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# **National and Regional Belonging in Twentieth-Century East Asia**

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**Herausgegeben von  
Stefan Hübner und Torsten Weber**



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# Introduction: National and Regional Belonging in Twentieth-Century East Asia

Stefan Hübner / Torsten Weber

## RESÜMEE

Die Konzepte von Nation und *belonging* sind entscheidend, um die Geschichte Ostasiens im zwanzigsten Jahrhundert als Periode der Entstehung von Nationen und der Neuverhandlung von Zugehörigkeitsgefühlen zu verstehen. Diskursive Verbindungen zwischen beiden Konzepten können mindestens bis ins neunzehnte Jahrhundert zurückverfolgt werden. Begegnungen mit dem westlichen „Anderen“ seit dieser Zeit hatten einen wichtigen Einfluss auf Vorstellungen und Formierungen von Nationalstaaten in Ostasien. Während der Aufstieg des Nationalismus eigentlich nationale Abgrenzung von Nachbarn suggeriert, vereinigten Anti-Kolonialismus und Anti-Imperialismus eine wachsende Zahl von Asiaten im Kampf für Gleichheit und Selbstbestimmung. Dieser Kampf beeinflusste nicht nur die Zwischenkriegszeit, sondern charakterisierte auch die Epoche der Dekolonisation nach 1945. Dementsprechend diente vielen asiatischen Akteuren nicht nur die Nation, sondern auch die supranationale Region als Referenzpunkt für die Ausbildung eines Zugehörigkeitsgefühls. Dieses basierte oft auf kulturellen Elementen wie Religion, Sprache, Werten und Abstammungsmythen. Zahlreiche räumliche Vorstellungen von Kommonalität trugen dementsprechend zur gleichzeitigen Ausbreitung von Nationalismus und Regionalismus bei. Dieser Artikel vermittelt einen Überblick über die Bedeutung der Konzepte von Nation und *belonging* für die Geschichte Ostasiens im zwanzigsten Jahrhundert und diskutiert theoretische Ansätze, die zum Verständnis des Zusammenhangs der Konzepte dienen. Abschließend stellt er die fünf Fallstudien dieser Ausgabe vor.

The emergence and dispersion of ideas of belonging<sup>1</sup> to a distinct ethnic or civic entity and the pursuit of their realization as nationalism in various parts of twentieth-century East Asia<sup>2</sup> is the result of a complex process of interacting phenomena. Anthony Reid in his work on the dissolution of the European colonial empires in Southeast Asia in the mid-twentieth century differentiates three types of East Asian nationalisms<sup>3</sup>, which can be described as political assertions of belonging to a certain nation: *Ethnie nationalism*, which is based on myths of common descent; *state nationalism*, which relies on state-promoted education, ritual and media; and *anti-imperialist nationalism*, which he deems the most important type and which emerged as a result of the power asymmetry between colonizers and colonized (and after decolonization often turned into state nationalism).<sup>4</sup> This new reference of belonging, that of the nation, was fostered by the confrontation with the Western ‘Other’ in the wake of the rapid European and American territorial expansion in the nineteenth century, and triggered important debates about the conflicting or complementary nature of different forms of belonging.

East Asian reactions to these encounters with Western practices and discourses were manifold. Japan, for instance, following the ‘Meiji Restoration’ (1868) implemented rapid processes of ‘modernization’ and of national integration and standardization, ideologically centred on the Emperor as the spiritual head of the Japanese nation. Based on Japan’s ‘successful’ escape from colonization and on its military victories, the nation state could be relatively easily propagated as the key reference point of belonging. In contrast, many East Asian countries descended to the status of colonies or semi-colonies and saw their nation-building efforts hampered by near-complete coordination under imperial structures (Korea, Taiwan, Southeast Asia) and by internal separatism (China, Eastern Siberia). As a result, processes of nation-building were interrupted or delayed and “the dream of [national] belonging”<sup>5</sup> became an important driving force of political discourse and activity. Other countries, such as the Philippines, experienced a change in terms of the colonial master and encountered increased pressure on territories that had previously remained relatively autonomous. As a consequence, the formation of anti-colonial and

1 We have chosen to privilege the term ‘belonging’ over ‘identity’, although we acknowledge the partially interchangeable character of both terms. In this article we understand ‘belonging’ as connoting two characteristics: first, it refers to the sense of belonging to a certain group and less to the effects this may have on one’s identity. We therefore suggest that there is a notable difference between belonging (to a group), in the sense of “this is where I belong” and identity. Second, we interpret ‘belonging’ as conveying a stronger sense of self-asserted (as opposed to assigned) features. For a critical discussion of the use and abuse of the concept ‘identity’ see Frederick Cooper, *Colonialism in Question: Theory, Knowledge, History* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2005), 59–90.

2 In this article and volume we define East Asia as consisting of Northeast Asia (roughly coinciding with the territory covered today by the two Koreas, Japan, Taiwan, the People’s Republic of China, Mongolia and Eastern Siberia) and Southeast Asia (roughly covering the territory represented by the ASEAN nations today).

3 In fact, Anthony Reid adds a fourth type which he calls ‘outrage at state humiliation’. This type, however, resembles anti-imperialist nationalism so closely that we propose not to discriminate between the two. See: Anthony Reid, *Imperial Alchemy. Nationalism and Political Identity in Southeast Asia* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 10–11.

4 Reid, *Imperial Alchemy*, 5–11.

5 Ibid., 5.

anti-imperialist movements heavily contributed to the emergence of nationalism as an (initially mostly urban-based) mass phenomenon.

The First World War and its aftermath are often considered a catalyst of these movements. During the ‘Wilsonian Moment’ between late autumn 1918 and spring 1919, many intellectuals from East Asia and other parts of the world expected an end to colonialism, in line with US President Woodrow Wilson’s promotion of the right of self-determination. However, the Euro-centric and self-serving interpretation of self-determination at the Paris Peace Conference eventually disappointed Asian hopes. Large-scale anti-imperialist demonstrations like the May Fourth Movement in China or the March First Movement in Korea (both 1919) brought together people from various layers of society and of different religions and ethnicities, uniting them – as quasi-apostles of the nation – in protest.<sup>6</sup> In this way, the nation became the promise of a better and self-determined future where people would enjoy equal rights without legal discrimination. The transnational spread of the communist promise of anti-imperialism and the equality of all human beings, gaining in importance after the Bolshevik victory in the Russian Civil War (1917–1922), further contributed to deliberations on self-determination and national integration.<sup>7</sup> This promise was eventually realized through decolonization after the Second World War, although this process, too, against the background of the Cold War, led directly and indirectly to many new ‘intra-national’ conflicts, some of which have not been solved to this date (Taiwan-PR China, North Korea-South Korea, as well as separatist movements in the Philippines, the PR China, etc.). The relation between nation and belonging is therefore particularly instable in places where the colonial experience has left deep scars; that is, in most parts of East Asia.<sup>8</sup>

The historical connectedness of East Asian peoples under the influence of the Sinocentric tributary system, together with shared historical experiences of encounters with the West, also produced a different sense of belonging that complicates the role of the nation

6 See for example: Erez Manela, *The Wilsonian Moment. Self-Determination and the International Origins of Anti-colonial Nationalism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007); Benedict R. Anderson, *The Spectre of Comparisons. Nationalism, Southeast Asia, and the World* (London: Verso, 1998); Cemil Aydin, *The Politics of Anti-Westernism in Asia: Visions of World Order in Pan-Islamic and Pan-Asian Thought* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), chapter 5–6. On anti-colonial nationalism in the Philippines aimed against Spanish rule, and its global connections, see: Benedict R. Anderson, *Under three Flags. Anarchy and the Anti-Colonial Imagination* (London: Verso, 1998).

7 See for example: Aydin, *The Politics*, chapter 6; John Riddell (ed.), *To See the Dawn: Baku, 1920 – First Congress of the Peoples of the East* (New York: Pathfinder, 1993). On China see for example: Elizabeth J. Perry, *Patrolling the Revolution. Worker Militias, Citizenship, and the Modern Chinese State* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006), especially chapters 1–3; Elizabeth J. Perry, *Anyuan: Mining China’s Revolutionary Tradition* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2012), especially chapters 1–5.

8 See for example: Karl Hack, “Decolonization and Violence in Southeast Asia. Crisis in Identity and Authority,” in: Els Bogaerts and Remco Raben (eds.), *Beyond Empire and Nation. The Decolonization of African and Asian Societies, 1930s–1960s* (Leiden: KITLV Press, 2012), 137–166; Martin Shipway, *Decolonization and Its Impact. A Comparative Approach to the End of Colonial Empires* (Malden: Blackwell, 2008), chapters 1–4; Clive J. Cristie, *A Modern History of Southeast Asia. Decolonization, Nationalism and Separatism* (London: Tauris Academic Studies, 1996); Gungwu Wang (ed.), *Nation-Building. Five Southeast Asian Histories* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2005); Reid, *Imperial Alchemy*; Anderson, *The Spectre*.



and of nationalism. Pan-Asianism or Asianism, which may be defined as “perceptions and processes that focus on similarities or common interests between Asian regions, draw on common historical roots and traditions or consider integration as a politico-cultural vision”<sup>9</sup>, has mostly expressed itself as political or cultural anti-Westernism, as Cemil Aydin has shown.<sup>10</sup> However, as Asian actors often transcended national borders, forged friendships with other Asians, and engaged in transnational cultural, economic, and political activities, Asianism also displayed a positive and self-affirmative dimension whose main rationale was not always anti-Western. Instead, it could be directed at traditional structures within Asian societies that obstructed reform along the lines of democracy, liberty, and equality.<sup>11</sup> In this way, Asianism’s ‘Asia’ could serve as a regionalist proxy for the nation whose realization had – for whatever reasons – to be delayed. This potential of ‘Asia’ to appeal to different aspects of commonality (cultural, ethnic, anti-Western etc.) was later exploited by the Japanese government and military in the course of their imperialist expansion and the proclamation of a ‘Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere’.<sup>12</sup> The creation of *dependent* nation-states (or ‘puppet states’) such as Manchukuo, established by the Japanese army in 1932, can be seen as an adaption to the ‘problem’ of increasing resistance to traditional forms of imperialism and colonialism.<sup>13</sup> As Prasenjit Duara writes, such “national imperialisms” strove to develop regional bloc formations which “promoted economic autarky as a means for the imperial power to gain global supremacy or advantage”.<sup>14</sup> Of course, these projects could not substitute the nation as a desired place of belonging, but rather infused the national idea with even more vigour. Eventually, “the national interests of the imperial power” caused the disintegration of the region; it became “an unsustainable region”.<sup>15</sup> Only after the end of the Second World War could Asianist concepts of regional belonging find a different trajectory of power, resulting, for example, in the comparatively more egalitarian Afro-Asianism that characterized the 1955 ‘Asia-Africa Conference’ in Bandung.<sup>16</sup>

9 Marc Frey and Nicola Spakowski, “Einleitung: Asianismen seit dem 19. Jahrhundert. ‘Asien’ als Gegenstand nationaler und transnationalen Diskurse und Praktiken,” *Comparativ* 18, no. 6 (2008), 7–15, here: 8. For an overview of different Asianist conceptions see also: Sven Saaler and Christopher W. A. Szpilman (eds.), *Pan-Asianism. A Documentary History*, 2 Vols. (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2011), especially “Introduction”.

10 Aydin, *The Politics*, especially chapters 4, 5, 7.

11 See: Saaler and Szpilman, *Pan-Asianism*, Vol. 1, Part III.

12 See for example: Aydin, *The Politics*, chapter 7; Eri Hotta, *Pan-Asianism and Japan’s War 1931–1945* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007). See also the relevant articles in: Saaler and Szpilman, *Pan-Asianism*.

13 See: Prasenjit Duara, *The Global and Regional in China’s Nation-Formation* (London and New York: Routledge, 2009), especially chapter 2.

14 See: Prasenjit Duara, “Asia Redux: Conceptualizing a Region for Our Times,” *Journal of Asian Studies*, 69, no. 4 (2010), 963–983, here: 966.

15 Duara, “Asia Redux”, 968.

16 See for example: Christopher J. Lee (ed.), *Making a World after Empire. The Bandung Moment and its Political Afterlives* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2010); See Seng Tan and Amitav Acharya (eds.), *Bandung Revisited: The Legacy of the 1955 Asian-African Conference for International Order* (Singapore: NUS Press, 2008); Sinderpal Singh, “From Delhi to Bandung: Nehru, ‘Indian-ness’ and ‘Pan-Asian-ness,’” *South Asia* 34, no. 1 (2011): 51–64. See also the relevant articles in Saaler and Szpilman, *Pan-Asianism*.

## Methods and Theories

For a couple of years now, international history and more recent methodological approaches like transnational and global history have strongly influenced research on the nation, including its limits and its relation to supranational entities such as, for example, the region and the global.<sup>17</sup> The spatial turn in the humanities further contributed to this development, focusing attention on entanglements and demarcations, and putting maps and other means of representing or constructing spaces at the centre of analysis.<sup>18</sup> At the same time, historical research has been shaped and guided by several other cultural turns, such as the performative turn, which draws attention to the staging, for example, of the nation. This staging includes symbols, architecture, and many other components serving to (non-verbally) communicate certain messages to the public and to create or support certain sentiments of belonging. Thereby, a certain past can be referenced or a vision of the future shown.<sup>19</sup>

In the remainder of this article we will discuss and connect some of the different approaches that appear particularly useful for studying the relation between nation and belonging in modern East Asia. This overview will provide the theoretical and methodological framework for the five case studies in this special issue, which we will introduce at the end of this article.

Having already briefly reviewed the impact of colonialism on the nation and on belonging in modern East Asia, it is only logical to follow Anthony Reid's claim that anti-imperialist nationalism can be considered the most important form of nationalism in East Asia. Nevertheless, we believe that ethnic nationalism and state nationalism, to use Anthony Reid's concepts, were also important, since these forms provided many of the ethnic and cultural elements that could be – and were in fact – used to create both national and supranational (East Asian) sentiments of belonging. Ethno-symbolism, an approach to studying the nation proposed by Anthony D. Smith that has strongly influenced Anthony Reid's typology of nationalism, is very useful for explaining nationalism based on the state, the monarchy and on myths, and acknowledges the significance of

17 For new approaches to international history see: Patrick Finney (ed.), *Palgrave Advances in International History* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005); Jessica Gienow-Hecht and Frank Schumacher (eds.), *Culture and International History* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2003). On transnational and global history see for example: Akira Iriye, *Global and Transnational History. The Past, Present, and Future* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013); Dominic Sachsenmaier, "Global History, Version 1.0," *Docupedia-Zeitgeschichte*, 14 August 2012, [http://docupedia.de/docupedia/images/6/66/Global\\_History.pdf](http://docupedia.de/docupedia/images/6/66/Global_History.pdf) (accessed: 17 August 2012); Sebastian Conrad and Andreas Eckert, "Globalgeschichte, Globalisierung, multiple Modernen: Zur Geschichtsschreibung der modernen Welt," in: Sebastian Conrad, Andreas Eckert and Ulrike Freitag (eds.), *Globalgeschichte. Theorien, Ansätze, Themen* (Frankfurt am Main: Campus Verlag, 2007), 7–49.

18 See for example: Matthias Middell and Katja Naumann, "Global History and the Spatial Turn: From the Impact of Area Studies to the Study of Critical Junctures of Globalization," *Journal of Global History* 5, no. 1 (2010): 149–170; Barney Warf and Santa Arias (eds.), *The Spatial Turn. Interdisciplinary Perspectives* (Routledge: London, 2009); Doris Bachmann-Medick, *Cultural Turns. Neuorientierungen in den Kulturwissenschaften*. Fourth Edition (Reinbek: Rowohlt Taschenbuch Verlag, 2010), chapter 6.

19 On the new turns see: Bachmann-Medick, *Cultural Turns*, especially chapter 2 (on the performative turn).

the performative turn for nationalism studies. Regarding the practical usage of official or semi-official nationalisms Anthony Smith stated: "There is no greater effect on the collectivity of members than that created by moving ceremonies, reiterated rituals, striking political symbols and the music and imagery of choreographed mass gatherings, especially when these are linked to the ideology of the nation; nor is there any more powerful means of binding the members of the community, and separating them from outsiders."<sup>20</sup> Sporting events, public trials, or any form of mass communication, insofar as they emphasize messages of collective belonging and group ideology, may be examples of such nationalism (including subnational regionalist micro-nationalism and supranational regionalist macro-nationalism<sup>21</sup>) in practice.

Ethno-symbolism strongly focuses on the *mythomoteurs* (cultural elements) of certain *ethnies* (ethnic communities), who constitute a nation. Among such cultural elements are languages, religions, values, laws, myths of ancestry or election, memories of 'Golden Ages', heroes and saints, architecture, dances, music and dress. Cultural elements are deemed particularly important because they play a vital role in shaping social structures and cultures. Distinctive symbolic repertoires serve, for example, to differentiate a specific community from other analogous communities. Cultural elements also help to ensure a sense of continuity with past generations of the community. As a result, the cultural elements of the dominant ethnic community in a population often seem to have been selected by elites in their nation-building efforts. A shift in power relations, therefore, can be – and often is – accompanied by a reselection of cultural elements. Hence, the working definition which Anthony Smith provides for 'nation' is: "a named and self-defining human community whose members cultivate shared memories, symbols, myths, traditions and values, inhabit and are attached to historic territories or 'homelands', create and disseminate a distinctive public culture, and observe shared customs and standardised laws".<sup>22</sup> It is obvious that in many parts of East Asia where peoples did not have the power to organize self-defined communities for a long time and where territories were subjected to massive changes of population and borders the above-outlined processes of nation formation were extremely complicated.

The impact of the change in power relations within a nation is particularly interesting. Colonialism and decolonization can both be considered to have had a strong impact on the choice of cultural elements that served to constitute the nation. Arguably, ethno-symbolism can also be used to explain the creation of macro-national feelings of belonging, especially when regionalist activities reach the level of organized and insti-

20 Anthony D. Smith, *Ethno-Symbolism and Nationalism: A Cultural Approach* (London: Routledge, 2009), 51-52. Further literature on ethno-symbolism can be found there.

21 For the definition of regionalisms as micro- and macro-nationalisms, including the argument that the dynamics of nationalism resemble those of regionalisms, see: Louis L. Snyder, *Macro-Nationalisms. A History of the Pan-Movements* (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1984), 3-5. Louis Snyder uses the term mini-nationalism for micro-nationalism.

22 Smith, *Ethno-Symbolism*, 29.

tutionalized cooperation.<sup>23</sup> A region can be constituted in a similar way by using those cultural elements that are common to several nations, or by modifying and 'reinventing' the cultural elements of a nation in such a way as to facilitate a connection with the cultural elements of other nations, thus increasing the potential for regional integration. Cultural unity, historical interconnectedness, racial kinship, values and spirituality, and a common destiny were among the cultural elements pan-Asianists advocated to construct Asia as a supranational, regional entity.<sup>24</sup> Ethno-symbolism is therefore useful not only as an approach to studying mechanisms of nationalism in Asia, but also for examining certain types of pan-movements before, during, and after the Second World War.

Imagining space is another important factor in constituting nations as well as in national and supranational notions of belonging. There are certainly strong connections between the spatial and performative approaches to studying the nation if one focuses on content, since cultural elements are identified with a certain geographical entity or 'homeland' (and, possibly, a diaspora). Research on the imagination of space nevertheless also serves to explain how ideas of belonging emerged and spread in the first place. Benedict Anderson in his seminal study on 'imagined communities', as well as in some of his later works, described the spread of nationalism in Europe not primarily as the outcome of deliberate inventions of commonality, but as the result of the anonymous forces of 'print-capitalism'. The increase in mass media, such as vernacular language newspapers that covered a certain area, increased consumption of news and contributed to the readers' imagining of themselves as members of a certain community, even though they never had met (and would never be able to meet) every member of this community.<sup>25</sup> The point here is not to debate whether the spread of nationalism in East Asia was the outcome of 'print-capitalism' or of deliberate attempts by elites, since these also needed to use mass media, including newspapers, maps and textbooks, to reach the people. Nor are we concerned about the question of which cultural elements (languages or symbols, for instance) have had a greater impact. The important point is the change in spatial thinking created by the

23 When explaining different regionalisms in Asia, Amitav Acharya describes regions not only as material constructs, but also as ideational ones, which are not given or fixed, but are socially constructed and can rise and decline just like nations. Regionalism thus describes the deliberate forging of a common regional identity. See: Amitav Acharya, "Asia Is Not One," *Journal of Asian Studies* 69, no. 4 (2010): 1001-1013, here: 1001-1002. To describe the degree of regional integration, Marc Frey provides a typology that at the first level only sees an identifiable geographical form. On a second level, multiple relations between individuals and communities are added, while on a third level organized and institutionalized co-operation in fields like culture, economy, politics or strategy exist. Finally, a fourth level is characterized by the emergence of a civil society and the establishment of institutions with independent actor capabilities. See: Marc Frey, "Concepts of Region in International History," in: Marc Frey, Lothar Hönnighausen, John Peacock and Niklaus Steiner (eds.), *Regionalism in the Age of Globalism*. Vol. 1: *Concepts of Regionalism* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2005), 15-26, here: 24-25.

24 Sven Saaler and Christopher W. A. Szpilman, "Introduction. The Emergence of Pan-Asianism as an Ideal of Asian Identity and Solidarity, 1850-2008," in: Saaler and Szpilman (eds.), *Pan-Asianism*, Vol. 1, 1-41, here: 2, 34-35.

25 Benedict R. Anderson, *Imagined Communities. Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. Revised Edition (London: Verso, 2006). In addition to newspapers, Benedict Anderson also named other media such as maps and museums, which are based on print-capitalism, as the reason for imagining communities. For some comparisons between events in the West and in Southeast Asia see also: Anderson, *The Spectre*; Anderson, *Under three Flags*.

maps and other geographical displays used and reproduced in an increasing number of copies of newspapers and school textbooks. These maps and other geographical displays very often shifted their focus from showing a mythological or cosmic order based on a religious worldview to national and other (secular) forms of borders. Producing maps that only provided national borders thereby especially contributed to the imagining of a national community linked to a certain territory.<sup>26</sup> It should be obvious that the production of different maps, which focused on confession, ethnicity, 'mere' geography and other categories, could serve to create different feelings of community independent from and possibly surpassing the nation.

In conclusion, the public performance of cultural elements such as symbols, values, religion, language, and law had an important impact on constituting feelings of belonging to a nation or to a supranational entity. Many of these elements were already available and practiced in East Asia, such as dynastic mythology, collective names, or myths of descent.<sup>27</sup> However, direct encounters with a hegemonic West necessitated new considerations of political, cultural, and ethnic organization and affiliation that would to a large extent draw on ethno-symbolism as defined by Anthony Smith. While acknowledging the importance of material preconditions, we propose – following him – that studying the “constituent symbolic resources” of communities and their diverging representations facilitates entry into “the ‘inner world’ of the participants and understand[ing of] their perceptions and visions”<sup>28</sup> regarding the nation, sentiments of belonging, and their intertwined character in twentieth century East Asia.

## The Case Studies

The following articles reflect the above outlined theoretical considerations of conflicting ideas of nation and belonging in different case studies. They cover the entire modern (and post-modern) era from the mid-nineteenth century to the early twenty-first century, with temporal foci on the First World War and the Russian Civil War (Sablin), the Second World War (Weber) and its immediate aftermath (Lawson), the early 1960s (Shuman) and 1964 (Smith). Their spatial radius is equally wide in order to include transnational linkages that span much of the globe, focussing on the Russian-Mongolian Baikal region (Sablin), China (Shuman, Weber), Japan (Smith, Weber), and the Philippines (Lawson).

Using the concept of “relational space” with a focus on Eastern Siberia, Ivan Sablin discusses different ways of how feelings of common territorial belonging came into existence in this area. They were based on various geographical, ethnic, social and religious categories which were produced and reinforced through communication that

26 Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, chapter 10.

27 See Reid, *Imperial Alchemy*, 6-7.

28 Smith, *Ethno-Symbolism*, 15-16.

encouraged people to relate to each other. But many of these relations had to be imagined in order to make claims about the formation of collectivities plausible. This became especially important when the Russian February and October Revolutions, the Civil War and the ‘Wilsonian Moment’ led various actors in Eastern Siberia to engage in projects of separatism or autonomy. As his three rival cases of integration show, the “key question for most actors was which group would best legitimize delineation and should therefore form the basis for a future autonomous or independent nation”. Because the former territorial boundaries were of only secondary importance, particular ethnic (initially Buryat, later, on a supra-ethnic level, pan-Mongolian) and religious (Buddhist) categories were prominently mobilized, albeit with limited success as the emphasis placed on them also served as a reminder of the actual ethno-cultural heterogeneity of the population. These unsuccessful examples of nation-building attempts suggest that the variety of often conflicting feelings of belonging (as to an ethnicity and a social group), the imperial resistance against separation, and the choice of ‘impractical’ cultural elements such as pacifist Buddhism may, at least partly, be blamed for their failures. Later, both the USSR and the Mongolian People’s Republic used the lessons learnt from these short-lived projects as they – often violently – enforced grander narratives of belonging based solely on ethnicity.

Torsten Weber studies how maps and cartoons as political mass media aimed at conveying messages of national and regional belonging. He particularly focuses on the gaps between the supranational claims of these visual portrayals and their implicit (and sometimes rather explicit) nationalist contents. Weber argues that the “rhetoric of images” [...] has played a key role in the way people have been persuaded to define themselves territorially, to fight for territorial revisions, or to accept given territorializations” since images visualize otherwise abstract dimensions of written political discourse. Even more so than maps, political cartoons “through their simplistic exaggerations and satirical portrayals” function as powerful tools of political communication that often define collectivities according to explicitly noticeable traits, such as race or cultural symbols. Importantly, such portrayals seem to require an outer point of reference or comparison (territory beyond the border on maps, xeno-stereotypical portrayals in cartoons) in order to fully unfold their impact. As the case studies of visual visions of a united Asia during the first half of the twentieth century make clear, however, Asianist messages were often dominated by nationalist agendas. In the discursive battle that accompanied the numerous conflicts and wars between China and Japan from the late nineteenth to the mid-twentieth centuries this meant that Janapo-centric visions of ‘One Asia’ competed with Sinocentric visions. ‘Asia’, more often than not, served only as the territorial screen on which imperial ambitions and self-proclaimed national greatness could be projected.

Konrad Lawson’s case study of the war crimes trials of Filipinos who had collaborated with the Japanese occupation forces during the 1940s points at the particular complexity of the relationship between conceptions of the nation and belonging, on the one hand, and shifting power relations on the other. In a rapidly changing political context of Philippine semi-autonomy, war, Japanese occupation, formal independence, reconquest

by the United States, and (renewed) formal independence (all within less than one decade), sentiments of collective belonging beyond the local level were frequently challenged. Large parts of the Filipino elite had committed treason against the (pre-war) nation by politically or economically collaborating with the Japanese occupation forces, but the “vast majority of accused Filipino traitors were dismissed for lack of evidence and other technicalities” or amnestied by President Manuel Roxas, a member of the Filipino elite, following the post-war achievement of independence. His very broad amnesty, however, excluded Filipinos who had been members of several pro-Japanese organizations and who had engaged in certain criminal activities, mostly extremely violent ones. It is nevertheless almost ironic that the trials for atrocities committed by Filipino collaborators judged their crimes to be treason, that is, betrayal of the (pre-war) nation, instead of war crimes. The Philippine Supreme Court thereby *de facto* (and most likely willingly) reduced the severity of the punishment, by declaring acts such as murder to be expressions of treason. Had, for example, charges of both treason and murder been pursued, the act would have been a ‘complex crime’ and the maximum penalty for the greater crime (treason – therefore a death sentence) imposed. These legal judgments – one could call them tricks – illustrate how cultural elements, in this case law and its interpretation, that constituted and defined the Filipino nation, reflected the change in power relations due to post-war independence. The new interpretation of the law showed a willingness to ignore most crimes of treason committed against the pre-war nation that had been an American colony, if a relatively autonomous one, thereby indirectly delegitimizing it or at least begging the question of whether the Japanese-sponsored Filipino nation during the war had not been more relevant and present than the American one.

Amanda Shuman’s article focuses on sports events as stages of national re-definition and of the re-interpretation of international belonging. Shuman studies how leaders of the young People’s Republic of China tried to use international sports exchanges and events from the late 1950s to establish and position their country internationally. Shuman’s study of the first Games of the New Emerging Forces (GANEFo), held in Jakarta in 1963, demonstrates how sports events served the shifting needs of political agendas. While early PRC leaders had been keen on placing their country alongside the Soviet Union, the eventual deterioration of Sino-Soviet relations required a new narrative of international belonging. As the potential leader of a bloc of non-aligned and newly decolonized nations mostly from Asia and Africa, Chinese politicians made every effort to establish a new geopolitical order and to use the Games as its first stage. As Shuman shows, “GANEFo served to spread propaganda worldwide on the Afro-Asian ideals that conveniently resonated with the Chinese revolutionary model of socialism”. The hosting of the event, which focused heavily on the ‘Bandung spirit’ of Asian-African solidarity (though it was eventually also opened to other ‘progressive’ countries) and – obviously – excluded the Republic of China (Taiwan), sent powerful messages to the international community, but also to the domestic audience: “By challenging the western dominance of international sport through producing their own large sports mega-event, the GANEFo, Chinese leaders stressed their solidarity and identification with other recently



decolonized and third world nations involved in the burgeoning Afro-Asian movement.” New symbols, constituting the idea of belonging to the supranational group of the ‘Newly Emerging Forces’, were created and were supported by further images of international solidarity against ‘American imperialism’. In addition, China could be seen as modern without being Western and as Socialist without being a satellite of the Soviet Union. The Games therefore contributed to a re-definition of the national status and international belonging of China roughly one decade prior to the PRC’s replacement of Taiwan as the sole representative of China in international diplomacy. Although the GANEFO movement quickly disintegrated, it offered a new arena of geopolitical affiliation whose rhetoric has survived to the present day.

Turning to Japan and the first Olympic Games hosted in Asia, Martyn Smith analyzes popular mass media (weekly or monthly women’s journals) to understand how the Tokyo Games of 1964 served as an occasion for the re-negotiation of Japaneseness and Japan’s place in the region and the world. Against the background of the rapid economic growth Japan had experienced from the late 1950s onwards and which would catapult it to the top ranks of the global economy, the Olympics triggered a debate about the potential loss of Japanese cultural uniqueness if it became part of a “global modernity” characterized by a focus on ‘mere’ economic progress and consumption. Smith explains that this debate was far from homogeneous. With a view to the international community, Japan’s capital city was advertised as the “most cosmopolitan city in the world”. Within Japan, the many new symbols of economic progress such as the high-speed monorail linking Tokyo and Haneda Airport and the bullet train running between Osaka and Tokyo affected the idea of the Japanese nation, and distinguished it, for example, from its less industrialized Asian neighbours. However, the years leading up to the Games also produced different critiques of Japanese patterns of cultural, social, and economic behaviour. In particular, the impact the event would have on Japanese mentality (modern vs. traditional), the Japanese sense of belonging (West vs. East vs. Japan), and the outward orientation of the Japanese nation as such (open vs. closed) came under debate. Were the Japanese really ready to face “the foreign visitors, coming from one hundred and ten countries [who] have different languages, customs, laws, history, and traditions”, one observer critically asked as late as a few weeks before the opening ceremony (Furugaki, August 1964). While Smith’s study underlines the importance of looking beyond the official staging of mega events to understand the diverse range of contexts it produces, it also demonstrates how encounters with the foreign shape processes of renegotiation of the national collectivity. On the national level, the actual impact of these encounters which centred on only one host city (Tokyo) may have been marginal. In fact, most Japanese did not meet a single visitor to the Tokyo Games personally. However, the mental and symbolic processes mega events such as the Olympic Games produce through nation-wide media, education, and consumption may influence the sense of belonging to a not inconsiderable degree. As this case of the most homogenous and stable society studied here reminds us, the constant imagining of the nation seems to be an essential part of belonging to it even long after the nation state has been established.



# **Buryat, Mongol and Buddhist: Multiple Identities and Disentanglement Projects in the Baikal Region, 1917–1919**

**Ivan Sablin**

## **RESÜMEE**

Die Baikalregion in Sibirien war lange Zeit ein Gebiet der Interaktionen zwischen europäischen, asiatischen und globalen Akteuren. Geographische Informationssysteme (GIS) dienen hier zur Rekonstruktion und Analyse von Beziehungsräumen, die durch diese Interaktionen entstanden. Zwischen 1917 und 1919, nach dem Fall des Chinesischen und des Russischen Reichs, kam es vermehrt zu Versuchen, die administrativen und internationalen Grenzen in dieser Region neu zu definieren. Unter anderem beteiligten sich lokale Intellektuelle und buddhistische Mönche an diesen Projekten der Entflechtung von Beziehungen. Zu diesen Projekten gehörten die 1917 ausgerufene Autonomie der Burjaten, die buddhistische Theokratie des abtrünnigen Mönchs Lubsan Samdan Tsydenov und die von japanischen Offizieren und dem Kosakenführer Semenov unterstützte pan-mongolische Föderation. Jedes Projekt konstruierte eine eigene Gruppenidentität und entwickelte eigene Beziehungsräume. Dieser Artikel untersucht, wie Konflikte zwischen konkurrierenden Identitäten gelöst wurden und warum letztlich alle drei Projekte scheiterten.

## **Introduction**

The creation of the Buryat-Mongolian Autonomous Socialist Soviet Republic (BMASSR) within the Soviet Union in 1923 and the independent Mongolian People's Republic (MPR) in 1924 was preceded by several disentanglement projects, which suggested the establishment of new boundaries along the remains of the Russian and Qing empires. These projects were developed and partly implemented in the Baikal region in Siberia

between 1917 and 1919, and included the autonomy of the Buryat people, a Mongolic-speaking indigenous people, declared in April 1917; the Pan-Mongolian federation of Inner, Outer, Hulunbuir and Buryat Mongolia proclaimed in February 1919; and the Buddhist theocracy created by Lubsan Samdan Tsydenov the same year. The advocates of the BMASSR and MPR had to consider both the failure of the previous attempts and the identities they sought to articulate. Moreover, many proponents and opponents of the three failed projects actively participated in the interactions behind the creation of the two national republics.

The boundaries of the three projects discussed in this article were not constructed in the geographical space, but in the many relational spaces – spaces formed by various relations between objects (people, places, institutions, etc.).<sup>1</sup> In some of these spaces, social boundaries were imagined and articulated in terms of group identities (e.g., ethnic, religious, occupational) and then projected onto the geographical space suggesting demarcation of territories. The projects developed through power relations<sup>2</sup> and involved particular mobilization framings<sup>3</sup> from global and local discourses.

Entering power relations, actors have to deal with the complex entanglements between and within natural and social environments. Disentanglement is a way of coping with the complexity through categorization and construction of boundaries (be it a list of social groups and categories in a text; an isocline or a contour line on a map; or articulation of a uniform group identity); it is a way of substituting transculturality – the entanglement of meanings – with univocal interpretations of particular space or spaces; it is a way of meaning construction and setting up bases for action.<sup>4</sup>

If entanglement is generally understood as connection, disentanglement can therefore be rendered as disconnection. The motivation for disentanglement lies in the common principle of politics formulated by Caesar as *divide et impera*.<sup>5</sup> Disentanglement – the process of boundary construction – is a struggle against power-challenging connections for establishing a uniform system of interpretation which would make reconfiguration of and domination over relational spaces possible. Although it may be designed against transculturality, in practice disentanglement aims at limiting its dynamics. It is important to realize that transculturality as intersection of meanings is always present when two or more individuals enter an interaction.<sup>6</sup>

1 Roland Wenzlhuemer, "Globalization, Communication and the Concept of Space in Global History," *Historical Social Research* 35, no. 1 (2010): 19–47; Martina Löw, *Raumsoziologie* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2001).

2 Michel Foucault, "The Subject and Power," *Critical Inquiry* 8, no. 4 (1982): 777–795.

3 Patrick M. Regan and Daniel Norton, "Greed, Grievance, and Mobilization in Civil Wars," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 49, no. 3 (2005): 319–336.

4 Denis Wood and John Fels, "The Natures of Maps: Cartographic Constructions of the Natural World," *Cartographica: The International Journal for Geographic Information and Geovisualization* 43, no. 3 (2008): 14.

5 Juliet Fall, "Divide and Rule: Constructing Human Boundaries in 'boundless Nature,'" *GeoJournal* 58, no. 4 (2002): 243–251.

6 See Madeleine Herren, Martin Rüesch, and Christiane Sibille, *Transcultural History: Theories, Methods, Sources* (Heidelberg: Springer, 2012) for more information on the concept of transculturality.

In order to rally support for their disentanglement projects, actors need to present their arguments<sup>7</sup> in a way understandable for their recipients. In this article, the process and transitory result of formulating and defining abstract ideas about social and natural phenomena is rendered as discursive framing. Although framings as notions<sup>8</sup> are deeply embedded into particular contexts, the actors which produce these contexts do not necessarily share their understandings: different phenomena may be included into a single discursive framing, whereas a single phenomenon may be framed in a variety of different ways. In this sense discursive framing is an illusion of sharing an interpretation. Discursive framings are thereby different from discursive frames or frameworks – larger structures which may be constructed by elites and dominate particular contexts.<sup>9</sup> Even though in a historical and geographical context there may indeed be such dominant structure<sup>10</sup>, the framings used by actors do not have to either originate from it or support it.

When constructing his, her or its own discursive framework an actor may easily use framings which belong to competing or contradicting structures – existing global or regional discourses or discursive trends – and adjust them for local public and particular purposes. In the early twentieth centuries such major global discursive trends included, for instance, self-determination and anticolonial nationalism<sup>11</sup>; social justice and class struggle; search for new spiritual foundations and religious syncretism; geopolitics and world domination; social evolution and progress. Appadurai describes the spread of discourses in terms of global discursive flows and circulation of forms (with examples of “novel form” and “nation form”).<sup>12</sup> We chose the terms “trends” and “crossings” instead of “circulation” in order to make agency more present here, as discourses are produced, crossed and circulated by actors through interactions (including power relations), but are rarely controlled by a single definable actor.

The Baikal region between 1917 and 1919 is a fruitful case for studying both power relations and discursive crossings. The region’s entangled social environment had been forged through the interactions of many European, Asian and Eurasian actors. Local people exchanged with Asian, European and American settlers, soldiers, missionaries, exiles, monks, scholars, merchants and diplomats who came to the region, and travelled themselves. Migrations, travels and the exchange of goods, values, practices, knowledge and beliefs created a multitude of group identities which coexisted, interacted and con-

7 David A. Snow, “Framing Processes, Ideology, and Discursive Fields,” in *The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements*, ed. David A. Snow, Sarah A. Soule, and Hanspeter Kriesi (Oxford: Blackwell, 2004), 380–412.

8 Lenita Freidenvall, “A Discursive Struggle – the Swedish National Federation of Social Democratic Women and Gender Quotas,” *Nordic Journal of Women’s Studies* 13, no. 3 (2005): 175–186.

9 Alan Deacon and Kirk Mann, “Agency, Modernity and Social Policy,” *Journal of Social Policy* 28, no. 3 (1999): 413–435; Julianne Cheek and Terri Gibson, “The Discursive Construction of the Role of the Nurse in Medication Administration: An Exploration of the Literature,” *Nursing Inquiry* 3, no. 2 (1996): 83–90.

10 Bo Hellgren et al., “How Issues Become (re) Constructed in the Media: Discursive Practices in the AstraZeneca Merger,” *British Journal of Management* 13, no. 2 (2002): 123–140.

11 Erez Manela, *The Wilsonian Moment: Self-determination and the International Origins of Anticolonial Nationalism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).

12 Arjun Appadurai, “How Histories Make Geographies,” *Transcultural Studies* no. 1 (2010): 6, 9–11.

flicted within the regional social environment. With the fall of the Qing (1911–1912) and Russian (1917) empires, global and local interactions in the region became practically unmediated. The Russian Civil War and the Allied Intervention (1917–1922) intensified the existing power entanglements and brought many new actors into play. Besides the various political and military groups formed in Russia and China, they included Japanese, American, Czechoslovak, British, French, Italian, Romanian and Serbian troops.

Each disentanglement project designed and partly implemented in the Baikal region was a product of both, power relations and discursive crossings (the interactions and intermixtures between global and local discourses). Each project emphasized certain group identities, which could legitimize a new international or administrative boundary. Unlike the constructive notion of “state-building”, the destructive understanding of boundary construction as disentanglement underlines the limitations of transculturality it is supposed to introduce and defend. It was this focus on limitation and exclusion which largely contributed to the failure of all three projects.

Cartography is one of the ways people use to mentally disentangle their environments and turn the imagined social borders into geographical ones. Colonialism and evolutionary theories tremendously increased the efforts on mapping human racial, linguistic, religious and other characteristics.<sup>13</sup> The dominant forms of population mappings in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century suggested clear-cut boundaries between categories of opposition – ethnic, religious, economic, etc. – and fostered the discourse of partisanship.<sup>14</sup> Such “scientific” categories were used in framing power claims in the region and period under study.

Maps and other spatially referenced representations of disentanglements (statistics, legislature, etc.) can be integrated into a geographic information system and analyzed jointly.<sup>15</sup> With GIS it is possible to reconstruct and reentangle multidimensional social environments, which was done for the Baikal Region through combining data from maps depicting ethnic and religious divisions, land use, religious institutions, economic activities, communication lines, and textual sources into a four-dimensional system (latitude, longitude, altitude and time). Sharing a critical post-representational perspective on cartography<sup>16</sup>, we would like to foreground the post-representational character of the GIS: we do not reconstruct the world; instead we combine different interpretations of it and propositions how it should be. The ability to combine several perspectives makes

13 Heather Winlow, “Mapping Race and Ethnicity,” ed. Rob Kitchin and Nigel Thrift, *The International Encyclopedia of Human Geography*, vol. 6 (Oxford: Elsevier, 2009), 398–408.

14 Jeremy W. Crampton, “Rethinking Maps and Identity: Choropleths, Clines, and Biopolitics,” in *Rethinking Maps*, ed. Martin Dodge, Rob Kitchin, and Chris Perkins (London: Routledge, 2009), 39.

15 Anne Kelly Knowles, “Introducing Historical GIS,” in *Past Time, Past Place: GIS for History*, ed. Anne Kelly Knowles (Redlands, CA: ESRI Press, 2002), xiii–xv.

16 Jeremy W. Crampton, *The Political Mapping of Cyberspace* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003).

GIS into a valuable tool for global history and transcultural studies in their quest for relationality and multipolar argumentation.<sup>17</sup>

In the first half of the article we deal with the relational spaces of the Baikal region which were reconstructed using cartographic sources. The second half focuses on the efforts to utilize the numerous social boundaries in disentanglement projects and power claims.



Figure 1: The Baikal region and the recognized international boundaries in Asia, 1917<sup>18</sup>

17 Sebastian Conrad and Andreas Eckert, "Globalgeschichte, Globalisierung, Multiple Modernen: Zur Geschichtsschreibung Der Modernen Welt," in *Globalgeschichte: Theorien, Ansätze, Themen*, ed. Sebastian Conrad, Andreas Eckert, and Ulrike Freitag (Frankfurt am Main: Campus Verlag, 2007), 7–49.

18 The Asia North Equidistant Conic Coordinate System was used for the maps in this text. Data source: Pereselenčeskoe upravlenie Glavnogo upravleniâ zemleustrojstva i zemledeliâ i Kartografičeskoe zavedenie tovarišestva A. F. Marks, "Karta Administrativnogo Deleniâ Aziatskoj Rossii [Map of Administrative Divisions of Asian Russia, Map, 1:12,600,000], No. 6," in *Atlas Aziatskoj Rossii [Atlas of Asian Russia]*, ed. G. V. Glinka (Saint Petersburg: Izdanie Pereselenčeskogo upravleniâ Glavnogo upravleniâ zemleustrojstva i zemledeliâ, 1914); W. & A.K. Johnston, "Asia [map, 1:20,967,600]," in *Keith Johnston's General Atlas*, Aug. 1911 (Edinburgh: W. & A.K. Johnston, Limited, 1912), 31.

## The Relational Spaces

From a global historical perspective, the Baikal region in Siberia, just like any other mentally outlined territory, may be treated as a zone of interactions<sup>19</sup> and, therefore, could not have clear-cut boundaries. The analytical outline of the region (Figure 1) includes the territory of two provinces of the Russian Empire (the Irkutsk province and the Transbaikal region). Besides locating the region in the geographical space, Figure 1 also provides some information on its position in political, administrative and communication spaces: prior to 1917 the Baikal region was situated in the Russian Empire, governed by the Irkutsk province and Transbaikal region administrations and connected to several major European and Asian cities via the Trans-Siberian Railway and the telegraph (see Figure 1). The parts of the region, which were not covered by the railway or telegraph, were more remote from Irkutsk and Chita than Saint Petersburg, Harbin or even Paris in the communication space. The speed of communication was especially slow in the mountainous areas and areas without access to navigable rivers, i.e. it depended on the natural environment.

The entanglements between the social and natural environments are even more relevant for spaces formed by resources-oriented economic activities and agriculture. Particular substances become mineral resources when they are interpreted as such by humans and then discovered, extracted and used in the economy. Interpretative interactions, social relations connected to mining and modes of utilization make the spaces of natural resources no less constructed than other relational spaces.

In terms of mineral resources, the Baikal region of the early twentieth century was considered wealthy.<sup>20</sup> Precious metal deposits were the most important objects in this space. Siberia at large was the “treasure chest” of the Russian Empire in terms of gold production, much of which was mined around Baikal. The known and newly discovered reserves lasted well into the Soviet and even post-Soviet periods.<sup>21</sup> Furthermore, the mineral wealth made the region into a major center of penal servitude and exile. Many politically active exiles, including socialists and non-Russian nationalists, lived here in the 1910s and participated in shaping the regional social environments through teaching and otherwise transmitting their ideas to the local population.<sup>22</sup>

Siberia was called the treasure chest not only because of its gold: the so-called “soft gold” – the furs of squirrels, foxes, sables and other animals – had been one of the most

19 William Gervase Clarence-Smith, Kenneth Pomeranz, and Peer Vries, “Editorial,” *Journal of Global History* 1, no. 1 (2006): 1–2.

20 *Pereselenčeskoe upravlenie Glavnogo upravleniâ zemleustrojstva i zemledeliâ and Kartografičeskoe zavedenie tovarišestva A. F. Marks*, “Karta Poleznyh Iskopaemyh Aziatskoj Rossii [Map of Minerals Asian Russia, Map, 1:12,600,000], No. 56,” in *Atlas Aziatskoj Rossii [Atlas of Asian Russia]*, ed. G. V. Glinka (Saint Petersburg: Izdanie Pereselenčeskogo upravleniâ Glavnogo upravleniâ zemleustrojstva i zemledeliâ, 1914).

21 Ivan Sablin and Maria Savelyeva, “Mapping Indigenous Siberia: Spatial Changes and Ethnic Realities, 1900–2010,” *Settler Colonial Studies* 1, no. 1 (2011): 77–110.

22 Š. B. Čimitdoržiev and T. M. Mihajlov, eds., *Vydašiesâ Burâtskie Deâteli [Prominent Buryat Figures]*, vol. 1 (Ulan-Ude: Burâtskoe knižnoe izdatel'stvo, 2009).

significant Russian exports and retained its importance until the 1920s.<sup>23</sup> Hunting furbearing animals was a major occupation in the northern Baikal region. However, for the majority of the people, agriculture was their main economic occupation. The two types of agriculture – crop farming and cattle breeding – formed the most important occupational identities of the Baikal region.<sup>24</sup> These two identities were often defined not only through the predominant occupation, but also through further characteristics of the lifestyle: all crop farmers were sedentary, whereas many cattle breeders pursued a nomadic or semi-nomadic way of life.<sup>25</sup> The latter were continuously marginalized with the arrival of many thousands of sedentary farmers in the early twentieth century.

Both the Irkutsk province and the Transbaikal region barely had any industry in 1917. Only the major cities – Irkutsk (population of 126,700 in 1910), Chita (74,300), Verkhneudinsk (15,200) and several others<sup>26</sup> – had some light industry. The cities of the Baikal region developed and rapidly expanded in the 1900s and 1910s, mainly as trade centers. The demand for imported manufactured products, the booming agriculture and the international trade routes (the Great Tea Route substituted by the Trans-Siberian Railway and the routes to Mongolia) fostered economic exchange.

The usage of the data originating from the settler administration of the Russian Empire is relatively unproblematic when discussing the economic spaces of the Baikal region, as it reflects the knowledge of mineral deposits and provides contemporary economic data. However, when analyzing spaces formed by ethnic and religious interactions and identities, one has to be very cautious: the primary objective of the aforementioned agency was to foster Russian settlement in Siberia. The settler administration's version of the ethnic spaces fully reflected its agenda, showing vast unoccupied areas ready for Russian settlement.<sup>27</sup> The puzzling inconsistency of the polygons on the ethnic maps and the maps

23 James Forsyth, *A History of the Peoples of Siberia: Russia's North Asian Colony, 1581–1990* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 38, 247.

24 Pereselenčeskoe upravlenie Glavnogo upravleniâ zemleustrojstva i zemledeliâ and Kartografičeskoe zavedenie tovarišestva A. F. Marks, "Karta Promyslov Aziatskoj Rossii [Map of Trades of Asian Russia, Map, 1:12,600,000], No. 47," in *Atlas Aziatskoj Rossii* [Atlas of Asian Russia], ed. G. V. Glinka (Saint Petersburg: Izdanie Pereselenčeskogo upravleniâ Glavnogo upravleniâ zemleustrojstva i zemledeliâ, 1914).

25 I. I. Serebrennikov, *Burâty, Ikh Hozâjstvennyj Byt i Zemlepol'zovanie* [Buryats, Their Economic Life and Land Use], ed. N. N. Koz'min (Verkhneudinsk: Burât-mongol'skoe izdatel'stvo, 1925), 16.

26 Pereselenčeskoe upravlenie Glavnogo upravleniâ zemleustrojstva i zemledeliâ and Kartografičeskoe zavedenie tovarišestva A. F. Marks, "Naselennost' Gorodov Aziatskoj Rossii (diagramma) [Population of the Cities of Asian Russia (chart), Map], No. 61," in *Atlas Aziatskoj Rossii* [Atlas of Asian Russia], ed. G. V. Glinka (Saint Petersburg: Izdanie Pereselenčeskogo upravleniâ Glavnogo upravleniâ zemleustrojstva i zemledeliâ, 1914).

27 Pereselenčeskoe upravlenie Glavnogo upravleniâ zemleustrojstva i zemledeliâ and Kartografičeskoe zavedenie tovarišestva A. F. Marks, "Étnografičeskââ Karta Aziatskoj Rossii [Ethnographic Map of Asian Russia, Map, 1:12,600,000], No. 25," in *Atlas Aziatskoj Rossii* [Atlas of Asian Russia], ed. G. V. Glinka (Saint Petersburg: Izdanie Pereselenčeskogo upravleniâ Glavnogo upravleniâ zemleustrojstva i zemledeliâ, 1914).

showing economic activities<sup>28</sup> and especially religions<sup>29</sup> from the same volume suggested that agriculture and rituals were conducted in the areas where nobody lived.

A further challenge every map maker working on Siberian ethnic spaces faced was how to depict nomadic and semi-nomadic ways of life. It was taken up in two different ways. In the northern Irkutsk province the area occupied by the indigenous population showed no major discontinuity, whereas in the Transbaikalian region and in the southern Irkutsk province it was represented by small disconnected polygons. It is no surprise that it was these areas which were potentially suitable for Russian settlement and, therefore, advertised by the settler administration, which was set up for promoting Russian settlement, via the medium of the map.

The contemporary maps even have some value beyond that of being an example of biased cartography: they identify some groups of non-Russian population as “Other Mongols”, suggesting the ethnic kinship between Mongolic-speaking Buryats and the population of Mongolia and demonstrating transboundary settlement patterns.<sup>30</sup> The depiction of ethnic spaces in the same place and practically at the same time published by Soviet ethnographers in 1961 was very different in several aspects.<sup>31</sup> Firstly, it did not show any unoccupied land: the nomadic indigenous groups were mapped through the scope of their economic presence and not permanent dwellings. Secondly, it suggested ethnic homogeneity in particular areas, which may unequivocally be interpreted as a justification of the ethno-territorial boundaries introduced by the Soviet government. Thirdly, it demonstrated a larger ethnic diversity in the area. Finally, it did not hint at the ethnic kinship and transboundary settlement patterns of Mongolic groups: after major shifts in Soviet politics the Buryats could no longer even be called Buryat-Mongols.<sup>32</sup>

28 Pereselenčeskoe upravlenie Glavnogo upravleniâ zemleustrojstva i zemledeliâ and Kartografičeskoe zavedenie tovarišestva A. F. Marks, “Karta Promyslov Aziatskoj Rossii [Map of Trades of Asian Russia, Map, 1:12,600,000], No. 47,” in Atlas Aziatskoj Rossii [Atlas of Asian Russia], ed. G. V. Glinka (Saint Petersburg: Izdanie Pereselenčeskogo upravleniâ Glavnogo upravleniâ zemleustrojstva i zemledeliâ, 1914).

29 Pereselenčeskoe upravlenie Glavnogo upravleniâ zemleustrojstva i zemledeliâ and Kartografičeskoe zavedenie tovarišestva A. F. Marks, “Karta Raspredeleniâ Naseleniâ Aziatskoj Rossii Po Veroispovedaniâm [Map of Distribution of the Population of Asiatic Russia by Religion, Map, 1:12,600,000], No. 27,” in Atlas Aziatskoj Rossii [Atlas of Asian Russia], ed. G. V. Glinka (Saint Petersburg: Izdanie Pereselenčeskogo upravleniâ Glavnogo upravleniâ zemleustrojstva i zemledeliâ, 1914).

30 Pereselenčeskoe upravlenie Glavnogo upravleniâ zemleustrojstva i zemledeliâ and Kartografičeskoe zavedenie tovarišestva A. F. Marks, “Ėtnografičeskââ Karta Aziatskoj Rossii [Ethnographic Map of Asian Russia, Map, 1:12,600,000], No. 25,” in Atlas Aziatskoj Rossii [Atlas of Asian Russia], ed. G. V. Glinka (Saint Petersburg: Izdanie Pereselenčeskogo upravleniâ Glavnogo upravleniâ zemleustrojstva i zemledeliâ, 1914).

31 S. I. Bruk, “Rasselenie Narodov Sibiri v konce XIX i Načale XX V. [Settlement of the Peoples of Siberia in the Late 19th and Early 20th Century, Map],” in Istoriko-ėtnografičeskij Atlas Sibiri [Historical and Ethnographical Atlas of Siberia], ed. M. G. Levin and L. P. Potapov (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Akademii nauk SSSR, 1961).

32 Šandor Ánoš Sili, “Sovetskoe Sibirevedenie v 1930–1960 Gg. i Konceptual'nââ Problema «dobrovol'nogo Vhoždeniâ» Pri- i Zabajkal'â v Sostav Russkogo Gosudarstva v XVII V.: Dejstvie Partijnogo Upravleniâ Istoričeskoj Naukoj v Otnošenii k Regionam SSSR Po Primeru Burâtii v Istoriofaričeskom Rakurse [Soviet Siberian Studies in the 1930–1960 and the Conceptual Problem of ‘Voluntary Accession’ of Baikalia and Transbaikalia to the Russian State in the 17th Century: Party Control over Soviet Regional Historical Science after the Example of Buryatia in the Historiographical Perspective],” in Regional'nye Školy Russkoj Istoriofarii [Regional Schools of Russian Historiography], ed. Svak Dôla (Budapest: Russica Pannonica, 2007), 183–199.



Neither map says anything about the size, density or dynamics of the given ethnic groups or regional population in general. Textual sources published independently from the maps provide the following data: the population of the Baikal region was 1,187,142 in 1897 and 1,618,790 in 1911. Russians and Buryats were an absolute majority. In 1911 there were 588,148 Russians in the Irkutsk province (78.4 percent of the population), whereas the indigenous population (Buryats, Evenks and others) made up 134,363 (17.9 percent). Another 27,489 people (3.7 percent) did not fall into either category. In the Transbaikal region the Russian population was 590,645 (68 percent), the indigenous population was 244,003 (28 percent) and the non-Russian non-indigenous population was 34,142 (4 percent) in 1911. In 1916 the Buryat population of the Baikal region was reported to be 250,097.<sup>33</sup> The questions of how the members of particular ethnic groups were distinguished from each other, how the remote areas were incorporated into the collection of statistical data, to what group children of mixed ethnic origin were ascribed, together with the indications that people could consciously provide false data about their ethnic identity<sup>34</sup>, make these figures problematic. Nevertheless, they still indicate that the indigenous population was a minority in both provinces.

Textual sources provide further divisions of the regional population: the Russians were categorized into “old settlers” and “new settlers”, whereas many Russians, Buryats and Evenks belonged to the Cossacks – a privileged semi-military estate (*soslovie*). There were 250,978 Cossacks (including up to 17,570 absent) in the Transbaikal region in 1917, of which 21,092 were Buryat.<sup>35</sup> Here, contemporary maps were very precise, as the borders between the arable and non-arable lands in many cases correspond to modern satellite data.<sup>36</sup> The categorization of the land into identity categories, however, appears to be problematic. When compared to a map showing land use in 1914 published by the same agency<sup>37</sup>, but made by a different cartographer, one may notice different interpretations of the same lots: there appears to have been confusion as to how to distinguish between the Russian old settlers and the non-Russian indigenous population (“aliens” in contemporary legal terms). A major problem here was the legal inequality of the different

33 P.T. Haptaev, *Oktâbr'skaâ Socialističeskaâ Revolûciâ i Graždanskaâ Vojna v Burâtii* [The October Socialist Revolution and the Civil War in Buryatia] (Ulan-Ude: Burât. kn. izd-vo, 1964), 44–45.

34 State Archive of the Russian Federation, Collection 1701, Inventory 1, File 16, 46.

35 Serebrennikov, *Burâty, ih Hozâjstvennyj Byt i Zemlepol'zovanie* [Buryats, Their Economic Life and Land Use], 39.

36 *Pereselenčeskoe upravlenie Glavnogo upravleniâ zemleustrojstva i zemledeliâ and Kartografičeskoe zavedenie tovarišestva A. F. Marks, “Karta Zabajkal'skoj Oblasti* [Map of the Transbaikal Region, Map, 1:3,360,000], No. 32,” in *Atlas Aziatskoj Rossii* [Atlas of Asian Russia], ed. G. V. Glinka (Saint Petersburg: Izdanie Pereselenčeskogo upravleniâ Glavnogo upravleniâ zemleustrojstva i zemledeliâ, 1914); *Pereselenčeskoe upravlenie Glavnogo upravleniâ zemleustrojstva i zemledeliâ and Kartografičeskoe zavedenie tovarišestva A. F. Marks, “Karta Irkutskoj Gubernii* [Map of the Irkutsk Province, Map, 1:3,360,000], No. 31,” in *Atlas Aziatskoj Rossii* [Atlas of Asian Russia], ed. G. V. Glinka (Saint Petersburg: Izdanie Pereselenčeskogo upravleniâ Glavnogo upravleniâ zemleustrojstva i zemledeliâ, 1914); Google, *Google Earth 7.1*, 2013.

37 [Pereselenčeskoe upravlenie] and Kartografičeskoe zavedenie G. De-Kel's, *Karta Irkutskoj Gubernii* [Map of the Irkutsk Province, Map, 1:1,680,000] (Saint Petersburg: Kartografičeskoe zavedenie G. De-Kel's, 1914).

groups.<sup>38</sup> The Russians had more rights than the indigenous population, whereas the Cossacks had even further privileges.<sup>39</sup>

The ambivalence of identity categories, together with the settlement policies of the Tsarist government – the lands for new settlers were often taken from the indigenous population<sup>40</sup> – caused the land use patterns in the Baikal region to appear striped. This strip holding was by far the most important source of intergroup conflicts in the Baikal region, as most sources indicate. Compulsory takeover of Buryat lands, creation of settlers' lots between Buryat rural districts and the artificial increase of the strip holding between different ethnic groups were part of the intentional Russification policy prior to 1917, and it was this “offensive nationalism of the Russian government” which gave birth to the “defensive” nationalism among the Buryat population.<sup>41</sup>

According to the Buryat and Soviet sources, it was only the interethnic strip holding which produced conflicts, whereas the mixed settlement patterns of the Cossacks and non-Cossacks of indigenous origin did not cause any trouble, as these two groups were very close in terms of everyday life, religion and culture.<sup>42</sup> Grigory Semenov, a leader of the anti-Bolshevik forces in the Russian Civil War and a Transbaikal Cossack, however, interpreted the Cossacks not as a social estate, but as a quasi-ethnic group with distinct characteristics and shared interests.<sup>43</sup> It should be noted that many Russian and Buryat Cossacks belonged to different religious groups, with the latter being predominantly Buddhist.<sup>44</sup>

The Buryats as an ethnic group, however, did not belong to a single religious group.<sup>45</sup> As contemporary maps claimed, the three religious groups in the Baikal region were Orthodox Christianity, Buddhism, and Shamanism.<sup>46</sup> The political agenda behind such

38 N. P. Egunov, *Kolonial'naâ Politika Carizma i Pervyj Êtap Nacional'nogo Dviženiâ v Burâtii v Êpohu Imperializma* [Tsarist Colonial Policy and the First Phase of the National Movement in Buryatia in the Era of Imperialism] (Ulan-Ude: Burât. kn. izd-vo, 1963), 92.

39 Haptaev, *Oktâbr'skaâ Socialističeskaâ Revolûciâ i Graždanskaâ Vojna v Burâtii* [The October Socialist Revolution and the Civil War in Buryatia], 177; G. C. Cybikov, *Izbrannye Trudy* [Selected Works], vol. 2: *O Central'nom Tibete, Mongolii i Burâtii* [On Central Tibet, Mongolia and Buryatia] (Novosibirsk: Nauka, Sibirskoe otdelenie, 1981), 161, 164.

40 Compare data from: [Pereselenčeskoe upravlenie], *Karta Zabajkal'skoj Oblasti* [Map of the Transbaikal Region, Map, 1:1,680,000] ([Saint Petersburg], 1911); Pereselenčeskoe upravlenie Glavnogo upravleniâ zemleustrojstva i zemledeliâ and Kartografičeskoe zavedenie tovarišestva A. F. Marks, “Karta Zabajkal'skoj Oblasti [Map of the Transbaikal Region, Map, 1:3,360,000], No. 32”; [Pereselenčeskoe upravlenie] and Kartografičeskoe zavedenie G. De-Kel's, *Karta Irkutskoj Gubernii* [Map of the Irkutsk Province, Map, 1:1,680,000]; Pereselenčeskoe upravlenie Glavnogo upravleniâ zemleustrojstva i zemledeliâ and Kartografičeskoe zavedenie tovarišestva A. F. Marks, “Karta Irkutskoj Gubernii [Map of the Irkutsk Province, Map, 1:3,360,000], No. 31.”

41 State Archive of the Russian Federation, Collection 200, Inventory 1, File 478, 189 rev.

42 Cybikov, *Izbrannye Trudy* [Selected Works], 2: *O Central'nom Tibete, Mongolii i Burâtii* [On Central Tibet, Mongolia and Buryatia]:161, 164.

43 G. M. Semenov, *O Sebe: Vospominaniâ, Mysli i Vyvody* [About Me: Memories, Thoughts and Conclusions] (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo AST, 2002), 94–96.

44 Cybikov, *Izbrannye Trudy* [Selected Works], 2: *O Central'nom Tibete, Mongolii i Burâtii* [On Central Tibet, Mongolia and Buryatia]:164.

45 L. L. Abaeva and N. L. Žukovskaâ, eds., *Burâty* [Buryats] (Moscow: Nauka, 2004).

46 Pereselenčeskoe upravlenie Glavnogo upravleniâ zemleustrojstva i zemledeliâ and Kartografičeskoe zavedenie tovarišestva A. F. Marks, “Karta Raspredeleniâ Naseleniâ Aziatskoj Rossii Po Verospovedaniâm [Map of Distribu-

maps can be deduced: it was supposed to show how broad the presence of Orthodox Christianity was and thereby further stimulate Russian settlement in the area. It also suggested a clear-cut division between the Shamanism in the Irkutsk province and the Buddhism in the Transbaikalia region. Textual sources, however, demonstrate that neither were these three religions the only ones practiced in the Baikal region<sup>47</sup>, nor were they homogeneous or independent, as many Orthodox Christians belonged to the dissident Old-Believer groups which did not recognize the official church.<sup>48</sup> Buddhist monasteries (*datsans*) were built on both sides of the lake.<sup>49</sup> Furthermore, syncretic religious practices were being followed on the intersection between Shamanism, Buddhism and Christianity.<sup>50</sup>

As these brief insights demonstrate, there could be no geographic border that could correspond to every social border even within the mappable spaces, let alone the unmappable gender, age and political relations.

## The Disentanglement Projects

The very first project to introduce new geographical and legal disentanglements in the Baikal region came in the wake of the February Revolution in 1917. A group of Russian-educated lay Buryat intellectuals including Elbek-Dorzhi Rinchino, Mikhail Nikolayevich Bogdanov, Bazar Baradin, Tsyben Zhamtsarano, Tsyden-Eshi Tsydypov, Sanzhimitab Tsybiktarov and Dashi Sampilon took up the initiative and advocated the creation of a self-governing Buryat Autonomy with elective bodies. The project proposed by Bogdanov was adopted on April 24, 1917, at the First All-Buryat Congress in Chita. A day later

tion of the Population of Asiatic Russia by Religion, Map, 1:12,600,000], No. 27," in Atlas Aziatskoj Rossii [Atlas of Asian Russia], ed. G. V. Glinka (Saint Petersburg: Izdanie Pereselenčeskogo upravleniâ Glavnogo upravleniâ zemleustrojstva i zemledeliâ, 1914).

47 V. V. Perinov, "Musul'mane v Zabajkal'e (seredina Veka XIX–1917 God) [Muslims in Transbaikalia (mid-19<sup>th</sup> Century–1917)]" (Dissertaciâ na soiskanie učenoi stepeni kandidata istoričeskikh nauk, Institut mongolovedeniâ, buddologii i tibetologii SO RAN, 2010); L. V. Kal'mina, *Evrejskie Obšiny Vostočnoj Sibiri (seredina XIX V. – Fevral' 1917 Goda) [Jewish Communities of East Siberia (mid-19<sup>th</sup> Century–February 1917)]* (Ulan-Ude: Izdatel'sko-poligrafičeskij kompleks VSGAKI, 2003); Zabajkal'skij oblastnoj statističeskij komitet, *Pamâtnaâ Knižka Zabajkal'skoj Oblasti Na 1914 G. [The Memorial Book of the Transbaikalia Region as of 1914]*; Irkutskij gubernskij statističeskij komitet, *Pamâtnaâ Knižka Irkutskoj Gubernii: 1914 G. [The Memorial Book of the Irkutsk Province, 1914]* (Irkutsk: Gubernskaâ tipografiâ, 1914); M. F. Želnovakova, "Pričiny Poâvleniâ Protestantizma v Irkutskoj Gubernii [The Reasons for the Emergence of Protestantism in the Irkutsk Province]," *Izvestiâ Altajskogo Gosudarstvennogo Universiteta* no. 4–3 (2010): 73–77; S. M. Emel'ânov, "Istoriâ Katoličeskoj Cerkvi v Vostočnoj Sibiri (načalo XIX V.–1917 G.) [History of the Catholic Church in East Siberia (early 19<sup>th</sup> Century–1917)]" (Dissertaciâ na soiskanie učenoi stepeni kandidata istoričeskikh nauk, Irkutskij gosudarstvennyj universitet, 2002).

48 F. F. Bolonev, *Staroobrádny Zabajkal'â v XVIII–XX Vv. [The Old Believers of Transbaikalia in the 18<sup>th</sup>–20<sup>th</sup> Century]* (Moscow: IPC «DIK», 2004).

49 G. R. Galdanova et al., *Lamaizm v Burâtii XVIII–Načala XX Veka: Struktura i Social'naâ Rol' Kul'tovoi Sistemy [Lamaism in Buryatia of the 18<sup>th</sup>–Early 20<sup>th</sup> Century: Structure and Social Role of the Religious System]*, ed. V. V. Mantatov (Novosibirsk: Nauka, Sibirskoe otdelenie, 1983), 44.

50 O. V. Buraeva, *Étnokul'turnye Vzaimodejstviâ Narodov Bajkal'skogo Regiona v XVII–Načale XX V. [Ethnocultural Interactions of the Peoples of the Baikal Region in the 17<sup>th</sup>–Early 20<sup>th</sup> Century]*, ed. M. N. Baldano (Ulan-Ude: Izdatel'stvo Burâtskogo naučnogo centra SO RAN, 2005), 153.

an interim self-government body – the Provisional Buryat National Committee – was elected. The decision was made for participation in the Russian Constituent Assembly and demarcation of a national territory.<sup>51</sup>

The project drew heavily on the Buryat identity in an ethno-national sense. In a telegram sent to the leaders of the Russian provisional government the “Buryat nation (*narod*) inhabiting the Transbaikalian region and the Irkutsk province” was defined as a “distinct group in national, cultural-economic and legal sense”. The proponents of the project sought to disentangle the space of land use formed by occupational and ethnic identities and secure Buryat economic interests with special attention to the nomadic herders. The project introduced a three-level system of self-government. The main unit of the Buryat Autonomy was called a *somon* (a rural community). *Somons* were then united into *khoshuns*, and *khoshuns* formed *aimaks*. The names of the *aimaks* represented regional subethnic groupings of the Buryats. The supreme body of the Autonomy “uniting all parts of the Buryat nation into a single whole” was supposed to be the Buryat National Assembly (*Duma*) elected by a direct, secret and equal vote by all Buryats of both genders from the age of eighteen with no criminal convictions. The problem of Russification in terms of language was also in the focus and the Congress adopted a resolution on the nationalization of Buryat schools making Buryat the primary language of education. Russian, as the state language, remained mandatory. The Congress also decided to contact Bandida Khambo Lama (the head of the officially recognized Buddhist organization in the Baikal region) about the inclusion of clergy in the National Committee.<sup>52</sup> Zhamtsarano and other intellectuals considered Buddhism to be central for the Buryat national solidarity and consciousness.<sup>53</sup> In 1919 the established self-government bodies used a religious symbol – the Buddhist swastika – as their emblem on official documents.<sup>54</sup>

Some leaders of the movement were members of the Party of Socialists-Revolutionaries and the project strongly relied on its democratic and socialist ideology. The major discursive framings, which crossed in the project in the early stages, included the ideas of ethnic equality, self-determination and land municipalization.<sup>55</sup>

The interpretation of a Buryat national identity in ethnic and religious terms with subsequent disentanglements in the corresponding spaces met with opposition along several lines: First of all some Cossacks accented their estate (Cossack) and not ethnic (Buryat) identity<sup>56</sup> and protested against joining the Autonomy at the Buryat Cossack Gathering in July 1917 chaired by Tsybiktarov. The Gathering nevertheless voted to join the

51 State Archive of the Russian Federation, Collection 1701, Inventory 1, File 16, 18a–30.

52 State Archive of the Russian Federation, Collection 1701, Inventory 1, File 16, 18a–30.

53 K. M. Gerasimova, *Obnovlencheskoe Dviženie Buratskogo Lamaistskogo Duhovenstva: 1917–1930 Gg.* [Reformist Movement of the Buryat Lamaist Clergy, 1917–1930] (Ulan-Ude: Burat. kn. izd-vo, 1964), 17.

54 State Archive of the Russian Federation, Collection 1701, Inventory 1, File 16, 44; State Archive of the Russian Federation, Collection 1701, Inventory 1, File 64, 2.

55 Gerasimova, *Obnovlencheskoe Dviženie Buratskogo Lamaistskogo Duhovenstva: 1917–1930 Gg.* [Reformist Movement of the Buryat Lamaist Clergy, 1917–1930], 5.

56 Cybikov, *Izbrannye Trudy* [Selected Works], 2: O Central'nom Tibete, Mongolii i Buratii [On Central Tibet, Mongolia and Buryatia]:160.

Autonomy.<sup>57</sup> It is important to note that many Cossacks did not interpret joining the Autonomy as leaving the Cossacks and openly claimed to retain their estate identity. A group headed by Dondok Abiduev did not accept the ethno-religious disentanglement even after the Gathering and initiated hostilities in Transbaikalia in the ensuing months, which resulted in Tsybiktarov's emigration to Mongolia. This opposition supported by the Russian Cossacks and military administration interpreted the Autonomy as "harmful separatism". The Buryat-speaking Evenk Cossacks (the "Buddhist Nomads" and not the "Russified Orthodox Christians"), however, voluntarily joined the Buryat Autonomy.<sup>58</sup> According to a 1919 report prepared by the Russian military administration of the Irkutsk province, further opposition came from the Orthodox Buryat villagers of the province whose settlements were included in the Autonomy created by a small group of intellectuals without asking the villagers themselves and leaving a large part of the population dissatisfied with the self-government organizations.<sup>59</sup>

In the Irkutsk province the organized anti-autonomous movement was led by N. A. Khankhasaev who in May 1917 appealed to the Russian provisional government in Petrograd claiming that the Buryat people would be satisfied with the limited administrative self-government which was repealed in 1901.<sup>60</sup> This conflict between the proponents and the opponents of the Autonomy in the Irkutsk province was interpreted by a Russian official as interclan struggle<sup>61</sup>, which brings a further conflicting identity to the foreground.

In the regional power crossings the proponents of the Autonomy underlined Buryat national interests and maneuvered between the various political forces and belligerents in the Russian Civil War. In spring–fall 1917, they communicated with the provisional government, which nonetheless rejected the idea of a territorial autonomy. After the October Revolution they cooperated with the Siberian Soviet government, which recognized the right of the Buryats to self-determination. The Autonomy as such, however, was not recognized. After the temporary retreat of the Soviets in 1918 some members of the national movement cooperated with the Japanese-supported Transbaikalia's ruler Semenov, who recognized the Buryat self-government bodies, and communicated with Alexander Kolchak's government in Omsk, which refused to approve them. In late 1918 the Buryat National Committee was renamed the People's Duma of the Buryat-Mongols of East Siberia and chaired by Sampilon.<sup>62</sup> The leaders of this new body now also articulated a Pan-Mongolian identity and used new discursive framings appealing to the

57 Haptaev, Oktâbr'skaâ Socialističeskaâ Revolüciâ i Graždanskaâ Vojna v Burâtii [The October Socialist Revolution and the Civil War in Buryatia], 178.

58 State Archive of the Russian Federation, Collection 1701, Inventory 1, File 16, 5–6.

59 State Archive of the Russian Federation, Collection 1701, Inventory 1, File 16, 66.

60 State Archive of the Russian Federation, Collection 6996, Inventory 1, File 479, 1–2.

61 State Archive of the Russian Federation, Collection 1701, Inventory 1, File 60, 1–2.

62 B. V. Bazarov and L. B. Žabaeva, Burâtskie Nacional'nye Demokrati i Obščestvenno-političeskaâ Mysl' Mongol'skikh Narodov v Pervoj Treti XX Veka [Buryat National Democrats and Socio-political Thought of the Mongolian Peoples in the First Third of the 20<sup>th</sup> Century] (Ulan-Ude: Izdatel'stvo Burâtskogo naučnogo centra SO RAN, 2008), 83–84, 137–138.

past experiences of the Mongols and the figure of Genghis Khan, defining the Buryat-Mongols as “a branch of Genghis Khan’s Mongolia”.<sup>63</sup>

These framings and the articulation of a Pan-Mongolian identity reached their zenith on February 25, 1919 when the “representatives from the whole of Mongolia: Inner, Outer, Hulunbuir and Buryat” gathered in Chita for the congress on “discussing state affairs”.<sup>64</sup> The congress, chaired by a twenty-five-year-old Inner Mongolian *lama* Neise Gegen (Nichi Toyn Bogdo Mendebayar)<sup>65</sup> and co-chaired by Sampilon, resolved that because the initially independent Mongolia did not have anything “common in customs and interests” with the Chinese Republic “all people of Mongolian descent form a state enjoying full rights.” The capital of the new federative state consisting of four *aimaks* (Inner, Outer, Hulunbuir and Buryat) was to be located in “the Hulunbuir city of Hailar”. The provisional government formed at the congress consisted of four ministries: Home Affairs, Foreign Affairs, Finance and War.<sup>66</sup>

Besides the chairman, co-chairman and the secretaries Dobdon Vanchuk and Radnazhap Bimbaev, the resolution was passed by two further representatives of Inner Mongolia (Fussenge and Khasbatur), three representatives of Hulunbuir (Erkimbatu, Danchzhin Neren and Dakhasu) and four of the Buryats (Bayarto Vampilon, Tsydypov, Rinchino and Namdak Dylykov).<sup>67</sup> It is no coincidence that the resolution was not signed by anyone from Outer Mongolia which at that time had autonomous status within China: its ruler Bogd Gegen, the Eighth Jebtsundamba Khutuktu, did not send any representatives despite an invitation, but promised to join the state if it was recognized by the Paris Peace Conference and especially by the United States of America and Japan.<sup>68</sup> The congress also voiced support to the Tibetans, with whom the Mongols had a “religious connection”, and to the Manchus, with whom they had a “friendly connection”, in creation of their independent states. The provisional government, headed by Neise Gegen and temporarily seated at Dauria (located in the southeast of Chita) railway station, was granted the right to invite foreign advisors.<sup>69</sup>

These “foreign advisors” included Semenov (who at the time was in conflict with Kolchak’s Omsk government) with his Russian subordinates, who organized the meeting, and Japanese officers.<sup>70</sup> Here a major role was played by Semenov’s advisor Lieutenant

63 State Archive of the Russian Federation, Collection 1701, Inventory 1, File 16, 3 rev.–4.

64 State Archive of the Russian Federation, Collection 200, Inventory 1, File 406, 1.

65 B. V. Bazarov, *Neizvestnoe iz Istorii Panmongolizma* [Unknown Aspects of the History of Pan-Mongolism] (Ulan-Ude: Izdatel'stvo Buratskogo nauchnogo centra SO RAN, 2002), 29.

66 State Archive of the Russian Federation, Collection 200, Inventory 1, File 406, 1 rev.

67 State Archive of the Russian Federation, Collection 200, Inventory 1, File 406, 2.

68 Bazarov and Žabaeva, *Buratskie Nacional'nye Demokrati i Obšestvenno-političeskaâ Mysl' Mongol'skih Narodov v Pervoj Treti XX Veka* [Buryat National Democrats and Socio-political Thought of the Mongolian Peoples in the First Third of the 20<sup>th</sup> Century], 146–147.

69 State Archive of the Russian Federation, Collection 200, Inventory 1, File 406, 1 rev.; Bazarov and Žabaeva, *Buratskie Nacional'nye Demokrati i Obšestvenno-političeskaâ Mysl' Mongol'skih Narodov v Pervoj Treti XX Veka* [Buryat National Democrats and Socio-political Thought of the Mongolian Peoples in the First Third of the 20<sup>th</sup> Century], 151.

70 Bazarov and Žabaeva, *Buratskie Nacional'nye Demokrati i Obšestvenno-političeskaâ Mysl' Mongol'skih Narodov*

Colonel Kuroki Chikayoshi (黒木親慶)<sup>71</sup> who promised that Japan would help the new state.<sup>72</sup> No major help, however, was provided. Firstly, some particular mid-level officers, such as Kuroki, actively participated in regional affairs using their own judgment. Secondly, there was no single opinion among the country's political elites on the Japanese intervention at large: the liberal circles opposed it, whereas the conservative military insisted on expansion.<sup>73</sup> Finally, the attitude of the Japanese elites towards Semenov and the Buryats changed over time, with Kuroki having been recalled to Japan "for explanations".<sup>74</sup> The lack of Japanese support had a great deal to do with the protests from the Omsk government supported by the French, British and American governments<sup>75</sup>, the position of China, and the tensions between the United States and Japan.<sup>76</sup> The congress composed a telegram to the Paris Peace Conference asking for international recognition and support and decided to send a delegation of five representatives to the conference.<sup>77</sup> Besides the telegram, a letter was drawn up from the provisional government signed by Neise Gegen. The major discursive framings used in the letter included the appeal to previous experience and Genghis Khan ("our Mongolian tribe roaming in Asia since the most ancient times formed an independent state with full rights"), illegitimacy of and anarchy in the Chinese Republic, its danger to Buddhism ("all temples built by our ancestors will be destroyed by them and our religion will be violated by them") and ethnic inequality both in China and in Russia.<sup>78</sup> The letter can be explicitly attached to the so-called Wilsonian moment<sup>79</sup>, as it made the following reference: "... the President of the North American United States, proceeding from the philanthropic feeling of the Almighty, claimed that it would be just to grant all peoples who lost their religion and original rights and were divided from their kind in flesh and blood the right to unite and form a state." It also outlined the major identities central to the new nation: super-ethnic Pan-Mongolian, Buddhist religious and clan (the monarch or the president was to be elected from the largest clan).<sup>80</sup> Although neither the messages nor the delegation

v Pervoj Treti XX Veka [Buryat National Democrats and Socio-political Thought of the Mongolian Peoples in the First Third of the 20<sup>th</sup> Century], 147.

71 Hara Teruyuki, *Shiberia Shuppei: Kakumei to Kanshō 1917–1921* [The Siberian Expedition: Revolution and Intervention 1917–1921] (Tokyo: Chikuma shobō, 1989), 79. In some English and Russian sources his name is rendered as "Kuroki Shinkei".

72 State Archive of the Russian Federation, Collection 200, Inventory 1, File 406, 8.

73 See Hara, *Shiberia Shuppei: Kakumei to Kanshō 1917–1921* [The Siberian Expedition: Revolution and Intervention 1917–1921].

74 State Archive of the Russian Federation, Collection 200, Inventory 1, File 406, 4, 8; State Archive of the Russian Federation, Collection 200, Inventory 1, File 478, 156.

75 State Archive of the Russian Federation, Collection 200, Inventory 1, File 406, 3; State Archive of the Russian Federation, Collection 200, Inventory 1, File 478, 141.

76 Russian State Military Archive, Collection 40308, Inventory 1, File 119, 1; See, for instance, Michael A. Barnhart, *Japan Prepares for Total War: The Search for Economic Security, 1919–1941* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987).

77 State Archive of the Russian Federation, Collection 200, Inventory 1, File 406, 1 rev.

78 State Archive of the Russian Federation, Collection 200, Inventory 1, File 478, 118–120.

79 Manela, *The Wilsonian Moment: Self-determination and the International Origins of Anticolonial Nationalism*.

80 State Archive of the Russian Federation, Collection 200, Inventory 1, File 478, 120.



made it to Paris due to the lack of diplomatic support<sup>81</sup>, Woodrow Wilson was informed about the project by American representatives in Siberia.<sup>82</sup>

In the letter to the Peace Conference, Great Mongolia, as the new entity was referred to by contemporary and later observers, called for all Mongolian territory beyond the Great Wall to be detached from China.<sup>83</sup> Nothing was said about the Russian areas. According to the information received from a Buryat emigrant organization in Urga, at best the state would include “Transbaikalia, Khalkha, Uryankhai, Barga and Inner Mongolia”. The Russians from Transbaikalia were to be resettled in the Irkutsk province which would be abandoned by the Buryat population. Likewise, all Chinese were to be evicted from Inner Mongolia. If this did not work, the Russians from the southern Transbaikal region would have to move to its northern part which would remain Russian, whereas the Chinese would be resettled from northern to southern Mongolia and the Mongols would have to move in the opposite direction.<sup>84</sup> Hence, nominally the project was to disentangle superethnic and religious spaces and impose this disentanglement on others, involving the resettlement of more than a million people.<sup>85</sup>

Many actors in the power relations behind this project, however, had other spaces in mind. The Japanese participants and Semenov wanted to control the economic spaces: Japanese support for the movement was to be exchanged for exclusive trade rights and the disposal of mineral resources.<sup>86</sup> There is evidence that Japanese mining engineers were exploring mineral deposits in Transbaikalia.<sup>87</sup> The leaders of the Buryat Autonomy, according to a member of the Buryat organization in Urga, participated in the project only because they wanted to relieve the suffering of the Buryat people in the Civil War (who were frequently robbed and forced from their land by neighboring Russian peasants) and for that purpose sought to create armed self-defense forces with the help of Semenov.<sup>88</sup>

81 Bazarov and Žabaeva, *Burátskie Nacional'nye Demokrati i Obščestvenno-političeskâ Mysl' Mongol'skikh Narodov v Pervoj Treti XX Veka* [Buryat National Democrats and Socio-political Thought of the Mongolian Peoples in the First Third of the 20<sup>th</sup> Century], 153.

82 State Archive of the Russian Federation, Collection 200, Inventory 1, File 478, 39.

83 State Archive of the Russian Federation, Collection 200, Inventory 1, File 478, 122.

84 State Archive of the Russian Federation, Collection 200, Inventory 1, File 478, 78–78 rev.

85 This is based on the following data sources: State Archive of the Russian Federation, Collection 200, Inventory 1, File 406, 1–2; State Archive of the Russian Federation, Collection 200, Inventory 1, File 478, 78; The Edinburgh Geographical Institute, John Bartholomew & Son, Ltd., “China - Political [map, 1:10,000,000],” in “The Times” Atlas (London: The Times, 1922), 62; Russian State Archive of Socio-Political History, Collection 495, Inventory 152, File 20; *Pereselenčeskoe upravlenie Glavnogo upravleniâ zemleustrojstva i zemledeliâ i Kartografičeskoe zavedenie tovarišestva A. F. Marks*, “Karta Zabajkal'skoj Oblasti [Map of the Transbaikal Region, Map, 1:3,360,000], No. 32.”

86 State Archive of the Russian Federation, Collection 200, Inventory 1, File 478, 78 rev.; State Archive of the Russian Federation, Collection 200, Inventory 1, File 406, 9; Russian State Military Archive, Collection 40308, Inventory 1, File 119, 1.

87 Japan Center for Asian Historical Records, Reference Code B03051345000, Reel 1-1341, Frames 0462-0466, <http://www.jacar.go.jp/index.html>; Russian State Archive of Socio-Political History, Collection 372, Inventory 1, File 1210, 92.

88 State Archive of the Russian Federation, Collection 200, Inventory 1, File 478, 104 rev.



These armed forces were formed in Dauria, where a military school for Mongols was established. Besides this, the People's Duma organized conscription for the indigenous population. Although these forces were said to be the foundation of the future Buryat and Mongolian national armies<sup>89</sup> and intended to be used for self-defense and for making Outer Mongolia join the Pan-Mongolian movement after negotiations with Bogd Gegen failed, in the summer of 1919 they were sent to fight the Bolsheviks without the consent of the People's Duma or the government in Dauria. This resulted in Fussenge's demarche and death, the secret arrest and murder of Bogdanov by Semenov's subordinates, and the flight of Rinchino, and later Sampilon and Tsydypov from Chita. In the meantime the Chinese government used the intended campaign as a cause for denouncing the treaties related to Outer Mongolia's autonomy and occupying the region. Neise Gegen was soon killed by Chinese Republican troops after being invited for negotiations. The fall of 1919 marked the end of both the Buryat People's Duma and Great Mongolia.<sup>90</sup>

The conscription among the Buryats and other policies of the Buryat National Committee and People's Duma gave cause for the creation of another disentanglement project which distanced itself from ethnic self-determination framings and relied on the spiritual ideas of a dissident Buddhist monk Lubsang Samdan Tsydenov. According to an oral history of his followers, Tsydenov developed the idea to reform Buddhism after Dzhayag Lama from the Kumbum Monastery in Tibet visited Transbaikalia and discussed the future of religion in the region with the abbot of the Chesansky Datsan, Tsydenov and two other *lamas*. Tsydenov criticized the established religious institutions for ignorance and lack of piety, saying that "the datsan is the Samsara" and soon after Dzhayag Lama had left Tsydenov quit the Kizhinginsky (Kudunsky) Datsan and together with his disciples settled in the woodland area called Soorkhoy (Suarkhe). This reformist movement and Tsydenov's followers, who by 1919 were numerous, were known under the name Balagad.<sup>91</sup>

A report put together by regional officers of the State Political Directorate in 1923, however, stated that a conflict between Tsydenov and another influential *lama* Baldoeshi Tsyrenov over the abbacy of the Kudunsky Datsan was the major reason behind the dissidence. After Bandida Khambo Lama supported Tsyrenov, Tsydenov left for seclusion in the taiga. The conflict nevertheless continued, which led to Bandida Khambo Lama to remove Tsyrenov and appoint Tsydenov. During several years of the abbacy Tsydenov's authority among the Buddhists of the area increased and after being seen as a threat by Bandida Khambo Lama Tsydenov was dismissed. Tsydenov again left for the taiga, but this time did not live in seclusion and rallied his supporters instead. After the Soviets as-

89 Russian State Military Archive, Collection 39454, Inventory 1, File 2, 25, 31 rev., 52, 53, 54, 72, 84 rev., 96, 97, 160.

90 Bazarov, *Neizvestnoe iz istorii Panmongolizma* [Unknown Aspects of the History of Pan-Mongolism], 30–42.

91 B. D. Dandaron, *Izbrannye Stat'i, Černaâ Tetrad', Materialy k Biografii, Istoriâ Kukunora Sumpy Kenpo* [Selected Articles, the Black Book, Biographical Materials, Sumpa Kenpo's History of Kukunor], ed. V. M. Montlevič (Saint Petersburg: Evraziâ, 2006), 261–262, 264, 482–483.

sumed power in 1918, Tsydenov started campaigning against lay intellectuals saying that their policies were contrary to the teachings of the Buddha.<sup>92</sup>

Whatever the initial reasons for the movement were, with the establishment of the Buryat Autonomy it spread beyond the religious space attracting those who were dissatisfied with the policies of the National Committee and later the People's Duma, ranging from ordinary peasants and monks to former clan leaders and Tsarist functionaries.<sup>93</sup> The general conscription initiated by the Autonomy in 1918 vexed local people and they continuously sent delegates to Tsydenov asking to explain the resolution that flew in the face of the religion of the Buddha which was against the taking up of weapons. Tsydenov replied that if the people did not want to serve in the army they had to become his subjects.<sup>94</sup>

After the Kizhinga Credit Union appealed to him in February 1919 asking to shield the population of three *khoshuns* of the Khorinsky Aimak in central Transbaikalia, Tsydenov proclaimed himself the Dharmaraja of Three Worlds, religious and civil ruler. The state officially called "the Rightfully Detached State of the Khudun (Kudun) Valley" soon included around twenty *somons* with 13,000 people.<sup>95</sup> It had a draft constitution, a government<sup>96</sup> with Ministries of the Court, Foreign Affairs, Finance, Home Affairs, Industry and Trade, Agriculture, Justice, and Education, and an officially appointed heir to the throne.<sup>97</sup>

Tsydenov's state abandoned the violence, refused to establish a military and allowed all its citizens to avoid service for the belligerents in the Russian Civil War. Such a state was doomed and in May 1919 Tsydenov and members of his government were arrested by representatives of the People's Duma and Semenov. Tsydenov's ideas, however, remained popular after the failure of the state and even after his death in 1922. The Balagad movement opposing the ethnic autonomy was active until 1929.<sup>98</sup>

The state articulated the Buddhist religious identity. Later the movement explicitly opposed any delineations based on ethnicity.<sup>99</sup> The framings used in the project derived from Tibetan, Mongolian and Indian Buddhist discourses and from contemporary West-

92 Russian State Archive of Socio-Political History, Collection 372, Inventory 1, File 239, 6–7.

93 N. V. Cyrempilov, "Lubsan Samdan Cydenov i Ideâ Buddijskoj Teokratii v Zabajkal'e [Lubsan Samdan Tsydenov and the Idea of a Buddhist Theocracy in Transbaikalia]," *Vostok: Afro-aziatskie Obšestva: Istoriâ i Sovremennost'* no. 6 (2007): 67; Dandaron, *Izbrannye Stat'i, Černaâ Tetrad', Materialy k Biografii, Istoriâ Kukunora Sumpy Kenpo* [Selected Articles, the Black Book, Biographical Materials, Sumpa Kenpo's History of Kukunor], 262.

94 Russian State Archive of Socio-Political History, Collection 372, Inventory 1, File 239, 7–8.

95 For a rough outline of the state see the following data sources: Nikolay Tsyrempilov, "Samdan Tsydenov and His Buddhist Theocratic Project in Siberia," in *Biographies of Eminent Mongol Buddhists: PIATS 2006: Proceedings of the Eleventh Seminar of the International Association for Tibetan Studies, Königswinter 2006*, ed. Johan Elverskog, *Beiträge zur Zentralasienforschung* 15 (Halle, Saale: International Institute for Tibetan and Buddhist Studies, 2008), 117–138.

96 Cyrempilov, "Lubsan Samdan Cydenov i Ideâ Buddijskoj Teokratii v Zabajkal'e [Lubsan Samdan Tsydenov and the Idea of a Buddhist Theocracy in Transbaikalia]," 67.

97 Russian State Archive of Socio-Political History, Collection 372, Inventory 1, File 651, 13.

98 Cyrempilov, "Lubsan Samdan Cydenov i Ideâ Buddijskoj Teokratii v Zabajkal'e [Lubsan Samdan Tsydenov and the Idea of a Buddhist Theocracy in Transbaikalia]," 67–68.

99 Russian State Archive of Socio-Political History, Collection 372, Inventory 1, File 210, 21 rev.

ern political science. Although Tsydenov's personal involvement in the design and implementation of the project remains unclear, he defined the state as theocracy combining the religious and lay principles of rule. The usage of the concept *Dharmaraja* and implicit appeals to Tibetan and Mongolian experience derived from Tsydenov's Buddhist scholarship. At the same time he was very interested in Western science, European statehood and world religions, and would question Russian travelers and read books and journals in European languages. He continued to work on the framings and theoretical grounds of the projects in prison. His notes featuring extracts from an encyclopedic dictionary include many European political terms with special attention to the term 'theocracy' and its definitions.<sup>100</sup>

Tsydenov's reputation in Buddhist scholarship and spiritual authority made him very effective in non-violent power relations with the local people, enabling the dissemination of his ideas. The rejection of violence, however, made the state vulnerable to the armed group actors and turned it into a utopia.

## Conclusion

All the discussed projects were developed and implemented through the confluence of global and local power relations and discursive crossings. The key question for most actors was which group would best legitimize delineation and should therefore form the basis for a future autonomous or independent nation. The attempts to raise the status of imagined social boundaries in particular spaces (ethnic, religious, superethnic) and project them onto the geographic space together with alternative interpretations of particular categories (varying definitions of the Buryats, religious sectarianism and obscurity of superethnic categories) caused major conflicts, not only between already defined groups, but also within them. The poor performance of the proponents in power and violence relations (defeat in the Civil War, inability to counteract armed groups, and shifts in global politics) made the imposition of suggested disentanglements impossible and ultimately resulted in the failure of all projects.

Their experience was nevertheless incorporated into the ultimate disentanglement of the region, as the designers of the Buryat-Mongolian Autonomous Socialist Soviet Republic and the Mongolian People's Republic explicitly and implicitly addressed the Buryat ethnic, Pan-Mongolian superethnic and Buddhist religious identities. Moreover, Rinchino, Zhamtsarano, Baradin and others who actively participated in either the creation or destruction of the abovementioned projects brought along their personal experience and previously used discursive framings during the construction of the new entities. Taking the failures into account, the emphasis was then placed not on the disentanglement of

100 Cyrempilov, "Lubsan Samdan Cydenov i Ideâ Buddijskoj Teokratii v Zabajkal'e [Lubsan Samdan Tsydenov and the Idea of a Buddhist Theocracy in Transbaikalia]," 68, 72–73. Tsyrempilov, "Samdan Tsydenov and His Buddhist Theocratic Project in Siberia."

particular social spaces, but on the transboundary entanglements: the connection of the Mongolian and Buryat Republics to the global labor movement and the Soviet Union via the Comintern and central government, respectively; the trade and linguistic connection between the two republics; the religious networks binding the two republics with Tibet and other Buddhist regions. One of the first official maps of the Buryat Republic<sup>101</sup> is a very illustrative source. The republic itself occupied less than a half of the map's surface. Besides the administrative and international boundaries it featured many *datsans*, monasteries and communications in Siberia and Mongolia suggesting transboundary entanglements between the outlined administrative and international areas, thereby appealing to ethnic, religious and superethnic identities and suggesting the relevance of other spaces.

With Joseph Stalin's accession to power, ethnicity gradually became the only one of the abovementioned identities to be relevant for the state, and many people were executed or imprisoned for defending their position in religious or other spaces. Many Buryats, Buddhists and Mongols, including Zhamtsarano, Rinchino, Baradin, Sampilon and Tsydypov became victims of the purges in the USSR and the MPR in the late 1920s and 1930s.

101 Burnarkomzem, Karta Burât-Mongol'skoj A.S.S. Respubliki, Zabajkal'skoj Gub. i Častej Irkutskoj Gub. i Mongolii [Map of the Buryat-Mongolian A.S.S. Republic, the Transbaikalian Province, and Parts of the Irkutsk Province and Mongolia, Map, 1:2,520,000] (Irkutsk: Pervââ Gostipo-litografiâ, 1924).

# **Imagined Territoriality: Visual Portrayals of 'Asia' in the Age of Nationalism in East Asia**

**Torsten Weber**

## **RESÜMEE**

Dieser Artikel untersucht die Darstellung ‚Asiens‘ als kulturell-politische Einheit in visuellen Imaginationen von Territorialität und politischen Karikaturen, die überwiegend in den 1930er und 1940er Jahren in Japan und China entstanden. Auf den ersten Blick stehen diese Portraits vor allem für eine asianistische Agenda, die asiatische Kommonalität in Abgrenzung zum ‚Westen‘ betont. Visionen eines geeinten Asiens enthielten oft jedoch auch sehr explizite Ansprüche auf Zentralität oder Führerschaft einer bestimmten Nation. Im Kontext des japanischen Imperialismus nimmt zwar meist Japan diese Rolle ein, allerdings zeigen Darstellungen ‚Asiens‘ aus Kollaborationsgebieten, dass auch anderen Nationen diese Rolle zugeschrieben werden konnte, solange dies innerhalb der asianistischen Metanarrative erfolgte. Damit ergänzten visuelle Imaginationen anderweitig verbreitete nationalistische Konzeptionen des Asianismus, wie sie vor allem seit den 1930er Jahren verstärkt propagiert wurden. Gegen dieses imperialistisch-hegemoniale Erbe des Asianismus nutzen Intellektuelle und transnationale Initiativen in Ostasien heute u.a. visuelle Darstellungen alternativer Territorialität, um zur Überwindung des gespaltenen Geschichtsbewusstseins und nationaler Chauvinismen beizutragen.

## **Introduction**

In the modern period, the organisation of peoples and societies according to territorial criteria has predominantly taken place within the paradigmatic framework of the ‘national’. As scholars of nationalism have taught us, nations were forged with the help of imagined national identities and commonalities.<sup>1</sup> Indeed, the formation and persistence

1 The term imagination, which is of particular relevance here, of course refers to Benedict Anderson's argument of the nation as an “imagined community”. See Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, London 1983, 1-7.

of the nation state may have relied, to a large degree, on the *imagination* of the nation as a limited and sovereign community. The nation state as such, however, is also a very tangible reality that can be experienced in various ways by its citizens, for example, through the usage of nationally issued money or of a state-denominated national language.<sup>2</sup> The most direct way to experience the *territorial* dimensions of the nation state is probably the crossing of national borders. There, the domestic experience of the existence of the nation state is reinforced territorially through the inner-outer demarcations that mark the transit, if granted, from one territorial entity – the modern nation state – to another.

Given the historical limitations to mass mobility before the spread of long-distance public transport in the latter half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century,<sup>3</sup> for many people in East Asia and other parts of the world any direct territorial experience of units larger than villages, cities, counties, or prefectures may have been the exception rather than the rule. Therefore, more than any other dimension of the nation state, its territoriality<sup>4</sup> has relied on imagination. That is, the territorial dimension is imagined in the literal sense of the term: it relies on *images* that portray certain units as entities. Still today, the most direct and common way to visualize territory is through maps, be it traditionally as printed maps in atlases or virtually via Google Maps.<sup>5</sup> In fact, maps are a major instrument of territorial definition<sup>6</sup> and, as Mark Monmonier has demonstrated, also of distortion and political propaganda:

*A good propagandist knows how to shape opinion by manipulating maps. Political persuasion often concerns territorial claims, nationalities, national pride, borders, strategic positions, conquests, attacks, troop movements, defences, spheres of influence, regional inequality, and other geographic phenomena conveniently portrayed cartographically. The propagandist moulds the map's message by emphasizing supporting features, suppressing contradictory information, and choosing provocative, dramatic symbols. People trust maps, and intriguing maps attract the eye as well as connote authority.*<sup>7</sup>

2 See Michael Billig, *Banal Nationalism*, London 1995, 13-18 and 41-42.

3 While the global origins of leisure travel are commonly seen in the founding of the Thomas Cook travel agency in England in the mid-19<sup>th</sup> century, it was not before massive expansion and improvement of the railway infrastructure and the availability of leisure time through social legislation that domestic tourism became widespread. In Japan, for example, although a Japan Tourist Bureau was already established in 1912, the origins of domestic mass tourism are usually located in the economic boom that started in the late 1950s. See Teshima Yasuyuki, "Masu tsūrizumu no rekishi teki henshen to kongo no yukue" [The historical changes of mass tourism and its future directions], *Nihon Kokusai Kankōgakkai Ronbunshū* [Essay Collection of the Japanese Association of International Tourism], Vol. 15, 2008, 11-17: 13.

4 This paper understands territoriality primarily as a concept that refers to the significance of territory as "sections of space occupied by individuals, social groups or institutions, most typically by the modern state" (John Agnew as quoted in Anssi Paasi, "Territory", Agnew/Mitchell/Toal (eds.), *A Companion to Political Geography*, Oxford 2003: 109). It also refers to the implications that result from the links between a certain territory and social practices there, that is as "a powerful geographic strategy to control people and things by controlling area" (R. D. Sack, *Human Territoriality*, Cambridge 1986: 5). Territoriality, therefore, may be summarized as a "primary geographical expression of social power" (R. D. Sack, *Human Territoriality*, Cambridge 1986: 5).

5 See Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, 170-178.

6 See Thongchai Winichakul, *Siam Mapped: A History of the Geo-Body of a Nation*, Honolulu 1994.

7 Mark S. Monmonier, *How to lie with maps*, Chicago 1996: 87.

As Monmonier implies, maps reach an audience that would be less receptive to political messages expressed conventionally as texts in opinion editorials, essays, or books. In addition, through simplification and visualization, maps disseminate messages more explicitly, directly, and suggestively. As will be elaborated on in more detail below, maps of 'Asia' have historically relied on a number of the above-mentioned mechanisms to suggest Asia's significance or insignificance, its unity or disunity, its natural opposition to other regions or possible inclusion in or of other regions. In addition, by including or excluding certain lands and seas and by naming parts or entities in a certain way, maps confront the problem of territoriality most directly and therefore can hardly avoid taking a political stance in debates about territorial issues.

A second genre of visual portrayals that features even more suggestive simplifications of political messages is political cartoons. By virtue of their genre, political cartoons exaggerate simplistically and satirically, and thereby create amusing or insulting messages that propose clear-cut divisions between self and other, friend and enemy, good and bad. As Peter Burke has argued,

*between the invention of the newspaper and the invention of television, for instance, caricature and cartoons made a fundamental contribution to political debate, demystifying power and encouraging the involvement of ordinary people with affairs of state. They performed these tasks by presenting controversial issues in a simple, concrete and memorable way and the main actors on the political stage as unheroic fallible mortals*<sup>8</sup>.

In fact, the invention of the newspaper as a popular medium may have even increased the role played by caricature and cartoons, as they soon became a regular feature in printed dailies and other periodicals.<sup>9</sup> As Burke mentions, the factors of popularity and simplicity, together with its high commemorative degree, have made visual abstraction a central part of mainstream political discourse. Its links to territoriality, however, may be less obvious. Where maps make territorial dimensions explicit, cartoons normally only implicitly refer to them, although sometimes visual portrayals of territory are included. In other words, cartoons mostly point to the figurative side of territory and territoriality; demarcations are not indicated mainly through lines that denote borders but through stereotypical portrayals of civilizations, races, or assumed outward or inner characteristic traits of the 'Self' and the 'Other'. Cartoons rely on such "auto-stereotypes" and "xenostereotypes"<sup>10</sup> more than other media, especially texts, which can include more nuances, explain heterogeneities, and discuss contradictions. As Burke has noted,

*[t]he stereotype may not be completely false, but it often exaggerates certain features of reality and omits others. The stereotype may be more or less crude, more or less violent. However, it necessarily lacks nuances since the same model is applied to cultural situa-*

8 Peter Burke, *Eyewitnessing. The Uses of Images as Historical Evidence*. Ithaca 2001, 79.

9 On the role of newspapers in the spread of nationalism see Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, 25-36.

10 Bo Stråth, "A European Identity: To the Historical Limits of a Concept", *European Journal of Social Theory* 2002, 5-4, 387-401: 395.

*tions which differ considerably from one another. It has been observed, for example that European pictures of American Indians were often composite ones, combining traits from Indians of different regions to create a simple general image.*<sup>11</sup>

As we shall see below, this same pattern that seems to have informed processes of Othering around the globe also underlay many portrayals of the 'Self' and the 'Other' in the Asianist context in the first half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century.<sup>12</sup> Most prominently, it can be observed in the iconic portrayal of the European 'Self' awaiting the invasion by barbaric hordes from the 'East' in the famous Knackfuss painting (1895) that quickly became a symbol of Yellow Peril discourse.<sup>13</sup> As will be discussed below, the Knackfuss painting – originally no political cartoon or caricature but a painting commissioned by Kaiser Wilhelm II – inspired imitations that revealed a similar pattern to that described by Burke. Unsurprisingly, the Asianist visual discourse also followed the general trend regarding the positive portrayal of the 'Self' and the negative portrayal of the 'Other'. In any case, Burke's observations, which mainly rely on intra-European encounters and those of Europeans with peoples of the 'New World', may rather easily be transferred to the East Asian context. Here too, "most stereotypes of others [...] were and are either hostile, contemptuous or, at the very least, condescending. A psychologist would probably look for fear underlying the hatred and also for the unconscious projection of undesirable aspects of the self on the other."<sup>14</sup> The Yellow Peril discourse from the late 19<sup>th</sup> century onwards which helped to trigger Asianist discourse and visions of 'One Asia' in the following decades may serve as a rather fitting example of denigration on the basis of fear.<sup>15</sup>

In recent years, a number of historians have started to criticize "the merely 'illustrative' use of visual materials in historical scholarship"<sup>16</sup> and the fact that "when most historians think about images, they tend to see only illustrations for the arguments they have already derived from the documents in the archives"<sup>17</sup>. Critics have problematized "the 'logocentrism' of the discipline of history" and have called attention to "the relationship between text and image", the usefulness of visual sources in "exploring aspects of history that more conventionally-based textual histories ignore or discount".<sup>18</sup> Nevertheless, vi-

11 Peter Burke, *Eyewitnessing*, 125.

12 The theoretical framework of this Othering, albeit with a focus on texts, is Edward Said, *Orientalism*, New York 1979.

13 On Yellow Peril discourse see Heinz Gollwitzer, *Die gelbe Gefahr: Geschichte eines Schlagworts* [Yellow Peril: History of a Key Concept], Göttingen 1962.

14 Peter Burke, *Eyewitnessing*. Ithaca 2001, 126.

15 On the history and different conceptions of Asianism see *Pan-Asianism: A Documentary History*, Volume 1 (1850–1920) and Volume 2 (1920–Present), ed. by Sven Saaler and Christopher W. A. Szpilman, Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2011.

16 Johannes von Moltke, "von Moltke commentary", in: *Forum: German history after the visual turn* (25 September 2006), [http://www.h-net.org/~german/discuss/visual/visual\\_index.htm](http://www.h-net.org/~german/discuss/visual/visual_index.htm) (last accessed 8 July 2013).

17 David Crew, "The Power of Images?", in: *Forum: German history after the visual turn* (18 September 2006), [http://www.h-net.org/~german/discuss/visual/visual\\_index.htm](http://www.h-net.org/~german/discuss/visual/visual_index.htm) (last accessed 8 July 2013).

18 See contributions to *Forum: German history after the visual turn* by Elizabeth Otto (26 September 2006), Paul Betts (22 September 2006), and Lee Palmer Wandel (20 September 2006), [http://www.h-net.org/~german/discuss/visual/visual\\_index.htm](http://www.h-net.org/~german/discuss/visual/visual_index.htm) (last accessed 8 July 2013).



sual portrayals of 'Asia' and of its Others must be located in their respective political and textual contexts. In other words, Asianist visual discourse is part of a larger discourse on peoples, nations, and regions which had existed ever since the first (real or imagined) encounters had produced narratives of Asia *versus* Europe or the 'West' *versus* the 'East'.<sup>19</sup> This article aims to contribute to the supplementation of logocentric scholarship on Asianism by analyzing how maps and political cartoons used territorial elements to display different conceptions of a unified Asia. It focuses on Japan and China during the first half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, when Asianism had become a key concept in political discourse in East Asia. Specifically, this essay addresses the dominance of nationalist messages within the Asianist framework and the particular role played by territory as a central point of reference.

### 'One Asia' Contextualized

'Asia' as a concept first entered the consciousness of the people living in the so-defined region<sup>20</sup> during the 18<sup>th</sup> century and became widespread during the second half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century.<sup>21</sup> Initially, the concept only possessed a geographical and descriptive dimension. In the context of increasing economic and political penetration of East Asia by Western powers, from the late 19<sup>th</sup> century onwards, 'Asia' discourse was mainly directed against the 'West' as the imperialist colonizer of the 'East'.<sup>22</sup> In China and Japan, this discourse was complicated by the fact that the 'West' served as the model for modernisation advocated by reform-minded individuals in China, while in Japan it had even provided the rationale for far-reaching state-led modernising initiatives. In the light of (sincerely or strategically) positive views of the 'West', it was therefore difficult to establish an affirmative anti-Western 'Asia' discourse.<sup>23</sup> In addition, the anti-colonial dimension of 'Asia' discourse was limited by the fact that Japan itself was both Asian and an imperialist power. For pro-Western Chinese reformers, this led to a twisted love-hate relationship with Japan which was viewed both as a model of modernisation for China but also as

19 Over the last decade a large number of works have appeared on the topic of Asianism which would facilitate the discursive contextualization of visual Asianist materials that have, by contrast, received little attention in scholarship thus far. For a collection of historical Asianist documents see Pan-Asianism: A Documentary History. For a critique of the exclusion of visuals in these volumes see Dick Stegwers, "Review of Pan-Asianism: A Documentary History, Volume 1 (1850–1920) and Volume 2 (1920–Present)", *Monumenta Nipponica*, Volume 67, Number 2, 2012, 343–348: 347–348.

20 This study's spatial focus regarding Asia is on East Asia or Northeast Asia, and therein mainly Japan and China.

21 For the following overview see for Japan Yamamuro Shin'ichi, *Shisô kadai toshite no Ajia* [Asia as thought], Tokyo 2001, and for China Zhou Jiarong, "Jindai Zhongguoren de Yazhou guan" [Modern Chinese views of Asia], in: You Yudian (ed), *Zhongguo yu Yazhou* [China and Asia], Hongkong 1990: 221–239 and Rebecca E. Karl, "Creating Asia: China in the World at the Beginning of the Twentieth Century", *American Historical Review* 103–4, 1998, 1096–1118 as well as the Introduction in Saaler/Szpilman.

22 On this aspect see also Cemil Aydin, *The politics of anti-Westernism in Asia: visions of world order in pan-Islamic and pan-Asian thought*, New York 2007.

23 See Urs Matthias Zachmann, *China and Japan in the late Meiji period: China policy and the Japanese discourse on national identity, 1895–1904*, London 2009, 1–7.

the imperialist ‘Other’.<sup>24</sup> Chinese affirmations of ‘Asia’ therefore, suffered considerably from these constraints. For most Japanese, on the other hand, there was little need to embrace ‘Asia’ when an eclectic combination of Westernization and nationalism had worked rather well for the modernisation (*kindaika*) of Japan. Why should Japan redefine itself as a part of Asia or even identify itself with the “backward” and “uncivilized” company of Asia<sup>25</sup> when Japan had managed to react most successfully to encroachment by the Western powers since the mid-19<sup>th</sup> century? Ethnic-cultural proximity on the one hand, and the usefulness of ‘Asia’ as a concept for Japan’s further imperial expansion on the other hand provided the incentive for a gradual embrace of Asianist conceptions in mainstream Japanese political discourse from the early 1910s onwards.<sup>26</sup> These conceptions became all the more plausible when Asia’s ‘Other’ – “Europe and America” (Jp. *Ô-Bei*, Ch. *Ou-Mei*) – displayed a different side of its assumedly superior civilization in the massively destructive First World War and in anti-Asian exclusionist policies.<sup>27</sup> ‘Asia’ as a regionalist discursive unit<sup>28</sup> and an imagined civilizational, ethnic, or imperial entity, had the potential to challenge the prerogative of the nation state as the main territorial entity. The nation state, however, remained the main territorial unit providing sovereignty in the international setting and granting civil rights domestically. In addition, Wilson’s declaration of the right to self-determination and the creation of the internationalist League of Nations emphasized the role of the nation state, as an aim to achieve or as political reality. The fact that non-Western or non-White nations, including Japan, had not been able to establish themselves on equal footing at Versailles and in its aftermath only reinforced the significance of national strength and the relevance of nationalism.<sup>29</sup> Consequently, the mainstream of Asianist discourse after World War One remained premised on the necessity and existence of the nation state. Of course, this Asianist rationale fit all too well into the expansionist policy adopted by the Japanese military and government from the early 1930s onwards.

24 See Zachmann, *China and Japan*, 59–60 and Douglas Reynolds, *China, 1898–1912: the Xinhai revolution and Japan*, Cambridge 1993, 5–6.

25 This position was most famously expressed in Fukuzawa Yukichi’s “Datsu A Ron” [On Leaving Asia], 1885. An English translation of this classical essay is available in Japan: a documentary history: The Late Tokugawa Period to the Present, David John Lu (ed.), New York 1996, 351–353.

26 See Torsten Weber, „Unter dem Banner des Asianismus“: Transnationale Dimensionen des japanischen Asianismus-Diskurses der Taishô-Zeit (1912–26), *Comparativ*, Vol. 18, No. 6 (2008), 34–52.

27 See Michael Adas, “Contested Hegemony: The Great War and the Afro-Asian. Assault on the Civilizing Mission Ideology”, *Journal of World History* 15, no. 1. (March 2004), 31–63 and Cemil Aydin, *Anti-Westernism*, Chapter 5.

28 For a discussion of Asianism in the context of historical regionalism see Prasenjit Duara, “Asia Redux: Conceptualizing a Region for Our Times”, *Journal of Asian Studies* 69–4 (November 2010), 963–983.

29 For the impact of World War and Versailles on the spread of nationalism in East Asia see Erez Manela, *The Wilsonian Moment. Self-Determination and the International Origins of Anticolonial Nationalism*, Oxford 2007 and Rana Mitter, *A bitter revolution: China’s struggle with the modern world*, Oxford & New York 2004.

## Asia and the Nation in Maps

Two main topics dominate visual portrayals of Asia in maps. The first of these was Asia's self-formation in opposition to non-Asia or the 'West'. Because of its direct adjacency, this 'West' in maps was mostly Europe, whereas in political cartoons America could easily join or substitute Europe as Asia's 'Other'. The second topic was Asia's self-formation *within*, that is, the inclusion of certain parts within the concept by inferring sameness, usually racial or cultural commonality or geographical proximity. This second issue, of course, is informed by and depends on which parts are portrayed as non-Asia or as non-core Asia. Unsurprisingly, Asia discourse in Japan and China – at least in its affirmative – centred on Japan and China as core parts of Asia. In this respect, despite some exceptions, much of Japanese and Chinese 'Asia' discourse in fact is more accurately described as 'East Asia' or 'China & Japan plus surroundings' discourse. Probably as a consequence of this focus on a defined core region, membership in the category 'Asia' was rather flexible at the edges. In a collection of some of the earliest Japanese maps of the world (1875), different lines of demarcation suggest a loose understanding of the territorial boundaries of "Asia". One map from this collection defined the Western boundaries of Asia as the Ural River and Mountains but excluded the Muslim Western part of Asia, which it subsumed under the term "Europe".<sup>30</sup> A different map from the same collection, however, includes in its representation of "Asia" the Arabian Peninsula and Turkey.<sup>31</sup> At any rate, the inner-outer opposition of Asia and Europe, however flexible, implies internal homogeneity and unity of the two regions – be it as an assumed fact or a political goal. Moving 130 years ahead into the early 21<sup>st</sup> century, few would claim that "Asia is one".<sup>32</sup> Transnational scholarly and activist projects throughout Asia, however, use the idea of Asian commonality as a vehicle to overcome nationalist chauvinism and rifts in historical consciousness that obstruct reconciliation and peaceful coexistence in the region.<sup>33</sup> Visual portrayals of an Asia without national borders therefore bear the political message stressing regional cooperation and commonality over national differences. In the more recent efforts at reconciling divergent narratives of the modern history of China, Japan, and Korea, a private tri-national joint historical research committee has aimed at producing a more balanced and common historical consciousness among East Asians.<sup>34</sup> To-

30 See "Japanese study map of the world" (Ansha Sekai Chizu), 1875, from the collection of Kobe University, Sumita library, 5C-168, 2-8, 1875, MID: 00163996; [http://www.lib.kobe-u.ac.jp/directory/sumita/5C-168/basic/5C-168\\_02.html](http://www.lib.kobe-u.ac.jp/directory/sumita/5C-168/basic/5C-168_02.html) (last accessed 8 July 2013). The map does not indicate national borders or any other sub-regional specifications.

31 See "Japanese study map of the world" (Ansha Sekai Chizu), 1875, from the collection of Kobe University, Sumita library, 5C-168, 3-8, 1875, MID: 00163996; [http://www.lib.kobe-u.ac.jp/directory/sumita/5C-168/basic/5C-168\\_03.html](http://www.lib.kobe-u.ac.jp/directory/sumita/5C-168/basic/5C-168_03.html) (last accessed 8 July 2013). This map indicates national borders.

32 For an Asianist-inclined rebuttal of the idea of Asian unity see Amitav Acharya, "Asia Is Not One", *Journal of Asian Studies*, 69-04 (November 2010), 100-1013.

33 On these networks and activities see East Asia beyond the history wars: confronting the ghosts of violence, ed. by Tessa Morris-Suzuki, London / New York 2013.

34 See Claudia Schneider, "The Japanese History Textbook Controversy in East Asian Perspective", *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. 617 (May 2008), 107-122.

gether with this agenda, the map on the cover of the book works as a mission statement. The four letters of “Asia” in Roman script are made up of letters from the three countries’ names plus the term “history”. The territory displayed by the map is white, representing the empty pages of Asia’s history to be written jointly and without nationalist divisions. While the letters of the country names consist only of empty frames, ‘Asia’ is printed in red letters, thereby suggesting that the territory which forms the spatial background of the historical narrative is best understood and referred to as ‘Asia’, not Japan, China, and Korea. As the overcoming of national borders is the main objective of this project, and the irrelevance of the borders is the main political message of the map, Asia’s Western ‘Other’ is absent. Here, it is not required as the *national* histories take the role of the ‘Other’ vis-à-vis transnational historiography.

Although regarding content and intention the tri-national history textbook can hardly be compared to collaborationist war-time propaganda, a similar strategy of portraying Asian territory can be observed. Wang Jingwei’s collaborationist Nanjing regime (1941–44/45)<sup>35</sup> published a number of journals aimed at persuading Chinese to take a conciliatory stance towards Japan and to support the project of erecting a unified ‘Greater Asia’. On the cover of the *Greater Asianism and East Asian League* (Da Yazhou zhuyi yu Dongya Lianmeng) monthly that was published in Nanjing from 1942 to 1944, a map of ‘Greater Asia’ appeared in white, without any borders and including parts of Western Asia. As an instrument of political discourse or propaganda directed at the Chinese, the map displayed some unique characteristics that differed from most Japanese portrayals of Asia at that time. First, Japan was hardly visibly at the periphery and appeared even smaller than normal since the scale was stretched. Second, the central position was taken by China. This visual rhetoric coincided with much of the textual discourse produced by the Wang regime.<sup>36</sup> Although in principle Wang was pro-Japanese, his embrace of Japanese policies and Japan in general did not lead to a complete submission to the Japanese. Also, of course, in order to set up a rival agenda to the Chinese Communists and opposing powers within his *Guomindang* (Nationalist Party), a Sino-centric conception of Greater Asia that marginalized Japan was easier to sell to a Chinese audience.

35 On Wang’s regime see Dongyoun Hwang, “Some Reflections on war-time collaboration in China: Wang Jingwei and his group in Hanoi” (Working Papers in Asian/Pacific Studies 98-02), ed. Anne Allison, Arif Dirlik, Tomiko Yoda, 1998.

36 See Torsten Weber, “Nanjing’s Greater Asianism, 1940”, Pan-Asianism, Vol. 2, 209-219.




Figure 1: Cover of a tri-national modern history textbook, 2006<sup>37</sup> (left)

Figure 2: Cover of the Chinese collaborationist journal 'Greater Asianism and East Asian League', 1942<sup>38</sup> (right)

In contrast, comparable Japanese maps of Asia differed notably in two respects. First, although Japan was portrayed as a part of Asia, it was clearly distinguished from other parts of the region through the indication of national borders. The *Nichi-Man Kōron* journal even distinguished Japan's Korean colony by name, although it was given the same colour as Japan. The *Dai Ajiashugi* journal, too, portrayed Asia with national borders. Although it could be argued that these Asianist journals deplored the fragmented and shattered state of Asia which they were seeking to overcome, from the context provided by the journals it appears more likely that their conception of 'One Asia' never included the abolition of national borders. 'Greater Asia' to them meant an alliance of Asian nations with pro-Japanese regimes that would otherwise, at least in name, remain "independent".

37 Ni-Chū-Kan san koku kyōtsū rekishi kyōzai iinkai [Committee for shared history teaching materials of the three countries of Japan, China, and Korea] (ed), *Mirai o hiraku Rekishi* [History that opens up the future], Tokyo 2006 (Japanese version), reproduced with kind permission of Koubunken Publishers Tokyo. All reasonable efforts have been made to identify and contact copyright holders but in some cases these could not be traced. If you hold or administer rights for materials published here, please contact the editors.

38 Inaugural issue of the monthly *Da Yazhou zhuyi yu Dongya Lianmeng* [Greater Asianism and East Asian League], published in Nanjing, October 1942.

Second, as opposed to the collaborationist Chinese journal, in these Japanese journals the islands of Japan were portrayed as central even at the cost of including “empty” areas of the Pacific Ocean to Japan’s East.<sup>39</sup> While this focus on Japan may be convincing on the case of the Japanese-Manchurian journal, there is no geographical justification for positioning Japan as centrally as the *Dai Ajiashugi* journal does. The map here works as an obvious political instrument, implying that Japan – despite its small size and peripheral location – together with its colonial possessions in the South (Taiwan), to the West (Korea) and to the North (Sakhalin) was still the centre of a “Greater Asia”, even if Asia stretched as far west as the Caspian Sea.



Figure 3: Cover of the *Nichi-Man Kōron* [Raise Japan and Manchuria] monthly, 1939<sup>40</sup> (left)




Figure 4: *Dai Ajiashugi* [Greater Asianism] journal, published by the Greater Asia Association from 1933 to 1945<sup>41</sup> (right)

39 It is difficult to see whether the area east of Japan was indeed completely “empty” or “blank” or whether the group of islands there were too small to be identified in print.

40 *Nichi-Man Kōron* 12-2, March 1939. The journal was published in the Japanese language in Mukden, an ancient capital of Manchuria (today’s Shenyang). Reproduced with kind permission from the collection of Waseda University Library.

41 *Dai Ajiashugi*, October 1933. Reproduced with kind permission from the collection of Waseda University Library.



As these maps reveal, even in a regionalist context the map may work as “the perfect symbol of the state”<sup>42</sup>, in particular when regionalist conceptions were imperialist-oriented, as many Japanese conceptions of Greater Asia from the 1930s onwards doubtlessly were. These historical legacies serve as the background to attempts at redefining affirmative conceptions of ‘Asia’ today, for example in the case of the 2005 history textbook introduced above. The territorial dimension is of particular importance, at least if Japan or Japanese are involved, because contemporary regionalist visions appear to be compelled to demonstrate their difference from anything that resembles the historical expansion of Japan’s empire. This has led to a self-imposed de-centralisation of Japan. In a positive iteration of the well-known “cartographic David-and-Goliath contest” that has frequently been used as visual evidence of an assumedly threatening encirclement of a small nation by its bigger neighbours,<sup>43</sup> these portrayals trivialize the actual role of Japan as a political and economic powerhouse in the region.

The most elaborate and creative contemporary Japanese example is Wada Haruki’s map of Northeast Asia.<sup>44</sup> Wada, an expert on Russian and Korean history and fervent propagator of “new regionalism” in East Asia, has not only decentralized Japan but also turned the conventional perspective of maps upside down. This new perspective allows Wada to visualize Northeast Asia as a network of islands and peninsulas including Hawaii, Alaska, Korea, Taiwan, and Japan. In addition, his Northeast Asia consists of Russia, China, and Mongolia, of which all, with the exception of Mongolia, have extensive sea borders and islands as part of their state territories.

Consequently, Wada calls his regionalist view “Maritime Asia”. This vision of Asia as a network of islands has little relevance to Wada’s conception of regionalism with regard to cultural aspects. Rather, the territorial dimension is more symbolic and preemptive of criticism, yet it is central to his claim: in true regionalism, national borders ought to be transcended and the role of the nation state must be put into perspective. By changing the perspective on territory, the significance of place and the inherent hierarchy of nations based on their size and location is challenged. As a consequence, the conventional focus on territory in the representation of the nation state is questioned. In Wada’s proposal Asia becomes a “union of Northeast Asian islands” and the place of nation states is taken by islands, mostly on the sub-national level such as Hawaii, Okinawa, and Cheju. In addition, Wada argues that the historical, political, economical and cultural diversity and heterogeneity in that area is overcome by the presence of Korean diasporas throughout the region.

42 Mark S. Monmonier, *How to lie with maps*, 88.

43 See Mark S. Monmonier, *How to lie with maps*, 94-107. Examples include Germany of 1914 (in between France and Russia) and Israel “encircled” by neighbouring Arab nations.

44 For an English summary of Wada’s “new regionalism” see his “Maritime Asia and the Future of a Northeast Asia Community”, *Japan Focus* (27 October 2008), [http://www.japanfocus.org/\\_Wada\\_Haruki-Maritime\\_Asia\\_and\\_the\\_Future\\_of\\_a\\_Northeast\\_Asia\\_Community](http://www.japanfocus.org/_Wada_Haruki-Maritime_Asia_and_the_Future_of_a_Northeast_Asia_Community) (last accessed 8 July 2013).



Figure 5 Wada Haruki's "Complete map of Northeast Asia", including Hawaii, Alaska, and parts of Russia, 2003 (above).<sup>45</sup>

Figure 6 Wada Haruki's "Complete map of the Sea of Japan Rim", with Korea at the centre, 2003 (below)<sup>46</sup>; reproduced with kind permission of Heibonsha Publishers, Tokyo.

45 From Wada Haruki, *Tôhoku Ajia kyôdô no ie* [Common House of Northeast Asia], Tokyo 2003, 6.

46 From Wada Haruki, *Tôhoku Ajia*, 7.



His map of the Sea of Japan rim, therefore, centres on Korea rather than Japan. More than any other map, Wada's decentralized and unorthodox look at the globe facilitates the inclusion, if not prioritization, of a human dimension of political cartography in the geopolitics of 'Asia' as displayed in maps.<sup>47</sup>

### Political Cartoons as Civilizational Portrayals of Asia

A second genre that has exerted immense influence on political discourse, especially with the rise of mass media, is visual portrayals such as political cartoons. While they command less credibility and objectivity than maps, their impact on political consciousness may be even greater.<sup>48</sup> Combining elements of information and entertainment, exaggeration and stereotypes, political cartoons have been a major and popular instrument of mainstream opinion formation, both in democratic and totalitarian systems.<sup>49</sup> Mostly, their messages are clear, simple, and easy to understand and to reproduce in political discourse, although some may only be consumed by a well-informed audience that is able to comprehend contexts and allusions. Cartoons do not typically include explicit references to geo- or cartographic aspects, but more frequently, as opposed to maps, refer to territory figuratively through portrayals of human beings as representatives of nations, religions, regions, etc. If territoriality can be understood as "a primary geographical expression of social power" and "an effective instrument to reify and depersonalize power"<sup>50</sup> then visual portrayals of 'Self' and 'Other' or friend and enemy are persuasive tools for reclaiming the human dimension in territorial relations. Political cartoons that include portrayals of people work particularly well in this process of re-personalization of territorial power as they literally give caricatures a human (or inhuman) face.

Because political cartoons are often more suggestive, inventive, and original than maps, they can easily become visualized arguments themselves or visualizations of existing political viewpoints. Through repeated reproduction and (sometimes satirical) reference, some have become icons of political discourse and collective memory. In the context of historical Asian auto- and xeno-stereotypisation, the famous Knackfuss painting – though not a political cartoon or caricature in the strict sense – is probably the only visual portrayal that has become a political icon itself.<sup>51</sup> Commissioned in 1895 by Kaiser Wilhelm II, whose name would later become inseparably linked with Yellow Peril discourse, the painting by German painter Hermann Knackfuss portrays Asia in the form of a sitting

47 Wada stresses this aspect not only by calling his vision for Northeast Asia "home" or "house" but also by referring to the presence of the Korean diaspora throughout the region as an element that binds the regions together in a human way. See Wada 2008.

48 See Roy Douglas, *The World War 1939–1945. The Cartoonists' vision*. London 1990, ix–xii.

49 See Priska Jones, *Europa in der Karikatur [Europe in caricature]*, Frankfurt/M. 2009.

50 Sack after Anssi Paasi, "Territory", 111.

51 By political icon, this essay proposes to understand a ubiquitous image which aims at the propagation of a particular political message in mainstream discourse. See Michael Diers, *Schlagbilder [Key Visuals]* Frankfurt/M. 1997.

Buddha and Asia's 'Other', Europe, as an assembly of national patrons or personifications of nations, such as France's Marianne and Great Britain's Britannia under the leadership of Germany's Saint Michael.<sup>52</sup> While Europe is portrayed as a collective of strong and upright, yet diverse, people united under the cross of Christianity, Asia is visualized as mysterious, obscure, potentially dangerous, and homogeneous.

The concrete political message of this painting ("Peoples of Europe! Protect your holiest goods!"), and of Yellow Peril discourse more generally, is captured well by the inclusion of a territorial dimension. Western civilization and Christianity is bound to a place, namely Europe, that needs to be defended against the Buddhist, that is heathen, East. In the political context of the late 19<sup>th</sup> century – the coming conflict between Russia and Japan – Wilhelm II apparently meant to encourage Russia to function as the bulwark of the Christian West against the infidel East. While the painting failed to inspire Russia to victory in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904/05 it did not fail to inspire political discourse. For example, the German satirical journal *Kladderadatsch* published a cartoon that satirized the hypocritical nature of the Knackfuss painting; Chinese are portrayed in fear of a European Christian missionary.<sup>53</sup> While Christian missionaries had been active in China and Japan for centuries and had caused tremendous social uproar there, neither Buddhism nor any other teaching or belief from those countries had had any notable influence on Western societies. Therefore, in this cartoon and in reality, too, the West needed to fear the East (East Asia) much less than vice versa as the political, economic, and ideological penetration of East Asia by European colonialism had proved. This reversed logic underlay self-affirmative Asia discourse in Japan and China from the early 1910s onwards when Western Yellow Peril discourse was countered by White Peril discourse<sup>54</sup>. As the white races, according to its rationale, continued to colonize and oppress Asia, the "yellow races" needed to fully realize their situation, form an alliance of yellow peoples under the banner of Greater Asianism, and resist this oppression or even take revenge on the Whites of Euro-America. Asia's territory needed to be liberated from Western aggressors in order to protect Asian peoples and their civilizations.<sup>55</sup> Protecting their own self-ascribed civilizational characteristics required, both in Western Yellow Peril and in Asian White Peril discourse, the defense of one's "own" territory by force against real or potential intruders.

52 Hermann Knackfuss, „Völker Europas, wahret Eure heiligsten Güter“ [Peoples of Europe! Protect your holiest goods!], 1895, [http://www.dhm.de/ausstellungen/tsingtau/katalog/fotos/aus2\\_1.htm](http://www.dhm.de/ausstellungen/tsingtau/katalog/fotos/aus2_1.htm) (last accessed 8 July 2013).

53 Gustav Brandt, "In Frankreich erschallt der Ruf: Völker Chinas wahret Eure heiligsten Güter, denn unsere Missionare kommen" [Peoples of China! Protect your holiest goods because our missionaries are on their way!], *Kladderadatsch*, 55-1 (January 1902), 15, <http://www.payer.de/religionskritik/karikaturen134.htm> (last accessed 7 November 2013).

54 See Sven Saaler, "The Construction of Regionalism in Modern Japan: Kōdera Kenkichi and his 'Treatise on Greater Asianism' (1916)", *Modern Asian Studies*, 41 (2007), 1261-1294.

55 On this aspect see Iikura Akira, *Ierō Periru no Shinwa: Teikoku Nihon to Kōka no Gyakusetsu* [The Myth of the Yellow Peril: Imperial Japan and the Paradox of the Yellow Danger], Tokyo 2004.

As the cases above illustrate, visual portrayals in political discourse may be particularly useful and effective in times of crisis and war.<sup>56</sup> It is not surprising, therefore, that during the Pacific War (1941–45) political cartoons became ubiquitous tools of persuasion or propaganda on both sides of the Pacific. As John Dower has argued in his study of American portrayals of Japan and vice versa, “the pure Self and the demonic Other were such polar extremes that they made the work of many polemicists and artists fairly easy”<sup>57</sup>. Their work, however, became more complicated when the dividing lines between ‘Self’ and ‘Other’ could not be drawn as easily between East and West as in the cases studied by Dower. Asianist rhetoric, be it visual or textual, of course drew heavily on anti-Western stereotypes in order to define Asia’s “pure Self” against the “demonic” West. Yet, in addition, it also had to overcome dividing lines within Asia, namely between the Japanese and other Asians, who – according to official propaganda – had to follow Japanese guidance if they were to be liberated from Western colonialism. In order to create a context that would not too obviously ignore or beautify political reality, Chinese Asianist discourse, mainly propagated by Wang Jingwei’s collaborationist regime, relied on a combined strategy of implicitly pro-Japanese Sino-centrism<sup>58</sup> and anti-Westernism. Similar to the way Chinese collaborationist maps had portrayed China as the centre and Japan at the periphery of a Greater Asia, political cartoons, too, were characterized by a focus on Chinese leadership of Asia and, at least implicitly, attempts to marginalize Japan’s role. As can be seen in the original Knackfuss painting (1895), Buddha functioned as a symbol of Asia, in opposition to Western Christianity. Chinese claims to leadership, however, largely ignored Buddhism but instrumentalized Confucius and Confucianism as the unifying element and symbol of ‘One Asia’. Thereby, Wang was able to establish a Sinocentric conception of Asianism that clearly differed from the war-driven Japanese way of uniting Asia. In the place of Japan a peace-promoting Confucius was displayed as “the guiding teacher of the Asian peoples”.

In this cartoon, a teacher dressed in Chinese clothes and pointing to Confucius explains to an assembly of Asians dressed in different traditional clothes a phrase from the Confucian Doctrine of the Mean (*Zhongyong*), ending with “creating ever-lasting peace in all the world” (*wei wanshi kai taiping*). Below the Chinese teacher, a Japanese soldier is pointing at the picture of Confucius, like a good student who is imitating his teacher. Though he represents military force his position is clearly subordinate to that of the teacher. Portrayed in this way – and coinciding with Japanese war-time rhetoric according to which lasting peace could only be established by the liberation of all Asians from Western oppression – the cartoon draws a rather explicit line of demarcation between Chinese traditional teachings and Japanese reality. The Japanese, it is implied, had

56 For a discussion of the role of cartoons during the Second World War with a focus on Europe see Roy Douglas, *The World War 1939–1945*, ix–xii.

57 John Dower, *War Without Mercy*, New York 1986, 250.

58 For reappraisals of Wang’s critical collaboration with the Japanese see Andrew Cheung: “Slogans, Symbols, and Legitimacy: The Case of Wang Jingwei’s Nanjing Regime” (Indiana East Asian Working Paper Series on Language and Politics in Modern China, No. 6), 1995 and Hwang 1998.

adopted the Western civilizational traits of aggression and war; now they needed to be reminded of their civilization's Sinic roots. This reminder was nothing new to the Japanese: in 1924, shortly before his death, Sun Yat-sen, the founder of modern China and a frequent visitor to Japan, had delivered a speech on Greater Asianism in the Japanese city of Kobe. In it, he elaborated on the Confucian distinction between the virtuous rule of right (*wangdao*) and the despotic rule of might (*badao*) as the essence of Asian commonality. Sun had closed his speech by asking the Japanese whether they wanted to become “the watchdog of Western rule of might” or function as “the stronghold of Eastern rule of virtue”.<sup>59</sup>



Figure 7 Confucius as “the teacher of the Asian peoples”, 1942<sup>60</sup>

59 For Sun's speech and contemporary reactions see Chin Tokujin and Yasui Sankichi (eds.), *Son Bun kôen 'Dai Ajiashugi' shiryô shû* [Collection of materials of Sun Yat-sen's 'Greater Asianism' speech], Kyoto 1989; quotes from page 80.

60 “Yazhou minzu de daoshi” [Teacher of the Asian Peoples], *Dongya lianmeng huabao* [East Asian League Pictorial], Sept. 1942.

The memory of Sun and his conception of Greater Asianism, as opposed to Japanese Asianist conceptions, played a central role in Chinese collaborationist discourse.<sup>61</sup> This allowed Wang and his regime to stay terminologically within the framework set by the Japanese while differing conceptually. The main message, however, was anti-Western. In Sun's distinction between *wangdao* and *badao*, Europe (and America) is portrayed as a culture of scientific materialism, force, and war, whereas traditional Asian, meaning Chinese, culture is characterized by benevolence, justice, and morality. The threat expressed in this dichotomous view of East *versus* West also refers to territorial rights. Western rule of might has obtained Asian territory and thereby also threatens Eastern ideals and social order. As Sun had argued in his Kobe speech in 1924, only control over one's territory enables a status of complete independence. Asia therefore, Sun had explained, included only two independent countries, located at the very Western and Eastern extremes: Turkey and Japan. In order to re-establish the virtuous rule of right according to Confucian principles, the Asian peoples first needed to regain sovereignty over their lands.

This theme of territorial self-determination was more explicit in political cartoons that combined civilizational and geopolitical elements. There, too, the national or ethnic differences among Asians were visibly depicted but put into perspective by their joint actions. Typically, such images portrayed Asians joining hands, touching each other in joy, or facing in the same direction. Cooperation of Asians against the Westerners – usually symbolized by the British and Americans – is emphasized as the means to regain control over their native lands. The Japanese are actively involved in establishing “Greater East Asia” by, practically, kicking out the British and Americans, but Asians can only enjoy harmonious lives and celebrate a “cheerful and bright” future as the result of cooperation.<sup>62</sup> In a cartoon that portrays the “rise of a union of East Asian peoples”, the anti-Western aspect is alluded to by the joint march of Asians carrying weapons.<sup>63</sup> A rising sun in the background here functions as the future map of a borderless Asia in which Japan is portrayed disproportionately large, yet still trumped by China which is, of course, much larger and positioned at the centre. The group is led by Chinese and, as in the cases above, Japanese participation is prominent but subordinate.

Probably in an attempt to make the message of these political cartoons more credible to their Chinese audience, the *East Asian League Pictorial* also introduced *manhua* (manga) from other parts of Asia. In a very familiar fashion, a three-picture-cartoon from Burma (recently occupied by Japan) visually explained the situation of the Burmese people during and after the presence of Western colonial forces. The first picture shows a fat British man smoking a cigar, possibly a caricature of Winston Churchill, sitting at the centre of the Asian side of the globe, next to an American (Uncle Sam). Three Asians, probably signifying different Burmese ethnicities (Burmese, Chinese, Indian), are looking at them

61 See Weber “Nanjing’s Greater Asianism, 1940”, Pan-Asianism.

62 A typical example is “Yukuai yu minglang” [Cheerful and bright], *Dongya lianmeng huabao* [East Asian League Pictorial], June 1942.

63 An example can be found in “Women xieliang xin Dongya jianshe qiantu maijin” [We cooperate to advance in big strides the erection of a new East Asia], *Dongya lianmeng huabao* [East Asian League Pictorial], April 1942.

resentfully, but they are obviously helpless. In the second picture, a Japanese soldier arrives and together with the three Burmese pushes the American and Briton from the globe. The third picture shows the three Burmese and the Japanese soldier united in jubilant poses, singing songs of joy together while the Japanese cheerfully plays the accordion.




Figure 8 Introducing a political cartoon from the “street corners” of (Japanese occupied) Burma to Chinese readers, 1942.<sup>64</sup>

Although, compared to Chinese collaborationist cartoons, the role of Japan is more central and proactive, this cartoon, too, includes the two typical characteristics of anti-Westernism and Japanophile self-centrism. The political message of this cartoon, and of the previous one, is obvious: joining hands with the Japanese is the way to solve national problems without having to give up one’s own national self-esteem. ‘Asia’, it insinuates, can be a joint project of all Asians for the sake of one’s own nation as long as everyone is willing to cooperate with Japan. While many of the cartoons studied above relied on and reinforced nationality visually, they also portrayed the political community as a supra-national *regional* community, albeit with an imperialist inflection. Territory formation in this way was easy to depict visually and possibly entertaining to consume, but it proved impossible to implement. Imperialist visions of ‘One Asia’ ended as nightmares – both for the Asian ‘Self’ and the Asian ‘Other’.

## Conclusion

The controversy about the Muhammad cartoons first printed in a Danish newspaper in 2005 may serve as a more recent reminder of the lasting impact of visuals on political discourse and daily life. Indeed, the “century of images”<sup>65</sup> has not ended with the end of

64 “Miantian jietou xuanchuan manhua jieshao” [Introducing propaganda cartoons from the street corners of Burma], *Dongya lianmeng huabao* [East Asian League Pictorial], Sept. 1942.

65 Gerhard Paul, “Das Jahrhundert der Bilder. Die visuelle Geschichte und der Bildkanon des kulturellen Gedächtnisses” [The Century of Images. The visual history and canon of cultural memory], *Das Jahrhundert der Bilder* [The Century of Images], ed. Gerhard Paul, Göttingen 2009, 14-39.



the century. Historically, the “rhetoric of images”<sup>66</sup> as expressed in maps and political cartoons has played a key role in the way people have been persuaded to define themselves territorially, to fight for territorial revisions, or to accept given territorializations. Images visualize, and therefore make explicit, territorial dimensions that remain abstract in written political discourse and are rarely experienced in daily life. Many territorial disputes between Asian countries even in the present, such as the ongoing Sino-Japanese quarrel over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, would lose some of their impact if they could not be visualized, in maps or otherwise. Cartoons, through their simplistic exaggerations and satirical portrayals, often add a human side to political discourse; they are more suggestive, more insulting, and less balanced or nuanced. As such, they are particularly well suited to be carriers and catalysts of political controversy and dispute, and to serve as tools of political propaganda. With regard to territory, cartoons facilitate the inclusion of a human or social dimension that re-personalizes geographically expressed power relations. Like their textual counterparts, visual portrayals of ‘One Asia’ during the first half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century remained focused on the nation. When opposition to a different region or common enemies *without* was stressed, the national dimension frequently stepped into the background, but rarely disappeared completely. Instead, visions of ‘One Asia’ often reproduced and reinforced the national competition for leadership and dominance. During a period of heightened nationalism, nations and nation states were not only taken as natural givens but also, in particular where nation state formation was still underway, as the legitimate purpose of historical development and human effort. In this context, regionalist conceptions of “macro-nationalisms”<sup>67</sup> fraternized easily with imperialism. Today, as the political and economic organisation of life has become more trans-nationalized and discourse on Asian regional integration is accompanied by practical steps towards integration,<sup>68</sup> the transcendence of nations and national borders (“transnational”) has started to substitute the national paradigm. Simultaneously, new visions of Asian commonality have emerged that address the danger of a renewed fraternization of transnational regionalism with new forms of de-territorialized imperialism.<sup>69</sup> Within this framework, Wada Haruki, whose map of Northeast Asia challenges the conventional and self-centred way of looking at the region without abandoning nation states immediately, has called for a “new utopia” to build a “common house of Northeast Asia”. As his map of Northeast Asia implies, the problem of territorialisation cannot be overcome simply by transcending the geographical boundaries that have been used for centuries as a social means to control people.<sup>70</sup> Rather, Wada argues, what is required is a reform-oriented utopian mindset that allows for putting political, national, religious and other boundaries into perspective, thereby facilitating peaceful cooperation and exchange, dis-

66 W. J. T. Mitchell, *Iconology: Image, Text, Ideology*, Chicago 1986, 1-2.

67 Louis L. Snyder, *Macro-nationalisms: a history of the pan-movements*, Westport 1984.

68 See *A new East Asia: toward a regional community*, ed. Kazuko Mori and Kenichiro Hirano, Singapore 2007.

69 See, in general, Michael Hardt & Antonio Negri, *Empire*, Cambridge/London 2000 and, with particular reference to East Asia, Kuan-hsing Chen, *Asia as method: toward deimperialization*, Durham 2010.

70 See R. D. Sack, *Human Territoriality*, 5.

cussion and respect as a first step towards “making the impossible possible and pursuing the realization of the unthinkable: utopia”. As Wada concludes, “if a ‘common house of Northeast Asia’ can be realized, a common house of the human race, a common house of the whole planet may be possible, too.”<sup>71</sup> New images and ideas of territoriality, or rather of de-territorialisation, may thus contribute to dissociating a given territory from social control exercised within defined boundaries, be they local, national, or regional.

71 Wada Haruki, *Tōhoku Ajia*, 266-270.



# **Universal Crime, Particular Punishment: Trying the Atrocities of the Japanese Occupation as Treason in the Philippines, 1947–1953**

**Konrad M. Lawson**

## **RESÜMEE**

Nach dem Ende der japanischen Besatzung der Philippinen 1945 wurden dort Prozesse zur Verfolgung von Kriegsverbrechen und von Landesverrat initiiert. Während im ersten Fall eine universalistische Kategorie von Verbrechen zur Strafe stand, ging es im zweiten Fall meist um den Verrat an der Nation, die als Opfer definiert wurde. Im Januar 1948 erklärte Manuel Roxas eine Präsidialamnestie für alle des Landesverrats Beschuldigten mit Ausnahme von Kollaborateuren aus dem Militär und der Polizei, Spionen, Informanten und gewalttätiger Verbrechen Beschuldigter. Die meisten der Fälle von Landesverrat, die diese Amnestie nicht umfasste, betrafen Personen, die Formen von Gräueln begangen hatte, die in Prozessen gegen Japaner als Kriegsverbrechen eingestuft wurden. Dieser Artikel untersucht den Prozess der gerichtlichen Aufarbeitung von Gewaltverbrechen und sexueller Gewalt, meist begangen durch Kollaborateure aus dem Militär und der Polizei, in den Philippinen nach 1945 gemäß dem Gesetz gegen Verrat. Im Mittelpunkt steht die Frage, inwiefern – ungeachtet der Tatsache, dass die Kriegsverbrecherprozesse der frühen Nachkriegszeit den Erwartungen in vielerlei Form nicht entsprachen – die alternative Kategorisierung von Brutalität im Krieg als Landesverrat nicht auch hochproblematisch war.

## **Introduction**

After the Second World War, prosecutors and judges of war crimes tribunals in Nuremberg and Tokyo, as well as in military tribunals and national courts around the world,

faced the accused in the name of humanity.<sup>1</sup> At the same time as Allied courts were adding new universal crimes to a roster listing violations of the rules of war, a parallel process of legal and extralegal retribution was being carried out against those accused of committing one of the oldest of crimes of betrayal, treason. Like the wartime leaders of the Axis nations, who were convicted for the crimes of underlings who followed their direct commands and carried out their policies, many of those accused of treason were powerful figures who served more or less reluctantly in brutal regimes established under military occupation. They often led security organs responsible for widespread torture and atrocities, or else were complicit in their violence through a failure to rein them in. Under the Japanese wartime occupation of the Philippines, from late 1941 to 1945, these included officials and local elites who worked with a “Philippine Executive Commission” and later served the Philippine Republic, which that was granted nominal independence by the Japanese in 1943. Others among the accused were at the bottom of the power hierarchy but confronted or participated in the daily violence of the Japanese occupation at close proximity, serving as auxiliaries, as soldiers, as informants, or in police and constabulary units. By an accident of birth, those who faced retribution were punished, for the most part, under the laws and rhetoric of treason rather than for committing the universal crimes represented in the world’s war crimes tribunals.

This article explores the process of trying the atrocities and sexual violence of military and constabulary collaborators with the 1941–1945 Japanese occupation of the Philippines under the law of treason and finds that, if early war crimes trials of the early postwar period fell short in many ways, punishing the brutality of war as betrayal was a deeply troubled alternative. These were Filipino citizens who, during the war, were called upon to carry out acts of extreme violence. These acts were justified as acts of sacrifice carried out in defense of both an Asian order their occupiers claimed to be the only bulwark against the injustices of Western imperialism, and on behalf of the new Philippine republic established under occupation. When the Philippines returned to American control and was once again granted independence in 1946, these same acts were denounced as examples of barbarity that breached universal laws. In the Philippine courts that tried them, however, it was more important to demonstrate disloyalty and betrayal than establish the scale and nature of their brutality in order to secure their convictions not for war crimes, but treason. The identity of the accused thus determined their crimes, while the prewar law of treason they were tried under defined the victim of their betrayal to be against not one, but two nation-states: a Philippine commonwealth that technically no longer existed, and the United States, the very colonial power a new Philippine republic was struggling to establish independence from.

1 In the Asia-Pacific, the most well known of these were the trials held under the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE), also known as the Tokyo Trials. See Madoka Futamura, *War Crimes Tribunals and Transitional Justice: The Tokyo Trial and the Nuremberg Legacy* (London; New York: Routledge, 2008) and Yuma Totani, *The Tokyo War Crimes Trial: The Pursuit of Justice in the Wake of World War II* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 2009).

The 1940s was a decade that saw many claims of liberation and independence in the Philippines. On the eve of the Japanese invasion of the archipelago in December 1941, the Philippines was an American colony that exercised limited autonomy under its Commonwealth President Manuel Quezon. Filipinos had been promised full independence by 1946 under the terms of the 1934 Tydings-McDuffie Act, but the arriving Japanese declared themselves agents of liberation come to help Filipinos cast off Western imperialism. Working closely with pre-occupation elites, who cooperated with the Japanese through a newly established Executive Commission and later a nominally independent Philippine Republic, the occupation authorities faced increasing resistance from a variety of U.S. supported, as well as independent, guerrilla forces.<sup>2</sup> Many of these groups radically increased the scale of their raids and the harassment of occupation forces after the return of U.S. forces in 1944.

The violence of the occupation itself is most memorably associated with the horrifying fate of surrendered Philippine and American soldiers in the Bataan Death March in the spring of 1942, the increasingly brutal counter-insurgency campaign of the Japanese military and its allies, and the atrocities of desperate Japanese forces defending Manila, especially in February, 1945.<sup>3</sup> War crimes associated with all of these atrocities would be the subject of trials of Japanese soldiers and officers after the war.<sup>4</sup> The collaboration of Filipinos with the Japanese occupation was handled separately. Formal investigations of collaborators were carried out by Counter-Intelligence Corps units attached to returning U.S. forces. The files related to these investigations were transferred to the Philippine government for use in treason trials of a newly established People's Court from late 1945. The resulting treason trials resulted in almost no convictions of major wartime officials and have received only limited attention from historians.<sup>5</sup>

In accounting for, and justifying, the leniency of the process, later historical accounts have tended to emphasize the colonial status of the Philippines and have juxtaposed the collaboration with the Japanese alongside the longstanding collaboration of Filipinos

2 On the often complex local dynamics of resistance and collaboration, see Alfred W. McCoy "Politics By Other Means": World War II in the Western Visayas, Philippines" in Alfred W. McCoy, ed., *Southeast Asia Under Japanese Occupation* (New Haven, Conn: Yale University Southeast Asia Studies, 1980) and Satoshi Ara, "Collaboration and Resistance: Catalino Hermosilla and the Japanese Occupation of Ormoc, Leyte (1942–1945)," *Philippine Studies: Historical and Ethnographic Viewpoints* 60(1) (2012): 33–68.

3 The most straightforward overview of the fall and recapture of the Philippines is still the U.S. official military history, Robert Ross Smith, *Triumph in the Philippines*, CMH Pub 5-10 (Washington, D.C: Center of Military History, U.S. Army, 1991).

4 In the Philippines, war crimes were tried in U.S. military trials and later in Philippine courts. See Richard L. Lael, *The Yamashita Precedent: War Crimes and Command Responsibility* (Wilmington, Del: Scholarly Resources, 1982), Sharon Williams Chamberlain, *Justice and Reconciliation: Postwar Philippine Trials of Japanese War Criminals in History and Memory* (Ph.D., United States, DC: The George Washington University, 2010) and Hitoshi Nagai, *Firipin to tainichi senpan saiban 1945-1953* [The War Crimes Trials and Japan-Philippines Relations, 1945-1953] (Tōkyō: Iwanami Shoten, 2010).

5 The treason trials in the Philippines, at least up to 1948, are treated in Augusto V. de Viana, *Kulaboretor!: The Issue of Political Collaboration During World War II* (Manila: University of Santo Tomas Pub. House, 2003) and David Joel Steinberg, *Philippine Collaboration in World War II* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1967).

with American rule.<sup>6</sup> In political debates and during the trials that followed Japanese defeat, however, the debate was rarely framed in post-colonial terms. Instead, wartime leaders of the Philippines leaned heavily upon the same two arguments, that local allies of military occupations employed around the world in their trials after the Second World War, from France to China: the “shield” defense, which claimed that collaboration mitigated the violence of the occupier, and the “double game” defense, which claimed that patriotic collaborators feigned allegiance to the enemy while secretly supplying aid to the resistance.<sup>7</sup>

These approaches achieved unparalleled success in the special Philippine People’s Courts for crimes of treason committed during the occupation set up in September, 1945, especially when combined with a compromised judiciary and weak support from the early postwar government of President Manuel Roxas. The crippled process is usually described as ending with a presidential amnesty signed by president Roxas as Proclamation Number 51, on January 28, 1948. The amnesty provided official validation for the “shield” defense, arguing that wartime collaborators believed in the necessity of their wartime roles. In the words of the amnesty, it “was their patriotic duty to execute them in the interest of the safety and well-being of their countrymen who were then at the mercy of the enemy” and they “did everything in their power to minimize the atrocities of the enemy...”<sup>8</sup>

The amnesty was not universal, however, declaring that, the “public sentiment” favoring mercy did “not extend to persons who voluntarily took up arms against the alleged nations or the members of the resistance forces, or acted as spies or informers of the enemy, or committed murder, arson, coercion, robbery, physical injuries or any other crime defined and punished in our penal laws.”<sup>9</sup> Anyone accused of these crimes would continue to face charges of treason, together with other crimes of violence, even after the dismantlement of the People’s Court system.

When the Philippine legislature debated the presidential amnesty in February, 1948, it was this contrast between the collaboration of the occupation’s governing elite and the informers and military collaborators that dominated the discussion. Was it fair, they asked, to punish thousands of largely poor and lower level collaborators who were at the site of the massacres, while exempting everyone higher up in the wartime apparatus? The legislature eventually ratified the amnesty by a large majority, but the trials of those

6 See, for example, Teodoro A. Agoncillo, *The Fateful Years: Japan’s Adventure in the Philippines, 1941-45* (Quezon City: R.P. Garcia Pub. Co, 1965) and Teodoro A. Agoncillo and Jorge B. Vargas, *The Burden of Proof: The Vargas-Laurel Collaboration Case* (Manila: University of the Philippines Press for the U.P.-Jorge B. Vargas Filipiniana Research Center, 1984).

7 For more on the framing of the treason debate in the Philippine legislature after the war see Konrad M. Lawson, *Wartime Atrocities and the Politics of Treason in the Ruins of the Japanese Empire 1937-1953* (Ph.D., United States, MA: Harvard University, 2012), 166-209.

8 Republic of Philippines “Proclamation No. 51 – A Proclamation Granting Amnesty” (January 28, 1948) <http://www.gov.ph/1948/01/28/proclamation-no-51-2/> (accessed 12 January, 2013).

9 Ibid.

who remained would reveal the challenges of punishing atrocities and wartime violence through trials dominated by the charge of treason.

### Military Collaboration in the Philippines

Who were the Filipinos who faced potential prosecution even after the 1948 amnesty? In the Philippines the two best known sources of armed support for Japanese occupation were the Bureau of Constabulary, which operated from around mid-1942 to its collapse as an (in)effective fighting force in the fall of 1944, and the League of Patriotic Filipinos, known by its abbreviated Tagalog name Makapili (Tagalog: Kalipunang Makabayan ng mga Pilipino, in Japanese: *firipin aikoku dôshi kai*), which was founded in November 1944 and lasted until the collapse of the Japanese occupation in the summer of 1945. There was also a number of other organizations, often with overlapping memberships.<sup>10</sup> The term Makapili referred to a concrete organization likely to number only a few thousand at most, but it was only one among many employed by the Japanese military in its final months on the archipelago. Increasingly, Makapili became a catch-all reference for those seen as the most enthusiastic lackeys of the Japanese occupation. At least one Japanese unit described their Makapili as an “assassination group”, though it is likely they carried out a variety of tasks, including labor.<sup>11</sup> In memoirs and histories of the Philippine occupation the word invokes horror, and is often associated, rightly or wrongly, with masked “magic eye” informers who pointed out suspected guerrillas to Japanese patrols.<sup>12</sup>

The largest and best, if still poorly equipped, force under arms in the occupied Philippines was the Bureau of Constabulary (BoC). The BoC, or just the Constabulary as it was more frequently called, was in many ways the successor to the Philippine Constabulary it was modeled upon, which had a long prewar history dating back to 1901.<sup>13</sup> Indeed, two

10 The *Yôin* (要員) is occasionally mentioned, although its members were most often engaged as laborers along the lines of the various auxiliaries that Japan employed all over occupied territories, often termed *heiho* (兵補). This organization was known to Filipinos, by a coincidence of pronunciation, as “United Nippon.” On various organizations that sometimes provided armed assistance to the Japanese in the final stage of the war, such as those under Aurelio Alvero and Artemio Ricarte, see Motoe Terami-Wada, “The Filipino Volunteer Armies,” in Setsuho Ikehata and Ricardo Trota Jose, eds., *The Philippines Under Japan: Occupation Policy and Reaction* (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1999), 88–90 and Grant Goodman “Aurelio Alvero: Traitor or Patriot?” *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 27, no. 1 (March 1, 1996): 95–103.

11 Description of Makapili in captured Japanese Naval Defense Force Headquarters report, translated by Allied Translator and Interpreter Service (4 February 1945), Claude M. Owens Papers, Box 2, Hoover Library, Stanford, California.

12 For more on memories of the Makapili and the “magic eye” see Konrad M. Lawson, *Wartime Atrocities and the Politics of Treason*, 193–196.

13 The most detailed history of the Philippine Constabulary and related organs in the pre- and post-war periods, though not during the war, is Alfred W. McCoy *Policing America's Empire: The United States, the Philippines, and the Rise of the Surveillance State* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2009). On the wartime constabulary see Ricardo Trota Jose, *Captive Arms: The Constabulary Under the Japanese, 1942–1944* (Manila: University of the Philippines, College of Social Sciences, 1997).

prewar heads of the Constabulary, Jose de los Reyes and Guillermo B. Francisco, were each made director, in turn, of its Japanese sponsored equivalent. The BoC was, however, structured somewhat differently from its predecessor in that it included all local police, and its military aspects were deliberately toned down by the Japanese military administration until the founding of the Republic in 1943.<sup>14</sup> The organization was established in early 1942, but it did not truly get off the ground until after the surrender of Bataan in April, when a large number of Philippine prisoners of war, many of them with prewar Constabulary experience, fell into Japanese hands.<sup>15</sup>

The BoC was never designed to fight alongside Japanese soldiers across its far-flung battlefronts in the manner of the Indian National Army that fought alongside the Japanese in Burma and across the border into India.<sup>16</sup> Instead they were to defend the homeland, carry out policing duties, and crush resistance to Japanese rule. The members of the BoC for the most part refused to fight the returning Americans in the fall of 1944 and deserted in large numbers; its total strength dropped from 18,000 in August to 7,500 in December before the Constabulary was completely disarmed in the spring of 1945.<sup>17</sup> Like Japan's local allies in occupied China, and others throughout its occupied territories, BoC officers did indeed widely engage in a "double game" before their mass desertion in 1944.<sup>18</sup> Even when they did serve, the ineffectual patrols of the BoC were usually preferred by the resistance to the more attentive ones by the Japanese.

At the same time it was equally clear that, prior to the fall of 1944, the BoC was increasingly active in Japanese-led mopping up operations and general "pacification" campaigns carried out at the behest of the Japanese military, or by order of other Filipino government officials.<sup>19</sup> A U.S. G-2 military intelligence report, which recorded the high potential of the BoC to turn on the Japanese, also noted their responsibility for the deaths of USAFFE guerrillas and that "to a limited extent" they had been employed as "undercover agents and spies" by the Japanese.<sup>20</sup> Japanese activity reports on mopping-up work collected by the American forces, while slim on details, are full of references to punitive raids being carried out, "in cooperation with the police," "aided by the police,"

14 Jose, *Captive Arms*, 3-7. Military ranks were restored after the independence of the Republic.

15 Most of the remainder were United States Armed Forces in the Far East soldiers who had served in either the prewar Philippine Division or the Philippine Scouts.

16 For an overview of the various armies that fought on Japan's side see Joyce Lebra-Chapman, *Japanese-Trained Armies in Southeast Asia: Independence and Volunteer Forces in World War II* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977).

17 Jose, *Captive Arms*, 18. On the desertions of the BC from around September, 1944, see also Elmer Norton Lear, *The Japanese Occupation of the Philippines, 1941-1945* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1961), 217. Then Foreign Minister Claro Recto claims that President Laurel, aware of the desertions, allowed up to 75% of Constabulary officers to freely desert. Claro M. Recto, *Three Years of Enemy Occupation*, 56.

18 See for example Ray C. Hunt and Bernard Norling, *Behind Japanese Lines: An American Guerrilla in the Philippines* (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2000), 107.

19 Jose, *Captive Arms*, 7. Manuel E. Buenafe, *Wartime Philippines* (Manila: Philippine Education Foundation, 1950), 226.

20 General HQ United States Army Forces, Pacific Military Intelligence Section, General Staff Intelligence Activities in the Philippines during the Japanese Occupation: Documentary Appendices Volume II Intelligence Series, "G-2 Information Bulletin: Report on Conditions in the Philippine Islands" (June 1943), 29.

and “working [in] conjunction with the police unit.”<sup>21</sup> For this reason, it should not have been surprising to see them well represented in trials for the atrocities of treason in the aftermath of the war.

### **Trials After Amnesty**

The vast majority of accused Filipino traitors were dismissed for lack of evidence and other technicalities, even before the 1948 amnesty and the dismantlement of the People’s Court. Of the cases which remained, some convictions were appealed to the Philippine Supreme Court, and the rulings of at least 157 cases are readily accessible in numerous Supreme Court digests and legal databases.<sup>22</sup> Historians of the treason trial process Augusto V. de Viana and David J. Steinberg both claim that less than 1% of People’s Court treason cases were tried and reached conviction during the time of its existence, but it is not known how many of the remaining untried cases that were turned over to courts of first instance resulted in convictions of the same crime. The 156 convictions in their own count of cases, up to 1948, is extremely close in number to the count of 157 Supreme Court rulings I have identified, but it is less than half of the 323 wartime collaborators who would eventually receive a pardon in 1953. A closer examination of cases in the lower courts after 1948 would be necessary to fully compare post-amnesty conviction rates with those of the People’s Courts up until they were dismantled.

The majority of the post-amnesty treason cases in the Philippines worked their way through the regular criminal courts from 1948 to 1953, during the most violent period of postwar Philippine history. They continued through an increasingly violent insurgency known as the Huk rebellion, through elections plagued by corruption and the conclusion of the Philippine war crimes trials of accused Japanese in 1949. They continued through the suspension of *habeas corpus* under presidential emergency powers in 1950, through the sudden and controversial execution of over half a dozen Japanese war criminals in January 1951, the rural reconstruction movement of 1952, and the dramatic suppression of the Huk insurgents under the then Secretary of National Defense, Ramon Magsaysay.<sup>23</sup>

Well over half of treason cases ruled upon by the Philippine Supreme Court, some 92 in total, involved an accused member of the occupation period Bureau of Constabu-

21 The term “police” refers to the BoC, since the two were essentially merged by the Japanese by wartime. These examples are taken from a collection of translated mopping up reports from early 1944. See: General Headquarters, Far East Command, Military Intelligence Section, General Staff, Allied Translator and Interpreter Section, South West Pacific Area Current Translations No. 146 (January 31, 1945).

22 I have depended mostly on the copies of these rulings in the searchable Philippine Laws and Jurisprudence Databank, created by the Arellano Law Foundation, which is a non-profit institution specializing in legal education. <http://lawphil.net/>, hereafter LawPhil.

23 On this period see H. W. Brands, *Bound to Empire: The United States and the Philippines*, First Edition. (Oxford University Press, USA, 1992), 227-248 and Benedict J. Kerkvliet, *The Huk Rebellion: a Study of Peasant Revolt in the Philippines* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977).

lary (BoC), an alleged member of the organization known as the Makapili, Philippine employees of the Japanese military police, a “United Nippon” auxiliary member (*yōin*), a member of the Coastal Defense Corps (CDC, *kaigun jiyūtai*), or other unidentified uniformed military collaborator.

Table 1: Supreme Court Rulings on Military Collaboration 1947–1959<sup>24</sup>

Organization	No. of Cases (% of 157 total treason cases)	Affirmed Convictions (% of 92 military collaboration cases)	Reclusion per- petua or Death (% of 83 convictions)
Bureau of Constabulary	13 (8.3%)	9 (69.2%)	7 (77.8%, inc. 1 death sent.)
Makapili	48 (30.6%)	44 (91.7%)	37 (84.1%, inc. 1 death sent.)
Other Organizations	31 (19.7%)	30 (96.8%)	21 (70%)
Total Mil. Collaborators	92 (58.6%)	83 (90.2%)	63 (75.9%)

For years after the defeat of Japan, the Supreme Court was an awkward institution to deliberate upon the issue of collaboration. Five of its eleven early postwar members had served in the occupation government in some capacity, and three of its members, Ramon Ozaeta, Ricardo Paras, and Manuel V. Moran had served on the Supreme Court in the wartime republic.<sup>25</sup> In the postwar period the Supreme Court would be the final arbiter of state retribution in a host of violent crimes. As we examine their handling of cases involving wartime atrocities, however, it is important to note that the slow moving legal machine of the Philippines worked side-by-side with other legal and extralegal forms of political retribution. At the same time the Supreme Court was handing down rulings on leading cases of military collaboration and atrocities committed by traitors, a new rebellion by the most powerful wartime guerrillas, the Hukbalahap, was brewing on the plains of Luzon. Summary justice in the field, which reigned on all sides during the Japanese occupation, or in special military courts, together created an expansive space for violence against, and by, various insurgent groups that has continued, not only during the occupation and early postwar but, to a greater or lesser degree, down to the present day. For this reason, it is not terribly surprising if the unusual characteristics and legalistic complexities of postwar treason trials, and especially the more invisible post-amnesty trials, have escaped the historian’s notice. Nonetheless, as we shall see, the Philippine

<sup>24</sup> Statistics compiled by the author from rulings at LawPhil.

<sup>25</sup> The other members with service in the occupation period were Cesar Bengzon and Manuel Briones. See Hernando J. Abaya, *Betrayal in the Philippines* (Quezon City: Malaya Books, 1970), 82.



Supreme Court's treatment of murder as treason, and denying sexual crimes in war their political nature, both capture the legal and political field of moral calculation regarding wartime atrocities in the early postwar, and they reveal the difficulty in employing prosecutions for a crime against the nation as the means to punish atrocities in war.

### Complex Crimes and the Atrocities of Treason

In almost all of its rulings on wartime treason convictions, the Supreme Court corrected judges of the People's Court or courts of first instance, which had combined allegations of treason with murder or other violent crimes to charge the accused of having committed a "complex crime." The lower courts frequently ruled that military collaborators, informers, and spies were guilty of treason on the one hand and, separately, of violent crimes on the other. When these were compounded as "complex crimes" as defined by Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code of the Philippines, conviction guaranteed that the maximum penalty for the heavier crime would be given, which resulted in a relatively large number of death sentences before appeal to the Supreme Court. Thus, a military collaborator who joined a Japanese patrol and, say, beat or tortured an individual or robbed suspected guerrillas was, if convicted of the "complex crime" of treason and murder, automatically given the maximum penalty for treason: a death sentence.

The Supreme Court rejected this argument in case after case, usually referring to the precedent established by *People vs. Prieto*, a ruling issued the very day after the amnesty for political collaborators, on January 29, 1948.<sup>26</sup> In this case, Eduardo Prieto was accused of being an agent of the Japanese military police, who participated in raids on suspected guerrillas, of torturing suspects, himself bayonetting two guerrillas to death and also murdering a third. The lower People's Court had ruled that the accused was guilty of "the crime of treason complexed by murder and physical injuries" and sentenced him to death. Rejecting this compounding of the crime, the Supreme Court described the crime of treason in this way:

*The execution of some of the guerrilla suspects mentioned in these counts and the infliction of physical injuries on others are not offenses separate from treason...when the deed is charged as an element of treason it becomes identified with the latter crime and can not be the subject of a separate punishment, or used in combination with treason to increase the penalty...*<sup>27</sup>

In other words, in the context of an enemy occupation, assuming that adherence to the enemy could be demonstrated, the murder of a guerrilla was *the treason of murder*. It was not a traitor who committed a killing but a murder that made the traitor. Why did

26 All Supreme Court rulings below are from LawPhil. *People vs. Eduardo Prieto* LawPhil G.R. No. L-399 (January 29, 1948).

27 Ibid.

this matter? Besides the fact that the original “complex crime” would have guaranteed the harshest punishment, this Supreme Court ruling could be beneficial to the accused in other ways. Whereas a murder case required only a single credible witness to convict, murder which constituted treason required two, a requirement inherited by Philippine law from the treason law of the United States. It also prevented a suspect of being convicted of treason for providing aid and comfort to the enemy by accompanying soldiers on a raid and then being convicted of a separate count of murder, should the expedition have resulted in the death of any guerrillas.

Seen from the perspective of a victim’s call for justice, however, not only did the ruling make it more difficult to secure convictions for atrocities because of a two-witness rule originally designed to prevent a tyrannical government from overusing accusations of treason against its enemies, but the *political nature of the offense* came to dominate the arguments of the court. In each case, it was just as important, from a legal standpoint, to establish that the accused, in violation of a “duty of allegiance,” and “for the purpose and with the intent of giving aid and comfort to the enemy, did willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and traitorously” carry out each act, rather than to establish all the details of the violence itself, since adherence to Japan was as crucial to conviction as the overt act itself. In the political crime of treason the primary victim was the nation, and only particular brutality shown in a killing, rather than a “less painful method of execution” could serve as an aggravating circumstance to increase the penalty.<sup>28</sup>

In the broader historical terms of an international conflict, rulings on *murder as treason* detached the act from both its common criminal context, and also distinguished it from the kind of acts commonly committed by armed parties on all sides in war up to that time. Instead, its separate category confirmed the widespread domestic sentiments in recently liberated countries around the world in the aftermath of World War II that, during an occupation, there were in fact three different kinds of murder by a fellow citizen: killing for personal motives, killing for the cause of freedom, and treasonous murder. This may seem to be an obvious and natural division at the social and political levels, but in legal terms it was radically different from an approach to wartime violence based on the laws of war, either in the decades leading up to World War II, or within the scope of the new “crimes against humanity” prosecuted by the war crime courts of Nuremberg, Tokyo, and elsewhere.

Within the weak international legal environment created by the 1899 and 1907 Hague conventions and the 1929 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, violence against those under the control of an occupier was classified according to the status of the victim: recognized belligerents treated as prisoners of war after capture, non-combatants, and unlawful combatants who were, in the absence of any explicit protections, generally subject to military justice, the speed and severity of which not

28 People vs. Eduardo Prieto G.R. No. L-399 (January 29, 1948) LawPhil.

only varied widely from conflict to conflict and army to army, but often showed a lack of consistency within them.

As in early postwar treason cases in other countries, however, no attempt was made by the Philippine courts to make a distinction between the war crime of killing innocent civilians and the execution of spies and guerrillas whose lives had never been effectively protected by international law.<sup>29</sup> When a Makapili auxiliary executed a guerrilla under Japanese orders, he was automatically guilty, by accident of birth, of the capital offense of treason, while a Japanese soldier might potentially go free under the laws of war for the same crime.

### A Crime Political in Nature

As we have seen, a collaborator's violent acts, including beatings, torture, and the massacre of civilians were considered not to be separate crimes or even special "complex crimes" that compounded sentencing but to themselves be manifestations of treason which provided aid to the enemy. In cases of rape or the abduction of women into sexual slavery, however, majority rulings of the Philippine Supreme Court held that neither acts constituted aid and comfort to the enemy. Instead, they were, at most, relegated to aggravating circumstances.

Sexual violence was a prominent feature of Japanese military conquest throughout East and Southeast Asia, with some variation, such as the opening stages of the occupation of the Dutch East Indies, when the Japanese command demonstrated an ability to limit its attacks on women.<sup>30</sup> By contrast, the occurrence of rape by Japanese soldiers in the Philippines from the earliest stages of the occupation was enough to cause the alarm of section chiefs of the Japanese Ministry of War in February, 1942, though the 14 rapes they saw as a "considerable" number came nowhere near the prevalence of rape noted in accounts of the occupation.<sup>31</sup> While a constant part of the campaign of violence and fear

29 A catch-all principle, known as the "Martens Clause", found in the preamble of the 1899 and 1907 Hague conventions calls for "cases not covered by this Protocol or by other international agreements, civilians and combatants remain under the protection and authority of the principles of international law derived from established custom, from the principles of humanity and from dictates of public conscience." A source of much debate in international law, it has been used to argue that unlawful combatants receive protection but according to Kevin Jon Heller, it was not employed in the early postwar war crimes trials. It has, however, become increasingly recognized as part of customary international law in recent decades. Kevin Jon Heller, *The Nuremberg Military Tribunals and the Origins of International Criminal Law* (New York: Oxford University Press US, 2011), 209. Yutaka Arai, *The Law of Occupation: Continuity and Change of International Humanitarian Law, and its Interaction with International Human Rights Law* (Leiden: Brill, 2009), 68-71.

30 While Dutch women were targeted for sexual violence, Toshiyuki Tanaka didn't find evidence of rapes of Indonesians in the opening stage, where he characterized the Japanese treatment of them as "relatively benign." Toshiyuki Tanaka, *Japan's Comfort Women: Sexual Slavery and Prostitution during World War II and the US Occupation* (London: Routledge, 2002), 63.

31 Yoshiaki Yoshimi and Suzanne O'Brien, *Comfort Women: Sexual Slavery in the Japanese Military during World War II* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000), 78. For a collection of short oral accounts by women and the rape they confronted in the Philippines during the occupation see Angelito L. Santos and Renato Constanti-

in the counterinsurgency campaign against guerrillas throughout the archipelago, the widespread rapes during the battle for Manila in February, 1945, were among the many war crime counts at the military tribunal of General Yamashita Tomoyuki, held in the city later in the fall of the same year, which resulted in his conviction and execution.

Attempts to reduce the spread of venereal disease and arbitrary acts of sexual violence led to the formation of military brothels. According to one 1943 count, over a thousand women employed by deception and various degrees of coercion, including many Filipinas directly abducted by Japanese troops, served in these official ‘comfort stations’, while many more were taken and held as sex slaves by small isolated army units.<sup>32</sup> None of the Japanese soldiers or civilians was tried for the operation of the comfort women system, but the indictments of Japanese soldiers and civilians for war crimes trials carried out by Philippine courts did include 45 counts of rape, the third largest category of war crime behind the abuse of civilians (92 counts), and the killing of civilians (134).<sup>33</sup>

So how did the Supreme Court deal with cases of these atrocities when Filipino collaborators were the perpetrators, or indirectly complicit in the broader Japanese system of sex slavery? An example of its approach to sexual violence can be seen in a 1949 ruling on 14 counts of treason in the case of a Filipino agent of the Japanese military police, Antonio Racaza. Rape was seen only as an aggravating circumstance and not an overt act of treason, a finding that would set a precedent for later rulings.<sup>34</sup> Racaza’s other violent acts, in which he “willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably,” summarily shot, beheaded, and strangled suspected guerrillas, tortured detainees during interrogation, and guided Japanese soldiers on raids, constituted the very acts of his betrayal of the nation. However, his attempt to rape a woman who refused to offer information during a raid was explicitly reduced to aggravating circumstances which were seen as, “deliberately augmenting unnecessary wrongs,” without itself constituting an overt act of treason. In a separate opinion on the same case, Associate Justice Gregorio Perfecto (served 1945–1949) concurred with the conviction but argued that the attempted rape should not even be considered an aggravating circumstance:

*The attempted rape on the person of Silvina Cabellon may be considered as ground for the prosecution of a different offense, but cannot be considered as aggravating treason, a*

no, eds., *Under Japanese Rule: Memories and Reflections* (Quezon City: Foundation for Nationalist Studies, Inc. and BYSCH, Tokyo, 1992), 221–227. The texts of a number of reports of rape in the Philippines that have been preserved, along with reports expressing alarm at the negative effect these rapes had on Filipino sentiment towards the Japanese, can be found in Shiryōshū Nihongun ni miru Sei kanri to Sei bōryoku: Firipin 1941–45 [Documentary Collection of Sex Management and Sexual Violence as seen by the Japanese Military: Philippines 1941–45] (Tokyo: Nashinokisha, 2008), 59–73. One of the earliest reports of large-scale rape can be found in the January 1 entry in the diary of Pacita Pestaño-Jacinto. Pacita Pestaño-Jacinto, *Living with the Enemy: a Diary of the Japanese Occupation* (Manila: Anvil Pub., 1999), 14.

32 Tanaka, *Japan’s Comfort Women*, 47.

33 Hitoshi Nagai, *Firipin to tainichi senpan saiban 1945–1953* [The War Crimes Trials and Japan-Philippines Relations, 1945–1953] (Tōkyō: Iwanami Shoten, 2010), 220. The fourth, fifth and sixth largest number of counts were for the burning or destruction of property (23), looting (18) and cannibalism (15).

34 *People vs. Antonio Racaza* G.R. No. L-365 (January 21, 1949) LawPhil.

crime political in nature. *In the attempted rape there was nothing political and it had nothing to do with defendant's adherence and aid to the enemy.*<sup>35</sup>

Justice Perfecto was here trying to make a distinction between common crimes and the uniquely political crime that was treason. Sexual violence in war against a suspected guerrilla was not, he argued, like beatings, torture, or the killing of civilians, which constituted *political* crimes that provided aid and comfort to the enemy. Rape was thus neither treason nor a war crime but, alone among the acts of violence in this wartime context, considered a common crime.

If the court held that rapes did not themselves constitute acts of treasonous violence then neither would the abduction of women into sexual slavery. The Philippine Supreme Court ruling in the case against one Susano "Kid" Perez, which would also become a precedent in similar cases, offers an unusually detailed justification for the position that complicity in securing sexual slaves for the occupation forces did not constitute acts of treason.<sup>36</sup> It also offered a remarkable dissenting opinion, which revealed the glaring inconsistency in the court's argument. In all six counts of treason Perez was accused of "commandeering" women to serve as sexual slaves for Japanese officers, and sometimes raping the women himself. In some cases, deception was employed, as when Perez summoned women for the purported purpose of providing testimony against some accused suspect, or when he attempted to convince a reluctant woman who had already escaped once that a Japanese colonel merely wanted her to be his secretary. According to testimony in the trial, the same colonel would go on to rape or enslave more than half a dozen women provided for him by Perez. In one of the counts, Perez took a woman he had delivered to the Japanese colonel directly from one rape encounter to an uninhabited house where he then raped the traumatized woman himself. On other occasions, Perez abducted women from their homes and delivered them to banquets and dances where those who were "selected" were subsequently raped by Japanese officers in attendance. Even nurses working in the Cebu provincial hospital were targeted for these "invitations" at gunpoint.<sup>37</sup>

Perez appealed the treason conviction and its death sentence without denying any of the findings in the accounts. In his opposing brief the Solicitor General argued that the actions of Perez constituted treason because his acts helped the Japanese to "maintain and preserve the morale of the soldiers." The majority of Supreme Court judges disagreed. Their reasoning is worth quoting at some length:

*The law of treason does not prescribe all kinds of social, business and political intercourse between the belligerent occupants of the invaded country and its inhabitants... What aid and comfort constitute[s] treason must depend upon their nature, degree and purpose... As [a] general rule, to be treasonous the extent of the aid and comfort given to the enemies*

35 Ibid. Emphasis mine.

36 People vs. Susano Perez G.R. L-856 (April 18, 1949) LawPhil. Steinberg has also pointed out that this case set the precedent that securing women was not treason, see Philippine Collaboration, 155.

37 LawPhil People vs. Susano Perez

*must be to render assistance to them as enemies and not merely as individuals and in addition, be directly in furtherance of the enemies' hostile designs... His "commandeering" of women to satisfy the lust of Japanese officers or men or to enliven the entertainment held in their honor was not treason even though the women and the entertainment helped to make life more pleasant for the enemies and boost their spirit; he was not guilty any more than the women themselves would have been if they voluntarily and willingly had surrendered their bodies or organized the entertainment. Sexual and social relations with the Japanese did not directly and materially tend to improve their war efforts or to weaken the power of the United State[s]... Whatever favorable effect the defendant's collaboration with the Japanese might have in their prosecution of the war was trivial, imperceptible, and unintentional. Intent of disloyalty is a vital ingredient in the crime of treason...*<sup>38</sup>

This same argument employed by the court could also, of course, protect women who would be accused of treason for their relationships with the Japanese, whether they were intimate or not; and whether they were willing or were involved in varying degrees of coercion.<sup>39</sup> However, Perez, who freely admitted accusations that he had violently coerced women, deceived them, and knowingly participated in the procurement of sexual slaves for Japanese officers, would not receive any punishment for those specific acts, which were dismissed as "trivial, imperceptible and unintentional" in their effect. The judges never fully confronted the fact that Perez was not simply procuring reluctant dance partners for the Japanese but knowingly facilitating their rape. The death sentence and treason convictions were overturned, to be replaced with a conviction on only four counts of rape and a 10-17 year sentence for those encounters in which Perez directly attacked the women himself.

Associate Justice Guillermo Pablo (served 1945–1955), who had served as a judge in Cebu before the war and was one of the few Supreme Court judges at the time who had not served in it during the occupation, offered a lone dissenting opinion in this case.<sup>40</sup> He quoted from the Solicitor General's brief a rather uncomfortable comparison between the role of the United Services Organization (U.S.O.) in providing entertainment for the U.S. army in the Philippines and the "entertainment" provided for the Japanese Imperial forces. It appeared incomprehensible to him how the provision of women for the enemy could not be seen as an example of aid and comfort in wartime, and therefore treasonous. Pablo did not dance around the issue of the rape of the women who testified, and did not speak only in more vague terms of "entertainment." Instead, the violation of Philippine women was seen by Pablo as very much a "crime political in nature." How-

38 Ibid.

39 For the cases of Philippine women, including 'comfort women' being tried for treason for relations with the Japanese see Florina Yamsuan Orilos, "Preliminary Profile of Women 'Collaborators' in the People's Court Records," *Philippine Social Sciences Review* 57(1) (2010): 181–220.

40 Overview of Pablo's career on the Philippine Supreme Court E-Library <http://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/supreme-courtjustices/associatejustice/59> (accessed 1 January, 2013).

ever, by conceding its political nature, Pablo shifted the focus from the women who were the victims of violence we would today clearly identify as war crimes in order to argue that the crimes of rape and sexual slavery were an affront to the nation itself. He asked rhetorically whether there could be any greater treason than such acts. "They took over all of our resource production: everything in their path, but, by God, save the honor of our women."<sup>41</sup>

The fact that these sexual crimes of war were treated differently in the treason trials than the other crimes is a reminder that legal systems around the world, including that of early postwar Philippines, had yet to grapple fully with the relationship between acts of sexual violence and the environment of war. In the early postwar trials, the comfort system of sexual enslavement, which involved thousands of women throughout Japanese occupied areas, received the dedicated attention of a court only in the 1948 Batavia Military Tribunal trying Japanese for the rape and forced prostitution of one particular group of Dutch women.<sup>42</sup> Forced prostitution was a prosecutable crime along with rape and did find mention in trials records elsewhere. However, it was often buried in testimony that covered a wide range of atrocities, such as descriptions of the abduction of women into sexual slavery for German officers in Smolensk and in the nearby village of Bassmanova.<sup>43</sup> Mention of the high incidence of rape also appeared in the testimony of the war crimes trials in Tokyo and elsewhere, especially in relation to the atrocities in Nanjing after its capture in December, 1937. However, overall after World War II sexual assaults were given far less direct attention in terms of actual prosecutions.<sup>44</sup>

The Philippine Supreme Court was, as in all treason cases, not evaluating the issue in terms of the international laws of war but in a domestic legal context in which the sole choice was between the common crime of rape and the capital crime of treason. Rejecting the "political" nature of the crimes did not remove the possibility of punishment for some sexual crimes but it was a telling exception, given its other rulings which held all forms of violence in the service of the occupier as treason.

As the dissenting opinion of Justice Pablo suggests, "nationalizing" the crime of rape by including it as a form of treason would not have necessarily brought Philippine society any closer to confronting the issues of rape and sexual enslavement as weapons of war and expressions of occupation power. Instead of focusing on the women who survived the sexual violence, punishment for their enslavement in the form of a treason charge could easily transform the issue into a violation of the nation's honor. It would not be until the wars of Yugoslavia in the 1990s that the full range of these issues would begin to receive considerable attention in the academic, legal, and social realms.

41 People vs. Susano Perez (alias Kid Perez), G.R. L-856 (April 18, 1949), LawPhil.

42 Kelly Dawn Askin *War Crimes Against Women: Prosecution in International War Crimes Tribunals* (Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1997), 85. Yuma Totani, *The Tokyo War Crimes Trial: the Pursuit of Justice in the Wake of World War II* (Cambridge: Harvard University Asia Center, 2009), 14.

43 Askin, *War Crimes Against Women*, 66, 72. Theodor Meron, "Rape as a Crime Under International Humanitarian Law," *The American Journal of International Law* 87.3 (December, 1993), 426.

44 See *Ibid.*, 98.



## War Crimes Trials and the 1953 Pardons

The treason trials in the Philippines were carried out alongside the war crimes trials for Japanese occupation forces in the Philippines. From 1945 to 1947 American military courts tried war criminals, who were charged with conventional crimes of war (category B) and of the new crimes against humanity (category C), including the famous trials of generals Yamashita Tomoyuki and Homma Masaharu.<sup>45</sup> Numbering almost a hundred trials, and continuing after Philippine independence in 1946, they resulted in a 90% conviction rate and 69 executions.<sup>46</sup> Philippine-run war crimes trials under a National War Crimes Office began in August, 1947, and continued until December, 1949, convicting 138 Japanese soldiers and civilians out of 155 total arraigned in the trials, and sentencing some 79 of them to death.<sup>47</sup> Three executions were carried out in 1948 and over two years later, in January, 1951, another 14 were suddenly put to death. In the months that followed, sympathy for the plight of those imprisoned grew rapidly among the Japanese public, and Japanese, American, and even Chinese diplomatic representatives placed direct and indirect pressure on the Philippine government to put an end to the executions, and to consider a return of the remaining prisoners to Japan.<sup>48</sup> Domestically, leading occupation period officials such as former Makapili vice-Supremo Pio Duran and Senator Camilo Osias, who had both benefited from the 1948 amnesty, were active in supporting moves to release the Japanese war criminals.<sup>49</sup> Massive petition drives within Japan eventually totaling millions of signatures showed the breadth of mobilization efforts behind the issue, but there were concerns within the Philippines that Japanese war reparations to the Philippines would become tied to fate of the war criminals.<sup>50</sup>

On June 27, 1953, President Quirino announced that many Japanese war criminals would be among those included in his annual presidential pardons. The pardons took effect on 4 July and the decree would eventually lead to the return to Japan of 106 war criminals. However, while the pardons of the Japanese had the most significant international impact, they did not compose the largest number of individuals on the list of these 1953 pardons. Hundreds of Filipinos convicted of treason would also go free.<sup>51</sup>

45 On the U.S. military trials in the Philippines, and especially the importance of the Yamashita trial see Lael, *The Yamashita Precedent*.

46 There were 97 trials and 92 sentenced to death, but only 69 executed. Chamberlain, *Justice and Reconciliation*, 53. Some 140 out of about 150 Japanese war criminal suspects were convicted. Nagai Firipin to tainichi senpan saiban, 200. See Chamberlain's Appendix 1 for a list of cases and outcomes, Chamberlain, *Justice and Reconciliation*, 235-247.

47 *Ibid.*, 70.

48 *Ibid.*, 151-180.

49 *Ibid.*, 177. Duran was well known for his support for the Japanese war effort and was one of the leading officials of the Makapili. Grant K. Goodman, "Pio Duran and Philippine Japanophilism," *Historian* 32(2) (1970): 228-242.

50 Chamberlain, *Justice and Reconciliation*, 151-2.

51 The news was reported internationally as a side note. For example, "President Quirino also announced that 350 Filipinos convicted as wartime collaborators would be pardoned." See: "Philippines to Free Japanese Captives," *New York Times* (June 28, 1953), 2.



On July 4, 1953, 323 names of convicted traitors who were to be released that day were published.<sup>52</sup> The day the collaborators were released the American communist and a leading Huk fighter, who had been captured the year before, William Pomeroy, watched them make their way to freedom from the National Penitentiary in Muntinglupa prison.<sup>53</sup>

*As prisoners, the collaborators have been tolerated, their identities blurred in the orange mass of the prison population, but on the day the released group marches to the control gate, carrying their rolled-up possessions, the memory of their wartime behavior surges back. From the upper windows of buildings, water and missiles are poured down upon the collaborators. Prisoners strain at the bars, screaming, "Taksil! Taksil!" (Traitor! Traitor!). There is more respect for the thief and murderer here than for the traitor.<sup>54</sup>*

When the 1948 amnesty argued that "public sentiment did not extend" to those who waged war on the Philippines and carried out atrocities against the people, it set aside some acts of violence as fundamentally different in nature. It did this in a fashion not entirely dissimilar from the way war crimes trials around the world after World War II, including the Philippines, similarly struggled to create and foster an understanding of a *universally prohibited violence*. However, the trials for treasonous atrocities and war crimes trials differed in two fundamental ways: the retributive process created this space, or attempted to create this space, at the conclusion of a process of elimination rather than an active attempt to confront the horrors of the war as such.

Second, in each case, the violence at the heart of the charges was, as we have seen, everclouded by the primary crime they were judged for: a violation of an allegiance to the nation. When William Pomeroy noted that the traitors who walked out of prison on that July day in 1953 were more despised than thieves and murderers, one might have noted that almost all of those released by President Quirino's pardons were convicted of the treason *of murder*; each held responsible for the deaths of their countrymen at their own or Japanese hands, as a result of their collaboration.

Even if the violent crimes in the Philippine trials are considered without the obscuring veil of the treason charges that encapsulated them, the rules of the game when it came to command responsibility differed significantly from the most noteworthy war crimes trial held in the archipelago: the prosecution of General Yamashita Tomoyuki by a U.S. military court for the atrocities of his men. The Yamashita case of late 1945, which resulted in his conviction and execution, established a principle of strict liability in command responsibility for war crimes that would not be approached again in law until the 1977 Additional Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, and not tested in the courts

52 The clipping from the July 4, 1953 issue of the Manila Times was an attachment to "List of Names of Filipino Prisoners Pardoned by President QUIRINO on July 4, 1953" (July 21, 1953) 796.00/7-1053 RG 59.

53 Pomeroy was a Communist Party USA education secretary in New York before World War II and wrote about his experiences fighting with the Huks in William J. Pomeroy, *The Forest, a Personal Record of the Huk Guerrilla Struggle in the Philippines* (New York: International Publishers, 1963).

54 William J. Pomeroy, *Bilanggo: Life as a Political Prisoner in the Philippines, 1952–1962* (Manila: UP Press, 2009), 80.

until the later stages of the war crimes trials in the former Yugoslavia.<sup>55</sup> Judges in the Yamashita case held that he could only have been ignorant of the widespread atrocities committed by soldiers under his command if this ignorance was a willing one.<sup>56</sup> However, the high bar set for treason convictions in the Philippines virtually guaranteed that any distance between the violence and the accused would result in a dismissal. Instead, the “small fry” collaborators who were patronizingly referred to as the “ignorant simple-minded credulous Filipino,” by congressman Lorenzo Sumulong in the 1948 debates over how broad the amnesty for treason should be, carried out their daily interactions with the Japanese occupier within earshot of the screams of the tortured, and as witnesses or themselves participants in the executions.<sup>57</sup>

When they evaded responsibility by claiming to be, “just following orders” to cooperate with the Japanese military, or to join in the urgent task of eradicating the “bandits” throughout the land, these excuses were, in the majority of cases, dismissed by the Supreme Court, as they were in the trials of Japanese or other Axis war criminals. However, unlike the trials of Axis power officers and political leaders, the responsibility for the atrocities that came with military collaboration rarely extended beyond the immediate scene of the crime.

This was a matter of course for those “political collaborators”, who were civilian heads of military organizations but who were not close to their day-to-day operations such as President Jose P. Laurel, who organized wartime “pacification” committees, and Pio Duran, who was nominally vice-supremo of the Makapili. However, it was just as true for leading military commanders. The surviving former head of the wartime Bureau of Constabulary, Guillermo Francisco, was acquitted, even though his “double game” behavior did not prevent him from overseeing “pacification” campaigns that resulted in atrocities. Even more remarkable was the inability to account for any kind of command responsibility in the trial of the head of the wartime Manila police, Antonio Torres. Francisco might have, albeit feebly, argued that the national scope of the Constabulary was such that he was completely ignorant of the fact that many of his units, even those who maintained strong connections to some resistance forces, were actively engaged in the suppression of Huks and other guerrillas, regularly employed torture, and that some units carried out summary executions. It is far harder to imagine that Torres could have

55 Charles Garraway, “The Doctrine of Command Responsibility” in Doria, José, Hans-Peter Gasser, and M. Cherif Bassiouni, eds., *The Legal Regime of the International Criminal Court: Essays in Honour of Professor Igor Blishchenko*. (Hague: Brill, 2009), 713-723. The most infamous example of how far the liability of command responsibility had weakened in the decades after WWII is the 1971 failure to prosecute Captain Ernest Medina following the My Lai massacre in Vietnam.

56 Bruce D. Landrum, “The Yamashita War Crimes Trial: Command Responsibility Then and Now,” *Military Law Review* 149 (Summer 1995): 296. Landrum argues that two Nuremberg Trials of 1948 weakened command responsibility by adjusting the requirement from the idea that the officers “must have known” to a “should have known” standard, and thus “a commander’s knowledge of widespread atrocities within the command area was rebuttably presumed rather than irrebuttably presumed” *ibid.*, 298. This less harsh “should have known” standard is the one that is generally used by the International Criminal Court today.

57 Philippines Congressional Record: House of Representatives v. 3 no. 13 (Feb. 11, 1948), 243.

been wartime Manila police chief without being aware of the extensive cooperation between his officers and the Japanese military police, or their responsibility for the torture and execution of suspects being carried out by the secret service division of the Manila Police Department.<sup>58</sup>

As in the case of Francisco, the case against Torres was dismissed even before the 1948 amnesty. This exoneration of wartime guilt so emboldened the former police chief that he immediately proceeded to petition for the removal of his replacement, Eduardo Quintos, so that he might be rightfully restored as chief of police. The mayor of Manila turned down his request in 1948, but Torres pressed his case with a letter to President Quirino and then directly brought a legal case against police chief Quintos. The Supreme Court itself ruled on the case in April 1951, when the majority opinion rejected his arguments without noting the boldness of the claimant.<sup>59</sup>

### Beyond the Trials and Beyond Trial

Even if a principle of command responsibility had been adopted, establishing liability on either a narrow or broad level, the limited treason trials of military collaborators and perpetrators of atrocities could not hope to offer anything close to a full reckoning with the wartime, precisely because collaborators had no monopoly on these acts. The brutality of some guerrillas rivaled that of the worst atrocities of the occupying forces and their domestic allies. The American Ray Hunt, who became a mid-level guerrilla leader in Luzon, had great respect for the conduct of some of his fellow resistance leaders, but reserved harsh judgment for many of those who claimed to have joined the war against occupation,

*Many a Filipino "guerilla" was concerned mostly to take advantage of current confusion to avenge himself on old enemies, destroy some rival family, betray a political foe to the Japanese, or simply to indulge a taste for sadism. Cruel as the Japanese were to everyone else, cruel as some despicable Americans were to suspected Filipino collaborators, nobody exceeded the savageries various depraved Filipinos inflicted on their own countrymen.*<sup>60</sup>

Hunt struggled with the moral consequences of his own command responsibility. Some guerrillas under his command captured a spy who, in a public display to impress some villagers, was bled to death, roasted, and eaten. Hunt was disgusted but took no action against them, since "to have executed the whole guerrilla troop responsible would have demoralized all my men..."<sup>61</sup> Though responsible for a more horrifying scale of violence, similar words could have easily been uttered by Colonel Nagahama Akira, head of the military police in the occupied Philippines.

58 See for example testimony in *People vs. Pedro Santos Balangit*, G.R. L-1298 (May 31, 1949), *LawPhil*.

59 *People vs. Antonio C. Torres*, G.R. L-3304 (April 5, 1951), *LawPhil*.

60 Hunt and Norling, *Behind Japanese Lines*, 72.

61 *Ibid.*, 127.

During his American military war crimes trial Nagahama claimed that, despite an attempt to ban torture and enforce a more humane policy towards prisoners, “the tremendous weight of the forces which worked against any possible materialization of the good intentions I possessed,” robbed him of success and “each day that passed strengthened the hands of those who from the outset could not bring themselves to follow a course other than outright force and the imposition of fear.”<sup>62</sup> There was little evidence of Nagahama’s attempts to limit the widespread brutality, and his own claim to be a feeble “shield” was justifiably dismissed by the court. Nor has his argument earned the sympathy of many historians. However, it is worth reminding ourselves that the crimes seen as an affront to the dignity of all humanity in early postwar courts that war criminals like Nagahama were convicted of, were treated differently when the accused were either his Filipino allies or guerrilla opponents in contemporary courts, and continue to be remembered within a distinctly separate historical discourse.

Trials to punish the atrocities of Filipino citizens who served alongside the Japanese occupation appear almost nowhere in postwar histories of the Philippines, which usually conclude any discussion with the amnesty that excluded those most likely to be directly responsible for serious crimes of war. Wartime violence, tried in regular criminal courts under the laws of treason, took place outside the legal environment prosecuting war crimes around the world that referred to an emerging set of global legal practices, principles, and precedents. Citizenship alone, the only form of identity which mattered in the trials of those accused, transformed their atrocities into manifestations of their national betrayal and, as we have seen, this had direct consequences on their prosecution.

Though distinct from war crimes trials, however, this seemingly more localized process was no less global. Margherita Zanasi has shown the ways in which collaborationist trials in China played a similar political role and gave rise to many contemporary comparisons with the same process in France, and especially the trial of Vichy leader Philippe Pétain.<sup>63</sup> In many of the countries that emerged from occupation in 1945, the process of punishing collaborators accused of responsibility for acts of rape, torture, and massacre developed in a legal space that, like war crimes trials, suffered from a weak foundation. Outdated treason laws, or newly written ones, were summoned to prosecute disloyalty, but in former colonies such as India, the Philippines, and Korea, among others, there was also the awkward question of what nation really commanded legitimate loyalty at the moment alleged crimes of treason occurred. However, these trials need to be evaluated, not only as an arena for nationalist politics and purification, but as a process for retribution against extreme violence. As the trials discussed above show in the case of the Philippines, the primary focus on identity, loyalty, and the nation as the primary victim

62 Quoted in Syjuco, *Kempei Tai in the Philippines*, 83. Original in *U.S.A. vs. Akira Nagahama, Japanese War Crimes Trials*, Bundle No. 74 Vol. XII, pp. 22-23, Philippine National Archives, Manila.

63 Margherita Zanasi, “Globalizing Hanjian: The Suzhou Trials and the Post-World War II Discourse on Collaboration,” *The American Historical Review* 113, no. 3 (June 1, 2008): 731–751. For similar references to European trials in the Philippines see Konrad Lawson “Wartime Atrocities,” 168, 204.

submitted atrocities to charges of treason poorly equipped to confront the horrors of war.

# **From Soviet Kin to Afro-Asian Leader: The People's Republic of China and International Sport in the early 1960s**

**Amanda Shuman**

## **RESÜMEE**

In den frühen 1960er Jahren nutzte die chinesische Führung den internationalen Sport für ihr außenpolitisches Ziel der Neupositionierung der Volksrepublik China auf globaler Ebene. Damit versuchte sie auch, die bisherige geopolitische Situation in Asien gemäß ihren Interessen zu revidieren. Der Kulminationspunkt dieser Anstrengungen waren die Ersten Spiele der Neuen Aufstrebenden Kräfte (GANEFO), die im November 1963 in Jakarta abgehalten wurden und als Sport-Großereignis in vielerlei Hinsicht den Olympischen Spielen ähnelten. Die Volksrepublik leistete einen fundamentalen Beitrag zur Entstehung der Spiele, sendete die größte Delegation und gewann die meisten Medaillen. Der Artikel untersucht das Interesse und die Beteiligung Chinas an den GANEFO im Rahmen der Stärkung der chinesisch-indonesischen Beziehungen und des Versuchs, China als sozialistische Führungsmacht der afrikanischen und asiatischen Länder zu stilisieren. Die GANEFO sollten dementsprechend dazu dienen, Ideale des Afro-Asiatismus im Sinne des revolutionären Sozialismus Chinas weltweit zu propagieren.

## **Introduction**

*We the Youth of the New Emerging Forces, do hereby solemnly pledge that we will take part in our Games, in the true Spirit of Fairness, of Sportsmanship [sic] and of Solidarity among New Emerging Forces, For the Honour of our Countries and for the Victory of our Common Ideas.*” – Athlete Pledge recited at the first Games of the New Emerging Forces held November 1963<sup>1</sup>

1 China's Sports, vol. 1, 1964, 21.

In the early 1960s Chinese leaders used international sport as part of a larger effort to re-position the People's Republic of China (PRC) on the world stage, a move that fundamentally challenged and shaped the geopolitics of Asia. In the early to mid-1950s, just after the establishment of the PRC, Chinese leaders had sought to emulate the Soviet Union, including in sport. They believed in Soviet ideological superiority and they wanted China to be part of the Soviet-led international socialist movement. Following the deterioration of Sino-Soviet relations in the late 1950s, however, Chinese leaders began to focus their efforts on building their influence among non-aligned and newly decolonized nations. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, Chinese leaders began to see these nations – most of which were in Asia and Africa – as potential allies in a Chinese-led worldwide socialist revolution. Sports exchanges propagandized China as the natural leader for worldwide socialist revolution that would arise primarily from underdeveloped and recently decolonized nations in Asia and Africa. They believed that China's brand of socialism would serve as the model for these nations to follow.

The culmination of these efforts came in 1963 with the first Games of the New Emerging Forces (GANEFO), a major sports mega-event that took place in Jakarta, Indonesia in November 1963 and paralleled the Olympic games in many respects. PRC involvement was fundamental to engendering these Games, they sent the largest delegation of athletes, and they won by far the most medals.

In this essay I trace the PRC leadership's interest and involvement in the GANEFO, vis-à-vis larger geopolitical changes post-World War II that led to contestations in international sport over who represented Asia (as an entity), and in the wake of new geopolitical frameworks that had emerged by the early 1960s. The Games can be attributed to strong Sino-Indonesian relations at the time, but they also show how Chinese leaders, following the deterioration of Sino-Soviet relations, sought to increase their influence as socialist leader among African and Asian nations. I show how Chinese leaders manipulated the relationship with Indonesia for the purposes of their own agenda: GANEFO served to spread propaganda worldwide on the Afro-Asian ideals that conveniently resonated with the Chinese revolutionary model of socialism.

Sports mega-events provide excellent venues for spreading propaganda due to their scale and spectacle. Maurice Roche defines a sports "mega-event" as a large-scale cultural event, which has "a dramatic character, mass popular appeal and international significance."<sup>2</sup> Sports mega-events also have political, cultural, and economic importance, and significant consequences for the host, such as infrastructure development and increased media surrounding the event. I would further add that political consequences and national image are always tied into the hosting of any international sports mega-event. In China, sport has always been associated with overcoming a narrative of national humiliation in which China suffered in the past from "victimization" by foreigners.<sup>3</sup> Participation in

2 Maurice Roche, *Mega-Events and Modernity: Olympics and Expos in the Growth of Global Culture* (London: Routledge, 2000), 1.

3 Peter Gries, "Nationalism, Indignation, and China's Japan Policy," *SAS Review* 25, no. 2 (2005): 109-110.

Olympic and Far Eastern Championship Games in the first half of the twentieth century helped Chinese leaders imagine China as part of Asia (as a geographical and political entity) and within a “world of respected modern nations.”<sup>4</sup>

By challenging the western dominance of international sport through producing their own large sports mega-event, the GANEFO, Chinese leaders stressed their solidarity and identification with other recently decolonized and third world nations involved in the burgeoning Afro-Asian movement. They sought to strengthen the national image of China as “victor” over foreign aggressors,<sup>5</sup> and as leader of the international socialist movement. Chinese socialism, they believed, had produced a state superior to that in the Soviet Union, and the GANEFO could help bolster that image nationally, in Asia, and worldwide.

### Learning from the Soviet Union and the “two Chinas” issue

In the first few years of the PRC, Chinese leaders had few resources and little desire to send athletes abroad. The more pressing issues were consolidating Communist rule, building a centralized government, and the Korean War (1950–1953). Furthermore, many top sports leaders had fled the mainland following the end of the Civil War,<sup>6</sup> and Communist leaders tended to be more interested in – and familiar with – mass sport (e.g., calisthenics, paramilitary drills, ping pong and basketball), than the world of international sport.<sup>7</sup>

Chinese leaders promoted the emulation of Soviet models in the development of new sport and physical culture (*tǐyù*) programs as part of the official policy of “leaning to one side,” which remained strong until mid-1956 and positioned China as a member of the broader, Soviet-led socialist world. The PRC received Soviet economic and military assistance and welcomed Soviet technical advisers, specialists, and experts in a wide range of fields - including social and cultural.<sup>8</sup> At the center of sports and physical culture was

4 Andrew Morris, *Marrow of the Nation: A History of Sport and Physical Culture in Republican China* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004), 141.

5 Gries, “Nationalism”, 109.

6 For example, of the three Chinese Olympic committee members from the earlier Republican period, only one, Dong Shouyi, remained on the mainland following the establishment of the PRC. The other two, Wang Zhengting and Kong Xiangxi, were ardent Nationalist leaders who fled the country during the Civil War. Hao Gengsheng, another sports leader and Nationalist, fled to Taiwan where he subsequently became the main representative for the Republic of China (ROC) in international sports organizations. For more on this issue, see Xu Guoqi, *Olympic Dreams: China and Sports 1895-2008* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2008), especially pages 80-82.

7 This was largely due to the communist ideological belief in, and the leaders’ practical experience with, mass sport in Soviet base areas in the 1930s and 1940s. Ping pong, for example, was a popular recreational sport played by future Premier Zhou Enlai, and basketball – which has a history in China dating back to the YMCA’s influence in the early twentieth century – was popular with future Vice Premier Marshall He Long, who was named head of the newly founded State Sports Commission in 1952.

8 Zhihua Shen and Danhui Li, *After Leaning to One Side: China and Its Allies in the Cold War* (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2011). 121.



the Soviet-inspired “Ready for Labor and Defense” system, which focused on strengthening the health and fitness of ordinary citizens and building an athletic foundation. Soviet sports books and articles were translated, and Soviet experts and athletes sent to China. These “friendly” learning experiences, as they were often called in Chinese, emphasized the unilateral nature of the Sino-Soviet relationship. Chinese sports leaders claimed that working with their Soviet comrades on matters in international sport helped create friendly relations between the two countries.

When PRC leaders received an invitation in February 1951 sent by the Helsinki organizing committee for the upcoming 1952 Olympics, they decided that the decision hinged on whether or not the Soviet Union would also participate.<sup>9</sup> But PRC leaders also needed Soviet support in their own Olympic battle. IOC rules technically stated that each nation could have only one National Olympic Committee (NOC), but the PRC and the Republic of China (ROC) in Taiwan each claimed to be the only “China.”<sup>10</sup> Just a few days before the opening ceremonies at Helsinki, the IOC decided to allow both to attend as “China.”<sup>11</sup> The ROC withdrew in protest, while the PRC delegation arrived six days after the start of the Games and only one swimmer was able to officially compete. Despite this, PRC leaders claimed that attending the Games had been very successful in raising the international status of the PRC in light of the ROC’s non-participation.<sup>12</sup> Soviet athletic successes at the Olympics also impressed PRC leaders. Rong Gaotang, leader of the Chinese delegation and vice chair of the All-China Sports Federation, cited five things that the PRC needed to do: strengthen national sports leadership (and mimic Soviet sports organizational structure); centrally train outstanding athletes and create a program for future prospective athletes; hire five Soviet sports experts to come work in China; hold national games each year in every Olympic discipline; and build sports stadiums and facilities around the country.<sup>13</sup>

PRC leadership meanwhile instructed their Olympic delegates to rely on Soviet comrades in the IOC for advice on all matters. The Soviets gladly took on this role as part of an agenda to build their own position and influence in the IOC, promote the Soviet Union as leader in sports development, and make the IOC more inclusive (especially of African and Asian nations) – all part of their effort to “democratize” sport.<sup>14</sup>

9 Chinese Foreign Ministry Archives (CFMA) 113-00097-01: Guanyu woguo shifou canjia shiwujie aolinpike yundonghui (zai fenlan) de youguan wenjian [Related documents concerning whether or not our nation participates in the 15th Olympic games (in Finland)].

10 Christopher Hill, *Olympic Politics* (New York: Manchester University Press, 1996), 44–45.

11 Morris, *Marrow of the Nation*, 238–39.

12 CFMA 113-00158-02: Wo canjia aoweihui de jue ding ji huihou baogao [Post-Games report on our decision to participate in the Olympic games], message sent from Rong Gaotang to Liu Shaoqi and the Central bureau, August 21, 1952.

13 Ibid.

14 Jenifer Parks, “Red sport, red tape the Olympic games, the Soviet sports bureaucracy, and the Cold War, 1952–1980,” Unpublished dissertation, University of North Carolina, 2009, 105–107.

In 1954 the IOC changed its rules so that territories under the control of an NOC could receive the same recognition as nations, thus recognizing both the ROC and PRC.<sup>15</sup> Official PRC policy in this period, however, dictated that the PRC would refuse to participate in any event that also recognized the ROC as China.<sup>16</sup> When the IOC invited both to the 1956 Melbourne Olympics, the ROC rejected, and then accepted, the invitation. The PRC delegation, in an attempt to discourage ROC participation, apparently planned to arrive at the Olympic village ahead of time – they were shocked upon their arrival to see that the ROC flag had already been hoisted. They formally voiced their discontent to the IOC and organizing committee to no avail and subsequently withdrew from the Games.<sup>17</sup> Sino-Soviet solidarity at IOC meetings also broke down as PRC representatives felt increasingly belittled and their interests ignored. The Soviets had silenced them at a 1955 IOC meeting for having brought up the “two Chinas” issue, claiming that socialist unity was more important.<sup>18</sup>

But ideological differences with the Soviet Union following Joseph Stalin’s death in 1953 had already created a rift between the two nations, and the years 1956–1957 saw a general disintegration of this supposed socialist unity.<sup>19</sup> The earlier emphasis on “learning from the Soviet Union” declined as Chinese leaders began to show a more active interest in pushing their own agenda. This continued into 1958, when China kicked off the Great Leap Forward, a massive political, economic, and social movement marked by an intensive propagation of Maoist ideology that stressed revolutionary action and practice. In August, as the Politburo approved the nationwide establishment of communes that accelerated collectivization and marked the beginning of the most extreme phase of the movement, the PRC withdrew from the IOC and several other international sports associations. In a letter to the IOC, Dong Shouyi, IOC member for China, accused IOC President Avery Brundage of serving the American imperialists and their “two Chinas” plot.<sup>20</sup>

Nevertheless, the PRC continued to build elite sport programs and promote international sports exchanges. During the Great Leap Forward a campaign to boost the number of elite athletes over a ten-year period began,<sup>21</sup> and although international sports federations affiliated with the IOC technically had rules prohibiting competitions between member and non-member nations, many countries still sent athletes to compete with

15 Hill, *Olympic Politics*, 45.

16 Liang Lijuan, He Zhenliang and *China’s Olympic Dream* (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 2007), 46–47.

17 Xu, *Olympic Dreams*, 85.

18 Susan Brownell, “Sports and politics don’t mix’: China’s relationship with the IOC during the Cold War,” in *East Plays West: Sport and the Cold War*, eds. Stephen Wagg and David Andrews (London; New York: Routledge 2007), 259–260.

19 Lorenz Lüthi, *The Sino-Soviet Split: Cold War in the Communist World* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), 46–47.

20 Dong Shouyi to IOC, 19 August 1958, International Olympic Committee (IOC) Archives, Lausanne, Switzerland.

21 Fan Hong, “China,” in *Comparative Elite Sport Development: systems, structures and public policy*, ed. by Barrie Houlihan and Mick Green (Oxford: Butterworth-Heinemann, 2007), 28.

the PRC in “friendly” (unofficial) competitions.<sup>22</sup> In fact, these types of sport exchanges increased in the following years.<sup>23</sup> For the next half-decade, as exchanges with socialist bloc countries continued much as they had before, PRC leaders also forged their own path by fostering new sports relations with third world nations.

### **Bandung and International Sport: A Shared Struggle**

These changes in sports relations came alongside Chinese efforts to get more involved in the burgeoning Afro-Asian, Third World-led movements. In April 1955, PRC Premier Zhou Enlai had delivered a memorable speech at the Bandung Conference held in Indonesia. Over two-dozen national leaders convened at Bandung to discuss future economic and cultural cooperation, united on the basis of a common opposition to colonialism and imperialism.<sup>24</sup> Those who called for the Bandung Conference, including Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and Indonesian President Sukarno, were interested in looking for ways in which they could unify and represent the interests of decolonized nations in an increasingly polarized political situation. Conference participants unified around general themes expressed through a common repertoire of terms, such as “peaceful co-existence,” Afro-Asian solidarity, and the shared struggles against colonialism and imperialism. Zhou praised the goals of the conference and called for Asians and Africans to “rise against colonialism” and unite for “peace and independence.”<sup>25</sup>

The Bandung Conference is often considered the beginning of the Afro-Asian and non-aligned movements, or the third world project,<sup>26</sup> as it took place in the context of massive decolonization and the rise of anti-colonial nationalist movements. Positioned between the end of European imperialism and the height of the Cold War, the Bandung meeting became an important turning point between colonial and post-colonial periods.<sup>27</sup>

Despite political differences among some participants, Bandung resulted in a kind of political and moral solidarity<sup>28</sup> that Christopher Lee has recently called a “community of feeling.”<sup>29</sup> Sentimental rather than geopolitical in nature, this community united on “a shared experience of western imperialism,” with the goal to produce “a distinct, even

22 Liang, He Zhenliang, 51.

23 See: Dashiji [Record of big events] for the years 1958-1961 in *Zhongguo tiyu nianjian 1949-1991* [China Sports Yearbook 1949-1991] (Beijing: Renmin tiyu chubanshe, 1993).

24 For more on Bandung, see Vijay Prashad, *The Darker Nations* (New York: New Press, 2007), Chapter 2, and McDougall and Finnane, eds., *Bandung: Little Histories* (Victoria: Monash University Press, 2010).

25 Chou En-lai, “Main Speech by Premier Chou En-lai, Head of the Delegation of the People's Republic of China, Distributed at the Plenary Session of the Asian-African Conference,” in *China and the Asian-African Conference* (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1955), 10, 19.

26 Prashad, *The Darker Nations*, 1.

27 Christopher J. Lee, “Introduction: Between a Moment and an Era: The Origins and Afterlives of Bandung,” in *Making a World After Empire: the Bandung Moment and Its Political Afterlives*, ed. Christopher J. Lee et al. (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2010), 9-10.

28 Odd Arne Westad, *The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times*, New Ed (Cambridge University Press, 2011), 106.

29 Lee, “Introduction,” 25.

utopian alternative to the preceding era through a discourse of Afro-Asian solidarity.”<sup>30</sup> The conference offered leaders a venue to discuss colonial pasts and possible postcolonial futures. Sukarno acknowledged this purpose at the opening session:

*Our nations and countries are colonies no more. Now we are free, sovereign, and independent. We are again masters in our own house. We do not need to go to other continents to confer.*<sup>31</sup>

Bandung thus set the framework for the rise of a community of leaders from decolonized nations, armed with hopeful optimism for the future even as they continued to deal with decolonization's discontents at home.

In 1956, following on the heels of Bandung, Nehru called for a policy of “nonalignment” – in other words, for countries and peoples who did not wish to align themselves with either the U.S. or the Soviet Union to promote instead “nonaggression and non-interference” between countries.<sup>32</sup> PRC leaders, not willing to completely sever relations with the Soviet Union, remained hesitant on nonalignment, but they attended the first Afro-Asian Peoples’ Solidarity conference held in Cairo in late 1957 and subsequently joined the Afro-Asian People’s Solidarity Organization (AAPSO) established in 1960. The AAPSO upheld many of the principles of Bandung and coincided with major changes in PRC foreign policy. The Sino-Soviet split in 1960 led to increasing isolation from Soviet “brother” countries (*xiongdi guojia*) and PRC leaders simultaneously began to compete with the Soviet Union for socialist influence in Africa and Asia. Zhou Enlai, as well other high-level PRC leaders, worked hard towards cultivating Afro-Asian relations.<sup>33</sup>

The Non-Aligned Movement and the AAPSO both claimed that nation-states could choose independent ideological paths, but goals such as uniting oppressed peoples in anti-colonial struggles conveniently blended with the goals of international socialism as interpreted by the Chinese Communist Party. The Soviet Union, in the Chinese Communist Party’s analysis, had abandoned the international socialist movement and forgotten about oppressed peoples around the world; the PRC should instead set the example for others to follow. Socialist China, according to the PRC leadership, would lead the rest of the world in the development of peaceful co-existence and economic cooperation.<sup>34</sup>

Between 1961 and 1965, the influence of Chinese leaders vis-à-vis Soviet and Indian leaders in the AAPSO reached its height.<sup>35</sup> PRC leaders participated in numerous state-

30 Ibid, 26.

31 Cited in Prashad, *The Darker Nations*, 30.

32 Jawaharlal Nehru, “Economic Development and Nonalignment” from a speech in Washington, D.C., December 18, 1956, printed in the U.S. Department of State Bulletin, January 14, 1957, 4950.

33 R. MacFarquhar, *Origins of the Cultural Revolution* Volume 3, 298, 310-312. Sino-Indian relations meanwhile deteriorated following unresolved border conflicts in 1962, and the PRC never joined the Indian-backed non-aligned movement established in 1961.

34 Mao Zedong, “Speech At The Tenth Plenum Of The Eighth Central Committee, 24,” in *Selected Works of Mao Tse-Tung* (India: Kranti Publications, no date), [http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/volume-8/mswv8\\_63.htm](http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/volume-8/mswv8_63.htm) [accessed 24 February 2012].

35 Omar Ali Amer, “China and the Afro-Asian Peoples’ Solidarity Organization,” PhD Thesis, Université de Genève, 1972, 10.

to-state visits, but at a time when prominent international organizations like the United Nations did not recognize the PRC, sport visits and cultural exchanges with AAPSO nations often helped foster diplomatic relations. Indeed, the PRC's active establishment of sports relations with decolonized nations grew alongside these Afro-Asian and non-aligned movements. Already by 1960, as PRC and Soviet leaders competed for socialist influence in Africa and Asia, international sports exchanges had become sites for PRC leaders to promote Chinese socialism – in the name of Afro-Asian solidarity and friendship. Official sports delegation visits with African and Asian nations grew during subsequent years and included exchanges with Indonesia, Japan, North Korea, Vietnam, Cambodia, Mali, Guinea, Ghana, and Sudan among others.<sup>36</sup>

These visits occurred in the aftermath of the disastrous economic effects following the end of the Great Leap Forward that led to a re-evaluation of sports programs in the PRC. Chinese leaders decided to use scarce financial resources exclusively for elite athletic development and specialized training programs. The International Table Tennis Federation (ITTF), one of the few international sports organizations that consistently recognized the PRC, gave the nation its first opportunity to host a major event, and in April 1961 Beijing held the ping-pong world championships. Athletes from over thirty nations showed up to watch the Chinese sweep the competition; a year later the government sent top ping-pong athletes to Africa where, in two months, they visited Egypt, Ghana, Guinea, Mali, and Sudan. Delegation leader Huang Zhong enthusiastically reported that the Chinese athletes had expressed “Chinese and African people's deep camaraderie” through, for example, playing exhibition matches covered by the local presses as well as visits to historic and cultural sites to learn about the “heroic struggle” of African people against imperialism and colonialism.<sup>37</sup> Huang argued that the visit also showed African people “our nation's vigorous development” and noted that efforts had been made to help Guinea, Mali, and Sudan develop their sports programs. Couched in terms of Afro-Asian solidarity, sports exchanges such as this one thus served as platforms for promoting Chinese socialism at home and abroad.

These PRC efforts to use sport as a means to expand its own influence among AAPSO nations reached an apex with the 1963 Games of the New Emerging Forces, which will be discussed in more detail below, an international sports mega-event co-orchestrated with Indonesian leaders following the Fourth Asian Games held in Jakarta in 1962. By then PRC leadership had developed a particularly close political relationship with Indonesian president Sukarno; there was no formal alliance between the two nations, but Chinese leaders and leftist Indonesian leaders shared common communist goals.<sup>38</sup> The Fourth Asian Games demonstrated the influence of PRC leaders in this relationship

36 See: Dashiji in *Zhongguo tiyu nianjian 1949-1991* for the years 1961-1965. Although sports exchanges with the Soviet bloc (i.e., the Soviet Union, Poland, Romania, Czechoslovakia, etc.) declined, and could sometimes grow tense, they did continue in this period.

37 CFMA 108-00816-01: *Zhongguo pingpangqiu dui fangwen feizhou baogao* [Report on the Chinese ping pong team's visit to Africa], August 1, 1962.

38 MacFarquhar, *Origins*, 121, 134, 339.

as they successfully pressured Indonesian leaders to prevent ROC athletes from participation.

### **“Ever Onward”:<sup>39</sup> The 1962 Asian Games**

The founding members of the Asian Games Federation (AGF), established in 1949, had all come from their countries’ Olympic committees – but given the political circumstances at the time, the AGF did not initially include any Chinese members. The Games, to be held every four years, were designed as regional qualifiers for the Olympics. At the first Games, held in New Delhi in 1951, the best the PRC could do was send a handful of observers; the ROC could not even manage that. When both PRC and ROC representatives attended an AGF meeting held during the 1952 Olympics, Rong Gaotang (PRC) claimed that the AGF remained separate from the Olympics, relying instead on the “cooperation of all Asian countries.”<sup>40</sup> But the AGF mostly followed IOC policy, and ROC athletes participated in the 1954 Manila Games.

Jakarta won the bid to host the 1962 Games in 1958, and Sukarno wanted to use the event to promote national image.<sup>41</sup> Some members of the AGF (Japan, India and the Philippines) expressed concern, however, over how Sino-Indonesian relations might affect the Games – would the planning committee send invitations to the PRC and not the ROC (Taiwan)?<sup>42</sup> Indeed, leading up to the event, Chinese embassy officials in Jakarta discussed how to exert pressure on the Indonesian Foreign Ministry and national sports leaders to prevent ROC participation.<sup>43</sup> PRC leaders, as part of a larger anti-American campaign, and in the face of a growing Sino-Soviet split, saw an opportunity to use the Games to further their own agenda.

When Hao Gengsheng, the AGF member from ROC (Taiwan), visited Indonesia in the spring – despite Indonesian promises to the Chinese that he would not – top Chinese leaders decided to take action. Vice Premier Chen Yi warned the Indonesian ambassador to China that allowing Taiwan to participate would be detrimental because it would make the outside world think that Indonesia’s policy toward China had changed. He also argued that people would suspect that Indonesia was “not determined to recover

39 The official motto of the Asian Games Federation.

40 CFMA 113-00158-02: message sent from Rong Gaotang to Liu Shaoqi and the Central bureau, August 21, 1952.

41 Stefan Hübner, “The Fourth Asian Games (Jakarta 1962) in a Transnational Perspective: Japanese and Indian Reactions to Indonesia’s Political Instrumentalisation of the Games,” *The International Journal of the History of Sport* 29, no. 9 (2012): 1298.

42 See collected news briefs from January 18, 1962 in CFMA 105-01086-03: Youguan guojia zai guoji tiyu huodong zhong dui Taiwan dangju de taidu [The attitudes of some nations towards Taiwan in international sports activities]. Also, in 1959 the IOC ruled that the ROC Olympic committee, since it did not represent the majority of the Chinese people, could not use “China” in its name. Throughout the 1960s ROC leaders protested this decision and the IOC continued to remain divided over an appropriate name. Xu, *Olympic Dreams*, 90-94.

43 See CFMA 105-01492-01: Guanyu yinni ni yaoqing Taiwan dangju canjia di si jie yayunhui wenti [Concerning the issue of Indonesia inviting Taiwan to participate in the 4th Asian Games], telegram December 2, 1961.

the [Dutch colonial territory] West Irian [West Papua].”<sup>44</sup> China, he noted, supported Indonesia’s counter-insurgency in West Irian,<sup>45</sup> while Taiwan did not. Thus it was “difficult to understand” why Indonesia wanted Taiwan in the Asian Games. A month later, during discussions on the upcoming Afro-Asian conference preparatory meeting to be held in Indonesia, the ambassador claimed that if Taiwan was banned then some nations might boycott the Games (namely Thailand, Philippines, Hong Kong, Malaysia and Japan) and that would “affect the prestige of Indonesia and Sukarno.”<sup>46</sup> Chen retorted that Sukarno’s prestige rested on his “anti-imperialism, anti-colonialism, and peaceful founding of the country” and he compared Taiwan to West Irian, asking, “if we invited a representative group from West Irian to participate in an activity in China how would Indonesia feel?” PRC leaders simply would not do that, he claimed, because that would be “engaging together in colonialism.”<sup>47</sup>

By late July, the Chinese embassy in Jakarta had sent numerous telegrams to Chinese leaders outlining the preparations being made for the arrival of the Taiwanese. Distressed PRC leaders called for more pressure on Sukarno, and stepped up propaganda on the “American conspiracy.”<sup>48</sup> An article in the popular magazine *New Sport* [*Xin tiyu*] linked the situation at the Asian Games to the IOC and its American president Avery Brundage. Outlining the entire history of the “two Chinas” issue in the IOC, it claimed that international sports organizations hypocritically stated, “sports and politics don’t mix” while carrying out their own political plot under the influence of American imperialism.<sup>49</sup>

In August the Indonesian organizing committee made its move: the Taiwan delegation received blank slips of paper instead of entry cards for its athletes.<sup>50</sup> Some AGF leaders tried desperately to reverse the situation at the last minute, but behind the scenes PRC leadership pressured Indonesian leaders through their embassy in Jakarta and intelligence agents.<sup>51</sup> Officially, Sukarno waited until the opening ceremonies to publicly ban Taiwan. Emergency AGF meetings were held and G. D. Sondhi, Indian delegation lea-

44 CFMA 105-01085-03: summary of talks between Vice Premier Chen Yi and Ambassador Sukani, May 29, 1962.

45 The West Irian was a part of the Dutch East Indies. Although Indonesia had laid claim to all former Dutch colonies following independence in 1949, the West Irian remained an area of dispute. Charles A Coppel, *Indonesian Chinese in Crisis* (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1983), 24, 34. At the time of these talks, Sukarno was in the midst of military operations to take over the territory, which was still technically under the control of the Dutch. In fall 1962 the territory became part of Indonesia. R B Cribb and Colin Brown, *Modern Indonesia: A History Since 1945* (London, New York: Longman, 1995), 85-86.

46 CFMA 105-01085-03: summary of talks between Vice Premier Chen Yi and Ambassador Sukani, June 22, 1962.

47 Ibid.

48 CFMA 105-01083-01: telegram from Foreign Ministry to Chinese embassy in Jakarta, July 24, 1962.

49 “Mei diguozhuyi yi gui zai guoji tiyu huodong zhong wannong ‘liangge zhongguo’ de yinmou [America imperialism has always played the “two Chinas” plot in international sports activities],” *New Sport* [*Xin tiyu*], August 6, 1962, 2-3.

50 Hübner, “The Fourth Asian Games,” 1299.

51 See numerous telegrams sent from the Foreign Ministry to the Chinese embassy in Jakarta during August 1962 in CFMA 105-01086-01: Zhu yinni shiguan guanyu zuzhi Taiwan dangju canjia yayunhui douzheng xingshi de baogao ji yinni gejie dui Taiwan canjia yayunhui de fanying [The Embassy in Indonesia’s report concerning the forms of struggle to prevent Taiwan participation in the Asian Games and the general Indonesian reaction towards Taiwan participation in the Asian Games].



der and (IOC-friendly) AGF member, convinced the IOC executive board to withdraw support of the Games. As riots against him broke out in Jakarta, Sondhi fled, but he continued to work the IOC for suspension of Indonesian membership.<sup>52</sup>

Zhou Enlai and Chen Yi meanwhile sent personal messages of thanks to Indonesian leaders for having blocked the Taiwanese delegation from participation.<sup>53</sup> Sukarno thanked the PRC for its support and replied that the event “further strengthened the friendship between Indonesia and China.”<sup>54</sup> Shortly thereafter, Indonesian leaders requested Chinese support for organizing an Afro-Asian sports structure. International sports organizations, they believed, needed to have a “revolution.”<sup>55</sup>

Chinese leaders supported the idea. In an official summary of “achievements and weakness” for 1962, the State Sports Commission stated that the year’s most important accomplishments in international activities had been increasing “understanding and friendship” particularly between Asians and Africans – as well as “coordinating foreign struggles and expanding political influence.”<sup>56</sup> Furthermore, in light of the fact that the Olympics had become a stage for showcasing American and Soviet athletes, and Chinese ping-pong athletes had brought international glory through their wins, the leadership in the PRC knew that one way to display their power would be through the talent of Chinese athletes in a large-scale, international, multi-sport competition. Except for ping-pong, many Chinese athletes had yet to participate in any large-scale sports competition outside the socialist world. The creation of an alternative organization thus appealed not only to top leaders, but also to Chinese sports leaders and athletes.

In early February 1963, the IOC passed a resolution that would suspend the Indonesian Olympic Committee, who then voluntarily withdrew from the IOC.<sup>57</sup> Sukarno subsequently announced the creation of a new international sports organization, the Games of the New Emerging Forces. Politically inspired by the Bandung conference, the GANEFO would have specific and explicit political aims in line with Sukarno’s larger political project. He believed that the world was made up of “New Emerging Forces” and “Old Established Forces.” The “New Emerging Forces” constituted “all countries opposing imperialism and colonialism and struggling for justice and prosperity,”<sup>58</sup> whereas the old forces were essentially those of colonialism. Apart from these political aims, the Games themselves would resemble the Olympics in nearly every aspect.

52 Hübner, “The Fourth Asian Games,” 1295, 1304-1305.

53 CFMA 105-01085-05: Zhou Enlai zongli, Chen Yi fuzongli dui Yinni zuzhi Taiwan dangju canjia yayunhui biaoshi ganxie [Premier Zhou Enlai and Vice Premier Chen Yi express their thanks for Indonesia blocking the participation of Taiwan in the Asian Games], September 3, 1962.

54 CFMA 105-01085-06: Youguan Yinni zongtong Sukanuo zhixin Zhou Enlai zongli, Chen Yi fuzongli shi [Letter from Indonesian President Sukarno to Premier Zhou Enlai and Vice Premier Chen Yi], October 4, 1962.

55 CFMA 105-01789-05: Yinni zhushiguan dashi Sukani tan yayunhui he dierci yafeihuiyi wenti [Indonesian ambassador Sukani discusses the Asian Games and the 2nd Afro-Asian conference issue], October 12, 1962.

56 “1962 nian quanguo tiyu gongzuo huiyi jiyao (zhailu) [Summary of the 1962 nationwide sports conference (extract)] in *Tiyu yundong wenjian xuanbian 1949–1981* [Selected documents on sports] (Beijing: Renmin tiyu chunbanshe, 1982), 85.

57 Ewa Pauker, “Ganefo I: Sports and Politics in Djakarta” (*Asian Survey* 5, no. 4 (1965), 173.

58 “Imperialist Intrigues in Olympic Games,” *Peking Review*, February 22, 1963, 8-9.



From the start, PRC leaders played a central role in seeing the GANEFO come to fruition. A week after the announcement Zhou Enlai wrote Sukarno in praise of the decision to uphold “the national dignity of Indonesia as well as that of the Asian-African countries and peoples.” “The Chinese government and people,” he stated, would “strive jointly with the Government and people of Indonesia to bring about the realization of this proposal.”<sup>59</sup>

But the Chinese interest in GANEFO also extended beyond the Sino-Indonesian alliance, with the intent to use the event to re-position China on the world stage as the Afro-Asian leader. Chinese leaders privately concluded that even though Sukarno’s definition of “new emerging forces” was “vague”, China should “strive for the GANEFO to become a gradual realization of African-Asian-Latin American strength and a world competition opposite to the IOC.”<sup>60</sup> Even though participation in this first GANEFO would probably be limited, the potential long-term importance was enough to conclude that “no matter how many athletes, what the budget” they should “make [this first one] happen.” So confident were Chinese leaders of their own influence among African and Asian nations that the only concern they had was possible Soviet-led sabotage.

### **“Onward! No Retreat!”: the GANEFO as Idea**

The first GANEFO preparatory conference, held in April 1963, sheds light on the overlapping (and sometimes disparate) political goals of both the PRC and Indonesian leadership. Sukarno’s opening speech emphasized that the main purpose of the Games was to unite nations in the struggle against imperialism. Starting with a quote from Bertrand Russell that the world is divided into two communities, that of the “Declaration of Independence” and that of the “Communist Manifesto,” Sukarno stated that some people said there was now a “third community” among the peoples and countries of Asia and Africa. But, he stated, mankind was still divided into two communities, “the community of the Old Established Forces, and the community of the New Emerging Forces!”<sup>61</sup>

According to Sukarno, the problem was not the Olympics per se, but rather current IOC leadership. He reiterated support for the original Olympic principles to “build an international structure of sports that encourages the flowering of international respect, friendship, and peace” and tied it to the Indonesian revolution’s aim to build a “new world order of friendly brotherhood” which also included sports. Turning to China, he

59 CFMA 105-01833-01: Zhou Enlai zongli zhihan yinni zongli Sujianuo zhichi yinni tuichu guoji aolinpike weiyuanhui [Premier Zhou Enlai’s letter to Indonesian President Sukarno supporting Indonesia leaving the IOC], February 20, 1963.

60 CFMA 105-01169-01: Guanyu wo zhichi zhaokai xinxing lilian yundonghui de fangzhen [Policies concerning our support of holding the GANEFO], March 23, 1963.

61 GANEFO Preparatory Committee, Documents on Preparations of the First GANEFO, and Conference of the Preparatory Committee in Djakarta, November 1963 ([N.p.] Secretariat of the GANEFO Preparatory Committee, 1964), 3.

asked, “Were you not excluded from these International Games [i.e., the Asian Games], because you are said to be communist?”<sup>62</sup>

PRC representative Huang Zhong gave by far the most supportive speech in favor of the GANEFO, with anti-Americanism (and anti-ROC policies) high on his agenda. Both Indonesia and the PRC had suffered from “discrimination, restriction and interference” by the IOC “under the manipulation of the American imperialist elements” – the GANEFO would unite countries in the “common struggle against imperialism.”<sup>63</sup> A clause was also added to the GANEFO charter, stating that only one sports delegation from each country could participate; in other words, excluding the ROC from eligibility.<sup>64</sup>

Practically speaking, the GANEFO were to be nearly identical to the Olympics in format, structure, inspiration, and overall goals. The only difference was in the overtly political message it wanted to project; technically, the Olympic committee claimed it was apolitical, while the GANEFO argued that sports were absolutely political.<sup>65</sup> The committee adopted general Olympic ideals, such as sportsmanship, international friendship, and peace. The development of independent youth sports movements in all countries was encouraged. Friendly, equal, amateur competitions would be held every four years in a country from the “New Emerging Forces.”<sup>66</sup>

The committee for the GANEFO, consisting of four vice-presidents from Asia, Africa, Latin American, and Europe, would send invitations to nations, but other nations (or “forces” who were not yet nations) could also apply to participate.<sup>67</sup> Indonesia was chosen to host the first GANEFO mostly because it already had the infrastructure and facilities built for the Fourth Asian Games – originally built with funding from the United States and the Soviet Union.<sup>68</sup> An International Village for athletes, complete with a press house, transportation facilities, and a guesthouse, would be offered free of charge (paid for by the Indonesian government) to participating athletes. Twenty Olympic sports would be played over a period of 12 days and an arts festival would accompany the event.<sup>69</sup>

A flag, song, logo, and other symbols and emblems were designed uniquely for the GANEFO. The logo used on all official event publications was a revolving globe with a sea of flags and the words “Onward! No Retreat!” – a specific reference to the “Ever Onward” motto of the Asian Games. It accompanied official publications, including committee

62 See Sukarno’s speech at the GANEFO preparatory conference in CFMA 105-01833-02: Yinni yaoqing wo canjia xinxinglilang yundonghui choubai huiyi he xinxinglilang yundonghui ji wo fang fuzhao [Indonesia invites us to participate in the GANEFO preparatory conference and we reply], 32-36.

63 Ibid., 23.

64 GANEFO Federation, Charter of the Games of the New Emerging Forces, the GANEFO (n.p., 1963), 19.

65 IOC President Brundage had been claiming for years “sports and politics don’t mix” without realizing that this was in itself taking a political stance. For more on this issue, see Allen Guttman, *The Games Must Go On: Avery Brundage and the Olympic Movement* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1984), especially Chapter 9.

66 GANEFO Preparatory Committee, Documents, 5.

67 Ibid., 11.

68 Pauker, “Ganefo I”, 171.

69 GANEFO Preparatory Committee, Documents, 22-23.

documents, press releases, and reports from the games. The globe represented “Onward!” in the motto and symbolized a march “toward a new world...eternally new” based on “the right conviction and ideals.” The flags represented “No Retreat!” and symbolized nations “fighting for truth and justice” by participating in “an international unity to build together a new world, to eliminate imperialism and colonialism in all their manifestations.”<sup>70</sup>



Official logo of the Games of the New Emerging Forces<sup>71</sup>

Beneath all this talk of unity, preparations for the first GANEFO also brought to light the Sino-Soviet competition for influence in Asia and Africa. The Soviets interpreted Chinese leadership in the GANEFO as an attempt to divide the world of international sport, in which they had invested so much time and effort.<sup>72</sup> At the preparatory meeting the Soviet representative asked that the Games “not be bound with any limitations concerning future participation of national sports organizations in the world sports movement, official championships of the world... and Olympic Games.”<sup>73</sup> The Soviets felt they had to participate in the GANEFO for the purposes of maintaining relations with Afro-Asian and socialist countries. At the same time, they had already made significant headway with and bolstered their own position in the IOC, and one of their goals was to hold the Olympics in Moscow. Hence they did their best to negotiate the use of Olympic language in GANEFO documents, while also trying to convince the IOC that the GA-

70 GANEFO Federation, Charter, 13.

71 Logo taken from GANEFO Opens New Era in World Sports; Chinese Sports Delegation in Djakarta (Beijing: Renmin tiyu chubanshe, 1964).

72 Parks, “Red sport,” 184-186.

73 GANEFO Preparatory Committee, Documents, 23.

NEFO would be significant in African and Asian countries as meetings of youth, rather than sports competitions – and thus in no way competing with the Olympics.<sup>74</sup>

PRC leaders meanwhile remained determined to show the rest of the world that the PRC was the socialist and Afro-Asian leader. In May, the *Peking Review*, the English-language mouthpiece of the CCP, stated that GANEFO was the first time the “anti-imperialist peoples” had “their own” international sports organization like the Olympics. But, unlike the (presumably imperialist-run) Olympics, GANEFO remained faithful to promoting “friendship and understanding and serving the interests of world peace.”<sup>75</sup> A government media directive in July stated that GANEFO served to break the “monopoly and control” of imperialists in international sports organizations and would help nations develop independently, while strengthening mutual exchange and friendship among Asian, African, and Latin American countries. The GANEFO would be an important aspect of the “international political struggle...an anti-imperialist revolutionary struggle in the international sports world.”<sup>76</sup>

Media was asked to promote the Games as much as possible, including reporting abroad on Chinese sports activities and at home on Indonesian preparations and activities, as well as on sports in other participating nations. Particular emphasis was to be placed on the “struggles” in the international sports world, especially those taking place in IOC meetings.<sup>77</sup>

The State Sports Commission prepared by choosing the very best Chinese athletes to send to the GANEFO, and provided ample funding for their delegation and to the Indonesian government for the event. In some cases they even offered to fund several delegations from other countries.<sup>78</sup> Indonesian leaders also prepared by promoting the event, organizing an art exhibition, constructing a new hotel, and training “a hundred translators.”<sup>79</sup>

In October the number of GANEFO attendees remained unclear even as Chinese leaders geared up to also send acrobatic troops, sports movies, and Shanghai singing troupes to Indonesia.<sup>80</sup> Chinese leaders privately estimated that, in the best-case scenario, more than thirty countries would participate, competitions would be organized well and results would be good, leading to a permanent structure. In the worst-case scenario, there

74 Parks, “Red sport,” 180-187, 197.

75 “GANEFO: Sports and Anti-Imperialism,” *Peking Review*, May 3, 1963, 19.

76 Shanghai Municipal Archives (SMA) B126-1-688: Guanyu xinxing liliang yundonghui de xuanchuan yaodian [Propaganda points concerning the GANEFO], July 13, 1963.

77 SMA B126-1-688: Guanyu xinxing liliang yundonghui de xuanchuan baodao jihua [Media coverage plan concerning the GANEFO], August 28, 1963.

78 Xu, *Olympic Dreams*, 53.

79 CFMA 105-01169-02: Zhu Yinni shiguan dui “xinxing liliang yundonghui” qingkuang de fenxi baogao ji xiezhu jinxing gexiang zhunbei gongzuo qingkuang [Embassy in Indonesia report on the analysis of the GANEFO situation and status on assistance in preparatory work], October 8-9, 1963.

80 The Foreign Ministry sent out numerous telegrams to cultural bureaus in October 1963. See CFMA 105-01548-03: Guanyu canjia xinxing liliang yundonghui yanchu de wo yishituan, canzhantuan, shying deng wenti [Issues concerning our performing arts troops, exhibition troops, photography, etc.]

would be fewer than ten countries, results would be dismal, and the GANEFO would be “destroyed by imperialism and old revisionist elements.”<sup>81</sup>

Meanwhile, IOC leaders seemed unconvinced of the Soviet claim that this was just a youth festival and they persuaded international sports federations to institute a 12-month ban on Olympic participation for any GANEFO athlete.<sup>82</sup> Brundage privately wrote that the GANEFO had become “unquestionably the first move in a campaign to take over international sport in one way or another.”<sup>83</sup>

### The first GANEFO: “a revolution in athletics”

The first GANEFO opened on November 10 to great fanfare. At the opening ceremonies in Jakarta's Bung Karno stadium, a 100,000-person crowd greeted athletes from forty-eight nations. President Sukarno officially opened the games and recognized the PRC delegation, followed by recitation of the athletes' pledge, a torch lighting, and a flag procession. The Indonesian Minister of Sports then declared the GANEFO the beginning of “a revolution in athletics.”<sup>84</sup>

The Games lasted twelve days and attracted media worldwide. By the early 1960s, the Olympic Games had already long been a media spectacle, but few others sporting events could boast the same amount of exposure. *The Japan Times* stated conservatively that GANEFO's “victory” was simply that it had occurred.<sup>85</sup> France's *L'Équipe* meanwhile ran day-by-day detailed accounts on every aspect of the GANEFO, including extended commentaries on the ceremonies, competitions, speeches, the International Village, and the lives of athletes.<sup>86</sup> *The New York Times* covered the (mostly Chinese) athletic achievements of the Games. After just four days, the Chinese team had already won seventy-six medals,<sup>87</sup> and on November 18, the article “China Dominates Jakarta Games” listed the names of Chinese athletes and events in which they had picked up additional gold medals.<sup>88</sup> When athletes broke world records, they reported that, too.<sup>89</sup> In the end Chinese athletes won sixty-five gold medals; in second place was the Soviet Union with twenty-seven.<sup>90</sup>

81 CFMA 105-01548-03.

82 Susan Brownell, “Globalization is not a Dinner Party: He Zhenliang and China's 30-Year Struggle for Recognition by the International Olympic Committee” (paper presented at the Conference on Globalization and Sport in Historical Context, University of California, San Diego, March 2005), 19.

83 Personal correspondence from Avery Brundage to Otto Mayer, 9 November 1963, IOC Archives, Lausanne, Switzerland.

84 “Hail the First Games of the New Emerging Forces,” *Peking Review*, November 15, 1963, 21.

85 “Sukarno's GANEFO Is An 'Emerging Sport; How to Qualify? Bite Hand That Feeds You,” *The Japan Times*, November 11, 1963.

86 See *L'Équipe*, November 11-23, 1963.


87 “Chinese Capture 7 First Places,” *New York Times*, November 15, 1963, 54.

88 “China Dominates Jakarta Games,” *New York Times*, November 19, 1963, 69.

89 “Chinese Weight-Lifter Sets World Record in Jakarta,” *New York Times*, November 12, 1963, 71.

90 “First GANEFO Comes Through with Flying Colors,” *Peking Review*, November 29, 1963, 18.

In China, *New Sport* devoted its entire November issue (and a substantial portion of its December issue) to the GANEFO. *People's Daily* published numerous articles and photographs on its front page. Articulated in the language of the Afro-Asian movement, these publications reiterated GANEFO's political goals of unity in the struggle against colonialism and American imperialism. For example, a cartoon published in *New Sport* shows a character resembling JFK, who dons a shirt with the characters "imperialism" and carries a caricature of a colonialist on his shoulders, as evidenced by the word "colonialism" on his hat. A sports ball inscribed with the words "Games of the New Emerging Forces" slams into the face of the colonialist, knocking him back. Song lyrics accompanied this cartoon, reminding readers that the "New Emerging Forces link up and surge forward" in order to "oppose imperialism and colonialism!"



Political cartoon in *New Sport*, November 1963

Media in the PRC also emphasized the success of the GANEFO alongside critiques of the IOC and American imperialism. A *People's Daily* cartoon printed less than three days into the Games depicts a diverse parade of athletes, happily and gallantly marching ahead led by a Chinese male athlete who carries a flag that says "Games of the New Emerging Forces." The athletes seem in complete ignorance of the three men holding sports equipment in the bottom right corner, one of whom wears a shirt with Olympic rings and the letters "US" on it, one man who wears boxing gloves, and one who holds a baseball bat.





“The Games of the New Emerging Forces”<sup>91</sup>

Another cartoon, printed a week into the Games, was even more brutal. Depicting three men in business suits, each with his head buried in a mound of sand, the banner above declares this the “International Olympic Committee Ostrich Competition.” From left to right, the mounds read: “non-recognition of GANEFO”, “non-recognition of new world records”, and “we don’t know anything about the Games of the New Emerging Forces.” The caption asks: “Who can keep their head buried the longest?”



“The International Olympic Committee Ostrich Competition”<sup>92</sup>

91 People's Daily, November 13, 1963.

92 People's Daily, November 17, 1963.

Photographs of the GANEFO circulated by the PRC were also positive and stressed that the GANEFO offered athletes of all nations the opportunity for cultural sharing, friendship, cooperation, and mutual aid. Whether in the form of newspaper articles, magazines, images, athlete interviews, or post-event books and publications – the reader was constantly reminded that friendship and sharing was far more important than competition between athletes and countries.<sup>93</sup> The International Village was depicted as a place where athletes from various countries shared cultural experiences, while an art exhibition displayed works from different countries, and cultural performances from seven countries accompanied events.<sup>94</sup> The *Peking Review* stated that all athletes “learned from each other so that they all raised their athletic level together,”<sup>95</sup> while the *People’s Daily* declared that every nation’s athletes had throughout, whether during practice and competition, “helped each other, cared for each other, exchanged experience, open-mindedly learned from each other, [and] the playing field brimmed with a spirit of solidarity [and] friendship.”<sup>96</sup> Similar statements accompany pictures from the Games and show athletes smiling, laughing, and helping one another during and outside of competition. The GANEFO was “a reality of tremendous power and potentials” stated *China’s Sports*. “Athletes from various countries will meet again in the future. The torch of GANEFO will burn brightly forever.”<sup>97</sup>

PRC leadership also reiterated support of this new tradition in sports. Liu Shaoqi and Zhou Enlai sent a message to Sukarno declaring that the GANEFO marked a “victory gained by the people of the new emerging countries in their struggle against the... monopoly of international sports by imperialism.”<sup>98</sup> No matter what actually occurred in competition, they believed that the GANEFO would “become a household name.”

## Aftermath

Following the successful first GANEFO, delegates from thirty-six nations met immediately in Jakarta to establish a permanent GANEFO organization.<sup>99</sup> After just two hundred days of preparation, the number of participants had proved to them that despite “fighting and struggling” many nations had awoken “in the spirit of confidence

93 See, for example, GANEFO-related articles in: *China’s Sports*, Vol 1, 1964 and *People’s Daily*, November 16, 1963.

94 “GANEFO: New Wave in Sports And Friendship,” *Peking Review*, November 22, 1963, 17-18.

95 “First GANEFO Comes Through with Flying Colors,” 19.

96 “Tianjing changshang chengji youyi shuang fengshou [A double bountiful harvest of track and field achievements, friendship],” *People’s Daily*, November 16, 1963.

97 *China’s Sports*, Vol 1 1964, 10.

98 “Hail the First Games of the New Emerging Forces,” 22.

99 For more on the establishment of a permanent GANEFO organization, see Chris Connolly, “The Politics of the Games of the New Emerging Forces (GANEFO),” *The International Journal of the History of Sport*, 29:9 (2012), 1315-1320.



in [their] own power.” A second GANEFO was planned for Cairo in 1967 and the PRC chosen as a backup site in case of unspecified “difficulties.”<sup>100</sup>

In fact, press reports varied over participation counts and countries, making it difficult for the IOC to determine who faced possible Olympic disqualification. A circular was sent out to NOCs to determine who had participated in the GANEFO. Responses indicated that, although not many NOCs had sent athletes to the GANEFO, the governments of these nations had sent groups of workers, students, youth, and other non-Olympic athletes.<sup>101</sup> Nevertheless, IOC leaders upheld the ban on GANEFO athletes and neither North Korean nor Indonesian athletes participated in the 1964 Tokyo Olympics.<sup>102</sup>

In PRC media the political message was clear: the Games helped cultivate friendships between athletes and nations, especially those from Africa and Asia, all of whom were united against an IOC dominated specifically by the U.S. and its allies. Post-event publications, however, focused more broadly on “friendly competition,” cultural sharing, and solidarity among peoples of the world, who were united in a struggle against imperialism and colonialism. *GANEFO Opens New Era in World Sports* (1964) opens with a statement from Rong Gaotang, stating that the GANEFO “clearly demonstrates that countries and peoples free from imperialist and colonialist control are fully able to organize and develop their own independent sports activities” and they could also “contribute much to the development of world sports.”<sup>103</sup> The importance of GANEFO, above all, was in strengthening solidarity “among the peoples of Asia, Africa, Latin America and the rest of the world.” World sport no longer included only those countries in the Olympics; the GANEFO torch would “shine forever” for all nations engaged in the anti-imperialist, anti-colonial struggle. But, as a sports mega-event, the GANEFO had primarily served to boost the international political position of China and its athletes.

Moreover, publications depicted Chinese athletes as initiating friendships and leading efforts to share culture, knowledge, and experience with athletes from other nations. Images in the above-mentioned publication show content athletes, from various countries, engaged in friendly, non-competitive, non-sports activities. Underlying these images, of course, was the reality of Chinese athletic superiority, demonstrated in the results of competition. What they also show is that Chinese athletes were more than simply athletes—they were representatives and leaders for their nation, above and beyond their athletic duties. Indeed, taken out of context, none of these images evidences the importance of sports competition, or any sign of sports at all.

100 Documents of the First GANEFO Congress, Djakarta, 24th-25th November 1963 (Djakarta, 1964), 11, 19.

101 List of Responses to Circular Letter no. 252, 12/15/63, Avery Brundage collection, box 201, reel 116, IOC Archives, Lausanne, Switzerland.

102 “Brundage Condemns Political Interference in Sport,” *New York Times*, October 8, 1964, 56. Because other nations had not sent their Olympic athletes to the GANEFO, these Olympic athletes could participate in Tokyo.

103 *GANEFO Opens New Era in World Sports*; Chinese Sports Delegation in Djakarta, introduction.

## Conclusion

Although the first GANEFO were successful, a second large-scale GANEFO never occurred. An Asian-only GANEFO, held in Cambodia in 1966, was not nearly as popular in the media as its predecessor. Afro-Asian solidarities became strained following PRC opposition to the 1963 Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.<sup>104</sup> Relations with Indonesia and the PRC quickly disintegrated following the 1965 military coup that overturned Sukarno's authority and brought his successor to power on anti-Communist, anti-China platform.<sup>105</sup> Political tensions among GANEFO leaders, which mostly revolved around the organization's strong anti-IOC position, likely resulted in Egypt's unwillingness to host the second Games.<sup>106</sup> In China, the changing political tides in Chinese high politics, including the fall of Liu Shaoqi and the start of the Cultural Revolution, had a significant impact on foreign relations and the role of elite athletes in society. The state turned inwards, embroiled with internal ideological battles, to purge "bourgeois" elements from its ranks and begin another mass movement. Publications like *New Sport* no longer showed athletes breaking records or competing in friendly competitions, but instead portrayed them holding portraits of Mao and reading from the Little Red Book. By late 1966, the GANEFO had all but disappeared from the record. In the early years of the Cultural Revolution, sports newspapers and magazines ceased publication and few international sports competitions were held.

In summary, international sport played a defining role in Chinese diplomacy and Chinese leaders' attempts to project itself as an Afro-Asian leader during the years of 1961-1965. The GANEFO expressed China's unbroken commitment to using elite competitive sports for nation building, but the Games also served as an important piece of a larger political project: expanding political influence in the Afro-Asian movement, itself an expression and a vision of a new ordering of the world. The GANEFO shows how international sport offered Chinese socialism a way to represent itself to its own people, while also challenging Western-dominated sports organizations and negotiating a new position for China on the world stage.

The GANEFO also complicates traditional Cold War narratives that tend to align nations with either the Soviets or Americans. Furthermore, the ideals of nonalignment and Afro-Asianism sometimes overlapped, but they cannot be easily grouped into a single, third alternative. Nonalignment, for example, called for total disarmament and a ban on nuclear weapons, while Afro-Asianism stressed the need for revolutionary struggle against colonialism and imperialism. The Bandung-inspired GANEFO served as a site for performing the ideals of post-Bandung organizations such as the AAPSO, but these ideals were neither exclusively geographic nor Asian. The GANEFO was instead based

104 B. E. Shinde, "China and Afro-Asian Solidarity 1955-65: A Study of China's Policy and Diplomacy," *China Report* 1978 14(2), 48-71.

105 Coppel, *Indonesian Chinese in Crisis*, 52.

106 Connolly, "The Politics," 1311.

on the idea of unity found in common sentiment, and the belief that a revolutionary struggle in international sport was necessary. Built on the foundations of a strong Sino-Indonesian relationship and China's influence in the AAPSO, Chinese leaders had high hopes that the success of these Games would help show the rest of the world that the Chinese revolutionary model of socialism was the superior path to follow.

# Between East and West: The Cold War, Japan and the 1964 Tokyo Olympics

Martyn Smith

## RESÜMEE

Die Olympischen Spiele 1964 in Tokio dienten als Spektakel und Medienereignis dazu, die Idee einer einzigartigen asiatischen Identität mit der einer komplett neuen, modernen, ökonomisch entwickelten und demokratischen Gesellschaft zu verbinden. Japan wurde als ein nachahmenswertes Beispiel für einen erfolgreichen Modernisierungsprozess beworben, in dessen Verlauf es seine asiatische Identität und kulturelle Einzigartigkeit nicht verloren habe. Der Artikel untersucht, wie vor dem Hintergrund der ideologischen Prioritäten des Kalten Krieges die Frage nach der japanischen nationalen Identität in Debatten über den ‚Westen‘ und über ‚Asien‘ diskutiert wurde. Japan versinnbildlichte 1964 eine ‚globale Moderne‘ nicht nur durch die Transformation seiner Infrastruktur. Nationale Identität wurde auch ein ‚Konsumartikel‘ und ein ‚Japan‘ entstand, das unabhängig von der symbolischen Politik der Olympischen Spiele existieren konnte und jungen Japanern in den Metropolen eine scheinbar unpolitische nationale Identität offerierte. Dieses Bild wurde sowohl dem internationalen wie auch dem nationalen Publikum vermittelt und kann im Rahmen seiner Beschreibung von ‚Japan‘, dem ‚Westen‘ und ‚Asien‘ als ein Produkt des Kalten Krieges betrachtet werden.

*Understood in its totality, the spectacle is both the outcome and the goal of the dominant mode of production...the spectacle epitomizes the prevailing model of social life.*

Guy Debord<sup>1</sup>

The Tokyo Olympics held in October 1964 were the first to be held in Asia. Indeed they were the first to be held in a non-white, non-western country. They were also the first

1 Guy Debord, *The Society of the Spectacle*, Zone Books, New York 1995, 13.

to be telecast internationally, live and in colour, the first to use computer technology to record the results of the sporting events, and the first time a fibre glass pole was used in the Pole Vault competition.<sup>2</sup> In as much as the Olympics have long been considered a 'Western' event, their hosting by 'non-western' cities has mostly been interpreted in terms of the attainment by the host of certain social and economic conditions, usually marking the Games as a 'rite of passage' for the host country in the eyes of the international audience and the domestic public. But the Games in Tokyo in 1964, no less than those in Beijing and Seoul more recently, tell as much about the changing international political environment as about the social and economic development of the host country.

In many ways, the overarching imperative to make the Tokyo Olympiad a success was driven by the desire to flaunt the fact that, in the words of the Japanese government's 1956 white paper, the 'postwar is over.'<sup>3</sup> When novelist and cultural critic Yasuoka Shōtarō (1920–2013) claimed that the Tokyo Games brought a certain amount of peace to the hearts of the Japanese people after the worries of the immediate post war, and critic Etō Jun (1932–1999) watched an opening ceremony that 'showed a Japan which could at last take its place in the world', the same could no doubt be said for South Korea in 1988 and China twenty years later.<sup>4</sup> Nevertheless, the hosting of the Olympics in East Asia has not simply demonstrated a growing worldwide homogeneity. The Games have very often emphasised distinctive Asian histories, priorities and identities more than what William Tsutsui has called 'a unitary global modernity.'<sup>5</sup>

The 1964 Tokyo Olympics as a spectacle and media event sought to combine the idea of a unique Asian identity with a thoroughly modern, economically advanced democratic society. In doing so, it demonstrated how the recurring question of 'universality and cultural integrity'<sup>6</sup> confronted Japan within the context of Cold War rivalries and rapid economic growth. For the domestic audience, as well as for the 'advanced countries' the Games presented 'Japan' as more than ready to play its role in the global modernity of the 1960s. Peace loving and democratic, the Japan on display in 1964 had thoroughly abandoned the militaristic, feudal tendencies of the 1930s and 1940s and could now be completely reintegrated into international society.<sup>7</sup> Less than twenty years after the end of the war the Games also projected an image of a rebuilt, modern country, centred on

2 <http://www.olympic.org/tokyo-1964-summer-olympics> (Accessed on December 17, 2012).

3 Sekiguchi Eri, 'Tokyo Orinpiku to Nihon Banpaku Hakurankai' (The Tokyo Olympics and the 1970 World Fair), in Oikawa Yoshinobu Ed. *Tokyo Orinpiku no Shakai Keizaishi* (The Socio-economic History of the Tokyo Olympics), 2009, Nihon Keizai Hyōronsha, Tokyo, 1-38; Yoshikuni Igarashi, *Bodies of Memory: Narratives of War in Postwar Japanese Culture, 1945-1970*, 2000, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 143-163; Christian Tagsold, 'Modernity, space and national representation at the Tokyo Olympics 1964', *Urban History*, Vol. 37, No. 2, August 2010.

4 Ueyama Kazuo, 'Tokyo Orinpiku to Shibuya, Toyo' (The Tokyo Olympics and Shibuya), in Oikawa Yoshinobu Ed. *Tokyo Orinpiku no Shakai Keizaishi* (The Socio-economic History of the Tokyo Olympics), 2009, 39-74; William Tsutsui 'Introduction', in William Tsutsui and Michael Baskett Eds. *The East Asian Olympiads*, 2011, Global Oriental, Leiden, 1-22.

5 William M. Tsutsui, 'Introduction', in William M. Tsutsui and Michael Baskett, Eds. *The East Asian Olympiads 1934-2008: Building Bodies and Nations in Japan, Korea, and China*, 2011, 15.

6 Stefan Tanaka, *Japan's Orient: Rendering Pasts into History*, 1993, University of California Press, Berkeley, 68.

7 Noriko Aso, 'Sumptuous Repast: The 1964 Tokyo Olympics Arts Festival', *Positions* 10:1, Spring 2002, 8.

its capital city Tokyo, which offered up an example of modernization to be emulated by other countries in Asia. Within the popular media this idea of a Japan that had successfully followed the path of modernisation laid down by the 'free world', and had apparently 'caught up with the West' was one, which nevertheless retained its Asian identity and retained its cultural uniqueness.

The Tokyo Olympics confirmed Japan's existence in the world, and confirmed for the Japanese people their identity within a world of nations. There were vast, widely celebrated transformations which aimed to turn Tokyo into a modern, cosmopolitan city. 97.25% of the budget for the Games was spent on urban expansion and infrastructure improvement.<sup>8</sup> As the popular photographic magazine *Asahi Graph* recalled a few weeks after the closing ceremony: "The children of Tokyo had (the fact of) their existence among the many countries of the world burned into their eyes, and the visitors experienced first-hand the heart and energy of the Japanese people (*Nihonjin*). It was a truly precious month."

Regarding the Tokyo Olympiad, Christian Tagsold has argued that, "symbolic politics and the burden of history called for image management not simply in order to enhance marketing opportunities but to reconstruct national identities."<sup>9</sup> Yet, this paper shows how the growth of a consumer society within the context of almost a decade of high-speed economic growth, firmly embedded the reconstruction of Japanese national identity within the marketing opportunities presented by a youth led vibrant consumer society. As an event, the Tokyo Olympics was about consumption, and when "Tokyo turned out to be the most cosmopolitan city in the world during the 15 day Olympic Games..." it was in those spaces of consumption that this became a reality. As the *Asahi Graph* continued: "Tokyoites saw men and women from all the continents in the world at shopping centres, entertainment places and parks."<sup>10</sup> The 1960's was a period when "high school students' and University students' new ways of living and feeling brought about a change in the scenery of the imagination,"<sup>11</sup> and, to the extent that this changing scenery was about consumption, it was literally made concrete by the alterations in the actual scenery of Japan itself as the Games approached.

This paper will argue that an analysis of the popular media in Japan in the lead up to the 1964 Olympics exposes the tension between the emphasis on a distinctive cultural identity and the 'global modernity' of the Cold War. In the context of the Olympics, the question of Japan's national identity emerged in the popular press as a debate over the nature and desirability of consumer society. These debates informed ideas of nation in Japan throughout the period of high speed economic growth and made clear Japan's place in the global order of so-called 'free world capitalism.' As Shunya Yoshimi has shown, by the early 1960s Japanese companies had begun to assert a certain amount of national

8 Tsutsui, 2011, 14.

9 Christian Tagsold, 'Modernity, space and national representation at the Tokyo Olympics 1964', *Urban History*, Vol. 37, No. 2, August 2010, 291.

10 'Afureru Kokusai Iro' (Overflowing with International Colour), *Asahi Graph*, November 6<sup>th</sup> 1964.

11 Nakamura Masanori, Sengoshi (Postwar History), 2008, Iwanami Shoten, 107.

pride in their advertising of new consumer goods.<sup>12</sup> From this perspective Japan was, by 1964, an example for other Asian countries to follow as it epitomised 'global modernity' not only through the transformation of its infrastructure. The very nature of national identity was transformed into an article of consumption, one which could be separated from the symbolic politics of the Games and allowed an apparently depoliticised idea of nation to emerge.<sup>13</sup> This shift affected the way both Asia and the West figured domestically in the formation of ideas of nation. Japan's re-emergence onto the world stage as a 'bridge between East and West' was not simply related to the numerous feats of civil engineering carried out to make the Games a reality, it was also about the presentation of a lifestyle firmly embedded, ideologically if not economically, in consumption. Yet, this 'Japan' was just as much a product of Cold War concerns as the democratic, peaceful, economically advanced 'Japan' of modernisation theory. The debates framed the Olympics as a national and international event, and tied the policies of high-speed economic growth pursued since the mid-1950s directly to the ideological concerns of the Cold War.

### Japan as a Role Model

During and after the Bandung Conference, many in Japan saw an opportunity for the country to position itself as 'neither Eastern nor Western' but having an original civilisation which fitted the country to be the ideal bridge between the Cold War powers.<sup>14</sup> In the late 1950s, Japan's increasing economic role in Southeast Asia provided the ideal means to fulfil this position. After the signing of the San Francisco Peace Treaty in 1952, the issue of war reparations to countries in Southeast Asia was combined with the Japanese government's desire for economic development in the region. Japanese leaders sought to promote economic cooperation and create markets for the rapidly growing Japanese economy. The region offered Japan the cheap raw materials and markets neces-

12 Shunya Yoshimi, 'Consuming America, Producing Japan', in Sheldon Garon and Patricia L. Maclachlan Eds. *The Ambivalent Consumer: Questioning Consumption in East Asia and the West*, 2006, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 79-82.

13 Kosaku Yoshino discusses the connection between nationalism and consumption in the popularity of *Nihon-jinron* (theories of Japaneseness). Whilst Yoshino focuses on the 1980s and the consumption of a particular kind of 'cultural nationalism', driven by elite discourse and apparently detached from the state, this article takes a broader view. Ideas of nation are grounded in everyday experience and the Tokyo Olympics provided the opportunity for the people to see and experience the emergence of the country as 'modern'. See Kosaku Yoshino Ed, *Consuming Ethnicity and Nationalism, Asian Experiences*, 1999, University of Hawaii Press, Honolulu; for a discussion of national identity as grounded in everyday experience see Tim Edensor, *National Identity, Popular culture and Everyday Life*, Berg, Oxford, 2002.

14 Ikeda Sôgo, 'Sengo Nichibei Kankei ni Okeru Nihon Gaikô no Aidentiti' (Japan's Diplomatic Identity in the Context of Postwar U.S.-Japan Relations), in Hasegawa Yuichi Ed. *Nihon no Gaikô no Aidentiti* (Japan's Diplomatic Identity), 2002, Nansôsha, Tokyo, 195-198; Ronald P. Dore, 'Japan's Place in the World', *The World Today*, Vol. 22, No. 7, (Jul, 1966), 304-306; Kweku Ampiah, 'Japan at the Bandung Conference: An attempt to assert an independent foreign policy', in Iokibe Makoto, Caroline Rose, Tomaru Junko, John Weste Eds. *Japanese Diplomacy in the 1950s: From Isolation to Integration*, 2008, Routledge, New York, 79-97.

sary to build up capital reserves and begin to bridge the 'dollar gap'. Yet Japan's position in the post-war world was closely tied up with decolonisation in Asia and the ideological power politics of the Cold War. It was closely linked to the transformation of order in the region.<sup>15</sup> Throughout the 1950s, Japan's war reparations, paid in the form of services and capital goods, were explicitly designed to, and did, "facilitate integration with Southeast Asia" whilst easing the path for Japanese influence in the region.<sup>16</sup>

After 1945, as the Japanese Empire was disbanded and international power politics divided along 'Free World' versus 'Communist Bloc' lines, the strategic imperatives of the United States and its allies shifted. The immediate post-war emphasis of the Occupation authorities on stripping Japan of military and economic power and punishing the country's wartime leaders ceded to the necessity of finding a way to bring the country back into the post-war world, in particular into Asia. Unaware of the strength of nationalist feeling in the colonies of Southeast Asia and lacking an overall post-war plan for the region, the European and American colonial powers feared that instability could provide fertile ground for pro-communist movements. The longer the transfer of sovereignty took, the weaker the anti-communist nationalists and the colonial powers. By 1949, U.S Policy Planning Staff Paper 51 emphasised the importance of Southeast Asia in the battle against communism in Asia and the importance of relations between Japan and Southeast Asia for the economic revival of both regions.<sup>17</sup> Japan's advance into the region throughout the 1950s then, "proceeded with the tacit acceptance of the United States" which worried that the vacuum created by the retreat of the colonial powers would be filled by communist influence. "Japan's return to Southeast Asia overlapped with decolonisation and the Cold War, and Japan's return to Asia was thus closely linked to the transformation of the order in this region."<sup>18</sup>

After the boom of the Korean War, reparation payments through the provision of services and products continued to fuel domestic production in Japan and provided ready-made export markets for Japanese firms. Trade with Asia increased more than 300% in the ten years between 1957 and 1967. But, aside from the purely economic benefits, the policy is also credited with sowing the seeds of a conscious independent identity in Japan's international relations. This was further bolstered by the policies pursued by the Kishi government in the late 1950s.<sup>19</sup> During the same period, the Japanese domestic

15 Taizo Miyagi, 'Post-War Japan and Asianism', *Asia-Pacific Review*, Vol. 13, No. 2, 2006; John Weste, 'Japan in British Regional Policy Towards southeast Asia, 1945–1960', in Iokibe Makoto, Caroline Rose, Tomaru Junko, John Weste Eds. *Japanese Diplomacy in the 1950s: From Isolation to Integration*, 2008, 34–54.

16 William S. Borden, 'Cooperation in Southeast Asia, 1950–1954', in *The Pacific Alliance: United States Foreign Policy and Japanese Trade Recovery, 1947–1955*, 1984, University of Wisconsin Press, Madison; Akira Suehiro, 'The Road to Economic Re-entry: Japan's policy toward Southeast Asian Development in the 1950s and 1960s', *Social Science Japan Journal*, Vol 2, No 1, 1999.

17 Kenichi Goto, *Tensions of Empire: Japan and Southeast Asia in the Colonial and Postcolonial World*, 2003, Ohio University Centre for International Studies, Athens. See Chapter 11.

18 Taizo Miyagi, 'Post-War Japan and Asianism', *Asia-Pacific Review*, Vol. 13, No. 2, 2006.

19 Ikeda, 2002. Sakamoto Kazuya, 'Conditions of an Independent State: Japanese Diplomacy in the 1950s', in Makoto Iokibe Ed. *The Diplomatic History of Postwar Japan*, 2011, Routledge, London, 50–80.



economy grew at a rapid rate and by 1964 according to a government white paper the standard of living in Japan was equal to that of countries in Western Europe. The policies pursued at Bandung in 1955, and then through the Kishi administration, gradually put Japan in a position economically, to take over much of the burden of leading the development of the region from the United States.<sup>20</sup> By the early 1960s, this was as much political as economic.

From the mid-1950s, historian and diplomat Edwin Reischauer had pressed the need for the downplaying of the American model in advancing the cause for democracy in Asia because, “to the extent that we identify democracy exclusively with the United States, we are actually undermining our cause in Asia, for then we make democracy seem hopelessly unobtainable.”<sup>21</sup> Reischauer did not offer up Japan as a role model to take the place of the United States, but, by early 1960, the United States National Security Council had made clear its desire to “use Japan as an example to the less developed countries of the feasibility of achieving rapid economic progress within a framework of free institutions.”<sup>22</sup> Nevertheless, by 1964, as Ronald Dore pointed out, Japanese attempts to claim a place alongside the developed world whilst siding with the interests of its poorer Asian neighbours were becoming increasingly difficult.<sup>23</sup> How Japan was understood in the region became a pressing issue as its economic power increased. Not only that, but Japan was still not accepted as a part of the ‘developed world’ of the West.

In July 1964, three months before the start of the Tokyo Olympics housewives magazine *Fujin Kōron* carried an article based on a roundtable discussion, which focused on the way people in other Asian countries viewed Japan. The article was accompanied by a picture of Prime Minister Ikeda Hayato on a visit to Southeast Asia, and sought to examine the way ordinary people in Asia understood Japan’s diplomatic policies in the region and what that meant for their views on the country itself. After recent U.N. trade negotiations in Geneva one newspaper reported that within Asia Japan was seen as an ‘advanced country’, while from the viewpoint of ‘advanced countries’ Japan was Asian. This report gave the impression that both sides – Asia and the advanced countries – had marginalised Japan. The *Fujin Kōron* roundtable hoped to understand why despite the best efforts of Japan’s diplomats to present Japan as ‘one country in Asia,’ one of the ‘three principles’ of Japanese foreign policy announced by the Kishi cabinet, Japan was still not accepted by countries in Asia as ‘a member of Asia.’<sup>24</sup>

20 Suehiro, 1999; the result of the Vietnam War was to leave Japan in the position of the most powerful country in the region, Thomas Havens, *Fire Across the Sea: Japan and the Vietnam War*, 1987; although Tadokoro Masayuki argues that this did not become evident until the 1970s, Tadokoro Masayuki, ‘The Model of an Economic Power: Japanese Diplomacy in the 1960s’ in Makoto Iokibe Ed. 2011, 83-86.

21 Quoted in John Dower, ‘E. H. Norman and the Uses of History’, in *Origins of the Modern Japanese State: Selected Writings of E. H. Norman*, 1975, Pantheon Books, New York, 48.

22 ‘U.S. Policy Toward Japan’, NSC 6008, May 20, 1960. (Accessed at <http://nsarchive.chadwyck.com/home.do> April 2, 2013).

23 Ronald P. Dore, ‘Japan’s Place in the World’, 1966.

24 Japanese Foreign Ministry, *Diplomatic Bluebook 1957* at [www.mofa.gov.jp](http://www.mofa.gov.jp) (accessed April 3, 2013); Sakamoto 2011, 66-69.

At a time when the United States was seeking Japan's support for operations in South Vietnam and talks between South Korea and Japan had been put on hold due to violent student protests against the resumption of bilateral relations, Tokyo University law professor Terasawa Hajime, a specialist in international law, urged the need to think about how Asian people saw Japan. The legacy of Japanese colonialism and the present Cold War between the free world and communism loomed large in the discussion. As the sub-title of the article put it 'twenty years after war how do Asian people caught up in the ideological battle between East and West see and think about a Japan which has recovered so surprisingly?' By understanding the views of ordinary Asian people it would be possible to understand the stance Japan should take in international relations. As the article saw it knowing how 'ordinary people' in other Asian countries saw the effects of Japan's diplomacy it would be possible to get to the core of how Japan should act in Asia.<sup>25</sup> The perception of a low opinion of Japan among many of the people in Asian countries was a worry for all the participants in the roundtable debate.

Maruyama Shizuo, an editorial writer for the *Asahi* daily newspaper who as a war correspondent had covered Japanese campaigns in Burma, discussed Indonesia, where during the wartime he had sensed a lot of hope and expectation among the people in regard to Japan.<sup>26</sup> Unfortunately, those hopes were dashed by the actions of the Japanese military in Southeast Asia. As Maruyama saw it, despite their initial goodwill, the Indonesian people were left understandably disappointed. With the end of the war and the dismantling of the Japanese Empire "whether in Singapore or Manila" the people's opposition to Japan in light of the actions of what he referred to as 'bad Japanese soldiers' grew stronger and anti-Japanese sentiment continued to rise. Nevertheless, the journalist was optimistic that over the next three or four years feelings would become much more favourable towards Japan. In analysing the way Japan was viewed in Asia, Maruyama sensed a feeling of affinity towards Japanese as fellow Asians. He put this shift in opinion down to the recent rapid development of the Japanese economy and a growing respect for the way Japan had overcome the total destruction of the war. In most countries of Asia, as Maruyama saw it, the feeling that there was something to learn from Japan's policies of high-speed growth was now very strong. Ômori Minoru, head of foreign news for the *Mainichi Shimbun* agreed that feeling towards Japan's present economy and the feelings in most countries during the war were completely different.<sup>27</sup> By the mid-1960s, for many Asian countries the Japanese experience offered a path to economic success and development which would allow those post-colonial countries to stand on their own two feet.

25 'Kongetsu no shoten: Ajia ni okeru tai Nichi kanjô'(Focus of the Month: Feeling Toward Japan in Asia), Fujin Kôron, No 577, July 1964.

26 See Maruyama Shizuo, 'A New Asian Approach to Asia', in Joyce C. Lebra Ed. Japan's Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere in World War II: Selected Readings and Documents, 1975, Oxford University Press, London, 171-175.

27 'Kongetsu no shoten: Ajia ni okeru tai Nichi kanjô'(Focus of the Month: Feeling Toward Japan in Asia) Fujin Kôron, No 577, July 1964.

Travelling around Asia, journalist Obokata Kôhei had been struck by the wealth of Japan. During the discussion he chose to emphasise the fact that Japan's position in the Cold War under the protection of the United States 'nuclear umbrella' was essential to this. In a section of the debate entitled 'Blissful Japan,' he explained how Japan's wealth had come about predominately because of the security of the country. When he met with political leaders in Taiwan, Laos, and Korea they had all told him that Japan was in a position to develop its economy safe from the fear of communism because Vietnam was the focus of the battle between the United States and the Soviet Union. Obokata claimed that at first he didn't pay much attention to these comments, but after thinking about it he had to admit that "having a military budget of 2 per cent of the people's earnings and the Anpo treaty" Japan had "absolutely no fear of communism."<sup>28</sup> Despite the fact that all over Asia the battle between left and right still raged, Japan was secure because of her "blessed geography."

As the participants in the roundtable debate pointed out, there was an emerging respect for Japan among many Asian countries, particularly with regard to the economic advances it had made. Japan was portrayed as a role model for many countries hoping to overcome their positions as pawns in an ideological battle between the free world and the communist bloc. The commentators all saw Japan itself as having moved beyond those ideological struggles, struggles which had been the hallmark of much of the debate over ideas of nation in Japan in the early and mid-1950s.<sup>29</sup> Yet, as Obokata hinted, the problem of Japan's seeming subordination to the United States could negatively influence feeling toward Japan in many Asian countries. While the *Fujin Kôron* debate presented Japan as a leader on the world stage and an example to other countries in Asia, the 'low key diplomacy' of the 1950s needed to appear further disengaged from U.S. policy in the region if Japan was to be fully accepted as 'one country in Asia.' The problem of finding the right balance between Japan as 'West' and Japan as 'East' was firmly embedded in the concerns of the Cold War. In his commemoration speech to mark Japan's accession to the United Nations in December 1956, Japanese foreign minister Shigemitsu Mamoru had claimed that Japan could be 'regarded as a bridge between East and West'.<sup>30</sup> Throughout the late 1950s and early 1960s Japan's diplomacy was characterised by attempts to "unobtrusively position Japan as an international mediator" in Asia. The Tokyo Olympics provided the opportunity to embody that role.

28 'Kongetsu no shoten: Ajia ni okeru tai Nichi kanjô'(Focus of the Month: Feeling Toward Japan in Asia), *Fujin Kôron*, No 577, July 1964. The ANPO treaty refers to the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty which went into effect at the same time as the peace treaty. This is the shortened Japanese name for the treaty.

29 See Curtis Anderson Gayle, *Marxist History and Postwar Japanese Nationalism*, 2002, RoutledgeCurzon, London, for a discussion of the polarized debates on nationalism in the 1950s.

30 See <http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/un/address5612.html> for a transcript of Shigemitsu's address. (Accessed January 10, 2013); Sakamoto, 2011, 66-67.

## The Virtue of Consumption

In the mid-1950s, Japanese politicians and economists sought ways of continuing economic growth after the Korean War boom. With less need for armaments and heavy industrial goods, new methods of production, along with ways and means of stimulating demand, were necessary. These were sought and developed under the guidance of the Japan Productivity Centre (JPC), established with American assistance in 1955. The first such group had been set up in Britain in 1948 with the assistance of Marshall Aid. The economic theory behind the JPC, closely linked to the emergence of the Mutual Security Agency, was an American ideology and, an important component of U.S. Cold War policy.<sup>31</sup> The original aim was to increase industrial productivity, a goal that would bring about the expansion of markets, help to increase employment, and raise real wages and standards of living.<sup>32</sup> Promoting the belief that the golden egg of rapid growth in gross national product was tied to improvements in productivity, the United States had, by the time of the JPC's inauguration, already welcomed some 16,000 European managers, technicians and labour leaders paid for by the Foreign Operations Administration. U.S. aid had also financed a large series of reports on American productivity in Japan and Europe, and the efforts came to incorporate CIA personnel in the U.S. embassy in Tokyo as well as front organisations such as the Asia Foundation.<sup>33</sup>

Between 1956 and 1966, the JPC sent more than six hundred inspection groups to the United States in which more than six thousand people took part. The groups were made up of representatives of small business, academics, labour leaders, technical specialists and business leaders who studied various aspects of American manufacturing know how. As Simon Partner has shown, these groups studied and took back to Japan technical skills and knowhow, which helped to spur the development of the Japanese consumer electronics market. Yet in the late 1950s and early 1960s, by far the most important tool these tourists brought back were marketing techniques. Japanese managers came to see marketing as an essential technology "offering a solution to a problem that had plagued Japan throughout its modern history: how to find domestic outlets for the nation's growing industrial capacity."<sup>34</sup> Throughout the late 1950s and early 1960s, the power and wealth of the mass market came to be seen as best fuelled by the spending power of the middle classes.

This consumption would create a virtuous circle spurring production, which would in turn fuel people's desire to consume more. As the agro-economist Tobata Seiichi put it: "the masses are appearing on the economic stage, they are the agents of effective

31 Lonny E. Carlile, *Divisions of Labour: Globality, Ideology, and War in the Shaping of the Japanese Labour Movement*, 2005, University of Hawaii Press, Honolulu, 218-221.

32 Andrew Gordon, *The Wages of Affluence, Labor and Management in Postwar Japan*, 1998, Harvard University Press, Cambridge M.A, 45-57.

33 Simon Partner, *Assembled in Japan: Electrical Goods and the Making of the Japanese Consumer*, 1999, University of California Press, Berkeley 124; Gordon, 1998, , 49.

34 Partner, 1999, 121-136.

demand.”<sup>35</sup> Yet these ideas and policies by their very nature were not confined to the discussions and debates of intellectuals, politicians or business leaders. The period saw the emergence of a “mass-consumption consciousness,”<sup>36</sup> and popular magazines showed their readers what they should be, what they should aspire to, and what they should and could consume.<sup>37</sup> In doing so, they deliberately constructed the 1964 Tokyo Olympics as a consumer event. As Eri Sekiguchi has argued, the Games became “a mechanism for the formation of consumer culture through a media which reflected the times, influencing society whilst changing people’s lifestyles and consciousness.”<sup>38</sup> In the popular media the transformation of the country for the Tokyo Olympiad was one aspect of this broader, Cold War influenced, shift in emphasis from a production oriented economics to a focus on the ‘consumer as king.’

The design and development of buildings central to the Games themselves, such as the stadia and the athlete’s village, were directly aimed at proving Japan’s modernity whilst reconciling its recent history. Kenzo Tange’s Yoyogi gymnasium with its ‘imagined line of sight’ towards the resting place of the Meiji Emperor, deliberately proposed a continuation between Meiji era modernisation and the postwar transformation of the country.<sup>39</sup> But wider transformations in infrastructure were also necessary in light of the hasty reconstruction of the Occupation period, which had been followed by the rapid population growth brought about by the industrialization of the 1950s. Japan, and particularly Tokyo, was dramatically rebuilt to prepare for the Games, with much of the budget for the Games being spent on urban expansion and infrastructure improvement.<sup>40</sup> Taking the previous Olympiad in Rome in 1960 as an example, the Tokyo Olympics became the trigger for large-scale urban improvement.<sup>41</sup>

According to the headline of an article in the young people’s magazine *Shūkan Heibon* in August 1964, massive building projects had, over the course of the early 1960’s, transformed Tokyo into a ‘dream modern city.’<sup>42</sup> This was an element of the vast cleanup operation beginning in the late 1950s, which took in infrastructure as well as public morality with the aim of ‘beautifying Japan’ for the foreign visitors.<sup>43</sup> To address the noxious smell emanating from the Sumida River new sewers were laid and the govern-

35 Tobata Seiichi quoted in Shinozaki Takao, ‘Shōhi wa Bitoku no Keizai Shisō’ (The Economic Thought of Consumption as a Virtue), in Oikawa Yoshinobu Ed. *Tokyo Orinpikku no Shakai Keizaishi*, (The Socio-economic History of the Tokyo Olympics), 2009, 75–98.

36 Charles Yuji Horioka, ‘Consuming and Saving’, in Andrew Gordon Ed. *Postwar Japan as History*, 1993, University of California Press, Berkeley, 279.

37 Marilyn Ivy, ‘Formations of Mass Culture’, in Gordon Ed. *Postwar Japan as History*, 1993, 247.

38 Sekiguchi Eri, ‘Tokyo Orinpikku to Nihon Banpaku Hakurankai.’ (The Tokyo Olympics and the 1970 World Fair), 2009.

39 Tagsold, 2010, 295.

40 More than \$12 billion of the total amount of \$13 billion spent on the Tokyo Olympics went into these areas. See above and Tsutsui, 2011, 14.

41 Tagsold 296; Igarashi, 2000, 143–163; Ueyama 2009.

42 ‘Yume no Kindai Toshi Tokyo shin chizu’ (The Dream Modern City: A New Map), *Shūkan Heibon*, August 27<sup>th</sup> 1964.

43 Sheldon Garon, *Moulding Japanese Minds: The State in Everyday Life*, 1997, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 170.

ment attempted as best it could to conceal the persistence of prewar hygiene conditions and various unsightly aspects of the city. The human side of the cleanup campaign saw the metropolitan police removing “malicious violators who would damage the capital’s appearance,” targeting wounded veterans begging on the streets outside major train stations and anyone caught ‘urinating in the street.’<sup>44</sup> A policy which would not only affect the homeless as ‘*Punch-kun*’ of the young men’s magazine *Heibon Punch* pointed out: with only thirteen weeks left before the Olympic Games there was a distinct lack of public toilets. In Tokyo there were four hundred public toilets but, according to ‘*Punch-kun*,’ this was only a tenth of the number in London. Clearly, with the new law against urinating in public, for the foreign visitors flocking to Japan, going out of the hotel during the Olympics to enjoy the bars and restaurants could pose a problem.<sup>45</sup>

It had its critics, but the idea of Tokyo as a ‘dream modern city’ helped fuel the discourse over Japan’s rebirth less than twenty years after the destruction of 1945. These debates revolved around the idea of consumption and the consumer society. In the popular media, it was the promise of a modern consumer lifestyle that was being touted as the true symbol of modernity. Even the efforts of the police to eradicate crime sought to present Tokyo as “a bright space where nothing could hide in its interstices.”<sup>46</sup> The ‘*hanzai no nai akarui machi*’ (crime free, bright town) touted by the metropolitan police used ‘bright’ (*akarui*) in exactly the same way as the advertising gurus and corporate salesmen of the high-speed growth period in their promotion of a consumer driven economy. The ‘bright life’ had emerged in the 1950s as an ideological symbol, which sought to imply “the housewife-centred family and the dominance of the middle class.”<sup>47</sup> Companies such as Matsushita promoted their electronic appliances as the ‘housewives partner’ and linked the arrival of these goods in the home to democratisation, even going so far as to link the promotion of these goods to article 25 of the Japanese constitution: “The people of Japan have the right to enjoy a healthy and cultural life.”<sup>48</sup> This clearly reflected the deliberate shift in the wider economic discourse from a production led economy to the promotion of consumption as the ultimate driving force of economic growth. The expansion of the mass media throughout the 1950s played a central role in pushing these ideas onto Japanese social attitudes.<sup>49</sup> They strongly influenced debate and discussion over the nature of Japanese national identity as the Olympics approached.

44 Igarashi, 2000, 146-153.

45 ‘Punch-kun no Yoron Chōsa’ (Punch’s Public Opinion Survey), *Heibon Punch*, July 20<sup>th</sup> 1964, 15.

46 Igarashi, 2000, 153.

47 Partner, 1999, 145.

48 Yoshimi, 2006, 79.

49 Partner, 1999; Helen Macnaughtan, ‘Building up Steam as Consumers: Women, Rice Cookers, and the Consumption of Everyday Household Goods in Japan’, in Penelope Francks and Janet Hunter, Eds. *The Historical Consumer, Consumption and Everyday Life in Japan, 1850–2000*, 2012, Palgrave MacMillan, London, 79-104; Marilyn Ivy, ‘Formations of Mass Culture’, 1994, 239-259; Yoshimi, 2006, 75-79.

## Consuming the City, Consuming the World

In January 1964, nearly ten months before the start of the event, the *Asahi Graph* published images and commentary on the building work being carried out in Tokyo in preparation for the opening ceremony in October. The journal boasted that the Tokyo Olympiad would be: “the first celebration of beauty and power in the East, adorned with the unique ideas of Japan and supported by world class civil engineering.”<sup>50</sup> In terms of engineering, the rebuilding of Tokyo was a spectacular demonstration that Japan had achieved the standards of the economically advanced countries and the *Asahi* focused on those buildings that would host Olympic events. Meanwhile, *Shūkan Heibon* and *Heibon Punch* excited their readers with the rapid growth of opportunities for a life of leisure. A high-speed monorail to link the city centre with the country’s busiest airport, Haneda, had been constructed, new roads and highways, new subway lines, not to mention the stadiums and facilities which would be used to host the Games were impressive examples of the ‘dream modern city’ and brought vast changes to the experience of the city. “While breathing in the sea air of Tokyo Bay,” Haneda international airport was now only thirty minutes away thanks to a fantastic new highway. The nature of these changes and their basis in consumer culture was underlined by the fact that while around 50,000 people per day visited the airport itself, 20,000 of them were there purely to see the airport. For these ‘tourists’ there was a ‘flight simulator’, which gave the experience of ‘really flying in an aeroplane.’ At four to five degrees cooler than the city the airport was a great place to take in the view and the ‘leisure mood’ was epitomised by a rooftop beer garden where the beer drunk in the evening while gazing at the amazing illuminations of the airport “tasted completely different,” according to Mr Nakazawa of the airport building management company. With the opening in September of the high-speed monorail it would be possible to travel from Haneda airport to the city of Hamamatsu non-stop in just fifteen minutes. At Hamamatsu a heliport was planned next to the monorail station, a bus terminal would be built, and eventually the monorail would be extended to Shimbashi in central Tokyo.<sup>51</sup>

These above ground changes were impressive, but of greater interest to the magazines younger readers was the fact that Ginza would see a great new underground ‘date spot’ once the underground lines and the marble shopping arcades were finished. Amorous young couples would be able to “see a film in Hibiya and then enjoy shopping in Ginza.” The article also pointed out that for those who wanted to soak up just ‘a smidgen’ of the ‘gorgeous atmosphere’ at the airport there was a hotel on the third floor of the international departures lounge which could be reached (rooms for two costing 2,800 yen for three hours!) via the escalator in the lounge.<sup>52</sup> Tokyo was Japan’s capital city but other areas

50 ‘Kansei Isogu Hare Butai’ (Hurrying to Complete the Big Stage), *Asahi Graph*, January 24<sup>th</sup> 1964.

51 ‘Yume no Kindai Toshi Tokyo shin chizu’ (The Dream Modern City: New Map), *Shūkan Heibon*, August 27<sup>th</sup> 1964.

52 Ibid.



would not be left out of the transformation. In July 1964, the world's fastest rail network was unveiled. Capable of carrying people from Tokyo to Osaka in just three hours, it would begin passenger services right before the beginning of the Games in October. As a sign of the rapid development of the country, this was a feat of engineering which would allow the intrepid Japanese office lady to skip work for the day, visit her boyfriend in Kyoto for lunch, after that visit some temples, and easily return home by 8.30pm, then "with a look of innocence, give the excuse of overtime work" before joining in her sister's birthday party."<sup>53</sup> The country was undergoing huge changes, but for the young and predominantly single female readership of *Shūkan Heibon*, it was the promise of a lifestyle of consumption and leisure, which framed those changes.

The narrowing of the country through the development of world leading Japanese technology made travelling around the country much easier. At the same time, the lifting of restrictions on foreign travel brought the world closer through the popular media. Up to the mid-1960s it was unusual for Japanese to travel abroad. Passports were valid for only one trip, there was a \$500 limit on the amount of money that could be taken out of the country, and the Ministry of Finance had to approve the trip. Tourism was not usually considered a valid reason. In any case the cost of travel was prohibitively expensive for most Japanese so that even when restrictions were lifted in 1964 only 15.1% of overseas Japanese travellers were classed as tourists.<sup>54</sup> Nevertheless, by the year of the Tokyo Olympics, magazines such as *Fujin Kōron*, *Shūkan Heibon*, and *Heibon Punch* were promoting not only tourism, but living and working abroad.

In September 1964, *Fujin Kōron* published an article on Japanese women working abroad. According to the magazine, it was a reality that the "number of women saying 'whatever city, whatever job I want to try working abroad'" was increasing. The article explained which countries were the best for Japanese women seeking work (Argentina and Brazil if they learnt the language) and which would be difficult (Soviet Bloc countries of course).<sup>55</sup> *Shūkan Heibon* celebrated the luxury of life in Sydney where "at the age of twenty there were typists who earn 80,000 Yen per month." Not only that, the population was 1/5 of that of Tokyo and "even at the young age of twenty, around the average age to marry, it is normal for a standard middle-class household to own their own house and car."<sup>56</sup> In January 1964, the magazine published a 'travel essay' by Kanetaka Kaoru a TV presenter of Tokyo Broadcasting Services (TBS) 'Kanetaka Kaoru's World Travels,' which predicted that 1964 would be a boom year for travelling abroad.<sup>57</sup> Then in May 1964, the magazine published a travel guide for those readers who were "fed up

53 'Yume no Chōtokkyū wa Itsu Hashiruru?' (When Will the Super-Express Begin Running?) *Shūkan Heibon*, January 23<sup>rd</sup> 1964.

54 Lonny E. Carlile, 'Economic Development and the Evolution of Overseas Tourism, 1964–1994', *Tourism Recreation Research*, Vol. 2(1), 1996, 11–18.

55 'Sekai wa Nihon Josei o motomete iru,' (The World is Seeking Japanese Women) *Fujin Kōron*, September 1964.

56 'Kaigai Rupo: Hatachi de Gesshū Hachi-man Yen no Taipisuto mo iru' (Report from Abroad: There are Even Twenty Year Old Typists Earning 80,000 Yen per Month), *Shūkan Heibon*, June 18<sup>th</sup> 1964.

57 'Kanetaka Kaoru no Sekai no Tabi,' (Kanetaka Kaoru's World Travels) *Shūkan Heibon*, January 9<sup>th</sup> 1964.



of living in small Japan.”<sup>58</sup> The world was getting closer and easier to navigate. At the same time, readers of *Fujin Kōron* were urged not to look for cultural differences but to “see the world as one place, like going from Kyūshū to Tokyo.” Air travel had transformed the globe in the same way as the Shinkansen had transformed Japan. “From Tokyo to Kyūshū takes 20 hours, on a jet you can be in America in the same time. And Europe too.”<sup>59</sup> The world was getting smaller, and Japan’s young people were urged to look at the world outside Japan.

In an article in *Fujin Kōron* in February 1964, Tokyo University Professor and management guru Hayashi Shūji hoped to encourage Japanese women to travel more. Through the article Hayashi also wanted to address the questions ‘What is Western Europe?’ ‘What kind of thinking governs the daily life of the people of ‘Western Europe?’” But also to work out what ‘Western Europe’ really meant, at a time when the Japanese government claimed that their country was on a par with ‘Western Europe’ at least economically. Travel to Europe was becoming cheaper for Japanese tourists, and Hayashi recounted meeting a Japanese woman in Heidelberg who was travelling around on only three dollars a day. The woman did not speak German so in Hayashi’s opinion the trip must have been difficult, nevertheless, more freedom to travel would mean more people being able to gain this kind of experience. “Touching deeply embedded Christian culture and monuments, seeing the remains of the development of civic culture” this was all needed “to make Japanese people into world people.”<sup>60</sup> Despite what the Japanese government said about Japan reaching the levels of Western Europe, Hayashi saw Europe as a cheap place to live, work, and travel. In contrast the cost of living and travelling in Japan was very expensive. The reason for this difference in living costs was cultural according to Hayashi, and it was very evident in the large differences in the modes and means of consumption between Europe, and the U.S. and Japan.

Life was ‘cheaper’ in Europe because people placed more value on what they owned, the problem in Japan was the adoption of an American attitude to everyday consumer society. For Japanese people to live at the same level as the people in Western Europe, to ‘have central heating, eat luxurious high calorie food, wear Italian shoes, and English clothes,” they “would probably need four or five times the lifestyle costs of today.”<sup>61</sup> Housing costs were more expensive in Japan, but watches, clothes, stationery, leather goods, jewellery and other goods were also more expensive in Japan. In a consumer society this meant that Western Europe was a much cheaper place to live than Japan. For Hayashi, things became more expensive if other people did them for you, and this was a fundamental part of the culture of consumption in Japan. Hayashi’s advice to Japanese people travelling in Europe was simple, “drive the car yourself, stay in a pension, wash your own clothes, eat in self-service restaurants.” Japanese people thought Europe was expensive

58 ‘Kaigai Ryokō no Pin kara Kiri Made,’ (The Top to Bottom of Travelling Abroad), Shūkan Heibon, May 14<sup>th</sup> 1964.

59 ‘Sekai wa Nihon Josei o motomete iru,’ (The World is Seeking Japanese Women), Fujin Kōron, September 1964.

60 Hayashi Shūji, ‘Josei Seiyō no Michi’ (Women’s Path to the West), Fujin Kōron, February 1964.

61 Ibid., 115.

because they tried to travel like they did in Japan. Japanese consumer society had developed on the basis of cheap labour and that had brought about a culture of 'service' where everyday tasks were paid for.<sup>62</sup> The implication was that Japan through its somewhat different culture of consumption was not yet among the ranks of the 'developed countries' (*senshin koku*). At the same time the country needed to distance itself from the consumer culture of the United States.

Another difference between Japan and Europe was the existence in the latter of an independent spirit. Hayashi claimed that while people in Europe would deal with problems among themselves, in Japan it was always necessary to rely on officials. To solve problems Japan always created more bureaucrats and this cost the people in tax. In Western Europe these problems were always sorted out independently. In Japan, because Japanese people were "always meddling in others affairs" people didn't care about causing other people trouble and so didn't try to solve it themselves. This led to a situation where the Japanese government treated the people like children, while in Western Europe they were treated like adults. Everyone was free to decide the best way to live but, Hayashi insisted, "if you don't treat people like adults there will be no independence. In Europe the independence which is at the base of democracy runs deep."<sup>63</sup> Japan lacked an independent people who took their civic responsibilities seriously, and the high cost of living stemmed, not only from the government's economic policies but also from a backward culture of waste. Hayashi neatly tied the economic insecurity and inequalities brought about through the policy of high-speed growth in Japan to cultural modes of consumption identified with the United States. His cultural explanation went beyond the economic though, pointing to broader problems of democratic accountability and individual independence.

In another article published in *Fujin Kôron* in August 1964, Furugaki Tetsurô described the coming Games as a national ordeal, which Japan, and particularly Japanese women would have to pass successfully. In France, the U.S. and Europe newspapers, radio, and television programmes were full of special editions about Tokyo, and Japanese cuisine, dance cabaret and restaurants had become fashionable around the world.<sup>64</sup> According to Furugaki, Tokyo would need to prepare to welcome tourists on honeymoon, celebrating silver wedding anniversaries, people celebrating retirement by 'diving into Japan', and the Japanese people wanted to give them something to remember as a once in a lifetime experience. But the overarching worry was about the reputation of Japan, 'its position in the world.'

This was not simply a problem of changing the landscape of Tokyo and cleaning up the morals of the people in the same way as the public spaces. From the point of view of the Japanese people the Games themselves were, in the author's opinion, like a school

62 Ibid. See Partner, 1999, for a discussion of the prevalence of cheap labour and its effect on the nature of the consumer culture that emerged in the early 1960s.

63 Ibid.

64 Furugaki Tetsurô, 'Orinpikku to Nihon Josei' (The Olympics and Japanese Women), *Fujin Kôron*, August 1964. Furugaki had been an ambassador to France between 1956 and 1961 although he was not a career diplomat. He also served as the head of Japan's national television station NHK.

entrance test. Furugaki saw the Games as a chance for Japan to join the ranks of the advanced countries. The modernisation this entailed, however, was, for him, something the country may later regret. Furugaki reminded readers of the eve of “the opening of the country” one hundred years earlier, in the Meiji era. In every area of society, politics, economics, manufacturing policies, “enlightenment and the catchphrase of freedom were put into practice.” At the beginning of the Meiji period, all over Japan, but particularly in Tokyo, hotels, bars and restaurants catering for high-class foreign tourists changed the nature of the country’s economy. The fear was that the transformation of the country in 1964 would, as in the Meiji period, entail the loss of something essential to Japan. Of course, Furugaki acknowledged, without things produced at home the foreign customers would have problems in the hotel lobbies, but at some point during their stay they would want to eat tasty Japanese food that was close at hand. Nevertheless, “without a Japanese person to tell them the best place to go they will be at a loss.”<sup>65</sup>

As Furugaki saw it, Tokyo had been ‘painted with the brush of the Olympics’, a mistake Paris and London before had avoided. The traditional Japanese culture, which would interest the huge numbers of tourists arriving in Japan, had gone as the city was rebuilt for the Games. People had not only visited London and Paris to experience the sport, they had also taken in the culture and history of the respective cities. There appeared to be no cultural life in Tokyo, as far as Furugaki was concerned, sport and fashion had completely taken over. The uniqueness of old Japan, or even of modern Japanese culture and tradition had gone. Tokyo had completely given itself over to the Olympics, yet “the foreign visitors, coming from one hundred and ten countries have different languages, customs, laws, history, and traditions we can’t have all of them. But *they* will all want to know about our country.”<sup>66</sup>

## Conclusion

Furugaki’s fear of the loss of a unique culture, as much as Hayashi’s questioning of Japanese consumer culture, emerge from a changing model of social life based on the supremacy of the consumer in economic discourse. As the country prepared to host the 1964 Tokyo Olympics, the question of national identity emerged in discussions of the ‘West’ and ‘Asia’, framed within the changing ideological priorities of the Cold War. If Japan was, by 1964, an example for other Asian countries to follow, it epitomised ‘global modernity’ not only through the transformation of its infrastructure. In becoming an article of consumption, the very nature of national identity was being transformed. Throughout the early 1960s, a ‘Japan’ emerged which could be separated from the symbolic politics of the Games to offer an apparently non-political sense of national identity. This ‘Japan’ was just as much a product of Cold War concerns as the democratic,

65 Ibid.

66 Ibid., 63.

peaceful, economically advanced 'Japan' of modernisation theory. Nevertheless, young Japanese could now create a Japanese national identity as they consumed the world on their travels and sampled the 'leisure mood' of their newly rebuilt capital city. And, if the reality of everyday life may still have made it difficult for most young people to experience the world first hand, the Games brought the world to Japan. In 1964, the shopping centres, entertainment places and parks thronged with young people from all the continents of the world in the 'most cosmopolitan city in the world'.

# FORUM

## **Dezentrierung des Weltbildes? Die Krise der westlichen Zivilisation, das Ereignis der Dekolonisierung und die Frage des Subjekts im Diskurs der Geschichtsschulbücher in Frankreich in den 1960er Jahren<sup>1</sup>**

**Marcus Otto**

### **ABSTRACT**

The modern colonial representation of the world which in metropolitan France has emphatically manifested itself under the famous title of a mission civilisatrice depended on a methodological nationalism as well as a political-epistemological ethno- and eurocentrism. It thus constituted an imperial western subject position of representation. Yet this central subject position of representation has eventually been challenged and decentered by the historical process of decolonization since the 1950s. Hence this article investigates how and to what extent decolonization affected, changed and rearticulated the subject of representation. To do this it will focus on historical textbook knowledge in France in the 1960s. History textbooks are especially relevant in this regard insofar as they can be described as national autobiographies as well as prominent and effective media of the above mentioned modern (colonial) representation of the world.

1 Dieser Aufsatz ist hervorgegangen aus dem von der Deutschen Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG) geförderten Projekt „Dekolonisierung und Erinnerungspolitik. Schulbücher im Kontext gesellschaftlicher Konflikte in Frankreich 1962–2010“ unter der Leitung von Prof. Dr. Eckhardt Fuchs am Georg-Eckert-Institut (GEI) für internationale Schulbuchforschung in Braunschweig. Ich danke der DFG für die finanzielle Förderung und Unterstützung.

## Einleitung

*En réalité, une révision déchirante de notre Weltanschauung s'impose; au-delà des contingences politiques, ce sont nos habitudes de pensée, nos modes d'action qui sont mis en cause. Bref, le monde doit être réinventé, réinterprété à l'aide d'une échelle de valeurs authentiquement universelles. Mais pour ce faire, le chemin passe par une introspection, rendue possible, enrichie par la confrontation avec le Tiers Monde. Le dépassement de l'eurocentrisme est l'affaire exclusive d'Européens et, dans ce sens, cet essai sera passionnément eurocentrique.<sup>2</sup>*

Das koloniale Weltbild, das unter dem Titel der republikanischen *mission civilisatrice* in Frankreich zugleich einem methodologischen Nationalismus und einem politisch-epistemologischen Ethno- bzw. Eurozentrismus verhaftet war, konstituierte eine entsprechende zentrale Subjektposition der Repräsentation. Diese ist durch das Ereignis der Dekolonisierung grundlegend herausgefordert und eventuell dezentriert worden, wie dies zumindest bereits zeitgenössisch wahrgenommen wurde.<sup>3</sup> In seinem 1971 veröffentlichten Werk „La découverte du Tiers Monde“, das in einer von Fernand Braudel herausgegebenen Reihe erschien, diagnostizierte der Ökonom Ignacy Sachs jedenfalls bereits eine politisch-epistemologische Zäsur infolge der Dekolonisierung und der sukzessiven Formierung des *Tiers Monde*. Demnach forderten diese Ereignisse die vorherrschende eurozentrische *Weltanschauung* grundlegend heraus. Im folgenden wird ausgehend vom Diskurs der Geschichtsschulbücher der *terminale* in Frankreich untersucht, wie sich diese politisch-epistemologische Zäsur im (Schulbuch-)Wissen in den 1960ern ausgeprägt hat und wie das entsprechende Subjekt der Repräsentation davon eventuell affiziert worden ist.

Denn die moderne Welt als Wissen und Vorstellung ist zutiefst mit der politisch-epistemologischen Figur des Subjekts, das sich eben diese Welt vor allem im Modus der Repräsentation aneignet, verknüpft. Heidegger hat in diesem Sinne einen epochalen Nexus zwischen dem neuzeitlichen Weltbild und der Subjektwerdung des Menschen im Zeichen des Humanismus postuliert. So argumentierte er, dass erst in der Moderne die Welt durch Repräsentation für den Menschen als Subjekt *vorge stellt*, *dargestellt* und damit letztlich überhaupt erst im Modus des Wissens *hergestellt* und angeeignet wird. „Dass die Welt zum Bild wird“, so konstatiert Heidegger darüber hinaus, „ist ein und derselbe Vorgang, mit dem der Mensch innerhalb des Seienden zum Subjectum wird“<sup>4</sup>. Die Welt wird somit in der Neuzeit vom Standpunkt des souveränen vor-stellenden Subjekts aus in Gestalt des Weltbildes erfahrbar, in dem „das menschliche Tun als Kultur erfasst“ wird.<sup>5</sup> Wissen bildet dabei den zentralen Mechanismus, mit dem sich die korrespondie-

2 I. Sachs, *La découverte du Tiers Monde*, Paris 1971, 8.

3 Vgl. ebenda. Siehe auch C. Kalter, *Die Entdeckung der Dritten Welt. Dekolonisierung und neue radikale Linke in Frankreich*, Frankfurt a. M. 2011, 8.

4 Vgl. M. Heidegger, *Das Zeitalter des Weltbildes*, in: ders., *Holzwege*, Frankfurt a. M. 1950, 85.

5 Vgl. ebenda.

rende Aneignung der Welt durch das kulturell tätige Subjekt „Mensch“ vollzieht. „Das Wort Subjectum (...) nennt das Vor-Liegende, das als Grund alles auf sich sammelt. Diese metaphysische Bedeutung hat zunächst keinen betonten Bezug zum Menschen und vollends nicht zum Ich. Wenn aber der Mensch zu dem ersten und eigentlichen Subjectum wird, dann heißt das: Der Mensch wird zu jenem Seienden, auf das sich alles Seiende in der Art seines Seins und seiner Wahrheit gründet. Der Mensch wird zur Bezugsmittel des Seienden als solchen.“<sup>6</sup> Demnach rückt der Mensch im Zeitalter des Weltbildes als Subjekt gleichsam ins Zentrum der Repräsentation.

Aus einer postkolonialen Theorieperspektive<sup>7</sup> betrachtet, bezeichnet Heideggers Begriff des Weltbildes zugleich implizit, wie Weimann systematisch herausgearbeitet hat, den universalistischen Anspruch eines imperialistischen Subjekts der Repräsentation.<sup>8</sup> Das neuzeitliche Weltbild, so lässt sich also argumentieren, trägt inhärent einen kolonialistischen Index. Der Kolonialismus war in diesem Sinne mithin nicht primär ein politisch-ökonomisches, sondern ein fundamental epistemologisches Projekt der Weltaneignung durch das selbsternannte universalistische Subjekt. In diesem Weltbild waren die Relationen Subjekt/Objekt und Eigenes/Fremdes im Modus vornehmlich textueller Repräsentation gleichsam parallelisiert. Im asymmetrischen modern codierten Blick dieser verwissenschaftlichten Repräsentation, die inhärent hierarchisch angelegt war, offenbarte sich das Andere idealtypisch als kulturell spezifisches Objekt gegenüber dem Universalismus eines Subjekts. Damit ging eine imperialistische Teilung der Welt einher, die sich auch und gerade in der Bildung und den Schulbüchern niederschlug.<sup>9</sup> Dies manifestiert sich insbesondere, aber nicht ausschließlich in den Darstellungen zur Geschichte und Geographie der (post)kolonialen Welt. In diesem Schulbuchwissen *bildet* sich mithin der Standpunkt des (universalistischen) Subjekts im Bezug zu anderen Orten, Zeiten und Räumen. Allerdings schließt hier unmittelbar die grundlegende politisch-epistemologische Frage an, inwiefern und vor allem unter welchen Namen das entsprechende Subjekt der Repräsentation selbst in der *condition postcoloniale*<sup>10</sup> immer noch im Zentrum eben dieser Repräsentation erscheint. Und damit unmittelbar verbunden ist die Frage, wie ausgehend von dieser Repräsentation und in wessen Namen im Schulbuchwissen wiederum jeweils bestimmte gegenwärtige und angehörige Subjekte angerufen werden. In diesem Beitrag geht es daher um die Frage, wie das entsprechende Subjekt der Repräsentation ausgehend vom Ereignis der Dekolonisierung in den 1960ern im Schulbuchwissen affiziert, neu bestimmt und verändert worden ist. Die Geschichtsschulbücher

6 Ebenda, 81.

7 Vgl. hier insbesondere zur postkolonialen Dekonstruktion des europäischen bzw. westlichen universalistischen Subjekts D. Chakrabarty, *Provincializing Europe. Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference*, Princeton 2008.

8 R. Weimann, Einleitung: Repräsentation und Alterität diesseits/jenseits der Moderne, in: ders. (Hg.): *Ränder der Moderne. Repräsentation und Alterität im (post)kolonialen Diskurs*, Frankfurt a. M. 1997, 7 ff.

9 Vgl. J. Willinsky, *Learning to divide the world. Education at Empire's End*, Minnesota 1998, 13.

10 Vgl. M. Otto, Das Subjekt der Nation in der *condition postcoloniale*. Krisen der Repräsentation und der Widerstreit postkolonialer Erinnerungspolitik in Frankreich, in: Lendemains. *Etudes comparées sur la France*, 39 (2011), 144, 54-76.

eigenen sich in besonderem Maße für eine solche Fragestellung, insofern sie nicht nur eine jeweilige politisch sanktionierte „nationale Autobiographie“<sup>11</sup> auf der Ebene des Nationalstaates, sondern darüber hinaus auch ein Medium eben jenes Weltbildes der politisch-epistemologischen Repräsentation darstellen, das korrespondierende Subjekte (der Nation) konstituiert und durch eine ausgesprochene *interpellation* (Althusser)<sup>12</sup> hervorbringen soll.

### **I Das Subjekt der Geschichte, die Krise der westlichen Zivilisation und das Werden der modernen Welt in den Geschichtsschulbüchern der *terminale* der 1960er**

*Qui a une histoire? Quel est le sujet de l'histoire? L'humanité tout entière, certes: mais cette unité doit être conquise (...) Cette unité même, nous n'en pouvons guère encore avoir l'idée: sera-t-elle unité d'une diversité en colloque (...) En tous cas, il faut prendre conscience que nous vivons à l'époque du 'monde fini'. Ceci nous impose un certain nombre de questions absolument originales. Se refuser à être dans son temps, à poser et à examiner ces questions, c'est en être réduit à maintenir l'ordre: attitude dérisoire, et qui n'a jamais empêché les vraies questions de se poser.*<sup>13</sup>

Seit den 1960ern stellen sich die Geschichtsschulbücher infolge einer grundlegenden Reform der Lehrpläne die programmatische Aufgabe, die moderne Welt der Gegenwart und ihre historische Entstehung im 20. Jahrhundert zu beschreiben, um die Schüler/innen der Abschlussklassen des *lycée* dazu zu befähigen, an dieser Welt teilzuhaben und sie eventuell mit zu gestalten. Geschichte und *Education civique* wurden dementsprechend im Sinne einer „initiation au monde moderne“ stärker miteinander verknüpfte.<sup>14</sup> Darüber hinaus erfolgte eine programmatische Ausweitung der Repräsentationen im mehrfachen Sinne: zeitlich, räumlich und konzeptionell.<sup>15</sup> Dies zeigte sich vor allem am Be-

11 Vgl. W. Jacobmeyer, Das Schulgeschichtsbuch – Gedächtnis der Gesellschaft oder Autobiographie der Nation?, in: Geschichte, Politik und ihre Didaktik, 26 (1998), 26-35.

12 Vgl. L. Althusser, Ideologie und ideologische Staatsapparate, Hamburg, 1977, 108-153.

13 J. Moutaux, Les poètes et l'unité de l'humanité, in: Cahiers pédagogiques. Les civilisations du monde contemporain, 4 (1962), 35, 100.

14 Vgl. Ministère de l'Education. Direction des lycées, Circulaire No. 72-178 du 24 Avril 1972, in: Histoire et Géographie, Institut National de Recherche et de Documentation pédagogiques, Paris 1976, 62 u. Ministère de l'Education nationale, Instructions sur l'éducation civique (4 juillet 1961), in: Instruction civique. Horaires, programmes et instructions. Lycées, Ecoles Normales et Classes du Cycle d'Observation, Institut Pédagogique National, 60, Paris 1963, 7f.

15 „Instructions du 10 Décembre 1954: Le champ de l'enseignement de l'histoire dans nos classes du second degré ne cesse de s'élargir. Elargissement dans le temps. Il ne suffit plus d'arrêter l'étude du passé à 1914, voire à 1919; la connaissance de l'histoire immédiatement contemporaine, au moins jusqu'à 1939 – et pour combien d'années cette date de 1939 restera-t-elle encore l'étape suprême? – devient une des conditions essentielles de la formation de l'homme et du citoyen de demain. Elargissement dans l'espace. Nos programmes, naguère centrés au premier chef sur la France et, accessoirement sur l'Europe, embrassent aujourd'hui, dans une certaine mesure du moins, l'histoire de tous les peuples; en particulier, la création de l'Union française nous assigne comme un devoir de plus en plus inéluctable de projeter sur le passé de ceux qui se sont associés à nous une



griff und Konzept der *civilisation* bzw. *civilisations*. Denn an diesem Begriff (und seiner zeitgenössischen Problematisierung und Bedeutungsverschiebung) orientierten sich das Programm, das vom Historiker Fernand Braudel aus der berühmten Annales-Schule federführend mit verfasst wurde, sowie sukzessiv die Schulbücher für Geschichte sehr weitgehend. So umfassten die Darstellungen zumeist jeweils zwei große Teile, und zwar erstens einen Teil mit dem Titel „Histoire du monde contemporain“ bzw. „Histoire du monde moderne“ und zweitens einen Teil mit dem Titel „Les (grandes) civilisations du monde“.<sup>16</sup> Diese Gliederung verrät bereits nachdrücklich das Konzept einer global ausgerichteten „histoire totale“, in der die konventionelle „histoire nationale“ Frankreichs zumindest auf den ersten Blick weitgehend verschwindet. Dabei bildete die „Entdeckung“ der Geschichte der bis dahin weitgehend als „geschichtslos“ bezeichneten nicht-europäischen Zivilisationen und die damit verbundene Relativierung des universalistischen Anspruchs der (eigenen) *civilisation occidentale* einen entscheidenden Ausgangspunkt, indem aus der vormaligen universalen *civilisation* angesichts der Gegenwart und Geschichte der modernen Welt sukzessive eine Pluralität von *civilisations* wurden.

*Les nouveaux programmes tiennent compte en partie de ces recommandations: en géographie, par exemple, dans l'étude des pays africains et malgaches d'expression française, 'on fera une large place à l'étude des populations, de leurs activités, de leur évolution'. En histoire, dans les classes terminales, on étudiera 'la situation de l'Europe devant la montée de nouvelles puissances', 'l'émancipation des pays coloniaux, les contrastes entre pays inégalement développés' et 'les grandes civilisations du monde contemporain' – abandonnant ainsi le concept occidental et traditionnel de civilisation.*<sup>17</sup>

Die korrespondierende Beschreibung der gegenwärtigen modernen Welt und ihres Werdens, ihrer buchstäblichen *mondialisation*, im 20. Jahrhundert erfolgte allerdings explizit aus der Perspektive eines zutiefst gegenwärtigen Subjekts, und die Dekolonisierung erscheint in diesem Zusammenhang zunächst freilich eher implizit als kritisches politisch-epistemologisches Ereignis mit weitreichenden Konsequenzen hinsichtlich der Selbst- und Fremdbeschreibungen von Nation/*civilisations/monde(s)* im Diskurs der Geschichtsschulbücher.

*... nous avons à enseigner la diversité du monde, la façon dont il échappe à l'Europe, dont il en diffère; c'est la condition même d'un humanisme qui soit à l'échelle de l'ensemble des civilisations, et non plus seulement de la Méditerranée ou d'une Antiquité qui est une*

lumière jusque-là distribuée avec trop de parcimonie. Elargissement dans la conception même de l'histoire, qui n'est plus seulement, pour les programmes officiels comme pour les historiens, politique, diplomatique, militaire, mais qui englobe désormais l'analyse des faits économiques et sociaux, la description des civilisations et des cultures, l'examen de l'évolution des techniques.“ Ebenda, 33.

16 In einigen Werken folgt darauf noch ein Ausblick wie z. B. „Demain, les grands problèmes bzw. „Demain. Le monde en devenir“ mit den Unterkapiteln „Unité de la civilisation“ und „Unité et diversité du monde“. Vgl. z. B. F. Braudel u. a., *Le monde actuel. Histoire et civilisations, classes terminales*, Belin, Paris 1963, 477 ff.

17 M. Semidei, *De l'Empire à la Décolonisation. A travers les manuels scolaires français*, in: *Revue française*, 16 (1966), 80 u. Arrêté du 1<sup>er</sup> juillet 1964, in: *Bulletin de l'Education nationale* du 16 juillet 1964.

*des richesses de l'Occident, à la condition que celui-ci ne s'obstine pas à vivre et à penser dans cette unique perspective. (...) De leur côté, les nations sous-développées, aussi diverses qu'elles soient, sont toutes des civilisations ou des cultures traditionnelles (...) elles ont (...) le souci de se moderniser et de s'industrialiser.*<sup>18</sup>

In den Geschichtsschulbüchern der 1960er bildet das Konzept der *civilisation* bzw. *civilisations* den zentralen Ausgangspunkt für die Repräsentation der Welt mitsamt ihren Teilungen. Der Begriff der *civilisation* erscheint dabei durchaus als ambivalent. Denn einerseits fungiert er als primäres und die Darstellungen gliederndes Teilungsprinzip innerhalb der Repräsentation der modernen Welt, und andererseits wird anhand einer Geschichte des Begriffs die konventionelle Verwendung des Begriffs im Rahmen der Unterscheidung zwischen zivilisierten und unzivilisierten bzw. primitiven Gesellschaften problematisiert. Darüber hinaus wird explizit darauf reflektiert, dass das Konzept der *civilisation* konstitutiv für die französische Kolonisation und die ihr inhärente republikanische Semantik einer *mission civilisatrice* war und inwiefern dies nun angesichts des historischen Prozesses der Dekolonisierung fragwürdig geworden ist. So wird daraufhin betont, dass nicht mehr von einer singulären und universalistischen *civilisation occidentale* die Rede sein kann, sondern dass diese nunmehr (nur noch) eine Zivilisation neben anderen bildet.<sup>19</sup> Das Konzept der *civilisation* erfuhr in diesem Zusammenhang ausgehend von der historiographisch einflussreichen Schule der *Annales* eine grundlegende Erweiterung und Verschiebung. Programmatisch und gleichsam in einer utopisch-visionären Perspektive war dabei sogar – in einer offensichtlichen Korrespondenz mit anderen zeitgenössischen gesellschaftlichen Diskursen – von einer Demokratisierung der Idee der Zivilisation die Rede.

*Réfléchissant à cette idée de la civilisation, je suis amené à me demander d'abord pourquoi elle est en ce moment à l'ordre du jour, beaucoup plus que dans les périodes précédentes. Autrefois, on parlait de 'la' civilisation: certains peuples étaient civilisés, d'autres ne l'étaient pas (...) notre civilisation de l'Europe occidentale était la civilisation normale, les autres n'étant à considérer que dans leur rapport avec celle-là. (...) le développement de l'histoire et de la géographie nous a conduits à renoncer à notre égocentrisme en matière de civilisations. Il nous a fallu accomplir une sorte de révolution à la Copernic. Nous nous sommes mis à parler de civilisations en dehors de l'orbite du monde occidental. (...) Enfin, il y eut une nouvelle étape, que l'on pourrait caractériser comme étant celle de la démocratisation de l'idée.*<sup>20</sup>

Infolge dieser grundlegenden politisch-epistemologischen Verschiebung erschien nicht zuletzt der Kolonialismus als historisch prägende Formation des Verhältnisses zwischen

18 F. Braudel: L'étude des civilisations. Principes et méthodes. Difficultés fécondes, in: Cahiers pédagogiques (Anm. 13), 6f.

19 Vgl. A. Bonifacio u. a., Le monde contemporain, Hachette, Paris 1962, 190.

20 G. Chabot, Sur l'idée de civilisation, in: Cahiers pédagogiques (Anm. 13), 8f.

der *civilisation occidentale* und ihrem universalistischen Anspruch einerseits und den verschiedenen anderen Zivilisationen der Welt andererseits in einem neuen Licht.

*Enfin il y a des civilisations qui tombent sous les coups portés de l'extérieur: conquête, colonisation, pénétration d'autres façons de vivre. (...) On parle beaucoup de la civilisation occidentale, on ne peut pas ne pas en parler; mais est-elle toujours très différente d'autres formes de civilisations, que nous ne rattachons pas au même ensemble?*<sup>21</sup>

Dies warf zugleich die nunmehr rhetorisch anmutende Frage auf, welches das maßgebliche Subjekt der Geschichte ist: die Menschheit als Ganzes, auch und gerade ihrer neu akzentuierten Diversität und mitsamt ihrer als evolutionärem Fortschritt begriffenen Geschichte?

*Qu'est-ce qui a une histoire? Quel est le sujet de l'histoire? (...) le sujet de l'histoire c'est l'humanité tout entière qui a une histoire, cette histoire étant comprise comme une évolution linéaire.*<sup>22</sup>

Mithin artikuliert sich in diesem von der *Annales* geprägten Diskurs die grundlegende Herausforderung, eine erneuerte Repräsentation der gegenwärtigen Welt mit der Neubestimmung des Subjekts der Geschichte zu verbinden. Tatsächlich wurde im Verlauf der 1950er und 1960er vor allem unter Federführung von Fernand Braudel der von der *Annales* begründete Ansatz einer umfassenden *histoire des civilisations* in den Lehrplänen und Schulbüchern für den Geschichtsunterricht verankert. Dies bedeutete eine grundlegende Neuausrichtung der Geschichtsschulbücher insofern, als damit an die Stelle einer primär nationalstaatlich fokussierten politischen Ereignisgeschichte eine umfassende *histoire totale* der verschiedenen Zivilisationen der Welt trat. Die Geschichtsschulbücher der 1960er vermittelten damit sehr weitgehend und explizit eine Geschichte der zeitgenössischen Gegenwart. Und Zivilisation bildete dabei offensichtlich eine, wenn nicht die entscheidende Kategorie innerhalb dieser Genealogie der gegenwärtigen Welt. Exemplarisch hierfür ist die einleitende Bemerkung in einem schulischen Lehrwerk für Geschichte bei Delagrave. Ganz im Sinne des Programms sei der inhaltliche Fokus dieses Geschichtsschulbuches auf eine aktuelle Geschichte der Gegenwart gerichtet. Wie im Programm vorgesehen, geht es hier also darum, den Schülern einfache und solide Begriffe und Konzepte über die Welt zu vermitteln, in der sie leben. Darum zielt das Buch bewusst darauf ab, die gegenwärtigen Aspekte der großen Zivilisationen zu vermitteln und auf ihre Vergangenheit nur einzugehen, um die gegenwärtige Situation zu erläutern.<sup>23</sup> Die Kategorie der *civilisation* überlagerte und überformte schließlich die Kategorie der Nation innerhalb der Beschreibung der gegenwärtigen Welt. *Civilisation* avancierte dergestalt zur zentralen Referenz und Subjektposition im Diskurs der Geschichtsschulbücher der 1960er. Während zuvor der Kolonialismus und die korrespondierende universalistische

21 Ebenda.

22 J. Moutaux, *Les poètes* (Anm. 13), 92f.

23 J. Sentou u. a., *Le monde contemporain*, cours d'histoire, classes terminales, Delagrave, Paris 1962, V.

*mission civilisatrice* inhärenter Bestandteil der republikanischen Selbstbeschreibung Frankreichs waren, so ruft das Ereignis der Dekolonisierung nunmehr sowohl einen Bruch zwischen Nation und *civilisation* als auch eine dekonstruktive Kritik des Konzepts der *civilisation* überhaupt hervor.

Diese Perspektive prägt daran anschließend die Revisionen des Kolonialismus seit dem 19. Jahrhundert, wie sie in den Schulbüchern seit den 1960ern erfolgen. Aus dieser neuen Perspektive heraus wird der Kolonialismus überhaupt erstmals tentativ historisiert, während er bis dahin einen integralen Bestandteil des universalistischen republikanischen Selbstverständnisses Frankreichs bildete, wie es in den Schulbüchern der Dritten Republik artikuliert wurde.<sup>24</sup> Darüber hinaus wird der französische Kolonialismus eingeordnet in den übergreifenden Zusammenhang europäischer Zivilisation und ihres inhärenten imperialistischen Expansionsstrebens. Der europäische Kolonialismus erscheint dabei zunächst vor allem als Ausdruck des nunmehr überkommenen universalistischen Anspruchs europäischer Zivilisation. Im Zuge der beiden Weltkriege und der daraus resultierenden Schwächung der europäischen Kolonialreiche erfährt dieser prätentöse Universalismus Europas schließlich eine tiefgreifende Erschütterung, wie sie besonders pointiert Paul Valéry formuliert hat:

*Nous autres, civilisations, nous savons maintenant que nous sommes mortelles. Nous avons entendu parler de mondes disparus tout entiers, d'empires coulés à pic avec tous leurs hommes et tous leurs engins ; descendus au fond inexorable des siècles avec leurs dieux et leurs lois...*<sup>25</sup>

In den Schulbüchern der 1960er erscheint diese Aussage an prominenter Stelle und rahmt gleichsam die freilich eher kursorische Beschreibung der Dekolonisierung seit dem Ende des Zweiten Weltkrieges. Mit dieser umfassenden Krisendiagnostik korrespondiert ein Gestus der Kritik, der sich insbesondere auf den spezifischen *Fall* des französischen Kolonialreiches bezieht. Im Zentrum der Kritik steht dabei freilich nicht der Kolonialismus als solcher, sondern die defizitäre Kolonialpolitik Frankreichs. In den Werken der 1960er wird indes die Selbstbeschreibung Frankreichs und seiner Krise nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg weitgehend aufgehoben im Konzept der *civilisation occidentale* und deren allgemeiner Krise angesichts der beiden Weltkriege und der darauf folgenden Dekolonisierung inklusive des Verlusts der europäischen Vormachtstellung in der Welt überhaupt.<sup>26</sup> So erscheint die Dekolonisierung in den Schulbüchern der 1960er weniger als eigenständiges historisches Ereignis, sondern primär als Ausdruck der Krise der universalistisch ambitionierten westlichen Zivilisation infolge der beiden Weltkriege sowie in diesem Zusammenhang spezifisch der Krise Frankreichs als Protagonistin der korrespondierenden universalistischen *mission civilisatrice*. Dieses ausgesprochene Kri-

24 Vgl. E. Savarèse, *L'ordre colonial et sa légitimation en France métropolitaine. Oublier l'autre*, Paris 1998, 137.

25 P. Valéry: *La crise de l'esprit*, Paris 1919, hier zitiert in L. Genet, *Le monde contemporain, classes terminales, Collection d'Histoire*, Hatier, Paris 1962, 314.

26 Vgl. J. Bouillon u. a., *Le monde contemporain. Histoire, Civilisations, Collection d'Histoire*, Bordas, Paris 1962, 512.

sennarrativ wird ergänzt durch die Einordnung der Dekolonisierung in die *longue durée* der verschiedenen vom Kolonialismus affizierten Zivilisationen der Welt.

Insgesamt zeigt sich hier schließlich die Subsumption der Geschichte Frankreichs unter eine aktuelle Geschichte der zeitgenössischen Welt inklusive eines dem entsprechenden Krisen- und Problembewusstseins angesichts der neuerdings erfahrenen Heterogenität von Zivilisationen. Im Zuge der Dekolonisierung hat sich dabei grundlegend die Definition von *civilisation* bzw. *civilisations* gewandelt, und zwar vom Universalismus westlicher Zivilisation hin zu *civilisations* im Plural und zur Vorstellung von der Relativität der Zivilisationen, wie sie insbesondere durch die zeitgenössische Ethnologie akzentuiert wurde.<sup>27</sup> Im Folgenden wird anhand einiger Aspekte näher ausgeführt, wie die Dekolonisierung und das Leitmotiv der *civilisation(s)* im Schulbuchwissen vielfältig aufeinander bezogen waren.

## II Das Ereignis der Dekolonisierung und das Erscheinen des *Tiers Monde* in den Geschichtsschulbüchern der *terminale* der 1960er

*L'enjeu c'est l'avenir de l'humanité, la découverte du Tiers Monde nous obligeant à repenser de fond en comble notre place, nos attitudes, nos images d'autrui, nos obligations. Puis de passer à l'action. L'euro-péo-centrisme doit être attaqué au niveau de ses manifestations intellectuelles et culturelles, apparentes et cachées, virulentes et endémiques... (...) Aux cyniques, nous disons: notre intérêt nous dicte de participer activement à l'émancipation du Tiers Monde, ne serait-ce que comme à une mesure d'assurance à long terme. A ceux qui n'ont pas renié la tradition humaniste de la culture européenne, celle-là même que, malgré tout ce qui s'est passé au cours de l'histoire, nous avons le droit de partager avec tous les hommes, nous crions: il y va de notre dignité. Et de notre liberté aussi, qui se mesurera à notre capacité de nous affranchir de la terreur des choses et des inégalités qu'elle instaure, de concevoir et de réaliser des projets de civilisation et des contrats sociaux fondés sur le respect d'autrui. La découverte du Tiers Monde aura-t-elle posé un jalon sur cette voie?*<sup>28</sup>

Unter dem Eindruck der Dekolonisierung haben sich die Repräsentation der Welt und das umfassende Konzept von „civilisation“ im Schulbuchwissen also dahingehend gewandelt, dass die (westlichen) Nationen nicht mehr beanspruchen können, die einzige Zivilisation zu sein. So wird im Schulbuchwissen der 1960er explizit darauf reflektiert, dass es andere gleichwertige Zivilisationen der Menschheit gibt.<sup>29</sup> In diesem Sinne wurde der Begriff der *civilisation* nicht mehr für die singuläre universalistische Selbstbeschreibung westlicher Zivilisation reserviert, sondern bezeichnete nunmehr im Plural verschiedene

27 Vgl. L. Genet, *Le monde contemporain* (Anm. 24), 290.

28 I. Sachs, *Tiers Monde* (Anm. 2), 274.

29 J. Sentou, *Le monde contemporain* (Anm. 23), 231.

Gesellschaften und Populationen der Welt.<sup>30</sup> In der Konsequenz werden unweigerlich auch der Kolonialismus allgemein und die selbsternannte *mission civilisatrice* Frankreichs als historisches Phänomen erklärungsbedürftig. Aus einer solchen neuen Perspektive heraus wurde der Kolonialismus daher überhaupt erstmals in den Geschichtsschulbüchern historisiert. Zwischen der Erschließung der Welt und der Dekolonisierung galt die Kolonisation demnach vormals als die normale Form des Verhältnisses zwischen Europa und den anderen Bevölkerungen der Welt, die weniger auf eine internationale Konfrontation vorbereitet waren, wie es nunmehr retrospektiv etwas verbrämt heißt.<sup>31</sup> Auf der Basis der faktisch begründeten politischen, juridischen und ökonomischen Ungleichheit habe der Kolonialismus allerdings zum ersten Mal in der Geschichte die Bildung einer universellen Zivilisation ermöglicht.<sup>32</sup> Vor diesem Hintergrund erscheint das konkrete Ereignis der Dekolonisierung in einem welthistorischen Zusammenhang gleichsam als unmittelbare Nachwirkung des Zweiten Weltkrieges zunächst einmal in einem ersten Teil „Naissance du monde actuel“, in dem die Entstehung der zeitgenössischen Welt seit dem Zweiten Weltkrieg beschrieben wird. In den Geschichtsschulbüchern der 1960er avancierte damit nicht nur das zeitgenössisch historiographisch prominente Konzept der Zivilisation zur zentralen Kategorie der historischen Darstellung, sondern es fanden darin bereits die noch sehr neuen Begriffe der „décolonisation“ und partiell des *Tiers Monde* unmittelbar Eingang und Verwendung.<sup>33</sup> So wird zumeist explizit in der Einleitung oder auch im Fazit auf die Dekolonisierung und die korrespondierende Formierung des *Tiers Monde* als grundlegendes Problem der modernen Welt im allgemeinen und als Ausdruck der Krise der *civilisation occidentale* im besonderen rekurriert.<sup>34</sup> Das thematische Leitmotiv bildet hier insgesamt der Zusammenhang zwischen der Dekolonisierung, der Krise der (okzidentalen) Zivilisation infolge der beiden Weltkriege und dem Ende der europäischen Vormachtstellung in der Welt.

Darüber hinaus wird die Dekolonisierung in den Geschichtsschulbüchern zum Anlass genommen, den französischen Kolonialismus insbesondere im Vergleich mit Großbritannien zu reflektieren sowie seine Probleme und Errungenschaften gleichsam vor einem imaginären Tribunal der Geschichte zu bilanzieren. Den verschiedenen akzentuierten zivilisatorischen Errungenschaften der französischen Kolonisation wird schließlich das weitgehende Scheitern französischer Kolonialpolitik an den eigenen Ansprüchen gegenüber-

30 Vgl. L. Genet, *Le monde contemporain* (Anm. 24), 291.

31 Vgl. ebenda, 305f.: „la colonisation. De tous les agents de diffusion c'est le plus puissant pour les Temps modernes : du reste, il englobe la plupart des autres. Entre les grandes découvertes et le mouvement de décolonisation, la colonisation fut, durant quatre siècles, la forme normale des relations entre les nations évoluées de l'Europe occidentale et les groupements humains des autres continents moins préparés à la confrontation internationale.“

32 Vgl. ebenda, 305f.

33 Die Geschichte des Begriffs der Dekolonisierung beginnt bereits vor dem Ereignis der Dekolonisierung der 1950er/60er und steht im unmittelbaren Zusammenhang mit dem Diskurs der Krise der westlichen Zivilisation nach dem Ersten und Zweiten Weltkrieg. Vgl. T. Shepard, *The Invention of Decolonization. The Algerian War and the Remaking of France*, New York 2006, 55 f. u. G. Pervillé, *De l'Empire français à la décolonisation*, Paris 1991, 15.

34 Vgl. J. Bouillon, *Le monde contemporain* (Anm. 25), 512.

gestellt. So wird auch die Dekolonisierung der ehemaligen Kolonien insgesamt weniger als Resultat der Akteure in den ehemaligen Kolonien denn als Folge der Defizite der Politik Frankreichs beschrieben. Im Vergleich der Kolonialreiche Frankreichs und Großbritanniens wird zwar zunächst einmal betont, dass beide Kolonialmächte vergleichbare Probleme mit ihren Kolonien haben.<sup>35</sup> Allerdings werden dann die besonderen Spezifika des französischen *Empire* vor allem im Vergleich mit Großbritannien beschrieben. So sei Frankreich im Vergleich mit Großbritannien ein relativ schwach ausgeprägtes Kolonialreich (gewesen)<sup>36</sup> und habe im Unterschied zu Großbritannien in seinen Kolonien eine Politik der Assimilation der indigenen Bevölkerung betrieben.<sup>37</sup> Bei aller Akzentuierung der Probleme werden jedoch auch Errungenschaften des französischen Kolonialismus hervorgehoben. So habe Frankreich vor allem in den Kolonien in „Afrique-noir“ einen vielfältigen zivilisatorischen Einfluss ausgeübt und insbesondere nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg neue indigene Eliten hervorgebracht, die sich an die moderne Welt angepasst und nicht zuletzt eine entscheidende Rolle im Prozess der Emanzipation der (ehemaligen) Kolonien gespielt haben.<sup>38</sup> Aber auch diese Bilanz der zivilisatorischen Errungenschaften erscheint in den Darstellungen ambivalent. Demnach wurden in den Kolonien auf verschiedenen Gebieten wie Demographie, Gesundheit allgemeine sowie in der Wirtschaft und Bildung ungleich verteilte und widersprüchliche zivilisatorische Fortschritte erreicht. Die rechtliche und politische Entwicklung sei hingegen defizitär geblieben, da sich der rechtliche Status der Kolonien sowie die politische Vertretung der indigenen Bevölkerung nur langsam und in beschränktem Maße entwickelt habe.<sup>39</sup> Paradoxerweise habe sich die Dekolonisierung allerdings gerade in dem Moment ereignet, als man in der Metropole die Kolonien zu schätzen begonnen habe und die Legitimation der Kolonisation durch vielfältige zivilisatorische Fortschritte gewachsen sei.<sup>40</sup> Denn in Frankreich habe zwischen den beiden Weltkriegen das imperiale Selbstverständnis eines „plus grande France“ zugenommen, jedoch habe man sich parallel dazu die allgemeinen humanen, ökonomischen und politischen Probleme der Kolonisation nicht bewusst gemacht und es versäumt, bei den verschiedenen indigenen Bevölkerungen ein Zugehörigkeitsgefühl zum „ensemble français“ auszubilden.<sup>41</sup> In dieser Aussage klingt schließlich an, inwiefern die Politik der Assimilation, die der universalistischen Selbstbeschreibung der *mission civilisatrice* Frankreichs inhärent war, bereits zeitgenössisch als weitgehend gescheitert galt. Und auch die so genannte „Union française“ vermochte die Kolonien nicht mehr effektiv an Frankreich zu binden.<sup>42</sup> Die Konstitution der „Union française“ und das nunmehr

35 Vgl. ebenda, 79 ff.

36 Vgl. M. Rouable, *Histoire contemporaine, classes terminales, lycées classiques, modernes et techniques*, Dunod, Paris 1963, 383.

37 Vgl. A. Bonifacio, *Le monde contemporain* (Anm. 19), 357.

38 Vgl. J. Bouillon, *Le monde contemporain* (Anm. 25), 499.

39 Vgl. J. Sentou, *Le monde contemporain* (Anm. 23), 171.

40 Vgl. J. Bouillon, *Le monde contemporain* (Anm. 25), 80.

41 Vgl. ebenda, 81.

42 Vgl. ebenda, 499 f.



umstrittene uneindeutige Verhältnis zwischen Metropole und Kolonien haben demnach die Unabhängigkeitsbestrebungen in den Kolonien noch verstärkt.<sup>43</sup>

Insgesamt reflektieren die Darstellungen durchaus ein mehr oder weniger explizites Krisenbewusstsein hinsichtlich der Selbstbeschreibung Frankreichs in einer sowohl durch die beiden Weltkriege als auch durch die Dekolonisierung grundlegend veränderten Welt im 20. Jahrhundert. Daran, dass diese mit dem Begriff der Dekolonisierung bezeichneten vielfältigen Unabhängigkeitsbewegungen, Frankreich, die anderen ehemaligen Kolonialmächte und letztlich Europa überhaupt sowie dessen Stellung in der Welt nachhaltig affizierten, wird kein Zweifel gelassen. In einer generalisierenden Betrachtung werden in diesem Zusammenhang die weitreichenden und krisenhaften Folgen der Dekolonisierung nicht nur für Frankreich, sondern für Europa insgesamt akzentuiert, wie bereits ganz zu Beginn des Werkes von Hatier:

*La décolonisation. Elle illustre bien le recul de l'Europe. Les pays qui, hier encore, avaient des colonies, ont vu naître, à la place, des Etats indépendants. Quelquefois, l'évolution s'est faite sans crise : ainsi en Angleterre pour l'Inde, ainsi en France pour l'Afrique noire ; mais souvent elle se heurte à des résistances : Indonésie, Indochine, Algérie. Il est vrai que le problème est complexe. Si le mouvement de décolonisation est un fait historique contre lequel on ne peut rien, on ne saurait demander à ceux qu'il lèse de le comprendre et de l'admettre, d'où les résistances, inutiles mais décidées, des anciens colons qui refusent d'accéder au changement inévitable. Quant aux nouveaux peuples libres, si certains comprennent qu'ils ont encore besoin d'aide pour élever le niveau de civilisation de leur pays, d'autres, enivrés de leur nouvelle liberté, ne s'en montrent pas dignes et se jettent avec aveuglement dans les bras de faux amis, qui se révéleront bientôt plus exigeants que leurs anciens tuteurs. La décolonisation en cours affaiblit l'Europe par les conflits qu'elle soulève, par les crises de politique intérieure qu'elle provoque, par les dépenses considérables qu'elle entraîne, par les rivalités internationales auxquelles elle conduit.*<sup>44</sup>

Die Dekolonisierung erschien jedoch nicht ausschließlich als Ausdruck der Krise westlicher Zivilisation allgemein und der *mission civilisatrice* Frankreichs im besonderen, vielmehr wurde im Schulbuchwissen auch darauf rekurriert, inwiefern die Dekolonisierung selbst wiederum auf der Basis von *civilisation(s)* erfolgte. Dies wird insbesondere in den Beschreibungen der Entstehung nationaler Unabhängigkeitsbewegungen in den Kolonien deutlich, insofern diese in mehrfacher Hinsicht als zivilisatorische Effekte gedeutet wurden. Die kolonial beherrschten Zivilisationen wurden einerseits als quasi geschlossene Kulturkreise mit einer langen Tradition dargestellt, dann aber auch im Kontext der europäischen Kolonisation sowie insbesondere im Kontext der Dekolonisierung und von deren Konsequenzen seit der Mitte des 20. Jahrhunderts dezidiert im Verhältnis zur *civilisation occidentale* beschrieben. Dementsprechend erfolgt eine anhand der Kategorien Nation bzw. Nationalismus und *civilisation* differenzierende Betrachtung der Unabhän-

43 Vgl. ebenda, 500.

44 L. Genet, *Le monde contemporain* (Anm. 24), 6 f.



gigkeitsbewegungen in den verschiedenen Kolonien. Die nationalistischen Unabhängigkeitsbewegungen in den Kolonien sind demnach seit 1919 aus jeweils spezifischen Kontexten heraus entstanden: während es in „Afrique noire“ keinen Nationalismus gab, entstanden im „Extrême-Orient“ und in den panarabischen bzw. panislamischen Regionen nationalistische Bewegungen, vor allem im Maghreb und im „Moyen-Orient“. In Indochina bildete sich eine nationalistische Unabhängigkeitsbewegung in Anlehnung an die revolutionären bzw. kommunistischen Bewegungen in China und Indien heraus.<sup>45</sup> Darüber hinaus stellte Algerien als einzige französische „colonie de peuplement“ zusätzlich einen absoluten Sonderfall dar, denn dort stellte sich die grundsätzliche Frage, ob man die Kolonisatoren und die Kolonisierten als zwei getrennte Gemeinschaften beibehalten oder die indigenen Muslime tatsächlich assimilieren sollte. Diese Frage wurde umso virulenter, wie die muslimische im Vergleich zur europäischen Bevölkerung viel stärker wuchs.<sup>46</sup> Auf den Mahgreb insgesamt bezogen, wird die wichtige Rolle des Islams als zivilisatorischer Macht hervorgehoben. Insbesondere im Maghreb bildete der Islam bzw. die Islamisierung demnach einen geopolitisch entscheidenden Faktor des Strebens nach Unabhängigkeit der ehemaligen Kolonien.<sup>47</sup> Dabei wird der Algerienkrieg wie die anderen antikolonialen Unabhängigkeitskriege nicht unbedingt ausschließlich tabuisiert<sup>48</sup>, sondern vielmehr eingeordnet in den allgemeinen Rahmen verschobener Kräfteverhältnisse zwischen den ehemaligen Kolonialmächten und ihren Kolonien.<sup>49</sup> Eine besondere Bedeutung erlangt außerdem die Dekolonisierung des lange Zeit als geschichtslos betrachteten Afrika, wobei nunmehr die besondere Rolle der als kulturell-humanistisch qualifizierten Bewegung der *Négritude* betont wird. Das Unabhängigkeitsstreben der afrikanischen Völker ist demnach eine unmittelbare Antwort auf die koloniale Unterdrückung, und auch das zivilisatorische Einheitsstreben der neuen Staaten Afrikas antwortete unmittelbar auf die koloniale Aufteilung Afrikas in der Konferenz von Berlin 1885.<sup>50</sup> Die Bewegung der *Négritude* widersetzte sich dergestalt schließlich der kolonialistischen Assimilation und avancierte damit zur Unabhängigkeitsbewegung im Namen

45 Vgl. J. Sentou, *Le monde contemporain* (Anm. 23), 173.

46 Vgl. L. Genet, *Le monde contemporain* (Anm. 24), 537.

47 Vgl. ebenda, 536.

48 Vgl. C. Kohser-Spohn/F. Renken (Hg.), *Trauma Algerienkrieg. Zur Geschichte und Aufarbeitung eines tabuisierten Konflikts*, Frankfurt a. M. 2006.

49 Vgl. J. Bouillon, *Le monde contemporain* (Anm. 25), 512: „Dans certains cas, l'indépendance a été le résultat d'une lutte armée; Insulinde, Indochine, Congo belge, Afrique du Nord ont connu, à des degrés divers, des années de guerre contre le peuple colonisateur. Les combats ont fait naître des rancœurs violentes; nous avons vu, par exemple, à quel point les Hollandais sont, maintenant encore, détestés en Insulinde. Souvent, par désir de mieux marquer leurs distances, les colonisés ont été tentés par des solutions extrêmes; le Nord-Vietnam est entièrement passé au communisme, et le parti communiste est devenu une des forces de l'ancien Congo belge. Les conflits coloniaux ont menacé, tout à la fois, l'équilibre des pays colonisateurs et celui des Etats émancipés. En Belgique, aux Pays-Bas et surtout en France, l'opinion s'est divisée, de façon souvent tragique, au sujet de la conduite à tenir vis-à-vis des mouvements de libération indigène. Le partage de l'Indochine, le triomphe des rivalités locales en Indonésie, la guerre civile congolaise, la guerre d'Algérie ont marqué, en sens inverse, le grave bouleversement que connaissent les nouveaux Etats.“

50 Vgl. M. Rouable, *Histoire contemporain* (Anm. 35), 383.

einer gemeinsamen afrikanischen *civilisation*.<sup>51</sup> Die Bewegung der *Négritude* artikuliert darüber hinaus eine humanistische Kritik an Europa im allgemeinen und Frankreich im besonderen, indem sie auf deren skandalösen Verrat der allgemeinen Menschenrechte im Kolonialismus verwies. Damit verband sich ein neues kulturelles und zivilisatorisches Selbstbewusstsein der ehemals Kolonisierten, das ein entscheidender Faktor der Dekolonisierung war.<sup>52</sup> Bemerkenswert und relativ singulär erscheint in diesem Zusammenhang die geradezu verheißungsvolle Perspektive des u. a. von Braudel verfassten und bei Belin publizierten Werkes auf Afrika nach der Dekolonisierung. Infolge der Dekolonisierung stelle Afrika mit seiner *Négritude*, seinen Werten und Möglichkeiten sowie dem Bestreben, seine eigene Geschichte zu schaffen, einen neuen „monde culturel en plein devenir“ dar.<sup>53</sup> In dieser Aussage zeigt sich allerdings zugleich paradigmatisch die ausgeprägte Ambivalenz zwischen historisierender und essentialisierender Perspektive in der Repräsentation Afrikas, wie sie ausgehend vom Paradigma der *civilisations* im Schulbuchwissen reüssierte:

*Pour une étude des civilisations, l'Afrique Noire s'offre comme un cas privilégié. Avec les indépendances qui se sont étendues, ces dernières années, à la majeure partie de son espace, avec la valorisation de sa 'négritude', cet 'humanisme naissant' qui commence à prendre conscience de ses valeurs propres et de ses possibilités, avec la recherche passionnée d'une histoire qu'il lui faut construire, presque inventer, l'Afrique Noire a le très gros avantage de se présenter comme un monde culturel en plein devenir. Elle offre à notre observation toutes les formes, depuis les plus archaïques jusqu'aux formes urbaines les plus progressives, et tous les stades de l'acculturation.*<sup>54</sup>

Ein weitergehender Fokus richtet sich schließlich auf die Frage, wie sich die infolge der Dekolonisierung neu entstehenden Staaten in die moderne Weltordnung einfügen und insbesondere wie sich ihr Verhältnis zu den ehemaligen Kolonialmächten sowie zur westlichen bzw. nördlichen Welt entwickelt. Infolge der Dekolonisierung sei das Verhältnis der ehemaligen Kolonien zu ihren ehemaligen Metropolen grundsätzlich gespalten: einerseits wünsche man sich weiterhin ein enges Verhältnis, andererseits betreibe man antikoloniale Propaganda gegen die ehemaligen Kolonialmächte. Außerdem bedeutet die ökonomische Unterentwicklung, dass die ehemaligen Kolonien weiterhin wirtschaftlich abhängig von den ehemaligen Metropolen blieben und sogar die Rückgabe der kolonialistisch ausgebeuteten Rohstoffe verlangten.<sup>55</sup> Dieser Zusammenhang zwischen der Dekolonisierung und einem zugleich spezifischen und gemeinsamen Selbstverständnis der ehemaligen Kolonien innerhalb der zeitgenössischen Weltordnung wird vor allem unter dem neuen Titel des *Tiers Monde* dargestellt: Die Entstehung des *Tiers Monde* infolge der Dekolonisierung sei im Zusammenhang mit dem Wandel der okzidentalen

51 Vgl. ebenda, 385.

52 Vgl. F. Braudel, *Le monde actuel* (Anm. 16), 127.

53 Vgl. ebenda, 229.

54 Ebenda, 229.

55 Vgl. J. Bouillon, *Le monde contemporain* (Anm. 25), 512.

Vorherrschaft, dem Hunger in der Welt und dem Nationalismus ein zentrales Problem der gegenwärtigen Welt.<sup>56</sup> Die Dekolonisierung wird zuweilen umgekehrt (auch) als eine Folge der Entstehung des *Tiers Monde* beschrieben. Denn mit der Dekolonisierung strebten die Länder des *Tiers Monde* sowohl die wirtschaftliche als auch die politische Unabhängigkeit an.<sup>57</sup>

Im Hinblick auf die moderne Zivilisation, die Krise des Selbstverständnisses Europas und die Lage der gegenwärtigen Welt überhaupt kommt damit dem historischen Ereignis der Dekolonisierung eine entscheidende Bedeutung zu. Die Dekolonisierung wird dementsprechend als eines der großen Probleme der gegenwärtigen Welt identifiziert. Denn sie bedeutet einen relativen Niedergang Europas und das Ende der Kolonien. Als Konsequenz der beiden Weltkriege, der ökonomischen Krisen und des gewaltsamen Verlustes der Kolonien habe *l'occident* insgesamt in der ersten Hälfte des 20. Jahrhundert infolge der beiden Weltkriege und der Dekolonisierung die tiefgreifende Erfahrung gemacht, dass er nur noch eine unter mehreren Zivilisationen, also neben sozialistischer, islamischer Welt, *Extrême-Orient* und *Afrique noire* nur noch eine *fraction de la planète* und letztlich auch als Zivilisation sterblich ist. Diese grundlegende Krise sei vergleichbar mit dem Ende des römischen Weltreiches, dem Aufstieg des Christentums und der Wiederentdeckung des Menschen am Ende des Mittelalters.<sup>58</sup>

Das Ereignis der Dekolonisierung markiert mithin nicht nur reine historische Zäsur, sondern stellt darüber hinaus eine politisch-epistemologische Herausforderung dar, die vor allem auch im Schulbuchdiskurs seit den 1960ern insistiert. Narrativ wird das Ereignis der Dekolonisierung in den Schulbüchern der 1960er und 1970er weitgehend aufgehoben in der Geschichte des Zweiten Weltkrieges und seiner unmittelbaren Konsequenzen. Dementsprechend erscheint die Dekolonisierung in den Schulbüchern der 1960er in erster Linie nicht als eigenes historisches Ereignis, sondern primär als Ausdruck der Krise der universalistisch ambitionierten westlichen Zivilisation infolge der beiden Weltkriege sowie in diesem Zusammenhang spezifisch der Krise Frankreichs als Protagonistin der korrespondierenden universalistischen *mission civilisatrice*. Dieses ausgesprochene Krisennarrativ wird ergänzt durch die Einordnung der Dekolonisierung in die *longue durée* der verschiedenen vom Kolonialismus affizierten Zivilisationen der Welt. Insgesamt deutet sich hier schließlich an, inwiefern die vormals dominante Kategorie der Nation (als historisches Subjekt) allgemein und die Geschichte Frankreichs im besonderen partiell durch die Perspektive einer umfassenden *histoire des civilisations* sowie eines damit verbundenen Krisen- und Problembewusstseins angesichts der neuerdings akzentuierten Heterogenität von Zivilisationen überlagert wurden.

Allerdings bildet die Dekolonisierung, auch wenn sie durchaus bereits vergleichsweise frühzeitig in den Geschichtsschulbüchern seit Anfang der 1960er thematisiert worden ist, dabei weniger einen eigenständigen Gegenstand als vielmehr das zeitgenössische

56 Vgl. ebenda, 512 u. F. Braudel, *Le monde contemporain* (Anm. 16), 137f.

57 Vgl. F. Braudel, *Le monde contemporain* (Anm. 16), 138.

58 Vgl. A. Bonifacio, *Le monde contemporain* (Anm. 19), 190.

Prisma, in dem der bereits nach dem Ersten Weltkrieg omnipräsente (kulturkritische) Diskurs der Krise der (westlichen) Zivilisation vielfältig und facettenreich aufscheint und aktualisiert wird. Insbesondere die genuin französische Schöpfung des Begriffs *Tiers Monde*, die paradoxerweise in einer expliziten Analogie zum historischen *Tiers Etat* erfolgte<sup>59</sup>, ermöglichte es zumal innerhalb des neuen globalen Paradigmas der Modernisierung – besonders pointiert als Entwicklung inklusive der Unterscheidung zwischen den entwickelten Ländern vor allem Europas einerseits und den unterentwickelten (neuen) Staaten des *Tiers Monde* andererseits – die Folgen der Dekolonisierung gleichsam aus der Nationalgeschichte auszulagern und im Rahmen der Entstehung einer neuen Weltordnung auf die globale Ebene zu projizieren.

*Du sous-développement au Tiers Monde: De 1939 à 1950, les pays 'développés' s'absorbent dans une lutte à mort, puis dans la reconstruction pénible de l'Europe, qui les obligent à relâcher leur domination sur le reste du monde. Ils apprennent vite que les pays, jadis soumis, peuvent devenir l'enjeu de la nouvelle rivalité entre les deux blocs. Une universelle explosion nationaliste complique le difficile problème de la 'décolonisation', quelle qu'en soit la forme.*<sup>60</sup>

Ausgehend von der Dekolonisierung, die zugleich als welthistorischer Prozess und nationalgeschichtliche Herausforderung erschien, avancierte der *Tiers Monde* dergestalt zu einer zentralen Referenz innerhalb des sich formierenden sozialwissenschaftlichen Paradigmas der Modernisierung.<sup>61</sup> In diesem politisch-epistemologischen Zusammenhang erscheint der *Tiers Monde* ausgehend vom Ereignis der Dekolonisierung im Schulbuchwissen der 1960er, und zwar gleichsam als Projektion und Projekt des westlichen Subjekts allgemein und des republikanischen Subjekts Frankreichs im besonderen.

### III Nation oder *civilisation*? Die Frage des Subjekts der Repräsentation

Der französische Historiker Lucien Fèbvre, der gemeinsam mit Marc Bloch die im 20. Jahrhundert in Frankreich besonders einflussreiche historiographische Schule der *Annales* begründete, äußerte sich in den 1950ern überaus kritisch zur internationalen Schulbuchrevision im Rahmen der UNESCO nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg. Dabei warf er der Schulbuchrevision vor, dass sie mit ihren friedenspädagogischen Bestrebungen des Abbaus nationaler Feindbilder in den Geschichtsschulbüchern lediglich an den Symptomen laboriere, während sie weiterhin einem grundlegenden methodologischen Nationalismus verhaftet sei: Der Nationalstaat bleibe der unhinterfragte Bezugspunkt auch der überarbeiteten Geschichtsschulbücher. Demgegenüber plädierte Fèbvre vehement und durchaus polemisch für die Einführung einer *histoire des civilisations*, des histori-

59 Vgl. A. Sauvy, Trois mondes – une planète, in: L'Observateur, 14. August 1952, 118, 14.

60 F. Braudel, Le monde contemporain (Anm. 16), 137.

61 Vgl. C. Kalter, Entdeckung (Anm. 2), 44 ff.

ographischen Ansatzes der *Annales*-Schule, auch und gerade in den Geschichtsschulbüchern, um die Geschichte zu „entwaffnen“. Denn die Geschichte der Zivilisationen sei im grundlegenden Unterschied zur Geschichte des Nationalstaates von vornherein „unbewaffnet“. <sup>62</sup> Auf diese Weise stellt Fèbvre der Geschichte der Nationalstaaten als einer Geschichte des Krieges im mehrfachen Sinne die Geschichte der Zivilisationen als eine Geschichte des Friedens gegenüber. Die hier dezidiert normativ artikulierte historiographische Unterscheidung zwischen (National-)Staat und *civilisation* stand indes im weiteren Zusammenhang eines Diskurses der politisch-epistemologischen Krise des Universalismus okzidentaler Zivilisation im allgemeinen und der französischen Nation im besonderen. Dieser machte sich vor allem an den beiden Weltkriegen sowie dem sukzessiven Ereignis der Dekolonisierung fest und sollte sich schließlich auch in den Lehrplänen und Schulbüchern für den Geschichtsunterricht niederschlagen.

Die 1950er und 1960er markierten dabei in Frankreich eine tief greifende historische Zäsur, da sie nicht nur das Ende der Vierten Republik und den Beginn der Fünften Republik (1958), sondern zugleich das Ende des französischen Kolonialreiches bedeuteten. Da der französische Kolonialismus nicht zuletzt auch ein epistemologisches Projekt darstellte, in dem die Welt durch ein universalistisches (republikanisches) Subjekt der Zivilisation im Modus der Repräsentation angeeignet wurde, betraf die Dekolonisierung unweigerlich auch die Logik kolonialer Repräsentation selbst. „L'apparition de ces phénomènes nouveaux bouleverse les idées reçues: les années 1950–1960 sont celles d'une mise en question des connaissances et des représentations constituées dans la période coloniale“. <sup>63</sup> Aus diesem Krisenbewusstsein heraus und im Prisma des Ereignisses der Dekolonisierung wurde der Kolonialismus selbst überhaupt erst gewissermaßen zu einem kontingenten historischen Ereignis, während er bis dahin einen integralen Bestandteil der universalistischen republikanischen Selbstbeschreibung Frankreichs gebildet hatte. Daher stellte das Ereignis der Dekolonisierung nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg in Frankreich eine besondere Herausforderung dar, die sich insbesondere im Schulbuchwissen seit den 1960ern niederschlug. Während im Zeichen der *mission civilisatrice* die Nation und das Metanarrativ der Zivilisation inhärent miteinander verknüpft waren, ereignete sich nicht zuletzt ausgehend von der Dekolonisierung in den 1960ern ein politisch-epistemologischer Bruch zwischen Nation und Zivilisation.

Grundsätzlich und programmatisch formulieren seit den 1960ern die Geschichtsschulbücher der *terminale* explizit eine Geschichte der Gegenwart, um ein Verständnis der gegenwärtigen Welt zu vermitteln. Daran schließt die Frage an, von welchem Standpunkt aus dies erfolgt. Oder anders formuliert: welches sind die zentralen Referenzen und vor allem welches ist das Subjekt, das aus dieser Repräsentation spricht? So erscheinen Nation und Zivilisation als zentrale Referenzen und Subjektpositionen in der Anrufung von Subjekten, der Repräsentation der gegenwärtigen Welt und der Geschichte der Gegenwart im Diskurs der Geschichtsschulbücher seit den 1960ern. Das Ereignis

62 Vgl. L. Fèbvre, *L'histoire, c'est la paix?*, in: *Annales. Economies, sociétés, civilisations*, 11 (1956), 1, 53 ff.

63 C. Liauzu, *Race et civilisation. L'autre dans la culture occidentale*, Paris 1992, 444.

der Dekolonisierung stellte dabei eine besondere Herausforderung dar, insofern es in diesem Diskurs sowohl eine dezidiert national- als auch eine weltgeschichtliche Dimension entfaltete. Zentraler Ausgangspunkt hierfür waren Begriff und Konzept der *civilisation* inklusive der signifikanten zeitgenössischen Verschiebung vom universalistischen Kollektivsingular als moderne *civilisation occidentale* hin zu einer (kultur-)kritischen geschichtsphilosophischen und begriffsgeschichtlichen Reflexion sowie zur Pluralisierung im Sinne einer relativen und (potentiell) vergleichenden Würdigung verschiedener *civilisations*. Diese politisch-epistemologische Verschiebung erscheint im Diskurs der Geschichtsschulbücher paradoxerweise zugleich als Ursache und Wirkung des Ereignisses der Dekolonisierung in den 1950ern und 1960ern, das insgesamt weniger als nationalgeschichtlicher denn als welthistorischer Prozess beschrieben wird. Damit korrespondieren veränderte Teilungsprinzipien der Repräsentation und (potentiellen) Konfliktkonstellationen mit solchen diskursiven Verschiebungen im Schulbuchdiskurs einhergehen. So erweist es sich in diesem Zusammenhang, dass die Nation als vormalig bestimmende Kategorie der politisch-epistemologischen Unterscheidung von Freund und Feind bzw. Selbst und Anderem oder auch Subjekt/Objekt teilweise hinter die vor allem geschichtsphilosophisch begründete Kategorie der Zivilisation(en) zurücktrat. Damit rückten zugleich Kolonialismus und sukzessive die Dekolonisierung als zumindest potentiell vorherrschende Konfliktkonstellationen zwischen verschiedenen und zumindest potentiell gleichwertigen Zivilisationen innerhalb der Entstehung der zeitgenössischen Welt in den Vordergrund. Vor dem Hintergrund des Ereignisses der Dekolonisierung insistierte im Diskurs der Geschichtsschulbücher allerdings insbesondere die Frage nach der zentralen Subjekt-Referenz innerhalb der Beschreibung der gegenwärtigen Welt: Nation oder *civilisation*? Die historiographisch einflussreiche Schule der *Annales* kritisierte dabei den methodologischen Nationalismus der traditionellen Politik- und Ereignisgeschichte, wie sie insbesondere auch in den früheren Geschichtsschulbüchern vermittelt worden war, und propagierte demgegenüber ihren umfassenden Ansatz einer *histoire des civilisations*. Allerdings hatte der Begriff der *civilisation*, der unter dem Titel der *mission civilisatrice* konstitutiver Bestandteil des universalistischen Selbstverständnisses der republikanischen Nation in Frankreich war – entgegen dem von Fèbvre suggerierten Eindruck – spätestens infolge der Dekolonisierung gleichsam bereits seine Unschuld verloren. Freilich wurde die Dekolonisierung auch und gerade im Rahmen der *Annales* zunächst geradezu als erfolgreiche Konsequenz und gewissermaßen zeitgemäße Fortführung der *mission civilisatrice* gedeutet, deren primäre Träger die europäischen Nationen darstellten:

*Mais la décolonisation n'est pas un retour aux conditions d'avant l'impérialisme colonial. Elle est, tout au contraire, la sanction de l'œuvre colonial. Elle suppose le succès de la 'mission civilisatrice' à laquelle prétendirent autrefois les nations européennes. Elle résulte de l'occidentalisation des colonies. En émancipant au point de vue politique, les anciennes colonies, elle exige cependant, sous d'autres formes et avec d'autres moyens d'action la poursuite de l'œuvre coloniale. Elle n'est pas une rupture, mais une accélération de l'évolution suscitée par l'établissement des colonies. Elle se fonde sur une collaboration*

*entre les anciennes métropoles et les élites des pays décolonisés, pour achever d'instruire les masses et d'équiper techniquement les nouveaux Etats. Cette œuvre s'inscrit dans le cadre des vastes aménagements internationaux, qui sont en train de s'accomplir de nouveaux groupements de pays développés y prennent en charge les pays sous-développés. Ils visent à une planification générale dans l'exploitation des ressources mondiales. Dans la mesure où cette œuvre est désintéressée, où elle considère l'avenir de l'Humanité plutôt que celui d'une nation particulière, elle rejoint l'ancien idéal des philanthropes et des missionnaires.<sup>64</sup>*

Auf diese Weise sollte die Dekolonisierung mithin in ein umfassendes, weil nunmehr auf die *Humanité* bezogenes emanzipatorisches Metanarrativ der Moderne integriert werden. Während Frantz Fanon bekanntlich in seiner monumentalen Artikulation der Dekolonisierung als revolutionären geschichtsphilosophischen Prozess gerade auf den inhärenten Bruch in diesem Metanarrativ hinwies, indem er Europa angesichts des Kolonialismus vorwarf, seine zivilisatorischen Ideale verraten zu haben, so dass es gerade nicht darum gehen könne „ein drittes Europa zu schaffen“<sup>65</sup>, machte sich hier gleichsam eine Rezentrierung des europäisch verfassten Weltbildes geltend. Noch deutlicher zeichnet sich eine solche auf die europäische Zivilisation und spezifischer auf Frankreich rezentrierte Perspektive ab, wenn das Ereignis der Dekolonisierung, die Unabhängigkeit der ehemaligen Kolonien und deren potentielle *Entwicklung* sogar explizit an die zivilisatorischen Werte der Französischen Revolution zurückgebunden werden, wie dies mitunter in Geschichtsschulbüchern der 1960er geschieht. So heißt es beispielsweise bezogen auf die Ambitionen der ehemaligen Kolonien im Prozess der Dekolonisierung:

*Deux traits définissent leurs aspirations et leur philosophie commune: l'indépendance et le développement. L'indépendance est une revendication de dignité, une aspiration incoercible. Aucun peuple, si peu développé qu'il soit et quelque grand besoin qu'il ait de l'aide des autres, n'accepte plus d'être dépendant: il rejette toute domination politique, militaire, juridique. C'en est fait des rapports d'inégalité qui ont réglé pendant des siècles les relations entre continents. Telle est la signification profonde du grand mouvement de décolonisation qui s'est amplifié après la seconde guerre mondiale et dont les dernières péripéties s'accomplissent sous nos yeux. C'est l'ultime conséquence des principes que la France énonça jadis dans sa révolution.<sup>66</sup>*

Allerdings stellte auch Fanon die Dekolonisierung, wie sie sich gleichsam paradigmatisch mit der „algerischen Revolution“<sup>67</sup> ereignete, in eine unmittelbare Analogie zur Französischen Revolution, indem er in diesem Zusammenhang emphatisch das Projekt der

64 H. Brunschwig, Le monde à l'heure de la décolonisation. Politique française et anglaise, in: Annales. Economies. Sociétés. Civilisations, 12 (1957), 3, 392.

65 Vgl. F. Fanon, Die Verdammten dieser Erde, Frankfurt a. M. 1981 (orig. 1961), 264f.

66 L. Genet u. a., Le monde contemporain, classes terminales, Paris 1966, 603.

67 Vgl. F. Fanon, L'an V de la révolution algérienne, Paris 1959.



Schaffung eines „neuen Menschen“ postulierte.<sup>68</sup> Das Ereignis der Dekolonisierung warf indes eine noch viel grundlegendere politisch-epistemologische Frage auf, die sich darauf richtete, welches das gegenwärtige Subjekt der Geschichte und der Repräsentation überhaupt sei und wo es seinen Standpunkt innerhalb des Weltbildes finde.

## Fazit

Im Schulbuchwissen erscheinen nicht nur vorherrschende Repräsentationen der Welt, sondern damit verbunden artikuliert sich eine jeweils vorherrschende Subjektposition, von der aus das Wissen um die Welt versammelt und vermittelt wird, um dergestalt „zugehörige“ Subjekte anzurufen. Das korrespondierende Weltbild des 20. Jahrhunderts war insbesondere in Frankreich durch die republikanisch-universalistischen *mission civilisatrice* geprägt. In der *mission civilisatrice*, wie sie vor allem im Schulbuchdiskurs der Dritten Republik repräsentiert und legitimiert wurde, setzte sich die republikanische Nation als universalistisches Subjekt, das im Rahmen des französischen Kolonialreiches die Errungenschaften der Zivilisation in weite Teile der Welt brachte. Dieser politisch-epistemologische Einklang zwischen Nation und *civilisation* erfuhr mit dem Ereignis der Dekolonisierung schließlich eine fundamentale Herausforderung, die sich auch und gerade im Diskurs der Geschichtsschulbücher in Frankreich seit den 1960ern niederschlug. Infolgedessen konkurrierten und interagierten Nation und *civilisation* seitdem als zentrale Referenzen und Subjektpositionen innerhalb des Schulbuchwissens und im korrespondierenden Diskurs der Selbstbeschreibung miteinander. In diesem weiterhin ethno- bzw. eurozentrischen Rahmen avancierte das Ereignis der Dekolonisierung im Schulbuchwissen der 1960er allerdings zu einem emblematischen Ausdruck der Krise der westlichen Zivilisation als präventives universalistisches Subjekt der Geschichte. Und die Geschichtsschulbücher der *terminale* gerieten angesichts des zugleich welthistorischen und nationalgeschichtlichen Ereignisses der Dekolonisierung zu veritablen Medien der *mondialisation* der Welt und ihrer Repräsentation, und zwar vor allem ausgehend von dem nunmehr gleichsam ausgelagerten und projizierten Subjekt/Objekt des geschichtsträchtig so genannten *Tiers Monde*.

Die Dekolonisierung erscheint dabei als historisches Ereignis und begriffliches Konzept in den 1950ern zunächst im unmittelbaren Zusammenhang mit dem Diskurs der „Krise der westlichen Zivilisation“ nach dem Ersten und Zweiten Weltkrieg. In diesem Zusammenhang gehen Ereignis und Begriff der Dekolonisierung dann auch in die Schulbücher der 1960er ein, die durch das Programm einer Geschichte der *civilisations* geprägt sind, wie sie die *Annales*-Schule hervorgebracht hat. Darin wird die Ereignisgeschichte einerseits gleichsam in der Geschichte und Geographie der Zivilisationen aufgehoben, jedoch wird andererseits die aktuelle Gegenwart explizit und programmatisch von jeweils kontingenten historischen Ereignissen her begriffen. Neben den beiden Weltkriegen des

68 Vgl. F. Fanon, *Die Verdammten* (Anm. 65), 267.



20. Jahrhunderts erscheint dabei die Dekolonisierung als entscheidendes historisches Ereignis, das die Gegenwart Frankreichs, Europas und der Welt insgesamt in der zweiten Hälfte des 20. Jahrhunderts maßgeblich konstituiert hat. Auf diese Weise insistiert das Ereignis der Dekolonisierung weiterhin auch und gerade in der diskursiven Formation des Schulbuchwissens, indem es die Selbstbeschreibung der republikanischen Nation in Frankreich sowie das zivilisatorische Selbstverständnis Europas<sup>69</sup> überhaupt bis in die Gegenwart grundlegend herausfordert. Allerdings bedeutet dies keineswegs eine Aufhebung des Ethno- bzw. Eurozentrismus, zumal solche statischen und wenig trennscharfen Begriffe kaum zur Beschreibung des politisch-epistemologischen Subjekts des (Schulbuch-)Wissens taugen, insofern sie jeweils die Möglichkeit eines Standpunktes jenseits der Befangenheit in der eigenen Selbstreferenz unterstellen. Vielmehr gilt es weiterhin zu untersuchen, wie das entsprechende Subjekt der Repräsentation jeweils konstituiert, kontingent gesetzt und insbesondere im Zuge der wahrgenommenen Herausforderung und Dezentrierung des Weltbildes infolge der Dekolonisierung verändert worden ist.

69 Zur Frage des Kolonialismus als nationaler oder genuin europäischer Erinnerungsort vgl. S. Grindel, Deutscher Sonderweg oder europäischer Erinnerungsort? Die Darstellung des modernen Kolonialismus in neueren deutschen Schulbüchern, in: dies. (Hg.), *Koloniale Vergangenheiten – Colonial Pasts*, Themenheft der Zeitschrift für internationale Schulbuchforschung, 30 (2008), 3, 695-716.

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