ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR GLOBALGESCHICHTE UND
VERGLEICHENDE GESELLSCHAFTSFORSCHUNG

Herausgegeben im Auftrag der
Karl-Lamprecht-Gesellschaft e. V. (KLG) / European Network in
Universal and Global History (ENIUGH) von
Matthias Middell und Hannes Siegrist

Redaktion

Gerald Diesener (Leipzig), Andreas Eckert (Berlin),
Hartmut Elsenhans (Leipzig), Ulf Engel (Leipzig),
Marc Frey (Bremen), Eckhardt Fuchs (Braunschweig),
Frank Hadler (Leipzig), Katharina Middell (Leipzig),
Matthias Middell (Leipzig), Hannes Siegrist (Leipzig),
Stefan Troebst (Leipzig), Michael Zeuske (Köln)

Anschrift der Redaktion

Global and European Studies Institute
Universität Leipzig
Emil-Fuchs-Str. 1
D – 04105 Leipzig

Tel.: +49 / (0)341 / 97 30 230
Fax.: +49 / (0)341 / 960 52 61
E-Mail: comparativ@uni-leipzig.de
Internet: www.uni-leipzig.de/comparativ/

Redaktionssekretärin: Katja Naumann
(knaumann@uni-leipzig.de)

Comparativ erscheint sechsmal jährlich mit einem Umfang von jeweils ca. 140 Seiten. Einzelheft: 12.00 €; Doppelheft 22.00€; Jahresabonnement 50.00 €; ermäßigtes Abonnement 25.00 €. Für Mitglieder der KLG / ENIUGH ist das Abonnement im Mitgliedsbeitrag enthalten.

Zuschriften und Manuskripte senden Sie bitte an die Redaktion. Bestellungen richten Sie an den Buchhandel oder direkt an den Verlag. Ein Bestellformular finden Sie unter: http://www.uni-leipzig.de/comparativ/

Wissenschaftlicher Beirat

Gareth Austin (London), Carlo Marco Belfanti (Brescia), Jerry Bentley (Honolulu), Christophe Charle (Paris), Catherine Coquery-Vidrovitch (Paris), Michel Espagne (Paris), Etienne François (Paris / Berlin), Michael Geyer (Chicago), Giovanni Gozzini (Siena), Regina Grafe (Evanston / Chicago), Margarete Grandner (Wien), Michael Harbsmeier (Roskilde), Heinz-Gerhard Haupt (Florenz), Konrad H. Jarausch (Chapel Hill), Hartmut Kaelble (Berlin), Markéta Křižova (Prag), Wolfgang Küttler (Berlin), Marcel van der Linden (Amsterdam), Hans-Jürgen Lüsebrink (Saarbrücken), Barbara Lüthi (Köln), Attila Melegh (Budapest), Alexey Miller (Moskau), Patrick O'Brien (London), Diego Olstein (Jerusalem), Juan Carmona Pidal (Madrid), Lluis Roura y Aulinas (Barcelona), Jürgen Schriewer (Berlin), Hagen Schulz-Forberg (Aarhus), Alessandro Stanziani (Paris), Edoardo Tortarolo (Turin), Eric Vanhaute (Gent), Peer Vries (Wien), Susan Zimmermann (Budapest)

Leipziger Universitätsverlag GmbH
Oststraße 41
D – 04317 Leipzig
Tel. / Fax: +49 / (0)341 / 990 04 40
info@univerlag-leipzig.de
www.univerlag-leipzig.de

Borders in Imperial Times. Daily Life and Urban Spaces in Northeast Asia

Herausgegeben von
Frank Grüner, Susanne Hohler und Sören Urbansky

Leipziger Universitätsverlag

Comparativ.
Zeitschrift für Globalgeschichte und vergleichende Gesellschaftsforschung / hrsg. von Matthias Middell und Hannes Siegrist – Leipzig: Leipziger Univ.-Verl.
ISSN 0940-3566
Jg. 22, H. 5. Borders in Imperial Times. Daily Life and Urban Spaces in Northeast Asia – 2012

Borders in Imperial Times. Daily Life and Urban Spaces in Northeast Asia. Hg. von Frank Grüner, Susanne Hohler und Sören Urbansky –
Leipzig: Leipziger Univ.-Verl., 2012
(Comparativ; Jg. 22, H. 5)
ISBN 978-3-86583-715-8

© Leipziger Universitätsverlag GmbH, Leipzig 2012
Comparativ.
Zeitschrift für Globalgeschichte und vergleichende Gesellschaftsforschung 22 (2012) 5
ISSN 0940-3566
ISBN 978-3-86583-715-8

Inhaltsverzeichnis

Aufsätze

Buchbesprechungen

Borders in Imperial Times: Daily Life and Urban Spaces in Northeast Asia

Frank Grüner / Susanne Hohler / Sören Urbansky

In particular during the 19th and 20th centuries, Northeast China has been formed by competing plans of expansion and international rivalries for power.[1] With the changing powers of the 20th century – Russian, Chinese and Japanese – a wide field of European-Asian interaction arose with complex mutual influences. The cultural polymorphy of the region known as "Manchuria" in the West started with Han-Chinese migration, which began in the 17th century and was significantly intensified since the 1870s, continued

1 Some significant recent contributions on the Chinese, Russian, Soviet, Japanese and other imperial histories of Manchuria are N. E. Ablova, KVZhD i rossiiskaia emigratsiia v Kitae. Mezhdunarodnye i politicheskie aspekty istorii (pervaia polovina XX veka), Moscow 2005; Blaine R. Chiasson, Administering the Colonizer: Manchuria's Russians under Chinese Rule, 1918–1929, Vancouver / Toronto 2010; Shao Dan, Remote Homeland, Recovered Borderland: Manchus, Manchukuo, and Manchuria, 1907–1985, Honolulu 2011; Prasenjit Duara, Sovereignty and Authenticity: Manchukuo and the East Asian Modern, Lanham 2004; Bruce A. Elleman / Stephen Kotkin (eds), Manchurian Railways and the Opening of China: An International History, Armonk, NY 2010; Mark C. Elliott, The Limits of Tartary: Manchuria in Imperial and National Geographies, in: The Journal of Asian Studies 59 (2000) 3, pp. 603-46; Ralph Edward Glatfelter, Russia, the Soviet Union, and the Chinese Eastern Railway, in: Clarence B. Davis / Kenneth E. Wilburn with Roland E. Robinson (eds), Railway Imperialism, New York et al. 1991, pp. 137-54; Mariko Asano Tamanoi (ed.), Crossed Histories. Manchuria in the Age of Empire, Ann Arbor 2005; Sören Urbansky, Kolonialer Wettstreit: Russland, China, Japan und die Ostchinesische Eisenbahn, Frankfurt a. M. 2008; David Wolff, To the Harbin Station. The Liberal Alternative in Russian Manchuria, 1898–1914, Stanford 1999; Louise Young, Japan's Total Empire: Manchuria and the Culture of Wartime Imperialism, Berkeley, CA 1998. In addition, a few selected "classical" reference works are Tao Shing Chang, International Controversies over the Chinese Eastern Railway, Shanghai 1936; Paul Hibbert Clyde, International Rivalries in Manchuria, 1689–1922, Columbus, Ohio 1926; Adachi Kinnosuke, Manchuria: A Survey, New York 1925; Owen Lattimore, Manchuria: Cradle of Conflict, New York 1932; Rosemary K. I. Quested, "Matey" Imperialists? The Tsarist Russians in Manchuria 1895–1917, Hongkong 1982; Peter S. H. Tang, Russian and Soviet Policy in Manchuria and Outer Mongolia 1911–1931, Durham, NC 1959.

Comparativ | Zeitschrift für Globalgeschichte und vergleichende Gesellschaftsforschung 22 (2012) Heft 5, S. 7–13.

with the Russian expansion into the Far East of the late 19th century, and was fortified by regional and global migration in the first half of the 20th century. By the 1920s the region consisted of numerous Asian and European ethnicities. With Russia's defeat in the Russo-Japanese War (1904/05), Japan entered the stage to change the region decisively over the following decades. By wresting the South Manchurian Railway from Russia, Japan managed to increase its economic influence constantly, first in the southern parts and subsequently throughout Northeast China. While Russia's influence in Manchuria was significantly weakened after the breakdown of the Tsarist Empire, the territory of the Three Northeastern Provinces (then called 'the Special District') was officially under administration of the Chinese Central government in Beijing. In practice, however, the Chinese warlord Zhang Zuolin, partly backed by Tokyo, ruled the area until 1928. After a short period of Chinese sovereignty over Manchuria, the Japanese occupied the territory in 1931 and installed a puppet regime. This newly created puppet-state, Manchukuo, was formally a constitutional monarchy, which existed between 1932 and 1945. The Soviet invasion in August 1945 toppled Manchukuo, and Manchuria fell temporarily under Soviet dominion. After the retreat of the Soviet Army in early 1946, the Chinese Communists soon threw out the Guomindang forces and seized the entire region.
Overlapping waves of imperial expansion fostered different principles of power and cultural-ideological monopolies of interpretation. The competing imperialist visions commingled with diverging ethnic, national, religious and cultural traditions of the inhabitants. Thus, Northeast China unexpectedly developed into a field of experiments on globalization, international interaction, and transcultural entanglement, which surpassed the national, political, and cultural frontiers of the ruling powers. Only the absorption of the region into the People's Republic of China put an end to the dynamics of this development.

Border towns

The international rivalry of competing powers was reflected in the interaction of their respective peoples "on the ground" in border towns. In many ways, cities in the vicinity of state borders are similar to any other urban area. However, certain features are particular to border towns. They often are established when new borders are drawn during imperial expansion, wars and in postwar treaties, or when new trade routes emerge. The existence and development of these urban areas often heavily depend on the fate of the border itself, the relations between the adjacent countries and their peoples, and the prevailing legal conditions and agreements, such as special rights for foreigners in concession areas, including treaty ports or railway zones. Border towns at the periphery of empires offer various opportunities that are usually absent at the center. Interactions between the "people" and the "state" are often more pronounced in these settlements. Prominent phenomena include the smuggling of goods and cross-border migration. These special features of border towns attract distinct groups of people with a "frontier spirit". They

comprise a mixed population of smugglers, political exiles, and polyglot soldiers of fortune, for example, that can only be found at the margins of territorial political entities. Numerous other characteristics are also typical for these settlements, such as a distinct underworld and interracial marriages.

This special issue goes beyond these well-known features of towns in imperial borderlands and concentrates particularly on contacts across ethnicities and nationalities that are defined not by state borders but by borders inside these towns. Thus, the aim is to offer some tentative answers for a more comprehensive knowledge of the characteristics of border town communities. More generally speaking, it is concerned with the cultural complexity of cross-border phenomena, transcultural entanglements, as well as processes of segregation inside border towns.

The study of borders has long been concerned with geographical, geopolitical, and juridical issues. Recently however, academic interest in transnational migration and in the historical effects of borders has reemerged. Leading scholars of border studies, such as Victor Prescott, Benedict Anderson, and Peter Sahlins, come from different disciplines, and their work represents an interdisciplinary renaissance of border studies. The term "border" itself has become a buzzword and is applied in many different ways.[2] Historians are relative latecomers in this regard, and the field of history is strongly influenced by anthropological approaches. The work of Sahlins and others have diverted historians away from traditional studies based on top-down and center-periphery interpretations of boundaries towards developments in the borderlands themselves, which include the perspectives of the border populations and the regional elites in the borderlands. They suggest that national policies and local-level actions are interdependent.[3] Historical studies on China's borders and borderlands still center, however, around the relationship of the imperial center and its heterogeneous peripheries.[4]

Despite the strong recent interest in borders, no significant concept of border towns has yet been formulated in the field of history. Historical studies of borders and contact zones in urban spaces are, however, necessary to transcend traditional historiography based on the nation-state. In our preliminary definition of border towns, we postulate that borders are not conceptually restricted to the category of state borders. Instead, we trace and analyze them apart from the cartographical aspect dictated by nation-states. In

2 For an excellent overview on the interdisciplinary study of borders, see, for instance: Hastings Donnan / Thomas M. Wilson, Borders. Frontiers of Identity, Nation and State, Oxford 1999. For a comparative research about the history of borderlands see: Michiel Baud / Willem van Schendel, Toward a Comparative History of Borderlands, in: Journal of World History 8 (1997) 2, pp. 211-42.

3 Peter Sahlins, Boundaries. The Making of France and Spain in the Pyrenees, Berkeley 1989.

4 On the formation of cultural, regional, and religious identities of borderlanders, the relationship between center and periphery and the question whether border peoples accepted Chinese cultural expansion to become inalienable parts of the Chinese Empire during Ming and Qing dynasties see the essays in: Pamela Crossley (ed.), Empire at the Margins: Culture, Ethnicity, and Frontier in Early Modern China, Berkeley 2006; Nicola Di Cosmo (ed.), Political Frontiers, Ethnic Boundaries, and Human Geographies in Chinese History, London 2003; Stevan Harrell (ed.), Cultural Encounters on China's Ethnic Frontiers. Hong Kong 1996; Diana Lary (ed.), The Chinese State at the Borders. Vancouver 2007. On the Russo-Chinese relations and the making of their common imperial border see: Sarah Paine, Imperial Rivals: China, Russia, and their Disputed Frontier, Armonk 1996.

contrast to the traditional notions of static state-borders and cities located directly on or divided by national borderlines (such as Cold War Berlin and the twin cities of Tijuana and San Diego), which are usually altered through wars or specified by border commissions, borders inside border towns prove to be much more flexible. They are highly dynamic because inhabitants constantly negotiate them, and they are difficult to enforce from the political centers.

Consequently, the case studies in this issue go beyond the traditional understanding of border towns. With the exception of Manchuria Station (Manzhouli), which was located directly on the border between Russia and China, these cities, such as Harbin and Dalian (Dairen, Dal'nyi) in China and Vladivostok in Russia, need not straddle state borders. Such cities are good specimens for border town studies because of their multicultural populations, colonial concessions, ethnic segregation, and competing political systems. It was the inter-imperial power struggle involving Russia, the Soviet Union, China, and Japan during the first half of the 20th century that created new borders separating different social, political, ethnic, and cultural groups within these urban arenas. Among them, borders could not easily be discerned and did not always correspond to the official boundaries as defined by the prevailing regimes. Borders became *the* determinant elements for those urban societies. For that reason, the border towns under study are distinct from other cities because they formed dynamic centers of different, often competing, economic, political, social, national, ethnic processes. Harbin, Dalian, Vladivostok and Manchuria Station are places where notions of identity, nationhood, and empire were especially significant because groups in fluctuating relations of competition and cooperation were constantly challenging these categories. Rivalry is often reflected in and represented through symbolic architecture,[5] day-to-day encounters in city life, competing public opinions, and contending performative actions.

Urban space

The concept of urban space, explicitly or implicitly, plays an important role in most articles of this volume. Urban space has recently enjoyed increasing popularity as a concept in various academic disciplines. Researchers typically emphasize two different aspects of urban spaces. On the one hand, developers, architects and urban planners focus more on the actual physical design and outline of cities; that is, public as well as private spaces, like housing, shopping malls, streets, squares and parks. On the other hand, urban spaces can be considered not just as any physical space within the borders of a city, but as common or shared spaces where the inhabitants of a city meet on a daily basis. Of course,

5 The role of symbolic architecture in Harbin is discussed in: James Hugh Carter, Creating a Chinese Harbin. Nationalism in an International City, 1916–1932, Ithaca 2002, pp. 126-61.

these two interpretations are not dichotomous; in fact, they are often interrelated conceptually and empirically.[6]

Another feature of these border towns is frequent changes of the politically dominant group. As a result, historians must transcend national biases in order to analyze various ethnic, political and social groups equally. This also helps to overcome exclusionary and partisan diaspora-narratives, which are common in the historiography of cities in overlapping inter-imperial borderlands.[7] The six case studies examine different borders crossing urban spaces in the everyday city life of border towns. They aim for a deeper understanding of the different levels of borders by examining the functions of borders in the daily lives, actions, and experiences of citizens and their organizations. The articles also inquire how and by whom borders were imposed. In general, two different levels of borders can be identified. The first level relates to "lower" and in many cases less visible borders, which cover daily encounters between people of different ethnic, social and cultural background in contact zones "on the ground", such as train stations, bazaars and playing fields. The second level relates to the "principal" borders of colonial discourses, cultural superiority, power, and *Deutungshoheit* (discursive power).

The articles by Benjamin Isitt, Susanne Hohler and Sören Urbansky aim at the first level of lower borders. Taking occupied Vladivostok as his case, Isitt visits street corners, marketplaces, barracks, and other cross-cultural zones of contact to trace the complex interactions between Canadian soldiers and local civilians in the spring of 1919. In border towns, as in many other regions and cities, processes of migration shaped the social relations and social spaces of the town. This article embraces a broad conception of "migrant worker", extending from the foreign soldiers to local civilians and refugees, to cope with the ubiquity and prominence of migration in urban surroundings. Sports, as Hohler demonstrates, offer another unique insight into the complex relationships between the different segments of the society in border towns with multiethnic populations. Hohler argues that the playing field, because of its particular characteristics, was a common or urban space where usually clear and regulated borders could be shifted, partly lifted and even abandoned. Urbansky's article on Manchuria Station is the only case study that

6 For "urban space" in urban development and planning see, for example: Clare Herrick, Designing the fit city: public health, active lives, and the (re)instrumentalization of urban space, in: Environment & Planning 41 (2009) 10, pp. 2437-54; Katherine B. Hankins / Emily M. Powers, The Disappearance of the State from "Livable" Urban Spaces, in: Antipode 41 (2009) 5, pp. 845-66; Gro Sandkjær Hanssen, Negotiating Urban Space: The Challenge of Political Steering in Market- and Network-oriented Urban Planning, in: Scandinavian Political Studies 35 (2012) 1, pp. 22-47. On "urban space" as a contact zone see, for example: Robert Rotenberg (ed.), The cultural meaning of urban space. Westport, Conn. 1993; Simon Gunn (ed.), Identities in space: contested terrains in the Western city since 1850, Aldershot 2001; Fran Tonkiss, Space, the city and social theory: social relations and urban forms, Cambridge, 2005; Helmuth Berking (ed.), Negotiating urban conflicts: interaction, space and control, Bielefeld 2006; Imagining the City. The politics of urban space, Oxford / Bern / Berlin 2006.

7 Especially relating to Dalian and Harbin, there are ongoing debates among historians and former residents about the identities with a "Russian", "Chinese", "Japanese", "Polish" past in national historiographies. See e.g. Søren Clausen / Stig Thøgersen (eds), The Making of a Chinese City: History and Historiography in Harbin, Armonk 1995; Thomas Lahusen, A Place Called Harbin: Reflections on a Centennial, in: The China Quarterly 154 (1998), pp. 400-10.

looks at border towns in their literal sense, that is, urban settlements located directly on an international border. By assessing the value of different types of sources, Urbansky explores the limits of our knowledge about border settlements in general. Located at the border between the Russian and the Chinese Empires, Manchuria Station contained many contact zones between Russians, Mongols and Chinese. Various administrative, cultural and ethnic boundaries existed inside the city and could only partly be crossed in everyday life by locals and travelers.

The remaining three case studies treat the second level of principal borders. Through Russian and Chinese newspapers printed in Harbin between 1900 and 1932, Frank Grüner and Rudolph Ng examine self-perceptions and perceptions of the "other". The periodicals mainly represented the Russians and Chinese as distinct entities with clear cultural boundaries, despite their spatial proximity and economic interdependence. Based on a few momentous events in the city, such as the 1924 Opera Riots, Blaine Chiasson argues that cultural divisions between the Russians and Chinese and the dispute over the nature of each people's contribution to Manchuria's development shaped Harbin's daily life. The volatile post-colonial atmosphere led to continuous conflict between the two founding populations over how each community represented itself and was represented by the other. Chiasson also demonstrates how particular common spaces can also be susceptible to conflict His examples, the Harbin Opera and the Museum of the Manchurian Research Society, were deliberately designed as common institutional space to encourage cultural contact and exchange between Russian and Chinese, but it was precisely this intensified contact that raised the stakes and made the opera and the museum into such heavily contested cultural territory. Therefore, common spaces or contact zones proved to be ambiguous for the quality of interethnic coexistence. Christian Hess studies Dalian's (Dairen) changing position in the empire and the nation from the late 1800s through the 1950s from two perspectives. First, Hess analyzes how the rise of the Japanese empire and, later on, the rise of the People's Republic of China defined this new city from the perspective of the nation-state and empire. Second, Hess examines urban spaces as spaces of encounter and visible signifiers, and he identifies internal borders within Dalian, especially between Chinese and Japanese residents there. In the process, Hess traces the layout of urban spaces in Dalian in relation to the city's position in the empire as a whole and shows how the two aspects of urban spaces, namely design and common space, are often interwoven and mutually dependent.

These case studies reveal several analogies and differences pertaining to the border town-concept. A central similarity is the long neglected fact that borders are not an exception but the rule in urban society. For over a century, historians have been trained to look for nation-states and have thus neglected many borders, principally those that are not coterminous with state borders. Further, borders can be imposed from the inside or the outside. Urban spaces are always spaces of encounter, representation (Grüner and Ng), conflict (Chiasson, Urbansky), and partnership (Hohler), but they are also instantiated as visible signifiers (Hess). The relations between imperial center and periphery are often crucial for the populations of border towns because they are immediately affected by

shifts in imperial policy and by the transitions from one empire to the next. Contested identities and representations of self and other is another analytic framework shared by many of the articles (Chiasson, Grüner and Ng, Hohler). A further similarity of border towns is the dynamic of their populations. Migration is the norm, not the exception. Most people were migrants from other provinces or countries (Isitt, Urbansky).

As a whole, the six case studies on borders in urban spaces analyze daily life in Northeast Asia in its diversity and complexity, surpassing the traditional narratives that have appeared in national historiographies until now. Common analytical categories and, in particular, *asymmetric counterconcepts*,[8] as Reinhart Koselleck has designated them, such as center-peripheries or colonizers-colonized, have often been applied in a single, linear dimension. Such applications oversimplify the polymorphic, entangled, and highly dynamic character of social interaction among the various ethnic or cultural populations that shared certain urban spaces in this overlapping imperial borderland. Similarly, borders have generally been considered static and stable. Challenging this assumption, the articles on Manchuria Station, Harbin, Dalian and Vladivostok reveal the performative and dynamic aspects of borders. In fact, borders in imperial times have been fluid and ambivalent. These articles argue that different kinds of borders were negotiated in the daily routines in an inter-imperial setting. The focus on borders lends insight to the study of daily life and urban spaces. It serves as a useful tool for a more adequate description of the highly dynamic developments in multicultural societies of Northeast Asian border towns.

8 See Reinhart Koselleck, The Historical-Political Semantics of Asymmetric Counterconcepts, in: Idem, Futures Past: On the Semantics of Historical Time, New York 2004, pp. 155-91.

Playing Guest and Host on the Manchurian Stage: Debating Modernity in the Chinese Northeast

Blaine Chiasson

RESÜMEE

Am 12. Januar 1924 wurden im Harbiner Klub der Ostchinesischen Eisenbahn im Beisein von Vertretern der verschiedenen Bevölkerungsgruppen zwei Operetten aufgeführt. *Der Sohn des Mandarin* von Cesar Cui und *Die Geisha* von Sidney Jones waren beide leichte Stücke mit orientalischer Thematik, von denen die Organisatoren hofften, dass sie das multikulturelle Milieu Harbins widerspiegeln würden. Stattdessen verließen die chinesischen Verwaltungsbeamten die Aufführung unter Protest, weil sie die Stücke als Beleidigung Chinas auffassten, während die meisten Russen die Aufregung nicht nachvollziehen konnten. In der folgenden Woche wurde Harbin von Demonstrationen paralysiert, auf denen die protestierenden Menschen eine öffentliche Entschuldigung und den Rücktritt des russischen Leiters der Eisenbahn forderten. Die unterschiedlichen Reaktionen auf die Demonstrationen spiegeln die Spaltung zwischen den jetzt unter chinesischer Kontrolle lebenden Russen und den in ihrer Rolle als Machthaber noch unsicheren Chinesen wider. Aufbauend auf meiner Monographie *Administering the Colonizer: Manchuria's Russians under Chinese Rule, 1919–1929* argumentiere ich, dass das alltägliche Leben in der ehemaligen Eisenbahnzone durch Spannungen zwischen diesen beiden Bevölkerungsgruppen geprägt war. Nach 1917 sahen sich die Russen gezwungen, ihre Position in der Mandschurei neu zu verhandeln. Aber obwohl sie nun chinesischer Kontrolle unterstellt waren, behielten die Russen Schlüsselpostionen in Wirtschaft und Verwaltung. Die chinesische Verwaltungselite des Distrikts war bestrebt, die ehemalige russische Kolonialverwaltung zu erhalten und zu verbessern. Sie reagierte empfindlich auf Vorwürfe, sie sei zu unorganisiert, um über eine europäische Gemeinschaft zu herrschen. Umso mehr zeigte sie sich entschlossen, die Region als modern und progressiv zu präsentieren. In diesem Beitrag werden die Opern-Demonstrationen mit den Debatten um den Beitrag der einzelnen Bevölkerungsgruppen zur Entwicklung der Region verglichen, die innerhalb der Harbiner *Gesellschaft zur Erforschung der Mandschurei*

Comparativ | Zeitschrift für Globalgeschichte und vergleichende Gesellschaftsforschung 22 (2012) Heft 5, S. 14–26.

geführt wurden. Insgesamt soll gezeigt werden, dass die erhitzte post-koloniale Atmosphäre in der ehemaligen Eisenbahnzone vor allem zu Auseinandersetzungen darüber führte, wie sich jede Gemeinschaft selbst repräsentierte und wie sie von anderen dargestellt wurde.

During the 1920s the Chinese northeastern city of Harbin was the location of a unique administrative experiment. This city, the hub for the Chinese Eastern Railway (CER) concession was now the capital of the newly created Special District of the Three Eastern Provinces (hereafter Special District), a Chinese controlled and Chinese administered district designed to replace the formerly Russian controlled concession. Before 1917 the concession had been a virtual Russian colony in northern China and within its boundaries local government, education, commerce, the language of daily life was Russian. The Chinese lived, as they commented, as "guests" in their own country. After 1917, the "guests" asserted their rights to be the "host," that is, to be the city's dominant group.

Harbin, and the Special District, was also the site of two conflicts, or debates, that reflected the cultural tensions in a changed political context between the Chinese, once the colonized, and the Russians, once the colonizers. Each debate focused on how the Russian elite represented the Chinese and their culture as pre-modern, and demonstrated how entangled the two Chinese and Russian projects of creating a modern Manchuria had become. This entanglement, highlighted in the 1924 Opera Riots, and the 1929 museum scandal, could have only happened on the two empires' periphery, where both the Chinese and Russian empires met. As imperial frontier, and periphery to both China and Russia each polity built the CER railway zone, and the successor Special District, in their own image. This extended beyond the railroad to the building of cities, the founding of schools and universities and the imposition of their own cultures and vision of modernity on this frontier periphery.

This paper argues that these two competing, yet similar, visions of colonial modernity required that the Russians publically represent the Chinese as pre-modern. The first, in 1924, was a public protest over the depiction of Chinese characters at a charity opera performance to a multi-national audience. The second was a 1929 debate within the confines of an academic research museum, merged with regional politics. Each event shared similar characteristics, elite Chinese protesting the depiction, representation, and exhibition of contemporary Chinese people and culture by members of Harbin's established Russian community. Each conflict brought to the stage, in the first instance the very real stage of Harbin's opera, in the second the curatorial "stage" of the public museum, with its attendant belief of objective representation, a debate over the relative modernity and developmental stage of Harbin's competing elites.

Representation of self and other, it will be seen, became a means by which each elite, both jockeying for position in the changed political and cultural context of the 1920s Special District, attempted to impose their own version of modernity on the region. The Chinese elite, now co-administrators on the railway, had imposed a Chinese managerial administrative structure over the former Russian colonial government, and a new Chinese managerial class to supervise the transition of the Special District from informal

Russian colony to Chinese district. Despite the fact the Russian's had lost extraterritorial status, Harbin's Russian elite had maintained much of its economic and administrative power, its "cultural capital" in the words of one Chinese journalist, in the new Special District.[1] Although this continued privileged position was a conscious decision, and acknowledgement, by the new Chinese political overlords that Russians were essential to the Special District, the Russian elite used this "capital" to justify a continued Russian domination over Harbin's political, economic, social, and cultural life in the press, and as will be seen, on the operatic and curatorial stage. This Russian depiction of the Chinese as a people, too undeveloped and culturally immature to administer the sophisticated economic and political machine that was the Special District, justified continued Russian economic and cultural dominance, and can be seen as a strategic cultural response to their loss of political power.

The strategy worked, however, because of the particular circumstances of the Harbin and the railway zone as a place of competing modernities. Both the Russian founders and the Chinese administers who inherited the district in the 1920s had a vision of the railway zone as a modern district. The Chinese admired what the Russians had created and did not want to radically change the district it, only improve it under Chinese supervision. Harbin then became the locus of a cultural transfer, in which the Chinese took on the Russian administrative and economic project, including elements of Russian culture, such as opera. This cultural transfer, emblematic of the District's multiple modernities, and the entanglements that would lead to the disputed cultural territory of the opera and the museum.

What gave this debate added importance was the Special District's place in the Russian and Chinese colonial imaginations. Despite Russian or Chinese long-term claims over the Chinese northeast, also known as Manchuria, the fact remained that the Chinese northeast had only been recently been attached to the Chinese polity, while Russia had interests in the region dating back centuries. Manchuria, ethnic homeland of the Qing dynasty, had been officially closed to Chinese immigration, although unofficially settlement had been taking place for at least two hundred years in southern Manchuria. Northern Manchuria, however, had a relatively small Chinese population. Only after the Qing government agreed to the construction of the CER as a joint Sino-Russian venture, did large numbers of Russians and Chinese arrive in the region. Only after 1905 did the Qing government formerly divide Manchuria into three new Chinese provinces, in part to establish a Chinese administrative fact in the face of growing Russian and Japanese imperial interest.

The CER concession had been developed in the late 1890s and early 1900s as not only a railroad, but as a complete Russian community. Taking advantage of a discrepancy in the translation of the original CER contract the Imperial Russian Government was able to

1 The Harbin Municipal Government on the Eve of Reforms, in: Novosti Zhizni, 2 July 1924, United States National Archive Record Group (hereafter USNA-RG) 59, M329 Roll 100, File 893.102H/44, 7 July 1924.

build a virtual colony in northern China.[2] From this dispute over semantics, backed by Russian power, grew CER Russian concession administration. The company controlled all institutions of this fully developed European community, the railroad, the city councils, schools, hospitals, and museums. Following the 1917 revolution the CER concession became a colony abandoned by its motherland. Spurning, and spurned by, the new USSR, the concession was forced into a new relationship with the Chinese government and local Chinese elite.

On 31 October 1920, by special order of the Chinese President, Russian extra-territoriality was ended and the Chinese government created the Special District, in the former CER zone. The CER was charged with creating for itself a new role, that of sound financial institution. Nevertheless, from 1920 to 1924 Chinese administrators left the original colonial mandate of the CER intact, albeit under new Russian supervisors. In 1920, a new General Manager was appointed, B. V. Ostroumov. A former colonial bureaucrat from the Russian Far East, Ostroumov was a man accustomed to building a strong Russian colonial presence. His new challenge was to make the CER a viable economic concern but his experience as a colonial administrator colored his directorship. He expanded CER investment into health resorts, factories, experimental agricultural farms, and research societies. Largely successful, these changes were presented as benefiting the general welfare of the Special District, but laid Ostroumov open to the charge that he was re-colonizing the Special District, in the name of progress and modernity, for the benefit of the Russian community.

In 1923, the 25th anniversary celebrations gave the CER the opportunity to highlight Russian contributions to the region's development. The railway was still dominated by a Russian managerial class who saw its role as employer for the Russian population and the promotion of regional economic development.[3] The twenty-fifth anniversary gave these Russian leaders the opportunity to pioneer a new vision of Russian leadership in Northeastern China, except it was a vision of modernization driven Russian technology, Russian talent and supposed objective development targets, albeit supervised by Russians. The highly successful Jubilee exhibition highlighted the CER's contribution to northeastern frontier modernization and economic progress. In all exhibits and publications references to the railway's connection to the Czarist government were dropped. Instead, the Chinese Eastern was portrayed as a pure economic enterprise, which had opened the Chinese northeast to Chinese and Russian colonization. Although Chinese labor contributions were acknowledged, the underlying message was Russian planning, capital, and expertise that had created the modern northeast.

2 "Lands necessary for the construction of the railroad in the vicinity of the line will be turned over to the company freely. The company shall have the absolute and exclusive right of the administration of its lands. *La Société aura le droit absolu et exclus de l'administration de ses terrains*." John V.A. MacMurray, Treaties and Agreements with and Concerning China 1844–1919, New York 1921, p. 75.

3 Interview between American representative and Ostroumoff, head of the CER, "Journey of the American Minister to Harbin and over the CER," USNA-RG 59 861.77 3233. 25 September 1923. 3.

> *However, it is not only by exhibitions and by material distinctions to old employees that this holiday should be observed. The Railway is an emblem of Russian genius. With the efforts of the Russian mind, and with Russian energy this country, which had slept for centuries, was awakened but improved and made to blossom with material and cultural progress. The might of the Russian mind was shown through the combined efforts of hundreds of thousands of Russians. Bearing this in mind the Railway should erect a number of monuments which would serve as an inspiration to further efforts on behalf of this country. The Russian population of the Railway Zone has the right to demand, in the view of the fact that it is with its efforts that the railway has been placed in its present condition, that out of the budget of millions of rubles that the requirements of this population should be satisfied.*[4]

Although the CER's history was published in both languages, a "narrative of some 690 pages (which) justified and glorified Russian work and achievements in building the CER and Harbin,"[5] and four scholarships, two each in honour of CER pioneers, were established, all jubilee activities took place in Pristan, with its predominately European and Russian population. Harbin's Municipal Council, still dominated by Russian members, featured prominently in all activities. From the opera at the railway club, the singing of a Te Deum in the Russian cathedral, the dance in the municipal gardens, all events signaled that the jubilee was a Russian celebration.[6]

The first debate took place on the stage of Harbin's opera, one year after the 1923 jubilee. In this conflict member's of Harbin's elite Chinese community contested representations on stage, of Chinese and Chinese culture as servile and pre-modern. European opera in Harbin was serious business, patronized by both Chinese and Russian elites. At a time when many North American cities could not support a permanent company, opera was performed in Harbin twice a week at the Railway club and other performances were scheduled around the city. The theater in the CER club was lavishly appointed and its performances subsidized by the company, stressing the railway's commitment to the best of European civilization. Everybody in Harbin went to the opera, including Chinese, according to an American journalist.[7] In the Special District's dual cultural context both Russian and Chinese elites patronage of European opera illustrates the entangled nature of the District's culture, in which both elites accepted European opera as a cultural marker of modernity.

The particular incident arose from the performance of two operas on 12 January 1924. The performances in question were benefit productions for the disadvantaged students

4 Two Jubilees, in: Novosti Zhizni translated and included as enclosure #1 with Dispatch # 1294 May 29th, 1923 in USNA-RG59 Roll 153 M316 861.77/3121 29 May 1923.

5 Olga Bakich, City and Émigré Identity: the Case of Harbin, in: 4. Unpublished conference paper for "Place, Space and Identity: Harbin and Manchuria in the first half of the Twentieth Century", University of Toronto, 19-21 November 1988.

6 Twenty-fifth Anniversary of the Chinese Eastern Railway, in: Russian Daily News, 7 June 1923. Enclosure #1 with dispatch 1335 8 June 1923 from USNA-RG59 Roll 153 M316 861.77/3133.

7 Adelaide Nichols, Any Night at the Opera in Harbin, in: New York Times, 23 March 1923, I. 8.

of the Russo-Chinese Technical Institute. In performance were "The Mandarin's Son" by Cesar Cui and "The Geisha" by Sidney Jones as well as some Russian light opera. The intention was to celebrate the Special District's two leading populations, Chinese and Russian,[8] and in the audience were CER manager Ostroumov and leading members of Harbin's economic, diplomatic and political communities.

Both the Cui and the Jones piece depicted Chinese and Chinese life in a manner that the Chinese members of the audience found insulting. "The Mandarin's Son," composed in 1858 by the Russian Cui, is an orientalist fantasy depicting the romantic difficulties of a young Chinese servant, in love with his patron's daughter. The inn where he works is to be visited by a high official who is revealed as the boy's father and all romantic difficulties are resolved. The Chinese objected to the portrayal of slavish relations between the classes, and the depiction of the Chinese ruling class as hopelessly corrupt.[9] One Russian source said the piece portrayed the Chinese as "total idiots."[10]

"The Geisha" by Sidney Jones was a very popular English music hall piece, widely translated, which depicted a day in a Japanese brothel. The brothel was run by a "Chinaman" Wun-hi, described in the libretto as "devious." The plot concerns the efforts of one geisha to marry her Japanese lover and an English woman's attempt to disguise herself as Japanese in order to woo back her fiancée. In the libretto, both the Japanese and the English characters speak in normal, correct English. Only the Chinese character Wun-Hi, speaks in a broken pidgin English – presumably translated into Harbin pidgin Russian.

Wun-hi. *Oh dearee me! Oh dearee me! This is very awkward – and most obstreperous! He wantee O Mimosa San, and O Mimosa San makee sing-song for English officer, who givee me plenty much money. What will Wun-hi tell Marquis?*

Juliette. *A Chinaman is never at a loss for a lie.*

Wun-hi. *Me very like a woman! Oh, here he comes! This very awkward, most unrelishable. What me do? You, Frenchee girl, be very nice to Marquis. Perhaps Marquis like French girlee – leave Mimosa San – makee much money for me!*[11]

In the second act Wun-hi bows repeatedly to a Japanese official: in the Harbin production Wun-hi was slapped repeatedly.[12]

General Ma, representing the Chinese Municipal Bureau and a devotee of Russian opera,

8 Letter to the editor of the „International", 30 January 1924, from USNA-RG59 Roll 153 M316 861.77/3371.

9 The Mandarin's Son. http//php.indiana.edu/~lneff/russmus/cui/syn.html. Last visit August 2001. The opera is still popular in Russia, especially for children. Several Russian friends have spoken of it fondly and one said it formed her first images of China.

10 Iu. V. Kruzenshtern-Peterets, Memoirs, in: Russians in Asia, 4 (Autumn 1997).

11 Act Two. Geisha by Sidney Jones. Edited and formatted by Fraser Charlton, www.staff.ncl.ac.uk/ fraser.charlton/geisyn.html. Last visited August 2001.

12 Iu. V. Kruzenshtern-Peterets, Memoirs (note 10).

walked out during the performance of "Geisha" and members of the Chinese elite followed him. What followed was a furor in the Chinese press and demonstrations against Ostroumov and the émigré Russian CER administration. The Chinese press condemned the two pieces as degrading and insulting to China and took great offense to the pleasure quarters setting of the piece and the depiction of Chinese life as corrupt and backward. The obsequious behavior of the Chinese character, "Wun-hi" towards a Japanese official, garnered particular fury in the Chinese press. On 20 January, at a joint meeting of three Binjiang[13] self-governing societies-- ostensibly called to discuss paving Fujiadian's[14] roads-- the participants resolved that the operas had been an insult "to the dignity of the state and all Chinese" and formed a committee to unify CER employees and protest to the authorities.[15] The protest took place on 19 February, when a crowd of several hundred, described as "mostly coolies and boys", marched from Fujiadian into Pristan, stopping at the office of the CER's Chinese president and moving on to the CER's main administration building. They carried banners and shouted "down with Ostroumov." The demonstration was described as peaceful and that the Chinese police were alerted and kept order.[16]

Non-Chinese newspaper did not understand what the furor was about, and that these performances were perceived by the Chinese as insulting and degrading. Instead, the demonstrations were blamed on national chauvinism. In one Russian paper the "Fujiatian (sic) press" was blamed for creating animosity against the Russians and the CER.[17] The foreign press cast doubts on the protestor's nationalist feelings, writing that they were bribed with food and drink. "It (the demonstration) is not an indication of popular feeling. It is not an expression of popular wrath, but merely a rude imitation of it. The people of Harbin know full well by what means Chinese popular wrath is staged."[18] The demonstrations were thus portrayed as illegitimate: the sentiments manufactured by the Chinese elite for their own selfish purposes. Lacking in the Russian press was any attempt on the part of the Russians or other foreigners to see the Chinese point of view. Never was the choice of performing these operas considered by the Russians as a severe lack of judgment and exercise in bad taste. That, Russians could not comprehend why two performances, depicting Chinese as corrupt, servile, and pre-modern, with leading members of the Chinese community in the audience, were insulting, demonstrates that these Russians still believed that Chinese and their culture were not modern, a belief essential for the maintenance of Russian superiority in the Special District.

To admit the insult, however, would also have to acknowledge the Chinese as equal part-

13 Binjiang was the Chinese county where Harbin was located.

14 Fujiadian was the settlement adjacent to Harbin but always under Chinese administration.

15 Propaganda of all circles in favor of the banish (sic) of Ostroumoff, in: Dawning, 25 January 1924, translated from Chinese and included in USNA-RG59 Roll 153 M316 861.77/3371.

16 USNA-RG59 Roll 153 M316 861.77/3376 20 February 1924. American Consul to American Ambassador, Beijing.

17 CER to demand guarantees against demonstrations, in: Harbin Daily News, 22 February 1924, from USNA-RG59 Roll 153 M316 861.77/3376.

18 Russky Golos, 21 February 1924, translated and enclosed in USNA-RG59 Roll 153 M316 861.77/3376.

ners in the Special District. If a modern Special District could only be achieved under a Russian managerial class, than it followed that the Chinese were incapable of achieving this vision. Thus, the opera depictions were consistent with the Russian émigré belief system. What the Chinese elite objected to was the making explicit of what had been up to that point, implicit. The Jubilee celebrations and the new CER regime had not overtly stated that the Chinese were incapable of managing a modern administration, although it was implicit in the Russian re-imagining of the Special District.

What the Russian and foreign press seemed to most object to was that the Chinese had publicly protested-- that they had claimed public space in Harbin's European neighborhoods. The stories that attracted the most attention in the Russian press were the purported chants of "We will throw the Russians into the Sungari River!"[19], as the Chinese marched towards the Russian cathedral although the Chinese administration said the incident did not take place.[20] Even if these chants were not voiced that this detail was taken up by the Russian press shows an underlying sense of frustration, fear, and powerlessness. The power dynamic had changed and these rumors were the acknowledgement that the Chinese were in control and if they wanted, could indeed "throw the Russians into the Sungari." As demonstrations, the opera protests were relatively tame. Zhang Zuolin, Special District head, did not put national insults above the smooth functioning of the Special District, ordering the Russian press to cease printing rumors of a Chinese plan to expel the Russians. Zhang promised all efforts would be made to stop such rumors and both the Chinese and Russian population would be treated with complete equality.[21] Zhang Zuolin then prohibited all further demonstrations and closed the opera issue. By the standards of foreigners who choose to see every Chinese meeting as a threat to foreign privilege even the Fujiadian nationalists behaved well. There was much shouting but no violence during the demonstrations. Given that the Special District Chinese elite witnessed the performance, the willingness of the same authorities to defuse rather than exploit the issue demonstrated that, for the Chinese administration, peaceful government came before "chauvinistic" nationalism.

The second debate over representation and modernity did not end so well for the Russian community, concluding as it did in the suppression of a Russian research institute. This takeover of the research institute, the Manchurian Research Society (Obshchestva izucheniia Man'chzurskogo kraia**,** OIMK according to its Russian abbreviation), must also be put into context of growing Russian, especially Russian-Soviet interference in the Special District, after the Soviet Union became a co-administrator of the CER after 1925. OIMK was founded and funded by the CER as a research institute and clearinghouse for information on the CER zone, as part of Ostroumov's new vision of a railway committed to regional development in a Russian cultural context. It was a complex

19 The Sungari is the river that flows through Harbin.

20 USNA-RG59 Roll 153 M316 861.77/3376.

21 Proclamation issued to prohibit the circulation of rumors, 24 February 1924. Enclosed in USNA-RG59 Roll 153 M316 861.77/3376.

institute, with a large museum in Harbin, experimental farms, many publications, and a generous budget funding its members' research agendas and providing them with employment.

As the CER's research and development arm, OIMK was devoted to the ethnographic, economic, anthropological, botanical and historical study of northeastern China.[22] During the seven years it operated, the society published numerous proceedings and by 1929 had 800 members.[23] The society operated a museum with over 62,000 exhibits, a publishing house, botanical garden, library, and archive.[24] The society had many successful exhibitions, in Harbin and abroad; sponsored many research expeditions across the northeast and contributed much to the study of northeastern China. OIMK's publications extolled the virtues of the northeast's untapped natural resources and the CER as the best tool to tap them, a land to be conquered by technology and research.[25] Within Harbin OIMK was an important institution and its members were acknowledged as the intellectual leaders of the community.

Specific Chinese criticisms of OIMK's activities concerned the displacement of Chinese farmers on OIMK's experimental farm, the representation and periodization of Chinese culture in OIMK's publication and museum, and the overall Russian context in which OIMK's work was presented. Unacknowledged in the criticisms was the use of the terms "Manchurian" and "region" in OIMK's work, a semiotic glimpse into how OIMK saw the Chinese northeast and the contribution of Russians to it.

OIMK's researchers emphasized the northeast as a region, rather than as a Chinese administrative unit, therefore not one particular culture or nationality dominated their work. In the Russian language, krai contains the meaning of "territory" in the sense of an administrative unit. It was used in the title of various Russian Far Eastern territories such as Amurskii krai (Amur Territory or Region) and Primorskii krai (Maritime Territory). The use of krai, instead of the Chinese word for the area dong sheng (Eastern Provinces), and the use of the even more vague Manchuria in OIMK's English translations suggested an the region had an ambiguous relationship to Chinese sovereignty. Designating this area as a "region or as "Manchurian" had (and still has) never been accepted by the Chinese because it suggests the area's distinct identity. Although there is historical evidence for the area's unique and separate identity, by the 1920s the northeast had been fully integrated into the Chinese state. The Chinese elite had watched in frustration, when in the late 1800s and early 1900s, both Japan and Russia tried to detach the northeast from China through a program of railway colonization. OIMK's claim that the Chinese northeast, as a region, shared characteristics and development potential with the Russian Far East and Korea did not resonate well for a Chinese elite with its own national agenda for the region. By using both controversial geographical terms, "Manchuria" and

22 Olga Bakich, Society for the Study of Manchuria (Unpublished notes).
23 Ibid.
24 Ibid.
25 OIMK, in: Isvestia obchestva izuchenia Manchurskovo Krai, No. 16, Harbin, March 1926.

"region" in its title OIMK could be accused of having its own agenda. If the northeast was not Chinese what was it – and whose was it?

OIMK's construction of northeast ethnographic history was another point where Chinese and Russian constructions of local identity diverged. For example, the society followed established Russian scientific practice of periodizing the region's ethnic groups by time of settlement. Since Chinese settlement in the northeast occurred in the 1890s, the same time as Russians arrived, OIMK's historical narrative of the northeast stressed indigenous groups such as the Manchus and the Mongolians and their dress, customs, language, economic life. Studies of the Chinese were confined to either ancient China or contemporary studies of labor, marriage, and economic life. OIMK's research created a hierarchy of contributions by the different ethnic groups to the economic and political development of the region, placing a greater value on the Russian, rather then the Chinese contribution.

Chinese perceptions of OIMK having a hidden agenda were also based on the content and form of its work. The prominence of economic studies underscored the importance of OIMK as a promoter and disseminator of information on the economic life of the Northeast. In 1926, 177 researchers, the largest portion of the Society's membership of 460, were involved in economic studies.[26] These studies ranged from forestry to numerous studies of the soybean, the main agricultural export of the area. These studies highlighted the unique characteristics of the area's flora and fauna. One particular study of Manchurian wheat portrayed the species as unique to the region, a synthesis of Russian and local varieties.[27] Contrasts were drawn between the traditional methods of cultivation and modern methods promoted by OIMK, however, these modern methods were Russian in form and personal. OIMK publications repeatedly gave the impression, not only to the Chinese, that modernity equaled Russian.[28]

OIMK's museum was located on Bolshoi Prospect, the main street of Russian Harbin. It shared the street with the other visible reminders of Russian power: the railway headquarters and club, the Technical University, the Orthodox Cathedral and the main department stores. The museum's curator had divided the space into exhibits on regional anthropology and history, economic life and culture. The biggest section was devoted to natural science, which stressed cross-border (China and USSR) regional flora and fauna. The second largest section was ethnography founded "to collect exhibits, delineating the level of existence and culture attained by the indigenous races inhabiting the territory."[29] In the archeological exhibit the Chinese came second to last in the periodization of the region's peoples, again highlighting the fact the Chinese were also recent immigrants.

All exhibits concerning China and the Chinese were found in the museum's rooms on traditional culture, marking a clear division between the pre-modern and the modern.

26 A. P., Isvestia obchestva izuchenia Manchurskovo Kraia, p. 10.
27 No author, North Manchurian Wheat, in: Manjurskaiia pmenitsa (circa 1925), p. 25.
28 This dispute over OIMK and its museum took place at the same.
29 Loukashskin, p. 184.

Thus, there were examples of Chinese arts and crafts, historical displays and models of Chinese homes and costume. All emphasized China's traditional lifestyles and ancient past. Exhibits on contemporary industry all concerned with the Russian-controlled railway. There were no examples of the region's Chinese controlled economy and nothing of Chinese industry outside of Manchuria. The exhibition's message was clear; modernity was Russian.[30]

Although OIMK's ethnographic/historical expositions highlighted Chinese bronzes, Mongolian Buddhism or Manchu costumes, the expositions on contemporary themes, such as art, photography or industry, reflected the dominance of a Russian and European vision of culture, in part due to the Russian émigré community's tenuous psychological, political, cultural and economic position. Homeless after the creation of the Soviet Union, émigrés in China bolstered Russian and European culture not only to preserve cultural and community values, but to demonstrate that the émigrés were still European, with all the privileges that identity gave in 1920s China. In the Special District European and Russian culture had taken on a new and desperate legitimacy.

This dislike, on the part of the Chinese, for the content of OIMK's research material must also be linked to the Russian context in which it was presented. OIMK, although never explicitly promoted as a Russian cultural institution, was in language, socialization and intent purely Russian. These members of OIMK presented themselves not just as Russians, but Russians educated in the best model of Russian liberal enlightenment thought. As the number of OIMK members grew, so did the number of honorary Chinese members, local dignitaries and representatives of the provincial and civic elite and Chinese educated in Harbin's Russian school system. Other then these few exceptions, there were no active Chinese members and no Chinese language section. In only one instance were proceedings published in both languages.[31] OIMK remained a source of employment for Russian academics centered on the railroad, itself a reminder of Russian imperialism, and like the other Russian cultural institutions, OIMK held itself above the greater Chinese linguistic, national, and geographic context of the Special District. Since the society's language of publication was Russian, it was difficult to attract the interest of local Chinese scholars and academics. The Russian members of OIMK did not question their model of science and research into the northeast because this model validated their social and ethnic status in Harbin. This elite dominated Harbin society and by the act of naming, studying and cataloguing created and filled a new role for themselves and the culture they represented. Using the tools which OIMK researchers knew best, they dominated their physical and social landscape.

Dogmatic Russian attitudes that only Russians and Russian methods were modern and the Chinese were mired in a pre- modern past were illustrated in the conflict over the OIMK/CER's experimental agricultural farm at Anda, a small town on the railway.

30 A. Pachkovskii, Shest' let (Six Years), in: Isvestiia obshchestva izucheniia Man'chzhurskogo Kraia (Review of the Manchurian Research Society) 7, Harbin, December, 1928, p. 3.

31 A.P., Isvestia obchestva izuchenia Manchurskovo Kraia, p. 17.

OIMK's Russian authorities had seized land and built a cattle farm and milk procession station, ignoring the protests of resident Chinese farmers who argued the land was their property. Eventually Chinese farmers, with the permission of local Chinese authorities, invaded the experimental farm, divided the land into small plots and destroyed the milk processing equipment, which had benefited only the European diet. In the accompanying investigation the Russian authorities could not, or would not, take the Chinese position seriously, labeling the farmers "anti-modern," "feudal" and "dark." In this case, by believing themselves on the side of development and modernity the Russians closed any possibility of dialogue with their Chinese partners. The Chinese press actively resisted the pre-modern label, instead they argues that the Russians and OIMK had ignored the farmers valid claims. The Chinese sources reveal an acute sensitivity about being labeled "pre-modern" and a desire to be seen as progressive. This anxiety the Russians misunderstood as chauvinism, the need to pursue Chinese interests to the detriment of the "greater" good. Thus, the toxic misunderstanding between the two elites was well established, even before OIMK was suppressed.

By 1929, the Chinese municipal and provincial elites were actively campaigning to change OIMK's status, leading to its incorporation into the Chinese provincial educational system. This campaign was also related to elite Chinese concerns about growing Soviet influence. In 1924, the Chinese government, tired of what they perceived as Russian émigré neo-colonialism, signed an agreement giving the Russian power of the jointly administered railway to the Soviet Union. Almost immediately the Chinese discovered they had exchanged one colonial vision for another. The USSR very much saw the CER as part of Russia's traditional sphere of influence, and used its position in the Special District to advance its version of soviet socialism. Soviet advisors interfered in municipal politics and used CER funded institutions, such as schools or OIMK, to pursue their agenda.

In language and form OIMK was seen as a "private" institution of the Harbin Russian community and not the public, non-political research institute it claimed to be. In 1929, with a war over the railway looming with the USSR, OIMK was placed under the authority of the local Chinese government. That same year exhibits on the Manchu and Mongol peoples from OIMK's Harbin museum were removed on order of OIMK's new Chinese directors, recently appointed by the Chinese controlled Special District, because they were "uninteresting."[32] OIMK's new Chinese directors substituted for these exhibitions of "regional" dress and daily life, an exhibition on Soviet industrialization, associating these Chinese elites with Soviet modernity, even as the same elite opposed Soviet interference in the district's affairs. OIMK's museum was the "exhibitionary"[33] manifestation of OIMK's greater project to render the Chinese northeast as an ordered and comprehensible region open to economic development by its Russian managerial

32 A. C. Loukashskin, The Museum of Northern Manchuria in Harbin, in: Manchurian Monitor 1 (1934), p. 187.

33 Sharon MacDonald, Exhibitions of power and powers of exhibition: an introduction to the politics of display, in: Sharon Macdonald (ed.), The Politics of Display: Museums, Science, Culture, London / New York 1998.

class. From the Chinese point of view, the society served the former Russian colonials. The Chinese elite understood OIMK's museum as political, "in other words, lies not just in the policy statements and intentions but also in the apparently non-political and even minor details such as the architecture of buildings, the classification and juxtaposition of artifacts."[34] In marginalizing Chinese contributions to the hoary past, in ignoring the claims of Chinese farmers, in the use of politically ambiguous terms such as "region' and "Manchurian," and by presenting their findings only in Russian, OIMK was sending a clear message. The region's political identity was doubtful, that Chinese were not modern and could not be expected to meaningfully contribute to regional development.

Conclusion

The question of who would be the guest and the host in Manchuria was one that could not be solved through political change alone. Although the region was politically Chinese, Manchuria was a border frontier of recent settlement by both Russian and Chinese. It was a perphiphery to both empires, in which each empire competed to build their own 'modern' Manchuria. The CER concession, later the Special District, was the product of both peoples and polities, illustrating the entangled natures of the cultural transfer in the Chinese northeast. Each had contributed labour, money, and technology to northeast China, first in the form of the Russian-controlled CER concession, then as the Chinese-administered Special District. After 1917, with their real political power gone, the Russian elite attempted to retain its status by remaking itself as a developmental elite, best equipped to modernize the northeast. The former colonizer had become the uneasy subject of the former colonized who were intent on taking over the Russian development project and imposing Chinese direction and reform. In this context of post-colonial competitive visions of modern development whoever could best direct the exploitation of the region and its rich resources could claim the title of "host." The stage was Manchuria itself and how elite Chinese and Russians represented themselves and each other. That the Russians would assume the role of host in this changed post-colonial context irritated the Chinese elite, eager to prove that northern Manchuria could be both "modern" and "Chinese." Both groups clashed over depictions over how Chinese culture was staged by Russians, either on the real stage of Harbin's opera house, or the exhibitory stage of OIMK's vision of pre-modern Chinese culture that implied modernity could only be Russian. Both examples demonstrated that in this bi-cultural and bi-racial northeastern border town the ways in which each community presented itself and represented the other, indeed even whose representation of modernity would prevail, resulted in an identity politics debate that we in the 21st century find familiar today.

34 Ibid.

Borders in Daily Life and the Press: Harbin's Russian and Chinese Newspapers in Early Twentieth Century

Frank Grüner / Rudolph Ng

RESÜMEE

Russische und chinesische Zeitungen, die in der multikulturellen Stadt Harbin zwischen 1900 und 1932 erschienen, stehen im Zentrum dieses Beitrags. Eine vergleichende Analyse von russischen und chinesischen Presseorganen soll Aufschluss darüber geben, wie die unterschiedlichen Bevölkerungsgruppen Grenzziehungen zwischen den Kulturen und grenzüberschreitende Phänomene im Alltag der mandschurischen Stadt kommunizierten. Im Mittelpunkt dieser Studie steht die Frage, wie sich Russen und Chinesen in einer kulturellen Kontaktzone wie Harbin gegenseitig wahrnahmen und wie sie in einem von konkurrierenden Herrschaftsansprüchen, Werten und Lebensentwürfen bestimmten Raum Grenzen aller Art konzeptualisierten. Exemplarisch werden solche Prozesse mit Blick auf „Epidemien", vor allem hinsichtlich der verheerenden Pestepidemie von 1910/11, und „Wirtschaft" untersucht. Beide Untersuchungsbereiche waren von umfassenden Interaktionen und Verflechtungen beider Bevölkerungsgruppen sowie von Konkurrenzsituationen und Konflikten geprägt. Es zeigt sich, dass es zwar durchaus stereotype Bilder vom anderen gab, dass diese wechselseitigen Wahrnehmungen aber keineswegs statisch waren und in spezifischen Kontexten durchaus unterschiedlich, sogar widersprüchlich ausfielen. Interessant ist daher mit Blick auf bestimmte diskursive Praktiken nicht nur die Frage, was in welcher Weise kommuniziert wurde, sondern auch die Frage danach, welche Bereiche des gemeinsamen Alltags nicht thematisiert wurden. Das multilinguale Pressewesen war Ausdruck der sozioökonomischen und kulturellen Diversität der kosmopolitischen Stadt Harbin. Mehrere Dutzend Zeitungen und Zeitschriften vor allem in russischer, chinesischer, japanischer und englischer Sprache, die in der ersten Hälfte des 20. Jahrhunderts erschienen – in der Zeit von 1917 bis 1932 weitgehend unbehelligt von Zensur –, bilden einen unikalen Quellenbestand für Untersuchungen über kulturelle Identitätsbildungen sowie Eigen- und Fremdwahrnehmungen von Bevölkerungsgruppen in multikulturellen Gesellschaften.

Comparativ | Zeitschrift für Globalgeschichte und vergleichende Gesellschaftsforschung 22 (2012) Heft 5, S. 27–46.

Harbin was a cosmopolitan city for much of its history until the Second World War. Inhabited by Chinese (both Manchu people and Han Chinese), Russians, Japanese, Jews and Poles, as well as peoples of many other nationalities, Harbin emerged as a vibrant border town among three empires – China, Russia, and Japan. Situated in northern Manchuria along the tracks of the Chinese Eastern Railway, which stretched from Ulan-Ude and Chita via the Russian-Chinese border cities of Zabaikal'sk and Manzhouli across Manchuria to Beijing, Harbin was founded by Russians in 1898 in the course of their economic expansion in the Far East. The town served as a railway depot and administrative centre of the Russian Chinese Eastern Railway (CER in the following).[1] It was a strategic commercial and military base for all its rulers: first the Russians, then Chinese, and ultimately the Japanese, who took over the city in 1932. Harbin, as the hub of the Chinese Eastern Railway, attracted huge volume of regional and international trade unsurpassed by any other cities in Northeast China for many years.

The first generation of newspapers in Harbin was thus born under this historical context. Inherently multilingual, numerous papers in Russian, Chinese, Japanese, English, and other languages were printed and circulated freely throughout Manchuria and beyond. As Russian and Chinese newspapers in Harbin went through different phases of development, they both faced certain level of censorship before 1917, enjoyed more freedom afterwards. These newspapers constitute a unique corpus of primary sources on the history of Harbin and Manchuria in early 20th century. In particular, the newspapers serve as an excellent source for understanding predominant discourses and opinions of all sorts, including the local interpretation of "border" and relationship between Chinese and Russian[2] populations in Harbin. The editorials offer local, sometimes explicit, opinions about the other cultures or ethnicities. The news coverage reflects day-to-day intercultural relations. Even the advertisements provide historians material in studying culture- or nation-based marketing.

Drawing on Russian and Chinese newspapers printed in Harbin between 1900 and 1932, this paper traces the city's print media and investigates how different communities interpreted the idea of border and sovereignty. While Harbin has been reconstructed as a purely Chinese city in official Communist historiography,[3] this paper argues that the

1 Some of the notable works treating the early history of the Chinese Eastern Railway (CER) and Harbin include: Olga M. Bakich, A Russian City in China: Harbin before 1917, in: Canadian Slavonic Papers 28 (1986) 2, pp. 129-48; idem, Charbin: „Russland jenseits der Grenzen" in Fernost, in: Karl Schlögel (ed.)., Der Große Exodus. Die Russische Emigration und ihre Zentren 1917 bis 1941, München 1994, pp. 304-28; Olga M. Bakich, Origins of the Russian Community on the Chinese Eastern Railway, in: Canadian Slavonic Papers 27 (1985) 1, pp.1-14; James H. Carter, Creating a Chinese Harbin. Nationalism in an International City, 1916–1932, Ithaca 2002; Evgenii Kh. Nilus, Kitaiskaia Vostochnaia Zheleznaia Doroga: Istoricheskii Ocherk, 1896–1923, Harbin 1923; Rosemary K. I. Quested, "Matey" Imperialists? – The Tsarist Russians in Manchuria 1895–1917, Hongkong 1982; Boris A. Romanov, Russia in Manchuria (1892–1906), trans. Susan Wilbur Jones, Ann Arbor 1952; E. P. Taskina (ed.), Russkii Kharbin, Moscow 2005; David Wolff, To the Harbin Station. The Liberal Alternative in Russian Manchuria, 1898–1914, Stanford 1999.

2 "Russian" or the "Russians" means in this context both ethnic Russians as well as members of many other nationalities who immigrated to Harbin from the Russian Empire.

3 See Søren Clausen / Stig Thøgersen (eds), The Making of a Chinese City: History and Historiography in Harbin,

multilingual press in Harbin pointed decidedly to the contrary: Russians saw Harbin as a Russian city until at least 1917. Then, starting with the October revolution and the incremental decline of Russia's dominance in northern Manchuria, the self-perception of Russians in Manchuria was altered, even though Harbin remained a Russian city in their mind. The Chinese, too, recognized the Russian suzerainty of the city, albeit Chinese nationalism and the effort for reestablish Chinese sovereignty increased importantly during the 1920s.[4] Taking these supposed coexisting or conflicting perceptions of Chinese and Russian sovereignty in Harbin into account, the question arises whether Russian and Chinese newspapers printed at that time demonstrated any rigid understanding of a border separating the two peoples? Or alternatively, instead of focusing on the perception of borders, it also could be questioned whether or to what degree the Harbiners seemed to have understood that their economic prosperity relied heavily on the cooperation from both sides. Kinds the central question of this paper is which of borders or demarcations between Chinese and Russians can be observed in Harbin's daily life and how had they been communicated in Russian and Chinese newspapers?
To answer these questions two aspects of Harbin daily life deserve particular attention, namely epidemics and the economy. While the focus on an epidemic like the North Manchurian plague in Harbin and Fujiadian (1910/11) serves to analyze Chinese-Russian relationship under extreme circumstances, the investigation of Harbin trade sheds light on Sino-Russian relations on a daily basis.

A Brief History of Harbin's Press

The Russian Press

Shortly after the founding of Harbin in 1898, the city saw its first Russian newspapers.[5] A majority of these early newspapers, such as the *Kharbinskie vesti* (Harbin News, founded in 1900) and the *Kharbinskii listok* (Harbin Leaflet, founded in 1902) were in print for only a short time.[6] Similar to what other press organizations in the Russian Empire experienced prior to the October Manifesto in 1905, the Harbin Russian press was censored by the Tsarist regime.[7] Another structural similarity between the Harbin Russian press

Armonk 1995; Thomas Lahusen, A Place Called Harbin: Reflections on a Centennial, in: The China Quarterly 154 (1998), pp. 400-10.

4 Carter, Creating a Chinese Harbin, passim.

5 For more detailed information about the Russian Press in Harbin, see Olga Bakich, Harbin Russian Imprints. Bibliography as History, 1898–1961: Materials for a Definitive Bibliography, New York 2002, pp. 1-47; idem, Charbin: Russland „jenseits der Grenzen" in Fernost, pp. 321-2; Shaohua Diao, Kratkii obzor istorii russkoi pechati v Kharbine, in: Revue des Études Slaves 73 (2001) 2-3, pp. 403-45; Amir A. Khisamutdinov, Po stranam rasseianiia. Chast' 1: Russkie v Kitae, Vladivostok 2000, pp. 161-71; Tat'iana V. Kuznetsova, Russkaia kniga v Kitae (1917–1949), Khabarovsk 2003, pp. 44-57.

6 Bakich, Harbin Russian Imprints, pp. 8-9.

7 Ibid., p. 11. For more information about the press within the Russian Empire, see L. McRenolds, The News under Russia's Old Regime: The Development of a Mass-Circulation Press, Princeton 1991; J. Walkin, Government Controls Over the Press in Russia, 1905–1914, in: The Russian Review 13 (1954), pp. 203-9.

and its counterparts elsewhere in the Russian Empire was the source of its financing. In the earlier years the newspapers had been state enterprises, which received full monetary support from the government. In the case of the official Russian press in Harbin, the Russian Ministry of Finance sponsored these publications through the CER. At the same time, private Russian newspapers appeared in Harbin already since 1900, but only after 1905 were some of these papers published on a regular basis. One example of such a private newspaper was the *Vestnik vostoka* [Herald of the East], which was founded in 1907 and merged together with another newspaper, *Deviatyi val* [The Ninth Wave], into the successful newspaper *Novaia zhizn'* [New Life, 1907–1929] in November of the same year.[8] Nonetheless, as the majority of private papers did not achieve the consistently large circulation of official Russian press, our focus remains the official ones.

The first of these official papers was named the *Kharbinskii vestnik* (Harbin Herald). It was published by the CER Commercial Section from 1903 until 1917.[9] After the October Revolution, the *Kharbinskii vestnik* was renamed in December 1917 as the *Zheleznodorozhnik* [Railway Worker] and the *Vestnik Man'chzhurii* [Manchurian Herald] in 1918. Their publications continued subsequently under other names until March 1920.[10]

Standing in a much more financially secured position compared to private newspapers, the *Kharbinskii vestnik* as the official CER press achieved high Russian standards of reporting, layout, and printing. In the beginning, the paper was published three times a week, and after February 1906 it was issued daily.[11] With a circulation of 17,000 copies in 1904/05, the *Kharbinskii vestnik* was read by readers not only in Harbin but also across the entire Russian Far East and Siberia. The CER officials in charge of this newspaper described its most important objective in the first issue of June 10, 1903 as "an exhaustive investigation of economic interests of the Far East and an accurate presentation of the CER's duties and responsibilities concerning trade and industry."[12] Tasked with huge responsibilities of informing all railway personnel and of reaching out to the population within the purview of the CER, the publishers of the *Kharbinskii vestnik* quickly realized that a single, Russian-language newspaper was insufficient to achieve the given objectives. It became apparent from the early days of the *Kharbinskii vestnik* that a Chinese section would be of enormous help for connecting with the Chinese population in Harbin and across the CER-controlled region. In the first two years of its publication, the *Kharbinskii vestnik* printed only advertisements in Chinese. Around 1905 and 1906, internal discussions were held concerning the publication of a standalone Chinese newspaper.[13] The goal of such a Chinese newspaper under the CER management would

8 Bakich, Harbin Russian Imprints, p. 10.
9 Diao, Kratkii obzor istorii russkoi pechati v Kharbine, p. 405.
10 Bakich, Harbin Russian Imprints, p. 423.
11 Diao, Kratkii obzor istorii russkoi pechati v Kharbine, p. 407; Bakich, Harbin Russian Imprints, p. 423.
12 Diao, Kratkii obzor istorii russkoi pechati v Kharbine, pp. 405-6.
13 Kharbinskii vestnik, No. 656, 19 January (1 February) 1906. Cf. also Diao, Kratkii obzor istorii russkoi pechati v Kharbine, pp. 405-6.

be the "converging interests of the Russian and Chinese population under the area of the CER."[14] In 1906, these repeated discussions resulted in the CER-managed, Chinese-language newspaper the *Yuandongbao* 遠東報 (The Far Eastern Paper), and the CER hired the Russian Sinologist Aleksandr Vasil'evich Spitsyn[15] as the paper's editor in chief. How closely Spitsyn followed the original objectives drawn by the CER officials should be discussed later in this paper.

Until 1917, the importance of the *Kharbinskii vestnik* traces back to its large circulation and readership. As an official CER communication tool, it disseminated a rather accurate representation of Tsarist policies in general and CER administration in Harbin in particular. Furthermore, as Shaohua Diao argues succinctly, the *Kharbinskii vestnik*, despite its official characteristics, constitutes an indispensable primary source for the urban history of Harbin.[16]

In Russia, the years between 1905 and 1907 witnessed a period of political and social upheavals. Among them were the key developments of political parties and the press across the country. The events at that time constituted not only the founding of numerous political parties,[17] but also the rapid growth of political journalism within the empire.[18] Although the social and political conditions of Harbin, a young city located at the empire's border, differ significantly from other inland cities of the Russian Empire, one can observe much progress in the Russian press in Harbin from 1905 onward. The political liberalization in Russia after the publication of the October Manifesto resulted in more press institutions in Harbin, above all newspapers, including the private *Novyi krai* (New Territory), *Kharbin* (Harbin) and *Novaia zhizn'* (New Life).[19] These independent papers, such as the anti-tsarist *Novaia zhizn'*, represented liberal political viewpoints and followed more liberal or "democratic" approaches to reporting than the official CER

14 Kharbinskii vestnik, No. 656, 19 January (1 February) 1906 .

15 A native of Tambov Province, Aleksandr Vasil'evich Spitsyn (1876–1941) graduated with honors from the Chinese and Manchu Department of the Oriental Institute in Vladivostok in 1906. Before his tenure at the *Yuandongbao*, he edited the Russian-financed Chinese newspaper *Shengjingbao* 盛京報 in Mukden. As the Russian army retreated up north after the Russo-Japanese War, Spitsyn followed and in 1906 founded the *Yuandongbao* in Harbin. For more than three decades, Spitsyn played an important role between Russian and Chinese communities. On one side, he was a key confidant of General Khorvat, the CER chief, and represented him in negotiations with the Chinese. On the other side, he was advisor to Bi Guifang 畢桂芳 and Bao Guiqing, two governors of the Heilongjiang Province. Locally, he was member of the Harbin Municipal Council and remained a respected member of the community even after Russians lost power in the region. Spitsyn died in Harbin in 1941. Only limited scholarship has been dedicated to Spitsyn. On Spitsyn's relationship to both Russian and Chinese political circles, see Quested, "Matey" Imperialists, pp. 241 and 244-46. On Spitsyn's educational background and its contribution to his approach to Sino-Russian cooperation, see Wolff, To the Harbin Station, pp. 155-59. On primary sources concerning Spitsyn, see Lahusen, A Place Called Harbin, p. 404. Spitsyn's CER personal file is currently located in the Khabarovsk Regional Archives (Gosudarstvennyi arkhiv Khabarovskogo Kraia), f. 830, op. 3, d. 2019.

16 Diao, Kratkii obzor istorii russkoi pechati v Kharbine, pp. 407-8.

17 Cf. H.-D. Löwe, Das Spektrum der Parteien, in: G. Schramm (ed.), Handbuch der Geschichte Russlands, Vol. 3: 1856–1945, Stuttgart 1983, pp. 392-419.

18 Cf. C. Ferenczi, Funktion und Bedeutung der Presse in Rußland vor 1914, in: Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas (1982) 30, pp. 362-98; Walkin, Government Controls Over the Press in Russia, pp. 203-9.

19 Diao, Kratkii obzor istorii russkoi pechati v Kharbine, pp. 409-14.

media outlets.[20] Concerning the dissemination and reader acceptance of these Russian newspapers until 1917, the *Kharbinskii vestnik* and *Novaia zhizn'* probably carried the most weight since they significantly shaped the public opinion in Harbin.[21]

During the Tsarist period between 1900 and 1917, 45 Russian newspapers and 32 Russian magazines appeared in Harbin.[22] The ever-growing number of Russian publications demonstrates a dynamic development of the press in Harbin after the Russo-Japanese War and the 1905 Revolution, even though Harbin was a newly established and still rapidly expanding city.[23] As such, one can agree with Olga Bakich regarding the progress of the Russian press after 1917 in Harbin: "In Tsarist Russia, the Harbin periodical press was rather small: some 25% of newspaper (45 of total 182) and 9 % of the journals (32 of 338) were published in that period."[24]

After 1917, the Harbin Russian press underwent further important developments. First, the October Revolution of 1917, the subsequent Civil War, and the massive movement of migrants out of Russia (especially the anti-Bolshevik "Whites" constituting a large portion of the Harbin population) fundamentally altered the situation in Harbin. On one hand, Russia lost its dominant social and political position in the city. On the other, the CER continued operating under the new joint Sino-Soviet administration in accordance with the 1924 treaty between China and the Soviet Union. These changes, however, did not lead to an "emancipation" of the Chinese population in Harbin. Instead, they created new dilemmas for the Russian residents in the city. The new classification of Russian-speaking residents in Harbin according to their political orientation and nationality caused much fragmentation among the people. Once perceived as a rather homogenous group, the Russian-speaking Harbiners were now categorized as people with full Soviet citizenship, as claimants of Soviet citizenship, as Chinese residents with Russian nationality, or as stateless individuals.[25] Such categorization went further according to their political affinities: the anti-Bolsheviks, monarchists, patriot-nationalists, democrat-liberals, socialists, pro-Soviets, and later also fascists. Thanks to these diverse groups of Russian-speaking residents, fluid political circumstances, and free of Tsarist censorship, the Harbin Russian press enjoyed a period of unprecedented growth from 1917 until 1924. The development of these subgroups reflects the vibrant and diversified growth of Russian newspapers in Harbin. Certainly it is not surprising to observe the highest level of publication of Russian newspapers in the period between 1920 and 1922.[26] Among the 135 Russian newspapers and 299 Russian magazines published in Harbin

20 Ibid., pp. 413-14.
21 Ibid.; Bakich, Charbin. Russland jenseits der Grenzen in Fernost, pp. 321-2.
22 Bakich, Harbin Russian Imprints, p. 47.
23 For the impact of the Russian Revolution of 1905 in Harbin, see Frank Grüner, The Russian Revolution of 1905 at the Periphery: The Case of the Manchurian City of Harbin, in: Felicitas Fischer von Weikersthal / Frank Grüner / Susanne Hohler / Franziska Schedewie / Raphael Utz (eds), The Russian Revolution of 1905 in Transcultural Perspective: Identities, Peripheries, and the Flow of Ideas [forthcoming].
24 Bakich, Harbin Russian Imprints, p. 8.
25 For more information on different categories of Russians in Harbin since 1920, see ibid., p. 14.
26 Ibid., pp. 32-9, 46-7.

from 1918 until 1945, most appeared before 1931. Then during the Manchukuo period (1932–1945), this high number of publications dropped drastically.[27]
Some newspapers from the period before 1917, such as the *Kharbinskii vestnik*, *Vestnik Man'chzhurii*, *Novaia zhizn',* and *Novosti zhizni*, survived the political upheavals to different extent. Among the numerous new publications in the 1920s, *Zaria* [Dawn, 1920], *Rupor* [The Mouthpiece, 1921] and *Gun-bao* [The Public Newspaper, 1926] were the most popular newspapers among the Russian readership in Harbin: "The first two [*Zaria* and *Rupor*] were anti-Soviet, moderately liberal, independent of specific political forces, and aimed at providing international and local news, socio-political commentary, literary works, satire, and reports of local scandals and sensations."[28] The *Gun-bao*, the only newspaper with both Chinese and Russian editions, was financially supported by the joint Sino-Soviet administration of the CER, because it apparently "supported the Chinese administration and restoration of Chinese sovereignty in the Northeast in general and in Harbin in particular."[29]

The Chinese Press

The press as a communication tool to the masses arrived late in China. Coastal cities such as Shanghai and Hong Kong saw their first foreign-managed Chinese-language newspapers in the middle of 19th century.[30] In the north, however, Chinese newspapers did not appear until the last years of the Qing Dynasty. Harbin and indeed Northern Manchuria, did not have any newspaper until the Russians arrived. The first Chinese newspaper in the region, the *Yuandongbao*, was born in 1906 under CER management and continued to be managed by Russians until its closing in 1921.[31] Some other Chinese newspapers were published sporadically during this same period, but none came close to the scale, circulation, and influence achieved by the *Yuandongbao*.[32] Importantly, most other Chinese newspapers rarely lasted more than a year and their copies are lost. The *Yuandongbao* was the only widely-read Chinese newspaper in Harbin and Northern Manchuria during this period, and a significant portion of its issues have been retained in good condition until today.

27 Ibid., p. 46.
28 Ibid., p. 34.
29 Ibid.
30 For the development of newspapers in China see: Barbara Mittler, A Newspaper for China? Power, Identity and Change in Shanghai's News Media, 1872–1912, Cambridge, MA 2004; Rudolf Wagner (ed.), Joining the Global Public: Word, Image, and City in Early Chinese Newspapers, 1870–1910, Albany 2007.
31 Microfilms of the *Yuandongbao* can be found in the City Library and the Provincial Library in Harbin. However, neither library has a complete collection of the newspaper from 1906 to 1921. For example, issues before 1910 are not available in the libraries.
32 Although much research has been done on the Chinese press in the late Qing and early Republican era, a limited volume of scholarly literature is dedicated to the Chinese press in Manchuria, and even less to the Harbin press. An overview of the historical Chinese press in Harbin was published as part of the local gazetteers. See Haerbinshi difangzhi bianzuan weiyuanhui, Haerbin shizhi [Harbin Gazetteer], Vol. 25, Harbin 1997.

The creation of the *Yuandongbao* traces back to its predecessor in southern Manchuria. The Russian army printed the Chinese-language newspaper *Shengjingbao* 盛京報 in Mukden until 1905.[33] After their defeat in the Russo-Japanese War, the Russians moved north, and General Nikolai Linevich, commander in chief of the Russian forces in the Far East, handed over the printing press of the Chinese newspaper to the CER. The CER's general manager, General Dimitrii Leonidovich Khorvat, seized this opportunity and launched a new Chinese newspaper, the *Yuandongbao*, with a number of objectives. Above all, this new Chinese newspaper was to play a role in the rapprochement of the two empires and their peoples. In addition, the *Yuandongbao* would attempt to improve Russia's image in Manchuria after its inglorious loss at the hands of the Japanese. The *Yuandongbao* was also supposed to counteract the growing presence of Japanese-backed newspapers in the Far East. Furthermore, as a practical matter, the newspaper, with its daily train schedule and related CER advertisements, would bring in more Chinese customers to the railway, which was still being operated by the Russians.[34]

Khorvat retained the service of two key staff members of *Shengjingbao*. The editor in Mukden, A. V. Spitsyn, became the manager and editor-in-chief of *Yuandongbao* in Harbin. Gu Zhi,[35] the Chinese editor of *Shengjingbao*, continued to work in the same position for *Yuandongbao*. Il'ia Amvlikhovich Dobrolovskii[36] became the Spitsyn's assistant. The new *Yuandongbao* staff put out the paper's first issue on March 14, 1906, printing 1,000 copies.[37] Four years after its first publication, *Yuandongbao* tripled its daily circulation to 3,000 copies, when the 1000th issue was celebrated on May 19, 1910.[38]

Yuandongbao was financially supported by the Russian Finance Ministry, which allocated 170,000 rubles through the CER as the paper's annual budget.[39] With this strong sup-

33 Wolff, To the Harbin Station, p. 160.

34 Ibid., p. 161.

35 Gu Zhi 顧植 (1874–?), a Shanghai native, was the main Chinese counterpart of Spitsyn and Dobrolovskii in Mukden and, for two years, in Harbin at Yuandongbao. After his tenure at *Yuandongbao*, he moved to Changchun to manage another Chinese newspaper *Jichangribao* 吉長日報. Details about his life remain largely unclear, but his congratulatory message to Yuandongbao on its 10-year anniversary was published, in which he briefly describes the founding of Yuandongbao and mentions the paper being a joint venture between Spitsyn and him, with the shared goal of enriching North Manchurian culture and of making contributions to Sino-Russian friendship. See Yuandongbao. 1916. 15 March.

36 Like Spitsyn, Il'ia Amvlikhovich Dobrolovskii (1877/8–1920) also studied at the Oriental Institute in Vladivostok. Upon leaving Vladivostok, he worked as a translator in the Russian Army during the Russo-Japanese War. After the war, Dobrolovskii assisted Spitsyn at Yuandongbao and became a regular correspondent for the Russian Telegraph Agency and for New Time [*Novoe vremia*], a popular paper in St. Petersburg. He co-founded the Society of Russian Orientalists in Harbin and dedicated much time locally. Dobrolovskii published widely on Manchuria. His major works include Heilongjiang Province of Manchuria [*Kheiluntszianskaia provintsiia Man'chzurii*]. Harbin, 1906; General Brief Description of the Heilongjiang Province [*Vseobshchee kratkoe opisanie Kheiluntszianskaia provintsiia*]; and Transcription of Chinese Place Names in Manchuria [*O transkriptsii kitaiskikh nazvanii v Man'chzhurii*] For detailed description of Dobrolovskii's work, see Vestnik Azii (Herald of Asia) 48 (1922) 1. This was an issue dedicated to him by the Society of Russian Orientalists. Also see Roza P. Tamazanova, "Zhurnal 'Vestnik Azii' v sisteme russkoiazychnykh periodicheskikh izdanii v Man'chzhurii (Harbin, 1909–1917 gg.), Ph.D. dissertation; Moscow 2004.

37 Kharbinskii vestnik, 1913, 4 December.

38 Wolff, To the Harbin Station, p. 161.

39 Heilongjiangribaoshe xinwenzhi bianjishi, Dongbei xinwen shi, Harbin 2001, p. 21.

port and its CER connections, *Yuandongbao* was able to maintain a large network of reporters and pay to reprint stories from expensive foreign news outlets such as Reuters. For a long time, the newspaper had reporters across Manchuria and in every major city in China, Russia, and abroad who served multiple purposes: They reported on the news for *Yuandongbao,* but they also solicited subscriptions and actively sought out potential advertisers. The paper was circulated not only in Russian-controlled northern Manchuria but also in southern Manchuria, where the Japanese sphere of influence was located. Though the target audience of *Yuandongbao* was in northeast China, it reached well beyond Manchuria. For example, newspapers in Shanghai often reacted to what *Yuandongbao* had to say, which means people in places as far away as Shanghai were reading it.

Yuandongbao did not contradict the general Russian policy in the Far East. Its pro-Russian stance reached its zenith during 1912, when a *Yuandongbao* editorial argued for the independence of Outer Mongolia from China. The Chinese denounced *Yuandongbao,* and as a result the paper's sales dropped 30 percent and Spitsyn received multiple death threats. However, *Yuandongbao*'s reputation rebounded, as Spitsyn took several measures to modify the newspaper. He expanded the number of pages in *Yuandongbao* and included an extra page of entertainment written exclusively in vernacular Chinese, so that even the lower classes could read the paper with ease. Criticism against Chinese policies would be toned down, and anti-Russian news items introduced. All these measures yielded positive results in a short time.

On December 17, 1913, *Yuandongbao* marked its 2,000th issue by printing portraits of prominent Chinese figures congratulating the paper. Even Xiang Xiling 熊希齡, the prime minister of the Chinese Republic, sent in his best wishes. On March 14, 1916, the paper celebrated its tenth anniversary with congratulations from officials, businesses, schools, and organizations of both Chinese and Russian communities. The year 1916 also saw the pages of *Yuandongbao* expand to twelve and the circulation reach a new volume of 5,000 — making it the largest among the twenty Chinese newspapers in the region. Except for its major rival, *Shengjingshibao* 盛京時報 — the Japanese-financed Chinese newspaper based in Mukden — *Yuandongbao*'s influence in the region and beyond was unparalleled.

During the last week of February 1921, *Yuandongbao* published a short notice on its front page indicating its forthcoming end and announcing that subscriptions would be refunded.[40] The paper claimed its cessation was a CER order and did not explain the reason behind it. In fact, an agreement had been reached a few months back between the Chinese and the Russians. *Yuandongbao* was to end not because of financial reasons, as it was still a viable commercial enterprise and financially dependent from CER.[41] Instead, the closing was political and was not under the control of Spitsyn and his Chinese colleagues. The Chinese government had begun a rollback of Russian privileges in Harbin, which included *Yuandongbao* and other CER publications, the Society of Russian Ori-

40 Yuandongbao, 1921, 25-28 February, p. 1.
41 Wolff, To the Harbin Station, p. 232.

entalists, and the Municipal Council. These and other rights in the city were to be taken away as the Chinese gained more political clout in Harbin.
After the fall of *Yuandongbao*, the Japanese-backed Chinese newspapers filled the void. *Shengjingshibao*, published in Mukden since 1908, and *Dabeishenbao* 大北新報, published in Harbin since 1922. They reflected the Japanese policies in the Far East and, with political backing of Manchukuo, both newspapers did not face any serious competition and remained the most read Chinese newspapers until 1944. Much different from *Yuandongbao*, the Japanese-back Chinese newspapers allowed only pro-Japanese items appear and did not reveal much interracial dynamics as its Russian predecessors once did.

Two Examples from Harbin Russian and Chinese Press: Focusing on Epidemics and Economy

Epidemics in the Russian Press

During the first half of the 20th century, residents of Harbin experienced a number of natural catastrophes and epidemics. The cholera broke out twice, in 1900 and 1932. The pneumonic plague arrived in Harbin in 1910. The city witnessed flooding around 1910 und in 1932. Each of these natural disasters poised tremendous danger to the multiethnic population of the city. Catastrophes also challenged the city administration; Russian and Chinese leaders would scramble to establish emergency help, to provide medical care, to improve sanitary standard, and to enact policies which could help the city in case of another catastrophe. All these activities were happening while cultural differences appeared up front between the Russian and Chinese communities. The pneumonic plague would highlight these cultural differences. A comparative examination of the actions among these two peoples in Harbin would illustrate how different ethnic, national, and cultural groups of people lived together under these extreme circumstances. How did they perceive each other in difficult times? Did they communicate to one another and did they cooperate? Or did these events create or even strengthen an us-versus-them mentality? How did Harbin residents alter or even overcome their pre-plague image of the other during and after the catastrophe. For Harbin, all these seem to be open questions. Their answers can hardly be one standard theory that is applicable to all border towns in Northeast Asia. Yet they would tell us more about the daily life in Harbin where living under border was an everyday issue that all residents had to confront with. To this end, a selected set of examples from news reports should be examined, and news coverage on the 1910 plague would serve as the basis of study.
The pneumonic plague of between 1910 and 1911 in Manchuria was one of the most devastating epidemics in the 20th century. Different estimates put the number of deaths between 42,000 and 60,000.[42] In Harbin, where about 30,000 people resided, the num-

42 See Mark Gamsa, The Epidemic of Pneumonic Plague in Manchuria 1910–1911, in: Past & Present 190 (2006), pp.

ber of casualties reached 1,500, almost all of them Chinese.[43] Among the dead, only 40 were Europeans and 31 of them belonged to the medical crew. In the neighboring Chinese city Fujiadian, which stood outside of CER purview, the situation was even more dramatic. About one-third of the population fell victims to the plague, which counted between 7,000 and 8,000 people.[44] Most of these victims came from the lower class of the Chinese society. From the Russian and American point of view, the speedy spread of this disease had to do with the unsatisfactory standard of hygiene in the area where the Chinese were living.[45] To oversee and coordinate the fight against the plague more effectively, the Central Sanitary Executive Commission of the city of Harbin established a Plague Bureau. Under the direction of this office, disinfection teams were deployed; plague hospitals, quarantine stations, and isolated quarters were set up; hygienic standards across the city were monitored; traffic of people (Chinese, above all) and goods were closely watched; and, gatherings in public places were banned.[46] In this context, the regular contacts and trade between Harbin and Fujiadian were temporarily severed. Only Europeans could travel freely between the cities without being inspected. In Pristan', the commercial district within Harbin where the plague hit hardest, bazaars and markets were closed in the interim.[47] The most critical comments were made regarding the poor hygienic standards in Harbin's Chinese quarter and in Fujiadian. Appeals from the Russians were loud and clear that the Chinese ought to rectify the situation as soon as possible. These appeals received a great deal of attention from the press and the city government.

The Russian press carried important implications in this situation, because the papers reported on daily basis new ordinances and other initiatives from the Central Sanitary Executive Commission. Above all, the official CER Russian newspaper *Kharbinskii vestnik* and Chinese newspaper *Yuandongbao* must have contributed to this end.

Reporting on the plague, the Russian press did not hesitate to offer its explanation for the general situation. In words which left no doubts, an article from *Novaia zhizn'* on October 28, 1910 summarized the Russian perspective succinctly: "We see that the plague mostly appears among the Chinese."[48] However, the Russian press was equally clear that, given the proximity between the two peoples, the plague poised a serious threat towards the Russians and other Europeans, too. While the Harbin's Russian newspapers reported

147-183, 154; Cornelia Knab, Plague Times: Scientific Internationalism and the Manchurian Plague of 1910/1911, in: Itinerario 35 (2011) 3, pp. 87-105; Carl F. Nathan, Plague Prevention and Politics in Manchuria 1910–1931, Cambridge, MA 1967.

43 The Epidemic of Pneumonic Plague in Manchuria 1910–1911, p. 154.

44 Ibid., p. 154.

45 U.S. National Archives: Harbin Consular Files. Vol. 6. Dispatch No. 125, Harbin, China, January 28, 1911, pp. 56-60 (Plague in North Manchuria).

46 U.S. National Archives: Harbin Consular Files. Vol. 6. Enclosure with dispatch No. 129, Harbin, China, February 7, 1911, pp. 75-82 (Plague Bureau of the Central Sanitary-Executive Commission: Description of the Measures Adopted Against the Plague in the City of Harbin).

47 Ibid.

48 K bor'be s chumoi, in: Novaia zhizn', 1910, 28 October.

daily what kind of actions were taken by the CER administration and the city government, more and more questions concerning the Chinese reactions (in Fujiadian and other area along CER under Chinese jurisdiction) to the plague showed up on the Russian-language press, "Just what steps have the Chinese authorities been taking against the plague!"[49]

In the same article, Chinese would be accused of failing to act against the plague. The Chinese leaders, according to the writer, left their due responsibilities to their Russian and European counterparts. The Chinese simply expected that certain measures would be taken; some personnel and means would be arranged at once to fight the epidemics and to save the Harbin population.[50] Furthermore, the Chinese authorities should have explained clearly to their people the danger of and solution to the plague, even if they had to impose some punishment on certain individuals. The Chinese did not isolate the places where many Chinese gathered and did not prevent Europeans from going to those locations. Generally speaking, *Novaia zhizn'* recommended that Europeans avoid making contacts with the Chinese. However, as the Russians and Chinese lived and worked everyday side by side, such a recommendation for most Harbin residents was simply inapplicable.

Despite the frustration over the alleged idleness of the Chinese authorities, Harbin's Russian press pointed out that only with the Chinese cooperation could the plague be effectively contained. When the Chinese authorities in Fujiadian demonstrated their willingness to cooperate with their Russian counterpart in fighting the plague, the editors of *Kharbinskii vestnik* expressed their relief.[51]

Russians in Harbin, having enjoyed semi-colonial status above the Chinese, felt their own vulnerability for the first time. Being caught quite off guard, Russians realized that their privileges depended on the cooperation with the Chinese population. Before the crisis in 1910/11, such awareness of their own limitation should not be understood as a matter of course within the Russian community in Harbin. The imminent threat posed by the plague evidently forced the Russian community to rethink its relationship with the Chinese neighbors. The official paper *Kharbinskii vestnik* made this readjustment clear: the sealing off and isolation of Fujiadian must be understood as both a temporary solution and a last resort. Such a policy was not intended to humiliate the Chinese, but only to achieve the necessary steps in stopping the pest. In an almost apologetic tone, the article at the end clarified the isolation of Fujiadian:

> *We never supported chauvinistic policies; clang of arms has always sickened us. A friendly coexistence with China, which we have preached for all along, is exactly what we are trying so hard to achieve right now.*[52]

49 Ibid.
50 Ibid.
51 Kharbinskii vestnik, 1910, 4 November.
52 Izoliatsiia Fudziadiana, in: Kharbinskii vestnik, 1910, 17 November.

Although it had been published in a Russian paper, this remark was addressed to the Chinese population of Harbin and Fujiadian, which reacted in parts intensely to the Russian means of compartmentalization. According to *Kharbinskii vestnik,* especially the Chinese paper of Fujiadian, *Dongchuigongbao* 東陲公報,[53] sharply criticized Russian measurements and compartmentalization, as they were felt to be a degradation and deprivation of rights for the Chinese population.[54] It can be seen from several reactions in the Russian papers in Harbin, that *Dongchuigongbao* called for boycotts of Harbin self-government measurements, because they allegedly did not serve the struggle against the plague but rather aimed at Russian gain and the goal of suspension of Chinese sovereignty in Fujiadian.[55]

The polemical and implacable controversy between Russian press in Harbin and Chinese press in Fujiadian can be read as an indication for the fact that in the process of crisis management of the plague epidemic cultural boarders in mutual understanding of Chinese and Russians were reached and overstepped. This brought along the spread of a foe image and respectively a demonization of that other group. This foe image shows in the numerous anti-Russian depictions in which *Dongchuigongbao* antagonized its readers against the Russians, for example this one: "The Russians regard the Chinese as animals, this can be seen, inter alia, from the fact that the sent veterinaries to fight the plague in Fujiadian." [56]

Nationalist and chauvinist undertones can likewise be spotted in the depictions of the Russian press, although their coverage was otherwise marked by objectivity, the Chinese population was blamed for the spread of the plague and defamed as a group. In the context of the plague the picture of the Chinese grows increasingly negative. What is more, the picture of the Chinese can be distinctly distinguished from the depiction of the Chinese before and after the plague.

Epidemics in the Chinese Press

Yuandongbao, like its Russian counterparts, dedicated many pages to cover the pneumonic plague in Harbin between 1910 and 1911 and public health directives could be read daily. In the early phrase of the plague, some reports detailed the joint Sino-Russian effort in combating the plague. For instance, on November 20, 1910, *Yuandongbao* recorded that the Russian medical personnel and CER's chief of Chinese affairs inspected

53 *Dongchuigongbao* (Dongchui Public Paper) was founded by Wang Dezi 王德茲 in March 1910 with the express purpose to oppose *Yuandongbao*. The original of *Dongchuigongbao* is lost. The Russian and Chinese press, namely *Kharbinskii vestnik* and *Yuandongbao*, had referred to it either explicitly or implicitly. Like many other Chinese newspapers from Fujiadian, the publication of *Dongchuigongbao* did not last more two years. Until 1921, the leading Chinese paper in Harbin and vicinity remained *Yuandongbao*. For this reason, our discussion of the Harbin Chinese press focuses on *Yuandongbao* only. For more details of the early Chinese press in Harbin, see *Haerbin shizhi* 哈爾濱市志 (Harbin City Gazette), Vol. 25, Harbin 1994.

54 See, e.g. Fudziadianskie oratory, in: Kharbinskii vestnik, 1910, 18 November.

55 See, e.g. Novaia Zhizn', 1910, 17. and 18 November.

56 Cited by Novaia Zhizn', 1910, 17 November.

Fujiadian.[57] A few days later, the newspaper informed its readers that Chinese students would be separated from the Russian students at the Harbin No. 2 Primary School and Dr. Roger Budberg would visit the affected families soon.[58] However, the focus of reporting shifted to the Chinese – the impact, consequences, and solutions to the plague. On March 22, 1911, the paper reported that 7,214 deaths accumulated in Fujiadian.[59] Nowhere could the reader know how many Russians in Harbin were affected. On March 14, 1911, *Yuandongbao* detailed the actions taken by the Fujiadian's Health Authority against the plague: stopping all traffic in and out of the Chinese community, having a team of Chinese doctors from Tianjin and Peking inspecting the hygiene situation in Fujiadian, burning down several buildings which had been lived by the infected, etc.[60] On January 14, 1911, the paper reported a groundbreaking change of burial practice, which would help curb the epidemics. Dr. Wu Liande 伍連德 (1879–1960), the British-educated Chinese-Malaysian who became the Imperial Commissioner overseeing all plague-related policies, successfully petitioned the Qing court's approval of cremation.[61] The paper applauded such an initiative and praised Dr. Wu and his team for rescuing the Harbin population. Russian involvements in all these events, however, were disproportionately obscure even on this Russian-financed Chinese newspaper. Indeed, there were few news clips in 1911 reporting Russian doctors' participation in the quarantine and inspections. When their activities were reported, they were usually written in fact-of-the-matter-style, without praising or criticizing them. For example, on March 14, 1911, *Yuandongbao* reported under the title "Russian Doctors Inspecting Fujiadian":

> *On Sunday afternoon, a team of Russian doctors visited Fujiadian and inspected the hospitals and quarantined buildings. They were accompanied by local anti-plague specialists. The Russian doctors did not make any comments, but lamented how deserted the city has become.*[62]

Such a report was not characteristic of the news items covering the plague. Generally, Russians were either entirely out of the picture or became the neutral subjects in the reports. Border, a concept which diseases do not recognize, found quite a consistent reception in the Chinese newspaper. Based on what *Yuandongbao* reported about the plague, one cannot miss the emphasis that the plague, from the Chinese perspective, was primarily a Chinese issue. Being outsiders, Russians had little, if any, say on this matter and Dr. Wu was fully capable of handling the matter.

Unlike the Russian press, some of which criticized the Chinese openly, the Russian-sponsored *Yuandongbao* showed no negative feelings explicitly. However, observing the gener-

57 Cited by Gamsa, The Epidemic of Pneumonic Plague in Manchuria 1910–1911, p. 150. Yuandongbao, 1910, 20 November.
58 Cited ibid.; Yuandongbao. 1910. 24 November.
59 Yuandongbao, 1911, 22 March, p. 3.
60 Yuandongbao, 1911, 14 March, p. 3.
61 Yuandongbao, 1911, 14 January, p. 3.
62 Yuandongbao, 1911, 14 March, p. 3.

ally outspoken attitude of the Chinese editors of *Yuandongbao*, the lack of attribution of the plague to any particular cause, and subsequent appraisal of Dr. Wu's performance, one might argue there were acrimonious feeling also from the Chinese side, but complying with the Sino-Russian cooperative editorial policy, any negative commentaries on the Russian reaction to the plague could not have appeared in *Yuandongbao*. Chinese criticism could be, however, read in newspapers printed elsewhere in China.[63]

Economy in the Russian Press

Topics concerning Harbin's economic development as an administrative and economic center of Northeastern China appeared often in the Russian-language newspapers in Harbin. *Kharbinskii vestnik*, the official CER information outlet, had a state goal of bringing the general welfare of the entire region (Chinese and Russian) into consideration.[64] Its reporting reflects such an objective. Examples can be found in pieces discussing the availability of food and consumer goods and articles investigating the Russian positions in regional trade and industry. As it was part of CER, the focus of *Kharbinskii vestnik* remained primarily Russian-related and its effectiveness of crossing border in exploring the economic interests of both people continued to be unclear.

In practice, neither *Kharbinskii vestnik* nor other Russian newspapers were up to the task in bringing attention to both Russian and Chinese population in Harbin. The deeper reason behind the unaccomplished border-crossing was not because of the lacking of a stated goal of connecting Russian and Chinese interests, but because of the fundamental perspective of Russian position in the region: the Russian commercial interests *are* Harbin's commercial interests. This perspective did not always reflect the reality. In fact, trade and industrial development of Harbin relied in many ways on the broad cooperation among Russians and Chinese who shared common goals and joint strategies.[65] Such cooperation, however, were rarely, if ever, reported in the Harbin's Russian press. To illustrate this point, the following section will provide an example from the Russian press.

Already in the first years of printing, the Harbin's Russian press – such as *Kharbinskii vestnik* – portrayed Chinese, Japanese, and other people as competitors in businesses.[66] The reports, which were largely one-sided discussions, focused on economic disadvantages of the Russians in the area and elicited a sharp us-versus-them mentality. The Russian press showed its particularly strong fear against business competition from the Chinese. On December 1, 1906, *Kharbinskii vestnik* carried an article with this beginning:

63 For example, see Shenbao and Shibao.

64 Kharbinskii vestnik, 1903, 18 October.

65 See Frank Grüner, In the Streets and Bazaars of Harbin: Marketers, Small Traders, and Peddlers in a Changing Multicultural City, in: Itinerario 35 (2011) 3, pp. 37-72, in particular pp. 42-45.

66 O mestnoi torgovle (On local trade) , in: Kharbinskii vestnik, 1903, 22 June.

> *In our newspaper, we have already made our conviction known many times, that the most dangerous competition for our (Russian) industrialists and merchants do not stem from the Japanese, not from other foreigners, but from the local Chinese population. So strong are the business sense of the Chinese and their close-knitted nature among themselves. Equally strong is the development of their chambers of commerce. The Chinese are tough competitors for us because of their fidelity, hardworking nature, endurance, patience, and readiness to accept minimum level of profit. These characteristics of them are particularly apparent, when they are home with their countrymen together.*[67]

The tone, in which many pre-1917 Russian articles addressed business issues in Harbin, can be described as sharply competitive and not cooperative vis-a-vis the Chinese:

> *On these already known matters, we would like to emphasize again, that we (the Russians) want to strengthen our industry and trade development in Manchuria. However, we must pay attention to the competitions from the locals (the Chinese), because lack of such attention would lead to a bitter end for us.*[68]

After such an opening, the editor of *Kharbinskii vestnik* argued for a closer cooperation with the Chinese on site and adopting Chinese business strategies. It is interesting to note that, although Russians at this point still enjoyed semi-colonial privileges in Harbin, the Russian press repeatedly discussed the commercial disadvantages of the Russian business community.

Russian newspapers presented a rather ambivalent picture of Russian economic role in Manchuria. Despite the fact that Russians were the main contributors to Manchurian modernization, such as bringing technical experts into the region and making major investments, Russians could not compete with the Chinese on the long run. When *Kharbinskii vestnik* reported on Chinese businesses, it showed certain fear, that "our (Russian) commercial interests would be sooner or later taken over by them," specifically by the credit of the Russo-Asiatic Bank.[69]

Numerous examples from the Russian press also pointed to deep skepticism and begrudging attitude towards Japanese business activities in Manchuria, regardless of the actual market share of the Japanese in regional trade, in financial sector, and in the expected railway expansion. On August 10, 1908, *Kharbinskii vestnik* published an article titled "The Conquest of Northern Manchuria by the Japanese" which sounded quite ominous: "The Japanese have conquered South Manchuria with arms; they will take Northern Manchuria with economic means."[70]

In general, one can argue that the pre-1917 official Russian press, instead of observing Harbin economy as one collective, emphasized diverging economic interests among Russians, Chinese, Japanese, and other groups of people. Market competition among and

67 Kharbinskii vestnik, 1906, 1 December.
68 Ibid.
69 Kharbinskii vestnik, 1906, 2 December.
70 Kharbinskii vestnik, 1906, 10 August.

different cultural aspects of peoples were depicted up-close. In this sense, concerning both small trade within Harbin and regional and international trade connected with Northern Manchuria, the Russian press such as *Kharbinskii vestnik* reinforced rather than challenged the concept of border in the Harbiner's mind.

This competitive perspective commingled with the overall Russian perception of their own cultural superiority. The idea of Russia's civilizing mission in China was frequently articulated in Harbin Russian press, as the article "Twenty Years in Manchuria" from *Vestnik Man'chzhurii* (Manchurian Herald) exemplarily shows:

> *We, the Russians have brought to this region [Manchuria] a higher culture than that of the Chinese, we have given the native masses our technological knowledge and skills, we have taught them how to perfect their working methods, we have expanded their intellectual horizons (there is already a group of Chinese intellectual youths who have graduated from the Russian school), we have helped the rich productive potential of the country to find a perspective, and we have guaranteed its supply of imported products. In a word, neither the sovereign of the country nor the native population have the slightest justification to accuse our colony of exploitation, and of draining northern Manchuria of its resources in the course of the last twenty years. In this respect, the politics of Russia fundamentally and beneficially differ from the traditional colonial politics of the majority of other states.*[71]

The Russian elites in Harbin were convinced that by mobilizing all of its powers Russia made Manchuria a modern and prosperous region for the good of China and its population. This can be seen as credo and at the same time as a legitimization of Russian imperialist politics. In general, it is certainly not an exaggeration to state that the conviction of Russia's civilizing mission in China represented the core of Russian identity formation and imperial consciousness in Manchuria.[72] The Harbin Russian press played a major role in establishing this mindset among Russians in Harbin.

Economy in the Chinese Press

Almost on a daily basis, *Yuandongbao* delivered news on Russian economy. Tsarist economic policies received priority treatment and they were usually printed as headlines – and in positive light. Such treatment was especially salient during WWI, when Russia issued government bonds and *Yuandongbao* encouraged the purchase of the bonds.[73] In

71 Vestnik Man'chzhurii, 1918, 3 (16) January.

72 See Frank Grüner, Russians in Manchuria: From Imperial to National Identity in Colonial and Quasi-Colonial Space, in: Simon Wendt/Brian D. Behnken (eds), Transcultural Perspectives on Nationalism and Ethnicity in the Twentieth Century [forthcoming].

73 Common policy addresses concerned with the issues of war bonds, regulations of interest rates, and new economic initiatives in other parts of the Russian empire. For examples, see issues of Yuandongbao, 1910, 1 August, p. 1: 1911. 14 March, p. 2; 1916, 11. March 11, p. 1; 1921. 27 February, p. 2.

addition, the Chinese newspaper made regular reports on cross-border trading activities such as smuggling and tariff rates.[74] These reports reflected the general editorial principles of Spitsyn.

While the concept of "border" revealed itself in what the Russian press published, *Yuandongbao* did much to demonstrate it in what was not written. In fact, neither Russia nor Russians was the focus beyond the frontpage of *Yuandongbao* and, for all practical purposes, only Chinese-related economic events were printed, even though Russians certainly played a crucial role in the Harbin economy. Commercial transactions were at least until 1918 predominately in Russian hands.

> *Consequently, […], the bulk of the commerce of Harbin, as the administration of the municipality, is in Russian hands; there are 192 Russian firms out of a total of 235, and the Russians number over 92 per cent of the total foreign population of some 35,000 during the year of 1912.* [75]

Thus, it was surprising that a few weeks would pass by without even a single article concerning Russian business activities appearing on *Yuandongbao* – both locally in Harbin and regionally in Manchuria. One might have the impression after reading some issues of *Yuandongbao* that Russian commercial endeavors in Harbin were almost nonexistent and Chinese firms practically dominated Harbin commerce. A few examples are given below to illustrate the obvious *Yuandongbao*'s neglect of Russian participation and contribution to Harbin economy.

Banking was one of the most important areas where Russian participation was influential in Harbin commerce. The Russo-Asiatic Bank 俄亞銀行, which closely associated with the CER and had its headquarter in St. Petersburg, was the second largest bank in China in early 1900s.[76] One cannot find any news report or editorials dedicated to this important bank in Harbin. Instead, Chinese banks such as the Agricultural Bank of China 農業銀行, Sinhua Savings Bank 新華儲蓄銀行 – which were much smaller on operational scale – received coverage, when their branch openings and stock offerings took place.[77]

The second area of Russian business, which contributed to the vibrant economy in Harbin, was the department stores. An important example was the Tchurin Department Store. Founded by E. Y. Tchurin, this store was the "oldest and most influential Russian commercial enterprise in Manchuria."[78] Both Russians and Chinese were customers of this department store; however, its activities were curiously not reported in *Yuandongbao*. Finally, the business of transportation should not be disregarded, as ships regularly carried all kinds of products to and from Russian ports such as Vladivostok.[79] Russians

74 Yuandongbao, 1910, 4 September, p. 2.
75 Report for the Year 1912 on the Trade of the Consular District of Harbin, 5, in: British Foreign Office, No. 5123.
76 Zhaojin Ji, A History of Modern Shanghai Banking: The Rise and Decline of China's Finance Capitalism, New York 2003, p. 70.
77 Yuandongbao, 1917, 13 March, p. 7.
78 The China Monthly Review, 1936, p. 170.
79 John Coulter. Harbin: Strategic City on the "Pioneer Fringe", in: Pacific Affairs 5 (1932) 11, p. 969.

remained the major business partners to Chinese entrepreneurs in Harbin. However, nowhere were the accidents, disputes, and agreements concerning the transportation business to be read in *Yuandongbao*. It is probably hard to imagine, through weeks and months, there was no newsworthy commercial events in and around Harbin – at ports, harbors, train stations, warehouses – related to Russian businesses and personnel.

The absence of reporting on the Russian business community seemed to reinforce the concept of border in *Yuandongbao*. Such concept, however, aligned itself along with the traditional nation-state definition of border. In discussing "border" and the people on the other side being named "*eren*" (Russians), *Yuandongbao* concentrated on the Russians far from Harbin, who were living in European Russia, for example in St. Petersburg, or in the Russian Far East. The Russians just a few miles away, living in Harbin, did not receive their due share of attention. While the official policy of *Yuandongbao* must have put Sino-Russian cooperation in the forefront, the two diverging approaches of handling "Russians" in the news show the true editorial attitude of the Chinese editors under Spitsyn: On one hand, the front page satisfied what the official policy, reporting Tsarist policies in the best light possible; on the other hand, in the rest of the newspaper, the Chinese writers showed what they truly interested in – i.e., the Chinese community – and how they perceived the Russian population in Harbin. *Yuandongbao*'s coverage of Chinese commercial activities and non-coverage of Russian business events suggest that the Chinese and Russian commercial communities were two distinct groups. These two communities were by no means integrated. However, instead of the hostile attitude demonstrated by the editorials of *Kharbinskii vestnik*, the Chinese showed not much interest in the Russian enterprises and did not observe them as a serious threat to the point where they deserved daily coverage.

Conclusion

An examination of the Russian and Chinese presses in Harbin suggests strong demarcation between the two peoples, despite of their spatial proximity, economic interdependence, and daily transcultural entanglements. Russian residents in Harbin, just like their Chinese neighbors, saw themselves as two separate collectives and mainly concerned with their own interests. Especially the Russians, saw the other basically as competitor or even a serious threat to their livelihood. Such a phenomenon was particularly dramatic during the pneumonic plague between 1910 and 1911, when the Russian press openly criticized the Chinese community. Along the same line, reports on trade further illustrated such delineation between Russians and Chinese. In other cases written by the press, both Russian and Chinese paid little if any attention to the other culture.

Showing their self-perception and perception of the other, the Russian and Chinese newspapers left no doubt in their writing about the nature of their local Sino-Russian relationship: Two groups would be represented as distinct entities with clear cultural boundaries. Under normal circumstances, the Russian and Chinese press portrayed their

neighbors as the *other* (but not as an enemy) and showed no particular interest in highlighting Sino-Russian cooperation. In addition, the Russian press communicated the idea of Russian cultural superiority over the Chinese, in particular during the period of Russian dominance of Manchuria until around 1920. The tone, however, changed dramatically in times of crises. Russian and Chinese newspapers, namely *Kharbinskii vestnik* and *Dongchuigongbao* criticized the other in a much more nationalistic and hostile manner. Despite such an aggressive tone, both Russian and Chinese press organs encouraged cooperation and pragmatism in overcoming critical situations. Not surprisingly, this pragmatic approach was especially noticeable from a transcultural newspaper such as *Yuandongbao*.

Through the lens of newspapers, the paper investigates everyday life in Harbin between the two peoples. From this study, one might reasonably argue for a tendency: Russians and Chinese understood themselves above all as representatives of a certain culture or even a country – this is at least what the newspapers communicated to their readers. The discursive confrontation between the two populations, each with its "own" interests, fear, cultural identity, and perception of the others, almost always served as a polarizing force instead of a uniting agent. Under the best circumstances, the Russian and Chinese newspapers in Harbin reported about the neighboring people in a neutral, indifferent manner. Even the hybrid newspaper *Yuandongbao* did not achieve what was supposedly its number-one task: bringing together the interests of both communities. Reading between the lines of the Russian and Chinese newspapers, one might get the idea of daily life in Harbin being part of the vibrant life of a "border town." Further research on the social fabric of Harbin has to prove the overall picture, given by the press, that borders rather than cross-border processes and transcultural entanglements were predominant in Harbin daily life.

Gateway to Manchuria: The Port City of Dalian under Japanese, Russian and Chinese Control, 1898–1950

Christian A. Hess

RESÜMEE

Dieser Aufsatz untersucht die Transformation der Stadt Dalian (Russ. Dal'nii, Jap. Dairen) von einem Exporthafen der von kolonialen Einflüssen geprägten Mandschurei zu einer Industriemetropole des japanischen Imperiums während der Kriegszeit und schließlich zu einer Modellstadt für industrielle Produktion der Volksrepublik China. Dalian ist ein besonders eindrückliches lokales Beispiel für den Übergang vom Imperium zur Nation in dem strategisch wichtigen Gebiet der Mandschurei. Der Beitrag analysiert, wie die aufeinander folgenden Regime die Stadt definierten und sich die Stadt in wechselnden geographischen und ökonomischen Kontexten veränderte, von einem weit entfernten russischen Handelsposten über ein Zentrum des Exports während der japanischen Kolonialzeit und einer japanischen Produktionsstätte während des Krieges zu einer sowjetisch besetzten Zone und bis zu einem integralen Teil der Volksrepublik China. Diese fortwährenden Verschiebungen übten einen großen Einfluss auf die lokale Gesellschaft aus, insbesondere auf die chinesische Bevölkerungsmehrheit der Stadt. Der Wandel der wirtschaftlichen und politischen Funktionen der Stadt veränderte nicht nur ihre physische Gestalt, sondern auch die komplexe, im steten Wechsel begriffene Identität ihrer Bewohner. Als eine *instant city* oder „neue Stadt" an den Grenzen des Imperiums, des militärischen Schutzgebiets und der Nation war die urbane Identität Dalians dynamischer als in anderen Städten Nordostasiens. Die Geschichte dieser Stadt rückt bislang von der historischen Forschung vernachlässigte Aspekte der großen Narrative von Entkolonialisierung, Revolution und Nationalstaatsbildung, die gemeinhin mit der Region in Verbindung gebracht werden, ins Zentrum der Analyse.

The port city of Dalian, located at the tip of the Liaodong peninsula in Northeast China, was one of the first 'instant cities' in Northeast Asia, growing from a trading outpost in the late 1890s to a city of close to 800,000 people by 1945. From its inception, the

Comparativ | Zeitschrift für Globalgeschichte und vergleichende Gesellschaftsforschung 22 (2012) Heft 5, S. 47–59.

city was built to serve as a model of empire, envisaged by Russian and Japanese imperial planners as an ultramodern gateway to the Manchurian frontier. For much of its early history, Dalian was, in fact, a city at the edge of empire and nation, and for a time in the late 1940s it existed in geopolitical limbo between the two main state formations of the 20th century. Built from the ground up first by Russia (1898–1905), then for forty years by Japan (1905–1945), Dalian 'moved' on the imperial map from being a peripheral colonial outpost, to a regionally and globally linked export port and finally to an integrated production node. During a five-year occupation by the Soviet military (1945–1950) Dalian teetered on the brink of collapse. Severed from the Japanese empire it once served, but not yet integrated with China, Dalian existed on the map only as part of the Soviet-controlled Port Arthur naval base area. It was finally reintegrated with China in 1950, at which time it was hailed as a model socialist production city, heavily influenced by the Soviet model.[1] By shedding light on Dalian's changing position within borders of empire, military zone, and nation, we can begin to chart the understudied process of how it came to be defined and integrated into the geobody of various state formations.

Internal borders were likewise a major feature of Dalian's urban landscape. Exploring these is vital to understanding city life and to identify where city people may have resisted the state's efforts to be defined in certain ways. Unlike the treaty ports of coastal China, Dalian was a total colonial space, and the city was home to the largest urban population of Japanese civilians outside of Japan. Yet over two-thirds of the city's total population were Chinese. Spatial divisions between colonizer and colonized changed over time, some divisions strengthened while others weakened. This often correlated to the larger political changes affecting Dalian's status within empire and nation. This paper is organized chronologically, and traces Dalian's shifting position within and between empire and nation. These shifts likewise had an impact on internal borders set by successive regimes. The resetting of these internal borders was an important part of Dalian's changing identity from the late 1800s through the 1950s.

Manchuria's Gateway: Dalian, frontier port city

The city of Dalian was born from the competing desires of Russia and Japan to gain a strategic foothold in Manchuria. After defeating Russia in the Russo-Japanese war, Japan inherited Russia's colonial territory on the Liaodong peninsula, which included the naval port town of Lüshun and the blueprints for the magnificent but only partially constructed port city of Dal'nii. Japan renamed the city Dairen (Chinese: Dalian) in 1905, and set about finishing Russia's dreams for an international trading port, linked by rail to the agricultural wealth of Manchuria, and by steamship to world markets. No city existed on the barren shores of Dalian bay before 1895, and the new town grew rapidly into a

1 Chen Qiying, "Dalian – xin Zhongguo de mofan dushi" (Dalian – new China's model metropolis), in: Luxing zazhi 23 (1949) 11 (November 1949).

city unfettered by walls. The opportunities for both Chinese and Japanese merchants to break into business success in a new place made Dalian an attractive destination. As a result, the first two decades of Japanese rule were boom years for the growing city. The population grew from 19,000 in 1906 to over 200,000 in 1926.[2] The port quickly surpassed its regional rival at Yingkou to become the major export and processing center of Manchuria's lucrative soybean trade.[3] With an abundant source of cheap Chinese labor from nearby Shandong, long distance railroad connections to a fertile hinterland, and deepwater port facilities, Dalian's economic might grew rapidly. As the main city of the Guandong Leased Territory (Japan's colonial leasehold over the Liaodong peninsula), it occupied a unique position on Japan's imperial map. It was not part of a formally annexed colony like Korea or Taiwan.

Dalian was the terminus and headquarters of the South Manchurian Railway Company (SMR), a massive, quasi-governmental entity that oversaw the development of the railway and port facilities which brought great wealth to the city. The company also systematically set out building Dalian into a model of Japanese colonial development in Asia. By the 1920s, visitors marveled at the city's wide, tree-lined boulevards, grand central plazas, parks, vibrant markets, and modern shopping districts. Dalian's "Great Plaza" (Ō-hiroba) served as a symbol of its booming economic clout. This central space was ringed with monumental commercial buildings, including two major banks, and the grandiose Yamato hotel. The SMR built schools, hospitals, libraries, port facilities, and established industrial enterprises in Dalian and the Leased Territory and the Railway Zone (*fuzokuchi*), a narrow strip of land controlled by the company on both sides of the tracks stretching to Changchun. [4] The SMR hospital in Dalian was one of the largest modern facilities in China, with room for 450 patients, and an outpatient clinic serving over 800 people per day.[5]

By the 1920s, Dalian had grown from a fishing village into the formal symbol of Japan's informal empire in Manchuria. The Japanese population was always very high, and hovered between one-third and one-fourth of the total population of the city, reaching 225,000 by 1945. Japanese dominated the most lucrative businesses and industries, earned higher wages than Chinese, and had access to the best schools and hospitals. However, Chinese elites were far from politically powerless. Chinese residents were the majority population throughout the city's brief history, and Dalian was home to a sizable Chinese merchant community, with strong associational identities. By 1924 there were over 4,000 Chinese businesses of various sizes throughout the city.[6] The largest and most profitable were bean mills, which processed soybeans into soybean oil for export to meet

2 Inoue Kenzaburo (ed.), Dairen-shi shi, Dairen 1936, pp. 15-16.
3 Zhou Yonggang (ed.), Dalian gangshi (A history of the port of Dalian), Dalian 1995, p. 170.
4 Manshikai (ed.), Manshū kaihatsu yonjūnenshi, Tokyo 1964, pp. 224-26.
5 Adachi Kinnosuke, Manchuria: A Survey, New York 1925, pp. 134-35.
6 Gu Mingyi / Fang Jun / Ma Lifeng / Wang Shengli / Zhang Qingshan / Lu Linxiu (eds), Diguozhuyi qinlue Dalian shi congshu: Dalian jin bainian shi (Collected history of the imperialist invasion of Dalian: the recent hundred-year history of Daliain), 2 vol., Shenyang 1999, p. 999.

the increase in demand from Europe and the United States.[7] Many of the mill owners were members of the Shandong Native Place association, which served as a political and economic network for its elite members, while providing charitable functions for migrant laborers.[8] This even included nighttime Japanese language courses and technical training. Dalian's vibrant colonial economy had grown so quickly that by the late 1920s there existed significant competition between Chinese and Japanese merchants, and it was not uncommon for smaller Japanese firms to lose business and even close due to Chinese competition.[9]

Colonial Dalian's commercial streets were not totally segregated, thus the sense of competition between Chinese and Japanese merchants could be intense. However, in terms of residency, the situation was more complex. Russian blueprints for the city from the late 1890s had called for racially segregated neighborhoods, with a European sector separated from a Chinese sector by a large park.[10] However, as the city grew under the Japanese, strictly segregated areas became less tenable due to space demands. By the 1920s and early 1930s, Chinese and Japanese lived together in some neighborhoods in the city, creating anxieties among the colonial population. Starting with the population boom in the 1920s, there had been considerable public discourse in Japanese journals about the problems associated with 'mixed residency', with Chinese and Japanese living side by side. While these articles noted with some pride that Dalian was an "international city," the authors quickly turned their attention to the cultural differences between Chinese and Japanese, and how this impacted daily life. According to one author, Ishikawa Tetsuo, while it was part of the city's cosmopolitan character to have mixed commercial streets, it became more problematic with mixed residency, where cultural differences and hygiene were "issues." Ishikawa found mixed streetcars, for example, to be too much to handle, particularly when he had to sit with Chinese laborers.[11]

Issues of mixed residency aside, a racial hierarchy characterized colonial society in Dalian. Japanese, regardless of class, were on top, and enjoyed the best housing, education for their children, and high-paying jobs. The Korean population, although never sizable, also enjoyed a privileged status as Japanese subjects. The large Chinese population had its own hierarchy as well. At the top were Taiwanese, who like Koreans, were thought of as loyal subjects. Most Taiwanese in Dalian came to attend technical schools, and were often trained as doctors. Next were those classified as "Kantōshū jin" (People from Guandong), who were registered permanent residents of the Guandong Leased Territory.

7 Xu Jingzhi, "Jiefang qian Dalian minzu gongshangye jianwen," (Information on pre-liberation Chinese industry and commerce in Dalian), Dalian wenshi ziliao (Dalian historical materials) 6 (1989), p. 87.

8 Dairen shōgakkai kenkyū bu, "Dairen chihō ni okeru shinajin no shakai jigyō" (Social enterprises of Dalian's Chinese residents). Dalian: 1930, pp. 8-11.

9 Yanagisawa Asobu. Nihonjin no shokuminchi keiken: Dairen Nihonjin shōkōgyōsha norekishi (The Japanese colonial experience: the history of Japanese entrepreneurs in Dalian), Tokyo 1999, pp. 168-72.

10 Koshizawa Akira, Shokumin chi Manshū no toshi keikaku (Urban planning in Manchuria) Tokyo 1978, pp. 49-50. See also Mark Gamsa, Harbin in comparative perspective, in: Urban History 37 (2010) 1, pp. 136-49.

11 Ishikawa Tetsuo, "Dairen shi to zakkyo mondai" (The problem of mixed residency in Dalian), in: Shin tenchi, September 1924, pp. 43-5.

Below them was the vague term "Manshū jin" (Manchurians), referring to people who came from the Northeast. At the bottom were Chinese migrants, the vast majority of whom were from rural Shandong, and often referred to as "hai nan ren" (people from the southern sea) or simply "Shandong ren" (Shandong people).[12] This system, as we will examine below, was not codified into hardened legal categories until the outbreak of the Pacific war. In most statistical compilations and census data, Japanese authorities typically divided the population into three categories: Japanese, Korea, and "Man-Shi jin" short for "Manshu jin" (Manchurians) and the pejorative "Shina jin" (Chinese).

Until the wartime period, there had been considerable confusion among colonial bureaucrats in Dalian and the Leased Territory about how best to classify the Chinese population. Much of this can be attributed to the unique political status of the Guandong Leased Territory, particularly prior to the founding of Manchukuo. While many bureaucrats saw the extension of Japanese laws in Guandong as beneficial, others wondered what it would mean for the Chinese population. Were they to become subjects of the Japanese empire like Taiwanese and Koreans? If not, were they to be treated like "foreigners" (*gaikoku-jin*)?[13] Through the 1920s and 1930s, the status of most of Dalian's Chinese population was somewhere in between, and often depended on one's economic status.

Perhaps the most extreme example of the segregation of Chinese residents in colonial Dalian was the Chinese worker dormitories of the Fukushō Chinese Labor Company (Fukushō Kakō kabushiki kaisha). Located in the eastern side of the city, just south of the port, the Fukushō company built a massive dormitory complex to house Shandong migrant workers, which they called "Hekizansho" or "Blue Mountain Manor." To Chinese it was known as "Hongfangzi" or the "red house," for its red brick walls. Construction of the dorm complex began in the first few years of Japan's rule. It was, from its inception, designed to be a city within a city. Japanese colonial authorities had expressed the desire to keep the Chinese migrant population contained and removed from Dalian proper, and Blue mountain manor was designed to accomplish this task. The dorm buildings themselves were built in long rows, some single-level others multi-level, 92 in all. Although designed to house 15,000 workers, throughout the 1930s and 1940s its actually capacity was between 30-40,000, making it extremely cramped. In addition to the living quarters, the complex featured ten gambling halls, seven opium dens, 13 brothels, and 11 money-lenders.[14] There was also an opera stage and a temple facility. Each year, on July 15, company representatives made offerings to commemorate those workers who died on the job.

In reality, the "Red house" functioned like a prison. It had high walls, topped with metal fencing, and restricted access to only one main gate, which featured a tower with a large clock with faces in all four directions. Each morning at 4 am, the clock's bells would ring,

12 Qi Hongshen (Takenaka Kenichi transl.), "Manshū" ōaru hisutorī: "doreika kyōiku" ni kōshite (Oral histories from "Manchuria": resisting slave education), Tōkyō 2004, pp. 501-14.

13 Yamada Takeyoshi, Kantōshū no shisei mondai (The problem of city administration in the Guandong Leased Territory), Dairen 1928, p. 2-4.

14 ESDGYS, pp. 345-46.

signaling the start of another long work day.[15] Workers were shuttled to work on special tramcars, painted bright orange to indicate they were from the "Red house." Gate inspections occurred twice daily as workers entered and exited the dormitory, and included body and clothing searches. Outbreaks of infectious disease were especially brutal in the cramped quarters of the dorms, and often occurred in deadly waves. At the peak of an outbreak, dozens died each day. Those admitted to the infirmary seldom came back alive, and workers called it "the execution ground."[16]

Colonial Dalian grew into a major trading metropolis due to both its location, and to the efforts of Japanese economic interests to change the flow of trade from established Chinese centers to the new city. The city's political status as part of a leaded territory, something between formal colony and national space, meant that for a time, Chinese and Japanese alike moved here in search of opportunity. Economic opportunity aside, the colonial city was divided by internal borders, and a racial hierarchy worked to keep Chinese and Japanese populations separated, particularly in terms of residence.

Dalian as an Imperial Production Center

On 18 September 1931, the Guandong Army, garrisoned in Dalian and Lüshun, invaded Manchuria and established the puppet state of Manchukuo. Over the next few years Dalian would lose its centrality as the political and economic capital of the Japanese empire in Manchuria. The shift of human and material resources to Manchukuo, and the outbreak of total war in China (1937) and the Pacific (1941) resulted in a fundamental reshaping of the city's economic function, as the colonial economy and the city built around it were militarized and industrialized. Dalian's transformation from a colonial port to an imperial production node would have lasting consequences for its postwar fate.

Japan's invasion of China in the mid 1930s, and the start of the Pacific War in 1941, led civilian and military planners alike to build and prioritize key parts of the empire as production bases. The former colonial gateway city of Dalian became one such place. If the symbol of the city in the 1920s was the bustling docks and the banks, hotels and business around the 'Great Plaza', then the 1930s saw the symbolic centre shift toward new suburban industrial zones and the imperial spaces of power like the new train station and the Guandong Leased Territory administration building. By the late 1930s the people of Dalian, Chinese and Japanese alike, were increasingly viewed and categorized in terms of their position and value towards production.

In Manchukuo, Japan implemented a blueprint for building a modern industrial base, designed to be a production center serving the expanding empire. This developmental scheme represents a significant break with the patterns common to European imperi-

15 Liu Yongcai / Sun Chunfu / Chen Shizong, "Xuelei jintou 'Hekizansho': jiefang qian Dalian matou gongren de kunan shenghuo" ('Hekizansho' soaked in blood and tears: the miserable life of pre-liberation dockworkers in Dalian), in: Dalian wenshiziliao no. 1 (1985), pp. 26-37.

16 Ibid.

alism, where the colony simply provided food and raw materials to the metropole.[17] Rather, Manchukuo was a radical experiment, designed to be a self-sufficient part of the empire, able to consume its own resources for industrial development, and feed its population with its agricultural goods.[18] Larger companies from Japan, Nissan in particular, migrated to Manchukuo to form the Manchuria Industrial Development Company (Mangyō). Mitsubishi and Mitsui also invested heavily in chemicals and machine factories.[19] This wave of state-led industrialization would have a major impact on Dalian's urban development for the next four decades.

Before the 1930s, Dalian had never been a significant industrial or production center. The bulk of its industry was in SMR hands, namely the SMR locomotive manufacturing and repair facilities. However, with the prioritization of large-scale industrial development after 1932, the SMR and other companies were encouraged to invest in new factories. A new industrial zone was developed and incorporated into the city, which became a major chemical and manufacturing base.[20] The number of factories employing five or more employees in Dalian and the Guandong Leased Territory stood at 487 in 1932 and grew to over 1,000 by 1937.[21] The industrial labor force increased 250 percent.[22]

From the mid-1930s onward, Dalian was steadily transformed economically from an export port to a center of wartime production in service of Japan's expanding wartime empire. Politically, the city was no longer part of a leased outpost of Japan's informal economic empire in Northeast Asia. Dalian now found itself occupying a sort of middle space between two political incarnations of the Japanese empire. For a time, it kept its status as the main city of the Guandong Leased Territory, however after the leasehold was transferred to Manchukuo, Dalian became, in a sense, a border city of the puppet nation. This lack of clarity from 1932 to the outbreak of war in 1937 led to considerable tensions on the ground, tensions of identity felt by both colonizer and colonized as the internal borders set during the colonial period began to shift.

A notable Japanese author and resident of Dalian, Saitō Mitshuhiro, wrote a provocative article in the *Dalian Shibao* newspaper, asking "who are the people residing abroad in Guandong?" He continued, "now that Guandong is considered an extension of Japanese territory, for those Han people living here, whether consciously or not, we already consider them citizens of Manchukuo (*Manzhouguoren*)."[23] Saitō Mitshuhiro's fears rested on the administrative uncertainty of the Guandong Leased Territory. He continued, "We should set up a principle of putting Japanese first, otherwise, it will be like it has been in the past, where Han people are the original inhabitants and we Japanese are the people

17 W. G. Beasley, Japanese Imperialism, 1894–1945, Oxford 1987, pp. 213-17.
18 Louise Young, Japan's Total Empire: Manchuria and the Culture of Wartime Imperialism, pp. 241-306.
19 W. G. Beasley, Japanese Imperialism (note 17), pp. 213-17.
20 Dalian shi Ganjingzi qu difangzhi bianzuan weiyuanhui (ed.), Ganjingzi quzhi (Ganjingzi district gazetteer). Beijing 1995, pp. 18-19, 170.
21 Dairen shōkō kaigi (ed.), Kantōshū no kogyō jijō (The Guandong Leased Territory's industrial circumstances), Dairen 1939, pp. 10-11.
22 Ramon Myers, The Japanese Economic Development of Manchuria, 1932–1945, New York 1982, p. 127.
23 Diguozhuyi qinlue Dalian shi congshu: Dalian jin bainian shi, p. 423.

residing abroad. In the Guandong Leased Territory we must establish a system where we Japanese are the principal residents, and Chinese are the visitors."[24]

Clarity came during the war years (1937–1945). Dalian's colonial core districts were the physical reminders of the glory years of the port. From 1935 onwards, new, imperial spaces dominated the map of the city. This included the new Dalian train station, and, to the west of the old downtown, the Guandong government offices, police headquarters and courts, constructed facing one another across a massive new square. All of these buildings were completed by the late 1930s. They served to signal Dalian's new position as part of the Japanese empire, one city among many that this expanding empire covered.

The war brought changes to the old colonial social hierarchies as well. In practices consistent throughout the empire, the pressing need for wartime labor and biopower led to new policies, which promised elevated roles to non-Japanese subjects of the empire. In Dalian wartime industrial prioritization created new social hierarchies in the city. The biggest change was a redefinition of categories of residency in the Guandong Leased Territory which gave Chinese with permanent jobs, particularly those with industrial jobs, higher status in the eyes of the wartime state. Until the wartime period, there had been considerable confusion among colonial bureaucrats in Dalian and the Leased Territory about how best to classify the Chinese population. Much of this can be attributed to the unique political status of the Guandong Leased Territory, particularly prior to the founding of Manchukuo. While many bureaucrats saw the extension of Japanese laws in Guandong as beneficial, others wondered what it would mean for the Chinese population. Were they to become subjects of the Japanese empire like Taiwanese and Koreans? If not, were they to be treated like "foreigners" (*gaikokujin*)?[25] Through the 1920s and 1930s, the status of most of Dalian's Chinese population was somewhere in between and often depended on one's economic status.

By the early 1940s, Japanese authorities established a more definitive registration policy for the Guandong Leased Territory. The new registration laws of 1942 divided the Chinese population into two categories. Those whose family registry was now in Guandong were granted "registered" (*minseki*) status. Everyone else, including those who wanted to work in the city for more than 90 days with the hopes of someday becoming a permanent resident, was considered a temporary resident (*kiryū seki*).[26] To establish permanent residency, one had to have a permanent home in the Leased Territory, usually by owning property or a house. A stable job was also a factor. An individual hoping for this status would present these qualifications to the neighborhood or village leaders to forward to the higher up authorities for approval. Once approved, an entire family could gain status

24 Ibid.

25 Yamada Takeyoshi, Kantōshū no shisei mondai, Dairen 1928, pp. 2-4.

26 "Kantōshū minseki kisoku" (Regulations for Guandong Leased Territory residence), Feburary 11, 1942, reprinted in: Nakamura Wataru (ed.), Kantōshū soshakuchi to Minami Manshū Tetsudō fuzokuchi (The Guandong Leased Territory and the South Manchuria Railway Zone), Tōkyō 1966, pp. 245-46.

as registered residents of the Leased Territory, with permission to work and move about far more freely than others.[27] They would then be issued a permanent resident card.[28]
Being a registered resident of the Leased Territory, a "Kantōshū jin," allowed one's children to attend better schools, and afforded opportunities to try and attend Japanese-run schools, training institutes and colleges. College for most Chinese in Dalian was not a possibility, only 6.5 percent of Chinese students attended colleges.[29] Enterprising families from Shandong who had yet to attain permanent status might be able to send their children to school, but their path to success was much harder. Zhang Lianmin was born in a shantytown area outside of Dalian. His family was from Shandong, and lived in a community with others from their home village. Zhang was lucky enough to attend a school nearby, and recalls learning the harsh lessons of the colonial hierarchy, where Shandong people were generally mistrusted by the authorities. Shandong children who first started attending school had to learn not to refer to themselves as Chinese.[30]
The most skilled Chinese workers, and those in prioritized industries were often locally born or with 'registered' status.[31] Workers in the shipbuilding and machine tool manufacturing sector had comparatively higher literacy rates. Industrial surveys from the wartime period praise this highly skilled workforce, noting that the educated, permanent labor force found in Dalian was a key feature of its continued industrial growth, and that locals were well suited for factory work due to a "higher cultural level and an educational system in place for Chinese."[32] Thus, it was only under increasingly severe wartime conditions the Japanese imperialist system granted large numbers of Chinese a more privileged imperial status.
From 1932 to 1945, Dalian experienced major shifts in its position on Japan's map of empire. What had once been an intermediary zone – a leased territory – now became in a sense a border of a new imperial construct, the puppet nation of Manchukuo. This in turn led to a reshuffling of internal borders, as it became less clear who was 'Manchurian' and what this meant. The war clarified Dalian's position on the map. It became an integrated, imperial production city. As such, Chinese residents, particularly those with industrial skills, were granted a new status within the imperial racial hierarchy.

27 Ibid.
28 "Aiguo de minzu gongshangyezhe – Xu Jingzhi" (A patriotic industrialist—Xu Jingzhi), in: Dalian wenshiziliao no. 6 (December 1989), p. 18.
29 Qi Hongshen (ed.), Dongbei difang jiaoyu shi (The history of education in the Northeast), Shenyang 1991, p. 259.
30 Takenaka Kenichi, Dairen akashia no gakusō: shōgen shokuminchi kyōiku ni kōshite, Tokyo 2003, pp. 80-87.
31 Kantōshū rōmu kyōkai,"Kantōshū ManShijin keiei kōjō rōdō chōsasho." (An investigation of Chinese-managed factories in the Guandong Leased Territory) (August 1940), in: Shen Jie/Nagaoka Masami (ed.), Shokuminchi shakai jigyō kankei shiryōshū [Manshū, Manshūkoku] hen (Collected materials on colonial social enterprises in Manchuria and Manchukuo), vol. 11., Tokyo, 2005, pp. 89-168.
32 Dairen shōkō kaigi, ed. Dairen keizai benran (An economic handbook of Dalian), Dairen 1943, p. 51.

Between Empire and Nation: Dalian Under Soviet Occupation

From August 1945 through 1949, Dalian was a city caught between the empire and nation. The empire it had served for nearly its entire existence evaporated. Although Chinese political powers, both the Nationalists and the Chinese Communists, relished the opportunity to liberate the city, and control its vital industrial base and port facilities, in the end it was not Chinese troops who took over the city. On August 22, Soviet soldiers arrived on the streets. Unknown to most people in Dalian at the time, the Soviets were there to stay. The Yalta Agreement and the subsequent Treaty of Friendship and Alliance, signed in February 1945 with Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist government, granted the Soviets control of the former Guandong Leased Territory.[33] Dalian would remain a part of the Soviet-controlled Lüshun Naval Base Area until 1950, at which time it was formally handed over to the People's Republic of China. Soviet military forces retained control of the nearby Lüshun naval port until 1955.

The prolonged Soviet presence would prove crucial in re-shaping the former Japanese city. In the first few months after Japan's defeat, expectations ran high among both Nationalists and Chinese Communists that their side would take over Dalian. In the fine print of the agreements at Yalta and those signed between the Soviets and the Nationalists in February 1945, Dalian was to remain open as an international port, while the rest of the surrounding territory was to be in Soviet military hands. However, the Soviet interpretation was that as long as a state of war existed with Japan, Dalian would not be open in such a way. Throughout 1946 and 1946, Chiang Kai-shek's government repeatedly attempted to gain a foothold in the city, only to be shut out by the Soviets. After these failures, the Nationalists resorted to defining the city in a negative way. In the Nationalist-controlled press, Dalian was portrayed as a place still suffering the indignity of foreign military occupation. Soviets were painted as imperialists, and the Chinese Communists as their willing collaborators in keeping Dalian separated from China. In this negative definition presented by the Nationalists, the city was a foreign-occupied periphery.

Many Chinese Communist officials sent to Dalian after 1945 shared this view, and played the nationalism card to win support of the population. They felt it was time that Dalian be reunited with China, and viewed the Soviet's military occupation and behavior as imperialistic.[34] However, the view of Mao and other key leaders was somewhat different. To them, Dalian was an important zone of contact with the Soviets. Moreover, the city's industries made it a vital production base for the civil war battles to come. It was strategically advantageous for the Soviets to retain military control over the city, which allowed for the reindustrialization of its war industries to serve the Chinese Communists war efforts in the Chinese civil war.

33 Dieter Heinzig, The Soviet Union and Communist China 1945–1950: The Arduous Road to the Alliance, Armonk 2004, pp. 51-125, 348, 415.

34 Christian A. Hess, Big Brother is Watching: Local Sino-Soviet Relations and the Building of New Dalian, 1945–1955, in: Paul Pickowicz / Jeremy Brown (eds), Dilemmas of Victory: The Early Years of the People's Republic of China, Cambridge, Mass 2007, pp. 160-83.

Borders become extremely useful categories of analysis for clarifying the complex political and social situation in Dalian during the years of Soviet occupation. Despite Dalian's political limbo, the city did become a major source of contact between Soviet and Chinese Communist personnel. No other place in China had been under Soviet control for as long as Dalian and the other communities of the former Guandong Leased Territory. The Soviets had stationed over 100,000 military personnel throughout this 1300 square mile space. By 1947, several of the largest former Japanese industrial establishments were now under joint Sino-Soviet control. These places became the testing grounds and models for implementing the Soviet production model in China, and by 1949, Dalian was home to model industries pointing to the future of 1950s urban China.

To ease tensions between Chinese and Soviet military occupation forces, Sino-Soviet Friendship Associations were formed throughout Dalian and the Naval Base Area. Among their diverse functions, these organizations served to propagate positive images of the Soviets and point to a Soviet-style future for Dalian and all of China. As a city without a nation, the banner of socialist internationalism was particularly powerful in Dalian. Sino-Soviet Friendship stories in the press and read at Friendship Association meetings told dramatic tales of Soviet doctors saving local Chinese with blood transfusions, and Chinese orphans adopted by Soviet families stationed in Dalian and the nearby military port at Lüshun. The message here was that while racial hierarchies existed under the Japanese, Chinese and Soviets were all one family under socialism.[35]

The borders within the city began to dramatically shift as well. As Japan's civilian population was repatriated through 1947–1948, entire neighborhoods stood vacant. In one of the more fascinating policies of the postwar period, Soviet and Chinese Communist leaders conducted what amounted to a program of urban land reform. Known officially as the "Housing readjustment movement" (*zhuzhai tiaozheng yundong*) and colloquially as the "poor people's moving campaign" (*pinmin banjia yundong*), the policy involved relocating upwards of 30,000 Chinese families from Dalian's shantytowns and poorer districts into modern spacious homes and apartments – once the exclusive home to Japanese and Chinese colonial elites.[36] Tales of such moves filled the pages of local newspapers and read like high socialist drama – the urban poor, the labourers, and industrial workers--those who had toiled under Japanese imperialism – were now the masters of the new society, complete with the mansions of their former colonial rulers. Strong patriotic and racial overtones were used to characterize the campaign, creating a sense that the comfortable life once denied Chinese was finally at hand.[37]

35 Ibid.

36 These statistics are available at the Dalian municipal archive website: http://www.da.dl.gov.cn/xhsb/message-info.asp?id=343

37 Dalian ribao, August 27, 1946.

Dalian as a Chinese City: Integration with the PRC

It was not until late 1949-early 1950 that Dalian became formally integrated with the China. The city was no longer at the periphery of empires, or part of a contested military base. Yet Dalian's experience and history as a colonial trading port and imperial production city served to empower a new definition of the city. In 1949, the Chinese press was hailing 'New Dalian' as 'New China's model city'.[38] Its colonial past may have just as easily condemned it as a scarred city of victims of Japanese imperialism, or worse still, as a place whose majority Chinese population might be considered suspect in their collaboration with Japan. Instead, we see the fantastic tale of the rebirth of what is claimed to be an undeniably Chinese, cutting-edge production city. The People's Daily newspaper wrote of how Dalian had been 'transformed from an oppressed Japanese imperialist colony, to an industrial base of New Democracy and New China'.[39] One commentator even proclaimed the city to be 'a worker's paradise.'[40]

Throughout the 1950s, Dalian became a less cosmopolitan space, its colonial population had long since been repatriated, and the number of Soviet citizens slowly declined. Integrated with the PRC, it was no longer a center of socialist internationalism. As China's other industrial cities came online, from Shenyang to Shanghai, Dalian's model status began to wane. Cut off from more expansive regional and global trade links, the port was now one of many serving the emerging Second World. As a city of the People's Republic of China, borders within Dalian's society became increasingly political and ideological. During the mass campaigns of the 1950s, for example, the city's skilled labor force, trained under the Japanese and prized for their knowledge and effort during the Chinese civil war, came under fire for their past collaboration. New lines were being drawn in the city.

Conclusion

Dalian's history of successive regime changes and its total colonial status make it unique among Chinese cities. However, its experience sheds important light on understudied process affecting many cities in China in the early 20th century. Dalian's shifting position on imperial and national maps highlights the challenges that various states faced as they attempted to incorporate and redefine the city within imperial and national projects.

While 'liberation' from colonial powers was certainly a monumental occasion, Dalian's case reminds us that the process of nationalizing a city may not always be positive. In the decades after Japan's defeat, Dalian's population shrank from its colonial and wartime peaks, and, with its port cut off from global and regional trading networks, the city came to occupy a less dynamic position on the map of 'New China'. Perhaps Dalian's histori-

38 Chen Qiying, "Dalian – xin Zhongguo de mofan dushi" (note 1).

39 Dalian gongye zhanlanhui (ed.), *Gongye Zhongguo de chuxing* (The embryonic state of Industrial China), Guangzhou 1950, pp. 7-10.

40 Li Zongying / Liu Shiwei / Liao Bingxion (eds), *Dongbei xing* (Travels through the Northeast), Hongkong 1950, p. 50.

cal experience can shed new light on the concept of the Second World by revealing the complex and multiple paths that its various components experienced as they became a part of a new national and global order. In Dalian's case, its colonial past was not erased, but rather reworked into a new narrative to build up its claim as a model metropolis of the socialist world.

Go Team Harbin. Sports, Borders and Identity in the 1930s

Susanne Hohler

RESÜMEE

In den 1930er Jahren war Harbin eine multikulturelle Stadt, in der Menschen aus mehr als 50 unterschiedlichen Nationalitäten mehr oder weniger friedlich zusammenlebten. Der multikulturelle Alltag mit all seinen Besonderheiten und Konflikten sowie die dynamischen Beziehungen zwischen Menschen so unterschiedlicher Herkunft machten Harbin zu einem außergewöhnlichen Ort, der auch heute noch das Interesse von Wissenschaftlern verschiedener Disziplinen weckt. Wie dieser Artikel zeigt, ermöglicht Sport einen einzigartigen Einblick in die komplexen, vielschichtigen und zeitweise durchaus konfliktgeprägten Beziehungen zwischen den unterschiedlichen Gruppierungen innerhalb der Stadt Harbin. Dieser Artikel versucht anhand von Sport Prozesse der Grenzüberschreitung und Grenzziehung zwischen den verschiedenen nationalen Bevölkerungsgruppen im sozialen Geflecht Harbins der 1930er Jahre zu beleuchten, indem das eigentliche Spielfeld oder der Sportplatz als städtischer Raum (urban space) konzeptualisiert wird – also als ein gemeinschaftlicher Raum (common space) oder eine Kontaktzone, wo sich Vertreter der verschiedenen Bevölkerungsgruppen sowohl auf als auch außerhalb des Platzes begegneten. Mit Blick auf die multikulturelle Zusammensetzung der Bevölkerung, die wiederholten Machtwechsel und Auseinandersetzungen über die Identität Harbins waren sowohl die Ausgestaltung des als auch das Verhalten im städtischen Raum von größter Bedeutung. Dies führte häufig zu Konflikten. Ich argumentiere, dass aufgrund seiner besonderen Charakteristika das Spielfeld zu einem gemeinschaftlicher Raum werden konnte, auf dem ansonsten klar definierte Grenzen verschoben oder zumindest zeitweise aufgehoben werden konnten.

Comparativ | Zeitschrift für Globalgeschichte und vergleichende Gesellschaftsforschung 22 (2012) Heft 5, S. 60–71.

Introduction

Sport history is not "just for fans with an academic liability to negligibilities"[1], simply put because sports matters. Honduras and El Salvador fought a war over a soccer match in 1969. Over 140 million people worldwide watch the Super Bowl, the final game of the National Football League in the United States. And 4% of the world's population plays soccer in a registered sports club. A closer look at the sources also indicates that sports mattered for the inhabitants Harbin, Manchuria. Contemporary newspapers reported regularly and in sometimes exhausting detail about sports events and tournaments even on a school level. Memories of former residents of Harbin are full of vivid recollections about all kinds of sports.[2] The journal of the IGUD YOTZEI SIN, an association for former Jewish residents of China and their descendants, still include references to the athletic qualities of deceased members in their obituaries.

Harbin, founded in 1898 on Chinese soil by Russians on the banks of the Sungari river, owed its existence to the construction of the Chinese-Eastern-Railway, which connected Chita with Vladivostok.[3] Because the city was a railway junction and its favorable location in the resource-rich Manchurian plains, Harbin quickly became one of the most important cities in the region and attracted people from all over the world with its investment and employment opportunities. European and American investors, Japanese and Korean businessmen, Russian railroad personal and Chinese workers swarmed to Harbin. After 1917 the city became the centre of the White Russian Emigration to the Far East.[4] At times over 50 different nationalities lived in Harbin.

That Harbin contained people of so many ethnicities and their vibrant interaction as well as their disassociation from each other is what made Harbin a unique place, attracting the attention of researchers of various disciplines today. Sports, as will be demonstrated in this article, can provide a unique insight into the complex and multilayered relationships between the different segments of the city. James Carter, for example, has already used the case of a basketball match between Russians and Chinese that ended brawl to

1 Olaf Stieglitz / Jürgen Martschukat / Kirsten Heinsohn: Sportreportage: Sportgeschichte als Kultur- und Sozialgeschichte. H-Soz-u-Kult, 28.05.2009, <http://hsozkult.geschichte.hu-berlin.de/forum/2009-05-001. p. 1. Last visit August 30, 2011.

2 See for example Yaakov Liberman, My China: Jewish life in the Orient, 1900–1950, Berkeley / Jerusalem 1998; Alexander Menquez, Growing up Jewish in Manchuria in the 1930s, in: Jonathan Goldstein (ed.), Jews of China, Vol. 2: A Source Book and Research Guide, New York/London 1999, pp. 71-84; Igor Konstantinovich Koval'chuk-Koval', Svidanie c pamiat'iu (Vospominania), Moscow 1996.

3 Steven Marks, Road to Power. The Trans-Siberian Railroad and the Colonization of Asian Russia, 1850–1917, London 1991; Sören Urbansky, Kolonialer Wettstreit: Russland, China, Japan und die Ostchinesische Eisenbahn, Frankfurt a. M. 2008.

4 On the Russian Emigration to Harbin, Manchuria and China see Natalia N. Ablazhei, S vostoka na vostok: rossiiskaia emigratsiia v Kitae, Novosibirsk 2007; Elena Aurilene, Rossiiskaia Diaspora v Kitae (1920–1950), Chabarovsk 2008; Olga Bakich, Charbin. Russland jenseits der Grenzen in Fernost, in: Karl Schlögel (ed.), Der große Exodus. Die russische Emigration und ihre Zentren, München, 1994, pp. 304-28; Amir A. Chisamutdinov, Rossiiskaia emigratsiia v Kitae: opyt enciklopedii, Vladivostok 2002; Reviakina, Rossiiskaia emigratsii v Kitae: Problemy adaptacii (20-40 gody XX v.), Moscow 2002.

outline his theses on Chinese nationalism in "Creating a Chinese Harbin"[5]. This article similarly attempts to use sport to shed light on the social fabric of Harbin and especially processes of border-building and border-crossing between the different ethnic segments of the population in the 1930s by conceptualizing the physical playing field as a so-called urban space. I will argue that the playing field, because of its particular characteristics, was a common space where usually clear and well-maintained borders could be shifted, partly lifted and even abandoned.

Because this article is based on various Russian newspapers from Harbin[6] there are certain limitations to my study as well as my conclusions. First, casual sports, such as street soccer and the like, are left out simply because they are not reported. Due to resource constraints, I had to rely on the available Russian sources to the neglect of Chinese and Japanese sources. Therefore, the side of the Chinese, Japanese or Koreans might be underrepresented.

Urban Space and Sports. The Sports Field as a Common Space

The term 'urban space' is increasingly popular among academics from different fields of research. Most commonly the term is used in the context of architecture and urban planning, but is gaining currency in cultural studies, history and anthropology. The latter conceive urban space not just as any physical space within the borders of a city, but as a common space or contact zone where the inhabitants of a city meet on a daily basis.[7] Specifically urban about this common space is the constant present of the "other". Living in the city means permanent exposure to different lifestyles, ideas, values and identities as well as challenges to one's own value system and identity. Relations, terms and conditions of coexistence or borders are represented, negotiated and sometimes contested in and about urban space. Because of Harbin's multiethnic and multicultural population, its history of repeated changes of power and an ongoing struggle about the identity city as either a Chinese or Russian town, representation and behavior in, and the design of, urban space was of utmost importance and often disputed.[8]

Sports, or more precisely the field of play, is a particular common space with certain unique characteristics that distinguish it from other common spaces. First, since on the playing field the very same and usually clearly defined rules apply to everyone equally,

5 James Cater, Creating a Chinese Harbin. Nationalism in an international city, 1916–1932, London/New York 2002.

6 For this paper I consulted the most widely read Russian newspapers *Kharbinskoe Vremia* (Harbin Times), *Zaria (Dawn), Gun Bao*, a Japanese newspaper in Russian language and the liberal *Rupor* (The Mouthpiece) as well as the fascist *Nash Put'* (Our Way) and the Jewish *Hagadel* (The Flag).

7 So far no coherent concept of urban space has been developed, especially in differentiation to the public space. For me the later should be at least formally and ideally accessible to everyone for example without paying a entrance fee, while access to some urban spaces like the amusement park are restricted to people that can afford it. Therefore one could say every public space is also a common space, but not the other way around.

8 See for example Carter, Creating a Chinese Harbin.

sports allow all participants to be on a par with each other and meet on equal terms. Naturally, some athletes or teams might have had an advantage because they possessed the means to buy better equipment or employ an experienced coach, but at least in theory everyone can win, even if there is just a very slight chance of doing so. Second, sports have a dual or ambivalent character. Sports are always a competition, however amicable and playful it may be, but this also presupposes the presence of an opponent.

For many people in Harbin, Asians and Europeans alike, sports were an important part of their daily lives. Over 20 different sports facilities were scattered around town from the central districts of *Pristan* and *Novyi Gorod* to the suburbs of *Korpusnyi Gorod* and *Gondattievskii Gorod*. Some, like the City Stadium and the skating rink in *Pristan* were run by the city administration, while others belonged to different sports organizations and clubs. The local YMCA[9] alone operated a stadium, an exercising field, which was sometimes used by up to a hundred people at a time and the biggest gymnastic hall in Harbin that was open every day from 7 a.m. until 11 p.m.[10] Sports and physical exercise were also mandatory in most Chinese, Russian or Japanese schools as well as educational institutions for the children of Western expatriates.

Representatives of all ethnic groups took part in sporting competitions, like the citywide leagues and championships organized by local sports clubs sometimes together with the city administration. In 1937, for example, Estonian, Chinese, Polish, Ukrainian, Lithuanian and Russian teams competed for the annual championship of Harbin's soccer league.[11] Furthermore, if one thinks of sports or sports facilities as a common space, one should keep in mind that participation in a sports event is not limited to those directly on the field, but also includes coaches, administrators, care takers and most notably supporters and spectators. Since several games and competitions were free of charge, it is

9 The YMCA played the most important part in the introduction of Western types of sports in China. Before sports like athletics or basketball spread from the YMCA run schools and colleges, the dominant form of physical exercises, besides traditional forms like Chinese martial arts, was calisthenics and military drill at military academies. The YMCA had operated a branch in Harbin since the beginning of the 1920s, including a middle school and a college and was the first institution in Harbin that offered a sports program for girls and women. On the YMCA in China and particularly sports see: Risedorph A. Kimberly, Reformers, Athletes, and Students: The YMCA in China, 1895–1935, Ph.D. dissertation; Washington University, 1994; Graham / Gael, Exercising control: Sports and physical education in American Protestant mission schools in China, in: Signs: Journal of Women in Culture & Society (1994), 20, pp. 23-48; Andrew D. Morris, Marrow of the Nation: A History of Sport and Physical Culture in Republican China, Berkeley/Los Angeles 2004; on the YMCA in Harbin see: S. Avenarius, Pervye gody Russkogo ChSML v Kharbine, in: E. Taskina (ed.), Russkii Kharbin, Moscow 2005, pp. 227-28; M. Dubaev, Khristianskii soiuz molodykh liudei russkaia emigratsii v Kitae. Kul'turologicheskii aspect vzaimodeistviia russkoi obshchiny s molodezhnymi emigrantskimi organizatsiiami, in: Istoriia i sovremennost' 1 (2009) 1, pp. 33-44. See also in Rupor and Zaria on the occasion of the ninety years of existence/jubilee of the YMCA: Devianostoletie Khristianskago Soiuza Molodykh [Ninety years Young Men Christian Association], in: Rupor, No. 305, 8 November 1934, p. 4; Devianosto let Khristianskago Soiuza Molodykh [Ninety years Young Men Christian Association], in: Zaria, No. 304, 8 November 1934, p. 5.

10 Christianskii Soiuz Molodykh Liudei. Administrationyi Otchet. Starshego Sekretariia Kh.S.M.L. Sobraniiu Deistvitel'nykh CHlenov. Harbin, 24 February, 1935, p. 6.

11 Razdacha prizov fultbolistam [Award ceremony for the soccer players], in: Rupor, No. 308, 12 November 1937, p. 4.

reasonable to assume that at least some of them attracted a mixed crowd of spectators.[12] Evidently, sports in Harbin can be perceived as a common space or contact zone where representatives of different ethnic backgrounds encountered each other, be it on or off the field.

Sports and Ethnicity

Much of the research on sports in the first half of the 20th century focuses on topics like nationalism, ethnicity, gender and identity.[13] One branch of sports research concentrates more on the exclusion of certain ethnic or religious groups, for example on the exclusion of Jews from sports during the Weimar Republic and the early Nazi regime in Germany and Austria,[14] while others deal with the development of ethnic or national identity through sports, with notable recent work in connection with colonial regimes or racism against blacks in the United States.[15] Despite their rather antipodal starting points, both branches deal with processes of exclusion, inclusion, border-making and border-crossing. This is not surprising since certain characteristics of modern sports seem to make an excellent arena for agents of nationalistic, racist or ethnocentric bodies of thought. Standardization and measurable results allowed for quick and easy comparisons even on a global scale and could be employed for a nationalistic, racist or ethnocentric rhetoric and claims of superiority and dominance,[16] or, for that matter, to improve the self-esteem of marginal or oppressed groups. The clear division into teams, sometimes with their own uniforms, colors, songs, traditions or symbols, facilitates the identification with a specific team and allows the spectator to communicate and demonstrate ethnic (or other) belonging. Therefore, national, regional or ethnic identification was often emphasized in sports by contemporaries in the beginning of the 20th century and beyond.

12 See for example: Segodnia – otkrytie dvorca sporta [Today – opening of the palace of sports], in: Rupor, No. 76, 21 March 1937, p. 7.

13 See for example for ethnicity and identity: Amy Bass, In the Game: Race, Identity & Sports in the Twentieth Century, New York 2005; James A. Mangan (ed.), Ethnicity, Sport, Identity: Struggles for Status, London 2005.

14 See for example: Lorenz Peiffer, „… unser Verein ist judenfrei" – Die Rolle der deutschen Turn- und Sportbewegung in dem politischen und gesellschaftlichen Wandlungsprozess nach dem 30. Januar 1933, in: Historical Social Research 32 (2007) 1, pp. 92-109; Michael John, Anti-Semitism in Austrian sports between the wars; and Jacob Borut. Jews in German sports during the Weimar Republic, in: Michael Brenner / Gideon Reuveni (eds), Emancipation through Muscles; Jews and Sports in Europe, Lincoln 2006; Arnd Krüger, "Once the Olympics are through, we will beat up the Jew": German Jewish sport 1898–1938 and the anti-Semitic Discourse, in: Journal of Sport History 26 (1999) 2, pp. 353-75.

15 Boria Majumdar, Cricket in colonial Bengal (1880–1947): A lost history of nationalism, in: International Journal of the History of Sport 23 (2006) 6, pp. 960-90; James H. Mills, Subaltern Sports: Politics and Sports in South Asia, London 2005; Annie Gilbert Coleman, The Unbearable Whiteness of Skiing, in: John Bloom / Michael Nevin Willard (eds), Sports Matters. Race Recreation and Culture, New York 2002, pp. 141–68; Patrick B. Miller / David K. Wiggins (eds), The Unlevel Playing Field. A Documentary History of the African American Experience in Sport, Urbana 2003.

16 Of course, this can backfire disastrously as Adolf Hitler for example found out during the Olympics in Berlin in 1936.

Sports in Harbin was no exception and most organizations and clubs were still set up along ethnic lines. There were special clubs for Japanese, British and American citizens or for Chinese students. People of Polish origin joined the local branch of Sokoł, and members of the Jewish community in Harbin could choose at times between the sports organizations Maccabi and Betar.[17] Even in organizations like the YMCA, which was frequented by Russian and Chinese alike, specific teams were still usually ethnically homogeneous.

Border-Building and Border-Crossing in Sports. Spoiling for a Rout: Antagonism and Sports

In the following I want to trace processes of border-making or, more precisely, enforcement between two Harbin groups that particularly emphasized ethnic and national belonging: the aforementioned Jewish Betar and the Russian Vanguard Union. Betar was actually the youth organization of the so-called Revisionist Zionists an anti-socialist and nationalistic faction within Zionism.[18] The Vanguard Union founded in 1934 was an organization for teenagers and young people run by the highly influential Russian Fascist Party in Harbin.[19] Neither was a sports organizations in the classical meaning, since they also offered lectures on different historical and political topics, evening dances and other activities like a theater club, but each emphasized physical exercise and sports as one of the most important parts of their youth education programs.[20]

For the Russian fascists in Harbin fierce anti-Semitism was a constitutive part of their Russian identity. [21] Betar on the other side took considerable pride in defending their community against any possible offender. The fascists and especially their young followers regularly challenged the presence of Jews in the common space of Harbin. They attacked Jewish teenagers on the street, posted anti-Semitic slogans on walls in the main

17 Khisamudtinov, Rossiiskaia Emigratciia v Kitae, p. 250; Luch Azii 1937 October, p. 5; Scharov: NSO razvivaet energichnyiu sportivnuiu raboty v Kharbine [The NSO expands their energetic activities for Sports in Harbin], in: Rupor, No. 80, 24 March 1933, p. 4.

18 On Revisionism see: Colin Shindler, The Triumph of Military Zionism. Nationalism and the Origins of the Israeli Right, London / New York 2006; Eran Kaplan, The Jewish Radical Right: Revisionist Zionism and its ideological legacy. Studies on Israel, Madison 2005.

19 For the Russian fascists in Harbin, see: Aleksandr V. Okorokov, Fashizm i Russkaiia Emigratsiia: (1920–1945 gg.), Moscow 2002; Nadezhda Ablova, Rossiiskaia fashistskaia partiia v Man'chzhurii', in: Belorusskii zhurnal mezhdunarodnogo prava i mezhdunarodnykh otnoshenii 2 (1999); John Stephan, The Russian fascists. Tragedy and farce in exile, 1925–1945, New York/London 1978. So far not much has been published about fascist youth groups in Harbin and Manchuria. See: Aurilene, Rossiiskaia Diaspora, pp. 203-11; Aleksandr V. Okorokov, Molodeznye organizacii russkoi emigratsii (1920–1945 gg.), Moscow 2000, pp. 120-99.

20 For the Vanguard Union see for example: K Rozhdestvu, "Avangarda" stanet gorgostiu emigratsii [At Christmas the Vanguard will be the pride of the Emigration], in: Nash Put', No. 223, 8 September 1935, p. 8. Olischev, Za fashistskoe Vospitanie [For a fascist education], in: Nash Put', No. 321, 15 December 1935, p. 8; Fashistskaia molodezh' prinimaet sportivnyi komplex "Za Rossiiiu" [Sport complex "Za Rossiiiu"], in: Nash Put', No. 77, 24. March 1937, p. 2; Ustav Soiuza Iunych Fashistov "Avangard", Harbin 1935.

21 A good insight into the anti-Semitism of the Russian fascists in Harbin is to be found in the "Testament of Russian Fascism", an entire book by their leader, Konstantin Rodzaevskii, on the alleged Jewish world conspiracy. Konstantin Rodzaevskii, Zaveshchanie russkogo fashista, Moscow 2001.

streets or smashed the windows of the main synagogue.[22] Therefore, it is not surprising that the sports fields of Harbin became another battle ground for the fascists to attack and attempt to decry the Jews of Harbin.

For the self-perception of the fascists, and even more so for the image they created of Russianness and true Russian identity, it was crucial that Russians in general were head and shoulders above the Jews in sports. For example, their newspaper *Nash Put'* wrote about a series of boxing matches between members of Betar and Russians from the YMCA in 1935:

> *And one can just be astonished why athletes like Ignatev, Varfalamev, Belii, Permiakov and others compete in a Masonic organization. Of course it was not bad when the Russians beat the Betar people, because in the end the Russian character showed and stepped out of the triangle (the symbol of the YMCA) into the Russian organization under the three colored Russian flag.*[23]

Winning against a Jew is presented here as part of the Russian character that cannot be constrained. By joining the YMCA, Ignatev, Varfalamev, Belii and Permiakov in a way betrayed and negated their true "Russianness", but in the end they had no other choice but to capitulate and return to their own people.

Members of fascist youth organizations were also willing to apply unfair means, like threats, in cases where the superiority of a Russian athlete was in doubt. Yaakov Liberman, a very active member of Betar, describes in his autobiography how he was threatened on the streets and, according to his own account, needed protective help from his fellow Betar members, because he was the biggest rival of the Russian competitor for the 100 meter race during the Harbin championships in 1940. Radical Russians even hurled a stone through his window with a warning attached to prevent him from participating in the race.[24] Liberman explained this with the need to demonstrate superiority of Russians over other ethnicities and especially the Jews.

> *The Russians outnumbered the Jews in Harbin by three to one, and were extremely proud of their predominance in sports. They were not prepared to jeopardize their standing more than they had to. […] they were not about to risk losing their hold on the championship in the men´s category, especially not to a Jew! […].*[25]

22 Hellmut Stern, Saitensprünge. Die ungewöhnlichen Erinnerungen eines Musikers, der 1938 von Berlin nach China fliehen mußte, 1949 nach Israel einwanderte, ab 1956 in den USA lebte und schließlich 1961 zurückkehrte als Erster Geiger der Berliner Philharmonie, Berlin, 1997. Evreiskaia nasiliia nad plakatami Nashego Put' [Jewish atrocities on posters of Nash Put'], in: Nash Put', No. 64, 7 December 1933, p. 4; Protiv bezobrazii tvorimykh khuliganami [Against the mischief by hooligans], in: Rupor, No. 65, 10 March 1934, p. 4.

23 Iudo-Masonskii boks [Jewish-Masonic boxing match], in: Nash Put', No. 319, 13 December 1935, p. 6.

24 "[…] my competitor was Vasili Protasoff, the former champion, from the White Russian Sports Organization. His supporters included "the musketeers," the Rodzaevsky fascist youth […] Since my reputation and 11.3-second record presented a serious challenge to Protasoff, I was often approached on the street by various unknowns who threatened to break my legs if I appeared at the championship competitions […]" Liberman, My China, pp. 104-105.

25 Ibid., p. 104.

The fascists did not just attack Jewish athletes, but also the presence and especially the influence of Jewish citizens in the common space of the sport. In the beginning of the 1930s the main City Stadium of Harbin was administrated by a Russian Jew by the name of Matlin. *Nash Put'* defamed Matlin for the first time in an article at the end of 1933:

> *During the long period of his service as the inspector for Sports, the Jew Matlin was mainly busy systematically wasting the property of the stadium. The debt totals 10,800 Ruble. This debt was caused by negligence and because Matlin subordinated the interests of the stadium to his own interests. […] Nash Put' has testimonies which indicate that Matlin is practically a criminal.*[26]

They also accused Matlin and the caretaker of the stadium, who happened to be a member of Betar, of failing to protect the property of the stadium during the catastrophic flood in the summer of 1932. *Nash Put'* demanded Matlin's dismissal because of fraud and misappropriation. But apparently this smear campaign did not achieve its goal. Matlin continued to play an important role in the administration of Harbin's sports facilities. In 1937 *Nash Put'* again tried to discredit Matlin by claiming that he, as a member of the supervisory board of the hippodrome, discriminated against the Russian members and tried to incite them against each other.[27] Presumably, this effort to strip Matlin of his prestigious positions was part of the fascists' attempt to relegate the Jewish community to the fringes of Harbin society.

Team Harbin: Identification with the Local

But this is just one side of the story. The *Novoe Sportivnoe Obshchestvo* (New Sports Organization – hereafter NSO), Harbin's biggest sports organization, was not in the hands of one particular political or ethnic group, but run conjointly by representatives of the Chinese, Japanese, Russian and Jewish community.[28] The well-established *Kharbinskoe Obshchestvo Tennisnogo I Kon'kobezhnogo Sporta* (Harbins Tennis and Skating Club - hereafter KhOTKS) recruited their members from among all the better of segments of Harbin's society, independent of their ethnic background.[29] The same applies for the local horse-racing society and the local yacht club, where financial ability mattered much more than skin color or ethnic origin.[30] And by no means were all sports teams ethnically homogeneous, but sometimes recruited their members from different ethnicities. In 1939, for example, a mixed team of Chinese and Russians from Harbin competed in

26 Kak evrei Matlin pazbazaril imushchestvo stadiona [How the Jew Matlin squanders the property of the stadium], in: Nash Put', No. 84, 29 December 1933, p. 6.

27 Intrigi Ia. S. Matlina na gosudarstvennom ippodrome [The intrigues of Matlin at the public hippodrome], in: Nash Put', No. 222, 24 August 1937, p. 5.

28 Scharov, NSO razvivaet energichnyiu sportivnuiu raboty v Kharbine [The NSO expands their energetic activities for Sports in Harbin], in: Rupor, No. 80, 24 March 1933, p. 4.

29 For the tennis and skating club see: V. P. Ablamskii, Russkii sport v Harbine, in: Taskina, Russkii Kharbin, pp. 219-20.

30 E. Zentka, Kharbinskii ippodrom, in: Taskina, Russkii Kharbin, pp. 224-26.

the so-called First International Bicycle Race in Harbin.[31] The city sent a mixed team of Chinese, Russians and Japanese to the so-called Manchukuo Olympics in 1935 and 1936.[32] In 1934 the athletes Dun Yaoting, Belen'kov, Danilov and Liu Tai won nearly all skating competitions for the KhOTKS.[33]

Sports in Harbin was apparently a relatively open common space were border-crossing generally prevailed over border-building. One reason for this might lay in a sense of local pride, loyalty and identification with Harbin itself. At the beginning of the 1930s several organizations, first and foremost the NSO, exerted themselves to raise the level of Harbin athletes and organize sports on a city-wide level because of the sometimes embarrassing performances of Harbin's young athletes in competitions against Western foreigners or teams from other Manchurian cities. As an employee of Harbin's main stadium said in an interview with the newspaper *Kharbinskoe Vremia*:

> *The last series of competitions against foreigners revealed this to a high degree. During their appearance in the stadium several local athletes not only did not know the basic rules of their disciplines, but got into arguments with experienced instructors, who admonished them. Sports was without discipline. Everybody did what they wanted, thought or wished to do.*[34]

So they planned the establishment of a special college for sport, which was to be open to the best representatives of all sport organizations to ensure a better representation of Harbin as a whole at regional and international competitions.[35] For them it was irrelevant whether the athlete was Chinese, Russian or Manchu as long as he was a worthy representative and not a source of embarrassment.

A similar tendency can be observed in semi-professional boxing, which was particularly popular in Harbin in the second half of the 1930s.[36] Interested spectators simply wanted to see a good fight. They cheered the impetuous attacks of Khan, who called himself Ginger[37], admired the brilliant technique of the Jewish boxer, Ilia Kagan,[38] or the heavy punch of Akita Iutaka.[39] Nobody really cared that the coach of Harbin's most famous boxer, Shiliaev, was a German Jew who also coached Betar's boxing team.[40]

31 Gromadnyi uspekh bcherashnikh velosipednykh gonok [Huge success at yesterdays cycling race], in: Zaria, No. 212, 9 August 1939, p. 4.

32 Rezul'taty pervago dnia IV. vceman'chzhurskoi Olimpiady [Results of the first day of the all-Manchurian Olympics], in: Gun Bao, No. 2830, 30 September 1935, p. 1.

33 Sportsmeny KhOTKS – pobediteli na ledianom fronte [The athletes of the KhOTKS – winners at the ice front], in: Rupor, No. 53, 26 January 1934, p. 3.

34 Fizicheskoe vospitanie molodezhi dolzhno byt' centralizovano [The physical education of youth should be unified], in: Kharbinskoe Vremiia, No. 232, 29 August 1933, p. 7.

35 Ibid.

36 Vozprozhdaetsia interes Kharbincev k boksy [The interest in boxing is growing among people in Harbin], in: Rupor, No. 200, 26 July 1937, p. 4.

37 Kto pobedit? [Who will win?], in: Rupor, No. 296, 1 November 1937, p. 4.

38 Komu prineset pobedy voskresnyi boi? [Who will win the fight on Sunday?], in: Rupor, No. 188, 14 July 1937, p. 6.

39 Akita Iutaka ili Iuzefovich [Akita Jutaka or Juzefovich], in: Rupor, No. 251, 17 September 1937, p. 4.

40 Shiliaev actually went to the United States to become a professional boxer but died tragic in one of his first fights in San Francisco. He is still remembered as the greatest athlete that ever came out of the Russian com-

Boxing was also the only sport where athletes from Harbin could present themselves on an international stage beyond Manchukuo and Japan. In this context ethnic origin, the importance of political and religious beliefs faded as long as the local boy won. Harbin newspapers reported enthusiastically about the performances of Harbin's boxers in Shanghai and Manila, especially about Harbin's "wonder boy", the boxer Shiliaev, who was said to have what it takes to become an international champion.[41]

Training the Warrior versus Sportsmanship: Sport as a means or an end

In comparison to the above, for the Vanguard Union and Betar sports was never a value in itself, but more of an instrument to train their members for their future roles as the saviors of Russia or as fighters for a Jewish homeland in Palestine. As the fascist leader Konstantin Rodzaevskij said on the occasion of the ceremonial promulgation of the results of the examination and the bestowal of medals to outstanding members: "Physical preparation is of great importance, because today's struggle for existence and our future mobilization will require all of our strength. Our bodies must be steeled and trained."[42] Charles Clurman, a Russian Jew and a very active member of Betar, also portrayed sports as means of preparation for future fights:

> *Then there were the Trumpeldor (Betar) scouts. We had athletics. We had a skating team. Boys and girls. We were preparing to go to Israel to fight for the independence of Israel.*[43]

Therefore, sports within Betar as well as the Vanguard Union was usually embedded in the overall ideological and political education of children and youth, and further, as part of their internal examination system. To rise within the different ranks, each member had to pass a combined examination of a written and a physical test. At the Vanguard Union, for example, boys between the ages of 15 and 18 had to play either soccer, volleyball or basketball, show their abilities in track and field and do a written test in Russian history and politics to reach the next higher rank.[44] Sports events at the Vanguard Union and, to

munity in the Far East. E. Shiliaev, Pamiati brata, Andreia Shiliaeva – Russkogo L'va iz Kharbina, in: Rossiiane v Azii. Literaturno-istoricheskii ezhegodnik (1998) No. 5, pp. 106-25.

41 Vallo-Spida priglashaiut v Parizh. Kharbinskii bokser na poroge bol'shoi sportivnoi kar'ery [Vallo-Spida invited to Paris. Harbin boxer at the threshold of a great career], in: Rupor, No. 322, 25 November 1934, p. 8; Ia v etom mal'chike ne oshibsia! Trener Zelikh schitaet, chto emu udastsia sdelat' A. Shiliaeva velikim bokserom […], in: Rupor, No. 149, 5 June 1937, p. 4; S Shiliaevym nikto ne reshaetsia srazit'sia. [No one dares to fight with Shilaev], in: Zaria, No. 119, 8 June 1937, p. 5.

42 Russkiia deti verny Velikoi Rossii [Russian children are true to Great Russia], in: Nash Put', No. 220, 8 March 1935, p. 4.

43 Interview with Charles Clurman conducted by Irene Clurman 29 October 1982, transcripts on http://www.shtetlinks.jewishgen.org/harbin/Charles_%28Ruvim%29_Isaac_Clurman.htm. Last visit 30 August, 2011. Similar also Yaakov Liberman: "Sports and physical fitness are the prerequisites of a healthy society. Zionists soon realized the importance of cultivating able-bodied women and men, who would one day stand at the forefront of the Jewish struggle for independence." Liberman, My China, p. 62.

44 Olischev, Za fashistskoe Vospitanie [For a fascist education], in: Nash Put', No. 321, 15 December 1935, p. 8; Za Russkost' Russkikh Detei! Rabota VFP sredi detei i iunoshestva [For the Russianness of Russian Children.The work

a lesser degree, also at Betar were also normally framed by uniformed parades, inflammatory speeches, the reading of nationalistic poems and singing of patriotic songs.[45]
But many, if not most, athletes and officials in Harbin did not see sports and physical exercise only as a means to prepare youth for lives as fighters and soldiers or to demonstrate ostensible ethnic superiority, but rather the opposite. Just as many like-minded Europeans earlier, they believed that sports could improve the coexistence of different groups and promote values and norms like discipline and selflessness as well as tolerance and cooperativeness. In contrast to the Vanguard Union and Betar, the editor of the more liberal newspaper Rupor saw sports as an antithesis to chauvinism, intolerance and war-mindedness:

> *On the field sportsmen show their success and their accomplishments and arouse feelings of competition as well as admiration. Athletes with their rules and traditions propagate the athletic nobleness of a gentlemen, fairness and mutual help. Sportsmanship in its contemporary meaning against a bellicose and chauvinistic spirit forms a strong and self-confident generation and teaches courtesy and mental balance.*[46]

Some organizations, like the sports division of the local chapter of the YMCA, hoped "to strengthen interethnic relations among youth"[47] as one of the main objectives of their engagement in sports. To achieve this goal, the YMCA organized a city-wide basketball league in 1934 open to teams from Russian and Chinese schools, which, according to the YMCA administration, ended in a common celebration.[48]

No man's Land: Sport between the Fronts

And even the borders drawn between Betar athletes and members of the fascist youth groups was not insuperable and at times were crossed at least indirectly. Since the mid-1930s the Bureau of the Affairs of Russian Émigrés (hereafter BREM), an institution erected to preside over the Russian population of Harbin, was also in charge of Russian sports organizations, sports at Russian schools and the organization of several sports competitions, such as the annual school Olympics, with sometimes over 1000 participants.[49] At the same time, the leadership of BREM installed by the Japanese consisted to a significant degree of members of the Russian Fascist Party. Their leader Konstantin Rodzaevskij, a die-hard anti-Semite, was actually the head of the so-called Second Department for Culture and Education, which was also responsible for sports.[50] The actual

of the VFP among Children and youth], in: Nash Put', suppl., 24 May 1935, p. 25; Fashistskaia molodezh' prinimaet sportivnyi kompleks "Za Rossiiu" [Sport complex "Za Rossiiu"], in: Nash Put', No. 77, 24 March 1937, p. 2.

45 Russkiia deti verny Velikoi Rossii [Russian children are true to Great Russia], in: Nash Put', No. 220, 8 March 1935, p. 4.

46 Politika i Sport [Politics and Sports], in: Rupor, No. 139, 26 May 1937, p. 1.

47 Christianskii Soiuz Molodykh Liudei: Administrationyi Otchet, p. 8.

48 Ibid.

49 Luch Azii, No. 22. June 1936, p. 6.

50 Aurilene, Rossiiskaia Diaspora, pp. 52-53; It is still not clear from the sources whether any Jewish organizations ever registered with BREM. Several revisionist associations, though, did press for membership in 1936, arguing

sub-department for sports was run by I. N. Dunaev, who was also the leader of the Union of Fascist Youth, the umbrella organization for all fascist children and youth groups.
Betar members repeatedly participated in sports events organized by the BREM. In November of 1937 Ilia Kagan, one of the most talented boxers from Betar, competed in a BREM-sponsored series of boxing matches.[51] The same applies for Betar's volleyball, ping pong and the track and field team, who all took part in tournaments organized by the BREM. It is conceivable that the desire for a serious competition with other talented athletes beyond Betar overrode usually firm lines.
Members of fascist youth organizations and Betar also occasionally competed for the same team during the annual school Olympics.[52] The participation of Jewish teenagers and youth at those events appears to have remained possible because it occurred in a different context, outside of Betar and the Vanguard Union. For example, the alternative identification in this case with one's school instead of ethnicity, nationality or religious affiliation seems to have enabled them to overlook the otherwise prevailing antagonism between the two groups.

Conclusion

By no means do I want to create the expression that sports in Harbin was a sphere of interethnic and interracial harmony and peace. As I have shown on the basis of the Russian fascists and the Jews, sports in Harbin was not devoid of ethnic antagonism and occasional violence, especially if it was just a side show of deep-rooted antagonism and an instrument to demonstrate superiority and debase the "other". If sports was "no longer […] a competition between two sportsmen", but "a contest between "them" and "us", between White Russians and Jews",[53] as Liberman puts it in his recollections about his "famous" race in 1940, it would have served to reinforce borders much more than erode them. But if unhinged from a nationalistic and ethnocentric context, sport organizations, facilities and competitions seem to be a common space where otherwise clearly defined political, religious or ethnic borders could be shifted, adjusted, replaced and even sometimes abandoned.

that they also belonged to the Russian emigrant groups and the anti-Bolshevik coalition but there is no clear indication that they ever formally joined the BREM. See: Evrei o Biuro po delam Russkiiskikh emigrantov [The Jews about the Bureau for Russian Emigrants], in: Zaria (1936), No. 41, 15. February, p. 4. Altman says in his article that the Jewish organization joined BREM against Russian resistance, but he relies on the memoirs of General Higuchi, which Altman admits are of questionable reliability. Avraham Altman. Controlling the Jews, Manchukuo Style, in: Roman Malek (ed.), Jews in China. From Kaifeng … to Shanghai, Sankt. Augustin 2000, pp. 279-317, here p. 290.

51 Sport v Betare [Sports at Betar], in: Hagadel, No. 23-24, 15 December 1937, p. 19.

52 Luch Azii, No. 22, June 1936, p. 6.

53 Liberman, My China, p. 106.

On the Borders of Bolshevism: Class, Race, and the Social Relations of Occupied Vladivostok, 1918–19

Benjamin Isitt

RESÜMEE

Nach der Revolution von 1917 war die Machtfrage in Vladivostok ungeklärt. Rivalisierende staatliche und nicht-staatliche Akteure rangen um politischen Einfluss. Die geopolitischen Konflikte übertrugen sich auf die lokalen Verhältnisse und sozialen Beziehungen – ein Prozess, der mit Blick auf Klasse, Rasse und Ideologie seinerseits Grenzen festlegte und soziale Räume im besetzten Vladivostok formte. Nach dem Machtverlust der Bol'ševiki in Vladivostok strömten im Sommer 1918 mehr als einhunderttausend ausländische Soldaten in Russlands fernöstliche Hafenstadt. Sie mischten sich mit der dort ansässigen asiatischen und europäisch-russischen Zivilbevölkerung und Emigranten, vorwiegend Anhängern der antibolschewistischen Weißen Bewegung, die vor dem Bürgerkrieg im Inland geflohen waren. Am Beispiel des besetzten Vladivostok soll in diesem Artikel das Konzept des „Wanderarbeiters" so erweitert werden, dass es sowohl ausländische Soldaten als auch die lokale Zivilbevölkerung und Flüchtlinge erfasst. Ein besonderer Schwerpunkt liegt dabei auf den Beziehungen zwischen den kanadischen Soldaten und der lokalen Zivilbevölkerung. Die höheren Offiziere identifizierten sich mit den Anhängern der Weißen Bewegung und reagierten mit Empörung auf die Guerilla-Taktik der Partisanenverbände aus den Dörfern der Region Primor'e. Einfache Soldaten hingegen standen den Zielen ihrer Länder in Russland eher skeptisch gegenüber und identifizierten sich mit dem Volksaufstand im Frühjahr 1919. Die Zivilbevölkerung chinesischer und koreanischer Abstammung wurde durch einen „kolonialen Blickwinkel" wahrgenommen, aber kaum mit Geringschätzung, weil man sie (fälschlicherweise) für immun gegenüber kommunistischen Einflüssen hielt. In Cafés, auf den Straßen, in den Kinos und der Straßenbahn, auf Marktplätzen, in den Kasernen und Bordellen des besetzten Vladivostok entwickelten sich zwischen alliierten Soldaten und der aufsässigen Zivilbevölkerung der Grenzstadt komplexe Wechselbeziehungen, die einen einzigartigen sozialen Raum an der Grenze zum Bolschewismus schufen.

"Vladivostok is full of the scum of the earth," observed Harold Bickford, a 42-year-old career soldier from Toronto and second-in-command of the 4,200-strong Canadian Ex-

Comparativ | Zeitschrift für Globalgeschichte und vergleichende Gesellschaftsforschung 22 (2012) Heft 5, S. 72–86.

peditionary Force (Siberia), which occupied Russia's Far Eastern border town during the winter of 1918-19 along with motley Allied powers.[1] In the words of another soldier, American chief intelligence officer Robert Eichelberger, it was "a dirty place for Americans to be."[2] These officers articulated a widely held view among the foreigners who converged on Vladivostok: the city was a chaotic social and geopolitical space, combining the unruliness of a port town with the upheaval of revolution and the horrors of civil war. However, beneath this veil of insecurity and general unease toward the civilian population, shades of difference could be discerned. Borders – political, economic, ethnic, and ideological – were shaped and contested in occupied Vladivostok.

The Allied soldiers – migrant workers impelled to this corner of Northeast Asia by rival state and non-state actors and overlapping imperial interests – interpreted and negotiated relations with Vladivostok's local civilians through the lenses of class, race, and ideology. Elite officers identified with the White Russian refugees who converged on the terminal city after fleeing the fighting in the Eurasian interior; they saw legions of Bolsheviks and responded with outrage to the irregular tactics waged by *partizan* guerrillas from the hill villages of the Primorye region. Rank-and-file troops, meanwhile, were more suspicious of their countries' aims in Russia and identified with, or at least sought to understand, the popular insurgency that surged in the spring of 1919. Local citizens of Chinese and Korean ethnicity were viewed through a "colonizer's gaze," yet were held in lesser contempt because they were seen (inaccurately) as being impervious to Bolshevik influence. In the cafés, street corners, cinemas, marketplaces, trams, barracks, and brothels of occupied Vladivostok, Allied soldiers entered into a complex interaction with each other and with the bordertown's restive civilian population – creating a unique social space located on the borders of Bolshevism.

This tumultuous moment in the history of Russia, Northeast Asia, and the world challenges and expands our conception of "borderlands," while building on a trans-national historiography of the Pacific world and the Russian Far East, "a region where Europe, Asia, and America come together."[3] Occupied Vladivostok was significant not so much because of the ethnic diversity created by a surge in human migration, but because of the blurred lines of political authority which prevailed in the wake of the Bolshevik Revolution. Migration is "a structural aspect of human life," Lucassen notes.[4] Cross-cultural

1 H. C. Bickford diary, 20 January 1919, Bickford Family Collection, Providence, Rhode Island, USA (Private Collection); H. C. Bickford Attestation Paper, Library and Archives of Canada (hereafter LAC), Record Group (hereafter RG) 150, Accession 1992-93/166, Box 717-20.

2 As quoted in Paul Chwialkowski, A "Near Great" General: The Life and Career of Robert L. Eichelberger (PhD diss., Duke University, 1991), p. 35, as cited in Ernest Zitser, "A Dirty Place for Americans to Be", in: Slavic & East European Information Ressources 10 (2009) 1, p. 36.

3 John J. Stephan, The Russian Far East: A History, Stanford 1994, p. ix; B. I. Mukhachev (ed.), Dal'nii Vostok Rossii v period revoliutsii 1917 goda i grazhdanskoi voi ny (The Far East of Russia in the Period of the Revolutions of 1917 and Civil War), Vladivostok 2003; Canfield F. Smith, Vladivostok Under Red and White Rule: Revolution and Counterrevolution in the Russian Far East, 1920–1922, Seattle 1975; Amir Khisamutdinov, Vladivostok: Window or Fortress?, in The Russian Far East: Historical Essays, Honolulu 1993.

4 Leo Lucassen, Migration and World History: Reaching a New Frontier, in: International Review of Social History, 52 (2007), pp. 89-96; also Leslie Page Moch, Moving Europeans: Migration in Western Europe Since 1650, Bloo-

relations within bordertowns and borderlands are therefore imbued with meaning when placed in the context of the "power politics of territorial hegemony," with borderlands viewed as "the contested boundaries between colonial domains" (according to Adelman and Aron), shaped by inter-imperial dynamics.[5] Post-revolutionary Vladivostok is therefore a vital site of analysis as a "bordertown," shaped by the overlapping imperial interests of foreign powers and rival Russian authorities, as well as the interests of non-combatant civilians and refugees.

Taking occupied Vladivostok as a case study, this work embraces a broad conception of "migrant worker" that extends from the foreign soldiers to local civilians and refugees – placing particular emphasis on relations between Canadian soldiers and local civilians. States have always shaped migration in important ways, embracing policies that either encourage or discourage migration among specific groups. Military intervention is perhaps the most developed and tightly regulated form of state-supported migration: thousands of worker-soldiers being mobilized and transported across borders to project national power. However, domestic civilians are also "migrant workers," attracted or repelled by state policies or by political and economic conditions. Whether they reached Vladivostok as refugees in the heat of the civil war, or arrived decades or centuries earlier from European Russia, China, and the Korean peninsula, the process of migration shaped the social relations and social spaces of the bordertown. This work engages diverse fields: migration and borderlands studies, race relations in the Pacific world, urban history, labour history, intellectual history, military history, and the history of international relations. It seeks to break free from "methodological nationalism," which erases important distinctions and historical questions by treating the nation-state as the inevitable frame of historical analysis, moving beyond "imagined communities" to encompass the messy social relations of diverse migrant workers in this corner of northeast Asia and the Pacific world.[6]

Finally, this work engages the historiography of Allied intervention in Russia's civil war, giving priority to the voice of individual soldiers – both officers and the rank-and-file.[7] Applying the lens of social history to interpret dynamics of military occupation raises fresh questions on the class identity of soldiers, civilian insurgency, the politics of coali-

mington 1992; Dirk Hoerder, Cultures in Contact: World Migrations in the Second Millennium, Durham, NC 2002; Jan Lucassen / Leo Lucassen (eds), Migration, Migration History, History: Old Paradigms and New Perspectives, Berne 2005.

5 Jeremy Adelman / Stephen Aron, From Borderlands to Borders: Empires, Nation-States, and the Peoples in Between in North American History, in: American Historical Review 104 (August 1999) 3, pp. 815-16.

6 Andreas Wimmer / Nina Glick Schiller, Methodological Nationalism and Beyond: Nation-State Building, Migration and Social Sciences, in: Global Networks, 2 (2002) 4, pp. 301-34; Daniel Chernilo, Social Theory's Methodological Nationalism: Myth and Reality, in: European Journal of Social Theory, 9 (February 2006) 1, pp. 5-22; Daniel Chernilo, Methodological Nationalism: Theory and History, paper presented to the annual conference of the International Association of Critical Realism, King's College, London July 2008; Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, London 1991.

7 One of the few works that employs a trans-national approach is John Albert White, The Siberian Intervention, New York 1950.

tion warfare.[8] Such an approach has the potential to engage new generations of scholars (in Russia and beyond) in a post-Sovietological pursuit of Russia's revolutionary past.[9] In Vladivostok after 1917, power was in flux. Rival state actors vied for legitimacy, a geopolitical conflict that translated into local and human relations—a process mediated by class, race, and ideology – which in turn defined borders and shaped social spaces in occupied Vladivostok.

Spaces of Occupation

In June 1918, foreign marines landed from warships in Vladivostok's harbour, joining the anomalous Czecho-Slovak Legion and Chinese troops to topple the local Soviet government led by a 24-year-old Bolshevik student, Konstantin Sukhanov.[10] One hundred thousand foreign soldiers would pass through the city in ensuing months, the Far Eastern manifestation of Allied intervention in Russia's Civil War. Vladivostok's population had surged during the war, from 65,000 people in 1914 to about 170,000 by the time of the Allied intervention. One third of Vladivostok's population was ethnically Asian, including Korean fishers at Gornostai Bay and Chinese merchants, farmers, and city-dwellers.[11] They mingled with immigrants from European Russia, who had populated the hilly shores of Golden Horn Bay (*Zolotoy Rog*/*Gamat*) as the Trans-Siberian and Chinese Eastern Railroads were completed at the dawn of the 20th century. The toppling of Czarist authority and establishment of Sukhanov's Soviet administration inaugurated the most unstable moment in Vladivostok's past. Tens of thousands of White Russian refugees flooded the city, fleeing the Siberian interior, while the warships dropped anchor in the harbour followed by the landing of foreign troops: Japanese, Czechoslovak, American, Canadian, British, French, Chinese, Serbian, Polish, and Italian.[12] They propped up the White Russian government of Dmitri Horvath, manager of the Chinese Eastern

8 Timothy C. Winegard, The Canadian Siberian Expeditionary Force, 1918–1919, and the Complications of Coalition Warfare, in: Journal of Slavic Military Studies 20 (2007) 2, pp. 283-328.

9 For a discussion of this emerging post-Soviet historiography, see Michael Confino, The New Russian Historiography and the Old – Some Considerations, in: History and Memory 21 (Fall/Winter 2009) 2, pp. 7-33; Boris Kolonitskii, Russian Historiography of the 1917 Revolution: New Challenges to Old Paradigms?, in: History and Memory 21 (Fall/Winter 2009) 2, pp. 34-59; Teddy J. Uldricks, War, Politics and Memory: Russian Historians Reevaluate the Origins of World War II, in: History and Memory 21 (Fall/Winter 2009) 2, pp. 60-82; Vera Kaplan, The Vicissitudes of Socialism in Russian History Textbooks, in: History and Memory 21 (Fall/Winter 2009) 2, pp. 83-109; Victor Shnirelman, Stigmatized by History or by Historians?: The Peoples of Russia in School History Textbooks, in: History and Memory 21 (Fall/Winter 2009) 2, pp. 110-49; Yaacov Ro'i, The Transformation of Historiography on the "Punished Peoples", in: History and Memory, 21 (Fall/Winter 2009) 2, pp. 150-76.

10 See The Red Funeral of Vladivostok, in: British Columbia Federationist (Vancouver), 13 December 1918 (Reprinted from the New Republic). See also Dorothy Findlay letter, 1 July 1918, in: Letters from Vladivostok, 1918–1923, in: Slavonic and East European Review 45 (July 1967) 105, pp. 497-502.

11 Smith, Vladivostok Under Red and White Rule, p. 4; Stephan, The Russian Far East, pp. 71-80.

12 See Michael Kettle, The Road to Intervention: March–November 1918, London/New York 1988; John Silverlight, The Victors' Dilemma: Allied Intervention in the Russian Civil War, London 1970.

Railway who relocated from Harbin to Vladivostok, while battling a growing *partizan* insurgency in the hill villages of Primorye.

The convergence of foreign armies on Vladivostok strained an already desperate social situation. The port town had a modern electricity grid and tramway system, but no waterworks or sewers. Dead dogs and cats lay strewn across the roads. The lack of sanitation created a conducive climate for contagion, reflecting Vladivostok's "unfinished attempt at a flashy civilization" that had been "plunged into a sordid and dingy savagery."[13] The Civil War made a bad situation worse, as a typhus epidemic hit in early 1919. As terminus of the Trans-Siberian Railway, Vladivostok was "an end-of-the-road haven" for "scores of thousands of refugees – White Russians, Poles, Georgians, Mongolians, Chinese and Koreans; aristocracy, bourgeoisie, peasants and beggars… It was said that one could have a man's throat cut for a rouble."[14] The refugees – described as "the backwash of the revolution" – were in desperate need of food, clothing, and shelter. According to one Allied soldier, Vladivostok was "one of the worst holes on the face of the earth," a "God foresaken hole."[15]

The refugees included White Russian aristocrats aligned with the old regime as well as ordinary peasants and townsfolk displaced by the fighting in the Ural Mountains 6,000 kilometres to the west. They lived in abandoned boxcars and passenger cars that cluttered the sidings along the railroad, and squatted vacant buildings and Vladivostok's bullet-scarred rail station, a "foul place" with refugees "reeking with typhus."[16] A Canadian medical doctor described the scene aboard one of these railcars, where an old Czarist general clung to a world that was rapidly disappearing in the wake of the Bolshevik Revolution:

> *There were an old general and his wife, living in this used railway carriage. And they were selling what things they'd managed to escape with their life, which was a tea and coffee service, all in gold. And they'd sell a cup, and then a plate. And I said to this old general, "What's going to happen when you've sold all that?" "We will just die," he said. "We will just die."*[17]

The Trans-Siberian Railway station was "full of thousands of starving refugees. Literally starving. They had a little area on the floor and they all had fled from the Bolsheviks."[18] The motley Allied armies aggravated an already tense situation, consuming scarce accommodation in Vladivostok's centre and sprawling Czarist-era barracks that dotted the hillsides around the port. "Warehouse space on the wharves is limited" along with "suit-

13 Pares, My Russian Memoirs, pp. 498-99.
14 Clingan, Siberian Sideshow, p. 40.
15 Harold to Josie, 8 March and 19 March 1919, LAC, Harold Steele Collection, MG 30, E564, file "Correspondence, 1 Dec. 1918-1 May 1919"; see also Letters from Vladivostok, 1918–1923, in: Slavonic and East European Review 45 (July 1967) 105, pp. 497-530.
16 Pares, My Russian Memoirs, pp. 498-507; Mackintosh Bell, Sidelights on the Siberian Campaign, p. 49.
17 Eric Elkington interview, June 1980, University of Victoria Archives and Special Collections (hereafter UVAC), Military Oral History Collection, SC 141, 169.
18 Elkington interview, June 1980, UVASC.

able accommodation," a Canadian report noted in October 1918. The regal sixty-room Versailles Hotel had been claimed by the French mission, requiring the turfing of refugee inhabitants with "nowhere to go." Lamenting the "inequitable" distribution of accommodation, the Canadians claimed that the first Allied contingents had seized quarters that were "not occupied to their full capacity."[19] White Russian military commanders were powerless to requisition civilian buildings and the White-sponsored Town Council was reluctant to supersede property rights. "There is no recognized law or force that can turn them out of their buildings," the Canadians complained.[20] General Horvath had nominal authority over the Russian Far East, after sidelining another would-be-anti-Bolshevik regime, Pyotr Derber's Provisional Government of Autonomous Siberia.[21] However, locally, a political vacuum existed between White Russian administrators and military rulers.

Contested social space was graphically revealed in October 1918 when Canada's advance party landed in Vladivostok and seized the Pushkin Theatre, an ornate building housing the Cultural-Enlightenment Society and featuring a theatre and library. This unilateral action angered local business leaders, who were staunchly anti-Bolshevik but resented foreign incursion on property rights and culture. At an emergency meeting on 1 November 1918, members of the Vladivostok Trade-Manufacturers' Assembly passed a protest resolution, with a scant five opposing votes, lambasting the "trampling" of the rights of Russian citizens and "interference" in Russia's "internal affairs." "It would seem that such a Society would have a just cause on inviolability, and meanwhile, our Allies, in the name of the Canadian command, have grasped the Society's premises," depriving its 700 members from continuing cultural-educational and "public work." Revealing that class did not always shape social relations in Vladivostok in a straightforward way, the Vladivostok merchants and industrialists demanded "the clearing of the occupied premises."[22] In an open letter published (in Russian) in Vladivostok's *Dalekaya Okraina* newspaper, Canadian General James Elmsley refused to vacate the theatre, assuring the city's elite that the library and reading room would remain open, while reminding them that the "Allied armies have entered the country under the invitation of the Russian people who

19 War Diary of Force Headquarters CEF(S), 27 October 1918; Correspondence of Maj. George Addison McHaffie, Deputy Assistant Director of Supplies and Transport, Canadian Army Service Corps, Vladivostok, in LAC, George Addison McHaffie fonds, MG 30, E22. Earlier inquiries for Canadian office space had been made by Knox, head of the British Military Mission, and CPR representative Ross Owen. See Knox to CGS, 29 September 1918.

20 Situation at Vladivostok under Allied occupation, n.d. (c. 27 October 1918), War Diary of Force Headquarters CEF(S), October 1918, appendix G.

21 Ask Horvath to Yield Dictatorship Claims, in: New York Times, 16 July 1918.

22 Resolution passed by Vladivostok Trade-Manufacturers' Assembly, 1 November 1918, K rekvizitsii Pushkinskogo Teatra ("On the Requisition of Pushkinsky Theatre"), in: Dalekaya Okraina (Vladivostok), 4 November 1918. Vladivostok State Historical Archive.

repeatedly asked for help."[23] Guards were posted at the theatre, which served as the Canadian headquarters until the force evacuated in June 1919.[24]

Spaces of Fraternization

The foreign troops in Vladivostok faced the common task of defeating "Bolshevism", but the similarity ended there. Class and rank segmented each national contingent, which included large numbers of conscripts who had deployed to the Far East against their will. This included French-Canadian conscripts from the province of Quebec, who had mutinied in the streets of British Columbia's capital city, Victoria, the day they embarked for Vladivostok.[25] The Canadian contingent provides a compelling window into social relations and social spaces in occupied Vladivostok, since the Canadian government refused to authorize their deployment into the Siberian interior. The 4,200 Canadians stand out as unlikely "tourists' during one of the roughest moments in Vladivostok's history. Their experiences are therefore distinct from the horrors experienced by many Canadian and Allied troops in the trenches of France and Flanders. They "served as mere 'spectators'," making "the least contribution to the White cause" of all the anti-Bolshevik armies in eastern Russia.[26] Lacking authorization to proceed "up country," the Canadians tried took keep busy in barracks at Gornostai Bay and Second River. "Every day here is about the same," Brig-General Harold Bickford wrote two weeks after reaching the Russian Far East.[27] A week later, he would lament: "I am beginning to think from reports received that this expedition is a faust."[28] The *Siberian Sapper*, published by the Canadians, blared the banner headline "What Are We Doing Here?" – posing a question on the minds of many troops.[29]

The class location of soldiers shaped social spaces in occupied Vladivostok. Within the Allied officer corps, strong fraternal ties developed, even as the strategies of the imperial powers diverged. Officers shared a common class experience, often hailing from the elite of their respective states and sharing a common antipathy to the amorphous menace of

23 Raz'yasneniee po povodu rekvizitsii Pushkinskogo teatra ("Explanation concerning requisition of Pushkinsky Theatre"), in: Dalekaya Okraina (Vladivostok), 6 November 1918; Otvet Kanadksogo Komandovaniya na rezolyutsiyu protesta bynesennogo na obschem sobranii torgovo-Promyshlennogo Obschestva ("The answer of the Canadian command to the resolution of protest of general meeting of the Commercial and industrial Society), in: Primosrskaya Zhizn' (Vladivostok), 7 November 1918, Vladivostok State Historical Archive.

24 War Diary of Force Headquarters CEF (S), 29 October 1918 and 31 October 1918; War Diary of Advance Party 6th Signal Company CEF (S), 3 November 1918, Centre for Research on Canadian-Russian Relations Special Collections (hereafter cited as CRCR), series 1, section 1 (Archival Materials); Hertzberg diary, 3 November 1918, LAC, Hertzberg fonds, vol. 1, file 1-18, Diary #8; MacLaren, Canadians in Russia, p. 151.

25 Benjamin Isitt, Mutiny from Victoria to Vladivostok: December 1918, in: Canadian Historical Review 87 (June 2006) 2, pp. 223-64.

26 Canadians Had Easy Time in Siberia, in: Daily Times, 19 April 1919; Beattie, Canadian Intervention in Russia, p. 381.

27 Bickford diary, 29 January 1919.

28 Bickford diary, 5 February 1919.

29 Siberian Sapper (Vladivostok), 8 February 1919, LAC, RG 9, ser. III, vol. 363, fi le 119.

Bolshevism. Officers' diaries and memoirs paint a picture of a vibrant social scene, with regular leave from the barracks to dine at restaurants and cafés that dotted Svetlanskaya, bathe in authentic Russian bathhouses, and frequent theatres and private homes in the cosmopolitan port. Allied officers travelled on *droshky*, horse-driven carts.[30] At their mess halls, they feasted on duck and geese. Many took lessons in Russian. Some developed strong camaraderie with White Russians attached to the Allied units as translators, such as Lieut. Aleksandr Ragosin, a former Czarist officer attached to the Canadian force headquarters. The small coterie of foreign women in Vladivostok, such as Mrs. Ross Owen, wife of the Canadian Pacific Railroad envoy, provided entertainment for the officers and offered civilian relief.[31]

The lower ranks satisfied themselves with more frugal pursuits: frequenting the bustling markets and bazaars and rambling around the fortifications that dotted the coastline inside and outside town.[32] The lower ranks reached Vladivostok by tram or on foot. Organizations including the YMCA and Knights of Columbus operated canteen huts, readings rooms, and movie theatres at the barracks, and organized concerts, lectures, dances, baseball and soccer games, and church services.[33] In February 1919, the Illusion Idyllion theatre on Svetlanskaya was leased for four months and transformed into the Maple Leaf Cinema and Café, a facility intended to be "as nearly Canadian in all its services as possible."[34] An eight-team hockey league was established, as well as two brigade newspapers. [35] On 1 May 1919, the various Allied contingents participated in a large *Gymkhana* sports day at Vladivostok's Exhibition Grounds, with activities ranging from tug-of-war and polo to wrestling.[36]

30 Capt. W.E. Dunham, The Canadians in Siberia, in: Maclean's (May 1918), 11-12; Bickford diary, 11 February 1919 and 8 March 1919.

31 Dorothy Findlay to Mother, 2 December 1918, in: Letters from Vladivostok, 1918–1923, in: Slavonic and East European Review 45 (July 1967) 105, pp. 506-7; Tompkins, A Canadian's Road to Russia, pp. 369-404; Elkington interview, July 1980, UVASC, Military Oral History collection, SC 141, 170; Massey, When I Was Young, pp. 212-13; Hertzberg diary, 28 October-5 June 1919, LAC, Hertzberg fonds, vol. 1, file 1-18, Diary #8 (10 May 1918-15 Nov. 1918) and Diary #9 (16 Nov. 1918-22 July 1919); Hertzberg, Military Engineering with the Canadian Brigade in Siberia 1919, p. 8; Ardagh diary, January 1919-May 1919, LAC, Harold Vernon Ardagh fonds, MG 30, E-150; MacLaren, Canadians in Russia, p. 198.

32 Bickford diary, 24 April 1919.

33 MacLaren, Canadians in Russia, pp. 198-99; "Notice," 29 March 1919, War Diary of General Staff CEF(S), Daily Routine Orders, March 1919, appendix XLI p. 31. For the activities of the YMCA, see LAC, RG 9, series II-B-12, "Part II Daily Orders – Vladivostok – YMCA"; Charles W. Bishop, The Canadian YMCA in the Great War: The Official Record of the Activities of the Canadian YMCA in Connection with the Great War of 1914–1918 (Toronto, 1924), p. 304–10; I.J.E. Daniel and D.A. Casey, For God and Country: War Work of Canadian Knights of Columbus Catholic Army Huts, Ottawa, c. 1922, pp. 167-70.

34 YMCA Notes, in: Siberian Sapper (Vladivostok), 8 February 1919, Stephenson Family Collection (private collection); Daily Routine Order No. 69, 31 January 1919, War Diary of Force Headquarters, CEF(S), Appendix XCII-XCIV, p. 69; also Stuart to Edna, 15 February 1919, in Tompkins, A Canadian's Road to Russia, p. 402.

35 Polk, The Canadian Red Cross and Relief in Siberia, p. 65; Faulstich, Mail from the Canadian Siberian Expeditionary Force, pp. 24-25; MacLaren, Canadians in Russia, p. 198; Stuart to Edna, 25 January 1919, in Tompkins, A Canadian's Road to Russia, p. 378; Ardagh diary, 31 January 1919, LAC, Harold Vernon Ardagh fonds, MG 30, E-150, file 1/6. For the organization of sporting activities, see "Sports Organization CEF (Siberia)," 4 February 1919, War Diary of General Staff CEF(S), Daily Routine Orders, February 1919, appendix XLIX pp. 33-34.

36 "Notice – Gymkhana," 26 March 1919, War Diary of General Staff CEF(S), March 1919, Daily Routine Orders, ap-

Mixed social spaces did, however, exist. Boxing matches animated barrack life most evenings – drawing crowds of officers and enlisted men – while American and Canadian soldiers (of all ranks) played frequent baseball games once the snow melted in the spring of 1919.[37] Theatrical performances also bridged the class divide, such as the vaudeville show *The Roadhouse Minstrels*, directed by Canadian machine-gun officer and future Hollywood actor Lieutenant Raymond Massey (an established member of Canada's elite), playing to two dozen packed audiences.[38] In March 1919, American troops from the 27th Infantry Regiment gave a concert for Allied officers in the Pushkin Theatre.[39]

Social spaces were also contested in Vladivostok's sex trade. The Japanese command allowed for a regulated form of prostitution, acknowledging the reality of sexual relations in every theatre of war. Japanese commanders issued "ration cards" to their troops for "comfort visits" to sex-trade workers who had accompanied the expeditionary force from Japan; medical tests were frequent to limit the spread of venereal disease.[40] Even so, this system relied on the dubiously voluntary participation of working-class Japanese women and foreshadowed the horrific "comfort stations" that would emerge as Japan spread its power across the Pacific world.[41] In contrast to this Japanese policy, the Canadian command officially forbade all sexual relations among the British and Canadian troops in Vladivostok, with the quarter master general informing all ranks that sexual intercourse with a women was an offence punishable by court martial, equivalent to a self-inflicted wound. "The percentage of Venereal Disease in our Force is very high and unless there is some improvement […] in the near future, it will be necessary […] to modify or cancel the privilege of passes in the City."[42] The policy reflected the rigid Protestant norms of the Anglo-Canadian elite. The quarter master's decree threatened to ship infected soldiers back to Canada and "notify the relatives of these men" as to the cause.[43] Canada's policy was a spectacular failure. According to medical records, roughly one half of all hospital cases at Canada's Second River Hospital related to venereal disease. Two Canadian soldiers died of Asiatic syphilis.[44] Defying the standing order, Canadian and British troops frequented sex-trade workers at the district known as "Kopek Hill." "These are the girls who love anyone with the price," one Canadian observed.[45] A graphic incident resulted

pendix XLI; Wilgress, Memoirs, p. 55; Charles Sumner Lund Hertzberg diary, 12 April 1919 and 28 April-2 May 1919, LAC, Hertzberg fonds, vol. 1, file 1-18, Diary #9.

37 See Bickford diary, March-June 1919 (particularly 22 March, 23 March, 25 April).

38 The Roadhouse Minstrels, in: Siberian Sapper (Vladivostok), 8 February 1919, Stephenson Family Collection (private collection); The Roadhouse Minstrels Present the Following Bill, n.d. (c. January 1919), LAC, RG 9, series III-D-3, vol. 5057, file 964; Massey, When I Was Young, pp. 214-21.

39 Bickford diary, 28 March 1919.

40 Stephan, The Russian Far East, p. 134; MacLaren, Canadians in Russia, p. 201.

41 Yuki Tanaka, Japan's Comfort Women: Sexual Slavery and Prostitution During World War II and the US Occupation, London 2002.

42 Daily Routine Orders, 11 December 1918. LAC, RG 9, War Diary of Force Headquarters CEF (S).

43 Ibid.

44 "Officers & Others Ranks, C.E.F. (Siberia) Who Have Died," LAC, RG 24, series C-1-a, vol 1992, file 762-11-25 "Returns of Strength C.E.F. (Siberia)."

45 William H. Bryant photo album, overleaf of photograph of Russian sex-trade workers, from the Bryant Family Collection, Nanton, Alberta (private collection); Raymond Massey, When I Was Young (Toronto, 1976), p. 206.

in a Canadian military court of inquiry. Lance-Corporal Peter Marchik, an interpreter with the force headquarters battalion, was "shot in the penis" by a Russian woman at a Vladivostok brothel. The hearing, held in February 1919, found that the Lance-Corporal Marchik suffered a "flesh wound" that was not fatal.[46]

In contrast with the prostitution practiced by rank-and-file Allied troops (whether regulated or illicit), Allied officers were more subtle and invisible in their sexual relations. Innuendo in personal memoirs gives a hint, such as a seemingly close relationship that developed between a certain Canadian lieutenant and an unnamed White Russian émigré woman living near the Canadian barracks at Second River. The officer referred euphemistically to nights spent "dancing" until the wee hours of the morning.[47] Another Canadian officer, Walter Halsall of the Base Depot Unit, remained in Vladivostok after the Canadians had evacuated to marry a White Russian wife.[48] Apparently transcending such class boundaries, American chief intelligence officer Robert Eichelberger interviewed hundreds of Russians of diverse socio-economic complexion, "everything from a Baron to a prostitute," by his own account.[49]

Class and gender shaped the social spaces of occupied Vladivostok, but so too did ethnicity and race. Reflecting the cultural traditions of the Maritime region prior to Russian colonization, as well as ongoing migration, a large minority of the local population was ethnically Asian, including Korean fishers at Gornostai Bay and Chinese labourers who performed much of the manual work for the Allies. "By 1900 all the towns between Chita and Vladivostok contained Chinese quarters" with large numbers of "shopkeepers and workmen."[50] Nine-tenths of Vladivostok shipyard workers and half the city's population were Asian at the turn of the century:

> *were it not for the Chinese, the naval administration would have had to transport thousands of Russian labourers to construct Vladivostok's naval fitting yards, arsenal, fortifications and coastal defences… The Chinese – construction workers, diggers, porters, merchants, and peasants – were quite simply indispensible to the continuation of the rapid pace of economic activity occasioned by the construction of the Trans-Siberian Railway.*[51]

Like elsewhere in the Pacific world, "indispensability of the Chinese did not endear them to the Russian settler population" – as European Russians displayed cultural superiority and racism in their interactions with local Asians – displayed most graphically during

46 "Shooting of No. 417988 L/Cpl. P. Marchik," 5 February 1919. LAC, RG 9, series III-a-3, vol 378, file "A3. SEF Courts of Enquiry." Part II Daily Orders, 10 December 1918. War Diary of Force Headquarters CEF (S).

47 Ardagh diary, January 1919-May 1919, LAC, Harold Vernon Ardagh fonds, MG 30, E-150.

48 Correspondence with Raymond Halsall, Victoria, BC, 27 July 2010; Interview with Raymond Halsall, by author, Victoria, BC, 2 September 2010.

49 Paul Chwialkowski, A 'Near Great' General: The Life and Career of Robert L. Eichelberger (PhD diss., Duke University, 1991), 32, as cited in Zitser, "A Dirty Place for Americans to Be", p. 31.

50 Lewis Siegelbaum, Another "Yellow Peril": Chinese Migrants in the Russian Far East and the Russian reaction before 1917, in: Modern Asian Studies 12 (April 1978) 2, p. 316.

51 Ibid., pp. 316-17.

the Boxer Rebellion when several thousand Chinese civilians were slaughtered at Blagoveshchensk.[52] Ernest Zitser's recent study on the "colonial gaze" of American troops helps us to extend to the interpretive lens into the Civil War period. According to Zitser, soldiers viewed Vladivostok civilians with a focus on "only certain racial types or socials situations," in order to "reassert the superiority of [their] own nation, sex, and race." Such photographic representations of the Asian "other" help to illuminate "daily life during wartime in a multi-ethnic and multi-confessional region on the border of three major twentieth-century powers (Russia, Japan, and China)."[53]

This assessment is supported by evidence from the Canadian soldiers in Vladivostok. Lacking authorization to proceed "up country", the Canadians (both officers and lower ranks) took thousands of photographs of Vladivostok and its people during the winter of 1918-19. The interpretive framework of "Orientalism" helps us to understand Canadian photographic representations of Vladivostok's Asian people, as does the concept of "multiculturality" and a particularly "Canadian multiculturality," which shaped the perception of the troops. Like the Americans, the Canadians focused disproportionately on the "other" and the exotic: Korean fishers at Gornostai; their sod huts and children and livestock; their cultural and religious practices; Chinese peddlers, merchants, and labourers; and "exotic" forms of entertainment such as bear and tiger shows on Svetlanskaya and acrobatic performances by Allied Chinese troops. This reflected an air of unfamiliarity (at least among those Canadians who lived outside the country's west coast, which had its own well-established Chinese and Japanese communities). But it also reflected a larger colonial mindset. Shortly after reaching Vladivostok, Canadian medical doctor Eric Elkington wrote how he was "were struck by the curious inhabitants who were about the wharf. Chiefly Manchurians well built and strong looking Mongolians and not like the Coolies so frequently seen in B. C. They were employed in unloading the boat and native transport being largely used."[54] Another Canadian, Private Percy Francis with the supply depot at Egersheld Wharf, worked closely with Chinese labourers and wrote fondly of one: "Mong … would give me his shirt."[55] However, rather than a single "Asian" other, the Canadians' perceptions operated in complex ways. There is evidence of strong camaraderie with Japanese officers, who were largely viewed as "western," in distinction to the perception of local Korean and Chinese civilians, which raises questions over how "Japanese Orientalism" may have shaped race relations in occupied Vladivostok.[56]

If the Canadian experience is indicative of the larger Allied experience, the soldiers appeared to interact more with the local Asian population than with Russian civilians of European ethnicity, who were likely suspected of Bolshevism to a greater extent. However, even this conclusion reflects a colonial mindset, that somehow the Chinese merchants

52 Ibid., pp. 317-19.
53 Zitser, "A Dirty Place for Americans to Be", pp. 40-42.
54 Eric Elkington diary, n.d. (c. January 1919), Eric Elkington Collection, University of Victoria Special Collections.
55 Photograph of Chinese labourer named "Mong," n.d. (c. April 1919), Percy Francis Collection, Las Vegas, Nevada, USA (private collection).
56 Sang-Jung Kang, Beyond Orientalism, Tokyo 1996.

and Korean fishers were impervious to the radical political philosophy of Bolshevism: important partisan commanders hailed from both of Vladivostok's two major ethnically Asian communities, Do Lin Tsoy as commander of Primorye's Chinese partisans and Kim Pen Ha as commander of the region's Korean partisans.[57]

Spaces of "Bolshevism" and Insurgency

Ideology had a major role to play in shaping the social relations and social spaces of occupied Vladivostok – particular as the *partizan* guerrilla movement surged in the city and surrounding hill villages in the early months of 1919. While Canada's official history claims that "the mass of the Siberian people, who were generally content with their ordered existence under the old regime, had little leaning towards the Bolshevik system," the top Canadian policeman in the city estimated in 1919 that in Vladivostok "the inhabitants are about ninety percent Bolshevik."[58] Another Canadian, press correspondent Wilfred Playfair offered a nuanced perspective, suggesting that while "there is undoubtedly a Bolshevik element in Siberia, the leading problem at present is not Bolshevism but the conflict between various types of reactionaries and the democratic element."[59] This view was confirmed by American intelligence officer Robert Eichelberger, who believed that the "typical bunch of Russians are practically all anti-Kolchak in sympathy."[60] William S. Graves, commander of the American Expeditionary Force, explained how the term "Bolshevik" broadened in tandem with the partisan insurgency in 1919: "In Siberia, the word Bolshevik meant a human being who did not, by act or word, give encouragement to the restoration to power of representatives of Autocracy in Russia."[61] Finally, a Canadian officer elaborated on this point:

> *The people of Siberia resent the presence of the Allied troops… They regard us as intruders… They are all Bolshevists in the meaning of the word as it is used here. A Bolshevist, with them, is one who wants a change.*[62]

Facing this amorphous enemy of "Bolshevism," the Allied soldiers were largely isolated from Vladivostok's ethnically European Russian community (with the exception of those White Russians who were deemed to be sufficiently anti-Bolshevik). A climate of fear was manifest when two White Russian officers were tortured and crucified on the road to Second River, with their noses, eyes, ears, and tongues cut off and their hands severed

57 Civil War Collection, V. K. Arseniev State Museum of Primorsky Region, Vladivostok.
58 Nicholson, Official History of the Canadian Army in the First World War, p. 518; G.S. Worsley Report on "B" Squadron RNWMP, 11 October 1919, LAC, RG 18, vol. 3179, file G 989-3 (vol. 2); MacLaren, Canadians in Russia, p. 197.
59 Canadians Had Easy Time in Siberia, in: Daily Times, 19 April 1919.
60 As quoted in Zitser, "Dirty Place for Americans to Be", p. 38.
61 Graves, America's Siberian Adventure, p. 101.
62 Capt. W. E. Dunham, The Canadians in Siberia, in: Maclean's Magazine (May 1919), pp. 94-5.

and nailed to their shoulder blades "in lieu of epaulettes."[63] Canadian officer Raymond Massey wrote how they "continually found the bodies of these men, bearing obscene evidence of torture before death. Many times through the winter, we were alerted to take action stations according to prearranged anti-riot plans, but nothing happened 'above-ground.'"[64] Apprehension was also apparent in March 1919, when a belligerent Russian civilian appeared at the Canadian supply shed at Egersheld Wharf, demanding gasoline on the grounds that "the czar was dead … and everything was public property." The local sentry panicked and stabbed the man in the groin with his bayonet.[65] A month later, as the Canadians prepared to evacuate Vladivostok, a Russian print shop expelled soldier Roderick Rogers, halting publication of the *Siberian Sapper*. The Russians claimed that the Canadian was a drunk, while Rogers insisted that "the Russian press men are Bolsheviks."[66]

As winter gave way to spring in 1919, the partisans intensified their guerrilla campaign against the Allies, tapping growing revulsion toward the tactics of White Russian authorities in Vladivostok and the Primorye. The "Supreme Ruler" of White Siberia, Admiral Aleksandr Kolchak, had decreed a conscription law to raise recruits for an anti-Bolshevik "New Siberian Army." However, the tactics of White Russian soldiers in the hill villages around Vladivostok drove peasants to take up arms in concert with local Bolsheviks, who had gone underground since the fall of Sukhanov's Soviet government in June 1918 (Sukhanov himself had been shot in November 1918). The partisans seized the village of Vladimiro-Aleksandrovskoye at the mouth of the Suchan River on 15 February, and two weeks later, a military-revolutionary committee from the Tetyukhe mine rode on horseback to the seize the port of Olga up the coast.[67] An appeal from the rebels conveyed the political mood: "We rose because with all our heart we want to help our Soviet country to get rid of the executioner Kolchak, to reinstall Soviet power in Siberia and the Far East, and to get rid of the interventionists."[68] A Canadian intelligence officer attributed the disturbances at Suchan and Olga to "the government order for the conscription of men of military age" and a second order for the surrender of arms: "The peasants say they do not like the Kolchak government or believe its democratic professions and hence do not want to fight for it." They objected to the second order since arms were

63 Clingan, Siberian Sideshow, p. 40; Memorandum, Vladivostok, 21 March 1919, LAC, RG 9, series III-B-3, vol. 5057; Ardagh diary, 23 March 1919, LAC, Harold Ardagh fonds, file 2/3; see also Harold to Josie, 8 March 1919, LAC, Harold Steele Collection, MG 30, E564, file "Correspondence, 1 Dec. 1918-1 May 1919."

64 Massey, When I Was Young, pp. 206-7.

65 Memorandum, 21 March 1919, LAC, War Diary Base HQ CEF (S); Ardagh diary, 23 Mar. 1919, LAC, Harold Vernon Ardagh fonds, file 2/3.

66 Hertzberg diary, 23 April 1919, LAC, Hertzberg fonds, vol. 1, file 1-18, Diary #9.

67 Mukhachev, Dal'nii Vostok Rossii v period revoliutsii 1917 goda i grazhdanskoi voi ny, 318-19; Willett, Russian Sideshow, pp. 189-90; Report on Military Situation, 28 Feb. 1919, LAC, War Diary Gen. Staff CEF(S), Feb. 1919, app. 45; "Extract of Communication Received from Japanese Headquarters – Bolshevik Movements in the Priamur Province," 1 March 1919.

68 Borba za vlast Sovyetov v Primorye, Vladivostok 1955, p. 193, as quote in Mukhachev, Dal'nii Vostok Rossii v period revoliutsii 1917 goda i grazhdanskoi voi ny, p. 318.

> *vital to their welfare against tigers, bears and robbers […]. As the Kolchak men approach a village the young men clear off into the hills with their rifles and large bands are reported to have collected in outlying hill villages.*[69]

Within Vladivostok itself, tensions were palpable by March 1919, as Allied commanders spoke openly of an impending insurrection. A tyrannical White Russian military commander, General Pavel Ivanov-Rinov, had inflamed public opinion by ordering the arrest without trial of Vladivostok's mayor and five other dissidents, "not Bolsheviks but plain radicals," four of whom were spirited away to a prison on the Manchurian border, inflaming the local population. "The Bolsheviki have placarded the city calling on the working men to gather to-morrow and protest against the action," Canadian engineer Charles Hertzberg recorded in his diary. On 12 March, a huge demonstration celebrated the second anniversary of the Romanovs' fall.[70] Japanese General Otani warned Allied commanders of a "considerable amount of unrest among the Russians in Vladivostok," suggesting "an uprising is not improbable," while consular officials (citing "political reasons") closed the port of Vladivostok to "all Russians returning to Siberia from America."[71] A Canadian intelligence report shed light on the process of radicalization:

> *The moderate socialists instead of standing with [Kolchak] at first wavered and then sided with the Bolsheviks, more as a* modus operandi *than from any actual sympathy. Anything was better than a return to Czarism, which they read clearly in the tactics of Kolchak's followers.*[72]

The feared insurgency of March 1919 exposed schisms within the Allied camp, demonstrating contested spaces in Vladivostok but also ongoing fraternal ties. Canadian General James Elmsley warned in a secret cable: "I consider the only grave danger from [an] uprising here will be from the Allies, who having no unity of Policy or Command, may come into armed conflict themselves, particularly as strong Allied guards are mingled throughout Vladivostok and the feeling between American, Japanese and Russians is far from friendly."[73] It was an explosive situation, with Japan and Britain more tolerant of the White Russians' autocratic methods, while the Americans refused to participate in operations of a "political" nature. Even so, this strategic divergence did not sour friendly personal relations within the Allied officer corps. Canada's second-in-command, Brig-General Bickford, wrote in his diary that he favoured the American position, but he retained close ties with the Japanese command. In April 1919, 200 Canadians join a

69 Maj. Jason Adams, "Disturbance in Olga Bay and Suchan Mines Districts," 2 Mar. 1919, LAC, War Diary Gen. Staff CEF(S), Mar. 1919, app. 7.

70 LAC, War Diary 16th Inf Bde CEF(S), 12 Mar. 1919; Hertzberg diary, 9 Mar. 1919, LAC, Hertzberg fonds, vol. 1, file 1-18, Diary #9; "Canadians Had Easy Time in Siberia" and "Siberian Lines Being Improved," in: Daily Times (Victoria), 19 Apr. 1919.

71 Instructions in Case of Riotous Disturbances in Vladivostok Area, 15 March 1919, and Special Operation Orders, 13 March 1919, LAC, War Diary Base HQ CEF (S); "Cannot Enter Siberia," in: Tribune, 10 Apr. 1919; Pares, My Russian Memoirs, p. 506.

72 Mackintosh Bell, Sidelights on the Siberian Campaign, p. 125.

73 Elmsley to War Office, 18 March 1919, LAC, War Diary Gen. Staff CEF(S), Mar. 1919, app. P (g).

Japanese-led operation to protect the strategic White-held town of Shkotovo, which connected Vladivostok to its coal supply on the Suchan River. On 18 April, Bickford dined with General Otani, enjoying "plenty of wine of every variety."[74] Five days later, he hosted three senior Japanese officers for a luncheon and game of bridge at Gornostai.[75] And on 1 May 1919, during the *Gymkhana* sports day organized for the Allied contingents, Bickford shared a viewing box with General Otani and chatted with General Horvath, who narrowly escaped an assassination attempt on his return to Vladivostok. While returning to his apartment on Svetlanskaya, partisans detonated two bombs near Horvath's motorcade. A chase ensued, culminating in the culprit's capture by two Canadian mounted police officers. They were handed over to White Russian authorities and shot by firing squad the following day.[76] Yet in this moment of tension, Brig-General Bickford remarked that the Russians he met in the villages during a horse ride up the coast from Gornostai were "very polite."[77]

Conclusion

From the fishing villages of Gornostai Bay, to Vladivostok's brothels, bazaars, cafés, and Chinese Market, to the town of Shkotovo where foreign troops encountered the multiethnic *partizan* guerrilla movement, the social relations and social spaces of the occupied "bordertown" of Vladivostok were shaped by class, race, and ideology. Vladivostok, like Russia's Primorye region generally, was a contested geopolitical and social space – located on the borders of Bolshevism – as rival state and non-state actors vied for influence. In the tumultuous wake of the 1917 revolutions, an array of borders were contested: political, economic, ethnic, and ideological. The preceding pages have located cross-cultural relations in the political context of the Allied occupation, with particular reference to Canadian soldiers and local civilians, illuminating how the foreign soldiers perceived of, and interacted with, each other and with Vladivostok's diverse civilian population. Officers were strongly motivated by ideology, fearing a Bolshevik threat while nurturing a tight fraternal network within the Allied officer corps and the cafés and mess halls of the city and surrounding barracks. Rank-and-file troops were less committed to their countries' war aims and were more open to engagement with civilian populations, but seemed to engage more with the local Asian inhabitants who were seen (however inaccurately), as being impervious to Bolshevik influence. Collectively, foreign soldiers' class, race, and ideologies shaped their perceptions of, and relations with, Vladivostok civilians.

74 Bickford diary, 19 April 1919.
75 Ibid., 23 April 1919.
76 Bickford diary, 1 and 2 May 1919; G. S. Worsley Report on "B" Squadron RNWMP, 11 October 1919, LAC, RG 18, vol. 3179, file G 989-3 (vol. 2); War Diary of General Staff CEF(S), 1 May 1919; Hertzberg diary, 2 May 1919, LAC, Hertzberg fonds, vol. 1, file 1-18, Diary #9.
77 Bickford diary, 4 May 1919.

Mapping Manchuria Station. Crossing Borders into the "Yellow Land"

Sören Urbansky

RESÜMEE

Der Aufsatz untersucht Grenzstädte im wörtlichen Sinne, sprich urbane Siedlungen, die unmittelbar an Staatsgrenzen liegen und deren Schicksale durch politische Abgrenzungen von Nationalstaaten oder Imperien bestimmt wurden. Er analysiert die Geschichte des Grenzbahnhofs Man'čžurija (chin. Manzhouli) in den ersten beiden Jahrzehnten des 20. Jahrhunderts und zeichnet seine Topographie und wirtschaftliche Entwicklung sowie die sozialen Beziehungen der dort siedelnden Menschen nach. Man'čžurija liegt an der Grenze zwischen dem zu Russland gehörenden Transbajkalien und dem Nordosten Chinas. Erst mit dem Bau der Ostchinesischen Eisenbahn, dessen westlichen Endhaltepunkt Man'čžurija markiert, gewann der Ort an Bedeutung. Der Beitrag verfolgt zwei Ziele: Zum einen ist es ein Versuch, den Wert verschiedener historischer Quellengattungen (Reiseliteratur, ökonomische Berichte, Archivakten, Karten, Fotos usw.) für die Erforschung kleiner Grenzorte zu ermessen, zu deren Geschichte die Quellenlage meist äußerst spärlich ist und das Material nicht selten über die ganze Welt verstreut liegt. Ein zweites Ziel dieses Beitrags ist die Erforschung des Charakters von Grenzsiedlungen als spezifischen urbanen Räumen mit einer besonderen Bevölkerungsstruktur. Er identifiziert verschiedene Kontaktzonen und Grenzlinien, die von den dort lebenden Bewohnern gezogen und überwunden wurden.

Most of us have crossed state borders and have our own images of border places in mind. Still, our topographic and mental familiarity, our knowledge of life in border settlements at the periphery of China's Northeast remains blurry. With an analysis of public spaces and some aspects of daily life in a railway settlement at the Sino-Russian border, this article seeks to overcome this gap. It has two aims: First, it explores the limits of knowledge about border settlements at the shared periphery of Russia and China. In other words, it

Comparativ | Zeitschrift für Globalgeschichte und vergleichende Gesellschaftsforschung 22 (2012) Heft 5, S. 87–105.

is an attempt to assess different types of historical sources on these places that are available to us. Second, it analyzes the character of border settlements as a specific urban space and searches for different layers of borderlines, which were drawn and crossed by people in these dwellings during the first twenty years of 20th century. The point of departure is Ernst Cordes' travelogue *Das jüngste Kaiserreich. Schlafendes, wachendes Mandschukuo* (The youngest Empire. Manchukuo asleep and awake), a book beautifully wrapped in yellow linen. Opening the index page the reader can track Cordes' route with his fingertip: On his mid-1930s scamper through Manchuria he took the express train from Siberia. He crossed the border at Manchuria Station (in Chinese known as Manzhouli, 滿洲里) to visit Harbin, then Manchukuo's "New Capital" (新景, formerly Changchun, 長春), and Mukden (Shenyang, 瀋陽). Travelling further south he left the mainstream Baedecker-route of Manchukuo, ignoring the coast and Liaodong Peninsula. Instead, Cordes turned westwards to Jehol (Rehe, 熱河) the "Bandits Province"[1] and finished his journey in Beijing. The majority of travelogue intellectuals of the 1900s to the 1940s chose Cordes' path along the major railway tracks, but most – other than Cordes – went on to Dairen. Few travelers left the colonial dwellings to go further inland and explore native parts of China's Northeast. If they followed Cordes' route, they were usually in search of the region's famous bandits (the *honghuzi*).[2] Only some crossed borders into "Chinese" Manchuria to visit Haila'er (海拉爾), Qiqiha'er (齊齊哈爾) or Shanhaiguan (山海關), cities of Chinese origin, urban settlements that existed long before the Russians and Japanese discovered and conquered China's Northeast.[3] What the traveler saw and his readers read were the cities – again a peculiar part of the region under study.

Cordes mimed the ambitious. In the introduction he promises that his monograph is aimed at "readers who through newspaper coverage on the Far East became eager to see what the country over there [*das Land da drüben*], which gets so much attention from the world public, looks like." He goes on and quotes a reader of his books who reminded him that many authors writing about Asia answer "'big, serious world-significant questions. But one never really learns anything real and vivid that gives more than the ordinary Central European's common travel account, that gives a realistic, vital breath of the new Far East.'" Cordes – in his yellow linen book – also asserts to be aware of the Yellow Peril. "Is Europe so old and fatigued that it has to follow the Far East's arousal in fear and danger?"[4] He plays the sanguine and claims to leave all colonial or xenophobic ballast at home. *Das jüngste Kaiserreich*, published in pro-Japanese Nazi Germany of 1936, is surprisingly critical of Manchukuo. Hence, Cordes' book, although published when

1 Ernst Cordes, Das jüngste Kaiserreich. Schlafendes, wachendes Mandschukuo. Frankfurt a. M. 1936, pp. 181-3.

2 See amongst others: Mark Mancall, Georges Jidkoff, Les Honghuzi de la Chine du Nord-Est (1860–1910), in: Jean Chesneaux et al. (eds), Mouvements populaires et sociétés secrètes en Chine aux XIXe et XXe siècles, Paris 1970, pp. 297-315.

3 See for example: P. Kropotkin, Poezdka iz Zabaikal'ia na Amur cherez Man'chzhuriiu, in: Russkii Vestnik. 1865, pp. 663-81; N. Garin, Po Koree, Man'chzhurii i Liaodunskomu poluostrovu. Karandazhom z natury. St. Petersburg 1904. The term "Chinese", again, is an imperial oversimplification since there were Manchu, Mongol or Korean parts of Manchuria.

4 Cordes, Einleitung (note 1).

Manchuria Station long had reached maturity, should be the perfect starting point to "go native" and to get in touch with the alien country off the beaten path.

Getting off the train

Like many other travelers, Cordes started his Chinese endeavor at Manchuria Station. Lacking physical boundaries, Manchuria Station is situated in the grasslands at the trilateral junction of present Mongolia-China-Russia. It was founded by the time the Chinese Eastern Railway (hereafter CER) was built. Although in some respects strongly influenced by its nomadic surroundings, it became, like Harbin, a colonial city with a multi-cultural population. During ensuing decades, the border crossing became the major economic hub for Sino-Russian commerce, which it remains to the present day. For him, entering China's Northeast at Manchuria Station was everything but ceremonious. "It is the simple, naked little train station of Manchuria, that forms the gate from Soviet-Siberia to Manchuria – now Manchukuo."[5] When getting in or leaving Manchuria Station, many passengers witnessed the border settlement only through the safe distance of their train car window. Though some had to get off to change trains, few left the station and crossed the border into the dwelling.[6] Luckily again, Cordes did get off; he needed a visa for Manchukuo. The reader is therefore able to explore Manchuria Station through traveler's eyes. As Cordes spots numerous soldiers – "[t]wo yellow sorts and one white"[7] – on the platform he becomes alarmed by the thought of having no proper endorsement on his passport yet. His passport is taken away for consular revision and a White Russian inspects his luggage politely. All his worries are gone. Relieved, Cordes decides to explore the place:

> *Manchuria is not a city, but actually just a train station. On one side of the railroad embankment is the small Chinese settlement, consisting of several shabby houses. Some orderly placed cubes stand on the other side, houses of the Russian emigrants. People directly or indirectly live off the railroad. A large number of them are employees of the railroad, customs, or military. About three hundred meters outside the village stand border patrol barracks. A morning breeze lifts a Japanese and a Manchukuo flag. A small Russian church rises in the middle of the emigrant settlement, likewise made of wood. I glimpsed through its windows, which haven't been cleaned in years. This looks like in a lumber-room, was my first thought. […] Far off the barren mountain range: foothills of the Xing'an going from South to North along the whole western border, separating Manchukuo and Mongolia.*[8]

5 Ibid., p. 17.
6 Vereshchagin, for example, changed trains in 1901 but did not leave the station. A. Vereshchagin, V Kitae. Vospominaniia i razskazy 1901–1902 gg, St. Petersburg 1903, pp. 22-3.
7 Cordes (note 1), p. 18
8 Ibid., p. 19.

Cordes learns from a passerby that the large green building is an abandoned school, which originally used to be the Russian officer's mess hall. He chats with random people, mostly short and odd conversations with men and women who seem to be lost in time. His stroll through Manchuria Station remains brief and soon he returns to the station building. The highlight there is a group of Japanese officers in the station restaurant at the table next to him. The uniformed order lemon tea, ham and eggs. Though the waiter is a Russian, their order is in Chinese. The colonizers have become colonized. "Where are we? I think in Manchukuo? So many peoples being mixed-up, who will understand?!"[9] Cordes has tasty rotten eggs and inquires the whereabouts of his passports of the Japanese officers who ask him to follow them. Cordes obtains his travel documents in a henhouse, where the visa-office is temporarily set up. The German traveler then heads for the Harbin bound train. For Cordes, as for most travelers, the border dwelling was just a place to change trains. Manchuria Station is gone, crossed off his list.

Curious as the globetrotter Ernst Cordes was, the reader learns at least a few things about Manchuria Station: The reader learns of the border settlement's decline in the 1930s that corresponds with the deterioration of the Soviet-Manchukuo bilateral trade and the militarily increasing tense atmosphere. He is being informed of the settlement's rough topographic layout, people's occupations in this remote border post, such as the Russian waiter or the Japanese soldiers. Besides, Cordes' account unintentionally reveals what kind of borders short-term visitors who disembarked the train for a day or two were not able to cross; he is lucky to get off the train and go into town. With Cordes, the reader enters traveler's places such as the platform, the station restaurant and the visa office, but he sees the church only by looking through its dusty windows. Cordes' stay was too brief to visit the cinema "Illiuzion", the bustling shabby bazaar or one of numerous massage parlors. If the reader had opened another Western travelogue, most likely he would have waited at the platform for the departure of the train. In short: Travelogue readers almost always remain onlookers. Through Cordes' hasty and untrained eyes, the reader knows everything a traveler needs to know. Despite getting a glimpse of some interethnic and intercultural encounters, the reader still knows next to nothing. To historians interested in lives of border people, all kinds of border-crossing travelogues are nice to read before bed and yet sources of this genre by themselves remain of little value to the questions historians are usually interested in.[10]

Three decades prior to Cordes, Petr Krasnov, assigned by the Russian Minister of War to an investigation trip through East and South Asia, crossed the Russo-Chinese border. As a career officer and productive author, Krasnov turned his travel notes into the book Po Azii (On Asia). The observant traveler experienced the border still pleasantly free from "traditional luggage inspection, customs officers, soldiers, and money exchange".[11]

9 Ibid., p. 21.

10 On the limits of train passengers perspectives as narrated in travelogues see: Sören Urbansky, Kolonialer Wettstreit. Russland, China, Japan und die Ostchinesische Eisenbahn, Frankfurt a. M. 2008, pp. 59-69.

11 P. Krasnov, Po Azii, Putevye ocherki Man'chzhurii, Dal'niago Vostoka, Kitaia, Iaponii i Indii, St. Petersburg 1903, p. 46.

Unlike Cordes, Krasnov witnessed a border where state sovereignty had not yet been enforced. No one really seemed to care who was crossing the border. "Where are we?" the Russian traveler wondered just as the German visitor did. Russian traces, Russians everywhere. "A white building with the sign 'Café Moscow' across the station and next to it the Paramonovs, Ivanovs, Stukins in their kiosks and stalls trading all one could imagine. Shops specializing in haberdasheries, the sale of beer, the trade of canned food […]."Although Krasnov spotted a long line of shops and first occupied houses, Manchuria Station was not yet a city where everything was in place. The traveler on his explorations around the unfinished train station passed Russian workers, drunk and seedy, a guard, a lady with her child, a salesman on his bike and various other Russian elements. "Where are we?" Krasnov asked again. "And where are the Chinese?" Some kilometers away from the Russian border, it took him some time to see them. "There they are. Over there is a crowd of pigtails sitting on the platform eating something, and there two Mongols tying up their horses at a stall, chatting with a salesperson standing on a threshold … that's it."[12] To Krasnov, the Russians were on their way to dominate and colonize the Chinese borderlands. With a smell of dirty boots, of *makhorka*, cheap vodka and onions in his nostrils, Russians of all four train classes united and were about to take over, what many of Krasnovs contemporaries already imagined as "Yellow Russia", of which the border settlement Manchuria Station that was still in the making of was to become the starting point. Again it is a travelogue. Let us leave travelers observations aside.

What now follows is a second attempt to arrive in Manchuria Station, this time through reading newspapers, maps, historical reference books, and some archival materials about Manchuria Station's municipality in order to assess the value of these source types for city borders as opposed to a travelogue. It is the range of different source types to transcend the borders, and cross borders into the city.

Leaving the footpaths of globetrotters

Although extremely scattered, the early yeas of Manchuria Station's history are most comprehensively described in Russian language regional periodicals that were published in Harbin and Chita. Chinese language newspapers of the period under study such as the Harbin Yuandongbao[13] had literally no reporting on Manchuria Station. While some of the Russian papers had journalists reporting from the border dwelling, local newspapers did not exist yet.[14] Regional-level reporting on Manchuria Station was much

12 Ibid., p. 48. For another similar description see: Ot Irkutska do Pogranichnoi, in: Sputnik po Man'chzhurii, Amuru i Ussuriiskomu kraiu, Vladivostok 1906. Otdel III, pp. 1-20, here p. 9.

13 This newspaper existed from 1906 to 1921 and was run and partly controlled by the CER. See Frank Grüner and Rudolph Ng's paper in this issue.

14 The first local papers, issued in the border settlement, appeared only during turmoil of World War I, revolution and civil war. Vostochnaia Azia came out in 1916 or 1917. Man'chzhuriia existed at least during 1918–1921. There are only single issues of these periodicals left in libraries around the globe.

more thorough in the Chita based papers, which might be explained through actual distance to Manchuria Station. But the perception of distance however seems to be even more significant. Although Manchuria Station never belonged to Transbaikal province, Zabaikal'skaia nov' even included news coverage on Manchuria Station under it's "provincial news"-heading ("*po oblasti*").

Time consuming archeological research in libraries and archives throughout Eurasia presents a patchwork of dozens of newspaper clippings, complemented by some archival files, that, once put together, offer a surprisingly informed picture of daily life in a border town that was still in the making. Not a brisk traveler's account, but news from men who had spent some time in town and spoke the language of the locals.

When Cordes crossed the border, Manchuria Station had existed for three and a half decades. Although he visited the border settlement in the mid-1930's, few things had changed since the years before the war with Japan. The quantity and ethnic composition of inhabitants remained astonishingly stable.[15] The settlement also, in terms of geographic magnitude and economic significance, did not grow.[16]

But how was the border settlement founded? Like many border settlements, Manchuria Station was built by chance.[17] After negotiations between the chief engineer of the CER's western section Greshov with Chinese authorities in Qiqiha'er, and promises of the Russians and Chinese to the local Mongol population that "only a narrow strip was to be expropriated that would not affect their pastures at all and, additionally, grade crossings were to be built wherever inhabitants indicate such a necessity"[18] in 1900 the right-of-way was granted to lay railway tracks. Manchuria Station was founded at a locality that local nomadic tribes back then still called Nagadan. It was a place they visited rarely with their livestock herds, and of almost untouched nature with wild Przewalski horses that still used to graze on the open meadows.[19]

Only one year later, as fall gave way to winter in 1901, the first trains ran along the tracks, though traffic was still temporary. Work on the first section of what was to become the CER – interrupted by the Boxers – had just been finished. People changing from Russian to CER trains often had to wait overnight for their connection at Manchuria Station. They had to be quick to get a room in "Metropol", "Evropa", "Tertumasov" or one of

15 In 1910 some 10,000 people dwelled around the station. See footnotes 61-64. – According to official statistics in 1929 12,954 people lived in Manchuria Station including the following ethnic groups and nationalities: Chinese: 5,053, Russian emigrants: 4,708, Soviets: 2,937, Japanese: 154, Poles: 38, Koreans: 23, and Europeans of various nationalities: 41. See: V. A. Kormazov, Dvizhenie naseleniia v raione Zapadnoi linii KVzhd (Uchastok st. Man'chzhuriia-r. petlia), in: Vestnik Man'chzhurii (1930), No. 4, pp. 51-7, here p. 53.

16 See: Ekonomicheskii biuro KVzhd (ed.), Spravochnik po S. Man'chzhurii i KVzhd. [Kharbin] 1927; Opisanie naselennykh punktov, rek, gor i prochykh geograficheskikh nazvanii Man'chzhurii i Vn. Mongoolii (perevod s iaponskogo), Vol. 1, p. 167.

17 Originally, topographers and engineers projected the CER further north. The line was to cross the Argun River in the vicinity of Staro Tsurukhaitu. But a route further south, even beyond the Abagaitui hills and the Cossack station that had existed for two centuries, proved to be more convenient. Investors would spare a bridge because the Argun leaves the borderline turns east to become as Haila'er an entirely Chinese river.

18 Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi istoricheskii arkhiv (RGIA), F. 323. O. 1. D. 1214. Ll. 65-66 obl., quotation on L. 66.

19 Zabaikal'skaia nov'. 1908. 25 March.

the other few hotels often already occupied by the "aborigines" inspecting achievements of European culture.[20] Other First or Second Class passengers spent the night in the station's greasy waiting room or sought consolation with a beer from the overpriced buffet – a ruble for the Munich imported bottle. The poor slept *plein-air* on wet soil.[21]

Frontier spirit

When did Manchuria Station enter adolescence? Harbin and Chita based Russian language newspapers tell the story. The settlement developed rapidly and the magic word "boom" reached the steppe. To many observers it was just a question of months or maybe a few years for the border station to become a major commercial center. "Houses grow like mushrooms here after a good rainfall."[22] "New stalls, shops, hotels, and inns are opening almost every day."[23] But the completion of the permanent station building with its two facades – one for the trains bound for Chita, the other for those bound for Harbin – scheduled to open in 1903 was delayed until after the war against Japan.[24] The public bathhouse operated by the CER that opened in 1905 was so overcrowded that people had to wait for hours.[25] A new brewery produced the first local beer for thirsty Mongols, Russians, and Chinese. Gambling in the open air attracted players of all nations. Disagreements and small scandals that occur between quarrelsome players wherever cards are on the table were settled in "'good' Chinese spoken by the Russians, the same Russian spoken by Chinese" and other forms of pidgin that were native to the people of border.[26] A "Railway Theatre" showed hobby spectacles for a selected audience.[27] And in "Mauretania", a variety theatre, people could forget about their daily duties or worries for an hour or more.

The war with Japan accelerated growth even more, as Manchuria Station became the trading center for the bulk of horses, cattle and hay to feed and equip the Russian armies.[28] The "housing question" became the most urgent one on the agenda, since the influx of new people created severe shortages of accommodations. People lived in stables or shared lodgings with other families in rooming houses designed for singles.[29] In the steppe, tim-

20 Ot Irkutska do Pogranichnoi, in: Sputnik po Man'chzhurii, Amuru i Ussuriiskomu kraiu, Vladivostok 1906. Otdel III, pp. 1-20, here p. 10.
21 Zabaikal'ie. 1902. 23 June. – See also: Zabaikal'ie, 1903. 31 October.
22 Zabaikal'ie. 1903. 16 July.
23 Kharbinskii vestnik. 1903. 9 October.
24 See: Zabaikal'ie. 1903. 31 October.
25 See: Zabaikal'ie. 1905. 27 April.
26 Kharbinskii vestnik. 1903. 9 October.
27 See: Zabaikal'ie. 1903. 10 January. – Zabaikal'ie. 1903. 7 March.
28 See: V. Soldatov, Zheleznodorozhnye poselki po Zabaikal'skoi linii. Statisticheskoe opisanie i materialy po perepisi 1910 goda. S predisloviem i pod redaktsiei D. M. Golovacheva. Vol. 5, Part 1 and Table Appendix. St. Petersburg 1912, p. 312.
29 Zabaikal'ie. 1905. June 6.

ber and other basic construction materials were extremely expensive. Many houses were built of unburned clay taken from the soil and washed away by the first rain.[30]

During the first two decades, people at the border witnessed not only times of prosperity, but all too often severe setbacks as well. As Cordes observed economic decline caused by international politics during 1930s, Manchuria Station very early experienced the burden of its distinct geographic position. The years following the defeat to Japan were particularly difficult. The disastrous outcome caused great damage to Manchuria Station. With the Russian armies leaving China's Northeast, "the main customer of almost all our economy in the Far East and Transbaikal region had gone".[31] The construction of the Amur Railway, out of strategic considerations that Japan might sooner or later annex Northern Manchuria and the East-West line of the CER, sucked people, money, and energy out of the border settlement. Prices fell and people who remained could buy almost everything at discount rates. "Houses and flats that just one year ago people were willing to pay astronomical sums for are now boarded up."[32] "Wherever one let one's gaze wander among the commercial buildings in the village at all, there will be a 'For Sale' sign".[33]

Yet there was still hope among business people of Manchuria Station. Many sought to emancipate the settlement from the railway and war-related industries as well as the dictate of the planned economy by the Russian Ministries of Finance and War. Major enterprises, such as the nearby coal mines of Zhalainuo'er (扎賚諾爾), were still under CER control.[34] For decades, the region had been a trading center between the Russians and Mongols and could have been the foundation for future business opportunities. Bandits attacking the unarmed herders and the construction of the railway however, had let the Mongols bypass the settlement since the early 1900s. Plans by business people in the near to the border envisioned secure Mongolian trade routes that were to be guarded by Chinese and Russian soldiers in order to attract trade with Mongol herdsmen once again. The establishment of a caravansary for the trade of horned cattle and as a tax collection post for Russian and Chinese authorities, as well as an international market for cattle that could compete with the traditional trade fair in Guanzhur gave new hope but proved to be fruitless for a long time.[35] The turmoil of Chinese Revolution in 1911 and the Mongolian independence movement in Hulunbei'er, disadvantageous customs regulations coupled with more competitive imported goods from Japan all altered the plans. The market, which was first held in 1912, soon got cut out by more favorable trade routes.[36] For many years the role of the Mongols, the colonized nomadic natives to this

30 See: Zabaikal'skaia nov'. 1907. 29 September.
31 Zabaikal'skaia nov'. 1908. 2 March.
32 Zabaikal'skaia nov'. 1908. 26 January.
33 Zabaikal'skaia nov'. 1908. 2 March.
34 For a historical outline see: L. I. Liubimov, Chzhalainorskie kopi, Kharbin 1927, pp. 13-21.
35 Novaia zhizn'. 1911. 6 October.
36 See: Dumy Zabaikal'ia. 1911. 17 March. – Kharbinskii vestnik. 1915. 5 May.

place, was negligible in the urban border settlement. Manchuria Station remained a city populated by Russian and Chinese colonizers.

Other businesses seemed to save the border people from despair and the settlement from depression. The hunting of marmots in the Russo-Chinese borderlands created several thousand jobs during season, a whole new industry of hunters, tanners, and traders and new zones of contact between the Russians and Chinese. It attracted trainloads of Chinese migrants mainly from the Hebei and Shandong provinces that during hunting season left for the steppe.[37] Increasing demand caused the price of marmot furs to multiply over the years. The shipment by CER of marmot furs accounted for 1 to 1.5 million rubles annually in the late 1900s. In 1911 however, the Manchurian plague that was transmitted by the animals paralyzed the business. The epidemic first occurred in Manchuria Station where modern infrastructure and hunting ground met. From there the plague spread at full tilt across the railway network.[38]

Yet it was not the trade of fur or cattle that was most important for the border settlements economy. In Manchuria Station and in other settlements at the Russo-Chinese border, the biggest business was the production, trade and consumption of alcohol. According to estimates of a contemporary, in 1909, only 42,000 buckets[39] of Chinese alcohol were brought in and sold in Manchuria Station. "If all the imported alcohol would be drunken by the locals, this village would probably be the most drunk on globe", he noticed. Many borderlanders made a living by smuggling vodka or other goods across the border. Only 17 percent were consumed on the spot, the rest was smuggled onwards to the Russian borderlands.[40] Despite central government and Russian customs' efforts to crush the business, the reduction of mostly illegal business seems not to have been a major concern of the Russian municipal authorities on the scene. They charged a one Ruble tax for every bucket of vodka that was produced or traded in the village.[41] In 1910, taxes on liquor, wine and beer businesses made up more than two thirds of Public Administration's overall tax income.[42] Thus the municipal fiscal policy at the periphery rather undermined the central authorities effort to fight smuggling along the porous border.

Alcohol business alone was not enough to keep the border settlement alive. Signs of new hope accompanied the prewar years. On the surface, the border settlement developed within multiple modernities as it added some features that gave the impression of a

37 See: Soldatov (note 28), p. 311.

38 Ibid., pp. 311-2. – For the 1911 plaque in China's Northeast see Marc Gamsa, The Epidemic of Pneumonic Plague in Manchuria 1910–1911, in: Past & Present (February 2006), No. 190, pp. 147-183.

39 Vedro (*bucket*) is a traditional Russian liquid measure. One vedro equals 12.299 liters.

40 According to estimates given in this source only about five percent of Russia-bound alcohol exports went through customs. See: Novaia zhizn'. 1910. 8 February. – On the production, trade, and consumption of alcohol in the Russo-Chinese borderlands see Sören Urbansky, Der betrunkene Kosake. Schmuggel im sino-russischen Grenzland (circa 1860–1930), in: Martin Aust (ed.), Russland und die Sowjetunion global 1851–1991, Frankfurt a. M. (forthcoming).

41 See: RGIA. F. 323. O. 1. D. 1027. L. 16 obl.

42 The total tax income in 1910 was 91.220,75 Rubles of which 63.520,25 Rubles came from alcohol business. See: RGIA. F. 323. O. 1. D. 1027. Ll. 46-48.

small bit of 20th century urbanity. Telephones first appeared in the summer of 1911.[43] Kerosene lamps illuminated parts of the Transbaikal side and were soon to be replaced by electric streetlights that were powered by a Siemens & Halske plant.[44] In 1914, two banks opened for business.[45] The construction of a brick church began which replaced the old wooden structure – which Cordes visited during his stroll some 20 years later – that became a missionary school.[46] After the Mongols of Hulunbei'er declared independence from the Republic of China in early 1912, trade with the Mongols also grew at an unprecedented rate, a rate that, according to old inhabitants, "was even more extraordinary than during war with Japan".[47] The streets of Manchuria Station were packed with camels. Numerous corporations like the all-Russian tea company Gubkin-Kuznetsov or the fur-trading firm Batuev & Zimmerman sent agents to pay Mongols advances. Even foreign enterprises like the Leipzig-based fur and raw materials Biedermann Company set up businesses. Latest rumors said that a new railway link between Urga (Ulan Bataar) and Manchuria Station would be built to further stimulate business.[48] High-spirited local politicians demanded from CER administration in 1913 a juridical city status that should not be inferior to that of Harbin. The authorities in St. Petersburg however, declined the proposal. That very year the Russian Empire celebrated the Romanov dynasty's 300th anniversary. Manchuria Station was to be renamed "Romanovsk" in order to "let the people in the distant borderland [*dalekoi okrainy*] remember this great moment in Russian history eternally".[49] Again war, this time in Europe, destroyed all aspirations.

Delimiting urban borders

What is known about urban topography of dwellings at the Sino-Russian border? Manchuria Station is situated at the Kulidzhi Creek that flows into the Argun River. Because the creek valley is wide and its surface is flat, it divides the settlement in two parts. Manchuria Station, like Harbin and other settlements along the CER, was encircled by the boundary of the right-of-way strip (*polosa otchuzhdeniia*). Bulging at Manchuria Station, the "zone" was 5002 *desiatin* (5462 ha) in size.[50] The most concise information on statistics and the urban shape of Manchuria Station during its early years can be found in a voluminous reference book with statistics on Transbaikal railway. Published in 1912, it gives a precise description of the settlement's structure.[51] It does not give a journey

43 See: RGIA. F. 323. O. 1. D. 1028. Ll. 14-15 obl.
44 See: RGIA. F. 323. O. 1. D. 1031. Ll. 165-166.
45 See: Zabaikal'skaia nov'. 1914. 9 July.
46 See: Zabaikal'skaia nov'. 1914. 24 June.
47 Zabaikal'skaia nov'. 1914. 10 January. – Some observers were less sanguine of the new boom. See: Novaia zhizn', 1914. 12 February.
48 See: Novaia zhizn'. 1914. 16 January.
49 RGIA, F. 323. O. 1. D. 1031. Ll. 38-43, quotation on L. 39 obl.
50 See: Kavakami Tosichiko (ed.), Promyshlennost' Severnoi Man'chzhurii, in: Materialy po Man'chzhurii, Mongolii, Kitaiu i laponii. No. 33, Harbin 1909, p. 91.
51 Soldatov (note 28).

impression like one would find in travelogues, nor does it report on local news like the papers, but rather it gives a description of the settlement's urban layout and describes the different neighborhoods. The Zarechnyi village, beyond the "alienated" zone's borders, was part of the Chinese Empire and is north of the narrow river. The main part lies to the south of it. With few trees and sparse vegetation, the soil is generally not suitable for agriculture. Climate and geology meant hardship for the population. "In general the station's surroundings half resemble a desert. Inhabitants of the state treasury buildings are supplied by a water pipe, inhabitants of the private village get their water from the pump house or at the springs."[52] The Kulidzhi dried out in summers and water shortage remained a serious problem for people, cattle, and whenever a fire broke out.[53]
Manchuria Station was not only divided by nature, but also by infrastructure and semi-colonial boundaries, which reveal the strong influence of the rail company as a political agent. The settlement consisted of four parts: First the Chinese side (*Kitaiskaia storona*), situated south of the railway tracks, second, the Transbaikal side (*Zabaikal'skaia storona*) north of it, third, the bustling private village (*chastnyi poselok*) with its individual housing and independent enterprises directly bordering the Transbaikal side, all of which fell after the extension of the zone within the right-of-way boundary. Finally there was the village beyond the stream (*Zarechnyi poselok*) – outside the right-of-way boundary on the other bank of Kulidzhi. Compared to Cordes' biased description of Manchuria Station as "shabby houses" opposed to some "orderly placed cubes", Soldatov's reference book gives a less unprejudiced and quite detailed description of the settlement's different quarters:

> *On the Chinese side state-owned, mainly brick houses are built accommodating railway workers and servants. It is home to the CER's station facilities, namely: the church, hospital, school, public assembly, library […], police head-office and other institutions. The train station is home to the post, telegraph, and customs office. That part of the village with its broad symmetrical streets has quite original buildings […] many of which are residential houses, small villas for 1-2 families, surrounded with gardens […]. Behind the state-owned village, closer to the hills, a large, private village originally had been planned.*[54]

In September 1904, a CER commission had projected a whole city there with "everything a decent city needs". Avenues and boulevards were named after heroes of the still ongoing Russo-Japanese War.[55] But these streets existed only on the maps. Because of the war with Japan, they remained castles in the air and by 1906, projected estates had almost entirely been leveled again.

> *There are still some unfinished houses left but the majority of owners gave up their property, since there is not a bit of hope for further quick development of the village. On [the*

52 Ibid., p. 309.
53 See: Kharbinskii vestnik. 1908. 13 September.
54 Soldatov (note 28), p. 310.
55 Zabaikal'skaia nov', 1907. 29 September.

> *Chinese] side there are only three private houses in total. The Transbaikal side consists of a state-owned village within the borders of the alienated zone of the Transbaikal railway and developed with governmental houses for railway employees and administrative structures of the railway. The private village that was planned beyond the Transbaikal railway zone, designed with wide parallel streets is almost entirely developed. Among the buildings there are many brick structures, especially many made of clay. This is the main part of the village in terms of population and economic importance. Here are all the shops, businesses, and the busy bazaar. The private village hosts the following institutions: a Missionary Church [of the Russian-Orthodox Mission in Beijing – S.U.], the municipal secondary school with four classes, a primary school, two Russian and one Chinese public assemblies, the municipal self-government, and other municipal institutions such as a fire brigade, slaughterhouse, hospital, veterinarian and library. The greater number of shops are liquor or grocery stores and textiles, there is also one small bookstore, two drugstores and a pharmacy.*[56]

Although the private village with its many wooden houses probably remained the liveliest district with the majority of the 326 businesses of the dwellings around Manchuria Station, in the interwar-period many of its houses had been abandoned and fallen into disrepair. The situation in Zarechnyi village beyond Kulidzhi stream was even worse. Shacks were of poor quality and the shantytown was demolished in late 1910. By that time parts of the settlement under the management of Transbaikal railway were handed over to the CER administration and unified with the CER village. Still, the division between private and governmental districts in the settlement remained, thereby underlining importance of the rail company as political agent.[57]

The overall impression of the dwelling in Soldatov's reference book, Corde's travelogue and the newspaper clippings, is that of a rather aesthetic, cultivated Chinese side, with small fountains, and an uninviting Transbaikal side "covered with dust, where houses stand naked like in the steppe" was shared by many visitors and journalists.[58] Again different source types imply different perspectives. Travelogues, newspapers and contemporary reference books are to be used complementary to combine of a variety of sources that can be claimed to be reliable.

The village around the railway station of Manchuria had features that are usually prevalent in cities at borders or frontiers, such as the several hotels, quite poor in standard and exceptionally expensive[59] or a population that predominantly lived off the border. Additionally, Manchuria Station was home to institutions that could only be found in some of the hybrid, semi-colonial settlements along the CER right-of-way strip in North Manchuria. Among them were the immigration post with the adjoining hospital, the Russian barracks, the Chinese Imperial Maritime Customs and the estates of the Chinese

56 Soldatov (note 28), pp. 310-1.
57 Ibid., pp. 311-2.
58 Zabaikal'skaia nov'. 1914. 3 June.
59 See: Soldatov (note 28), p. 311.

customs head officer, the chief officer of the Chinese police, and the Chinese prefect all of which were situated in the private village on the Transbaikal side north of the tracks. Furthermore, in order to regain control of the borderlands, Chinese authorities some kilometers south off Manchuria Station built their own small fortified settlement Lubinfu (臚濱府) with barracks for Chinese soldiers.[60]

Who lived in this town in the making? The accuracy of censuses taken in border settlements is a myth. The official 1910 census counted 8,550 people at Manchuria Station of which almost three quarters lived in the private village (6,165) and the remaining part (2,385) in the state-owned district. The Transbaikalian census takers, in charge because in 1910, some parts of the village still belonged to the Trainsbaikal railway, admitted, that mainly the Chinese migrants (many of whom left the settlement for the steppe during hunting season) were out of statistical reach.[61] Newspapers further concealed that other Russian authorities striving against Trainsbaikal railway authority hampered the counting of people in parts of the settlement.[62] Other sources estimate the number of dwellers in 1909–1910 between 12,000 of which 40 percent were labeled as Chinese[63] or even 25,000 including 60 percent Chinese and other foreign nationals.[64] Again, the study of different materials challenges official statistics.

Descend into Demimonde

Plans, maps, and descriptions of urban topography in reference books enable the historian to make a virtual stroll through a settlement that still exists but has now many times as many inhabitants as before. Population statistics offer an idea of quantities; social, ethnic, and national proportions. The impression becomes more precise than with only the reading of travelogues and yet historians still lack the mental image of "what life was like" in the border settlement. They still know little about which ethnically, culturally, religiously, socially, or economically defined zones of contact existed at Manchuria Station. They need to consider archival materials to go track down contact zones and cross borders in a border city.

Issues of conflicts between Russians and Chinese members in the Municipal council,[65] or of Chinese businessmen protesting against taxes imposed by Russian authorities[66] are two topics that could serve as examples of areas of interaction that have already been studied in the case of Harbin and would most likely confirm what is already known. A historiography often tells stories of antagonism, and seldom stories of cooperation between the Russians and the Chinese. This article will focus on crime, since crimes are

60 Ibid., pp. 311-2.
61 Ibid., p. 311.
62 See: Zabaikal'skaia nov'. 1910. 24 June.
63 Kavakami (note 50), p. 92.
64 See: Zabaikal'skaia nov', 1910. 24 June.
65 See: Dumy Zabaikalia, 1912. 15 February, 27 July, and 28 July.
66 See: RGIA, F. 323. O. 1. D. 1026. L. 156 and delo 1029. L. 28.

often committed across ethnic boundaries and friction tends to be grievous. The history of crime thus offers an adequate angle to identify borders within border towns.

Already before the Russo-Japanese War, lack of proper discipline was common among local police staff. Officers recruited from the Zaamurskii District Special Corps of Border Guards (*Zaamurskii okrug otdel'nogo korpusa pogranichnoi strazhi*) went out and "while boozing with their buddies they could be spotted in every single tavern, in restaurants and various other institutions or tottering in the streets".[67] The war washed all kinds of suspicious "elements" from other peripheries of the Russian Empire and China to the Manchurian border. Released exiles from Nerchinsk *katorga* or from Sakhalin mingled with folk recruited from discharged servants, laid off railway workers, ruined merchants people suspicious to local authorities that, according to a governmental report "either on their way from Russia proper to Manchuria or in the opposite direction, were stranded temporarily or took up permanent residence in the border settlement due to lack of funding or missing passports".[68] General public, stirred up by local media, soon found the chief culprits: People from the Caucasus (*kavkaztsy*). Was it a stereotype of refugees that exists in Russia until this very day? Petty crimes like mugging or burglary were common, even murder was not rare. Police all-too-often remained inactive. Normal people became victims, like a certain Mr. Grif, shot and strangled by a group of Ossetians, or like Romual'd Surovetskii, a salesman of sewing machines, killed in his house not far from the public *bania* on a September night in 1905. The murderers left with money and other valuables. Locals demanded stronger police presence.[69]

It is striking that although Chinese, as shown by the statistics, made up a significant if not the major share of people in the border settlement, they rarely became the bogey in public Russian discourse of Manchuria Station's early stages of crime history. Marginalized in newspapers, they pop-up rarely in articles or commentaries. Most of Manchuria Station's Russians and Chinese lived in different isolated quarters rarely socializing with "the others" in daily life. Pravdin, a local Russian journalist who published occasionally in Zabaikal'skaia nov', describes a scene of theft he observed near the railway tracks. In a pidgin-conversation with the Chinese delinquents, he asks the men what they are "carrying"? The Chinese answer him as follows: "Our little, little found wood, our found coal." Pravdin provides his readers with his translation of the verb "to find" in the next sentence: "steal".[70] In opposite to other semi-colonial urban spaces of China's Northeast, the Chinese seem to not be a major cause of fear to the Russian public of Manchuria Station. The "bad guys" in Russian local media are Georgians, or men from Ossetia and Chechnya. To what extent stereotypes influenced reports on crime is difficult to evaluate. The illegal activities of the Chinese targeted construction materials of plaque-contaminated or abandoned houses or public property like timber and coal from the CER

67 Zabaikal'ie. 1904. 13 February.

68 Gosudarstvennyi arkhiv Rossiiskoi Federatsii (GARF). F. 102. DP. 4. O. 1908 g. D. 21, Ch. 6. L. 69 and Ll. 76 obl.-77 (quotation). – See also: RGIA, F. 323. O. 1. D. 1027. L. 101.

69 See: Zabaikal'ie, 1905, 20 November. – Zabaikal'ie, 1905, 16 December.

70 Nasha malo-malo drova nakhodili, nasha ugol' nakhodi, in: Zabaikal'skaia nov'. 1911. 16 March.

storehouses, thus a kind of "self-service"-culture that was not unpopular among Russian subjects too. If Russians and Chinese competed at Manchuria Station, it was usually the bottom of society, fighting for stolen coal, timber, or the service charge for luggage transport at the railway station. And if they fought, in most cases it was the Chinese that were the vulnerable.[71]

The crime scene of Manchuria Station became an issue of national importance in Russia after the Sobolinsk post and telegraph office was raided in 1908 and more than 210,000 rubles were seized by the bandits. Again these outlaws were subjects of the Russian but not the Chinese Empire. As soon as the issue got attention from the political center, one finds historical evidence preserved in national archives for minor settlements at the shared Sino-Russian periphery such as Manchuria Station that is usually lost or out of the reach of historians.

In a 1908 letter to the Ministry of the Interior Police Department (*Departament Politsii Ministerstva Vnutrennikh Del*), the Military Governor in Chita describes Manchuria Station as a "reservoir" (*priton*) of criminals triggering crime in the whole Transbaikal area. Authorities were sure that the outlaws lived and hid in Manchuria Station as in other criminal cases before. Just to mention one case here: On July 24, 1908, a group of armed Caucasians (*kavkaztsy*), in this case, escaped exiles, raided the Tsagan-Oluevski Cossack post and stole horses. Seven bandits were arrested and it turned out that "these folks […] arrived from Manchuria Station where they not only illegitimately live but some of them also received residence permits from the local police."[72] In his letter mailed to St. Petersburg, the Transbaikal Military Governor draws a gloomy conclusion:

> *A chronic of crimes committed at Manchuria Station would show best what kinds of elements find refuge there and how vigorous local police prosecute them. On the number of cases of robberies and theft against Mongolian nomads committed by Russian nationals near Manchuria Station, information can be obtained from the local consulate, rumors say figures are tremendous. Even more enormous is the number of burglaries and murders in Manchuria Station. I have no exact data on that. According to personal surveys I can just name several: For instance, 1) armed robbery of the postal train Manchuria–Harbin in the vicinity of the station, 2) larceny of Podliasok's pharmacy, 3) of Pakhatinskii's and 4) Partin's houses, 5) several cruel murders with theft. And finally 6) policeman Merzhinskii's assassination. Whole gangs of robbers committed all crimes except for the last. In none of the cases were the delinquents found. […] Taking into account the high number of policemen and soldiers stationed in Manchuria village […] then the situation of public security and order can only be described as bad, to put it mildly.*[73]

71 For example fights between Chinese and Russian porters at the train station usually ended in favor of the Russian for the simple reason that the (Russian) railway police refused to help the Chinese and sent them away with the phrase: "Get lost, monkey!" Zabaikal'ie, 1903. 1 July.

72 GARF, F. 102. DP. 4. O. 1908 g. D. 21, Ch. 6. L. 70 obl.

73 GARF, F. 102. DP. 4. O. 1908 g. D. 21, Ch. 6. L. 70 obl.-71.

Police officers recruited from the Zaamurskii Border Guards remained insufficient to meet criminality during the first years. Their posts were located exclusively in the administrative village, two kilometers off the settlement's private districts that were guarded by seldom and defenseless patrols. The situation improved through structural changes in 1909 and 1910. The recently inaugurated public administration rented special observation posts within private village boundaries and provided them with lower rank police forces. These posts were now able to ask for help from special patrols immediately sent after first signs of danger. The private settlement was then divided into three police districts, the Chinese side, the eastern part, and the western part of the private village, each of which was directed by a police officer supported by some lower ranks. Zaamurskii Border Guards still provided police staff. The budget came from Manchuria Station's Public Administration. Railway Police was a second police force that controlled public order in the administrative village. A special Chinese police force was in charge of Chinese subjects in the settlement. In the early 1910s, these structural changes led, according to official documents, to a significant reduction of crime.[74] But with World War I, Manchuria Station was struck again by organized groups of criminals, raiding people's homes, shops, and storehouses, forcing citizens to stay indoors and shopkeepers to close their shops and the public administration to provide its servants with guns after nightfall.[75] The local history of crime demonstrates that offenses predominantly occurred within the community of Russian subjects at Manchuria Station rather than across borders of different national groups.

Other components typical for settlements with high numbers of visitors made up of more men than women, as well as with a vibrant nightlife, were prostitution, gambling, and the consumption of alcohol. Alcohol made up not only the biggest share in municipal sales taxes because of production and sale to the Russian borderlands as mentioned above, but consumption was high as well. In 1911, Manchuria Station counted about 200 grocery and liquor stores (one store per 50 inhabitants) selling beer on tap, 7 or 8 wine taverns, 7 to 10 restaurants with "private rooms", up to 30 canteens, most of them clustered around the bazaar, selling Chinese *baijiu* and Russian *vodka*, and, needless to say, girls that entertained clients in various ways. All these institutions were open around the clock and generally packed with customers.[76] More and more things went out of control. After a fight between customers of a bazaar-canteen during Easter week in 1911, the municipal council put the problem of the sex industry on the agenda. Customers had attacked each other, one brandishing an axe, the other throwing glass bottles of which one by mistake almost killed children playing on the street. In a lively discussion among the council's members, it was decided without a single vote of opposition to prohibit the services of prostitutes to men under the age of 40 years as well as to ban the lodging of prostitutes in canteens and restaurants. Restaurant owners that would not obey the lat-

74 See: RGIA, F. 323. O. 1. D. 1027. L. 101-101 obl. – Soldatov (note 28), p. 311.
75 See: Kharbinskii vestnik. 1915. 6 January.
76 See: Zabaikal'skaia nov', 1911. 4 June.

ter rule would lose their license. The municipal, council in collaboration with the police and medical committee, began to search for a suitable place in the village to run the sex business.[77] The record stops here and it is up to the historian to imagine how things developed further. Archival materials, in combination with newspaper articles, reveal a quite wide-ranging picture of Manchuria Station's dubious side. Also in this case, police files in combination with news of crime reveal that it was not the Chinese, but various shady "elements" from the Russian Empire, that both the authorities and the border people feared most. Far more work needs to be done with respect to this understudied aspect, especially the role Russian nationals with a bad reputation played in comparison to Chinese nationals not just in Manchuria Station but in China's Northeast in general.

Conclusion

This article attempted to map Manchuria Station during the first two decades of its existence, its topography, economic development, and people's interactions. This early stage of development sheds light on understudied border cities at the periphery of China's Northeast. For historians today, as for Western travelers in the past, borders into China are not easy to cross. The article attempted to value different types of historical sources on these places that are available to us, sources that shape our limited knowledge of small border settlements.

The journey started with Western and Russian travelogues that in language and judgment often remain biased. Travelers routinely arrive with certain ideas in mind, or worse, prejudices of a culture that they try to prove upon arrival. Often enough, the visited place simply serves as scenery for own mind games as the British author Maurice Baring honestly admits. "All I can hope to do is to give a faint shadow of the pictures that have imprinted themselves on my memory […] such as one obtains at a railway station by putting a penny in the slot of a small machine."[78] On the other hand, outsiders tend to be more curios than, for example, a journalist or a state official – locals acquainted with the borderland that over time got partially sighted. The practice of Japanese officers giving an order in Chinese to a Russian waiter might have seemed normal to a local journalist. To a German traveler however, this kind of stereotype-affirming interethnic encounter was certainly new. Yet the contact zone of the traveler and the native is usually the train station, and travelogues only sporadically cross borders beyond its limits.

The picture becomes more comprehensive if one reads newspapers and archival files, studies maps and photographs. Chita and Harbin-based Russian language papers both had some news coverage, but Chita journalists certainly did a better job. Articles, commentaries, and letters to the editor provide historians with a thorough reporting of the

77 See: RGIA, F. 323. O. 1. D. 1028. L. 181.

78 Maurice Baring, With the Russians in Manchuria, London 1906, preface p. IX.

settlement's general development, and offer insights to the discourse of the Russian public. Newspapers are eye-openers for certain prevalent problems like crime.

There are just a few accessible records left in national archives which concern Manchuria Station before the October Revolution, mostly preserved in CER or police record groups.[79] Municipal files offer information on the general development, the local economy, and scandals, but from a different angle than newspapers. Police files give insights into various facets of demimonde. Most important is that newspapers, as well as archival records, help to cross borders into contemporary public discourses. Reference books belong to another genre, which usually covers whole regions like Manchuria's Russian semi-colonial North or Transbaikalia, and, if the historian is lucky, have at least a few pages on Manchuria Station too. Reference books are crucial for statistics, administrative features, or topography descriptions. They are of much less value for the research of encounters between common people. The same holds true for the limited "other sources" such as maps and photographs. Again, there are very few of them.[80] On their own virtually useless, they help in combination with other materials to "see" the texts one reads in newspapers or archival files. Maps are a significant supplement for the visualization of urban topography that is narrated in travelogues and reference books. Through photographs, researchers are able to see how people dressed, and are able to read shop signs. It was through photographs, not texts that I first understood how tiny and marginal Manchuria Station was.

The sources mentioned so far are – with the exception of one map – of Russian or Western origin. Of course, Chinese customs and police officials did, like their Russian counterparts, document their duties. Still, the unprivileged historian is unable to study the traces they left.[81] At least in the case of Manchuria Station, the knowledge remains limited to Russian and Western perspectives and it is difficult for us to assess how Chinese contemporaries perceived the border city. The unprejudiced and unrestricted use of all different types complementary to each other is imperative to cross at least some borders.

Just like other settlements in the Russo-Chinese borderlands, Manchuria Station boasted various ethnic and cultural contact zones that often resulted from economic incentives. Commercial life during the border settlement's early years however remained rocky, as

79 Other aspects beyond the focus of this paper, such as the Russian customs at Manchuria Station, are well covered in regional archives. Gosudarstvennyi arkhiv Chitinskoi oblasti (GAChO). F. 107: Man'chzhurskaia tamozhnia (1902–1916).

80 I was only able to trace two detailed maps of Manchuria Station. The first was issued in February 1908 and depicted the future development of the settlement as envisioned by its Russian planners. See: RGIA. F. 323. O. 1. D. 1026. L. 9. The second is a Chinese map published in 1920s. There is many photographs of the station building but very few on other parts of the dwelling. The best pictures, I know of, were taken by US Vice Consul to Mukden (Shenyang) Gerald Warner during the mid-1930s. URL: http://digital.lafayette.edu/collections/eastasia.

81 Attempts to get access to local and regional Archives in Manzhouli, Haila'er and other cities by the author in summer 2009 proved to be futile. When authorities granted admittance the sources they offered were historically of minor value. Justifications for the loss of "real" sources ranged from creative to flimsy, but could not be proved. Also in Russian archives many sources disappeared. For the Russian case see Sören Urbansky, Auf in die Provinz! Recherchen in Russlands Regionalarchiven, in: Osteuropa 59 (2009), No. 11, pp. 121-30.

it was strongly affected by wars, epidemics, customs policies and other external factors. The economic ups and downs in turn were mirrored by the influx and efflux of different groups of people. Though Manchuria Station had become a multi-ethnic microcosm within just five years time, cultural entanglements between subjects from the Russians and Chinese Empires were often limited to the train station and the bazaar, to restaurants, gambling houses and other public urban spaces. Separated by the railway tracks, the Chinese side and the Transbaikal side as well as the fortified settlement of Lubinfu kept their distinct characters up to the year of 1917, and partly administrative borders remained quite intact. Also the roles which different ethnic groups inside in the town were assigned to play were clearly defined.

These invisible borders reflect the social fabric of Manchuria Station. In a border town that was made up of separated urban communities, many dwellers did not have enough interest to pick up a foreign language or to marry across ethnic boundaries. This was the case partly because fluctuation of people was generally high, and partly because cross-cultural fraternizations were rarely tolerated people proved unwilling to integrate. Even with the knowledge of some pidgin, few Chinese were able to mingle with the Russian community and vice versa. The Mongols remained aliens in town. Ethnic or national division however did not necessarily result in aversion against "the others." When Russians raised the issue of crime at Manchuria Station, Chinese rarely became the scapegoats in their public discourse. Hence, Manchuria Station was, at least not in every aspect, Harbin en miniature.

BUCHBESPRECHUNGEN

Beate Wagner-Hasel: Die Arbeit des Gelehrten. Der Nationalökonom Karl Bücher (1847–1930), Frankfurt am Main: Campus Verlag, 2011, 405 S.

Rezensiert von
Arnulf Kutsch, Leipzig

Karl Bücher gehörte zu den großen Häuptern der historischen Richtung der Nationalökonomie, obschon er in der Theoriegeschichte des Faches meist nach dessen berühmteren Vertretern Gustav Schmoller, Werner Sombart und Lujo Brentano genannt wird. Wie Max Weber, mit dem er in vielfältigem wissenschaftlichen Austausch stand, kam Bücher von der Alten Geschichte zur Nationalökonomie. Nach seinem Studium der klassischen Philologie und Geschichtswissenschaft, einer Tätigkeit als Gymnasiallehrer in Dortmund und Frankfurt am Main und anschließend als Redakteur der liberalen Frankfurter Zeitung, begann seine akademische Tätigkeit mit der Habilitation für Statistik und Volkswirtschaftslehre 1881 in München. Nach akademischen Stationen an den Universitäten Dorpat (1882), Basel (1883) und Karlsruhe (1890) folgte er 1892 einem Ruf nach Leipzig. An dieser Universität, die er 1903/04 als Rektor leitete, lehrte Bücher über ein Vierteljahrhundert als Nationalökonom, um sich nach seiner Emeritierung noch gut zehn Jahre hauptsächlich der Presseforschung zu widmen und mit dem von ihm 1916 eingerichteten Institut für Zeitungskunde die Grundlage für dieses neue Universitätsfach in Deutschland zu legen.

Bücher schuf ein theoretisch, methodisch und thematisch vielgestaltiges, mehrere Hundert Publikationen umfassendes Werk. Schon seine Zeitgenossen rühmten seine exakte Begriffsarbeit und seine Fähigkeit, epochal-komplexe wirtschaftliche, gesellschaftliche und kulturelle Entwicklungen auf das Typische zu verdichten. Die Analyse historischer Wirtschaftszustände verstand er als volkswirtschaftliche Theorie und diese wiederum nutzte er, um Problemstellungen seiner Gegenwart zu verstehen. Wie unter den Vertretern der jüngeren historischen Schule der Nationalökonomie üblich, bemühte er sich folglich, den Bezug seiner historischen Erkenntnisse zu gesellschaftlichen und sozialpolitischen Herausforderungen seiner Zeit aufzuzeigen. Aus seiner Baseler Zeit sind seine methodisch wegweisenden statistischen Enqueten über die Bevölkerung und Wohnverhältnisse Basels sowie über die deutsche Presse hervorzuheben. Berühmt wurde er durch sein Buch „Die

Entstehung der Volkswirtschaft“ (1893), eine Sammlung von komplexen Einzelstudien. Sie umfasste u. a. seine kontrovers diskutierte Theorie der Wirtschaftsstufen, seine grundlegende Untersuchung über die Anfänge des Zeitungswesens sowie seine Studie über Arbeitsteilung und soziale Klassenbildung; letztere wurde wegen ihrer präzisen Definition von Arbeitsteilung und Arbeitsvereinigung bis in die 1960er Jahre nachgedruckt. Hohes Ansehen auch außerhalb der Nationalökonomie erwarb Bücher sich durch seine Monographie „Arbeit und Rhythmus“ (1896), in der er zeigte, dass sich der Kräfteverbrauch von – vor allem ermüdender – körperlicher Arbeit durch Arbeitslieder und rhythmische Gestaltung regeln lässt. Diese historisch-ethnographische Untersuchung sowie sein „Gesetz der Massenproduktion“ (1910) zählen zu seinen bleibenden Werken. Den Höhepunkt seiner internationalen Reputation in der Wissenschaft wie auch als prominentes liberales Mitglied des Vereins für Socialpolitik (VfS) erreichte er im ersten Jahrzehnt des 20. Jahrhunderts. Im Mai 1910 bekannte Max Weber, dass die jüngeren Nationalökonomen im VfS von Bücher „geführt und berathen sein möchten“.

Nach Büchers Tod geriet sein Werk und Wirken mehr und mehr in Vergessenheit. Dazu hat gewiss auch beigetragen, dass sich die historische gegenüber der theoretischen Richtung der Nationalökonomie nicht zu behaupten vermochte. Andererseits hatte Karl Bücher keine Schule ausgebildet und sich obendrein mit einigen seiner namhaften akademischen Schüler zerstritten. Seit etwa zwei Jahrzehnten beschäftigen sich jedoch Historiker, Wirtschafts-, Kommunikations- sowie Musikwissenschaftler und Ethnologen mit der wissenschaftlichen und hochschulpolitischen Bedeutung von Bücher und dem Reichtum und der Modernität seiner kulturhistorisch- und ethnologisch-vergleichenden Perspektive, durch die er in der Zeit der sich ausdifferenzierenden Disziplinen in zahlreiche akademische Fächer gewirkt hat. Diese Interdisziplinarität von Büchers Werk sei es, so schreibt Beate Wagner-Hasel, die den Reiz der Beschäftigung mit seinen Arbeiten ausmache. In ihrer Bücher-Biographie interessiert sich die Althistorikern zwar besonders für Büchers Beitrag zur Erforschung der antiken Wirtschaft, zumal er sich seit seiner Dissertation (1870) und seiner frühen Studie über „Die Aufstände der unfreien Arbeiter 143–129 v. Chr.“ (1874) bis in sein Spätwerk immer wieder mit der Antike beschäftigt hatte. Doch diese Biographie ist viel breiter angelegt. Kristallisiert in der Person Büchers, versucht sie, „die Veränderungen in der Wissenschaftslandschaft zu erfassen und Aufschluss über die Genese der Moderne zu gewinnen“. Das ist der Autorin überzeugend gelungen. Einen wichtigen Quellenbestand für ihre Perspektive hat sie bei Büchers Enkelin Luise Lauth entdeckt und erschlossen: Die Briefe von Büchers Ehefrau Emilie aus den Jahren 1892 bis 1907, die der Forschung bis dato unbekannt waren. Diese Korrespondenz, so Wagner-Hasel, stellt „eine unschätzbare Quelle für die Rekonstruktion des Gelehrtenalltags“ dar; sie bietet einen reichen „Stoff für eine Ethnographie des bildungsbürgerlichen Lebens am Ende des 19. Jahrhunderts“ und bilden „ein wichtiges Korrektiv“ zu dem Selbstbild, das Bücher in seinen „Lebenserinnerungen“ (1919) vermittelt hat.

Die Biographie gliedert sich in vier weitgehend chronologisch angelegte Teile. Den Lebensweg und die berufliche Laufbahn von Karl Bücher bis zu seiner Berufung nach Leipzig schildert der erste Teil. Pointierter als dies Bücher in seinen „Lebenserinnerungen" darstellte, richtet die Autorin ihren analytischen Blick auf die Genese und Entfaltung, die Einordnung und Bewertung der wissenschaftlichen Arbeiten von Bücher sowie auf die unterschiedlichen Milieus, Lebensorte und Wirkungsstätten, in denen sich seine „knorrige" Persönlichkeit, sein Selbstverständnis, seine Werthaltungen und wissenschaftlichen Normen formten und sein gesellschaftlicher Aufstieg von einem Handwerkersohn zum angesehenen, sozial etablierten Ordinarius an einer international renommierten Universität vollzog. Dem Leben und Wirken Büchers in Leipzig sind der zweite und der dritte Teil über das „Gelehrtenleben in Leipzig" und die „Wissenschaftliche und politische Wirksamkeit" von Bücher gewidmet, die man schon deshalb mit Spannung liest, weil Bücher diesen Höhepunkt seines Gelehrtenlebens in den „Lebenserinnerungen" nicht behandelt hatte. In diesen Teilen entfaltet die Autorin die ganze Stärke ihrer Perspektive und subtilen Quellenanalyse, indem sie Büchers Forschungen, seine akademische und hochschulpolitische Tätigkeit in den familiären Alltag bettet und dadurch eindrucksvoll zu veranschaulichen vermag, wie die „Arbeit des Gelehrten", seine beruflichen Erfolge und Lasten, seine persönlichen und wissenschaftlichen Freundschaften, Animositäten und Kontroversen, seine intellektuellen Zirkel und geselligen Gemeinschaften das Leben seiner Familie und seiner Frau bestimmten, die ihm andererseits den für seine Arbeit bedeutsamen ausgleichenden Rückhalt bot. Als sie 1909 starb, geriet Bücher in eine tiefe Schaffenskrise. Der dritte, eher systematisch angelegte Teil rekonstruiert das fach- und hochschulpolitische Engagement von Bücher sowie sein öffentliches Wirken, das auch durch seine Kriegsschriften zur Pressepropaganda (1915) und zur Sozialisierung (1919) zum Ausdruck kam, ferner sein hohes Ansehen unter seinen akademischen Schülern und nicht zuletzt die Rezeption seiner nationalökonomischen, historischen und ethnologischen Theorien und Methoden. Der vierte Teil schließlich erörtert die Bedeutung von Büchers althistorischen Forschungsbeiträgen, vor allem seiner Theorie der geschlossenen Hauswirtschaft, aus dem Blickwinkel der aktuellen wissenschaftlichen Debatte über die antike Wirtschaft.

Mit ihrem Buch legt Beate Wagner-Hasel eine sehr anschaulich und gut geschriebene, quellengesättigte und obendrein reichhaltig illustrierte Biographie eines großen Gelehrten des Deutschen Kaiserreiches vor, die sie in die Ideen-, Gesellschafts- und Mentalitätsgeschichte dieser Zeit bettet und aus ihr verständlich macht und dadurch zugleich einen bedeutsamen Beitrag zur Wissenschaftsgeschichte der Wilhelminischen Ära liefert. Deshalb ist es müßig, hier jene Forschungen und Aktivitäten von Karl Bücher anzuführen, denen die Autorin eher beiläufige Aufmerksamkeit widmet. Mit der Biographie liegt ein Werk vor, das eine unverzichtbare Grundlage für die weitere Bücherforschung bildet und diese zugleich zu inspirieren vermag.

Isabella Löhr: Die Globalisierung geistiger Eigentumsrechte. Neue Strukturen internationaler Zusammenarbeit 1886–1952, Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2010, 352 S.

Rezensiert von
Malte Zierenberg, Berlin

Gesetze zum Schutz von Autoren sind ein relativ junges Phänomen, das sich seit dem ausgehenden 18. Jahrhundert in Europa etablierte und erst allmählich weltweit Verbreitung fand. Die Autorin dieser an der Universität Leipzig entstandenen Dissertation wendet sich der globalen Ausdehnung dieser Rechte seit dem 19. Jahrhundert zu. Wie entwickelte sich seither das Verhältnis zwischen den Autoren, den Verwertern und den Nutzern von kulturellen Gütern, von Produkten also, die zunehmend grenzüberschreitend gehandelt wurden? Welche Formen internationaler Regelungen lassen sich ausmachen, die die unterschiedlichen Interessen von Produzenten und Händlern, staatlichen Stellen und Konsumenten austarieren sollten? Und welche Akteure spielten bei der Ausgestaltung dieser Regelungen eine maßgebliche Rolle? Diesen Fragen geht Löhrs Arbeit nach und bettet sie zugleich in mehrere Forschungskontexte ein – von der Geschichte internationaler Organisationen über die Diskussionen um eine *new global history* bis hin zur Rolle des Nationalstaates im Globalisierungsprozess.

In ihrer Einleitung leistet die Autorin mit großer Umsicht begriffliche Klärungsarbeit. Sie versteht ihren Gegenstand, das „geistige Eigentum", mit Hannes Siegrist als „ein Bündel sozialer, kultureller und rechtlicher Handlungsregeln und Handlungsrechte", durch welches „Rollen, Beziehungen und Praxisformen des kulturellen und wissenschaftlichen Feldes bestimmt sind" (S. 12). Verrechtlichung verwendet sie als eine Kategorie, die die Entstehung solcher Regelungen zunächst einfach beschreibt, ohne eine normative Aufladung damit zu verbinden. Ein gewisses Spannungsverhältnis kann man zwischen der im Titel genannten Globalisierung und den von Löhr untersuchten Fallbeispielen – vor allem Deutschland, Frankreich und Vertretern der Panamerikanischen Union – sehen. Auch reicht ihr Untersuchungszeitraum vor allem bis in die 1930er Jahre. Allerdings bettet sie ihre Ergebnisse durchaus noch in die weitere Geschichte der UNESCO-Anfänge ein. Das Jahr 1952, das der Titel verspricht, wird damit als Fluchtpunkt der Untersuchung erkennbar ernst genommen und in die Argumentation einbezogen.

Der erste von drei größeren Abschnitten wendet sich frühen Schritten auf dem Weg zu einem globalen Autorenschutz zu. Nachdem sie in einem kurzen Abriss Vorläuferentwicklungen im 18. Jahrhundert geschildert hat, nimmt Löhr im chronologischen Durchgang einzelne Phasen in den Blick. Sie geht dabei auf die Bedeutung bilateraler Abkommen als Wegbereiter der weiteren Entwicklung und die Rolle internationaler Organisationen ein. Diesen widmet sie ein eigenes Kapitel. Mag die Rekapitulation der Forschungsfrage „Was ist eine internationale Organisation?" inmitten des Untersuchungsteils (S. 50-57) zunächst auch ein wenig deplatziert wirken – mit Blick auf den eigentlichen Dreh-

und Angelpunkt dieses ersten Abschnitts, die Berner Union, erfüllt die Erörterung der Charakteristika und Leistungspotenziale internationaler Organisationen eine wichtige Funktion. Sie greift die in der Einleitung bereits skizzierte These von der Bedeutung solcher Institutionen für transnationale Entwicklungen wieder auf und verortet die Berner Union zugleich im historischen Setting der zweiten Hälfte des 19. Jahrhunderts. Die treibenden Akteure in jenem Prozess, der schließlich zur Unterzeichnung der Berner Konvention im Jahr 1886 führen sollte, waren – so arbeitet Löhr heraus – einerseits nichtstaatliche Akteure wie Schriftsteller, Wissenschaftler, Verleger und Juristen, die bereits seit den 1850er Jahren auf nationalen wie internationalen Kongressen für die Anerkennung von Autorenrechten geworben hatten. Andererseits bedurfte es der Zusammenarbeit mit staatlichen Stellen, hier namentlich der französischen und schweizerischen Regierung, um das Thema schließlich auf die Ebene zwischenstaatlicher Diplomatie zu heben. Bis zum Ersten Weltkrieg hatten 17 überwiegend europäische Staaten den völkerrechtlich innovativen Vertrag unterzeichnet, der im Folgenden die Handlungssouveränität der Unterzeichnerstaaten zugleich erweiterte und beschränkte; und das, indem er einerseits einen internationalen Rechtsraum schuf, der auf die „Internationalisierung des Lesestoffs“ reagierte und neue Zugriffsmöglichkeiten eröffnete, andererseits aber auch Verpflichtungen definierte und einen internationalen Harmonisierungsdruck ausübte, den Löhr am Beispiel der Schutzfrist eines Werkes anschaulich nachvollzieht (S. 72 f.). Wiewohl sie hier die Anfänge einer Erfolgsgeschichte nachzeichnet, unterschlägt Löhr nicht die Schattenseiten. Neben Tendenzen der Verrechtlichung, Institutionalisierung und geografischen Ausweitung des Autorenschutzes macht sie zu Recht auf die Grenzen dieser Prozesse aufmerksam. So trat eine ganze Reihe von Staaten, die zu den Verhandlungen eingeladen waren, der Union nicht bei. Löhr kann zeigen, dass hierfür sowohl ökonomische Gründe ausschlaggebend waren – das Recht der Union privilegierte die europäischen Staaten mit einer hohen Buchproduktion – als auch zum Beispiel nationale Rechtstraditionen. So traten die USA neben wirtschaftspolitischen Erwägungen auch deshalb nicht bei, weil die Konvention seit 1908 die zentrale Registrierung von Werken abgeschafft hatte. Diese Maßnahme aber war nicht in Einklang zu bringen mit dem amerikanischen Copyright-Prinzip.

Dass die Union trotz solcher Vorbehalte und Hindernisse über den Ersten Weltkrieg hinaus eine Erfolgsgeschichte werden konnte, schreibt Löhr wesentlich dem Charakter der Konvention und der Rolle des Berner Büros zu. An Stelle eines starren Regelwerks, das schnell in Gefahr geraten konnte, von bilateralen Abkommen „überholt“ zu werden, schufen die Signatarstaaten über stetige Revisionskonferenzen einen Raum für Angleichungsmöglichkeiten, die nationales und internationales Recht erfolgreich miteinander verwoben. Zudem wurde mit dem Berner Büro eine organisatorische Verankerung geschaffen, die von der Nähe zu den betroffenen Praktikern lebte und – so argumentiert Löhr überzeugend – der Organisation erlaubte, schließlich als eigenständiger Akteur neben staatlichen Stellen aufzutreten. Die im Widerstand gegen anderslautende Bestim-

mungen der Pariser Vorortverträge durchgesetzte Trennung von sachgebundenen Normen und tagespolitischen Auseinandersetzungen bewertet Löhr zu Recht als Erfolg des Büros, übersieht dabei aber auch nicht, dass dieser auf die Zustimmung der Nationalstaaten zurückzuführen war, die auf den Gewinn an Handlungssouveränität durch die Konvention nicht mehr verzichten wollten (S. 111 f.).

Der zweite, kürzere Abschnitt der Studie widmet sich mit den 1920er Jahren einer Zwischenzeit. Löhr geht hier den vielfältigen Revisions- und Neuausrichtungsbemühungen im Feld internationaler Autorenrechte nach, ehe sie im dritten – wieder ausführlicheren – Teil ihres Bandes auf eine neue Take-off-Phase der globalen Ausbreitung und Angleichung zu sprechen kommt. Das problematische Verhältnis zwischen der überwiegend europäisch geprägten Berner Variante des Autorenschutzes und den amerikanischen Bemühungen, einen multilateralen Verbund amerikanischer Autorenrechte zu formulieren, blieben auch während der Zwischenkriegszeit auf der Tagesordnung, wobei die unklare Rechtslage innerhalb der Panamerikanischen Union eine retardierende Rolle spielte. Gleichwohl, so kann Löhr zeigen, entstanden mit der „Organisation für geistige Zusammenarbeit" (OGZ) innerhalb des Völkerbundes bereits seit 1922 jene „mehrdimensionalen Handlungsstrukturen" auf globaler Ebene, die – wie das Modell der Berner Union – zwischenstaatliche Regelungen unter Einbeziehung nichtstaatlicher Akteure möglich machten. Man mag einwenden, dass Löhr vielleicht ein wenig den Fortschritt überzeichnet, den die OGZ gegenüber der Berner Union bedeutete. Denn auf das Mandat der Mitgliedsstaaten blieb diese neue Organisation bei ihren Versuchen der „governance by, with and without government" letztlich natürlich auch angewiesen. Den Fortschritt kann man allerdings sehr wohl – Löhr folgend – mit Blick auf eine neue Selbstverständlichkeit im Umgang mit solchen Organisationsformen, ihrer Institutionalisierung weitgehend unabhängig von einzelstaatlichen Strukturen und ihrem globalen Anspruch sehen (S. 268 f.). Tendenziell angelegt war dieses Vorgehen allerdings bereits in den Bemühungen der Berner Union. Zugleich sah sich auch die UNESCO, die für die Ausgestaltung und Einhaltung des 1952 von insgesamt vierzig Staaten unterzeichneten Welturheberrechtsabkommens verantwortlich war, immer noch mit ähnlichen Problemen konfrontiert, wie Löhr in ihrem Epilog darlegt. Bedeuteten die hier formulierten Mindeststandards mit Blick auf die europäisch geprägte Berner Konvention auch einen Rückschritt, ließen sie sich mit Blick auf die globale Ausbreitung und Harmonisierung von Autorenrechten doch als notwendige Fortführung interpretieren.

Man kann bezweifeln, ob die von Löhr vorgestellte Erfolgsgeschichte der Globalisierung geistiger Eigentumsrechte glatt aufginge, wenn man – was die Autorin nicht vorhatte – eine andere Perspektive wählte. Weil die Studie eine Geschichte von Abkommen und Verträgen schreibt sowie von Akteuren, die sich um die Institutionalisierung, Verrechtlichung und Internationalisierung von Autorenrechten bemühten, bleibt die Frage nach dem Erfolg dieser Bemühungen in der (Rechts-) Praxis naturgemäß unterbelichtet. Dort, wo Löhr auf diese Frage eingeht, zum Beispiel bei Streitigkeiten zwischen einem

deutschen Verlagshaus, dem Berner Büro und nationalen Buch- und Musikalienhändlern um einen unerlaubten Nachdruck während des Ersten Weltkriegs (S. 93), verlässt sie sich ausschließlich auf Quellen des Berner Büros selbst. Was aber, wenn die Schwierigkeiten bei der Umsetzung der Berner Konvention hier nicht deutlich formuliert wurden? Dass für die Durchsetzung geistiger Eigentumsrechte bei gedruckten Texten andere Erfolgschancen bestanden als etwa beim Handel mit Fotografien, wo seit dem ausgehenden 19. Jahrhundert eine gewisse Piraterie zu den Usancen gehört, ist nachvollziehbar. Dass es dabei allerdings einigermaßen problemlos, d. h. ohne Missachtung der Berner Konvention und ihrer Nachfolgeabkommen, zuging, eher nicht. Das Narrativ einer Erfolgsgeschichte bezieht seine Überzeugungskraft damit vor allem aus der Anlage der Untersuchung und der damit verbundenen Quellenauswahl. Das ist kein Einwand gegen Löhrs Studie an sich. Aber interessieren würde einen schon, ob sich die hier verhandelten Konflikte nicht auch anhand einzelner, paradigmatischer Fallstudien analysieren und auch darstellen ließen – und ob man dann das Narrativ beibehalten könnte. Daran schließt sich ein Kritikpunkt an, der auf die stellenweise etwas technisch-politologische Sprache und eine gewisse Modellhaftigkeit der Argumentation abhebt. Entwicklungs- oder Fortschrittsparadigma und die Applikation politologischer Governance-Konzepte ergänzen sich – vor allem in Einleitung und Schluss – zu einer Darstellung, der ein wenig mehr Allgemeinverständlichkeit gut getan hätte.

Dennoch kann man ohne jede Einschränkung festhalten: Isabella Löhr wendet sich äußerst klar und kompetent den von ihr gewählten Untersuchungsfragen zu, sie kontextualisiert ihren Gegenstand überaus umsichtig und bettet ihn plausibel in eine Geschichte globaler Verrechtlichung ein. Ihre Studie leistet, auch in der differenzierten Bewertung nationalstaatlicher Handlungsspielräume im Globalisierungsprozess, nicht nur Pionierarbeit auf einem bislang zu wenig beachteten Feld. Sie bereichert darüber hinaus die Forschung zur Bedeutung internationaler Organisationen für eine transnationale Geschichtsschreibung auf vorbildliche Weise.

Daniel Marc Segesser: Recht statt Rache oder Rache durch Recht? Die Ahndung von Kriegsverbrechen in der internationalen wissenschaftlichen Debatte, 1872–1945 (= Krieg in der Geschichte, Bd. 38), Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, 2010, S. 472

Rezensiert von
Adamantios Skordos, Wien

Über einen langen Zeitraum hinweg stellte die Völkerrechtsgeschichte innerhalb der Rechts- und Geschichtswissenschaften eine „Randdisziplin“ dar. Erst seit Ende des Kalten Krieges findet eine intensive Beschäftigung mit der historischen Entwicklung des Völkerrechts statt. Mittlerweile spricht man in völkerrechtlichen Kreisen sogar von einem *turn to history*, der in den letzten Jahren auf dem Gebiet der Völkerrechtsdisziplin erfolgt sei.[1] Die-

sem neuen „Trend“ lässt sich auch die hier zu besprechende Habilitationsschrift Daniel Marc Segessers zuordnen.

Der Berner Historiker ist nicht der erste, der vor dem Hintergrund der Errichtung des im Völkerstrafrecht neue Maßstäbe setzenden Internationalen Strafgerichtshofes für das ehemalige Jugoslawien 1994 sowie der darauffolgenden Gründung des Internationalen Strafgerichtshofes in Den Haag 2002 eine historische Untersuchung der Ahndung von Kriegsverbrechen vornimmt. Daher stellt sich zunächst die Frage, inwieweit es sich bei dieser Studie um einen innovativen Forschungsbeitrag handelt. Indem sich Segesser vorrangig auf die Debatten innerhalb (völker-)rechtswissenschaftlicher Kreise des späten 19. und der ersten Hälfte des 20. Jahrhunderts konzentriert, kann er sich deutlich von der Untersuchung des US-amerikanischen Politologen Gary Jonathan Bass „Stay the Hand of Vengeance: The Politics of War Crimes Tibunals“ (Princeton 2000) abgrenzen. Letztere richtet ihren Fokus nicht auf rechtswissenschaftliche Diskurse, sondern auf die politischen Entscheidungsprozesse, aus denen die Errichtungen von Kriegsverbrechertribunalen im 20. Jahrhundert (Istanbul, Leipzig, Nürnberger, Den Haag) hervorgingen. Auch im Vergleich zu der Arbeit Heiko Ahlbrechts zur „Geschichte der völkerrechtlichen Strafgerichtsbarkeit im 20. Jahrhundert“ (Baden-Baden 1999) lässt sich der innovative Charakter der Studie Segessers ausmachen. Stehen bei Ahlbrecht völkerrechtliche Abkommen, insbesondere Gründungstatuten internationaler Kriegstribunale, im Mittelpunkt des Interesses, ist Segesser bemüht, auf der Grundlage der minutiösen Auswertung von völkerrechtswissenschaftlichen Periodika den vorhergegangen und nachträglichen Diskurs zu einem Abkommen zu rekonstruieren. Dabei nimmt er erfreulicherweise – zumindest aus Sicht eines Historikers – eine dezidiert akteurszentrierte Perspektive ein, die man an der primär juristisch angelegten Arbeit Ahlbrechts vermisst. Kurzum: Zwar ist in der Wissenschaft die Idee der historischen Untersuchung der völkerrechtlichen Ahndung von Kriegsverbrechen nicht neu, dennoch ist der von Segesser gewählte Zugriff innovativ und sein Buch ergänzt sowohl in zeitlicher als auch vor allem methodologischer Hinsicht den bestehenden Forschungsstand zur Völkerstrafrechtsgeschichte.

Der Hauptteil des Buches ist chronologisch aufgebaut und in vier Kapitel gegliedert, die folgende Zeitabschnitte behandeln: die Spätphase des „langen“ 19. Jahrhunderts ab 1872, die Jahre der Balkankriege 1912/13 und des Ersten Weltkrieges, die Zwischenkriegszeit und schließlich die Zeit des Zweiten Weltkrieges. Diesen vorangestellt ist eine nahezu vorbildlich verfasste Einleitung, in der über die zentralen Forschungsfragen und die Quellen der Arbeit informiert, der Begriff der Kriegsverbrechen erläutert und der Forschungsstand besprochen wird. Lediglich im letzten Punkt vermisst Segesser, die besagte innovative Leistung seines Buches gegenüber anderen Arbeiten ähnlicher Thematik deutlich hervorzuheben. Nicht ganz nachvollziehbar ist im Weiteren seine Entscheidung, den Beginn der Untersuchung mit dem Jahr 1872 zu datieren. Zwar unterbreitete der Schweizer Jurist und Vorsitzende des Internationalen Komitees vom Roten Kreuz, Gustave Moynier, zu diesem Zeitpunkt erstmals den Vorschlag der Gründung eines inter-

nationalen Strafgerichtshofes, dennoch hatte man schon früher, wie Segesser selbst in seinem Buch kurz anspricht, Gedanken über die strafrechtliche Verfolgung von Verstößen gegen das Kriegsrecht angestellt. Im Allgemeinen ist es eine der wenigen Schwachstellen dieser Arbeit, dass sie aufgrund ihrer zu starken Fixierung auf das Jahr 1872 die vorangegangenen Entwicklungen ab Mitte des 19. Jahrhunderts zu wenig berücksichtigt. So wird etwa in der Arbeit die Genfer Konvention von 1864 des Öfteren angeführt, ohne dass der (mit der Entwicklung des humanitären Völkerrechts nicht unbedingt gut vertraute) Leser ausreichend in deren Bestimmungen eingeweiht wird. Hier wäre zumindest eine einschlägige Fußnote wünschenswert gewesen.

Segesser beschreibt im Hauptteil seiner Studie, wie sich allmählich ab Mitte des 19. Jahrhunderts die Forderung liberaler Juristen durchsetzte, rechtliche Normen des Völkerrechts in der Form internationaler Vereinbarungen verbindlich festzuhalten. Insbesondere galt dieses Interesse für den Bereich des Ius in Bello, das aufgrund der Bemühungen Johann Caspar Bluntschlis, Gustave Moyniers, Gustave Rolin-Jaequemyns' u. a. zunehmend an Anerkennung gewann und kodifiziert wurde. Diese positive Entwicklung stand allerdings in enger Verbindung mit großen Kriegen und den daraus gewonnenen Erfahrungen. Aus der Studie Segessers geht hervor, dass es für die Verfechter einer durch verbindliches Recht geregelten Kriegsführung mehrere, aufgrund ihrer Brutalität und ihrer vielen Opfer Aufsehen erregende Kriege im „langen" 19. Jahrhundert gebraucht hat, um ihr Anliegen, insbesondere gegenüber unwilligen, an dem Prinzip der „militärischen Notwendigkeit" festhaltenden Militärs, vorbringen zu können. Einer dieser Kriege war der Amerikanische Bürgerkrieg (1861–1865), der den deutschstämmigen US-amerikanischen Juristen und Publizisten Francis Lieber dazu bewegte, ein umfassendes Regelwerk zum Ius in Bello zu verfassen, den so genannten „Lieber Code". Die Repressalien gegen die französische Zivilbevölkerung von Seiten der Truppen Moltkes im Deutsch-französischen Krieg von 1870/71, um den Einsatz französischer irregulärer Guerillaeinheiten zu bestrafen, führte wiederum Völkerrechtlern und Politikern vor Augen, dass die Bestimmungen der kürzlich verabschiedeten Genfer Konvention von 1864 bei den Truppen auf dem Schlachtfeld nicht angekommen waren. Demzufolge schlug, wie bereits gesagt, Moynier 1872 erstmals die Gründung eines internationalen Tribunals zur Ahndung von Verstößen gegen das Kriegsrecht vor. Die Bestrafung der vom internationalen Tribunal für schuldig erklärten Personen sollte seiner Ansicht nach dem Staat überlassen werden, in dessen Gewahrsam sich diese befänden. Lieber und andere Juristen kritisierten den Vorschlag Moyniers in Hinsicht auf die Unwahrscheinlichkeit der Umsetzung der Urteile dieses internationalen Tribunals sowie auf die zu starke Einschränkung der staatlichen Autonomie.

Moynier unternahm erst wieder Mitte der 1890er Jahre einen Versuch, ein Ahndungsverfahren für Verstöße gegen das Kriegsrecht vertraglich festzulegen. Dieses Mal plädierte er allerdings für die Schaffung einer internationalen Untersuchungskommission statt für die Gründung eines internationalen Strafgerichtshofes. Einen ersten Erfolg konnte er schließlich 1906

verbuchen, als in einer diplomatischen Konferenz die Genfer Konvention von 1864 revidiert und durch eine Bestimmung zur Verpflichtung der vertragsschließenden Parteien zur Ahndung von Verstößen gegen das Kriegsrecht ergänzt wurde.

Während des Ersten Weltkrieges wurde in völkerrechtlichen Kreisen anlässlich der deutschen Gräueltaten in Belgien darüber erneut heftig debattiert, ob Verstöße gegen das Kriegsrecht strafrechtlich verfolgt werden sollten sowie über die Art und Weise, wie das zu geschehen sei. Bezugnehmend auf Artikel 28 der 1906 revidierten Genfer Konvention, der die Staaten dazu verpflichtete, Verstöße gegen die Regeln des Ius in Bello zu ahnden, verlangte der französische Völkerrechtler Louis Renault 1915 die strafrechtliche Verfolgung der von deutschen Truppen begangenen Grausamkeiten. Der Ausgang der Prozesse vor dem Leipziger Reichsgericht wurde allerdings seitens Renault und anderer alliierten Juristen, die sich während des Krieges für eine rechtliche Ahndung von Kriegsverbrechen stark gemacht hatten, eher als eine Diskreditierung statt als Belohnung ihrer Bemühungen empfunden.

Nichtsdestoweniger bemühten sich in der Zwischenkriegszeit weiterhin Straf- und Völkerrechtler, die in der *Association Internationale de Droit Pénal* und in der *International Law Association* organisiert waren, allen voran der Rumäne Vespasian V. Pella, eine Konzeption für einen internationalen Strafgerichtshof und einen internationalen Strafrechtskodex zu erarbeiten. Ihre Anstrengungen fanden allerdings seitens der Politik wenig Aufmerksamkeit, was sich im Briand-Kellogg-Pakt von 1928 eindrücklich widerspiegelte. In diesem völkerrechtlichen Abkommen, in dem das freie Kriegsführungsrecht der Staaten als Mittel zur Lösung von Streitigkeiten stark eingeschränkt wurde, waren keine Sanktionen für Paktbrecher vorgesehen. Es brauchte schließlich einen weiteren Weltkrieg und Millionen neuer Opfer durch Kriegsverbrechen, damit der erste internationale Strafgerichtshof einberufen wurde. Wie Segesser zeigt, war es zu einem großen Teil der Verdienst namhafter Straf- und Völkerrechtler, wie etwa Hans Kelsen, Quincy Wright und Robert H. Jackson, dass es nach Kriegsende statt zu einer summarischen Hinrichtung der Nazi-Hauptkriegsverbrecher zur Anklage letzterer vor dem Internationalen Militärtribunal in Nürnberg kam.

Im abschließenden Resümee stellt sich Segesser die spannende Frage, inwieweit Moynier, Pella, Jackson und ihre Mitstreiter die Verabschiedung des Römer Statuts des Internationalen Strafgerichtshofes von 1998 als das erfolgreiche Ende ihrer Bemühungen betrachtet hätten. Er tut dies, indem er den aktuellen Stand des Völkerstrafrechts den Erwartungen und Zielen dieser Vorreiter der strafrechtlichen Ahndung von Kriegsverbrechen gegenüberstellt. Segesser gelangt durch diese Gegenüberstellung zum Ergebnis, dass sich Moynier und seine Nachfolger vor allem angesichts der mangelnden Autorität des Haager Internationalen Strafgerichtshofes keineswegs am Ziel ihrer Anstrengungen gesehen und sich weiterhin für stärker verbindliche internationale Instrumentarien zur Ahndung von Kriegsverbrechen eingesetzt hätten.

Um die Wende vom 19. zum 20. Jahrhundert hatte Lassa Oppenheim, einer der Mitbegründer des modernen Völkerrechts, im *American Journal of International Law*

die Notwendigkeit betont, den Ursprung jeder völkerrechtlichen Norm zu klären, wie sie sich entwickelt habe und graduell in der Praxis anerkannt wurde. Zugleich rief er seine Kollegen auf, sich der „vernachlässigten Geschichte" des Völkerrechts anzunehmen, da diese noch „unkultiviertes Land" sei, das auf seine „Kultivatoren" warten würde.[2] Daniel Marc Segesser hat mit seinem ebenso exzellent recherchierten wie hervorragend analytisch interpretierten Buch einen wichtigen Beitrag in diese Richtung geleistet.

Anmerkungen

1 Vgl. z. B. M. Craven, Introduction: International Law and its Histories, in: ders. / M. Fitzmaurice / M. Vogiatzi, (Hrsg.), Time, History and International Law, Leiden 2007, S. 1-25.
2 L. Oppenheim, The Science of International Law. Its Task and Method, in: American Journal of International Law 2 (1908) 2, S. 313-356, hier: S. 316 f.

Chang-Tai Hung: Mao's Political Culture in the Early People's Republic, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2011, 352 S.

Rezensiert von
Eva-Maria Stolberg, Duisburg-Essen

Die Konsolidierungsphase der Volksrepublik China in den Jahren 1949 bis 1953, also zwischen dem Sieg Mao Zedongs im chinesischen Bürgerkrieg und dem Ende des Koreakrieges, ist für Historiker eine der interessantesten Perioden der chinesischen Zeitgeschichte. Ein zentrales Thema stellt dabei die politische Kultur dar, die neue Ideologie und die neue Gesellschaftsordnung eines sozialistischen China der Bevölkerung erfolgreich zu vermitteln. Drei entscheidende Begriffe korrelierten in diesem Prozess: Propaganda, Selbstdarstellung der Führungspersönlichkeit Mao Zedongs und Repräsentation.

Diesen Konnotationen und ihrer Entstehungsweise widmet sich Chang-Tai Hung, renommierter Historiker an der Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, in fünf, klar strukturierten Kapiteln: I. Space, II. Celebrations, III. History, IV. Visual Images, V. Commemoration. Die Titel bieten den roten Leitfaden durch die faktenreiche Analyse, die auf mehrjähriger Archivarbeit basiert. Darüber hinaus führte der Autor Interviews mit Städteplanern, Architekten, Künstlern und Museologen.

Die Erklärung zur Gründung der Volksrepublik China, die Mao Zedong auf der Politischen Konsultativkonferenz am 21. September 1949 in Peking hielt, bildete nach Hung den Auftakt zur politischen Indoktrinierung. In dem Manifest brachte Mao den chinesischen Nationalstolz und das Streben nach Weltgeltung nach einem Jahrhundert kolonialer Demütigung durch die europäischen Mächte zum Ausdruck. Offiziell wurde die Volksrepublik China am 1. Oktober 1949 auf dem Tiananmen in der Hauptstadt Peking ausgerufen, und an diesen symbolträchtigen Schauplatz knüpft Hungs Darstellung an. Zunächst beschreibt der Autor in der Einführung das „Historical Setting", die historischen Rahmenbedingungen. Die Kommunistische Partei stand im Oktober 1949 vor einer schwierigen Aufgabe: Die chinesische Gesellschaft war durch den langjährigen

Bürgerkrieg zersplittert, die Wirtschaft lag darnieder und die Bevölkerung war desillusioniert. Und genau hier beginnt nach Hung der Personenkult um Mao zu greifen. Der mühselige militärische Sieg im zermürbenden Bürgerkrieg wurde von Mao und der Kommunistischen Partei in eine nationsweite kulturelle Erneuerung gegossen. Wie diese in den Anfangsjahren organisiert wurde, ist das Thema der vorliegenden Studie.

Ausgangspunkt für Hungs essentialistisch-kulturalistische Analyse der kulturellen Erneuerung ist die Hauptstadt Peking. Plätze, Straßen, Gebäude werden in ihrem räumlichen Ausdruck vorgestellt. Die zentrale Fragestellung lautet, wie sich kulturelle Erneuerung, neues Nationalbewusstsein und Personenkult nicht nur in der Architektur widerspiegelten, sondern auch durch die Kommunistische Partei in eine neue Volkskultur gegossen wurden. Räumlichkeit versteht der Autor keineswegs statisch, sondern untersucht diese handlungs- und akteursspezifisch, sie ist darüber hinaus als Schaffung einer neuen Ordnung zu verstehen.

Im ersten Kapitel arbeitet Hung die raumbildenden Faktoren der hauptstädtischen Architektur am Beispiel des Tiananmen, des „Platzes des Himmlischen Friedens" heraus. Architektur besitzt nach Ansicht des Autors eine historisch verwurzelte und zugleich die aktuelle Politik formende Gestaltungskraft, derer sich die chinesischen Kommunisten vollends bewusst waren. Entgegen der nationalen Leitlinie der Volksrepublik China nach 1949 mutet der Hauptstadtentwurf eklektisch an. Doch dieser Eklektizismus weist auf die komplizierte Suche nach Orientierung und nach einer neuen Identität. Da ist zum einen das kulturelle Erbe des alten China in Gestalt des Kaiserpalastes und der „Verbotenen Stadt". Ihr stellten die chinesischen Kommunisten ein Ensemble von zehn „öffentlichen" Gebäuden (die „Große Halle des Volkes", das Museum der Chinesischen Revolution, das Museum der chinesischen Geschichte, der Kulturpalast der Nationalitäten u. a.) gegenüber. Dieser Gegenüberstellung von „kaiserlicher" Hauptstadt und „Volks"-Hauptstadt ist eine hohe Symbolik gegeben, deren Potential der Autor jedoch nicht genügend erschöpft. Welches Konzept von Öffentlichkeit die chinesischen Kommunisten gerade auch in Abgrenzung zur imperialen Geschichte Chinas hatten, wird nicht deutlich. Stattdessen schweift Hung auf eine theoretische Erörterung öffentlicher Räume im Westen ab (S.47). Aufschlussreicher und fokussierter sind dagegen seine Ausführungen, dass sich die chinesischen Kommunisten bei der Gestaltung des öffentlichen Raumes in ihrer Hauptstadt am sowjetischen Vorbild orientierten. Pate stand hier der stalinistische Großplan zur Stadterneuerung Moskaus aus dem Jahr 1935. Der sowjetische Einfluss auf die Architektur der chinesischen Hauptstadt ist nicht gering zu schätzen. Bis 1957 standen sowjetische Ratgeber und Meinungsmacher den chinesischen Städteplanern zur Seite. Die chinesischen Kommunisten bewiesen jedoch eine beträchtliche Eigenwilligkeit, die sich darin äußerte, dass der Rote Platz in Moskau zwar als Ausgangspunkt genommen wurde, ein neuer politischer Raum jedoch nach chinesischen Maßstäben geschaffen werden sollte, d. h. der Tiananmen sollte den Roten Platz in Design und Symbolik übertreffen – eine eindeutig nationalkommunistische Maxime. Dies verdeutlicht

der Autor in den folgenden Kapiteln. Die Gestaltung des Tiananmen, insbesondere hinsichtlich des Gebäudeensembles, weist eine enge Symbiose von Architektur, Museumskultur und politischer Repräsentation auf. Aufschlussreich ist dabei, dass die chinesischen Kommunisten auf die traditionelle chinesische Geomantie zurückgriffen und sich damit offenkundig vom sowjetischen Vorbild distanzierten. Ausschlaggebender war die ästhetische Auseinandersetzung mit der „Verbotenen Stadt" der Kaiserzeit. Dies zeigt sich am deutlichsten an der Großen Volkshalle; im Unterschied zur Kaiserstadt waren es nun die Volksdelegierten und nicht der Kaiser, die die Räumlichkeiten durchschritten.

In Kapitel II widmet sich der Autor der sozialistischen Festkultur. Auch hier kam es zu beträchtlichen Anleihen aus der Kaiserzeit. Als Beispiel kann die Aufführung des klassischen Tanzes des Yangge genannt werden, der jedoch in eine neue Agitpropform gegossen wurde. Im Gegensatz zur Kaiserzeit fanden diese Tanzdarbietungen jedoch nicht in geschlossenen Räumen des Kaiserpalastes, sondern in der Öffentlichkeit statt. Zu Recht weist Hung daraufhin, dass es sich hier nicht allein um politische Indoktrination, sondern auch um einen inszenierten Spaß für die Massen handelte.

In Kapitel III beschäftigt sich der Autor mit der Entstehungsgeschichte des Museums der Chinesischen Revolution. Dem sowjetischen Vorbild entsprechend, sahen die chinesischen Kommunisten die Funktion in einer proletarischen Erziehung der Bevölkerung. Sowjetische Museologen wurden nach Peking eingeladen. Hier wird nicht ganz deutlich, was in der Diskussion unter sozialistischer Museumskultur überhaupt verstanden wurde, vor allem welche nationalen sowie kulturspezifischen Differenzen vor dem andersartigen historischen Kontext in der Sowjetunion und in der Volksrepublik China zum Tragen kamen. Um den sowjetischen Kultureinfluss zu demonstrieren, stellt Hung einige bekannte Ölgemälde wie „The Founding Ceremony of the Nation" des Künstlers Dong Xiwen vor, unterlässt jedoch eine Bildanalyse, inwiefern die Kunst dem sozialistischen Realismus entsprach, welche Bildsymbole z. B. tatsächlich sowjetischen oder vielmehr indigen-chinesischen Ursprungs waren. Fest steht jedoch, dass der ikonografische Stil sowjetischer Propagandagemälde in der „neuen" chinesischen Kunst nicht zu finden war.

In Kapitel IV (Visual Images) analysiert Hung das Konzept der chinesischen Kommunisten von Kunst und Ästhetik, wobei dieses Kapitel sehr der Theorie verpflichtet ist. Es ging dabei darum, mit der Kunst, d. h. durch Visualisierung, sozialistische Inhalte einer kaum alphabetisierten bäuerlichen Bevölkerung nahe zu bringen. Einfache, plakative Darstellungen politischer Gegner (Guomindang, Bürgertum, USA) machten sich aber gerade diese Unbildung zunutze. Die beliebten *lianhuanhua*, eine Art Comic, enthielten einfache, aber emotional aufgeladene Bilder; Inhalte wurden dagegen kaum textuell vermittelt. Feindbilder, d. h. Stereotypen, ließen sich wegen ihrer guten Einprägsamkeit am besten visuell verbreiten. Wichtig ist auch Hungs Hinweis, dass die kommunistische Propaganda ständig neue Feindbilder erschuf, die Schablonen der Visualisierung dabei jedoch gleich blieben. Den Feindbildern wurden die sozialistischen Helden gegenübergestellt.

In Kapitel V (Commemoration) widmet sich der Autor der Entstehung und Wirkungsweise des Märtyrerkultes, der sich u. a. in der Schaffung von „Revolutionären Friedhöfen“ widerspiegelte. Hung weist daraufhin, dass der Mythos und das Zelebrieren des Heldentodes in Revolution und Bürgerkrieg dazu dienten, die Unsterblichkeit der Kommunistischen Partei zu konstruieren. Darüber hinaus löste der Märtyrerkult den traditionellen Ahnenkult des Kaiserreiches ab. Unklar bleibt an dieser Stelle, wie sich der Märtyrerkult zu dem Personenkult um Mao positionierte.
Insgesamt liefert Hung eine facettenreiche Studie, allerdings fällt das Schlusskapitel enttäuschend aus. Hier hätten die wichtigsten Thesen pointierter zusammengeführt werden müssen. Stattdessen entsteht der Eindruck, dass die Argumentationslinien des Autors nebeneinander verlaufen und nicht in eine Synthese münden. Irritierend wirkt der Titel des Buches, denn in „Mao's New World“ fehlt der interpretatorische Bezug auf den Kult um Mao, der metaphorisch als „Roter Kaiser“ tituliert wird und einen prägenden, ja dominanten Einfluss auf die politische Kultur hatte. Zudem stellt sich auch die weiterführende Frage, inwiefern sich das sich in der Architektur der Hauptstadt widerspiegelnde Zelebrieren der sozialistischen Nation in den Städten der Peripherie auswirkte.

Gary Haq / Alistair Paul: Evironmentalism since 1945, Routledge: London, 2012, 126 S.

Reviewed by
Maxi Freund, Saarbrücken

“Over the past fifty years there has been an unprecedented growth in public concern for the environment” (p. 5). It is the growth of this environmental consciousness and the major events attached to it which are the focus of Gary Haq's and Alistair Paul's introduction to “Environmentalism since 1945”. The history of environmentalism is told through five areas: the environmental movement, environmental governance, science, economics and popular culture. This allows the authors to highlight “a different aspect of environmentalism” (p. 2.) in each chapter. Most of the book's many references to national events are taken from the USA and UK since “[m]any of the oldest and most powerful campaign groups in the environmental movement were first formed or gained popular support in the USA and UK” (p. 3).
The first substantive chapter (chap. 2) is dedicated to the birth and development of the environmental movement. It retraces its evolution from a single issue, nature conservation, social movement to a “global anti-consumerism counterculture”.(p. 24) In fact, many environmental organisations were born in the 1960s and 1970s, in a time of the general uprising by young people against the practices of the establish-

ment. The authors conclude the chapter by remembering the reader that the environmental movement failed to set environmental concerns as a long-term issue in the media, referring to the wide-spread expression of the 'issue-oriented cycle' coined by A. Downs (1972).

Titled "global environmental governance", chapter 3 gives an account of the uptake of environmental issues in international politics and recalls the process of the founding of (inter)national institutions defending the environmental cause. Starting in the late 1960s with the Biosphere Conference organised by the UNESCO in Paris in 1968, the report goes on to stress the importance of the 1972 UN conference on the Human Environment held in Stockholm, which led to the creation of the UNEP. It then moves on to the instauration of the World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED) which, in 1987, published the report "Our common future", also referred to as the Brundtland report after its chair, Norwegian Prime minister Gro Harlem Brundtland, which defines the notion of sustainable development. The Rio Earth Summit in 1992, which saw the birth of the Agenda 21 and the Commission of Sustainable Development (CSD) as well as its follow-up conferences (Rio +5, Rio +10) are also presented. The chapter closes with a section about the multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) as a mechanism for international cooperation in the context of global environmental governance.

Chapter 4 is dedicated to the ambiguous relationship between science and the environment. Even as science has helped to identify environmental problems and has come up with solutions to them (i.e. contributing to nature conservation), it has also developed innovations like nuclear energy and genetically modified food, thereby driving environmental degradation.(p.57) Beside this equivocal link between science and the environment, science has played a major part in backing environmental arguments. Both environmentalists and their opponents have expected science to produce irrefutable facts to support their point of view. However, the "lack of conclusive scientific evidence" (p. 49) means that either side can use scientific results to strengthen its position. Furthermore, Haq and Paul mention events where confidence in scientific results was badly damaged due to methodological errors or leaked internal debates. As examples, the authors recall Greenpeace's mistake in measuring remaining oil levels on the British oil platform Brent Spar (1995), attempts to suppress climate change sceptical opinions in an IPCC's report (1995) as well as the leaked emails of the Climatic Research Unit (CRU) at the University of East Anglia (2009). Another section gives an account of the radical ecology movement, i.e. a biocentric approach that puts "nature first, humanity second" (p. 46).

Chapter 5 presents works that have questioned the strong focus by economists on growth and have highlighted the scarcity of natural resources. The Club of Rome's "Limits to Growth" (published in 1972) is mentioned as well as ideas contesting GDP as being a representative measure of a nation's wealth. Apart from this school of thought criticising the capitalist approach, the authors also present works that have tried to put a value to nature, thereby integrating the environmental impact of industrial production in the form of pollu-

tion or resource use into existing economic models. Haq and Paul also present the idea of 'decoupling' economic growth from environmental deterioration (OECD 2002) (p. 73) and mention Tim Jackson's book "Prosperity without growth" which had an important impact on the public discourse in the UK. The authors conclude that, to date, "a comprehensive theory" for an environmentally friendly economic model is still absent: "Environmentalism is not linked to a mature, convincing political economy that rivals Marxism or challenges the classical liberal theory of Smith and Ricardo" (p. 73).

The sixth chapter examines the advancement of green issues in popular culture. Compared to war time, the post-war period is seen as a step backwards for environmentalism. If in the 1940s re-use was an everyday practice, the 1950s introduced a consumer culture stimulated by an advertising industry that made luxuries seem necessities (p. 76). The first photograph of planet Earth from space (called "Earthrise") published in 1968 however made people more conscious about the beauty and vulnerability of our planet. This gave way to the rise of the green consumer in the 1980s, resulting both in a growing interest in green products and a boycott of non-environmentally friendly goods. The development of ecolabels (the EU introduced its first ecolabel in 1992) followed. Another sign of the mainstreaming of environmental ideas in popular culture was an increased involvement of celebrities in defending the environmental cause. In 1985, the Live Aid concert, simultaneously held in the UK and USA, raised funds for the famine in Ethiopia (p. 84), but it is only since the 2000s that celebrity advocacy has become more widespread, illustrated by a number of films highlighting climate change like Al Gore's "An inconvenient truth", "The day after tomorrow" or "the Age of Stupid". Apart from a more intensive coverage of environmental issues in the media, a changing terminology has contributed to keep the topic in the focus of attention. The words "green", "low carbon" or "ecological footprint" are only some examples of this phenomenon (p. 87 f.).

The authors also remind their readers of the 'value-action gap', which means that environmental consciousness does not automatically translate into environmentally friendly behaviour (p. 91). Furthermore, it is being argued that there is still confusion over what a green lifestyle ultimately means and what behaviour it encompasses (p. 91).

The last chapter looks at the future of environmentalism. It discusses the main challenges ahead, the central task being to form "a strong and effective environmental movement" (p. 94) which addresses issues such as population growth or climate change. Another challenge lies in clarifying the "role of technology" (p. 95), alongside combatting environmental scepticism. On the individual level, Haq and Paul stress the importance of individual actions: "Since almost all aspects of modern western lifestyles contribute to greenhouse gas emissions, it is necessary for the environmental movement to demonstrate that everyone can make a difference, whatever their personal, social or economic circumstances." (p. 89) As a result, "(w)inning hearts and minds" (p. 96) by speaking to people's values and identity is certainly one of the most needed and most difficult goals.

Finally, there is, according to the authors, a need for a new environmentalism: "A new form of environmentalism is required for a new age of global challenges" (p. 99). For the environmental movement, the authors see a potential force in a global network of grassroots groups.

What makes this introduction to environmentalism since World War II rather appealing, is its division into different aspects of environmentalism. Each chapter presents key discourses, schools of thought or trends in the respective area, thereby avoiding a merely chronological account of events. Each chapter, though, is built up chronologically. This spotlight-effect is easy to digest and allows the reader to pick the chapters he or she is most interested in, without loosing an otherwise discernible red thread. However, this is also a potential weak point. Other than the idea of showing how environmental ideas spread in different parts of society, there is no connection between the chapters, and the thematic ordering may seem arbitrary.

One other weakness lies in the modular approach of the book, in which the reader may be irritated by repetitive references to the same facts and events appearing in different chapters – though, on the other hand, it may help the reader to remember key events.

The title "Environmentalism since 1945" is very generic, leaving the reader with different expectations. After reading the book, though, the title makes sense. It would have been appreciated if the authors would have also mentioned the development of environmentalism in countries other than the UK and the USA. It is, however, understandable that a choice had to be made for a concise introduction to the topic on 100 pages. For a German reader, the focus on examples from the UK and USA might be slightly disappointing, but he or she may be happy to know that the German green party is cited as "(t)he most successful European environment-focused political party" (p. 10).

Both authors work (Gary Haq) or have worked (Alistair Paul) at the Stockholm Environment Institute at the University of York. Unsurprisingly, the author's view on environmentalism is positive. This book is, however, also critical of the environmental movement's impact on the whole of society and sees its limitations. Affirmations like "The ability of the environmental movement to bring about change through targeted campaigns has been both a great strength and a weakness" (p. 24) illustrate this point. It is through the assessment of the challenges ahead that this intention of giving the reader a balanced evaluation comes forward best.

Having evaluated these five aspects of environmentalism, the question arises as to what the book does leave out.

A first observation is that there is a lack of a specific focus on the relationship between the media and the environment. If the role of the media in the environmental cause is touched upon in several chapters, there is no dedicated chapter about the impact the media has had in promoting environmentalism. Developing on the role of the media in environmentalism would hence be a new and important perspective.

Moreover, the book does not elaborate on how corporations have taken on green issues in the last 60 years. Also, it does not mention at all the role of education and how environmentalism has been taught in schools.

On the whole, it is a very user-friendly book. Summaries at the end of each chapter allow a time-constrained reader to get the gist of each chapter before reading it in its entirety. A few sentences of outlook identify future needs for action and research which are a real added value. A chronological overview at the beginning of the book serves as a reminder of key events. Notes have been deferred to the end of the book, making the text more readable, although it takes a short moment to find the right chapter and footnote number as note counts restart with every chapter. A two-page list of titles for further reading direct the reader to further study.

The book is rich in facts and thereby offers any reader, well-informed or new in the topic, added value. One learns for instance that "(t)he Quaker philosophy of bearing witness, demonstrating passive resistance by placing campaigners at the scene of environmental problems has been fundamental to Greenpeace campaigns ever since" (p. 12) the first trip of a ship its crew called Greenpeace, trying to stop nuclear tests at Amchitka Island by sailing into the test zone.

Therefore, the book is highly recommendable to any student of environmentalism, seeking to get a concise and fact-based overview of environmentalism since World War II. The importance of the topic is due to increase in the coming years, since: "What seems certain is that the whole of society will have to develop ways to respond to the profound effects that future global environmental change will have on our current way of life" (p. 99).

Belinda Davis / Wilfried Mausbach / Martin Klimke / Carla MacDougall (Hrsg.): Changing the World, Changing Oneself. Political Protest and Collective Identities in West Germany and the U.S. in the 1960s and 1970s (= Protest, Culture and Society Series, Bd. 3), New York: Berghahn Books, 2010, 334 S.

Martin Klimke / Jacco Pekelder / Joachim Scharloth (Hrsg.): Between Prague Spring and French May. Opposition and Revolt in Europe, 1960–1980 (= Protest, Culture and Society Series, Bd. 7), New York: Berghahn Books, 2011, 347 S.

Reviewed by
Michael Stauch, Durham

In these two edited volumes in Berghahn's "Protest, Culture and Society" series, the transnational – the non-governmental and ungovernable, the not-yet-global yet nation-transcending[1], "the movements, flows, and circulation of people, practices, and ideas, and […] their interaction, interpenetration, and entanglement"[2] – informs a collection of essays that range widely over geographic terrain, disciplinary boundaries, and several decades of post-war protest movements in the U.S. and Europe. That these essays range so widely while remaining firmly grounded in their particular contexts is a testament to the cohort of scholars from around the globe that assembled each volume as well as to the diligence of the contributors, them-

selves mostly younger scholars from institutes in the U.S., Europe and Japan. The result greatly expands our knowledge of the insurgency on both sides of the Atlantic that erupted in the 1960s and continued into the 1970s and beyond. It inspires scholars of the U.S. and Europe to rethink the meaning and limitations of the nation, to challenge narrow disciplinary constraints, and to see 1968 as part of a longer history of protest and rebellion across the continent and the world. As such, it is a culmination of recent trends as well as a point of departure for future research.

Changing the World, Changing Oneself focuses on the exchanges that occurred between individuals and groups in the United States and West Germany in the postwar period. These include intellectual exchange, as in Adorno's exile in the United States and the insight into his identity as a European he gained there and then brought back to Europe. They also include the exchange of national histories, as when activists on both sides of the Atlantic engaged each other's past in order to come to terms with their place in the present, documented here by Wilfried Mausbach. Other contributions, notably the "new" diplomatic histories of Martin Klimke and Jeremi Suri, explore the limitations that government officials encountered when faced with the powerful protests of the era. Carla MacDougall continues this theme, describing the contest that emerged over the symbolic meaning of West Berlin in 1982, as activists and government officials each attempted to cast Reagan's visit to the city that year in their own terms. This focus on the concrete and specific brings the transnational into greater relief. – *Between Prague Spring and French May* expands the geographic coverage of protest activity in the 1960s and '70s to include countries from Eastern and Western Europe, including Scandinavia, while continuing the transnational focus of *Changing the World, Changing Oneself*. Articles in one section examine the impact of international events on domestic developments. In Sweden, Denmark and Britain, events in the 1950s instigated a critical re-examination of political loyalties that led to the founding of a New Left in each of these countries. In France, the French Communist Party undermined student protests in May '68 due to a combination of domestic concerns and Moscow's Cold War calculations. In Yugoslavia and the former Czechoslovakia, rebellious students challenged party leaders and destabilized the domestic consensus built in the immediate postwar years.

What is perhaps most exciting about both of these books is their uncompromising attempt to bridge disciplinary boundaries. In addition to examinations of intellectual, diplomatic, and social history, articles on "White Negroes" and "Stadtindianer" in West Germany add a cultural dimension to both collections. Susanne Rinner's contribution to *Changing the World, Changing Oneself* provides a literary analysis of novels published after the fall of the Berlin Wall, illustrating how German characters gain insight into the relationship between Germany and the United States in the twentieth century by remembering 1968. In an essay on the autonomous movement in Europe, Georgy Katsiaficas evokes the subterranean connections between "millions of ordinary people"[3] as instances of an "eros effect" expressed through direct action rather than ideological disputes, and skeptical of both established and insurgent

elites. *Between Prague Spring and French May* expands the range of disciplines still further, including linguistic analysis of the transmission of protest language between the U.S. and West Germany, and media studies on the Dutch Provos, the impact of global protest on Norwegian circumstances, and Ceaușescu's skillful appropriation of anti-Soviet sentiment in Romania to bolster his position in power. The vast array of different approaches is at times dizzying, but contributes to a remarkable survey of the social reality of the period.

These works also confront one of the more unpleasant aspects of the movements of the era – their relationship to armed struggle. Some connections are quite direct, as in the case of Ulrike Meinhof's transformation from left-wing journalist to armed insurgent. Others are more diffuse, such as the Dutch solidarity efforts on behalf of the Red Army Faction (RAF). Taken together, a nuanced discussion ensues that suggests the transnational character of the discourse and practice of violence. At the same time, these contributions ground groups like the RAF in the social milieus they emerged from "without, however, using the RAF's violence to discredit the protest movement."[4]

The concluding sections of both volumes are also innovative. *Between Prague Spring and French May* ends with a detailed chronology of the European events of 1968 and a first-person narrative by Ingrid Gilcher-Holtey. Gilcher-Holtey's essay examines the difficulties both of writing and researching a well-known participant in these events, Régis Debray, as well as Debray's relationship to his past. *Changing the World, Changing Oneself* concludes with a lengthy conversation between a number of former student leaders from the U.S. and Germany on their involvement in these movements. In this way, the editors once again demonstrate their commitment to transnationalism as an interaction between individuals and groups with little or no ties to official governments, making concrete the otherwise abstract connections of lifestyle, culture, and ideas often stated but seldom demonstrated.

The inclusion of reflections from participants further establishes these collections as above all a portrait of a generation. The scholars included here confront this history in all its messy and sometimes unpleasant detail. The result is a bold reappraisal of the sometimes naïve, sometimes dangerous, but always courageous confrontation of one generation with the world it was meant to inherit. That this generation failed to overturn that world suggests not the paucity of their efforts but the enormity of the task.

Notes:

1 Between Prague Spring and French May, p. 118.
2 Changing the World, Changing Oneself, p. x.
3 Ibid., p. 241.
4 Ibid., p. 186.

Jie-Hyun Lim / Karen Petrone (Hrsg.): Gender Politics and Mass Dictatorship. Global Perspectives, Mass Dictatorship in the 20th Century, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011, 305 S.

Reviewed by
Rebecca Friedman, Miami

This edited volume provides its readers with a comparative framework for understanding the role of mass dictatorships in the twentieth century. Indeed, it offers a rare transcontinental analysis of the relationship between subject/citizen and state in democratic, socialist, communist and fascist regimes across the last century. The substantive chapters focus, in particular, on the modern mass political regimes in Europe and Asia, including Britain, China, Germany, Japan, Korea, Poland and the Soviet Union. This book, one in a collective series on mass dictatorship in the twentieth century, is edited by both the General Series editor, Jie-Hyun Lim, professor of Comparative History at Hanyang University in Seoul, South Korea, and Karen Petrone, Professor of History at the University of Kentucky. Its focus is on gender and mass dictatorship. Petrone and Lim do a careful job of contextualizing this book on gender within the larger project on mass dictatorship.

The volume begins with a series introduction, which describes how the project challenges a variety of central assumptions about the workings of mass political societies. These assumptions include conceptual dichotomies, such as: "tragic victimhood" versus "heroic resistance"; or coercion versus consent; tropes that have become truisms within scholarship on the twentieth century. A Vaclav Havel quotation is used in order to emphasize how comparison can illuminate subtleties. "The line did not run clearly between victimizer and victims. Rather it ran through the individual" (p. 1). This observation reflects the goal of the series as a whole, as well as this volume on gender. The authors wish to challenge long held assumptions about how individuals navigated their way through the challenges of twentieth century modern mass political regimes. Moreover, the studies in this collection highlight how mass regimes were never "tightly sutured machine(s)", and that, indeed, there was always space for individual agency as a means of navigating the system (p. 14).

In organizational terms, the book has four parts and an overall series introduction. The first section is the most overtly theoretically informed, conceptually minded and comparative in approach. In the first essay, the two editors, Lim and Petrone, introduce gender as the main frame of analysis and focus of this impressively transnational volume. By using the lens of gender, the editors highlight scholars' ability to challenge long accepted categories, including the meaning and functioning of mass dictatorships and the role of individuals and groups in creating and sustaining these political regimes. While there is no space to comment on each individual chapter, I will only pause on a few overall. After the editors' contribution, there are two conceptual and comparative essays by Barbara Einhorn and Claudia Koonz. Einhorn presents a comparison of fascism and

socialism in regards to gender policies and ideals. Einhorn writes that even though in theory in Germany there was an exclusive gender ideology which insisted on women's role in "children, kitchen and church" and in the socialist societies of Eastern Europe, there was a system of equality set up, in each case, in fact, there was no consistent practice of gender equality. (p. 34-36) This theme of the interplay between ideas and realities repeatedly emerges throughout the individual chapters in this excellent collection.

The next three sections are organized around twentieth-century European and Asian periodizaton schemes: interwar era; age of empire/colonialism and the time of post-colonialism. The first of these sections offers the readers a truly comparative look at European examples of the era of mass society. Together these essays on Soviet Russia, Britain, and Germany illustrate quite clearly the degree to which mass politics and mass society blurred the lines of democracy and dictatorship. Sangsoo Kim, in one of the few chapters on a democratic society, describes how the government attempted to maintain and control the empire through a gendered ideology, in this case, masculinity. This notion of gender discourse as regime control inspires the conclusion that there are "subtle linkage" between democracy and dictatorship (p. 86-87). In this section we also learn about the fascist movement in Britain in these years, and the attempts of the Soviet state to remake gender ideas. In her contribution, Petrone takes on the long debated question of the degree to which women, and women's work, were transformed by the emancipatory promises of the Stalinist regime in the 1930s. Her consideration to these questions reflects her nuanced approach to sources and debates. Ultimately, we learn that individuals interacted with official ideologies in a variety of ways and that there is no single result. Exploitation and empowerment were not dichotomous and could coexist within individuals and within group experiences. The final contribution to this section is by Alf Lüdke, who traces the narrative of visual representations of male bodies in Germany over much of the twentieth century, with an emphasis on the Nazi and the Communist eras. What is most fascinating about this account is how Lüdke fluidly moves between representations of ideal masculine types and the realities of social and economic, and political life. This chapter, I would venture, serves as a model of methodological grace, as the author moves between visual approaches and social and political ones.

The third and forth sections take on the hierarchies and relationships so integral to the processes of the creation of gendered narratives within the interaction between colonial centers and peripheries, both during and after colonization. These sections focus more substantively on countries and relationships between centers and peripheries in Asia, most notably Japan and Korea. The authors deploy a wide variety of sources in their attempt to understand how gender operates within Japanese and Korean societies. Kyu Hyan Kim, for example, uses magazines and publications that extol the reconfiguration of the Korean family to explore whether, in fact, women were marginalized or coopted by the Japanese colonists. This creative use of sources leads to the conclusion that modern Japanese women supplied the discourse on family to Korean women in the early twentieth cen-

tury, and in turn, Korean society emulated these norms. The New Korean Woman was constructed, in part, by male intellectuals; but ultimately, as a result of Japan's extreme focus on processes of modernization and industrialization, the Japanese colonial regime preferred the modern woman to the traditional one. Similar interpretations appear in the remaining chapters of this section. Within colonial history, these authors collectively show us, the notion of a binary between victim and perpetrator does not work. The final section on the postcolonial world takes on three new countries, including China, South Korea and Poland. In the only stand alone article on communist eastern Europe, Malgorzata Mazurek, in her contribution on Poland in the 1970s-1980s, looks to the dynamic between the state and citizens to understand changing gender expectations and experiences. She argues that during the Lodz strikes, the Polish socialist state extended its social welfare net unevenly and women were striking for their state benefits (rather than for the availability of more consumer goods, as is commonly argued). The author describes how women strikers might have been boxed in by male workers in traditional roles (bring your children to strike), but women themselves embraced both identities and saw them as intertwined. This chapter, like so many in the collection, reframe the historical narrative and ultimately ascribe additional agency to women.

This comprehensive volume offers much to scholars and students alike. Each individual essay could stand alone or could be taught in tandem as they appear. While it is impossible to do justice to each individual chapter in the space of this review, let me emphasize the rich research and creative argumentation on display in this volume. The only substantive suggestion I am inclined to offer revolves around the nature of the comparative or transnational scholarly engagement in the volume as a whole. While I commend the editors for creating a forum for cross-regional discussions, the project might have benefited from more examples – if such exist – of direct comparisons between the Asian and European experiences of mass dictatorships. Are there, for example, parallels between the gendered nature of militarized culture in Japan, Germany and the Soviet Union? No doubt the differences can teach us much about each case, just as the similarities might allow us to reach a broad consensus that could lead us away from old dichotomies. Such comparative frames might also have allowed more detailed and nuanced discussion of how gender operates within mass dictatorial societies across time and space. Where, for instance, do democracy and dictatorship meet? Yet despite these suggestions, one volume can only do so much, and Lim and Petrone have accomplished a lot. They provide for their readers a coherent and creative scholarly enterprise that gets us one step closer to understanding how gender relationships and ideologies, both masculinity and femininity, transform – and are transformative – within twentieth century dictatorships.

Toyin Falola / Saheed Aderinto: Nigeria, Nationalism, and Writing History, Rochester: University of Rochester Press, 2010, 333 S.

Rezensiert von
Axel Harneit-Sievers, Delhi

Unter den Ländern im subsaharischen Afrika besitzt Nigeria eine der markantesten Traditionen universitärer Geschichtsschreibung. Sie begann in den 1950er Jahren, in der Dekade des Aufbruchs vor Erreichen der Unabhängigkeit. Damals entstanden mit dem Nationalarchiv und der Abteilung für Geschichte an der Universität Ibadan zwei Basis-Institutionen, die die weitere Entwicklung der Disziplin in Nigeria entscheidend beförderten. In den beiden folgenden Jahrzehnten wurde die „Ibadan School of History" zum Angelpunkt einer – wie sie oft genannt wurde – „nationalistischen Geschichtsschreibung" in Nigeria. Sie hat einen wichtigen Beitrag dazu geleistet, die Geschichte Afrikas als anerkannte Subdisziplin innerhalb der weltweiten (vor allem anglophonen) Geschichtswissenschaft zu etablieren. Durch Zugriff auf vorkoloniale Quellen und methodologische Innovationen wie die Integration von mündlicher Geschichte und schriftlichen Quellen zeigte sie, dass es möglich war, eine afrikanische Geschichte zu schreiben, die wesentlich mehr war als eine „Geschichte der europäischen Einflusses in Afrika". J. F. Ade Ajayi, einer der hervorragendsten Vertreter dieser Schule, bezeichnete die Kolonialzeit gar als „Episode" unter vielen in der Geschichte des Kontinents.

In ihrem umfangreichen Überblick zur Geschichte der akademischen Geschichtsschreibung in Nigeria geben die beiden aus Nigeria stammenden und in den USA arbeitenden Historiker Toyin Falola und Saheed Aderinto dieser heroischen Epoche der nationalistischen Geschichtsschreibung einen angemessen breiten Raum. Im Zentrum des Buchs stehen acht Kapitel, die jeweils einem der bekanntesten Vertreter aus dieser Epoche der akademischen Geschichtsschreibung Nigerias gewidmet sind; unter ihnen ist nur eine Vertreter*in* des Fachs, nämlich Bolanle Awe, eine der Begründerinnen historischer Genderforschung in Afrika. Jedes dieser acht Kapitel unternimmt eine ausführliche Werkschau im Stil eines ausführlichen Literaturberichts – ein adäquater Ansatz, hat sich doch jede(r) der hier Dargestellten in markanter Weise einen Namen gemacht, von Adiele Afigbo, der am Beispiel der Igbo die Möglichkeiten und Grenzen einer Historiographie staatenloser Gesellschaften in Afrika auslotete, bis hin zu Yusufu Bala Usman, der eine marxistische historiographische Tradition begründete, die ihre Basis bemerkenswerterweise vor allem im islamisch geprägten Nord-Nigeria (speziell an der Abteilung für Geschichte der Universität Zaria) hatte.

Allerdings kommt der politische und gesellschaftliche Kontext, in dem diese Historiker arbeiteten, insgesamt recht kurz, jedenfalls für Leserinnen und Leser, die mit der Geschichte Nigerias nicht vertraut sind. Dies überrascht insofern, als eine ganze Reihe von Fragestellungen, mit denen sich die nigerianische Historiographie befasste, mit Mitteln der avancierten histo-

rischen Analyse durchaus zeitgenössische Erfahrungen Nigerias reflektierte, etwa die destruktive Kraft ethnisch-regionaler Gegensätze, die in den Bürgerkrieg/„Biafra-Krieg" 1967–1670 mündete, den Mangel an nationalem Bewusstsein und nationaler Integration, dem einige Historiker explizit entgegenzuarbeiten suchten, und die seit den 1970er Jahren immer deutlicher werdenden Defizite postkolonialer Staatlichkeit in Nigeria.

Ein hoher Konzentrationsgrad ist augenfällig: Alle der hier dargestellten Historiker haben sich schwerpunktmäßig mit der Geschichte Nigeria selbst befasst, auch wenn sie die Geschichtsschreibung in anderen Teilen Afrikas beeinflusst haben und J. F. Ade Ajayi etwa durch die gemeinsam mit Michael Crowder herausgegebene „History of West Africa" (2 Bde., 1971, 1974) einen großen überregionalen Einfluss ausgeübt hat. Aber auch innerhalb Nigerias ist Konzentration unübersehbar: Vier der acht behandelten Persönlichkeiten stammten aus dem Yoruba-sprachigen Südwesten des Landes und hatten ihre wesentliche Arbeitsschwerpunkte in dieser Region.

Nach den Ölbooms von 1972–1973 und 1979–1980 geriet Nigeria Mitte der 1980er Jahre in eine schwere Wirtschaftskrise und verfolgte eine Strukturanpassungspolitik, die die Universitätslandschaft des Landes schwer beschädigte und viele der besten Köpfe des Landes (darunter auch die Autoren des hier rezensierten Bandes) dazu brachte, ihre Karriere im Ausland zu machen. Dabei waren nigerianische Historiker insbesondere an den wachsenden Abteilungen für Afrika- und afroamerikanische Studien an US-Universitäten ausgesprochen erfolgreich. Auch und gerade jenseits der Hoch-Zeit nationalistischer Geschichtsschreibung hat der vorliegende Band vieles zu bieten und gibt einen ausgezeichneten Überblick über die Bandbreite der Geschichtsschreibung in und zu Nigeria. Allerdings verfolgen die Autoren hier angemessenerweise statt eines personenbezogenen einen thematischen Ansatz: Ein einleitendes Kapitel zieht lange Linien – und beschreibt die Kontraste – zwischen traditionellen Formen von Geschichtserzählungen und der universitären Geschichtsschreibung. Vier Kapitel zur politischen, Wirtschafts-, Sozial- und Frauengeschichtsschreibung sind in ihrer Substanz ausführliche Literaturberichte zu den wichtigsten Strömungen und Debatten in der Geschichtsschreibung Nigerias, die auch in den Jahren der Krise lebhaft geblieben ist. Zwei abschließende Kapitel zu den Institutionen und Schulen der nigerianischen Geschichtsschreibung und zu neueren Trends einer „ethnisch fragmentierten" und teilweise auch islamistisch beeinflussten Geschichtsschreibung in Nigeria selbst runden das Buch ab. In diesen thematischen Kapiteln kommen auch die an verschiedenen Punkten (z. B. bei Themen wie Sklaverei oder in der Wirtschaftsgeschichte) wegweisenden Beiträge zahlreicher Historikerinnen und Historiker zur Geltung, die selbst nicht aus Nigeria stammen.

In den thematisch organisierten Kapiteln zeigt sich, dass die Historiographie Nigerias in vielfacher Weise von Fragestellungen, Debatten und Trends der weiteren Geschichtsschreibung (als Disziplin, zu Afrika und darüber hinaus) beeinflusst ist, und dass sie diese auch weiterhin beeinflusst, wenn heute wohl auch weniger stark als dies in der heroischen Phase der nationalistischen Historiographie der Fall

war. Zugleich ist aber auch deutlich, dass nigerianische Historikerinnen und Historiker ihrem eigenen Land (bzw. dem Land ihrer Herkunft, soweit es die akademische Diaspora betrifft) weiterhin eine enorme Aufmerksamkeit widmen, und dass die Geschichtsschreibung Nigerias in vielerlei Hinsicht ihren eigenen, durch nationale Fragestellungen und Debatten bestimmten Richtungen folgt. Angesichts der Größe des Landes und des (bei aller Weltoffenheit und internationalen Vernetztheit) hohen Grades an Konzentration auf sich selbst ist dies letztlich wenig überraschend. Nigeria diskutiert sich kontinuierlich selbst – seine Realität, seine Hoffnungen und seine Defizite. Es tut dies mit großer Intensität. Debatten über und Referenzen auf die nigerianische Geschichte sind ein integraler Bestandteil dieses Diskurses, der sich nicht nur in der Fachliteratur, sondern fast täglich in den Kommentarspalten der Tageszeitungen finden.

Insgesamt bietet der Band von Falola und Aderinto eine exzellente Einführung in die Geschichtsschreibung Nigerias. Die Auswahl der „Hauptdarsteller" (dies umfasst Personen ebenso wie Debatten) ist angemessen, und die Autoren behandelten sie fair und mit Respekt. Für nicht mit Nigeria vertraute Leserinnen und Leser stellt das Buch ein Standard- und Referenzwerk dar, doch auch für diejenigen, die die nigerianischen Debatten besser kennen oder gar ein Teil von ihnen sind, bleibt der Band aufgrund der Diversität der hier behandelten Themen eine wahre Fundgrube.

Christopher J. Lee (Hrsg.): Making a World after Empire. The Bandung Moment and Its Political Afterlives, Athens: Ohio University Press, 2010, 280 S.

Reviewed by
Tan See Seng, Singapore

This collection of essays on the 1955 Asian-African Conference (a.k.a. Bandung Conference) and its legacy is an ambitious project aimed at assessing the historical, political and cultural significance of the Bandung Conference in shaping global history in the latter part of the 20th century. Against the conventional discourses on decolonization, postcolonialism, and international relations – and, crucially, the disjunctures between them – the contributors interrogate the effectiveness of the Bandung Conference as an exercise in imagining new ways of socio-political thinking, doing, and being beyond the hegemonic subjectivity of the nation-state and the world of inter-*nation*-al relations that have hitherto enthralled global life. Not least of all, they look at how the Bandung Conference furnished ideas and visions on "new forms of 'political community' beyond the nation-state" (p. 4), in the words of Christopher J. Lee, the editor of the anthology. Chronologically bookended at the mid-point of the 20th century by the end of modern European imperialism and the start of the Cold War, Bandung, fairly or otherwise, has been linked to a host of

developments, real or imagined – as a symbol of Third Word solidarity, as incontrovertible evidence of the Third World as agent rather than adjunct, as unequivocal rejection of cultural, economic and political subalternism vis-à-vis the First and Second Worlds, and the like – all summed up by the notion of the "Bandung Spirit," so-called.

The anthology has three parts. The first part (comprising essays by Dipesh Chakrabarty, Michael Aidas, and Julian Go) introduces the conceptual tools – anticolonialism, postcolonialism, globalization – that inform the volume's reflections as well as the historical, cultural, intellectual, political, and strategic contexts within which the Bandung Conference arose. The second (with essays by Laura Bier, James R. Brennan, G. Thomas Burgess, Jamie Monson, and Lee himself) is a compilation of empirical investigations on the "multiple afterlives of the Bandung moment" (p. 30): various national and regional – and, in Lee's biographical piece, even interpersonal – movements and developments that took their inspiration, directly or indirectly, from Bandung. The third part (comprising essays by Denis M. Tull and Jeremy Prestholdt) returns the audience to "the present," assessing contemporary issues such as China's growing engagement with Africa and the symbolic value of Osama bin Laden on Afro-Asian political ideologies. Finally, Antoinette Burton closes the anthology with an appeal to rescue Bandung from anonymity and to revive critical inquiry "about how – and whether – our collective lives have been conscripted by the species of postcolonial history [Bandung] apparently set in motion" (p. 359).

The book is a welcome addition to the literature on the Bandung Conference. Ironically, to the extent Bandung at all facilitated prospects for thinking, doing, and being political community beyond the nation-state, a key legacy of Bandung has arguably been the expansion and consolidation – the normalization, if you will – of the nation-state as the principal form of political subjectivity. Indeed, against the recent efforts by some scholars to promote Bandung as a kind of normative precursor to contemporary institutional expressions in solidarity / sodality in Southeast Asia or, more broadly, the Asia Pacific, Bandung has also been seen as a rival to the idea of region and / or regionalism, not least because of the detrimental impact the newly reconfigured, postcolonial nation-states had on older regionalisms of the colonial era, and / or the exclusion of Malaya from the Bandung Conference. For sure, Bandung proffered us all a cursory glimpse of what a trans-regional community of nation-states – *Afro-Asian* – might conceivably look like, except it did not last long enough to translate such a vision, if indeed one existed, into reality.

Mabel Moraña / Bret Gustafson (Hrsg.): Rethinking Intellectuals in Latin America, Madrid: Iberoamericana-Vervuert, 2010, 388 S.

Reviewed by
Janet Burke, Tempe

Latin American literature and cultural studies have a fairly well established history among English speaking peoples, but its vibrant public philosophers remain relatively unknown. Many of them have never even been translated into English. This collection of essays starts to fill a hole in that regard. As is typical in collections of essays, the various parts of this volume go off in a multitude of directions and lack the strong thematic foundation of a monograph, but the editors have done an excellent job of assembling the ideas into a coherent whole. The result is a complex but quite extensive look at the various ideas and actions of intellectuals on the periphery at a time when that periphery is starting to move toward center stage. Many of the essays offer new ways of thinking about traditional subjects, and many venture into totally new areas of consideration. The various threads of thought offer the reader a rather exciting collection of novel ideas and thought provoking approaches to those ideas and, certainly, an appreciation of the challenges Latin American intellectuals face as they attempt to navigate their way through the intricacies of a world in flux. This collection brings together the ideas and insight of scholars from a variety of disciplines, including literature, history, anthropology and sociology, on the timely subject of the rapidly changing world of the intellectual in Latin America. The essays grew out of the "South by Midwest"-Conference (November 2008) on "the role of intellectuals and the definition of intellectual practices in peripheral societies" (p. 10). The volume's diversity of writers, writing styles and viewpoints is an appropriate reflection of the pluralism that engaged intellectuals currently face; it is a world in motion, a transformation of knowledge production and politics in Latin America, which the writers indicate they wish to document and encourage.

In his summative essay, "Pluralism, Articulation, Containment," Bret Gustafson writes that "these shifts represent possibilities, ruptures, and interventions that create space for rethinking and addressing the region's ongoing paradoxes – a history of monocultural nationalism in a region of vast plurality, vast wealth and intense gaps of inequality, democracy and racial and social exclusion, environmental degradation and an embrace of natural resource extraction and export, and zones of relative stability alongside regions of bloody war, violence, and criminality" (p. 355). Indeed the concept of pluralism is at the heart of the volume, and the tension described by many of the writers arises as this pluralism runs up against conservative elements of society that would contain it. In this unstable and quickly evolving world, the intellectual has a critical role to play: He or she is no longer the traditional member of the lettered elite or the revolutionary leader, but rather is now in think tanks, part of the media, an activist for various causes. Today's Latin American intellectual

must "negotiate multiple scales and forms of intellectual activity and consider how these intersect with multiple modalities of analysis and representation" (p. 358). Besides thinking across national boundaries, different localities and traditional social and ideological orders, the contemporary intellectual must operate in a world that contains new forms of social and political agency and the heavy influence of technology.

Although grounded in the fluctuating world the Latin American intellectual of today must navigate, the volume explores a multitude of directions, Including the role of literature; the importance of sacred beliefs and indigenous practices in this intellectual world and the concomitant need for the indigenous to participate in exploring their own knowledges; and the role of language, specifically English as the dominant global language because of its grounding in the sciences, and Spanish as an umbrella for a new Pan-Hispanism, built upon an intriguing mix of the discrediting of area studies, the growth of Spanish capitalism and transnational corporations, and Spain's new international status.

Two essays glance back at the roots of the intellectual on the periphery to some of the earliest intellectual outliers: the Inca Garcilaso de la Vega and Blas Valera, whom José Antonio Mazzotti sees as the "colonial antecedents to elements of contemporary discourse on indigenous rights" (p. 29); and Jacinto Ventura de Molino, a black intellectual in 1820s and 1830s Montevideo who engaged with the public through his advocacy writing and law practice on behalf of black people. Looking at the challenge to contemporary intellectuals as they seek to navigate national cultures, Jan Hoffman French examines the role of anthropologists as collaborators with and advocates for descendants of fugitive slaves in Brazil and other black people who live in quilombo, their traditional settlements, and seek government recognition and property rights.

Concentrating on Ecuador and Bolivia, Catherine Walsh looks at the social-political-ancestral movements of Indian and African descendent peoples, which she sees as "leading and orienting the most significant intellectual projects" (p. 200). These projects move away from the lens of Europe and the United States, she writes, and the two countries' recently adopted constitutions create a new way of thinking about the State.

Walter Mignolo analyzes indigenous practices within the framework of pluriversality, as opposed to universality. Despite a tendency of many to see Evo Morales's rise to the presidency of Bolivia as indicating the merging of indigenous decolonialism and the Latin American Left, in this pluriversality, there is no Right or Left; Indian decolonialism is not the equivalent of the Latin American new Left. From the Indian perspective, Marxism and capitalism are both part of Occidentalism, and the Indian revolution opposes both. Instead, decolonialism "focuses on racism that justified exploitation of labor outside of Europe and now inside of Europe because of immigration." (254). The Aymara intellectual Félix Patzi Paco proposes that a communal system replace the liberal system, which would entail reconstituting the traditional indigenous *ayllusand markas*; this reconstitution defines what Mignolo's plurinational state would be like: "The

idea is coming from the simple existence and memories of millions of Indians who are not convinced that they can live the existence and memories of millions of Europeans and their descendants in the Andes, whether these come from the Left or from the Right" (p. 255).

George Yüdice looks at technology as the ultimate transnational flow, the way the public sphere moves into the area where the private sphere used to predominate and takes it to the international level. Intellectuals have a major role to play in this world. As Yüdice argues, "Transcultural intellectual work does much of the translation necessary to render the communicative power of public spheres into law or administrative power" (p. 309). Examples from El Salvador and Brazil illustrate the complexities involved.

Although the volume covers a broad spectrum of ideas and both poses and answers many questions, it also points the way for future research; each contributor offers extensive bibliographies that might serve as a starting point. As editor Mabel Morańa writes, "Without a doubt, due to the changing nature of our cultures and the deep changes we are witnessing both at social and political levels in Latin America, all the answers that we seem to find to our questions today are necessarily provisional and subject to reconsideration. This book is intended as a modest but passionate contribution to this process of recognition and understanding (p. 23)."

Jürgen Kocka / Günter Stick (Hrsg.), Stiften, Schenken, Prägen. Zivilgesellschaftliche Wissenschaftsförderung im Wandel, Frankfurt am Main: Campus Verlag, 2011, 206 S.

Rezensiert von
Thomas Adam, Arlington

Der hier zu besprechende Band bietet Einblicke in die gegenwärtigen und wohl auch zukünftigen Diskussionen um die Rolle von Stiftungen in der Förderung der wissenschaftlichen Lehre und Forschung an deutschen Universitäten. Die in dem Band versammelten Autoren nähern sich diesem Thema von fachlich verschiedenen Ausgangspunkten sowie unterschiedlichen Interpretationen und Grundüberzeugungen an. So ist Gesine Schwan davon überzeugt, dass nur eine staatliche Wissenschaftsförderung nicht willkürlich sein kann, während private Wissenschaftsförderung nicht demokratisch kontrolliert sei und daher Stiftungen willkürlich handeln könnten. Dem hält Jürgen Kokka in seinem Schlusswort entgegen, dass auch staatliche Wissenschaftsförderung intransparent und „meist nur in sehr vermittelter Form demokratisch legitimiert" sei. Insgesamt widerspiegeln diese gegensätzlichen Ansichten die Grundlinien der Diskussionen unter Akademikern und Politikern und das oftmals generelle Unwohlsein gegenüber privater Anteilnahme an der Finanzierung öffentlicher Projekte in Deutschland. Hier wird allerdings auch ein begriffliches Grundproblem deutlich: Handelt es sich bei Stiftern um Akteure

der Zivilgesellschaft, und wie verstehen wir Zivilgesellschaft? Verschiedene Autoren des Bandes stimmen darin überein, dass Stiftungen nicht demokratisch verfasst sind und dass ihre Aktivitäten demokratischer Kontrolle entzogen seien. Stifter wollen, wie Frank Adloff auch klarstellt, mit ihrer Stiftung etwas bewegen und Gesellschaft verändern. Diese Veränderungen werden durch den Stifter bestimmt und können durchaus zum Konflikt mit dem Staat führen. Stiften erfolgt also immer in Konkurrenz zu staatlichem und individuellem Handeln.

Auch wenn vor allem die Autoren, die mit einem Gegenwartsbezug geschrieben haben, sich darüber einig sind, dass die staatlichen Zuschüsse zur Wissenschaftsförderung in den kommenden Jahren weiter zurückgehen werden, ergibt sich daraus die spannende Frage, wie diese Verschiebungen der Finanzierung von Universitäten ausgeglichen werden könnten. In Systemen der „mixed economy" erhalten Universitäten Finanzmittel aus drei verschiedenen Einkommensquellen: (1) Staat; (2) Studenten (Studiengebühren); (3) Stifter (Endowments). Mit der verfehlten Einführung von Studiengebühren in verschiedenen deutschen Bundesländern haben sich die Politik und die staatlichen Universitäten einer wichtigen Einnahmequelle, über die der Wegfall staatlicher Zuschüsse hätte kompensiert werden können, beraubt. Eines der Desiderate dieses Bandes ist die Ausblendung der lebhaften Diskussionen um die Einführung von Studiengebühren an deutschen Universitäten im 21. Jahrhundert.

Die Beiträge von Volker Meyer-Guckel und Kai Brauer zu den Stiftungsprofessuren an deutschen Universitäten enthalten für den Historiker manche überraschende Erkenntnis. Beide Autoren prüfen die Verteilung der Stiftungsprofessuren in Abhängigkeit von verschiedenen Faktoren wie z. B. der Wirtschaftskraft der jeweiligen Region, in der sich die Universität befindet, oder der durchschnittlichen Einkommenshöhe der Wohnbevölkerung in diesen Regionen. Brauer kommt zu dem Schluss, dass die private Wissenschaftsförderung nicht lokal gebunden sei, sondern „dass die Förderung von Stiftungsprofessuren in den weniger wirtschaftsstarken Bundesländern durch Unternehmen und Stiftungen generiert werden, die nicht in den Grenzen von ‚Heimat-Bundesländern' agieren, sondern weit darüber hinaus" (S. 170). Dieser Befund steht in fundamentalem Gegensatz zur Wissenschaftsförderung in historischer Perspektive. Die von verschiedenen Autoren beschworene „goldene Zeit" des Stiftens im Deutschen Kaiserreich war vor allem durch eine lokal verortete und auf kleine bürgerliche und urbane Gemeinschaften beschränkte Stiftungskultur charakterisiert. Selbst Projekte wie die Kaiser-Wilhelm-Gesellschaft, die ihrem Anspruch nach durch eine nationale Stiftergemeinschaft getragen werden sollten, waren, wenn man sich die Mitgliedschaft genauer ansieht, eher lokale Projekte, die selbst innerhalb Preußens nur auf beschränkte Unterstützung außerhalb von Berlin und der Rhein-Provinz hoffen konnten.

Die von Meyer-Guckel und Brauer vorgelegten Befunde stehen in diesem Band jedoch weitgehend isoliert da, weil auf eine historische Einbettung des Phänomens der Stiftungsprofessur leider verzichtet wurde. Die Aussage, dass es heute Stiftungsprofessuren im eigentlichen Sinne – also eine

Professur, die dauernd aus Stiftungsmitteln finanziert wird – kaum gibt, verweist auf Brüche in der Stiftungskultur in der ersten Hälfte des 20. Jahrhunderts, die von Historikern noch aufzuarbeiten sind. Auch der Verzicht auf den Vergleich zur amerikanischen Situation, der in verschiedenen Beiträgen durchscheint, aber nicht systematisch vorangetrieben wird, führt an einigen Stellen zu stereotypen, aber wenig fundierten Aussagen. Auch wenn, wie Stephan Jansen in seinem Beitrag herausstellt, die Endowments der amerikanischen Universitäten sich vor allem in den letzten 25 Jahren gewaltig vermehrt hätten, verlangt dies nach einer Kontextualiserung und vor allem nach einer kritischen Betrachtungsweise auf die mehr als fragwürdigen Investitionspraktiken der Endowment Managers, die auch für die enormen finanziellen Verluste dieser Endowments in den letzten fünf Jahren verantwortlich sind. Bereits am Ende des Zweiten Weltkrieges verfügten die reichsten 29 Universitäten der USA über ein Gesamt-Endowment-Kapital von mehr als 1,5 Milliarden Dollar. Dies entsprach etwa 60 Prozent aller von Universitäten akkumulierten Stiftungskapitalien. Damit hatten schon in der Mitte des 20. Jahrhunderts amerikanische Universitäten gewaltige Finanzreserven angehäuft, deren Anlage in privaten und staatlichen Wertpapieren den Bereich der höheren Bildung zu einem wichtigen Wirtschaftsfaktor werden ließ. Als Anfang der 1970er Jahre dann die Regulierung der Investitionspraktiken der Endowments aufgegeben wurde, begann eine fatale Investitionspraxis, vor allem ab den 1990er Jahren, in denen erhebliche Finanzmittel der reichsten Universitäten in äußerst riskante Aktien zu überhöhten Renditen angelegt wurden, was in der Finanzkrise zu einer erheblichen Entwertung dieser Endowments führte. Die Harvard Universität, um nur einen Fall zu nennen, verlor mehr als acht Milliarden Dollar ihres Endowments. Insofern wäre es zu wünschen, wenn sich Forscher nicht nur für die Einwerbung von Stiftungsgeldern durch die Universitäten interessieren würden, sondern auch für die Verwaltung und die Anlagepraktiken der Stiftungskapitalien, die nicht nur das finanzielle Wohlergehen der Universität garantieren sollen, sondern auch eine andauernde positive Beziehung zwischen Stiftern und Universität.

Stiften ist, wie Frank Adloff herausstellt, das Resultat selbstbestimmten Handelns einer Person, die unter Einsatz ihrer finanziellen Möglichkeiten ein Stück Gesellschaft formen und gestalten möchte. Es ist aber auch, wie Francie Ostrower in ihrer Studie „Why the Wealthy Give?" (1995) gezeigt hat, eine Tradition, die erlernt und erworben werden muss. Stiften galt und gilt in bürgerlichen Familien als eine Verantwortung, die von Generation zu Generation weitergegeben werden kann. Steuererleichterungen und rechtliche Rahmenbedingungen werden die Entscheidung einer Person, zu stiften, leichter machen, aber wohl kaum erzeugen. Insofern mag es wichtig sein, dass der Staat ein stiftungsfreundliches Klima gestaltet. Inwiefern Personen sich dann zur Gründung von Stiftungen animieren lassen, ist wohl kaum durch staatliches oder gesellschaftliches Handeln beeinflussbar.

Akira Iriye / Pierre-Yves Saunier (Hrsg.): The Palgrave Dictionary of Transnational History, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009, 1272 S.

Rezensiert von
Torsten Loschke, Leipzig

Das Erscheinen eines Lexikons deutet im Allgemeinen darauf hin, dass ein wissenschaftliches Fachgebiet einen gewissen Reifegrad erreicht hat und eine Zusammenfassung des darin angesammelten Wissens nicht nur sinnvoll erscheint, sondern überhaupt erst möglich geworden ist. Das vorliegende Nachschlagewerk zeigt tatsächlich auf beeindruckende Weise, welche rasante Entwicklung Forschungen zu globaler und transnationaler Geschichte in den letzten Jahren genommen haben. Allerdings handelt es sich hier weniger um die Zusammenstellung gesicherter Wissensbestände, als vielmehr um eine Art „work in progress", eine erste Bestandsaufnahme in einem lebhaften Forschungsfeld. Dies macht das „Dictionary" nicht zu einer langweiligen Pflichtanschaffung für das Bücherregal, sondern zu einer spannenden und anregenden Lektüre.

Die Herausgeber Akira Iriye und Pierre-Yves Saunier verstehen das „Dictionary" als einen ersten, vorläufigen Schritt, um einerseits das wachsende Forschungsinteresse an "circulations and connections between, above and beyond national polities and societies, from the 19th century to current times" (xvii f.) aufzugreifen, und andererseits das Fehlen adäquater Nachschlagewerke zu derartigen historischen Prozessen zu beheben. In ihrer Konzeption des Bandes ließen sie sich von einigen klugen Grundsätzen leiten: Erstens folgt das Lexikon glücklicherweise keiner strengen Definition von transnationaler Geschichte, sondern will an all jene Ansätze – von der *international history* über die *global history* bis zur *histoire croisée* – anknüpfen, die ein ähnliches Interesse an transnationalen oder transkulturellen Prozessen teilen. Zweitens zeichnet das Lexikon das ernsthafte Bestreben aus, transnationale Geschichte zugleich in einer transnationalen Praxis entstehen zu lassen. Tatsächlich kommen die über 350 Autoren des Bandes aus immerhin 25 Ländern, auch wenn – dies ist den Herausgebern bewusst – die Mehrzahl von ihnen aus dem angloamerikanischen Raum stammt. Drittens unternimmt das „Dictionary" nicht den Versuch, durch Vollständigkeit zu glänzen, was angesichts des fließenden Charakters des Forschungsfeldes ohnehin ein vergebliches Unterfangen wäre. Stattdessen schlagen die rund 400 Einträge eine erste Schneise in das Feld der transnationalen und globalen Geschichte, zeigen dabei aber die bereits erreichte Bandbreite der bisherigen Forschung auf.

Die einzelnen Einträge des Lexikons gewannen die Herausgeber durch die Definition größerer und ziemlich vager Themenkomplexer (z. B. *people flows*, *production and trade*, *body and soul*), die dann assoziativ in eine Reihe spezieller Themen und Begriffe ausdifferenziert wurden. Bei diesem Verfahren folgten Iriye und Saunier keinen strengen Rationalitätskriterien, um dem experimentellen Charakter des „Dictionary" gerecht werden. Allerdings ist die Auswahl der Begriffe für den Leser nicht

wirklich nachvollziehbar, auch wenn die thematischen Gruppen und die dazugehörigen, vielgliedrigen Baumdiagramme am Beginn des Bandes abgebildet sind. Ein Beispiel: Die Gruppe „Planet Earth" spaltet sich auf in drei Untergruppen (*environment*, *resources* und *infrastructures*), von denen jeweils weitere Verzweigungen mit zahlreichen Schlagworten abgehen. Etwa von *environment* die Schlagworte *climate change, biodiversity, zero growth, germs, outer space* und *environmentalism*. Zugleich gilt es zu beachten, dass sich vielfach kein Eintrag zu einem allgemeinen Obergriff (z. B. *automobile*) findet, sondern stattdessen zu mehreren spezifischen Ausprägungen (*assembly line, car culture, car safety standards* u. a.). Dieses Prinzip macht die Lektüre des Lexikons zunächst verwirrend, mitunter auch unbefriedigend. So werden Leser, die ein bestimmtes Schlagwort suchen, durch die selektive Auswahl der Einträge möglicherweise enttäuscht. Es stellt sich beispielsweise die Frage, warum es Einträge zu Africa, Asia und America – letzterer zwar ein guter Artikel, der jedoch ausschließlich und unkommentiert die USA behandelt – aber nicht zu Latin America oder Europe gibt? Um solche Lücken zu schließen, wird auch das ausführliche Namens- und Sachregister nur eine begrenzte Hilfe sein. Wer hingegen offen für Anregungen ist, dem dürften gerade die kreativen Querverweise mancherlei Anknüpfungspunkte zu verwandten Themen bieten. Zum Schlagwort „liberalism" existieren beispielsweise Querverweise zu *anarchism, Asia, Cold War, empires and imperialism, human rights, knowledge, Maoism, Romanticism* oder *Zen aesthetics.* Wenn man sich auf dieses Strukturprinzip einlässt und manche Inkonsistenz in Kauf nimmt, kann sich das „Dictionary" daher nicht nur als praktisches, sondern auch überraschendes Nachschlagewerk zum Schmökern und Weiterdenken erweisen.

Gerade die Vielfalt der Schlagworte ist dabei hilfreich. Sie decken ein breites Themenspektrum von der Politikgeschichte über Wirtschafts- und Sozialgeschichte bis hin zur Umwelt- und Kulturgeschichte ab. Neben „klassischen" transnationalen Themen (z. B. *arms sales, diasporas, globalization, missionaries*) stößt der Leser auf Ungewohntes und zunächst absurd Erscheinendes, das jedoch beim Lesen vielfältige transnationale Bezüge offenbart (z. B. *bodybuilding, condom, cosmetic surgery, love, psychoanalysis, salsa, traffic signals, wildlife films* oder *yoga*). Auch wissenschaftsgeschichtliche Themen (*historians and the nation state, humanities* u. a.) werden behandelt.

Der Kerngedanke des „Dictionary" – die transnationale Dimension historischer Phänomene zu diskutieren – wird nicht in allen Einträgen zufrieden stellend verwirklicht, mitunter bleibt die transnationale Qualität eines Objekts undeutlich. Auf der anderen Seite neigen manche Artikel durch eine übertriebene Betonung der transnationalen Dimension bzw. ein Unterschlagen der lokalen oder nationalen Dimension dazu, ein schiefes Bild des behandelten Gegenstandes entstehen zu lassen (z. B. *architecture*). Zudem könnte das Verhältnis bzw. die Spannung zwischen dem Nationalen und Transnationalen in vielen Einträgen deutlicher herausgestellt werden. Auch in anderer Hinsicht variiert die Qualität der Beiträge. Es finden sich kleine Diamanten wie der Eintrag zu „beauty pageants", dem es auf wenigen Zeilen gelingt, den spannungsreichen Zu-

sammenhang von lokalen, nationalen und globalen Entwicklungen in der Geschichte von Schönheitswettbewerben klar strukturiert zu erläutern und gleichzeitig eine Balance zwischen theoretischer Erörterung und konkreten Beispielen zu finden. Andere Einträge hingegen, wie der benachbarte Artikel zu „beauty", erschweren die Lektüre durch ihren essayistischen und unsystematischen Stil. Damit einher geht oftmals eine unbefriedigende Einseitigkeit der Darstellung, die allerdings in vielen Fällen dem Umstand geschuldet sein dürfte, dass das zugehörige Themenfeld erst am Anfang seiner Erforschung steht.

Diese Einseitigkeit von Einträgen, die aus dem raschen Wandel des Forschungsstandes, aber auch dem jeweiligen Wissensstand der Verfasser resultiert, ist ein Grundproblem jedes Lexikons. Sie tritt allerdings im vorliegenden Nachschlagewerk besonders deutlich hervor. Denn trotz des Bemühens um eine transnationale Autorenschaft und trotz der Tatsache, dass es sich hier um eine englischsprachige Publikation handelt, erzeugen viele – nicht alle! – Einträge den Eindruck einer vermeintlichen oder tatsächlichen Vorherrschaft angloamerikanischer Forschung. Dies ist bis zu einem gewissen Grad nachvollziehbar, im Einzelfall aber auch bedauerlich. So basiert etwa der Eintrag zu „higher education" stark auf amerikanischer Literatur und fokussiert weitgehend auf Entwicklungen in den USA. Ähnlich verhält es sich mit dem Eintrag zu „history", in welchem der Autor sich zum einen auf die Diskussion von *Transnational History* beschränkt und beispielsweise *Global History* als etwas komplett anderes bewusst ausblendet, und zum andern die Genese des Forschungsfeldes nach 1945 im Wesentlichen auf eine US-amerikanische Geschichte verengt. Trotz dieser Einwände überwiegt insgesamt ein positiver Eindruck dieses monumentalen Pionierunternehmens. Zwar werden die Struktur und die Vielfalt des Bandes es jenen Lesern schwer machen, die mit der Thematik noch nicht vertraut sind und versuchen, sich einen systematischen Überblick zum Feld der transnationalen und globalen Geschichte zu verschaffen. Gleichzeitig aber dürften die thematische Breite und der explorative Charakter des „Dictionary" Nachwuchswissenschaftler wie auch gestandene Forscher dazu anregen, über die transnationale Qualität historischer Phänomene neu nachzudenken oder neue Forschungsfelder zu erschließen. Daher hat das „Dictionary" das Potenzial, sich in den kommenden Jahren nicht nur (und trotz des inakzeptabel hohen Preises) zu einem wichtigen Referenzwerk zu entwickeln, sondern auch als Motor in der weiteren Entfaltung einer Geschichtsschreibung in transnationaler Perspektive zu wirken.

Autorinnen und Autoren

Thomas Adam
Prof. Dr., The University of Texas at Arlington
E-Mail: adam@uta.edu

Janet Burke
Dr., Arizona State University
E-Mail: janet.burke@asu.edu

Blaine Chiasson
Associate Professor
Wilfrid Laurier University, History Department, Ontario, Canada
E-Mail: bchiasson@wlu.ca

Maxi Freund
M.A., Universität des Saarlandes
E-Mail: maxi.freund@googlemail.com

Rebecca Friedman
Ph.D., Florida International University, Miami
E-Mail: friedman@fiu.edu

Frank Grüner
Dr., Cluster of Excellence "Asia and Europe", Universität Heidelberg,
Karl Jaspers Centre for Advanced Transcultural Studies
E-Mail: gruener@asia-europe.uni-heidelberg.de

Axel Harneit-Sievers
Dr., Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung, Indien-Büro
E-Mail: axel.harneit-sievers@in.boell.org

Christian A. Hess
PhD, Assistant Professor of Modern Chinese History, Sophia University, Tokyo
E-Mail: cahess@sophia.ac.jp

Susanne Hohler
Cluster of Excellence "Asia and Europe", Universität Heidelberg,
Karl Jaspers Centre for Advanced Transcultural Studies
E-Mail: hohler@asia-europe.uni-heidelberg.de

Benjamin Isitt
PhD, University of Victoria, Victoria, British Columbia, Canada
E-Mail: isitt@uvic.ca

Arnulf Kutsch
Prof. Dr., Universität Leipzig
E-Mail: kutsch@uni-leipzig.de

Torsten Loschke
M.A., Universität Leipzig
E-Mail: loschke@uni-leipzig.de

Rudolph Ng
Cluster of Excellence "Asia and Europe", Universität Heidelberg,
Karl Jaspers Centre for Advanced Transcultural Studies
E-Mail: ng@asia-europe.uni-heidelberg.de

Adamantios Skordos
Dr., Universität Wien
E-Mail: adamantios.skordos@univie.ac.at

Michael Stauch
Ph.D. candidate, Department of History, Duke University
Email: michael.stauch@duke.edu

Eva-Maria Stolberg
PD Dr., Universität Duisburg-Essen
E-Mail: EvaMaria.Stolberg@t-online.de

Tan See Seng
Dr., Nanyang Technological University, Singapore
E-Mail: issstan@ntu.edu.sg

Sören Urbansky
Universität Freiburg, Historisches Seminar
E-Mail: soeren.urbansky@geschichte.uni-freiburg.de

Malte Zierenberg
Dr., Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin
E-Mail: malte.zierenberg@geschichte.hu-berlin.de