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Asian Experiences of Development in the 20th Century

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Buchbesprechungen

Introduction

Marc Frey / Ronald W. Pruessen

In the twentieth century, Asian countries experienced "development" in many ways. South Korea and Taiwan built upon Japan's example of state-directed, planned, Western-oriented modernization and witnessed transformation from less developed colonies to fully industrialized and post-industrial nations. China underwent dramatic changes in a different fashion. Starting in the late 1970s, the Chinese leadership introduced market reforms and a mainly capitalist economy within a socialist political order. Breathtaking economic growth, accelerated urbanization, industrialization, and the rise of a middle class are only some of the features of China's transformation into the economic and political superpower of today and tomorrow. Yet other regions of Asia have charted their own courses toward fundamental changes as well. Beginning a decade later than China, for instance, India moved towards liberalization of its economy and transformed itself into an economic heavyweight, capable of providing material well-being for ever more of its citizens in a democratic context (despite the persistence of mass poverty). And in Southeast Asia, countries have also moved far beyond the circumstances of colonial times. Over the course of just two or three generations, they have diversified, expanded, accelerated economic growth, raised standards of living, and, generally speaking, substantially improved qualities of life.

Gunnar Myrdal, who wrote about the development of Asia (or, from his point of view, about the lack of it) some forty years ago – using the title of "The Asian Drama" – would not be the only one who would have difficulties comprehending the vastness of the transformations that the region has undergone. Today, there is no longer any debate about the "Asian Drama": we speak instead of the beginning of the "Asian Century".

National paths to development varied greatly – and the countries of Asia faced quite different problems and challenges. It does an injustice to multiple pathways to develop-

ment, in fact, to try summarizing them in a few sentences. To varying degrees, though, countries, governments, elites and people coped with a number of core issues pertinent to development, chiefly among them governance and planning; economic development through changes in agriculture, industry and services; and social development (for instance with regard to population, health, education). While the articles which follow do not have a common theme or a unifying topic, they do explore development issues with an eye to this range of issues. In the process, each focuses on fundamental variables without which the present cannot be properly understood. By suggesting the intellectual rewards that would flow from a comparative analysis of Asian development experiences, this grouping is also at least in part designed to lay out an agenda for further research. The guest editors realize, of course, that a comparative analysis approach inevitably yields a more complicated picture – and that it ultimately requires more difficult research and analytical efforts. As such, however, it brings us closer to a genuine understanding of a world and a stage of history that defy simplification. Seeing the world around us as it really is – and appreciating more thoroughly just how it came to be so – is a prerequisite for charting effective policies for solving current (and often long-standing) problems.

Bai Gao, a sociologist at Duke University, begins the cluster of articles with a discussion of the long-term strategies and underlying motives of Japanese 'developmentalism'. He argues that both the militarist versions, promulgated in the 1930s and 1940s, as well as the postwar market-based one, have to be understood in connection with the history of globalization throughout the 20th century – pointing to the critical importance of the Japanese state in developing the economy.

Imran Ali, an economic historian at the Lahore University of Management Science, introduces the reader to the complex history of development in Pakistan from the late colonial period until the early 1970s. He points to the troublesome legacies of the colonial period, which made a sustained development policy on the national level so much more difficult, and also emphasizes institutional constraints such as the role of the state and the army. His discussion of the case of Pakistan easily lends itself to a comparison with other decolonized countries.

Marc Frey, a historian of international history at Jacobs University Bremen, looks at aspects of the external dimensions of development in Southeast Asia by turning to U.S. development cooperation with countries of the region during the 1950s. More specifically, he sees Washington development cooperation as an integral part of an American civilizing mission intended to forge a global capitalist system conducive to the growth of the United States both politically and economically. But he also describes the responses of Southeast Asian countries, where there was interest in "development" that could unfold in keeping with local or national prescriptions and in their own due time.

Ronald W. Pruessen, a historian specializing in U.S. foreign policy and the early roots of "globalization," uses the often controversial career of John Foster Dulles to explore the complexities of American "development" policies in Asia. On one hand, Pruessen uses Dulles as an example of the complexities of Washington thinking (pointing to Cold War calculations as well as deeper "Wilsonian reform" concerns). On the other hand, he sees

the limited effectiveness of Dulles's approach as representative of the longer-term failings of Western development initiatives overall.

Sunil Amrith, Senior Lecturer in History at Birkbeck College, takes our attention back to the regional dimension of development issues. His discussion of public health campaigns elucidates the connection between nature and development in tropical Asia from the 1930s to the 1960s.

Finally, Amit Das Gupta, a research associate at the Institute for Contemporary History Berlin, presents us with a little-known case of multilateral development cooperation, namely the consortia organized during the 1960s. He argues that for all their deficiencies, these consortia had significant benefits, especially for recipient countries, as they provided for more long-term development planning.

The articles gathered here were first presented – and subsequently reworked – at a workshop organized by Medha Kudaisya, Yong Mun Cheong, and the guest editors of this volume at the National University of Singapore, in June 2006. The workshop was generously supported by the National University of Singapore, the Regional Office of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation, the German Science Foundation, and the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada. We wish to thank these institutions for their generous support. We also wish to thank the editors of Comparativ for agreeing to publish a selection of the papers originally presented at this conference.

Globalization and the Origins of Japanese Developmentalism

Bai Gao

RESÜMEE

Welche langfristigen politischen und ökonomischen Leitlinien charakterisiert das japanische Entwicklungsmodell? Unter welchen Umständen entwickelte sich das japanische Modell von Entwicklung bis zur Mitte der siebziger Jahre? In diesem Beitrag wird argumentiert, dass das japanische Entwicklungsmodell in engem Verhältnis zur Globalisierung im 20. Jahrhundert steht. Entsprechend nimmt der Beitrag zunächst Globalisierungsschübe des 20. Jahrhunderts in den Blick. Anschließend wird gezeigt, dass das japanische Entwicklungsmodell der Zeit vor und während des Zweiten Weltkrieges als eine von drei Strategien interpretiert werden kann, mit denen Staaten auf die globale Wirtschaftskrise und auf Prozesse von Entglobalisierung reagierten. Die für Japan charakteristische Version eines militärischen Entwicklungsregimes wurde in der Nachkriegszeit abgelöst von einer langfristigen Strategie, die sich am System von Bretton Woods orientierte.

What were the origins of Japanese developmentalism? Under what historical conditions had Japanese developmentalism evolved up to the 1970s? In this chapter, I argue that the evolution of Japanese developmentalism needs to be understood in relation to the long-term movement of globalization. To illustrate my point, I first discuss the two waves of globalization in the 20th century. Then I demonstrate that most of the major features of Japanese developmentalism, a military version, emerged during the Great Depression and World War II as one of the three patterns among industrialized countries responding to the down-turn of the first wave of globalization. I further show that in the postwar period this military version of Japanese developmentalism was transformed into a trade version during the up-turn of a new wave of globalization sustained by the Bretton Woods system and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.

The Institutional Nature of the Two Waves of Globalization

In the existing literature, globalization is considered as a structural process characterized by the free flow of goods, capital, technology and labor (in the form of immigration) across national boarders. Many scholars have used the ratio of global trade against global GDP as the major measurement of globalization. I argue that globalization is also an institutional process because the international economic order has played a crucial role in the ups and downs of the trade ratio against the world GDP in the twentieth century. Without highlighting the importance of international monetary and trade regimes to the process of globalization, we cannot fully explain why the postwar expansion of trade and production occurred in the first place, how capitalist economies sustained social protection in the 1950s and 1960s, why the expansion of trade and production shifted toward an expansion in finance and monetary activity, and why efforts directed toward social protection were replaced by efforts to release market forces.

The last wave of globalization in 1870–1913 was sustained by the international gold standard and various international treaties on tariffs. Both monetary and trade regimes were backed up by British hegemony. In the international gold standard system, the Bank of England used its discount rate to influence the movement of gold both domestically and internationally. The stability of the gold standard relied on two things: a hierarchical structure in which London was the most important financial center in the world, and confidence in the continued convertibility of sterling and other major currencies into gold at par value.[1] In the international trade regime, the Cobden-Chevallier Treaty of 1860 between Britain and France not only yielded reciprocal tariff cuts but also led France to sign tariff treaties with other European countries and the German customs union.[2]

The downturn in the movement of the ratio of trade against world GDP did not start naturally as a structural process. Rather, it was triggered by the collapse of the gold standard in 1914. In the same year, World War I broke out. These two events ended what John M. Keynes called an "extraordinary episode in the economic progress of man".[3] At the Genoa conference of 1922, the major powers agreed to establish a gold exchange standard in which currencies would be exchanged at fixed parities. Britain returned to gold in 1925, with an emphasis on sterling-dollar convertibility, but left gold again in 1931 during the Great Depression. Japan tried to follow the British lead, but the attempt quickly failed. Between 1931 and 1944, there was no comprehensive and agreed-on set of rules or norms governing international monetary arrangements.[4] The First World War, the peace settlement, and shortsighted policies disrupted trade patterns in international trade, and protectionist pressures began to build up everywhere. As major industrialized

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1   Robert O. Keohane / Joseph S. Nye, Power and Independence. Boston 1977, 67-71.
2   Peter B. Kenen, The International Economy. Englewood Cliffs, NJ 1989 [1985], 213.
3   Dani Rodrik, "The Debate Over Globalization: How to Move Forward by Looking Backward." Unpublished paper 1998. Quoted with permission of the author.
4   Keohane / Nye, Power and Independence (note 1), 73-76.

countries adhered to the so-called lifeline theory, they fought over markets, materials, and resources trying to establish their spheres of influence. These conflicts led to World War II.

The Down-Turn of the Last Wave of Globalization and the Rise of Japanese Developmentalism

Most of the major features in Japanese developmentalism, both ideological and institutional, emerged between 1931 and 1945, as a response to the down-turn of the last wave of globalization through the practice of managed economy. The profound changes in the international economic regimes provided the dynamics for the changes in the Japanese economic system. The collapse of the gold standard in 1914 triggered a series of crises for capitalist economies on a global scale. To a large extent, the evolution of Japanese developmentalism had been driven by two major events in the period between 1927 and 1945, the Great Depression and World War II. In responding to these two major crises, coordination and stability emerged as two major principles for Japanese developmentalism.

The focus on coordination resulted from the effort of preparing for wars, as the collapse of the international order greatly intensified the conflicts of interests among nation states. According to the popular life-line theory at the time, each nation state in time of chaos had to maintain its control over certain geographical areas as the source of its materials and the market for its products in order to survive. To achieve this goal, great powers often sought military solutions. This brought about the birth of the total war theory. The total war theory argued that

> *In modern war victory or defeat is determined directly not only by the fighting strength on the battlefield, but mainly by the strength of industries that made weapons … [the state must] utilize every economic instrument, to devote all available materials, and to fight to the last minute in order to survive.*[5]

In 1931 Japan engaged in the military occupation of Manchuria, the northeast region of China; in 1937, in the full-scale invasion of China; and in 1941, in direct confrontation with the United States. During this period, the economy was perceived as the foundation of national defense. During this process, a drastic institutional re-composition occurred in Japanese capitalism. Influenced by the German theory of total war, the ideology of the managed economy resembled the orthodox doctrine of mercantilism, which regards wealth as the essential means to acquiring military power and views military power as an important means of acquiring wealth.[6]

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5   Hiromi Arisawa, Sangyō dōin keikaku (Planning industrial mobilization). Tokyo 1938, 18, 80-81.
6   David Williams, Japan: Beyond the End of History. London 1994.

The focus on stability resulted from the effort of countering the shocking impact of the Great Depression, which produced massive bankruptcies and layoffs. The rise of the Japanese managed economy occurred during a turning point of history where states in all industrialized countries strengthened interventions in order to survive the Great Depression. Thus, its historical significance needs to be understood in a broader historical context. According to Karl Polanyi, the evolution of capitalism was driven by two opposing movements:

> One was the principle of economic liberalism, aiming at the establishment of a self-regulating market, relying on the support of the trading classes, and using largely laissez-faire and free trade as its methods; the other was the principle of social protection aiming at the conservation of man and nature as well as productive organization, relying on the varying support of those most immediately affected by the deleterious action of the market – primarily, but not exclusively, the working and the landed classes – and using protective legislation, restrictive associations, and other instruments of intervention as its methods.

Polanyi believed that "the protective countermovement was not external; rather, it was essential for the vitality of a capitalist order"[7].

Although all industrialized countries witnessed the protective countermovement in the 1930s in the downturn of globalization, "the emerging regimes of fascism, socialism, and the New Deal were similar only in discarding laissez-faire principles".[8] State intervention reflected an epochal dynamic of the 1930s, which was shared by all industrialized countries. What was singular in fascism? I argue that the impact of fascism on the Japanese managed economy in 1931–1945 can be identified in three areas of ideology, which shaped the pattern of institutional transformation of Japanese developmentalism.

First, the economy was bestowed with strategic significance. As Polanyi pointed out, the failure of the self-regulated market in the 1930s not only resulted in the rise of state intervention. The collapse of the gold standard had a direct implication to international politics because "the balance of power system could not ensure peace once the world economy on which it rested had failed".[9] Shared with the Germans and Italians, the Japanese believed that the collapse of the international economy after World War I would inevitably lead to military conflicts. This changed Japanese economic thinking profoundly. In the ideology of managed economy, the end of the economy was not derived from economic perspective but from political perspective. In other words, the economy was no longer the end itself but a means of the nation-state in international politics.[10] Different from state intervention practiced by liberal capitalism in the United States and Britain in the 1930s which primarily aimed at combating the Great Depression, the state intervention in Japan, similar to that in Germany and Italy, from early

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7   Quoted in Fred Block, Postindustrial Possibilities. Berkeley 1990, 39.
8   Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation: The Politics and Economic Origins of Our Time. Boston 1957 [1944], 224.
9   Ibid., 4.
10 Tōa Keizai Chōsakyoku, Nachisu no keizai seisaku (Nazi's economic policy). Tokyo 1935, 23.

on was a strategic measure to prepare for war. The states in these three countries paid a special attention to the development of heavy-chemical industries in order to ensure the munitions production.

The strategic view of the economy inevitably changed the role of the state. Chalmers Johnson points out that

> *It is true that industrial policy in one form or another goes back to the Meiji era, but it is also true that after the turn of the century the government moved progressively away from its former policies of interference in the domestic economy (if not in those of the colonies or dependencies), and that for about thirty years an approximation of laissez faire was in vogue.* [11]

Driven by the pressures of the Great Depression and war mobilization, the Japanese state emerged as the "economic general staff." It not only began to make long-term plans to promote production and upgrade the industrial structure of the economy, but also exercised a tight control in resource allocations, adopting a discriminatory policy to ensure the supply of materials and capital to the munitions industries. The General National Mobilization Law enacted in 1938 gave the state bureaucracy unprecedented power to carry out the managed economy in the form of administrative decree. From then on, the state bureaucracy could issue orders directly to the private sector without consulting the Diet.

Second, although both liberal capitalism and fascism tried to constrain the market forces in the 1930s, the ideology of Japanese developmentalism had a strong anti-capitalist orientation which was sustained by nationalist ideology. This ideology rejected the assumption of economic man. The freedom of individuals and the property right of private ownership were challenged by the claims of the "national interest", which referred to "economic strength, independence in the world, military power".[12] Ideologically, fascism aimed at

> *creating a social order that modulated the profit-seeking impulses of the capitalists and the wage-seeking impulses of the proletariat by simplifying the social structure, and by eliminating the market mechanism as the principal means for the allocation and distribution of social goods. They wished to achieve social harmony and consensus with institutional reforms that contained and redirected individual materialistic motives in the name of higher collective purposes rather than through appeals to traditional 'collectivist' values.* [13]

As Preston points out,

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11   Chalmers Johnson, MITI and the Japanese Miracle. Stanford 1982, 33.
12   S. J. Woolf, ed., The Nature of Fascism. London 1968, 128.
13   Peter Duus / Daniel I. Okimoto, Fascism and the History of Pre-war Japan: The Failure of a Concept, in: Journal of Asian Studies 39 (1979), 39-64, here 69-70.

fascism's control over the economic order proved ultimately to be for a non-economic purpose, even an anti-economic purpose. Communist effort has been consistently geared to economic development, with military power as an important concomitant objective but deemed a temporary necessity rather than a goal in itself. Fascism placed military preparedness at the forefront of its objectives from at least 1935 on.[14]

To restrain the market forces, the state encouraged the development of non-market governance structures, such as cartels, control associations, and the main bank system. Before the Great Depression, cartels had not fully developed in Japan; control associations did not exist; the indirect financing constituted only about 30 percent of the total capital supply in contrast to 90 percent at present.[15] During the Great Depression, the Japanese state started a program of industrial rationalization. Cartels were established in each industry to control production in order to ease economic hardship by preventing private companies from going bankrupt. The state enacted the Important Industry Law in 1931. According to this law, when two thirds of the companies in one industry joined a cartel, the state had the authority to force the rest of the companies to follow the agreement set by the cartel. If a cartel agreement contradicted "public interest", the state could change or eliminate it. In the 1930s, the state also enacted a series of industry laws, which made every element of business activity in that industry subject to state licensing. This marked the beginning of intensive government regulations that have lasted until present day. On the eve of the Pacific War, the Japanese state promulgated the Important Industry Association Ordinance, which resulted in the establishment of control associations in more than twenty industries. These associations were entrusted by the state with administrative power but were operated by the private sector. They had the authority to decide not only the amount, varieties, and methods of production, but also terms, prices, partners, and timing of transactions. They also had the power to determine profits, dividends, and bonuses.[16] In order to ensure the capital supply to the munitions industries, the main bank system evolved. By the end of World War II, this practice spread into the non-munitions industries as well.[17] The development of these non-market governance structures indicates that the Japanese state not only directly intervened in the economy by itself. It also encouraged the development of non-state institutions that constrained the market forces and placed them under its control. The private sector, under the pressure of

14   Nathaniel Stone Preston, Politics, Economics, and Power: Ideology and Practice Under Capitalism, Socialism, Communism, and Fascism. New York 1967, 210.

15   John O. Haley, Law and Society in Contemporary Japan, Dubuque 1988; Tetsuji Okazaki / Masahiro Okuno, eds., Gendai nihon keizai shisutemu no genryū. Tokyo 1993, 1-34; Kamekichi Takahashi, Nihon keizai tōseiron (On Japanese economic control). Tokyo 1933.

16   Masanori Nakamura, "1950-60 nendai no hihon" (Japan in the 1950s and the 1960s). In Asano Naohiro, Amino Yoshihiko, Ishii Susumu, Kano Masanao, and Hayakawa Shōichi, Iwanami Kōza: nihon tsūshi. Vol. 20. Gindai I. Tokyo 1995, 3-68.

17   Tetsuij Okazaki/Masahiro Okuno, eds., Gendai nihon keizai shisutemu no genryū. Tokyo 1993, 145-182; Jūrō Teranishi, Meinbanku shisutemu., in: Tetsuji Okazaki / Masahiro Okuno, eds., Gendai nihon keizai shisutemu no genryū. Tokyo 1993, 61-96.

nationalism during the war, had to compromise with the state in accepting the state's supervision in order to protect itself from more serious state intervention.

To oppose the profit principle, the state exerted strong pressure on private companies. Before the managed economy, Japan's economic system

> *was very different from its present form … job was separated from permanent employment. There was a high priority toward capital return to share-holders and reward to managers. The present practice of keeping profits within the company for investing in equipment almost did not exist.*[18]

As the state strengthened its control over business activities during the war, the profit principle encountered great challenge. This control was achieved not only through directing the flow of capital into the munitions industries, but also through constraining the property right of shareholders in private companies. The increased indirect financing and the bureaucratic control over dividends gave managers strong autonomy. Through a series of administrative orders by the state following the outbreak of war against China, the job transfer of individual workers was no longer allowed; the starting salary of employees was under the control of the state, and all employees' salaries were raised together once a year.[19] Meanwhile, an industrial patriotic association was established in each company. Unlike the pre-1937 period, where white collar and blue collar workers had belonged to different unions, these industrial patriotic associations included both groups as their members. Thus, "the attempted elimination of the opposed interests of capital and labor were unique to fascism, a deliberate contrast to the class concept accepted by both capitalism and communist Russia".[20]

Third, the ideology of Japanese developmentalism in the era of the managed economy, shared with German and Italian counterparts, also had a strong anticommunist orientation. As an alternative protective countermovement to liberal capitalism, fascism represented "a revolutionary tendency directed as much against conservatism as against the competing revolutionary force of socialism". It was both "counterrevolution and nationalist revisionism." S. J. Woolf points out that

> *[d]espite the sporadic protests of the fascist left wings against big capital and absentee landowners, the regimes rapidly abandoned any attempt radically to change the existing structure of economic power, and endeavored instead to turn this structure to the service of their politically motivated economic aims… The governments in Italy, Germany and Japan had little desire to nationalize industries, for ideological as well as political rea-*

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18   Okazaki/Okuno, eds., Gendai nihon keizai shisutemu no genryū, 18-19.

19   Hideo Kobayashi/Tetsuji Okazaki/Seiichirō Yonekura, 'Nihon kabushiki kaisha' no showashi (The showa history of Japan Inc.). Tokyo 1995; Yukio Noguchi, 1940-nen taisei (The 1940 system). Tokyo 1995; Kōnosuke Otaka, Nihonteki rōshi kankei (The Japanese-style labor relations), in: Tetsuji Okazaki/Masahiro Okuno, eds., Gendai nihon keizai shisutemu no genryū. Tokyo 1993, 145-182.

20   Woolf, ed., Nature of Fascism (note 12), 137.

> *sons…The policy of the regimes was rather to leave the industrial sector in private hands and ensure that it acted in accordance with national 'needs'.*[21]

This character resulted from the politics of practicing industrial policy. A direct control was asserted and pursued by segments of the state. Due to the constraints of the economic situation and resistance of the private sector, however, many policy measures were altered or even failed. The rise of Japanese developmentalism in 1931–1945 did not occur peacefully and the process of transformation was full of resistance and conflicts.[22] As a result, in comparison with the socialist program adopted by the Soviet Union, the control of the Japanese state over the economy did not take the form of nationalizing property right, and the operation of the managed economy was still based on the private ownership. In comparison with New Deal, however, the Japanese state established much stronger control over the economy through both direct bureaucratic intervention and non-market governance structures, no matter how incomplete it might be. This character of Japanese developmentalism in 1931–1945 has some important contemporary implications.

The Postwar Wave of Globalization and the Transformation of Japanese Developmentalism

In the postwar period, the Bretton Woods system and the GATT were established under the leadership of the United States. Both the new international monetary regime and the trade regime became the institutional foundation sustaining a new wave of globalization. Between the late 1940s and the end of the 1960s, the Japanese economic system was reconfigured to cope with this new international economic order. The transformation of Japanese developmentalism in this period, however, can still be divided into two stages. Between the end of World War II and the end of the 1950s, Japan and many West European countries suffered from a shortage of dollars. As a result, they all adopted protectionist policy to guard their domestic markets in order to balance their international payments, despite of the fact that the GATT was in place. Beginning from the second half of the 1950s, the United States began to push the liberalization of trade. A new regime of free trade was finally emerging in the international economy, sustained by the hegemony of the Pax Americana. As Japan joint the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT), it was required to liberalize its imports and foreign currency exchange. Against this new development in the international economic order and the process of globalization, Japanese developmentalism accomplished its final transformation to a trade version by the end of the 1960s. Japanese developmentalism was transformed from the military version to a trade version in the postwar period. Unlike the

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21   Ibid., 129, 136.
22   Akira Hara, Nihon no senji keizai-kokusai hikaku no shiten kara (Japan's wartime economy-from a comparative perspective), in: Akira Hara, ed., Nihon no senji keizai. Tokyo 1995, 3-44.

military version, which had a strong inward orientation, the trade version was aggressively outward. This outward orientation, however, was not cosmopolitan, but nationalistic. The strategic view of the economy still dominated Japanese industrial policy, though serving for a new national purpose. In the 1950s, this orientation aimed at strengthening the nation's power through engaging in international competition. In the 1960s, the strategic view of the economy in Japanese developmentalism was raised to a new level.

Although Japan lost World War II, Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru held that "A defeated nation, by analyzing and exploiting the shifting relations among world powers, could contain the damage incurred in defeat and instead could win the peace."[23] The fall out between liberal capitalism and communist Russia, who used to be the ally in World War II against fascism, provided Japan with a great opportunity to maneuver. Facing the Cold War environment, Yoshida designed a grand strategy for Japan: take the U.S. side politically and militarily in exchange for economic aid and military protection, and in the meantime concentrate Japan's resources on economic growth, while minimizing the spending on national defense. This nationalist economic strategy, however, was challenged by both the conservative who asserted rearmament and the amendment of the constitution, and the progressives who advocated keeping distance from the United States.

In the 1950s, the development of heavy-chemical industries remained the top priority in Japanese industrial policy. Although these industries were no longer centered on the production of weapons, they were still regarded as the foundation, or the strategic components in the industrial structure of the economy, which would maximize Japan's gain in international trade. As the slogan "export or die" indicates, in the 1950s the promotion of exports was directly related to 'national survival'. Japanese economic ideology revised the classical definition of comparative advantage: this no longer meant rich resources or cheap labor that had been given naturally to an economy, but denoted production technology that would add values to products and thus generate more benefits for the nation in international trade. Even Japan did not have this comparative advantage at the time; it had to be obtained by human effort. Production technology was perceived as Japan's only alternative in the 1950s to military force in building the nation's power. Although technology had always had strategic implications to Japan's national security, it was of central importance in Japanese economic ideology in the 1950s, because after learning about the achievements of technological development in the United States, many Japanese concluded that their defeat in World War II was a result of losing the competition in technology.[24]

In this policy paradigm, the state changed its way of intervention. During the war, the ultimate goal of Japanese industrial policy had been to support the military. The state directly controlled the distribution of materials and prices. The function of the market

23   Kenneth B. Pyle, The Japanese Question. Washington, D.C. 1992, 21.

24   Bai Gao, Economic Ideology and Japanese Industrial Policy: Develomentalism from 1931 to 1965, New York 1997.

in resource allocation was largely replaced by bureaucratic control and non-market governance mechanisms. This trend was further strengthened in the occupation period to combat the economic crisis. After the implementation of the Dodge plan in 1949, in contrast, the state still controlled, but by organizing the market competition. It abolished the control over material distribution and prices, and changed the control over credit from direct to indirect. As a result, the market resumed its function and private companies, who had been heavily protected by the state in the managed economy, were forced to the market and had to ensure the supply of capital, materials, and the marketing channels by themselves.[25] Beginning in 1950, the principle of rejecting competition was transformed to restraining "excessive competition."

In contrast to the policy focus on the promotion of competitiveness of Japanese companies in strategic industries in the 1950s, the interpretation of the national power of production was further extended in the 1960s to the high growth rate of the entire economy. It aimed not simply at sustaining economic growth or adjusting for market fluctuations, but at "achieving economic growth at a much quicker pace than other countries." In this policy paradigm, macro-financial policy was directly tied to industrial policy. Government planning and public spending were regarded as important means to sustain economic growth, The state increased public spending aggressively in an effort to promote infrastructure, human capital, social welfare, and science and technology, and to upgrade the industrial structure of the Japanese economy by moving quickly toward the heavy-chemical industries. The high growth policy distinguished Japanese developmentalism from liberal capitalism. After World War II, Keynesian economics became influential in state policy in most industrialized countries. Although the application of this economics had often gone beyond the short-term adjustment of market fluctuations, the policy objectives in Western industrialized countries were basically full employment, a welfare state, or economic growth in general. In the Japanese case, however, macro-financial policy was directly applied to sustain high growth, upgrade the industrial structure of the economy, and to strengthen the national competitiveness in international trade. These differences suggest that when Western economic ideas were diffused throughout Japanese policy making, they were often applied in a "developmental" way. The strategic view of the economy was further reflected in the state's effort to mobilize the whole country into the "new industrial system" (*shinsangyō-taisei*).

The anti-capitalist orientation, measured in restraining market competition and the profit principle, reemerged in new forms in the postwar period after they had been strongly challenged during the occupation. Although the Japanese economy of the 1950s is often called a "free economy" (Jiyū keizai) in contrast to the managed economy, it was considerably different from the Anglo-Saxon type of liberal capitalism. To be true, the dissolution of zaibatsu and the enactment of the antimonopoly law in the late 1940s encouraged market competition. To promote exports, however, the state revised the an-

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timonopoly law twice, providing the legitimacy for business reorganization. As a result of democratic reforms, the prewar type of holding companies, which had the power to control capital and personnel of their subordinates, did not come back, and in comparison with the prewar period, the order of market competition became more unstable.[26] Nevertheless, cross-shareholding and the exchange of personnel, which had been prohibited in the 1947 antimonopoly law, became legal again. Former zaibatsu companies, represented by Mitsubishi and Mitsui, began to reorganize themselves into keiretsu after temporary dissolution during the occupation. These keiretsu networks, centered around large commercial banks, provided manufacturers with reliable finance in pursuing technological transfers and investments in production equipment. At the same time, the Japanese state restrained the market competition in strategic industries through intensive government regulations. To nurture the competitiveness of Japanese companies in strategic industries, the state continued to restrain imports of foreign products to Japan. To promote exports, the state also controlled foreign exchange. Finally, cartels, which had been a critical instrument in Japanese industrial policy since the Great Depression, were again allowed to combat economic recession and to promote rationalization after being outlawed since 1947. In the managed economy, the function of these non-market mechanisms was to counter the Great Depression and to prevent the market forces from disturbing the nation's goal of ensuring the production of munitions industries. In the 1950s, their function was to prevent the market forces from scattering capital supply, to nurture the competitiveness of Japanese companies; and to keep an industrial order in rapid economic growth.

The industrial reorganization in the late 1960s in light of liberalization of foreign direct investment (FDI) served to restrain the market competition in order to increase the economy of scale. It was argued that foreign companies could cut the price down as their advantage in capital enhanced their economies of scale. In order to compete with them, Japanese companies must be organized into an industrial system which would not only coordinate capital investment and organize each industry's distribution system, but also encourage mergers among large Japanese companies in order to increase the economy of scale. All these measures became a big issue concerning the antimonopoly law. Supported by the state, however, they were carried out anyway. As a result, keiretsu witnessed a new wave of development and became major players in the international competition. The practice of relational contracting, as history would indicate later, constrained the market competition considerably. It especially restrained the access of foreign companies to the Japanese markets.

After the free trade regime pushed Japanese developmentalism to adapt to the new environment of an open economy, the private ordering became increasingly important and the power of state bureaucracy began to decline. The settlement of the "private ordering" in the governance of the Japanese economy reflected the continuities of not only the

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26   Akira Hara, Nihon no senji keizai-kokusai hikaku no shiten kara (Japan's wartime economy-from a comparative perspective), in: Akira Hara, ed., Nihon no senji keizai. Tokyo 1995, 91.

anti-capitalist orientation of constraining the market competition, but also the anti-communist orientation which rejected the direct control by the state. This development directly resulted from the politics of building the new industrial system. At the time, MITI proposed the "state-private sector coordination," which would give the state the power to supervise each loan made by commercial banks.[27] MITI's proposal was perceived as "reviving the direct bureaucratic control" and was strongly resisted by big commercial banks. Resisting MITI's bureaucratic control, the private sector came up with a proposal of "independent adjustment." Eventually MITI's efforts for enacting the "Law Concerning Special Measurement for Promoting Strategic Industries" were blocked, and the "independent adjustment" proposed by the private sector through non-market and non-state institutions turned out to be the major instrument to meet the challenge of the liberalization of trade and capital investment.

This development has a strong contemporary implication. With this settlement, the division of labor between the state and the private sector was redefined. Beginning at that time, the Japanese state began to depend more strongly on administrative guidance in its economic intervention. At the same time, the state relaxed its antimonopoly law; in the late 1960s it encouraged further industrial reorganization among big companies through mergers in order to strengthen the competitiveness of Japanese companies. Supported by the state, the industrial reorganization under the policy paradigm of liberalization resulted in a further development of non-market governance mechanisms, which privatized the protection of Japan's domestic markets. As a result, not only keiretsu emerged as the major player in the international competition, various social regulations of the market such as trade associations also created a big problem for foreign companies to access the Japanese market. Although Japan's domestic markets were opened, they were still tightly protected by both vertical and horizontal business alliances that practiced relational contracting.

In the postwar period, the profit principle was rejected again in the management of Japanese companies. This principle influenced the business strategy in the rationalization movement in the early 1950s in which Japanese companies made massive layoffs in an effort to reduce production cost. In the mid 1950s, progressive business leaders who gathered at the Japan Committee of Economic Development (Nihon Keizai Dōyūkai) initiated the productivity movement with the support by the state, aiming at taking labor unions into their program of promoting exports. In order to pursue comparative advantage in production technology, some large companies made a historical trade-off. They started giving up allocative efficiency as measured in short-term cost-benefit analyses; this had been their primary concern in the early 1950s. In exchange they wanted to gain labor's cooperation in technological innovation and quality control; to do this, they were required by labor unions to provide job security and to increase salaries. During this process, the traditional value of harmony was strategically advocated by business leaders

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27   Kent E. Calder, Strategic Capitalism. Princeton 1994.

to smooth the relationship between management and labor, which had been an arena of constant confrontation for a decade. Labor's response was divided. The majority of labor unions still remained skeptical, but one third of labor unions decided to cooperate with management. The so-called Takano Minoru line of the labor movement, which had advocated political confrontations with management, was replaced by the Ōta Kaoru-Iwai Akira line which emphasized gaining economic benefits through the spring strikes.[28] The solution to the labor conflicts was not widely accepted until the mid 1960s. As the Miike strike of 1960 indicates, a major labor dispute at the national level was to come soon. Nevertheless, the productivity movement had marked the beginning of the effort to stabilize labor relations.

The rejection of the profit principle was supported in part by a side-effect of democratic reforms. At the end of the war, there was a possibility for Japanese management to return to the prewar tradition. Nevertheless, the zaibatsu dissolution destroyed a core of the prewar corporate system. When the members of zaibatsu families were removed from managerial posts, management was finally separated from ownership. As a result, those who fought hard with the state to protect profits were replaced by a new generation of managers, and employee sovereignty was established. Supported by the main bank system, these managers obtained more autonomy. They aggressively engaged in the competition in long-term investment.[29] Besides, after the land reform and labor reform democratized Japanese society, equality became a widely-spread ideal. Under such circumstances, the wartime practice of ensuring job security and annual wage increase were regarded as desirable.[30] In the 1960s, the Japanese management system, characterized by permanent employment, the seniority-based wage scale, and company-based labor unions, was eventually institutionalized among large Japanese companies.

In the 1950s, despite the fact that some Japanese business leaders started their efforts to stabilize labor relations through the productivity movement, the impact of the confrontational strategy adopted by both management and labor still remained strong, there were still some considerable resistance and doubts to this initiative on both sides. A major confrontation eventually took place between the two sides at the national level during the Miike strike in 1960 when Mitsui Company intended to lay off more than six thousand workers in the Miike coal mine. The Miike dispute became a turning point in the postwar Japanese labor relations. Although this dispute ended with labor's failure, it forced the state, business leaders and labor unions to reexamine the confrontational strategies they had adopted. Labor unions realized that the national level and industry level confrontations could not effectively protect their interest; they decided to fully participate in the productivity movement. Management also keenly recognized the huge

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28　Masanori Nakamura, 1950-60 nendai no hihon (Japan in the 1950s and the 1960s), in: Asano Naohiro / Amino Yoshihiko / Ishii Susumu / Kano Masanao / Hayakawa Shōichi, Iwanami Kōza: nihon tsūshi. Vol. 20. Gindai I. Tokyo 1995, 37-38.

29　Hideo Kobayashi / Okazaki Tetsuji / Yonekura Seiichirō, 'Nihon kabushiki kaisha' no showashi (The showa history of Japan Inc.). Tokyo 1995, 126.

30　Esuke Sakakibara, Shihonshugi no oeta nihon (Japan that transcended capitalism). Tokyo 1990.

cost involved in the confrontational strategy. As the labor market became favorable to the supply side for the first time in 1963, management also lost its leverage over labor unions. In order to ensure the supply of labor, permanent employment became widely institutionalized. Previously the state had regarded labor disputes as an issue of public security. Now it realized that in order to sustain a rapid economic growth without major social disturbance, it had to treat labor relation as an issue of social policy.

Concluding Remarks

By the end of the 1960s, the transformation of Japanese developmentalism from the military version to a trade version was largely accomplished. Even though many original components of the wartime economic system changed in appearance, the general principles that had been established between 1931 and 1945 remained. Amaya Naoyasu, a young MITI bureaucrat, commented in the early 1960s that

> The United States and Europe replaced their wartime practices in the postwar period with the social and economic continuities that originated in the nineteenth century. The operation of their postwar economies simply took the form of returning to the prewar tradition. Japan, in contrast, never returned to its prewar tradition. Something new, yet quite different, was born, which was strongly influenced by the wartime economy. Although the economy as a whole admitted the ideology of free economy, the market was vertically divided… Unlike the markets in the U.S. and Europe, which have high horizontal mobility, the Japanese market is vertically divided into several markets and each of them is topped by a commercial bank… Based on these social conditions, the government intervened in various ways.

In the postwar period, the principle of coordination changed from restoring economic order after the Great Depression and mobilizing resources for national survival during World War II to promoting economic growth. As a result, the means of coordination also changed significantly. Unlike the situation during the wartime, after 1952 the state no longer directly controlled the distribution of production materials and consumer products. Although the state still applied various policy tools to affect the behavior of private corporations, it could no longer use coercive power to achieve its goal. Sustained by the Bretton Woods system, the state was able to rely on an expansionary monetary policy to promote economic growth and meanwhile maintain a stable exchange rate with the dollar. Engaged in asymmetric cooperation with the United States, the state aimed at maximizing Japan's gains in international trade by promoting exports.

However, these institutions and mechanisms, designed to strengthen coordination, also weakened shareholders' control over management and banks' monitoring of corporate finance. They also encouraged moral hazard behavior: Banks lent money aggressively without close scrutiny of their corporate borrowers, and corporations borrowed and invested money aggressively at a level far beyond their capital worth. Excessive competition

for market share led both to the banks' over-lending and to the corporations' over-borrowing. Although MITI regarded the resulting excessive competition as a major threat to Japanese corporations' economies of scale and to Japan's international competitiveness, the vested political interest was too strong for any possible reform. The close relationship between coordination and excessive competition is the key to understanding not only how high growth was institutionally sustained but also the contingent dependence of the Japanese economic system on the international economic order and state policy mix. The implication is that when the contingent conditions that had tolerated excessive competition began to change after the collapse of the Bretton Woods system in the early 1970s, the Japanese economic system was destined to malfunction. In this sense, the ideologies and institutions of Japanese developmentalism which evolved between the 1930s and the early 1970s had already contained the built-in mechanisms that eventually led to the bubble economy in the 1980s and its burst in the early 1990s.[31]

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31   Bai Gao, Japan's Economic Dilemma: The Institutional Origins of Prosperity and Stagnation. New York 2001.

Development and its Antidotes: Pakistan's Colonial Legacies and Post-Independence Strategies

Imran Ali

RESÜMEE

Der Beitrag untersucht die langfristigen Wirkungen kolonialer Herrschaft auf die sozioökonomische Entwicklung Pakistans und beleuchtet die entwicklungspolitischen Anstrengungen des Landes in den ersten drei Jahrzehnten staatlicher Unabhängigkeit. Die hier behandelte Epoche begann und endete mit einschneidenden Ereignissen: mit der Gewinnung staatlicher Unabhängigkeit infolge der Teilung Britisch Indiens im Jahre 1947 und dem Sturz der zivilen Regierung durch das Militär. Die entwicklungspolitischen Aktivitäten dieser Jahre spiegeln emblematisch die Möglichkeiten und Grenzen wider, denen viele Länder des entkolonisierten ‚global South' ausgesetzt waren. Die Diskussion soll zeigen, dass die Dekolonisierung, hier verstanden als ein Prozess der Gewinnung staatlicher Souveränität, aus sozioökonomischer Perspektive keineswegs als eine Zäsur aufgefasst werden kann.

I.

The term 'development', even within its more contextualized notion of 'economic development', has acquired a universalism and pervasiveness accorded to few other terms in human history. Its use is related closely to the almost extreme polarization in the world economy that emerged, and was consolidated, during the period of colonial ascendancy of the people of Western Europe and their overseas settler populations. If economic development equated with the post-1750 enterprise of industrialization, then Europe's colonial possessions remained singularly bereft of this resource. Only Japan, perhaps the sole country to escape western imperialism, was able to industrialize. Only Japan transferred some industrial assets to its colonial possessions, in north-east Asia, mainly because

they were geographically contiguous, which was not the case with most of Europe's colonies.[1] Moreover, the regions of European demographic appropriation witnessed either a physical annihilation of their indigenous populations, or their inexorable reduction to a racial underclass. Especially in North America, these regions also excelled in industrial development, as well as high living standards for its white settler communities.[2]

Meanwhile, the global economy itself was reshaped. According to some propositions this restructuring took the lines of a developed, 'metropolitan' segment of industrial economies, which were serviced for raw materials, labour resources and consumer markets, by a much larger group of undeveloped, or 'underdeveloped', and presumably dependent, 'satellite' economies.[3] It was the latter that, following de-linking from overt imperialist control, were expected to achieve economic development. This was to be clearly within a capitalist mode, in order to preserve the politico-economic interests of the industrialized economies on the one hand, and the emergent native intermediary groups on the other. Preference for the socialist-communist alternative would bring severe retribution, as experienced with the counter-revolutionary retaliations in southern Africa and South America, and the even more genocidal Vietnam War, in which over two million casualties were inflicted on an Asian peasant population by the emergent imperialist protagonist, the United States. These conflicts, spanning the very decades of post-colonial experience with which we are concerned here, could very well be termed from the sufferers' perspective as the 'War on Equality'.

Moreover, such 'development' was supposed to occur in societies severely handicapped by the imperialist impact, through the displacement of indigenous institutions, and the warping of political systems, economic structures and human resources to feed the strategic imperatives of imperial extraction and control. While the relative quality of human assets clearly varied over the colonized spectrum, there were many underlying similarities.[4] The vast majority of the populations in the colonized regions remained impoverished, with limited or no access to the 'modern' sector in terms of education, health, communications, electrical energy and other services. They remained essentially rural-based, and were either tribal or peasant in composition. They seriously lacked the educational and productive capacities that had been generated among the 'masses' in the industrialized economies, and which over time became critical inputs into both reducing

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1   See on this topic especially the work of Bruce Cummings, such as: The origins and development of the Northeast Asian political economy: Industrial sectors, product cycles and political consequences., in: International Organization 38, no. 1 (Winter 1984a): 1-40. For a further analysis see Atul Kohli, Where Do High Growth Poltical Economies Come From? The Japanese Lineage of Korea's Developmental State, in: World Development 22, no. 9 (1994): 1269-1293.

2   Stanley F. Engerman / Kenneth L. Sokoloff, Factor Endowments, Inequality and Paths of Development Among New World Economies, in: Economia 3 (Fall 2002): 41-109.

3   There is an extensive extant literature on this subject. See among others the works of Samir Amin, Paul Baran, Andre Guntur Frank and Immanuel Wallerstein.

4   See, for example, Daron Acemoglu / Simon Johnson / James A. Robinson, The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development. An Empirical Investigation, in: American Economic Review 91 (December 2001): 1369-1401.

inequality and gaining competitive advantage.[5] With smaller cities, owing to a restricted industrial and service sector, the urban working class also by and large remained inconsequential till decolonization. Most urban workers remained concentrated in the informal sector, working around traditional labour forms: the proportions in formal secondary sector enterprise remained miniscule.

The elites that inherited power in these societies, too, were hardly positioned for the endeavour of development. A traditional upper element of either large landlords or tribal heads had played an intermediary role between colonial rulers and subjugated people. After decolonization they were more likely to be a hindrance rather than a catalyst for change. A more 'westernized' educated segment manned the professions and the public administration structure. Strategies for development were more likely to emanate from this source. However, productive outcomes could be limited because of the professional bourgeoisie's politico-social weaknesses and, in many societies, by its marginalization by more atavistic identities and ideologies.[6] The implementation incapacities of the native bureaucracy, as well as its predilection for rent seeking, could be a further constraint to the realization of 'rational' development. The commercial bourgeoisie, from which was also spawned much of the post-colonial industrialist class, was equally unqualified for achieving rapid development. The economy was anyway dominated in most cases by immigrant or minority ethnic groups, or by expatriate colonial enterprise. It could hardly compete outside of the micro-enterprise sector with the overwhelming market shares taken by the products and services of multinational firms and financial institutions. Formal sector business enterprise was not only limited in scale and scope, but it was incapacitated from achieving the wider goals of a 'bourgeois revolution' by its own rent-seeking proclivities, fuelled by rapidly formed alliances with state functionaries.[7]

The extent of the developmental task facing the newly decolonized economies appears even more formidable, in the light of the deep seated nature of the historical transitions involved in actually achieving such developmental goals. As the experience of the European subcontinent itself showed, fundamental transformations were entailed over an exhaustive range of domains. Institutions and patterns of behaviour underwent irreversible metamorphoses in the demographic, cultural, economic, political, social, religious and technological spheres. The European world was indeed 'turned upside down', though not in all cases with the same rapidity and clearly not concurrently.[8] This process was rife with tension and conflict, as with sectarian wars, the carving out of nation states, and the growing intensification of national rivalries. The continuing acrimony between these

5   Stanley L. Engerman / Kenneth L. Sokoloff, Colonialism, Inequality and Long-Run Paths of Development. National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 11057 (2005).

6   For a discussion of these issues in the Pakistani context, see Imran Ali, Historical Impacts on Political Economy in Pakistan, in: Asian Journal of Management Cases 1, no. 2 (2004).

7   In the Pakistani case, see Imran Ali, Business, Stakeholders and Strategic Responses in Pakistan. Armidale: University of New England Asian Centre Papers, no. 8 (2005).

8   See the works among others of Philippe Aries, Phyllis Deane, Christopher Hill, Eric Hobsbawm, David Landes, Peter Mathias and Douglas C. North.

'developed' states eventually culminated in the two most disastrous catharses of institutionalized slaughter in human history, known as the first and second 'world wars'.

Additionally, contemporary developing countries clearly cannot replicate the extensive colonial depredations on the rest of humanity, a process that played an integral role in the economic success of Europe. Since the colonial resource is simply not available to them, the prospects of successful development become even more problematical. Outside Europe, the Japanese case again illustrates the need for colonial possessions as a necessary appendage to an industrializing economy, with its associated human turmoil inflicted on the Asian mainland, and the sanguinary war for resources and markets with the United States. Moreover, in both the Soviet Union and China, the communist alternative was equally, if not in greater measure, accompanied by a scale of human sacrifice and suffering that can hardly make it a palatable option. Even more unequivocally, the mass killings of indigenous peoples in such regions of white settlement as North America and Australia exclude them from providing any kind of 'model' of development that is not altogether reprehensible.

There is also a need to guard against the tendency to adopt a normative development template for a wide range of societies, which might otherwise appear quite similar because of a convergence in economic indicators. Thus measures such as gross domestic product, per capita incomes and income-based social segmentation, literacy levels, health and demographic data, sector share of agriculture as opposed to industry and services, and exports per capita, might induce the lumping together of such economies for analysis.[9] Solutions, or development strategies, might also be proposed, especially from metropolitan sources, without due regard for the structural peculiarities and historical differences between such societies. The structural adjustment programmes of the International Monetary Fund are one example of a deductive policy format that has been directed at economies with widely disparate characteristics and politico-social structures.[10] An understanding of the historical processes that have shaped these economies, and of the actual conditions that prevail there, and which thereby militate against a convergence approach, will help to specify the kinds of developmental problems facing these regions.

In the ensuing analysis of Pakistan, my effort will be to identify the critical impact of colonial policies and strategies in this region, and how these interrelated with political and socio-economic trends in the post-colonial period. The outcomes therein comprise a discussion of both colonial legacies and of Pakistan's own formative experiments with development, specifically during the first three decades of its existence. These latter years

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9   The Millenium Development Goals adopted by the United Nations are on such current example. Somewhat earlier, the wave of 'sustainable development' thinking generated its own efforts at comparative indices, on which see Imran Ali, "Indicators for Sustainable Development: A Southern Perspective", World Wildlife Fund for Nature Report, submitted to United Nations Council for Sustainable Development, April 1995; and conference Paper, Conference on Green Economics, Islamabad, September 1995.

10 Pakistan itself was brought within the structural adjustment programme parameters in the 1990s, when it had to seek financial relief from the IMF, owing to a combination of high fiscal deficits, trade imbalances and rising and unsustainable levels of domestic and foreign debt.

commenced and concluded with epochal turns: the winning of independence through a partition of British India in 1947, and the overthrow of a civilian government and assumption of power by a military ruler in 1977. The experiences of the intervening years provide an intriguing insight into developmental challenges and opportunities. They also articulate several themes that are germane to the dilemmas concerning development raised in the foregoing discussion of this article. Moreover, the patterns we encounter in this period could also challenge the assumption that decolonization was as critical a watershed as is assumed in historical and social sciences analysis.

II

The notion of development under British rule was at one level similar for the Pakistan area as for other non-white colonies. A general understanding prevailed among those tied to the venture of empire that the colonial authority represented a 'civilizing' force, which would oversee the wellbeing of subjects, in particular in the agrarian sector. These regions were also visualized as remaining predominantly agrarian economies, with the majority of the population retaining its rural roots, and with no great departure of the economy into the industrial and service sectors.[11] The concern for agricultural viability was symbiotically tied to the need for political and social stability. This imperative was in turn driven by two critical factors. One was the need to achieve revenue sustainability, in order to bear the colonial administrative and military burden without drawing on metropolitan resources. The other goal was to make commodity production marketable, to help meet metropolitan demands for food and industrial raw materials, as well as to enhance local demand for manufactured products, which were in turn predominantly imported from the colonial home base.

In the Indus basin, the area that became Pakistan, the reinforcement of the agrarian order was especially intense.[12] An extensive network of perennial canals, laid out on arid terrain from the late nineteenth century, was accompanied by unprecedented social engineering through agricultural colonization and land settlement. This process led to extensive economic growth, unrivalled anywhere else in the British Indian Empire. This irrigation infrastructure has since provided the agricultural backbone to the contemporary Pakistani economy, which now enjoys a cultivated area of over 20 million hectares. The granting of hitherto barren canal irrigated land to those who already possessed land, to some extent larger landowners but to a far greater degree the upper peasantry, and accompanied

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11 For the Pakistan region, the works of Malcolm Darling, a colonial administrator, graphically illustrate the concern for retaining a predominantly agrarian economy and for maintaining the viability of smallholder production. See especially Malcolm Darling, The Punjab Peasant in Prosperity and Debt. London 1947. See also H. C. Calvert, The Wealth and Welfare of the Punjab. Lahore 1936.

12 We will exclude here any detailed discussion of 'East' Pakistan, which was a part of the province of Bengal in British India till 1947, then a province of Pakistan till 1971, and thereafter became the independent nation of Bangladesh after seceding from Pakistan.

by the exclusion of the peasant underclass, helped to consolidate colonial alliances with rural intermediaries. The bulk of land grants given in the newly canal irrigated tracts, known in the province of Punjab as the 'canal colonies', were in smallholdings of up to 25 hectares. Grantees were carefully selected from settled villages for migration to the new canal irrigated tracts. The retention of the individualized peasant farm, as the unit of ownership and production, was upheld through the decades of agricultural colonization to the mid-twentieth century; and was pithily envisioned as follows:

> *It seemed essential to preserve the Punjab as a country of peasant farmers. No other frame of society is at present either possible or desirable in the Province…. (T)he size of individual holdings has been fixed on a scale which will, it is hoped, attract the sturdy, the well-to-do, and the enterprising classes without excluding men of smaller sources and more broken fortunes.*[13]

The social origins of the smallholder land grantees were not from the landless masses, but from the socially and economically dominant 'agricultural castes' of incumbent upper peasant landholding lineages. These were the same elements from whom the British drew land revenue, the chief source of income for the colonial state, and whose 'proprietary rights' in agricultural land they had in turn recognized. Indeed, through the Alienation of Lands Act of 1901, unique to the Punjab, the British went as far as restricting the social market for land in favour of these incumbents, by disallowing 'non-agricultural castes' from purchasing their lands.[14] Through this and further legislation controlling mortgage foreclosures, the colonial authority hoped to forestall the impact of market forces, but thereby also retard the development of agricultural capitalism and innovation, in order to secure political 'stability'. Moreover, it was from this favoured landed peasant segment that the British almost exclusively drew recruits for the native army. Not entirely by coincidence, such recruitment was especially intense in the Punjab, which alone provided over half the manpower for the British Indian army.[15]

The more established rural elite also obtained a sizeable aggregate allotment of canal land, in the form of larger sized land grants stretching in some cases to hundreds of hectares. This class provided a useful intermediary function between the colonial rulers and the subjugated, and in the Indus basin its acquisition of significant new landed resources greatly enhanced its socio-political resilience.[16] The underlying nexus of the granting of

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13   Letter of Revenue Secretary, Punjab, to Revenue and Agriculture Secretary, Government of India, 22 July 1891, Punjab Revenue and Agriculture (Irrigation) Proceedings, India Office Records, British Library, London, July 1891, no. 19.

14   Norman G. Barrier, The Punjab Alienation of Land Bill of 1900. Durham, N.C. 1966; and Peter H. M. van den Dungen, The Punjab Tradition. London 1962.

15   See Tan Tai Yong, The Garrison State: The Military, Government and Society in Colonial Punjab. Delhi 2005.

16   For more details on the land grants to the rural elite, and for an analysis of the process of agricultural colonization and its impacts, see Imran Ali, The Punjab under Imperialism, 1885–1947. Princeton, N.J. 1988 (reprints Delhi 1989 and Karachi 2003).

land as a reward for services to the colonial authority was well established, as in the following communication from the provincial to the central government:

> *In every district there are men of this stamp who have for years given loyal assistance to the officers of Government, while since the commencement of the War many instances have come to … notice of excellent work in connection with recruitment to the army, the maintenance of public order, and the suppression of the revolutionary movement…. (T)he bestowal of grants of land … will be widely appreciated and encourage and stimulate the growing ideal of civic duty throughout the province.*[17]

On the other hand, the landless rural masses were universally excluded, through official policy, from occupancy or proprietary access to canal land. Demeaned to the lowly status of 'service castes', and even termed as 'menials' in official colonial records, the landless population was expected to provide the vital labour input for agricultural expansion, but not to hope for a dilution of hierarchical and economic disabilities. Thus, the new agrarian frontier created by canal irrigation and colonization served to both entrench inequalities and to strengthen the upper elements of the rural hierarchy; and these processes continued to have major ramifications for post-colonial political economy.[18] The exclusion of the underclass, comprising the large majority of the rural population, was expressed by the colonial authority as follows:

> *It appears however to Government a sound principle that in making selections of grants of Government waste, tenants, labourers and other landless men should not as a rule be chosen, as their selection involves the aggravation of the difficulty, already acutely felt, of obtaining agricultural labour, and it is obviously undesirable that Government should use its position as the proprietor of large tracts in such a way as to upset the existing social and economic order. Tenants and landless men will derive advantage from colonisation proceedings by the diminution of pressure in their home districts, and by the opening given to them as labourers and subtenants in the newly opened tracts.*[19]

The providers of these labour services, and those conducting commercial activities, were actually made to pay a ground rent for living in the new settlements, an impost from which the land grantees were immune. The following rationale for this is also indicative of the rulers' attitudes towards the masses:

> *Its object was to secure a return to Government from the vagrant hordes, who administered to the needs of the agricultural classes, shopkeepers, dealers, brokers, menials, artisans and the like – the flotsam and jetsam of the colony population. The right of Government to tax persons, who exploited the prosperity of the newly settled tracts for*

17   Letter of Revenue Secretary, Punjab, to Revenue and Agriculture Secretary, Government of India, 5 March 1917, Punjab Revenue and Agriculture (Irrigation) Proceedings, India Office Records, British Library, London, May 917, no. 51.
18   Imran Ali, The Historical Lineages of Poverty and Exclusion in Pakistan, in: South Asia 25, no. 2 (August 2002).
19   Punjab Government, Press Communique, 8 December 1914, File J/301/1179 A, Board of Revenue, Lahore, Pakistan: 193-195.

their private advantage, will hardly be disputed. Without some organised scheme of allot-
ment, moreover, these persons would have swarmed promiscuously around every abadi,
reproducing the squalor and congestion of the old homes, which it was the ambition of
the Colony officers to avoid.[20]

In this emergent hydraulic society, the institutions of an authoritarian state were also
reinforced during colonialism. The civil bureaucracy gained stature, through control of
the water source and the granting and transfers of land. Even the subordinate, native
segment, whose successors were to claim the high grounds of public decision making
after independence, gained arbitrary and rent receiving aptitudes. The implementation
of the extensive agricultural colonization programme, requiring a myriad of mutations,
land transfers, tenurial conditions, and lease and sale transactions, created abundant
opportunities for graft and misdemeanour, as well as for the exercise of arbitrary author-
ity. Irrigation officials not only controlled the water source in an arid ecology, but they
also assessed water rates on canal irrigated crops, which further enhanced their coercive
power. Mutually advantageous relations, especially with the larger landholders who had
the resources to bribe or patronize such officials, actually led to serious leakage of state
revenues. Audit reports of district offices and government procedures in the 1930s re-
vealed that the British were quite cognizant of these malpractices in the native bureau-
cracy. Yet they were indisposed to implement remedies, either because they were unable
or unwilling to reform and thereby possibly alienate an important support mechanism of
colonial rule. The whirlwind of bureaucratic inefficiency and rapacity, and the corrosive
deinstitutionalization that this bred, was to be reaped by the new nation.[21]
The military also became a major absorber of landed resources, through soldier settle-
ment and large-scale breeding of military animals on tenured grants. Initially directed
at pensioners, the scale of land grants to ex-soldiers was greatly extended and redirected
to war veterans during the two world wars: a level of gratification that no other region
of British India could replicate. Extensive areas were reserved for the breeding of cav-
alry horses, either through regimental and private stud farm grants or more commonly
through smallholder horse-breeding grants. Apprehensive that an international emer-
gency might disrupt supplies to the cavalry, the British endeavoured to build a country
capacity within India. However, they were doing so when the cavalry horse was itself
becoming obsolete in the technology of warfare. The militarization of the economy of
the Indus basin, the other aspect of which was the heavy recruitment from this region
to the British Indian army, was again to have major impacts on the political economy of
Pakistan after 1947.[22]

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20   Report on the Chenab Colony Settlement. Lahore 1915: para. 153. *Abadi* means the village residential site.
21   Imran Ali, The Sinews of Governance: Bureaucracy, Narrative and Power under Colonialism and Independence,
      in: The Pakistan Development Review 45, no. 4 II (Winter 2006): 1255-1262.
22   Imran Ali, Malign Growth: Agricultural Colonization and the Roots of Backwardness in the Punjab, in: Past and
      Present 114 (February 1987): 110-132.

The nationalist movement in the Pakistan territory also remained at best nascent and incipient, in contrast to the area that became India. In the elections consequent to the Government of India Act of 1935, the Hindu majority provinces of British India had voted for the Indian National Congress, against the landlord nominees preferred by the British.[23] While this power reversal might have reflected the dislocations of the economic depression of the 1930s, it also foretold the demise of British rule and a subsequent programme of land reforms in India. In the Pakistan area, except for the Frontier province where allies of the Congress made some headway, the pro-British landlord segment remained dominant, indicating that this nexus still enjoyed the support of the enfranchised upper peasantry.[24] Especially in the vital Punjab province, the new agrarian resources, brought about by canal irrigation, helped to dilute the adversities of the depression. As a result, the nationalist movement remained relatively weak and failed to secure a significant presence in the Indus zone till the very eve of the cathartic transitions of partition and independence.

Hence, agrarian land settlement and economic growth presumably served to retard nationalism, since the major landed resources conferred on the rural gentry and upper peasantry ensured the continued allegiance of these segments to British rule.[25] Moreover, the major Muslim nationalist party, the Muslim League, lacked the organizational and institutional capabilities of the Congress: it was more a fledgling caucus of landed elite elements. Therefore its formulations on development remained inconsequential before 1947, except that it remained heavily aligned with the upper agrarian hierarchy. No economic policy framework was developed in any coherent and systematic form and pronouncements on economic issues by League leaders prior to independence remained general and rhetorical in nature. The Muslim League also failed to replicate the Indian National Congress' readiness to seek funding from and build alliances with the business community, partly because Muslim business itself was weak and fragmented, especially in the Muslim majority areas that became Pakistan.

After independence, the continuing weakness of political organizations reflected their retarded development prior to 1947. The contrast with the political stability and policy continuities provided in India by the Congress under Nehru were again quite dramatic. One contributor to the ongoing deinstitutionalization in Pakistan was the factionalism of the landlord stratum. While remaining socially prominent, though mostly recently arisen from peasant ranks, it displayed an inability to run or develop the institutions of an independent state. It lost the initiative in policy making to its other partners in Pakistan's authoritarian power structure. This was the civil bureaucracy and, increasingly, the military. All three, in the face of the denial of democratic rights to the Pakistani

23   See D. A. Low, ed., The Congress and the Raj. New York 1977.
24   See D. A. Low, ed., The Political Inheritance of Pakistan. London 1991.
25   Imran Ali, The Punjab and the Retardation of Nationalism, in: ibid., pp. 29-52. See also Imran Ali, Relations between the Muslim League and the Panjab National Unionist Party, 1935–1947, in: South Asia 6 (1976): 51-65.

people, were obliged to seek quick succour in returning to a subordinated relationship with Western power.

One further constraint on development remained the emasculation of the entrepreneurial element. This had been predominantly non-Muslim in composition, and had to migrate to India in 1947 as a consequence of communal conflict. The major portion of the professional class was also lost in this manner. Economic nationalism, or grievances against the rising class of essentially non-Muslim traders, financiers and processors in a predominantly Muslim region, could have been an underlying, though understated, factor behind the creation of Pakistan. After 1947 Muslim commercial groups began to fill the vacuum created by the flight of capital and entrepreneurial skills. In the port city of Karachi refugees from western India provided a mercantile class, as in the Punjab did upcountry entrepreneurs, that had hitherto concentrated in the leather trade shunned by Hindus. These petty traders saw significant new opportunities opening up in the new country. Pakistan at its inception was predominantly agrarian. Though a major supplier of raw cotton to Indian and overseas markets, it had only one textile mill; and also a single sugar mill. The pre-1947 neglect of the secondary sector was clearly there to be filled.[26]

III

The initial post-1947 period in Pakistan was taken up by trying to ensure survival, but with time distinct economic strategies emerged. In the beginning, the countless casualties from communal conflict, the massive task of resettlement of refugees, and the onerous one of obtaining an assets division with India, and of securing its own share of the gold reserves in order to float a currency, took up the early efforts of the administration. Profits from the trade upturn during the Korean War provided the first opportunity for investment in industry, with mercantile groups beginning to enter manufacturing.[27] Thereafter the state retained a focus on private sector industrial development till the end of the 1960s. An incentive and subsidy based policy of induced industrialization was adopted, with markets for domestic goods protected from foreign competition, and raw material pricing and project financing at concessionary rates. Thus the early focus of national economic management envisaged the establishment of import-substituting industries. Large scale capital intensive industry was, however, dependent on the import of capital goods, for which indigenous capacity continued to remain undeveloped.

The lack of a strong and broad based political organization meant that socio-political stakeholders had a restrained access to policy making. Therefore distortions were bound to appear, at least in the perceptions of competing interest groups, and with time these

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26   Imran Ali, Business and Power in Pakistan, in: Power and Civil Society in Pakistan, ed. Anita Weiss / S. Zulfiqar Gilani. Karachi 2001.

27   See Imran Ali / Ambreen Zaman, Early Growth of Business Enterprise in Pakistan: 1947–1958. Lahore: Lahore University of Management Sciences (henceforth LUMS) Case 14-080-870-1 (1987).

dissonances became strong enough to challenge national strategies and even national integrity. While the larger landlords could preserve their class interests and average incomes, agricultural growth rates as a whole stagnated in the 1950s. Adequate resource allocation failed to be provided to the agricultural sector, whose disappointing performance in turn affected national growth rates. Additionally, though overall budgetary resources were scarce, the neglect of the social sector was especially marked. This under-allocation left Pakistan with continuing inadequate educational resources, health facilities and infrastructural development, a consequence also of the squeeze from heavy defence spending.

Geo-strategic overlaps from imperialism were to play an important role in resource allocation decisions. Military expenditures remained a major component of the national budget; and after direct military rule from 1958 these allocations remained beyond civilian oversight.[28] The regiments of the British Indian army that fell to Pakistan's lot were not disbanded, but were retained and the size of the military was progressively expanded. The justification given was defence against India, though the unstated agenda was more probably to act as a United States proxy deterrent against the Soviet Union. To that extent, the poor in Pakistan have supported a military of dysfunctional size to meet US needs, and thereby provided for over half a century major military assistance to the West, at the cost of their own development prospects. The recurring denials of democracy, and of more people-centered development strategies, were clearly critical ingredients in this ongoing resource drain.

After independence a small group of emerging industrial entrepreneurs also rapidly accumulated wealth, with windfall profits in the consumer goods and textile sectors in which they concentrated. The initial industrial investments, in the early 1950s, emanated from profits from commodity exports, essentially jute and raw cotton, especially during the Korean War trade upturn. A policy regime of expediting industrial growth was put into place with the First Five Year Plan (1955–1960).[29] A planning division was established in the federal Ministry of Finance; and was later expanded into the Planning Commission. Protected markets, subsidized finance, divestments of state owned enterprises, and other incentives were perhaps necessary to build the industrial sector in an exclusively agrarian economy, though the level of non-market interventions also fuelled the mechanisms of rent. Additionally, business groups were allowed to enter insurance and commercial banking, further raising concerns over the manipulation of people's savings and deposits for personal investment decisions. An overvalued exchange rate kept down import costs of capital goods, but hurt agricultural exports, and allegedly constituted an implicit tax

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28   See ibid., Table 1. Defence expenditure as a percentage of revenue receipts of the central government in 1949-50 and 1957-58 was 63.7 and 48.0 respectively, as a percentage of development expenditure it was 193.0 and 60.7 respectively, and as a percentage of gross national product 3.0 and 2.0 respectively.

29   For some descriptive accounts of Pakistan's development process, see B. M. Bhatia, Pakistan's Economic Development 1947–1990. Lahore 1990; M. L. Qureshi, Planning and Development in Pakistan. Review and Alternatives 1947–1982. Lahore 1984; and Sohail J. Malik et al, Pakistan's Economic Performance 1947–1993. A Descriptive Analysis. Lahore 1994.

on agriculture. Consumers also failed to benefit, because of protective tariffs and import restrictions, forcing them to purchase higher priced locally manufactured goods. On the other hand, for manufacturing exports a dual exchange rate was maintained, called the 'bonus voucher' scheme, which countered the currency overvaluation effect. Price ceilings on agricultural products created further pressures on agricultural incomes, and arguably represented a significant resource transfer to the processing sector.[30]

Such concessions to an emerging entrepreneurial elite led to heightened wealth inequalities by the mid-1960s, along with rapid concentration in the manufacturing and financial sectors. The phrase "the twenty-two families", which became current by this time, came to symbolize the policy bias in favour of capital intensive, larger scale, private sector industrial investment. The emergent 'big business' segment soon began to diversify out of its cotton textile base, into such industries as cement, chemicals, electrical, light engineering, food processing and automobile assembly. It could claim to be laying the foundations for a successful industrial transition. However, these rapid, high profile changes were not without political risks, not least being the apparent alliance between industrial barons and military rule.[31] Also, the temptation for public display of new found wealth contrasted with the more ascetic lifestyles of India's business tycoons, who were actually far richer than their Pakistani counterparts. Meanwhile, the real wages of workers stagnated; and with military rule from 1958 trade unions and political dissent were suppressed. The great bulk of non-agricultural labour was also absorbed by the small scale, informal sector, but this struggled and survived through its own efforts rather than any supportive state policies.

In these doings there was a clear design. The 'growth strategy' that oversaw these trends was most explicitly stated in the Second Five Year Plan (1960–1965). These strategies were formulated by a new breed of planners: western-trained economists based in the Planning Commission, and ideologically committed to 'functional inequality' as a driver of the development process. These values were epitomized by the economist Mahbubul Haq, and most explicitly stated in his book, *The Strategy of Economic Planning*.[32] Local technocrats were in turn mentored by metropolitan economists, like the controversial Harvard Advisory Group. The doses of foreign economic assistance, the benefits of which rarely extended beyond the elite's own absorptive reach, did continue to secure metropolitan influence over local decision-makers. Pakistan's choice of federal ministers of finance, especially during the extended periods of authoritarian rule, has also remained beholden to Washington's intervention. A graphic example of this dependence and control was the appointment of a World Bank hireling, Muhammad Shoaib, as the Minister of Finance in Ayub Khan's cabinet. (These neo-colonial linkages have enjoyed

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30   For some analyses by western academics on Pakistan's economic performance in these early decades, see Stephen R. Lewis, Jr, Economic Policy and Industrial Growth in Pakistan. London 1969; Gustav F. Papanek, Pakistan's Development. Social Goals and Private Incentives. Karachi 1970; and Lawrence J. White, Industrial Concentration and Economic Power in Pakistan, Princeton, NJ, 1974.

31   See Stanley A.Kochanek, Interest Groups and Development. Business and Politics in Pakistan. Karachi 1983.

32   Mahbubul Haq, The Strategy of Economic Planning. A Case Study of Pakistan. Oxford 1963.

continued longevity, with the Finance Ministry being headed by the bureaucrat Ghulam Ishaq Khan under the Zia-ul-Haq military regime in the 1980s, Sartaj Aziz from the Food and Agriculture Organization under the two Nawaz Sharif administrations in the 1990s, and the Citibanker Shaukat Aziz who also became Prime Minister during the post-1998 Musharraf military regime, as well as the World Bank operatives Moin Qureshi and Shahid Javed Burki as 'caretaker' administrators when elected governments were dismissed during the 1990s.)

When the Second Plan targets were actually exceeded, an effulgent Planning Commission visualized a further reinforcement of the 'growth strategy' for the Third Five Year Plan (1965–1970). Based on enhancing reinvestment by maintaining a high rate of 'savings', a euphemism for the appropriation of surplus value, the strategy assumed that the wage bill would be controlled, and capital-intensive projects incentivized, by essentially transferring the development burden to the major productive class, the peasantry. Controlling the wages of industrial labour, keeping the agricultural labour force at subsistence level, and minimizing expenditures on the social sector and human resource development, would fuel a 'growth philosophy' and an elite appropriation of resources that would hopefully deliver an 'industrial revolution'. These expectations, both within Pakistan and beyond, were unambiguously expressed by the mid-1960s. In late 1947 the US magazine *Time* (8 December 1947) had noted: "Pakistan (is) an economic wreck and serious social unrest (is) rising." Within two decades, the *New York Times* (18 January 1965) made the following observation: "Pakistan may be on its way toward an economic milestone that so far has been achieved by only one other populous country, the United States." Further optimism was expressed by the *The Times* of London (26 February 1966): "The survival and development of Pakistan is one of the most remarkable examples of state and nation building in the post-war world."[33]

However, events in Pakistan took a course that the rationalism of the planners and analysts could hardly have comprehended. Ayub Khan's efforts to perpetuate his rule led to further distortions and contradictions.[34] A concocted electoral college of 'basic democrats', along with a manipulated election in 1964, heightened political polarizations. War with India in 1965, which ended in a stalemate after 23 days, was probably meant as a diversion from domestic political tensions. However, it also led to a reduction in foreign assistance and a downturn in economic trends. United States military assistance was curtailed, since it was aimed at building military capacity against the Soviet Union rather than for conflict with India. This was a material and psychological blow to the military leadership, whose dependence on the US had followed the earlier subaltern role with the British colonial army. Loss of economic assistance did, in a capital scarce economy, lead to a lower growth rate for the rest of the 1960s. Counterfactually, it could be argued that had the Ayub Khan dictatorship been replaced by an elected civilian government in

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33   Gustav F. Papanek, Pakistan's Development (note 30), p. 1.
34   For a review of this period, see Imran Ali / Ambreen Zaman, Pakistan's Industrial Development and Business Enterprise in the 1960s. Lahore: LUMS Case 14-088-87-1 (1987).

1964, a number of detrimental impacts that Pakistan experienced in the ensuing years could have been avoided. Clearly, politics intervened strongly in shaping the manner in which the development process was to be managed.[35]

One source of tension was the growing perception of regional imbalances. Consolidating the four western provinces into 'one unit' created concern over the dominance of the largest region, the Punjab. The gulf with the eastern wing was greater, and eventually led to the break up of the country in 1971. Its mainsprings lay in political discontent over centralization, resource diversions from the jute export earnings of East Pakistan to industrial investment in West Pakistan, and dissatisfaction over the former having been left without adequate defence arrangements in the 1965 war. These regional dissonances highlighted the fact that the problem of disparities, perhaps inherent in capitalist development, could create serious political cleavages. If these could not be resolved through a consensual approach, and military dictatorships were perhaps less well positioned for this than democratic systems, then the outcomes could be severe, and even disastrous. The centralizing forces in the western wing were seen to represent the interests of a 'dominant' Punjabi ruling element. The removal of the federal capital from Karachi to the upcountry location of Islamabad further reinforced these apprehensions. With East Pakistan, linguistic, ethnic and cultural differences, the geographical separation of a thousand miles of hostile Indian territory, and increasing anger over economic exploitation and the deprivation of political rights, proved too much for the country to hold together.[36]

Even in West Pakistan, discontent was brewing, and flowed through in the elections of 1970. Faster growth in agriculture, with the 'green revolution', brought uneven benefits to the rural economy. Smaller farmers could not afford the high cost inputs, while subtenants were threatened by farm mechanization, and expropriation under authoritarian fiat. Larger landlords gained differentially through greater access to higher yielding hybrids, fertilizers, pesticides, agricultural machinery, and improved land management.[37] Small and medium enterprise too was disillusioned with the concessions and subsidies going to large scale business, while the informal sector and smaller entrepreneurs were virtually ignored. The urban intelligentsia was also disenchanted with the lack of democracy, while the suppression of trade unions alienated industrial labour. Even the larger landlords, though economic beneficiaries of the Ayub regime, were riled by the rising stature of an acquisitive capitalist class. The costs of business focused development and rapid growth were creating a gathering storm. Ayub's celebration of a 'decade of development' in 1968 seemed distasteful, and presaged his downfall. A popular agitation in 1969 led to Ayub's resignation, in favour of the army chief, General Yahya Khan, who agreed to hold general elections in December 1970.

35   For an analysis of political developments in this period, see Lawrence Ziring, The Ayub Khan Era: Politics in Pakistan. Syracuse 1971.

36   See Rounaq Jahan, Pakistan: Failure in National Integration. New York 1972; and G. W. Choudhury, Last Days of United Pakistan. Bloomington 1974.

37   For an analysis of the agricultural sector, see Mahmood H. Khan, Underdevelopment and Agrarian Structure in Pakistan. Boulder, Colorado 1981.

IV

While the post-Ayub interregnum led to the secession of East Pakistan through a fratricidal struggle, the transitions in the remaining Pakistan were no less dramatic. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, leading the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP), was able to forge an alliance of discontented, yet discordant, elements. There is a view that breaking up Pakistan worked in Bhutto's favour, as he would not have enjoyed a legislative majority in a united Pakistan. Whether he himself conspired towards this end is conjectural. The PPP government rapidly undertook a major reversal in development strategy, with sweeping reforms in institutions and economic sectors. Much of large scale industry was nationalized, especially in those businesses into which the 'monopoly' houses had diversified from their base in cotton textiles.[38] These moves aborted the conglomerate diversification characteristic of business development, in environments with institutional voids and weak contract enforcement. Bereft of the benefits of such diversification, the 'big' business groups proved chary of domestic investment for years to come.

Bhutto also commercialized the private banks and life insurance, thus severing finance capture by the industrial elite. Consequently, private sector investment rates declined, while public sector investment expanded. The nationalized organizations were brought under sector based corporations, as with fertilizers, automotive manufacturing, edible fats, cement, gems and minerals, insurance and shipping. To distance them from Pakistan's intrusive bureaucracy, the state owned enterprises were overseen by a Board of Industrial Management, hopefully to be composed of professionals and technocrats. Significantly, the board was abolished soon after Zia's military coup in 1977, thereby handing over control of these vast assets to the civil bureaucracy and senior military officials. The PPP's attempted reforms went well beyond large scale industry. Measures were introduced to protect labour rights; but provisions to bring registration to businesses down to ten employees began to alienate Bhutto's small enterprise constituency. Land reforms were announced, lowering land ceilings well below Ayub Khan's titular measures. In this case, as well, it is unlikely that there was a substantive transfer of land from the agrarian magnate segment, though even nominal transfers to tenants did create some problems of reversion later. Rural activism and insecurity, as well as industrial labour unrest, did pose further disincentives to investment. The 1970s was also an unstable economic environment. Adversities came from decline in foreign assistance, unprecedented international inflation along with the oil shock, and devastating floods in 1973–74.[39] Education and health reforms also led to the nationalization of educational institutions and hospitals, leaving the social sector vulnerable to the performance and delivery capacity of the governmental agencies and functionaries, a capability that was to become increasingly depleted over time.

38   For a review, see Imran Ali/Faisal Bari, Bhutto's Social Democracy. Lahore: LUMS Case 14-091-92-1 (1992).
39   Viqar Ahmed and Rashid Amjad, The Management of Pakistan's Economy 1947–82. Karachi 1986.

After the first round of nationalization, Bhutto moved even further with public sector control over agricultural trade and agro-processing, which were in the intermediate smaller scale sector, and hardly the domain of monopoly houses.[40] Flour mills, ginning factories and edible oil plants were taken over from private entrepreneurs. On an even wider scale, state owned trading monopolies were created for the major commodities, such as the Cotton Export Corporation and the Rice Export Corporation. At a considerably more extensive level, the Pakistan Agricultural Storage and Supplies Corporation (PASSCO), was established to act as a public sector wheat procurement and distribution monopoly. One explanation of this major extension of state interventionism in agribusiness was that Bhutto, having removed his socialist party colleagues, sought support for the next elections from the upper agrarian segment. The price this traditional arbiter of power demanded for its political support for Bhutto was the exclusion of private enterprise from the forward linkages of the agricultural value chain.

The public sector functionaries that took over these lucrative transactions in agricultural commodities thereby displaced, or at least pushed back, a capitalist sector that did not have the political resilience to hold on to its economic gains won in the two previous decades. These retaliations throw up intriguing parallels with a roll back of capitalism in 1947 itself, when communal politics and the creation of Pakistan resulted in the expulsion of virtually the entire business segment, on the basis of being non-Muslim. Going further back in time, colonial political economy clearly prioritized the maintenance and protection of agrarian interests against the destabilizing inroads of market functionaries, especially since the Indus region was of such military and geo-political importance. The Punjab Alienation of Lands Act of 1901, for example, restricted trading and moneylending non-agriculturists from expropriating incumbent landowners. These limitations on the social market for land contrasted vividly with the forces and processes that brought about Britain's own 'agricultural revolution', which so intimately contributed to its industrial transformation.

It could be speculated that earlier still, the eighteenth century peasant rebellions in the Punjab, which eventually displaced both Mughal rule and the *haute* economy, were provoked not only by the overbearing revenue and rental demands of the Mughal establishment, but perhaps also by the inroads of the money economy, in financing the more intensive and specialized agricultural production and increasing levels of commodity trade that were emerging in the Mughal period. As I have suggested elsewhere, such successful 'counter-revolutions' against embryonic capitalism in this region could be contrasted to the successful capitalistic 'revolutions' of western Europe, which led to deep seated transformations and self-sustaining development. Moreover, when the region that later became Pakistan succumbed to colonialism, and then experienced a century of colonial rule, the prospects of achieving real development in the post-colonial era became even more arduous and problematical.[41]

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40   Shahid J. Burki, Pakistan Under Bhutto 1971–77. London 1980.

41   Imran Ali, Business, Stakeholders and Strategic Responses in Pakistan (note 7).

V

Thus, for Pakistan it could be posited that the three decades between 1947 and 1977 both started and ended with decisive reactions against market forces. Understanding the nature of change in the subsequent period following these decades entails discussion of a further set of variables, but ones which place the processes of the first three decades in a more telling perspective. Forces impacting on Pakistan went beyond the context of market orientation, capitalist activity and even economic parameters, and yet they intimately affected the country's prospects of development. In mid-1977 the civilian Prime Minister, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, was overthrown by a military coup, ushering in more than a decade of dictatorial rule under General Zia-ul-Haq. Bhutto's own credentials as a democratic politician had proved to be questionable. While he had succeeded in achieving political consensus in the adoption of Pakistan's 1973 Constitution, he had maintained an authoritarian demeanour towards his own party colleagues, mistreated political opponents, and created a paramilitary force (the Federal Security Force) to curb political dissent.[42] His overthrow in 1977 followed upon allegations of a rigged election; and if true were another example of ruling cliques wantonly tampering with the country's precarious institutions.

Bhutto's undoing, however, and the course of history thereafter in Pakistan, did not in the main spring from internal contradictions, but had an international dimension. He had already incurred the displeasure of the United States by hosting the world Islamic summit in 1973; and the title of his book, *The Myth of Independence*, was hardly appropriate for a leader from a client Third World entity. Bhutto's pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability appeared a further aggravation, and Pakistanis liked to believe that this had triggered the infamous threat of being made "a horrible example" by Henry Kissinger, the US Secretary of State. However, it is more likely that the real reason for this threat, as well as for Bhutto's own downfall, was altogether more malign. Inadequate as Bhutto may have been as a democrat, he still probably subscribed to the chimera of national sovereignty. He was clearly resisting the compulsions of superpower rivalry, the consequences of which would gravely affect Pakistan in the next three decades of its existence. He was resisting the kind of role that Pakistan was then made to play under military rule, with a more malleable military client as head of state. The subsequent course of events is well known: the destabilization of Afghan neutrality, leading by 1979 to the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan, then the militant struggle under American instigation and assistance, leading eventually to the dissolution of the Soviet Union itself.

Analyzing the impact on Pakistan of these post-1977 developments is outside the scope of this paper. Yet certain features need to be highlighted, since they bear on the foregoing discussion on Pakistan's development path in its first three decades. The nationalization policies of the 1970s had an immediate impact on business confidence. Private sector in-

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42   See Lawrence Ziring, Pakistan: The Enigma of Political Development. Boulder, Colorado 1980.

vestment rates remained low during Bhutto's government; but even in the 1980s they remained unsatisfactory.[43] Despite more stable internal and international economic conditions than in the volatile 1970s, as well as the resumption of foreign assistance on a large scale with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the subsequent war, Pakistan failed to be an attractive destination for both foreign and domestic investment. The efforts of the Zia regime to revive the latter, including successive schemes to facilitate 'whitening' of black money, achieved indifferent results. The failure to initiate privatization meant that state functionaries continued to manipulate and exploit public sector assets, with loss making enterprises supported by the public treasury.[44]

After 1985 an upturn in investment did occur, but it was plagued by heavy doses of rent capitalism and further concentration on lower value added industrial segments, such as sugar and cotton yarn production.[45] An energy shortage highlighted the neglect by the military regime of infrastructural development. Telecommunications development was seriously retarded: by 1990 the land line density was a mere one per hundred population, and in the rural areas where the majority of people lived closer to one per thousand.[46] The inability to start construction of the proposed Kalabagh Dam on the Indus River threatened the future sustainability of both energy and irrigation resources. The military regime's focus was clearly being diverted towards geo-political priorities. Yet Pakistan in the 1980s supposedly enjoyed, at around six percent, the highest growth rate in South Asia, though this bouyancy was underwritten more by remittances from Pakistani labour in the Gulf region and foreign aid, rather than industrial investment and productivity growth.[47] For foreign direct investment flows, Pakistan was also completely overshadowed by nations in South-East Asia, an indicator that Pakistan's role in the emerging globalized economy was more in the business of insecurity and conflict than in wealth creation and economic strengthening.

Some other trends evident in Pakistan's first three decades have continued to influence development prospects in the subsequent periods. The substantial military expenditures, absorbing a sizeable proportion of the national budget, have been maintained. Related to this has been Pakistan's vassalage to Western imperialism, especially intense in periods of conflict, as in the 1980s and then since 2001.[48] Also, the under-funding in the social and human resource sectors has been pervasive, with continued under achievement in education, health and welfare. High income inequalities have been retained, with no real

43 Imran Ali / Faisal Bari, The Zia Years: Pakistan's Political Economy. Lahore: LUMS Case 14-092-92-1 (1992).

44 Robert LaPorte Jr. / Muntazar B. Ahmad, Public Enterprises in Pakistan. Boulder, Colorado 1989.

45 Imran Ali / Humayun Khalid, Pakistan During Democracy 1988–1999. Lahore: LUMS Case 14-101-2004-1 (2004).

46 Imran Ali, Telecommunications Development in Pakistan, in: Telecommunications in Western Asia and the Middle East, ed. Eli Noam. New York / Oxford 1997.

47 See Craig Baxter, Zia's Pakistan: Politics and Stability in a Frontline State. Lahore 1985. See also, Shahid J. Burki / Craig Baxter, Pakistan Under the Military: Eleven Years of Zia-ul-Haq. Boulder, Colorado 1991.

48 Imran Ali, Pakistan: Political Economy and Post-2000 Developments, in: Pakistan in Regional and Global Politics, ed. Rajshree Jetly. Routledge (forthcoming).

return to a redistributive focus as attempted in the 1970s.[49] The population growth rate has been one of the highest in the world, with the country reaching over 160 million by the end of the decade. With well over half the population under the age of 20, the challenge of meeting even basic human aspirations has become almost insurmountable. This level of deprivation can motivate political radicalism. Religious extremism, not particularly prominent in the first three decades, has surfaced visibly.[50] In one other feature there has been continuity: the slow pace of regional cooperation in South Asia.[51] For this the ongoing bilateral animosity between India and Pakistan is largely responsible, fuelled with their, and the world's, inability to find a solution to the problem of Kashmir.

49   Imran Ali, Pakistan and the Continuing Dilemma of Inequality. Conference paper, Conference on the Independence of India and Pakistan: Sixtieth Anniversary Reflections, University of Southampton, UK, July 2007.
50   See Imran Ali, Power and Islamic Legitimacy in Pakistan, in: Islamic Legitimacy in a Plural Asia, ed. Anthony Reid / Michael Gilsenan. New York / Oxford 2007.
51   Imran Ali, Pakistan, in: Regionalism and Trade: South Asian Perspectives. Singapore 2007.

The Limits of Modernization: American Development Assistance and Southeast Asian Resistance during the 1950s

Marc Frey

RESÜMEE

Die amerikanische Entwicklungskooperation mit südostasiatischen Staaten während der fünfziger Jahre ist Thema dieses Beitrags. In einem ersten Teil werden die ideellen und institutionellen Grundlagen amerikanischer Entwicklungspolitik beleuchtet. Anschließend werden deren regionale Prämissen diskutiert. Schließlich geht der Beitrag näher auf die amerikanische Entwicklungspolitik gegenüber Indonesien und Süd-Vietnam ein. Die Beispiele machen das Bemühen deutlich, südostasiatische Länder mit Hilfe von Entwicklungspolitik im Sinne amerikanischer Modernisierungsvorstellungen zu verändern. Deutlich werden aber auch die Möglichkeiten südostasiatischer Staaten, diesen Modernisierungsprojekten enge Grenzen zu setzen. Der Beitrag ordnet sich damit in neuere Interpretationen des Kalten Krieges als einem perizentrischen System ein, das kleineren Akteuren erhebliche Handlungsautonomie zuspricht.

This article deals with U.S. development policies towards Southeast Asia during the 1950s. I begin with a discussion of the institutional and ideological origins of development cooperation in the late 1940s and early 1950s. Then I will briefly comment on the evolution of American development policies towards Southeast Asia in the 1950s. The third part of the article discusses strategies and projects of development assistance in two countries of the region, non-aligned Indonesia and western-oriented South Vietnam. Both countries were important for the United States for two reasons: Indonesian independence had come about partly with the assistance of American diplomacy, and Washington had high hopes for the successful integration of the country into the "Free World" by means of development cooperation. Like Indonesia, South Vietnam, a client

state of the United States from 1954 on, serves as an example of the limits regimes set to American efforts at penetrating and reshaping societies in the Third World.[1]

Following World War II, the United States created an "empire by invitation" in Europe.[2] The Marshall Plan and NATO stabilized war-torn Western Europe and integrated the countries economically and in terms of security. American policies, however, were not only meant to contain communism and induce economic development. Equally important were transfers of norms and values such as democratic procedures, social norms, and business administration techniques. Occupation policies in Japan were geared towards comparable objectives.[3] Nationalist revolutions in the Southern hemisphere – first in Southeast Asia, the Near and Middle East, and later in Africa – projected American transformation policies on a global scale. With the demise of European empires the United States felt it needed to prevent power vacuums in emerging nations.[4]

American perceptions of the Third World were conditioned by belief systems which can be summarized as follows: a teleological view of the nation's history as a universally applicable model of linear, evolutionary progress; a deep distrust of revolutions and a preference for gradual transfers of power in the colonial world as well as continued cooperation between Europe and the newly-independent countries; and the conviction that cultural variations legitimized the belief in the superiority of Europeans and white North-Americans over Asians, Latin Americans and Africans. With few exceptions, decision-makers

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1   For the broader picture, see David C. Engerman / Corinna R. Unger, eds., Towards a Global History of Modernization. Special Issue of Diplomatic History 33.3 (2009), 375-542.

2   Geir Lundestad, The American "Empire" and other Studies on U.S. Foreign Policy in a Comparative Perspective, Oxford 1990, 37.

3   Michael Hogan, The Marshall Plan. America, Britain, and the Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1947–1952, Cambridge 1987. See also Volker Berghahn, America and the Intellectual Cold Wars in Europe. Shepard Stone Between Philanthropy, Academy and Diplomacy, Princeton, NJ, 2001; Frank Costigliola, Awkward Dominion: American Political, Economic, and Cultural Relations with Europe, 1919–1933, Ithaca, NY, 1984, 167-183; Anselm Doering-Manteuffel, Wie westlich sind die Deutschen? Amerikanisierung und Westernisierung im 20. Jahrhundert, Göttingen 1999; Jessica Gienow-Hecht, Transmission Impossible. American Journalism as Cultural Diplomacy in Postwar Germany, 1945–1955, Baton Rouge, LA, 1999; Victoria de Grazia, Irresistible Empire: America's Advance Through Twentieth-Century Europe, Cambridge, MA 2006; Felicitas Hentschke, Demokratisierung als Ziel der amerikanischen Besatzungspolitik in Deutschland und Japan, 1943–1947, Münster 2001; Walter L. Hixson, Parting the Curtain. Propaganda, Culture, and the Cold War, 1945–1961, New York 1997; Michael Hochgeschwender, Freiheit in der Offensive? Der Kongreß für kulturelle Freiheit und die Deutschen, München 1998; Gilbert M. Joseph / Catherine C. Legrand / Ricardo D. Salvatore, eds., Close Encounters of Empire. Writing the Cultural History of U.S.-Latin American Relations, Durham, NC, 1998; Scott Lucas, Freedom´s War. The American Crusade against the Soviet Union, New York 1999; Richard Pells, Not Like Us. How Europeans have loved, hated, and transformed American culture since World War II, New York 1997; Emily Rosenberg, Spreading the American Dream: American Economic and Cultural Expansion, 1890–1945, New York 1982; Frances Stonor Saunders, The Cultural Cold War. The CIA and the Worlds of Arts and Letters, New York 1999; Axel Schildt, Zwischen Abendland und Amerika. Studien zur westdeutschen Ideenlandschaft der 50er Jahre, München 1999, 398-423; Frank Schumacher, Kalter Krieg und Propaganda. Die USA, der Kampf um die Weltmeinung und die ideelle Westbindung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 1945–1955, Trier 2000, 223-275; Reinhold Wagnleitner, Coca-Colonization and the Cold War. The Cultural Mission of the United States in Austria after the Second World War, Chapel Hill, NC, 1994.

4   David Ryan / Victor Pungong, eds., The United States and Decolonization, Power and Freedom, London 2000 and David D. Newsom, The Imperial Mantle. The United States, Decolonization, and the Third World, Bloomington, ID, 2001.

in Washington felt that non-European peoples could not effectively govern themselves immediately and that due to scientifically identifiable defects of non-European cultures, emerging nations in the Third World needed tutelage. Since the European powers could not perform these duties any more because their rule was discredited and opposed, the United States had to perform the task of assisting in nation-building efforts.[5]

Transformation policies came to be guiding principles of America's relations with the Third World.[6] Transformation operated on many levels, ranging from the individual to the national, from rural areas to urban conglomerates, and from small ethnic groups to multi-cultural states. Modernization, its underlying rationale, operated within a set of doctrines based on Western standards and experiences.[7] American foreign policy promoted transfers of norms and values, of modes of behavior, and tried to establish institutions in Third World countries which would form nuclei of modernization, such as development agencies, planning offices, tax systems, American-trained police forces, parliaments etc. Transformation policies had all the ingredients of a civilizing mission – its aim being to convince Third World peoples that capitalism was a "coherent and attractive philosophy".[8] It proceeded from the assumption that the competence to modernize "backward" or "traditional" societies was not simply self-assumed but politically, morally and scientifically justified.[9]

This hegemonic project operated with a number of instruments. Alliances were formed to integrate newly-independent countries strategically. Police assistance was designed to promote internal order and stability. Information and propaganda campaigns were conducted to effect ideological affiliation, orderly transfers of power and regime stability. They also promulgated individual and social hygiene, birth control, nuclear families and specific gender roles.[10] A highly important tool to project norms and standards became development policy.

Development policies in the contemporary meaning of the term had been initiated on a modest scale already by the colonial powers – France, Great Britain and the Netherlands – at the turn from the 19th to the 20th century.[11] After the First World War, the League of Nations institutionalized development aims in the mandate system.[12] These early de-

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5   For a more detailed exploration of this theme, see Marc Frey, Dekolonisierung in Südostasien. Die Vereinigten Staaten und die Auflösung der europäischen Kolonialmächte, 1930–1961, München 2006, chap. 7

6   The theoretical background of transformation is well-discussed in Wolfgang Merkel, Systemtransformation. Eine Einführung in die Theorie und Empirie der Transformationsforschung, Opladen 1999.

7   I find Robert Packenham´s distinction between doctrines and theories useful. See Robert A. Packenham, Liberal America and the Third World. Political Development Ideas in Foreign Aid and Social Science, Princeton, NJ, 1973, xvii, 4-8.

8   "We Are Learning to Live With Asia", Speech by Harlan Clevelands at the Far East-America Council of Commerce and Industry, New York, 20 October 1950, NA, RG 469, Entry 59, Box 26, F FE General 3.

9   For a comparable assessment, see Chalmers Johnson, The Sorrows of Empire, London 2004.

10   Marc Frey, Tools of Empire: Persuasion and the U.S. Modernizing Mission in Southeast Asia, in: Diplomatic History 27 (2003), 543-568.

11   David Fieldhouse, The West and the Third World. Trade, Colonialism, Dependence and Development, London 1999, 127-224.

12   Anthony Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law, Cambridge 2004; Susan Pederson, Back to the League of Nations: Review Essay, in: American Historical Review, 112: 4 (Oct. 2007), 1091-1117.

velopmental policies, however, came to a halt during the 1930s, mainly as a result of the Great Depression and the efforts of European powers to maximize the potential of the colonies in order to strengthen metropolitan economies. Following World War II, the United States built on these efforts and promoted development issues both within the newly-founded United Nations as well as on a regional and bilateral level.[13]

In the formative phase of American development policies, decision makers in Washington perceived development to have a "global" and a "total" dimension. It should "reach every corner of the world", and it was conceived as an integrationist strategy encompassing political, psychological, economic and military requirements.[14] American development policies in the 1950s aimed at transforming the colonial and post-colonial world by means of an ideational, material and technological resource transfer. It predicated an evolutionary model of progress and a universal paradigm of societal development based on the history of European capitalism. Embedded in development doctrines was an interpretation of past, present and future, whose central component was a globalized concept of transformation: the linear development of underdeveloped territories towards stable, prosperous nations. This teleology had two major implications. It provided principles of organization for the modernization and transformation of colonial and post-colonial societies. But it also called for accelerated development and for a compression of time. In view of the Cold War, strategies and instruments had to be devised to speed up the transformation process. While the evolution from feudal agrarian societies towards industrialized, capitalist societies in Europe had taken centuries, the specter of communism necessitated almost instant "impact".

Early American development policies were not based on distinctive theories but on doctrines shared by decision-makers. These doctrines were the result of dominant perceptions of the non-European world, of the experience of the New Deal and Marshall Plan, and of the input of social science research, whose focus turned increasingly towards the Third World during the 1950s. Race as a defining category of human development had been thoroughly discredited by the Holocaust, and anthropological research conducted during the interwar period had led to the hypothesis that culture, and not race, seemed to be responsible for the varying degrees of development.[15] This did not mean, however, that hierarchies did not persist. Concepts of culture superseded notions of development based on ethnic variations. Climate, cultural distinctions, traditions and religion were regarded as inhibiting factors of modernization. Euro-American culture was perceived as dynamic, open to change, technology-friendly and capitalist-minded, while Asian cultures (with the exception of Japan) seemed static, corrupted by despotism, and unresponsive to change from within Asian societies themselves.

13   Olaf Stokke, The UN and Development. From Aid to Cooperation, Bloomington, ID, 29-130.
14   International Development Advisory Board, Partners in Progress. A Rockefeller Foundation Report, Washington 1951, 4.
15   Carl Degler, In Search of Human Nature. The Decline and Revival of Darwinism in American Social Thought, New York 1991, 59-104.

A second influence on early American development doctrines was the New Deal experience.[16] With its combination of ideas about free markets, liberal capitalism and limited state intervention, the "New Deal synthesis" aimed at the free exchange of goods, capital and services, coupled with the establishment of national and international institutions which promoted market forces. According to the New Deal synthesis, economic development necessitated the corporatist cooperation of the various actors of society, the organization of transnational networks, the modernization of the means of production, the adoption of American business administration techniques and tax reforms, and it called for the creation of a broad middle class. Thus, for example, the Civilian Conservation Corps of the 1930s was promoted as a model of youth organization, identity formation, and nation building vis-à-vis Southeast Asian governments.[17] The belief in the utility and applicability of the New Deal synthesis remained very much alive well into the 1960s. President Johnson's April 1965 offer to finance a Mekong development scheme embodied all the ingredients of the New Deal synthesis: Modeled on the Tennessee Valley Authority of the 1930s, the project not only envisaged energy production and the taming of nature. The scheme also called for new and better housing, schools, jobs and a general improvement of living conditions and quality of life.[18] This integrated approach was reflected in community development programs, with which American experts experimented in India, Taiwan, Laos or Vietnam.[19] But social engineering was not the only legacy of the New Deal. New Deal institutions served as models for the Economic Cooperation Administration, responsible for the administration of the Marshall Plan and development in European colonies. Finally, many early development experts who came to deal with Southeast Asia had gained experience within the ECA or in connection with the Reconstruction program in China.[20] This expert knowledge was complemented by

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16   I draw on Michael Hogan, The Marshall Plan. America, Britain, and the Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1947–1952, Cambridge 1989, 427 f. and passim.

17   Harry Kahn to Shannon McCune (both ECA), 27 September 1950, NA, RG 469, Entry 59, Box 28, F FE Indochina.

18   David Ekbladh, "Mr. TVA": Grass-Roots Development, David Lilianthal, and the Rise and Fall of the Tennessee Valley Authority as a Symbol for U.S. Overseas Development, 1933–1973, in: Diplomatic History 26 (2002), 335-374; Milton Osborne, The Mekong. Turbulent Past, Uncertain Future, New York 2000, 190-193.

19   Nick Cullather, "The Target is the People": Representations of the Village in Modernization and National Security Doctrine, in: Cultural Politics 2 (2006) 1: 29-48.

20   John Blum (Director, ECA-Mission Paris 1948–1950, 1950 Director ECA Mission Saigon); Robert W. Barnett (State Department member of the interministerial Far Eastern Commission, Japan, 1945–1949, Chief, China Economic Divison, State Department 1949–1950); Leland Barrows (Assistant to the Special Representative in Europe, ECA, and leader of various missions to Vietnam 1950–1958); Harlan Cleveland (specialist for economic warfare, United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administrator in China 1942–1948, director, China aid program, ECA 1948, head of the department of Southeast Asian Affairs, ECA 1948–1952, Assistant Director for Europe, Mutual Security Agency, 1952–1953); Samuel P. Hayes (1942–1951 in various functions for the Foreign Economic Administration and the State Department, chief, Special Technical and Economic Mission Indonesia 1951–1952, Assistant Director, MSA, Far East 1952–1953); James P. Hendrick (official in the ECA 1948–1953 and Director, MSA-Program in Hanoi 1953); John D. Sumner (Economic Advisor of the Embassy in China, 1944–1945, member of the Industrial Mission, ECA, China, 1948, economic advisor to the ECA mission in China 1948–1949, economic advisor in Indonesia 1950). See inventories, Hendrick Papers and Sumner Papers (HSTL); Richard W. Barnett Oral History Interview, February 1976, HSTL; Leland Barrows Oral History Interview, January 1971, ibid.; Samuel P. Hayes Oral History Interview, July 1975, ibid.

scholars from the social sciences who were commissioned to write studies on the economies and societies of Southeast Asia.[21]

A third influence on early American development policies were British and American economists who from the 1940s theorized on development issues in Europe and beyond. Influenced by Keynesian theories on economic growth, experts were united in their assessment that growth of the gross national product was the ultimate aim of development as well as its chief indicator. By the mid-1950s, sociologists and political scientists entered the debate about development. They perceived modernity as a syndrome of change characterized by industrialization, urbanization, alphabetization, education and communication. They shared the belief that economic growth was a fundamental prerequisite of development. However, they assumed that economic progress would lead to democratic structures and would serve as the most effective means to prevent the spread of communism.[22] These hypotheses implicated a call for a comprehensive transfer of norms and values from the United States to Third World countries. Development policies thus assumed the quality of a strategy for the establishment of an informal empire – of a sphere of influence in which Southeast Asian societies were controlled by a set of norms and rules which guaranteed a modernization defined by American standards and system compatibility. Development policies were an essential component of the American civilizing mission.

Perhaps the most influential expert on development policies during the 1950s and 1960s was the economic historian and government adviser Walt Rostow. His theories corroborated the doctrines of decision makers, and appealed to a large audience. Building on his research on the industrialization of Western Europe, Rostow suggested a development theory which promised universal applicability and modernization along European and Western models.[23] Already in 1954, however, he advised the Central Intelligence Agency

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21 "Report Prepared by Dr. John F. Embree on a Trip he Made through the Kingdom of Laos, French Indochina", John Hamlin (Consul Saigon) to Department of State, 3 March 1948, NA, RG 59, 851G.00/3-348; "Cultural Cautions for US Personnel Going to South East Asia", John F. Embree, 15 March 1950, ibid., RG 469, Entry 415, Box 20, F Public Relations 1950.

22 See Nils Gilman, Mandarins of the Future. Modernization Theory in Cold War America, Baltimore 2004. See also the anthology by Gerald M. Meier, ed., Leading Issues in Development Economics. Selected Material and Commentary, New York 1964, and subsequent updates. Cf. Frederick Cooper and Randall Packard, eds., International Development and the Social Sciences: Essays on the History and Politics of Knowledge, Berkeley, CA, 1997; Mark T. Berger, The Rise and Demise of National Development and the Origins of Post-Cold War Capitalism, in: Millenium: Journal of International Studies 30 (2001), 211-234; idem; Arturo Escobar, Encountering Development. The Making and Unmaking of the Third World, Princeton, NJ, 1995; Irene L. Gendzier, Managing Political Change: Social Scientists and the Third World, Boulder, CO, 1985; Michael Latham, Ideology, Social Science, and Destiny: Modernization and the Kennedy-Era Alliance for Progress, in: Diplomatic History 22 (1998), 199-229; idem., Modernization as Ideology. American Social Science and "Nation Building" in the Kennedy Era, Chapel Hill, NC, 2000, 21-68 and passim; Colin Leys, The Rise and Fall of Development Theory, Bloomington, ID, 1996; Christopher Simpson (Hrsg.), Universities and Empire. Money and Politics in the Social Sciences during the Cold War, New York 1998.

23 Walt W. Rostow, The Process of Economic Growth, New York 1952, and, of course, his famous The Stages of Economic Growth. A Non-Communist Manifesto, New York 1960.

to promote development policies as the most appropriate instrument for growth in and affiliation of Third World countries with the West:

> *Taking a longer view, we, in common with virtually all the peoples of the world, have an overwhelming interest in the development of world conditions which will free security from dependence on military strength. Where men's energies can be turned constructively and with some prospect of success to the problems of expanding standards of living in a democratic framework we believe the attractions of totalitarian forms of government will be much reduced. In the short run communism must be contained militarily. In the long run we must rely on the development, in partnership with others, of an environment in which societies which directly or indirectly menace ours will not evolve. We believe the achievement of a degree of steady economic growth is an essential part of such an environment.*[24]

Rostow's creed, soon to be widely known as "modernization theory", was that development was "feasible". Development evolved in a linear process, and the transfer of resources (knowhow, technology and capital) would result in growth and a global adoption of democratic procedures.

American decision makers felt that development policy had to "show that democracy is the best way for the realization of economic progress and political freedom".[25] Development economist and ECA-specialist on Indonesia, John Sumner, stated: "What we seek to build are attitudes, institutions and ability to solve problems on a self-supporting, continuing basis."[26] The envisaged process of transformation necessitated an influx of foreign investment, capital accumulation, industrialization, planning, technical cooperation, land reforms, and agricultural development programs. Moreover, it stipulated an appreciation of capitalism as a positive system of values by nationalist elites. Development aid was meant to show that Western capitalism was no longer the "predatory capitalism" of colonial days but a "coherent and attractive philosophy". Capitalist ideology would not only induce economic progress but also "good government".[27]

The aim to establish democratic procedures was soon discarded. By the end of the 1950s, the President's National Security Council stated:

> *A number of reasons centering on cultural traditions, religion, and the burden of living explain the decline of Asian democratic institutions. There can be no real democracy in countries where the preponderant majority is illiterate, cannot express an intelligent*

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24   "Notes on Foreign Economic Policy", Max F. Millikan and Walt W. Rostow to Allen Dulles, 21 May 1954, in: Simpson, ed., Universities and Empire, 39-55, quote on 41.

25   "Policies of Point Four. Guide Lines for Administration of the Act for International Development", International Development Advisory Board, 5 June 1953, Truman Papers, Central Files, Roll 19.

26   "The Problem Before us in Asia", draft memorandum by John Sumner, undated [June 1950], HSTL, Sumner Papers, ECA Files, Box 5, F General Memos and Reports, 1950–51.

27   "We Are Learning to Live With Asia", Speech by Harlan Cleveland to the Far East-America Council of Commerce and Industry, New York, 20 October 1950, NA, RG 469, Entry 59, Box 26, F FE General 3.

choice between democratic values and Communist blandishments, accepts a fatalistic or quietist religion, recognizes authoritarianism as the traditional way of life, and is too enmeshed in the struggle for survival to have time or energy for individual self-development. The crisis confronting a backward society during the modernization process is so profound that authoritarian controls and disciplines are required to guide the revolution on stable course. We must accept these facts.[28]

While the transfer of "democratic values" and "human rights" as an ultimate aim was not abandoned in principle, authoritarian regimes came to be regarded as being better suited to steer "backward" economies and societies through the "revolution of rising expectations". This applied in particular to military regimes. They were considered to possess qualities no other institution in newly independent countries had. They seemed better organized, commanded technical know how, and supplied a variety of specialists. And they were seen as the best available bulwarks against communism. This reasoning, already promulgated for quite a long time by observers in the region, legitimized American support for military regimes in Southeast Asia and beyond in a dual sense. Superpower competition and the Cold War framework provided one justification for support. Yet, now assistance to military regimes assumed a progressive-humanist quality, since military outfits seemed best equipped to effect societal modernization. Hardly ever did decision makers reflect on the fact that it had been the United States who had built up military forces in the first place. Small wonder that Washington felt most comfortable with actors they themselves had elevated to power. This neglect of their own role in the genesis of military rule in Third World countries rationalized the already existing military assistance programs and legitimized continued support in the future.

The aim to transfer norms and values in either a democratic context or in a development-oriented authoritarian state-building scheme could only be realized by a "top-down approach".[29] Several reasons were responsible for this: First and foremost was the common aim of both the donor and recipient to strengthen governmental institutions and make them more efficient. Secondly, development was closely linked to regime legitimacy. While the United States had an interest to bolster non-communist regimes, Southeast Asian governments needed economic success to make good the promises given during independence struggles. (With regard to sovereign Thailand, things were different, but here as well ruling elites had to demonstrate that their close alliance with the US

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28 "Political Implications of Afro-Asian Military Takeovers, Summary of Conclusions", Marion W. Boggs (Director, Policy, NSC) to NSC, 21 May 1959, NA, RG 273, Mill Papers, Box 4; "Political Implications of Afro-Asian Military Takeovers", undated paper of discussion, National Security Council [Ramsey], June 1959, ibid., RG 59, Entry 3115, Box 5, F Afro-Asian Affairs. President Eisenhower agreed with the findings of the paper: "He [Eisenhower] did wish to state that Mr. Ramsey's report was the finest report which he had ever heard given before the National Security Council". Memorandum of Discussion at the 410th Meeting of the National Security Council, 18 June 1959, in: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Vol. 18: East Asia-Pacific Region; Cambodia; Laos, Washington 1992, 97-102.

29 "Proposal for a Longer-Range Program of Aid to Asia", Memorandum by Cleveland, 3 November 1950, NA, RG 59, Lot 58D258, Box 6.

had overall positive effects). Thirdly, critical agents of modernization like a middle class, entrepreneurs, labor leaders or women leaders were lacking or were perceived as being unsuited for cooperation (Europeans and overseas Chinese). Fourthly, the problem of interference in domestic affairs was an ever-present one. Cooperation with government agencies was therefore a sine qua non.

A number of fact-finding missions toured Southeast Asia in 1950. Their brief encounters with the complex realities of life in Southeast Asia allowed for tentative analyses of the situation: debt peonage of a significant part of the rural population on Java and in Thailand; exorbitant land leases and corvée in large parts of Vietnam; a dramatic shortage of textiles in Java and insufficient supply of basic tools; a significant percentage of the populations infected by malaria, ranging from 30 to 90 percent; a high child mortality of up to 50 percent (in the case of Laos); structural malnutrition on the densely populated islands of Java and Madura. Life expectancy in Southeast Asia was at a medium of 32 years; in Western Europe and North America the corresponding figure was 64.[30] Statistics, though not very reliable and based upon sketchy information from various sources, revealed great discrepancies between the industrialized world and Far Eastern countries. Per capita income in selected countries in 1946 was stated as follows: China $ 23, Indonesia $ 35, Thailand $ 41 [1948], India $ 43, the Philippines $ 88, Ceylon $ 91, Japan $ 100, Great Britain $ 660, the United States $ 1269.[31] Reports emphasized the strong need for capital transfers and know how. Colonialism and the cultural disposition of the peoples were identified as reasons for low standards of living, widespread poverty and subsistence farming.

With regard to Europe, ECA officials had identified the lack of foreign currency as the main impediment to economic growth. In Southeast Asia, however, observers encountered a completely different setting: some sectors of the economy did not participate in monetary circulation, credit institutions were missing, and the infrastructure was deficient. Autochthonous capital formation was insufficient, planning institutions and reliable statistics were lacking. Moreover, there was a great need for the development of entrepreneurial classes and for norms and rules congruent with capitalist systems in a variety of societal sectors. Discussions about the need for a Marshall Plan for Asia surfaced regularly during the Truman and Eisenhower administrations. However, top decision makers continuously argued against such a concerted effort on two grounds: economically, it seemed unclear whether Southeast Asian countries could utilize relatively large amounts of aid ("absorptive capacity"); politically, it was felt that Congress

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30   "Report of Visit of Agricultural Officer to North Vietnam, October 11-21,1950", Robert Blum to ECA, 30 October 1950, NA, RG 469, Entry 237, Box 48, F French Indochina, Agriculture; Blum to ECA, 28 February 1951, ibid., F Indochina Agriculture, Land Development; "Health Program", ECA Memorandum, 6 May 1952, ibid., Entry 1236, Box 2, F Health; "Diversification of Indonesian Economy", Foreign Operations Administration Memorandum, undated [30 December 1953], DDEL, NSC, OCB, CFS, Box 41.

31   "Postwar Regional Economic Problems of the Far East", Preliminary Version, Office of Intelligence Research OIR Report no. 5028, Division of Research for Far East, Department of State, 25 August 1949, NA, RG 469, Entry 411, Box 12, F Far East, Economic Conditions; "ECAFE Study on Thai Financial Institutions", 31 March 1950, ibid., Entry 59, Box 26, F Far East General.

and the American taxpayers would not support such a program.[32] To be sure, Truman's Point Four program of 1949 held out the prospect of long-term development efforts by the United States. The President's message raised high expectations, but it obscured rather than clarified the range of problems associated with early American development policies.[33]

U.S. Economic Assistance to Southeast Asia, 1950–1961 (in million Dollars)[34]

	Burma	Indonesia	Malaya	Philippines	Thailand	Vietnam
1950	–	137,7	–	137,9	–	–
1951	10,4	8,0	–	138,8	8,9	21,9
1952	14,0	8,0	–	132,4	7,2	24,7
1953	12,8	13,2	–	20,8	6,5	25,0
1954	–1,8	4,5	–	14,8	8,8	25,0
1955	–1,0	7,2	0,3	30,0	46,8	322,4
1956	17,0	88,2	0,5	47,9	33,5	210,0
1957	1,3	12,3	0,4	42,8	35,0	282,2
1958	44,2	29,0	0,1	29,1	30,9	189,0
1959	8,9	67,6	20,2	145,2	45,7	207,4
1960	–2,6	70,2	0,3	23,4	24,6	181,8
1961	0,4	31,6	0,4	86,0	26,1	152,0
Total	103,6	477,5	22,2	849,1	274,0	1641,4

The vagueness and ambivalence of the Point Four program was paradigmatic for American development policies in Southeast Asia during the 1950s. They were multi-causal and multi-functional. While social and economic factors like poverty alleviation, market integration and regional interdependence (Japan, Europe, and Southeast Asia) were both motivating factors and long-term aims of development, its ultimate rationale and chief purpose was security. The mix of political / military and social / economic reasons and

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32   The debate is covered in part by Burton I. Kaufman, Trade and Aid. Eisenhower´s Foreign Economic Policy 1953–1961, Baltimore 1982.

33   "Objectives and Nature of the Point IV Program", Under Secretary's Meeting, 24 February 1949, NA, RG 59, Lot 58D609, Box 1; Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman, 1949, Washington 1963, 114-116. See also Gilbert Rist, The History of Development. From Western Origins to Global Faith, rev. and expanded ed. London 2002, 69-79.

34   Figures for Vietnam include Cambodia and Laos until mid-1954. Sources: "Negotiating Paper. Singapore Conference, Defense of SEA", Steering Group on Preparations for Talks between the President and Prime Minister Churchill, 2 January 1952, HSTL, TP, PSF, General File, Churchill-Truman Meetings, Box 116, F Far East Problems; "A Summary of Total U.S. Aid for the Associated States of Indochina from FY 1950-FY 1954", STEM and MAAG Saigon to Mutual Security Agency, 26 October 1953, NA, RG 469, Entry 1432, Box 17, F Programs FY54; Douglas C. Dacy, Foreign Aid, War, and Economic Development. South Vietnam, 1955–1975, Cambridge 1986, 200, and Robert J. McMahon, The Limits of Empire. The United States and Southeast Asia Since World War II, New York 1999, Appendix 2.

aims of development as well as the initial lack of coherent theories of development in Third World countries was largely responsible for the rather chaotic evolution of American development programs in Southeast Asia. Country programs varied greatly over the course of the 1950s, at times emphasizing agricultural projects over industrialization (and vice versa), state planning over private initiatives (and vice versa), and so forth.

Indonesia: Development Policies in the Context of Structural Problems and the Cold War

The economic challenges facing the Indonesian governments following the transfer of independence in 1949 were remarkable.[35] Per capita income in the early 1950s was considerably lower than in 1939. Due to the devastations of World War II and the struggle for independence in the post-war period, output had not corresponded to population growth, and labor had moved from productive sectors to low-productive subsistence farming. Indonesia thus needed to grow fast, to industrialize, and to invest heavily. Basically, economic development was conditioned by four factors: (1) the colonial legacy and the government's efforts to accommodate foreign, mainly Dutch, business interests with the needs of a sovereign economy; (2) the disparate economic requirements and potentials of the parts of the archipelago; (3) harmonization of needs and demands of various social actors; and (4) the world market and the decline of the price of raw material following the Korean war boom. Due to the primacy of political over economic aims, Indonesian economic policy during the 1950s exacerbated rather than assuaged the problems arising out of these complex factors.

Until the expropriation of Dutch businesses in 1957, the Indonesian economy performed quite well, with per capita incomes rising on an annual basis of about 3.4 percent. But a political climate increasingly resentful of foreign investment and Chinese businesses made Indonesia an unattractive place to invest. *Indonesianiasi* – a policy to provide for indigenous ownership and transfer of management to indigenous experts – led to further disinvestment. Government development planning was sketchy from the start, and the various development plans devised during the 1950s remained largely

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35 On the Indonesian economy in the 1950s, see Anne Booth, Growth and Stagnation in an Era of Nation Building: Indonesian Economic Performance from 1950–1965, in: Thomas Lindblad, ed., Historical Foundations of a National Economy in Indonesia, 1890s–1990s, Amsterdam 1996, 401-420; idem, The Indonesian Economy in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries. A History of Missed Opportunities, London 1998, 53-72, 116-124, 161-168, 222-227, 311-318; Howard Dick / Vincent J. H. Houben / J. Thomas Lindblad / Thee Kian Wie, The Emergence of a National Economy. An Economic History of Indonesia, 1800–2000, Leiden 2002, 170-193; J. Thomas Lindblad, Foreign Investment in Southeast Asia in the Twentieth Century, London 1998, 103-106; John O. Sutter, Indonesianasi: Politics in a Changing Economy, 1940–1955, Ithaca, NY, 1959, 695-1230; Jeroun Trouwen, Indonesia´s Foreign Policy and Trade, 1957–1965: Economic Reorientation versus Political Realignment, in: Piyanart Bunnag / Franz Knipping / Sud Chonchirdsin, eds., Europe-Southeast Asia in the Contemporary World: Mutual Images and Reflections 1940s–1960s, Baden-Baden 2000, 173-188; Thee Kian Wie, Economic Policies in Indonesia During the Period 1950–1965, in Particular with Respect to Foreign Investment, in: Lindblad, ed., Historical Foundations, 315-330.

unexecuted. By the early 1960s, it was clear to foreign and Indonesian observers that economic policies had failed to convince, that the investment climate had deteriorated and that foreign investments (with the exception of the oil sector) had collapsed. Set against the background of these developments, it is difficult to assess whether a sustained, well-coordinated American development assistance program could have generated long-term economic growth. But with the small funds allocated to Indonesia and the Cold War context looming, American efforts could not have the desired effects.

Until the mid-1950s, American development policies in Indonesia were targeted towards five sectors: agriculture, public health, support for small businesses and consumer industries, development of big technical projects, and public education. During the second half of the decade, infrastructure projects as well as commodity exports (agricultural surpluses) became more and more important.

American Development Aid to Indonesia 1950–1960[36]

Sektors	in Mill. $	Percent	Percent of loans and credits
Infrastructure	107,5	23,0	92
Industry and Energy	55,7	11,8	88
Agriculture	46,8	10,4	70
Education and Public Administration	16,3	3,4	–
Security	11,1	2,3	–
Health	24,2	5,1	–
Agricultural Surplus Exports	148,3	31,7	100
Others (consumer goods etc.)	57,4	12,3	–
Total	467,3	100	72,4

A basic feature of early development efforts was the principle of "jointness". From the start, however, cooperation between Indonesian officials and American development experts was complicated by a number of issues. In principle, the Indonesian government and media welcomed American efforts. But the presence of white Americans – in the early fifties there were about 50 experts operating in Indonesia – was widely perceived as a post-colonial, paternalistic variant of the traditionally asymmetrical relations between Indonesians and Europeans. While American technical experts avidly advised the Indonesian government to speed up planning, Indonesian officials urged them to take the challenges associated with nation building into account and to conduct development "in our own good time", and not in American-defined stages.[37] Highly problematic

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36   Raymond B. Allen (Director, USOM Jakarta) to ICA Washington, 17 March 1960, NA, RG 469, Entry 416, Box 81, F Indonesia Program Briefing. Due to different accounting systems, one also finds a figure of about 1 billion Dollars in the literature.

37   "Indonesian Attitudes Toward American Programs of Assistance", DRF-DR-221, Division of Research for Far East, Department of State, 3 April 1951, NA, RG 59, Lot 58D245, Box 5.

was the American demand that Indonesian economic policies should conform as much as possible to the (American-defined) global economic system. This, however, operated under conditions detrimental to an economy largely dependent on the export of a few raw materials (rubber, tin, and oil). Decreasing prices for raw materials from 1952 significantly reduced room for financial maneuvering and the ability to generate capital for investment in development projects. In view of decreasing state revenues and increasing allocation of funds to non-productive sectors (mainly the army) American prescriptions to create a friendlier climate for foreign investment were more and more perceived as intrusive. By the end of the 1950s, both the Indonesian government and the media at large associated American development efforts with handouts.

Between 1949 and 1954 the United States provided Indonesia with $ 160 millions in development assistance. Resource and knowhow transfers, however, could not generate sustained growth. The amounts transferred were insufficient, competition by Indonesian planning and distribution agencies harmed efficiency, programs could not be executed successfully due to unforeseen problems. For example, Javanese farmers could not purchase subsidized fertilizer because the price was still far too high. A motorized fishing fleet lay idle because of a lack of mechanics. Drugs did not reach their destination because of insufficient distribution systems.

By mid-1954, both Jakarta and Washington saw the need for a new initiative regarding development and financial assistance. Inter-ministerial planning groups within the Eisenhower administration came to the conclusion that Indonesia needed more assistance and that new donors like Japan or Western Germany had to shoulder a substantial part of the burden. But conflicting interests within the administration and between the administration and Congress made development planning on a long-term basis virtually impossible. Moreover, following Communist gains in the Indonesian parliamentary elections in 1955, Washington became increasingly alarmed about the prospect of a communist take-over of Indonesia. From that time on, American development planning with regard to Indonesia virtually came to a halt. Superpower confrontation insured that some prestige projects, mainly in infrastructure, received continued attention. But other than that, American development policies now came to be substituted by agricultural surplus exports (PL 480) which did not generate any developmental impulses. By 1961, the newly-elected Kennedy-Administration was no longer prepared to "subsidize the status quo".[38]

A number of reasons, both endogenous and exogenous, were responsible for the meager results of American development policies in Indonesia: an adverse economic climate, a primacy of political considerations, yearly Congressional appropriations which made long-term planning virtually impossible, and a lack of consistency on the part of the American and Indonesian governments to allocate funds to key projects and specific sectors of the economy. Underlying these factors, however, were conflicting views of the

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38 "Indonesian Problems", Memorandum of a discussion with the Indonesian Foreign Minister Subandrio at the State Department, 24 April 1961, NA, RG 59, 798.00/4-2461.

role of government within the economy. What was equally important was the fact that American advisory efforts were increasingly regarded as neo-colonialist prescriptions. American development cooperation in Indonesia thus largely failed not only because of structural impediments or domestic political and economic choices. Development in self-defined time frames, economic nationalism (*Indonesianasi)* or unattractive investment laws reflected Indonesian efforts to channel and restrict aspects of the American civilizing mission they deemed unsuited for the creation of a national economy and a nation state based on indigenous Indonesian sets of rules and norms.

Vietnam: A Bifurcated Response to Development Assistance

Between 1954 and 1961, the United States pumped about $ 1.5 billion economic aid into South Vietnam. In addition, the client state received some $500 million in military aid. Towards the end of the 1950s, when South Vietnamese per capita income was roughly $ 140 annually, almost 20 percent was attributable to American transfers. Initially conceived as a "holding operation" to stabilize the regime of Ngo Dinh Diem, American development experts assisted in the development of the South Vietnamese economy from 1955. In the second half of the decade, growth rates were quite remarkable (about 7 % annually). These were mainly the result of a temporary state of political stability and of American goods and capital transfers rather than of self-sustained growth. Growth and stability were the ingredients which were supposed to turn South Vietnam into a showcase of the West.[39]

Two factors inhibited the realization of this aim from the beginning on. First, by 1958 the deteriorating security situation made development practically impossible. Second, there was a wide discrepancy between American and South Vietnamese approaches to development. Conflicting ideologies increasingly paralyzed development initiatives, and in 1961/62 development as a fundamental aim of U.S. foreign policy vis-à-vis South Vietnam was disbanded altogether. At that time, Ngo Dinh Nhu, brother of Diem and chief adviser of the President, characterized the American-South Vietnamese relation as a "clash of cultures". As no other aspect of bilateral relations, conflicts over development revealed the limited extend of America's influence in the country. The United States did stabilize the Diem-regime, create institutions and promulgate development initiatives. But it could not control Diem, effect changes in institutional behavior or gain control over the implementation of specific projects and programs.[40]

For Diem and Nhu – as for all Southeast Asian leaders – development did not simply mean economic growth. The regime aimed at a broad transformation of society. It envisaged a transformation from a predominantly agrarian economy to a corporatist society

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39   Douglas C. Dacy, Foreign Aid, War, and Economic Development. South Vietnam, 1955–1975, Cambridge 1986, 56 and passim.

40   This argument is in part based on Philip E. Catton, Diem's Final Failure. Prelude to America´s War in Vietnam, Lawrence, KS, 2002.

with a diversified economy, functioning national institutions and a nationalist ideology. Basic propositions of the regime – "Personalism, community and collective progress" – implied that development was a multifunctional instrument of modernization. 'Personalist' modernization, however, did not much have in common with an American-sponsored one. Diem and Nhu were convinced – again like many other Southeast Asian leaders – that neither capitalism nor communism provided suitable models for the development of South Vietnam. Both strongly disliked communist models of development, but they also disliked capitalist ones, since they regarded capitalism as the driving force of colonialism. Diem and Nhu favored a "third way" informed by personalist ideology.[41] In practice, South Vietnamese development policies were imbued with authoritarian, sometimes even totalitarian notions. While American experts in South Vietnam regarded economic and social development as a prerequisite for the establishment of democratic and liberal-capitalist structures, Diem was interested in creating a corporatist state held together by an authoritarian leadership.

American development efforts were in part geared towards short-term aims such as re-settlement of refugees or relief programs. In order to check inflation, it provided mechanisms for the absorption of large capital transfers by the small South Vietnamese economy. According to the functionalist logic of "spill-over" effects, another basic aim was the establishment of institutions and the transfer of rules and norms to a variety of political institutions and economic sectors. Advisory functions proceeded from the assumption that institution building would, over the long term, lead to behavioral changes of individuals which in turn would lead to the establishment of "good government".[42]

While institutional reforms reflected a "top-down approach", land reform – a much desired object of American development policies in the 1950s – reflected "bottom-up approaches". This holistic notion of national development eventually formed the basis for theories of "nation building", a term which began to dominate American development discourses from the early 1960s on. Nation building, in the words of Karl Deutsch, was an "architectonic or mechanistic model" which helped to create "independent, relational, politically organized autonomous and internally legitimized systems".[43] Modernization and modernization theory provided the functional instruments for conducting "nation building". Conditions for this transformation process seemed nowhere more promising than in South Vietnam. French rule had been thoroughly discredited, an anti-colonialist and anti-communist outlook had taken hold of the regime, and the lack of expertise and resources demanded an extensive advisory capacity as well as the distribution of development assistance.

After 1955, a range of American institutions and their employees were engaged in transforming South Vietnam. A case in point was the Michigan State University Vietnam Ad-

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41 Vu Van Thai, Vietnam's Concept of Development, in: Wesley R. Fishel, ed., Problems of Freedom. South Vietnam Since Independence, East Lansing, MI, 1961, 69-73.

42 Philip Selznick, Leadership in Administration. A Sociological Interpretation, New York 1957, 134-156 and passim.

43 Karl Deutsch / William J. Foltz, eds, Nation Building, New York 1963, 3, 11 f.

visory Group, which reorganized the police and public administration.[44] However, while the group was able to create institutions analogous to American models, it was unable to effect changes in individual and institutional behavior. Curricular contents aiming at decentralized hierarchies and individual responsibility were increasingly criticized by the regime until in 1962 Diem asked the group to pack up and go.

Another central feature of American development efforts was land reform, and here, again, conflicting ideas about approaches as well as implementation soon paralyzed the whole program. Land reform was an essential requirement of successful transformation, since it generated individual freedom as the basis for collective freedom. Thus declared Wolf Ladeijnsky, since the 1930s a capacity on land reform:

> *Poverty, hunger, disease, and the lack of opportunity for self-development have been the lot of the overwhelming majority of the people in underdeveloped countries. What is new about this poverty is that it has become a source of discontent, and an overworked and overexploited common man who for centuries was inertly miserable is now alertly miserable. Now the forces that keep the peasant within well-defined bounds are breaking down under the impact of what has been aptly termed "the revolution of rising expectations". … Changes in land tenure arrangements will enhance the political power of the peasants and very possibly endow them with rights and responsibilities resembling those of the rural people in a democratic society. …[P]opular support in Asia is peasant support or nothing. An owner cultivator or a reasonably satisfied tenant would acquire a stake in society. He would guard that society against extremism.*[45]

But American prescriptions about land titles, distribution, rents, agrarian credit societies and so forth fell on deaf ears with a regime that was basically interested in maximizing its control over the rural population. The Saigon regime's version of the land reform supported the interests of large farmers and of the government itself. Eventually, it became clear that land reform, as Diem and Nhu understood it, was principally designed to reduce French influences over the economy.[46]

The American-South Vietnamese conflict over land reform was symptomatic for the relation between superpower and client. Comparable developments occurred in connection with the creation of credit institutions, investment programs, macroeconomic planning,

44 "Monthly Report of the Michigan State University Team", Edward W. Eisner (Chief Advisor) to Leland Barrows, 10 August 1956, NA, RG 469, Entry 1432, Box 3, F Correspondence FY 1955-56; "Civil Police Administration Program", Michigan State University Vietnam Advisory Group, 1 May 1957, ibid., Box 4, F Defense; Aspects of Modern Public Administration, course manuals by the Michigan State University, December 1956, ibid., Entry 430, Box 1, F Public Admin. See also John Ernst, Forging a Fateful Alliance: Michigan State University and the Vietnam War, East Lansing, MI, 1998.

45 Ladeijnsky to Kenneth Iversion (Ford Foundation), undated [November 1954], in: Agrarian Reform as Unfinished Business. The Selected Papers of Wolf Ladeijnsky, ed. Louis J. Walinsky, New York 1977, 204-214.

46 "Group Meeting of Big Landlords of South Vietnam", Ladejinsky to Barrows, 18 March 1955, NA, RG 59, 851G.16/3-2555; "Land Reform", Barrows to Harold H. Rhodes, 24 May 1957, ibid., RG 469, Entry 1432, Box 21, F Program Policy Committee. See also William Henderson, "Opening of New Lands and Villages: The Republic of Vietnam Land Development Program", in: Fishel, ed., Problems of Freedom, 123-138.

the tax system and all kinds of laws pertaining to the economy. To the growing anger of American experts, the regime was little interested in creating a market economy. Instead, it followed a policy of economic nationalism aimed at the exclusion of French and ethnic Chinese influence.

By the end of the 1950s, neither the Eisenhower-Administration nor the Diem-regime had a coherent development policy. South Vietnamese officials saw "advice" increasingly as "control", and accordingly openly or covertly torpedoed American initiatives.[47] By that time, it had become evident that the Diem-regime was informed by an ideology quite distinct from what Americans believed in, and that South Vietnam successfully repudiated vital elements of the American prescriptions and programs.

Conclusion

I have tried to show that American development policies in the late 1940s and 1950s aimed at the transformation of societies in an all-encompassing way. Development policies were a central ingredient of American foreign relations. It postulated a linear, evolutionary development from "traditional" to "modern" societies, and it operated on the assumption that the United States provided the standards that needed to be adopted. Both Indonesia and South Vietnam pursued policies of economic nationalism which tended to channel, restrict or exclude aspects of this hegemonic project. The leeway of local actors in determining national approaches to development was considerable. Instead of nation building, the United States promoted state building. By the end of the 1950s, optimistic assumptions about the feasibility of transfers of norms and values had given way to unqualified support for military establishments and authoritarian regimes. This was legitimized in a double sense: the Cold War context, and the assumption that military regimes were best qualified to lead Third World countries on the road to modernization.

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47   "The State of the Nation – Educationally", Charles J. Falk (Ecudation Division, USOM) to Barrows, 18 May 1956, NA, RG 469, Entry 1432, Box 3, F Director´s Correspondence FY 1955-56.

Shadows in Asia:
John Foster Dulles and
the Perpetual Failure of
U.S. Development Policies

Ronald W. Pruessen

RESÜMEE

John Foster Dulles gilt nicht gerade als Befürworter einer aktiven amerikanischen Politik der Entwicklungskooperation. Diese Interpretation, so der Beitrag, bedarf einer Korrektur. Fragen der Entwicklungskooperation bewegten den amerikanischen Außenminister sehr wohl. Dies galt insbesondere mit Blick auf Asien. Der Beitrag beschäftigt sich mit seinen Vorstellungen über Entwicklung und Entwicklungspolitik, die sich an den Reformimpulsen Woodrow Wilsons und zeitgenössischen Überlegungen zur Rolle von Entwicklungspolitik im Kalten Krieg orientierten. Untersucht werden die Diskrepanz zwischen Rhetorik und politischem Handeln, die Zwänge des amerikanischen politischen Systems und die Bedingungen, unter denen eine damals noch experimentelle Entwicklungspolitik überhaupt möglich waren.

> Between the idea
> And the reality
> Between the motion
> And the act
> Falls the shadow.
> T. S. Eliot, *The Hollow Men*

T. S. Eliot, John Foster Dulles, and "development": an odd combination? Can a poet join a U.S. secretary of state often associated with simplistic Cold War blustering to tell us something about one of the most complex of modern global issues? Yes.

Eliot's vocabulary and imagery ("hollow men" traversing "wasteland," etc.) actually communicate all too well some of the tragic features of the 20th century – including those

generated by the political and international currents swirling around his troubled individuals. The notion of a "shadow" falling between "idea" and "reality" is certainly relevant to one of the key themes in scholarship concerning "development": the almost constant gap between rhetoric and action, between promises and delivery. Consider Gilbert Rist's elegant, historically sensitive explorations of the tension between pretensions and performance. On one hand, he cites a "collective hope of improving the conditions of life of the majority of mankind" through the encouragement of economic growth and equity – and recognizes that it is "mostly sincere." On the other hand, however, there are "distinctive practices" as opposed to "feelings," generating a functional definition that veers in a very different direction: "'Development' consists of a set of practices … which require … the general transformation and destruction of the natural environment and of social relations. Its aim is to increase the production of commodities (goods and services) geared, by way of exchange, to effective demand."[1] Consider, as well, the powerful elaborations on an altruism / self-interest dichotomy offered by scholars like Arturo Escobar, Nils Gilmar, and Wolfgang Sachs (with crucial indebtedness to Karl Marx, Michel Foucault, Edward Said, V. Y. Mudimbe, Juergen Habermas, and Michael Adas). Their landmark treatises have helped make it impossible to ignore the way the history of "development" has been perpetually plagued by arrogance and greed – in tandem with the impulse to control and homogenize.[2]

To turn to John Foster Dulles is to turn to a high-level policy maker whose calculations, actions, and inactions help illuminate the shadowed terrain of "development." In spite of images that have often suggested otherwise, his perceptions of economic and geo-political currents had much in common with those of policy-making successors (and predecessors) in Washington. His sense of the importance of "development," for example – and the reasoning behind his appraisal – means that the 1950s fit comfortably and revealingly within a long chronological continuum. This is also true with respect to Dulles's impulses regarding appropriate responses. Though his precise approaches evolved through the years of Eisenhower's presidency (nudged by accumulated experience), policy preferences reveal patterns and priorities of relevance far beyond this particular secretary of state's tenure: e.g., the clear tendency to deliver much less than either altruistic of "Cold War" rhetoric implied.

Nudged by T. S. Eliot's imagery, then, this article will use John Foster Dulles's approach to "development" in Asia as a test case for exploring over-arching themes and controversies. Beginning with an overview of the 1950s policies that demonstrate Dulles's engagement, it will move on to suggest the deep and complex roots of his interest before concluding with a discussion of longer-range and problematic implications.

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1   Rist's superb study was originally published in French. The quotations used here are from the English translation: Gilbert Rist, The History of Development: From Western Origins to Global Faith, London 2002, 13, 19-20.
2   Arturo Escobar, Encountering Development: The Making and Unmaking of the Third World, Princeton 1995; Wolfgang Sachs, The Development Dictionary: A Guide to Knowledge as Power, London 1992; Nils Gilman, Mandarins of the Future: Modernization Theory in Cold War America, Baltimore 2004.

I.

Even now, after extensive re-examination of John Foster Dulles's role in the 1950s, it might still seem somewhat surprising that the secretary of state associated with massive retaliation, brinkmanship, and "pactomania" had an intensive interest in "development" issues. In fact, however, related problems and opportunities engaged his attention from the very beginning of his tenure – and he played a central role in the Eisenhower administration's nurturing of innovative policy initiatives, very much including those targeting Asia. There are many reasons to question the effectiveness or sufficiency of the U.S. efforts he helped to design and administer on this front (which is equally true, of course, for the efforts of others in succeeding decades), but there is no real justification for doubt regarding interest and activism.

Dulles's first extensive journey as secretary of state, for example, saw him spending three weeks in the Middle East and South Asia in May 1953. None of his predecessors had visited these regions while in office and Dulles believed it was "high time" to signal the new administration's determination to make a "fresh start." From Turkey "all the way around to Japan and Korea," he told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, "all the areas are soft. They are full of all sorts of troubles" that required urgent attention.[3] It quickly became clear that "development" was one of the most pressing concerns, figuring constantly in Dulles's discussions as he moved through Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia.[4] This was equally the case in India and Pakistan. Having arrived in New Delhi on the early morning of May 20, for example, Dulles stopped only to lay a wreath at the Gandhi Memorial and to make a quick initial courtesy call on Prime Minister Nehru before moving into an extended meeting with the Indian Planning Commission. Pointing out that the new U.S. administration supported the latest five-year plan, he

> explained that in order to obtain appropriations from Congress for foreign aid, he and others in his group wished to learn as much as possible regarding [the] actual working of [the] plan to justify American help.[5]

When he moved on to Karachi on May 22, discussions with Prime Minister Mohammed Ali immediately echoed this. Nagging India-Pakistan tensions were placed into a specific "development" context, for instance, when Dulles said he had "told Nehru that it was difficult for the U.S. to justify the giving of economic aid when the economies of both

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3   Executive Sessions of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (Historical Series), (Washington D.C., 1977), April 29, 1953 (this series will hereafter be cited as FRCX). Relevant sources on "Dulles revisionism" include Richard Immerman, ed., John Foster Dulles and the Diplomacy of the Cold War. Princeton, N.J. 1990) and Ronald W. Pruessen, John Foster Dulles: The Road to Power, New York 1982.

4   The U.S. Department of State's published records of Dulles's Middle East and South Asian trip provides a valuable overview of many discussions: Foreign Relations of the United States, 52-54, IX, 1-167.

5   Ibid., 113.

India and Pakistan were being dragged down by the maintenance of military establishments made necessary by the possibility of hostilities over Kashmir."[6]

Such South Asian interests were reiterated – and then expanded – after Dulles returned to Washington. His testimony to the Senate Appropriations Committee regarding the Eisenhower administration's first Mutual Security Program requests was clear in this respect. Citing the desirability of meaningful U.S. aid, he said

> *Both India and Pakistan have shown initiative in undertaking programs for economic development, despite the very limited resources at their disposal. Economic progress is demanded by the people in these new nations and the survival of free governments in them depends on whether such progress will take place.*

In East Asia, as well, the secretary of state argued, the U.S. was seeking to "develop internal stability and strength." Japan in particular, he said,

> *possesses the most advanced industry and the greatest reservoir of technical skills and commercial experience. She is in a position to contribute substantially to the strengthening of the free nations of the Pacific and to the raising of living standards in the area.*[7]

As Dulles began, so he continued. By mid-1954, replying to a proposal for a "World Economic Policy" from C. D. Jackson (a Time-Life executive who had become something of an Eisenhower confidante), the secretary of state clearly sketched his over-arching concerns:

> *I have become personally convinced that it is going to be very difficult to stop Communism in much of the world if we cannot in some way duplicate the intensive Communist effort to raise productive standards. They themselves are increasing their productivity at the rate of about 6% per annum, which is twice our rate. In many areas of the world such as Southeast Asia, India, Pakistan, and South America, there is little, if any, increase. That is one reason why Communism has such great appeal in areas where the slogans of "liberty", "freedom" and "personal dignity" have little appeal.*[8]

Specific new proposals soon followed, if not on the scale that Jackson was urging. Dulles arranged presidential approval for an interdepartmental committee whose report urged a "bold, far reaching initiative" – and then worked to at least begin moving in that direction. Harold Stassen (Director of the Foreign Operations Administration within the Department of State) was allowed to pledge an expansion of U.S. aid to Asian countries at the October meeting of the Colombo Plan, for example. Dulles also pressed his de-

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6   Ibid., 122.

7   The Importance of the Mutual Security Program to Our National Security, in: Department of State Bulletin, July 20, 1953, 88-92.

8   John Foster Dulles to C. D. Jackson, August 24, 1954, C. D. Jackson Papers, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library (Abilene, Kansas). (The Eisenhower Library will henceforth be identified as EL.)

partmental agenda in a way that helped produce Treasury Secretary George Humphrey's November announcement of U.S. support for the creation of an International Finance Corporation (IFC) – a projected affiliate of the World Bank that would facilitate local currency loans to private investors.[9]

Such steps suggest a clear gathering of momentum in late 1954 and both Dulles and Eisenhower soon gave signals about yet other initiatives. In the spirit of the Colombo Plan and IFC announcements, the secretary of state alerted Congressional leaders to his interest in devising a program for "stimulating economic development in underdeveloped countries" – and the president then used a December press conference to announce plans for a special fund specifically targeting Asian needs on this front.[10] By January, a Department of State committee was suggesting an initial appropriation of $200 million for what came to be called the "Asian Development Loan Fund" (ADLF). By April, Dulles was testifying on behalf of the proposal before the Senate and House committees reviewing all of the administration's Mutual Security Aid proposals.

Neither he nor the ADLF concept had an easy time of it. On one hand, the secretary encountered a by now standard cast of doubters and critics. Senator William Knowland (R-CA) complained about plans to include India among aid recipients, saying "it would be bad if the impression got around the world that we reward neutralism" – to which Dulles responded that "We are not awarding gifts for policies we dislike; we are simply trying to prevent India from moving towards Communism." When others expressed concern about the potential lavishness of U.S. spending, he emphasized the modesty of a program that was not trying to duplicate the Marshall Plan: "This fund is a pump priming allocation," he said at one point, "… not a grant operation [but] a matter of getting certain things underway."[11] On the other hand, the end result of the tangles with Congress proved all-too-typical of the pattern that would hold throughout the Eisenhower years. More than half a billion dollars was cut from the administration's request – approximately 15 % – with the appropriation for ADLF being chopped in half (down to $ 100 million).[12]

Such Congressional behavior did not prevent substantive executive branch movement on the aid and development front, however. Dulles – and others within the Eisenhower administration – proved determined to conceptualize and begin implementing initiatives that would be relevant across the breadth of Asia. Early attentiveness to Japan and Southeast Asia never weakened, for example. Dulles's 1950–52 work on the Japanese Peace Treaty had given him a particular interest in encouraging a productive linkage

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9   A fine overview of the complicated aid, trade, and development terrain is provided in Burton I. Kaufman's *Trade and Aid: Eisenhower's Foreign Economic Policy, 1953–1961*, Baltimore 1982. For the 1954 initiatives with which Dulles was involved, see pp. 34-57.

10   Kaufman, *Trade and Aid* (note 9), 52-54 – and for Dulles's efforts to prepare Congressional leaders, see the minutes of the Bipartisan Leadership meetings, November 17, 1954 and December 13, 1954, "Legislative Meetings, 1953–1955," Whitman Files, EL.

11   Kaufman, *Trade and Aid* (note 9), 54-55; Dennis Merrill, *Bread and the Ballot: The United States and India's Economic Development, 1947–1963*, Chapel Hill 1990, 111-117.

12   Kaufman, *Trade and Aid* (note 9), 54-55; Merrill, *Bread and the Ballot* (note 11), 116-117.

between the industrial capacity of the defeated enemy and the markets and raw materials of formerly colonial territories.[13] It was freely admitted, however, that such a linkage would require the nurturing of Southeast Asian enterprise – which led to a range of mid-1950s efforts like the encouragement of mining and other raw materials development projects involving Japan, Thailand, and the Philippines and assistance in the negotiation of Japanese "reparations" agreements with Southeast Asian countries designed to jump-start useful trade patterns.[14] South Asia offers abundant examples of concern and action as well. Dennis Merrill's fine study of the U.S. role in India's economic advancement details the many programs that continued even in the face of curtailed funding: by 1956, there were two hundred people working within the Technical Cooperation Mission that was housed within the U.S. embassy in New Delhi and its "Community Development Project" alone helped finance payments "for fertilizer, seed, jeeps, wireless radios, crop sprayers, well-drilling and irrigation equipment, and other basic supplies."[15]

Nor did concern for Capitol Hill resistance keep Dulles from conceptualizing yet additional initiatives. Even before the end of 1955, he was urging steps that would provide greater "flexibility" and "continuity" in U.S. efforts – in particular, "the organization of an institution with substantial capital to make 'soft' loans as a sort of equity behind World Bank 'hard' loans." What he had in mind was a request for Congressional authorization

> *to use not more than 100 million dollars a year for 10 years for 'soft' local currency loans… The net result … would be to enable the Administration to undertake long-term projects aggregating in value one billion dollars.*[16]

A Dulles visit to India the following March also helped to spark new thinking. Ambassador John Sherman Cooper had crafted a proposal to significantly expand U.S. support for the country's development and the secretary tasked a Department of State study group with assessing possibilities to include in the president's annual Mutual Security recommendations. Although Cooper would have been disappointed at the less than dramatic nods to his ideas, Eisenhower's overall recommendations (sent to Congress in April) did reveal signs of the movement being urged by Dulles and others: an additional $1.4 billion was requested, with increased attention to economic as opposed to military aid evident in the call for restoration of more generous funding for ADLF and the creation of a "President's Emergency Fund." While Congress again proved difficult, refusing

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13   Pruessen, Dulles: The Road to Power (note 3), Chapters 16-17.

14   See, for example, the fine study by William S. Borden, The Pacific Alliance: United States Foreign Economic Policy and Japanese Trade Recovery, 1947–1955, Madison, WS 1984, 178-179, 193-195, 203-205 and passim.

15   Merrill, Bread and the Ballot (note 11), 121.

16   "Memorandum of Conversation at Luncheon," December 8, 1955, "Meetings with President, 1955" folder, John Foster Dulles Papers, Seeley G. Mudd Library, Princeton University. (The John Foster Dulles Papers will hereafter be referred to as DP.)

two thirds of the additional funding request, 90% of the cuts required in administration plans came from military assistance.[17]

The pattern set in the first Eisenhower administration continued through the second: Dulles remained steadily engaged in efforts to expand U.S. development initiatives in Asia (and elsewhere), regularly using his key leadership position to steer ideas around sometimes doubting colleagues. In 1957, this meant advocacy on behalf of a "Development Loan Fund" (DLF). Dulles vigorously urged a significant expansion and broadening of 1955's Asian Development Loan Fund, arguing that

> *You have to achieve a certain minimum speed to take-off. It would not be prudent to invest our resources in development programs which are too small to offer any hope of achieving a self-sustaining rate of growth.*[18]

He also worked with the president to organize a high-profile public relations campaign to encourage grass roots support for foreign aid initiatives in general. One of his personal contributions to public discourse became an emphasis on the domestic economic value of loans, grants, and global development. At least three-quarters of "foreign" aid was spent in the U.S., he argued, providing employment to perhaps as many as 600,000 Americans. "To cut these funds would be to cut employment here at home."[19]

By 1958, Dulles went to Congress to request an additional $625 million in funding for the Development Loan Fund. This was three times greater than the sum requested for the ADLF just three years earlier – indicating how far and how quickly his "development" interests had grown. At the same time, the secretary of state also lent his support to a campaign to study the creation of what would become known as the International Development Association (IDA), intended to become an affiliate of the World Bank with a capacity to offer low-interest loans repayable at least in local currencies. He also supported an augmentation of U.S. contributions to the United Nations' Technical Assistance Program.[20]

II.

Why did "development" figure regularly in John Foster Dulles's agenda of priorities during the 1950s?

Some might be tempted to touch base quickly with the question of motivation and rationale. Isn't it relatively obvious, after all, that a famous Cold Warrior like Dulles would have turned to an interest in development because of the implacable struggle against international communism? In fact, however, the sources of this secretary of state's interest are more complex than this. Dulles's concern had deep roots that *predated* the Cold

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17   Merrill, Bread and the Ballot (note 11), 127-128.
18   U.S. Congress, Senate, Foreign Relations Committee, Hearings: Mutual Security Act of 1957, 7.
19   Quoted in Kaufman (note 9), Trade and Aid, 136.
20   Ibid., 141-143.

War – and an appreciation for those deep roots can enrich our understanding of both the complexities of the 1950s *and* the overarching span of the post-World War II U.S. approach to "development."

To point to tangled roots does not for a moment mean that the Cold War was irrelevant to Dulles's interest in development – and his words and policy choices make it abundantly clear that it was, in fact, of great significance. In Dulles's case, concern for a "Free World" vs. "Communist" struggle had emphatically stretched to Asia as early as 1949. With the Marshall Plan and N.A.T.O. bringing a measure of stability to Europe, he argued at that point, Kremlin leaders were realizing that "the going for them was not very good going" on that front and "their ambitions for the moment lie more in the Far East…" The end of the Chinese civil war was especially worrisome. "Most of China is under a Communist Government which today spearheads the Soviet Communist policy of inciting peoples of South Asia and the Pacific to violent revolution against their existing governments on the theory that these governments are merely the 'lackeys' of the West," he wrote at one point.[21]

The Korean War seemed to confirm Dulles's anxiety about an Asian front in the global Cold War. He had been in Seoul just days prior to the June 25, 1950 invasion across the 38th parallel and he offered regular public speculation about the nature of a new Kremlin move in "the world strategy of international communism." On some occasions, he emphasized particular targets. "The Russians already hold the island of Sakhalin, just to the north of Japan," he said at one point, "and Korea is close to the south of Japan. Thus… Japan would be between the upper and lower jaws of the Russian Bear."[22] At other times, he painted with more sweeping brush strokes. As he put it in a mid-1953 conversation with Syngman Rhee, for example:

> … *the United States must take a broad view as the leader in the world struggle against communism. The Secretary explained the general strategic position in the Far East which required holding a position anchored in the north in Korea, which swung through the offshore island chain through Japan, Formosa, and the Philippines, to Indo-China at the other end. If that arc can be held and sufficient pressures developed against the communists, it might be possible eventually to overthrow communist control of the mainland. However, if any part of that strategic position is lost, the whole position will go under.*[23]

Such Cold War concerns and conceptualizations helped to generate many of the explanations offered for his aid and development proposals during Dulles's tenure as secretary of state – as witnessed by his telling C. D. Jackson that "it is going to be very difficult to stop Communism in much of the world if we cannot in some way duplicate the intensive Communist effort to raise productive standards" or his explanation to Senator

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21   Dulles addresses, January 9, 1950; March 10, 1950, DP.
22   Dulles addresses, July 1, 1950; July 7, 1950; July 31, 1950, DP.
23   United States Minutes of the Second Meeting Between President Rhee and the Secretary of State, August 6, 1953, in: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Vol. XIV, Washington 1985, 1475.

Knowland regarding support for Nehru's five year plan because "we are simply trying to prevent India from moving towards Communism."[24] It is worth noting, as well, that Dulles was giving voice to such views in both a private letter (to Jackson) and a public Congressional hearing (with Knowland). The echoing of public thoughts behind closed doors would hold true for him throughout the 1950s and suggests real conviction as opposed to political posturing.

If Dulles's "Cold Warrior" impulses have relevance to his interest in "development," however, his identity as a whole must also be kept in mind. Like other policy makers of the 1950s, that is, the man who served as Eisenhower's secretary of state – like Eisenhower himself – had had a long career and a rich intellectual life before 1953 and before the onset of bitter conflict with the Soviet Union. While the Cold War often reinforced earlier concerns and priorities, a sufficiently wide-angle lens makes it clear that it did not create them. Dulles himself was very much aware of this. In executive session testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee just prior to his spring 1953 journey to the Middle East and South Asia, he said the countries he was going to visit were "full of all sorts of troubles, some of which, many of which are not directly due to the Soviet Union but which they move in to take advantage of."[25]

Dulles's long life and career helped to generate his interest in "development" in at least two ways. First, he had had decades of experience in the international economy by the time he became secretary of state – and there can be little question that "development" policies and strategies in the 1950s were intensively linked to calculations regarding the dynamics of global trade and investment. Dulles knew those dynamics like the proverbial back of his hand. He had worked on the War Trade Board in 1917; he had been an economic adviser at the Paris Peace Conference (and drafter of the notorious "war guilt" clause in the Treaty of Versailles); he had specialized in international work with major American and European corporations and banking houses as a Wall Street lawyer throughout the 1920s, 1930s, and 1940s. When Dulles thought and talked about matters like raw materials, exports, and investment in the Eisenhower years, there would have been few people in the administration – very much including the president – who could have matched his hands-on expertise.

Second, Dulles's interest in "development" also emerged under the influence of a president who held office long before Dwight Eisenhower: Woodrow Wilson. In 1917, Dulles had been coaxed to Washington from a prominent Wall Street law firm by his uncle Robert Lansing – to serve on the War Trade Board and then as a member of the U.S. delegation to the Paris Peace Conference. The young lawyer never really looked at the world in the same way after this. Both then and later, he evidenced intense interest in Wilson's dramatic wartime vision of a more peaceful world order – a reformed international system in which the horrors of modern conflict would not be repeated.[26]

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24   See above.
25   Executive Sessions of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (Historical Series), Washington, D.C. 1977, p. 384.
26   Dulles's early experiences with Woodrow Wilson are discussed in Pruessen, The Road to Power, Chapter 3.

Dulles's career and the prolonged economic crises of the 1930s generated particular attentiveness to certain facets of a Wilsonian worldview. Contemplating the disasters of the Great Depression from his Wall Street vantage point, he more and more regularly emphasized the need to create a freer global *economic* environment: the liberal "open door" policies that had been important to Wilson were seen as simultaneously relevant to both an amelioration of severe production and trade crises and a prevention of their escalation into another world war. It was long past time to create "a world which is elastic and fluid in its organization," Dulles argued regularly, with "national monetary units in some reasonably stable relationship to each other" and a "substantial removal of barriers to the exchange of goods."[27]

Such interwar views were a crucial springboard for Dulles's approach to many 1940s and 1950s issues. His vision of a reformed world order lost none of its centrality, for example, whatever his public reputation and ultimate abilities (or inabilities) to vivify the vision may suggest. Leading a high profile "study group" for the U.S.'s Federal Council of Churches, he became associated with a campaign to revive Wilson's earlier agenda during World War II: a new international organization and freer "interstate commerce" were identified as central tenets. In 1945-46, he emphatically urged the need to avoid a 1920s-like retreat from global responsibility. "We are at the beginning of a long and difficult negotiation which will involve the structure of the post-war world," he wrote, with an opportunity to avoid behaviors that had traditionally generated war and economic crisis. "This time we must break the cycle. We have what may be mankind's last chance."[28]

The relevance of these Wilsonian convictions to Dulles's evolving thoughts on "development" emerged in tandem with the future secretary of state's strong conviction that "colonial reform" was a tool of great value for creating an "elastic and fluid" world. He regularly referred to Wilson's far-sightedness in calling for an end to traditional imperialism as a key step in the campaign to eliminate the sources of conflict that had plagued the international arena for centuries: eliminate colonies, it was argued, and there would be fewer reasons for powerful states to go to war with each other. With an eye on the cataclysmic economic environment in the 1930s, Dulles urged an especially energetic pursuit of "open door" policies in realms controlled by imperial powers. "When we move on to those nations which are less highly developed," he wrote at one point, "and particularly when we consider colonial areas, a much more ambitious program is practical… There would seem to be no insuperable obstacle to opening up vast areas of the world through the application of the principles of the 'mandate' system as proposed by President Wilson."[29]

Such convictions remained of constant importance to Dulles as he contemplated Asian issues in the 1950s. His work on the Japanese Peace Treaty, for example, revealed a steady

27   Ibid., Chapters 5, 7, 8.
28   Ibid., pp. 178-217, 259-261.
29   Dulles's anti-colonialism is discussed in Ronald W. Pruessen, John Foster Dulles and Decolonization in Southeast Asia, in: Marc Frey / Ronald W. Pruessen / Tan Tai Yong, eds., The Transformation of Southeast Asia: International Perspectives on Decolonization, Armonk, N.Y. 2003, pp. 226-240.

search for ways of liberalizing the economic structure of the broad Asia Pacific region. "One of the things we must try to do is to help create in that part of the world, Asia and the Pacific, economic health," he said in 1951: "A greater degree of economic health… is a thing which is perhaps most of all wanted in that part of the world."[30] Japan could be very important here. He believed Tokyo and Washington between them could play a particularly important role in building "expanding economies in South and Southeast Asia": this would allow access to the "fabulous potential wealth" of the region's raw materials as well as rich markets for recovering Japanese industry.[31] Much of the scholarly work on the Eisenhower administration's steady immersion in Indochina recognizes the ongoing resonance of precisely this kind of thinking.[32] Nor did other Asian and more broadly global arenas lack for attention that sprang from Wilsonian as well as "Cold War" sources. In 1953 testimony on the administration's Mutual Security proposals, for example, Dulles explicitly highlighted what he called "the twin threats stemming from communism and instability." This was a theme he turned to regularly during his tenure as secretary of state. In his 1957 testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on behalf of expanded foreign aid appropriations, he said recently independent nations were both volatile and at risk: "These people are determined to move forward… If they do not succeed there will be increasing discontent that may sweep away their moderate leaders of today and bring to power extremist measures fostered by international Communism."[33] The sequence of steps suggested here makes it clear that the root cause of danger was not to be found in Moscow or the so-called "international communist conspiracy."

Dulles was explicitly conscious of the connection between "decolonization" and "development" – as demonstrated by the radio / television report he delivered on his May 1953 travels to the Middle East and South Asia. His concluding remarks in this broadcast highlighted several key conclusions that would guide his work in the years ahead (as they had in the past) and his very first two points highlight the sequential nature of his thinking. On one hand, he said, the United States must remain true to its anti-colonial roots: whatever ties existed with close allies like Great Britain and France, Americans would have to persuasively demonstrate their "traditional dedication to political liberty" to newly independent states. On the other hand, the United States would have to work for the "orderly development" of formerly colonial societies by supporting understand-

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30   Dulles interview, September 12, 1951, The Papers of John Foster Dulles (Princeton University). Dulles's work on the Japanese Peace Treaty is discussed in Pruessen, The Road to Power (note 3), Chapters 16-17.

31   United States Summary Minutes of Meeting, November 9, 1954, in: Foreign Relations of the United States, 52-54: XIII, pp. 1779-1782. See also William S. Borden, The Pacific Alliance (note 14), 215.

32   See, for example, David L. Anderson, Trapped by Success: The Eisenhower Administration and Vietnam, 1953–1961, New York 1991 and Lloyd C. Gardner, Approaching Vietnam: From World War II through Dienbienphu, New York 1988.

33   The 1953 reference to "twin threats" is in: The Importance of the Mutual Security Program to Our National Security Program, in: Department of State Bulletin, July 20, 1953, 91; the 1957 testimony is quoted in Merrill, Bread and the Ballot (note 11), 145.

able drives for economic advancement. "The peoples of the Near East and Asia demand better standards of living, and the day is past when their aspirations can be ignored."[34]

III.

If John Foster Dulles had a clear, sometimes strong interest in "development" – an interest that emerged from various facets of his long career and intellectual evolution – what explains the severely limited "development" achievements of the Eisenhower years? And can an understanding of the failings of the 1950s help illuminate the more general problems and shortcomings of the later 20th century's "development" efforts?

"Failings" is certainly the appropriate term. It would be hard to make a case for even modest success, that is, with respect to something like Gilbert Rist's articulation of the altruistic reading of "development" as a "collective hope of improving the conditions of life of the majority of mankind."[35] By the end of Dulles's years as secretary of state, hunger, disease, poverty and the full panoply of problems associated with *under*development continued to plague Asia and other arenas. The United States, for its part – and the country was, of course, far and away the wealthiest in history – had at best *acted* only very tentatively on the kinds of initiatives increasingly *conceptualized and discussed* during the Eisenhower years. Much fine scholarship on the period makes this abundantly clear. Burton Kaufman's study of "trade and aid" issues, for example, superbly lays out a year-by-year saga of struggles to expand the "economic" components of the Eisenhower administration's "Mutual Security" program: although expansion did take place, "development" support consistently remained the tail on the dog of "military" assistance. Dennis Merrill's work on Washington responses to Indian development plans reveals a similar pattern of rhetoric that significantly outpaced performance – as does Marc Frey's fine article on South Vietnam and Indonesia in this issue of *Comparativ*.[36]

Nor, to be sure, did Dulles-Eisenhower successors make up for all the short-comings of the 1950s. Far from it, indeed, as attested to by countless statistics concerning the ongoing prevalence of global poverty, hunger, and health care and education shortfalls in the early 21st century. Recently updated World Bank figures suggest 1.4 billion still live below a poverty line defined as an income of less than $1.25 per day – with U.N. Food and Agricultural Organization estimates indicating that at least 20% of even India's population continues to suffer from serious malnutrition problems.[37] Fine scholarly analyses have persuasively elaborated on the statistics as well: e.g., Arturo Escobar's provocative

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34   Department of State Bulletin, June 15, 1953, 833-834.
35   See above.
36   Kaufman, Trade and Aid (note 9); Merrill, Bread and the Ballot (note 11). For Frey's "The Limits of Modernization: American Development Assistance and Southeast Asian Resistance during the 1950s," see p. 44-60 in this volume.
37   World Bank statistics can be consulted at: http://go.worldbank.org/33CTPSVDC0 – and Food and Agricultural Organization statistics at: http://www.fao.org/publications/sofi/en/

"Encountering Development: The Making and Unmaking of the Third World", Gabriel Kolko's "Confronting the Third World: United States Foreign Policy, 1945–1980", and Jan Knippers Black's revealing "Development in Theory and Practice: Paradigms and Paradoxes".[38]

What produced the "shadows" that fell so steadily between pretension and action regarding "development"? How can the gap between John Foster Dulles's rhetoric and performance on this front be explained – and how does the mottled nature of his record suggest patterns of broader applicability to the "development" story? Although complexities would ultimately demand more expansive discussion, three particularly relevant factors can be identified and briefly explored within the confines of this article. In each case, specific grounding in Dulles's experiences during the 1950s can be seen as opening windows onto a longer historical trajectory.

Tensions inherent in the U.S. political system

Whatever Dulles's – or Eisenhower's – personal inclinations may have been, each was forced to operate in a political arena that set clear limits to what might have been achieved. On one hand, this meant dealing with a *Congress* that was often more concerned with cutting expenditures and holding down taxes than with the "foreign aid" and "development" initiatives forthcoming from the Executive branch; on the other hand, it also entailed recognizing the indifference or skepticism of the *electorate* that reinforced a Congressional inclination to tilt toward obstructionism on spending proposals. Dulles spent an enormous amount of time trying to navigate this Scylla and Charybdis. He travelled to Capitol Hill to testify as regularly as he traveled abroad – which meant a great deal, considering his reputation for globe-hopping – and he took directly to radio and television airwaves to reach a yet wider audience more frequently than would be the case for almost all succeeding secretaries of state. Each annual budget messages turned into a multi-act drama that could stretch out over four to six months: testimony to relevant Senate and House committees regarding the core components proposed for the next fiscal year's Mutual Security Program; phone calls and White House meetings of "Legislative Leaders" as hearings and Congressional votes unfolded; repetitions of the scripts as passage of amended and/or fine-tuned budget proposals went through later "appropriations" processes to determine what resources would actually become available. Occasionally, the administration would mount a particularly intensive "public relations" effort to improve results. In late 1957 / early 1958, for example, prominent business leaders were brought to the White House for a series of dinners, Eric Johnston (head of the Motion Picture Producers and Distributors Association) was persuaded to organize an advocacy campaign, and there was outreach to the kinds of church groups Dulles had

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38   Jan Knippers Black, Development in Theory and Practice: Paradigms and Paradoxes, 2nd edition, Boulder, CO 1999; Escobar, Encountering Development (note 2); Gabriel Kolko, Confronting the Third World: United States Foreign Policy, 1945–1980, New York 1988.

worked closely with during World War II.[39] Time and again, however, the best that could be said for all the administration's efforts was that Congressional cuts were probably somewhat smaller than they would otherwise have been.[40]

Dulles gave no signs of severe agitation concerning Senate, House, and public reactions to aid and "development" proposals, drawing perhaps on decades of legal experience in which time- and energy-consuming maneuvering were seen as inevitable components of any pursuit of objectives. The secretary of state also drew on his high-power lawyer's imagination in order to devise ways around obstacles. In November 1957, for example, he helped soften the frustration mounting among advocates of a large loan to India as a result of Congressional opposition. Eisenhower, Treasury Secretary Anderson, and others were happy to follow his lead as he articulated a complex alternative strategy:

> We will not go to Congress for a special grant; we will try to break the problem down into parts; we will try to get the Germans to cover the Indian trade deficit with them; we will try to cover our deficit through the Ex-Im [Export Import] Bank, perhaps $ 200 million; we will try to provide $ 50 million or so from the development fund; we will talk with them [the Indians] about the bomber question; and we will talk with them about their internal condition which impedes the flow of private funds.[41]

Eisenhower, it might be added, was not always so unflappable about Congressional obstructionism on foreign aid. "I am repeatedly astonished, even astounded," he wrote an old friend during one difficult round, "by the apparent ignorance of members of Congress on the general subject of our foreign affairs." Opposition to programs that helped control U.S. military costs while expanding U.S. exports reflected "abysmal ignorance," he said, sentiments which prompted occasional run-ins with his own party's leaders on Capitol Hill.[42]

The limits of 1950s knowledge and insights

As wide-ranging as their international experiences may have been prior to 1953, it should be kept in mind that high-level policy makers like John Foster Dulles were dealing with a drastically – and recently – altered world during the Eisenhower years. Two world wars and the Great Depression had fundamentally shaken the global arena and produced a significantly reconfigured landscape. Post-1945 moves toward the "Bretton Woods" system, for example, were profoundly re-structuring the patterns and practices associated with trade, currency, and investment. Of equal (perhaps greater) importance to understanding the history of "development" efforts, the defeat or slower-motion demise

39   See, for example, Kaufman, Trade and Aid (note 9), 133-136.
40   See again, e.g., ibid., 139.
41   Memorandum of a Conference with the President, Washington, November 12, 1957, in: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Vol. VIII, Washington, D.C. 1987, 404-406.
42   See, for example, Stephen E. Ambrose, Eisenhower: The President, New York 1984, 379-381.

of once-great empires had ushered in an era of "decolonization" that would create both extreme volatility and opportunity.[43] Wilsonian inclinations meant that someone like Dulles was pleased with the direction of global change in the post-World War II era; he had, in fact, long advocated precisely these kinds of reforms. The fact remains, however, that the international arena which greeted him (and others) after Eisenhower's inauguration was in some ways very different from the one he had worked in for decades – and it is not unreasonable to recognize the ways in which time would have been required for effective adaptation.

As Dulles and other 1950s policy makers sought to navigate an altered global terrain, they began the now much-studied practice of relying on "experts" for advice on "development" policies.[44] By 1954–55, for example, Walt Rostow and Max Millikan were beginning to find a Washington audience for the work they were doing at MIT's Center for International Studies. (The president's confidante C. D. Jackson was one of those who helped to connect academic and political circles.[45]) Performance in the Eisenhower years – and long after – makes it clear that the experts had a tendency to sound more authoritative and confident than they had any right to be, of course, but they nonetheless potently influenced evolving discourse and policy-making. There were occasional moments, however, when experienced Washington hands admitted to the frustrations inherent in grappling with problems beyond the range of even their own extensive experience. At one point during a very long October 1956 National Security Council meeting, for example, Dulles seemed to lose patience with a seemingly endless discussion comparing the reports of various committees studying U.S. foreign aid programs. Everyone was in apparent agreement with Treasury Secretary George Humphrey's view that "foreign aid spending was the most critical problem now facing the present administration," but the secretary of state was not inclined to put too much weight on the advice of government outsiders. He was "curious," he said,

> to know why were imagined that the Fairless Committee [one of the study groups] would come up with the right answer to this great problem, when we ourselves don't yet have the slightest idea what the answer is.[46]

43   A useful overview of fundamental changes can be found in Jeffrey A. Frieden, Global Capitalism: Its Fall and Rise in the Twentieth Century, New York 2006.

44   Nils Gilman, Mandarins of the Future: Modernization Theory in Cold War America, Baltimore, MD 1003; Michael E. Latham, Modernization as Ideology: American Social Science and "Nation Building" in the Kennedy Era, Chapel Hill, NC 2000.

45   See, for example, C. D. Jackson to Dwight Eisenhower, July 1, 1959; Eisenhower to Jackson, July 6, 1959, C.D. Jackson Papers (Eisenhower Library).

46   Memorandum of Discussion at the 301st Meeting of the National Security Council, October 26, 1956,, in: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Vol. X, Washington, DC 1989, 124-133.

Seeing like a "Great Power"

Even if they were navigating new terrain, however, neither Dulles nor other U.S. policy makers were moving through anything that could be described as complete *terra incognita*. They were not entirely inexperienced, that is, in dealing with what they might have thought of as the "Third World." (Eisenhower himself had been posted in the Philippines during his U.S. Army career – and his secretary of state had worked with clients having extensive business interests in Cuba and Central America as early as 1910.[47]) Such previous experiences clearly colored perspectives on the nature of the post-World War II "development" agenda – and the identification of priority concerns.

In particular, mid-20th century U.S. leaders like Dulles were thoroughly at home within a historical trajectory that had made their nation an indisputable "Great Power" (far and away, indeed, the *greatest* power of the post-World War II era). This status almost invariably prodded a mindset and a cluster of policy objectives that proved problematic for "development." At base, for example, "center / periphery" or "metropole / frontier" calculations were pervasive – with less-developed regions and countries confined (even if unconsciously) to second-class roles in evolving relationships and systems.

As the "development" literature effectively demonstrates, the thrust of "metropole" policies could entail a measure of condescension that essentially "infantilized" the recipients of aid and advice while seeking to steer them toward more mature or "modern" behavior. One potent driver in this regard was the perceived need to more closely integrate underdeveloped nations into a more thoroughly globalized economic system – with strong emphasis on the value of their raw materials to the appetites of industrial "centers." And one common consequence of the corralling process was what some analysts describe as the reinvigoration of "imperialism."[48] "Development" initiatives both before and after World War II contributed to what Gilbert Rist refers to as the "internationalization" of imperialism: a move away from traditional, formal, and national concepts of "empire" – via mechanisms like the League of Nations' "mandate" system or the rules of the International Monetary Fund – which did not simultaneously undercut the authority and economic advantages of the powerful vis a vis the poor and weak.[49] This was a pattern that emerged long before Dulles's years as secretary of state and continued long after, as much more recent debate about the virtues and pitfalls of "globalization" makes clear.

John Foster Dulles's Wilsonian reform impulses can be seen as meshing closely with such an "internationalized" imperialism – or with what is sometimes termed "neo-colonialism" or "informal empire." And this fact provides one further explanation for the limitations of U.S. development policies in the Eisenhower years. Dulles did demonstrate strong early concern for "decolonization" (evident in positive comments about the "mandate" system and other matters as early as the 1930s) and he did move on to strong

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47   See, for example, Pruessen, The Road to Power (note 3), Chapter 2.
48   See, for example, Escobar, Encountering Development (note 2), 24-26.
49   Rist, History of Development (note 1), Chapter 3, for example.

interest in "development" in decolonized regions in the 1940s and 1950s. It was almost invariably true, however, that Dulles's decolonization / development progression revealed a primary preoccupation with the way in which those being nurtured or assisted would play an appropriate role in economic and political systems serving the "metropolis" needs of the United States and its highly industrialized allies. As ever, Asian examples of this Dulles (and 1950s) proclivity are plentiful. A core design component of the U.S. policy that took shape within the Japanese Peace Treaty (negotiated by Dulles), for example, involved using Southeast Asian raw materials and markets for the purpose of bringing about Japanese economic recovery and stability. There was conscious realization that this would delay or prevent industrialization within the decolonizing region.[50] Nor was it a coincidence that much of the U.S. aid which flowed to India in the 1950s was directed toward projects involving agriculture and commodities.[51] In these cases, as elsewhere, Dulles was responding to a logic he captured with perfect clarity in 1956 remarks to North Atlantic Treaty Organization colleagues about the dangers posed by instability in the underdeveloped regions of the world. If Russian and Chinese agitation was successful, he said, "the world ratio as between communist dominated peoples and free peoples would change from a ratio of two-to-one in favor of freedom to a ratio of one-to-three against freedom." This would be "almost intolerable … given the industrialized nature of the Atlantic Community and its dependence upon broad markets and access to raw materials."[52]

Conclusion

Between the idea / And the reality … Falls the shadow, T. S. Eliot wrote, offering an image perfectly appropriate to the unfolding of John Foster Dulles's engagement with "development" in Asia (and elsewhere). The "idea" was clearly of interest and importance to this secretary of state: the impulse to develop "development" strategies that would build on "decolonization" progress, for reasons connected with both "Cold War" calculations and Wilsonian reform ambitions. The "reality" was something else, however, as achievements were circumscribed by a variety of factors and forces.

Unfortunately, this was a pattern all too typical of succeeding decades as well. Those who shaped U.S. policies after the 1950s would see the evolution of intellectual content and policy design – but no diminution in the presence of shadows.

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50 See, for example, Borden, The Pacific Alliance (note 14), 203.
51 See above, 8-9, as well as Devesh Kapur / John P. Lewis / Richard Webb, The World Bank: Its First Half Century, Vol. I: History, Washington, D.C. 1997, 94-99.
52 Dulles remarks, Paris, May 1-7, 1956, The John Foster Dulles Papers (Princeton University).

Health and Sovereignty in the New Asia: Visions of Development[1]

Sunil Amrith

RESÜMEE

Der Beitrag untersucht den Zusammenhang von Vorstellungen über Natur / Umwelt und Visionen asiatischer Entwicklung. Im Mittelpunkt steht dabei das Verhältnis von Krankheit, Gesundheitspolitik und Entwicklung. Rekonstruiert wird ein Prozess früher optimistischer Erwartungen in menschliche Fähigkeit, mit Hilfe von Technologie Natur zu meistern, hin zu einer pessimistischen Einsicht, dass dies nur begrenzt möglich ist. Asiatische Nationalisten und Sozialreformer rekurrierten auf koloniale Diskurse über das tropische Asien, waren jedoch davon überzeugt, dass Technik die Umwelt beherrschbar machen konnte. Ausdruck dieser Überzeugung war die globale Kampagne zur Ausrottung der Malaria, deren Schwerpunkt in Asien lag. Krankheitserreger machten jedoch nicht vor Grenzen halt, innerhalb derer Entwicklung zunehmend definiert wurde. Ebenso blieben Krankheiten ein Charakteristikum urbaner Räume. Zu Beginn der sechziger Jahre griffen Beobachter daher wieder auf vom Kolonialismus eingeführte Vorstellungen über die Unbeherrschbarkeit tropischer Natur zurück: nicht staatliche Institutionen oder nationale Entwicklungspolitik erschienen verantwortlich für die Persistenz von Armut, sondern Natur und Umwelt.

> *Already in Tokyo, house-fronts are dirty and Asian, but Hong Kong in the East, just as Cairo in the West, is the first true symbol, of clothes drying on projecting iron rods, or tattered gunny bags making do as screens, of ill-fed and diseased children, of fouled hu-*

> manity sprawling on the roadsides … this Asia of teeming millions, of dirty and impotent millions. All Asia is prostrate with the common disease of poverty…[2]
> Ram Manohar Lohia (1952)

This declaration by Ram Manohar Lohia to a conference of fellow Asian socialists in Rangoon, in 1952, captures some crucial features of the imagination of development in post-colonial Asia: the notion of common sights, smells and dispositions across 'Asia'; the focus on the thickness of population, the 'teeming millions'; the biologization of poverty ('a disease'). In Lohia's vision there is more than an echo of a long tradition of discourse that David Arnold has called 'tropicality' – Asia as an area of heat and humidity which possessed distinctive vegetation, flora and fauna, a distinctive epidemiology, and produced distinctive (distinctively undesirable) human and social characteristics.[3] This was a vision of tropical Asia dominated by the power of nature, and 'naturally' poor. Yet Lohia departed from many of his colonial forebears in his optimism that radical economic and social reform – that is to say, policy – could overcome the sloth and despair induced by geography. 'This is no time for laissez-faire', Lohia concluded, 'at least in Asia'.[4]

This article examines the shifting role of nature – and particularly of disease – in shaping visions of Asian development. The basic narrative of the paper lies in the gradual shift from optimism to pessimism about the possibility of conquering nature using technology, and I argue that this shift was shaped by the particularly complex bio-political terrain of Asia's borderlands, on the one hand, and growing cities on the other. A number of Asian nationalists and social reformers, I suggest, drew on aspects of colonial discourses about tropical Asia, but took a more optimistic view, that the tropics could be 'conquered' in the name of national development. From the early twentieth century, the belief grew that technology, discipline and social reform could conquer the tropics, thus transforming not only the natural environment, but social structures and even embodied behaviours. Within that vision – shared by a diverse group of scientists, officials, and political activists – there were contrasting emphases: a dominant view, which placed technology front and centre, and a current that emphasized redistribution and social transformation.

Given its easy availability, its widespread political acceptability, and the sense of enthusiasm it was able to evoke, the techno-centric approach to conquering the tropics prevailed. The global malaria eradication campaign of the 1950s, which focused intensively on Asia, epitomised the faith in this approach, and represented the apogee of late-colonial-into-post-colonial optimism. However, the malaria eradication programme encountered several difficulties, and experience began to suggest that 'nature' would not be so easily subdued. Two questions in particular troubled governments and observers:

2   Ram Manohar Lohia, An Asian Policy [speech in Rangoon, March 1952], in: Marx, Gandhi and Socialism, Hyderabad 1963.

3   David Arnold, "Illusory Riches": Representations of the Tropical World, 1840–1950, in: Singapore Journal of Tropical Geography, (1999), pp. 6-19.

4   Lohia, Marx, Gandhi and Socialism (note 2), p. 292.

the first was that the space of malarial distribution did not correspond to the increasingly well-defined spaces of national economies – the anopheles mosquito was no respecter of sovereignty, and at times cast doubt on the ability of states to master 'their' territory. The second area where the narrative of epidemiological transition broke down was in Asia's growing cities, increasingly central to the problematic of development.

By the 1960s, nature re-emerged as an explanation for poverty, for the inaction of states, and as the primordial condition of Asia. Frustrated states turned, more or less gradually, towards two kinds of policies which would characterize Asian approaches to development in the following generation, even as the paths of Asian nation-states diverged: an obsessive focus on population control, and an increasingly coercive urban policy of 'slum clearance' and 'beautification'.

I

By the 1930s, a more optimistic narrative emerged to challenge the determinism of tropical medicine, out of the conjunction of nationalist thought and international professional networks. On this view, technology, knowledge and education could overcome the diseases of the tropics, and also the habits and bodily dispositions of tropical peoples. The historian of medicine Warwick Anderson has characterized this shift as the moment where 'biomedical science ceases to be an environmental discourse in the Asian Tropics and becomes primarily a discourse on social citizenship'.[5] An increasing number of observers – from colonial medical officials to Asian social reformers – felt that education might lead to the 'modification' of the human characteristics produced by tropical conditions.[6]

The new knowledge of nutrition played a central role in this transformation, by suggesting a materialist critique of the notion of tropical medicine. The global economic depression of the 1930s served as a catalyst for the wider circulation of new knowledge of human nutrition, with the League of Nations playing a central role in its transmission. Beginning with an investigation of the impact of unemployment on the nutritional status of workers in a number of European countries, the League swiftly moved to an authoritative declaration on minimum standards of human nutrition. Notably, the League's seminal report suggested that their findings were as significant in tropical countries as in temperate, industrial lands. Developments in the scientific knowledge of vitamins provided a language that could draw together Europe and the colonies, 'core' and 'periphery', economics, geopolitics, and the government of the individual human body.

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5   Warwick Anderson, The Natures of Culture: Environment and Race in the Colonial Tropics, in: P. Greenough / A. Lowenhaupt-Tsing (eds.), Nature in the Global South: Environmental Projects in South and Southeast Asia, Durham, N.C. 2003.
6   Anderson, Natures of Culture (note 5), pp. 40-41.

The explicitly comparative framework of nutritional discourse was open to application to colonial problems. Indeed, a significant amount of the 'new knowledge of nutrition' emerged from colonial laboratories. Perhaps the best known of the new nutritional studies were John Boyd Orr's contrast of the diets and health of the Maasai and Kikuyu, and Robert McCarrison's experiments contrasting the health and vigour of rats fed with Punjabi diets with the malnutrition experienced by their counterparts fed on the rice-based diet of the 'Bengalis and Tamils'.[7] W. R. Aykroyd, director of the Coonoor Nutrition Research Laboratories, undertook the most wide-ranging research on questions of nutrition in South India. His pioneering research with Indian colleagues had shown that the preponderance of highly milled rice in the south Indian diet led to a range of nutritional deficiencies, as a result of the lack of proteins and of 'protective foods', and a particular lack of leafy vegetables and proteins. Significantly, Aykroyd and others suggested that nutritional deficiencies, more than the 'tropics' or particular cultural failings, explained the acute susceptibility of the Indian poor to infectious disease.

The implication was that education, and even a 'nutritional policy', might improve public health. A range of Asian nationalists took up the nutritional critique, their visions of the future sought to transcend the pessimism of colonial discourse on the tropics. Foremost amongst them was Gandhi. Gandhi's writings on nutrition are full of references to the latest research on the subject. He gave pride of place – because of its authority and its universality – to the League of Nations Health Committee's seminal findings on the Physiological Bases of Human Nutrition in 1936. A summary of the report immediately appeared in the pages of *Harijan*.[8]

In Gandhi's view, harnessing this international scientific knowledge could go towards increasing national vigour and vitality. Underlying Gandhi's experiments with food and hygiene was a critique of the economic impact of colonial rule on rural India. Not only did polished rice weaken the vitality of the Indian 'race', it was an example of the (economic and moral) impoverishment of India's villages through mechanisation:

> *If rice can be pounded in the villages after the old fashion the wages will fill the pockets of the rice pounding sisters and the rice eating millions will get some sustenance from the unpolished rice instead of pure starch which the polished rice provides. Human greed, which takes no count of the health or the wealth of the people who come under its heels, is responsible for the hideous rice-mills one sees in all the rice-producing tracts.*[9]

In an article simply entitled 'Green Leaves', Gandhi declared that "since the economic reorganization of the villages has been commenced with food reform, it is necessary to find

7   J. Boyd Orr / J. L. Gilks, Studies in Nutrition: The Physique and Health of Two African Tribes, London 1931.

8   Findings of the International Commission of Experts appointed by the Health Committee of the League of Nations, in: Harijan, 25 April 1936. The original report was: League of Nations, Report on the Physiological Bases of Nutrition, League of Nations Document A.12 (a), 1936.

9   Polished vs. Unpolished, in: Harijan, 26 / 10 / 1934.

out the simplest and cheapest foods that would enable villagers to regain lost health."[10] Gandhi's critique culminated in the redefinition of his Constructive Programme in 1940: 'it is impossible for unhealthy people to win *swaraj*', Gandhi declared, "therefore we should no longer be guilty of the neglect of the health of our people".

Interestingly, a regional imagination continued to shape the discussion of health in Asia, but now in a more complex way. An undifferentiated discussion of the epidemiology of 'the tropics' gave way, in light of nutritional analysis, to a consideration of the problems of the 'rice-eaters' of Asia. Aykroyd suggested, for example, that the illnesses common to a large part of South, Southeast and Eastern Asia came not from the determining influence of the environment, or even the ecology of rice cultivation, but from the interconnected regional economy. Malnutrition, he suggested, was a consequence of the regional economy involving the import of rice by the densely-settled parts of eastern India (and southern China) in exchange for the export of labour and skills to the frontier lands of Burma, Malaya and Ceylon.[11] During the Depression, the price of rice fell more sharply even than that of other commodities, and cheap, poor quality imported rice continued to flood south India.[12]

Alongside nutritional knowledge, new birth control methods, new insecticides, innovations in housing and in latrine construction allowed for the emergence of a more optimistic view of the possibility of transcending the tropics. As Warwick Anderson has put it, by the 1930s, 'it is the irresistible technical force of modern colonialism – better cooling, refrigeration, "physiological" housing, railways, the telegraph – that stuns the new generation of scientists, exciting wonder and trepidation', where once it had been sublime tropical nature that had fulfilled this role.[13] Often with the support of the Rockefeller Foundation, keen to spread the gospel of 'scientific' social organization, demonstration areas and model health centres sprouted up across Asia in the 1930s – from northern China to Ceylon and South India. One of the most ambitious, and most publicized, was the Dutch colonial government's Poekwerto Health centre in Java, run by the Rockefeller official Dr. J. L. Hydrick, whose faith in rural public health as a panacea for all ills is oddly touching. The League of Nations' conference on Rural Hygiene in the Far East, held in Bandung in 1937, provided a forum for the exchange of ideas and enthusiasm, bringing British, French and Dutch colonial officials together with Chinese, Japanese and Siamese public health experts. The optimism was infectious. In their plans for the health services of post-independence India, the Congress Party's National Planning Committee declared that India's young health workers needed to be imbued with 'missionary spirit'. 'By example and persuasion', these workers would 'spread the gospel

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10   M. K. Gandhi, Diet and Diet Reform, Ahmedabad 1949, p. 51.
11   C. J. Baker, Economic Reorganization and the Slump in South and Southeast Asia, in: Comparative Studies in Society and History, 23, 3 (1981), 325-39.
12   Ibid.
13   Anderson, Natures of Culture (note 5), p. 42.

of healthy living, communal and personal, and thus take other villagers a step or two away from their age-long prejudices and superstition on the road to better living'.[14]

As Asian nationalists began to 'see like a state' public health assumed a central place in their visions of national development, because it promised a way of overcoming natural conditions. That is to say, precisely those conditions which colonial officials had long used to explain Asia's poverty and excuse themselves from responsibility: the tropical environment, and its production of lassitude, inertia and sloth, and sensual excess. Perhaps the example par excellence of this transformation in nationalist thought – characterized by Partha Chatterjee as the 'moment of arrival' of Indian nationalism[15] – is the National Planning Committee of the Indian National Congress, in which Jawaharlal Nehru and Subhas Chandra Bose were the driving forces. In a series of reports on public health, population, and on 'women's place in the planned economy', the Planning Committee gave voice to a vision of the future where science, technology, and personal and national discipline would conquer tropical poverty.

The Planning Committee decried the vicious circle of poverty and under-nutrition leaving the Indian poor with 'inadequate safeguards against the rigours of nature or ravages of disease to resist which they are very poorly equipped'.[16] In the eyes of the Planning Committee, the qualitative issues of individual nutrition linked closely with the question of the quantity and 'quality' of the population as a whole. Increasing food production, as much as redistributing its consumption, was at the heart of the Planning Committee's vision. The Planning Committee declared that: 'all social customs, religious taboos and injunctions which now stand in the way of the husbandry of soil resources and efficient utilisation of available food resources have now to be abjured to mitigate the effects of chronic food shortage and poverty'.[17] The health of the population became a reason of state. An unhealthy population would pose an obstacle to the state's plans for industrialization and social transformation.

This was but a first step. The planning committee declared itself interested in the 'possibilities inherent in careful scientific breeding of the human race'; in creating a new, improved race of Indian bodies that, healthy and vigorous, would allow for the country's 'development'.[18] The health of the population becomes, here, an instrument, a tool for government in the service of greater aims – planned industrial development, and socio-cultural modernization. In the words of Mohan Rao's recent study, the Planning

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14 National Planning Committee, Report of the National Health Sub-Committee, Chair: S. S. Sokhey; K. Shad (ed.), Bombay 1947, pp. 43-4.

15 Partha Chatterjee, Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World: A Derivative Discourse?, London 1986.

16 National Planning Committee, Population: Report of the Sub-Committee (Chair: Dr. Radhakamal Mukherjee), K. T. Shah ed., Bombay 1948, p. 8. See also National Planning Committee, Report of the Sub-Committee on National Health, Bombay 1948. Although the proceedings of the Planning Committee were published in edited form after the war, the discussions took place between 1938 and 1940.

17 NPC, Population (note 16), p. 127.

18 Ominously, the Planning Committee included Nazi Germany on its list of countries where 'successful' experiments on eugenic lines had been conducted.

Committee's vision was one of 'harnessing bodies not just for the economy, but for a sublime, and sublimating, nation state'.[19]

The techno-scientific breakthroughs of the Second World War – the insecticide DDT, antibiotic drugs, and X-ray technology – cemented the optimistic, transformative narrative of health and development. Converted bombers taking flight to blanket swathes of land with DDT transformed the bounds of the possible, suggesting the real possibility of disease control. This technology, married with the winning of sovereignty and state power by a newly mobilized and confident cohort of Asian nationalist leaders, made the post-tropical future look bright. Many were confident that, once the tropics were conquered by technology, history – human, secular history – would prevail over geography.

II

What emerged at the end of the Second World War, in fact, was a layered, regional, imagination of development. Two overlapping narratives tied together questions of health, ecology, and economic transformation in Asia. The first was the older, tropical, narrative; that is, the vision of what Pierre Gourou called 'hot, wet Asia', sharing fundamental, biological and political characteristics. The second was a historical discourse on poverty: an explanation of Asia's poverty in terms of a shared history of colonial exploitation and underdevelopment, the solution to which would lie in the assertion of national economic sovereignty, perhaps within the framework of some sort of broader, regional cooperation.

Thus, a number of discussions immediately after the war revolved around the idea that Asia posed a particular, and unified, set of problems with respect to the government of welfare; a set of commonalities and regularities in the sphere of political economy, governed by climate, resources, population and – as a residual category – 'culture'. Implicit in these discussions was a quest to define the scope of action open to post-colonial Asian states. Asian governments and the new international organizations alike saw a set of deeper regularities governing the conditions of life and health across Asia.

The conception of 'Asia' as an administrative category for the government of life and welfare drew on a range of disciplines, many of them colonial disciplines. The first was tropical geography and tropical medicine. 'Asia' found its unity, on this view, in patterns of climate and disease ecology. In the words of a WHO expert, writing in 1947:

> *The Central and South-Eastern parts of Asia, together with Indonesia, i.e. the 'Monsoon Asia' of geographers, should be considered as one epidemiological area. It would include the endemic foci of cholera and territories most readily infectible [sic.] by that disease … it is free from yellow fever but is severely affected by malaria, by flea-borne and mite-borne rickettsioses and by the ubiquitous smallpox. Most of the area suffers from the food*

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19   Mohan Rao, From Population Control To Reproductive Health: Malthusian Arithmetic, London 2005, p. 20.

> *deficiencies of the rice eaters, from a high tuberculosis morbidity and mortality in its cities and the extension of the prevalence of that disease in the rural districts.*[20]

The leaders and administrators of post-colonial states reinforced this view of 'Asia', as possessing a certain unity, but their focus was less on the disease environment and more on the ontological fact of Asia's poverty. Indeed, a focus on Asia's poverty undermined the power of tropical nature as an explanation for the region's disease patterns. Jawaharlal Nehru suggested, at the anti-colonial Asian Relations Conference of 1947, that 'backwardness' was the essential problem that united Asia; across the region, he said, 'standards of life are appallingly low'.[21] There was an unfortunate commonality in that 'most of the Asian countries suffered from extreme backwardness in respect of health'. A committee at the Asian Relations conference explained the persistently high mortality and morbidity across Asia in terms of material deprivation: 'the reason for infant mortality and lower vitality', they argued, 'is also largely economic. It was stated that in Ceylon two-fifths of the population did not obtain sufficient energy from their diet'.[22]

The social welfare committee of the Asian Relations Conference discussed the continent's problems in singular terms. The high levels of mortality and morbidity in 'Asia' were due to a veritable catalogue of ills: 'an extreme inadequacy of existing health services'; 'unhygienic environmental conditions'; a 'lack of education and certain social practices which have had an adverse impact on the physical and mental health of the people'. Above all, illness was due to poverty.[23]

The implications of this definition of the problem of public health as part of a broader nexus of poverty and under-development had clear implications. The new international organizations and postcolonial Asian governments held the view that concerted policies of public health might form part of a broader series of interventions to bring about agrarian transformation and industrial development. A number of modernizing colonial administrators, and some British and American doctors, concurred.[24]

The relationship between health and development remained ambiguous. On the one hand, public health policies would constitute an effort to liberate Asia from the deadening hand of 'nature'. Yet, there was also, in the immediate post-war period, a counter-argument, which held that liberation from the tropics would come not through technology, but with social justice, and the redress of historical inequalities. The tropics continued

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20 World Health Organization Archives, Geneva. First Generation Files [hereafter WHO.1]: 452-1-5. 'Delimitation of Regional Health Areas on an Epidemiological Basis', Third Session of the Interim Commission of the WHO, 31 March 1947.

21 Asian Relations: Report of the Proceedings and Documentation of the First Asian Relations Conference, New Delhi, March-April 1947, New Delhi 1948.

22 Report on Social Services, in: Asian Relations, pp. 183-5.

23 K.C.K.E. Raja, Health Problems of India, Pamphlet from the Asian Relations Conference, Indian Council of World Affairs 1947 (Nehru Memorial Library collection).

24 On British colonial views on post-war development in their African territories, see F. Cooper, Decolonization and African Society; J. Lewis, Empire State Building: War and Welfare in Kenya, 1925–52, Oxford 2000; T. N. Harper, End of Empire and the Making of Malaya, Cambridge 1999.

to exert an influence on how development was imagined, but now in dialogue with a more transformative, social rather than environmentalist, discourse.

III

The 1950s and early 1960s saw the height of techno-optimism in the imagination of healthy development. The orthodoxy in international public health, by the early 1950s, was that radical new technologies would allow for the control, or even eradication, of 'tropical' diseases, as a precondition for development. Deploying an agricultural metaphor, a UN report declared that there was 'the tangle, the jungle undergrowth, of disease which has to be cleared before a country has a fair chance of development'.[25] Most prominent amidst this 'jungle undergrowth' was malaria, widely accepted as the number one international health priority – not least because of the availability of DDT, and its seemingly miraculous results during and immediately after the Second World War. David Arnold has shown that 'the identification of malaria with tropical backwardness and torpor became a recurring theme', particularly in the writings of Pierre Gourou.[26]

The notion that malaria was one of the most important factors underlying the prospects of development was widely held. Jawaharlal Nehru, addressing an Asian malaria conference in Delhi, put the challenge in universal terms: 'In this, as in other matters which affect us underdeveloped countries', he declared, 'the pace, the speed of advance, become all the more important. … If you don't go fast enough, the others will'. 'The others' in this case referred to all manner of natural forces, from evolving anopheles mosquitoes to the 'iron laws' of human population growth. Nehru himself suggested that non-human actors might shape the outcome of events: 'In many of these regions of Asia, maybe elsewhere, malaria has been a more powerful determinant in the course of human history than people imagine'; the implication was that it might still prove to be so.[27]

Nothing better symbolised the narrative linking biology with development than public representations of the malaria control programme, from the mid-1950s. In 1954, the Indian government issued a postage stamp to mark the intensification of anti-malarial efforts under the Five Year Plan, funded and orchestrated by the WHO and the American Economic Cooperation Administration.[28] As a cultural marker, it tells us much about the way in which national and international public health was imagined in the 1950s. In the image, we see the staff of Asclepius, with its characteristic intertwined snakes, rising from the ground like a telegraph pole, confronted by a giant mosquito. It symbolises

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25   UN, Preliminary Report on the World Social Situation, New York 1952., p. 25.
26   David Arnold, "Illusory Riches" (note 3), p. 15. See Pierre Gourou, The Tropical World: Its Social and Economic Conditions and Its Future Status, London 1966 (4th ed.).
27   Report on the Third Asian Malaria Conference, Delhi, 19-21 March 1959, WHO. SEA/Mal/16, Annex 3, Opening Address by Jawaharlal Nehru.
28   On the intensified National Malaria Control Programme in India, see: D. K. Viswanathan, The Conquest of Malaria in India: An Indo-American Co-operative Effort, Bombay 1958; Government of India, Directorate General of Health Services, Annual Reports, various years; Roger Jeffery, The Politics of Health in India, Berkeley 1988.

the connection between public health and national development. In the foreground of the picture is agriculture, on which malaria control would have the most immediate impact. A path leads from the well-ploughed fields to the small rooftops of a meticulously planned town. In the far distance, symbolising the end-point, are two smokestacks evoking the industrial modernity to come. The image exudes exactly that strong aesthetic dimension that James C. Scott holds to be central to 'high modernism'.[29]

Spraying with DDT was a means of making land cultivable and releasing labour for the modern industrial economy. Indeed, malaria eradication would cement the space of the 'national economy' itself, making the space of production congruent with the space of state sovereignty, removing 'natural' obstacles to cultivation. The invocation of the Terai region signifies an escape from the tropics, for it had been notorious in the colonial imagination as representing the lethality of the Indian environment. The Terai, David Arnold has shown, was once 'almost defined by death. This tract was considered so deadly as to be impassable for Indians and Europeans a like through a large part of the year'.[30] The key was to be able to show that malaria eradication would allow for an increase in food production, at a time when, from east and west, alarm grew about the global 'population explosion'.[31]

It was not long, however, before the language of 'natural forces' re-emerged strongly, with increasing reports of natural resistance to DDT, of obstacles and shortcomings standing in the way of the smooth workings of the malaria eradication machine. Already in 1955, exhorting the world's governments to support an intensification of the malaria control programme, the American malariologist Paul Russell posed the problem as an acute struggle between nature and development:

> *Already four or five of the fifty-odd major malaria-carrying anopheline species had developed different kinds of resistance to DDT in certain areas … Since there was not at present any satisfactory substitute method of attacking malaria, it was very important to eradicate the disease before the vector anophelines became resistant to the insecticide. It was not known exactly how many years the insects would remain sufficiently susceptible to DDT to allow of malaria eradication; the minimum appeared to be six or seven years and the maximum ten.*[32]

Perhaps as significant as 'natural' resistance was the fact that national sovereignty was always vulnerable to the influence of transnational movement. The international health campaigns of the 1950s were organized on a territorial basis, each centred on a pilot project or a training centre – the most important of them staffed by international consultants. The boundaries of these regions were assumed fixed, usually according to geo-

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29   James C. Scott, Seeing Like a State: Why Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed, New Haven 1998.

30   David Arnold, The Tropics and the Traveling Gaze: India, Landscape, and Science 1800–1856, Delhi 2005, p. 49.

31   Cf. Matthew Connelly, Fatal Misconception. The Struggle to Control World Population, Cambridge 2008.

32   WHO, Committee on Programme and Budget, Sixth Session, 1955, OR, 63, p. 198.

graphical or epidemiological features (Burma's hill zones, Ceylon's 'dry', 'intermediate' and 'wet' zones), or, as in India, according to the lines of provincial boundaries.[33]

Yet the population of South and Southeast Asia in the 1950s was anything but stable. If the borders between nation-states were increasingly rigid, the boundaries of regions were constantly in flux.[34] The 1950s saw a significant and continuing movement of population across the borders of India's partition. Civil and political conflict spurred the frequent movement of population in Burma and Indonesia, to say nothing of the tens of thousands of Asian Muslims who made the pilgrimage to Mecca each year.[35]

Not only were the pathogenic targets of the international health campaigns constantly slipping out of control, so, too, were human victims, or 'vectors', of infection. The plans for disease eradication assumed populations to reside within static regions, densely or sparsely populated, hypo- or hyper-endemic with malaria. They assumed, furthermore, that the space of claimed sovereignty would also constitute the space of national disease control programmes. Yet as Agnese Lockwood, an American political scientist, observed in Burma at the time:

> *The whole programme … is seriously jeopardized by the inaccessibility of insurgent-held regions. To be effective, a programme must cover the infested areas and their population 100 per cent. Not only do mosquitoes fly from one place to another but, even more serious, they gradually develop resistance to insecticides. At the present time, a race is developing in Burma between the vector resistance and the government's ability to make the entire country accessible to malaria spray teams.*[36]

There was a constant 'threat of infection across borders with India, Pakistan, China, Laos, Thailand'.[37]

Although the malaria control programme was conceived as a transnational initiative, the WHO planners ultimately assumed a series of 'homogeneous' national spaces that did not exist. Where the reach of state sovereignty was weakest, so the threat of infections crossing borders was greater. At the end of the 1950s, Edmund Leach concluded that the Burmese state's 'claims regarding territorial suzerainty were optimistic in the extreme'. Leach argued that 'the authority exercised by the central government over the Independent Sovereign State of Burma over its outlying regions in the year 1959' was in some senses 'a fiction'. Nor did the sharp dichotomy between the densely populated Valleys of Burma and the 'isolated' Highland societies prove an adequate representa-

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33   WHO. SEA/Mal/5 (1956); WHO. SEA/Mal/7 (1957); WHO. SEA/Mal/6 (1956).

34   See the essays in P. Kratoska / R. Raben / H. Schulte Nordholt (eds.), Locating Southeast Asia: Geographies of Knowledge and Politics of Space, Singapore 2005.

35   A report on the implications of the Haj for malaria eradication exposed another challenge posed by population movement, this time of an inter-regional kind: M. A. Farid, The Pilgrimage and its Implications in a Regional Malaria Eradication Programme, 9 April 1956, WHO/Mal/168.

36   Agnese Lockwood, The Burma Road to Pyidawtha, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, International Conciliation, No. 518, May 1958, p. 433.

37   Ibid..

tion of Burmese society.[38] Even anecdotal evidence from the time suggests that people, including sick people, were very mobile, presenting a picture of 'population' very different from the one established in the documents on malaria and tuberculosis control in Burma. Ludu U Hla, Burmese journalist and folklorist, collected, in the 1950s, a series of life histories, narratives of his fellow prisoners in Rangoon central jail – each was a story of movement, from the Karen lands to lower Burma, from Rangoon to the Tamil Nadu countryside and back again; and, almost universally, from the country to the city.[39] Borderlands have always posed a particular problem for the planners of development in post-colonial Asia.

IV

Development was, to adapt Raymond Williams, imagined as a journey from the country to the city. In the realm of economic theory, this found expression in W. Arthur Lewis's vision of the 'dual economy' and the transfer of labour from the 'economic darkness' of the 'traditional' sector to the 'fructification' of the modern capitalist economy. The journey from country to the city formed an almost ubiquitous cultural narrative in the postcolonial world – in cinema, in literature, both high-brow and low-brow, and in the popular imagination. With his genius for synthesis and comparison, Mike Davis has recently shown that the 1950s and 1960s marked the 'takeoff' of the mega-cities of the South, and, with it, the growth of urban slums.[40] The 'housing problem' remained one of the most pressing challenges of development, and one of the most neglected.

It was in the alleyways of Asia's growing urban slums that the dreams of disease eradication were lost; the lanes through which, quite literally, pathogens and the 'carriers' of disease could not be traced. The city was where the narrative of epidemiological transition crumbled. Whereas medical science and modernization theory, put together, suggested that the transition from the country to the city would signify a transition from epidemic to chronic disease, the true picture was more complicated, and less predictable: a recent account suggests that:

> *The urban poor are the interface between underdevelopment and industrialization, and their disease patterns reflect the problems of both. From the first they carry a heavy burden of infectious diseases and malnutrition, while from the second they suffer from the typical spectrum of chronic and social diseases.*[41]

Early optimism that the revolution in pharmaceutical technology might circumvent the problems of poor housing and overcrowding, for example in the treatment of tubercu-

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38   Edmund Leach, The Frontiers of "Burma", in: Comparative Studies in Society and History, 3, 1 (1960), 49-86, p. 61.
39   Ludu U Hla, The Caged Ones ([1958] trans. Sein Tu, Bangkok 1986.
40   Mike Davis, Planet of Slums, London 2006.
41   E. Werna / I. Blue / T. Harpham, cited in: ibid., p. 147.

losis, proved ill-founded. Instead, Indian medical researchers in the early 1960s found that the urban environment posed formidable obstacles to the penetration of the medical gaze. The very chaos of the urban landscape and the fluidity of population rendered any hope of tight control over patients taking drugs at home very difficult. Investigators at the National Tuberculosis Institute of Bangalore pointed out that they could not find, let alone supervise, the tuberculosis patients whose courses of drug treatment they were overseeing:

> *…in many cities in India, and presumably in several other countries, an address is not necessarily adequately described in terms of a street and a number. One needs description in terms of landmarks, distances and directions from these, perhaps in terms of names of inhabitants of neighbouring houses, for example, those of shop owners.*

While there seemed to be scope for 'improvement in address-taking', the researchers concluded that 'it would seem unlikely that this problem can be solved until the whole street-naming and house-numbering system has been improved'.[42] That is to say, a degree of control over tuberculosis patients taking chemotherapy could not be achieved until the map of south India's cities had been rendered more 'legible' to bureaucrats and medical policymakers.[43] These problems were, in a sense, a symptom of the social change and massive urban influx of the 1950s and 1960s.[44]

The lanes through which the WHO and its local partners had to pursue recalcitrant patients were difficult to navigate, if they were marked on the map at all. As one of the early social surveys of Bangalore made clear, 'the area between Commercial Street and Russel Market are mostly congested. In the above areas, there are no sufficient open places between houses. The streets with the houses on both the sides are very narrow. Dust and dirt surround these houses. Sanitation is very poor in these localities'.[45]

The fundamental problem was an almost complete absence of the kinds of diffuse medical surveillance which Michel Foucault, David Armstrong, and others have highlighted in their writings on public health in modern European history.[46] Michel Foucault observed, in the case of eighteenth century Europe, that for a process of outpatient treat-

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42   Stig Andersen / D. Banerji, A Sociological Inquiry into an Urban Tuberculosis Control Programme in India, in: Bull. of the Word Health Organization 29 (1963) 5, p. 685-700, p. 689. The 1961 census of Madras, too, talks of "a number of dwellings … [which] offer no surface on which a number could be painted, not even a substantial door post or indeed a door at all": Government of India, Census of India, 1961, Volume 9, Part 11 C, 'Slums of Madras City' (1965), p. 96.

43   This is James C. Scott's term. J. C. Scott, Seeing Like A State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed, New Haven / London 1998.

44   A social survey of Bangalore noted that: "The rapid growth of industries and trade attracted many outsiders to settle and work in some factory or other in the city … Government service, domestic services, general labour, factory labour, cart driving, brick laying and mason work, trade and money lending businesses have attracted outsiders". K. Venkatarayappa, Bangalore: A Socio-Ecological Study, Unversity of Bombay 1957, p. 32.

45   Ibid., p. 41.

46   M. Foucault, The Politics of Health in the Eighteenth Century, in: P. Rabinow (ed.), The Foucault Reader, London 1984; D. Armstrong, Political Anatomy of the Body: Medical Knowledge in Britain in the Twentieth Century, Cambridge 1983.

ment (the shift towards a 'domestic form of hospitalisation') to work, there needed to be a 'medical corps dispersed throughout the social body, and able to offer treatment for free or as cheaply as possible'.[47] In Asia's growing metropolises, it was precisely this level of dispersion of medical care within society that was missing.

Thus even as international organizations armed with wonder drugs aimed to 'universalise' the Third World city as a site for technological intervention against disease, another kind of universalism threatened to re-assert itself: the 'universal' colonial—and now post-colonial—city: Unchanging; filthy; pathogenic, and capable of subverting even the wonder-drugs of the age.[48] The problems of environmental sanitation which a 1949 Government of India report had highlighted remained intractable.[49]

What emerges, strongly, in many accounts of the urban environment is an almost miasmic theory of disease; contagion comes from the filth of the environment, which is the ultimate 'menace to public health'. 'The sewage and sullage tend to settle down', one Madras census commissioner declared in 1965, 'causing a perpetual stench that pervades the entire neighbourhood, pollutes nearby wells in houses and constitutes a menace to public health and the aesthetic susceptibilities of the people.[50] One of the striking features of his despairing, yet almost lyrical, report on Madras City, is its timeless nature. The descriptions of pathogenic urban squalor move rapidly across time and space: contemporary accounts from the early 1960s are juxtaposed with extracts from colonial reports of the early twentieth century, suggesting that nothing much had changed.[51] The census commissioner's description of Madras's housing problem is substantiated by a description of the Greater Bombay Housing Scheme committee in 1946:

> *overcrowding in rooms or tenements, close construction, bad lighting and ventilation, dirty and dilapidated appearance owing to total neglect of maintenance, filthy surroundings, insufficient and substandard sanitary arrangements and amenities and on the whole a sub-human sickening look and atmosphere about the place, often reeking with the smell of rotting food or garbage thrown round about, sluch, overflowing sewage owing to chokes and filthy soil pans, with most of the pull chains missing and flushing tanks out of order.[52]*

The reach of this environmentalist discourse on ill-health was broad.

I suggested earlier that 'Asia' was imagined as a single category for the administration of public health policies. Observers in the international organizations, and many of their

47   Foucault, The Politics of Health (note 46), p. 285.
48   On this tradition of colonial medical discourse, see W. Anderson, Excremental Colonialism, and D. Chakrabarty, Open Space / Public Place: Garbage, Modernity and India, in: South Asia, 14,1 (1991), pp. 15-31.
49   Government of India, Ministry of Health, Report of the Environmental Hygiene Committee, October 1949, New Delhi 1956.
50   Government of India, Census of India, 1961, Vol. XI: Madras. Part I – A (i): General Report, P. K. Nambiar, Superintendent of Census Operations, Madras 1966, pp. 225-6.
51   The report, for example, quotes from the 1908 Imperial Gazeteer of Madras: Census of India 1961, Vol. XI: Madras, p. 44.
52   Government of India, Census of India, 1961, Volume 9, Part 11 C: Slums of Madras City, Madras 1965, p. 6.

counterparts in national governments, saw Asia in terms of a set of shared problems and shared conditions, all of them amenable to technological intervention. However, an older discourse on 'Asia', focusing on the almost insurmountable problems of 'filth' and the tropical environment, had not disappeared.[53]

The teeming tropical city became a frequently used trope in support of arguments for a shifting approach to development: away from welfare and social transformation and towards a narrow focus on population control. It appeared that the cities of the South, and particularly of Asia, held the power to evoke almost physical revulsion on the part of outsiders. This was present, most infamously, in the opening lines of Paul Ehrlich's crude Malthusian tract, *The Population Bomb*, describing a 'stinking hot night' in Delhi:

> *As we crawled through the city, we entered a crowded slum area… the streets seemed alive with people. People eating, people washing, people sleeping. People visiting, arguing, and screaming. People thrusting their hands through the taxi window, begging. People defecating and urinating… People, people, people, people.*

This, Ehrlich declared, was "the *feel* of overpopulation."[54] More thoughtful observers, like Claude Levi-Strauss, were no more immune to this vision of the teeming urban tropics. Arriving in Calcutta, Levi-Strauss described "the herding together of individuals whose only reason for living is to herd together in millions, whatever the conditions of life may be. Filth, chaos, promiscuity, congestion; ruins, huts, mud, dirt; dung, urine, pus, humous, secretions and running sores…" Views such as these, increasingly widely expressed, backed a rising crescendo of calls for population control, using coercion if need be. The problem of development was not poverty but overpopulation; poverty was a direct result of overpopulation. As Vijay Prashad has shown, by the early 1960s, the 'housing problem' in Delhi was, once again, the problem of how to keep the urban poor out of the city, a path that would lead to the grotesque excesses of 'slum clearance' and 'beautification'.

It was not outsiders alone who produced this discourse of the pathogenic urban tropics, silencing issues that had, for a time, featured in discussions of development: land ownership, and power relations. It was, equally, a discourse generated by Asians, in Asia. This focus upon the pathogenic dangers of the urban environment spanned from India to Singapore, from Kuala Lumpur to Rangoon. Colonial and post-colonial, national and international medical discourses amalgamated in a way that challenged the optimistic narrative of progress in international public health.[55]

What we see, then, is the re-emergence of the power of Asian nature, but in a specifically urban, pathogenic form. A specifically 'tropical' form of social medicine was taking root.

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53   Cf. Warwick H. Anderson, The „Third-World" Body, in: Medicine in the Twentieth Century. Ed. Roger Cooter / John Pickstone. London / New York 2000, 235-46.

54   Paul Ehrlich, The Population Bomb, New York 1968, 15-16.

55   On earlier colonial discourses on sanitation and the urban environment in Singapore, see: B. Yeoh, Contesting Space in Colonial Singapore: Power Relations and the Urban Built Environment, Singapore 1996.

One of the foremost centres for the revival of this tropical medicine within Asia was the Department of Social Medicine at the University of Singapore medical school in the 1950s – attracting students from throughout the region.

In this environmentalist discourse on health, the late-colonial (and post-colonial) metropolis remains defiantly mired in filth.[56] Within this environment, the threat of infection was everywhere. Mobile food hawkers were viewed with particular suspicion by public health authorities across South and Southeast Asia; they were the ultimate 'vectors' of disease.[57] In the words of a Burmese student of public health, writing a thesis on post-colonial Rangoon whilst at the University of Malaya in the mid-1950s: 'the itinerant hawker is a very difficult person to locate when the authorities suspect him to be the cause of ill-health in consumers … some do not have a fixed place nor travel the same streets'.[58] It was deemed that 'as carriers of communicable diseases the sherbet (prepared cold drink) seller, and the ice cream vendor [are] the most dangerous'. Ignorance, of course, was at the root of the problem. The author of the thesis lamented that 'society sees no evil in consuming food from a hawker or a road side stall. Many people do not have the basic knowledge of hygiene. Plainly, they do not know the consequences of eating dirtily. Or even if they do, as some do vaguely, they do not care'.[59]

This provides an illuminating illustration of the complex relationship between medical discourse and the narrative of development. A narrative of progress, enlightenment and prosperity was always juxtaposed with a nihilistic picture of insurmountable environmental obstacles. The language of WHO reports and technical assistance publications, of techno-science triumphing over nature, was never unchallenged; always, there remained a language of 'natural forces', of overcrowding and over-population in a tropical environment which needed 'ceaseless disinfection'.[60]

Yet, if it could be employed to raise the spectre of breeding masses in the Third World, the persistence of poverty and risky environments could also be used by those in the Third World, to mock the promises of governments and international organizations; to question what it really meant to speak of a 'right to health'. Such was the case of an Indonesian account of disease and death, which is mocking, even contemptuous, of the possibility of liberation through the international 'gospel of hygiene', or by modern medical care. The work is question is a short story entitled 'My Kampung', published in 1952 by Pramoedya Ananta Toer.

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56   See also, M. Lim, The History of the Maternal and Child Welfare Services, Singapore City 1956.

57   The 'hawker' problem absorbed much energy within the colonial government of Singapore in the 1950s. See, for example: National Archives of Singapore [NAS], Ministry of Health Subject Files (MH/630), DMS 4068/60, 'Ad Hoc Committee on Hawkers', and the voluminous correspondence therein. For an early post-independence statement on the 'hawker problem' in Indian cities, see Government of India, Ministry of Health, Report of the Environmental Hygiene Committee [October 1949], (Delhi, 1956).

58   Tin Maung Maung (Assistant Health Officer, Corporation of Rangoon), 'Hawkers and Roadside Foodstalls in Rangoon', DPH thesis, University of Malaya, Singapore 1958.

59   Ibid.

60   The phrase is from Warwick Anderson, 'Excremental Colonialism' (note 48).

The story appears in a collection of tales and sketches set in the Djakarta of the late 1940s and early 1950s, its characters are Djakarta's labouring poor. The subtitle to the collection, 'Caricatures of Circumstances and Their Human Beings' is strongly suggestive of the tone of the stories, with their atmosphere of futility and acquiescence.[61] 'My Kampung' begins with a caricatured image of filth and pestilence, so characteristic of the colonial discourse on the tropical environment. Pramoedya evokes the grotesque and the corporeal, even as his tone alternates between resignation and sarcasm. The story begins: 'Friend, you've heard the name of my Kampung, haven't you? Kebun Djahe Kober, five hundred metres in a straight line from the palace. And you also know, don't you? Its gutters are covered in shit of the *kampung* residents' (p. 77). The proximity of the *kampung* to the Palace is an irony that runs through the story.

The narrator declares that not even a 'small guerrilla squad' – writing, here, in the aftermath of Indonesia's bloody war of independence – would suffer the mortality of this kampung, 'with its stink and condition', where 'people die one after another'(p. 78). There follows a sordid catalogue of the many residents of the narrator's alley, one of seven in the kampung, who had suffered 'cheap' deaths. There is the case of the man who dies from 'chronic venereal disease'; the mother who kills her favourite child with an overdose of worm medicine; the print setter who dies of lead poisoning, and the Chinese shop owner who flees on a ship to 'die in [his] own country', leaving his wife to die in the Kampung. And then there are the countless victims of tuberculosis: 'T. B. did not surprise anyone in my kampung anymore; it was something routine' (p. 83). In keeping with the tone of tragedy, bordering on farce, the narrator makes no attempt to pass judgement on the situation. Instead, he implicitly mocks the discourse of hygiene and public health: 'If killing with weapons is punished by the government, killing because of ignorance and poverty is not prohibited in my *kampung*, even if the killing is of one's own child. It is a routine situation and perhaps quite understandable' (p. 82).

If this portrait of the *kampung* Kebun Djahe Kober appears to mock the promises of positive health, hygiene and development which were so prevalent in the early 1950s, the effect was entirely intentional. It is the conclusion of 'My Kampung' that makes it such an explicit, and interesting, commentary on the global discourse of public health. 'You too, friend, can come to my *kampung* sometime', the narrator says, 'finding it is not hard at all' (p. 84). The *kampung*, after all, is a stone's throw from the Palace: 'five hundred metres in a straight line towards the southwest, there my *kampung* stands in all its glory, defying the doctors and the technical professionals' (p. 84). And then this striking point is repeated once more: 'the *kampung*'s located so near the palace where everyone's health and every little detail is guaranteed' (p. 84).

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61   Pramoedya Ananta Toer, My Kampung [1952], in: Tales From Djakarta: Caricatures of Circumstances and Their Human Beings (translated from the Indonesian by Sumit Mandal), Jakarta / Singapore [1963], 2000, pp. 75-86.

Conclusion

David Arnold traces a direct line between colonial discourses of 'tropicality' and later, post-colonial visions of development:

> *The image of the tropics as a world set apart by nature, a world characterized by poverty, disease and backwardness thus acquired a new scientific authority and specificity: the foundations had been laid for a reconceptualizaton of the "backward" tropics as the Third World.*[62]

Undoubtedly, works by the likes of Pierre Gourou provide a direct line of continuity between nineteenth-century colonial views, and the notion of 'tropical development'. However, I would argue that the specific form taken by discourses about tropical 'nature' in Asia by the 1960s owed much to debates within Asia, and between Asian scientists, politicians and writers – often conducted within the new international organizations. In particular, the 'return of nature' to explanations of Asia's poverty stemmed from the frustrations encountered by post-colonial visions of an escape from nature through technology, social reform, and nationalist revolution, directed by sovereign states.

Above all, I would suggest that the notion of Asia as hostage to natural forces – the laws of human reproduction as much as the spread of pathogens – emerged out of the 'ungovernable spaces' frustrating attempts at planned transformation.[63] Modern power, Foucault argued, involved the development of governmental technologies to understand and control the 'mass effects characteristic of a population', a technology which 'tries to predict the probability of these events' – the birth rate, the death rate, rates of disease, life expectancies – and control for them.[64] This article has suggested that in two realms in particular, it seemed by the 1960s that such regularities all-too-often slipped beyond the grasp of governmental power: at the borders between states, and in the growing urban centres.

Although subsequent decades have seen very different histories of development across Asia – some states, this one in particular, are more 'governmentalized' than others – it would seem fair to suggest that borderlands and urban centres are still those spaces least amenable to government and development.

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62   Arnold, "Illusory Riches" (note 3), p. 16.
63   Michael Watts, Development and Governmentality, in: Singapore Journal of Tropical Geography, 24. 1 (2004), 6-34, p. 26. Watts argues that "the Foucauldian project from which governmentality is derived is often chided for its panoptical sense of closure and overwhelming aura of domination, but … [the case of Nigeria] reveals ragged, unstable, perhaps ungovernable, spaces and analytics of government that hardly correspond to the well-oiled machine of disciplinary biopower".
64   Michel Foucault, Society Must Be Defended: Lectures at the College de France, 1975–76, trans. D. Macey, London 2003, p. 249.

Development by Consortia: International Donors and the Development of India, Pakistan, Indonesia and Turkey in the 1960s

Amit Das Gupta

RESÜMEE

In den sechziger und frühen siebziger Jahren bildeten Geberländer und ausgewählte Nehmer-länder so genannte entwicklungspolitische Konsortien. Diese ermöglichten eine Multilaterali-sierung von Entwicklungskooperation und eine längerfristige Planung von Transferleistungen. Der Beitrag zeigt, dass diese Konsortien entwicklungspolitisch sinnvoll waren, aus politischen Gründen jedoch keinen Bestand hatten. Untersucht wird diese Form multilateraler, langfristiger Entwicklungskooperation an den Beispielen Indien, Pakistan, Türkei und Indonesien.

Introduction

The period when consortia played a major role in development policy was rather short. After the establishment of those for India, Pakistan and Turkey in 1958, 1960 and 1962 respectively, and the Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia (IGGI) in 1966/67, do-nors were little interested in forming new ones. Additionally the existing consortia were somewhat loosing their importance. Either they were no more meeting on an annual base or even terminated for an uncertain period of time, like the Turkey Consortium did in 1975 as a result of the Turkish military involvement on Cyprus. Or donors – particu-larly the US – were leaving consortia and returning to bilateral aid. Nevertheless, on the financial and economic field, all consortia were successes altogether. Pakistan turned into a show-case of successful close cooperation of donors and receivers in the first half of the 1960s. The turning point came not for economic, but political reasons: In 1965 Islam-

abad started and lost the gamble of the second Kashmir War. Thereby, the government of Mohammed Ayub Khan had wasted resources urgently needed in agriculture and industries, but above all lost the credibility needed to improve the living standards of its own people, instead pursuing the obsession of victory over India. Whilst Pakistan disappointed by not following the line of the donors, India did so. The Aid India Consortium performed well until the mid-1960s. Its failure was proof of the inflexibility of the forum. The most striking reason for the hesitance of industrialised countries to form new consortia was the successful performance of the existing ones. Joining them was a question of prestige and the promotion of exports. Once a donor had become a permanent member, however, he could hardly reduce his loans significantly any more, let alone leave the solidarity of the industrialised countries completely, as the co-donors were not willing to shoulder the burden alone once again. Therefore participation became an expensive annual obligation. With decreasing growth rates of the world economy in the second half of the 1960s, and decreasing support for development policy at home, donors wanted more freedom of decision in aid relationships with other developing countries.

There is hardly any literature about the consortia. The only comparative study concerning the India, Pakistan and Turkey consortia by John White[1] dates back to 1967 and therefore covers the early years only. G. A. Posthumus has provided a short study about the Inter Governmental Group on Indonesia in 1971.[2] Publications about the foreign policy of donors hardly mention the consortia. An exception is the diplomatic history of India by Charles H. Heimsath and Surjit Mansingh.[3] From the early 1970s on, scholars seem to have lost interest in consortia alltogether. More recently, Marcel Bearth[4] and Petra Glietsch[5] have published studies on the US-Indian relationship, with a strong focus on aid and the role of the World Bank in India's development respectively. This article is therefore mainly based on the author's research around the South Asia policy of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG)[6], and it focuses mostly on the early years of the two South Asian consortia. This makes sense as they set the tone for others. They stand at the beginning of development aid on a large scale. Never before had so much money been raised for that purpose and for a single receiving country. Therefore they were not only show-cases, but also laboratories for all sorts of concepts of development policies and theories, then a new field for political actors and experts. In the same way that the Pakistan Consortium profited from experiences with India, the economic relations between industrialised and developing countries as a whole were influenced by the experiences of the consortia. They were laboratories from another perspective as well: No doubt the

1   John White, Pledged to Development. A Study of international Consortia and the Strategy of Aid, London 1967.
2   G. A. Posthumus, The Inter Governmental Group on Indonesia (I.G.G.I.), Rotterdam 1971.
3   Charles Heimsath / Surjit Mansingh, A diplomatic history of modern India, Bombay 1971.
4   Marcel Bearth, Weizen, Waffen und Kredite für den Indischen Subkontinent. Die amerikanische Südasienpolitik im Dilemma zwischen Indien und Pakistan, Stuttgart 1999.
5   Petra Glietsch, Der Einfluß der Weltbank auf die wirtschaftliche Entwicklung Indiens, Frankfurt a. M. 1993.
6   Amit Das Gupta, Handel, Hilfe, Hallstein-Doktrin. Die bundesdeutsche Südasienpolitik unter Adenauer und Erhard, 1949–1966, Husum 2004.

US initially took the lead in all of them and in the case of the Pakistan Consortium kept it. In the Aid India Consortium, however, the limits of American influence became visible soon. The United Kingdom, too, as the former colonial power in South Asia, with the best individual contacts and the deepest knowledge, was not able to play the role it had designed for itself. No doubt the status of British companies in India and Pakistan could not be matched by any of the donors. Nevertheless the shape of British economy throughout the 1960s did not allow London to play the desired role of the junior partner of the US in the consortia Instead, the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) took over: Profiting most from the trade with South Asia, West German interest in stabilising those markets was high, and the economic boom took care of the availability of funds. Therefore the FRG played the UK's projected role as the runner-up, which was taken over much later by Japan with a similar combination of economic interests and financial power. Although political power mattered in the hierarchies within the consortia, which themselves exercised political influence quite a bit in a narrower sense, what counted most was the amount and quality of aid. Therefore, like the G7 later, they helped improve the international standing of the losers of the Second World War via economic strength.

Creation, structure and character of the consortia

The circumstances, under which the individual consortia came into being, differed in each case, and that again took care that no two consortia were alike. The Aid India Consortium (AIC) was a platform to keep the development process in the world's most populous democracy on track, but at least the same importance was given to the need to save an important market for the exports of the Western industrialised countries. The motivation thus was mainly economic – for both the donors and for India. Political considerations, such as keeping non-aligned India democratic and pro-Western as well as balancing the Western against the Eastern bloc where present, but in fact by 1958 there was not much doubt anymore about India's domestic stability and its position in international affairs. Two and half years before India gained independence in 1947, leading industrialists like Jehangir Ratanji Dadabhoy Tata, Ghanshyam Das Birla and John Mathai had agreed in the Bombay Plan (December 1944[7]) that practically every aspect of economic life would have to be rigorously controlled by the Government, especially where development was concerned. Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, an admirer of the rapid Soviet industrialisation under Stalin, thought in similar terms: he favoured a mixed economy, i.e. mostly a planned economy with certain free market elements.[8] From 1951 onwards the planning commission under professor Prasanta Chandra Mahalanobis for-

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7   Purshotamdas Thakurdas, et. al., A Brief Memorandum outlining a Plan of Economic Development of India. Bombay 1944.

8   Sarvepalli Gopal, Nehru. A Biography, Vol. III, New Delhi 1989, pp. 286-296.

mulated five-year-plans. Following then common economic theories[9] the Government of India invested into heavy industries and infrastructure. The savings from war production were spent quickly without much financial returns, as both sectors have prospects of long-term profits only. Whilst the first five-year-plan was rather moderate, the second was over-ambitious and soon ran into troubles.[10] It became known in Western capitals that Nehru was in need of loans urgently. Surprisingly during his trip through Europe in 1956 the Prime Minister shied away from raising the question. Obviously asking for money was too humiliating for Nehru, still.[11] His aides and foremost among them the Finance Minister Tiruvellore Thatti Krishnamachari were much less scrupulous. Supported by the US, which gave food aid from the early 1950s already[12], and the UK they were focussed on the FRG. West Germany's exporters made the highest profits on the Indian market against the background of an extremely one-sided balance of trade. Initially, India paid the full sum at the moment deliveries left German ports. Soon, however, India sought more generous financial terms. The Federal Government then prolonged payments for the Rourkela steel plant for three years for altogether US-$ 160 million. Thereafter Bonn looked for assistance elsewhere; as it was clear that the task of keeping India liquid could not be shouldered by one country alone.[13]

The German quest met with initiatives from Washington and the World Bank in 1957. For the sake of the free world and a stable world economy US President Eisenhower declared his readiness to assist. He left it to World Bank President Eugene Black to organise a meeting of India's major Western economic trade partners in Washington from August 25 to 27 1958. The meeting took place without an Indian delegation, a feature of the AIC for the years to come. It was designed to raise US $ 930 million to cover the foreign currency gap for the second five-year-plan as a whole, ending in 1960. The donors, however, were not ready to give pledges for more than the next nine months to come, in total US $375 million. Compared to later meetings of the AIC and India's needs this was a moderate sum. Large scale development aid, however, until then had not been known. Though Western governments became aware that there was no alternative to stabilising the economy of the South Asian giant it took some time to find ways to get money free in their national budgets. Due to the rapid deterioration of New Delhi's financial situation, which was paralleled by the sloth of Western donation, the 2nd five-year-plan fell short of the expectations of its authors.[14]

From the donor side there was nothing like a master-plan for India. None of the participants at first thought about the creation of a consortium. Therefore the meeting of the AIC in 1959 was reserved for monitoring India's performance exclusively. No further

9   John P. Lewis, Quiet crisis in India, Washington 1962. See also Gopal, Nehru. Vol. III, p. 293.

10   Ibid., pp. 292-293.

11   Amit Das Gupta, Handel (note 6), pp. 132-135.

12   Dennis Kux, Estranged Democracies. India and the United States 1941–1991. New Delhi 1994, pp. 78-82 and 124-128. For food aid see also Bearth, Weizen, Waffen und Kredite (note 4), pp. 217-218.

13   Das Gupta (note 6), Handel, pp. 158-166.

14   Ibid., pp. 171-172.

pledges were given, although the situation had not improved much. After the August 1958 meeting every donor had entered into individual bilateral negotiations with India about development assistance. Canada, for instance, had pledged US $17 million only, but as grant. The Germans, offering US $40 million on rather hard terms, drafted a cheque and handed it over to the Indian Ministry of Finances. Therefore the money went directly and immediately into the Indian budget. The US gave US $ 100 million under soft terms in form of project aid. Thereby a pipeline was created: India would receive the loans gradually until the projects were completed, which usually took years. According to the 'buy-American-policy' the money was given for purchases in the US exclusively. Altogether India received a mix of cheap or cost-free money, immediately available expensive money, and large amounts of money for the future.

The next step towards extending aid towards South Asia was the Indus Water Treaty. The British had established the world's largest connected irrigation system in Punjab, but this province had been split up between India and Pakistan with the partition in 1947. Since then, 1947 India and Pakistan had struggled for water for their parts of the irrigation system, provided by the Indus River and its five tributaries running through Indian controlled Jammu and Kashmir. New Delhi was literally in a position to drain Pakistan's agriculture. Unable to find a compromise themselves, the opponents turned to the Commonwealth, which in view of the sums needed for new dams and canals transferred the task to the World Bank. The Bank prepared a scheme giving each state access to the water of three of the six rivers. It foresaw costs of US $ 1.033 billion in total, including US $ 635 million in foreign exchange. The foreign exchange part was meant to be shouldered by the World Bank, the US, the UK, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. The Indus Water Treaty was signed in September 1960[15] with the FRG as an additional signatory. Bonn saw a number of advantages: The treaty seemed to be fulfilled with a one-time payment, and its purpose was to ease the tensions in South Asia for the short and the long term. Since most of the construction work was to be done in Pakistan, the latter would profit most from the heavy influx of money, much to the liking of FRG, which favoured Pakistan over India during those years.[16] On the other hand notwithstanding Pakistani claims of Kashmir or at least major parts of the former princely state, the treaty implicitly made the actual line of control a permanent border. Any major territorial change in Kashmir would most probably have made necessary another round of expensive construction works. Western governments would not have been willing to pay the bill once again: When Pakistan and the World Bank asked for another US $315 million in 1963 due to massive miscalculations in the original scheme, the donors openly voiced their dissatisfaction.[17] The Indus Water Treaty therefore had much stronger political connotations than the AIC.

15   Heimsath / Mansingh, A diplomatic history (note 3), pp. 133-138.
16   Das Gupta, Handel (note 6), pp. 264-266.
17   Ibid., pp. 318-320.

For Pakistan this was the first step towards initiating a proper Aid Pakistan Consortium (APC). Whereas India was in the midst of an initially self-managed industrialisation process in the late 1950s, Pakistan with a dominantly agrarian economy had not spent much thought on development. Thanks to the exports of jute and rice from the Eastern Wing and the high prices for raw materials during the Korean War, Pakistan's trade balance looked favourable in the decade after independence. As an ally of the US both in the Baghdad Pact and SEATO, it received substantial US military aid in the period from 1954 to 1965 (about US $1,5 billion).[18] With a temporarily prospering economy and a powerful ally easing fears of being dominated by a superior India, the major concern became the instable domestic political situation. In October 1958, however, a coup d'etat brought General Mohammed Ayub Khan to power, a calculable, pro-Western moderate dictator expected to rule for a longer period. From his point of view, it was only just to give Pakistan money, after archrival India had received so much. The US took a similar stand. During the negotiations around the Indus Water Treaty the World Bank, based on a report about shape and perspectives of Pakistan's economy, had been considering the creation of an APC already. Encouraged by the US[19], in August 1960 the Government of Pakistan asked for the establishment of a consortium.

The donors were the same – Canada, France, FRG, Japan, UK, USA and the World Bank, together with France, which joined both consortia in 1960 and 1961. Notwithstanding political sympathies for western-oriented Pakistan, the first meeting in October 1960 saw teething troubles. Pakistan had presented a revised version of its second five-year-plan, which foresaw an increase of expenditures of 65 % compared to the original version. And its delegation declared openly they had no idea how to pay back the loans considering the low export rate. Therefore, though all donors apart from FRG had promised certain sums, the final round was postponed until June 1961 when pledges were given for the second year of the second plan only.[20]

Like in the AIC, from then on two meetings per year took place: In the first one the donors discussed Pakistani requests and gave preliminary pledges, which usually did not cover the foreign currency gap. The months before the second round, where the binding pledges were to be given, were characterised by diplomatic wrestling among the donors behind closed doors and press campaigns against those who were not willing to pay their share. Of course India and Pakistan themselves participated in the game as well (see below). The meetings of the AIC took place earlier in the year than those of the APC – a disadvantage for Pakistan. India by sheer size, population and need received more aid than any other developing country. The total annual pledges in the AIC summed up to around one billion US-$ until the mid 1960s, whereas for smaller and lesser developed Pakistan they ranged between 320 and 625 million US-$ in the same period. This disad-

18   Golam Wahed Choudhury, India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and the major powers. Politics of a divided subcontinent, New York 1975, p. 122.
19   Robert J. McMahon, Cold War on the Periphery. The United States, India and Pakistan, New York 1994, p. 277.
20   Das Gupta, Handel (note 6), pp. 240-241.

vantage, however, was compensated by the much higher efficiency of the APC. There was hardly a clash of interests among the donors or between donors and Pakistan.

The situation of both the receivers of Western aid was much different: India not only had pursued its own development policy without external help, but its planning commission under Mahalanobis had won some international reputation.[21] Since Nehru and his successors were believed to have sufficient indigenous expertise, the willingness to accept foreign concepts was limited throughout the history of the AIC. This attitude was enforced by the Indian claim for a leading role among Third World countries and a say in global affairs. New Delhi demanded a status equal to the donors on principle and aid without political strings attached. Any sign of renewed Western domination would have hurt India's own image painfully. New Delhi could pursue such a policy thanks to its non-aligned foreign policy, which made it a subject of desire for both the competing blocks.

Pakistan in 1954 had signed a Mutual Defence Agreement with the USA and until the mid 1960s remained firmly in the Western camp. Political and economical interaction therefore took place with Western and mostly poor developing countries exclusively – the partnership with the PRC was not yet established and anyway never had a strong economic part. India, on the other hand, had trade relations with the Soviet Union and its satellites since the mid 1950s. The volume was rather small[22] and there were discussions of their value. Indian exported raw materials and products of lower quality which it could not sell on the world market. Soviet promises of loans more than once either never materialized or were provided many years later only.[23] Nevertheless these trade relations and loans left a strong impact on Indian and Western minds. Both felt that unlike Pakistan, India was not dependent on Western aid only. Another factor, of course, was the sheer size of the task to develop a country with a population of around 400 million. US-President Eisenhower, highly sceptical about the military partnership with Pakistan in the late 1950s, once said he was pleased that India had turned down the offer for an alliance itself. Had India been an ally this would have obliged the US to pay sums much beyond the level of acceptance of the public at home, which was still much more sympathetic towards aid programs than in the years to come.[24] Pakistan had not had a development policy worth the name until 1960 when Ayub Khan toured Western capitals to create good-will. Islamabad was simply happy to receive that much money and did not make the aid relationship a question of national pride. Even more, Pakistan's Finance Minister Mohammed Shoaib had been an Executive Director of the World Bank in the 1950s and therefore was familiar with its proceedings.

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21 For a critical review of Indian planning and Mahalanobis' concept see Sukhamoy Chakravarty, Development Planning. The Indian Experience. Oxford 1987, pp. 12-18.

22 For the volume of Indo-Soviet trade see Peter J. S. Duncan, The Soviet Union and India. New York 1989, pp. 69-77.

23 Ibid., p. 72.

24 Kux, Estranged Democracies (note 12), p. 154.

Turkey, again, was another case.[25] There was no country worldwide with a longer lasting experience with development politics. Whereas India and Pakistan as independent states were newcomers in international affairs, the Ottoman Empire had played a role in European politics over centuries. With its decline the proverbial "sick man from the Bosporus" had come up in the 19th century. Urgently needed as a buffer against Russian ambitions towards the Mediterranean, Moscow's European rivals had started to 'develop' the Ottoman Empire, which itself tried to modernise in order to keep up its claim of being a great power.[26] The focus was on both the army and the economy. Since then there was a continuous line of European experts working as advisors for their own or the Turkish government. With the Cold War starting, the US entered the stage. Turkey had been admitted to the Organisation for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) in 1948 and therefore had become eligible for Marshall Aid. From then on the US, via bilateral agreements, gave loans, from 1951 mostly grants. Joining NATO in 1952 Turkey was given an extraordinary role in military terms as the South-Eastern bastion of the alliance. At the same it had the weakest economy among the members. The effects of aid were mostly disappointing due to the inflationary politics of the Turkish government under Prime Minister Adnan Menderes. As the Korea-boom lessened the situation worsened. Following an agreement in 1954 the World Bank decided not to give any more loans and kept that stand for a decade. Therefore when the Turkey Consortium was formed in 1962 it was lead, unlike the AIC and the APC, by the OEEC and not the World Bank. At the end of the decade Turkey ran into a severe economic crisis. External debt repayments in 1958 were higher than the total export earnings, and the external indebtedness had risen to more than US-\$ one billion. OEEC came up with a stabilisation programme which among other measures demanded a 70 % devaluation of the Turkish lira. This was a rescue operation only, no long-term solution, and effects were rather limited in the face of at best limited cooperation of the Menderes administration. As with Pakistan earlier, a radical change came only when the military took over in May 1960. The new government under General Cemal Gürsel quickly established a State Planning Organisation, which came up with a five-year-plan in 1962.

There were more parallels with the creation of the APC. In both cases the US looked for partners to share the financial burden until then shouldered alone mostly. Turkey, like Pakistan, hoped to stimulate the influx of loans with the establishment of a consortium. And the other Western donors were not only obliged towards the US, but ready for a gesture of good will towards a reform-willing Ankara. Like in the AIC there were American, British and German business interests. Their combined exports towards Turkey made out 70 % of the total exports of all donors in 1962, and in 1964 the three held 90 % of the Turkish obligations to foreign governments. The attitude of the Turks towards the cooperation in the consortium was comparable to that of the Indians. Both developed

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25   For the following see White, Pledged to Development (note 1), pp. 90-163.
26   Ibid., p. 93; see also Friedrich Scherer, Adler und Halbmond. Bismarck und der Orient 1878–1890. Paderborn 2001, pp. 4-9.

five-year-plans on their own and saw it as a question of national pride and sovereignty that the donors did not interfere either in the formulation of goals and projects or in the performance. From the point of view of Ankara and New Delhi the proper procedure in the consortia was to give information about how much foreign exchange was needed. Turkey was as keen as India to keep up the impression to be a partner among equals. Therefore the request to form a consortium formally was made towards NATO, which transferred the request to the OECD.

Whereas the Worldbank in the AIC and the APC played a constructive role in providing both countries assistance in the form of expertise, evaluating the five-year-plans, promoting country studies and moderating the discussions among the donors, OECD was no institution to play a similar role. To make things worse, within the OECD the Trade and Payments Department was responsible for the consortium. This body was mainly concerned with short-term balance and payments fluctuations only. What the OECD did was not more than to collect data provided by Ankara. There was no man-power or expertise for studies or evaluations. Unlike the established consortia the new one met more than twice a year. In the years from 1962 to 1964 there were altogether nine rounds taking place in Paris, most of them highly inefficient. Discussions centred around minor questions based on informations which just had swept in from Ankara via the OECD, and there seemed to have been no urgency to take final decisions. Nevertheless the pledges in 1963 summed up to US-$ 187 million and another US-$258 million in 1964.

Indonesia was a latecomer. As in the cases of Pakistan and Turkey a coup d'etat paved the way for the Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia (IGGI). President Sukarno, the founding father of Indonesia, had established authoritarian rule in 1959. His government, however, proved to be unable to develop the economy. In international affairs Indonesia tended towards the communist block isolating itself more and more, finally even the Soviet Union was dropped and only the PRC and North Korea were left as partners.[27] In 1965, it even left the United Nations. In March 1966, General Suharto took over power and opened the country towards the West. With the reforms of October 3, 1966 the former rigid system of import-licences was abolished, policy guidelines were changed to allow credit extension and those credits were to be used to extend exports. There was an urgent need for foreign currency in the face of inflation, a balance of payment crisis and foreign debt repayment obligations.

With its leftist orientation and its claim for a leading role among the developing countries the Sukarno government had refused to accept any Western aid. Loans from the Eastern block had mostly been meant for military sales. The Suharto government almost immediately turned towards the West and found a favourable reaction much faster than had Pakistan and Turkey. First of all the economic and financial crisis was severe and demanded immediate action – like India in late 1957. Secondly, the change in government and politics opened a chance to make Indonesia follow a pro-Western course in the

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27   Ragna Boden, Die Grenzen der Weltmacht. Sowjetische Indonesienpolitik von Stalin bis Brežnev. Stuttgart 2006, pp. 119-121.

longer run. The more pressing issue from the creditors' point of view were the arrears in debt repayments. A majority asked to solve this question before foreign aid should be discussed. The terms of the debt rearrangement were negotiated in Tokyo in September and in Paris in December 1966.

The Netherlands as the former colonial power organised a conference with 14 Western countries and five international organisations, held in Amsterdam in February 1967. An Indonesian delegation requested US-$ 200 million for a stabilisation programme as direct balance of payments aid to be made available in the same year. Like India and Turkey, Indonesia successfully pushed through the acceptance of its own development concept. As a number of the donors hesitated to form another consortium, the Dutch chairman suggested calling the conference the Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia. The IGGI functioned much like the other consortia, with the exception that the World Bank, as with Turkey, remained in the background. The group monitoring Indonesian performance and providing data for the meetings was the IMF, which had been active in Indonesia from the summer of 1966 on in order to help with the debt repayments. Another new feature was the parallel existence of a Paris club concerned with debt questions, while the IGGI focused on overall development policy. Naturally both should have cooperated closely as both questions were intertwined. Not to the benefit of Indonesia the flow of information between the two clubs was late and often insufficient.

Laboratories for development policy

Although the backgrounds of the consortia were all different, the changes in the philosophy of development politics affected all of them similarly. There was nothing like systematic research or analysis to make the use of external funds more efficient. The recipient countries – with the exception of Pakistan – followed their own concepts and reacted allergic to any attempt from the donor side to exercise influence. Changes occurred from learning by doing or from changes in domestic affairs with one of the major donors. The very laboratory was the AIC, not only because India ran into troubles first, but because its problems were so pressing, and solving them meant solving those of a large portion of the developing world as a whole. As mentioned above, before the first meeting of the AIC some donors already had attempted to help in the Indian foreign exchange crisis. The founding meeting of the AIC in August 1958 was meant to finance the financial year four and five of the second plan, and the delegations came with individual concepts. Those of Canada (like the Netherlands and the Scandinavians in the years to come) were based on a strong humanitarian approach. Though the sum Ottawa gave in total was moderate, it was given as a grant. Others were less charitable. The terms of their loans were shaped by business interests with India and the (limited) possibilities to raise funds at home. The hardest terms were offered by FRG and UK, who had arranged things with each other in advance[28], i.e. commercial loans with a credit period of five years, no

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28   Das Gupta, Handel (note 6), p. 169.

period of grace and interest rates of 6.3 %. Besides the lack of experience with aid, FRG in those years suffered from a lack of capital and had no means to create loans initially. Bonn spent the little savings from the Marshal aid. The traditional instrument of export promotion, Hermes guarantees, were not accepted as equivalent to development loans either by India or the other donors. Therefore the money had to come from the capital market and was given under commercial terms.

Nevertheless, German aid was most popular with New Delhi as it was not linked with projects like parts of American or British aid. Bonn in 1958 and again in 1960 could do so because it knew for sure New Delhi would use the money to pay German contractors anyway. Nehru had a preference for German companies in the early 1950s, as "Made in Germany" stood for quality and the FRG had a standing in international affairs too weak to attach political strings. Furthermore the balance of bilateral trade was much in favour of the FRG for years. Project aid, however, become common in 1960 / 61, with the exception of the FRG. Bonn on the contrary made it a point in the AIC meeting in 1961 to give the bigger share of its loans not linked to projects. With the APC, however, project aid dominated from its beginnings. Pakistan did not suffer under a comparable foreign exchange crisis and since industrialisation was to start with the establishment of the consortium it made sense to finance projects. Project aid became dominant in the AIC, too, because it had a number of advantages for the donors: First of all it postponed the transfer of money, which was given gradually only with the progress of the individual project. In the longer run this was a zero-sum-game of course, in the short run, however, it eased the problem of raising funds for aid in the budgets. Secondly, project aid opened the chance to influence the planning of the recipient country and to monitor its performance. India, for instance, accepted the World Bank's advice by working out the third five-year-plan, but later on rejected all criticism of aid-giving national governments in the AIC. It has to be added that donors themselves showed no interest in participating in the formulation of the plan, as this had made them responsible for its performance much more.[29] The easier, smoother and less binding way of limiting the effects of over-ambitious planning, however, was to reject certain projects through feasibility studies. In some cases this proved to be mere theory – there were always "white elephants" among the projects: Tata and Daimler-Benz e.g. in 1953 had formed a successful joint venture, TELCO, producing a truck for the Indian market. Indian Defence Minister Krishna Menon, however, dreamed of a completely self-sufficient arms industry. Therefore in 1959 he asked for German loans for producing another truck called Shaktiman. The Federal Government for obvious reasons turned down the request.[30] The list of approved projects in 1963, however, included the Shaktiman. India had to recover from the humiliating military defeat against the PRC in late 1962. Objections that German law would not allow financing military projects through development aid were evaded by the

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29   For the German case see ibid., pp. 232.
30   Ibid., pp. 171-172.

statement that it was possible that the truck could be used for civilian purposes as well.[31] Recipient countries could profit from the introduction of project aid as well, as can be seen with Pakistan. Islamabad had good reasons to believe that the APC was created less out of necessity but as gesture of good will. Against the background of this knowledge plus the lack of experience with development planning Pakistani delegations initially believed that it would be sufficient to name a number of hardly worked out drafts of projects more or less as a cover to receive loans used later on when Islamabad believed them to be necessary. Notwithstanding political sympathies for Pakistan donors did not accept this practice and virtually forced Pakistan to initiate proper long-term planning, definitely to the advantage of the recipient country.

Parallel to the establishment of project aid the terms of loans became much softer in general in all consortia. Interest rates fell to 3 % and less, periods of grace were extended up to ten years and credit periods even beyond that. The donors came to understand that otherwise the sums necessary for repayments of existing debts would exceed the influx of new loans. With India that point was reached in 1965.[32] The debates about the softening of terms at first centred on FRG, later on the World Bank got criticised heavily. National government slowly got used to the idea that complete repayments would be made in the distant future at best. Therefore the sums were partly given as grants. These were political decisions. The World Bank, however, is a bank dependent on repayments. That is why this institution was not able to soften terms as far as national donors, and therefore its loans became less and less attractive. The International Development Association (IDA), founded in 1960 and managed by the personal of the World Bank, did provide soft loans.[33] This was true for the AIC and the APC, but not for the Turkey Consortium, as the sums absorbed by India and Pakistan left little from IDA's budget for other developing countries.

In 1964 in the AIC, however, it became apparent that project aid alone could not solve all problems. Until the end of the third plan in 1965 there would be an established pipeline of 2.3 billion US-$ for projects, giving New Delhi security for further planning. The existing industrial plants, however, were not used to full capacity, because quite often there was no foreign exchange available for the imports necessary for production in India. Project aid therefore was supplemented by commodity aid, i.e. New Delhi was given cash to finance those imports. At the same time a general diversification of aid was taking place for other reasons. Whereas politicians and experts in the 1950s and the early 1960s had believed in development through huge industrial projects and trickle down effects, the performance of India following that path proved that industrialisation of that kind was no panacea. The country was still not able to feed its own people, so food aid and the green revolution became a topic in the debates of the consortium. Especially US-President Lyndon B. Johnson forced India to focus on the development of its agriculture.

31   Ibid., pp. 308-309.
32   Glietsch, Der Einfluß der Weltbank (note 5), pp. 83-84.
33   Manfred Ferber, Internationaler Währungsfonds, Weltbank, IFC, IDA. Frankfurt a. M 1985 (3rd edition), pp. 71-72.

In fact this was a policy for the poor within the developing societies. Interest in them came from another corner, too. When industrial plants had been constructed in India earlier, it was left to the managements that they took care for a proper social environment there. Some companies built schools and hospitals around the new plants. The enormous gap between highly qualified and well-paid Western and local experts on one hand and the average people on the other was hardly bridged and there was a growing awareness of that phenomenon in the press of Western countries. With the growing volume of aid, new departments or even ministries came up. Typically these had to delimit from existing ministries and therefore were hunting for new topics – social politics in the Third World was one of them.

Power struggles

The consortia were forums for regular power struggles. Even moderate criticism about the five-year-plans got harsh replies. After the pledging round of the AIC in 1958 in September Indo-German negotiations about the loans took place. When the head of the German delegation declared it was expected that the third plan should be much less in volume than its predecessor, the Indian Ambassador Badruddin Faiz Husain Badruddin Tyabji replied that the shape of the third plan was a question not concerning the FRG.[34] In the following summer, Indian Finance Minister Morarji Ranchhodji Desai visited Bonn and asked for additional loans for the second plan. The West German Minister of Economic Affairs, Ludwig Erhard, replied money wouldn't grow on trees in the FRG. Desai's emotional response left no doubt about the deep conviction of a moral obligation of industrialised countries to give aid:

> *I was led to believe that Germany was willing to help us, I would not have come otherwise. […] I do not wish my hand in your pocket. […] I grew up a poor man, I have remained a poor man to this day, but I have always made it a point never to beg money from anybody.* [35]

India knew it was needed: The donors could neither afford to lose a promising market of that size nor a leading Third World country, which otherwise might have leant stronger towards the communist block. Right from the start the donors had in mind a reduction of India's defence budget or discussed if New Delhi should not take a loan on its enormous gold reserves. However, they never dared to raise those topics officially. Asking for moderate planning became even more difficult after the defeat against the PRC in 1962, as not only in India it was felt that the Chinese challenge could be met by massive industrialisation and rearmament only.

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34   Strictly confidential note, Eberl, October 2 1958; Political Archives of the German Foreign Office (PA/AA), B61, Vol. 108.

35   Note, Eberl, June 29 1960; PA/AA, B 12, Vol. 1292.

Another permanent demand of the donors was to open the Indian market via import liberalisation and a devaluation of the Rupee. Nehru's successor Lal Bahadur Shastri, being more pro-Western in general, responded positively, but during his one and a half years in office no radical change took place. In 1966, though, there came a unique opportunity, when Indira Gandhi became Prime Minister. Nehru's daughter urgently needed to get a profile of her own, and she tried the economic programme the donors had been asking for. Besides the hope for a major economic breakthrough this move was motivated by foreign relations at large. 1965 had seen the second Kashmir War. Although it had been started by Pakistan, India experienced much silent and not so silent support for Islamabad. Only the Soviet Union came to help India diplomatically and with arm supplies. After the declaration of Tashkent from January 1966 restoring the status quo ante in South Asia, New Delhi felt it was high time for a gesture towards the West. What looked like a turnaround in India's economic policy enforced by Western powers, however, proved to show the weakness of Western development concepts. India needed US-$ 2.9 billion for food imports and raw materials, but exported items with a value of US-$ 1.7 billion only. The reform programme aimed at an increase in exports, but this would take time. In the meantime a massive influx of commodity aid would be necessary. The World Bank, for the AIC meeting in 1966, asked for 900 Million US-$ commodity aid alone, which was to be supplemented by the usual project aid. Most of the donors were not ready to support such a programme and the reform programme became a blunder.[36]

There was another paradoxical aspect of the consortia, which were created by capitalist countries to promote free trade and open market economies. Long-term development needed long-term planning and this was needed, too, in the face of the large sums given. Hence, planning and, to some degree, a planned economy, was a factor in the debates of the consortia right from the beginning. Consequently all the recipient countries, if they had not introduced planning commissions and five year plans before like India, did so as soon as the consortia were established. De facto, donors considered economic planning a precondition of any financial engagement. Predictability was a main feature of the consortia, flexibility definitely not. Lessons from such insights could be seen after the Indo-Pakistani wars in 1965 and 1972. After minor Indo-Pakistani military clashes around the Run of Kutch, President Lyndon B. Johnson ordered a partial stop of loans for the AIC pledging session. More important for that decision, however, were critical Indian statements about the American military engagement in Vietnam and particularly Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri's hesitation to push forward economic reforms.[37] A little later, Pakistan seemed to have to pay an even higher price for the military adventure following soon after. President Ayub Khan initiated a war for Kashmir in summer. A full-fledged war between the – as far as aid was concerned – then two most important recipients of the West was understood as a slap in the face of the donors. The US and the UK cancelled the APC meeting scheduled for fall 1965 and considered stopping all food

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36   Glietsch Der Einfluß der Weltbank (note 5), p. 93; Bearth, Weizen, Waffen und Kredite (note 4), pp. 179-185.
37   Ibid., pp. 166-170.

deliveries to India as well. All others, however, gave Pakistan the amount of aid bilaterally they had intended for the consortium anyway, like they had done in the framework of the AIC for India in April. American diplomats in South Asia let their Western colleagues know that Washington would welcome such steps in order to keep Islamabad in the Western camp.[38] In December 1966 another pledging round of the APC took place, again with the US participating. Washington could not afford to side with India and drop Pakistan. The overall logic of the highly unrealistic political strategy of the US in South Asia was to make the opponents form a united front against the communist powers. Nevertheless the American part of the US-$ 525.8 million in total in the APC was reduced remarkably to 42 % instead of the formerly usual 49 %. The crisis around the creation of Bangladesh in 1971 was treated in a similar way. The donors came together on June 21 1971 in Paris to discuss if it made sense to organise a proper meeting.[39] The latter took place in 1972 only when the Indo-Pakistani war was over and Bangladesh had been established as an internationally recognised state. Turkey experienced similar treatment after it had sent armed forces to secure the claims of the Turkish population in Cyprus in 1974, after the Greeks on that island had staged a coup d'etat and had declared their willingness to join Greece. The Turkey consortium was postponed for an indefinite period. Discussions around resumption began in 1977 only, but in the face of Turkey's economical problems aid on a bilateral base flowed without much interruption.

More in a state of flux was the constellation among the donors themselves. The US exercised the strongest influence in the South Asian consortia. Notwithstanding the support by others, the APC in fact was mostly their creation. The general line there given by the US was never seriously questioned by the other donors. The story in the AIC and later in the Turkey consortium was different. The interests of other donors were similarly strong, so Washington here was the first among equals only. A case in point to illustrate this is the position of Great Britain. As the former colonial power the UK had hoped to have a say in South Asian affairs after independence in 1947. India and Pakistan both remained in the Commonwealth, but otherwise turned down any attempt of tutelage. After a short transition period with British officers in both armies, the UK soon stopped playing a role in security questions, most visible with the US-Pakistani military alliance and the establishment of the Baghdad Pact and SEATO. What was left was economic influence. The UK-sponsored Colombo-Plan from 1950 foresaw an improvement of living standards in Ceylon, India, Pakistan, Malaysia and Singapore through financial and technical from Australia, Canada, New Zeeland, Japan, the UK and the US. With the establishment of the AIC it became obvious that London did not have the financial means to play a dominant role in development politics of its former colonies. During the first meeting of the AIC the UK tried to play the leading role, though the initiative for the meeting had come from Washington and Bonn. Eventually, London gave the largest

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38   Telegramme No. 485, German Ambassador Koehler, Islamabad, October 27 1965; BAK, B 106 (Ministry of Financial Affairs), Vol. 23961.

39   Note, Schmidt, June 24 1971; PA/AA, B 61-IIIB7, Vol. 562.

contribution – US-$ 108 million – but showed signs of political weakness nevertheless. The UK introduced matching, though the term itself was used a few years later only as a US strategy in the consortia. It meant that London or Washington proposed the sum they were ready to pledge, if other donors would match it. In case the latter failed, the UK or the US would reduce their own pledges and put the blame on others. The US, moreover, usually wanted to see their contribution matched by all other governments in the consortia. The UK in 1958 tried to pressurize FRG and Japan to match the British loans of US-$ 100 million. The attempt failed, because a self-confident German delegation could point to the prolongation for the repayments for the Rourkela steel plant summing up to 160 Million US-$. German loans in the AIC and the APC regularly almost doubled those pledged by the British. The FRG became the junior partner of the US, not of the UK.

Conclusion

The consortia were forums for major macro-economic decisions and power politics. They shaped the economic, financial and political relationships between Western industrialized countries and important countries in the developing world in the formative years of development policy. Multilateral attempts to raise funds of hundreds of millions of Dollars, multilateral discussions about the use of those sums and about development planning in general were unknown prior to the founding of the consortia. Like huge tank ships they tended to loose flexibility after they had been established. This was one of the major reasons for the decline of interest in consortia on the part of donor countries. For other donors and naturally the recipient countries the consortia were of great value. Surprisingly there is still much to investigate about the consortia in the 1960s, not to mention the 1970s, which seem to have escaped the attention of scholars completely until today.

FORUM

Die Verhandlung der Dekolonisierung im Klassenraum: französisch-libanesische Interaktion während der Mandatszeit 1920–1943

Esther Möller

ABSTRACT

Negotiating Decolonization in the Classroom: French-Lebanese Interaction during the Mandate Period (1920–1943)

This article deals with the history of French schools in Lebanon during the mandate period (1920–1943) and examines their contribution to the process of decolonization in Lebanon. It argues that French institutions of catholic, protestant, jewish and secular obedience constituted places where decolonization was negotiated between the different actors involved in the activities of the schools (French and Lebanese staff of the schools, their superiors of their head offices in France, the politicians and bureaucrats of the French government in Paris and Beirut and the Lebanese parents and notables). On the one hand, as the article demonstrates, their interaction stengthened the French colonial presence in Lebanon. On the other hand, however, the French schools also constituted spaces for nationalistic claims from different Lebanese nationalists. As a result of different clienteles and differing relations with the French government, French schools either witnessed the former or the latter aspect.

Einleitung

Am Anfang dieser Studie steht eine Beobachtung: von den ersten sieben Präsidenten der libanesischen Republik ab 1926 waren sechs ehemalige Schüler einer französischen Schule, speziell der Jesuitenschule in Beirut,[1] und auch nach der Unabhängigkeit des

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1   Vgl. Youssef Mouawad, L'enfance des chefs. L'éducation au Collège Secondaire des Pères Jésuites à Beyrouth (1875–1914), in: Bernard Delpal u. a. (Hrsg.), France – Levant. De la fin du XVIIe siècle à la Première guerre mondiale, Paris 2005, S. 191-210, S. 193.

Libanons waren viele seiner führenden Politiker Absolventen einer französischen Schule im Libanon.[2]

Augenscheinlich haben die französischen Schulen das politische Leben des Libanons während und nach der Zeit des französischen Mandats von 1920–1943[3] stark geprägt. Bedeutet das, dass die französischen Schulen die Unabhängigkeit des Libanons gefördert haben oder eher, dass sie auch nach der Unabhängigkeit ihren Einfluss im Land aufrechterhalten konnten?

Dieser Artikel behandelt die Rolle der französischen Schulen im Libanon in dem Prozess seiner Dekolonisierung. Der Übergang des Libanons vom französischen Mandatsgebiet zum unabhängigen Staat ist in der Forschung kein gänzlich unerforschtes Thema. Einschlägige Studien haben dabei die Kontinuität der politischen und patriarchalischen Strukturen innerhalb der libanesischen Gesellschaft zwischen osmanischer Zeit, der Zeit des Mandats und schließlich der Periode der Unabhängigkeit betont.[4] Weiterhin gibt es diverse Untersuchungen über die Verhandlung der Dekolonisierung des Libanons auf politischer Ebene.[5] Diese schließen an die Dekolonisierungsforschung an, in der die vier Ansätze der nationalistischen, der internationalen, der metropolitanen Erklärung und schließlich die Erklärung der kollaborierenden Eliten dominieren, um die Ursachen der Dekolonisierung in den einzelnen Kolonien zu erklären.[6] Auch wenn alle diese Faktoren ihre Relevanz für die Beendigung des französischen Mandats im Libanon haben, ist spätestens seit der theoretischen Hinwendung der Geschichtswissenschaften zur Zivilgesellschaft klar, welche Bedeutung auch nicht-staatliche Akteure für politische Prozesse haben.[7] Studien, die diese Akteure in den Mittelpunkt stellen, sind für die Frage der Dekolonisierung des Libanons noch sehr selten.[8] Der vorliegende Beitrag füllt

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2   Prominente Beispiele sind der Präsident Bechara al-Khoury (1943–1952) und der Ministerpräsident Riad al-Solh (1943–1945 und 1946–1951).

3   In Anschluss an den Ersten Weltkrieg und den Zusammenbruch des osmanischen Reiches hatte Frankreich vom Völkerbund ein politisches Mandat über Libanon und Syrien erhalten.

4   Vgl. Phillip S. Khoury, Syria and the French Mandate. The Politics of Arab Nationalism 1920–1945, London 1987, S. 617. Diese Studie bezieht sich auf Syrien in der Mandatszeit, aber der Autor betont die parallelen Entwicklungen im Libanon. Vgl. auch Elizabeth Thompson, Colonial Citizens. Republican Rights, Paternal Privilege and Gender in French Syria and Lebanon, New York 2003, S. 284.

5   Vgl. Nadine Méouchy (Hrsg.), France, Syrie et Liban 1918–1946. Les ambiguïtés et les dynamiques de la relation mandataire, Damas 2002.

6   Siehe deren Zusammenfassung z. B. in Marc Frey, The Indonesian Revolution and the Fall of the Dutch Empire, in: Marc Frey / Ronald W. Pruessen / Tan Tai Yong (Hrsg.), The Transformation of Southeast Asia. International Perspectives on Decolonization, Armonk, NY 2003, S. 83-104; siehe auch Jürgen Osterhammel, Spätkolonialismus und Dekolonisation, in: Neue Politische Literatur 1992, 37, S. 404-426.

7   Siehe beispielsweise die Forschungsrichtungen der „entangled history" oder der „histoire croisée", aber auch des Kulturtransfers, die mit der transnationalen Geschichte die Bedeutung der zivilgesellschaftlichen Ebene für politische Prozesse betonen. Vgl. Sebastian Conrad / Shalini Randeria, Geteilte Geschichte. Europa in einer postkolonialen Welt, in: dies. (Hrsg.), Jenseits des Eurozentrismus. Postkoloniale Perspektiven in den Geschichts- und Kulturwissenschaften, Frankfurt a. M. / New York 2002, S. 9-49; Michael Werner / Bénédicte Zimmermann, Vergleich, Transfer, Verflechtung. Der Ansatz der ‚histoire croisée' und die Herausforderung des Transnationalen, in: Geschichte und Gesellschaft, 28 (2002), S. 607-637.

8   Ausnahmen bilden Studien zu den Boykotts in Beirut während der Mandatszeit in Méouchy 2002, zur Rolle des Kinos und der Presse in Thompson, Colonial Citizens (Anm. 4), der Pfadfinderbewegung bei Jennifer M. Dueck, A Muslim Jamboree: Scouting and Youth Culture in Lebanon under the French Mandate, in: French Historical

dieses Forschungsdesiderat weiter auf. Die These lautet, dass die französischen Schulen im Libanon insofern aktiv an der Dekolonisierung beteiligt waren, als in ihnen die verschiedenen Positionen für und gegen die französische Präsenz im Libanon miteinander verhandelt und ausgefochten wurden. In diesem Sinne waren die Schulen Medien der französischen kolonialen Macht, boten aber auch Instrumente für die Emanzipation der Libanesen.[9] Eine weitere These lautet, dass die französischen Schulen nach der Unabhängigkeit des Libanons ihre Rolle im Land behalten konnten, indem sie weiterhin in Anspruch nahmen, die libanesische Elite auszubilden.

Nach einer Einführung in den historischen Kontext der Mandatsperiode wird die Rolle der französischen Schulen für die Gesellschaft des Libanons unter dem französischen Mandat skizziert. Daraufhin werden diese Schulen als Orte analysiert, an denen durch die Diskurse und Praktiken einerseits die französischen Machtinteressen verteidigt und andererseits die libanesischen nationalistischen Interessen zu Gehör gebracht wurden. Schließlich wird diskutiert, inwiefern diese Schulen die Erziehung der libanesischen Eliten gesichert oder in Frage gestellt haben.

1. Der historische Kontext

Das französische Mandat im Libanon

Von Dekolonisierung im französischen Mandatslibanon zu sprechen, stellt ein erstes Definitionsproblem zur Diskussion: war der Libanon eine französische Kolonie? In der Tat war der Libanon nie Teil des französischen Kolonialreiches, sondern nur von 1920 bis 1943 ein vom Völkerbund an Frankreich vergebenes Mandat, dessen erklärtes Ziel war, den Libanon auf die Unabhängigkeit und Selbständigkeit als eigenen Staat vorzubereiten und in diesem Prozess zu begleiten.[10] Trotzdem errichtete oder vielmehr befestigte das französische Hochkommissariat, die Vertretung der französischen Regierung in Libanon und Syrien, dem anderen Mandatsgebiet unter französischer Führung, quasi koloniale Strukturen im Land. Denn die französische Präsenz im Libanon geht nicht erst auf 1920 zurück. Seit Mitte des 19. Jahrhunderts hatte sich Frankreich als stärkste westliche Macht sowohl militärisch, politisch und ökonomisch als auch kulturell im Libanon behaupten können.[11] Zur kulturellen Präsenz trugen maßgeblich die französischen Schulen bei, die

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Studies 2007, 30 / 3, S. 485-516. Die Studie von Jennifer Dueck, Educational Conquest: Schools as a Sphere of Politics in French Mandate Syria, 1936–1946, in: French History (2006) 4, S. 442-459, die die Schule als politische Sphäre im Mandatssyrien analysiert, ist für den vorliegenden Artikel sehr hilfreich gewesen, da sie auch Parallelen zu Libanon zieht. Allerdings beachtet Dueck nur die Archive der Schulen der Jesuiten.

9   Wie die Forschungen zu kolonialer Erziehung zeigen, produzieren gerade die Schulen im kolonialen Kontext diese Ambivalenz. Vgl. Phillip Altbach / Gail Kelly, Introduction, in: dies. (Hrsg.), Education and Colonialism, New York / London 1978. S. 1-49, S. 2.

10   Siehe die Texte des Völkerbundes für das französische Mandat im Libanon, z. B. in Méouchy (Hrsg.), France, Syrie et Liban (Anm. 5), S. 423-428.

11   Vgl. Jacques Thobie, Intérêts et impérialisme français dans l'empire ottoman (1895–1914), Paris 1977, S. 446. Auch wenn der Libanon in seinen heutigen Grenzen erst seit 1920 besteht, dem Datum seiner Ausrufung als

sich seit Ende des 17. Jahrhunderts, aber vor allem seit Beginn des 19. Jahrhunderts im Libanon niedergelassen hatten.[12] Von französischen katholischen Orden geleitet, richteten sie sich vor allem an ein christliches, genauer gesagt katholisches, libanesische Publikum, das sich diese Schulen gewünscht hatte und ohne Einschränkung begrüßte.[13]

Auch die Errichtung des französischen Mandats im Libanon war mit Hilfe der libanesischen Christen, vor allem der Maroniten, einer mit Rom unierten katholischen Religionsgemeinschaft, zustande gekommen.[14] Auf diese stützten sich die französischen Regierungsvertreter, um das Mandat zu etablieren.[15] Die Christen bildeten 1932 58,5 % der Libanesen: davon machten die Maroniten 33,5 % aus und waren also die größte Gemeinschaft, gefolgt von den muslimischen Sunniten mit 18,6% und den Schiiten mit 15,9 %.[16] Durch ihre Nähe zu Frankreich erlangten viele libanesischen Christen in der Mandatszeit wichtige und einflussreiche Posten.[17]

Aber die Mandatsträger verstanden schnell, dass ihre traditionelle Politik, sich vornehmlich auf die Christen zu stützen, ihnen die Unterstützung der Muslime entzog.[18] Gerade mit dem wachsenden Einfluss des arabischen und syrischen Nationalismus versuchten sie deshalb verstärkt, mit den Eliten der muslimischen Gemeinschaften, und vor allem den Sunniten, in Verbindung zu treten. Ab Mitte der 1920er Jahre waren einige der sunnitischen und schiitischen Familien bereit, mit den Franzosen zu kooperieren.[19] Auch die griechisch-orthodoxe Gemeinschaft, mit den Sunniten die größte und älteste Gemein-

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"Etat du Grand Liban" durch den französischen Hochkommissar Henri Gouraud, ist es berechtigt, den Begriff schon für die vorliegende Zeit zu gebrauchen und darunter die seit 1861 vom osmanischen Reich relativ unabhängige Provinz (*mutassrifiya*) des „Mont Liban" (Jabal Luban), die Regionen (Vilayet) Saida mit der Stadt Beirut und Tripoli zu verstehen.

12 Vgl. Bernard Heyberger, Les Européens vus par les Libanais (XVIe–XIXe siècles), in: Bernard Heyberger / Carsten-Michael Walbiner (Hrsg.), Les Européens vus par les Libanais à l'époque ottomane, Würzburg 2002, S. 1-22, S. 6. Allerdings gab es auch libanesische Muslime, die den europäischen Einfluss positiv sahen und christliche Libanesen, die eine zu starke Europäisierung (arabisch *tafarnug*) kritisierten. Vgl. Rotraud Wielandt, Das Bild der Europäer in der modernen arabischen Erzähl- und Theaterliteratur, Wiesbaden 1980, S. 151-153.

13 Vgl. Nasri Salhab, La France et les Maronites, Beirut 1997, S. 106.

14 Vgl. Gérard Khoury, La France et l'Orient arabe. Naissance du Liban moderne 1914–1920, Paris 1993; Fawwaz Traboulsi, A History of Modern Lebanon, London / Ann Arbor 2007, S. 75-87.

15 Man kann in dieser Tatsache schon den ersten Hinweis auf den Widerspruch zwischen anti-klerikaler und laizistischer Politik in Frankreich selber und anti-laizistischer Politik in den französischen Einflussgebieten sehen. Der viel zitierte Ausspruch „*L'anti-cléricalisme n'est pas un article d'exportation*", der Gambetta zugeschrieben wird, illustriert diesen Widerspruch sehr deutlich. Siehe für eine Analyse dieser widersprüchlichen Politik die Artikel in Patrick Cabanel (Hrsg.), Une France en Méditerranée. Écoles, langue et culture française, XIXe–XXe siècles, Paris 2006.

16 Vgl. Rania Maktabi, The Lebanese Census of 1932 Revisited. Who are the Lebanese?, in: British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 26 (1999) 2, S. 219-241, S. 235.

17 Allein die Festlegung, dass das mächtige Amt des Präsidenten immer von einem Maroniten besetzt sein musste, macht dies deutlich. Vgl. auch Traboulsi, A History of Modern Lebanon (Anm. 14), S. 93.

18 Siehe zum Beispiel den Brief des französischen Außenministers an den französischen Hochkommissar in Beirut vom 10.07.1927: „(…) *nous devons nous efforcer de rapprocher de nous les milieux lettrés musulmans qui, à Damas en particulier, nous sont peu favorables et parmi lesquels se recrutent les adversaires les plus résolues et les plus acharnés de notre mandat.*" Archives du Ministère des Affaires étrangères / Paris, Correspondance Politique et commerciale, carton 376.

19 Vgl. Carla Eddé, Beyrouth: L'émergence de la capitale libanaise à l'ombre du mandat français. Les premiers pas (1918–1924), thèse de doctorat : Université Aix-Marseille / Université Saint-Joseph Beyrouth, 2008.

schaft in Beirut, arbeitete teilweise mit der Mandatsautorität zusammen.[20] So kann man feststellen, dass die Strukturen und Institutionen des Mandats den *political feudalism*[21] der führenden Gruppen im Libanon verstärkten.

Allerdings gab es auch Protest gegen die französische Präsenz im Libanon, die von vielen Libanesen als unterdrückend empfunden wurde. Während viele Muslime schon vor dem Beginn des Mandats dieses verurteilten, regte sich in den Reihen der Maroniten erst ab Mitte der 1930er Jahre Kritik an der Mandatsregierung.[22]

Die Kritik an dem Mandat und das Streben nach Unabhängigkeit des Libanons hatte lokale, nationale und internationale Motive und entspricht somit verschiedenen Erklärungsmustern der Dekolonisierungstheorie. Der weltweit einsetzende Prozess der Dekolonisierung wirkte sich auch in der Levante aus.[23] Auch wenn die für die Mandate zuständigen Organe des Völkerbundes in ihrer Kontrolle nicht sehr rigide waren, war doch klar, dass das französische Mandat im Libanon zeitlich begrenzt war. Wie in anderen kolonialen Einflussgebieten waren durch den Einfluss des Kommunismus, aber auch des europäischen Faschismus, die nationalistischen Bewegungen im Libanon noch verstärkt worden.[24] Dabei muss zwischen den verschiedenen Nationalismen, die im Libanon vorherrschten, unterschieden werden. Während viele der Muslime den Libanon entweder als Teil einer syrischen oder einer großen arabischen Nation sahen, verfochten viele der Christen mit dem „Libanismus" einen Libanon als eigene Nation, dessen hoher Christenanteil ihre Privilegien sichern sollte.[25] Die internen französischen Konflikte zwischen der Vichy-Regierung und dem freien Frankreich unter de Gaulle schwächten die französische Position in ihren Einflussgebieten. Schließlich war die britisch- französische Konkurrenz in der Region verantwortlich für die Schwächung der französischen Position.[26] Angesichts dieses lokalen, nationalen und internationalen Drucks war Frankreich genötigt, seine Macht im Libanon abzugeben. Allerdings geschah das nur sehr zögerlich. Die 1926 proklamierte libanesische Republik blieb völlig unter französischer Kontrolle, und der französisch- libanesische Vertrag von 1936 mit dem Ziel der libanesischen

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20   Carla Eddé, Étude de la composition du conseil municipal beyrouthin (1918–1953). Renouvellement des elites urbaines ou consolidation des notables?, in: Agnès Favier, Municipalités et pouvoirs locaux au Liban, Beyrouth 2001, S. 79-102, S. 82.

21   Meir Zamir, Lebanon's Quest. The road to statehood 1926–1939, London 1997, S. 245.

22   Diese Kritik entsprang vor allem dem Kreis um den maronitischen Patriarchen, der einige der Entscheidungen des französischen Hochkommissars nicht gut geheißen hatte. Vgl. Eyal Zisser, Lebanon. The challenge of Independance, London 2000, S. 35.

23   Gerade unter dem Einfluss des 14-Punkte-Programms, das von dem amerikanischen Präsidenten Wilson entworfen worden war, dominierte immer mehr die Idee der Selbstbestimmung der Völker. Vgl. Jürgen Osterhammel, Kolonialismus. Geschichte – Formen – Folgen, München 2006, S. 121.

24   Für den Einfluss des Kommunismus siehe Thompson, Colonial Citizens (Anm. 4), S. 102; für den Einfluss des Faschismus, vor allem auf die libanesische Kataib-Partei siehe Christoph Schumann, Radikalnationalismus in Syrien und Libanon. Politische Sozialisation und Elitenbildung 1930–1958, Hamburg 2001, S. 261.

25   Vgl. Kais Firro, Inventing Lebanon. Nationalism and the Statd under the Mandate, London 2002, S. 23-41.

26   Diese schwelte vor allem im Nahen Osten schon seit Ende des 19. Jahrhunderts und hatte sich in der gemeinsamen Besetzung des Libanons 1941 noch verstärkt. Vgl. Henry Laurens, L'Orient arabe: arabisme et islamisme de 1798 à 1945, Paris 2000, S. 290 ff.

Unabhängigkeit wurde vom französischen Parlament nie ratifiziert.[27] Die im November 1941 vom französischen General Catroux verkündete libanesische Unabhängigkeit verabschiedete Verfassung blieb ohne Wirkung. Erst im November 1943 akzeptierte Frankreich eine libanesische Regierung, die das Ergebnis eines Nationalen Pakts zwischen den verschiedenen religiösen Gemeinschaften, vor allem zwischen den Maroniten und Sunniten, war.[28] Und erst im Sommer 1946 verließen die französischen (und britischen) Truppen schließlich den Libanon und Syrien.

Die Rolle der französischen Schulen in der libanesischen Mandatsgesellschaft

Wie schon angedeutet, wurde die Frage der Dekolonisierung nicht nur auf der politischen, sondern auch auf der zivilgesellschaftlichen Ebene ausgefochten. Ein Ort, an dem diese Auseinandersetzungen zwischen französischen und libanesischen Positionen offensichtlich wurden, waren die französischen Schulen. Sowohl für die Franzosen als auch für die Libanesen war die Frage der Erziehung der jungen Libanesen von höchster Bedeutung, waren sich doch beide Seiten im Klaren über die eminente Bedeutung der Schule für die Herausbildung der Identität der Schüler.[29] So formulierte ein Verantwortlicher des französischen Hochkommissariats: *„Die Frage der Schulen ist für uns die wichtigste aller Fragen, wichtiger als die unserer wirtschaftlichen Interessen im Land.“*[30] Ebenso betonten die libanesischen und arabischen Nationalisten, wenn auch mit unterschiedlicher Ausrichtung, die Bedeutung der Schule für die Entwicklung der jungen Libanesen.[31]

Wegen der großen Bedeutung der Schulen für die Etablierung und Festigung ihrer Machtposition subventionierten die französischen Regierungsorgane massiv vor allem die französischen Schulen, aber auch viele lokale Schulen, die von Interesse für die Verbreitung des französischen Einflusses schienen.[32]

Die französischen Schulen im Libanon gehörten zu den Privatschulen. Es gab im Mandatslibanon auch öffentliche Schulen, aber diese wurden von den französischen Behör-

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27 Jacques Couland, Le Front populaire et la négociation des traités avec les États du Levant, in : Walid Arbid u. a. (Hrsg.), Méditerranée, Moyen-Orient : Deux siècles de relations internationales. Recherches en hommage à Jacques Thobie, Paris 2003, S. 501-520, S. 519.

28 Vgl. Traboulsi, A History of Modern Lebanon (Anm. 14), S. 109-111.

29 Für Syrien und viele Parallelen mit der libanesischen Situation siehe Dueck, Educational Conquest (Anm. 8), S. 442-443.

30 Siehe z. B. die Aussage des Abgeordneten des französischen Außenministeriums, Robert de Caix:„(…) *la question des écoles est la plus importante pour nous, beaucoup plus même que celle des intérêts économiques qui ont été créés par nos nationaux dans les pays du Levant*". Archiv der Jesuiten / Vanves (F), Fonds Jalabert, 7-1/K, Brief von Robert de Caix an Louis Jalabert, 29.10.1931.

31 Die Maroniten setzten sich beispielsweise für eine christliche Schule mit kultureller Anbindung an Frankreich ein, wie ein Dokument ihrer Tagung zum Thema „Deuxième semaine sociale de Beyrouth. L'école et l'éducation nationale" von 1941 deutlich macht. Die arabischen Nationalisten hingegen sahen in der Erziehung vor allem das Ziel eines arabischen Nationalstaates. Siehe für den arabischen Nationalisten Adeed Sati al-Husri Dawisha, Arab Nationalism in the Twentieth Century. From Triumph to Despair, Princeton 2003, S. 67.

32 Siehe z. B. Archives du Ministère des Affaires étrangères / Nantes, Syrie-Liban Instruction Publique, carton 83: 1931, « écoles locales ».

den bewusst vernachlässigt.[33] Während die lokalen Privatschulen relativ geringe Schulgebühren erhoben, waren die Gebühren der ausländischen Schulen erheblich. Zwar gab es innerhalb der von religiösen Orden geführten Schulen ein System, das aus den Einkünften der zahlenden Schüler eine Schule ohne Gebühren für arme Schüler finanzierte, und die französischen Schulen vergaben auch Stipendien für mittellose, aber begabte Schüler. In diesem Sinne können die französischen Schulen durchaus in begrenztem Maß als Vektoren sozialen Aufstiegs bezeichnet werden.[34] Insgesamt waren sie aber in hohem Maße Orte der Reproduktion der Eliten.[35] Dies galt zunächst vor allem für die Maroniten, die ihre Kinder mit Vorliebe auf die Schulen der französischen katholischen Orden, vornehmlich der (zumindest im Libanon französisch dominierten) Jesuiten, Lazaristen oder der „Frères des Écoles chrétiennes", gaben. Aber auch einige griechisch-orthodoxe, jüdische und muslimische Notabeln wählten diese Schulen für ihre Kinder.[36] Allerdings zogen diese die französischen Schulen vor, die keinen eindeutigen Bezug zum Christentum hatten oder diesen weniger stark betonten: die griechisch-orthodoxen, sunnitischen und jüdischen Gemeinschaften waren die Hauptklienten der Schulen der laizistisch ausgerichteten „Mission laïque française" und des protestantischen „Collège Protestant Français" in Beirut.[37] Speziell für die libanesischen Juden gab es zudem noch die Grundschulen der französischen jüdischen Organisation „Alliance Israélite Universelle."[38] Diese ideologisch sehr unterschiedlich ausgerichteten Schulen bilden den Korpus der Analyse.[39]

Alle diese Schulen wurden von den Libanesen eindeutig mit der französischen Mandatsmacht in Verbindung gebracht. Diese Nähe zur politischen Macht wurde von den einen begrüßt, von den anderen abgelehnt, und von einer dritten Gruppe von Libanesen

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33   Als Begründung gaben die Mandatsorgane in ihrem Bericht an den Völkerbund an, dass die staatlichen Schulen jahrzehntelang vernachlässigt worden waren und eine ‚Aufpäppelung' zu zeit- und kostenintensiv war. Vgl. Ministère des Affaires étrangères, „Rapports sur la situation de la Syrie et du Liban. Juillet 1922-juillet 1923", „Instruction Publique". Archives nationales / Beirut.

34   Vgl. Mouawad, L'enfance des chefs (Anm. 1), S. 198.

35   So gab es in den französischen Schulen viele Kinder einflussreicher libanesischer Familien, deren Verwandte ebenfalls diese Schulen besuchten. Siehe Interviews mit Camille Hechaime, ehemaliger Schüler der Jesuitenschule, Beirut / 24.10.2008; mit Haifa Zahad, ehemalige Schülerin der Mission laïque française, Doha / 03.12.2008; mit May Saikaly, ehemalige Schülerin des Collège Protestant français, Beirut / 13.11.2008.

36   Vgl. Chantal Verdeil, Un établissement catholique dans la société pluriconfessionelle de la fin de l'Empire ottoman : l'université Saint Joseph de Beyrouth, in: Cahiers de la Méditerranée n° 75, décembre 2007, Islam et éducation au temps des réformes modernes. Systèmes scolaires et enjeux de l'enseignement au Proche-Orient et en Afrique du Nord aux XIXᵉ et XXᵉ siècles, S. 28-38.

37   Für die Schulen der Mission laïque française im Libanon liegt noch keine vollständige Monographie vor; siehe Elemente in André Thévenin, La Mission laïque françaises à travers son histoire 1902–2002, Paris 2002. Für das Collége protestant français in Beirut siehe Jean-Paul Eyrard / Georges Krebs, Le protestantisme français et le Levant de 1856 à nos jours, Strasbourg 2007.

38   Für eine umfassende Studie dieser Schulen siehe Aron Rodrigue, De l'instruction à l'émancipation. Les enseignants de l'Alliance israélite universelle et les Juifs d'Orient 1860–1939, Paris 1989.

39   Die dafür eingesehenen Archive waren die der einzelnen Schulen im Libanon, ihrer Mutterorganisationen in Frankreich sowie die Archive des französischen Außenministeriums.

auch genutzt, um an der Macht zu partizipieren und ihre eigenen Machtpositionen zu verfestigen.[40]

Die französischen Schulen selber standen ebenfalls in unterschiedlicher Position zu der französischen Mandatsherrschaft. Einerseits waren alle von ihnen auf die finanzielle und ideelle Unterstützung durch die französischen Regierungsorgane angewiesen. Andererseits führten ihre ideologischen Ausrichtungen auch zu Differenzen mit den französischen Behörden. Während die katholischen Schulen in der Regel die Nähe zur Mandatsmacht begrüßten und keinesfalls kaschierten,[41] war die Beziehung der „Mission laïque française" zu den Autoritäten sehr viel angespannter. Das lag nicht nur an der ambivalenten Beziehung Frankreichs zum Laizismus, der in Frankreich als Staatsdoktrin propagiert und verfolgt wurde, im Libanon aber zugunsten einer Unterstützung der katholischen Orden weichen musste. Vielmehr waren die Verantwortlichen dieser Organisation darauf bedacht, von den Libanesen nicht zu eng in Verbindung mit der Mandatsmacht gebracht zu werden. Diese Sorge speiste sich vor allem aus der starken Präsenz sunnitischer Schüler, deren Eltern den arabischen nationalistischen Kreisen nahe standen.[42]

Die Verantwortlichen des „Collège Protestant Français" zeigten einen ‚soliden Patriotismus', aber kamen den Mandatsorganen nie so nahe wie die katholischen Schulen.[43] Die Leiter der „Alliance Israélite Universelle" schließlich waren ebenfalls überzeugte französische Patrioten, aber auch ihr Bemühen um die Mandatsträger blieb oft unbeantwortet.[44] Die relative Distanz der beiden Institutionen zur französischen Mandatsmacht ist durch deren traditionelle Nähe zu den Katholiken zu erklären.

Trotz dieser Unterschiede ist es aber von großem Interesse, diese verschiedenen französischen Schulen bezüglich der Frage ihrer Beteiligung an der Dekolonisierung miteinander in Beziehung zu setzen.[45]

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40   Die Schulen der Mission laïque française versammeln beispielsweise diese Positionen: viele der Eltern kooperieren und korrespondieren einerseits mit den französischen Hochkommissaren, drücken andererseits in Briefen und Versammlungen ihre Kritik an den Verbindungen der Schule zur Mandatsmacht aus, nutzen die Schule aber schließlich auch, um dort so viele Kinder ihrer Familie so günstig wie möglich ausbilden zu lassen. So z. B. der sunnitische Notable Omar Daouk. Vgl. Archives nationales / Paris, 60 AJ 123, Brief des Schuldirektors Le Héricy an den Generalsekretär der Mission laïque française Besnard, Beirut / 08.10.1920.

41   Siehe zum Beispiel ein Buch des katholischen französischen Frauenordens „Sœurs de Saint Joseph de l'Apparition" über ihre Arbeit im Libanon, das sie dem französischen Hochkomissar Weygand widmeten. Archives du école de Saint Joseph de l'Apparition / Beirut.

42   Siehe Archives Nationales / Paris, 60 AJ 122, Brief Deschamps an Guincamp, Beirut / 19.04.1919.

43   Vgl. Eyrard / Krebs, Le protestantisme français (Anm. 37), S. 188-189.

44   Siehe Archives de l'Alliance Israélite Universelle / Paris, Liban VIE 80-81, „Lettre de fin d'année", Beirut / 2.10.1915.

45   Neben den französischen Privatschulen, die die stärkste Gruppe ausmachten, gab es auch noch andere ausländische Privatschulen, vor allem amerikanischer und englischer Provenienz. Im Gegensatz zu den französischen wurden die amerikanischen Privatschulen von einigen Libanesen als liberaler und neutraler, weil nicht mit dem Mandat verbunden, angesehen und stellten deshalb eine echte Konkurrenz für die französischen Institutionen dar. Vgl. Schumann, Radikalnationalismus (Anm. 23), S. 220-224.

2. Orte der Verteidigung der französischen kolonialen Dominanz

In diesem Abschnitt geht es um die Frage, inwiefern die französischen Schulen im Libanon Orte bildeten, innerhalb derer die Diskurse und Praktiken die die französische koloniale Dominanz verstärkten. Dabei frappiert bei der Analyse der Archive zweierlei: einerseits die Konstanz, mit der angesichts der wachsenden nationalitistischen Tendenzen und Forderungen innerhalb der libanesischen Gesellschaft die französischen Schulen im Libanon ihre Diskurse und Praktiken beibehielten und andererseits den großen Raum, den die libanesischen Akteure (vor allem Eltern der Schüler und Notabeln) innerhalb der Schulen einnahmen. Widersprechen sich beide Beobachtungen oder bilden sie nicht vielmehr zwei Kehrseiten der Medaille, die die Bedeutung der Schule als umkämpften Raum der Macht deutlich macht?

Für die Analyse müssen zunächst die Begriffe „Ort", „Diskurs" und „Praxis" geklärt werden. Der Begriff „Ort" soll nach Pierre Bourdieu als sozialer Raum verstanden werden, in dem die Machtstrukturen und die Handlungen der Subjekte aufeinander treffen. Es geht also um *„Strategien in der Konkurrenz um die Position im sozialen Raum"*.[46] Im Fall der Schule bedeutet das, dass diese Konkurrenz von den Akteuren genutzt wurde, um ihre Positionen für oder gegen die französische Präsenz im Libanon zu entwickeln und zu sichern. Das geschah mit Hilfe von Diskursen und Praktiken. Der Begriff „Diskurs" soll in Anlehnung an Michel Foucault als Rede, Text oder andere Äußerung verstanden werden, die *„(zumindest für eine bestimmte Zeit) mit einem Wahrheitswert geladen (…), an die unterschiedlichen Machtmechanismen und -institutionen gebunden"*[47] sind. Für den vorliegenden Untersuchungsgegenstand heißt das, dass sich in den Aussagen der verschiedenen Akteure der Schulen, in den gehaltenen Reden, den Schulbüchern und Schüleraufsätzen Wahrheitsansprüche und Machtstrukturen manifestiert haben.[48] Der Begriff „Praxis" schließlich orientiert sich in dieser Untersuchung ebenfalls an der Frage der Macht. Pierre Bourdieu hat hier richtungweisend die Wirksamkeit der sozialen Praktiken analysiert und vor allem anhand des Konzepts des „Habitus" gezeigt, wie sehr dieser die Position seines Trägers im sozialen Raum bestimmt.[49] Alf Lüdtke hat dabei das „Kräftefeld" betont, in dem ‚Herrscher' und ‚Beherrschte' aufeinander treffen

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46 Martina Löw, Raumsoziologie, Frankfurt a. M. 2001, S. 180. Siehe auch Pierre Bourdieu, Sozialer Raum und symbolische Macht, in: ders., Rede und Antwort, Frankfurt a. M. 1992, S. 135-154.

47 Michel Foucault, Sexualität und Wahrheit, Band 1: Der Wille zum Wissen, Frankfurt a. M. 1997, S. 8.

48 Auch hier kann auf die Forschungen Foucaults verwiesen werden, der anhand der Gefängnisse und Schulen die Anordnung und Disziplinierung der Schüler als Allgegenwärtigkeit der Macht betont hat. Vgl. Michel Foucault, Surveiller et Punir. Naissance de la Prison, Paris 1973, v. a. S. 164-199. Dabei darf aber nicht vergessen werden, dass diese Macht von den Lehrern und Schülern gleichermaßen realisiert wurde.

49 Auch wenn Bourdieus Studie von der kabylischen Gemeinschaft in Algerien ausgeht, beanspruchte er Gültigkeit auch für andere Gesellschaften. Vgl. Pierre Bourdieu, Entwurf einer Theorie der Praxis. Auf der ethnologischen Grundlage der kabylischen Gesellschaft, Frankfurt a. M. 1976, S. 149 ff. In einer weiteren Studie hat Bourdieu die beschriebenen Mechanismen auch auf das Erziehungssystem angewandt und dabei die Reproduktion bestimmter kultureller und sozialer Praktiken, z. B. bezüglich der Sprache, durch die Schule betont. Vgl. Pierre Bourdieu / Jean-Claude Passeron, La reproduction. Éléments pour une théorie de l'enseignement, Paris 1970, u. a. S. 134-143.

und ihre Positionen in gegenseitiger Anerkennung, aber auch Differenz und Reibung verhandeln.[50] So bildete zum Beispiel die Teilnahme französischer Persönlichkeiten an Schulfesten und anderen Feierlichkeiten der Schulen für diese Persönlichkeiten die Möglichkeit, nicht nur ihre Macht zu demonstrieren, sondern auch von den Schülern und Lehrern anerkennen zu lassen.

Wie schon erwähnt, wurden die Schulen von den französischen Regierungsvertretern sowohl ideell als auch finanziell massiv unterstützt. Neben dieser ,passiven' Verstärkung der französischen kolonialen Dominanz durch ihre bloßer Rezeption französischer Hilfe wirkten die Schulen aber auch aktiv an dieser Verstärkung und Verteidigung mit. Das gilt für die verschiedenen Akteure, die Lehrer und Schüler genau so wie die betroffenen Eltern.

Zunächst muss betont werden, dass viele der Lehrer in den unterschiedlichen Schulen von der Legitimation Frankreichs, seine Dominanz im Libanon aufrechtzuerhalten, überzeugt blieben. So fotografierte noch 1936 ein jesuitischer Lehrer in den libanesischen Bergen einen seiner Schüler, der eine Tafel mit „*Vive la France*" hochhielt- mit Sicherheit eher Ausdruck seiner als seines Schülers politischen Meinung von der französischen Dominanz des Libanons.[51] Im selben Jahr 1936, das massive Proteste gegen die französische Präsenz im Libanon erlebte, drückte der Direktor der Schulen der „Alliance israélite universelle" in Beirut seine Sorge vor dem Ende des Mandats aus: „*Solange die französische Flagge über uns flatterte, fühlten wir uns in Sicherheit und von der französischen Armee beschützt.*"[52]

Neben den Lehrern bejahten auch viele Schüler und ihre Eltern die französische Präsenz im Libanon. In Briefen und Reden betonten sie die Größe der französischen Kultur und deren Segen für den Libanon sowie ihre Dankbarkeit, in den Schulen daran teilhaben zu können.[53] Auch wenn einige von ihnen, vor allem die Vertreter eines Libanons unter französischer Vormundschaft, von diesen Aussagen überzeugt waren, gab es sicher auch andere, die diese Aussagen tätigten, um ihre Chancen auf einen Schulplatz und eventuelle Ermäßigungen des Schulgeldes zu erhöhen. Angesichts der kolonialen Strukturen, die den Libanon in der Mandatszeit beherrschten, muss man fast von einer totalitären

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50   Vgl. Alf Lüdtke, Einleitung: Herrschaft als soziale Praxis, in: ders. (Hrsg.), Herrschaft als soziale Praxis. Historische und sozial-anthropologische Studien. Göttingen 1991, 9-63, S. 12-13.

51   Siehe dieses Foto in Lévon Nordiguian (Hrsg.), Les „petites écoles" du Mont Liban. Joseph Delore, sj (1873–1944), Beyrouth 2004. Denselben Diskurs führen auch die Verantwortlichen der protestantischen Schule in Beirut : „L'œuvre (…) *est à la fois une oeuvre patriotique et une œuvre religieuses (…) laïques. Les Allemands avaient organisé des oeuvres florissantes. Il faut les remplacer et il faut éviter qu'ils reviennent. C'est pour la France une question de prestige.*" Archives de la Présence Protestante Française/Plaisir, Bericht des 'Conseil d'Administration' vom 17.07.1927.

52   Wörtlich: „(…) *tant que le drapeau français flottait sur nos têtes, nous nous sentions en pleine sécurité. L'armée française nous protégeait.*" Archives de l'Alliance Israélite Universelle/Paris, « Liban 1 C 1 », Brief des Direktos Penso an den Präsidenten der Alliance Israélite Universelle in Paris, 19.06.1936.

53   Siehe zum Beispiel für die Schulen des katholischen Frauenordens „Filles de la Charité" die Berichte von deren Schule in Tripoli 1923: „*Depuis l'occupation française les parents attachent plus d'importance à l'étude du français.*" Archives de la Congrégation de la Mission/Paris, Ordner « Rapport général sur les Maisons des Filles de la Charité de la Province : Syrie, Palestine, Egypte, 1923. »

Situation sprechen, in der für die Libanesen ohne eine Anbindung an das Französische keine beruflichen, finanziellen oder politischen Aussichten möglich waren.[54]

Aber neben diesen Aussagen gab es auch nicht-diskursive Praktiken, durch die die Schulen die französische koloniale Dominanz verstärkten. So wurden in allen französischen Schulen bis zum Ende des Mandats, und oft noch darüber hinaus, zu Schulfesten und anderen feierlichen Gelegenheiten französische Persönlichkeiten aus Politik, Militär, Wirtschaft und Kultur eingeladen, die die Verbindung der Schulen zum französischen kolonialen Milieu visuell und strukturell bestätigten.[55] Bei diesen Gelegenheiten wurde, meistens von den Schülern, die französische Nationalhymne gesungen, was die Zugehörigkeit der Schulen zu Frankreich noch betonte.[56] Die von den französischen Persönlichkeiten gehaltenen Reden überhöhten und legitimierten die Idee der französischen „Mission civilisatrice", die durch das Mandat Wirklichkeit wurde.[57]

Schließlich blieben bis zum Ende des Mandats die französischen Abschlüsse an den betreffenden Schulen gültig und alle Versuche, die libanesischen Abschlüsse weiterzuentwickeln und gleichberechtigt neben den französischen an den Schulen einzuführen, scheiterten.[58] Das bedeutet, dass die auch im Bereich der Erziehung geforderte und proklamierte ‚Begleitung Frankreichs des Libanons auf dem Weg seiner Unabhängig- und Selbständigkeit' für die französischen Schulen nicht realisiert wurde.

So kann abschließend festgehalten werden, dass die erwähnte frappierende Konstanz dieser Diskurse und Praktiken weniger eine selbstverständliche Überzeugung der Legitimation der kolonialen Dominanz als vielmehr den verzweifelten Versuch ausdrückt, angesichts beunruhigender Änderungen in der Gesellschaft in den Schulen einen Mikrokosmos kolonialer Ordnung aufrechtzuerhalten.

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54 So ist im Fall der Schulen der Lazaristen zu bemerken, dass mit zunehmender Einflussnahme Frankreichs im Libanon die Zahl der Briefe von Eltern, die um Aufnahme ihrer Kinder bitten und die Bedeutung des Französischen betonen, signifikant ansteigt. Vgl. Archives des Lazaristes / Paris, „Beyrouth Correspondance 1869–1918".

55 Siehe beispielsweise für die Festivitäten der Schule der „Frères des Écoles Chrétiennes" in Beirut deren Berichte in der Schulchronik: am 08.02.1921 besuchte der französische Admiral Grandclément mit einigen Offizieren die Schule, nahm auf einem Podest Platz um Schülerdarbietungen zuzuhören. Ein Foto davon wurde in der Chronik festgehalten. Archives du collège de Sacré-Cœur / Beirut. Solche Besuche hatte die Schule mehrere Male im Jahr. Auch die Archive der anderen Schulen zeugen von ganz ähnlichen Zeremonien.

56 Siehe zum Beispiel den Bericht über das Schulfest der Schulen der Mission laïque française in Beirut in einem Brief des Schuldirektors an den Generalsekretär der Mission laïque française in Paris vom 29.06.1934. Archives nationales / Paris, 60 AJ 136.

57 In der Zeitschrift der Alliance Israélite Universelle „Paix et Droit" vom Mai 1937 berichtet die Direktorin einer Grundschule der Organisation in Beirut von dem Besuch des französischen Vizekonsuls: « (…) *se tournant vers moi, il dit : „ Ce qui me frappe et m'enchante particulièrement, c'est la facilité avec laquelle vos élèves s'expriment en notre langue. Je veux donc saisir l'occasion de ma visite pour rendre hommage aux maîtres si dévoués qui savent donner à leurs élèves le goût et l'amour du travail intelligent et bien compris.* (…) *L'école de l'Alliance Israélite Universelle ne mérite que des compliments."* Archives de l'Alliance Israélite / Paris.

58 Das blockierten sowohl die französischen Schulen als auch die Vertreter des Hochkommissariats in Beirut. Für das Zögern der französischen Behörden siehe Archives du Ministère des Affaires étrangères/Nantes, Syrie-Liban Instruction Publique, carton 07, Notiz des Hochkommissars vom 06.07.1921. Die Verantwortlichen der Jesuitenschule in Beirut sind auch im Februar 1942 noch nicht vom libanesischen Abitur überzeugt. Vgl. Archives des Jésuites / Beirut, 11.D.14.

3. Orte der Infragestellung des Mandats und nationalistischer Forderungen

Laut Christoph Schumann gab es, wenn auch in unterschiedlicher Abstufung, in allen libanesischen Schulen nationalistische Tendenzen, und dies besonders am Ende der Mandatszeit.[59] Inwiefern gilt das auch für die französischen Schulen?

Dieses gilt erst einmal insofern für alle französischen Schulen als sie dadurch, dass sie die jungen Libanesen ausgebildet haben, ihnen auch die intellektuellen und kulturellen Werkzeuge für ein politisches Denken und das Streben nach Souveränität mitgegeben haben. Diese Ambivalenz jeder kolonialen Erziehung[60], durch die konsequenterweise der Kolonialismus sich selber auflösen müsste, ist ein eindeutiger, wenn auch nicht unbedingt beabsichtigter, Beitrag der französischen Schulen zur Dekolonisierung des Libanons.

Zwischen den verschiedenen französischen Schulen herrschten aber auch beachtliche Unterschiede: grob kann man sagen, dass in den Schulen der Mission laïque française mehr Platz für die Kritik am französischen Mandat und damit nationalistische Forderungen von den Libanesen gefordert und von den Schulen eingeräumt wurde als in den katholischen, protestantischen und jüdischen französischen Schulen. In Interviews mit ehemaligen Schülern katholischer Schulen haben diese interessanterweise behauptet, ihre Lehrer hätten ihnen die Liebe zur eigenen Nation erst beigebracht und sie in dem Kampf um Unabhängigkeit unterstützt.[61] Allerdings muss hier erstens die Verklärung einer 50 Jahre zurück liegenden Vergangenheit und zweitens der Reflex einer Verteidigung der katholischen Orden als prolibanesisch, der nicht als Handlanger einer französischen kolonialen Macht fungierte, beachtet werden. So wurden Fragen zur Integration der arabischen Sprache und Kultur in die Schulprogramme, die in den Schulen der Mission laïque française schon in den 1920er Jahren aufkamen, in den Schulen der katholischen Orden, zum Beispiel der Jesuiten, erst Anfang der 1940er Jahre dringend.[62] Das hat vor allem damit zu tun, dass das Publikum der Mission laïque française stärker vom arabischen und syrischen Nationalismus, der am virulentesten die französische Präsenz im Libanon kritisierte, beeinflusst war als das der anderen Schulen. Da die Schulen sehr auf ein konstantes, zahlendes und zudem renommiertes Publikum angewiesen waren, mussten die Verantwortlichen diese Forderungen ernst nehmen, ohne dabei ihren Auftrag aus den Augen zu verlieren – ein nicht immer leichtes Unterfangen.[63]

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59 Schumann, Radikalnationalismus (Anm. 23), S. 219.

60 Diese Ambivalenz haben Akteure der Dekolonisierung wie Frantz Fanon betont, zum Beispiel in seinem Buch Les damnés de la terre von 1961.

61 Interview mit Camille Hechaimé, Beirut / 24.10.2008.

62 Siehe für die Mission laïque française beispielsweise Archives nationales / Paris 60 AJ 127 „Voyage Piat (déc. 1924–1925)"; siehe für die Schule „Saint Joseph" der Jesuiten in Beirut Archives des Jésuites / Beirut, Karton 11.D.14, „Réunion des professeurs 1942 / questions de programmes".

63 So hatten die Direktoren der Schule der Mission laïque française in Beirut große Schwierigkeiten damit, dem sunnitischen Notablen und ehemaligen Präsidenten des Stadtrates von Beirut Omar Daouk einerseits viele Privilegien einzuräumen und andererseits dabei nicht ihre eigene Handlungsfreiheit zu verlieren. Vgl. Archives nationales / Paris, 60 AJ 129, Brief des Direktors an den Generalsekretär in Paris, Beirut / 01.12.1926.

Wie kann in den Diskursen und Praktiken innerhalb der verschiedenen Schulen ein Ansteigen der nationalistischen Forderungen festgemacht werden? Welches waren die Antworten und Strategien der Verantwortlichen der Schulen darauf?

Eine Gruppe, die innerhalb der Schulmauern der Mission laïque française die Forderungen nach größerer Anerkennung der libanesischen Akteure laut werden ließ, waren die libanesischen Lehrer. Schon ab Mitte der 1920er Jahre forderten sie einen gleichwertigen Status und eine Angleichung ihres Gehalts an das ihrer französischen Kollegen. In ihrem Forderungsschreiben für einen Status „echter Partner" argumentierten sie mit ihrer Wertschätzung der laizistischen französischen Republik und ihrer Enttäuschung, wenn diese Wertschätzung desillusioniert werden würde.[64] In diesem Schreiben wird die ganze Ambivalenz der Zivilisierungsmission beziehungsweise der kolonialen Erziehung als Legitimation kolonialer Dominanz sichtbar, denn logisch zu Ende gedacht, müsste sie zur einer Gleichstellung der „Kolonisierten" mit den „Kolonisierern" führen und damit den Kolonialismus auflösen.[65] Auf die Forderungen der arabischen Lehrer reagierte die Zentrale der Mission laïque française in Paris nur zögerlich und in sehr kleinen Schritten. Dass die Lehrer ihre Forderungen auch noch 1942 wiederholten, zeigt wie wenig sie Gehör fanden. Es ist interessant zu sehen, dass Lehrerschreiben solcher Art in den Archiven der anderen Schulen nicht auftauchen. Das lässt sich entweder dadurch erklären, dass die einheimischen Lehrer in diesen Schulen nicht wagten aufzubegehren, oder auch dadurch, dass sie mit der französischen Dominanz in größerem Maße einverstanden waren beziehungsweise sie nicht als negativ empfunden haben.

Neben den libanesischen Lehrern waren auch die Schüler in den französischen Schulen sensible Rezeptoren der steigenden Forderungen nach Unabhängigkeit von Frankreich in der libanesischen Gesellschaft. Beispielsweise formulierte ein Schüler der Jesuitenschule „Saint Joseph" in einem Aufsatz von 1931, dass die, die in sein Land kommen, auch seine Kultur respektieren.[66] Im Jahre 1940 berichtete der Direktor der Schule der Mission laïque française in Beirut, dass auf einer Schulmauer Hakenkreuze gemalt wurden.[67] Diese Handlung, die sicher nur eine Nachahmung erwachsener Aussagen und Praktiken war, kann einerseits als Sympathie mit Nazideutschland, andererseits aber (deswegen) auch als Animosität gegenüber Frankreich als Besatzungsmacht interpretiert werden.[68]

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64 Archives nationales / Paris, 60 AJ 131, Brief der einheimischen Lehrer an den Generalsekretär der MLF, Beirut / 09.01.1925: „Si la situation qui nous est faite depuis déjà longtemps ne devait pas être modifiée (…) nous aurions en effet l'impression que nous ne pourrons jamais avoir chez vous le rang de collaborateurs et que nous ne sommes que des auxiliaires de passage avec lesquels on hésite à s'engager. Nous serions d'autant plus surpris que nous nous faisons une idée très haute de l'idée laïque fille de la France républicaine, et de nos devoirs et de notre dignité d'éducateurs."

65 Vgl. Jürgen Osterhammel, Europe, the "West" and the Civilizing Mission. The 2005 Annual Lecture, German Historical Institute London, 2006, S. 31; Phillip Altbach / Gail Kelly, Introduction, in: dies. (Hrsg.), Education and Colonialism, New York 1978, S. 1-49, S. 41.

66 „Etant par nature apte à m'adapter aux choses les plus variées, capable de m'assimiler ce qu'il y a de bon en elles, j'exige la même attitude de celui qui se mêle de juger ma culture et ma civilisation." „Le point de vue de l'élève 30/10/1931 P. J. Honiskiss", Archives des Jésuites / Vanves, RPO 62.

67 Archives du Ministère des Affaires étrangères / Nantes, Syrie-Liban Instruction Publique, carton 162 / Bericht Grandjouan an Bounoure, 29.05.1940.

68 Viele libanesische Nationalisten beriefen sich auf den deutschen Faschismus für ihre eigene Ideologie und

Die Eltern der libanesischen Schüler waren eine andere Interessengruppe im Umfeld der französischen Schulen im Libanon, die ihre Unzufriedenheit mit der französischen Dominanz ihres Landes in den Foren der Schule laut werden ließen. Besonders gilt das für Schulen der Mission laïque française. Ihr Elternrat enthielt Mitglieder der syrischen und arabischen nationalistischen Bewegung[69], die innerhalb dieses Schulorgans ihre Ansichten deutlich machten und diese im Schulalltag verwirklicht sehen wollten. Sie forderten den Respekt der arabischen beziehungsweise libanesischen Identität der Schüler und deshalb eine Verstärkung der Unterrichtsfächer arabischer Sprache und Kultur: „(…) *ne négligez pas dans votre programme la langue arabe, langue des Syriens.*"[70] Die Reaktion des Schuldirektors der Mission laïque française, Lucien Ruche, auf eine solche wiederholte Forderung im Jahre 1934 zeigt, dass er auf die Ansicht der Eltern einzugehen versuchte. Er betonte, dass seine Schule aus den Kindern keine Franzosen zweiter Klasse machen, sondern mit Hilfe der französischen Kultur ihren syrischen Patriotismus erleuchten und stärken wolle.[71] Diese Ambivalenz von französischer Seite findet sich auch in den katholischen französischen Schulen. So betonte der Direktor der Schule der Lazaristen in Antoura 1931, dass seine Schule gleichzeitig hundertprozentig französisch und hundertprozentig libanesisch sei.[72]

Auch sie unterstützten nationalistische Tendenzen, allerdings fast ausschließlich den christlich geprägten libanesischen Nationalismus. Beispielsweise nahmen die Lehrer der Schule der „Frères des Écoles chrétiennes" 1931 an einer Zeremonie für die libanesischen Martyrer teil und berichteten ausführlich darüber.[73]

Diese Diskurse und Praktiken machen wieder deutlich, mit welcher Ambivalenz französische koloniale Erziehung und ‚indigener' Nationalismus eng miteinander verbunden sind. Er zeigt den Versuch der französischen Schulen, ihre Rolle angesichts des arabischen Nationalismus zu behaupten und zu legitimieren.[74]

In ihren Versuchen, dem libanesischen Nationalismus entgegenzukommen, reagierten die französischen Schulen auch auf die Politik des Hochkommissars. Der Repräsentant der französischen Regierung im Libanon bemerkte, dass die libanesischen Muslime als Hauptvertreter des Nationalismus seinem Einfluss entglitten und sich gegen das Man-

nutzten die deutsche Propaganda, die Deutschland als Befreier der arabischen Länder von der französischen und englischen Besatzung darstellte. Siehe unter anderem Schumann, Christoph, Symbolische Aneignungen. Antun Saadas Radikalnationalismus in der Epoche des Faschismus, in: Gerhard Höpp u. a. (Hrsg.), Blind für die Geschichte? Arabische Begegnungen mit dem Nationalsozialismus, Berlin 2004, S. 155-189, S. 156.

69   Z. B. den libanesischen Politiker Riad el-Solh. Siehe Archives nationales / Paris, 60 AJ 133.

70   Z. B. Archives nationales/ Paris, 60 AJ 123, Brief Le Héricy an Generalsekretär, Beirut / 05.10.1920.

71   Archives nationales/ Paris, 60 AJ 136, „Compte rendu des Comité de Patronage", 29.03.1934.

72   „(…) *notre collège est français* ; (…) 3. (…) *il est libanais plus que tout autre, puisque avant la guerre, Tripoli et Beyrouth n'appartenaient pas au Liban* (…)." Archives du Ministère des Affaires étrangères / Nantes, Syrie-Liban Mandat / Instruction Publique, carton 81, Brief Salroutte an Generalinspektor, 25.05.1931.

73   Archives du collège Sacré Coeur / Beirut, Schulzeitschrift „L'Essor", Juli 1931, S. 6-11.

74   Die Nationalisten selber haben oft eine ähnlich schwierige Haltung zu den europäischen Ländern, die sie einerseits als Modell und Inspiration sahen und andererseits als kolonialistisch und fremd ablehnten und bekämpften. Vgl. für den arabischen Reformer Gurgi Zaydan siehe Anne-Laure Dupont, Gurgi Zaydan 1861–1914. Écrivain réformiste et témoin de la Renaissance arabe, Damas 2006, S. 119.

dat stellten. So versuchte er, durch das Medium der Schulen auf ihre Bedürfnisse und Sensibilitäten einzugehen. Beispielsweise verbat er 1924 zum ersten Mal ein Schulbuch, das abwertende Passagen über den Islam enthielt. Allerdings scheint dieses Verbot nur zögerlich in den Schulen umgesetzt worden zu sein, denn noch Anfang der 1940er Jahre mahnte der französische Hochkommissar die Institutionen zur Befolgung seiner Anweisungen.[75] Ausgehend von diesem Beispiel wird deutlich, dass die französischen Staatsorgane die Schulen genutzt haben, um dem sich immer stärker manifestierenden nationalen und kulturellen Selbstbewusstsein im Libanon entgegenzukommen, aber dass sie dabei selber nicht von diesem Entgegenkommen überzeugt waren, weil es logisch das Ende ihrer Präsenz im Libanon bedeutet hätte.

Insgesamt kann man feststellen, dass die französischen Schulen im Libanon versuchten, sich den sich ändernden lokalen Verhältnissen anzupassen und, teils aus Überzeugung, teils aus pragmatischen Überlebensgründen, dem wachsenden Nationalismus und der Forderung nach einem Ende der französischen Dominanz im Libanon im Rahmen ihrer Möglichkeiten Raum zu geben. Das Ergebnis war eine ambivalente Position zwischen französischen und libanesischen Forderungen. Diese war zudem nicht immer von Erfolg gekrönt. Beispielsweise berichtete der Direktor der Mission laïque française 1936 an das französische Außenministerium, dass er befürchte, die muslimischen Nationalisten in Beirut würden die amerikanische Schule seiner Institution vorziehen, weil sie als politisch neutraler gelte und nicht mit dem französischen Mandat in Verbindung gebracht werde.[76]

Aber das Ende des Mandats war nicht aufzuhalten und 1943 musste Frankreich endgültig die libanesische Unabhängigkeit anerkennen. Bedeutete das das Ende der Ära der französischen Schulen im Libanon? Was die massiven Subventionen aus französischen Staatsgeldern betrifft, sicherlich. In vielen anderen Bereichen aber konnten diese Schulen eine große Kontinuität bewahren.[77] Schließlich wurden sie von den libanesischen Regierungen nicht geschlossen. Wie konnten sie also ihre Kontinuität wahren?

Die These lautet, dass die Schulen den Übergang zwischen Mandatszeit und Unabhängigkeit bewältigten, indem sie weiterhin für sich in Anspruch nahmen, die libanesische Elite auszubilden. Sie passten sich damit an die weiter oben beschriebene Kontinuität der Herrschaft einiger Familien im Libanon an. In dieser Hinsicht unterstützten sie und profitierten gleichzeitig von dem Fortleben patriarchalischer Strukturen, die nicht nur die Dominanz der Männer, sondern auch der traditionellen Machtverhältnisse bedeutet.[78] So konnten sie ihren Einfluss wahren und gleichzeitig ihre Verbindung mit der

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75 Siehe Archives du Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, Syrie-Liban Instruction Publique, Carton 162/1940.

76 Siehe Archives du Ministère des Affaires étrangères / Nantes, Service des Œuvres françaises à l'étranger, carton 378 / Brief Besnard an das französische Außenministerium, 04.04.1936.

77 So verlief beispielsweise das Schulfest der Jesuitenschule in Beirut nach der Unabhängigkeit noch genau so wie während der Mandatszeit: Ehrengast war ein französischer Offizier. Siehe den Bericht in der Schulzeitschrift „Nous du Collège" Nr. 99 vom Juni 1946. Archives du collège Notre Dame de Jamhour / Libanon.

78 Siehe für die ambivalente Rolle der Frauen in der libanesischen Erziehung, die sich progressiv gibt, aber traditionell patriarchalisch verhaftet ist: Mirna Lattouf, Women, education, and socialization in modern Lebanon: 19th and 20th centuries social history, Lanham / Md. u. a. 2004, z. B. S. 88.

französischen kolonialen Präsenz aufgeben. Natürlich hat dieses aber auch zu Reibungspunkten und Empfindungen der Entwurzelung und Identitätskonflikten[79] auf Seiten der libanesischen Schüler geführt. Man kann also im Sinne Homi Bhabhas von den französischen Schulen im Libanon auch als „dritten Räumen" sprechen, welche hybride Identitäten erzeugt haben, die sich weder der französischen noch der libanesischen Kultur zugehörig fühlten.[80] Das bedeutet, dass es für manche ehemaligen Schüler schwierig war, sich auf die pro-französische oder pro-nationalistische Seite zu stellen und dass es unmöglich ist, beide Seiten klar voneinander zu trennen.

4. Orte der Kontinuität durch die Ausbildung der Elite

Wie oben erwähnt, hat die Epoche und das Ende des französischen Mandats die patriarchalischen Strukturen, die im Libanon existierten, nicht verändert, sondern noch verstärkt. Daran haben sich auch die französischen Schulen im Libanon beteiligt, denn die Familien, welche die Geschicke des Landes während und nach der Mandatszeit leiteten, hatten in hohem Maße die französischen Schulen besucht.[81] Die Familien, die während des Mandats ihre Kinder auf französische Schulen geschickt hatten, behielten diese Praxis auch nach der Unabhängigkeit bei. Eine amerikanische Kommission, die im Frühjahr 1946 im Auftrag des Department of States insgesamt 89 Schulen im Libanon besichtigte, betonte diese Kontinuität:

> The French, having lost Lebanon, are still exerting great efforts through the Œuvres Françaises and through their schools to maintain their cultural influence. There is no doubt that in this they have the support of a section of the Christian population which has been brought up along French lines and is loath to see this influence weaken. (…) French cultural influence will probably remain strong for a long time to come.[82]

Vor allem die Maroniten besuchten weiterhin die katholischen französischen Schulen. Was die Sunniten betrifft, wählten einige von ihnen nun bewusst die amerikanischen Schulen, aber andere gingen weiterhin auf die französischen Schulen. Die libanesischen staatlichen Schulen, die während des Mandats vernachlässigt und deshalb außer Konkurrenz geraten waren, fanden auch nach der Unabhängigkeit keinen Platz unter den

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79 Vgl. Mouawad, L'enfance des chefs (Anm. 1), S. 200. Siehe auch Gespräch mit der libanesischen Professorin Suad Slim, Beirut / 06.12.2008.

80 Vgl. Homi Bhabba, The Location of Culture, London / New York 1994, S. 53-56. Die Theorien Bhabhas haben auch Kritik erfahren, unter anderem für mangelnde Konkretheit in Doris Bachmann-Medick, Dritter Raum. Annäherungen an ein Medium kultureller Übersetzung und Kantierung, in: Claudia Breger / Tobias Döring (Hrsg.), Figuren der / des Dritten. Erkundungen kultureller Zwischenräume, Amsterdam / Atlanta 1998, S. 19-36, v. a. S. 22-25. Trotzdem überzeugt sein Konzept für die Frage nach der Identität ehemaliger Schüler kolonialer Institutionen.

81 Die maronitische Gemeinschaft stellte den Hauptanteil der Schüler der katholischen französischen Schulen, die sunnitische Gemeinschaft die größte Gruppe der Schulen der Mission laïque française.

82 Roderic D. Matthews / Matta Akrawi, Education in Arab countries of the Near East, American Council on Education, 1949, S. 500.

vorgezogenen Schulen der Eliten des Landes. Von den 963 libanesischen Privatschulen, die die amerikanische Kommission für 1944–1945 festgemacht hatte, waren 406 maronitische Schulen, die dem Französischen einen hohen Stellenwert einräumten und auf diese Weise seine Präsenz auch nach der libanesischen Unabhängigkeit sicherten.[83]

Die Diskurse und Praktiken, die innerhalb der französischen Schulen während des Mandats schon eingeübt wurden, um das Bewusstsein einer Elite zu schaffen, wurden auch nach 1943 beibehalten.[84] Beispielsweise war die Ehemaligenarbeit in diesen Schulen sehr aktiv und hatte eine große Bedeutung. Durch Treffen, Zeitschriften und andere Instanzen wurde die Solidarität unter den ehemaligen Schülern beschworen. Netzwerke wurden aufgebaut, deren erklärtes Ziel es war, jüngeren Ehemaligen zu helfen, in die führenden Positionen im Staat zu gelangen.[85]

Auch die französischen Persönlichkeiten bewahrten ihre Präsenz innerhalb der französischen Schulen im Libanon. Bei einer der traditionellen Jahresabschlussfeiern der Jesuitenschule „Saint Joseph" in Beirut im Sommer 1946 beispielsweise nahmen französische Militärs ihren Ehrenplatz ein wie während des Mandats die Hochkommissare.[86] So konnten sie einerseits den französischen Einfluss auf die Schulen wahren und andererseits den Lehrern, Schülern und Eltern weiterhin das Gefühl vermitteln, ihre Schule sei eine ausgewählte Institution, die den Respekt der französischen Autoritäten wecke.

Schluss

Die Ausgangsfrage dieses Artikels war, welchen Beitrag die französischen Schulen im Libanon zur Dekolonisierung des Libanons geleistet haben. In der Analyse ist deutlich geworden, dass die Schulen in der Tat einen aktiven Beitrag zur Dekolonisierung des Landes geleistet haben, weil sie Orte dargestellt haben, an denen die Dekolonisierung diskutiert und verhandelt wurde. Bei dieser Verhandlung wurde durch die Diskurse und Praktiken in den Schulen einerseits die französische koloniale Präsenz noch verstärkt. Mit Bezug auf Foucault und Bourdieu kann man diese Verstärkung mit dem Interesse an der Bewahrung von Machtpositionen erklären, welches nicht nur die französischen, sondern auch einige libanesische Akteure auszeichnete. Gleichzeitig gaben die Schulen aber das Forum für nationalistische Forderungen, denen sie auch selber in Teilen nach-

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83 Ebd., S. 504.

84 Siehe z. B. das Erziehungsprogramm der jesuitischen Schule Notre Dame de Jamhour nördlich von Beirut im Jahre 1982–1983 : „(…) *sa tâche est de former des gens désintéressés et généreux (…)*". Als Sinn der Prüfungen und Erfolge wird formuliert, dass « leur véritable rôle est de préparer des hommes capables de porter des responsabilités." Archives du collège Notre Dame de Jamhour / Libanon, „programme éducatif 1982–1983".

85 So formulierte das Magazin der Ehemaligenvereinigung der Schule der Lazaristen in Antoura 1938: „*Créer une association amicale, c'est continuer la Vie du Collège, unir dans un lien moral les membres d'un même établissement, permettre aux plus jeunes de connaître les Anciens, fournir à ceux qui sont avantagés le moyen de venir en aide à ceux qui attendent, qui désirent un emploi, une place au soleil.*" Archives des Lazaristes / Paris, Association Amicale des Anciens Élèves d'Antoura, 1938.

86 Siehe den Bericht darüber in der Schülerzeitschrift der Schule „Nous du Collège", 1946. Archives du Collège Notre Dame de Jamhour / Libanon.

kommen wollten oder mussten. Allerdings ist deutlich geworden, dass die verschiedenen Schulen sehr unterschiedlich reagierten auf die notwendige Anpassung an die politischen Umwälzungen der 1920er bis 1940er Jahre. Diese Unterschiede lagen vor allem an ihrer Klientel und an der Einstellung ihrer Verantwortlichen zur französischen Regierung. Die protestantische französische Schule „Collège protestant français" schien dabei einen goldenen Mittelweg zu wählen. Besonders ihre langjährige Direktorin Louise Weggmann war einerseits eine französische Patriotin, aber achtete andererseits auf den Platz der arabischen Sprache und Kultur innerhalb ihrer Schule und hatte beste Beziehungen zu den führenden Politikern des Landes.[87]

Es ist interessant, in diesem Zusammenhang auf die Unterschiede zu französischen Schulen in anderen kolonialen Einflussgebieten zu verweisen. So hat Nicola Cooper für die französischen Schulen in Indochina herausgearbeitet, dass diese viel weniger als die Schulen im Libanon die nationalistischen Stimmen und Forderungen zu Wort kommen ließen.[88] Dieser Unterschied ist damit zu erklären, dass es im Libanon in größerem Maße als in Indochina Bevölkerungsgruppen gab, die die französischen Schulen begrüßten, aber auch damit, dass die französischen Regierungen im Nahen Osten eine sehr wechselhafte Politik bezüglich der Muslime führten, was diesen relativ viel Handlungspotential gab.[89]

Das Ergebnis dieser verschiedenen Kräftemessungen war, dass die französischen Schulen ambivalente Orte der Machtverhandlungen der verschiedenen Interessengruppen, die an ihnen beteiligt waren, darstellten. Auf diese Art und Weise repräsentieren die französischen Schulen vortrefflich die gespaltene und vielschichtige libanesische Gesellschaft mit ihren divergierenden Staatsvorstellungen und kulturellen und politischen Referenzen. Trotz, oder besser wegen dieser ambivalenten Position konnten die französischen Schulen ihre Rolle als Erzieherinnen der Elite des Landes auch nach der Unabhängigkeit bewahren – bis heute.

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87   Vgl. Jean-Paul Eyrard / Afaf Khoury/Georges Krebs, Le Collège Protestant Français de Beyrouth. 80 ans d'excellence, Strasbourg / Beirut 2006, S. 80. Die besondere Beziehung Louise Wegmanns zu der libanesischen politischen Spitze in den 1950er und 1960er Jahre hat auch eine ehemalige Lehrerin dieser Schule, Claudine Arnac, in einem Interview am 27.03.2009 in Paris betont.

88   Vgl. Nicola Cooper, Making Indo-China French: promoting the Empire through Eduaction, in: Martin Evans, (Hrsg.), Empire and Culture. The French Experience 1830–1940, London 2004, S. 131-147.

89   Pascal Le Pautremat, La politique musulmane de la France au vingtième siècle. De l'Hexagone aux terres d'Islam. Espoirs, réussites, échecs, Paris 2003.

BUCHBESPRECHUNGEN

Céline Trautmann-Waller: Aux Origines d'une Science Allemande de la Culture. Linguistique et Psychologie des Peuples chez Heymann Steinthal, Paris: CNRS Éditions 2006, 338 S.

Rezensiert von
Geneviève Warland, Brüssel

Cet ouvrage, consacré à une figure marquante de la psycholinguistique allemande du XIXe siècle, Heymann Steinthal (1823–1899) et publié dans la collection « De l'Allemagne » dirigée par M. Espagne et M. Werner, s'inscrit dans le programme de recherches sur les transferts culturels. En effet, la perspective adoptée aborde la pensée de cet auteur juif allemand en lien avec son contexte : au plan idéologique et social, elle révèle les tensions de la société allemande entre un libéralisme intégrateur et un nationalisme antisémite de même que celles de la communauté juive entre assimilation et traditionalisme ; au plan intellectuel et savant, elle met en évidence le caractère « transnational » de la linguistique et de la philosophie sur le long XIXe siècle. Si, dans cette contribution à l'histoi-

re intellectuelle de l'Allemagne, Steinthal tient le haut du pavé, il n'est pas l'unique protagoniste dont les thèses sont présentées et analysées. Une bonne part du travail est consacrée à évoquer les impulsions reçues et à rappeler les idées maîtresses de ceux qui l'ont influencé ou qui se sont inspirés de lui: tels le linguiste Wilhelm von Humboldt, dont Steinhalt a édité les œuvres de philosophie du langage, mais aussi le philosophe Johann Friedrich Herbart, le philosophe néo-kantien Hermann Cohen, l'ethnologue Adolf Bastian, le philosophe Georg Simmel, ou encore Ferdinand d'Eckstein qui appartenait à un groupe parisien de savants travaillant sur les langues, les religions et les peuples, parmi lesquels se trouvait également Ernest Renan.

Ainsi, au-delà des dimensions philologiques et philosophiques, largement présentes dans le livre avec de nombreux renvois aux principaux courants de la pensée allemande, de l'idéalisme kantien ou hégélien à une approche plus empirique de la science comme dans la philologie humboldtienne ou la psychologie herbartienne, ce sont des milieux qui sont évoqués : le contexte de la vie d'un étudiant à Berlin dans les années 1840, et en particulier d'un étudiant juif, celui d'une « sociabilité » reliant institutions universitaires, clubs littéraires, sociétés savantes et salons dans la capitale prussienne et ensuite allemande dans la

seconde moitié du XIXᵉ siècle, de même que celui se rapportant à l'axe des échanges intellectuels entre Paris et Berlin.

La construction du livre suit une ligne chronologique afin d'appréhender les continuités et les changements tant dans la vie intellectuelle de Steinthal que dans son environnement social et politique : de l'étudiant juif en théologie au linguiste qui s'est intéressé aux langues mandingues (i. e. celles des populations du Soudan) et qui, s'opposant à la domination du paradigme sanscrit et indo-européen, étudie le chinois à Paris entre 1852–1856, vivant chichement des rentes du prix Volney (le plus important prix de linguistique dont il fut lauréat à deux reprises), le parcours de Steinthal illustre l'ampleur des intérêts d'un savant érudit de cette époque, soucieux d'établir des classifications et des catégorisations. Dans ce sens, un de ses livres majeurs, *Grammatik, Logik und Psychologie* (1855), vise à redéfinir les liens entre grammaire et logique en s'orientant vers la psychologie des peuples, à laquelle il consacrera la majeure partie de ces recherches dès son retour à Berlin. Vers la fin des sa vie, Steinthal se penche à nouveau sur la question de la religion, à laquelle il attribue essentiellement une signification éthique. Il rédige une *Allgemeine Ethik* (1885), inspirée de l'impératif catégorique kantien, insistant sur l'importance de la *Bildung* pour la formation de la conscience morale du peuple allemand. Steinthal est l'auteur d'une œuvre abondante, tant par les livres, les éditions que par les nombreux articles rédigés pour « sa » revue.

Au cœur de son œuvre se trouve, en effet, la *Zeitschrift für Völkerpsychologie und Sprachwissenschaft* (1859–1890), fondée avec Moritz Lazarus et rassemblant des contributions de linguistes, philosophes, anthropologues, philologues, statisticiens, psychologues, historiens du droit, historiens de l'économie et de l'art, allemands mais également anglais, français, suisses, russes et tchèques, au gré des contacts des directeurs. L'important chapitre consacré par Trautmann-Waller à la mise en valeur des thématiques abordées dans cette revue, certes principalement à l'aune des contributions de Steinthal, a pour but de montrer comment elle s'inscrit dans le développement d'une science allemande de la culture. La revue se conçoit comme une synthèse visant à donner un caractère plus scientifique (autrement dit empirique) aux philosophies allemandes du langage et de l'histoire, considérées par ses fondateurs comme trop idéalistes, et à ouvrir la philologie aux sciences sociales. Elle promeut une science empirique des représentations collectives, plus explicative que descriptive. Les concepts centraux, autour desquels tourne la définition d'une psychologie des peuples, sont ceux de *Volksgeist*, de *Gesamtgeist* et d'*objektiver Geist* : il s'agit d'étudier les rapports entre culture matérielle et culture spirituelle, les interférences entre les différentes aires culturelles et leur importance pour l'histoire de telle civilisation ou nation, ainsi que les représentations collectives à travers la religion, les mythes, la poésie populaire, l'épopée, etc. Moment précurseur des sciences sociales (à l'époque in statu nascendi), la psychologie des peuples est marquée par la prééminence de la philologie : ce sont les recherches linguistiques, les travaux sur les traditions populaires, également liés à des recherches ethnologiques, qui dominent. Cette tendance, quoique traversée par des distinctions comme entre *Naturvölker* et

Kulturvölker, qui ne sont pas exemptes de jugements de valeur, tranche sur l'évolution ultérieure de cette discipline, plus ethnologique et anthropométrique, qui a ouvert la voie aux dérives de l'idéologie raciale.

Ce n'est pas seulement la définition de cette nouvelle discipline que l'étude de la revue cherche à reconstruire. Se distinguant comme une contribution originale, qui comble une lacune dans l'historiographie contemporaine, cette étude montre comment les intérêts de recherche sont le produit d'un milieu discursif, celui du Berlin néo-humaniste et libéral de la seconde moitié du XIXᵉ siècle, croisant les dynamiques entre les disciplines et les lieux académiques (allant de l'Université de Berlin à la *Hochschule für die Wissenschaft des Judentums* en passant par la *Medicinisch-psychologische Gesellschaft* ou la *Berliner Gesellschaft für Anthropologie, Ethnologie und Urgeschichte*, jusqu'aux *Gemeinverständliche wissenschaftliche Vorträge* et à la Humboldt-Akademie, promouvant la vulgarisation scientifique et l'éducation populaire, ou encore à la maison d'édition Ferdinand Dümmler). Sont suggérés ici les liens entre science et politique, illustrés par des contributeurs, de tendance nationale conservatrice pour certains, mais, pour la plupart, de tendance libérale progressiste, rejoignant les cercles du socialisme allemand. Dans le cas des directeurs de la revue, Steinthal et Lazarus, tous deux judéo-allemands, un tel rapport met en lumière deux éléments : d'une part, l'insistance sur la langue et la culture légitime leur appartenance à l'Allemagne ; d'autre part, le processus d'acculturation, vécu par eux, est interprété comme une donnée constitutive et féconde de la vie culturelle, débouchant sur une conception anti-substantialiste, constructiviste et pluraliste des faits culturels.

La dimension diachronique retenue pour l'analyse permet, en outre, de suivre les avatars idéologiques de la société allemande, dont la revue se fait l'écho et auxquels elle tente de répondre : de l'optimisme libéral des années 1860–1870, aux crises économiques et sociales des années 1870 qui font resurgir l'antisémitisme (dont le Treitschke-Streit est une illustration), la revue conçoit de plus en plus la science sous la forme d'une psychologie des peuples devant proposer des remèdes à la crise des fondements éthiques diagnostiquée par les auteurs. À côté de l'éducation au sens de la transmission et de la diffusion de connaissances, un de ces remèdes est la voie de l'éthique, comme indiqué ci-dessus pour Steinthal.

Le dernier chapitre analyse la réception de Steinthal et Lazarus chez des anthropologues, ethnologues et sociologues, à partir d'un découpage géographique : en Allemagne (chez Wundt essentiellement), en France (chez Célestin Bouglé et Emile Durkheim), aux Etats-Unis et en Russie.

On retiendra de ce livre qui apporte un nouvel éclairage sur la genèse historique de la science de la culture allemande, une information précise et abondante, voire foisonnante par l'accumulation de données biobibliographiques sur les personnages rencontrés par Steinthal. Il constitue une excellente entrée dans la pensée philologique et philosophique de Steinthal de même que dans le contexte intellectuel qui l'a marqué. Toutefois, la présentation chronologique de l'activité scientifique de Steinthal, accompagnée de celle du contenu philologico-philosophique de ses œuvres principales, introduit, à mon sens, une

linéarité dans l'exposé qui nuit à la problématisation de la question centrale : en quoi et comment la psychologie des peuples que Steinthal développe, pour l'essentiel, dans la revue co-dirigée avec Lazarus, contribue-t-elle au développement de la science de la culture allemande ?

Dans cette optique, un découpage et une analyse conceptuels plus poussés auraient été profitables. Il aurait été également souhaitable de développer plus amplement, dans un souci plus analytique qu'historique, le chapitre sur la réception de la *Völkerpsychologie* de Steinthal et Lazarus. Ceci dit, ces remarques de type méthodologique n'entament pas le plaisir de lecture suscité par la description des sociabilités berlinoises et parisiennes, laquelle constitue le motif central de la démarche de Trautmann-Waller : relier le texte à son contexte de production et de réception et analyser ainsi les interactions entre la pensée et l'expérience.

Gertrud Lütgemeier: Deutsche Besinnungen 1911–1971. Hundert Reifeprüfungsaufsätze als Spiegel ihrer Zeit (= Beiträge zur Geschichte des Deutschunterrichtes, Bd. 61), Frankfurt am Main: Peter-Lang-Verlag 2008, 479 S.

Rezensiert von
Friedemann Scriba, Berlin

„Deo. Litteris. Patriae" (Für Gott. Für die Bildung. Für das Vaterland) Diese Worte zierten ein Jugendstil-Glasfenster der 1912

errichteten Aula des Gymnasiums in der bergischen Kleinstadt Langenberg und vermittelten den Schülern Bildungswerte der spätwilhelminischen Bürgerschicht. Aus solchen Leitbegriffen leiteten sich dann anfangs auch die Themenstellungen der sogenannten „freien", also nicht an einen literarischen Text gebundenen Abituraufsätze ab, die an diesem Gymnasium geschrieben wurden. Die ehemalige Lehrerin der Schule, Gertrud Lütgemeier, hat 100 Aufsätze aus den 60 Jahren zwischen 1911 und 1971 ausgewählt, weitgehend komplett (und pseudonymisiert) abgedruckt und mit ergänzenden Bemerkungen, Bildern, historischen Erläuterungen und knappen Interpretationen historisch eingeordnet. Dabei ist eine exemplarische Materialsammlung entstanden, die – bei aller Individualität in einzelnen Aufsätzen – auch einen epochentypischen Mainstream in der Wahl der Themen und vor allem seit den späten 1960er Jahren auch in der Sprache zeigt.

Für die Aufsätze aus dem Ersten Weltkrieg konstatiert Lütgemeier eine standardisierte Opfermentalität, die Neigung zu Verschwörungstheorien sowie eine Vorliebe zu präformierter Metaphorik.

In den Aufsätzen aus der Zeit der Weimarer Republik (bis einschließlich Abitur 1933) werden die Kriegsbewältigung, die Rolle von Mädchen, Maschinen und Arbeitsteilung, aber ebenso die Presse als „zersetzend" und die „Volksgenossen auseinandertreibend" oder die klassenübergreifende Wirkung des Sports diskutiert. Auch ein autobiografischer Rückblick des Geburtsjahrgangs 1911–1913, Paneuropa und Völkerbund, 1933 dann Großdeutschland und Arbeitsbeschaffungsmaßnahmen erscheinen als Themen.

In der NS-Zeit gab es unter den vier zur Auswahl stehenden Themenvorschlägen in der Regel ein ideologisch „neutrales" Thema. Neben Themen wie Führermythos anhand Treitschkes „Männer machen die Geschichte", Rassenkunde, Frauen im Nationalsozialismus und Heroismus im Krieg stand z. B. 1935 „Was ich der Lektüre Goethes verdanke" mit Topoi der Inneren Emigration.

In den – häufig von älteren Kriegsheimkehrern verfassten – Aufsätzen der Nachkriegsjahre spielten die Kriegserfahrungen eine starke Rolle, wobei die von den Nationalsozialisten geprägte Sprache in Wendungen wie „Aufgehen in der Volksgemeinschaft" immer noch durchschlug.

Die Aufsätze der 1950er Jahre problematisierten ein neues Selbstverständnis von Jugend (auch im Vergleich mit dem Jugendbewegungstreffen auf dem Hohen Meißner 1913), das Verhältnis von Tradition und Fortschritt, das Konzept „Deutsches Vaterland" angesichts der deutschen Teilung und – in vergleichender Gegenüberstellung mit einem Aufsatz von 1920 – das Verhältnis zwischen Deutschland und Frankreich.

Die Arbeiten der 1960er Jahre zeigen deutlich die Friktionen der bundesrepublikanischen Gesellschaft, insbesondere im Umgang mit der NS-Vergangenheit einschließlich der Abwehrreflexe gegenüber dem beginnenden öffentlichen Diskurs darüber. Die Thematik der deutschen Wiedervereinigung taucht in dem Jahrzehnt gleich drei Mal auf. Auch wurden konkretere politische Themen wie Frauenemanzipation und Mitbestimmung gestellt.

Es ist bei dieser – paradoxerweise dann doch – recht schmalen Basis schwierig, über eine allgemeine Einpassung in bekannte mentalitäts- und ideologiegeschichtliche Trends hinauszukommen. Insofern fungiert diese Sammlung einer bislang kaum genutzten Quellengattung eher als Belegmaterial, um bekannte Aussagen zu untersetzen oder (eher weniger) zu relativieren, weniger um – über die Platzierung dieser Gattung als Forschungsfeld – neue Perspektiven zu eröffnen. Aussagen über den Deutschunterricht der Zeit über diese Ergebnisse hinaus lassen sich – auch anhand der gelegentlich eingeblendeten Marginalien der Lehrer – nicht treffen. Inwieweit der Deutschunterricht an sich, das Epochenklima, das jeweilige häusliche Milieu oder schlichter schulischer Anpassungsdruck zu diesen Elaboraten geführt hat, bleibt dunkel. Hier hätten evtl. einige Tiefeninterviews noch lebender Schüler mehr Aufschluss gegeben.

Jedenfalls eignet sich der Band gut als Grundlagenmaterial für ein mentalitätsgeschichtliches Seminar, der zum einen die Materialien für eine erste Einordung in Gestalt von kurzen Quellenauszügen und Bildern mitliefert und zum anderen die Aufsätze für eine gründliche, auch sprachliche Quellenarbeit ausführlich genug zitiert.

**Christine Walther: Siegertypen.
Zur fotografischen Vermittlung
eines gesellschaftlichen Selbst-
bildes um 1900 (= Kulturtransfer 4),
Würzburg: Verlag Koenigshausen &
Neumann 2007, 285 S.**

Rezensiert von
Kerstin Lange, Leipzig

Sportfotografie und Sportpresse sind bis-
her kaum untersuchte Felder kulturwis-
senschaftlicher Forschung. Obwohl gerade
in Verbindung mit der Veränderung von
Körperbildern und der Entstehung der
Freizeit um 1900 auch dem Sport selbst als
Untersuchungsgegenstand verstärkt Auf-
merksamkeit entgegen gebracht wurde,
sind die Medien und die Visualisierungen
einer solchen Entwicklung erst wenig ana-
lysiert worden. Christine Walther hat am
Fachbereich Volkskunde und europäische
Ethnologie der Ludwig-Maximilians-Uni-
versität München eine Dissertation vorge-
legt, die Sportgeschichte als eine Dimen-
sion der Kulturgeschichte begreift. Im
Mittelpunkt der Arbeit steht die illustrier-
te Sportzeitschrift „Sport im Bild", eine
der auflagenstarken Wochenzeitschriften
der Jahrhundertwende. Am Beispiel der
frühen Sportfotografie von 1895 bis 1920
verfolgt Walther die Entwicklung der foto-
grafischen Darstellung von Siegern in
sportlichen Wettkämpfen. Dafür analy-
siert sie die Herausbildung einer spezi-
fischen Siegerikonografie. Der Sieger ist
dabei laut Walther eine Figur, an der ein
soziokulturelles Vorbild statuiert wird, an

dem gesellschaftliche Normen und Werte
ablesbar werden. Wie es zu solchen Bedeu-
tungszuschreibungen kam, wodurch sie
sich vermittelten und welche Elemente aus
dem Sieger einen zeitgenössischen „Star"
machten, sind die zentralen Fragestel-
lungen der Arbeit. Die Idee, damit eine
Geschichte der visuellen Sportberichter-
stattung zu schreiben, lässt sich vor dem
Hintergrund eines ‚Visual Turn' in den
Kulturwissenschaften interpretieren, Me-
dialität verstärkte Aufmerksamkeit zu wid-
men und dadurch neues Quellenmaterial
und neue Perspektiven zu erschließen.
Walther orientiert sich dafür methodisch
am klassischen Modell der ikonogra-
phischen Analyse Erwin Panowskys sowie
der philosophischen Bildtheorie Klaus
Sachs-Hombachs.
Die Illustrierung der Sportberichterstat-
tung begann in den 1890er Jahren. Die
Fotografie ersetzte die bisher übliche
Zeichnung und wurde zu einem elemen-
taren Medium einer entstehenden spezia-
lisierten Sportpresse. Der erste Teil der Ar-
beit gliedert sich chronologisch. Walther
zeigt für eine Phase von 1895 bis 1900,
dass die Darstellung von Siegern der zeit-
genössischen Porträtfotografie entsprach.
Sieger wurden ateliertypisch abgebildet.
Die Gestaltungsmerkmale verwiesen auf
die ausgeübte Sportart, jedoch nicht auf
Sieg oder Niederlage im vorhergegan-
genen sportlichen Wettkampf. Eine sie-
gerspezifische Bildsprache fehlte zu dieser
Zeit noch weitgehend, so Walther. Ohne
die Bildunterschriften habe es keine Mög-
lichkeit gegeben, Gewinner von Verlierern
zu unterscheiden. Für eine zweite Phase
von ca. 1900 bis 1910 weist Walther die
Herausbildung siegertypischer ikonogra-
phischer Elemente nach, die den Sieger

eines sportlichen Wettkampfes eindeutig erkennbar werden ließen. Bewegungsaufnahmen ermöglichten erstmals „echte" Sportbilder. Groß- und Nahaufnahmen sowie hierarchisierende Bildachsen kennzeichneten seitdem den Sieger gegenüber anderen Sportlern. Die Perspektive wechselte vom „Start- zum Zielbild" (S. 66). Diese Bildsprache popularisierte ein Siegerbild mit heroisierenden Elementen und herausragenden körperlichen Qualitäten. Walther verweist auf Vorbilder der griechischen Antike und die Einflüsse der Lebensreform und Körperkulturbewegung bei der Herausbildung einer solchen Visualisierung. Die Sportfotografie entwickelte entlang der fortschreitenden technischen Möglichkeiten spezifische Darstellungsformen von Siegern im Sport. Bis zu den 1920er Jahren führte dies zur Ausformung einer Bildsprache, die eng mit heutigen Sehweisen korrespondiert.

Eine übergeordnete Ebene, in der es darum gehen soll, Werte und Normen zu erarbeiten, die den fotografischen Visualisierungen zugrunde liegen, wird im zweiten Teil der Arbeit entwickelt. Hier soll vor dem historischen Kontext danach gefragt werden, welche gesellschaftlichen Vorstellungen über den Sport kommuniziert wurden. Konzeptionell wurden die drei Kategorien Geschlecht, „Rasse" / Nationalität und Klasse ausgewählt, um wiederkehrende Muster der Darstellung und deren gesellschaftliche Implikationen herauszuarbeiten. Das Kapitel „Der männliche leistungsstarke Sieger" thematisiert diesem Ansatz folgend vor allem die Begündungslinien für eine Ausgrenzung von Frauen aus dem Sport und weist die visuelle Umsetzung solcher Argumentationen nach. Ein weiteres Kapitel befasst sich mit

dem „fairen fleißigen Sieger". Hier wird vor allem der Transport von Bürgerlichkeit via Sportfotografie an zentralen Elementen wie Disziplin und Leistung sowie Chancengleichheit und Fairness aufgezeigt. Das Anliegen, soziokulturelle Wertvorstellungen und Zuschreibungen aufzudecken, wird in diesem Kapitel besonders deutlich.

Unter der Überschrift „Der weißhäutige zivilisierte Sieger" wird die Frage nach der Visualisierung von Nation und der Formulierung von Rassismen in der Sportfotografie aufgeworfen. In der Analyse des fotografischen Quellenmaterials kommt Walther zu dem Ergebnis, dass eine Kennzeichnung nationaler Zugehörigkeit in der Bildgestaltung im Untersuchungszeitraum nicht üblich war. Die Bilder blieben uneindeutig. Auch eine Differenzierung in der Wertigkeit deutscher Sieger gegenüber Siegern anderer Nationen sei nicht zu erkennen. Demgegenüber orientiere sich die Darstellung außereuropäischer sportlicher Sieger an der völkerkundlich-anthropologischen Fotografie. Hier unterschieden sich die Elemente der Bildgestaltung von der üblichen Porträtfotografie. Zu den spezifischen Mittel zur Markierung des Fremden gehörten beispielsweise Abbildungsgröße, Bildanordnung und Perspektivwahl. Ein kolonialer Blick und die Konstruktion von Stereotypen manifestierten sich damit auch in der Sportfotografie. Fotografiehistorisch ist dies plausibel hergeleitet und fördert interessante Beobachtungen zutage. Die historischen Schlussfolgerungen überzeugen jedoch weniger. Walther kommt zu dem Ergebnis, dass Sportfotografie in den Jahren 1895–1920 nicht als Träger nationaler Identifikationen einzuordnen sei, die Fotos würden vielmehr

Kosmopolitismus demonstrieren. „Die Einheit ‚Nation' scheint vielmehr überlagert (nicht verdrängt!) zu werden von einer größeren, multinationalen Einheit" (S. 164). Um die These, in der Sportfotografie hätten sich zeitgenössische Diskurse um nationale Zugehörigkeit nicht abgebildet, zu belegen, wäre eine Einbindung von Sport generell in politisch gesellschaftliche Formationen notwendig gewesen. Die Auseinandersetzung mit der dezidiert nationalistisch ausgerichteten Turnbewegung und deren Vorstellung der Erziehung des „Volkskörpers" durch Leibesübungen wäre hierfür sicherlich gewinnbringender gewesen als eine kaum begründete Ausgrenzung des Turnens aus der Untersuchung. Des weiteren sollte eine Arbeit, die sich der Fotografie bis in die 1920er Jahre hinein widmet und Fragen nach Nationalisierung stellt, den Ersten Weltkrieg nicht mit der Bemerkung „hinsichtlich der Illustrierung seien keine gravierenden Unterschiede festzustellen" (S. 109) außer acht lassen. Darüber hinaus bleibt die Begrifflichkeit unscharf. Europa, erweitert durch Amerika und Neuseeland (!), wird zu einer „westlichen Enklave" (S. 165). Angeblich fehlender Nationalismus und ein stattdessen konstatierter Kosmopolitismus homogenisieren Europa zu einer Einheit und konstruieren „ein gemeinsames Selbstbild" (S. 150) ohne Rückbindung an historisch-politische Konstellationen.

Die Arbeit von Christine Walther leistet einen Beitrag zur Sportgeschichte, indem sie die Genese einer Bildsprache zur Visualisierung von Sportstars aufzeigt und diese mit der technischen Entwicklung der Fotografie verknüpft. Historisch bleiben jedoch Lücken zurück. Leider werden Wechselwirkungen zwischen Fotografie, Sport und

historisch-politischer Entwicklung kaum behandelt. Statt die Entwicklung der Fotografie aus der Geschichte heraus abzuleiten, wählt Walther den umgekehrten Weg und ergänzt spezifische Darstellungsmuster lediglich durch mögliche historisch bedingte Erklärungen. Dies ist soweit legitim, wie der Fokus auf die Sportfotografie gerichtet bleibt; wo aber dadurch notwendige Kontextualisierungen fehlen, geht den Forschungsergebnissen ihre Relevanz teilweise verloren. Eine stärkere Einordnung des Sports bzw. der Sportfotografie in gesamtgesellschaftliche Entwicklungen wären notwendig gewesen, um Kontinuitäten aufzuzeigen, und Wechselwirkungen plausibel zu machen.

Leonard Blussé: Visible Cities. Canton, Nagasaki, and Batavia and the Coming of the Americans, Cambridge: Harvard University Press 2008, 148 S.

Rezensiert von
Paul A. Van Dyke, Macau

This book is a collection of three lectures given by Leonard Blussé during his stay at Harvard University in 2005–2006, as Erasmus Lecturer, and deliverer of the Reischauer Lectures. Stemming from his many years of research of the Dutch in Asia, Blussé compares three ports the Netherlanders encountered in the eigh-

teenth and early nineteenth centuries: Batavia, Canton, and Nagasaki. The title "visible cities" was chosen "because they are represented visually in maps and drawings of the time more than any other cities in Asia, but also because they laid bare the regional impact of global developments" (p. 98).

In delivering the series of Reischauer lectures at Harvard, it was necessary to "come up with a balanced and well-timed menu in order to feed the audience with information in easily digestible chunks" (p. x). The three chapters are thus intentionally very broad in scope, with the text sprinkled throughout with colorful examples of the personal feelings and observations of contemporaries. The book is thus more of a gathering of anecdotes about the three ports, with a lively narrative connecting the points, than a systematic analysis of the cities in question.

The first chapter entitled "Three Windows of Opportunity" begins the discussion by introducing Monsoon Asia and sketching a broad background of historical literature, maritime encounters, Chinese perceptions of the aquatic world, and the arrival of Europeans. The author walks the reader through a fascinating and rapidly changing world beginning with Thomas More's perceptions of Utopia, Marco Polo, and Zheng He's expeditions, to Catholic and Protestant nations expanding their empires in Asia and the interactions and conflicts that emerged from those encounters.

Chapter two entitled "Managing Trade across Cultures" explores how the three cities responded to shifting movements of cultures, peoples, trade, and commodities in Monsoon Asia from the seventeenth to the eighteenth centuries. Batavia entered the eighteenth century still very much the "Queen of the Orient", but then experienced ethnic strife in the Chinese massacre in 1740; a decline in trade owing partially to direct Netherlands-to-China voyages being commission from 1757; and ended the century with "depression and despondency on the face of most people" in the city (p. 43). That outcome is explained as the result of circumstances with the city falling victim (as is suggested in the subtitle "Batavia Betrayed") to shifting trading patterns, international wars, politics, and an unhealthy environment. In the end, Americans dominate.

After Nagasaki's emergence as an international emporium in the 1570s, the port city went through many changes with the expulsion of the Portuguese in 1639, the Chinese and Dutch traders being relocated to the port a couple years later, and then a series of restrictions on trade by the Japanese shoguns that greatly reduced international commerce by the end of the eighteenth century. The trade at Nagasaki was later seen by Japanese politicians as a threat that needed to be brought under greater control, so although the port continued to be a window of knowledge from the outside world, it fell victim to the fears of the Japanese Court and a consequential restriction of trade policies. It was not until the Americans arrived in the mid-nineteenth century that things began to change.

In comparison, Canton thrived while the others declined. The author attributes this success largely to the Chinese world monopoly on tea, the huge demand for that product in the West, and the unscrupulous behavior of British private and company traders in advancing opium into China

for the sake of a quick profit, all of which enabled the tea trade to expand. The rise of rampant smuggling and gradual loss of control of trade (and eventually Opium Wars) is seen as partially a result of foreign greed and the inability of the Qing administration to adjust effectively to the needs of trade. But here again, the author sees the Americans as the real winners. Although peripheral to the argument, the author also discusses shifts in the junk trade between China and Southeast Asia, and changes in Qing policies towards that commerce.

Chapter three entitled "Bridging the Divide" does not go well with chapters one and two or with the flow of the narrative. It retraces personal opinions and experiences of people who were involved in the three ports and the countries in question, but in the end, adds little to the overall argument of the book. But by the end of the chapter, the author again sees the Americans as the real benefactors of the changing environment in Asia. They filled voids in international commerce, in the three port cities, that were left by European wars and the collapse of the large East India companies. The author provides some clues as to how this happened, but does not provide an analysis of why it happened.

Keeping in mind that this study is a compilation of three lectures given to audiences of varying knowledge and backgrounds, we should not expect the book to be all-inclusive, in-depth, or comprehensive. But it is an important stepping stone, which now shows more clearly how the study needs to be broken down into smaller components and analyzed separately. And the book makes clear that the focus needs to be expanded beyond those who were in-volved in all three ports (namely, Chinese, Dutch, and Americans, with British scattered throughout), and many other factors need to be brought into the picture.

The private traders from India, who predate the East India companies and Americans in Canton, such as Armenians and Muslims and later, Parsees, played an enormous role in financing trade in Macao, China, Manila, Southeast Asia and later Singapore and Hong Kong. The capital market, which drives trade and is the foundation upon which all international commerce develops and expands, needs to be central to the discussion. If there is no capital or credit, then tea and opium are irrelevant, because there is no means of purchasing them. And of course, everyone was involved in trading opium in Asia, including the Dutch and Chinese, so there is much more to say about that, and rice from Batavia, Singapore and Manila was central to the opium-tea exchanges in Canton as well. All of these factors need to be part of the analysis. Also the expansion of the press (newspapers) and dispersion of commercial knowledge across Asia and the world helped enormously in lowering risks in international commerce and made it possible for private Americans to move in when the large companies pulled out. And of course, steamships were central to the collapse of the Canton system, changes in global commerce and maritime supremacy. Thus, we could say the greatest value of this collection of anecdotes is not what it says (because the "visible cities" have too many "invisible parts" that still need to be addressed), but rather the many questions it raises, as well as holes it illuminates, which future researchers can now explore.

Rezensiert von
Otfried Dankelmann, Halle

Im Jahre 2004 eröffnete der Herausgeber und Übersetzer Uwe Pfullmann mit zwei Titeln – Georg August Wallin, Reisen in Arabien 1845–1848 und Richard Francis Burton, Das Land Midian – die in mehrerlei Hinsicht verdienstvolle Buchreihe Edition Morgenland, die nach einem weiteren Werk – Adolph von Wredes Reise in Hadramaut (2006) – nun mit einem französischen Autor fortgesetzt wird. Wie schon zuvor in der Serie cognoscere (hrsg. von Ulrich von der Heyden, edition ost Berlin, Motto: Erkennen entdecken verstehen) erweckt Pfullmann, ein seit langem bestens ausgewiesener Arabist und Historiker Leipziger Schule, vielfach vergessene Orientreisende zu neuem Leben, die man mit einem Untertitel der Doughty-Reise in Arabiens Wüsten – Ein Christ entdeckt den Vorderen Orient – meist recht gut charakterisieren könnte. Es geht fast stets um die Begegnung europäischer (und das heißt auch christlich geprägter) Reisender mit den islamischen Völkern des Orients, um das Aufeinandertreffen zweier großer Kulturen und (in arabischen städtischen Zentren) oft zugleich auch multikultureller Gesellschaften.

Zum vorliegenden Werk: Zu Beginn der 1830er Jahre bereitete der seit 1805 regierende ägyptische Vizekönig Muhammad Ali einen weiteren Feldzug gegen das als so reich wie aufmüpfig geltende Hochland von Asir im südlichen Hedschas vor, dessen Herrscher Aït Pascha sein Herrschaftsgebiet 1818 für unabhängig erklärt hatte. (In unseren Tagen kamen bereits zahlreiche Selbstmordattentäter genau aus dieser Region). Der junge Arzt Maurice Tamisier (geb. 1810), der bereits Teile Abessiniens bereist hatte, ein überzeugter Saint-Simonist, schließt sich als Sekretär des Chefs des ägyptischen Sanitätsdienstes, Chédufau[t], dem Feldzug an, um die Gelegenheit zu nutzen, das widerspenstige Asir und seine Leute kennen zu lernen und zu beschreiben. So erfahren wir denn auch Mannigfaltiges über das Leben und die Gesellschaft entlang der Marschroute, zunächst ausführlich über die Stadt Djeddah an der arabischen Küste des Roten Meeres, wo die ägyptisch-türkische Armee wochenlang verweilt, ehe sie am 17. Mai 1834 den ersten Marschtag beginnt. Tamisier berichtet vorerst nichts über Sinn und Umstände des Kriegszugs, das Wort „Marsch" (die nun chronologisch vermerkten Marschtage der Truppe) erscheint fast als das einzig Militärische in den sehr vielseitigen und oftmals wunderbar detaillierten Schilderungen. Sitten der Beduinen, Brunnen, Muscheln, Höhlen, Fischer, Boote, Nebel sind etwa Stichworte des ersten Kapitels, andere Abschnitte befassen sich mit Gründung und Ausbreitung und mit den Institutionen Djeddahs, mit seiner multiethnischen und -kulturellen Bevölkerung, ferner mit Aussehen, Bekleidung, Toilette der Frauen, mit Beschneidung, Hochzeit, Eifersucht, Kurtisanen usf.

In und zwischen den in Tagebuchform gebotenen Notizen erfindet der Autor lange

Dialoge, die er nach eigenem Bekunden für die natürlichste Form der Wissensaneignung hält, bestimmte Passagen setzt er ausdrücklich in wörtliche Rede. Er verwendet durchaus auch Literatur (in einigen seiner 240 Anmerkungen nachgewiesen), einmal zitiert er die gelungene Beschreibung Mekkas des Schweizers Johann Ludwig Burckhardt, deren englische Erstveröffentlichung er ins Französische überträgt, weil er deren Kenntnis beim Leser nicht voraussetzen, auf das Thema „Mekka" aber auch nicht verzichten will. Tamisier selbst konnte Mekka nicht besuchen, die Truppen wurden um Meilen an diesem Wallfahrtsort vorbei über die Pässe des Hedschas geführt. (Pfullmann vergleicht Tamisiers Übersetzung und seine darauf fußende eigene Übertragung akribisch mit der deutschen Ausgabe der Burckhardtschen Arbeit von 1834 und weist Abweichungen in gesonderten Anmerkungen nach).

Uwe Pfullmann ist ausdrücklich bemüht, Stil und Wortwahl des Autors genauestens zu folgen, wodurch sich die zeitbedingte Formulierungskunst des Franzosen kritisch nachvollziehen lässt. Dabei gelingen Autor wie Bearbeiter mitunter geradezu anrührende Formulierungen, etwa, wenn von Zeichen religiöser Toleranz die Rede ist, von der engen Beziehung der Beduinen zu ihrem Kamel, oder von der natürlichen, jahrhundertealten Gastfreundschaft der Beduininnen: „Sie haben mir aus einem mit Stroh umflochtenen Gefäß zu trinken gegeben. Welche Unveränderlichkeit bei diesem Volk! Ich glaubte einer Szene des patriarchalischen Lebens beizuwohnen … Tamisier empfand in einer so einfachen Handlung einen unerklärlichen Zauber …" (S. 81). Allerdings erweist sich diese

Wortreue der Übertragung oftmals als zu umständlich, ein Lektor oder Korrektor hätte zudem Passagen erheblicher sprachlicher Wackler ausbügeln (und zugleich mitunter doch störende Druckfehler mindern) müssen.

Von nicht minderem Interesse als die ausführlichen landeskundlichen und wertvollen kulturgeschichtlichen Mitteilungen des Franzosen ist die Schilderung des militärischen Verlaufs, die erst ab dem 26. Juni, dem achten Marschtag ab Taïf (Tayed) dominant werden. Mit kritischem Blick erinnert Tamisier an die Strapazen (hochsommerliche Hitze, Hunger, Durst, Verwundungen, Krankheiten), denen die von Ahmad Pascha zögerlich und wenig umsichtig geführten, zusammengewürfelten Einheiten von insgesamt etwa 16.800 Mann (nicht selten unnötigerweise) ausgesetzt werden. Am ehesten verkraften dies noch jene Beduinen aus den verschiedensten, während der 36 Marschtage und langen Ruhetage tributpflichtig gemachten und wegen unterschiedlichster politischer Interessen oft unzuverlässigen Stämmen. Er notiert die beiderseits verübten blutigen, mitunter hinterhältigen Grausamkeiten an Gegner und Zivilbevölkerung, die etwa den verlustreichen, aber letztlich nicht entscheidenden Sieg der Invasoren in der Schlacht von Kh[r]amir-Michet begleiten, und er bewertet den Waffenstillstandsvertrag von Ménader, der Ende September 1834 auf Vorschlag Aïts von Asir den Feldzug beendete, als schmähliche Niederlage. Der bekennende Saint-Simonist Tamisier, der sich mit sozialistischem Gedankengut trug und sie auch bei seiner großen Reise durch Ostafrika 1835–1837, deren Bericht ihm und einem Freund die Goldmedaille der französischen Geogra-

phischen Gesellschaft eintrug, verbreiten helfen wollte (gelungen ist es den Saint-Simonisten auch dort nicht), führt grausame Kampfpraktiken wie Köpfeabschlagen oder Ohrenabschneiden auf mangelnden Einfluß europäischer Zivilisation zurück, den Kriegszug selbst kritisiert er nicht grundsätzlich, wohl aber seine unprofessionelle Durchführung. Kurzum: Die Opfer waren umsonst gebracht. Asir blieb unabhängig, bis es in den 1870er Jahren die südlichste Provinz des freilich längst schwächelnden Osmanischen Reiches wurde. Tamisier hat dies noch erlebt; er starb 1875 in Fontainebleau.

Wie schon bei früheren Veröffentlichungen erweist sich Pfullmann auch mit dieser neuerlichen Publikation als ein geschickter Entdecker interessanter Reiseberichte. Immerhin gilt Tamisiers Schilderung als die erste Beschreibung dieses missglückten Feldzuges und als eine der wenigen bis heute auch von Asir. Pfullmann hat viele der Gegenden, über die er publiziert, selbst bereist, er hat Land und Leute in Wort und Bild festgehalten und die eigenen wie die neu ans Licht gezogenen Texte mit großer Sachkenntnis verfasst bzw. erschlossen. Ein Glossar und übersichtliche Hinweise auf Publikationen (von Tamisier, Burckhardt und vom Herausgeber selbst) fehlen auch dieses Mal ebenso wenig wie ein Vorwort, das für das in Rede stehende Territorium 100 Jahre über den geschilderten Zeitraum hinausreichend einen faktenreichen historischen Überblick bietet. Interessant wäre ein Wort zur Quellenlage und zur zweifellos schwierig zu ermittelnden zeitgenössischen Rezeption des publizierten Werkes gewesen. Vielleicht könnte man sich auch die eine oder andere analytische Bemerkung zur Glaubwürdigkeit der für

einen Laien kaum überprüfbaren und vergleichbaren Beobachtungen des Reisenden wünschen. Andererseits erschließt der Anhang so manches Detail. Eine zeitgenössische französische Karte lässt uns den Reiseweg ab Djeddah ziemlich genau verfolgen (die damals und seither veränderten Schreibweisen von Personennamen und Orten werden in einer Konkordanzliste unter Einschluß des heutigen Arabisch fast vollständig aufgelöst), Zeichnungen und Aquarelle von Bärbel Pfullmann, nach arabischen Vorlagen einfühlsam gefertigt, unterstützen unsere Phantasie, mit der wir Reisenotizen gewöhnlich begleiten.

Fazit: Mit diesem Werk, dem 4. Band der Edition Morgenland, erschließt uns der Herausgeber ein weiteres Kapitel orientalischer Reisegeschichte, das – u. a. – zum genaueren historischen wie gegenwärtigen Verständnis des Islam und zur Geschichte wünschenswerter und geradezu lebenswichtiger Verständigung zwischen den Religionen und Kulturen beitragen kann. In dieser Reihe könnte man sich bei anhaltendem Leserzuspruch noch weitere Werke vorstellen. In seinem vielgelobten Entdeckerlexikon Arabische Halbinsel, das 2001 ebenfalls im trafo verlag Berlin unter dem Titel „Durch Wüste und Steppe" erschien, hat Pfullmann weit über 270 Reisende vorgestellt – ein unerschöpfliches Reservoir für eine ansehnliche, sorgfältig übertragene und zuverlässig wissenschaftlich begleitete Reisebibliothek, wie sie sich der bzw. die einschlägig Interessierte nur wünschen kann, ganz gleich, ob er oder sie sich nun zum Aufbruch in den Orient verführen lassen oder die anstrengende Reise daheim genießen will.

Klaus J. Bade / Pieter C. Emmer / Leo Lucassen / Jochen Oltmer (Hrsg.): Enzyklopädie Migration in Europa. Vom 17. Jahrhundert bis zur Gegenwart, Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh Verlag 2007, 1156 S.

Rezensiert von
Bernard Wiaderny, Frankfurt/ Oder

Das umfangreiche, 1156 Seiten zählende Werk liefert den Überblick über die Migrationsbewegungen in Europa innerhalb der letzten vier Jahrhunderte. Den Ausgangpunkt bildet der Dreißigjährige Krieg 1618–1648, das Schlussereignis das Inkrafttreten des Zuwanderungsgesetzes in Deutschland im Januar 2005. Es ist ein Ergebnis eines gemeinsamen Forschungsprojekts des Osnabrücker Instituts für Migrationsforschung und Interkulturelle Studien (IMIS), an dem die beiden deutschen Herausgeber Bade und Oltmer tätig sind sowie des Institute for Advanced Study der Niederländischen Akademie der Wissenschaften in Wassenaar.

Bei der Lektüre des Werkes wird schnell ersichtlich, dass das Projekt sorgfältig vorbereitet worden war und dass ebenso seine Ergebnisse sorgfältig präsentiert werden. Es beginnt mit einer Darstellung der Idee der Enzyklopädie und ihrer Umsetzung sowie einer Einführung in die Terminologie und Konzepte der Migrationsforschung. Dem schließt sich eine Schilderung der Ein- bzw. Auswanderungswellen innerhalb einzelner Länder Europas an, das in sieben Großräume aufgeteilt wird.

Der dritte und gleichzeitig ausführlichste Teil umfasst mehr als 200 Artikel zu einzelnen Gruppen der Migranten. Jedes Kapitel und jeder Artikel wird um Quer- und Literaturverweise ergänzt; ein durchdachtes Inhaltsverzeichnis, ein zusätzliches Verzeichnis der Länder, Regionen, Orte und Wanderungsformen ermöglichen eine komfortable Nutzung des Bandes.

Bei der einführenden Präsentation des Werkes kommt dessen gegenwärtiger Bezug unverkennbar zum Ausdruck. Nach Ansicht der Herausgeber soll es den Lesern – und darunter sind nicht nur Spezialisten gemeint sondern auch die politischen Entscheidungsträger und das breite Publikum – zeigen, dass Migration keine historische Ausnahmesituation bildet, sondern zu zentralen Themen der europäischen Geschichte und der Conditio humana überhaupt gehört (S. 19). Es sollte ebenfalls in Bezug darauf sensibilisieren, dass sich der Prozess der Assimilation meistens langsam und schrittweise vollzieht. Nicht unbedingt schließt er auch mit einem Erfolg ab, sondern kann mit der Entscheidung für die Annahme einer multiplen Identität bzw. in der „selbstgewählten Isolation" der Zuwanderer enden oder sogar rückläufig sein. Dabei ist die Assimilation ein zweiseitiger sozialer Prozess – er verändert sowohl die Zuwanderer als auch die Aufnahmegesellschaft (S. 47 ff.). Im Zentrum der einzelnen Untersuchungen steht immer die Frage nach der zeitgenössischen Selbst- und Fremdbeschreibung der Prozesse von sozialer Komposition bzw. Dekomposition der Migranten, anders gesagt, eine ebenfalls aktuelle Frage nach dem Grad der Integration in den Zielräumen der Wanderung (ib., ähnlich S. 21 und 24).

Der einführende Beitrag von Dirk Hoerder, Jan Lucassen und Leo Lucassen über die Ansätze in der Migrationforschung bietet unter anderem eine gelungene Zusammenfassung der Geschichte der Migration in Europa innerhalb der letzten vier Jahrhunderte (S. 29-32). Darüber hinaus wird der Prozess der Migration dargestellt; mit Recht betonen die Vf. die Bedeutung der Familie als einem Ort, in dem die Entscheidung über die Abwanderung getroffen wird, des Weiteren der bereits ausgewanderten Verwandten, die meistens die erste Anlaufstelle im Zielland bilden, sowie der staatlichen Politik, der Gewerkschaften und der Kirchen, die „integrierend, marginalisierend oder ausschließend wirken [können]" (S. 35). Migration definieren die Vf. sehr breit als räumliche Bevölkerungsbewegung sowohl über Staatsgrenzen wie innerhalb eines politisch-territorialen, sozialen oder kulturellen Raumes (S. 36). Ihre genauere Typologisierung führen sie anhand solcher Kriterien wie Motive, Distanz, Richtung, Dauer, sozioökonomischer Raum und wirtschaftlicher Sektor, in denen die Migranten sich betätigen, durch (S. 37).

Die Präsentation der einzelnen Gruppen der Migranten hat einen exemplarischen Charakter, bei einem solch breiten Forschungsgegenstand völlig verständlich. Erschwerend dazu kam die Tatsache, dass die Erforschung der einzelnen Themen höchst unterschiedlich vorangetrieben ist. Umso mehr müssen die für den Leser sichtbare Abgleichung der Präsentation der einzelnen Themen und der offene Umgang mit den Forschungslücken gelobt werden. So informiert das Buch auch präzise über den aktuellen Forschungsstand zu dem jeweiligen Thema. Als ein Beispiel von vie-

len kann an dieser Stelle der Artikel über „französische Revolutionsflüchtlinge in Europa nach 1789" erwähnt werden (S. 587-591). Um der Komplexität des Themas gerecht zu werden, konzentriert sich Daniel Schönpflug, der Vf. des Beitrags, auf die in Koblenz formierte französische Emigrantenkolonie; die anderen Orten und Formen des französischen Exils dieser Zeit werden lediglich mit ihr verglichen.

Wie die Vf. mit Recht betonen, wanderten im Laufe der letzten Jahrhunderte nicht nur die Menschen über die Grenzen, sondern auch die Grenzen über die Menschen. Infolgedessen wurden die Einheimischen zu Fremden im eigenen Land, dessen Grenzen neu definiert wurden. Diese wechselvolle Geschichte der räumlichen Gegebenheiten bekommen aber nicht alle Verfasser in den Griff. So behauptet Richard Hellie in seinem Beitrag über Russland und Weißrussland (S. 314-332) nicht richtig, dass Russland die Ukraine und Weißrussland zwischen 1601 und 1678 annektierte. Dieser Prozess wurde erst 1793 (die Zweite Teilung Polens) bzw. 1945 (die Enverleibung der Karpato-Ukraine) abgeschlossen. Diskussionswürdig ist ebenfalls seine Feststellung, dass Russland bereits 1719 das Baltikum einverleibte.

Die einzelnen Beiträge beschäftigen sich mit äußerst unterschiedlichen Migrantengruppen: der erste mit „Ägyptischen ‚Sanspapiers' in Paris seit den 1980er Jahren", der letzte mit „Ziprioten in Großbritannien seit dem Ende des Zweiten Weltkrieges". Ihre Lektüre eröffnet die Möglichkeit für anregende Vergleiche einzelner Migrationen, ihrer Selbst- und Fremdwahrnehmung. So zum Beispiel wird an die Millionen deutschen überseeischen Auswanderer im 19. Jh. in ihrer alten Heimat so gut wie

gar nicht erinnert; dagegen bildet die polnische Diaspora „ein zentrales Element des polnischen kollektiven Gedächtnisses" und die politische Emigration wird eindeutig positiv konnotiert (S. 258 und 885). Während die russische Emigration nach 1917 keine Integration anstrebte und sich als „der Ort des Überlebens des wahren […] Russland" verstand (S. 918 f.), assimilierte sich die politische tschechoslowakische Emigration nach 1968 problemlos in der Fremde und beabsichtigte nicht, nach dem Ende des Kommunismus 1989 in ihre alte Heimat zurückzukehren (S. 1053). Im Falle der französischen Hugenotten, die am Ende des 17. Jhs. in mehrere westeuropäische Länder emigrierten, bildeten die Toleranzedikte in ihrer alten Heimat an der Schwelle zum 19. Jh. den Entzug der Legitimation, sich als Emigrierte und Franzosen zu bezeichnen, was eine schnelle vollständige Assimilation in der jeweiligen Aufnahmegesellschaft zur Folge hatte (S. 642). Die lange Assimilation der sogenannten „Ruhrpolen", das heißt der Polen, die aus den ostpreußischen Provinzen Ende des 19. Jhs. nach Westfalen wanderten, endete erst nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg, als die „Gastarbeiter" aus Südeuropa nach Deutschland kamen (S. 878). Offensichtlich wurde dadurch sowohl der einheimischen Bevölkerung als auch den „Ruhrpolen" selbst der Assimilationsgrad der Letzteren bewusst.

Auch die Präsentation der relativ kleinen und unbekannten Gruppen ist lesenswert. So zum Beispiel veranschaulicht der Beitrag über „Deutsche Dienstmädchen in den Niederlanden in der Zwischenkriegszeit" sehr gut die Zerrissenheit dieser Personen zwischen der angestrebten Assimilation, steigender Ablehnung durch das neue Umfeld (was als Folge der Verschlechterung der deutsch-niederländischen Beziehungen und der Besatzung des Landes während des Zweiten Weltkriegs geschah) sowie dem Druck des nationalsozialistischen Regimes, welches von ihnen verlangte, ihre ursprüngliche deutsche Identität beizubehalten oder sogar nach Deutschland zurückzukehren (vgl. S. 473).

Die breit gefasste Definition des Begriffs „Migration" führt dazu, dass im Band Gruppen besprochen werden, die m. E. nicht dazu gerechnet werden können. Die alliierten Militärangehörigen in West- und Ostdeutschland nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg halte ich für keine Migranten, sondern Personen, die durch ihre Arbeitgeber lediglich (vorübergehend) ins Ausland geschickt worden sind und die in die rechtlichen Rahmenbedingungen ihrer Heimat stets integriert blieben. Von ihnen als einer „Minderheit" in Deutschland bzw. von ihrer „Rückwanderung" in den 1990er Jahren zu sprechen (S. 370) halte ich für unbegründet.

Die kleinen Makel ändern jedoch nichts an dem Gesamturteil. Die Arbeit ist hoch zu bewerten: Den Verfassern gelang es, viele namhafte Autoren für das vielschichtige Projekt zu gewinnen, es vortrefflich zu strukturieren, die Ergebnisse in einer verständlichen Sprache dazustellen und auf die vorhandenen Forschungslücken präzise hinzuweisen. All dies macht sie zu einer richtungsweisenden Publikation.

Klaus-Peter Friedrich: Der natio-
nalsozialistische Judenmord und
das polnisch-jüdische Verhältnis im
Diskurs der polnischen Untergrund-
presse, 1942–1944 (= Materialien
und Studien zur Ostmitteleuro-
paforschung, Bd. 15), Marburg:
Herder-Institut 2006, 246 S.

Rezensiert von
Kai Struve, Halle

In den letzten Jahren ist die Haltung der
polnischen Mehrheitsgesellschaft während
des Zweiten Weltkriegs gegenüber dem
von den deutschen Besatzern verübten
Mord an der jüdischen Bevölkerung in der
internationalen und der polnischen For-
schung, nicht zuletzt im Kontext der Jed-
wabne-Debatte, zunehmend kritischer be-
urteilt worden. Gegenüber der in der
polnischen Forschung und Öffentlichkeit
lange Zeit vorherrschenden Meinung, dass
angesichts der deutschen Terrorherrschaft
nicht wesentlich mehr an Hilfe für die Ju-
den hätte geleistet werden können, als tat-
sächlich erfolgt ist, hatte u. a. Jan Tomasz
Gross die Ansicht vertreten, dass ein ubi-
quitärer Antisemitismus in der polnischen
Gesellschaft verhindert habe, dass mehr
Juden dem Holocaust entgehen könnten.[1]
Zu diesem kontroversen Forschungsfeld
leistet Klaus-Peter Friedrichs Studie zur
Berichterstattung der polnischen Unter-
grundpresse über das Schicksal der Juden
einen wichtigen Beitrag.
Der zu besprechende Band ist eine grund-
legend überarbeitete und erheblich ge-
kürzte Fassung der schon vorher im In-

ternet veröffentlichter Doktorarbeit des
Verfassers.[2] Gegenüber dieser ersten Fas-
sung, die die Untersuchung der Presse
bis 1947 fortführt, beschränkt sich das
Buch im Wesentlichen auf die Zeit von
Mitte 1942, als mit dem Beginn der De-
portationen aus dem Warschauer Ghetto
die deutschen Mordtaten die größte In-
tensität erreichten, bis zum August 1944,
als mit dem Warschauer Aufstand andere
Themen aus den Untergrundblättern ver-
drängt wurden und viele Publikationen
ihr Erscheinen einstellen mussten. Zu-
gleich bietet das Buch eine grundlegende
Neustrukturierung des Hauptteils der
Arbeit. Während die Doktorarbeit das
Material nach den verschiedenen poli-
tischen Richtungen gegliedert präsentiert
hatte, ordnet Friedrich es in dem Buch
nach einem einleitenden Kapitel, in dem
die verschiedenen im Untergrund aktiven
politischen Richtungen und die mit ihnen
verbundenen, wichtigsten Publikations-
organe kurz vorgestellt werden, thematisch.
Darüber hinaus verzichtet das Buch ge-
genüber der Internetpublikation auf eine
zur deutschen Übersetzung parallele Wie-
dergabe des polnischsprachigen Originals
der in der Studie enthaltenen zahlreichen
Quellenzitate.
Im Zentrum von Friedrichs Diskussion
der Haltung der Untergrundpresse ste-
hen die großen Vernichtungsaktionen seit
Sommer 1942, als insbesondere in War-
schau, wo die wichtigsten Untergrundzeit-
schriften ihren Sitz hatten, das Vorhaben
der völligen Vernichtung der jüdischen
Bevölkerung unübersehbar wurde, sowie
der Widerstand im Warschauer Ghetto
im Winter und Frühjahr 1943. An eine
Untersuchung der konkreten Reaktionen
in der Presse auf diese Ereignisse schließt

Friedrich ein Kapitel an, das sich mit Diskussionen über die Verantwortung für den Mord an der jüdischen Bevölkerung beschäftigt. Im Mittelpunkt eines weiteren Kapitels mit der Überschrift „Verschwörungstheorien und Feindbilder" steht die Haltung der polnischen Rechten, die auch angesichts des Holocaust weitgehend ungebrochen an ihren antisemitischen Feindbildern festhielt.

Der große Verdienst der Studie besteht darin, die umfangreiche polnische Untergrundpresse erstmals im Hinblick auf ihre Haltung gegenüber den Juden einer systematischen Untersuchung unterzogen zu haben. Gegenüber generalisierenden positiven oder negativen Zuschreibungen im Hinblick auf die Haltung der polnischen Gesellschaft zeigt Friedrichs Analyse ein durchaus differenziertes Bild. Da die Presse meist mit bestimmten politischen Milieus und Parteien verbunden waren, ist nicht überraschend, dass sich hier Sichtweisen aus der Vorkriegszeit fortsetzten. Empörung über die Ermordung der jüdischen Bevölkerung und Forderungen, Hilfe zu leisten, wurden in den Publikationen der demokratischen Mitte, nicht zuletzt dem wichtigsten Untergrundorgan, dem *Biuletyn Informacyjny* der Regierungsdelegatur, sowie von der sozialistischen Linken zum Ausdruck gebracht. Weniger Anteilnahme und eine distanziertere Haltung zeigte sich dagegen in den Presseerzeugnissen des Sanacja-Lagers und der Bauernbewegung, während die Veröffentlichungen der Rechten von antisemitischen Stereotypen geprägt blieben und meist zum zynischen Schluss kamen, dass das deutsche Mordprogramm gegenüber der jüdischen Bevölkerung polnischen Interessen diene. Als genereller Befund, der auch für die

Veröffentlichungen des linken politischen Spektrums gültig ist, lässt sich dabei festhalten, dass über die Juden als andere, fremde Gruppe berichtet wurde. Auch in der Presse der Linken und der demokratischen Mitte nahmen Berichte über deutsche Verbrechen an der polnischen Bevölkerung meist einen deutlich größeren und prominenteren Platz ein als solche an der jüdischen Bevölkerung. In der Tradition der Unabhängigkeitsbestrebungen des 19. Jh.s wurde der Kampf gegen die deutsche Besatzung als polnischer nationaler Kampf gesehen, bei dem die Juden, je nach Einstellung, eine bemitleidenswerte Gruppe von anderen Opfern der deutschen Herrschaft oder aber als weitere Gruppe von Gegnern und Konkurrenten betrachtet wurden.

In den Publikationen des gesamten politischen Spektrums machte sich mehr oder weniger deutlich auch schon eine gewisse Opferkonkurrenz bemerkbar, nämlich das Bestreben die Juden nicht als größere Opfer der deutschen Herrschaft erscheinen zu lassen als die Polen. In den Deutungen des Holocaust und des polnisch-jüdischen Verhältnisses in der Kriegszeit selbst sind damit schon viele derjenigen Elemente erkennbar, die die kontroverse Diskussion dieses Themas bis in die Gegenwart bestimmen.

Insgesamt hat Klaus-Peter Friedrich mit seiner Studie zur polnischen Untergrundpresse einen grundlegenden Beitrag zur Diskussion des polnisch-jüdischen Verhältnisses im Zweiten Weltkrieg und darüber hinaus vorgelegt. Gegenüber der Dissertationsfassung bietet das Buch eine konzisere, aber auch anders gegliederte Darstellung. Wer mehr an einem Gesamtüberblick oder an einzelnen thematischen

Aspekten des Diskurses der Untergrund-
presse interessiert ist, sollte die Buchveröf-
fentlichung nutzen. Wer sich dagegen vor
allem für bestimmte politische Gruppie-
rungen interessiert, dem dürfte am besten
mit der Internetpublikation gedient sein.

Anmerkungen:

1   Vgl. neben J. T. Gross, Nachbarn. Der Mord an
     den Juden von Jedwabne, München 2001, vor
     allem ders., Upiorna dekada. Trzy eseje o stere-
     otypach na temat Żydów, Polaków, Niemców i
     komunistów 1939–1948, Kraków 1998; ders.:
     A Tangled Web. Confronting Stereotypes Con-
     cerning Relations between Poles, Germans, Jews,
     and Communists, in: I. Deák/J. T. Gross/T. Judt
     (Hrsg.), The Politics of Retribution in Euro-
     pe. World War II and its Aftermath, Princeton
     2000, S. 74–129.
2   K.-P. Friedrich, Der nationalsozialistische Ju-
     denmord in polnischen Augen. Einstellungen
     in der polnischen Presse 1942–1946/47, Köln
     2003, 730 S. (http://kups.ub.uni-koeln.de/
     volltexte/2003/952/, letzter Zugriff 7. August
     2008).

**Dan Diner: Gegenläufige
Gedächtnisse. Über Geltung und
Wirkung des Holocaust. Göttingen:
Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht 2007,
128 S.**

Rezensiert von
Natan Sznaider, Tel-Aviv

This is an important book. It could change
how people think about memory and
World War II. It could even affect the
world – but even if it does neither, it is a
kind of a dazzling argument just by itself.

Since the book is dense, I'm afraid that
very few people will read it if they are not
persuaded beforehand that it will be well
worth their time. As indeed it is.

Many books have been written on the
question of whether globalization is good
or bad. Diner's book starts out with this
issue of moral evaluation but takes it in
a new direction. It does not linger on the
question of whether universalization is
morally superior to particular memories of
the Holocaust – as so many other books in
this genre do – but rather contextualizes
and historicizes it by considering different
contexts within and outside Europe.

The interested reader will find four very
tightly composed essays, each one ap-
proaching a different set of memories.
Taken together however the book works
like a composition of counterclockwise
(or "reverse" memories (which also ex-
plains the German title of the book "Ge-
genläufige Erinnerungen"). The stakes are
high for Diner. Nothing less than histori-
cal judgment is at risk when we look at
the recent politics of memory. This loss
of historical judgment was caused by the
separation of two intertwined historical
events: World War II and the destruction
of European Jewry. This in turn – accord-
ing to Diner – leads to a loss of temporal-
ity, a loss of historical time, and hence a
loss of judgment. We are left with nothing
except an undifferentiated moralizing dis-
course about victims, which again results
in thinking without differentiation. Thus,
Diner's aim is to differentiate and this is ex-
actly what these four essays attempt to do.
They cannot be read separately; they need
to be read together since the full argument
only emerges from their sum total. In the
first essay "The Epistemics of the Holo-

caust", Diner takes the term "epistemics" seriously. Epistemics refers to the scientific study of knowledge, and in the opening chapter Diner sets out to study knowledge about the Holocaust. He returns to a concept which he developed in earlier writings, "Zivilisationsbruch" – a "rupture in civilization", a term which encompasses the breakdown of ontological security and which coheres with Hannah Arendt's position as developed in her "Origins of Totalitarianism". Zivilisationsbruch can be characterized as a breakdown in a rational understanding of the world, a breakdown in the basic belief that life is more important than death, a reversal of values where survival was accidental and destruction became the rule. This rupture of civilization does not stop with the perpetrators. They are part of this breakdown as well and their survival is suspended together with their victims'. From here, Diner analyzes two possible modes of approach one angle looks at the historical and the particular and inquires why it happened to the Jews. The second approach is universal: it asks how it could have happened at all. Diner returns repeatedly to Arendt's thoughts on the Holocaust and how she understood early on that the destruction of the Jews was a break with the past and called for a new mode of thinking.

Diner explains that comparisons (including analogies and metaphors) are not merely neutral devices but also ideological vehicles whose meanings can be transformed. Thus a universal framework situating memories of the Holocaust on the same level as for instance remembrance of German expellees, the victims of allied bombings or the victims of colonial atrocities has multiple meanings that are determined within the parameters of different needs and situations. However, every de-contextualization involves also a re-contextualization. Thus, there are two parallel – and somewhat incompatible – conceptions of victim consciousness, one universal and one particular. The particular highlights the crimes of the aggressor; the universal downplays them through the very idea that we are all victims. Both imply a conversion experience because the exposure to trauma requires a redemptive departure from the original traumatic experience. The particular form of victim consciousness depends on its distinction between perpetrator and victim. Under the particular system, there can be no victim without a perpetrator – and conversely, to call someone a victim is to instantly accuse someone else of being a perpetrator. These are the points Diner develops in the essays that follow.

The second is called "Kontinentale Verschiebungen". "Verschiebung" in German can mean both displacement and postponement and Diner implies both the temporal and the spatial. He talks about temporal icons such as May 8th, 1945, the date of German capitulation in Reims, the city where French kings were traditionally crowned. For Germans, this date began as a capitulation and within 40 years turned into an icon of liberation. For Germans, May 8th, 1945 now symbolizes the start of Germany's alliance with the West. The date stands for liberal values like freedom and democracy, pluralism and parliamentary democracy. It may be a good date for the West, but it is not the only one. From May 8th, Diner moves to May 9th, 1945. One day later, another capitulation site, this time in Berlin-Karlshorst, this time capitulation to the Western allies, but

also capitulation to the Soviets. This icon marks the end of the war as perceived from Moscow, and not from Washington, Paris or London. For many nations of Eastern Europe this was not a date of liberation, but the beginning of Soviet oppression. Diner highlights the meaning of this date for the Baltic peoples, the Poles, the Czechs and others. Memories of Stalinism and memories of the Holocaust and German oppression need to be viewed side by side, as strange but necessary bedfellows.

In his next essay, "Kontinentale Verwerfungen" ("Continental Fault Lines"), Diner not only uses a geological metaphor, but moves outside the European context. He returns to May 8th, 1945. However, the location is different: Setif in Algeria. The same day Germany surrendered in World War II, a parade organized by the local Algerian population to celebrate German capitulation turned out to be not only a French victory parade, but a demonstration for Algerian independence. The French who had vital reasons to protect their colonies after World War II responded by bloody attacks on the local Algerians. Here, May 9th, 1945 was the beginning of the colonial struggle against the French and the West. Decolonization and the end of World War II start exactly on the same date. Diner weaves his arguments together, writes about the Algerian struggle, Camus, Pontecorvo's brilliant documentary movie (1966), the Battle of Algiers to better define the meaning of the anti-colonialist struggle. He shows how former French resistance fighters, who were tortured by the Nazis, themselves became torturers, and how this fact contributed to the blurring of the Holocaust and colonial atrocities. On the other hand, Diner demonstrates that torture is not equal to extermination. The purpose of torture is the breaking of your enemy's political will. As paradoxical as it sounds, torture demands the recognition of the other's human-ness. From here, Diner returns to historical judgment and his insistence on the need to differentiate. Genocidal colonial wars and the Holocaust are not the same. Diner again emphasizes the singularity of the Holocaust. The Holocaust was about extermination no reason can justify and is situated therefore beyond the scope war, conflict or animosity. It was death without meaning. Diner then shifts to India and Japan and shows how World War II created new alliances. German Nazis were celebrated as liberators by local peoples. They became the enemy of the enemy. He shows how Jews in these lands became hostages of impossible situations and how especially Jews in Muslim countries became hostages of processes of decolonization.

The last essay "Verstellte Wahrnehmungen" (again, the German word "verstellt" has several meaning. It can mean "displaced" and also "disguised") is not even five pages long but contains the whole crux of the book. It condenses his recently published book in English "Lost in the Sacred: Why the Muslim World stood still". He returns to the beginning and the concept of "civilizational rupture", but this time shows how this concept of the breakdown of ontological security is connected to Western processes of secularization. In brief, to doubt the achievements of the Enlightenment, one needs the Enlightenment as a horizon. Diner inquires whether such a process can oblige other civilizations, which do not have this type of tradition, such as the Muslim civilization. If your reality is im-

bued with the question of the presence of God, a worldview with rational man at its center may be meaningless for you. Such a worldview cannot accept the Holocaust as civilizational rupture, which accounts for its relativization or even negation. It is indeed a displaced perception. Diner ends his book on a pessimistic note in a return to Europe. In his view, processes of pluralization will displace the historical judgment of the Holocaust as well. Diner sees this as the end of Europe as the historical continent. Historical judgment will be replaced by universalization and relativism. Pre-modernity and post-modernity will join forces to undermine our historical understanding of the past. Diner's book is a heroic effort to prevent this demise. Whether this effort is doomed to fail, only time will tell.

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