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ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR GLOBALGESCHICHTE UND
VERGLEICHENDE GESELLSCHAFTSFORSCHUNG

Non-State Actors in European Integration in the 1970s: Towards a Polity of Transnational Contestation

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RESÜMEE

Dieser Aufsatz fragt nach der Rolle nicht-staatlicher Akteure in der Europäischen Gemeinschaft (EG) der 1970er Jahre. Er will dazu beitragen, die traditionelle diplomatiegeschichtliche Integrationsgeschichtsschreibung mit ihrem Fokus auf die Politik der Mitgliedsstaaten gegenüber „Europa" zu überwinden, die gesellschaftliche Akteure kaum erfasst und analysiert. Die empirischen Beiträge über transnationale Sozialisten, Gewerkschafter, Landwirtschafts- und Umwelt-Lobbyisten in diesem Heft zeigen nachdrücklich, dass nicht-staatliche Akteure bereits in den 1970er Jahren transnational zusammenarbeiteten, ihre Organisationsformen europäisierten und zunehmend in der EG-Politik aktiv waren. Einerseits folgten die Verbände der Verlagerung von Politikfeldern auf die europäische Ebene. Andererseits – und zwar weit mehr als bisher bekannt – trugen sie selbst mit dazu bei, Themen, Umfang und Reichweite der europäischen Politik(en) zu definieren. Europäisches Regieren als governance ist in seinen Grundzügen somit bereits in den 1970er Jahren zu verorten.

This special issue explores the role non-state actors played in European integration in the 1970s.[1] Its goal is twofold. First, the articles will contribute to the growing debate on the

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1970s as a period of crisis, transition and major change within societies and at the international level, specifically in relation to the politics of the European Communities (EC). At the time, the experience (in the dollar and oil crises) of global economic interconnectedness convinced contemporary observers that they were living in a world of 'interdependence'[2] – a term that can be understood as the 1970s version of what we now call 'globalization'.[3] Thus, we seek to embed the notoriously secluded and inward-looking historiography of European integration[4] within the global and national historiography of the period more generally, and to foster dialogue with international, transnational, and national historiographies.

The second goal of this special issue is to overcome the limitations of the predominantly state-centric historiography of European integration in the diplomatic history tradition and to shed light on the role of actors beyond state institutions like national governments and European supranational institutions. As the EC increasingly became involved in policy-making in multiple fields in the decade after the summit of The Hague in 1969 EC politics offered new opportunities for the growing participation of interest groups, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and other non-state actors. These actors frequently mediated between national societies and the EC as well as between the international level and the EC. By exploring these non-state actors' twin roles of mediation between different levels of politics and participation in policy-making, we aim to contribute to a reformed historiography of European integration that systematically takes all relevant actors into account.[5]

To provide the necessary context for the empirical contributions to this special issue, this introductory article will first give a brief overview of the most relevant dimensions of European and global developments in the 1970s that may have impacted on EC politics. Secondly, we will set out the rationale for considering the role of non-state actors in European integration, outlining their core characteristics and discussing their roles in EC politics. Thirdly, we will introduce the common research questions that we have asked the authors to take into consideration. We will also briefly set out the case studies in the four empirical articles before presenting a concluding comparative overview of their findings.

2   Robert O. Keohane / Joseph S Jr. Nye, Power and Interdependence. World Politics in Transition, Boston 1977.

3   See also Andrew Moravcsik, Robert Keohane: Political Theorist, in: Helen V. Milner / Andrew Moravcsik (eds.), Power, Interdependence and Nonstate Actors in World Politics, Princeton 2009, pp. 243-263, here p. 258.

4   For a comprehensive discussion of this historiography see Wolfram Kaiser / Antonio Varsori (eds.), European Union History: Themes and Debates, Basingstoke 2010.

5   For an ambitious earlier attempt to address and overcome the limitations of the traditional historiography, see the contributions in Wolfram Kaiser / Morten Rasmussen / Brigitte Leucht (eds.), The History of the European Union. Origins of a Trans- and Supranational Polity 1950-72, Abingdon 2009.

A period of crisis, transition and change

The 1970s have frequently been characterized as a period of crisis, transition and major change.[6] They have been understood as marking the origins of the world we live in today.[7] Even though the political, societal and international contexts were very different, the analogies between our contemporary world and the pressing issues of the 1970s – not least the economic crises – are suggestive.[8]

At the global level, the world economy faced two major economic crises in the course of the decade, first in 1973 and again in 1979. In both cases, the economic crises followed a sharp rise in oil prices. However, these crises did not simply result from the conflicts in the Middle East, where most of the oil production was concentrated. They were also an unintended consequence of the end of the Bretton Woods System, which had provided monetary stability since the end of World War II. In the 1960s the system of fixed exchange rates based on the convertibility of the dollar into gold had come under pressure due to the excessive credit financing of the Vietnam War by the United States (US) administration and large US trade deficits. It came to an end with the Nixon administration's revocation of convertibility on 15 August 1971. Attempts to maintain stable exchange rates at a newly-adjusted level had failed by 1973. The transition to floating exchange rates led to a devaluation of the US currency and the erosion of oil prices in real terms since oil was paid for in US dollars. Oil producers hence pushed for higher prices with the Yom Kippur War in October 1973 presenting them with a welcome opportunity to flex their muscles.[9]

The excessive reliance on oil as a source of energy combined with the steep rise in its price pushed Western economies into the first serious recession after a long period of unprecedented growth of almost thirty years, the *trente glorieuses*.[10] Rising levels of unemployment, and a growing sense of economic insecurity contributed to what Konrad Jarausch has described as the 'end of confidence'. The crisis put an end to the experience and optimistic expectation of continuously rising prosperity, which had increasingly come to be taken for granted in western Europe and the US.[11]

The global economic crisis strengthened competitive pressures and exposed structural weaknesses in western Europe's labour-intensive manufacturing economies. Millions of jobs in manufacturing were lost in the course of the 1970s as businesses moved produc-

6   Anselm Doering-Manteuffel / Lutz Raphael (eds.), Nach dem Boom. Perspektiven auf die Zeitgeschichte seit 1970, Göttingen 2008; Gabriele Metzler (ed.), Krise des Regierens in den 1970er Jahren. Deutsche und westeuropäische Perspektiven, Paderborn forthcoming 2010; Niall Ferguson, Crisis, what Crisis? The 1970s and the Shock of the Global, in: Niall Ferguson, et al. (eds.), The Shock of the Global. The 1970s in Perspective, Cambridge, MA 2010, pp. 1-21.

7   Philippe Chassaigne, Les années 1970. Fin d'un monde et origine de notre modernité, Paris 2008; Antonio Varsori (ed.), Alle origine del presente. L'Europa occidentale nella crisi degli anni Settanta, Milan 2007.

8   See most recently the contributions in Niall Ferguson, et al. (eds.), The Shock of the Global. The 1970s in Perspective, Cambridge, MA 2010.

9   Harold James, Rambouillet, 15. November 1975. Die Globalisierung der Wirtschaft, Munich 1997, pp. 140-156.

10 Jean Fourastié, Les trente glorieuses ou la révolution invisible de 1946 à 1975, Paris 1979.

11 Konrad H. Jarausch (ed.), Das Ende der Zuversicht? Die siebziger Jahre als Geschichte, Göttingen 2008.

tion to places of cheaper labour or rationalized their production. At the same time, the US not only temporarily improved its competitiveness vis-à-vis the Europeans as a result of the devaluation of its currency; it also benefited from its strength in high technology. The increasing presence of the emerging Asian economies on the global market put additional competitive pressure on the European economies across a broad range of products. Japan became a major exporter of manufactured goods, profiting from new production methods (as in the car industry), high productivity and state support for exports,[12] and making inroads into western European home and export markets in sectors such as consumer electronics.[13]

The growing awareness of global interdependence was not limited to economic matters, however. It also related to new problems that immediately became defined as issues of global concern. The suggestive contemporary imagery of the 'blue planet' or 'spaceship earth' set against a black infinity – which was popularized after the first landing on the moon in 1969 – resonated to some extent with everyday experience. In a series of first time international conferences on the environment (1972), oceans policy (1973), food security (1974), world population (1974) and women's issues (1975), the UN and other international organizations raised awareness of the 'Limits to Growth', as the Club of Rome termed it,[14] of the question of justice in the distribution of resources between North and South, and of gender issues. Non-state actors of various kinds played a growing role in these debates and agenda-setting processes.[15] The EC – in particular the European Commission – was eager to have a voice in this emerging world of what is now often referred to as global governance.

Change was not limited to the international level, however. In the wake of 1968, western European societies underwent considerable social change. They saw new forms of political mobilization and new modes of political conflict and protest.[16] The rise of new social movements – such as the women's movement or the environmental movement[17] – made new claims for global justice, gender equality and enhanced environmental protection. At the same time, these movements were frequently opposed to, or at least sceptical about, 'old' forms of representative parliamentary politics. Their prevailing attitudes have frequently been linked to changing values – from the materialism of the post-war

12   See, for example, Volker Elis, Von Amerika nach Japan – und zurück. Die historischen Wurzeln und Transformatio-nen des Toyotismus, in: Zeithistorische Forschungen/Studies in Contemporary History, Online-Ausgabe 6 (2009) 2, pp. 1-12. http://www.zeithistorische-forschungen.de/16126041-Elis-2-2009 [last accessed 7 June 2010].

13   Anselm Doering-Manteuffel, Nach dem Boom. Brüche und Kontinuitäten der Industriemoderne seit 1970, in: Vierteljahreshefte für Zeitgeschichte 55 (2007) 4, pp. 559-581, here p. 570.

14   Dennis Meadows, et al., The Limits to Growth, New York 1972.

15   Glenda Sluga, The Transformation of International Institutions, in: Niall Ferguson, et al. (eds.), The Shock of the Global. The 1970s in Perspective, Cambridge, MA 2010, pp. 223-236, here p. 223ff.

16   Jens Ivo Engels, ‚Politischer Verhaltensstil'. Vorschläge für ein Instrumentarium zur Beschreibung politischen Verhaltens am Beispiel des Natur- und Umweltschutzes, in: Franz-Josef Brüggemeier / Jens Ivo Engels (eds.), Natur- und Umweltschutz nach 1945. Konzepte, Konflikte, Kompetenzen, Frankfurt 2005, pp. 184-202; Martin Klimke / Joachim Scharloth (eds.), 1968 in Europe. A History of Protest and Activism, 1956-77, London 2008.

17   Christopher Rootes, The Environmental Movement, in: Martin Klimke/Joachim Scharloth (eds.), 1968 in Europe. A History of Protest and Activism, 1956-77, London 2008, pp. 295-305.

generation to the post-materialism of the baby-boomers born after the war.[18] As neo-Marxist ideas and Keynesian demand management continued to gain ground in debates among intellectuals and policy-makers, policy-making became more contentious and politicized.[19] Change also affected more traditional policy fields via the activism of the youth organizations of political parties and labour unions.[20] The articles in this special issue provide clear evidence for the at least partial mediation of these changes within and across national societies to the European level and into EC policy-making. Transnational linkages between social movement organizations that usually shared broadly internationalist attitudes may have been instrumental in this respect.

The 1970s have usually been characterized as the 'dark ages' of European integration following the so-called Luxembourg compromise of January 1966, which strengthened the consensus culture in the EC and made reaching decisions more cumbersome.[21] More recent research has emphasized change in EC politics in the 1970s, however. Not only did the EC acquire its own finances in the Luxembourg Treaty of 1970; a number of important institutional reforms with long-term impacts were also made, including the informal institutionalization of intergovernmental coordination and decision-making in the new European Council of the Heads of State and governments from 1975 onwards, and the first direct elections to the European Parliament (EP) in June 1979.[22] More importantly, the introduction of new policies – including development policy, the environment and political cooperation – helped transform the EC into something resembling a trans- and supranational polity rather than a mere system of intergovernmental bargaining,[23] result-

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18 See, for example, Hartmut Kaelble, Sozialgeschichte Europas: 1945 bis zur Gegenwart, Munich 2007, pp. 125-127. For a contemporary analysis see Ronald Inglehard, The Silent Revolution. Changing Values and Political Styles among Western Publics, Princeton 1977.

19 For a vivid account of the situation in Britain see, for example, Andy Beckett, When the Lights went out. What really happened to Britain in the Seventies, London 2009, pp. 53-59.

20 For Germany see Dietmar Süß, Die Enkel auf den Barrikaden. Jungsozialisten in der SPD in den Siebzigerjahren, in: Archiv für Sozialgeschichte 44 (2004) 1, pp. 67-104; Wolfgang Schroeder, Gewerkschaften als soziale Bewegung - soziale Bewegung in den Gewerkschaften der Siebzigerjahren, in: Archiv für Sozialgeschichte 44 (2004) 1, pp. 243-266.

21 Robert O. Keohane/Stanley Hoffmann, Institutional Change in Europe in the 1980s, in: Robert O. Keohane/Stanley Hoffmann (eds.), The New European Community. Decisionmaking and Institutional Change, Boulder 1991, pp. 1-39, here p. 8.

22 Franz Knipping/Matthias Schönwald (eds.), Aufbruch zum Europa der zweiten Generation: die europäische Einigung 1969–1984, Trier 2004; Antonio Varsori, Introduzione – Alle origine del presente L'Europa occidentale nella crisi degli anni Settanta, in: Antonio Varsori (ed.), Alle origine del presente. L'Europa occidentale nella crisi degli anni Settanta, Milan 2007, pp. 9-22.

23 Wolfram Kaiser, Transnational Networks in European Governance. The Informal Politics of Integration, in: Wolfram Kaiser/Morten Rasmussen/Brigitte Leucht (eds.), The History of the European Union. Origins of a Trans- and Supranational Polity 1950-72, Abingdon 2009, pp. 12-33. On the policy developments see, for example, Davide Zampoli, I primi passi della Cooperazione politica europea: problematiche ed evoluzione istituzionale, in: Antonio Varsori (ed.), Alle origine del presente. L'Europa occidentale nella crisi degli anni Settanta, Milan 2007, pp. 169-192. Marie-Thérèse Bitsch/Gérard Bossuat (eds.), L'Europe unie et l'Afrique : De l'idée d'Eurafrique à la convention de Lomé Brussels 2006; Michele Affinito/Guia Migani/Christian Wenkel (eds.), Les Deux Europes/The Two Europes, Brussels 2009; Giuliano Garavini, The Colonies Strike Back: The Impact of the Third World on Western Europe, 1968–1975, in: Contemporary European History 16 (2007) 3, pp. 299-319.

ing in a greater degree of integration that has often been overlooked.[24] The establishment of the EC as a major site of policy-making induced a growing number of interest groups to try to gain access to the EC decision-making process. Such a development had in fact been predicted in broad outlines by the neo-functionalist theories that were fashionable in the late 1950s and 1960s, although they initially operated with simplistic assumptions about 'spill-over', the expansion of EU competences and the wholesale transfer of actors' loyalties from the national to the European level.[25]

Contesting EC politics and policy-making

Against the backdrop of these changes at the global, domestic and European levels, we assess the extent to which global and domestic changes were mediated to the European level by non-state actors. We also explore the extent to which changes at all three levels formed an environment conducive to the involvement of non-state actors in EC politics and decision-making. Put differently: to what extent did the emergence of a more developed European polity with a complex institutional setting, a multitude of actors and a much broader range of policies encourage the involvement of non-state actors? This question not only concerns the historical analysis of policy-making in the EC, but also problems of representation and democracy at the trans- and supranational levels – an issue that has played such a prominent role in contemporary political debates about the European Union (EU).

To date, the role of non-state actors has largely been overlooked in historical research on European integration. Traditionally, diplomatic historians have dominated EU historiography. Their concentration on the 'default' question of national governments' policies towards 'Europe' (as if they were not part of this 'Europe'), and their overreliance on government records, largely account for this lacuna. Due to their tacit 'realist'[26] assumption that governments dominate the process of European integration and act in order to realize given interests determined by the geographical position or economic situation of a country, studying non-state actors seemed irrelevant to them.[27] Whenever historians of European integration have taken non-state actors such as business groups into account, due to the prevailing methodological nationalism in EU historiography these historians usually limited their research to the attitudes of national groups towards European issues.[28] Economic historians likewise subscribed to methodological nationalism, assuming

24 Zampoli, I primi passi della Cooperazione politica europea (note 23).

25 Ernst B. Haas, The Uniting of Europe. Political, Social, and Economic Forces, 1950–1957, Stanford 1958; Leon N. Lindberg, The Political Dynamics of European Economic Integration, Stanford 1963.

26 In the sense of the classical 'realist approach' in International Relations represented e.g. by Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, New York 1948.

27 For a critique see Wolfram Kaiser, From State to Society? The Historiography of European Integration, in: Michelle Cini / Angela K. Bourne (eds.), Palgrave Advances in European Studies, Basingstoke 2006, pp. 190-208.

28 E.g. Werner Bührer, 'Immer pro Europa': Die Integrationspolitik des BDI in den siebziger und frühen achtziger Jahren, in: Franz Knipping / Matthias Schönwald (eds.), Aufbruch zum Europa der zweiten Generation: die europä-

that governments' converging interests (shared with their national business and labour representatives) in achieving economies of scale and welfare gains was a major impetus for European integration. Potentially cross-cutting transnational interests and modes of organization of non-state actors were not part of their research agendas either.[29]

In contrast to these approaches, we conceptualize the EC as an incipient trans- and supranational polity that provided political opportunities for non-state actors of various kinds and at different levels of aggregation: sub-national, national and European. Recent attempts to analyse politics and policy-making in European integration from a network perspective indicate that a variety of non-state actors have been involved in the process, including political parties, experts, and NGOs. This research has also shown the substantial level of their often informal transnational cooperation.[30] The extent to which actors actually cooperated across borders is thus also an important research question for the authors of this special issue.

The role of non-state actors in international politics was first highlighted by contemporary political science observers in the 1970s. At the time, neoliberal institutionalists like Karl Kaiser, Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye tried to come to grips with the new situation of economic interdependence. In opposition to the older realist paradigm, they emphasized the role of non-state actors such as multinational corporations and NGOs.[31]

The definition of non-state actors we suggest here is a pragmatic one: non-state actors are individuals, groups or organizations which may be involved in politics and policy-making, but do not have the legal status or fulfil the legal functions of the state and its institutions. They pursue their objectives independently of the state and they mediate these interests, goals and ambitions to the state, EC institutions or international organizations. Although such non-state actors – especially NGOs – often claim to represent general public interests, what they advocate usually reflects the views and preferences of their leading activists and/or members and thus, those of more or less clearly delineated sections of society. Even private companies pursuing their business interests may also work towards larger goals such as ensuring the general competitiveness of national economies or of 'Europe'. In contrast to the widespread political science conceptualization of 'private' (business) and 'public' (general) interests and actors, we prefer the functional differentiation into non-state and state actors. In this definition of non-state actors, political

ische Einigung 1969–1984, Trier 2004, pp. 435-450; Clemens A. Wurm, Sozialisten und europäische Integration. Die britische Labour Party 1945–1984, in: Geschichte in Wissenschaft und Unterricht 38 (1987) 5, pp. 280-295.

29   Alan S. Milward, The European Rescue of the Nation-State, London, New York 2000. See also the critical discussion of this approach in Morten Rasmussen, European Rescue of the Nation State? Tracing the Role of Economics and Business, in: Wolfram Kaiser / Antonio Varsori (eds.), European Union History: Themes and Debates, Basingstoke 2010, pp. 128-149.

30   Kaiser, Transnational Networks in European Governance (note 23).

31   Helen V. Milner, Power, Interdependence, and Nonstate Actors in World Politics. Research Frontiers, in: Helen V. Milner / Andrew Moravcsik (eds.), Power, Interdependence and Nonstate Actors in World Politics, Princeton 2009, pp. 3-27, here pp. 5, 26. For the contemporary debate see for example Karl Kaiser, Transnational Politics: Toward a Theory of Multinational Politics, in: International Organization 25 (1971) 4, pp. 790-817; Joseph S Jr. Nye / Robert O. Keohane, Transnational Relations and World Politics: An Introduction, in: International Organization 25 (1971) 3, pp. 329-349.

parties qualify as non-state actors, as they have an independent legal status, even if they also play a key role in structuring state institutions and forming governments.

Thus, this special issue's goal is to address the previously neglected role of such actors beyond the state in EC politics in the 1970s as a period of crisis, transition and change. We have compiled the four articles to cover a broad spectrum of actors and their involvement in a variety of policy areas. One group of actors are socialist parties and party networks. Socialist parties had of course been involved in early European integration. However, they were much less influential than the networks of European Christian democrats in deciding the outlines of 'core Europe' integration in the first two decades after 1945.[32] Their greater internal division over the institutional forms of integration and membership in the European Economic Community (EEC) / EC initially made it more difficult for them to cooperate effectively. In the 1970s, however, they enjoyed unprecedented electoral success throughout western Europe. The EP and the Socialist International also facilitated their transnational cooperation. In his article, Christian Salm analyses the changing nature of this cooperation and its importance for the field of development policy, which remained a national competence, but with increasing European dimensions in the context of the Lomé Conventions.

Similarly, the Labour unions and agricultural lobbies had been institutionally involved in European integration from the very beginning. Organized Labour was represented in the Consultative Committee of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) from 1953 onwards and in the EEC's Economic and Social Committee (ESC) from 1958 onwards.[33] Yet the growing grass-roots mobilization within the unions, combined with the consequences of the socio-economic crisis, at least had the potential to influence and change the unions' involvement in EC politics, and especially in social policy-making – the focus of Thomas Fetzer's article.

The European Commission, like the ECSC High Authority before it, remained sceptical about close links with business actors, which it believed could be detrimental for policy-making and for its own image as an institution independent of particular national or sectoral interests. In contrast, the Commission had fostered the Europeanization of agricultural interest representation from the beginning and throughout the formation of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) as the politically and financially most important EEC policy in the first half of the 1960s. In fact, the Commission took it for granted that the involvement and Europeanization of agricultural interests was crucial for the drafting of the EEC policy, and to ensure political support for it and its long-term legitimacy in the member-states. Once the CAP was set up, however, it became clear that it was turning into an increasingly wasteful policy as milk lakes and beef mountains grew in the 1970s, with massive repercussions also for the EC's external trade relations. Against this background, Carine Germond analyses the Europeanization of agricultural interest

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32   Wolfram Kaiser, Christian Democracy and the Origins of European Union, Cambridge 2007.
33   Cf. Berthold Rittberger, The Historical Origins of the EU's System of Representation, in: Journal of European Public Policy 16 (2009) 1, pp. 43-61.

groups, their links with EC institutions and how they contributed to preventing a meaningful reform of the CAP until the Mac Sharry reforms of 1992.

Meanwhile, the venerable nature protection movement, which dated back to the turn of the nineteenth to the twentieth centuries in most European countries, went through a period of transition in the 1970s. With the rise of environmentalism, new organizations were founded and old ones modernized. The change in membership also led to growing politicization. The environmental movement was at the core of the new social movements during the 1970s, yet it was only the prospect of a supranational EC environmental policy of sorts which induced the environmentalists to go to Brussels for the first time. Their new engagement with EC politics, and their role in developing an EC approach to environmental protection, is the focus of Jan-Henrik Meyer's article in this special issue.

These four non-state actors – socialist parties, labour unions, agricultural interest groups and the environmental movement – were involved in European policy fields old and new. By the 1970s, agricultural policy was a firmly established common EC policy. In contrast, while social policy issues had been present on the agenda of European integration from the early days, debate on an EC level social policy of some kind only really took off in the 1970s before the election of Margaret Thatcher in 1979 at least temporarily put a halt to these ambitions. The third policy, development policy, was to some extent an illegitimate child of the older colonialism of western European nations. In fact, in his declaration of 9 May 1950 the French foreign minister Robert Schuman had already mentioned generating common funds to develop Africa as a European mission as one of the objectives of the future ECSC. The idea of 'Eurafrique' as a third economic and political force in the world exerted a powerful influence for some time, especially in French politics. Subsequently, decolonization and the new discourse on global justice turned development policy into a highly innovative field in the 1970s, when it appealed to the political Left in particular, not just in France.[34] Lastly, the environment as an area of policy-making only emerged in national and international politics in the 1960s and early 1970s.[35] The European Conservation Year in 1970 and the UN conference on the environment in Stockholm in 1972 helped place the issue more firmly on domestic agendas and the EC agenda. The outlines of an EC level environmental policy emerged with the first Environmental Action Programme of 1973, followed by a series of ambitious legislative projects, although environmental policy only became an EC competence in the Single European Act of 1987, with majority voting introduced in the Maastricht Treaty.

All four articles consist of two parts. In the first part the authors focus on the actors: what motivated non-state actors to become (more) involved in European policy-mak-

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34   Mark Atwood Lawrence, Containing Globalism. The United States and the Developing World in the 1970s, in: Niall Ferguson, et al. (eds.), The Shock of the Global. The 1970s in Perspective, Cambridge, MA 2010, pp. 205-219, here p. 213.

35   J. R. McNeil, The Environment, Environmentalism, and International Society in the Long 1970s, in: Niall Ferguson, et al. (eds.), The Shock of the Global. The 1970s in Perspective, Cambridge, MA 2010, pp. 263-278, here p. 263 f.

ing? Did they pro-actively invest resources in EC policy-making, or were they induced to come to Brussels by the opportunities – from financial support to networking – offered by the European institutions, especially the European Commission? In short, to what extent did they push, and to what extent were they pulled into EC politics and policy-making?[36] In this context, all authors also examine the conditions for cooperation and competition among non-state actors in the respective policy area, and the degree of their transnational cooperation.

In a second part, all four articles address the role of non-state actors in policy-making in a clearly delineated policy field. How did non-state actors seek to exert influence, which instruments did they use, and how successful were they? In this connection, to what extent did non-state actors function as transnational mediators of policy ideas between the national, the international and the European levels, and how important was this role of agenda-setting and policy formulation in the EC?

Covering a broad range of non-state actors and policies – both old and new – our ambition is to draw some initial comparative conclusions concerning the role of non-state actors in EC politics and policy-making in the 1970s. First, we hope to ascertain whether non-state actors actually did become more important in EC policy-making in the 1970s, as we assume. Secondly, if they did, we are keen to identify the main reasons for their growing involvement. Thirdly, we wish to know more about any similarities and differences across the different kinds of actors and policy areas – old and new –, and about the reasons for any such variation.

We have found considerable variation with respect to the transnationalization and Europeanization of their political activities among the four non-state actors discussed in the contributions to this special issue. European socialist parties were clearly influential actors in the 1970s. Social democrats were in government (as in Germany or Britain) or participated in governing coalitions (as in Italy) for a good part of the decade in a number of EC member states. Nonetheless, compared to their Christian democratic political competitors, the socialist parties were slow to formally Europeanize their cooperation. It was only in 1974 that they set up the Confederation of Socialist Parties in the EC in anticipation of the introduction of direct elections to the EP. Compared to the European People's Party set up in 1976, this comparatively loose institutional arrangement – a 'confederation' – reflected the internal divisions on European integration within and across the socialist parties of the member states. After the first EC enlargement of 1973, these divisions became even more pronounced. A large number of Danish and British socialists were at least sceptical towards European integration, not least because they feared that it might compromise their own countries' pursuit of socialist policies. Some of the British Labour Party's leading politicians – including Cabinet ministers – campaigned

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36   The concept of push and pull was originally developed in migration studies in the 1960s, but this suggestive analytical juxtaposition has since widely been applied in the social sciences. Everett S. Lee, A Theory of Migration, in: Demography 3 (1966) 1, pp. 47-57.

against continued British membership in the British EC referendum of 1975.[37] Instead, they favoured broader international ties. In that respect, the socialists' traditional focus on internationalism instead of regional economic integration may have hampered rather than facilitated European-level institutionalization. At the same time, these transnational ties that went beyond the smaller, more integrated, Europe of the six or nine member states of the EC – including the traditionally strong Scandinavian and Austrian socialists – formed the basis for a wider informal network of leading socialists, supported by social democratic think tanks like the Friedrich Ebert Foundation and the Vienna Institute for Development. This web of overlapping contacts formed the infrastructure for European opinion and preference formation with regard to those policies – like development policy – that were close to the heart of socialist/social democratic ideological commitments.

The Labour unions' formal representation at the European level in the ESC, where they were routinely consulted on European legislation, had not immediately led to the Europeanization of their institutions. The European Trade Union Congress (ETUC) was only established in 1973, and remained internally divided. Ideological fragmentation, as well as fundamental differences of union organization, prevented this newly founded union umbrella organization from playing a more active role. While, for instance, in Germany and Britain, labour unions were united under one formally non-party political roof organization, in many other member states such as in France or Italy, union representation was fragmented along party lines into Christian democratic, socialist and communist unions. Whereas socialist and Christian democratic unions had already established a small European level organization in the 1950s to deal with the ECSC and a secretariat for the EEC, the Communist labour unions were initially opposed to western European integration. The Italian communist union joined the ETUC in the 1970s, once it had become more Eurocommunist. Generally, Christian democratic and socialist unions in the EEC were broadly supportive of European integration. The lack of commitment of the most powerful organizations like the German Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund (DGB), which – from a position of strength – feared that it could lose under too much European harmonization, limited the Europeanization of the unions' engagement.

Agricultural pressure groups were long-established and probably the most deeply embedded in policy-making among the lobbying organizations at the European level. Not only had their European organization Comité des organisation professionnelles agricoles (COPA) been set up with the support of the European Commission, the farmers also enjoyed privileged access to what was considered the most advanced area of European policy-making which also made up in the region of 80 per cent of EC expenditure. At the same time, as Germond argues, it took a considerable amount of time for a more thorough transnationalization and Europeanization to take place, not least since agricultural interest groups also had privileged access to 'their' national ministries. As national governments continued to play the decisive decision-making role in the Council of Min-

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37   Jan-Henrik Meyer, The 1975 Referendum on Britain's continued Membership in the EEC, 2006. http://www.ena. lu?lang=2&doc=21284 [last accessed 25 June 2010].

isters, the national lobbying route remained crucial for them. In the face of Commission initiatives to reform the increasingly costly and wasteful CAP in the 1970s, however, transnationally organized lobbying via COPA in defence of the status quo became more important, leading to a more thorough Europeanization of agricultural interest representation.

In the novel area of environmental policy, the transnationalization and Europeanization of interest groups was relatively fast, even if not particularly thorough. The initial foundation of the European Environmental Bureau (EEB) in 1974 was largely coincidental and based on informal transnational ties between European environmentalists, as Meyer explains in his article. Commission support and encouragement for its establishment came from the Information and Communication Directorate General, rather than the Service of the Environment and Consumer Protection, which remained oriented towards national organizations and experts. In the 1970s, the EEB remained a small and weak organization, relying on the strength of its member groups and transnational cooperation for lobbying and expertise. However, in concrete policy-making in the context of the birds directive, both bird protection and hunting groups were able to Europeanize their lobbying and organize at the European level. For this purpose, they relied on pre-existing transnational ties from the older international bird protection and hunting organizations.

What explains this variation in transnationalization and Europeanization of non-state actors in the 1970s? Three main factors need to be taken into account. First – in line with historical institutionalist explanations in political science – non-state actors' institutional structures, traditions and routines have an important influence on their propensity to Europeanize. Secondly – as argued by rational choice institutionalism – the European level's actual competence in the respective policy area is crucial in determining the attractiveness of setting up shop at the EC level. Thirdly – in line with theoretical arguments advanced by sociological institutionalism – dominant ideologies shaping perceptions strongly influence the extent to which a European level solution is considered as an option at all. With different weight, and in different ways specific to each non-state actor and policy area, these factors could work against or in favour of the transnationalization and Europeanization of non-state actors' political activities.

Organizational traditions and routines strongly oriented towards the nation state proved to be an important obstacle to non-state actors' further transnationalization and Europeanization. Socialist parties' and labour unions' political activities, for instance, were heavily geared towards the national welfare state and its policies. The EC member states had almost exclusive competence in this area. Thus, socialist parties – frequently in national government in the 1970s – and unions that were traditionally close to them, looked towards member state governments in the first instance for the delivery of social policy. As the problems of global competition and national budgetary constraints had not yet become so obviously pressing, there appeared to be no need to shift attention from the national level, which seemed the natural place to go for these policy issues, to the EC level. Similarly, farmers' unions had been closely connected to the nation states in (west-

ern) Europe since the late nineteenth century, when tariffs to protect national agriculture were increasingly (re-) introduced. Traditional ties with national parties and agricultural ministries – which also remained important players at the EC level – were well-established and institutionalized. Such structural traditions might initially have discouraged farmers' organizations from investing more resources at the new European level, which was more remote and less predictable.

Moreover, in as much as they behaved like rational actors, non-state actors were more likely to Europeanize in those cases where the EC had competences in the policy areas in which they were most interested. Thus, the lack of EC competence in social policy to a large extent explains the hesitant attitudes of both the unions and the socialist parties, whose interests were strongly focussed on this policy area. In this context, the Commission's attempts to gain a higher profile in these areas through the attempts to broaden European social policy in the 1970s were not really taken seriously by the unions or the socialist parties who thus refrained from allocating major resources to Brussels.

At the same time, ideological factors also mattered, since they shaped perceptions of interests and – in particular – the perception of 'Europe' as an arena for policy-making. Socialists and labour unions had long been committed to internationalism. However, unlike the Christian democrats, who had only begun to internationalize beyond western Europe in the mid-1950s and who shared a strong and more or less federalist commitment to European integration,[38] socialists were much more divided over the formation and development of core Europe, which many initially perceived as too Catholic, conservative and capitalist. Thus they were also more sceptical towards Europe as an alternative or complementary level of policy-making. Similarly, many business actors initially opted for a much broader transatlantic Western world as their sphere of action when pushing for trade liberalization and market integration. Their assessment and activities changed progressively until the European Round Table of Industrialists (ERT) – formed in 1983 – singled out the EC as the appropriate primary place for market making.[39] In political science, drawing upon ideological commitments to explain political behaviour is characteristic of sociological institutionalism. Similarly, Pierre Bourdieu's sociological concept of 'fields' suggests that world views, belief systems and ideological commitments prevent actors from stepping outside of their routines, and – in this case – from starting to invest more resources into their Europeanization and the Europeanization of particular policies.[40]

Under particular circumstances the very same factors – traditions, interests, and ideology – worked in favour of transnationalization and Europeanization. For instance, previous

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38   Kaiser, Christian Democracy (note 32); Peter van Kemseke, Towards an Era of Development. The Globalization of Socialism and Christian Democracy, Leuven 2006.

39   Sigfrido M. Ramírez Pérez, Transnational Business Networks Propagating EC Industrial Policy: The Role of the Committee of Common Market Automobiles Constructors in: Wolfram Kaiser / Morten Rasmussen / Brigitte Leucht (eds.), The History of the European Union. Origins of a Trans- and Supranational Polity 1950-72, Abingdon 2009, 74-92.

40   Pierre Bourdieu, The Genesis of the Concepts of Habitus and of Field, in: Sociocriticism 2 (1985) 2, pp. 11-24.

ties via existing international organizations facilitated greater engagement at the European level and the investment of more resources into European transnational cooperation. This was the case, in particular, among bird protection and hunting groups when they established transnational cooperation in the EC. Bird protection organizations could build on their transnational linkages in the framework of the International Council for Bird Preservation (ICBP). The hunters who set up the European Federation of Hunting Associations (FACE) relied on existing connections via the International Council for Hunting and Game Conservation (CIC) and the German language international forum Internationale Jagdkonferenz. Similar forces were at work in the case of many non-state actors not treated in this special issue. When the EPP was founded in 1976, it immediately achieved a greater level of integration than the Socialist Confederation, not least because it could build on the long tradition of close transnational ties on European integration among European Christian democrats. Similarly, the founding of the ERT in the early 1980s benefited from previous transnational ties among Europe's automobile industry to prevent the transposition of the more demanding and costly US safety standards to Europe in the 1970s.[41]

In many cases it was rational for non-state actors to invest resources at the European level. When the EC was the competent authority, it made sense for interest groups to try to shape supranational policies, even if this meant a departure from traditional routines. The European competence in agricultural policy and the pivotal role of the Commission from the early 1960s onwards forced even unenthusiastic farming organizations such as the Deutscher Bauernverband, the German Farmers Union, to get organized at the European level and cooperate transnationally or face losing influence on policy development.[42] Similarly, the prospect of achieving the preferred kind of legislation at the European level that was unattainable at the national level encouraged bird protection organizations to join forces across borders and to lobby the EC. Shared interests in advancing the European supranational project in the area of environmental policy made the Commission a promising ally for these groups. The Commission financially supported European meetings in the framework of the EEB, thus further strengthening transnational cooperation among environmental groups. Likewise, the Commission paid out money for expert reports, research projects and the participation of experts in expert and advisory committees. Such financial incentives and other resources were particularly important for grassroots groups with limited funding who largely relied on membership fees. In the 1960s neo-functionalists had already stressed the importance of the new supranational institutions, their formal and informal powers, and their activism for attracting non-state actors to the EC, bringing in their expertise and also using these non-state actors as a resource to enhance their institutional legitimacy in policy-making – something the European Commission has attempted to do much more systematically

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41   Ramírez Pérez, Transnational Business Networks Propagating EC Industrial Policy (note 39).
42   Kiran Klaus Patel, Europäisierung wider Willen. Die Bundesrepublik in der Agrarintegration der EWG 1955–1973, Munich 2009.

since the downfall of the Santer Commission in 1999 and the White Paper on Governance of 2001.

Likewise their strong ideological commitment to European level solutions encouraged non-state actors to push towards the European level and invest resources there. The most prominent example is the demand for European liberalization to create a truly common market by the ERT in the 1980s, which helped pave the way for the Single Market Project.[43] In the 1970s, the radical bird protection groups addressed the European institutions, believing that only a European solution could solve the obviously cross-border problem of bird protection: the Italian authorities in particular seemed incapable of passing the appropriate legislation. The Commission has generally supported such demands as they are in line not only with its interest in enhancing its institutional role, but also with its overall preference for a more strongly integrated EC/EU. Recent literature on European lobbying has argued that non-state actors who give unconditional support to European level solutions can greatly enhance their influence with the supranational institutions.[44] Shared ideological preferences for supranational integration and particular policy solutions can create a solid basis for joint political action. In contrast, the more hesitant and sceptical actors find it harder to build fruitful cooperative ties with the institutions.

Impact on EC politics and policy-making?

What role did non-state actors play in EC policy-making? Non-state actors provided an important channel of interest intermediation between a variety of groups within European societies and the emerging European political system. They were facing a highly complex institutional system, with the European Commission at its centre as agenda setter and formally the only institution allowed to initiate legislation, a continued strong role of the member states and mainly consultative bodies such as the EP and the ESC. The incorrect usage of names of institutions in letters by non-state actors demonstrates that they initially struggled with understanding the complexity of the EC set-up. The introduction of new policies in the 1970s arguably paved the way for the further constitutionalization of the EC, with the Single European Act in 1987 and the Maastricht Treaty. Through their involvement, and their occasional pushing for new policies as in the case of environmental policy, non-state actors clearly contributed at a general level to the further evolution of the European polity.

At the same time, non-state actors who were getting involved at the EC level had to act as intercultural brokers in order to be successful. Not only did they have to deal with a multitude of languages, but they also had to grapple with institutional and legal as well

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43   Cf. Maria Green Cowles, Setting the Agenda for a New Europe: The ERT and EC 1992, in: Journal of Common Market Studies 33 (1993) 4, pp. 501-526.

44   For an introduction see Justin Greenwood, Interest Representation in the European Union, Basingstoke 2007.

as attitudinal differences. Improving their own intercultural competence and enhancing intercultural communication in the larger political and decision-making system were of crucial importance for achieving those compromises on which European decisions were routinely based. Those who were most successful in Europeanizing their organization had ample experience in international work and transnational cooperation. The usually young academics in the environmental organizations clearly found their integration in EC politics much easier to achieve than older labour representatives who had risen from the shop floor through the ranks of their organization. The cultural barrier, we argue, thus has important normative implications for what kinds of interests can be organized at the EC/EU level.

An important role of non-state actors in the 1970s was to mediate issues across levels of policy-making. This inter-level mediation is most conspicuous in the case of the new policy issues of the 1970s. The European socialists' transnational network performed a key agenda setting function – as Salm demonstrates – mediating the 0.7 per cent of GDP development aid target of the UN to the national governments and the EC at the same time. Similarly, in the area of environmental policy, a number of key concepts on habitats protection from international agreements were downloaded into European legislation through the involvement of transnationally cooperating policy advisers from the bird protection organizations at the EC level. The anti bird hunting issue was also discussed internationally. However, there were crucial variations in this debate between Northern and Southern Europe. Eventually, it was an issue from the mainstream of the Northern European discourse that was uploaded to the EC level. In the case of the CAP, COPA proved very effective in preventing the downloading of the important discourse on the negative effects of the CAP on developing countries, as well as the uploading of the discourses taking place in many of the member states, on the waste that characterized the CAP.

As the examples in the contributions to this special issue demonstrate, non-state actors in the 1970s used the same set of methods of interest mediation that are still practiced today. The environmental groups and COPA in particular engaged in direct lobbying of the European institutions and of the member states. They routinely stressed the representativeness of their interests – referring to the large numbers of their members or supporters – often in comparison with their opponents. Environmental groups were particularly strong in providing scientific expertise – on which credible legislation had to be based in the case of a complex issue such as the conservation of all wild birds of Europe. However, all of these methods were routinely applied across different levels as the member states retained exclusive control over formal decision-making in Council. The labour unions and the socialist parties, which were less interested in direct involvement with the EC and enjoyed direct ties with socialist national governments, tended to focus their action more on the member states.

Lastly, how successful were the non-state actors in influencing EC politics and policy-making? Success should be measured against the non-state actors' own aims, of course, rather than some abstract normative definition of what was, or would have been, good

for 'Europe' and its citizens. Measured in these terms, COPA probably remained the most successful EC level non-state actor in the 1970s, given its effectiveness in blocking change. COPA managed to prevent any attempt to reform the CAP. The minimal co-responsibility levy that was introduced against the will of COPA demonstrates their success rather than their failure, since its small size prevented any noticeable effect. It took more than twenty years, until the 1990s, for COPA's line of defence to collapse after pressures for reform mounted within the World Trade Organization and budgetary concerns over the costs of the CAP became greater and greater. For a long time, however, COPA had succeeded in establishing and fostering closely knit relations with DG Agriculture, dominating the consultation process, which has only recently begun to become more open to include consumers and environmental groups.[45]

In a similar way, the DGB as a national non-state actor played an influential if ambiguous role in defining the nature of the emerging EC social policy during the 1970s. On the one hand, the German trade union was a key actor lobbying for the establishment of social policy as a new area of EC competence, which would complement national welfare states. On the other hand, the DGB was instrumental in defining the (modest) scope of that policy, in particular through its preferences for the coordination of national policies (rather than European harmonization) and for regulatory policies (rather than redistributive schemes).

Both the socialist and the environmental groups were successful in working towards change at the EC level, managing to frame their preferences – the 0.7% target and the need for transnational bird protection – and to place them on the EC agenda. Working with public opinion and putting moral pressure on the governments, they worked towards political measures, even though they could not control the intergovernmental negotiations at the end of the EC decision making process.

Conclusion

We can thus conclude that the rise of policy-making in the 1970s attracted more and new non-state actors to the EC and led to their greater involvement. The economic crises after 1973 and the relative institutional stagnation compared to the ambitious expectations of the summit of The Hague in 1969, actually proved beneficial to the involvement of non-state actors. The economic and integration crises, and the perception of crisis, opened up debates with regard to the EC's future development, including issues such as the international competitiveness of EC business vis-à-vis the US and Japan and cross-border environmental problems.

The transnational organization and Europeanization of these non-state actors in policy-making in the EC varied a great deal, however. There are multiple reasons for this, which

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45   Cf. Karen Heard-Lauréote, European Union Governance. Effectiveness and Legitimacy of European Commission Committees, Abingdon 2010, chapter 6.

require a multi-causal analysis sensitive to the different contexts. Theoretical approaches used in the social sciences – frequently with a mono-causal thrust – are useful in singling out relevant factors, but need to be combined to deal with the complexity of this issue appropriately.

The most obvious variation is between older policies such as agriculture and social policy, where the crucial non-state actors were less interested in changing the level of decision-making. Conversely, concerning the novel issues such as development policy and environmental policy, non-state actors were very keen on change. Likewise, given the openness of the policy-making with the absence of existing EC competences and policy traditions combined with new opportunities for setting up transnational, partly informal network ties, these non-state actors were actually able to contribute to the shaping of policy change, and to the formulation of new policy issues and policies at the EC level.

These comparative observations merely constitute a first attempt at exploring the issue of non-state actors in the EC in the 1970s. A variety of other non-state actors – such as business actors – could not be considered for the purpose of this special issue. Similarly, only a limited range of policy areas is addressed in the four articles. Provisional as these findings may be, however, we can conclude that in the 1970s there existed patterns of governance involving non-state actors that were astonishingly similar to what we are used to at the start of the twenty-first century. In fact, it seems that in many ways the 1970s mark the origins of non-state actors' much greater engagement and new forms of informal policy-making involving them more systematically in the EC. Whether their greater role ever had, or at least has the potential to have, a beneficial effect on the democratic quality of EC/EU governance can be disputed and is another crucial question for future research and debate among historians and social scientists alike.

Regional or Global? Political Networks of Socialist Parties in European Community Development Policy[1]

Christian Salm

RESÜMEE

Der Aufsatz untersucht die transnationalen politischen Netzwerke der europäischen sozialdemokratischen/sozialistischen Parteien im Bereich der Entwicklungshilfepolitik der Europäischen Gemeinschaft zu Beginn der 1970er Jahre. Hierzu werden zunächst jene netzwerkartigen Verbindungen und Überlappungen der europäischen Sozialdemokraten / Sozialisten rekonstruiert, die sich im Rahmen des transnational institutionalisierten Netzwerkes der Sozialistischen Internationale (SI) herausbildeten. In einem zweiten Schritt werden am Beispiel der Debatte über ein regional oder global konzipiertes EG-Entwicklungshilfesystem die von den Netzwerken entwickelten Funktionen, Strategien und Aktivitäten für eine Einflussnahme auf den politischen Entscheidungsfindungsprozess der EG herausgearbeitet. Zum Schluss erfolgt eine Bewertung des Einflusses der transnationalen politischen Netzwerke der europäischen sozialdemokratischen / sozialistischen Parteien auf die EG-Entwicklungshilfepolitik.

In the beginning of the 1970s the wealth gap between the developed and the developing countries began to widen. The global increase in poverty and the only partially successful development programmes such as the strategy for the first United Nations (UN) Economic Development Decade (1961–1970) put development issues on the political agenda. The first television reports on starving children in the so-called Third World and television-led fund-raising campaigns for developing countries strengthened demands for improved development aid, with the churches and left-wing student groups in particular giving a voice to these demands.[2] As Richard T. Griffiths has pointed out, the growing

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2   See Bastian Hein, Die Westdeutschen und die Dritte Welt. Entwicklungsdienst und Entwicklungspolitik zwischen Reform und Revolte 1959–1974, Munich 2006, p. 135 ff.

public awareness of the problem of poverty in the beginning of the 1970s mobilized public opinion in the western European countries in favour of more concerted efforts by their governments in the field of development policy –[3] this at a time when systems of development aid were still largely based on national policy competences and structures and a shared European Community (EC) approach was only beginning to emerge.

In fact, the question of what relationship the EC should have with the developing countries can be traced back to the origins of the European Economic Community (EEC) in the 1950s.[4] When discussions on the later EEC Treaty started in 1955, two camps advocating distinct concepts of development policy formed. One camp, mainly consisting of the governments of France and Belgium, demanded a regional focus on development aid directed at their colonies. The other camp, mainly consisting of the governments of Germany and the Netherlands, clearly had wider trading interests. Indeed, because the economies of its colonies were so closely tied to France, for political and economic reasons the French government made an association of the overseas territories a precondition for signing the EEC Treaty.[5] Germany and the Netherlands eventually accepted the French government's demand in order to facilitate the successful conclusion of the negotiations.[6]

About 15 years later, development policy was again a major point on the EC's agenda. By then changes in the global political economy had called into question the narrowly-based EC development policy. By 1970, eighteen of the former colonies associated with the EC had become independent, and had negotiated new agreements with the EEC/EC: the Yaoundé Convention I in 1963 and the Yaoundé Convention II and the Arusha Convention in 1969. Furthermore, the EC had become the largest and fastest expanding market for products from developing countries. In addition, the accession of Great Britain to the EC was to transform the Commonwealth system and make the Community even more important to the developing countries.[7] Against this background, the negotiations on the Lomé Convention of 1975 marked an important step towards a more coherent EC policy vis-à-vis at least a part of the Third World.[8]

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3   Richard T. Griffiths, Development Aid. Some References for Historical Research, in: Helge Ø. Pharo / Monika Pohle Fraser (eds.), The Aid Rush. Aid regimes in Northern Europe during the Cold War, vol. 1, Oslo 2008, pp. 17-49, here p. 29.

4   Ronald Marwood, The European Community and the Third World: A Global or a Regional Development Policy?, in: Millennium – Journal of International Studies 3 (1974) 3, pp. 208-224, here p. 208.

5   On the negotiation of the association of the overseas territories with the EEC see especially Urban Vahsen, Eurafrikanische Entwicklungspolitik. Die Assoziierungspolitik der EWG gegenüber dem subsaharischen Afrika in den 1960er Jahren, Stuttgart 2010, pp. 55ff.

6   See, for example, Desmond Dinan, Europe Recast: A History of European Union, London 2004, p. 74; Gerhardt Brunn, Die Europäische Einigung von 1945 bis heute, Stuttgart 2002, pp. 114f.; Hans Küsters, Die Gründung der Europäischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft, Baden-Baden 1982, pp. 379ff.

7   Marwood, The European Community and the Third World (note 4), p. 208.

8   See Carol Cosgrove Twitchett, Europe and Africa: From Association to Partnership, Westmead / Farnborough, 1978, p. 148; Lotte Drieghe / Jan Orbie, Revolution in Time of Eurosclerosis. The Case of the First Lomé Convention, in: L'Europe en formation, 2009, 353-354, pp. 167-181, here p. 169.

In the 1970s the growing wealth gap across the world strengthened the moral case for more equitable global institutional arrangements. At the same time, the increased international bargaining power of the developing countries as producers of crucial raw materials and their position in the Cold War competition between the superpowers gave them some leverage on the Lomé negotiations and on the broader international economic policy debate as part of the North-South Dialogue.[9] The new power of the developing countries was also reflected in the Group of 77 (G-77), the largest intergovernmental organization of developing states in the UN, established during the 1960s with the aim of articulating and promoting the collective economic interests of the countries of the South. The G-77 demanded a New International Economic Order (NEIO) in the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) deliberations and the implementation of the International Strategy for the Second UN International Development Decade (1971–1980).[10]

The International Strategy for the Second UN Development Decade was proclaimed by the UN General Assembly in November 1970. The concept included a comprehensive global policy strategy for development aid and provided an indicative framework for extending and coordinating the international community's contribution to economic and social progress in the Third World.[11] The general objective of the strategy was 'to seek a better and more effective system of international cooperation whereby the prevailing disparities in the world may be banished and prosperity secured for all'.[12] The strategy called for a global development approach based on joint concerted action by developed and developing countries in all spheres of economic and social life.[13] Moreover, the strategy contained one of the most frequently discussed policy targets concerning international development aid, namely that 'each economically advanced country will progressively increase its official development assistance to the developing countries and will exert its best to reach a minimum net amount of 0.7 per cent of its Gross National Product … by the middle of the Decade'.[14]

At the EC level, France still advocated limiting a policy of association to the former colonies whereas Germany and the Netherlands wanted to replace the association policy with global development aid.[15] However, both camps essentially agreed on the further

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9   See Giuliano Garavani, The Colonies Strike Back: The Impact of the Third World on Western Europe, 1968–1975, in: Contemporary European History 16 (2007) 3, pp. 299-319, here p. 313ff.

10   See, for example, Thorsten B. Olesen, Between Words and Deeds. Denmark and the NIEO Agenda, 1974-1982, in: Helge Ø. Pharo/Monika Pohle Fraser (eds.), The Aid Rush. Aid Regimes in Northern Europe during the Cold War, vol. 1, Oslo 2008, pp. 145-182, here p. 146f.

11   Jörg-Udo Meyer/Dieter Seul/Karl Heinz Klinger, Die zweite Entwicklungsdekade der Vereinten Nationen. Konzept und Kritiken einer globalen Entwicklungsstrategie, Düsseldorf/Gütersloh 1971, p. 14.

12   UN General Assembly Resolution 2626 (XXV), Paragraph 6, 19 November 1970.

13   UN General Assembly Resolution 2626 (XXV), Paragraph 7, 19 November 1970.

14   UN General Assembly Resolution 2626 (XXV), Paragraph 43, 19 November 1970.

15   See Dieter Frisch, The European Union's Development Policy, Policy Management Report 15 of European Centre for Development Policy Management, Maastricht 2008, p. 7; Enzo R. Grilli, The European Community and the Developing Countries, Cambridge / New York 1993, pp. 65-71.

Europeanization of development policy.[16] To achieve this goal, two different systems of development aid had to be integrated into one single system: the individual development policies of the EC member states as well as the already existing EC policy system of regional development aid in the form of the association conventions.[17] This integration could only be achieved if EC development policy was formulated in global terms for relations with all developing countries. It was at this point that the European socialist parties became engaged in EC development policy.

In line with their internationalist origins and traditions, European socialists tended to feel a special responsibility for the situation in developing countries.[18] Such sentiments were clearly reflected in the development polices of many European socialist parties and organizations. For example, from its creation in 1951, the partly-institutionalized meta-network of the Socialist International (SI) defined development aid as one of the most important policy fields on its agenda.[19] Holding its Council meeting in Haifa in Israel in 1960, the SI for the first time met outside of Europe. In his study of the internationalization of party cooperation, Peter van Kemseke has interpreted this decision for Haifa as signalling that development issues had become a top priority for the SI.[20] Hence, it is not surprizing that in the beginning of the 1970s European socialists were deeply involved in the ongoing debates on the future of development policy at the international, European and national levels. Using transnational political networks, the European socialists sought to reframe the debate on the future of EC development policy by pushing for the full integration of the proposals of the Second International UN Development Strategy into the EC development system and promoting a global concept of EC development aid.

Drawing upon the definition of Wolfram Kaiser, Brigitte Leucht and Michael Gehler, I understand the term 'transnational political networks' as the mainly informal and non-hierarchical cooperation of state and non-state actors linked across national borders. Unlike in the case of policy networks, their cooperation is not necessary geared or limited to influencing policy-making in one policy sector only.[21] This definition has one particular heuristic advantage. The categorization of actors within networks as state and non-state

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16   Eppler hofft immer noch auf eine gemeinsame Entwicklungspolitik, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 27 September 1972.

17   See Klaus Billerbeck, Europäisierung der Entwicklungspolitik II. Gemeinschaftliche Entwicklungspolitik für den Mittelmeerraum, Asien und Lateinamerika, Berlin 1972, p. 2.

18   See, for example, Grilli, The European Community and the Developing Countries (note 15), p. 3.

19   Karl Ludwig Günsche / Klaus Lantermann, Kleine Geschichte der Sozialistischen Internationale, Bonn 1977, p. 128. For a short overview on the reactivation of the SI after World War II see Wilfried Loth, The Socialist International, in: Walter Lipgens / Wilfried Loth (eds.), Documents on the History of European Integration, vol. 4, Transnational Organizations of Political Parties and Pressure Groups in the Struggle for European Union, 1945-1950, Berlin/New York 1991, pp. 436-442.

20   Peter van Kemseke, Towards an Era of Development. The Globalization of Socialism and Christian Democracy, Leuven 2006, p. 256.

21   Wolfram Kaiser / Brigitte Leucht / Michael Gehler, Transnational Networks in European Integration Governance: Historical Perspectives on an Elusive Phenomenon, in: Wolfram Kaiser / Brigitte Leucht / Michael Gehler (eds.), Transnational Networks in Regional Integration. Governing Europe 1945–1983, Basingstoke 2010, pp. 1-17.

actors is less rigid than the distinction often used in social science between public and private actors. On the assumption that political parties formulate und advance general public interests, this latter definition treats them as public actors comparable to governments. Despite the fact that political party actors often also hold government posts, political parties are clearly non-state actors. Thus, leading socialist politicians played a role as state actors in their governments and in inter-state negotiations, and as non-state actors in their parties, where they were involved in the transnational networks of the European socialists.

The aim of this article is to reconstruct these transnational political networks of the European socialists, their activities and their relations with state and other non-state actors including experts and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in the field of EC development policy. The two central research questions are: first, what transnational political networks did the socialists establish and use? Secondly, to what extent was the ongoing debate on the future of EC development policy shaped by the transnational cooperation of the European socialists? The article is thus structured in two main sections. In the first section I map the transnational political networks of the European socialists engaged in development policy, explain why they were constituted, describe their degree of formal integration, highlight and evaluate any overlap among the various networks, and assess the informal dimension of their cooperation. I discuss those political networks of the European socialists that formed around the SI, the Liaison Bureau of the Socialist Parties in the EC, as well as the German Friedrich Ebert Foundation (FEF) and the Vienna Institute for Development. In the second section I discuss the functions, strategies and activities of these transnational networks in EC development policy. In the conclusion I provide a preliminary assessment of the impact of the European socialist parties on EC development policy.

Mapping socialist networks in development policy

When the SI attempted to reconstitute itself as a global network of socialist and social democratic parties at its congress in Frankfurt in June 1951, it adopted two documents: a draft of new statutes and a declaration on the principles of democratic socialism. The declaration envisaged inter alia a 'world plan' for international institutions and policy measures to be used for economic assistance for underdeveloped countries. Furthermore, the declaration stipulated that a socialist policy for economically underdeveloped countries should be formulated. In order to frame such a socialist development policy, a conference of economic experts was held in Vienna in November 1951. Only ten west European parties participated in this conference.[22]

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22   See Günsche / Lantermann, Kleine Geschichte der Sozialistischen Internationale (note 19), p. 236 ff.

Although the organization had started to intensify contacts with socialist parties in Asia and elsewhere since the early 1950s[23], about twenty years later, the main SI actors were still the west European member parties. For instance, all important members of the bureau of the organization were west European socialists. Members of the Socialist Party of Austria (SPÖ) filled the position of president (Bruno Pittermann), and the position of secretary-general (Hans Janitschek, who succeeded Albert Carthy, a member of the British Labour Party, in April 1969).[24] Furthermore, with the exception of Tokyo in 1977, throughout the 1960s and 1970s all SI party leaders' conferences were held in west European countries. These party leaders' conferences were attended by high ranking west European socialists, including socialists in high positions in the European Commission, with the purpose of enabling discussions and exchanges of views.[25] Even though the SI defined itself as a global network of socialist parties, the organization still had a strongly Eurocentric character in the beginning of the 1970s.

The cooperation of the socialist parties in the EC was first institutionalized in the Liaison Bureau of the Socialist Parties in the European Community in 1957. As the resolution of the second congress of the socialist parties in the EC stated in June of that year, the aim of the Liaison Bureau was to strengthen relations between the parties and to reach agreement in particular on EC political issues.[26] The Liaison Bureau consisted of one delegate of each member party and met every six months.[27] In spite of this institutional organization, the cooperation of the socialist parties in the EC remained very weakly developed throughout the 1960s. Only the decision of the summit of The Hague in 1969 in favour of direct elections for the European Parliament (EP) provided an impetus for strengthening their transnational cooperation through further institutionalization.[28] The socialist parties reacted to this decision by founding the Confederation of the Socialist Parties in the EC in April 1974. However, as Simon Hix and Urs Lesse have demonstrated, the institutional structures of the former Liaison Bureau were largely maintained, with some small changes.[29] Due to only marginal institutional improvements, as well as a lack of funding and staff, the formal cooperation of the socialist parties in the EC remained

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23 Kemseke, Towards an Era of Development (note 20), 53 ff.

24 Bruno Pittermann was SI president from 1964–1976. Hans Janitschek held the position of the SI secretary-general from 1969–1976. Albert Carthy was SI secretary-general from 1957–1969.

25 Rodney Balcomb (SI assistant secretary) to Hans Janitschek, 9 November 1973, International Institute for Social History (IISH) Amsterdam, Socialist International Archives (SIA), box 337.

26 See Simon Hix / Urs Lesse, Shaping a Vision. A History of the Party of European Socialists, Brussels 2002, pp. 11 ff. Six parties were represented: Parti Socialiste Belge / Belgische Socialistische Partij (PS / SP); Section Française Internationale Ouvriere (SFIO); Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (SPD); Partito Socialista Democratico Italiano (PSDI); Parti Ouvrier Socialiste Luxembourgeois / Letzeburger Sozialistische Arbechter Partei (POSL / LSAP); an the Dutch Partij van de Arbeid (PvdA).

27 See, for example, Andreas van Gehlen, Europäische Parteiendemokratie? Institutionelle Voraussetzungen und Funktionsbedingungen der europäischen Parteien zur Minderung des Legitimationsdefizits der EU, http://www.gehlen.net/diss/ [last accessed 4 May 2010], p. 192.

28 See, for example, Oskar Niedermayer, Europäische Parteien? Zur grenzüberschreitenden Interaktion politischer Parteien im Rahmen der Europäischen Gemeinschaft, Frankfurt a. M. 1983, p. 60; Norbert Gresch, Transnationale Parteienzusammenarbeit in der EG, Baden-Baden 1979, p. 109.

29 Hix / Lesse, Shaping a Vision (note 26), p. 22.

weak throughout the 1970s. Thus, although the Confederation considered itself to be the independent section of the SI in the EC,[30] the partly-institutionalized structures of the SI remained the most important network for the west European socialist parties for defining socialist policies in and for Europe and the EC.

In fact, due to the prospect of enlargement and new impulses for further integration after the summit of The Hague such as the plan for a common monetary policy, various SI study groups became more concerned with EC politics in the beginning of the 1970s. The topic of European integration was also high on the agenda of the SI congress in Vienna in June 1972. In order to elaborate a European socialist policy, influential representatives of the European socialist parties spoke at this congress. They included Willy Brandt, the west German chancellor; Sicco Mansholt, the president of the European Commission; Pietro Nenni, the leader of the Italian Socialist Party; Harold Wilson, the leader of the British Labour Party; Walter Behrendt, the president of the EP; François Mitterrand, the leader of the French Socialist Party; Ivar Nørgaard, the Danish minister for foreign trade and EC affairs; and Olof Palme, prime minister and leader of the Swedish Social Democratic Labour Party. Highlighting the close relationship of the SI with the socialist parties in the EC, the congress resolution on EC politics stated that the SI 'supports the socialist parties of the EC which decided to take the lead in pressing both at national and Community level for effective assistance to the developing countries'.[31]

Alongside the SI and the Liaison Bureau – subsequently transformed into the Confederation of the Socialist Parties in the EC –, in the 1970s the FEF, a political foundation closely linked to the German Social Democratic Party (SPD), fulfilled a special role as what might be termed a political network organization for the European socialist parties, becoming an engine of transnational socialist party cooperation.[32] As early as the early 1960s the foundation began to develop far-reaching transnational relations in order to shape development policy.[33] Since its original foundation in 1925, international cooperation had been one of the foundation's main activities. Before 1933 it developed close relations in particular to officials of the international organizations at the time such as the League of Nations and the International Labour Organization. FEF activists maintained these contacts to some extent while in exile during World War II. This in turn made it easier for the reconstituted FEF (1946) to continue and expand its international cooperation in the 1950s and 1960s.[34]

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30   Interview des Parlamentarischen Pressedienstes mit dem Präsidenten des Bundes der sozialdemokratischen Parteien in der EG Wilhelm Dröscher, IISH, Archief Sicco L. Mansholt (ASM), box 274.

31   Report of the 12th Congress of the SI held in Vienna, 26-29 June 1972, IISH, SIA, box 263.

32   On the role of the FEF as political network organization in another context see also Wolfram Kaiser / Christian Salm, Transition und Europäisierung in Spanien und Portugal. Sozial- und christdemokratische Netzwerke im Übergang von der Diktatur zur parlamentarischen Demokratie, in: Archiv für Sozialgeschichte, Bd. 49, Bonn 2009, pp. 259-282, here pp. 264 ff.

33   Alfred Nau (president of the FEF) to Helmut Schmidt (then interior minister of the city-state of Hamburg and later West German chancellor), 6 September 1962, Archiv der sozialen Demokratie (AdsD) Bonn, Helmut Schmidt Archiv (HSA), 1/HSAAA007503.

34   The most important of these organizations are: International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, various Eu-

European integration played a prominent role in the foundation's political activities. The FEF developed contacts with the Council of Europe, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the EEC/EC.[35] Together with the Directorate-General for development aid (DG VIII) of the European Commission, the FEF organized training programmes for qualified individuals from developing countries associated with the EEC from the mid-1960s onwards.[36] To intensify its contacts with the European Commission, the FEF's research institute offered DG VIII at the end of the 1960s to produce various research reports on development policy.[37] In fact, the Commission agreed that the foundation's research institute should prepare a report on the economic development of two African states, Togo and Dahomé (renamed Benin in 1975), which were associated with the EC.[38] In 1973, the foundation opened an office in Brussels to operate in the field of EC development policy.[39] In the light of the Yaoundé Convention II and the future Lomé Convention, the FEF considered development policy as a suitable policy field for networking at the European level.[40] Using the example of EC development policy, the foundation's office in Brussels invited political actors to familiarize themselves with the political system of the EC. These activities were complemented by a variety of international seminars and conferences, which the foundation organized in cooperation with EC institutions in Luxembourg, Strasbourg and Paris. International seminars were not only held in EC member states but also in other European states such as the Scandinavian countries, the United Kingdom and Austria.[41] Additionally, the foundation's research centre maintained contacts with the most relevant institutions for development policy in these countries such as, for example, the Vienna Institute for Development.

Based on the idea of the former Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru that an international institute free from the influence of governments should be set up to promote development policy, the Vienna Institute was founded in 1962 by Foreign Minister Bruno Kreisky, who later became chancellor of Austria from 1970 to 1983. It was one of the first NGOs to discuss problems of development policy and promote new forms of development aid. The main function of the institute in the 1970s was to influence

ropean and non-European governments, Rockefeller-Foundation, Ford-Foundation, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Lieber-Foundation and institutions from Asia, Africa, Latin America and the United States working in the field of development policy.

35   Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Die partnerschaftlichen Beziehungen der FES zu den Entwicklungsländern – Bericht 1962, AdsD, HSA, 1/HSAAA007503.

36   Aktenvermerk Generaldirektion Entwicklungshilfe VIII, 22 July 1969, European Commission Historical Archives (ECHA) Brussels, Bac 25 1980 146.

37   Dr. Horst Heidermann (director of the FEF research centre) to Henrie Rochereau (member of the European Commission), 17 July 1969, ECHA, Bac 25 1980 146.

38   Johannes Westhoff (director general DG VIII) to Dr. Horst Heidermann, 7 October 1969, and Johannes Westhoff to Dr. Horst Heidermann, 24 November 1969, ECHA, Bac 25 1980 146.

39   Patrik von zur Mühlen, Die internationale Arbeit der Friedrich Ebert Stiftung. Von den Anfängen bis zum Ende des Ost-West-Konflikts, Bonn 2007, p. 194.

40   Interview Hermann Büntz (former member of staff of FEF office, Brussels), 24 February 2009.

41   Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Die partnerschaftlichen Beziehungen der FES zu den Entwicklungsländern – Bericht 1962, AdsD, HSA, 1/HSAAA007503.

public opinion in industrialized countries in favour of international development by disseminating information about the developing world and the role of industrialized countries in the development process. The institute's board included important decision-makers from national and international institutions and NGOs from the West and the South.[42] With its predominantly social democratic shape, the board also included American Democrats such like Paul G. Hoffman, the administrator of the UN Development Programme. European socialists involved in the board's informal meetings and activities included Kreisky, Brandt, Erhard Eppler, the SPD minister for development cooperation, and Ernst Michanek, a member of the Swedish Social Democratic Party (SAP) and director general of the Swedish International Development Authority.[43]

The Vienna Institute and the FEF were linked to each other not least through the close relationship between Kreisky and Brandt. In the 1970s, both organizations sought to extend their relations.[44] They mainly cooperated by organizing joint seminars for a wide range of different actors to discuss various aspects of international development policy. A representative of the FEF or the SPD usually attended the board meetings of the Vienna Institute. In 1969 the board meeting was even held in the FEF headquarters in Bonn.[45] Furthermore, the board meeting invitations for delegates of European socialist parties closely connected with the SPD and the SPÖ were prepared by the international secretary of the SPD party executive, Hans Eberhard Dingels.[46] Dingels' list of invited participants largely covered the members of a tight network of international secretaries and secretary-generals of the European socialist parties.[47]

The members of this network regularly exchanged information on new developments in European and international politics.[48] Furthermore, the executive committees of the European socialist parties were continuously informed of the political activities of their sister parties. By deputizing for the party leaders at formal and informal meetings at the international and European level, the international secretaries played an important role

42   Peter Jankowitsch, Österreich und die dritte Welt. Ein neues Kapitel Außenpolitik, in: Erich Bielka / Peter Jankowitsch / Hans Thalberg (eds.), Die Ära Kreisky: Schwerpunkte der österreichischen Außenpolitik, Wien 1983, pp. 257-292, here p. 267.

43   Composition of Board, 28 October 1973, Bruno Kreisky Archive (BKA) Vienna, III. 8. Wiener Institut für Entwicklungspolitik, box 10.

44   Alfred Nau to Bruno Kreisky, 29 October 1970, BKA, III. 8. Wiener Institut für Entwicklungspolitik, box 10.

45   Minutes of the Vienna Institute Board Meeting, 7 June 1969, BKA, III. 8. Wiener Institut für Entwicklungspolitik, box 9.

46   Hans Eberhard Dingels to Dr. Günter Grunwald (executive director of the FEF), 3 April 1969, AdsD, Willy Brandt Archiv (WPA), A11.4, 50.

47   Karl Czernetz (international secretary of the SPÖ), Tom McNally (overseas secretary of the Labour Party), Pieter Dankert (international secretary of the PvdA), Alberto Bemporad (international secretary of the Partito Socialista Italiano, PSI), Piere Schori (international secretary of the SAP), Jan Luyton (general secretary of the Belge PS), Niels Mathiasen (general secretary of the Danish Social Democratic Party), Anssi Karkkinen (secretary of the Social Democratic Party of Finland), Richard Müller (secretary of the Social Democratic Party of Switzerland), Reiulf Steen (vice-chairman of the Norwegian Labour Party), Fernand Georges (secretary-general of the Liaison Bureau of the Socialist Parties in the EC) and Albert Carthy (secretary-general of the SI).

48   Interview Hans Eberhard Dingels, 7 July 2009.

in the socialist networks. Occasionally they chaired transnational working groups established in the frameworks of the SI or the EC Bureau.

For instance, after UNCTAD II in New Delhi in 1968 the SI formed a working group on development cooperation. Dingels was appointed chair of this group, later renamed Working Party on Socialist Priorities in the Second Development Decade. Again, most of the members of this informal group belonged to the network of the international secretaries of the European socialist parties. [49] The group's objective was to make the SI more visible in development cooperation and guarantee that it would be a main factor in making the upcoming Second UN Development Decade a success. After the first meeting in January 1969, the working group proposed to the SI Bureau that experts from other institutions in the field of development cooperation should be invited to assist the group in their further deliberations. [50] Thus, the secretary-general of the SI at the time, Carthy, transmitted a request to Kreisky to send an expert on development policy from the Vienna Institute to the next meeting of the working group.[51] Dingels himself made sure that a representative of the FEF research centre was involved in the deliberations, too.[52] The next group meeting was already attended by the director of the Vienna Institute, Peter Jankowitsch who was a close assistant of Kreisky and later his chief of cabinet, and the director of the FEF research centre, Horst Heidermann.[53] Given the SI's Euro-centric character in the 1970s, the working group discussed not only socialist policies and strategies related to the International Strategy of the Second UN Development Decade, but also how proposals from this strategy could be inserted into EC development policy.[54]

Motivated by the same political objectives, Jan Tinbergen (a member of the Dutch Labour Party, chair of the UN Development Planning Committee and winner of the Nobel Price for economics in 1969) proposed the establishment of an informal network in the framework of the SI to coordinate socialist activities in development policy. At the eleventh SI congress in Eastbourne in Britain in April 1969, Tinbergen presented unpublished documents of several UN agencies on the International Strategy for the Second UN Development Decade highlighting that these proposals were clearly in line with socialist policy. Tinbergen called on the socialist parties to commit themselves to two targets of international development policy in particular: first, the spending of one per cent of the gross domestic product (GNP) of industrialized countries on development aid; and secondly, tariff-free imports of products from developing countries.[55] Further-

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49   The working party was composed of members from Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Great Britain, Israel, the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden.

50   SI Circular No. 6/69, 7 February 1969, The Danish Labour Movement's Library and Archives (ABA) Copenhagen, Socialist International (SI), box 566.

51   Albert Carthy to Bruno Kreisky, 13 February 1969, IISH, SIA, box 909.

52   Hans Eberhard Dingels to Alfred Nau, 12 February 1969, AdsD, WBA, A11.4, 50.

53   Albert Carthy to Peter Jankowitsch, 12 March 1969, and Albert Carthy to Dr. Horst Heidermann, 12 March 1979, IISH, SIA, box 909.

54   Interview Hans Eberhard Dingels, 27 January 2010.

55   The 0.7 per cent figure was first mentioned in a UN document with the declaration of the Second UN Development Decade in November 1970. From then on the SI took on the 0.7 per cent target. On the origins of the 0.7

more, he stressed the need for socialist parties to strengthen their cooperation vis-à-vis the UN Development Strategy.[56] Following Tinbergen's speech, the congress adopted a resolution that demanded that SI member parties assume a uniform position vis-à-vis the UN Development Strategy for the 1970s.[57]

A short while later, Tinbergen considered the election of the SPD-led government of Brandt in the Federal Republic in September 1969 – at a time when the Labour Party was still in power in Britain – to be a unique chance for socialist parties to contribute to the future of development policy.[58] In November 1969, at a meeting with the recently elected new SI secretary-general, Janitschek, and the overseas secretary of the Labour Party, Tom McNally, Tinbergen discussed how the SI could foster cooperation among socialist development ministers. Besides the German and the British ministers, Tinbergen also wanted to involve the Swedish development minister, stressing that socialist governments and parties should develop a long-term plan for development policy. Tinbergen proposed the establishment of an informal network, to be called World Plan Council of the SI, which would bring together leading members of socialist parties throughout the world with experts in the field of development aid.[59] The major objective of this network would be to channel the transnational cooperation of the socialist parties to prepare for the new tasks in the field of development policy.

In March 1970, at the SI party leaders' conference in Brussels, Tinbergen again drew attention to the International Strategy for the Second UN Development Decade and presented his proposal for a World Plan Council of the SI. According to the Dutch professor, the socialists faced a dilemma: they considered it essential to eliminate poverty in the world but the very policies of development and industrial growth pursued to eliminate poverty led to the destruction of the environment and a population increase. For Tinbergen this meant that if the twin goals of eliminating poverty and protecting the environment were to be maintained, then it was necessary not only to coordinate the two policies, but to re-examine and possibly alter them. His proposal for a World Plan Council was to facilitate the preparation of a comprehensive socialist policy for development and environmental protection in a transnational framework. The lack of proper socialist planning for such policy issues at an international level motivated the party leaders' decision to establish a socialist network for development policy. The World Plan Council of the SI was intended to fill a lacuna in socialist policy, namely to take a leading position in international development policy and to support the proposals of the UN strategy

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per cent target see Michael A. Clemens/Todd J. Moss, Ghost of 0.7%: Origins and Relevance of the International Aid target, Center for Global Development, Working paper No. 68, 2005, http://www.cgdev.org/content/publications/detail/3822/ [last accessed 7 June 2010].

56   Socialist Priorities for the Second Development Decade. Speech by Jan Tinbergen at the 11th SI Congress in Eastbourne, 16-20 June 1969, IISH, SIA, box 414.

57   Resolution of the 11th SI congress reiterated in the resolution on the Second Development Decade adopted by the Council conference of the SI, 25-27 May 1971, Circular No. 10/72, 9 June 1971, ABA, SI, box 751.

58   Jan Tinbergen to Judith Hart, 27 October 1969, IISH, SIA, box 909.

59   Minutes of the meeting with Jan Tinbergen at the SI Secretariat, 7 November 1969, IISH, SIA, box 414.

for the Second Development Decade.[60] To underline the ambitions of the World Plan Council as well as to provide detailed information on the issues of the UN Development Strategy, the SI Bureau circulated to its member parties a report prepared by Tinbergen's UN Development Planning Committee.[61] Additionally, to raise the awareness of the UN in respect of this initiative and to discuss further which part the SI could play in the Second UN Development Decade, the secretary-general of the SI, Janitschek, met the administrator of the UN Development Programme, Hoffmann.[62]

As a first step, in the beginning of the 1970s, a small working group of experts from SI member parties was set up under the chairmanship of Tinbergen.[63] This working group's task was to prepare a detailed plan of the structure of the World Plan Council and its role in international development policy. In order to retain a close link between the work of the group and policy-making in development policy, Tinbergen drew up a list of prospective participants in the informal meetings of the working group. It contained persons whom he considered crucial for the core of the network of the World Plan Council: Kreisky or a representative of the Vienna Institute; Eppler or a representative of the FEF; Judith Hart, former and future British minister for overseas development; Nikolas Kaldor, an economist from the University of Cambridge and political advisor of the Labour Party; Paul Lambert, an economist from the University of Liège in Belgium; Mohammed Hoda, the London Representative of the All-Indian Praja Socialist Party; and, in order to create a link to EC policy-making, Robert Marjolin, who had led the French delegation in the negotiations on the formation of the EEC and had been a member of the European Commission until 1967.[64]

A first meeting of the working group was held in London in June 1971. The participants were Tinbergen, Hart, Kaldor, Hoda, Jankowitsch; Winfried Böll, an official from the German development ministry attending on behalf of Eppler; and the SI assistant secretary, Rodney Balcomb.[65] It was agreed that the role of the World Plan Council should be to draw up specifically socialist development aid proposals for the Second UN Development Decade, proposals that could be recommended to socialist parties and governments. The working group suggested to the SI Bureau that the structure of the World Plan Council should consist of a small, 'inner group' of about a dozen development experts. There should also be an 'outer group' of a considerably larger number of development experts and leading members of socialist parties from developed and developing countries with an interest in development problems whose advice and expertise could be used by the 'inner group'.[66] The 'inner group' should meet sporadically to plan the work

60   SI Circular No. 47/70, 18 September 1970, IISH, SIA, box 414.
61   SI Circular No. W.5/73, 15 June 1973, ABA, SI, box 584.
62   SI Information, Press Release. Hans Janitschek meets Paul G. Hoffman, 10 April 1970, ABA, SI, box 566.
63   Rodney Balcomb to Judith Hart, 9 June 1971, Labour History Archive and Study Centre (LHASC) Manchester, Judith Hart papers, box Hart/8/96.
64   Jan Tinbergen to Hans Janitschek, 14 May 1971, IISH, SIA, box 414.
65   Minutes of Experts' Meeting called to draw up Proposals for Council for World Development Policies (World Plan Council) of the SI, London, 11 June 1971, IISH, SIA, box 414.
66   SI Circular No. W.A/71, 29 October 1971, ABA, SI, box 566.

of the World Plan Council, to discuss questions of development policy and to make suggestions for, and help to draft, various statements and reports.[67] In contrast, the 'outer group' was not to hold meetings. It would instead have a consultative role and submit ideas or papers to the 'inner group'. The members of the 'outer group' would consist of a wide range of socialist politicians and experts, who would not be necessarily members of socialist parties, from all over the world. Members from European socialist parties involved in this loose network would include Kreisky, Eppler, Marjolin, Mansholt and Antonio Giolitti, member of the Central Committee of the Italian Socialist Party and minister for budget and planning.

The SI Bureau generally agreed to these proposals for the structure of the World Plan Council. It additionally set up two study groups, however: one to study questions of development policy and another to study questions of environmental protection. Both groups were to hold joint meetings from time to time.[68] The tasks of the study groups was to draw up socialist policy strategies which could be adopted by the SI and recommended to parties, governments and international organizations. More generally, the tasks of the World Plan Council were defined as acting as a high-level pressure group in relations with governments; making suggestions on future development aid; and creating publicity for the problem of development aid.[69] The World Plan Council would be a consultative body in relation to the SI Bureau.[70]

Functions, strategies and activities

These partly overlapping networks had three main functions related to EC development policy: raising public awareness and increasing support for development aid; setting the agenda in this policy field; and coordinating the policies of the socialist parties.

The first function was to influence public opinion in favour of increased EC development aid. Indeed, beside agreement on the need to foster and improve their transnational cooperation, there was broad consensus among the European socialist parties that public opinion would play an important role in realizing socialist policy objectives for the Second UN Development Decade. The socialist parties assumed that their influence on public opinion would help legitimize increased international development aid. Moreover, as Eppler stated at the board meeting of the Vienna Institute in 1969, support for development aid limited to the national level had to become extended to the European and the international levels.[71] The existing networks were supposed to promote socialist

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67   Minutes of Experts' Meeting called to draw up Proposals for Council for World Development Policies (World Plan Council) of the SI, London, 11 June 1971, IISH, SIA, box 414.

68   SI Circular No. B. 13/72, 3 March 1972, IISH, SIA, box 414.

69   SI Circular No. M. 13/73, 18 May 1973, ABA, SI, box 583.

70   SI Circular No. M. 13/73, 18 May 1973, ABA, SI, box 583.

71   Minutes of the Vienna Institute board meeting, 7 June 1969, BKA, III. 8. Wiener Institut für Entwicklungspolitik, box 9.

proposals at these levels, including greater public participation in formulating the aims of development aid and mobilizing new groups, particularly the youth, as argued in a paper on the role of public opinion in development policy-making by the SI Working Group on Socialist Priorities in the Second Development Decade.[72]

Achieving such mobilization of the public and greater engagement with new groups at the European level was also one of the main objectives of the Vienna Institute for the 1970s. Thus, projects with this objective were high on the agenda of the institute. At the board meeting in 1969 Kreisky declared the organization of a European youth conference to be one of the most important tasks to be realized. The idea for such a conference was both to enable young Europeans to understand the importance of development policy and to convince them of constructive approaches to it.[73] Also involving young delegates from Third World countries, this conference was held in Salzburg in 1970.[74]

In 1975 the Vienna Institute organized a conference to bring together for the first time all European institutes of development research to accelerate the founding of a European umbrella organization called European Association of Development Research and Training Institutes (EADI).[75] The initiative for this Europe-wide organization came after a conference of the OECD in early 1973, in which delegates from development research institutes of Third World countries argued that it would simplify their work if they could deal with a single contact organization of all European public and private development research institutes. By organizing this conference in 1975, the Vienna Institute not only helped to launch the EADI, but it also hosted its office until 1981.[76] Another initiative of the Vienna Institute to mobilize new platforms in order to support discussions among development experts on the European level was the organization of the Second European Conference of the Society of International Development (SID).[77] The first such conference had taken place in 1973, when the Director of the Vienna Institute at the time, Arne Haselbach, a member of the SPÖ, was elected chair of the SID European Regional Committee.[78] In the 1970s, the SID supported calls for more equitable global institutional arrangements as also proposed by the UN Strategy for the Second UN Development Decade. The second European SID Conference was held in Linz in 1975.[79]

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72   SI Circular xlvi/69, 16 April 1969, Working Party on Socialist Priorities in the Second Development Decade, The role of public opinion, IISH, SIA, box 414.

73   Minutes of the Vienna Institute board meeting, 7 June 1969, BKA, III. 8. Wiener Institut für Entwicklungspolitik, box 9.

74   Interview Arne Haselbach (former director of the Vienna Institute), 19 March 2010.

75   The EADI today is a leading network for development research in Europe. The most important members are the Overseas Development Institute (ODI) in London, the Institute of Development Studies (IDS) in Sussex, the European Centre for Development Policy Management (ECDPM) in Maastricht, and the German Institute for Development Policy (DIE).

76   Interview Arne Haselbach, 26 March 2010.

77   The Society for International Development (SID) was funded in Washington, DC in 1957 with the aim of exchanging information and experience among development professionals.

78   Projektvorschlag: Europäische Regionalkonferenz der Gesellschaft für internationale Entwicklung, BKA, III. 8. Wiener Institut für Entwicklungspolitik, box 10.

79   Interview Haselbach (note 76).

To realize such initiatives, however, the Vienna Institute occasionally had to rely on bilateral cooperation, especially with the FEF.[80] At times the FEF supported the Vienna Institute financially as well.[81]

A further strategy of the transnational socialist networks to influence public opinion was the publishing of reports on development policy. In order to participate effectively in the policy-making-process at the international and the European levels, the socialist networks considered it essential to disseminate their ideas and proposals on development policy to member parties, governments and international organizations.[82] For example, in order to interest the Council of Europe in matters of development policy, the Vienna Institute sent reports and information documents to the parliamentarians of the Consultative Assembly.[83] In the 1970s, the board members of the Vienna Institute believed that the Council of Europe was actually in a position to influence European governance in subtle ways despite the fact that it had no legislative competences at all. Additionally, in order to achieve more publicity for the International UN Development Strategy, the Vienna Institute translated UN documents into different European languages.[84] The FEF also widely disseminated its research on development policy widely.[85] As it was in contact with many international development institutions and research institutes, the FEF also published reports and articles on problems of development aid by other European researchers, including Tinbergen's development reports. After the World Plan Council was set up, together with the Bureau of the SI the FEF intended to have articles published on the work of the two study groups chaired by Tinbergen.[86] However, this particular project was never realized.

In fact, the work of the SI World Plan Council was never published, as the two study groups rarely met and produced few notable results. The mere setting up of the World Plan Council did help the SI Bureau to achieve publicity for socialist proposals of the Second UN Development Decade of the SI, however. The various resolutions adopted by the SI to endorse the goals and policy measures of the International UN Development Strategy were also part of the SI's public campaigning to put political pressure on governments and international organizations to attach importance to the International UN Development Strategy.[87]

The second function of the European socialist networks in the field of EC development policy was agenda-setting. Following the example of the UN Development Strategy,

80   Bruno Kreisky to Alfred Nau, 4. September, BKA, III. 8. Wiener Institut für Entwicklungspolitik, box 10.
81   Interview Haselbach (note 76).
82   SI Circular No. 47/70, 18 September 1970, IISH, SIA, box 414.
83   Minutes of the Vienna Institute board meeting, 7 June 1969, BKA, III. 8. Wiener Institut für Entwicklungspolitik, box 9.
84   Interview Haselbach (note 76).
85   Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Die partnerschaftlichen Beziehungen der FES zu den Entwicklungsländern - Bericht 1962, AdsD, HSA, 1/HSAAA007503.
86   Winfried Böll to Hans Janitschek, 17 March 1972, IISH, SIA, box 414.
87   Resolution on the Second Development Decade adopted by the Council conference of the SI, 25-27 May 1971, Circular No. 10/72, 9 June 1971, ABA, SI, box 751.

the European socialist parties contributed to the placing of the question on the future concept of EC development policy on the agenda of the Community. The Second UN Development Strategy was a trigger for the European socialists to call for a global policy of EC development aid.[88] This was also supported by leading individual European socialists.

In May 1971, Brandt commented on the results of the talks of the EC foreign ministers on development policies, insisting that the Community should increase its efforts to achieve the aims of the Second UN Development Decade.[89] In line with the SI, the EC socialist parties emphasized at their eighth congress in June 1971 that European development aid had to be carried out according to the International UN Development Strategy. Moreover, they stressed that EC commercial policy had to be designed in particular to increase imports of manufactured and semi-manufactured products from the developing countries by reducing import duties on such products.[90] The EC socialist parties argued that the Community's existing regional cooperation in the form of the association agreements of Yaoundé and Arusha only served a useful purpose as long as no effective global policy of development aid was yet in place. Likewise, as a representative of the EC at the plenary meeting of UNCTAD III in April 1972, Mansholt noted that the Community should increase its development assistance in accordance with the UN Development Strategy.[91] EC development policy was also an important issue at the congress of the SI in Vienna in June 1972. Taking the Second UN Development Strategy as a blue-print, Hans-Jürgen Wischnewski, a member of the executive of the SPD, reminded his audience of prominent socialist party leaders and members of EC member state governments that the Community 'cannot adopt such different attitudes towards the countries of the Third World'[92] as was still the case at the time. Judith Hart called on the SI and the delegates who played a role in socialist or socialist-led governments in west European countries to realize the target of the Second UN Development Strategy, namely, that every industrialized country should devote 0.7 per cent of its GNP to development aid.[93] Moreover, this objective was also re-stated in the resolution of the congress on international development policy.[94] Before the EC summit of heads of states or governments in October 1972, the Bureau of the Socialist Parties in the EC adopted another resolution emphasizing that the EC must give priority to its development policy. The resolution called on the EC heads of state or governments to pursue such a policy

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88   Interview Erhard Eppler, 25 January 2010.

89   Stellungnahme Willy Brandt zu den außenpolitischen Konsultationen der Außenminister der Sechs am 13./14. Mai 1971 in Paris, AdsD, WBA, A8, 20.

90   Resolutions of the 8th Congress of the Socialist Parties in the European Community, Historical Archives of EU (HAEU) Florence, Groupe socialiste du Parlement européen (GSPE), GSPE-000006.

91   Statement of Sicco Mansholt, President of the EC, in the plenary meeting of UNCTAD III, 17 April 1972, IISH, ASLM, box 213.

92   Speech of Hans-Jürgen Wischnewski, Report of the 12th Congress of the SI held in Vienna, 26-29 June 1972, IISH, SIA, box 263.

93   Speech of Judith Hart, Report of the 12th Congress of the SI held in Vienna, 26-29 June 1972, IISH, SIA, box 263.

94   Report of the 12th Congress of the SI held in Vienna, 26-29 June 1972, IISH, SIA, box 263.

on the global level, thus overcoming the traditional focus on the former colonies of EC member states.[95]

Indeed, the European Commission had already recognized this objective in its Memorandum on development policy in July 1971.[96] The EC leaders then took initial modest steps in this direction at the EC summit in Paris in October 1972. In paragraph 11 of the summit's official declaration the EC leaders stated:

> … *in the light of the results of the UNCTAD Conference and in the context of the Development Strategy adopted by the United Nations, the Institutions of the Community and Member States are invited progressively to adopt an overall policy of development cooperation on a world-wide scale, comprising, in particular, the following elements: the promotion in appropriate cases of agreements concerning the primary products of the developing countries with a view to arriving at market stabilization and an increase in their exports; the improvement of generalized preferences with the aim of achieving a steady increase in imports of manufactures from the developing countries.*[97]

Despite this declaration, however, the conflict between the two camps in EC development policy remained virulent. In the following years, the French Gaullist government effectively blocked the implementation of the Paris summit's declared objective of extending EC development policy to non-associated developing countries.[98] Nevertheless, the European socialist parties contributed to keeping the topic on the agenda of the Community by continuously campaigning for a global policy of EC development aid.

In this context, the socialist press played an important role. For instance, the Bureau of the Socialist Parties in the EC organized a cooperation of all socialist journals in the Community. Articles on various topics of EC politics written by leading European socialist politicians[99] sought to address a transnational European socialist public sphere.[100] They were simultaneously published in the British *Socialist Commentary*, the German *Die Neue Gesellschaft*, the French *Revue socialiste*, the Italian *Mondo Operario*, the Danish *Nypolitik*, the Luxembourg *Le Pharo*, the Belgian Francophone *Socialisme*, the Flemish Belgian *Sozialistische Standpunten* and the Dutch *Socialisme en Démocratie*.[101] The article on the relations of the EC with the Third World by the German development minster Eppler underlined that a regionally-limited EC development aid policy had to be overcome and replaced by a global concept guaranteeing development aid also for non-associated

95 Resolution addressed by the Bureau of the Socialist Parties in the European Community to the Heads of States or Governments, HAEU, GSPE-000006.

96 Grilli, The European Community and the Developing Countries (note 15), p. 66.

97 Paragraph 11 Statement from the EC Paris Summit, 19-21 October 1972.

98 Zwei Auffassungen von Entwicklungspolitik, Die Welt, 27 June 1973.

99 Among them, for example, Sicco Mansholt, Bruno Kreisky, François Mitterrand, Roy Jenkins, Jens Otto Krag, Joop den Uyl and Altiero Spinelli.

100 On a European public sphere see, for example, Jan-Henrik Meyer, The European Public Sphere. Media and Transnational Communication in European Integration 1969–1991, Stuttgart 2010.

101 Sozialismus in Europa. Europa in der Welt, Gemeinsame Veröffentlichung der sozialistischen Zeitschriften, 17 Februar 1973, Archiv Nationales Luxembourg (ANL), Fonds Lydie Schmit (FLS), Fonds Divers (FD) 141/12.

developing countries, which should be designed and coordinated as a supplement to UN development aid. Eppler also claimed that different forms of development aid including financial and technical aid, trade preferences as well as agricultural and industrial policies had to be incorporated into the EC development concept. Crucially, Eppler argued that the EC could develop a significant role vis-à-vis the Third World only if all EC member states raised their development aid to 0.7 per cent of their GNP in accordance with the Second UN Development Strategy.

The third function of the transnational party networks was to help coordinate socialist development policies on the EC level. Circulated regularly within the network of the SI and beyond, the SI resolutions reminded the member parties to assume a uniform position vis-à-vis the proposals of the Second UN Development Decade. However, the SI did not have any formal instruments to force the member parties to adopt a particular political option or strategy. Nevertheless, political proposals that were discussed in the network of the SI occasionally influenced the decision and policy-making of leading European socialist politicians. Thus, having debated development policy for years at various meetings in the framework of the transnational political networks, in particular of the SI, the European socialist parties in fact created a platform to coordinate policy-making in this field.

By involving socialist politicians who were in power in Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom in the 1970s, the political networks of the European socialist parties were able to influence EC intergovernmental decision-making. Indeed, their close cooperation gave Eppler, Hart and Jan Pronk, the Dutch minister of development cooperation and a former student of Tinbergen, a strong position in the EC Council of development ministers.[102] At the meeting of the EC Council of development ministers in July 1974 they succeeded in convincing the French-led camp to accept a resolution to provide financial and technical aid to non-associated developing countries.[103] Furthermore, the ministers adopted a resolution on the volume of official development aid, stating that the EC member states should 'make efforts to attain as soon as possible the target for official assistance of 0.7 per cent of the GNP mentioned in the International Development Strategy for the Second Decade, as adopted by the UN'.[104]

Conclusion

Precisely measuring the concrete impact of the European socialist parties on EC development policy is difficult for two reasons: first, the European socialist parties did not establish one cohesive network with the exclusive purpose of influencing EC development

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102   Interview Erhard Eppler, 26 January 2010.

103   EC, The Council, Development Co-operation – Resolutions and recommendations adopted by the Council, Financial and Technical help to non-associated developing countries (Resolution), Brussels 29 July 1974, Archive of the Council of Ministers (ACM), Brussels.

104   EC, The Council, Development Co-operation - Resolutions and recommendations adopted by the Council, Volume on Official Development Assistance (Resolution), Brussels 29 July 1974, ACM, Brussels.

policy, as in the case of European environmental NGOs and EC environmental policy as discussed by Jan-Henrik Meyer in this issue. Secondly, following the international impulse for the Second UN Development Decade, the political activities of the most important network of the European socialist parties, the SI, were predominately directed at the international level of development policy.

Nevertheless, the example of the SI World Plan Council illustrates very well how non-state actors became more organized in a European-centric transnational form in the 1970s. The example of the SI and its initiative for the World Plan Council involving representatives from the FEF and the Vienna Institute also shows how socialist party networks often functioned as top-down mediators for introducing the proposals of the International Strategy for the Second UN Development Decade into EC agenda-setting and policy-making. The UN Development Strategy served as a blue-print for the European socialist parties. They inserted and enshrined the UN's 0.7 per cent target in EC development policy and pushed strongly for a global concept for EC development aid. To achieve these goals, the socialist parties drew upon their evolving and partly overlapping networks with their particular activities, strategies and functions. First, their public campaigning for the proposals of the UN development strategy gave the debate on the EC relationship with the developing countries a new impulse. Their campaigning helped to raise public awareness of the need for more effective development aid, with the discourses and activities of the churches and left-wing student groups providing a useful sounding board for their demands. Secondly, by continuously debating and commenting on EC development policy in various forums, socialist networks succeeded in putting their demands for a new concept of development policy on the EC agenda. Thirdly, by repeatedly emphasizing the need to globalize EC development aid, the European socialists were able to solidify their position in this debate. Socialist politicians active in the networks and as state actors played a crucial role in pushing socialist ideas at the highest level of EC policy-making. Thus, the close cooperation of the socialist development ministers Eppler, Hart and Pronk paved the way for the adoption of the resolutions on a globalization of EC development policy at the EC Council meeting of development ministers in July 1974.

Nonetheless, the adoption of the Lomé Convention in 1975 instead reinforced the EC's traditional regional development concept.[105] In fact, despite their cooperation in the G-77, the developing countries themselves had diverging interests and many former colonies expected major benefits from the continuation of a privileged relationship with the EC at the expense of non-associated countries. The conflict in the World Trade Organization (WTO) in the 1990s over the EU's banana import regime illustrates this conflict especially well. Thus, the debate between the two camps and their opposed ideas

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105   See Jean-Marie Palayret, Mondialisme contre régionalisme: CEE et ACP dans les négociations de la convention de Lomé 1970-75, in: Antonio Varsori (ed.), Inside the European Community. Actors and Policies in the European Integration 1957-1972, Baden-Baden 2006, pp. 369-397, here p. 396; Grilli, The European Community and the Developing Countries (note 15), p. 68.

and preferences continued. At the same time, the G-77 strongly promoted the idea of a NEIO at the ordinary and extraordinary UN General Assembly, particularly from 1974-75 until the end of the 1970s.[106] As early as 1971, the SI had called on governments and international organizations to examine the demands of the G-77.[107] In the debate on the NEIO, as in the parallel discussions about the EC's development policy, transnational political networks of European socialist parties may well have played an important role as top-down mediators in the transfer of ideas, arguments and demands from the international level to the EC level. To test this hypothesis, however, further research on the role of European socialist parties and their networks as non-state actors in EC policy-making would clearly be necessary.

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106   See, for example, Olesen, Between Words and Deeds. Denmark and the NIEO agenda (note 10) p. 145.
107   Resolution on the Second Development Decade adopted by the Council conference of the SI, 25-27 May 1971, Circular No. 10/72, 9 June 1971, ABA, SI, box 751.

Trade Unions and European Social Policy: the Example of the German DGB

Thomas Fetzer

RESÜMEE

Dieser Aufsatz analysiert am Beispiel des Deutschen Gewerkschaftsbundes (DGB) die Rolle der Gewerkschaften bei der Etablierung der EG-Sozialpolitik in den 1970er Jahren. Ausgehend von einer Bestandsaufnahme europäischer Gewerkschaftsstrukturen nach 1945 wird argumentiert, dass sich diese Rolle weder als die einer zivilgesellschaftlichen Avantgarde für eine Supranationalisierung dieses Politikfeldes noch als die eines defensiven „Bremsers" angemessen beschreiben lässt. Es wird gezeigt, dass sich der DGB einerseits aktiv für eine supranationale Sozialpolitik einsetzte, diese aber andererseits auf eine Ergänzung und Koordinierung nationaler Wohlfahrtsstaatlichkeit begrenzen wollte, insbesondere im Hinblick auf redistributive Elemente der Sozialpolitik. Der Aufsatz illustriert damit, dass bei der Analyse nichtstaatlicher Akteure nicht nur auf deren Rolle als Lobbyisten in Brüssel zu achten ist, sondern auch darauf, wie solche Akteure die Reichweite supranationaler Politik definieren helfen.

Social policy, along with a number of other fields like regional and environmental policy, became a new domain of European Community (EC) activities during the 1970s. Prior to that, leaving aside a few specific measures in the framework of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), social policy had by and large been confined to the regulation of cross-border worker mobility. The European Social Fund created by the European Economic Community (EEC) treaty in 1957-8 was negligible in terms of its financial volume, while a treaty provision on equal pay for men and women had few practical ramifications until the late 1960s.[1]

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1   For an overview of European social policy see for example Linda Hantrais, Social Policy in the European Union, 3rd edition, London 2007.

Change started with the summits of The Hague and Paris in 1969 and 1972 where a consensus on pursuing a more active social policy took shape. The rationale for this initiative was similar to the one underlying the parallel beginnings of EC regional policy, namely to complement economic and monetary integration, and to provide a cushion against possible social dislocations resulting from that integration. The Commission duly submitted the EC's first social policy 'action programme', which the Council adopted in January 1974. It included measures to promote employment, better working and living conditions, worker participation in industry, the equal treatment of men and women, and a reform of the social fund. Not all of these objectives were achieved. Worker participation initiatives, for example, became bogged down in disagreement over which model to implement. Still, from the mid-1970s onwards a limited number of new directives did see the light of day, in particular concerning gender equality and occupational health and safety. Two agencies were set up to conduct research in the areas of occupational training and 'working and living conditions'. The consultation of 'social partners' in EC decision-making was given added emphasis, most clearly in a number of 'tripartite conferences' to discuss employment policy, supplemented, from 1973, by occasional broader gatherings deliberating a concerted macro-economic EC response to the oil crisis.[2]

Underlying this process were a variety of factors, from the protest and strike wave after 1968 and the electoral advance of social democracy in many European countries, to the return of unemployment after 1974 and the emerging debates on the regulation of multinational companies. In a longer-term perspective EC policy initiatives could build on efforts for international social policy coordination by the International Labour Organization (ILO) and the Council of Europe.[3] From the perspective of this particular issue, the role of non-state actors in European integration, one of the most interesting questions is how and to what extent the trade unions shaped the emerging agenda for a European social policy during the 1970s – a time when they reached the apogee of their post-war influence, expressed in growing membership figures, rising bargaining strength, and their crucial role in tripartite arrangements to promote growth and contain inflation in the wake of the oil crisis.[4]

Not least against the backdrop of this general trade union advance a number of authors have suggested that unions were also instrumental in bringing about a European social policy during the 1970s, through their general lobbying for a 'social dimension' to counterbalance market integration, as well as through specific efforts to shape policy initiatives, e.g. in the fields of vocational training and occupational safety.[5] However, these ar-

2   See Maria Eleonora Guasconi, Paving the Way for a European Social Dialogue. Italy, the Trade Unions and the Shaping of a European Social Policy after the Hague Conference of 1969, in: Journal of European Integration History 9 (2003) 1, pp. 87-110.

3   See Cédric Guinand, Die Internationale Arbeitsorganisation (ILO) und die soziale Sicherheit in Europa (1942– 1969), Berne 2003.

4   See Donald Sassoon, One Hundred Years of Socialism, The West European Left in the Twentieth Century, London 1996, chapters 6 and 8.

5   See Guasconi, Paving the Way (note 2); Stefan Remeke, Gewerkschaften als Motoren der europäischen Integration: Der DGB und das soziale Europa von den Römischen Verträgen bis zu den Pariser Gipfelkonferenzen

guments sit uneasily with more general assessments of the trade unions' role in European integration. Since the late 1970s these have mostly emphasized the unions' defensive attitudes, reacting to rather than proactively shaping integration.[6] Thus, Patrick Pasture and Johan Verberckmoes have argued that 'as a matter of fact the trade union movement shows a blatant reluctance to make use of the opportunities offered by Europe.'[7]

This controversy reflects not only diverging assessments of what trade unions did, but, more fundamentally, contrasting notions of what they could have done. Those emphasizing the unions' positive contribution to integration point to employers and governments as frustrating more far-reaching initiatives, while the 'sceptics' emphasize missed opportunities by the trade unions themselves. This article seeks to address this issue by probing more deeply into the complexity of trade union notions of 'social Europe' during the 1970s through a case study of the German Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund (DGB). The case of the DGB is particularly interesting not only because it has been the leading affiliate of the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC, and its predecessors) created in 1973, but also because the German confederation is often described as a 'vanguard force' within the ETUC by those who emphasize the trade unions' allegedly pro-active role vis-à-vis European institutions.[8] Building on the available literature[9], the first section outlines the institutional structures of trade unions at the European level, and the role of the DGB within those structures. The second and main section, based on research in the DGB and ETUC archives, then addresses the question of the DGB's approach towards European social policy during the 1970s. I argue that the DGB was faced with the strategic question of how to conceive 'social Europe' in terms of the interplay between European and national regulation, and that the function of EC-level initiatives came to be vaguely and narrowly defined as complementing national welfare states and industrial relations regimes. Next to the German unions' commitment to national Keynesianism and industrial relations traditions, this was also due to the still weakly perceived impact of economic globalization. The conclusion briefly contrasts this pattern with the period

(1957–1974), in: Jürgen Mittag (ed.), Deutsche Gewerkschaften und europäische Integration im 20. Jahrhundert, Mitteilungsblatt des Instituts für soziale Bewegungen 42 (2009) 1, pp. 141-164.

6　For influential early examples see Wolfram Elsner, Die EWG. Herausforderung und Antwort der Gewerkschaften, Cologne 1974; Lutz Niethammer, Defensive Integration – Der Weg zum EGB und die Perspektive der westeuropäischen Einheitsgewerkschaft, in: Ulrich Borsdorf et. al. (eds.), Gewerkschaftliche Politik: Reform aus Solidarität. Zum 60. Geburtstag von Heinz O. Vetter, Cologne 1977, pp. 567-596.

7　Patrick Pasture/Johan Verberckmoes, Working Class Internationalism and the Appeal of National Identity: Historical Dilemmas and Current Debates in Western Europe, in: Patrick Pasture / Johan Verberckmoes (eds.), Working Class Internationalism and the Appeal of National Identity: Historical Dilemmas and Current Perspectives, Oxford / New York 1998, pp. 1-41, here: p. 22.

8　Remeke, Gewerkschaften als Motoren (note 5).

9　Corinne Gobin, Consultation et concertation sociales à l'échelle de la Communauté économique européenne. Etude des positions et strategies de la Conféderation européenne des syndicats (1958–1991), Brussels 1996; Barbara Barnouin, The European Labour Movement and European Integration, London 1986; Jan-Erik Dolvik, An Emerging Island? ETUC, Social Dialogue, and the Europeanization of the Trade Unions in the 1990s, Brussels 1999; Emilio Gabaglio/Reiner Hoffmann (eds.), The ETUC in the Mirror of Industrial Relations Research, Brussels 1998. For a long-term perspective on the role of the DGB in the process of European integration see in particular Mittag, Deutsche Gewerkschaften (note 5).

since the late 1980s when a stronger threat perception – against the backdrop of the Single Market project – led the DGB to step up its lobbying for supranational social policy measures. The conclusions also discuss some more general implications of the case study for the analysis of non-state actors in European integration.

Trade unions as a European actor

In a longer-term perspective the trade union movement can be considered as a European actor since the turn of the twentieth century, when the movement set up its first international confederation and a number of sector-specific 'international trade secretariats'; while nominally 'international', these organizations, with the exception of the American Federation of Labour (AFL) and its affiliates, were exclusively composed of European trade unions.[10] There were enormous internal conflicts from the outset, not only because of national rivalries, but also because of contrasting political approaches to trade unionism, in particular with regard to the split between social democratic reformism and syndicalism. In the wake of the First World War these conflicts were exacerbated by the peace settlement and the Bolshevik revolution, which led to the formation of separate communist and also Christian Internationals.[11]

After 1945 there was a short-lived attempt at reunification which was thwarted by the onset of the Cold War. The Soviet leadership wanted a communist international trade union organization as a propaganda tool, while the United States (US) government, assisted by the American labour movement, enlisted social democratic unions as allies to contain the appeal of communism among West European workers. As a consequence, the communist-driven World Federation of Trade Unions rivalled the socialist/social democratic International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU), as well as the reconstituted Christian International.[12]

European integration initially only had a marginal effect on this complex configuration. The communist unions were ideologically opposed to European integration itself, and they refused to deal with the new supranational institutions. This pattern only began to change from the 1970s onwards, and with a great deal of variation between affiliates from different countries.[13] The socialist and Christian Internationals, on the other hand,

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10   See Marcel van der Linden et. al. (eds.), The International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, Berne 2000; for the exceptionally active transport workers' international see Sigrid Koch-Baumgarten, Gewerkschaftsinternationalismus und die Herausforderung der Globalisierung: das Beispiel der Internationalen Transportarbeiterföderation (ITF), Frankfurt 1999.

11   See Patrick Pasture, Histoire du syndicalisme chrétien international: la difficile recherche d'une troisieme voie, Paris / Montreal 1999; Reiner Tosstorff, Profintern. Die Rote Gewerkschaftsinternationale 1920–1937, Paderborn 2004.

12   For the Cold War involvement of international trade union bodies see for example Anthony Carew, Labour under the Marshall Plan, Manchester 1987; Federico Romero, The United States and the European Trade Union Movement, 1944–1951, Chapel Hill 1992.

13   See Juan Moreno, Trade Unions without Frontiers. The Communist-Oriented Trade Unions and the ETUC, 1973–1999, Brussels 2001.

had already created European regional organizations in the early 1950s though this was partly due to the growth of trade unionism in other continents and the concomitant need to deal with the increasing heterogeneity within the international organizations. Still, both the ICFTU and Christian unions also established special bodies to deal with the new European institutions. In the case of the ICFTU this was first limited to the coal and steel industries – in response to the ECSC – before the EEC Treaty entailed the establishment of the more encompassing European Trade Union Secretariat in 1958. However, these bodies, composed of delegates from the six founding member states, had very meagre resources and were further weakened by frequent internal disputes and competence quarrels with the respective Internationals, and between themselves.[14]

Given the subordinate status of social and industrial relations issues in the EC treaties, there was of course little that could have 'pulled' the unions more strongly into the European arena. At the same time, as Pasture has demonstrated, the unions themselves developed few initiatives to influence European institutions – except with regard to representation in these institutions themselves, which became an end, rather than a means of trade union action at the European level.[15] By the late 1950s, however, the trade unions' importance for securing progress in integration appeared less indispensable in the eyes of many national governments. Consequently, their lobbying for trade union representation in EC institutions also became less successful.[16] For example, while the unions managed to place two representatives in the ECSC High Authority during the Schuman Plan negotiations, they achieved nothing comparable in the EEC after 1958. Here, the role of trade unionists was reduced to participation in informal working groups and consultative bodies such as the Economic and Social Committee.[17]

Significant change only occurred from the late 1960s. A lengthy debate on the need for a more comprehensive and active trade union organization at the European level culminated in the creation of the ETUC in 1973, which brought together national centres not only from the now nine EC member states, but also from the remaining countries of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA). In 1974 ETUC's pan-European character was further reinforced through the accession of all European organizations affiliated with the Christian International, and, still more spectacularly, the entry of the Italian Confederazione Generale Italiana del Lavoro (CGIL), the major European affiliate of the Communist World Confederation of Labour. By the late 1970s ETUC represented 29 national trade union centres with a combined membership of about 44 million workers, and it had become the universally acknowledged voice of labour at the European level.[18]

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14   See Patrick Pasture, The Flight of the Robins. European Trade Unions at the Beginning of the European integration process, in: Bart de Wilde (ed.), The Past and Future of International Trade Unionism, Ghent 2000, pp. 80-103.

15   Pasture, The Flight of the Robins (note 14).

16   See Patrick Pasture, Trade Unions as a Transnational Movement in the European Space 1955-65, in: Wolfram Kaiser / Peter Starie (eds.), Transnational European Union. Towards a Common Political Space, London/New York 2005, pp. 109-130.

17   Niethammer, Defensive Integration (note 6), p. 577.

18   For this transformation see Barnouin, European Labour Movement (note 9), pp. 14 ff.; Dolvik, Emerging Island

While this represented a significant historical achievement in terms of organizational breadth, it inevitably also entailed more difficult internal decision-making processes. For example, the accession of the Eurosceptic British and Scandinavian affiliates undermined the earlier general pro-European consensus with regard to the 'high politics' of integration.[19] Differing national industrial relations and trade union traditions made compromise-building still more difficult, for example in relation to the issue of enterprise-level worker participation.[20]

Still, the creation of the ETUC undoubtedly marked a watershed in the history of European trade unionism. Interestingly, however, the belated birth of a comprehensive pan-European trade union body cannot simply be interpreted as a trade union response to the new European integration dynamics since the EC summit of The Hague in 1969. To be sure, this dynamic did play an important role. The new prospects for EC enlargement made the reorganization of the ETUC an urgent task, while the imminent departure of the British, Danish and Irish unions raised the question of the viability of the ICFTU's old European regional organization. At the same time, the French President Charles de Gaulle's resignation in 1969 and the coming to power of a social democratic-led German government created a new, if vague, groundswell for a stronger 'social dimension' in European trade union circles.[21]

However, two other aspects were at least as important as the new integration dynamics, both of which connected European developments to changes in the global context. First, the late 1960s witnessed the emergence of a vivid public and trade union debate on economic internationalization, in particular with regard to the role of multinational companies (MNC). This reflected not only the steep rise in foreign direct investment in many West European countries since the 1950s but also the innovative strategies of such firms to integrate their operations across borders, as well as the prominence of US-owned firms among Europe's MNCs, which translated into anxious concerns about the 'American challenge'.[22] Against this backdrop, a stronger and more unified European trade union organization was increasingly perceived as necessary to enhance union capacities in dealing with multinational firms – not only with regard to lobbying for their EC level regulation, but also to step up the trade unions' autonomous capacity for cross-border coordination. It was mainly to this latter end that British and Scandinavian unions supported the creation of an all-embracing European confederation in the early 1970s.

(note 9), pp. 42-75; Cyril Gläser, Europäische Einheitsgewerkschaft zwischen lähmender Überdehnung und umfassender Repräsentativität: EGB-Strukturen und die Herausforderung der Erweiterung, in: Jürgen Mittag (ed.), Deutsche Gewerkschaften und europäische Integration im 20. Jahrhundert, Mitteilungsblatt des Instituts für soziale Bewegungen 42 (2009) 1, pp. 215-233, here: pp. 219f.

19   In 1975, for example, due to internal disagreements, the ETUC proved unable to deliver an opinion on the Tindemans report – see Gobin, Consultation (note 9), pp. 480f.

20   See Thomas Fetzer, Industrial Democracy in the European Community. Trade Unions as a Defensive Transnational Community, 1968–88, in: Marie-Laure Djelic / Sigrid Quack (eds.), Transnational Communities: Shaping Global Economic Governance, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010, pp. 282-304.

21   Niethammer, Defensive Integration (note 6), p. 585.

22   Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber, Le défi américain, Paris 1967.

Against the plans of French and German unions to restrict ETUC membership to EC member states they insisted on a more comprehensive composition that would facilitate practical efforts for bargaining coordination in MNCs.[23]

Still more importantly, the reform of European trade union structures was closely linked to changes in transatlantic relations and the new phase of East-West *détente*. The surge of anti-Americanism in many West European countries in the wake of the Vietnam War and the transatlantic rows over *Ostpolitik* could not fail to influence European trade union opinion, not least because there emerged a number of initiatives to support détente through East-West trade union encounters. The rapprochement with 'Euro-Communist' unions like the Italian CGIL was another clear example of this process, which raised hopes for a reunification of the European labour movement.[24] The creation of the ETUC, in this perspective, primarily reflected a growing European self-confidence vis-à-vis the US, and a concomitant aspiration to make European trade unionism more independent of the ICFTU – as reflected in the dropping of 'free' from the new European confederation's name after a controversial internal debate.[25] In fact, these European developments entailed a major falling-out in transatlantic trade union relations. A number of Asian and African ICFTU affiliates likewise criticized European aspirations as undermining the principles of 'free trade unionism' in the world.[26] It should be said, however, that the ETUC did continue to cooperate with the ICFTU after the mid-1970s despite a much stronger emphasis on European autonomy.

Ever since the creation of the ETUC many observers have pointed to the influential role of the German DGB within the new organization. In fact, the DGB is often referred to as having had an 'informal veto' power during the 1970s and 1980s.[27] The German role was not only strong in terms of ETUC's personnel – DGB leader Heinz-Oskar Vetter was president of ETUC and its predecessor throughout the 1970s – but also in the decision-making of ETUC's executive committee. This primarily reflected the importance of size. Alongside the British Trade Union Congress (TUC) the DGB was the largest European trade union organization in the second half of the twentieth century.[28] In France and Italy, the other large EC member states, the union movement remained divided along ideological lines, and at least in the French case, the dominant communist confederation did not join the ETUC before the end of the Cold War.[29] Secondly, DGB influence within ETUC was indirectly enhanced by the Eurosceptic attitudes of the TUC and the

23   Barnouin, The European Labour Movement (note 9), pp. 14 f.
24   See Niethammer, Defensive Integration (note 6), pp. 583 f.
25   Niethammer, Defensive Integration (note 6), pp. p. 585.
26   Barnouin, The European Labour Movement (note 9), pp. 16 f.
27   See for example Justin Greenwood, Interest Representation in the European Union, 2nd edition, Houndmills 2007, p. 110.
28   See Bernhard Ebbinghaus / Jelle Visser (eds.), The Societies of Europe. Trade Unions in Western Europe since 1945, Basingstoke / Oxford 2000.
29   The Communist French CGT eventually joined the ETUC in 1999.

Scandinavian affiliates until the late 1980s.[30] Thirdly, the European industry federations – trade union bodies representing labour interests in specific sectors[31] – obtained seats and votes within ETUC, too, and many of them, not least the powerful organizations in the metal and chemical industries, were dominated by their German affiliates like IG Metall and IG Chemie.[32]

This last remark already points to the multi-level character of the German trade unions' European activities, which also had important implications for decision-making processes within the DGB. The post-war reorganization of the German trade union movement had been based on the model of a confederation made up of industry-based affiliates, which were fully autonomous with regard to collective bargaining and strike policies in their sectors, while the DGB's tasks were confined to coordination and interest representation in the political sphere.[33] In terms of European trade union activities this meant that the large affiliates like IG Metall and IG Chemie developed their own structures and policies. They participated in sector-specific European trade union bodies (the European industry federations), and, through them, developed contacts to the supranational EC institutions, in particular the European Commission. At the same time, the DGB's European policies were usually developed in close coordination with the most powerful affiliates, particularly in cases where Community initiatives and legislation touched on industrial matters, for example with regard to collective bargaining regulation. Likewise, DGB representatives in EC institutions such as the Economic and Social Committee always included prominent leaders from IG Metall and IG Chemie.[34]

The DGB's internal organization of European activities was also of a complex nature. Initially, competences for dealing with EC matters were accorded to the international department but in practice other departments soon became involved, too. The economic department started to play the leading role with regard to aspects of Common Market regulation, while the social policy department became the main actor dealing with the Directorate General (DG) for Social Affairs.[35] From the mid-1960s the DGB's European portfolio further diversified through the inclusion of the departments for collective bargaining and co-determination (later renamed *Gesellschaftspolitik*), the latter dealing with the question of employee participation in EC legislation. In 1972 an attempt was made

30   For the TUC see Thomas Fetzer, Turning Eurosceptic: British Trade Unions and European Integration (1961–1975), in: Journal of European Integration History 13 (2007) 2, pp. 85-102.

31   See Ingrid Stöckl, Gewerkschaftsausschüsse in der EG: die Entwicklung der transnationalen Organisation und Strategie der europäischen Fachgewerkschaften und ihre Möglichkeiten zur gewerkschaftlichen Interessenvertretung im Rahmen der europäischen Gemeinschaft, Kehl/Strasbourg 1986.

32   See Jörg Rumpf, IG Metall, IG CPK und der Prozess der europäischen Integration, in: Jürgen Mittag (ed.), Deutsche Gewerkschaften und europäische Integration im 20. Jahrhundert, Mitteilungsblatt des Instituts für soziale Bewegungen 42 (2009) 1, pp. 123-140.

33   For a general account of German post-1945 trade union history see Michael Schneider, Kleine Geschichte der Gewerkschaften. Ihre Entwicklung in Deutschland von den Anfängen bis heute, 2nd revised edition, Bonn 2000, pp. 270-482.

34   For more details see Rumpf, IG Metall (note 32), pp. 125 ff.

35   See Remeke, Gewerkschaften als Motoren (note 5), pp. 155-6.

to coordinate these various activities through a special European integration department, which, however, ended in failure only three years later.[36]

The DGB's European lobbying corresponded to the typical practice of most national non-state actors to combine interest representation through national and European channels.[37] Lobbying of the German government was combined with direct contacts to supranational EC institutions, in particular the Commission, and with efforts to influence ETUC positions. The case of employee participation in the so-called European Company Statute (ECS), discussed since the late 1960s, illustrates this pattern especially well. On the one hand, DGB representatives made strenuous efforts to convince their European trade union counterparts of the merits of German co-determination. On the other hand, they energetically lobbied the German Ministry of Justice and Commission officials. There was even an element of strategic personnel policy here – it was no coincidence that the DGB pressed for Wilhelm Haferkamp (until 1967 head of the DGB's economic department) to become European commissioner for internal market affairs from 1970, the DG in charge of European company law harmonization.[38]

The German DGB and European social policy

German and European trade union documents confirm that the DGB played an active role in the process to launch a European social policy in the early 1970s. In August 1972 DGB representatives participated in meetings with civil servants of the German chancellor's office in preparation for the Paris summit later that year, and shortly afterwards DGB leader Vetter wrote a formal letter to Willy Brandt, the social democratic German chancellor, which stressed the need for a stronger social dimension of European integration as a counterweight to the planned economic and monetary union.[39] Authors like Stefan Remeke and Maria Eleonora Guasconi are thus correct up to a point in their emphasis on the DGB's contribution to the emergence of a European social policy.[40] Indeed, following the Paris summit, the DGB was among the most active European trade unions in shaping Commission drafts for a European social action programme. In May 1973, the DGB board adopted a policy document outlining its positions on the Commission programme.[41] The document emphasized three major elements: In the field

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36   See Jürgen Mittag / Maren Zellin, Grenzen der Koordination europäischer Gewerkschaftspolitik: Die Episode der Abteilung Europäische Integration des DGB (1972–1975), in: Jürgen Mittag (ed.), Deutsche Gewerkschaften und europäische Integration im 20. Jahrhundert, Mitteilungsblatt des Instituts für soziale Bewegungen 42 (2009) 1, pp. 165-185.

37   See Greenwood, Interest Representation (note 27), chapter 2.

38   See Thomas Fetzer, Defending Mitbestimmung: German Trade Unions and European Company Law Harmonisation 1967–1990, in: Economic and Industrial Democracy 31 (forthcoming 2010) 4.

39   Mittag and Zellin, Grenzen der Koordination (note 36), pp. 165-6.

40   See note 5.

41   Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund: Vorschläge für ein soziales Aktionsprogramm der Europäischen Gemeinschaft, 20 February 1973, Archiv der sozialen Demokratie (AdSD), Bestand DGB, 24/888.

of employment policy, the DGB argued that labour market problems had increased in a number of regions and sectors, and that more efforts were therefore necessary to coordinate national economic and employment policies. Secondly, with regard to standards of welfare and working conditions, the DGB urged greater efforts to achieve an upward harmonization of these standards across the EC – without preventing more advanced countries from moving ahead. Thirdly, the importance of a European dimension of 'industrial democracy' was emphasized. The DGB held that the EC should provide a legal framework for European collective bargaining, and that it should also undertake more efforts to implement co-determination rights for employees in multinational companies, not least in the framework of the ECS.[42]

While these initiatives clearly testify to the active role of the DGB in launching a European social policy, the proposals themselves remained rather vague. In fact, subsequent developments revealed a much more cautious DGB attitude in many respects, as well as a number of internal disagreements between the DGB and its affiliates, particularly IG Metall, which neutralized some initiatives in practice.[43] For example, with regard to employment policy, DGB representatives had nothing positive to say about ideas of the ETUC secretariat to establish a European labour agency or a permanent committee for employment policy. Instead, the DGB favoured more co-ordination among the national labour agencies and a harmonization of national labour market statistics. Moreover, national governments were asked to submit regular employment reports to the Commission.[44] The same caution was displayed towards proposals to set up a European *comissariat de plan* as in the French system of indicative planning.[45]

As far as welfare policies were concerned, the DGB's formula of 'upward harmonization' left it open how such a process should be promoted through European action. When subsequently faced with concrete initiatives in this direction, the DGB, in fact, appears to have pulled on the brakes. In October 1973, for example, the Belgian Fédération Générale du Travail de Belgique (FTGB) suggested a higher social policy budget to raise the lowest national standards above a given threshold but met with determined German trade union resistance. Gerd Muhr, head of the DGB's social policy department, pointed out that such a 'schematic harmonization' was not desirable because it did not take into account the 'different traditions and values' of the national societies. In the absence of truly democratic European governing structures, member states needed a sufficient degree of autonomy to manage their social security systems.[46] Proposals for a European unemployment insurance were likewise rejected as 'premature'. DGB representatives ar-

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42   Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund: Vorschläge (note 41).

43   The following builds on Thomas Fetzer, Europäische Strategien deutscher Gewerkschaften in historischer Perspektive, in: Michèle Knodt / Barbara Finke (eds.), Europäisierung der Zivilgesellschaft: Konzepte, Akteure, Strategien, Wiesbaden 2005, pp. 299-318.

44   Hausmitteilung Abteilung Sozialpolitik an Abteilung Europäische Integration, 5 June 1975, AdSD, Bestand DGB, 24/2076.

45   Aktenvermerk Abteilung Europäische Integration, 12 September 1973, AdSD, Bestand DGB, 24/1518.

46   Aktenvermerk Abteilung Europäische Integration, 9. Oktober 1973, AdSD, Bestand DGB, 24/2158.

gued that European solidarity should be promoted by reducing unemployment across the Community, rather than by using EC funds to mitigate its consequences.[47] The DGB advocated much less ambitious measures, for example the gradual harmonization of social insurance definitions and the exchange of statistical data.

With regard to working conditions, the DGB, despite its confessed commitment to European minimum standards on working time and holiday entitlements, refused to accept any binding European legislation that would interfere with free collective bargaining in the Federal Republic. A Council recommendation on the 40-hour week was only accepted because it would not have a binding effect on national law. In general terms, DGB representatives stressed that 'Brussels' could not be allowed to become an arbiter in matters of domestic industrial relations.[48] Likewise, when faced with a draft directive to promote equal pay in early 1974, the DGB massively lobbied the German Ministry of Labour to oppose the envisaged controls of collective bargaining agreements on the basis that this would violate *Tarifautonomie*. The lobbying proved successful: in the subsequent Council deliberations the contested paragraph was dropped.[49]

The DGB's call for a European dimension of 'industrial democracy' was hardly more than a slogan, and it was anything but new. Since the late 1960s, the DGB had lobbied for the inclusion of German-style co-determination into the planned ECS, but by that time it had already become clear that these German ideas would not make their way into European legislation.[50] In the field of collective bargaining there were even more contradictions. The DGB asked for a new European legal framework for collective bargaining both at industry level and within multinational companies. DGB (and ETUC) chairman Vetter also advocated more efforts for an autonomous cross-border coordination of collective bargaining.[51] Clearly, however, any such endeavour had to be supported by the DGB's industrial affiliates, and such support was not forthcoming. IG Metall, the most powerful industry federation, had already vetoed proposals for European bargaining in the coal and steel industry in the 1950s.[52] It also opposed the new ideas of the early 1970s. In 1971, the IG Metall board noted with concern that 'there is too much talk about European collective agreements'.[53] Subsequently, IG Metall chairman Eugen Loderer made it clear that even European framework agreements related to working time or holiday entitlements were 'not realistic'. Similarly, IG Metall undermined any pros-

47   Aktenvermerk Abteilung Europäische Integration (note 46)
48   Aktennotiz zur Besprechung im Bundesarbeitsministerium, 26. Juni 1974, AdSD, Bestand DGB, 24/2096.
49   See Ursula Engelen-Kefer, Sozialpolitik der Europäischen Gemeinschaft: Rückblick und Perspektive, in: Soziale Sicherheit 24 (1975) 2, pp. 97-101.
50   See for example: Protokoll der Sitzung des Bundesvorstandes des Deutschen Gewerkschaftsbundes, 7 February 1967, AdSD, Bestand DGB, 5/DGAI/535.
51   Protokoll der Sitzung des Bundesvorstands des DGB, 3 February 1970, AdSD, Bestand DGB, 5/DGAI 536.
52   Protokoll der Sitzung des Exekutivausschusses des 21er Ausschusses, 14 Oktober 1955, AdSD, Bestand DGB, 5/DGAI 91.
53   Niederschrift der Klausurtagung des Vorstandes der IG Metall vom 6. bis 9. Januar 1971, AdSD, Bestand IG Metall, Vorstand, Nr. 1/71-6/71.

pects for cross-border bargaining in multinational companies with its verdict that foreign capital had to be challenged primarily at the national level.[54]

The preceding analysis should not be taken to mean that the DGB took little interest in the EC's new social policy dimension. What it demonstrates is, rather, that the German unions' conceptualization of 'Social Europe' was far more complex than is often assumed. The crucial issue was the relationship between supranational and national social policies, and in this regard DGB positions were characterized by three core elements.

First, the DGB supported the notion that EC social policy should complement and coordinate national policies, while showing little interest in European harmonization and/or the wholesale transfer of social policy competences to the EC level. Moreover, the DGB insisted on what later came to be called the principle of subsidiarity: EC legislation should not excessively restrict the scope for implementing domestic social policies. In some cases, for example the above-mentioned working time and equal pay directives, this autonomy discourse was reinforced by the classic trade union insistence on free collective bargaining.

Secondly, social policy at EC level was not primarily to be carried out by the creation of additional supranational authorities. The DGB was unenthusiastic about suggestions for a European *commissariat de plan* or a central labour agency in Brussels. It preferred the method of co-ordination of national social and labour market policies, for example, the use of more sophisticated data exchanges and a system of regular monitoring. In a similar way, the creation of a European archive for collective bargaining was called for, which would collect data from all member states and make them available for exchange across borders. European institutions were thus also seen as service-providers for national actors.

Thirdly, the DGB supported the limitation of EC social policy to regulatory matters. In this view, EC institutions should concentrate on the procedural regulation of problems that resulted from market integration, and the setting of minimum social standards. On the other hand, the DGB was highly sceptical about attempts to establish mechanisms of monetary redistribution as part of a European social policy. The transfer of resources was by and large to remain a domain of national policy. In Europe, similar ideas were seen as premature because of the 'different traditions and value systems' of national societies. In as much as there was any concept of European solidarity it was one in which cross-border redistribution of resources played a minor role – witness the DGB opposition to proposals for a European unemployment insurance. Likewise, while supporting a more active European labour market policy, the DGB warned that this should not entail large-scale subsidy programmes for poorer regions, which could diminish the financial scope for labour market programmes in the Federal Republic.[55]

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54   See for instance: Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund, Protokoll 9. Ordentlicher Bundeskongress, 25. bis. 30. Juni 1972, pp. 163, 202.

55   Schreiben Heinz Oskar Vetter an Bundeskanzler Brandt, 11.12.1973, AdSD, Bestand DGB, 24/2086.

A good starting point for analysing the reasons for this DGB approach is an argument put forward by Paul Teague in his work on British trade union attitudes towards European integration. Teague points out that the failure of British labour to develop any comprehensive strategy for European economic and social policies was due not only to a long-standing tendency of Euroscepticism, but also to a 'naïve Keynesianism', that is, a belief that such policies had to be implemented at the national level where over time labour had established structures and institutions to challenge the dominance of capital.[56] Notwithstanding the difference between British and German unions in terms of their general attitudes to European integration during the 1970s, the DGB's positions reflected a similar pattern of 'naïve Keynesianism' – witness, in particular, the DGB's emphasis on the coordination of national policies instead of European harmonization. In fact, the DGB's European activities themselves must at least partly be understood in terms of a national logic – aiming not so much at new European social regulation than at the creation of a more supportive European environment for the further development of domestic social policies. In the internal DGB deliberations on a European *commissariat de plan*, for example, strong emphasis was placed on the question of whether or not such a new European bureaucracy would help German trade unions to acquire more influence over domestic economic policy.[57] Likewise, the above mentioned lobbying in relation to the ECS was primarily designed to back up DGB positions in the domestic co-determination reform debate of the early 1970s. DGB representatives asked other national trade unions to support co-determination provisions in the draft ECS statute because this would help the DGB in the national context.[58] Once the lobbying of ETUC and the Commission had led to the incorporation of German-style participation in the draft directive, the DGB invoked the 'new European situation' in the domestic debate. The Commission proposal, taken together with co-determination debates in a number of countries, was portrayed as representing a European trend that confirmed the legitimacy of German union demands for an extension of *Mitbestimmung* (co-decision) in the Federal Republic.[59]

Such a perspective also helps us to better understand the discrepancy between the DGB's strong insistence on representation in European institutions and the more limited interest in actual legislation. Representation served first and foremost to provide information about new European developments to national headquarters, and to lobby EC institutions with a view to opposing the negative repercussions of market integration while maximizing European support for the expansion of national social policies. Typically, in a 1979 DGB board discussion of the ETUC action programme, IG Chemie Chairman Karl Hauenschild (who became a social democratic Member of the European Parliament from 1979 to 1984) suggested skipping this point on the agenda unless the ETUC docu-

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56   Paul Teague, The British TUC and the European Community, in: Millennium 18 (1989) 1, pp. 29-45, here: p. 39.

57   Aktennotiz Abteilung Wirtschaft, 5 July 1971, AdSD, Bestand DGB, 24/2163.

58   Procès-Verbal de la réunion du comité executif, 5 December 1968, Archive International Institute of Social History (IISH) Amsterdam, ETUC collection, part I, file 476.

59   Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund, Protokoll 10. Ordentlicher Bundeskongreß, 25. bis 30. Mai 1975, p. 125.

ment contained something that could cause domestic trouble.[60] When such instances of 'trouble' did occur, the DGB representatives in Brussels could become the target of heavy criticism. This was the case in 1978, for example, when DGB leader Vetter publicly advocated the ETUC demand for a shorter working week while this issue was still contested within the German union movement.[61]

The more fundamental reasons for this priority accorded to the nation-state in terms of social policy are of course well known. German trade unions, as their counterparts in other West European countries, came to be accepted as 'estates of the realm' at the national level after 1945, and their new stakes in industrial relations systems and the administration of welfare programmes made them susceptible to the appeal of national identity.[62] It is worth emphasizing in this regard, too, that the DGB's attitude towards a supranational European social policy – in substance if not in rhetoric – was not fundamentally different from that of German employers and the government.[63] The only serious signs of controversy between the DGB and the German employer association Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie (BDI) were related to the European regulation of co-determination, but this was, in essence, a domestic rather than a European debate.

What this analysis demonstrates overall, then, is that it is misleading to interpret the active DGB engagement with the emerging EC social policy in the 1970s as evidence of a broader aspiration to 'counterbalance' European market integration. Indeed, the most striking continuity of German trade union thinking on European integration during this period was not the preoccupation with the dangers of 'social dumping' but the support for European free trade. The origins of this support date back at least to the union's embracing of ideas for a European customs union during the inter-war period.[64] After 1945 the belief in the benefits of free trade was reinforced in the light of the damaging effects of the protectionism of the 1930s. It is true that IG Metall expressed serious reservations about early post-war European integration in the coal and steel industries but it appears

60   Protokoll der Sitzung des Bundesvorstands des Deutschen Gewerkschaftsbundes, 3 April 1979, Übertragung aus dem Stenogramm, in: AdSD, Bestand DGB, 5/DGAI 500.

61   Protokoll der Sitzung des Bundesvorstands des Deutschen Gewerkschaftsbundes, 2 May 1978, Übertragung aus dem Stenogramm, in: AdSD, Bestand DGB, 5/DGAI 597.

62   See Pasture/Verberckmoesm, Working-Class Internationalism (note 7).

63   Stephan Seifen, Die Bedeutung der europäischen Beschäftigungspolitik für den Strategiewandel der deutschen Gewerkschaften in der Phase der 'Eurosklerose' (1973–1986), in: Jürgen Mittag (ed.), Deutsche Gewerkschaften und europäische Integration im 20. Jahrhundert, Mitteilungsblatt des Instituts für soziale Bewegungen 42 (2009) 1, pp. 187-213, here: p. 195; for the attitudes of German employer associations towards European integration see Werner Bührer, Le BDI (Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie) et les institutions européennes, in: Marie-Thérèse Bitsch (ed.), Le couple France-Allemange et les institutions européennes, Bruxelles 2001, pp. 261-279; Wolfram Kaiser, Quo vadis, Europa? Die deutsche Wirtschaft und der gemeinsame Markt 1958–1963, in: Rudolf Hrbek/Volker Schwarz (eds.), 40 Jahre Römische Verträge: Der deutsche Beitrag, Baden-Baden 1998, pp. 195-213.

64   See Patrick Pasture, The Interwar Origins of International Labour's European Commitment (1919–1934), in: Contemporary European History 10 (2001) 2, pp. 221-237.

that this was due to the specific provisions of the Schuman Plan that were perceived to favour the French steel industry at the expense of its German counterpart.[65]

Importantly, the DGB welcomed the EEC Treaty from the outset – despite the fact that the representation of trade union interests in EEC institutions was weaker in comparison to the ECSC. At its 1962 congress, the new DGB leader Ludwig Rosenberg told delegates that the Common Market had accelerated economic and social progress in West Germany.[66] As Lutz Niethammer has pointed out, this attitude reflected not least the shift towards a more pragmatic type of trade unionism inspired by US-style 'politics of productivity' (Charles Maier) and symbolized in the DGB's new 1963 Düsseldorf programme, which abandoned the earlier union emphasis on state ownership and planning.[67] At the same time, the growing contribution of European exports to the Federal Republic's 'economic miracle' reinforced German trade unions' commitment to market integration. 'Europe', in other words, came to be perceived primarily as an economic space that helped to raise wages and expand welfare services in the Federal Republic.

This perception of European market integration as an enabling factor of domestic social progress did not fundamentally change during the 1970s, which in turn limited DGB aspirations for a supranational social policy. What appears striking in hindsight is precisely how little emphasis was put on possible negative implications of market integration – despite the oil crisis and recession in 1973-4, and the subsequent steep rise in unemployment. The debate about multinational corporations, for example, appears to have petered out within the DGB after 1974.[68] At the European level, in response to the oil crisis and recession, DGB leader Vetter helped in 1974 to bring about a series of tripartite conferences to discuss prospects for macroeconomic coordination. But the lack of concrete results and economic recovery soon reduced the salience of the initiative.[69] Clearly – against the backdrop of record union density rates and the Federal Republic's comparatively impressive macroeconomic performance in the second half of the 1970s[70] – the DGB did not yet perceive European (and broader global) market integration as raising serious problems for West Germany's welfare state and industrial relations institutions.

65   See Karl Lauschke, Zwischen Mitbestimmungs- und Europapolitik: Die IG Metall und die Anfänge der europäischen Integration, in: Jürgen Mittag (ed.), Deutsche Gewerkschaften und europäische Integration im 20. Jahrhundert, Mitteilungsblatt des Instituts für soziale Bewegungen 42 (2009) 1, pp. 89-102.

66   Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund, Protokoll des 4. Ordentlichen Bundeskongresses, 7. bis 12. September 1962, pp. 100 f.

67   Niethammer, Defensive Integration (note 6), pp. 575; for this transformation see Julia Angster, Konsenskapitalismus und Sozialdemokratie: Die Westernisierung von SPD und DGB, Munich 2003.

68   See Walter Braun, Die 'Multinationalen' – ein inzwischen vergessenes Problem? in: Gewerkschaftliche Monatshefte, 29 (1978) 6, pp. 349-54.

69   See Gobin, Consultation (note 9), pp. 461 ff.

70   See Sassoon, One Hundred Years of Socialism (note 4), chapter 18.

Conclusion

The importance of the national and international context factors discussed above is clearly borne out if we look at how German trade union's attitudes towards European integration have developed in more recent decades. In fact, these attitudes have substantially changed since the late 1980s due to domestic weakening and a much more difficult macroeconomic environment. 'Europe' has received a much higher degree of attention in German trade union thinking – witness the routine praise for the 'European social model' at DGB congresses during the 1990s.[71] It also seems clear that there has equally been a shift in the evaluation of economic integration. The DGB continues to emphasize the advantages of market integration for German exports, yet there is now also a growing concern about negative effects of the EU's internal market on Germany's welfare system. This concern has been voiced, for instance, in relation to Economic and Monetary Union and, above all, Eastern enlargement. German trade union leaders have warned against the dangers of 'social dumping' in the old member states as a result of enlargement.[72] In turn, these more ambivalent views of market integration went hand in hand with demands for a more active supranational social policy. Thus, the DGB has encouraged the European social dialogue and supported a European coordination of collective bargaining.[73] 'Social Europe' is also increasingly invoked as a necessary response to the acceleration of global competition – in fact, DGB leaders have explicitly framed the 'European social model' in juxtaposition to the 'American model' of liberal capitalism.[74]

On the other hand, however, continuities need to be stressed, too, in particular with regard to the still dominant preference for coordination over harmonization. For example, during the 1990s, the DGB still advocated a better EU-wide coordination of national employment policies, rather than a wholesale transfer of competences to Brussels.[75] Likewise, there was still a clear emphasis on limiting the redistributive component of European initiatives. Within the framework of European wage co-ordination, for example, German unions have insisted that coordination should be based on the 'neutral' concept of unit labour costs, that is, the relation between productivity and labour costs. In practice, moreover, German trade unions have repeatedly not complied with the 'soft targets' of bargaining coordination.[76]

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71 See for example: Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund, Protokoll des 15. Ordentlichen Bundeskongresses, 13. bis 17. Juni 1994, pp. 110 f.

72 Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund, Protokoll des 5. Außerordentlichen Bundeskongresses, 13. bis 16. November 1996, pp. 211 f.

73 See Torsten Schulten, Der Koordinierungsansatz des Europäischen Metallgewerkschaftsbundes, in: Torsten Schulten / Wolfgang Bispinck (eds.), Tarifpolitik unter dem Euro, Hamburg 1999, pp. 197-226.

74 See Thomas Fetzer, 'Social Europe' as an Answer to Economic Globalisation: British and German Trade Unions and European Integration in the 1980s and 1990s, in: Ann-Christina Lauring Knudsen / Morten Rasmussen (eds.), The Road to a United Europe – Interpretations of the Process of European Integration, Brussels 2009, pp. 169-188.

75 See Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund (ed.), Geschäftsbericht 1994–1997, p. 16.

76 See Roland Erne, European Unions. Labor's Quest for a Transnational Democracy, Ithaca 2008, pp. 99 ff.

Interestingly, recent comparative scholarship suggests that a number of trade unions in other countries also experienced a 'European turn' during the 1990s,[77] which points to a possible broader significance of the German case study discussed in this article. Of course, there have been and continue to be numerous cross-national differences in trade union attitudes to European integration – the political Euroscepticism of British and Scandinavian unions, for example, never found an equivalent in Germany. In Italy and France, with their ideologically divided labour movements, European integration played a very different role, too, not least in terms of its importance for inter-union competition itself.[78] Belgium seems to be a special case.[79] Still, beyond these numerous cross-national differences one similarity stands out: until the late 1980s most trade unions' concern with European integration appears to have been predominantly related to the benefits and drawbacks of EC membership – but not yet so much to the EC as a new political arena for trade union action.

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77 See Klaus Tenfelde / Jürgen Mittag (eds.), Towards Transnational Trade Union Representation? National Trade Unions and European Integration, Essen forthcoming 2010.

78 For Britain see Teague, The British TUC (note 56); for France see Jean-Marie Pernot, Dedans, dehors. La dimension internationale dans le syndicalisme français, Paris 2001; for Italy see Andrea Ciampani, La Cisl tra integrazione europea e mondializzazione. Profilo storico del sindacato nuovo nelle relazioni internazionali: dalla Conferenza di Londra al trattato di Amsterdam, Rome 2000.

79 See Patrick Pasture, 'Belgium', in: Klaus Tenfelde / Jürgen Mittag (eds.), Towards Transnational Trade Union Repre-sentation? National Trade Unions and European Integration, Essen forthcoming 2010.

Defending the Status Quo: Agricultural Interest Groups and the Challenges of Overproduction

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RESÜMEE

Das *Comité des organizations professionnelles agricoles* (COPA) ist die älteste und größte Agrarlobby der heutigen Europäischen Union. Basierend auf Forschungen im Archiv von COPA und gestützt auf historisch-institutionalistische Theorien, untersucht dieser Artikel, ob und wie einige der meist kritisierten Ergebnisse der Gemeinsamen Agrarpolitik (GAP) wie die Förderung von Überproduktion auf den Einfluss nicht-staatlicher Akteure wie COPA zurückgingen. Der Aufsatz beginnt mit einer Darstellung der institutionellen Strukturen und Arbeitsweisen der COPA und beleuchtet das enge Verhältnis zwischen COPA und der europäischen Kommission. Anschließend untersucht der Artikel COPAs Bemühen, Reformvorschläge der Kommission im Milchsektor abzuwehren bzw. zu beeinflussen. Der Aufsatz zeigt, dass nicht-staatliche Akteure wie COPA eine der treibenden Kräfte hinter dem agrarpolitischen Status quo in den 1970er Jahren waren.

Agriculture is one of the economic sectors where the process of European integration has been carried furthest. The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) is not only the oldest common policy of the present-day European Union (EU) but also the most controversial.[1] The treaty of March 1957 creating the European Economic Community (EEC) set five explicit goals for the CAP: to increase productivity, to ensure a fair standard of living to farmers, to stabilize markets, to ensure the availability of supplies and to guarantee reasonable prices for consumers. In January 1962, the six EEC member states agreed that the CAP would be organized around the core principles of market unity, Community preference and financial solidarity so that its costs would be shared among the

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1   Desmond Dinan, Ever Closer Union. An Introduction to European Integration, New York / London 2005, p. 325.

member states. Agricultural prices were linked to farm incomes and reviewed annually. The subsequent creation of the European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF) provided the financial basis for the CAP. The EAGGF's main task was to support agricultural prices in the EEC, with price levels generally above world market prices (guarantee section), and to support rural development and the improvement of agricultural structures (guidance section). In the first half of the 1960s, common prices for each product were adopted and common market organizations created. The common agricultural market became fully implemented in the summer of 1967.

Although the six member states of what became the European Communities (EC) after the institutional merger in 1967 agreed at the summit of The Hague in December 1969 to finalize the financial regulations for completing the CAP, demand for reforms of the policy grew stronger in view of its increasingly obvious side-effects. The high price levels for agricultural commodities adopted in the early 1960s had encouraged production to increase faster than demand. Structural surpluses emerged in several sectors like cereals and sugar, but they were particularly important in the sector of milk and dairy products, where the improved breeding of cattle with higher yields combined with technological progress resulted in spectacular growth.[2] The often disparaged 'butter mountains' and 'milk lakes' became a leitmotiv of the CAP critics and represented a strong incentive for reform.

Criticism of the CAP was not new but the economic crisis of the 1970s following the first oil shock of 1973, with its rampant inflation and rising unemployment, provided new arguments for reforming the policy. Moreover, in the 1970s, the policy was increasingly confronted with two main challenges, one external and one internal. On the one hand, monetary instability after the collapse of the international monetary system, the growing denunciation of the CAP's protectionism by Third World countries, and the opening of a new round of trade negotiations in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) provided additional incentives for revising the policy. On the other hand, overproduction and the resulting steep rise in the guarantee section of the EAGGF created an increasing burden for the EC and national budgets and threatened to develop into a budgetary crisis.[3]

Recent studies on the role of lobby groups in EU policy-making have used the concept of multi-level governance as an explanatory tool for analysing how non-state actors exert political influence on EU institutions.[4] Yet, as Svien Andersen and Kjeil Eliassen have stressed, only limited attempts have been made to address the role of interest representation and lobbying in the overall pattern of EU decision-making and in CAP decision-making in particular.[5] So far social scientists have tried to explain the 'status quo bias' of

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2   Brian E Hill, The Common Agricultural Policy: Past, Present and Future, London 1984, p. 73.

3   Accounting for 40 % of the guarantee section of the FEOGA, the milk sector was the most important item.

4   See for instance Tanja A. Börzel/Karen Heard-Lauréote, Networks in EU Multi-Level Governance. Concepts and Contributions, in: Journal of Public Policy 29 (2009) 2, pp. 135-151.

5   Svien S. Andersen/Kjeil A. Eliassen, EU-lobbying: the new research agenda, in: European Journal of Political Research, 27 (1995) 4, pp. 427-441.

EU agricultural policy mainly by studying voting rules and the distribution of votes in the Council of Ministers.[6] As a result, these studies fail to take into account the impact of interest groups in their explanation of agricultural policy inertia. Conversely, historical research on the CAP has focused on inter-state negotiations during the creation and the initial phase of the policy.[7] An archive-based study of non-state agricultural actors in Europe and their influence on the CAP from the late 1960s onward has yet to be carried out.[8]

One of the oldest and largest of the EU's farm organizations is the Comité des organisation professionnelles agricoles (COPA, Committee of Professional Agricultural Organizations) created in 1958. However, most studies of COPA and its role in EU politics and policy-making either set out its institutional organization and working methods,[9] or focus on more recent developments such as the Mac Sharry reforms of 1992.[10] Based on research conducted in COPA's archives, which have become accessible for the first time to historians; this article seeks to address some of the shortcomings of the existing literature on EU lobbying and CAP reform by analyzing whether and if so, how some of the most criticized outcomes of the CAP, such as the enormous surpluses and high costs, were the (direct or indirect) result of opportunities for COPA to impose the interests of Community farmers by influencing EC decision-making. I assume that the emergence and consolidation of organized farming groups as a network of actors sharing a common aim created the conditions for what could be called the Europeanization of farming interests (as already predicted in essence by neo-functionalist scholars in the 1950s and 1960s) which ensured the preservation of the policy in its original form throughout the 1970s and beyond. I will draw upon assumptions of historical institutionalist theories

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6   Jan Pokrivcak / Christophe Crombez / Johan F. M. Swinnen, The Status Quo Bias and Reform of the Common Agricultural Policy. Impact of Voting Rules, the European Commission and External Changes, in: European Revue of Agricultural Economics 33 (2006) 4, pp. 562-590.

7   See Ann-Christina Lauring Knudsen, Farmers on Welfare. The Making of Europe's Common Agricultural Policy, Ithaca 2009; Gilbert Noël, Du pool vert à la politique agricole commune: les tentatives de Communauté agricole européenne entre 1945 et 1955, Paris 1988; Kiran Klaus Patel (ed.), Fertile Ground for Europe? The History of European Integration and the Common Agricultural Policy, Baden-Baden 2009; Richard Griffiths/Brian Girvin (eds.), The Green Pool and the Origins of the Common agricultural policy, Bloomsbury 1995; Guido Thiemeyer, Vom 'Pool Vert' zur Europäischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft, Munich 1999; Kiran Klaus Patel, Europäisierung wider Willen. Die Bundesrepublik Deutschland in der Agrarintegration der EWG, 1955–1973 Munich 2009.

8   For a historical study of agricultural networks, albeit limited to the creation phase of the CAP, see Ann-Christina L. Knudsen, Politische Unternehmer in transnationalen Politiknetzwerken. Die Ursprünge der Gemeinsamen Agrarpolitik, in: Michael Gehler / Wolfram Kaiser / Brigitte Leucht (eds), Netzwerke im europäischen Mehrebenensystem. Von 1945 bis zur Gegenwart, Vienna/Cologne/Weimar 2009, pp. 105-120.

9   See Graham Averyt, Agropolitics in the European Community. Interest Groups and the Common Agricultural Policy, London 1977; Barbara Burkhardt-Reich / Wolfgang Schumann, Agrarverbände in der EG. Das agrarpolitische Entscheidungsgefüge in Brüssel und in den EG-Mitgliedstaaten unter besonderer Berücksichtigung des Euro-Verbandes COPA und seiner nationalen Mitgliedsverbände, Kehl am Rhein 1983.

10   See for instance Julian R. A. Clark / Alun Jones, From Policy Insider to Policy Outcast? Comité des Organisations Professionnelles Agricoles, EU Policymaking, and the EU's 'Agri-Environment' Regulation, in: Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy 17 (1999) 5, pp. 637-653; Alun Jones / Julian Clark, The Modalities of European Union Governance, Oxford 2001, pp. 79-99.

that utilise the concept of path-dependency as a way of explaining institutional persistence and stability across time, to clarify COPA's success in resisting policy change.[11]

The first section of the article focuses on COPA as a non-state actor. In this section, I briefly introduce its structure and working methods. I also scrutinise the historically close relationship between COPA and the Directorate General (DG) VI (Agriculture) of the European Commission and examine how this relationship shaped the modalities of COPA's interest representation in the EC as a lobby and pressure group. By looking at different Commission-initiated attempts at reform in the dairy sector in the second section, I explore COPA's efforts to influence and shape CAP reform proposals, and discuss to what extent COPA was able to prevent any significant policy reform during the 1970s. In conclusion, I argue that non-state actors such as COPA were one of the driving forces behind the agricultural policy status quo in the 1970s.

Agricultural actors at national and European level

Agricultural integration represented both an opportunity and a challenge for European farmers. It enabled a rapid modernization of the agricultural sector and increased living standards. At the same time, farmers lost influence on agricultural policy-making since decisions were increasingly being taken in Brussels. European farmers have always been well organized at national level. As several case studies have shown,[12] the successful enforcement of their interests in Brussels relied to a great extent on the 'extraordinary organizational capacity of farmers' unions in the member states.'[13] The formation of the EEC and the prospect of the CAP did, however, create strong incentives for increasing and formalizing transnational European-level ties. COPA was founded in the wake of the Stresa conference in September 1958 and comprised the main farm organizations of the six EEC member states. COPA worked closely with the Comité général de la coopération agricole (General Commitee of Agricultural Cooperation, COGECA), the umbrella organization of agricultural cooperatives founded in 1959. In the early days of the EEC, the Commission was anxious to establish contacts with farmers. Sicco Mansholt, the first and long-time Agricultural Commissioner, was very interested in the formation of Community-wide agricultural interests groups and was eager to 'encourage the creation

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11   For an introduction to historical institutionalist theories, see Paul Pierson, The Path to European Integration. A Historical Institutionalist Analysis, in: Comparative Political Studies 29 (1996) 2, pp. 123-163. For an analysis of the concept of path-dependency applied to the CAP, see Adrian Kay, Path Dependency and the CAP, in: Journal of European Public Policy 10 (2003) 3, pp. 405-420.

12   See for instance John T. S. Keeler, The politics of Neo-Corporatism in France. Farmers, the State and Agricultural Policy-Making in the Fifth Republic, New York 1987; Paul Ackermann, Der deutsche Bauernverband im politischen Kräftespiel der Bundesrepublik. Die Einflussnahme des DBV auf die Entscheidung über den europäischen Getreidepreis, Tübingen 1970; Gisela Hendriks, Germany and the CAP: National Interests and the European Community, in: International Affairs 65 (1988) 1, pp. 75-87; Gisela Hendriks, Germany and European Integration. The Common Agricultural Policy: An Area of Conflict, New York 1991.

13   John T. S. Keeler, Agricultural Power in the European Community. Explaining the Fate of CAP and GATT Negotiations, in: Comparative Politics 28 (1996) 2, pp. 127-149.

of umbrella organizations at the EEC level for various types of interest groups.'[14] It was also in the Commission's interest to reinforce the power of COPA, because the Commission preferred to speak to an EEC-wide group that negotiated the differing views of its constituent members, thus presenting the Commission with a united European farmers' view. Created to provide a single voice for farmers in dealing with the Commission, COPA gradually established itself as a key player in the agricultural policy-making process.[15] As defined by its internal rules, COPA's objectives were, and still are, to represent and defend the interests of European farmers, to seek solutions of common interest, to establish contacts with the European authorities and other professional organizations, and finally, to coordinate the positions of its constituent federations with the aim of establishing a common position vis-à-vis the European institutions.[16] After the first enlargement in 1973, COPA represented a total of twenty-two organizations from the then nine EC member states.

COPA is a peak organization with a federal structure. In 1960, the Committee created an institutional structure including an assembly and an executive board, the Praesidium. They were assisted by a secretariat and specialized groups, each of which were devoted to specific commodities such as milk and dairy products, fruit and vegetables, or area of expertise such as social or veterinary issues, taxation, transport, etc.[17] A more stringent institutional organization was not simply necessary in order to buttress COPA's lobbying activities but also reflected the institutional set-up of some of the member associations, such as the Deutscher Bauernverband (DBV, the German Farmers' Union). It might also be seen as indicative of the greater influence of some member associations in the early days of COPA – and of the quasi-federal structure of the EC. Broadly in line with neo-functionalist assumptions, John W. Meyer and Brian Rowan explained such institutional isomorphism in terms of the fact 'that formal organizations become matched with their environment by technical and exchange interdependencies.'[18]

The assembly was COPA's legitimizing institution. It was composed of the representatives of the member federations, the members of the Praesidium and the presidents of the specialized groups. Its task was to define the guiding policy principles, examine and adopt the budget and mandate the Praesidium to implement the decisions adopted

14   Knudsen, Farmers on Welfare (note 7), p. 125.
15   As argued by Rosemary Fennell, The Common Agricultural Policy of the European Community, Oxford 1987, p. 57; Michael Keane / Denis Lucey, The CAP and the Farmers, in: Christopher Ritson / David R. Harvey, The Common Agricultural Policy, Wallingford 1997, pp. 227-239; Michael Gorges, Euro-Corporatism? Interest Intermediation in the European Community, New York 1996, p. 169.
16   Archives historiques de la Commission européenne [hereafter AHCE], BAC 71/1984-80, Règlement intérieur du COPA, Bruxelles, 11 mai 1973, A (73) 7; Archives COPA, Séminaire Milly-la-Forêt, 1977, Communication du Président sur la structure et le fonctionnement du COPA et de ses différents (sic) instances, Bruxelles, 5 janvier 1966.
17   AHCE, 71/1984-85, Organigramme du COPA.
18   John W. Meyer / Brian Rowan, Institutionalized Organizations: Formal Structure as Myth and Ceremony, in: The American Journal of Sociology, 83 (1977) 2, pp. 340-363, here p. 346. See also Arne Niemann / Philippe C. Schmitter, Neo-functionalism, in: Antje Wiener / Thomas Diez (eds.), European Integration Theory, Oxford 2009, pp. 45-66.

during the plenary sessions.[19] Composed of the leaders of each national federation, the Praesidium was its highest decision-making body. The presidency of COPA consisted of a president and two vice-presidents of different nationalities elected for a two-year period. Its tasks were to represent the Committee, to implement decisions taken by the assembly, to organize the Committee's works, including planning for farmers' demonstrations, and most importantly, to establish regular relations with the Commission, the Council and the European Parliament (EP). Decisions in the Praesidium were taken by unanimity. If consensus was impossible, decisions were adopted by a qualified majority of fifty-two votes.[20]

Contacts between the Praesidium and the Commission were very close. Not only did the Praesidium meet regularly (approximately once a month) with the agriculture commissioner, but officials from DG VI also frequently attended the Praesidium's meetings.[21] Reflecting the growing complexity and technicality of the CAP, the Praesidium decided in 1977 to extend the length of its discussions and to meet for a full day once a month rather than only half a day, while general expert groups were expected to have two-day reunions each month.[22] In addition, whenever the Commission prepared important proposals, the Praesidium met in order to discuss their implications for farmers.[23] These meetings, attended by representatives of all member associations, were meant to define COPA's position vis-à-vis the Commission's proposals.

The role of the experts was to assist the Praesidium, and in particular to 'prepare the debates of the Praesidium and, to this aim, to establish a philosophy of the CAP about the price policy, the structural, commercial and social policy.'[24] The group of general experts was made up of a representative of each member organization. Documents drafted by the experts had to be approved by all member organizations. Until 1977, the reunions of the experts took place shortly before those of the Praesidium, which limited their input into the Praesidium's discussions. The Praesidium subsequently decided that the meetings of the experts would take place fifteen days before their own in order to enhance the efficiency of the Praesidium.[25]

The EC enlargement of 1973 posed problems to COPA similar to those posed to the Community institutions. To begin with, it raised organizational problems, as the new

19   Archives COPA, Séminaire Milly-la-Forêt, 1977, Communication du Président sur la structure et le fonctionnement du COPA et de ses différents (sic) instances, Bruxelles, 5 janvier 1966.

20   Germany, France and Great-Britain had twelve votes each; Belgium, Denmark and the Netherlands six, Ireland four and Luxembourg two. AHCE, BAC 71/1984-80, Règlement intérieur du COPA, Bruxelles, 11 mai 1973, A (73) 7.

21   Averyt, Agropolitics (note 9), p. 75.

22   Archives COPA, Séminaire Milly-la-Forêt, 1977, Projet rapport succinct du séminaire de réflexion sur l'avenir de la Politique Agricole Commune des 8/9 décembre 1977, Bruxelles, 29 décembre 1977, Pr (77) 32.

23   There were four so-called conclave meetings during the 1970s: Itre (Belgique) 1971, Wye (United Kingdom) 1975, Milly-la-Forêt (France) 1977, Bonn (Germany) 1980.

24   Archives COPA, Séminaire Milly-la-Forêt, 1977, Communication du Président sur la structure et le fonctionnement du COPA et de ses différents (sic) instances, Bruxelles, 5 janvier 1966. [All quotes from original sources written in French were translated by the author, CG.]

25   Archives COPA, Séminaire Milly-la-Forêt, 1977, Programme de travail résultant des décisions prises par le Praesidium lors du séminaire de Milly-la-Forêt les 8 et 9 décembre 1977, Bruxelles, 19 décembre 1977, S (77) 96.

member states had to be included in COPA's administrative structures. The farm groups from Britain, the Republic of Ireland and Denmark were integrated relatively smoothly in 1973. In contrast, the prospect of the accession of the Mediterranean countries Greece, Spain and Portugal raised many concerns either because of the fragmented structure of national producer associations as in Spain or the lack of such associations as in Portugal.[26] Moreover, the increasing number of organizations from countries with dissimilar agricultural structures, traditions and policies made the search for common positions more difficult and undermined COPA's cohesion. The growing number of Community languages required costly and time-consuming translation of internal documents and assistance by interpreters during the meetings of the Praesidium and assembly became necessary more often.

At the same time, the EC enlargement also had certain advantages, most notably in budgetary terms. COPA's budget was funded from national contributions. The contribution of the bigger member states (France, Germany, Italy and Great Britain) amounted to 4/23 each, while the smaller member states (Belgium, Netherlands and Denmark) paid 2/23. Ireland paid 1/23 and Luxembourg a lump sum into COPA's budget.[27] Interestingly, the budgetary contributions did not depend on the number of national federations adhering to COPA. This created a heavier financial burden for the DBV, the sole German member association of COPA, than for the French or British national associations, who could split their contribution among three or four different organizations. In any case, as William Averyt has stressed, the inclusion of the farming organizations from Britain, Ireland and Denmark into COPA resulted in a substantial increase in the organization's financial resources.[28] This was mainly due to the inclusion of the British National Farmers' Union (NFU). Accustomed to a corporatist relationship with the British government, the NFU insisted that COPA work even more closely with the EC institutions and increase its staff in Brussels. Initially fearful of the consequences of British EC accession for British farmers, the NFU in fact decided to use and develop COPA's possibilities as a way to influence the agricultural policy process.

COPA's primary role was to establish a network of farming interests and to lobby the European institutions. Because the Commission had, and still has, an exclusive competence for initiating legislative proposals in supranational policy areas, it figured at the top of COPA's list of institutions for lobbying at an early stage in the policy-making process. Their supranational character also made the Commission and COPA congenial partners. However, formal contacts between the Commission and interests groups initially were not the norm and most important contacts did not occur in the formal, institutionalized channels.[29] Instead the Commission favoured personal contacts between COPA's

26   Wolfgang Schumann, Agrarverbände in der EG. Das agrarpolitische Entscheidungsgefüge in Brüssel und in den EG-Mitgliedstaaten unter besonderer Berücksichtigung des Euro-Verbandes COPA und seiner nationalen Mitgliedsverbände, Kehl am Rhein 1983, p. 335.

27   AHCE, BAC 71/1984-80, Règlement intérieur du COPA, Bruxelles, 11 mai 1973, A (73) 7.

28   Averyt, Agropolitics (note 9), pp. 78-79.

29   Nielsen T. Tierken, Aspects of the EEC influence on European Groups in the Decision-Making Process: The Com-

experts and the DG for agriculture, and between members of COPA's Praesidium and the agriculture commissioner.

The informality of these relations was advantageous for the Commission. Mansholt's deal with the European agricultural interest organizations enabled the Commission to present a united front with COPA and to promote the realization of the CAP in the 1960s. COPA was a key ally for the commissioner in pushing his agenda. Hence, Mansholt patiently and skilfully negotiated with the farmers, although he also occasionally met with the leaders of the main national agricultural organizations.[30] Thus, by the mid-1970s, Averyt observed that 'a relationship approaching clientele has arisen between the Directorate-General and the interest groups.'[31] The Commission was interested in learning the farmers' viewpoints but also in benefiting from their expertise. While DG VI was open to input from COPA, it also desired to keep the initiative in the relationship.

Interestingly, the informal nature of contacts with the Commission was not satisfactory for COPA. If COPA was to a certain extent the creature of the Commission, which had pushed for its creation in 1958, it rapidly tried to reshape the rules decided by Mansholt for framing the relationship, and campaigned in favour of 'an institutional and preliminary consultation procedure between the Commission and COPA.'[32] Formalizing the consultation process was important because it would impose clear obligations on DG VI and increase COPA's input into EC policy-making. Accordingly, in the mid-1960s the COPA Praesidium decided to streamline relations with the Commission. The rationale was that while meetings had evolved into 'contacts of mutual information'[33] they should actually serve to help confront and negotiate viewpoints. To that end, COPA decided to establish contacts with the agriculture commissioner and his services at three different levels: first, informal contacts between the general experts and the service of DG VI responsible for preparing the discussion between the agriculture commissioner and the members of the COPA Praesidium; secondly, formal and regular meetings between the agriculture commissioner and the president of COPA in order to discuss current problems; and finally, information meetings between the Commission and the assembly of COPA. The Committee succeeded in obtaining more regular meetings with the representatives of DG VI, but it failed to institutionalize these contacts.

A particularly important demand was the establishment of an 'annual conference' during which COPA and the Community institutions would discuss the economic and social conditions of farmers as well as the evolution of costs, prices and income. One official from DG VI remarked that 'COPA has been demanding for a long time to be consulted

mon Agricultural Policy, in: Government and Opposition 6 (1971) 4, pp. 539-558, here p. 547.

30   Alan Butt Philip, Pressure Group Power in the Europe Community, in: Intereconomics 22 (1983), pp. 282-289, here p. 283.

31   William Averyt, Eurogroups, Clientela, and the European Community, in: International Organization 29 (1975) 4, pp. 949-972, here p. 960.

32   Archives COPA, Séminaire Milly-la-Forêt, 1977, Projet document de travail n°2 en vue du séminaire de réflexion sur l'avenir de la Politique Agricole Commune, Bruxelles, 14 novembre 1977, S (77) 86.

33   Archives COPA, Séminaire Milly-la-Forêt, 1977, Communication du Président sur la structure et le fonctionnement du COPA et de ses différents (sic) instances, Bruxelles, 5 janvier 1966.

by the Commission on an institutional basis before it presents proposals to the Council, be these proposals on the annual definition of prices or other measures of the common agricultural policy. So far this demand has been unsuccessful. There are regular informal meetings with Mansholt but there is no genuine discussion on the basis of objective data before the Commission presents its propositions.'[34] Another special request of COPA was to be allowed to participate in the elaboration of the Commission's annual report. Here again, the Commission was not prepared to collaborate with COPA on its terms. Yet, this form of 'pre-emptive lobbying'[35] was crucial for COPA and required the careful cultivation of contacts with DG VI, especially during the preliminary phase of the policy formulation rather than at later stages.[36] As a collaborator of Mansholt remarked, COPA 'hopes to strengthen its negotiation power with the Commission and to force his member organizations, often inclined to turn to their national government, to act at the European level.'[37]

Personal and direct contacts with the services of DG VI were not the only way used by COPA to influence CAP policy decisions. Professional farming groups were also represented in the advisory committees that were set up for each major commodity and met regularly with the Commission to discuss various aspects of the policy. Advisory committees were thus another channel of influence for COPA and integrated it further into CAP decision-making.

COPA was also at its most efficient when it was not merely a coordinating body and a place of exchange of information but when it acted as a clearing house of national positions, that is, when it aggregated and articulated national positions into a united stance. To a large extent, COPA's lobbying efficiency depended on how successful it was in getting its member organizations to commit to policies agreed at the Community level, and in obtaining 'the engagement of [its member] organizations to defend [decisions] in relation to the national and Community decision-making body.'[38]

The attempts by COPA to institutionalise its relationship with the Commission are at odds with the explanatory model of the policy network approach. This would suggest that informal privileged access guarantees the greatest influence. As a result, it might seem surprising that COPA demanded more than the informal regular and routine consultations with the Commission. However, the increasing competition among agricultural interest groups at the EC level in the 1970s helps explain this mismatch between the theoretical assumptions and the practice of agricultural interest representation. While COPA enjoyed a near monopoly position in the 1960s, this was increasingly challenged in the

34   AHCE, BAC 7/1974-3, Propositions du COPA en ce qui concerne la consultation du COPA relative au rapport annuel sur la situation de l'agriculture et des agriculteurs, COPA, Bruxelles, 10 septembre 1970.

35   Jones / Clark, The Modalities of European Union Governance (note 10), p. 85.

36   Clark / Jones, From Policy Insider to Policy Outcast (note 10), p. 642.

37   AHCE, BAC 6/1974-38, Note à l'attention de M. le vice-président S.L. Mansholt, division des relations avec les organisations non gouvernementales, Bruxelles (no date).

38   Archives COPA, Séminaire Milly-la-Forêt, 1977, Mémoire rédigé au titre des délibérations et considérations recueillies à l'occasion du conclave organisé à Itre, les 28 et 29 juin 1971, août 1971.

1970s with the creation of new farm interest groups such as the Comité européen pour le progrès agricole (COMEPRA, European Committee for Agricultural Progress). COPA had to make sure that its position as the sole representative of farmers' interests was not eroded by the direct contacts between the Commission and national federations or other organized groups from outside COPA. Institutionalizing contacts with the Commission was considered a means by which COPA could buttress its position as the Commission's privileged interlocutor, and consequently enhance COPA's political influence on agricultural policy-making. The same approach is also reflected in the contacts COPA had with other agricultural stakeholders such as the Confédération européenne de l'agriculture (CEA, European Confederation of Agriculture) and the Fédération internationale des producteurs agricoles (FIPA, International Federation of Agricultural Producers). In July 1972, the three organizations decided to streamline the coordination of their work and signed an agreement that recognized COPA as the sole legitimate interlocutor in relation to the Community authorities and other socio-professional associations.[39] This agreement granted COPA a privileged position in the defence of agricultural interests and in its relationship with the Commission.

Most European interest organizations have rarely adopted a high public profile, traditionally seeking to influence policy-making in the EC by means of direct representations to officials and commissioners. In contrast, COPA did not shy away from using traditional means of expressing farmers' discontent and from sponsoring noisy street demonstrations.[40] From 1968 to 1971, for example, COPA supported a series of demonstrations against the first attempt by the Commission to reform the policy, the Mansholt Plan, to be elaborated upon in the next section. These demonstrations culminated in a huge rally and riots in Brussels in March 1971.

In backing demonstrations by farmers, COPA had a twofold objective. First, the massive and sometimes violent demonstrations underlined COPA's ability to mobilize its members. This provided publicly visible evidence of its representativeness. Secondly, these demonstrations served to channel the dissatisfaction of national federations and consequently, to secure the position of COPA as the sole institution speaking for farmers' interests, a position which could be undermined by national federations acting alone or coordinating actions outside of the COPA forum.[41] The overarching aim was to bolster COPA's standing and strengthen its role in relation to the DG VI.

COPA and agricultural policy reform

During the 1970s the Commission made several attempts to re-establish the balance of markets in which structural surpluses had emerged. Overproduction was especially critical in the dairy sector. Surpluses of milk and butter were not a new problem and

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39   AHCE, BA 71/1984-80, Coordination CEA-COPA-COGECA-FIPA, Bruxelles, 10 juillet 1972.
40   Some of COPA's flyers calling for demonstrations are available in Archives COPA, Plan Mansholt, 1968–1979.
41   Archives COPA, Aménagement de la PAC, 1973, Note (no date).

had started building up in the second half of the 1960s. However, in the early 1970s a substantial further increase in production caused a five-fold increase in butter surpluses and a steep rise in the guarantee section of the EAGGF. In order to tackle this problem and achieve a reform of the CAP, Commissioner Mansholt published a provocative memorandum in December 1968, the *Programme Agriculture 1980*, soon dubbed the Mansholt Plan, which proposed policy principles to greatly accelerate structural change in agriculture.[42] Mansholt suggested stopping the use of the price instrument as the sole determining factor of farm income, and thus 'taking farmers off welfare.'[43] His proposals included structural policy elements such as incentives to encourage about half of the farming population to leave the sector during the 1970s, to increase the size of farms in order to make them more efficient, and direct payments such as slaughter premiums. The Commission argued that these policy interventions would help solve the problem of commodity surpluses, allow institutional prices to develop more in line with costs and demand, support farmers on non-viable farms to change jobs and to ensure for the remaining farmers an income comparable to that available in other sectors.[44] The Mansholt Plan thus combined structural policy proposals with measures to re-establish the market balance in key agricultural sub-sectors.

The propositions of the Mansholt plan met with passionate protests from farmers and COPA critics. While COPA welcomed the Commission's offer to consult with farm organizations, it did not agree with the proposed disconnection between prices and farm income and the use of the price instrument to reduce surpluses.[45] In particular, COPA fiercely opposed anything that would negatively impact on farm incomes and maintained that any attempt to limit production through a pressure on prices and a modification of the structures was both 'inacceptable and impossible.'[46] COPA was aware of the likely social consequences of Mansholt's proposal, especially for the milk sector. The latter was characterized by small and relatively inefficient farms with ten or fewer cows and in which the farmer was the sole income earner of the household. This structural situation made relatively high milk prices necessary in order to ensure a minimum income to dairy farmers. Any Commission reforms proposals that attempted to lower the price of milk or dairy products or to favour bigger farms in order to reduce the production incentive were thus perceived as amounting to an economic death sentence for a large number of milk farmers.

As a result, COPA defended a general price rise although it recognized that this rise should be applied differently depending on the products in order 'to realize a better scale

42   European Commission, Memorandum sur la réforme de l'agriculture dans la Communauté Economique Européenne, in: Bulletin of the European Communities 2 (1969) Supplement 1.

43   Cf. for this argument: Katja Seidel, Taking Farmers off Welfare. The EEC Commission's Memorandum "Agriculture 1980" of 1968, in: Journal of European Integration History 32 (forthcoming 2010) 2.

44   David R. Stead, Europe's Mansholt Plan Forty Year On, in: Eurochoices, 6 (2007) 3, pp. 40-45, here p. 41.

45   Archives COPA, Plan Mansholt, 1968–1969, Note d'observations du COPA sur le mémorandum « Agriculture 1980 », Bruxelles, 26 septembre 1969, A (69) 6.

46   Archives COPA, Plan Mansholt, 1968–1969, Note sur la fixation des prix pour la campagne 1971–1972, Bruxelles, 23 mai 1969, A (69) 2.

of prices and better orientate production.'[47] COPA responded to the Mansholt Plan by advancing three categories of measures, which were intended to stabilize the milk sector. These included measures to absorb the existing surpluses (largely by selling dairy products at reduced prices); measures to avoid the further growth of surpluses (for instance by trying to increase the consumption of dairy products through advertising campaigns, by subsidizing exports of milk and the use of dairy products as part of the World Food Programme); and finally, measures to align supply and demand, for example with the help of premiums for the slaughter of milk cows or to encourage beef production. Most importantly, 'according to the Praesidium, these measures ought to exclude any price cuts in the milk price.'[48] COPA thus demanded that the CAP should continue to have a social, regional and structural policy dimension.[49]

The opposition of COPA and of national farm organizations weakened member state support of the proposals in the Council. As a result, the Commission had to limit its ambitions. After much debate, and many protests and delays, the initial legislative proposals issued in April 1970 were severely diluted, in order to address many of the concerns raised by COPA,[50] eventually being passed in May 1971. The three directives adopted about a year later were even further reduced in scope.[51] The stark downgrading of Mansholt's ambitions had clearly shown the narrow limits of a 'big bang' policy reform approach and demonstrated the impact of COPA on agricultural policy-making.

The failure of Mansholt's ambitious reform and the resulting directives demonstrated that, although the policy mechanisms adopted in the 1960s may have been inefficient at achieving a higher standard of living for those employed in agriculture or at preventing unintended consequences such as over-production and surpluses, reforming the system was perceived to be too costly politically. As assumed by historical institutionalist scholars, the longer a policy like the CAP is in place the more difficult it becomes to dismantle or fundamentally change its mechanisms. Historical path-dependency and institutionally well-positioned defenders of the CAP like COPA hindered far-reaching policy change. Due to its early formation and establishment of channels providing regular access to EC institutions, COPA had contributed greatly to shaping the original policy path protective of the farmers' interest. It thus opposed any measures perceived as harming these interests.

In October 1973, the Commission presented a new *Memorandum on the Adjustment of the CAP*, which was aimed at, first, improving the balance between supply and demand in the internal market; secondly, reducing the cost of support in particular in the milk

47   Archives COPA, Plan Mansholt, 1968–1969, Position du COPA sur les propositions de la Commission concernant la fixation des prix pour les produits agricoles, Bruxelles, 23 juillet 1969, A (69) 4.

48   Archives COPA, Plan Mansholt, 1968–1969, Propositions du COPA en vue de rétablir l'équilibre sur le marché laitier dans la Communauté, Bruxelles, 19 juillet 1969, Pr (69) 26.

49   Archives COPA, Plan Mansholt, 1968–1969, Note d'observations générales sur les propositions de la Commission concernant la « réforme de l'agriculture », Bruxelles, 10 septembre 1970, Pr (70) 22.

50   AHCE, BAC 71/1974-6, Note d'observations générales sur les directives modifiées de la Commission au conseil, Bruxelles, 29 octobre 1971, Pr (71) 28 rév.

51   Official Journal of the European Communities, Legislation, 15(23 April 1972) n° L96.

sector, for instance by introducing a temporary levy on surpluses of not more than two per cent of the indicative price to be paid by producers; and thirdly, simplifying some of the market mechanisms.[52] Considering the ever-worsening problem of overproduction, DG VI feared that the CAP itself was in danger. COPA's reactions to the Commission's new memorandum were largely negative since the proposed market and price adjustments would have reduced the guarantees given to the Community farmers, in particular in terms of income progression.[53] COPA thus reaffirmed 'its strongly held conviction that the fundamental principles and essential mechanisms of the CAP must be maintained. The Committee believed that some of the Commission's proposals, notably those dealing with the adaptation of price support mechanisms and their more flexible use could in fact result not only in a challenge to the Community principles but also in a reduction of price stability for consumers and of income guarantees for producers.'[54] In particular, COPA opposed the Commission's suggestion to lower the intervention price of milk, which, according to DG VI, was not only the easiest measure to apply but presented the further advantage that it would 'lead to a participation of milk producers to the reduction of surpluses.'[55] COPA, in contrast, argued in favour of an increase in milk prices. To by-pass the likely opposition of DG VI to such an increase, COPA's milk and dairy products section proposed a rather technical ploy: the rise of the indicative price of milk would be achieved by an increase of the indicative price of skimmed milk powder, which was equal to or below the intervention price, without any modification of the price of butter.[56] It was assumed that this price modification would be a zero-sum operation for the Community finances. However, neither COPA nor the Commission anticipated the undesirable consequences.

Another issue raised by the Commission memorandum on CAP reform was the co-responsibility of producers. The rationale behind this new policy instrument was to make producers liable for the surpluses and to limit the Community financial responsibility while not touching the milk prices, which would otherwise have to be frozen or cut.[57] The co-responsibility levy was an extremely problematic issue for COPA as its member organizations held highly divergent opinions on it. While COPA's specialized section of milk and dairy products categorically rejected a levy that would only penalize farm income without solving the EC's surplus problem, some member federations did request

52   Aménagement de la politique agricole commune, Bulletin of the European Communities 6 (1973) Supplément 17.

53   Archives COPA, aménagement de la PAC, 1973, Premières observations du COPA sur le mémorandum de la Commission concernant l'aménagement de la PAC, Bruxelles, S (73)44 ; Communiqué de presse, Bruxelles, 9 novembre 1973.

54   Archives COPA, Aménagement de la PAC, 1973, COPA comments on the Commission's memorandum on changing the CAP, Brussels, 14 December 1973, Pr (73) 28.

55   Archives COPA, PAC–CEE, 1968–1975, Note a/s politique commune dans le secteur du lait, VI/4611/73-G

56   Archives COPA, PAC–CEE, 1968–1975, Projet mesures susceptibles de rétablir l'équilibre sur le marché de la matière grasse et d'améliorer la situation de marché du secteur laitier, Bruxelles, 1er mars 1973, LPL (73) 4.

57   Archives COPA, Aménagement de la PAC, Réponses données par M. Lardinois et ses services aux questions que soulève le mémorandum dans le domaine laitier (cf. LPL (73) 13), Bruxelles, 29 novembre 1973, LPL (73) 16.

major amendments, but were prepared to consider such a measure.[58] The eventually agreed position was to reject the principle of a co-responsibility levy.[59] However, the divergence of opinion among the national federations on this issue had clearly reinforced the need for close contacts among the producer organizations through COPA.

By modifying the price relation between milk and milk powder as COPA had suggested, the Commission opened a Pandora's Box: milk powder mountains replaced the butter mountains of 1973. Measures to solve this new problem were subsequently addressed in the *Stocktaking of the Common Agricultural Policy* submitted by Agriculture Commissioner Petrus Lardinois in March 1975.[60] These proposals went beyond those of the 1973 Commission memorandum to solve the price policy conundrum, that is, to guarantee a 'fair' income to farmers while at the same time re-establishing market equilibrium, a challenge made even more difficult by rising inflation and low growth.

One of the main adjustments proposed by the Commission was not only to limit the expansion of the guarantee section of the EAGFF but also to drastically reduce the support cost by the end of a five year period. Some governments, including the German government, supported the proposal to control or even reduce the amount they paid into the fund in order to use the savings for domestic expenditure. These governments used the existence of structural surpluses in some sectors (in particular the milk and dairy sector) to justify a restriction of the EAGFF expenditure and to demand a (financial) co-responsibility of producers in these sectors.[61]

From COPA's viewpoint, the introduction of this levy would inevitably have resulted in limiting the EC guarantees to agricultural producers. A freezing, or even reduction, of farm incomes, as a result of either price pressure or of making producers partly responsible for the disposal of surpluses, appeared unacceptable in principle and even less so in the difficult economic circumstances of the second half of the 1970s. Farmers' disposable income as producers and consumers had already been doubly hit by inflation and the high costs of energy, fertilizers and animal feed. COPA concluded: 'The Commission has failed so far to reassure producers that within the ambit of their proposals it would still be possible for the incomes of European producers to develop in accordance with the trend of incomes in other sectors and indeed to achieve a narrowing of the wide gap that still exists between farm and other income.'[62]

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58 Archives COPA, Aménagement de la PAC, 1973, Projet conclusions de la section spécialisée « lait et produits laitiers » sur les aménagements proposés dans le mémorandum de la CEE en ce qui concerne l'organisation commune des marchés dans le secteur du lait et des produits laitiers, Bruxelles, 23 novembre 1973, LPL (73) 15.

59 Archives COPA, Aménagement de la PAC, 1973, Observations du COPA et du COGECA relatives aux mesures concernant différents marchés agricoles du mémorandum de la CEE sur l'aménagement de la PAC, Bruxelles, 18 février 1974, Pr (74) 12, CD (74) 4.

60 Mémorandum « Bilan de la politique agricole commune », Bulletin of the European Communities 8 (1975) Supplement 2.

61 Archives COPA, Bilan de la PAC, 1975 (classeur nr. 3), Draft Working Document on the Problems with regards to the Financing of the Common Agricultural Policy, Brussels, 31 July 1975, EG (75) 20.

62 Archives COPA, Séminaire Milly-la-Forêt, 1977, COPA comments on the Commission's memorandum on changing the CAP, Brussels, 14 December 1973, Pr (73) 28.

COPA also strictly opposed setting a ceiling on the EAGGF's spending on two grounds. First, this would not have solved the EC's surplus problem but instead challenged one of the declared principles of the CAP. COPA invoked the principle of financial solidarity: 'It is out of the question to accept setting such a ceiling on EAGGF expenditures. If such restrictions are implemented at the level of the EAGGF, the principle of financial solidarity itself will be challenged whereas it constitutes one of the very cornerstones of the common agricultural policy.'[63] For COPA, financial solidarity meant first and foremost 'a Community financial responsibility as complete as possible.'[64] As a result, COPA rejected the suggestion that producers be made partly responsible for structural surpluses, especially in the milk sector.[65] The economic and international context provided COPA with good arguments for opposing the principle of financial co-responsibility. Farm income support appeared more legitimate in the light of the increase in production costs and the creeping inflation. In addition, the world food crisis of the mid-1970s, which seemed to prove right the claims of the Club of Rome regarding 'limits to growth', made the surplus problem appear less acute, as some of the surpluses could be subsidized and exported or used as development aid.[66] Secondly, COPA feared that limiting the EAGFF expenditure would lead to a 'renationalization' of the CAP as governments, especially in countries in which farmers were well organised and could exert sufficient political pressure, might be encouraged to work towards greater national aid in order to compensate for the impact of any limitation on EAGFF expenditure.[67] This in turn would have undermined COPA's position in EC policy-making because the national associations would then have had the upper hand over the EC-level organization.

Given COPA's opposition to the new Commission proposal, Agriculture Commissioner Lardinois attempted to gain its support for some kind of CAP reform to tackle increasing costs and overproduction. On 3 October 1975, Lardinois met with the COPA Praesidium. COPA had made clear that it could accept co-responsibility only on certain conditions: 'firstly the principle that common farm prices have in future to be adjusted solely by reference to the application of objective criteria, secondly that the principle of Community preference is effectively administered,[68] and thirdly that producers must participate more fully in the management of the market.'[69] The latter condition was crucial because it would place COPA in a better position to influence the price-fixing of

63 Archives COPA, Bilan de la PAC, 1975 (classeur nr. 3), Projet aide mémoire à l'attention du président du COPA en vue de la rencontre avec M. Lardinois sur le bilan de la PAC, Bruxelles, 3 octobre 1975.

64 Archives COPA, Bilan de la PAC, 1975 classeur nr. 3), Projet document de travail concernant les problèmes liés au financement de la Politique Agricole Commune, Bruxelles, 2 septembre 1975, EG (75) 20 rev.

65 Archives COPA, Bilan de la PAC, 1975 (classeur nr. 2), Aide Memoire for the Attention of the President of COPA and the President of COGECA for the Press Conference on 13 June 1975, Brussels, 12 June 1975.

66 Dennis Meadows, et al., The Limits to Growth, New York 1972.

67 Archives COPA, Bilan de la PAC, 1975 (classeur nr. 3), Projet document de travail concernant les problèmes liés au financement de la Politique Agricole Commune, Bruxelles, 2 septembre 1975, EG (75) 20 rev.

68 This, in particular, targeted the butter imports from New Zealand that Great Britain had successfully negotiated during the adhesion negotiations.

69 Archives COPA, Bilan de la PAC, 1975 (classeur nr. 3), Draft working document on the problems with regards to the financing of the common agricultural policy, Brussels, 31 July 1975, EG (75) 20.

levies and restitutions, the methods of stocking and destocking, as well as the price-fixing of certain premiums for changing products like cereals or skimmed milk powder into other products used in animal feed, the loss involved being financed by the EAGGF.[70] This would ensure that COPA would have a greater say in CAP decision-making.

In COPA's view, surpluses also resulted from the ineffective management of markets by Community authorities, which did not sufficiently observe the Community preference or ensure that farmers received the price to which they were entitled for their production.[71] Hence, participating in the management of market organizations was another means of securing a 'fair' income for farmers. In addition, by being involved in the market management, COPA would also forego being made accountable for the surpluses and would associate farmers with the stabilization of markets to which they were called to contribute.[72] Defending the Community preference was, furthermore, a tactical move at a time when Third World countries were pressuring the Commission to weaken this preference because it barred them from accessing the EC market – an argument they also used in the ongoing GATT negotiations. Moreover, certain national delegations in COPA supported the view that the problem of surpluses would be partly resolved by a more aggressive export policy, given the difficulty of reducing production amid the economic crisis.

In July 1976 the Commission submitted to the Council the *Action Programme 1977– 1980 for the Gradual Establishment of Balance in the Milk Sector*. One of its key proposals was once again the introduction of a levy. The co-responsibility principle, that is, a tax of 1.5 per cent of the indicative milk price, was finally adopted in May 1977. COPA eventually agreed to the co-responsibility principle because it could bring about a reduction of the level of the co-responsibility levy (originally set at 2.5 per cent) and a rise of the indicative price of milk.[73] These two elements made the co-responsibility levy almost irrelevant. It was set at such a low level that it did not represent an incentive to curb production, and the price augmentation would compensate financial losses for farmers.[74] In fact, the impact of the co-responsibility levy was so negligible that the Commission had to recommend the suspension of price support for skimmed milk powder in 1978 and

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70   Archives COPA, Bilan de la PAC, 1975 (classeur nr. 3), Rapport des premières discussions du groupe des « experts généraux » relatives aux problèmes liés à la participation du COPA et du COGECA à la gestion des marchés, Bruxelles, 2 septembre 1975, EG (75) 17 rev ; Document de travail relatif aux problèmes liés à la participation du COPA et du COGECA à la gestion des marchés, Bruxelles, 20 mai 1975.

71   Archives COPA, Bilan de la PAC, 1975 (classeur nr. 3), Draft Working Document on the Problems with regards to the Financing of the Common Agricultural Policy, Brussels, 31 July 1975, EG (75) 20.

72   Archives COPA, Bilan de la PAC, 1975 (classeur nr. 3), Note du président Deleau sur les problèmes liés au financement de la Politique Agricole Commune, Bruxelles, 29 septembre 1975, NI (75) 25.

73   AHCE, BAC 71/1984-4, Réunion M. Gundelach/Praesidium COPA, 4 février 1977.

74   As Wyn Grant stressed, the co-responsibility levy was never a very efficient policy instrument since it was never more than 3 per cent of the target price and was offset by increases in support prices and the manipulation of the green currency system. Wyn Grant, Policy Instruments in the Common Agricultural Policy, in: West European Politics 33 (2010) 1, pp. 22-38, here p. 31.

a substantial increase in the co-responsibility levy in 1979 (combined with a freezing of prices) in order to solve the persistent overproduction in the milk sector.[75]

Moreover, COPA successfully negotiated with the Commission the conditions of the consultation procedure and of their participation in the decisions regarding the co-responsibility levy,[76] thus establishing some sort of co-governance. Additionally, the farmers' participation in the co-responsibility group was conditional on the maintaining of price support in the milk sector and, hence, on guaranteeing the income of milk producers.[77] As Dominique Souchon, a close adviser to COPA's secretary general André Herliskta, observed, 'in exchange for agreeing to the financial co-responsibility of milk producers, we were able to obtain a closer association of farmers with the management of the milk market.'[78] Thus, the co-responsibility levy demonstrated the success of COPA in defending the status quo and thwarting any reform of the CAP.

Given the increasing budgetary pressures that threatened the CAP as a whole, COPA had to endorse a very limited financial co-responsibility of producers for the stockpiling and disposal of surpluses.[79] By agreeing to a small reform, that is, a partial and limited responsibility for the costs of overproduction, the farmers avoided a freezing or cutting of prices and the resulting lowering of farm income, as well as a more radical reform with the introduction of quotas. The new COPA president Gérard de Caffarelli explained to Commission President Roy Jenkins 'that COPA would not resist change and simply demand the maintenance of the status quo: it was interested in the development of the CAP, provided that the basic principles were respected.'[80] Yet, in de Caffarelli's mind, the respect of the basic principles meant no reform at all, since any change to the policy would disrupt the compromises agreed in the 1960s. Indeed, COPA only accepted the co-responsibility levy because it did not challenge the status quo of the CAP.[81]

75   AHCE, BAC 71/1984-4, Note d'information a/s réunion du praesidium COPA avec M. Gundelach le 22 mars 1978; BAC 71/1984-85, Lettre de Finn Gundelach à Gérard de Caffarelli, Bruxelles, 2 mars 1979 ; BAC 74/1984-8, Premières réactions du COPA aux propositions de la Commission concernant la fixation des prix pour certains produits agricoles et certaines mesures connexes pour la campagne 1978/79 (COM (79) 10 final), Bruxelles, 9 février 1979, PR (79) 3.

76   AHCE, BAC 71/184-4, Lettre de Finn Gundelach au president du COPA, M. de Caffarelli, Bruxelles, 27 août 1977.

77   AHCE, BAC 71/1884-4, Note à l'attention de M. le Vice-Président Gundelach, Bruxelles, 20 mars 1978; Note to Mr. Williamson, Deputy Director General of Agriculture in the Commission of EC and Co-Chairman of the Coresponsibility Group, Brussels, 9 March 1978.

78   Archives COPA, Séminaire Milly-la-Forêt, 1977, Projet document de travail n°2 en vue du séminaire de réflexion sur l'avenir de la Politique Agricole Commune, Bruxelles, 14 novembre 1977, S (77) 86.

79   With a view to the looming budgetary crisis, COPA also signaled towards the end of 1979 its willingness to discuss a (limited) increase of the co-responsibility levy as to avoid the setting of a ceiling to the guarantee section of the EAGGF. AHCE, BAC 71/1984-9, Note à l'attention de M. Gundelach a/s réunion avec le Presidium du COPA à Strasbourg, le 15 novembre 1979, Bruxelles (sans date); Observations du COPA et du COGECA sur la situation et les mesures à prendre dans le secteur laitier, Bruxelles, 9 novembre 1979, Pr (79) 21, CD (79) 9.

80   AHCE, BAC 71/1984-3, Meeting between the President [Roy Jenkins] and Mr. de Caffarelli, 12 July 1977.

81   Archives COPA, Séminaire Milly-la-Forêt, 1977, Projet rapport succinct du séminaire de réflexion sur l'avenir de la Politique Agricole Commune des 8/9 décembre 1977, Bruxelles, 29 décembre 1977, Pr (77) 32.

Conclusion

While intergovernmental negotiations played a major role in the creation of the CAP in the early 1960s, farmers were increasingly organized at a transnational level by the end of the decade and used the combined influence of their national and supranational organizations to defend their interests in EC policy-making. In line with neo-functionalist theory, farming interest groups increasingly shifted their attention from the national to the European level during the 1970s.[82] It is thus impossible to fully understand the inertia in agricultural policy – involving only very minor reforms – during this decade by simply studying the role of EC member states or institutions. The formal and informal linkages between COPA and DG VI help explain the status of the European farmers' organization as an institutionalized lobby group that had channels of influence at its disposal from which other agricultural and non-agricultural interest organizations were effectively excluded. Even if COPA did not succeed in shaping the formal consultation method used by the Commission, it nonetheless had a major impact in agricultural policy-making in the 1970s. This tends to refute the assumption of political scientists who assume that networks only started to play a significant role in EU policy-making from the mid-1980s.[83]

The second conclusion that can be drawn from the analysis above is that the Commission's repeated reform, especially its efforts to control and reduce overproduction by using the price policy instrument, represented an incentive for farmers to Europeanize their interests in order to be in a better position to secure the status quo of the CAP. This is consistent with historical institutionalist theories, which argue that 'initial policy moves can create rents that encourage groups to mobilize for the maintenance of the programme or its expansion.'[84] It is likely, although this requires further in-depth research, that the cooperation of national representatives in COPA also facilitated the emergence and transfer of policy ideas with socialization effects that contributed to an increased awareness of the opportunities of EC policy-making among formerly very nationally oriented policy-makers in agriculture. COPA was a forum where the representatives of national organizations negotiated among themselves for years and which required that they explored and struck compromises whenever possible. COPA was also an arena where national farming associations could gain information that influenced their domestic political behaviour and the kind of pressure they exerted on national ministers of agriculture.[85] COPA thus acted as a transnational mediator between the national and the supranational levels.

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82   Anil Awesti, The Myth of Eurosclerosis. European Integration in the 1970s, in: L'Europe en formation 352-354 (2009), pp. 39-53, here p. 45.

83   See for instance Justin Greenwood, Representing Interests in the European Union, London 1997.

84   Paul Pierson, When Effect becomes Cause. Policy Feedback and Political Change, in: World Politics 45 (1993) 4, pp. 595-628, here p. 599.

85   Michel Petit et al., Agricultural Policy Formation in the European Community: The Birth of the Milk Quota, London 1987, p. 114.

The 1970s also reveal another trend. Increasingly, the power of the agricultural lobby and especially that of COPA was challenged by the Commission who was alarmed at the continued scale of over-production and the long-term costs of financing the CAP. From the mid-1970s onwards, the relationship between COPA and DG VI deteriorated: 'The commonality between the two organizations was placed under pressure for the first time with the build-up of surpluses in CAP commodities. The situation worsened as these surpluses became chronic, exposing substantial, conflicting interests between DG VI and the national farming unions represented by COPA over the need for CAP reform.'[86] While the period from the creation of the CAP to the mid-1970s marked the heyday of COPA's influence, the increasing divergence of interests between COPA and DG VI over the problem of over-production progressively undermined the former alliance. Nevertheless, COPA could still exert influence and successfully thwart radical reform attempts in the second half of the 1970s because it remained a cohesive network.

In fact, the member organizations of COPA shared the same social and welfare motives for opposing the Commission's reform attempts. They regarded reforms using the price policy instrument as impacting negatively on farm income and hence as detrimental to the principle of social equity between the agricultural and industrial sectors, a core policy objective of the CAP. As a result, farmers consistently and firmly opposed the severing of the connection between prices and incomes and wanted the support of prices at high levels to remain the main plank of the CAP.[87] All Commission attempts to break this link were likely to raise hostile reactions from farming lobbies. In addition, larger socio-cultural reasons influenced the farmers' opposition to CAP reform. Continental European farmers had been used to a very high degree of (national) protectionism since the late nineteenth century. The creation of the CAP had Europeanized the existing patterns of national protectionism, but not changed them in any fundamental way. Thus, defending the CAP merely continued the long tradition of farmers' support for highly protectionist policies shielding them from world market forces, and thus represented another incentive for them to use their leverage to prevent major policy reform.

COPA's efforts to block far-reaching reforms of the CAP during the 1970s were also aided by the strength of political support for the status quo at member state level.[88] In the absence of sustained external pressure in the GATT, which only built up in the 1980s, the economic context of the 1970s provided few incentives for national government to support the Commission's reform proposals. They seemed likely to increase the burden on national budgets as the projected reduction in agricultural employment could no longer be matched by the creation of new jobs in other sectors, creating a variety of social and regional policy challenges. National governments were unwilling to endorse

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86   Clark / Jones, From Policy Insider to Policy Outcast (note 10), p. 643.
87   Hill, The Common Agricultural Policy (note 2), p. 40.
88   This was for instance obvious when the member states did not endorse the Mansholt Plan of 1968 or rejected the price freeze and the considerable increase of the co-responsibility levy in June 1979 proposed by the Commission.

more drastic policy measures at a time when the agricultural vote was still important for many political parties across the EC. As a result, support for the status quo remained strong at the national level, despite the ever-growing budgetary burden of the CAP. Arguably, the unwillingness of the member states to commit to CAP reform at least in part demonstrated the power of COPA. Its national member associations, who had privileged access to national governments, were able to insert arguments into the debate in the Council and to persuade a national government to block progress on an issue or to veto a proposal.[89]

Moreover, COPA's success in preventing major reforms of the CAP during the 1970s was facilitated by the fact that the domestic and international reform pressures were still relatively weak – despite the fact that the creation of the co-responsibility levy was the result of the stronger budgetary pressures arising from the ever-increasing costs of price support from the guarantee section of the EAGGF that were threatening to exceed the limits of budgetary resources. Despite this, the combination of international (enlargement to the Mediterranean countries and trade negotiation in the Uruguay Round of the GATT) and domestic pressures (budgetary crisis) eventually rendered a reform in the milk sector unavoidable, when the EC introduced quotas in 1984. However, if we follow Peter Hall's classification of policy reform, the 1984 reform was a moderate one because the policy paradigm remained untouched; only the policy objectives and instruments were altered.[90] Accordingly, the true path-breaking reform occurred with the Mac Sharry reforms of 1992.[91] Nevertheless, the introduction of quotas, which COPA had opposed consistently during the 1970s, highlighted the erosion of its power and represented an attempt, albeit a limited one, to break the path-dependency of the policy.

This has been a limited study of one agricultural non-state actor, albeit the most prominent and influential one. Researching the influence of agricultural non-state actors on CAP reform (or lack thereof) would require including other farm interest groups in order to generalize the findings. In addition, cross-fertilization with social science research would theoretically underpin archive-based research and, by providing analytical tools, help to further conceptualize the European multi-level polity as 'an incipient transnational political society of intense networking and informal political coordination and governance.'[92]

89   Werner J. Feld, Implementation of the European Community's Common Agricultural Policy: Expectations, Fears, Failures, in: International Organization 33 (1979) 3, pp. 335-363, here pp. 349-350.

90   Peter Hall, Policy Paradigms, Social Learning, and the State, The Case of Economic Policymaking in Britain, in: Comparative Politics, 25 (1993) 3, pp. 275-296, here pp. 278-279. See also Carstens Daugbjerg, Reforming the CAP: Policy Networks and Broader Institutional Structures, in: Journal of Common Market Studies, 37 (1999) 3, pp. 407-428, here p. 412.

91   Adrian Kay, Path Dependency and the CAP, in: Journal of European Public Policy, 10 (2003) 3, pp. 405-420, here p. 408, 414-417.

92   Wolfram Kaiser / Brigitte Leucht / Morten Rassmussen (eds.), The History of the European Union: Origins of a Trans- and Supranational Polity 1950–1972, Abingdon 2009, p. 1.

The network policy approach, which was originally developed to analyze national policy-making but has been increasingly used at EU level,[93] could help explain how groups who benefit from a policy succeed in resisting pressure for radical reform. This appears to be a particularly well-suited approach for highly cohesive policy networks like COPA and other EU level agricultural interest groups, whose members shared a consensus on the policy paradigm and policy principles. Policy network analysis on the linkages between non-state actors and state actors including the EC institutions could also help elucidate the lack of fundamental reform of the CAP and the influence of COPA on the stark downgrading of reform attempts by the Commission. As argued by Carsten Daugbjerg, policy network members may defend the status quo but, in order to have reform demands removed from the agenda and hence to moderate reforms, may agree to minor concessions like the co-responsibility levy.[94] Furthermore, theories on social learning and socialization could inform a more sophisticated archive-based account of the role that ideas play in the policy-making process and in shaping the policy network – also helping to explain 'enduring alterations in behaviour that results from experience', something that could also contribute to a better understanding of the policy sector and policy change over the long-run, and up to the present-day.[95]

93   See for instance John Peterson, Decision-Making in the European Union: Towards a Framework for Analysis, in: Journal of European Public Policy 2 (1995) 1, pp. 69-93; Carsten Daugbjerg / David Marsh, Explaining Policy Outcomes: Integrating the Policy Network Approach with Macro-Level and Micro-Level Analysis, in: David Marsh (ed.), Comparing Policy Networks, Buckingham 1998, pp. 52-71.
94   Carsten Daugbjerg, Reforming the CAP (note 91), p. 414.
95   Hugh Heclo, Modern Social Politics in Britain and Sweden, New Haven 1974, p. 306. See also Peter Knoepfel / Ingrid Kissling-Näf, Social Learning in Policy Networks, in: Policy and Politics 26 (1998) 3, pp. 343-367.

Greening Europe? Environmental Interest Groups and the Europeanization of a New Policy Field[1]

Jan-Henrik Meyer

RESÜMEE

Dieser Aufsatz untersucht den Beitrag der Umweltorganisationen in der Frühphase der Umweltpolitik der Europäischen Gemeinschaft. In den frühen 1970er Jahren entsteht in den Mitgliedsstaaten parallel zur Erfindung von Umwelt als Politikfeld eine moderne Umweltbewegung. Erstaunlich rasch geht diese den Weg nach Europa. Als transnationale Grass-Roots-Initiative, aber mit Unterstützung der Europäischen Kommission wird bereits 1974 das Europäische Umweltbüro (EEB) als europäischer Dachverband etabliert, der aber lange Zeit personell unterbesetzt bleibt. Dagegen zeigt das Beispiel der Entstehung der Vogelschutzrichtlinie von 1979, dass nicht-staatliche Akteure bereits in den 1970er Jahren in der Lage waren, in transnationaler Zusammenarbeit untereinander und mit europäischen Institutionen Umweltthemen auf die europäische Agenda zu setzen, mit öffentlichem Druck und Expertise Einfluss zu nehmen, und so auf die Mitgliedsstaaten hin zu wirken, Europas Zugvögel unter europäischen Schutz zu stellen.

The environment as an area of policy-making is an invention of the early 1970s. To be sure, on an ad-hoc basis, national governments as well as the European Communities (EC) had already been regulating problems that we understand to be part of environmental policy today, such as issues relating to pollution.[2] Demands for the protection of

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2   For instance, the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) enacted the directive 59/221 regarding the protection of workers from iodising radiation as early as 1959. In 1967, the European Economic Community (EEC) agreed on the directive 67/548 concerning the classification, packaging and labelling of chemicals. John McCormick, Environmental policy in the European Union, Basingstoke 2001, p. 45.

nature, the beauty of the pre-modern landscape and wildlife had mainly been advanced by predominantly bourgeois associations as early as the late nineteenth century in many western European countries. However, treating pollution, waste, limited resources and the destruction of nature as a single comprehensive issue area that should be subject to one single policy was a novel development of the 1970s.[3] The ecological conception of the environment as a complex bounded system, the so-called 'biosphere', had been germinating in international expert circles over the course of the 1960s. Towards the end of the 1970s, such ideas were popularized by internationally best-selling books which stressed the dangers of unfettered population growth in the face of limited natural resources and growing pollution threatening human health.[4] The apparent fragility of the 'blue planet' and the fact that humanity had to make do with the resources and the ecosystem of 'spaceship earth' was frequently symbolized by the compelling image of the earth set against the backdrop of dark, endless and inhospitable space. Ironically, this image was only made possible by the most advanced technological achievements of space travel.

Much publicized international events were instrumental in spreading these ideas, raising awareness and putting the issue of the environment on the agenda of international and subsequently also of domestic and European politics and policy-making. The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) conference on the 'Man and the Biosphere' in Paris in 1968 and the decision by the Council of Europe to designate the year 1970 as the European Conservation Year, had already been planned in the mid-1960s, well before it was possible to anticipate the issue's rise to prominence.[5] Environmental disasters, notably the vast oil spill caused by the supertanker Torrey Canyon near the French and British coasts in 1967, and the images of dead birds covered with oil, further raised awareness of the downsides of prosperity and technology. At the political level, the event demonstrated the cross-border implications of pollution. The Torrey Canyon disaster put pressure on policy-makers to take preventive action.[6] The politicization of the issue was accelerated by American President Richard Nixon's announcement in January 1970 of the targeting of environmental clean-up as a priority for the 1970s. Nixon also intended to make the environment an important issue within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), thus encouraging the West European partners to engage with these issues, too.[7] Not least since environmental degradation affected

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3   Frank Uekötter, Von der Rauchplage zur ökologischen Revolution. Eine Geschichte der Luftverschmutzung in Deutschland und den USA 1880–1970, Essen 2003, p. 480. See also: Frank Uekötter, The Age of Smoke. Environmental Policy in Germany and the United States, 1880–1970, Pittsburgh 2009, pp. 221-230.

4   For instance: Paul Ehrlich, The Population Bomb, New York 1968.

5   Kai F. Hünemörder, Vom Expertennetzwerk zur Umweltpolitik. Frühe Umweltkonferenzen und die Ausweitung der öffentlichen Aufmerksamkeit für Umweltfragen in Europa (1959–1972), in: Archiv für Sozialgeschichte 43 (2003), pp. 275-296; Thorsten Schulz, Das Europäische Naturschutzjahr 1970 – Versuch einer europaweiten Umweltkampagne, WZB-Discussion Paper P 2006 (2006) 7, pp. 1-34, here p. 1f; John Sheail, An Environmental History of Twentieth-Century Britain, Basingstoke 2002, p. 146.

6   Abel Wolman, Pollution as an International Issue, in: Foreign Affairs 47 (1968) 1, pp. 164-175, here p. 173.

7   Sandra Chaney, Nature of the Miracle Years. Conservation in West Germany 1945–1975, New York 2008, p. 186.

many citizens, tackling pollution seemed to be a popular new issue for policy-makers to take on board. In the early 1970s, contemporaries tended to underestimate the cost and the potentially controversial nature of the new policy, which facilitated the uptake of the issue.[8] When a number of European governments such as Germany introduced environmental action plans or a separate ministry for the environment (France, UK, Bavaria),[9] governments quickly came to realize the limitations of regional and national approaches to what in many cases amounted to a cross-border problem, such as river pollution or acid rain. International organizations such as the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and specialist organizations like the International Commission on the Rhine were initially deemed to provide the appropriate institutional settings for resolving cross-border environmental issues, in preference to the EC, which had been established to further economic integration.

Faced with the prospect of a multitude of national environmental regulations, the European Commission in particular was worried that these measures would lead to the distortion of competition in the Common Market. As plans for a United Nations (UN) conference on the human environment to be held in Stockholm in 1972 were underway, the Commission was keenly interested in coordinating a joint approach of the EC member states (and the accession states). Activist Commissioners such as Altiero Spinelli and Sicco Mansholt, who shared an ambition to further European integration and were increasingly concerned about the consequences of economic growth for Europeans' quality of life, started preparations for Community action in this emerging field of policy-making.[10] From 1970 onwards, officials in the Directorate General for Industry started to collect information about existing national environmental legislation and tried to achieve an overview of existing research. European cooperation in scientific and technological research, the COST programme, proved instrumental in gathering expertise for a subsequent programme of action.[11] Thus ambitious members of the Commission, which was eager to carve out a role of its own in order to ensure that Europe would speak with one voice within the OECD and at the UN conference, and the governments of the member states cooperated to place the environment as a new policy area on the Community's agenda.[12] From 1971 onwards, the Commission prepared a number

8   Chaney, Nature of the Miracle Years (note 7), p. 186. Even such a politically circumspect observer as Downs also shared this view with respect to the US in 1972: Anthony Downs, Up and Down with Ecology. The 'Issue-Attention' Cycle, in: Public Interest 28 (1972) 1, pp. 38-50, here p. 47.

9   John McCormick, British Politics and the Environment, London 1991, p. 16 f.; Uekötter, Von der Rauchplage zur ökologischen Revolution (note 3), p. 485; Michael Bess, The Light Green Society. Ecology and Technological Modernity in France, 1960–2000, Chicago 2003, p. 83 f.; Hans Maier, Fortschrittsoptimismus oder Kulturpessimismus? Die Bundesrepublik Deutschland in den 70er und 80er Jahren, in: Vierteljahreshefte für Zeitgeschichte 56 (2008) 1, pp. 1-17, here p. 9.

10   Michel Carpentier, La naissance de la politique de l'environnement, in: Revue des Affaires Européennes 9 (1999) 3, pp. 284-297, here pp. 284-286.

11   See for example, Secretariat of the European Cooperation in the Field of Scientific and Technological Research (COST), Note to the Working party on Pollution, 4 May 1970, National Archive, London, FCO 55/425, EEC Environmental Pollution Studies 1970, document 1.

12   Laura Scichilone, The Origins of the Common Environmental Policy. The Contributions of Spinelli and Mansholt

of documents to test the ground.[13] When the heads of state and government, meeting in Paris in October 1972, invited the Commission to present a Programme of Action on the Environment, preparatory consultations between the Commission, experts and ministerial officials from the member states had long been underway. Eventually, in November 1973, a European Environmental Policy was officially kick-started with the Environmental Action Programme, which foresaw measures to be taken across a wide range of aspects of environmental policy, including water and air protection and waste treatment.[14] The European institutions already consulted with and received opinions from non-state actors during this germination phase of environmental policy. Legal experts from the University of Bonn were commissioned to provide a comparative legal study of existing environmental legislation.[15] The European agricultural interest group Committee of Professional Agricultural Organizations (COPA)[16] and the business interest organization Union of Industrial and Employers' Confederations of Europe (UNICE, now called BUSINESSEUROPE)[17] routinely voiced their – generally supportive – opinions, reflecting the privileged position they enjoyed in EC consultation mechanisms in the early 1970s.

By contrast, the environmental movement, which was in a process of transformation from old nature protection groups to the new environmental movement that became part of the new social movements in the 1970s, was initially not a central actor in the creation of environmental policy. However, once environmental policy making was started at the European level, environmental groups quickly adapted themselves to the new level of policy making, and effectively managed to exert influence on policy-making. This

in the *ad hoc* Group of the European Commission, in: Morten Rasmussen/Ann-Christina Lauring Knudsen (eds.), The Road to a United Europe. Interpretations of the Process of European Integration, Brussels 2009, pp. 335-348, here p. 340; Laura Scichilone, L'Europa e la sfida ecologica. Storia della politica ambientale europea 1969–1998, Milan 2008, pp. 54-65.

13   E.g. European Commission, First Communication of the Commission about the Community's Policy on the Environment, SEC (71) 2616 final, 22 July 1971, Archive of European Integration, http://aei.pitt.edu/3126/01/000045_ 1.pdf [last accessed 25 June 2010].

14   Council of the European Communities, Declaration of the Council of the European Communities and of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States meeting in the Council of 22 November 1973 on the Programme of Action of the European Communities on the Environment, in: Official Journal of the European Communities 16 (1973) C 112, 20 December 1973, pp. 1 ff.

15   Letter by A.E. Furness, UK Delegation to the European Communities in Brussels, to Angus Hislop, Confederation of British Industry, 13 May 1970, National Archive, London, FCO 55/425, EEC Environmental Pollution Studies 1970, document 5.

16   E.g. Comité des Organisations Professionnelles Agricoles (COPA), Observations du COPA sur le programme en matière d'environnement, 10 November 1972, sent to Sicco Mansholt, European Commission, 16 November 1972, Historical Archive of the European Commission (HAEC), BAC 244/1991 6, pp. 7-18; Comité des Organisations Agricoles, Observations du COPA sur le programme en matière d'environnement, 10 November 1972, letter from C.S. Knottnerus, Secretary General of COPA to J. Calmes, Secretary General of the Council of Ministers, 16 November 1972, Archive of the Council of Ministers (ACM), CM2 1973.529 517.

17   E.g. 'Avis de l'UNICE [Union des Industries de la Communauté Européenne] sur le Projet d'accord des représentants des gouvernements des états membres réunis au Conseil concernant l'information de la Commission en vue d'une harmonisation éventuelle à l'ensemble de la Communauté des mesures d'urgence en matière de l'environnement (Doc. COM (72) 334 du 22 mars 1972)', letter from H.M. Claessens, Secretary General of UNICE to J. Calmes, Secretary General of the Council of Ministers, 10 July 1972, ACM, CM2 1973.529 517.

chapter will first explore the conditions for environmental groups to become involved in European policy making. In a second step I will discuss the role of environmental interest groups in an example of concrete European environmental policy-making, namely the making of the Council Directive of 2 April 1979 on the conservation of wild birds, the so-called birds directive.[18] In a final step, some general conclusions will be drawn, and the role of environmental groups will be juxtaposed to that of other groups discussed in this special issue.

Environmental groups on their way to Brussels

Concern for what we now call the environment had already led to the founding of nature protection organizations in European countries (as well as the US) in a first 'green wave' before the First World War. The second 'green wave' in the 1960s and 1970s led to the rise of the modern environmental movement. Unlike their conservationist predecessors, modern environmentalists no longer focussed on aesthetic values and the protection of natural monuments or specific parts of nature, but based their approach on a comprehensive understanding of the environmental problem. On the basis of ecological ideas, they stressed the complex relationships that connected all parts of the living environment, and the dangers of disturbing the natural balance that not only enabled plants and animals to exist but also ultimately ensured human health and the survival of mankind.[19] New organizations were created, such as the World Wildlife Fund (WWF, today World Wide Fund for Nature). Established organizations underwent a transformation: new alliances were formed, new issues appeared on the agenda and new styles of political action were tried and frequently successfully applied.[20] While influenced by a global shift towards the creation of an environmental consciousness, changes at the level of groups and associations largely took place within the respective national institutional frameworks. These developments differed from country to country, depending on the strength, goals and the specific situation of the organization of the older nature protection movement and the radicalism of the new groups.[21]

18   European Community, Council Directive of 2 April 1979 on the Conservation of Wild Birds (79/409/EEC), in: Official Journal of the European Communities 22 (1979) L 103, 25 April 1979 pp. 1-18. For further information on the origins of the birds directive see: Jan-Henrik Meyer, Saving Migrants. A Transnational Network supporting Supranational Bird Protection Policy in the 1970s, in: Wolfram Kaiser / Michael Gehler / Brigitte Leucht (eds.), Transnational Networks in Regional Integration. Informal Governance in Europe 1945–83, Basingstoke 2010, p. 176-198.

19   C.S.A. van Koppen / William T. Markham, Nature Protection in Western Environmentalism. A Comparative Analysis, in: C.S.A. van Koppen / William T. Markham (eds.), Protecting Nature. Organizations and Networks in Europe and the USA, London 2008, pp. 263-285, here pp. 264-266.

20   For an account of these changes with regard to the case of Germany see: Jens Ivo Engels, Naturpolitik in der Bundesrepublik. Ideenwelt und politische Verhaltensstile in Naturschutz und Umweltbewegung 1950–1980, Paderborn 2006.

21   Where international comparisons exist, most studies of the rise of environmentalism only cover a small number of countries; see e.g. Andrew Jamison, et al., The Making of the New Environmental Consciousness. A Comparative Study of the Environmental Movements in Sweden, Denmark, and the Netherlands, Edinburgh 1990;

In post-war western Europe, issues of nature conservation and the emerging environmental concerns were being dealt with at various levels of policy-making – at the local level, at the regional or national level, as well as by international organizations of varying geographical scope such as the UN and the Council of Europe. Non-state advocates of environmental concerns had been established at all of these levels. A first international organization for nature protection had already been set up in the interwar years, in 1926 – the International Office for the Protection of Nature (IOPN) in Brussels. Based on this experience, in 1948, the International Union for the Protection of Nature (IUPN) was founded in the institutional context of the newly established UNESCO. The IUPN, later renamed International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN), was a hybrid organization, consisting both of government representatives and non-governmental organizations (NGOs).[22] An international organization for bird protection, the International Council for Bird Preservation (ICBP) had already been set up in 1920.[23] The World Wildlife Fund (WWF) was established in 1961 on the initiative of Max Nicholson, the director of Britain's Nature Conservancy, as a fund-raising organization for IUCN. However, it quickly outgrew its parent, started its own projects and branched out to set up national chapters in many countries.[24] Present internationally and at the national level, the WWF set an example for later foundations of international environmental organizations like Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth.

While all western and northern European countries were affected by the second 'green wave' starting in the late 1960s, the strength and the focus of the first 'green wave' before the World War I had varied considerably between countries. As a result, the structure, the character and the focus of nature protection groups differed substantially, as did the size of the membership base. Generally speaking, in the Protestant northern European countries, where industrialization set in earlier, the awareness of nature protection arose more quickly.[25] For instance, in Italy, a bird protection organization was only established in 1965 with the founding of the Lega Italiana Protezione Uccelli (LIPU). In most other western European countries bird protection had been one of the earliest concerns of the nature protection movement and had led to the founding of the Ligue de Protection des Oiseaux (League for the Protection of Birds, LPO) in France in 1912, of the Deutscher Bund für Vogelschutz (German Ligue for Bird Protection, DBV) in Germany in 1899 and of the RSPB in Britain in 1891, for example. As a consequence, the Italian chapter of

Dieter Rucht, Modernisierung und neue soziale Bewegungen: Deutschland, Frankreich und USA im Vergleich, Frankfurt 1994; C.S.A. van Koppen / William T. Markham (eds.), Protecting Nature. Organizations and Networks in Europe and the USA, London 2008.

22   John McCormick, The Global Environmental Movement. Second Edition, Chichester 1995, p. 38 f.

23   Anna Katharina Wöbse, Naturschutz global – oder: Hilfe von außen: internationale Beziehungen des amtlichen Naturschutzes im 20. Jahrhundert, in: Hans-Werner Frohn (ed.), Natur und Staat 1906-2006, Münster 2006, pp. 625-727, here p. 649 f.

24   McCormick, The Global Environmental Movement (note 22), p. 46 f.

25   On the link between Protestantism and environmentalism see: David Vogel, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Environmentalism. Exploring the Cultural Roots of Contemporary Green Politics, in: Zeitschrift für Umweltpolitik und Umweltrecht 25 (2002) 3, pp. 297-322, here 316-320.

the WWF (established in 1966) was much more prominent in Italy than WWF branches in Northern Europe, where older organizations dominated.[26] In terms of membership, WWF Italia was the largest environmental organization with 30,000 members in 1978, more than that of the second-ranked nature protection group Italia Nostra (15,000) and LIPU (12,000) taken together.[27] By comparison, in the UK, the traditional bird protection organization RSPB was the largest environmental organization. Membership figures were much higher – in a country with a comparable population size. Its membership grew from 98,000 in 1971 to 441,000 members in 1981.[28] As a consequence of growing environmental awareness, membership in environmental organizations increased dramatically across western Europe in the 1970s.[29]

Environmental groups swiftly became established at the European level, with the founding of the European Environmental Bureau (EEB) in December 1974, barely a year after the publication of the first Environmental Action Programme.[30] Its origins can be traced back to the UN conference on the human environment in Stockholm in 1972, which had put national environmental groups in touch with each other.[31] The American Sierra Club's international programme was the important catalyst for the founding of the EEB. They and the International Institute for Environment and Development invited 20 representatives of North American and European environmental groups to Brighton in 1974. Representatives of the Gents Aktiekomitee Leefmilieu from Belgium and the British Conservation Society proposed closer cooperation among environmental groups of the EC member states. They realized that the EC was going to become an important institution for decision-making on the environment, and hence a promising target for NGO lobbying. The environmentalists from Ghent organized a meeting in December 1974, during which the EEB was founded. It originally comprised 25 member organizations, many of them local grass-roots groups with young members, representing the new environmentalist impetus of the 1970s. Funding by the Commission's Directorate General for Information and Communication – for members' travel to meetings, and free office space in the Royal Belgian Institute of Natural Sciences, conveniently located in the European quarter – were thus essential for the EEB's operation.[32]

26   Giorgio Osti, Nature Protection Organisations in Italy. From Elitist Fervour to Confluence with Environmentalism, in: C.S.A. van Koppen / William T. Markham (eds.), Protecting Nature. Organizations and Networks in Europe and the USA, London 2008, pp. 117-139, here p. 122; van Koppen / Markham, Nature Protection in Western Environmentalism (note 19), p. 264 f.

27   Fulco Pratesi, Ein Brief aus Italien. Nicht nur das Land der Vogelmörder, in: Wir und die Vögel 10 (1978) 5, pp. 16 f.

28   Christopher Rootes, Nature Protection Organisations in England, in: C.S.A. van Koppen / William T. Markham (eds.), Protecting Nature. Organizations and Networks in Europe and the USA, London 2008, pp. 34-62, here p. 39.

29   E.g. Jamison, et al., The Making of the New Environmental Consciousness (note 21), p. 153.

30   Council of the European Communities, Declaration of the Council of the European Communities and of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States meeting in the Council of 22 November 1973 on the Programme of Action of the European Communities on the Environment, in: Official Journal of the European Communities 16 (1973) C 112, 20 December 1973, pp. 1 ff.

31   McCormick, The Global Environmental Movement (note 22), p. 124 f.

32   European Environmental Bureau, Ten Years of the European Environmental Bureau (EEB) (1974–1984). Ten Years of European Community Environmental Policy [Manuscript], Brussels ca. 1985, pp. 2-3, 10; Interview with Hubert David, former Secretary General of the European Environmental Bureau, Brussels 5 May 2010.

Even by the end of the 1970s, the EEB remained a small organization, with the secretary general as its only permanent staff member. Working methods and organizational structure were still very provisional, as a report by the Economic and Social Committee (ESC) observed. In 1980, the umbrella organization consisted of 39 member organizations, some of which were national federations, while others were specialist organizations like the Dutch bird protection organization. Due to the lack of staff at the European level, the member organizations played a major role, directly addressing relevant members or committees of the European Parliament (EP), for example. The EEB largely served as a framework for coordination and information exchange.[33]

Why did environmental interest groups become involved in European decision-making? In the 1970s the issue of the environment not only received new attention in public debates across western countries, it was also increasingly understood as a global problem that extended beyond borders. Public salience of the issue strengthened the thrust towards the international level, where the leadership of nature protection groups had been operating for a long time.

However, as long as international organizations had very little decision-making power and had to limit themselves to frequently ignored resolutions and international agreements, international activism was often futile and frustrating for participants. The key difference between the EC and international organizations such as the UN or the Council of Europe was that the former was able to take binding decisions. This made the EC an interesting target for environmental interest groups seeking to change policy. The proposals concerning, for instance, the clean-up of the river Rhine, which had been discussed from 1969 onwards,[34] and various elements of the EC's Environmental Action Programme of 1973 demonstrated that the EC was intent on dealing with cross-border problems. Thus the EC provided a novel and promising locus of decision-making. Uploading issues to this forum also offered the opportunity to shake up the balance of power among interest groups. For instance, this was part of the rationale for the bird protection groups when they tried to move the issue of protecting migrant birds away from Italian politics, where it had proven difficult to ensure that bird protection laws would not simply be revoked by the next government, to the European level. However, as European environmental policy only slowly took off in the course of the 1970s, groups did not immediately realize what the European level had to offer. As I will demonstrate below, however, once they found the EC to be a relevant decision-maker, national environmental groups were able to quickly establish transnational ties and cooperative relations at the supranational level.

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33 Economic and Social Committee of the European Communities, European Interest Groups and their Relationships with the Economic and Social Committee, Westmead 1980, p. 433 f.

34 E.g. Jacob Boersma, Bericht im Namen des Ausschusses für Sozial- und Gesundheitsfragen über die Reinhaltung der Binnengewässer unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Verunreinigung des Rheins, 11. November 1970, doc. 161, Archive of the European Parliament (AEP), PEO-AP RP/ASOC.1967 AO-0161/70.

The openness of the European decision-making process with its multiple access points for non-state actors made it easier for environmental groups to get involved.[35] Moreover, the European institutions, particularly the new Service for the Environment and Consumer Protection of the Commission, as well as the respective committees of the EP and the ESC, perceived the environmental interest groups as partners who shared their vision of extending the scope of EC policy-making in this policy area.[36] In 1976, for example, Michel Carpentier, the Director of the European Commission's Service of the Environment and Consumer Protection, and some members of this Service, invited the member organizations of the EEB for a day-long consultation.[37] By referring to the views of interest groups as representatives of citizens' interests, the supranational institutions were able to enhance the legitimacy of their proposals. Moreover, they appreciated – and crucially relied upon – environmental groups' apparently independent scientific expertise as ammunition for arguing and bargaining.[38] As supranational actors frequently acted as advocates of the dossiers they worked on, they welcomed those non-state actors who were willing to join and form an advocacy coalition.[39] Hence, there was a keen interest on both sides, which encouraged the involvement of environmental groups.

Cooperation among environmental groups was facilitated by the EEB. However, the EEB did not enjoy a monopoly in the field. In the context of the birds directive, bird protection groups set up their own European network WEBS (Working group of European Bird Protection Societies) in autumn 1978, in order to institutionalize the previous informal cooperation that had been facilitated by existing ties via the ICBP. WEBS served to facilitate information exchange and coordinate the lobbying of national governments when the proposal was stuck in the Council of Ministers.[40] Difficulties with effective access to decision-makers and competition apparently encouraged the founding of European organizations. The EEB was also strengthened by the precedent set by the birds directive in the area of nature protection. With the objective in mind 'to push for further Community competence in this field', a 'large number of conservation bodies' joined the EEB at the end of 1979.[41]

35   Wolfram Kaiser, Bringing History back in to the Study of Transnational Networks in European Integration, in: Journal of Public Policy 29 (2009) 2, pp. 223-239, here p. 228.
36   Interview with Claus Stuffmann, former director in European Commission's service on the Environment and Consumer Protection, Brussels, 10 June 2009.
37   Economic and Social Committee, European Interest Groups (note 33), p. 435 fn.1.
38   Harald Müller, Arguing, Bargaining and all that: Communicative Action, Rationalist Theory and the Logic of Appropriateness in International Relations, in: European Journal of International Relations 10 (2004) 3, pp. 395-435.
39   On the concept of advocacy coalitions, particularly with regard to the EU, see: Paul Sabatier, The Advocacy Coalition Framework: Revisions and Relevance for Europe, in: Journal of European Public Policy 5 (1998) 1, pp. 98-130.
40   Bärbel Häcker, 50 Jahre Naturschutzgeschichte in Baden-Württemberg. Zeitzeugen berichten, Stuttgart 2004, p. 123f; Zugvogelschutz im Vordergrund: in: Wir und die Vögel 10 (1978) 6, pp. 13; Interview with Alistair Gammell, former assistant to the Director of International Affairs of the Royal Society for the Protection of Birds (RSPB), by phone, 7 May 2009.
41   European Environmental Bureau, Ten Years of the European Environmental Bureau (note 32), p. 23.

Since the birds directive touched upon their interests, several hunting organizations also decided to set up the Federation of Hunting Associations of the EC (FACE) in 1977, in order to lobby the European institutions more effectively.[42] Traditionally, hunting interests had been represented at the international level by the Paris-based International Council for Game and Wildlife Conservation (CIC, founded in 1930).[43] Consisting of individual and government members (mainly from Eastern Europe), the CIC was a socially exclusive club that could usually rely on the direct contacts of its elite members, rather than on professional lobbying activities. The CIC did not prove to be very influential in the EC in the context of the birds directive.[44] The Europeanization of interest groups – and their professionalization – apparently closely followed the Europeanization of policy-making in the respective areas.

From agenda setting to implementation: environmental groups in environmental policy-making

The birds directive of 1979 was the first piece of European environmental legislation in the area of nature protection. It laid the basis for subsequent legislation, such as the habitats directive of 1992[45] and established the EC as a central policy maker in conservation.[46] The birds directive emerged from the public outcry in Northern Europe against the hunting of migrant birds in Southern Europe. The fact that the issue was placed on the European agenda despite a shaky legal base for European level action in the form of Article 235 of the EEC Treaty and that it was eventually enacted by the unanimous agreement of the member states can be attributed to a large extent to the joint effort and various activities of environmental groups in close collaboration with the European institutions. Thus the directive provides an excellent and multi-faceted example of non-state actors' activities in European policy-making.

The goal of the birds directive was the conservation of bird species and the maintenance of sufficient populations.[47] For this purpose, member states had to designate and protect habitats, including those covered by international conventions. This was an issue very

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42 Federation of Associations for Hunting and Conservation of the European Union, History – 25 Years of History, 2002, available from: http://www.face-europe.org/Documents/FACE25book/faceBook%2011-40%20history. pdf, [7 June 2010], pp. 12 f.

43 From 1974 the organization's name included the reference to 'Wildlife Conservation' which better fit the new era of environmentalism. Hanns-Gero von Lindeiner-Wildau, Glückwunsch an einen CIC Jubilar, in: Zeitschrift für Jagdwissenschaft 25 (1979) 2, pp. 115-117; Erhard Ueckermann, 20. Jahreshauptversammlung des Conseil International de la Chasse, in: Zeitschrift für Jagdwissenschaft 19 (1973) 4, pp. 213-215.

44 Interview Stuffmann (note 36); Interview with Yves Lecocq, Secretary General of FACE, Brussels 4 May 2010.

45 European Community, Council Directive 92/43/EEC of 21 May 1992 on the Conservation of Natural Habitats and of Wild Fauna and Flora, in: Official Journal of the European Communities 36 (1992) L 206, 22 July 1992 pp. 7-50.

46 Wouter P.J. Wils, La protection des habitats naturels en droit communautaire, in: Cahiers de Droit européen 30 (1994) 3-4, pp. 398-430.

47 European Community, Council Directive of 2 April 1979 (note 18).

dear to traditional bird protection organizations such as the RSPB. These organizations had long been linked internationally in the framework of the ICBP and fought for these conventions and their transposition into national law. The directive prohibited the 'large-scale and non-selective' hunting methods using lime or nets that had triggered much of the public outrage. Hunting and the trade in birds were limited only to game species. All European bird species were categorized in different lists in the annex of the directive. These lists – which specified which bird species could legally be hunted and sold in the EC or only in some member states – were at the core of contention in the negotiations between member state governments. Birds' habitats – particularly of those bird species which enjoyed the highest level of protection listed in Annex I – were subject to conservation measures. Effectively, the directive severely limited the hunting of songbirds. However, not least due to the unanimity requirement, the directive was a European compromise, so that a few songbird species could still be hunted in Italy and France, where in some regions various kinds of songbirds were traditionally killed and eaten.

Throughout the stages of the policy-making process, from agenda-setting and policy formulation to policy adoption and policy implementation, environmental groups applied different means and methods of exerting influence in the policy making process. Students of environmental organizations have distinguished various methods that groups utilized to advance their cause:[48] First, groups engaged in lobbying. Representatives of environmental groups directly contacted decision-makers, trying to exert influence by arguing for their cause. Secondly, while lobbying was based on their own initiative, environmental groups were invited to state their opinion on certain policy papers or legislative proposals. Thirdly, by informing the public via public relations – directly or via the media – groups sought to change public opinion, thus indirectly influencing policy making. Fourthly, groups encouraged citizens to express their dissatisfaction or organized protest. Protest was voiced in various ways, for instance, via public events or through letter-writing campaigns. Fifthly, networking was used to combine and coordinate various environmental groups engaging in all of these activities. Exchanging information, organizing joint action, combining the respective areas of strength such as easy access to decision-makers greatly improved the effectiveness of non-state actors' intervention in the policy process. Network ties were established between different environmental groups, but also between environmental groups and European policy-makers from the various European institutions, forming a policy network.[49] Network ties also covered non-state actors with only partially overlapping interests, e.g. hunting organizations and bird protection groups.[50]

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48   Jochen Roose, Die Europäisierung von Umweltorganisationen. Die Umweltbewegung auf dem langen Weg nach Brüssel, Wiesbaden 2003, p. 216. Similarly: van Koppen / Markham, Nature Protection in Western Environmentalism (note 19), pp. 273-275.

49   For an introduction into the concept see: John Peterson, Policy-Networks, in: Antje Wiener / Thomas Diez (eds.), European Integration Theory, Oxford 2009, pp. 105-124.

50   For a historical perspective on networks in EC policy-making see: Wolfram Kaiser, Transnational Networks in European Governance. The Informal Politics of Integration, in: Wolfram Kaiser / Morten Rasmussen / Brigitte Leucht

Finally, researchers have highlighted that environmental groups engaged in environmental projects in order to set an example of how nature could be protected. By the mid-1970s, the purchase of land for habitat protection was high on the agenda of traditional bird protection organizations such as the RSPB and the DBV. This was an area of transnational cooperation and exchange of expertise, relying on international ties via the ICBP.[51] While environmental projects did not directly influence policy-making, the engagement of traditional bird protection groups in such projects arguably strengthened habitat protection as one of their policy priorities. Furthermore, the knowledge accumulated through environmental projects helped environmental interest groups to convincingly present themselves as experts at the policy formulation stage and even more so at the implementation stage. Moreover, the ties established through cooperation in habitat protection surely helped with transnational network building. In what follows, I will explore the extent to which and how effectively the different environmental groups made use of these methods in the course of the policy process, from agenda setting to policy formulation and adoption. I will also provide some pointers to their role in subsequent policy implementation.

The fact that the unlikely issue of bird protection was placed on the agenda of early European environmental policy-making can only partially be attributed to the efforts of environmental groups. However, different environmental groups did play a decisive role in agenda-setting – through protest and public relations, but also as experts who were consulted by the Commission.

In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the hunting of migrant birds, particularly of songbirds, was an important issue in the media, particularly of the Northern European countries. The cruelty of the hunting practices – involving the use of lime and nets – was illustrated with graphic images. The apparent inability of the Italian government to outlaw the hunting of songbirds, and the scandals surrounding this legislation stirred up public alarm, and fears for the total destruction of the songbirds.[52] For instance, the public relations efforts of the recently established bird protection groups in Italy – like the Lega Nazionale Contro La Distruzione Degli Uccelli in Florence, founded in 1966 – and their ambition to find allies beyond borders certainly played a role in getting the issue into the media.[53] Clearly, media reporting and protest made an impression on the European institutions. Media reports and protests by animal protection societies were cited by Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) and of the ESC when they posed questions to the Commission about possible Community measures against the mass killing

(eds.), The History of the European Union. Origins of a Trans- and Supranational Polity 1950–72, Abingdon 2009, pp. 12-33; Michael Gehler/Wolfram Kaiser/Brigitte Leucht (eds.), Netzwerke im europäischen Mehrebenensystem von 1945 bis zur Gegenwart/Networks in European Multi-Level Governance from 1945 to the Present, Vienna 2009.

51 Englische Wissenschaftler arbeiten auf Wallnau, in: Wir und die Vögel 8 (1976) 5, pp. 24.

52 Robert Berger, Stoppt endlich den Vogelmord, in: Wir und die Vögel 7 (1975) 3, pp. 22 f.

53 Umberto Marini, Der Brief eines Italieners, in: Wir und die Vögel 5 (1973) 2, pp. 5 f.

of birds in the early 1970s.[54] In fact, when the Commission justified the inclusion of the issue of bird protection in its eventual proposal for the first Environmental Action Programme, it referred to the worldwide protest and the barrage of letters by individuals and animal protection societies it had received in 1973.[55] At this stage, when the Commission was collecting issues to be included in the Environmental Action Programme, putting bird protection on the incipient European environmental agenda was relatively easy. The Commission was highly receptive to the issue, since it perceived bird protection as a popular cause and an opportunity to advance the new European environmental policy. While the emotional and moral style of protest initially did not appeal to the technocrats in the newly established environmental service, they were won over, for example, by the ecological arguments regarding the role of birds as biological pest controls.[56] Not only the Commission rank and file, but also the upper echelons of the Commission were sympathetic to the cause. In the response to a parliamentary question, the Commission referred to its President Mansholt who was reported to have demanded putting a halt to killing birds at a conference in Venice.[57]

While the inclusion into the Environmental Action Programme placed bird protection on the European agenda, the Community only committed to promoting 'joint action by Member States in the Council of Europe and international organizations'. In the eyes of the environmental groups, this was hardly going to resolve the issue. International organizations had long been dealing with bird protection, but because their resolutions were not binding, national governments could simply ignore them. However, the Commission opened a window of opportunity for possible EC legislation by promising a 'study with a view to possible harmonization of national regulations on the protection of animal species and especially migratory birds'.[58]

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54   E.g. Jean-Pierre Glesener, Written Question No. 285/71, 10 September 1971, to the Commission concerning killing of migratory birds in Belgium and Italy, in: Official Journal of the European Communities 14 (1971) C119, 26.11.1971, pp. 3; Hans Edgar Jahn, Written Question No. 620/72, 15 February 1973, concerning mass killing of migratory birds in Italy, in: Official Journal of the European Communities 16 (1972) C 39, 7.6.1973, pp. 12; Wirtschafts- und Sozialausschuss, Anlage zum Protokoll der 6. Sitzung des Unterausschuss Umwelt am 31.05.1972. Zusammenfassung des Gedankenaustausches zwischen den Vertretern des Unterausschusses und Herrn Toulemon, Vertreter der Kommission, Historical Archives of the European Union, SEC 4298, here p. 9; Horst Seefeld, Question écrite no. 253/72, 08.08.1972 à la Commission des Communautés européennes, in: Official Journal of the European Communities (1972) C120, 17.11.1972; Hans Richarts, Written Question No. 254/67, 11 December 1967, to the Commission concerning the harmonisation of rules for bird protection, AEP, PE0 AP QP/QE E-0254/67 (1967).

55   Commission of the European Communities, Programme of Environmental Action of the European Communities. Part II: Detailed Description of the Actions to be undertaken at Community Level over the next Two Years. Forwarded by the Commission to the Council, COM (73) 530 final C, 10 April 1973, p. II.67 f.; European Commission, Answer to Written Question No. 321/73, 6 September 1973, by Lord O'Hagan on Migratory Birds, in: Official Journal of the European Communities 16 (1973) C 116, 29.12.1973, p. 10; European Commission, Answer to Written Question No. 620/72 by Hans Edgar Jahn, 15 February 1973, concerning Mass Killing of Migratory Birds in Italy, 10 April 1973, in: Official Journal of the European Communities 16 (1972) C 39, 7.6.1973, pp. 12.

56   Interview Stuffmann (note 36).

57   European Commission, Antwort auf die Schriftliche Anfrage 259/72 von Herrn Seefeld, in: AEP, PE0 AP QP/QE E-0259/72.

58   Commission of the European Communities, Programme of Environmental Action, Part II (note 55), p. II.67 f.

Since the Commission lacked the expertise for writing such a study, it contracted it out to a non-state actor, an external expert. The contract was given to the Frankfurt Zoological Society of 1858, chaired by Professor Bernhard Grzimek, easily the most prominent figure in German environmentalism at the time.[59] The director of the Frankfurt Zoo and host of a popular TV show featuring wild animals had been the German Chancellor Willy Brandt's special representative for the environment from 1970 to 1973.[60] Grzimek – a veterinary doctor by training – was not exactly an authority on migrant birds, however. Thus the actual work was carried out by two junior ornithologists Bernhard Conrad and Wolfgang Poltz, who produced their study under the supervision of Gerhard Thielcke.[61] Thielcke was equally well-connected both nationally and internationally as the head of the German Section of the ICBP.[62] In the course of their work, Conrad and Poltz interviewed bird protection activists throughout Europe. The bird protection organizations were not simply invited to state their opinion: they were also given the chance to frame the issue by giving their assessment of the problem and by suggesting possible solutions.[63] Besides calling for more research in cooperation with international bodies of ornithological research and the accession of all EC members to the relevant international conventions, they demanded uniform European legislation with regard to the hunting and catching, breeding and trade of birds. They emphasized the role of hunting as the major cause of the decline of bird populations, but they also demanded the protection of habitats to ensure the survival of bird species. They called for a system of European bird reserves specifically for migrant birds – referring to the model apparently practiced in the United States.[64] At this early stage, the member organizations of the ICBP were alerted to possible European legislation, and given the chance to act upon it. Even if the Frankfurt Zoological Society lacked thorough expertise in ornithology, it was proficient in networking. Once the study was finally completed in July 1975, Grzimek's assistant Rosl Kirchshofer wrote to Inge Jaffke from the Komitee gegen den Vogelmord (KV), a newly founded German activist bird protection group with a clear anti-hunting agenda, which had grown out of the animal protection movement. Kirchshofer encouraged her to ask

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59   Grzimek's prominence and air of expertise was apparently the main reason for his selection: Interview Stuff-mann (note 36).
60   Cf. Claudia Sewig, Der Mann, der die Tiere liebte. Bernhard Grzimek, Bergisch Gladbach 2009, pp. 345-372.
61   Zoologische Gesellschaft Frankfurt, Vogelschutz in Europa, in: Wir und die Vögel 7 (1975) 3, pp. 30. The work was subsequently published as: Wolfgang Poltz / Bernhard Conrad, Vogelschutz in Europa. Ein Situationsbericht über den Vogelschutz in den Staaten der Europäischen Gemeinschaft, Luxemburg 1976.
62   On the links between Thielcke and Grzimek in the national context see: Jens Ivo Engels, Von der Heimat-Connection zur Fraktion der Ökopolemiker. Personale Netzwerke und politischer Verhaltensstil im westdeutschen Naturschutz zwischen Nachkriegszeit und ökologischer Wende, in: Arne Karsten / Hillard v. Thiessen (eds.), Nützliche Netzwerke und korrupte Seilschaften, Göttingen 2006, pp. 18-45, here p. 33.
63   On the concept of framing see Robert Entman, Framing: Toward Clarification of a Fractured Paradigm, in: Journal of Communication 43 (1993) 3, pp. 51-58, here p. 52; applied to the EU: Falk Daviter, Policy Framing in the European Union, in: Journal of European Public Policy 14 (2007) 4, pp. 654-666.
64   Poltz / Conrad, Vogelschutz in Europa (note 61), pp. 67-69. On the actual situation of migratory bird protection in North America see: Mark Cioc, The Game of Conservation. International Treaties to protect the World's Migratory Species, Athens, Ohio 2009, pp. 58-103.

the Commission to propose a binding directive, based on the results of their expertise. After the final submission of the report and the end of the contractual relation with the Commission, the Zoological Society would also call for a directive.[65] Not least because the Commission was not satisfied with its scientific quality and the 'undiplomatic' language used, however, the expert opinion itself did not have much impact.[66]

In the 1970s, petitions to the European institutions were an important instrument of environmental and animal protection groups to intervene in European environmental policy-making. Until 1979, fourteen petitions submitted to the EP related to animal protection, while another nine petitions related to other environmental problems, such as pollution in the Mediterranean. The Stichting Mondiaal Alternatief (SMA), an activist ecological organization from the Netherlands founded in 1974, accounts for the lion's share of these petitions. Together with its international partner organizations from Austria, Belgium, England, Kenya, Netherlands, South-Africa, Surinam, Switzerland, the USA and West Germany, it presented seven petitions on bird protection. Most of the supporting groups were animal protection organizations, such as the KV in Germany. After the initial success with its first petition, SMA kept pushing for European bird protection legislation and the larger issue of the 'new ecological order' even until after the Directive had been enacted in 1979.[67]

This first petition 'Save the Migratory Birds' was submitted by SMA simultaneously to the European Commission, the Council of Ministers and the EP – as well as to the Dutch Foreign Ministry – on 26 August 1974.[68] It warned against the ecological consequences of the decline of bird populations across Europe and Africa for humanity as a whole. Some bird species had declined so drastically that they were on the verge of extinction, the authors of the petition stated, singling out the mass killings of migrant birds in the Mediterranean area, particularly in Italy, as the main reason. Given insects' growing resistance against chemical pesticides, they predicted 'apocalyptic chaos in the Old World's ecology', the destruction of crops and enormous costs, if insectivorous birds were taken out of the ecological balance. To solve this problem, they called for an international conference to address the issue and demanded the end of hunting migratory songbirds.[69] The EP's Committee on Public Health and the Environment, and its rapporteur Hans-Edgar Jahn, a German Christian Democrat, who had posed parliamentary questions on the issue of bird protection before, took up this petition to produce a report and a resolution. The committee carefully used the opportunity provided by the petition to call on the Commission to propose binding European legislation based on the

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65 Letter by Rosl Kirchshofer, Zoologische Gesellschaft Frankfurt, to Inge Jaffke, Komitee gegen den Vogelmord, 3 July 1975, Archive for Christian Democratic Politics (ACDP), Nachlaß Hans Edgar Jahn, Umweltschutz Tierschutz Schriftwechsel 098/2, 1975–1976.

66 Interview Stuffmann (note 36).

67 Franco Piodi, The Citizen's Appeal to the European Parliament. Petitions 1958–1979, Luxembourg 2009, pp. 18-20, 41-44.

68 Stichting Mondiaal Alternatief, Save the Migratory Birds. Petition to the Parliament, the Council and the Commission of the European Communities, 26 August 1974, ACM, Liste Rouge 2680.

69 Stichting Mondiaal Alternatief, Save the Migratory Birds (note 68), here pp. 3-5.

findings of the expert opinion of the Zoologische Gesellschaft, arguing that the urgency of the issue did not allow any more time to be wasted on international conferences.[70] In fact, in the ensuing debate, Commissioner Guido Brunner assured the MEPs that if recommendations to the member states did not produce 'satisfactory results', the Commission would propose a directive, as Jahn had demanded.[71]

In the agenda setting phase, different environmental groups were able to insert their views about bird protection into the European policy process. Their public relations and protest were taken up by the European policy-makers, who even brought in environmentalists as experts to prepare appropriate measures. Even though to some extent European policy makers used the cues provided by the environmental groups at their discretion, they accepted and supported the cause of bird protection as a relevant issue of policy-making. They also facilitated protest and lobbying by providing access to the institutions. Jahn, for instance, had additional documents sent by environmental groups translated and distributed to the members of the EP's Committee on the Environment and Public Health in October 1974 before the discussion on the petition started.[72] At times, environmental groups were even embedded within the European institutions. For instance, the British MEP Lord Chelwood, who asked a parliamentary question in 1974 about the expert opinions gathered by the Commission, was himself a former president of the RSPB. Consequently, he recommended their expert knowledge and that of similar organizations in other countries.[73]

Particularly in the policy formulation phase, when the content of the directive was specified, the embedding within the European institutions of a member of the international bird protection organization the ICBP played a crucial role. In the informal situation of the Commission in the 1970s, when it was still a relatively small organization, John Temple Lang, an Irish official from the Legal Service, took part in the Commission's internal working group on bird protection on his own initiative. He was welcome to the other officials from the new environmental service because of his expertise. Temple Lang was a hobby ornithologist and had previously been involved in international meetings of the ICBP. He was thus familiar with experts in the field as well as with the legal intricacies of international conventions. Conveniently placed, Temple Lang helped in particular with the drafting of those sections of the directive that deal with habitats protection. Articles 3 and 4 of the directive specified ambitious goals. They required the member states to

70 Hans Edgar Jahn, Report drawn up on behalf of the Committee on Public Health and the Environment on Petition No. 8/74 'Save the Migratory Birds', doc. 449/74, PE 38.979fin, ACM, Liste Rouge 2680, here p. 6.

71 European Parliament, Debate on Petition No. 8/74 'Save the Migratory Birds', 21 February 1975, in: Official Journal of the European Communities, Annex: Proceedings of the European Parliament (1975) 186, February 1975, pp. 262-267, here p. 266.

72 E.g. Committee on Public Health and the Environment European Parliament, Notice to Members: Report by Mr Uberti, Secretary of the Verona Branch of the National Society for the Protection of Animals, on the Trade in Birds in the Mediterranean Region, particularly in Italy, 30 October 1974, AEP, PE0 AP RP ENVI.1973 A0-0449/74.

73 Lord Tufton Victor Chelwood, Oral question (doc 12/74) 'Protection of Wild Birds especially Migratory Birds' and Explanatory Statement, 15 May 1974, in: Official Journal of the European Communities, Annex: Proceedings of the European Parliament (1974) 176, May 1974, p. 104.

'maintain and restore a sufficient diversity and area of habitats for all species of wild birds'.[74] He included a reference to 'recognized wetlands of international importance' – protected by the Ramsar Convention of 1971[75] – in the text of the directive. Given that some member states remained hesitant to implement the initial recommendation on bird protection of 1974,[76] which asked the member states to accede to the existing international conventions on bird protection, the birds directive was intended to bring this international convention through the back door.[77] Since for the preparation of a directive the Commission required additional and more balanced expertise than the study by the Frankfurt Zoological Society was able to provide, Temple Lang recommended Stanley Cramp as an expert. Stanley Cramp, a former British diplomat and author of a multi-volume handbook on *Birds of the Western Palearctic*,[78] was a prominent figure not only in ornithology, but also within the ICBP.[79] Cramp's expert opinion stressed habitat protection, particularly the protection of wetlands, and the general reduction of pollution, as well as research in which the international research and protection organizations such as the ICBP and the International Wildfowl Research Bureau (IWR) were to play an important role. Even though Cramp also called for EC legislation ensuring uniform rules concerning hunting at the highest level of protection, his words were much more carefully chosen than in the report from Frankfurt. The treatment of the hunting issue in particular was less emotional and much more even-handed.[80]

The process of consultation on the early drafts for a directive was informal and very open to groups which could demonstrate an interest or contribute expertise. It included bird protection organizations, environmentalists, hunting organizations and national governments.[81] Cramp had alerted the RSPB to the project of legislation. Its director for international affairs Ian Presst and his assistant Alistair Gammell had been unsure about the role the EC could play in bird protection, but decided that Gammell should go to Brussels to offer his expertise and to lobby. Gammell found the Commission to be very receptive to outside expertise, so that it was very easy to get appointments. The

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74   European Commission, Proposal for a Council Directive on Bird Conservation, 20 December 1976, COM (76) 676 final, ACM, Liste Rouge 2772, here art. 3.

75   Convention on Wetlands of International Importance, especially as Waterfowl Habitat. Final Text adopted by the International Conference on the Wetlands and Waterfowl at Ramsar, Iran, 2 February 1971. http://www.ramsar.org/cda/ramsar/display/main/main.jsp?zn=ramsar&cp=1-31-38^20708_4000_0__ [last accessed 26 June 2010]..

76   European Commission, Recommendation to Member States concerning the Protection of Birds and their Natural Habitats, 20 December 1974, in: Official Journal of the European Communities 18 (1974) L 21, 28.01.1975, pp. 24 f.

77   Interview with John Temple Lang, former official in the legal service of the European Commission, Brussels 9 June, 2009; John Temple Lang, The European Community Directive on Bird Conservation, in: Biological Conservation 22 (1982) 1, pp. 11-25, here pp. 14-17.

78   Stanley Cramp, Handbook of the birds of Europe the Middle East and North Africa: the birds of the Western Palearctic, Oxford 1977–1992.

79   K.E.L. Simmons, Stanley Cramp (1913–1987) – Obituary, in: Ibis 131 (1989) 4, pp. 612-614.

80   Stanley Cramp, Schicksal und Zukunft der Vögel Europas. [Bird conservation in Europe], Kilda 1978 [1977], pp. 62-65.

81   Interview Stuffmann (note 36); Interview Gammell (note 44).

access and information Gammell had gathered early on helped him during the lobbying in the policy adoption phase, during which he acted as the official expert for the ESC's environmental committee and wrote the EEB statement on the birds directive submitted to the ESC.[82]

Even though various experts were engaged in the Commission's consultation, the eventual legislative proposal indicates the success of the traditional bird protection groups in shifting the framing of the issue. The issue of bird protection had started out from the alarm over the mass killing of birds, put on the agenda by protest and public relations. Expertise and lobbying provided by representatives of the ICBP and the RSPB at the drafting stage helped shift the focus of the legislative project to the institutionally more convincing, scientific arguments about the need to protect habitats in order to ensure the long-term survival of the birds.

The European legislative process provided plenty of opportunities for access to non-state actors. At the same time, its complexity posed a formidable challenge for the bird protection organizations that were involved in European policy-making for the first time. The Council of Ministers had the power to take the final decision on the directive, after the Committee of Permanent Representatives (Coreper) and its working groups consisting of national ministerial officials had undertaken all the preparatory negotiations. At the time, the still unelected EP and the ESC only had to be consulted. Even though the relevant committees consulted experts, produced reports and suggested amendments, and voted on them in the respective plenaries, the Council was under no obligation to include these proposals.

What characterized non-state actors' lobbying efforts at the legislative stage is their co-ordinated nature. Three – partially overlapping – networks formed: First, the traditional bird protection organizations used their ties from the ICBP and created the above-mentioned European network WEBS to improve their lobbying efforts. Secondly, the newer and more radical anti-hunting groups were also transnationally linked around the KV and the ecologically oriented SMA, which continued to churn out petitions. They shared many of the views of the EP's rapporteur Jahn and were in regular contact with him. As explained above, the hunting organizations not only relied on their pre-existing ties via the CIC, but also established new cooperation at the European level with FACE. These networks were never totally separate. Particularly among local chapters of the traditional bird protection organizations, there was frequently a lot of sympathy for the radical bird protection groups.[83] Moreover, in what could be considered a precursor to what lobbying strategists now call 'transversal lobbying'[84] the SMA met with representatives from FACE

82 Interview Gammell (note 44); Economic and Social Committee, Minutes of the Meetings of the Study Group on Bird Protection and the Section Environment, Public Health and Consumer Protection, February-July 1977, Archive of the Economic and Social Committee, Dossier: Proposition de Directive du Conseil concernant la conservation des oiseaux doc (76) 676 final [340.145:591.615] 636.6.

83 E.g. Letter by Hans Mohr, member the CDU and of local section of DBV to Hans Edgar Jahn, 18 June 1977, ACDP, Nachlaß Hans-Edgar Jahn, Vogelschutz Tierschutz 050/2, 1976–1977.

84 Daniel Guéguen, European Lobbying. 2nd edition, Brussels 2007, pp. 135-138.

in October 1977. In the face of the legislation being stuck in the Council of Ministers, they tried to explore the possibility of cooperation, since 'it had never been our goal to harmonize the hunting legislation in the member states, but only to save the Euro-African migrant birds'.[85]

These networks targeted different institutions at different points in time. On 12 May 1977, shortly before the report of the EP was due, rapporteur Jahn received a large number of supportive letters and telexes by the groups from the transnational anti-hunting network, including letters from Grzimek, Ermanno Rizzardi of the Italian ICBP, and animal protection groups in Munich and Würzburg. This was clearly the result of a co-ordinated effort. All of these groups had previously been in regular contact with Jahn.[86] Both the KV and Prof. G.V.T. Matthews – simultaneously representing the traditional nature and bird protection organizations the IUCN, the ICBP and the IWRB – lobbied Jahn with detailed proposals for amendments to the draft directive.[87] Representing bird protection, Matthews also participated in the meeting of the representatives of FACE with Jahn and three other members of the environmental Committee in Strasbourg on 12 May 1977. Since Jahn had little sympathy for the hunters, it took substantial lobbying efforts and complaints about their position not having been heard to get this meeting organized. A few days in advance of this meeting, the German Hunting Association (Deutscher Jagdschutzverband, DJV) sent out a FACE resolution on the issue of hunting legislation in the EC not only to Jahn and the European institutions, but also to the German president, chancellor, relevant ministers and parliamentary committees, and the parliamentary parties' leaders. It is highly likely that the member organizations of FACE in other EC member states did the same in a coordinated lobbying effort.[88]

Since the ministers of the national governments represented in the Council of Ministers were the relevant decision-makers, protest and letter-writing subsequently focused on national ministries and the Council as a whole. Citizens sent a large number of letters – sometimes including postcards with children's images of birds, distributed by the KV. The member organizations of all three networks also engaged in letter writing.[89] Most of these letters date from 1978, when it had become altogether unclear whether the directive was going to be enacted at all. The negotiations had entered a deadlock. The French government insisted on reducing the number of birds that could be sold, an issue that was important to hunters in Denmark and the UK, where wild ducks and geese were

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85 My translation from the German original. Letter by Fanny Rosenzweig, Stichting Mondiaal Alternatief to Jahn, Zusammenarbeit SMA/Jäger, 23 October 1977, ACDP, Nachlaß Hans-Edgar Jahn, Vogelschutz Tierschutz 050/1, 1977–1978.

86 ACDP, Nachlaß Hans-Edgar Jahn, Vogelschutz Tierschutz 050/2, 1976–1977.

87 Letter by G.V.T. Matthews to Jahn, 13 May 1977, and Letter by Inge Jaffke to Jahn, 9 June 1977, ACDP, Nachlaß Hans-Edgar Jahn, Vogelschutz Tierschutz 050/2, 1976–1977.

88 Jahn, Vogelschutz Tierschutz 050/2 (note 86), ACDP, Nachlaß Hans-Edgar Jahn, Vogelschutz 098/5, 1975–1978.

89 Council of the European Communities, Prises de position concernant la directive 79/409/CEE du Conseil du 02.04.1979 concernant la conservation des oiseaux sauvages, ACM, Liste Rouge 2787, 1977–1979; Council of the European Communities, Prises de position concernant la directive 79/409/CEE du Conseil du 02.04.1979 concernant la conservation des oiseaux sauvages, ACM, Liste Rouge 2789, 1977–1978.

usually marketed after their shooting. Against this, the French government insisted on a longer list of songbirds that should remain free to be hunted in France (and Italy).

When it seemed that the position of the French government remained the last obstacle to the successful agreement on a birds directive in the summer of 1978, the French Fédération des Sociétés de Protection de la Nature (FFSPN), the environmental umbrella organization in France not only wrote to the responsible French ministers, demanding the signing of the directive, but also distributed information to its member organizations for PR purposes and for organizing protest. Its expressed hope was to 'constitute a pressure group equivalent to that of the hunters'. In conjunction with the EEB, the FFSPN had already encouraged international protest in early June 1978. The member organizations of the EEB were asked to write to the French ambassadors in the respective countries. Also the IUCN wrote to the French ministers responsible.[90]

To what extent these efforts actually made the position of the French government untenable, remains unclear. In any case, by November 1978, the French government – domestically under pressure from the hunting lobby – had lost its last remaining ally in the Council. The Italian government now favoured the enactment of the directive, as they hoped that this might help overcome the negative image Italy had acquired because of bird hunting.[91] Apparently, the continued campaign against Italy as a country of bird hunting – pursued by the KV and its partners – was not without effect on government decision-makers.

The case of the birds directive demonstrates that environmental organizations had improved their ability to lobby the European – and national – institutions using a combination of methods, from protest letters to offering expert opinions. At the same time, the environmental groups also acted as transnational mediators. The new European policy was shaped both by ideas from the international level – that is, the 1971 Ramsar Convention and habitats protection – and domestic concerns in various European countries about the killing of singing birds in Southern Europe. At the European level, these concerns came together in a binding piece of European level legislation beyond the nation state.

By contrast, the implementation of the birds directive can hardly be considered a success story. At various instances, the Commission had to take governments to the European Court of Justice for their failure to properly implement and enforce it.[92] However, the environmental groups which participated in the creation of the directive played a central part in its implementation. Those who had become part of a policy network in the course

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90   J. P. Le Duc, Fédération Française des Sociétés de Protection de la Nature: Le Point sur la Directive européenne pour la Protection des Oiseaux, 14 Juillet 1978, ACDP, Nachlaß Hans-Edgar Jahn, Vogelschutz Tierschutz 049/2, 1978–1979, quote p. I; my translation from the original French.

91   Direction des Affaires Economiques et Financières Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, Note [de HCL/LV] au sujet: Concertation franco-italienne sur les problèmes de l'environnement, 10 November 1978, Archives Nationales, Fontainebleau, 19910580, article 33.

92   Alexandre Kiss / Dinah Shelton, Manual of European Environmental Law. Second Edition, Cambridge 1997, p. 206.

of the legislative process subsequently also became part of the expert committee set up for the implementation and adjustment of the directive. The list of candidates – drawn up by the EEB – included various members of the traditional bird protection organizations and the ICBP, among others John Temple Lang, Ian Presst and Alistair Gammell from the RSPB, and Rainer Ertel from the DBV. In a protest letter to Jahn in March 1979, Inge Jaffke from the KV demanded the inclusion of experts closer to the cause of the radical anti-hunting groups.[93] Jahn's intervention was apparently successful, and the candidates were included.[94] The incident demonstrates that the KV, one of the initiators of the policy project, while being effective in building up public pressure, had not become part of the inner circle of the policy network around the Commission. The organization had to rely on its links to Jahn, who was not going to return to the EP after the direct elections.[95] At the same time, their inclusion in the expert committee illustrates the completion of a process of the Europeanization of the bird protection organizations by the end of the 1970s – as a result of the lengthy battle over the birds directive.

Conclusion

Two main conclusions can be drawn from the analysis of non-state actors in environmental policy-making in the 1970s. First, in the emerging policy area of the environment, non-state actors, namely environmental interest groups, increasingly played a role in policy-making. When environmental interest groups realized the importance and the binding nature of European policy-making in various aspects of environmental protection, they set up shop at the European level. The founding of the EEB as the umbrella organization was advanced by actors from the international level in the aftermath of the Stockholm conference. It was thus a download from the international level. Pre-existing connections via the ICBP and the CIC facilitated transnational cooperation between national organizations which led to the founding of European networks like the WEBS or organizations like FACE. However, this bottom-up Europeanization of these more specialized interest groups was much slower, and was a direct response to concrete policy-making in their specific area of concern.

Not only did the interest groups push towards the European level, since European legislation offered new opportunities, there was also an important pull by the European institutions to include them.[96] The involvement of non-state actors in environmental

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93   Letter by Inge Jaffke, KV, to Jahn, 21 March 1979, ACDP, Nachlaß Hans-Edgar Jahn, Vogelschutz Tierschutz 049/2, 1978–1979.
94   ACDP, Nachlaß Hans-Edgar Jahn, Vogelschutz Tierschutz 049/2, 1978–1979.
95   Jahn's apparently anti-Bolshevist and anti-Semitist writings during World War II were revealed by the German newsmagazine Stern shortly before the first direct elections in June 1979. Jahn thus had to withdraw from standing as a candidate. See: Arnim von Marnikowski, Christdemokraten: Ein Mann für Europa? Sternredakteur Arnim von Marnikowski über die NS-Vergangenheit eines CDU Spitzenkandidaten für die Europawahl, in: Stern, 23 May 1979.
96   I am loosely borrowing this concept of push and pull factors developed by students of migration to distinguish

policy was encouraged by the openness of the European policy process, the willingness particularly of the supranational organizations to listen to demands, in order to both advance European integration and enhance the legitimacy of the European project by considering the opinions of scientific experts and of the representatives of important societal concerns. The Commission was also still in a learning process with regard to selecting experts, while the environmental movement had to learn how to present their expertise, as the example of the study by the Zoological Society indicates.

Secondly, the example of the birds directive demonstrates how non-state actors successfully cooperated with the European institutions and among themselves, using the entire gamut of methods for making their voice heard. An important condition for their success was the willingness of supranational actors to cooperate with them. That is, the EP picked up the issue and produced a report. Similarly, the Commission made use of external expertise in order to demand legislative action. This case study shows how new these groups were to the European policy process, but also how quickly they learned that transnational cooperation was a key to success. In the 1970s, we can observe the emergent role of environmental groups at the EC level, which laid the basis for future cooperation with the European institutions. At a theoretical level, the 'Europeanization' of environmental groups can largely be interpreted within a neo-functionalist framework.[97] The creation of the EC environmental policy made the European level more attractive, and led to their growing presence and advocacy of European level solutions. Similarly, the case fits institutionalist claims that organizations always closely follow the institutional patterns of the institutions they depend on.[98] Finally the Europeanization of environmental groups may also be interpreted as part of the formation of a European political society, or a system of governance, as early as the 1970s.[99] In contrast to what is frequently claimed by political scientists,[100] who contend that consultation of experts only started in the 1990s, the cases of the birds directive and the environmental action programme demonstrate that non-state actors' expert knowledge was already routinely drawn on in1970s environmental policy.

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between the factors that induced interest groups to 'go to Europe'. Cf. Everett S. Lee, A Theory of Migration, in: Demography 3 (1966) 1, pp. 47-57.

97 Ernst B. Haas, The Uniting of Europe. Political, Social, and Economic Forces, 1950–1957, Stanford 1958, p. 312 f.; Arne Niemann / Philippe C. Schmitter, Neofunctionalism, in: Antje Wiener/Thomas Diez (eds.), European Integration Theory, Oxford 2009, pp. 45-66, here p. 49.

98 Paul J. DiMaggio / Walter W. Powell, The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields, in: American Sociological Review 48 (1983) 2, pp. 147-160, here p. 150. For the use of institutionalist theories in the historical study of the EC see: Morten Rasmussen, Supranational Governance in the Making. Towards a European Political System, in: Wolfram Kaiser/Morten Rasmussen/Brigitte Leucht (eds.), The History of the European Union. Origins of a Trans- and Supranational Polity 1950-72, Abingdon 2009, pp. 34-55.

99 Wolfram Kaiser, Transnational Western Europe since 1945. Integration as political society formation, in: Wolfram Kaiser / Peter Starie (eds.), Transnational European Union. Towards a Common Political Space, London 2005, pp. 19-35.

100 Daviter, Policy Framing in the European Union (note 63), p. 658; Johan Nylander, The Construction of a Market. A Frame Analysis of the Liberalisation of the Electricity Market in the European Union, in: European Societies 3 (2001) 3, pp. 289-314, here p. 307.

BERICHT

Katja Naumann / Michael Mann

Conference Report: "1989 in a Global Perspective". 14.10.2009–16.10.2009, Leipzig

Organisers:
Global and European Studies Institute, University of Leipzig; in cooperation with the Centre for East-Central European History and Culture, the European Network in Universal and Global History (ENIUGH) and the Graduate Centre for the Humanities and Social Sciences of the Research Academy Leipzig (RAL)

1. Introductory Remarks

A conference report as long as the following requires a word of explanation at the beginning: It was indeed a remarkable conference, so it deserves a more detailed discussion of its purpose and accomplishments rather than merely a description of some of its presentations. The report therefore starts with introducing the wider conceptual background. Thereafter selected papers and the central aspects of the final plenary debates are presented. The report concludes with a summary of its achievements and future tasks will be pointed out.

It goes without saying that the year of 1989 is an intensively debated historical subject, especially in conjunction with its 20th anniversary. The significance of 1989 as a marker of global change however is even more under discussion. Without forestalling, all papers held during the conference attested to the importance of the events of that year from a global historical perspective, although – in contrast to other modern large-scale transfor-

mations – a consensus as to its interpretation, be it a revolution or not, or a final judgment is as yet not apparent.

Let us begin, however, with the observation that was the starting point for the conference. Without any doubt historical jubilees mark events at which a given society reflects upon its past as well as upon the present state of affairs. Generally these debates go hand in hand with a reflection of the preferred societal order, for the present as well as for the future. And so it was in regard to the 20th anniversary remembrance festivities of 1989, which played a large role in public debates in Germany last year. The transformations in the former GDR and Eastern Europe and the question as to whether what happened in Leipzig in October 1989 is to be remembered as the beginning of a change with an open end including the option of the socialist order to be reformed, or whether it should be better described as a "peaceful revolution" which would invoke an all-German notion in the sense that it would present the first 'Freiheitsrevolution' in German history dominated the debate. At the margins of these discussions, remained the international dimension of the developments including the relations to the processes in neighbouring eastern states.

More striking is a second omission: As early in the late 1980s Mikhail Gorbachev had begun speaking about a "common European house" as a new political order to be built in the years to come. In September 1990 the then president of the US George Bush went even further when he stated in a speech before Congress that the collapse of the communist system in the GDR, in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union made the construction of a new world order necessary. These broad interpretations stand aside of a narrower one that perpetuates an Cold War world-view. Following his understanding and action twenty years ago the former foreign minister of the Federal Republic of Germany, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, recently interpreted the protests in Leipzig on October 9, 1989 as well as the transformations in Eastern Europe as the beginning of a European emancipation movement and revolution against the Soviet regime dominating Eastern and Central Europe.

According to this narrative Eastern Europe was finally catching up with the development of Western Europe and thus in 1989 the foundation were laid to a united Europe of democracies and liberal economies.[1] This difference in language and interpretation of "1989" was neither mentioned during the celebrations nor was it dealt with by historical analyses. Therefore the changes, which promulgated the end of the twentieth century, are seen as a global caesura, but its historical-cum-global interpretation seems separated from the signifiers of a changing world situation, among others the North-South conflict replacing the model of the 'three worlds' or the transformation of a bipolar into a polycentric world.

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1   Hans-Dietrich Genscher during the plenary discussion „Revolution ohne Gewalt? Rückblicke auf ein unwahrscheinliches Ereignis", University of Leipzig, 9.10. 2009. Also during his Introductory Speech of this conference, titled "Auf dem Wege zum und im Epochenjahr 1989" on October 14, 2010, University of Leipzig.

Consequently certain questions have not been raised, for example: Is it that the events of "1989" indicate the emergence of a new world order, or is the global transformation a result of how this year of change was interpreted and remembered afterwards? If both is the case one may ask, how the 'global quality' of these processes relates to the predominating historical interpretation. What is included, what excluded in the dominating master narratives, and with which consequences for a general interpretation? These and connected questions formed the basis of the conference entitled "1989 in a Global Perspective" that took place at the University of Leipzig between 14-16 October, 2009. It was organised by the Global and European Studies Institute (GESI) of the University of Leipzig, in co-operation with the Centre for Eastern-Middle-European History and Culture, the European Network in Universal and Global History (ENIUGH), as well as the Graduate Centre for the Humanities and Social Sciences of the Research Academy Leipzig (RAL). Funding was provided by the Bundesstiftung Aufarbeitung der SED-Diktatur and the University of University.

2. The "Global Quality" of 1989 and the historical theory of "Critical Junctures of Globalization"

In their introductory comments, the three main organisers, Ulf Engel (Leipzig), Matthias Middell (Leipzig) und Frank Hadler (Leipzig), observed that the changes of 1989 were by no means restricted to East Central Europe and are too narrowly interpreted as the end of the Cold War period. Consequently, it has been falsely seen as the victory of one system over the other. They suggested instead to take into consideration all the conflicts that culminated worldwide and then to ask whether the convergence of these events account for global-historical dynamics and, if that is so, whether this does not open up, maybe even demand, a different view on these developments.

As indicated in the conference program[2] events in Cuba, China as well as in Zambia and Kenya do not fit into the well-known argument according to which the political transformations of 1989 resulted in a global breakthrough of western democracy and economic liberalism. Such a perspective fails in taking into account the multitude of interests and visions that were articulated in the transformative movements around the world, of which many differed from, if they were not even opposed, to the Eurocentric narrative of westernisation. Furthermore there is little evidence for what is also claimed by this view, namely that these transformations originated in internal conflicts and dynamics leading forthright to the collapse of socialism and the victory of capitalism. This account is thus based on a limiting Eurocentric perspective. Moreover, it ignores the convergence of the synchronic processes of transformation and consequently it leaves out their systemic causes and results.

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2   The programme is listed under: http://www.uni-leipzig.de/gesi/

Looking more closely at events in Africa, Asia and Latin America it becomes clear that around 1989 hitherto well-established political and economic structures were shattered without clear alternative concepts being at hand. International processes and local constellations were interdependent; in each case in it own terms. The perception of external dynamics and their local acquisition did not follow one pre-thought, clear-cut scheme rather the occurring cultural transfers brought about a plurality of intellectual responses and social actions. Obviously 1989 did not trigger the homogenisation of social orders nor did the 'South' join univocally and in unison with the 'North'. Instead, as Engel, Hadler and Middell emphasised in their introductory remarks, established political, economic and social orders were contested and structures of international system became fragile by the converging events of 1989.

To comprehend the events of 1989 in their global significance, (both spatial as well as structural) and thus to prevent Eurocentric patterns of interpretation, the conference was organised along three parallel sections. Papers under the heading '1989 – Events, Places, Comparisons' gave an overview of events in various world regions pointing out differences and similarities. The section 'Towards an Entangled History of 1989' was conceived to reconstruct trans-local processes of transfers and interactions to gather the empirical material for an entangled history of 1989. The section 'Processes of Remembrance and Re-Conceptualisation of the World' focused on those historical actors who were successful in enforcing their interpretation of what happened, on their interests and their strategies of gaining dominance in an open and complex situation. It would have been beneficial of the organisers to emphasise that this structure was meant not just as an organisational scheme but that in it the main positions of current international academic research on 1989 were reflected: First, that 1989 is interpreted as the end of the Cold War era; second, that events of 1989 are, recently, understood as being globally entangled; and third, that a new mode of analysis and interpretation is required to ultimately establish 1989 as a global category.[3]

Beside this general framework the conference was intended to discuss and to test the interpretative approach the three organisers have been developing over the last years for capturing the global dimension of 1989. Engel, Hadler and Middell analyse the dynamics and mechanisms of worldwide integration with regard to the spatialisation of political sovereignty, but also in view of cultural and economical organisation. Processes of globalisation are to them de- and re-territorialisations, i.e. the formation, concussion and replacement of the spatial enclosure of politics and societal life. They argue, together with others, that in the middle of the 19th century a worldwide correlation of economical, cultural, social and political spaces emerged which simultaneously supported and challenged territorialisation within the nation-state framework. Evidence for this is the balance, which can be found between the preservation of sovereignty and autonomy,

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3   Recently Timothy Garton Ash described some of those perspectives that henceforth are to be studied for a global interpretation of the changes that occurred in the year: 1989!, in: New York Review of Books 56 (2009)17, online unter: http://www.nybooks.com/articles/23232.

usually in the national demarcation of power and identity, and the involvement in global entanglements and interactions.

This dialectic consolidated for certain periods into stable spatial relations, while in others these orders lost their persuasive power. When once established patterns of territorialisation lose their effectiveness and become porous crises break out. Furthermore, when these crises solidify and emerge worldwide they turn into a structural challenge for the respective order of things and the world order begins to change. The organisers conceptualise such phases of change as "critical junctures of globalisation".[4] As to it temporal dimension these junctures are not limited to single events or years, but they culminate in 'global moments'. These are times in which ongoing crises are accorded with meaning by statements of visions concerning a new territorial order. 1989 can be understood as such a global moment, as in almost all regions of the world phenomena of crises gained momentum and were interpreted as thoroughly contesting of the state of affairs with the resulting processes of change becoming increasingly synchronised. While they were before restricted by and within a national framework, henceforth their global power becomes obvious. Consequently, interpretations as to what the old world order was like and the new one would be are formulated and discussed. Assertive, at least for a short period, was the interpretation of the enforcement of western democracy and economic liberalism. In fact in diverse ways and in very different contexts new political actors demanded participation according to their own interests: transnational social groups challenged the demarcations of nation-states, protest movements against the Soviet power emerged, and in the non-European world post-colonial positions were emplaced against the western hegemony. In the end, it seems, the dominating patterns of territorialisation became to an extent so porous in 1989 that they were openly and successfully challenged.

3. Conference Report

In view of the wide range of topics and approaches usually presented at conferences the specific focus of this one raised high expectations. Without doubt many of the previously asked questions were debated during the presentation of papers. However, the speakers would have benefited from an outline of the conceptual framework before the conference, not merely in the program and the introductory remarks. So many interesting questions were posed at the outset, yet since there was little opportunity for incorporating them into the presentations and comments, only few were addressed during the panel sessions. Some papers even passed over the requested contextualisation of their case studies in the global framework. Christoph Boyer (Salzburg) argued along the lines of the traditional transformation studies showing that the unrest in East Central Europe was provoked by a structural backwardness of these countries and their incapability to modernise accord-

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4   Cf. Ulf Engel / Matthias Middell, Bruchzonen der Globalisierung, globale Krisen und Territorialitätsregimes. Kategorien einer Globalgeschichtsschreibung, in: COMPARATIV 15 (2005) 5-6, S. 5-38.

ing to western standards. In comparison, Stefan Troebst (Leipzig) and Michael Zeuske (Cologne) reconstructed the history of events in 1989 without any normative judgment in their respective talks on Yugoslavia and the Caribbean. However, they did not engage in a reflection of what can be taken from these cases for any global history of 1989.

In general more emphasis concerning the global implications of the local and regional crises would have been desirable, such as was undertaken by Chris Saunders (Cape Town). He convincingly demonstrated the influence the imploding and collapsing GDR had on the parliament of Namibia constituting in March 1990 (when the country gained independence from South Africa after decades of struggling) and on the negotiations between F. W. Klerk and the ANC in South Africa.

Particularly as scholars from all world regions attended the conference, one would have wished that the developments of 1989 had been focused on more indepthly in their transnational dimension. Illuminating this fact was the paper by Scarlett Cornelissen (Stellenbosch) who demonstrated that the Anti-Apartheid-Movement in South Africa constituted a transnational movement based on a network transgressing national borders. In this way, internal political affairs were directly linked with international politics. Likewise, Klaas Dykmann's (Leipzig) case study on El Salvador made clear that the general elections in spring 1989 as well as the escalating violence in autumn that year marked a *wendepunkt* in the still ongoing civil war (1980–1992). Since then the US and the UN, in addition to many other transnationally operating non-governmental organisations, have engaged themselves in the conflict suggesting solutions on the basis of international values such as democratisation as a means of securing worldwide peace.

The debate on the relationship between national and regional developments and international relations produced ambivalent results. On the one hand, linkages between local processes became clear. Among others they were all framed using a transnational language. The vocabulary of 1989 – freedom, democracy, disarmament and inter-cultural dialogue – had inspiring power in many places of the world and created the hope for a new political, economic and social order. Furthermore, the observation of emancipation movements taking place at a distance often enough induced dynamics locally. On the other hand most of the papers argued for a primacy of internal causes of political crises rather than accentuating a transnational inter-connectedness. For example John French (Durham) stressed in his paper on Brazil the national context of the general elections in autumn 1989 and pointed out that South America and East-Central Europe may have been connected by some kind of peripheral status within the hierarchies of the Cold War, yet no (direct) connections could be drawn between the processes in these areas which is why a global 1989 is nothing but an *ex post* historical construction. In a similar way Heidrun Zinecker (Leipzig) argued that Columbia contradicts the thesis of a global moment in 1989 because internal social tensions were the real causes for demanding democracy and its ultimate realisation.

Interestingly enough in some cases global inter-connectivity was rejected based on the argument that such an emphasis would again support a perspective in which Western concepts of democracy and marked-orientated economy are assumed as having been

imposed and transferred to non-European countries. In particular the papers on Latin America stressed that the events in Europe did not have any influence on the history of their countries. By generalising their statements one would assume that the same would be true for a region like South Asia. By looking at the academic research on that world region one is persuaded by the initial impression, Yet on taking a closer look at the region's development it becomes clear, as Michael Mann (Hagen) demonstrated in his paper, that India (as the largest nation state in South Asia) fits very well into a global scenery, although developments elsewhere did not have any immediate impact on the country. However, after the collapse of the Soviet Union the US missed her chance as the only remaining super-power to include the Indian Union in a global peace order, or, at least, to incorporate the country into a global security concept. Instead she concentrated on the expansion of NATO into the eastern countries of Europe. The Indian Union which had affiliated to the Soviet Union by a treaty of friendship since 1971, yet, at the same time, was one of the most powerful states within the league of non-aligned countries, was left out of the globally oriented military strategy and political concept. (Strangely enough, the then Bush-administration realised the global importance of 1989 demanding a new world order without including India in such a re-oriented geo-political strategy.)

Left on her own, at least that was the impression of the Indian government and military, India developed her own security concept in the 1990s including the development of nuclear weapons. In 1998 the then Hindu-nationalist BJP-government led by A. B. Vajpayee officially tested the first atomic bomb (followed by Pakistan's a couple of months later) catapulting the country into the 21st century. On the one hand this was the result of an explicitly nationalist policy; on the other hand it was the result of the geo-political bias. Consequently the US had to abandon their non-proliferation policy and to co-operate with the Indian Union. Thus the missing US global strategic concept offered India's military and her three governments of the 1990s exactly the kind of agency that was needed to establish her as a "global player" in South Asia and the Indian Ocean Area.

Mark Jürgensmeyer (Santa Barbara) plausibly argued in his paper that in Western Asia and North Africa – one may well add South Asia – the radicalisation of politics, be it through Islam or Hinduism, gained decisive momentum and religious fundamentalism emerged. Similarly, in the US a shift in politics took place, the Bush (jun.) administration being dominated by evangelical fundamentalists. This kind of converging of fundamentalist and nationalist developments must also be integrated into the interpretations of 1989. For example, the Indian Union saw the regionalisation of her territory leading to the founding of three new federal states at the turn of the millennium, precisely at the same time when the territory of the European states and the European Union was being reorganised. Evidently then, processes of reterritorialisation were enfolding in two distant world-regions.

Finally let us mention two papers that put the global meaning of 1989 into the centre of their argument and thus tried most clearly to transcend a Eurocentric perspective. Michael Geyer (Chicago), speaking about the US and the administration of George Bush (sen.) (1989–1993), pointed out a tension which makes the year difficult to in-

terpret: on the one hand this year did not imply major change for the country, on the other the administration intensively discussed a strategy on how to react to the changing global situation. Two options seemed to develop: First, the continuation of the country's global hegemony by applying imperial strategies. Second, the enforcement of geo-political domination camouflaged by promoting democracy and liberal economy in the rest of the world. Relatively early, however, the limits of both options became obvious. The 21st century would neither be one of empires, nor did political and economical development continue to parallel and accompany each other. Thus the US-administration was negotiating visions of the future which did not transpire without having a more promising alternative at hands. This indicates that, also seen from the US the situation, 1989 was much more open then it appeared in the years to follow. The 'Americanisation' of the world was not the only issue that was at stake. In particular the country's foreign politics gives evidence of the indecisiveness that circulated at the outset. Management of the crises that broke out almost everywhere was the prevailing stance at first, as later, strategies of preserving the hegemonic position in a changing world order dominated the considerations. This rather cautious and contained position can be explained, according to Geyer, by the fact that the US-American society was in a process of fundamental transformation at least since the beginning in the 1980s. With the collapse of the corporatist and Fordist organisational patterns society became highly fragmented. Both Bush administrations tried to halt these tendencies, to which a strategy of delay with regard to geo-politics corresponded. In general there was a high degree of uncertainty reaching back into the 1960s and 1970s when the post-war order shattered.

Taking Africa as an example Ulf Engel (Leipzig) in his paper on the transformation of financial politics during the 20th century argued a similar stance. In his understanding, a dialectical process of border-transgression and border-setting has characterised the last century. On the one hand, independent actors and uncontrollable movements increased within the financial sector ('casino-capitalism'). On the other hand, nation states and supra-national organisations such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund tried to politically regulate the trend of de-territorialisation to maintain their sovereignty over the increasingly unmanageable financial markets. Interestingly the Washington Consensus which sought to mitigate consequences of globalisation, like poverty and exploitation, by initiating economic reforms and by developing mechanisms for distribution of wealth (as limited they might have been) to stabilise the political order finally ended to the contrary. It caused global political change. In South Africa the Apartheid system collapsed because of post-colonial challenges, which were used to challenge and finally erode the global financial order, the latter up to an instrument of western control over the rest of the world. Seen from this perspective, 1989 pointed towards the established global financial and economic sector as it marked a moment at which those structures were negotiated anew.

4. Summary and Prospects

From the two plenary sessions of the conference two aspects are to be mentioned. Some irritation among the participants was voiced that the main organisers had suggested 1989 as a decisive marker for a global transformation with regard to territorialisation of political orders and international relations. Yet the question whether this process was to be characterised as a revolution was not posed. The discussion at the end of the conference however addressed this issue, although without any clear result. Not even the events in East-Central Europe were unanimously interpreted as revolutions, although in comparison with occurrences in other world regions they were ascribed the biggest revolutionary potential.

Second, the relevance of the interpretation of 1989 for current political debates was again called into question after Michael Geyer had argued that the end of the Soviet Union should not be merely limited to an implosion but, in fact, was a revolution because social actors set their agency against the communist ruling structures. This soon spilled over borders and inspired demand for freedom rights on a global scale. Since this process has far from ended further revolutions remain a distinct possibility. With that consideration a line was drawn to the basic question of the conference, namely: Does 1989 really mark "the end of history" in the sense of whether it confirms western political and economic patterns or does it mark more convincingly a new period in the structuring of the world?

Three aspects seemed to become clear at the end of the conference: First, it is advisable to start with the historical actors' understanding and the following processes of remembrance for analysing the global quality of 1989. Otherwise one tends to simply reproduce the view that has been ultimately enforced, namely the Cold War perspective of a victory of capitalism over socialism. This perspective, however, despite writing the history of the winners, loses two aspects of the developments that culminated in 1989, namely the challenge of the nation state model for preserving sovereignty and the subjugation of most parts of the world through western European and north American states. Second, diametrical processes have also been emphasised – for example the demilitarisation of Europe within the context of the global proliferation of nuclear weapons, which can even be taken as a starting point for the efforts of provincialising Europe.

Third, it once again became obvious how difficult it still is to overcome established historical narratives such as reproducing the Eurocentric logic of the bi-polarity of the Cold War instead of arguing for the acknowledgment of the poly-centric world of today. The conference has made it clear that the second perspective had already been voiced in 1989 but became forgotten once it was overshadowed by the first. In addition to that we would like to point out that although not intensively discussed, one could gather from the presentations over the two days that given the historically uneven distribution of power the transformations that took place in 1989 could not produce solely winners. The integration into the world economy of East-Central Europe, for example, caused a massive decrease of power and agency in other parts of the world. In this view the continuing

economic crises in many countries of Latin America at the beginning of the 1990s corresponds to and stands in clear connection with developments elsewhere.

Although the conceptual framework of the conference was only sporadically taken up in the panels, the conference was successful regarding the formulation of an empirically founded critique on the present-day prevalent Eurocentric interpretations of the 1989.

The argument concerning the development of the hegemonic pattern of territorialisation since the end of the 1970s starkly emphasises socio-economic structural development as an integral process of the last third of the 20th century. Currently, it seems, two interpretations stand in opposition with each other: Primarily that focused on tracing the annulment of the bipolar pattern of organisation with its consequences, developments and necessities this rea-djustment entailed for all regions of the world. This confronts attention given to the structural crises and the learning process that industrial societies underwent in both eastern and western Europe which was catalysed by the events of 1989 without fully grasping the global meaning of the year.

In reflection, the intended publication of an edited volume of papers from the conference should document, on the one hand, the debates raised and, on the other hand, papers should be improved with respect to clearer arguments including a reference to the triple concept of the conference. This conference report may serve as a guideline stressing once more the original intention of the conference. Should the edited volume strive to widen and, even more ambitiously, to open up new horizons, its publication should go beyond the mere presentation of the given papers. Paper presenters should be asked to discuss their case studies more thoroughly with regard to the global dimension of the 1989 and to respond to the intellectual challenge the conceptual ambition of the conference had posed. Moreover, besides an edited volume, a further conference dealing with the same questions within the next years would be desirable. Until then, one may hope, the presently dominating master narrative on "1989" as the end of the Cold War may have already given way to a globally oriented historical narrative stressing transnational entanglements and the global dimension of "1989".

Conference Program

Key note lecture (Oskar-Halecki-Lecture of the GWZO)
Hans-Dietrich Genscher, former Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany: "Auf dem Wege zum und im Epochenjahr 1989"
Introduction: *Frank Hadler* (GWZO)

Words of Welcome by
Rainer Eckert, Director of the Zeitgeschichtliches Forum
Franz Häuser, Rector of the University of Leipzig
Burkhard Jung, Mayor of the City of Leipzig
Bernd Faulenbach, Bundesstiftung Aufarbeitung der SED-Diktatur

Introduction:

Ulf Engel (University of Leipzig), *Frank Hadler* (GWZO, Leipzig), *Matthias Middell* (University of Leipzig): Global structures and the events of 1989
Ivan Berend (UCLA): Global financial architecture before and after 1989

Parallel Sessions of Sections

Section 1: 1989 – events, places, comparisons

Chairs: *Frank Hadler* (GWZO, Leipzig), *Amanda Gouws* (U Stellenbosch), *Colin Lewis* (London)
Konrad H. Jarausch (U Chapel Hill): Germany 1989: A New Type of Revolution?
Alexandr Shubin (Moscow): International Influence on Gorbačovs Reform and on Civil Movement
Oldrich Tuma (Academy of Sciences, Prag): Czechoslovakai in 1989
Chris Saunders (U Cape Town): 1989 and Southern Africa
Ulf Engel (U Leipzig): A Structuralist Interpretation of the Making of Sychronicity: Re-contextualising 1989 in the Finance Politics of the 20ᵗʰ Century
John French (U Duke): Without Fear of Being Happy: The 1989 Presidential Election Campaign of the 'Brazilian Lech Wałęsa' Luis Inácio Lula da Silva
Heidrun Zinecker (U Leipzig): Where 1989 did not Happen: Colombia in 1989
Klaas Dykmann (U Leipzig): El Salvador in 1989

Section 2: Towards an entangled history of 1989

Chairs: *Ulf Engel* (U Leipzig), *Michael Mann* (U Hagen)

Christoph Boyer (U Salzburg): The socio-economic causes of "1989" in a comparative perspective
Michael Mann (U Hagen): India in 1989
Stefan Troebst (GWZO, Leipzig): A Turn to the Worse: 1989 in Yugoslavia
Rüdiger Steinmetz (U Leipzig): Televison as a Universal Therapist and Entertainer. An Analysis of Programmes in the Transition Period between the Opening of The Berlin Wall and the Unification of Germany
Mark Juergensmeyer (U California, Santa Barbara): Storm Clouds of Global Religious Rebellion in 1989
Scarlett Cornelissen (U Stellenbosch): Resolving the South African Problem: Transnational Activism, Ideology and Race in the Olympic Movement, 1960–1990
Hartmut Elsenhans (U Leipzig): Rising New Cultural Identitarian Movements in Africa and Asia in the Emerging Multipolar World

Section 3:
1989 in processes of remembrance and re-conceptualisation of the world

Chairs: *Matthias Middell* (U Leipzig), *Michael Riekenberg* (U Leipzig), *Beata Ociepka* (U Wrocław)
Michael Geyer (U Chicago): The United States in 1989 – A Brief History of the Future
Bernhard H. Bayerlein (U Mannheim): Communism – A History of Erosion
László Borhi (Budapest): The International Context of the Hungarian Transition, 1989
Michael Zeuske (U Köln): 1989 in the Carribbean: Social Rebellion in Venezuela and Conflicts over Reforms on Cuba
Pierre Grosser (EHESS Paris): The 1989 Moment: Rethinking the demise of East Communist Europe in a Global Context
Jie-Hyun Lim (U Seoul): Where Has the Socialism Gone? Korean Lefts Looking at the Post-Communist Eastern Europe
Claudia Kraft (U Erfurt): Remembering the End of Polish Communism
Mihai Manea (U Bucharest): 1989 in Romania. A Violent Popular Oust. Different Interpretations

Plenary Section: Reports from the Parallel Sections
chair: *Erin Wilson* (U Melbourne)

Concluding plenary session
chair: *Mark Juergensmeyer* (U California, Santa Barbara)
Introductory comment: *Dietmar Rothermund* (U Heidelberg)

BUCHBESPRECHUNGEN

Rezensiert von
Hartmut Kaelble, Berlin

Der große, über 80 Jahre alte, tschechische Neuzeithistoriker Miroslaw Hroch legt in diesem Band seine wichtigsten Aufsätze in internationalen Sprachen vor. Der Band erscheint in einer Reihe, in der schon andere bedeutende ostmitteleuropäische Historiker wie Ivan T. Berend, György Ranki, Janusz Zarnowski und Anna Zarnowska Aufsatzsammlungen in Englisch publizierten.

Miroslaw Hroch ist international bekannt geworden vor allem durch seine Thesen zur Nationsbildung in kleinen Ländern Europas ohne Staat und durch sein Konzept der Phasen der Nationsbildung, das stark auf gesellschaftlichen Bedingungen aufbaut. Seine bekannten Phasen A, B, C der Nationsbildung in kleinen Ländern werden auch in diesem Band präsentiert: Phase A, in der Gelehrte die sprachlichen, kulturellen, gesellschaftlichen und wirtschaftlichen Besonderheiten einer Minderheit untersuchen; Phase B, in der andere Akteure auftauchen, die durch Agitation möglichst große Teil der nationalen Minderheit zu gewinnen und eine moderne Nation zu schaffen versuchen; schließlich Phase C , in der eine nationale Identität und ein Nationalstaat durch die Mehrheit der Bevölkerung gewollt und durchgesetzt wird. Hroch bezeichnet dieses Konzept ungern als Theorie, weil er nicht den Ehrgeiz hat, ein generelles analytisches Konzept zur globalen Nationsbildung zu liefern. Sein Ansatz ist daher nicht so verbreitet wie die viel zitierten Konzepte des Ethnologen Ernest Gellner, des Südostasienhistorikers Benedict Anderson oder des Historikers Eric Hobsbawm. Hroch möchte vor allem für die Nationsbildung in den kleinen Ländern Europas mehr Aufmerksamkeit gewinnen. Die kleinen Länder wurden in seinen Augen zugunsten der großen Länder im atlantischen Raum viel zu sehr vernachlässigt, obwohl die Nationsbildung in den kleinen Ländern in der Regel anders verlief und die Geschichte der Nationsbildung in Europa ohne die kleinen Länder ein Torso bliebe.

Der vorliegende Band enthält vor allem Publikationen aus den 1990er Jahren bis 2004, also aus der Zeit nach dem Zusammenbruch des sowjetischen Imperiums. Alle Aufsätze sind in der Form der

Originalpublikation wieder abgedruckt, also nicht überarbeitet. Sie spiegeln die enormen Chancen wieder, die sich für vergleichende Historiker des östlichen Europa nach dem Fall der Mauer eröffneten. Davor waren die Möglichkeiten der internationalen Publikation für Hroch weit schlechter. Obwohl er schon seit den 1960er Jahren über das Thema der kleinen Nationen in Europa vergleichend forschte, konnte er erst zwanzig Jahre später seine Ergebnisse in Englisch publizieren.[1] Der vorliegende Band spiegelt auch eine besondere thematische Herausforderung an einen ostmitteleuropäischen Historiker in Europa nach dem Fall der Mauer wider: die Debatte über den neuen Nationalismus im östlichen Europa. Gleichzeitig ergänzt der Band eine erfolgreiche Synthese zur Geschichte der Nationen in Europa, die Hroch 2005 veröffentlichte.[2]

Das Band beginnt mit einem Vorwort, das als Leitfaden durch den Band dienen kann. Es enthält drei aufschlussreiche Einschätzungen des Autors.

Hroch sieht sich erstens selbst in hohem Maß als Historiker des sozialen Wandels in der frühen Neuzeit und bedauert, dass er das Bild des reinen Nationenhistorikers mit dem vorliegenden Band nicht korrigieren kann, weil er zu diesem Thema primär in Tschechisch, kaum in Englisch veröffentlichte.

Darüber hinaus lehnt Hroch im Vorwort den Begriff des Nationalismus vehement ab, auch wenn er ihn im Titel des Bandes verwendet und sich ein ganzer Block von vier Beiträge mit diesem Thema befasst. Hroch fühlt sich, wie er schreibt, in dieser Abwehrhaltung gegen den Begriff des Nationalismus in einer Minderheitsposition, fast als Einzelkämpfer. Der Grund für seine Ablehnung: Er bekämpft im Nationalismusbegriff die Vorstellung von einem Übergewicht von mentalen Faktoren in der Entwicklung von Nationen. Er lehnt das strikt ab und sieht die Entwicklung der Nation vor allem von sozialen und wirtschaftlichen Faktoren bestimmt. Er präsentiert daher in zwei Beiträgen auch seine Skepsis gegenüber den Nationalismustheorien Eugen Lembergs und Roman Szporluks und wendet sich energisch gegen die These westlicher Intellektueller von einer Wiederkehr des Nationalismus nach dem Zusammenbruch des sowjetischen Imperiums, gegen die „Gefrierschrankthese", wonach der Nationalismus mit den kommunistischen Machtübernahmen eingefroren und nach 1989 aus dem mentalen Dauerfrost wieder aufgetaut worden wäre.

Auch die Position Hrochs als vergleichender Historiker wird im Vorwort deutlich. In einer knappen, konzisen Skizze der verschiedenen Zugänge zum historischen Vergleich setzt er seine Prioritäten. Es geht ihm anders als vielen Historikern beim Vergleich nicht nur um Unterschiede, sondern auch um Ähnlichkeiten. Ohne diese Priorität hätte er sein generalisierendes Konzept der drei genannten Stufen der Nationsbildung in kleinen Ländern sicher nicht entwickelt. Darüber hinaus misst er den historischen Typologien eine sehr hohe Bedeutung zu. Sie haben für ihn einen höheren Wert als die bloße Suche nach Ähnlichkeiten und Unterschieden. Auch darin unterscheidet er sich von der Mehrzahl der Historiker, die sich auf den Vergleich von *zwei* Ländern, Regionen oder Orte konzentrieren. Typologien dagegen sind nur sinnvoll, wenn man mehrere Länder, Regionen oder Orte vergleicht. Schließlich sieht Hroch auch den Vergleich ähnlicher

Phänomene zu *verschiedenen* Zeitpunkten für besonders wichtig. Damit ist für ihn nicht unbedingt die gemeinsame Epoche der grundlegende Maßstab des Vergleichs, sondern eher ein Konzept des Wandels, der in ganz verschiedenen Epochen in ähnlicher Weise stattfinden kann.

Der erste Teil des Bandes enthält acht Aufsätze zu den nationalen Bewegungen, vor allem zur tschechischen, auch zur zionistischen nationalen Bewegung, daneben auch zu reinen Minderheiten, die nie einen Nationalstaat anstrebten. Der zweite Teil des Bandes setzt sich in vier Aufsätzen mit Nationalismuskonzepten und Nationalismusdebatten auseinander. Der dritte Teil enthält Aufsätze über nationale Mythen und nationale Geschichtsschreibung, auch ein Aufsatz über die Europadebatten in Tschechien. Im vierten Teil verlässt Hroch dann das Thema der nationalen Bewegungen und befasst sich in vier Aufsätzen mit sozialem Wandel. Zwei Aufsätze befassen sich mit der Geschichte der europäischen Revolutionen seit 1789, zwei Aufsätze mit wirtschaftsgeschichtlichen Themen, mit Handelsverflechtungen zwischen Ost- uns Westeuropa im 16. und 17. Jahrhundert und mit der ungleichen wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung in Europa. Der Band ist für ein internationales Publikum zusammengestellt. Er enthält vor allem die englischsprachigen Aufsätze Hrochs, einige wenige Aufsätze in Deutsch und Französisch. Die tschechischen Aufsätze von Hroch sind nicht enthalten.

Hroch nimmt in den derzeitigen historischen Forschungen zur Nation eine besondere Rolle ein. Das vorliegende Buch kann nicht alles leisten. Man würde seine Aufsätze sicher überfordern, wenn man von ihnen eine ausführliche Stellungnah-

me zum aktuellen Verhältnis von Nation und europäischer Integration erwartete. Hroch behandelt zwar in einem Aufsatz die Debatte über Europa in der tschechischen nationalen Bewegung, geht aber nur bis zur frühen Nachkriegszeit nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg, also bevor die supranationale europäische Integration durchgesetzt wurde. Wie sich mit der Entstehung der europäischen Union die europäischen Nationalstaaten und die nationalen Identitäten veränderten, ist nicht das Thema des Buches, vielleicht auch weil der Beitritt Tschechiens zu neu ist. Das Buch Hrochs unterscheidet sich auch von den Zielen des großen vergleichenden Projekts zur Historiographie der European Science Foundation, dessen Ergebnisse demnächst von Stefan Berger und Christoph Conrad veröffentlicht werden. Es geht in dem Buch von Hroch darüber hinaus nicht um die in der letzten Zeit von Jürgen Osterhammel, John Darwin, Jörg Leonhardt und anderen aufgeworfene Frage, ob das 19. Jahrhundert in Europa eher ein Zeitalter der Nationen oder eher ein Zeitalter der Imperien war. Schließlich geht es in dem Buch Hrochs auch nicht um die Frage, ob das europäische Konzept der Nation wirklich Teil der Europäisierung der Welt war oder ob darin eines der großen Missverständnisse im welthistorischen Blick der Europäer auf die außereuropäische Welt liegt, wie unlängst Shalini Randeria und Andreas Eckert in einem Band über die jüngste Geschichte Afrikas argumentierten. Die Besonderheit dieses Bandes liegt anderswo: Er diskutiert die Geschichte der Nation in Europa aus dem Blick der kleinen Länder. Er sieht sie aus dem Blick des ostmitteleuropäischen Historikers mit seiner besonderen Position in der Debatte über die

Wiederkehr des Nationalismus nach 1989. Er sieht sie schließlich auch aus der langen Perspektive des Frühneuzeithistorikers, für den Nationalbewusstsein nicht erst im 19. Jahrhundert beginnt. Hroch ist eine sehr wichtige und originelle Historikerstimme in der Debatte über Nationen in Europa.

Anmerkung:

1   Social preconditions of national revival in Europe. A comparative analysis of the social composition of patriotic groups among the smaller European nations, Cambridge UP 1985.
2   Das Europa der Nationen. Die moderne Nationsbildung im europäischen Vergleich, Göttingen, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht 2005, veröffentlicht in der Reihe „Synthesen" des Berliner Kollegs für vergleichende Geschichte Europas.

In seiner Antrittsvorlesung am 2. Dezember 1970 am Collège de France hat Michel Foucault in sehr verdichteter Form die Grundzüge seiner späteren Forschungen entworfen. Am Ende (aber noch vor den Reminiszenzen an seine Lehrer) versuchte er, halb ironisch, der ganzen Unternehmung ein Etikett anzuhängen: „Und nun mögen jene, deren Sprache arm ist und die sich an dem Klang von Wörtern berauschen, sagen, daß das Strukturalismus ist."[1] Die Ironie mochte daher rühren, dass erstens wissenschaftliche Ansätze, Methoden und Perspektiven sich manchmal schwer in einzelne Schubladen stecken lassen und dass zweitens Foucaults Diskursanalyse und -theorie, seine Methoden (oder Darstellungsformen?) der Genealogie und der Archäologie sich doch in wichtigen Punkten von klassischen strukturalistischen, etwa de Saussures, Lévi-Strauss' oder Barthes' unterscheiden. Für die radikale Weiterentwicklung der strukturalistischen Perspektiven seit den Sechzigerjahren wurde vielmehr der Begriff „Poststrukturalismus" geprägt.

Der vorliegende Sammelband bietet eine umfassende und sorgfältige Bestandsaufnahme der poststrukturalistischen Konzepte und Entwicklungen in den vergangenen vierzig Jahren. Die beiden Herausgeber versuchen in ihrer Einleitung, das poststrukturalistische Denken in Abgrenzung zu seinem Vorläufer anhand einer fünffachen „konzeptuellen Blickverschiebung" zu charakterisieren: „(1) zum Spiel der Zeichen und der sich selbst stabilisierenden Logik der Kultur, (2) zu den Mechanismen der Macht und der Hegemonie, (3) zum konstitutiven Außen und den widersprüchlichen kulturellen Mechanismen asymmetrischer Differenzmarkierung, (4) zur Verzeitlichung und historischen Entuniversalisierung, (5) schließlich zur Subjektivation von Körper und Psyche und damit generell zur Materialisierung der Kultur" (S. 13). Oder, wie es Andreas Hetzel in seinem Beitrag zur Religion (als sozialwissenschaftlichem Forschungsfeld) beschreibt: „Der Poststrukturalismus löst den Strukturalismus nicht einfach ab, sondern radikalisiert ihn. Autoren wie Lacan, Foucault und Derrida akzeptieren die Grundüberzeugung der älteren Strukturalisten, daß die Strukturen universal

sind, daß wir Codes folgen, daß nicht das Subjekt spricht und handelt, sondern die Sprache durch es hindurch. Das Subjekt wird im Strukturalismus durch Techniken der Subjektivierung ersetzt. […] Konzepte wie Sprache, Code, Struktur und Subjektivierung werden nun selbst als brüchig, unvollständig und prekär beschrieben" (S. 350). Diese eher abstrakten Definitionsversuche dienen dazu, der „mehr als uneinheitliche[n] Theoriegeschichte des Poststrukturalismus" (Martin Saar, S. 195) eine Kohärenz zu verleihen. Sie bedürfen aber positiver Erläuterungen am Beispiel.

Stephan Moebius, der als Juniorprofessor für Soziologie in Erfurt arbeitet, und Andreas Reckwitz, Professor für Allgemeine Soziologie und Kultursoziologie in Konstanz, haben darauf verzichtet, diese Theoriegeschichte anhand von Einzeldarstellungen der herausragenden Vertreterinnen und Vertreter von Jacques Derrida und Michel Foucault bis Judith Butler, Slavoij Žižek und Bruno Latour durchexerzieren zu lassen. Stattdessen haben sie sich für ein problemorientiertes Vorgehen entschieden. Die „Probleme" sind einerseits sozialwissenschaftliche Grundbegriffe: Gesellschaft, Gemeinschaft, Handlung und Praxis, Subjekt / Identität, Sprache und Diskurs, System, Institution / Organisation, Raum, Macht und Hegemonie, Exklusion, Klasse / Ungleichheit, Geschichte, Zeit und sozialer Wandel, Moderne, Postmoderne. Andererseits, und davon handelt der zweite Teil der Anthologie, geht es um sozialwissenschaftliche Forschungsfelder: Globalisierung, Politik und Regierung, Ökonomie, Recht, Geschlecht und Sexualität, Religion, Literatur, Kunst und Architektur, Medien, Technik / Artefakte,

Konsum, Wissenschaft. Die Leitfrage des ganzen Unternehmens, die sich tatsächlich sehr konsequent durch die einzelnen Beiträge zieht, heißt: „Wie genau verändern sich die sozialwissenschaftlichen Grundbegriffe, und wie verändern sich die Forschungsfelder, wie könnten sie sich verändern, wenn sie sich poststrukturalistisch informieren?", so die Herausgeber (S. 22). Durch diesen Aufbau bietet dieser Band nicht nur einen Überblick über die verschiedenen poststrukturalistischen Konzepte und Perspektiven, sondern er kann auch als Wörterbuch poststrukturalistisch gewendeter sozialwissenschaftlicher Grundbegriffe und Gegenstandsfelder funktionieren.

Den einzelnen Beiträgerinnen und Beiträgern ist es gelungen, den Artikeln untereinander eine gewisse Kohärenz zu verleihen, ohne schematisch zu wirken. In der Regel beginnen sie mit einer kurzen Einleitung, die das Verständnis des jeweiligen Begriffs in den „klassischen" Sozialwissenschaften, etwa einer an Max Weber orientierten Soziologie, erläutert. Im zweiten Schritt beleuchten sie die strukturalistische Brechung oder Dekonstruktion dieses Begriff, um schließlich zur poststrukturalistischen Kritik und Neukonzeption zu kommen. Dass diese radikalere Perspektive keineswegs eine einheitliche ist, demonstrieren sie meistens an drei bis vier einschlägigen poststrukturalistischen Ansätzen und arbeiten ihre Gemeinsamkeiten und Unterschiede heraus. Am Ende eines jeden Beitrags – und das verleiht diesem Buch auch eine sehr praktische Dimension – steht eine Bilanz, die die Leitfrage wieder aufnimmt und darüberhinaus einige noch unbearbeitete Forschungsfelder skizziert. So zum Beispiel Markus Schroer (Darm-

stadt) zum Lemma „Raum. Das Ordnen der Dinge" (S. 141-157): Stellte man sich lange Zeit („seit der Antike") den „Raum als Container" vor, so habe sich inzwischen das Verständnis einer „aktive[n] Entstehung des Raums durch soziale Praxis, Handlungen oder Kommunikationen" durchgesetzt (S. 142). Die Strukturalisten, so Schroer, hätten noch „der weitverbreiteten Idee" nachgegangen, „Raum mit Stagnation und Unbeweglichkeit gleichzusetzen" (ebd.). Seine kleine Geschichte des „zunehmenden Abrückens" von dieser Idee hin zum relationalen Raumverständnis beginnt bei Pierre Bourdieus „sozialem Raum" (wobei er Bourdieu – wie auch andere Autorinnen und Autoren – nur einschränkend als Poststrukturalisten einführt) und führt über Michel Foucaults „Andere Räume" („Heterotopien") hin zu „glatten und gekerbten Räumen" in Gilles Deleuzes und Félix Guattaris physisch-praktischer Dekonstruktion „Tausend Plateaus". An diesen Stationen tauchen immer auch neuere Anschlüsse und Kontexte auf, etwa Martina Löws „Raumsoziologie" oder Bruno Latours Weiterentwicklung des Deleuzeschen Rhizoms zum Netzwerk. Am Ende der Reise aber konstatiert Schroer, freilich etwas zugespitzt: „Noch immer uneingelöst erscheint dagegen das von Foucault skizzierte Programm einer Heterotopologie, ‚die es sich zur Aufgabe machte, in einer bestimmten Gesellschaft diese andersartigen Räume, diese anderen Orte, diesen zugleich mythischen und realen Gegensatz zu dem Raum, in dem wir leben, zu erforschen, zu analysieren, zu beschreiben und zu ‚lesen'". Was spricht dagegen, mit diesem Projekt endlich zu beginnen?" (S. 157).[2] Ein interessanter Befund des Bands ist die Feststellung, dass

sich manche der vorgestellten Grundbegriffe und Forschungsfelder aus verschiedenen Gründen der konstruktivistischen Analyse weitgehend entziehen oder entzogen haben. Ein Beispiel dafür ist die Ökonomie, ein anderes das Recht. Urs Stäheli (Basel) meint, dass die Ökonomie „als Ort des Substantialismus, Essentialismus und kausalen Determinismus" galt und deshalb (?) „lange Zeit keiner eigenen Diskursanalyse oder einer dekonstruktiven Lektüre unterzogen" worden sei. Die Konsequenz: „Erstens bleibt die Analyse des Ökonomischen damit dem Bereich gerade jener ‚essentialistischen' Perspektiven verpflichtet, welche so heftig kritisiert werden; zweitens entsteht dadurch in vielen poststrukturalistischen Analysen eine politizistische Schieflage, die das Ökonomische ins Politische überführt; drittens übersieht eine voreilige Verabschiedung des Ökonomischen oder gar dessen Dämonisierung die immanente Heterogenität ökonomischer Praktiken und Diskurse" (S. 298). Während hier also vielen poststrukturalistisch arbeitenden Wissenschaftlerinnen und Wissenschaftlern ein normativer Überschuss die Augen zu verschließen scheint, sind es, folgt man Rainer Maria Kiesow (Frankfurt/M.) beim Recht interdisziplinäre Berührungsängste, die auf einem „doppelten strukturellen Irrtum" beruhen: „Die Juristen sehen nicht, daß die Poststrukturalisten überwiegend das Recht gar nicht irrationalistisch auflösen, und die Poststrukturalisten sehen überwiegend nicht, daß die Irrationalität des Rechtsdiskurses für Analysten jenseits von Strukturen ein gefundenes Fressen darstellt. Mit anderen Worten: Beim Recht hat der Poststrukturalismus Angst vor der eigenen Courage. Das hängt sicher

mit der laienhaften Vorstellung der Nicht-juristen zusammen, es müsse doch klar aus dem Gesetz ableitbar sein, was Recht sei. Nichts irriger als das." (S. 323) In der Tat: Recht werde durch juristisches (Ver-)Handeln produziert – ein Spiel, aus dem Überschüsse: „Spiele, Teile, Fragmente, Fetzen, Balkanisierung" resultierten (S. 328).

Neben dem Überblick über die poststrukturalistischen Ansätze und Perspektiven und dem lexikalischen Nutzen liegt darin ein dritter Mehrwert der Anthologie: Viele der Beiträge nehmen diese Ansätze kritisch in den Blick und machen darauf aufmerksam, dass auch das postmoderne sozialwissenschaftliche Denken (wenn ich diese Kategorie hier noch einführen darf) modernen Essentialismen verhaftet ist. Darin liegt auch eine gewisse Hoffnung: Anders als in jüngster Zeit gelegentlich behauptet wird, hat sich das poststrukturalistische „Projekt" offenbar noch lange nicht erschöpft.

Anmerkungen

1   M. Foucault, Die Ordnung des Diskurses, Frankfurt a. M. 1991, S. 44.
2   Das Zitat im Zitat stammt aus: M. Foucault, „Von anderen Räumen", in: J. Dünne, S. Günzel, Raumtheorie. Grundlagentexte aus Philosophie und Kulturwissenschaften, Frankfurt a. M. 2006, S. 317-329.

Rezensiert von
Martin C. Wald, Hamburg

Der türkische Rhythmus-Musiker der Titelillustration – dem sog. „Berliner Kostümbuch" von 1764 entnommen – schaut den Betrachter grimmig, ein wenig müde und insgesamt wenig einladend an. Und doch nimmt der Leser den gut ausgestatteten und sorgfältig lektorierten Sammelband, der auf eine Potsdamer Tagung von Mai 2005 zurückgeht, gerne zur Hand. Zwei konzeptionellen Beiträgen folgen elf Fallstudien in weitgehend historisch chronologischer Reihenfolge. Möglicherweise hätte es dem Leser mehr Orientierung gegeben, wenn die Aufsätze stringenter entlang der schillernden Forschungsbegriffe des Titels angeordnet worden wären. Denn drei „Achsen" sind es, um die herum sich in den Augen der Herausgeber die Beiträge gruppieren: Europäische Wahrnehmungen, Interkulturelle Kommunikation und Medienereignisse. Wie in dieser Rezension zu zeigen sein wird, fehlt in diesem (bereits sehr weiten) Spektrum der in den Beiträgen besonders häufig zur Sprache kommende Aspekt der Transnationalität.

„Europäische Wahrnehmungen" verweisen auf den Aspekt der Konstitution des

„Europäischen" als Neuem in Anschauung, Wahrnehmung und Verstehen des Anderen, Fremden. Joachim Eibach (S. 13–73) ergänzt das von Urs Bitterli aufgestellte bipolare Modell von der Wahrnehmung archaischer Völker als „edle Wilde" oder „Barbaren", indem er mit der „Annäherung", der „Abgrenzung" und der „Exotisierung" drei idealtypische Kategorien definiert, in denen sich die Europäer das Fremde aneigneten. Aus seiner Analyse der europäischen Fremdwahrnehmungen von Türken, Chinesen und Schweizern in der Frühen Neuzeit geht hervor, dass sich die Aneignung der Türken (nach abklingender Türkenfurcht) als auch der Chinesen zu Beginn des 18. Jahrhunderts in exotistischer Neugierde äußerte, dann aber gegen Jahrhundertende „dauerhaft ins Negative umkippte" (S. 73). Anders liegt der Fall der Schweiz, die im Großen und Ganzen diesem negativen Verdikt entging und weiterhin als positives Exempel taugte. Seit einer „Sattelzeit" um 1700, in welcher, so Eibach, das Fremde sowohl im Bedrohlichen als auch Vorbildlichen begonnen wurde zu entzaubern, marschierte der Eurozentrismus. Doch weiterhin verglich sich Europa mit Asien; erst im 19. Jahrhundert war es dann jedoch nach einer Formulierung Jürgen Osterhammels „mit sich selbst allein". In einer Reihe von Punkten bestätigt und ergänzt wird Eibach von Sven Trakulhun in einem Aufsatz über die Perzeption des persischen Kriegsherrn Nadir Schah im „aufgeklärten" Europa und von Stephan Theilig, der die Presseberichterstattung über die erste osmanische Gesandtschaft in Berlin 1763/64 auswertet. Trakulhun (S. 229–250) kommt zum Ergebnis, dass Aufstieg und Fall des persischen Usurpators zu dessen Lebzeiten

(Nadir Schah starb 1747) noch als „allgemein-menschliche und daher kulturneutrale Dimension eines Helden" (S. 249) verstanden wurde, während seine Massaker und Willkürhandlungen bald darauf den Niedergang und Verfall Asiens und damit die zivilisatorische Sonderstellung Europas repräsentieren konnten. Theilig (S. 131–160) hebt den „Event-Charakter" (S. 152) hervor, den der Tagesablauf der türkischen Diplomaten in der preußischen Metropole für die Zeitungsleser annahm. Erstaunlich modern – man vergleiche die Gepflogenheiten der heutigen globalen „Gipfelitis" – mutet der regelmäßige Besuch von Manövern, Schulen und Wissenschaftseinrichtungen durch die Türken an. Im Wahrnehmungsfeld zwischen Annäherung und Abgrenzung faszinierte die religiöse Differenz weniger als der fremdartige Habitus der Delegation. Vor diesen unter ständiger medialer Aufmerksamkeit täglich „Coffee, Confect, Confitüren, Erfrischungen" zu sich nehmenden Türken mussten die Europäer eines nicht mehr haben: Angst.

Da Theilig auch türkische Quellen zur Verfügung stehen, werden bei ihm auch Tendenzen der „interkulturellen Kommunikation" im 18. Jahrhundert nachvollziehbar. Darüber hinaus ist in dem Band diese „Achse" unterrepräsentiert. Freilich ist dies bei interkontinentalen Themen aufgrund von Quellenlage und Sprachbarriere auch nicht weiter erstaunlich. Zu nennen bleibt lediglich Hillard von Thiessens Beitrag über konfessionelle Konflikte im Fürstbistum Hildesheim zwischen 1650 und 1750 (S. 101–129), in dem interkulturelle als interkonfessionelle Kommunikation aufgegriffen wird. Freilich ist Thiessens Hauptziel eine skeptische Prüfung der Konfessiona-

lisierungsthese. Das „konfessionell hybride Verhalten" der Hildesheimer beweise sich in Protestanten und Katholiken gemeinsamen alltagsreligiösen und magischen Praktiken. James Lee nutzt in einem Aufsatz über anti-katholische und diese ablösende anti-französische Gedenkpredigten englischer Geistlicher im späten 17. Jahrhundert (S. 161–184) nicht die Chance, dieser „protestantischen Wahrnehmung" eine katholische entgegenzustellen und somit ein interkulturelles Konfliktfeld beschreibbar zu machen.

Stärker ist im Band der Bereich der „Medienereignisse" gewichtet. Der historische Ereignisbegriff ist ja auch deswegen so diffus, weil er nicht unbedingt die das aktuelle Geschehen distribuierenden Medien als „Instrumente der Wirklichkeitskonstruktion" mitbedenkt. Denn Medien, so Sven Trakulhun, „bringen eigenständige Kommunikationszusammenhänge hervor und können selbst Ereignisse generieren, insofern sie Öffentlichkeit(en) schaffen" (S. 233). Auf einer hohen Ebene der theoretischen Reflexion operiert auch der konzeptionelle Beitrag von Thomas Weißbrich und Horst Carl (S. 75–98). Die Autoren zeichnen die frühneuzeitliche Konkurrenz zweier Begriffe von „Medienereignissen" nach. Die Wirkungsabsicht medialer Repräsentationen von höfischem Fest und Zeremoniell entsprach dem des Festes selber: einen lebendigen Gesamteindruck zu geben und den Betrachter – abgestuft nach seinem sozialen Rang – in die Rolle eines Teilnehmers zu versetzen. Der Überführung dieses „Präsenzmediums" in ein publizistisches „Bild- und Textmedium" entsprach ein Wandel in der Auffassung vom Nachrichtenwert eines Ereignisses und somit selbst der Zeiterfahrung: Nicht mehr

die vorhersehbare Repetition von Feierelementen in einem bestimmten Ensemble von Anlässen „machte ein Ereignis", sondern die Qualität des Außerordentlichen und Unerwarteten, die „stets überholbare Aktualität" (S. 88). Diesen Paradigmenwechsel machte sich die Zeitung als Informationsmedium zunehmend zunutze, ohne in der Folge vollständig auf eine „Präsenzsuggestion" verzichten zu können. Welche große Rolle gerade die Bildmedien für die Wirklichkeitskonstruktion spielten, stellt Joachim Rees im Zusammenhang mit der europäischen Entdeckungs- und Expansionsgeschichte in Brasilien dar (S. 251–298). Doch Rees' drei gewählte Fallbeispiele von Bildtypen und Distributionswegen liegen sehr weit auseinander und lassen in ihrer Vereinzelung kaum verallgemeinernde Aussagen über die europäische Aneignung eines fremden Kontinents zu. „Wie das riesige Territorium jenseits des Atlantiks binnen weniger Jahre medial als ein Imaginationsraum konstituiert wurde", kann der Artikel entgegen dem Fazit deshalb nicht darstellen, sicher ist bloß, dass dies geschah. Spannend ist es dennoch zu lesen, dass die europäischen Zeitgenossen der an einen schlafenden Riesen gemahnenden Topographie an der Küste bei Rio de Janeiro eine politische Teleologie einschrieben, oder dass der Franco-Brasilianer Hercule Florence einen wichtigen, heute vergessenen Beitrag zur Frühgeschichte der Photographie leistete, gerade weil ihm dort eine Infrastruktur traditioneller Reproduktionstechnik fehlte. Das intensive Licht, das Florence für sein neuartiges Druckverfahren benötigte, konnte nur die Sonne Brasiliens liefern. Zwei sehr verschiedene Medienereignisse, gleichwohl durch den Nachrichtenwert

des „Katastrophalen" verklammert, nehmen sich die Historiker Matthias Georgi und Rolf Reichardt vor: das Erdbeben von Lissabon 1755 und die europäischen Revolutionen 1848. Die Engländer, so Georgi, interpretierten die Zerstörung der portugiesischen Hauptstadt zunächst als Strafe Gottes für die Katholiken, deuteten sie im Verlauf der Debatte jedoch zunehmend als Warnung an die Engländer im Zeichen heraufziehender Kriegsgefahr um (S. 185–205). Nicht nur die englische Selbstwahrnehmung war dabei religiös geprägt – als Protestanten und auserwähltes Volk Gottes –, auch der „Bedrohungsraum", in dem Katastrophen medial verarbeitet wurden, war christlich definiert und zwischen Sündern, Büßern und Opfern aufgeteilt. Interessanter als Erdbeben in Kairo und Konstantinopel waren deshalb nicht nur Erdbeben in Lima und Lissabon, sondern auch Heuschreckenplagen in Transsylvanien.[1] Die folgende kommunikative Verdichtung in Europa hat Reichardt im Blick, wenn er in vorbildlicher, stets transparenter Weise die Bildberichterstattung der Barrikadenkämpfe in Frankreich und Deutschland im Februar, März und Juni 1848 vergleicht. 1842 / 43 hatten sich kurz hintereinander in London, Paris und Leipzig Illustrierte Zeitungen ge- und damit eine neuartige Bildpresse begründet (S. 339–387). Diese Blätter tauschten ihre Clichés zu Schlüsselereignissen untereinander aus und prägten so in ihren drei Nationen – anders als noch zur Julirevolution 1830 – identische Bilder der Ereignisse. National- traten deshalb hinter Sozialstereotype zurück.

Reichardt misstraut also zu Recht dem Paradigma, im Jahrhundert der modernen Nation müssten Kommunikationsprozesse und Wahrnehmungsmuster ebenfalls nahezu ausschließlich national verfasst gewesen sein. In Wirklichkeit wirkten Vorstellungen vom christlichen Abendland – siehe den Beitrag Georgis –, sondern auch von einer europäischen République des Lettres dauerhaft weiter in Richtung einer stabilen europäischen „Transnationalität" – der durch Titel und Herausgebervorwort „verleugneten vierten Achse" des Sammelbands. Kirill Abrosimov berichtet von einer symptomatischen Arbeitsteilung zweier den Idealen der „empfindsamen Aufklärung" verpflichteten Periodika, dem französischen „Journal étranger", einem öffentlichen Journal, das nur über ausländische Literatur berichten durfte, und der „Correspondance littéraire" Friedrich Melchior Grimms, mit dem nur eine Handvoll aufgeklärter Herrscherpersönlichkeiten in ganz Europa beliefert wurden (S. 207–228). Abrosimov führt den Leser also in ein klassisches Zeitalter europäischer Transnationalität im 18. Jahrhundert. Dabei traten Konzept und Vision einer Sprachgrenzen überschreitenden „Weltliteratur" jedoch in einen problematischen Dualismus „zwischen dem universellen Wirkungsanspruch und dem elitären Selbstverständnis der Trägerschicht" (S. 228). Demgegenüber erscheinen die Ergebnisse Susanne Lachenichts über die transnationalen Dimensionen des Hambacher Fests (S. 319–337) wenig neu oder gar überraschend: Ja, Polen und Franzosen nahmen an der nationalen Feier auf dem Pfälzer Schloss am 27. Mai 1832 teil, und ebenso wurde die Kunde vom Fest in Warschau und Paris vernommen und verbreitet. Der „Völkerfrühling" übte eine europaweite Anziehungskraft aus, der deutsche Nationalismus verbrüderte sich mit den

als verwandt empfundenen Freiheitsbewegungen. Lachenicht transportiert unreflektiert einen Widerspruch: Wie könnte denn das Hambacher Fest ein „nationales Ereignis" gewesen sein, wenn es doch erklärter Wille der Teilnehmer eben dieses Festes gewesen ist, die deutsche Nation (in einem verfassungsgebenden Akt) erst noch zu begründen? Besondere „transnationale" Qualitäten werden gemeinhin auch dem europäischen Judentum zugewiesen, und anhand der Rothschild-Brüder Nathan, Amschel Mayer, Salomon, Jakob (James de) und Carl, die in London, Frankfurt, Wien, Paris und Neapel ansässig wurden, vollzieht Rainer Liedtke (S. 299–318) nach, „inwiefern sich die Mitglieder dieser Familie primär als einer jüdischen Nation zugehörig fühlten oder sich als Angehörige existenter oder im Werden begriffener Nationen betrachteten" (S. 300). Liedtke bezeichnet das nationale Bewusstsein der Rothschilds als letztlich „elektiv": Der Wohnsitz war entscheidend, und darüber hinaus kamen die fünf Rothschilds zu individuell ganz unterschiedlichen Lösungen, wobei der in den Gastgebernationen vorhandene Antisemitismus offenbar nur eine untergeordnete Rolle spielte. Insgesamt seien, etwa in einer zu schreibenden Geschichte der Juden im europäischen Bankgewerbe[2], nationale Loyalitäten relativ unwichtig; zentrale Untersuchungskategorie müsse die Transnationalität sein.

Der insgesamt gelungene Band leidet also letztlich nur unter wenigen schwächeren Beiträgen und unter der nicht immer gegebenen Verbindbarkeit der Aufsätze mit den theoretischen Rahmenkonzepten und untereinander – verstärkt durch fehlende innere Gliederung, die auch den Aspekt der Transnationalität prominenter hätte

herausstellen können. Die orientierendste Lektüre bietet der Aufsatz von Weißbrich/Carl, die interessanteste jener von Theilig, die perspektivenreichste jener von Rees und die befriedigendste jener von Reichardt. Durch den grimmigen osmanischen Musiker des Einbands jedenfalls sollte sich niemand von der Lektüre abschrecken lassen.

Anmerkungen:

1 M. Georgi, Heuschrecken, Erdbeben und Kometen. Naturkatastrophen und Naturwissenschaft in der englischen Öffentlichkeit des 18. Jahrhunderts, München 2009.
2 R. Liedtke: N M Rothschild & Sons. Kommunikationswege im europäischen Bankenwesen im 19. Jahrhundert, Köln 2006.

Thomas Adam, Buying respectability. Philanthropy and urban society in transnational perspective, 1840s to 1930s (= Philanthropic and Nonprofit Studies), Bloomington: Indiana University Press 2009, S. 256.

Rezensiert von
Stefanie Bietz, Leipzig

Mit seiner Veröffentlichung zur Wohltätigkeit und städtischer Gesellschaft in transnationaler Perspektive von 1840 bis 1930 präsentiert Thomas Adam Ergebnisse seiner umfangreichen Forschungen, die in Leipzig vor etwa zehn Jahren ihren Ausgang nahmen und ihn schließlich auch in amerikanische, britische und kanadische Metropolen führten.

Das Phänomen der Wohltätigkeit betrachtet Adam, derzeit Professor an der Universität von Texas in Arlington, über Nationalstaatsgrenzen hinweg und bezieht sich auf das von Michel Espagne und Michael Werner eingeführte Konzept des interkulturellen Transfers, mit dem Phänomene und Ereignisse beschrieben werden können, die von einem räumlichen Ausgangs- zu einem Zielpunkt transferiert werden und dabei meist auch verändert und entsprechend an die abweichenden, neuen Bedingungen angepasst werden. Mit dem Konzept des interkulturellen Transfers werden die veränderte Struktur und der Charakter unterschiedlicher, jedoch für den Austausch offene Gesellschaften beschreibbar. Als zentral erkennt Adam im interkulturellen Austausch wohltätiger Projekte und Ideen die Position der Vermittler und ihrer individuellen Handlungen, die vor allem einen lokalen Bezug zur Heimatstadt aufweisen. Im Anschluss an deutsche Forschungen zur Wohltätigkeit betrachtet er wohltätiges Handeln in Form von Stiften als Bestandteil einer elitären Kultur und in klarer Abgrenzung zum Spenden, das von einer breiteren Bevölkerungsschicht wahrgenommen wurde.

Vor allem die Möglichkeit des Reisens, die sozial privilegierte Stellung, die well-respected career wie auch das Wissen und die Erfahrung der Vermittler und späteren „Wohltäter" sieht Adam als Voraussetzungen für einen gelungenen Transfer von Vorstellungen und Konzepten zum sozialen Wohnungsbau, zur Errichtungen und Etablierung von Krankenhäusern, aber auch von Museen und Bibliotheken. Als Handlungsmotive werden von ihm zum einen Gefühle der Unterlegenheit und Schwäche gegenüber der als anders

und weiter entwickelten Kultur angeführt, zum anderen wirkten das Bemühen nach Anerkennung in der Öffentlichkeit und der Wunsch nach Integration in bereits etablierte Gesellschaftskreise ebenso nachhaltig, um wohltätige Projekte ins Leben zu rufen. In Anlehnung an das Konzept von Thorstein Veblens leisure class deutet Adam die Intentionen der sozialökonomisch privilegierten Gesellschaftskreise im Kontext von Wohltätigkeit vor allem als deren conspicuous consumption (vgl. hierzu S. 6 f.), aber auch als deren Streben nach kultureller wie politischer Macht, wobei Frauen und religiöse Minderheiten bisweilen gegen stärkere Widerstände und Vorurteile bei der Umsetzung und Präsentation ihrer angestrebten Einrichtungen zu kämpfen hatten.

Das Anliegen und die Ergebnisse der Arbeit werden durch den klar strukturierten formalen wie inhaltlichen Aufbau transparent: Einleitend umreißt Adam das Konzept des interkulturellen Transfers und die von ihm herangezogenen Konzepte (Veblen) und ordnet seine Studie allgemein in vorliegende amerikanische, britische und deutsche Forschungsrichtungen zum Phänomen der Wohltätigkeit ein; diese trennt nach Adams Ansicht vor allem das unterschiedliche Verständnis von Stiften und Spenden, wobei er den Anschluss an das deutsche Forschungsverständnis sucht (vgl. hierzu S. 7). Die zwei Teile der Studie gliedern sich in jeweils zwei und drei Kapitel auf, wobei die ersten beiden Kapitel sich schwerpunktmäßig mit dem Transfer von Museums-, Kunst- und Bibliothekskonzepten von deutschen Städten nach New York und Boston wie von dort nach Toronto und anderen amerikanischen Städten beschäftigen und den interkultu-

rellen Austausch von sozialen Wohnungs-
bauunternehmen nachvollziehbar werden
lassen. In den drei Kapitel des zweiten
Teils werden letztendlich die Bedingungen
des Transfers und die Adaption und Ver-
änderung der importierten Vorstellungen
und deren Umsetzung beschrieben und
beispielhaft an einzelnen Kulturvermitt-
lern und ihrer geschaffenen Institutionen
in New York, Boston, Toronto und Leip-
zig vorgeführt. Ein zweiseitig prägnanter
Schluss fasst die Ergebnisse der einzelnen
Kapitel zusammen und ein umfangreiches
Fußnotenverzeichnis mit Anmerkungen
und Literaturverweisen wie auch der Index
zu Personen und Schlagwörtern gibt dem
Leser die Möglichkeit, die Einordnung in
den Forschungskontext klar nachzuvoll-
ziehen und die kulturellen und sozialen
Einrichtungen wie auch ihre häufig ver-
wendeten Abkürzungen nachzuschlagen.
Im Vorfeld der Gründung des Metropoli-
tan Museum of Art (MMA) in den späten
1860ern durch Mitglieder des elitären Uni-
on League Club, bei denen die Grand Tour
durch Europa zum guten Ton gehörte, galt
es die durch Besuche kennen gelernte Vor-
und Nachteile europäischer Kunstmuseen
in Kensington, Berlin, München, Leipzig
oder Dresden zu bedenken. Die von Adam
als Wissensvermittler für das New Yorker
Museum vorgestellten William Cullen
Bryant und George Fiske Comfort stellten
ihre Erfahrungen und Vorstellungen, vor
den New Yorker Eliten vor. Die entstan-
dene Organisationsstruktur dieser neuen
kulturellen Institution wies schließlich
Merkmale von deutschen Kunstvereinen
und von den sozialen Klubs in New York
auf. Hingegen war die von Comfort an-
gestrebte Verbindung von Museum und
Universität, die den unterrichtenden Cha-

rakter des MMA herausstellte, deutlich
stärker als in deutschen Museen präsent.
Wie Adam nachweist, wurde das MMA
zum Vorbild für zahlreiche Museumsgrün-
dungen in den USA und Kanada. Der in
New York tätige kanadische Bankier Byron
Edmund Walker besuchte nicht nur regel-
mäßig die Ausstellungen des MMA, um
sein empfundenes Bildungsdefizit zu behe-
ben, sondern verfolgte auch die durch die
New Yorker leisure class forcierte Grün-
dung des MMA und deren städtische und
staatliche Unterstützung und versuchte,
ein ähnliches Konzept um 1900 zusam-
men mit der reichen Elite Torontos zur
Gründung der Art Gallery of Ontario und
des Royal Ontario Museums zu etablieren.
Wie Adam betont, nahmen im Gegensatz
zu New York und Leipzig auch zahlreiche
Künstler in Toronto Einfluss auf die Grün-
dung und die Etablierung der Kunstgalerie.
Auch im Fall der public library in Boston
riefen engagierte alteingesessene Bostoner,
wie George Ticknor, die beeindruckt von
Bibliotheken in Dresden und Göttingen,
oder der öffentlichen New Yorker Biblio-
thek eines John Jacob Astors ein prestige-
trächtiges Gegengewicht bieten wollten,
eine Bibliothek für die Allgemeinheit in
ihrer Heimatstadt ins Leben.
Nach 1900 professionalisierte sich die Be-
sichtigung und Einschätzung von Museen
und Bibliotheken und angesichts des Aus-
baus der Museumslandschaft in den USA
entwickelte sich ein zunehmendes Inte-
resse, diese zu begutachten und die ent-
deckten Vorteile für europäische Museen
umzusetzen. Adam führt u. a. das Beispiel
von Adolf Bernhard Meyer an, dem Direk-
tor des Königlichen zoologischen, anthro-
pologischen und ethnographischen Muse-
um in Dresden (vgl. hierzu S. 26-31).

Dass Philanthropen, aus Gründen der Erinnerung und um ihre Ideen in der Öffentlichkeit zu manifestieren, Stiftungen, Schenkungen oder Museumsgründungen und Krankenhäuser finanzierten, stellte Adam sowohl für Männer und Frauen der Elite fest. Philanthropische Projekte dienten nicht selten dazu, eine kulturelle Macht parallel zur politisch ausgeübten Macht zu begründen oder wie im Fall der alten Elite Bostens als Ausgleich zum verlorenen politischen Einfluss an die irisch katholische Minderheit zu wirken. Obgleich Wohltätigkeit einen zentralen Platz im Wertesystem der Eliten einnahm, führte der Streit, wie Adam belegt, um einzelne Projekte und um die Einflussnahme in Kuratorien in New York und Leipzig zu verschiedenen philanthropischen Kulturen (Vgl. hierzu insb. Kapitel 3). Frauen und Juden nahmen mit unterschiedlichem Umfang an der Förderung sozialer und kultureller Einrichtungen teil, so waren sie in Leipzig relativ stark in Kuratorien vertreten und an wohltätigen Projekten beteiligt. Juden sahen in der Wohltätigkeit einen Wert, der ihnen ihre Integration in die christlich dominierte städtische Gesellschaft auf beiden Seiten des Atlantiks ermöglichen konnte. Frauen waren häufig wie beispielsweise Therese Rossbach in Leipzig oder Sarah Warren in Toronto in die verschiedensten Pläne involviert, die sie im Einklang mit dem viktorianischen Denken u. a. zur Pflege von Armen durchsetzten und dabei auch in Positionen kamen, in denen sie in der städtischen Gesellschaft merkbaren Einfluss nahmen. Diesen jedoch auch als emanzipatorischen Schritt zu beschreiben, wie Adam vorsichtig andeutet, ist ambivalent, zumal sich die Kultur der Wohltätigkeit zugunsten des Handlungsspielraumes von Frauen zwar verändert, aber immer im gemeinsamen Wertesystem der städtischen Eliten verankert bleibt und dieses sogar zu festigen scheint. (Vgl. hierzu die Kapitel 4 und 5). Die gut lesbare Studie Adams überzeugt formal und inhaltlich und durch die beispielhaft vorgestellten „Wohltäter" und ihre interkulturellen Vernetzungen gewinnt die Arbeit an Erzählfluss, der durch Rückbezüge und Widerholungen nur selten unterbrochen wird. Unabhängig vom amerikanischen Begriffsverständnis drängt sich, angesichts der Ausführungen Adams, letztendlich doch die Frage auf, warum das Engagement dieser sozial privilegierten Kulturvermittler als philanthropisch bzw. wohltätig bezeichnet wird, tritt doch altruistisch motiviertes Handeln deutlich in den Hintergrund.

Heinz-Gerhard Haupt / Cornelius Torp (Hrsg.): Die Konsumgesellschaft in Deutschland 1890–1990. Ein Handbuch, Frankfurt a. M. / New York: Campus 2009, 504 S.

Rezensiert von
Manuel Schramm, Chemnitz

Die konsumgeschichtliche Forschung in Deutschland hat in den vergangenen Jahren enorm an Breite und Tiefe gewonnen. Waren es noch vor zehn Jahren im Gegensatz zu Großbritannien oder den USA nur eine Hand voll Forscher/innen, die sich mit entsprechenden Themen beschäftigten, so sind allein in dem vorliegenden Sammelband 25 Autor/innen vertreten,

die unterschiedliche Aspekte der deutschen Konsumgeschichte kompetent beleuchten. Der Band ist als Handbuch gedacht, also in erster Linie für Studierende oder Forscher/innen aus anderen Forschungsfeldern. Der selbst gestellte Anspruch, die deutsche Konsumgeschichte des 20. Jahrhunderts überblicksartig zusammenzufassen, ist durch die Breite der behandelten Themen und die Gewinnung fachkundiger Autor/innen überzeugend eingelöst worden. Allein die Einleitung der beiden Herausgeber bleibt doch etwas dünn. Wer hier weiterführende konzeptionelle Überlegungen sucht, wird enttäuscht werden. Selbst die Definition von Konsum als „Befriedigung eines Bedarfs" (S. 12) bleibt hinter dem Diskussionsstand zurück.

Die Beiträge selbst können hier nicht im Einzelnen diskutiert werden. Sie bewegen sich alle auf einem hohen Niveau. Von den Herausgebern sind sie in vier Rubriken eingeteilt worden: Wirtschaft, soziale Lagen und Identitäten, Politik sowie Kultur und Wissenschaft. Die Gliederung entspricht dem bekannten Schema der Bielefelder Gesellschaftsgeschichte, zu dem sich die Herausgeber im Vorwort bekennen. Sie wirkt aber in Bezug auf den Konsum doch etwas aufgesetzt. So behandeln viele Beiträge in der Abteilung Wirtschaft auch kulturelle Fragen und umgekehrt. Die Geschichte der Werbung wird gleich zweimal abgehandelt, einmal von der wirtschaftlichen (Peter Borscheid), einmal von der kulturellen Seite her (Alexander Schug). Insgesamt drängt sich der Eindruck auf, dass hier eine Chance vertan wurde, weil das die traditionellen subdisziplinären Grenzen sprengende Potential der Konsumgeschichte verkannt wurde.

Der relativ enge zeitliche wie geographische Rahmen trägt zur Homogenität des Bandes bei. Der Preis dafür ist allerdings die Ausblendung der Diskussion über frühneuzeitliche Wurzeln des modernen Konsums. Lobenswert ist, dass unter Deutschland nach 1945 nicht nur die Bundesrepublik, sondern auch die DDR gebührende Berücksichtigung findet. Die transnationale Perspektive fehlt nicht völlig, sie wird in zwei Beiträgen zur Amerikanisierung (Adelheid von Saldern und Axel Schildt) sowie zu Ethnizität (Maren Möhring) behandelt. Dennoch fragt sich der Leser an manchen Stellen, welche der geschilderten Entwicklungen denn typisch deutsch und welche allgemeiner Natur sind.

Insgesamt ist das Buch sehr zu empfehlen, besonders als Einstieg in die Thematik. Dass den Spezialist/innen vieles bereits bekannt ist, bleibt da nicht aus, ist aber kein Manko. Interessante Beiträge, die neue Perspektiven eröffnen, sind (aus zugegebenermaßen subjektiver Sicht des Rezensenten) diejenigen von Michael Prinz über konsumgesellschaftliche Leitbilder in der westdeutschen Nachkriegszeit und von Jakob Tanner über Konsum in den Wirtschaftswissenschaften, der allerdings für Studierende ein harter Brocken sein dürfte.

Sören Urbansky: Kolonialer Wettstreit. Russland, China, Japan und die Ostchinesische Eisenbahn (= Globalgeschichte, Bd. 4), Frankfurt/Main: Campus Verlag, 2008, 260 S.

Rezensiert von
Ingrid Schierle, Moskau

Mit der Studie des Kulturwissenschaftlers und Historikers Sören Urbansky liegt erstmalig eine Gesamtdarstellung der Geschichte der Ostchinesischen Eisenbahn (OCE) in deutscher Sprache vor. Ein „Stück Regional- und Weltgeschichte" hat Sören Urbansky in seiner Untersuchung zur exterritorialen Verlängerung der Transsibirischen Bahn geschrieben. Diese durchquerte Chinas Nordosten in Gestalt eines „T" auf der Ost-West-Achse Richtung Vladivostok und in Nord-Süd-Richtung von Harbin nach Dairen (Dalnij). Urbansky analysiert die Ostchinesische Bahn als Instrument im kolonialen Wettstreit Russlands und Japans um die Mandschurei, einer in westlichen Medien zu Anfang des 20. Jahrhunderts oft als „Balkan des Ostens" betitelten Region (S. 14).

Urbanskys Untersuchung basiert auf einer an der Europa-Universität Viadrina Frankfurt (Oder) entstandenen Magisterarbeit. Sie reiht sich ein in das neue Forschungsfeld der russischen Eisenbahngeschichte mit laufenden Projekten wie Frithjof Benjamin Schenks Studie „Das Russländische Reich und die Eisenbahn: Mobilität und sozialer Raum im langen 19. Jahrhundert" oder wie Walter Sperling gerade

abgeschlossene Dissertation „Eisenbahn als politischer Diskurs in Russland 1850–1917". Der Schwerpunkt der Studie liegt – im Unterschied zu anderen Arbeiten über die OCE[1]– auf der raumproduzierenden Funktion der Bahn, d.h. der Autor untersucht die Technik der Moderne als Instrument der sozialen und kulturellen Neuordnung von Räumen.[2]

Im Mittelpunkt der Untersuchung stehen die verschiedenen Funktionen der Bahn von ihrer Projektierung im ausgehenden Zarenreich und dem Baubeginn 1897 bis zu ihrer Übergabe 1952 durch die Sowjetunion an China. Die Ostchinesische Bahn stellte das wichtigste Verkehrs-, Kommunikations- und Eroberungsmittel, den „zentralen Motor der Entwicklung einer aufstrebenden Region" dar (S. 19). In wechselnden Etappen fungierte die OCE als Kolonial,- Kriegs- und Flüchtlingsbahn. Die Geschichte des Eisenbahnbaus in der umkämpften Region beschreibt Urbansky als „globale Unternehmung", als „Eisenbahnimperialismus" mit der Folge, dass die Region an der Peripherie zum „Hauptschauplatz des Eisenbahnbaus" in China werden sollte (S. 16).

Die beiden im Vergleich zu den europäischen Großmächten verspätet in den kolonialen Wettbewerb eintretenden Staaten Russland und Japan standen sich seit der Jahrhundertwende in der Mandschurei als Konkurrenten um den Einfluss in der geostrategisch wichtigen Region gegenüber. Sieger in diesem „Wettstreit", so das Fazit des Autors, war aber China. Denn die Eisenbahn ermöglichte maßgeblich die chinesische Besiedlung des Gebiets. Ca. 500.000 Wanderarbeiter und Migranten strömten jährlich vor allem aus dem Norden Chinas in die dünn besiedel-

te Mandschurei. Die chinesischen Behörden setzten verbilligte Tarife für Arbeitssuchende in der Mandschurei auf allen Eisenbahnlinien durch. Das japanische Siedlungsprogramm zeigte dagegen nur Teilerfolge in den Städten. Auch eine dauerhafte russische Kolonisation blieb aus. Abgesehen von Harbin, dem Zentrum der exilrussischen Emigration, kam es zu keiner massenhaften Ansiedlung von Migranten aus dem Russländischen Reich.

Das Buch ist chronologisch in fünf Teile gegliedert, ein Epilog beschreibt die Ostchinabahn der Gegenwart.

„Konstruktion und Dekonstruktion" betitelt Urbansky das erste Kapitel. Von der „friedfertigen ökonomischen Durchdringung Chinas" hatte der russische Finanzminister Sergej Vitte im Zusammenhang mit der Projektierung der Bahn und dem Ziel der Schaffung einer Landbrücke zwischen dem europäischen Teil des Imperiums und dem Fernen Osten und damit eisfreien Häfen am Pazifik gesprochen. Finanziert durch französisches Kapital der Russisch-Chinesischen Bank entstand die Ostchinesische Bahn. 1903 setzte der reguläre Schienenverkehr ein. Gegen diese exterritoriale Bahn regte sich noch vor Inbetriebnahme Widerstand. „Boxer und andere Saboteure" (S. 48) bekämpften um die Jahrhundertwende die Bahn als Fremdkörper. Dies hatte zur Folge, dass Russland weiterhin Truppen zum Schutz der Eisenbahn stationierte, was die Exterritorialität des „entfremdeten Streifens" noch verstärkte (S. 51).

Im Kapitel „Traum und Wirklichkeit" beschreibt Urbansky die Bahn in ihren Anfangsjahren, beginnend mit dem Russisch-Japanischen Krieg 1904–1905, der die große strategische Bedeutung der Bahn

zeigte und mit der Niederlage Russlands endete. Japans Sieg in diesem „Eisenbahnkrieg" hatte den Verlust des Südarms der Ostchinesischen Bahn für Russland zur Folge. Diesen 700 Kilometer langen Streckenabschnitt übernahm die von Japan gegründete Südmandschurische Eisenbahngesellschaft. Die Einflusssphären wurden nun geteilt zwischen Japan und Russland. Im Ersten Weltkrieg und im Bürgerkrieg diente die Bahn als Fluchtader und transportierte Hunderttausende von Menschen, die vor den Bolševiki flohen. Harbin, am Knotenpunkt der Eisenbahnlinien gelegen, entwickelte sich zum Zentrum der Weißen Emigration.

„Neue Meister, neue Ziele" betitelt Urbansky die Abschnitte, in denen es um die Übernahme der Bahn in die Hände der neuen sowjetischen Machthaber und um die Zeit der sowjetisch-chinesischen Bahnverwaltung geht. Nach der Oktoberrevolution blieben die Kontrollverhältnisse lange ungeklärt. Das exilrussische Bahnmanagement war auf sich alleine gestellt. 1924 erfolgte der Abschluss von chinesisch-sowjetischen Paritätsverträgen, die die Zukunft der OCE regeln sollten. Die sowjetische Bahnverwaltung suchte den exilrussischen Einfluss zurückzudrängen. Ein Erlass von 1925 verfügte die Kündigung von allen Bahnangestellten, die weder die chinesische noch die sowjetische Staatsbürgerschaft besaßen. Gegen den Protest der chinesischen Seite erfolgte die Entlassung von über hundert Exilanten aus dem Russländischen Reich. Die „Liaison der Notwendigkeit" zwischen dem sowjetischen und dem chinesischen Bahnmanagement war von Anfang von Spannungen geprägt. Die Auseinandersetzungen erreichten ihren Höhepunkt 1929, als die chinesische

Nationalregierung auf ihrer Forderung nach Übernahme der Bahn bestand. Es kam zum offenen Konflikt, sowjetische Truppen drangen in die Mandschurei ein. Die Beilegung des Konflikts war schon ohne große Bedeutung. Längst hatte sich das Mächtegleichgewicht zugunsten der „Ordnungsmacht" Japan verschoben.

Wie Urbansky im letzten Kapitel zu „Japans Eisenbahnimperialismus" darlegt, war Japan mit seiner Südmandschurischen Eisenbahngesellschaft erfolgreicher in der ökonomischen Durchdringung des Raumes als das Russländische Reich. 1932 besetzten japanische Truppen die Mandschurei, der japanische Vasallenstaat Mandschukuo wurde eingerichtet. 1935 verkaufte die Sowjetunion unter Protest der chinesischen Nationalregierung ihre Konzessionsanteile an Japan. Der neue japanische Zug „Asia" demonstrierte den Machtwechsel in der Mandschurei und zeigte die Überlegenheit neuer Eisenbahntechnik und die Eleganz neuer Waggonausstattung.

Nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg kam es noch zu einer kurzen Phase sowjetisch-chinesischer Kooperation in der Eisenbahnverwaltung. Die Ostchinesische Bahn wurde zum Symbol der sowjetisch-chinesischen Völkerfreundschaft bevor sie 1952, dem zwischen Mao und Stalin ausgehandelten Grundlagenvertrag von 1950 gemäß, endgültig an die Volksrepublik China übergeben wurde.

Die vielfältigen Perspektiven, unter denen Urbansky die Geschichte der Ostchinesischen Bahn entwickelt, beeindrucken und machen das Buch zu einer spannenden Lektüre. In dieser Herangehensweise liegt gleichzeitig aber auch die Schwäche der Untersuchung. Die Ausführungen zur Globalgeschichte und zur raumprodu-

zierenden Funktion der Ostchinesischen Bahn hätte man sich ausführlicher und stärker auf die Eisenbahngeschichte bezogen gewünscht. Nicht immer gelingt es, wie von Karl Schlögel im Vorwort angekündigt, eine Fokussierung auf die verschiedenen Funktionen der Bahn herauszuarbeiten.

Auch der Widerstand gegen den Bau der Bahn hätte ausführlicher analysiert werden können. Über weite Strecken dominieren in der Darstellung die Berichte und Schlagzeilen russischer, westeuropäischer oder auch amerikanischer Reisender oder Journalisten, ohne dass diese als Quellen diskutiert würden. Unwillkürlich entsteht der Eindruck, dass es auch lohnend gewesen wäre, die Geschichte der Bahn als Medienereignis zu untersuchen. Problematisch sind zum Teil die Bildunterschriften, so wenn z. B. anstatt von Weißen von „weißrussischen" Arbeitern die Rede ist (S. 110, Abb. 9), oder wenn unklar bleibt, welche Perspektiven und Kategorien angelegt werden bei Aussagen wie: „Die Methoden, mit denen auch das Russische Reich versucht, die Übergriffe der Gesetzlosen einzudämmen, sind nicht die eines zivilisierten Staats" (S. 65, Abb. 7).

Trotz dieser Schwächen ist dem Autor eine umfassende auf breiter Quellenbasis geschriebene Geschichte der Ostchinesischen Bahn gelungen, die belegt, dass die Kontrolle über die Bahn „der Schlüssel zur Macht in der Region" war (S. 133) und dass die Geschichte der Mandschurei „erfahrbar" ist (S. 190).

Anmerkungen:

1   Vgl. D. Wolff, To the Harbin Station. The Liberal Alternative in Russian Manchuria, 1898–1914, Stanford 1999; F. Patrikeev, Russian Po-

litics in Exile. The Northeast Asian Balance of Power, 1924–1931, Basingstoke 2002.

2   Zum spatial turn vgl. F. B. Schenk, Das Paradigma des Raumes in der Osteuropäischen Geschichte, in: zeitenblicke 6 (2007), Nr. 2 [24.12.2007], URL: http:// www.zeitenblicke. de/2007/2/schenk/index_html, URN: urn: nbn: de:0009-9-12362.

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