kampf gegen die Franken aktiv waren (S. 185-207). Der Autor führt die Niederlagen der Fatimiden auf die Nutzung einer unfreien Infanterie zurück, die nach und nach von türkischen und kurdischen Reitern ersetzt wurde. Sein Aufsatz rundet einen aufregenden Band über einen in der Historiographie der Kreuzzüge vernachlässigten Bereich ab.

Anmerkung:

- 1 J.M. Smith Jr., Ayn Jälüt. Mamlük success of Mongol Failure, in: Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies, XLIV (1984), S. 307-345.

Mark Caprio / Matsuda Koichirō
(Hrsg.): **Japan and the Pacific, 1540–1920. Threat and Opportunity**
(= **The Pacific World. Land, People and History of the Pacific, 1500–1900, vol. 10**), Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Company 2006, 422 S.

Rezensiert von
Salvatore Ciriaco, Padua

This volume is part of a larger historical series that aims to overcome traditional nation-state perspective and to highlight instead, as underlined in the preface by the General Editors Dennis O. Flynn and Arturo Giráldez, “large-scale geographic interconnections” inside the Pacific Ocean.

This series on the Pacific World is modelled after the other one (An Expanding World; the European Impact on World History, 1450–1800 also published by Ashgate) but pushes the content into a later century. We could also look to this study as a chapter of a “thalassographie” whose best and successful example has been *The Méditerranée* by Fernand Braudel. Indeed as for the Mediterranean the issue is to describe and grasp the elements that eventually unified the Pacific Ocean, considering that “in mid-nineteenth century this Ocean had long ceased to be a barrier; rather it was a free way” (Flynn-Giráldez). Nevertheless, even if this conclusion is worth of attention, we should not underestimate the deep differences, the contrasts, and the larger articulation which clearly existed in the past and still exist in the present in a so broad area as the Pacific (the “Great Eastern Sea”). Correctly Tsunoyama Sakae (one of the eighteen contributors) points out that the eastern sea coastline “is buffered by smaller seas, from north to south, with the Sea of Okhotsk, the Sea of Japan, Bo Hai, the Yellow Sea, the East China Sea, the South China Sea, the Philippines Sea, the Java Sea, the Celebes Sea, the Sulu Sea, the Molucca Sea, and the Banda Sea”. Inside these small seas certainly economic activity and cultural exchange have been intense for centuries, but one can wonder to what extent they reached the American coast and invest the Pacific as a whole. In short, these collected papers try to give answers – especially to the many “Western” historians, who are used to tackle problems not surpassing the Mediterranean and Atlantic areas.

This study is focused on Japan, seen in its complex rapports with, first, the other two

Eastern Asia giants, i.e. China and Korea, further with the other numerous Pacific co-habitants. It is the story of a relative small archipelago, proud of its cultural inheritance, gifted with extremely rich (certainly during the sixteenth and seventeenth c.) silver mines as famous as the well known Spanish-American mines. A country which believed to have also a civilizing mission towards a large area, where it inevitably came in contact with nations such as the United States, Russia, and in earlier times with the Christian Portugal (Fernando Mendes Pinto reached Japan in 1543) and Spain. Indeed, the latter intentioned in name of the Catholic Church to evangelize Japan, and provoked, or at least played an important role in the so called “sakoku” (“national seclusion”) of the archipelago, a concept that has a long historical tradition. This fundamentalism has been scrutinized over the last years and is now fully analyzed by Arano Yasunori. Also the other essays demonstrate how complex this seclusion was, for the Tokugawa authority opening the country to what was necessary (information, science, technique) in order to develop the economy and at the same time to strengthen their political power. Definitions as “maritime prohibition” and “civilized/barbarian order”, proposed by Arano Yasunori, seem to be more useful to describe the Japanese reality and this Asian path to the construction of a national state. From the other side the persecution of the Christians decided by the Tokugawa Bakufu, and the definitive expulsion of the Spanish and the Portuguese (1639), left important marks inside the Pacific space thanks to the diaspora of Japanese converted during the Seventeenth century, from Macao to Cambodia, from Siam to Bata-

via (Madalena Ribeiro). Michael Mathes has estimated the Japanese population of Manila at 15,000 in this period, forming a peculiar “mestizo culture” and an enduring “Asiatic heritage” inside this archipelago. On the contrary, later on, Spain would not become a part of the Western presence when Japan reopened its doors in the Nineteenth century. The opening to the West was a spontaneous movement of expansion and migration that could not fully impeded by the Tokugawa and was on the contrary favoured by the Meiji authorities.

Even though the diplomatic and cultural aspects are massive in this volume, economy and monetary issues are treated in a fruitful way by Tashiro Kazui and Nagazumi Yoko. Although relations to and competition with China, considering itself as the centre of the earth and the true “Middle Kingdom”, became the focus of the Tokugawa efforts (not less important was the building of a national economy, creating a kind of an oriental mercantilism), it was evident that the major preoccupation was for the 17th and 18th centuries to restrain the export of silver (in silver ingots as well silver coins) at the advantage of its major competitor, China. Korea played in this period the role of an intermediary economy between the two countries (a large amount of ginseng was exported by this peninsula) as Japan had interrupted diplomatic relations with China. (One can working with between a vertical alliance (Korea and China) and a horizontal one between Korea and Japan). In order to reduce the flow of silver abroad the Tokugawa did not hesitate to proceed to a monetary debasement, induced by the natural diminution of the mine resources. It is

certain that the crisis of the Ming dynasty offered a decisive input to Japan. So the country had the possibility to increase its production of porcelain, lacquer ware, paper, sugar, and especially of silk, becoming independent from the import of raw silk and being able to compete directly with China on the market of luxury goods.¹ In this sense the neighbouring countries, such as Siam, were worried to lose contact with an ascendant economy and were keen to admit a status of subservience and to renew alliances (Nagazumi Yoko).

The most numerous essays collected by Mark Caprio and Matsuda Koichirō, who wrote an enriching Introduction, adding more information to an already broad scope, focus on an expanding Japan, which during the Nineteenth century, after the Meiji restoration, invested with its “castaways” (sometimes introduced by simple fishermen, lost in the vast ocean, as pointed out by Stephen W. Kohl; sometimes by political planning and an assertive policy). Josefa M. Sanieel puts in evidence how in the early Meiji period on one side the government adopted “a policy of restraint from territorial expansion” but on the other side “the Japanese nationalistic-activists rested their case on four arguments: that Japan had a surplus population for which outlets had to be found; that Japan needed raw materials and food; that Japan had a right to preventive self-defence; and that Japan had a mission of civilizing and/or aiding backward areas of the world especially their neighbours”. This pressure had been directed to Papua and New Guinea especially “from 1890 to 1914, because the settlement was most prosperous in this period” (Iwamoto Hiromitsu) as well as to Australia. It is true that the discovery of

the importance of Australia (the existence of a „Southland“) remained obscure to the Japanese concept of world geography, being this limited to Asia, “the depiction of India, China, and Japan adhering to a Buddhist-oriented three country view of the world” (Henri Frei).

Relatively late did Japan and Russia discover each other. The area of friction and direct confrontation became the Kuril Islands (the Japanese were also present in Kamchatka at the end of the Seventeenth century). The expansion of Russia in compliance with Peter the Great’s policy in direction of Siberia, the exploration of the Danish Vitus Bering seeking for a passage to the American continent, and the advantages that the possession of the Kuril islands would entail, all these facts led to an open hostility between Russia and Japan (Georg Alexander Lensen). The only encounter, basically peaceful, of fishermen, hunters and merchants (“birds of passage”) of the two countries in Kamchatka, Sakhalin, Vladivostok, on the Kuril Islands and Hokkaido was replaced by direct confrontation during the Russia-Japan war, 1904–1905. Past of the remarkable process of a Japanese diaspora is the migration to Russia, which ranks seventh in terms of the total number of Japanese residents abroad, “following Hawaii, the continental United States, Brazil, Canada, Peru, and the Philippines” (Igor R. Saveliiev).

A movement of people with many facets, which included on the one side the sad phenomenon of women trade towards the American coast, controlled by the Japanese themselves (Ichioka Yuji), on the other side an advanced program of women emancipation. This was the case of Tsuda Ume, “pioneer educator of women”, sent to United

States with four other young girls in order to learn what was necessary for the country if it wanted to catch up with the West. Tsuda Ume greatly accomplished her task and founded in 1900 a still existing and celebrated college for women. Just like the “Yankeeified Japanese”, she was a testimony of the deep sense of duty and work so typical for Japanese mentality. Many scholars recognize a Max Weber effect also in this country. Indeed, she insisted to her students that “life without work is useless” (Christine Chapman).

It is without doubt that the ambition of the new Japanese elite, after the Meiji restoration, aimed to exercise a sort of economic and political domination on its Asian neighbours, Korea in the first place, after having neutralized the Chinese influence. Even though the process of industrialization (i.e. the formation of large concerns with a high number of workers per unity of production²) developed rather slowly, the progress of the Japanese economy was undoubtedly strong, as well as the government’s will to implement a policy of armament. First of all, it was necessary to tackle Western superiority revising the unequal treaties imposed on Japan at the arrival of the Commodore Matthew Calbraith Perry in 1853. The mission organized by the Minister of Foreign Affairs Iwakura Tomomi in 1871 (it was composed by four vice-ambassadors, the minister of finance, the vice-minister of industry and numerous officials and commissioners with their own assistants, by a total of nearly hundred Japanese) has to be interpreted on this light. Officially the mission was charged “to study Western institutions and culture”. The mission visited for two years (1871–1873) the United States and Eu-

rope and has been, by the conclusion of Eugene Soviak, “one significant factor in the development of modern Japan”.

Following the example of Western colonialism and abandoning the traditional Asian diplomacy, the “new Japan” directly and dramatically confronted China. Sending to this country in the same period an analogous mission as that of Iwakura, the Mission of Soejima Taneomi, “made an appeal for greater cooperation between China and Japan”. The diplomat reminded “the penetration of the foreign powers in Asia – the French in Annam, the British in the canton area, the Russians to the north of the Amur and in Karafuto”. It was necessary to address the “barbarians” with their own guns and on their own field. As Wayne C. McWilliams quotes, behind the diplomacy there was already the conviction by the Japanese to have a civilizing mission to accomplish, for “even barbarians are people; if you treat them as barbarians they will be just that, but if you treat them as true gentlemen they will indeed become true gentlemen”. The result of this attitude led to the military victory during the Sino-Japanese war in 1895, the real start of an imperial history of Japan and a subtle policy with Korea. The Kanhwa Treaty signed by the Japanese in 1876 formally provided to Korea a statute of independence and equality, but the ultimate aim, as correctly demonstrates Brahm Swaroop Agrawal. The conclusion here is that “Japan herself violated the provisions of equality and independence of both nations, established her protectorate over Korea in 1905 and annexed her completely in 1910”.

We know what happened in the following decades with the new international order implemented by Japan, but also “that even

at the peak of imperial rule, the Pacific was never Japan’s ocean” (in 1942 nevertheless the country controlled an area “thirteen times of its home islands” as Marcia Yonemoto points out). Now, the Empire of Sun, having been in the last decades the second world economy, has to compete again with the ancient rival China, but this, as the editors Caprio and Koichirō convincingly conclude, “may eventually encourage Japan to exploit further opportunities among its traditional deep-rooted Small Eastern Sea ties”. Meanwhile the new economic order will provoke new challenges to some partnerships in the “Great Eastern Sea”.

Notes:

- 1 S. Ciriaco, Scambi commerciali e produzione di beni di lusso nel Giappone del periodo Edo. Una lettura storiografica, in: Quaderni Storici, 125 (2007) 2, pp. 591-621.
- 2 M. Tanimoto (Hrsg.), The Role of Tradition in Japan’s Industrialization. Another Path to Industrialization (Japanese Studies in Economic and Social History, vol. 2), Oxford 2006.

Susanne Michl: Im Dienste des „Volkskörpers“. Deutsche und französische Ärzte im Ersten Weltkrieg (= Kritische Studien zur Geschichtswissenschaft, Bd. 177), Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht 2007, 307 S.

Rezensiert von
Heinrich Hartmann, Berlin

In der Wissenschaftsgeschichte sind die Grenzen der Medizin zu anderen naturwissenschaftlichen Feldern wie der Biologie und der medizinischen Anthropologie, immer öfter aber auch zu eher sozialwissenschaftlichen Fächern wie der Soziologie, Volkswirtschaft und Demografie häufig offen. Gerade im Kontext des Ersten Weltkrieges stand die Volksgesundheit von verschiedenen Seiten unter Beobachtung. Doch die Mediziner nutzten dieses Interesse auch, um politische Handlungsspielräume zu erweitern. Diese Gemengelage unterschiedlicher, politisch hoch aufgeladener Diskurse in Deutschland und Frankreich steht im Mittelpunkt des Buches von Susanne Michl zu den Ärzten im Ersten Weltkrieg. Nach Michls Ausgangshypothese bewirkte der Krieg in der Medizin einen Paradigmenwechsel im wissenschaftlichen Erkenntnisinteresse: nicht mehr Schutz und Fürsorge der individuellen Gesundheit standen im Zentrum, sondern vielmehr die jeweilige nationale Kriegstauglichkeit und die damit verbundenen medizinischen Repräsentationen der Bevölkerung: „Im Mittelpunkt stehen

die ärztlichen Denk- und Vorstellungsmuster über die Einwirkungen des Krieges auf den Individual- und ‚Volkskörper‘ und die therapeutischen Möglichkeiten und Prognosen ihrer zukünftigen ‚Regeneration‘“ (S. 13). Der Krieg stellte dabei für die Ärzte im doppelten Sinne den zentralen Ort zur Reformulierung ihres professionellen Selbstverständnisses dar. Einerseits sahen sie sich mehr denn je in der Lage, ihr Expertenwissen in politische Kontexte einzubinden und als Akteure in bevölkerungspolitischen Debatten aufzutreten. Zum anderen wandten sie sich aber auch mit Interesse der Kriegschirurgie als Experimentierfeld in extremis zu. Nicht nur die einmalige Ansammlung der Rekruten in nahezu gleichen Lebensumständen, sondern auch die neuen Krankheitsbilder machten die Kriegslazarette zum Ort wissenschaftlicher Neuverhandlungen. Diesen doppelten Bruch beschreibt Michl in drei Teilen, in denen nacheinander demografische, sozialhygienische und psychopathologische Diskurse der deutschen und französischen Mediziner verglichen werden.

Im ersten Abschnitt ihrer Untersuchung versucht Michl den Handlungsspielraum der Mediziner in beiden Ländern zu beschreiben und damit die Rede über den „Volkskörper im Krieg“ mit den demografischen Interessen der Profession in der Vorkriegszeit zu verbinden. Hierzu zeigt sie, in welchem Maße gerade in Frankreich die Institutionalisierung sozialer Gesundheitspolitik in den Jahren vor dem Krieg den Arzt wieder zu einem Agenten der sozialen Vorsorge machte und den medizinischen Forscher als Prototyp gesundheitlichen Expertenwissens in den Hintergrund treten ließ. Wie in Frankreich trugen auch

in Deutschland die fest institutionalisierten Für- und Vorsorgeanstalten dazu bei, den Arzt als Träger staatlichen Handelns im breiten Bewusstsein zu verankern. Der „Arzt als ‚Wächter‘ der gesellschaftlichen Gesundheit und Sittlichkeit“ (S. 52) wurde dabei gerade vor dem Hintergrund des Krankenkassenwesens zum mächtigen Akteur, in Deutschland freilich in noch größerem Maße als in Frankreich. Für den französischen Fall betont Michl die politische Vereinnahmung der Ärzte in den sozialpolitischen Debatten, die das Bild des apolitischen Experten häufig bedrohten. Diese sehr breit angelegten Skizzen zum professionellen Background der Ärzte in beiden Ländern bilden für Michl die Folie, vor der die Wirkmacht medizinischer Diskurse über den „Volkskörper“ umrissen werden soll. In ihrer sozialen Verortung dieser Gruppe entscheidet sie sich somit für die breitestmögliche Herangehensweise. Die sehr viel spezifischere Trägergruppe der Militärmediziner, deren professionelles Selbstverständnis in dieser Zeit ebenfalls einem starken Wandel unterlag, bleibt dabei leider außen vor.

Die von Michl im ersten Teil in den Vordergrund gerückten Diskurslinien beschäftigen sich nicht nur mit der Reformulierung von Tauglichkeitskriterien und der Rolle des Krieges für die Volksgesundheit; die Autorin betrachtet daneben auch das Verhältnis von Individuum und Medizin, also die patientenrechtlichen Dynamiken, in denen aus dem Recht auf Behandlung langsam eine Pflicht wurde. Doch der „Volkskörper“ ist für Michl nicht nur eine Denkfigur zur Beschreibung der Soldaten an der Front, sondern auch für die Veränderungen demografischer Diskurse an der „Heimatfront“ (S. 82ff.). An dieser Stelle

der Untersuchung bietet die Diskussion über den Geburtenrückgang, der schon seit dem Ende des 19. Jhs. in Frankreich, seit etwa 1913 aber auch im Deutschen Reich eine stetig steigende Aufmerksamkeit erfuhr, die Gelegenheit, den rein männlichen Topos der „Bevölkerung im Krieg“ aufzubrechen. Die Mediziner sprachen den Frauen die Verantwortung für den Geburtenrückgang zu und konstruierten den weiblichen Körper zum Träger der heimischen Produktivkraft um (S. 94 ff.), nicht ohne diese Entwicklung als ein Element der Degeneration zu begreifen. Die weibliche Gesundheit war dabei in steter Gefahr und übertrug die Kriegsgefahr auch auf die unter diesen Umständen geborenen künftigen Generationen. In dieser Hinsicht sind auch nicht mehr nur die am Krieg beteiligten Ärzte Akteure des neuen Bevölkerungsdiskurses, sondern auch die Ärzte in der Heimat, die ihre Behandlungen, aber auch ihre öffentlichen Stellungnahmen nach den Kriegszielen ausrichteten.

Bei Michls Analyse der demografischen Diskurse der Ärzte im Zeichen des Krieges bleibt allerdings die außerordentliche Rolle, die Militär- und Rekrutenstatistik schon seit der zweiten Hälfte des 19. Jhs. gerade auch in der transnationalen Verständigung über demografische Methoden spielten, bedauerlicherweise unberücksichtigt. Seit 1894 waren die Internationalen Kongresse für Medizin auch der Ort, an dem eine Internationale Militärsanitätsstatistik erstellt wurde und der „Volkskörper“ auf einer transnationalen Ebene ausgehandelt wurde. Auch die Militärmediziner und allen voran ihr erster Repräsentant in Deutschland, Otto von Schjerning, erlangten weitreichende Deutungshoheit

über Teile der neuen demografischen Wissensfelder. Den Krieg im Wesentlichen als Bruch zu verstehen heißt hier nach Meinung des Rezensenten, wichtige Dynamiken in der Vorgeschichte zu verkennen. Hierzu ein Beispiel: Michl geht davon aus, dass in Deutschland „bis etwa Ende 1915 die männliche wehrpflichtige Bevölkerung in ihrer Zusammensetzung noch relativ unbestimmt“ blieb, und sich erst in der Folgezeit die Ärzte um eine statistische Aufschlüsselung nach „Alter, Berufsklasse oder auch nach Land- bzw. Stadtangehörigkeit“ (S. 60) bemühte. Gerade diese statistische Erfassung der Wehrpflichtigen ging allerdings auf Bemühungen um die Jh.wende zurück. Die städtische und ländliche Herkunft wurde nach dem Disput im Verein für Sozialpolitik ab 1902 abgefragt. Gleiches galt für die Berufszugehörigkeit. Für 1905/06 wurde im deutschen Reich ein Bericht über die Körperbeschaffenheit der Rekruten auf Grundlage der Musterungsdaten vorgelegt. Auf Grund des hohen administrativen Aufwandes sollten diese Daten allerdings nur alle zehn Jahren erhoben werden. Es ist also keinesfalls ein Zufall, wenn es um 1915 zu einer erneuten Intensivierung in der Diskussion kam. Da diese Initiativen in der Vorkriegszeit grundsätzlich auch auf einer internationalen Ebene verhandelt wurden, waren entsprechende Bemühungen zur statistischen Erfassung auch in Frankreich zu verzeichnen. Das Interesse an der Bevölkerung im Spiegel des Militärs war nicht alleine eine Kriegsfolge, wie Michl dies als ein zentrales Ergebnis formuliert (S. 276); der Krieg stand hier den zahlreichen Bemühungen der Vorkriegszeit um einen statistischen Zugriff auf das Militär sowie dem internationalen Austausch

in diesen Fragen sogar eher im Wege. Zu den äußerst überzeugenden Aspekten des Buches gehört die systematische Berücksichtigung der komplexen Rolle, die das Geschlecht in der Debatte um den „Volkskörper“ spielte. An der Frage der Sexualhygiene zeigt Michl in welchem Maße das Sexualleben, insbesondere aber der weibliche Körper als Gefahr für die Gesundheit des männlichen Soldaten konstruiert wurden. Überzeugend werden hier auch die transnationalen Dimensionen der Debatte, also die vielfältigen Beratungen auf den internationalen Kongressen für venerische Krankheiten dargestellt (S. 114 f.). Diesen Foren internationalen Austausches wurde allerdings in Frankreich weit mehr Beachtung geschenkt als in Deutschland, wo sich die Wissenschaftler traditionell dem internationalen Kongresswesen gegenüber ablehnend verhielten. Immer wieder Erwähnung finden auch die Aktivitäten amerikanischer Stiftungen zur breitflächigen Verbesserung der Sexualhygiene in Frankreich (S. 124 f.). Im Verlauf des Krieges kam es daneben in steigendem Maße zu Debatten um die Regulierung der Prostitution an der Front, aber auch im Hinterland, das nun ebenfalls zur sexuellen Gefahrenzone gemacht wurde (S. 132 ff.) Mit offenen Fragen sahen sich die Forscher im Falle der Wirkung des Krieges auf die männliche und weibliche Zeugungsfähigkeit konfrontiert. Hier wurde der Krieg zu einem neuen „einzigartigen Experimentier- und Beobachtungsfeld“, auf dem sich gleichzeitig wissenschaftliche Debatten um den Zusammenhang von statistischen Beobachtungen und neuen Formen der Kriegspathologie ausgetragen werden konnten. In diesem Sinne kommt Michl zu dem überzeugenden Ergebnis,

dass der Krieg in Deutschland gerade für die gynäkologischen Wissenschaften von außerordentlicher Bedeutung war, denn das Expertenwissen der Gynäkologen „ermöglichte es ihnen, die Kriegssituation wissenschaftlich zu nutzen. Der Krieg begünstigte die ärztliche Vision einer quantitativ und qualitativ gesteuerten Geburtspolitik.“ (S. 180).

Die Psychopathologie des Krieges stellt Michl im letzten Teil ihres Buches dar. Die in den letzten Jahren von historischer Seite viel beforschten ungeahnten psychischen und nervlichen Belastungen des Weltkrieges führten zu bislang unbekannten Krankheitsbildern, die von den Ärzten mit großem Interesse, aber auch mit einer gewissen Hilflosigkeit zur Kenntnis genommen wurden. Kriegsbedingte psychische Erkrankungen wurden nicht mit den körperlichen Schäden auf eine Stufe gestellt (S. 202 ff.). Auch hier konstatiert Michl einen generellen Trend zur Individualisierung von Krankheitsbildern, gerade aber auch der damit verbundenen Verantwortung. Dies gilt etwa für Fragen der Krankheitssimulation, auch wenn Michl zu dem Schluss kommt, dass in solchen Fragen „Auto- und Fremdzensur eine entscheidende Rolle“ gespielt haben, galt es doch ein möglichst unbeschadetes Bild der Kriegsbegeisterung der eigenen Soldaten zu geben (S. 217). In besonderem Maße originell erscheint das Kapitel zu „Erschöpfung und Emotion“, in dem die Autorin die zahlreichen Diskussionen um eine Pathologisierung der soldatischen Gefühlswelt und deren Querverbindung zu einer Ergonomisierung der individuellen Wehrfähigkeit unternimmt (S. 239 ff.). Hiermit tut sich eine Vielzahl von Querverbindungen zu arbeitsphysiologischen

Diskussionen der Vorkriegszeit auf, die allerdings nicht annähernd erschöpfend dargestellt werden können. Weiterführend ist dagegen die Frage, inwieweit emotionale Störungen in die Diskussionen um Kriegsfolgen Eingang fanden. Für Frankreich zeigt die Autorin an der Frage nach der Einordnung des „tremblement émotionnel“ als eigenständige Form der Kriegsbeschädigung (S. 257) die relative Offenheit der Diskussion. Insgesamt stellt Michl fest, dass es in Deutschland einen Trend hin zur Frage nach der Anfälligkeit des deutschen Soldaten für psychologische Erkrankungen gab, während in Frankreich eher die nachträgliche Frage nach den Wirkungszusammenhängen im Vordergrund stand.

Michls Untersuchung fasst somit in recht kurzer und prägnanter Form die unterschiedlichen Entwicklungsstufen im Begriff des „Volkskörpers“ in beiden Ländern zusammen. Die Pinselstriche geraten dabei manchmal ein wenig grob. Da ist dann schon mal von einer spezifisch nationalen „Diskussions- und Streitkultur“ in beiden Ländern die Rede (S. 182); durch solche Aussagen werden die differenzierten Beschreibungen professioneller Strategien und innerwissenschaftlicher Diskurslinien nur zu leicht konterkariert. Dies hat häufig mit der relativen Quellenarmut von Michls Untersuchung zu tun. Sie stützt sich in ihrer Analyse lediglich auf publizierte Quellen, die aber naturgemäß eher Einblick in wissenschaftliche Selbstdarstellungen, als in entsprechende Aushandlungsprozesse zwischen Akteuren und Institutionen bieten. Hierfür wären zumindest die offiziellen Akten von Kriegsministerien, statistischen Ämtern, Berufsorganisationen etc. hilfreich gewesen. Besonders unzureichend er-

scheint eine solche Quellenlage allerdings in Hinblick auf die Interaktion zwischen der Repräsentation des „Volkskörpers“ und der Behandlungspraxis an der Front oder im Hinterland, die in der Darstellung an vielen Stellen eine sinnvolle Ergänzung gebildet hätte. Zudem ergibt sich durch die Beschränkung auf die publizierten Quellen eine Verzerrung in der vergleichenden Perspektive zwischen Deutschland und Frankreich. Die persönlichen Netzwerke der Militärärzte, die vor allem vor dem Krieg in breitem wissenschaftlichen Austausch miteinander standen, geraten so teilweise aus dem Blick.

Zum Ende der Arbeit fragt sich der Leser, welches nun der „Volkskörper“ ist, den Michl eigentlich im Blick hat. Ist es der statistisch-demografische? Ist es der über sozialhygienische und stark geschlechtskonnotierte Diskurse hoch aufgeladene? Oder ist es der verändert aus dem Krieg hervorgehende, nervös-emotionale, dem die positiven ergonomisch-physiologischen Vorkriegsbeschreibungen sukzessive abhanden gekommen sind? Michl führt die Leser durch eine Phase der langsamen Erosion des „Volkskörpers“, der 1918 nicht mehr derselbe ist wie 1914. Auch wenn an einigen Stellen eine bessere soziale Einbettung, eine breitere historische Kontextualisierung und eine schärfere Beschreibung der chronologischen Abläufe und Brüche sinnvoll gewesen wäre, so kommt der Arbeit doch das Verdienst zu, die Wirkung des Krieges nicht mehr nur in seiner Bedeutung als neuen Erfahrungsort medizinischer Forschung, sondern auch als paradigmatischen Bruch im medizinischen Erkenntnisinteresse in Bezug auf Fragen der „nationalen Gesundheit“ zu verstehen.

Martin Aust (Hrsg.): Vom Gegner lernen. Feindschaften und Kulturtransfers im Europa des 19. und 20. Jahrhunderts, Frankfurt am Main: Campus 2007, 359 S.

Rezensiert von
Michel Espagne, Paris

Seit längerer Zeit hatte man schon beobachtet, dass ein Kultransfer nicht nur auf freundschaftlichen Beziehungen beruht, sondern durchaus auch politische Spannungen ausnutzen kann. Vom Gegner, ja vom Feind kann man lernen und entscheidende Impulse bekommen. Die 15 Beiträge des Bandes bemühen sich, dieser Hypothese nachzugehen, indem sie sich mit Momenten der deutsch-französischen oder russisch-deutschen oder östlich-westlichen Geschichte seit der Mitte des 19. Jhs. auseinandersetzen. Die Herausgeber Martin Aust und Daniel Schönplüg vertreten in der Einleitung den Standpunkt, dass Lernvorgänge auch Formen bewusster Nichtimitation sein dürfen. Obwohl die französisch-russischen Beziehungen in der ersten Hälfte des 19. Jhs. auf eine gegenseitige Abgrenzung hinauslaufen, tut sich sogar mit dem Empire-Stil ein weites Feld russischer Frankreich-Rezeption auf. Schon Katharina II. hatte übrigens die Gründung einer „nouvelle France“ in Rußland erwogen (Denis Sdvizkov). Die preußische Heeresreform unter Scharnhorst war von vornherein darauf eingestellt, das Erfolgsmodell der französischen Truppen zu übernehmen (Michael Sikora), und die gegen-

seitige Beobachtung im Laufe des 19. Jhs., die bis zur systematischen Kenntnisnahme der jeweiligen Publikationen ging, ermöglichte einen militärischen Kulturtransfer (Jakob Vogel).

Auch wenn die polnisch-deutschen Beziehungen in der Provinz Posen auf Exklusionsmechanismen hinausgehen, profitierte die polnische Nationalpolitik von einzelnen Aspekten der preußischen Innenpolitik und akzeptierte das Vorgehen der Gegenseite als Vorbild. Schon dass die neue Posener Bibliothek sich auf polnische Nutzer einstellte, zeugt von dieser aufrechterhaltenen Kommunikation, die der polnischen Nation auch zur Selbstbehauptung verhalf (Christoph Schütte).

Auch wenn die eurasische Bewegung unter exilierten Russen die Nähe der russischen Kultur zu Asien betonte, üernahm sie weitgehend die politische Kultur Westeuropas (Marlène Laruelle). Die Sowietunion behauptete, in den 1920er und 1930er Jahren ein soziales und politisches System aufzubauen, das sich vom amerikanischen Modell radikal getrennt hätte. Der Wunsch, den Konkurrenten einzuholen, ohne ihn zu überholen, bewog sie jedoch, denselben Kult des technischen Fortschritts zu pflegen und eine spezifische Form des Taylorismus zu bereiten.

Sogar zu Kriegszeiten ergibt sich die Möglichkeit, technische Fertigkeiten sowie organisatorische Prinzipien oder Methoden der Planung zu importieren, wie es im Zweiten Weltkrieg zwischen Deutschland und Frankreich geschah. Dann hätten die freundschaftlichen Beziehungen zwischen Speer und Bichelonne mehr als einen anekdotischen Charakter. (Olivier Dard, Dieter Gosewinkel). Zwischen dem amerikanischen „new deal“ und dem „Reichs-

arbeitsdienst“ hat man Parallelen erkannt, die hinreichend nachweisen, dass die Autonomie der Nationalgeschichte eine reine Fiktion gewesen ist (Kiran Klaus Patel).

Der Kalte Krieg kann als eine Reihe politischer Inszenierungen – wie etwa der Besuch Kennedys in Berlin – analysiert werden, die aufeinander abgestimmt sind und deren Konkurrenz eine Selbstlegitimation zum Ziel nimmt (Andreas W. Daum). Wenn man das komplexe Spiel von Ost- und Westfernsehen beobachtet, kann man feststellen, dass die DDR-Bürger nicht unbedingt aus mangelnder Loyalität die Westprogramme sahen, und dass andererseits die Ostprogramme durch Imitation den Konsum der westlichen Industriekultur eindämmen wollten (Hanno Hochmuth). Obwohl die staatliche Kontrolle das Lernen von der westlichen Wissenschaft, der bundesdeutschen wie der amerikanischen, eindeutig erschwerten, muß man feststellen, dass der Austausch nie nachgelassen hat, wie das Beispiel der Institutionalisierung der Krebsforschung in der DDR auch zeigt (Jens Niederhut).

Umgekehrt haben die Anwandlerungen von Sympathie für den zweiten deutschen Staat in Großbritannien niemals zu Versuchen geführt, seine politische Substanz oder seine Errungenschaften zum Vorbild zu nehmen (Arnd Bauerkämper).

In einer theoretischen Bilanz bemüht sich Johannes Paulmann, den Ertrag der Beiträge für die Kulturtransferforschung näher zu bestimmen. Er zeigt im einzelnen, warum die Transferforschung als Terminus die alte Verflechtungsgeschichte glücklich ablöst, fragt sich inwieweit die Transferleistungen trotz Spannungen bewußt gewesen sind, und zweifelt, ob die Feindschaft nicht mehr Transfermechanismen unter-

bunden als begünstigt hat. Dass wir es mit einem nützlichen Baustein der Transfertheorie zu tun haben, steht jedenfalls außer Zweifel.

Thomas Kroll: Kommunistische Intellektuelle in Westeuropa. Frankreich, Österreich, Italien und Großbritannien im Vergleich (1945–1956) (= Industrielle Welt, Bd. 7), Köln: Böhlau Verlag 2007, 775 S.

Rezensiert von
Anne Kwaschik, Berlin

Viel ist über die Anziehungskraft des Kommunismus auf die Intellektuellen bereits geschrieben worden – selten aber auf der Suche nach einer Systematik und im Ausgang von umfangreichen Quellenstudien. Vielmehr hat die Rede von der „Illusion des Kommunismus“ den differenzierenden Blick auf die Akteure verstellt, die nach Erscheinen des Schwarzbuchs des Kommunismus zu Statisten des stalinistischen Terrors degradiert schienen. Thomas Krolls vergleichende Studie zum Engagement der westeuropäischen Intellektuellen für den Kommunismus im Jahrzehnt vom Ende des Zweiten Weltkriegs bis zur Ungarnkrise ist nun der Versuch, die politischen Parameter und Erzählmuster des Kalten Krieges in der Zeitgeschichte durch entschlossene Historisierung zu überwinden. Um diesem Anspruch gerecht zu werden, stützt die Giessener Habilitationsschrift sich auf die Methode des internationalen Vergleichs. Mögliche Einsprüche der An-

hänger von Transfermodellen werden in der Einleitung mit dem Hinweis auf das außerordentlich geringe Maß an gegenseitiger Beeinflussung der Intellektuellengruppen für diesen Zeitraum abgewiesen. (S. 8).

In vier Großkapiteln wird das kommunistische Engagement der Intellektuellen Frankreichs, Österreichs, Italiens und Großbritanniens auf Unterschiede und Gemeinsamkeiten hin untersucht. Genutzt werden prosopographische Methoden. Kroll konstituiert aus den Autoren der führenden kommunistischen Zeitschriften die zu untersuchenden Intellektuellengruppen und wertet insgesamt 608 Biographien aus. Er verzichtet auf eine Definition des Intellektuellen sowie auf ontologisierende Vorabbestimmungen. Seine Studie versteht sich auch als Beitrag zur Intellektuellengeschichte, die divergierende Rollenverständnisse von Intellektuellen zu notieren und ihre Grundbegriffe durch europäische Perspektiven zu schärfen hat.

Gefragt wird nach den Erfahrungen, Zielen und Formen des Engagements. Zum Verständnis des Engagements entwickelt Kroll in Anlehnung an Paul Tillich ein glaubensgeschichtliches Konzept, das im Sinne der Weberschen Idealtypen einen „utopischen“ von einen „sakramentalen“ Typus unterscheidet: Während der utopische Glaube an den Kommunismus sich auf die Zukunft richte, beziehe sich die sakramentale Dimension des Glaubens auf etwas bereits Existierendes – im Kontext der Studie bedeutet dies nichts anderes als eine starke Orientierung an der Sowjetunion oder wie es in der Diktion des Arguments heißt, die Annahme der Sowjetunion als „Heilszentrum“. Im Gegensatz zum Konzept der „politischen Religion“ will

Kroll den Kommunismus nicht als irrationales Substitut für eine durch Säkularisierung verloren gegangene transzendente Religion verstanden wissen, sondern als eine offenere Form der „Gesinnungsqualität“, die sich dadurch auszeichnet, „dass der Gläubige sein Handeln freiwillig einer gesetzten Sache unterwirft“ (S. 10). Die Dynamisierung der Perspektive, die mit der Absage an totalitarismustheoretische Überlegungen verbunden ist, ist ebenso begrüßenswert wie die in der Einleitung vorgebrachte Kritik an der religiösen Symbolsprache in der Erklärung ideengeschichtlicher Phänomene. Dies verhindert jedoch nicht, dass der Kommunismus nun in einem Länderkapitel doch wieder zu etwas Monolithisch-Illusionärem wird.

Für Frankreich nämlich gibt Kroll schließlich François Furet Recht. Das stark sakramentale Verhältnis zum Kommunismus habe hier, wo der politische Glaube seinen utopischen Gehalt fast völlig eingebüßt habe, ein heteronomes Selbstverständnis der Intellektuellen befördert. Die französischen Intellektuellen stellten sich „in den Dienst einer totalitären Bewegung, die sich bedingungslos der Sowjetunion unterordnete“ (S. 632). Die grundlegende Offenheit, die mit der Unterscheidung verschiedener Glaubensdimensionen die Analyse der Kommunismen allererst ermöglicht, bedeutet einen Fortschritt. Der Unterschied zum Verständnis des Kommunismus als politischer Religion allerdings ist innerhalb dieser Einzelanalyse nicht immer klar erkennbar.

Im Gang der Argumentation arbeitet Kroll das Generationsprofil der Intellektuellengruppen heraus und analysiert das Verhältnis der beiden Glaubensdimensionen zueinander als charakteristisch für das

Selbstverständnis und die Aktionsformen der Intellektuellen. Neben der totalitären Stoßrichtung, repräsentiert durch Frankreich, habe das kommunistische Engagement der Intellektuellen – und das ist die SchlussThese der Studie – auch die westlichen Demokratisierungsprozesse vorantreiben können. In Italien und in geringerem Maße auch in Österreich, wo die utopische Dimension des Glaubens an den Kommunismus überwog, dominierte die Vorstellung von einem demokratischen Weg zum Sozialismus. Ebenso wie in Italien verstanden die österreichischen Kommunisten die Schaffung eines Nationalbewusstseins und eines breiten gesellschaftlichen Konsens als Ausgangsbedingung für den Aufbau des Sozialismus.

Im Gegensatz zu den Austromarxisten aber, die zur Befürwortung einer Diktatur nach stalinistischem Muster übergegangen waren, hielten die Italiener an ihrer Konzeption fest. Auch während des Kalten Krieges galt die Sowjetunion ihnen nicht als Modell (S. 459). Im Ergebnis bietet sich folgendes Bild: Während in Frankreich ein orthodoxer Marxismus-Leninismus regierte, sich in Österreich die Theorie der Nation mit der Idee einer bolschewistischen Erziehungsdiktatur verband, erhielt in Italien die utopische Dimension des kommunistischen Glaubens durch die Rezeption von Gramscis Gefängnisschriften eine theoretische Legitimation (S. 464 ff.).

Kroll verweist zur Erklärung auf die politischen Systeme, in denen sich die Mehrheit der Intellektuellen in Österreich und Italien dem Kommunismus anschloss und er hebt die unterschiedlichen Generationsprägungen hervor: Während in Frankreich die bolschewistische Generation die politische Führung übernahm, domi-

nierte in Italien die Weltkriegsgeneration, wohingegen in Österreich weder die eine noch die andere Prägung existierte, da hier die Hinwendung der Intellektuellen zum Kommunismus – in der Mehrheit handelt es sich um austromarxistische Sozialdemokraten – erst nach dem Februaraufstand 1934 erfolgte.

Anders lag der Fall in Großbritannien, wo die Kommunistische Partei eine Randexistenz führte. Dass kommunistische Wissenschaftler eine herausragende Bedeutung für die Entwicklung einiger akademischer Disziplinen und insbesondere der Geschichtswissenschaft hatten, dürfte bekannt sein. Erkenntnisfördernd ist Krolls Situierung der Nachkriegsgeneration in den bürgerlichen und zumeist protestantischen Mittelschichten und im elitären „Oxbridge-Milieu“ sowie seine Beobachtungen zur britischen Absage an sakramentale Glaubensformen. Die Rezeption des Marxismus – hier allein bietet der europäische Vergleich lohnenswerte Anschlussmöglichkeiten – erfolgte in einem gänzlich anderen Koordinatensystem. Im Zentrum der Marxismus-Rezeption standen die Konzepte des „Klassenkampfes“ und des „Staats“, die auf die je eigene Situation übertragen werden sollten. Die Sowjetunion wurde zum Beweis für die Marxschen Theorien, nicht aber zum nachahmenswerten Modell (S. 583 ff.).

Krolls Studie leistet ohne jeden Zweifel einen Beitrag zum Verständnis des Jhs. der Extreme. Sie ist in inhaltlicher und methodischer Hinsicht innovativ für die Geschichte der europäischen Intellektuellen und die politische Zeitgeschichte. Faszinierend wird sie in den vergleichenden Abschnitten zu Konversionen und Glaubenskrisen. Mit Hilfe des internationalen

Vergleichs gelingt es, nationale Spezifika und europäische Entwicklungen präzise herausarbeiten. Aber hier verhält es sich wie mit der Dialektik von Nationalem und Transnationalem: Je einsichtiger die Fruchtbarkeit komparativer materialgesättigter Forschung dem Leser für die Ideengeschichte des 20. Jhs. vor Augen geführt wird, desto mehr erwacht angesichts der aktuellen Internationalisierung der intellektuellen Felder sein Interesse an den gegenseitigen Wahrnehmungen, Beeinflussungen, den Interaktionen.

Björn Hofmeister/Hans-Christoph Liess (Hrsg.): Rüdiger vom Bruch, Gelehrtenpolitik, Sozialwissenschaften und akademische Diskurse in Deutschland im 19. und 20. Jh., Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 2006, 430 S.

Rezensiert von
Geneviève Warland, Brüssel

Ce livre, publié par les soins de Hofmeister et Liess au nom de Rüdiger vom Bruch, rassemble des articles et des contributions qu'il a écrits au cours des vingt-cinq dernières années. Il fait suite à un autre volume de même nature, *Bürgerlichkeit, Staat und Kultur im Deutschen Reich*, publié en 2005 chez le même éditeur.

Comme l'indique le titre et le suggèrent d'ailleurs les photos retenues pour orner la couverture, le projecteur est tourné vers le monde académique, émanant des sciences

sociales, dans son rapport entre la production du savoir scientifique et l'engagement politique, grosso modo de 1870 à 1914. Ce sont les figures de Harnack, Lamprecht, Meinecke, Schmoller et Weber qui se trouvent au centre des considérations institutionnelles, politiques et épistémologiques de Bruch.

Les articles et contributions de ce volume – non remaniés sur le fond (à côté des informations factuelles qu'ils livrent, ils reflètent l'état de la recherche à l'époque de leur rédaction), mais pour la mise en forme et la correction des coquilles – sont regroupés en trois sections.

La première partie étudie la constellation particulière des rapports entre culture politique et culture scientifique à l'époque wilhelminienne et présente différents traits de l'attitude politique des savants (*Gelahrtenpolitik*); la seconde se concentre sur les conflits au sein de l'université, entre sociabilité urbaine et tensions sociales, entre subordination des professeurs à l'Etat et critique du système politique scientifique de même qu'entre représentants de disciplines telles que l'histoire et la *Nationalökonomie*; enfin, la troisième partie porte sur la formation de nouvelles sciences comme la sociologie ou les sciences journalistiques (*Zeitungswissenschaften*), issues des traditionnelles Staatswissenschaften.

Quelques titres évoquent le dénominateur commun de chacune des parties de l'ouvrage: pour la première, tels Kulturimperialismus und Kulturwissenschaften, Krieg und Frieden. Zur Frage der Militarisation deutscher Hochschullehrer im späten Kaiserreich; pour la seconde partie, tels Universitätsreform als soziale Bewegung. Zur Nichtordinarienfrage im späten deutschen Kaiserreich, Max We-

bers Kritik am „System Althoff“ aus universalgeschichtlicher Perspektive, Gustav Schmoller: zwischen Nationalökonomie und Geschichtswissenschaft; pour la troisième, Die Staatswissenschaftliche Gesellschaft zu Berlin 1883–1919, Zeitungskunde und Soziologie. Zur Entwicklungsgeschichte der beiden Disziplinen.

L'auteur étudie l'histoire des sciences (sociales) et de l'université, en rapportant les thèmes traités à leur contexte politique, social et académique, et en se posant la question de la postérité de professeurs marquants tels que Karl Lamprecht ou Gustav Schmoller. La comparaison entre disciplines, attitudes politiques des professeurs et conceptions historiques (par exemple, la psychologie culturelle et la biologie culturelle chez Karl Lamprecht et Oswald Spengler), est un outil essentiel de la méthode de Bruch.

Afin de donner un aperçu d'un livre riche par ses descriptions et analyses, quelques balises autour des thèmes suivants mettent en avant les thèses principales de Bruch: le savant dans l'espace public, la modernisation de l'université et le rôle de l'histoire et de la *Nationalökonomie*.

Même si après 1870, les professeurs des universités allemandes combinent de moins en moins un mandat politique avec une charge scientifique, ils continuent cependant à intervenir dans l'espace public. Le canal principal de cette activité est la presse. Une distinction doit être établie entre ceux qui exercent en permanence une activité de publiciste, comme l'historien de l'Europe de l'Est, Theodor Schieman, chroniqueur au Kreuzzeitung, ou le médiéviste et historien de l'époque moderne, Dietrich Schäfer, mentor de la presse nationaliste, ou encore Hans Delbrück, éditeur

des *Preussische Jahrbücher*, et ceux qui ne se manifestent qu'occasionnellement: tels le libéral progressiste Friedrich Meinecke, rédacteur en chef du *Historische Zeitschrift*, le très conservateur Georg von Below ou les historiens de la culture que sont Karl Lamprecht et Kurt Breysig. Les thèmes de prédilection touchent à la politique intérieure et extérieure de l'Allemagne: d'une part, la question sociale et, d'autre part, la position de l'Allemagne dans le monde.

La presse mise à part, les autres espaces d'influence des professeurs au titre d'intellectuels sont la sociabilité dans le cadre de sociétés comme la *Mittwochsgesellschaft* ou la *Staatswissenschaftliche Gesellschaft* à Berlin, d'associations à but réformateur émanant de la bourgeoisie cultivée et protestante comme la *Verein für Socialpolitik*, mais encore au sein de l'université avec des cercles de discussion. Dans cette activité s'exprime l'idéal du savant, conseiller des princes et formateur de l'opinion publique. Qu'ils se traduisent par les liens étroits entre le monde académique et les hauts fonctionnaires et gouvernants, noués dans les sociétés susmentionnées, ou qu'ils s'incarnent par d'autres modes, l'intervention des professeurs, mettant leurs connaissances au service de la nation, vise la cohésion sociale et le renforcement d'une identité nationale.

Parmi les grandes figures citées, il en est une qui occupe une place à part dans les propos de Bruch: Gustav Schmoller, dont le rôle comme savant, professeur et intellectuel bourgeois progressiste, résume, d'une certaine façon, à lui seul les tendances de l'époque: „Wir haben mit Schmollers Wissenschaftsprogramm, mit seinem Wirkungs willen, mit seiner wissenschaftlichen wie politischen Resonanz

in Teilen der deutschen wissenschaftlichen Hochschullehrerschaft, mit seinem Credo der Sozialreform als Existenzgrundlage des monarchisch-bürokratischen nationalen Machtstaats und mit einer spezifischen Einschätzung von öffentlicher Meinung die Voraussetzungen jener 'Gelehrtenpolitik' benannt, die diesen Nationalökonom zwischen Wissenschaft und öffentlicher Meinung kennzeichnen und die durch die folgende drei Kriterien bestimmt sind:

1. den nationalpädagogischen Anspruch universaler Wahrheit, befreit von materiellen Sonderinteressen und verankert im sittlichen Medium der Vernunft;
2. Unabhängigkeit und Distanz gegenüber Parteien, Verbänden, Agitationsvereinen und offiziöser Presse, insofern diese Partikularinteressen repräsentieren und
3. eine in der Macht-Kultur-Synthese des späten Kaiserreichs verfestigte und vertiefte Geistesverwandtschaft zum höheren Staatsbeamtentum“ (p. 328).

Au cœur de la modernisation de la société allemande, qu'elle doit éclairer par le „Fackel der Erkenntnis“ (Schmoller), se trouve l'université. Celle-ci est soumise à des changements importants dans les années 1870 à 1914. Non seulement pèse sur elle le „système Althoff“ de centralisation, perçu comme une tentative de mainmise de la Prusse sur les universités des autres Etats (jouant sur les nominations et les réseaux, mais aussi sur le développement d'instituts de recherche), mais elle est encore affectée par l'explosion du nombre d'étudiants (accentuant le fossé entre enseignants et étudiants) et la dégradation des conditions de vie des „Nicht-Ordinarien“.

Les principales caractéristiques de la formation de l'université comme „Großbetrieb“ sont les suivantes: premièrement,

la concentration des universités renforce les écarts entre les universités de masse comme Berlin, Munich et Leipzig et les autres; deuxièmement, la diversification des disciplines s'accompagne d'une spécialisation croissante (multiplication des instituts, séminaires et laboratoires); troisièmement, les nouvelles branches du savoir répondent aux besoins de la puissance industrielle allemande: c'est l'adaptation de l'université à son contexte économique et politique.

Enfin, les rapports entre l'histoire et la *Nationalökonomie*, deux disciplines maîtresses du dernier tiers du XIX^e siècle, sont au cœur des exposés de Bruch. En effet, elles ont exercé une influence considérable entre 1890 et 1914 sur la culture politique du Reich au titre d'interprètes du „national“ et de productrices de sens pour une communauté sociale et culturelle insécurisée. Le rôle de l'histoire à cette époque se résume en cinq adjectifs, qui pourraient d'ailleurs s'appliquer à la *Nationalökonomie*. Il s'agit d'une science renommée (i.e. jugée comme légitime et utile par la société), d'une science politique (elle promeut l'État allemand), d'une science protestante (elle est dominée par les professeurs de confession protestante au détriment des catholiques et des juifs), d'une science nationale (elle est au service de la nation allemande, révélant sa continuité dans l'histoire) et d'une « science scientifique » (elle recherche la vérité et se fonde sur des méthodes heuristiques et herméneutiques solides).

Ces éclairages divers, qui dressent un panorama de l'université, de ses acteurs et des questions politiques et culturelles, ne sont pas exempts de redondances. Tel est le risque majeur d'un recueil comme celui-ci. Toutefois, ces redondances ne sont pas gê-

nantes: elles offrent des regards différents, plus ou moins détaillés, sur les questions étudiées. Elles le sont encore moins pour un lecteur étranger, car cela lui permet de mieux saisir les spécificités du système académique allemand sous l'Empire. Cela est d'autant plus utile que l'information, issue de la lecture des auteurs comme de données administratives et statistiques, est abondante. Souvent, l'auteur pose explicitement les problèmes de méthode liés à l'interprétation des sources, dévoile les questions qu'il se pose et n'hésite pas à synthétiser, à l'aide de catégories contemporaines, les caractères principaux de cette élite universitaire. Se dégage ainsi une image à la fois diversifiée, bien documentée et vivante de l'université et de la société allemande fin XIX^e-début XX^e siècle. Les points de vue développés par Bruch – en tous les cas pour Lamprecht qui m'est le plus familier – ne me semblent pas contredire les résultats actuels de la recherche. Ce livre, quoique parfois ardu à lire, offre donc une belle introduction au système de pensée principalement de l'époque wilhelmienne.

Gisela Bock / Daniel Schönpflug
(Hrsg.): Friedrich Meinecke in seiner
Zeit. Studien zu Leben und Werk,
Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag
2006, 294 S.

Rezensiert von
 Jan Eckel, Freiburg

In den jüngsten Diskussionen um die deutsche Geschichtswissenschaft im 20. Jh. hat Friedrich Meinecke, gemessen an seiner fachlichen Bedeutung und der Länge seines Wissenschaftlerlebens, eine eigentümlich geringe Rolle gespielt. Die zentralen Fragen nach den Lebens- und Karrierewegen, den politischen Haltungen und den intellektuellen Dispositionen deutscher Historiker sind an anderen akademischen Biographien als der des 1862 geborenen und 1954 gestorbenen Gelehrten untersucht und debattiert worden. Ein wichtiger Grund dafür dürfte Meineckes „unzeitgemäße Geisteshaltung“ sein, die Rüdiger vom Bruch in seiner biographisch-akademischen Skizze hervorhebt, die den vorliegenden Band einleitet. Im Kaiserreich, während der Weimarer Republik und des Nationalsozialismus, in mancher Hinsicht auch noch in der frühen Bundesrepublik stand der langjährige Berliner Historiker im Gegensatz zu wichtigen politischen und historiographischen Zeitströmungen. Es mag sein, dass ihn dies in den letzten Jahren für die Suche nach dominierenden Tendenzen der Wissenschaftsgeschichte hat ungeeignet erscheinen lassen. Die Erkenntnisse, die man gerade deswegen an Meineckes Leben und

Werk gewinnen kann, weil er sich diesen Tendenzen oftmals entzogen hat, sind daher aber unausgeschöpft geblieben.

Insofern ist es zu begrüßen, dass Gisela Bock und Daniel Schönpflug dessen 50. Todestag zum Anlaß für eine neue historische Beschäftigung mit Friedrich Meinecke genommen haben. Die Ergebnisse der von ihnen organisierten Gedenkveranstaltung haben sich in einem Band niedergeschlagen, der die verschiedenen Dimensionen von Meineckes Schaffen berücksichtigt: seine Geschichtsschreibung und sein politisches Denken ebenso wie die akademische Persönlichkeit und die Rezeption seiner Werke. Zudem enthält der Band eine von Stefan Meinecke erstellte Bibliographie der Literatur zu Meinecke.

So facettenreich der Band konzipiert ist, so uneinheitlich fällt allerdings sein Ertrag aus. Das zeigt sich bereits an der Reihe der historiographiegeschichtlichen Aufsätze. Diese beginnt Daniel Schönpflug mit einer erhellenden Analyse der Vorstellungen von Revolution und „Erhebung“, die sich durch Meineckes Arbeiten zur französischen und deutschen Geschichte ziehen. Er legt plausibel dar, dass Meinecke zwei verschiedene Modelle historischer Umbruchprozesse entwickelte. In der Revolution sah er einen destruktiven Vorgang, der sich aus einer strukturellen monarchischen Führungsschwäche ebenso speise wie aus dem chaotischen Treiben historischer Massen. Daher erlangten die Ereignisse von 1789 und 1918 in Meineckes Augen auch keine eigentliche geschichtliche Dignität. Die „Erhebung“ galt ihm hingegen als ein positiver, da schrittweiser Prozess der Reform und der Behebung politischer Defizite, wenn er ihn auch in der Geschichte nie rein verwirklicht sah. Sehr

rekonstruktiv angelegt ist Gisela Bocks minutiöse philologische Untersuchung des Machiavellibilds in Meineckes „Idee der Staatsräson“, das sie mit demjenigen Gerhard Ritters kontrastiert. Stand der italienische Fürst bei Meinecke für den Dualismus von Macht und Moral, so assoziierte ihn Ritter in seinem Buch „Machtstaat und Utopie“ einseitig mit der „Dämonie der Macht“ und schuf damit ein in der frühen Bundesrepublik einflußreiches Interpretament. In dem Beitrag klingt das uneingestandene Rivalitätsverhältnis an, das Ritter zu immer neuen Versuchen der Überbietung des älteren Kollegen antrieb und das eine nähere Untersuchung lohnen würde. Es läßt sich auch in dem Beitrag von Wolfgang Wippermann zu Meineckes „Die deutsche Katastrophe“ erkennen, der allerdings kaum Neues bietet. Wippermann skizziert die bekannte Position Meineckes in der „Schuld“-Diskussion der frühen Nachkriegszeit und hält ihr die ebenso bekannte Stellungnahme Ritters gegenüber; während Meinecke bedeutsame Kontinuitätslinien zwischen dem Nationalsozialismus und der früheren deutschen Geschichte aufzeigte, wehrte sich Ritter gegen die Vorstellung, das „Dritte Reich“ sei durch belastende deutsche Traditionen vorbereitet worden.

Die akademische Persönlichkeit Meineckes bleibt in dem Band eher blaß. Gerhard A. Ritter skizziert, zum Teil aus der persönlichen Erinnerung, Meineckes Rolle als Gründungsrektor der Freien Universität Berlin und die frühen Jahre des Friedrich-Meinecke-Instituts. Eine wirkliche Analyse von Meineckes wissenschaftsorganisatorischer Arbeit ist damit aber nicht verbunden. Die beiden stark faktologischen Aufsätze von Peter Thomas

Walther zum Lebensweg Hedwig Hintzes seit 1933 bis zu ihrem Tod im niederländischen Exil und zu den Neubesetzungen der Lehrstühle von Meinecke haben nur indirekt mit dessen wissenschaftlicher Vita zu tun. Eine ausführliche Darstellung der italienischen Rezeption von Meineckes Historismusstudien liefert der Aufsatz von Fulvio Tessitore.

Die meisten dieser Beiträge gelten bisher kaum erforschten Themen und können dem historischen Meinecke-Bild somit neue Elemente hinzufügen. Dabei handelt es sich jedoch überwiegend um Detailspekte. Diese werden zweifellos sorgfältig, wenn auch meist recht weitschweifig dargestellt. Vor allem aber lassen die Autoren über der Konzentration auf die Einzelbefunde die Chance, von der Persönlichkeit und dem Denken Meineckes neue und weiterführende Fragen an die deutsche Geschichtswissenschaft des 19. und 20. Jhs. zu stellen, weitgehend ungenutzt.

Die Ausnahme von dieser Regel stellen die Aufsätze von Stefan Meineke und Nikolai Wehrs dar, die einen sehr ergiebigen Blick auf das politische Denken Meineckes vor allem in der Weimarer Republik werfen. Meineke legt überzeugend dar, wie Meinecke seit Ende der fünfziger Jahre dem Verdikt verfiel, politisch reaktionär gewesen zu sein, indem seine politischen Stellungnahmen aus dem Zusammenhang der zeitgenössischen Debatten gerissen und am Maßstab der politischen Verhältnisse und Normen der Bundesrepublik gemessen wurden. Meineke hält dem entgegen, dass das politische Denken des Historikers in den zwanziger und dreißiger Jahren als Versuch verstanden werden muss, angesichts der gravierenden Funktionsprobleme des Weimarer Parlamentarismus über

Möglichkeiten nachzudenken, wie sich die Handlungsfähigkeit der Regierung sichern ließe. Damit strebte er eine Lösung innerhalb des Rahmens der Republik an, die er keineswegs zu überwinden beabsichtigte. Nikolai Wehrs' Beitrag gilt demselben Problemkomplex. Er sieht die Kernelemente von Meineckes politischer Publizistik der Weimarer Zeit in dem Gedanken einer Einheit der Volksgemeinschaft und in der Befürwortung einer autoritativen Staatsführung. Beides habe es ihm notwendig erscheinen lassen, die Regierungsgewalt von der parlamentarischen Basis zu lösen und bei einem plebiszitär gewählten Staatsoberhaupt zu konzentrieren. Zwar stellt auch Wehrs heraus, dass Meinecke an der Republik festhalten wollte, doch weist er ebenso darauf hin, dass seine politischen Grundvorstellungen mit der Realität einer pluralistischen Massendemokratie nur schwer vereinbar gewesen seien. Diese Akzentuierung steht in einem leichten Widerspruch zu den Ergebnissen Meineckes, der in dem Band nicht aufgelöst wird. Auch in dieser Spannung eröffnen beide Autoren gleichwohl interessante Perspektiven und verdeutlichen, welche Aufschlüsse das immer noch unzureichend erforschte Feld des demokratischen Denkens und des „Vernunftrepublikanismus“ in der Weimarer Republik bieten kann.

Tobias Kaiser: Karl Griewank (1900–1953). Ein deutscher Historiker im „Zeitalter der Extreme“ (= Pallas Athene. Beiträge zur Universitäts- und Wissenschaftsgeschichte, Bd. 23), Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag 2007, 528 S.

Rezensiert von
Mario Keßler, Berlin

Mit dieser Biographie über Karl Griewank wird zum ersten Mal, nach einer Reihe von Spezialstudien zur frühen DDR-Geschichtswissenschaft, einer ihrer unterschiedlich beurteilten Vertreter Gegenstand einer Dissertation. Ihr Verfasser schrieb sie unter Hans-Werner Hahn an der Universität Jena, wo Griewank die letzten Jahre seines kurzen Lebens erfolgreich lehrte. Bei durchgängiger Würdigung des wissenschaftlichen Werkes wurde Griewanks politischer Standort sehr verschieden bestimmt. Einerseits galt er als „Wegbereiter der DDR-Geschichtswissenschaft“, so in einem Band, der unter diesem Titel noch 1989 in der DDR erschien. Für Herbert Grundmann, Universität Münster, war er 1956 hingegen ein bürgerlicher, doch in Ostdeutschland „unter Naturschutz stehender“ Historiker. Griewanks nunmehriger Biograph Tobias Kaiser sieht seine Hauptgestalt als einen deutschen Historiker im „Zeitalter der Extreme“, der sich einer einfachen Zuordnung entzieht. Unvermeidlicher Weise gab der Selbstmord des in allen Lagern angesehenen Wissen-

schaftlers am 26. Oktober 1953 vielen Spekulationen Raum. Oft wurde vermutet, Griewank habe sich aus Verzweiflung über die politische Lage in der DDR das Leben genommen. Eine Biographie über diesen Historiker war zur Klärung solcher und anderer Fragen deshalb notwendig. Wissenschaftlich trat Griewank, ein Spezialist der preußischen Reformzeit und des Vormärz, mit Editionen zu Gneisenau und Königin Luise sowie kleineren Monographien über die Revolutionen von 1789 und 1848 hervor. Doch haben vor allem seine Bücher zum Wiener Kongress (1942, Neuauflage postum 1954) und zum neuzeitlichen Revolutionsbegriff ihren Wert behalten. Die letztere Arbeit erschien erstmals 1955 und erlebte bis 1992 mehrere Auflagen. Nur wenig war bislang über Griewanks wissenschaftsorganisatorische Tätigkeit in der Deutschen Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG) bekannt, die er 1945 eine kurze Zeit kommissarisch leitete.

Kaisers überaus bemerkenswertes, streckenweise sogar brillantes Buch bietet viele, bisher unbekannte biographische Einzelheiten, so über Griewanks Familienhintergrund, die protestantische Prägung, seine (kinderlos gebliebene) Ehe und eine Krebserkrankung in den 1930er Jahren. Der aus Bützow in Mecklenburg stammende Arztsohn verlor früh den Vater und erlebte in der Inflationszeit persönliche Not, was zum Interesse für soziale Fragen beigetragen haben dürfte. 1922 schloss er sein Studium in Rostock bei Willy Andreas mit einer Dissertation über Friedrich Wilhelm Held, einen Linksliberalen der 1848er Revolution, ab. Danach war er Lokalredakteur der Neuen Zeit, einer Berliner Tageszeitung, die der DDP nahe stand.

Seit 1926 war Griewank hauptamtlich in der Notgemeinschaft der Deutschen Wissenschaft, der späteren DFG, tätig. Politisch bejahte er die Weimarer Republik. Der Aufstieg des Nazismus beunruhigte ihn, die Rassenlehre, die ab 1933 zur offiziellen Ideologie wurde, lehnte er ab. Er schloss sich der Bekennenden Kirche an, exponierte sich aber dort nicht so stark, dass seine bürgerliche Existenz bedroht wurde. In den internen DFG-Publikationen machte er durchaus Zugeständnisse an das Regime, konnte andererseits sogar einem Emigranten nach Australien noch ausstehende Geldzahlungen überweisen. Ernst Klees Vorwurf, Griewank habe von Mengeles Menschenversuchen in Auschwitz gewusst und sogar entsprechende Unterlagen bearbeitet, kann Kaiser zumindest relativieren; es findet sich kein sicherer Beleg für Griewanks Mitwissenschaft. „Er wurde in der DFG zum Ansprechpartner für die traditionellen Wissenschaftler, gestaltete zu bürgerlich-christlichen Kreisen ein offenes Verhältnis. Griewank war jedoch kein Widerstandskämpfer der Wissenschaft, kein Dissident oder Saboteur.“ (S. 117) Er trat dem Stahlhelm bei, um sich nicht anderen Naziorganisationen anschließen zu müssen, und wurde mit dessen Auflösung in die SA übernommen. Wegen seiner Erkrankung konnte er diese jedoch bald unauffällig verlassen. Dem NS-Dozentenbund schloss sich Griewank nicht an, geschweige denn der NSDAP.

Eine Universitätskarriere, die angesichts des republikfeindlichen Klimas unter den meisten Historikern für ihn schon vor 1933 schwierig war, schien im „Dritten Reich“ ganz unmöglich, obgleich Griewank die Hoffnung darauf nie ganz aufgab. Geschickt verstand er sich nicht nur

die Unterstützung seines Doktorvaters Willy Andreas, sondern auch des NS-Historikers Walter Platzhoff zu sichern, der ihm 1942 mit dem Buch über den Wiener Kongress die Habilitation in Frankfurt ermöglichte. Damit suchte Griewank, der den Hitlerstaat innerlich stets ablehnte, seine Position innerhalb der Historikerzunft und innerhalb des NS-Wissenschaftssystems allmählich zu verbessern. Eine Professur erlangte Griewank aber im „Dritten Reich“ nicht.

1945 schlug allerdings seine relative Ferne zum gestürzten Regime positiv zu Buche. Die kommissarische Leitung der Deutschen Forschungsgemeinschaft verband Griewank mit der Herausgabe der wissenschaftspolitisch wichtigen Deutschen Literaturzeitung. Obgleich er keine Lehrerfahrung und noch wenige Publikationen aufwies, ernannte ihn schon 1946 die Zentralverwaltung für Wissenschaft in der SBZ zum außerordentlichen Professor in Berlin. Ein Jahr später erhielt er einen Lehrstuhl für mittlere und neuere Geschichte in Jena und wurde Institutsdirektor. Als Dekan der Philosophischen Fakultät amtierte er neben seinem Großonkel Karl Heussi, dem Dekan der Theologischen Fakultät.

Der Anspruch der DDR-Führung auf ideologische Deutungshoheit zog naturgemäß Griewanks Fach in besondere Mitleidenschaft. 1951 griffen ihn Studenten an, da er für eine sachliche Auseinandersetzung mit den Schriften Heinrich von Treitschkes plädierte. Er verherrliche einen Nationalisten, hieß es. Es gebe keine gleichberechtigten Richtungen, sondern nur zwei Anschauungen in der Wissenschaft: die fortschrittliche und die reaktionäre. Beide seien miteinander unvereinbar,

und der Historiker müsse sich für eine entscheiden.

Griewank, ein Kenner des Marxismus, erkannte dem historischen Materialismus durchaus den Wert eines heuristischen Prinzips zu, wandte sich aber gegen dessen Anwendung als alleiniges Lösungsmittel zur Erkenntnis von Problemen der Gesellschaft.

In Privatbriefen fürchtete er, kaum noch lange den Beruf des Historikers ausüben zu können. Er dachte an Übersiedlung in den Westen, wollte sich diese aber offiziell genehmigen lassen und keineswegs die Brücken in die DDR abbrechen. Doch während Griewank auch auf der DDR-Historikertagung im Juni 1952 kritisiert wurde, erfreute er sich zugleich, wie Kaiser nachweist, offizieller Anerkennung. So schloss der Staat einen Einzelvertrag mit ihm ab, den nur privilegierte Wissenschaftler erhielten, und wurde in den Wissenschaftlichen Beirat der Fachrichtung Geschichte berufen, der für die Konzeption der Lehr- und Forschungsinhalte mitverantwortlich war.

Zugleich war Griewank ordentliches Mitglied der Historischen Kommission bei der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, die ihn sogar zu ihrem Sekretär ernannte und ihm bei eventueller Übersiedlung in den Westen einen Arbeitsplatz bot, wenn er dort schon wenig Aussichten auf einen neuen Ruf hatte. Im noch gesamtdeutschen Historikerverband suchte Griewank zwischen politischen Gegnern zu vermitteln und zog sich damit den Argwohn ideologischer Scharfmacher in Ost, aber auch in West zu. Der Entschluss, seinem Leben ein Ende zu setzen, hatte jedoch, wie Kaiser gleich zu Beginn klarstellt, keine politischen, sondern persönliche

Gründe. Letztlich bleibe Griewanks keine Korrektur zulassende Handlung „schwer nachvollziehbar“, und nur „aus einer inneren Not, aus subjektiv-psychischen Faktoren lässt sich seine Selbsttötung erklären, wobei externe und endogene Faktoren zusammen kommen. Die letzte Erklärung bleibt auch diese Arbeit schuldig.“ (S. 20) Griewank litt seit seiner Krebserkrankung an Depressionen. Dennoch mag die Erkenntnis, im Osten wie im Westen letztlich kaum zumutbare Zugeständnisse machen zu müssen, zur Tragik seines Lebens beigetragen haben. Es fällt schwer, sich Karl Griewank als bürgerliches Aushängeschild einer marxistisch-leninistischen Legitimationswissenschaft vorzustellen. Ebenso schwer kann man ihn sich als Kalten Krieger im Westen denken, der seine Publikationen mit den amtlich vorgegebenen Führungsstrichen für die DDR gezeichnet hätte. Doch kann über solche Fragen natürlich nicht entschieden werden, und das Unabgeschlossene in Griewanks Leben erleichterte es Historikern aus verschiedenen politischen Lagern, sich nach seinem Tod auf ihn zu berufen.

Ulrike von Hirschhausen: Die Grenzen der Gemeinsamkeit. Deutsche, Letten, Russen und Juden in Riga 1860–1914 (= Kritische Studien zur Geschichtswissenschaft, Bd. 172), Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht 2006, 430 S.

Rezensiert von
Felix Heinert, Düsseldorf

Es war und ist eine folgenreiche Illusion, dass mit fortschreitender Modernisierung Ethnizität und (National-)Staatlichkeit zunehmend konvergieren würden. Die Illusion wurde auch durch Forschungen zu Nationsbildungs- und Modernisierungsprozessen gehegt und gepflegt, welche den nationalhistorischen Rahmen zu einem nicht hinterfragbaren Paradigma stilisierten. Mit der zunehmenden Infragestellung der Prämissen eines solchen „methodischen Nationalismus“ wird der Blick auch für die vielschichtigen Phänomene von polykulturell oder multiethnisch strukturierten Gesellschaften frei, können neue Erklärungsansätze erprobt werden. Mindestens zwei Ansätze zur Überprüfung lang gehegter Annahmen sind denkbar. Zum einen können aus der Innenperspektive der als ethnisch gedachten Gruppen zeitgenössische Ansprüche, semantische Konstrukte sowie nationalhistoriographische Postulate auf ihre empirische Überzeugungskraft hin geprüft sowie dekonstruiert werden, zum anderen bietet sich eine verflechtungsgeschichtliche Perspektive an, um den Blick auch auf wech-

selseitige Einflüsse, Abhängigkeiten oder Konflikte zu lenken. Beide Ansätze haben ihre Stärken, beide haben ihre spezifische Optik – sie ergänzen einander auf eine fruchtbare Art und Weise.

Ulrike von Hirschhausen hat sich in ihrer Arbeit zu den „Grenzen der Gemeinsamkeit“ zwischen Deutschen, Letten, Russen und Juden in Riga im halben Jh. vor de Verwerfungen des Ersten Weltkrieges für die interethnische Perspektive entschieden. „In einer interethnischen Verflechtungsgeschichte sieht diese Studie einen methodischen Neuansatz zur Überwindung jenes ethnozentrischen Narrativs, welches die bisherigen Historiographien“ (S. 21) dieser Stadt kennzeichnet. Diese weiterführende Studie ist schon deshalb zu begrüßen und zu würdigen, weil sie die allzu oft passionsgeschichtlich inspirierten, ethnozentrischen Narrative der Historiographien dieser Stadt aufeinander bezieht. In der Geschichte dieser Stadt und Region sind solche Ansätze bisher kaum ernsthaft erprobt worden. Vielmehr wird die Historiographie bis heute von einem Paradigma geprägt, dass zwar mittlerweile nicht mehr die scharfen historiographischen Gegensätze des 19. und 20. Jhs. widerspiegelt, wohl aber die Auffassung von einem Nebeneinander ethnischer Gruppen fortpflegt und Riga als eine Vielvölkerstadt begreift, die sich durch ein mehr oder weniger friedliches Nebeneinander von Bevölkerungsgruppen entlang markanter ethnischer Linien charakterisieren lasse. So habe es ein „Riga der Letten“, ein „Riga der Deutschen“, ein „Riga der Russen“, ein „Riga der Juden“ und weitere ethnische Segmente gegeben.¹

Von Hirschhausen nimmt diese These zum Ausgangspunkt ihrer Fragestellung: „Das

multiethnische Riga, wo unterschiedliche Kulturen, eine deutsche, eine lettische, eine russische und eine jüdische, aufeinander trafen, legt die Frage nach ihrer wechselseitigen Beeinflussung und Vermischung besonders nahe.“ (S. 17) Mit der Analysekategorie des „ethnischen Milieus“ definiert die Autorin die zu vergleichenden Gruppen, knüpft damit an die Forschungen zur Ethnisierung der städtischen Gesellschaft Rigas an und stellt die Frage, wie es dazu kam, dass „Riga in den Jahrzehnten vor 1914 in eine ethnisch segmentierte Stadt zerfallen“ ist (S. 12). Das Konzept der ethnischen Milieus als Analyseeinheit begründet von Hirschhausen nicht durch essentialistische Ethnizitätsvorstellungen, sondern durch das Konzept, welches Ethnizität als relationale Größe, als Ergebnis der Opposition zu anderen (konkurrierenden) Gruppen begreift. Die interethnische Perspektive, die die Autorin wählt, ist daher hilfreich, zu bestätigen bzw. zu erklären, dass bzw. warum „im Rigaer Fall Ethnizität zu jener Bezugsgröße wurde, welche die Grenze des Milieus bezeichnete“ (S. 28). Es geht also nicht um ethnische „Schicksalsgemeinschaften“, sondern um „hochverdichtete Gruppen, die sich durch spezifische Selbst- und Weltdeutungen nach außen abgrenzen und durch die Umsetzung dieser Deutungskultur in der Lebenswelt innere Kohärenz aufweisen“ (S. 27). Um dieses Konzept anzuwenden, zieht von Hirschhausen reichhaltiges und umfangreiches Quellenmaterial heran, das in mehreren Schritten darauf befragt wird, wie das jeweilige ethnische Milieu seine Außengrenze konstruierte, wie sich diese Grenzen im Austausch bzw. in wechselseitiger Beeinflussung mit anderen ethnischen Milieus formierten und wie es zur

„Politisierung von Ethnizität“ und „Ethnisierung von Kultur“ (S. 370) in Riga gekommen sei.

In der Einleitung wird zu Recht betont, dass die Interpretationen von Nation, Region oder Reich auch in Riga nicht als stabile Größen vorzustellen seien. Vielmehr werden und wurden diese Bezüge unterschiedlich gedeutet. Um die Deutungen sowie deren Wandel am Beispiel der vier Milieus herauszuarbeiten, situiert von Hirschhausen die Rigaer Ausgangslage sowie den durch Industrialisierung und Migration ausgelösten Wandel im historischen Kontext und beschreibt zunächst demographische, soziökonomische und ethnische Verschiebungen. Es wird deutlich, dass die deutschbaltische Handelsstadt, die bis in die zweite Hälfte des 19. Jhs. eine ausgeprägte ständische Ordnung aufwies, im Laufe der Zeit zu einer bürgerlichen Klassen- und einer polykulturellen städtischen Gesellschaft wurde. Nicht mehr Bauer oder Bürger waren nun die relevanten Bezugsgrößen. Vielmehr spielten, so die These, ethnische Kategorien eine zunehmend entscheidende Rolle, wurde v. a. der Konflikt zwischen lettischen Migranten und deutschbaltischen Eliten politisch aufgeladen. V. a. die lettische Massenmigration nach Riga stellte die Bevölkerungspyramide auf den Kopf, stellten Letten 1913 laut der Volkszählung mit großem Abstand die relative Mehrheit der Bevölkerung dar. Die „Verwissenschaftlichung des Sozialen“ ging in Riga mit der kontroversen Aushandlung dessen, wie die Zählungen kulturelle Zugehörigkeit adäquat zu vermessen hätten, einher.

Der zentralen Frage der Arbeit, den „Grenzen der Gemeinsamkeit“ zwischen den ethnischen Gruppen und dem Verhältnis

zwischen Multiethnizität und zivilgesellschaftlichen Prozessen, geht die Autorin nach, indem sie zunächst jedes „ethnische Milieu“ beleuchtet und die „spezifischen Leitvorstellungen“ (S. 120) und „allgemeinverbindlichen Denkfiguren“ (S. 102) der Milieus mit den zivilgesellschaftlichen Mustern in Beziehung setzt. Dabei betont von Hirschhausen bereits in der Einleitung die Ambivalenz, die potenzielle Normativität und die mangelnde Historisierung des Konzepts der Zivilgesellschaft sowie die scharfe Abgrenzung gegenüber den Bereichen des Marktes und des Staates. Einen Vorteil des Konzepts gegenüber etwa dem Begriff der „Bürgerlichen Gesellschaft“ sieht die Autorin darin, dass „die Frage nach zivilgesellschaftlichen Elementen sich nicht auf bürgerliche Gruppen beschränkt“ (S. 18).

Um die „spezifischen Leitvorstellungen“ der Milieus zu bestimmen, rückt die Autorin zunächst die Biographien von Einzelpersonen, wie deutschbaltischen kommunalen Größen bzw. Wortführern der lettischen Nationalbewegung und der russischen Öffentlichkeit, in den Vordergrund. Die Autorin illustriert anhand der Biographien „allgemeine Leitvorstellungen“, „welche das jeweilige Milieu konstituierten und zusammenhielten“ (S. 101 f.). Damit gelingt es, die Untersuchung mit Einblicken in das Leben von „Menschen mit Namen und unterscheidbarer Geschichte“ anzureichern. Die ungleiche Analysedichte im Falle der Darstellung der „Denkfiguren“ der Milieus wird leider im Falle der Beschreibung des „jüdischen Milieus“ besonders deutlich, was nicht zuletzt auf die ungünstige Quellenlage und einen noch unbefriedigenden Forschungsstand zurückzuführen ist. Bei

der Darstellung der für das Milieu spezifischen Leitvorstellungen wurde als Repräsentant nur eine Frau herangezogen, deren Biographie auf die für das Milieu verbindlichen Denkfiguren auf der Grundlage einer 2001 erschienenen Autobiographie des Enkels befragt wurde. Nichtsdestotrotz seien an diesen Erinnerungen die für das „jüdische Milieu“ kennzeichnenden Leitvorstellungen ablesbar, könne durch die zusätzliche Auswertung einiger in der Literatur enthaltener Angaben zu Paul Mintz, einer der einflussreichen jüdischen Persönlichkeiten Rigas um die Jh.wende, der Wandel der Denkfiguren des „Milieus“ skizziert werden. Insgesamt bestätigt, so die Autorin, die Befragung der Biographien die Hauptthese, dass die Milieus trotz innerer Heterogenität die Außengrenzen zunehmend ethnisch markierten und dass Deutungsmuster in wechselseitiger Bedingtheit konstruiert wurden und einem Wandel unterlagen.

Darauf aufbauend wird die „Nationalisierung der politischen Kultur“ der Stadt untersucht und der Rigaer Fall im überregionalen Kontext verortet. Dabei wird auf das Verhältnis von Multiethnizität und Reformfähigkeit der Kommunalpolitik eingegangen. Die Autorin zeigt überzeugend, dass Multiethnizität in Riga dazu führte, dass sich eine kommunalpolitische Kultur der Gemeinwohlorientierung entwickelte, die eine im innerrussländischen Vergleich beeindruckende Sozialpolitik ermöglichte. Diesen „Rigaer Munizipalsozialismus“ situiert von Hirschhausen im Kontext der Entwicklungen in den deutschen Reichs- und Hansestädten, wobei die Autorin plausibel zeigen kann, dass die deutschbaltische Oberschicht auf ständische Traditionsbestände und Transferprodukte aus

dem Westen aufbauend die Orientierung am „übernationalen Gemeinwohl“ (S. 195) unter dem Legitimitätsdruck der multiethnischen Konstellation entwickelte und als Instrument der Machtsicherung entdeckte. Außerdem unterstreicht die Autorin, dass die Formierung ethnischer Milieus im Kontext des kommunalrechtlichen Wandels zu verstehen sei, der in Riga v. a. durch die Einführung der Städteordnung von 1877 eingeleitet wurde. „Erstmals in der Geschichte der Region eröffnete sich ein politischer Handlungsraum, der grundsätzlich allen ethnischen Gruppen offenstand“ (S. 169). Zwar war das deutschbaltische Bürgertum weiterhin durch den Zensus de facto begünstigt, doch konnte jetzt im Wahlkampf die Nationalisierung der politischen Kultur von den Wortführern der lettischen und russischen Opposition argumentativ erprobt werden, wendete sich deren Wahlkampf gegen die Hegemonie der deutschen Eliten. Diese „neuartige Erfahrung politischer Konkurrenz“, so von Hirschhausen, „führte zu einer ungewohnten Mobilisierung der städtischen Gesellschaft“, die sich beispielsweise darin ausdrückte, dass „die Zeitungen aller ethnischen Gruppen“ (S. 175) diesem Thema sehr viel Platz einräumten. Damit zeigt von Hirschhausen, dass die auf der Grundlage der Biographien veranschaulichte These von der Formierung ethnischer Milieus in Abgrenzung zu konkurrierenden Milieus auch durch die Analyse des Wandels der „politischen Kultur“ der Stadt unterstrichen werden kann. Vielleicht wäre an dieser Stelle – dies sei nur am Rande vermerkt – der Hinweis auf das Fehlen lokaler jüdischer Presse in dem Wahlkampf² hilfreich gewesen, denn sonst entsteht der etwas irritierende Ein-

druck, auch die jüdische Presse hätte sich mit dem Thema ausgiebig beschäftigt und so zur weiteren Formierung des „jüdischen Milieus“ beigetragen.

Anschließend beleuchtet die Autorin die lokale Vereinskultur als wichtigen Katalysator der Milieubildung. Das Rigaer Vereinswesen, dessen enorme Dichte im ostmitteleuropäischen Raum ihresgleichen sucht, wird entlang der ethnischen Milieus beleuchtet. „Untersucht wird jeweils ein typischer Verein auf Vereinsziel, soziale Trägerschaft und kulturelle Praxis, wobei mögliche Bezüge und Anlehnungen an andere, meist westliche Modelle besondere Beachtung finden.“ (S. 213) Anhand dieser ausgewählten „typischen“ Vereine unterstreicht die Autorin die These, dass sich die jeweiligen Milieus im Laufe der Zeit nach innen verdichtet hätten. Die Gegenüberstellung der „typischen“ Vereine der ethnischen Milieus verdeutlicht, wie sehr Denkfiguren aufeinander bezogen waren und wie unterschiedlich sie im Inneren der „Milieus“ ausgelegt werden konnten. Die Segmentierung des lettischen Nationalismus macht deutlich, dass sich auch in Riga Nationalisierungsprozesse keinesfalls zur Homogenisierung der Milieus führten, dass Ethnizität vielmehr als Außengrenze der Milieus Bedeutung hatte. Dies gilt offenbar auch für die Ethnisierung des „deutschen Milieus“, dessen ständische Differenzierung abzubauen vor 1914 ein erfolgloser Versuch blieb. Noch deutlicher wird dies bei der Betrachtung des „russischen Milieus“, dass bis 1914 schwach integriert war. Vor allem der für das russische Milieu „typische“ Russische Klub hielt bis 1914 an unpolitischer Geselligkeit fest und hatte auch – gemessen am Bevölkerungsanteil – nicht wenige jü-

dische Bürger unter seinen Mitgliedern. Die schwache innere Integration ist wohl gerade für das „jüdische Milieu“ charakteristisch gewesen, dessen „typischer“ Verein, der jüdische Bildungsverein, der kurz skizziert wird, „wenig schichtenübergreifende Popularität [...], wie sie der Lettische Verein und der Russische Klub anfänglich genossen“, (S. 261) hatte. Dass diese Vereine trotzdem die Verfestigung der „ethnischen Milieus“ vorantrieben hätten und als „typisch“ zu gelten seien, ist die Schlussfolgerung, die die Autorin aus der Analyse zieht.

Abschließend illustriert die Autorin die „Segmentierung der kulturellen Praxis“ am Beispiel der Russifizierungsmaßnahmen im Schulwesen und im kirchlichen Bereich, der Veranstaltung der 700-Jahr-Feier Rigas im Jahr 1901, der Deutungs Offenheit des Denkmals für Peter den Großen sowie der Konkurrenz um Verortung bzw. der „mental maps“ der deutschbaltischen und lettischen Rigenser. An diesen Ereignissen und Beispielen werden konkurrierende Leitvorstellungen noch einmal herausgearbeitet, wobei in der aufschlussreichen mehrdimensionalen Analyse Juden nicht berücksichtigt wurden, was vielleicht einer Begründung oder Anmerkung bedürfte, die der Rezensent leider vergeblich gesucht hat.

Insgesamt betrachtet, stellt die quellenreiche und im Übrigen sehr gut lesbare Darstellung eine erkenntnisreiche und weiterführende Arbeit dar, die die Narrative der Forschung konstruktiv miteinander verschränkt. Diese solide Studie wird in der baltischen Geschichte lange Zeit kein Wissenschaftler ignorieren können. Auch ist die vorgeschlagene Perspektive auf die Rigaer Geschichte sinnvoll, wenn

die Wechselwirkungen zwischen den „Bevölkerungsgruppen“ und die reziproke Abhängigkeit der Milieubildungsprozesse untersucht werden sollen. Ob das Konzept der weitgehenden „Ethnisierung der Kultur“, das durch die gewählte interethnische Perspektive besonders betont wird, auch für das Innenleben der Milieus ein überzeugendes Interpretament darstellt, scheint dem Rezensenten fraglich zu sein und ist durch eingehende empirische Untersuchungen zu prüfen, die die vorausgesetzten „ethnischen Milieus“ aus dem „Inneren“ heraus stärker abklopfen müssten. Auch die – quellenbedingte – starke Fokussierung der Arbeit auf die Leitvorstellungen der kommunalen Größen und „selbsternannten“ Wortführer der „Milieus“ könnten die an diese wertvolle Studie anknüpfenden Arbeiten durch die Prüfung der Ausstrahlungskraft und „Verbindlichkeit“ derer Denkfiguren sowie durch die Untersuchung alternativer Sinnstiftungsangebote auch jenseits der hier als „typisch“ bezeichneten Vereine ergänzen, was zumindest für die Zeit nach 1906 möglich wäre.

Eine Anmerkung zum Entstehungshintergrund von zahlreichen durchweg interessanten und weiterführenden Thesen sei gestattet. Leider konnte der Rezensent nicht immer nachvollziehen, auf welcher Grundlage manche Schlussfolgerungen im Einzelfall zustande kamen und auf welche Quellen und Kontexte sich die Zitate im Konkretefall beziehen. Das recht häufige Fehlen von (genauen) Seitenangaben oder auch Namen in den Belegen erschwert nicht selten unglücklicherweise das Nachvollziehen der Zusammenhänge, die Kontextualisierung der Beispiele und Zitate sowie weiterführende Recherchen. An

einigen Stellen schien dem Rezensenten auch die Wahl der Beispiele und Quellen zur Verdeutlichung von interessanten und wichtigen Thesen im Text nicht ausreichend elaboriert zu sein. Außerdem enthält die Arbeit auch einige faktographischen Ungenauigkeiten. Diese Wermutstropfen mindern aber nicht die grundsätzliche Bedeutung und den Wert dieser Studie.

Anmerkungen:

- 1 So z. B. die Titel der Beiträge in: Riga. Portrait einer Vielvölkerstadt am Rande des Zarenreiches 1857–1914, hrsg. von Erwin Oberländer und Kristine Wohlfart, Paderborn 2004.
- 2 Das gilt auch für alle Rigaer Wahlkämpfe bis zum Verlust des Wahlrechts 1892. Auch gab es in der Zeit keine jüdischen Parteien, sondern eine deutsch-jüdische Wahlallianz. Letzteres erwähnt aber auch von Hirschhausen.

Dmytro Myeshkov: Die Schwarzmeerdeutschen und ihre Welten, 1781–1871 (= Veröffentlichungen zur Kultur und Geschichte im östlichen Europa, Bd. 30), Essen: Klartext Verlag 2008, 507 S.

Rezensiert von
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Die Geschichte deutscher Kolonisten in (dem damaligen Sprachgebrauch folgend) Süd- oder Neurußland (*Novorossija*) ist von deutschsprachigen Historikern bereits wiederholt und auf hohem Niveau behandelt¹, aber offenbar noch nicht erschöpfend erforscht worden. Tatsächlich kann

der Verfasser der vorliegenden, 2005 in Düsseldorf verteidigten Dissertation auf der Grundlage z. T. bislang unbearbeiteten Quellenmaterials aus russischen und ukrainischen Archiven einige neue Facetten herausarbeiten. Die Untersuchung umfaßt den Zeitraum zwischen der Öffnung des nördlich des Schwarzen Meers gelegenen Gebiets für Kolonisten nach dem Russisch-Osmanischen Kriegs von 1768–1774 bis zum Jahr 1871, also bis zur Aufhebung der Kolonistenprivilegien. Gewählt wurde ein mikrohistorischer Zugang, in der vor allen Dingen das Beziehungsgeflecht zwischen den Kolonisten/den Kolonien einerseits und den staatlichen Ebenen vor Ort, anderen ethnischen Gruppen und Religionen andererseits untersucht wird. Als weiterer Parameter kommen die natürlichen Bedingungen in der neuen, oft unzugänglichen Heimat hinzu. Methodisch fühlt sich der Verfasser einer Geschichte ‚von unten‘ verpflichtet, konkret den unter dem Lemma „Lebensweltforschung“ firmierenden Ansätzen. Diese haben philosophische (Edmund Husserl) und soziologische (Alfred Schütz/Thomas Luckmann) Wurzeln, auf die sich Myeshkov auch beruft. Für ihn steht mithin im Mittelpunkt zu zeigen, welche Anstrengungen die Kolonisten unternahmen, um diejenigen vertrauten „Elemente zu bewahren, die ihnen zur Aufrechterhaltung ihrer Identität wichtig schienen“. Gleichzeitig bemühten sie sich, sich an die neue Umgebung anzupassen (S. 24). Lebenswelten sind nicht statisch, sondern im Gegenteil sehr dynamisch. Sie wandeln sich ständig, so Myeshkov, und kreieren „Wirklichkeiten“, welche zudem multipel sind: „Die Menschen leben in vielen Welten gleichzeitig: in einer Arbeitswelt, in der Welt der Familie, der religi-

ösen Gemeinschaft“. Folgerichtig werden sowohl die „innere Welt“ innerhalb der Gemeinschaft als auch die Außenwelt behandelt, also die vielfältigen Beziehungen und Berührungspunkte zum zumeist nichtdeutschen Umfeld außerhalb der Kolonien. Dabei ist zu bemerken, dass die zumeist als deutsche Kolonien bezeichneten Siedlungen keinesfalls immer ethnisch homogen waren, sondern beispielsweise auch von Menschen schwedischer oder Schweizer Herkunft bewohnt waren.

Aus Gründen der Operationalisierbarkeit werden neben mennonitischen Siedlungen im wesentlichen mit Kleinliebental und Alexanderhilf jeweils eine katholische als auch eine lutherische Kolonie untersucht. Myeshkov will nicht allein eine „abstrakte Geschichte der deutschen Kolonisation“ vorlegen, sondern diese durch eine „Geschichte der Kolonisten“ ergänzen. Ob allerdings damit tatsächlich die reklamierte „Rekonstruktion historischer Lebenswelten“ gelingen konnte (S. 25), steht auf einem anderen Blatt.

Die Arbeit gliedert sich in fünf Hauptkapitel: Im ersten Kapitel werden die ökonomischen Grundlagen beschrieben. Die Landwirtschaft, das Handwerk als auch die vielfältigen protoindustriellen Aktivitäten der Kolonisten werden vor dem Hintergrund der staatlichen Rahmenbedingungen aufgezeigt. Dabei werden im wesentlichen einige bereits bekannte Ergebnisse repetiert, z. B. dass sich slavische Neusiedler auf diesem Sektor als weniger anpassungsfähig und experimentierfreudig erwiesen als ihre deutschen Nachbarn, oder dass mennonitische Kolonien besonders prosperierten. Im zweiten Kapitel über die „demographische Entwicklung und Familiengeschichte“ werden auf der Basis

von Einwohnerlisten und Matrikelbüchern die Entwicklung von Geburts- und Sterberaten sowie die Besonderheiten der Familienentwicklung und der Eheschließungen nachgezeichnet. Eindringlich wird u. a. gezeigt, dass auch die Kolonistenehe in dieser Zeit vorrangig eine Versorgungsgemeinschaft war: Viele Verbindungen wurden nur deshalb geschlossen, um an das vom Staat offerierte Land zu kommen. Leider kann der Verfasser auf der Grundlage seiner Quellen keinerlei Aussagen über die emotionale Seiten dieser Beziehungen treffen. Wie auch in der deutschen Heimat waren voreheliche sexuelle Verbindungen, aus denen Kinder hervorgingen, auch in den Kolonien sehr verbreitet. Dies kann als ein Beleg für das hohe Maß an Toleranz seitens der Gemeindemitglieder wie auch der Kirchenführungen gewertet werden. Hinzu kam sicher auch, dass sich manche der in den ersten Jahrzehnten durch Krankheiten, Epidemien und Mißernten z. T. dramatisch dezimierten Kolonien bei einer restriktiven Sexualpolitik demographisch kaum erholen konnten. „Der Umsiedler in den neuen natürlichen Bedingungen“ ist der etwas sperrige Titel des dritten Kapitels. Die komplexen Anpassungsmodi der fremden Natur und die Möglichkeiten zur Umformung in Kultur werden hier nachgezeichnet, allerdings wird auf die so spannende Einordnung in kulturgeschichtliche Kontexte weitgehend verzichtet. Dennoch wird deutlich, dass die Kolonisten an vielen „natürlichen“ Fronten zu kämpfen hatten: Es ging um die Sicherung der Wasserversorgung, den Kampf gegen außergewöhnliche Naturereignisse, Heuschreckenplagen etc. Dass auch die, wie von russischer und ukrainischer Seite immer wieder und vor

allen Dingen seit dem Ende des 19. Jhs. beklagt wurde, ‚für sich‘ lebenden deutschen Kolonisten keinesfalls streng segregiert lebten, wird in den Kapiteln 4 („Die Kolonisten und ihre Nachbarn“) und 5 („Die Kolonisten und der Staat“) gezeigt. Die Faktoren Infrastruktur (Städte, Häfen, Entwicklung des Transportwesens) und Kommunikation werden dabei ausdrücklich berücksichtigt. Der Verfasser zeigt, dass der Austausch zwischen den einzelnen ethnischen und religiösen Gruppen in aller Regel wirtschaftlicher Natur war, zumal exogene Eheschließungen im Untersuchungszeitraum praktisch nicht vorkamen. Der Wunsch des russländischen Staates, dass ‚ihre Deutschen‘ bei der Anhebung des allgemeinen landwirtschaftlichen Niveau helfen sollten, äußerte sich u. a. in der Anwerbung deutscher „Musterwirte“. Deren Aufgabe war es u. a., Juden zu ‚produktivieren‘, d. h. in der Agrarwirtschaft anzulernen; dies war ein wenig erfolgreiches Projekt, zumal die angeworbenen Musterwirte zumeist von antijüdischen Ressentiments durchdrungen und allein von der Aussicht auf zusätzliche Landzuteilungen motiviert waren. Die ohne Zweifel auf vielen Ebenen vorhandenen (und geneideten) Sonderrechte deutscher und vor allen Dingen (zumindest vor den Großen Reformen) mennonitischer Kolonisten waren, wie Myeshkov zeigt, auch Ursache für Konflikte und Verwerfungen innerhalb der Kolonien: Die innergemeinschaftliche Freiheit wurde nämlich auch dafür genutzt, religiösem Separatismus und Sektierertum zu frönen. Ein besonders interessanter Aspekt ist das Verhältnis zwischen den muslimischen, vom russischen Staat als gefährlich und illoyal ausgemachten, Krimtataren und

Nogayern einerseits und deutschen Kolonisten andererseits. Myeshkov zeigt die Vielfältigkeit der Kontakte: Auf der Krim kam es beispielsweise zu Akkulturationen zwischen diesen Gruppen, aber auch zu ökonomisch motivierten Gewalttaten. Unstrittig ist, dass die Deutschen (zumindest innerhalb des Untersuchungszeitraums) von staatlicher Seite auch gegenüber diesen Gruppen bevorzugt behandelt wurden. Die durch die immer wieder auflebenden tatarischen Emigrationswellen ins Osmanische Reich (natürlich nicht in die zu diesem Zeitpunkt noch nicht existierende Türkei, wie es leider heißt) freiwerdenden Ländereien wurden häufig an Deutsche abgegeben. Wirtschaftlich war dies übrigens, wie Myeshkov nicht weiter verfolgt, zum Teil eine nicht sonderlich erfolgreiche Maßnahme, da die hochgelobten und flexiblen deutschen Bauern etwa mit der im Krim-Bergland üblichen und für sie ungewohnten Gartenwirtschaft große Probleme hatten.

Das vorliegende Werk basiert auf einem peniblen Quellenstudium, dessen Grundlage bereits während der langjährigen Arbeit des Verfassers als Mitarbeiter des Archivs von Dnipropetrovsk gelegt wurde. Es ist eine sorgfältige, detailgenaue Analyse dessen, was für den Autoren unter dem Begriff Lebenswelten firmiert und ohne Zweifel eine wichtige Ergänzung zu den bislang zum Thema vorliegenden Arbeiten. Über weite Strecken erscheint die Arbeit aber zu detailverliebt und zu deskriptiv. Sie läßt vor allen Dingen an manchen Stellen – Mikrogeschichte hin oder her – die Einordnung in die größeren Kontexte wie Migration, Spannungsfeldern zwischen Imperium und Nation oder Außenpolitik vermissen.

Anmerkungen:

- 1 Zu nennen sind u. a. folgende Arbeiten: D. Brandes, Von den Zaren adoptiert. Die deutschen Kolonisten und die Balkansiedler in Neu-rußland und Bessarabien 1751–1914 (=Schriften des Bundesinstituts für ostdeutsche Kultur und Geschichte, Bd. 2), München 1993; D. Neutatz, Die „deutsche Frage“ im Schwarzmeergebiet und in Wolhynien. Politik, Wirtschaft, Mentalität und Alltag im Spannungsfeld von Nationalismus und Modernisierung 1856–1914, Stuttgart 1993.

Antoni Graf Sobański: Nachrichten aus Berlin 1933–1936. Aus dem Poln. von Barbara Kulinska-Krautmann, Berlin: Parthas Verlag 2007, 250 S.

Rezensiert von
Klaus-Peter Friedrich, Marburg

Der Autor Antoni Sobański (1898–1941) zählte zu einer für das Polen der Zwischenkriegsjahre eher außergewöhnlichen Gruppe. Er war Angehöriger des kleinen Teils der liberal-demokratisch gesonnenen *inteligencja*; als solcher verspürte er keine Berührungsängste gegenüber Menschen, die der jüdischen Minderheit zugerechnet wurden. Witold Gombrowicz, ein anderer Unangepasster, würdigte ihn als einen „sehr kultiviert[en]“ Europäer und einen der „aufgeklärtesten polnischen Aristokraten“ (S. 218).

Wenige Wochen nach der Machtübernahme durch das NS-Regime schickte die angesehene Warschauer Zeitschrift „*Wiadomości Literackie*“ (Literarische

Nachrichten) ihren Mitarbeiter Sobański nach Berlin, um ihre Leser über die rasanten Fehlentwicklung in Deutschland auf dem Laufenden zu halten. Der in der Übersetzung mit „Nachrichten aus Berlin“ betitelte Band¹ gibt essayistische Beiträge wieder, für die der Verfasser auf drei Reisen im nationalsozialistischen Dritten Reich Eindrücke sammelte, die ihn im Frühjahr 1933 und im Sommer 1934 nach Berlin sowie 1936 während der einwöchigen Reichsparteitags-Ekstase nach Nürnberg und nach Bamberg führten.

Sobański war ein scharfer Beobachter, und seine Erlebnisberichte sind auch heute noch lesenswert. Den Deutschen an sich wohlgesonnen, stand er Hitlers Revolution von Anfang an mit großer Skepsis gegenüber. Über den Terror gegen politisch anders Denkende wusste er Bescheid, die Angst bei seinen oppositionell orientierten Gewährsleuten konnte er 1933 selbst spüren. In seiner Beschreibung der Bücherverbrennung deutet sich das kollektive Abgleiten in die Barbarei bereits an, wobei Sobański sich freilich bemüht, für die schweigende Mehrheit mildernde Umstände geltend zu machen (S. 40-47). Doch der persönliche Umgang mit Stützen der neuen Gesellschaft eröffnet dem Berichterstatter erschreckende Einblicke in die Psyche der jungen, radikalisierten Intelligenzler, die großen Eifer zeigten, für Hitler ihr Leben hinzugeben (S. 111). Ein andermal, im Theater, fühlt sich der Feingeist von der „unerhörten Verherrlichung von Brutalität, reaktionärer Gesinnung, nationaler Eitelkeit und rassischer Überlegenheit“ schlicht „überrollt“ (S. 87). Am Ende seines ersten Aufenthalts deutet Sobański an, dass er Hitlers aggressives, imperiales Programm ernst zu nehmen be-

ginnt: Er verspreche seinen Gefolgsleuten „einen riesigen Teil der Erde [...], der sich vom kolonisierten Sibirien bis Nancy und Genf und vom Nordpol bis hin zu Barbarossas Sizilien erstrecken soll.“ Die Zweifel angesichts einer fatalen Mischung aus idealistischer, rauschhafter Begeisterung, pausenloser Propaganda, auf brutaler Gewalt beruhender Einschüchterung und aus mangelndem Bürgermut, die Werte der Zivilisation zu verteidigen, verdichten sich zu Vorahnungen des Grauens: „Ein übermächtiger Staat [...] schwimmt auf dem Blut der eigenen Söhne und dem seiner Feinde [...]“ (S. 129).

Als er im Sommer 1934 zurückkehrt, registriert Sobański wiederholt die solide Verankerung des Regimes in der breiten Zustimmung der Bevölkerung (139, 152). Zugleich befürchtet er, „dass alle diese jungen, fleißigen Menschen ihre Blicke auf das flüchtige Bild einer Fata Morgana richten“ (S. 143). Als besonders abstoßend empfindet Sobański die antijüdische Mythomanie der Nazis (S. 66-84). Nachdem er 1936 erlebt hatte, wie Julius Streicher, der Gauleiter von Franken und „Stürmer“-Herausgeber, unter dem Beifall seiner Anhänger dazu aufforderte, „die Judenfrage [...] auf blutigem Wege“ zu lösen, steigerte sich diese Abneigung zu körperlich empfundenem Ekel (S. 187-191). Vielmals beobachtet er, wie sehr nationalsozialistische Pathologien das alltägliche Leben der Menschen längst totalitär überformt haben – angefangen bei der Allgegenwart des sog. deutschen Grußes bis hin zur Selbstaufgabe des Einzelindividuums und dessen devoter Einordnung unter das nationale Kollektiv.

1939 vermochte Sobański, sich den Folgen seiner entlarvenden Berichterstattung aus

Hitler-Deutschland zu entziehen, indem er zu Beginn des Zweiten Weltkriegs aus Polen floh. Bei dem Versuch, in die USA zu gelangen, kam er bis nach London. Dort konnte er eine Zeitlang das polnische Exilmilieu intellektuell bereichern, und er war für das Informationsministerium der Regierung Sikorski und für die BBC tätig, ehe er einer Lungenkrankheit erlag. Die Edition der Sobańskichs „Reportagen“ weist eine Reihe von Mängeln auf. Zunächst fehlt durchgängig der genaue Nachweis, wann welche (der insgesamt 13) Teile erschienen sind. Der Text ist durch 160 Endnoten kommentiert – von wem, wird nicht offenbart (die biografischen Informationen über den Verfasser stammen vom Herausgeber der polnischen Buchausgabe, Tomasz Szarota [S. 217-225]). Das, was kommentiert wird, erscheint oft willkürlich. Weithin bekannte Personen wie Wilhelm II., Stefan George, Trotzki oder Rosenberg werden erläutert, weniger geläufige Namen bleiben unkommentiert. Bei Karl Liebknecht wird versäumt richtig zu stellen, dass die Nazis ihn fälschlicherweise als Juden bezeichneten, bei Gottfried von Cramm hingegen, dass Sobański irrt, wenn er ihm eine „nichtarische“ Herkunft zuschreibt (S. 76). Im Text ist von Scheidemanns Tochter die Rede (S. 65), die Erläuterung erschöpft sich jedoch in einem Biogramm des SPD-Politikers. Gerne hätte man etwas mehr über das 1933 in Berlin gespielte „Stück aus dem Elsass“ erfahren, oder auch über den „internationalen Tanzwettbewerb in Warschau“ (S. 85) – immerhin errang 1933 den ersten Preis für Solotänzerinnen die aus Halle an der Saale gebürtige Ruth Sorel.² Unklar bleibt, auf wen die Anspielung zielt, es seien in Polen Personen jüdischer Abstammung, die An-

tisemitismus propagierten; und undeutlich bleibt hier ebenso, auf welche Weise sich Magda Goebbels in einem „Amt für nationale Mode“ verdient machte (S. 93). Auf S. 103 ist statt von Ostpreußen fälschlich von Westpreußen die Rede. „Der Raum Posen“ und Danzig gehörten angeblich zu den in der Zeit der Weimarer Republik als „Ostmark“ bezeichneten „damals östlichsten Regionen des Deutschen Reiches“ (S. 233, Anm. 63), doch waren diese Provinzen nicht Teil von dessen Staatsgebiet. Problematisch erscheinen zudem jene Zitatstellen, die offenbar aus „Wiadomości Literackie“ ins Deutsche rückübersetzt wurden.

Trotz solcher editorischen Mängel und Unstimmigkeiten sollte Sobańskichs Beobachtungen hiezulande wenigstens nachträglich die ihnen gebührende Aufmerksamkeit zuteil werden. Er eröffnet an zahlreichen Beispielen erhellende Einblicke in Entwicklungen während der Frühphase des NS-Regimes und zeigt immer wieder jene Mechanismen auf, die unter dem Nationalsozialismus in der deutschen Gesellschaft wirksam wurden und diese tiefgreifend veränderten.

Anmerkungen

- 1 Eine polnische Neuausgabe erschien 2006 im Warschauer Verlag Sic! Unter dem Titel „Cywil w Berlinie“ [Ein Zivilist in Berlin].
- 2 Siehe K.-P. Friedrich: Ein bewegtes Leben. Vor einhundert Jahren wurde Ruth Sorel geboren, in: Tribüne 46 (2007) 182, S. 78-84.

Christoph Boyer (Hrsg.): Sozialistische Wirtschaftsreformen.

Tschechoslowakei und DDR im

Vergleich, Frankfurt am Main:

Vittorio Klostermann 2006, 627 S.

Christoph Boyer (Hrsg.): Zur Physiognomie sozialistischer Wirtschafts-

reformen. Die Sowjetunion, Polen,

Ungarn, die DDR und Jugoslawien

im Vergleich, Frankfurt am Main:

Vittorio Klostermann 2007, 324 S.

Rezensiert von

Jörg Roesler, Berlin

Mit den beiden Bänden stellte sich der Herausgeber einer doppelten Herausforderung: Er widmete sich erstens den sozialistischen Wirtschaftsreformen, obwohl das doch aus Sicht mancher Wirtschaftshistoriker eigentlich kein Thema mehr ist: Als echte Reformen gelten nach heutigem Verständnis nur solche, die von der Planwirtschaft zur Marktwirtschaft führten. Alle anderen Entwicklungen waren nur Manöver, um entweder anhand von Planspielen eine neue Generation von Kadern zu qualifizieren oder um der unzufriedenen Bevölkerung Veränderungswillen vorzutäuschen, während es beim traditionellen „Wirtschaftsstalinismus“ blieb. Für Boyer dagegen ist eine sozialistische Wirtschaftsreform „jede weitreichende, vom klassischen System wegführende Veränderung am ökonomischen Mechanismus“. Erst wenn die Steuerung der Reform durch die Partei außer Kontrolle gerät, be-

steht die Möglichkeit des Übergangs von der sozialistischen Reform in eine Transformation von der sozialistischen Plan- zur kapitalistischen Marktwirtschaft. Das muss nach Boyer aber nicht zwangsläufig so sein, denn „staatssozialistische Systeme sind nicht starre, zu jeder Entwicklung unfähige Reiche des Bösen. Sie besitzen die Fähigkeit, inhärente Problemlagen zu bearbeiten und sich ... durch Umbauten zu stabilisieren“.

Boyers erfreulich exakte Definitionen – auch eine des „vorreformatorischen Staatssozialismus“ gehört dazu – sowie seine realitätsnahen Einschätzungen bilden die Voraussetzung für die Bewältigung der zweiten Herausforderung, der sich der Herausgeber gestellt hat: der des Vergleichs der sozialistischen Wirtschaftsreformen in verschiedenen mittel- und osteuropäischen Ländern.

Begonnen hat Boyer im ersten Band, den „Sozialistische Wirtschaftsreformen“, mit den vom Standpunkt des „tertium comparationis“, d. h. gemessen an der Anzahl der Gemeinsamkeiten, wohl ähnlichsten sozialistischen Ländern, der Tschechoslowakei und der DDR, beides alte Industrieländer mit entwickelter Arbeiterklasse. Im zweiten, „Physiognomie sozialistischer Wirtschaftsreformen“ betitelten Band werden als nächstes Paar Polen und Ungarn in den Wirtschaftsreformvergleich mit einbezogen. Beide sind sich ähnlich als Agrarländer, die eine Entwicklung zum Industrieland erst im Staatssozialismus vollzogen. Allen vier gemeinsam sind nach Boyer „im Prinzip westliche Rechtstraditionen und Mentalitäten“. Die politische Kultur unterscheiden diese Länder „fundamental von der autokratischen und despotischen Tradition des orthodoxen und osma-

nischen Europa.“ Warum dann doch im zweiten Band auch die Sowjetunion und Jugoslawien einbezogen werden, ist nicht wirklich nachvollziehbar, so willkommen natürlich dem interessierten Leser auch Informationen über die selten analysierten sowjetischen und jugoslawischen Wirtschaftsreformen sein werden.

Bei den untersuchten Ländern werden systemische Gemeinsamkeiten und „kontingente Unterschiede“, die sich aus der nationalgeschichtlichen Entwicklung ergeben, festgestellt. Den Einfluss eines sowjetischen Diktats hält Boyer für gegeben, doch nicht für prägend, ebenso wie die Wirkungen zwischenstaatlicher Beziehungen, etwa durch die Partnerschaft der behandelten Länder im „Rat für gegenseitige Wirtschaftshilfe“. Man habe es vor allem mit „Parallelevolutionen“ zu tun.

Was von Boyer in seinem höchst lesenswerten Essay im ersten Band niedergelegt wurde und im zweiten wiederholt und erweitert wird, ist als Richtschnur für die von Spezialisten angefertigten Einzelbeiträge gedacht. Bei den Darstellungen zum Thema Wirtschaftsreform handelt es sich entweder um zusammenfassende Ländergeschichten oder um problemorientierte „Vertiefungen“. Im ersten Band sind es 13, im zweiten Band 14 Beiträge. Die Autoren kommen in der Regel aus den jeweils behandelten Ländern. Sie haben sich – wie nicht anders zu erwarten – in unterschiedlichem Maße an die Vorgaben des Herausgebers gehalten. Wenn einerseits Drahomir Jancik und Eduard Kudu in ihrem Beitrag über die ökonomischen Reformen der 50er Jahre in der Tschechoslowakei z. B. konstatieren, dass für diese Zeit von Reformen eigentlich nicht gesprochen werden kann, dann haben sie

Boyers Vorgabe im Kopf, der definiert hat: „Reformen sind nicht Maßnahmen lediglich mit dem Ziel der Perfektionierung der Befehlswirtschaft: etwa durch Umbauten des Planungsapparats, Verschärfung der Plandisziplin, Rationalisierung von Planungsprozesse durch Computerisierung u. ä.“ Wenn andererseits André Steiner in seinen beiden Beiträgen zum Neuen Ökonomischen System das damalige Reformpotential an den Grundzügen einer kapitalistischen Marktwirtschaft misst und bedauert, dass die 16,5 % der Arbeiter und Angestellten der Industrie, die in privaten bzw. halbprivaten Betrieben beschäftigt waren, für die Reform keine Vorbildfunktion hatten, dann ignoriert er Boyers Definition der Ziele einer sozialistischen Wirtschaftsreform, die man eben nicht an Lehrsätzen kapitalistischer Marktwirtschaft messen kann. In den „vertiefenden“ Beiträgen werden Themen wie Außenwirtschaft, Gewerkschaften und Arbeiterräte, Entwicklung der sozialen Sicherheit sowie Konsumstrategie und Kaderpolitik behandelt.

Das hohe Niveau der Essays weckt beim Leser Wünsche. Anders als bei einigen Einzeldarstellungen, ist in Boyers Essay die herrschende sozialistische Dienstklasse stets homogen – d. h. sie macht Reformen oder entschließt sich, sie zurückzunehmen. Tatsächlich hat es aber Reformbefürworter und Reformgegner in den höchsten Partei- und Staatsgremien aller Länder gegeben, und sie haben miteinander um die Fortführung bzw. die Rücknahme der Reformgerungen, wobei beide Seiten bestrebt waren, Reformskeptiker, die sich noch nicht eindeutig entschieden hatten, auf ihre Seite zu ziehen.

Auch wird von Boyer festgestellt, dass die Reformen im Staatssozialismus immer wieder zur Rücknahme tendierten. „Reformarrangements sind permanent der Versuchung einer tendenziellen Rückwendung zum klassischen Regulierungsmechanismus ausgesetzt.“ Boyer benennt als Sicherheitsmechanismus, der das Verlassen des eingeschlagenen staatssozialistischen Entwicklungspfades verhindert, die Aufrechterhaltung des „Primats der Politik“, der politischen Herrschaft durch die Partei. Unklar bleibt, wie dann während der dritten Reformwelle, die in den 80er Jahren einsetzte, zumindest in Polen, Ungarn und der Sowjetunion unter Gorbatschow aus der Reform eine Transformation werden konnte.

In gewissem Widerspruch zu diesen Ausführungen Boyers steht seine Auffassung, dass alle sich reformierenden staatssozialistischen Länder „nicht zwangsläufig, aber mit hoher Plausibilität auf den – vergleichsweise abrupten – Zusammenbruch und die Systemtransformation“ zusteuern.“ Das hat so sicher für die planwirtschaftlich organisierten Länder Mittel- und Osteuropas gestimmt. Ein derartiges „Ende der Geschichte des Staatssozialismus“ ist allerdings im Falle von Kuba, Vietnam und China, alles Länder, die auch die „dritte Reformwelle erfolgreich“ – gemessen an Boyers wichtigstem Kriterium für Staatssozialismus, dem „Primat der Politik“ – bewältigt haben, bisher nicht eingetreten.

Bei den angeführten Fragestellungen handelt es sich eigentlich weniger um Kritiken als um Wünsche um die Weiterführung der Thematik über die Reformen der 60er Jahren hinaus bis an die Gegenwart heran. Ein besseres Zeugnis kann wissenschaft-

lichen Arbeiten zu einer Thematik, deren Analyse seit 1990 wieder in den Anfängen steckt, wohl kaum ausgestellt werden.

Holm Sundhaussen: Geschichte Serbiens. 19.–21. Jahrhundert, Wien: Böhlau Verlag 2007, 514 S.

Rezensiert von
Rayk Einax, Jena

Zweifellos hat Serbien in seiner gegenwärtigen Transformationsphase, die sich den postjugoslawischen Sezessionsgräueln und dem Regime Slobodan Miloševićs angeschlossen, eine verstärkte publizistische und (politik-)wissenschaftliche Aufmerksamkeit auf sich gezogen. Dem hat sich die historische Zunft angeschlossen. Holm Sundhaussen legt nunmehr mit einer „Geschichte Serbiens“ nicht nur die Essenz seiner jahrelangen Forschungstätigkeit sondern auch ein Novum vor, denn in deutscher Sprache war etwas historiographisch Vergleichbares bislang nicht auszumachen.

Der umfangreiche Band versucht ausgehend von einem chronologischen Korsett, aktuelle sozial- und kulturhistorische Fragestellungen z. T. exkursiv miteinander zu verbinden. Dazu gehört z. B. die Beschäftigung mit dem Konstrukt der „kollektiven Erinnerung“ oder modernen Zeitvorstellungen. Hierzu ist es immer wieder notwendig, die zahlreichen gesellschaftlichen (Opfer-)Mythen oder scheinbar festste-

hende historische Begriffe zu hinterfragen und genauer unter die Lupe zu nehmen. Angesichts der Inkongruenz des serbischen Staates in seiner geschichtlichen Entwicklung mit der serbischen (mental)en Nation zielt Sundhaussen nicht auf die exklusive Abfassung einer serbischen Nationalhistorie oder einer politischen Geschichte des Landes ab, sondern bemüht sich um eine „transterritoriale“ und „transnationale“ (S. 17) Darstellungsweise.

Ein einleitendes Kapitel klärt die Voraussetzungen für die Entstehung eines Staates sowie einer serbischen Nation zum Zeitpunkt der Erlangung der Autonomie vom Osmanischen Reich zu Beginn des 19. Jhs. Einen wichtigen imaginären Anknüpfungspunkt stellte der mittelalterliche serbische „Staat“ dar. Hierbei und beim Diskurs über andere „Erinnerungsorte“, wie z. B. das Kosovo polje oder die türkische „Fremdherrschaft“, spielte die serbisch-orthodoxe Kirche eine exponierte Rolle.

Die sich den Aufständen gegen die osmanische Herrschaft im Pašaluk Belgrad anschließende Formierung eines Staatswesens war mit vielfältigen Schwierigkeiten verbunden. „Überall stellte die Überwindung der segmentären Gesellschaft die Vorbedingung für die Konsolidierung des „modernen“ Staates dar.“ (S. 71) Neben den innenpolitischen Richtungskämpfen ist auch die Abfassung erster Nationskonzepte, z. B. durch Vuk S. Karadžić, aus heutiger Perspektive recht widersprüchlich. Bei der Kategorisierung, die sich zusätzlich auf Volkslieder und die Volksmythologie stützte, würden die Sprache und Religion der Bewohner zu Hauptkriterien. Später daraus abgeleitete Begehrlichkeiten hinsichtlich der angrenzenden Gebiete sorgte für stetigen außenpolitischen Zünd-

stoff, nicht nur bei den Großmächten, welche versuchten, die diversen Nationalbewegungen auf dem Balkan in unterschiedlicher Weise für ihre Interessen einzuspannen. Die internationalen Krisen im Vorfeld des Ersten Weltkrieges sind somit auch durch die vorangegangene serbische Expansionspolitik zustande gekommen.

In einem umfangreichen Abschnitt schildert der Autor die serbische Gesellschaft dieser Epoche als gespalten, und zwar „zwischen Beharrung und Aufbruch“. Aufgrund der Synthese eigener Forschungsarbeiten und Veröffentlichungen, aber auch durch die Hinzuziehung neuer psychologischer Ansätze, werden die patriarchalischen Familienstrukturen, der Urbanisierungsprozess, sozialer Wandel, das Bildungswesen, die Verhältnisse auf dem Dorf und die einsetzende Industrialisierung analysiert.

Der Erste Weltkrieg hatte im Ergebnis auch für Serbien gravierende Auswirkungen. Seine Das erste jugoslawische Staatsgebilde war durch die konfliktreiche Entstehungsgeschichte belastet. Das Konzept des „Jugoslawismus“ mündete nicht nur angesichts der national determinierten Frontstellungen in der Integrationskrise, sondern z. B. auch durch die immensen wirtschaftlichen Disparitäten.

Daran anschließend werden die deutsch-italienische Besatzungsherrschaft während des Zweiten Weltkrieges und die gegengerichteten Widerstandsbewegungen untersucht. Sundhaussen thematisiert dabei erneut seine Erkenntnisse zum Mythos der Kriegsofferzahlen. Nach dem Sieg der Tito-Partisanen fand sich Serbien als (staatstragender) Teil der Föderativen Volksrepublik Jugoslawien wieder. Im Gegensatz zur Zwischenkriegszeit war im

neuen Bundesstaat der Föderalismus ins Extrem verkehrt worden. Komplementär wurde, zumindest in der Anfangszeit, die jugoslawische Nationalität und Identität aller Bewohner propagiert. Das Verhältnis der Ethnien blieb aber nach wie vor problematisch. Weitere Grundpfeiler der propagandistischen Selbstlegitimation bildeten der Mythos vom „Volksbefreiungskrieg“, der extreme Kult um Titos Person und der außenpolitische Sonderweg nach 1948. Weit wichtiger in der Akzeptanz seiner (serbischen) Staatsbürger waren allerdings der relativ hohe Lebensstandard, die allgemeine Partizipation am Fortschritt, sowie die spürbare Urbanisierung und Industrialisierung. Die Modernisierung vieler allträglicher Lebensbereiche lief dennoch nicht reibungslos ab: die von Nord nach Süd verlaufenden Verteilungskämpfe blieben nicht nur bestehen, sondern sie verstärkten und „nationalisierten“ sich in der Folge weiterhin. Auch der zunächst elitär geführte serbisch-kroatische Sprachstreit führte zu offenen und latenten Spannungen.

Mit dem Ende der Tito-Ära waren viele staatspolitischen Determinanten plötzlich grundlegend in Frage gestellt. Besonders der Zweite Weltkrieg war nun einer rasanten Umwertung unterworfen. Die rote Partisanenbewegung bekam nun serbischerseits unliebsame Konkurrenz durch die zuvor tabuisierte Erinnerung an den monarchistischen Widerstand des Draža Mihajlović. In fast allen Republiken zogen die einsetzenden nationalen Diskurse eine regelrechte Flut an neuen Veröffentlichungen nach sich. „Die jugoslawische Identität, die von den Politikern schon seit den 60er Jahren zur Disposition gestellt worden war, wurde nun unter dem Druck

der politischen Polarisierung auch bei der Mehrheit der Bevölkerung durch eine ethnische nationale Identität verdrängt und ersetzt.“ (S. 415) In Serbien selbst beteiligten sich nicht nur Historiker und Wissenschaftler an diesem Abgrenzungswettbewerb, auch die orthodoxe Kirche mischte fleißig mit an der Neujustierung nationaler Narrative, z. B. im Bezug auf das Kosovo. So gelang es nicht zuletzt Milošević, den jugoslawischen Zerfallsprozess zu beschleunigen und die „Selbsterstörung Serbiens“ einzuleiten. Sundhaussen diskutiert ausführlich und anregend die vielfältigen Gründe für diese rasante Fragmentierung, die schließlich in den postjugoslawischen Kriegen und den „ethnischen Säuberungen“, besonders in Bosnien-Herzegowina und Kosovo mündeten, und scheut sich darüber hinaus nicht, Schuldfragen zu bemessen. In einem Ausblick werden die Jahre nach der Ära Milošević (ab 2000) und neue politische und geistige Strömungen im heutigen Serbien skizziert.

Für die Anfertigung seiner Monographie hat der Autor die aktuelle historiographische Literatur aus Serbien berücksichtigt. Ältere Veröffentlichungen werden teilweise unter neuen Fragestellungen ausgewertet. Dies liegt nicht zuletzt in der Quellenarmut für den Balkan des 19. Jhs. begründet, die sich auch in diesem Buch bemerkbar macht. Die Vergleichsperspektive zu anderen Balkanstaaten bietet sich aber nicht nur unter diesem Aspekt an, sondern hilft dem Leser auch, Serbien im 19. Jh. aufgrund soliderer Maßstäbe zu bewerten. Gleichzeitig kommt die politische Ideengeschichte nicht zu kurz.

Einzelne Kapitel wirken sehr eingeeengt und fielen wohl dem Zwang zur publizistischen Mäßigung zum Opfer. Bedauerli-

cherweise sind mehrere Unstimmigkeiten bei einzelnen Fußnoten oder in der Tabelle auf Seite 491 der Endredaktion nicht aufgefallen. Ein großes Plus stellen die kurz eingefügten Porträts der historischen Persönlichkeiten dar, die den Leser knapp über die maßgeblichen Akteure der jeweiligen Epoche informieren. Zahlreiche Illustrationen helfen dem Vorstellungsvermögen ebenso wie die Tabellen und Karten im Anhang auf die Sprünge. An diesem Buch wird sich die historische Forschung zu Serbien in den nächsten Jahren messen lassen müssen.

Elizabeth Janik: *Recomposing German music. Politics and musical tradition in Cold War Berlin Studies in Central European histories*, vol. 40), Leiden: Brill Academic Publishers 2005, 356 S.

Rezensiert von
Dorothea Trebesius, Leipzig

Was ist Musik? Ist sie ein klingendes Kunstwerk ohne jegliche außermusikalische Bedeutung oder ist sie mehr als das, vielleicht sogar Mittel politischer und gesellschaftlicher Deutungskämpfe? Die Antwort Elizabeth Janiks fällt eindeutig zugunsten der letzteren aus, wie schon der Titel ihres Buches erahnen lässt. Unter der Überschrift „*Recomposing German music. Politics and musical tradition in Cold War Berlin*“ fragt die Autorin anhand der Ge-

schichte der Musik in Berlin nach 1945, wie die Besatzungsmächte und die entstehenden deutschen Teilstaaten unterschiedliche Vorstellungen von Musik und ihrer gesellschaftliche Funktion dazu nutzten, um sich gegenüber dem politischen Gegner, bzw. dem jeweils „anderen“ Deutschland abzugrenzen. Mit dieser Fragestellung reiht sich Janik erfolgreich in die Versuche von (vor allem amerikanischen) Studien ein, Musik weniger unter musikhistorischen Gesichtspunkten zu betrachten, sondern anhand der Musikgeschichte Aussagen über die kulturhistorische und politische Entwicklung in Deutschland treffen zu wollen. Obwohl der Titel anderes vermuten lässt, behandelt Janik das gesamte 20. Jh., und parallel dazu man kann ihr Buch in drei Blöcke teilen. In einem ersten Teil widmet sie sich der Erfindung und Entwicklung der „musikalischen Tradition“ bis nach dem Nationalsozialismus, um dann im zweiten Teil nach der zunehmenden Abgrenzung der entstehenden deutschen Staaten zu fragen und in einem dritten Teil die gleichzeitige Entwicklung der beiden Traditionen bis zum Ende der 1990er Jahre nachzuzeichnen.

An den Anfang ihres Buches stellt Janik die These von einer besonderen Beziehung Deutschlands zur Musik, die auch die Wahl der Musik als Gegenstand ihres Buches rechtfertigt. Musik sei, so Janik, „the most abstract, but also ‘most German’ of all the arts“ (S. X). Diese besondere Beziehung entstand laut Janik mit der Erfindung einer „musical tradition“ im 19. Jh., die bis in die zweite Hälfte des 20. Jhs. bestimmend blieb und an die nach 1945 sowohl die Besatzungsmächte als auch die deutschen Akteure des Musiklebens anknüpften. Janik fragt, wie die jeweiligen

Akteure das Konzept der musikalischen Tradition nutzten, um im Zuge der Teilung Deutschlands, die auch verschiedene Vorstellungen des Verhältnisses von Musik und Politik bedeutete, die jeweilige Konzeption zu legitimieren, bzw. zu delegitimieren und damit zugleich den politischen Gegner insgesamt abzuwerten. Zur Beantwortung dieser Frage konzentriert sich Janik auf die Geschichte der Komponisten sowie der musikalischen Institutionen, Praktiken und Vorstellungen über „E-Musik“ in Berlin als Brennpunkt für die gesamtdeutsche Entwicklung und will die *“evolving strategies of Berlins and their Allied occupiers in their quest to recompose and rehabilitate elite German musical tradition between 1945 and 1951”* (S. X) nachzeichnen.

Bevor sie diese Frage beantwortet, geht Janik allerdings in das 19. Jh., denn hier setzt sie die „Erfindung“ der musikalischen Tradition im Zuge der zunehmenden Nationalisierung der Kultur und Gesellschaft an. So scheint es folgerichtig, dass Janik eben dieser Erfindung ein erstes Kapitel widmet. Dabei stellt sie vier Entwicklungen heraus, die eine entscheidende Rolle im 19. Jh. spielten: die Rolle des Bildungsbürgertums, eine ambivalente Beziehung zum Staat im Bereich der Kunst, der Glaube daran, dass Musik eine „heilige“ und „deutsche“ künstlerische Ausdrucksform sei und nicht zuletzt der Glaube an einen musikalischen und historischen Fortschritt.

In den Jahren der Weimarer Republik erfuhr die musikalische Tradition des 19. Jhs. eine tiefe Krise und wurde von Komponisten, Musikkritikern und Musikwissenschaftlern zunehmend in Frage gestellt, wobei der Streitpunkt in der Frage nach

der Art des musikalischen Fortschritts und der musikalischen Entwicklung bestand. Drei Antworten kristallisierten sich heraus: die Konzeption musikalischen Fortschritts als „new sound“ (die Entwicklung der musikalischen Ästhetik), als „new idea“ (die Suche nach einer Balance zwischen ästhetischen und sozialen Fortschrittsgedanken) und als „a new social base“ (die Suche nach einer neuen sozialen Trägerschaft der Musik). Anhand von Künstlerbiographien erläutert Janik die Entstehung und Verbreitung dieser Ideen und später deren zu großen Teilen unkomplizierte Integration in nationalsozialistische Strukturen.

Nach 1945 stellte sich dann nicht nur für die Alliierten sondern auch für die deutschen Akteure des Musiklebens die Frage nach dem kulturellen Wiederaufbau. In der folgenden Reorganisation mischten sich die Ideen des 19. Jhs. mit Konzeptionen aus der Zeit der Weimarer Republik. Hinzu traten die Zielsetzungen der Alliierten, die ihre verschiedenen Vorstellungen und musikalischen Traditionen im besetzten Berlin durchsetzen wollten. In den Kapiteln vier bis sechs zeigt Janik, wie diese Vorstellungen aufeinander prallten, wie sie (kultur)politisch instrumentalisiert wurden und schließlich in die „Erfindung“ zweier unterschiedlicher musikalischer Traditionen mündeten, die sich bis 1951 stabilisierten.

In ihrem vierten Kapitel geht Janik vor allem den Strategien der Besatzer nach, zeichnet deren Zielsetzungen und Traditionen im kulturellen Bereich, zu welchen Ergebnissen sie führten und welche Besatzungsmacht letztlich ihre Version der musikalischen Tradition etablierte. Sie konzentriert sich auf die Aktivitäten der USA und der SU, um zu dem Ergebnis zu

gelingen, dass vor allem die sowjetische Musikpolitik erfolgreich schien. Die Kulturoffiziere der SMAD waren mit reichen finanziellen Mitteln ausgestattet, verfügten über einen großen Freiraum und hatten ähnliche Vorstellungen über Musik, die in weiten Teilen den deutschen Vorstellungen vor allem des 19. Jhs. entsprachen und an die sie erfolgreich anknüpften. Im Gegensatz dazu vertraten die amerikanischen Offiziere eine andere Vorstellung von Musik und deren Organisation, die sich in der Folgezeit nicht durchsetzte. Sie mussten im Gegenzug beweisen, dass „amerikanische“ Musik mit der „deutschen“ konkurrieren konnte und ließen sich damit an „deutschen“ Standards der Musiktradition messen. In den folgenden „Golden Hunger Years“ 1946/1947 (Kapitel fünf) etablierte sich in Berlin ein reges kulturelles Leben und es wurde breit über die Verbindung von Kunst und Politik debattiert (auch aufgrund der Entnazifizierung prominenter Musiker wie Furtwängler), allerdings verschärfte sich die Spannung zwischen den Besatzungsmächten, die schließlich die Musiker zwang, sich in der Folgezeit für eine Zone und damit auch für eine bestimmte musikalische Tradition zu entscheiden.

Jede der Besatzungsmächte hatte seit 1945 ihre Vorstellung von Musik propagiert und versuchte zunehmend, die jeweils andere Tradition zu delegitimieren (Kapitel sechs). Strittig war neben der Frage der Entnazifizierung auch die Frage, ob Kunst und Kultur von Natur aus unpolitisch waren (so die USA) oder nicht (so die SU). Allerdings führte die gegenseitige Beobachtung der Alliierten und die besondere Rolle Berlins dazu, dass sich die Strategien der Autoritäten gegenseitig anglichen: die

USA führten die Entnazifizierung weit weniger streng durch als ursprünglich geplant und die sowjetischen Besatzer ließen Musik spielen, die in der SU als „formalistisch“ verboten worden wäre. In Veranstaltungen wie den regelmäßig stattfindenden Kulturbundkonzerten knüpften die Akteure, unter Betonung des absoluten Charakters der Musik, an die Tradition der „new sounds“ der Weimarer Republik an. Das war nicht zuletzt auch für die deutschen Musiker ein Mittel der „Entschuldigung“ ihrer eigenen Aktivitäten während des Nationalsozialismus. Indem sie Musik als „unpolitisch“ darstellten und diese Deutung auch durchsetzten, mussten sie für ihre musikalischen Aktivitäten nicht zur Rechenschaft gezogen werden.

Mit dem sich zuspitzenden Kalten Krieg schien auch ein gesamtdeutsches Kulturleben zunehmend weniger möglich und in der Folgezeit gründete sich nicht nur eine Reihe von unterschiedlichen musikalischen Institutionen in beiden Teilen der Stadt (Hochschule für Musik, Berufsorganisationen), auch die Vorstellung des musikalischen Fortschritts in beiden Zonen wurde zunehmend exklusiver. In der sowjetischen Besatzungszone spielten die Remigranten, die an die Tradition der „new social base“ der Weimarer Republik anknüpften, eine tragende Rolle für die spezifische Interpretation musikalischen Fortschritts. Im Westen dagegen verlor die Musik zunehmend ihre Anbindung an einen sozialen Inhalt, wurde als apolitisch dargestellt und musikalischer Fortschritt schien nur in ästhetischer Hinsicht möglich.

Bis 1951 hatten sich die zwei „musikalischen Traditionen“ in Berlin verfestigt und wurden nun von beiden Staaten zur

gegenseitigen Abgrenzung instrumentalisiert (Kapitel sieben). Für das östliche Berlin und die DDR beschreibt Janik die „Sowjetisierung“ des Musiklebens und die Verabsolutierung des „Sozialistischen Realismus“ als Schaffungsmethode, die schließlich auch zu einer gewissen Traditionalisierung des Musiklebens führte. Im Westen verbot der Senat in den Jahren 1950/51 den Kontakt zu Musik und Musikern aus dem Osten und mit der Institutionalisierung der Avantgardemusik bei den Festivals in Darmstadt und Donaueschingen integrierte sich die Bundesrepublik in die „westliche“ Musikgemeinschaft.

Obwohl sie ihre Unterschiedlichkeiten immer wieder betonten, hatten doch beide Staaten einen wesentlichen Teil ihres Verständnisses aus dem 19. Jh. übernommen (Kapitel 8) und ähnelten sich damit in gewisser Hinsicht. In der DDR knüpfte die Musikpolitik implizit an das bildungsbürgerliche Konzept der Bedeutung von Musik für die „Bildung“ des Menschen an und die BRD wiederum betonte das Ideal der absoluten Musik. Beiden gemeinsam war die Wertschätzung der Hochkultur, die auf einem engen Kulturverständnis basierte. Dieses Verständnis wurde zunehmend im Osten wie im Westen in Frage gestellt und alternative Vorstellungen von Kultur wie die amerikanische Populärkultur (Jazz, die Songwriter-Bewegung) integriert (Kapitel 9). Die letzten Jahrzehnte des 20. Jhs. brachten ein Aufbrechen und Neuerfinden der musikalischen Tradition, die sich am ehesten mit dem verbinden lassen, was lange als amerikanische Musiktradition beschrieben wurde. Somit stellt sich letztlich die Frage, die Janik allerdings nur anreißt, ob nicht bei der Neuerfindung der musikalischen Tradition in Deutschland

eine Amerikanisierung stattgefunden hat. Spätestens hier hätte man sich, wie auch an einigen anderen Stellen, einen vergleichenden Ausblick auf andere europäische Staaten gewünscht. Trotzdem überzeugt die Arbeit nicht zuletzt durch ihre gute Lesbarkeit und stringente Argumentation. Sie zeigt darüber hinaus, dass Musik als Untersuchungsfeld nicht nur für Musikwissenschaftler fruchtbar gemacht werden kann. Als zentraler Teil des Selbstverständnisses von Kulturen und Gesellschaften ist sie Mittel und Kristallisationspunkt von Deutungskämpfen, Wahrnehmungen und Selbstdarstellungen und damit auch für die Kultur- und Politikgeschichte interessant. Dies hat Elizabeth Janik für Deutschland äußerst plausibel nachgezeichnet.

Gert Gröning / Joachim Wolschke-Bulmahn (Hrsg.): Naturschutz und Demokratie!? (= CGL-Studies, Bd. 3), München: Martin Meidenbauer 2006, 320 S.

Rezensiert von
Björn Brüsch, Berlin

Die Erforschung der vielfältigen Bemühungen um den Schutz der Natur in unterschiedlichen politischen Systemen gehört seit geraumer Zeit zu einer Thematik, die sich einer wachsenden Popularität erfreut. Dass sich der hier besprochene Dokumentationsband diesem Gegenstand multiperspektivisch und interdisziplinär unter dem

Begriffspaar „Naturschutz und Demokratie!“ annimmt, ist aus der Perspektive der bisherigen, insbesondere die Zeit des Nationalsozialismus betreffenden Forschungsergebnisse bemerkenswert. Der Band stellt die Beiträge einer Veranstaltung in der Vorburg von Schloss Drachenburg vor, die sich im November 2004 dem bislang in der Forschung zur Geschichte des Naturschutzes und der Freiraumplanung nur zögerlich thematisierten Zusammenhang zwischen theoretischen und praktischen Bemühungen um einen umfassenden Schutz der Natur und politischen Systemen zuwandte. Organisatoren der Tagung waren die Stiftung Naturschutzgeschichte und das Zentrum für Gartenkunst und Landschaftsarchitektur (CGL) der Leibniz Universität Hannover in Kooperation mit dem Institut für Geschichte und Theorie der Gestaltung (GTG) der Universität der Künste (Berlin).

Ausgangspunkt, wie die beiden in der Thematik bestens ausgewiesenen Herausgeber in ihrer Einleitung präzise herausstellen, war die bewusst aufgeworfene Frage nach der Bedeutung politischer Rahmenbedingungen für oder innerhalb von Naturschutzarbeit. Ziel war es demnach weniger eine Geschichte eines demokratisch orientierten Naturschutzes in Deutschland zusammenzustellen. Vielmehr wurde mit dem Band der Versuch unternommen, diejenigen „bislang unbekannten Facetten“ herauszuarbeiten, die sich im Widerspiel von Politik und Naturschutzarbeit in unterschiedlichen politisch-gesellschaftlichen Konstellationen bieten, um damit auch den positiven Auswirkungen einer demokratischen Grundhaltung auf fachliche Auffassungen im Naturschutz nachzugehen. Virulent erscheinen diese Fra-

gen nicht nur vor dem Hintergrund des Entwicklungsganges der deutschen Geschichte seit der Reichsgründung. Signifikant wird die Klarstellung darüber hinaus ebenso aufgrund der zahlreichen Zäsuren und Brüche, aber auch der Kontinuitäten zwischen Kaiserreich, Weimarer Republik, Nationalsozialismus, der Bundesrepublik und der DDR und der sich daraus ergebenden fachinternen Historiographie, deren Kenntnis, Auseinandersetzung und kritische Aufarbeitung für andere Fächer und Institutionen längst selbstverständlich geworden ist.

Unter welch zahlreichen Fragestellungen sich der Themenkomplex jenseits jeglicher (Erb-)Last bearbeiten lässt, beweisen nicht nur die knapp dreißig Beiträge, sondern ebenso deren thematische, geographische, historische, biographische, institutionelle und methodologische Bandbreite. Diese reicht vom Naturschutz in der jüdischen Tradition (Hüttermann, Eikenberg, Gröning) über Gedanken zum nationalsozialistischen Naturschutz (Hölzl, Wolschke-Bulmahn) und ihren einzelnen institutionellen Interessenvertretern (Behrens), Reflexionen zum Umgang mit der 'guten Sache' Naturschutz in beiden deutschen Staaten (Schütze, Fibich, Voigt und Zütz) bis hin zu rezenten naturschutzpolitischen Anstrengungen im In- und Ausland (Young, Herrington, van der Windt) oder der Institutionalisierung von Naturschutzwissen in den 1950er und 1960er Jahren (Linse, Dietz).

Wenn es einen klar konstatierbaren Zusammenhang zwischen politischen Systemen und den darin stattfindenden Naturschutz gibt, so gilt es diesen zu differenzieren, und zwar insofern, als die verschiedenen Akteursebenen und Biographien in unter-

schiedlicher Art und Weise von etablierten politischen Bedingungen betroffen und infiltriert waren. Wie zahlreiche Untersuchungen indes herausstellen, darf dies nicht zu der Ansicht führen, dass die politischen Rahmenbedingungen mit zunehmender Entfernung von den Repräsentanten und Entscheidungsträgern weniger Einfluss zu üben in der Lage waren. Vielmehr kann, jenseits der in ausgewählten Teilaspekten komparativ aufgefächerten zunehmenden Demokratisierung, Institutionalisierung und Politisierung, ein deutlicher Zusammenhang zwischen Naturschutzarbeit und Politik festgestellt werden. Der Schutz der Natur(ressourcen) stand in seiner jeweiligen Wirksamkeit und Wirkmächtigkeit immer auch in enger Beziehung zu den herrschenden politischen oder gesellschaftlichen Sachlagen, gleichgültig ob in der religiös motivierten und ökologisch fundierten Besiedlung des heutigen Israels oder mit Bezug auf die nationalsozialistische Zeit, im Nachkriegsdeutschland oder den beiden deutschen Staaten. Brisant erscheint die Analyse des Zusammenspiels von politischen Strukturen mit Naturschutzbemühungen vor dem Hintergrund der von den Herausgebern, insbesondere für die nationalsozialistische Zeit, konstatierten Verharmlosung oder gar Relativierung der eigenen Geschichte. So beschied man die Wechselbeziehungen zwischen Naturschutz, Politik und Religion noch bis in die 1980er Jahre eher abschlägig. Hierzu legt der Band wertvolle und korrigierende Erkenntnisse vor. U. a. wird mittels der Analyse der lange manifesten Geschichtsschreibung des Naturschutzes in Deutschland oder der Engführung jüdischer Biographien und deren Schicksal im Nationalsozialismus

aufgezeigt, wie anhand gepflegter Traditionalismen oder erinnerungspolitischer Mechanismen maßgebliche Leistungen jüdischer Naturschützer gewollt aus dem öffentlichen Bewusstsein getilgt wurden. Dass innerhalb der damit aufgeworfenen Diskussionen eine gewisse Polemik zu Tage tritt, auch was die konzeptionelle Vorbereitung der Tagung selbst anbetrifft (Wolschke-Bulmahn, Gröning), verdeutlicht, wie notwendig die historische Aufarbeitung der deutschsprachigen Naturschutzarbeit jenseits von Geschichtsklitterung und politischen / institutionellen / ideologischen Grabenkämpfen ist. Hier zeichnen sich die einzelnen Beiträge durch das bewusste Infragestellen bisher als allgemeingültig angenommener Zusammenhänge aus, die bis hinein in die Biographien der für die Entwicklung des Naturschutzes maßgeblichen Personen (z. B. Georg Pniower, Siegfried Lichtenstaedter, Benno Wolf, Heinrich Mendelssohn oder Hans Klose) verfolgt und vor dem Hintergrund der Rolle demokratischer Entscheidungsstrukturen diskutiert werden.

Die thematische Reichhaltigkeit wird ferner durch die zahlreich vertretenen Außenperspektiven untermauert, die neben der historiographischen Evaluierung demokratischer Grundhaltungen den Wechselbeziehungen von Naturschutz und Politik komparatistisch nachspüren, womit sich der Band ebenso in die seit geraumer Zeit andauernden Debatten um die zunehmend globalpolitisch gefasste Geschichte der Natur- und Umweltschutzarbeit und ihrer jeweiligen Historiographen einreihet. Deutlich wird dadurch auch, wie disparat sich die Frage nach einem demokratischen Naturschutz beantworten lässt, der von der Erhaltung der Subsistenz einer

Gesellschaft bis hin zu Beteiligungsmechanismen innerhalb der rezenten Naturschutzarbeit reichen. Keinesfalls, so lassen sich die zahlreich vertretenen Beispiele zusammenfassen, scheinen demokratische Rahmenbedingungen explizite Voraussetzung für Naturschutz zu sein; allenfalls geht es dabei um eine gesellschaftspolitische Effizienz oder Wirksamkeit, in der die praktische Naturschutzarbeit in ihrer sozialen Orientierung und die demokratischen Beteiligungsmechanismen in ein ausgewogenes Verhältnis treten.

„Naturschutz und Demokratie!“ liefert beeindruckende Facetten zur Geschichte des Naturschutzes und der Naturschutzarbeit in unterschiedlichen politischen Systemen, die als Basis weiterer Forschungen verstanden werden müssen. Indem die versammelten Beiträge neben den vielstimmigen historischen Aspekten die damit engstens verknüpften demokratischen, sozialen und diskursiven Rahmenbedingungen der Naturschutzarbeit beleuchten, deuten diese das historische Fundament an, das zurecht dazu dienen kann, die eigene Geschichte des Fachs für heutige naturschutzrelevante Fragestellungen konstruktiv zu nutzen, das jedoch weiterer Spezifizierungen bedarf. Besonders die zum Schwerpunkt 'Judentum und Naturschutz' geäußerten Ansichten verdienen weitergehende und detailliertere Untersuchungen, die auch in einer materiellen, begrifflichen, institutionellen und personellen Gesamtsicht der Geschichte des Naturschutzes wichtige Anregungen zu geben vermag.

**Lois Merriweather Moore (Hrsg.):
The Dispersion of Africans and African Culture Throughout the World.
Essays on the African Diaspora,
Lewiston: Edwin Mellen Press 2007,
210 S.**

Rezensiert von
Stefanie Müller, Leipzig

Es ist bekannt, dass durch den transatlantischen Sklavenhandel über mehrere Jahrhunderte Millionen afrikanischer Arbeitskräfte ihrer Heimat entzogen und unter unmenschlichsten Bedingungen in die verschiedensten Regionen der Welt verschifft wurden. In der Geschichte Afrikas nimmt der Sklavenhandel eine essentielle Position ein – nicht zuletzt aufgrund seiner moralischen Verwerflichkeit und der Auswirkungen für die Entwicklung auf dem afrikanischen Kontinent.

In der öffentlichen Wahrnehmung wesentlich weniger präsent hingegen ist die Vielzahl der Gemeinschaften von Nachkommen afrikanischer Sklaven in Vergangenheit und Gegenwart. Der vorliegende Sammelband widmet sich daher den Menschen afrikanischer Herkunft und ihrer Geschichte und Kultur in verschiedensten Regionen der Erde in verschiedenen Jahrhunderten. Herausgeberin Lois Merriweather Moore von der School of Education der Universität San Francisco vereint neun wissenschaftliche Arbeiten zu Afrika und afrikanischen Diasporen in Portugal und der sog. „schwarzen“ oder „großen Karibik“, denen ein Vorwort des ruandischen Senators Aloysie Inyumba vorangestellt ist.

„Afrikanische Diaspora“ wird als „word-wide dispersion of African descent people from their native land of Africa“ (S. V) verstanden, die im Wesentlichen afrikanische Sklaven und deren Nachfahren umfasst. Die Geschichte der Sklaverei als Teil der Weltgeschichte wird hier um die Perspektive der Überlebenden und deren (neue) Kulturen bereichert.

Die Mehrheit der Beiträge wurde von Doktoranden der School of Education verfasst und ging aus der Teilnahme an Moores Seminar „Pan African Language and Culture“ hervor. Methodisch handelt es sich um Mikroanalysen von Herkunft und historischen sowie kulturellen Besonderheiten einzelner afrikanischstämmiger Gemeinschaften.

Ziel der Textsammlung ist es, einen kleinen Beitrag für die internationale und multikulturelle Wissenschaftsgemeinschaft über die Verbreitung der aus Afrika stammenden Menschen zu leisten (S. IV). Der Band soll zudem die globale Kulturgeschichte afrikanischer Diasporen auch einem nichtwissenschaftlichen Publikum näher bringen.

Die interozeanische Migration der Menschen afrikanischer Herkunft, der transatlantische Sklavenhandel, die Zeit des Kolonialismus sowie die gegenwärtigen sozialen und wirtschaftlichen Probleme der Nachfahren afrikanischer Sklaven werden mit Blick auf so verschiedene Weltgegenden wie Portugal, Ecuador, Belize, Dänisch-Westindien, Mexiko, Sea Island (Georgia) und Nordamerika erörtert. Alle Kapitel zielen auf die afrikanische Erfahrung in einem bestimmten Teil der Welt und fokussieren jeweils auf andere Aspekte des alltäglichen Lebens – Bildung, Religion, Sprache, Tradition, Wirtschaft und Politik.

So erfährt der Leser Detailreiches über den Ursprung afrikanischer Sklaven in Portugal zu Beginn des 15. Jhs., über ihre Position in der portugiesischen Wirtschaft und ihre Arbeitsbereiche. Helmut Buehler beschreibt die Lebensweise der schwarzen Bevölkerung im portugiesischen Mittelalter, die Rechtsvorschriften für Sklaven in Bezug auf Kleidung und Ernährung, ihre Sprache, den Umgang mit Musik, Tanz und Religion, bis hin zum Einfuhrverbot von Sklaven im Jahr 1761.

Pati de Robles Untersuchung konzentriert sich auf Esmeraldas, die Provinz Ecuadors, die mit 85 Prozent heute die höchste Bevölkerungsquote an Afro-Ecuadorianern aufweist. Die Autorin identifiziert die dort lebenden Menschen als marginalisiert, öffentlich negiert und gar vergessen. Rassismus in höchstem Ausmaß, insbesondere gegen afro-ecuadorianische Frauen, beeinflusst die Stimmung im Land. Durch die Isolierung vom Rest des Landes sind zugleich viele „afrikanische“ Kulturelemente besonders gut erhalten und für das tägliche (Über-)Leben von zentraler Bedeutung.

Besonderes Augenmerk auf die ökonomische Situation der Frauen legt Onllwyn Dixon, der sich dem Wandel in der belizischen Bevölkerung infolge der Einfuhr von Afrikanern durch die spanischen Kolonialherren widmet.

Der Beitrag von Alicia Jackson analysiert die Ausweitung der Grund- und Sekundarschulbildung unter Berücksichtigung der schwarzen Bevölkerung in Dänisch-Westindien zu Beginn des 20. Jhs. Sie beschäftigt sich insbesondere mit den Schwierigkeiten und Herausforderungen im Umgang mit ethnischer Vielfalt im Bildungssystem nach der Übernahme des Territoriums durch die USA im Jahre 1917.

In Mexiko gilt die Rassenfrage heute als entspannt. In der öffentlichen, stark elitär geprägten Verhandlung dieser Frage ist die Vorstellung vorherrschend, es gäbe keine Rassenunterschiede mehr, sondern nur noch Mestizos (im Wortursprung die Bezeichnung für Mischlinge europäisch-„indianischer“ Abstammung), welche in diesem Diskurs mit den Mexikanern gleichgesetzt werden. Infolge ethnischer Vermischungen sind klare Verbindungen zur afrikanischen Kultur anhand von äußerlichen Merkmalen nur schwer erkennbar. Dennoch kommt Tina Lemos zu dem Schluss, dass soziale Ungleichheit, die teilweise rassistisch interpretiert wird, nach wie vor präsent ist. Mexikaner, die sich ihrer afrikanischen Abstammung bewusst sind, verschleiern diese Tatsache oft; spanische oder indische Vorfahren gelten als höherwertig.

Veränderungen, die Sprache durch das Zusammensein mit der einheimischen Bevölkerung der neuen Heimat erfährt sowie Beweise für den Reichtum an afrikanischen Spuren in der gegenwärtig genutzten Sprache, sind Gegenstand des Beitrages von Samantha Rainer zur Geschichte und Sprache der Gullah auf Sea Island (Georgia).

Thema des letzten Artikels, verfasst von der Herausgeberin selbst, ist Entstehung und Blütezeit der afrikanisch-amerikanischen Kirche in Nordamerika. Moore identifiziert die christliche Kirche als historisch verbindendes Element unter den Afro-Amerikanern, als die einzige Institution, die für die Menschen afrikanischer Herkunft sowohl während der Sklaverei als auch heute noch als sicherer Hafen und Rückzugsraum gilt. Diese Sonderrolle weist Moore für die USA wie für Kanada gleichermaßen nach.

Die Präsenz von Menschen afrikanischer Herkunft in verschiedenen Regionen der Welt ist lange beobachtet worden; eine kritische Forschung um die historischen Verflechtungen der Nachkommen afrikanischer Sklaven bis zur Gegenwart in verschiedenen Regionen, die Entstehung und die jeweils spezifische Ausprägung ihrer Kultur hat jedoch erst kürzlich begonnen. Der vorliegende Band besticht durch gut recherchierte Beiträge zur Kolonialgeschichte und zur Entwicklung kultureller Besonderheiten der schwarzen Bevölkerung in den untersuchten Gebieten. Dabei verliert er sich nicht übermäßig in Details. Vielmehr versucht er, die Identitätssuche der afrikanischstämmigen Bevölkerung, ihre Auseinandersetzung mit eigener und neuer Kultur und daraus entstehende Symbiosen in der jeweils untersuchten Region zu fassen.

Der Aufbau des Sammelbandes erscheint jedoch nicht ganz eindeutig. Teil 1 trägt die Überschrift „Africa“, Teil 2 „African Diaspora“. Die Einleitung zu Teil 1 beschränkt sich auf wenige Zeilen und den Hinweis, dass Afrika die Wiege der Menschheit ist und sich über Jahrtausende von da aus Menschen in die ganze Welt verstreuten. Warum genau die beiden Essays zum Niedergang Rwandas in der zweiten Hälfte des 20. Jhs. von Jean Schuldberg sowie zur Rückführung äthiopischer Juden nach Israel in den 1980er Jahren von Nicole Fox diesem Teil 1 zugeordnet wurden, ist nicht recht nachvollziehbar. Insbesondere der Bezug zum Titel des Buches wird nicht deutlich herausgearbeitet, zumal die Geschichte des Genozids hier Flucht und Migration nahezu komplett ausblendet. Es verwundert zudem, dass den gesammelten Beiträgen keine integrative Zusammen-

fassung folgt. So verschenkt das Buch die Möglichkeit, die gemeinsame Erfahrung der ewigen Fremdheit und Andersartigkeit herauszuarbeiten, die bleibende Identitätssuche, die selbst jene Menschen dunkler Hautfarbe erfahren, die bereits seit Generationen auf entsprechendem Territorium leben, aber auch die Gemeinsamkeit des Widerstandes, der in vielen Beiträgen anklingt, übergreifend zu erörtern. Eine abschließende Diskussion des Verlustes von Souveränität durch den Einfluss von außen und der Entstehung einer neuen afro-amerikanischen Kultur bleibt ebenfalls aus. In der Gesamtdarstellung außerdem völlig unbeachtet bleiben Versklavungsszenarien in den Herkunftsregionen, die Beteiligung und der Profit afrikanischer Akteure im Sklavenhandel, die Wege der Sklaven nach Amerika, die Rückkehr von befreiten Sklaven aus Amerika oder auch die Bedeutung der spezifischen afrikanischen Geschichte für Sklavenkulturen und deren Nachkommen auf der ganzen Welt – Themen, die unter diesem Titel durchaus vorstellbar gewesen wären.

Die vorliegende historische Darstellung verschiedener afrikanischer Diasporen tangiert die lang anhaltenden kolonialen Implikationen für verschiedene Menschen in verschiedenen Regionen der Welt und zeigt eindrücklich, dass Rassenkonstrukte und Rassismus und deren Effekte noch lange keine abgeschlossenen und gelösten Probleme sind. Nicht zuletzt bietet der Band die Möglichkeit, der Konstruktion eines mythischen Afrika der Vergangenheit bzw. einer real gelebten neuen afro-amerikanischen Kultur ein Stück näher zu kommen.

Gorch Pieken / Cornelia Kruse: *Preußisches Liebesglück. Eine deutsche Familie aus Afrika*, Berlin: Propyläen Verlag 2007, 271 S.;

Hugh Barnes: *Der Mohr des Zaren. Eine Spurensuche*, München: Albrecht Knaus Verlag 2007, 427 S.;

Walter Sauer (Hrsg.): *Von Soliman zu Omofuna. Afrikanische Diaspora in Österreich, 17. bis 20. Jahrhundert*, Innsbruck: Studien-Verlag 2007, 269 S.;

Jacob Emmanuel Mabe: *Wilhelm Anton Amo interkulturell gelesen (= Interkulturelle Bibliothek, Bd. 31)*, Nordhausen: Verlag Traugott Bautz 2007, 108 S.;

Rea Brändle: *Nayo Bruce. Geschichte einer afrikanischen Familie in Europa*, Zürich: Chronos Verlag 2007, 253 S.

Rezensiert von
Ulrich van der Heyden, Berlin

Wir wissen heutzutage immer noch sehr wenig über Afrikaner oder Nachfahren von Afrikanern, die in den vergangenen Jahrhunderten einen mehr oder minder langen Lebensabschnitt in Deutschland bzw. dem deutschsprachigen Europa verbracht haben. Zwar gibt es bereits einige „schwarze Biographien“, indes zumeist als relativ knappe Lebensskizzen in Form kleinerer Aufsätze in oftmals obskuren Zeitschriften, die sich mit besonderen Leistungen von Angehörigen der afrikanischen Diaspora in Deutschland befas-

sen. In selbständigen Monographien sind solche durchweg aufwändigen Rechercheleistungen bislang kaum veröffentlicht worden. Selbst die Verfilmung der beeindruckenden Biographie von Hans-Jürgen Massaquoi ist wieder in Vergessenheit geraten. Ganz anders ist dies in einigen west-europäischen Ländern und in den USA, wo die Beschäftigung mit Einzelschicksalen der afrikanischen Diaspora schon lange Zeit akademisch anerkannt ist.

Im Jahre 2007 sind indes einige mehr oder weniger umfangreiche Werke zu dieser Thematik auf dem deutschsprachigen Büchermarkt erschienen, die sowohl die Biographieforschung als auch die Forschungen zur Geschichte der afrikanischen Diaspora in Deutschland und seinen Nachbarländern entscheidend vorangebracht haben. Pieken und Kruse haben sich der Familiengeschichte der Sabac el Chers angenommen, deren „Urahn“ im Jahre 1843 als siebenjähriger Knabe als Geschenk des ägyptischen Vizekönigs für den preußischen Prinz Albrecht nach Berlin gelangte. Dort stieg Albrecht, wie er dann genannt wurde, vom Leibdiener zum hochherrschaftlichen Silberverwalter auf. Sein Sohn, Gustav Sabac el Cher, wurde der wohl bekannteste afrikanische Militärmusiker Preußens. Als junger Mann besuchte er die Musikhochschule in Berlin-Charlottenburg, komponierte mehrere Musikstücke und brachte es schließlich bis zum Kapellmeister beim 1. Ostpreußischen Grenadierregiment. Nachdem er die Tochter eines reichen Häusermaklers geheiratet hatte, quittierte er den Dienst, kaufte ein Gartenlokal am Rande Berlins und verstarb schließlich im Jahre 1934. Von ihm existiert ein Gemälde – ein in preußischer Uniform gekleideter Afrika-

ner hält in seinem Arm eine „weiße“ Frau –, welches den ehemaligen Mitarbeiter des Deutschen Historischen Museums, Gorch Pieken, nach mehreren kürzeren Einzelstudien, gemeinsam mit Cornelia Kruse zu diesem Buch, veranlaßt hat. Auch andere Familienmitglieder der Sabac el Chers zog es, wie die Autoren recherchiert haben, zum Militär. Mehrere Generationen dienten im kaiserlichen Heer, in Hitlers Wehrmacht und in der Bundeswehr. Andere Nachfahren arbeiteten als Musiker bis in unsere Tage.

Den Rassismus der Nazis überlebten die Sabac el Chers relativ unbehelligt. Zwar wurde das von ihnen geführte Gartenlokal in Senzig bei Königs Wusterhausen boykottiert und musste schließlich geschlossen werden, aber ein Sohn der Familie kämpfte für „Volk und Vaterland“ an der Ostfront.

Allein schon die imposante Rechercheleistung, aber auch die spannend zu lesende Familiengeschichte an sich können nicht genug gelobt werden; ebenso die Erfolge bei der nicht leichten Suche nach entsprechendem Illustrationsmaterial, das die Autoren in beeindruckendem Umfang finden konnten.

Die „Familiengeschichte“ ist eingebettet in das historische Umfeld sowie in die gegenwärtigen Forschungsdiskussionen. Beide Aspekte behindern nicht das flüssige Lesen, und so ist das Buch zugleich Unterhaltung mit einem spannenden Einblick in ein so gut wie völlig unbekanntes Kapitel preußisch-deutscher Geschichte und Bereicherung der deutschen Diaspora-Forschung.

Über die Geschichte der zahlenmäßig begrenzten afrikanischen Immigration in anderen, vor allem osteuropäischen Län-

dern, gibt es noch weit weniger Literatur als über diejenige in Deutschland. Dabei gab es gerade in Rußland einen über die Landesgrenzen hinaus bekannten Afrikaner, der am Zarenhof lebte und der Großvater von Alexander Puschkin war. Dessen Geschichte liegt nunmehr in deutscher Sprache vor. Zuvor war der „afrikanische Ursprung“ des bekannten Dichters hierzulande kaum bekannt, selbst wenn in der historischen Rußlandliteratur hierauf ab und an verwiesen worden ist.

Zumindest in den nicht wenigen biographischen Darstellungen über Puschkin ist durchaus erwähnt worden, dass der Urenkel eines afrikanischen Sklaven, der unter dem Namen Gannibal (in Deutschen eigentlich Hannibal) am Hof Peters I. aufwuchs, recht stolz auf seinen Vorfahren war. Unzählige Mythen ranken sich in Rußland um das Leben dieses außergewöhnlichen Mannes. Selbst in seriösen Geschichtswerken sind hingegen die biographischen Fakten lückenhaft und in sich widersprüchlich. Puschkins Vorhaben, selbst eine Lebensgeschichte seines Großvaters unter dem Titel „Mohr Peters des Großen“ zu schreiben, scheiterte.

Der britische Journalist und Rußlandexperte Hugh Barnes hat in jahrelanger Recherche oftmals schwer auffindbare Spuren verfolgt, in relevanten Akten und in der zumeist russischsprachigen Fachliteratur geforscht und versucht, Gannibals Leben zu rekonstruieren. An den Stellen, wo der Historiker tiefer nachgeforscht oder Lücken seines Wissens markiert hätte, geht Barnes im Stile journalistischer Freiheit über solche problematischen Passagen hinweg. So ist immerhin eine gut lesbare Biographie entstanden: Im Jahre 1704, mit ungefähr sieben Jahren, wurde

ein afrikanischer Junge (im Klappentext und zuweilen im Text nicht ganz der political correctness entsprechend als „Mohr“ bezeichnet) als exotisches Geschenk dem russischen Zaren übereignet. Der Monarch erkannte recht bald Gannibals besondere Auffassungsgabe und sein technisches Geschick. Peter I. ermöglichte ihm deshalb eine hervorragende Ausbildung, vertraute ihm schließlich hohe diplomatische Posten und militärische Aufgaben an. Jener machte sich die aufklärerischen Ideale des Zaren zu eigen. Schon bald war Gannibal aus dem höfischen Leben des russischen Zaren nicht mehr wegzudenken. Er war einer seiner wichtigsten Vertrauten. Gelehrte wie Montesquieu oder Voltaire zählten zu Gannibals Freunden. Voltaire nannte ihn einmal den „dunklen Stern der russischen Aufklärung“. Doch Respekt und Ruhm gingen auch mit Mißgunst und rassistischen Vorurteilen einher. Für viele seiner Mitmenschen blieb er stets der Fremde, dem etwas Unberechenbares, etwas Fremdes, anhaftete.

Dem Autor gelingt es, in 19 Kapiteln, einem Vorwort und einem Epilog nicht nur die trockenen Fakten zur Biographie Gannibals zusammenzutragen, sondern auch anschaulich zu vermitteln, welche Hoffnungen und Sorgen Gannibal bewegten, welche Erfolge er im von Peter I. begonnenen Prozeß der Aufklärung in Rußland errang und welche Niederlagen er einstecken mußte.

Ebenfalls in einem Land außerhalb Deutschlands angesiedelt, macht ein anderes Buch mit der Geschichte der dortigen afrikanischen Diaspora bekannt. Allerdings nicht als personenbezogene Einzelgeschichte; u. a. anhand der Schilderung mehrerer relevanter Biographien

wird die Geschichte der afrikanischen Diaspora in Österreich vom 17. bis zum 20. Jh. nachgezeichnet. Als im Mai 1999 Marcus Omofuma, ein in Österreich um Asyl nachsuchender Nigerianer, bei seiner Abschiebung mit dem Flugzeug unter qualvollen Umständen starb, führte dies in der Alpenrepublik zu einer heftigen Diskussion über Asylpolitik, Integration und Rassismus – Anlaß genug, sich verstärkt mit der Geschichte der afrikanischen Migration auseinanderzusetzen. Der Vorfall gab auch Anstoß zu dem vorliegenden Sammelband, der der Geschichte der afrikanischen Diaspora Österreichs vom 17. bis zum 20. Jh. gewidmet ist.

Der Hrsg. des Werkes, Walter Sauer, hat sich bereits mit zahlreichen einschlägigen Veröffentlichungen zum Thema einen Namen gemacht. Die Autorinnen und Autoren, die er für diesen Band zusammenführen konnte, machen deutlich, dass heute ca. 40.000 Menschen afrikanischer Herkunft, mit und ohne Staatsbürgerschaft, in Österreich leben. In den Jahrhunderten zuvor war es eine kleine Minderheit von afrikanischen Migranten, die ihren Weg in die k.u.k.-Monarchie fand. Die frühere Habsburgermonarchie, die keine Überseekolonien besaß, wies aus diesem Grund vergleichsweise wenig Berührungspunkte mit dem afrikanischen Kontinent auf, wenngleich, wie neuere publizierte Forschungen belegen, es diese auch gab. Auch hier war Sauer der spiritus rector solcher historischen Recherchen. Die meisten Autoren dieses gut illustrierten Bandes stellen die Probleme der Gegenwart erstmals in einen historischen Zusammenhang. So wird den Fragen nachgegangen, unter welchen sozialen Verhältnissen die afrikanischen Zuwanderer in früheren Zeiten lebten, wie

ihre Einbindung in Arbeitsmärkte erfolgte, welche Bildungsmöglichkeiten ihnen offen standen und wie sich ihr gesellschaftliches Leben gestaltete.

Die Beiträge der sechs Autor/innen sind chronologisch geordnet. Es wird dem Schicksal schwarzer Menschen vor allem im Wien des 17. und 18. Jhs. nachgespürt, darunter dem Lebensweg des wohl europaweit bekanntesten Afrikaners aus Österreich, des „Hofmohren“ Angelo Soliman, der nach seinem Tode ausgestopft und ins Museum gestellt wurde. Die Geschichte größerer Migrantengruppen im 19. Jh., der „mohrischen“ Dienstboten, Artist/innen und Missionsschüler wie auch der ersten afrikanischen Studenten an österreichischen Universitäten findet Behandlung, und ein weiteres Kapitel befaßt sich mit dem (Über-)Leben von Afrikaner/innen unter dem NS-Regime. Zu den im KZ Mauthausen ermordeten Afrikanern gehörte der Malinese Tiémoko Garan Kouyaté. Der Kommunist war zuvor in dem in Hamburg ansässigen „Internationalen Gewerkschaftskomitee der Negerarbeiter“ engagiert. Die beiden abschließenden Aufsätze haben die marokkanischen Soldaten der französischen Befreiungsarmee wie der afro-österreichischen Diaspora in der Zeit nach 1945 zum Gegenstand.

Der Sammelband kann für sich in Anspruch nehmen, unter Verwendung vieler bisher unbekannter Archivquellen die erste systematische historische Bestandsaufnahme der afrikanischen Migration nach Österreich zu sein. Er reiht sich ein in die mittlerweile erfreuliche Vielzahl von Publikationen und Projekten zum „Black Europe“. Die Autor/innen erinnern daran, dass Österreich keineswegs nur „weiß-germanisch“, sondern multikulturell war und

entscheidend geprägt und bereichert wurde durch verschiedene, auch afrikanische Zuwandergruppen.

Eine interessante Blickweise auf die Geschichte eines Afrikaners, der im 18. Jh. in Deutschland aufwuchs, stammt aus der Feder eines Afrikaners. Jacob Emmanuel Mabe, ein in Berlin lehrender Philosoph, untersucht das philosophische Erbe von Wilhelm Anton Amo. Amo setzte sich mit so gut wie allen damals diskutierten wichtigen Fragen der Philosophie, von der Metaphysik über die Logik und Erkenntnistheorie bis zur Politiktheorie und Sprachphilosophie, auseinander. Mabe, ein ausgewiesener Kenner der interkulturellen Philosophie, versucht das schriftliche Werk Amos in einer auch für den Nichtfachmann verständlichen Sprache zu erklären. Auch wird die Frage nach der Bedeutung Amos für die Weltphilosophie gestellt. Um diese weitergehend zu diskutieren, wäre es sicherlich von Vorteil, die schriftlichen Hinterlassenschaften Amos einem größeren Leserkreis vertraut zu machen. Einige seiner Schriften sind bereits in den 60er Jahren von der Universität Halle veröffentlicht worden, indes nur in geringer Auflage. Bei den biographischen Daten und in seinen Wertungen hätte der Verfasser durchaus die einschlägige Forschungsliteratur stärker berücksichtigen können. So hat Burchard Brentjes nicht nur im Jahre 1976 die erste Biographie von Amo verfaßt, sondern zu ihm in den Jahren danach noch eine ganze Reihe weiterer Veröffentlichungen vorgelegt. Auch M. Firla und P. Martin haben zu Amo neue Forschungsergebnisse präsentiert. Selbst ein Theaterstück, ein Roman und ein Tanztheater sind in den letzten zehn Jahren über dessen Leben entstanden.

Solche Popularität hätte analysiert werden müssen. Ansonsten ist die Broschüre, die eine Lektorierung (die vielen Druckfehler sind mehr als ärgerlich!) verdient hätte, durchaus zu empfehlen.

Schließlich ist auch die Familiengeschichte von Nayo Bruce aus der Feder der Schweizerin Rea Brändle zu erwähnen, die schon des öfteren zu Aspekten der Geschichte der Familie Bruce publiziert sowie ein Standardwerk über Völkerschauen vorgelegt hat. Bruce stammt aus Togo, als dieses westafrikanische Land noch deutsche Kolonie war. Er zog zwanzig Jahre mit mehreren Ehefrauen und einer Showtruppe durch Europa. Die vorliegende Studie zeigt auf, wie es Nayo Bruce gelang, sich aus der Abhängigkeit seines Impressario zu befreien und eine eigene „Völkerschau“ zu etablieren und erfolgreich zu führen. Er tingelt mit verschiedenen Formationen durch halb Europa und gelangt bis in den Kaukasus, wo er am 3. März 1919 verstarb. Auf seinen Reisen hat Bruce 13 Kinder gezeugt. Einige begleiteten ihn später oder wuchsen bei wohlhabenden Pflegeeltern oder in christlichen Heimen in Deutschland und in Rußland auf. Ein vielseitiges Recherchefeld also für die Autorin. Sie macht in ihrem Buch nicht nur deutlich, woher, aus welchen sozialen Verhältnissen, wie und warum Bruce nach Europa kam und schließlich hier seinen Lebensmittelpunkt sah, sondern v. a., was er auf den Tournéen erlebte, wie diese abliefen – soweit jedenfalls, wie es die Quellen hergeben. Brändle spürte ebenso verbissen den Lebenswegen von Bruces Kindern und Enkeln bis in die Gegenwart nach. Sie hat sie nicht nur in den beiden Teilen Deutschlands, sondern auch in anderen europäischen Ländern sowie in Afrika gefunden.

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