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Global and European Studies Institute
Universität Leipzig
Emil-Fuchs-Str. 1
D–04105 Leipzig

Tel.: +49 / (0)341 / 97 30 230
Fax.: +49 / (0)341 / 960 52 61
E-Mail: comparativ@uni-leipzig.de
Internet: www.uni-leipzig.de/comparativ/

Redaktionssekretärin: Katja Naumann
[\(knaumann@uni-leipzig.de\)](mailto:knaumann@uni-leipzig.de)

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Entangled Histories: Reflecting on Concepts of Coloniality and Postcoloniality

Ed. by
Angelika Epple, Olaf Kaltmeier and Ulrike Lindner



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Introduction

Angelika Epple / Ulrike Lindner

Almost all societies and cultures around the world are profoundly shaped by colonial and postcolonial experiences. Even though these are ubiquitous and interlinked phenomena – and in this sense globally shared – they are always cause and effect of power relations within an asymmetric world order. For far too long, (post-) colonial experiences have been analysed within a binary analytical framework dividing the world into ‘the colonisers’ and ‘the colonised’ or into ‘the West and the rest’.¹ Apart from countless doubts and criticism about its explanatory power, such a simplifying model also hid existing continuities in colonial cultures, structures, and legacies before and after independence. Fortunately, the concepts of coloniality and postcoloniality have come to the fore in different academic contexts.² Furthermore, during the last decades, different understandings of (post-) coloniality have been elaborated in the historiographies of South Asia, Latin America, and Africa.

Without neglecting their internal differences and difficulties, we are confident that the concepts of ‘(post-) coloniality’ can provide us with a better understanding of colonial and postcolonial experiences. Most importantly, coloniality and postcoloniality do not necessarily refer to a bounded time period, a given world region, or a specific system of

- 1 S. Hall, The West and the rest: Discourse and power, in: S. Hall / D. Held / D. Hubert / K. Thompson (eds.), *Moderne: An introduction to modern societies*, Malden, MA 1996, pp. 184–228; S. Conrad / S. Randeria, Einleitung: *Geteilte Geschichten – Europa in einer postkolonialen Welt*, in: idem (eds.), *Jenseits des Eurozentrismus. Postkoloniale Perspektiven in den Geschichts- und Kulturwissenschaften*, Frankfurt am Main/New York 2002, pp. 9–49.
- 2 W. Mignolo, *Local Histories/Global Designs*, Princeton, NJ 2000; G. C. Spivak, A Critique of Postcolonial Reason. Toward a History of the Vanishing Present, Cambridge, MA 1999; A. Dirlir, The Postcolonial Aura: Third World Criticism in the Age of Global Capitalism in: *Critical Inquiry*, 20 (1994), pp. 328–356.

power relations. They rather stress the varieties of entanglements within (post-) colonial societies and cultures. Combining the approaches of coloniality and postcoloniality allows not only an analytical separation of colonial power from actual colonial rule but also a concentration on entangled and connected histories. Besides these common features that shape the concepts of (post-) coloniality, these approaches entail different problems in different settings – problems involving both empirical research and the terms themselves.

The aim of this special issue of *Comparativ*, ‘Entangled Histories: Reflecting on Concepts of Coloniality and Postcoloniality’ is therefore to explore these problems and to examine uses and discourses of (post-) coloniality in different settings from a comparative perspective by addressing general questions and then focusing on various case studies in Africa, Latin America, and South Asia.

In all these regions, we have to deal with different experiences of colonial regimes, with different phases of colonisation and decolonisation, with various forms of colonial/post-colonial governance, and with diverging processes of subjectivation and identity formation.³ These significant differences between (post-) colonial cultures make it all the more interesting to pay special attention to entanglements and their limits on several levels: we discuss the entangled histories of motherlands and colonies, of colonisers and colonised, in various regions and within different empires. We follow these intertwined histories during the process of decolonisation and beyond when new asymmetries and power relations were developed, and we analyse the influence of coloniality in the novel settings. Furthermore, because our special issue addresses such entangled histories in various regions, we are able to offer a comparative outlook on (post-) colonial processes from a global viewpoint. Eventually, on a meta-level, we refer to the entanglements between different conceptualisations of (post-) coloniality.

It is worth noting that the different experiences of colonisation and decolonisation in Africa, Latin America, and South Asia also provoked different understandings of coloniality and postcoloniality as categories of analysis. Generally, in the 1980s, the emerging postcolonial discourse was strongly connected with South Asian subaltern studies and with research on the British Empire, and it was dominated by Anglo-American and South Asian scholars, although research on Africa and its colonial heritage also began to adopt postcolonial approaches. The concept of governmentality, derived from Foucault’s theories, played an important role in this emerging postcolonial discourse, because it seemed to explain how power relations were reproduced within postcolonial subjects.⁴

³ See, as a few examples of the vast literature, C. Marx, *Geschichte Afrikas. Von 1800 bis zur Gegenwart*, Paderborn 2004; A. A. Boahen (ed.), *General History of Africa*, Vol. VII: *Africa under Colonial Domination 1880–1935*, London u. a. 1985; S. Rinke, *Geschichte Lateinamerikas*, München 2010; C. Schmidt-Nowara (ed.), *Interpreting Spanish Colonialism. Empires, Nations, and Legends*, Albuquerque, NM 2005. N. B. Dirks, *Castes of Mind: Colonialism and the Making of Modern India*, Princeton, NJ 2001.

⁴ See, e.g. J. Comaroff, *Body of Power, Spirit of Resistance: The Culture and History of a South African People*, London/Chicago 1985; E. Mbengalack, *La gouvernementalité du sport en Afrique: Le sport et le politique au Cameroun*, Lausanne 1995, see for the US-American context N. Finzsch, *Gouvernementalität, der Moynihan-*

Presumably it was the dominance of the Anglophone context that led to the marginal role of Latin America within postcolonial theory.⁵ However, recent research on the history of Latin America has stressed the persistence of coloniality in the societies of the Latin American states as well as within the concept of Latin America itself.⁶ The early decolonisation at the beginning of the 19th century still left societies heavily imprinted by structures and cultures of coloniality.⁷ Recently, approaches have been taken up to address this deficit.⁸ Here, we try to follow this trend, and we shall combine approaches on coloniality/postcoloniality in Latin American studies with such discussions on Africa and South Asia.

From there, we would like to highlight yet again that neither coloniality nor postcoloniality are necessarily bound to a specific period of (de-)colonisation, even if the term postcolonial was used as such in studies on decolonisation written in the 1960s and 1970s.⁹ Postcolonial analysis can address historical processes during or after the European colonisation starting in the 16th century, but it can also include other periods of time or other regions and universalise the concept of postcoloniality to some degree.¹⁰ When taking the postcolonial approach seriously, one should try to focus on an intertwined, entangled history of Europe and the global South, of colonisers and colonised, thus addressing not a history of isolated entities but rather a history that takes several sides as one complex unit – as various scholars have stressed.¹¹ Postcolonial history should no longer be seen as a history of European influence on the rest of the world or as a history of a serious deficit – of a catching up with European modernisation.¹² In using a postcolonial approach, we try to stress the interactions between the ‘west and the rest’ and to encompass postcolonial formations in their ambivalence and complexity. Furthermore, in a postmodern

Report und die Welfare Queen in Cadillac, in: J. Martschukat, *Geschichte schreiben mit Foucault*, Frankfurt am Main 2002, pp. 257–283, p. 259.

5 M. do Mar Castro Varela/N. Dhawan, *Postkoloniale Theorie. Eine kritische Einführung*, Bielefeld 2005, p. 26.

6 W. Mignolo, *The Idea of Latin America*, Malden, MA 2005.

7 S. Rinke, *Revolutionen in Lateinamerika. Wege in die Unabhängigkeit 1760–1830*, München 2010.

8 M. Morana/E. D. Dussel/C. A. Jáuregui (eds.), *Coloniality at large. Latin America and the Postcolonial Debate*, Durham, NC 2008.

9 B. Ashcroft/G. Griffiths/H. Tiffin, *Post-colonial Studies. The Key Concepts*, London, New York 2005.

10 This happens particularly in research on National Socialism that uses colonialism as a category for analysing German rule in the East, see, e.g., J. Zimmerer, *Kolonialer Genozid? Vom Nutzen und Nachteil einer historischen Kategorie*, in: D. J. Schaller (ed.), *Enteignet – vertrieben – ermordet. Beiträge zur Genozidforschung*, Zürich 2004, pp. 109–128.

11 S. Subrahmanyam, *Connected Histories: Notes towards a Reconfiguration of Early Modern Eurasia*, in: V. Lieberman (ed.), *Beyond Binary Histories. Re-imagining Eurasia to c. 1830*, Ann Arbor, MI 1999, pp. 289–316; S. Randeria, *Geteilte Geschichte und verwobene Moderne*, in: J. Rüsen/H. Leitgeb/N. Jegelka (eds.), *Zukunftsentwürfe. Ideen für eine Kultur der Veränderung*, Frankfurt am Main/New York 2000, pp. 87–96; S. Conrad/S. Randeria, *Einführung: Geteilte Geschichten* (footnote 1); see also the classification of entangled history by F. Hadler/M. Middell, *Auf dem Weg zu einer transnationalen Geschichte Ostmitteleuropas*, in: *Comparativ*, 20 (2010), pp. 8–29.

12 H. K. Bhabha, *The location of culture*, London 1994, p. 173; in the meantime, concepts of postcoloniality are also used to analyse territorial empires and their dependent/half-dependent territories, see A. L. Stoler/C. McGranahan/P. C. Perdue (eds.), *Imperial Formations*, Santa Fe, NM 2007; R. L. Nelson (ed.), *Germans, Poland, and Colonial Expansion to the East. 1850 through the Present*, New York 2009.

sense, we understand the ‘post’ in postcoloniality as an in-depth analysing of the complex arrangements of colonialism and modernity.

Convincingly, postcolonial theory has developed the concept of ‘hybridity’ for the production of new transcultural forms within contact zones shaped by colonisation, trying to point to the ambivalence and the subversive practices within the postcolonial setting. The concept of ‘mimicry’ also hints at problems of identity in (post-) colonial discourse, because the colonised is seen as a ‘blurred copy’, mimicking the language/behaviour of the coloniser, never being far from parody, and thereby producing a certain threat.¹³ Such concepts are particularly valuable when addressing colonised people in colonial settings or in settings of decolonisation and change. People try to negotiate between the cultures of the colonisers and the colonised, assuming many roles and changing the coloniser’s culture by appropriating it. Often these processes continue beyond the break of decolonisation. The concept of hybridity is equally helpful when looking at continuities between colonial and postcolonial productions of identity, of knowledge, or of culture in general.

However, besides continuities and the blurred demarcation lines between the colonial and the postcolonial, the time period after colonisation still signifies a break with old structures of dominance.¹⁴ Do the concepts of (post-)coloniality cover up this shift in power relations by stressing persistence? Can they offer new and convincing interpretations for change and continuity? Or if they go beyond the opposition of the colonial and the postcolonial, are they able to explore new, hybrid forms of governance, knowledge production, and identity formation? The following articles address these questions by exploring how far we can apply concepts of (post-)coloniality to culturally different and complex societies, and how these concepts may help us to compare and understand historical social processes in an entangled world more profoundly. By looking at different (post-) colonial regimes and cultures and at various forms of (post-)colonial governance, we are able to ask whether the historical developments in the different cases are characterized by a persistency of coloniality, by changing forms of coloniality, or by new hybrid formations within (post-)colonial settings, thereby shaping governance as well as cultural productions in a novel way.

To clarify the differences and commonalities between and within various concepts of (post-) coloniality, this issue begins with their contextualisation in the historiography of India, Latin America, and Africa. In their article ‘Reflecting on Concepts of Coloniality/Postcoloniality in Latin American, South Asian and African Historiography’, Olaf Kaltmeier, Ulrike Lindner, and Binu Mailaparambil compare different phases of colonisation and decolonisation in three areas, discuss different approaches towards the writing of a history of colonialism, and elaborate on the respective concepts of (post-) coloniality. They also refer to the entanglements and the telling partitions between these discourses.

13 Bhabha, Location of Culture (footnote 12); Ashcroft/Griffiths/Tiffin, Postcolonial Studies (footnote 9), pp. 139–140.

14 J. Clifford, Diasporas, in: Cultural Anthropology 9 (1994), pp. 302–338, p. 328.

The authors point to the fact that the postcolonial discourse is now being shaped by an international division of intellectual labour, with significant contributions by scholars from India, Africa, and Latin America – an aspect that is often overlooked in the discussion on the historiography of postcolonial theory.

The following articles then go on to perform more detailed analyses based on case studies of three important aspects of (post-) coloniality, namely, colonial/postcolonial governance, (post-) coloniality and knowledge production, as well as (post-) colonial processes of identity formation.

A special emphasis is laid on the comparative discussion of regimes of colonial/postcolonial governance, thus dealing with coloniality as a mode of administration and rule in colonial as well as in postcolonial societies and particularly in the process of decolonisation and its immediate aftermath. Since Edward Said's publication on Orientalism, postcolonial thought has been strongly connected with Foucault's approaches, even though Foucault himself hardly addressed colonialism.¹⁵ We can observe this in, for example, highly sophisticated studies applying Foucault's thoughts on sexuality to the analysis of colonial settings¹⁶ or to the colonial production of knowledge.¹⁷ In particular, his concept of governmentality has been very influential in the discussion on colonial administration. Recently, however, much doubt has been cast upon its suitability. Following this trend, the first two articles in our special issue take a critical look at the Foucauldian concept of governmentality and its use in (post-) colonial discourses and spaces. The articles explicitly address the topic from a South Asian and an African perspective – an approach that has not been elaborated so far and allows a new, comparative outlook on the whole problem of colonial governmentality.

In her contribution 'Colonial Governmentality: Critical Notes from the Perspective of South Asian studies', Nira Wickramasinghe examines the need to contextualise and to complete the concept colonial governmentality by adopting a historically attentive approach to relations of power in colonial situations. The author points out how the use of the grid of colonial governmentality/modernity alone neglects other types of analysis and tempts us to essentialise and read colonialism as a monolithic universal project – thereby ignoring the role of the colonised in effectuating changes in the colonial power systems. She argues that there was no one single colonial situation that calls for a unifying colonial modernity, and points out the importance of observing history from the perspective of the colonised.

Michael Pesek also performs a fundamental criticism of the Foucauldian concept of governmentality in his paper 'Foucault Hardly Came to Africa: Some Notes on Colonial and Postcolonial Governmentality'. He stresses the inadequacy of applying the Foucauldian paradigm of governmentality in analysing the colonial and postcolonial African history.

15 E. W. Said, *Orientalism*, New York 1978.

16 A. L. Stoler, *Race and the Education of Desire. Foucault's 'History of Sexuality' and the Colonial Order of Things*, Durham, NC, London 1995.

17 A. L. Stoler, *Along the archival grain. Epistemic anxieties and colonial common sense*, Princeton, NJ 2009.

In contrast to Foucault's assumption that governmentality is characterised by the accomplishment of a single or at least a dominant political rationality, his article argues that the history of colonial rule cannot be written as a successive enforcement of European political rationalities. He points out that political development did not proceed along straight lines in either Europe or Africa, and that the European interaction with African realities resulted in the formation of a heterogeneous mix of political rationalities. Therefore, Michael Pesek suggests that different stages of colonial penetration in different places resulted in different political rationalities. He also argues that the maintenance of the sovereignty/territoriality nexus depends on the availability of a certain amount of resources to agents of sovereignty such as the state. Thus, the state in Africa, in its colonial and postcolonial form, failed to dominate or even create a political field.

Second, we focus on flows of knowledge and people, on symmetries/asymmetries in these processes, and we examine these in both colonial and postcolonial settings. This relates to the debate on the 'coloniality of knowledge', and power-knowledge complexes. The first case study shows how fruitful a combination of a comparative approach and a history of entanglements can be. In her article on "Resisting Modernisation? Two African Responses to the Kariba Dam Scheme in the Central African Federation", Julia Tischler analyses a telling example of state-driven, so-called modernisation experiments in late-colonial Africa: the Kariba hydroelectric dam built on the border between present-day Zambia and Zimbabwe from 1955 to 1960. The article discusses the ambivalence this 'modernisation' paradigm engendered among the local African leadership. By comparing two different reactions to a colonial regime, Julia Tischler escapes clear-cut labels such as 'resistance' or 'collaboration' while simultaneously denying such dichotomous categories as coloniser/colonised and collaboration/resistance. She shows instead, that colonial positions have to be located in reciprocal and dynamic negotiations between all participants involved, thus creating a hybrid space of the 'in-between'.

How a 'hybridisation' of administrative knowledge and techniques served to combine changes and continuities within the system of coloniality can be seen in Felix Brahm's article on "Techniques éprouvées au cours des siècles": African Students at the Former School for Colonial Administrators in Paris, 1951–1967'. This second case study in the special issue concentrates on how the *Ecole nationale de la France d'outre-mer*, the foremost institute in Paris with a monopoly on training French colonial administrators from the metropole, transformed into an institute for training local bureaucrats for post-colonial African states during the decolonisation period. The author points out that the popularity of this colonial institute among African candidates was mainly due to the fact that postcolonial African states had to be built upon the infrastructures of the former colonial administration, and this, in turn, necessitated a continued transfer of governmental techniques between the colonial and several postcolonial francophone states. The author argues that the changing political atmosphere forced the institute to transform its teaching concept into a hybrid of 'proven' techniques of colonial/metropolitan administration combined with the 'new' techniques for economic and social development that were considered to be crucial for development in postcolonial Africa at that time.

The final article deals with changing identity formations and the sense of belonging in a postcolonial world shaped by the hybrid and transcultural formations of (post-) coloniality. In his article ‘Representations of Emancipation: (Post-)Coloniality and the Zapatista Insurgency in Mexico’, Stephan Scheuzger attempts to critically analyse the problem of applying postcolonial theory in Latin American historical analysis without paying ample attention to the dynamics of historical interactions and transformations. By focusing on the Zapatista insurgency – a Mayan-dominated guerrilla movement – in postcolonial Mexico, he argues that Walter Mignolo broadly reified the concept of ‘colonized subject’ and its culture without giving due attention to the complex pattern of historical interactions involved in such identity formations. He argues that attention also has to be paid to the different temporalities of postcolonial experiences. He points out that the idea of coloniality in Mignolo’s analysis of *zapatismo* privileges is oriented towards the binary logic of an original mutual translation between a homogeneous and self-contained ‘Occidental’ ideological system and Amerindian ways of knowing and representing preserved in traditions over the centuries. It fails to engage in a thorough examination of the complex historical conditions that actually led to this liaison and were the result of long-term permanent interactions between indigenous and non-indigenous social and cultural spheres.

Our special issue is based on a workshop held at Bielefeld University in May 2010 at which we succeeded in bringing together several scholars for exciting discussions on the problems of (post-) coloniality. We would like to thank our authors as well as Eva Bischoff, Ute Schneider, Thoralf Klein, and Sebastian Knake for their contributions to the lively discussions at our conference. We also very much appreciate the financial support of the Bielefeld Graduate School in History and Sociology that made our workshop possible.

Reflecting on Concepts of Coloniality / Postcoloniality in Latin American, South Asian and African Historiography

**Olaf Kaltmeier / Ulrike Lindner /
Binu Mailaparambil**

RESÜMEE

Die Konzepte der Kolonialität / Postkolonialität sind seit den 1980er Jahren in verschiedenen Disziplinen intensiv diskutiert worden. Postkoloniale Theorie hat sich in den Geistes- und Sozialwissenschaften zu einer höchst einflussreichen Denkrichtung entwickelt. Wenig erforscht blieb jedoch ein wichtiger Aspekt dieser Debatten: die signifikanten Unterschiede, aber auch die Überlappungen zwischen den spezifischen Diskursen über Kolonialität / Postkolonialität in Lateinamerika, Indien und Afrika, die hier in den Blick genommen werden. Die unterschiedlichen Historiographien der Kolonialität sind eng verknüpft mit den auch zeitlich divergierenden Erfahrungen von Kolonialismus in den einzelnen Weltregionen. Seit den 1980er Jahren hatte in allen Diskursen die Entwicklung postkolonialer Theorien einen bedeutsamen Einfluss, der eine neue kritische und umfassende Beschäftigung mit Kolonialismus und seinen Auswirkungen anstieß. Die lateinamerikanischen, indischen und afrikanischen Debatten über Kolonialität und Postkolonialität, ihre Unterschiede und ihre gegenseitige Durchdringung lassen sich adäquat nur in Form einer verflochtenen Geschichte der Historiographien darstellen.

During the last decades, concepts of coloniality / postcoloniality have become intensely debated issues in academic research, particularly so in non-European history. Many of the prominent concepts have been highly contested, be it otherness, hybridity or transculturation. However, one aspect that has not gained much attention of the scholarship is the considerable variations in the academic debates on (post)coloniality in different world-regions. The history of discourses and the priorities within the discourses show that the impact of regional characteristics could be quite significant. On the following pages, we thus try to address this lacuna. We will compare the different uses of concepts of (post)coloniality in the academic debates on Latin America, Africa, and Asia, showing

some distinct developments, analysing the state of the art in the discourse on the different regions and looking at the different phases of colonisation and decolonisation in the three areas.

We address coloniality/postcoloniality as interwoven concepts of assessing social dynamics, domination and resistance, socio-cultural formations and regimes of representation. The inclusion of the concept of postcoloniality emphasises the contested state of colonial patterns by highlighting conflictive negotiations and negations, and points at hybridisations and transculturation in cultural contact.

With this comparison, we aim at giving some background for the following papers that deal with coloniality/postcoloniality in many different world regions. In a wider context, we aim at providing some thoughts for an academic interchange without neglecting the differences between the discourses.

The different uses of concepts of (post)coloniality are strongly intertwined with the diverging experiences of colonisation in the three world regions. With regard to Latin America, we stress the point that coloniality lies at the heart of the constitution of the Americas as a geocultural unit. The Spanish conquest initiated a process of colonisation of the whole western hemisphere that can be understood as the largest and deepest project of colonisation in world history. Formal decolonisation started much earlier than in other world regions and this strongly influenced the (post)colonial debates in studies on Latin America. In the South Asian context, the article focuses on India: The colonisation of the Indian Subcontinent started much later than in Latin America, in the second half of the eighteenth century. Here we can observe that Indian academic historiography had its origin in the colonial legacy itself and that various concepts of coloniality were debated and discussed during the long struggle against colonial domination. After the formal decolonisation of India in 1947 the impact of colonisation remained a contested issue in the postcolonial discourse on Indian history, particularly after the emergence of the field of subaltern studies. We can observe a similar development, albeit later, in Africa with its colonial occupation in the second half of the 19th century, which also initiated the beginning of an African academic historiography. Here, the master narrative of a successful colonisation was questioned later and the ongoing decolonisation movement in the 1950s and 1960s was accompanied by research on the effects of modernization, urbanization and industrialisation during decolonisation, leaving the colonial legacy more or less aside.

In all regional debates, the emergence of postcolonial studies in the Anglophone world since the 1980s had a considerable impact, mostly so in Indian historiography with the strong intertwining of subaltern studies and postcolonial approaches and the dominance of the Anglophone discourse in Indian history. Also in African and Latin American historiography postcolonial studies renewed the interest in coloniality with research now addressing (post)coloniality and its impact from different angles; looking at systems of power, at symbolic resources, including also topics such as reproduction or racial boundaries.

Since the discussion on postcoloniality was mainly dominated by the Anglophone world, it often excluded Latin America. In our approach we therefore try to follow Fernando

Coronil's plea he made in a 2008 article titled "Elephants in the Americas? Latin American Postcolonial Studies and Global Decolonization" and to bring together debates on (post)coloniality from Asia, Africa and Latin America.¹ We will also show when and in what ways the discourses overlapped and at what point in the historiographical discourse certain concepts such as subalternity or hybridity were actually addressed. Thus, we hope to reach a more global understanding of the approaches in question.

1. (Post-) Coloniality in the Americas

1.1. America as a Colonial Invention

Coloniality lies at the heart of the constitution of the Americas. It is the Spanish conquest that initiated a process of colonisation of the whole western hemisphere by European powers that can be understood as the largest and deepest project of colonisation in world history. A lot has been written on the political and social history of Latin America under colonialism.² Recently, many scholars have argued that the constitution of America as a geo-cultural unit is the product of the process of European expansion and conquest.³ This is even expressed in the semantics of the continent's name, which goes back to the Italian explorer Amerigo Vespucci. Different indigenous peoples and nations are subsumed under the catch-it-all category 'indio', due to the historic mistake of Cristóbal Colón who thought to be in India.⁴ These aspects illustrate that America is marked by a colonial difference, which stands at the beginning of the Capitalist World-System and as a geo-cultural construction of the West.⁵

Departing from this point of discussion, we see in the context of Latin American postcolonial studies a critical discussion on Edward Said's seminal work on Orientalism. Walter Mignolo argues that the construction of the Orient in the 18th century as the 'Other' was only possible on account of the triumph of Christian Spain in the expulsion of the Moors from the Iberian Peninsula and the conquest of the Americas. Drawing on the

1 F. Coronil, Elephants in the Americas? Latin American Postcolonial Studies and Global Decolonization, in: M. Morana/E. D. Dussel/C. A. Jáuregui (eds.), *Coloniality at Large: Latin America and the Postcolonial Debate*, Durham 2008, pp. 396-416.

2 For example, see: H. Pietschmann, *El Estado y su evolución al principio de la colonización española de América*, México 1989; M. Mörrer (ed.), *Race and Class in Latin America*, New York 1970; M. Burkholder/L. Johnson, *Colonial Latin America*, New York 1998.

3 E. O'Gorman, *The invention of America: An Inquiry into the Historical Nature of the New World and the Meaning of Its History*, Bloomington 1961; J. Rabasa, *Inventing America: Spanish Historiography and the Formation of Eurocentrism*, Oklahoma 1993; and recently, see: W. Mignolo, *The Idea of Latin America*, Malden 2005.

4 C. Büschges, *Die Erfindung des Indianers. Kolonialherrschaft und ethnische Identität im spanischen Amerika*, in: T. Beck/M. Dos Santos Lopes/C. Rödel (eds.), *Barrieren und Zugänge. Die Geschichte der Europäischen Expansion*, Wiesbaden 2004, pp. 193-228.

5 I. Wallerstein, *The Modern World-System: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World-Economy in the Sixteenth Century*, v. I, New York/London 1974. For a perspective that includes also cultural dynamics, see: I. Wallerstein, *Geopolitics and Geoculture: Essays on the Changing World-System*, Cambridge 1991. For an inter-American approach, see: A. Quijano/I. Wallerstein, *Americanity as a Concept, or the Americas in the Imaginary of the Modern World-System*, in: *International Journal of Social Science*, 134 (1992), pp. 549-559.

works of the philosopher Enrique Dussel, he contends that this can be seen as the first – Hispanic and humanist – modernity, while Orientalism appears only in the second phase of modernity associated with the emergence of new centers in the world system and with the beginning of industrialisation.

He summarises:

Orientalism, in other words, was a particular re-articulation of the modern/colonial world system imaginary in its second phase, when Occidentalism, structured and implemented in the Imaginary of Spanish and Portuguese empires, began to fade away.⁶

In Latin America, colonialism constitutes the historical period from the conquest in the ‘long 16th century’ until the early process of independence and the formation of post-colonial republics at the beginning of the 19th century. Nevertheless, many scholars have argued that we can notice in the formal post-colonial societies a persistence of colonial elements like the head tax for indigenous people, forced-labor systems, the *hacienda-dispositif*, slavery, the reservation-system and racial segregation, internal colonialism, as well as the exclusion of the indigenous majority from enjoying political rights.⁷

In order to deal with this colonial *longue durée*, in the recent interdisciplinary discussions in Latin American postcolonial studies a conceptual distinction is made between colonialism as a historic period and coloniality as the enduring weight of colonial elements, values, discourses, and practices in the post-colonial societies. This colonial *longue durée* does not mean that the ongoing power of coloniality can be conceived of as a monolithic, never-changing structure. Instead, we can argue with Mary Louise Pratt that “the ‘colonial legacy’ has been and continues to be renewed and integrated into a changing world through continuing permutations of its signifying powers, administrative practices, and forms of violence”.⁸

1.2. World-System and Ethnic Classification

An often criticised aspect of postcolonial approaches is their supposed negligence of socio-economic structures and inequalities and their over-interpretation of cultural elements. Florencia Mallon puts forth the same argument from the perspective of social history which is one of the most influential historiographical approaches in Latin America.⁹

⁶ W. Mignolo, Local Histories/Global Designs, Princeton 2000, p. 61.

⁷ S. Rivera Cusicanqui, La Raíz: Colonizadores y Colonizados, in: X. Albó / R. Barrios (eds.), Violencias Encubiertas en Bolivia, La Paz 1993, pp. 27-139; M. Thurner, From Two Republics to One Divided: The Contradictions of Post-colonial Nationmaking in Andean Peru, Durham 1997; B. Larson, Trials of Nation Making: Liberalism, Race, and Ethnicity in the Andes, 1810-1910, Cambridge 2004; O. Kaltmeier, Hacienda, Staat und indigene Gemeinschaften: Kolonialität und politisch-kulturelle Grenzverschiebungen von der Unabhängigkeit bis in die Gegenwart, in: H. J. Burchardt / I. Wehr (eds.), Der Verweigerte Sozialvertrag: Politische Partizipation und blockierte soziale Teilhabe in Lateinamerika, Baden-Baden 2010.

⁸ M. L. Pratt, In the Neocolony: Destiny, Destination, and the Traffic Meaning, in: E. Dussel / C. Jáuregui / M. Moraña (eds.), Coloniality at Large, Durham 2008, p. 461.

⁹ For an analytical overview over the debate between J. Beverly, from the Latin American Subaltern Studies Group, and the social historian F. Mallon, see: G. Bustos, Enfoque Subalterno e Historia Latinoamericana: Nación,

Although it is true that postcolonial studies focus more on cultural issues, it is certainly an overstatement to say that they do not take into account socio-economic structures. Latin American thinkers heavily draw on Marxism, Dependence Theory and, especially the World-System-approach.¹⁰ The work of Aníbal Quijano and his concept ‘coloniality of power’ demonstrate how cultural approaches and the World-System Theory can go hand in hand.¹¹ Quijano’s central idea is to see ‘coloniality of power’ as a machine that transforms differences into antagonistic values – modern versus traditional, white versus black. Thus the concept of cultural classification – namely racism – is of supreme importance for the understanding of the formation of the modern world. This ethnic classification is related to the system of exploitation and thus forms an integral part of the Capitalist World-System. Walter Mignolo has expanded the idea of a ‘coloniality of power’ by arguing that coloniality remains ‘the darker side of modernity’ in so far as Renaissance and Enlightenment are conceived of as inherently European dynamics whose entanglement with coloniality is systematically silenced.¹²

1.3. Post-Colonial Spaces and Transcultural Identities

Following the post-structural and constructivist insights of identity-building processes as well as the debate around the spatial turn, postcolonial thinkers questioned the juxtaposition of such homogenized entities as colonisers vs. colonised. Instead, they put an emphasis on hybrid spaces of encounter, as it is expressed in the idea of ‘cultural contact zone’ proposed by Mary Louise Pratt.¹³ With Homi Bhabha and Edward Soja these spaces can be understood as ‘third spaces’ or as spaces-in-between.¹⁴ Concerning the Americas, some authors make use of such indigenous concepts as *nepantla*, which was coined by Nahuatl-speaking people to refer to the space-in-between the Spanish and the Mexican.¹⁵ These ‘third spaces’ generate multiple positionings and new hybrid identities that can be conceptualised with terms like ‘transculturation’, ‘mestizaje’, ‘anthropofagia’, and ‘post-colonial mimicry’. The concept ‘transculturation’ – a concept introduced by the Cuban author Fernando Ortiz¹⁶ – is of particular importance as it has less biological

Subalternidad y Escritura de la Historia en el Debate Mallon-Beverley, in: Fronteras de la Historia, v. 7, Bogotá 2002, pp. 253-276.

- 10 For example, see: F. Coronil, The Magical State: Nature, Money, and Modernity in Venezuela, Chicago 1997; R. Grosfoguel, Developmentalism, Modernity, and Dependency Theory in Latin America, in: E. Dussel / C. Jáuregui / M. Moraña (eds.), Coloniality at Large: Latin America and the Postcolonial Debate, Durham 2008, pp. 307-335; W. Mignolo, Local Histories/Global Designs, Princeton 2000.
- 11 A. Quijano, Colonialidad del Poder, Eurocentrismo y América Latina, in: E. Lander (ed.), Colonialidad del Saber, Eurocentrismo y Ciencias Sociales, CLACSO-UNESCO 2000.
- 12 W. Mignolo, Local Histories/ Global Designs (footnote 10), p. 249; Id., The Darker Side of the Renaissance: Literacy, Territoriality, and Colonisation, Michigan 1995.
- 13 M. L. Pratt, Imperial Eyes: Travel Writing and Transculturation, London / New York 1992.
- 14 H. Bhabha, The Location of Culture, London 1994; E. Soja, Thirdspace: Journeys to Los Angeles and Other Real-and-Imagined Places, Oxford 1996.
- 15 W. Mignolo, Human Understanding and (Latin) American Interests – The Politics and Sensibilities of Geohistorical Locations, in: H. Schwarz / S. Ray (eds.), A Companion to Postcolonial Studies, Oxford 2005, pp.180-202.
- 16 F. Ortiz, Cuban Counterpoint: Tobacco and Sugar, Durham 1995, pp. 96-97.

connotations as such concepts as ‘mestizaje’ or hybridity. These concepts question the hegemonic models of assimilation, or ‘whitening’, that were predominantly in use not only in the 19th century but also in the modernisation and development discourse of the 1960s and 70s.

1.4. Geopolitics of Knowledge

Another topic discussed in the Latin America postcolonial studies is the articulation of coloniality and the production of legitimate knowledge. Mignolo argues that corresponding to the ‘real’ geopolitics, there exists a ‘geopolitics of knowledge’, in which indigenous and other peripheral knowledge and languages are not taken into account.¹⁷ Instead, knowledge about the ‘Other’ is constructed. We can argue that the construction of Western knowledge parts from a singular position – here from a Euro-centric standpoint – that is universalised and presented as the only valid knowledge-system. In order to put into question the existing geopolitics of knowledge it is important to ask for the locus of enunciation of every speaker. In order to go beyond the egocentric construction of knowledge we need, as Walter Mignolo points out, a double critique, that is to say, in an intercultural contact zone we have “to think from both traditions and, at the same time, from neither of them”.¹⁸ This is what he terms ‘epistemologic creolization’ or ‘border thinking’. In this sense, there exists a challenge to think about the modes of a mutual construction of knowledge in the processes of transculturalisation or hybridisation. However, in spite of the usefulness of such an approach, there still remains the question of the articulation of power and knowledge. For example, a German historian who writes in the academic lingua franca has other chances to be heard and to produce academically acknowledged knowledge than a kichwa-speaking indigenous shaman in the Ecuadorian Highlands.

1.5. Decolonising Historiography

This leads postcolonial historians to a project of epistemological decolonisation. Although Gayatri Spivak has postulated that the subaltern has no voice that can be heard in the hegemonic systems of representation, the main purpose of American postcolonial studies is to bring the subaltern back to historical narrations. This aim is explicitly formulated in the founding statement of the ‘Latin American Subaltern Studies Group’ published for the first time in English in 1995.¹⁹ Although the constitution of the group is interdisciplinary, we can discern a strong influence especially of comparative literature studies. Therefore, historians like Florencia Mallon have criticised that the group ignores and makes invisible the contributions that social history – particularly the idea of social

17 W. Mignolo, Local Histories / Global Designs (footnote 10).

18 Ibid., p. 67.

19 M. Aronna / J. Beverley / J. Oviedo (eds.), The Postmodernism Debate in Latin America, Durham 1995.

history ‘from below’ – has made to include the subalterns into the writing of history.²⁰ On the one hand this argument is certainly true, if we think, for example, of the rich oral sources collected by the famous Workshop for Oral History in Bolivia under the direction of Silvia Rivera Cusicanqui. On the other hand, it is important to acknowledge that the epistemological critique of the postcolonial goes deeper, including the classical historiographic methods.

Another academic formation is necessary if the historian needs not only to take into account sources in Spanish and / or Latin, but also, for example, the Maya codices in order to write an alternative history of the conquest, as José Rabasa did.²¹ Questions arise also about the standpoint of the archive and the problem to make subaltern voices heard, as they are usually not collected in the archives. Often they can only be approached through secondary archives. And in the case of the existence of indigenous sources, the historian faces a new challenge of reading, translation, and interpretation.²² It seems important, especially for historians concerned with subalternity, to enter into a broader, self-reflexive discussion on the own methods and the specific locus of enunciation.

2. Conceptualising Coloniality in South Asia: Changing Perspectives

2.1. Perceiving Coloniality under Colonialism

In this section, we will focus mainly on the changing perception of coloniality in India. Although the role of British colonialism in shaping and/or reshaping the history of South Asia has been generally accepted by scholars, apparently there is no agreement among them about the nature and the corollary of this interface between the ‘East’ and the ‘West’. Even though India is credited with a history of thousands of years, the historiography of ‘Indian history’ cannot boast of such an antiquity. The root of the history of Indian historiography has its origin in its colonial legacy itself. James Mill and later Vincent A. Smith, the best-known of the British administrative historians, founded the structure within which an ‘Indian History’ was construed firstly by the Colonial West and later by native Indian intellectuals.²³ According to such a British intellectual view, British occupation of India inaugurated a new era in its history – a transformation from an ‘archaic’ past to a ‘modern’ present and was the natural and eventual success of a superior culture/civilisation over an inferior one. It was this master colonial discourse that

20 F. E. Mallon, The Promise and Dilemma of Subaltern Studies: Perspectives from Latin American History, in: *The American Historical Review*, 99 (1994) 5, pp. 1491-1515; Id., Subalterns and the Nation, in: *Dispositio/n: Special Issue on Latin American Subaltern Studies Revisited*, 25 (2005) 52, pp. 159-178.

21 J. Rabasa, Thinking Europe in Indian Categories or, “Tell me the Story of How I Conquered You”, in: E. Dussel / C. Jáuregui / M. Moraña (eds.), *Coloniality at Large: Latin America and the Postcolonial Debate*, Durham 2008, pp. 43-73.

22 M. Baud, Liberalism, Indigenismo, and Social Mobilization in Late Nineteenth-Century Ecuador, in: M. Becker / A. K. Clark (eds.), *Highland Indians and the State in Modern Ecuador*, Pittsburgh 2007, pp. 72-88.

23 J. Mill, *The History of British India*, 3rd edition, London 1826; V. A. Smith, *The Oxford History of India: From the Earliest Times to the End of 1911*, Oxford 1911.

created and defined subsequent discourses (both Western and indigenous) on colonial India.

An alternative view on colonialism was the consequence of the rise of Indian nationalism by the end of the 19th century. Although its tone was different, the ‘nationalist’ perception about British colonialism was moulded in the same crucible of the colonial master narrative. Early Indian nationalist leaders like Dadabhai Naoroji wrote about the economic exploitation of India under colonial hegemony. The title of Naoroji’s book *Poverty and un-British Rule in India* exactly reflects the attitude of the Western-educated early Indian nationalist leaders towards colonialism.²⁴ Although they were critical towards colonial exploitation, they did not completely reject the colonial rhetoric of ‘progress’. Facing the problem of satisfactorily explaining the British success in subjugating and controlling India, they, to a great extent, accepted the civilising mission of the British and the need to ‘catch up’ with the West to be ‘modern’. According to this view, Indian suffering under colonial rule was mainly because of the unwillingness of the British to introduce a ‘proper’ (and therefore ‘progressive’) British system of rule in India. For them colonialism was a necessary evil. British hegemony was necessary to recuperate the degenerated Indian culture and to guide it to a progressive future. However, the British were unwilling to do so. Obviously the perception of the early leaders of Indian nationalism about colonialism was rather shaped by the discourse produced by the hegemonic West. During the first half of the twentieth century, when the Indian nationalist movement was gaining its momentum, ‘nationalist’ historiography achieved particular political significance. There was serious reaction on the part of these ‘nationalist’ historians against the colonial attempt to degrade the Indian past and to glorify colonial occupation as a ‘civilising mission’. Naturally the Indian past (especially the ‘ancient Hindu’ past in preference to the ‘medieval Islamic’) was glorified as a period of great achievements and progress.²⁵ In this way the nationalist scholars constructed an ‘ancient India’ and sought to establish the ability of an Indian nation to rejuvenate itself without the West. Within this nationalist historiography, there developed a Marxist trend. Its early products were R. P. Dutt, *India Today*, and Shevlankar’s *Problem of India* (1940), both dealing with India and its economic downturn under British rule.²⁶

24 D. Naoroji, *Poverty and un-British Rule in India*, London 1901; R. C. Dutt, who wrote in the early 20th century also concentrated on the issue of economic exploitation of India under the British. R. C. Dutt, *The Economic History of India in the Victorian Age from the Accession of Queen Victoria in 1837 to the Commencement of the Twentieth Century*, London 1904; R. C. Dutt, *The Economic History of India under Early British Rule: From the Rise of the British Power in 1757 to the Accession of Queen Victoria in 1837*, London 1902.

25 R. C. Majumdar, *Champa, Ancient Indian Colonies in the Far East*, Vol. I, Lahore 1927; R. C. Majumdar, *Kambuja Desa Or An Ancient Hindu Colony in Cambodia*, Madras, 1944; R. K. Mookerji, *Local Government in Ancient India*, Oxford 1919.

26 R. P. Dutt, *India Today*, London 1940; K. S. Shelvankar, *The Problem of India*, London 1940.

2.2. Perceiving Coloniality in Postcolonial India

The political success of Indian nationalism to create a ‘nation-state’ by emulating the West in 1947 had a deep influence in shaping the postcolonial perspective on British colonialism. In postcolonial India, colonialism became ‘historic’, an issue that needs to be observed and analysed from the ‘present’. Postcolonial nationalist scholars had the task of not only decolonising Indian history and providing an ‘Indian view’ about its colonial past but also of dealing with the persisting socio-political problems in postcolonial India. As opposed to imperial ‘Indian histories’ which always portrayed colonial rule as being beneficial to India and its people, this new scholarship argued that colonialism not only hindered economic and political progress in the Indian subcontinent in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, but also postcolonial India continued to bear the brunt of this colonial experience. Such nationalist historians as Bipan Chandra and Sumit Sarkar argued that colonialism was a regressive force that distorted all developments in colonial India and the fundamental reason of social, economic, political ills of post-independent India.²⁷ For them modernity and the nationalist desire for political unity were not so much British gifts to India as fruits of struggles undertaken by the Indians themselves. Opposed to this ‘nationalist-Marxian’ view of British colonialism, there developed another stream of scholarship – widely known as ‘Cambridge School’ – which depicted Indian nationalism as the work of a Western-educated Indian elite who competed and collaborated with the British in search of power and prestige.²⁸ From this point of view, Indian nationalism was not the very result created by colonial conditions, but the handiwork of an Indian elite clamouring for power. Later, C. A. Bayly, in his *Rulers, Townsmen and Bazaars*, extended the range of interpretation to the 18th century by discerning a continuity of ‘corporate groups’ from late Mughal into early British regimes.²⁹ If the national movement was largely an illusion to Seal, the British conquest became to Bayly an elaboration of processes already at work in India. According to him British colonialism has never been a hegemonic power in India, but operated successfully only because of the support rendered by the local people.³⁰

In spite of their differences in perceiving colonialism and its consequences, both nationalist and Cambridge scholars have emphasised the socio-political and economic aspects of colonialism and mainly focused on structural changes in the affected societies. Little attention has been paid in the study of colonialism to the culture of the colonised in Brit-

27 B. Chandra, Nationalism and Colonialism in Modern India, New Delhi 1979; S. Sarkar, Modern India, 1885–1947, Delhi 1983. Irfan Habib and many other scholars followed similar arguments. For example, see: I. Habib, Essays in Indian History – Towards a Marxist Perception, New Delhi 1995; Id., A People’s History of India: Indian Economy, 1858–1914, New Delhi 2006.

28 A. Seal, The Emergence of Indian Nationalism: Competition and Collaboration in the Later Nineteenth Century, London 1968.

29 C. A. Bayly, Rulers, Townsmen and Bazaars: North Indian Society in the Age of British Expansion, 1770–1870, Cambridge 1983.

30 C. A. Bayly, Indian Society and the Making of the British Empire, Cambridge, 1988; Id., Knowing the Country: Empire and Information in India, in: Modern Asian Studies, 27 (1993) 1, pp. 3–43.

ish India. Anthropologists like Bernard S. Cohn noticed this lacuna in Indian colonial studies and tried to bring up the issue of cultural consequence of colonial hegemony in Indian colonial studies.³¹ However, it was mainly after the publication of Edward Said's *Orientalism* that this cultural facet of colonial dominance came into the forefront of Indian colonial studies.³² Also, anthropologists like Nicholas B. Dirks greatly contributed in this direction.³³ However, it was the 'Subaltern Studies' project initiated by Ranajit Guha that created a paradigm shift in Indian colonial-postcolonial studies.

2.3. Subaltern Studies School

Heavily inspired by and indebted to Marxist and Gramscian concepts, Ranajit Guha tried to critique the two established trends in Indian historiography – the colonial-neocolonial and the nationalist-neo-nationalist.³⁴ For him and his colleagues both these schools were elitist which excluded the history of the Indian subalterns from colonial discussions because they were considered as 'pre-political' and 'backward'. By doing so, their history under colonialism was excluded from elitist narratives as irrelevant in anti-colonial struggles. There was a conscious attempt on the part of these scholars to detach themselves from Euro-centric approaches, including Marxist which analysed history from a 'universal history of capital' point of view, and thereby crediting the subalterns with their own consciousness. In spite of severe criticism levelled against their approach, especially regarding the attribution of an independent thinking realm (subaltern consciousness) to the subalterns and the idealisation and reification of pre-colonial 'Indian culture' based on religion as the only genuine local culture with the inherent ability to withstand colonial cultural assault, this study group successfully divulged the Euro-centric foundation of Indian colonial historiography.³⁵ Although the contributors to the later *Subaltern Studies Series* moved away from Guha's idea of the subalterns as 'the maker of their own destiny' and their ability to speak for themselves ('letting the subaltern speak'), especially after Gayatri Spivak raised the question 'can the subaltern speak?', and began to concentrate more on Western colonial power-knowledge by reading sources against the grain, and uncovering the signs and discourses by which our knowledge of the subaltern is created, their attempt to bring out how colonialism fundamentally re-

31 B. S. Cohn, *An Anthropologist Among the Historians and Other Essays*, Delhi 1990; *Id.*, *Colonialism and its Forms of Knowledge: The British in India*, Princeton 1996.

32 E. W. Said, *Orientalism*, New York 1978.

33 N. B. Dirks, *The Hollow Crown: Ethnohistory of an Indian Kingdom*, Cambridge 1987; *Id.*, *Castes of Mind: Colonialism and the Making of Modern India*, Princeton 2001.

34 R. Guha, On Some Aspects of the Historiography of Colonial India, in: *Subaltern Studies*, v. I, Delhi 1982, pp. 1-7; *Id.*, *Elementary Aspects of Peasant insurgency in Colonial India*, Delhi, 1983.

35 For more details about the various criticisms against the Subaltern approach, see: D. Ludden (ed.), *Subaltern Studies: Critical History, Contested Meaning and the Globalization of South Asia*, London 2002. Interestingly the idealisation of pre-colonial Indian culture as 'religious' very much echoes early Indologists' notion of 'spiritual' India as opposed to 'secular' West. Such an assumption can be problematic in studying pre-colonial Indian history. For a critique, see: B. J. Mailaparambil, *The Ali Rajas of Cannanore: Status and Identity at the Interface of Commercial and Political Expansion, 1663-1723*, Leiden / New York (forthcoming).

structured the lives as well as the perceptions of its subject population about ‘itself’ and its ‘other’ largely contributed in eliciting the salient features of colonialism which did not get enough attention from earlier scholars.³⁶ For them colonialism was not merely about political dominance and economic exploitation. It had a far deeper impact on the world-view of the colonised which defined and re-moulded their lives according to the hegemonic discourse authored by it. By doing so, the Subaltern Studies project came closer to the postmodernist, poststructuralist approaches in history.³⁷

In the past three decades the Subaltern Studies group and other postcolonial scholars have been successful in offering a systematic critique of both colonialism and nationalism and thereby challenging the fundamentals of Indian historiography.³⁸ They effectively divulged how colonial and its derivative nationalist discourses were successful in depriving the masses of their role in history through the practices of negation and appropriation and thereby rendering the history of modern India as a linear narrative of conflict between colonialism and elite nationalism, culminating in the victory of the latter.³⁹ In doing so, the Subaltern-postcolonial scholarship considers the postcolonial politics in India as a continuum of the colonial and thereby continuous to serve as a useful critique of both colonial and postcolonial histories of the Third World.⁴⁰

In recent years, the Subaltern Studies group has been focusing on two different, but mutually contributing, directions. While a group continued to deal with the subaltern issue in colonial and post-colonial Indian history, especially by deconstructing colonial discourses, the other concentrated more on expanding the theoretical horizon of the study group.⁴¹ In a continuous attempt to deconstruct the colonial knowledge about the colonised and to recover their self, the members of the second group have extended their critique to the discipline of history itself. Accordingly, it has been argued that insofar as the academic discourse of history is concerned, Europe remains the sovereign, theoretical subject of all ‘other’ histories.⁴² This hegemonic nature of institutionalised history led

36 G. C. Spivak, Can the Subaltern Speak?, in: C. Nelson / L. Grossberg (eds.), *Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture*, Urbana 1988, pp. 271-313.

37 For a discussion on various trends in the Subaltern Studies group, see: G. Prakash, Subaltern Studies as Postcolonial Criticism, *The American Historical Review*, 99 (1994) 5, pp. 1475-1490.

38 Beyond the Subaltern Studies group, scholars like Nicholas B. Dirks contribute much to the postmodern critique of Colonialism and its forms of knowledge. For example, see: N. B. Dirks (ed.), *Colonialism and Culture*, Ann Arbor 1992.

39 For a critique of Indian nationalism by Subaltern scholars, see: P. Chatterjee, *Nation and Its Fragments* (footnote 7); Id., *Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World: A Derivative Discourse?*, London 1986; S. Amin, *Gandhi as Mahatma: Gorakhpur District, Eastern UP, 1921-22*, in: *Subaltern Studies*, v. III, Delhi 1984, pp. 1-61.

40 For the attention gained by the Subaltern Studies approach beyond India, though with reservations, see: F. E. Mallon, *The Promise and Dilemma of Subaltern Studies* (footnote 20); F. Cooper, *Conflict and Connection: Rethinking African History*, in: *American Historical Review*, 99 (1994), pp. 1516-1545.

41 For the first group, see recent Subaltern Studies series issues: P. Chatterjee / P. Jaganathan (eds.), *Subaltern Studies XI: Community, Gender, and Violence*, New York 2000; S. Mayaram / M. S. S. Pandian / A. Skaria (eds.), *Subaltern Studies XII: Muslims, Dalits, and the Fabrications of History*, New Delhi 2005.

42 D. Chakrabarty, *Postcoloniality and the Artifice of History: Who Speaks for ‘Indian’ Past?*, *Representations*, 37 (1992); Id., *Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference*, Princeton 2000. For a critique, see: C. Dietze, *Towards a History on Equal Terms: A Discussion of Provincializing Europe*, in: *History and Theory*,

to the degradation of popular historical narratives in colonised societies. Therefore, the Subaltern scholarly critique of the discipline of history gives ample impetus for scholars to pay more attention to the marginalised popular narratives in colonised societies to recover local historical traditions before the introduction of ‘scientific’ histories.⁴³ Moreover, challenging the concept of historical knowledge as ‘universal’, subaltern historians urge to look for multiple historical perspectives in which previously marginalised and suppressed groups could get enough representation and expect for some form of shared and general history to be evolved in the future.⁴⁴

In conclusion, the perception of coloniality in Indian historiography has tremendously changed in course of time. While the focus of early colonial and nationalist discourses was on the success or failure of colonial institutions to introduce Western ideas of modernity and progress in the region, nationalist discourse in later years emphasised the political and economic exploitation of India under British colonialism. However, it was only in the closing decades of the twentieth century that the link between colonialism and its capacity to produce hegemonic knowledge forms about the colonised started to receive the attention of scholars which fundamentally challenged the hitherto notions about coloniality in Indian historiography.

3. Concepts of (post)Coloniality in Research on Africa

3.1. Defending the Colonial Enterprise

Literature that dealt with colonialism and coloniality in the African context started to emerge when the so-called ‘scramble for Africa’ was in its last stages around 1890.⁴⁵ If one looks at the British literature on Africa of this time-period, it was often a semi-official form of apology for Britain’s role in the partition of Africa, written for a wider audience. There were also narratives of ex-administrators and ex-missionaries, sometimes supported by ample evidence from parliamentary papers or unpublished materials.⁴⁶ In the French context, a *histoire coloniale* started to emerge as well and similar books as in

47 (2008), pp. 69-84. Also see: D. Chakrabarty, In Defence of Provincializing Europe: A Response to Carola Dietze, in: History and Theory, 47 (2008), pp. 85-96.

43 For more details, see: D. Chakrabarty, A Global and Multicultural “Discipline” of History, in: History and Theory, 46 (2006), pp. 101-109; Id., History and the Politics of Recognition, in: K. Jenkins/S. Morgan/A. Munslow (eds.), Manifestos for History, New York 2007, pp. 77-87.

44 D. Chakrabarty, The Public Life of History: An Argument out of India, in: Public Culture, 20 (2008) 1, pp. 143-168. For an attempt to connect the multiple history perspective of the Subaltern Studies group and Global History, see: A. Epple, New Global History and The Challenge of Subaltern Studies: Plea for a Global History from Below, in: The Journal of Localatology, 3 (2010), pp. 161-179.

45 J. E. Flint, Britain and the Scramble for Africa, in: R. W. Winks (ed.), The Oxford History of the British Empire, vol. V, Historiography, Oxford 1999, pp. 450-462, here p. 451.

46 A. D. Roberts, The British Empire in Tropical Africa: A Review of the Literature to the 1960s, in: R. W. Winks (ed.), The Oxford History of the British Empire, vol. V, Historiography, Oxford 1999, pp. 463-485, here p. 464; As an example for an early study by the then administrator of Uganda, see: F. Lugard, The Rise of Our East African Empire, 2 vols., London 1893.

the British context were being written by colonial administrators or governors at the turn of the century.⁴⁷

From then onwards, historical research began to deal to some extent with colonial structures and economies, e.g. with colonial trading companies and their endeavours in East and West Africa. Another strand of research connected colonialism with humanitarianism and dealt with the abolition of the slave trade in East Africa by upholding the humanitarian ideals of the colonialists and by defending the colonial enterprise as necessary and beneficial to Africa.⁴⁸ After WWI some critical approaches towards the colonial situation started to emerge: for example the report written by Leonard Woolf on “Empire and Commerce in Africa” for the research department of the Labour Party in Great Britain in 1920, or the work by the French historian Charles-André Julien on French Northern Africa in 1931. Julien stressed the fact that the North-African countries had their own original history – besides the French colonisation.⁴⁹ However, most of the early works on colonies, colonialism and coloniality in Africa, be it in French, English, or German, concentrated on colonial administration, commerce and similar topics. These studies that generally dealt with colonisers and the structures of colonial rule left the African side unwritten and by and large defended the colonial enterprise as a form of civilizing mission or as a necessity for economic development.

3.2. Critical Approaches towards Coloniality and Colonialism

More critical approaches emerged after the Second World War: Studies that dealt with colonial situations from a variety of perspectives were conducted not only by British, French, and American historians but also by a new generation of African scholars.⁵⁰ Expansion of higher education started, particularly in the British-African colonies, after 1945. University colleges were established in Nigeria, the Gold Coast, Uganda, Sudan, and Rhodesia between 1950 and 1961.⁵¹ African graduates began to come to British universities and to address topics in African history from a new standpoint and to look at colonialism / coloniality from a new perspective.⁵² One could, for example, point at

47 F. Brahm, Wissenschaft und Dekolonisation. Paradigmenwechsel und institutioneller Wandel in der akademischen Beschäftigung mit Afrika in Deutschland und Frankreich, 1930–1970, p. 87.

48 A. D. Roberts, British Empire (footnote 46), p. 468.

49 L. Woolf, *Empire and Commerce in Africa: A Study in Economic Imperialism*, London 1920; C.-A. Julien, *Histoire de l'Afrique du Nord. Tunisie – Algérie – Maroc*, Paris 1931.

50 Also in Leipzig, East German historians started to work critically on German colonialism in the 1950s, most prominently Walter Markov. See: M. Middell, *Weltgeschichtsschreibung im Zeitalter der Verfachlichung und Professionalisierung. Das Leipziger Institut für Kultur- und Universalgeschichte 1890–1990*, 3 Bde., Leipzig 2005. In West Germany, similar topics were addressed only from the late 1960s onwards. See: H. Bley, *Kolonialherrschaft und Sozialstruktur in Deutsch-Südwestafrika 1894–1914*, Hamburg 1968; K. Hausen, *Deutsche Kolonialherrschaft in Afrika. Wirtschaftsinteressen und Kolonialverwaltung in Kamerun von 1914*, Zürich, Freiburg i. Br. 1976. For a general description of literature on German colonialism, see: U. Lindner, *Plätze an der Sonne? Die Geschichtsschreibung auf dem Weg in die deutschen Kolonien*, in: *Archiv für Sozialgeschichte*, 48 (2008), pp. 487–510.

51 A. D. Roberts, British Empire (footnote 46), p. 474.

52 T. Falola, *West Africa*, in: R. W. Winks (ed.), *The Oxford History of the British Empire*, vol. V, *Historiography*, Oxford 1999, pp. 486–499, here p. 491.

the work “Trade and politics in the Niger Delta” (1956) by Onwuka Dike – a Nigerian, trained by British imperial historians, who worked on new fields in the research on colonialism. He concentrated on the interactions between European and African traders, while distancing himself from classical British imperial history that would rather deal with colonial institutions and colonisers only.⁵³ In Paris, similar phenomena can be observed. Leopold Senghor, who was the first African from a French colony to reach an *agrégation* in France and who, together with other African intellectuals, developed the new critical concept of *négritude*, was appointed as Professor of African studies in Paris in 1948.⁵⁴ On a macrohistorical perspective, one of the most important critical texts of this period dealing with coloniality is certainly George Balandier’s article “La situation coloniale” (1951), in which he brought together anthropological and historical approaches.⁵⁵ He looked at colonialism and coloniality as a relationship of power and as a specific historical process; he aimed at analysing the multitude of relationships between colonisers and colonised. Still, these new critical approaches were not broadly taken up in historical research, as the scholarly interest in African colonialism, its power structures, relationships, and consequences began to dwindle during the next two decades that were dominated by the issue of African decolonisation.

3.3. Modernisation, Decolonisation, and Dependency Theory

During the 1950s and 1960s, in the fields of political science and sociology as well as in the emerging field of area studies, research on African states started to focus more on the effects of modernisation, urbanisation and industrialisation. In the beginning, this trend was not necessarily pro-colonial or anti-colonial in direction. Especially in British scholarship, the re-organisation of colonial establishments and the promotion of scientific research within colonial establishments brought new trends into the research of colonialism. At the end of the 1940s, French Socialists and the British Labour party were still debating whether colonial regimes could be transformed into forces of economic and social progress.⁵⁶ However, with an ongoing decolonisation movement in Africa, modernisation and the dynamics of social change in decolonised societies came more strongly into the focus of research.⁵⁷

In the context of the Algerian war in the 1950s and 1960s, French scholarship started to attack colonialism by criticising it as a regressive force that needs to be removed. Even a critical study of colonialism was now judged as a reinforcement of the old colonial struc-

53 K. O. Dike, *Trade and Politics in the Niger Delta, 1830-1885: An Introduction to the Economic and Political History of Nigeria*, Oxford 1956.

54 F. Brahm, *Wissenschaft und Dekolonisation* (footnote 47), p. 93; see also A. Eckert, *Das Paris der Afrikaner und die Erfindung der Négritude*, in: R. Hohls / I. Schröder / H. Siegrist (eds.), *Europa und die Europäer. Quellen und Essays zur modernen Geschichte*, Stuttgart 2005, pp. 287-292.

55 G. Balandier, *La situation coloniale: Approche théorique*, in: *Cahiers internationaux de sociologie* 6 (1951), pp. 44-79; for an assessment of Balandier’s article, see: F. Cooper, *Colonialism in Question*, Berkeley 2005, p. 35.

56 F. Cooper, *Colonialism in question* (footnote 55), pp. 33-38.

57 I. Wallerstein (ed.), *Social Change: The Colonial Situation*, New York 1966; see also J. Miller, *History and Africa / Africa and History*, in: *American Historical Review*, 104 (1999), pp. 1-32.

tures; a new history should rather be a history of the anti-colonial past.⁵⁸ In this framework one has to mention Frantz Fanon's famous studies. Drawing on Marxist thought and psychoanalysis he wrote a scathing critique of colonialism. In his view, colonialism could only be overcome by force and by a thorough decolonisation process that would modernise the African states.⁵⁹ Even if Fanon's studies with their strict dichotomy between coloniser and colonised were strongly criticised by many scholars, his work had a considerable impact on African studies and was also taken up in the discussions on coloniality in Latin American studies.

In the late 1960s and the 1970s, with some disillusionment around the concepts of modernisation new interests in historicising and economising of the situation in Africa emerged. Studies on the economic development of the new African states and their colonial legacies were brought to the fore, most prominently Walter Rodney's book on "How Europe Underdeveloped Africa" from 1972.⁶⁰ Rodney drew his theoretical insight from Latin American Studies on underdevelopment and dependency and wrote about European-African economic relations. Quite a number of works on the history of Africa now dealt with the articulation of modes of production in African societies, using neo-Marxist and *dependencia* approaches.⁶¹ In this context, colonialism and concepts of coloniality remained secondary concerns. Here, the themes of the Latin American and African discourses overlapped significantly, though with a considerable time-lag.

3.4. Postcolonialism and New Research on Coloniality in Africa

In the 1980s and 1990s we can observe a sudden revival of scholarship on colonial issues in the Anglophone world. Edward Said's book on Orientalism from 1978, which looked at the Orient as the product and construct of a western discourse and showed how certain images of oriental societies dominated European literature, is seen as the start of a new postcolonial critique. Generally, Said addressed the issues of cultural production and representation of difference in colonial and postcolonial societies.⁶² During the 1980s, the field of postcolonial studies emerged, essentially shaped by the theoretical considerations of Homi Bhabha and of the subaltern studies group, particularly of Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak.⁶³ The new approaches led to an upsurge in studies on colonial topics. In the beginning, postcolonial analysis was primarily employed in the field of literary studies, later

58 F. Cooper, Colonialism in Question (footnote 55).

59 F. Fanon, Die Verdammten dieser Erde, Frankfurt am Main 1966; F. Fanon, Schwarze Haut, weiße Masken, Frankfurt am Main 1980. For a critical view on Fanon, see: A. Eckert, Predigt der Gewalt? Betrachtungen zu Frantz Fanons Klassiker der Dekolonisation, in: Zeithistorische Forschungen/Studies in Contemporary History, Online-Ausgabe, 3 (2006), H. 1, URL: <http://www.zeithistorische-forschungen.de/16126041-Eckert-1-2006>.

60 W. Rodney, How Europe Underdeveloped Africa, London 1972.

61 See: F. Cooper et al. (eds.), Confronting Historical Paradigms: Peasants, Labor and the Capitalist World System in Africa and Latin America, Madison 1993.

62 E. W. Said, Orientalism, New York 1978.

63 H. K. Bhabha, The Location of Culture, London 1994; G. C. Spivak, In Other Worlds: Essays in Cultural Politics, New York 1987.

on postcolonial approaches developed in many different disciplines, in cultural studies, cultural anthropology and in history. They were taken up – as already mentioned – in Latin American research. In African studies and African history concepts of coloniality, colonialism and its impact now also found a renewed interest. Studies emerged dealing with interactions between colonisers and colonised, concentrating on hybridity in social formations and on the cultural conceptions of politics, thereby overcoming binary oppositions in the analysis of (post-)colonial societies.⁶⁴ Furthermore, several African scholars developed their own voice in postcolonial theory and started to address political and cultural power in Africa. Particularly Achille Mbembe tries to overcome the notion of Africa as an endless account of violence and as a “gap in history” and focuses on the compositeness of the African postcolony.⁶⁵

Highly influential African historians as Terence O. Ranger and Frederick Cooper have explicitly taken up postcolonial approaches in their work.⁶⁶ Cooper, who is himself quite critical of postcolonial theory, tries to bring it together with a thoroughgoing study of power relations. He concentrates on such various issues as the system of power in which the colonised lived, the symbolic resources they used, the interactions between colonisers and colonised and the challenging of the system by the colonized, addressing identity production in (post)colonial settings as well as colonial governance.⁶⁷

More generally, African colonialism is now addressed from many different angles and no longer reduced to such topics as ‘modernity’, ‘dependency’ or colonial institutions. Reproduction and sexuality are researched as key problems of (post-)colonial societies in Africa. Regulation of sexuality and gendered politics are analysed as distinctive demarcation lines in colonial settings. Likewise, racial boundaries and race as a general question of coloniality are more consequently taken up.⁶⁸ In the wake of Foucault forms of gov-

64 As an example for the numerous works that have been published in this context, see: J. L. Comaroff, *Images of Empire, Contests of Consciences: Models of Colonial Domination in South Africa*, in: F. Cooper / A. L. Stoler (eds.), *Tensions of Empire: Colonial Cultures in a Bourgeois World*, Berkeley 1997, pp. 163–197; M. Vaughan, *Curing Their Ills: Colonial Power and African Illness*, Cambridge 1991; for African history in Germany, see: A. Eckert / A. Wirz, *Wir nicht, die Anderen auch. Deutschland und der Kolonialismus*, in: S. Conrad / S. Randeria (eds.), *Jenseits des Eurozentrismus. Postkoloniale Perspektiven in den Geschichts- und Kulturwissenschaften*, Frankfurt am Main / New York 2002, pp. 372–392; M. Pesek, *Koloniale Herrschaft in Deutsch-Ostafrika. Expeditionen, Militär und Verwaltung seit 1880*, Frankfurt am Main / New York 2005.

65 A. Mbembe, *On the Postcolony. Studies on the History of Society and Culture*, Berkeley 2001; see for a view that stresses compositeness and cosmopolitanism in Africa (and elsewhere) as well K. A. Appiah, *Cosmopolitanism: Ethics in a World of Strangers*, New York 2006.

66 T. O. Ranger (ed.), *Postcolonial Identities in Africa*, London 1996; F. Cooper / A. L. Stoler (eds.), *Tensions of Empire: Colonial Cultures in a Bourgeois World*, Berkeley 1997

67 F. Cooper, *Conflict and Connection: Rethinking Colonial African History*, in: *American Historical Review*, 99 (1994), pp. 1516–1545; F. Cooper, *Colonialism in Question: Theory, Knowledge, History*, Berkeley, Los Angeles 2005.

68 For example, see: A. McClintock, *Imperial Leather: Race, Gender and Sexuality in the Colonial Contest*, London, New York 1995; P. Scully, *Rape, Race, and Colonial Culture: The Sexual Politics of Identity in the Nineteenth-Century Cape Colony, South Africa*, in: *American Historical Review*, 100 (1995), pp. 335–359; Z. Magubane, *Bringing the Empire Home: Race, Class and Gender in Britain and Colonial South Africa*, Chicago 2004; K. Walgenbach, „*Die weiße Frau als Trägerin deutscher Kultur*“. *Koloniale Diskurse über Geschlecht, „Rasse“ und Klasse im Kaiserreich*, Frankfurt am Main / New York 2005; L. Wildenthal, *German Women for Empire 1884–1945*, Durham,

ernmentality in the colonial / postcolonial situation are questioned as well, particularly so in research on southern Africa.⁶⁹ Not all new research on colonial and decolonised Africa is informed by postcolonial considerations. However, in many of the studies of the last two decades, the ongoing discussion in postcolonial studies has a considerable impact on the topics and approaches chosen.

In conclusion, after a long period of dwindling interest in colonial themes, coloniality, its representations and its impacts are now seen as a prominent marker of African societies and cultures, being shaped by colonial and postcolonial experiences. These topics are meanwhile researched in a great number of varieties within the field of African history.

4. Conclusion

As it is evident from the above discussion on the colonial and postcolonial historiographies in Africa, South Asia, and Latin America, it remains an open task to explore the different connotations and historical experiences of colonialism in a transnational perspective. Nevertheless, it is obvious from the discussion that colonial experience was crucial in shaping the cultural, social, and economic layers of power in all these regions. In this article we made a distinction between (post-)coloniality as a historical period and as a mode of thinking. According to the latter perspective, (post-)coloniality is not related to a specific historical period, instead it can be described as a mode of thinking that highlights the lasting difference made by colonial practices and discourses. Departing from that approach it is nevertheless important to face the problem that we use concepts that have the same denomination although their historical and regional meaning may be very different. Therefore postcolonial studies, like cultural studies, have to deal with a radical contextualism as expressed best by Lawrence Grossberg: "To put it succinctly, for cultural studies, context is everything and everything is contextual".⁷⁰ This radical contextualism has lead to an epistemological change that brought local and indigenous epistemologies as well as subaltern actors into the historiographical discourse, thus challenging the hegemonic concepts of a universal history that is orientated in the leading difference between 'the West and the rest'. In spite of the different regional, theoretical, and methodological approaches that rally under the banner postcolonial studies, there is a common interest that can be described as the decolonisation of history. The critique and deconstruction of the hegemonic Eurocentric and nationalist historiographies, the regional diversification of history, and the inclusion of subaltern actors can be considered as integral parts of this movement of epistemological decolonisation.

London 2001; U. Lindner, Contested Concepts of "White"/"Native" and Mixed Marriages in German South-West Africa and the Cape Colony, 1900–1914: A Histoire Croisée, in: Journal of Namibian Studies, 6 (2009), pp. 57–79.

69 See the article by Michael Pesek on Foucault, his concept of governmentality and its reception in African history in this issue.

70 L. Grossberg, Cultural Studies: What's in a Name (One More Time), in: Taboo, 1 (1995), p. 13.

Surely Edward Said's seminal work 'Orientalism' can be conceived as one of the milestones that questioned a Eurocentric worldview and contributed to what Chakrabarty has later called 'Provincializing Europe'.⁷¹ A critical reference to his work plays a major role in all regional debates on (post)coloniality. In spite of its seminal role in postcolonial studies, Said has been questioned from post-colonial scholars from other world-regions. One critical aspect is – probably unintended – the re-centralisation of the history of the modern West as opposed to the Orient. This depiction can also be questioned as it silences other histories; namely the histories of Africa, America, Asia, or Australia. This critique has been explicitly expressed from a Latin American standpoint by introducing the concept of Occidentalism. Nevertheless, from our trans-regional perspective it does not seem to make much sense to substitute one region – Orient – for another – the Americas. Instead it seems to be more appropriate to take into account the mutual, global, and pluri-topic constructions of 'shared histories'.⁷²

A further important contribution of postcolonial historical approaches is their conceptual inclusion of subaltern actors. In this aspect the Subaltern Studies Group has done pioneering work which found its reception also in other world regions as it is the case of the Latin American Subaltern Studies Group. Nevertheless, the question how subalterns can be represented in historical discourses still remains open.

The continuing importance of coloniality is surely one of the strengths of postcolonial approaches, though there still remain some problems. These approaches run the risk of re-centering the historiography because Western and especially European powers were the initial actors of colonisation. Furthermore, the concept of (post-)coloniality can be overused so that it runs the risk of loosing its explanatory validity. The debates on dependency theory in Latin American and African history have shown that it is highly problematic to locate the explanations for all power structures, exploitation systems and regimes of representation only in external factors like coloniality.

In spite of the differences in the processes of colonisation and decolonisation in the three regions that came under the purview of this article, it is possible to see that the interpretation of the experience of coloniality is shaped by overlapping concepts and histories. It is precisely in these interfaces that a primarily comparative approach reaches its limits as it fails to explain satisfactorily the intersections and the mutual constitutions of geo-cultural entities. Therefore we think that it is important to expand the scope of postcolonial studies and to connect the post-colonial debate with the ongoing discussions in the field of transnational and entangled histories.⁷³

71 D. Chakrabarty, Provincializing Europe: Postcoloniality and the Critique of History, in: *Cultural Studies*, 6 (1992) 3, pp. 337-357.

72 See: S. Conrad/S. Randeria (eds.), *Jenseits des Eurozentrismus. Postkoloniale Perspektiven in den Geschichts- und Kulturwissenschaften*, Frankfurt am Main 2002.

73 See: A. Epple, New Global History and The Challenge of Subaltern Studies (footnote 44); O. Kaltmeier, Post-koloniale Geschichte(n): Repräsentationen, Temporalitäten und Geopolitiken des Wissens, in: J. Reuter/A. Karentzos (eds.), *Schlüsselwerke der Postcolonial Studies*, Wiesbaden (forthcoming); U. Lindner, Neuere Kolonialgeschichte und postcolonial studies, in: Docupedia Zeitgeschichte, <http://docupedia.de/zg/>, forthcoming.

Colonial Governmentality: Critical Notes from a Perspective of South Asian Studies

Nira Wickramasinghe

RESÜMEE

Das Konzept der kolonialen Gouvernementalität, das in Anlehnung an Foucaults Theorien entwickelt wurde, ist in den letzten zwei Dekaden gerade in der südostasiatischen Geschichte oftmals als Ansatz benutzt wurden, um koloniale Gesellschaften zu interpretieren. Der Aufsatz untersucht diesen Ansatz kritisch und entwickelt eine nuanciertere historische Herangehensweise an koloniale Situationen. An Beispielen aus der Geschichtsschreibung Indiens und Sri Lankas wird erläutert, inwiefern das Projekt der „colonial governmentality/modernity“ eine Überinterpretation der kolonialen Dominanz in der Forschung erzeugte und wie dadurch die Rolle der Kolonisierten und deren Spielräume im kolonialen Machtssystem marginalisiert wurden. Außerdem wird grundsätzlich auf die Vielfalt der kolonialen Situation verwiesen, die nur durch eine verstärkte Erforschung der Lebenswelt der Kolonisierten wahrgenommen werden könne.

The purpose of this paper is to offer some critical but constructive notes on the notion of colonial governmentality which has in the past two decades provided a convenient grid for the understanding of relations between colonizers and colonized. It does not in any way attempt to engage with or debunk more general ideas on governmentality, ideas that Michel Foucault quite magisterially elaborated in some of his later lectures at the College de France and elsewhere.¹ Taking most of his examples from early modern Europe, Foucault devoted a good deal of attention to the theme of modern political power; in particular its rationality, sources, character and targets. He suggested that a new set of concerns heralded new foci of power – clustered not around the binary of ‘us’

1 M. Foucault, Sécurité, Territoire, Population. Cours au Collège de France (1977–1978), Paris 2004; for a useful synthesis, see: G. Burchell / C. Gordon / P. Miller (eds.), *The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality*, Chicago 1991.

and ‘them’ but around a more complicated set of concerns about life based on statistical probabilities and rational normative discourses. How well do his ideas translate into the relations of power that prevailed in the colonized world and how helpful to think with and formative of explanation is the concept of colonial governmentality?

I belong to the generation who began writing in the early 1990s in the wake of intellectual giants such as Edward Said, Benedict Anderson, and the Subaltern Studies collective of historians.² The debt of my generation of scholars to Foucault’s work and that of his intercessors cannot be dismissed easily. James C. Scott compared works of great originality to a shipyard and suggested that a sure mark of influence was how many ships were launched from its dock. I have no doubt, to borrow Scott’s words, that around the world “thousands of ships have since sailed forth flying his pennant” and others are still ready to sail away.³ But with hindsight it is now clear that while Foucault unlocked a new world of interpretation, at the same time he gave us the hubris to think that we were the privileged ones who held the key.

For a scholar of colonialism whose archive was the Sri Lanka British colonial state Foucault’s work was an invitation to rethink the story told in the 1960s and 1970s by liberal and Marxist scholars alike about the nature of the colonial state – benevolent or extractive – and the relations between colonizers and colonized.⁴ According to these master narratives the state was the privileged site of an immense power standing in opposition to a civil society – nested between state and market – imagined either as the absence of power or as the fulfillment of freedom. These works that belonged to the British empirical tradition were written in a theoretical void, totally divorced from the shattering developments in philosophy and social theory encapsulated in the term ‘poststructuralism’ that were sweeping through continental Europe. Foucault was, for instance, painstakingly tracking the emergence in early modern Europe of a new form of political rationality which combined simultaneously two seemingly contradictory modalities of power: one totalizing and centralizing, the other individualizing and normalizing. A decade later however, all the certitudes of Sri Lankan colonial historians would be questioned by scholars formed in the American and European academia, cognizant of Michel Foucault’s 1978 lectures on governmentality as well as parallel radical trends emerging closer to home in India.

It has now become increasingly commonplace, even banal, to understand the circulation of power as a decentered process. The excitement of the 1980s and 1990s is gone. Today everywhere – with the exception of the Netherlands where postcolonialism is still marginalized – scholars are using Foucauldian frames to explore the production of colonial

2 E. Said, *Orientalism*, New York 1979; B. Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism*, revised edn., London 1991; R. Guha/G. Spivak (eds.), *Selected Subaltern Studies*, New York 1988.

3 See foreword by James Scott in: R. Guha, *Elementary Aspects of Peasant Insurgency in Colonial India*, Durham/London 1999, p. IX.

4 In the Sri Lankan context see: K. M. de Silva, *History of Ceylon* (ed.), v. III, Peradeniya 1973.

subjects.⁵ Instead of identifying government with the centralized locus of state rule, this burgeoning governmentality literature argues that governmental power operates through the production of discursive normalizations, political rationalities, and techniques of regulation that ultimately produce subjects that behave as they are expected to.

Let me spell out some of my concerns with the generalisations and essentialisation of colonial governmentality as well as give just a few insights from my own work to argue for the need for a more contextualized, nuanced, and historically attentive approach to relations of power in colonial situations.

1. The Production of Colonial Modernity

One concern I have with the notion of colonial governmentality is the manner in which colonialism is essentialized in studies that use it as a grid to read the effects of colonial domination on subject populations. This is the case even in theoretically sophisticated works of scholars such as Antoinette Burton or David Scott whose underlying thesis is that colonization was a universal project that had as its aim to inscribe the colonized in the space of modernity.⁶ One can only agree with Frederick Cooper who has forcefully argued that while there were colonial initiatives in the 19th and 20th centuries that might be described this way, it makes little sense to say that the sum of such efforts produces a ‘colonial modernity’ or that colonial administrators intended them to do so.⁷ This is not to deny that there were such initiatives; one of them being in the field of education in India. Gauri Visvanathan has demonstrated to what extent Macaulay’s 1835 Minute on Indian Education was designed under the “guise of liberal education” with the aim of preventing the risk of native insubordination.⁸ But can we follow Gyan Prakash when he argues that there was a well defined aim to discredit indigenous systems of knowledge to ensure that ‘natives’ could be trained with modern scientific methods and lifted into the cradle of civilization?⁹ Anyone who has read minutes of colonial administrators at the Public Records Office will agree that most of them did not have the faintest idea what they were doing. Beyond the immediate task of running a colony there was no grand plan, or if it existed it must have been in the realm of the tentative and the uncertain. Ann Laura Stoler makes this point when she shows that although rules of classification of peoples were produced by civil servants (in the Netherlands East Indies) they were ‘fash-

5 As an exception, see: A. Stoler, *Carnal Knowledge and Imperial power: Race and the Intimate in Colonial Rule*, Berkeley/Los Angeles 2002. For a critique of Dutch colonial historiography, see: J. Cote, *Strangers in the House: Dutch Historiography and Anglophone Trespassers*, in: *Review of Indonesian and Malaysian Affairs*, 43 (2009) 1, pp. 75-94.

6 A. Burton (ed.), *Gender, Sexuality and Colonial Modernities*, London 1999; D. Scott, *Refashioning Futures: Criticism after Postcoloniality*, Princeton 1999.

7 F. Cooper, *Colonialism in Question: Theory, Knowledge, History*, Berkeley 2005, p. 143.

8 G. Visvanathan, *Masks of Conquest: Literary Studies and British Rule in India*, New York 1989.

9 G. Prakash, *Another Reason: Science and the Imagination of Modern India*, Princeton 1999.

ioned from uncertain knowledge' and were an 'unruly and piecemeal venture at best'.¹⁰ The quality of colonial rule is better described as haphazard and tentative. So we must be mindful of the slippage in some scholarship from arguments that were articulated from within colonial regimes to an "essence of colonial rule" in the modern era.¹¹

We must also avoid facile causal explanations that are present in even the most sophisticated accounts of colonial rule where it is common to read colonial governmentality as the mechanism that led to the onset of colonial modernity and its alter ego capitalism in the colony. Colonial modernity in turn is made responsible for various transformations in the colony. Taking these as self-evident explanatory grids, 'modernity' is endowed with some kind of agency as in this example taken from a recent work on Africa: "What is more, given that modernity has engendered forms of social living that command our approbation in different parts of the world...."¹²

In this example modernity is given a causal significance. The danger with this type of explanation is that it casts away other types of analysis and other historical frames. Events surely happen owing to multiple agents, actions, forces and processes.

Furthermore, the framing already presupposes the answer. The 'why' question, crucial to the craft of the historian, disappears when a question is already framed through the lens of governmentality / modernity. So my first critique relates to the way the overall history of the 19th- and 20th-century colonized territories has been read by some scholars through the lens of colonial governmentality or colonial modernity, neglecting the other factors that generated change by assuming that colonial rules had a complete political and cultural authority over those it ruled.

2. Colonial Governmentality and Subaltern Studies

Another concern linked to this idea of essentialism is the way one case study (as India or Bengal) is used to make universal pronouncements and claims over colonialism – a phenomenon that spanned five centuries at least and all continents. Historians from India or using India as their archive have argued very forcefully that modern governmentality was imposed upon colonial subjects. From the late 1980s onwards this notion reoriented the way power was conceptualized in many studies of the British Raj and of other South Asian colonies and the way relations between colonizers and colonized were written about.

The most influential scholarship came indeed from the Subaltern Studies collective of Indian historians. Influenced by Foucault but also by Gramsci and rebelling both against the nationalist and the Marxist traditions in Indian history, they examined the ways in which the imposition of a kind of colonial governmentality in India shaped the very

10 A. L. Stoler, *Along the Archival Grain*, Princeton 2009.

11 F. Cooper, *Colonialism in Question* (footnote 7), p. 143.

12 O. Taiwo, *How Colonialism Preempted Modernity in Africa*, Bloomington 2009, p. 4.

conditions in which knowledge could be obtained and organized. Inspired by Bernard Cohn's pioneering work, their works centered on the importance British officials attached to institutions that defined the subject in relation to the state – the census, the survey, and more generally the collection of knowledge that defines a 'population' and can be used to maintain surveillance and superintend social change.¹³ These historians creatively adapted Foucault's paradigm by incorporating a reflection on resistance and what was being resisted. They questioned whether the Foucauldian approach gave adequate tools to understand the deflections, reinterpretations and reconfigurations to which indigenous peoples subjected colonial power systems. They saw a need to study how modes of power were received, lived and transcended.¹⁴ But in many ways by privileging texts and their exegesis over social being and materiality, subaltern historians tended to replicate the axioms and premises of colonial representations.¹⁵

These scholars explored to what extent the modes of governmentality that Michel Foucault had shown as characterizing modern Europe were deployed in a field of power that included the metropole and the colony, in this case India. Gyan Prakash for instance pointed out to what made colonial governmentality profoundly different from that which was being enacted in the West, was its absolute need for domination. Unlike in the West, he argued the purpose was to dominate in order to liberate.¹⁶

Where these scholars were less cautious was when they implicitly or explicitly applied the situation in Bengal or another region of India to the entire subcontinent and even to the other colonized worlds. In Sri Lanka, my own work on the construction of authenticity as Kandyan Sinhalese shows that colonial rule depended not only on making the individual subject understandable within the categories of the state, but on a collectivized and reified notion of traditional authority.¹⁷ So clearly there was no one single colonial situation which calls for a unifying colonial modernity. Cooper has pointed out that the situation was quite different in African countries such as Kenya where the first census was done in 1948. In many instances, colonial administrators saw little need to classify and count or see subjects with relation to the state, as they read them as belonging to tribes that were governed through the collectivity.¹⁸

While the Subaltern Studies tried to reveal that there existed a much richer range of oppositional movements and ways of thinking than colonial or nationalist elites were capable of seeing or acknowledging, they ignored the fact that other scholars in the field

13 B. S. Cohn, *An Anthropologist among Historians and Other Essays*, New Delhi 1991.

14 F. Cooper, *Colonialism in Question* (footnote 7), pp. 48-50.

15 Gayathi Spivak, however, encouraged and critiqued the work of the Subaltern Studies group. In her 'Can the Subaltern speak' in C. Nelson/L. Grossberg (eds.), *Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture*, Urbana Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1988, she takes issue with Michel Foucault and other postcolonial critiques for effacing their role as intellectuals in representing disempowered groups and letting the oppressed subjects speak for themselves.

16 G. Prakash, *Another Reason* (footnote 9).

17 Nira Wickramasinghe, *Sri Lanka in the Modern Age. A History of Contested Identities*, London C.Hurst and Honolulu University of Hawaii Press 2006, pp. 73-111.

18 F. Cooper, *Colonialism in Question* (footnote 7), p. 143.

of peasant studies were doing the same in a manner that explored forms of politics that had often led to alliances between elites and peasants. Their work shows that subalterns were quite readily and willingly mobilized by nationalists of various sorts, adopted on many occasions non-violent forms of struggle described as ‘elitist’ by Subaltern historians and participated in civil disobedience movements in a manner displaying their political consciousness. The politics of engagement were more complex than anti-colonial politics split between autonomous subalterns and colonized elites.¹⁹

Increasingly scholars questioned Ranajit Guha’s formulation that described the particular form of power in colonial situations as domination without hegemony – that gave rise to particular forms of subaltern politics in which the very non-hegemonic nature of the state allowed subaltern groups a considerable measure of autonomy. Chandavarkar for instance called out to find ways around “the sterile dichotomies of East and West, science and superstition, rationality and rumour which have enveloped the subject”.²⁰

Most colonial regimes of the 19th and 20th centuries combined coercive domination with hegemonic strategies such as dissemination of Christianity, European literature and science which trapped subjects within a web of beliefs and values.

3. Colonial Governmentality in Sri Lanka

I would like to turn to what I think is the most articulate and field defining work on governmentality that uses Sri Lanka as an archive; namely the work of anthropologist David Scott who developed a line of thinking to move toward a better understanding of the operation of colonial power.²¹ His influential piece set forth ways of understanding the political terrains that colonial power made possible: what new forms of subjectivity, society, and normalcy Europe’s insertion into the lives of the colonized organized and produced. He did so by working through one particular historical instance: what he called the “formation of Sri Lanka’s modernity”, which he traced back to British Ceylon’s Colebrooke-Cameron constitutional reforms of the early 1830s. These institutional changes, Scott skillfully argues constituted a crucial break with the past, ushering in Sri Lanka’s modernity by way of “the introduction of a new game of politics that the colonized would (eventually) be obliged to play if they were to be counted as political”.²² David Scott’s work is important because it moves away from the writing back at the West strategy of much of the work on colonialism where what is at stake is the way colonialism as a practice of power works to include or exclude the colonized (the epistemic violence

19 M. Mukherjee, Peasants in India’s Non-Violent Revolution: Practice and Theory, New Delhi 2004; R. O’Hanlon, Recovering the Subject: Subaltern Studies and Histories of Resistance in Colonial South Asia, in: Modern Asian Studies, 22 (1988) 1, pp. 189-224; R. O’Hanlon / D. Washbrook, After Orientalism: Culture, Criticism, and Politics in the Third World, in: Comparative Studies in Society and History, 34 (1992) 1, pp. 141-167.

20 R. Chandavarkar, Imperial Power and Popular Politics: Class Resistance and the State in India c. 1850–1950, Cambridge 1998.

21 D. Scott, Colonial Governmentality, in: Social Text, 43 (1995); D. Scott, Refashioning Futures (footnote 6).

22 D. Scott, Refashioning Futures (footnote 6), chapter 1.

of colonialist discourse). He tells us the story of Sri Lanka's colonial modernity along the axis of the displacement of one kind of political rationality – that of mercantilism or sovereignty up to 1832 – by another, that of governmentality with the Colebrooke-Cameron reforms. In a nutshell these reforms which followed the arrival of a commission of enquiry in 1830 introduced the idea of political representation, modern social institutions, and a capitalist plantation economy. In Scott's article and book, the move towards colonial modernity is described not in the language of modernization but read as a transformation of power, as colonial power adopting a different strategy and working on through different targets.

My own work on colonial petitions gives a somewhat different picture of 'colonial power' where power was much less routinized and normalized and colonial power was understood as made of different and often conflicting forces and individuals.²³ Let me give one example. Scott argues that through the creation of a modern public sphere colonized subjects were recast as modern subjects. But what then of those who were outside this enchanted circle, what then of 95 percent of the peoples? Their relation to the colonial state cannot be understood through the grid of governmentality. The form of political action – the petition – which they used was a political instrument that existed during Dutch colonialism (18th century) and if petitions did not succeed in obtaining their demands they rebelled. They were outside the field of governmentality and remained so well into the 20th century. The petition constituted the domain of those who were not yet ready for a 'civilized government', for the social groups that John Stuart Mill suggested were still under control of the Gods, the spirits and the supernatural beings and who did not frequent the same spheres as the bourgeois. Since they had no civic rights they used the petition to express their demands and sentiments. The petition is evidence of the presence of a dense and heterogeneous time in the colony where the times of the modern – of the quasi citizen and of the pre-modern – of populations – were coeval.²⁴ The petition can thus be understood as a democratic instrument and as a form of political action. But it is a double-edged instrument. It favoured direct contacts between plaintiffs and authorities but at the same time it did not encourage the formation of political institutions that represented rather than simply listened to grievances of the people. David Scott's analysis of colonial governmentality addressed only those groups that the colonial state included in its path towards progress, the English speaking westernized bourgeois classes. The politics and voices of the rest, literate in the vernaculars or illiterate who expressed their demands in various ways, are not heard. Empirical archival work would have revealed another world beyond the text of the Colebrook-Cameron report. Perhaps they would uncover singular notions of improvement or progress to which people laid claim; or they would show us peoples who reacted to colonial structures with varying

23 N. Wickramasinghe, *La Petition Coloniale. Objet de Controle, Objet de Dissidence*, in: *Identity, Culture and Politics: An Afro-Asian Dialogue*, 7 (2006) 1, pp. 82-97.

24 P. Chatterjee, *The Politics of the Governed: Reflections on Popular Politics in Most of the World*, New Delhi 2004.

degrees of instrumentality, or display evidence that people thought with little regard to the traditional / modern polarities or even outside that frame altogether.

The words, for instance, that are used today in Sinhala to describe the idea of modern, ‘nutana’ and ‘navina’, both from Sanskrit, came to common parlance after the 1930s. Martin Wickramasinghe, the most reputed Sri Lankan novelist of the 20th century, author of a seminal work entitled *Gampaleriya* or *The Changing Village*, used the term in his editorial columns in the two Sinhalese daily newspapers – the *Dinamina* and the *Silumina* – in the 1920s and 1930s and also in his other critical works. But in the late 19th century these words were not common. Most Sinhalese writers used the term ‘abhinava’ or ‘nava’ to denote the period, which literally means ‘new’. Some writers used the term ‘varthamana’ (the present, the now) to describe their time. For example John de Silva’s play *Sinhala Parabhavaya Natakaya* (1902), a satire on the upper-classes, uses the term ‘varthamana kalika’, literally the ‘present times’, in the introduction to the play. If an essential part of being modern is thinking you are modern, modernity was understood as an aspiration to be with the times. The term we use today (‘nuthanathvaya’) to translate ‘modernity’ was not used in the early twentieth century.²⁵

What is argued here is that the battles that were fought were not fought on the turf of modernity; the positions that were taken were framed differently. How did people understand their condition as dominated beings? How did they describe it in their own indigenous terms? As historians we owe it to the colonized peoples to understand their own framings or rationalities.²⁶

4. In Guise of Conclusion

Partha Chatterjee, building on Foucault argument, has pointed out that the ideas of participatory citizenship that were so much a part of the Enlightenment notion of politics have fast retreated before the triumphant advance of governmental technologies that have promised to deliver more well-being to more people at less cost.²⁷ “Citizens inhabit the domain of theory, populations the domain of policy”.²⁸ Michael Dutton who has traced what he calls the after-life of colonial governmentality has a different view on the part of disciplinary power. In major crises such as natural disasters or when it is necessary to re-establish norms of governance, “sovereign decisionism” – a term he borrows from Carl Schmitt – , “which is an overt form of political intervention, interrupts and overrides the everyday rationality of government”.²⁹ He argues that sovereign power and

25 Conversation with Sandagomi Coperehewa, Department of Sinhalese, University of Colombo.

26 For instance, see: J. D. Y. Peel, Olaju: A Yoruba Concept of Development, in: Journal of Development Studies, 14 (1978), pp. 139–165.

27 P. Chatterjee, The Politics of the Governed (footnote 21), p. 34.

28 Ibid.

29 M. Dutton, 911: The After-life of Colonial Governmentality, in: Postcolonial Studies, 12 (2009) 3, pp. 303–314, here p. 304.

disciplinary power worked together, merging into a discourse that attempted to occlude the political.³⁰ His work invites us to think again about the nature of the colonial state and its everyday impact on the lives of the dominated. Cooper argues that Foucault's reading of power as capillary based on European examples hardly fits colonial contexts where power can be described as arterial, strong near the nodal points of colonial authority but less able to impose its discursive grid elsewhere.³¹ Indeed in Sri Lanka, the Matara literature of early 19th century gives no reference to colonial rule, either the Dutch or the British, as though the presence and absence of colonial rule was irrelevant. Colonial rule was a shadow that loomed upon aspects of their lives that were more concerned with other forms of politics or other battles for power and distinction.³² In this sense, we can understand the violence of both the state of coloniality and what Mbembe calls the 'postcolony' as about the failure of the disciplinary technologies and governmentalized technologies of western modernity to produce modern rational subjects.³³

My own work has addressed the role of the census in framing identities and creating containers for people to use to claim entitlements from the state. But we have few historical sources to demonstrate that the local people's forms of self-representation actually changed. What many scholars documented was in fact the intentions and perceptions of colonial administrators. It is not clear how far the "colonization of the mind" went beyond the minds of missionaries and administrators. The reliance on colonial texts written in the language of the colonizer even read against the grain answers the near obsessive urge to understand how the native was 'represented', but gives us only part of the story, however compelling it might be. Too much lazy scholarly work, which involves a scant use of indigenous sources and limited visits to archives, has paid much attention to the way natives are represented – what Ann Stoler calls "the representation machines" – rather than how they negotiate with colonial state institutions and the market. Furthermore, the global market outside the frame of empire and new consumption forms surely played a role in the shaping of people's perceptions and worldviews in the late 19th century. Historians of the colonial have often overlooked global connections in their refusal to see the colonized/disempowered as purely "consumers of modernity" and eagerness to see them moving in uncontaminated autonomous cultures that create a reservoir of anti-colonialism. If modern subjects were actually created, it was also through various mechanisms and efforts that involved appropriating and deflecting colonial policies. Colonial governmentality is best used as a grid alongside others to understand the relations between colonized and colonizers.

30 Ibid.

31 F. Cooper, *Colonialism in Question* (footnote 7), p. 48.

32 See: N. Wickramasinghe, *Sri Lanka in the Modern Age: A History of Contested Identities*, London 2006, p. 11.

33 A. Mbembe, *On the Postcolony*, Berkeley 2001.

Foucault Hardly Came to Africa: Some Notes on Colonial and Post- Colonial Governmentality

Michael Pesek

RESÜMEE

Michel Foucault widmete in seiner Analyse von Machtbeziehungen der kolonialen Situation keinerlei Aufmerksamkeit. Nichtsdestoweniger eröffnete sich für eine neue Generation von Afrikahistorikern in den 1980ern mit Foucaults Konzepten von Gouvernementalität und Disziplinarmacht neue Perspektiven auf koloniale Machtverhältnisse. Sie ermöglichen vor allem, den bis dahin vorherrschenden Fokus auf den kolonialen Staat als zentralen Akteur kolonialer Herrschaft zu hinterfragen. Darüber hinaus rückten kulturelle Aspekte kolonialer Herrschaft stärker in den Vordergrund. Doch Foucaults Konzepte waren an europäischer Geschichte geschult. Die Herausbildung der politischen Rationalität, die Foucault mit Gouvernementalität beschrieben sowie der Karriere von Disziplinartechniken im Reservoir der Mächtigen fußten auf historischen Prozessen, die wenig mit kolonialer Herrschaft gemein hatten. Der Artikel fragt nach den Konsequenzen dieser Differenzen für das Konzept einer kolonialen Gouvernementalität. Dabei geht es vor allem um die räumlichen und zeitlichen Dimensionen kolonialer Herrschaft.

1. Foucault in Tunis

In 1965, at the age of thirty, Michel Foucault moved to Tunisia to teach at the University of Tunis. It was his first appointment as professor and his last stopover before he returned to France after years of travel through Europe and Latin America. When Foucault arrived in Tunisia in search for the mystic picture of the Orient and for personal freedom, as he wrote in his diary, Tunisia was in-midst of turmoil.¹ The country was among the

1 R. Ruffing, Michel Foucault, Paderborn 2008.

first French colonies in Africa to become independent in 1956. During the following years it struggled with the birth pangs of post-colonial societies: with political factionalism, experiments in social engineering and with various political ideologies from socialism to Pan-Africanism and Pan-Arabism. It struggled with its national identity and for the demarcation of its national boundaries and in particular against its former colonial power France. Surprisingly, Foucault, who could hardly neglect the social and political struggles within Tunisian post-colonial society, did not elaborate much on colonial and post-colonial societies in his main oeuvre, although he sometimes referred to his Tunisian experiences in interviews and in his diaries. Whilst in Tunisia Foucault worked on his *Archaeology of Knowledge*, a tour de force through several hundred years of European history of ideas.²

Although Foucault did not take note of colonialism in his main works, his ideas made it into African studies. I will follow some of the traces of Foucault's work in the history of colonial, post-colonial and post-post-colonial Africa.³ There are several limitations towards what this paper aims to do and what it can not do. The main discussion will be based on the concept of governmentality, as it was developed by Foucault in his later works. Foucault developed this concept of governmentality on the basis of European history, notably the history of France. When it was adapted by Africanist scholars, they often did so to overcome concepts that, due to their origin in European history, were regarded as "iron cages" of Western concepts.⁴ The question therefore is to which extent governmentality helped to escape these "iron cages" and at which costs?

2. African Historians and Foucault

This paper will not follow the footsteps of Edward Said, who with his work *Orientalism* introduced Foucault into post-colonial studies, or Valentin Yves Mudimbe, who did this for Africa.⁵ Although I am aware that Foucault's analysis of power and governance and his discourse analysis are somehow two sides of the same coin, his reception by post-colonial studies on the one side and by historians and political scientists on the other seem to be based on different readings of Foucault's œuvre. I argue that most authors who are inspired by Foucault's discourse analysis are more interested in what happened

2 M. Foucault, Die Ordnung der Dinge. Eine Archäologie der Humanwissenschaften, Frankfurt am Main 1989. For a general overview on Foucault's silence on colonialism, see: R. J. C. Young, Foucault on Race and Colonialism, <http://www.robertjcyoung.com/Foucault.pdf>.

3 For a postulation of the end of the post-colonial era in Africa, see: C. Clapham, Discerning the New Africa, in: International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-), (1998), pp. 263-269, here p. 263; C. Young, The End of the Post-Colonial state in Africa? Reflections on Changing African Political Dynamics, in: African Affairs, 410 (2004), pp. 23-49, here p. 24.

4 M. Foucault, Society Must be Defended: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1975-76, New York 2003; M. Foucault, Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1977-78, Basingstoke / New York 2007.

5 E. W. Said, Orientalism, New York 1978; V. Y. Mudimbe, The Invention of Africa: Gnosis, Philosophy, and the Order of Knowledge, Bloomington, 1988.

in the colonial metropolis than in Africa. Only a few authors have traced the production and impact of European discourses to colonial encounters in Africa.⁶ Within this indifference towards the impact of discourse on social reality they might have been closer to Foucault than other historians. Callewaert notes that Foucault was not a sociologist or a social historian:

*He wrote only very marginally about forms of exercise of power, or about power as an aspect of discourse. He always wrote about how the exercise of power is thought of, conceptualized and expressed, placed on stage and thousand-fold turned around in many different types of discourses, from scientific analysis to handouts for practical implementation, from discursive practices to non-discursive procedures. He never claimed that you can, from these discourses, conclude what people, professions, social classes, governments do, what is put into action, what materializes in the real world. Even when he is speaking of bio-power, of the techniques of disciplining the body, of governmentality, he is not describing and explaining social history, but the history of knowledge.*⁷

Nevertheless did this not prevent social historians and anthropologists like Jean and John Comaroff or Megan Vaughan to regard Foucault more as a historian than he perhaps had actually been. The inspiration these historians derived from Foucault was rather one of perspective than of theory. Foucault himself occasionally denied to see his work as theory and tended to see it more as a tool-kit.⁸ Foucault's denial to have formulated a coherent body of theory and the often sketchy nature of his later work makes it not easier to discuss Foucault's impact on African Studies.⁹ Nevertheless one may follow Bruce Berman in his observation that such an ostentatious refusal was something that met with a growing dislike among historians and political scientist for universalising theories in the 1980s. Foucault came with the soft appeal of post-modernist theory-making.¹⁰ The first generation of African historians as well as sociologists and political scientists had widely used models and theories that they derived from their parent disciplines. Historians usually adapted the model of the nation state transferred from European history to their research in Africa. They wrote national histories for the emerging nation states of post-colonial Africa. Political scientists described the political change of Africa in terms of modernisation.¹¹ The 1980s saw an increasing uneasiness with this situation. Already in 1976, the doyen of African history, Terence Ranger, spoke of a "state of crisis" of African history.¹² In his programmatic article on a "new agenda" of history in South Africa,

6 Among them C. Crais, M. Vaughan, Jean and John Coamroff.

7 S. Callewaert, Bourdieu, Critic of Foucault: The Case of Empirical Social Science against Double-Game-Philosophy, in: Theory, Culture & Society (2006), pp. 73-98, here p. 91.

8 R. Deacon, An analytics of Power Relations: Foucault on the History of Discipline, in: History of the Human Sciences (2002), pp. 89-117, here p. 91.

9 G. Ó Tuathail, Critical Geopolitics: The Politics of Writing Global Space, 1996, p. 8.

10 B. J. Berman, A Palimpsest of Contradictions: Ethnicity, Class, and Politics in Africa, in: The International Journal of African Historical Studies (2004), pp. 13-31, here p. 14.

11 J. Miller, History and Africa/Africa and History, in: American Historical Review (1999), pp. 1-32, here p. 9.

12 Ranger cited in A. Hopkins, Africa's Age of Improvement, in: History in Africa (1980), pp. 141-160, here p. 142.

Ran Greenstein thus promoted Foucault as a way to heal the tensions between history and theory. Instead of looking for the applicability of universalising theories, historians should “focus [more] on the concrete ways in which social forces interact under specific circumstances”.¹³ Foucault’s importance for African studies therefore lies to some extent in the fact that he marks a generation gap and alternation that took place in the 1980s. South Africa was and remains until today a major case study for historians inspired by Foucault’s concept of governmentality. There was a strong French influence on South African historians even before Foucault, notably the French Annales School. This “French connection” has probably contributed to an early reception of Foucault.¹⁴ In 1985 Jean Comaroff published her history of Christian missionaries in southern Africa.¹⁵ It became one of the first major works in African history that explicitly used Foucaultian concepts and terms for its analysis. The introduction illustrates the change in paradigm from Marxist and Weberian understandings of hegemonic ideology and colonial rule towards post-structuralist notions of discourse and disciplinary power. Her main question is how to locate missionaries into the orbit of colonialism. In contrast to earlier studies missionaries neither easily sided with the colonial state nor were positioned outside the colonial project. Foucault surely introduced her to a new way of puzzling together the many different agents of colonial rule and, as she later noted, to deconstruct “the master narrative of European imperial expansion – or, rather, its narrative of mastery – [that] would place the state at the centre of the story”.¹⁶ In the case of the Tswana, who lived along the Molopo River at the very periphery of the colony, the colonial state was only second to arrive at the scene. Long before the Tswana formally became part of British Bechuanaland in 1885 the Tswana encountered protestant missionaries and Boer settlers. Underlying this history was a spatial argument. What she describes is the establishment of a colonial order at the very periphery that was co-authored by many agencies. Colonial rule here could not be taken as something that was initiated, exclusively maintained and controlled by the state agency because the state was lately and then rarely present. But what connected all these different agencies with each other? In *Body of Power, Spirit of Resistance* it was a common ideology rooted in the doctrines of 19th century Protestantism and Victorian culture. Some years later, in *Of Revelation and Revolution*, which Jean Comaroff published together with her husband John, the nearly absent colonial state at the very periphery of colonial territory had finally given way to an analysis of power in terms of culture. The Tswana were not so much conquered by Europeans, but converted to their civilising mission. If one looks at the political rationality of colonial governance,

13 R. Greenstein, The Study of South African Society: Towards a New Agenda for Comparative Historical Inquiry, in: *Journal of Southern African Studies* (1994), pp. 641–661, here p. 643.

14 W. Clarence-Smith, For Braudel: A Note on the Ecole des Annales and the Historiography of Africa, in: *History in Africa* (1977), pp. 275–281, here p. 278.

15 J. Comaroff, *Body of Power, Spirit of Resistance: The Culture and History of a South African People*, London / Chicago, 1985.

16 J. L. Comaroff, Governmentality, Materiality, Legality, Modernity, in: J.-G. Deutsch / P. Probst / H. Schmidt (eds.), *African Modernities: Entangled Meanings in Current Debate*, Oxford 2002, pp. 107–134, here p. 109.

the civilising mission would certainly be a first-class candidate because it helped the Comaroffs to connect different agents and different spheres of colonial rule. Nevertheless, behind the palimpsests of Tswana's complicity they assume a local authorship in these processes that authors in the 1990s described as localisation of modernity.¹⁷

Timothy Mitchell was not looking at the periphery but at the very centre of a colonial project in his work *Colonizing Egypt* published in 1988. The main discussion in the book is based on Cairo, which was not only the administrative centre but also the model for the future transformation of the whole of Egypt. Mitchell started his study on Egypt with the argument that techniques of disciplinary power originated not in central Europe but in colonial possessions. The first panoptic spaces of power were created in colonial India.¹⁸ For Mitchell this seems to have been more than merely an accident, because the disciplining of a society is a profoundly colonial project. In contrast to the Comaroffs, Mitchell does not attribute the emergence of particular techniques of disciplinary power to a hybrid authorship at the periphery, but to the (nearly) uncontested ability of colonial rulers to enforce new schemes. To colonise Cairo meant to infiltrate, reorder and transform existing spaces and to create new social spaces from the drawing board. It was an attempt to remodel Egypt as a barracks square and to gain extensive control over economic production. It was a project that reached from the creation of a new educational system to the town-planning of Cairo and to the statistical survey of Egypt. The territory, which the colonial state claimed as his sovereignty space, was constructed as a spatial framework for colonial knowledge production and policing.

Mitchell's rewriting of the colonial project in Egypt as a steady process in which patterns of colonial governmentality covered the whole territory, was not easily reproducible in other parts of the African continent. Notably in Sub-Saharan Africa (with the exception of South Africa) colonial rulers lacked the resources and often the intention to develop the institutional prerequisites for modern governmentality. Most authors therefore turned to describe fragments of such a governmentality. Megan Vaughan's work on colonial politics of disease control and lunatic asylums gave way to a new field of inquiry into colonial governmentality.¹⁹ What looks at first as a classical topic for a Foucaultian analysis results in a balanced view on the limits of governmentality in colonial contexts. While Vaughan finds similar patterns in medical metropolitan and colonial discourses, she remains sceptical with regard to the second aspect of the "medical knowledge / power

17 J. Comaroff/J. L. Comaroff, *Of Revelation and Revolution: Christianity, Colonialism, and Consciousness in South Africa*, Chicago 1991.

18 T. Mitchell, *Colonising Egypt*, Berkeley 1988, p. 35. For a similar argument, see: P. Pels, *The Anthropology of Colonialism: Culture, History and the Emergence of Western Governmentality*, in: *Annual Review of Anthropology* (1997), pp. 163-183, here p. 174.

19 M. Vaughan, *Idioms of Madness: Zomba Lunatic Asylum, Nyasaland, in the Colonial Period*, in: *Journal of Southern African Studies* (1983), pp. 218-238; M. Vaughan, *Famine Analysis and Family Relations: 1949 in Nyasaland*, in: *Past & Present*, 1 (1985), p. 177; M. Vaughan, *The Story of an African Famine: Gender and Famine in Twentieth-Century Malawi*, Cambridge 1987; M. Vaughan, *Syphilis in Colonial East and Central Africa: The Social Construction of an Epidemic*, in: T. O. Ranger/P. Slack (eds.), *Epidemics and Ideas: Essays on the Historical Perception of Pestilence*, Cambridge 1992, pp. 269-302.

complex". Many of the biomedical theories and interventions failed in southern Africa, because they did not fit into the political and social context of either colonial order or local African societies. The impact of colonial health control was limited by the colonial state's meagre resources and knowledge about the African population. Due to this they were hardly "modern states" as they relied much more on occasional displays of repressive power than on everyday techniques of surveillance and control. Moreover did the colonial discourse on health not play such a central role for the colonial administration as it did in Europe, which only in times of crisis, such as famine and epidemics, went back to schemes that can be described as politics of population. Further did colonial health discourses not easily acquire dominance over local knowledge; its *dispositifs* were based on quite different understandings and cultures of the body than they were common in local cultures.²⁰ What differentiates metropolitan governmentality from its colonial counterpart was, according to Vaughan, the inability of the later to create "total worlds" that bound most Africans into an everyday regime of governmentality and disciplinary power.²¹ Frederick Cooper thus doubted in 1994 the Foucaultian paradigm of "capillary power" in the case of colonial order. Power in colonial societies, he wrote, "was more arterial than capillary-concentrated spatially and socially, not very nourishing beyond such domains, and in need of a pump to push it from moment to moment and place to place".²²

If the colonial rulers achieved to create a "new, self-regulating field of the social", they succeeded only in certain places or in certain situations.²³ Certainly colonial rule was thought by its proponents and agents in ways that were influenced by European models, although, as Scott mentioned, there were significant differences how these "European models" were perceived.²⁴ The history of colonial governmentality should be written as the history of transfer, which up until now has only been approached by a few authors. Neither political development in Europe nor in Africa occurred along straight lines. "There are significant alterations and discontinuities in European conceptions and practices of political power", Scott wrote.²⁵ So it was with the colonies. As one author has rightfully noted, colonial rule was characterised by a "simultaneity of the non-simultaneous".²⁶ Different stages of colonial penetration in different places resulted in different political rationalities. The politics of conquest existed next door to the establishment of centres of administration and "islands of cash-crop production".²⁷ In contrast to this heterogeneous mix of political rationality it seems to me that Foucault is rather assum-

20 M. Vaughan, *Curing Their Ills: Colonial Power and African Illness*, Cambridge 1991, p. 10.

21 Ibid., p. 12.

22 F. Cooper, *Conflict and Connection: Rethinking Colonial African History*, in: *The American Historical Review* (1994), pp. 1516-1545, here p. 1533.

23 D. Scott, *Colonial Governmentality*, in: *Social Text*, 43 (1995), pp. 191-220, p. 203.

24 Ibid., p. 198.

25 Ibid., p. 204.

26 A. Wirz, *Körper, Raum und Zeit der Herrschaft*, in: A. Wirz / A. Eckert / K. Bromber (eds.), *Alles unter Kontrolle – Disziplinierungsverfahren im kolonialen Tanzania (1850–1960)*, Köln 2003, pp. 5-34.

27 Cooper, *Conflict and Connection* (footnote 22), p. 1533.

ing that governmentality is characterised by the accomplishment of single or at least a dominant political rationality.

Nevertheless, was this not only a question of different political traditions and experiences of colonial politics, but also of different agents of colonial rule. I have argued elsewhere that the ability of the colonial state to maintain its prerogative of interpretation over its politics and agency was quite limited.²⁸ Metropolitan discourses on modern political rationality certainly reached the colonies. But they did so in meticulous ways. The transfer occurred through many channels, not all of them were in the hand of colonial bureaucracies. Missionaries usually had an important share, but an often different agenda from colonial bureaucrats. Their involvement in colonial rule was complex. In German colonies missionaries were often seen by the colonial administration as rivals for the prerogative of sovereignty in the colonial project. Many agents of the colonial state, especially the colonial military, showed little interest in the civilising mission of colonialism, while missionaries saw this as the main goal of the colonial project. Colonial rule was seen by colonial officers, who, in the first years, gained an important influence over colonial politics, in terms of enforcement of brute power over Africans. Moreover did most colonial officers and bureaucrats belong to the Prussian nobility in contrast to the missionaries, who came from the lower and middle classes of the country side of East Elbia.²⁹ Furthermore we have to consider that in most colonial projects Europeans were a minority. The colonial order, whether it manifested itself in administrative practices, at barrack squares, in plantations, in hospitals and missions, was made up by Africans. These intermediaries of colonial rule were ordered to count huts for taxation, to report about their societies, or to exercise punishments and health campaigns. Governmentality assumes certain complicity and a common understanding of the political rationalities. Most studies on the role of intermediaries have shown that the Africans developed their own views and goals of colonial rule.³⁰

One may argue that the difficulty of the colonial state to gain dominance over the colonial project was a result of its teething troubles. But the history of colonial rule cannot be written as a successive enforcement of European political rationalities. By the end of the First World War colonial rulers became, as Cooper notes, increasingly frustrated by their failure to remodel African societies. The declaration of “indirect rule” as an official goal of colonial politics can thus be regarded as an attempt to rationalise or spirit away this

28 M. Pesek, *Koloniale Herrschaft in Deutsch-Ostafrika: Expeditionen, Militär und Verwaltung seit 1880*, Frankfurt am Main 2005.

29 M. Pesek, *Islam und Politik in Deutsch-Ostafrika, 1905–1919*, in: A. Wirz / K. Bromber / A. Eckert (eds.), *Alles unter Kontrolle – Disziplinierungsverfahren im kolonialen Tanzania (1850–1960)*, Hamburg 2003, pp. 99–140.

30 M. Klein, *African Participation in Colonial Rule: The Role of Clerks, Interpreters, and Other Intermediaries*, in: B. N. Lawrence / E. L. Osborn / R. L. Roberts (eds.), *Intermediaries, Interpreters, and Clerks: African Employees in the Making of Colonial Africa*, Madison 2006, pp. 273–285; D. Van Den Berselaar, *Acknowledging Knowledge: Dissemination and Reception of Expertise in Colonial Africa*, in: *History in Africa*, (2006), pp. 389–393; A. Eckert, *Regulating the Social: Social Security, Social Welfare and the State in Late Colonial Tanzania*, in: *The Journal of African History* (2004), pp. 467–489.

failure as a change in the paradigms of their politics.³¹ In fact it was a partial capitulation in face of this failure to gain dominance over local political rationalities.

Foucault saw the emergence of a new form of political rationality (governmentality) as a reaction to the “demographic explosion” and industrialisation. This was based on a growing economic and administrative and coercive potential of the state in the 18th and 19th centuries as well as new technologies and knowledge. Authority was thought and eventually constituted around discursive and coercive techniques for disciplining space, populations and individuals in order to create a new “modern” system of production and consumption. If Foucault concentrates on the emergence of the discourse rather than social realities, he is assuming a certain historical symbiosis between discourses of governmentality and the social and political transformation of European societies. Governmentality is a discourse that corresponds with and results in the bureaucratization of the main sectors of societies: their economies, their political institutions and places of socialisation. The political rationality of governmentality connects these main sectors of societies and enables a mutual transfer of concepts and practices between them. Thus political institutions are able to embed economical discourses and goals. Places of socialisation like the family or the school share concepts and practices with places of power and economics, like the barrack square or the factory, etc.

The diffusion of governmentality into society results in the normalisation of power. This is, according to Foucault, a continuous process of investigating, disciplining and regulating subjects. Disciplinary and regulatory power presupposes mechanisms of power, which are already present and become effective in its establishment and dispersal. The presence of modern states in everyday life is thus rarely a problem and not only because of their developed administrative structures. While ordering the time and space of its society power realises itself in spatial and temporal configurations, creating and displaying itself in “serial rooms”.³² Just as the dispositions of the state are present in its institutions they are also incorporated in its subjects. In the disciplinary society, the modern state tries to create its counterpart: a society that shares its dispositions and therefore, so to speak, understands its orders and, to a certain extent, agrees to the legitimacy of its actions. What Gregory describes as the “inherently spatializing” character of disciplinary power is its ability to penetrate and transform social space with its presence or representations of its presence.³³ The modern state develops an overwhelming visibility by occupying its territory with representations of its power (monuments, administrative buildings, uniforms of its agents, etc.). Its disciplinary power is, due to its unspectacular normality, almost invisible in everyday life.³⁴ With these newly regimes of sovereign

31 Cooper, Conflict and Connection (footnote 22), p. 1531.

32 G. Deleuze, Foucault, Frankfurt am Main 1992.

33 D. Gregory, Geographical Imaginations, Cambridge 1994, p. 28.

34 M. Foucault, Überwachen und Strafen: Die Geburt des Gefängnisses, Frankfurt am Main 1976, p. 259; M. Foucault, Dispositive der Macht: Über Sexualität, Wissen und Wahrheit, Berlin 1978, p. 35.

authority a new regime of visibility and representation of the sovereign emerged.³⁵ The baroque state-rituals of the past were increasingly replaced by mundane and invisible representations of governmentality. The new disciplinary techniques produced a reversed visibility of power. Whereas power was by then visibly embodied in the sovereign, disciplinary power is much more “exercised through its invisibility”. If the visibility of power fades away in the mundane and everyday-life, the subjects of power are forced “to come into view, since their visibility assures the hold of the power exercised over them”.³⁶ This new visibility of subjects is assured by the creation of spatial arrangements of societies (the prison, the modern city) and new technologies of knowing as they emerged with sciences, in particular medicine, criminology, pedagogy, mathematics and social sciences, and bureaucratic practices in the last two hundred years.

Colonial governmentality did not emerge in such a historical symbiosis. It was brought to Africa by the conquest even if it was not always connected with the exercise of brute force. Colonial conquest was not only a military endeavour, but also a political project that aimed to fundamentally change African societies. If colonial governmentality was the result of such a conquest, then we have to take the specific feature of a colonial order in the making into account. James C. Scott suggested that historians should concentrate on how the targets of colonial power were formulated and in which fields of operation colonial power emerged and was maintained.³⁷ Although there were certainly “historically heterogeneous rationalities through which the political sovereignties of colonial rule were constructed and operated”, I am going to suggest some common characteristics of colonial governmentality, which resulted from specific spatial and temporal fields of operation of colonial power.

3. The Anti-Westphalian Colonial State

The dispersal of the idea of the territorial state around the globe is historically connected to the era of European imperialism and colonialism. With imperialism, as Clifton Crais argues, “mapping of frontiers and the creation of boundaries between polities gained special prominence in the European political imagination”.³⁸ The process of exploring, mapping and conquering the African continent, often occurring simultaneously, was the prelude to a colonial transformation aimed at creating political entities that fitted into European political imaginations. Mapping was often among the first acts of colonial

35 M. Foucault, *Die Ordnung der Diskurse*, Frankfurt am Main 1991; Foucault, *Society Must be Defended* (footnote 4), p. 249.

36 G. Deleuze, *What is a Dispositif*, in: T. J. Armstrong (ed.), *Michael Foucault: Philosopher*, New York 1992, pp. 159-168, here p. 160; N. Gordon, *On Visibility and Power: An Arendtian Corrective of Foucault*, in: *Human Studies*, (2002), pp. 712-145, here p. 131.

37 Scott, *Colonial Governmentality* (footnote 23), pp. 191-220, p. 193.

38 C. C. Crais, *Conquest, State Formation, and the Subaltern Imagination in Rural South Africa*, in: Id. (ed.), *The Culture of Power in Southern Africa: Essays on State Formation and The Political Imagination*, Portsmouth 2003, pp. 27-48, here p. 32.

conquerors, and creating these maps more precisely and adding knowledge about the population belonged to the first duties of the colonial administrators. Mapping, counting bodies and property, entitling populations and rulers “were central to the creation of colonial subjects, their disciplining, and control over their bodies and their movements”.³⁹ The history of European colonialism can therefore be written as a process “in which colonial practices were inscribed both physically and psychologically on the territories and peoples subject to colonial control”.⁴⁰ The question remains how far-reaching and how successful this colonial intervention was.

In Europe’s colonial empires sovereignty was stripped off its territorial dimension. It was a recourse on pre-Westphalian models of core zones of sovereignty.⁴¹ For colonial bureaucrats and politicians in the metropolis the question of territoriality / sovereignty seemed not to be of high priority. The Congo Conference of 1884 outlined how to establish claims over a territory and not, as is sometimes stated, define the borders of colonial territories. Thus the final documents of the conference can be read as a manifesto of colonial statehood. Colonial occupation was thought to be a prelude of a series of juridical rituals performed by Europeans in front of an African public. Protection treaties negotiated with African rulers legitimized colonisation in accordance with international law and marked the region as a sphere of influence against European rivals. By hoisting a flag of some kind (not always the national, but, as in the case of the Congo Free State, the Star-Spangled Banner) at the residence of an African ruler, the approbation was symbolically as well as actually performed. The Europeans, who were present in these initial moments of colonial state-building, did not always hold an official mandate of a European Government to act as its representative. Henry Morton Stanley made his treaties with African Chiefs in the Congo Basin while on an official mission of the Belgian King Leopold II. The King was not the actual head of the Belgian state; in fact he was by then no more than a private investor, who was tricking the European public by posing as the head of state. The notorious Carl Peters, who travelled in 1883 to East Africa to conclude protection treaties with East African chiefs, did so without an official approval by the German Empire. Originally he thought of establishing his very own private empire, which he wished to sell off to the highest bidding protecting power. Only when he presented his treaties on the eve of the Congo Conference did he receive his official mandate from the German Emperor. The same conference entitled the Belgian King as a sovereign over his shadow possessions in the Congo and with him Stanley as his official representative. In the bargaining atmosphere of the Congo-Conference not only colonial

39 Ibid., p. 33.

40 R. Young, *Colonial Desire: Hybridity in Theory, Culture and Race*, London 1995, p. 173.

41 The Westphalian process, starting in the middle of the 17th century, eventually led to the emergence of the territorial state as the dominant political order in Europe. Although there is a lengthy debate on the significance of the Treaty of Westphalia for this process, one can indeed argue that before the 17th century sovereignty was not necessarily bound to territoriality. The Holy Roman Empire with its complex dependent and tributary relationships was oscillating around the political figure of the Emperor. The sovereignty vested in the Emperor did not exceed a core territory or even the place where he actually resided.

territories were made but also their sovereigns. In 1884 the German delegation voted for a European sovereignty/territoriality model to be adopted for defining the validity of claims at the Berlin Congo-Conference. European colonial powers were assured of their claims by rivals only after they proved to have established a sound administrative network throughout the country. Nevertheless the German novices in colonial empire-building were quickly advised by the British that the implementation of European standards of statehood would be too costly. The British prevailed with their views and the Germans soon experienced the advantages that came with a low-level engagement in colonial state-building.⁴²

This juridical choreography of colonisation was, vaguely defined as it was, unsoundly based on international law. An African ruler – whose power was seldom based on territorial rights – was declared a sovereign over a territory with whom one could negotiate the cession of that territory. Sovereignty was thus “invented as an unavoidable part of colonial conquest because of the necessity of identifying the political subjects of empire”.⁴³ Simultaneously, this however invented sovereignty of African rulers over a certain territory was denied to him by the European concept of “ownerless sovereignty”. This concept negated per se the existence of states and statehood in Africa. It was partly the result of Europe’s limited knowledge of African political structures; partly it was a strategy to legitimise colonial projects. Before Africa was conquered, its political landscape had to be erased and its rulers de-legitimised as cruel and irresponsible tyrants by colonial discourse.

Once the colonial state set its first footholds on the African soil the anti-Westphalian nature of the colonial state became obvious. The Westphalian state established a particular regime of visibility. As in most other colonial projects, colonial rulers in German Eastern Africa for instance struggled with their presence and therefore with their ability to project the sovereignty over its African subjects in their daily life over many years. The presence of colonial rulers, like in most other colonial territories, was scattered on “islands of rule”. Colonial economies were merely “islands of cash crop production”.⁴⁴ Sovereignty was vested in the use of state-symbols and in the performance of state-rituals and rituals of statehood. It was vested in simulations of a territorial state. Notwithstanding, the Westphalian model remained a strong imagination for colonial politics. The territorial image still prevailed in the everyday colonial politics and thus created it as an imagination.⁴⁵ Colonial expeditions stopped at the borders of the colonies even if they chased resisting Africans. Bureaucratic practises of report and accounting created the colonial territory as a framework that was defined by spatial categories. The introduction of currencies imagined the colonial territory as a single market. Colonial festivities like

42 C. Young, *The African Colonial State in Comparative Perspective*, New Haven 1994, p. 96.

43 C. C. Crais, Custom and The Politics of Sovereignty in South Africa, in: *Journal of Social History*, 3 (2006), pp. 721-740, here p. 727.

44 Cooper, *Conflict and Connection* (footnote 22), pp. 1516-1545, p. 1529.

45 A. M. Brighenti, On Territoriology: Towards a General Science of Territory, in: *Theory, Culture & Society* (2010), pp. 52-72, here p. 57.

the birthday of the Emperor, the Queen and the 14th July were invented by the colony as a territory. They were to be held at every colonial station in the German, French and British colonies and later also reported in the newspapers of the colony and in administrative reports.

The question of the territoriality of the colonial state may thus open new perspectives on the sovereignty of the colonial state. My first point to make here is that the territoriality / sovereignty nexus of the colonial state can be seen as an exchange coin in global politics at the end of the 19th century. Since the Westphalian process in 1644 territoriality had emerged as the dominant way to describe the spatial dimensions of sovereignty in Europe. During the partition of Africa on negotiation tables of 19th century European diplomacy this sovereignty / territoriality nexus was also the blueprint for the political landscape of colonial Africa. Nevertheless, the imperial expansion became also the first major event in the history of Europe to challenge the Westphalian nexus of sovereignty / territoriality.

4. The Politics of Campaigning

What is often neglected in studies of colonial governmentality is the question of time. Foucault describes the emergence of the new rationality of governance as a gradual process over a time span of nearly three hundred years or more. In order to become an effective form of governance, this new rationality has to lodge itself into the everyday-life of its subjects. This is something that cannot be achieved overnight and time, or more exactly, durability is the important resource of governmentality. Had the colonial rulers of Africa enough time to impose colonial governmentality as a political rationality? This is thereby not an accident that South Africa became the heartland of Foucaultians not only due to the “French connection” but also because colonial rule with its relative long history there opened a window for a longue durée investigation into colonial rule. South Africa is the most ancient project of modern colonialism in Africa. It was founded as a Dutch settlement in 1652, nearly 250 years before the scramble for Africa started in most parts of the continent. The initial phase of colonial conquest started here at the end of the 18th century, a hundred years before it did for most of Africa. If we speak of colonial history in southern Africa we are dealing with a time-frame of more than two hundred years, which is hardly the case for most parts of Africa where the colonial episode was usually far briefer. In most colonial territories of Sub-Saharan Africa, where the initial phase of colonial conquest only ended with the end of the First World War, colonial rule became settled in the inter-war years.⁴⁶

The First World War was a watershed between the period of colonial conquest and the emergence of colonial governance. In most parts of Africa, the politics of conquest had

46 C. Young, *The African Colonial State* (footnote 41); J. I. Herbst, *States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control*, 2000.

not coincided with a pervasive institutionalisation of colonial rule. One reason for the underdeveloped colonial state during the period of colonial conquest was the fact that the conquest afforded relatively few resources. In most colonial projects, the number of troops used for the conquest hardly exceeded a few thousand. Measured against the huge territories, the administrative staff was comparatively small. Nevertheless, the anti-Westphalian nature of the colonial state in the making limited the goals of colonial conquest. In many places, the establishment of colonial rule took more the character of a fragile armistice than it led to the establishment of effective patterns of colonial administration. This changed with the First World War. The war efforts of the involved colonial powers resulted in the introduction of new forms of bureaucratic rule and economic management. This was particularly the case in Eastern Africa, where the military confrontation between Allied and German forces lasted four years. New needs and chances arose during that period to transform the largely unknown African into a member of a population. In British East Africa the newly created Military Labour Bureau issued thousands of identity cards for military labourers, which, after the war, became a basis for the bureaucratic management of colonial labour force. With military labour came the registration and military training. Investigations into the food-habits and health of Africans produced a knowledge that formed the basis of colonial bio-politics. Nevertheless, the colonial panopticum had a limited reach; so it was with colonial policies. Within the context of the war economy of British East Africa the colonial state mustered resources till then unavailable but only limited to the short period of time of the war. By the end of the war, some projects prevailed, but many were quickly abandoned because they threatened to exceed the meagre budgets of colonial administrations.⁴⁷

It is worth mentioning that one of the first moments when we can speak of the emergence of a sort of colonial governmentality is connected to a crisis. The inter-war period was in this regard a time of transition. With the introduction of Indirect Rule the colonial state disengaged from a further penetration of African societies. On the other hand, this period saw in most African colonial territories an increasing grip of colonial rulers on African societies. There were investigations on all matters of life of Africans. For the aim of tax gathering Africans were counted and categorised. To fit into the principles of indirect rule, which was introduced at the beginning of the 20th century by most colonial governments in one form or another, Africans had to be drawn up as separate social and political populations. Whereas the imagination of Africans as populations was based on similar techniques of counting, categorizing and investigating like in the metropolis, it was not aimed at the production of homogeneity but of differences.⁴⁸ Within the context of Indirect Rule different political rationalities were ascribed to these populations and, as a result, different ways of colonial politics to deal with them.

47 M. Pesek, *Das Ende eines Kolonialreiches*, Frankfurt am Main 2010, p. 207 ff.

48 P. Pels/O. Saleminck, Introduction: Locating the Colonial Subjects of Anthropology, in: *Id. (eds.), Colonial Subjects: Essays on The Practical History of Anthropology*, Ann Arbor 1999, pp. 1-53, here p. 18; A. L. Stoler, Colonial Archives and the Arts of Governance, in: *Archival Science* (2002), pp. 87-109, here p. 95; K. Dauber, Bureaucratizing the Ethnographer's Magic, in: *Current Anthropology* (1995), pp. 75-95, here p. 84.

Nevertheless, many of these colonial counting campaigns rarely went beyond mere estimates. South Africa seems to have been a forerunner in introducing this particular technique of governmentality on the African continent. As early as in 1690 the first census was held in the Cape Colony. By 1862 the first Census Act had been passed in the colony setting the norms and procedures of future census. What is therefore more relevant is that even with humble beginnings of the first censuses, which covered only parts of the colony's population, it was followed by regularly held censuses over the next 300 years. Each of the censuses successively widened its scope as the colonial conquest continued and more and more Africans came under colonial rule.⁴⁹ The first census in British West Africa was held in 1871 for the city of Lagos. It took another forty years to widen the geographical scope, when in 1911 a house-to-house enumeration was made in some ports and townships. Only in 1921 was the first attempt at a systematic census for the entire population made by the administration. But the colonial administration struggled with an underfunded budget and untrained staff and sometimes also with a fragile political situation in many peripheral parts of the colony. Moreover, there seemed to exist a general mistrust for the results of the census and some were corrected according to estimates of colonial officers.⁵⁰

Later phases of colonial rule saw increasing potentialities and a willingness on the side of colonial bureaucracies to project the dispositifs of colonial governmentality to African societies and to transform the subjugated into subjects and people into populations. Like in the case of the First World War a current crisis of European Empires led to a modernisation of colonial rule. The Second World War saw, as Crawford Young argues, a change in colonial politics. The doctrine of colonial self-sufficiency, which had previously been an obstacle to the development of colonial rule, was partially abandoned. The once isolated and autonomously acting colonial field agents became embedded in a hierarchy, which "was now fleshed out with a proliferating array of technical services". Developmentalism was the new "mantra" of post-war colonial politics and was followed by attempts of economic planning and social engineering.⁵¹ But was this the arrival of governmentality in Africa?

At least in terms of space and time colonial politics were much more characterised by campaigns than by the everyday routine of governmentality. Most of these attempts were spatially and temporally limited or were quickly abandoned. A campaign is to be understood here as a temporary and concentrated attempt to change within a short time span particular aspects of social configurations of a given society. The Oxford Dictionary gives two meanings of "campaign": it is either "a series of military operations intended to achieve a goal, confined to a particular area, or involving a specified type of fighting"

49 F. Tesfaye, L'usage public et politique des statistiques des populations en Afrique: des projets de domination aux violations des droits humains (paper presented at the Communication présentée au congrès annuel de la Société québécoise de science politique, 2010).

50 D. van den Berselaar, Establishing the Facts: PA Talbot and the 1921 Census of Nigeria, in: *History in Africa*, (2004), pp. 69-102, here p. 72.

51 J. D. Hargreaves, *The End of Colonial Rule in West Africa*, New York 1979, p. 41.

or “an organized course of action to achieve a goal”.⁵² In colonial contexts campaigns, to transform African societies, represented in certain matters a continuity of techniques of conquest like the expedition. And sometimes medical campaigns turned into military campaigns against a reluctant population as was the case with the plague expedition of the German doctor Max Zupitz to Lake Victoria in 1898, which ended in the devastation of several villages.⁵³

The idea to change societies through particular campaigns is connected to what James C. Scott has described as “high modernism”.⁵⁴ They are typical for historical situations of rapid change, where elites took up the challenge to transform societies in a relatively short period of time. Soviet Russia initiated in the 1920 and 1930s a number of campaigns, in which the communist elites tried to catapult the rural population, which they regarded as backward, into the future world of socialism within a few years. Underlying the discourse of such campaigns is the understanding of a deep rift between spheres of a society as they were common in post-revolutionary Russia and in colonial situations. Colonial campaigns for the introduction of new crops, disease control and against “amoral” behaviour were engineered according to discourses, which were accompanied by a vocabulary of “control”, “modernisation” and “improvement”. They were perhaps the most common techniques of colonial governmentality. As Megan Vaughan notes, the encounter of Africans with colonial medicine in the first half of the 20th century was predominately through the “great campaign”.⁵⁵ Also, attempts to change the patterns of rural agricultural production in colonial Africa were exercised mostly through campaigns.⁵⁶ If some authors recognised in the rise of developmentalism in the inter-war period the major theme of colonial politics then the campaign became a major technique to enforce it. As in the first colonial conquest this second colonial conquest met the resistance of African societies. Marie Luise White has described some forms of this resistance in her book *Speaking with Vampires*.⁵⁷ Nevertheless, colonial campaigns illustrate the shifting alliances within colonial projects as well. Venereal disease campaigns in colonial Buganda met the enthusiastic support of local chiefs, because they hoped to acquire more control over women.⁵⁸ The campaign against joint-drinking in urban Rhodesia in the 1930s

52 “Campaign”. Oxford Dictionaries. April 2010. Oxford Dictionaries. April 2010. Oxford University Press. 6 Jan. 2011 <http://oxforddictionaries.com/view/entry/m_en_gb0118630>.

53 Vaughan, Curing Their Ills (footnote 20), p. 37. For the Zupitz expedition, see: H. Rehse, Kiziba, Land und Leute, Stuttgart 1910, p. 267.

54 J. C. Scott, *Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Humans Condition have Failed*, New Haven 1998.

55 Vaughan, Curing Their Ills (footnote 20), p. 37.

56 A. F. D. MacKenzie, Contested Ground: Colonial Narratives and the Kenyan Environment, 1920–1945, in: *Journal of Southern African Studies* (2000), pp. 697–718, here p. 703; W. Beinart/K. Brown/D. Gilfoyle, Experts and Expertise in Colonial Africa Reconsidered: Science and the Interpenetration of Knowledge, in: *African Affairs*, (2009), pp. 413–433; Eckert, Regulating the Social (footnote 30), pp. 467–489; D. H. Groff, Carrots, Sticks, and Cocoa Pods: African and Administrative Initiatives in the Spread of Cocoa Cultivation in Assikasso, Ivory Coast, 1908–1920, in: *International Journal of African Historical Studies* (1987), pp. 401–416.

57 L. White, *Speaking with Vampires: Rumour and History in Colonial Africa*, Berkeley 2000.

58 Vaughan, Syphilis in Colonial East and Central Africa (footnote 19), pp. 269–302, here p. 276.

was initiated by missionaries and the colonial administration, but found its staunchest supporters in the urban African elite. It was again the question for the control of women which drove African elites into the ranks of colonial campaigners.⁵⁹

Although campaigns often use the language of metropolitan governmentality, they differ in their techniques. Campaigns have another regime of visibility and temporality. Many colonial campaigns were reactions to current crisis, notably as a reaction to diseases, famines and social unrest that were a result of the rapid transformations of African societies in the inter-war period and after the Second World War.⁶⁰ Often their short-term goals were only vaguely connected to long-term strategies of the colonial administration. With the crisis gone or solved by successful campaigns, the colonial state reduced its high-profile engagement and disappeared behind the veil of indirect rule. Regarding the chronic shortness of funds of colonial administration, it is no wonder that short-lived campaigns gained such an importance for colonial politics. If we can speak of a disciplinary power in these contexts, then it was not enforced through the constant acquisition of a *habitus*, but by the magic of propaganda and violence. The introduction and maintenance of colonial rule was much more characterised by the spontaneity and forcefulness of campaigns than the ordinary and reformative change that seems to me typical for the emergence of what Foucault described as governmentality.

5. Afterword: The Political Rationality of Developmentalism

The concept of governmentality and disciplinary power offered new possibilities to historians to describe the peculiar nature of colonial rule in Africa. First of all, the Foucaultian notion of governmentality de-centred the previous focus on the colonial state. Foucault came into African history in the middle of the debate on the questions of the magnitude of the colonial and post-colonial state.⁶¹ The ability of the colonial state to establish itself as an institutional framework for bringing Africans under the tutelage of colonial rule was increasingly doubted in African history in the 1980s.⁶² It opened up moreover a

59 M. O. West, Liquor and Libido: 'Joint Drinking' and the Politics of Sexual Control in Colonial Zimbabwe, 1920s–1950s, in: *Journal of Social History* (1997), pp. 645–667, here p. 646.

60 M. Dawson, The 1920s Anti-Yaws Campaigns and Colonial Medical Policy in Kenya, in: *International Journal of African Historical Studies*, 3 (1987), pp. 417–435; R. Waller, 'Clean' and 'Dirty': Cattle Disease and Control Policy in Colonial Kenya, 1900–40, in: *Journal of African History* (2004), pp. 45–80; M. H. Dawson, Socioeconomic Change and Disease: Smallpox in Colonial Kenya, 1880–1920, in: S. Feierman/J. M. Janzen (eds.), *The Social Basis of Health and Healing in Africa*, Berkeley 1992, pp. 90–103.

61 One of the first to come up with new perspectives on the complexities of colonial/post-colonial states was the afore-mentioned Hargreaves. Also see: B. J. Berman, Structure and Process in the Bureaucratic States of Colonial Africa, in: *Development and Change*, 2 (1984), pp. 161–202; T. Ranger, White Presence and Power in Africa, in: *The Journal of African History* (1979), pp. 463–469; Berman, A Palimpsest of Contradictions (footnote 10), p. 16; J. Lonsdale, States and Social Processes in Africa: A Historiographical Survey, in: *African Studies Review* (1981), pp. 139–225.

62 In 1989, Jean-François Bayart published his famous book on the state in Africa (J.-F. Bayart, *L'Etat en Afrique – la politique du vente*, Paris 1989) which subsumed his earlier work on this topic, see: J.-F. Bayart, *L'Etat au Cameroun*, Paris 1979; Id., *Le Politique par le bas en Afrique noire*, in: *Politique africaine*, 1 (1981), pp. 53–83; Id., *Civil*

view on a non-state agency in the process of an establishment of colonial rule. Foucault thus helped historians of colonial rule to collect the broken pieces of the colonial state, which had been smashed by a new generation of historians and political scientists in the 1980s. To describe the colonial state as an institution had certainly lost its momentum, but it could now be taken as something that was softer than institutions. It was a new rationality that produced discourses and techniques of governance. But what was easily overlooked is that the Foucaultian notion of governmentality bore in itself a certain “dogmatic functionalism”.⁶³ Despite using his concept of governmentality to dethrone the state as the sole agent of power in modern Europe, he still sticks to the state as a central agent.

As the colonial state had been part of an imperial world order, the post-colonial state, which was to emerge in the process of decolonization, became a subject of a post-war world order of nation-states even if many of these nations were in an ambiguous state. This world order, with its different political power blocs and centres, constructed its subjects, the nation-states, according to its premises. Crawford Young hints at the semantic metamorphosis of the “new” or “post-independent states” into “post-colonial states” or states of the Third World in the context of global discourses in the wake of decolonisation.⁶⁴ Most former colonies, in particular former French and British, developed special relationships with their former colonial powers. This led some authors to conclude that the post-colonial state was the continuation of Indirect Rule. But this did not happen within the space of the territorial defined and organized colonial state but within the framework of the post-colonial world order.⁶⁵

Much more such continuation in early post-independence politics than one could have expected had been exercised. Major development schemes that were started or planned after the Second World War were continued by nationalist politicians like the Volta-River Project in Ghana or the Geschira irrigation-scheme in the Sudanese Nil delta.⁶⁶ Developmentalism became a vision of nationalist elites of the post-independence states as well as of major global institutions. Some authors see in the emergence of the developmentalist institutional framework (the UNO, the World Bank, and the IMF) the creation of a “single social field” that was shaped by Foucaultian *dispositifs* of social engineering.⁶⁷ The new states/post-colonies quickly joined a variety of international organisations from the UN to the OAU, from the IMF to the World Bank. May it as it is, if Developmentalism

Society in Africa, in: P. Chabal (ed.), *Political Domination in Africa: Reflections on the Limits of Power*, Cambridge 1986, pp. 109-125. For a good overview, see: A. T. Gana, *The State in Africa: Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow*, in: *International Political Science Review* (1985), pp. 115-132; M. Doornbos, *The African State in Academic Debate: Retrospect and Prospect*, in: *The Journal of Modern African Studies* (1990), pp. 179-198.

63 D. Garland, *Frameworks of Inquiry in the Sociology of Punishment*, in: *British Journal of Sociology*, 1 (1990), pp. 1-15, here p. 4.

64 Young, *The End of the Post-Colonial State* (footnote 3), p. 23

65 C. Clapham, *Degrees of Statehood*, *Review of International Studies*, 2 (1998), pp. 143-157, here p. 147

66 See also the article by Julia Tischler in this issue on the Kariba-Dam.

67 M. Brigg, *Post-development, Foucault and the Colonisation Metaphor*, in: *Third World Quarterly* (2002), pp. 421-436, here p. 429.

still prevailed as a major theme in the political rationalities of post-colonial Africa, the campaign remained the appropriate tool for its enforcement. Post-colonial campaigns tried, like their colonial predecessors, to introduce new techniques of agricultural production and schemes for the prevention of diseases. They promoted new forms of habitus and (national) patterns of identity and fought against remains of “tribalism” and “colonialism”. Nearly every new president in post-colonial Africa launched his own anti-corruption campaign. Ghana under Nkrumah saw several campaigns for new dresses for women, for back-yard gardening in support of the politics of self-reliance.⁶⁸ Nyerere’s pronunciation of Ujamaa was followed by numerous campaigns for new settlement schemes, alphabetisation and the introduction of mechanized agriculture.⁶⁹ In William Tolbert’s Liberia campaigns became “sloganned responses to festering problems”, such as ‘Rallytime’, ‘Higher Heights’ and ‘Mats to Mattresses’ campaigns.⁷⁰

African elites eagerly took over the sovereignty / territoriality paradigm. “Seek the political kingdom first”, as Kwame Nkrumah put it in his famous phrase, was meant to inherit the shallow sovereignty of the colonial state. For Nkrumah and most of the African nationalists of the first generation the political kingdom lay at the capital and the main urban centres. The national state became the main framework for the political emancipation. This nationalisation of African political movements was quite astonishing with regards to the strong Pan-African tradition of the first generation of the then converted nationalists. The political kingdom the nationalists hoped to achieve was not a coherent political space nor was it a sovereignty-scape. African elites inherited the instruments of statehood from the colonial state but not the power that came with it in colonial days. The nationalist movements, which brought the African elites to power, quickly lost their momentum as a political force of national relevance simply because there was no nation to rely on. The problem for most post-colonial states was that they faced a mixture of different political traditions and systems. The politics of indirect rule had persevered although to a certain extent in a transformed manner. Some pre-colonial institutions and the political tradition of African elites themselves were a highly hybrid mixture of Christian, liberal, Marxist and nationalist ideologies, not to speak of the artificial boundaries inherited from colonial times. Somalia is here an interesting case to point out. After gaining independence from Britain and Italy Somali nationalists resorted to the idea of a Somali nation that included people living in the neighbouring countries of Kenya, Ethiopia and Djibouti. This led to more than 50 years of civil and inter-state war at the horn of Africa. The Congo (Zaire) is another example. The artificial creation included such heterogeneous political traditions as the former Congo-Kingdom and the former Lunda Empire and the stateless societies of the lower Congo basin. The Congo was one

68 J. A. McCain, Attitudes toward Socialism, Policy, and Leadership in Ghana, in: *African Studies Review* (1979), pp. 149-169, here p. 166.

69 H. Glickman, One-Party System in Tanganyika, in: *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* (1965), pp. 136-149, here p. 136.

70 J. D. Kandeh, What does The ‘Militariat’ do when it Rules? Military Regimes: The Gambia, Sierra Leone and Liberia, in: *Review of African Political Economy*, 69 (1996), pp. 387-404, here p. 389.

of the two examples for an experiment with federal structures in post-colonial Africa. The other, Nigeria, was to a great part abandoned after the Biafra-War. Therefore “Tribalism” and “Balkanization” became the ghosts in post-colonial discourses on statehood. When Nkrumah was faced after the independence by the Ashanti-Aristocracy with the slogan: “we are the true rulers” he reacted with condemnation of tribal tendencies that endangered the young nation and later with imprisonment of some of the Ashanti rulers. The struggle against tribalism was aimed at overcoming the fragmentation of the political space of the post-colony. Whereas Nkrumah lost this struggle, many other African leaders tried to manipulate the fragmented political space of the post-colony. The fear of Balkanization was based on the peculiarity of post-colonial state-building. Unlike Europe, where borders were the result of state-building processes, the African post-colonial state started with borders as a prerequisite. This made, as Clapham argues, the question of boundaries one of the most important for the survival of the post-colonial state.⁷¹ In Africa’s arena for international norm building, the Organisation of African Unity, the inviolability of former colonial borders became one of first principles for inter-state relations.

As I have argued at the beginning of my paper the maintenance of the sovereignty / territoriality nexus depends on a certain amount of resources that are available to agents of sovereignty like the state. The state in Africa, in its colonial and post-colonial shape, failed to dominate or even create a political field where his dispositifs were embedded. Paradoxically, many academics, as well as politicians and NGO employees, reacted to the failure of the sovereignty / territoriality nexus in post-colonial Africa with a Foucaultian language: Where there was no sovereign government to perform control over a territory to be found, many authors looked for some sort of governmentality. The failure of the state is answered by many commentators with concepts of a neo-liberal global governmentality. Nevertheless it seems doubtful that the globally circulating techniques will heal the African states as they emerge as a prerequisite of colonial and post-colonial governmentality.⁷²

71 C. Clapham, Rethinking African States, in: *African Security Review* (2001), pp. 1-6, here p. 1.

72 J. Joseph, The limits of Governmentality: Social Theory and the International, in: *European Journal of International Relations*, 10 (2010), pp. 1-24, here p. 16; R. Abrahamsen / M. C. Williams, Introduction: The Privatisation and Globalisation of Security in Africa, in: *International Relations* (2007), pp. 131-141; C. Clapham, Governmentality in Sub-Saharan Africa, in: *Third World Quarterly* (1996), pp. 809-824; K. C. Dunn, Africa and International Relations Theory, in: *Africa's Challenge to International Relations Theory* (2001), pp. 1-28.

Resisting Modernisation? Two African Responses to the Kariba Dam Scheme in the Central African Federation

Julia Tischler

RESÜMEE

Der Kariba-Staudamm an der Grenze zwischen dem heutigen Sambia und Simbabwe war ein Beispiel spätkolonialer Modernisierungspolitik und zugleich Symbol eines vielbeachteten Staatsbildungsexperiments: Die 1953 ins Leben gerufene Zentralafrikanische Föderation wurde von ihren politischen Vätern als „dritter Weg“ zwischen weißen und schwarzen Unabhängigkeitsbewegungen deklariert. Aus heutiger Sicht versinnbildlicht das Mammutprojekt sowohl das Scheitern der hochumstrittenen Föderation als auch die Verfehlungen großer Entwicklungsvorhaben insgesamt: Kariba nutzte der „weißen“ Industrie, brachte der verarmten indigenen Landbevölkerung jedoch Schaden. Lokale Akteure versuchten, diese Ungleichheiten zu korrigieren, wie der vorliegende Aufsatz anhand von Hezekiah Habanyama, einem Mitglied der lokalen afrikanischen Verwaltungselite, und Harry Nkumbula, dem Präsidenten des nordrhodesischen African National Congress aufzeigt. Die Positionen, die der „loyale Verwaltungsbeamte“ einerseits und der „Widerstandskämpfer“ andererseits einnahmen, entziehen sich allerdings einer einfachen Zuordnung in Für- oder Gegenstimmen, Opposition oder Kollaboration. Ihre vielfach verflochtenen Strategien und Ideen im Hinblick auf „Entwicklung“ verdeutlichen vielmehr die grundsätzliche Ambivalenz des spätkolonialen Doppelprojekts von Staatsbildung und Modernisierung.

Between 1955 and 1960, thousands of workers opened up “the dark jungle” of the middle Zambezi Valley on the border between today’s Zambia and Zimbabwe to “provide light and power for a nation”.¹ The Kariba hydroelectric dam, built to turn the recently

1 Note Gilmore to Kirkness, 6.5.1960, British National Archives / Public Record Office (PRO) DO 35/7719.

established Central African Federation into an industrial power, was a microcosm of late-colonial, state-making modernisation.² To Kariba's supporters, the dam and its massive reservoir constituted "a lasting impression of great Federal beginnings and a great future promise for our country".³ From today's perspective, however, the super-ambitious project rather seems to confirm historians' judgements of the Federation as a "quite extraordinary mistake"⁴ as well as general critiques of modernisation as a hubristic effort preserving existing material and power asymmetries.⁵ Not only was the expensive project narrowly targeted at the rapidly growing industrial sector in the region, mainly the multinational copper business, it also entailed the forced eviction of 57.000 Gwembe Tonga, who were shifted away from the rising waters in a "poorly conceived, and trauma-ridden, crash program".⁶

Local actors did not fail to see these imbalances and tried to redress them, as the following pages will show by employing the example of two prominent Northern Rhodesian Africans – Hezekiah Habanyama, the most influential member of Gwembe Valley's 'traditional' administrative council, and Harry Nkumbula, leader of the Northern Rhodesian African National Congress (NRANC).⁷ The 'loyal administrator' and the 'nationalist resister' perceived each other as antagonists. However, as this paper argues, their positions with respect to Kariba actually had much in common as both leaders struggled *with*, rather than *against*, development.⁸ Their perspectives therefore help to illustrate the fundamental ambivalence of nation-building modernisation.

1. Planning Kariba

Kariba's asymmetries were the outcome of a controversial planning process, initiated by the government of the Central African Federation and supported by British colonial

- 2 The Central African Federation, also known as "Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland", was an association of Northern Rhodesia (today's Zambia), Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) and Nyasaland (Malawi), which existed from 1953-1963.
- 3 Earl of Dalhousie, Governor-General of the Federation, Foreword, in: H. Andersen, Royal Occasion. The Kariba Project, Salisbury 1960, p. 5.
- 4 R. Hyam, The Geopolitical Origins of the Central African Federation. Britain, Rhodesia and South Africa 1948-1953, in: The Historical Journal, 30/1 (1987), pp. 145-172, here p. 145.
- 5 For a summary of development critiques, see: F. Cooper/R. Packard (2005) The History and Politics of Development Knowledge, in: M. Edelman/A. Haugrud (eds.), The Anthropology of Development and Globalization. From Classical Political Economy to Contemporary Neoliberalism, Malden/Oxford/Victoria 2005, pp. 126-139.
- 6 T. Scudder, A History of Development and Downturn in Zambia's Gwembe Valley: 1901-2002, in: C. Lancaster / K. Vickery (eds.), The Tonga-speaking peoples of Zambia and Zimbabwe. Essays in honor of Elizabeth Colson, Lanham 2007, pp. 307-343, here p. 311. The most central study on the Kariba resettlement is: E. Colson, The Social Consequences of Resettlement. The Impact of Kariba Resettlement upon the Gwembe Tonga, Manchester 1971.
- 7 This paper is based on a section of my PhD project "Light and Power for a Multiracial Nation: The Kariba Dam scheme in the Central African Federation", funded by the German Historical Institute London, the German Academic Exchange Service and the Cusanuswerk foundation.
- 8 In this article, I do not use 'modernisation' or 'development' as analytical concepts, but as terms used and given meaning to by the historical actors themselves. The terms are not set in inverted commas for reasons of readability.

authorities and the project's main financier, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD). The hydroelectricity scheme was the most central development investment of the Federation which was established in 1953 against fierce African opposition and broke apart only ten years later. This uneasy union between three very different territories – the British protectorates of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland as opposed to self-governing Southern Rhodesia with its strong settler community – was declared by its political fathers as a 'middle way' between black and white independence movements and was hoped to become a showcase of communal development in a 'multiracial' state.⁹ Industrialisation and economic expansion seemed like unpolitical panaceas for reconciling the black discriminated majority with the privileged settler minority. If the Federation's present economic growth was sustained, IBRD experts argued in their Kariba appraisal report, "then there should continue to be a margin for granting improvements to the Africans without cutting the European standard of living".¹⁰

At the same time, late-colonialism's initial development enthusiasm following the Second World War had already suffered a range of serious blows at that stage¹¹ and also Kariba's planners were aware of the risks involved in over-optimistic public spending. After a dramatic increase of cost estimates in early 1956, IBRD experts became even more nervous about the debt burden on the Federation's economy.¹² British authorities also realised that Kariba would consume a major part of the Federation's financial and labour resources at the expense of general development in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, which was effectively *African* development.¹³ Moreover, the Northern Rhodesian Governor predicted serious hardships, even casualties, resulting from the forced evictions of the Gwembe Tonga, the people who were living in the region.¹⁴

Despite the new state's professed dedication to 'racial reconciliation', the lopsided project was finally given green light. Fearing nationalist settlers' hostility as well as a power shortage in the copper industry, British authorities were anxious to see the Federation "get off to a good start".¹⁵ Moreover, economy-centred and universalistic concepts of modernisation which were gaining international ground at the time as well as the young state's new policy of 'multiracial partnership' provided a language to legitimise Kariba as a means of *African* development and to declare the scheme's drawbacks as necessary sac-

9 For an overview of the Federation's history, see: P. Murphy, Introduction, in: *Ibid.* (ed.), *British Documents on the End of Empire: Central Africa. Part I*, London 2005, pp. xxvii-cxvi.

10 IBRD, "The Economy of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland", Annex to Project Appraisal Report, 13.6.1956, PRO DO 35/5702.

11 A. Eckert, *Herrschern und Verwalten. Afrikanische Bürokraten, staatliche Ordnung und Politik in Tanzania, 1920–1970*, München 2007, p. 102.

12 Note of discussion with IBRD, Commonwealth Relations Office, 16.2.1956, PRO DO 35/4603.

13 Minute by Poynton, Colonial Office, 4.5.1956, PRO CO 1015/948.

14 Benson to Gorell Barnes, 31.12.1954, PRO CO 1015/944.

15 "Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. Hydro-Electric Schemes. Brief for discussions to be held with Sir G. Huggins", Treasury, ca. January 1955, PRO CO 1015/952 (quotation); "Brief for the Secretary of State", Colonial Office, ca. January 1955, PRO CO 1015/952. See P. Murphy, Introduction (footnote 9), pp. xlvi, lxiv, on white settler pressure.

rifices to kick-start a broader development process.¹⁶ British Treasury officials identified the Federation's white business elite as the 'senior partners', predestined to spearhead the self-induced "industrial revolution" which would translate automatically into "the advancement of the native".¹⁷ Similarly, IBRD experts argued that an expanding industrial sector was the best means to "hasten the transition of the Africans to a money economy and a Western-type society".¹⁸ Also the Federal Prime Minister justified Kariba postulating that "[i]t is vital that we have this cheap power so that we can industrialise and employ our rapidly increasing African population".¹⁹ As a consequence, an international development agency committed to helping colonised peoples supported a regime which was dreaded by the indigenous majority. Despite their different motivations, Federal politicians, IBRD experts, and British officials thus agreed on a specific 'pecking order' of modernisation in which big business was prioritised while Africans had to wait for the expected trickle-down effects.

2. Contestations from within – Hezekiah Habanyama and the Kariba resettlement²⁰

Hezekiah Habanyama, however, was not prepared to wait. The chief councillor of the Gwembe Tonga Native Authority (GTNA), the administrative body of chiefs and councillors supposedly representing the 'traditional' leaders of Gwembe Valley, had been collaborating with the colonial government for several years to improve the standard of living in the area.²¹ These previous efforts, ranging from agricultural measures to an extension of primary schooling, were rendered obsolete when local 'advancement' had to be sacrificed for Kariba's national 'progress'. Moreover, Habanyama's own position among the population came under pressure. Being largely responsible for the resettlement, he and the other Native Authority members feared the hostility of their people as well as a revival of nationalist-inspired resistance, which had troubled them considerably earlier in the decade. At the same time, their crucial role in this difficult situation enhanced their status in front of the British officers.²² Especially Habanyama, thanks to

16 On modernisation theory, development economics, and colonial development see e.g.: H. Arndt, *Economic Development. The History of an Idea*, Chicago/London 1987; F. Cooper, *Modernizing Bureaucrats, Backward Africans, and the Development Concept*, in: F. Cooper/R. Packard (eds.), *International Development and the Social Sciences. Essays on the History and Politics of Knowledge*, Berkeley 1997, pp. 64-92. On 'multiracial partnership' in the Federation, see: R. Rotberg, *The Rise of Nationalism in Central Africa. The Making of Malawi and Zambia 1873-1964*, Cambridge 1971, chapter ix.

17 "Note on Visit to Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland", Rowan, Treasury, 12.7.1954, PRO CO 1015/944.

18 IBRD, "The Economy of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland", Annex to Project Appraisal Report, 13.6.1956, PRO DO 35/5702.

19 Hansard. Parliamentary Debates Federal Assembly, 7.3.1955, PRO CO 1015/946.

20 I concentrate on the Northern Rhodesian side of the Zambezi, where 32.000 people were resettled. The move in the south was managed independently by the Southern Rhodesian Government.

21 See: E. Colson, *Social Consequences* (footnote 6), pp. 17-19, 21 f.

22 See e.g.: Southern Province Intelligence Report, period ending 25.7.1953, NAZ SP 1/3/3; Memorandum "Influence of Congress on Native Authorities", Reeves, for Provincial Commissioner, 28.12.1955, NAZ SP 1/14/18; E. Colson, *Social Consequences* (footnote 6), p. 19.

his outstanding education, had made himself an indispensable mainstay of local administration.²³ During the years of resettlement, the chief councillor used these conflicting pressures strategically, bargaining with the government to get the best terms possible for the people. His position as a self-conscious mediator, as will be argued, defies such dichotomous categorisations as coloniser / colonised, collaboration / resistance.²⁴

The news of the Kariba resettlement in April 1955 came as a shock to the Native Authority. Members feared that the decision reflected the growing influence of the Federal Government, which they did not trust to be “particularly concerned with African problems”.²⁵ Realising that they had no choice but to accept the decision, however, they quickly adopted a pragmatic attitude and drew up a list of concessions in return for their cooperation. These so-called “24 Points”, which were eventually signed by the Northern Rhodesian Governor, would become an important point of reference throughout the resettlement and its aftermath.²⁶ Apart from securing some minimal conditions for the removal, the “24 Points” laid down that the Tonga, once the reservoir filled up, must be allowed to shift back to the shore to make use of the fertile drawdown area and to install fisheries. These concessions were crucial in retrospect, giving the Northern Rhodesian Gwembe Tonga a significant advantage over their southern counterparts, who were permanently barred from the lakeshore and its economic potential.²⁷

During the resettlement and the ‘rehabilitation’ phase, Habanyama assumed the role of a watchdog: He toured the valley, talked to the people and persistently pointed to the numerous shortcomings, reminding officers of their paramount responsibility towards the population.²⁸ Moreover, he used his insider position to make known people’s grievances. In his reports, which were passed on to the Governor and to the Colonial Secretary in London, he graphically described the Gwembe Tonga’s “feeling of hopelessness and frustration” and warned that the relocation programme was anything but “an easy road to glory”.²⁹

23 Habanyama had studied at Bristol University and attended a colonial summer school in Cambridge (Stubbs, NR Native Affairs Department, to Morgan, Colonial Office, 10.5.1956, PRO CO 1015/953; Gwembe District Newsletter No. 5, November 1960, National Archives of Zambia, Lusaka (NAZ) SP 4/1/65; Annual Report on African Affairs, Southern Province, 1953, NAZ SP 4/2/59).

24 See recent scholarship on African employees in colonial administrations: N. Lawrence / E. Osborn / R. Roberts (eds.), *Intermediaries, Interpreters, and Clerks. African Employees in the Making of Colonial Africa*, Madison 2006; A. Eckert, Herrschen und Verwalten (footnote 11).

25 Southern Province Intelligence Report, period ending 25.4.1955, NAZ SP 1/3/14.

26 See: Annexure to minutes of meeting, 26/27.7.1955 – questions asked by GTNA, NAZ SP 4/1/61; Replies of the Northern Rhodesian Government to questions asked by GTNA, 22.2.1956, NAZ SP 4/1/61; Minutes of District Team meeting, Gwembe Boma, 9.2.1962, NAZ SP 1/4/22; GTNA Annual Report, 1956, by Habanyama, NAZ SP 4/2/118; T. Scudder, *The Kariba Case Study*, in: California Institute of Technology, Social Science Working Paper 1227, Pasadena 2005, <http://www.hss.caltech.edu/~tzs/The%20Kariba%20Case2.pdf> (accessed on 26 November 2010), pp. 31-32.

27 T. Scudder, *Case Study* (footnote 26), p. 32.

28 See e.g.: Tour of Sinazongwe Area, by Chief Councillor, 12.2.1959, NAZ SP 4/4/27; Tour of Chief Simamba's area, by Chief Councillor, 22.-24.7.1958, NAZ SP 4/12/82; Press Statement “Tranquility and Progress in the Gwembe Valley of Northern Rhodesia”, 11.6.1959, PRO CO 1015/1486; Minutes of District Team meeting at Gwembe Boma, 9.2.1962 NAZ SP 1/4/22.

29 GTNA Annual Report, 1956, by Habanyama, NAZ SP 4/2/118.

Most strikingly perhaps, the Native Authority later managed to prevent the formation of a joint company between Northern Rhodesia, Southern Rhodesia and the Federal Government that was meant to regulate business activities centred on the future Kariba Lake. Here, the chiefs and councillors asserted themselves against their superiors in the northern administration who would rather cooperate with than be outdone by the Southern Rhodesians.³⁰ In order to ensure that the Tonga profited as much as possible from this new asset, the Native Authority insisted that they would not allow “foreign powers” to have a say over their part of the lake.³¹

The Native Authority’s considerable impact on the move and its aftermath was the result of shifting micro-politics of consent and protest. Habanyama was determined to retain the solidarity of the British officers who he regarded as allies against land-grabbing settlers on the one hand and nationalist ‘troublemakers’ on the other. Similarly, he was courted by the officers, who realised the “difficulty of securing the services … of people of Mr. Habanyama’s calibre”.³² Constantly declaring his willingness to cooperate and his loyalty towards British colonial rule, Habanyama was able to express, in his words, “constructive criticism” and exchange “frank and heated arguments”.³³ His position thus exemplifies how colonial mimicry was not only a tool of domination but also a menace as middlemen like Habanyama, who were actively encouraged to ‘mimic’ the rulers by adopting their language, cultural habits and education, threatened to blur the central distinction between colonisers and colonised. The councillor displayed considerable skill in using his ambivalent position strategically, navigating between being “almost the same but not quite”, ostensibly living up to his superiors’ expectations while also finding ways to assert himself.³⁴ Prepared to operate within the framework of British rule, whose salaried servant he was, Habanyama, however, also drew claims from his impeccable record of colonial role performance: “The Northern Rhodesia Government has a duty to develop us. It has an obligation to spend money on our benefit.”³⁵

On the one hand, this strategy was pragmatic. Even if he “did not appreciate the benefits” of the scheme itself, Habanyama realised that Kariba could not be stopped and instead tried to negotiate its ‘side effects’ to the Tonga’s benefit, seizing the opportunities arising from the fact that Gwembe now received governmental assistance to an unprecedented degree.³⁶ The once neglected Tonga “have gained a lot”, he found once the resettlement programme was in full swing: They profited from better medical services and additional

30 NR Governor Hone to Federal Prime Minister Welensky and SR Prime Minister Whitehead, 20.10.1960, NAZ SP 4/7/17.

31 GTNA to Kariba Development Officer d’Avray, 10.3.1960, NAZ SP 4/7/16.

32 Comment by District Commissioner, in: Tour Report No. 6 of 1956, Sigongo area, 9.5.1956 NAZ SP 4/2/125.

33 GTNA Annual Report, 1959, by Habanyama, NAZ SP 4/2/151.

34 H. Bhabha, Of mimicry and man: The ambivalence of colonial discourse, in: *idem*, *The Location of Culture*, London/New York 1994, pp. 121-131, here p. 122.

35 Record of views expressed at GTNA meeting, 1.4.1960, NAZ SP 4/7/17.

36 Report of the Commission appointed to inquire into … the recent deaths and injuries caused by the use of firearms in the Gwembe District and matters relating thereto, Northern Rhodesian Government Printer, 31.10.1958 (hereafter: “Report of the Gwembe Commission”), NAZ SP 4/11/15.

schools, were taught to fish, advised on improved agricultural techniques and found employment with various contractors in the area.³⁷ On the other hand, Habanyama's strategies also need to be seen in connection with a hard and fast struggle over local influence. Fearing an erosion of their own authority, the chiefs and councillors had banned the Northern Rhodesian African Congress in Gwembe in 1953 and showed a firm hand in dealing with offenders.³⁸ 'Loyal administrator' Habanyama cast himself as the exact opposite to the "homeless, frustrated and failures in life [who] take the leading part in what would be called nationalist politics".³⁹ As an 'authentic' son of Gwembe Valley – well-versed in local drum music and dances, married to a Tonga wife, and shunning the cosmopolitan life that would have been open to a man of his qualification – he laid claims to know the "real grievances of the masses" better than "any outsider".⁴⁰ In government reports and in his own writings Habanyama was portrayed as an ideal broker of controlled change, sufficiently 'Westernised' to spearhead local 'advancement', nevertheless firmly rooted in the 'traditions' of the valley.⁴¹

Habanyama not only knew his place in the scripts of indirect rule, he also accepted the development schedule of a slow 'transfer of power' – postponing political change until socio-economic improvements had paved the way for it.⁴² His commitment to gradualism came under increasing pressure, however, when Gwembe ceased to be a "hidden spot on the map of the world".⁴³ He perceived his community to stand at a turning point of their history as the advent of modernity not only promised prosperity but also posed a threat of chaos. The chief councillor worried about the "terrible confusion" caused by technical development.⁴⁴ Gwembe was swarmed by experts, who sometimes went "out of their way to try their University theories, forgetting the human element in their method of approach".⁴⁵ The Tonga, forced to swap the natural resource of the Zambezi River for wells, boreholes and pumps, had to get used to a "mechanical world".⁴⁶ Different people – engineers, workers, businessmen – were "coming into Gwembe from many parts of Africa and abroad", who brought with them "good and bad habits". Moreover, "[r]oads

37 GTNA Annual Report, 1957, 15.1.1958, by Habanyama, NAZ SEC 2/143.

38 See e.g.: Tour of Chief Simamba's area, by Chief Councillor, 22.-24.7.1958, NAZ SP 4/12/82; Southern Province Intelligence Report, period ending 25.7.1955, NAZ SP 1/3/14; Annual Report on African Affairs, Southern Province, 1954, NAZ, SP 4/2/59; Annual Report on African Affairs, Southern Province, 1958, NAZ SP 4/2/59.

39 GTNA Annual Report, 1956, by Habanyama, NAZ SP 4/2/118.

40 Welcome address for Native Affairs Secretary's visit to Native Authority Headquarters, by Habanyama, 25.10.1956, PRO CO 1015/1484. More general information on Habanyama: Interview with Nancy Habanyama Hanchabila (his daughter), Northmeads, Lusaka, 29.1.2008; D. Howarth, *The Shadow of the Dam*. New York 1961, pp. 44-45.

41 Native Affairs Secretary Hall to Morgan, Colonial Office, 24.12.1956, PRO CO 1015/1491. On indirect rule and the policy of 'local government', see e.g.: R. Pearce, *The Turning Point in Africa. British Colonial Policy 1938-1948*, London 1982, chapters 6-8.

42 See e.g.: A. Eckert, Spätkoloniale Herrschaft, Dekolonisation und internationale Ordnung. Einführende Bemerkungen, in: *Archiv für Sozialgeschichte*, 48 (2008), pp. 3-20.

43 Welcome address for Native Affairs Secretary's visit to Native Authority Headquarters, by Habanyama, 25.10.1956, PRO CO 1015/1484.

44 GTNA Annual Report, 1957, by Habanyama, NAZ SEC 2/143.

45 Welcome Address to his Excellency the Governor, February 1960, NAZ SP 4/12/91.

46 GTNA Annual Report, 1957, by Habanyama, NAZ SEC 2/143.

are getting excellent which will mean easy travelling and easy transport. Cash economy is gaining its way at a terrific speed.”⁴⁷ All this might result in a corruption of morals and a loss of cultural ‘identity’, Habanyama warned. In order to not let the rapid social changes “get out of hand”, he strove to negotiate his own vision of development, which had nothing to do with electricity, industrialisation or universal economic rules, but was about schools, boreholes, medical facilities, agriculture and fishing.⁴⁸

3. Nationalist critiques – Harry Nkumbula and the Northern Rhodesian African National Congress (NRANC)

In official and public discourse, African nationalism embodied the very opposite of development: ‘Constructive administrators’ struggled against ‘destructive politicians’, who stirred up “personal hatred” at a time when “harmony is most essential”.⁴⁹ After the nationalist movement had suffered a serious blow in 1953 as the organised African resistance under the Northern Rhodesian African National Congress (NRANC) party had not been able to prevent the formation of the Federation,⁵⁰ Kariba was feared to become a new “spear-head of the Congress attack”.⁵¹ The few available scholarly assessments also suggest that NRANC leader Nkumbula *opposed* Kariba, treating his ‘anti-dam campaign’ as a successful case of nationalist mobilisation at the grassroots.⁵² However, Harry Nkumbula neither combated development, nor did he attempt “to wreck the Kariba Gorge scheme”.⁵³ Rather, as will be argued here, his position vis-à-vis Kariba was highly ambivalent, bespeaking the difficulty of ‘resisting’ a big-scale infrastructure project that promised to bring ‘light and power for a nation’.

A few months after the Federal Prime Minister had announced the Kariba decision in March 1955, the Congress president petitioned Queen Elizabeth II on behalf of the Gwembe Tonga.⁵⁴ In this central document, however, Nkumbula neither questioned

47 GTNA Annual Report 1956, by Habanyama, NAZ SP 4/2/118.

48 Ibid; see also: GTNA Annual Report, 1959, by Habanyama, NAZ SP 4/2/151.

49 GTNA Annual Report, 1956, by Habanyama, NAZ SP 4/2/118; see also: Governor Benson to Colonial Secretary, 23.9.1955, PRO CO 1015/952; “Move of Africans from Kariba Area”, Federal Newsletter, 11.11.1955, PRO CO 1015/952; “Only political agitation can bedevil move of Africans from Kariba site”, Northern News, 3.11.1955, PRO CO 1015/952.

50 G. Macola, Liberal Nationalism in Central Africa. A Biography of Harry Mwaanga Nkumbula, New York 2010, p. 51.

51 Southern Province Intelligence Report, for the period ending 25.12.1955, NAZ SP 1/3/14. The NRANC was often simply referred to as “Congress”.

52 See: J. McGregor, Crossing the Zambezi. The Politics of Landscape on a Central African Frontier, Woodbridge/Harare 2009, pp. 109-111. Also Giacomo Macola, while providing an excellently nuanced revision of Zambian nationalism, only briefly mentions the Congress leader’s “anti-Kariba dam campaign” and his “numerous” “anti-Kariba writings” (G. Macola, Liberal Nationalism (footnote 50), pp. 70, 178 fn 84).

53 Reeves, for Provincial Commissioner, to Native Affairs Secretary, “Influence of Congress on Native Authorities”, 28.12.1955, NAZ SP 1/14/18.

54 This petition, of November 1955, was Nkumbula’s most visible and first comprehensive critique of the Kariba scheme. Before that, shortly after the Prime Minister’s announcement, he had already condemned the resettlement as an “infringement of constitution” in a telegram to the Colonial Secretary and submitted a first petition to Her Majesty’s Government, in which he referred to the resettlement to formulate a broader attack on the Fed-

the rationale behind the power project – improving living standards through planned industrialisation – nor categorically rejected the idea that the resettlement might be a justifiable measure for the sake of progress. Nkumbula's challenge to Kariba's modernisation lay in the realm of representation, ownership, and participation, aimed at including the Gwembe Tonga, or Africans generally, in the development process. Concretely, the petition asked that it be “determined *whether* it is just that the people should be dispossessed of their land” and whether the removal was for their “benefit”. If no less harmful alternatives, for instance a nuclear power scheme, were found, the Tonga had to be adequately compensated. Moreover, a commission of “a majority of Africans” and of independent “hydro-electrical engineers” should be appointed “to examine and to determine the points already raised”. Finally, the future power plant should not be in the hands of the Federal settler government, but be administered by a Northern Rhodesia-controlled corporation.⁵⁵

Nkumbula followed this line of approach – principally accepting high-tech modernisation but demanding African participation in it – throughout his ensuing Kariba-campaign directed at the colonial government in London. Here, the politician joined forces with a network of colonial-critical organisations, like the Anti-Slavery Society and the Fabian Colonial Bureau, as well as individuals, including famous writer Doris Lessing. Most of them he already knew from his time as student at the London School of Economics (LSE) in the late 1940s.⁵⁶ Now, during the heyday of international anti-colonialism, Nkumbula and his allies used Kariba to ensure that the ‘periphery’ spoke back to the metropolis. By disclosing harrowing local information, Nkumbula enabled his supporters to formulate a knowledgeable critique.⁵⁷ Through members of the Labour opposition party their protest reached the British parliament where a series of embarrassing questions exposed the Colonial Secretary's ignorance and powerlessness regarding the Gwembe situation.⁵⁸ Moreover, the lobbyists challenged dominant discourse on Kariba in a range of publications, condemning the resettlement on humanitarian grounds and unmasking the hypocrisy of ‘multiracialism’.⁵⁹ Through these interventions, Kariba's crit-

eration (Nkumbula to Colonial Secretary, 7.3.1955, NAZ HM 70/5; Petition to Her Majesty's Government on the Kariba Gorge Decision, 4.3.1955, by Nkumbula, United National Independence Party Archives, Lusaka (UNIPA) ANC 7/90).

55 Petition Concerning the Evacuation of the People from the Zambezi Valley to Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II, 17.11.1955, by Nkumbula, UNIPA ANC 3/39.

56 G. Macola, Liberal Nationalism (footnote 50), pp. 20-23.

57 Most central was a substantial memorandum Nkumbula wrote for Labour MP Fenner Brockway: Nkumbula to Brockway, 17.2.1956, NAZ HM 70/5.

58 A few examples are: Question by Griffiths, 29.2.1956; Question by Swingler, 25.4.1956, Question by Rankin, 1.8.1956, Question by Rankin, 31.10.1956, Question by Swingler, 13.3.1957, Question by Stonehouse, 10.2.1959, in: Hansard, House of Commons Debates, quoted from: <http://hansard.millbanksystems.com> (accessed on 27.11.2010).

59 For instance: “Exodus with a Difference”, by Betts, Fabian Colonial Bureau, in: Venture 7/11, April 1956, Rhodes House Library, Oxford (RHL) MSS Brit. Emp. S 365, Box 102/1; “The Kariba Project”, by Lessing, in: New Statesman and Nation, 9.6.1956, School of Oriental and African Studies Library, London (SOASL) PPMS 6, Box 13, 6/7/3; “The Evictions from Kariba”, by Rex, in: Manchester Guardian, 9.2.1959, SOASL PPMS 6, Box 8, 6/6/3; Letter to

ics made concrete demands on behalf of the Gwembe Tonga – for technical assistance, compensation, rights to the lakeshore and participation in the reservoir's economic development – while also taking their fate as an example of Britain's failure to protect colonial subjects against the discriminating politics of Rhodesia's settlers.

In later years, however, the well-coordinated alliance crumbled, mainly because of Nkumbula's increasing isolation, both nationally and internationally, following the fallout with his rival Kenneth Kaunda and the split of the nationalist movement in 1958.⁶⁰ Moreover, Nkumbula's stance on Kariba, so stable and coherent in his metropolitan campaign, seemed significantly more nebulous from a local perspective. While British authorities had repeatedly been told that the Congress demanded fair treatment for the Tonga, but "does not condemn the Kariba scheme as a whole"⁶¹ and agreed "that these removals are necessary",⁶² most people in Gwembe were under the impression that Nkumbula was fighting *against* Kariba.⁶³ This misapprehension certainly owed to the fact that communication with the Gwembe Tonga was severely restricted due to the Congress ban. At the same time, Nkumbula's messages to them may have been deliberately obscure, especially since the people clearly entertained the forlorn hope that their political idol would prevent the removal.⁶⁴ Thus, the NRANC president was celebrated for his metropolitan intervention,⁶⁵ but remained vague with respect to the exact aims of the campaign. Regarding his petition, the impression created in party publicity and the local press was that the Queen had been asked to stop the move altogether.⁶⁶ Similarly, Nkumbula gave out ambivalent directives to the Tonga. In a circular letter, for instance, he claimed that the evictions had not yet been officially sanctioned and went on:

So you can take it for granted that until and when the Secretary of State agrees to your moval [sic] you should resist any attempt to move you. But if and when they move you, you must ask for adequate land which is just as large and equal in value as the land you are being moved from. And you should ask for compensation ...⁶⁷

When a group of people stubbornly resisted the move, leading to an open riot with eight fatalities in September 1958, colonial authorities were quick to blame the Congress leaders. Following the Northern Rhodesian Governor and the dominant press, the upheaval

editor "The Evictions in Kariba. Unfulfilled Promises", by Fox-Pitt, in: Manchester Guardian, 22.9.1958, PRO CO 1015/1484.

60 On inner-party rivalry and the split, see G. Macola, Liberal Nationalism (footnote 50), pp. 53-72.

61 Note for record, meeting of Labour MPs with Colonial Secretary, 16.12.1955, PRO CO 1015/952.

62 Scott, Africa Bureau, to Colonial Secretary, 15.8.1956, PRO CO 1015/953.

63 See e.g.: Southern Province Intelligence Report, 25.1.1956-25.6.1956, NAZ SP 1/3/14; E. Colson, Social Consequences (footnote 6), pp. 39-40.

64 Southern Province Intelligence Report, 25.1.-25.6.1956, NAZ SP 1/3/14; Southern Province Intelligence Report, period ending 25.10.1956, NAZ SP 1/3/18.

65 See: Northern Rhodesia Intelligence Report, January 1956, PRO DO 35/4605; Nkumbula to Fox-Pitt, 13.1.1956, SOASL PPMS 6, Box 13, 6/7/4.

66 "Move of Africans from Kariba Area", Federal Newsletter, 11.11.1955, PRO CO 1015/952; Congress Circular, 18.10.1955, SOASL PPMS 6, Box 13, 6/7/2.

67 Nkumbula to Gwembe Valley chiefs, 7.1.[1956], UNIPA ANC 2/1 (emphasis added).

had been instigated by Nkumbula and his fellow “evil men”, who had “told lies” to the “backward people”.⁶⁸ However, Nkumbula and Kaunda strongly refuted this allegation. Later investigations also concluded that local organisers themselves had used the name of the party “to reinforce their authority” without having been authorised by the headquarters.⁶⁹ At the same time, the NRANC’s ambiguousness may well have stimulated the spreading of certain rumours prior to the incident, which officers held accountable for people’s growing rebelliousness – for instance that the dam would break, that Nkumbula would stop the project and that he did not want the people to move.⁷⁰

Becoming a projection surface for the Tonga’s hopes was instrumental in Nkumbula’s endeavour to present himself as their spokesman and consolidate an important local support base at a time when his leadership in the nationalist movement came under attack. The Tonga’s frustration boosted Nkumbula’s popularity in the valley and also helped to fill the party’s coffers.⁷¹ How deeply his resettlement campaign was enmeshed in a struggle over authority emerges from numerous documents in which Nkumbula protested against the way Congress activity was repressed in the valley – an issue which often loomed larger than the more immediate concerns of the evacuations.⁷² Moreover, he did not tire of branding the Native Authority as stooges of government, who had irresponsibly given their consent to the removal with reckless disregard for the people. The politician thus seriously misjudged the nature of the Native Authority’s ‘consent’ and failed to see their efforts on behalf of the Gwembe Tonga.⁷³ Also Habanyama, in turn, did not appreciate how remarkably similar his own strategy was to the position adopted by the Congress, who he perceived to be “opposing” the resettlement “on principle”.⁷⁴ Therefore, possible synergies were, knowingly or unwittingly, sacrificed for the personal rivalry between two would-be representatives of the Gwembe Tonga.

68 “Gwembe Incident. Broadcast Statement by Governor of Northern Rhodesia”, 10.9.1958, PRO CO 1015/1484; also e.g.: Governor Benson to Colonial Secretary, 2.10.1958, PRO CO 1015/1484; “The evil people did their work too well”, Northern News, 11.9.1958, NAZ Northern News.

69 Report of the Gwembe Commission, Government Printer, 31.10.1958, PRO CO 1015/1485; Press Communiqué “Police absolved from criticism by Gwembe Commission”, 26.11.1958, NR Information Department, PRO CO 1015/1484.

70 Southern Province Intelligence Report, period ending 20.4.1958 and period ending 20.5.1958, NAZ SP 1/3/18; “Spearmen were ‘misguided or fantastically reckless’, says Commissioner”, Central African Post, 31.10.1958, SOASL PPMS 6, Box 8, 6/6/3; “Gwembe inquiry hears of plot to murder”, Central African Post, 31.10.1958, SOASL PPMS 6, Box 8, 6/6/3.

71 See: “Kaunda Claims 3,000 Congress Members in the Gwembe Area”, Central African Post, 4.11.1955, PRO CO 1015/952; Southern Province Intelligence Report, period ending 25.12.1955, NAZ SP 1/3/14; Southern Province Intelligence Report, period ending 20.5.1958, NAZ SP 1/3/18.

72 District Commissioner Sugg to NRANC, 19.1.1956, UNIPA ANC 9/15.

73 E.g.: Petition Concerning the Evacuation of the People from the Zambezi Valley to Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II, 17.11.1955, by Nkumbula, UNIPA ANC 3/39; Nkumbula to Brockway, 17.2.1956, NAZ HM 70/5; Draft “The Removal of Africans from the area flooded by the Kariba Scheme”, ca. November 1955, no author, certainly Nkumbula/Anti-Slavery Society, SOASL PPMS 6, Box 13, 6/7/4.

74 “The Evictions in Kariba. ‘Unfulfilled Promises’”, by Fox-Pitt, Manchester Guardian, 22.9.1958, SOASL PPMS 6, Box 8, 6/6/3.

4. Politics and development

While both men thus shared a concern for the Tonga's participation in Kariba's benefits, their underlying visions of modernisation appeared much less similar. In contrast to Habanyama's commitment to gradualism and 'un-political' advancement, Nkumbula's notion of development was closely intertwined with bolder visions of independent nation-building. Although the relevant literature and sources are rather patchy, it can be safely maintained that Nkumbula embraced the idea of development and talked about it in a way which was remarkably similar to contemporary technocratic paradigms.⁷⁵ Contradicting government's accusations, Congress claimed to be committed to the "promotion of the educational, political, economic, and social advancement of the Africans".⁷⁶ Moreover, as Giacomo Macola has recently shown, Nkumbula shared the views of many educated Africans, who regarded socio-economic development as the cornerstone of self-governed nation-building, and "subscribed to the ... basic evolutionary scheme – from tribe to nation".⁷⁷ Nkumbula's suggestions about how to overcome 'underdevelopment' bespeak his LSE-background and aligned him with prominent modernisation theorists of the time.⁷⁸ He advocated, for instance, state-planned "economic activity" for the sake of "market expansion" and pleaded for infrastructural improvements as well as an intelligent exploitation of natural resources with the help of scientific experts.⁷⁹ Even a large-scale hydroelectricity scheme had a place in the nationalists' plans for Central Africa's modernisation, as Nkumbula had argued already in 1953:

*Africans would have worked out a scheme for economic development in Central Africa. The Central African Council⁸⁰... could have been looked into and see whether it could have been given executive powers to effect major economic schemes such as the proposed Hydro-electrical Scheme at the Kariba Gorge. Such a plan would have been met with the least possible opposition by the Africans."*⁸¹

75 There is no comprehensive study on Nkumbula's views on modernisation. In the following, I use Macola's biography and several primary sources to draw out some of his ideas, but do not wish to suggest that Nkumbula developed a detailed and stable modernisation theory. In fact, his statements were in some cases even contradictory. Although Nkumbula generally advocated industrialisation (see below), he also advised people to 'return to the land' and protect it from greedy settlers during his anti-Federation campaign (G. Macola, Liberal Nationalism (footnote 50), pp. 39-42).

76 "Congress defines vote sought by N.R. Africans", Northern News, 21.8.1954, NAZ HM 70/11.

77 G. Macola, Liberal Nationalism (footnote 50), pp. 14-15, 18-19.

78 For instance one of LSE's most prominent teachers, Arthur Lewis (see: R. Tignor, W. Arthur Lewis and the Birth of Development Economics, Princeton / Oxford 2006, pp. 20-22).

79 "Immigration and progress of the Protectorate of N.R.", by Nkumbula, 1950, RHL MSS Brit. Emp. S 365, Fabian Colonial Bureau, Box 101/2. See also: "The Five Year Development Plan", by Kaunda, Congress Circular, 26.9.1954, UNIPA ANC 7/91; Nkumbula to all chiefs and people of Northern Rhodesia, 22.12.1952, UNIPA ANC 9/49; Chiefs and Delegates Conference, Kabwata African Welfare Hall, 19.8.-25.8.1952, UNIPA ANC 7/90.

80 The Central African Council was an advisory body, set up to make suggestions for the joint development of both Rhodesias and Nyasaland. The Council had discussed the possibility of damming the Zambezi already in 1945 (R. Rotberg, Nationalism (footnote 16), pp. 216-217).

81 Statement on the imposition of Federation, 6.3.1953, by Nkumbula, NAZ HM 70/5 (emphasis added).

And yet, this statement also exemplifies how Nkumbula's position differed from the strategy Kariba's planners pursued: Economic development could not be independent from political reform since "there is no economic stability without political stability".⁸² In collaborating with leftwing Fabian-Labour circles during his metropolitan Kariba-campaign, Nkumbula furthermore allied himself with the 'ultra-modern' fathers of the "second colonial occupation", who had initiated the greatly increased effort to develop the colonies after the Second World War.⁸³ Technological state-run development schemes featured in leftist grand visions too. However, Kariba's critics were not prepared to believe in automatic 'trickle-down' effects and demanded instead that the government make modernisation more inclusive. Within the current (settler-)colonial framework, they argued, the drastic changes were prone to produce further discrimination.⁸⁴ Furthermore, the Africans, having suffered from "the humiliations of the colour bar" all their lives, were not prepared to put off their legitimate demands for political participation and democratic rule for very much longer.⁸⁵

During the later stages of the project also Hezekiah Habanyama appears to have come to regard the "political kingdom" as a necessary prerequisite for Africans to rise from poverty.⁸⁶ After a series of broken promises and drawbacks in the resettlement process, shattered hopes and increasing frustration turned the Native Authority into a target of people's hostility. The 'loyal administrator' thus started to question his course of moderation.⁸⁷ In 1960 Habanyama served on the Monckton Commission, which had been set up to investigate into public attitudes towards the Federation and the state's future prospects.⁸⁸ Touring the three Central African territories to collect evidence, Habanyama connected his own disillusioning experiences in Gwembe with the rising tensions at the broader level at a time when the 'multiracial experiment' seemed on the verge of failure.⁸⁹ Disagreeing with the critical but not entirely condemnatory verdict of the Commission, Habanyama and his colleague W.M. Chirwa, a politician from Nyasaland, submitted

⁸² Statement on the imposition of Federation, 2.6.1953, by Nkumbula, UNIPA ANC 9/49.

⁸³ D. Low / J. Lonsdale, Introduction, in: D. Low / A. Smith (eds.), *History of East Africa*. Vol. III, Oxford 1976, pp. 1-64, here p. 12. On colonial developmentalism under Labour (1945-1951) and on Labour's think-tank, the Fabian Colonial Bureau, see further: R. Hyam, Introduction, in: *ibid.* (ed.), *The Labour Government and the End of Empire, 1945-1951*, London 1992, p. xxiii-lxxviii; S. Howe, *Anticolonialism in British Politics. The Left and the End of Empire, 1918-1964*, Oxford 1993.

⁸⁴ See e.g.: Memorandum on Gwembe resettlement report, 3.4.1956, by Betts, RHL MSS Brit. Emp. S 365, Fabian Colonial Bureau, Box 101/1; Fox-Pitt, Anti-Slavery Society, to Labour MP Brockway, 8.3.1956, UNIPA ANC 5/9.

⁸⁵ D. Lessing, *Going Home*, New York/London 1996 (first 1957), pp. 179, 181-188.

⁸⁶ This alludes to the famous proclamation of Ghana's first president Kwame Nkrumah: "Seek ye first the political kingdom, and all things shall be added unto you" (quoted from A. Mazrui, *Seek ye first the political kingdom*, in: A. Mazrui / C. Wondji (eds.), *Africa since 1935. General History of Africa*, Volume VIII, Paris/London/Berkeley 1993, pp. 105-126).

⁸⁷ On people's hostility against the Native Authority: E. Colson, *Social consequences* (footnote 6), pp. 185-188.

⁸⁸ P. Murphy, Introduction (footnote 9), pp. lxix-lxxvii; E. Windrich, *The Rhodesian Problem. A Documentary Record 1923-1973*, London/Boston 1975, pp. 32-40; Gwembe District Newsletter, November 1960, NAZ SP 4/1/65.

⁸⁹ Tensions had risen considerably following the constitutional negotiations in Northern Rhodesia and, foremost, the Nyasaland Emergency in March 1959. This period of violent unrest and harsh governmental repression "marked a turning point for the Federation" (P. Murphy, Introduction [footnote 9], pp. lxvii-lxxix, quotation p. lxix).

a “Minority Report”.⁹⁰ Here, they discussed the Kariba Dam as a micro-study of the Federation’s discriminatory politics: All economic development currently taking place, they argued, was heavily biased towards the south, business and industry, that is, the white minority. Within the existing framework the “standard of life of the poor majority” would not improve; instead, development “helped most those who were already well-off”.⁹¹ Habanyama, previously praised for his willingness to draw “a clear distinction between politics and local government”,⁹² now postulated an urgent need for political change since “there can be no long-term and stable economic prosperity until the Africans, duly elected by their people, are in control of their own governments.”⁹³ How drastically the mediator’s course was shifting can furthermore be seen from the fact that Habanyama stood as candidate for Kaunda’s new United National Independence Party (UNIP) in 1962 – a party which was widely perceived as a more radical rival to Nkumbula’s Northern Rhodesian Congress.⁹⁴

Moreover, little was left of Habanyama’s previous gradualism and cultural conservatism when he debated with officers over the uses of the future Lake Kariba in the later 1950s. While Southern Rhodesian authorities started to turn their part of the reservoir into a magnet for white tourism and big business, arguing that the indigenous people lacked the potential to develop the area by themselves,⁹⁵ the Native Authority in the north insisted that the lakeshore, especially the fisheries, be managed by the Gwembe Tonga. If the people received exclusive fishing rights and sufficient funds, the Native Authority itself would “push on training and get boats and equipment at a rapid rate” so that “we can develop much faster”.⁹⁶ Since the new land would not sustain the Gwembe Tonga on agriculture alone, the maxim was now “fish or starve”.⁹⁷ At that stage, development had thus become a fierce competition over limited resources, in which the south threatened to outdo the north, blacks competed against whites, national interests jeopardised local ones. Questions of *how* to develop, paternalist gradualism or notions of ‘tradition’-based

90 On W.M. Chirwa, see: R. Segal, Political Africa. A Who’s Who of Personalities and Parties, New York 1961, pp. 56-57.

91 W. Chirwa/H. Habanyama, Minority Report, in: Report of the Advisory Commission on the Review of the Constitution of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, London 1960, pp. 139-156, here p. 144-145.

92 Annual Report on African Affairs, Southern Province, 1960, NAZ SP 4/2/59.

93 W. Chirwa/H. Habanyama, Minority Report (footnote 91), p. 149.

94 E. Colson, Social Consequences (footnote 6), pp. 189-190, 199.

95 UK High Commissioner Metcalf to Shannon, Commonwealth Relations Office, 23.5.1957, PRO DO 35/4606. The Southern Rhodesian government reserved a five kilometre-wide strip along the shoreline for tourism, barring the southern settlers from the economic potential of the lake (T. Scudder, Case Study (footnote 26), p. 15). Similarly, they invited commercial businesses to set up a fishing industry, arguing that “a full exploitation ... cannot be achieved by leaving the fishing entirely to the natives” (Memorandum on Dr. Hickling’s report, by Maar, SR fisheries adviser, ca. mid-1956, NAZ SP 4/3/13).

96 D’Avray, Kariba Development Officer, to Minister of Legal Affairs, 17.3.1960, NAZ SP 4/7/16 (first quotation); Record of views expressed at Native Authority meeting regarding the proposed Kariba Lake Development Company, 1.4.1960, NAZ SP 4/7/17.

97 Memorandum on discussions on the formation of a Kariba Development Company, office of Federal Prime Minister, 8.2.1960, NAZ SP 4/7/16.

advancement ‘from within’ took a back seat, as all actors’ primary concern was not to be out-developed by their competitors.

5. Conclusion

Late-colonial, state-making modernisation illustrates the complexity of colonial subjectivation processes. As the examples of Hezekiah Habanyama and Harry Nkumbula show, development was not a “drama with two actors” – the powerful planners against the oppressed subalterns.⁹⁸ Escaping clear-cut labelling like ‘resistance’ or ‘collaboration’, both cases demonstrate how colonial positions have to be located in the ‘in-between’, in reciprocal and dynamic negotiations, as is captured by the concepts of mimicry and hybridity.⁹⁹ Habanyama’s role as one of “Government’s ‘good boys’”¹⁰⁰ opened up “new possibilities of influence”, enabling him to have an impact on the resettlement.¹⁰¹ The middle man’s course, oscillating between privilege and responsibility, expediency and conviction, opposition and cooperation, complicates our understanding of colonial governance and modernisation.¹⁰² It was the promise of development itself that prevented it from becoming a “simple knowledge-power regime” as those who worked from within the system appropriated, redirected and challenged the concept, drawing claims for material prosperity and political participation from it.¹⁰³ At the same time, this very ‘attractiveness’ made it difficult to formulate alternatives. As the case of Harry Nkumbula demonstrates, industrialising hydroelectric schemes also worked for the “imagined communities” of (soon-to-be) African nation-states.¹⁰⁴ Therefore, state-making modernisation was a major locus of colonial ambivalence. Desiring a modern nation with industries and electric power as well as democracy, civil rights, the rule of law was, essentially, desiring the nation-state of the coloniser.¹⁰⁵

Modernisation’s ambivalence was the result of multiple and dynamic entanglements. Both Africans adopted strikingly similar positions in order to redress Kariba’s asymmetries. At the same time, they belonged to competing political alliances, which – for different reasons – came under pressure in the course of time. Regarding their broader ideas of development, both Nkumbula and Habanyama welded together ‘global’ dis-

98 F. Cooper, *Africa since 1940. The Past of the Present*, Cambridge 2002, p. 38.

99 Bhabha, Mimicry (footnote 34); H. Bhabha, *Signs taken for wonders: Questions of ambivalence and authority under a tree outside Delhi*, May 1817, in: idem, *The Location of Culture*. London/New York 1994, pp. 145-174.

100 GTNA Annual Report, 1956, by Habanyama, NAZ SP 4/2/118.

101 A. Eckert, *Cultural Commuters. African Employees in Late Colonial Tanzania*, in: N. Lawrence / E. Osborn / R. Roberts (eds.), *Intermediaries, Interpreters, and Clerks. African Employees in the Making of Colonial Africa*, Madison 2006, pp. 248-269, here p. 251.

102 See also: Ibid., and A. Eckert, *Herrschern und Verwalten* (footnote 11).

103 F. Cooper / R. Packard, *Development Knowledge* (footnote 5), p. 130.

104 B. Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, London 1983.

105 See: B. Ashcroft / G. Griffiths / H. Tiffin, *Post-Colonial Studies. The Key Concepts*, London/New York 2007, pp. 138-139; on colonial ambivalence: H. Bhabha, *Interrogating identity: Frantz Fanon and the postcolonial prerogative*, in: idem (ed.), *The Location of Culture*, London/New York 1994, pp. 57-93.

courses and local experiences. The Congress president did not reject the technocratic rhetoric of Kariba's planners, but, in the light of his own discrimination, could not believe that politics and economics were neatly separable. Moreover, through his network of supporters Nkumbula ensured that the local realities of 'multiracial partnership' boomeranged on the colonial centre. Habanyama was also a cultural broker¹⁰⁶ who drew some of his concepts from the colonial service tradition, while also making his own suggestions for the Tonga's development. Witnessing colonial paternalism's failures on the ground, however, he came to modify his position considerably to arrive at a politicised, fast-track vision not dissimilar to that of his opponents.

On the one hand, it is important to appreciate that modernisation was thus not a money-knowledge-power monolith, but a complex negotiation among different actors.¹⁰⁷ On the other, notions of entanglement or ambivalence must not obscure Kariba's overall lopsidedness. Neither Habanyama nor Nkumbula were able to prevent the Federation's prestige project from becoming – and remaining – a prime case of asymmetrical, exclusive development. Even today, more than 45 years after Zambia's independence, many Gwembe Tonga do not have access to electricity and are food-aid dependent, having been driven from the lake by a multi-million fish industry and having lost even more land to those who could allegedly develop it better.¹⁰⁸

¹⁰⁶ See: A. Eckert, *Cultural Commuters* (footnote 102).

¹⁰⁷ See also: M. van Beusekom, *Negotiating Development: African Farmers and Colonial Experts at the Office du Niger, 1920–1960*, Portsmouth 2002.

¹⁰⁸ That is, public and corporate actors, who invested in tourism and other commercial activities (T. Scudder, *History of Development* (footnote 6); J. Leslie, *Deep Water. The Epic Struggle over Dams, Displaced People and the Environment*, New York 2005, pp. 191–200).

“Techniques éprouvées au cours des siècles”: African Students at the Former School for Colonial Administrators in Paris, 1951–1967

Felix Brahm

RESÜMEE

Die unabhängig gewordenen afrikanischen Nationalstaaten traten ein schwieriges Erbe an. Die postkolonialen Staatswesen standen vor der Aufgabe an eine kolonial geprägte Verwaltung anzuknüpfen. Die Frage nach Kontinuitäten und Diskontinuitäten in diesem Übergang rückt das Problem der Ausbildung der neuen afrikanischen Verwaltungsbeamten in das Zentrum des Interesses.

Der vorliegende Beitrag analysiert vor diesem Hintergrund den Wandel der Pariser *Ecole nationale de la France d'outre-mer*, die eine Monopolstellung in der Ausbildung der französischen Kolonialadministratoren innehatte, zum *Institut des hautes études d'outre-mer*, das überwiegend afrikanische Verwaltungsbeamte ausbildete. Die Untersuchung zeigt, dass trotz der von konservativer Seite so empfundenen und bekämpften „Umwälzung“ der Schule, das konzeptionelle Ziel derselben das gleiche blieb: die Ausbildung einer (post-)kolonialen Verwaltungselite. Die Analyse des Kurrikulums macht indes einen Wandel der zu vermittelten Wissenskorpora deutlich: Diese entwickelten sich zu einem Hybrid aus „bewährtem“ kolonialen/metropolitaniern Verwaltungswissen und neuen „Techniken“, die unter einem Paradigma sozialer und wirtschaftlicher Entwicklung standen.

Die Möglichkeit einer spezialisierten Qualifikation für den höheren Verwaltungsdienst in Paris wurde von den meisten frankophonen afrikanischen Staaten positiv aufgenommen. Wie die Untersuchung zeigt, erlangte die ehemalige Kolonialschule eine bemerkenswerte Funktion als Sprungbrett in hohe Staatsämter zahlreicher afrikanischer Nationalstaaten.

In the era of decolonization, the *Ecole nationale de la France d'outre-mer* in Paris experienced a profound change, at least in terms of its self-perception. From a *grande école*

holding a monopoly on training French colonial administrators – almost all born in the colonial metropole – it transformed itself into an institute for applicants from the former colonies, mainly those in sub-Saharan Africa.¹ But the overall ambition of the school remained the same: to train an administrate elite for the (post-) colonial state. This article looks for the continuities and discontinuities – both conceptual and institutional – that accompanied the transformation of the school. Drawing on Foucault's concept of "power / knowledge",² it focuses particularly on institutional and governmental policies in relation to the school's curriculum. The article also tries to specify which elements made the school particularly attractive for African students, highlighting its remarkable function as a stepping stone to high ranks in the public service of numerous francophone African nations. This alone makes the school's history particularly interesting for any analysis of postcolonial African governmentality.

1. Institutional history

The *Ecole coloniale* was founded in 1887 / 88 as a state-run training school for future colonial officers in Paris.³ From 1912 onwards, it held the monopoly on training colonial administrators.⁴ George Hardy, the school's director between 1926 and 1933, successfully professionalized the school. It was also during his directorate that the curriculum started to shift from an emphasis on colonial law towards the humanities in order to better understand the "natives" (*indigenes*) and "social evolutions" in the colonies.⁵ In 1934, the *Ecole colonial* was elevated to a *grande école* and renamed *Ecole nationale de la France d'outre-mer* (ENFOM).⁶ It became an elite school recruiting no more than 30 to 60 students a year directly after preparatory classes in some exclusive lycées. William B. Cohen, the US-American doyen of French colonial history, has pointed out that the selection of recruits was highly class-bound to the upper middle class bourgeoisie, favouring cadets from the French capital and conditioned especially by the fathers' occupations (pre-

1 In 1959, the *Ecole nationale de la France d'outre-mer* was transformed into the *Institut des hautes études d'outre-mer* (IHEOM). In 1967, IHEOM was renamed the *Institut international d'administration publique* (IIAP). In 2002, IIAP fused into the *Ecole nationale d'administration* (ENA), see below.

2 In particular, see: M. Foucault, *Surveiller et Punir: naissance de la prison*, Paris 1975; M. Foucault, *Geschichte der Gouvernementalität*, v. 1: *Sicherheit, Territorium, Bevölkerung*. Vorlesung am Collège de France, 1977–1978, ed. by M. Sennelart, Frankfurt am Main 2004.

3 On the *Ecole coloniale*, see: W. B. Cohen, *Rulers of Empire: The French Colonial Service in Africa*, Stanford 1971 (French edition: W. B. Cohen, *Empereurs sans sceptre. Histoire des administrateurs de la France d'outre-mer et de l'Ecole coloniale*, Paris 1973); D. Rigolot, *L'Ecole coloniale (1885–1939)*, Paris 1970.

4 W. B. Cohen, *Rulers* (footnote 3), p. 84.

5 F. Brahm, *Wissenschaft und Dekolonisation. Paradigmenwechsel und institutioneller Wandel in der akademischen Beschäftigung mit Afrika in Deutschland und Frankreich, 1930–1970*, Stuttgart 2010, pp. 38 ff.; V. Dimer, *Le Commandant de Cercle: un 'expert' en administration coloniale, un 'specialiste' de l'indigène?*, in: *Revue d'Histoire des Sciences Humaines* 10 (2004), pp. 39–57.

6 Centre des archives d'outre-mer, Aix-en-Provence (CAOM), 1 Col 1, dossier 5: *École coloniale comm.* 21 déc. 1934. Décret relatif au changement de dénomination de l'École coloniale en École nationale de la France d'Outre-mer.

dominantly, but not exclusively high civil service and liberal professions).⁷ The students passed through a two-year cycle followed by a one-year internship in an administrative institution either in the metropole or the colonies, and completed by a final year thesis (*mémoire*). There was a special program for serving officers and soldiers.⁸

The school was open only to male applicants. Moreover, since World War I, it had refused to admit so-called autochthon applicants from the colonies. Up until the 1950s, only a few non-white applicants of French citizenship were accepted, predominantly from the Caribbean or from the Four Communes of Senegal.⁹ These included Félix Éboué (1884–1944) who was born in Cayenne (French Guiana). After graduating from the *Ecole coloniale*, Éboué commenced a successful career in the French colonial administration before finally becoming governor-general of French Equatorial Africa. He called for a strengthening of indirect rule and reliance on a local African elite; a program that was partly put into practice during World War II in colonies whose governors supported de Gaulle.¹⁰ Although Éboué's career in the French colonial service was certainly exceptional, it also shows that the French differentiation between the Colonizer and the Colonized was not based exclusively on colour, but upon cultural differentiation and cultural racism.

After closing temporarily due to German aggression and French mobilization at the beginning of World War II, the ENFOM reopened and, as William B. Cohen has pointed out, flourished surprisingly well during wartime and the immediate post-war years. More candidates then ever applied to the school, because a career in the colonies had become more attractive, not only for material reasons but also in terms of social prestige.¹¹ The colonies, “Greater France” (*Plus grande France*), had returned to being a source of French national pride and self-assurance.¹² But in the 1950s, ENFOM became less attractive for French applicants than its direct counterpart since 1945, the *Ecole nationale d'administration* (ENA) that trained students for a career in the French metropole’s public service. The declining attractiveness of ENFOM was due particularly to problems in the colonies (not least the loss of control in Indochina in 1954) and rising public criticism of French colonial policy. This all made a career in the French overseas corps less desirable.

7 W. B. Cohen, *Rulers* (footnote 3), pp. 89–92.

8 Ibid., pp. 84–98; M.-A. Rauch, *Le bonheur d'entreprendre. Les administrateurs de la France d'outre-mer et la création du ministère des Affaires culturelles*, Paris 1998, pp. 24 ff.; A. Enders, *L'Ecole nationale de la France d'outre-mer et la formation des administrateurs coloniaux*, in: *Revue d'histoire moderne et contemporaine*, 40 (1993), pp. 272–288; F. Brahm, *Wissenschaft* (footnote 5), pp. 36–42.

9 Four communes of Senegal – Dakar, Gorée, Rufisque, and Saint-Louis – had achieved the legal status of communes françaises.

10 Cohen, *Rulers* (footnote 3), pp. 163 ff.

11 Ibid., pp. 143 ff.

12 For example, see: P. Blanchard / S. Lemaire (eds.), *Culture Coloniale. Les colonies au cœur de la République, 1931–1961*, Paris 2004.

2. A contentious change

The political spectrum among the post-war teaching staff of the ENFOM reveals a notable diversity. Robert Delavignette, director from 1937–1946 and lecturer up to 1962, was a Christian socialist.¹³ His popular books¹⁴ presented an anti-modernist picture of rural France as the “true France” and romanticized simple rural life and local traditions in Africa. However, we also find some notable critics of oppressive colonialism among the personnel at the school, in particular Charles-André Julien and Leopold Sédar Senghor. Both Julien,¹⁵ who became a lecturer of colonial history in 1946, and Senghor, the protagonist of the *négritude* movement who was a lecturer for *langues et civilisations négro-africaines* at ENFOM in 1948,¹⁶ favoured reforms and adhered to the idea of the French Union (*Union française*). In contrast, Paul Bouteille, who became director of the ENFOM in 1950, belonged to the conservative wing of the former overseas administrators. Only a few years earlier, he had held a high position during the bloody repression of the Madagascar Revolt.¹⁷

In October 1950, the majority of the schools’ council (*conseil de perfectionnement*) considered it to be unacceptable to admit African students, as we learn from the minutes of a meeting debating this issue.¹⁸ Accepting African applicants would, of course, have implied that the Colonized themselves should take over high ranks in colonial administration. Nonetheless, the ENFOM was soon obliged to unlock its doors, as will be shown below.

The colonial policy of the Fourth Republic was highly contradictory. On the one hand, independence movements and revolts were suppressed brutally as in Madagascar in 1947–1948, Indochina in 1946–1954, and Algeria in 1954–1962. On the other hand, France established the French Union and tried to transmute into the position of a *primus inter pares*. In the latter ambition, the sub-Saharan French colonies became the centre of attention. Conceptually, in exchange for a leading political position and for economic privileges, the French metropole pledged technical support and economic and social

13 On Delavignette, see: J.-C. Froelich, Delavignette et le service africain, in: *Revue française d'Histoire d'Outre-Mer* 54 (1967), pp. 44–51; P. Kalck, Robert Delavignette et la décolonisation, in: *Revue française d'Histoire d'Outre-Mer* 54 (1967), pp. 52–64; A. Enders, Ecole (footnote 8); B. Mouralis / A. Piriou (eds.) / R. Fonkoua (coll.), Robert Delavignette. Savant et politique (1897–1976), Paris 2003.

14 In particular, see: R. Delavignette, *Le Paysans noirs*, Paris 1931; R. Delavignette, *Soudan – Paris – Bourgogne*, Paris 1935.

15 On Julien, see: F. Brahm, Wissenschaft (footnote 5), pp. 92–95; C. Liauzu, Interrogations sur l’histoire française de la colonisation, in: *Genèses. Sciences sociales et histoire*, 46 (2002), pp. 44–59, here p. 48; A. Raymond, Une conscience de notre siècle. Charles-André Julien 1891–1991, in: *Des ethnies aux nations en Asie centrale. Revue des mondes musulmans et de la Méditerranée*, 59/60 (1991), pp. 259–262. In 1948, Henri Brunschwig followed Julien as lecturer on colonial history.

16 CAOM, ECOL 1, carton 14: Conseil de Perfectionnement de l’École Nationale de la France d’Outre-Mer, séance du 1er Juin 1948. On Senghor, see: J. G. Vaillant, *Black, French, and African: A life of Léopold Sédar Senghor*, Cambridge 1990.

17 Cohen, *Rulers* (footnote 3), p. 151. On the personnel of the ENFOM, see: J. Clauzel (ed.), *La France d’outre-mer (1930–1960). Témoignages d’administrateurs et de magistrats*, Paris 2003.

18 See: CAOM, 1 ECOL 14: Conseil de Perfectionnement, séance du Mardi 31 octobre 1950.

development.¹⁹ The build-up of the vast *Office de la recherche scientifique et technique outre-mer* (ORSTOM)²⁰ in the post-war years is a good example of the political efforts undertaken in this direction. Despite the intrinsic contradictoriness of simultaneous partnership and French supremacy, the majority of the West- and Central African elite considered it to be acceptable in the short term. A temporary French leadership was seen as a positive economic boost for development and a political preventive to so-called Balkanization.

The ENFOM did not remain unaffected by this policy. At the director's annual address in 1951, the Undersecretary of State at the Ministry of Overseas France, Louis-Paul Aujoulat, expressed the new guideline in front of the new students: "Your forerunners were bosses, you will be tutors, your forerunners gave orders, you will be called to give advice, your forerunners were pioneers, you will be initiators."²¹

The majority of the métropole-born students seemed to have supported this perspective. However, the school curriculum did not change in the following years, and in a 1956 manifesto, the students criticized their ENFOM training for being irrelevant to the changes taking place overseas, calling (unsuccessfully) for the introduction of a specialized technical education and "serious economic and sociological training".²²

Educating French scientific, technical, and social experts and trying to modify the self-conception of future French overseas administrators was one thing. But the education of African administrators was another. From the perspective of the colonial métropole, it was always risky if Africans from the colonies engaged in academic studies, because studying the history of ideas almost automatically revealed a gap between universalist concepts of freedom and self-determination and its actual political scope.²³ But because of the "thin white line" in the African colonies, cost considerations alone made it inevitable that Africans would have to receive a higher education and start to become involved in colonial administration.²⁴ Moreover, since World War II, the African elites had been calling forcefully for a stronger "Africanization" of the French overseas administration. For the Ministry of Overseas France, educating Africans at the school for colonial officers in Paris was a double-edged sword. On the one hand, there was, in the long run, the possibility of losing colonial control completely; on the other hand, by educating the

19 See: F. Cooper, Decolonizing Situations: The Rise, Fall, and Rise of Colonial Studies, 1951–2001, in: French Politics, Culture and Society, 20/2 (2002), pp. 47–76, here p. 51; F. Cooper, Modernizing Bureaucrats, Backward Africans, and the Development Concept, in: F. Cooper/R. Packard (eds.), International Development and the Social Sciences: Essays on the History and Politics of Knowledge, Berkeley 1997, pp. 64–92.

20 On ORSTOM, see: C. Bonneuil/P. Petitjean, Les chemins de la création de l'ORSTOM, du Front populaire à la libération en passant par Vichy, 1936–1945, in: P. Petitjean (ed.), Les sciences hors l'occident au XXe siècle, v. 2: Sciences coloniales. Figures et institutions, Paris 1996, pp. 113–161.

21 CAOM, 1 ECOL 40, dossier 18: Discours prononcé le 10 Nov. 1951 par M. Aujoulat, Secrétaire d'Etat à la France d'Outre-Mer. „Vos anciens étaient des chefs, vous serez des tuteurs / Vos anciens donnaient des ordres, vous serez appelés à prodiguer des conseils / Vos anciens étaient des défricheurs, vous serez des initiateurs.“

22 Cohen, Rulers (footnote 3), p. 154.

23 See: A. Eckert, Universitäten und die Politik des Exils. Afrikanische Studenten und anti-koloniale Politik in Europa, 1900–1960, Jahrbuch für Universitätsgeschichte, 7 (2004), pp. 129–145.

24 Ibid., p. 129.

applicants at the ENFOM, the so-called "Africanization" of the administration would be channelled into the controlled careers of the French corps of overseas administration. It was in 1951, the same year as Aujoulat's speech, that the ENFOM was forced to accept African applicants for the first time. It was instructed to provide training for a judiciary career (*section magistrates*), but only to applicants already in public service. In this year, as well as in the following years, some African students actually did come to the Paris school from Senegal, Guinea, and Dahomey. In the school's council, this triggered a harsh dispute with rather racist overtones. One professor, for example, asked whether any account had been taken of the "moral disasters" that would surely ensue if the "colonial candidates" were to stay in Paris without their families.²⁵

In 1956, the *loi cadre* successfully passed the French Parliament. It had been drawn up by the member of the French National Assembly from Côte d'Ivoire, Félix Houphouët-Boigny, and the new Minister of Overseas France and mayor of Marseilles, Gaston Defferre. By this act, Paris handed over more rights to the overseas territories in Africa and placed the "Africanization" of the administration on the official agenda. The *loi cadre* had overwhelming consequences for the ENFOM: from the next year onwards, two-thirds of all places had to be reserved for students originating from overseas territories.²⁶

African students conquer the school

In contrast to Cohen's assumption – drawn from an article in the student's newspaper in 1956 – that only few Africans wished to enter the school because of its odiousness as a "colonialist institution",²⁷ a great number of Africans did apply for places at the school. An analysis of the minutes of the school council's meetings reveals that one reason why there were initially so few of them actually studying at ENFOM lay in the school's efforts to restrict the inflow, arguing that it needed to protect its elite character.²⁸ Until the late 1950s, no preparatory classes for the ENFOM entrance exams were provided in any overseas territory,²⁹ and moreover, guest auditors were only admitted in limited numbers.³⁰ Looking at the implementation of the 1956 directive following the *loi cadre*, one can also observe that the school did not co-educate metropole-born candidates and overseas candidates, but separated them. Eventually, it copied the previous structure: the initial two cycles for new recruits – one for directly recruited candidates (*concours A* and *cycle A*) and the other for candidates already in service (*concours B* and *cycle B*) – were sup-

25 CAOM, 1 ECOL 14: Conseil de Perfectionnement, séance 8.11.1951.

26 CAOM, 1 ECOL 13: Conseil de Perfectionnement, séance 22.10.1957.

27 Cohen, Rulers (footnote 3), p. 155. It is notable that a majority of the school's students was in favour of the reforms. Ibid.

28 See: CAOM, 1 ECOL 13, Conseil de Perfectionnement, séances 17.12.1956 – 27.10.1959; 1 ECOL 14, Procès-verbaux des séances et rapports du Conseil de Perfectionnement, 1936–1961.

29 Cohen, Rulers (footnote 3), p. 155.

30 CAOM, 1 ECOL 13, séance 3.11.1958; séance 4.12.1959.

plemented by cycles C and D for the overseas candidates,³¹ renamed A' and B'.³² Nonetheless, from 1951 onwards, African students increasingly made their way to ENFOM as regular candidates as well as guest auditors. For example, in the summer of 1958, at least 9 out of the 29 students who graduated regularly from the ENFOM were African.³³ During the course of the creation of French Community (*Communauté française*), the ENFOM was put under the tutelage of the Prime Minister (delegated to a state minister³⁴), and transformed into the *Institut des hautes études d'outre-mer* (IHEOM) in 1959. The IHEOM was particularly dedicated to educating candidates from the present or former overseas territories.³⁵ The last metropole-born candidates left the school in 1961. Physically, the institution remained in its Moresque style building at its ancestral location, in the Paris *Quartier Latin*, 2, avenue de l'Observatoire.

Because the infrastructure of the French colonial state was inherited by the independent African states, it is not astonishing that most of the new francophone African national governments appreciated a diploma from the former school for colonial administrators in Paris, and officially accepted it as training for a career in public service. Normally, future graduates of IHEOM were guaranteed a career in public service. The African governments reserved the right to choose which candidates could apply to attend the Paris institute; and no regular students were admitted to the IHEOM without the approval of their national authorities.³⁶

Indeed, the training at the former *Ecole coloniale* was highly sought after by African candidates, and the institute expanded. More than 500 students graduated from IHEOM in 1961 alone.³⁷ In 1962, the institute counted 660 students, almost all African.³⁸ After declining in the 1950s, the former ENFOM had had only about one hundred students;³⁹ at the height of its popularity in 1945, this had been 367.⁴⁰

Almost all students at IHEOM came from sub-Saharan Africa, although the institute was principally open for applicants from all former French overseas territories and even

31 Centre historique des Archives nationales, Paris (CHAN), F/17/17708: dossier E.N.F.O.M. règlements organiques 1954–1958; CAOM, 1 ECOL 1, dossier 7 comm. année scolaire 1955–1956, "Décret n° 56.489 du 14 mai 1956 modifiant et complétant le règlement organique de l'ENFOM".

32 CAOM, 1 ECOL 13, Conseil de Perfectionnement, séance 22.10.1957; CHAN, F/17/17708: 23.12.1957, Le Ministre de l'éducation nationale, de la jeunesse et des sports à Monsieur le Ministre de la France d'outre-mer.

33 CAOM, 1 ECOL 13, Procès verbal des séances des lundi 7 et mercredi 9 Juillet 1958. These included Kéba Mbaye (1924–2007) who first made a career as a judge and president of the Supreme Court of Senegal before embarking on an international career. He became well known as a member of the International Court of Justice in The Hague and vice-president of the International Olympic Committee where he played an active part in the readmittance of South Africa to the Olympics after the end of apartheid.

34 Ministre d'état chargé de la fonction publique.

35 See: Ordonnance No. 59-42 Du 5 janvier 1959 portant création de l'institut des hautes études d'outre-mer, article 2; Décret No. 65-198 du 12 mars 1965 portant règlement d'administration publique relatif aux concours d'entrée, au régime des études et à la délivrance des diplômes de l'institut des hautes études d'outre-mer, article 35.

36 See: Centre des archives contemporaines, Fontainebleau (CAC), 20030470: M. Mérigonde: L'institut des hautes études d'outre-mer (1962), p. 9.

37 CAC, 20030470: M. Mérigonde: L'institut des hautes études d'outre-mer (1962), p. 3.

38 Ibid.

39 Cohen, Rulers (footnote 3), p. 157.

40 Ibid., p. 151.

other countries. However, non-African students were of no relevance until the end of the 1960s. Presumably, the French colonial wars in South-East Asia and Northern Africa discredited attendance at the IHEOM in these world regions. A list of all students between 1959 and 1967 reveals a total of 22 countries of origin⁴¹ of which only two were non-African: Laos and French Polynesia. Most of the candidates between 1959 and 1967 came from Madagascar (first place), Cameroon (second place), and Dahomey (third place). In the "transitional period", as this phase was called retrospectively in 1962, the IHEOM abandoned entrance examinations. However, they were reintroduced in this year.⁴² Again, a *concours* A was introduced for new recruits and a *concours* B for candidates already in public, civil, or military service (applicants had to have been in service for at least four years); a special *concours* was created for candidates applying from judicial authorities. But exceptions from the normal access procedure could be made.⁴³ Although not mentioned explicitly either in decrees relating to the institute or in the institutes' publications, the attendance of female students must have been introduced some years before 1969, because this is the first year in which we find female alumni in the yearbook.⁴⁴ No school fees were required, and scholarships for residence in Paris as well travel costs were provided by the French Ministry of Cooperation and some international institutions (UNO, ILO, and EEC).⁴⁵

3. Shifting paradigms?

A look at the courses offered to *concours* A first-year students in 1963/64 (table 1) reveals a wide-ranging programme of introductory courses covering law, administrative studies, ethnology, geography, history, the English language, and economics. This mainly followed up the teaching at the former ENFOM; only the teaching of economics – three out of twelve seminars in the first cycle alone – is rather surprising. The former ENFOM offered hardly any courses in this discipline⁴⁶ – a former critique by its students. Amongst the lecturing staff of IHEOM, we find a lot of university professors. This followed the pattern at the former ENFOM, in which a high percentage of the teaching personnel were professors from the Paris academia who were attracted by teaching assignments.⁴⁷

41 Burundi, Cameroun, Comores, Congo, Côte-d'Ivoire, Dahomey (later Benin), Gabon, Haute-Volta (later Burkina Faso), Laos, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritanie, Niger, Polynésie française, République centrafricaine, Rwanda, Sénégal, Tanzanie, Tchad, Territoire des afar et des issas (later Djibouti), Togo, Zaire. CAC, 20030470: Annuaire des anciens élèves. L'institut des hautes études d'outre-mer (1972), p. 3.

42 CAC, 20030470: M. Mérigonde: L'institut des hautes études d'outre-mer, (1962), pp. 3f.

43 Ibid., p. 4.

44 See: CAC, 20030470: Annuaire des anciens élèves de l'institut des hautes études d'outre-mer 1969.

45 CAC, 20030470: L'institut des hautes études d'outre-mer (1964), p. 37.

46 On the curriculum of the ENFOM, see: F. Brahm, Wissenschaft (footnote 5), pp. 36-42, here pp. 259 ff.

47 Ibid., p. 41.

Table 1: Courses offered at the Institut des hautes études d'outre-mer (IHEOM),
concours A, premier cycle, academic year 1963 / 64.⁴⁸

Course	Lecturer	Affiliation
Organisation Politique et Administrative des Etats Africains	Gonidec	Professeur à la Faculté de Droit et des Sciences Economiques de Paris
Les Institutions privées des Etats Africains	Alliot	Professeur à la Faculté de Droit et des Sciences Economiques de Paris
Economie d'Outre-Mer et Développement	Leduc	Professeur à la Faculté de Droit et des Sciences Economiques de Paris
Droit d'Outre-Mer et de la Coopération	Lampue	Professeur à la Faculté de Droit et des Sciences Economiques de Paris
Ethnologie juridique	Lévy-Bruhl / Alliot	Professeurs à la Faculté de Droit et des Sciences Economiques de Paris
Déontologie de la Fonction Publique	Dutheillet de Lamothe / Catherine	Maître des Requêtes au Conseil d'Etat / Directeur, Rédacteur en chef de la „Revue administrative“
Techniques administratives modernes	Gournay	Conseiller référendaire à la Cour des Comptes
Anglais	Mme. Dutheillet de Lamothe	Agrégée d'anglais
Travaux publics en Afrique ou Economie minière	M. Bonnal / Roland Pré	Inspecteur Général des Travaux Publics / Président du Bureau des Recherches Géologique et Minières
Commercialisation des produits tropicaux ou Syndicalisme et Coopération	Chauleur / Lasserre	Rédacteur en chef de „Marchés Tropicaux“ / Professeur à la Faculté de Droit et des Sciences Economiques de Paris
Géographie de l'Afrique et de Madagascar	Sautter / Delvert	Directeur des Etudes à l'Ecole pratiques des Hautes Etudes / Professeur à la Faculté des Lettres et des Sciences Humaines de Rennes
Histoire de l'Afrique contemporaine	Brunschwig	Directeur d'Etudes à l'Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes

During the course of the transformation of the ENFOM, some former lecturers resigned their posts, others remained.⁴⁹ Nevertheless, the teaching personnel at both the ENFOM and the IHEOM could certainly be called high-profile. In contrast to ENFOM, IHEOM personnel included a higher percentage of "practitioners" such as bank directors, journalists, and even former ministers – partly replacing a former proportion of retired colonial administrators who had lectured at the ENFOM.

During their second year, students at IHEOM could specialize in four sections. Unlike the ENFOM, there was no longer a general regional specialization (former African, Asian, and Madagascan sections).⁵⁰ However, in comparison to its forerunner, which concentrated on an administrator's and a magistrate's career, IHEOM offered a more differentiated curriculum addressing a range of vocational careers. The first section was on diplomacy (*section diplomatique*) covering mainly foreign and international affairs, area studies, and regional geography. Within the academic year 1963/64, this section contained 21 courses on, for example, international organizations (*Les Organisations Internationales*) by a university professor from Nancy, or on the Maghrib states (*Les Etats du Maghreb*) by an undersecretary of state.⁵¹

The economic and financial section (*section économique et financière*, eight courses in 1963/64), covered mainly business administration and fiscal policy in courses such as Banque, monnaie et expansion by a bank director or *Economie monétaire* by the acting French president of the central bank of the states of the former French Equatorial Africa and Cameroon. The administrative section (*section administrative*, 17 courses in 1963/64) tied together a diverse programme encompassing theoretical as well as applied political knowledge and administrative techniques starting with Civilisation française, *les grands courants de la pensée* by the head of the educational department of the Ministry of Cooperation and covering, for example, "Political and administrative organization of the African states and Madagascar" as well as "Statistical methods". The last section, *section sociale* (nine courses) focused on social affairs and public health with courses such as "Physiology of labour" (*Physiologie du Travail*) or "Methods of social statistics" (*Méthodes statistiques sociales*) by an administrator of the National Institute for Statistics and Economic Research.⁵²

Surveying the exemplary curriculum of 1963/64, it becomes very apparent that development is the dominant paradigm; this is even reflected semantically in no fewer than seven course titles. In fact, in all four of the second year's specialized sections, we find courses devoted to techniques for promoting technical or social development or to the organization of technical assistance.⁵³ The curriculum appears to be a mixture of approved

49 See: Cohen, Rulers (footnote 3), p. 157.

50 F. Brahm, Wissenschaft (footnote 5), p. 40.

51 This and the following quotes are taken from the 1963/64 programme: CAC, 20030470: L'Institut des hautes études d'outre-mer (1964).

52 Institut national de la statistique et des études économiques (INSEE).

53 For example, in the diplomatic section, Assistance technique internationale, by two directors of the Bureau for development and agricultural production (Bureau pour le développement de la production agricole, BDPA);

colonial as well as the metropole's governmental knowledge combined with "modern" techniques for promoting development.

The prominent position of the idea of development at IHEOM is also evident in a booklet portraying the institute in 1962:

En premier lieu, il [l'IHEOM] assure surtout pour les pays d'Afrique, de Madagascar et d'Asie et d'une façon plus générale pour les pays en voie de développement, une formation des cadres supérieurs relativement rapide et surtout particulièrement adaptée aux problèmes de chacun d'eux. En second lieu, il fait connaître à l'élite de ces pays non seulement l'essentiel de la culture occidentale mais aussi l'Administration française et les techniques à la fois éprouvées au cours des siècles et sans cesse adaptées au rythme nouveau de la vie moderne. En troisième lieu et enfin aux cadres des Etats d'Afrique et Madagascar, il apporte deux années de vie commune au cours desquelles les ressortissants d'un continent trop 'balkanisé' pour employer une expression à la mode, apprennent à se connaître, à s'estimer et voient se développer en eux même le sentiment de solidarité que unit tous les peuples d'Afrique et de Madagascar.⁵⁴

The second of IHEOM's training missions quoted above was to "introduce to the elite of these countries not only the essentials of western culture but also the French administration and the techniques that have been tried and tested over the course of centuries while simultaneously being adapted constantly to the new rhythm of modern life". The institute tried to approach this ambitious goal by not only recruiting more practitioners as lecturers, but also assigning the students to internships in French administrative and judicial institutions (usually a three-month internship in the first and a six-month internship in the second year). Moreover, the institute organized study trips to French cultural institutions, industrial plants, and so forth.⁵⁵

Here at the latest, it becomes obvious that from the perspective of the French government, IHEOM had also become a factor in cultural policy. This is confirmed in the alumni annuals (*Annuaires des anciens élèves*) published every few years. Names and functions of the former élèves are listed country-wise to facilitate networking – like a who's who of a presumably Francophile Africa.⁵⁶

4. An administrative elite

But what were the incentives encouraging African students to join IHEOM? This cannot be answered definitely without interviewing former students; but some obvious aspects

in the economic and financial section, Fiscalité et développement; in the administrative section, Droit du Développement or the "evolution of sciences" (L'évolution des sciences); in the section on social affairs, L'action médico-sociale face au sous-développement.

54 CAC, 20030470: M. Mérigonde: L'Institut des hautes études d'outre-mer, (1962), p. 10.

55 CAC, 20030470: L'Institut des hautes études d'outre-mer, (1964), pp. 5, 27; Ibid., L'Institut des hautes études d'outre-mer, (1965), p. 41.

56 For example, see: CAC, 20030470: Annuaire des anciens élèves. L'Institut des hautes études d'outre-mer (1972).

made the institute attractive. As mentioned above, the post-colonial state had to be built upon the infrastructures of the former colonial administration. Moreover, because, in many cases, the French administrative and juridical system was adopted extensively, acquiring an education at the former school for French overseas administrators was only logical. Indeed, a study of the alumni annuals reveals that an IHEOM diploma was a stepping stone to high-ranking positions in both the home country and international institutions. In 1965, the IHEOM could proudly mention that its alumni already included numerous state ministers, state secretaries, ambassadors, and other officials of high rank.⁵⁷ It listed no fewer than 24 active ministers, eleven state secretaries, 16 ambassadors, ten Supreme Court members, and six members of national assemblies (see table 2).

Summarizing the years 1951–1967 in the history of ENFOM and its institutional successor the IHEOM, we can see that this was a phase characterized by conservative resistance, roaring change, and a conceptual hybridity. As a result, any analysis of the “important changes” (*bouleversements importants*) in the “life” of the old ENFOM, noted retrospectively by the IHEOM in 1962,⁵⁸ needs to take a differentiated approach. Certainly, for African students, the fundamental difference was no longer being excluded from the administration of their own home countries and being able to train for high-ranking public service. However, the Paris school itself did not change substantially, and, moreover, it was very successful in achieving its goal of educating an administrative elite for post-colonial African states. This simultaneously foreshadows continuities in governmental techniques between the colonial and several post-colonial francophone states. Nonetheless, it is clear that the transformation of the school did not just consist in a change of clients – the curriculum changed as well. It did not just develop a more specific focus on functions in public service, but transformed itself conceptually into a hybrid of “proven” techniques of colonial / metropolitan administration combined with “new” techniques for economic and social development.

57 CAC, 20030470: L’Institut des hautes études d’outre-mer, (1965), p. 25.

58 CAC, 20030470: M. Mérigonde: L’Institut des hautes études d’outre-mer (1962), p. 3.

Table 2: High-Ranking Officials among the Alumni of ENFOM / IHEOM (1964)⁵⁹

Office (number)	Countries (number) ⁶⁰
Active (national) ministers (24)	(4) Cameroon; Chad; Mauritania; (3) Senegal; Upper Volta (Burkina Faso) (2) Central African Republic; Gabon (1) Côte d'Ivoire; Guinea
Ambassadors (16)	(3) Mali (2) Côte d'Ivoire; Senegal; Togo (1) Central African Republic; Chad; Congo Léopoldville (Democratic Republic of Congo); Dahomey (Benin); Guinea; Mauritania; N.N.
Supreme court members (10)	(3) Senegal (2) Mali (1) Cameroon; Congo Brazzaville (Republic of the Congo); Côte d'Ivoire; Dahomey (Benin); Madagascar
National assembly members (5)	(2) Côte d'Ivoire (1) Chad; Dahomey (Benin); Madagascar; Togo
Members of national councils of economic advisors / national banks (7)	(3) Central African Republic (1) Chad; Dahomey (Benin); Madagascar, Mali
State secretaries (11)	(2) Chad; Madagascar (1) Central African Republic; Congo Brazzaville (Republic of the Congo); Dahomey (Benin); Gabon; Niger; Senegal; Togo
Total (73)	(9) Chad, Senegal (7) Central African Republic (6) Côte d'Ivoire; Mali (5) Cameroon; Madagascar; Mauritania (4) Dahomey (Benin); Togo (3) Gabon; Upper Volta (Burkina Faso) (2) Congo Brazzaville (Republic of the Congo); Guinea (1) Congo Léopoldville (Democratic Republic of Congo); Niger; N.N.

59 CAC, 20030470: L'Institut des hautes études d'outre-mer (1964), pp. 27-31. Unlisted here: Grandes directions, e.g. Côte d'Ivoire (footnote 13); Chad (6); Administration préfectorale, e.g. Cameroon (footnote 14); Madagascar (footnote 19); *Ibid.*, pp. 31-33.

60 BF: Upper Volta (Burkina Faso); BJ: Dahomey (Benin); CAM: Cameroon; CD: Congo Léopoldville (Democratic Republic of Congo); CI: Côte d'Ivoire; GA: Gabon; GN: Guinea; ML: Mali; NE (Niger); RCA: Central African Republic; RCB: Congo Brazzaville (Republic of the Congo); RIM: Mauritania; RM: Madagascar; SN: Senegal; TD: Chad; TG: Togo.

Representations of Emancipation: (Post-)Coloniality and the Zapatista Insurgency in Mexico

Stephan Scheuzger

RESÜMEE

Die Fragen, ob und wie die unter der Bezeichnung „postcolonial studies“ zusammengefassten Analyseansätze auf lateinamerikanische Verhältnisse anwendbar sind, werden seit rund zwei Jahrzehnten kontrovers diskutiert. Ein Phänomen, das im Zusammenhang der Debatte über die Postkolonialität in Lateinamerika wiederholt angesprochen und erörtert worden ist, war der 1994 im mexikanischen Gliedstaat Chiapas ausgebrochene Aufstand des *Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional* (EZLN). Der Artikel fragt im Fall dieses Ereignisses aus geschichtswissenschaftlicher Warte nach Möglichkeiten und Grenzen der Einsicht von Analyseperspektiven des Postkolonialismus bzw. des mit Blick auf die historischen Besonderheiten der lateinamerikanischen Entwicklung im Anschluss daran formulierten Konzepts der Kolonialität. Exemplarisch im Mittelpunkt der Betrachtung steht die Analyse des *zapatismo* von Walter D. Mignolo.

“Somos producto de 500 años de luchas” (“We are a product of 500 years of struggle”).² This statement introduced the rebellion of the Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional (EZLN) to the Mexican and the international public. The first sentence of the *Declaración*

- 1 This research was funded by the Berghof Foundation for Conflict Studies in the framework of a 28-month research project on “The role of non-state actors in the transformation of the conflicts in Macedonia and in Kosovo”, which was located at the University of Munich and supervised by Prof. Dr. Marie-Janine Calic. Results of this research have been published in: Isabel Ströhle, The Politics of Reintegration and War Commemoration. The Case of the Kosovo Liberation Army, in: Südosteuropa (in print). Parts of section 2 are very similar to sections in that article, which is, however, more extensive and focuses on the ex-KLA-members’ reintegration and demilitarisation of post-war society. I warmly thank Stephanie Schwandner-Sievers for comments on an earlier draft of this paper.
- 2 Declaración de la Selva Lacandona [2º de enero], in: EZLN. Documentos y comunicados. 1º de enero/8 de agosto de 1994, México, D. F. 1994, pp. 33–35, here p. 33.

de la Selva Lacandona, promulgated one day after the beginning of the insurgence of the Mayan-dominated guerrilla army in the southeastern Mexican state of Chiapas on 1 January 1994, evoked a postcolonial setting of the Zapatista campaign. Such a condition of resistance implied, obviously, much more than the continuity of an anti-imperialist struggle against the succeeding antagonists of the Spanish, the French and, finally the US Empire. It opened, in fact, many overlapping, intersecting, and sometimes rather diffuse front-lines. The addressee of the *Declaración de la Selva Lacandona* was “el pueblo de México”, invoked to ally to the insurgent movement. The polysemous term *el pueblo* carried at least two meanings in this context: the people as the nation, in opposition to foreign powers, and the people in opposition to the national elites of the economically privileged and their political representatives. When the EZLN declared that it would re-establish the sovereignty of the people, the claim was directed against the 65-year-regime of the ruling Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) as well as the plundering (“*el saqueo*”) of the fatherland by alien powers. The *guerrilleros* denounced the alliance of neo-liberal *vendepatrias* (those, who sell the fatherland) and foreign economic interests. Consequently, the EZLN chose to start its rebellion the same day the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) between the United States, Mexico and Canada came into force. By inscribing their rebellion in a tradition of a five hundred year old struggle, the Zapatistas marked, in their statement from the geographic and social margins of the global periphery, yet another center of discourse: their indigenous identity at least connoted a sense of historical depth – if not of pre-colonial originality – in an act of resistance that became readable as a part of power structures still shaped by colonial forms of dominance. Such an alliance of ethnicity, class and nation was by no means unique in twentieth century identity politics in Latin America. But, due to the Mexican Revolution (1910–1920), these identities were more closely interwoven in discourses of emancipation in Mexico than elsewhere on the subcontinent. At the end of the century, the dazzling, subversive discourse of the EZLN, which soon became the main weapon of the hopelessly under-armed guerrilla, both built on traditional representations of emancipation – the project of a transition to democracy and socialism through the national liberation from a “neocolonial” dominance by the United States – and, at the same time, re-invented them in a genuine hybridisation of Marxism and indigenous narratives, as well as Mexican revolutionary and post-revolutionary nationalism.³ The combination of Indian subalternity, a post-Cold War revolutionary project and the alliance of indigenous subjectivities that overtly challenged the conventional non-indigenous imagery about Indian “Otherness” with a discourse ideologically engrained in various layers and currents of the Marxist left made the EZLN appear, for many scholars, as a pertinent illustration of a (post)colonial condition in contemporary Latin America.⁴

3 See Subcomandante Marcos in: Y. Le Bot, *El sueño zapatista. Entrevistas con el Subcomandante Marcos, el maestro Moisés y el comandante Tacho del Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional*, Barcelona 1997, p. 128.

4 See: F. Coronil, *Elephants in the Americas? Latin American Postcolonial Studies and Global Decolonization*, in: M. Moraña/E. Dussel/C. A. Jáuregui (eds.), *Coloniality at Large: Latin America and the Postcolonial Debate*, Durham/London 2008, pp. 396–416, 416; W. D. Mignolo, *The Zapatistas's Theoretical Revolution: Its Historical,*

1.

Meanwhile, the idea of a Latin American postcoloniality has been the source of a controversial debate for about two decades.⁵ There is no corpus of work commonly recognised as Latin American “postcolonial studies”, and the subcontinent has hardly featured on the map of postcolonial theory.⁶ To simplify, the interventions that contoured the early discussion about postcolonialism in Latin America may be grouped into four currents.⁷ As a form of postcolonial critique, the subaltern studies approach was introduced into the field of Latin American studies with the formation of the Latin American Subaltern Studies Group in 1992. However, the Group situated its conceptualisation of subalternity programmatically within the general context of the then-emergent field of Latin American cultural studies rather than define it specifically as a historiographic constituent of postcolonialism.⁸ The question of whether the approaches and categories of “postcolonial studies” could be meaningfully applied to Latin American contexts was discussed basically from three stances. Resistance to the adoption of postcolonial studies perspectives for analysing the subcontinent’s historical developments was spearheaded by the pronounced critique of J. Jorge Klor de Alva. The anthropologist stressed the differences between the cultural dimension of Spanish rule in America and of British or French rule in Asia and Africa in order to deny, not altogether convincingly, that the terms “colonialism”, “decolonisation” and “postcolonialism” “*as commonly understood today* [what meant: as inventions of the study of nineteenth and twentieth centuries’ colonial experiences], [were] particularly useful for making sense of the cultural processes that engendered post-contact and post-independence societies” in Latin America.⁹ On the other side, various authors advocated for an inclusion of Latin America into the field of postcolonial studies – as Peter Hulme did explicitly in response to Klor de Alva’s

Ethical, and Political Consequences, in: Review (Fernand Braudel Center), 30 (2002) 3, pp. 245–275; M. Moraña / E. Dussel / C. A. Jáuregui, Colonialism and its Replicants, in: M. Moraña / E. Dussel / C. A. Jáuregui (eds.), *Coloniality at Large*, p. 11; J. Rabasa, Without History: Subaltern Studies, the Zapatista Insurgency, and the Specter of History, Pittsburgh 2010; J. Saldaña-Portillo, Lectura de un silencio: el “Indio” en la era del zapatismo, in: S. Dube / I. B. Dube / W. D. Mignolo (eds.), *Modernidades coloniales*, México, D. F. 2004, pp. 49–77; R. J. C. Young, Postcolonialism: An Historical Introduction, Oxford et al. 2001, p. 193.

5 For a preliminary understanding about this debate, see: Patricia Seed, Colonial and Postcolonial Discourse, in: Latin American Research Review, 26 (1991) 3, pp. 181–200.

6 F. Coronil, Elephants in the Americas? (footnote 3), pp. 396; P. Hulme, Postcolonial Theory and the Representation of Culture in the Americas, in: M. Moraña / E. Dussel / C. A. Jáuregui (eds.), *Coloniality at Large* (footnote 3), pp. 388–395, here p. 389.

7 Terminologically this essay follows the differentiation proposed by Leila Gandhi: “The theory may be named ‘postcolonialism’, and the condition it addresses is best conveyed through the notion of ‘postcoloniality’”. Leila Gandhi, *Postcolonial Theory: A Critical Introduction*, Oxford et al. 1998, p. 5. The hyphenated adjective “post-colonial” is used in this contribution exclusively as a temporal marker of the formal decolonising process.

8 Latin American Subaltern Studies Group, Founding Statement (1992), reprinted in: J. Beverly / M. Aronna / J. Oviedo (eds.), *The Postmodernism Debate in Latin America*, Durham / London 1995, pp. 135–146, here p. 141.

9 J. J. Klor de Alva, Colonialism and Postcolonialism as (Latin) American Mirages, in: *Colonial Latin American Review*, 1 (1992) 1/2, pp. 3–23, here p. 3–4; id., *The Postcolonisation of the (Latin) American Experience: A Reconsideration of “Colonialism”, “Postcolonialism”, and “Mestizaje”*, in: G. Prakash (ed.), *After Colonialism: Imperial Histories and Postcolonial Displacements*, Princeton 1995, pp. 241–275.

objection.¹⁰ Hulme, and later Bill Ashcroft, – both literary specialists – pointed out that such an inclusion would also implicate a major change for postcolonial theory.¹¹ While Hulme emphasised the prominent Caribbean tradition of postcolonial studies, Ashcroft argued for the expansion of postcolonial studies perspectives to Latin America not least by referring to the existence of critical analyses of the “colonial discourse” *avant la lettre* on the subcontinent, initiated in the late 1950s by the work of the Mexican historian Edmundo O’Gorman.¹² This argument was taken from Walter D. Mignolo.¹³ Mignolo has been a major exponent of what can be identified as a third current, christened the Latin American Coloniality Group.¹⁴ This informal group, loosely united by commonalities of theoretical assumptions, terminology and interpretational patterns of Latin America’s past and present, has actually adopted postcolonial theory for Latin America studies, but under the label of “coloniality”. The term designates the “epistemic nucleus”¹⁵ of colonialism on which the group’s critical work has focused. The principal reason for this demarcation has been the critique that the notion of postcolonialism misleadingly suggests that colonialism is a phenomenon that has been left behind. The authors related to the group, in contrast, have placed emphasis on the continuity of colonial relations over five centuries of Latin American history.¹⁶ As the pioneers and the most prominent representatives of the current, Enrique Dussel (philosophy), Aníbal Quijano (sociology) and Walter D. Mignolo (semiotics) have made numerous contributions to a critique of modernity’s Eurocentric totalising logic – or mythology respectively –, conceiving colonialism not as a derivative, but as a constituent of modernity: “There is no modernity without colonialism and no colonialism without modernity.”¹⁷ The approaches of the Coloniality Group to the “epistemological violence” of modernity have established a Latin Americanist version of postcolonial studies that, at the same time, has been anxious to accentuate the specificity of the Latin American debate by contrasting it to postcolonial theory as it has been discussed elsewhere. Over the years, the ongoing discussion about the potentials

10 P. Hulme, Including America, in: Ariel: A Review of International English Literature, 26 (1995)1, pp. 117–123.

11 B. Ashcroft, Modernity’s First-Born: Latin America and Post-Colonial Transformation, in: A. de Toro/F. de Toro (eds.), *El debate de la postcolonialidad en Latinoamérica. Una postmodernidad periférica o cambio de paradigma en el pensamiento latinoamericano*, Madrid / Frankfurt am Main 1999, pp. 13–29.

12 E. O’Gorman, *La invención de América*, México, D.F. 1958.

13 W. D. Mignolo, Colonial and Postcolonial Discourse: Cultural Critique or Academic Colonialism?, in: *Latin American Research Review*, 28 (1993) 3, pp. 120–134, here p.122.

14 S. Castro-Gómez: (Post)Coloniality for Dummies: Latin American Perspectives on Modernity, Coloniality, and the Geopolitics of Knowledge, in: M. Moraña/E. Dussel/C. A. Jáuregui (eds.), *Coloniality at Large* (footnote 3), pp. 259–285, 260. Also see: R. D. Salvatore, The Postcolonial in Latin America and the Concept of Coloniality: A Historian’s Point of View, in: *A Contracorriente*, 8 (2010) 1, pp. 332–348.

15 S. Castro-Gómez: (Post)Coloniality for Dummies (footnote 13), p. 269.

16 See, for example, Walter D. Mignolo’s “argument from Latin America”, which proposes “postoccidentalism” as an alternative term to “postcolonialism”. Mignolo conceives postoccidentalism as a “project to criticize and overcome occidentalism which was the pragmatic project of the colonizing enterprises in the Americas since the sixteenth century, from Spanish colonialism to the North American and Soviet one” (translation S. S.). W. D. Mignolo, *Postoccidentalismo: el argumento desde América Latina*, in: S. Castro-Gómez/E. Mendilena (eds.), *Teorías sin disciplina. Latinoamericanismo, poscolonialidad y globalización en debate*, México, D. F. 1998, pp. 31–58, here p. 41.

17 S. Castro-Gómez: (Post)Coloniality for Dummies (footnote 13), p. 272.

and limits of postcolonial studies perspectives in the analysis of Latin American societies has produced an array of essays and books, entailing an increasing differentiation of arguments, a blurring of the controversy's original boundaries and more nuanced assessments.¹⁸ The Coloniality Group has thereby kept its shape and recently published a remarkable anthology both from and about its perspective on colonial persistence.¹⁹ The present essay will focus on the analysis of the Zapatista insurgency proposed by an exponent of the Coloniality Group. The aim is a critical appraisal, from an historian's point of view, of some implications of studying contemporary Latin American history by using of the concepts of (post)coloniality.

2.

The Zapatista movement originated in the clandestine encounter of a small, armed Marxist underground organisation's cell with Mayan communities in the Chiapanecan Selva Lacandona in the mid-1980s. As a part, albeit a less significant one, of the far-reaching transformations of the Mexican left after the massacre of Tlatelolco in 1968,²⁰ several guerilla movements appeared in different regions of the country. One of them was the Fuerzas de Liberación Nacional, founded in the northern city of Monterrey in 1969. The last of originally three *frentes* of the Castroist-Guevarist guerilla organisation, which had survived the repression over the years, entered the forests of Chiapas in late 1983 –still guided strategically by the theory of the revolutionary *foco* – to become the EZLN.²¹ In the decade leading up to the uprising on New Years Day in 1994, complex processes of interaction evolved between the rather orthodox Marxist *mestizos*, who formed the original cell of the EZLN, and the indigenous *comunidades*. The product of this “cultural shock”²² was the hybrid discourse of *zapatismo*, characterised by the Subcomandante Marcos, the most visible and famously eloquent spokesman of the EZLN, as follows:

Zapatismo was not Marxism-Leninism, but it was also Marxism-Leninism. It was not university Marxism, not Marxism of concrete analysis, not the history of Mexico, not

- 18 For example, see: S. Castro-Gómez/E. Mendieta (eds.), *Teorías sin disciplina* (footnote 15); A. de Toro/F. de Toro (eds.), *El debate de la postcolonialidad en Latinoamérica* (footnote 10); R. Fiddian (ed.), *Postcolonial Perspectives on the Cultures of Latin America and Lusophone Africa*, Liverpool 2000; M. Thurner/A. Guerrero (eds.), *After Spanish Rule: Postcolonial Predicaments of the Americas*, Durham/London 2003.
- 19 M. Moraña/E. Dussel/C. A. Jáuregui (eds.), *Coloniality at Large* (footnote 3). A Spanish forerunner of the publication was C. A. Jáuregui/M. Moraña (eds.), *Colonialidad y crítica en América Latina. Bases para un debate*, Puebla 2007.
- 20 On 2 October 1968, a few days before the inauguration of the Olympic Summer Games in Mexico City, police and military units crushed the Mexican student movement with a massacre in the neighborhood of Tlatelolco. Between 150 and 300 people were killed, and thousands detained.
- 21 See: Y. Le Bot, *El sueño zapatista* (footnote 2), pp. 57–58; J. Womack, *Rebellion in Chiapas: An Historical Reader*, New York 1999, pp. 190–197; B. de la Grange/M. Rico, *Marcos, la genial impostura*, México, D. F. 1997, pp. 167–169.
- 22 Subcomandante Marcos in Y. Le Bot, *El sueño zapatista* (footnote 2), p. 145.

*fundamentalist or millennialist indigenous thinking, and it was not the indigenous resistance: it was a mixture of all of this.*²³

In 2002, Walter D. Mignolo published an essay in the journal Review of the Fernand Braudel Center entitled *The Zapatista's Theoretical Revolution: Its Historical, Ethical, and Political Consequences*. In this contribution, Mignolo interprets the Zapatista movement in the coloniality of power frame as a revolt to restore the human dignity of the indigenous people "taken away by the coloniality of power enacted in the making of the modern / colonial world, since about 1500 until today".²⁴ According to Mignolo, the mechanism that made the zapatismo an emancipatory movement, able to bring about an "epistemic break" into the "configuration of modernity / coloniality", was double translation.²⁵ This bidirectional movement played the key role in what Mignolo ranked as the Zapatistas' theoretical revolution to unmask enduring colonial power structures in the reproduction of cultural difference and to open up "the possibility of conceiving possible futures beyond the limits imposed by two hegemonic abstract universals, (neo) liberalism and (neo) Marxism".²⁶ The author takes up Marcos' own description of the process that the Marxist convictions of the EZLN *guerrilleros* were exposed to in the exchange with the Mayan communities, building up, out of a guerilla cell, a Liberation Army with an indigenous base.²⁷ What Mignolo perceives as the most important result of this transformation is the modality of production of new social representations. With Marcos as a translator, on the one hand, from the Mayan discourses to the national and international public and, on the other, from a Marxist-nationalist ideology to the *comunidades*, a connection was established that enabled

*[f]orms of knowledge that had been discredited from the beginning of modernity/coloniality [to] enter into a double movement of "getting in / letting in" that is allowed by the reversal of coloniality of power". This "makes it possible to imagine epistemic diversality (or pluriversality) and to understand the limits of the abstract-universals that have dominated the imaginary of the modern/colonial world from Christianity to liberalism and Marxism.*²⁸

23 Ibid., p. 199 (translation S. S.).

24 W. D. Mignolo, The Zapatista's Theoretical Revolution: Its Historical, Ethical and Political Consequences, in: Review. Fernand Braudel Center, 25 (2002) 3, pp. 245–275, here p. 245. The notion of "coloniality of power" was introduced by Aníbal Quijano and refers basically to a colonisation of the imaginary of dominated peoples, to the imposition of models of production of knowledge and meaning as a not coercive means of domination. A crucial aspect of the "coloniality of power" was, for example, the idea of the social classification of the population on the basis of racial categories. See: A. Quijano, Colonialidad y Modernidad/Racionalidad, in: R. Blackburn/H. Bonilla (eds.), Los Conquistados: 1492 y la población indígena de las Américas, Bogotá 1992, pp. 437–447, here p. 438.

25 W. D. Mignolo, The Zapatista's Theoretical Revolution (footnote 23), p. 267.

26 Ibid., p. 249.

27 Subcomandante Marcos in Y. Le Bot, El sueño zapatista (footnote 2), pp. 142–155.

28 W. D. Mignolo, The Zapatista's Theoretical Revolution (footnote 23), p. 250. Mignolo makes use of Édouard Glissant's concept of diversality in contrast to "universality" or "plurality" in which the alternatives are not actively integrated or interacting.

Significantly, Mignolo neglects to mention the group of politicised Indians who realised, in addition to Marcos, the same bidirectional translating function.²⁹ And his contrasting of Marcos' position as a double translator to the Spanish missionaries of the sixteenth century as the implanters of the colonial model of a unidirectional translation is incomplete as well. The argument fades out the role of the Indian translators whom the missionaries depended on and who were important agents in colonial knowledge production, highly asymmetrical power relations notwithstanding. Translations were also bidirectional in this context of early formal colonialism. To affirm, that “[t]he missionaries were the only translators, and they never changed their conceptual frames”,³⁰ elides those cultural interactions between colonisers and colonised that also affected the missionaries' conceptual frames, with or without their intention.³¹ This objection is not captious. It points to what appears to be a crucial difficulty in the approach of Mignolo and the Coloniality Group.

In the introductory lines to his essay, Mignolo clarifies once again the basic assumption of this approach: “In the world-making process we identify today as modernity / coloniality, the term modernity does not stand by itself, since it cannot exist without its darker side: coloniality”.³² As becomes evident in what follows, Mignolo does not so much conceive modernity just as interwoven with coloniality, but rather as inextricably colonial. This quality of the alliance implies that emancipation for the subalterns cannot emanate from modernity itself. In his analysis of *zapatismo*, this perspective imposes a twofold limitation on Mignolo's perception of the historical process. First, there is no sign, that he would be able to comprehend the emancipatory – or, in his diction, revolutionary – potential of the Zapatistas' discourse in its modernity. Mignolo does not negate the obvious: the indigenous communities of the end of the twentieth century were not what they had been before the conquest.³³ Yet, the examined sources of Mayan capacities to counteract their subalternity appear to be ultimately rooted in the pre-colonial past.³⁴ The homogenisation of all forms of heteronomy and “epistemic violence” in the continuum of coloniality from the sixteenth to the twentieth century constrains perception of the Indian as fixed in the quality of a colonised subject, rather than as a dynamic agent in cultural interactions with changing identities and correspondingly altering concepts of emancipation. Second, despite Mignolo's diagnosis of a double movement of “getting

29 Subcomandante Marcos in Y. Le Bot, *El sueño zapatista* (footnote 2), p. 145.

30 W. D. Mignolo, *The Zapatistas's Theoretical Revolution* (footnote 23), p. 247.

31 See: N. Farris, *Maya Society Under Colonial Rule: The Collective Enterprise of Survival*, Princeton 1984; J. Lockhart, *The Nahua After the Conquest: A Social and Cultural History of the Indians of Central Mexico, Sixteenth Through Eighteenth Centuries*, Stanford 1992.

32 W. D. Mignolo, *The Zapatistas's Theoretical Revolution* (footnote 23), p. 245.

33 Ibid., p. 258.

34 Reflecting about indigenous concepts of democracy, Mignolo relates the Zapatistas' theoretical revolution with the notion of *ayllu* democracy discussed in Bolivia and states: “Indeed, after 500 years of external (Spain) and internal colonialism (the Bolivian State), indigenous communities in Bolivia (in significant numbers) continue to base their social organization on principles inherited from the ancient Aymaras and Quechuas, rather than the ancient Greeks and the European enlightenment, which is the case for the Creole and (neo) liberal state of Bolivia”. Ibid., p. 259.

in / letting in”, Marxism’s contribution to the *zapatismo* remains completely undiscussed in the essay. From Mignolo’s standpoint, Marxist thought becomes emancipatory for the indigenous project only through its exposure to “infection” by Mayan worldviews.³⁵ As an ideology of (an alternative) modernity, Marxism appears to have, on its part, no infecting effects on the indigenous interpretations of social realities relevant for the understanding of the Zapatistas’ discourse as a revolutionary one (in Mignolo’s sense).

3.

Obviously, the “Indian” was and continues to be a colonial product.³⁶ The integration of the population of a “new world” into European imageries was based fundamentally on generalisation and abstraction – the Indian was defined by his otherness vis-à-vis the colonising Self. One implication of these basic representational mechanisms was the ahistorical character of the imagined Indian: he was situated in the space of nature and not in the space of culture. Another consequence was the lack of coherence of the imagined Indian: the colonial discourse did not establish a fixed structure of stereotyped prejudices about the non-European Other, but instead rather ambiguous images of the *indio*, open to diverse interpretations of the constitutive cultural difference, depending on the concrete historical contexts of the enunciation. Both characteristics facilitated the variability in the representation of the Indian that ensured the persistence of certain colonial elements in the construction of Indian Otherness, far beyond Spanish rule. After independence, the Liberal Creole elite³⁷ that dominated Mexican political life in the nineteenth century sought a complete break with the colonial legacy, eliminating, amongst other measures, the colony’s statutory inequality of the indigenous population. Mexican Congress even proscribed the term “indio” in official language – without much success, but supporting the establishment of the alternative, post-colonial term “indígena”. Nevertheless, basic colonial patterns were at hand and applied to represent indigenous backwardness, when Indians’ modes of life increasingly came to be perceived as a serious obstacle for the nation’s progress. The reproduction of these schemata of representation within the new historical contexts of liberal and later positivist thinking, formal equality of the indigenes as Mexican citizens, profound alterations in modern sciences and an increasing capitalist penetration of economic relations implied, at the same time, their transformation. The widespread view of the Mexican Revolution (1910–1920), consolidated by the post-revolutionary historiography, as a radical rupture with the oligarchic, repressive and exclusionary – some said even racist – regime of the porfiriato and with its modernising project, characterised as intellectually and economically dependent on foreign premises, concealed for decades the continuities existent in

35 Ibid., p. 250.

36 Mignolo is, of course, right in asserting that there were no “Indians” in the Americas until the arrival of the Spaniards. Ibid., p. 245.

37 The term “criollo” designates in this context people of Spanish descent born in America.

the socio-cultural relationships of the state with the indigenous population well into the twentieth century. Only in the 1970s did severe cracks begin to show in the common non-indigenous representation of the Indian as the antithesis to modernity. The *indio* represented tradition, the modern *indio* was an oxymoron. In 1964, Alfonso Caso, director of the Instituto Nacional Indigenista, defined the policy of Mexico's integrationist *indigenismo*: "The indigene, who leaves his village permanently, who speaks Spanish, who works in a factory or lives in a city, is no longer of interest for indigenism".³⁸ In the eyes of the social engineers of Mexico's post-revolutionary progress, this *indigena* was not an *indigena* anymore, he was on the way to becoming a *mestizo*. But the project of mestizaje proposed by post-revolutionary intellectuals, scientists and politicians was not the same as the one envisioned by the nineteenth century liberal elites. Most of the nineteenth century, *mestizaje* was thought of as an agent of the *blanqueamiento* (the "whitening") of the national population to close Mexico's gap on the European and US-American societies, which provided the models of modernity. The *mestizo* should be, in this sense, a temporary phenomenon of the country's transition to a – more culturally than biologically understood – "white" modern society. With the nationalist revolution Mexican stances on the North-Atlantic modernity changed. And the post-revolutionary cultural nationalism had new needs for alterity: the nationalist project found its sources of distinctiveness within a universal modernity in the nation's indigenous cultures. The *mestizo* now acknowledged both of his parents and should no longer be an agent of the society's transformation to modernity, but represent Mexico's modernity itself – bearing the tension between tradition as a resource of identity and the (post)revolutionary project of an accelerated modernisation.

There was continuity in the dominant idea of Mexico's reading and writing elites from independence (1821) to at least the 1970s to deny a self-determined future for the *indígena* as a culturally different subject in a modern national society. Nevertheless, the above outlined shifts in the conceptions of the colonial and later the nation-state's relationship with the Indian evidently transformed the conditions in which indigenous and non-indigenous imaginaries interacted as well as the ways identities were negotiated. Conventions of colonial origin persisted because they were re-signified in changing colonial and national contexts. They cannot be understood adequately without looking at their innovations and at their interrelations with altering intellectual and ideological premises.

Striking continuities of the colonial discourse about the indigenous peoples indeed existed until the end of the twentieth century and the Zapatista rebellion. The widespread refusal to recognise the EZLN as a genuine indigenous movement and the argument time and again repeated that the insurgent Indians were manipulated by external forces was just one case in point: for too many politicians and observers in Mexico it was simply

38 A. Caso, Los ideales de la acción indigenista, in: Instituto Nacional Indigenista, *Memorias. Realidades y proyectos. 16 años de trabajo*, México, D.F. 1964, pp. 11–13, here p. 11 (translation S. S). The term "indigenism" subsumes in the Mexican context administrative, political, scientific and artistic forms of non-indigenous involvement with the indigenous population. The premise of this involvement was the project of *mestizaje*.

unthinkable that *indios* should be able to mastermind such a campaign that intervened incisively in the sphere of national politics and even provoked notable international reverberations. This logic guided also the governmental disclosure of the civil identity of Subcomandante Marcos in February 1995, when President Ernesto Zedillo in a televised address presented the *mestizo* university lecturer Rafael Sebastián Guillén Vicente from Tampico in the northern state of Tamaulipas as the man behind the most prominent mask of the Zapatista movement.³⁹ The authorities consequently portrayed Marcos as a ringleader and ignored the numerous statements of indigenous representatives of the EZLN that stressed the subordinate position of the Subcomandante in the organisational structure of the movement headed politico-militarily by the Comité Clandestino Revolucionario Indígena – Comandancia General. The idea that Marcos did not use the *indigenas*, but that the *indigenas* used Marcos – a plausible point of view, proposed also by Mignolo – seemed unconceivable.⁴⁰ The repeated infantilisation of Zapatista delegations in the rounds of negotiations with the government not only reflected the firmly rooted paternalism in the Mexican elites' posture towards their indigenous fellow citizens. It referred directly to the deepest strata of the colonial discourse about the American natives, the colonisers' conceptions of the *indios* as minors and wards of the Crown.

Along such lines of persistence, Mignolo is interested in “Amerindian wisdom among the Zapatistas that is both engrained in the intersubjective structure of their language and in their corresponding conception of social relations”.⁴¹ He discusses the disputed concepts of democracy though the mode of contrast: the Zapatista notion of “mandar obedeciendo” (“governing through obeying”, referring to the obedience of legitimate leaders to the consensually found will of the communal assembly⁴²) is opposed in a pre-colonial originality to a Western idea of democracy, which, in turn, is presented not only as a product of European Enlightenment, but linearly traced down to ancient Greece.⁴³ Modern aspects in the Zapatista indigenous communities’ “conception of social relations”, on the other hand, are not made the subject of discussion. The question: “How can we imagine democracy from a Tojolabal perspective, a perspective that has been and continues to be enacted by the Zapatistas?”⁴⁴, is beyond doubt, crucial to comprehend the agenda of the EZLN. The Zapatista discourse, however, was of many voices. Also linguistically, since the EZLN unified communities of four ethnic groups: Tzeltal, Tzotzil, Ch’ol and Tojolabal. The *comunidades* that actually formed the social base of the EZLN can be characterised as products of relatively recent modernising processes in Chiapas.

39 Zedillo declared on this occasion: “The origin, the composition of the leadership and the ends of this organization are neither popular, nor indigenous, nor Chiapanecan. We are dealing with a guerilla movement that emerged from a group created in 1969 outside Chiapas, the Fuerzas de Liberación Nacional. Its goal is the seizure of power by force of arms” (translation, S. S), 9 Feb. 1995, cited in: B. de la Grange / M. Rico, Marcos (footnote 20), p. 29.

40 W. D. Mignolo, The Zapatistas’s Theoretical Revolution (footnote 23), p. 260.

41 Ibid., p. 256.

42 Mignolo translates, “mandar obedeciendo” as “To rule and obey at the same time”. Ibid.

43 Ibid., pp. 256–259. Also see: footnote 33.

44 Ibid., p. 256.

anecan society. These *indígenas* had arrived at the Selva Lacandona only since the 1930s and continuing into the 1960s and 1970s, as a part of internal migrations mainly from other regions of the state. The *zapatismo* did not mobilise traditional communities, but indigenous sectors that, in the course of economic, religious and social transformations, had often opposed traditionalist groups and structures and therefore frequently had broken with their ancestral communities. Such dissident groups had formed, in many cases, their own *comunidades*, and they created new identities that were not necessarily based on language or on generations of shared customs, but not least on the experiences of participation in political organisations of peasants or rural workers as well as in the mobilising projects of the Catholic diocese of San Cristóbal de las Casas.⁴⁵ It is certainly plausible to argue that these recent experiences, which brought together varying cultural imaginaries and different practices of political decision-making, influenced the central Zapatista postulate of a “plural democracy” – which should be inspired by the principle of “mandar obedeciendo” and recognise, in particular, communitarian mechanisms of election and representation⁴⁶ – at least as much as did long-lasting ethnic traditions or the structure of the Tojolabal language. Besides the relatively novel multiethnic situation in the area, the politicisation of significant sectors of the indigenous population of the Selva Lacandona in their struggles of the 1970s – for land, better salaries and prices, against owners of large estates, state institutions and companies that exploited the natural resources of the region – was a decisive precondition of the *zapatismo*. These struggles were mainly fought within class organisations. The political forces that organised the indigenous peasants and rural workers and thereby substantially helped to prepare the terrain for the EZLN were of a highly orthodox Marxist provenance, such as the *Maoist Política Popular – Línea Proletaria* or the Communist Central *Independiente de Obreros Agrícolas y Campesinos*.

4.

Together with poststructuralism and postmodernism respectively Marxism has marked the intellectual history of postcolonial theory.⁴⁷ Its relationship with postcolonialism, however, is obviously an ambiguous one: Marxism's anti-imperialist critique was a source of postcolonialism, at the same time its claim of universality has been part of the Eurocentric power structures postcolonialism criticises. Authors in postcolonial studies have chosen different, although basically related ways to deal with this ambivalence. Mignolo's approach reduces the tension drastically, aligning the successive “abstract-universals that have dominated the imaginary of the modern / colonial world from Christianity to

45 See: Y. Le Bot, *El sueño zapatista* (footnote 2), pp. 33–43; L. Stephen, *¡Zapata Lives!* Histories and Cultural Politics in Southern Mexico, Berkeley et al. 2002, p. 88.

46 Y. Le Bot, *El sueño zapatista* (footnote 2), p. 86.

47 See: L. Gandhi, Postcolonial Theory (footnote 6), p. viii.

liberalism and Marxism".⁴⁸ This conception reproduces the old-established argument that Marxism actually has to become un-Marxist to be able to theoretically conceive questions of ethnicity:

*it was the tyranny of a logic grounded in abstract universals that misguided Che Guevara in Bolivia and the Sandinistas in Nicaragua in interactions with indigenous populations, and in their blindness to the theoretical, ethical, and political potential in Amerindian communities.*⁴⁹

What made the “epistemic break” possible in the case of the EZLN’s encounter of Marxism-Leninism and indigenous worldviews remains unanalysed by Mignolo. And the verdict about the Sandinista politics vis-à-vis the indigenous communities keeps quiet about the interactions that actually took place in the conflict between the government of the *Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional* and the indigenous communities, changed the attitudes on both sides and finally led to a pioneering autonomy solution for the Atlantic coast. Such schematising, historically underinformed treatment of Marxism is in no way unique among postcolonial studies perspectives on Latin America, as the example of Robert J. C. Young’s meritorious comprehensive historical introduction to postcolonialism shows. In contrast to Mignolo, Young puts great emphasis on Marxism’s centrality for postcolonialism.⁵⁰ Nevertheless, he separates a Western from a non-Western Marxism, implicitly associating the former with orthodoxy – and with Eurocentrism – the latter with the ideological de-centering – and correspondingly with the de-colonisation – of Marxist perspectives on Latin America. It goes without saying that the EZLN is presented as a major protagonist of the second tendency.

Eurocentrism was indeed a characteristic trait of the Marxists’ positions in Mexico towards the “indigenous question” across the twentieth century.⁵¹ A widespread disregard for the situation of the indigenous population in its cultural specificity was a main effect of this perspectivity. When the Mexican radical left addressed the discrimination and exploitation of the society’s indigenous sectors in its cultural dimension, advocacy for a unilateral incorporation of the *indígenas* into a modernity modeled by the teleology of Marxist philosophy of history accounted for most of its program. The revolutionary left in Mexico, correspondingly, not only shared ground with official integrationist *indigenismo*, its discourses also participated prominently in the perpetuation of colonial legacies in the representation of the ethnic Other. Historical materialism, for example, actualised the pattern, known since the sixteenth century and re-signified *inter alia* through evolutionism in the nineteenth century, of normalising cultural difference by conceiving the Indian Other as a manifestation of the non-Indian Self in an earlier historical stage. Participating in the historically established mechanisms of inclusion and exclusion – the

48 W. D. Mignolo, The Zapatistas’s Theoretical Revolution (footnote 23), p. 250. Also see: footnote 15.

49 Ibid.

50 R. J. C. Young, Postcolonialism (footnote 3).

51 On the Marxist left and the indigenous question in twentieth-century Mexico, see: S. Scheuzger, *Der Andere in der ideologischen Vorstellungskraft. Die Linke und die indigene Frage in Mexiko*, Frankfurt am Main 2009.

“coloniality of power” in Quijano’s terms – which simultaneously acknowledged and negated difference, Marxists operated with regimes of truth that had organised since colonial times the appropriation of the Other within structures of dominance.⁵² The Mexican revolutionary left clearly took part in the denial of indigenes’ capacities for a self-determined cultural and economic development. After a post-revolutionary intermezzo of moderately higher levels of attentiveness in the 1930s, interest on the left in the indigenous groups decreased once again and the Indian lost significance for Marxist-inspired projects of social transformation. In the era of the *milagro mexicano*, the Mexican economic miracle, from the 1940s to the 1960s – with its accelerated economic growth, first signs of a Mexican consumer society, and promise of transcending Third World status – the perception of the Indian as antithetical to modernity was reinforced also within the left. The tendency to neglect ethnic identities in the revolutionary projects of the Marxist left was even accentuated in the 1970s. The boom of Marxism in the political as well as the academic field in Mexico in this decade brought the materialist interpretation of the indigenous question to its apogee, minimising the significance of cultural difference to the degree that the *indígena* disappeared behind the *campesino* (the peasant) or the *jornalero* (the day-labourer). Nevertheless, Marxist orthodoxy was also responsible for propositions that opened spaces, however limited, for indigenous self-determination. Theorising the situation of the Latin American nation-states as “semi-colonial”, the Communist International decided in 1929 – more as a consequence of a Stalinist alignment than as a result of an in-depth reflection of the concrete implications – to interpret the indigenous question on the subcontinent strategically in the framework of the so-called national question. This meant that the Communist Parties had to demand for the indigenous groups the right of self-determination including the right of territorial secession. The Partido Comunista Mexicano (PCM) adopted the postulate, with a telling time-lag, in 1932. It was, in the first place, an act of ideological discipline. The transfer of this Marxist-Leninist theorisation of the so-called “race question” in Latin America had to meet with a certain resistance from the revolutionary left’s nationalism and anti-imperialism.⁵³ Accordingly, when the popular-front policy of the Third International required in 1935 the closing of ranks with the government of Lázaro Cárdenas – which gave the *indigenista* policy of integration of the indigenous population into the Mexican *mestizo* society not only a new face, but also a new political importance – the postulate of the indigenous right of self-determination silently disappeared from the discourse of the PCM. But it left traces. In the following decades, the general trend described above notwithstanding, the positions of the Mexican communists and other representatives of

52 See: footnote 23.

53 The nationalism of the revolutionary left resisted the idea of a violation of Mexico’s territorial integrity as well as the vision of a possible loss of a part of the population basic to the national identity. And it inhibited the perception of the Mexican nation-state engaged in an anti-imperialist struggle as an oppressor of national minorities – no Mexican Marxist was actually willing to equate post-revolutionary Mexico with czarist Russia. Furthermore, the deficient understanding of Marxism-Leninism in general impeded the comprehension of the dialectical and instrumental character of the postulate of the right to self-determination.

the Marxist left vis-à-vis the indigenous question never fell back into an exclusive class-approach, not even in the 1970s. Although less prominent and sometimes marginal, demands for special rights for the indigenous groups on the grounds of their cultural difference were permanently present in Marxist programmatic objectives in the postwar decades, as well as open critiques of the official indigenism's integrationist project.⁵⁴ This discourse, which has to be read as the intent to bring forward the creation of basic conditions for a limited self-determination of the indigenous communities, was not only an important condition for the introduction of the concept of internal colonialism into the Mexican discussion by Pablo González Casanova in the 1960s.⁵⁵ It was also a factor – not sufficiently appreciated in the literature – that prepared the ground for the discussions about indigenous rights and autonomy in the 1980s, with a prominent participation of indigenous movements and intellectuals. Also in this way, Marxist positions formed part of the intellectual bases of the Zapatista project.

5.

In the negotiations with the Mexican government about the subject area of *Cultura y derechos indígenas* ("indigenous culture and rights") in 1995, the EZLN demanded a communal (not a regional) autonomy in Chiapas. What appeared to many observers as an expression of "native" knowledge of social organization – the focus on the *comunidad* as the basic political entity of indigenous life and as main reference of indigenous identity constructions – was, of course, a conception implanted by a colonial strategy of "divide and rule".⁵⁶ This aspect of the Zapatista agenda – which Mignolo does not address – illustrates once again the importance of the colonial legacy in Mexico's post-colonial imaginaries. At the same time, it underscores the necessity of historicising these imaginaries. And this is exactly, what is missing in Mignolo's approach to the Zapatistas' "theoretical revolution". His essay illustrates the risk of essentialising historical formations – bodies of knowledge, patterns of representation, epistemologies – that is involved in the idea of (post)coloniality. Mignolo is definitely correct to portray zapatismo as the significant historical event when Marxism in Mexico entered into a serious dialogue with indigenous worldviews instead of only speaking about or to the *indígenas*.⁵⁷ The Zap-

54 The demands concerned, for example, the valorization of the cultural development of indigenous groups, the respect for their forms of organization and expression or the establishment of autonomous administrative units on community level.

55 P. González Casanova, *La democracia en México*, México, D. F. 1965.

56 During the 16th and 17th centuries the Spanish Crown implemented a series of measures (*encomienda, congregaciones, reducciones*) to fragment indigenous life down to the community-level in order to make political control more effective and to rationalise economic exploitation. From this policy originated not only local indigenous councils, but also distinctive "typical" dresses of different communities or particular religious rites.

57 The indigenous movements that had adopted a Marxist discourse for the promotion of their political interests before on local levels should, however, not go unmentioned, like the Coalición Obrera Campesina Estudiantil del Istmo in Juchitán, Oaxaca, the Unión de Comuneros Emiliano Zapata in the state of Michoacán or the Organización Independiente de Pueblos Unidos de las Huastecas in the region of the Huasteca.

atista discourse emerging from this interchange overtly showed its capacities to overcome ethnocentrism, exhibited in its programmatic call for “a world where many worlds fit”.⁵⁸ However, the notion of a persistent coloniality promotes a view on this “revolutionary” encounter that tends on the one side to focus on centuries-old traditions of indigenous modes to produce meaning of the social world and on the other side to deal with Marxism as an ideology contained in a Eurocentric orthodoxy and therefore not considerable as a source of “decolonising” concepts for the indigenous population. To formulate it trenchantly against the backdrop of postcolonial studies’ general claim to represent an intellectual “movement beyond a relatively binaristic, fixed and stable mapping of power relations between ‘colonizer / colonized’ and ‘center / periphery’” – quoted by Mignolo⁵⁹ – and their declaration to “fight against essentialism”⁶⁰: the idea of coloniality orientates in Mignolo’s analysis of *zapatismo* a perspective that privileges precisely the binary logic of an original mutual translation between a homogenous and self-contained “Occidental” ideological system and Amerindian ways of knowing and representing, preserved in traditions over the centuries, instead of a thorough examination of the complex historical conditions that actually led to this liaison and were the result of long-term permanent interactions between indigenous and non-indigenous social and cultural spheres. As a consequence, Mignolo completely glosses over the “modern”, post-colonial (hyphenated⁶¹) elements in the culture and the thinking of the Mayan communities that joined the EZLN. Among these decisive prerequisites for the emergence of *zapatismo*, orthodox Marxism played an influential role. *Zapatismo* was a hybrid political formation with multiple levels of meaning. It was in the 1990s a movement that intertwined in the representation of its emancipatory project closely indigenous imaginaries with Marxist ideology, liberation theology and nationalist narratives of modern Mexican history. At a certain point in his essay, Mignolo remarks critically against a statement made by Yvon Le Bot⁶² that a definition of democracy by Subcomandante Marcos – quoted in the text – has to remain basically meaningless for the interpreter who does not know the previous discourse of the EZLN and of its Tojolabal Major Ana María.⁶³ The same is true for the Zapatista discourse as well: without a comprehension of the historicity of its elements, the understanding of *zapatismo* is severely limited. And such a comprehension implies above all the arduous task to scrutinise historical interactions of the concerned entities and their transformations. Mignolo applies his concept of “border thinking” to the Za-

58 “El mundo que queremos es uno donde quepan muchos mundos”. Cuarta Declaración de la Selva Lacandona, 1º de enero de 1996, in: EZLN, Documentos y comunicados, v. 3, 2 de octubre 1995/24 de enero de 1997, México, D. F. 1997, pp. 79–89, here p. 89.

59 E. Shohat, Notes on the “Post-Colonial”, in: Social Text, 31 (1992) 32, pp. 99–113, here p. 108. Mignolo quotes the statement in: La razón postcolonial: herencias coloniales y teorías postcoloniales, in: A. de Toro (ed.), Postmodernidad y postcolonialidad. Breves reflexiones sobre Latinoamérica, Frankfurt am Main 1997, pp. 51–70, here p. 56.

60 F. de Toro, The Postcolonial Question: Alterity, Identity and the Other(s), in: A. de Toro / F. de Toro (eds.), El debate de la postcolonialidad en Latinoamérica (footnote 10), pp. 101–136, here p. 105.

61 See: footnote 6.

62 The author of *El sueño Zapatista* (footnote 2).

63 W. D. Mignolo, The Zapatistas’s Theoretical Revolution (footnote 23), p. 262.

patistas' theoretical revolution: "border thinking emerges from the double translation across the colonial difference".⁶⁴ Apparently, he underestimates the permeability of these borders.

As a reaction to the myth of decolonisation of social and cultural relations with the achievement of political independence, studies on coloniality and postcoloniality promise insights into the enduring efficaciousness of colonial discourses and patterns of thinking to the present day. Since academic knowledge participates in the cultural power structures between a post-colonial "we" and a "Western" – European and US – "they", a main argument against the adoption of postcolonial theory by Latin American Studies has been its "Metropolitan" origin and the danger of another form of "intellectual colonisation", a reasoning shared by Mignolo.⁶⁵ In terms of content, the Latin American critique has emphasised above all the different temporalities of the colonial experiences in the Americas on the one side and in Asia and Africa on the other side with the corresponding variety of the historical forms of colonialism. Nevertheless, attention has to be paid as well to the different temporalities of the post-colonial experiences. To subsume two hundred years of national histories in Latin America together with three hundred years of colonial history under the one long view of coloniality can hardly be considered historically valid. In correspondence with serious misconceptions of modernity – failure to recognise self-reflexivity as a basic constituent of modernity (of which theories about (post)coloniality are a product), disregard of the notion of change as a fundamental feature of the modern, and perpetuation of the idea of modernity descending to Latin America from without – the approach fails to differentiate adequately between continuity and change, and to explore the ambiguities in representations of projects of dominance and emancipation as well as in their epistemic preconditions. It is of indubitable importance to study how the post-colonial came into existence and developed connected with and permeated by the colonial. The name over the gate to such studies in the Latin American context does not have to "inevitably" be "postcolonial studies" as Peter Hulme suggested some years ago.⁶⁶ Maybe this is not even desirable. There are certain risks of essentialisations immanent in approaches that are committed to detect persistence of aesthetics, epistemologies and ethics of colonial violence from the 16th, 17th and 18th centuries to contemporary history. These risks are tangible where analytical perspectives are coupled with a political program to overcome Eurocentric systems of knowledge production, as Walter D. Mignolo's essay demonstrates. Nevertheless, they are not necessarily absent where such a political agenda does not exist, as Robert J. C. Young's view on Latin American Marxism shows.

64 Ibid.

65 W. D. Mignolo, Colonial and Postcolonial Discourses: Cultural Critique or Academic Colonialism?, in: Latin American Research Review, 28 (1993) 3, pp. 120–134, here p. 130.

66 P. Hulme, Including America (footnote 9), p. 123.

FORUM

Über die Gewalttheorie von Georges Bataille und ihren Nutzen für die Gewaltsoziologie

Michael Riekenberg

Summary

The theory of violence that Georges Bataille elaborated during the 1930s, under the impact of ethnology at that time, does not receive attention in the current sociology of violence. Nevertheless, Bataille stressed two ideas that are worth considering by historians or social scientists who actually examine physical violence. On the one hand, Bataille did not discuss violence as an instrumental means; but rather portrayed it as an act in which people go beyond themselves in order to find their self beyond their own limits. Thus violence is regarded as a transgressive attitude. On the other hand, referring to the emotions that the view of violence provoke in our minds, Bataille discussed in which ways the narrators of violence inscribe themselves into the narration of violence. This text comments on these ideas, while asking about their usefulness for today's sociology of violence and its relationship to anthropology.

1. Der Ort Batailles in der heutigen Gewaltsoziologie

Wer Gewalt beschreibt, spricht über Menschen und Mentalitäten, über Rituale, Tabus und deren Verletzungen und über vieles Andere, ansonsten ist das, wovon er erzählt, nur ein leeres Geschehen ohne Bedeutung. Aber wer Gewalt beschreibt, tut noch mehr. Er spricht zugleich über sich selbst und neben anderem über die Empfindungen, die der Anblick der Gewalt in seinem Innern hervorruft. Nehmen wir wissenschaftliche Abhandlungen in der Soziologie oder Geschichte in die Hand, so ist davon freilich wenig zu spüren. Wie wir im Anblick der Gewalt empfinden, scheint für die wissenschaftliche Methode ohne Bedeutung zu sein. Vielmehr schreiben Soziologen oder Historiker meist über die Gewalt, als sei diese Teil einer Welt, die nicht die ihre ist. Dies gilt auch für das

empathische Schreiben, weil wir Empathie nur für etwas empfinden können, das außerhalb unseres Selbst liegt. Gewalt bleibt das uns Äußere. Der Nutzen für die Wissenschaft liegt auf der Hand. Gewalt ist uneindeutig. Erst indem wir sie wie aus der Ferne beschreiben und durch Begriffe, Vergleiche oder Statistiken klassifizieren lernen, vermögen wir in der Gewalt eine Ordnung zu finden, die es ohne diese Distanz in unserem Blick nicht gäbe. Weniger klar freilich sind die Nachteile. Denn was gerät gegebenenfalls außer Sicht, sobald wir im Studium der Gewalt, um sie von uns fern zu halten, eine „selektive Reduktion“ unserer Gefühlsempfindungen organisieren?¹

Für Georges Bataille war es undenkbar, dass Menschen überhaupt distanziert von Gewalt erzählen können. Bataille begriff die Gewalt als etwas, in dem Menschen „sich überschreiten“.² Aus diesem Grund fand er in der Gewalt keine Ordnung, weder in moralischer, symbolischer oder anderer Hinsicht. Denn Menschen, die sich überschreiten, tragen die Gewalt hinter eine Ordnung. Für die Gewaltsoziologie ist Bataille deshalb ein befremdender Denker. In der Wissenschaft herrscht ja das Bestreben vor, Gewalt in der Perspektive ihrer Ordnung zu betrachten, sei es auch als deren Aushöhlung oder Verkehrung. Dies röhrt daher, dass die Soziologie über Ordnungen („Systeme“, „Strukturen“) reden muß, ansonsten hat sie nichts zu sagen. Hinzu kommt seit geraumer Zeit der Einfluß der kulturellen Anthropologie auf benachbarte Wissenschaften wie die Soziologie oder Geschichte. Die Suche nach Ordnungen in der Gewalt erhielt dadurch einen zusätzlichen Anstoß, weil die Kulturanthropologie auch dort Ordnungen findet, wo andere Disziplinen sie nicht vermuten. Gegenwärtig können wir jedenfalls kaum mehr über Gewalt reden, ohne zugleich über Ordnungen (in) der Gewalt zu sprechen.

Ich will dies, um nicht missverstanden zu werden, keineswegs abtun oder diskreditieren. Die Soziologie wie die Geschichtswissenschaft neigten ja lange Zeit, mitunter bis heute, dazu, Gewalt vorrangig aus der Sicht des Staates zu sehen und alle „andere“ Gewalt als wild und regellos einzustufen. Manche Gewaltszenarien (für die Geschichte Lateinamerikas, die mein Arbeitsgebiet bildet, ist der weite Bereich staatsferner Gewalt zu nennen³) wurden (und werden) deshalb gänzlich verständnislos betrachtet oder einfach ignoriert. Insofern ist die durch die Anthropologie angespornte Suche nach (verdeckten) Ordnungen (in) der Gewalt eine überfällige Korrektur einseitiger Anschauungen, hinter die wir nicht zurückfallen sollten. Jedoch stellt sich inzwischen die Frage, ob darüber nicht übersehen wird oder zumindest zu kurz kommt, dass Gewalt nicht in Ordnungen bzw. in deren kulturellen Repräsentationen aufgeht. Denn es ist eine Eigenschaft der Gewalt, dass Menschen in der Gewalttat Ordnungen verlassen.

Die Frage, was mit den Menschen geschieht, die in der Gewalt die Verbote einer Ordnung überschreiten, steht im Zentrum der Gewalttheorie Batailles. Wenn er von Gewalt sprach, hatte Bataille keine alltägliche Gewalt vor Augen, sondern eine schreckliche

1 A. R. Damasio, Ich fühle, also bin ich. Die Entschlüsselung des Bewusstseins, München 1999, S. 55 f.

2 G. Bergfleth, Theorie der Verschwendung, München 1985, S. 61.

3 Vgl. M. Riekenberg, Gewaltsegmente, Leipzig 2003, S. 19-34; ders., Caudillismus, Leipzig 2010, S. 109-116; ders., Of vague war and vague peace in Argentina's desert (1775-1880), in: Behemoth. A Journal on Civilization 1 (2010).

Gewalt, begleitet vom körperlichen Schmerz und von der Todesangst. Am besten lässt sich diese Gewalt in den Worten Heinrich Plessners als eine „in bodenlose Tiefe einstrudelnde“ Gewalt⁴ bezeichnen, die den Menschen in den Grundfesten seines Daseins erschüttert. Bataille ging davon aus, dass diese Gewalt mit einer „namenlosen Erregung“⁵ verbunden sei, erzeugt durch die Angst, die die Gewalt ausströmt. Diese Erregung begründet nicht allein das Verhältnis zwischen Täter, Helfer und Opfer, sondern sie durchzieht auch denjenigen, der von der Gewalt erzählt. Menschen, die von schrecklicher Gewalt berichten, werden von der Erregung der Gewalt ergriffen, anders können sie darüber nicht sprechen, glaubte Bataille. Der Grund dafür ist, dass wir in der Gewalt uns selbst begegnen: „Die Gewaltsamkeit würde uns nicht so in Schrecken versetzen, wenn wir nicht wüssten, wenn wir uns nicht zumindest dunkel dessen bewusst wären, dass sie uns selbst zum Schlimmsten führen kann.“⁶ Im Spiegel der Gewalt ahnen Menschen ihre dunklen Seiten. Besondere Beachtung verdient dabei, dass Bataille auch die Wissenschaft hiervon nicht ausnahm. Der Wissenschaftler teilt das Erschrecken über die Gewalt, sofern er, wie Bataille in Anlehnung an Heideggers Antrittsvorlesung *Was ist Metaphysik?* schrieb, nicht ein „gleichgültiges Wesen der Schulphilosophie“ ist, sondern ein lebendiger, „angstvoller“ Mensch, dessen Leben nicht sicher ist.⁷

Weil der Mensch nicht distanziert über schreckliche Gewalt erzählen kann, existiert in der vom Menschen erzählten Gewalt auch keine Ordnung. Für die Wissenschaft ist diese Ansicht verstörend (der Ethnologe Michel Leiris, der mit Bataille befreundet war, bezeichnete ihn ja auch einmal als „üblichen Spötter“⁸), weil sie nicht nur den positivistischen Glauben an die Macht der Quellen, was wir leicht verschmerzen könnten, in Frage stellt, sondern ebenso die konstruktivistische Auffassung, wonach wir im Erzählvorgang eine Ordnung im Gegenstand erzeugen, in der wir uns und die uns vertraute Welt spiegeln. Wir vertrauen ja darauf, dass wir im Erzählen aus einem „verwirrenden, verunsichernden, gefährlichen Erlebnis“⁹, wie es u. a. die Gewalttat darstellt, eine sinnhafte Geschichte erwachsen lassen können, um dadurch wieder Ordnung in die eigene Vorstellungswelt, die vom Auftauchen des Außergewöhnlichen bedroht ist, zu bringen. Verstehen und Erzählen werden identisch. Dieser hermeneutische Zirkel funktioniert bei Bataille aber nicht. Dies hinterlässt den Betrachter in gewisser Weise ratlos, wie wir denn unter diesen Voraussetzungen eigentlich noch über schreckliche Gewalt reden können. Und es wirft zugleich Fragen auf: Welchen Ausweg sah Bataille selbst aus dem Dilemma des Gewaltverständens, das er zeichnete? Wie wollte er eine Gewalt verstehen, die keine Ordnung kennt? Und welchen Wert schließlich besitzen seine Überlegungen für die

4 H. Plessner, Philosophische Anthropologie, Frankfurt a. M. 1970, S. 143.

5 G. Bataille, Die Erotik. Neu übersetzt und mit einem Essay versehen von Gerd Bergfleth, München 1994, S. 19.

6 Ebenda, S. 64.

7 G. Bataille, L'existentialisme, in: Critique (Paris) No. 41 (1950), S. 83-86, S. 83. Der Textausschnitt ist ebenfalls zitiert bei P. Wiechens, Bataille zur Einführung, Hamburg 1995, S. 129 Anm. 24. Diesem Buch verdanke ich für diesen Text zahlreiche Hinweise inhaltlicher wie bibliographischer Art.

8 M. Leiris, Das Auge des Ethnographen. Ethnologische Schriften Bd. 2, Frankfurt a. M. 1985, S. 78.

9 R. Bendix, Zur Ethnographie des Erzählens im ausgehenden 20. Jahrhundert, in: Zs. f. Volkskunde 92 (1996), S. 169-184, S. 170.

heutige Gewaltforschung, die ja nach einer Phase mitunter hitziger Diskussionen über die „Neue Gewaltsoziologie“ inzwischen eher wieder stagniert?

Diesen Fragen geht dieser Aufsatz nach. Insofern handelt es sich im Folgenden nicht darum, Batailles Denken in einer genetischen Betrachtungsweise zu rekonstruieren oder es in den geistesgeschichtlichen Kontext seiner Zeit zu stellen und darin zu erläutern. Das ist an anderer Stelle, ich denke beispielsweise an die Einführung in Batailles Werk von Peter Wiechens, besser geschehen, als ich es hier zu tun vermag. Vielmehr soll in diesem Text versucht werden, zentrale Elemente aus der Batailleschen Gewalttheorie aufzugreifen, um diese dem Leser vor Augen zu führen und mit Blick auf die Frage, welchen Nutzen sie für die heutige Gewaltsoziologie besitzen mögen, zu diskutieren. Insofern setzt dieser Aufsatz beim Leser freilich auch eine gewisse Kenntnis der neueren Gewaltsoziologie voraus.

2. Die ethnographischen Grundlagen

Manches im Denken Georges Batailles (1897–1962) erklärt sich vermutlich dadurch, dass er in der Wissenschaft ein Außenseiter war. Nach seiner Ausbildung zum Bibliothekar war er seit 1922 an der Pariser Nationalbibliothek tätig, ein akademisches Amt hatte er niemals inne.¹⁰ Kritiker halten ihm auch mit Blick auf diese persönlichen Umstände vor, er habe, statt aus dem Universitätsstudium sein Wissen zu beziehen, eine Authentizität des Denkens konstruiert und damit gegen die Spielregeln der Wissenschaft verstößen.¹¹ Ich komme darauf später zurück. In Frankreich übte Bataille als Mitbegründer des *Collège de sociologie* (1937) sowie der Zeitschrift *Critique* (1946) starken intellektuellen Einfluß aus, während seine Rezeption in Deutschland übrigens bislang sehr überschaubar ist.¹² Hier wurden seine Schriften vor allem in der Literaturwissenschaft sowie der Philosophie beachtet, ohne dass sie besondere Wirkung erzielt hätten, wobei der Höhepunkt der Rezeption scheinbar in den achtziger Jahren lag, danach flaute sie ab. In der deutschsprachigen Gewaltsoziologie hat sich bislang eigentlich nur Wolfgang Sofsky mit Bataille befasst.¹³ Bärbel Grubner hat darauf aufmerksam gemacht, dass der Gewaltbegriff Batailles und Sofskys Vorstellung „exzessiver Gewalt“ einander sehr ähneln.¹⁴

10 Vgl. zur Biographie P. Wiechens, Bataille (Anm. 7), S. 9 f.

11 Vgl. P. Bürger, Das Denken des Herrn. Georges Bataille zwischen Hegel und dem Surrealismus, Frankfurt a. M. 1992, S. 41.

12 Bernhard Giesen bezieht sich jüngst in einem Text zur Gewaltsoziologie auf Bataille. Vgl. B. Giesen, Gewalt und Gefühl (Arbeitsgespräche des Kulturwissenschaftlichen Kollegs der Universität Konstanz), Konstanz o. J. [2010].

13 Unter anderem bezog sich Sofsky im *Traktat über die Gewalt* auf Batailles Schrift über den französischen Heerführer und Kindermörder Gilles de Rais, der im 15. Jahrhundert lebte. Vgl. W. Sofsky, Traktat über die Gewalt, Frankfurt a. M. 1996, S. 45 f. Siehe dazu auch G. Bataille, Gilles de Rais. Leben und Prozeß eines Kindermörders, Hamburg 1989. Vgl. zum Blick Batailles auf Gilles de Rais u. a. auch N. Land, The Thirst for Annihilation. Georges Bataille and Violent Nihilism, London/New York 1992, S. 66 f.

14 B. Grubner: Sexualisierte Gewalt, in: Austrian Studies in Social Anthropology 2 (2005), S. 1-31, S. 4 Anm. 7. Vgl. dazu auch W. Sofsky, Der Prozeß der Gewalt, in: M. Klein (Hrsg.), Gewalt interdisziplinär, Münster 2002, S. 173-184, S. 184.

Theoriebildend für Batailles Gewaltverständnis war die Ethnographie seiner Zeit, die einen starken Einfluß auf ihn ausübte, so wie Bataille mit seiner Interpretation des Sakralen umgekehrt die damalige (französische) Ethnographie beeinflusste.¹⁵ „Les faits et les théories de l’ethnologie ont toujours exercé sur Georges Bataille une sorte de fascination“¹⁶, schrieb rückblickend der Ethnologe Alfred Metraux, der wie Leiris mit Bataille befreundet war. Bataille versuchte, aus der Beschreibung vorstaatlicher Gemeinwesen, die die Ethnographie lieferte, Erkenntnisse für die Analyse komplexerer Zusammenhänge zu gewinnen. Diese Vorgehensweise (bereits Thomas Hobbes hatte so im *Leviathan* gearbeitet¹⁷) ist heute strittig, weil sie vermeintlich „einfache“ Gesellschaften oder Kulturen als eine Art Laboratorium begreift, wodurch sie wie in einem naturwissenschaftlichen Verfahren kontrolliert analysiert werden könnten. In der Zeit, den zwanziger und dreißiger Jahren des letzten Jahrhunderts, zog die Ethnographie bzw. die damals sich formierende *Cultural Anthropology* aber einen Gutteil ihrer disziplinären Identität aus diesem Verfahren. Bereits Margaret Mead hatte in *Coming of Age in Samoa* (1928) die Auffassung vertreten, dass „einfache“ Gesellschaften sich besonders gut analysieren ließen. Ruth Benedict, eine führende Vertreterin der frühen Kulturanthropologie, schlug dann 1932 in ihrem Buch *Patterns of Culture* vor, überschaubare Ordnungen als gedanklich leicht zu durchdringende Versuchsfelder zu betrachten, um von dort aus tiefere Einblicke in komplexe, „spätere“ Verhältnisse oder Kulturen zu bekommen.¹⁸ Auch Bataille arbeitete auf diese Weise.

Dabei waren Batailles ethnographische Kenntnisse recht lückenhaft. Ihn interessierte anfangs besonders die aztekische Kultur, von der er freilich nur aus einer Quelle, dem *Florentiner Codex*, Kenntnis besaß.¹⁹ In dem Essay *L’Amérique disparue*, der anlässlich einer Ausstellung altamerikanischer Kunst in Paris im Jahr 1928 entstand, beschäftigte sich Bataille mit der Gewalt im vorspanischen Mexiko und der Praxis des Menschenopfers, die er auf einen verdeckten Todeswunsch unter den Azteken zurückführte.²⁰ Er sah darin eine Verbindung des Sakralen mit der Gewalt repräsentiert, die ihn in seinem gesamten Werk beschäftigen sollte. Wie alle Ethnographie suchte Bataille nach der Verdeckung und Bewältigung der Gewalt in Gründungsszenarien. Für ihn steht am Ursprung der Gesellschaft ein „gewaltsames Schweigen“²¹, hervorgerufen durch den von der Gewalt ausgehenden Schrecken, das durch rituelle Aufführungen und durch die Sakralisierung

- 15 So verdanke angeblich das Buch von Roger Caillois, *L’homme et le sacré* (1939), Bataille zahlreiche Überlegungen und Anregungen. Vgl. dazu T. Arppe, *Sacred Violence. Girard, Bataille and the Vicissitudes of Human Desire*, in: Distinktion 19 (2009), S. 31-58, S. 44.
- 16 A. Metraux, *Rencontre avec les ethnologues*, in: Critique (Paris) No. 195 / 196 (1963), S. 677-684, S. 677.
- 17 Vgl. J. Helbling, Hobbes und seine Theorie des tribalen Krieges, in: Schweizerische Zs. f. Soziologie 35 (2009), S. 97-116, S. 98 f.
- 18 Zit. bei U. Daniel, *Kompendium Kulturgeschichte*, Frankfurt a. M. 2001, S. 244.
- 19 Vgl. A. Metraux, *Rencontre* (Anm. 16), S. 681.
- 20 G. Bataille, *Das verschwundene Amerika*, in: C. v. Barloewen, *Kulturgeschichte und Modernität Lateinamerikas*, München 1992, S. 209-216, S. 216.
- 21 P. Hegarty, *Undelivered: the space/time of the sacred in Bataille and Benjamin*, in: Economy and Society 32 (2003), S. 101-118, S. 105.

der Gewalt in Ordnung überführt wird. Gewalt ist insofern ambivalent, zugleich heilig wie schreckenerregend. Wie sehr ihn dieses Thema umtrieb wird daran deutlich, dass Bataille 1937 maßgeblicher Mitbegründer des *Collège de Sociologie* in Paris war, dessen ein wenig krudes Ziel darin bestand, im Rückgriff auf die Religionssociologie Emile Durkheims eine „Sakralsoziologie“²² zu begründen und die sozialen Verhältnisse auf die darin verborgenen sakralen Elemente (im Gegensatz zu den profanen Vernunftordnungen, die Bataille als Bedrückung des Menschen interpretierte) hin zu analysieren.

Ausführlich beschäftigte sich Bataille mit dem Werk des französischen Soziologen und Ethnologen Marcel Mauss, dessen Konzept des Gabentausches (Potlatsch) Bataille in einer „Allgemeinen Ökonomie“ verarbeitete und das zur Grundlage seiner Gewalttheorie wurde.²³ Überhaupt nur aufgrund dieses theoretisierenden Gebrauchs des Gabentausches können wir mit Blick auf das Werk Batailles von einer Gewalttheorie sprechen, weil diese ja an keiner Stelle (am ausführlichsten mit der Gewalt befasste sich Bataille in seinen Schriften zur Erotik) systematisch ausformuliert ist. In seiner Untersuchung über *Die Gabe* hatte Mauss den Gabentausch in indigenen Gemeinwesen Nordamerikas analysiert. Mauss hob das Verschwenderische des Potlatsch im Gegensatz zum Nützlichkeitssprinzip des Wirtschaftens in okzidentalnen Gesellschaften hervor.²⁴ Für Bataille, der *Die Gabe* 1925 las²⁵, repräsentierte der Gabentausch eine dem Opfer verwandte Verschwendug, die er als Heterologie bezeichnete und auf die Betrachtung der Gewalt übertrug.²⁶ Analog zur Gabe definierte er die Gewalt als „bedingungslose Verausgabung“²⁷ des Menschen, wodurch er sie von allen Nützlichkeitserwägungen trennte. Étienne Balibar schreibt, Bataille habe das Prinzip der Überschreitung und Verausgabung bzw. Verschwendug vor allem in der „Grausamkeit“ der Gewalt manifestiert gesehen.²⁸ Aber für Bataille äußert sich dieses Prinzip ebenso in der Sexualität, dem Sterben (Tod), der Kunst oder auch dem Lachen, weil sich all dies den Vernunftordnungen und deren Nützlichkeitserwägungen entziehen würde. Auch ist die Verausgabung kein rein indivi-

22 S. Moebius, Die Zuberlehringe. Soziologiegeschichte des Collège de Sociologie (1937–1939), Konstanz 2006, S. 13; vgl. dazu ferner M. Richman, The sacred group. A Durkheimian Perspective on the Collège de sociologie, in: C. Bailey Gill (Hrsg.), Bataille – Writing the Sacred, London / New York 1995, S. 58–76; P. Hegarty, Undelivered (Anm. 21); T. Arppe, Sacred Violence (Anm. 15). Eine Sammlung von Texten und Dokumenten, die im Collège bzw. im Kontext der dort stattfindenden Diskussionen erstellt wurden, findet sich bei D. Hollier (Hrsg.), Le Collège de Sociologie (1937–1939), Paris 1979.

23 Die wichtigsten Beiträge zur Allgemeinen Ökonomie sind La notion de dépense (1933) und La part maudite (1949). Als Überblick vgl. T. Wex, Ökonomik der Verschwendug. Batailles Allgemeine Ökonomie und die Wirtschaftswissenschaft, in: A. Hetzel / P. Wiechens (Hrsg.), Georges Bataille. Vorreden zur Überschreitung, Würzburg 1999, S. 187–210. Vgl. dazu auch H. Kämpf, Die Lust der Verschwendug. Batailles Untersuchung des Potlatch als Beitrag zur Ethnologie, ebenda, S. 211–222; ferner M. Mauzé, Georges Bataille et le potlatch: à propos de La part maudite, in: D. Lecoq / J.-L. Lory (Hrsg.), Écrits d'ailleurs. Georges Bataille et les ethnologues, Paris 1987, S. 31–38.

24 M. Mauss, Die Gabe. Form und Funktion des Austauschs in archaischen Gesellschaften, Frankfurt a. M. 1968, S. 24.

25 M. Mauzé, Bataille et le potlatch (Anm. 23), S. 31.

26 Zum Potlatch als Opfermotiv vgl. B. Gladigow, Opfer und komplexe Kulturen, in: B. Janowski / M. Welker (Hrsg.), Opfer. Theologische und kulturelle Kontexte, Frankfurt a. M. 2000, S. 86–107, S. 89.

27 G. Bataille, Die Aufhebung der Ökonomie, München 1985, S. 12.

28 Vgl. É. Balibar, Der Schauplatz des Anderen. Formen der Gewalt und Grenzen der Zivilität, Hamburg 2006, S. 268 f.

duelles Verhalten, sondern eine ganze „menschliche Gesellschaft“ könne sich beispielsweise als Reaktion auf eine extreme Katastrophe vorübergehend in einen „orgiastischen Zustand“ flüchten.²⁹ Der wichtigste Beitrag Batailles zu einer Soziologie der Gewalt liegt in dem Versuch, das Verschwenderische, das er im Gabentausch materialisiert sah, auf eine Analyse der Gewalt zu übertragen. Dadurch erscheint die Gewalt in einem völlig anderen Licht als es in den Theorien der Fall ist, die auf Zweck-Mittel-Relationen abstellen, wie es vor allem in ökonomistischen Konzepten der Fall ist³⁰, oder die Gewalt als Ressource der Kommunikation³¹ betrachten oder sie als das Verhalten von „Verlierern“ definieren, die ihre eigene Ohnmacht in der Gewalt kompensieren wollten.³²

Es fällt auf, dieser Hinweis soll an dieser Stelle nicht fehlen, dass Bataille diese Gewalttheorie bzw. deren Grundzüge in einem Zeitraum entwarf, in dem in Deutschland in der Soziologie Norbert Elias die Zivilisationstheorie schrieb. Die Unterschiede zwischen beiden Ansätzen sind frappierend. Nun ist zwar fraglich, ob man hier von „nationaltypischen Besonderheiten“³³ der Wissenschaftstraditionen sprechen kann, um diese Differenzen zu erklären. Jonas Grutzwalk verneint dies in einem Vergleich verschiedener Gewaltbegriffe³⁴, die in Frankreich bzw. in Deutschland hervorgebracht wurden, und dies scheint angesichts der Diffusionen des Denkens zwischen verschiedenen Wissenschaftskulturen auch plausibel. Dennoch bleibt festzuhalten, dass Bataille in einer Tradition französischer Soziologie stand, die sich für die Anthropologie bzw. Ethnologie interessiert. Vermutlich hängt dies damit zusammen, dass Frankreich bereits seit 1500 im außereuropäischen Raum als eine kolonisierende Nation aufgetreten war und aus diesem Grund das Gewicht bzw. das Ansehen der Ethnographie in den Geisteswissenschaften dort höher war als in Deutschland. Hier interessierte sich die Soziologie seit Karl Marx weniger für die Anthropologie, sondern für lange historische Verläufe („Geschichtstheorien“), was damit zusammenhängen mag, dass im deutschen Wissenschaftsbetrieb der ausgehenden Kaiserzeit und der Weimarer Republik die Soziologie in ihrer Bedeutung gegenüber der Geschichte zurückstand. Elias jedenfalls stellte seine Zivilisationstheorie bewusst in eine Reihe der „soziologischen Theorien, die sich mit langfristigen gesellschaft-

29 Vgl. G. Bataille, Aufhebung der Ökonomie (Anm. 27), S. 10. Sehr ähnlich wiederum W. Sofsky, Zeiten des Schreckens. Amok, Terror, Krieg, Frankfurt a. M. 2002, S. 35: „Der Exzeß ist keine Selbstdarstellung, er ist eine orgiastische Selbststeigerung, ein Akt der Selbstgrenzung“.

30 Vgl. z. B. G. Elwert, Gewaltmärkte. Beobachtungen zur Zweckrationalität der Gewalt, in: Kölner Zs. für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie Sonderheft 37 (1997), S. 86-121, S. 87, wonach Gewalt „[...] in der Mehrzahl der Fälle als zweckrational“ interpretiert werden könnte.

31 In kommunikationstheoretischen Ansätzen gilt Gewalt bevorzugt als ein Mittel ressourcenschwacher Akteure, sich in sozialen Beziehungen zur Geltung zu bringen. Denn wer Gewalt anwende, der könne nicht ignoriert werden, woher die Attraktivität der Gewalt röhre. Vgl. D. Baecker, Form und Formen der Kommunikation, Frankfurt a. M. 2005, S. 171 f.; M. Schroer, Die im Dunkeln sieht man doch, in: Mittelweg 36 10 (2001), S. 33-48.

32 Vgl. H.-M. Enzensberger, Schreckens Männer. Versuch über den radikalen Verlierer, Frankfurt a. M. 2006.

33 W. Lepenies, Die drei Kulturen. Soziologie zwischen Literatur und Wissenschaft, München/Wien 1985, S. 11.

34 Die Untersuchung verweist auf Ähnlichkeiten im Gewaltverständnis zwischen Max Weber und Emile Durkheim einerseits bzw. Ernst Jünger und André Malraux andererseits. Vgl. J. Grutzwalk, Erkenntnis und Engagement. Wissenssoziologie als Methode eines Kulturvergleichs deutscher und französischer Intellektueller, Opladen 2003, S. 180 f.

lichen Prozessen“³⁵ befassen. Grundverschieden war, vergleichen wir die Auffassungen von Bataille und Elias, das Verständnis der Gewalt. Elias nahm an, dass die Leidenschaft der Menschen und mit ihr die Gewalt im Zivilisationsverlauf gedämpft würden, um soziales Leben zu ermöglichen. Für Bataille dagegen war die Leidenschaft, die er als Erregung umschrieb, keine Bürde fortschreitender Zivilisation, sondern ein Refugium menschlicher Kreativität: „For Elias, advances in rationality and control make a human existence possible. for Foucault [und wir können hier ergänzen: für Bataille] the repression of unreason means losing contact with a major source of human creativity“.³⁶

3. Der Gewaltbegriff Batailles

Catherine Toal sieht in „der“ französischen Philosophie um die Mitte des 20. Jahrhunderts die Neigung, im Rückgriff auf die Schriften des Marquis de Sade den Gewaltbegriff durch den der Grausamkeit zu ersetzen. Der Begriff der Grausamkeit sei bei Antonin Artaud, der als Theatertheoretiker 1935 ein „Theater der Grausamkeit“ gründete, dem Literaturtheoretiker und Schriftsteller Maurice Blanchot oder eben bei Bataille, der sich wiederholt intensiv mit de Sade befasste und eine hohe Wertschätzung der Schriften de Sades besaß, als besser geeignet befunden worden, die affektive Vergemeinschaftung von Täter und Opfer, die in der Gewalt stattfindet, zu umschreiben. Dagegen würde der Gewaltbegriff einseitig nur die repressiven Dimensionen gewalttätigen Handelns betonen.³⁷ Gewalt und Grausamkeit vermengten sich also bei Bataille begrifflich. Zudem gebrauchte Bataille, sprach er von der Gewalt, meist das Wort „Gewaltsamkeit“, d. h. er betrachtete die Gewalt in erster Linie als eine Haltung bzw. Einstellung des Menschen, während ihn die Analyse des Verhaltens bzw. der Gewalttat selbst weniger interessierte. Präzise definiert ist der Gewaltbegriff bei Bataille deshalb nicht, vielmehr besitzt er mehrere Bedeutungen.³⁸ Aus einer philosophischen Perspektive galt Bataille die Gewalt(samkeit) als Gegensatz zur Vernunft, im engeren anthropologischen Sinn stellt sie eine körperliche Verletzungshandlung dar, verbunden mit Schmerz, Leid oder auch Erniedrigung.³⁹ Bataille war ein Theoretiker der Gewaltsteigerung. Gewalt ist allgegenwärtig, weil sie zur Natur des Menschen gehört, die selbst gewaltsam sei. „Es gibt in der Natur und gibt auch im Menschen eine Bewegung, die unablässig über die Grenzen hinausdrängt [...] Nichts hält die Ausschweifung zurück, oder vielmehr, allgemein gesagt, es gibt nichts, was die Gewaltsamkeit bezwingt“.⁴⁰ Im Angesicht der Gewalt ist die Ordnung einer Ge-

35 N. Elias, Über den Prozeß der Zivilisation, Bd. 1, Frankfurt a. M. 1979, S. XXV.

36 D. Smith, Norbert Elias and Modern Social Theory, London 2001, S. 112.

37 Vgl. C. Toal, The Summit of Violence: Cruelty in the Work of Artaud and Bataille, in: Paroles gelées 18 (2000), S. 64-77.

38 Zu einer näheren Unterscheidung vgl. R. Ochs, Verschwendungen. Die Theologie im Gespräch mit Georges Bataille, Frankfurt a. M. 1995, S. 148.

39 Vgl. dazu die entsprechenden Textpassagen bei G. Bataille, Reflexionen über Henker und Opfer (1947), in: ders., Henker und Opfer. Mit einem Vorwort von André Masson, Berlin 2008, S. 11-20, S. 14 f.

40 G. Bataille, Erotik (Anm. 5), S. 42, S. 50.

meinschaft nur eine labile, „jederzeit störbare Form“⁴¹, die durch imperative Elemente (Herrschaft) bzw. durch Ängste, die Verbotsüberschreitungen tabuisieren, geschützt werden muß. Jedoch nährt sich die Gewalt aus der Erregung, die eintritt, wenn der Mensch das Verbot bricht und die eigene Angst vor dem Tabubruch überwindet. Moralischen Verboten der Gewalt gesteht Bataille deshalb letztendlich wenig Wirksamkeit zu, weil der Mensch in der Verletzung des Verbots seine Erregung sucht.⁴²

In der Literatur finden sich verschiedene Antworten auf die Frage, warum Menschen in der Gewalt Ordnungen verlassen. Die politische Theorie verweist auf das Versagen staatlicher Gewaltkontrollen oder umgekehrt auf den Ordnungswahn eines „gärtnerischen“ Staates⁴³, der unermessliche Gewalt erst erzeugen würde. Die Ethnographie zeigt uns theaterhafte Freisetzungen der Gewalt, in denen alle Ordnung verloren geht und dem Menschen vorübergehend der Schrecken einer anarchischen Welt vor Augen geführt wird, um ihn auf diese Weise wieder mit seiner Beherrschung durch Mächtige zu versöhnen.⁴⁴ Die kulturelle Anthropologie schließlich nennt die Fähigkeit des Menschen zur „Imagination, welche immerzu neue Gewaltformen erfindet“.⁴⁵ Auch Bataille machte die menschliche Vorstellungskraft für Gewaltauswüchse verantwortlich, weil der „Geist“ des Menschen von dem Entschluß beherrscht sei, „über die Grenzen des Verbots hinauszugehen“.⁴⁶ Jedoch den eigentlichen Grund für den Auswuchs der Gewalt fand Bataille in philosophischen Überlegungen, nicht in der Phantasie des Menschen. Nach Bataille organisiert die Vernunft im Alltag der okzidentalen Gesellschaft eine verdinglichte Welt, in der die Menschen einander fremd sind. Menschen sind „diskontinuierliche Wesen“⁴⁷, gefangen in ihrer Isolation. Anders als Karl Marx, der die verdinglichten Beziehungen, in denen Menschen sich begegnen, auf den Warencharakter der kapitalistischen Wirtschaftsweise zurückführte, sah Bataille den Grund für die Diskontinuität, die sich zwischen den Menschen erstreckt, in der Sterblichkeit des Menschen begründet. Das Wissen um seinen Tod lässt den Menschen einsam sein. Diese Diskontinuität, die sie von der Welt und von Anderen trennt, können die Menschen nur in der Ekstase überwinden. Die Ekstase entzieht sich der profanen, rationalen Ordnung der Gesellschaft und deren Nützlichkeitserwägungen, in ihr erlangen Menschen einen erfüllten Zustand, den Bataille Souveränität nennt. Wie in der Sexualität vermögen die Menschen in der Gewalt für einen Moment Souveränität zu gewinnen und die Verdinglichung ihrer Beziehungen zu überwinden. Es ist nicht verwunderlich, dass Bataille dieser Zuspruch zur Gewalt in den dreißiger Jahren des letzten Jahrhunderts (und später) den Vorwurf eintrug, ein

41 G. Bataille, Die psychologische Struktur des Faschismus, in: ders., Die psychologische Struktur des Faschismus / Die Souveränität. Hrsg. v. E. Lenk, München 1978, S. 7-43, S. 12.

42 Zur Sprache kommt hier die Faszination, die von der Gewalt ausgehen kann. Vgl. dazu H.-G. Soeffner, Gewalt als Faszinosum, in: W. Heitmeyer / H.-G. Soeffner (Hrsg.), Gewalt, Frankfurt a. M. 2004, S. 62-85.

43 Vgl. Z. Baumann, Dialektik der Ordnung. Die Moderne und der Holocaust, Hamburg 1992.

44 Vgl. G. Balandier, An Anthropology of Violence and War, in: International Social Science Journal 110 (1986), S. 499-511, S. 501 f.

45 W. Sofsky, Zeiten des Schreckens (Anm. 29), S. 27.

46 G. Bataille, Erotik (Anm. 5), S. 79.

47 Ebenda, S. 15.

faschistischer Denker zu sein, eine Ansicht, die in der heutigen Forschung aber nicht geteilt wird.⁴⁸

4. Gewalt und Gefühl

Michel Foucault, der Bataille zu einem seiner wichtigsten geistigen Mentoren zählte, schrieb über Bataille, dieser habe sich wie er, Foucault selbst, darum bemüht zu verstehen, wie der Mensch „Grenzerfahrungen“ in Erkenntnisobjekte verwandelt.⁴⁹ Im Vergleich dazu fällt auf, dass die Frage, *wie* wir in der Wissenschaft überhaupt geordnet von Gewalt erzählen (können), in der gegenwärtigen Gewaltsoziologie kaum eine Rolle spielt. Dies trifft auch für die „Neue Gewaltsoziologie“ zu, die hierzulande in den letzten Jahren die Gewaltforschung spürbar beeinflusst hat. Dies überrascht, weil die „Neue Gewaltsoziologie“ ja die Nähe zur kulturellen Anthropologie suchte, d. h. zu einer Disziplin, in der die Selbstreflexivität des Erzählens bzw. die Rolle des forschenden Subjekts im Verstehensvorgang besonders intensiv erörtert werden. Die „Neue Gewaltsoziologie“ hat sich an dieser Diskussion aber kaum beteiligt. Zwar wurde in einem ihrer Gründertexte postuliert, fortan das „Wie“ in den Vordergrund des Interesses zu rücken⁵⁰, aber gemeint war das Wie der Gewalt, nicht das Wie des Erzählens. Weil man sich der Sache sicher wähnte, wurde die „Gewalt selbst“⁵¹ zum Thema. In methodischer Hinsicht wurde aus der kulturellen Anthropologie das Verfahren der dichten Beschreibung übernommen, um der Gewalt in ihrer Analyse beizukommen. Gewalt sollte „minutiös“ beschrieben bzw. einem „mikrosociologischen Studium“⁵² unterzogen werden. Die dichte Beschreibung geriet zum methodischen Königsweg, um die Nähe im Blick auf die Gewalt zu gewinnen, die im Civilisationsprozeß verloren gegangen sei, die aber erforderlich sei, um im Detail die „(Un-) Erträglichkeit von Gewalt“ zu zeigen.⁵³

48 Vgl. zu dieser Kontroverse u. a. J.-M. Besnier, Bataille, the emotive Intellectual, in: C. Bailey Gill (Hrsg.), Writing the Sacred (Anm. 22), S. 12-25; S. Moebius, Contre-Attaque. Eine politische Initiative französischer Intellektueller in den 30er Jahren, in: SozialGeschichte 18 (2003), S. 85-100; P. Wiechens, Bataille (Anm. 7), S. 11 f. Kritischer jüngst E. Heinämäki, Politics of the Sacred: Eliade, Bataille and the Fascination of Fascism, in: Distinktion 19 (2009), S. 59-80, S. 63 f. Sie hält Bataille vor, sich nicht hinreichend klar von Denkelementen abgegrenzt zu haben, die für das faschistische Gedankengut nutzbar gewesen seien.

49 M. Foucault, Gespräch mit Ducio Trombadori, in: ders., Der Mensch ist ein Erfahrungstier, Frankfurt a. M. 1996, S. 23-122, S. 53.

50 T. v. Trotha, Zur Soziologie der Gewalt, in: Kölner Zs. für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie Sonderheft 37 (1997), S. 9-58, S. 20.

51 P. Imbusch, Mainstreamer versus Innovatoren der Gewaltforschung. Eine kuriose Debatte, in: W. Heitmeyer / H.-G. Soeffner (Hrsg.), Gewalt (Anm. 42), S. 125- 148, S. 126.

52 T. v. Trotha, Soziologie der Gewalt (Anm. 50), S. 21; W. Sofsky, Civilisation, Organisation, Gewalt, in: Mittelweg 36 3 (1994), S. 57-67, S. 64; vgl. auch T. Lindenberger / A. Lüdtke, Einleitung, in: dies. (Hrsg.), Physische Gewalt. Studien zur Geschichte der Neuzeit, Frankfurt a. M. 1995, S. 7-38, S. 28 f.

53 A. Lüdtke, Thesen zur Wiederholbarkeit „Normalität“ und Massenhaftigkeit von Tötungsgewalt im 20. Jahrhundert, in: R. P. Sieferle (Hrsg.), Kulturen der Gewalt. Ritualisierung und Symbolisierung von Gewalt in der Geschichte, Frankfurt a. M./ New York 1998, S. 280-289, S. 283.

Die Erwartungen, die an die dichte Beschreibung gerichtet wurden, waren (und sind) also hoch. Dem liegt jedoch ein doppeltes Missverständnis zugrunde. Denn zunächst geht es der dichten Beschreibung ja gar nicht um die detailgenaue Erfassung des Gegenstands selbst. Die Methode⁵⁴ der dichten Beschreibung sucht vielmehr nach dem verborgenen Bedeutungsgewebe der Kultur, das sich in den Gegenständen „verdichten“ würde.⁵⁵ Die Gewalttat interessiert in der dichten Beschreibung also gar nicht als solche, sondern bloß als Eintrittspforte zu einem verborgenen Sinnssystem. Demgemäß wird das äußerliche Verhalten, das wir beobachten können, also die Erscheinung der Gewalttat selbst, in der dichten Beschreibung als „vergleichsweise nichtssagen[d]“⁵⁶ bewertet. Aber was geschieht, wenn der vermeintlich nur „nichtssagende“ äußere Eindruck, an dem unsere Verstehensleistung ansetzt, derart mächtig und erschütternd ist, dass der „Gegenstand einen nicht mehr gleichgültig lässt, sondern einen vielmehr versengt“⁵⁷, d. h. der Mensch seine Fähigkeit, Sinn zu stiften, verliert? Um zu illustrieren, was er mit dem „Versengen“ der eigenen Person im Anblick der Gewalt meinte, verwies Bataille auf die Fotos der „chinesischen Folter“⁵⁸. Deren „Gewaltsamkeit [habe] eine bodenlose Bestürzung“ in ihm ausgelöst, die ihm in seinem Leben „nicht mehr aus dem Sinn gegangen“⁵⁹ sei. Mit Batailles Worten, der Schmerz sei sein Lehrer gewesen, beginnen Fred Botting und Scott Wilson denn auch ihren Sammelband über Batailles Werk.⁶⁰ Dabei ist es eine Randnotiz wert, dass Bataille visuelle Quellen (Photographien) heran zog, um das eigene Entsetzen in der Betrachtung der Gewalt zu belegen, nicht Textdokumente. Bildern wird ja gemeinhin nachgesagt, einen stärkeren Gefühlseindruck zu vermitteln, als verschriftlichte Quellen dies vermögen.⁶¹

Der Ausweis der Fähigkeit, die eigenen Gefühlsregungen zu kontrollieren, die der Anblick der Gewalt in uns auslöst, stellt in der Wissenschaft einen Initiationsritus dar. Wir können daran ablesen, wie die Wissenschaften die menschlichen Affekte als Ausdruck „dunkler“ Vorstellungen⁶² zu behandeln lernten bzw. in einer genetischen Betrachtungs-

54 In der Literatur ist bekanntlich umstritten, ob es sich bei der dichten Beschreibung tatsächlich um eine Methode oder aber bloß um eine begrifflich verklärte „Virtuosität“ handelt, analog zur Rolle der Intuition in der geisteswissenschaftlichen Hermeneutik. Vgl. L. Hunt, Geschichte jenseits von Gesellschaftstheorie, in: C. Conrad/M. Kessel (Hrsg.), Geschichte schreiben in der Postmoderne, Stuttgart 1994, S. 98-122, S. 104.

55 S. Wolff, Die Anatomie der Dichten Beschreibung, in: J. Matthes (Hrsg.), Zwischen den Kulturen?, Göttingen 1992, S. 339-363, S. 347. Kulturelle Phänomene stellen demnach ein „Ensemble von Texten“ dar, das wir deuten sollen. Vgl. C. Geertz, Dichte Beschreibung. Beiträge zum Verstehen kultureller Systeme, Frankfurt a. M. 1983, S. 259.

56 M. Fuchs/E. Berg, Phänomenologie und Differenz. Reflexionsstufen ethnographischer Repräsentation, in: dies. (Hrsg.), Kultur, soziale Praxis. Die Krise der ethnographischen Repräsentation, Frankfurt a. M. 1995, S. 11-108, S. 50.

57 G. Bataille, Aufhebung der Ökonomie (Anm. 27), S. 36.

58 Sie zeigen die Folterung eines politischen Attentäters in China im Jahr 1905. Die Fotos wurden Bataille durch den Psychoanalytiker Adrien Borel, der Bataille selbst analysierte, zur Verfügung gestellt. Vgl. P. Wiechens, Bataille (Anm. 7), S. 72. Sie sind abgedruckt in G. Bataille, Die Tränen des Eros, München 1981.

59 G. Bataille, Tränen des Eros (Anm. 58), S. 247.

60 Vgl. F. Botting/S. Wilson (Hrsg.), Bataille. A Critical Reader, Oxford 1998, S. 1.

61 Zur Bedeutung von Bildern für die Darstellung unsagbarer Gewalt vgl. K. Maclear, Beclouded Visions. Hiroshima, Nagasaki and the Art of Witness, Albany 1999.

62 E. Cassirer, Mythus und die Psychologie der Affekte, in: ders., Vom Mythus des Staates, Zürich 1949, S. 34-52, S. 37.

weise einfach den „Wilden“ zuschrieben.⁶³ Die Selbstbeherrschung des Forschers wurde zu einem zentralen Element der Verwissenschaftlichung.⁶⁴ In der Wissenschaft möchten wir heute nicht mehr davon absehen. Jedoch ahnen wir zugleich, dass unser Verstehen fremder Kulturen und Geschichten darunter auch leiden mag. So hegt der französische Historiker Alain Corbin mit Blick auf die Historiographie der Bürgerkriege in Frankreich im 19. Jahrhundert den Verdacht, dass seine Kollegen „ganz so wie die eigentlichen Zuschauer vom Entsetzen erfasst wurden“, als sie in den Quellen, die sie lasen, mit der Kriegsgewalt konfrontiert waren, weshalb sie in ihren Werken auf die Beschreibung des Grauens verzichtet hätten, um stattdessen die Beschreibung der Gewalt in eine „süßliche universitäre Geschichtsschreibung“ zu verpacken.⁶⁵ Die meisten von uns kennen vermutlich Beispiele solch „süßlicher“ Gewaltbeschreibung in der Wissenschaft. Offen wird über diese Problematik in der Anthropologie diskutiert, was wohl damit zusammenhängt, dass diese anders als die Geschichtswissenschaft nicht über Quellen, sondern direkt mit Menschen arbeitet. Der Anthropologe Renato Rosaldo hat in seinen Forschungen über die Kopfjäger im Norden der Philippinen-Insel Luzon, wie er schreibt, spät bemerkt, dass ihn erst das Erlebnis eigenen Verlustes zum Verstehen fremder Wut führte. Rosaldo zog daraus die Schlussfolgerung, dass wir die „Intensität“ von Gefühlen, und zwar sowohl jene im beobachteten Geschehen wie die im Erzähler selbst, stärker in unsere epistemologischen Überlegungen einbeziehen müssen.⁶⁶ In der Anthropologie wird gefragt, welche Gefühle der Wissenschaftler bei der Betrachtung der Gewalt in die Feldforschung einbringt, ob eventuell eher „Abenteuerlust“ statt seriöses wissenschaftliches Erkenntnisinteresse seine Arbeit bestimmt oder ob er vielleicht in den eigenen Untersuchungen gar einer „perversen Faszination“ an der Gewalt unterliegt, die sich in seine Erzählung einschleicht.⁶⁷ Michael Taussig, der hervorragende Arbeiten zur Ethnographie Südamerikas geschrieben hat, machte sich im Fach jedenfalls wenig Freunde, als er vor einigen Jahren in der *New York Times* zitiert wurde, eine Art Gewaltjunkie zu sein und sich aus diesem Grund nach der Gewalt im Gegenstand zu sehnen: „I started becoming a kind of violence junkie. I wanted the material to get wilder and more violent, and I started wondering about that: What is it in me?“⁶⁸ Wir sehen, dass

63 Ebenda, S. 36.

64 Vgl. W. Lepenies, Wandel der Mentalitäten und Wissenschaftsgeschichte, in: ders., Das Ende der Naturgeschichte. Wandel kultureller Selbstverständlichkeiten in den Wissenschaften des 18. und 19. Jahrhunderts, Frankfurt a. M. 1978, S. 197–214, S. 207 f. Grundlegend dazu ist G. Devereux, Angst und Methode in den Verhaltenswissenschaften, München 1973.

65 A. Corbin, Die Massaker von Paris, in: M. Wimmer u. a. (Hrsg.), Zur Historischen Anthropologie der Gewalt, Frankfurt a. M. 1996, S. 181–194, S. 191.

66 R. Rosaldo, Der Kummer und die Wut eines Kopfjägers, in: M. Fuchs / E. Berg (Hrsg.), Kultur, soziale Praxis (Amm. 56), S. 375–401, S. 375, S. 399. Gerd Spittler versteht das ethnographische Verfahren, er nennt es „dichte Teilnahme“, gerade in dem Sinn, dass es [...] nicht nur das Sehen und Hören, sondern auch das körperliche und seelische Fühlen“ einschließt. Vgl. G. Spittler, Teilnehmende Beobachtung als Dichte Teilnahme, in: Zs. f. Ethnologie 126 (2001), S. 1–25, S. 19.

67 K. Avruch, Notes toward Ethnographies of Conflict and Violence, in: Journal of Contemporary Ethnography 30 (2001), S. 637–648, S. 642.

68 Vgl. E. Eakin, Anthropology's Alternative Radical, in: New York Times v. 21. April 2001.

Batailles Interesse an der Erregtheit im Verstehen der Gewalt weniger singulär ist, als vielleicht zu erwarten war.

Nun ist die Feldforschung der Ethnographen, insbesondere die in offenen Gewalträumen, wo auch die Wissenschaftler ihres Lebens nicht sicher sein können⁶⁹, nicht einfach auf die vergleichsweise geruhsame Archivarbeit des Historikers übertragbar. Anders als Ethnologen können Historiker ihre Gefühle für die Gewalt nicht direkt ins beobachtete Geschehen tragen und zu einem Teil des Erkenntnisgegenstands machen. Der Historiker kann nicht selbst „native“ werden⁷⁰ und dadurch gegebenenfalls seinen Status als Wissenschaftler verlieren, wie die Anthropologie (sorgenvoll) erörtert. Insofern haben Historiker oder auch die Soziologen, die nicht „im Feld“ forschen, weniger Veranlassung, über die Rolle ihrer Empfindungen im Forschungsvorgang nachzudenken, als dies bei den Anthropologen der Fall ist. Aber wir können dieses Problem deswegen nicht einfach ignorieren. In der Literatur ist gegenwärtig von einer „Renaissance der soziologischen Emotionsforschung“⁷¹ die Rede, in der es nicht allein um die Bedeutung der Gefühle im Gegenstand (deren Relevanz dürfte mittlerweile in der Forschung unbestritten sein⁷²), sondern ebenso um den „systematischen Ort der Gefühle in der wissenschaftlichen Erkenntnis“⁷³ gehen soll. Auch in der Ethnologie wird über die Rolle des Gefühls im Erkenntnisvorgang neu diskutiert. So ist in einem kürzlich veröffentlichten Beitrag zur Gewaltforschung zu lesen, das „Hauptproblem“ für die Ethnologen bei der Betrachtung der Gewalt sei, „inwiefern Täter und Opfer von Gewalthandeln Verständnis entgegengebracht werden sollte“.⁷⁴ Gibt es also gegenwärtig ein *roll back* zum „Verstehen als Gefühlsmethode“⁷⁵, nachdem vor nunmehr einem Jahrhundert die lebensphilosophische Hermeneutik sich intensiv damit befasst und die Identität der Geistes- gegenüber den Naturwissenschaften darauf begründet hatte? Dabei ist es nicht frei von Ironie, dass sich in der aktuellen Diskussion Parallelen zu der Zeit finden, von der dieser Aufsatz handelt. Denn ungefähr als Bataille sich Gedanken über die Rolle der Erregung im Verstehensvorgang machte, publizierte der französische Historiker Lucien Febvre in der Zeitschrift *Annales d'histoire sociale* einen Aufsatz, in dem er eine Art Anfang für die histo-

69 Vgl. dazu auch C. Nordstrom/A. Robben (Hrsg.), *Fieldwork under Fire. Contemporary Studies of Violence and Survival*, Berkeley 1995.

70 B. Schnepel, *Ethnologie und Geschichte*, in: *Historische Anthropologie* 7 (1999), S. 109-128, S. 109.

71 M. Weihrich/W. Dunkel, *Gefühl und Emotion*, in: *Soziologische Revue* 33 (2010), S. 331-341, S. 332.

72 Vgl. J. Baberowski, *Gewalt verstehen*, in: *Zeithistorische Forschungen* 5 (2008), S. 5-17, S. 12: „Gewalt ist eine Wirklichkeit der Emotionen, [...] und deshalb verfehlt eine Gewaltforschung, die die Emotion und den Körper ausblendet, ihr Ziel.“

73 U. Jensen/D. Morat, *Die Verwissenschaftlichung des Emotionalen in der langen Jahrhundertwende (1880-1930)*, in: dies. (Hrsg.), *Rationalisierungen des Gefühls. Zum Verhältnis von Wissenschaft und Emotionen 1880-1930*, München 2008, S. 11-34, S. 17.

74 T. Zitelmann, *Gewalt diesseits, jenseits und am Rande des Staates. Ethnologische Positionen*, in: *Behemoth. A Journal on Civilization* 1 (2009), S. 20-40, S. 22.

75 Vgl. D. Morat, *Verstehen als Gefühlsmethode. Zu Wilhelm Diltheys hermeneutischer Grundlegung der Geisteswissenschaften*, in: U. Jensen/D. Morat (Hrsg.), *Rationalisierungen des Gefühls* (Anm. 73), S. 101-117.

rische Analyse der Emotionen reklamierte⁷⁶, wobei es ihm allerdings allein um die Rolle der Gefühle in der Geschichte ging, nicht um die im Erzählen der Gewalt. Kürzlich nun erschien in *Geschichte und Gesellschaft* ein Aufsatz, in dem von einem *emotional turn* in der historischen Forschung die Rede ist, also dem, wovon Febvre 1941 schrieb. Und wie bei Febvre geht es erneut nur um die Sache („die Geschichte“), nicht um das Erzählen davon.⁷⁷

Kommen wir zurück zu Bataille. Dieser stand, als er über die Bedeutung der Erregung (Affekte) im Erkenntnisvorgang schrieb, unter dem Einfluß Nietzsches sowie der lebensphilosophischen Hermeneutik.⁷⁸ Allerdings ist ein wichtiger Unterschied zu beachten. Bataille interessierte sich wie Nietzsche für starke Gefühle wie die Erregung. Diese Erregung überwältigt im Verstehensvorgang aber den Erzähler, sie ist von diesem nicht (mehr) kontrollierbar, wodurch das souveräne Erkenntnissubjekt aus der Welt verschwindet. Die lebensphilosophische Hermeneutik dagegen interessierte sich für Gefühle mittlerer Intensität wie die „Sympathie“⁷⁹ (heute würden wir es Empathie nennen), die der Erzähler kontrolliert. Die Wissenschaft tabuisiert als Erkenntnismittel also intensive Gefühle, toleriert oder fordert jedoch die im Ausdruck schwächeren. Norbert Elias hat dies in seiner Soziologie beschrieben und bekanntlich „Zivilisation“ genannt. Zivilisation, so Elias, bestehe nicht darin, Affekträßerungen aufzuheben, sondern sie in ihrem Ausdruck zu dämpfen und, was ihre Stärke angeht, auf einer „mittleren Linie“ einzupendeln.⁸⁰

Bataille interessierte sich für die Extreme des Gefühls. Er nahm an, dass allein die Erregung wirkliche Einblicke in die (schreckliche) Gewalt gewährt. Nur wenn wir der Erregung, die wir im Anblick der Gewalt verspüren, nachgäben, könnten wir Gewalt verstehen. Diese Ansicht ist irritierend. Die Neurowissenschaften gehen heute davon aus, dass Gefühle im Erkenntnisvorgang sich zwar auf den Gegenstand „richten“, diesen jedoch im Unterschied zu den Sinneswahrnehmungen oder den Denkakten nicht direkt „präsentieren“.⁸¹ Das Gefühl ist insofern nicht, wie Bataille glaubte, der Königsweg in den Stoff, sondern ein Hinweis auf die Natur des eigenen Denkens oder die Bedingtheit der eigenen Erinnerung und Erzählweise. Zwar kann der Mensch im Affekt oder in der Ekstase Eindrücke und Erfahrungen gewinnen, die er anders nicht zu erleben vermag. Wäre es anders, würden Menschen weniger Drogen konsumieren. Insoweit lässt sich Batailles Konzept, wie es in den achtziger Jahren des letzten Jahrhunderts im Zuge der

76 „Sensibilität und Geschichte: ein neues Thema“, beginnt der Text. Vgl. L. Febvre, Sensibilität und Geschichte. Zugänge zum Gefühlsleben früherer Epochen, in: Marc Bloch und andere, Schrift und Materie der Geschichte. Hrsg. v. C. Honegger, Frankfurt a. M. 1977, S. 313-334, S. 313.

77 U. Frevert, Was haben Gefühle in der Geschichte zu suchen, in: *Geschichte und Gesellschaft* 35 (2009), S. 183-207.

78 Für die Lebensphilosophie lag der Ausgangspunkt des Verstehens im „Lebensreichtum“ des Betrachters. Vgl. W. Dilthey, Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften, in: ders., Gesammelte Schriften. Band 1, Göttingen 1990, S. 3-120, S. 49. Zur Kritik, ob diese Hermeneutik „strengen wissenschaftstheoretischen Ansprüchen“ genügt, vgl. H.-U. Wehler, Geschichts als Historische Sozialwissenschaft, Frankfurt a. M. 1973, S. 89.

79 Vgl. I. Berlin, Geschichte als Wissenschaft, in: H. M. Baumgartner / J. Rüsen (Hrsg.), Seminar Geschichte und Theorie, Frankfurt a. M. 1976, S. 209-252, S.243.

80 N. Elias, Prozeß der Zivilisation, Bd. II (Anm. 35), S. 325.

81 I. Verrall Ferran, Die Emotionen, Berlin 2008, S. 134.

damals verbreiteten Kapitalismus- und Ideologiekritik geschah, als der positiv bewertete Versuch umschreiben, „Formen des herkömmlichen Denkens“ in der Konfrontation mit „angsterregenden Bildern“ neue Verstehenshorizonte zu eröffnen.⁸² Aber dies muß nicht der Fall sein. Ebenso ist möglich, dass unsere Eindrücke gerade dadurch betäubt werden, weil das Gefühl überwältigend stark ist und der Schrecken unser Denken blockiert. Der „Moment höchster Erregung [...] kann Details dem Geist einbrennen, er kann ihn aber auch blenden“.⁸³

Vor allem aber bleiben Einwände methodischer Art. Denn zum einen stellt der Affekt in den Geistes- und Kulturwissenschaften *kein* methodisches Konzept dar. Die Erregung ist kein geregeltes, nachprüfbares Erkenntnisverfahren, sondern sie begründet, wie in der Literatur (die Textstelle ist mir entfallen) zu recht argumentiert wird, nur ein emotionales Verhältnis zu dem, worüber wir erzählen wollen. „Erregung“ erzählt nicht und bildet auch keine Begriffe. Zum anderen sind die Zusammenhänge, die Bataille zwischen „Gewalt“ und „Affekt“ herstellte, recht mechanisch. Denn keineswegs ist alle Gewalttat eine erregte Praxis, worauf bereits Alexander Mitscherlich in seiner Unterscheidung in die affektiv gesättigte „Grausamkeitslust“ und die nüchterne „Grausamkeitsarbeit“⁸⁴ hinwies. Analog dazu können wir auch Gewalt auf unterschiedliche Weise erzählen, ohne dass die eine Art der Narration von vornherein „richtiger“ wäre als die andere. Ferner ruft der Anblick der Gewalt im Erzähler keineswegs zwangsläufig eine Erregung oder andere Affekte hervor. In den USA ist 1964 nach einem Kriminalfall, der besonders Aufsehen erregte, weil zahlreiche Zuschauer einer Gewalttat unbeteiligt blieben, das Wort der Zuschauergleichgültigkeit geprägt worden.⁸⁵ Ein eigener soziologischer Forschungszweig entstand, die Bystander-Forschung, die sich mit menschlicher Gleichgültigkeit angesichts fremden Leids befasst.⁸⁶ Wir können Gewalt also völlig teilnahmslos ansehen und erzählen. Wir benötigen auch keine Empathie, um Gewalt zu verstehen, weil wir verstehen können, warum ein Mensch Haß und Wut empfindet oder einen Anderen angreift, ohne dass wir für den Täter oder das Opfer Mitgefühl empfinden müssten. Zusammengefaßt bleiben die methodischen Überlegungen Batailles, wie in der Literatur kritisiert wird, „unfest“.⁸⁷

82 R. Bischof, Souveränität und Subversion. George Batailles Theorie der Moderne, München 1984, S. 143.

83 J. Kotre, Der Strom der Erinnerung, München 1998, S. 126.

84 A. Mitscherlich, Zwei Arten der Grausamkeit, in: ders., Gesammelte Schriften Bd. 5, Frankfurt a. M. 1983, S. 322-342, S. 337.

85 Vgl. T. Bastian, Das Jahrhundert des Todes. Zur Psychologie von Gewaltbereitschaft und Massenmord im 20. Jahrhundert, Göttingen 2000, S. 167.

86 Ebenda.

87 G. Bergfleth, Theorie der Verschwendug (Anm. 2), S. 72. Kritisch auch G. Häfliger, Autonomie oder Souveränität. Zur Gegenwartskritik von Georges Bataille, Mittenwald 1981, der moniert, Batailles Methodenbewusstsein sei „extrem zurückhaltend“ (S. 53).

5. Gewalt und Sprache

Die ekstatische Gewalt, nahm Bataille an, führt den Menschen in die Erregung, und sie macht ihn zugleich sprachlos, weil er in der Ekstase zu keinem geordneten Sprechen fähig ist. Neben der Rolle der Gefühle in der Gewalt ist deswegen die Sprache (bzw. in weiterem Sinn die Kommunikation) das eng mit dem ersten verbundene, zweite große Themengebiet in Batailles Gewalttheorie.

In der Wissenschaft wird das Verhältnis von Sprache und Gewalt auf unterschiedliche Weise behandelt. Manchen gilt die Gewalt gegenüber der Sprache als wirkmächtiger und insofern als überlegene Kommunikationsform, weil die Gewalt als eine Form des Einwirkens auf Andere nicht negiert werden könne. Anderen erscheint Gewalt dagegen als etwas, das Sprache und damit auch Bedeutung zerstört, wodurch soziale Beziehungen vernichtet würden. Vor gut einem Jahrzehnt kritisierte Hartmut Tyrell in einem Literaturbericht, die jüngere Gewaltsoziologie habe keinen Anteil daran genommen, „Gewalt gegenbegrifflich auf Kommunikation zu beziehen“⁸⁸. Dabei hatte Tyrell, wenn ich es recht versteh'e, die Gewalt als einen Abbruch von Kommunikation und Auflösung sozialer Bindungen vor Augen. Neuerdings dominiert bei der Behandlung des Verhältnisses von Gewalt und Sprache eine pragmatische Linguistik, die das gewalttätige Sprechen als Gewalthandeln selbst versteht.⁸⁹

In seiner Schrift *Zur Kritik der Gewalt* (1920/21) war Walter Benjamin, der in den dreißiger Jahren in Paris in regem Kontakt mit Bataille stand, auf das Verhältnis von Sprache und Gewalt eingegangen. Nach Benjamin ist die Sprache eine „Sphäre menschlicher Übereinkunft“, die „der Gewalt vollständig unzugänglich ist“.⁹⁰ Sprache verbindet Menschen, sie ist das Medium eigentlicher Verständigung, die Gewalt ist das störende Element. Für Bataille dagegen war die Gewalt als Tat der Sprache als Kommunikationsform überlegen. In der Batailleschen Theorie lehnt sich die Betrachtung des Verhältnisses von Gewalt und Sprache (Kommunikation) an die philosophischen Grundannahmen seines Denkens an. Bataille stand dabei unter dem Einfluß der Hegel-Vorlesungen, die der in Russland geborene Philosoph Alejandre Kojève zwischen 1933 und 1939 an der *École pratique des hautes études* hielt und die damals in gelehrt Kreisen in Paris große Aufmerksamkeit erregten.⁹¹ Kojève ging in seiner Hegelinterpretation von einer phänomenologischen Position aus, wonach der Mensch sich sowohl im „Wort“ wie auch in der „negierenden Tat“⁹² offenbaren könne. Bataille übertrug diese Unterscheidung auf die

88 H. Tyrell, Physische Gewalt, gewaltamer Konflikt und der Staat, in: Berliner Journal f. Soziologie 9 (1999), S. 269-288, S. 269.

89 Vgl. J. Butler, Haß spricht. Zur Politik des Performativen, Frankfurt a. M. 2008.

90 W. Benjamin, Zur Kritik der Gewalt, in: ders., Gesammelte Schriften, Bd. II,1, Frankfurt a. M. 1999, S. 179-203, S. 192. Über Bataille und Benjamin, die sich in den dreißiger Jahren in Paris kennenlernten, vgl. J. Hörisch, Die Theorie der Herausgabe und die Herausgabe der Theorie. Benjamin zwischen Bataille und Sohn-Rethel, Bremen 1983. Vgl. ferner J. Habermas, Zwischen Erosismus und Allgemeiner Ökonomie: Bataille, in: ders., Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne. Zwölf Vorlesungen, Frankfurt a. M. 1989, S. 248-278, S. 258 f.

91 Vgl. ausführlicher dazu P. Bürger, Denken des Herrn (Anm. 11).

92 S. Moebius, Zauberlehringe (Anm. 22), S. 215.

Betrachtung der Gewalt. In der Gewalttat würden die Menschen in eine neue Beziehung zueinander treten, um ihre „vollständigste Verlassenheit“⁹³ in der Welt zu überwinden. Gewalt integriert Menschen, während die Sprache dies nicht zu leisten vermag, weil sie Gewalt nicht erzählen kann. Angesichts der Gewalt „versagt“⁹⁴ die Sprache.

Dieser Blick auf das Verhältnis von Gewalt und Sprache ist der Gewaltsoziologie keineswegs so fremd, wie es vielleicht zunächst erscheinen mag. In der Literatur werden vor allem zwei Konstellationen unterschieden, in denen die Sprache keine Erzählung der Gewalt hervorzu bringen vermag, sondern unter dem Eindruck der Gewalt verstummt oder aber sich auf die Hervorbringung von Lauten reduziert, wodurch die Gewalt sich nicht mehr in sprachliche Texte übersetzen lässt und insofern Bedeutung einbüßt. Die erste Konstellation hat Elaine Scarry anhand der physischen Folter beschrieben. Scarry argumentiert, dass der körperliche Schmerz die Sprache zerrüttet und den Menschen in seiner Weltorientierung zerstört. Der körperliche Schmerz ist „resistent gegen Sprache, er zerstört sie, er versetzt uns in einen Zustand zurück, in dem Laute und Schreien vorherrschen“⁹⁵. Keine Erzählung kann den Schmerz vergegenwärtigen, den ein Gefolterter in der Gewalt erfährt. Sprache wird zu Lauten. Die zweite Konstellation ist die Panik. Es gibt kurze Momente, Augenblicke der alles überwältigenden Angst, die der Gewalt ihre Bedeutung nehmen. In diesen Situationen löst sich das die Panik auslösende Geschehen aus den kulturellen Sinnhorizonten, in die die Gewalt ansonsten eingebettet ist: „Es ist gewiß zutreffend, dass panischer Schrecken den Opfern von Gewalt jede Fähigkeit nimmt, Sinn und Bedeutung zu geben“.⁹⁶

Jedoch ist der Unterschied der, dass Bataille seine Zweifel an der Sprache und ihrer Fähigkeit, Gewalt deutend zu erzählen, nicht nur auf umgrenzte bzw. vorübergehende Situationen wie die Folter und die Panik bezog. Schreckliche Gewalt ist vielmehr prinzipiell das „Unaussprechliche“⁹⁷, weil die Erregung der Gewalt nicht in Sprache ausgedrückt werden kann. Bataille umschrieb dies im Kontext seiner philosophischen Betrachtungen als ein Spannungsfeld zwischen Zivilisation und Barbarei, die er (in heutiger Terminologie) als diskursive Felder definierte. Die Gewalt selbst ist demnach „stumm“ und somit Eigenschaft der Barbarei, weil diese die Sprache der Zivilisation nicht beherrscht. Nur diese redet über die Gewalt, wobei sie ihr aus der Perspektive des Zivilisierten „nur eine ungehörige und schuldhafte Existenz“ zubilligen könne.⁹⁸ Bataille bediente sich mit dieser Gegenüberstellung von Zivilisation und Barbarei eines althergebrachten philosophischen Topos, nutzte ihn aber für seine Vernunftkritik. Es gehört wenig Phantasie dazu sich vorzustellen, dass Bataille, obgleich er es in der hier zitierten Textstelle nicht

93 G. Bataille, Nietzsche, in: J. Salaquarda (Hrsg.), Nietzsche, Darmstadt 1980, S. 45-49, S. 45.

94 P. Wiechens, Bataille (Anm. 7), S. 79.

95 E. Scarry, Der Körper im Schmerz. Die Chiffren der Verletzlichkeit und die Erfindung der Kultur, Frankfurt a. M. 1992, S. 13.

96 R. Isaac, Geschichte und Anthropologie oder Macht und (Be-)Deutung, in: Historische Anthropologie 2 (1994), S. 107-130, S. 120.

97 C. Stanley, Bataille's communication at and after the limit of the law, in: International Journal for the Semiotics of Law 32 (1998), S. 155-179, S. 157.

98 G. Bataille, Erotik (Anm. 5), S. 182.

ausdrücklich erwähnt, nicht zuletzt die Wissenschaft vor Augen hatte, wenn er die „Vor-eingenommenheit“ der zivilisierten Sprache⁹⁹, die über Gewalt redet, kritisierte. In den Augen Batailles „verfemt“ die Wissenschaft, die aus ihrer Teilhabe an der Zivilisation heraus über Gewalt spricht, die Gewalt, sie erzeugt durch ihre Begriffe oder Theorien „Abfall“.¹⁰⁰ Die Wissenschaft analysiert demnach nicht allein Gewalt, sondern in der Definition von Gewalt begründet sie zugleich den Bestand einer (politischen, sozialen, diskursiven, usw.) Ordnung und trägt zu deren Selbstfindung bei. Allein der Literatur bzw. Kunst traute Bataille zu, auf „bildhafte Weise“ bzw. durch „künstlerische Imagination“¹⁰¹ Gewalt zu versprachlichen, ein Gedanke, der verschiedentlich in den Kulturwissenschaften auftaucht und bis heute diskutiert wird. Jedoch auch die literarische Sprache bzw. die Sprache der Kunst bleiben für Bataille eine immer gefährdete, brüchige, fragmentierte Sprache. Auch sie sind letztlich eine Sprache der „Abstürze“¹⁰², die die Erregung, die die Gewalt umgibt, nur notdürftig mitzuteilen vermag.

Jean-Paul Sartre hat diese Sprachkritik und den damit einhergehenden Wissenschaftskeptizismus scharf zurückgewiesen und Bataille in einem Aufsatz im Jahr 1943 (und dies auch mit Blick auf die Versuche zur Ausbildung einer „Sakralsoziologie“) als „neuen Mystiker“ bezeichnet.¹⁰³ Für seine Kritiker löste sich Bataille aus der Gemeinschaft der Wissenschaftler. Das Heterologe würde sich, kritisierte Jürgen Habermas, der Ansicht Batailles nach ja nicht allein in der Sache selbst manifestieren, sondern ebenso in der Erzeugung und Organisation des Wissens, weil es sich „dem methodischen Zugriff der Wissenschaften entzieht“.¹⁰⁴ Aber mir scheint, dass diese Kritik allzu kurz greift und darauf zurückzuführen ist, dass Habermas ein bestimmtes Wissenschaftsverständnis als allgemein Gültiges setzt. Denn Bataille stellte sich nicht außerhalb der Regeln wissenschaftlichen Arbeitens. „Es wäre unsinnig,“ schrieb er, „gegen die Regeln der Stringenz zu verstößen, die Methode und Besonnenheit voraussetzen [...].“¹⁰⁵ Was Bataille in Frage stellte, war die Annahme eines Prinzips autonomer Subjektivität, das sich auf die philosophischen Traditionen von Descartes oder Kant zurückführen lässt. Bataille kritisierte den Vernunftanspruch des aufklärerischen Denkens, er betrieb eine Dezentrierung des Subjekts im Erkenntnisvorgang, und er stellte dadurch in der Konsequenz, denken

99 Ebenda.

100 G. Bergfleth, Theorie der Verschwendungen (Anm. 2), S. 25. In Anlehnung an die Schriften des Marquis de Sade rückte Bataille die Vorstellung des Abfalls in die Nähe der Ausscheidung bzw. des Exkrementellen. Vgl. ebenda sowie G. Bataille, Aufhebung der Ökonomie (Anm. 27), S. 31.

101 R. Bischof, Souveränität (Anm. 82), S. 143.

102 M. Foucault, Vorrede zur Überschreitung, in: ders., Von der Subversion des Wissens, Frankfurt a. M. 1987, S. 28-45, S. 39. Vgl. dazu auch P. Collier, Beyond words. Language and silence in Bataille's fiction, in: P. Buch (Hrsg.), Violent Silence. Celebrating Georges Bataille, London 1984, S. 65-73; vgl. ferner das Interview, das Madeleine Chapsal 1961 mit Georges Bataille führte, in: M. Richardson (Hrsg.), George Bataille – Essential Writings, London 1998, S. 220-224, S. 221 f.; vgl. ferner aus der literaturwissenschaftlichen Perspektive auch M. Luckow, Nachwort, in: G. Bataille, Das obszöne Werk, Reinbek 1972, S. 225-232.

103 J.-P. Sartre, Ein neuer Mystiker, in: ders., Situationen, Reinbek 1965, S. 59-88; vgl. dazu auch P. Wiechens, Bataille (Anm. 7), S. 100.

104 J. Habermas, Erosmus (Anm. 90), S. 249.

105 G. Bataille, Aufhebung der Ökonomie (Anm. 27), S. 37.

wir an seine Kritik der Sprache im Verhältnis zur Gewalt, auch die Konstituierung von Subjektivität in (Re-) Narrationen der Gewalt¹⁰⁶ in Abrede. Nicht jeder verurteilt diese Anschauung jedoch als unwissenschaftlich. Vor allem Foucault bezog aus der Auflösung des „sprechenden Subjekts“¹⁰⁷, die Bataille in seiner Theorie betrieb, wichtige Anstöße für sein eigenes Denken. So argumentierte Foucault im Jahr 1978 in einer Kritik an Sartre (und im Sinn Batailles): „In einer Philosophie wie der von Sartre gibt das Subjekt der Welt Sinn [...] Könnte es aber nicht Erfahrungen geben, in denen das Subjekt sich von sich lösen und den Bezug zu sich selbst zerstören, seine Identität verlieren könnte?“¹⁰⁸ Was in der Theorie Batailles bleibt, ist ein kreatürliches Subjekt, ein in der Vernunftwelt isolierter, weitgehend sprachloser Mensch, der die Hilflosigkeit gegenüber den eigenen Ängsten in der situativen Verausgabung seiner selbst zu überspielen versucht und dazu die Gewalt gebraucht. Es ist leicht verständlich, dass dieses Bild einer Wissenschaft, die die „Modernisierung“ zu ihrem Leitbegriff erklärt hat und diese nun „kritisch“ begleiten will, nur wenig gefällt.

6. Zum Verhältnis von Anthropologie und Soziologie

Kehren wir zur Eingangsfrage zurück, welchen Nutzen die Theorie Batailles für die heutige Gewaltsoziologie haben mag. Zunächst, das bedarf keiner weiteren Ausführung, taugt die Theorie nicht für die Analyse aller Gewalt, sondern nur für bestimmte Formen, die wir notdürftig mit den Begriffen der Verausgabung, der Überschreitung, der Ekstase oder auch des rauschhaften Gewalterlebnisses überschreiben und auf diese Weise ungefähr, nicht präzise, eingrenzen können. Andere Formen, ich nenne nur die auf den Beuteerwerb gerichtete Gewalt, fallen nicht unter die Theorie. Diese Einschränkungen müssen wir uns vor Augen führen. Dennoch ist es mitunter irritierend, mit welcher Hartnäckigkeit Bataille ganze Teilbereiche der Gewalt aus seinen Überlegungen ausblendet. So schreibt er nichts über die Rolle von Organisationen in der Gewaltausübung. Und er erklärt auch nicht, warum in den Vernunftordnungen okzidentaler Gesellschaften in der Regel nur (kleine) Minderheiten der Bevölkerung sich in der Gewalt „verausgaben“, während die Mehrzahl der Menschen dies nicht tut, was von seinem theoretischen Ansatz her nicht selbstverständlich ist.

Der Grund für diese Irritationen, die Batailles Ansatz *auch* auslöst, ist der in gewisser Hinsicht statische oder, wenn man so will, asozialistische Charakter der Theorie. Es ist vor diesem Hintergrund denn auch kein Zufall, dass die schreckliche Gewalt, die Bataille vor Augen hat, die Ordnung „überschreitet“. Sie eskaliert nicht. Denn eine Es-

106 Vgl. dazu V. Das, Violence, Poisonous Knowledge and Subjectivity, in: dies. u. a. (Hrsg.), Violence and Subjectivity, Berkeley 2000, S. 205–225, S. 205 f.

107 M. Foucault, Vorrede zur Überschreitung (Anm. 102), S. 37. Dies könne letztlich zur „Auflösung des Denkens“ führen. Vgl. H. Schmidt, Sozialphilosophie des Krieges. Staats- und subjekttheoretische Untersuchungen zu Henri Lefebvre und Georges Bataille, Essen 1990, S. 87.

108 Zit. in B. Taureck, Michel Foucault, Reinbek 2004, S. 79.

kalation der Gewalt können wir nur dann beschreiben, wenn verschiedene rivalisierende Akteure sich wechselseitig zur Gewalt ermuntern und anspornen. Dieser Konflikt fehlt aber in der Theorie Batailles bzw. wird nur an ihren Rändern behandelt. „Räume“ der Gewalt, von denen seit einiger Zeit in der Gewaltsoziologie ja viel die Rede ist, existieren deshalb in der Theorie Batailles nicht. Stattdessen herrscht in seiner Theorie eine Sprache anthropologischer Konstanten vor. Jean Baudrillard hat deshalb kritisiert, dass Bataille am Anfang seiner Gewaltanalyse, also in der Betrachtung des Gabentausches, einer „biologistischen Versuchung“ erlegen sei, indem er die Verausgabung des Menschen als ein naturhaftes Verhalten betrachtet habe.¹⁰⁹ Diese Kritik ist nicht von der Hand zu weisen, wenngleich zu beachten bleibt, dass Bataille die sich verausgabende Gewalt auch politisch, d. h. als „Revolte“¹¹⁰ gegen die Vernunftordnungen in (okzidental) Gesellschaften verstanden wissen wollte. In Reminiszenzen an das marxistische Denken begriff er den Klassenkampf als die „grandioseste Form sozialer Verausgabung“.¹¹¹ Als eine Randgruppensoziologie, um dies noch hinzuzufügen und um Missverständnisse zu vermeiden, hat Bataille seine Theorie nie interpretiert. Bertrand Ogilvie hat mit Blick auf die Bevölkerungen (in Lateinamerika), die vom Markt ausgesondert und „hinter“ die Grenzen der Soziabilität, des Drogenkonsums oder der Kriminalität geschoben sind, den Begriff des Wegwerfmenschen geprägt, was dem Bild Batailles vom „Abfall“ nahezukommen scheint.¹¹² Aber bei Ogilvie ist der „Abfall“ das soziale Ergebnis von Exklusion und Marginalisierung, während es Bataille (wie Foucault) um die Frage geht, wie Menschen in der diskursiven Aussonderung des Anderen sich des Eigenen vergegenwärtigen.

Batailles Theorie ist für all jene eine Provokation, die nicht glauben wollen, dass Menschen Gewalt begehen, um sich darin zu finden, und dass es keinen anderen Grund für die Gewalt gibt. Dies ist eine schmerzhafte Vorstellung für die Teile der Wissenschaft, die ihre Aufgabe in der anwendungsorientierten Gewaltanalyse, der Kriminalprävention oder der Ratgeberschaft für die Politik sehen. Die Gewalt, die Bataille beschreibt, lässt sich zwar politisch nutzen (Bataille selbst behandelte dies in seiner Schrift über *Die psychologische Struktur des Faschismus*), aber sie lässt sich in ihrer unbedingten Subjektbezogenheit nicht „politisch konvertieren“.¹¹³ Darunter versteh ich alle Bemühungen, Gewalt aus der Welt zu verbannen, gleich ob durch Therapien, die Politik selbst oder durch wissenschaftliche Theorien, wonach Gewalt in historischen Prozessen abnehmen würde. Nach Bataille müssen wir uns nicht allein von der Vorstellung lösen, dass Gewalt sich irgendwohin „entwickelt“, sondern auch davon, dass Gewalt ein Mittel ist, um etwas gegen Andere zu erreichen. Menschen wollen sich nach Bataille in der Gewalt kein Gehör verschaffen, sie wollen sich finden. Gewalt ist kein Instrument, sie ist ein Spiegel, den Menschen vor ihr Gesicht halten, um sich darin zu erkennen. In gewisser Hinsicht liegt

109 J. Baudrillard, *Der symbolische Tausch und der Tod*, München 1982, S. 245, S. 249.

110 G. Bataille, *Aufhebung der Ökonomie* (Anm. 27), S. 25.

111 Ebenda, S. 27.

112 Vgl. B. Ogilvie, *Violence et représentation. La production de l'homme-jetable*, in: *Lignes. Revue trimestrielle. Arts, littérature, philosophie, politique* 26 (1995), S. 113–142, S. 128 f.

113 É. Balibar, *Schauplatz des Anderen* (Anm. 28), S. 38.

hierin im übrigen ein eigenartiger Trost der Batailleschen Theorie für die Wissenschaft, weil diese bei Bataille lernen kann, über Gewalt zu schreiben, ohne sich ständig um die Anwendungsorientierung der eigenen Forschung Gedanken machen zu müssen.¹¹⁴ Die „Normalisierung“ der Gewalt, die Bataille dadurch betreibt, ähnelt der, die Heinrich Popitz in der jüngeren Gewaltsoziologie vornahm, ist im Vergleich aber radikaler. Denn für Popitz, der Gewalt als eine „Jedermannsressource“¹¹⁵ definierte, lag deren Normalität darin begründet, dass jeder Mensch aufgrund seiner Körperlichkeit Gewalt im Prinzip anwenden kann, während sie für Bataille im ontologischen Status der Gewalt als erstrebte Verausgabung liegt. Für Bataille besitzt die Gewalt deshalb keine Grenzen.¹¹⁶ Er macht dadurch in seiner Theorie auf einen Bereich der Gewalt aufmerksam, die „ekstatische Selbststeigerung durch die Gewalttat“¹¹⁷, der, wie Bernhard Giesen schreibt, von der „konventionellen Soziologie der Gewalt“¹¹⁸ bislang kaum behandelt worden ist. Insofern kann Batailles Theorie dazu beitragen, eine Lücke in der Gewaltforschung zu schließen. Aber wie (und die Erörterung dieser Frage scheint mir mit Blick auf die Theorie Batailles und ihre Bedeutung für die heutige Gewaltsoziologie *wichtiger* zu sein) sollen wir über diese Gewalt sprechen, um die es geht? Die Wissenschaft redet in der Regel aus einer Haltung der „Fassungslosigkeit“ über die Gewalt.¹¹⁹ Dadurch wird Gewalt zu etwas Fremden, und die Wissenschaft muß Theorien entwerfen, um das zu erklären, was unfassbar ist. Für Bataille handelt es sich hierbei wie gesehen jedoch um einen Zivilisationsdiskurs, die Gewalt selbst spricht dagegen eine andere Sprache. Menschen, die Gewalt anwenden, sind nicht fassungslos. Sie verstehen sich in der Gewalt, aber sie verstehen nicht, wie über sie geredet wird, weil dies dort, wo sie leben, unwichtig ist.¹²⁰ Das Verstehen der Gewalt wird so betrachtet nicht dadurch beeinträchtigt, dass Gewalt etwas ist, das uns, die wir davon erzählen, fremd wäre, sondern dadurch, dass die Wissenschaft eine Sprache erzeugt (hat), die erst die Distanz schafft, in der wir uns die Gewalt entfremden.

Bataille wollte diese Form des hermeneutischen Zirkels mittels der Erregung im Lesen der Gewalt durchbrechen, aber die Bedenken gegen dieses Verfahren wurden oben ja bereits erörtert. Die Frage, wie wir die Erregung der Gewalt in eine wissenschaftliche Begrifflichkeit transformieren können, um die Gewalt erzählend zu verstehen, beantwortet es nicht. Der Anthropologe Anton Blok hat darauf hingewiesen, dass Begriffe

114 Dass dies im übrigen in den eigenen Gewaltforschungen, wird Batailles Ansatz zugrunde gelegt, zu Lasten der Drittmitteleinwerbung geht, ist ein anderer, eher ungewollter Nebeneffekt.

115 Vgl. H. Popitz, Phänomene der Macht, Frankfurt a. M. 1992, S. 48 f.

116 Vgl. auch C. Roa Hewstone, Instante y muerte. La experiencia de la transgresión en el pensamiento de Georges Bataille, in: Revista Observaciones Filosóficas 9 (2009), S. 1-16, S. 6.

117 B. Giesen, Gewalt und Gefühl (Anm. 12), o. S. [S. 5].

118 Ebenda.

119 Vgl. J. Baberowski, Gewalt verstehen (Anm. 71), S. 5.

120 Anschaulich zu erleben war dies auf einer Tagung über Gewaltkriminalität in Zentralamerika, die 2009 an der Universität Leipzig stattfand und zu der neben Wissenschaftlern, hohen Polizeioffizieren und Juristen aus Zentralamerika, die über die Gewalt referierten, auch drei Angehörige von Jugendbanden (maras) in Guatemala, Honduras und Nikaragua eingeladen waren, die aus ihrer Perspektive über die Gewalt sprachen. Dokumentiert ist die Tagung bei K. Seffer / H. Zinecker (Hrsg.), Gewaltkriminalität in Zentralamerika. Formen, Ursachen, Einheitsmöglichkeiten, Baden-Baden 2010.

„keine von der spezifischen Sprache oder dem Sprachspiel, in dem sie gebraucht werden, losgelöste Bedeutung“¹²¹ besitzen, weshalb das Dilemma der Wissenschaft darin besteht, dass sie nur die Begriffe verwenden kann, mit denen „sie und ihre Leser“ vertraut sind.¹²² Wollen wir also nicht ständig nur Selbstgespräche über die Gewalt führen, müssen wir versuchen, verschiedene Sprachen ineinander zu übersetzen, ähnlich der Tätigkeit von Ethnologen, die „Texte“ von der einen Kultur in die andere bringen. In der Gewaltsoziologie geschieht diese Übersetzung aber noch allzu häufig in dem Modus, den James Clifford als „monologische Autorität“¹²³ bezeichnet hat. Die Erregung ist dagegen aber kein Korrektiv, wie Bataille annahm. Denn wer hindert uns daran, Gewalt, die uns emotional berührt oder gar in unserem Empfinden „versengt“ (Bataille), in Begriffen von Herrschaft und Hegemonie zu erzählen? Auf diese Frage gibt Bataille keine Antwort.

Batailles Theorie fragt nicht nach Ursachen der Gewalt, weil es diese im Sinn eines zu lösenden Rätsels in seiner Theorie nicht gibt. Ihn interessieren stattdessen die Wirkungen, die von der Gewalt ausgehen. Wenn Menschen sich in der Gewalt verausgaben, wie Bataille annimmt, dann verändern sie selbst sich in dieser Gewalt und zugleich verändern sie die Welt, in der sie leben. Insofern ist jede verausgabende Gewalt auch ein Gründungsakt. Aber zugleich bleiben die Gewalttäter der alten Ordnung verhaftet, weil, wie Bataille schreibt, das Verbot sein „Gegenstück“ erzeugt.¹²⁴ Die Gewaltakteure der Batailleschen Theorie sind also Grenzgänger zwischen symbolischen Ordnungen. Der eigentliche soziologische Auftrag wäre, diese Grenze zu beschreiben und zu untersuchen, was mit den Menschen und der Welt, in der sie leben, in der Überschreitung der Grenze geschieht.

In seiner *Einführung* in Batailles Werk schlägt Peter Wiechens vor, dazu die Arbeiten des Ethnologen Victor Turner zu lesen.¹²⁵ Turner beschäftigte sich damit, wie im Ritual Übergangssituationen reguliert werden, übertrug seine Ergebnisse aber in Form einer modellhaften Betrachtungsweise aus dem ethnographischen Kontext auf die Analyse von Sozialbeziehungen überhaupt. Turner unterschied die „Struktur“, die ungefähr dem ähnelt, was Bataille als Vernunftordnung bezeichnet, und die „Communitas“. Diese entsteht im Übergang, der Schwellenphase. Bei der *communitas* handelt es sich um eine vorübergehende Gemeinschaft der Grenzgänger, Turner nennt sie auch „Schwellenwesen“, die sich aus der alten Ordnung gelöst haben, ohne in einer neuen schon angekommen zu sein. Von Gesetz und Norm, Tradition und Konvention, haben sie sich abgekehrt, sie verbindet ein diffuses Gefühl der Gleichheit und eine „intensive Kameradschaft“, vermengt mit sakralen Komponenten.¹²⁶

121 A. Blok, Anthropologische Perspektiven, Stuttgart 1985, S. 86.

122 Ebenda.

123 Vgl. J. Clifford, Über ethnographische Autorität, in: E. Berg/M. Fuchs (Hrsg.), Kultur, soziale Praxis (Anm. 56), S. 109-157, S. 149.

124 G. Bataille, Erotik (Anm. 5), S. 49.

125 P. Wiechens, Bataille (Anm. 7), S. 61 f.

126 V. Turner, Das Ritual. Struktur und Anti-Struktur, Frankfurt a. M./New York 2005, S. 95-97, S. 105.

Turners Modell lässt sich nicht eins zu eins auf Batailles Theorie übertragen. Turner interessierte sich für den Neuaufbau der Ordnung nach der sog. Schwellenphase, während für Bataille der Schwellenzustand das Ziel menschlichen Daseins ist. Aber Turners Modell des Schwellenzustands kommt Batailles Theorie, worauf Peter Wiechens hinweist, nahe. Und in einem Punkt könnte es nützlich sein, um eine wichtige Leerstelle in der Batailleschen Theorie, an der ihre Übertragung aus der Anthropologie in die Soziologie zu scheitern droht, auszufüllen. Denn Bataille lässt im Grunde ja in seinen Überlegungen offen, wie das Verhalten eines Einzelnen, in dem dieser sich überschreitet, in das kollektive Verhalten einer Gruppe umschlägt. Turners Konzept dagegen beschäftigt sich mit dieser Frage. Es nimmt an, dass im Schwellenzustand der *communitas* die ekstatische Gewaltneigung des einzelnen Gewalttäters vergemeinschaftet wird, indem Menschen Normen, Gesetze und Konventionen überschreiten und sich in die Ordnung einer „Anti-Struktur“ (Turner) gestellt sehen, die wiederum auf sie einwirkt und ihnen (neue) Handlungsräume eröffnet. In dieser *communitas* entsteht eine Einverständnisgemeinschaft aus „Schwellenwesen“ der Gewalt, die sich wechselseitig in der Gewalt finden.

7. Schluss

Sollen Historiker, die über Gewalt schreiben, fortan ähnlich den Ethnographen ein Tagebuch über ihre eigene Forschungspraxis führen, in dem sie dem Leser Rechenschaft ablegen, welche Befindlichkeiten oder Erregungszustände der Anblick der Gewalt in ihnen auslöst? Abgesehen davon, dass Historiker dazu kaum zu überreden wären, weil sie sich selbst als von der Gewalt dissoziiert betrachten, erschiene mir dies aus einem anderen Grund übertrieben. Anders als der Ethnologe besitzt der Historiker die Gnade der Abwesenheit im Geschehen. Im Gegensatz zum Ethnologen benutzt der Historiker historische Quellen, um zu verstehen. Quellen legen aber nicht allein Zeugnis ab von Vergangenem und führen uns auf diese Weise in die Geschichte, sondern sie schützen uns zugleich vor ihr. Als Historiker können wir eine Quelle, deren Lektüre oder Anblick (ich denke an die Fotos der „chinesischen Folter“, die Bataille um seine Ruhe brachten) uns überwältigt, beiseite legen, um sie ein anderes Mal neu zu betrachten. Diesen Vorgang können wir beliebig oft wiederholen. Durch den Akt der Wiederholung gewinnen wir keine Kontrolle über die Quelle, weshalb die Quelle wichtiger bleibt als ihr Erzähler. Aber wir kontrollieren die Bedingungen, unter denen wir die Quelle verstehen (wollen), und insofern auch den Ausgangspunkt unserer Narration.

Dies birgt Vorteile wie Nachteile. Bataille zeigt, dass wir uns von dem Glauben trennen müssen, wir könnten in unserer Erzählung die Sprache der Gewalt eins zu eins in die Sprache der Wissenschaft übersetzen und dadurch die hermeneutische Spannung aufheben, die zwischen dem Anblick der Gewalt und ihrer Unterordnung unter allgemeine Begriffe besteht. Das wird uns nicht gelingen. Vielmehr benötigen wir begriffliche Übertragungen aus der einen Sprache in die andere. Dazu werden Historiker sich, wie schon bislang auch, entscheiden müssen, wie sie Gewalt erzählen wollen. Je nachdem, wie wir

uns entscheiden, werden wir der eigenen Empfindung eine je andere Bedeutung in dieser Übertragung beimessen müssen. In jedem Fall jedoch werden wir unser Empfinden in die Begriffsarbeit überführen müssen. Denn „[the] shock to thought requires more than the activation of an affective trigger“.¹²⁷

127 J. Bennett, Empathic vision. Affect, trauma, and contemporary art, Stanford 2005, S. 50.

BUCHBESPRECHUNGEN

Benedikt Stuchey: Die europäische Expansion und ihre Feinde. Kolonialismuskritik vom 18. bis in das 20. Jahrhundert (Studien zur Internationalen Geschichte, Bd. 24), München: Oldenbourg, 2010, 475 S.

Rezensiert von
Martin C. Wald, Hamburg

Genau genommen übertreibt der Titel. Meist geht es in der Konstanzer Habilitationsschrift von Benedikt Stuchey nicht um eine massive, grundsätzliche Feindseligkeit gegenüber dem europäischen Kolonialismus, sondern um vorsichtige Bedenken und Reformvorschläge: Unter welchen Bedingungen war eine Ausbeutung fremder Kontinente moralisch erträglich? Wie war ökonomisch eine solide Kosten-Nutzen-Rechnung der imperialen Abenteuer zu gewährleisten? Konnte politisch imperiale Macht nicht auch dem universalen Frieden dienen statt immer neue Weltkrisen heraufzubeschwören? Kolonialskeptiker mussten sich in der Schaffung von kritischen Öffentlichkeiten mit dem arrangieren, was in ihrem jeweiligen –meist kolonialbegeisterten oder wenigstens kolonialzufriedenen – gesellschaftlichen Um-

feld denk- und sagbar war: Wege zu einem begründbareren, besseren Kolonialismus aufzuzeigen.

Stuchey legt den Fokus dabei auf die Analyse von Schriften europäischer Intellektueller, also der „metropolitanen“ Akteure, im aufgeklärten und viktorianischen Zeitalter. Erst im dritten Kapitel über den Hochimperialismus des Fin de Siècle kommen (wenige) indigene Stimmen zu Wort. Dies ist eine kluge Selbstbeschränkung, ebenso wie der durchgängige Schwerpunkt auf dem britischen Weltreich, das in kolonialer Effizienz und imperialer Ideologie Vorbild sowohl für Deutschland als auch die USA war. Lediglich der vierte behandelte Fall – Frankreich – ist dem weniger verwandt, weil hier der Kolonialismus ausschließlich dem nationalen Prestigedenken entsprang.

Als erster Schlüssel zum Verständnis des Problems gilt im Buch durchgängig der schwierige Dualismus von imperium et libertas. Bereits in der klassischen Periode des Freihandelsliberalismus – Stuchey arbeitet hier mit dem Begriff der Achsenzeit von 1770 bis 1830 – musste sich eine ambivalente Haltung zum Kolonialismus entwickeln: Die globale Entgrenzung der Handelsströme durfte in dieser Ideologie nicht weltpolitischem Konkurrenzdenken geopfert werden. Aus diesen Begründungszusammenhängen hellsichtig auszubre-

chen gelang erst Edmund Burke. Für den großen Kritiker der Französischen und Bewunderer der Amerikanischen Revolution schob sich das Problem der Kontrolle kolonialer Politik und der men on the spot durch Parlament und Öffentlichkeit in den Vordergrund. Daraus entwickelt Stuchtey leitmotivisch einen zweiten Schlüssel: die Wechselbeziehungen zwischen Nation und Imperium. Den britischen Kolonalkritikern – auch Little Englanders genannt – war es darum zu tun, den Verantwortlichen die Illusion zu nehmen, beim Weltreich handle es sich um nicht mehr als um ein Greater Britain. In Wirklichkeit mussten Weltreichsgedanke und konkretes Handeln an der kolonialen Peripherie die moralischen und politischen Wertmaßstäbe auch des Mutterlandes affizieren. Was bedeutete es zum Beispiel für das Verhältnis von Staat und Gesellschaft, wenn koloniale Truppen zurück in Großbritannien zur Niederschlagung von Arbeiteraufständen eingesetzt wurden? Plakativ wird dieses Problem auch von einer deutschen Karikatur „Die Macht der Gewohnheit“ auf den Mittelseiten des Bandes aufgegriffen, die Stuchtey leider – denn hier blitzt durchaus so etwas wie Kolonialfeindschaft auf – wie alle anderen Karikaturen dort nicht interpretiert: Ein Kolonialbeamter, der in Afrika eine Affäre mit einer schwarzen Frau hatte, malt zurück in der Heimat seine Ehefrau schwarz an, um diese nunmehr ebenfalls auszupeitschen.

Diese Mahnungen, die letztlich darauf hinausgingen, Imperialismus gefährde die sozialen Integrationsbemühungen und damit den nationalen Zusammenhalt, der ja wiederum notwendig sei für eine erfolgreiche Weltmachtpolitik, leuchteten langfristig selbst der hohen Politik und

notorischen Kolonialbefürwortern ein. Der konservative Premierminister Disraeli nannte Indien einen „Mühlstein“ am Hals der Briten. Auf der einen Seite wurde mit dem Rassismus eine neue Integrationsideologie bereitgestellt, die die Herrschaft über Indien und sogar den „bastard imperialism“ in Afrika über die alte „Zivilisierungsmision“ hinaus zu rechtfertigen vermochte. Auf der anderen Seite fasste der Gedanke immer besser Fuß, der „nationale Kolonialismus“ zumindest in den „Dominions“ Kanada, Australien und Neuseeland, den Siedlerkolonien, müsse sogar gestärkt werden, um einen reibungslosen Übergang in die staatliche Unabhängigkeit zu gewährleisten. Ältere Metaphern über den Auszug der erwachsenen Kinder aus dem Elternhaus oder das Bonmot Turgots, Kolonien seien wie Früchte, die, sobald reif, vom Baum fielen, gewannen wieder an Stichhaltigkeit. Auch für manche Eroberungskolonien schienen die Liberalen in paradoyer Wendung den Imperialismus nur deshalb immer weiter treiben zu wollen, um die Voraussetzungen für sein baldiges Ende zu schaffen. Das Schicksal des römischen Weltreichs spukte heftig in den Köpfen der britischen Intellektuellen, und somit wurde auch nach – eher hegemonialen als imperialen – Strategien gesucht, der Gesetzmäßigkeit von „decline and fall“ zu entgehen.

Der „Generalbass“, wie Stuchtey den die Kolonialzeit stetig begleitenden Grundton der Kolonialkritik wiederholt nennt, war also doch nicht so wirkungslos. Dennoch hat Stuchtey zweifellos Recht, wenn er das „Projekt“ der metropolitanen Kolonialkritik durch die Dreieheit von Distanz, Defensive und Dilemma bestimmt sieht. Für den Autor ist die Kolonialkritik eine

„Kontrastgeschichte“, für die Kritik europäischer intellektueller Öffentlichkeiten an Massenphänomenen nur ein Beispiel, das bis zur Totalitarismuskritik einer Hannah Arendt weitergedacht werden könnte. Ein gehöriger Schuss Fatalismus müsste diesen Idealisten und Skeptikern mit in die intellektuelle Wiege gelegt worden sein. Das „Dilemma“ bestand nicht darin, dass die Forderungen meist unpopulär waren und nur zu Zeiten der größeren Kolonialskandale, an denen sich die Kritik zu kristallisieren vermochte, weitere Kreise zogen. Seit der britische Imperialismustheoretiker John Robert Seeley 1882 die Unterwerfung der Erde durch die Europäer als einem unverrückbaren Geschichtsprozess entsprungen betrachtet und seinen Landsleuten in diesem Sinne eine Absent-mindedness bescheinigt hatte, schien sich alle Kritik am Weltenlauf als hoffnungslos rückwärtsgewandt und unmodern selbst zu entlarven. „Vorwärts“ wiesen indes die indigenen Unabhängigkeitskämpfer. Nicht erstaunlich, dass deshalb Kolonialkritik seit 1900 verstärkt ein Projekt von Minderheiten statt wie bislang von Eliten war.

Stuchtey liefert weitere Teilergebnisse, die hier aber nicht alle wiedergegeben werden können. Allerdings geht der Autor dabei doch allzu vorsichtig vor. Prägnante Thesenbildung ist ganz offenbar nicht sein Ding. Um seiner Sorgfaltspflicht Genüge zu tun, verschleiert er zudem richtige, wertvolle Aussagen hinter Satzungetümien, bei denen die pronominalen (oft auch thematischen) Anschlüsse ungelassen erfolgen. Über die französischen Kolonalkritiker sagt Stuchtey bezüglich der ägyptischen Krise von 1882: „Sie bewirkte vielmehr eine Form des Negativismus als Reak-

tion auf ihre bis dahin vorherrschende Ambivalenz“ (S. 299). Erstens muss man sich schon denken, dass sich „sie“ auf die Krise und „ihre“ dann aber auf die Kritiker bezieht. Zweitens bleibt als Ergebnis, dass die Kritiker irgendwie auf sich selbst reagiert haben – wie auch immer sie das gemacht haben mögen. Drittens wäre mit dem Satz „Vielmehr nahmen die Kritiker die Krise zum Anlass, ihre bislang ambivalente zugunsten einer noch negativeren Haltung aufzugeben“, mehr und Richtiger gesagt.

Schwerwiegender: Die Darstellungsweise, für die sich Stuchtey entschieden hat, fällt in der Regel negativ ins Gewicht. Sicherlich ist es lobenswert, dass der Autor im Sinne einer „modernen Intellektuellengeschichte“, zu der er sein Buch als Beitrag verstanden wissen will, die Beziehungen zwischen einzelnen europäischen Intellektuellen netzwerkartig entfaltet. Manchmal ist diese Einbettung in die umfassenderen intellektuellen Debatten der Zeit geeignet, zum Beispiel, wenn er John Hobsons Imperialismuskritiken (1901/02) vorausschickt, dass diese ohne die Vorarbeiten Gustave Le Bons zur Massenpsychologie nicht denkbar gewesen wären (S. 359). Doch im maßlosen Namensüberfluss entgleitet ihm zu oft der thematische Fokus, Stuchtey wirkt dann wie ein Zapper in der europäischen Geistesgeschichte. Was erklärt es zum Beispiel über das Wirken der Kolonialkritiker in der amerikanischen Anti-Imperialist League, über die wir uns gerade mühsam ein Bild machen durften, wenn im nächsten Absatz die Jahre später geäußerten antikapitalistischen Gedanken Lenins über diese Gruppe ausgeführt werden, uns vom gesellschaftlichen Ort ihrer Kritik weit, weit wegführend (S. 346)?

Diese den Leser überfordernde Schachtelstruktur führt recht spannungslos von einer Kolonialdeutung zur nächsten, Kritiker und Befürworter munter kreuzend und ineinander verwischend; Kapitel- und Abschnittsüberschriften helfen wenig. Zwar wird in einem Abschnitt häufiger auf einen Namen zurückgeblendet, der dann jedoch nicht als Leitlinie und „Lesehilfe“ im Titel erscheint (zum Beispiel John Bright in Kapitel II.13). Andersherum vagieren Informationen anscheinend völlig frei im Text ohne jeden Sinn im argumentativen oder gar nur thematischen Zusammenhang. So kommt – rein assoziativ? – Stuchtey vom Denken Gladstones zu dessen Evangelikalismus, von dort zu religiös motivierter Beschäftigung mit dem Kolonialismus und schließlich zu Annie Besants theosophischer Deutung der irischen Home-Rule-Bewegung von 1920 – und dies als Abschluss eines Kapitels, das heißt: „Die Entwicklung der Kolonialismuskritik seit den 1830er Jahren bis zum Indischen Aufstand 1857/58 im Spannungsfeld von Nation und Expansion“! Eine „netzwerkartige“ Verknüpfung zwischen Gladstone und Besant wird hieraus nicht deutlich. Fast scheint es, als habe sich Stuchtey schon sehr frühzeitig von der Möglichkeit, ein lesbares Buch zu schreiben, verabschiedet. Denn er verzichtet auf einen separaten Forschungsteil und lässt den Forschungsstand lieber in die Darstellung einfließen. Und da er hier wirklich vollständig und vertrauenswürdig ist, kommen diese Namen also alle noch hinzu!

Benedikt Stuchtey hat fachlich hinsichtlich einer Geistesgeschichte und „Geistespolitik“ (S. 390) nicht nur der Kolonialkritik, sondern des Kolonialdenkens überhaupt Beeindruckendes geleistet. Ein Schuss

mehr von der großartigen englischen Tradition lesbarer Geschichtsdarstellungen wäre allerdings zu wünschen gewesen.

Karsten Holste / Dietlind Hüchtker / Michael G. Müller (Hrsg.): Aufsteigen und Obenbleiben in den europäischen Gesellschaften des 19. Jahrhunderts. Akteure, Arenen und Aushandlungsprozesse (= Elitenwandel in der Moderne, Bd. 10), Berlin, Akademie-Verlag 2009, 294 S.

Rezensiert von
Silke Marburg, Dresden

Ostmitteleuropa ist hinsichtlich der Elitenformierung im langen 19. Jahrhundert ein reizvolles Experimentierfeld, umfasst es doch eine Reihe von Gesellschaften, denen nach noch immer gängigen Denkmustern ein Modernisierungsdefizit unterstellt wird. Denn die Interpretation der Epoche, die sich auf die Herausbildung des Bürgertums und die Entstehung der Nationalstaaten, darüber hinaus auf Industrialisierung, Marktwirtschaft und Parteiensystem konzentrierte, konstatierte beim Blick nach Osten hauptsächlich ein eigenständiges Gefälle. Gerade nachdem sich die Geschichtswissenschaft nun von dieser ausschließlichen Fokussierung gelöst und auch die Elitenforschung ein differenzierteres Verständnis der Gesellschaftsgeschichte des 19. Jahrhunderts entwickelt hat, muss Ostmitteleuropa als attraktives Vergleichsfeld gelten. Denn an weithin agrarisch geprägten Gesellschaften, in

denen sich traditionale Sozialstrukturen langfristig behaupteten, kann das generelle Verständnis von Elitenbildungsprozessen wachsen.

Von dieser Überlegung ging das Projekt „Von Ständegesellschaften zu Nationalgesellschaften. Elitenwandel und gesellschaftliche Modernisierung in Ostmitteleuropa (1750–1914)“ aus, das die DFG 2001 bis 2008 am Geisteswissenschaftlichen Zentrum für Geschichte und Kultur Ostmitteleuropas in Leipzig förderte. Seine Tagungen zeigten einen Begriffswandel. Ging es 2003 in Pardubice noch um „Orte der Elitenvergesellschaftung“, so waren es 2005 in Wittenberg dann die „Arenen“, die nun auch im vorliegenden Titel erscheinen. Der Band stellt jedoch keine eigentliche Tagungsdokumentation dar. Der in der Einleitung präsentierte Begriff der Arena ist konzeptionell nur sparsam konturiert. Sein Potenzial sehen die Herausgeber vor allem darin, Akteure, Handlungs- und Deutungsweisen, Sinnstiftungen, Interessen, Institutionen, Orte und Traditionen in ihrer jeweiligen historischen Ausprägung zu erfassen und relational zu verstehen. Es geht ihnen darum, Inszenierung und Bedeutungsherstellung als einen für die Herausbildung und Durchsetzung von Führungsformationen wesentlichen Aspekt des Obenseins mit in Betracht zu ziehen. Dieser weite Ansatz ist in der Tat geeignet, sehr verschiedene historische Problemlagen sowie unterschiedliche Analyseansätze zu überwölben. Die Beiträge stammen überdies aus vier unterschiedlichen Bereichen (Staat, Ökonomie, Politik und Kultur).

Claudia Kraft widmet sich dem Feld des „Staatlich-Administrativen“ und stellt Elitenkonzepte vor, die während der Re-

formen der polnisch-litauischen Adelsrepublik in der zweiten Hälfte des 18. Jh. sowie während des forcierten Verwaltungsausbaus im Herzogtum Warschau (1807–1813) bewegt wurden. Inwiefern das propagierte adelige Selbstverständnis dabei das einer staatstragenden Gruppe war, variierte im Verlauf der Entwicklung. Für die späte Zeit stellt sich ein Nebeneinander älterer und neuer Adelskonzepte heraus. Alte Elitengruppen entdeckten neue Aufstiegsmöglichkeiten für sich. Krafts an die deutsche Forschungsliteratur angelehnten weitreichenden Deutungen wären bei einer künftigen sozialhistorischen Erforschung des Terrains zu verifizieren. Dass in Polen eine gezielte Adelspolitik eher im militärischen denn im administrativen Bereich betrieben wurde, zeigt Bernhard Schmitt in seinem die habsburgischen und preußischen Teilungsgebiete vergleichenden Beitrag. Beide Teilungsmächte versuchten adelige Absteigergruppen durch Exklusion zu bereinigen und den niederen Adel in den Staatsdienst einzubinden. Preußen legitimierte außerdem seine Herrschaft, indem es bedeutende polnische Adlige in die oberste Militärführung aufnahm. Die in den Kadettenanstalten vermittelten Ausbildungsziele beschränkten sich in Preußen auf militärisches Handwerkszeug, während in Österreich auch den galizischen Adligen eine breite Ausbildung angeboten wurde. Wie sich dies jeweils auf die supranationale Einbindung der Adelsformationen sowie auf die Elitenvergesellschaftung auswirkte wären weiterführende Fragen.

Als wichtige Foren für die Eliten(re-)formierung der polnischen Agrargesellschaft zeigt Witold Molik die Landwirtschaftsvereine des Großherzogtums Posen. Sie dienten nicht nur als Umschlagplatz agra-

rökonomischen Fachwissens, sondern waren wichtiges Kommunikationsforum der ländlichen Führungsschicht. Hier entwickelte sie ein gemeinwohlorientiertes Herrschaftsverständnis weiter, bildete Meinung und Selbstbild. So konnten kulturelle Wandlungsprozesse auf dem Land bewältigt, der wirtschaftliche Erfolg gesichert und nicht zuletzt auch Aufsteiger integriert werden. Einen prinzipiell ähnlichen Befund liefert András Vári von den ungarischen Landwirtschaftsvereinen, in denen sich ebenfalls adlige Großgrundbesitzer und neue bürgerliche Agrarintelligenz zusammen fanden. Letztlich führte der Druck der Absatzkrise der 1880er Jahre dazu, dass sich beide Gruppen im Rahmen der antiliberalen Vereinsbestrebungen gegen kapitalistische Wirtschaftsformen zu einer konservativen Elite formierten, deren landwirtschaftliche Prägung nun allerdings vergleichsweise konstruiert war. Dass sich auch in der mitteldeutschen Landwirtschaft eine neue, langfristig stabile Elite bildete zeigt Dirk Schaals Beitrag über die Zuckerrübenindustrie. Der Grad der sozialen Amalgamierung dieser Führungsgruppe blieb allerdings deutlich hinter der ökonomischen Aktionseinheit zurück. Diese analytisch wichtige Unterscheidung zwischen sozialen Zugehörigkeiten einerseits und dem Agieren innerhalb von Funktionsapparaten andererseits thematisiert auch Josef Matzerath in seinem in Sachsen angesiedelten Beitrag mit dem pointierten Titel „Ein Landtagsabgeordneter ist ein Landtagsabgeordneter und kein Agent seiner Herkunftsgruppe“. Genauso in dieser Hinsicht bleiben die Be- und Zuschreibungen vergleichsweise unscharf, mit denen Karsten Holste die kurmärkischen Provinzialstände als Projekt der

Elitenvergesellschaftung betrachtet. Ihre Aktionsrichtung gegen die preußische Reformpolitik verdeutlichend, lässt er die Frage nach dem Vergesellschaftungspotenzial der Korporation offen. Die jüdische Welt Polen-Litauens präsentierte Yvonne Kleinmann als eine noch bis weit ins 19. Jh. hinein autonome Sphäre, in der religiöse Identität und soziale Organisation weit länger übereinstimmten als in Westeuropa und in der sich auch Eliten formierten. Unter dem Einfluss der zaristischen Judenpolitik löste sich diese geschlossene jüdische Elite auf, so dass sich sowohl Orte als auch Selbstverständnisse elitärer jüdischer Formationen diversifizierten – ein Weg, der seine Eigenheit im Vergleich mit dem Weg polnischer Eliten offenbart. Lukáš Fasora geht für sechs mährische Städte der jeweiligen Entwicklung der deutschliberalen Eliten in der Gemeindeselbstverwaltung nach und beleuchtet dazu die Infrastruktorentwicklung, die Schulpolitik, die Gesundheits- und Sozialfürsorge sowie die Selbstdarstellung. Wichtiger Faktor war das Kräfteverhältnis zwischen Deutschen und Tschechen. Grundsätzlich verdrängten zwischen 1848 und 1870 bildungsbürgerliche Schichten mit Unterstützung der in den Gemeindevertretungen nicht notwendiger Weise vertretenen Großunternehmer den Einfluss der altbürgerlichen Honoriatoren. In den Auseinandersetzungen mit der altschechischen Bewegung und noch deutlicher während der folgenden nationalpolitischen Radikalisierung flexibilisierten die Deutschliberalen ihre politischen Ideen und gelangten auf lokaler Ebene zu verschiedenen Elitenkompromissen. Für einen Vergleich bietet sich Ungarns polyethnische und multikonfessionelle Konstellation an, die Victor Karady für die Zeit

der Nationalstaatsbildung (1867–1918) skizziert. Er betrachtet Ungarn als Assimilationsprojekt, dessen Hochschulwesen die Wege der Elitenanwärter verschiedener Herkunft prägte und so staatliche Integrationsangebote realisierte. Eine prosopografische Studie zeigt die einzelnen Gruppierungen auf durchaus spezifischen Wegen in die Moderne, deren Bild durch die Option des Auslandsstudiums vervollständigt werden könnte. Angehörige von Minderheiten erwiesen sich hier generell als sehr durchsetzungsfähig. In Kroatien-Slavonien ortet Stefano Petrungaro eine neue Elite „zwischen Recht und Politik“ – die Verteidiger, denen in der sich neu formierenden Arena des Gerichts eine wichtige Rolle bei der Umsetzung von Reformen zukam. Gerichte entwickelten sich zum Forum gesellschaftlicher Diskursivität. Anwälte traten hier als Interpreten der Moderne auf, als Programmatiker und Visionäre.

Philipp Ther widmet sich den Operntheatern, die bis zum Beginn der Massenunterhaltungskultur Anfang des 20. Jahrhunderts eine der wichtigsten Institutionen des öffentlichen Kulturbetriebs waren. Sein Vergleich ostmitteleuropäischer Städte verdeutlicht die Unterschiedlichkeit und den Wandel der Träger- und Besucher- schichten der Opernhäuser. Lediglich zwei der fünf Fälle bestätigen die oft behauptete „Verbürgerlichung“ des Opernbetriebs. Anhand der Konflikte um die Theater weist Ther nach, dass der Macht über das Forum Oper zeitgenössisch eine besondere Bedeutsamkeit zugemessen wurde, die sich durch dessen repräsentative Strahlkraft erklärt. Ebenfalls das öffentliche Kulturreben fokussiert Halina Beresnevičiūtė-Nasálová. Anhand der jeweiligen lokalen

Presse vergleicht sie die durchaus unterschiedlichen Provinzialhauptstädte Brünn und Wilna, deren Eliten Ambitionen einer hauptstädtischen Hochkultur hegten. Während karitative Motive über das gesamte Jahrhundert hinweg wichtige Legitimation für die Veranstaltungslandschaft waren, verdrängte in den Aufführungen professionelle Künstlerschaft adligen Dilettantismus. Die Finanzbasis dieses Kulturlebens aber gewährleisteten weiterhin adlig dominierte Führungsschichten. Mit der Jagd behandelt Charlotte Tacke ein für die Selbstdarstellung der Eliten in Deutschland wie Italien sensibles Feld. Sie vergleicht die Konstruktionsmechanismen von exklusiven Jagdzirkeln und verfolgt die Entwicklung der Jagdkultur. Insbesondere die Bewertung einzelner Wildsorten und die Entwicklung sog. weidgerechter Jagdpraktiken zeigen einen Elitenwandel eigener Art auf. Tacke konzentriert sich auf die Beziehung von Adel und Jagd und zeigt, dass die idealisierende Zuschreibung des grünen Metiers zum Adel eine Fiktion war, deren Sinn sich im Zusammenhang mit geistes- und gesellschaftsgeschichtlichen Entwicklungen offenbart und für den deutschen Adel eine legitimatorische Funktion erfüllte.

Insgesamt behandelt der Band viele für die Elitengeschichte des 19. Jahrhunderts interessante Felder und bringt gleichzeitig unterschiedlichste ostmitteleuropäische Konstellationen auf kommunaler, regionaler oder staatlicher Ebene zur Kenntnis. Es werden sowohl verschiedene Funktionsapparate als auch korporative Vertretungen und assoziative Vergesellschaftungsformen behandelt. Ethnische und religiöse Diversität zwischen den Akteuren schlug sich dabei in der Herausbildung von Führungs-

schichten nieder, prägte insbesondere auch die Chancen ihrer Selbstrepräsentation. Ob und in welcher Weise gerade diese besondere Fragmentiertheit der behandelten Gesellschaften die sehr unterschiedliche Dynamik von Aufsteigen und Obenbleiben bedingten, wäre sicher eine im Weiteren bedenkenswerte Frage. Der niveauvolle Band dürfte gerade angesichts seiner Vielfalt ein brauchbares Repertorium sein, auf das sich künftige Überlegungen zur Elitengeschichte des 19. Jahrhunderts stützen können.

**Peter Gatrell / Nick Baron (Hrsg.):
Warlands. Population Resettlement
and State Reconstruction in the
Soviet-East European Borderlands,
1945–1950, New York: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2009, 276 S.**

Rezensiert von
Björn Hofmeister, Washington D. C.

Peter Gatrell's and Nick Baron's edition of essays on population and settlement politics in the East European Borderlands in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War is a very valuable contribution to the study of a subject that has found increasing interest among historians in the last ten to twenty years. Recent studies had analyzed the relationship between nation-state building and cultural as well as ethnic homogenization in Eastern and Central Europe during the First World War and the interwar period from 1918 until 1939, for instance, which now constitute its own,

although still nascent field in historiography.¹ The topic of politically enforced population transfer and resettlement of ethnic minorities involves the analysis of radical concepts of nationalization by majority governments in multi-ethnic Empires and nation-states. Such a methodological approach includes examining specific governmental understandings of power and territorial hegemony to explain the dynamics of violence and enforced nationalization politics.

Gatrell's and Baron's edition on "Warlands" attempts such a multi-layered analysis and contributes to a broader time-frame that takes into account the effects of the First and the Second World War on the politics of ethnic state intervention. This volume is a follow-up essay collection to their edition titled "Homelands", which was published in 2004 and focused on the effects of the Russian Revolution, subsequent consolidation of the nascent Soviet Union, and military conflict immediately following after the First World War, especially with Poland and in the Baltic territories.² What the new edition on "Warlands" shows is how Eastern European states pursued comprehensive movements of ethnic minorities after 1945 to consolidate political boundaries and promote ethnic and political homogeneity. In spite of the multi-ethnic nature of the Soviet Union and the assumption of humanist equality that a Socialist Weltanschauung certainly entailed, the claim of homogenization was not always stated openly in Socialist propaganda. However, the attempts to craft ethnically and thereby politically homogeneous "homelands" was an underlying trajectory of resettlement efforts in the Soviet occupied realm.

The ten case studies in this volume are extremely insightful in their focus on post-war politics towards ethnic homogenization in Lithuania (Tomas Balkelis), Latvia (Aldis Purs), Estonia (Meike Wulf), Armenia (Joanne Laycock), and especially Poland (Konrad Zielinski). Two chapters illuminate the relationship between health, sanitation politics, and population replacement in post-war Leningrad (Siobhan Peeling) and the involvement of Quaker organizations in post-war relief and reconstruction work in German Displaced Person's camps (Jenny Carson). Kateryna Stadnik devotes her chapter to the Ukrainian-Polish population transfers between 1944 and 1946 and Ewa Ochman analyzes the legacy of ethnic and cultural conflict between Germans and Poles in Upper Silesia after 1945.

As Gatrell emphasized in the introduction, between 1914 and 1945, the Western territories of the Soviet Union and of Eastern Europe had been highly contested as cultural and ethnic frontiers. Violent deportations and racial extermination politics of Nazi Germany between 1939 and 1945, as well as Soviet deportations of ethnic minorities between 1936 and 1944 contributed to enforced population resettlement that had severe demographic consequences. In addition to the Holocaust, which cost about six million Jews their lives, and the death of more than three million Soviet POWs, more than 1.7 million Polish and 2.8 million Soviet "Ostarbeiter" were drafted by German authorities by August 1944 as enforced labor and more than 2.2 million were again deported to the Ukraine until the end of the war.³ After 1945, on the other side, the Soviet authorities severely punished collaboration

during the war by arresting 350,000 returnees and sending them to labor camps, for instance.

The respective case studies illuminate that migration and resettlement of large ethnic groups in Eastern Europe need to be embedded in the traumatic experience of displacement of populations during military occupation and the internment of POWs between 1939 and 1945 and the following attempts by the Soviet regime to create loyally organized Socialist societies in Eastern Europe. In Lithuania, for instance, 250,000 people left the country during the Second World War. The subsequent post-war repatriation politics of the Soviets and the Western Allies in 113 DP camps in Italy, Germany, and Austria added to the Cold War competition between the Soviets on one side and British and French political propaganda on the other side. Those 300,000 Latvians who fled to Germany during the war soon became the object of Soviet repatriation propaganda, especially those who had engaged in collaboration with Nazi Germany. Collaboration and resistance sometimes cut right through entire groups and made the definition of their political post-war status additionally complicated. As Meike Wulf remarks, the Estonian army was completely dissolved after the Red Army invaded in 1941 and 20,000 Estonians were recruited into the red Army, while by 1944 some 50,000 Estonians served in the brutal SS legions after its Nazi occupiers had granted Estonia limited self-governance two years earlier. Poland was certainly most affected by the national restructuring of its territory and inhabitants after 1945. More than 480,000 Ukrainians had been moved from Poland to Ukraine and 790,000 Poles were

transported from Ukraine to Poland to please Stalin's vision of an expanded Soviet Empire. The status of ethnic minorities, such as two million Germans, 162,000 Ukrainians, 108,000 Jews, and Roma, for instance, was determined by international law and bilateral agreements that Poland had signed after 1945. As Konrad Zieliński lays out, however, these stipulations did not explicitly guarantee legal, cultural, or educational provisions. The devastating experience of Nazi occupation left a significant mark on Polish collective memory and determined post-war national politics. Anti-German but also anti-Semitic sentiments had an enduring effect on the rather restricted definition of minority rights. In multi-ethnic Upper Silesia, for instance, 300,000 Germans were expelled between 1945 and 1949 and between 30,000 and 90,000 Upper Silesians were deported to the Soviet Union. Zieliński shows that expulsion and assimilation that were carried out in Poland were assigned the importance of a national project as almost four million Polish inhabitants had to be transferred into the new boundaries of the Polish nation-state. Communist propaganda of the Polish Worker's Party / Polish United Worker's Party for the recreation of a larger Polish nation-state laid claims to Polish territories of the medieval Polish dynasty. Polish Socialism and territorial nationalism, therefore, joined forces on paradoxical ideological grounds.

The examples provided in this volume speak to the disastrous legacy of the Nazi occupation and the impact of Stalinist territorial utopias after the Second World War. A further point of departure is the apparent contradiction of Socialist transnational ideology and the actual persist-

ence of nationalism, as well as the primacy of ethnicity in Eastern European nation-states after 1945. This edition, therefore, is a very welcome contribution to the study of nation-state building, population settlement, and cultural politics in post-1945 Socialist Europe.

However, the endurance of nationalism and ethnic conflict played out in far more countries than were introduced in this volume and it would have been helpful to extend the focus to Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, and the German Democratic Republic, for instance.⁴ A broader geographical focus would sharpen the underlying assumptions of the editors, that despite a humanitarian ideology, Socialism entailed a reality of "socio-ethnic engineering" and that resettlement and exclusion of minorities continue to shape the commemorative cultures of large groups in these countries. As Gatrell and Baron suggest in their conclusion, the history of Soviet East European borderlands provides a story of continuing violence and radical state intervention in population management that predated, spanned, and continued through the Second World War. Strategies of remodeling social and political order through ethnic homogenization of populations, therefore, were not exclusively Fascist or right-wing authoritarian, but constitute an inherent part of the ambivalent nature and the destructive potential of modernity.⁵

These broader aspects of competing political visions of modern population management, ethnic expulsion and political exclusion, as well as an enforced political homogenization of the subjects of early Socialist nation-states might be considered in future studies. In addition to taking

into account the legacy of the immense destruction of the Second World War, it seems necessary to include the dynamics of the Cold War, and the resulting competition between Eastern and Western European countries over the legitimacy of their political institutions, as well as territorial boundaries. Political conflict in the German Democratic Republic between 1953 and 1961 and in Hungary in 1956, for instance, helped increase emigration to Western Germany and Austria and, thereby, may not only have contributed to some political homogenization in both countries. In addition to a considerable drain of labor and regime opponents in the respective Socialist countries, emigration of Eastern Germans to Western Germany and of Hungarians to Austria left a mark on all of the new respective nation-states in tackling their political (if even Imperial) past and in defining their own ethnic post-war boundaries. These additional observations only speak to the need for another comparative edition on ethnic migration and the exercise of Socialist power in Eastern Europe during the 1950s.

Notes:

- 1 See, for instance, P. Gatrell, *A Whole Empire Walking. Refugees in Russia during World War I*, Bloomington 1999; E. Lohr, *Nationalizing the Russian Empire. The Campaign against Enemy Aliens during World War I*, Cambridge 2003; J. Sanborn, *Drafting the Russian Nation. Military Conscription, Total War, and Mass Politics 1905–1925*, DeKalb 2005; V. G. Liulevicius, *War Land on the Eastern Front. Culture, National Identity, and German Occupation in World War I*, Cambridge 2000; J. Oltmer, *Migration in der Weimarer Republik*, Göttingen 2005; T. Martin, *The Affirmative Action Empire. Nations and Nationalism in the Soviet Union, 1923–1939*, Ithaca 2001; A. Kappeler/Z. Kohut/F. Sysyn/M. v. Hagen (Hrsg), *Culture, Nation, and Identity*.

The Ukrainian-Russian Encounter 1600–1945, Toronto 2003; R. G. Suny, T. Martin (eds), *A State of Nations. Empire and Nation-Making in the Age of Lenin and Stalin*, Oxford 2001.

- 2 N. Baron, P. Gatrell (eds.), *Homelands. War Population and Statehood in the Former Russian Empire, 1918–1924*, London 2004.
- 3 See also W. Benz (ed.), *Dimensionen des Völkermords. Die Zahl der jüdischen Opfer des Nationalsozialismus*, München 1991, C. Streit, *Keine Kameraden. Die Wehrmacht und die sowjetischen Kriegsgefangenen 1941–1945*, Stuttgart 1978, U. Herbert, *Hitler's Foreign Workers. Enforced Foreign Labor in Germany under the Third Reich*, Cambridge 21997.
- 4 P. Ther, *Deutsche und polnische Vertriebene. Gesellschaft und Vertriebenenpolitik in der SBZ/DDR und in Polen 1945–1955*, Göttingen 1998; A. Siljak/P. Ther (eds), *Redrawing Nations. Ethnic Cleansing in East-Central Europe 1944–1948*, Oxford 2001; J. Reinisch (ed.), *Displacement and Replacement in the Aftermath of the Second World War*, Basingstoke 2009.
- 5 See also M. Mann, *Fascists*, Cambridge 2005; ibid, *The Dark Side of Democracy. Explaining Ethnic Cleansing*, Cambridge 2005; J. Snyder, *From Voting to Violence. Democratization and Nationalist Conflict*, New York 2000; N. Naimark, *Fires of Hatred. Ethnic Cleansing in Twentieth-Century Europe*, Harvard 2001; E. Weitz, *A Century of Genocide. Utopias of Race and Nation*, Princeton 2003.

Robert L. Hellyer: Defining Engagement. Japan and Global Contexts, 1640–1868 (= Harvard East Asian Monographs, Bd. 326), Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2010, 281 S.

Rezensiert von
Julian Plenefisch, Berlin

In der Geschichtsschreibung zu globalen Verflechtungen haben außereuropäische Regionen in den letzten Jahren erfreulicherweise vermehrt Aufmerksamkeit erfahren. Eine Geschichte der Globalisierung nichteuropäischer Gesellschaften setzt einem rein eurozentrischen Verständnis von Globalisierung Grenzen. Robert L. Hellyer, Professor für Geschichte an der Universität Wake Forest, bietet mit dem vorliegenden Werk eine in weiten Teilen gelungene und überzeugende Geschichte der Einbindung Japans in globale Netzwerke vom 17. bis zum 19. Jahrhundert aus einer Perspektive japanischer Akteure. Der Autor ist bereits durch historische Forschung zu Japans außenpolitischer, Handels- und Seefahrtsgeschichte bekannt.¹

Die historische Auseinandersetzung mit Japan, insbesondere vor der so genannter Zeitenwende zur Moderne 1868, als das seit 250 Jahren herrschende Feudalsystem durch einen Putsch abgelöst und der japanischer Kaiser als Staatsoberhaupt eingesetzt wurde, bleibt für viele europäische Leserinnen und Leser ein Exotikum. Jedoch stellt gerade Japan mit seiner rasanten Mo-

dernisierung und, seit der zweiten Hälfte des 19. Jahrhunderts, imperialen Politik ein für die Globalisierungsgeschichte bedeutendes Untersuchungsobjekt dar. Der vorliegende Band bietet somit für Interessierte der Historie der Globalisierung eine japanische Perspektive auf die Entwicklung der globalen Verflechtungen insbesondere des 18. und 19. Jahrhunderts.

Im Japan der Edo-Zeit (1600–1868) herrschten die Shogunen der Tokugawa-Familie als oberste Feldherren aus Edo (heute Tokyo) über mehrere hundert Fürstentümern, diese waren zur Gefolgschaft verpflichtet, konnten aber ansonsten relativ autonom walten. Lange gab es in der Forschung die Sichtweise, dass Japan in der Edo-Zeit eine von der Welt abgeschlossene Gesellschaft war und die wenigen außenpolitischen Kontakte erfolgreich vom Shogunat reglementiert wurden. Dieses Narrativ wird nun schon seit einigen Jahren zunehmend aufgebrochen. Wollten westliche Autoren die bereits in der Edo-Zeit wirkenden transregionalen Austauschprozesse aufzeigen, schrieben sie die Geschichte von Japans Außenbeziehungen im 19. Jahrhundert als eine Geschichte der Hinwendung zum Westen. Hellyer bietet mit seiner Arbeit einen frischen Ansatz, indem er japanische agency ins Zentrum seiner Fragestellung rückt. Dabei fragt Hellyer, ob Japans Außenbeziehungen zwischen 1640 und 1868 maßgeblich durch ideologische Parameter oder durch eher rationale ökonomisch-politische Zielsetzungen bestimmt waren. Neu an Hellyers Ansatz ist, die außenpolitische Handlungsmacht Edo-Japans gleichbedeutend auf drei Akteure aufgeteilt zu sehen: das Shogunat in Edo, das auf einer Insel zwischen Korea und Japan gelegene Fürstentum Tsushima und das an der südliche

Küste von Kyushu gelegene Fürstentum Satsuma. Als zweite Frage möchte Hellyer beantworten, ob die globale Wirtschaftsentwicklung Einfluss auf die Politik dieser Akteure ausübte, und wenn ja, wie.

Hellyers Hypothese ist, dass, obwohl Japans Außenbeziehungen in der Edo-Zeit dezentral von verschiedenen Akteuren gesteuert wurden, eine rationale Handels- und Wirtschaftspolitik insbesondere mit China und Korea möglich war und die japanische Gesellschaft davon im Allgemeinen profitieren konnte. Den Fürsten von Tsushima und Satsuma gelang es, trotz der Kontrolle aus Edo, unabhängige Akteure zu bleiben und über die Außenbeziehungen Interessenspolitik für die eigenen Fürstentümer zu betreiben. Interessant: Hellyer geht davon aus, dass nach 1800, als zunehmend westliche Schiffe an japanischen Küsten erschienen und eine Öffnung des Landes forderten, es durch das Shogunat gerade nicht zu einer Beschränkung der agency der Fürstentümer kam, sondern es die Fürstentümer geschickt verstanden, die westliche Bedrohung zu ihrem eigenen Interesse zu nutzen.

Der Aufbau der vorliegenden Arbeit hält sich mit einigen Perspektivwechseln zwischen den Akteuren im Großen und Ganzen an eine chronologische Erzählung, die den Leser sinnvoll durch die verschiedenen Etappen der Argumentation führt. Hellyer beginnt mit einer kurzen Einführung in die japanische Geschichte und einer Darstellung der verschiedenen Akteure zu Beginn der Edo-Zeit. Das Shogunat kontrollierte den für sich bedeutsamsten Handel, mit China und Holland, direkt über den Hafen von Nagasaki. Tsushima diente nach 1600 als Mediator für die koreanisch-japanischen Beziehungen und war

dabei sowohl Vasall des Shogun in Edo als auch des koreanischen Königs. Satsuma gelang es 1609, die Ryukyu-Inseln (heute Okinawa) zu erobern. Ryukyu, Vasall des chinesischen Kaisers, diente seitdem Satsuma als Kanal für einen eigenständigen China-Handel. Andere Kanäle der Außenbeziehungen, wie beispielsweise das auf Hokkaido gelegenen Fürstentum Matsu-mae, werden von Hellyer ausgeklammert. Durch die folgenden Kapitel beschreibt Hellyer, wie sich entweder durch globale Einflüsse oder innere Prozesse die Politik der drei Akteure veränderte. Die erste bedeutende Phase macht Hellyer Mitte des 17. bis Mitte des 18. Jahrhunderts aus. Die Ausweisung portugiesischer und spanischer Händler und Missionare, die Verfolgung japanischer Christen und das Verbot für Japaner, das Land zu verlassen, nennt Hellyer Reaktionen auf die Globalisierung (S. 49 ff.). Er betont, dass die große Bedeutung des China-Handels eine wichtige Konstante der japanischen Außenbeziehungen blieb.

Eben dieser Handel stellte jedoch die japanische Wirtschaft zunehmend vor Herausforderungen. Die teure Einfuhr chinesischer Produkte, vor allem medizinischer Waren, Bücher und Stoffe, führte zu einem rasanten Abfluss japanischer Edelmetalle, so dass das Shogunat gezwungen war, den Silber- bzw. Kupfergehalt in seinen Münzen zu reduzieren und die Währung somit abzuwerten. Das Jahr 1764 markiert für Hellyer einen Wendepunkt in den japanischen Außenbeziehungen. In diesem Jahr verbrannten japanische Beamte in Nagasaki eine 270 Kilogramm schwere Kiste mit Ginseng aus Kanton (S. 74 f.). Ab sofort sollte kein Ginseng aus Kanton mehr importiert werden. In Japan wurde

mittlerweile selbst Ginseng angebaut, um den Abfluss von Silber und Kupfer zu verhindern. Gleichzeitig versuchte das Shogunat, die in China steigende Nachfrage von Fisch und Meeresfrüchten auszunutzen und so das Handelsdefizit ausgleichen. Satsuma und Tsushima kam dabei die Aufgabe zu, via Korea bzw. Ryukyu durch Tributsgesandtschaften den Kontakt zu China zu pflegen. Diese neue Form des Zugriffs auf den Handel und die Außenbeziehungen nennt Hellyer „kontrollierten Austausch“ (*guarded engagement*) (S. 110–115).

Auch im Zuge des 19. Jahrhunderts, trotz zunehmender Intervention Großbritanniens, blieben der japanische und chinesische Markt eng verwoben. Japanische Konsumenten schätzten chinesische Medizin und China verlangte weiter nach maritimen Produkten aus Japan. Die japanischen Akteure blieben von diesem Verhältnis weiterhin geprägt. Satsuma (durch Ryukyu) und das Shogunat (durch Nagasaki) konnten vom China-Handel profitieren. Kontrollierte das Shogunat im 18. Jahrhundert den Außenhandel, um den Abfluss von Edelmetallen zu verhindern, stellten im 19. Jahrhundert Gewinne aus dem Auslandshandel für das Shogunat zunehmend eine bedeutende Finanzquelle dar. Die sich zwischen beiden Akteuren entwickelnde Konkurrenz brachte das Shogunat dazu, seine Kontrolle über die Außenbeziehungen weiter zu festigen und Satsuma unter Druck zu setzen (S. 125–138). Tsushima blieb auf den Korea-Handel begrenzt und geriet ökonomisch ins Hintertreffen, was seine agency sowohl in Bezug auf das Shogunat als auch den koreanischen Hof beschränkte.

Im Laufe des 19. Jahrhunderts nahm die Interaktion zwischen Japan und westli-

chen Nationen immer mehr zu. Hellyer zeigt überzeugend, dass die Politik von Tsushima und Satsuma in den Zusammentreffen mit westlichen Seeleuten in erster Linie von lokalen und nicht von nationalen Interessen geleitet waren (S. 150 ff.). Während Satsuma gegen die Interessen des Shogunat versuchte, via Ryukyu aus dem neuen Zugang zum globalen Handel Profit zu schlagen, drohte Tsushima durch die steigenden Verteidigungsausgaben der Bankrott. Die Fürsten von Tsushima verlangten daraufhin, bereits vor den Unruhen der 1860er Jahren, eine Reform des politischen Systems. Sie wollten in das japanische Kernland verlegt werden und bat den Shogunat, direkte Kontrolle über Tsushima zu ergreifen (S. 168ff.).

Hellyer schließt sein Werk mit der Meiji-Restauration 1868 und der Etablierung des japanischen Nationalstaats. Interessant ist, dass nach knapp 250 Jahren das traditionelle System der Außenbeziehungen ohne viel Widerstand aufgehoben werden konnte. Hellyer führt dies darauf zurück, dass Tsushima von seinen Pflichten entlassen werden wollte und Akteure aus Satsuma in die neue Regierung eingebunden werden konnten (S. 237). Irritierend ist dann aber doch die Schlussfolgerung auf der letzten Seite: „it is to consider that prominent Edo-period intellectuals could not contribute to the development of a national ideology because in the Edo-period polity there was [...] no single actor creating coherent national policies“ (S. 250). Dass weniger Ideologien als vielmehr konkrete Wirtschaftsinteressen die Außenbeziehungen im 18. und 19. Jahrhundert bestimmten, zeigt Hellyer überzeugend. Dass ein zentraler außenpolitischer Akteur notwendig ist, damit sich intellektuelle National-

diskurse in einer Gesellschaft durchsetzen können, wäre aber noch zu beweisen. Die Arbeit basiert neben bekannter englischsprachiger Literatur in erster Linie auf einer umfangreichen Liste japanischer Sekundärliteratur. Insbesondere an den Stellen zu den lokalen Diskursen in Tsushima oder Satsuma und zur Kommunikation zwischen den Akteuren greift Hellyer auf meist editiertes japanischsprachiges Quellenmaterial zurück. Der Band wird mit sechs Karten, 21 Bildern und zwei Zeittafeln zur Ankunft westlicher Schiffe an japanischen Küsten abgerundet.

Auch wenn sich einige wenige Passagen, beispielsweise detaillierte Beschreibungen des Ginseng- und Meeresfrüchtehandels, etwas hinziehen, legt Hellyer mit seinem Werk eine interessante Analyse der japanischen Außenpolitik während der Edo-Zeit vor. Insbesondere die Perspektive der lokalen Akteure macht diese Arbeit zu einer wichtigen Ergänzung der bereits vorhandenen Forschung zu Japans Außenbeziehungen, wie beispielsweise von Ronald P. Toby, Michael Auslin oder Hamashita Takeshi. Für die Erforschung einer Geschichte der Globalisierung bietet Hellyer mit seiner Perspektive einer nicht-europäischen Gesellschaft auch für allgemein interessierte Leserinnen und Leser einen lesenswerten Beitrag.

Anmerkung:

- 1 R. L. Hellyer, The Missing Pirate and the Pervasive Smuggler. Regional Agency in Coastal Defense, Trade, and Foreign Relations in Nineteenth-Century Japan, in: International History Review 37 (2005) 1, S. 1-24; ders., Intra-Asian Trade and the Bakumatsu Crisis. Reconsidering Tokugawa Commercial Policies in Late Edo Japan, in: International Journal of Asian Studies, 2 (2005) 1, S. 83-110.

Michael Mann: Geschichte Südasiens. 1500 bis heute (= Geschichte kompakt), Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2010, 138 S.

Rezensiert von
Manju Ludwig, Heidelberg

Neuere geschichtliche Betrachtungen wenden sich zunehmend von der Fokussierung auf Nationalstaaten ab und analysieren historische Kontexte nun auch in ihren globalhistorischen Zusammenhängen. Diesem globalgeschichtlichen Ansatz gerecht werdend skizziert Michael Mann in der 2010 erschienenen Überblicksdarstellung der Reihe „Geschichte kompakt“ eine ebenso konzise wie innovative Geschichte Südasiens von 1500 bis in die Gegenwart. Die Monographie, die sich sowohl an ein breites, nicht fachspezifisches Publikum sowie Studierende und Lehrende richtet, gibt in allen Bereichen den neusten Stand der Forschung wieder. Mann grenzt sich – der Idee eines „polyzentrischen Weltbildes“ (S. 1) folgend – von einer vorurteilsbehafteten europäischen Geschichtsschreibung Südasiens ab und will stattdessen den Anspruch erfüllen, auch die südasiatische Perspektive wiederzugeben und eine nicht eurozentristische Sichtweise anzubieten. Diesem selbstgesetzten Ziel wird der Autor zum einen dadurch gerecht, dass er konsequent indigene Termini benutzt um südasiatische Herrschaftstitel (Padshah Akbar) und politische Konzepte (*inqilab*) differenziert wiedergeben zu können, ohne dabei

jedoch an Verständlichkeit einzubüßen. Relevant ist im Kontext der wertungsfreien Darstellung der südasiatischen Geschichte jedoch zum anderen auch, dass Mann die bisher übliche Zäsursetzung der Periodisierung der südasiatischen Geschichte grundlegend verwirft und die Neuzeit der südasiatischen Geschichte schon 1500 ansetzt. Durch die bewusste Abgrenzung von einem Verständnis der Neuzeit, das – von einer imperialistischen Geschichtsschreibung geprägt – den Beginn der Neuzeit mit der europäischen Expansion auf dem südasiatischen Subkontinent gleichsetzt, gelingt dem Autor eine neuartige Zäsursetzung ohne Wertigkeit. Stattdessen liefert Mann eine strukturorientierte Darstellung, der es gelingt, kausale und globale historische Zusammenhänge und ihre Kontinuitäten sichtbar zu machen. Dass die Überblicksdarstellung jedoch trotzdem nach Jahrhunderten eingeteilt wird, ist einem pragmatischen Zweck geschuldet: Obwohl dem Autor zu Folge alle periodischen Einteilungen letzten Endes willkürlich sind, können sie doch als hilfreiche Orientierungszeitspannen dienen.

Das sehr übersichtlich gegliederte Werk teilt sich in eine ausgezeichnete Einführung, in der die Themenschwerpunkte des Überblickswerkes, die Grundannahmen und die theoretische Verortung des Autors vorgestellt werden sowie fünf Hauptkapitel die jeweils eine Zenturie ab dem 16. Jahrhundert in verschiedenen thematischen Unterpunkten behandeln. Das Verhältnis der Einteilung mutet leicht unausgeglichen an, da die von Mann nun eingeschlossene frühe Neuzeit in der Darstellung an die 80 Seiten umfasst, während auf das nicht weniger relevante 19. und 20. Jahrhundert lediglich 45 Seiten entfallen,

worunter bedauernswertweise ab und an die Lesbarkeit leidet. Dem Hauptteil angeschlossen folgt eine thematisch sehr gut gegliederte Auswahlbibliographie, die zum Weiterlesen anregen soll, sowie ein nützliches Orts- und ein Personenregister. Im Fließtext selbst findet sich vielfältiges Kartenmaterial, das leider ohne bibliographische Angaben auskommen muss sowie gut ausgewählte Erläuterungskästen und Quellenübersetzungen, jedoch kein Verzeichnis derselben. Da das Überblickswerk ein breiteres und auch nicht-akademisches Publikum ansprechen will, hat der Autor auf Fußnoten verzichtet und verortet strittige Thematiken meist auch nicht in spezifischen historischen Debatten unter Nennung anderer wissenschaftlicher Werke. Neben der punktuellen und strukturellen Darstellung von politischen Entwicklungen und der Betrachtung von Prozessen der Staatsbildung fokussiert Mann seine Betrachtungen vorrangig auf die ökonomischen Entwicklungen Südasiens wie Kommerzialisierung und Industrialisierung und den damit verknüpften globalen wirtschaftlichen und kulturellen Austauschbeziehungen sowie Migrationsbewegungen. Die bislang unterschätzte Relevanz des Indischen Ozeans, den der Autor selbst als historische Weltregion versteht, wird wiederholt herausgestellt. Eine Untersuchung der Urbanisierungsprozesse auf dem südasiatischen Subkontinent sowie Umbrüche in Gesellschaft und Technik werden als weitere Schwerpunkte analysiert.

Neu ist in dieser Darstellung vor allem die Betrachtung der frühen Neuzeit als eine Epoche der inneren Restrukturierung, in der historische Regionen – von denen Prozesse der Vergesellschaftung ausgingen

– in Reichsbildungen unterschiedlichster Art mündeten. Die konventionelle Fehlinterpretation des Mogul-Imperiums als zentralisierter Staat wird dabei verworfen, das tatsächlich existierende fragmentierte Staatswesen jedoch nicht als Resultat eines „degenerative[n] Verfall[s]“ sondern als dynamische „renovierende Transformation“ (S. 59) im generellen Prozess einer zentripetalen Dezentralisation begriffen. Angegriffen wird hierbei von Mann insbesondere die eurozentristische Degradierung dieser Reiche zu „Regionalstaaten“, da diese flächenmäßig equivalent zu europäischen Staaten waren. Die Dynamik und hohe gesellschaftliche Durchlässigkeit der südasiatischen Gesellschaften konzeptionalisiert Mann im Modell des segmentären Staates, das von einer geteilten Souveränität sowie einer „pyramide[n] Ordnung einer Vielzahl von semi- und quasi-autonomen politischen Zentren“ (S. 10) ausgeht. Zur Erklärung einer idealtypischen Entwicklung der Staatsformierung entwirft der Autor zusätzlich ein erweitertes Stufenmodell des segmentären Staates, das er auch für die Erklärung der allmählichen territorialen Ausbreitung der britischen Ostindiengesellschaft heranzieht. Die britische Herrschaft auf dem südasiatischen Subkontinent – vor allem in den ersten Jahrzehnten – wird folglich immer als ein politisches System geteilter Souveränität verstanden, was anhand des Beispiels der vielzähligen, sich überschneidenden Souveränitäten in Bengalen überzeugend gezeigt wird.

Dass sich spätere koloniale Herrschaftsstrukturen jedoch vor allem durch ein asymmetrisches Mächteverhältnis auszeichneten und dass technische Modernisierung nicht immer mit Fortschritt

gleichgesetzt werden kann zeigt Mann an Hand des fehlenden Technologietransfers und der daraus resultierenden deformatorischen Wirkung im Bereich des Kanalbaus, der Eisenbahn und der Telegrafie. Auf Grund dieser auch politisch verankerten Asymmetrien bildete sich eine immer breitere südasiatische Widerstandsbe wegung, die sich jedoch am europäischen Konzept des Nationalstaates orientierte und im Hinblick auf die Teilung des südasiatischen Subkontinents in Indien, Pakistan und später Bangladesh von Mann als gescheitert dargestellt wird. Abgerundet wird der Überblick durch aktuellste politische und ökonomische Entwicklungen in Südasien. Der explizite Anspruch Manns keine „strikt chronologische und ereignis geschichtliche Darstellung zur Geschichte Südasiens“ (S. 9) vorzulegen gelingt weitestgehend, lediglich das fünfte Kapitel erinnert an bereits bekannte Muster der südasiatischen Historiografie.

Den Terminus ‚Indien‘ als eurozentristisch verwerfend, hat sich Mann in seinem historischen Überblickswerk das ehrgeizige Ziel gesetzt, die volle Region Südasiens abzudecken und grenzt sich hierbei von bisherigen Geschichtswerken ab, die meist den Fokus auf die heutige indische Nation richten. Dass er jedoch dem Anspruch nicht gerecht werden kann, eine umfassende Betrachtung der Historien des heutigen Indiens, Pakistans, Nepals, Sri Lankas oder gar Afghanistans auf 138 Seiten zu liefern ist leicht nachvollziehbar. Wie schon erwähnt nehmen in Manns Darstellung deswegen strukturelle historische Entwicklungen einen übergeordneten Platz ein, wobei der Autor kontinuierlich Analogien zu Prozessen in anderen Staaten wie dem Osmanischen Reich, aber auch

Staaten in Europa und Ostasien zieht. Durch das wiederholte Aufzeigen von Ähnlichkeiten und Unterschieden – wie zum Beispiel durch den Vergleich der militärtechnischen Standards des Mogul-Heeres mit den zeitgenössischen europäischen Heeren des Dreißigjährigen Krieges (S. 39) – gewährleistet Mann die Vergleichbarkeit der südasiatischen Geschichte mit der anderer Weltregionen und nimmt ihr so den Anstrich des Exotischen und der Andersartigkeit.

Trotz des längst überfälligen globalgeschichtlichen Ansatzes stellt sich die Frage, ob eine derart kurze Darstellung der südasiatischen Heterogenität, die Mann auch als „geografische Diversifiziertheit und [...] sprachliche, kulturelle und ethnisch-gesellschaftliche Vielfalt“ (S. 1) anerkennt, gerecht werden kann. Die Problematik zeigt sich in inhaltlichen Ungenauigkeiten der knappen Darstellung vielschichtiger Konflikte wie dem Kaschmir-Konflikt, aber auch in den sehr kurzen Abrissen zur Gegenwartsgeschichte – und keinesfalls eine seit dem 15. Jahrhundert – Nepals und Sri Lankas, sowie der kurzen Darstellung des ohne weitere Problematisierung als Befreiungskrieg dargestellten Aufstands des Jahres 1857. Ebenso wenig nehmen soziale und gesellschaftliche Entwicklungen einen großen Stellenwert in der Darstellung ein; lediglich das Phänomen der Kaste und die koloniale Religionspolitik nutzt der Autor exemplarisch um die Instrumentalisierung und die damit einhergehenden Konstruktion von gesellschaftlichen Strukturen innerhalb der kolonialen Machtpolitik zu beleuchten. Obwohl sich Mann in seiner Einführung von einer bloßen Betrachtung des Nationalstaates distanziert und ihn zu einer „geschichtswissenschaftlich-historio-

grafischen Kategorie“ (S. 9) reduzieren will, bleibt nichtsdestoweniger eine Problematisierung der indigenen Fokussierung auf den Nationalstaat absent, obwohl diese zur Betrachtung der Wirkmächtigkeit und Internalisierung westlicher Konzepte im südasiatischen Kontext befähigen würde. Positiv fällt auf, dass Mann diverse Formen des indigenen Widerstands – auf elitärer sowie subalterner Ebene – thematisiert und es ihm dadurch gelingt, das Bild einer hegemonial herrschenden kolonialen Elite zu dekonstruieren. Während in diesem Kontext das Bild einer heterogenen, mit Brüchen durchzogenen indigenen indischen Gesellschaft, in der es sehr wohl auch Nutznießer der kolonialen Herrschaft gab, gezeichnet wird, mutet die Darstellung der britischen Kolonialisierer oft undifferenziert an. Mann vermeidet es bis zuletzt „die Inder“ (S. 92) zu einer homogen agierenden Gruppe zu verallgemeinern, stellt aber gleichzeitig keine nennenswerten Unterschiede in der Vorgehensweise der Briten dar, die aber sehr wohl vorhanden waren.

Trotz dieser kleinen – auch dem Format geschuldeten – Mängel ist dem Autor ein historisches Überblickswerk gelungen, in dem die Handlungskompetenzen aller Akteure herausgearbeitet werden konnten. Dass südasiatischen Akteuren auch im kolonialen Kontext ein hohes Maß an Handlungsmacht zugesprochen werden muss, macht Mann vor allem durch die Dekonstruktion einer exklusiven Deutungshoheit der kolonialen Geschichtsschreibung und die Darstellung einer Vielfalt indigener Geschichtsschreibung deutlich. Das Bild Indiens als eine Gesellschaft ohne historisches Bewusstsein wird hierbei als ein Aspekt der britischen Rhetorik der sich selbst

auferlegten Zivilisationsmission entlarvt, die als Legitimationsmechanismus der Fremdherrschaft diente. Manns Fokus auf historiografische Traditionen der verschiedenen Epochen zeigt hingegen, dass Geschichtsschreibung auch in der vorkolonialen Epoche auf imperialer und regionaler Ebene als Werkzeug zur Legitimation von Herrschaft diente.

Insbesondere durch den globalgeschichtlichen, vernetzten Blickwinkel hat der Autor eine alternative Sicht auf die Geschichte Südasiens vorgelegt, mit der sich die Auseinandersetzung lohnt.

Robert H. Bates: When Things Fell Apart. State Failure in Late-Century Africa (= Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008, 191 S.

Rezensiert von
Ulf Engel, Leipzig

One of the three blurbs for this small volume simply states: "Bates is the undisputed doyen of political scientists working on Africa. Here, in one short book, he gives us his distilled analysis of a lifetime. Read it" – says no less a figure than Paul Collier, former World Bank chief economist who is now back at the Centre for the Study of African Economies at Oxford. The book, to leave no doubt, is exactly delivering on this promise – but on little more.

In late-century, Robert Hinrichs Bates, the Eaton Professor of the Science of Govern-

ment and Professor of African and African American Studies at Harvard (Cambridge), introduces, "things fell apart" in Africa – i.e. the number of civil wars started to increase. Answers to this puzzle, Bates claims, are to be found in the theories on the state and the sources of political disorder. Himself a political scientist by training, though with considerable exposure to anthropology, with a turn to political economy later, Bates develops his argument on a reading of Max Weber and, later, game theory and cross national regressions. The argument Bates develops explicitly takes on some approaches (which some may consider "mainstream") on the alleged role of ethnic diversity in conflict, the political significance of resource richness or the claimed nexus between democratisation and political instability.

The possibility of political order, Bates argues, rests on the level of public revenues, the rewards from predation, and the rate of discount of the "specialist in violence" (i.e. Weberian rulers). In the 1960s African politics were dominated by forms of electoral clientelism (though Bates doesn't call it this way): bloc votes were exchanged for material benefits. Once the voters learned "to play the system to their advantages they will then extract all the benefits n offer. Thus the incumbent's dilemma: Pursuing power to accumulate wealth, they find themselves having to surrender their ill-gotten gains to retain political office" (p. 40). And with the crisis of clientelism, already starting in the 1960s, African rulers started creating authoritarian regimes. Hence the political arena begun to shrink, political privileges played an ever more important role while economic inequality increased. At the end private benefits,

rather than public goods, dominated politics in what become “control regimes”, interventionist economies, which benefited an urban clientele and the president who “multiplied the political resources at his command” (p. 68). Against this background the sources for political tensions often were local and the seed for conflict was sown by the dynamics of agrarian societies – as illustrated with the case of the Kikuyu in the Kenyan Rift Valley or the Oromo in the Ethiopian lowlands.

Things started to go wrong when public revenues declined in the late 1970s, due to a combination of a downfall in commodity incomes and sharp increases in energy prices. As a consequence, incomes of public employees plummeted, the quality of public services declined, levels of corruption rose and it became more difficult to manage regional tensions. In response, to Bates narrative continues, African citizens as well as external actors, most importantly the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, called for political reforms. Africa’s political elites became insecure: And “with the loss of public revenues, governments became more predatory” (p. 121). The possible short-terms gains of abandoning the role of a guardian by cashing in on the continent’s natural resources pushed aside any other considerations.

The book is indeed delivering on Colliers’ promise. But this exactly is also the problem with Bates’ narrative. An old hand in US political science on Africa with a university career, which stretches over more than 40 years, Bates combines some of the most attractive, but also some of the more problematic traditions of his trade. The quest for systematization and rigorous modelling has resulted in a lean explana-

tion for what Bates terms “state failure”. The argument carries some elegance when elite decisions are basically reduced to game theory and dominant dynamics are described in a very lucid way. However, at the same time the argument is also heavily flawed by its superficiality. Too often Bates is glossing over historic differences. African Studies, too, has shown that elites (as any other social groups) cannot be reduced to rational actors in an arena modelled by the assumptions of game theory. The argument presented on the combination of internal and external pressure on incumbent regimes (which is said to have increased their sense of insecurity and willingness to take risks) is ahistorical: The cases of internal pressure quoted – Benin, Zambia – are the result of dynamics infolding only after external pressure had led to the adoption of structural adjustment programmes, they didn’t go hand in hand. But most importantly, “state failure” – at least in the way described as the core problem of this book – itself is too undifferentiated a term, is far too ambivalent in its empirical evidence and too controversial by way of its normative overload, that it makes sense analytically. Empirically the pathways African regimes have taken since the end of the Cold War offer more variation as simply “state failure” (and the many other cases of “good governance” or whatever the label might be) – and the nature of “states” itself seems far more complex.

Peter Wende: Das Britische Empire. Geschichte eines Weltreichs, München: Beck, 2008, 367 S.

Rezensiert von
Andreas Eckert, Berlin

Das Wort Imperium entstammt der politischen Sprache des Römischen Reiches und hat eine komplizierte Geschichte sowie diverse, oft sehr kontroverse Bedeutungen. Überdies ist es eng mit neueren, ebenso umstrittenen Begriffen wie Imperialismus, Kolonialismus, Neokolonialismus und Globalisierung verknüpft. Heute ist „Imperium“ weitgehend negativ konnotiert, etwa wenn dieser Begriff benutzt wird, um die Vereinigten Staaten zu charakterisieren. In neueren Ansätzen der Kolonialismusforschung gewinnt „Imperium“ hingegen zunehmend an Bedeutung, weil diese Kategorie es ermöglicht, Kolonien nicht als etwas „da draußen“ zu betrachten, das lediglich marginal für die metropolitane nationale Geschichte ist, sondern Metropole und Kolonie in ein gemeinsames analytisches Feld zu integrieren. Die vielfältigen Beziehungen zwischen diesen beiden Polen waren in der Regel höchst hierarchisch. Dennoch ist es wichtig festzuhalten, dass für Zeitgenossen, Kolonisierende wie Kolonisierte, die Imperien einen Rahmen boten, innerhalb dessen über die Relevanz von Rechten, Forderungen und Verpflichtungen debattiert wurde. Im Falle Großbritanniens etwa bildete die Kritik der Abolitionisten an der „Sklaverei unter britischer Flagge“ den Ausgangspunkt für

zahlreiche Auseinandersetzungen über Missstände und Verantwortung innerhalb des britischen Weltreiches.

Das Britische Empire war das territorial größte Imperium der Weltgeschichte. Sein Aufstieg und Niedergang vollzogen sich über fünf Jahrhunderte. Dieses höchst heterogene Gebilde entzieht sich einer eingängigen Interpretation. Gleichwohl gehört seine Erforschung seit nunmehr knapp zwei Jahrzehnten in England und den USA zu den boomenden Teilgebieten der Geschichtsschreibung. Der Frankfurter Historiker und langjährige Direktor des Deutschen Historischen Instituts in London, Peter Wende, legt nun die erste Überblicksdarstellung zum Britischen Empire in deutscher Sprache vor. Die weitgehend chronologisch angelegte Studie informiert insgesamt verlässlich über die zahlreichen Facetten der Geschichte dieses Weltreiches, in dem zeitweilig die Sonne nie unterging: Die Darstellung reicht von der Gründung der ersten Kolonien in Nordamerika und den West Indies bis zur Auflösung des Imperiums im 20. Jahrhundert und seiner Transformation zum Commonwealth. Zu einer Bilanz kann sich der Autor nicht durchringen. Die „angesichts der räumlichen wie auch zeitlichen Ausdehnung ins Unermessliche gesteigerte Vielfalt des Empire“ lasse alle Versuche scheitern, ein eindeutiges Urteil zu fällen. Gleichwohl hätte man sich an der einen oder anderen Stelle etwas pointiertere Aussagen gewünscht.

Die Gewissheiten der älteren Historiographie sind, das macht auch Wende deutlich, natürlich längst passé. Kein erstzunehmender Historiker kann die Geschichte des Empire heute noch als Geschichte britischer Helden auf zivilisatorischer Mis-

sion schreiben. Die Interaktion zwischen Kolonisierenden und Kolonisierten spielt in neueren Darstellungen eine wichtige Rolle, ebenso wie die Bedeutung globaler Konstellationen. Vornehmlich unter der Flagge des „Postkolonialismus“ segelnde Autoren betonen überdies, nicht zu Unrecht, den fragmentarischen, widersprüchlichen Charakter des Empire. Immer mehr Historiker schließlich verorten die Geschichte des Empire im Zentrum der britischen Nationalgeschichtsschreibung. Denn Großbritannien war nicht – wie Frankreich, Holland, Portugal und für kurze drei Jahrzehnte auch Deutschland – eine kolonienbesitzende, es war eine substantiell imperiale Nation, die wie keine andere dem modernen kapitalistischen Weltsystem vor dem Zweiten Weltkrieg ihren Stempel aufdrückte. In diesem Zusammenhang wird kontrovers diskutiert, wie stark die Tatsache, das Großbritannien ein Weltreich war, den britischen Alltag prägte, etwa in den Bereichen Sport, Musik, Wissenschaft, Kinderbücher, Film, Propaganda und Jagd. Wendes Interpretation bleibt hier abwägend. Er stellt fest, dass es in der Bevölkerung zwar eine pauschale Begeisterung für das Empire gab, diese jedoch weder auf genaueren Kenntnissen gründete noch das Interesse an spezifischen Fragen einschloss.

Das Buch ist nicht frei von Schwächen. In den Kapiteln über Afrika und Indien gelingt es dem Autor nicht wirklich, die Komplexität der kolonialen Situation einzufangen. Zwar konzediert er den Kolonisierten durchaus pauschal eine gewisse Handlungsmächtigkeit, doch bleibt die Darstellung ihrer Rolle im Empire recht blass. Auch die Ausführungen zum Ende des Weltreiches und zur Bedeutung der nun auf der Insel lebenden Migranten aus den ehemaligen Besitzungen lassen viele wichtige Aspekte außer Acht. Erstaunlich, dass Wende einige der wichtigsten historiographischen Ansätze zum Britischen Empire nicht erwähnt, wie etwa die Theorie vom „Gentlemen-Kapitalismus“ von Peter Cain und Anthony Hopkins. Und schließlich muss man kein verbissener Vertreter der „political correctness“ sein, um sich an im Buch verwendeten, höchst problematischen Begriffen wie „Stammeshäuptlinge“ und „Negersklaven“ zu stören. Es wäre zu wünschen, dass sich das gerade unter jüngeren Historikern hierzulande große Interesse an Kolonialismus und Imperialismus nicht, wie bisher, vor allem auf den deutschen Fall richtet, sondern auch das ebenso komplexe wie spannende Beispiel des Britischen Empire mit einbezieht. Wendes Buch bietet dafür einen guten Orientierungsrahmen.

Autorinnen und Autoren

Felix Brahm

Dr., Bielefeld University

Email: felix.brahm@uni-bielefeld.de

Andreas Eckert

Prof. Dr., Humboldt-Universität Berlin

Email: andreas.eckert@asa.hu-berlin.de

Ulf Engel

Prof. Dr., Universität Leipzig

Email: uengel@uni-leipzig.de

Angelika Epple

Prof. Dr., Bielefeld University

Email: angelika.epple@uni-bielefeld.de

Björn Hofmeister

M.A., Georgetown University, Washington D.C.

Email: bh62@georgetown.edu

Olaf Kaltmeier

Jun. Prof. Dr., Bielefeld University

Email: olaf.kaltmeier@uni-bielefeld.de

Ulrike Lindner

PD Dr., Bielefeld University

Email: ulrike.lindner@uni-bielefeld.de

Manju Ludwig

M.A., Ruprecht-Karls-Universität Heidelberg

Email: mludwig@sai.uni-heidelberg.de

Binu Mailaparambil

PhD, Bielefeld University

Email: binu.mailaparambil@uni-bielefeld.de

Silke Marburg

Dr., Technische Universität Dresden
Email: silke.marburg@tu-dresden.de

Michael Pesek

Dr., Humboldt University Berlin
Email: habari@arcor.de

Julian Plenefisch

M. A., Freie Universität Berlin
Email: julian.plenefisch@fu-berlin.de

Michael Riekenberg

Prof. Dr., Universität Leipzig
Email: riekenbe@rz.uni-leipzig.de

Stephan Scheuzger

Dr., Swiss Federal Institute of Technology, Zürich
Email: scheuzger@history.gess.ethz.ch

Julia Tischler

Dr. des., Bielefeld University
Email: julia.tischler@uni-bielefeld.de

Martin C. Wald

Dr., Hamburg
Email: martinc.wald@t-online.de

Nira Wickramasinghe

Prof. D. Phil., University of Leiden
Email: n.k.wickramasinghe@hum.leidenuniv.nl