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Representations of Europe as a Political Resource in the Early and Late Twentieth Century

**Herausgegeben von
Hartmut Kaelble**



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Globalizing History and Historicizing Globalization.

In Memoriam of

Jerry H. Bentley (1949–2012)

“The globalization of history and the historicization of globalization are two unfinished intellectual projects. Indeed they are barely under way.”¹ It is almost 10 years ago that Jerry H. Bentley problematized this double neglect and underlined the sharp contrast between this long-standing ignorance on the one hand and an equally long-lasting claim of most historical scholarship on the other hand, namely to understand the world and its development through time. Instead of developing tools by which foreign societies and peoples with their connection to the own culture could be traced and explained, professional historians have only given the nation and the nation-state a solid history, flanked by a belief that the European experience is the cornerstone of everything that has happened up until now. The many other pasts, however, have been silenced in this view. The long shadow of the marks of the time when the historical discipline and profession were founded – nationalism, industrialism and imperialism – stand at odds though with the fact that peoples at all times experience the need to know about others and create stores of knowledge about the larger world.

Jerry Bentley took the latter as starting point to plead energetically for the tracing of underlying encounters, contacts and shared trajectories. Never dogmatically, but always with enthusiasm, with all his energy he promoted world history as a subject matter and interpretative framework. In his view it had two sides, namely globalizing history, understood as learning about the world’s various lands and societies, and historicizing globalization, regarded as studying cross-cultural interactions. Owing to the fact that much had been done and gained in regard to the former, he engaged himself in what he called “larger human stories [...] the global stories of rising human population, expanding technological capacity, and increasing interactions”, arguing that they “have profoundly shaped the experiences of almost all human societies, and furthermore have worked collectively like the strands of a triple helix to reinforce one another with powerful effects throughout history”.²

Being aware that historical scholarship inevitably reflects the position of the one who produces it, he did not shy away from clearly stating that world-history writing has also been tainted by worldly interest, bearing the signs of expanding empires, missions and for that matter area studies, as well as has a bedeviled past. All too often “it has reproduced teleologies that make European modernity the reference point of the global past [... and has] overlooked differences both within and between societies through the flat-

1 Jerry H. Bentley, Globalizing History and Historicizing Globalization, in: *Globalizations* 1 (2004) 1, pp. 69–81.
2 *Ibid.* p. 78.

tening and homogenization of peoples”, presenting Europe as the only site of dynamism and progress, while other regions being considered little more than sinks of stagnation. Still he saw no reason to follow completely postmodern and postcolonial criticism of master narratives that escape into mini-histories and the local. Instead he pleaded to delve into the realities and dynamics of the radically heterogeneous world as it came into being. Along this line one would not only find numerous cross-cultural interactions and interdependencies but would also recognize them as an essential drive in the change of societies.

Bentley pursued this ambitious research agenda, also aimed at reforming education, for about 20 years, which today is well underway to considerable extent due to his efforts. With his death, world and global historians have lost a thoughtful and engaged colleague and comrade.

Jerry H. Bentley left us a lot. Being a trained Renaissance historian he turned to world history at the University of Hawai'i where he worked from 1976 until his retirement in 2012. The first book in which he pursued his new interest, *Old World Encounters: Cross-Cultural Encounters and Exchanges in Pre-Modern Europe* (1993), became in almost no time a bestseller in the US and abroad. Following, he edited and co-authored almost a dozen volumes on the history of the global past. To mention only a few very items from his list of publications, there is his well-known textbook written together with Herbert Ziegler on *Traditions and Encounters: A Global Perspective on the Past* (2000) and the *Berkshire Encyclopedia of World History* (2005) as well as the study of *Seascapes: Maritime Histories, Littoral Cultures, and Transoceanic Exchanges* (together with Renate Bridenthal and Karen Wigen, 2007). Additionally, he published numerous articles on methodological challenges and the political strings attached to the endeavor of historicizing globalization, always refuting meta-narratives that unify and theories that universalize.³ For him all macro-histories fail due to empirical grounds because they are unable to accommodate the diversity of the world's pasts.

Being a scholar able to perceive of both the university and the historical discipline as an institution, Jerry Bentley worked to anchor world history in their structures. At his own university he developed one of the first PhD programs in world history in the US as well as was a leading figure in the founding of the World History Association (WHA) in 1982, where he promoted the aims of undertaking both teaching and research, ideally at implementing research-oriented teaching. Only a few years did he seize the chance to realize this dual mission by establishing the *Journal of World History* (JWH). The opportunity came when the administration of the University of Hawai'i decided to provide funds to launch several new journals to be published by the university press. Thoughtfully, but still determined, he negotiated with the WHA the question if the journal could

³ For example: *World History and Grand Narrative*, in: Benedikt Stuchtey/Eckhardt Fuchs (eds), *Writing World History, 1800–2000*, Oxford 2003, pp. 47–65, *Myths, Wagers, and Some Moral Implications of World History*, in: *Journal of World History* 16(2005)1, pp. 51–82, *The Construction of Textbooks on World History*, in: *Comparativ. Zeitschrift für Globalgeschichte und vergleichende Gesellschaftsforschung* 16(2006)1, pp. 49–65.

become the official publication of the association and with the agreement in his hands he wrote the application for the competitive funds. Three years later the first issue was out and since then the JWH, with Bentley as the main editor, provided the newest research on the subject a place to meet and to be discussed.⁴

It did not take long until the news of the journal transcended the US-American context. In February 1992 Manfred Kossok, the founding father of *Comparativ*, wrote to one of his assistant professors a short note: "This is a really interesting journal and we should get in touch with the editor and arrange for an exchange between our two editorial teams." The contact was established fast and out of it grew a continuous joint discussion about how to write world history and how to overcome the predominance of national history paradigms.

We, based in Leipzig and equally working on the (re-)establishment of globally thought history, learnt immensely from Jerry Bentley as well as his struggle with the JWH and the WHA for more world historical questions to be raised in the classrooms and to be addressed by archival studies. After all, in the early 1990s we were confronted with a renaissance of interest in national history writing in the context that the reunified Germany was eager to give itself a fitting past. The first time we met Jerry in person was at the International Historical Congress in Oslo in 2000, which turned out to be a decisive moment for the recognition of world history as an essential part of the agenda of professional historians. The plan there was to integrate the WHA as an affiliated commission into the work of the Comité International des Sciences Historiques (CISH). Jerry was the one making the pitch to the governing board of CISH that the World History Association should be recognized as an affiliate of CISH. It did not work out then; the argument for the rejection was that the WHA was too centered in the US to be a international representative of the field. Despite this setback, the effort was successful ten years later when the newly established Network of Global and World History Association was accepted as an affiliated international commission. With that one of Jerry's dreams, the recognition of world history as valid and solid field of historical scholarship at a world scale, became true.

An enthusiastic academic and an intellectual of *engagement*, Jerry was full of humor and had the rare capability to gather people around his ideas and to make academic events festivals of sociability. We discovered through discussions in Oslo how close the notion and concept of cultural encounters he promoted was to the 'Kulturtransfer'-approach we were developing with colleagues in France.

Later Jerry came over from Hawai'i to participate in the conference organized in honor of Manfred Kossok's 70th birthday, which he contributed to with a powerfully eloquent plea for world history as a counter-strike against national history.⁵ A conference at the

⁴ Jerry Bentley, The Journal of World History, in: Patrick Manning (eds), *Global Practice of World History. Advances World Wide*, Princeton 2008, pp. 129-140.

⁵ See his contribution in: *Vom Brasilienvertrag zur Globalgeschichte. Festschrift für Manfred Kossok*, ed. by M. Middell, Leipzig 2002.

German Historical Institute in Washington DC on “World History Writing” organized by Eckhardt Fuchs provided the next opportunity to create a stable relationship between the WHA and its evolving European counterpart. The 2002-born European Network in Universal and Global History (ENIUGH) became, also thanks to Jerry’s support, an associate partner of WHA and later one of the founding members of Network of Global and World History Organisations (NOGWHISTO).

Jerry Bentley’s influence on the global community of global historians is hard to overestimate. He invested himself for decades in creating a web of people working together not only in research but also in pedagogy since he was convinced that both dimensions have to go hand in hand. In his view, a curriculum in world history would make no sense without being based on research at the highest standards possible, which he promoted by selecting the finest contributions for his journal, nor could a small community of academic experts change the attitude of a society without being firmly anchored in reforming high school, undergraduate and graduate education.

We will miss Jerry Bentley as a friend, as a member of our editorial board and as one of the most prominent scholars in the field of world history. And we will continue his plea for the two linked intellectual projects, the globalization of history and the historicization of globalization.

Matthias Middell/Katja Naumann

Representations of Europe as a Political Resource in the Early and Late Twentieth Century

Hartmut Kaelble

The history of representations of Europe has been examined from various angles and with widely differing aims over the past few decades. It has most commonly been written as a history of visions for European integration, usually to highlight the deep historical roots of today's European Union and point to the existence of visions of a common European policy throughout the history of Europe thus far, albeit with varying intensity and with varying aims. A second approach is related to the first yet with a different emphasis, namely the history of people's identification with Europe. It does not necessarily focus on a European decision-making centre, revolving instead around visions of a common Europe with a shared culture, places of remembrance, values and everyday norms that Europeans can relate to. These representations were not based on common political ideas of Europe alone but also on Europe as a way of life with shared norms and values, in the arts and common customs. Thus identification with Europe begs the question whether this was merely a history of elites or also a history of the European masses. Thus far the history of the identification with Europe has received less attention than the visions of a common European policy. Following the excavation of a vast contingent of historical representations of Europe by scholars employing either of these two approaches, a third approach adopted a more critical view to examine the numerous political and social differences and contrasts between representations of Europe that were successful and are still in effect today, and those that failed and are no longer acceptable. Scholars also began to grapple with the dark side of the history of representations of Europe, which is not part of the pre-history of today's European Union but instead serves as a historical overlay which the contemporary European Union decidedly sets itself off against. This includes, for example, the imperial notions of a natural, intrinsic European superior-

ity that developed since the enlightenment in the eighteenth century, or subsequently the seemingly scientific yet essentially baseless racist conceptions of Europe or National Socialism's ideological designs for Europe, which the National Socialists developed in the war against the USSR in particular and also as a means to accommodate the large non-German sections of the National Socialist armies.

This special issue examines representations of Europe with a fourth intention: the history of representations of Europe as a resource for political legitimization, which was not only employed within Europe by European politicians but also outside of Europe by non-Europeans. In these instances, Europe often served as a cipher for modernity, for global progress and for achievable superiority, however in general it was not employed as a means to establish a common decision-making centre, strengthen identification with Europe or criticize predominant representations of Europe, but instead co-opted as a source of legitimization for political alliances, military actions, political reforms or even national independence and ethnic autonomy within or outside of Europe. These representations of Europe were usually developed by political decision-makers or were created in close proximity to political decision making processes. They more rarely belonged to the programme of political opponents and intellectuals. They were usually conveyed via the media and were neither lofty armchair visions nor an everyday identification with Europe. They possessed a vast range of content and were oriented towards the context in which political decision-makers shaped policy, while their primary purpose was to secure the balance of power and mobilize resources for this end rather than serving to bring Europeans together. These representations of Europe cannot be comprehended adequately if one attempts to place them within the long debate concerning visions of a common European policy or within the history of identification with Europe, as they tend to appear marginal or even far-fetched in this context. They must be understood within the political contexts out of which they emerged and drew their meaning in the first place. The term representations in this special issue is used in the sense, that representations of the own are invariably linked to the experience and the representation of the other. They are also seen as produced and shaped by specific actors and as being in continuous competition, conflicts and readaption with other representations rather than one single representation fully predominating a specific society. They are seen as emerging and changing only in a public sphere. Finally, representations are to influence social and political practice in legitimizing actions or in criticizing political decisions.

Representations of Europe in international relations are the central theme of this volume. It not only deals with the domestic political aims of these representations, but also with European international relations in two respects: the articles in this journal focus on the reciprocal relationships between Europe and other world regions, intermediate zones into other regions of the world, Russia and North Africa. Rather than concentrating on scholarly or intellectual visions alone, representations relating to political decisions and political events are at the centre of these investigations. This issue therefore deals, on the one hand, with representations by Europeans associated with European international relations: this includes military actions by Europeans governments, including the

concerted military effort against the Boxer Rebellion in China around 1900 (Christian Methfessel), or French and German political think tanks during the 1990s (Johan Wagner) or fundamental decisions by the European Union concerning Eastern Enlargement and Mediterranean policy in the 1990s (Andreas Weiß). On the other hand, this issue also deals with the closely related counter-side to European foreign relations, i.e. the representations of Europe in other world regions or at the fringes of Europe. The article on representations of Europe in Russia between 1905 and 1917 (Benjamin Beuerle) stands for this counter-side, without which the European representations of Europe would be difficult to grasp, as they developed either in an exchange or in confrontation with or in condescending disregard for these other representations of Europe.

The articles in this issue deal with two periods of uncertainty in the development of representations of Europe. They examine, for one, the beginning of the twentieth century, a time in which Europe was indeed at the peak of its global power, yet in the representations of Europeans it was commonly perceived to be in the midst of deep uncertainty. In these perceptions, Europe was no longer the undisputed superior civilization over all other world regions, the navel of global progress and the superior model example for others to follow. Europe was facing new competition by the economic and political modernity of the rapidly ascending United States whose economy and population overtook the large European countries, and by the surprising modernity of the Japanese military machine, which defeated Russia in 1905. Some European authors warned of a new predominance of the American economy or the “Yellow Peril” from East Asia. This was among the reasons for the sense of crisis in Europe, for its own critique regarding the modernity of European values and the benefits of scientific progress, for the fear of Europe’s decline, for fears about the European arms race and a new war, and also for the nostalgic orientation towards non-commercialized, non-modern, non-European cultures in Asia and Africa. This is also the context of the articles on European military actions against the Boxer Rebellion in China in 1900/01 and on representations of Europe in Russia before 1914. In Russia’s case, however, the uncertainty was an inward one, whereas Western Europe’s own uncertainties had not yet affected the Russian debates.

In the 1990s, the second period under examination in this issue, Europe faced yet another upheaval and renewed deep uncertainty. Europe had to adapt to three new situations. The collapse of the Soviet Empire spelled the end of the Cold War. Europe not only had to build a new relationship with the only remaining superpower – the USA – but also faced new responsibilities in its immediate vicinity in Eastern and South-Eastern Europe and in the Mediterranean region. The Eastern part of Europe experienced a fundamental political and social upheaval and the challenging transition from a centrally planned Communist economy to a mixture between a free market economy and state intervention. How Europe would position itself towards new superpowers – to China, India and Russia – also remained an open question. Secondly, Europe not only had to adapt to the accelerated pace of globalization in the 1990s, but was also among the important, often underestimated key players in this process of globalization. Lastly, a new situation also arose for Europe because the European Union not only gained additional competence

and power, but had already been enlarged to include the neutral states in the 1990s and intended to admit new members in the Eastern part of Europe beyond this. The 1990s were also a period defined by new deep European disappointments, the most spectacular being the disappointment over the European Union's inability to effectively intervene in the Yugoslav Civil War and cease hostilities. Beyond this, there were numerous other disappointments, as the expectations heaved on the European Union in many political areas, including foreign policy, had grown enormously and exceeded the actual means and capabilities of the European Union by far. In this situation of upheaval, the representations of Europe developed in the media and in proximity to political decision-makers were also subject to change. What ultimately defined Europe, how its relations to other world regions should look like, where the borders of Europe lay and how Europe set itself apart, which areas outside the European Union were particularly important for Europe – all this was fiercely debated in the 1990s, and sometimes also decided.

Taken together, the contributions in this volume reveal just how profoundly representations of Europe as a political source of legitimization changed between the beginning and the end of the twentieth century. Four essential changes can be traced in summary. First, in its self-conception and in the perceptions abroad, Europe was the global benchmark for modernity at the beginning of the century, despite all European self-doubts in the face of the new economic modernity of the United States and the new military modernity of Japan. By the end of the twentieth century, however, Europe had lost this global position. In European representations of Europe, the United States in particular had become the primary new benchmark of modernity. Europeans nevertheless considered their own continent to be more liveable in a number of important aspects, especially when it came to the use of force in the private and the public sphere, environmental policy, public social security, city planning, secularization and a foreign policy geared towards negotiations rather than military action. Europe had been eclipsed by the United States as the benchmark of modernity, indeed also as the predominant military or economic threat. In the perceptions from other world regions, however, Europe was not merely viewed as a crisis zone, but also as a positive alternative to the American model, particularly with regard to social welfare and the international integration of nation states. Thus representations of Europe forfeited their original efficacy as a source of legitimization, yet retained considerable importance as a contrasting image to the modern United States of America.

Second, the contents of representations of Europe with which Europe set itself apart from other world regions and which were considered European in other world regions became narrower over the course of the twentieth century. At the beginning of the century, Europeans considered Europe to be superior in almost all areas. The rule of law, the degree of civilization, the sciences, the rationality in economics and the state bureaucracy, technological progress and the standard of living, and sometimes religion too, were seen as key elements of superior European culture. Even from an outside perspective from Russia, the (Western) European model was a sort of all-purpose weapon in a number of different political areas, including agricultural policy, social policy and military policy

around 1900. By the end of the twentieth century, however, the political contents of representations of Europe had become considerably narrower. European representations of Europe now centred on democracy and human rights in particular, but also on securing peace in Europe and its neighbouring regions, prosperity through economic growth and social security. Indeed, the scope of contents in which Europe differed from other regions of the world had become even narrower from a European perspective. Neither democracy and human rights nor economic dynamism were viewed as distinctly European features. Moreover, Europe continued to expect other world regions to adopt European values, although barely anyone in Europe at the end of the twentieth century still gave consideration to the methods that had been employed to enforce European values – through military action, through colonization or missionary work – at the beginning of the century. In other regions of the world, the contents of representations of Europe became even narrower. Europe stood, above all, for social security and for international political integration, sometimes even still for prosperity and consumption, but no longer for more.

Third, the geographical space of the representations of Europe also shifted. It is by no means marginal if representations of Europe that drew comparisons to China gained currency around 1900, as East Asia featured prominently in the European imagination. In world-historical terms, East Asia had been the most important counterpart to Europe for many centuries. On the other hand, the fact that the two articles dealing with the 1990s focus on Europe's neighbouring regions, i.e. Northern Africa and Eastern/South-Eastern Europe, is characteristic of this period. The world regions of particular interest to Europe narrowed down to the immediate neighbouring regions and the Atlantic over the course of the twentieth century.

Fourth, the meaning attached to representations of Europe in the realm of foreign relations grew to a considerable degree. Despite their rivalries between empires and nation states, Europeans undoubtedly shared a common European self-conception that distinguished them from the colonized peoples in Africa and Asia. This self-image was evoked time and again, for example in the famous concept of the “white man’s burden”. Representations of Europe played a more important role in European foreign affairs before 1914 than is often assumed. As Christian Methfessel’s article shows, they were employed and transmitted via the media, not only on occasion of rare concerted military actions as against the Boxer Rebellion in China, but also for national imperial projects. During the 1990s however, representations of Europe greatly gained in importance in the European Union’s foreign relations, since the Union had already attempted to develop its own foreign policy towards other world regions since the 1970s with aims and methods that would also distinguish it from the foreign policy of individual European national governments. Representations of Europe thus became ever more significant as a resource for legitimization in European foreign affairs at the end of the twentieth century. Discussing these representations in a public forum, criticizing them or refining them came to mean more in political terms. Conversely, representations of Europe were no longer

being employed as a legitimizing resource in the domestic affairs of non-European states as frequently as at the beginning of the twentieth century.

The articles collected in this volume come from the sub-project A5 of the Collaborative Research Project (Sonderforschungsbereich) 640 “Representations of Changing Social Orders”. Benjamin Beuerle has investigated representations of Europe in Russian political debates at the beginning of the twentieth century. His research indicates that Western Europe served as the benchmark for modernity across almost the entire political party spectrum – except for the extreme right and the Tsarist court – whereas it was employed as a legitimizing resource for a whole range of different political projects. Western Europe stood for modernity, particularly when it came to two of the most important political issues at the time: agrarian land reform, where Denmark featured as a particularly prominent model, and the introduction of social insurance, where Germany served as a commonly cited frame of reference. Unlike Western Europe at the time, this modernity had not yet been cast into doubt here. Furthermore, in contrast to the Ottoman Empire, the positive representations of a highly modern Europe were not hampered by fears of a military threat by Europe or European economic predominance. However, the notion of one’s own backwardness as compared to Western Europe did not extend into the realm of foreign policy. In the Russian debates, Russia itself was considered a full-fledged member in the European concert of powers.

Christian Methfessel’s article examines representations of Europe in the British and German media’s coverage of European colonial wars and military actions between the mid-1890s and 1909. These representations commonly revolved around the notion of protecting Europeans under threat, the spreading of European civilization and strengthening the European economy, and in some cases also the spreading of Christianity. Representations of Europe as a model example played an important role when it came to the legitimization of the military actions, albeit almost only prior to 1900. As it became increasingly difficult to mobilize broad support for these military actions among the British and German public and legitimize them following the turn of the century, representations of Europe as a model came to lose their previous significance. According to Christian Methfessel, the reasons behind this marked decline can be traced back to increasing difficulties and setbacks regarding military policy in the outer-European world and changing perceptions of imperial expansion and colonial policy in both countries. At the same time, the conception of European space also changed. During the Boxer War and the military operation against Tibet (1903/4) Russia was occasionally portrayed as an Asiatic power and excluded from Europe in the British media, whereas during British-Russian co-operation in Persia in 1909 the “Times” would emphasize the Europeanness of Russia.

Andreas Weiß deals with representations of Europe in the context of the European Union’s foreign relations with East-Central and Eastern Europe and with Northern Africa during the 1990s. He picks up on two of the European Union’s central policies in his article: the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership of 1995 and Eastern Enlargement, which was implemented in 2004 but was already being discussed intensively in the 1990s.

Andreas Weiß argues that the European Union's self-conception of an open, democratic Europe which championed human rights increasingly saw itself confronted with accusations that Europe was building a new empire or was sealing itself off from the outside like a fortress. While he considers neither of these accusations to be accurate, he nevertheless views them as indicators for the absence of a clear, concise foreign policy of the European Union during the 1990s.

Johan Wagner examines representations of Europe by the most important French and German political think tanks during the 1990s through their political consultation and public relations work. He highlights the considerable French-German differences, which nonetheless began to diminish to some degree due to the growth of international networks linking these institutions and the increasing attention they paid to European issues. Political consultants focused on the European Union in particular, often with a critical distance towards the Union's policies. In this particular case, representations of the European Union sometimes conceived of it as an empire of some kind, but most often saw it as a model for neighbouring regions such as the Maghreb, while the lines separating EU-Europe and its neighbouring regions tended to become sharper.

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Westernization as the Way to Modernity – Western Europe in Russian Reform Discussions of the Late Tsarist Empire, 1905–1917

Benjamin Beuerle

RESÜMEE

Der Artikel untersucht die Rolle und den Inhalt von Repräsentationen Westeuropas in innenpolitischen Reformdebatten Russlands zwischen den Revolutionen von 1905 und 1917. Jene, welche an diesen Debatten teilnahmen, teilten parteiübergreifend eine Reihe von Grundannahmen: Diesen zufolge bewegten sich Russland und Westeuropa auf derselben Entwicklungsleiter vorwärts; Westeuropa verfügte hierbei über einen erheblichen Vorsprung; und Russland war deshalb gut beraten, sich bei seinen weiteren Entwicklungsschritten an jenen Gesetzen und Regelungen zu orientieren, welche der Westen erfolgreich zur Anwendung brachte. Vor dem Hintergrund dieser gemeinsamen Grundannahmen ließ sich mit Repräsentationen Westeuropas Politik machen. Verweise auf den „Westen“ wurden herangezogen, um die unterschiedlichsten Positionen zu begründen und zu legitimieren. Gestritten wurde zwischen den Vertretern verschiedener politischer Ausrichtungen vielfach darüber, wie sich das fortschrittliche „Westeuropa“ im Einzelnen darstelle und wie dessen Erfahrungen zu interpretieren seien. Die Relevanz dieser Diskussionen für genuin innenpolitische Reformen in Russland stellte dagegen so gut wie niemand in Frage.

I Introduction

1. The West as a Resource for Political Action and Legitimization

Western Europe and the West¹ represented more than merely a geographical space for politicians in the late Tsarist Empire. In contrast to the nineteenth century, during which

1 The terms „Western Europe“ [Zapadnaia Evropa] and „West“ [Zapad], which were used interchangeably by the

Slavophile attitudes could at times have considerable influence on domestic political concepts and projects,² there was a broad and tacit consensus over a number of basic assumptions in Russia at the beginning of the twentieth century, bar some exceptions on the fringes of the political spectrum: The West and Russia were progressing along the same path of development; the West had a considerable head-start on this path; this allowed Russia to draw lessons from the experiences of the West, adopt measures which had proven themselves successful there and avoid those with largely negative effects. At the same time, the conditions that had been reached in the western states represented the highest level of human civilization to date, and thus an ideal worthy of imitation.³ These common basic assumptions were in keeping with the ideology of worldwide monolinear progress in the shape of an ascending ladder of development that predominated in large parts of Europe and beyond in the nineteenth century.⁴ Yet they were exceptional nonetheless: In no other case did the great majority of the political elites of a major power that had belonged to the European concert of powers throughout the nineteenth century adhere to the notion that *other* powers were at a higher stage of development than their *own, backward* country, which had yet to reach this stage.

Against the backdrop of these shared basic assumptions, it was possible to shape and influence policies through representations of Western Europe in Russia during the examined period:⁵ From the perspective of Russian political actors, the West provided empirical material for illustrative purposes and orientation in their search for reasonable concepts. Negative and positive past experiences made by the West could thus provide lessons on what was to be avoided in Russian politics and which strategies would lead to the next stage of civilization. The present state of the western nations pointed in the direction Russia was to develop in the future. Moreover, in inner-Russian debates over particular measures and reforms, representations of the West served to legitimize one's

Russian protagonists at the time, refer to all states located to the West of the Russian Empire, including the German Empire and Austro-Hungarian Empire; in case of the „West“ this at times also included the USA. As far as their use in the present paper is concerned, they refer to these source-based definitions.

- 2 The organization of the abolition of serfdom in the 1860s counts among the most notable examples of the influence of prominent Slavophile protagonists: cf. N. V. Riasanovsky, Russland und der Westen. Die Lehre der Slawophilen; Studie über eine romantische Ideologie, München 1954, 128-131. In contrast to the *Westernizers*, the *Slavophiles* denied the analogy between Russian and Western history and wanted Russia to follow its own path.
- 3 The theses mentioned here are based on ongoing research for my dissertation on the role, content and significance of representations of the West in the political debates of the late Tsarist Empire (1905-1917); for one example see: B. Beuerle, A Step for the Whole Civilized World? The debate over the death penalty in Russia, 1905-1917, in: St. Kirmse (ed.), One Law for All?, Frankfurt/ New York 2012, 39-65; cf. as well M. Hildermeier, Das Privileg der Rückständigkeit. Anmerkungen zum Wandel einer Interpretationsfigur der neueren russischen Geschichte, in: Historische Zeitschrift (1987), issue 244, 557-603.
- 4 See F. Rapp, Fortschritt. Entwicklung und Sinngehalt einer philosophischen Idee, Darmstadt 1992, 77-83, 153-163; R. Koselleck, „Fortschritt“ und „Niedergang“ – Nachtrag zur Geschichte zweier Begriffe, in: idem (ed.), Niedergang. Studien zu einem geschichtlichen Thema, Stuttgart 1980, 214-230, h. 222-225.
- 5 On the concept of representation cf. R. Chartier, Die unvollendete Vergangenheit. Geschichte und die Macht der Weltauslegung, transl. by U. Rauff, Berlin 1989, 7-19; R. Weimann, Einleitung: Repräsentation und Alterität dieses-/-jenseits der Moderne, in: idem (ed.), Ränder der Moderne. Repräsentation und Alterität im (post)kolonialen Diskurs, Frankfurt a. M. 1997, 7-43.

own respective position or de-legitimize the positions of political opponents. Once all protagonists involved were in agreement over the abovementioned premise, references to suggested measures being (successfully) applied in the West, or pointing out negative experiences that had been made in the West with measures suggested by the political opponent, or allusions to statements or opinions of prominent western personalities, could shape arguments whose significance and impact were not to be underestimated. Representations of the West could therefore be employed as a resource for action, orientation and legitimization in Russian politics during the late Tsarist Empire. This was especially true in times of severe political upheaval and high pressure for reform, during which the Russian present, past and tradition came to lose its power of persuasion as a political foundation for significant political projects and an outward orientation gained currency. This applies to the period between 1905 and 1917 in particular.

2. Reform Pressure and Central Reform Issues in the Late Tsarist Empire

The reform debates held in Russia between 1905 and 1917 were both numerous and intense. Virtually no political and social issue remained unaddressed – whether self-administration, jurisdiction, constitutional matters, the military, the position of women in society, or the rights of various nationalities living in the empire.⁶ This list could be extended at will. From the perspective of the most diverse range of imperial protagonists, the pressure for reform was considerable. For one, the devastating defeat in the war against Japan had not only exposed severe shortcomings in the military and infrastructure, but also seemed to be symptomatic of the inefficiency of a political system that was in dire need of reform – this was a widespread notion, prevalent even in government circles.⁷ Moreover, the 1905 revolution had shaken the autocracy to its very foundations. In October 1905 the Tsar had been compelled to announce the introduction of constitutional laws, basic civil liberties and an elected Duma with legislative powers. With these concessions, which were meant to accommodate the demands of the liberal opposition movement in particular, and a simultaneous rigorous policy of repression, the government was able to contain the revolution during the course of 1906 and allow the Tsar and his cabinet to retain a comparably strong position.⁸ Authoritative political protagonists however realized this was merely a victory on borrowed time, which may indeed have temporarily removed the symptoms of unrest but not the main causes behind it.⁹ It

6 The list of debated reform issues was by no means limited to Stolypin's reform programme, which was nevertheless rather extensive in and of itself: cf. N. B. Weissman, *Reform in Tsarist Russia. The State Bureaucracy and Local Government, 1900–1914*, New Brunswick (N.J.) 1981, 124–147; P. Waldron, *Between two Revolutions. Stolypin and the Politics of Renewal in Russia*, London 1998, 72–93.

7 Cf. *ibid.*, 22; A. Ascher, *The Revolution of 1905. Russia in Disarray*, Stanford (CA) 1988, 43, 52–53; P. Waldron, *The End of Imperial Russia, 1855–1917*, Basingstoke/ New York 1997, 29–30f.

8 Cf. A. Ascher, *Russia in Disarray* (cf. fn 7), S. 222–234, 320–336; A. Ascher, *The Revolution of 1905. Authority Restored*, Stanford (CA) 1992, 58–71; G. A. Hosking, *The Russian Constitutional Experiment. Government and Duma, 1907–1914* (Soviet and East European studies), Cambridge 1973, 1–13.

9 Cf. P. Waldron, *End of Imperial Russia* (note 7), 31–35; P. Waldron, *Between* (note 6), 49; A. J. Polunov, *Russia in the Nineteenth Century. Autocracy, Reform, and Social Change 1814–1914*, Armonk N.Y 2005, 228.

had become apparent since the 1890s that parts of “society” [obshchestvo] (often with a liberal attitude) were critical of the government. The numerous protest actions emanating from these circles prior to and during the revolution surely shocked the Tsar and the government in terms of their mass and at times radical character, but all in all they merely confirmed what had already been looming.¹⁰ In light of this antagonistic attitude among the elites, the Tsar and those around him found consolation in the fact that these elites made up only a small fraction of the overall population, while the simple “people” [narod] were thought to be overwhelmingly loyal to the Tsar, even connected to him through a spiritual bond.¹¹ Indeed, peasants still made up over 70 percent of the population around the turn of the century. The number of workers – often from a peasant background themselves – may still have been comparably low, yet they were concentrated in a small number of strategically important places and had already become a substantial political factor due to a series of notable protest actions and strikes in the two decades preceding the revolution. The true magnitude of the deep-rooted discontent among the workers and the peasants in particular that came to the fore during the revolution must therefore have been greatly alarming to the Tsar and his government, as it called the myth of the Russian narod’s loyalty to the Tsar into question.¹² As a consequence, the government strove to pursue policies that would lead to lasting changes with regard to the discontent among this overwhelming majority of the population. Moreover, it was crucial for Duma delegates and politicians from all parties to demonstrate their commitment to this broad electorate which, according to the revolutionary parties, would have to play a central role in the next revolution.¹³

It is therefore no coincidence that two reform issues of particular relevance to these parts of the population were at the forefront of the agenda over this period of around 12 years, more so than any of the aforementioned ones: labour legislation and the land- and peasant question.¹⁴ It was virtually beyond dispute in Russia in 1905 that these areas were

10 Cf. M. Hagen, Die Entfaltung politischer Öffentlichkeit in Russland 1906–1914, Wiesbaden 1982, 36–37, 77–83; A. J. Polunov, Russia (note 9), 208–213; H.-D. Löwe, Von der Industrialisierung zur ersten Revolution, 1890 bis 1904, in: Handbuch der Geschichte Russlands, Vol. 3: 1856–1945. Von den Autokratischen Reformen zum Sowjetstaat, ed. by G. Schramm, I. Halbband, Stuttgart 1983, 203–335, h. S. 304–315; Idem/ H. Gross, Die erste russische Revolution und ihr Nachspiel, in: ibid., 345–384, h. 345–351.

11 Cf. R. S. Wortman, Scenarios of Power. From Alexander II to the Abdication of Nicholas II, Princeton (NJ) 2000, 13–14, 365–366, 390, 396–397, 490; A. M. Verner, The Crisis of Russian Autocracy. Nicholas II and the 1905 Revolution, Princeton (NJ) 1990, 91; F.W. Wcislo, Reforming Rural Russia. State, Local Society and National Politics 1855–1914, Princeton (NJ) 1990, 142–146; A. J. Polunov, Russia (note 9), 224.

12 D. Moon, Estimating the Peasant Population of Late Imperial Russia from the 1897 Census: A Research Note, in: Europa-Asia Studies Vol. 48, N° 1 (Jan. 1996), 141–153, S. 141–149; R. E. Zelnik, Russian Workers and Revolution, in: The Cambridge History of Russia, Vol. 2: Imperial Russia, 1689–1917, ed. by D. Leaven, Cambridge 2006, 617–636, h. 620–622; R. Wortman, Scenarios (note 11), 396–397. The strike movement had mobilized around 400 000 factory workers in January 1905 and around half a million by October that same year; meanwhile there were over 3 000 recorded cases of (often violent) peasant unrest throughout the year: see P. Waldron, End of Imperial Russia (note 7), 30–30; in more detail A. Ascher, Russia in Disarray (note 7), 161–167; 136–151.

13 See ibid.; R. E. Zelnik, Russian workers (note 12), 624–625.

14 Also included in this list of prominent issues was the question of an expansion of public education. While this particular matter is not featured in this article, an examination can be found in my dissertation.

in dire need of improvement. Russian harvests paled in comparison to Western Europe, the hunger for land among the peasantry remained considerable, and the number of peasants steadily increased due to their high birth-rates, which invariably exacerbated the agrarian question.¹⁵ The workers on the other hand had no provisions or a safety net in case of illness or injury, often their wages barely guaranteed the minimum subsistence level, the living and housing conditions of the workers were frequently desolate, with working hours that were longer than in most West-European states.¹⁶ Anyone seeking to pre-empt a new outbreak of discontent, to allow Russia to prevail in the economic and potentially military competition with its western and eastern neighbours in the medium-term, and anyone who wanted to show the political rank-and-file and the electorate that they were doing something for the people could not avoid addressing these issues. The threat of revolution and upheaval loomed as alternatives to reform and modernization in these areas. But what did modernization mean in this context? More precisely: What was modernity to those who discussed political reforms during this period in Russia, and where was this modernity located?

II Discussions About the Right Path

1. Locating Progress and Modernity in the Late Tsarist Empire and the Particularities of This Case

In order to pursue this question adequately, it is necessary to define what the concept of “modernity” implies in this particular context. Because on the one hand, we are dealing with an ambiguous, loaded term when it comes to its scientific usage. On the other hand, there was no (foreign) word in Russian that would have corresponded to this term in a social-political sense.¹⁷ Hence it would be more appropriate to resort to a concept of modernity that does not necessarily refer to specific, absolute features (i.e. industrialization, rationalization, transition to capitalism etc.), but instead implies a particular historical conception of time that corresponds to the aforementioned paradigm of progress. According to this paradigm, there is a clearly recognizable progression over time with different stages of development, where the highest achieved stage in a given case represents – in dichotomous delineation to the earlier stage – modernity. Therefore, the question is not when the transition to modernity occurs, but what “modernity” means at a given point in time.¹⁸ Accordingly, “progress” and “modernity” describe two aspects of

¹⁵ Cf. H. Rogger, *Russia in the Age of Modernisation and Revolution, 1881–1917*, London (et al.) 1983, 75–78; Waldron, *End of Imperial Russia* (note 7), 51–52; A. Ascher, *Russia in Disarray* (note 7), 26–27.

¹⁶ Cf. M. Hildermeier, *Die russische Revolution, 1905–1921*, Frankfurt a. M. 1989, 32; V. I. Novikov, *Sotsial'no-politicheskie predposylki revoliutsionnykh sobytiy v Rossii v nachale XX veka*, in: *Pervaya russkaia revoliutsiya: vzgliad cherez stoletie*, Moscow 2006, 4–11, h. 4; T. I. Fomina, *Zakonodatel'nye akty Rossiiskoi Imperii v oblasti sotsial'noi raboty (1910–1914 gg.)*, Moscow 1999, 11–12; P. Waldron, *End of Imperial Russia* (note 7), 82–83.

¹⁷ Cf. F. Cooper, *Modernity*, in: *idem, Colonialism in Question: Theory, Knowledge, History*, Berkeley 2005, 113–149.

¹⁸ Cf. N. Knight, *Ethnicity, Nationality and the Masses: Narodnost' and Modernity in Imperial Russia*, in: *Russian Modernity. Politics, Knowledge, Practices*, ed. by D. L. Hoffmann and Y. Kotsonis, N.Y. 2000, 41–64, h. 41–42; see

the same phenomenon: “progress” (synonymous with “modernization”) is the movement that leads a particular society or humanity at large in an upward direction, either from the highest current stage to an even higher stage (as human progress knows no limits according to this ideology), or (as seen from the perspective of Russian political actors in the case of their empire, for example) from a respectively lower stage to the highest stage of development as it can already be observed elsewhere. “Modernity” on the other hand refers to the condition that corresponds to the highest stage that has been reached on the global ladder of progress at a given point in time.

These definitions bring us back to the theses mentioned earlier in this article. Proceeding from the presented concepts of “progress” and “modernity”, one can already anticipate where the latter was to be located for the majority of the Russian elites at the beginning of the twentieth century. In social-political terms, there was barely any dissent in this matter among those concerning themselves with Russia’s future path of development in the reform discussions. Modernity was to be found in the West – this much was generally beyond dispute. For leftist and rightist liberals, conservatives and socialists alike, it seemed clear that the West was ahead of Russia in terms of its development, that Russia would make progress if it followed the West, and that it was actually proceeding on a path that would have to lead it to where the West already was.

The broad consensus in this matter deserves attention as a time- and space-bound particularity. In Russia itself there had been an influential Slavophile movement throughout much of the nineteenth century that reached deep into parts of the political establishment which by now could only be found at the extreme fringes of the political landscape.¹⁹ The main reason behind this turnaround can be found in Russia’s rapid industrialization, which mainly began in the final third of the nineteenth century and accelerated once more in the 1890s, along with the concomitant relevant social problems and secondary effects. The assumption that Russia could pursue a separate socioeconomic path of development and prevent the emergence of a “proletariat” with the help of the peasant commune – the obshchina – now seemed obsolete. This effectively negated one of the central premises of Slavophile thought, whereas the concept of a worldwide unilinear strand of development, on which Russia lagged behind the countries of Western Europe, gained currency.²⁰ When it came to this matter, the Russian Empire also differed from the Ottoman Empire, which appears to be quite similar at a first glance. Indeed, the latter perceived its own condition as backward and Western Europe as advanced, yet in

as well D. P. Gaonkar, On Alternative Modernities, in: Alternative Modernities, ed. by idem, London 2001, 1-23, especially 6-7.

19 Cf. Riasanovsky, Russland und der Westen (note 2).

20 B. Ananich, The Russian Economy and Banking System, in: Dominic C. B. Lieven (ed.), Imperial Russia, 1689–1917 (The Cambridge history of Russia 2), Cambridge 2006, 394–425, h. 408-410, 414-416; A. J. Polunov, Russia (note 9), 213-214; H. Rogger, Russia (note 15), 113; O. Figes, Die Tragödie eines Volkes. Die Epoche der russischen Revolution 1891–1924, Berlin 1998, 125-129; Hildermeier, Revolution, 32; R. Pipes, Die russische Revolution, Vol. 1: Der Zerfall des Zarenreiches, Berlin 1992, 142; G. M. Hamburg, Russian Political Thought, 1700–1917, in: D. C. B. Lieven (ed.), Imperial Russia, 116-144, h. 136-138; A. Walicki, The controversy over capitalism. Studies in the social philosophy of the Russian populists, Oxford 1969, 20-28, 50-56.

this particular case this perception was linked to a permanent impression of an essential threat emanating from the advanced West.²¹ Not only since the defeat against Japan was there an awareness in Russia that it had fallen behind militarily and would have much to catch up on in this area also. These fears of a threat however were not directed against the West or Western Europe as a whole, but at most against single states and the German Reich in particular. This on the other hand was due to the state of foreign relations and its self-assessment: Throughout the entire nineteenth century Russia was considered to be an integral member of the European concert of powers, and in this sense it could not only feel on an equal footing with, but also part of Europe. Particularly the areas of economic and social policy stood in contradiction to this; here Western Europe continued to represent the advanced other – i.e. modernity as it had not (yet) been reached – in the perceptions of Russian politicians across party lines.²²

It is worth noting that the Russian consensus over this matter between 1905 and 1914 also came to be mirrored abroad in Western Europe, for example in the British press. While Russia was at least occasionally (still) portrayed as an Asian power in a negative sense – and thus genuinely distinct from Western civilization – at the turn of the century, the view unto Russia as a European power, or a (re)Europeanized power by means of political reform, which lagged behind Great Britain in terms of its development yet was nonetheless proceeding along the same path of development, began to predominate after 1907.²³ Although this change in perspective was apparently mainly due to foreign policy interests (i.e. the newly forged alliance between Russia and Great Britain), it also correlated with the entire Russian political establishment's re-orientation towards the same theory of development (with only minor variations) since 1905.

Beyond this remarkable consensus, however, two issues remained unclear and highly controversial among the political protagonists of the Tsarist Empire: the speed at which Russia could and should reach the West's current stage of development, and, above all, which of the various Western political and social models embodied *actual* modernity. Hence the real question within the Russian context at the time was not *whether* the West indicated the path to modernity, but *which* West pointed in the right direction. This shall be illustrated below.

21 J.-E. Zürcher, Young Turk Perceptions of Europe as Threat and as Model: Paper presented at the Workshop *Historical and Contemporary Representations of Europe*, Orient Institut Istanbul, 7 June 2012.

22 W. C. Fuller, The Imperial Army, in: D. C. B. Lieven (ed.), *Imperial Russia* (note 20), 530–553, h. 540–543, 550–551; D. Schimmelpenninck van der Oye, Russian foreign policy: 1815–1917, in: D. C. B. Lieven (ed.), *Imperial Russia*, Cambridge 2006, 554–574, h. 554–556, 566–574.

23 Cf. Christian Methfessel's article in this volume.

2. Which West?

a) Denmark as a Model Example and the Diversity of Arguments Drawing on the West: Debates Concerning Agrarian Legislation

Debates surrounding far-reaching agrarian reforms, motivated by growing peasant unrest in particular, had already begun in the run-up to the 1905 revolution, with the decisive involvement of former Finance Minister Witte.²⁴ They then gained considerable additional momentum after the outbreak of the revolution, which came to reveal the full extent of the discontent among the peasant population.²⁵ The agrarian question also featured prominently in the debates of the first Duma (in session from late April to early July 1906).²⁶ Two draft bills in particular were up for discussion here, namely those fielded by the leftist liberal Kadets and the agrarian socialist Trudoviks, who together held a majority in the first Duma – the so-called projects of the “42” and the “104”. Both bills called for the dispossession of estate-owned land and its communalization via a national land fund, from which small farmers were to receive land for cultivation.²⁷ In the heated debates over these two draft bills, representatives from all parties came to invoke Western models of reference. Aside from general allusions to “Western Europe” and the “western states”, they also made specific mention of Germany, France, England and Norway among others.²⁸

Yet there was one particular country that stood out and was cited as the model example by advocates and opponents of the “42” and “104” alike: Denmark.²⁹ The exceedingly positive perception of Danish agriculture, the conditions for its peasants, the livestock and the agrarian economy at large also found its expression in various publications that appeared during this period.³⁰ This can in part be explained by the fact that Denmark

24 S. Iu. Witte, *Zapiska po krest'ianskomu delu Predsedatelja Vysochaishe uchrezhdennago Osobago Soveshchaniia o nuzhdakh sel'skokhoziaistvennoi promyshlennosti*, Stats-Sekretaria S. Iu. Witte, S. Peterburg 1904; *Vysochaishe uchrezhdennoe Osoboe Soveshchanie o nuzhdakh sel'skokhoziaistvennoi promyshlennosti*, Protokoly po Krest'ianskomu Delu. Zasedaniia s 8 dekabria 1904 goda po 30 marta 1905 goda, S. Peterburg 1905.

25 Taken together, the catalogues of the Russian National Library (St. Petersburg), the Lenin Library (Moscow) and the Finnish National Library (Helsinki) list 183 monographs on the agrarian question that were published in Russia in 1906 – compared to 46 in the previous year (1905).

26 The First Duma was dissolved by the Tsar barely 2 months after its inauguration: see P. Waldron, Between (note 6), 55–56.

27 The names of these bills simply referred to the number of deputies which had officially introduced them to the Duma (42 for the Kadet project, 104 for the Trudovik one). The differences between these draft proposals essentially concerned the amount of land to be left in the hands of private estate owners and how much compensation would be paid for dispossession: cf. Ju. M. Zubikov, *Bor'ba politicheskikh parti po agrarnomu voprosu v Pervoi Gosudarstvennoi dume*, in: *Pervaia russkaia revoliutsia 1905–1907 godov i problemy stanovleniya grazhdanskogo obshchestva v Rossii*. Mezhvuzovskii sbornik nauchnykh trudov, S. Peterburg 2006, 33–36, 34; St. F. Williams, *Liberal Reform in an Illiberal Regime. The Creation of Private Property in Russia, 1906–1915*, Stanford (CA) 2006, 123–132.

28 *Gosudarstvennaia Duma, Sozyv I. Stenograficheskie otchety*, S. Peterburg 1906, e.g. 520, 524–527, 568, 576, 722–724.

29 *Ibid.*, 466, 604–605, 612, 722, 816, 884, 982.

30 Cf. E. Kingston-Mann, *In search of the true West. Culture, Economics, and Problems of Russian Development*, Princeton, NJ 1999, 158–160, 168–169.

held a top-tier position in agricultural statistics at the time: Due to the prevalence of three-field crop rotation in Russia, 30% of its arable land lay idle, as compared to 13% in France and a mere 7% in Denmark. Conversely, the average yield per desyatina of land in Russia was 33 puds of rye, whereas the yield in Germany was 56 puds and 101 puds in Denmark.³¹ Progress was measurable, and Denmark appeared to be right at the top of the ladder of progress in agricultural terms while Russia lagged far behind. Opponents in the Duma were merely in disagreement over the question of the reasons behind the successes of Danish agriculture and its progressive nature. Some, such as the agrarian expert of the Kadets Mikhail Gertsenshtein, were of the opinion that Denmark's success was due to the fact that this was a state in which the land was *in peasant hands* and being cultivated by peasants on their own initiative. According to Gertsenshtein, the Danish example showed

that the peasant culture in particular has yielded outstanding results. [...] Once the competition of cheap grain emerged, large estates – for example in Germany – suffered greatly, whereas Denmark began to flourish. [...] Denmark is a country with peasant-owned land, and there is no large estate owner at the top, as they practically do not exist there; the peasant stands at the pinnacle of culture. [...] Thus I am not alarmed if the peasant element really does become stronger in our country. [...]³²

Conversely, opponents of the course propagated by the Kadets and Trudoviks strove not to surrender the Danish model of progress as a legitimizing resource to their adversaries without a fight. For example, Boleslav Ialovetskii, a Polish engineer from Vilnius province, basically agreed with the enthusiastically painted image of Danish agriculture, yet depicted it rather differently: “unfortunately” Gertsenshtein had failed to

point out that everything there [in Denmark] had proceeded according to entirely different principles than those proposed by the project of the 42 persons, not to mention the project of the 104 persons. [...] At the beginning of the previous nineteenth century the entire Danish peasantry was still in terrible despair. [...] And there, without a doctrine of the nationalization of land, without the forced dispossession of private land, the state came to the people's aid by providing loans for the transition from communal field cultivation to individual cultivation [...]. Thanks to the availability of loans, peasant land ownership expanded significantly at the expense of large estates, without any coercion from this or that side. [...] Life itself had set the norms [...], so that the rural population of Denmark is now one of the wealthiest, most highly educated and cultivated in all of Europe. God grant that Russia will come to experience this soon.³³

31 Cf. the corresponding figures and references in Stetskii's speech: Gosudarstvennaia Duma, Sozv. I, Otchet, 612. One desyatina amounted to roughly 1,09 hectares, one pud about 16kg. Denmark's top tier position at the time in terms of land productivity (outperformed only by Japan) has also been confirmed by current research: G. Federico, Feeding the World. An Economic History of Agriculture 1800–2000, Princeton 2005, 73.

32 See Rossia. Gosudarstvennaia Duma, Sozv. I, Otchet, 466–467; M. Boiovich, Chleny Gosudarstvennoi Dumy (portrety i biografi). Pervyi Sozv., 1906–1911g., Moscow 1906, 21.

33 Gosudarstvennaia Duma, Sozv. I, Otchet, 604–605; Boiovich, Chleny (note 32), 18.

This portrayal was also endorsed by Mikhail Gotovetskii, a Lithuanian peasant and lawyer:

We were referred to the example of the well-ordered, peasant country of Denmark here. But there is and never was any nationalization of land, neither in Denmark nor Europe at large. Denmark never attained its current wealth along the path that is being proposed to us here. No one there conceived of a different form of agriculture than one based on personal property and general lease laws. [...]³⁴

Opponents of the projects of the “42” and “104” thus countered the perception of Denmark as a country whose agriculture was essentially in the hands of *peasants* with a view of Denmark as a country of *private landowners* where a peasant commune with communal land ownership no longer existed either.

These different characterizations of the Danish model of success, which in essence merely emphasized two different aspects that were not mutually exclusive, implied divergent imperatives for action in the given Russian case. Whoever considered it essential that the land was in the hands of peasants had to concentrate their efforts on providing the peasants with the greatest possible contingent of arable Russian land for cultivation – even by means of dispossessing estate owners if necessary, as envisioned by the projects of the “42” and the “104”. Conversely, anyone who considered it decisive that the land in Denmark was *privately owned* had to flatly reject the dispossession of private estates and instead focus on separating as many peasants from the peasant commune as possible and making them private land owners. The differing interpretation of the Danish model and the differing evaluation of the draft bills at hand were thus mutually dependent. Hence one can clearly observe how the Danish model and other Western models were employed by various speakers as a legitimizing resource in their own respective interpretation, which served to support one’s own political course in the agrarian question. This is also observable in the second Duma, albeit in a different shape.³⁵

The agrarian and land question stood at the centre of the debates in the second Duma, even more so than in the first. Prime Minister Stolypin had initiated a far-reaching agrarian reform in November 1906, based on article 87 of the constitution,³⁶ which aimed at the gradual dissolution of the peasant land- and redistribution commune and the creation of a social class of land-owning and wealthy small-scale farmers.³⁷ In light of the government’s efforts to create a fait accompli, it was up to the second Duma to position itself in this matter and possibly strive to still push through its own course. As in the first Duma, various draft bills were up for debate which envisioned the dispossession of

34 Gosudarstvennaia Duma, Sozyv I, Otchet, 884.

35 The second Duma convened from February 1907 until its dissolution by the Tsar in June of that same year.

36 Article 87 allowed the government to issue laws in urgent cases during the Duma’s recess periods (which nonetheless required the Duma’s subsequent approval to endure): A. Palme, Die russische Verfassung, Berlin 1910, 156–160.

37 Cf. in detail St. F. Williams, Liberal Reform (note 27), 138–179; R. Hennessy, The Agrarian Question in Russia, 1905–1907, Giessen/Marburg 1977, 133–138.

estate-owned land to the benefit of small-scale farmers. In the debates over these bills and Stolypin's reform, Russian backwardness (in agriculture), West-European progress, as well as the analogy between Western European and Russian development were the guiding themes. The Octobrist³⁸ Prince Dmitrii Sviatopolk-Mirskii was among the first speakers to point out that Russia's agriculture was *extremely backward* when compared to Western Europe as he defended the government's course. The peasant commune had also existed almost everywhere in Western Europe, he claimed, and successful innovations and the concomitant noticeable advances in productivity had set in at the very moment these communes had been dissolved. Moreover, the most essential innovations had been introduced by the private landowners there. It would thus be crucial not to weaken this class in Russia by means of dispossession, and instead focus on dissolving the peasant commune to the benefit of private landowners.³⁹ The delegate of the rightist faction Count Vladimir Bobrinskii also stressed that for the Russian people, the path to prosperity – “as in all civilized countries” – was not one that would lead to dispossessions, but to the dissolution of the obshchina instead.⁴⁰ His factional colleague Vasilii Shulgin proclaimed that all of human civilization had been built on the principle of private property. Anyone who sought to infringe upon it – i.e. in the form of dispossession – was deemed to be on the wrong track (which would ultimately end in the dispossession of even small tracts of land) and would destroy any incentive for personal initiative, with the result of general impoverishment. But even if – he conceded to his opponents as a possibility – socialism represented the future, it was *not up to Russia* to be the first to try it out. Russia, he claimed, was still at the very bottom of the developmental ladder, and thus needed to pass through much of what the western states had already experienced.⁴¹

It was, however, also possible to draw different conclusions from the general paradigm of progress and Russian backwardness. The Trudovik⁴² Aleksandr Karavaev for instance called attention to the disparately higher mortality rate – particularly among peasants – in Russia as compared to the western states, which amounted to enormous losses in both human and economic terms. Yet according to Karavaev Russia lagged behind the Germans by about fifty years with regard to agricultural productivity. Karavaev argued that Russia could by no means afford these fifty years to catch up on this deficit in productivity, given the high mortality rate and the oppressive situation of the peasants. This being the case, however, the only remaining solution would be the enlargement of peasant land, which would only be possible by means of dispossessing large estate owners.⁴³ The Kadet Fedor Tatarinov even assumed that it would be a matter of “centuries”

38 Octobrists: rightist liberal party with the initially strongest faction in the Third Duma.

39 Rossiia. Gosudarstvennaia Duma, Sozv 2, Stenograficheskie otchety, Tom 1, S. Peterburg 1907, 696–707.

40 Ibid., 1291–98.

41 Ibid., 1133–1137. For short biographical notes on Sviatopolk-Mirskii, Bobrinskii and Shulgin cf. M. Boiovich, Chleny Gosudarstvennoi Dumy (portrety i biografi). Vtoroi Sozv., 1907–1912g., Moscow 1907, 13, 51, 358.

42 The delegates of the agrarian socialist Trudovik faction predominantly came from a peasant background. In the First and the Second Duma it was second in size only to the leftist liberal Kadet faction.

43 Gosudarstvennaia Duma, Sozv 2, Tom 1, Otchet, 711–712, 717–719.

before Russia would reach the economic stage of development and productivity levels of the West-European countries. Like Karavaev, he too came to the conclusion that the enlargement of peasant land by means of dispossession would be the only feasible option in the short and medium term.⁴⁴

Citing prominent western personalities also belonged to the repertoire of representatives from various parties when it came to legitimizing their own respective positions. For instance, in his plea for the dispossession of estate-owned land without compensation, the Social Democrat Iraklii Tsereteli chose the Prussian von Hardenberg as his key witness – Hardenberg had urged his king to adopt revolutionary ideas in 1807, arguing that the state would otherwise founder or be forced to accept them.⁴⁵ While a Social Democrat referred to the Prussian Chancellor, the Russian rightist Prince Aleksandr Urusov alluded to the German Social Democrat Karl Kautsky, who was said to have described raising the Russian peasant economy to the level of “civilized states” as a priority, without which the nationalization of land could not be a viable solution.⁴⁶ To counter Social Democratic and Socialist Revolutionary demands for a dispossession of all estate-owned land *without compensation* (and by violent means if necessary), the Kadet Andrei Shingarev invoked revolutionary France as a *negative model*, which was deemed to have paid for the temporary application of this principle with almost a century’s worth of tremors sending shockwaves throughout the entire country.⁴⁷ Tsereteli subsequently sought to fend off this reference with an entirely different rendition of history, according to which it was the confiscation of estate-owned land that had helped France restore its power in the first place and secured the necessary support for the new order in the struggle against the old.⁴⁸

This abundance of references to the West combined with a range of different types of argumentation (references to *positive western models*, to the fact that particular measures were being applied either *everywhere* in the West, throughout *most* of the West or (almost) *nowhere* in the West, referring to prominent western personalities as *key witnesses* or, finally, pointing out the *negative experiences* made by western states) illustrates the central status of representations of the West as a resource for legitimization among politicians from virtually all political affiliations in Russian domestic political debates during the examined timeframe. While this also holds true for the next case in point, the abovementioned case differs from it in a number of aspects: Despite the significance of the Danish model in the first Duma, the agrarian debates did not centre around *one single* country as a generally accepted main model throughout the period in question. Moreover, with all due dissent among the speakers of various parties and ideologies, they were nonetheless in agreement over one thing: The backwardness of Russian agriculture

44 Ibid, 1760-1761, 1769. On Karavaev and Tatarinov cf. Boivich, Chleny, Vtoroi Sozyv (note 41), 97, 218.

45 Rossiiia. Gosudarstvennaia Duma. Sozyv 2, Stenograficheskie Otchety, Tom 2, S. Peterburg 1907, 1230-1235.

46 Duma, Sozyv 2, Otchet, Tom 1, 1812-1817.

47 Ibid, 1355-1356.

48 Duma, Sozyv 2, Otchet, Tom 2, 1225-1230. On Shingarev, Urusov and Tsereteli cf. Boivich, Chleny, Vtoroi Sozyv (note 41), 53, 361, 468.

as compared to the West compelled political reforms, whichever direction these reforms may ultimately be aiming at.

b) Germany as a Norm for the Social Security State: Debates in the Field of Labour Legislation

Reform debates over labour legislation demonstrate that it was also possible to draw a different conclusion from the diagnosis of Russian backwardness, namely that Russia should not pursue reforms – at least not too quickly or too extensively. Already shortly after the outbreak of the 1905 revolution a commission under the Finance Minister Kokovtsov began drafting legislation that aimed at accommodating some of the workers' demands and thus taking the wind out of the sails of discontent. They entailed a statutory reduction of the maximum permitted working hours per day as well as the introduction of insurance schemes for workers – including accident, health, old-age and unemployment insurance.⁴⁹ The reforms under discussion encountered resistance among a sizeable portion of organized business interests. Their arguments varied, yet were essentially based on references to West-European states. In response to the ministry of finance's draft bill, which was already in circulation in spring 1905 and proposed cutting the maximum daily working hours from 11.5 to 10 hours, a commentary published by the *St. Petersburg Society for the Support of the Improvement and Development of Factory Industry* (which represented the interests of employers) argued that a reduction in working hours had only been possible in Germany and England as a consequence of industrial progress and a higher degree of "cultivation" and efficiency among the workers; these steps in development could thus only commence in this particular sequence in Russia.⁵⁰ Hence according to this logic, Russian backwardness in the aforementioned areas represented an argument against the reforms based on western models – for the time being. As in the case of Kokovtsov's commission, the German model played a central role in subsequent government consultations under the aegis of the new Ministry for Trade and Industry.⁵¹ From the perspective of major protagonists involved in the legislative process, Germany was a vanguard in many areas, particularly when it came to the question of workers' insurance. This also informed the arguments of the employers' associations against the government's draft bill for the introduction of health insurance scheme for workers in 1908.⁵² In a statement addressed to the ministry in the late autumn of 1908,

49 On the first attempts cf. G. E. Snow, The Kokovtsov Commission: An Abortive Attempt at Labor Reform in Russia in 1905, in: *Slavic Review*, Vol. 31, № 4 (Dec. 1972), 780–796.

50 See K zakonoprojektu "O prodlzhitel'nosti i raspredelenii rabochago vremeni v promyshlennyykh zavedeniiakh". Zapiska S. Peterburgskago Obshchestva dlia sodeistviia uluchsheniiu i razvitiu fabrichno-zavodskoi promyshlennosti, S. Peterburg 1905, 6-7.

51 Cf. G. E. Snow, Kokovtsov Commission (note 49), 785; see Ministerstvo torgovli i promyshlennosti, Stenograficheskii otchet Osobago Soveshchaniia pri Ministerstve Torgovli i Promyshlennoti, pod predsedatel'stvom Ministra Torgovli i Promyshlennosti, Shtalmeistera D. A. Filosofova, dlia obsuzhdenia zakonoprojektov po rabochemu zakonodatel'stву. 2 T. Zasedaniia 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20 i 21 Dekabria 1906 g.; Zasedaniia 14, 25, 26 Fevralia, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 12 Marta 1907 g., S. Peterburg 1906/1907.

52 One of still only very few examinations of the insurance legislation for workers during this time can be found in:

the *Society of Petersburg Industrialists and Manufacturers* argued that it was beyond comprehension why the draft bill, which otherwise drew on the German example, deviated so decisively from this model when it came to the issue of payable dues: While employers in Germany would have to contribute half as much as the workers – which in practice amounted to a maximum of 4 percent of an employee's wages –, the proposed law envisaged an employer's contribution amounting to 2/3 of what their employee's paid, in addition to complete coverage of medical expenses by the employer, which according to their calculations meant up to 7 percent of an employee's wage. In their view, there was nothing to justify this deviation from the German system.⁵³ According to this line of argumentation, Germany no longer merely represented a possible model for Russia's future development, but rather a *norm* in light of its previously unanimously confirmed progressiveness, which effectively challenged deviations from this model a priori. Characterizations of the German model as an established norm were even more prominent in the debates over the Ministry for Trade and Industry's proposals for a workers' accident insurance scheme in the third Duma in 1911.⁵⁴ Although no single party rejected the basic proposition of introducing such a scheme, the issue of which categories of workers should receive coverage was a major point of contention. The ministry's draft bill, which the responsible Duma commission had confirmed for the most part, set clear and narrow limits in this regard. The statutory accident insurance scheme was to (initially) affect only wage labourers in businesses with at least 20 employees – provided that machinery was employed in the factory – or 30 employees – if this was not the case.⁵⁵ This encountered harsh criticism from the Kadets, who demanded a significantly lower minimum, and even more so from the Trudoviks and Social Democrats, who advocated insurance for all workers without exception. In this case too, major protagonists drew upon the German model. During the second reading of the bill, the Trudovik Konstantin Petrov came to quote the advisor of the Duma commission and Octobrist Baron Evguenii Tizen-gauzen, who claimed that the proposal had been drafted “on the provisions of German legislation”. And yet, declared Petrov, the latter did not feature anything resembling the limitations imposed by the proposal – at the very most, there was talk of a minimum size of ten workers per business (in the first insurance law of 1884). Thus the amendment introduced by the Kadets (which set a minimum of 16 workers per business) was said to be disappointing, because if anything, “it would have been better to take German legislation as an example and settle on the number 10”. The government's bill on the other hand was wholly unacceptable, for the Germans “had introduced something wholly dif-

R. A. Roosa, Worker's Insurance and the Role of the Industrialists in the Period of the Third State Duma, in: Russian Review, Vol. 34, №. 4 (Oct. 1975), 410–452.

53 RGIA, F. 150, op. 1, d. 600, l. 41-43; Zhurnal 8-go zasedaniia soveshchanija pri Obrabotke po zakonoprojektu o strakhovanii rabochikh, 24-ogo oktjabrja 1908 goda.

54 The Third Duma convened in the autumn of 1907 and lasted until the summer of 1912.

55 Cf. I. I. Shelymagin, Zakonodatel'stvo o fabrichno-zavodskom trude v Rossii 1900–1917, Moscow 1952, 237.

ferent to what Bar. Tizengauzen and his kindred spirits are introducing here.”⁵⁶ The Kadet Stepanov became even more explicit during his attack on the government project:

*As I have already mentioned, our [draft] law for insurance is based on the German prototype. According to German law, the insurance covers almost all types of temporary labour; hence positive proof is required for the exclusion of industrial enterprises that are subject to German insurance laws.*⁵⁷

The burden of proof was thus on the side of those who deviated from the German example as the *norm* for Russia. In Stepanov’s view, the government had failed to provide the necessary proof thus far. The German model also provided an essential foundation for the arguments of the Social Democrat Andrei Predkal’n. Almost the entire German working population was included in the state’s accident insurance scheme by now, which came to show that this was practically achievable.⁵⁸ Representatives from all political camps thus clearly treated the German model of the social security state as the *norm* in the third Duma as well, which showed Russia the way and as such warranted justification for deviations from this path.⁵⁹

Just how sustainable the impact of this norm was in the Russian context – and how useful it was for arguments from a range of different political positions – can be evinced from another case in the summer of 1917, between the February and October revolutions. In March 1917 the provisional government convened a special committee working out of the newly created Ministry for Labour, comprised of officials from various ministries as well as employees’ and employers’ representatives and responsible for the formulation of new projects in the area of labour legislation.⁶⁰ Among the various draft bills that were discussed, a proposal by the Ministry of Labour for the introduction of unemployment insurance for industrial workers occupied a significant portion of the agenda. Around three years into an ongoing bitter war against Germany as the main enemy – and in light of vast amounts of publications and rhetoric charged with anti-German resentiments⁶¹ – it would have been reasonable to assume that Germany had forfeited its position as the role-model for the further development of Russian domestic policy. And in actual fact, it initially seemed to be absent in the opening statement of the Ministry for Labour’s representative within said committee, Monoszon. He began by pointing out the existence of two different systems in the West, namely the English system – which made membership in the unemployment insurance scheme mandatory for certain categories of workers – and the so-called “Ghent system”, under which insurance was voluntary and

56 Rossiia. Gosudarstvennaia Duma. Sozyv 3, Sessia 4 (1910/11), Stenograficheskie otchety, Tom 1: Zasedaniia 1-41, S. Peterburg 1911, 170-174.

57 Ibid., 176-178. Italics by B. B.

58 Ibid., 210-211.

59 On Predkal’n, Tizengauzen, Petrov and Stepanov cf. M. Boiovich, Chleny Gosudarstvennoi Dumy (portrety i biografi), Tretii Sozyv, 1907–1912g., 6th edition, Moscow 1913, 158, 187, 232, 233.

60 See Vestnik Ministerstva Truda, № 1-2 (Avgust 1917 g.), 10-13, 26-59; cf. N. V. Beloshapka, Vremennoe Pravitel’stvo v 1917 g.: Mekhanizm Formirovaniia i Funktsionirovaniia, Moscow 1998, 92-96.

61 For a detailed examination: H. F. Jahn, Patriotic Culture in Russia during World War I, Ithaca/ London 1995.

organized by the unions themselves. The government's proposal was said to combine the advantages of the "Ghent system" – most notably the principle of autonomous self-organization among the workers – with the advantages of the English system, which included mandatory unemployment insurance for certain categories of workers.⁶² However, the Social Democratic workers' representative in the committee, Lur'e⁶³, would not content himself with these statements: He voiced his astonishment over the fact that the *German* system, which had been modified in the war, had been overlooked by the ministry. Monoszon promptly responded by explaining that the German system was a variant of the "Ghent system". In Lur'e's view, however, the ministry had ignored a decisive crucial advantage of what he continued to refer to as the "German" system that was absent in the government's draft legislation thus far. The presented proposal sought to introduce staggered insurance rates for workers of up to two percent of their wages, whereas in the new German system the state provided two-thirds of the total insurance rate while the remainder was paid for by the local communes, meaning that the workers themselves shouldered *none* of the cost. This system, which the German central government had only introduced as an option and which required the communes' approval prior to its implementation, had practically taken root in all of Germany within one year. Already *this* fact alone demonstrated that the system had proven itself. Conversely, as Lur'e stated for the record, it would be wholly unacceptable for Russian workers to forgo this accomplishment of the German system. It was not for nothing that Russia had already experienced a revolution and Germany had not.⁶⁴

Thus, besides invoking a barely concealed threat of further revolution, this line of argumentation essentially rested on Germany as a norm in the realm of social legislation from which one would not be allowed to deviate. The ministry representative Monoszon came to employ it himself during the committee's next session, when he essentially based the limitation of unemployment benefits to a maximum of three months per year on the German example, where the according regulation was in place.⁶⁵ It seems clear in any case that Germany also retained its status as the embodiment of modernity with regard to labour legislation in 1917, and that representations of its social security system had accordingly not forfeited their function as a guiding resource of legitimization in the area of social legislation in Russia – even though this could well have been the case considering the given political and military situation.

62 RGIA, F. 32, op. 1, d. 1966, l. 7-22ob: Zasedanie Osobago Komiteta pri Ministerstve Truda, 23-go avgusta 1917 goda, l. 8ob-9.

63 Mikhail („Larin“) Lur'e, originally a Menshevik, joined the Bolsheviks in August 1917: V. Kolodezhnyi, Iurii Larin, in: Shelokhaev, Valentin V. (ed.), Politicheskie parti Rossii. Konets XIX – pervaja tret' XX veka; entsiklopedia, Moscow 1996, 301-302.

64 RGIA, F. 32, op. 1, d. 1966, l. 10-10ob, 13ob.

65 4-e Zasedanie Osobago Komiteta pri Ministerstve Truda. 4-go Sentyabria 1917 goda, in: ibid., l. 33-40, l. 39ob.

3. On the Question of Consensus or Dissent Regarding the Western Orientation of Reforms

Was there indeed no dissent in the political reform discussions in Russia between 1905 and 1917 when it came to the question of whether progress had to lead Russia where the West already stood? To phrase the question differently: How far-reaching was the effectiveness of representations of the West as a resource for political action and legitimization, and – insofar as they had their limitations – where were their limits? First of all, it is worth pointing out that remarkably, barely anyone engaged in the *political* reform debates at the time came to argue that references to the West were of no relevance to Russian politics, as the circumstances in Russia were plainly different – an argument that theoretically would have been easily conceivable. This affirmative answer to the initial question, however, must be qualified in two respects. Firstly: When it came to two questions there were voices – particularly within liberal circles, which were especially receptive to reforms – that denied the West the role of the embodiment of modernity, at least in part. This regarded the fiercely debated question of a complete abolition of the death penalty in Russia at the time, as well as the question of equal rights – particularly voting rights – for women. It may not come as much as a surprise that particularly the representatives of the leftist liberal Kadets partially rejected the view unto Western Europe as the embodiment of modernity when it regarded both these questions, considering that their conceptions aimed at regulations – the abolition of the death penalty and legal equality for women – which did not exist in the countries in question.⁶⁶ Writing about this matter in 1906, Vladimir Nabokov, who later came to serve as a minister in the provisional government, pointed out that the overwhelming number of West-European states had yet to abolish the death penalty. He deemed this a “deplorable anachronism” [!], a remnant of the “old justice” and the “old barbarism”, unworthy of civilized states.⁶⁷ During one of the first Duma’s debates, Fedor Kokoshkin, another prominent Kadet, exclaimed that when it came to the question of women’s rights, Western Europe was not only not ahead of Russia, but in some respects – this applied to France and Germany – even more backward than Russia.⁶⁸ It is however interesting that both politicians nonetheless ultimately located modernity in the West with regard to these questions: In the above-mentioned article, Nabokov wrote that the “more sophisticated and honestly humane representatives of West-European thought” had “long-since recognized” the uncivilized and harmful nature of the death penalty.⁶⁹ Nabokov simply accorded the western opponents of the death penalty, who were in the minority, the status of being the actual and

66 The demand for a speedy introduction of women’s suffrage was not undisputed within the party. After the joint resolution adopted at the 2. party congress however it became part and parcel of the Kadet’s party programme: See Konstitusjonno-demokraticeskaja partija (Partija Narodnoi Svobody), Postanovlenija II-go S”ezda 5-11 ianvarja 1906 g. i Programma, S. Peterburg 1906, 5.

67 V. Nabokov, Otmena smertnoi kazni, in: Pravo 1906, 1901–1908, h. 1901, 1906.

68 F. F. Kokoshkin, Rechi F.F. Kokoshkins (partii Narodnoi Svobody), S. Peterburg 1907, 46-47.

69 V. Nabokov, Otmena (note 67), 1902.

better representatives of Western Europe and thus reclaimed “Western Europe” for his own side of the argument. Neither did Kokoshkin distance himself from the notion of a progressive Western Europe as such in his speech. He exclaimed to the plenum of the Duma that he did not fear the foreseeable objections from opponents of women’s emancipation who would cite Western Europe as an example: “[...] we will refer to the western countries where the legal equality of women has already been established, and with dazzling successes.”⁷⁰ Which specific countries he was referring to remained unaddressed. What is crucial at this point, however, is that although he denied individual western states – namely Germany and France – the status of progressiveness in this matter, this was not true of the West as such. Nevertheless, for the sake of providing a complete picture, it must be emphasized that between 1905 and 1917, there were also publicists and politicians in Russia who categorically rejected reforms according to western patterns. Aside from a number of Socialist Revolutionaries, they also included representatives of the extreme right in particular, chiefly organized in associations such as the *Union of the Russian People* [Soiuz Russkogo Naroda]. This organization propagated an extreme form of anti-Semitism, Great-Russian nationalism and the rejection of almost all innovations that followed the 1905 revolution and were being pursued by both the government and oppositional circles – in different directions.⁷¹ For example, in a characteristic opinion piece published in one of the press organs of the *Union of the Russian People* in the spring of 1907, one could read the following:

*The rotten, so-called progressive society, which also appears as the leader in the State Duma, credits itself with the role of the people's educator. It meddles with village life, which is holy, and subverts all healthy principles of Russian patriarchy. It seeks to inject its rottenness, its poison, into the holy stream of the spiritual life of the Russian peasantry with all its powers. For the sake of the elusive sheen of the progress of civilization it is prepared to sacrifice everything the Russian Orthodox has been educated towards [vospitatelya]. [...]*⁷²

Yet another article appearing in the same issue read:

*God the Lord has given Russia its own wit, which has erected a mighty state architecture – the autocracy –, sanctified by the Orthodox Church and historically justified. It is futile for the Russians to search for state-ideals in foggy England while we have our glowing autocracy, and with it the autocrat, our salvation, our fortune, and not in the form of Octobrist [...] autocracy, but in the real honest, unlimited Tsarist autocracy!*⁷³

70 F. F. Kokoshkin, Rechi (note 68), 46.

71 Cf. G. Hosking, Russischer Nationalismus vor 1914 und heute: Die Spannung zwischen imperialem und ethnischen Bewußtsein, in: Die Russen. Ihr Nationalbewusstsein in Geschichte und Gegenwart, ed. by A. Kappeler, Köln 1990, 169–183, h. 172–173; A. Ascher, Russia in Disarray (note 7), 239–242.

72 Ieromonakh Iliodor, Krest'ianskaia mudrost', in: Za Tsaria i Rodinu. Organ Soiuza Russkago Naroda. Odessa, № 50, 5-go aprelia 1907, 2-3, 3. Italics by B.B.

73 Razboiniki na zakonom osnovanii, in: Za Tsaria i Rodinu. Organ Soiuza Russkago Naroda. Odessa, № 50, 5-go aprelja 1907, 1.

It should be noted that these comments did not imply that modernity was not to be located in the West. Rather, they can be seen as an expression of the rejection of progress per se and thus the concept of modernity in and of itself. Indeed, the protagonists of the *Union of the Russian People* also strove for changes, yet these changes were explicitly meant to lead back to a Slavophile, idealized state of the past, with unlimited autocracy and a direct relationship between the ruler and his people.⁷⁴ Thus the authors of the *Union of the Russian People* did not question whether the path to modernity was via reforms according to western examples, but whether embarking on this path was even desirable in the first place. However this stance effectively disqualified them from the perspective of most Russian political protagonists at the time. It is characteristic that despite all public attention and a supposedly enormous membership the *Soiuz Russkogo Naroda* – the biggest extreme right-wing party in Russia between 1905 and 1917 – failed to attain a status reaching beyond that of a marginal splinter group in the elected Duma. Its positions and tactics also met with little approval in government circles.⁷⁵

This is not to say that these positions remained completely irrelevant. Nikolai II was known to sympathize with the positions of the “Union”, and up until February 1917 he was in a position to block any reforms that were not to his liking.⁷⁶ Since half of the members of the State Council – which had to confirm all legislation – were personally appointed by the Tsar and could be replaced by him at any given time, it is not particularly surprising that there were also some sympathizers of the Union among those serving in this upper chamber. And indeed, the State Council in particular had proven itself to be an obstacle for reforms between 1906 and 1917.⁷⁷ The fact remains, however, that the Russian debates at the time were not about a reform path geared towards or beyond western patterns, but rather revolved around the alternative between stasis or reaction on the one hand, and reforms and modernization according to western models on the other. Even in the debates of the State Council over specific reform projects, conflicting interpretations of particular western models and arguments over the right conclusions to be drawn for the Russian case played an important role.⁷⁸ On the whole, opponents of reform may have been able to slow down, postpone or constrain certain reforms, yet given the previously mentioned pressure for reform as it was perceived from nearly all

⁷⁴ D. C. Rawson, *Russian Rightists and the Revolution of 1905*, Cambridge/New York 1995, 63–67.

⁷⁵ Prominent Union functionaries boasted of a membership of millions; yet in the first two, relatively democratically elected Dumas it supplied a mere 1-2 percent of the delegates; even after a new electoral law that gave the estate-owning nobility a disproportionate amount of clout, this number rose to just 11 percent in the third elected Duma: cf. *ibid.*, 61–62, 167–168, 197–199, 221; on the attitude of the government *ibid.*, 142–151; cf. as well G. Hosking, *Nationalismus* (note 71), 173–174; A. Ascher, *Russia in Disarray* (note 7), 241–242.

⁷⁶ Cf. *ibid.*; D. C. Rawson, *Russian Rightists* (note 74), 142–143.

⁷⁷ A. Korros, *A Reluctant Parliament. Stolypin, Nationalism, and the Politics of the Russian Imperial State Council, 1906–1911*, Lanham (et al.) 2002, 58–59, 62. A whole range of reform projects approved by the Duma and the government – such as in the area of self-administration, local jurisdiction and public education – ultimately failed due to the resistance of the State Council: cf. A. F. Smirnov, *Gosudarstvennaia Duma Rossiiskoi Imperii 1906–1917. Istoriko-pravovoi ocherk*, Cheliabinsk 2010, 371, 376–378, 390.

⁷⁸ For one example see B. Beuerle, *Step* (note 3), 48–50.

sides they were ultimately unable to prevent it in the long run. The actual reforms that were adopted in the areas mentioned between 1905 and 1917 testify to this fact.

III Summary, Outlook and Conclusion

In summary it can be said that, from the perspective of those involved in the numerous reform discussions in Russia between 1905 and 1917, it was generally beyond dispute that the path to modernity was one paved by laws, establishments and institutions that were already to be found in Western Europe and the West by and large. Within this context, representations of Western Europe and the West could be employed as a resource for legitimization and political action in the domestic reform debates during this time. Yet this consensus neither implied unanimity nor a lack of ambiguity. Reform debates were particularly contentious when they concerned those questions which, in light of the apparent heterogeneity and ambiguity of the West, produced a diverse range of unambiguous answers: The question of which of the western states embodied the best – or rather actual – modernity in a certain field; how to interpret and explain the conditions and successes in a given western state and what concrete conclusions could be drawn from them for Russia; the speed at which Russia could and should proceed on the path to modernity; finally, and closely related to this, the question of whether laws and norms could lead the country into modernity, or whether they had to be preceded by the general progressive development of the country in a given area – such as labour productivity, for example. Behind the backdrop of Russia's generally acknowledged need for reform on the one hand and a virtually undisputed location of modernity in the West on the other, the answers to these aforementioned questions and the concomitant antagonistic representations of Western Europe had a profound impact on the shaping of Russian policy. Both the agrarian reforms ultimately implemented by Stolypin's government between 1906 and 1910 as well as the workers' insurance laws that came into effect in 1912 were undoubtedly decisively influenced by western models, regulations, theories and practices.⁷⁹

Finally, for the sake of providing a brief outlook, representations of the West again came to play an important role as a resource for legitimization and political action in Russia during the 1990s. Compared to the early twentieth century, however, the situation was markedly different in two respects, which in turn were subject to change as the decade progressed. For one, proponents of western-oriented theories of monolinear universal development featured prominently in the contemporary discourse, yet as had been the case throughout most of the nineteenth century, they faced a neo-Slavophile or Eurasian movement which stresses the necessity of a distinct Russian path of development between Europe and Asia and tends to perceive the West as a threat first and foremost.

79 Cf. e.g. St. F. Williams, Liberal Reform (note 27), 5; R. A. Roosa, Workers' Insurance Legislation (note 52), 436, 439. A more detailed examination will be included in my dissertation.

The balance between these two political currents shifted over the course of the decade 1990s: Early in the decade, proponents of close socio-economic and political proximity to the West were clearly dominant among the political establishment, while those seeking to locate Russia between Europe and Asia and to whom a distinct Russian path of development is a necessity gained in public and political influence during the latter half of the 1990s.⁸⁰

Furthermore, the United States now came to play a much more significant role in representations of the West than at the beginning of the century. The balance between the USA and Western Europe was also subject to change during the 1990s: While the United States initially assumed the position of the actual West and the leading model of modernity, this perception changes in the second half of the decade – due to fears of American global military and economic dominance, disappointed hopes for cooperation and the social dislocations caused by economic “shock therapy” – and becomes increasingly negative. Conversely, the EU is at the same time increasingly accorded the role of a “positive” West, to which Russia seeks at least partial alignment.⁸¹

In any case, questions concerning the nature of the “West”, its significance for Russia, Russia’s own position and the desirable options for the development of this large country – whether on the Western trail or on its own distinct path – are relevant to this day, and it can be safely assumed that they will continue to occupy Russia for the foreseeable future.

- 80 K. Lebedewa, Neoslavophile Tendenzen in der russischen Gegenwartskultur als Seismograph von Modernisierungskonflikten, in: Erhard Hexelschneider (ed.), Russland und Europa. Historische und kulturelle Aspekte eines Jahrhundertproblems. Leipzig 1995, 303–313; A. Kassianova, Russia: Still Open to the West? Evolution of the State Identity in the Foreign Policy and Security Discourse, in: Europe-Asia Studies 53 (2001), 6 (Sept.), 821–839, h. 824–825, 829, 835; E. Kingston-Mann, In Search (note 30), 190–194.
- 81 See ibid.; A. Kassianova, Russia (note 80), 830, 833–836; J.-Ch. Romer, Russia and Europe: 1944–2004, in: M. A. Lipkin (ed.), Rossiia i zapad: istoricheskii opty XIX–XX vekov. Moscow 2008, 57–59, S. 58–59.

Spreading the European Model by Military Means? The Legitimization of Colonial Wars and Imperialist Interventions in Great Britain and Germany around 1900

Christian Methfessel

RESÜMEE

Dieser Artikel untersucht, welche Funktionen der Verweis auf Europa in den englischen und deutschen Debatten über Kolonialkriege und imperialistische Interventionen um 1900 hatte. Welche Europarepräsentationen dienten den Kriegsbefürwortern als Legitimationsressource, wie instrumentalisierten Kritiker Europabilder, um für ihre politischen Positionen zu werben? So wird etwa gezeigt, wie die Repräsentationen Russlands als mehr oder weniger europäisch dazu dienten, dieses Land als Rivalen oder Kooperationspartner in imperialen Kontexten darzustellen. Im Zentrum des Artikels steht jedoch die Frage, inwieweit Militäreinsätze in der außereuropäischen Welt damit legitimiert wurden, das europäische Modell zu verbreiten (die „Zivilisierungsmission“). Hier ist die zentrale These, dass eine solche Argumentation nur dann eine prominente Rolle spielte, wenn die entsprechenden Militäreinsätze ohnehin populär und erfolgreich waren.

In political terms, the European expansion in the age of empires was the work of single nation states – European imperialism was “merely the sum of individual imperialisms.”¹ Conversely, research on the history of European self-conceptions from a cultural and intellectual history perspective has been able to demonstrate that imperial and colonial contexts were crucial to European representations of the Self and the Other, and that the

1 J. Osterhammel, *Die Verwandlung der Welt. Eine Geschichte des 19. Jahrhunderts*, München 2009, 682.

imperialist expansion in extra-European world regions was also conceived of and legitimized as a European project.² Proceeding from this line of inquiry, this article seeks to examine how the concept of European imperialism influenced political communication in two nation states, namely Great Britain and Germany. Even though the politicians responsible reached decisions about imperial and colonial matters within a national (or international) context, they regularly used representations of the European and the non-European as a resource to justify their actions in public.

What follows is an analysis of the legitimizing function of representations of Europe in the debates surrounding colonial wars and imperialist interventions. It focuses on those military actions which, through the use or the threat of military force, ultimately made imperial rule possible.³ The legitimacy of these military efforts was a commonly contested issue in public debates around 1900. Representations of Europe could have a variety of functions in these debates about legitimacy, the main types of which shall be enumerated below. In political practice, however, there were always several interwoven patterns of argumentation at play – whenever politicians justified, criticised or demanded a particular decision, consistency in content was not their main concern, as they resorted to any argument that supported their own position. The convolution of different patterns of argumentation will then be addressed in the second part of this essay, which will examine public debates on a number of British and German colonial wars as well as imperialist interventions in the period before and after the turn of the century. The central question is: To what extent did politicians and the pro-colonial press legitimize military actions with the purported aim of transforming non-European regions according to the European model? In this context, both politicians and the press often used “Europe” as a term that was interchangeable with other concepts such as “civilisation” or “culture”, and “Europeans” were synonymous with “whites”.⁴ In order to adequately

2 Cf. H. Gollwitzer, *Europabild und Europagedanke. Beiträge zur deutschen Geistesgeschichte des 18. und 19. Jahrhunderts*, 2. ed., München 1964, 328–332; U. Frevert, *Eurovisionen. Ansichten guter Europäer im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert*, Frankfurt am Main 2003, 78–100; H. Kaelble, *Eine europäische Geschichte der Repräsentationen des Eigenen und des Anderen*, in: J. Baberowski/H. Kaelble/J. Schriewer (eds), *Selbstbilder und Fremdbilder. Repräsentationen sozialer Ordnungen im Wandel*, Frankfurt a. M./New York 2008, 67–81, here 69–71.

3 Colonial wars here may refer to the use of military force as a means to maintain rule in a colony or its establishment in territories not yet under control. Imperialist interventions denote military actions in areas not formally part of a colonial empire, in some cases involving the mere threat of force (often with gunships). However it is not possible to always uphold a clear distinction between these phenomena, as military interventions may be a prelude to colonial wars and the expansion of the formally ruled territory. On the phenomenon of colonial war cf. also T. Klein/F. Schumacher (eds), *Kolonialkriege. Militärische Gewalt im Zeichen des Imperialismus*, Hamburg 2006; on the history of informal imperialism cf. J. Gallagher/R. Robinson, *The Imperialism of Free Trade*, in: *The Economic History Review*, New Series, 6 (1953), 1–15; on the history of gunship diplomacy cf. D. R. Headrick, *The Tools of Empire: Technology and European Imperialism in the Nineteenth Century*, New York/Oxford 1981, 19–21.

4 Cf. C. Methfessel, *Europa als Zivilisationsmacht. Kolonialkriege und imperialistische Interventionen in der deutschen und britischen Öffentlichkeit um 1900*, in: F. Bösch/A. Brill/F. Greiner (eds), *Europabilder im 20. Jahrhundert. Entstehung an der Peripherie*, Göttingen 2012, 54–78, esp. 55–57, 63; on the synonymous use of “Europeans” and “whites” in the sciences: V. Lipphardt/K. K. Patel, *Auf der Suche nach dem Europäer. Wissenschaftliche Konstruktionen des Homo Europaeus*, in: Themenportal Europäische Geschichte (2007), URL: <<http://www.europa.clio-online.de/2007/Article=204>> (30.09.2012).

analyse representations of Europe, this investigation will thus not merely confine itself to sources making specific mention of “Europe”, but also include those employing terms closely related to Europe.

1. Representations of Europe: Function and Form in Debates about Imperial Expansion

At the beginning of colonial wars and imperialist interventions, a clearly formulated imperial programme was usually not at the centre of the media's attention, which initially focused on reports of endangered fellow countrymen.⁵ Politicians and the press subsequently legitimized the ensuing military actions with the protection of compatriots in danger. The distinction between the European and the non-European played a significant role in this process; it was, after all, the threat emanating from what was perceived to be a “barbaric” enemy which made military intervention seem necessary. Hence there was often talk of “Europeans” or “whites” under threat, even in instances where only the members of a single nation were in danger. Uprisings in the colonies regularly began with such reports, but also when fellow nationals were under threat in seemingly uncivilized or semi-civilized states, the imperial powers made military action their prerogative.⁶ Military interventions for the protection of Europeans in distress tended to find approval even among critics of colonial policy, which made it easier for governments to commence with the mobilization of troops and press ahead with imperial expansion.

Following the eruption of conflicts, however, the debates about their causes and the political aims of the military actions also ensued. The question arose whether current colonial policy and the conduct of those on the spot were to blame for the escalation, and whether further imperial expansion or a withdrawal from the area in question was the more desirable course of action.

Advocates of imperial expansion often legitimized colonial wars and imperialist interventions with the commitment to the “civilizing mission”⁷ or the “cultural obligation” of the “more highly developed states”. The civilizing mission in this case can be understood as the aspiration to spreading the European model throughout the extra-European world.⁸ Yet these aspirations had their limitations: at a time when the distinction between Eu-

5 See for example R. H. MacDonald, *The Language of Empire: Myths and Metaphors of Popular Imperialism, 1880–1918*, Manchester/New York 1994, 129.

6 Cf. from a legal history perspective: J. Fisch, *Die europäische Expansion und das Völkerrecht. Die Auseinandersetzungen um den Status der überseeischen Gebiete vom 15. Jahrhundert bis zur Gegenwart*, Stuttgart 1984, 307–308.

7 Cf. J. Osterhammel, „The Great Work of Uplifting Mankind“. *Zivilisierungsmission und Moderne*, in: B. Barth/J. Osterhammel (eds), *Zivilisierungsmissionen. Imperiale Weltverbesserung seit dem 18. Jahrhundert*, Konstanz 2005, 363–425.

8 The representations of Europe as a model in the period under examination differ substantially from those of the European Union in the 1990s. For one they differ in terms of their content, and furthermore the latter mainly had an influence in non-military contexts and played significant role within the framework of EU enlargement in particular. Cf. the article by Andreas Weiß in this volume.

rope and the non-European was conceived of in hierarchical terms and belief in the superiority of European civilization dominated public discourse,⁹ it was not to be expected – at least not in the foreseeable future – that the extra-European regions of the world could be placed on an equal footing with Europe by means of an orientation towards the European model (barring the United States and Japan). Indeed, colonial rule and waging wars to maintain it were also legitimized by arguing that it served to raise the “civilizational standards” of the colonized peoples. In the eyes of the colonial rulers, however, this elevation could only be a gradual one – the hierarchy between the European colonial masters and their colonial subjects was to remain in place.

The primary objective was the suppression of customs that were perceived to be uncivilized and running counter to European values. Widespread colonial stereotypes about cannibalism, slave-trade and human sacrifices in Africa were regularly employed as a means to justify imperial expansion.¹⁰ Furthermore, colonial rule was also meant to serve the spreading of Christianity, at least in the eyes of some of its supporters.¹¹ According to the usual line of argumentation, Christianity was not to be spread directly by military means; however the creation of a secure environment was supposed to allow the missionaries to peacefully promote their faith.

Expanding the outreach of European civilization seemed desirable to many at the time, even within the milieu of the German Social Democrats, otherwise fierce opponents of imperialism.¹² Nevertheless, colonial critics such as the Social Democrats argued that military means were ill-suited for this purpose – even counterproductive – and called for civilization to be spread by peaceful means. And whenever it was possible to point out past transgressions of the colonial administration which could not be reconciled with the idea of the civilizing mission, anti-war critics would invoke them to delegitimize the military effort.

Colonial policy and warfare served to enforce the creation of economic structures that were in tune with European conceptions and wishes. Coercive measures such as the imposition of taxes were often employed in an effort to raise the “working morale” among the colonial subjects or establish one in the first place. In pro-colonial circles, such aims were considered to be part and parcel of the civilizing mission. Supporters of colonial policy for instance claimed that economic reforms would also help improve the standard

9 Cf. H. Kaelble, *Europäer über Europa. Die Entstehung des europäischen Selbstverständnisses im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert*, Frankfurt am Main/New York 2001, 27–31; H. Kaelble, *Eine europäische Geschichte* (note 2), 69–71.

10 Cf. A. Porter, *Trusteeship, Anti-Slavery, and Humanitarianism*, in: A. Porter (ed.), *The Oxford History of the British Empire*, vol. 3: *The Nineteenth Century*, Oxford/New York 1999, 198–221.

11 On the connexion between imperial expansion, colonial rule and Christian mission cf. A. Porter, *Religion, Missionary Enthusiasm, and Empire*, in: A. Porter (ed.), *The Oxford History of the British Empire*, vol. 3 (note 10), 222–246; H. Gründer, *Christliche Mission und deutscher Imperialismus. Eine politische Geschichte ihrer Beziehungen während der deutschen Kolonialzeit (1884–1914)* unter besonderer Berücksichtigung Afrikas und Chinas, Paderborn 1982; U. v.d. Heyden/H. Stoecker (eds), *Mission und Gewalt. Der Umgang christlicher Missionen mit Gewalt und die Ausbreitung des Christentums in Afrika und Asien in der Zeit von 1792 bis 1918/19*, Stuttgart 2000.

12 Cf. H.-C. Schröder, *Sozialismus und Imperialismus. Die Auseinandersetzung der deutschen Sozialdemokratie mit dem Imperialismusproblem und der „Weltpolitik“ vor 1914. Teil I*, Hannover 1968.

of living of the colonized population and contribute to their “civilization”, and the introduction of “legitimate trade” – as an alternative to slavery – in particular was considered to be the essential feature of this “civilization” and a contribution to the overall progress of humanity at large. Thus when it came to legitimizing the war, economic motives and humanitarian rhetoric went hand in hand. However, there were also cases where the pro-war press openly argued that spreading the European economic model in the extra-European world should, above all, serve European interests. This was particularly apparent in cases where some of the war’s proponents openly argued in social-Darwinist terms and would not even claim that colonial rule also served the interests of the colonized population. Rather, they invoked the right of the stronger and called for the suppression, displacement or even eradication of the non-European population. Arguments of this kind commonly surfaced whenever the debate concerned wars in settler colonies.¹³

However, the economic viability of single colonies and the benefits of colonialism as such were far from beyond dispute, and the burden which its costs placed on the taxpayer was among the most commonly raised arguments by opponents of military intervention. Critics would resort to representations of the European and the non-European to delegitimize colonial wars and imperialist interventions when they depicted the regions in question as unattractive and full of difficulties and dangers for the European military. Such depictions often drew on imageries of un-European landscapes¹⁴ and were meant to make expansion into these regions seem undesirable.

Representations of internal European divisions gained currency whenever colonial wars were said to be based on strategic interests. In some cases, ruling over a particular area was less decisive than ensuring they would not be ruled by others. This raises the question of how the depiction of other states could influence public debates. This would not merely involve rivalries, but also the possible desirability of co-operation with other states in the name of imperial expansion as a common European project. These portrayals also dealt with the question of the extent to which these other nations were worthy representatives and spreaders of European civilization. If the actions of a particular state did not appear to meet the demands of civilization, co-operation was less desirable; states were occasionally even characterized as un-European as a means of emphasizing conflicts and rivalries.

Representations of “Europe” and “civilization” not only shaped the debates around the necessity and purpose of military actions but also the acceptability of particular forms of warfare. According to a widespread notion, other forms of warfare that differed from those employed in interstate warfare in Europe were both necessary and legitimate when

13 Cf. B. Barth, Die Grenzen der Zivilisierungsmission. Rassenvorstellungen in den europäischen Siedlungskolonien Virginia, den Burenrepubliken und Deutsch-Südwestafrika, in: B. Barth/J. Osterhammel (eds), *Zivilisierungsmissionen* (note 7), 201–228.

14 Cf. I. Schröder, *Das Wissen von der ganzen Welt. Globale Geographien und räumliche Ordnungen Afrikas und Europas 1790–1870*, Paderborn 2011, 241–260.

fighting non-European adversaries.¹⁵ Critical voices on the other hand called for European values to be upheld even towards “barbarian” adversaries, which for instance included the demand for prisoners or the wounded to be kept alive.

2. Legitimization of Imperial Military Interventions in Great Britain and Germany before and after 1900

After having traced the typical patterns of argumentation during the period under examination, their employment in the press and parliamentary debates will now be analysed through individual case studies. These will be confined to British and German military actions from the mid-1890s into the first decade of the twentieth century. Both countries experienced an intensification of imperial expansion during this period. Numerous military actions were to maintain, expand or intensify their rule over the extra-European regions of the world. As will be shown, however, the assessment of the desirability and necessity of military force in the non-European world changed along with the ways in which both supporters and critics of military action employed representations of Europe to make their case.

Great Britain was under the impression of a spirit of imperialistic optimism in the late 1890s. This period in British history has often been portrayed as the high-point of “jingoism”, that particular blend of aggressive nationalism and imperialism which found its expression in popular culture. On the political level, the Unionist government elected in 1895 embodied the new course, personified by the new Colonial Minister Joseph Chamberlain. The numerous colonial wars of this period were popular events; the notion that the military advancement of imperial expansion would be a desirable course of action was widespread. An editorial published in the Daily Mail provided the following outlook for the coming year 1897: “There will be fighting in the New Year, of course, for the reconquest of the Sudan awaits us [...]. But a little blood-letting is good for a nation that tends to excess of luxury.”¹⁶

The abovementioned war in the Sudan (1896–1899) like few others was legitimized by its supporters as a crusade to spread civilization, considering that the adversaries were deemed to be “fanatics” and the regime in the Sudan represented the despotic counter-image of European civilization. Following the public announcement of Anglo-Egyptian military operations, Arthur Balfour addressed the House of Commons to defend this course of action on the government’s behalf, arguing it would be “a gain to civilization that Egyptian influence should be extended southwards.”¹⁷ The Times also considered

15 Cf. D. Wünsche, *Feldpostbriefe aus China. Wahrnehmungs- und Deutungsmuster deutscher Soldaten zur Zeit des Boxeraufstandes 1900/1901*, Berlin 2008, 231.

16 A Happy New Year, in: *Daily Mail*, no. 209, 1 Jan. 1897, 4.

17 Hansard Commons, Deb 16 March 1896 vol 38, col 1052.

the planned conquest of the Sudan to be “to the profit of Egypt, of England, and of all civilization.”¹⁸

However, the war involved actions that were deemed a violation of the values of civilization by parts of the British public. Aside from the killing of enemy wounded, the desecration of the mortal remains of the Mahdi, the Empire’s arch enemy in the Sudan in the 1880s, and the destruction of his tomb caused particular offence and raised serious concerns.¹⁹ To illustrate this controversy, one may consider the press coverage of a parliamentary debate in June 1899 which discussed awarding the sum of 30,000 pounds to the military commander Lord Kitchener in honour of his achievements in the Sudan. The issue of the mistreatment of the Mahdi’s remains was also raised, upon which Arthur Balfour explicitly defended Kitchener on the government’s behalf. The jingoist Daily Mail deemed Balfour’s speech to be so compelling that any reasonable person would have to recognize that Kitchener’s course of action was “wise policy”. Indeed, “repulsive to all ideas of our present civilization,”²⁰ but necessary nonetheless, for otherwise the burial site of the Mahdi would have become the focus of future rebellions. The Times, which tended to feature a pro-imperialist and pro-government outlook, also justified the grant, though it argued more cautiously that the destruction of the tomb – whether right or wrong – was “high policy” in any case and stood in no relation to Kitchener’s merits anyhow. It welcomed the grant from the outset, in light of his “services to the Empire and to civilization.”²¹

Both the radical Reynolds’s Newspaper and the left-liberal Manchester Guardian were of a different view. While each honoured Kitchener’s military achievements despite having opposed the campaign, they wanted the assessment of the tomb’s destruction and the desecration of the Mahdi to be weighted differently. The Manchester Guardian for instance stressed the basic principle that wars against “savages” would have to be fought like wars against civilized adversaries, and noted critically the differing perspective of Kitchener’s supporters in parliament: “Because he was a Soudanese fanatic it is assumed that we may treat his tomb as if we too were Soudanese fanatics.”²²

On the whole however, opponents of the war argued from a defensive position, while its proponents confidently presented the argument that this was a war being waged in the name of civilization. Strategic arguments also played a role, and the pro-colonial press repeatedly pointed out that spreading civilization in the Sudan would simultaneously bring a region with promising economic potential under Anglo-Egyptian rule. This not-

18 The Advance on the Nile, in: *The Times*, no. 34840, 17 Mar. 1896, 9.

19 Cf. H. Cecil, British Correspondents and the Sudan Campaign of 1896-98, in: E. M. Spiers (ed.), *Sudan: The Reconquest Reappraised*, London/Portland 1998, 102-127, here 119-123.

20 A Satisfactory Explanation, in: *Daily Mail*, no. 974, 6 Jun. 1899, 4.

21 A Grant to Lord Kitchener, in: *The Times*, no. 35848, 6 Jun. 1899, 11.

22 The Manchester Guardian, no. 16481, 6 Jun. 1899, 6-7; Parliament and the Mahdi’s Head, in: *Reynolds’s Newspaper*, no. 2548, 11 Jun. 1899, 4.

withstanding, legitimizations of the war mainly focused on the overthrow of “tyranny” or “despotism” in the Sudan and the establishment of a “civilized” government.²³

This also applies to a number of other wars involving the British Empire during this period, such as the expedition to Benin in 1897 or the colonial war in Sierra Leone in 1898. In both cases it was initially a matter of protecting Europeans or retribution for killed compatriots which played no small part in making the subsequent military reaction appear justified. The expedition to Benin was preceded by a massacre on an unarmed legation that had embarked to meet the ruler of Benin for negotiations. Following the first reports of this incident, the Daily Mail demanded revenge, calling for it to be served “coolly, but promptly, and with such severity that these savages shall never dare lay finger on an Englishman again.”²⁴ The colonial war in Sierra Leone began in a similar fashion, with reports of murdered merchants and missionaries.

In the case of Benin, however, additional older reports detailing the culture of cruelty at the court of the King of Benin and the human sacrifices there lent legitimacy to the actions that were taken against this African ruler.²⁵ When it came to the war in Sierra Leone, sceptical voices criticized that the misguided policy of introducing the hut tax was responsible for the uprising. Conversely, supporters of colonial policy in Sierra Leone argued that this revolt had been the inevitable outcome of civilization, law and order making inroads into “barbarian” areas. As the further advancement of civilization remained an imperative, however, they called for an intensification of colonial rule in the hinterland – a policy that eventually became prevalent.²⁶

The prominent role of the civilizational argument in the British wars before the turn of the century can in part be explained by the fact that these wars were an overall success when viewed from the British Empire’s perspective. Furthermore, they took place at a point in time when imperial expansion and the military actions associated with it enjoyed a considerable degree of popularity among the British public. The Boer War (1899–1902) marked both the high point and turning point of this popularity. Prior to its outbreak, the Daily Mail commenced to beat the drums of war with particular vigour, portraying a war between the British Empire, as a representative of civilization, and the Boer republics, which were described as uncivilized, as increasingly unavoidable in order to introduce the rules of civilization across South Africa. Wartime propaganda centred on the disadvantaged position of the British (and other foreigners) in the Boer republics as well as incidents of Boer police violence against fellow nationals.²⁷ Occurrences of

23 Cf. for example Smashed, in: The Pall Mall Gazette, no. 10434, 5 Sep. 1898, 1; The Fall of Omdurman, in: The Times, no. 35613, 5 Sep. 1898, 7; Lord Kitchener in the Sudan, in: The Times, no. 36921, 10 Nov. 1902, 9.

24 Daily Mail, no. 218, 12 Jan. 1897, 4.

25 Cf. A. E. Coombes, Reinventing Africa: Museums, Material Culture and Popular Imagination in Late Victorian and Edwardian England, New Haven/London 1994, 11–28; An African Monarch and His “Customs”. Superstition and Cruelty, in: The Manchester Guardian, no. 15733, 13 Jan. 1897, 7.

26 Cf. J. D. Hargreaves, The Establishment of the Sierra Leone Protectorate and the Insurrection of 1898, in: Cambridge Historical Journal, 12 (1956), 56–80.

27 Cf. for example Daily Mail, no. 236, 2 Feb. 1897, 4: “Two Englishmen expelled, robbed and starved by Transvaal black police already”. This report was to be denied at a later date.

this kind played no small part in the British media's depiction of the Boers as uncivilized (though European) and perceptions of the war's legitimacy. Yet the war became increasingly less popular as the military effort wore on and grew ever more costly and thus contributed to an overall decline in the degree of approval for imperial expansion.²⁸ Germany too was in the midst of a new phase of imperial expansion during this period. Both past commentators and current research view the late 1890s as the beginning of the new "Weltpolitik" (world politics). Voices demanding a more active policy "overseas" began to multiply from 1895 onwards;²⁹ in 1896 Kaiser Wilhelm II announced his empire's new claim to becoming a world power;³⁰ in 1897 the new agenda eventuated a change in personnel when Bernhard von Bülow was appointed Foreign Secretary and Alfred von Tirpitz became Secretary of State of the German Imperial Naval Office. While the early beginnings of "Weltpolitik" certainly struck a chord among parts of the public, they neither aroused overwhelming enthusiasm nor unanimous exaltation. This had less to do with the concrete, rather small-scale military actions with a successful outcome in the second half of the 1890s than with the costly build-up of the naval fleet. Long and tedious negotiations were necessary before the government could finally drum up a majority in the Reichstag and pass the First Navy Bill in 1898, and the National Liberals, the only party to offensively campaign on the back of its support for Weltpolitik sustained an electoral defeat in the 1898 Reichstag elections.³¹ Nevertheless, the government was able to secure the support of both the majority of the Reichstag and the press for the German Reich's military interventions in Haiti and China in 1897. It was of particular significance that the government deployed gunships for the protection of fellow countrymen in both cases and simultaneously seized upon these interventions to underscore its own claim to becoming a world power with national pathos. Following the intervention in China, which was sparked off by the killings of two missionaries, the territory that came to be known as the colony of "Kiao-chau" was annexed in 1898. The German government was able to act as the protector of the missionaries, which ensured the approval of the Catholic Centre Party, while the hopes invested in the future of the Chinese market allowed it to mobilize supporters from various political camps, even among left-wing liberals who were generally critical of colonial policy.³²

28 Cf. I. Sharpe, The Liberal Party and the South African War 1899–1902, in: *Journal of Liberal Democrat History*, 29 (2000), 3–8; K. O. Morgan, The Boer War and the Media (1899–1902), in: *20th Century British History*, 13 (2002), 1–16, esp. 9–12.

29 Cf. K. Canis, Von Bismarck zur Weltpolitik. Deutsche Außenpolitik 1890 bis 1902, Berlin 1997, 225.

30 Rede Wilhelms II. über Deutschland als Weltreich (1896), in: R. vom Bruch/B. Hofmeister (eds), Deutsche Geschichte in Quellen und Darstellung, vol. 8: Kaiserreich und Erster Weltkrieg 1871–1918, Stuttgart 2000, no. 65, 266–267.

31 Cf. B. Fairbairn, Democracy in the Undemocratic State: The German Reichstag Elections of 1898 and 1903, Toronto 1997, 166.

32 Cf. Stenographische Berichte über die Verhandlungen des Reichstags. IX. Legislaturperiode. V. Session 1897/98, vol. 159, 6 Dec. 1897, Berlin 1898, 60; Stenographische Berichte über die Verhandlungen des Reichstags, IX. Legislaturperiode. V. Session 1897/98, vol. 160, Berlin 1898, 892–937; A. Vagts, Deutschland und die Vereinigten Staaten in der Weltpolitik, Vol. 2, London 1935, 1708–1724; K. Canis, Von Bismarck zur Weltpolitik (note 29), 268–271.

When the Boxer War began in summer 1900 and Beijing's diplomatic quarter came under siege, politicians and the media in England and Germany justified their military actions as a "punitive crusade in the name of civilization".³³ Rescuing Europeans in danger and taking revenge for murdered Europeans stood at the centre of the war's legitimization. Beyond this, the military actions of the imperialist states were meant to ensure that China's future development would also proceed according to European designs. Writing in the *Berliner Lokal-Anzeiger*, the German novelist Dagobert von Gerhardt-Amyntor stipulated that the "bloody seeds" of the uprising would bear the "harvest" of an advanced stage in development, "not only for the civilized nations, but also for the yellow men themselves."³⁴

Faced with a common enemy, English and German newspapers called for co-operation between the states which were actively engaged on Chinese soil, and appeals of this kind were often addressed to "Europe"³⁵ whenever the press demanded unity among the enemies of China – even though the military coalition included not only six European states but also Japan and the United States. At the same time, calls for European co-operation were often coupled with criticism of individual states. English media pundits tended to be particularly adamant in their criticism of the traditional rival Russia, and occasionally went as far as to call for its exclusion from the European community. According to one racist pattern of argumentation that came to be employed in this context, the Russian Tsars had Mongolian blood pumping through their veins and therefore did not belong to Europe but stood in closer relation to the Chinese race instead.³⁶

Generally speaking, the necessity of the war against China was rarely in dispute. Indeed, as in the previously mentioned controversies surrounding the British campaign in the Sudan, reports of lootings and massacres led critics to question whether the conduct of European troops did justice to the demands of their own civilization. Essentially, however, only a small minority called the necessity of the war into doubt. In Germany's

33 T. Klein, Straffeldzug im Namen der Zivilisation: Der „Boxerkrieg“ in China (1900–1901), in: T. Klein/F. Schumacher (eds), *Kolonialkriege* (note 3), 145–181. On the Boxer War in the media and parliamentary debates cf. also U. Wieland/M. Kaschner, Die Reichstagsdebatten über den deutschen Kriegseinsatz in China: August Bebel und die „Hunnenbriefe“, in: S. Kuß/B. Martin (eds), *Das Deutsche Reich und der Boxeraufstand*, München 2002, 183–201; T. Trampedach, „Yellow Peril?“ German Public Opinion and the Chinese Boxer Movement, in: *Berliner China Hefte*, 23 (2002), 71–81; T. Klein, Propaganda und Kritik. Die Rolle der Medien, in: M. Leutner/K. Mühlhahn (eds), *Kolonialkrieg in China. Die Niederschlagung der Boxerbewegung 1900–1901*, Berlin 2007, 173–180; Lu Yixu, Germany's War in China: Media Coverage and Political Myth, in: *German Life and Letters*, 61 (2008), 202–214; C. Methfessel, „Orient gegen Orient“. Europabilder in der *Berliner Morgenpost* während des Boxerkriegs, in: *Themenportal Europäische Geschichte* (2009), URL: <<http://www.europa.clio-online.de/2009/Article=425>> (30.09.2012).

34 D. von Gerhardt-Amyntor, Wer ist schuld am chinesischen Aufstand?, in: *Berliner Lokal-Anzeiger*, no. 328, 17 Jul. 1900.

35 On Europe as a term and authority for appeal cf. P. R. Blum, Europa – ein Appellbegriff, in: *Archiv für Begriffs geschichte*, 43 (2001), 149–171; J. Requate/M. Schulze Wessel, *Europäische Öffentlichkeit: Realität und Imaginativ on einer Appellationsinstanz*, in: J. Requate/M. Schulze Wessel (eds), *Europäische Öffentlichkeit. Transnationale Kommunikation seit dem 18. Jahrhundert*, Frankfurt am Main/New York 2002, 11–42.

36 Cf. Are Russians Akin to Chinese? Why the Czar may Become the Chief Power in China, in: *Daily Express*, no. 68, 11 Jul. 1900, 6; Alberti, Conrad, Pariser Chronik [Ein welthistorischer Reinfall. – Leder und Lieder], in: *Berliner Morgenpost*, no. 147, 27 Jun. 1900.

case, the costly deployment of a large contingent of troops was among the main reasons for the dwindling popularity of the military effort. Although the German government initially enjoyed considerable support for its war strategy, the German troops did not arrive in China until after the high point of the war and the siege of Beijing was already over. Hence the deployment of large numbers of soldiers aroused little excitement and the “China mood” (“Chinastimmung”) subsided.³⁷

Thus attitudes towards colonial wars and imperialist interventions in Great Britain and Germany became subject to change around the turn of the century. Military interventions in the non-European world grew increasingly unpopular – one may even speak of an intermittent crisis of colonial and imperial policy in both states. In Great Britain’s case, the Boer War from 1899 to 1902 led to uncertainties with regard to its imperial self-image. Particularly the “War Stories Scandal” over corruption during the war tarnished the reputation of the Unionist government.³⁸

Debates surrounding other imperial issues also came to undermine the government’s popularity: The employment of Chinese contract labourers in South Africa caused public outrage in England and led to a long-lasting debate that contributed to the Unionist government’s subsequent electoral defeat. This also holds true for the actions of Chamberlain, who publicly campaigned for an imperial policy of protectionism. Protective tariffs were unpopular in England, and the differences in opinion on this imperial issue within the Conservative Party weakened it further.³⁹ Against this backdrop, it was a widespread notion within government circles that the public could not be expected to overwhelmingly approve of additional colonial wars.⁴⁰ When it came to military actions in the extra-European world nonetheless, government officials and the pro-colonial press tended to argue from a much more defensive position in their justifications than before 1900. As for the Liberal government, which came to replace the Unionist cabinet in 1905, imperial events and developments may not have contributed to a kind of permanent crisis as it had been experienced by their predecessors, however it too sought to avoid military actions outside of Europe or keep them contained – an aggressive form of imperialism remained unpopular.

Henceforth the argument of the civilizing mission lost its former pull when it came to British colonial wars. During the expeditions in Somalia from 1901 to 1904 against an enemy referred to as the “Mullah”, this kind of argumentation did not even feature in the pro-imperial press, even though the Mullah was compared to the former adversary in

37 According to the assessment of the German officer and doctor Georg Hillebrecht, who was deployed in China, on 6 December 1900 during his perusal of newspapers from home, cf. A. E. Eckl (ed.), „Man wird wohl später sich schämen müssen, in China gewesen zu sein.“ Tagebuchaufzeichnungen des Assistenzarztes Dr. Georg Hillebrecht aus dem Boxerkrieg 1900–1902, Essen 2006, 168.

38 Cf. F. Bösch, *Öffentliche Geheimnisse. Skandale, Politik und Medien in Deutschland und Großbritannien 1880–1914*, München 2009, 256–262.

39 Cf. J. D. Startt, *Journalists for Empire: The Imperial Debate in the Edwardian Stately Press, 1903–1913*, New York/London 1991, 31–105.

40 Cf. P. Fleming, *Bayonets to Lhasa: The First Full Account of the British Invasion of Tibet in 1904*, London 1961, 96.

the Sudan. Strategic considerations (i.e. the proximity to Aden) were at the forefront of the military action, and those defending this unpopular expedition in public placed particular emphasis on the promise of protecting allied tribes. Even the pro-colonial press did not call for an expansion into inner Somalia to spread “European civilization” there. While the Daily Mail demanded reinforcements as a reaction to a defeat in Somalia in October 1902, it also came to describe Somalia as “one of the least desirable countries on the face of the earth.”⁴¹ Opponents of the military effort seized upon this representation of Somalia as an unattractive region for European to call for a termination of the expeditions. Even the Conservative Prime Minister Arthur Balfour served to reinforce these representations when he declared in a speech in November 1902: “Waterless wastes and nomad fanatics have always been difficult problems to deal with since the very dawn of civilized communities.” At the same time, he described the intervention as less important. The Manchester Guardian promptly followed up on his statements:

*As Mr. Balfour attaches no importance to the ‘nomad fanatics’ in his ‘waterless wastes’, he surely ought to put a stop to the expenditure of British money on further attempts to catch this fanatic.*⁴²

While the war against Tibet in 1903/4⁴³ was also meant to force the Tibetans into upholding a trade agreement signed in 1890 and thereby incorporate Tibet into the global world economy under European domination, this argument was never the decisive one for its proponents – it proved itself ineffective and even met with public ridicule. A cartoon appearing in Punch depicted Britain as a lion, proclaiming “I’ve come to bring you the blessings of Free Trade,” upon which Tibet, represented by a llama, replies: “I’m a protectionist. Don’t want ‘em.”⁴⁴ Punch effectively equated Tibet’s position with the political position of Chamberlain; hence Tibet’s refusal to embrace free trade hardly appeared as a legitimate reason for war. Indeed, this satirical equation should not be overrated, however even in the political debate opponents of the war came to describe the Tibetans as a people who had a right to be left in peace. The government and the pro-war press thus placed less emphasis on spreading free trade and highlighted the threat emanating from Russian activities in Tibet to make the case for war. A commentary published in The Times on 16 January 1904 read:

*We have the treaty rights beyond all question, but it is more than likely that the urgency of enforcing them has been brought home to us by our knowledge that as a fact Russian intrigue has been busy in Tibet for some years past.*⁴⁵

41 The Somaliland Reverse, in: Daily Mail, no. 2029, 20 Oct. 1902, 4.

42 International Politics. Speech of Mr. Balfour. A Possible Future Menace of Peace. The Continent and Great Britain. Plea for a Better Understanding. The Preservation of the Concert of Europe, in: The Manchester Guardian, no. 17552, 11 Nov. 1902, 7. For the editorial comment on this speech: The Manchester Guardian, no. 17553, 12 Nov. 1902, 4.

43 On the depiction of this war in the media cf. G. R. Wilkinson, ‘There is No More Stirring Story’: The Press Depiction and Images of War during the Tibet Expedition 1903–1904, in: War & Society, 9 (1991), 1–16.

44 Printed in P. Fleming, Bayonets to Lhasa (note 40), 96.

45 The Advance into Tibet, in: The Times, no. 37292, 16 Jan. 1904, 11; cf. also The Tibetan Debate, in: The Times, no. 37368, 14 Apr. 1904, 7.

Once again, Russia appeared as a partly Asian power. This time however it was not the Tsar's family which came to embody this Asian element: Dorzhiev, a man from Central Asia who was active in Tibet and considered a Russian spy was cast in this role, although his significance was extremely overrated by both the English political establishment and the public. While the actual insignificance of Russian activities was revealed upon the conclusion of the Tibet War, the expedition's success served to legitimize the British course of action.⁴⁶ Nevertheless, supporters of the action were cautious in their argumentation when it came to the question of further expanding the outreach of European civilization – the Times for instance wrote that it was up to the Tibetan rulers to decide whether Tibet opened itself up to European tourists.⁴⁷

The fact that, unlike British military actions before 1900, exporting the European model by force played no role in either of these two wars certainly also had something to do with their particular political and geographical contexts. Indeed, during the war against the Sultanate of Sokoto, which ended in 1903 and was more comparable to the wars before 1900, the Times justified the intervention with the spreading of civilization and the overthrow of a ruler whom it described as a tyrant. At the same time, however, it pointed out that this war had barely cost anything and that a direct form of British rule in this region had not been planned.⁴⁸ The Times thus pursued a more cautious line of argumentation than in previous pledges for imperial expansion and an intensification of colonial rule in the name of the civilizing mission before 1900.

This defensive stance of British imperial policy in the first decade of the twentieth century also manifested itself in the public portrayal of British and Russian interventions in the Persian Civil War in 1909. Moreover, the Tsarist Empire no longer appeared as the rival of the British Empire as it had been the case during the wars in China and Tibet. Two years earlier, both states had negotiated a settlement concerning imperial points of contention in Asia. Great Britain, which had previously sympathised with the reform-oriented opposition, and Russia, whose traditional policy had been to support the reactionary Shah, agreed upon a common course of action.⁴⁹ This co-operation was by no means beyond dispute; there were critics in Great Britain who alleged that the government was merely supporting Russian ambitions by co-operating with the Tsarist Empire, keeping the Shah in office as a puppet and suppressing the opposition. The Times on the other hand did its utmost to back the pro-Russian course of Foreign Secretary Edward Grey. The fact that Russia was actually beginning to reconsider its previous support for the Shah at the time – albeit hesitantly – worked out in its favour.

Generally speaking, the Times upheld the principle of non-intervention and argued that Great Britain and Russia were only militarily involved in Persia to protect the lives of foreign nationals who were in harm's way. Nevertheless, it welcomed the pressure from

46 Cf. P. Fleming, Bayonets to Lhasa (note 40), 78-86, 234, 239.

47 The Tibetan Mission, in: *The Times*, no. 37484, 27 Aug. 1904, 7.

48 Cf. Nigeria, in: *The Times*, no. 37332, 3 Mar. 1904, 9.

49 Cf. F. Kazemzadeh, *Russia and Britain in Persia, 1864–1914: A Study in Imperialism*, New Haven/London 1968, 448-580.

both imperial powers, which led the Shah to declare in May 1909 that he would be prepared to hold elections. The opposition continued its struggle nonetheless, and the Times followed these developments with scepticism. While it supported the constitutional development in Persia, it insisted on the inclusion of the Shah (and Russia) in this process and expressed concerns that the demands made by the opposition were too radical. According to the Times, parliamentary institutions needed time to develop:

That has been illustrated in a remarkable fashion by the very real authority, and yet wider influence, which have been acquired by the remodelled Russian Duma. The great point is to have such institutions firmly established in some shape. Once the plant has taken root, it will grow with healthy vigour, provided that it be given time. Attempts to force it, as the history of the first and second Dumas and that of the first Mejliss again show, are seldom judicious. [...] They sought to apply in practice the extreme consequences of the democratic theories they had imbibed from their Western teachers, and they sought to do this amongst populations, to whose ideas and traditions those theories were altogether foreign.⁵⁰

Such a comparison between Persia and Russia, in which the Tsarist Empire appeared as merely one step ahead on the path of the Western model, proved to be an exception in the commentaries published by the Times during the Persian crisis in 1909. However, when a month later Russian parliamentarians visited England, the reforms in Russia were the main argument the Times used to promote sympathies for Russia. Prior to the meeting between the King of England and the Tsar, the latter was lauded by the Times for having introduced a constitution. At the same time, these comments also reveal the difference between the images of Russia and Persia as they appeared in the Times. A commentary published on 24 June viewed the Russian development as a shift towards (re-)Europeanization:

It means a new Russia in place of the old – or rather it means a Russia returning to those old principles of tempered liberty which the greatest of Russian communities shared with their brethren in the West of Europe, before the long night of the Tartar invasion overshadowed their land. The Emperor, who has voluntary opened the way to that happy restoration, has deserved well of his people, and his people and his people's representatives know that it is so.⁵¹

When it came to Persia on the other hand, the Times deemed the electoral law that was announced by the cabinet of the Shah “a daring provision in an Oriental country where representative government is still in its infancy” just one month earlier.⁵²

50 The Shah and his Counsellors, in: The Times, no. 38963, 19 May 1909, 11. On the reforms in Russia cf. Benjamin Beuerle’s article in this volume.

51 Our Russian Guests, in: The Times, no. 38994, 24 Jun. 1909, 11.

52 The Shah and his Counsellors, in: The Times, no. 38963, 19 May 1909, 11.

Within the context of its coverage of events in Persia, however, the Times tended to portray Russia as the imperial protector of foreign nationals in Persia. As the oppositional forces continued their advance and were closing in on Tehran, Russia also redeployed troops in proximity of the capital, though it affirmed that this was merely a precautionary measure to protect the lives and property of foreign nationals if necessary. Contrary to mistrustful voices in parliament, the Times sided with Foreign Secretary Grey and affirmed its confidence in the intentions of the Russians. A commentary from 7 July mentioned the “Europeans” on four occasions, claiming they were now being protected by Russia just as Great Britain had previously done in the south of Persia.⁵³

As was the case in Great Britain, the German military actions that followed after the turn of the century were also less popular there than the two imperial interventions that ushered in the beginning of Weltpolitik in 1897. The joint German-British intervention in Venezuela (1902/3) was unpopular in both countries, albeit for different reasons. The English media were particularly concerned about the reaction of the United States, while the co-operation with Germany was met with harsh criticism. When Germany proceeded to bombard Venezuelan forts in January 1903, the English press was indignant at the aggressive behaviour of the Germans.⁵⁴ In Germany on the other hand, criticism mainly centred on the lack of success. Nationalist circles in particular criticized Germany’s decision to yield to American pressure and accept a US-backed solution to the conflict by referring it to arbitration.⁵⁵

Following the outbreak of an uprising in South-West Africa in 1904, colonial wars became a fiercely debated issue in Germany over the next few years.⁵⁶ Yet another uprising had occurred in East Africa that following year, still the debate mainly centred on the war in South-West Africa. Initially the government could count on the Reichstag’s approval of the military interventions – after all, their primary purpose was to provide protection for the Europeans living there. As the wars turned out to be both lengthy and costly, however, they became increasingly unpopular over time and came to represent a failure of German colonial policy. Moreover, numerous colonial scandals involving abuses of authority and violent excesses were exposed at the time and tarnished the reputation of German colonial policy even further.⁵⁷ Beyond this, the genocidal character of warfare practised by German troops also drew criticism. As in the aforementioned cases, colonial-

53 The Troubles in Persia, in: *The Times*, no. 39005, 7 Jul. 1909, 9.

54 Cf. The „Admiral of the Atlantic“ at Work, in: *Daily Mail*, no. 2112, 24 Jan. 1903, 4; cf. also D. Geppert, *Pressekriege. Öffentlichkeit und Diplomatie in den deutsch-britischen Beziehungen (1896–1912)*, München 2007, 183–189.

55 Cf. M. Czaja, *Die USA und ihr Aufstieg zur Weltmacht um die Jahrhundertwende. Die Amerikaperzeption der Parteien im Kaiserreich*, Berlin 2006, 303–324.

56 On the public debates over the war in German South-West Africa cf. H. W. Smith, *The Talk of Genocide, the Rhetoric of Miscegenation: Notes on Debates in the German Reichstag Concerning Southwest Africa, 1904–14*, in: S. Friedrichsmeyer/S. Lennox/S. Zantop (eds), *The Imperialist Imagination: German Colonialism and its Legacy*, Ann Arbor 1998, 107–123; S. Kuß, *Deutsches Militär auf kolonialen Kriegsschauplätzen. Eskalation von Gewalt zu Beginn des 20. Jahrhunderts*, Berlin 2010, 348–351.

57 Cf. Bösch, *Öffentliche Geheimnisse* (note 38), 288–310.

sceptic voices alleged that this signified a violation of their own culture.⁵⁸ Nonetheless, the scandals and the rising cost of these military endeavours were of greater importance when it came to the dwindling popularity of German colonial policy.

Whenever proponents of German colonial policy called for perseverance, arguments alluding to a civilizing mission did not feature prominently. References to the civilizing role of Germany would likely have been inopportune, considering that German colonial policy regularly faced allegations of officials and settlers on the spot acting contrary to all principles of European civilization in the aftermath of the colonial scandals. In the Reichstag debate of 30 January 1905, the left-liberal delegate Schrader spoke of “particular actions of the civilized populations” towards the African population with “did not always have a civilizing, but sometimes rather uncivilizing effect.”⁵⁹ In cases where proponents of the war commended the “cultural work” of the settlers, they were not referring to their civilization of the native peoples but their work on the land instead. Colonial supporters denied the insurgent Herero the capability of contributing to the economic development in South-West Africa themselves and thus derived the right of the Germans to dispossess the land of the Africans.⁶⁰

While the Christianization of Africa continued to play a central role for the Centre Party, this made it an outsider among the war’s proponents. In light of the increasing conflicts between missionaries on one side and the colonial administration and settlers on the other, the Christian mission was no longer considered to be the precursor to colonial expansion – as during the intervention in China in 1897 – but an obstacle instead. When the director of the colonial department Stuebel came to address the conflict of interest between settlers and missionaries, he made it clear that this mainly concerned “an area where Germans can live and attain wealth. This is surely the main purpose of colonization.”⁶¹ Some newspapers went even further, alleging that the mission in South-West Africa had failed, as Africans who had converted to Christianity had also participated in the uprising against German rule.⁶²

Proponents of the war thus tended to focus on arguments of an economic nature and emphasized the potential for development of the German colonies. In response to criticism from the Social Democratic camp, the conservative delegate Arendt contended that “South-West Africa is not a worthless field of sand”.⁶³ Justifications invoking the civilizing mission could only appear at the margins in this frame of argumentation, for instance when the conservative delegate Liebermann v. Sonneberg described the aim of German colonial policy in the Reichstag on 31 January 1905 in the following manner:

58 Cf. “Ich, der große General!” Trotha gegen Bülow, in: Berliner Morgenpost, no. 191, 16 Aug. 1905.

59 Stenographische Berichte über die Verhandlungen des Reichstags. XI. Legislaturperiode. I. Session 1904/05, vol. 202, 30 Jan. 1905, Berlin 1905, 4121.

60 Die Ursachen des Aufstandes der Herero. I., in: Kölnische Zeitung, no. 488, 13.05.1904, Morgen-Ausgabe.

61 Stenographische Berichte, vol. 202 (note 59), 30 Jan. 1905, 4108.

62 Stenographische Berichte über die Verhandlungen des Reichstags. XI. Legislaturperiode. I. Session 1904, vol. 199, 17 Mar. 1904, Berlin 1904, 1892; Aus dem Hereroland IV., in: Kölnische Zeitung, no. 330, 1 Apr. 1904, Beilage zur Morgen-Ausgabe.

63 Stenographische Berichte, vol. 202 (note 59), 30 Jan. 1905, 4106.

When we obtain and conquer a colony with German blood, then we do not want to turn it into a nursery for the natives but further the interests of our fellow nationals there first and foremost while slowly raising the moral standards of the native peoples by accustoming them to regular work on the farms.⁶⁴

Indeed, in his first speech following his appointment as State Secretary for the Colonies on 28 November 1906, Bernhard Dernburg professed his support for the missionaries, describing them as one of the “bases from which European culture can advance.”⁶⁵ Furthermore, he argued that Germany was securing the preservation of European rule over the extra-European world through its wars:

All colonizing nations of Europe are solidly united with regard to their policy towards natives. They all base their power on the same means or the same lack of means and replace them with authority. Now, if a power such as Germany – which is considered to be a military power, and justifiably so – panders to the Hottentotten, then it is a matter of course that this would shatter the position of every colonizing nation in Africa.⁶⁶

The main part of his speech however was devoted to the promise of preventing abuses of authority in the future and bringing the colonies onto a more successful course in economic terms. Indeed, this particular pledge for reform played no small part in securing an electoral success for the pro-colonial parties in the 1907 Reichstag elections.⁶⁷

3. Concluding Remarks

The aim of this investigation was to determine the functions of representations of Europe when it came to the legitimization of colonial wars and imperialist interventions. As it has been shown, both proponents and opponents of colonialism came to invoke Europe or civilization time and again in the political debates over military actions. For instance, in both Great Britain and Germany the argument that military action served to protect the lives of Europeans in harm’s way was virtually uncontested. Colonial critics on the other hand could repeatedly point out that the conduct of the troops stood in contradiction to European values and civilization. Nevertheless, while news reports detailing massacres and other misdeeds of the military could be cause for public outrage in the short-term, they barely affected the general approval for the military actions. Despite the controversies surrounding the methods and conduct of the Commander-in-Chief Lord Kitchener, the campaign in the Sudan ranked among the most popular British colonial wars. In the German debate concerning the suppression of the uprising in South-West

64 Ibid, 31 Jan. 1905, 4160.

65 Stenographische Berichte über die Verhandlungen des Reichstags. XI. Legislaturperiode. II. Session 1905/1906, vol. 218, 28 Nov. 1906, Berlin 1906, 3962.

66 Ibid, 3967.

67 Cf. F. Bösch, Öffentliche Geheimnisse (note 38), 306.

Africa, the cost of the war and the economic future of the colony were the main points of contention, not the means of warfare.

Even when the English press reported on co-operation and conflicts with other imperialist states, representations of the European and the non-European came to be employed. During the Boxer War in 1900/01 and the military operation against Tibet in 1903/04, English newspapers would occasionally portray Russia as a partly Asian power, while the Times described the Tsarist Empire as the protector of Europeans abroad in its commentaries on the interventions in the Persian Civil War in 1909. This line of argumentation was bolstered by the fact that Russia itself was pursuing a course of political reform that followed the West-European example.⁶⁸

While representations of Europe came to be employed for the aforementioned political purposes throughout the period in question, the role of the civilizing mission and the exportation of the European model when it came to the legitimization of colonial wars and imperialist interventions was subject to change. This was neither the result of a changing European self-conception nor a critical re-examination of European civilization as a model example, but of altering patterns of perception regarding imperial and colonial policy in Great Britain and Germany. Under the banner of an imperial spirit of optimism, politicians and the media in Great Britain uniformly legitimized the use of military force with the professed aim of spreading civilization up until 1900 (regardless of the real political motives and the impact of the policies in the colonies). Once imperial military actions and the associated costs in particular became increasingly unpopular in the first decade of the twentieth century, arguments invoking the civilizing mission ceased to play a significant role. Instead, both politicians and the pro-war press emphasized the necessity of these actions and the defensive alignment of British imperial policy.

At a time when voices calling for a more active “Weltpolitik” grew louder in Germany, the government not only legitimized the military intervention in China in 1897 and the subsequent annexation of the colony Kiao-chau with arguments of an economic nature but also with the protection of the Christian mission. However, once military actions in the extra-European world came to be discussed more controversially since the autumn of 1900 and during the wars in Africa from 1904 to 1907 in particular, the civilizing mission no longer played a significant role as a basis for legitimization, just as in Great Britain. In contrast to the British case however, supporters of colonial policy in Germany were not as defensive in their argumentation and stressed the limited aims of the wars. Instead they called for an intensification of the military effort and colonial policy and primarily justified this aim with the economic interests of Germany.

In summary, the legitimization of colonial wars and imperialist interventions with arguments in accordance with a civilizing mission tended to be made in cases where the military efforts proved successful and the associated policy was popular anyhow. However, when wars lasted longer than expected and support dwindled, the exportation of the Eu-

68 On the reforms in Russia cf. Benjamin Beuerle's article in this volume.

ropean model hardly played a role in their legitimization anymore. Instead, proponents of military action in Great Britain pointed out the strategic or political necessity of these interventions, while their German counterparts appealed to the population's economic self-interest.

“Fortress Europe” or “Europe as Empire” – Conflicts between different EU long-term Strategies and its Effects on the Representation of Europe

Andreas Weiß

RESÜMEE

Der Artikel vergleicht zwei Repräsentationen der Europäischen Gemeinschaft, die „Festung Europa“ und „Europa als Imperium“ miteinander und untersucht sie als Fremdzuschreibungen hin auf ihre Kompatibilität mit der gemeinsamen europäischen Außenpolitik in den 1990er Jahren. Im Mittelpunkt stehen dabei die Euromediterrane Partnerschaft und die EU-Erweiterung 2004. Er geht davon aus, dass diese Fremdzuschreibungen auch deshalb solche Popularität erlangten, da sie zwar zugespielt die beiden extremen Pole europäischer Außenpolitik beschreiben, aber von „Innen“, aus der Perspektive Brüssels, nicht in Übereinstimmung mit den Eigenrepräsentationen der Gemeinschaft gebracht werden können und daher weniger Analysen europäischer Politik denn Kritik an Europa sind. Sie spiegeln so vielmehr die Dilemmata wider, vor denen die Politiker nach dem Fall des „Eisernen Vorhangs“ standen und auf die die EG aufgrund ihrer Eigenrepräsentationen und Sprachregelungen in nur eingeschränkter Weise reagieren konnte.

A widely used commonplace declares the European Union to be an entity *sui generis*. This is not only due to the very particular founding and developmental history of the EU, but also because to many its foreign policy seems erratic. This invited many to criticise this foreign policy and ascribed different representations to the EU, despite the EU's efforts to develop its own representations of Europe. I use here the concept of representation¹ not only because the EU uses it to ‘represent’ itself while negotiating with

1 This article is a part of the research results of the project “Representations of Europe” which is part of the SFB 640. The SFB is founded on the concept of representation used by Roger Chartier, Paul Rabinow and Serge Moscovici. Representations of Europe in our case would be things such as freedom, democracy, and rule of law. Then images of the self and representations of the other will be compared. The representations of Europe then gain in the political arena the function of a collective or social representation, in a Durkheimian sense; see G. Delanty, Inventing Europe: idea, identity, reality, Basingstoke 1995, 4-5; W. S. F. Pickering (ed.), Durkheim and Representations, London/New York 2000.

non-EU actors, but also because these representations operate inwards while establishing regimes of what can be said publicly. The Union conceives itself as a space of democracy, freedom and human rights; therefore, it cannot use quasi dictatorial compulsion vis-à-vis its unruly member states – as the current debates regarding the international debt crisis demonstrate. Representations establish regimes of thinking and sayability. As for legal practitioners, the same principle applies to politicians: one could not step back from what was once written down, especially in institutionally highly sensitive, complicated organisms such as the EU. In this sense, paper is not only patient but also a memory focused on permanence. Hence the main focus is not on the actors as such (i.e. which group intermingles with which), but rather what they discuss. Why, how and for what reason do they talk about the EU? For example, in the enlargement debates employed here as examples, the two options enlargement/integration vs. non-enlargement needed to be explained. This is also done with the help of representations of Europe; actually one could go as far as to suggest that in the long run, representations of Europe were employed as a means to forestall the entry of Southern Mediterranean states into the Union. To exemplify how the representations of Europe intermingle with joint actions in foreign policy, this article turns its attention to two major debates during the 1990s: the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and the 2004 enlargement – or Eastern enlargement, as it is called more often. Each was selected because it stands for two different ascriptions critics use to describe the common foreign policy of the Union: the concept of ‘Europe as Empire’ (the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership) and the ‘Fortress Europe’ (the 2004 enlargement). This means that the two different strategies were labelled in a negative way by their critics to delegitimize them in a way that racist ascriptions were allegedly used to denounce people of a different origin. These critics were mainly human rights groups as well as non-governmental organizations concerned with migration issues. Their issues connected them with different left wing groups in Europe. Both processes illustrate the different political means that were used to expand the influence of the EU. In the negotiations that accompanied them, the EU had to reflect about its role in the world, the representation of its policies and about its self-representations. They were interconnected with a range of global problems such as migration, the economic North-South divide, terrorism, trade relations and democratic deficits. But while these issues touched upon unequal common interests, the specific, more regional interests of the different member states played a more important role, such as Spain’s, Italy’s and France’s interests in the Mediterranean region and those of Germany and Austria in Eastern- and Central Europe. With regard to the Union as a whole, one might ask whether the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership could be classified as a first attempt to develop an imperial foreign policy.² Likewise, one may regard the Eastern enlargement as an attempt to revise the borders, as an initiative to close the walls of fortification, since this was the furthest expansion imaginable for conservative protagonists. Therefore the projects reflect the diverse local and

2 Cf. G. Vobruba, Das politische Potential der Europäischen Nachbarschaftspolitik. Zur Überwindung des Widerspruchs zwischen Integration und Erweiterung der Europäischen Union, in: Leviathan 38 (2010) 1, 45–63, esp. 48f.

regional interests of different member states. Furthermore, the Nineteen Nineties are a period during which the EU sought to define what Europe is and what represents it. For many of the actors it remained unclear for a long time which countries could enter the Union and which could not. Spain for its part pushed for the accession of Morocco and, in case this would not happen, for deeper cooperation between the Union and Morocco. Simultaneously the Spanish interests had to be consistent with the traditional Mediterranean policy of the Community. The Eastern Enlargement, however, was regarded as a way to turn the Union into a global player by creating the biggest single market in the world and thus a new economic superpower. Both projects were not mutually exclusive and even complemented each other, yet financial questions and the unclear foreign policy approach of the Union rendered both projects antagonistic. Precisely this inherent antagonism makes it so worthwhile to examine these processes for the representations of Europe. This is because the European Commission – as the 'Guardian of the Treaties' – could use a stalemate to call for more competences, especially because it possessed the formal right to propose new accession candidates.³ Especially during the Eastern Enlargement the EU, and the Commission in particular, claimed to be speaking on behalf of Europe as a whole. It became increasingly difficult for non-European states to play off one member state against another and make them exponents for another Europe, as had been attempted by Donald Rumsfeld in 2003.

However this article does not seek out the finality of European foreign policy. It is merely interested in these two particular projects and the representations of Europe articulated in both of them by European politicians as well as the two aforementioned catchwords. The presumption is that for politicians and bureaucrats at the level of the Commission and in other institutions of the EU, the self-image of being an Empire seemed rather absurd. This has both historical and cultural reasons. At the same time there was an undercurrent in its policies that could be perceived as being imperialistic. Conversely, one may pose the question as to the continuities regarding the imperial self-portrayal in the different member states. But the ambivalence can be explained by the circumstance that for the EU as a whole and especially in the European Parliament (EP), the concept of Empire carried extremely negative connotations. Nonetheless some politicians demanded – and still call for – a more active foreign policy of the Union combined with a stance of global dominance.⁴ These ambivalences are also part of this investigation. The differences, but also the commonalities, between both projects will help to clarify the development of the representations of Europe vis-à-vis the European borders and the non-European states during the Nineteen Nineties. It is important to ascertain that these antitheses describe different courses of action both for the Community as a whole and of use for the interests of the different member states. As will be illustrated, the foreign policy of the Union du-

³ See Bretherton, Charlotte/Vogler, John, *The European Union as a global actor*. London 1999, 11.

⁴ Here one has to differentiate between two different orientations of foreign policy involvement: one is intervention on behalf of human rights, itself supported by some critics from the left; the other the classical 'machiavelian' foreign policy. For the position of the Commission see Commission of the European Communities, KOM (2002) 247 endgültig: Mitteilung der Kommission: Ein Projekt für die Europäische Union, Brussels 2002, 12-17.

ring the examined period was shaped by many ambivalent factors. For instance, up until 1990 it was made very clear to Morocco that it could never become part of the EU. Then again, Spanish politicians were not the only ones who came to stress the similarities in the Mediterranean and the common ‘civilising’ values of a Europe that is precisely more than a mere geographical definition.⁵

This much can be said in advance: There was at least one major change in the representations during the period under consideration. Whereas different actors of the European Community made clear statements for a more active and dominant foreign policy in 1995, at the end of the decade statements pertaining to delimitation, inner reforms and consolidation of the EU came to the foreground. But this is not congruent with what critics understand under the term ‘Fortress Europe’. Due to its self-representations the EU cannot deviate from the image of being an attractive centre of the world. This brings us to the question of the way in which representations could be employed as a resource for political action and legitimization. Representations of Europe in this particular context will be understood in this sense – as political resources – as they shaped the mode of understanding of the European elite.⁶

Both catchwords gained publicity because they denote two different trends in European politics. For one, it can be said that since its beginnings, the history of the European Union is – in one way or another – linked to the concept of *Imperium*.⁷ Established as an alternative to founding an empire after the destructive experiences of the first half of the twentieth century (especially the two world wars), in the Nineteen Nineties a number of academics, politicians and political activists came to classify the European Union itself as such. They understood empire loosely as an entity which strove to influence politics beyond its borders without the use of direct force, but instead a combination of economic measures, military threat and ideology. Especially the last point makes the EU so vulnerable, as one of its representations is that of being just a “civic-normative power”, a self-portrayal that ironically was developed to counter any criticism of being an empire. So Empire became a highly ambivalent concept for the European Union. Just how problematic the concept of imperialism is when attributed to the EU is demonstrated by Jürgen

5 I. B. Neumann, European Identity, EU Expansion, and the Integration/Exclusion Nexus, in: L.-E. Cederman (ed.), *Constructing Europe's Identity: The External Dimension*, London 2001, 141-164, here 144. For the actual interpretation personal talk, Spanish Foreign Ministry, March 2011.

6 It is not of primary interest here whether the EU is an elite project. For more on this question see M. Haller, European integration as an elite process: the failure of a dream? New York 2008; K. Poehls, *Europa backstage: Expertenwissen, Habitus und kulturelle Codes im Machtfeld der EU*, Bielefeld 2009. For the problems interests vs. Representations of Europe see the Working Paper J., Grußendorf/A., Weiß, *Europarepräsentationen – Spanien, Frankreich und Deutschland im Vergleich*, Berlin 2010.

7 The best known book to bring the EU and the concept of Empire together is the book by Jan Zielonka; J. Zielonka, *Europe as empire: the nature of the enlarged European Union*, Oxford 2006.

8 Cf. B. Hettne/F. Söderbaum, Civilian Power or Soft Imperialism? The EU as a Global Actor and the Role of Interregionalism, in: *European Foreign Affairs Review* 10 (2005), 535-552; S. Fröhlich, *Die Europäische Union als globaler Akteur: eine Einführung*, Wiesbaden 2008. Apparently the concept of the ‘civil-normative power’ is tied to older concepts of the civilising mission, see especially B. Barth/J. Osterhammel (eds), *Zivilisierungsmissionen: imperiale Weltverbesserung seit dem 18. Jahrhundert*, Konstanz 2005.

Osterhammel's definition in his article on models of Europe and imperial contexts: "An Empire is a spacious, hierarchically structured governing association (*Herrschafsverband*) of polyethnic and multireligious character, whose coherence is ensured by threads of violence, administration, indigenous collaborators as well as a universalistic programme and the symbolism of an imperial elite (mostly with a monarchical centre), but not through social and political homogenization and the idea of a universal citizenship."⁹ Likewise Herfried Münkler: "Empires and state systems differ [...] in that the first pacify the internal space and do not admit violent struggles of interests, neither over political legitimacy nor legislative issues."¹⁰ However it is necessary to point out that members of the European Commission as well as other European politicians rarely combined the representation of Europe with the concept of Empire, in contrast to the beginning of the century, as is shown in Christian Methfessel's article. Besides the aforementioned employment of the term Empire in a critical sense, there was a second concept of Empire which seemed more appealing to the politicians as a positive example for the Union: the concept of the peaceful multiethnic empire. Two examples were mentioned: the Holy Roman Empire and the Austro-Hungarian Empire. They became models not only in the debate around *Mitteleuropa* but were also regarded as historic prototypes around which the European Union could be constructed and with which it could legitimize itself. Also, during the 1990s the EU tried to detach itself from any imperialistic policies akin to those of the USA.

Often one finds evidence for the belief that national affairs are shaped by notions of Europe. An idealistic reading tends to take Europe as a model example and a point of reference. However this article assumes that representations of Europe are more than merely a source for legitimization in the political arena. They establish regimes of what can be said (*Sagbarkeitsregime*). In the early Nineteen Nineties the then EC operated with representations of Europe it needed to revise up until the end of the century. These representations seduced it into seeing enlargement as a necessary historical process, because on the one hand the EU is attractive and on the other it would emerge stronger and better out of every enlargement round as well as every crisis. But this leads to a kind of *circulus vitiosus*: due to the enlargement the EU is criticised as an empire. The EU reacts by trying to amend its foreign policy. But this does not adequately describe the actual situation around 2000, because rather than changing the foundations of its foreign policy, the EU preserved many of its aspects. And this comes into conflict with the imperialistic traditions of some member states during the Nineteen Nineties. Both the EU and its member states develop their policies and self representations in interplay with each other. Actions of some member states which contradict the representation of

9 J. Osterhammel, Europamodelle und imperiale Kontexte, in: Journal of Modern European History 2 (2004) 2, 157-182, here 172 [own translation].

10 H. Münkler, Barbaren und Dämonen: Die Konstruktion des Fremden in Imperialen Ordnungen, in: J. Barberowski (ed.), *Selbstbilder und Fremdbilder. Repräsentation sozialer Ordnungen im Wandel*, Frankfurt a. M./New York 2008, 153-189, here 154, 166. This certainly applies in the EU's case where political struggle with peaceful means is at the heart of the Union.

the whole provoke criticism. Moreover, the Commission is compelled to react to the policies of member states running counter to the community's self image, particularly if it wants to assert its claim to leadership. With regard to the central concept of the title, it must be noted that while the term empire in one way or another (be it as delineation) accompanied the history of the EU since its beginnings and was sometimes given a positive connotation by some actors during its revival in the Nineteen Nineties 1990s, this was not the case with the concept of the 'Fortress Europe'.¹¹ One can differentiate between four different implications of the term. First, it has a high profile owing to the connotations evoked by the use of the term during the Second World War. Second, it alludes to an allegation made by the United States after the end of the Cold War, namely that the Union wanted to wall off its single market. Third, it is used in conjunction with the measures the European Union takes to stop South-North migration into the territory of the Union, something which keeps the topic in the media. And fourth, 'Fortress Europe' was employed as a counter-concept to the 'Europe in Diversity'.¹²

This applies to the groups of actors who brought this term into play in particular. On one side there were states of the opinion that their accession was either unduly delayed or withheld. On the other there were activists who criticised the migration policy of the community; especially in the Mediterranean, with the symbol of the border fence around Ceuta and Melilla. This results in unfamiliar constraints for the self representations of Europe. A region that projects an image of economic success and acts outwardly as an advocate for human rights and democracy can hardly behave towards the neighbour regions as a pure preventer with a new wall. How the EU reacted towards these challenges and if she adjusted her representations to a changed foreign policy is one of the central questions of this article.

11 As the prototypical critic on 'Fortress Europe' see Delanty, Inventing Europe (note 1), 149-155. Delanty uses the term in a diffuse sense, for him it means "the idea of Europe has become part of a new state-seeking nationalism that has crystallized in 'Fortress Europe' and far from being a successor to the nation-state, Europe, in fact, is a function of it." Ibid., 14. Similarly M. Pelzer, Festung Europa: Flüchtlingschutz in Not, in: Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik 56 (2011) 10, 47-53.

12 P. Blokker, Europe 'United in Diversity': From a Central European Identity to Post-Nationality? In: European Journal of Social Theory 11 (2008), 257-274, here 262; also Delanty, Inventing Europe (note 1), S. VIII. Gerald Delanty speaks of the "chauvinism of the Fortress Europe project in Western Europe"; G. Delanty, The Resonance of Mitteleuropa. A Habsburg Myth or Antipolitics? In: Theory, Culture & Society 13 (1996), 93-108, here 104. For the definition of 'Fortress Europe': Often used by journalist for critical purposes, based on the allegation that the EU practice a policy of sealing-off vis-à-vis third states, especially in the asylum and migration policy or by the common agrarian policy; source: B. Zandonella, Pocket Europa. EU-Begriffe und Länderdaten, Bonn 2005, 2009 revised edition. (http://www.bpb.de/popup/popup_lemmata.html?guid=1TDM6l). See also C. Phuong, Enlarging 'Fortress Europe': EU accession, asylum, and immigration in candidate countries. In: International and Comparative Law Quarterly 52 (2003) 3, 641-663, here 663, with regard to Eastern Europe: "that what we are currently witnessing resembles the resurgence of a new Curtain replacing the Iron Curtain, but further to the East. Europe's enlargement must not lead to the enlargement of 'Fortress Europe'. The Commission itself has warned that 'the future borders of the Union must not become a new dividing line'. In practice, whilst enlargement should be about inclusion, the hard border regime which is being imposed on candidate countries is about exclusion, 'about creating or recreating dividing lines in Europe'."

1. The Nineteen Nineties: The stage for the EU as a global actor

After the fall of the 'Iron Curtain' the global general framework changed fundamentally for the EU. The Commission used this new situation to develop its own profile, steeped in by the understanding for a historical challenge. Because of the unclear global political situation after 1990 the EU stood for a multipolar world order with a focus on inter- and supranational institutions – a consequence of what was believed to be one's own success story.¹³ Never before in history had the representation of Europe as a space of freedom and liberty seemed more fulfilled than in the beginning of the Nineteen Nineties. The EU improved, for example, its relations with the ASEAN states and provided institutional aid to model this and other organisations according to its own image.¹⁴ After the end of the ideological bloc formation new markets could be developed in a totally different dimension.¹⁵ At the same time the Yugoslav Wars (and Ruanda) demonstrated the EU's powerlessness in foreign affairs. Because military action was hardly conceivable for the Union – a consequence of the representations under discussion – new concepts of neighbourhood policy became the main focus beyond direct crises; new concepts without the ultimate aim of admission to the EU: strategies such as the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. What was new and exceptional about the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership was that it combined multi- and bipolar agreements at the same time; and the success of the project depended on this combination. This was so because security and economic interests corresponded with each other and were an important issue in the enlargement debates.¹⁶ Both reflected problems were linked to the two central trajectories of the European Community: enlargement and consolidation. But it is also clear that some single actors (e.g. the French government) during this time had far reaching ambitions regarding the common foreign policy of the EU, as is demonstrated by the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) 1992. In 2001 this was followed by the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP, now the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)). Both approaches were designed to bestow more importance on the foreign policy of the

- 13 For the importance of visions of multipolar order in the Nineteen Nineties see e.g. Manuel Castells, who names the unification of Europe as the most important global model, M. Castells, *Das Informationszeitalter*, Band 3: *Jahrtausendwende*, Opladen 2003, 355–356; on the relationship between political changes, expansion and economy *ibid.*, 357, 360–361.
- 14 For the overall enthusiasm for a free trade community, but also generally for regional cooperation, cf. J. M. Zaldom, *El Mediterráneo, gran oportunidad para los empresarios*, in: *Dirección y Progreso* 145 (1996), Enero–Febrero, 91–94, here 91ff. Further examples are the Uruguay Round, the AU (before 2002 OAU), the attempt of Lomé-II.
- 15 For the relationship between extension of commerce and "trade globalization" see N. Fligstein/A. Stone Sweet, *Constructing Polities and Markets: An Institutionalist Account of European Integration*, in: *American Journal of Sociology* 107 (2002) 5, 1206–1243, here 1237. Their institutional approach, it seems, is quite connectable with our concept of representations, cf. *ibid.* 1220–1221, 1224–1225, 1236, and 1239. The authors see the supranational policy of the Commission influenced by feedbacks, arising out of the interaction with lobbyists when these present their interests.
- 16 The author does not share the assessment common in the political sciences that security reasons stood at the foreground of the EMP; see A. Jünemann, *Repercussions of the Emerging European Security and Defence Policy on the Civil Character of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership*, in: A. Jünemann (ed.), *Euro-Mediterranean Relations after September 11. International, Regional and Domestic Dynamics*, London/Portland, OR 2003, 1–20.

Union, to consolidate the international appearance that did not rest on arguments of an economic nature alone. It is worth noting in our context that organisations such as Frontex are not directly associated with these organisations. As a result the appearance of the EU vis-à-vis its neighbours remained polyphonic. The burden of the operation is shouldered by particular member states. In our case a relevant example would be Operation Hera, where Spain and Italy provide the ships but the costs are divided up among all the member states of the Union.¹⁷ These operations are among those which contribute to the image of the ‘Fortress Europe’ given that it is primarily a defensive foreign policy. This could be used as an argument against ‘Europe as Empire’ because the old member states disagreed over the matter of a long term effective rapid reaction force, and for the new member states of East and East Central Europe the entry into the NATO had priority. Because the relationship between NATO and EU remains unclear to this day the latter cannot simply employ the military power of the former and many EU member states eschew the financial burdens of the installation of a military parallel structure.¹⁸ This does not mean that the EC lacked a foreign policy before 1990, yet it consisted mainly of association agreements and development policies. This is of particular relevance because in the Nineteen Nineties the EU barely broadened its foreign policy tools. They remained the same instruments: association and multilateral agreements in combination with bilateralism.¹⁹ Admittedly, the Commission reacted to the changed circumstances in 1993 at the Copenhagen Summit, where rules were defined for future member states, which also came to affect the representations of the Union. These so called “Copenhagen criteria” could be separated into three categories. First, an accession candidate has to fulfil the political criteria of “stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities”. Second, the EU emphasized the economic criteria of „the existence of a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union”. And third, the *Acquis communautaire*, the “the ability to take on and implement effectively the obligations of membership, including adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union”.²⁰ So an affinity for formalized relations is characteristic of the EU’s foreign policy – and this precisely what separates it from every concept of Empire.²¹

17 Cf. http://www.frontex.europa.eu/newsroom/news_releases/art13.html.

18 Castells, Das Informationszeitalter (note 13), 363. For the hope of synergy see government declaration of the German chancellor during the NATO summit with following debate in the 202. Session, 13.01.1994, printed in Das Parlament, Nr. 3, 21. Januar 1994, 3.

19 The only instrument not used in this ‘classic’ foreign policy of the EU were the so-called European Agreements, because they were considered to be direct precondition for concrete accession. For the problem foreign policy/ enlargement see Fröhlich, Die EU als globaler Akteur (note 8); C. C. Pentland, Westphalian Europa and the EU’s Last Enlargement, in: European Integration 22 (2000), 271-298.

20 Cf. the glossary of the European Union: http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/policy/conditions-membership/index_en.htm

21 Cf. M. Smith, The European Union and International Order: European and Global Dimensions, in: European Foreign Affairs Review 12 (2007), 437-456, here 441.

One could allege that over a long period the EU took the enlargement trajectory if the admittance of these states seemed unproblematic. In light of the changing circumstances in the Nineteen Nineties the EU had to cope with totally new, different and diverse pleas for admission than had seemed plausible at the time of the Treaty of Rome or the Southern enlargement. The altered conceptual structure and the sheer number of member states that complicated the coordination process demanded reforms in the consolidation process. Two foreign affairs projects (dominant foreign actions and civilising mission) were developed in parallel during the enlargement but also mutually depended on each other. If the EU understood the changed global circumstances as an opportunity to expand ideologically and politically, it also conceived of the political situation as unsecure, even as threatening as is underlined by the strong emphasis placed on security issues and counter-terrorism in the Declaration of Barcelona.²² Thus globalisation during this period was not only an opportunity but also a potential menace. Against this threat the regions felt compelled to "defend their traditions and their identities".²³

2. The EU and the Non-EU – The EU as actor

Against this background it becomes comprehensible that during the Nineteen Nineties the EU had a number of options regarding its foreign policy that partially overlapped with the interests of different member states but also with the self interests of the EU as an institution. Thus 'Fortress Europe' and 'Europe as Empire' are nothing less than two different paths of development for the EU as an institution that are not congruent with the enlargement debates used here as examples. Both could be related to older traditions that were dominant in the foreign policy of European states around 1900. Every now and then it seems that these imperialistic traditions of some member states effectively continued without interruptions. This is not only true for abstract large structures like the Commonwealth of Nations in the case of the United Kingdom and the *francophonie* for France. Also the prompt recourse to Special Forces and the tendency for small-scale

22 And this all before 2001! Focal point of the terroristic menace here was also an Islamist one, but in this case the focus was groups like the Algerian GIA and the Muslim brothers. Also the problem of illegal migration plays a role here. For an attempt to define the perspectives of the actors see E. Rhein, The European Union on its Way to Becoming a World Power, in: European Foreign Affairs Review 3 (1998), 325–340. Rhein makes particular mention of two criteria, namely Eastern Enlargement and the shared currency. On the issue of the EU's "Global Mediterranean Policy" cf. F. Pierros/J. Meunier/S. Abrams, The Global Mediterranean Policy, 1972–1989, in: Eidem, Bridges and Barriers: the European Union's Mediterranean policy, 1961 – 1998. Aldershot 1999, 82–125; for the problem of a diffuse concept, *ibid.*, 85–86. If at least this claim is kept, 85–86. For the pretence of international politics in the "Agenda 2000" see Bretherton/Vogler, The European Union as Global Actor (note 3), 15. The document itself was revised several times, the starting point was COM(97) 2000 final and emerged clearly from the Eastern enlargement.

23 See Romano Prodi at the 32. Plenary session of the Committee of the Regions on 16 and 17 February 2000; <http://europa.eu/archives/bulletin/de/200001/p110031.htm#anch0553>.

military interventions overstretching one's own abilities could be seen as being part of this tradition.²⁴

A frequent point of criticism the EU and its institutions have to grapple with is the allegation that its policies are corrupted by interests on every level – region, member state, EU. It appeared as though the foreign policy of the Union followed the national interests of single member states. In this reading the Eastern enlargements would come to benefit the North, e.g. Germany, while the Mediterranean partnership would be of use to the South, e.g. Spain. But on the level of the Union, the Commission was strengthened as the centre of the enlargement processes and the Union as a whole because it could expand its regional predominance and zones of influence. At the same time the institutions of the Union are also strengthened. But in the context of the Union national interests always have to be disguised with representations of Europe. No actor can formulate openly and officially on the level of the Union that a project serves its own interests alone, as this would lead to massive opposition and harsh reactions by the other partners. Besides the principle of compensation, which is at the roots of the peace-building founding ideals, this is based on the often articulated principle of (subsidiary) solidarity within the EU. Or to put it another way: Even if someone operating within the frame of global foreign policy in the 1990s had the idea of an 'Empire Europe' it could not be sold in the style of American foreign policy, as this would be incompatible with the self-representations of Europe – at least Europe had to appear as a model for the world. This tension is transferable onto the dichotomy under consideration here, namely between enlargement and integration, between 'Europe as Empire' and 'Fortress Europe'. The origin of both terms does not lie in the self-descriptions of the EU but are primarily ascriptions. Admittedly, it applies to some statements of EU actors.²⁵ It is interesting that while the EU justifies its power-political outreach with a better multipolar world order and the support of the United Nations, the neighbourhood policy could quite understandably be read as imperialistic:

*Stabilising the continent and boosting Europe's voice in the world. The aim is to pursue the enlargement strategy, which offers a unique opportunity to expand the area of freedom, stability, prosperity and peace. [...] It must also work to secure greater coherence in the management of the world economy, a gradual integration of the developing countries and the definition of new 'ground rules', essential if the fruits of globalisation are to be divided fairly and benefit the largest number of people possible. Finally, given the weakness of the international system, the objective must be to make Europe a global actor, with a political weight commensurate with its economic strength.*²⁶

24 Overstretching implies that up until today the Union lacks the necessary resources for long-term military combat operations of its own with designated EU combat troops.

25 A fairly recent example is given in an interview with the President of the European Commission, Manuel Barroso, in 2007. He picks up on the terminology of Europe as Empire and stresses the differences to old, "military empires". See H. Mahony, Barroso says EU is an 'empire', in: euobserver.com, 11.07.2007 (<http://euobserver.com/9/24458>).

26 See work programme (Commission); Bulletin EU 1/2-2001; <http://europa.eu/archives/bulletin/en/200001/>

Accordingly, the idea of a strong Europe as the guarantor of a multipolar world order forms an important element in the representations of the European Union with regard to its foreign policy.²⁷

Nonetheless specific positions of individual member states had to be taken into consideration. In the presidency's conclusions, the Seville European Council accepted the "traditional policy of military neutrality" of Ireland and promised "that this would continue to be the case after ratification of the Treaty of Nice".²⁸ Not only the consideration of political beliefs of single member states but also the lack of any common foreign policy as well as the multilateral orientation thwarted any dominant claim to power.²⁹ This view remained prevalent despite the challenges the enlargement placed on the efficiency of the Union. At the same time the reference to the continuing weakness of the European Union underpins the assumption that the European Union is not in the position to be an imperialistic power – even if this were its desire. The only 'imperialistic mission' that the Union could have besides the propagation of a (social) market economy and the establishment of regional organisations would be the promotion of human rights. Indeed, this is an argument often mentioned in programmatic foreign policy statements; however, this position is not accompanied by forceful efforts towards this end in day to day policy. A hint to the problematic reality of any imperialistic policy is given by the calls for a stronger commitment in the realm of foreign policy,³⁰ a fact underlined by the following remarks to the EMP.

p110012.htm. This point appears so or similar also in earlier work programmes and concepts. That the Union avoided in other co operations any imperialistic painting is demonstrated by the declaration of Rio de Janeiro in 1999. Point 3 of this declaration stresses the policy of non intervention; <http://europa.eu/archives/bulletin/de/9906/p000447.htm#anch0502>.

- 27 A paper by the Spinelli Group reads: „Die jüngsten Ereignisse zeigen, dass die Welt mit nur einer Hypermacht das gesamte globale System destabilisiert. Ein vereintes und starkes Europa ist notwendig, um die Arbeit der Vereinten Nationen möglich zu machen und um ihre Autorität wieder herzustellen. Europa hat die Pflicht, eine wichtige Rolle beim Fortschritt der internationalen Gemeinschaft hin zu demokratischen Verfahren, verbesserter Regulierung und zu einer Welt zu spielen, die kollektiv vom Recht und nicht von der reinen Macht regiert wird. Europa muss deshalb seinen Einfluß für eine angemessene Verteilung des Reichtums in der Welt, für faireren Handel, für internationale Zusammenarbeit, nachhaltige Entwicklung und Agrarpolitik, und für friedliche Konfliktlösung nutzen. Um ihre Verantwortung als ein ‚global player‘ zu erfüllen, braucht die EU den politischen Willen und die Instrumente, um eine wirkliche gemeinsame Außen- und Verteidigungspolitik entwickeln zu können.“ See Europa Dokumente Nr. 2317: Europäisches Konvent: Beitrag der Gruppe Spinelli zum neuen Föderalismus, Brussels 8. Mai [sic] 2003, 3.
- 28 Council of the European Union, Brussels, 24 October 2002 (29.10) (OR. fr) 13463/02: Seville European Council, 21 and 22 June 2002, Presidency Conclusions, 3; http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/press-data/en/ec/72638.pdf.
- 29 See, e.g., Europa Dokumente Nr. 2008: Politische Leitlinien und Gesetzesinitiativen für die Tätigkeit der Europäischen Kommission im nächsten Jahr, Brussels 25. Oktober 1996, 5, 6.
- 30 As an example from the end of the research period see Europa Dokumente Nr. 2334: Erweiterung, Stabilität und nachhaltiges Wachstum im Zentrum der Besorgnis der Kommission für das letzte Jahr ihres Mandats, Brussels 6. November 2003, 3; „Durch die Erweiterung wird das Auftreten der Union auf der internationalen Bühne verstärkt; dies bedeutet, dass die Union ihre Verantwortlichkeiten in ihrer Nachbarschaft überprüfen und bei der Entwicklung einer engen, unterstützenden Partnerschaft mit ihren nächsten Nachbarn im Osten sowie in der Mittelmeerregion die Führung übernehmen muss.“

3. The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership

Like the Eastern Enlargement, the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership was the result of local/regional interests of different member states. One can argue that the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership was a result of Germany paying off Spain in 1994 in order to implement the Eastern Enlargement. The connection to the EU as a whole was that the Southern member states feared Eastern Enlargement would alter the symmetry of the Union in favour of its Northern member states. But the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership was more than merely an attempt to save the Moroccan agricultural market for Spain. It was the first international effort for highly formalized and institutionalized cooperation with – by any definition – non-European states, which reached far beyond any previous exchanges of treaties and cooperation proposals. The EU had a list of specific goals it strove to accomplish through the partnership and some member states had vital interests in the cooperation with these close neighbours. The stabilisation of the region, countering the terrorist threat emanating from Islamic groups and of the cessation of South-North migration by enhancing economic growth in the Arab states were among its main purposes.³¹

The foundation of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership rested on several pillars. Besides the abovementioned global changes, economic interests such as the revival of the Mediterranean Policy of the Community played a role.³² But the main thrust of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership remained unclear. If one were to classify the (early failed) security cooperation as somewhere between ‘Fortress Europe’ and ‘Europe as Empire’ the European Parliament’s main focus was on “benevolent, civil-normative” Imperialism.³³ As in the Eastern Enlargement the issue of human rights was also used vis-à-vis the southern Mediterranean states as an instrument to intervene in their internal affairs. During the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership a number of Arab states deemed some of the reforms proposed by the Union to be unacceptable interferences in domestic affairs

31 How the different imaginations, especially of the Maghreb, shaped representations of Europe during this period is demonstrated by Johan Wagner’s article in this issue.

32 For the traditionalists in the EMP see Pierros/Meunier/Abrams, Bridges and Barriers (note 22); N. Fridhi/J. Quatremére (ed.), The new Euro-Mediterranean Economic Area. Study written by the Club de Bruxelles. For the conference organised on 28-29 February and 1st March 1996 by the Club de Bruxelles, with the support of the European Commission (DG IB, III, VII, XIII, XVII-Synergy Programme, XXIII), Brussels 1996, 3.

33 Cf. M. Köhler, Die Mittelmeerpolitik im Anschluß an die Konferenz von Barcelona: „EMP unterscheidet sich von den anderen regionalen Kooperationspolitiken der EU. Sie ist nicht auf wirtschaftliche Integration ausgerichtet, wie etwa PHARE. Sie ist auch nicht vordringlich auf den Aufbau neuer ökonomischer Strukturen ausgerichtet, wie etwa TACIS. Andererseits ist die EMP sehr viel mehr als lediglich eine Politik der wirtschaftlichen Kooperation, wie sie die EU mit Mercosur oder ASEAN betreibt. EMP ist vielleicht am besten zu beschreiben als ein politisches Kooperationsmodell mit dem Ziel, Transitionsprozesse in Richtung einer Integration der Partnerstaaten zu beschleunigen. Dabei ist nicht unbedingt klar, ob politische oder wirtschaftliche Interessen für die EU vordringlich sind. [...]. Für das Europäische Parlament ist die Förderung von Demokratie und Menschenrechten in den Partnerstaaten ein zentrales Kriterium für den Erfolg der EMP. Allen Akteuren gemeinsam erscheint die Tendenz einer funktionalen Reduktion auf Teilspekte der EMP. Der normative Ausgangspunkt dieser Studie ist, daß die Probleme des Mittelmeerraumes sich nur in einem langfristigen Prozeß der politischen, kulturellen, sozialen und wirtschaftlichen Annäherung der Partner lösen lassen.“ In: Europäisches Parlament, Generaldirektion Wissenschaft: Arbeitsdokument, Die Mittelmeerpolitik im Anschluß an die Konferenz von Barcelona, Luxemburg 1998, 7.

as well as a neo-colonial act. Thereby these critics exposed a weak spot of the Union, since a number of political actors had called for a more imperialistic foreign policy of the Union in the past, which ran counter to the image the European Commission wanted to portray. These discussions of the 1990s are connected to the changes in the global situation after the fall of the 'Iron Curtain'. Already in early statements one can clearly trace an all-embracing approach as the Community felt responsible for the Mediterranean as a whole very early on in its history.³⁴ In 1985 the Commission countered concerns of the Southern member states regarding an accession of Spain and Portugal with financial guarantees. Here the geopolitical-regional strategic relevance is clearly visible.³⁵ The prospect of negotiations with the EU was appealing for the Southern Mediterranean neighbours because a membership potentially seemed possible as the boundaries of the EU were not defined. It always remains unclear along which lines the borders of Europe run. Indeed the Treaty of Rome stated that every European state could become a member of the Community, but to this day the Commission refuses to fix the geographical borders of the continent³⁶. This is clearly illustrated in a report of the Commission from 1992: "In the Commission's view it would neither be possible nor expedient to fix the boundaries of the European Union now and for all times, as [the Union's] outlines require longer periods of time to evolve."³⁷ Here the Commission rejected a clear definition of the

34 E.g. Eberhard Rhein: „Es kann nicht genug betont werden, daß die neue EU-Mittelmeer-Politik in ihrem Ansatz nicht mehr auf die Finanzierung von Einzelvorhaben abzielt, sondern auf die dauerhafte Veränderung der wirtschaftlichen und politischen Rahmenbedingungen.“ E. Rhein, Mit Geduld und Ausdauer zum Erfolg, in: Internationale Politik 51 (1996), Nr. 2, 15–20, here 17. In contrast to this, Juan Manuel Fabra Valles, member of the EVP faction: "The recent conference of Barcelona defines the frame for a global pact with the whole Mediterranean area. Finally, one was anxious to apply this politic in such a way, that it encompasses all of the countries in the southern Mediterranean, not only those, with whom traditional association agreements existed." [Own translation, AW] In: Europäisches Parlament, Fraktion der Europäischen Volkspartei (Christlich-demokratische Fraktion): Die europäische Wirtschafts- und Währungsunion. Die politische und strategische Lage im Mittelmeerraum. Die Umweltpolitik. Vouliagmeni, Studientage, 29 April – 3 Mai 1996, Luxemburg 1996, 59.

35 "There is much at stake here, as whether or not the commitment is met will largely determine the future of the Mediterranean area, which – politically, strategically and economically – is of crucial importance for the Community." Quotation in: Europa Dokumente N. 1348: The European Commission invites the Council to give Mediterranean countries concerned about community enlargement some guarantees, Brussels 20 March 1985, 1.

36 Article 237 of the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, 25.03.1957: „Jeder europäische Staat kann beantragen, Mitglied der Gemeinschaft zu werden. Er richtet seinen Antrag an den Rat; dieser beschließt einstimmig, nachdem er die Stellungnahme der Kommission eingeholt hat. Die Aufnahmebedingungen und die erforderlich werdenden Anpassungen dieses Vertrages werden durch ein Abkommen zwischen den Mitgliedsstaaten und dem antragstellenden Staat geregelt. Das Abkommen bedarf der Ratifizierung durch alle Vertragsstaaten gemäß ihren verfassungsrechtlichen Vorschriften.“ (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/de/treaties/dat/11957E/tif/TRAITES_1957_CEE_1_XM_0310_x777x.pdf); see also G. Delanty, The Frontier and Identities of Exclusion in European History, in: History of European Ideas 22 (1996) 2, 93–103.

37 „Nach Auffassung der Kommission wäre es weder möglich noch zweckmäßig, jetzt ein für allemal die Grenzen der Europäischen Union festzulegen, deren Umrisse sich vielmehr über längere Zeiträume hinweg herausbilden müssen“ – Europa Dokumente N. 1790: Bericht der EG-Kommission zu den Kriterien und Bedingungen für den Beitritt neuer Staaten zur Gemeinschaft, Brussels 3. Juli 1992, 1-2. The position of the European Parliament was similar, see: Europa Dokumente Nr. 1820/21: Entschließung des Europäischen Parlaments zu institutionellen Problemen, zur institutionellen Rolle des Rates und zum Verfahren der Zusammenarbeit, Brussels 30. Januar 1993, 2: "[...]n der Überzeugung, daß die Zugehörigkeit zu Europa weder geographisch noch historisch, weder ethnisch noch religiös, weder kulturell noch politisch eindeutig definierbar ist, aber in jedem Fall den politischen Willen voraussetzt, an einem gemeinsamen Schicksal teilzuhaben, [...]"

borders. But, as previously indicated, this vagueness leads to political conflicts over objectives. Beyond its territory the EU erects different border regimes by inspecting the trans-border regions compatibility with Europe. Even though the relevant official formulations no longer differentiate between a ‘barbaric hinterland’ and ‘European’ regions (as around 1900) it nevertheless seems that there are concepts at play – from time to time different ones – which determine who may enter the Union and who may not. If one asks for the imperialistic path of the Union, it is necessary to record the commonalities and differences between both processes as the period of the decolonisation after 1945 must be regarded as a fundamental break.³⁸

There were numerous different representations of Europe towards the “South”. On the one side the European Community styled itself as an economically successful region. More important – and with stronger imperialistic tendencies – was the pretence of representing a policy of democracy, human rights and peace-building.³⁹ Although the Union emphasised the civilizational divide between ‘Europe’ and the ‘South’, this divide could be overcome by the ‘benevolent’ leadership of the Union. In this reading the “imperial border” is not the “zone that separates radically different strangers from each other” because the declaration of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership focuses on the common ground.⁴⁰ How interwoven this was with the problem of migration and the avoidance of a policy that could lead to a ‘Fortress Europe’ is exemplified by the same document:

*A considerable proportion of the European Community’s immigrants is from the Mediterranean region. [...] If planned cooperation with the countries in question fails to produce a methodical way of tackling migratory pressure, friction could easily result, hurting not just international relations but also the groups of immigrants themselves.*⁴¹

Under the impression of the discussion around ‘Fortress Europe’ the EU reacted with new strategies of its neighbourhood policies which had to take the changing circumstances and different representations into account.⁴² But through cooperation the Com-

38 Bretherton; Vogel, The European Union as a Global Actor (note 3), 34-36.

39 E.G. Commission of the European Communities, COM(95)72 final: Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament: Strengthening the Mediterranean Policy of European Union: Proposals for Implementing a Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, Brussels 08.03.1995, 2: “The Mediterranean is strategically important to the European Union. One of Europe’s priorities is to consolidate peace and stability in the region. This challenging task would involve: – supporting political reform and defending human rights and freedom of expression as a means of containing extremism; – promoting economic and social reform in such a way as to produce sustained growth (to create jobs) and an increase in standards of living, with the aim of stemming violence and easing migratory pressure. The Community and its partners in the Mediterranean are interdependent in many respects. Europe’s interests in the region are many and varied, including as they do the environment, energy supplies, migration, trade and investment.”

40 Münkler, Barbaren und Dämonen (note 10), 156. Cf. Europa Dokument N. 1930/1931: Bericht des Rates über die Beziehungen zwischen der Europäischen Union und den Mittelmeerländern zur Vorbereitung der Konferenz, die am 27.28. November in Barcelona stattfinden wird, Brussels 27. April 1995, 1-2.

41 COM (95)72 (note 39), 2.

42 See Commission of the European Communities, COM (2003) 104 final: Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament: Wider Europe – Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours, Brussels, 11.03.2003, 5: “In some cases the issue of prospective membership has already been resolved. Accession has been ruled out, for example, for the non-European Mediterranean

mission tried to avoid the impression of the EU as a fortress. This means that the EU did not want to bulkhead herself off but attempted to influence the environment in the South in a way that would minimize the migratory and security pressure and this region would become a smaller Europe, a small counterpart. Associated with this is a representation of Europe that is only hinted at in the statements of the EU but clearly visible in the Spanish documents. Here the EU is unquestionably the teacher that brings modernity to the South. One could criticise as imperialistic that the EU does not take different concepts and mentalities into account but that it tries to influence the processes according to its own liking. Indeed, by means of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, the EU sought to influence the conditions in the South in such a way that the migration stream would subside, yet this failed due to the actual implementation. The Southern Mediterranean neighbours gained more preferential quotas than other states but nonetheless they articulated a feeling that the Union wanted to seal off the Common Market, especially in textiles and agricultural products. So the perception of the EU as a fortress grew stronger during the EMP and intervention into the home domestic affairs of single states was regarded as imperialistic. Because the Commission as well as the Union did not understand the complaints and did nothing to resolve the tensions, the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership failed in the medium term.

4. The Eastern Enlargement of the European Community

How problematic debates around enlargement could become is demonstrated by the different terms used for the different accession rounds of the EC, especially when the official terms are far from consistent in and of themselves. They are problematic insofar as they are associated with historical thought structures. This especially applies to the fifth enlargement round of the EU.⁴³ Whereas 2004 Enlargement or Eastern Enlargement suggests neutrality, the German term *Osterweiterung* has more historical connotations. Especially some Polish saw the activism of some German groups as a renewal of the German Poland policy before 1945. For this reason the official accession documents

partners. But other cases remain open, such as those European countries who have clearly expressed their wish to join the EU. [...] In reality, however, any decision to further EU expansion awaits a debate on the ultimate geographic limits of the Union. This is a debate in which the current candidates must be in a position to play a full role. [...] The aim of the new Neighbourhood Policy is therefore to provide a framework for the development of a new relationship which would not, in the medium-term, include a perspective of membership or a role in the Union's institutions. A response to the practical issues posed by proximity and neighbourhood should be seen as separate from the question of EU accession."

⁴³ For an overview see F. Schimmelfennig, Die Osterweiterung der Europäischen Union: Politiken, Prozesse, Ergebnisse, in: Zeitschrift für Staats- und Europawissenschaften. 2 (2004) 3, 465–491; E. Bos/J. Dieringer (eds), Die Genese einer Union der 27. Die Europäische Union nach der Osterweiterung, Wiesbaden 2008. On the connexion on between migration, EU-accession and 'Fortress Europe' in this context (in which the term is used rather less frequently) see R. Krämer, Zwischen Kooperation und Abgrenzung – Die Ostgrenzen der Europäischen Union, in: WeltTrends (1999) 22, 9–26; Phuong, Enlarging 'Fortress Europe' (note 12).

stressed the aim of overcoming the European partition.⁴⁴ Many politicians understood the Eastern Enlargement as an event that corrected the historical ‘error’ of the ‘Iron Curtain’ and brought parts of Europe back into the boat of the European community. In the accession process the Central- and Eastern European candidates adopted the definition of a European identity as purported by the old member states – the ‘West’.⁴⁵ The Eastern enlargement therefore was stylised as a duty of historical dimensions, without any hints to an imperialistic or defensive foreign policy.⁴⁶ In this they continued older debates on the backwardness of Eastern Europe and the character of Europe as a model for reform there, as is demonstrated by Benjamin Beuerle for Russia after 1900 with regard to this issue. The dominant representation in view of the global position was the emphasis of the fact that with the accession of the Eastern European states the Union would be the biggest market of the world.⁴⁷ It is only possible to call the behaviour towards the accession candidates imperialistic insofar as they have to fulfil the conditions of the EU completely. Imperialistic indeed are the imaginations of global power and values developed after the enlargement as well as –and this is the commonality between the Eastern Enlargement and the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership – the civilising mission.

The enlargement supersedes the previous ‘walls’ of Europe, but towards the end of the millennium the EU begins to barricade itself off because the Community seems to be technically overburdened by the enlargement. Thus the EU does not become a fortress towards the migration streams but towards other states. Naturally it was clear for the Union that other states could interpret this big accession round as one last final acquisition project. The foremost goal was to create the biggest single market in the world and thereby strengthen the global importance of the Union. But because the Union draws an important part of its regional attractiveness from the potential entry into the Union and its global attractiveness from possible future alliances, any impression in the direction of a definitive closing had to be avoided. The “Joint Declaration: One Europe” of the “Final Act to the Treaty of Accession to the European Union 2003” therefore proclaimed that it is

[O]ur common wish [...] to make Europe a continent of democracy, freedom, peace and progress. The Union will remain determined to avoid new dividing lines in Europe and to promote stability and prosperity within and beyond the new borders of the Union. We are looking forward to working together in our joint endeavour to accomplish these goals. Our aim is One Europe.⁴⁸

⁴⁴ For example G. Verheugen, The Enlargement of the European Union, in: European Foreign Affairs Review 5 (2000) 439-444, here 439.

⁴⁵ See Delanty, The Resonance of Mitteleuropa (note 12), 102.

⁴⁶ Europa Dokumente Nr. 1766, Brussels 19. März 1992, 4.

⁴⁷ Verheugen, Enlargement (note 45), 443.

⁴⁸ Official Journal of the European Union, 23.09.2003: Final Act to the Treaty of Accession to the European Union 2003, 957-988, here 971. Available via <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2003:236:0957:0988:EN:PDF>.

But the accession complicated the foreign policy issue, as is demonstrated by the debates surrounding the Second Gulf War in 2003. The future member states of East Central Europe sided with the USA while old member states like France and Germany opposed military intervention. Even if the Union would have had a common position against American desires for military intervention, the problems of a common foreign policy would have become apparent by then. In this sense any common imperialistic foreign policy would have been impossible to implement. But also the 'Fortress' encountered its limits because Poland became a fervent advocate of future accession possibilities for other Eastern European states. This demonstrates that any foreign policy programme that may have existed would have reached its limits by now.

5. Conclusion

It is important to point out how often the EU emphasises that clear visions for a foreign policy are still missing.⁴⁹ Both ascriptions – 'Europe as Fortress' and 'Europe as Empire' fail both in reality as in the representations of Europe. Even if different groups of actors of the community came to use one of these ascriptions for their own goals, no group could enforce its own instrumentalisation of these representations. This is due to the character of the representations of Europe. Their foundations were laid in the Nineteen Fifties under circumstances that did not set boundaries for utopias because the reality was so unambiguous. This way a representation of an open, always receptive Europe without direct power-political interests outside of its common market could be articulated undisputed. It was not until 1990 that reality came to challenge these self-conceptions. However by 1995 it was too late to reformulate these representations given that two major enlargement rounds had taken place since 1980. Especially the so-called Northern enlargement, which strengthened that block of the Community which was most interested in the Eastern enlargement, applied criteria the Community could not step back from. These 'Copenhagen Criteria' had already been formulated in a similar version before 1990. To change the general requirements at this point in time would be a too obvious manipulation of the game. Both ascriptions thus only reflect the concentrated representation of the EU-inherent processes: the 'fortress' stands prototypically for the consolidation and the 'Empire' for the enlargement. But therefore Empire is a badly chosen term. When Herfried Münkler stresses that one of the defining features Empire is the presence of soft borders, then this does not apply to the EU as it is enclosed by sovereign states. The only form that could be considered imperialistic is the civilising mission. While the foreign policy is a prerogative of the member states the EU could concentrate on internal projects. It is important to mention that to follow any imperial idea the centre must know what it wants and how to achieve it; only then something

49 See e.g. Commission of the European Communities, COM (2003) 104 final: Wider Europe – Neighbourhood, Brussels 2003, 9.

like an expansive foreign policy comparable to that of an Empire becomes conceivable. But these clear visions are absent in the polyphonic EU. It may seem paradox in light of what has previously been mentioned, however the Union is too centralised and bureaucratically organised and manoeuvres within a world of established international law for “men on the spot” to be able to change a great deal. One problem is often forgotten when the foreign policy of the Community is flagged as imperialistic: the return of the nation state. The primary frame of reference for the EU – whether considered as a supra-, inter- or transnational institution – is the modern, Western nation state and not the Empire. The community had to cope with the resurgence of the nation state in Eastern Europe since the Nineteen Nineties and the permanent emphasis on this concept in the South. The time does not seem ripe for its efforts to build a multipolar world order with strong international institutions.

Fortress is a term coined to criticise the different efforts of the EU to cope with the growing pressure in migration. For the self-representation of the EU it was crucial to portray itself as an economical successful area. This was connected with the desire to be attractive. But when during the Nineteen Nineties this attractiveness led to rising numbers of immigrants the EU tried to stop this. Because the fortress-military-metaphor could not be combined with the self-representations, the community tried to establish ties to the periphery through contracts and agreements to influence their political and economical development. But one should not conflate this with a classical imperialistic foreign policy. Inside of the EU there was no consensus about what to do with the periphery. The conflicts and critical junctures of the enlargement debates of the Nineteen Nineties resulted in increasing self-preoccupation and reflection of the Union. But even then, there were no political and financial dispositions towards turning the EU into a fortress.

That this process is still underway and intermediary results will always be disputed by one or another is best proven by the conflicts around the two projects displacing the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and the Union for the Mediterranean. Nonetheless, the article asked for the articulated representations by European politicians involved in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and the Eastern Enlargement as well as secondary literature which either connect the Union to the concept of Empire or not. It is claimed as a result that for politicians and bureaucrats involved at the level of the Commission or other institutions of the European Union, the self representation of being an Empire seemed rather absurd. This had historical as well as institutional reasons, for example the representation of Europe as the space of freedom and democracy and the emphasis of a non-violent foreign policy of the Union as a whole. But there are sometimes politicians from single member states who on occasion propose openly or indirectly politics that could be interpreted as imperialistic. Here one can ask for continuities of imperial representations in different member states. The differences but also the similarities between both articles (Christian Methfessel's one and this one) clarify the evolution of representations of Europe vis-à-vis European border regions and non-European states.

One could therefore conclude from the different programmes that after an idealistic beginning these programmes were overtaken by reality. Just as the Eastern European states did not instantly become European in economic and judicial terms, the neighbours in the South did not become democratic and secure overnight either. So, the Union as a whole complied to a *realpolitik* and for that reason alone turned into an opponent of the United States. After the end of the Cold War the USA tried to defend their position as the last remaining superpower while the EU propagated a new multipolar world order dominated by supranational institutions. Although this was in some way also an ideological policy, the EU disliked the aggressive tone and the militant actions by which the USA strove to spread capitalism and democracy. It was impossible to implement any imperial or fortification policy in all its abrasiveness because no adequate representation of Europe could be instrumentalised in any consensual way. The big foreign policy approach to being at least a regional hegemonic power and to frame and advocate the policies of the neighbouring states (Euro-Mediterranean Partnership) failed and the classical mechanisms of negotiation and institutional arrangements seemed to be overstrained by the enlargement. Thus after the completion of the accession of the new Eastern European member states the EU halted any plans for further enlargement. Metaphorically speaking, this policy was more of a "snail shell" than a "fortress". Among the reasons behind this development were an inconsistent foreign policy, the inability to convince the regimes in the Southern Mediterranean to adopt more far-reaching economic and political reforms, the obstructions the USA used to restrict EU foreign policy in the region as well as the resurgence of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. But institutional reforms around the treaty of Lisbon and the creation of the office of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy set the institutional foundations for a more active foreign policy in the future. How this foreign policy will appear with regard to the representations of Europe mentioned here remains to be seen, yet past examples strongly suggest that the Union will never resort to an active foreign policy such as the one of the USA. So to say, both concepts had no lasting effects on the representations of Europe, they – if they ever did – changed only momentarily the politics of the Union.

Europe as a Model in International Relations? Representations of Europe in German and French Political Think Tanks, 1990–2000

Johan Wagner

RESÜMEE

Der Mauerfall ließ außenpolitische Beratungsinstitute in Deutschland und Frankreich nach neuen Deutungsmustern in den internationalen Beziehungen suchen. Der Artikel vergleicht die Europarepräsentationen in vier Institutionen (*Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik*, *Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik*, *Centre d'études et de recherches internationales*, *Institut français des relations internationales*). In den Arbeiten der Einrichtungen, die von 1990 bis 2000 die arabische Welt behandelten, spielen der Maghreb, die Euro-Mediterrane Partnerschaft und damit zusammenhängende Debatten zentrale Rollen. Wie legitimierten Institutsmitglieder hierbei Europa-konzepte? Der Vergleich reicht von gegenseitiger Abhängigkeit bis zum Empire *sans empereur* mit Mittelmeerachse und zeigt gemeinsame Entwicklungen und nationale Spezifika. In den Debatten machte sich eine zunehmende Konzentration auf die EU bemerkbar; die entscheidungsnahen Beratungseliten behielten ihren engen Bezug zu den nationalen Regierungen. Viele Quellen unterstrichen die Herausforderungen im Mittelmeerraum, andere sprachen der jüngsten europäischen Geschichte Modellcharakter zu – Europa wurde zur Handlungsressource.

The end of the Cold War did not usher in the end of history. Particularly with regard to the relations between Europe and the Islamic world, members of French and German political think tanks looked back beyond the age of European imperialism onto a millennium of reciprocal conceptions and developments. Rémy Leveau (1932–2005), an expert on the Maghreb associated with the *Centre d'études et de recherches internationales* (CERI) since the early 1990s and later also with the *Institut français des relations internationales* (IFRI), was also able to bring his reputation to bear in Germany, i.e. in the context of the *Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik* (SWP) and the *Deutsche Gesellschaft*

für Auswärtige Politik (DGAP).¹ In a working paper of the SWP, Leveau addressed the field of tension of European policy towards the Islamist movements; in an article for the DGAP he pointed out that dealing with the other had often served as a means to examine one's own, European development.²

In light of the scarcely reflected upon role of the above-mentioned actors in this field of research, the question arises as to how representations of Europe were used to legitimize or propose particular actions.³ The analysis draws its sources from various publications and documents from these institutions, which, in a socio-historical sense, can be described as actors of “scientification”. This term refers to a process that once again began to change since the mid-1970s, mainly due to “changes in the scientific, political and economic parameters”.⁴ The working papers, conference reports, magazine articles and other sources under examination are mainly printed texts, of which some were published while others were only accessible for a limited circle of individuals. Questions about representations regard their contents and the contexts in which they were read and composed, disseminated and published. Unlike the subsequent decade, the source material for the 1990s still largely remained dedicated to paper rather than the screen.⁵

How did actors juxtapose the own (European) against the other (non-European) in the process? In the following, the core of the Maghreb – Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia – will be examined as this other. Did members of political think tanks distinguish between these countries, or were they included in a European order of the South-Western Medi-

- 1 The four mentioned institutes provide the case studies for this paper. Obituaries of Leveau exist in both contexts: G. Kepel, Le Semeur: en hommage à Rémy Leveau, in: Politique étrangère, 70 (2005) 2, 241–242; K. Mohsen-Finan, Hommage à Rémy Leveau, in: R. Leveau/K. Mohsen-Finan (Ed.), Musulmans de France et d'Europe. en partenariat avec l'IFRI, Paris, 2005, IX–X. The Mahgreb expert spent three years in the mid-1990s working out of the French Institute for Social Sciences in Berlin; the Institute was eventually renamed Centre Marc Bloch: E. François, Das Centre Marc Bloch: Ein Knotenpunkt wissenschaftlicher Forschung und Kommunikation zwischen Frankreich und Deutschland, in: W. Engler (Ed.), Frankreich an der Freien Universität: Geschichte und Aktualität. Beiträge zur Ringvorlesung „Frankreich an der Freien Universität, Geschichte und Aktualität“, Wintersemester 1995/96, Stuttgart, 1997, 57–68.
- 2 The SWP working paper refers to Leveau's role as project manager at the Centre Marc Bloch in Berlin from March 1994 to July 1997. R. Leveau/G. E. Fuller, Pflegebedürftige Nachbarschaft: Islam und westliche Politik (SWP-AP, 3050), Ebenhausen, 1997, 9. His contribution made specific mention of Europe's interest in the Muslim world: “Seit gut einem Jahrtausend zeigt Europa – sei es aus Angst oder aus Faszination – ein Interesse an der muslimischen Welt.” [“For almost a millennium, Europe shows – be it out of fear or fascination – an interest in the Muslim world.”] R. Leveau, Der Islam – eine Herausforderung für den Westen, in: Internationale Politik, 52 (1997) 8, 25–32, 25.
- 3 This line of inquiry is based on my dissertation: J. Wagner, Europa das Eigene, der Maghreb das Andere. Europa-repräsentationen in deutschen und französischen Beratungsinstituten, 1990–2000 (Humboldt-Universität Berlin, 2012). The nationally shaped institutes can best be juxtaposed through the different actors located within European-institutional contexts, which already comes to be expressed in references to potentially *diverse representations of Europe* rather than assuming the existence of *one* – institutionally underpinned – *representation of Europe*. Cf. the article by Andreas Weiß in this volume.
- 4 L. Raphael, Die Verwissenschaftlichung des Sozialen als methodische und konzeptionelle Herausforderung für eine Sozialgeschichte des 20. Jahrhunderts, in: Geschichte und Gesellschaft, 22 (1996), 165–193, 178.
- 5 “From a larger perspective, we must reinscribe the emergence of the printing press in the longterm history of the forms of the book or the supports of texts (from the *volumen* to the *codex*, from the book to the screen) and in the history of reading practices.” R. Chartier, Texts, Printing, Readings, in: L. A. Hunt (Ed.), The New Cultural History, Berkeley, CA 2000, 154–175, 175. Emphasis in the original.

terranean? Representations become disputed in times of upheaval in particular, because we need them to understand the unknown.⁶ The period between 1990 and 2000 serves as a suitable timeframe immediately after the end of the Cold War. What were the differences and the similarities between Germany and France; what significance did the expansion of constitutional Europe have at a time which even contemporaries did not consider the “End of History” but quite the opposite?⁷

The article breaks down into five sections. First a concrete actor will serve as an example with which to trace the possibility of points of reference between the German and the French sphere. The context within which the protagonists found themselves in the 1990s and personal or institutional references were shaped will be illustrated by drawing on the example of an eminent expert on the Maghreb. This will be followed by an examination of two exceptional cases of representations of Europe in the given context, which also contain points of reference between the institutes under investigation, namely a) representations of *Europe as a role model* and b) representations of *Europe as Empire*.⁸ Fourth, a number of differences between the German and French policy think tanks will be highlighted. Fifth, three conclusions to be drawn from the similarities in the examined context will be presented, before a final summary seeks to determine the value of these findings.

1. Institutional Points of Reference

The political consulting scene in Germany and France in the 1990s found itself in a situation of increasing internationalization and Europeanization. While both processes can be understood as closely interconnected, they did not proceed in a linear or uniform manner.⁹ In a situation of upheaval, it was possible for networks and alliance to positively affect their consolidation, both on an institutional and personal level, also with regard to representations of Europe and the non-European.

Making references was the simplest means for actors to establish such contacts. For one, such referrals meant comparing one's own particular context with the situation being

6 J. Barberowski, Afterword: Representations of the National on the Fringes of Europe, in: T. Darieva/W. Kaschuba (Ed.), *Representations on the Margins of Europe. Politics and Identities in the Baltic and South Caucasian States*, Frankfurt a. M./New York 2007, 337–344, 337.

7 Namely as a phase of historical transformation without an end in sight. N. Davies, *Europe. A History*, Oxford, 1997, 1127–1129. On the thesis of political science concerning the consensus over liberal democracy as a system of government cf. F. Fukuyama, *Das Ende der Geschichte. Wo stehen wir?*, München, 1992. On the concept of constitutional Europe and its relation to the “civic society”: J. Nielsen-Sikora, *Europa der Bürger? Anspruch und Wirklichkeit der europäischen Einigung – eine Spurensuche*, Stuttgart 2009, 402.

8 The employment of Europe as a resource for political action and a referential model for a putative European periphery offers interesting parallels to diachronic arguments in Tsarist Russia (cf. Benjamin Beuerle's article in this volume). On the other hand, imperial representations of European community towards non-Europe played a similar role in other temporal and medial contexts (cf. the article by Christian Methfessel).

9 U. von Hirschhausen/K. K. Patel, *Europeanization in History: An Introduction*, in: M. Conway/K. K. Patel (Ed.), *Europeanization in the Twentieth Century. Historical Approaches*, Basingstoke, Hampshire 2010, 1–18.

referenced. On the other hand, there were also transfers of perceptions and bodies of knowledge. Within the reciprocal establishment of these connections, there were similarities and differences between individual actors and institutions. For example, in the working paper mentioned in the introduction, the Maghreb expert Leveau presented case studies on the significance of political Islam and Islamist movements in Algeria, Egypt and Turkey, before proceeding to link Algeria as a Maghreb-state to the Turkish question at the end of his article. The linkage between both lines of argumentation can in part be explained by the audience for which the working paper was intended. As it was aimed at a German readership, the possible expansion of the EU to include Turkey was an issue of particular relevance. The French scholar explicitly addressed a German public, which, like the French public, he claimed was not prepared for questions related to Turkish accession. This would inevitably revive the discussion about the candidacy of the three Maghreb states. In Leveau's view, a southern expansion of this kind would have positive effects in two areas in particular: For one, it would permit immigration and thereby curb radicalization. Furthermore, it would open up the possibility of taking influence on states bordering these countries in the future.¹⁰ The connection between Turkey and the Maghreb meant that this was not just about the perception of random others or a free-floating international relationship. Moreover, such processes of self-description were not independent from regional and international observations – they specifically concerned the Maghreb.

In his concluding remarks, which contained a number of recommendations, Leveau used *the West* and *Europe* interchangeably within the context of the self-representations.¹¹ He argued that the “Western governments” should participate in promoting the development of regional sub-systems, e.g. in the Maghreb. Among the reasons cited by Leveau to support his argument, he claimed that this would counteract developments “against Europe”.¹² While the EU functioned as a model, criticism towards undemocratic orders was also severely restricted in this case, at times also by means of arguments drawing on historical comparisons. For example, with the regard to the Arab states, the expert wrote that in part they showed “a certain similarity with the enlightened despotism of the 18th century or the first half of the 19th century in Europe”.¹³

While the challenge of Islam was described as an issue concerning the entire Muslim world in an article by Rémy Leveau that was published in the journal of the DGAP in December, the author nevertheless drew on the examples of Turkey and Algeria under the sub-heading “perspectives”. In light of the upcoming Turkish parliamentary elections and a possible election victory of an Islamist party, Leveau’s warning evoked the horrors

10 R. Leveau/G. E. Fuller, *Nachbarschaft* (note 2), 28.

11 The interchangeability of the West and (Western) Europe is not only characteristic for most recent conceptions of the role of Europe among European elites, but also the political debates in the late Tsarist Empire – cf. Benjamin Beuerle’s article.

12 Ibid., 30.

13 Ibid., 13.

of the Algerian Civil War.¹⁴ In both contributions to the debate about Europe and the Maghreb, he thus referred to Turkey as an example to underpin his interpretations due to its particular relevance for a German audience.

The representations of links, commonalities and differences were ambivalent for the actors in question, both individuals and organizations. In situations where upheaval or change was interpreted in relation to power, both forms of referencing brought their advantages and disadvantages. On the one hand, it was possible to heighten the reputation of the institute and its members by arguing on an *international* or *inter-sectoral* level, or in a *Europeanized* form. On the other hand, it was important to preserve particular features of distinction.¹⁵

2. Europe as a Disputed Model for Co-Operation, the Economy and Political Reform

The comparison between German and French institutes is insightful, as every culture needs other cultures to gain clarity about its representations.¹⁶ Thus, beyond the initial question regarding Europe as a resource for action, it is necessary to examine the contexts of the objects under investigation and the relationship between representations of the own and the other. As representations of Europe are the common feature (*tertium comparationis*) in this particular comparison, the question arises regarding the role played by developments in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War, which were initiated at the conferences of the European Council in Dublin in the first half of 1990. The heads of state and government sought to “transform the Community from an institution mainly based on economic integration into a union with a political character”, which was also meant to have “a common foreign and security policy”.¹⁷ What was the significance of this pre-ordained expansion of Constitutional Europe, which would come to define the decade? Are there also multiple forms within this expansion and consolidation, as they have already been described with regard to the multiple modernities within the first wave of modernity?¹⁸

14 Unlike the SWP paper, the article in the journal, which is older than the society itself, was accessible to the public. Leveau, Islam (note 2), 30.

15 Without the historically contingent polemic of Helmut Shelsky, one could speak of a type of *ruling knowledge* [*Herrschaftswissen*] that was to be preserved. Cf. G. Metzler, The Integration of Social Science Expertise Into the Political Process: Did It Actually Happen?, in: E. Kurz-Milcke/G. Gigerenzer (Ed.), Experts in Science and Society, New York u. a. 2004, 47–63, 61.

16 J. Baberowski, Afterword (note 6), 337.

17 Quoted in J. Elvert, Die europäische Integration, Darmstadt 2006, 120.

18 A historical example for this is found in the differing conceptions of the state on the continent and in Great Britain: “There was the strong homogenizing ‘laicization’ of France, or, in a different vein, of the Lutheran Scandinavian countries, as against the much more consociational and pluralistic arrangements common to Holland and Switzerland, and to a much smaller extent in Great Britain.” S. N. Eisenstadt, Multiple Modernities, in: S. N. Eisenstadt (Ed.), Multiple Modernities, New Brunswick, NJ 2002, 1–29, 10.

It is worth drawing attention to a *model within the model* beforehand. German-French cooperation served as a role model for future multilateral projects. Nevertheless, as an observer of such interwoven processes, one should be cautious of assuming a given automatism between close relations in a given area of society and political co-operation.¹⁹ A closer examination of the examples enumerated below reveals that while Europe often featured as a role model, particular emphasis was placed on the German-French partnership within Europe itself. This interpretive pattern is steeped in a longer tradition, considering that Charles de Gaulle and Konrad Adenauer provided the legal foundation for a special relationship with the signing of the Élysée Treaty in 1963.²⁰ On the other hand, one could also begin to see clearly the multitude of national perspectives regarding different visions of a European future. The examples for representations of Europe will be analyzed in chronological order and not according to institutes so as to provide a better impression of the course of the discussion between 1990 and 2000.

Economic interweaving is one particular representation which, at a first glance, denied thinking in models and imitation/emulation. At a second glance, it becomes apparent that drawing connections between Europe and the Maghreb could imply both a stronger and a weaker side. In 1991, the political scientist Dieter Senghaas defined a model for the international division of labour and underlined the necessity for purposeful assistance from Western Europe; Eastern Europe was in need of capital (from the West) and an export market (in the East).²¹ Senghaas had previously pointed out economic similarities between North-African Mediterranean accession candidates and Eastern Europe after it opened up to the West following the political upheavals.²² But Senghaas' model only seemed to apply to the Maghreb with regard to aid from Western Europe, as the market potential of the Soviet Union – or, in case of “the Soviet Union's dismemberment”, Russia²³ – was not present to an equal measure in the Maghreb states.

Whenever there was talk of Europe as a model for reforms – i.e. processes of democratization – spatial perceptions came into play.²⁴ The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), whose positive effect on the largely peaceful end of the Cold War has been highlighted, presented a model for a similarly structured common political space around the Mediterranean region in the early 1990s.²⁵ The Munich-based politi-

- 19 H. Kaelble, Die sozialen und kulturellen Beziehungen Frankreichs und Deutschlands seit 1945, in: *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte* (2003) 20.01.2003, 40–46, 46.
- 20 M. Sutton, France and the Construction of Europe, 1944–2007: The Geopolitical Imperative, New York/Oxford 2007, 4.
- 21 D. Senghaas, Europa, quo vadis? Neue Aufgaben für eine Politik der Friedensgestaltung (SWP-AP, 2679), *Ibid.*, 1991, 50–51.
- 22 *Ibid.*, 48–49.
- 23 *Ibid.*, 48.
- 24 U. Engel/M. Middell, Bruchzonen der Globalisierung, globale Krisen und Territorialitätsregimes – Kategorien einer Globalgeschichtsschreibung, in: *Comparativ*, 15 (2005) 5/6, 5–38, 15–16.
- 25 The CSCE model for the Mediterranean ultimately failed for a number of reasons. These included the disparity amongst the partners, the so-called Gulf Crisis in August 1990 and an increasingly comprehensive spatial conception of the Mediterranean. A. Jünemann, Europas Mittelmeerpolitik im regionalen und globalen Wandel: Interessen und Zielkonflikte, in: W. Zippel (Ed.), *Die Mittelmeerpolitik der EU*, Baden-Baden 1999, 29–63, 43–45.

cal scientist Mir A. Ferdowsi wrote an article for the spring 1992 edition of the journal *Europa-Archiv* about the proposal to summon a conference for the Mediterranean region to deal with this issue; this would open up the possibility for a common political space.²⁶ Spatial perceptions also played a role when parallels were drawn between the East and the South; at the IFRI, which conceived of itself as an exceptional forum, German diplomats and politicians also drafted plans for Europe. Wolfgang Ischinger pointed out the importance of continued German-French cooperation for a political Europe. Regardless of the necessary weight for an expansion towards the East, Germany would have to make sure not to neglect France's close ties to the Mediterranean region – both would need to seek stability there together.²⁷ Ischinger thus challenged the position of seeing national projections at work at the southern periphery in particular, and also spoke out against neglecting the model of Europe as a *Global Player*, which should underline its claims on the world stage through its common responsibility towards all border regions.

A Maghreb expert of the DGAP, Hartmut Kistenfeger, combined two concepts to devise a model in a 1994 assessment of the Arabian Maghreb Union (UMA). His recommendations regarding the relations between European states and the Maghreb Union clearly showed that cooperation should also have a positive impact on European structures.²⁸ The European structures, on the other hand, were implicitly exemplary for the Maghreb Union; Tunisia in particular had hoped for supranationality:

*It was the intention of Algeria and Morocco to give shape and stability to their dialogue by institutionalizing the Maghreb Union. Tunisia's hopes for a European Union-like structuring of the Union were dashed.*²⁹

As a guest speaker at the IFRI in Paris, and out of a wholly different political context, the politician Jean-Pierre Chevènement argued in favour of opening up the European model towards the Mediterranean region.³⁰ Rather than Christianity, he considered the category of *laïcité* to be of greater importance; furthermore, it would be a geographical

26 The author cited a "strategy paper" of the Europe research group working under the supervision of Werner Weidenfeld, who became editor of the DGAP-journal from 1995 onwards. M. A. Ferdowsi, Die KSZE als Modell? Möglichkeiten und Grenzen der Anwendung in der Dritten Welt, in: *Europa-Archiv*, 47 (1992), 76–83, 76.

27 "[...] les Etats méditerranéens – actuels principaux bénéficiaires des fonds de solidarité –, peu enthousiastes par crainte de perdre leurs avantages, ont besoin à tout prix d'un interlocuteur. La France, à moitié méditerranéenne, s'avère la plus à même de répondre à leurs inquiétudes et favoriser la vocation globale de l'Europe. En effet, si l'aventure européenne se joue désormais à l'Est, il ne faut cependant pas ignorer les problèmes de stabilité dans la région méditerranéenne." A. Bonraisin, Conférence de M. Wolfgang Ischinger. La France et l'Allemagne dans la nouvelle Europe, 20 janvier 1994, in: IFRI conférences (1994) Dezember/Januar 1993/1994. Ischinger was head of planning in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in late 1993/early 1994.

28 "Maghreb und Golf nehmen unter den Interessen der deutschen Außenpolitik einen eher untergeordneten Rang ein. Deutsche Außenpolitik gegenüber den arabischen Staaten vollzieht sich fast immer im europäischen Rahmen. Es würde die Europäische Union stärken, wenn Deutschland sich intensiver der Probleme und Entwicklungen der beiden Regionen annähme." H. Kistenfeger, Maghreb-Union und Golfrat. Regionale Kooperation in der arabischen Welt, Bonn 1994, 187.

29 Ibid., 188. The quotation can be found in the English abstract of the publication.

30 A.-L. Jolivet, Conférence de M. Jean-Pierre Chevènement. La France et la Méditerranée : pour une diplomatie laïque, 2 mai 1995, in: IFRI conférences (1995) April/Mai 1995. He had already given a similar talk in 1992. Within the post-Maastricht context the IFRI scholar summarized Chevènement's talk from a related perspective (in

necessity to remain a key player in the Mediterranean region instead of pursuing an exclusively European dimension.³¹

A French-National interpretation was able to assert itself in connection with the Maghreb issue, which established a difference between the Mediterranean region (making particular mention of Algeria) and the European core. Even a critic of Maastricht such as Chevènement conceived of Europe as a role-model for the Mediterranean region, albeit paired with typically French models such as *laïcité*.³² The demands for a strategy tailored towards the geographical conditions of the Mediterranean region exhibit a representation of Europe that differed from the notion of a small Europe. Along with Chevènement, Thierry de Montbrial, director of the IFRI and commentator for the conservative daily *Le Figaro*, was among the voices that also championed the French tradition in economic policy, perhaps not as vehemently, but certainly with verve.³³

By the mid-1990s, Post-Maastricht-Europe³⁴ also gained in importance in German policy think tanks. After the re-conception of the in-house journal of the DGAP, which was now published under the name *Internationale Politik*, the new editor Werner Weidenfeld entered the debate. He posed the question of how Europe would shape its “southern flank” in the future. Europe would need to face the demands for European developmental aid, a just social order and the accommodation of cultures.³⁵ The article contained a detailed graphical depiction of European institutions;³⁶ the text was characteristic of a European self-conception that caused institutional differences to fade into the background by means of a seemingly definite representation. Weidenfeld thus spoke of Europe rather than individual organizations or states in the comparisons and requirements he discussed.

terms of context). Cf. J. Paolini, Conférence de Jean-Pierre Chevènement. L’identité de la France dans le monde de l’après-Yalta, 17 mars 1992, in: IFRI conférences (1992) April/Mai 1992.

- 31 “Pour Jean-Pierre Chevènement, l’évolution historique de la France conduit à définir sa diplomatie par rapport à la notion de laïcité, plutôt que par rapport à l’idée de chrétienté. La France a, par sa position géographique, une vocation d’ouverture sur la Méditerranée, donc vers l’Afrique et l’Orient. [...] Principale puissance de la Méditerranée, il serait dangereux pour la France de s’enfermer dans une dimension purement européenne, comme elle tend à le faire.” Jolivet, Conférence (note 30).
- 32 On laïcité as a French particularity in modernity see the aforementioned quote by Eisenstadt regarding the difference between the British Isles and continental Europe. S. N. Eisenstadt, Multiple Modernities (note 18), 10.
- 33 This also happened in order to strengthen Europe’s role towards the United States and Japan. J.-H. Meyer, The European Public Sphere. Media and Transnational Communication in European Integration 1969–1991, Stuttgart 2010, 269.
- 34 Sutton justifiably views the concept of Post-Maastricht-Europe in close relation to the concept of Post-Yalta-Europe, as both reach beyond the dimension of the longtime successfully propagated formula *la construction européenne*. M. Sutton, France (note 20), 276–326.
- 35 W. Weidenfeld, Ernstfall Europa. Der Kontinent braucht konzeptionelle Klarheit, in: Internationale Politik, 50 (1995) 1, 11–19, 14.
- 36 The map listed the various membership structures of the EU, Western European Union (WEU), the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), the Council of Europe etc. The expansion of the community treaties to include a “common defence” policy and the association to the WEU was a triumphant success for German-French diplomacy. French President Mitterrand’s proposal for a European Confederation was essentially a spinoff of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE), albeit without Canada and the USA. This proposal ultimately led to a Paris Charter for a New Europe (November 1990), which in turn initiated the process towards the transformation of the CSCE into the OSCE (1994). M. Sutton, France (note 20), 266, 254.

A similar line of argumentation is found in an article on the Middle East that appeared soon thereafter, although in this particular case the main focus was on the self-image which implied that the integrative project of Europe in the shape of the EU could be positively implemented elsewhere. More to the point: EU-Europe was recommended as a model example. Aside from this representation of interweaving, Weidenfeld also came to address the highly distinctive role of the EU: Both in terms of Mediterranean policy as well as the question of identity, realism and orientation towards the future would have to be applied to an equal degree. Mediterranean policy was thus closely linked to future designs for a Union that was to become ever more closely connected. Against the backdrop of the prospect of progress in the Middle East peace process at the time, the Mediterranean came to be viewed as a single entity.³⁷

The Barcelona Conference in late November 1995 marked a turning point with regard to conceptions of Europe as a role model for the Maghreb. By announcing elaborate and extensive goals for political, economic and social development, the European participants at this diplomatic event opened up a new avenue for debate, which included discussions surrounding Europe as an exemplary model. After a lengthy phase in which the Maghreb's co operational deficits³⁸ were examined less thoroughly, numerous SWP-publications dealt with this issue again after the Barcelona Conference. This can be explained by the institute's desire to partake in the dialogue on questions concerning cooperation and development. Papers which directly referred to economic developments in the Mediterranean region tended to focus on the Arab states and their position towards Israeli concepts. For example, in a working paper, Volker Perthes analyzed economic cooperation in the entire Arab region, and subsumed the North-African states under the term Middle East.³⁹ The Maghreb did not remain completely unconsidered, however, particularly when the Arab world was juxtaposed with the European Union. This became apparent in the area of economic cooperation, for example in the exchange of labour: Workers from the Maghreb tended to migrate to Europe in far greater numbers than to Arab states, and inner-Arabian migration for the Maghreb was not recorded.⁴⁰ The regional integration of the Maghreb countries – though European integration was not always explicitly mentioned as a model example – was increasingly viewed as an area with deficits in the papers of the SWP. In his assessment of the “economic and socio-economic

37 W. Weidenfeld, Der neue Nahe Osten, in: *Internationale Politik*, 50 (1995) 7, 1–2. This had previously become more common, as in the case of the Commission member Peter M. Schmidhuber. P.M. Schmidhuber, Finanzpolitische Konsequenzen der Weiterentwicklung der Europäischen Gemeinschaften, in: *Europa-Archiv*, 46 (1991), 487–492.

38 The implicit backwardness of the Maghreb within this representation formed an example for the problems of the entire Arab world. References not only to the Mahgrebian but also the Mashreq countries in the Eastern Mediterranean were promoted through the Barcelona Declaration, which included both south-eastern and south-western neighbours.

39 V. Perthes, *Arab Economic Cooperation: A Critical View from Outside* (KA-SWP, 2943), Ebenhausen, 1996, 5.

40 Ibid., 10–11. Labour migration was charted by means of a graphical representation which, aside from the Maghreb states Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia, also included Mauretania and Libya, both members of the Maghreb Union (the graph indicated inward labour migration for Libya).

exchange”, Perthes concluded that one could only speak of regional integration in the Arab East, as there was no Maghreb state that exhibited a significant level of integration into its “Arab environment”.⁴¹ Time and again, the peace process between Israel and the Arab states took centre stage in his texts, which also shone through in his assessment of inner-Arabian economic relations. In his concluding remarks, Perthes pointed out two arguments in conjunction with the peace process: for one, there were fears that Israel would be a divisive economic power in the Arab world in a new order of the region and thus separate the Arabian Mashreq from the Maghreb. Secondly, peace between Israel and the Arab world would be a necessary prerequisite for regional cooperation.⁴² While the above-mentioned example certainly was hopeful in its outlook on the prospects for peace, the EU nevertheless appeared as the royal road behind the backdrop of the status quo and lacking economic integration. Perthes compared the average foreign trade ratio between individual EU member states (60 percent) against the statistically much lower amount between Arab states.⁴³ Security interests were another point where striking differences between the “soft” interests of the northern states and the “hard” interests of the southern states in the Mediterranean region were cited.⁴⁴

In the area of security policy, this contrast was explicitly mentioned in conjunction with the project of a Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP), i.e. cooperation between EU-Europeans and the *other* Mediterranean neighbours. This antagonism was almost given more weight than that between Americans and Israelis and Arab conceptions of the future Middle East, which were also discussed. German and French representations of Europe could also be viewed as antagonistic, however, given their different paths of historical development.

3. Empire as Model?

Institute members also tended to approach the issue of relations between Europe and the Maghreb from a perspective that related to the Community. In French publications and texts there was not only talk of spaces, but also explicit references to empire. An essay by IFRI scholar Philippe Moreau Defarges on the EU that appeared in 1997 concluded with reflections on strategic and political developments in the Mediterranean region, and also dealt with the purported Europe-relatedness of Russia and the United States in

41 Ibid., 13.

42 Ibid., 24–25.

43 Ibid., 7.

44 “Der KSZE-Prozeß mag Europäern als gutes Modell erscheinen; der größere Teil der arabischen Führungseliten indessen hält schon den Gedanken an eine Übertragung dieses Modells für gefährlich: In ihren Augen steht es vor allem für die Unterminierung und für den Zusammenbruch der sozialistischen Regime Osteuropas, deren Schicksal sie ungern teilen möchten. Stabile nahöstliche Arrangements werden sich aber nur treffen lassen, wenn die regionalen Führungseliten sie tragen und dabei auch ihre Sicherheitsinteressen gewahrt sehen.” Id., Auf dem Weg zum Frieden? Elemente einer nahöstlichen Sicherheitsarchitektur, in: Internationale Politik, 54 (1999) 7, 1–10, 10.

passing.⁴⁵ If we call into mind the ways in which Europe came to be used as an argument in the Russian reform debates examined by Benjamin Beuerle in this volume, references to historic or contemporary “civilized” states or regions seem to be steeped in a longer tradition. As Andreas Weiß demonstrates, the ideas of *realpolitik* in Europe (multipolar world) and the United States (imperial superpower) drifted apart after the end of the Cold War. Moreau Defarges however spoke of an empire without an emperor:

*L'Europe émerge dans la nuit du haut Moyen-Age, sur les ruines de l'Empire romain. Pendant des siècles, jusqu'aux deux guerres mondiales, elle ne cesse d'être hantée par cet Empire, sorte d'âge d'or à restaurer, quelques-uns (de Charlemagne à Charles Quint, de Napoléon à Hitler) imaginant de le reconstituer et finalement se brisant contre la résistance des Etats, des peuples. Au moment où ces ambitions semble irrémédiablement anéanties et confisquées par d'autres empires, américain, russe – eux aussi obsédés par Rome –, voici que l'Europe, en s'unifiant, réinvente un Empire sans empereur et se trouve conduite à retrouver l'aire géographique de la Rome antique avec, pour l'axe, la Méditerranée.*⁴⁶

Writing for the IFRI, Philippe Moreau Defarges made a prediction regarding this particular case that was similar to the one by Alain Minc in the early 1990s. Yet Moreau Defarges explicitly advocated a return to the Mediterranean, while in the summary of Minc's statement this merely resonated implicitly in the *empire* concept.⁴⁷ In contrast to Minc, the IFRI expert alluded to the *Imperium Romanum*. A possible explanation lies in the historical character of the Roman Empire.⁴⁸ Thinking in terms of spheres of influence and imperial dimensions had already featured in the French President Francois Mitterrand's plans for a confederation in January 1994 and the purported German plans for Eastern Europe.⁴⁹

45 P. Moreau Defarges, L'Union européenne: la fédération-nébuleuse, Paris, 1997, 59. The term “n  buleuse” (originally employed within the context of astronomy to describe star clusters) came to be used for the description of human groups in scholarly circles that considered themselves part of the *Annales*-tradition of Bloch, Febvre and Braudel. P. Burke, Die Geschichte der Annales. Die Entstehung der neuen Geschichtsschreibung, Aktual. und um ein Nachw. erw. Neuausg., Berlin, 2004, 147. Reflections on the role of political think tanks in the case of developments in the United States could also be found in France, cf. S. Boucher/M. Royo, Les think tanks. Cerveaux de la guerre des id  es, Paris 2006, 13–28.

46 P. Moreau Defarges, F  d  ration-n  buleuse (note 45), 60.

47 C. Risset-Hemad, Conf  rence de M. Alain Minc. Le retour du Moyen-Âge, 24 novembre 1993, in: IFRI conf  rences (1993) Oktober/November 1993. The talk coincided with the book's publication. A. Minc, Le nouveau Moyen Âge, Paris, 1993.

48 In this region in particular, the *Imperium Romanum* did not feature a so-called barbarian border. H. M  nkle, Barbaren und D  monen: Die Konstruktion des Fremden in Imperialen Ordnungen, in: J. Baberowski, H. Kaelble/J. Schriewer (Ed.), Selbstbilder und Fremdbilder. Repr  sentation sozialer Ordnungen im Wandel, Frankfurt a. M., New York, 2008, 153–189, 173–177.

49 He said to a select group of journalists, though his own interest in a confederation may have contributed to enhancing the inherent antagonisms: “As to the Germans, basically, they want a confederation, but for their own purposes. Their only thought is to reconstitute a sort of Austro-Hungarian Empire by reinforcing their domain in Mitteleuropa with Poland, Hungary, Bohemia and Slovakia, and Ukraine, as well as with Slovenia and Croatia. For this reason my confederation was a substitute for their imperialist ambition. Kohl was saying: ‘Why share the decisions about the future of these countries when they fall into our sphere, that belonging to the Germans?’”

When it came to the question of the model within the model, i.e. the role of German-French co-operation within European contexts, changes of government on a national level provided important points of fixation. Shortly after the change of government in Germany in 1998, Karl Kaiser (Director of the research institute DHAP) came to speak at the IFRI. His talk highlighted the circumstance that there were different concepts in France and Germany of how to approach the new balance of power in the post Cold War world. According to the summary report, Kaiser also came to address the new German government's position regarding the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). The Schröder Government intended to strengthen the European defence identity as well as co-operation between the EU and the WEU. However, Kaiser argued that Joschka Fischer's vision of a European power of new proportions" could come into conflict with the French concept of a more classical power-political approach.⁵⁰

Whereas the assessments of economic integration and Europe's role as a model example in these processes generally tended to be positive at the beginning of the examined period, more critical voices began to multiply as a result of the raised expectations following the Barcelona Declaration. A CERI paper from 1998 is of particular relevance in this context. With a kind of "call for empire" the Maghreb countries were said to have compelled the Commission in Brussels in particular to consider a predominantly economic relationship with the region promising.⁵¹ By citing the "appels d'Empire" the authors alluded to a book by the scholar Ghassan Salamé that appeared in 1996.⁵² In this study, the eminent scholar sought to demonstrate a renationalization of security policy and simultaneously accord real-political foundations to the calls for empire, both in those countries demanding intervention as well as in the power centres capable of intervention.⁵³ As is highlighted by Christian Methfessel's article in this volume, it was also possible to find common ground in Europeanness despite distinctive representations, for example of empire, at the beginning of the twentieth century. The CERI paper substantiated the real-political interest of a "common space of peace and stability",⁵⁴ especially for the Maghreb countries:

Zit. n. M. Sutton, France (note 20), 312–313. Emphasis in the original.

- 50 "[...] la vision d'une puissance européenne développée par le ministre des Affaires étrangères allemand, Joschka Fischer, autour du concept d'autolimitation du pouvoir [...]". D. Mugnier, Conférence de M. Karl Kaiser. La politique étrangère de l'Allemagne, 2 décembre 1998, in: IFRI conférences (1999) März 1999.
- 51 B. Hibou/L. Martinez, Le Partenariat euro-maghrébin: un mariage blanc ? (Les Études du CERI, 47 der Gesamtfolge), Paris, 1998, 6.
- 52 G. Salamé, Appels d'empire. Ingérences et résistances à l'âge de la mondialisation, Paris, 1996. Salamé was tied to the CERI himself.
- 53 On France, Salamé for example wrote with regard to the calls for interference: "Ces appels à l'ingérence musclée se marient avec une *Realpolitik* qui, plutôt que de se référer à quelque sentiment humanitaire, prône le recours à la force pour préserver les intérêts occidentaux dans le monde. En France, la 'menace islamiste' ou le sens des 'responsabilités particulières de la France en Afrique' en ont parfois été à l'origine." Ibid., 14. Emphasis in the original.
- 54 Europäische Kommission, Erklärung von Barcelona und Arbeitsprogramm, in: Bulletin der Europäischen Union, 1995, 153–164, 154.

Dans ce contexte, on peut comprendre l'intérêt des signataires de ce Partenariat. Cet “appel d'Empire” exprime les craintes d'une marginalisation accrue de ces Etats et de la balkanisation de la rive Sud de la Méditerranée. L'idée d'instaurer une “zone de paix et de stabilité” ne peut que séduire les Etats du Maghreb qui cherchent désespérément à se distinguer du Moyen-Orient, comme l'attestent les réflexions sur un possible découplage Est/Ouest dans l'application des accords de Barcelone.⁵⁵

As this example illustrates, the authors worked with the assumption of a conceptual trap: A simplifying image of relations and orders in the Mediterranean region, which drew upon historical lines of development and was said to be reinforced in a kind of complicity between elites in Brussels and other capitals of the states involved. Following the generalist Salamé, the new generation of CERI members inverted the idea of empire, according to which the Maghreb states at the periphery compelled the central European states to adopt a model that ran counter to the representations of Europe espoused by Hibou and Martinez.⁵⁶ With their trenchant critique, the authors provide an ideal segue into the differing viewpoints in the case studies.

4. Institutional Differences

Regarding the differences between the institutes in Germany and France, with particular focus on the unpublished texts, publications, events etc., it becomes apparent that every institute can be broken down into a multitude of individual actors. Not least the claim to scientificity and thus the claim to academic freedom speak for this individual view. Moreover, the lack of uniformity with regard to the source material – neither in the respective countries nor within each institute – represents a normal situation in historical comparative terms.⁵⁷ In this sense, when tracing institutional differences and commonalities, the results are bound to remain a mere approximation based on an interpretation of this polyphony. There are nonetheless factors which speak for retaining this institutional perspective, such as the hierarchies among various groups of protagonists. Directors for example could exert more influence by means of publication-related decisions, prefaces etc. than other institute members, also in fields far removed from their own particular area of expertise.⁵⁸ Furthermore, certain trends and tendencies can be made

55 B. Hibou/L. Martinez, Partenariat (note 51), 6.

56 The most substantial thesis to emerge from the discussions concerning these issue in the political sciences is the thesis of a neo-medieval empire, which established parallels between premodern forms of governance and the governing practices of the EU: “The rise of a neo-medieval empire does not need to herald the end of European integration. On the contrary, such an empire seems to be better suited than a Westphalian state to meeting some of the basic aims of integration. I have tried to show that a neo-medieval empire is in a good position to cope with the pressures of globalization because of its inbuilt flexibility and ability to learn.” J. Zielonka, Europe as Empire. The Nature of the Enlarged European Union, Oxford 2006, 189.

57 H. Kaelble, Der historische Vergleich. Eine Einführung zum 19. und 20. Jahrhundert, Frankfurt a. M./New York 1999, 148.

58 For example, regarding the position of the Director of the SWP and the personnel matter of Stürmer, the political scientist Winand Gellner wrote: “Die heftig diskutierte Berufung des ehemaligen Kanzlerberaters Michael

more plausible by examining various publications produced by three institutes; finally the comparison between various institutes also serves to distinguish between overarching trends and individual developments.

In the texts of the SWP for example, the Maghreb was considered an important part of the Mediterranean region – the most important when it came to matters of migration – and was regularly characterized as a field of experimentation for a European Mediterranean Policy. Moreover, the arguments of the SWP members took a wide range of security-related aspects into consideration. They came to distinguish between more classical scenarios dominated by strategic military deliberations, and *softer* aspects such as migration or human rights violations (one example here was the situation in the most important Maghreb state, Algeria). Self-representations towards the Maghreb nevertheless remained closely tied up with security related issues. As has been mentioned, in light of the efforts of coming to terms with the end of the Cold War – which had also taken the experts by surprise – and the new perspectives in development policy and developmental co-operation, it came to a broader discussion within the institute regarding its own role and the role of others in the international order.

In many cases, a critique of and scepticism towards the sincerity of the rhetoric of responsibility within the EU is clearly recognizable among SWP authors. Volker Perthes, an expert on the Middle East, was an important advocate of a more critical perspective.⁵⁹ For one, this critique confirmed that the EU was of exceptional importance in the relations between Europe and the Maghreb, or that it had come to attain this role of importance. Secondly, it belonged to the advisory work of the experts, who criticized current and past circumstances in order to suggest future improvements. The SWP in Germany was the number one address when it came to practical security-related considerations related to Euro-Maghreb relations.⁶⁰

In both the texts published and the events hosted by the DGAP over the course of the 1990s, the Mediterranean policy was conceptualized as a common area of interest among the member states of the European institutions time and again. Within this context the institutional diversity was summarized under the cipher *Europe* – similar in some cases to the Maghreb and the Middle East being referred to as the *Mediterranean*.⁶¹ The portrayal

Stürmer zum Nachfolger von [Klaus] Ritter verdeutlichte, daß auch Ebenhausen [also die SWP, J. W.] nicht völlig frei von parteipolitischen Absichten und Interessen ist“ [“The intense discussion surrounding the appointment of the former advisor to the Chancellor, Michael Stürmer, as the successor of Ritter made it apparent that Ebenhausen [i.e. the SWP, J. W.] is not completely free from party-political intentions and interests either.”] W. Gellner, Ideenagenturen für Politik und Öffentlichkeit. Think Tanks in den USA und in Deutschland, Opladen 1995, 172.

- 59 Quite explicitly in V. Perthes, Ist der Barcelona-Prozeß der Nukleus für gemeinsame Sicherheit?, in: P. Pasch (Ed.), Sicherheit und Zusammenarbeit zwischen Europa und den Ländern des Nahen und Mittleren Ostens. Internationale Konferenz, 19. Juni 1998, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Bonn, Bonn 1999, 12–21.
- 60 This was also due to the personnel-related pre-eminence of the SWP in the area of expert information, which during the period of inquiry was only matched by a Hamburg based institute, the German Overseas Institute (now called German Institute of Global and Area Studies). Gespräch mit J. Rogalski, G. Weiher, Büro SWP, (4.8.2011).
- 61 Cf. the supplement “Brennpunkt Mittelmeer” [“Hot Spot Mediterranean”] to the DGAP-Journal Internationale Politik. Therein e.g. W. Weidenfeld, Herausforderung Mittelmeer, in: Internationale Politik, 51 (1996) 2, 1–2.

of the Mediterranean Policy as a common interest of constitutional Europe came to be represented in a number of variations in the publications of the DGAP. Three particular manifestations predominated: *firstly* the embedding of the Maghreb in this interest-based Mediterranean Policy, *secondly* a responsibility towards the region, and *thirdly* intense discussions during the months in which peace in the Middle East appeared to be within reach as well as around the time of the Barcelona Declaration in November 1995.

Within the DGAP, whose structure had been conceptualized as more of a forum, the Germany-France complex was accorded greater importance than within the SWP.⁶² DGAP members and guests, but also politicians and journalists referred to the Mediterranean time and again with the frame of three European particularities during the examined period. Firstly, in connection with the supranational and potentially federative future structure of constitutional Europe. Secondly, when it came to processes of delimitation – particularly towards the United States. And thirdly, concerning the expansion of European institutions provided an occasion to consider setting limits to the European project of integration. On the whole, representations of a completed European project were increasingly strengthened through these different factors. The DGAP had a strong German-French emphasis, which left an indelible mark both in terms of personnel as well as in the discussions concerning Europe and the Maghreb within the institutional framework.

The CERI provides an example for how a regional-scientific bias had ceased to be *en vogue*. Regarding the question of the extent to which constitutional Europe played a role as an actor in CERI scholarship on the Maghreb, there was a notable increase with the development of the EU in particular. There is also evidence of an increased focus on the Maghreb's relations to South-European states or constitutional Europe as a whole; there were internal conflicts which were withheld from the public.⁶³ For example, CERI members would come to define the role of Europe (or Southern Europe) by assuming that European investors in the Maghreb would provide the impulse for qualitative improvements. Indeed, the authors often implicitly addressed the unequal level of commitment within the Community; explicit juxtapositions of the various interests in the East and South were much rarer, however. Rémy Leveau certainly made this distinction between German and French interests – not without offering a solution with France as the intermediary.⁶⁴

Of course not all assessments of the European projects were positive – criticism was often combined with praise –, and yet when viewed from a different perspective, the internal

⁶² This was not least due to the initiative of the head of the German-French workgroup at the DGAP, the France historian Ingo Kolboom. I. Kolboom (Ed.), Deutschland und Frankreich im neuen Europa. Referate – Berichte – Dokumente. Berlin, Reichstag, 28.–30. Mai 1990, Bonn 1991.

⁶³ For an example of internal conflicts over a European vs. global orientation of the institute see CERI, Extrait du Compte rendu de la réunion du Conseil de laboratoire du 16 mai 1994, in: CERI (Ed.), Rapport scientifique. Juin 1994–Juin 1996, Paris 1996.

⁶⁴ R. Leveau, L'Algérie au-delà de l'élection présidentielle, Réflexion – Notre collaborateur Rémy Leveau essaie de dégager des perspectives d'avenir pour le dossier algérien, in: La Croix, (16.11.1995).

reports in particular show how the CERI leadership and individual scholars increasingly began to devote their attention to projects from Brussels in the West-Mediterranean or within the context of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP). One representation of Europe in the Maghreb region was that of a role to be criticized; this representation of Europe, which casts the EU in the role of an ambivalent actor in the Euro-Maghreb relationship, featured most prominently in the working paper on the “partenariat euro-maghrebin”.⁶⁵ It is closely associated with the assessments of the CERI’s Director, Jean-Francois Bayart, as well as with Béatrice Hibou and Luis Martinez, who received funding from Bayart and later became CERI members themselves. In terms of the sharpness in tone and poignancy of the attacks, these analyses differed from similar criticism as it was practiced in other institutes – with regard to the attacks on the network of the Euro Mediterranean Study Commission (EuroMeSCo) they were unique. This is not particularly surprising, considering that all other examined institutes were among the founding members of this network. Thus during the late 1990s CERI, arguing from the theoretical background of international political economy,⁶⁶ was harshest in its criticism of the EU as the most essential European actor.

Since the IFRI had come to establish itself as a gathering place for political actors and consultants, there were numerous points of contact, not only to other experts from the Paris microcosm (including the CERI) but also to other German institutes and circles with an interest in foreign policy. Representations emphasizing Europe’s responsibility towards the periphery also came to be employed in other institutional contexts, however the IFRI often also became more explicit when it concerned the responsibility of Western Europe towards the Maghreb. Furthermore, the point of view adopted by the speakers and IFRI members differed from the one of their German counterparts in their respective institutes. From the perspective required by this particular Parisian forum – the German actors were certainly not excluded in the process – French relations to the Maghreb and to Germany tended to remain separate areas of policy. Whereas there had already been instances in the early 1990s where both issues came to be discussed simultaneously – these could be considered both German-French as well as German-French-Maghrebian – in the German institutes, it would take until the Barcelona Process for the IFRI to follow suit. Besides this, the special role played by Italian partners in the creation of a network which predominantly focused on security policy matters and gained in importance as a result of the Europe Mediterranean Partnership (EMP), also becomes apparent in the statements relating to the Mediterranean.⁶⁷ The IFRI represented the strongest paradiplomatic actor in the relations between Europe and the Maghreb; the type of argumentation employed here was similar to the one on the official diplomatic

65 B. Hibou/L. Martinez, Partenariat (note 51).

66 International political economy places particular emphasis on the interplay between economic and political power. U. Lehmkuhl, Theorien internationaler Politik. Einführung und Texte, 3., erg. Aufl., München 2001, 308.

67 The Barcelona Conference brought the Iberian peninsula to the foreground in this regard. The institute newsletter for instance pointed out the foundation of the *Euro-Mediterranean Study Commission* (EuroMeSCo) in Portugal. M. Chartouni-Dubarry, Autour de partenariat euro-méditerranéen, in: IFRI informations (1997) April 1997.

stage – a circumstance which above all can be traced back to the influence of the IFRI's director, who had previously been head of strategic planning in the Foreign Ministry. Aside from these differences, whether they were financially related or pertaining to size or content, there were also common trends in all four examined institutions during the period in question.

5. Common Institutional Features

What catches the eye is that every institute and research centre mentioned the Maghreb in connection with new European developments. A variety of institutional options defined the debate. As its member states moved in the direction of a constitutional Europe, the EU and its initiative became an integral part of a European self-conception that placed emphasis on a common policy towards the Maghreb. The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) played a key role in this regard. Together with the *Euro-Mediterranean Study Commission* (EuroMeSCo), it acted as a network that decisively contributed to the growing interest of national think tanks in the EU's Mediterranean policy, as well as strategic positions towards institutions that specialized in the Mediterranean region or had been newly founded in the course of developments on a European level. All institutes increasingly concentrated on the EU as an actor, while the experts linked distinctions between their own and the other (third parties or states) with the changes denoted by *Maastricht* and *Schengen*. In the case studies, changing representations of Europe spatialized the political entity which claimed the term Europe for itself.⁶⁸ This was not a static, but rather a dynamic process, which can be observed in all examined case studies, even within the relatively short timespan of ten years. The EU and its initiatives could serve as models. This also applied to additional EU-like systems surrounding the EU, as well as the institutional treatment of complex structures.

Furthermore, in all the cases under examination, inner-European agreements, economic relations and questions of belonging defined representations of Europe in dealings with non-Europeans or the European periphery. What these dynamics thus had in common was that they were in a field of tension towards the national agenda.⁶⁹ Nevertheless, it is possible to trace a general trend on the development of representations in all four examined institutes. Their actions indicate an increase in divisive representations of Europe. Put simply, in an open situation of transformations, the Maghreb could be imagined as a future field of action, both for the EU member states as well as the research institutes

68 Cf. H. Siegrist, Perspektiven der vergleichenden Geschichtswissenschaft. Gesellschaft, Kultur und Raum, in: H. Kaelble/J. Schriewer (Ed.), *Vergleich und Transfer. Komparatistik in den Sozial-, Geschichts- und Kulturwissenschaften*, Frankfurt a. M./New York 2003, 305–339, 321.

69 This observation does not only apply in the German or French context. In more detail J. Grußendorf/A. Weiß, *Europarepräsentationen. Spanien, Frankreich und Deutschland im Vergleich* (Working Papers des Sonderforschungsbereiches 640, 3/2010), Berlin, 2010, <http://edoc.hu-berlin.de/series/sfb-640-papers/2010-3/PDF/3.pdf> (18.3.2012), 18.

themselves. This is congruent with an examination of the cultural dimension of international relations. In the run-up to the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, it was possible to show the emergence of the concept of a “common, connecting” Mediterranean region in the early 1990s.⁷⁰ After a phase of self-reflection, the model of a political Europe almost appeared like a shining example for the Mediterranean South. However, by the end of the period under investigation, critical voices and assessments were on the rise. This applied to the states of the Maghreb under consideration in particular, which generally tended to be viewed as a threat. In this regard, a purported realism gained ground in the course of the 1990s in one way or another, as contradictions between an ideal Europe (Europe as a role model) and the observed difficulties of European institutions and also French-German relations became evident.⁷¹ There was an ever-growing impression of a fortress under siege⁷² – not explicitly, but certainly implicitly – though Klaus J. Bade fittingly argued that this image is both true and false at the same time.⁷³ Three conclusions can be drawn from an overarching examination of the institutes with regard to the links between them, how they differed and what they had in common:

First, there was an ambivalent relationship between networking and a desirable prerogative of interpretation for the institutes and its members, as *Europeanized* expertise promised an elevated reputation on the one hand, while national policy matters in particular were to remain as exclusive as possible. *Second*, the comparison of institutes and courses of action shows that, in various contexts – be they security-related (SWP), German-French (DGAP), political-economical (CERI) or paradiplomatic (IFRI) – *Europe* increasingly became a collective term for one’s own side in the international game of powers. *Third*, *Europe* was the resource for representation and action under which initiatives and incentives of the EU could be negotiated by various actors in the institutional framework. Aside from the problem of national projections, there is also a clearly discernible trend towards divisive representations of Europe.

6. Concluding Remarks

Proceeding from the abovementioned conclusions, an inquiry informed by an expanded political history approach begs the question of the extent to which expertise infused the political process.⁷⁴ In this concrete case, there are recognizable efforts by the actors to connect across Europe or internationally in order to increase the legitimization of their own representations. In their own particular institutional way, the SWP, DGAP,

70 Cf. I. Schäfer, *Vom Kulturkonflikt zum Kulturdialog? Die kulturelle Dimension der Euro-Mediterranen Partnerschaft* (EMP), Baden-Baden 2007, 112.

71 It is characteristic that at around the same time, the “new historiography” movement, the French Annales-School, began to dissolve. Cf. P. Burke, *Annales* (note 45), 132.

72 The image of “Fortress Europe” was strengthened by ambitions for a common foreign policy of the EU, which despite military operations was preeminently of a defensive nature. Cf. the article by Andreas Weiß.

73 K. J. Bade, *Migration in European history*. Translated by Allison Brown, Malden, Mass. 2003, 331–333.

74 G. Metzler, *Integration* (note 15).

CERI and IFRI were close to the German and French deciders. Furthermore, at least in the German case, the contents regarding the Maghreb show that the integration into the political process through advance knowledge towards the government, members of parliament etc. was probable.⁷⁵ But knowledge about the Maghreb was not substantially deeper in France either, as publications and projects from the French institutes, which generally contained rather basic information, suggest. Thus, in both national contexts, representations of Europe could serve as a mental point of departure for the unfamiliar territory when dealing with the Maghreb. At the same time, a scholar such as Rémy Leveau was able to use *Europe* in his argumentation when he established links – as in the German-French tandem, among others – that were simultaneously defined by several lines of development.

Europe featured as a model in all selected contributions from policy think tanks. *For one*, the institutes came to showcase Europe and its *mirrors* with various terms. The foil that was used to trace one's own model came to be referred to as the Mediterranean Region, the South, southern flank, Maghreb, or the Arab World (among others). For the *we*, the actors chose terms such as Western Europe, European dimension, new power, or even the idea of an *empire without an emperor* (in the French language). Despite the multitude of metaphors and concepts, there was nonetheless a stabilization of those representations that equated Europe with EU-Europe in the 1990s. *Secondly*, these terms implied particular notions of reform or even a civilizing effort; through representations of Europe, such designs for reform could also be geared to a national level. Actors would then point out different future designs for Europe, which were shaped by distinct national perspectives. Particularly with regard to the security-related aspects of relations to its surroundings in general and the Maghreb in particular, actors like Karl Kaiser came to exemplify such representations of the other Europe of the future.⁷⁶

Generally speaking, representations of Europe lead to the relationship of one's own in the mirror of the developments of the other; the Maghreb was increasingly separated from Europe. Even the reading of a European empire, which came to be used by French scholars in a number of cases, was co-opted, for example, by Béatrice Hibou and Luis Martinez to draw attention to the errors of the Model Europe in the form of complicity between elites on both sides of the Mediterranean. In a similar vein, a German expert such as Volker Perthes practiced criticism as well, also towards the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. This partnership is a reminder of the significance of the development of a EU in the period under investigation that increasingly sought to monopolize not only the EU-acronym, but also the term *Europe*. In both national contexts, this transformation of the Community into a Union also had an impact on the political consulting

75 All the more considering that for example, most of the material collections, studies etc. at the SWP were above all created (and continue to be created) at the behest of the target audience, i.e. elites involved in the political decision-making process. Gespräch mit J. Rogalski, G. Weiher (note 60).

76 As the face of the DGAP, Karl Kaiser came to represent a "substantial degree of personal continuity", also within the German-French context. Cf. D. Eisermann, Außenpolitik und Strategiediskussion. Die Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik 1955 bis 1972, München 1999, 293.

sector. Examples such as the European Empire are evidence of separate, individual lines of development, which is not surprising, particularly in relation to the Maghreb. Nevertheless, there were also signs of rapprochement with regard to conscious or affirmative representations of Europe that emphasized a sense of belonging. Hence, from 1990 to 2000, there was a gradual concentration on *Europe* as a resource for action, even in political think tanks not primarily concerned with European institutions. In a working paper for the SWP, the French expert Leveau thus recommended the creation of regional systems – a recommendation which was also directed at “Europe” itself. He proposed organizing the Maghreb according to the European model.⁷⁷

77 R. Leveau/G. E. Fuller, Nachbarschaft (note 2), 30. From a historical perspective, Leveau’s model conception thus drew on the model of institutional integration, according to which one goal is supranationality as it was created in Europe after the Second World War. Cf. J. Osterhammel, Europamodelle und imperiale Kontexte, in: Journal of Modern European History, 2 (2004) 2, 157–182, 165.

BUCHBESPRECHUNGEN

Julia Laura Rischbieter: Mikro-Ökonomie der Globalisierung. Kaffee, Kaufleute und Konsumenten im Kaiserreich 1870–1914 (= Industrielle Welt. Schriftenreihe des Arbeitskreises für moderne Sozialgeschichte, Bd. 80), Köln: Böhlau Verlag, 2011, 428 S.

Rezensiert von
Anne Dietrich, Leipzig

Betrachtet man seinen Ursprung, seine geographische und soziale Verbreitung, ist es nahezu unmöglich, Kaffee nicht in einem raumübergreifenden Kontext zu thematisieren. Dabei spielt es weniger eine Rolle, ob man sich mit der Gegenwart oder der Vergangenheit, mit der Ebene der Produktion, Distribution oder Konsumtion dieser globalen Ware beschäftigt. Julia Laura Rischbieters Studie zum Kaffeemarkt im Kaiserreich, welche auf einer an der Europa-Universität Viadrina in Frankfurt/Oder entstandenen Dissertation basiert, wendet Globalisierung als Perspektive auf die deutsche Geschichte an und fragt nach Zusammenhängen und Abhängigkeiten im lokalen, nationalen und globalen Kaffeehandel am Ende des 19. und Anfang des 20. Jahr-

hunderts. Damit ordnet sie sich einerseits ein in die Reihe der Publikationen, welche den regionalspezifischen Konsum von global gehandelten Waren ins Zentrum ihrer Betrachtungen rücken.¹ Andererseits orientiert sich die Autorin stark an einem produktzentrierten Ansatz², welcher die Verfolgung der zu analysierenden Ware von ihrer Herstellung über die diversen Weiterverarbeitungsstufen und Vertriebswege bis hin zu ihrem Endkonsumenten zum Ziel hat und dadurch den Vorteil bietet, neben Produktionsbedingungen und Handelsstrukturen auch nationale Wirtschaftspolitiken und lokale Konsumgewohnheiten zu berücksichtigen.³ Rischbieters Studie beginnt mit einer allgemeinen Einführung in die Thematik des Kaffeeanbaus und der Beschreibung des globalen Kaffeemarktes im ausgehenden 19. und frühen 20. Jahrhundert aus einer makroökonomischen Perspektive, welche den Ausgangspunkt für die in den folgenden fünf Kapiteln analysierten einzelnen Stufen der Wertschöpfungskette Kaffee darstellt. Den Schwerpunkt legt die Autorin dabei auf die Darstellung jener Transformationsprozesse, welche letztendlich zu einem Wandel des Kaffeehandels in der zweiten Hälfte des 19. Jahrhunderts führten. Neben den für das 19. Jahrhundert charakteristischen technologischen Innovationen und der branchenübergreifen-

den Neuorganisation des Handelssystems spielten vor allem die neuen Rahmenbedingungen des Weltkaffeemarktes eine entscheidende Rolle. Als wesentliche Veränderung wird hier vor allem die Ablösung der Handelsplätze Amsterdam und London durch Hamburg, Le Havre und New York benannt. Der Aufstieg der Letztgenannten sei laut Rischbieter vor allem auf die zunehmende Bedeutung Lateinamerikas als Kaffeeproduzent zurückzuführen. Von den engen Handelsbeziehungen der Kaffeegrosshändler Hamburgs, Le Havres und New Yorks zu Brasilien und anderen lateinamerikanischen Anbauländern profitierte der in den genannten Hafenstädten ansässige Kaffeemarkt. Bereits in diesem Kapitel greift die Verfasserin die sich durch zunehmende Interdependenzen der Märkte und Interaktionen der Akteure verdichtenden globalen Zusammenhänge im Kaffeehandel auf, welche in den weiteren Kapiteln eingehender untersucht werden. Die im nächsten Kapitel anschließende Analyse des Kaffeeimports konzentriert sich auf den Hamburger Kaffeehandel als lokale Basis globalen Handels. Die Verfasserin stellt fest, dass weniger infrastrukturelle Vorteile, als vielmehr der institutionelle Zusammenschluss vor Ort entscheidend für die Durchsetzung des Hamburger Kaffeegrosshandels im nationalen und internationalen Wettbewerb waren. Rischbieter benennt die Kooperation innerhalb des Hamburger Kaffee-Vereins in diesem Kontext als äußerst wirksames Erfolgskonzept und erklärt nachvollziehbar, wie dieser in der Speicherstadt verortete Branchenverband seine Mitglieder mit den für den Handel mit Kaffee außergewöhnlich relevanten Schlüsselkompetenzen Vertrauen und Information versorgte.

Eine Vereinsmitgliedschaft stellte demzufolge einen potentiellen Wettbewerbsvorteil dar und wurde deswegen von vielen im Kaffeehandel tätigen Unternehmen angestrebt. Allerdings waren nichthanseatische Unternehmen per se von der Mitgliedschaft ausgeschlossen und konnten lediglich über Dritte an besagten Vorteilen teilhaben. Dieser Sachverhalt und die von den Hamburger Kaufleuten angewandten umstrittenen Handelspraktiken führten zu Spannungen innerhalb des deutschen Kaffeemarktes, wie in den Ausführungen zum Terminhandel als neuem, global wirksamem Raum zur Aushandlung von Angebot und Nachfrage umfassend dargelegt wird. Die als Folge sich verändernder geschäftlicher Konventionen initiierten Terminbörsengeschäfte hatten nicht nur Auswirkungen auf bestehende Preisbildungsmechanismen, sondern auch auf das Verhalten der im internationalen Kaffeehandel agierenden Unternehmen. Rischbieter interpretiert die resultierende Verschiebung der Maßstäbe für akzeptable bzw. inakzeptable geschäftliche Verhaltensweisen als wichtige Voraussetzung zur Durchsetzung von Globalisierungsprozessen. Während die Hamburger Import- und Reexporthändler positiv auf die neuen Marktverhältnisse reagierten, standen die deutschen Binnenhändler diesen äußerst skeptisch gegenüber, was unter anderem in ihren Begehren für eine gesetzliche Einschränkung des Terminhandels im Rahmen der Börsenreform während der 1890er Jahre Ausdruck fand. Die Vorbehalte der deutschen Binnenhändler waren durchaus begründet, verschoben sich schließlich die Machtverhältnisse in Folge der Umgestaltung der globalen Kaffeegeschäfte auch im nationalen Kaffeehandel zu deren Nach-

teil. Wie die Abhängigkeit des deutschen Binnenhandels von den Kaffeeimporten des Hamburger Großhandels zur Herausbildung einer kaffeeverarbeitenden Industrie im deutschen Kaiserreich führte, thematisiert das folgende Kapitel. Da sich der Import und Direktverkauf von Rohkaffee an den Endkunden aufgrund der neuen Machtverhältnisse auf dem nationalen Kaffeemarkt für die Binnengroß- und Einzelhändler nicht mehr rentierte, integrierten diese das Verlesen, Mischen, maschinelle Rösten und Veredeln des Kaffees in ihre Unternehmen und führten damit eine neue Gewinnstufe in die Wertschöpfungskette Kaffee ein. Der Transformationsprozess von einer handelnden zu einer produzierenden Branche inkludierte auch die Durchsetzung von Vertriebsinnovationen, wie dem Filialhandel (namentlich erwähnt werden u.a. die Massenfilialisten Kaiser's Kaffeegeschäft, Darboven und Tengelmann), und das Aufkommen neuer Marketingmaßnahmen, wie der standardisierten Verpackung und der Anzeigengestaltung, welche das Vertrauen des Konsumenten in das jeweilige Kaffeeprodukt wecken sollten. Dass die Kaffeewerbung dabei auf ein vielfältiges Bildrepertoire zurückgriff, welches das Produkt nicht nur als exotische Kolonialware, sondern auch als Stifter deutscher bzw. regionaler Identität inszenierte, kann Rischbieter mittels einer umfangreichen quantitativen Analyse nachweisen.

Dem tatsächlichen Kaffeekonsum im Kaiserreich widmet sich das nächste Kapitel. Im Zentrum der Betrachtung steht dabei der Kaffeekonsum im Bürgertum und unter Industriearbeitern. Dass dem Produkt Kaffee von diesen beiden Konsumentengruppen unterschiedliche Bedeutungen

zugemessen wurden und der jeweilige Kaffeekonsum demzufolge auch differierende Funktionen erfüllte und andersartigen Konsummustern folgte, überrascht wohl kaum. Dass private und öffentliche Konsumorte für die zunehmende Populärisierung des Kaffeetrinkens eine entscheidende Rolle gespielt haben, ist auch keine neue Erkenntnis. Allerdings kamen im Verlauf des 19. Jahrhunderts neue Konsumorte – Rischbieter benennt hier u.a. Café Chantants, Volkskaffehallen und Kaffeeklappen – hinzu, welche letztlich zu einer Kommerzialisierung des Kaffeekonsums im öffentlichen Raum führten. Für die Integration des leistungssteigernden Kaffees in den Arbeitsalltag hingegen war vor allem der preisgünstige oder teilweise sogar kostenlose Ausschank in Unternehmenskantinen von großer Bedeutung. Eine Darstellung der aus unterschiedlichen Interessen des Weltmarktes und der nationalen Konsumpolitik resultierenden Konflikte rund um den Kaffee rundet Rischbieters Studie ab. Dabei werden sowohl die Bemühungen der transnational agierenden deutschen Unternehmen zur Stabilisierung der Weltmarktpreise für Kaffee im Valorisationsprojekts der 1890er Jahre als auch die Kaffeepreisdebatten in Folge der im Rahmen der Reichsfinanzreform von 1909 angehobenen Kaffeezölle berücksichtigt. Die Autorin stellt in diesem Zusammenhang fest, dass die Motive der Akteure des Valorisationsprojektes bzw. der Reichsfinanzreform entweder im ökonomischen Interesse am Handelsgut Kaffee oder in der politischen Orientierung an Partikularinteressen einzelner sozialer Gruppen begründet waren, keiner der involvierten Akteure handelte aus grundlegend nationalen Interessen.

Was hat Rischbieters Studie dem global- und konsumhistorisch interessierten Leser an neuen Erkenntnissen zu bieten? Globalisierungsprozesse anhand von Veränderungen auf der lokaler Ebene zu analysieren ist ein durchaus sinnvolles Vorgehen, wie Publikationen, welche sich eines Globalisierungsansatzes bedienen, in regelmäßigen Abständen beweisen. Eine Verknüpfung von konsumhistorischer Mikroebene und wirtschaftlicher Makroebene, welche die Inklusion mehrerer Akteure auf allen Stufen der Wertschöpfungskette gleichermaßen beinhaltet, scheint mir allerdings ein sehr großes Vorhaben. Leider verliert die Autorin durch ihre Absicht die großen, allgemeingültigen Zusammenhänge zwischen Globalisierungsprozessen und Akteurshandeln darzustellen an einigen Stellen der Studie die partikularen Interessen der konsumhistorischen Perspektive aus den Augen. Besonders im sechsten Kapitel der Monographie, welches sich mit dem Kaffeekonsum im deutschen Kaiserreich beschäftigt, wird dies deutlich. Hier proklamiert Rischbieter zwar einen Bedeutungswandel des Genussmittels Kaffees und des damit verbundenen Konsums während des von ihr untersuchten Zeitraums, welcher zweifellos stattgefunden hat, stützt sich bezüglich ihrer Grundannahmen zur Bedeutung des Kaffee(konsums) vor 1880 aber auf althergebrachte Thesen,⁴ ohne diese kritisch zu hinterfragen (eine Ausnahme bildet hier die kritische Auseinandersetzung der Autorin mit der Trickle-down-Theorie). Könnte man dieses Vorgehen noch mit einem Mangel an aktuellerer Forschungsliteratur zum genannten Untersuchungszeitraum entschuldigen, ist die ausschließliche Berücksichtigung von „traditionellen“ Analysekategorien des Kon-

sums von Genussmitteln zu beklagen. Wie aufschlussreich wäre es doch für den Leser gewesen, zu erfahren, welche Preis- und Geschmackspräferenzen die unterschiedlichen Konsumentengruppen verfolgten. Eine konkrete Nachfrageanalyse, aufgeschlüsselt nach den jeweiligen Kaffeemarken bzw. -produkten hätte außerdem die Zusammenhänge zwischen Distribution und Konsumtion sehr viel deutlicher zum Ausdruck bringen können und beispielsweise die im vorherigen Kapitel zur kaffeverarbeitenden Branche analysierte Kaffeewerbung auf ihren Erfolg hin überprüfen können.

Zusammengefasst lässt sich dennoch feststellen, dass Rischbieters Studie einen guten Überblick über den globalen und nationalen Kaffeemarkt um 1900 liefert. Die Berücksichtigung einer Vielzahl von Quellen unterschiedlichster Provenienz, angefangen bei Import-, Export- und Re-exportstatistiken über Zeitschriftenanzeigen bis hin zu Egodokumenten zur Deskription des Kaffeekonsums, schlägt sich in einer multiperspektivischen Darstellung nieder. Der Gliederungsverlauf entlang der jeweiligen Stufen der Wertschöpfungskette bietet außerdem eine angenehme Abwechslung zu einer strikt chronologisch oder themenbezogenen Präsentation der einzelnen Kapitel.

Anmerkungen:

- Einen Globalisierungsansatz verfolgen u.a. M. Schramm, Konsum und regionale Identität in Sachsen 1880–2000. Die Regionalisierung von Konsumgütern im Spannungsfeld von Nationalisierung und Globalisierung, Stuttgart 2002; Ch. Hochmuth, Globale Güter – lokale Aneignung. Kaffee, Tee, Schokolade im früheuzeitlichen Dresden, Konstanz 2008.
- Im Folgenden wird in Übereinstimmung mit Rischbieter die Bezeichnung Wertschöpfungs-

- kette verwendet. In der größtenteils englischsprachigen Forschungsliteratur finden sich für dieses Konzept auch die Bezeichnungen (Global) Commodity Chain bzw. (Global) Value Chain.
- 3 Weitere Beispiele für diesen Ansatz: W. G. Clarence-Smith/St. Topik (Hrsg.), *The Global Coffee Economy in Africa, Asia and Latin America, 1500–1989*, Cambridge 2003; B. Daviron/St. Ponte, *The Coffee Paradox. Global Markets, Commodity Trade and the elusive Promise of Development*, London 2005.
 - 4 W. Schivelbusch, *Das Paradies, der Geschmack und die Vernunft. Eine Geschichte der Genussmittel*, München 1980; R. Sandgruber, *Bittersüße Genüsse. Kulturgeschichte der Genussmittel*, Graz 1986; T. Hengartner/Ch. M. Merki (Hrsg.), *Genussmittel. Ein kulturgeschichtliches Handbuch*, Frankfurt/Main 1999.

Thomas Neuner: Paris, Havanna und die intellektuelle Linke. Kooperationen und Konflikte in den 1960er Jahren, Konstanz: UVK Verlagsgesellschaft, 2012, 390 S.

Rezensiert von
Christoph Kalter, Berlin

Der alte Fidel Castro durfte zuletzt den notorischen Kampfanzug gegen bequeme Trainingsanzüge tauschen, der junge Ernesto Guevara bleibt auf ewig in der düster-heroischen Pose gefangen, die eine globalisierte Polit-Pop-Kultur seit Jahrzehnten millionenfach reproduziert. Marktstrategisch ist es daher keine Überraschung, dass der von Alberto Korda fotografierte „Che“ auch das Buch von Thomas Neuner zierte. Erst auf den zweiten Blick zeigt sich, dass die gewählte Abbildung den Gegenstand des Historikers und Lateinamerikawissen-

schaftlers tatsächlich adäquat illustriert: die Beziehungen zwischen Kuba und Frankreich in den 1960er-Jahren.

Denn Neuners Buchcover zeigt wiederum ein Cover: das Titelbild einer Ausgabe der Zeitschrift *Cuba Sí*. Die maßgeblich vom Parti Communiste Français finanzierte Solidaritätsorganisation France-Cuba gab die Zeitschrift seit 1961 heraus. Ziel des Vereins war es, die Revolution auf der Karibikinsel zu unterstützen. Zugleich sollte France-Cuba auch die KP Frankreichs vom Glanz profitieren lassen, der die als Kontrahenten der USA gefeierten Politiker in der Karibik umgab. Dabei deuteten Frankreichs orthodoxe Parteikommunisten den kubanischen Sozialismus selektiv und strategisch: Sie beschwiegten Guevaras Positionen, wo seine Fokustheorie, die Grundsatzdebatte über sozialistische Wirtschaft oder seine Kritik an der sowjetischen Handelspolitik auch Frankreichs KP in Frage stellten – eine Strategie, die France-Cuba für viele unorthodoxe Linksradikale bald unattraktiv machte. Gleichzeitig aber schmückten sich auch France-Cuba und der PCF mit der Ikone Guevara. Sein Konterfei gelangte auf den Titel von *Cuba Sí* und auf Fanartikel wie die Guevara-Polyestertücher, deren Vertrieb die Zeitschrift 1968/69 übernahm.

Neuner zeigt: Die Begeisterung vieler Französinnen und Franzosen für Kuba war eingebunden in Auseinandersetzungen über die Rolle der Intellektuellen sowie die „richtige“ Politik in Frankreich und der Welt. „Kuba“ wurde zum Argument im Kampf um Gefolgschaft und Gestaltungsräume im linken Feld und bei der Suche nach „einer Alternative zum sowjetischen Marxismus“ (S. 11). Es ist ein Verdienst des Autors, dass er über diesen Nachweis noch

hinausgeht und die Kubaner nicht nur auf eine Projektionsfläche französischer Linker reduziert. Indem er sie vielmehr als Akteure in die Analyse miteinbezieht, kann er zeigen, dass die Versuche, das Gegenüber eigenen Interessen dienstbar zu machen, gegenseitig waren.

Neuner untersucht die kubanisch-französischen Beziehungen in den 1960er-Jahren also als symmetrische Kontakt- und Transfergeschichte, die Interessen und Handlungsinitiativen beider Seiten betrachtet, für die Machtasymmetrien ihres Verhältnisses aber sensibel bleibt. Dabei verfolgt Neuner eine „Globalgeschichte als Geschichte transkultureller Interaktion“ und will „methodologischen Nationalismus“ hinter sich lassen (S. 19).

Die Darstellung beginnt mit den Grundlinien der Frankreichpolitik Kubas (Kap. 2) und den zentralen Deutungsmustern der kubanischen Revolution in der intellektuellen Linken Frankreichs (Kap. 3). Anschließend werden bi-nationalen Interaktionen und ihre Folgen diskutiert, v. a. mit Blick auf Dissidenz und Radikalisierung in der französischen Union des Étudiants Communistes (UEC) sowie mit Blick auf Solidaritätsorganisationen wie France-Cuba und ihre linksradikale Konkurrentin Association Internationale des Amis de la Révolution Cubaine (Kap. 4). Der „Kulturtkongress von Havanna“ 1968 steht im Zentrum des Kap. 5. Neben der Auswertung französischer und kubanischer Printmedien beruht die Darstellung Neuners auf Korrespondenzen und Gesprächen mit Zeitzeugen sowie der Auswertung verschiedener staatlicher und nichtstaatlicher Archive auf beiden Seiten.

In dem von Kooperationen und Konflikten geprägten „Dreiecksverhältnis

zwischen Kuba, der französischen Regierung und der [...] intellektuellen Linken Frankreichs“ (S. 9) verfolgten auch die kubanischen Eliten konkrete Ziele. Einerseits hofften sie, durch auswärtige Kulturpolitik ein positives Bild der kubanischen Transformationsgesellschaft im Westen zu verbreiten. Zu keinem anderen Land waren die Beziehungen dabei so dicht wie zu Frankreich, das als „medialer Resonanzkörper Westeuropas“ fungieren sollte (S. 302). Andererseits sollte eine durch Handel, Technik- und Wissenstransfer sowie Expertenaustausch konkretisierte Politik staatlicher und nichtstaatlicher Zusammenarbeit in Wirtschaft und Wissenschaft die ‚autozentrierte Entwicklung‘ Kubas fördern. Zusammengenommen sollten Kooperation und auswärtige Kulturpolitik die Autonomie Kubas stärken, die durch die Blockade- und Interventionspolitik der USA sowie den Hegemonieanspruch der UdSSR bedroht schien. Eine gegen die Supermächte definierte Autonomie seines Landes wollte auch der französische Präsident de Gaulle. Wie Castro strebte er nach „nationaler Exzeption innerhalb der bipolaren Machtordnung des Kalten Krieges“ (S. 37) – wodurch sich nach Ende des Algerienkriegs 1962 ein Anknüpfungspunkt für die Kooperation mit Havanna bot. Allerdings begrenzte Paris die Zusammenarbeit immer auf die Bereiche Wirtschaft und Kultur sowie auf Kontakte unterhalb der Regierungsebene.

Diesen Ausführungen Neuners liegt ein Narrativ des Scheiterns zugrunde: Ab 1968, dem Höhe- und Umschlagpunkt der kubanisch-französischen Beziehungen, ging die kurze Phase der Kooperation beider Regierungen zu Ende, die durch die Bündnisse des Kalten Krieges und die fran-

zösische Angst vor einer „revolutionären Ansteckung“ ohnehin begrenzt geblieben war. Darüber hinaus beendeten Misstrauen und divergierende Interessen jetzt auch die zuvor teils intensive Zusammenarbeit Havannas mit prokubanischen Kräften der französischen Zivilgesellschaft. Denn: Angst vor politischer Kontamination hatte auch Castro. Die antiautoritäre Dynamik des Pariser Mai '68, die im rasch unterdrückten Protest Hunderter Jugendlicher in Havanna eine Entsprechung fand, kritisierte er als Unruhestiftung, bürgerlichen Eskapismus und eurozentrische Selbstbezüglichkeit. Zugleich billigte er – zum Entsetzen linksradikaler Unterstützer in Frankreich – die Niederschlagung des „Prager Frühlings“ durch sowjetische Panzer. Diese (kultur-)politische Wende ging in Kuba selbst mit dem Erstarken prosowjetischer Kräfte und der Verfolgung sowjetkritischer Intellektueller wie des 1971 verhafteten Heberto Padilla einher. Sie führte zum Bruch mit der radikalen Linken in Frankreich. Es war daher nur folgerichtig, dass die PCF-nahe, zuletzt fast bedeutungslos gewordene Organisation France-Cuba nun wieder zum privilegierten Partner Havannas avancierte, während Unterstützer der ersten Stunde wie Jean-Paul Sartre oder Le Monde-Journalist Claude Julien sich öffentlich von Kuba abwandten, das ihnen zehn Jahre lang als Modell eines alternativen Sozialismus gegolten hatte. Im Hintergrund dieser Trennungsgeschichte, so Neuner, stand die Notwendigkeit für Kuba, sich nach dem Scheitern des von Guevara verfolgten Exports von Guerilla und Revolution in Lateinamerika wieder stärker an die UdSSR anzulehnen, aber auch die „Fragilität des transkulturellen Einverständnisses“ (S.

317) zwischen kubanischen Eliten und französischen Intellektuellen.

Während letztere überwiegend auf einem Modell des engagierten, aber parteiunabhängigen Intellektuellen bestanden, überwog in den kubanischen Diskussionen das Gewicht jener Stimmen, die einen parteilichen, revolutionären Intellektuellen forderten, der seine Autonomie nicht gegen das politische Feld zu definieren, sondern sein Wirken ganz dem kubanischen Entwicklungsprojekt und dem tri-kontinentalen Befreiungskampf unterzuordnen habe. In solchen Debatten – die Neuner exemplarisch am Beispiel des „Kulturkongresses von Havanna“ 1968 rekonstruiert –, manifestierten sich Spannungen, die nicht nur den sehr verschiedenen Rahmenbedingungen von intellektuellem und politischem Feld in Frankreich und Kuba geschuldet waren, sondern auch breitere Fragen über das Verhältnis des „Westens“ und der „Dritten Welt“ adressierten. Hatten die Intellektuellen der westlichen Zentren ihr kulturelles Kapital auf Kosten der Peripherie angehäuft? Und begegneten sie den Kubanern mit einer „Mischung aus Paternalismus und Misstrauen“, wie der Essayist Ambrosio Fornet auf dem Kulturkongress monierte?

Neuners Auseinandersetzung mit dem Eurozentrismus-Problem ist anregend, hätte aber – beispielsweise im Rückgriff auf Debatten im Umfeld der Postcolonial Studies – konzeptuell geschärft und analytisch vertieft werden können. Auch untersucht der Autor nicht systematisch die Spannung, die sich daraus ergab, dass Kubaner gerade jenen Franzosen intellektuellen Paternalismus vorwarfen, die in Kuba ein Vorbild erkannten. Tatsächlich war die französische Begeisterung für Kuba – trotz ihrer

eurozentrischen Projektionen – zugleich Ausdruck eines an die Epoche der Dekolonisierung geknüpften Trends: Westliche Intellektuelle wollten die nunmehr weltweit hörbaren Stimmen von Politikern und Denkern der „Dritten Welt“ in ihre Gesellschaften tragen und deren Eurozentrismus programmatisch und selbstkritisch korrigieren. Daran anknüpfend hätte Neuner auch, wie in der Einleitung angekündigt, die globalhistorische Dimension seines Gegenstands stärker reflektieren können: Was an den kubanisch-französischen Beziehungen war spezifisch, was Teil der allgemeinen Dynamik, die westliche Linksradikale und Repräsentanten der „Dritten Welt“ in den 1960er-Jahren weltweit fragile Bündnisse eingehen ließ? Genuin globale Vernetzungen und deren Reflexion durch die Akteure berücksichtigt Neuner eher als Kontext denn als expliziten Gegenstand seiner Darstellung. Der Autor integriert die Dekolonisierung, die Spannungen in der kommunistischen Weltbewegung und die Nord-Süd-Dynamik des Ost-West-Konflikts; diese Entwicklungen bilden aber den Rahmen, nicht den Kern seines bi-nationalen Gegenstands. Neuners Zugang mündet also weniger in eine Globalgeschichte als in eine französisch-kubanische Verflechtungsgeschichte.

Doch dies sind kleinere Nachfragen an ein sehr gut geschriebenes Buch, das einen breiten Quellenbestand kenntnisreich interpretiert, das durch die integrierte Betrachtung zwischenstaatlicher und zivilgesellschaftlicher Kontakte überzeugt, und das, obwohl es vor allem eine gut gemachte Politik- und Ideengeschichte ist, diese Ideen doch immer wieder an konkrete Interessen sowie die Zirkulation von Texten und Menschen zurückzubinden

versteht (z. B. in vielen interessanten Informationen zur Mobilität zwischen Kuba und Frankreich). Sicher werden nicht alle Diskussionen innerhalb der kubanischen Führung oder der intellektuellen Linken Frankreichs alle Leser gleichermaßen fesseln. Wer aber Interesse an detaillierten Informationen dazu hat, wird im Text und im umfangreichen Fußnotenapparat bestens bedient. Zahlreiche Passagen des Buches – die Abschnitte zur antikolonialen Umdeutung des ursprünglich modernisierungstheoretischen Begriffs der „Unterentwicklung“ sind nur ein Beispiel – machen Neuners Arbeit darüber hinaus zu einer Lektüre, die über die kubanisch-französische Geschichte der 1960er-Jahre hinaus für alle relevant ist, die sich für die Nord-Süd-Dimension einer zunehmend integrierten Welt nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg interessieren.

Martin Klimke: The Other Alliance. Student Protest in West Germany and the United States in the Global Sixties. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010, 346 S.

Rezensiert von
Holger Nehring, Sheffield

Der transnationale, ja globale Charakter der Studentenbewegungen um 1968 ist oft konstatiert, aber sehr selten empirisch belegt worden. Martin Klimkes Buch bietet nun die erste quellenbasierte Untersu-

chung dieser transnationalen Netzwerke zwischen dem bundesdeutschen Sozialistischen Deutschen Studentenbund (SDS) und seinem amerikanischen Gegenpart, der *Students for a Democratic Society* (SDS), und betont die „shared cultural and political reference points“ (S. 6) zwischen den beiden Bewegungen. Klimke zeigt außerdem, wie diese transatlantische Allianz von unten erst durch die Zuschreibungen der bundesdeutschen und amerikanischen Regierung „von oben“ ihre radikale Kraft entfalten konnte. Er veranschaulicht so, wie sich über die sechziger Jahre hinweg eine „zweite Front“ (S. 237) des Kalten Krieges entwickelte, welche die offizielle Allianz zwischen Bonn und Washington ergänzte, ja grundierte. Sie gab Vorstellungen eines „anderen Amerika“ Ausdruck, wie sie sich in der amerikanischen Bürgerrechtsbewegung, den Black Panthers und der Bewegung gegen den Vietnamkrieg zeigte. Klimke verbindet gekonnt die Geschichte sozialer Bewegungen mit der Geschichte von Außenpolitik und Kulturdiplomatie im Rahmen einer innovativen internationalen Geschichte, welche vergleichende Beobachtungen mit der Analyse transnationaler Verbindungen verbindet. Seine Studie bietet die erste gründlich empirisch dokumentierte Analyse jener Dynamiken zwischen Innen- und Außenpolitik, die Jeremi Suri in seinem bahnbrechenden Standardwerk „Power and Protest“ großflächig konstatierte, aber nicht durchweg detailliert empirisch belegte.¹

Klimkes Buch leistet über seine sechs thematisch und chronologisch angeordneten Kapitel im Einzelnen dreierlei. Erstens legt der Autor dar, wie besonders Michael Vester als Austauschstudent in den USA Anfang der sechziger Jahre zu einem

transnationaler Mittler zwischen bundesdeutschen und der amerikanischen Neuen Linken avancierte, indem er Fragen der politischen Überwindung der Bipolarität des Kalten Krieges in einem transatlantischen Kontext diskutierte und so den westdeutschen SDS mit Diskussionen über Protestformen und Debatten in den USA bekannt machte. Klimke kann dabei sehr schön zeigen, wie die beiden Bewegungen trotz ähnlicher Zielvorstellungen aufgrund unterschiedlicher kultureller Prägungen zwar ihren revolutionären Enthusiasmus teilten, diese „shared history“ aber nicht bedeutete, dass sie bedeutende inhaltliche Differenzen hinter sich ließen.

Zweitens, und hierbei handelt es sich um den originellsten Beitrag des Buches zur Forschung, hebt Klimke besonders die Rolle der radikalen Gruppe der Black Panthers für die Entwicklung des SDS bei, eine ideologische Prägung, welche laut Klimke auch für den „Terrorismus“ der Roten Armee Fraktion in den siebziger Jahren noch relevant blieb. Nicht zuletzt analysiert Klimke drittens, wie die Bewegungen in den USA und der Bundesrepublik von den Regierungen beider Länder wahrgenommen wurde und wie diese Wahrnehmungen wiederum zu Verbindungen auf der offiziellen Ebene der transatlantischen Allianz führten. Auch mit diesem Teil und seiner Analyse des Inter-Agency Committee (IAYC), für das sich besonders Generalstaatsanwalt Robert Kennedy und Vizepräsident Hubert Humphrey stark machten, betritt Klimke empirisches Neuland.

Klimke argumentiert dabei, dass die transatlantische Allianz zu keiner Zeit durch die Studentenproteste gefährdet war: denn die Proteste seien nicht „anti-amerikanisch“

orientiert gewesen, sondern seien vielmehr von Vorstellungen gesellschaftlichen Wandels getragen gewesen, wie sie gerade von amerikanischen sozialen Bewegungen wie der Bürgerrechtsbewegung jener Jahre vertreten worden seien. Klimke kann durch diese differenzierte These die Forschungen zur Bedeutung der Proteste um „1968“ ein bedeutendes Stück voran bringen, indem er die Ambivalenzen dieser Bewegungen im Zusammenhang mit den transatlantischen Beziehungen während des Kalten Krieges betont und sie als Ergebnis komplexer Aushandlungen zwischen Aktivisten und Regierungen auf beiden Seiten des Atlantiks darstellt.

Klimke fasst die „Transnationalität“ der Bewegungen also vor allem aus der Perspektive von Netzwerken, ähnlich wie es auch schon Doug McAdam und Dieter Rucht, ebenfalls in Bezug auf die transnationalen Verbindungen zwischen der bundesdeutschen und der nordamerikanischen neuen Linken und ebenfalls mit Bezug auf Michael Vesters Rolle, aus sozialwissenschaftlicher Perspektive anregten.² Auch die Beziehungen zwischen der amerikanischen und westdeutschen Regierung werden hier vor allem als die direkten Beziehungen zwischen Personen gefasst. Klimkes Fokus liegt, sozialwissenschaftlich gesprochen, auf den kognitiven Orientierungen der Beteiligten, umgangssprachlich ausgedrückt: ihren Ideen und Vorstellungswelten. Der Begriff der „anderen Allianz“, der deutsch-amerikanischen Netzwerke der Studentenbewegungen, welche der „offiziellen“ Allianz der NATO gegenüberstand, ist also für Klimke nicht metaphorisch zu verstehen, sondern hat ihre Realität in den direkten personellen Beziehungen über den Atlantik hinweg. Der große Vorteil

dieser Konzeptionalisierung besteht darin, dass sie die transnationalen Verbindungen empirisch greifbar und fassbar macht. Klimkes Studie ist somit die erste, welche die Verbindungen zwischen dem westdeutschen und dem amerikanischen SDS analysiert und nachweist.

Klimkes Modell erzeugt auch einige blinde Flecken, derer sich Klimke selbst bewusst ist, wie er in seiner auch als Ausblick auf mögliche weitere Forschungen konzipierten Zusammenfassung ausführt. Die Leserinnen und Leser seines Buches erfahren recht wenig über die Dynamik der Bewegungen vor Ort, über die Art und Weise wie Protestereignisse selbst die Dynamik der Bewegungen konstituierten. Etwas überspitzt formuliert, hat Klimke weniger eine Geschichte sozialer Bewegungen geliefert, sondern eine Geschichte der Personen, Ideen und Organisationen, welche diese soziale Bewegungen an ihrer Spitze trugen: wir erfahren wenig über die Ebene unterhalb von Vesper, Rudi Dutschke, Angela Davis, Tom Hayden und anderen gut bekannten Aktivistinnen und Aktivisten. Diese Lücke ist insofern überraschend, als Klimke immer wieder die dynamische und konfliktreiche Realität der Bewegung konstatiert, sie aber nicht näher ausführt. Es ist also fraglich, ob angesichts dieser Konflikte der Begriff der „anderen Allianz“ nicht etwas zu hoch gegriffen ist, besonders wenn man ihn mit der hochgradig organisierten und durch militärische Gewalt fundierten Allianz der NATO vergleicht.

Die „Globalität“ der sechziger Jahre aus dem Untertitel des Buches steht bei Klimke vor allem als Chiffre für die wirtschaftlichen, gesellschaftlichen und kulturellen Transformationsprozesse im Westen. Diese Prozesse bilden gleichsam den wichti-

gen, aber nicht näher ausgeführten basso continuo seiner Argumentation, obwohl Klimke freilich selbst betont, dass er keiner kausalen Engführung der Bewegungen als Ergebnisse eines Wertewandels das Wort reden möchte. Dennoch werden die Bewegungen und ihre Aktivistinnen und Aktivisten bei ihm tendenziell zu bloßen Repräsentanten gesellschaftlicher Transformationsprozesse und nicht zu Akteuren sui generis. Die Bedeutung des Protests selbst für das Vorantreiben dieser Transformationsprozesse gerät dagegen in den Hintergrund, so dass das gewaltige utopische Potential der Bewegungen zwar konstatiert, aber nicht näher ausgeführt wird. Leser erhalten allenfalls durch Klimkes exzellente Analyse der Beobachtung der Bewegungen durch die Regierungen eine Ahnung von ihrer radikalen Dynamik.

Quinn Slobodian hat in seiner nach Klimkes Buch erschienenen Studie eine bedeutende Erweiterung der Perspektive vorgeschlagen. Transatlantische Verbindungen, die Realität von „Amerika“ im internationalen System des Kalten Krieges der sechziger Jahre und die „Dritte Welt“ als Projekt globaler revolutionärer politischer und sozialer Transformation müssen dabei immer zusammen gelesen werden und zwar als gegenseitig aufeinander verweisende „alternative futures“ (Arif Dirlik), welche lokale Verankerung und globale Verbindungen kombinierten.

Diese Aneignung des Projektes der „Dritten Welt“ durch die Protestbewegungen war nicht unproblematisch: indem die Aktivisten im Westen eine letztlich aus westlichen Normen abgeleitete Globalität konstruierten gerannen die Dynamiken der Proteste in Afrika und Lateinamerika zu nur mehr statischen Symbolen.³ Aus

genealogisch-strukturhistorischer Perspektive könnte man sogar soweit gehen und konstatieren, dass die verschiedenen Manifestationen von Ideen und Praktiken der „Befreiung“ in den Projekten zur nationalen Unabhängigkeit, wie sie seit Mitte der fünfziger Jahre im Kontext der blockfreien Staaten der „Dritten Welt“ entstanden waren und wie sie in der Vorstellung des „Trikont“ während der späten sechziger Jahre ihre Wirkung entfalteten, ihren Ursprung haben, also „1968“ das Ergebnis der Globalisierung dieses Projekts war.⁴ Das von Klimke vermessene „1968“ besteht dagegen vor allem aus den Studentenbewegungen – und der Reaktion der Regierungen auf diese Bewegungen –, so dass die ganze Breite der jeweiligen Vorstellungen internationaler Solidarität und ihre emotionalen Grundierungen etwas unterbelichtet bleiben. Die Bedeutung sub- und gegenkultureller Trends für die kognitive Repertoires und Praktiken dieser Bewegungen und ihre jeweiligen Mischungsverhältnisse bleiben dagegen eher unterbelichtet. Obwohl Klimke das revolutionäre Potenzial der Bewegungen behauptet und durch den Nachweis einer engen Verbindung zwischen dem amerikanischen Black Power und Black Panther Bewegungen und dem bundesdeutschen SDS in den späten sechziger Jahren anschaulich macht, bleibt seine Antwort auf die Frage, worin denn der revolutionäre Charakter der Studentenbewegungen jeweils lag, letztlich etwas vage. Gerade der Gehalt und die Sprengkraft der politisch-kulturellen demokratischer Repräsentation erscheinen dadurch in einem sehr milden, vielleicht zu milden, Licht.

Durch Klimkes Engführung auf die Politik im engen Sinne gerät tendenziell auch die

Komplexität und Diversität der verschiedenen Bewegungen, die „1968“ konstituierten, ins Hintertreffen. Genau an diesem Punkt könnten zukünftige transnationale und vergleichende Forschungen ansetzen. In einem bahnbrechenden Aufsatz haben Alexander Sedlmaier und Stefan Malinowski auf die Bedeutung dieser Fragen hingewiesen und vorgeschlagen, „1968“ als Wegbereiter einer global ausgelegten, individualistisch orientierten Konsumgesellschaft zu interpretieren.⁵ Für eine solche Analyse müsste die historische Forschung allerdings auch die kleineren und oft versteckten Archive vor Ort einbeziehen, um in die alltagsgeschichtlichen Vorstellungs- und Lebenswelten der Bewegungen vorzudringen. Für die Analyse solcher Verbindungen dürfte das von Klimke favorisierte Modell des transnationalen Transfers nicht mehr ausreichen, zumal viele diese Prozesse medial vermittelt waren und sich nicht mehr über direkte Kontakte zwischen Aktivisten erfassen lassen.⁶

Diese kritischen Nachfragen können aber nicht davon ablenken, dass Klimke mit seinem Buch eine bahnbrechende Studie geliefert hat; sie sind vielmehr Beleg für die Bedeutung dieses Buches für die weitere Forschung. Die Komplexität und empirische Grundierung seiner Studie ist beispielhaft. Klimkes Studie zeigt beeindruckend, wie klare Argumentation und Struktur nicht auf Kosten von Differenzierungen gehen müssen. Das Buch stellt nicht nur die historische Forschung zu „1968“ auf eine neue Grundlage, sondern enthält auch für die transnationale Geschichte allgemein Anregungen.

Anmerkungen:

1 J. Suri, *Power and Protest*, Cambridge 2003.

- 2 D. McAdam/D Rucht, The Cross-National Diffusion of Movement Ideas, in: *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 528 (1993), S. 56-74.
- 3 Q. Slobodian, *Foreign Front. Third World Politics in Sixties West Germany*, Durham 2012, S. 7.
- 4 Dies ist die These von Hanno Balz, Die janusköpfige Revolte. Das globale „1968“ zwischen Genealogie und Fortschreibung, in: *sozial. geschichte* 5 (2011), S. 114-134; dazu auch grundlegend: V. Prasad, *The Darker Nations. A People's History of the Third World*, New York 2007.
- 5 A. Sedlmaier/St. Malinowski, „1968“ als Katalysator der Konsumgesellschaft. Performative Regelverstöße, kommerzielle Adaptionen und ihre gegenseitige Durchdringung, in: *Geschichte und Gesellschaft* 32 (2006), S. 238-267; G. Eley, Commentary: Politics, Culture, and the Public Sphere, in: *positions: east asia cultures critique*, 10 (2002), S. 219-236.
- 6 H. Nehring, National Internationalists. The British and West German Protests against Nuclear Weapons, the Politics of transnational communications and the social history of the Cold War, 1957-1964, in: *Contemporary European History*, 14 (2005), S. 559-582.

Myron Echenberg: Africa in the Time of Cholera. A History of Pandemics from 1817 to the Present, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011, 230 S.

Rezensiert von
Claudia Prinz, Berlin

Im 19. Jahrhundert galt die Cholera in der entstehenden Tropenmedizin und der europäischen Öffentlichkeit als „asiatische Krankheit“. Während sechs Pandemien nahezu den gesamten Globus umspann-

ten, wurde in Darstellungen der schreckenregenden Krankheit nahezu immer auf Asien als ihre „Heimat“, ihr „endemisches Gebiet“ verwiesen. Ab den siebziger Jahren des 20. Jahrhunderts wurde die Cholera zu einer „afrikanischen Krankheit“: nicht nur ist hier die absolute Mehrzahl der bekannten Fälle der letzten Jahrzehnte verzeichnet; auch in der öffentlichen Wahrnehmung ist Cholera als Armutskrankheit mit den politischen und wirtschaftlichen Krisen Afrikas verknüpft. Die Geschichte, wie Cholera afrikanisch wurde, erzählt Myron Echenberg in „Africa in the Time of Cholera“.

Der Emeritus für Afrikanische Geschichte an der kanadischen McGill Universität hat bereits mehrere Studien zur Pest in Afrika vorgelegt und kann als ausgewiesener Kenner afrikanischer Medizingeschichte gelten. Mit der Cholera widmet er sich nun wieder einer der verheerenden epidemischen Krankheiten der Moderne.

Nach der Einleitung ist das Buch in zwei Teile untergliedert: auf 75 Seiten behandelt Echenberg zunächst die ersten sechs Cholerapandemien in Afrika, von 1817 bis 1947. Knapp hundert Seiten widmet er im Anschluss der siebten Pandemie, die seit fast 50 Jahren andauert. Da sich die Quellenlage, aber auch die ökologischen, epidemiologischen, sozialen und politischen Faktoren für die siebte Pandemie erheblich von den vorhergehenden Seuchen unterscheiden, leuchten die Unterteilung sowie die Gewichtung ein.

Für die ersten sechs Pandemien im 19. und frühen 20. Jahrhundert beschreibt Echenberg die Ausbreitung und geographische Reichweite sowie die ökonomischen Kreisläufe, kolonialen Interaktionen und Pilgernetzwerke, die zur Ausbreitung der

Krankheit führten (S. 15-28). Die Stärke dieser Abschnitte liegt in der Kombination detaillierter epidemiologisch-geschichtlicher Fakten mit politischen und sozialgeschichtlichen Veränderungen. Für die Darstellung beispielsweise der politischen Diskreditierung der tunesischen Eliten als Folge von Choleraepidemien im Tunesien kurz vor der kolonialen Besetzung durch Frankreich 1881 (S. 65-72), oder der Ausbreitung von Cholera in Ägypten als Folge von agrarökonomischen und technologischen Veränderungen im 19. wie 20. Jahrhundert, verlässt Echenberg sich auf die anerkannte Sekundärliteratur, vor allem die Studien von Nancy Gallagher oder auch Timothy Mitchell.

Es folgt eine Auseinandersetzung mit der medizinischen Erforschung der Krankheit und politischen Reaktionen auf sie. Echenberg beschränkt dieses Unterkapitel keineswegs auf Afrika, sondern fasst medizingeschichtliche sowie gesundheitspolitische Entwicklungen auch in Südasien, Europa und den USA zusammen. Das Kapitel ist ausschließlich aus Sekundärliteratur und publizierten Quellen gearbeitet. Teilweise neu ist Echenbergs Beschäftigung mit James Christies Forschungen zur Cholera in Ostafrika in den 1870er Jahren, die der Autor als ebenso bedeutend wie Johns Snows Untersuchungen in London ansieht (S. 57-64). Während letzterer bis heute als einer der wichtigsten frühen Erforscher der Krankheit gilt, ist ersterer nahezu vergessen. Echenbergs knappe Darstellung der Forschungen zum Zusammenhang zwischen Cholera und Sanitärwesen und Trinkwasser, zu Choleraimpfstoffen und ihrem Scheitern, sowie zur Rehydrierungs-therapie sind nicht uninteressant, aber sie bringen wenig Neues und sind an einigen

Stellen unpräzise (S. 29-41). Sehr gut gelungen ist seine konzise Darstellung des Desinteresses an wissenschaftlicher Weiterentwicklung in der Zwischenkriegszeit und erneut in den 1960ern, als die Cholera als weitgehend besiegt galt (S. 41-44). Während Afrika unter den ersten sechs Pandemien nicht in höherem Maße zu leiden hatte als andere Kontinente, war und ist die siebte Pandemie, die den afrikanischen Kontinent 1970 erreicht, „a grave concern for global public health in general and for Africa in particular“ (S. 85), wo sie „especially devastating“ ist (S. 89). Die Darstellung der siebten Pandemie in Afrika geht von einer schlichten, aber komplexen Ausgangsfrage aus, die Echenberg als „Paradox“ formuliert: „Why should a disease that had become well understood scientifically, and for which an effective and inexpensive therapy had emerged, have become more widespread and lethal, and not less?“ Die Antwort gibt er als eine Kombination von Faktoren: „the increased severity of risk factors, a minority of which stemmed from natural phenomena, and a majority from the deteriorating social, political, and economic conditions most sub-Saharan Africans endured after the 1970s“ (S. 109). Der zweite Teil ist dementsprechend aufgebaut: auf die knappe Darstellung medizinischer Veränderungen folgt die konzise Darstellung der Pandemie seit 1970 in Afrika, inklusive der epidemiologischen Veränderungen. Da die siebte Pandemie durch eine neue Erregerform verursacht wurde, veränderten sich auch die Bedingungen ihrer Ausbreitung. Echenberg beschreibt die wichtigsten Entwicklungen in der Erforschung, Therapie und Prävention von Cholera seit den 1950er Jahren. Völlig zu Recht hebt er als bedeu-

tende Veränderungen die Entdeckung des Choleratoxins, die Entwicklung von Oral Rehydration Therapy, neue Impfstoffe sowie ökologische Forschungen zur Ausbreitung der Krankheit und insbesondere die Rolle von Wasser hervor (S. 91-108). Die knappe Zusammenfassung großer Forschungsgebiete ist gut gelungen. Die Diskussion von Oral Rehydration Therapy, die als einer der wichtigsten medizinischen Entwicklungen des 20. Jahrhunderts gilt, ist allerdings an einigen Stellen unpräzise und geht wenig auf Konflikte um die Therapie ein (S. 100-104).

Im Anschluss diskutiert Echenberg zwei Sets von Risikofaktoren, die er als Hauptgründe für die Schwere der Pandemie ansieht: ökologisch-soziale (S. 125-139) sowie politische (S. 140-162). Dass die Cholera in mehreren großen afrikanischen Seen endemisch wurde und somit regelmäßige epidemische Ausbrüche folgten, ist eine wichtige epidemiologisch-ökologische Veränderung. Die großen Flüchtlingslager mit unzureichenden sanitären Verhältnissen in der Folge politischer Krisen, die für Choleraausbrüche anfällig waren (wie zum Beispiel 1994 in Goma), zählen zu den deutlichsten Beispielen für die gesundheitlichen Konsequenzen von humanitären Katastrophen und bewaffneten Konflikten. Echenberg schreibt die Geschichte der Cholera im postkolonialen Afrika als „a function of public health policy choices“ (S. 149), also als eine politische Geschichte, an der neben nationalstaatlichen Regierungen und Internationalen Organisationen wie der Weltgesundheitsorganisation (WHO) auch Warlords, multinationale Konzerne und kommunale Infrastruktureinrichtungen oder internationale NGOs beteiligt sind. Die Passagen

zu den Zusammenhängen zwischen Choleraausbrüchen, dem Zusammenbruch des öffentlichen Gesundheitswesens in zahlreichen afrikanischen Staaten und der Privatisierung der Wasserversorgung gehören zu den engagiertesten des Buchs. Am Gesundheitswesen in Zimbabwe (als ausführlichste Fallstudie, S. 163-173), der Privatisierung in Angola, Senegal und Südafrika erläutert Echenberg überzeugend, wie wirtschaftliche und politische Entscheidungen die Verbreitung, Häufigkeit und schwerwiegenden Folgen von Cholera in Afrika beeinflussen. Kritisch reflektierend und von den Einzelfällen ausgehend kommt Echenberg zu dem Schluss, dass „the experiences of South America and of Africa during the seventh cholera pandemic reflected global inequalities“ (S. 179) – ein Themenkomplex, der in den technizistischen Interventionen der WHO, wie Echenberg kritisiert, ignoriert wurde.

Myron Echenbergs „Africa in the Time of Cholera“ betritt mit seiner Synthese der bisher sieben Choleraepidemien, die den afrikanischen Kontinent tangierten, Neuland. Er nennt eine Reihe von Gründen und Zusammenhängen, wie Cholera eine afrikanische Krankheit wurde. Die Akzentuierung der Besonderheit der Entwicklung in Afrika für das 20. Jahrhundert, und insbesondere für die Zeit ab 1970, ist eindrucksvoll und eine der Stärken des Buchs. Seine Interpretation historischer Epidemiologie als Kombination von Umwelt-, Politik- und Sozialgeschichte überzeugt ebenso wie seine zentralen Argumente. Schade allerdings, dass durch die Kürze des Buchs gerade die sozialgeschichtlichen Dimensionen (Migrationen, Konflikte, Wirtschaftsbeziehungen, Besiedelungen etc.) oft zu knapp diskutiert werden und

Wünsche offen lassen. Hier hat Myron Echenberg einerseits anthropologische Studien zur Medizingeschichte in Afrika ergänzt, andererseits ein Forschungsfeld eröffnet, in dem hoffentlich weitere Studien folgen werden. Echenbergs kritische Diskussion der veröffentlichten Quellen (wie der WHO-Statistiken, S. 109-112) sollten neben Studierenden der Geschichtswissenschaften auch Public Health Officials lesen. Durch das Studium von Archivquellen könnten aber einige Aspekte der Geschichte der Cholera in Afrika noch vertieft werden.

Jean-François Bayart: *Les études postcoloniales, un carnaval académique*, Paris: Les Editions Karthala, 2010, 126 S.

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Kolja Lindner, Berlin

Sozialwissenschaftliche, genauer ungleichheitstheoretische und kulturwissenschaftliche Debatten leiden in Frankreich nach wie vor daran, dass Jahrzehnte v. a. englischsprachiger Literatur unbekannt sind. Daher sind gewisse Frontstellungen, wie die von materialistischen und postmodernen Ansätzen, Versuche ihrer produktiven Überwindung bzw. ganz allgemein gewisse Denkbewegungen wenig oder gar nicht bekannt. Allein die in den letzten Jahren zunehmend einsetzende Übersetzung von Klassikern der geschlechtertheoretischen, postkolonialen und kulturwissenschaft-

lichen Literatur ins Französische, bei der sich v. a. die Pariser Verlagshäuser Amsterdam und La Découverte hervorgetan haben, wird den großen französischen Nachholbedarf nicht all zu schnell beseitigen können. Die vorliegende Streitschrift des Pariser Politikwissenschaftlers Jean-François Bayart muss vor dem Hintergrund dieser Situation und der dadurch für die französischen Geistes- und Sozialwissenschaften im internationalen Zusammenhang häufig entstehenden Probleme und Komplexe gelesen werden.

Eingangs hält Bayart fest, dass die postkoloniale Diskussion in Frankreich¹ „in der ‘kolonialen Situation’ und ihrer Reproduktion den Ursprung und den Grund für zeitgenössische soziale Verhältnisse sieht, ob es sich nun um Klassenverhältnisse, Geschlechterverhältnisse oder Gruppenzugehörigkeiten, sowohl in den alten Kolonien als auch in den alten Metropolen“ (S. 8), handle. Gleichzeitig kritisiert er eine politische Anwendung, wie sie von Gruppen wie den Indigènes de la République vorgenommen werde, die versuchten, die Geschichte der Französischen Republik im Lichte der Kolonialgeschichte neu zu schreiben.² Bayart fordert dagegen eine differenzierte Erforschung der Kolonialgeschichte.

Doch zunächst ist in dem vorliegenden Band ein sozialpsychologisch durchaus interessanter move zu beobachten (S. 20–39): Bayart behauptet, die postcolonial studies stünden tief in der Schuld der französischen Epistemologie und Soziologie, sowie in jener der in Frankreich praktizierten Kritik des Imperialismus etwa durch Aimé Césaire, Mongo Beti, Sembene Ousmane etc. Ähnliches gälte auch für die cultural studies, die von den Arbeiten von

Paulin Hountondji, Valentin Mudimbe, Stanislas Adotevi etc. profitierten. Zudem sei der Vorwurf einer angeblichen Nicht-Rezeption von Autoren der subaltern, cultural oder postcolonial studies in Frankreich kontrafaktisch, da diese hier seit den 1980er Jahren zu zahlreichen Kongressen eingeladen gewesen und zahlreich zitiert und kommentiert worden seien. Es sei nicht übertrieben, „in der plötzlichen Vermarktung der postcolonial studies oder im Anprangern eines französischen Zurückgebliebenseins eine Nischenstrategie von Wissenschaftlern, die nach ihrem Teil des akademischen Marktes suchen, bzw. eine Form der Koketterie zwischen amerikanophilen Snobismus und französischer Selbstgeißelung“ zu sehen (S. 38). Der Ansatz, der in dem Rest des Buches einer polemischen Kritik unterzogen wird, soll sich also ganz maßgeblich Diskussionen verdanken, die schwerpunktmäßig in Frankreich geführt worden seien.³

Auf den folgenden 60 Seiten werden „zwei Methodenfehler“ beklagt: „einerseits die Enthistorisierung des Kolonialismus, der selbst verdinglicht wird, andererseits die Enthistorisierung der Kontinuitäten bzw. der Diskontinuitäten oder genauer der Verbindung, der Verkettung von kolonialem und postkolonialem Moment“ (S. 45f.). Man mag das Anliegen eines Plädoyers für eine differenzierte Analyse kolonialer Beziehungen und ihrer Nachwirkungen teilen. Dennoch geht Bayarts Kritik ins Leere und zwar aus mehreren Gründen.

Erstens erscheinen postcolonial studies selbst als homogener Block. Die Postkolonialen hätten nicht zwischen verschiedenen Formen der Kolonialisierung differenziert (S. 46), die Postkolonialen verschrieben sich einer Extremform des cultural turn (S. 44)

etc. 35 Jahre Debatte und Forschung zum Thema mit solch allgemeinen Vorwürfen zu überziehen, ist äußerst fragwürdig. Bezeichnend für Bayarts Vorgehen ist dabei, dass seine Kritik so gut wie ohne Belege auskommt – zitiert werden v. a. Referenzen, die seine Gegenentwürfe stützen sollen. Dabei sind die Anschuldigungen gegen postkoloniale Ansätze keine geringen: vom Kulturalismus bis zur Unterstützung von Al Qaida (S. 21). Wer so weit ausholt, sollte schon ein bisschen materialgestütztere Beweise liefern.

Zweitens erreicht Bayart mit seinen historischen Argumentationen, mit denen er Differenzierung beansprucht, häufig das Gegenteil. So erkennen die Behauptungen, dass auch andere Formen der Sklaverei und des Sklavenhandels als die transatlantische in Rechnung gestellt werden müssten (S. 11) bzw. andere Formen imperialer Beherrschung als Kolonialismus zu fassen seien (S. 48 ff.), dass es den postcolonial studies um ein spezifisch modernes Unternehmen der Kolonisierung (und weniger zentral auch um den Sklavenhandel und die Versklavung) geht, das konstitutiv für die Schaffung einer vom Westen dominierten Weltordnung sowie die dazugehörigen Epistemen ist. Zudem ist nicht ersichtlich, warum mit der Allgemeinheit, die Bayart für die Analyse imperialer Herrschaft einfordert, die Siedlungspolitik Israels in den palästinensischen Gebieten, die tatsächlich in einigen Ansätzen der postcolonial studies unzulänglicher Weise mit dem europäischen Kolonialismus gleichgesetzt wird, nicht auch noch in das Bayartsche Herrschaftspanorama gehören soll (S. 17).⁴ Sein Text ist so stark von polemischem Furor durchzogen, dass dem

Autor selbst solche argumentativen Widersprüche gar nicht auffallen.

Drittens entwickelt Bayart zahlreiche Argumente, deren historische Belege fragwürdig sind. So betont er für das Imperium und seine Subjekte eine „Zugehörigkeit zu einer gemeinsamen Norm politischer, rechtlicher oder kultureller Ordnung, die die Partikularismen und die Heterogenität der Provinzen transzendiert“ (S. 80) – eine vor dem Hintergrund des von der französischen Kolonialmacht in Algerien mittels des *code d'indigénat* eingeführten zwei-Klassen-Rechtssystems allemal steile Behauptung. Nicht minder erstaunlich ist das Aufrufen eines klassisch kolonialen Mythos: „Überall in Afrika hat die öffentliche Gesundheitsversorgung zu wahrhaften medizinischen Verbrüderungen zwischen Weißen und Schwarzen geführt“, wobei eingeräumt wird, dass deren Zwangscharakter traumatische Konsequenzen hatte, die im sozialen Imaginären fortlebten (S. 94).⁵ Und schließlich wird herausgestellt, dass zentrale koloniale Institutionen umkämpft waren, wobei der analytische Mehrwert dieser Feststellung alles andere als einleuchtend ist: „In allen Reichen [empires] war die Kategorie der Rasse [...] täglicher Aushandlung ausgesetzt, während sie gleichzeitig aufgeherrscht und geteilt wurde. Zudem hat sie Bündnisse zwischen den Weißen und verschiedenen indigenen sozialen Gruppen befördert, z. B. [...] zwischen den Tutsi der großen Seen (gegen die Hutu), Verbindungen, deren Vermächtnis der postkoloniale Staat angenommen hat.“ (S. 95) Zweifellos lässt sich die kreativ-praktische Ausfüllung von durch die Kolonialregime geschaffenen Strukturen durch die Kolonisierten nicht bestreiten. Allerdings hat gerade der von

Bayart geschmähte (S. 66) Mahmood Mamdani gezeigt, dass die vorkolonialen kulturellen Identitäten von Hutu und Tutsi durch die Kolonialmächte in politischen Identitäten transformiert wurden. Mit ihnen waren in der Kolonialzeit virtuelle bürgerliche Rechte verbunden und sie sind nach der Unabhängigkeit zum Ausgangspunkt für politisches Handeln geworden – im Falle Ruandas bis hin zur Eskalation im Genozid von 1994.⁶ Es geht solchen Ansätzen in der Kolonialismusforschung nicht darum, „die eigene Historizität der kolonisierten Gesellschaften“ (S. 95) zu negieren, sondern vielmehr darum zu zeigen, wie die kolonialen Verhältnisse spezifische Transformationen vorkolonialer Strukturen bewerkstelligt haben.

Viertens zeigt sich an genau solchen Stellen, dass Bayarts Polemik sozialtheoretisch auf tönernen Füßen steht. Dies betrifft zunächst seine Konzeption von Struktur und Handlung. Das Bestreben, andere historische Determinationszusammenhänge als den Kolonialismus auszumachen, bringt ihn anscheinend zu der Annahme, dass allein das aktuelle kreative Agieren von Menschen innerhalb von in der Vergangenheit erschaffenen Herrschaftsstrukturen diese ihrer politischen Relevanz enthebt. Es scheint dagegen treffender mit Ansätzen des Critical Realism davon auszugehen, dass Struktur und Handeln derart aufeinander einwirken, dass Menschen nicht einfach soziale Strukturen neu erschaffen, sondern sich ihre Handlungen immer schon in einer von diesen Strukturen geprägten Welt vollziehen, sie diese also reproduzieren und transformieren, sie damit aber keinesfalls ihrer politischen Brisanz entheben.⁷ Auch Bayarts Zurückweisung des in der postkolonialen

Diskussion prominenten agency-Begriffs zeugt nicht gerade von sozialtheoretischer Versiertheit. Er stellt diesem „nicht-utilitaristische Begriffe von Prozessen und Praktiken“ (S. 71) entgegen und ignoriert dabei, dass in der internationalen Diskussion unter agency gemeinhin ein zeitlich situiertes soziales Handeln gefasst wird, das von der Vergangenheit geprägt (Habitus), aber gleichzeitig auf die Zukunft gerichtet (Fähigkeit, sich Alternativen zum status quo vorzustellen) und auf die Gegenwart bezogen ist. Gegenwartshandeln kann in diesem Zusammenhang als komplexe Integrationsleistung von habituellen Dispositionen aus der Vergangenheit, für die Zukunft geplanten Projekten und (bewertender) Anpassung an die momentanen Kontingenzen gefasst werden. Dieses Handeln ist in der Lage, Antworten auf sich ständig verändernde gesellschaftliche Situationen zu geben, und zur Reproduktion und Transformation sozialer Strukturen beizutragen.⁸

Fünftens verwechselt Bayart schlichtweg Kolonialgeschichtsschreibung und post-colonial studies bzw. hat eine äußerst eingeschränkte Auffassung von letzteren. Sie sprächen zwar von Institutionen und sozialen Gruppen, die die Kolonialisierung getragen hätten, „aber in dem sie sich getreu dem Vorgehen der cultural studies auf die diskursive Ordnung von Körpern statt auf deren tatsächlichen Praktiken beschränken“ (S. 81). Die Untersuchung von sozialen Repräsentationen ist für Bayart also gleichbedeutend mit Diskursreduktionismus, gegen den nur die hard facts der „wirklichen Geschichte [histoire effective]“ (S. 83) helfen würden. Solch eine Gegenüberstellung bestätigt die eingangs erwähnte Nicht-Rezeption englischsprachiger

chiger, materialistischer Theorie sozialer Repräsentationen, der sich beispielsweise der erst kürzlich ins Französische übersetzte Stuart Hall verschrieben hat.⁹

Ein Essay sollte natürlich nicht als wissenschaftliche Studie gelesen werden. Dennoch ist ein gewisses Niveau der Auseinandersetzung wünschenswert. Bayarts Streitschrift unterschreitet dieses mit ihren zahlreichen Missverständnissen, falschen Gegenüberstellungen und nationalen Selbstbezüglichkeiten allerdings recht konsequent. Einer kritischen Diskussion postkolonialer Ansätze in Frankreich ist damit ein Bärendienst erwiesen.

Anmerkungen:

- 1 Zu nennen sind v. a. zwei Sammelbände, die große Aufmerksamkeit genossen haben: N. Bancel/P. Blanchard/S. Lemaire (Hrsg.), *La fracture coloniale. La société française au prisme de l'héritage colonial*, Paris 2006; N. Bancel/F. Bernault/P. Blanchard/A. Boubeker/A. Mbembe/F. Vergès (Hrsg.), *Ruptures postcoloniales. Les nouveaux visages de la société française*, Paris 2010.
- 2 Der zu Beginn des Jahres 2005 lancierte Aufruf dieses Zusammenschlusses, den auch zahlreiche Wissenschaftler unterzeichnet haben, findet sich imInternet(http://www.indigenes-republique.fr/article.php3?id_article=6&var_recherche=appel, letzter Zugriff: 6.6.2012). Indem die Autoren von der Beschreibung rassistischer Diskriminierungen in der französischen Gesellschaft recht unvermittelt auf einen „Kolonialstaat Frankreich“ schließen, in dem die aus der rassistischen Kolonialherrschaft in Algerien resultierende juristische Konstruktion des „Indigenen“ auch noch gegenwärtig das Handeln der Republik anleiten soll, machen sie sich leicht angreifbar. So ist verschiedentlich kritisiert worden, dass in dem Aufruf Kolonialismus und Sklaverei durch hältlose Vergleiche banalisiert werden und Rassismus zu Ungunsten einer sozio-ökonomischen Bestimmung auf seine epistemische Dimension verengt wird. Bemerkenswert und symptomatisch für die verweigerte Anerkennung von rassifizierten Minderheiten in Frankreich ist allerdings die öffentliche Aufmerksamkeit für diesen Text und für die verschiedenen Positionen der Indigènes selbst.
- 3 Eine solche ‚kritische Umarmungsstrategie‘ ist in Frankreich auch gegenüber den mit der postkolonialen Diskussion verwandten globalgeschichtlichen Ansätzen zu beobachten: Einerseits werden sie – wenn nicht gleich als gegenüber der Nationalgeschichte unwissenschaftlich abgetan (so Pierre Nora in seinem Schlusswort zum französischen HistorikerInnentag 2011, http://www.eurozine.com/articles/article_2011-11-24-nora-fr.html, letzter Zugriff: 6.6.2012) – als wesentlich US-amerikanische ‚Erfahrung‘ gebrandmarkt, andererseits wird behauptet, viele ihrer Themen seien zuvor schon in anderen historiographischen oder sozialwissenschaftlichen Zusammenhängen v.a. in Frankreich zum Gegenstand gemacht worden (vgl. P. Grosser, *L'histoire mondiale/globale, une jeunesse exubérante mais difficile*, in: *Vingtième Siècle. Revue d'histoire*, 110 (2011) 2, S. 3-18).
- 4 Die israelische Siedlungspolitik setzt bereits die kanonische Studie Orientalismus (1978) von E. Said (2009, insbesondere S. 327-376) in den Kontext des europäischen Kolonialismus. Inwiefern sich der Zionismus vom Kolonialismus unterscheidet, zeigt gerade unter Herausstellung historischer Ungleichzeitigkeiten D. Diner, Israel in Palästina. Über Tausch und Gewalt im Vorderen Orient, Königstein/Ts. 1980.
- 5 Der Mythos des ‚Gesundheitsexports‘ ist ein gängiges Thema der Kolonialapologie. Dagegen hält F. Arzalier für die Gesundheitspolitik in den französischen Kolonien fest: „nach einer Zeit der demographischen Regression (von 1890 bis 1930), die weitgehend den Konsequenzen der europäischen Eroberung zuzuschreiben ist (Epidemien und Misshandlungen), erlaubten es die ersten Gesundheitsmaßnahmen für Afrikaner (Beginn der Impfkampagnen) ab 1930 wieder ein Wachstum der Bevölkerung zu erreichen (vor der demographischen Explosion nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg und vor allem nach der Unabhängigkeit). Die zahlenmäßigen Bedeutung der gesundheitspolitischen Anstrengungen der dreißiger Jahre sollten nicht übertrieben werden: im gesamten AOF-Raum [Afrique Occidentale Française; K.L.] praktizierten 1929 189 europäische- und 88 afrikanische Ärzte sowie 133 Hebammen. 1946 gab es 505 Ärzte, davon 335 Afrikaner (*Annuaire statistique de la France d'Outre-Mer*).“ (F. Arzalier, Colonialisme et impérialisme. ‚L'exception française‘ ou le mythe ‚humaniste‘, in: *Une mauvaise décolonisation*.

- La France. De l'Empire aux émeutes des quartiers populaires, Pantin 2007 [ohne Hrsg.], S. 15-43, hier S. 30f.)
- 6 M. Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers. Colonialism, Nativism, and the Genocide in Rwanda, Princeton 2001.
 - 7 So lautet das zentrale Argument von R. Bhaskars „Transformational Model of Social Activity“, siehe: The Possibility of Naturalism. A Philosophical Critique of Contemporary Human Sciences, London 1998, S. 25-79.
 - 8 S. M. Emirbayer / A. Mische, What Is Agency?, in: American Journal of Sociology, vol. 103 (1998) 4, S. 962-1023.
 - 9 Zu nennen ist v. a. der Sammelband S. Hall, Identités et Cultures. Politique des Cultural Studies, Paris 2007, aber auch S. Hall Le populisme autoritaire. Puissance de la droite et impuissance de la gauche au temps du thatchéisme et du blairisme, Paris 2008.

Naheem Jabbar: Historiography and Writing Postcolonial India, London: Routledge, 2011, 244 S.

Rezensiert von
Georg Berkemer, Berlin

Dem Leser dieser Zeilen sei zuvor eine Mitteilung gemacht, die der Autor des Buches unterschlägt: Es geht trotz des Titels nicht wirklich um Historiographie, also das kritische Reflektieren über Motive und Anlässe zur Schreibung von Geschichte innerhalb und außerhalb des wissenschaftlichen Umfeldes. Stattdessen geht es um Geschichte Südasiens als Feld der Erinnerung und als literarisch wie politisch umkämpfter Diskurs, und darum wie dieser nach Meinung des Autors im postmodernen Zeitalter geschrieben werden sollte. Die Kritik am Geschriebenen dient nur als

Vehikel zum Propagieren des eigenen Stils des postmodernen Schreibens mit historischen Anklängen. Historische Sinnbildung und deren Kritik läuft hier nicht über die Frage nach dem „Was“ des Kommunizierten, sondern über die Frage nach dem „Wie“ der Kommunikation. Wohl aber bleibt Jabbar bei der alten Regel von Karl Popper, wonach eine „Theorie“ nur durch eine neue zu ersetzen ist. Diese neue „Theorie“, der Jabbar anhängt, erklärt aber jegliche Wissenschaft zum Mythos und Geschichtsschreibung zu einer zwar temporär Sinn schaffenden, politisch umkämpften, aber letztlich von Fiktion nicht zu unterscheidenden Veranstaltung.

Das Buch besteht aus zwei Teilen. Im ersten werden Themen im weiteren Umkreis der postmodernen Historiographie erörtert. Hierzu gehören je ein Kapitel zu Hindutva und Ambedkar, bei denen die Wurzeln konservativen und im Kolonialismus verfangenen Denkens auf die deutsche Romantik zurückgeführt werden. Zuvorher stehen zur methodischen Verortung zwei Texte, die mit „Historiography and narrative“ sowie „The historical sense“ betitelt sind. Auch hier ist die nicht eben neue Auseinandersetzung mit Schlegel und Herder, Hegel und Marx prominent. Der zweite Teil des Buches besteht aus zwei Artikeln zu Naipaul und Rushdie, die eher der Literaturkritik als der Historiographie zuzuordnen sind. Insgesamt sieht das Werk in seiner Heterogenität wie eine Sammlung von eigenständig verfassten Artikeln aus. Zumindest würde dieses die ständige Wiederkehr der Kritik an (meist deutschen) Klassikern der Orientalistik und Geschichtsphilosophie sowie marxistischer Historiker erklären. Einige Sorgfalt in der editorischen Arbeit hätte Wiederholungen

vermieden. Als zentrale Frage kann die auf S. 136 gestellte gelten, um die die Beiträge des Buches immer wieder kreisen. Jabbar fragt dort: "... what a priori considerations are involved in any interpretive feat before these can plausibly describe events in Indian history in terms of sociological modalities." Diese Frage ist nicht neu, aber an sich immer wieder interessant. Passagen, in denen Jabbar sich hierauf konzentriert, lassen sich mit einigem Gewinn lesen. Im Mittelpunkt stehen in weiten Teilen des Buches aber nicht Inhalte, etwa Aussagen zur Geschichtsschreibung und deren Zustandekommen, Fragen der Koinzidenz und des Sinns, Zeitgenossenschaften und gesellschaftliche Zwänge, zu kulturellen Voraussetzungen und nationalen Vorbehalten historischer Darstellung.

Den Autor interessiert vor allem die stilistische Form dieses Tuns. Es geht Jabbar eher um die Frage, in welchem literarischen Duktus, und ob überhaupt, Geschichte geschrieben werden sollte. Gerade hier hätte Jabbar in die Details gehen und explizit werden können. Denn eine mögliche Interpretation der Auswahl seiner Protagonisten und Zitierquellen könnte sein, dass er gemäß des Titels seines Buches „Historiographie“ dem westlich-kolonialen-wissenschaftlichen Stil der Geschichtsdarstellung zuordnet, „Writing Postcolonial India“ aber eher dem postkolonial-indigen-literarischen Ansatz.

Dies alles geschieht konsequent ohne Diskussion möglicher Vorbilder historiographischer Kritik wie Hayden White oder Frank Ankersmit. Anstatt solcher Bemühungen versteigt sich der Autor in eine intensive Sekundärverwertung von Zitaten seiner zumeist französischen Lieblingsautoren und allseits bekannter indisch-

amerikanischer Pandits der New Yorker Schule. Solche Kollagen von Zitaten als zentrales Stilmittel sind aus der postmodernen Literatur und Dramatik wohlbekannt, und es ist hier der leider nie explizit gemachte Versuch zu vermuten, die Geschichtsschreibung solchen Darstellungstechniken zu öffnen. Diese Art des Schreibens ist aus Sicht des Autors „state of the art“ und muss daher offenbar nicht weiter begründet werden. Kreativität zeigt Jabbar konsequenterweise im Konstruieren von riesigen, partizipien- und nebensatzlastigen Satzgirlanden, wie sie künstlicher und verschwurbelter von Judith Butler nicht hätten stammen können.

Mit der Präsentation dieses postmodernen Barocks scheint sich der Zweck der Veröffentlichung auch schon erschöpft zu haben. Es ist nämlich nicht erkennbar, für wen die Schrift verfasst worden sein könnte. Sollte sie für „Experten“ gemeint sein, dann stellt sich die Frage, was an Neuem darin zu finden ist. Antwort: bis auf einige selten zitierte Autoren, mit denen Jabbar die übliche postkoloniale Leseliste ergänzt, nichts. Wer die Thematik kennt, wird sich als postmodern Denkender vielleicht bestätigt fühlen, aber nicht viel neue Information erhalten. Marxisten und andere prä-postmoderne Richtungen könnten sich sogar darin bestärkt fühlen, gewisse postmoderne Epigonen für drittklassig und irrelevant zu halten.

Warum noch einmal auf tote Groß- und Urgroßväter wie Hegel, Herder, Marx einhauen (Max und Alfred Weber fehlen hier erstaunlicherweise), warum wieder einmal Naipaul kaputt machen und noch einmal beweisen, dass Hindu-Faschisten genau so wenig Gehirn spazierenträgen wie andere Nazi-Klone? Das wissen wir alles schon;

und Jabbars verquaste Wortdrehselci ist nun weder witzig noch feuilletonistisch genug, um damit des Lesers Lebenszeit zu verschwenden.

Bleiben die Anfänger und Laien der historischen Disziplinen, die solche Themen und Diskurse neu erwerben müssen. Diese sind Interessenten, die dieses Buch womöglich tatsächlich zur Information über postmoderne Historiographie zu lesen versuchen. Aber statt Argumenten und erklärender Offenheit finden sie nur Fallenstellerei. Sie werden Probleme haben, Worthülsen und Buzzwords von echter Analyse zu unterscheiden. Sie werden vielleicht auch nicht die künstliche Wand erkennen, die Jabbar zwischen deutscher Moderne und französischer Postmoderne aufbaut. Sie werden sich fragen müssen, welche Aussagen hinter all den langen Sätzen nun tatsächlich stecken und dann vielleicht erkennen, dass der Autor auf die Interessen jeglicher potentieller Leserschaft nicht viel Rücksicht nimmt. Damit wäre dann auch die Frage beantwortet, ob es nicht doch besser wäre, Foucault und Marx, Benjamin und Lyotard im Original zu lesen. Und wenn es ein Roman sein soll: David F. Wallace, Thomas Pynchon oder Roberto Bolaño bieten Erbaulicheres. Jabbars Stilübungen haben nichts vom Sprachrausch der zeitgenössischen literarischen Meister und taugen auch nur wenig als Judith Butler-Imitat. Zumindest beantwortet der Autor unfreiwillig die Frage, wie es klingt, wenn man Wissenschaft im Stile von David Foster Wallace schreibt: nicht gut nämlich. Ein Trost ist immerhin, dass es der Autor unterlassen hat, auch den Umfang des postmodernen Mammutromans zu imitieren.

**Pascal Gin/Walter Moser (eds.),
Mobilités Culturelles. Regards Croisés
Brésil et Canada / Cultural Mobilities.
A Cross-Perspective between Brazil
and Canada (= Transferts culturels /
Cultural transfers, Ottawa: University
of Ottawa Press, 2011, 360 S.**

Reviewed by
Nadine Sieveking, Leipzig

The notion of cultural mobility has gained increasing importance over the last decade, signifying a rising interest in new avenues for transdisciplinary research on questions related to the conditions of globalisation, transnational migrations, and new types of material and virtual mobility for processes of cultural transfer. However, in contrast to the more technical term of cultural transfer, the notion of cultural mobility remains conceptually much more diffused, neither determining a clear empirical field of study nor defining a particular theoretical and methodological approach. Instead it expresses an urge to study the interrelated dynamics and effects of processes of globalisation with respect to their cultural dimensions. At the same time, it leaves open how the ‘cultural’ might precisely be determined or understood. This conceptual vagueness demonstrates the strength but also the weakness of the bilingual volume, which has grown out of an on-going collaboration between Canadian and Brazilian researchers, initiated in 2002 by the Research Chair in Literary and Cultural Transfers at the University of Ottawa.

Whereas the volume mainly focuses on cultural representations of mobility in terms of visual or literary artwork, the editors do not restrict their approach to artistic representations and circulations. With the aim to open up a broader field of theoretical debate, the volume also includes articles on historical and contemporary processes of cultural transformation related to nation building, migrations and diasporic experiences, as well as political restructuring and transformations of urban space in Brazil and Canada. The editors achieve a certain closure of this broad topical opening by giving special attention to meta-critical artistic reflections on the political implications of mobility.

In the first part of the volume this meta-critique is articulated on a practical level, analysed by articles that refer to examples of civic movements, political and artistic ‘urban interventions’ (Janine Marchessault on contemporary art practices in Toronto; Ivete Lara Camargos Waltz on street journals in Brazil and their translocal networks; Ludmila Brandão on political initiatives to spatially regulate the sector of urban informal petty trade; Annie Gérin on an “ecosophical” arts movement in Ottawa; Angélica Madeira on the constitution of the artistic field as part of the creation of a new capital: Brasília). Most of the theoretical references in the first section, conceived by the editors as the more “empirical” part, refer to concepts of (urban, public, social) space, its creation, regulation and contemporary global restructuring. They show a particular concern to political histories of spatial transformation, urbanism and globalisation, “subaltern circulations”, as well as economic and material aspects of mobility and its (re-)sources, potential and

limitations. The first article by Ismail Xavier on the link created between a particular place (the sertão) and the experience of migration in cinematic representations since early Brazilian nation building, however, is an exception, since it provides a profound analysis of historical transformations without elaborating on theoretical concepts.

In the second part, a critique is offered on a more explicitly theoretical level through various articles referring to artwork that reflect upon mobility as a condition for modernities and cosmopolitanisms in the plural (Smaro Kambourelis on a novel about pioneering experiences of the Canadian wilderness; Eurídice Figueiredo on contemporary Brazilian novels; Sandra Regina Goulart Almeida on transnational literary fiction; Hudson Moura on transnational lives and intercultural cinema). This section mainly concentrates on immaterial aspects brought forward by literature and visual arts representing and reflecting on mobility as an inherently contradictory “ethos of modernity” as well as a condition for the emergence of “new forms of cosmopolitanism” (Figueiredo, p. 235). It also includes an article by Mônica Dantas on contemporary dance and bodily techniques to creatively engage in the encounter and anthropophagic ingestion, digestion and incorporation of a cultural ‘other’. What these articles have in common is a sense of the “emancipatory function” of mobility (Gin, p. 345) for the individual subject, which seems more existentially bound to the “heavy spatiality” of the infrastructure needed for various systems of mobility than to any territorially defined culture. This kind of emancipatory experience of mobility, however, is in contrast to the more hegemonic functions and systematic

constraints highlighted especially in the first section of the volume.

Although the various contributions indicate the relevance of certain common dimensions of analysis (e.g. space, practice, modernity, subjectivity), the editors' explicit aim to reflect on "conceptual instruments" and to elaborate upon an "adequate theoretical framework" (Moser, p. 3) for the study of cultural mobility is neither realised systematically nor coherently. The introduction to the volume is telling in this respect: instead of outlining the elements of a common conceptual framework for all the contributions, it illustrates with concrete examples the variety of meanings mobility can acquire as an aesthetic experience in the way it is evoked and materialised through contemporary artwork exhibited at the spectacular complex of the Inhotim Institute in Brazil that, unfortunately for the reader unfamiliar with the site, remains decontextualised with respect to its specific socio-political location and history. More helpful in giving an orientation are the short overviews at the beginning of each of the two parts of the volume, although the introduction of the second part and the conclusion of the volume by Pascal Gin are so heavily loaded with theoretical references that the specific value and particular perspectives provided by the contributions become somewhat lost.

With regard to bringing forward a transdisciplinary approach to the study of cultural mobility – instead of introducing a minimal definition of art (Moser, p. 5) – it could have been more helpful for the reader if the editors had reflected on the significance of their own disciplinary location in the fields of modern languages,

comparative literature, cultural transfer and translation studies for advancing the study of particular, namely artistically mediated cultural dimensions of mobility. Nevertheless, the cross-perspective on Brazil and Canada turns out to be particularly fruitful not only with regard to a comparison of historical and contemporary forms of mobility, but also because the contributions relate to a broad range of theoretical debates on globalisation that bring together francophone and anglophone traditions of critical thought. Not the least in this respect, the volume is a worthwhile and inspiring contribution to a field of transdisciplinary interest and growing cross-disciplinary exchange.

Karl Kaser: The Balkans and the Near East. Introduction to a Shared History (= Studies on South East Europe, Bd. 12), Wien: LIT, 2011, 405 S.

Reviewed by
Isa Blumi, Leipzig

The increasingly lucrative textbook market targeting large undergraduate "introductory" (and mandatory) courses has spread to the study of "World History" over the last decade. Evidence of the greater sensitivity to teach college-age students how to think of an integrated world includes a competitive explosion in world history textbooks. Most authors aim to decentering the Euro-Atlantic world in favor of a more inclusive narrative of human exchange. A subgenre of this movement has been the growing in-

terest in regional studies. This has included identifying the Mediterranean, Indian, Pacific and Atlantic Oceans as conduits for productive inter-communal exchanges. Authors have successfully argued that these exchanges blur once impermeable cultural boundaries separating “continents” and “religious traditions.” Karl Kaser’s recent book reflects the best of this revisionist pedagogical spirit. What The Balkans and the Near East: Introduction to a Shared History does differently is fuse the Balkans and Eastern Mediterranean worlds into a common narrative that moves well beyond antiquity and the seemingly permanent break caused by the rise of Islam in the early 8th century. Indeed, Kaser’s most welcome project hints at the possibilities for such integrative thinking and finally bridging gaps between “East and West.” In seventeen tightly written chapters, Kaser reinforces a basic claim that “[u]nlike any other region in the world, Eurasia Minor ... shares a joint history, if we define ‘joint history’ as embeddedness [sic] in politically superior structures over long periods of time.” (p. 2) Taking a thematic approach to elaborate on assertions that this area between the Tigris and the Danube rivers shares a common heritage that extends from antiquity to the present, Kaser crafts a narrative that appropriates a vast body of earlier scholarship. As rightly pointed out in the introduction, most scholarship has fixated on telling stories from within neatly defined “Area studies” at the expense of providing a meaningful combined story. As such, Kaser’s book is an invaluable first step to conceptually preparing English-speaking undergraduate students to think beyond conventional boundaries. He does this by discussing themes that may help

appreciate what shaped these regions as a singular unit across millennia. Be it “power and dominance” in the first chapter, the environment in chapter 3 or the sciences and technology throughout, Kaser neatly threads topics of discussion that could easily be adopted in the classroom.

What this reviewer finds especially useful is the heavy emphasis on the shared heritage Muslims of these interconnected regions share with their predecessors, be they other faiths of “the book” – Christians and Jews – or even the pagans of antiquity. While this reviewer has much to quibble about the selection of secondary readings the author provides after each tightly written chapter, the very fact that Kaser offers such a service needs acknowledgement. In this respect, the author may have been more helpful if he actually linked the works listed in the chapters’ bibliographies with the actual content. It may be too much to ask non-specialist instructors and undergraduate students to figure out for themselves which books are relevant to the issues they found especially intriguing. That being said, the service does provide a good foundation for any aspiring young historian to start her own development.

For all the good intentions, the book does have some crucial flaws that the reader cannot ignore. Trying to infiltrate a highly competitive “market” in trans-regional/world history textbooks requires considerable investment in time and, unfortunately, money. To produce one of those shinny, sleek textbooks requires considerable resources, something Kaser personally could not bring to the project and the publisher clearly did not wish to offer. From the start it is clear this book enjoyed minimal financial investment, leaving the

appearance of the book pale in comparison to comparable books on the market. The book almost looks rushed and amateurish in respect to many of the images and overall design. This reviewer has seen undergraduate students produce better looking papers with their computers. Considering this, one wonders if there was any production support at all provided to the author. Even if none was forthcoming, we must fault Kaser for not mastering basic production skills to offer images that are clear. Far too many pictures throughout the book offer nothing but frustration to the reader: not only are they illegible, but become a distraction because of the poor quality.

This issue of production extends to the prose. Dr. Kaser must appreciate that no matter how fluent he is in English, it is not his mother-tongue. The text seriously needs a native-speaking copy editor, one who is given full authority to rewrite Kaser's book. First, the text is written almost exclusively in the "passive" voice. As such, any professor assigning this book risks undermining every freshman writing course her student takes. As any writing teacher will explain, overuse of the "to be" passive voice subverts the English language and reads poorly. In this regard, any book that aspires to compete with the larger productions, at a minimum, needs careful copy-editing. This equally applies to Kaser's occasional use of phrases that work in German but only undermine the reader's confidence in the quality of the book's arguments when literally translated into English. Likewise, the requisite definite and indefinite articles – the/a/an – often goes missing in this book. In the end, this book can really only cater to an advanced reader who would supple-

ment more simplistic, but sleeker productions, with Kaser's thoughtful suggestions about how to integrate these long separated regions. Instructors should not assign this book to students, but use it as a guide to help them translate Kaser's useful elaborations and informed linkages to their classroom. In short, the unfortunate sloppiness and poor production leaves Kaser without a larger audience. That said, I can recommend this book to the previously mentioned instructor who is looking for ways to supplement the narratives found in mainstream textbooks with a particularly Balkan perspective. It offers an angle to discussing larger Mediterranean (and world) history that has long needed attention; hopefully in future projects, publishers can invest greater resources to help scholars like Kaser produce a competitive alternative to the mainstream textbooks he clearly hopes to correct.

Lucas Elmenhorst: Kann man national bauen? Die Architektur der Botschaften Indiens, der Schweiz und Großbritanniens in Berlin, Berlin: Gebr. Mann Verlag, 2010, 239 S.

Rezensiert von
Ralf Dorn, Darmstadt

Wirft man einen Blick auf einige der leer stehenden Botschaftsbauten die derzeit in der ehemaligen Bundeshauptstadt Bonn zum Verkauf stehen¹, so könnte man ver-

muten, dass die dort ehemals vertretenen Länder sich erst seit ihrem Umzug nach Berlin einer repräsentativen und nationalen Formensprache befleißigen. Dieser Eindruck stellt sich bei der Betrachtung der Bonner Botschaftsbauten ein, von denen viele den Charme öffentlicher Verwaltungsbauten besitzen. Mit den neuen Berliner Botschaftsbauten und der Frage „Kann man national bauen?“ hat sich Lucas Elmenhorst in seiner 2010 im Gebrüder Mann Verlag erschienenen Dissertation eingehend beschäftigt.

Der Anlass der Untersuchung liegt auf der Hand: Seit der Wiedervereinigung und dem anschließenden Hauptstadtentscheid kam es in Berlin zu einem Bauboom im Bereich des Botschaftsbaus. Vor dem Hintergrund des Funktionswandels dieses Bautyps gewinnt die Untersuchung sogar noch an Bedeutung. „Zu beobachten ist [...] seit Anfang der 1990er Jahre eine Abnahme der Bedeutung von Botschaften als Orte klassischer Diplomatie und ein Bedeutungswandel hin zum Imageträger einer ‚Kulturdiplomatie‘.“ (S. 10) Dabei konzentriert sich Elmenhorst vornehmlich auf die Betrachtung der Fassaden dieser „unbetretbaren politischen Räume“ (S. 10). Er gliedert seine Arbeit in einen historischen Teil, der die Entwicklung des Botschaftsbaus bis 1990 behandelt und einen analytischen Teil, der die Bauten Indiens, der Schweiz und Großbritanniens eingehend untersucht.

Die Auswahl der drei Botschaftsbauten folgte bestimmten Kriterien. So stellt Indien eine noch junge Nation dar, die in der Bundeshauptstadt einen Neubau errichten musste, während die Schweiz bereits einen Altbau besaß, der um einen Neubau erweitert wurde. Großbritanniens Altbau wurde

hingegen im Zweiten Weltkrieg zerstört und erhielt nun an alter Stelle einen Neubau. Als Gegenprobe stützte sich Elmenhorst auf einen Vergleich mit den Länder-Pavillons der drei Staaten auf der EXPO 2000 in Hannover. Dieser Vergleich lieferte gewissermaßen den Lackmustest seiner Untersuchung, um „zu bestimmen, ob bei den an den ausgewählten Botschaften beobachteten nationalen baulichen Eigenheiten auch eine Strategie der nationalen Selbstdarstellung im Gastland Deutschland zu erkennen ist“ (S. 16).

Die Botschaft stellt einen recht jungen Bauotypus dar. Erst seit dem ausgehenden 19. Jahrhundert Jahren fungieren Botschaftsbauten als diplomatische Vertretungen eines Gastlandes. Ein frühes Beispiel stellt die deutsche Botschaft in Istanbul dar, deren flügelschlagende Adler auf dem Dach an das ehemalige Kaiser-Wilhelm-Palais in Berlin erinnern und dem Gebäude eine nationale Note geben. Ungleich präsenter gibt sich die von 1911 bis 1913 errichtete deutsche Botschaft in St. Petersburg, deren kraftvolle Geste jedoch ins Herrische abgleitet, wie manch ein Zeitgenosse Kaiser Wilhelms II. kritisch bemerkte. Kolossalpfeiler aus Granit und eine Rossebändiger-Gruppe aus Bronze dominierten die Fassade und drängten sich dem Betrachter geradezu auf. Die Monumentalität dieses Botschaftsbauwerks, die der Architekt Peter Behrens bereits in ähnlicher Form an seinen Industriebauten für die AEG anwandte, spiegelt nach Elmenhorst den deutschen Weltmachtsanspruch wider. Dieser Anspruch verschärft sich noch in der Zeit des Nationalsozialismus wie das Beispiel des Berliner Botschaftsviertels lehrt. „Die neuen Botschaftsbauten entwarfen zumeist deutsche Privatarchitekten, die Speer ei-

genhändig ausgewählt hatte, um die architektonische und städtebauliche Einheit des Gebiets sicherzustellen“ (S. 55 f.). Damit vollzog Speer die Umkehrung aller Vorzeichen und formte so „eine einheitliche deutsche Baugesinnung“, so Elmenhorst, „die den Machtanspruch und das ästhetische Selbstverständnis der Erbauer – und nicht das der Nutzer – materialisieren sollte“ (S. 59). Eine solche Architektursprache verordnete Stalin ab 1932 auch der Sowjetunion, und so präsentierte sich die sowjetische Botschaft Unter den Linden nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg, wie vormals die Repräsentationsbauten des NS-Regimes. Doch was der Sowjetunion erlaubt war, konnten sich andere Staaten in der Hauptstadt der DDR nicht herausnehmen. „Nur die wichtigen ‚Sozialistischen Bruderstaaten‘ Polen, Ungarn, Bulgarien, Nordkorea und die Tschechoslowakei durften in der Innenstadt diplomatische ‚Individualbauten‘ errichten“ (S. 77). Aus diesem Schema heraus fällt insbesondere die tschechische Botschaft. Ihre prägnante Kubatur bringt Elmenhorst in Zusammenhang mit dem tschechischen Kubismus, der als eine Sonderleistung der tschechischen Architektur in die Geschichte eingegangen ist und als nationale Form Eigenständigkeit für sich beansprucht. Elmenhorst sieht die Botschaft als „Verweis auf die Bestrebungen“ der Tschechen, „sich bereits vor dem Ersten Weltkrieg mit Hilfe des Kubismus visuell mit Westeuropa zu solidarisieren und gleichzeitig von Österreich-Ungarn zu lösen“ (S. 93). Mit dem Bau der tschechischen Botschaft bezog man sich in einer architektonischen Bipolarität sowohl auf die eigene nationale Tradition wie auch auf die aktuellen Tendenzen der westlichen Welt“ (S. 97) und reagierte damit sehr

selbstbewusst auf die politische Situation der 1970er Jahre.

Nach dieser historischen Betrachtung kommt Elmenhorst schließlich zu der Analyse der neuen Botschaftsbauten. In ihrer Formensprache und der Wahl ihrer Baumaterialien könnte man die indische Botschaft als einen klassischen Vertreter nationaler Selbstdarstellung bezeichnen. Was auf den ersten Blick irritiert ist die jedoch die Wahl eines Berliner Architekturbüros (Hilde Léon und Konrad Wohlhage) für die bauliche Umsetzung. Der Grund für diese Wahl mag darin liegen, dass Indien ein Vielvölkerstaat ist und die Auswahl eines indischen Architekten die Bevorzugung einer bestimmten Ethnie bedeutet hätte. Auf der anderen Seite zeigt sich das heutige Indien der westlichen Moderne zugewandt, wie das berühmte Beispiel der Regierungsbauten in Chandigarh von Le Corbusier zeigt. Das Material, ein roter Barauli-Sandstein aus der Provinz Rajasthan, vermittelt die „Identität des Landes“ (S. 110). Direkte Zitate lehnten die Architekten jedoch vor vornehmerein ab. „Das von ihnen als ‚faded memory‘ bezeichnete Zitierverfahren umgeht eine eindeutige Zuordnung und vermischt verschiedene Bilder miteinander“ (S. 110). Vergleiche mit traditionellen Kalenderbauten Indiens stellen sich ein, drängen sich jedoch nicht auf. Diese Ambivalenz der Bezüge steht einerseits für Indiens große Vergangenheit und andererseits für eine zukunftsorientierte moderne Gesellschaft, für die sowohl die traditionelle indische Architektur als auch die westliche Architektur der Moderne beispielhaft ist. Dagegen steht das Motiv der zusammengelegten Hände (Namaskar-Geste) des bewusst auf Wiedererkennbarkeit setzenden Expo-Pavillons In-

diens in ostentativem Gegensatz. Ungleich zurückhaltender agierte das Büro Diener und Diener mit seinem Um- bzw. Neubau der Schweizer Botschaft, der auf „fast einhellige Ablehnung“ (S. 138) stieß. „Im Gegensatz zur Indischen Botschaft wurden für den Anbau der Schweizerischen Botschaft keine schweizer Materialien verwendet, durch die der Bau eine nationale Charakterisierung erhalten könnte“ (S. 146). Doch was der Botschaft an Materialien Schweizer Provenienz fehlt, wird durch eine aufwändige Verarbeitung des Sichtbetons kompensiert. Diese besitzt in der Schweiz eine lange Bautradition, die zurück reicht bis zu Karl Moser und Le Corbusier. Diener und Diener setzen bewusst auf den spannungsreichen Gegensatz zwischen Alt- und Neubau. „Der Verzicht auf deutliche Zitate und eine historisierende Fassade erweist sich“, laut Elmenhorst „als eine Respektgeste gegenüber dem Altbau“ (S. 155), könnte aber auch als eine selbstbewusste Geste der Architekten gelesen werden. Mit dem eigenständigen Anbau könnte zudem ein bewusster Rückgriff auf die ursprüngliche städtebauliche Situation getätigt worden sein. „Der Umgang mit der Kubatur des Neubaus, welcher in Andeutungen die verlorene Blockrandbebauung rekonstruiert, verweist auf Strategien der Tessiner Schule“ (S. 155).

Für den Neubau der britischen Botschaft wurden zehn britische Architekturbüros zu einem beschränkten Wettbewerb eingeladen, den das Büro Michael Wilford and Partners gewann. Im Sinne der „Kritischen Rekonstruktion“ wie sie Paul Josef Kleihues für die IBA Berlin 1984 erstmalig propagierte, baute Wilford auf der alten Parzelle der britischen Botschaft einen Neubau, der sich an den Berliner Bauvor-

schriften orientiert. „Rein formal und vordergründig hält sich die Fassade der neuen Britischen Botschaft an die Vorgaben der Gestaltungssatzung, unterläuft sie jedoch zugleich“ (S. 190). Sowohl die Traufhöhe als auch die Fassadenmaterialien passte Wilford der Umgebung an und ging doch spielerisch und humorvoll mit diesen Vorgaben um. Die rustizierte Sandsteinfassade in scheinbarer Massivbauweise öffnet sich wie die leckgeschlagene Bordwand eines Supertankers, aus dessen Bauch bunt gefärbte Raumkuben in den Straßenraum ragen. Hinter der Steintapete wird die Stahlskelettkonstruktion in einem Spiel aus Massivität und Transparenz bewusst inszeniert. Der Entwurf verhält sich nach der Ansicht Elmenhorsts wie eine domestizierte Postmoderne, „die sich nicht mehr innovativ gibt, sondern zu einem Zeitpunkt, zu dem dieser Baustil schon nicht mehr aktuell war, retrospektiv auf die Anfänge der postmodernen Architektur verweist“ (S. 207). Auch hier verschwinden nationale Bezüge zugunsten eines Interpretationsangebots.

Allen drei Botschaftsbauten gemein ist eine „deutlich von lokalen Bautraditionen geprägte, vermeintlich nationale Identität“ (S. 216). Mehr scheinen die Bauherren mit ihren Botschaften nicht vermitteln zu wollen. „Diese Offenheit mag auch ein Ausdruck dafür sein, daß nationale Identitäten nach den heute herrschenden Auffassungen weitgehend unbestimmt sind, zumindest nicht eindeutig sind, und einer ständigen Veränderung und Konstruktion unterworfen sind“ (S. 216). So bleibt am Ende lediglich die klassische Flagge als nationales Element übrig. „Dabei macht der Einsatz der Nationalflagge als letzter und entscheidender Akzent eine Dimension

dieser Lesbarkeit sichtbar und vorherrschend. Fehlen die Flagge und mit ihr die nationalen Hoheitszeichen, so bleibt die Mehrdeutigkeit erhalten“ (S. 217).

Ein kleines Manko dieser Arbeit ist die geringe Zahl an Abbildungen, die auch durch die manchmal ein wenig zu lang geratenen Baubeschreibungen nicht kompensiert werden können. Die enthaltenen Abbildungen fallen zudem recht klein aus, Details sind Mangelware und fehlen genau dort, wo von ihnen die Rede ist. Die konkrete Beantwortung der Frage „Kann man national bauen?“ bleibt Elmenhorst schuldig. Die Frage spiegelt aber auch nicht den Kern seiner Untersuchung wider. Vielmehr zeigen die vorgestellten Beispiele aktueller Botschaftsbauten Strategien nationaler Selbstdarstellung durch zeitgenössische Architekten, die ihren Bauten den vom Bauherrn gewünschten Bezugsrahmen verleihen. Doch erst „der Kontext ihrer Benutzung, ihre Funktion als Botschaften kodiert diese Bauten national. Ohne diesen Kontext verlieren sie ihren scheinbar nationalen Charakter“ (S. 219). Sollte also dereinst die Flagge an der britischen Botschaft in Berlin eingeholt werden, so darf spekuliert werden, ob dort demnächst irgendein Unternehmen des Dienstleistungssektors einzieht.

Anmerkung:

- 1 J. Thaurer, Bericht aus Bonn, in: Süddeutsche Zeitung Magazin, Nr. 18, 4. Mai 2012, S. 38–42.

Stephen Mosley, *The Environment in World History (= Themes in World History Series)*, London: Routledge, 2010, 123 S.

Reviewed by
Anthony N. Penna, Boston

This is a cogently written and succinct introduction to the field and a welcome addition to the growing literature of the impact of modern humans on the environment. The book's contribution to environmental history lies in its ability to condense a sampling of the existing literature into a short volume with 117 pages of text. It excels as a primer for newcomers to the field including interested citizens, college students and faculty committed to adding courses on global environmental history to the curriculum. It contains six chapters with the following titles: Introduction: environment and history, The world hunt, Forests and forestry, Soils and irrigation, Cities and the environment, Conclusion: beyond the limits.

Mosley begins by describing the origins of the field, differentiating it from other more narrowly defined disciplines and providing a concise and informative survey of many “main themes in world-environmental history-deforestation, species loss, soil erosion and pollution of air, land and water- using case studies.” (p. 4). Although the order of these themes is not followed precisely in the chapters that follow, the thoroughness with which Mosley addresses each remains one of the volume's more appealing contri-

butions. In addition, Mosley argues, “one of the most challenging things about environmental history is its interdisciplinarity,” (p. 2), noting that it gives historians an opportunity “to rethink systems of periodisation,” (p. 4).

The world hunt describes human exploitation of species during the last 500 years. Although a familiar narrative to environmental historians, its vivid retelling describes an “epic circumpolar quest for fur,” (p. 17), in which one species, the beaver population, fell precipitously from an estimated 50 million in pre-contact North America to about 100,000 in the early twentieth century. As Mosley points out, the modern world “still teems with life, [but] it is much less exotic and diverse,” (p. 13). With the near collapse of “charismatic megafauna,” such as bison and wolves, and an equally charismatic aquatic life with the global slaughter of whales in past centuries, “the world hunt” became emblematic of the ecological transformation of earthly space. Livestock, cattle and sheep primarily, domesticated these traditionally wild eco-niches.

In the next 25 pages, Mosley describes the many economic, cultural, technological and natural forces that triggered the depletion of the world’s forests. Agricultural expansion, urban development, and needs for building materials and fuel became symbolic of a modern world economy. Here Mosley’s carefully constructed narrative crosses national and imperial boundaries. Industrial expansion in England, Germany, Japan and the United States swallowed primal forests. During its incipient years of industrial development beginning in 1810, the USA consumed about two million tons of wood, the equivalent of one

thousand square miles, to produce 49,000 tons of pig iron. This onslaught continued into the last century and by 2005 “some 40 percent of the world’s forests have been lost.” (p. 31).

Importantly, Mosley avoids the trap of retelling a well-worn declensionist narrative of the world’s woodlands. As he points out, about two billion people depend on trees for wood and its fruits and nuts. Despite a near quadrupling of the earth’s population in the last century, regrowth now exceeds cutting, a measure of the success of a worldwide initiative of forest conservation and the establishment of forest reserves and parklands.

In Soils and irrigation, chapter 4, Mosley focuses on the worldwide agricultural expansion of settler societies in the fifteenth century and the mechanization of food production in the second half of the twentieth century. Soil composition and erosion serve as global organizing concepts. Mosley defines their centrality best in the following way. “Soils (the pedosphere) are in contact with the gases of the atmosphere, the groundwater of the hydrosphere and the minerals of the lithosphere, linking them together ‘in one body’ and supporting every form of life on earth (the biosphere).” (p. 58).

Centuries of ploughing up the land, repeated cropping, and poor grazing practices by expanding settler societies eroded and exhausted the soil. Plantation agriculture accelerated the depletion of the soil’s nutrients by cultivating the “soft drugs,” sugar, tea, coffee, chocolate and tobacco that quickly became globally traded commodities.

As Mosley points out, however, soil management in the last century meant “the

large scale ‘chemicalisation’ of agriculture, particularly the use of nitrogen-based fertilizers.” (p.74). As many ecologists and soil scientists have suggested, Mosley questions the safety of this short-term solution to the world’s food needs. Like them, he notes that artificial fertilizers disrupt the soil’s microbial activity that supports life in the biosphere. However, renewed appeals for sustainable agricultural land management, less dependent on fossil fuel energy for farming may remain a distant goal.

Chapter 5, “Cities and the environment,” examines many of the social and health related consequences of the world’s increasingly urban and industrial growth. Beginning with ancient Rome and bringing urban history up to the present, urban energy flows produced goods initially for local and regional consumption and later for a global marketplace leaving a residual of polluted land, water and air. Despite legislative initiatives to reduce our ecological footprint, Mosley’s narrative suggests that our policies fail to acknowledge the human costs related to urban-industrial development. With China now burning two billion tons of coal annually, a tonnage that will undoubtedly grow as more millions of Chinese move to its 120 million person cities, a “technical fix” to constrain global pollution seems improbable.

In a brief three-page conclusion, Mosley asserts that environmental history teaches us about the relationship between social inequality and ecological degradation. One could also argue that the more compelling message from reading “The Environment in World History” is that for most of human history, we exploited the natural world but left a delicate footprint. The fossil fuel revolution and the four-fold population increase in the last century, however, changed our relationship with the planet and turned us truly into the “rogue species” that J. R. McNeill described in “Something New under the Sun: An Environmental History of the Twentieth Century”. For centuries, the West benefited the most from its exploitative behavior. Now others, including China, India, Brazil with more countries to follow will exhibit a pattern of behavior developed in the West. As with many of the volumes in this series “Themes in World History” edited by Peter N. Stearns, this one will undoubtedly become an important contribution to the field of world environmental history. Brevity and clarity with a broad historical perspective make this book a valuable addition to a relatively new and vibrant field of study.

2012

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