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Changes from the "Margins": Non-European Actors, Ideas and Strategies in International Organizations

Herausgegeben von
Klaas Dykmann und Katja Naumann

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Changes from the "Margins". Non-European Actors, Ideas, and Strategies in International Organizations. Introduction

Klaas Dykmann / Katja Naumann

The history of international organizations (IOs) has received substantial research interest not the least as they are seen as significant actors in a variety of border-crossing processes, and their emergence and development seems to become one of the core topics of transnational and global historical studies. Indeed, processes of globalization have to a large degree been shaped by these institutions. When turning to the dynamics of the increasingly worldwide integration since the mid-19th century, one discovers IOs becoming crucial contemporary channels through which societies have managed their external relations and the enlarging spaces of their contacts. This also explains why an increasing number of actors, governmental as well non-governmental, made use of them. Not surprising, international organizations are depicted as "making and unmaking the threats of interdependence and interaction between polities and societies across borders", and as essential in the construction of national societies. Therefore, IOs are seen as makers of our modern world.[1]

The pasts of international organizations help in addressing hypotheses and arguments central to global history, ranging from the role of technologies and wars in deepening intercultural contacts, to the interdependence of national and transnational frames of action and complex spatialities, to processes of colonialism, European hegemony, and global inequalities. In short: the formations and changes of IOs offer an entry into the dynamics of globalization.

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1   P.-Y. Saunier, International Non-Governmental Organizations (INGOs), in: A. Iriye/P.-Y. Saunier (eds.), The Palgrave Dictionary of Transnational History, Basingstoke 2009, pp. 573-579, p. 579.

This has led to lively and inspiring research[2] that among others, has questioned problematic tendencies in earlier studies, in particular the following two: For long, insider studies dominated the literature, i.e., the descriptions and analyses written by officials of the respective organization, which often had commemorative functions.[3] Equally persistently present was the interpretation of the 1920s and 1930s as an "interwar period" and road to war, with which the League of Nations (LON), at least the organization at large, appeared as a failure that did not live up to its main goal: the creation of peace.[4] By now, however, the negative picture of the LON and other institutions of the first half of the 20th century has been put into perspective, as has the related idealized view of the United Nations (UN) as successor.[5]

All in all, an empirically solid research field has emerged that consists of different strands and debates, amongst others, around the issue of the periodization of international institutions and orders, the claims for vis-à-vis the reactions to postulates of universalism,[6] or the transnational dimension of IOs.[7]

In our view, there are two aspects that have received rather limited attention but are nonetheless significant for understanding IOs at the crossroads with global history, including discontinuities or shifts in IOs and the impact of the related actors from Latin American, African, and Asian regions. To put the state of the art in a nutshell: Political scientists and international relations scholars in particular – who long dominated the field of study – analyse IOs with a systematic and categorizing approach that accordingly tends to be less differentiated. Historians, on the other hand, have focused on specific institutions or

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2   Exemplary of new surveys and inventories are: M. Herren, Internationale Organisationen seit 1865. Eine Globalgeschichte der internationalen Ordnung, Darmstadt 2009; B. Reinalda (ed.), Routledge Handbook of International Organizations, London 2013; V. Bart, Internationale Organisationen und Kongresse, in: Europäische Geschichte Online, URL: http://www.ieg-ego.eu/barthv-2011-de URN: urn:nbn:de:0159-2011121203 (access on 27.01.2014); for widely discussed reinterpretations see: M. Mazower, Governing the World. The Rise and Fall of an Idea, 1815 to the Present, New York 2012.

3   The analysis of Jasmien van Daele on the International Labour Organization applies also to other IOs, see: J. v. Daele, Writing ILO Histories, in: idem/M. R. García/G. v. Goethem/M. v. d. Linden (eds.), ILO Histories. Essays on the International Labour Organization and its Impact on the World during the Twentieth Century, Bern 2010, pp. 13-39.

4   Among the first and widely heard critics is Akira Iriye, Global Community. The Role of International Organizations in the Making of the Contemporary World, Berkeley 2002.

5   S. Pederson, The Meaning of the Mandates System. An Argument, in: Geschichte und Gesellschaft 32 (2006) 4, pp. 560-82; idem, The Impact of League Oversight on British Policy in Palestine, in: R. Miller (ed.), Palestine, Britain and Empire. The Mandate Years, London 2010, pp. 39-65; D. Gorman, The Emergence of International Society in the 1920s, Cambridge 2012; S. Amrith/G. Sluga, New Histories of the UN, in: Journal of World History 19 (2008) 3, pp. 251-274; D. Laqua (ed.), Internationalism Reconfigured. Transnational Ideas and Movements between the World Wars, London 2011; M. Mazower, No Enchanted Palace. The End of Empire and the Ideological Origins of the United Nations, Princeton 2009.

6   I. Schröder, Die Wiederkehr des Internationalen. Eine einführende Skizze, in: Zeithistorische Forschungen 8 (2011) 3, pp. 340-349.

7   S. Kott, Les organisations internationales, terrains d'étude de la globalisation. Jalons pour une approche socio-historique, in: Critique internationale 52 (2011) 3, pp. 11-16; G. Sluga, Editorial. The Transnational History of International Institutions, in: Journal of Global History 6 (2011) 2, pp. 219-222; that special issues publishes articles coming out of conference entitled "Towards the Transnational History of International Organizations. Methodology / Epistemology, held in 2009 in Cambridge, United Kingdom.

periods and continuities in the development. The majority of both only hesitantly look beyond Europe and the US. Also, particular approaches tend to neglect transformation of time and the role of "non-Western"[8] actors and organizations; for example, consider research that combines the analysis of international relations, public administration, or organization sociology to emphasise internal dynamics of IOs as bureaucracies.[9]

While there are works that trace shifts in the agendas of IOs and driving actors, like the ones by Sunil Amrith and Thomas Fischer, they usually focus on one specific IO.[10] Studies with a more general outlook are rare, like Susan Zimmermann's contribution or the most recently compiled contributions in the *Oxford Handbook of the History of International Law*.[11] One of the reasons for this situation is the serious difficulty for any interest in the spaces to manoeuvre and actions of non-Western delegates and experts, which is caused by the argument that internationalism served the preservation of a Western-centred world order in changing global circumstances. Especially scholars working with approaches from postcolonial studies reason that IOs institutionalized and perpetuated global imbalances, veiled by a discourse portraying them as neutral players who altruistically sought to improve the world. They are seen as being established to maintain and globally enforce values, norms, patterns, and standardized rules of European origin, based on the analysis of the emergence of international law – out of which IOs originated – and its close linkage to imperial power.[12] Later, these institutional novelties aimed at

8   The term "West" is used to indicate North American and (West) European shared belief systems and practices, although they are constructions and ascriptions, which often enough were instrumental to differentiate oneself from the "other", "non-western". By no means do we intend to substantiate a belief in the imagination of a world divided into West/East or North/South.

9   See J. Ege/M. E. Bauer, International bureaucracies from a Public Administration and International Relations perspective, in: B. Reinalda, Routledge Handbook of International Organization (2), pp. 135-148; S. R. Brechin/G. D. Ness, Looking Back at the Gap. International Organizations as Organizations Twenty-Five Years Later, in: Journal of International Organizations Studies 4 (2013) 2, special issue on "Sociological Perspectives on International Organizations and the Construction of Global Order", edited by M. Koch and S. Stetter, pp. 14-39; J. Trondal/M. Marcussen/T. Larsson/F. Veggeland, Unpacking International Organisations.The Dynamics of Compound Bureaucracies, Manchester 2010; M. Barnett/M. Finnemore, Rules for the World. International Organizations in Global Politics, Ithaca 2004.

10   S. Amrith, Decolonizing International Health. India and Southeast Asia, 1930-65, Basingstoke 2006; T. Fischer, Die Souveränität der Schwachen. Lateinamerika und der Völkerbund, 1920-1936, Stuttgart 2012; see also: M. Connelly, Taking of the Cold War Lens. Visions of North-South-Conflict during the Algerian War of Independence, in: American Historical Review 105 (2000) 3, pp. 739-769; v. Daele et. al., ILO Histories (3); T. Shepard, Algeria, France, Mexico, UNESCO. A Transnational History of Anti-racism and decolonialization, 1932-1962, in: Journal of Global History 6 (2011) 2, pp. 273-297; C. Stolte, Bringing Asia to the World. Indian Trade Unionism and the long Road towards the Asiatic Labour Congress, 1919–37, in: Journal of Global History 7 (2012) 2, pp. 257-278; R. Leemann, Entwicklung als Selbstbestimmung. Die menschenrechtliche Formulierung von Selbstbestimmung und Entwicklung in der UNO, 1945-1986, Göttingen 2013. Not taken into consideration by us is the long tradition of comparing cultures/civilizations, which has come under criticism for good reasons: M. Espagne, Comparison and Transfer, in: M. Middell/L. Roura (eds.), Transnational Challenges to National History Writing, Basingstoke 2013, pp. 36-53; on the neglect of extra-European thought and scholarship in political science/international relations see: R. Shilliam (ed.), International Relations and Non-Western Thought. Imperialism, Colonialism and Investigations of Global Modernity, London 2010.

11   S. Zimmermann, GrenzÜberschreitungen. Internationale Netzwerke, Organisationen, Bewegungen und die Politik der globalen Ungleichheit vom 17. bis zum 21. Jahrhundert, Wien 2010, pp. 187-211; B. Fassbender/A. Peters/S. Peter/D. Högger (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of the History of International Law, Oxford 2013.

12   M. Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations. The Rise and Fall of International Law 1870-1960, Cambridge

and were successful in perpetuating old patterns of thought and imaginings of order. When, after World War I, colonization had come under attack and the principle of national self-determination was established, which later led to the independence of many new states outside of Europe and the US,[13] direct control by Western powers had only been replaced by indirect rule. This was effectuated not the least through the Western-based international institutions and rules, mostly set up long before the new states could have a say in their formulation. Even for the time after decolonization, it is claimed that IOs helped to stabilize unequal power relations.[14]

Without doubt, they were, and still are, interest-driven and thus prone to serve particular concerns. Moreover, certainly for a long time their internal mechanisms and distributions of power have hindered even a rough representation of demands from different parts the world while imperialist structures and dynamics continued in these institutions.[15] On the one hand criticism of colonialism and Eurocentrism increased considerably after the end of the First World War;[16] on the other hand, IOs were increasingly conceived as means of "gaining access to international politics through the back door of internationalism" as well as membership as an indication of the status in global politics.[17] It would be surprising if both trends did not bring change. Would one not assume that

2002; A. Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty, and the Making of International Law, Cambridge 2004; idem, Hegemonic International Law in Retrospect, in: P. H. F. Bekker/R. Dolzer/M. Waibel (eds.), Making Transnational Law Work in the Global Economy, Cambridge 2010, pp. 19-33; T. Kayaoglu, Legal Imperialism, Sovereignty and Extraterritoriality in Japan, the Ottoman Empire, and China, Cambridge 2010. That non-Western actors nonetheless shaped international law is shown for instance: B. Rajagopal, International Law from Below. Development, Social Movements and Third World Resistance, Cambridge 2003; A. Anghie/B. Chimni/K. Mickelson/O. Okafor (eds.), The Third World and International Order. Law, Politics and Globalization, Leiden 2004.

13   Erez Manela, The Wilsonian Moment. Self-Determination and the International Origins of Anticolonial Nationalism, Oxford 2007; J. Fisch, Das Selbstbestimmungsrecht der Völker. Die Domestizierung einer Illusion, München 2010.

14   The issue of the persistence of Western universalism and hegemonic pursuit is discussed particularly intensive for the field of human rights, see among others: G. Gott, Imperial Humanitarianism. History of an Arrested Dialectic, in: B. E. Hernández-Truyol (ed.), Moral Imperialism. A Critical Anthology, in New York 2002, pp. 19-38. On Western, socialist, and anti-colonial traditions in the legitimization of human rights, see: S.-L. Hoffmann (ed.), Moralpolitik. Geschichte der Menschenrechte im 20. Jahrhundert, Göttingen 2010 (published in English as "Human Rights in the Twentieth Century" Cambridge 2011).

15   Michael Geyer and Charles Bright, for example, argue that in the course of the 19th century old metaphors of European expansion such as "thrust" and "projection" were replaced by "webbing" and "enveloping". Supported by new technologies, the telegraph, later the radio and telephone, transnational regimes of power emerged, which were facilitated though the creation of communication-based control systems, like the gold standard or international maritime law. These systems – which encompassed the world in global circles of power – served as the key of a "new" European imperialism that passed from the mere extension of direct rule to a lasting organization of the "others" in global monitoring systems. Via that way the European-Atlantic world became "the West" and got its status of a centring axis in an integrating world – integrating not the least through international organizations, see: M. Geyer/ C. Bright, World History in a Global Age, in: American Historical Review 100 (1995) 4, pp. 1034-1060, p. 1047-48.

16   M. Adas, Contested Hegemony. The Great War and the Afro-Asian. Assault on the Civilizing Mission Ideology, in: Journal of World History 15 (2004) 1, pp. 31-63; C. Aydin, The Politics of Anti-Westernism in Asia. Visions of World Order in Pan-Islamic and Pan-Asian Thought New York 2007.

17   M. Herren, Governmental Internationalism and the Beginning of a New World Order in the Late Nineteenth Century", in: M. H. Geyer/J. Paulmann (eds.), The Mechanics of Internationalism. Culture, Society, and Politics from the 1840s to the First World War, Oxford 2001, pp. 121-144, p. 125.

given these circumstances actors from Africa, Asia, and Latin America began to enter and appropriate IOs, also for working against the dominance of representatives from Western Europe and the US?

An example for a gradual redistribution of power and thus change is the case of the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), which is also dealt with in this special issue. With regards to "world cultural heritage", the previously dominating universalistic approach in the selection of qualified sites has given way to an awareness and appreciation of particularity. Nowadays, awarding the title and allocating the funds is meant to enable states to maintain their cultural sites themselves and not to do the preservation for them, as has hitherto been the case, which is in line with a clear-cut paternalism and self-understanding of having a civilizing mission. While the concept and practice of world cultural heritage had been confined to Europe when it was established, in the context of decolonization it was opened up. At the beginning, it was in the form of "development aid" for the preservation of cultural sites in other world regions; since the late 1960s, however, the notions of "civilization" and "culture" were pluralized and a serious effort towards a representation of (presumably) all cultures arose. Similar decentralization processes took place in connection to big projects for an internationally authorized Scientific and Cultural History of Mankind or the project on Mutual Appreciation of Eastern and Western Cultural Values, which demonstrate the changes of the organization.[18]

Against this background, we engaged the dynamics of change and the role of actors from non-European regions in these shifts have played. To do this, we looked across institutions, that is to say, we took different IOs into consideration. The issue is obviously closely linked to membership structures. Without participation from these parts of the world, there is no influence from the seeming "margins". Fortunately, the situation is encouraging – in terms of official representation as well as in regard to the composition of the secretariats – decolonisation, particularly since the 1960s, has led to a much more globally representative membership in IOs.

With such empirical evidence and the neglect of the literature, we began to explore the extent to which policies, programmes, and internal regulations were transformed due to the increasing involvement of actors from non-Western world regions. We also considered the resistance their initiatives met, how they succeeded or failed in terms of more visibility of their own concerns, larger spaces to manoeuvre, and decisions for redistribution of resources, which all together led towards a decentring of IOs. At the Third European Congress on World and Global History in 2011, we could discuss these issues at a panel, which was made possible through the support of the Centre for Area Studies at the University of Leipzig – our warmest thank for that. The presentations of

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18   A. Rehling, Universalismen und Partikularismen im Widerstreit. Zur Genese des UNESCO-Welterbes, in: Zeithistorische Forschungen 8 (2011) 3, pp. 414-436; N. Braun, Globales Erbe und Regionales Ungleichgewicht. Repräsentationsprobleme der UNESCO-Welterbe-Liste, Hamburg 2007; L. E. Wong, Relocating East and West. UNESCO's Major Project on the Mutual Appreciation of Eastern and Western Cultural Values, in: Journal of World History, 19 (2008) 3, pp. 349-374.

the speakers we invited and the comments by Madeleine Herren, Sandrine Kott, and Corinne Pernet who joined the discussion were so stimulating that we set out with our colleagues to publish them.[19]

In the following section, we want to introduce the contributions and highlight the core findings in hope of instilling some curiosity and interest to read further.

Klaas Dykmann argues that the founding and further development of international organizations was fuelled by civilizing motives. The guiding principle "to do good" and "to make the world a better place" lies at the heart of IOs. In the beginning, it reflected the longing for progress and modernity as much as the belief in a natural superiority of Western, secular, and technocratic techniques of governance and solutions to global or border-transcending problems. Dykmann points out, however, that although Western civilizing missions remained a core feature and an elementary, often unconscious, driving force, a considerable change took place during the 20th century that also transformed IOs to some extent. First, non-Western IO members subscribed to the dominant civilization discourse in and propagated by these institutions. At least since the 1950s and 1960s, however, competing and contradictory civilizing missions coexisted. Non-Western actors "were certainly not only recipients of civilizing missions, but also contributed to the continuous change of this powerful concept" (p. 39) by appropriating the cause for their own concerns and by developing their own versions.

The second article deals with organized internationalism after WW I, focused on international women's movements and the impact of women from non-Western world regions. Examining the International Council of Women (ICW) and the International Alliance of Women (IAW), Leonie Rörich depicts a remarkable shift away from a European-North American-centred, universalist, and imperialistic outlook towards a more balanced perspective, receptive of the constellations feminists in other world regions were confronted with. The move reveals itself in the expansion into the non-Western world; both organizations admitted branches in Latin America, Asia, the Middle East, and Africa. Evidently, they did so on the grounds of a civilizing ambition or claimed responsibility for the concerns of women in the colonies. Still, the greater inclusiveness was consequential. A reconsideration of the exclusionary membership policy began, leading towards a changed admission policy for women associations from countries without full political sovereignty. It also was expressed in broader agendas and activities, especially in terms of addressing a variety of nation-specific feminist issues (visible in the adoption of resolutions on child marriage and polygamy). Added to that space, the criticism of imperialism was opened up, Western notions of feminism could be rejected directly, and Orientalist stereotypes and misrepresentations could be countered. These changes caused a culturally more diverse participation at the congresses of the ICW and IAW, and pluralized the composition of their internal bodies, all the way up to the execu-

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19   We are very glad that the manuscript has been accepted by Comparativ and grateful for the continuous support and patience of Forrest Kilimnik; without his carefully editing what follows would have looked quite different.

tive level, which Rörich traces in detail for the representation of Indian women. At the same time, she looks at the development of the three Indian women's organization of the time. All of them acted self-confidently in the ICW and IAW, presenting their own situation and policies as instruction for others. In response to the different religions they had to deal with, they imagined an Indian sisterhood and the idea of intercultural convergence, which they sought to insert into the international debates. By portraying such an All-India feminist unity as a variation of "inter-nationalism", they also redefined established notions. In general, they perceived themselves as shapers of the international scene, which is exhibited in their work towards a new feminist internationalism, their global agendas, and internationalization strategies. In parallel, Indian activists initiated regional cooperation and built connections to like-minded groups in European, Latin American, and Arab countries, which leads Rörich to conclude that the Indian women's movement possessed multiple scales and addressed simultaneously local, regional, national, and international concerns, which cautions against equating feminism between the world wars with European thinking and acting. To the contrary, feminist internationalisms were made in different parts of the world and in the context of trans-imperial and transnational networks.

The next four articles look at IOs of the second half of the 20th century, emphasising the 1960s and 1970s as period of transition, particularly for the shaping power of actors from Africa, Asia, and Latin America.

Chloé Maurel analyses the actors' influence and collaboration in UNESCO, as well as the resulting opening of the organization towards their demands and broadened scope of action. While European countries and the US initially dominated the membership and pursued policy, this changed rapidly. Many Latin American countries joined UNESCO in the first years after its establishment, in the early 1950s an Asian-African group established itself, soon followed by other coalitions. In the next decade, the decolonization processes turned the nominal share of Western members in the General Assembly upside down. In multifold ways, non-European representatives pressed that their concerns would be respected and that their interests would be served. In this process, the world outside of Europe and US gained prominence, visible already in the selection of meeting places of the yearly, later biennially General Conferences, as well as, even if to a lesser extent the elections of Director-General. Essential for the impact on and redirection of the UNESCO's agenda and programme was, according to Maurel, collaboration. As early as in 1948, joint action for common concerns began. Although it met fierce resistance, it achieved some of its goals and had institutional effects, such as the establishment of regional offices or the extension of official and working languages. In the 1960s even a collective endeavour to transform UNESCO into an "instrument of cultural decolonization" could be observed, for which an increased spending on projects in the newly independent states and a better representation in the Executive Board was requested, and partially granted. The fight for larger recognition and better status was flanked by a commonly voiced criticism, particularly of an unbalanced world regional representation in the secretariat and in the expert delegations, which were sent to non-Western coun-

tries. United action of members from Latin America, Asia, and Africa reached its peak in the late 1960s and 1970s, thereafter frictions and conflicting interest came to the fore. Nevertheless, a thorough shift in UNESCO's approach to cultural diversity remained, which the article shows by retracing the engagement in Africa. Whereas initially projects offering development aid dominated more and more, an appreciation of African culture, and thus a recognition of cultural diversity, held sway. Increasingly, the budget for the region was used to collect and preserve indigenous and threatened cultural manifestations, as well as to facilitate the knowledge production in Africa and its past in Africa itself, which reflects a rising sensitivity to the positionality of research and politics. In sum, Maurel concludes that "non-Western member states have progressively taken ownership of UNESCO, helped to decentre internal structures, and globalized policies and programmes, thus triggering significant changes in the direction of diminished command by the large powers from Europe and the US" (p. 92).

Policy adaptation besides the rising importance of actors and knowledge production outside of Europe for programmes of IOs are also addressed by Claudia Prinz, who deals with the international health agenda and global disease control programmes, in particular with the control of diarrhoeal diseases, one of the top priorities in international health and health-oriented development aid since the late 1970s. In her detailed reconstruction, she clarifies firstly that shifts in health politics result less from the disease and biomedical progress per se, but are more driven by the institutional settings in which respective research and politics are undertaken. Usually a multiplicity of actors is involved, ranging in the case of diarrhoea from the World Health Organization (WHO), to US and bilateral aid donors as well as numerous national governments, to research institutions in South Asia. An important role is also played by border-crossing institutional collaboration, involving researchers located in the global South, which is exemplified by the John Hopkins International Center for Medical Research, Calcutta and the Pakistan-SEATO, Cholera Research Laboratory, Dhaka – both instrumental in the development of the Oral Rehydration Therapy (ORT), which was made the foundation of a Special Programme for Diarrhoeal Diseases Control (CDD), globally promoted by the WHO, UN International Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF), UN Development Programme (UNDP) and the World Bank. Secondly, Prinz highlights the inherent tension between universalizing claims and the reassertion of local diversity in the formulation of a global "development" programme, which originates from the mutual constituency of locally and globally produced knowledge, local and global power, and the politics of health. Thirdly, the article calls attention to the impact of local knowledge and expertise on international programmes and policies by detailing the history of ORT. While the international development community was enthusiastic about this technology and treatment, the medical community in the many "developing countries", later also the persons responsible for the national diarrhoeal diseases control programmes, was rather sceptical. In this constellation, the authority of regionally generated and legitimized knowledge grew. Illustrative is International Center for Diarrhoeal Disease Research, Bangladesh, which became a major factor in the CDD. Staffed largely by Bangladeshi, it promoted

a regional perspective, operated globally, while it was also a transnational intersection, bringing researchers from epistemological cultures together and enabling multidirectional knowledge transfers.

The article by Changavalli Siva Rama Murthy leads into again a different arena, namely the Non-Aligned-Movement (NAM) and its shaping power of IOs, especially of the UN from the 1960s to 1970s. Here the role of non-European actors is addressed most explicitly, though in a different way, as influence from outside rather than from inside. The basic finding is clear and sharp: NAM was a notable source of transformation and strengthening of contemporary IOs despite its heterogeneous nature and different directions. Murthy subscribes most clearly to the above-mentioned research position that IOs were created by West Europeans and US-Americans, incorporated their values, and advanced their foreign policy interests. He thus considers the purposes of NAM countries as largely different from the interests of the US and its European allies, and consequently emphasises that NAM members countered the "Western dominance" in IOs by engaging with them instead of keeping themselves out. Their commitment arose from their appreciation of the normative power of IOs, i.e., their capability to establish rules of conduct and principles of accountability for all states, their view of IOs as useful devices to preserve freedom and peace, as well as to promote progress and justice. In terms of the concrete impact, the article highlights that NAM countries enhanced the democratic legitimacy of the UN, among others, by pushing the principle of universal membership, which was only adopted in 1964. Furthermore, they undercut the manoeuvring capacity of the "Western countries" and exploited their voting strength, for example, in the negotiations leading to the adoption of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in 1966. And they worked towards the reform of key structures of the UN, as visible in the initiatives leading to the addition of four non-permanent seats to the Security Council or to the threefold increase in membership of the Economic and Social Council. Their transformative role is demonstrated most strongly in two key policy areas: economic development and the control of armed conflicts through peacekeeping missions. The article notes, however, a second general line of the combined efforts of the developing countries, which was to achieve policy reorientations favouring their aspirations and interests, resulting, among others, in the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, new agendas taken up by the UN General Assembly and some of its specialized agencies, as well as new initiatives of the world.

The theme issue closes with an essay by Craig N. Murphy who discusses the International Organization for Standardization (ISO), the peak association of a global network of volunteers – private companies, experts, and national standard-setting bodies – who set international product standards. Together with its forerunner, the International Electrotechnical Commission, it has been the main facilitator of agreements on industrial standards, meant to create the needed infrastructure for a growing global economy. Murphy makes two arguments: Firstly, he reveals that ISO's current global legitimacy emerges from a long-standing and progressive inclusion of non-Europeans and representatives of colonized societies, despite the fact that ISO service to industrial economies played a ma-

jor role. In fact, from the beginning the movement of engineers and applied scientists for global standards was multi-regional and multi-racial, not the least due to its close connection to the electrical industry and the central role of Japan in that field. After World War I, (national) standardization bodies were founded increasingly outside of Europe, which gradually began to collaborate with ISO. That process was spurred in the 1950s by the UN and it technical assistance programmes, which often provided an advisor who helped local engineers establish a national industrial standard-setting body. Reacting to that, ISO began subsidizing these new institutions in the decade to follow. Secondly, Murphy sketches a fundamental change of ISOs interest from creating industrial standards to management systems, and since the end of the Cold War to standards for environmental protection and corporate social responsibility (including human rights, labour, etc.). With this shift, ISO increasingly addressed issues in which its non-Western members had a stake. Even more, many non-European firms and activists promoted environmental and social regulatory standards referring to broader concerns then those Western activists had in mind. This turned the organization into a prime place for negotiation, which again made its standard setting more global. Thus, Murphy concludes that "while the world's 'non-Western' majority may not have fully appropriated the ISO, they have become influential actors within it, working with its executive leadership to make fundamental changes in the organization's focus that may have a significant influence on the global political economy" (p. 138).

All in all, with this issue we hope to inspire research on IOs that explores the growing importance of these institutions in terms of their change, in particular due to the growing range of actors from increasingly different backgrounds and origins who appropriated them. We argue that the more diversified membership made possible open criticism and unequivocal protest against Eurocentric attitudes and regulations, which could grow at times into the formulation of counterproposals; being significant in the respective negotiation. Many different interests were at play and their concurrence explains – not alone but to a considerable extent – why IOs have become significant players. Uncovering the agency and changing potential of the only seeming "margins"[20] helps, in our view, to counter the construction of centres and peripheries, which is implicit in many accounts focusing on the limits of African, Latin American, and Asian voices in IOs. Admittedly, the historical and thorough empirical[21] perspectives that our colleagues and we take up complicate the matter. The impact and shaping power of non-European actors the articles present are always time-, place- and context-dependent. Still, maybe precisely because of that, they tell a fascinating process of decentring and renewal, hard-fought and with clear limits.

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20   We use the notion "margins" only to express the perceived perspective of non-Western regions and actors in the predominantly Western IOs.

21   For the challenge to reconstruct global historical processes from the archive due to the dominating national organization and collection archival material, and the potential of the archives of international organisations, see: E. Rothschild, The Archives of Universal History, in: Journal of World History 19 (2008) 3, pp. 375-401.

Also, beyond the concrete question addressed here, the articles can give encouragement, among others, for a well-needed historicizing of a widespread but problematic concept. Especially in political science, international organizations as a field of study has been somewhat replaced by the notion of global governance. However, global governance already existed in the 19th century with the increasing number of unions, commissions, professional networks, etc.[22] The concept emerged in the early 1990s as a response to the UN's failure to become a "global government" in the aftermath of the East-West conflict between the capitalist West and the Soviet Union. The notion sums up policy areas that the UN supports –human rights, democracy (after 1989), environment, etc. – but regards many stakeholders –states, IOs, NGOs, civil society, private sector, etc.– to be accountable in guaranteeing the responsible management of global problems, challenges, and flows. In the words of the first political science pioneers in the field, it meant above all to secure worldwide "governance" in times without a global government. This notion of "governance without government"[23] somehow diverges attention from organizations and actors, and their weaknesses, towards policy areas. Global governance thus promises a more positive connotation, even though the old actors and organizations are naturally essential participants as well. Is global governance consequently an artificial notion that describes what has already been out there before? Old wine in new bottles? A charming advantage of global governance is that it blurs the Western agents, even though the implied concepts and policies are by and large similarly Western-centric. One may argue that the invention of global governance served as a distraction from the Western-centric international organizations towards more globally legitimate policy areas. Global governance helped to simultaneously de- and re-institutionalize at the same time the Western world order built on controlling IOs. It can be interpreted as an actor-less reinvention of a regulating and defining power, which similarly to the UN in 1945 was based on Western values and concepts. This undermines the decentralization and "globalization" of international organizations, which we will describe with some examples in this issue. De- and re-institutionalization means that the central institutions – for example, for health (the World Health Organization), labour issues (the International Labor Organization), or food (the Food and Agriculture Organization) – now compete with other institutions such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Trade Organization as well as private funds for health or development and ear-marked programmes within organizations. This leads to a greater interconnectedness and complexity of actors and resources, and it further blurs responsibility and transparency, which may help to maintain old power structures. In other words, global governance helps to re-establish mostly Western-dominated power structures by weakening the now more globally representative (read: less Western) traditional IOs and establishing a new, less visibly insti-

22   M. Herren, Internationale Organisationen (2); C. N. Murphy, International Organization and Industrial Change. Global Governance since 1850, New York 1994.
23   J. N. Rosenau/E.-O. Czempiel, Governance without Government. Order and Change in World Politics, Cambridge 1992.

tutionalized system of global governance that appears more globally legitimate. While global governance scholars often focus on specific areas in narrowly defined time periods, we would need a history of world government(s) and an actor-centred world ordering since the 19th century, which also looks at non-European concepts. We think the contributions in our special issue can also provide some insights in this regard.

Only With the Best Intentions: International Organizations as Global Civilizers

Klaas Dykmann

RESÜMEE

Internationale Organisationen sind aus einem Drang zur Weltverbesserung entstanden. Daher werden sie sowohl von ihren Gründern als auch von zahlreichen Forschern als Institutionen angesehen, die dem Weltfrieden dienen und den technologischen Fortschritt selbst in entfernteste Regionen bringen oder auf andere Weise die Welt „sicherer", „gesünder" bzw. schlicht „besser" machen. In all diesen Zuschreibungen steckt die Annahme, dass die Welt durch sie zu einem „zivilisierteren" Ort werde. Daher argumentiere ich, dass Internationale Organisationen als Akteure einer „universalen Zivilisierungsmission" gedeutet werden können. Die Charakterisierung als ,globale Zivilisierer' denkt neuere Forschungen weiter, die sich von Studien zum Kolonialismus und ,civilizing missions' inspirieren lassen, und trägt zu einem tieferen Verständnis der Institutionen bei. Der Aufsatz veranschaulicht diesen Interpretationsansatz anhand des internationalen Beamtentums, der Menschenrechtspolitik der UN sowie des Einflusses nicht-„westlicher" Konzepte auf die zivilisierende Rolle. Insofern entwickelt er ideengeschichtliche Hintergründe von Dynamiken in Internationalen Organisationen.

The emergence and massive increase of international organizations (IOs) since the mid-19th century, which has led to a system of "global governance", has inspired much research and produced many explanations. In the more recent discussion, a critical consideration has been dominant that deconstructs two highly normative characterizations, namely that these institutions mitigated often violent conflicts since the middle of the 19th century and helped the "world community" make use of the potential emerging from increasing worldwide interactions. Examples of the first dimension range from the Hague Peace Conventions (1899 and 1907), the Red Cross to the International Court of Justice (1945) and the human rights documents since the Universal Declaration (1948) up to

the International Criminal Court (2002). Examples of the second motivation include the standardization of technology, the harmonization of world trade regulations, as well as global health politics and the concern for "development cooperation". From different angles, it is argued today – as detailed in the introduction of this issue – that IOs were powerful instruments for the European powers and the US to maintain their hegemonic positions. They institutionalized and perpetuated global imbalances, veiled by a discourse that presented them as being neutral players altruistically seeking to improve the world. This legitimizing self-characterization was built upon the idea of a civilizing mission that proved to be enduring, actually guiding their politics up to the present. While true, little recognised as of yet is that the missionary character changed in response to the fact that IOs become more global over time, both in terms of their memberships and in regard to their agendas. Added to that, "non-Western"[1] actors appropriated the IOs for their own concerns, often through internal conflict, thereby transforming their guiding ideas. This argument will be presented in six parts: First, an introductory part providing an overview of what the concept "civilizing mission" means and how it can be employed in the study of IOs. It is followed by an analysis of the international civil service and human rights in the UN system. Afterwards, the article presents the role of civilizing ideas developed by non-Western actors, and, lastly, the concept of "global governance" will be discussed.

Civilized, Barbarians and Civilizing Missions

The conceptual problem of the notion "civilization" is, as Mazlish accurately holds, that neither a clear-cut definition nor a universal acceptance thereof exists. In addition, civilization is often compared with or even considered equal to the concepts of "culture", "modernity" or progress,[2] which further blurs the notion's content. The concept of civilization emerged during the Enlightenment "as part of the European imaginary", even though the dichotomy between civilized and barbarian can be traced back to the Greek view during the Persian War in the 5th century BC, which was followed by the Romans and medieval Europeans.[3] The concept's definition shows a high level of complexity and imprecision, and is "inextricably imbricated with other categories by which historical materials are organized, such as culture, nation and race".[4] It is important to emphasise that in European – and other world – regions different understandings of "civilization" competed with each other; a clear-cut "European civilization" hardly exists, but rather

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1   In this article, the notion of the "West" is only used as a working concept that typically entails North American, (West) European and other European settler colonies' shared belief systems, even though these are only constructions and ascriptions, which were both, used to differentiate these from "other", "non-western" (The "West" and the "Rest") conceptions as well as adopted and modified by the latter. By no means does the use of the word include a belief in the dichotomic imagination of a world subdivided into west/east or North/South.

2   See B. Bowden, The Empire of Civilization: The Evolution of an Imperial Idea, Chicago 2009, chapter 3.

3   B. Mazlish, Civilization and its Contents, Stanford 2004, pp. xiii, 1, 2, 4.

4   A. Al-Azmeh, 'Civilization, Concept and History of', in: International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences, 2001, p. 1903.

constitutes a construct that was used to define "Europe" against other non-European regions. This means that in this article the notion of "civilization" as such and "European civilization" in particular shall be understood as mere constructions. Civilization was seen as a Eurocentric notion of the 18th century as well as "a universalistic measuring rod against which all societies could be compared. In regard to the former, this implied that non-European societies had to become like their European model, or at least as close as possible".[5] The conceptualization of the notion has notoriously focused mostly – if not exclusively – on Europe, even though others also thought of themselves as being different from "savages": for example, the Chinese as the Middle Kingdom, Romans embraced the Pax Romana, Arabs distinguished between city and nomads. Mazlish sees these self-images as being parallel to the European "civilization" concept. Also, other civilizations than the European one found recognition; however, explicitly or implicitly these were often regarded as possessing only "a second-class civilizational status" in comparison with the Western model. What made Europe different was its tendency to "expand and explore".[6] Racism was a normal element in the European discourse on civilization in the 19th century: "the supremacy of European civilization, as it defined itself against its own inner barbarians, but especially as it sought to subordinate to its rule the rest of the world – lesser peoples and civilizations – carried a simple explanation: racial superiority. The scientific explanation, of course, was also a justification, as well as a prescription to cure any possible feelings of guilt", even though there were critical voices as well.[7] In the end of the 19th century, "international lawyers integrated their nationalism in a larger, humanist version of European civilization, sometimes defining nationhood … in a cosmopolitan way, as an aggregate of, or political compact between, individuals."[8] Mazower also emphasises that Europeans saw their "civilization" as superior: "Granted the existence of very different cultures and societies around the world, what the lawyers did was to show how the idea of a standard of civilization could provide a criterion for determining global rank and appropriate diplomatic practice." Lawyers in the 19th century developed a sort of civilizational hierarchy: (1) civilized and half-civilized: Europeans and European settler colonies; (2) Barbaric powers like Ottomans and Chinese, exhibiting some state capacity; and (3) "savage" peoples in Africa and the Pacific.[9]

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5   B. Mazlish, Civilization and its Contents (3), p. 17.

6   Ibid., pp. 91, 17, 27.

7   "[T]he claim to the obvious superiority of European civilization was shaken both internally, by thinkers such as Mill, Freud, and Elias ... and externally by its world wars basically civil (although uncivilized) in nature. Nevertheless, for all practical purposes, until the end of World War II the notion of a superiority of European civilization largely prevailed. Even as a ghost, it exercised a kind of ghastly power." B. Mazlish, Civilization and its Contents (3), pp. 69-70, 92.

8   M. Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations: The Rise and Fall of International Law 1870–1960, Cambridge 2002, p. 63.

9   M. Mazower, Governing the World. The History of an Idea, New York 2012, p. 71; G.W. Gong, The Standard of 'Civilization' in International Society, Oxford 1984, p. 6.

The concept of civilization has mostly served political motives by establisheing an internal and external social hierarchy (internal barbarians within civilizations[10] and the "others" in colonial territories), while "another function of the concept of civilization is to represent an aspiration".[11] The common understanding – in the West – of the concept of civilization included a general refinement of the social order, advanced agricultural and industrial development, urbanity, professional specialization, a complex system of transport, and sophisticated economic, social and cultural structures.[12] Based on the colonial expansion and the related increase in power, Europe largely served as main reference for the idea of civilization, which suggested opposing models like the "civilized" (Europe) and the barbarians (other world regions). Bowden even speaks of an "Empire of Civilization" and holds that "the dominant architects of international society continue to be informed and influenced by a faith in the Enlightenment ideal of progress and humankind's universal linear march toward modernity that is universally liberal democratic, market capitalist, and cosmopolitan in appearance."[13] Cosmopolitanism was, however, only maintained by "the rational, civilized and universal West".[14]

Other civilizations, even those recognised by the West, such as the Chinese or Indian, have largely been ignored when it came to setting up structures of international organization, or as some label it today, global governance. This is the reason why it appears enriching to analyse historical and contemporary international organizations critically in order to identify the underlying concepts of a civilizing mission. As the bigger and better known IOs were mostly European or Western enterprises, at least in the beginning; the connection with both a colonial mindset and a humanistic attitude, particularly in European societies, seems to suggest that civilizing missions being carried out in European countries and toward non-European societies, also decisively influenced the very concept of international organizations.

Jürgen Osterhammel stresses two main features of modern civilizing missions. First, it needs a civilizer who is convinced of his superiority, or the general desirability of his plans, and expects that the recipients of these missions from the outside would basically welcome these endeavours.[15] Similar views – and this is the first point in understanding IOs as institutionalized and "internationalized" forms of civilizing missions – direct the policies of international organizations. To give one example, the first IOs of the 19th

10   M. B. Salter, Barbarians & Civilization in International Relations, London/Sterling 2002, pp. 19, 28-29, 53-54.

11   B. Mazlish, Civilization and its Contents (3), pp. 139-141.

12   Traditionally the works of Norbert Elias and Max Weber on the civilization process serve as main references, at least for the Western form of civilization. See also: L. Febvre, 'Évolution d'un mot et d'un groupe d'idées', in: idem et al., Civilization. Le mot et l'idée, Paris 1929; J. Goudsblom, 'Civilization. The Career of a Controversial Concept', in: History and Theory 45 (2006), pp. 288-297; B. Mazlish, 'Civilization in a Historical and Global Perspective', in: International Sociology 16 (2001) 3, pp. 293-300.

13   B. Bowden, Empire of Civilization (2), pp. 2, 3.

14   S. Bose / K. Manjapra (eds.), Cosmopolitan Thought Zones. South Asia and the Global Circulation of Ideas, London 2010, p. 8.

15   J. Osterhammel, "The Great Work of Uplifting Mankind". Zivilisierungsmission und Moderne, in: B. Barth / J. Osterhammel (eds.), Zivilisierungsmissionen, Konstanz 2005, p. 365.

century, the international public unions, initially dedicated to technical standardization (thus a seemingly "neutral" and "un-political" field[16]), served as the conservation of the Western norm and value system, which would henceforth determine, mostly unchallenged, international relations. Later such a role was played by specialized organizations such as the International Labour Organization (ILO), the World Health Organization (WHO) or international finance institutions. Their activities "are much more similar in terms of their expected impacts than the often almost impossible to unravel multitude of organizations would suggest. They all share the expectation that developing states will develop once they share the same attitudes to technology as the specialized agencies themselves".[17] Osterhammel's definition also corresponds to global inequality, which co-determined the creation and development of IOs.[18]

Wolfgang Schröder distinguishes between three main typologies of civilizing missions: (1) those within a state; (2) those which target societies in other states: and (3) civilizing missions that address the international system as a whole.[19] In the latter case, one finds IOs particularly present.

Admittedly, there is a problem in analysing the politics and programmes of IOs as civilizing projects. There is neither a "reference civilization" serving as a standard nor a uniform recipient culture. It is hard to tell whether rather British, French, Spanish, or US-American models of civilization were dominant when organized internationalism emerged. One can, however, assume that a "cosmopolitanized Western civilization" mixture emerged as a result of continuous negotiations, firstly dominated by British[20] and French cultural ideas, and later expanded mainly through North American models. This negotiated concept of "civilization" mirrored minimum standards, which served to identify which societies, peoples, and states qualified as participants of the "civilized community of peoples", be it members of an IO, or those who would attain membership after a transition to "civilization", or those who were put on the back burner and were expected to work hard before becoming part of the civilized club. Such a classification is particularly obvious in the preamble to the Covenant of the League of Nations, which speaks of "organised peoples" implying the existence of non-organized or less civilized

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16   Claude assumed that – in contrast to the maintenance of peace as major goal of the League of Nations and the UN – the first IOs could be characterized as "non-political". I. L. Claude Jr., Swords into Plowshares. The Problems and Progress of International Organization, New York, ⁴1971 (¹1956), p. 36. Reinalda, in contrast, appropriately attests as well that technical areas always have political implications. B. Reinalda, Routledge History of International Organizations. From 1815 to the Present Day, London et al. 2009, p. 335.

17   Reinalda, Routledge History of International Organizations (16), p. 338.

18   S. Zimmermann, 'International – transnational: Forschungsfelder und Forschungsperspektiven', in: B. Unfried / J. Mittag / M. van der Linden (eds.), Transnationale Netzwerke im 20. Jahrhundert, Vienna 2008, p. 46.

19   W. M. Schröder, Mission impossible? Begriff, Modelle und Begründungen der „civilizing mission" aus philosophischer Sicht, in: B. Barth / Osterhammel (eds.), Zivilisierungsmissionen, Konstanz 2005, p. 30.

20   A nice example for a civilising mission carried out by an NGO is the British Salvation Army whose activities outside of Europe are illustratively depicted by H. Fischer-Tiné, Global Civil Society and the Forces of Empire, in: S. Conrad / D. Sachsenmaier (eds.), Competing Visions of World Order. Global Moments and Movements, 1880s–1930s, New York et al., pp. 29-67.

peoples.[21] Minimum standards included the general acceptance of Western-designed international law and more specifically labour norms, health regulations, human rights, and environmental standards or criteria for the granting of International Monetary Fund loans. At least in the beginning, non-Western societies did not participate actively in these negotiation processes; instead they served as references for regions "to be civilized". Consequently, the applied notion of modernity seemed to be genuinely European.[22]

As unconscious and vague the Europeans' civilizing missions may have been, they were operating along such a line that was based on Western values, norms and patters, and standardized rules mostly of European origin. Western European and then North American-European or Western concepts shaped the goals, the structures, the organization, the power relations, and concrete design of policies within and through IOs. Examples would be international norms of weights and measures, telegraphic regulations or labour rights elaborated upon by the International Labour Organization, but also the notion that the League of Nations was mainly a US-inspired venture put into practice by Europeans and the United Nations (UN) was a project largely designed by the United States, which simultaneously carried on the British Empire to some extent.[23] The attribute "international" helped them to claim authority in the light of "neutrality" and "universality" as it was considered less driven by particularistic national interests and more by the belief in a common good. In the following section, I will illustrate my argument by going through the history of IOs.

International Organizations and their Universal Civilizing Missions

One major element in the establishment of IOs was the dedication to "improve the world".[24] This ambition coincided with the maintenance of a Western-dominated world order, even though this was not necessarily a conscious strategy but rather an implicit conviction that it would be the best to civilize the world with a Western blueprint in hand. It draws attention to the fact that a liberal idealism was at the heart of the founders' endeavours, which gave wings to many supporters of IOs who regarded them as universal keys to bring well-being to humanity, although non-Western perspectives and civiliza-

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21   B. Reinalda, Routledge History of International Organizations (16), p. 290.

22   This does not ignore the fact that other forms of modernity certainly influenced continuously the development of "Western modernity" and had a more direct impact on IOs since decolonization took off in the 1960s: S. Conrad / A. Eckert, Globalgeschichte, Globalisierung, multiple Modernen: Zur Geschichtsschreibung der modernen Welt, in: S. Conrad / A. Eckert / U. Freitag (eds.), Globalgeschichte. Theorien, Ansätze, Themen, Frankfurt a. M. et al. 2007, pp. 18, 19; S. Eisenstadt, Multiple Modernities, in: Daedalus, 129 (2000), pp. 1-30.

23   M. Mazower, No Enchanted Palace. The End of Empire and the Ideological Origins of the United Nations, Princeton 2009.

24   See A. L. S. Staples, The Birth of Development. How the World Bank, Food and Agriculture Organization, and World Health Organization Changed the World, 1945–1965, Kent (OH) 2006. "Clearly the international civil servants studied here viewed economic development in the Third World as a process that would improve the lives and standard of living of peoples by rationalizing and modernizing economies and states." Ibid., p. 1.

tions were largely ignored. One can describe that as a form of "enlightened colonialism"; their motives mirror benevolent Eurocentric patrimonialism.[25]

It is important to note that this mission was not necessarily aimed exclusively at non-Western societies, at least not in the beginning. From the Hague Peace conferences until the creation of the United Nations, "civilizing the world" meant first of all to pacify Europe and the West; "universal" meant European/Western and was only later extended to other world regions. The role of international law as a "gentle civilizer of nations", as elegantly put by Martti Koskenniemi, was decisive for European endeavours to avoid violent conflicts among countries and instead build institutions around international treaties to mediate non-violent solutions instead.[26] One of the most illustrative examples is the League of Nations, which represented the European desire to pacify the continent and civilize inter-European relations and thus also the behaviour of the respective peoples. Another is the civilization of international relations. If we interpret civilization as a synonym for a peaceful settlement of interpersonal conflicts within a society, then we see that this was transferred to international relations.[27] With this understanding, international agreements and organizations have become crucial instruments to civilize relations between nation-states and agencies to civilize others. The transformation of colonialism became highly influential in this regard, as it turned at the end of the 19th century more explicitly to civilizing missions that sought to make colonized people "fit to stand for themselves". After humanism in Europe contributed to the maturing idea that personal characteristics were not based on genetics but on sociocultural influences, a missionary belief developed that replaced the racist ideology of Europeans who considered themselves biologically superior compared with other peoples. This belief in a genetic superiority was substituted with the conviction of the cultural superiority of European civilization, although the former still continued as a principle, at least underneath the surface. According to this civilizing thought, non-Europeans also could profit from this European-made progress, one should only help them to get on the "right" track. Thus, European civilizing missions contained the idea to bring the people in the world closer to the "European" to improve themselves.[28] European civilizations, particularly the British under Queen Victoria, apparently seemed attractive to other societies, also outside of Europe.[29] The world fairs of the 19th century exposed the technical and cultural accomplishments of "civilization" and further showed "social, cultural and anthropological hierarchies", which downgraded less advanced "civilizations".[30]

25   K. S. Coates, A Global History of Indigenous Peoples. Struggle and Survival, Houndsmills et al. 2004, p. 194.
26   M. Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations (8).
27   See M. B. Salter, Barbarians & Civilization (10).
28   J. Osterhammel, "The Great Work of Uplifting Mankind" (15), p. 365.
29   "Der Import einer westliche[n] Idee von Zivilisiertheit, wie stark im einzelnen auch immer modifiziert, bedeutete stets eine Kritik einheimischer Traditionen, die einem solchen Standard nun nicht länger genügten. Daher war das Zivilisationskonzept nicht selten die Speerspitze einer einheimischen Kulturrevolution, die zugleich als innere Kolonisierung auftreten konnte." J. Osterhammel, "The Great Work of Uplifting Mankind" (15), p. 382.
30   M. H. Geyer / J. Paulmann, Introduction, in: M. H. Geyer / J. Paulmann (eds.), The Mechanics of Internationalism. Culture, Society, and Politics from the 1840s to the First World War, Oxford 2001, p. 6.

This paralleled a similar stance in the policies of IOs and international law that developed "standards of civilization".[31] After all, the attraction of European civilizations was transferred to the emerging system of international organization. The membership in an IO and thus the participation in the "community of nations" or "global community"[32] appeared desirable for many states, although this also led to repercussions on the condition of the domestic societies. In the 19th century, perceptions of "civilizing deficits" led to dichotomous categories such as "centre vs. periphery", static vs. dynamic, "backward cultures" vs. "advanced societies".[33] Simultaneously emerging international organizations accompanied this process, which elevated general standards of the "centre" as expressions of "progressive societies" to international norms.[34] IO member states ("Insiders") were considered to be progressive, advanced, inventive, while non-members ("Outsiders") were seen as mere receivers of input from the "Inside".[35] Madeleine Herren argues that besides the international public unions, forms of international intervention into the administrations of societies evolved that were regarded as a "uncivilized" or at best a "half-civilized" periphery from a European perspective.[36] Following this line of thought, IOs became civilizers of the world through, for example, human rights, development, fair trade relations, a civil conduct of armed conflicts, etc.

According to several authors, the first formulation of a European (in contrast to British or French) civilizing mission took place at the Berlin Conference in 1884/85, where the European colonial powers decided upon the fate of African territories.[37] Anghie and Gong also argue that a European civilizing mission was at the heart of evolving international law, starting in the 19th century. Gong points out that "[w]herever possible, the European countries sought to bring traditional, non-European countries into the international society in as orderly and humane a manner as possible." Anghie concludes that the League of Nations' mandate system, development concepts of the UN, and

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31 M. Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations (8); G. W. Gong, The Standard of 'Civilization'(9). See also B. Bowden, Empire of Civilization (2), chapter 5.

32 A. Iriye, Global Community. The Role of International Organizations in the Making of the Contemporary World, Berkeley et al. 2004.

33 "Ein Welt- und Geschichtsbild, das Zivilisierung als Aneignung moderner Kulturtechniken betrachtet, existierte gerade im 19. Jahrhundert neben einem, das in Zivilisierung die Voraussetzung für heilsgeschichtliche Erfüllung sah." J. Osterhammel, "The Great Work of Uplifting Mankind" (15), pp. 411, 393.

34 S. Conrad / D. Sachsenmaier, Competing Visions of World Order (20), p. 6.

35 "The basic model of diffusionism in its classical form depicts a world divided into the prime two sectors, one of which (Greater Europe, Inside) invents and progresses, the other of which (non-Europe, Outside) receives progressive innovations by diffusion from Inside." J. M. Blaut, The Colonizer's Model of the World. Geographical Diffusionism and Eurocentric History, New York/London 1993, p. 14.

36 M. Herren, Internationale Organisationen seit 1865: Eine Globalgeschichte der internationalen Ordnung, Darmstadt 2009, p. 19.

37 A. Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law, Cambridge et al. 2004, p. 90; M. Mazower, Governing the World (9), p. 72; G. W. Gong, The Standard of 'Civilization' (9), p. 6. Nevertheless, Jörg Fisch identifies the regulation of rivalries between colonial powers as the main reason for the "civilized" remarks in the General Act of the Berlin conference – less so truly civilizing ambitions. J. Fisch, Internationalizing Civilization by Dissolving International Society. The Status of Non-European Territories in Nineteenth-Century International Law, in: M. H. Geyer / J. Paulmann (eds.), The Mechanics of Internationalism. Culture, Society, and Politics from the 1840s to the First World War, Oxford 2001, pp. 251-2.

more recent efforts to define good governance follow same line.[38] Indeed, the influence of international lawyers was decisive in the establishment of "universal" norms defining "standards of civilization", whose attainment eventually allowed non-Western countries to enter the "international community" of peoples.[39]

In the mandate system, League of Nations member states supervised former German and Ottoman colonies in Africa, the Middle East, and the Pacific. These mandate territories were grouped into A, B and C mandates – according to the expected civilization potential.[40] Without a doubt, the system led to various forms of governance, degrees of self-determination, as well as mixed results regarding the successes and failures.[41] Nevertheless, the very intention of the mandate system creators reflects the purpose to civilize and/or maintain colonial power or influence. According to Mazower, the mandate system "extended imperial control in a less overt form. Nothing showed better the extent to which the League of Nations remained part of a worldview that took the virtues of empire for granted."[42] For Mark Salter, the mandate categories corresponded to the hierarchization of barbarians and savages.[43] Susan Zimmermann depicts the mandate policies of the League as a "specific form of reform-oriented internationalisation of colonialism".[44] One can extend that argument: the mandate system of the League of Nations that administered the colonial territories of the defeated war parties was guided by an "internationalized" civilizing mission. The former colonies were meant to be "released" into independence after a transition period when they were finally "civilized".[45] The mandate system included "the promise that any coercive rule existing under a liberal world order would be temporary, a station on the way toward an ethical kind of hegemony of the cosmopolitan bourgeoisie under which people everywhere would enjoy the riches – and the political voice – of the citizens in the powerful republics."[46]

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38   G. W. Gong, The Standard of 'Civilization' (9), p. 6; A. Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty (37).

39   S. Zimmermann, 'International – transnational' (18), p. 43.

40   "The Ottoman Middle East was carved up into 'A' mandates, where the mandatory powers (Britain in Iraq and Palestine, France in Syria and Lebanon) were merely to provide 'administrative advice and assistance' to peoples in theory soon to be granted self-government. Most of German Africa became 'B' mandates, which the mandatory power was to administer under a list of conditions, including that the territory be opened to commerce and the inhabitants protected in various ways." 'C' Mandates were in "remote" areas: Southwest Africa, German New Guinea, Western Samoa and some Pacific Islands. "The status of the 'C' mandates was particularly ambiguous: the Mandatory power was allowed to administer them 'as integral portions of its territory'. S. Pedersen, The Meaning of the Mandates System: An Argument, in: Geschichte und Gesellschaft, 32 (2006) 4, p. 561.

41   S. Pedersen, The Meaning of the Mandates System (40).

42   M. Mazower, Governing the World (9), p. 166.

43   M. B. Salter, Barbarians & Civilization (10), p. 88.

44   S. Zimmermann, 'International – transnational' (18), p. 43.

45   "To those colonies and territories which as a consequence of the late war have ceased to be under the sovereignty of the States which formerly governed them and which are inhabited by peoples not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world, there should be applied the principle that the well-being and development of such peoples form a sacred trust of civilisation and that securities for the performance of this trust should be embodied in this Covenant." Covenant of the League of Nations, Article 22.

46   C. Murphy, International Organization and Industrial Change. Global Governance since 1850, New York 1994, p. 210.

There is another facet. The mandate system enabled the colonial powers to transfer the moral burden of colonial administration to a technocratic, faceless bureaucracy: "as domestic public opposition to colonialism had eaten away the moral foundation of colonial empires, they were eager to find an alternative way of managing the administration of these territories in order to keep them open for trade and exploitation." Thus it legitimated development and the well-being of the "natives" as international principle, which marked the change from exploitative colonialism (imperialism) to cooperative colonialism, which, according to Rajagopal, is development.[47] While the 19th-century positivist international law authorized colonial exploitation, the mandate system pretended to guarantee their protection.[48] In general, civilizing missions have become a central element of colonialism since the end of the 19th century, which increasingly found expression in international organizations. The mandate system thus perpetuated (informal) colonialism by internationalizing the civilizing mission, while it also civilized colonial rule through its internationalization: "Internationalism was not the antithesis to empire but its civilizer".[49] Also Geyer and Paulmann emphasise that internationalists were "missionaries of civilization".[50]

Another illustrative example of civilizing missionary positions in the European interwar period is the conflict within the International Labour Organization on labour rights for persons in non-self-governing regions. The first ILO conference after World War I tackled the question whether international labour standards, with a strong reference to European industrial society, should also be applied in "overseas" areas. The colonial powers addressed this issue initially with a strongly restrictive attitude, which later on softened. It was a matter of "civilizing mission" to equip these workers with a part of labour norms. This provision became famous as the "colonial clause" of Article 35 of the ILO constitution. The colonial powers thus managed to install exceptions for their "overseas" territories from the international labour standards. In practice, the article served the colonial powers before World War II to enfeeble demands for a quicker implementation of these norms in the colonies.[51] So, these civilizing endeavours of IOs also had their limits when major powers' interests were affected. Put together, the whole of ILO conventions and recommendations are labelled the International Labour Code, which includes "a

47   B. Rajagopal, International Law from Below. Development, Social Movements and Third World Resistance, Cambridge et al. 2003, pp. 50, 52, 71.

48   A. Anghie, Colonialism and the Birth of International Institutions: Sovereignty, Economy, and the Mandate System of the League of Nations, in: New York University Journal of International Law and Politics, 34 (2002) 3, p. 515. Moreover, "the League was subordinate to the will of sovereign states. In the mandates, this relationship was reversed entirely. Here, international institutions, rather than being the product of sovereign states, were given the task of creating sovereignty out of the backward peoples and territories brought under the mandate regime." Ibid., pp. 544, 545.

49   M. Mazower, Governing the World (9), p. 167. See M. Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations (8), p. 170..

50   "Despite rival interpretations of what constituted the essence of civilization, debates among internationalists always converged on this topic, which held out the promise of unifying modern societies, if not the world." M. H. Geyer / J. Paulmann, Introduction (30), p. 9.

51   D. Maul, Menschenrechte, Sozialpolitik und Dekolonisation. Die Internationale Arbeitsorganisation (IAO) 1940–1970, Essen 2007, pp. 37-38.

many-sided international standardization in the fields of labour, social insurance and other topics related to the welfare state." The ILO's labour standards mainly followed the models in democratic and industrialized societies of Western Europe and North America, including the existence and influence of particular interest groups such as trade unions, company federations, and women's organizations.[52]

When the United Kingdom and France, in particular, saw the League as increasingly impotent in fighting the rise of fascism and Nazi Germany's aggressiveness, the delegated and universalized civilizing mission was taken back to London, Paris, and eventually Washington. The war propaganda employed rhetoric of "civilizing the fascist barbarians". The UN was then designed to restore the lost faith in (Western) civilization after two massive wars and the Holocaust,[53] and should eventually achieve what the League failed to do: to civilize Europe and the world.

After World War II, direct European control over the colonies could no longer be justified, although the colonial powers needed another two decades to accept this. The new international system was more subtle but still represented an indirect version of the old one.[54] Koskenniemi points out that the "sacred trust of civilization", represented in the mandate system, replaced formal European imperialism "as the perspective from which international law conceived Europe's outside", which then was substituted by the trusteeship system of the UN.[55] Zimmermann describes the UN Trusteeship Council – that by and large continued the mandate system of the League – and the development policy of the United Nations as elements of a forward-looking strategy. According to this strategy, the "international community" was composed of many participants that committed themselves to "particular Western universal basic values".[56]

Obviously, growth in number of international actors, especially in the 1960s, challenged the Eurocentric dominance.[57] Particularly, the US feared a demographic menace to Western civilization, a "Malthusian nightmare": "Worried at the prospects of being swamped by 'Oriental civilization,' the United States would forestall this [Western model of development], not through the race war Hitler had forecast but rather by Westernizing the colonial world."[58] The old ideas needed to be mediated between old colonial powers and the newly independent countries. For this the concept of "development" was instrumental because it fixed the supposed necessity to include the rest of the world into the realm of modernity, i.e., into the Western economic system. Within this sphere, capitalism was expected to generate advanced economic growth. The higher goal of development was

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52   B. Reinalda, Routledge History of International Organizations (16), pp. 230-234.
53   "Aimé Césaire and Frantz Fanon argue that the Holocaust and Nazi rule removed any moral authority that Europeans might have. Europe's 'civilizing mission' was in crisis if Europe itself was barbaric. Both writers agree that the methods used by the Nazis were colonial methods, perpetrated for the first time on Europeans instead of 'natives.'" M. B. Salter, Barbarians & Civilization (10), p. 111.
54   R. C. Young, Postcolonialism. An Historical Introduction, Oxford et al., p. 4.
55   M. Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations (8), p. 171.
56   S. Zimmermann, 'International – transnational' (18), p. 44.
57   M. Herren, Internationale Organisationen seit 1865 (36), p. 34.
58   M. Mazower, Governing the World (9), pp. 285, 273-276.

modernization, equated with a Westernization of the "Third World", today one would speak about "globalization".[59] In reality, of course, the implementation of this conception led to quite different outcomes. However, in the discourse, development served to justify the ways and means of the industrialised world, which should serve as uncontested models for the not yet industrialized world, i.e., the "underdeveloped" or later "developing countries". The most prominent example to illustrate the belief in modernization is still the model of development stages by Walt Rostow, which determined that all societies had to undergo five phases of development, from an initial traditional to the final mass consumption society.[60]

It may be helpful to describe the relationship between "developed" and "underdeveloped" or "developing" countries and societies in three ways: (1) as the West is racially/socially/economically superior than the "rest" it is legitimate to keep it that way (colonial superiority view); (2) as the non-Western world regions suffer, the "developed" world has an interest or is morally obliged to help them develop themselves (benevolent colonialism); and (3) the aggressive exploitation of Western colonialism and imperialism affected the disfiguration and impoverishment of non-Western societies – all reformist endeavours within the Western-dominated world system only serve to maintain existing power relations and only appease the poor, hungry and underprivileged (critical or postcolonial narrative). The second narrative obviously displays the conviction of the global civilizers in international organizations. Compared with the first narrative, the second seems to be progressive, but according to the third it was just an adaptation to the times, where open Western racial-cultural supremacy was challenged. The postcolonial view also regards "development" critically: Even the opening of the concept of development to consider other "developments" such as "participatory" or "socialist" development, or the one proposed by non-Western states in the demand for a New International Economic Order (NIEO) in the 1970s, still maintained the idea that development as such was desirable: "Development had achieved the status of a certainty in the social imagery".[61]Again, international organizations represented an institutionalized expression of the belief in a somewhat modified concept of progress and (Western) modernity.[62]

A Point In Case: International Civil Servants as Agents of Civilization

Since the 19th century, technological progress seemed synonymous with "advanced societies", i.e., civilized (and sovereign) nations. However, this not only includes the technical measures and norm-setting policies of IOs, the internal microcosm of these institutions

59   R. C. Young, Postcolonialism (54), pp. 44, 49.
60   W. W. Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto, New York 1960.
61   A. Escobar, Encountering Development. The Making and Unmaking of the Third World, Princeton 1995, p. 5.
62   One may consider an understanding of the term "development" as an "element in the religion of modernity". G. Rist, The History of Development. From Western Origins to Global Faith, Translated by Patrick Camiller. London/ New York ³2008, p. 21.

also gave the impression of Western prevalence. Professional networks of emerging vocations (lawyers, physicians, economists, engineers, etc.) formed transnational networks, built respective institutions, and set up the first international public unions, which were only established formally by intergovernmental agreements but essentially remained non-state bodies. These inspired internationalist professional networks can be seen as the forerunners of the international civil service of the 20th century as well as the driving forces of international organization in history. An initially European-dominated international civil service felt dedicated to the task of globally distributing Western conceptions – first in the technical area and later regarding comprehensive social questions.

From the late 19th century until the 1920s, the new social elites in Western societies became involved in the progressive and social democratic movements that fought for "gradual, democratic, expert-guided change through reforms meant to remedy the worst ills and abuses of laissez-faire industrialization". These individuals mostly came from the new professional middle class, comprising educators, social workers, journalists, physicians, lawyers, economists, and/or businessmen who were all motivated to "improve society".[63] We can regard liberal internationalism[64] as a form of powerful ideas that tied together an epistemic community within IOs and outside of these institutions.[65] Important internationalists influential in the creation of the League of Nations were the South African Jan Smuts and the British Alfred Zimmern. While they shared a belief in the benefits – for the world and/or, in particular, the British Empire – of international cooperation, both also considered this rather as a Western project and not a multicultural enterprise. It is astonishing that particularly Smuts was convinced of "white supremacy" and that this belief in racial superiority went hand in hand with his belief in international cooperation.[66] As Smuts was influential in the planning of both the League of Nations and the United Nations, it is important to emphasise this belief in international cooperation as an enterprise of civilized people as a key idea on which international organizations are built. We can regard the Secretariat of the League of Nations as a place where liberal internationalism became institutionalized.

The international civil service is a concept that only began with the League of Nations in 1920: According to several definitions, international officials can be described as being independent of governments and should therefore be responsible for running the international secretariats. They were supposed to be highly competent, loyal to their organization and internationalist in mind, although not giving up their own national "identity". One may add that an international version of the Weberian understanding of

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63   A. L. S. Staples, The Birth of Development (24), p. 3; P. M. Haas, Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination, in: International Organization, 46 (1992) 1, Knowledge, Power, and International Policy Coordination (Winter 1992), pp. 7-8.

64   Mazower speaks of three internationalisms: liberal, communist, and fascist. M. Mazower, Governing the World (9). As all these three concepts seem European, it will be necessary to analyse diverging internationalisms in non-Western societies as well.

65   See, for instance, P. M. Haas, Introduction (63), pp. 1-35.

66   Mark Mazower vividly analyses the contradictions of the internationalism that inspired both men. M. Mazower, No Enchanted Palace (23).

bureaucracy was influential: the idea of a non-political, neutral, effective, and efficient bureaucrat,[67] somewhat mirroring Protestant-secular rationalism. If we take the notion of IOs as norm-generating bureaucracies,[68] a remark by the League's first Secretary-General illustrates the main narrative of the impartial international civil service working successfully in the background: "It is not always those who secure public praise to whom thanks are mainly due, and the work unknown to the public which is done behind the scenes is often a large factor in the success which has been obtained."[69]

The recruitment practices in the early years of the League provide an insight into some shared beliefs: When a Member of Section or higher-ranked official was travelling, particularly in countries like China or the Latin American subcontinent, "well-qualified" candidates had a good chance of becoming staff members in Geneva. There is reason to believe that the travelling League officials evaluated candidates they found matching according to a set of Western-oriented parameters. For example, the first Director of the Health Section, Ludwik Rajchman, proposed a Chinese physician he had met on his trip in China. In Rajchman's telegramme to Drummond, he emphasised that Dr. Tsefang F. Huang was "exceptional" but also that his medical background was a US-American medical training.[70] In the case of staff from Latin America, there was obviously a relation to the Secretary-General's overall desire to demonstrate the very "international" – in contrast to the perceived European – character of the League.[71] In the first half of the 20th century, we can observe a widely shared belief in European-North American liberal internationalism within the League's Secretariat, in which national links and peculiarities played a significant role. If we take the Eurocentric idea of Europe as the centre of the world, the staff was rather internationally minded although national loyalties were never abandoned. But a true influence of non-Western ideas of, for instance, bureaucracy or diplomacy, seemed not to notably influence the British-French imprint of the Secretariat's "nature".[72] The staff of the League Secretariat showed an increasingly internationalist understanding, but certainly (and understandably) not the global and intercultural idea of the late 20th century. The internationalist thought was clearly inspired by Western ideology and thus per se seemed to keep out non-Western ideas, although it somewhat

67   In accordance, the UN Charter, Article 101, 3, states: "The paramount consideration in the employment of the staff and in the determination of the conditions of service shall be the necessity of securing the highest standards of efficiency, competence, and integrity. Due regard shall be paid to the importance of recruiting the staff on as wide a geographical basis as possible."

68   M. Barnett / M. Finnemore, Rules for the World. International Organizations in Global Politics, Ithaca et al. 2004.

69   Letter from Eric Drummond to Thanassis Aghnides, Geneva, 12th December 1927 (LN Archives).

70   "[F]ound exceptional candidate health section doctor huang strongly recommended health ministry excellent medical background superior American health degree occupied responsible posts china stop in view general personal circumstances early appointment essential stop grateful decision three years contract commencing march next initial salary eighteen thousand two hundred family travelling reimbursable outright rajchmanpekinote lpeiping". Telegramm from Rajchman to Eric Drummond, (from China (Peiping), received in Paris C), 24/11/1929.

71   Personnel files. League of Nations Archives, Geneva.

72   See E. F. Ranshofen-Wertheimer, The International Secretariat. A Great Experiment in International Administration, Washington 1945, chapter 1.

paternalistically included non-Western staff members – but only if they shared the same belief in internationalism and an international bureaucracy and thus could legitimize, for example, the universal civilizing mission expressed in the ideas of the mandates. Internationalism was therefore crucial to a basic conviction on which the civilizing thought was founded. Internationalists further combined two key elements of international organization since the 19th century: first, colonialism was seen as problematic insofar as it meant a gradually challenged (European) domination over others – therefore civilizing missions seemed to promise a new moral justification; and second, the ruling classes were only interested in reforms, which would by and large uphold the existing power relations, i.e., Western dominance. Therefore, internationalism embraced international organizations and their reformist approach to improve and civilize the world according to the European blueprint.

After 1945, with the creation of a similarly inspired international civil service of the United Nations, the situation changed insofar as the staff became increasingly affected by East-West conflict concerns. More interesting from our perspective, however, was the entry of non-Western staff after decolonization took off in the 1960s: Western critics soon bemoaned the diminishing quality of non-Western staff members but also their increasingly important governmental ties. In 1971 the UN issued an internal report that deplored disorder, inefficiency, the waste of resources, personal disputes, and useless transfers of incapable employees from one department to another, as well as a decline of motivation and independence of the international staff. A similar report in 1985 mostly confirmed these harsh findings, which led Yves Beigbeder, a former civil servant himself, to identify a crisis of multilateralism: "One reason is that the Western democracies no longer recognize their creature, over which they have lost some of their control; for them, the organizations have thus become politicized."[73] Here it appears obvious that a "politicization" was only detected if the practices deviated from the "normal" European methods and work ethics – a divergence from the uncontested impartial bureaucrat (as described in the UN Charter) constituted politicization. Consequently, the increasingly culturally diverse international civil service running the organization's day-to-day business was considered not to be inspired anymore by the good values of liberal internationalism. Besides the Soviet employees, many non-Western staff members supported policies that were perceived as anti-Western, such as the New International Economic Order, demanding a more just international trade regime favouring the poorer countries. Subsequently, Western governments started to set up special programmes that were attached to the UN and specialized organizations, but had separate budgets, recruitment policies, and concrete goals.[74] By this, the West sought to circumvent Western-critical UN bodies equipped with secretariats they perceived as increasingly inefficient, costly and politically opposed to Western policies. Here, the dilemma of the civilizing mission becomes apparent: Somehow, the Western governments attempted to impose their idea

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73   Y. Beigbeder, Threats to the International Civil Service. London et al. 1988, p. 4.
74   See Y. Beigbeder, Threats to the International Civil Service (73).

of international organization again through special programmes on which the under-funded UN bodies heavily relied. On the other hand, it could be seen as a real problem that the staff became gradually less competent (in terms of the goals and tasks of the staff) and increasingly dependent on governments (also contrasting the UN Charter's provisions for the staff).

In a way, development policies after 1945 were inspired by a revisited version of paternalistic internationalism: "The international civil servants of the World Bank, FAO [Food and Agricultural Organization], and WHO [World Health Organization] inherited this faith in the ability of professionals to craft rational social policy".[75] When the non-Western regions sent personnel to the international secretariats, particularly after 1960, these new international civil servants had to a certain extent to adjust to the existing Western organization structure and management culture. Unlike seemingly radical demands in 1974 of the Third World for a New International Economic Order suggest, there seemed to be no serious break with the Western-oriented structures, codes of conduct, and personnel policies. The non-Western personnel did alter the international civil service in practice (and as mentioned before, not few Western observers argued for the worse in terms of competence and impartiality) – but apparently not decisively with regard to the general outlook of the secretariats. Nevertheless, in this area hybridizations have taken place – while Western-style forms, such as codes of conduct, were kept up, these did not necessarily represent the reality and have often been eroded or simply redefined in actuality. An example would be the regionally different ways to put internal employment requirements designed in Geneva or New York – best practice, required qualifications, transparent recruitment procedures, competitive hiring, etc. – into practice outside the Western world. In reality, traditional clientelism and beliefs in gender or age hierarchies seem at times to weigh more than qualifications, effectiveness, or gender equality.[76] This example demonstrates that in many areas Western concepts were only officially upheld, while in practice they were increasingly challenged by hybridizations.

It would be worthwhile to analyse to what extent the international civil service, since 1960 increasingly diverse, rather than following a Western understanding of modernity brought in concepts of modernity from other world regions/countries or were key players in developing an IO sui generis and hybrid idea of modernity at international secretariats.

What one can see in this example is that international organization and the respective institutions appeared to change in their general outlook and began to acquire a "truly" global representative character, at least in terms of represented nations and world regions. A modified mission to make the world a better place still was at the core of their raison d'être. The pledge "to do good" served to make the individuals and groups responsible for and working in IOs believe they were serving a higher or common good, which was translated into the very mission IOs had to fulfil. Consequently, IOs were considered le-

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75   A. L. S. Staples, The Birth of Development (24), p. 3.
76   Interviews 2007 at the UN in New York and the SEARO in New Delhi in 2008.

gitimate and even absolutely essential (and irrevocable) institutions due to their civilizing vocation – and now even more representative as the globe seemed justly represented.

The Concept of Human Rights

The concept of human rights became more prominent and influential after the Second World War. The characterizations of human rights as either a "gift" to the world[77] or an instrument to foster Western dominance[78] have increasingly been nuanced by newer research.[79] Following up on these arguments, I understand the concept as another expression of a civilizing endeavour. With this I do not mean that human rights were a mere instrument of the West to de-radicalize social and political unrest in other parts of the world and make it the only internationally accepted expression of protest. International human rights – meaning the classical individual (civil and political) rights and possibly also the economic, social, and cultural rights – certainly have Western origins, but were used by non-Western actors for their own demands and interests. Among others, Erez Manela showed that Woodrow Wilson's call for self-determination after World War I inspired non-Western peoples to long for it too.[80] Roland Burke emphasises that the non-Western enthusiasm for the right of self-determination was matched by a strong support for human rights after 1945. He demonstrates that many non-Western protagonists upheld human rights mostly to support their struggle for independence, to fight against racism, and later to denounce, particularly South African apartheid, "Zionism", and Pinochet's dictatorship in Chile. More importantly, he argues that the first universalists in terms of international human rights were in fact non-Western countries, while North Americans and West Europeans still argued that many non-Western societies were not yet ready to introduce and implement human rights in full due to their development stages: "In the opening years of the 1950s, cultural relativism was the language of the Western colonial powers, which resisted any attempt to extend human rights to their colonies".[81] Even moral eminences like René Cassin – probably due to pressure from his government – called it improper to apply human rights obligations to countries "at the lowest stage of development".[82] Burke's argumentation with regard to Western relativism sheds a light on the neglected dimension of Asian, Arab, and African contributions in the making of international human rights, even though it remains debatable to what

77   See, for example, J. M. Headley, The Europeanization of the World. On the Origins of Human Rights and Democracy, Princeton et al. 2008.

78   A. Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty (37), B. Rajagopal, International Law from Below (47), and I. Bonny, Imperialism and human rights: colonial discourses of rights and liberties in African history. Albany (NY) 2007..

79   For the UN, see R. Normand/S. Zaidi, Human Rights at the UN. The Political History of Universal Justice. United Nations Intellectual History Project Series, Bloomington (IN) 2008.

80   E. Manela, The Wilsonian Moment. Self-Determination and the International Origins of Anticolonial Nationalism, Oxford/New York 2007.

81   R. Burke, Decolonization and the Evolution of International Human Rights, Philadelphia 2010, p. 114.

82   Ibid.

extent non-Western actors believed in human rights or simply used them. The fact that the Europeans and US-Americans were the first relativists, based on civilizational arguments, is an interesting aspect with regard to the civilizing mission narrative: "Western colonial delegation attempted to evade their human rights obligations through a feigned reverence for the traditional culture of indigenous inhabitants. Their arguments to this end constituted a distinct subspecies of cultural relativism."[83] Similar to the "colonial clause" of the ILO labour regulations, the opposition of Western governments and intellectuals against the immediate effectiveness of human rights for "uncivilized" peoples also suggests that they should first have to "earn" human rights – an idea that seems fundamentally divergent from the contemporary idea of "universal" human rights. Similar to the right to self-determination, human rights thus appear as concepts to civilize Europe first after the traumatic experience of World War II and the Holocaust, only as a second thought were these extended to other world regions, with a relativism based on civilizational differences. It is remarkable that non-Western actors adapted these concepts for their own struggles for self-determination and independence. Nevertheless, the examples of self-determination (only for Europe), human rights (only for the civilized) or the unsuccessful proposal of the Japanese in 1919 to include a clause on racial equality,[84] illustrate the difficulty of non-Western actors to take these attempts of civilization seriously in practice.

To the fragmentary and double-standard universality of human rights, the Third World added their civilizing mission in terms of these rights: The non-Western countries used both human rights as a concept and the UN as a stage to condemn apartheid, to criticise Israel and Pinochet's Chile, and to denounce former colonial masters with resolutions favouring decolonization and condemning racism. These all were sensitive themes for the West. Chilean torturers, racist Boers, occupying Zionists, and their allied imperialists in the US and former colonialists in Europe were targeted as subjects to be "civilized" by the human rights-defending "international community" speaking through international organizations.

In sum, even though today human rights are often perceived as a moral instrument of the West to "civilize" other world regions, in the origins of the UN human rights politics these rights were emphasised rhetorically by the West, while their concrete one-to-one application to non-Western societies was seen as problematic. Then the "Third World" began using the concept to attack the West with "their weapons" in the 1970s and thus somehow modified the civilizing mission expressed in the concept of human rights as it was now used against the "original" civilizers.

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83   Ibid.
84   "Die neue internationale Ordnung hielt mit der Festlegung eines Zivilisationsgefälles eine ambivalente Botschaft bereit, zumal 1919 der japanische Vorschlag, die Gleichstellung der Rassen in die Völkerbundssatzung aufzunehmen, gescheitert war." M. Herren, Internationale Organisationen seit 1865, p. 58 (36); See M. Mazower, Governing the World (9), pp. 162-164.

Non-Western Civilizing Missions

My argument that international organization as a process and the respective organizations as institutional expressions of this process were mostly driven by Western-inspired civilizing endeavours seem to neglect non-Western influences. Non-Western ideas, concepts, and actors were certainly not only recipients of civilizing missions, but also contributed to the continuous change of this powerful concept at international organizations.

First of all, non-Western countries wanted to become members of the civilized club and thus started efforts to "civilize" their societies in order to be accepted as "civilized nations". In fact, some Asian and Middle Eastern nations were actually considered as being "civilized" by Western observers – even though at a secondary position – which found expression, for example, in the presence of some non-Western delegations at the Hague peace conferences.[85] This recognition of the Ottoman Empire, Egypt (1801–1882), Japan, and, of course, the United States only took place reluctantly and merely because these nations tried to "imitate" Europe.[86] When international recognition did not set in as expected, and with the rejection of introducing racial equality as one of the League's cornerstones, the Japanese, particularly, pursued to establish an "Asian" or "Eastern" counter-civilization to challenge the Western-dominated model of civilization in international organizations: "The nation must persuade the fellow Asians, who had also been prone to follow the path of Westernization, to awaken to their Asian destiny and join together in reconstructing 'Asian ideology, Asian political organization, and Asian society'."[87] But this Asianist rhetoric of the Japanese, who eventually were recognised as "civilized" thanks to their economic success in the 1970s,[88] proved to be unsuccessful among other nations in the 1930s[89] and seemed to have no influence on the civilizing mission at international organizations at all. However, the Bandung conference in 1955, also seen as the birth of the later Non-Aligned Movement, can be interpreted as a form of alternative non-Western organization (in the sense of the process), where a modified civilizing mission began to take shape. In the final communiqué of the conference, Asia and Africa were identified as the "cradle of great religions and civilisations which have enriched other cultures and civilisations while themselves being enriched in the process. Thus, the cultures of Asia and Africa are based on spiritual and universal foundations." The document also underlined that this wish to strengthen Asian-African cooperation did not base itself on an "exclusiveness or a rivalry with other groups of nations and other civilisations

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85   A. Iriye, Cultural Internationalism and World Order, Baltimore et al. 1997, pp. 20-21.
86   M. B. Salter, Barbarians & Civilization (10), p. 17.
87   A. Iriye, Cultural Internationalism (85), pp. 36, 39, 44-49. See P. Duara, 'The Discourse of Civilization and Pan-Asianism', in: Journal of World History, 12 (2001) 1, pp. 99-130.
88   Particularly the Trilateral Commission, established in 1973, can be interpreted as a joint effort of Japan, the US, and Europe to safeguard the capitalist system. "By 1980, the countries represented in the Trilateral Commission traded two-thirds of all world exports, and nearly two-thirds of world GNP. The effect was to weaken the bargaining power of the South, at the very moment that the latter's own internal cohesion was starting to splinter under the impact of the oil crisis." M. Mazower, Governing the World (9), p. 313.
89   A. Iriye, Cultural Internationalism (85), pp. 134-135.

and cultures", but that "Asian and African cultural co-operation should be developed in the larger context of world co-operation."[90] However, Iriye soberly analyses a missed opportunity: "Had this sort of collective action been continued, the Third World might have enriched the vocabulary and content of cultural internationalism: Asian, African, Middle Eastern, and Latin American nations might have cooperated with one another in the cultural as well as other spheres and strengthened internationalism, even as it was being undermined by the geopolitics of the cold war."[91] The conference document further supported human rights as formulated in the UN realm, but also described the right to self-determination of peoples and nations as a "prerequisite" to their full enjoyment. Most interestingly, the Bandung communiqué ascribed Asia and Africa a "duty towards humanity and civilisation" to avoid a nuclear war and thus to promote disarmament.[92] Although conference documents like this often merely present shiny rhetoric, it is still remarkable that the Asian and African representatives at Bandung described their world regions as responsible for the salvation of human kind and civilization, unlike the capitalist and communist barbarians toying with the ultimate atomic catastrophe. Here, Asian and African nations see themselves as civilizers – and saviours – of the world who turned to the United Nations to stop the arms race for the sake of mankind.[93]

The prominent period of the 1970s, when the Third World displayed a remarkable self-consciousness by challenging Western predominance in many intergovernmental settings and regarding various policy fields seemed to have been accompanied by a sort of non-Western variation of civilizing mission addressed to IOs. The main assumption to improve – at least the "poor" part of – the world was still influential, but own methods for making the (Third) world a better place gained momentum. One of the most convincing examples is the Primary Health Care (PHC) episode supported by the WHO and initially also by United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF): The goal was to achieve "health for all" but not only through Western medicine, vaccinations, and more physicians and hospitals, but also with a stronger reliance on non-Western traditional medicine systems, local health workers like the Chinese "barefoot doctors", and decentralized basic health care. Shortly, an improvement of particularly rural health conditions with the means of poor societies with non-Western health systems. Primary Health Care became temporarily a very powerful concept that was widely adopted – at least rhetorically

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90   Asian-African Conference, Bandung. April 18-24, 1955. Final Communiqué, pp. 2-3.

91   A. Iriye, Cultural Internationalism (85), pp. 161-162.

92   "The Conference considers that disarmament and the prohibition of the production, experimentation and use of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons of war are imperative to save mankind and civilisation from the fear and prospect of wholesale destruction. It considered that the nations of Asia and Africa assembled here have a duty towards humanity and civilisation to proclaim their support for disarmament and for prohibition of these weapons and to appeal to nations principally concerned and to world opinion, to bring about such disarmament and prohibition." Asian-African Conference, Bandung. April 18-24, 1955. Final Communiqué (90), p. 4.

93   "The Asian-African Conference gave anxious thought to the question of world peace and co-operation. It views with deep concern the present state of international tension with its danger of an atomic world war. The problem of peace is correlative with the problem of international security. In this connection, all states should co-operate, especially through the United Nations, in bringing about the reduction of armaments and the elimination of nuclear weapons under effective international control." Ibid., pp. 4-5.

– at the WHO. Interestingly enough, the concept was seen as promising also for the "rich" world, even though Europeans and physicians in general were reluctant to consider this form of non-Western mission as appropriate. The WHO European regional office responded sceptically to the universal claim of the PHC concept: As Europe constituted a technically and industrially "advanced" region with a "highly organised medical coverage", PHC was rather seen as important for "developing countries". Even though the European office admitted that PHC was also significant for Europe, its relevance was, however, different: "it must be adapted to European cultural and developmental achievements" because diseases and health problems of Europeans were different from those of other world regions.[94]

Even though conditions in various world regions certainly differ, the reaction may also be read as a general reluctance to adopt non-Western concepts to civilize Europe, to put it provocatively. In any case can we interpret Primary Health Care as a hybrid form of civilizing mission in global health politics that included significant non-Western elements. Many non-Western member states and WHO representatives were convinced that this new approach would actually achieve "health for all in the year 2000", as a momentous PHC conference in 1978 proclaimed. This conviction of the right methods in combination with an intriguing optimism do allow us to qualify PHC as a civilizing mission, which was shaped to a large extent by non-Western concepts, even though it did not abandon the Western medical approach entirely but rather constituted a mixture of Western and traditional non-Western medicine.

Similar elements of introducing non-Western civilizing missions might be alternative cultural concepts as through the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the demand for a New Information and Communication Order, or the entire human rights debate beyond the first and second generation rights catalogue (including the right to self-determination, to development, or the elusive "right to be different").

In a way, Akira Iriye believes, imperialism can even be regarded as a form of internationalism: "it brought different races and cultures together and established an international 'community'. Imperialism spread Western civilization to non-Western areas of the world and thus contributed to developing global awareness."[95] It raises the relevant question to what extent the inclusion of non-Western peoples/cultures (on equal terms) into internationalist thought would have destroyed the intra-Western consensus. One has to keep in mind, however, that the IOs in the 20th century – although some of its guiding figures earnestly advocated cooperation with the non-West – did not practise a "global internationalism"; their civilizing mission did not change but stick to the idea of inequality. The UN, contrary to how it appears today as the saviour for suppressed victims from their savage governments (in Asia and Africa, in particular), continues to try to civilize

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94   From Dr. D. Glyn Thomas, to: Dr. D. Tejada de Rivero, ADG. EURO Report for the International Conference on Primary Health Care, Regional Director's Report. P7/48/7, 21 March 1978 (WHO files), p. 11.

95   A. Iriye, Cultural Internationalism (85), p. 41.

the violent transformations Western powers in Afghanistan or Iraq undertake as their own 21st-century version of a civilizing mission, and thus – in practice –substantiates its role as civilising force of both, the "uncivilized" and the civilizers.[96] This is insofar note worthy as also non-Western actors participate actively in the endeavour to civilise the Western civilizers, which results in a broader legitimation of the UN's mission when it reminds also Western powers of international law obligations or human rights commitments. So in the end, the UN appears to be the legitimate civilizer of "less civilized" regions and societies ("developing" areas) as well as the only civilizer of the new Western civilizing missions in the Arab world (anti-terrorism), Africa (humanitarian interventions), or Latin America ("war" against drugs, for instance).

Global Governance as a Civilizing Mission

"As a means of rescuing the mission of empire from its darker, dirtier side, this language of responsibilities, care, and duties survives with surprisingly few alterations into our own times as the vocabulary with which a postcolonial 'international community' now validates rule by its own executive organs, in the shape of the United Nations."[97] In the course of contemporary "globalization" and the concept of "global governance" that emerged since the early 1990s, tendencies of a modified international civilizing mission underline that international organizations continue civilizing the world.
After the neoliberal decade of the 1980s and the collapse of Eastern European socialism, globalization became a major catchword that has often been equated with economic and financial globalization only. In this context, in which capitalism appeared to be the uncontested worldwide system, calls for international, or rather global regulation emerged: *global governance* should handle all the good and bad aspects caused by increasing global intertwining. The notion has not been authoritatively defined, despite the existence of a Commission on Global Governance installed by the UN in the mid-1990s. The problem of the term is that it neglects "government" (the UN is not a world government) and rather hints at a collectivity of various actors and "international regimes" (trade, human rights, environment, etc.). Some authors equate global governance with international organization(s).[98] This provides the opportunity to regard global governance as a historical phenomenon that already started in the mid-19th century. This is insofar relevant as global governance can be directly connected to a form of world order – or maybe better "ordering" the world as an ongoing process – apparently based on some universally shared values. This interpretation of global governance would suggest, if applied to the mid-19th century, that already the public unions addressing technical areas were expres-

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96 See C. A. Watt, Introduction. The Relevance and Complexity of Civilizing Mission c. 1800–2010, in: M. Mann / C. A. Watt (eds.), Civilizing Missions in Colonial and Postcolonial South Asia: From Improvement to Devlopment, London 2011, p. 2.

97 M. Mazower, Governing the World (9), p. 73.

98 C. Murphy, International Organization and Industrial Change (n. 46).

sions of a general motivation to regulate and "order" the world based on certain (European) standards and associated belief systems. I see this as (another) argument against the functionalist assumption of politically neutral technical agencies. In any case, as IOs gained worldwide reputation since they were considered neutral or "international", so global governance is portrayed by some as a positive (or neutral) way to address global problems in the interest of all people (or mankind).

One may find some similarities between the combination of self-interests of the West and civilizing convictions in terms of global governance, for instance with regard to the categorisation of the mandate territories. The UN Millennium Development Goals or the Global Compact are good examples as they rely on traditional Western beliefs (development, economic growth, human rights, and social responsibility to appease the unhappy) following humanitarian convictions (like the "responsibility to protect") without seriously putting the existing, largely Western-dominated, world order into question.[99] An important element of the civilizing process was the limitation of violence, a general tendency to establish legal rules to civilize and humanize armed conflicts. Mazlish considers that in the Middle Ages absolutist monarchies promoted this restraint from violence also to maintain power, while asking whether today the UN is doing the same.[100] The reference to international law as an example of mediation rather than going to war was considered an achievement of "civilized peoples". In general, the establishment of international legal regulations laid the foundation for an international community of "civilized" states that accepted certain norms and rules. Those who did not were uncivilized.[101] Regarding these "humanitarian duties", Mazower sees a continuity between making peoples in independent mandate territories in the 1920s and 1930s "fit for the modern world", the UN trusteeship system, and the more recent concept of a "responsibility to protect".[102] John Gerard Ruggie states that "[a]t the normative level, liberal internationalism, of which the United States has been a leading champion, traditionally has served as an animating vision of global governance." In this context, notions like "global community" or "global civil society" suggest a sort of worldwide network, while those who diverge from this unwritten consensus are declared an "uncivil society", such as transnational criminal or terrorist networks.[103] Thus I follow Yakub Halabi who provides a rather critical interpretation of global governance: "Global Governance is an attempt to manipulate the forces of globalization, mitigate globalization's negative effects, and privilege states that follow global rules" and it "involves an attempt by the developed countries to regulate relations among states and to bind developing states to global rules. But, perhaps more importantly, global governance helps shape domestic institutions within the latter countries so that they become more compatible with global

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99   A. Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty (37), p. 256.
100 B. Mazlish, Civilization and its Contents (3), p. 134.
101 A. Iriye, Cultural Internationalism (85), p. 20.
102 M. Mazower, Governing the World (9), p. 167.
103 J. G. Ruggie, Foreword, in: T. G. Weiss / Ramesh Thakur, Global Governance and the UN. An Unfinished Journey, Bloomington (IN), p. xix.

regulations, ensuring that developing states will not engage in economic nationalism at the expense of the developed countries."[104] I rhetorically ask whether this is really a new phenomenon. In addition, it seems that the richer countries' supposed "forced integration" of poorer countries into a system of global rules also originates from a deep belief that these universal sets of norms and rules are actually the best for all – thus combining the pursuit of own interests and benevolent motives.[105] Halabi further distinguishes between three groups of economically poorer states from a Western viewpoint. The first group is "underdeveloped states" receiving little foreign direct investments (FDI) due to a lack of modern capitalist institutions, small markets, high illiteracy rates, and low per capita income. The West doubts their rationality and wants to advance them out of altruistic motivation. The second are states receiving little FDI, but are considered to be strategically (Egypt, Turkey) or economically (oil exporters) important, in company with labour-intensive economies that do not pose a threat to Western countries. The Bretton Woods institutions put them under pressure to adopt free market economies. The third are states attractive for FDI in the past 20 years (newly industrialized countries, NICs): "These states have challenged the developed countries in their own markets and are the ones that have been consistently pushed to adopt Western models of economic order and to help create, among other things, a level playing field in international trade".[106] This grouping appears similar to the categorization of the mandate system and can be seen as reflecting the economic-financial "maturity" of the respective states.

Conclusion

Power structures, contemporary problems, events, and personal preferences and networks have shaped the origins and further development of international organizations and their policies. Nonetheless, the civilizing missions international organizations followed have been another powerful element in the making of IOs. It appears necessary to use the plural form, as several competing and contradictory civilising missions co-existed. Other authors have already identified civilizing features of IOs. I go further and consider these as an almost ingenuous and often unconscious driving force that has been elementary for the very establishment and further advancement of international organizations. Accordingly, I deem it helpful to identify civilizing missions as a discourse of a perceived moral obligation and personal dedication to "do good" at the heart of international organization since this discourse not only reflects the longing for progress and modernity as well

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104   Y. Halabi, The Expansion of Global Governance into the Third World: Altruism, Realism or Constructivism?, in: International Studies Review (2004) 6, pp. 23, 22.

105   Interestingly enough, the recent emergence of new regional or prospective "world powers" (China, India, Brazil) rather led to 19th-century power politics with a strong reference to national sovereignty and less to alternatives and a fundamental questioning of the present international system. See The Economist, 20 August 2010; and T. G. Weiss / R. Thakur, Global Governance and the UN (103), p. xix,

106   Y. Halabi, The Expansion of Global Governance (104), p. 22.

as the belief in the natural superiority of initially mostly Western, secular, technocratic, and up-to-date techniques or solutions, but also mirrors the benevolence of the decisive actors, mostly deeply embedded in humanitarianism or, more general, liberal internationalism. At the same time cultural relativism as a European invention went along with civilizing missions that were initially rather aimed at Western societies to improve social conditions and prevent wars. Nominally these missions also included non-Western societies. However, there were limitations that were not necessarily motivated by colonial interests only but also postulated in the belief that these societies were not ready yet for (1) self-rule, (2) independent economic government, (3) social achievements such as human rights, labour rights, freedom of speech, or gender equality, and (4) in general not fit for democracy (even applicable today).

It is important to note since benevolent civilizing missions often ignored cultural peculiarities, the "otherness" of non-Western societies was often only considered collectively in comparison with the Western ideal (the "West and the rest"), not between the "others". In colonial times it joined the belief of racial inferiority; later on cultural "backwardness" replaced the former, including the articulated need to advance to Western standards. With good reasons, it has been argued that since the emergence of IOs these incorporated a problematic paternalism. This has proven to be long lasting. The current discourse and practice of global governance has been elevated to an impersonal and secular catechism of enlightened multilateralism: Peace, human rights, democracy, the preference of diplomacy over violence, and the belief in international solutions have become cornerstones of international politics, at least at the rhetorical level.

In comparison to the war-torn first half of the 20th century when the League of Nations – founded in the spirit to prevent a second (European) world war – proved to be impressively ill equipped and lacking substantial support to maintain the fragile European peace, there has certainly been an improvement despite the problems for international organization in view of the East-West conflict. However, the non-Western countries seemed to do both, adapt unconditionally to pre-existing concepts and procedures of IO, and at times contesting these fiercely with success in some policy areas. Non-Western actors, however, appeared hardly able to challenge the very concept of international organizations and civilizing missions fundamentally, also as a result of an often brittle unity. One may certainly argue that particularly since the 1970s, and even more so since the beginning of the new millennium, rising non-Western powers have challenged the Western imprint on IOs.

However, international organizations also sought to civilize colonialism and later civilizers. Furthermore, also non-Western ideas were introduced and contributed to modifying the nature of civilizing missions carried out by IOs. Nevertheless, the debate on a truly global health policy or global human rights – in contrast to neo-colonial medicine in world health or Western individualized rights – often moved within the previously established frameworks, and in the end succeeded to broaden the dimension of "global health" and human rights. When it comes to funding or policy priorities, however, the hybridized forms we can see still bear a rather Western imprint (human rights, health

programmes, development projects, global governance) to civilize the world. It seems that also non-Western actors and ideas supported the idea of making the world a better and more civilized place. In the case of Primary Health Care, we can detect both a combination of Western medical practices to non-Western "health realities" with existing "traditional" practices, as well as a challenge to the previously by and large hardly contested pre-eminence of Western medicine as the superior standard. The prevalence of Western concepts in general and in world health politics in particular seems to hint at a perpetuated Western civilizing mission, conducted by health organizations since the early 20th century. Nevertheless, the strong influence of the Chinese concept that combined traditional Chinese medicine with Western medicine, adapted to the challenge of remote rural populations, can be seen as a sort of non-Western version of civilizing efforts. With Primary Health Care, the WHO challenged predominant Western definition methods of what is necessary but at the same time created a sort of non- (or less) Western-dominated civilizing mission to bring "health for all" to the world's peoples. Interestingly, the advocates of PHC as a sort of hybrid non-Western version of civilizing mission were also uneasy about other world regions – here Europe in particular – that showed more scepticism regarding the applicability of this concept to their region.

Contemporary IOs are also shaped by civilizing missions that contain Western patterns of making the world a better place by making the world more "European", "Western", or simply "modern". These "best intentions" have also led to laudable successes, such as the improvement of labour conditions, women's rights, democratic standards, or better health conditions. Large problems remain that often display a pitiable lack of holistic approaches or inappropriate measures applied to culturally different regions. Today it seems difficult to be "uncivilized": "While the word 'civilization' has become almost taboo, the underlying doctrines are flourishing more than ever. The key words now are development, modernization, and human rights."[107] In accordance, nowadays the belonging to the "international community" requires the acceptance of international law, rules, and norms – and a hierarchy is also still shimmering through when politicians and academics speak of rational and "rogue" states, or news magazines write about "serious states".[108]

My argument that a global civilizing discourse has been one of the essential driving forces for international organization shall contribute to a more accurate study of international institutions as an alternative to a questionable postcolonial overall condemnation of these institutions, and too normative and applauding assessments of IOs as only universally legitimate global "governors". It will be of particular research interest in the future to look closer at non-Western internationalisms and their influence on civilizing features of IOs.

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107   J. Fisch, Internationalizing Civilization, p. 257 (37).
108   http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21567939-even-miserable-standards-peace-process-israels-proposed-new-settlements-are, accessed on 8 January 2013.

Decentring Feminist Internationalisms: Indian and International Women's Organizations between the World Wars

Leonie Rörich

RESÜMEE

Frauen aus nicht-westlichen Weltregionen hatten einen großen Einfluss auf die internationale Frauenbewegung in den 1920er und 1930er Jahren. Der Aufsatz illustriert dies anhand von drei indischen Frauenorganisationen. Zunächst wird gezeigt, dass der anfänglich westzentrierte Universalismus des *International Council of Women* und der *International Alliance of Women* nach dem Ersten Weltkrieg einer globaleren Perspektive wich, sowohl hinsichtlich der internen Politik als auch der Bandbreite der Anliegen, obwohl sie als kulturell und national spezifisch angesehen wurden. Einige der Leitfiguren nahmen die Forderung nach Selbstbestimmung ernster und unterstützten Frauen in kolonialisierten Gesellschaften in ihren spezifischen Vorhaben, anstatt ihnen die eigenen, oft genug imperialen Sichtweisen aufzudrängen. Sodann wird nachgezeichnet, dass die indischen Frauenorganisationen eigene, global ausgerichtete Agenden entwickelten, die ,westliche' und ,nicht-westliche' Aktivistinnen ansprachen sowie für lokale, regionale, aber auch grenzüberschreitende Interessen offen waren. Die bewusst dezentral angelegte Programmatik war auch dazu gedacht, die internationalen Frauenverbände zu reformieren.

The Plurality of Interwar Internationalisms and "Non-Western" Feminist Internationalists

After the First World War, feminists[1] strove intensively to improve the societal position and living conditions of women in their own transnational networks and through

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1   When I speak of "feminist" or "feminism", I refer to a person, movement, or organization that works to change women's inferior social or legal position as well as the social, political, economic, and, at times, even cultural discrimination perpetuating this, see: L. Lindsey (ed.), Gender roles: a sociological perspective, Boston 2011, p. 14. This does not imply that the women's organizations and their members, which are studied here, necessarily

three international women's organizations: the International Council of Women (ICW), the International Alliance of Women (IAW), and the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF).[2] They undertook these endeavours during a time when nationalism was gaining momentum worldwide due to the echo of the Paris Peace Conferences, which proclaimed the right to self-determination in regions still under colonial rule.[3] Over the last three decades, historians highlighted their contribution to international cooperation, among others, through their involvement in the League of Nations.[4] However, the historical account of feminist internationalisms in that period still has a Eurocentric bias.[5] By and large it blends the role of feminists from Asia, Latin America, and Africa; their contributions are seldom traced and detailed.[6] Without doubt, there are studies critically reviewing the parochial and at times imperialist mindsets of activists from Europe or the US. But even these accounts are often "Western"-centric[7] carrying forward an universalist idea of a "global womanhood".

There are several reasons why "non-Western" feminism has been marginalized. Imperialist reasoning in international politics continued after 1919 – visible, for example, in the mandate system of the League of Nations – which also affected feminist international-

defined themselves as such or attended to women issues only. Moreover, this study does not go into detail concerning the possibly different feminist schools of thought to which individual members of the different international and Indian women's organizations belonged besides their activities in the frame of feminist internationalisms. By and large though, the women's organizations under consideration can be labelled with "liberal" in difference to radical or Marxist/socialist. For a comprehensive study of different feminist schools of thought, see: R. Tong, Feminist Thought: A more Comprehensive Study (3rd ed.), Colorado 2009.

2   When the third major international women's organization, the WILPF, was established in 1915, the ICW, founded in 1888, had already been active for more than two decades. The IAW was creded in 1902. See: L. Rupp, Worlds of Women: The Making of an International Women's Movement, Princeton 1999; C. Bolt, Sisterhood Questioned? Race, Class and Internationalism in the American and British Women's Movements, c.1880s–1970s, London 2004.

3   E. Manela, The Wilsonian Moment: Self-Determination and the International Origins of Anticolonial Nationalism, Oxford 2007.

4   For information on the international women's organizations and the League of Nations, see C. Miller, Geneva- the Key to Equality: Inter-war Feminists and the League of Nations: Women's History Review, 3 (2004) 2, URL: http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/09612029400200051, access on 04.11.2013, pp. 219-245.

5   Scholars writing about "feminist internationalism" have been circumscriptive and elusive in offering definitions for the term. The present work compares a variety of perspectives on and practices of feminist internationalism that emerge from different cultural, national, and organizational contexts. As will become apparent in this study, feminist internationalism could mean both to highlight what has connected women, as Mrinalini Sinha has put it "through time and across racial, cultural, religious, class, national, linguistic, and other barriers" and to speak about the limits to the common experience of women and "universal sisterhood". See: M. Sinha/D. J. Guy/A. Woollacott, Feminisms and Internationalism, Oxford 1999, p. 4.

6   See: M. Sandell, A Real Meeting of the Women of the East and the West: Women and Internationalism in the Inter-war Period, in: D. Laqua, Internationalism Reconfigured: Transnational Ideas and Movements between the World Wars, London 2011, pp. 161-187; C. Weber, Making Common Cause? Western and Middle Eastern Feminists In The International Women's Movement, 1911–1948, PhD., Ohio State University 2003, URL: https://etd.ohiolink.edu/ap:0:0:APPLICATION_PROCESS=DOWNLOAD_ETD_SUB_DOC_ACCNUM:::F1501_ID:osu1056139187,   access on 04.11.2013; R. Yasutake, The Rise of Women's Internationalism in the Countries of the Asia-Pacific Region during the Interwar Years, from a Japanese Perspective, in: Women's History Review, 20 (2011) 4, pp. 521-532.

7   Both terms, "West" and "non-West", are highly problematic, juxtaposing entities that do not exist but are constructs for specific purposes and interests. I am aware of that and use them only as abbreviations for actors from North America and Western Europe.

isms. Women in the non-Western world were seen as colonial subjects that had to be civilized to become "good global feminists".[8] Added to that, feminist movements in the colonies have been mainly studied with a geographical limitation as part and parcel of the anti-colonial liberation struggle.[9] Both perspectives do not take into account that these women may have followed their own global agenda.

This shortcoming is my starting point: I concentrate on Indian feminists in three selected Indian women's organizations and reconstruct their programmatic ideas and practice, while showing that non-Western feminist internationalisms possessed multiple scales and addressed local, regional, national, and international concerns. This is reflected in the changing self-understanding and agendas of two of the three international women's organizations – the ICW and the IAW – both also driven by Indian representatives – especially through their attendance in the conferences of the organizations. Although the ICW and the IAW incorporated the "illusion of a 'universal woman'",[10] they left space for the reformulations of their biased visions. In parallel, Indian women's organizations saw themselves as feminist internationalists and acted accordingly. That is reflected in the activities of the three major Indian women's organizations that existed in the interwar period, namely the All-India Women's Conference (AIWC), the Women's Indian Association (WIA), and the National Council of Women in India (NCWI).[11] These organizations developed their own notions of feminist internationalisms and sought a dialogue with their comrades from Europe and the US. They initiated regional networks with women organizations from other Asian countries and even organized an international conference in Calcutta in 1936.

The connections between Indian women's organizations and feminists from other parts of the globe indicate that "internationalist" was not synonymous with "European" during the 1920s and 1930s. Rather imaginations of "internationalism" varied between the different cultural, political, and national contexts as they varied among different women's organizations. In light of this, two widely spread narratives in the secondary literature become problematic, namely that international women's organizations had an unchanging Eurocentric outlook that led them to pursue imperialist policies, and that the response by Indian activists' was purely opposing and critical without alternative ideas of international women's solidarity. In connection with that, one should also note that "there was nothing fixed about an international feminist identity in the 1920s and 1930s"; rather

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8   See, for example, A. Burton, Some Trajectories of 'Feminism' and 'Imperialism', in: M. Sinha/D. J. Guy/A. Woollacott (eds.), Feminisms and Internationalism, Oxford 1999, pp. 214-225; C. Weber, Unveiling Scheherazade: Feminist Orientalism in the International Alliance of Women, 1911–1950, in: Feminist Studies, 27 (2001) 1, pp. 125-157.

9   See: G. Forbes, Women in Modern India, in: G. Johnsons/C.A. Bayly/J. F. Richards (eds.), The New Cambridge History of India vol. IV. 2, Cambridge 1996; R. Kumar, The History of Doing: an Illustrated Account of Movements for Women's Rights and Feminism in India, 1800–1990, London 1993.

10 E. Du-Bois / K. Oliviero, Circling the Globe: International Feminism Reconsidered, 1920 to 1975, in: Women's Studies International Forum, 32 (2009) 1, p. 1.

11 For this article, conference and annual reports of each organization and several issues for the years 1937, 1938, and 1939 of the feminist periodical "The Bulletin of the Indian Women's Movement" have been used. The majority of the material has been accessed from the US-based Sophia Smith Collection.

"the meaning of the term 'feminism' ranged from a narrow description of a particular equalitarian position on political issues to a concern for women that broadened into humanitarianism".[12] And as we will see, the feminism of Indian women's organization complicated claims for universality. In short, both "feminism" and "internationalism" should be looked at as being undefined, volatile practices and narratives, which become definable only in the specific contexts and geographic locations of their emergence and transformation.

The term "internationalism" had been employed since the mid-19th century by different political and social movements in Europe to designate their efforts to reform society and politics by cooperating transnationally and advocating new international structures; as "conscious movements" they pursued particular interests.[13] Due to that, as Daniel Lacqua notes, the term has an "ambiguous meaning" and contains a "variety of possible connotations".[14] It makes the categorization of variants difficult if one does not want to simplify. It is plausible to distinguish with Mark Mazower between liberal (Wilsonian), socialist (Leninist), and fascist internationalism.[15] The feminist internationalisms that are addressed in the following belong by and large to the liberal current of internationalist thought. On the other hand, his scheme has a homogenizing tendency and marginalizes internationalisms in non-European regions. To emphasise the many directions the internationalist movement took, also within the larger groups Mazower underlines, the use of the plural form of "internationalisms" seems helpful to me. It also draws attention to transnational networks and bonds that evolved outside of Europe in the 20th century, and it connects with the studies that demonstrate the plurality of feminism.[16]

To come back to the interwar period: after World War I the ambition to organize a truly worldwide campaign supporting women's rights gained popularity. This was based on the encouraging cosmopolitan Zeitgeist, advanced by many of the intellectual, political, and cultural elites in Europe and North America who began to establish cross-national exchange and cooperation.[17] However, these networks were not the only stages and centres of internationalist thinking and practice. Madeleine Herren argues convincingly that these internationalists, in contrast to their predecessors in the 19th century, were not necessarily middle-class male and European.[18] New actors appeared and previously unheard voices became part of the debate, resulting in the structure of the international order

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12   L. Rupp, Worlds of Women (2), pp. 154, 365.
13   On the need to historicize the term "internationalism", see: M. H. Geyer / J. Paulmann (eds.), The Mechanics of Internationalism. Culture, Society, and Politics from the 1840s to the First World War, Oxford 2001, pp. xii, 3, 25.
14   D. Laqua (ed.), Internationalism Reconfigured (6), p. xii.
15   M. Mazower, Governing the World. The History of an Idea, New York 2012.
16   In the 1980s, feminist scholars started to speak of "feminisms", acknowledging with the plural of the term that "specific historical and cultural experiences will differently construct understandings of gender at different times and places", in F. Miller, Feminism and Transnationalism, in: M. Sinha / D. Guy / A. Woollacott (eds.), Feminisms and Internationalism (5), p. 225.
17   A. Iriye, Cultural Internationalism and World Order, Baltimore 1997.
18   M. Herren, Internationale Organisationen seit 1865: Eine Globalgeschichte der internationalen Ordnung, Darmstadt 2009, p. 81.

of the 1920s and 1930s being both old and new. European-North American universalism and imperialism intersected with anti-colonialism and several nationalisms.[19] The newly founded League of Nations mirrored this increasingly global outlook – starting with 32 original members, of whom only ten were from Europe – which marked a shift away from an uncontested Eurocentric world order and a growing self-consciousness of actors from Asia and South America towards the West.[20] Still, as several authors have pointed out, the League of Nations continued to be a European enterprise, albeit based on the Wilsonian idea of self-determination.[21] No matter what Eurocentric outlook the League of Nations had, in the end there was new leeway for colonized countries.[22] Also India, among other non-sovereign countries, was awarded greater scope of action in international politics after World War I, although it was still under British rule and thus signed the peace treaties as part of the British Empire.[23] It was a founding member of the League of Nations and soon entered the International Labour Organization (ILO).[24] The question that arises is how far the concessions of the British for an increased Indian participation went and in how far they were in fact part of a British strategy to gain maximum influence in those international organizations for themselves. Nonetheless, Indian intellectuals used the Geneva institutions for intellectual cooperation to outsmart the control of the government of India, and were quite successful in lobbying for support for Indian independence.[25]

Globalizing Agendas and Membership: ICW, IAW, and Indian Women's Organizations

In the 1920s, when in several European countries and in parts of the British Commonwealth suffrage was granted to women, the ICW and the IAW began to expand; both

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19   The simultaneity of old and new structures emerged with the caesura of World War I. On the one hand, the war infused a deep insecurity in the British self about maintaining imperial supremacy and, on the other hand, in the colonies the cry for self-rule was voiced vociferously. Colonialism and anti-colonialism encountered each other in complex constellations during the interwar period. See, for example, E. Hobsbawm, The Age of Extremes. A History of the World, 1914–1991, New York 1996, p. 210.

20   A. Iriye, Cultural Internationalism (17), p. 58.

21   For Gorman, the intersection of imperialism and internationalism formed the dominant logic of the League of Nation's outlook on international relations. See: D. Gorman, Empire, Internationalism, and the Campaign against the Traffic in Women and Children in the 1920s, in: 20th Century British History, 19 (2008) 2, p. 192 and M. Mazower, Governing the World (15).

22   For a critical discussion that still sees a progressive move in the mandate system, see: S. Pederson, The Meaning of the Mandates System: An Argument, in: Geschichte und Gesellschaft, 32 (2006) 4, pp. 560-82, and E. Manela, Wilsonian moment (3), p. 5.

23   M. Herren, Internationale Organisationen seit 1865 (18), p. 55.

24   Carolien Stolte has shown that Indian workers' delegations made use of the relative openness of the ILO with its universalist approach and its tripartite system towards non-Western internationalist actors. Moreover, India together with Japan drove the efforts to better represent Asia within the ILO, see: C. Stolte, Bringing Asia to the World: Indian Trade Unionism and the Long Road towards the Asiatic Labour Congress, 1919-37, in: Journal of Global History, 7 (2012) 2, pp. 257-278.

25   M. Herren, Internationale Organisationen seit 1865 (18), p. 81.

admitted national branches in Latin America, Asia, the Middle East, and Africa.[26] The IAW in fact had already around 1900 started to incorporate feminist activist from non-Western regions, and some scholars even argue that the engagement for the betterment of their conditions belongs to the founding features of the Euro-American international women's movement.[27] Illuminating in this regard is also the fact that Carrie Chapman Catt, then president of the IAW, and Aletta Jacobs, a Dutch suffragist, travelled widely in 1911–1912 to initiate new IAW branches and recruit new members in non-Western regions.[28] In their travel reports, they did not only consider but recognised that women in the "Orient" do not need help from abroad to organize, let alone because they had already formed their own movement.[29] Yet, at least the leading figures of the IAW did not see themselves on par with their like-minded counterparts from other areas of the world. Catt, for example, remarked at a conference in 1909 that the emancipation of women was a global task, which would only be completed if also women from the "uncivilized parts of the world" were given equal rights.[30] This attitude of superiority does not contradict, however, the more global outlook that came up in the 1920s. In the decades before, non-Western women had been excluded; now they were integrated, albeit on the grounds of a civilizing ambition and responsibility for the concerns of women in the colonies.

The greater inclusiveness of the IAW and the ICW went beyond rhetorical statements. The importance the ICW attached to the geographical broadening of its activities is clearly visible in the stocktaking on the occasion of its 50th anniversary. In connection with the celebrations, a brochure was published on "Histories of Affiliated National Councils", in which the then first vice president Maria Ogilvie Gordon proudly reported that, already in 1914, of the 23 affiliated National Councils six were non-European.[31] By listing the additions since 1918 separately, she voiced the perception that at that time a new era had begun, namely the further broadening of the IAW through affiliations in "India, China (in small measure), Chile, Peru, [and] Brazil".[32] The interest in a more global representation did not take the form of a strategic expansion. As much as the ICW sought to internationalize, its statutes, at least initially, spoke a different language

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26   See: L. Rupp, Worlds of Women (2), p. 79; M. Sandell, A Real Meeting of the Women of the East and the West, p. 165 (6); L. Rupp, Constructing Internationalism: The Case of Transnational Women's Organizations, 1888–1945, in: American Historical Review, 99 (1994) 5, pp. 1571-1600, here p. 1580.

27   M. Moynagh/N. Forestell (eds.), Documenting First Wave Feminisms: Transnational Collaborations and Crosscurrents, Volume I, Toronto 2012, p. 5.

28   Aletta Jacobs was a leading figure of the Dutch suffrage organization and co-founder of the WILPF in 1919. Compare: H. Feinberg / A. H. Jacobs, Jewish Women: A Comprehensive Historical Encyclopedia, Jewish Women's Archive (2009), http://jwa.org/encyclopedia/article/jacobs-aletta-henriette, access on 04.11.2013.

29   L. Rupp, Worlds of Women (2), p. 77.

30   Susan Zimmermann describes this attitude as "developmentalist internationalism", see: The Challenge of Multinational Empire for the International Women's Movement: The Habsburg Monarchy and the Development of Feminist Inter/National Politics, in: Journal of Women's History, 17 (2005) 2, p. 91.

31   Histories of affiliated National Councils 1888–1938, International Council of Women 1938, in: International Archief Vrouwenbeweging Amsterdam [in the following IAVA], WER 7 1938, p. 16.

32   Ibid., p. 16. Brackets are there in the original.

by requesting that affiliated organizations needed to represent a sovereign country.[33] In view of this narrow and Eurocentric regulation, the admission of the National Council of Women in India in 1925 was exceptional, which can be partly explained by the fact that Indian feminists had participated in the founding meeting of the ICW in Washington in 1888.[34] In any case, when the Indian delegates returned from their visit to the 1927 conference of the ICW, they reported that "great interest was shown in the newly formed Council in India".[35]

In 1930 the ICW began to rethink its admission policy through an "Enquiry into the possibility of representation of countries not entirely self-supporting and in different stages of development".[36] This consideration, made public, heralded a noticeable change in the composition of the conference delegations. Already at the second conference, at which the Indian Council participated (1930), all but one of its eight representatives were Indian born, compared to 1927 when the group consisted of two native Indian women out of five.[37] Partly this has to do with the large size of the delegation – compared with the ones from Latin America, Palestine, or China, who attended with two women at most[38] – resulting, among others, from close contacts Indian feminists held with British activists, which again stemmed from the fact that several of them had lived in Britain for years and were used to travel back and forth.

In terms of the leading positions of the ICW, the Indian Council – as well as other non-European members – was hardly represented. The post of the honorary vice president in the Board of Officers, filled by Cornelia Sorabji (vice president of the NCWI) in the year when the Indian Council joined the ICW, was soon "lost".[39] As a result, up until 1930 Indian delegates were neither nominated for the Board of Officers nor – being the most likely appointment[40] – for the Executive Committee with its different standing committees.[41]

As late as 1936, and then again in 1938, an officer of Indian origin was appointed.[42] Also in regard to other prominent positions, delegates from India were either not asked to apply or were not interested. Only the conference in 1930 was an exception. Then delegates of the NCWI participated in *all* standing committees through Jivraj Mehta[43] – that is

33 M. Sandell, A Real Meeting of the Women of the East and the West (6), p. 167.
34 C. Bolt, Sisterhood Questioned? (2), p. 15.
35 National Council of Women in India, Report 1925–1927, Sophia Smith Collection [in the following SSC], Box 6, Fd. 54, p. 18.
36 International Council of Women, Report on the Quinquennial Meeting, Vienna, 1930, in: IAVA, WER 72 1930, p. 49, see also: M. Sandell, A Real Meeting of the Women of the East and the West (6), p. 167.
37 Compare: International Council of Women, edited by the Marchioness of Aberdeen and Temair (36), p. 742.
38 Ibid.
39 Histories of affiliated National Councils 1888–1938 (31), p. 281.
40 There is evidence that Lady Tata, chairman of the NCWI's Executive Committee, was also part of the ICW's Executive Committee since she appears, dressed in a sari, on a photo of the Committee from the year 1927, and seems to have been involved in drafting a resolution on the finances of the organization, see for that: International Council of Women, 1925–1927, p. 1-4 and International Council of Women 1930, p. 43.
41 International Council of Women, Biennial Report, 1925–1927, in: IAVA, WER 71 1927, p. 1-4.
42 L. Rupp, Worlds of Women (2), pp. 67-68.
43 International Council of Women 1930 (36) 20-38. The standing committees were in charge of special subjects,

remarkable since the IWC consisted at that time of 43 National Councils and even the two large committees on "Fine and Applied Arts" and "Literature" could not represent all Councils at once. In addition, at the 1930 gathering a special peace meeting was held at which Sorabji was one of the four speakers, emphasising inter- and transnational understanding as the only way to peace.[44]

That the Indian Council was at times relatively well and better represented than the other non-Western Councils originated from its special status: it was formed as a sister organization of the ICW, had an Anglo-British membership, and was elitist in character, while being led by wealthy and influential women (like maharanis or wives of bankers and industrialists).[45] To give just one example, Lady Tata (Chairman of the NCWI's Executive Committee) had married in 1898 into the Tata family, which owned one of the largest industrial companies in India; she epitomized a "particular breed of enlightened Westernized and wealthy Indian philanthropist who remained conservative by instinct but who was influential through her links with wealth and Indian royalty".[46] Overall, the NCWI attracted a high number of members not of Indian origin, particularly British women. Along that line the NCWI's constitution states that the "council is organized to represent women of all races and nationalities whatsoever, who are resident in India",[47] placing an emphasis on residence and not nationality as a condition for membership. Between 1926–1927 one-third of the Central Executive Committee members and two-thirds of the provincial councils representatives were British. The NCWI even had a branch in London, "formed to be of service to members of the NCWI in India visiting Europe, and to act on behalf of the NCWI in India whenever so desired",[48] which had its bureau in the house of the High Commissioner for India.[49] Due to this nature, it held a politically conservative position and was at a distance to the independence movement, which separated it from the two other Indian women's organization.[50]

Regarding the special role of the NCWI, its country reports are telling because they mirror the self-understanding and self-positioning in the intellectual framework of the ICW.[51] The family and the individual were cornerstones of a benevolent, philanthropic

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such as peace and arbitration; suffrage and rights of citizenship; equal moral standard and prevention of traffic in women; public health and child welfare; education; migration; and trades and professions; see: Histories of affiliated National Councils 1888–1938 (31), p. 15.

44   International Council of Women 1930 (40), pp. viii, 47, 36.

45   See, for example, G. Forbes, Women in Modern India (9).

46   See: H. Rappaport, Encyclopedia of Women Social Reformers (M-Z), Santa Barbara 2001, p. 702.

47   National Council of Women in India (35).

48   Report of the twelfth congress: Istanbul, April 18th to 24th 1935, International Alliance of Women, London 1935, IAVA, WER 72 1935, p. 12.

49   International Council of Women 1930 (36), p. 746. The High Commissioner for India at that time was Atul Chandra Chatterjee. He was married to Gladys Mary Broughton, who happened to be adviser to the government of India on women's and child welfare. Compare: "Atul Chandra Chatterjee", Making Britain Database, http://www8.open.ac.uk/researchprojects/makingbritain/content/atul-chandra-chatterjee, access on 04.11.2013.

50   G. Forbes, Women in Modern India 1996, p. 77 (9). Elitism and social conservatism have also been ascribed to the ICW. See: L. Rupp, Worlds of Women (2), p. 20.

51   All national councils were asked to submit reports to the ICW, which were printed in the quinquennial conference or biennial meeting reports. The format and length of the reports varied, but all were designed such that

and party conservative, feminism, which echoed the emergence of a modern humanitarianism in the context of a more "moral internationalism" that transcended self-interested imperialism.[52] As Maria O. Gordon outlined in 1938, one wanted "to provide opportunities for women to meet together from all parts of the world to confer upon questions relating to the welfare of the common wealth, the family and the individual".[53] This philanthropic feminism was embedded in a Christian missionary thinking, which included the idea that the Christian moral principle of charity should be carried "to many countries, where … our ideals have not been sufficiently realized".[54] This in turn went along with the developmentalist vision of the global mentioned above.

In its reports, the NCWI clearly expressed its view on India as being backward and in need of help from women to develop. In terms of hindrances to progress, so formulated by an unsigned report of 1927, "principally, a want of enthusiasm, a lack of knowledge, and a lack of funds" were presumed.[55] Deprived Indian women were considered as "poor and ignorant mothers", guilty of giving opium to their babies, and refusing medical treatment.[56] This statement can be read in two ways: as a chauvinist and elitist remark that blames Indian women from the lower or lowest social strata for the supposedly "underdeveloped" state of India, or as a declaration that attaches an inherent lack of "civilization" and "knowledge" to these women, who through education can still catch up with the standards of care the NCWI and its parent organization had in mind for mothers. Later, however, in the reports to the council meeting in 1930 and the report to the council meeting in 1938, the general situation of "underdevelopment" was explained or even excused owing to the multilingual and multicultural nature of India.[57]

That the multiracial constitution of India was one of the specific challenges to the Indian women's movement had already been noted in 1925 in the report of the ICW Committee on Education, stating that "India and Palestine have very complicated educational problems to meet, owing to the great variety of racial, religious and social conditions within their borders". That is one attestation of that the ICW was aware of in regards to

they would briefly inform the ICW and the other national councils of the activities and successes since the last conference. Success, by that way, was primarily defined by the degree to which they had put into action what had been decided on the international level in the resolutions.

52 D. Gorman, Empire, Internationalism, and the Campaign against the Traffic in Women and Children in the 1920s (21), p. 192.

53 Histories of affiliated National Councils 1888–1938, International Council of Women (31), p. 14.

54 Report of the Activities of the International Council of Women since the last Council Meeting, Dubrovnik, 1936, Bruxelles 1938, in: IAVA, D 114/12, p. 2. For the point on the "developmentalist vision of the global", see: Zimmermann, who argues that the international women's organization's adopted a developmentalist vision of the international system at the beginning of the 20th century, in: S. Zimmermann, The Challenge of Multinational Empire (30), p. 91.

55 Ibid., p. 285.

56 Ibid.

57 As one can read in the ICW conference report from 1930: "The achievement of our Council may be read rather small beside those of Sister National Councils, but it must be realized that we work under singular difficulties, a fierce climate, which will, we suppose always be with us, … and a great diversity of races and customs". See: International Council of Women 1930 (40), p. 595. Yet, in the report it is not further elaborated on what the "singular difficulties" are and in how far they and the "fierce climate" hinder the achievements of the NCWI.

the specific issues of "non-European women". It was backed by, maybe even reflected, an anti-colonial discourse of modernity that developed in India in the 1920s and 1930s, in which Indian women were portrayed as essential players in the advancement of the nation, guaranteeing its natural growth. The writer of the mentioned report, Lady Tata, picked up on this discourse by stating that "India's former greatness" could only be won back with reforms that would enable them to devote themselves "to the improving of their race".[58] Indian women here do not solely figure as part of the ICW's internationalist feminism, but are acknowledged as being active contributors to it: "In the ICW, I seem to see that the International Banyan Tree of Understanding is dropping one of its roots into Indian soil, soil lain fallow for some seasons, perhaps, yet responsive and rich, which will in time bring forth new nourishment for that tree, to the benefit of all humanity".[59] According to Lady Tata, women's participation in the international movement could allow India to regain cultural and national strength. With such expressions the Indian women's movement became an integral part of in the ICW's mission to help international understanding, while at the same time it was strengthened in its own right. From its beginnings the NCWI sought to influence and shape the feminist internationalism movement: in 1936 it tried through a conference in Calcutta, jointly organized with the ICW.[60] At the conference not only members of the NCWI and the ICW met – from the latter representatives for a whole range of National Councils attended, coming from Australia, Denmark, France, Greece, Ireland, Romania, and Switzerland – but also women who did not work in either of these organizations. For example, a female subeditor of the *Sunday Times* came to Calcutta to speak on the position of English women in journalism. More importantly, leading figures of the All-India Women's Conference, the most active local organization, also attended. Begum Shah Nawaz, Sarojini Naidu, Faridoonji, Kamaladevi Chattopadhyay, and Lady Nilkanth figured prominently in the conference programme, addressing vital issues like rural reconstruction, child welfare, and legal disabilities.[61] Thus, overall the gathering attracted activists far beyond the IWC and its Indian branch. Not surprisingly, the daily *Gazette Montreal* reported on the meeting under the title "World Womanhood Confers in India", mentioning in particular the presence of Chinese women and thus underlining the internationality of the conference, both in terms of ICW representation and activists from other organizations.[62]

The NCWI took advantage of this constellation by raising up their own status in the international community of feminists. One of its members called the conference a "great clearing house" that should do away with prejudices about "ignorant or inefficient" Indian women.[63] Padmini Satthianadhan presented the "richer and more enlightened women" of India as those who through their "craving for travel and knowledge of the

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58   Compare: ibid., pp. 594-595.
59   Ibid., p. 594.
60   Calcutta Conference Souvenir Book, 1936, in: SSC, International Council of Women Records, Box 2, Fd. 8.
61   Ibid., pp. 21-23.
62   World Womanhood Confers in India, in: The Gazette Montreal, 7 April 1936.
63   Calcutta Conference Souvenir Book, International Council of Women (60), p. 8.

world" will join the ranks of a cosmopolitan feminist elite: "soon it will be a common sight to see dark-eyed, brown-complexioned women, in their vivid draperies, in every part of the world".[64] In her statement one sees that the NCWI did not envision itself as all-embracing; underprivileged women were explicitly excluded. Satthianadhan described them as "dirty, insanitary, scantly-dressed, coarse, extremely primitive and usually very dark-skinned", with "lives that are obscure and apart from the development of national life in India."[65] Other of her colleagues shared such a view.

One should, however, not conclude that the NCWI, with its appeal for the "richer and more enlightened women", tried to lean on or advocated an adaptation to the lifestyle of Western women. Certain that their positions were shared but were derived from their own context, like for example the demand of gender equality, which was justified by a specific Indian "religious philosophy". Alongside, the difference to Western women was underlined: "the character of an Indian woman … is that of a modest, chaste, gentle creature, whose life is concentrated in love for others, especially her own husband, no matter what his character might be."[66] Added to that, Indian feminist practices were emphasised, such as, among others, the promotion of communal harmony by advocating the right to vote without differentiating between "Hindus, Moslems and Christians", or campaigns against child marriages and brothels or references to "their marvelous attitude in the recent Civil Disobedience Campaign".[67]

In Calcutta, in front of an international audience, the NCWI and participants from the other Indian women's organizations experienced that they could gain recognition in the national and international arena. Especially the self-understanding of being promoters of communal harmony was seen as an Indian contribution to feminist internationalisms. As it says in the speech "Indian Women of To-day", by Padmini Satthianadhan, "it is impossible to generalize about Indian women as a whole", but nevertheless, "a cosmopolitan spirit is causing all Indians to be more or less friendly with each other".[68] Further in the speech Satthianadhan points out that having "advanced even further than men", Indian women overcame "all communal prejudices" demanding adult franchise not as "Hindus, Moslems and Christians".[69]

Added to that, the conference helped to address a challenge all Indian women's organizations were faced with, namely that by claiming to represent women from the whole country they had to handle the different religions, cultures, and races. In response, an Indian sisterhood was envisioned that was based on an intercultural convergence, and the strive for an All-India feminist unity was understood and formulated as an "in-

64   Ibid., p. 25.
65   Ibid., p. 27.
66   Ibid., p. 25.
67   Ibid., p. 26.
68   Calcutta Conference Souvenir Book (60), p. 24.
69   Ibid., p. 26.

ter-nationalism".[70] What we can observe here is the appropriation of the notion of a united womanhood in a context characterized by different cultures and religions, with the aim to insert it into both feminist internationalism and national politics. After all, an All-India unity was seen by the Indian emancipation movement as a precondition for independence.[71]

Having demonstrated the different ways through which Indian feminists made themselves heard in the ICW, I will now turn to the second international organization, the IAW, and sketch how Indian women shaped their feminist internationalisms by requesting space for non-European viewpoints and by accentuating its self-organization.

The IAW had a higher rate of members from non-Western countries compared to the ICW. Already in 1913 a Chinese branch was established followed by an Argentinean and Uruguayan in 1920, and three year later by a Brazilian, Egyptian, Indian, Jamaican, Japanese, and Palestinian. In 1926 associations from Bermuda, Cuba, Peru, Puerto Rico, and Turkey entered, in 1929 organizations from Ceylon, Dutch East Indies, Rhodesia, and Syria joined.[72] The IAW's internationalism was different from that of the ICW as it was based on the US-American political tradition of self-government and self-determination of nations, while carefully distancing itself from the European colonial system.[73]

With the extension after World War I to countries not granting women the right to vote, suffrage became a core issue of the IAW, being seen as a responsibility of women from already franchised countries. That led to the idea of a Western tutelage to "help" non-Western women to get the vote.[74] The already mentioned Carrie Chapman Catt (president from 1914–1923) wrote in a letter to Aletta Jacobs that the women of the "East" probably needed "our help more than others".[75] The "East" was an arbitrary denomination that mainly referred to Asia and the Middle East.[76] Women's movements from these regions were treated by the IAW throughout the 1920s and 1930s as one whole and received special interest. Already in 1920, at the organization's conference in Geneva, one of the public evening events addressed the concerns of "Women of the East – Women from India and Japan",[77] and although not yet affiliated at that time some Indian women participated.[78] In the year of India's joining, in 1923, Catt, as the president

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70   M. Sinha, Indian Women under an Imperial State. Suffragism and Internationalism: The Enfranchisement of British and Indian Women under an Imperial State, in: Economic Social History Review, 36 (1999) 4, pp. 461-484.

71   J. Everett , All the Women were Hindu and all the Muslims were Men. State, Identity Politics and Gender, 1917–1951, in: Economic and Political Weekly, 36 (2001) 23, pp. 2071-2080.

72   L. Rupp, Worlds of Women (2), pp. 16-18.

73   S. Zimmermann, The Challenge of Multinational Empire (30), p. 92

74   See: Report of the tenth congress: La Sorbonne, Paris, 30 May to 6 June 1926, International Alliance of Women, London 1926, IAVA, WER 72 1926, p. 175. In fact study tours of women from disenfranchised to franchised ones were offered by the IAW, although only Switzerland accepted the offer. See: ibid., p. 55.

75   L. Rupp, Worlds of Women (2), p. 23.

76   The East was a world region, which was especially prone to be exoticized by the West, shown in the numerous works that resort to Edward Said's groundbreaking study "Orientalism" from 1978. See: E. Said, Orientalism, New York 1978.

77   M. Sandell, A Real Meeting of the Women of the East and the West (6), p. 170.

78   M. Bosch / A. Kloostermann (eds.), Politics and Friendship: Letters from the International Woman Suffrage Alliance, 1902–1942, Columbus 1990, p. 175.

of the IAW, celebrated the wide geographic and cultural span of the organization, now representing the "five great races of the world, Caucasian, Mongolian, Malay, Polynesian and Indian".[79] And in 1926, on the occasion of the Paris conference, a colloquium was held, which afterwards was proudly described as a "dramatic meeting of the East and the West" that "aroused the Paris public".[80]

The IAW's focus on cooperation between West and East culminated in the conference of 1935 that took place in Istanbul. It was the first time ever (and the last time in the interwar period) that a meeting took place outside of Europe and the United States. Here, as before, Indian women engaged intensively and effectively. "For the first time, the Alliance declared its opposition to polygamy after hearing from Begum Kamaluddin and Shareefeh Hamid Ali, delegates from the All-India Women's Conference".[81] Additionally, the conference committed itself to the special concerns of women from Asia and the Middle East, not least because Shareefeh Hamid Ali and others openly criticised with common voice – "we of the East" – Western imperialism and feminist orientalism.[82] The collective action was facilitated by the fact that the three Indian delegates (Kamaluddin, Hamid Ali, and Begum Ikbalunnissa) were Muslim and thus could easily reach common understanding with the Muslim activists from the Middle East. That was less the case with Hindu feminists, who blamed the invasion by Muslims for having introduced *purdah*, a custom of which Turkish women were freed under Kemal Atatürk, which made them more easily ally with Indian Moslem feminists fighting against it.

The twenty resolutions agreed upon in 1935 exhibit a pronounced interest in the needs and demands from Asian and Middle Eastern women and an unprecedented attention to their specific, both nationally and culturally rooted, feminism. Resolution no. 2 sought to establish closer ties and solid "East and West in co-operation" for "the interests of universal peace"; resolution no. 3 recommended the abolition of child marriage wherever it is practiced; resolution no. 16 tackled woman suffrage in India and expressed support to the "demand for the abolition of all sex disqualifications in regard to their civic and political rights" in the country.[83]

At the last conference before World War II, in Copenhagen in 1939, two Indian delegates, Kamaladevi Chattopadhyaya and (Malini?) Suktankar, spoke about the threat of war and struggle for peace, linking the issues self-confidently, on the one hand, to the question of national emancipation and beyond the male-female divide: "Peace could only come when the right to self-determination of every people was recognized and all took their rightful place as comrades in the world community of nations." On the other hand, they argued for collaboration with men for "great principles of democracy and freedom" as the key

79   Ibid., p. 171.
80   International Alliance of Women (74), p. 38.
81   Cited in: C. Weber, Making Common Cause? (6), p. 146.
82   L. Rupp, Worlds of Women (2), p. 80; A. Basu/B. Ray, Women's Struggle: A History of the All India Women's Conference, 1927–1990, New Delhi 1990, p. 70. In that sense, Turkey was a promised land for Muslim Indian feminists.
83   Report of the twelfth congress: Istanbul, 18-24 April 1935, International Alliance of Women, London, 1935, in: IAVA, WER 72 1935, pp. 19, 29.

to world peace, and asserted in the *Bulletin of the Indian Women's Movement*, the journal of the Liaison Group between the All-India Women's Conference and British women's societies, that "Indian women gave a lead in this matter to the rest of the world".[84] This strong stance can also be seen as an outcome of the conference two years earlier where the Indian delegates had successfully pleaded to base the intended resolution against the war on the Ghandian principle of non-violence, also taken up as one of the moral principles of the AIWC. Referring to the fratricidal warfare in Spain and Japan's ruthless aggression against China as a threat to peace, they advocated the following declaration: "Standing on the threshold of another year we dedicate ourselves to non-violence in thought, word, and deed, and appeal to women throughout the world to join hands with us, for we are confident that this doctrine alone can quell the desire for possession, can save the nations from racial jealousies and communal strife and protect humanity from oppression and exploitation." Their leading role was widely recognised, among others, by the British feminist Grace Lankester who stated that "many of us in the West are looking to you women of India with your fundamental belief in the power of non-violence to give a lead … in international affairs."[85]

By the end of the 1930s, Indian feminists had gained a greater self-confidence through their struggle at home and the important part they played in the independence movement, as well as due to their recognition by feminists on the international stage. As a result, the image of the "East", and more specifically of India, in the IAW changed from one of attributed backwardness to being seen as a spiritual leader, partially due to Gandhi's ideas to which Indian feminists subscribed.[86] Central to this trend was the fact that Indian concerns had gained increasing space in the discussions of the IAW and influence in its resolution, far more than the Indian National Council in the ICW was able to assert. To briefly illustrate : at the IAW conference of 1926, of the eight questions to study in the next three years two addressed what was reduced to as the Indian "problem", namely the age of consent for child marriages, both seen as a moral and a health problem.[87] In 1929 Rama Rau and Rosa Welt-Straus, representing the Union of Hebrew Women in the IAW, seconded the vote to raise the age to 16 for girls and 18 for boys.[88] The representation of Indian women belonging to the IAW at the conferences and in the organizational body, in terms of numbers and positions, was similar to the ICW, if one

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84 Bulletin of the Indian Women's Movement 20 (1939), SSC, Box 2, Fd. 8, p. 3.
85 Bulletin of the Indian Women's Movement 16 (1938), SSC, Box 2, Fd. 8, p. 4.
86 According to Duara, after World War I, the idea of a hegemonic West was countered by a new discourse of civilization, where the Asian civilizations were identified as "spiritual" and "peaceful" as opposed to the "warlike" and "material" West, see: P. Duara, The Discourse of Civilization and Pan-Asianism, in: Journal of World History, 12 (2001) 1, pp. 99-130.
87 International Alliance of Women 1926 (74), p. 109.
88 Report of the eleventh congress: Berlin, 17- 22 June 1929, International Alliance of Women, London 1929, in: IAVA, WER 72 1929, p. 32. On Rosa Welt-Straus, who had moved from the US to Palestine and had organized there the affiliation of the Union with the IAW, see: H. Safran/R. Welt-Straus, in: Jewish Women: A Comprehensive Historical Encyclopedia, in: Jewish Women's Archive (2009), http://jwa.org/encyclopedia/article/welt-straus-rosa, access on: 04.11.2013.

leaves out the limited participation in the fewer standing committees – with one delegate in 1926, none in 1929, and three in 1935, which was also the only time during the inter-war period when a board member from India (Rama Rau) was elected.[89] The reason for this is a rule on "nationality of delegates" the IAW introduced in 1926, which – contrary to the statutes of the ICW – permitted only persons belonging to a sovereign country to become a delegate.[90] With that decision also the participation of Western women living in colonies or mandate territories as delegates, substituting their local comrades, was complicated, if not impeded.

If we compare the composition of the Indian delegation to the IAW conferences of 1926, 1929, and 1935, then we see the growing influence of women from the region: In 1926, out of the eight delegates three came from Europe and one was a man;[91] afterwards all were female and Indian by origin. This trend seems to be linked to the fact that the IAW, contrary to the NCWI and the ICW, involved a local and independent Women's Indian Association (WIA).[92] In the WIA's reports, on their work in the respective umbrella organization, a striking characteristic emerges, which can be grasped in the following quote on the objectives of the WIA: "To present to women their responsibility as daughters of India, to help them to realize that the future of India lies largely in their hands; for as wives and mothers they have the task of training and guiding and forming the character of the future rulers of India … and to band women into groups for the purpose of self-development, education and for the definite service of others".[93]

From the responsibility for national progress and attainment of national sovereignty as a precondition, two positions are derived: a confirmation of the traditional role of women as serving the social community and the legitimate advocacy of women's rights. Charlotte E. Weber interprets this combination as "the rhetoric of modern womanhood", implying that a great role of women in the nation and a "successful transition to modernity" were intertwined and made for "a common feature of otherwise diverse nationalist discourses around the world over".[94] Added to that, in the reports another link is made, namely between an Indian discourse of modernity that claims a distinctive situation of Indian women, and a commitment to feminist internationalism in the form the IAW pursued. Attention is drawn to the fact that one works "to suit the different localities and needs …

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89 International Alliance of Women 1926 (74), pp. 4, 114; International Alliance of Women 1935, pp. 131-154.
90 International Alliance of Women 1926 (74), p. 127.
91 Bessie Drysdale, one of the European women among the Indian delegates was secretary of the British Birth Control League (New Generation League), see: R. Pierpoint (ed.), Report of the 5th international Neo-Malthusian and Birth Control Conference, 11-14 July 1922, London/Toronto 1977, p. 212.
92 The NCWI was founded in 1917 by a group of Theosophist women and was the earliest of the Indian women's organizations. See: G. Forbes, Women in Modern India 1996 (9)., pp. 72-75.
93 International Alliance of Women 1926 (74), p. 244 and International Alliance of Women 1929 (102), p. 413. In a similar manner president Ashby stated in one of her speeches, that "women shall bring to problems of citizenship and nation-building our special contribution and our special experience", see: International Alliance of Women 1935 (89), p. 9.
94 C. Weber, Making Common Cause? (6), p. 154.

spreading as the Association does from Bhavnagar to Calcutta, from Lashkar to Tuticorin", so that "every kind of Indian race and many differing customs" are embraced.[95] Interesting to note is also that whereas the multiculturalism was presented by the NCWI as a hindrance to the struggle for a betterment of Indian women, the IAW described it as a value and positive feature, even seeing it as characteristic of the All-India internationalism. Emphasising their own version of feminist internationalim became stronger when the All-India Women's Conference[96] – expressing its encompassing approach in its name – joined the IAW as a second Indian member organization, affiliated in 1935 and with that drawing the attention of an international audience to the plurality of feminist internationalism. Visitors from the US, the British Empire, Japan, and China, among others, attended the AIW conferences and were, according to the self-report, "impressed by the All-India universalism that Indian feminists vividly performed",[97] resulting from the fact, as Agatha Harrison wrote, that "women of all religions, all classes, demonstrate[d] a unity that gives lie to the prevailing idea that Indians are always divided amongst themselves. These women were certainly not."[98] The unity translated in greater visibility and spaces to manoeuvre at the conferences of the international organizations, as noted for example by Emmeline Pethwick-Lawrence, a leading figure of the British Suffrage Movement: "I rejoice in the lead they have given at the International Conferences. In my view the women of the East are foremost in their insistence upon women's complete equality and freedom."[99]

This growing influence on the international scene was without doubt partly an outcome of the stable cooperation between the Indian and British women's societies, which was even institutionalized in Liaison Groups. The WIA established a London branch (1931) and the AIWC a Liaison Committee (1934). The latter in fact went beyond the British-Indian connection with four societies coordinating their actions via the British Commonwealth League (BCL), the Six Point Group, the Women's Freedom League, and the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom.[100] With such a broad representation, the Liaison Committee was able to decisively shape the outlook and activities of the AIWC. Important about this is that instead of dominating Indian women, speaking for them in an imperialist and material mode,[101] the British and the Liaison Committee let

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95   International Alliance of Women 1926 (74), p. 244.

96   The establishment of the AIWC, which became the most vital of the three Indian women's organizations during the interwar period, was initiated in 1927 by the Irish theosophist Margaret Cousins who was also involved the founding of the WIA; both organizations followed a similar programme and there were overlaps in the membership, especially in the leading positions, see: Women's Indian Association, Report on the year 1927, in: SSC, Box 6, Fd. 57, p. 5; G. Forbes, Women in Modern India, 1996 (9).

97   All-India Women's Conference, Report on the 11th Session, Ahmedabad 1936, in: IAVA, V IND 72 1936 – B, p. 216.

98   Bulletin of Indian Women's Movement 12 (1937), SSC, Box 2, Fd. 8, p. 1.

99   Bulletin of Indian Women's Movement 14 (1937), SSC, Box 2, Fd. 8, p. 2.

100   Ibid., pp. 1-6.

101   For the view that the relationship between Indian and British women during the colonial time should be interpreted as maternal imperialism by the British, see: B. Ramusack, Cultural Missionaries, Maternal Imperialists, Feminist Allies: British Women Activists in India 1865–1945, in: N. Chaudhuri / M. Strobel (eds.), Western Women and Imperialism: Complicity and Resistance, Bloomington 1992, pp. 119-135.

Indian feminists speak for themselves. This was accomplished, amongst others, through the Liaison Committee's *Bulletin of the Indian Women's Movement*, which for Shareefeh Hamid Ali and others did "great propaganda work" for the AIWC since its copies were sent to over 30 women's organizations in the British Commonwealth, Switzerland, and the US.[102] One should not forget that the support of Indian feminists and of platforms for their self-determined expression by Western feminists did not, in all likelihood, just occur out of sisterly altruism. Rather, they were now considered as "civilized" or Western enough to "speak for themselves".

These organizational bonds between British and Indian feminists were the result of two developments. Since the mid 1920s a number of collaborative societies and committees had been formed, reflecting an emerging Indian intelligentsia with a national consciousness and some British support of the Indian independence movement and its spiritual leaders,[103] due to which the ties between Indian and British women became closer.[104] In addition, networks emerged when a handful of Indian women began to lobby for suffrage in London and elsewhere in Europe. In the words of the AIWC: "One very useful outcome of the political work outside India has been the many contacts that our delegates made with women's organizations of other countries and with institutions of international scope including the various organizations connected with the League of Nations".[105]

The new interactions and connections also crossed the Atlantic. The WIA received, for example, financial support from the Leslie Woman Suffrage Fund of America while Indian activists went to the US, like Muthulakshmi Reddi (president of the WIA from 1933 to 1934 and of the AIWC from 1931 to 1932), who travelled "nearly half around the world" in the year of her presidency to establish contacts with feminists abroad.[106]

Travels to women's conferences in other countries were an important way to contour and consolidate their own internationalism, impressively spanning a wide space of action. In 1937 AIWC members went to Japan to attend the 7th World Educational Conference, at which contacts to the Indo-European Women's Association and the Indian Welfare Association in Johannesburg, South Africa, were established, and to the Conference on Immoral Traffic in Women and Children in Java, convened by the League of Nations,

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102   All-India Women's Conference: eleventh session (97), p. 70.

103   The Britain-based India League, for example, engaging in the independence movement consisted of both Indian and British members and had a Women's Committee, see: "India League", Making Britain database, http://www8.open.ac.uk/researchprojects/makingbritain/content/india-league, access on 04.11.2013. For the wider "emerging anti-imperialist discourse in [the] international public spheres", see: C. Stolte/H. Fischer-Tiné, Imagining Asia in India: Nationalism and Internationalism (ca. 1905–1940), in: Comparative Studies in Society and History, 54 (2012) 1, pp. 65-92.

104   M. Sinha, Suffragism and Internationalism. The Enfranchisement of British and Indian Women Under an Imperial State, in: I. Fletcher/L. Mayhall/P. Levine, (eds.), Women's Suffrage in the British Empire: Citizenship, Nation and Race, London 2000, pp. 224-241; A. Woollacott, Inventing Commonwealth and Pan-Pacific Feminisms. Australian Women's Internationalist Activism in the 1920s-30s, in: Gender & History, 10 (1998) 3, pp. 425-448.

105   All-India Women's Conference: eleventh session (97), p. 213.

106   Women's Indian Association, p. 10 (96); Women's Indian Association. Report: 1933–1934, Madras 1934, in: ibid., Box 6, Fd. 57, pp. 12, 28.

which let them to appoint their own subcommittee on the issue.[107] Already a decade earlier, however, they had linked up, as indicated by Sarojini Naidu representing the AIWC at the first Pan-Pacific Women's Conference (PPWC) held in Honolulu in 1928.[108]

Parallel to the internationalization of the Indian women's movement, the 1920s and 1930s also saw a process of regionalization and institutional broadening. Stretching across the Dominion, the British Commonwealth League and the Pan-Pacific Women's Conference were founded, and conferences with like-minded feminists from Arab countries were organized.[109] This double trend can also be observed in other reform movements: the Indian Trade Unionists engaged more intensively in international organizations, while comprehending and presenting themselves as drivers of Asian regional initiatives.[110]

One event deserves special attention, namely the All-Asian Women's Conference (AAWC), held in Lahore in 1931, organized by the AIWC on the initiative of Margaret Cousins and attended by "delegates from Afghanistan, Burma, Ceylon, Japan and Persia (Iran)" but also observers from "Britain, New Zealand, the USA and Java".[111] The issues discussed were themes under debate everywhere: education, gender equality, equal moral standards, peace, children's rights, and labour. Remarkable are its two layers: the international and the regional. On the one hand, collaboration between East and West was stressed and Western feminists were called "friends and co-workers"; on the other hand, Asian women and their position in the world were highlighted. The need to preserve "oriental culture" as an "enrichment of the world" was expressed, as well as an awakening of the Asian woman, which would bring back their "former position of the Giver of Light to the World".[112]

The AAWC can be seen as an expression or moment of "pan-Asian enthusiasm", an interpretation Stolte and Fischer-Tiné used to mark the attempts in India to link the national discourse with a cultural-historical discourse of Pan-Asianism.[113] That Asian-focused rhetoric did not mean, however, a distance or disconnection from the international women's movement; it was rather used as a means to mobilize against the colonial

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107   Bulletin of Indian Women's Movement, 14 (1937), in: SSC, Box 2, Fd. 8, p. 6 (98); Bulletin of Indian Women's Movement 15 (1937), ibid., Box 2, Fd. 8, p. 2 (98).

108   V. Naravane, Sarojini Naidu, Her Life, Work and Poetry, Hyderabad 1980, p. 97.

109   A. Woollacott, Inventing Commonwealth and Pan-Pacific Feminisms, 1998, pp. 425-448 (104); R. Yasutake, The Rise of Women's Internationalism in the Countries of the Asia-Pacific Region (6), pp. 521-532; M. Sandell, Regional versus International: Women's Activism and Organisational Spaces in the Interwar-Period, in: The International History Review, 33 (2011) 4, pp.607-625.

110   See: C. Stolte, Bringing Asia to the World (24), p. 261.

111   A. Basu/B. Ray, A History of the All-India Women's Conference, 1990 (90), p. 133; K. Jayawardena, The White Woman's other Burden: Western Women and South Asia during British Colonial Rule, New York 1995, p. 152; M. Sandell, Regional versus International (109), p. 612.

112   Women's Indian Association. Report: 1930–1931, in: SSC, Box 6, Fd. 57, p. 11. See: M. Sandell, Regional versus International (109), p. 615.

113   C. Stolte / H. Fischer-Tiné, Imagining Asia in India (103), p. 75. For a thorough discussion of Pan-Asianism, see also: C. Aydin, The Politics of Anti-Westernism in Asia: Visions of World Order in Pan-Islamic and Pan-Asianist thought, New York 2007.

constellation via the construction of solidarity among Asian women, which was hoped to "bridge Asian developmental gaps"[114] in fields such as education.

The conference also became a platform to connect Indian and Middle Eastern women. A year later Margaret Cousins[115] represented the AIWC at the Eastern Women's Conference in Tehran, and soon after a cooperation with leaders of the Pan-Arabian Women's Conference was agreed upon. Dorothy Jinarajadasa (AIWC) had met in Beirut and Damascus, and Shareefeh Hamid Ali and Sarojini Naidu (both from the AIWC), became members of the High Council of the Congress, appointed by the then president Madame Noor Hamada.[116] Hamid Ali, a Muslim with special interest in women's rights in Muslim countries, connected the Liaison Group of the AIWC with women in Egypt while travelling with her husband, an Indian civil service officer, to Egypt, Palestine, Turkey, Hungary, and Austria in 1937.[117]

Thus Indian feminists did not only forge international bonds with women from the Western hemisphere, but also with women from other colonized regions that strove under similar conditions for their rights.

Conclusion

After the end of World War I, two of three world women's organizations, the ICW and the IAW, expanded into the non-Western world in the context of altered relations between the colonial metropoles and the colonies, newly won suffrage rights, and the trauma of war. This expansion has mostly been interpreted as the urge of Western feminists to live up to their self-proclaimed imperial(istic) responsibility of civilizing non-Western women, which provoked a response anti-colonial of emancipatory efforts and a critical stance towards feminist internationalisms originating in Europe and the US. A closer look at Indian feminists and their action in the world women's organizations reveals, however, that the reactions from women's movements in the colonies were much more proactive and multifaceted.

Without doubt, the ICW and the IAW reached out to the East with a deeply hierarchical mental map; to them the women of the world was split into disenfranchised and franchised, "developed" and "underdeveloped", and "civilized" and "uncivilized". Yet, the successive inclusion of activists from different cultural and national backgrounds led them to revise and broaden their agenda. The IAW paid particular attention to constellations in the Arab world and in Asia. Specific resolutions on child marriage and polygamy

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114   C. Stolte, Bringing Asia to the world (24), p. 258.

115   The fact that Cousins was an Irish woman and seems to have been accepted as an Indian representative among Arab woman shows that there was no reluctance against a Western feminist spokesperson per se. C. Weber, Making Common Cause (6), p. 104.

116   Women's Indian Association. Report (112), p. 12.

117   A. Basu / B. Ray, A History of the All-India Women's Conference (111), p. 7; Bulletin of Indian Women's Movement,14 (1937), p. 6 (98).

were adopted, while space was given to the criticism of imperialism (voiced, for example, by Indian women at an IAW conference in Istanbul). The ICW opened up less, but was still influenced by the constant and close relation to its Indian branch: the NCWI. At a commonly organized meeting in Calcutta in 1936, a straightforward adoption of Western notions of feminism could be ruled out openly, and stereotypes and Orientalist misrepresentations could be countered explicitly. This had to do with the fact that Indian women were considerably better organized and better represented in both the IAW and the ICW, as compared to other Asian or non-Western activists. Most of them had received an education in the metropoles of the British Empire, belonged to the middle or upper classes, and possessed the cultural vocabulary to communicate and connect internationally. Consequently, the internationalisms of the feminists in the previously studied Indian women's organizations also must be interpreted and understood as an elite phenomenon, reserved to a small circle of women. This is something that has also been noted for the feminists of the international women's organizations.[118]

Feminists in Indian women's organizations, like feminist activists elsewhere, were not a homogenous group. While the NCWI represented a group of wealthy and conservative Anglophile Indian and British members who described the majority of Indian woman as backward and in need to catch up with Western standards, the AIWC and the WIA self-confidently represented Indian concerns at eye level in the international arena, presenting themselves as spokespersons for a united Indian womanhood and defending the right for national self-determination.

The three Indian women's organizations made the world women's organizations aware that a reasonable feminist agenda for India had to acknowledge the conditions of a multicultural society. Initially, some Western feminists conceived this diversity as a hindrance to feminist unity and progress in the East, later they had learnt that recognising differences did not impede a common struggle for women's rights. At the end of the 1930s, with the start of World War II in Europe together with the context of a changing image of India in parts of the Western intelligentsia – increasingly discarding the ascription of "backwardness" and recognising the legitimacy of civil disobedience – Indian women were perceived as amongst the strongest advocates for world peace.

Feminist internationalisms between the two world wars were conceived and established not only in the West but in many parts of the world. One of their most decisive features were their close exchanges in transnational networks. Indian feminists were particularly linked to the British movement, which reflects the imperial context. In the 1920s these linkages lost their colonial character; what previously had been a relationship of dominance turned increasingly into one of cooperation.

Although the Indian women's organizations pursued a local-regional agenda and strove for the creation of solidarity and collaboration among Asian feminists, they also, and in equal parts, perceived themselves as international. All AIWC conferences from the mid-

118 See: L. Rupp, Worlds of Women (2); C. Bolt, Sisterhood Questioned? (2).

1930s onwards were events with participants from many countries, being prime moments for foreign visitors in the building and strengthening of a global women's movement. Playing on the regional and international level did not exclude one another; rather the two spheres were seen as being interconnected.

What I have shown questions the persisting view in most of the related research, that being that women from Asia have developed transnational ties and gained agency in international organizations only from the 1960s on. This occurred during the UN Decade for Women and the four international women's conferences in Mexico, Copenhagen, Nairobi, and Beijing, which prioritized the concerns of "Third World Women" in the context of economic and industrial development schemes.[119]

The findings I have presented invite one to ask about the legacy of the feminist internationalisms until World War II in the second half of the 20th century, in particular in the institutions of the UN system. After all, some of the leading Indian feminists of the interwar period continued to work in the post-war international women's movement and did not end their border-crossing careers after India's independence.[120] Other made use of the opportunities national sovereignty brought, like, for example, Rama Rau, who organized in 1952 an international conference on birth control from which the International Planned Parenthood Federation (IPPF) emerged.[121] Further it would be interesting to contextualize the feminist internationalisms of the 1920s and 1930s with other international movements of that time, to determine their mutual influence. and, on a more general level, to measure the degree of departure from Eurocentric agendas and relations. This would take up recent studies that argue convincingly that anti-colonial criticism already after World War I became more and more powerful, and that as a result institutions of global governance of the interwar time began to critically reconsider its Eurocentric bias while trying to (better) represent the non-Western world in their decision-making and executive bodies.[122]

119 J. Zinsser, From Mexico to Copenhagen to Nairobi: The United Nations Decade for Women, 1975–1985, in: Journal of World History, 13 (2002) 1, pp. 139-168; M. Roces / L. Edwards (eds.), Women's Movements in Asia: Feminisms and Transnational Activism, London / New York 2010.

120 A. Devenish, Recognising local faces in global spaces: Lessons we can learn from our Grandmothers, 5.12.2012, http://womenshistorynetwork.org/blog/?tag=india, access on 04.11.2013.

121 Margaret Sanger Papers Project, International Planned Parenthood Federation, New York 2010, http://www.nyu.edu/projects/sanger/secure/aboutms/organization_ippf.html, access on 04.11.2013. To focus on subjects and individual actors in future studies might reveal more about feminist internationalism from an Indian perspective. It would also be a way to write entangled histories from a transcultural perspective. See for the discussion of such an approach: A. Höfert / C. Opitz-Belakhal / C. Ulbrich, Geschlechtergeschichte global (= L'Homme. Europäische Zeitschrift für Feministische Geschichtswissenschaft, 23 [2012] 2), Köln 2012.

122 J. Van Daele / M. Rodríguez García / G. Van Goethem u. a. (eds.), ILO Histories. Essays on the International Labour Organization and its Impact on the World during the Twentieth Century, Bern 2010, and the review of T. Luks in: Archiv für Sozialgeschichte (online) 52 (2012), http://www.fes.de/cgi-bin/afs.cgi?id=81366, access on 04.11.2013; C. Stolte, Bringing Asia to the World (24), pp. 257-278.

Internationalization and Decentring of UNESCO: Representation and Influence of "Non-Western" Countries, 1945–1987

Chloe Maurel

RESÜMEE

Die UNESCO wurde 1945 ins Leben gerufen, um durch Bildung, Wissenschaft und Kultur zum Weltfrieden beizutragen, wobei sie in den ersten Jahren ihres Bestehens hauptsächlich in Europa agierte. Zunehmend jedoch weiteten sich die Aktivitäten auf Asien, Lateinamerika, den Nahen Osten und schließlich auf Afrika aus. Diese Ausweitung ist im Wesentlichen das Resultat des politischen Drucks von Vertretern aus nicht-westlichen Ländern, die die eurozentrische Geisteshaltung und Politik der Gründungszeit bzw. der Anfangsjahre kritisierten. Eine Voraussetzung dieses Einspruchs war die sich ausweitende Mitgliedschaft der UNESCO, die sich vor allem in Hinblick auf die Teilnahme von nichteuropäischen Staaten pluralisierte. Dieser Prozess wird im ersten Teil detailliert beschrieben. Anschließend werden Kooperationen zwischen den neuen Mitgliedern nachgezeichnet, einschließlich der Grenzen, auf die das gemeinsame Handeln stieß. Im dritten Abschnitt wird gezeigt, wie sich in der UNESCO eine offenere Haltung gegenüber Forderungen und Anliegen nicht-westlicher Gesellschaften durchsetzte. Zum Schluss wird diese Öffnung beispielhaft am Engagement in Afrika belegt.

A Quantifiable Increase of Influence: Membership, Venues of the General Conference, and the Elections of the Director-General

During the first decade of its existence, European countries and the US dominated UNESCO, not only in terms of the representation of world regions but also in regard to the pursued policy. To give just one example, France, Great Britain, and Belgium – still possessing colonies in Africa and Asia – were reluctant to see UNESCO engaging in these regions, being afraid it would threaten their control as the organization advocated the general UN principle of promoting national self-determination. Such a position

could, however, be less and less preserved – it became challenged particularly by the increasing number of "non-Western"[1] countries entering UNESCO.[2]

Set up in 1945 by 37 countries signing its Charter, the organization came into force in November 1946 after the ratification by 20 signatories. By the end of that year seven Latin American countries, four Middle Eastern, and three Asian states had applied and been granted membership, together with Australia and Turkey.[3] In parallel, the first national commissions were established, first by Brazil, followed by France, Great Britain, Norway, Poland, and the US. Already this development illustrates that what later came to be called the "Third World"[4] saw in UNESCO an important arena for promoting their concerns and thus took the necessary steps to become a member. The scope of the lands and regions represented increased in the years to come (table 1), and comparing the globalization of membership one sees that the world regions entered in different rhythms (table 2).

Many Latin American countries joined UNESCO shortly after the organization had been established, while only two states from Africa, Ethiopia and Liberia, also joined at that time.[5] A few years later, at the beginning of the 1950s, an Asian-African group established itself in UNESCO, and immediately pushed for the adoption of a resolution on the right of peoples to govern themselves (1952). Numerous African countries entered the organization between 1960 and 1962 once they had gained independence. This new composition, together with the fact that representatives from non-Western countries held the majority for that time, considerably altered UNESCO.

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1   The term "West" is used to refer to North America and (West) Europe despite its problematic nature, among others the homogenizing tendency and the differentiation between the "own" and "other" ("West" and the "Rest"), the latter being the non-western" world. I am aware that both conceptions are constructions and serve a dichotomic imagination of a world, divided into "west"/"east" or "North"/ "South".

2   Accession to UNESCO membership is codified in Articles II and XV of the Constitution of UNESCO and Articles 98 to 101 of the General Conference's Rules of Procedures. UN member states have the right to become member states of UNESCO. States that are not members of the UN can be admitted as UNESCO member states upon recommendation of the Executive Board by a two-thirds majority of the General Conference. UNESCO's member states contribute to the organization's budget in proportion to their wealth and can benefit from UNESCO's activities on their territory.

3   The Latin American countries being Bolivia, Brazil, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, Mexico, Peru, and Venezuela; the members from Asia being China, India, and the Philippines; and the Middle Eastern group consisting of Egypt, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, and Syria.

4   The concept of the "Third World" was coined by the French demographer Alfred Sauvy in the article "Trois mondes, une planète" published in the Observateur on 15 August 1952. It applied at that time to countries that did not align with any of the two power blocs. It alluded to the third estate, the overwhelming yet powerless majority of the French population at the beginning of the French Revolution. "Third World" became a popular label for African, Asian, even Latin American countries, and eventually a synonym for "poor" or "underdeveloped countries". With the end of the Cold War, it lost parts of its meaning and is increasingly replaced by the term "global South", see V. Prashad, The darker nations. A people's history of the third world, New York 2007; I. Wallerstein, C'était quoi, le tiers-monde ?, in: Le Monde diplomatique, August 2000, pp. 18-19; A. Escobar, Encountering Development: The Making and Unmaking of the Third World, Princeton 1994.

5   This may have to do with the fact that Latin America was of special importance to the UN in terms of representing also the "developing world" and strong signals were sent out to countries from that region.

Table 1: Membership of countries from Latin America, Asia and Africa (1947–1983)

1947	Colombia, Cuba, Ecuador, Honduras, Liberia, Uruguay
1948	Afghanistan, Argentina, El Salvador, Iran, Iraq
1949	Burma, Israel, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Thailand
1950	Costa Rica, Guatemala, Indonesia, Jordan, Korea, Panama
1951	Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam
1952	Nicaragua
1953	Chile, Libya, Nepal
1955	Ethiopia, Paraguay
1956	Morocco, Sudan, Tunisia
1958	Ghana, Malaysia
1960	Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo-Brazzaville, Cote d'Ivoire, Gabon, Guinea, Kuwait, Madagascar, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Somalia, Togo, Zaire
1962	Algeria, Burundi, Jamaica, Kenya, Mongolia, Mauretania, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, Uganda, Yemen
1964	Malawi, Zambia
1967	Guyana, Lesotho
1968	Mauritius
1972	Bahrain, Bangladesh, Oman, Qatar, United Arab Emirates
1973	Gambia
1974	Bissau-Guinea, Democratic People's Republic of Korea
1975	Granada
1976	Suriname, Mozambique
1977	Angola, Comoros
1978	Cape Verde, Namibia, Swaziland
1979	Dominica, Equatorial Guinea
1980	Botswana, Maldives, Zimbabwe
1981	Bahamas
1982	Bhutan
1983	Fiji

Table 2: Membership of non-European Countries per World Region (1947–1983)

Africa	Asia
	1949: Burma, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Thailand 1950: Indonesia, Korea 1951: Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam
1955: Ethiopia 1956: Morocco, Sudan, Tunisia	1953: Nepal
1958: Ghana 1960: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo-Brazzaville, Cote d'Ivoire, Gabon, Guinea, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Somalia, Togo, Zaire	1958: Malaysia, Madagascar
1962: Algeria, Burundi, Kenya, Mauretania, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, Uganda 1964: Malawi, Zambia	1962: Mongolia
1967: Lesotho 1968: Mauritius 1973: Gambia 1974: Guinea-Bissau, Democratic People's Republic of Korea 1976: Mozambique	
1977: Angola, Comoros 1978: Cape Verde, Namibia, Swaziland 1979: Equatorial Guinea 1980: Botswana, Zimbabwe	1980: Maldives 1982: Bhutan 1983: Fiji

Latin America	Middle East
1947: Colombia, Cuba, Ecuador, Honduras, Uruguay 1948: Argentina, El Salvador 1950: Costa Rica, Guatemala, Panama	1947: Liberia 1948: Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq 1949: Israel 1950: Jordan
1952: Nicaragua 1953: Chile 1955: Paraguay	1953: Libya
	1960: Kuwait
1962: Jamaica	1962: Yemen
1967: Guyana 1975: Grenada 1976: Suriname	1972: Bahrain, Bangladesh, Oman, Qatar, United Arab Emirates
1979: Dominica 1981: Bahamas	

Telling of the growing prominence of the world outside of the US and Europe are the meeting places of the General Conferences (GCs), which are highly symbolic and also influential for agenda setting and outlook. Initially organized annually, from 1952 the GCs were held biennially, usually taking place at the UNESCO headquarters in Paris; yet on particular occasions it was held elsewhere. Already in 1947 the GC gathered outside of Paris in Mexico City, the year after it moved to Beirut, and in 1954 to Montevideo, which signifies – and was meant to account for – the increasing influence of non-Western countries in the UN agency. At the same time, being requested (or allowed) to organize the GC was seen as an acknowledgement of the internal development and international status of a country. Reflecting upon the GC meeting in Beirut in 1948, then Director-General Jaime Torres Bodet assessed that by securing the organization on its territory Lebanon had displayed "genuine progress".[6] Similarly, the Italian delegation in a confidential cable to its foreign minister judged that it was a great asset – in terms of international publicity and commerce[7] – for

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6   J. Torres Bodet, El desierto internacional, Memorias, III, Mexico 1971, p. 47.
7   Note of the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, General direction of cultural relations with other countries, 9 February 1950, in: Italian diplomatic archives [in the following IDA], Carte di Gabinetto, 1943–1958, pacco 99.

the young state to host UNESCO, even more since it was the first time that an international summit was held in the country.[8] During the 1956 GC in New Delhi, Athelstan F. Spilhaus, the US representative of the Executive Board, underlined (in a quite questionable manner) the symbolic capital it brought for India by stating that it "is the first multilateral conference of this importance in India".[9] Surely the decision for New Delhi was a reaction to the Bandung conference of 1955 at which the Non-Aligned Movement had its beginnings. Still, it shows that India and other non-Western countries had become recognised powers and players on the international scene. The next GC outside of Paris occurred in Nairobi in 1976, and was presented by Amadou Mahtar M'Bow, in his concluding remarks as Director-General, as having been fully in the "spirit of Nairobi",[10] by which he referred to a strong pan-African character that reflected the creation of the Organisation of African Unity in 1963.

Another indication for the growing role of non-Western countries at UNESCO is the election of the Director-General, whose responsibilities include the budget and programme planning. His origin may not have influenced his policy – often actors in international politics belong to a cosmopolitan elite that had some distance to their home political contexts – but it surely was assigned symbolic meaning. It is thus not surprising that already at the 1948 General Conference representatives from non-European regions agreed upon Jaime Torres Bodet, the Mexican Secretary of Foreign Affairs, as a common supported candidate for the Director-General.[11] In a confidential cable, a French diplomat accounted the support of Bodet to the "semi-conscious yet very powerful, and probably racially connoted, impression that M. Torres Bodet, a Mexican of French descent yet of noticeable Indian appearance, is one of them, that he is one of the brilliant ambassadors of the world of men of color with whom they strongly sympathize. Thus Torres Bodet needs to be defended against the attacks of the old world that persists in maintaining the white man's domination."[12]

Torres Bodet – a scholar, writer and librarian, politician, and diplomat – seemed to many the best man for the job because of the high esteem he held in Latin America as well as in international politics.[13] As minister for education since 1943, Torres Bodet restructured Mexico's national literacy campaign, supervised the building of many schools

8   Telespresso 2042/483 of the Italian delegation in Beirut, 11 October 1948, in: U.S. National Archives, Diplomatic Records, US, College Park [in the following US DR], Decimal file 398.43, RG 59, Department of State, 1950-54, Box 1603.

9   A. F. Spilhaus, Report to the Secretary of State, 20 April 1956, in: US DR, Decimal file RG 59, Entry CDF 1955-59 (NND 907444, international organizations, conferences VI), Box 1556; Confidential Letter, US Embassy in Rio de Janeiro to the Department of State, 4 March 1958, in: ibid, Box 1564; Confidential Cable, Dulles to US Embassy in Paris, 2 January 1957, in: ibid, Box 1560.

10   UNESCO Archives Paris [in the following UAP], 19 C/INF, 23, 18 January 1977.

11   Confidential Report, Holland to Thomson, 27 October 1948, in: US DR, Decimal file, RG 59, Entry CDF 1945-49 (NND 760050, 501.PA/3-147 to 501.PA/4-1647), Box 2252.

12   Confidential Document 17 July 1950, in: Archives Diplomatiques, Paris [in the following ADP], Nations Unies Organisations Internationales, Secrétariat des conférences, 1960-1968 [in the following NUOI], Carton 835.

13   M. H. Holcroft, Lebanon. Impressions of a Unesco Conference, Christchurch 1949, p. 47; J. Huxley, Memories II, New York 1973, p. 67.

and libraries, and propagated the view that each literate person had a moral obligation to teach how to read and write to an illiterate person.[14] Within a few years, thanks to this campaign, 1.2 million Mexicans learned to read.[15] Not least because of this success, he was nominated president of the Mexican delegation to the founding conference of UNESCO.

Torres Bodet[16] won the election, on the one had because France supported him, and on the other hand since he was built up as the candidate of the "weak" against the Australian Ronald Walker. The latter was initially promoted by the US, being considered most open to issues of relevance to non-Western countries, but was finally asked to withdraw from his candidacy.[17] For G.V. Allen, then president of the US delegation, "in contrast to the bitter struggle attending the election of [Julian] Huxley two years earlier [as UNESCO's first Director-General], the practical unanimity which governed the choice of Torres Bodet augured well for the future of UNESCO."[18] It is indeed remarkable that almost all Latin American and Asian members united and voted for Torres Bodet, and that in consequence the US gave up its preferred option.[19] Equally important to note is the fact that Torres Bodet – unanimously supported by the Executive Board and the Secretariat – was able to ease the tensions and antagonism between the "Latin bloc" and the "Anglo-Saxon bloc", which had divided UNESCO from its very beginning[20] (at least in the eyes of French and American diplomats), and also due to his credo that "there can be no absolute boundary between the educationalist's duties and the diplomat's obligations".[21]

In 1952 Torres Bodet resigned, disillusioned by the Executive Council's refusal to vote for the budget he had made and which he saw necessary for his programme plans.

The second Director-General from outside of Europe and the US was the Senegalese Amadou Mahtar M'Bow, who was elected over two decades later in 1974. Before he was member of the Executive Board and Assistant Director-General for Education (1970–1974)[22], and through these positions he had been closely involved in efforts in reforming

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14   J. L. Martinez, Semblanzas de Académicos, Ediciones del Centenario de la Academia Mexicana, México 1975; on Torres Bodet see: S. Spaulding / L. Lin, Historical Dictionary of the UNESCO, Lanham 1997, p. 48.

15   En deux ans, 1 200 000 Mexicains apprirent à lire. Biographie de M. Torres Bodet, in: Courrier de l'Unesco, December 1948, p. 2.

16   Confidential Letter, Sargeant to Lovett, 20 November 1947, in: US DR, Decimal file RG 59, Entry CDF 1945-49 (NND 760050, 501.PA/3-147 to 501.PA/4-1647), Box 2244.

17   Doc ML/77, Annex I, Paris, 4 June 1948, in: UAP, X 07.531 DG; Confidential Report, US delegation to the 1948 General Conference, p. 10, in: US DR, Decimal file RG 59, Entry CDF 1945-49 (NND 760050, 501.PA/3-147 to 501. PA/4-1647), Box 2254.

18   G. V. Allen, Memorandum to the Secretary on the UNESCO Conference at Beirut, 17 November - 11 December 1948, p. 18, in: US DR (16).

19   Columbia Center for Oral History, New York [in the following CCOH], interview Luther Evans, pp. 372, 386; Doc ML/77, Annexe I, Paris, 4 June 1948, UAP, X 07.531 DG; Confidential Report of the American delegation to the Unesco General Conference, 1948, p. 10, in: US DR (16).

20   Confidential Report, Holland to Thomson, 10 January 1949, pp. 1f.; Confidential Report, Holland to Thomson, 21 January 1949, p. 1; Confidential Report, Holland to Thomson, 28 January 1949, pp. 1f., in: US DR (16).

21   UAP, DG/1, Paris, 10 December 1948, p. 2.

22   Report of the US delegation to the 84th session of the Executive Board, June 1970, p. 14, in: US DR, Subject Mumeric File, 1970-73, Special Organizations, Box 3222; UAP, biographic file of M'Bow.

UNESCO.[23] M'Bow's skills and the strong support his predecessor René Maheu account for his success in the election. Similarly influential was his African origin and his biography. He came from an illiterate Wolof family[24] and his childhood was overshadowed by a famine that occurred in Senegal between 1928 and 1930, out of which his later commitment to development aid and technical assistance to Third World countries arose.[25] During World War II, M'Bow served in the French air force, returning shortly to Dakar in October 1940 before fighting for the French De Gaulle's government-in-exile. After the liberation of France he went to Paris to study at Sorbonne University,[26] where he became the leader of the Federation of African Students in France and worked to "rehabilitate the African heritage".[27]

UNESCO officials considered M'Bow a "great" and "remarkable" Director-General during his first term (1974–1980), but less during the second term (1980–1986), mainly because of his advocacy for the controversial "community-ism-concept", a passionate promotion of non-European cultural identities and traditions, and because he appeared to be increasingly securing and widening his personal power.[28] Before his support decreased, he argued for a broadening of UNESCO's self-understanding. It his view UNESCO should not only devote itself to universalism but also to multiculturalism – mankind should be seen in its "unity and diversity".[29] To him, UNESCO's objective was a "true cultural osmosis that would neither be the domination of a particular type of culture nor some sort of cultural cosmopolitanism drawing on common yet non-essential features of each culture and thus prone to trivialization."[30] In the duality of universalism/multiculturalism he saw "UNESCO's vitality" grounded.[31] However, in the later years of his presidency M'Bow emphasised multiculturalism, engaged in projects to foster African cultural identities, and distanced himself from the universalist thinking that had been driven UNESCO's programmatic lines and policy.[32] Presenting himself now first and foremost as a spokesman of the Third World, he considered his re-election as "a sign of consideration and respect towards regions and people – Third World people – that, for a very long time, were kept away from the centres of decisions and of universal influence." Openly he declared that his mission now stems from "the genius and wis-

23   UAP, biographic file of M'Bow.
24   S. Groussard, Un Africain à la tête de l'Unesco. Amadou M'Bow: de la cause du petit paysan ouolof au Palais de la Culture, interview of M'Bow, in: Le Figaro, 15 November 1974.
25   A. M. M'Bow, D'un village du Sahel à la direction générale de l'Unesco, in: Educafrica, 1, 1977, pp. 5-11, p. 8.
26   S. Groussard, Un Africain à la tête de l'Unesco (24).
27   A. M. M'Bow, D'un village du Sahel, p. 9 (25). He repeatedly returned to Senegal to teach, see: S. Groussard, Un Africain à la tête de l'Unesco (24).
28   Personal interviews with Jean Larnaud (4 March 2004), Harold Foecke (19 March 2004), Acher Deleon (24 February 2004), by Chloé Maurel (Paris).
29   "Unité et diversité" is the title of the first chapter of Amadou-Mahtar M'Bow's book "Le Temps des peuples" (Paris 1982).
30   A. M. M'Bow, L'Unesco et le monde, idées pour une action de large portée, p. 10, quoted in: A. Monclus / C. Saban, La Escuela Global: La educación y la comunicación a lo largo de la historia de la Unesco, Madrid 1997, p. 142.
31   DG/74/15, Speech by the DG of Unesco, 23 November 1974, p. 1, in: UAP.
32   G. Sluga, UNESCO and the (One) World of Julian Huxley, in: Journal of World History, 21 (2010) 3, pp. 393-418.

dom of the African people",[33] while developing concepts for strengthening the "cultural dimension of development" and arguing for a "cultural finality of development". Along this line UNESCO had to help an "integrated development" in the Third World, in which "highly interconnected economic, social and cultural factors contribute together to progress",[34] and it should commit itself to creating a "new world information and communication order" (NWICO), because in this sphere African capabilities (the mastering of information technologies) could come out strongly. Of little surprise, M'Bow's radical defence of the economic and cultural interests of Third World countries brought criticism and as a result multiculturalist arguments were met with opposition, especially by European and North American members. It is, however, also an example that African and other non-European concerns could be pursued directly and vigorously.

Non-Western Collaboration and its Difficulties

Representatives from Latin America, Asia, and Africa became more influential especially due to their collaborative action. As early as 1948/49 they expressed joint demands: the election of a Director-General from their ranks, the venue of the General Conferences being in their regions, the recognition of a non-Western language as an official UNESCO language, and the expansion of the organization's activities beyond Europe and the US. Altogether they requested a thorough decentring and de-provincialization. In the following years one can observe the formation of three regionally based lobby groups: the Latin American, the Arab , and the Asian states.

After Latin American representatives had already engaged with a common voice in the debates of the 1946 General Conference, supported by Director-General Julian Huxley,[35] at the meeting two years later Arthur Compton (heading the US delegation) observed not only the growth of steady exchanges and links between them, but saw a group that "has developed a strong and united front on major issues which is very hard to break".[36] Taking up on that, Middle Eastern states formed a solid group within UNESCO a few years later, with Egypt a driving force.[37] Here the cohesion resulted less from their opposition to the hegemony of the Western countries and more from a shared stance against Israel. The attitude towards the neighbour had already been debated at the General Conference

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33 F. Valderrama, Histoire de l'Unesco, Paris 1995, p. 224.

34 A. M. M'Bow, Le Temps des peuples, pp. 165, 177-181 (29).

35 At a press conference in June 1947, Huxley criticised Western influence within UNESCO and wished that non-Western states gained the influence they deserved, see: Confidential Letter, Cody (cultural attaché, Mexico) to US Secretary of State, 16 June 1947, in: US DR, Decimal file missing information, RG 59, Entry CDF 1945-49 (NND 760050, 501.PA/3-147 to 501.PA/4-1647), Box 2241. In June–July 1947, Huxley visited many non-Western states in order to promote UNESCO and to encourage membership in his organization, see: Direction of Cultural Affairs, UNESCO Service, No. 3, 25 August 1947, in: ADP, NUOI 1946-59, Carton 333.

36 Compton to Allen, Confidential Report on 3rd session of UNESCO General Conference, Nov.-Dec. 1948, p. 1, in: US DR (16).

37 At the 1948 General Conference Arthur Compton still noted dissension within the group on particular issues, ibid.

of 1948 in reaction to the foundation of Israel and the first Arab-Israeli war that year, which had increased the hostility between the two camps.[38] Shortly before the opening of that meeting, a Lebanese Foreign Office employee proclaimed publically that Lebanon would prefer a withdrawal from hosting the conference to see a "Zionist representative" participating.[39] And at the opening of the conference, the representatives of Israel, the Jewish World Congress, and the World Union of Jewish Youth were banned from entering by Lebanese authorities, which caused serious political tensions that UNESCO was with difficulty able to minimize.[40] Already in UNESCO's third year, two non-Western alliances, the Latin American and the Arab, had formed and stood together against the Anglo-Saxon and the Latin blocs (with France and Italy in the centre). Arthur Compton wrote in a confidential report of "a marked display of Arab-Latin-American solidarity on major political issues", strong enough to make up "a formidable bloc".[41] Equally the Egyptian press observed – and praised – the "collaboration between Arab and Latin American states."[42] Nevertheless, such joint actions were not welcome everywhere, the least by US diplomats.[43] In the spring 1949 – according to Torres Bodet – members from Asia started to band together under India's leadership,[44] which has to been seen in relation to the recent entry of Thailand, Burma, and Sri Lanka.

Thus at the beginning of the 1950s "the increasing influence in conference debates of economically under-developed countries"[45] had became widely noted and soon led to a divide between industrialized countries – specially the US, the UK, and France – and economically less advancing and/or politically less powerful ones.[46]

Collaboration was not the only way through which African, Asian, and Latin American members fought for larger recognition and better status. Especially in the early years they criticised the highly unbalanced world regional representation in the UNESCO staff; for example, the Indian representative Radakrhishnan deplored at the 1947 General Conference the marginal position of non-Western countries in the Secretariat.[47] Added

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38 3C/VR 2, Beirut, 19 November 1948, pp. 14-16, in: Columbia University Rare Books and Manuscript Library, New York [in the following CU RBML], Charles Ascher Papers, Box 148.

39 Telespresso No. 2042/483 de la délégation d'Italie à Beyrouth, 11 October 1948, in: US DR (8).

40 Bidault to Schuman, Confidential Report, 26 April 1949, pp. 20-22, in: ADP, Mission permanente de la France auprès des Nations Unies, carton 117; Telespresso No. 1152, adressé par Valdenaro au ministère des affaires étrangères italien, 26 November 1948, in: US DR (7).

41 Compton to Allen, Confidential Report, p. 2; US delegation 3rd session of General Conference, Beirut, December 1948, Report on General Political Relations during 3rd session of UNESCO General Conference, 31 December 1948 (confid.), p. 4, in: US DR (16).

42 M. Perrier, Avec la nomination d'un directeur général mexicain à l'Unesco: La collaboration entre les pays arabes et ceux d'Amérique latine va entrer dans une phase nouvelle, in: Le Journal d'Egypte, 27 November 1948.

43 R. S. Smith, The formulation of Unesco programme, Harvard University, 31 January 1949, p. 111, 125, in: CU RBML, Charles Ascher Papers, Box 149.

44 J. Torres Bodet, Memorias III, pp. 163, 175 (6).

45 US National Commission for Unesco, Informal Report of the US Delegation to the seventh session of the General Conference of Unesco, 12 November-11 December 1952, p. 2.

46 Torres Bodet in allusion to the Christian native scene nicknamed the ones the "Magi" and the others "shepherd states", and deplored that the latter predominantly sought after material benefits with UNESCO, see: J. Torres Bodet, Memorias III, pp. 361, 364, 210 (6).

47 Diary of the 1947 General Conference, vol. 1, 4th plenary session, 8 November 1947, Intervention by S. Rada-

to that there was large sensitivity as to the origins of the experts sent by UNESCO to non-Western countries, which in several cases were former colonial administrators. For instance, in 1952, the government of Liberia – one of the few African countries then being in UNESCO – opposed the intention to send a British expert for inspection who had worked for the Colonial Office in London. This was successfull since in the end an Indian expert was sent to Liberia.[48]

The collectively articulated demands had also institutional effects, for example the establishment of regional offices. The initiative in this direction had started early, in fact by Julian Huxley in March 1946. Then Executive Secretary of the Preparatory Commission he wanted to create a decentralized organization, operating from headquarters in ten regions. Although his proposition was considered favourably by the US State Department, in whose hands the organization of the founding conference had been, the idea was not realized. Despite of that, during his visits to Latin America and the Middle East in 1947 and 1948, Julian Huxley repeatedly heard the call that his organization should expand its operations.[49] Jaime Torres Bodet also experienced this call, which, among others, Jawaharlal Nehru expressed the expectations about a more global anchor of UNESCO.

At the 1947 General Conference the idea of regional centres was revived, among others, by Paulo E. Berrêdo Carneiro (Brazil). He advocated "decentralization" and "regionalization" and activities "disseminated worldwide".[50] In 1948 the request was taken up by a group of Latin American representatives who proposed a regional centre to be established in Cuba, an idea that "was backed solidly by all the Arab states", while a similar proposal by Arab representatives for a cultural centre in their region "was backed solidly by the Latin Americans."[51] Notwithstanding opposition – notably from the US – the General Conference enacted the establishment of a "UNESCO regional centre for the western hemisphere" in Havana,[52] which opened in July 1949.[53] The struggle went on; and although it escalated in 1951 due to fierce opposition from the US,[54] the Regional centre of fundamental education in Latin America (CREFAL) in Mexico and the Arab States

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krishnan, pp. 61-62; UAP, SC/ADM/12, quoted in: G. Archibald, Les Etats-Unis et l'Unesco, 1944–1963, Paris 1993, p. 170. In 1950, among the 345 senior positions at the Secretariat, 156 were held by US, French, and British representatives.

48   Capper to Allen, Confidential Letter, 3 May 1952; Capper to Allen, Confidential Letter, 29 July 1952, in: UK National Archives, Kew [in the following UK NA] FO 371/97165.

49   J. Huxley, Memories II, p. 39 (13).

50   Diary of the 1947 General Conference, vol. I, 5th plenary session, 10 November 1947, Intervention by Carneiro, p. 72, in: UAP.

51   US delegation, Confidential Report, 31 December 1948, p. 4.

52   Bidault to Schuman, 26 April 1949, p. 15-16; G. V. Allen, Memorandum to the secretary on the UNESCO conference at Beirut, 17 November-11 December 1948, p. 14, in: US DR (16).

53   Création d'un bureau régional de l'Unesco pour l'hémisphère occidental, in: Courrier de l'Unesco, July 1949, pp. 1f.; Constituye un éxito la creación de la Unesco, in: El Mundo, 26 February 1950, pp. 1, 12, in: US DR, Decimal file 398.43, RG 59, Department of State, 1950-54, Box 1601.

54   Holland to Thomson, Confidential Report, 6 January 1950, in: US DR, Decimal file 398.43, RG 59, Department of state, 1950-54, Box 1600; C. Asher, Program-making in Unesco, 1946-51, Chicago 1951, p. 33; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Confidential Note, 27 March 1953; Note for the Conference Secretariat, 19 July 1951, in: ADP, cultural relations 1951-52, Carton 242.

Fundamental Education Centre (ASFEC) in Egypt opened in 1950. Apart from these three main and few other regional offices, UNESCO remained centralized, being run from the Paris headquarters.

Another issue on the agenda was the recognition of Spanish and Arabic as UNESCO's official languages. To establish Spanish as a working language was discussed first in 1946 when Ecuador had officially requested that documents be translated into Spanish. Again it was mainly the US delegation, flanked by France, who objected drawing on the administrative and financial costs of such a step.[55] A year later the Mexican delegation, supported by the whole regional group and backed by favourable press at home, tried it again, voicing loudly the resentment about the rejection.[56] In 1948 Arab and Latin American like-minded representatives joined and achieved a compromise. Spanish was to be used when interpreting is available, yet documents and reports would continue to be published only in English and French.[57] This success can clearly be attributed to the collaboration between delegates from non-Western regions.

Increasing Action (from the mid-1950s until the mid-1960s)

Representatives from the "global South" were strengthened by the experience of the success of united action and thus the continued to make use of it, even more often from the mid-1950s, then in many cases led by India, and other delegates from Asia.[58] The first conference of the Indian National Commission for UNESCO, held in January/February 1954, at which educational experts from the whole region and from Africa participated, constituted a landmark in efforts to profile African and Asian concerns in UNESCO. It offered an occasion to get to know each other, to assure oneself of the developing significance of the Third World in international affairs, and to take stock of the cohesiveness of their demands. It also allowed for the coordination of views on UNESCO's policy as well as for the preparation of joint interventions and demands for the 1956 General Conference.[59] Thus the conference can be described as a "pre-Bandung" summit in reference to the meeting at which the Non-Aligned Movement was formed. The partaking of Indian parliamentarians and of the Indian minister of education, Maulana Azad, in the

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55 General Conference 1946, C/30, 13th plenary session, p. 88-90, in: UAP; Noyes to Benton, Confidential Report, 24 December 1946, p. 4, in: US DR, Decimal file, RG 59, Entry CDF 1945-49 (NND 760050, 501.PA/3-147 to 501.PA/4-1647), Box 2241.

56 Fisher, First Secretary of the US embassy in Mexico, to the Secretary of State, Confidential Letter, 5 December 1947, p. 4; Fisher to the Secretary of State, Confidential letter, 19 December 1947, in: US DR, Decimal file, RG 59, Entry CDF 1945-49 (NND 760050, 501.PA/3-147 to 501.PA/4-1647), Box 2244.

57 US delegation to the 3rd session of the General Conference, Beirut, Confidential Report, 31 December 1948, pp. 4f., in: US DR (16); Bidault to Schuman, Report, 26 April 1949, pp. 16-17, in: ADP, French permanent mission to the UN, carton 117.

58 Letter by the Embassy of the German Federal Republic in India, 13 September 1954, in: Bundesarchiv Berlin [in the following BA], Bestand B 91, Bd. 252; P. Lengyel, International Social Science: The Unesco experience, New Brunswick 1986, pp. 28f.

59 Unesco in Schools, New Delhi 1964, pp. 55f.

1956 meeting of their National UNESCO-Commission, as well as in the 1956 General Conference in New Delhi, which the Indian government had organized with pomp, was meant to demonstrate that India was to engage more actively in UNESCO – especially in urging it to become more involved in the Third World.[60] Amongst the Asian states aspiring to play a larger role was Japan, which envisioned itself as "a bridge between the western and Asian members."[61]

Openly, non-Western members began to address the unbalanced composition of the UNESCO Secretariat.[62] Such criticism was on good grounds since in 1952 52% of senior staff positions were filled by French, British, and US-American officers.[63] In addition, non-Western states continued to oppose the stationing of experts from Europe and the US in their countries. For example, in 1957, in the context of the Suez affair, the Syrian government refused to host French and British cultural diplomats, and strongly urged for appointment of UNESCO experts and scholars from the region.[64]

But also Latin American engagement became more directed against the European domination of the organization, and sharper in tone. At the second conference of the ministers of education of the Organization of American States in Lima in May 1956, the Ecuadorian minister acerbically deplored UNESCO's lack of action towards Latin America" and the Bolivian minister complained that Latin America "receives only crumbs" of the "UNESCO feast" while accusing UNESCO of being a "European organization ignorant of the Latin American realities and behaving towards Latin American countries like a 'magisterat' full of his doctrinal superiority". According to the report of René Maheu, who observed the conference, these speeches were met with "salvos of applause". Yet Maheu also returned to Paris with the impression of a general "sympathy" towards UNESCO, and although to him the expectations were far beyond what UNESCO can give, he conceded: "I tend to agree with our Latin American critics … namely that the UNESCO Secretariat, in general, has yet to develop sufficient knowledge and understanding of Latin American problems, people and customs."[65]

As in the late 1940s and early 1950s representatives from Latin America, Asian, and Africa demanded material assistance, especially the opening of regional offices.[66] Throughout

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60 Pfauter, Report on the sessions of the Indian national commission, 24 February 1956, in: BA, Bestand B 91, Bd. 16; Glaring Gap in UN Practice and Profession. Azad's Criticism in Unesco Body. Speech by M. Azad, 6 February 1956, in: Hindustan Times, 7 February 1956; see also: Times of India, 7 February 1956, p. 1, and CCOH, interview with Luther Evans, pp. 437, 440.

61 Hackler, US Embassy in Tokyo, to the Department of State, Confidential Letter, 27 July 1956, in: US DR, Decimal file, RG 59, Entry CDF 1955-59 (NND 907444, international organizations, conferences VI), Box 1558.

62 UAP, SCX/PRIV. 2, 45th session, 5th private audience, 1 December 1956, p. 2.

63 They summed up to 182 out of the 349 positions, see: UNESCO archives, 42 EX/38, annex I, quoted in: G. Archibald, Les Etats-Unis et l'Unesco, p. 171 (47); Unesco activities in Japan, p. 16.

64 US embassy in Damas to the Department of State, Report, 16 November 1957, pp. 3f., in: US DR, Decimal file, RG59, entry CDF 1955-59 (NND 907444, international organizations, conferences VI), Box 1563. Requests to UNESCO to address their needs are documented in: K. Pfauter, Report, 24 February 1956; Glaring Gap in UN Practice and profession; Times of India, 7 February 1956, pp. 1, 7.

65 UNESCO archives, file X 07.83 Maheu, I, Maheu to Director-General, Confidential Report, May 1956, pp. 22-27.

66 See for this an interview with Luther Evans (Director-General from 1952 to 1958), in which he reports on the re-

the 1960s, they strove to transform UNESCO into an "instrument of cultural decolonization" – for which a significant increase of the budget and spending on projects in the newly independent states was seen as being primarily needed, alongside a better representation in the Executive Board.[67] The latter was met with success, as indicated by the observation of Oliver de Sayve, a French diplomat, who noticed that the African-Latin American group had become in 1965 an "essential element" in the Executive Board.[68] He had in mind in particular Paulo de Berrêdo Carneiro, who became the spokesperson of the Latin Americans in the Executive Board, later followed by M. Dell'Oro Maini. Also Carlos Chagas, a friend of Carneiro and permanent member of the Brazilian delegation at the General Conferences, played a significant role together with Malian Amadou Hampâté Bâ (Mali) and M. Tewfik.[69]

Still an issue in their engagement was the language policy; they argued that at least one of the widely spoken languages in the non-Western world should be used in UNESCO's internal and public communication. For instance Pakistan, Iran, Egypt, Kuwait, and Sudan drafted for the 1962 General Conference a resolution on a wider usage of Arabic, which was only recognised as an official language, as were French, English, Spanish, Russian, Chinese, Hindi, and Italian.[70] At the meeting in 1964, finally important documents were interpreted and translated into Arabic at the expense of the Arab states. And in 1966 it was agreed to progressively use it as a working language besides French, English, Spanish and Russian.[71] In 1968 granting Arabic the status as official internal means of communication failed due to the refusal of the US.[72]

Nevertheless, significant changes were achieved: UNESCO spending became more global; non-Western concerns received larger attention; Latin America, Asia, and Africa were better represented in the Executive Board as well as in many of the undertaken projects; and the multi-language policy was broadened. Besides, UNESCO offered a "good training ground" for those who would later work for the government or in politics at home, and they became acquainted with strategies to gain visibility and influence in the international arena.[73]

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sponses on a questionnaire the US Department of States had sent to embassies in Africa, Asia, and Latin America to inquire into the local expectation, see CCOH, interview with Luther Evans, p. 541.

67 H. Nafaa, L'Egypte et l'Unesco, Paris 1977, pp. 629, 636; N. Gaudant, La politique de l'Unesco pour l'alphabétisation en Afrique occidentale (1946-1960), Master Thesis, Université Paris, 1990, pp. 158-160; doc AE/78 EX/3.1 (n°236), in: ADP, NUOI, carton 835.

68 Letter from O. de Sayve to M. Couve de Murville, 21 May 1965, pp. 2f., in: ADP, Mission permanente de la France auprès des Nations Unies, Carton 117.

69 US delegation to the 72nd session of the Executive Board, 2-31 May 1966, Confidential Report (Benton), pp. 11-14, in: US DR, Central foreign policy files, RG 59, 1964-66, special instructions (NND 959000), Box 3340; No. 404/A/5 in: FDA, NUOI carton 835.

70 UNESCO archives, document of the General Conference 14 C/8, pp. 3-4.

71 Political instructions for the French delegation at the 14th General Conference, 25-30 November 1966, in: ADP, France's permanent mission at the UN, Carton 25.

72 Airgram, Department of State to all US diplomatic posts, 16 September 1968, in: US DR, Decimal file, RG 59, Entry CDF 1967-69 (special instructions), Box 3212.

73 Report of the US delegation to the 17th session, p. 4.

However, from the mid-1960s onwards, and especially during the 1970s, the unity began to fall apart. Frictions emerged, especially between Latin American representatives and delegates from Africa and Asia.[74] In addition tensions and different opinions within the groups arose. At the occasion of the 1968 General Conference, the head of the Pakistani delegation publically criticised (i.e., in the press) an alleged under-representation of Pakistan in the UNESCO staff, comparing it with the number of officials from India.[75] Rivalries also emerged between African diplomats from the former French colonies, the former British colonies, and the Maghreb, evident among others at an expert meeting on the development of information media in Africa in January-February 1962.[76] As the 1960s unfolded, the African group became "fragile", at least in the perception of the French and US-American Executive Board members. In 1966 William Benton (US) on the one hand observed an "increasing maturity and cohesion of the African group", yet on the other also saw "evidence of divisions within the group, not only along traditional language boundaries, but also in function of personalities and politics".[77] These internal rifts as well as the disaccord in the non-Western bloc widened in the 1970s and 1980s.

East-West Competition to Win the Third World

In the late 1950s the Cold War was increasingly fought over influence and control of non-Western regions, with decolonialization being the trigger of this expansion. Both the US and the Soviet Union (SU) competing for the alignment of Latin American, Asian, and African states, also in international organizations.[78] In 1956, as the New Delhi General Conference was approaching, the US member of the Executive Board, Athelstan F. Spilhaus, was confident that the meeting would "offer the US a stimulating occasion to gain a dominant position in this part of the world."[79] At the General Conference four years later, the US delegation aimed to "affirm US domination over the conference, to marginalize the Soviets and to gain the trust and esteem of underdeveloped regions, especially Africa", and the head of the American delegation, Robert H. Thayer, stated that "we have, I think, succeeded in taking the leadership in the Conference in offering assistance to the Africans in the field of education, without making our friends in Asia, the Arab States and Latin America feel that we have been doing it at their expense."[80] Here, how-

74   De Sayve to Couve de Murville, 21 May 1965, pp. 2f.
75   Airgram, Rawalpindi to the Department of State, 17 October 1968, in: US DR, Decimal file, RG59, entry CDF 1967-69, special instructions, Box 3212.
76   Report, US delegation to the Unesco meeting of experts on the development of information media in Africa, submitted to the Secretary of State by R. E. Hartland, 26 March 1962, p. 7, in: US DR, Decimal file, RG 59, Entry CDF 1960-63, Box 825.
77   Document No. 404/A/5 in: ADP, NUOI carton 835; Confidential Report, US delegation to the 72nd session of the executive board, pp. 13f, in: US DR, Central foreign policy files, RG 59, 1964-66, special instructions (NND 959000), Box 3340.
78   O. A. Westad, The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times, Cambridge 2007.
79   See the three documents stated in (8).
80   Thayer to Herter, 2 December 1960, in: US DR, Decimal file, RG 59, Entry CDF 1960-63, Box 822. The same goal

ever, attempts of the US to win the hearts and mind of the Third World – for ideological and economic reasons – were insofar contradictory as the advocacy for African concerns in the international arena were at odds with the racial discrimination at home.[81]

Similarly the Soviet Union profiled itself as a advocate of the Third World.[82] To give a few examples: at the 1958 Executive Board meeting the Soviet delegates supported a Middle Eastern candidate for Director-General against Vittorino Veronese (Italy), considering that "it is time for a representative of the Middle East to lead UNESCO".[83] And in June 1960, during a confidential meeting with Veronese, the Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko regretted that "the organization is still influenced by the residual interest of former colonial powers for their former colonies" and criticised that "colonizers impeding … UNESCO's activities aiming to assist newly independent countries."[84] To counter that the Soviet delegation suggested in 1960 firstly a UNESCO Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, which was opposed by the US and its allies with the argument that the aim was the task of the UN not UNESCO. Eventually a more moderate declaration on "the role of UNESCO in the attainment of independence was adopted, which stipulated the necessity to overcome all forms of colonialism and hindrances to freedom and independence.[85] Secondly, Soviet delegates proposed replacing the position of Director-General by a "collegial directorate" composed of three directors with equal powers, one representing socialist, one neutral, and one Western countries. Not surprising the move was supported by non-Western and East European representatives, but not from others.[86] It also failed in the second attempt, namely at the Executive Board meeting in 1961 where Alexei Pavlov sought to ensure "a fairer geographic distribution" of power and a larger influence for non-Western representatives concerning the governance of UNESCO via a collegial directorate.[87] Not giving up, the Soviet Union suggested five years later another draft resolution that would condemn "colonialism and neocolonialism" and request that independence being granted

orientated the US delegation to the Asian National Commissions for UNESCO, Manila 1960, which also meant to counter the pro-Third World attitude of the USSR, perceived as being implemented by "inject[ing] political and propaganda issues into the conference", see: W. Dox, Report of the US national commission on the 2nd regional conference of the Asian regional commissions, Manila, 18-23 January 1960, in: US DR, Decimal file, RG 59, Entry CDF 1960-63, Box 819.

81   G. Archibald, Les Etats-Unis et l'Unesco, pp. 291, 323 (47).

82   Cable by Trutschler to Bonn, 22 November 1956, in: BA, Bestand B 91, Referat 601, Bd. 16.

83   10 C/VR.17 (secret), January 1959, pp. 9f. and pp. 22f.; Speech by Soviet diplomat Kuznetsov; Cable, 22 November 1958, in: ADP, NUOI, Carton 836.

84   Confidential Aide-Mémoire on the meeting between Veronese and Gromyko, 10 June 1960, in: Istituto Luigi Sturzo, Rome, Fonds Vittorino Veronese, Carton 32.

85   Resolution, Le rôle de l'Unesco dans l'octroi de l'indépendance aux pays et peuples colonisés, in: UAP 11C/Rés. 8.2; Note, French permanent representative to the Secretariat General of DGACT, 8 December 1960, and Note for the Secretary General of DGACT, 10 December 1960, in: ADP, NUOI, carton 834.

86   11th General Conference, Note, DGACT to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, 22 November 1960, in: FDA, NUOI, carton 834; Le Monde, 26 November 1960, p. 2.

87   UAP, document of the Executive Council 60 EX/PRIVSR.1 (prov.), 29 January 1962, pp. 6f., in: UAP, SCX/PRIV.5.

without delay to all colonized people.[88] Again it was refused on the ground that it would "lead UNESCO to drift towards a political path diverging from its mission."[89]

In comparison, the American strategy focused on provision of material and technical assistance and subsidies, while the Soviet strategy promoted resolutions and declarations on political, economic, and social rights as well as against colonialism.[90]

Overall the sessions of the UNESCO's General Conference and Executive Board as well as other meetings became arenas of competition between the US and the SU to see who supports the most as well as in the best manner non-Western representatives and their concerns. The Kennedy government institutionalized development assistance in 1961 – not the least to promote US culture and US political principles in Africa as part of consolidating American hegemony. Merging distinct agencies, the International Development Association, the Peace Corps, the Alliance for Progress, and the Food for Peace Program were created, in response also to the announced "United Nations Development Decade".[91] These concerted efforts intensified the relation between the US and UNESCO;[92] the US used UNESCO as a means to spread its own culture and it is striking how explicitly – in confidential papers as well as in Congress speeches – it was linked with the ambition to rule the world. For example, Eugene Sochor, assistant director of the US National Commission, acknowledged in 1964 that UNESCO was seen as an instrument against Soviet propaganda, hoping it would "become a powerful voice for our ideals and concepts which will be heard by many uncommitted nations."[93] This application promoted by the US could now even be used to challenge the organization's own policies. Donald B. Eddy (UNESCO delegate) among others bemoaned that the US had lost influence in the Executive Board as well as popularity among non-Western representatives because it had opposed the increase of the budget for projects in their parts of the world.[94] Reacting to that, President Lyndon B. Johnson informed René Maheu of his decision to transfer funds that had been hitherto allocated to bilateral aid to development projects conducted by UNESCO and substantiating that the US would engage more in the future in multilateral assistance, as provided by UNESCO.[95] Along this line

88   UAP, document of the General Conference, UNESCO, 14 C/71.
89   See on that: G. Bourreau, La politique française à l'Unesco durant la période gaullienne, 1958-69, in: R. Frank et al. (eds.), L'Unesco: un instrument pour le prestige français, Paris 2002, p. 77.
90   C. Maurel, L'Unesco de 1945 à 1974, doctoral thesis, Université Paris 1, Paris 2005, pp. 274-280.
91   At the 1962 General Conference, the US delegation encouraged UNESCO to fully devote itself to the UN "Development Decade", see: Cook, US embassy in Niamey, to the Department of State, Confidential Letter, 2 January 1962, in: US DR, Decimal file, RG 59, Entry CDF 1960-63, Box 824.
92   US Report at the 1962 General Conference, p. 52; G. Archibald, Les Etats-Unis et l'Unesco, pp. 287-288 (47). In September 1965, President Lyndon B. Johnson presented a five-point programme, which to Olivier de Sayve seemed "very close to UNESCO's mission in many respects", see: de Sayve to Couve de Murville, 30 November 1965, in: ADP, Délégation permanente de la France auprès de l'Unesco, Nantes, carton 6.
93   E. Sochor, A New Look at Unesco, April 1964, quoted in: US National Commission for Unesco (eds.), Congress Reports, vol. 110, 88th Congress, 2nd Session, Senate Meeting, 8 April 1964, pp. 7273-7275.
94   Letter Donald to Eddy and Benton, 13 May 1963, in: UCA, William Benton Papers, Box 404.
95   De Sayve to Couve de Murville, 20 December 1965, in: ADP, Délégation permanente de la France auprès de l'Unesco, Nantes, Carton 6.

the Johnson administration generously subsidized UNESCO's special fund projects,[96] while initiating and funding projects in Africa to prevent African countries from taking the socialist path and to win their sympathy.[97]

The self-interest and the competition with the SU driving this engagement was naturally noticed, and countered. René Maheu, Director-General from 1962 to 1974, and being the first head of a UN agency to visit the newly independent Algeria, where he initiated projects,[98] emphasised in 1963 vis-à-vis the US National Commission that "no European state remains a great colonial or world power" and was "held in high esteem by representatives of under-developed countries" for that position,[99] which helped him to be re-elected in 1967 despite the rival candidacy of Humayun Kabir (India), who was supported by the British government.[100] But also those whom the US policy targeted voiced disagreement. In 1960 Amadou Hampâté Bâ (Mali) stated that "African countries are not ashamed of being the students of more developed countries, yet they ask them to not fight to be the first to help them and to let African countries carefully examine the presents that they wish to offer."[101] This shared attitude comes out clearly in confidential letters and reports, especially those African delegates sent to their governments.

This understandable refusal to let their own interests fall victim to the geopolitical rivalry between the superpowers helps to explain a growing distance and finally division between the global North and the global South. At least one can observe an ambivalent position towards the demands of non-Western delegates by representatives of the "First" and "Second" World. General sympathy runs parallel to a reluctance to significantly increase the budget and to focus the organization's programme on developing countries. In contrast to the jubilant and united atmosphere of the 1960 General Conference, at which new, post-colonial member states were prominently promoted, the following General Conference was "very rough, violent even", riddled with frictions between Western and non-Western states while not approving the requested budget of US$50 million.[102] And in 1963 France, the UK, and the US collaborated in the Executive Board

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96 Report of the visit of the Director-General to Washington, October 1967, pp. 1-3, 6-8, in: UNESCO archives, file X 07.83, Maheu, V.

97 Confidential Report, US delegation to the 72nd session of the Executive Board, p. 11-12, in: US DR, Central foreign policy files, RG 59, 1964-66, special instructions (NND 959000), Box 3340; Confidential Letter M. Cook (US embassy in Niamey) to the Department of State, 2 January 1962, in: US DR, Decimal file, RG. 59, entry CDF 1960-63, Box 824.

98 UAP, file X 07.83 Maheu, IIa: Communiqué from Algiers, 12 November 1963; Généralités sur la République algérienne démocratique et populaire, November 1963, pp. 5-9.

99 See the text "The New Europe" of the international conference organized by the US National Commission for UNESCO which took place in Chicago, 2-3 October 1963, in: UAP, X 07.83, Maheu, IIa; Record of conversation, Peter Thomas and René Maheu, 13 April 1964, in: UK NA, ED 121/1163; R. Maheu, Confidential Note on Record of meeting with Prime Minister, 10 April 1964, in: UK NA, PREM 11/5185.

100 Confidential Letter Pridham to Martin, 6 April 1966, in: UK NA, DO 163/65; Confidential Letter, A. R. Thomas, 9 May 1966; Letter Laurent to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, 24 October 1967, in: ADP, French permanent delegation to UNESCO, Carton 6.

101 UAP, document of the General Conference, 11 C/PRG/SR.6 (prov.), p 4.

102 M. Prévost, L'île des Uneskimos, Mémoires d'un ancien fonctionnaire de l'Unesco, 1949-1983, January 1996, unpublished manuscript, pp. 105-106, in: UAP.

to counter the repeated demand.[103] It surely played a role that Maheu was finally able to enforce his budget proposal – seen by many as "clear emergence of a doctrine and the implementation of policies" directed by non-Westerns states[104] – which European and US-American delegates adopted a "reserved attitude" towards. Dissatisfied with not being able to "impose their views" in face of a very cohesive and extremely determined African group, both groups had more "fear of offending the Africans [and] of being seen as defending rich nations."[105]

Two further issues exemplify the split: Firstly throughout the 1960s and 1970s, France, the UK, and the US refused to fundamentally change the composition of the Executive Board, trying to it keep it as a stronghold for the West, which was important since it affected the nominations for senior positions in the Secretariat, which in these years were heatedly fought over internally.[106] The second example is the debates about the New World Information and Communication Order (NWICO). In the 1970s developing countries began criticising the dominance of Western press agencies in the international public and demanded the adoption of fairer, more equitable, and democratic structures of production and diffusion of information and of knowledge, which would allow for greater participation. In 1977 UNESCO established an international commission, headed by Sean McBride (founder of Amnesty International and Nobel Peace Prize winner in 1974), to give a report on critical issues in regards to information and communication at the global level.[107] The report *Many Voices, One World* (1980) revealed serious North-South inequalities in regards to the production, access, and circulation of information. To counter that, it suggested to adopt the right to communicate as a new social right, and demanded the establishment of the NWICO, which would be more favourable to non-Western information and news agencies, especially African ones. Instantly the recommendations were opposed by those whose dominance it sought to reduce; they wanted to maintain their control over the main modes of international information and communication. Especially the US violently attacked NWICO and presented it as an attempt to impose totalitarian control over the freedom of press and opinion, and an inacceptable restriction to individual freedom. Together the US and the UK, where neoliberalism was then on the rise, insisted on the principle of the free flow of information in the spirit of laissez-faire and opposed any state, or intergovernmental intervention fostering a more balanced circulation of information. As the US threatened to suspend

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103 De Leusse, to the direction of NUOI, 18 December 1963, in: ADP, NUOI 1106, contributions obligatoires de la France; Minister of Foreign Affairs to the French ambassador in Washington, 27 December 1963, in: ibid.; Alphand, to the DGCAT, 10 January 1964, in: ibid., NUOI 836, programme et budget 1961-66.

104 Note of the general direction on cultural and technical affairs on the 13th general conference, 7 January 1965, pp. 49f., in: ADP, French permanent mission to the United Nation, carton 117.

105 De Sayve to Couve de Murville, 21 May; Rapport of the DGCAT on the 13th general conference, in: ADP, NUOI, carton 834.

106 Confidential Letter Martin to Cohen, 14 July 1966, and numerous other letters, in: UK NA, OD 24/15.

107 The commission included Hubert Beuve-Méry, Gabriel Garcia Marquez et Marshall McLuhan. Yet of its 15 members, only one was from sub-Saharan Africa, namely Fred Isaac Akporuaro Omu (Nigeria).

its financial contribution to UNESCO and even to leave the organization, the NWICO project was abandoned.[108]

Africa: A New Field of Engagement and its Problems

With many newly independent African countries joining UNESCO from 1960 onwards, the organization engaged intensively in this continent, especially in the field of education but also technology and culture.

Right from the beginning it pursued literacy and schooling in Africa. More than 20 training schools for schoolteachers (*écoles normales*) and 12 regional education centres were built on this continent, followed in 1963 by the Dakar-based Regional Group for Educational Planning and Administration , which became in 1970 the UNESCO Regional Bureau for Education in Africa, in charge of the planning of educational activities in sub-Saharan Africa.[109] However, financial difficulties, internal rivalries, bureaucratic inertia, and competition with other structures contributed to disappointing outcomes. Several UNESCO centres that aimed at training African administrative staff failed in their mission. For instance, Training Centre for Administrative Civil Servants of African Countries, established in Tangier in 1965, could not function as planned and was rapidly assigned to other purposes.[110] Still the efforts continued: UNESCO organized a series of international regional conferences, among others, a meeting of African Ministers for Education (MINEDAF) in Addis Ababa in 1961. It resulted in the adoption of the "Addis Ababa Plan", which reviewed the situation of education in 1960 and listed needs in regards to financial resources, building and equipment, staff training, and development of school curricula. Attended by many African ministers for education, ambitious and broad objectives were set.[111]

During the 1960s, using modern technologies such as radio and television to facilitate the transmission of knowledge in Africa was in vogue. In this context, UNESCO became increasingly interested in educational radio and TV programmes. In Cote d'Ivoire, it launched the Educational Television Programme (PETV) in 1969, which was implemented two years later. The objective of the programme was to compensate for the lack of African teachers through television and to harmonize the teaching curricula in the entire country in order to strengthen the Cote d'Ivoire's national identity. Schooling programmes were filmed in a production studio in *Bouaké* and then televised to primary schools throughout the entire country. The numbers of pupils with access to this form

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108   The advocacy for NWICO was one of the factors leading to US withdrawal from UNESCO in 1984, the US being more generally displeased with M'Bow's Third-Worldism. The UK followed suit and withdrew from UNESCO in 1985.

109   C. Maurel, Unesco Educational Programs, in: A. Iriye / P.-Y. Saunier (eds.), The Palgrave Dictionary of Transnational History, London 2008.

110   Report of the Director General for the year 1963, p. 35, in: UAP; M. Smieton, Report, July 1965, pp. 2, 5, in: UK NA, OD 24/041.

111   Document of the General Conference 11 C/PRG/1, 12 August 1960, in: UAP.

of teaching grew significantly. In 1980 schooling programmes on TV reached more than 650,000 pupils, that is, 80% of Cote d'Ivoire's primary school students.[112]

If the method was innovative and aimed to be accessible to many, its implementation by teachers proved difficult. The programmes were criticised as not being enough "African" and being too rigid. Indeed, the system was imposed; the programmes were conceived under the supervision of experts from Europe and the US, resulting in several negative effects. Many students who had completed primary school through televised schooling found themselves later marginalized as their formal knowledge was too limited to continue in secondary school. In addition, PETV challenged the traditional role of the teacher, as he seemed to lose prestige and authority, becoming auxiliary to a machine. After enthusiastic beginnings, PETV was also confronted with many technical problems as well as significant opposition, especially by teachers and the French-speaking intelligentsia of Cote d'Ivoire. This provoked the programme's demise in 1982,[113] while UNESCO's enthusiasm for new technologies as a means of knowledge diffusion generally decreased in the 1980s.

Another area of activities in and for Africa, which was demanded by African politicians, was the provision of technical and scientific knowledge, conceived as an instrument of economic and social development. Particularly needed were financial resources and help to build infrastructures in order to improve the scientific, technical, and technological training of African people.

In this context, the UN organized in Geneva in 1963 the *Conference* on the Application of *Science* and *Technology* for the *Benefit* of *Less Developed Areas* (UNSCAT). In his address to this conference, UN Secretary-General U Thant stressed that UNESCO should play a significant role in the promotion of science and technology as instruments of development.[114] René Maheu shared his view and began to promote the concept of "endogenous development", which was based on the assumption that unidirectional knowledge technology transfer from the global North to African countries was not sufficient. What mattered more was to help these countries take ownership of scientific and technological knowledge in order to to develop methods and tools modified for their cultures and specific needs. For Maheu, "endogenous development" was the only way to "attack the roots of underdevelopment and finally overcome it."[115] Equally, Victor Kovda, director of the Science Department of UNESCO, recommended that UNESCO help developing countries to nurture their own "scientific and technological potential". The latter was defined as "an operational bundle of talent and resources that a state should possess in order to solve its problems" as well as to reach "scientific and technical autonomy."[116] In

112   A. J. Tudesq, L'Afrique noire et ses télévisions, Paris 1992, p. 167; M. Egly, Télévision didactique, Paris 1984.

113   J. C. Pauvert / M. Egly, Le 'complexe' de Bouaké, 1967–1981, in: Les Cahiers d'Histoire 1 (2001), Unesco, AAFU.

114   A. W. Cordier / W. Foote (eds.), Public Papers of the Secretary General of the United Nations, New York 1976, vol. VI, pp. 372-374.

115   Press release ECOSOC/1595, 9 July 1963, in: UCA, William Benton Papers, Box 394.

116   Document NS/ROU/27, 11 February 1963, in: UAP.

order to implement this plan, UNESCO created in 1964 a Department for the Application of Science to Development.

Within a few years, and with the support of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), established in 1966, Maheu oversaw a rapid and significant expansion of UNESCO's operational scientific activities in Africa, including, for instance, a pilot project for teaching biology in Africa, launched in 1967; the publication of studies such as the Inquiry on the Scientific and Technical Potential of African Countries, released in 1970; the organization of conferences, such as the Conference of African States on Education and Scientific and Technical Training in Development in Africa, which took place in Nairobi in 1968; the Conference of Ministers on Application of Science and Technique to the Development of Africa, organized in Dakar in 1974; and the establishment of training centres, such as the Regional Office for Science and Technology for Africa in Nairobi in 1965.[117]

In parallel, UNESCO promoted African cultures, which marked a decisive change. During the 1940s and 1950s, the organization followed a universalist approach, advocating closer links between cultures as a way to overcome differences. Yet a conceptual shift occurred from 1960 on. In the context of decolonization, and what was soon to be known as "globalization", UNESCO strove to collect, preserve, and promote cultural manifestations, especially African cultures that appeared under threat. The latter also resulted from impulses by African representatives. At the 1960 General Conference, they advocated the development of African studies centres in their region, backed by Amadou Hampâté Bâ – Malian Executive Board member between 1962 and 1970 and leading figure in UNESCO's shift towards the preservation of African cultural knowledge – who urged to "save from destruction a considerable oral heritage, so far only preserved in human memory", and arguing that "preserving oral traditions from African countries" was "a pressing need".[118] Along these lines he declared in 1962, at an International Council of Museums (ICOM) meeting, that African museums "must become sanctuaries for African culture".[119]

Part of the UNESCO's engagement in this regard was the support to the collection of African oral traditions and to the transcription of African languages; Amadou Hampâté Bâ supported, for example, the development of a unified system of transcription. Together these efforts mounted in numerous achievements: the publication of grammar handbooks, dictionaries, and reading material in nine African languages that had yet to be transcribed, and the collection of historical and cultural texts, especially the oral initiatory tale Kaidara, transcribed and published in 1968 by Hampâté Bâ.[120] In 1972 UNESCO adopted even a "ten-year plan for the study of oral tradition and the promotion of African languages."

117   Similar centres were established in Tanzania (1968), Nigeria and Sudan (1970), Senegal (1974), and in Kenya (1975).
118   Document of the General Conference, 11 C/PRG/SR.6 (prov.), p. 4, in: UAP.
119   Bâ A. H., Nos musées doivent devenir des hauts lieux de la culture africaine, in: La vie africaine, (1962) 29, pp. 40f.
120   Kaïdara, récit initiatique peul rapporté par A. H. Bâ, Paris 1968.

Without doubt the shift towards Africa's cultures was influenced by the Negritude and Pan-African movement. Illustrative is the World Festival of Negro Art organized in Dakar in 1966 with UNESCO support, which sought to make a "wide international audience" aware of "African artists, writers, painters, sculptors, dancers, actors, filmmakers and craftsmen" and to let Africa appear "as a producer of cultures, thus marking the beginning of a new era, the era of cultural independence."[121]

In general UNESCO engaged in disseminating knowledge about African cultures to audiences in Europe and North America while also highlighting cross-cultural entanglement. For instance, a supported travelling exhibition on African arts in 1971 considered that "African visual arts have played a stimulating role for western artists during the entire first half of the 20th century" and that "the contribution of African arts to the universal history of art has been and will remain of considerable significance."[122] During the 1970s the *UNESCO Courier*, the organization's flagship periodical distributed in numerous countries, intensely introduced African cultural heritage to its worldwide readership; and in 1979, for the first time, the *Courier* devoted an entire issue to Africa.[123]

In connection, African representatives began in 1970 to underline that many African artworks as well as historical, and archaeological artefacts had been transferred to imperial home countries during the colonial era and had remained there. Seeing them as necessary to develop knowledge on African history, they asked that "artistic and cultural treasures from Africa, which have been taken from their countries of origin before independences, be returned."[124] This demand became more vocal over the following years due to support by Amadou Mahtar M'Bow,[125] which took in 1978 the form of restitution claims when M'Bow officially appealed to the return of "stolen" African heritage.[126] It met resistance: the US and several European states denounced a Third-Worldist shift within UNESCO, while the North-South dissensions deepened.

Also in 1970 the agency fostered the organization in Timbuktu of the Ahmed-Baba Documentation and Research Centre. Its task was to list, restore, and protect thousands of ancient manuscripts found in the region, which were threatened with decay and loot-

121   Leaflet "Premier festival mondial des arts nègres", in: UAP, file 7 (96) A 066 (663) « 66 », II.

122   Arts africains, Exposition en 34 panneaux, Unesco, Paris 1971, pp. 7-11.

123   See the following issues of Le Courrier de l'Unesco: January 1971 (L'Afrique et la décolonisation culturelle), May 1977 (Visages de l'Afrique), July 1977 (Freiner l'avance des déserts), November 1977 (L'Afrique australe et le racisme), December 1977 (L'essor de la cité arabe il y a 1000 ans), August-September 1977 (L'empreinte de l'Afrique), August-September 1979 (L'Afrique et son histoire).

124   UNESCO, Conférence intergouvernementale sur les aspects institutionnels, administratifs, et financiers des politiques culturelles, Venise 1970, Final Report, Annex I, p. 31, quoted from: H.-P. Sagbohan, L'Afrique noire francophone et l'Unesco de 1960 à nos jours, doctoral thesis, Université Paris I, Institut d'histoire des relations internationales contemporaines, Paris 1979, pp. 244-252.

125   A. M. M'Bow was Senegal's Minister for Education and Culture in 1957 and 1958. He was involved in the struggle for Senegal's independence, was Minister for National Education in independent Senegal in 1966, then the country's Minister for Culture and Youth in 1968.

126   A. M. M'Bow, Trafic illicite et restitution des biens culturels. Pour le retour, à ceux qui l'on créé, d'un patrimoine culturel irremplaçable, 7 June 1978 , URL:http://portal.unesco.org/culture/fr/files/38701/12320176145discours_mbow_retour_fr.pdf/discours_mbow_retour_fr.pdf, access: 15-10-2013).

ing, yet its crucial role not only shed new light on African history, but also disproved the myth that there were no written African historical records.[127]

From the 1970s onwards, UNESCO engaged in African cultures through the International Fund for the Promotion of Culture. However, the implementation of the several projects it supported, such as the establishment of an Inter-African Cultural Fund or of the Universite des Mutants, an intercultural university founded in Senegal in the early 1980s, proved arduous.[128]

Most importantly, UNESCO supervised, in collaboration with the Organization of African Unity, between 1965 and 1986 the editing of a *General History of Africa*, based on significant documentary and inventory research as well as a new systematization of knowledge on African history. Amongst the contributors to the eight-volume work were many African historians, among others Joseph Ki Zerbo and Cheikh Anta Diop, who constituted two-thirds of the members of the international scientific committee supervising the project. *General History* was the first attempt to give a unified historical account of Africa as a whole,[129] reflecting Pan-African aspirations. It was also thoroughly influenced by the "new African history", which reassessed the previously neglected and underestimated precolonial past. Africa's "new historians", amongst whom Cheikh Anta Diop was a leading figure, made use of specifically African, especially archaeological sources. The project is a testimony of the desire of many Africans to produce knowledge themselves on their history and culture instead of being confronted with accounts and research by other countries.[130] As M'Bow's foreword indicated, the purpose was to "remain faithful to the way in which African authors see their own culture" and "to see the things from the inside".[131] This project was an important achievement in terms of inscribing African history in the general cultural world heritage.[132]

Conclusion

Non-Western countries have played an increasing role in UNESCO since the 1940s, especially through collective action. First, representatives from Asian countries formed a lobby group, later an alliance of Latin Americans and of delegates from Arab countries emerged, and after 1960 representatives from the newly founded African states coordi-

127   J. M. Djian, Les manuscrits trouvés à Tombouctou, in: Le Monde diplomatique, August 2004.

128   Sénégal, création d'une bibliothèque interculturelle, Gorée 1984, in: UAP, document CLT/CIC/FIPC/12: OP 44.

129   A. M. M'Bow, Préface, Histoire de l'Afrique, Paris 1981, vol. 1, pp. 12, 14; idem, Preface, Histoire de l'Afrique, vol. 1, pp. 9-10, 15. For instance in the volume on the 20th century, section VII, "Independent Africa in World Affairs" discusses relations between African and other world powers. The section entails chapters on "Africa on Capitalist Countries", "Africa and Socialist Countries ", "Africa and Developing Regions" and "Africa and the UN".

130   Jean Copans has shown how the United States have expanded their influence in Africa, especially through scientific and cultural institutions, development assistance mechanisms, the establishment or financial support to intellectual networks, journals, research centres, and foundations. All these structures have influenced knowledge protection in Africa, see: J. Copans, Anthropologie et impérialisme, Paris 1975.

131   A. M. M'Bow, Préface, in: Histoire de l'Afrique, vol. 1, pp. 9f., 15 (129).

132   A. B. Ogot, Introduction, in: Histoire de l'Afrique, vol. 2, p. 18 (129).

nated their actions. All of them, and increasingly together, pressed in multifold ways that UNESCO would pursue their interests. I argue that non-Western member states have progressively taken ownership of UNESCO, helped to decentre internal structures, and globalized policies and programmes, thus triggering significant changes in the direction of diminished command by the large powers from Europe and the US – to an extent that in international public opinion UNESCO was considered to be a Third-Worldist organization. While the influence of non-Western actors within UNESCO was at its peak in the 1960s and 1970s, such leverage had its limits, as the organization has remained Western-centred.

Between "Local Knowledge" and "Global Reach": Diarrhoeal Diseases Control and the International Health Agenda[1]

Claudia Prinz

RESÜMEE

Der Aufsatz geht der Produktion medizinischen Wissens im Kontext globaler Programme zur Krankheitsbekämpfung zwischen den 1960er und 1990er Jahren nach. Am Beispiel der Eindämmung von Durchfallerkrankungen, eine der Hauptursachen für Kindersterblichkeit in ärmeren Ländern, wird der enge Zusammenhang von institutionellen, ideologischen und technologischen Faktoren behandelt. Die detaillierte Rekonstruktion der Schaffung von Wissen und politischen Direktiven im Umfeld der zentralen Initiativen der weltweiten *Diarrhoeal Diseases Control*-Programme hilft die divergierenden Positionen zu Gesundheit, wissenschaftlichen Agenden und Politik in der Weltgesundheitsorganisation, aber auch von Forschungsinstituten in Südasien sowie US-amerikanischen Entwicklungsagenturen zu erkennen. Das zentrale Argument des Nahblicks auf diese Konstellation lautet, dass biomedizinischer ‚Fortschritt' zwar von entscheidender Bedeutung für den Beginn weltweiter Gesundheitsprogramme war, jedoch eine äußerst geringe Rolle in der konkreten Zielsetzung und Entfaltung spielte. Verfolgt man gleichermaßen die Forschungspraxis wie die ideologische Rahmung der Gesundheitspolitik, entsteht ein komplexes Bild des Agenda-Setting und der Ergebnisse von Weltgesundheitsprogrammen.

The control of diarrhoeal diseases as a topic of international health policy is both old and new. On the one hand, the danger of cholera, an epidemic disease that has circled the globe in so far seven pandemics from the early 19th century on, had spurred the

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beginnings of modern international health regulations in the mid-19th century.[2] Vibrio cholerae is, however, only one of many causal agents in the broader group of diarrhoeal diseases, and when it comes to mortality statistics it plays a minor role, which stands in marked contrast to its importance in international health as well as popular imagination. Infant and child mortality due to other diarrhoeas with various etiologies were high all over the world in the 19th century, and after sanitary and nutritional changes in indus-trialized countries remained by the mid-20th century in "developing"[3] countries. On a global scale and as far as statistics tell us, diarrhoeal diseases became the primary cause of death of infants and children under five in the 20th century. Today, the World Health Or-ganization (WHO) ranks them second in causes of child mortality. On the other hand, on the international health agenda diarrhoeal diseases were addressed implicitly through sanitation programmes until the late 1970s, when a number of international organiza-tions, bilateral development aid donors, and numerous national governments initiated a global diarrhoeal diseases control programme. In the 1980s, diarrhoeal diseases control was one of the top priorities in international health and health-oriented development aid, but today is treated as a minor issue when compared with other infectious diseases.[4]

It is, apparently, not the evidence of a health problem as such that sufficiently explains the changes in the international health agenda in regard to this important group of diseases, but rather specific sets of ideas and institutional settings that have resulted in greater concern. In this sense, the purpose of this paper is not an epidemiology or "dis-ease biography" of diarrhoeal diseases, but an investigation of the relations between dif-ferent institutional actors; issues of local and global knowledge production, power, and the politics of health; as well as the medical, political, and social factors influencing the formulation of the international health agenda.

Change in the history of medicine is often attributed to variations in epidemiologies and disease patterns, to general changes in living conditions in a society, or to a change – "progress" – in health interventions such as treatment options and medical technology. Arguably, all of these factors were crucial for the history of diarrhoeal diseases prevalence, spread, and control in the second half of the 20th century: A new cholera pandemic from 1961 on captured the attention of the public, the medical profession, and health policy makers alike. Furthermore, the ensuing intensified biomedical research helped produce an effective as well as cheap treatment that could be used for all diarrhoeas, while interna-tional connections as well as a mutation of the cholera pathogen brought the pandemic

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2   N. Howard-Jones, The Scientific Background of the International Sanitary Conferences 1851–1938, Geneva 1975; V. Huber, The Unification of the Globe by Disease? The International Sanitary Conferences on Cholera, 1851–1894, in: Historical Journal, 49 (2006) 2, pp. 453-476; C. Hamlin, Cholera: The Biography, Oxford 2009; M. Echenberg, Africa in the Time of Cholera. A History of Pandemics from 1817 to the Present, Cambridge 2011

3   Obviously, the terms "developing" and "developed" countries are native categories taken from the sources, de-scribing complex social constructs that imply a style of thought, political imperatives, and overall ideas in social sciences. They are therefore not used as analytical concepts or categories, but as constructs to be historicized.

4   PATH. A Catalyst for Global Health (ed.), Diarrheal Disease Control and the Global Health Agenda, January 2011.

from its endemic areas in South and Southeast Asia to postcolonial African states on a massive scale, which resulted in ambitious international relief efforts.

An adequate explanation of the initiation, size, scope, and focus of the global diarrhoeal diseases control efforts from the late 1970s on, however, has to take into account the institutional and intellectual framework of international health at the time. In this article, the institutional framework within the United Nations (UN) setting, the influence of individual nation-states such as the United States or Bangladesh, and the role of specific research institutions for the formulation of diarrhoea research and health policy will be discussed. Looking at international diarrhoeal diseases control can serve as a prism from which the framework of ideas and institutions that have shaped the international health agenda can be understood.

International Health After World War II

From its inception international health policy was "politicized", as expressed in different traditions of medical reasoning. Social medicine, with an emphasis on the broad and social conditions underlying disease and health, had played an important role in interwar health policy. After World War II, when within the United Nations framework the WHO, as a specialized agency, held the health mandate, social medicine lost influence to biomedical approaches focusing on individual factors in disease. The 1970s were a decade of reformulating the basic assumptions of health and general "development" after the apex of modernization theory, a framework for development theories that was increasingly questioned in the 1970s. Internally, criticism was directed toward large "single-issue" campaigns that focused exclusively on eradicating individual diseases, such as the Global Malaria Eradication Programme, which had spectacularly missed its ambitious target.[5] Newly independent postcolonial states voiced concern over the exclusive focus on allopathic Western medical thought and advocated alternative medical traditions. Representatives of the Group of 77 set out to influence the WHO's agenda.[6] And just as investments in large infrastructure development were challenged in other agencies, it was argued that the emphasis on curative care rather than on prevention, the narrow focus on urban hospital-based treatment by professionals, and the expensive investments in high technology in health were not meeting the needs of rural – as well as urban poor – populations in the world's developing countries.[7]

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5   A. Mills, Mass Campaigns versus General Health Services: What have we learnt in 40 Years about Vertical versus Horizontal Approaches?, in: Bulletin of the World Health Organization 883 (2005) 4, URL: www.who.int/bulletin/volumes/83/4/315.pdf, access on 16.09.2013; K. Lee, The World Health Organization (WHO), New York 2008, pp. 47-54; S. Litsios, The Third Ten Years of the World Health Organization, 1968-1977, Geneva 2008; R. Packard, Visions of Postwar Health and Development and their Impact on Public Health Interventions in the Developing World, in: F. Cooper / R. Packard (eds.), International Development and the Social Sciences, Berkeley 1997, pp. 93-118.

6   S. Litsios, The Third Ten Years, pp. 19-20 (5).

7   K. Lee, The World Health Organization, pp. 72-86 (5)

Along with the "basic needs approach" formulated in other development agencies, a paradigm shift occurred in the WHO around the mid-1970s. The new concept of Primary Health Care (PHC) drew from a variety of sources – echoing the social medicine of the interwar years, the 1960s "basic needs" advocates, as well as India's Community Health Workers, China's so-called "barefoot doctor" approach, and Latin American child health accomplishments, publicized widely by influential figures in international health.[8] The WHO's Director General Halfdan Mahler embraced these approaches, and in 1976, the annual World Health Assembly – the WHO's executive forum – endorsed the goal of "health for all by the year 2000". This vision was reiterated at the famous conference of Alma-Ata in 1978, co-sponsored by the WHO and the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF). Considered to be a (yet another) revolution in health thinking, the focus was shifted from top-down high-tech policies to grassroot action. PHC was proclaimed to be a more equitable, democratic, and participatory health system, demanded new priorities addressing the "basic needs" of rural populations; and emphasised simplified "appropriate" technology, the expansion of local health auxiliaries, and the fight against diseases of poverty. Instead of "vertical" health campaigns focusing on one specific disease (such as the malaria or smallpox programmes), "horizontal" strategies of strengthening health services in general were advocated. This included an emphasis on local government, citizens' participation, and civil society (i.e., nongovernmental) organizations. PHC's normative basis lay in the strong belief that the socioeconomic causes of poor health needed to be addressed, that a more equitable health system ensuring access for all was necessary, and that health as a human right – established in the WHO Constitution – had to be recognised. It was argued that the fundamental importance of health for the entire social development process had to be reassessed. Of the WHO's 158 member states, 134 attended the conference, which unanimously endorsed the Declaration of Alma-Ata.[9]

However, soon conflicts arose, both over the general vision and its implementation. While the idea was alleged of being anti-scientific or naïve by its critics, much debate focused on the feasibility of Primary Health Care. The goal was challenged as being too

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8   A. E. Birn, The Stages of International (Global) Health: Histories of Success or Successes of History?, in: Global Public Health, 4 (2009) 1, pp. 50-68; N. S. Deodhar, Primary Health Care in India, in: Journal of Public Health Policy, 3 (1982) 1, pp. 76-99; J. Bryant, Health and the Developing World, Ithaca 1969; K. Newell, Health by the People, Geneva 1975; C. Taylor, Doctors for the Villages: Study of Rural Internships in Seven Indian Medical Colleges, Delhi 1976.

9   M. Cueto, The Origins of Primary Health Care and Selective Primary Health Care, in: American Journal of Public Health, 94 (2004) 11; S. Litsios, The Long and Difficult Road to Alma-Ata: A Personal Reflection, in: International Journal of Health Services, 32 (2002), pp. 709-732; J. A. Walsh/K. S. Warren, Selective Primary Health Care: An Interim Strategy for Disease Control in Developing Countries, in: New England Journal of Medicine, 301 (1979), pp. 967-974; the Alma-Ata Declaration; the WHO and UNICEF Report „Alternative Approaches to Meeting Basic Health Needs in Developing Countries", Geneva et al. 1975; B. Wisner, GOBI versus PHC? Some Dangers of Selective Primary Health Care, in: Social Science and Medicine, 26 (1988) 9, pp. 963-969; as well as the materials on several Bellagio Conferences between 1978 and 1985 in the Rockefeller Archive Center: Protecting the World's Children Conference, RF A86 series 120 Box R2308; Selective Primary Health Care Conference, RF A85 series 120 Box R2247; Diarrhoeal Diseases and Malnutrition Conference, RF A83 series 120 Box R1990; Health and Population in Developing Countries Conference, RF A82 series 120 Box R1776; Child Survival Conference, RF81 series 120 Box R2364.

ambitious and costly, at a time of severe restrictions on public health. And how were policy strategies or priorities for action to be formulated, being based on nothing but a general health-systems strengthening approach?

In 1979, a mere year after Alma-Ata, a coalition of experts from UNICEF, the Rockefeller Foundation, the World Bank, and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) proposed the alternative concept of *selective* Primary Health Care (SPHC). They argued that an "interim strategy" was needed in order to formulate health priorities. Based on the criteria of prevalence, mortality, morbidity, feasibility, and cost-effectiveness, SPHC was defined as a core set of limited, simple, and cost-effective health interventions targeting the prime health problems of poor populations. While the controversy over this approach continues today, UNICEF soon after the proposition adopted the SPHC approach and modified it into what its charismatic Executive Director James P. Grant coined the "Child Survival Revolution". Since the early 1980s, UNICEF backed four programmes addressing pressing problems of child health – the two most important ones being immunization campaigns and the control of childhood diarrhoeas through oral rehydration. Both in UNICEF's "Child Survival Revolution" and in the prestigious accompanying "Task Force for Child Survival" founded in 1984, immunization as a simple and effective technology to reduce child mortality took centre stage, with diarrhoeal diseases control at its side.

The expert controversy over Primary Health Care was fought with havoc and in principle, and for an analysis of international health policy the debate is meaningful. It may however, be more interesting to address it at the level of programme planning and execution. While the rivalries between the WHO and UNICEF in immunization campaigns have been studied,[10] diarrhoeal diseases control has so far received little attention. It is an interesting topic for a number of reasons: it can serve to investigate the importance of research and knowledge production for international health policy; the formulation of a "global" development programme between universalizing claims and the reassertion of local diversity, such as socioeconomic factors and "culture"; the importance of institutions and bureaucratic culture; agency and adaptation within international organizations; and changes in the international health agenda from the 1970s to the 1990s.

The Development of Oral Rehydration Therapy

The origins of diarrhoeal diseases control clearly lay in cholera control. In 1961, in Indonesia, the onset of the 7th cholera pandemic led to a renewed interest in cholera research both in the endemic area in South and Southeast Asia, and in other parts of the world.[11] As the pandemic rapidly spread westward, affecting new territories and from 1970 on-

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10   W. Muraskin, The Politics of International Health: The Children's Vaccine Initiative and the Struggle to Develop Vaccines for the Third World, New York 1998.

11   C. Hamlin, Cholera (2).

wards a large number of insufficiently prepared African countries, the search for remedies became more pressing. When the pandemic began, preventive and curative options were limited and case fatality rates high.[12] Quarantine proved ineffective to halt the spread in this era of international travel and trade; sanitary improvements were known to be helpful in the long run, but were useless in acute epidemic situations; a cholera vaccine was widely distributed and required in many states' travel regulations, only to prove ineffective during the 1960s; antibiotics were a fairly valuable, though expensive option, thus leaving intravenous rehydration as the best available intervention. Intravenous rehydration did neither prevent nor cure the disease, but dealt with the most dangerous symptom of most acute diarrhoeas, the body's dehydration. The rapid loss of fluids and electrolytes from the body can result in fatal organ failure. Restoring the fluid and electrolyte loss through water-electrolyte-infusions can prevent deadly dehydration until the disease episode is overcome, thus reducing mortality considerably, a method that was perfected in the early 1960s. But it was an expensive intervention and could only be administered by trained health personnel, and therefore was no viable mass-scale option for poor countries with, at best, a rudimentary health system. These conditions made the cholera pandemic a significant challenge for international health experts.[13]

This brief assessment helps understand the importance of the development of a new treatment option in the 1960s. Conventional wisdom in allopathic medical thought claimed that in cases of diarrhoea, patients should "rest the gut" since it was assumed that ingesting food or drink would aggravate the condition. This faulty assumption partly rested on the correct observation that most diarrhoeal agents inhibit the absorption of water and salt in the intestinal tract. In the 1940s and 1950s, biomedical research revealed that this was in most cases not due to a destruction of the lining cells, and from this vantage point it became possible to investigate the option of oral rehydration during diarrhoeal illnesses.[14] Biomedical research in South Asia was crucial for several breakthroughs leading to oral rehydration therapy. The first and most important step was the discovery that the addition of glucose as a transport medium to water-salt solutions, in the right proportions, enabled the absorption of fluid and electrolytes during episodes of acute diarrhoea. The rapid succession of important discoveries eventually leading to a viable oral rehydration therapy has been described as a fascinating story of intense institutional competition as well as exceptional collaboration between several research teams.[15]

12 The case fatality rate for Asia in 1961, as reported to the WHO, was 49.3%. Within the next ten years, it declined to less than 15%. M. Echenberg, Africa, p. 123 (2).

13 R.Pollitzer, Cholera, Geneva 1959; N. Howard-Jones, Cholera Therapy in the Nineteenth Century, in: Journal of the History of Medicine and Allied Sciences 27 (1972), pp. 373-395; D. Barua, The Global Epidemiology of Cholera in Recent Years, in: Proceedings of the Royal Society of Medicine 65 (1972), pp. 423-428; D. Barua / W. Burrows (eds.), Cholera, Philadelphia 1974; see the newer version of this standard reference publication for the developments in cholera research: D. Barua / W. B. Greenough III (eds.), Cholera, New York 1992.

14 S. N. De's seminal contribution is described in: R. H. Hall, A De in the Life of Cholera, in: Indian Journal of Medical Research 133 (2011), pp. 146-152.

15 J. Ruxin, Magic Bullet. The History of Oral Rehydration Therapy, in: Medical History 38 (1991), pp. 363-397, gives a quite comprehensive account, but unfortunately relies heavily on a few interviews; W. E. Van Heyningen / J.

South Asia at the time was a world region that served as the "laboratory" for biomedical research in several fields and as the testing ground for a whole range of health policy programmes.[16] For cholera research, this endemic area with high prevalence of the disease was obviously an interesting environment, and during the 1960s numerous institutions engaged in research on this disease, with partial sponsorship from national governments, from the WHO, and from foreign institutions.[17] Among the institutions discovering and advancing oral rehydration therapy, three research groups stand out, all of them dominated by the US. The United States Navy Medical Research Unit (NAMRU) led by Captain Robert Allan Phillips performed both laboratory and clinical research in cholera, first in Egypt and then in Southeast Asia, with the aim of helping protect US soldiers abroad. The Johns Hopkins University International Center for Medical Research and Training (JHU-ICMR) was created in Kolkata in 1960, funded by the US Department of Health, Education and Welfare (DHEW) and administered by the National Institutes of Health (NIH), as part of a state-sponsored effort to maintain a modest level of interest and competence in tropical medicine among American biomedical scientists. The ICMR agenda was restricted to activities "advancing the status of the health sciences in the United States and thereby the health of the American people."[18] In collaboration with several Indian research institutions, the ICMR performed biomedical and ecological research in diverse areas throughout the 1960s; cholera and more general diarrhoeal diseases developed into one of its core research fields over the years.[19]

In the early 1970s, then, tensions between American administrations and the central government of India grew and the ICMR relocated to Dhaka,[20] joining yet another influential research institute there. The Pakistan-Southeast Asian Treaty Organization

R. Seal, Cholera: The American Scientific Experience, Boulder 1983, is mostly a memory of two participants and, while very valuable, therefore should not be read as academic literature; S. J. Savarino, A Legacy in 20th-Century Medicine: Robert Allan Phillips and the Taming of Cholera, in: Clinical Infectious Diseases 35 (2002), pp. 713-720, contains interesting information, but is mostly devoted to the memory of one (important) researcher. Personal accounts that partially cover the history include: O. Fontaine / C. Newton, A Revolution in the Management of Diarrhoea, in: Bulletin of the World Health Organization 79 (2001) 5; W. B. Greenough III, Oral Rehydration Therapy: An epithelial transport success story, in: Archives of Disease in Childhood 64 (1989), pp. 419-422; S. McGrane, A Simple Solution, in: http://www.jhsph.edu/publichealthnews/magazine/archive/Mag_Spring03/prologue/index.html, access: 2013-09-16, is a journalistic approach and inaccurate in several points.

16   S. Amrith has shown this for tuberculosis research, eg., In Search of a "Magic Bullet" for Tuberculosis: South India and Beyond, 1955–1965, in: Social History of Medicine 17 (2004) 1, pp. 113-130; H. Power for malaria research, Drug-resistant Malaria: A Global Problem and the Thai Response, in: A. Cunningham / B. Andrews (eds.), Western Medicine as Contested Knowledge, Manchester 1997, pp. 262-286.

17   For a large WHO research programme in cholera, see the cholera carrier studies and other investigations of the Cholera Research Laboratory in Kolkata, cosponsored by the Indian Council for Medical Research and the WHO.

18   This is specified in Public Law 86-610, International Health Research Act of 1960. H. A. Minners, Evaluating the International Centers for Medical Research (ICMR) Program, in: The American Journal of Tropical Medicine and Hygiene 23 (1974) 4, pp. 828-831.

19   See the ICMR's Annual Reports for detailed discussions of the individual research projects. They can be accessed at The Johns Hopkins Medical Archives in Baltimore.

20   The spelling of several names of cities in South Asia has been changed in the last decades. In order to simplify things, I have opted for a coherent writing in today's style, even though the names in primary sources were written differently (e.g., "Dacca" vs. "Dhaka").

(SEATO) Cholera Research Laboratory (CRL) was founded in 1960 in Dhaka, then East Pakistan, as a part of the SEATO Cholera Research Program. Most funding came from the United States International Cooperation Administration/United States Agency for International Development.[21] The NIH administered the laboratory. Whereas the Johns Hopkins Center had a direct and exclusive research purpose, the CRL's agenda was mixed. While it was hoped that it would advance the knowledge about cholera in its endemic area, the CRL predominantly served Cold War geopolitical considerations, satisfying a number of American allies in South and Southeast Asia that were affected by the pandemic.[22] The CRL usually hosted a small number of American researchers (mostly, though not exclusively, epidemiologists), a larger number of Bengali researchers, and supporting field personnel. It was comprised of a research hospital in Dhaka, a large-scale field research station in the rural area of Matlab, several smaller field research stations in other parts of East Pakistan, and the main laboratory facilities in Dhaka. The research that was undertaken here in the 1960s and early 1970s included clinical and laboratory investigations in the principles and mechanisms of cholera as well as the development of therapies, thus integrating basic and applied research. But the CRL also employed a small number of anthropologists and sociologists to study the social conditions of diseases as well as social factors in disease control efforts. The three research units thus varied in their agendas and structure. They shared the experience of field research in an area where diarrhoeal diseases of all (known and mostly unknown) aetiologies were prevalent throughout the year, often symptomatically indistinguishable. The endemic and epidemic situations called for a therapy that was feasible for use on a mass scale, and every day illustrated the magnitude of the public health problem of diarrhoeal diseases.

It was not exclusively but predominantly these institutions that, in a rather close-knit communication network, developed oral rehydration therapy, building on newer scientific understandings of metabolic processes and the mucosal membrane functioning in cholera, while synthesizing different research strands on diarrhoea and metabolic functions in a succession of trials. Among other findings, the role of glucose as a carrier enabling sodium transport across the mucosal membranes proved crucial. After initial clinical trials of oral rehydration in the Philippines in 1962, a rapid succession of large clinical field trials in South Asia followed. If administered incorrectly, oral rehydration can (and did in early trials) result in patients' deaths. The development of an oral rehydration therapy that could be considered both effective and safe was a complicated process and a long journey, not just one discovery. [23] A number of studies and settings

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21 Some additional funding in this phase of the laboratory's existence came from Great Britain and Australia.
22 W. H. Mosley, The Pak-SEATO Cholera Research Laboratory, in: J. Sack / M. A. Rahim (eds.), Smriti. ICDDR,B in Memory, Dhaka 2003, p. 58. For the importance of geostrategic considerations for US development aid: Carol Lancaster, Foreign Aid: Diplomacy, Development, Domestic Politics, Chicago 2006; L. A. Picard / T. F. Buss, A Fragile Balance: Re-examining the History of Foreign Aid, Security, and Diplomacy, Sterling, VA 2009.
23 The NAMRU researcher who was responsible for the trials that resulted in five deaths in the Philippines later directed the Cholera Research Laboratory and there tried to slow or shut down further trials, but was overruled by several young and eager scientists. From the published account of the Philippine trials, later considered to be one of the most important steps, Phillips omitted the fatalities: R. A. Phillips, Water and Electrolyte Losses in

were instrumental in the progression from dangerous clinical trials in 1962, to the first perfected version of oral rehydration therapy in 1968/69. Most of the translation from basic to applied science can be attributed to the research institutions named above, including vice-versa confirmations of hypotheses and study findings.[24]

The history of diarrhoeal diseases control is compelling in terms of the role of biomedical research and technology in an international health campaign. Changing knowledge and a new technology recast the role development agencies saw for themselves and attributed to the disease. Diarrhoeal diseases had long been known to be a major public health problem in the developing world. But what had seemed like a condition that could only be brought under control through general socioeconomic development – concerning, for example, sanitation, water, and nutrition – now could be imagined as being easily solvable through a programme directly targeting this group of diseases. Soon after "the simple solution" (as oral rehydration came to be called) had been discovered, the South Asian research was translated into a global public health programme, and further developed in these new circumstances along the way. The potential of this new medical technology, cheap and easy to administer as it was, quickly became obvious to international health experts. Its feasibility in the most adverse circumstances became apparent in 1971, when during the Bangladesh independence war a cholera epidemic broke out in refugee camps in India. Indian ICMR researchers administered oral rehydration fluids in huge quantities in one of the refugee camps. With a grant from the World Council of Churches (the ICMR funds could not be used for "humanitarian purposes"), they reduced the camps' mortality figures quickly from over 30 % to about 3 %.[25] This demonstration of successful mass application of oral rehydration usually is considered as a major breakthrough for international attention. In 1978, the influential medical journal *The Lancet* therefore considered the entire discovery process of oral rehydration to be "potentially the most important medical advance this [i.e., the 20th] century".[26]

One of the cholera managers at the World Health Organization in Geneva, Dhiman Barua, was himself a cholera expert who had been affiliated with the ICMR research before joining the WHO. He closely observed the research in South Asia. Already in the late 1960s, the WHO included the general therapy of oral rehydration in its lists of recommended health interventions. The WHO and especially its Regional Office for South Asia (SEARO) advised member states to use oral rehydration, 16 countries being active by the mid-1970s. Together with UNICEF, an effort at standardization of the therapy was launched. In the mid-1970s, expert committees set a standard for the exact

Cholera, in: Federation Proceedings 23 (1964), pp. 705-712. For the early trials in Dhaka see, e.g.: D. R. Nalin/R. A. Cash/R. Islam/M. Molla/R. A. Phillips, Oral Maintenance Therapy for Cholera in Adults, in: The Lancet 7564 (1968), pp. 370-373.

24   This is detailed in Ruxin: Magic Bullet (15).

25   D. Mahalanabis et al., Oral Fluid Therapy of Cholera among Bangladesh Refugees, in: The Johns Hopkins Medical Journal 132 (1973), pp. 197-205. Letter from T. W. Simpson to F. Bang, 31 May 1972; Letter from T. W. Simpson to S. Mitton, 25 April 1972; Memo by T. W. Simpson, Participation of JH-CMRT in Bangla Desh relief work, 30 October 1971, all in The Johns Hopkins Medical Archives, BOX 123DD6.

26   Water with Sugar and Salt. Editorial, in: The Lancet 312 (1978) 8084, p. 300.

composition of oral rehydration fluids, to be called Oral Rehydration Solution (ORS), in the midst of both enthusiastic support as well as medical criticism of premature action with too shaky a clinical data basis – and indeed the standard was revised in some of the details several times in the following decade.[27] Since the early 1970s some WHO officials advocated and planned a large programme for the control of diarrhoeal diseases through the use of ORS,[28] ensuring the support of the Director-General and a number of member states. At the 31st World Health Assembly in 1978, delegates of WHO member states passed resolution WHA31.44, urging the organization and the member states to identify diarrhoeal diseases as a major priority area for action. Subsequently, the World Health Organization together with UNICEF, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the World Bank in 1979 initiated a global Special Programme for Diarrhoeal Diseases Control (CDD). In the late 1970s diarrhoeal diseases control thus became a priority on the international health agenda, and during the 1980s most major international and bilateral aid donors as well as over 100 developing countries became involved in this control effort.

Diarrhoeal Diseases Control on the International Health Agenda

Within the international health community the new technology was regarded as a major and much-needed progress not just because of the ongoing cholera pandemic. The issue was reframed, with oral rehydration no longer being predominantly advocated as a cholera intervention in a bacterial diseases framework (where the research originated and most health policy had been concerned) but as a major step to reduce childhood mortality. Diarrhoeal diseases of all aetiologies over-proportionally affect infants and children. Additionally, dehydration occurs much faster in children, thus augmenting mortality rates. Statistics in the 1970s for most regions were fragmentary at best. However, the general problem was well-known by the time,[29] and data was robust enough to conclude that diarrhoeal diseases were the primary cause of death of infants and children under five in practically every poor country in the world. A 1977 report by the Pan-American Health Organization (PAHO) stated, "Sickness, disability and death from the diarrheal diseases produce global statistics which are literally incomprehensible."[30] WHO estimates in 1978 assumed about 500 million diarrhoea episodes a year and attributed anything

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27   Annual Report of the Cholera Research Laboratory, 1976, p. 17.
28   Miracle Cure for an Old Scourge. An Interview with Dhiman Barua, in: Bulletin of the World Health Organization 87 (2009), pp. 91-92; N. F. Pierce / N. Hirschhorn, Oral Fluid: A Simple Weapon against Dehydration in Diarrhoea. How it Works and How to Use it, in: WHO Chronicle 31 (1977), pp. 87-93.
29   See for example the work of the Instituto de Nutrición de Centro América y Panamá (INCAP), e.g. J. E. Gordon / M. Behar / N. S. Scrimshaw, Acute Diarrhoeal Diseases in Less Developed Countries, in: Bulletin of the World Health Organization 31 (1964), pp. 1-28; N. S. Scrimshaw / C. E. Taylor / J. E. Gordon, Interactions of Nutrition and Infection, Geneva 1968.
30   Pan American Health Organization (PAHO), Sixteenth Meeting of the PAHO Advisory Committee on Medical Research, Washington D, 11-15 July 1977: The Diarrhoea of Travelers, PAHO/ACMR 16/11, p. 1.

between "5 to 18 million deaths" annually to diarrhoeal diseases.[31] While experts agreed that there was a need for more research in all areas of diarrhoeal diseases prevalence and control, oral rehydration finally seemed to be a starting point to tackle "one of the greatest social evils" in the world.[32]

Child health programmes at the time were supported. Not only did they address priorities of the WHO's Primary Health Care initiative, UNICEF also broadened the scope of its health-related work while the World Bank's focus on poverty was compatible with combating child health as well. As modernization theorists' assumptions about quasi-automatic paths of economic and social development were questioned, the role of health in the overall development process was reconsidered. The control of the major cause of death of poor children with the help of a simple "appropriate" technology fitted into any of the health agendas delineated above. Child health was invoked not just as a human right, but also as a means of achieving higher economic productivity and breaking the cycle of poverty. Diarrhoeal diseases were argued to be a prime cause of malnutrition in poor countries, thus hampering individuals' abilities for overall social and economic development.[33] These arguments were complemented by another top priority of the 1970s development policies: the control of population growth. The "Child Survival Hypothesis" postulated that the survival of children was a necessary condition for women to voluntarily reduce birth rates. This would contribute to the demographic transition that could no longer be assumed to happen automatically as well as to the prevention of the much-feared "population explosion" in the developing world.[34] It may be these frameworks as much as the constant presence of the problem in developing countries that explain the striking difference in the assessment of the value of oral rehydration therapy in the international development community on the one hand, and the paediatric communities in "developed" countries on the other. While the former enthusiastically embraced the new technology, the latter vehemently voiced scepticism about such a seemingly second-rate, low-tech intervention that was regarded as a poor substitute for antibiotics and intravenous therapy.[35]

31   Development of a Programme for Diarrhoeal Diseases Control. Report of an Advisory Group (Geneva, 2-5 May, 1978), WHO/DDC/78.1, p. 4.

32   WHO/DDC/78.1, p.4; Summary of Activities in the Field of Diarrhoeal Disease Control in the American Region, 1954-1958, prepared by Pan American Sanitary Bureau / Regional Office of the WHO for the Americas, WHO D.D. 2 (August 1958); Review of the Present Situation of Diarrhoeal Diseases and their Importance from the World Health Point of View, by L. Le Minor, Institut Pasteur Paris, August 1958, WHO/D.D./3; and the further reports in this record group; WHO Diarrhoal Diseases Advisory Team in co-operation with medical services of Mauritius: Report of a Survey of Diarrhoeal Diseases in Mauritius (March-May 1960), WHO/Ent/66.1 and the further reports in this record group; N. Y. H. Blaise / D. B.Dovie, Diarrheal Diseases in the History of Public Health, in: Archives of Medical Research 38 (2007), pp. 159-163.

33   See the works cited in footnote 30.

34   For an overview of the discussion, see: C. E. Taylor / J. S. Newman / N. U. Kelly, The Child Survival Hypothesis, in: Population Studies 30/2 (1976), pp. 263-278; and L. C. Chen / S. Ahmed / M. Gesche / W. H. Mosley, A Prospective Study of Birth Interval Dynamics in Rural Bangladesh, in: Population Studies 28 (1974) 2, pp. 277-297.

35   See for an assessment from one of the oral rehydration proponents: C. C. J. Carpenter, Treatment of Cholera: Tradition and Authority versus Science, Reason and Humanity, in: The Johns Hopkins Medical Journal 139 (1976), pp. 153-162. Compare also M. Echenberg, Africa, pp. 103-105 (2); N. A. Daniels et al., First do no Harm. Making

The development community support for diarrhoeal diseases control in general is exemplified in the rapid establishment of the WHO Special Programme for Diarrhoeal Diseases Control and the substantial financial commitments of large development donors.[36] As one of the roundabout ten Special Programmes, the CDD was only marginally funded by the WHO's regular budget and instead financed by WHO member states' extra-budgetary funds (EBFs). The influx of EBFs marks a structural change in the WHO's funding, which became more significant during the 1980s and the early 1990s. A number of member states – out of dissatisfaction with WHO priorities, management, or results – froze or reduced their regular annual contributions and instead increased EBFs to special programmes. This ensued a more direct donor influence on overall as well as specific programme priorities. EBFs accounted for about 25% of the WHO's total budget in 1970, which rose to 40 % in 1980 and in 1990 exceeded 50 %.[37] As for the CDD, only 12.5 % of its budget came from the WHO's regular budget, with the remainder being provided by approximately 20 donors, among them member states such as the USA, Great Britain, and Sweden, and international institutions such as UNICEF, the UNDP, and the World Bank. The CDD budget rose throughout the 1980s, from about US$ 15 million for the 1982–83 biennium to US$ 21.5 million in 1986–87. The early 1990s saw a slight decline, which accelerated swiftly in the mid-1990s.[38] While pure fi-

Oral Rehydration Solution safer in a Cholera Epidemic, in: American Journal of Tropical Medicine and Hygiene 60 (1999), pp. 1051-1055; M. Santosham et al., Oral Rehydration Therapy for Diarrhea: An Example of Reverse Transfer of Technology, in: Pediatrics 100 (1997), http://pediatrics.aappublications.org/content/100/5/e10.full.pdf, access: 2013-09-16. Numerous letters to the "Diarrhoea Dialogue" Newsletter throughout the 1980s name the paediatricians' reluctance to use oral rehydration therapy as serious problem. An analysis of the complex motivations behind this reluctance is beyond the scope of this paper. The degree of resistance in the United States is exemplified in three large conferences on oral rehydration conducted between 1981 and 1985; one of their targets was to convince the US paediatric professional community to support the new technology. See, e.g.: R. M. Clay, ICORT Follow-Up Activities, during the period November 1, 1983-March 9, 1984, AID/DSPE-C-0053, Assgn. No. 583154, http://dec.usaid.gov/index.cfm?p=search.getCitation&rec_no=34133, access: 2013-09-16; ICORT Conference Proceedings, Washington DC, 7-10 June, 1983; ICORT, in: Diarrhoea Dialogue issue 14, August 1983, p. 2.

36   The actual sums spent to this avail cannot be reconstructed in a meaningful way, see: PATH 2011, pp. 11-12. Too many donor agencies and states with national CDD programmes invested large sums. For many funds, diarrhoeal diseases control is subsumed with other child health activities. Apart from the CDD programme as administered by the WHO, budgets for some agencies can be partially reconstructed, e.g., for the USAID: the USAID provided close to US$70 million for diarrhoeal diseases activities between 1983 and 1985 alone; a major Child Survival Programme launched by the USAID in 1985 was allocated the initial sum of US$85 million, with diarrhoeal diseases control one of the two main features. Between 1983 and 1984, expenditure on ORT by the USAID was nearly doubled; at the end of 1984, the US Congress approved another US$85 million in 1985 for health, nutrition, and child survival with ORT as a major component. AID focused at this time on social marketing and ORT, and on mass media use for health education. In early 1985, the agency had already distributed 10 million packets of standardized ORS worldwide. See for this information: United States Agency for International Development, Oral Rehydration Therapy: A Revolution in Child Survival. A.I.D. Science in Development Series, Weston Mass. 1988; AID, review of ORT activities, in: DD issue 20, March 1985, p. 2. In the fiscal year 1988, 39% of USAID funding went to the Child Survival Fund, another 33% to different health activities. Oral Rehydration Salts production, distribution, marketing, and research are marked with 22% of the overall budget, see: Child Survival. Fourth Report to Congress on the USAID Programme, Washington DC 1989, p. 6.

37   J. P. Vaughan et al., WHO and the Effects of Extrabudgetary Funds: Is the Organization Donor Driven?, in: Health Policy and Planning 11 (1996), pp. 253-264.

38   Proposed Programme Budget for the Financial Period 1984–1985, CDD/83.2; Proposed Programme Budget for

nancial proportions cannot by themselves reveal much about the influence of individual institutions in the development field, the numbers corroborate a general assessment in the interpretation of the WHO's history: while official WHO policy emphasised the integration of all activities in a primary health care framework, the agency had limited control over the Special Programmes oriented along the lines of disease-specific vertical programmes running parallel to other international health activities and, in the eyes of critics, "undermining" the integrative PHC agenda.[39]

The CDD formed a separate unit with a staff of a programme director and 20–25 programme managers in the Geneva headquarters, with additional staff in the WHO Regional Offices. Their job was to coordinate global efforts and assist all interested member states in setting up national CDD programmes. One major task was to initiate, support, and evaluate member states' national programmes. Their interest exceeded the CDD's expectations. Two years after the foundation of the CDD programme, almost 50 countries had developed national CDD programmes, 30 of which were classified as being operational. In early 1983, 60 countries had formulated plans, in 1984 the number rose to 95, with 75 country programmes being categorized as operational. The total number of countries rose to over 120 in the course of the CDD activities.[40] These country programmes obviously varied greatly in their size and scope, with ambitious goals being set for example in Bangladesh, Egypt, India, and Mexico.[41]

As for the organization and priorities of the CDD in Geneva, the immediate objective was to reduce diarrhoea-related mortality in children by widespread implementation of oral rehydration therapy and by improving feeding practices, especially by promoting breastfeeding. The long-term objective was a significant reduction of morbidity through the improvement of child care practices, the provision of safe water supply and sanitation, epidemiological surveillance and the control of epidemics. Through these preventive measures, diarrhoeal diseases should "cease to be a major public health problem" through all "appropriate control measures",[42] which would break the "vicious cycle of

the Financial Period 1986-1987, CDD/85.1; DDCP, Report of the Third Meeting of the Management Review Committee, Geneva 12 April 1983, CDD/MRC/83.2, p. 5; DDCP, Report of the First Meeting of the Management Review Committee, Geneva, October 7 1981, CDD/MRC/81.8, p. 3. All accessible at the WHO Archives in Geneva.

39 F. Godlee, The World Health Organisation: WHO's special programmes: undermining from above, in: British Medical Journal 310/178.2 (1995), http://www.bmj.com/content/310/6973/178.2.extract, access: 2013-09-16.

40 DDCP, Report of the First Meeting of the Management Review Committee, Geneva, October 7 1981, CDD/MRC/81.8, p. 3; Report of the Fifth Meeting of the Steering Committee of the Scientific Working Group on Drug Development and the Management of Acute Diarrhoeas (Geneva, 20-21 September 1982, WHO Archives, CDD/DDM/82.3, p. 2; DDCP Fact Sheet, CDD/83.1, p. 2; Report of the Sixth Meeting of the Steering Committee of the Scientific Working Group on Drug Development and the Management of Acute Diarrhoeas (Geneva, 6-8 April 1983), CDD/DDM/83.1, p. 2; DDCP, Report of the Fifth Meeting of the Management Review Committee, Geneva 10 April 1985, CDD/MRC/85.1, p. 2.

41 The remaining archival sources on the CDD at the WHO Archives in Geneva are largely organized in a country structure, which allows one to follow individual country programmes. Additionally, progress reports on individual national programmes reveal (often overly optimistic) facts about scope and size. See, for example: John Snow Inc., Taming a Child Killer: The Egyptian National Control of Diarrhoeal Diseases Project (NCDDP), Boston 1995.

42 WHO/DDC/1978.1, p. 7.

diarrhoea and malnutrition".[43] The CDD had two integrated components: implementation or health services support and research.[44] The first component was focused on supporting member states' national CDD programmes. The WHO's activities included support in formulating national plans; the training of programme managers through technical training manuals and management courses; and setting up the logistics for national diarrhoea control activities.

Oral rehydration therapy was considered to be "at the heart" of the diarrhoeal diseases control efforts, which implied a focus on curative care and case management for most phases of the CDD programme.[45] Oral rehydration therapy stood for a range of different things: oral rehydration could refer to the basic medical principle of rehydrating a dehydrated patient through some mixture of glucose or sucrose, electrolytes, and water; could stand for the WHO/UNICEF standard composition for this medical technology, written in capitals as Oral Rehydration Therapy (ORT) to distinguish it from the basic principle; and could refer to the modified version relying on the ORT standard, known as Oral Rehydration Salts (or Sachets, ORS), further standardizing the basic principle with regard to package sizes, packing materials, production facilities, ingredients, etc.

Throughout the CDD's existence, there were debates and conflicts over which version of oral rehydration the global programme should rely on. Initially, a marked privileging of the commodity of ORS is clearly noticeable in the international agencies. Programme priorities and activities were sought to foster the rapid mass production, dissemination, and usage of ORS on a global scale. UNICEF publicized an optimistic perspective on diarrhoeal diseases control: "The need for ORT is clear. The technology is known. The means of dissemination are available. The receptiveness of parents has been demonstrated. The cost is small. And only an inexcusable lack of national and international will can now prevent the bringing of its benefits to the vast majority of children in need."[46] It soon became clear for all involved that the task was not that simple. UNICEF took over the production side, not only commissioning large quantities of ORS sachets (roughly between 40 and 150 million packages per biennium since the CDD's existence), but also helping to set up industrial production facilities following one global standard for ORS in numerous countries. Local production of ORS in over 60 participating countries quickly rose from a marginal position to two-thirds of all production, e.g., over 400 million packages in the year 1991.[47] The CDD in Geneva was supposed to facilitate na-

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43   See, for one of numerous accounts: M. Rahaman / S. N. Pombejr, Breaking the Vicious Cycle of Diarrhoea and Child Malnutrition in Bangladesh, in: UNICEF News 101 (1979), pp. 14-17.

44   Financially, the health services component was stronger, with about 60% of all funds allocated to this branch, 75% of which was distributed to the WHO Regional Offices. DDCP, Report of the Fifth Meeting of the Management Review Committee, Geneva 10 April 1985, CDD/MRC/85.1, p. 5; 4th MRC meeting.

45   USAID, Oral Rehydration Therapy, p. x.

46   UNICEF State of the World's Children Report 1982–1983.

47   For these numbers, see: World Health Organization, Programme for control of diarrhoeal diseases. Ninth Programme Report 1992–1993, Geneva 1994, WHO/CDD/94.46; World Health Organization, The Evolution of Diarrhoeal and Acute Respiratory Disease Control at WHO. Achievements 1980–1995 in Research, Development, and Implementation, Geneva 1999, WHO/CHS/CAH/99.12.

tional plans for distribution. Additionally, educational activities were an issue of growing concern. The CDD created training manuals to be distributed widely. It organized and financed over 7,000 clinical training courses for health personnel from all parts of the health care systems. Over 500,000 health workers from more than 100 countries were trained in the workshops offered by the WHO's CDD alone. For these workshops, the CDD relied on a number of health facilities in member states, where internationally composited groups were taught in clinical diarrhoea management. In the later stages of the programme, the focus was readjusted to support the construction of national specialized Diarrhoea Training Units (DTUs) that were hoped to be more sustainable.[48] While these efforts were targeted largely at health professionals, social marketing mass media campaigns were designed in order to reach the general population. A 1978 report stated, "The challenge today is to provide replacement of diarrhoeal losses with oral rehydration fluid as early as possible during illness. At present this cannot be done on the massive scale necessary by depending on the existing health care delivery systems with their limited coverage and outreach. This problem can be overcome only by a more universal dissemination of rehydration services which in the case of diarrhoea in children must include participation of mothers in this health care process."[49] The design, planning, and execution of mass campaigns in health education with leaflets, radio, and television spots – adapted and tailored to the circumstances and health-related beliefs in each country – were supposed to convince caregivers of children to use oral rehydration, and to do it correctly.

The programme managers set ambitious targets for ORS production as well as ORS use. While original targets for ORS production were overachieved in the course of the 1980s, it was ORS use that proved to be problematic. The continuous gap between ORS production and ORS use as well as widely differing numbers in countries with national diarrhoeal diseases control programmes questioned the original assumption that ORS provided a "simple solution" regardless of social or cultural circumstances.[50] Before describing the responses to these problems, it is necessary to consider the second basic task of the CDD programme: research promotion in diarrhoeal diseases.

Research promotion at the WHO was guided by advisory teams and usually took one of two forms. WHO departments could install Scientific Working Groups (SWGs) with specific topics and appoint the members, financing their regular meetings and the dissemination of meeting reports. It was assumed that ongoing discussion among international experts would lead to research projects addressing the most pressing needs identified in the SWG, with some of the necessary research being funded by the WHO. The CDD initiated several SWGs, both on global and on regional levels. Initially, the

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48   WHO Publications of Training courses, CDD/ARI Programme Management. A training course, WHO/CDR/95.12; Diarrhoea Training Unit, Director's guide, CDD/SER/86.1 Rev.1; Teaching materials, CDD/SER/88.1; Diarrhoea management training course, CDD/SER/90.2 Rev. 1. All accessible at the WHO Archives.

49   WHO/DDC/78.1, p. 8.

50   See: WHO, The Evolution of Diarrhoeal and Acute Respiratory Disease Control at WHO for targets and achievements.

CDD's SWGs focused on disease etiology, but soon after better clinical case management with an emphasis on further research in oral rehydration dominated the agenda. Around 1990, research in prevention grew in importance, which had been paid little attention before. The second tool for research promotion at the WHO was to cooperate with WHO Collaborating Centres. Most WHO programmes had formal ties with a number of research institutions, such as university departments, renowned laboratories, or independent research institutes. Collaborating Centres were designated through the initiative of a WHO unit or department after several years of successful collaboration with the WHO in carrying out jointly planned research activities. The formal ties with Collaborative Centres implied regular consultations and continuous representation in the programme's Advisory Committees, SWGs, and planning meetings. While the CDD had ties with a range of Collaborative Centres, one institution stands out in its importance both for the CDD and for the global efforts in diarrhoea control in general. Its role in the global network of medical knowledge and policy raises questions concerning the relationship between basic and applied research; between field research and policy formulation in bureaucratic headquarters of international medical institutions; and concerning the role of institutions and epistemic communities in international health.

The International Centre for Diarrhoeal Disease Research, Bangladesh: Regional Knowledge Production and its Influence on Global Programmes

The Cholera Research Laboratory in Dhaka had developed into a major centre of diarrhoeal diseases research, while further growing in importance after its transformation into an international research institute. The agreements with Pakistan that had initially brought about the CRL lost their relevance after Bangladesh's independence in 1971, leaving the laboratory's future uncertain. For various reasons, all interested parties agreed that the CRL's continuation was desirable, even though the envisaged agenda and structure varied considerably. The internationalization was preceded by provisory institutional forms and long, tenacious negotiations under the UNDP's on the laboratory's future, which benefitted from a Ford Foundation grant and thereby allowing its continued existence during the negotiations. These negotiations, as far as they can be reconstructed, reveal the interests of a number of participants. Representatives from about a dozen national governments, philanthropic foundations such as the Ford Foundation, and international organizations like the WHO participated in this process. Whereas the USAID and the NIH favoured a structure that would retain their control over the institution, the government of Bangladesh strongly opposed a predominantly American institution, not least because the recent war had revealed US allegiances to Pakistan and manifested the disadvantages of depending on one single donor. The Bangladeshi government wanted a legal structure that secured national authority over the institute, while, for a time, differences in opinions between the Bangladesh Planning Commission and the Ministry of Health brought the negotiations to a halt. The Ford Foundation, as well as the UNDP,

favoured an international institution modelled in some form on the agricultural research institutes and thus argued for a fundamental transformation of its structure. The WHO expressed "strong support, indeed enthusiasm" for the institute and especially for "a formal WHO relationship". However, the WHO "fear[ed] an independent lab" and wanted to bring it under its wings, something that neither the representatives of the numerous American institutions nor the Bangladeshi government thought to be desirable. Sweden, an important development donor, supported the institution, being contingent upon a strong scientific and managerial presence of researchers from developing countries.[51]

The result was the creation of the International Centre for Diarrhoeal Disease Research, Bangladesh (ICDDR,B) in 1978, financed by a variety of 20 donors (growing to over 50 in the years to come) and operating under Bangladeshi law. It was guided by an international Board of Trustees, composed of renowned diarrhoeal diseases experts from both developed and developing countries, reserving seats for the Bangladeshi government, the Americans, the WHO, and UNICEF.[52] Deliberate attempts were made to "de-Americanize" the institution: the USAID agreed to continue its numerical financial support, with the expectation to reduce its overall proportion from about 85 % to about 25 % within a few years, resulting in the reduction of the number of American scientists. Relations with US institutions, nonetheless, remained among the closest ones, with scientists from Johns Hopkins, the NIH, and the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) regularly being seconded to the ICDDR, B. While the director had to be a non-Bangladeshi citizen, the majority of researchers and middle management over the years were staffed with (often internationally trained) Bangladeshis. Governmental institutions in Bangladesh reserved rights to approve research designs and control compliance with Bangladeshi ethical standards. Thus the ICDDR, B developed into an international research institute with a mandate as well as a network of donors and of governing bodies that allowed it to work independently from any one partner, donor, or agency without reducing its general dependency on development aid and the oscillating international health agenda. Its first budget as an internationalized institute amounted to roughly US$ 3 billion, and quickly multiplied within the next years. For the 1980s the annual budget fluctuated between US$ 8 and eleven billion.[53] The support for such an institution from a large variety of countries, foundations, and international organizations was due to its previous successes,

51   L. C. Chen, CRL Development Process, Status Report, 04 February 1977, Rockefeller Archive Center, Record Group II, General Correspondence (1927–1989), Portion Filmed 1977, Reel 46, 466: Cholera Research Laboratory, p. 3; Note by A.C.B [probably Alan Barnes] for the Rockefeller Foundation, Cholera Research Laboratory, Meeting in Washington, February 17, 1977, Rockefeller Archive Center, Record Group II, General Correspondence (1927–1989), Portion Filmed 1977, Reel 46, 466: Cholera Research Laboratory; Recommendation for Grant / DAP Action, Grantee: International Centre for Diarrhoeal Disease Research, Bangladesh, Request No. ID-3475, March 26, 1981, pp. 3-7, Reel R-4264, Ford Foundation Collection at the Rockefeller Archive Center.

52   Memorandum from L. C. Chen, An International Institute for Research in Health and Population in Bangladesh, to J. Bresnan and O. Harkavy, 14 October 1976, p. 2-3; Rockefeller Archive Center, Record Group II, General Correspondence (1927–1989), Portion Filmed 1977, Reel 46, 466: Cholera Research Laboratory. On the internationalization process and the ICDDR,B's structure, also see: Annual Report of the Cholera Research Laboratory 1977.

53   The annual budgets can be found in the ICDDR,B Annual Reports. They are accessible at the IDCCR,B Library in Dhaka, some at the National Library of Medicine, Bethesda, USA.

for example, in oral rehydration research; upcurrent for diarrhoeal diseases control; and the general perception that biomedical science could not be restricted to laboratories, but needed "field research" in order to tackle the problems of "health and population control". The latter was of paramount importance, for example, for the Ford Foundation support. In 1975 the international health expert Jon Rohde coined the phrase that there was a necessity of "taking science where the diarrhoea is";[54] the slogan was repeated often in the following years.

With the internationalization, the CRL's research agenda was considerably expanded and no longer limited to a narrow cholera focus. The mandate requested that the ICDDR, B "function as an institution to undertake and promote study, research and dissemination of knowledge in diarrhoeal diseases and directly related subjects of nutrition and fertility with a view of developing improved methods of health care and for the prevention and control of diarrhoeal diseases and improvement of public health programmes with special relevance to developing countries".[55] The following decade saw an expanding research profile on general maternal and child health, environmental and ecological issues of diarrhoea, vaccine research, clinical management of diseases of childhood, malnutrition, and fertility control. One of the ICDDR, B's strongest assets of interest to donors such as the Ford Foundation[56] was its capacity to undertake "multidisciplinary research using … 'natural experiments,' that is, situations in which health or social interventions are being introduced into large populations".[57] Already before the transformation into an international research institute, the CRL had begun to collect population-related data in the Matlab field area on a large scale, initially to conduct cholera vaccine trials. Since the mid-1970s, these data collections were expanded and used for general health and fertility control research and campaigns. Through its internationalization, the ICDDR, B held the most extensive database on population data anywhere in the developing world, which in the future would be used by many international researchers and policy makers.[58] For all areas of research, the centre pursued a close integration of research in the medical and social sciences, arguing that a "new analytical approach incorporating both social and medical science methodologies into a coherent analytical framework of child survival" was needed.[59] The ICDDR, B thus undertook research in disease etiologies, transmission patterns in Bangladeshi communities, malnutrition, a number of infectious diseases of childhood, disease prevention, cholera vaccines, hygiene, hand washing and

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54   J. E. Rohde / R. E. Northrup, Taking Science where the Diarrhoea is. Acute Diarrhoea in Childhood (Ciba Foundation Symposium 42), 1975, pp. 339-366.

55   For the Ordinance, see, for example: ICDDR,B 4/BT/DEC. 82, Director's Report. Significant Happenings, p. 10, at ICDDR,B Library.

56   Memorandum from L. C. Chen, An International Institute for Research (52); RAC Record Group II, General Correspondence (1927–1989), Portion Filmed 1977, Reel 46, 466: Cholera Research Laboratory.

57   W. H. Mosley / L. C. Chen, An Analytical Framework for the Study of Child Survival in Developing Countries, in: Population and Development Review, Supplement: Child Survival: Strategies for Research (1984) 10, pp. 25-45.

58   See the many articles on Matlab in the Journal of Diarrhoeal Disease Research; the Matlab Censuses published by the ICDDR,B; the Matlab Demographic Workbook.

59   W. H. Mosley / L. C. Chen, Analytical Framework (57).

sanitation, the social behaviour influencing health, community use of medical centres, family planning, and many more topics.[60]

The ICDDR, B over the coming years evolved into a research institution of considerable importance to the global diarrhoeal diseases efforts. A USAID review of global diarrhoeal diseases control in 1988 remarked, "In addition to its own work, most of the leading scientists currently active in research on diarrhoeal disease around the world have been on staff at the Dhaka centre of have otherwise been heavily influenced by its work."[61] The centre deliberately sought a global radius and put emphasis on disseminating its research through various channels. The ICDDR, B established its own Journal on Diarrhoeal Disease Research with a focus on the Asian research community, hosted or co-organized international conferences in Asia, Africa and North America, and advised governments and hospital managers through expert teams in Saudi Arabia, Yemen, China, Kuweit, Egypt, Indonesia, Colombia, Tanzania, Kenya, the Philippines and several other countries since the early 1980s. Short-term emergency response teams were active in most major cholera or shigella epidemics.[62] With a mandate for both research and teaching and assigned the centre to "provide facilities for training to Bangladeshi and other nationals in areas of the Centre's competence in collaboration with national and international institutions",[63] the ICDDR, B developed and regularly conducted workshops on all aspects of laboratory diagnosis and clinical treatment of diarrhoeal diseases. While the training component was strongly advocated and increasingly substantially financed by the Government of Bangladesh, it was designed as an international programme. Aside from formalized training relations with the Bangladeshi National Oral Rehydration Programme (NORP) and with the largest, NGO-led nationwide rehydration programme, over the years approximately 30,000 health workers from about 80 countries received training at the ICDDR, B as workshop participants or as research fellows.

The ICDDR, B's position in the international child health networks is an interesting question in order to establish, in a case study, the influence of regional research institutes on global health policy, and more general the influence of agents not situated in the "centres" of development policy formulation. Historians of development concepts and programmes have debated the issues of influence, as well as circulation or transfer of

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60   The research conducted at the ICDDR,B was published in short summaries in the Annual Reports, which also contain a yearly bibliography detailing the research publications that involved ICDDR,B staff in the Journal of Diarrhoeal Disease Research as well as medical journals in general.

61   USAID, Oral rehydration therapy, p. x.

62   See, e.g.: A. K. Siddique et al., Why treatment centres failed to prevent cholera deaths among Rwandan refugees in Goma, Zaire, in: The Lancet 345 (1995), pp. 359-361; the accounts in J. Sack / M. A. Rahim (eds.), Smriti (22); ICDDR,B Board of Trustees Meeting, December 1982, Project Development Committee Report, ICDDR,B Library 4/BT/DEC.82; ICDDR,B Board of Trustees Meeting, December 1984, Director's Report, ICDDR,B Library 4/BT/DEC.84; ICDDR,B Board of Trustees Meeting, November 1985, Report of the BT Meeting November 26-28, 1985 Meeting Minutes, ICDDR,B Library 1/BT/NOV.85; ICDDR, B Annual Report 1983, p. 2.

63   ICDDR,B Board of Trustees Meeting, December 1982, p. 10 (62).

knowledge, practices, and policies in health policy.[64] Anthropologists have followed the path of questioning the relevance of global health policies for people's health behaviour in many locations,[65] a problem already talked about by the diarrhoeal diseases experts with regard to educational campaigns.[66] The purpose of this paper is less a perspective on the adaptation, "localization", and transformation of global policies under local circumstances, and rather a look at the other side of the coin of the mutual constitution of global and local policies, the influence of locally produced knowledge on global programme, and policy formulation.

The ICDDR, B management's position on its global reach was outspoken. Several Directors argued that the ICDDR, B served a worldwide interest, at least an interest for all developing countries, and used this argument to claim authority.[67] Bangladesh, it was argued, was a viable starting point for the formulation of global health policies, since it shared its problems with numerous other developing countries. The ICDDR, B was argued to be the best starting point for research into these problems, since it was one of few institutions that could perform interdisciplinary research into all aspects of diarrhoeal diseases in a developing country.[68] Taking a developing country perspective as starting point for global issues would alter the overall research agenda, as the first director wrote: "Those working in the field of global health and supporting this work must never again allow the major cause of death and illness to be left out of primary focus, as was the case historically when Tropical Medicine omitted the two largest killers in the world, diarrhoeal disease and acute respiratory infections from central consideration."[69]

Exactly how local research could provide viable results of importance to Bangladesh and the (developing) world was an issue of debate between the centre's management and the group of donors whenever research and social policies overlapped. In the first years of its existence, the ICDDR, B Director William B. Greenough III repeatedly voiced "a strong belief that neither research nor training can prosper without provision of the best health service possible to the people involved with our activities. Thus we view the large component of services rendered as intrinsic and necessary to any research and training."[70] This was argued to be more than an "ethical necessity"[71] or politically appropriate. It was also an integral part of the research agenda. However, the Dhaka hospital and the rural treatment centres were expensive. Donors repeatedly refused to fund them and argued

64   F. Cooper / R. Packard (eds.), International Development and the Social Sciences: Essays in the History and Politics of Knowledge, Berkeley 1997; H. Büschel / D. Speich (eds.), Entwicklungswelten: Globalgeschichte der Entwicklungszusammenarbeit, Frankfurt a. M. 2009.

65   See, for example: J. Justice, Policies, Plans, & People: Foreign Aid and Health Development, Berkeley 1986, and her other publications.

66   See for examples: USAID, Oral Rehydration Therapy; J. E. Rohde, To drink or not to drink, in: Diarrhoea Dialogue, (1980) 2, p. 4-5.

67   ICDDR, B Board of Trustees Meeting, December 1982, p. 1 (62).

68   Ibid., p. 9 (62).

69   ICDDR, B Board of Trustees Meeting November 1985, Meeting Minutes, ICDDR,B Library, 1/BT/NOV.85, p. 3.

70   ICDDR, B Board of Trustees Meeting, December 1982, p. 10 (62).

71   ICDDR, B Board of Trustees Meeting November 1985, BT/NOV.85, Annex II, "Goals and Priorities ICDDR,B 1985–1989", p. 1 (62).

that health-services delivery was the task of the government of Bangladesh, not of the ICDDR, B. Additionally, there was criticism of mismanagement of core funds. From 1981 onwards, more and more donors earmarked their funds, thus financing specific research projects and not the ICDDR, B as such. Maintaining the Dhaka hospital proved exceedingly difficult over the years and could only be achieved through the government's funding.[72] The discussions about service delivery and the hospital not only reflect money concerns, they also reveal differing conceptions of the politics of knowledge production. For the ICDDR, B management, every research necessarily was "localized", and thus the right location was of paramount importance for determining research trends, priorities and outcomes. In an opposite perspective, the location of research was essential because of prevalence of diseases and populations as a necessary resource, but the research agendas still could be defined with limited attention to local health needs. This issue reveals a variety of conceptions of the relationship between "the local" and "the global" and implications of globalizing as well as localizing knowledge production. It was only at the turn of the 1980s and 1990s that the proportions between core and project funding changed again, and the percentage of core funding increased, not least in order to be able to react to local circumstances, such as new epidemics or changes in disease prevalence.[73]

The ICDDR, B established close and formalized relations with the Diarrhoeal Diseases Control Programme in Geneva immediately after the internationalization and the establishment of the CDD. The ICDDR, B was not only used as a major training centre, its researchers also participated in the CDD expert advisory teams. The communication between the two institutions were intertwined not only through numerous visits (chronicled in the ICDDR, B Annual Reports), but also through frequent exchange of personnel. A number of CDD managers had worked in Dhaka before or went there after the WHO assignment, a back and forth of experts that ensured continuously open communication channels. At the same time, donor competition was fierce and hampered relations. The CDD could benefit from close ties with a constantly active research institute in a developing country; for the ICDDR, B, relations with the WHO were desirable

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72   See: the ICDDR, B Annual Reports Introductions for almost every year during the 1980s, especially the late 1980s. The hospital is one example of this conflict; the Teknaf field research station would provide an additional example of this conflict of conceptions of research. For conflicts between management and donors, see, for example: ICDDR,B Board of Trustees Meeting February 1980, Draft Proceedings, Draft 25 March 1980, 5d/BT/Feb.80: External Scientific Relationships; ICDDR, B Board of Trustees Meeting November 1985, Resources Development Report, 5/BT/Nov.80, p.10, both at ICDDR, B Library; W. T. Mashler, ICDDR,B Consultative Group Meeting, New York, 17 June 1983, UNDP Memo GLO/77/014, 18 May 1983, Reel R-4262, the Ford Foundation Collection at the Rockefeller Archive Center; ICDDR,B: Training and Outreach Activities, Memo for the Ford Foundation, to W. Carmichael, 31 August 1982, Reel R-4262, the Ford Foundation Collection at the Rockefeller Archive Center; memo from L. C. Chen "WHO Meeting" to O. Harkavy, July 13, 1982, Reel R-4262, the Ford Foundation Collection at the Rockefeller Archive Center.

73   See the documentation on the establishment of the ICDDR, B Reserve Fund at the Ford Foundation, a major contributor: Grant File PA 850-0598, Reel R-5566, the Ford Foundation Collection at the Rockefeller Archive Center. A major shigella epidemic in Bangladesh in the 1980s was considered to be a prime example of changing disease patterns that required flexible research responses.

since donor decisions partly depended on the WHO's vote.[74] Additionally, the WHO funded some of the ICDDR, B's research, for example, in cholera vaccines.

Both institutions shared an emphasis on research in oral rehydration therapy. The ICDDR, B pursued numerous projects in finding better formulas and delivery systems of oral rehydration solutions. This included the evaluation of standardized ORS and the search for a "Super ORS" that would combine diarrhoea treatment with nutritional impacts. Additionally, the centre placed considerable importance on diversifying oral rehydration solutions to adapt them to staples available in different geographical regions. Substituting glucose with sucrose/starches, according to their studies, not only yielded better treatment results (a contested point) but also was economically and thus politically sound since it enabled a number of poor countries to produce oral rehydration solutions without having to import glucose. These attempts at substituting sugar with rice, plantains, maize, and other staples were published widely and discussed with the WHO regularly. The CDD accepted most results, but the WHO and UNICEF did not alter their ORS production or standards in order to integrate the "rice research". The ICDDR, B's influence on the CDD technical assistance component in this aspect was limited.[75]

Differences also arose over the use of home fluids. Instead of using the industrially produced, pre-packaged ORS "medicine" or commodity, caregivers could treat dehydration by mixing water, sugar (or rice water), and salt in the correct proportions at home, thus resorting to the basic principle of oral rehydration. These homemade, simplified solutions had the obvious advantage of better availability, but safety concerns were acute. The CDD commissioned evaluations and in 1984 produced a manual on Recommended Home Fluids (RHFs), but advised that these fluids should be considered a second-rate option and advertised an ORS-focused strategy to its member states. RHF required even more intense and successful educational campaigns than standardized ORS. However, the CDD integrated the administration of home fluids into the WHO definition of oral rehydration; initially restricted to the administration of standardized ORS, it was broadened in its scope. From 1984 on it included some forms of RHFs, and from 1988 on also continued feeding with appropriate foods in general. In 1991, the WHO's definition of oral rehydration was changed to define it as any increase in administered fluids.[76] This

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74   ICDDR, B Board of Trustees Meeting November 1985, Resources Development Report, 5/BT/Nov.80, p.10, at ICDDR, B Library.

75   M. Molla et al., Rice-powder electrolyte solution as oral therapy in diarrhoea due to Vibrio cholera and Escherichia coli, in: The Lancet (1982), pp. 1317-1319; F. C. Patra et al.: Is Oral Rice Electrolyte Solution superior to Glucose Electrolyte Solution in Infantile Diarrhoea? in: Archives of Disease of Childhood 57 (1982), pp. 910-912; repeated accounts, e.g. in the Journal of Diarrhoeal Diseases Research; R. L. Guerrant / B. A. Carneiro-Filho / R. A. Dillingham, Cholera, Diarrhea, and Oral Rehyration Therapy: Triumph and Indictment, in: Clinical Infectious Diseases 37 (2003) 3, pp. 398-405; H. B. Wong, Rice water in treatment of infantile gastroenteritis, in: The Lancet 2 (1981) 8237, pp. 102-103; M. N. Mehta / S. Subramaniam, Comparison of rice water, rice electrolyte solution, and glucose electrolyte solution in the management of infantile diarrhoea, in: The Lancet 1 (8485), pp. 843-845; S. M. Gore / O. Fontaine / N. F. Pierce, Impact of rice based oral rehydration solution on stool output and duration of diarrhoea: meta-analysis of 13 clinical trials, in: British Medical Journal 304 (1992) 6822, pp. 287-291.

76   World Health Organization, Programme for the Control of Diarrhoeal Diseases: The Selection of Fluids and Food for Home Therapy to Prevent Dehydration from Diarrhoea: Guidelines for Developing a National Policy, WHO/

can be seen as a reaction to the fact that ORS usage rates did not grow to the extent that had been hoped for. However, RHFs were seen as a double-edged technology since incorrect and dangerous solutions brought safety risks.[77] ICDDR, B researchers performed a number of studies intended to evaluate the safety of Recommended Home Fluids. For these studies, the situation in Bangladesh proved to be favourable: a large NGO, the Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee (BRAC), started a series of almost nation-wide rehydration education programmes entirely relying on RHFs (called *lobon-gur*) exclusively produced from local staples. The ICDDR, B as a partner performed laboratory analyses of several hundreds of thousands of samples of home-produced *lobon-gur*, and was thus instrumental in making the solution safer.[78] In an international comparison, ICDDR, B researchers were by far not the only ones performing research in Recommended Home Fluids; however, they were among the most outspoken proponents of this approach and, as a Collaborative Centre for the global CDD programme, enjoyed a privileged position of making themselves heard.

The ICDDR, B record in influencing the global CDD is a considerable one. For some of the research undertaken in Bangladesh, the global resonance is obvious, such as for vaccine trials that resulted in WHO regulation revisions, ecological studies of the cholera vibrio that revised assumptions about the spread of cholera epidemics, or the identification of causal agents.[79] For others the results are mixed, as the "rice research" episode demonstrates. The field experience in Bangladesh and the research of ICDDR,B scientists helped to shape the strategies of the global campaign. Its record draws the conclusion that the role of international and regional research institutes for the formulation of global policies in the health sector should be taken into account when investigating the history of international organization programmes. The production of medical knowledge needs to be situated in its specific locations and circumstances. As has been argued for other fields of expertise, medical knowledge is far from being "objective". For an investigation of the social, political, and institutional structures of knowledge production, the role of research institutes within global networks of medical knowledge and policy is an interesting starting point.[80] Not only did postcolonial populations like the people of

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CDD/93.44; C. G. Victora / J. Bryce / O. Fontaine / R. Monasch, Reducing Deaths from Diarrhoea through Oral Rehydration Therapy, in: Bulletin of the World Health Organization 78 (2000) 10, pp. 1246-1255.

77 For example PSEG Hartland et al., Composition of Oral Solutions Prepared by Jamaican Mothers for Treatment of Diarrhoea, in: The Lancet (1981), pp. 600-601.

78 M. R. Chowdhury, Evaluating Community ORT Programmes: Indicators for Use and Safety, in: Health Policy and Planning 1 (1986), pp. 214-221; USAID, Oral Rehydration Therapy, pp. 30-35 (45); J. E. Rohde (ed.), Learning to Reach Health for All: Thirty Years of Instructive Experience at BRAC, Dhaka 2005; R. A. Cash / M. R. Chowdhury, A Simple Solution: Teaching Millions to Treat Diarrhoea at Home, Dhaka 1996; C. H. Lovell, Breaking the Cycle of Poverty. The BRAC strategy, West Hartford 1992; M. R. Islam / W. B. Greenough / D. Sack et al., Labon-gur (common salt and brown sugar) Oral Rehydration Solution in the Treatment of Diarrhoea in Adults, in: The Journal of Tropical Medicine and Hygiene 83 (1980) 1, pp. 41-45. For the programme, also see: W. Cutting / K. Elliott, Agents of Change (editorial), in: Diarrhoea Dialogue (1980) 3, p.1; BRAC's oral rehydration programme 1980, in: Glimpse vol. 2 (1980) 1, p. 1-2. Diarrhoea Dialogue, (1980) 1, p. 2; see for the study: The Lancet (1979) 2, pp. 802-812.

79 R. R. Colwell, Global Climate and Infectious Disease: The Cholera Paradigm, in: Science 274 (1996) 5295, pp. 2025-2031.

80 Compare for this argument: Sunil Amrith, Plague of Poverty? The World Health Organization, Tuberculosis and

Matlab serve as "laboratories" for new medical approaches and remedies, international research organizations in developing countries also shaped distinct approaches to medical problems and health research, claimed global relevance, and deliberately influenced international organizations' agenda-setting processes. The ICDDR,B's research agenda was determined by multiple factors, with medical considerations being only one point among many. Independent field research as well as a cooperation with an NGO-led oral rehydration programme seemed to prove that Recommended Home Fluids were both safe and acceptable in local disease belief frameworks. Donor constraints and considerations tended to navigate the institute toward standardizations and away from service delivery. One strategy of success for the institute was to multiply donors, another to insist on the global relevance of the knowledge produced in Bangladesh. It was thus the global range that served as an argument for authority and relevance. While not an autonomous agent, ICDDR, B management and scientists were able to pursue a research agenda that was not entirely dependent on considerations in Geneva, New York, or Washington. As a transnational actor, the ICDDR,B brought together researchers from different institutional and epistemological cultures, thus allowing for multidirectional knowledge transfers. For the processes of transfer and translation into international organization policy and country programmes initiated by the WHO's CDD, standardization is a major issue (in the global ORS standard), with diversification (in RHFs) being a complementary issue especially since the late 1980s. It is a delicate task to discern longer-term balances between these two influences since the global efforts were considerably lessened by the mid-1990s.[81] Diarrhoeal diseases now were listed second in global child mortality figures, with the global diarrhoeal diseases control efforts left an unfinished goal. The end of the CDD as an independent programme in 1994 can be interpreted in a number of ways. The successor programmes further integrated diseases of childhood, but the Integrated Management of the Sick Child Initiative (IMCI) never gained the momentum the CDD enjoyed.[82] This lower importance of diarrhoeal diseases on the international health agenda can be attributed as a consequence of its success; but in light of prevailing high mortality figures this can only serve as a limited explanation. Vanishing institutional

International Development, c. 1945–1980, Dissertation, http://www.histecon.magd.cam.ac.uk/docs/amrith_WHO.pdf, access: 2013-09-16; M. Malowany, Unfinished Agendas: Writing the History of Medicine of Sub-Saharan Africa, in: African Affairs 99 (2000), pp. 325-349.

81 See: P. K. Ram's statistics; P. K. Ram / M. Choi / L. S. Blum / A. W. Wamae / E. D. Mintz / A. V. Bartlett, Declines in Case Management of Diarrhoea among Children less than five Years old, in: Bulletin of the World Health Organization 86 (2008) 3, http://www.who.int/bulletin/volumes/86/3/07-041384/en/, access: 2013-09-16; B. C. Forsberg B. C. / M. G. Petzold / G. Tomson / P. Allebeck, Diarrhoea Case Management in low- and middle-income Countries: An Unfinished Agenda, in: Bulletin of the World Health Organization 85 (2007), pp. 42-48; PATH, Diarrhoeal Diseases Control gives a brief but concise overview of recent statistics both for mortality statistics and for ORS use. The end of the CDD also brought with it a marked decline in statistics so that they, from the mid-1990s on, again become scattered and incomplete. Compare also D. Werner / D. Sanders, Questioning the Solution: The Politics of Primary Health Care and Child Survival with an in-depth critique of Oral Rehydration Therapy, Palo Alto 1997.

82 J. Bryce / C. G. Victora / J. P. Habicht / R. E. Black / R. W. Scherpbier, Programmatic Pathways to Child Survival: Results of a Multi-country Evaluation of Integrated Management of Childhood Illness, in: Health Policy Planning 20 (2005), pp. 15-17.

support, changes in the broader development frameworks with less emphasis on population control, and the end of a specific network of scientists-cum-managers predominantly in Geneva, Dhaka and Baltimore – who shared a vision and used the institutional support in order to set the health and development agenda and to publicize ORS as a global solution for a major health problem – are additional factors. The ICDDR, B managed to survive through broadening its scope and agenda. The consequential integration of diarrhoeal diseases into broader health topics was a successful strategy for this research institute, which enabled an expansion of its strategic partners and donors.

Summary

This article offered a case study in agenda setting in international health and the role of biomedical technology as well as institutional frameworks in an international health campaign. It was the development of a simple health intervention treatment for most diarrhoeas that recast the problem for health policy makers. Struggles over commodification, education, and community participation continuously accompanied the global programme in diarrhoeal diseases control. Institutional frameworks for research and technical cooperation, as well as the political discussions on the nature of social and economic development, influenced the agenda of diarrhoeal diseases control and its place in the international health framework. Especially the influence of nation-states as different as the United States and post-independent Bangladesh has been looked at. The story of the ICDDR,B sheds light on the complexities of health-policy agenda setting with a focus on the appropriation of global programmes by non-Western institutions, arguing that individual national interests cannot be separated from institutional cultures and intellectual currents such as Primary Health Care. While biomedical "progress" was a game changer when the programme came about in the 1970s, it cannot serve as explanatory factor for the status, outlook, and priorities of the global programme alone, as discussion about commodification, standardization, and education reveal. A closer look reveals a less linear, and more "politicized", story.

Non-Aligned Movement Countries as Drivers of Change in International Organizations

Changavalli Siva Rama Murthy

RESÜMEE

Die Länder der *Bewegung der Blockfreien Staaten* waren bedeutende Akteure im Wandel der zeitgenössischen internationalen Beziehungen. Indem sie den Vereinten Nationen beitraten, vergrößerten sie deren Legitimität wie auch die anderer internationaler Organisationen. Durch individuelle und kollektive Initiativen bewirkten sie eine Reorientierung der politischen Leit-linien der UNO, die den eigenen Hoffnungen und Interessen mehr Raum gaben. Ihr wach-sendes Gewicht, allein durch die zunehmende zahlenmäßige Stärke, setzte die USA und ihre westeuropäischen Verbündeten unter massiven Druck. Die Etablierung von Mechanismen wie die *United Nations Conference on Trade and Development*, aber auch neue Agenden für die Ge-neralversammlung der UNO und etliche ihrer Spezialorganisationen sowie einige Initiativen der Weltbank in den 1960er Jahren verdeutlichen den Einfluss der Bemühungen der Entwick-lungsländer. Ihre maßgebliche Rolle kommt schließlich in der Begründung von Programmen zur wirtschaftlichen Stärkung von „Dritte Welt"-Ländern sowie in den UN-Friedensmissionen zum Ausdruck.

Change is inherent to any living organisms, and it is also natural to international orga-nizations (IOs). While its occurrence can be anticipated, its direction, pace, scope, or source cannot be prejudged. Change manifests itself in "modifications to formal insti-tutional structures or to informal practices and working methods". Change can occur in an abrupt or incremental fashion "from within the organization, from outside it, or from a mix of endogenous and exogenous sources".[1] Following this line, the article es-says the efforts and achievements of the non-aligned countries, either individually or as

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1   L. R. Helfer, Understanding Change in International Organizations: Globalization and innovation in the ILO, in: Vanderbilt Law Review, 59 (2006) 3, pp. 649-726, here pp. 666-667.

a group, in transforming the United Nations (UN) and other major IOs in giving their concerns and priorities necessary space and influence. After all, their purposes differed considerably from the interests of West European countries and the United States (US), which had created and shaped most of the newly founded IOs in the mid-20th century. In the strong position of having won World War II the "Western" countries[2] organized the founding conferences, ensured that the constitutional framework of these institutions incorporated their values –among others peace, freedom, equality, and justice– and placed the secretariats in their own lands.[3] Until the entry of newly independent states in the 1960s, the US had an "assured majority" that allowed them to push their agendas and to block the moves of the Soviet Union and its allies.[4] In fact, several IOs had been (ab)used as instruments of American foreign policy, due partly to the dominance of the advanced Western countries in the higher echelons of the secretariats.[5] Remarkably, the non-aligned countries actively countered this dominance by entering and engaging with IOs instead of keeping themselves out. More so, the Non-Alignment Movement (NAM) – comprising more than 100 countries from Asia, Africa, and Latin America – followed a vision that centred on the potential of existing institutions in finding just and amicable solutions to common problems.

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2   I use the term "West" for the countries of Western Europe, the United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, which benefited from colonizing foreign territories across the world and were engaged in an ideological and military competition with their communist rivals in Eastern Europe. Likewise, the phrase, "non-Western" countries is used here to refer to the newly independent and economically underdeveloped countries of Africa, Asia and Latin America, which collectively strove to end political, economic and cultural exploitation and inequities. Further I make no distinction between the terms the "non-aligned" and "Third World" countries. On the meanings and problems as well as on the continuing relevance of these terms see: D. J. Puchala, Some Non-Western Perspectives on International Relations, in: Journal of Peace Research, 34 (1997) 2, pp. 129-134; B. R. Tomlinson, What was the Third World?, in: Journal of Contemporary History 38 (2003) 2, pp. 307-21; M. T. Berger, After the Third World: History, Destiny and the Fate of the Third World, in: Third World Quarterly, 25 (2004) 1, pp. 9-39.

3   The United Nations (UN) and the Bretton Woods institutions are located in the United States, just as the United Kingdom, France and Canada host the headquarters respectively of the International Maritime Organisation (IMO), the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), and the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). According to information from the Yearbook of International Organizations, the following top ten hosts of intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations are the United Kingdom, France, the United States, Switzerland, Belgium, Netherlands, Germany, Canada, Italy, and Austria. See also: W. J. Feld / R. S. Jordan, International Organizations: A Comparative Approach, Westport 1994, p. 18.

4   J. G. Stoessinger, The United Nations and the superpowers, New York 1965; J. W. Müller / K. P. Sauvant (eds.), The Third World without Superpowers: Chronology, Bibliography and Index for the Group of 77 and the Non-Aligned Movement, New York 1993; M. Mazower, No Enchanted Palace: The End of Empire and the Ideological Origins of the United Nations, Princeton 2009; M. Sherwood, 'There is no new deal for the Blackman in San Francisco': African Attempts to Influence the Founding Conference of the United Nations, April-July, 1945, in: The International Journal of African Historical Studies 29 (1996) 1, pp. 71-94.

5   L. S. Finkelstein (ed.), The United States and International Organization: The Changing Setting, Cambridge 1969; on the longer involvement of the US in international politics see: I. Tyrrell, Reforming the World: The Creation of America's Moral Empire, Princeton 2010. Official statistics compiled in 2011 regarding occupation of higher level posts in the UN Secretariat reveal that 38 Western-developed countries held more (117) posts than those (80) held by 137 developing countries. See Table 24 on the Distribution of Staff on at the D-1 Level and above, in: UN Document A/66/347, 8 September 2011, p. 51.

Non-Alignment as Movement: Principles, Priorities and Phases

The roots of non-alignment as a concept go back to the colonial experiences of peoples in Asia and Africa and their desire to build enduring peace following the ravages of World War II. Furthermore, the impetus to the thought process was provided by the vitiation of the post-war international environment, characterized by the onset of the Cold War between the erstwhile wartime partners who divided Europe and threatened to take away the newly earned independence of former colonies in Asia and Africa by roping them in as military allies.

The earliest expressions of the idea of non-alignment may be traced to the speech of Jawaharlal Nehru in September 1946, made shortly after he assumed the leadership of the pre-independence interim government in India. Outlining the objectives of a free foreign policy for India, he stated: "We propose, as far as possible, to keep away from the power politics of groups, aligned against one another, which have led in the past to world wars and which may again lead to disasters on an even vaster scale. We believe that peace and freedom are indivisible and denial of freedom anywhere must endanger freedom elsewhere and lead to conflict and war." He also obviously stressed the emancipation from colonial rule and the recognition in theory and practice of equal opportunities for all peoples, while articulating the vision of "one world" in which there would be "free cooperation of free peoples, and no class or group exploits another".[6] While referring to the negative perceptions that non-alignment meant not taking positions on contentious issues, Nehru once highlighted its positive attributes. According to him, the term being "non-aligned" means "nations which object to lining up for war purposes, to military blocs, to military alliances and the like. We keep away from such an approach and want to throw our weight in favour of peace".[7] These thoughts were reinforced later by other leaders like Gamal Abdel Nasser (Egypt), Marshal Josip Broz Tito (Yugoslavia), and Sukarno (Indonesia) who, together with Nehru, steered the newly independent countries from Asia and Africa to formulate the key principles of non-alignment in the 1950s.[8]

The first milestone in the formation of NAM was the Bandung conference in April 1955 at which ten principles of peaceful coexistence and cooperation were endorsed, besides the pledge to support the UN Charter.[9] In 1961 some twenty countries met in Cairo– as

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6   Quoted from: R. Khan, Non-Alignment: Context, Dimensions, and Challenges, in: idem (ed.) Perspectives on Non-Alignment, New Delhi 1981, pp. 3-39, here pp. 10-11.

7   R. Khan, Non-Alignment (6), p. 14.

8   K. Ampiah, The Political and Moral Imperatives of the Bandung Conference of 1955: The Reactions of the US, UK and Japan, Kent 2007; C. J. Lee (ed.), Making a World after Empire: The Bandung Moment and its political afterlives, Athens (OH) 2010; S. S. Tan / A. Acharya (eds.), Bandung Revisited: The Legacy of the 1955 Asian-African Conference for International Order, Singapore 2009; A. Ajala, The Organisation of African Unity and Non-Alignment, in: Nigerian Journal of International Affairs, 7 (1981) 1-2, pp. 103-117; P. P. Ramchandani, India-Africa: Economic and Technical Co-operation, 1947–1997. An assessment, in: Africa Quarterly, 37 (1997) 1-2, pp. 77-122; for the European background see: R. Kullaa, Non-Alignment and its origins in Cold War Europe: Yugoslavia, Finland and the Soviet Challenge, London 2011.

9   The principal source for these ten principles was the "Panchsheel" (five principles) incorporated in an agreement signed by China and India in 1954. Nehru explained the concept of Panchsheel after the Bandung conference:

a prelude to the first summit conference of the non-aligned countries in Belgrade – and agreed on the criteria of eligibility to become part of the group: a country should be in pursuit of an independent policy based on the coexistence of states with different political and social systems; should reliably support independence movements, should not be involved in bilateral or multilateral military alliances related to "Great Power" conflicts, and should not allow military bases for use in the Cold War rivalry.[10] In a sense, the criteria for NAM membership were couched in a liberal, inclusive manner: a country had to show a tendency towards an independent foreign policy, even if it momentarily tilted towards one of the power blocs, and it could have military relationships with the "Great Powers" but they should not be such that it could precipitate competition and conflict among those powers.[11]

Clearly the intention to turn non-alignment into a powerful political concept and policy depended on its popularization. In the span of 50 years since the founding of NAM in Belgrade, 16 summit meetings took place, while the membership increased from the original 25 to 120 at the most recent summit in Tehran in 2012, which shows that is has spread beyond Africa and Asia. From 1972 onwards a number of Latin American countries joined NAM, whereas prominent global and regional organizations such as the African Union, the (British) Commonwealth, and the United Nations have been associated with NAM as observers.

In the five decades of its existence, NAM has evolved in different directions and at varying paces. Johan Galtung identified two periods in the evolution of NAM. In the early phase, managing the Cold War rivalry and upkeep of world peace by emphasising the importance of dialogue, conciliation, and coexistence remained the central concern. In the next phase, during the 1970s when decolonization had made significant strides, economic issues became prominent with a focus on altering the existing unjust economic order.[12] This can be seen in issues dealt with and resolutions taken: While the summit

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"This idea of Panchsheel lays down the very important truth that each people must ultimately fend for itself. I am not thinking in terms of military fending, but in terms of striving intellectually, morally, spiritually, and in terms of opening out all our windows to ideas from others, and learning from the experience of others." Quoted from: Soedjatmoko, Non-alignment and Beyond, in: U. S. Bajpai (ed.), Non-Alignment: Perspectives and Prospects, New Delhi 1983, pp. 61-74, here p. 63.

10   O. Jankowitsch / K. P. Sauvant, The Third World without Superpowers: The Selected Documents of the Non-Aligned Countries, vol. 1, Dobbs Ferry 1978, pp. xxxi-xxxii.

11   E. Agaev / S. Krylov, Non-Aligned Movement: 116 Nations, in: International Affairs: A Russian Journal of World Politics, Diplomacy and International Relations, 52 (2006) 3, pp. 46-63; A. Orlov, The Non-Aligned Movement: 40 Years After, in: International Affairs: A Russian Journal of World Politics, Diplomacy and International Relations, 48 (2002) 1, pp. 49-56; K. Tassin, Lift Up Your Head My Brother: Nationalism and the Genesis of the Non-Aligned Movement, in: Journal of Third World Studies 23 (2006) 1, pp. 147-168.

12   J. Galtung, On the Relationship between Military and Economic Non-Alignment, in: The Nonaligned World, 1 (1983) 3, pp. 192-202. An equally important part of the agenda of NAM was the aim of ending all manifestations of colonialism and apartheid in South Africa, see: H. Strydom, The Context and Determinants of South Africa's new Role in the United Nations, in: Strategic Review for Southern Africa, 29 (2007) 1, pp. 1-37; A. Fourie, Non-Alignment as a Foreign Policy Orientation of the African National Congress, in: Politikon, 19 (1992) 2, pp. 81-98; on recent developments: S. Morphet, South Africa as Chair of the Non-Aligned, September 1998-February 2003, in: D. Lee / I. Taylor, P. D. Williams (eds.), The New Multilateralism in South African Diplomacy, Basingstoke 2006, pp. 78-99.

at Belgrade paid a good deal of attention to the danger of war between the two super-powers and the need to make all possible efforts avert such confrontation, the policy of non-alignment began to be spelled out in broader terms from the next summit in Cairo in 1964. Five priority areas for collective action were identified: (a) bringing an end to colonial rule wherever it existed, (b) fighting against racial discrimination, (c) general and complete disarming and settling of disputes without resorting to use of force and in accord with the UN Charter, (d) strengthening of the role of the UN and better implementation of UN resolutions; and (e) then promoting economic development and cooperation.

Still, the first two summits of the non-aligned countries were concerned almost exclusively with political matters. Of the 27 points of the declaration adopted at the 1961 Belgrade summit, only three or four points had a bearing on economic questions. Similarly, out of the 11 chapters of the "Programme" adopted by the 1964 Cairo summit, only one dealt with economic issues.[13] However, as the decolonization gained irreversible momentum by the end of 1960s (owing to the push given by the UN Declaration on Decolonization), the 1970 Lusaka summit brought a thorough reordering of priorities. The Lusaka Declaration on Non-Alignment and Economic Progress took note of the "rapidly widening gap between the economies of the rich and the poor nations" and characterized it as "a threat to the independence of developing countries and to international peace and security". The participating countries were called upon "to employ international machinery to bring about a rapid transformation of the world economic system particularly in the field of trade, finance and technology so that economic domination yields to economic cooperation and economic strength is used for the benefit of the world community."[14]

Another clear shift took place from politics to economics. For the first time two separate declarations were adopted – one on political and another on economic subjects–and this practice was continued at the meeting in Algiers in 1973 when the political and economic manifestations of imperialism were sharply attacked: "Imperialism is still the greatest stumbling block to the emancipation and advancement of developing countries, which are striving to attain a standard of living in accordance with the basic norms of welfare and human dignity. Imperialism is not only opposed to the economic and social progress of developing countries but has also adopted an aggressive attitude towards those who stand in the way of its designs and seeks to impose political, social and economic structures which facilitate foreign domination, dependence or neo-colonialism."[15]

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13   O. Jankowitsch / K. P. Sauvant, The Initiating Role of the Non-Aligned Countries, in: K. P. Sauvant (ed.), Changing Priorities on the International Agenda: The new International Economic Order, Oxford 1981, pp. 41-77, here p. 58.

14   Quoted from Lusaka NAM Summit Final Document, pp. 81, 84, URL:http://cns.miis.edu/nam/documents/Official_Document/3rd_Summit_FD_Lusaka_Declaration_1970.pdf, access on 16.09.2013.

15   O. Jankowitsch / K. P. Sauvant, Third World without Superpowers, p. 215 (10); K. P. Sauvant, From Economic to Socio-Cultural Emancipation: The Historical Context of the New International Economic Order and the New International Socio-Cultural order, in: Third World Quarterly, 3 (1981) 1, pp. 48-61; A. K. Das Gupta, Non-Alignment and the International Economic Order, in: K. P. Misra (ed.), Non-Alignment Frontiers and Dynamics, New Delhi

Having set its eyes on a "new type of international economic relations", "new and more equitable international division of labour", and "new international monetary system", the Algiers declaration requested member governments to "use all possible means" to achieve the economic objectives of the non-aligned countries including "the establishment of a new international economic order".[16] The radical stance peaked and spread to political issues at the Havana summit in 1979 where the Soviet Union was described as a natural ally. Understandably, the members were distressed at the completely stalled "North-South"[17] dialogue over economic issues and the deterioration of economic and political climate by the end of 1970s. The effectiveness of the movement has decreased since 1980s, particularly after the Cold War came to an end.[18] As part of this process, fissures between more moderate and more radical positions broke open. India, Egypt, Indonesia, Sri Lanka, and Yugoslavia were generally seen as moderate in comparison to Cuba, Iraq, Libya, and Vietnam, which were considered as radicals.[19] Often NAM countries began to be identified either as pro-US or pro-Soviet in their foreign policy orientation. Added to this, there occurred armed conflicts between NAM countries during the 1980s, with the result the movement faced the hard task of projecting unity. For

1983, pp. 133-142; more broadly: R. Looney, New International Economic Order, in: R. J. B. Jones (ed.), Routledge Encyclopedia of International Political Economy, London 1999; M. Hudson, Global Fraction: The New International Economic Order, New York 2003.

16   O. Jankowitsch / K. P. Sauvant, Initiating Role of the Non-Aligned Countries, p. 59 (13).

17   Here the reference is to the economic polarization between the industrially advanced countries of Western Europe and North America on the one side and the economically less developed countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America on the other. On this see: C. N. Murphy, What the Third World wants: An interpretation of the Development and Meaning of the New International Economic Order, in: International Studies Quarterly, 27 (1983) 1, pp. 55-76; J. Bandyopadhyaya, North over South: A Non-Western Perspective on International Relations, New Delhi 1984.

18   Gradually NAM summits failed to attract substantial inputs from its members, notwithstanding that the declarations of the 1990s pleaded unequivocally to build a multipolar world order, to enhance multilateralism and democratization of the international financial architecture, and addressed the widening income gaps. On the post-Cold-War development of NAM see: G. N. Srivastava, The Non-Aligned Movement: A Methodology for the post-Cold War Era – a note for Discussion, in: Peace and Security, 30 (1998), pp. 14-20; S. Morphet, Multilateralism and the Non-Aligned Movement: What is the Global South Doing and where is it Going?, in: Global Governance, 10 (2004) 4, pp. 517-537.

19   The non-aligned group is known for its unity as much as for its issue-based divergence. For example, on the issue of anti-colonialism, India is considered to have taken a moderate stance while Ghana and Indonesia followed a more aggressive line. Likewise, at the 1976 Colombo summit Iraq, Cuba, North Korea, and Libya – heavily criticising the US– were pitted against India, Indonesia, Yugoslavia, and Sri Lanka who feared that an intemperate declaration could damage the own bargaining position, see for example: N. S. Sutresna, The Non-Aligned Movement: An Indonesian Perspective, in: The Indonesian Quarterly, 25 (1997) 2, pp. 128-141. Consistency of non-aligned voting at the UN and other decision-making forums varied depending on the issue. Votes on core questions of decolonization tended to be unanimous while on issues more peripheral to the non-aligned or where the context was clearly East-West rather than North-South differences came up. Cohesion was greater on geographical issues where its regional subgroup was unified. As a general rule, differences were greater on votes with a specific and limited focus, and less or non-existent on more generalized or global issues, see: P. Lyon, The Non-Alignment: Performance and Prospects, in: U. S. Bajpai (ed.), Non-Alignment, pp. 28-38, especially p. 30 (9); R. L. Jackson, The Non-Aligned, the UN and the Superpowers, New York 1983, pp. 29, 141-142. See also: S. Y. Kim / B. M. Russett, The new Politics of Voting Alignments in the United Nations General Assembly, in: International Organization, 54 (1996) 4, pp. 629-652; E. Voeten, Clashes in the Assembly, in: International Organization, 54 (2000) 2, pp. 185-215.

long, NAM scrupulously avoided taking up contentious issues between their members. For example Marshal Tito clearly stated at the Belgrade summit that disputes between the non-aligned countries were delicate "issues of secondary importance", and on "some of them it is not easy to reach agreement and they could, if insisted upon, impair the successes" of the movement. Protecting and projecting unity was necessary "at this moment of vital importance for all mankind".[20]

The policy of the 1960s could not be sustained in the 1980s as conflicts in Afghanistan, Angola, Kampuchea, Iran, Iraq, and Nicaragua tested the capabilities of NAM to paper over serious differences. Burma (now Myanmar), a founding member, even announced its withdrawal, while Egypt, another influential player, felt unwanted, at least until its widely noted participation in the 2012 Tehran summit. Furthermore, the developments in post-Tito Yugoslavia, a country to which NAM had always looked for leadership, proved to be demoralizing. While the ethnic conflict leading to the disintegration of post-Tito Yugoslavia in the beginning of 1990s had affected the morale of NAM countries, the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union along with emergence of the United States as the only superpower shook the foundations of NAM, both as an idea and as a movement. Doubts about its usefulness were magnified.[21] Nonetheless, a few analysts continue to passionately hold that "the transition from a bipolar world does not render NAM anachronistic", rather they argue that both the non-alignment and "Third World" would "retain [their] usefulness so long as the world continues to be riven by serious economic and political disparities".[22]

Nevertheless, a few aspects of the incremental institutionalization of NAM are noteworthy. Until the end of the 1950s individual countries like Egypt, India, Indonesia, and Yugoslavia maintained a relatively independent foreign policy. Only sporadically did they take part in consultations in Bandung or Brioni. When the escalating arms race between the Cold War rivals severely threated world peace, they became more open to the need for collective action and institutionalization of non-alignment as a movement. In the formative phase during the 1960s, an ad hoc approach found favour in the Belgrade and the Cairo summits. Both were held at the personal initiative of the leaders of the host countries (that is to say, Tito and Nasser) and neither summit could envisage as to when the next one would take place.[23] The summits were held on an ad hoc basis at irregular intervals. The Lusaka summit in 1970 signified a clear attempt at institutionalization of NAM in two ways: It called for regular summits every three years and it established a bureau of foreign ministers who would meet at the time of the UN

20   L. Mates, The Movement is Facing Discord and Trial, in: U. S. Bajpai (ed.), Non-Alignment, pp. 51-60, here p. 52 (9).

21   C. R. Mohan, Impossible Allies: Nuclear India, United States and Global Order, New Delhi 2006; T. G. Weiss / M. A. Kessler (eds.), Third World Security in the post-Cold War Era, Boulder (CO) 1991.

22   C. Grant, Equity in International Relations: A Third World Perspective, in: International Affairs, 71 (1995) 3, pp. 567-587, p. 569; E. T. Agaev / S. Krylov, The Non-Aligned Movement, in: International Affairs, 42 (1996) 2, pp. 90-96.

23   F. R. D. Bandarnaike, History of Non-Alignment as a Force for Peace and Stability in a Divided World, in: U. S. Bajpai (ed.), Non-Alignment, pp. 18-27 (9); P. Lyon, Non-Alignment: Performance and Prospects, in: U. S. Bajpai, Non-Alignment, pp. 28-38, here pp. 29-31 (9); R. L. Jackson, Non-Aligned, pp. 11-36 (19).

General Assembly annual sessions in New York City or elsewhere in the intersession period to coordinate the movement and do the groundwork before each summit. As a corollary, NAM received an observer status in the General Assembly. Three years later in Algiers it was decided that the country hosting the NAM summit would represent the non-aligned countries in all international gatherings till the next summit. Accordingly, delegates from host countries voiced collective views on behalf of NAM on issues ranging from disarmament to development, even when some individual non-aligned countries might have struck different notes.[24]

NAM Countries and Change in International Organizations

Non-aligned countries have taken extraordinary interest in strengthening IOs, despite the fact that these institutions were used by major powers for advancing their material power and interests. The non-aligned countries valued the "normative power" of IOs "to define, control, and transform the agenda of international politics and to legitimate another world view or vision as the dominant political paradigm",[25] and to establish rules of conduct as well as principles of accountability for all states. In sum, the non-aligned countries viewed IOs as useful devices to preserve freedom and peace as well as to promote progress and justice.

NAM has attached special importance to the strengthening of the worldwide role of the UN. At the Belgrade summit it was agreed to work for peaceful resolution of problems in line with the provisions of the UN Charter and to seek better implementation of UN resolutions, the need for which was regrettably ignored by the big powers. The Cairo summit (1964) recognised the "paramount importance" of the world organization and the need to enable it to carry out the task of promoting international cooperation.[26] And the final act of the Lusaka summit held in 1970 asserted that the UN had "a vital role to play in safeguarding the independence and sovereignty of the non-aligned nations"[27] while it was also viewed as the most suitable forum for cooperative action by the non-aligned countries and a key factor in democratizing international relations. In pursuit

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24 Discord within NAM equally had effects on its approach and performance. Illustrative are several instances in the 1970s. Cuba as the head of NAM after the Havana summit suggested in 1979 to keep Kampuchea's seat in the UN vacant in view of the competing claims by two rival factions that had emerged after the military intervention by Vietnam. At the meeting of the General Assembly, however, 35 non-aligned countries voted for the representation of the old regime (Democratic Kampuchea), whereas 25 supported the pro-Vietnamese People's Republic of Kampuchea, with 24 abstaining. Likewise, non-aligned countries did not heed the call of the Lusaka Summit Declaration in 1970 to follow the initiative for a UN declaration on the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace until Ceylon in 1971 went alone with the proposal, see: K. P. Saksena, Non-Alignment and the United Nations, in: International Studies, 20 (1981) 1-2, pp. 81-102, here pp. 92-95.

25 S. S. Kim, The United Nations and the Development of International Law, in: M. S. Rajan / V. S. Mani / C. S. R. Murthy (eds.), The Nonaligned and the United Nations, New Delhi 1987, pp. 1-16, here p. 12.

26 Cairo Summit Programme for Peace and International Cooperation, in: O. Jankowitsch / K. P. Sauvant, The Third World without Superpowers (10), p. 56.

27 Lusaka Summit Statement on the United Nations, in: O. Jankowitsch / K. P. Sauvant, The Third World without Superpowers (19), p. 104.

of their political and economic agendas, NAM countries had a strong preference for the UN system over the Bretton Woods institutions, conceiving the former as the most appropriate forum to flag their problems because of the organization's comprehensive mandate and the "equality principle" that guided its decision-making. In other words, the weighted voting mechanism in the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank was seen as an unwelcome antithesis to the one-country-one-vote principle embodied in the UN and other organizations.

This positive and supporting attitude towards the UN was reciprocated when the UN Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim during his tenure in the 1970s began to attend NAM summits as an acknowledgement of the growing importance of NAM in international affairs.[28] Despite serious pressure at times – most recently the US and Israel advised Ban Ki-moon to stay away from the summit in Iran – the tradition continues. Naturally, for the UN, an enduring engagement with the non-aligned countries turned out to be a source of dynamism, direction, and democratization aimed at strengthening its role.[29]

As noted already, the West European countries and the US not only invested time and money in establishing a range of IOs in the mid-1940s but also took advantage of their founding role by ensuring that they would serve their own political and ideological interests. That limited the space for NAM, at least in the beginning. The socialist bloc tried but hardly succeeded (in organs other than the Security Council) in its efforts to resist the Western stronghold due to limited voting power. Added to this, many Latin American countries supported the US on political questions in the UN General Assembly, at a time when only few Afro-Asian countries were represented. Surely, the steady increase in membership of the UN and other IOs brought tactically important voting power to the non-aligned countries and helped to counter the power wielded by the West.

NAM countries effectively sought to overcome limitations of their individual bargaining power by forging large voting coalitions to push the West to a minority position on political and economic questions. The non-aligned group in the UN General Assembly and elsewhere joined forces with the Third World grouping to put forward a common economic agenda. They extended these tactics to such other IOs as the International Labour Organization (ILO), United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), and the World Health Organization to denounce the policies of the Western countries with regards to colonialism, apartheid, economic development, Israeli policies in occupied Palestine, and so forth.[30] Analysts – mostly from the West – have mistakenly argued that, unlike in the case of the UN, influence of the non-aligned was

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28   M. S. Rajan, The Role of the Nonaligned in the United Nations', in: M. S. Rajan / V. S. Mani / C. S. R. Murthy (eds.), The Nonaligned (24), pp. 294-348.

29   M. Komatina, Policy and Movement of Non-Alignment and the United Nations, in: Review of International Affairs 32 (1981) 756, 5 October, pp. 11-14.

30   B. Reinalda, Routledge History of International Organizations: From 1815 to the present Day, London 2009, pp. 545-547; R. Coate, The Changing Pattern of Conflict: The United States and UNESCO, in: M. P. Karns / K. P. Mingst (eds.), The United States and Multilateral Institutions: Patterns of Change, London 1990, pp. 231-260 here pp. 250-251.

limited in the UN specialized agencies owing to "the technical nature of these bodies".[31] The fact, however, was quite opposite. The non-aligned and the developing countries had an impact on the functioning of many of these agencies. UNESCO is a clear example where the non-aligned and the Third World countries linked up with the socialist group to press for their demands. They instituted a press pool of their own in 1976 to counter what was dubbed "media imperialism" and joined the socialist bloc to call for a New World Information and Communication Order.[32] Similarly, during the 1970s the International Labour Organization – on their insistence – denounced the oppressive policies of Israel in Palestinian territories.[33] As a result both these organizations incurred the wrath of the US and West European countries who alleged that they had come under the influence of the radical Third World.

Universality of Membership

NAM also had considerable contribution to enhancing representative character of the UN. In a generation's time, UN membership increased manifold due to the entry of newly independent non-aligned countries from Africa and Asia (see table 1). This is by far an important change since the UN when created was not intended to be a universal or unaligned institution. The criteria for membership, laid down in Articles 3 and 4 of the Charter, were unambiguous, that is to say, only those who declared war against the Axis powers (Germany, Japan, and Italy) during World War II would be eligible. At the founding conference in San Francisco it was still debated whether universal membership – advocated by Brazil and some others – should be the aim. The position taken in the end was that universality was not advisable at that point in time.[34] Nevertheless, the situation eased with the recognition that UN should not be "a club of like-minded states" and room had to be made for "states with widely differing ideologies and different economic and political systems".[35] This captured the core conviction of the non-aligned countries who from the beginning consistently pressed for universal membership – whether it was China's representation or admission of former enemy countries.[36] This position was stat-

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31   R. L. Jackson, Non-Aligned (19), p. 173. The impact of actors from the non-European world more broadly is shown among others by: S. Amrith, Decolonizing International Health: India and Southeast Asia, 1930-65, Basingstoke 2006.

32   C. Roach, The Movement for a new World Information and Communication Order: A second Wave?, in: Media, Culture & Society, 12 (1990) 3, pp. 283-307, here pp. 292-293.

33   D. Williams, The Specialized Agencies and the United Nations: The System in Crisis, London 1987, pp. 65-66; K. A. Mingst, The United States and the World Health Organization, in: M. P. Karns / K. A. Mingst (eds.), The United States and Multilateral Institutions (29), pp. 205-230, here p. 223.

34   R. B. Russell, A history of the United Nations Charter: The Role of the United States, Washington 1958, pp. 843-848; R. C. Hilderbrand, Dumbarton Oaks: The Origins of the United Nations and the Search for post-War Security, Chapel Hill 2001.

35   L. M. Goodrich E. Hambro A. P. Simons, Charter of the United Nations: Commentary and Documents, New York 1969, pp. 76-77.

36   The NAM support to seating of Communist China in the UN bodies was articulated right from the Belgrade Summit.

ed in the final declaration of the Cairo summit (1964): "In order to be an effective instrument, the United Nations Organization should be open to all the States of the world. It is particularly necessary that countries still under colonial domination should attain independence without delay and take their rightful place in the community of nations."[37] The push to universalize the UN has inspired other IOs like the International Labour Organization, UNESCO, and the World Bank to widen their membership too.[38]

Growth of UN Membership of the United Nations[39]

Years	New Admissions	Total Membership
1946–54	9	60
1955–60[1]	39	99
1961–70[2]	28	127
1971–90	32	159
1991–2011[3]	34	193

1   In this period, two of the enemy countries – Italy and Japan – were admitted in 1955 and 1957 respectively, while the two Germanys had to wait till 1973. Otherwise, 30 of the newly admitted hailed from Africa and Asia.
2   Since the adoption of the Declaration on Decolonization in 1960, 54 former colonies became independent and joined the UN. China occupied its seat in the UN in 1971. For China's views on NAM, see: G. Chaudhuri, China and nonalignment, New Delhi 1986.
3   These consisted predominantly of the new states that emerged as a result of disintegration of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia.

With the steady entry of members from Africa and the Pacific region, the profile and politics of the UN changed; the new members united to undercut the manoeuvring capacity of the Western countries and exploit their own voting strength to full effect.[40] For instance, NAM countries successfully manoeuvred in the negotiations leading to the adoption of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in 1966 and acceptance of the right to self-determination, which preceded all other rights! The caucusing group of NAM countries was launched in the 1970s to enhance their bargaining position in the General Assembly where it worked as a pressure group on disarmament and other issues. To cite an example, the group successfully lobbied for convening special session of the General Assembly on disarmament in 1978.[41] There Mexico, Yugoslavia, and others

37   O. Jankowitsch / K. P. Sauvant, Third World without Superpowers (10), p. 56,
38   At the time of writing this article, the membership of the ILO, UNESCO and the World Bank stood at 183, 195, and 185 respectively – not very different from that of the UN.
39   Prepared by the author based on the information available on the UN official website, URL: www.un.org.
40   See: C. S. R. Murthy, US and the Third World at the UN: An ambivalent Relationship, in: International Studies, 40 (2003) 1, pp. 1-21.
41   M. J. Peterson, The UN General Assembly, New York 2006, pp. 122-137; D. Bourantonis, Democratization, Decentralization, and Disarmament at the United Nations, 1962–1978, in: International History Review, 15 (1993) 4, pp. 688-713.

harmonized initial divergence of positions on replacement of the Disarmament Committee – considered to be working in the shadow of the two superpowers – with a more democratic body: the Conference on Disarmament.

Focus on Key Structures

Deeply convinced of the indispensability of the UN, the non-aligned worked for changes in the composition and functions of key structures. The notable initiatives in this regard related to the addition of four non-permanent seats to the Security Council in the mid-1960s and the three-fold increase in membership of the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC).Each case had different consequences: For the latter (enlarged twice in the mid-1960s and early 1970s) they were rather negative since that organ was caught between the Western countries, which distanced themselves, and the Third World, which in reaction turned to the General Assembly to take up their concerns.[42] The transformed Security Council, on the other hand, strengthened the position of smaller and non-aligned countries. Often seven among ten non-permanent members belonged to the non-aligned group.[43] With that the Western permanent members lost their dominance in decision making and were left with two options in dealing with the new development, either to block adoption of resolutions by veto or to compromise. Particularly uncomforting was the situation for the US. From the time of its first veto in 1972 up to the end of the Cold War in 1990, it made use of it veto power 37 times, far more than any other permanent member.[44] At times the US and its allies went along with the proposals of the non-aligned non-permanent members; illustrative is the adoption of a resolution for imposition of a mandatory arms embargo against the apartheid regime of South Africa in 1977.[45]

In a bid to take the success further, NAM debated in the 1980s to propose a second expansion of the non-permanent membership, revising it with the end of the Cold War to also claim the permanent seats. Holding the view that the process of Security Coun-

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42 T. G. Weiss, ECOSOC is dead, long live ECOSOC (= Dialogue on globalization, edited by Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung), Berlin 2010.

43 Jackson, tracing in 1978 the development of the non-aligned group in the Security Council, notes a compatible group of non-aligned members and observers comprising Bolivia, Gabon, India, Kuwait, Mauritius, Nigeria, and Venezuela emerged. In 1979, Bangladesh, Jamaica, and Zambia replaced India, Venezuela, and Mauritius as non-permanent members. The group of seven non-aligned non-permanent members held regular consultations and acted in concert on issues targeting South Africa and Israel, see: R. L. Jackson, Non-Aligned, pp. 116-119 (19). D. Bourantonis, Reform of the UN Security Council and the Non-Aligned States, in: International Peacekeeping 5 (1998) 1, pp. 89-109.

44 See Negative Votes by Permanent Members at public meetings of the Security Council, Annex III in Supplement 47 (Doc.A/58/47), 58th session of General Assembly, 2004. See also: R. L. Jackson, Non-aligned, p. 116 (19); E. C. Luck, UN Security Council: Practice and Promise, London 2006; V. Lowe / A. Roberts / J. Welsh (eds.), The United Nations Security Council and War: The Evolution of Thought and Practice since 1945, Oxford 2010.

45 R. Jaipal, Consensus Making in the Security Council, in: Indian and Foreign Review, 15 (1978) 1, pp. 21-23; J. Prantl, Informal Groups of States and the UN Security Council, in: International Organization, 59 (2005) 4, pp. 559-592, especially pp. 577-578; also R. L. Jackson, Non-Aligned (19), pp. 116-119.

cil reforms need to be "comprehensive, transparent, inclusive and balanced",[46] NAM countries demanded enlargement in both permanent and non-permanent categories to strengthen the representative character of the organ and enhance its legitimacy and effectiveness. However, NAM could not endorse the candidature of any particular country from within its ranks for permanent seat due to irreconcilable differences.[47] Naturally, the General Assembly is ceaselessly seized of the matter without any sign of a breakthrough in the foreseeable future. However, one interesting consequence is discernible. Disappointed with lack of progress and being suspicious of an unreformed Security Council, the non-aligned worked through the General Assembly to limit the influence of the Security Council by pressing for a shared responsibility, or power sharing, between the two main organs, as it happened when the Peace Building Commission was set up in 2005.More strikingly, the Human Rights Council, established in 2006 in place of the Commission on Human Rights, was mandated to report only to the General Assembly, thus denying any overseeing role to the Security Council.[48]

Impact in Key Policy Areas: Economic Development

Two key policy areas may be discussed briefly to demonstrate the role of the non-aligned in affecting change in the agendas of major IOs. Foremost is the concern of NAM countries about problems of economic development, which they made into an overriding priority of numerous IOs. The second area relates to the control of armed conflicts by hugely supporting the UN in conducting peacekeeping activities on a large scale. Both need to be seen as complementary, and not as conflicting or competitive.

First, the promotion of a "development agenda": The priority given to economic development set from the very beginning the less-developed countries apart from the industrialized world, although their achievements in shaping the institutional design were at best marginal. Still, the assertion mattered and can be illustrated with the developments at the San Francisco and the Bretton Woods conferences.

At the Monetary and Financial Conference at Bretton Woods – which gave final shape to the setting up of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) – the non-European developing countries had little to influence. Although they had a numerical advantage (they were 27 out of 44 participating countries), their combined voting weightage stood at 13.21 % against the weight of 73.69 % held by the North American and European countries. Little wonder they could hardly impact the negotiations and the final outcome.[49] However, even with

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46   H. Strydom, The Non-Aligned Movement and the Reform of International Relations, in: A. v. Bogdandy / R. Wolfrum (eds.), Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law, 11 (2007), pp. 1-46, here p. 15.

47   C. S. R. Murthy, US and the Third World (43).

48   C. S. R. Murthy, New Phase in UN Reforms: Establishment of the Peacebuilding Commission and the Human Rights Council, in: International Studies, 44 (2007) 1, pp. 39-56.

49   Even in 1971 when the "developing countries" supplied three-fourths of the members of the World Bank, they

a more balanced voting power the result would not have been very different since the core lines of the agreement had already been laid in the bilateral exchanges between the United States and the United Kingdom prior to the conference.[50] Not surprisingly, the request by the Latin American countries to allocate half of the funds of the IBRD for development purpose was not considered. As a matter of consolation, however, they could get "development" included in the name of the World Bank.[51]

At the San Francisco Conference, held in April 1945, the situation was different. The African, Arab, and Asian states[52] joined forces with other small states and secured a significant concession from the sponsoring powers, namely to elevate the ECOSOC from originally a subsidiary to a principal organ of the UN – notwithstanding the downside that it was provided with limited power, i.e., it could only initiate studies and make recommendations.[53]

Nevertheless, during the early years the developing countries made themselves heard in the ECOSOC, mainly through Latin American representatives, with India chipping in regularly. After ensuring establishment of the first regional economic commission in 1946, they called for the setting up of the UN Economic Development Administration in 1949.[54] That had far-reaching effects: Firstly, it prompted the UN to design modest technical assistance facilities, later in 1966 consolidated into the UN Development Programme (UNDP), the largest multilateral technical aid body funded voluntarily by the Western advanced donor countries. Initially intended as a modest provider of advisory services of a pre-investment nature besides finances for training and exchange programmes, over time the UNDP assumed a greater role as key tasks were entrusted by other IOs, including the IMF. Secondly in the 1960s the UN began playing the role of catalyst in promoting public policies for economic growth in the Third World.[55] The first in the series of "development decades" was launched in 1961 by the General Assembly, as a positive follow-up to the proposal mooted by US President John F. Kennedy, with the aim to boost economic growth by setting targets for different sectors of developing countries' economies.

possessed only one-third of the voting weight: E. S. Mason / R. E. Asher, The World Bank since Bretton Woods, Washington 1973, p. 65.

50 T. Ferguson, The Third World and Decision Making in the International Monetary Fund: The Quest for full and effective Participation, London 1988, p. 26.

51 Ibid., p. 22.

52 They included Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Liberia, Philippines, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, and Syria.

53 R. B. Russell, History of the United Nations Charter (33), p. 777.

54 India as chairman of the UN Sub-commission on Economic Development proposed a new international organization called the UN Economic Development Administration (UNEDA) to be financed by member countries in their own currencies, with the purpose to provide "loans and not grants, though terms of repayment will be liberal and the interest charged may be only nominal", see: E. S. Mason / R. E. Asher, World Bank (51), p. 382. This idea took later shape in the International Development Association.

55 K. Dadzie, United Nations and the Problem of Economic Development, in: A. Roberts / B. Kingsbury (eds.), United Nations, Divided World: United Nations' Roles in International Relations, Oxford 1993, pp. 139-57.

Soon foreign aid as a tool for development was viewed with suspicion because it tended to increase dependency of the recipient countries, thus the focus shifted to demand positive change in the terms of trade. NAM took its cue from the lead given by the Latin American voices. For example the Argentinean economist, Raul Prébisch, then Director-General of the UN Economic Commission for Latin America, took part in the special meeting called by NAM on problems of economic development in Cairo in 1962. Two years later the Cairo summit asserted that "a new international division of labour is needed to hasten the industrialisation of developing countries and the modernisation of their agriculture, so as to enable them to strengthen their domestic economies and diversity their export trade".[56]

The "free" trade regime perpetuated terms favourable to the Western advanced countries and unfair to the less developed countries pushing the latter continually to the periphery of the world economy. The Geneva-based General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) founded on the non-discrimination principle to promote free trade was perceived as advantaging industrialized countries, especially since it was not part of the UN framework.[57] Protection on the international markets via fair and stable prices for exports or new shipping and insurance regulations seemed necessary. Consequently, NAM and other developing countries urged the need for the UN to work for creating conditions in world trade in their favour. As a result, the UN convened the conference on trade and development in 1964, which paved the way for two important developments, both with long-lasting impacts. Firstly, developing countries formed a pressure group, known as Group of 77 (G-77) to formulate common positions and to undertake collective bargaining in multilateral economic negotiations. Secondly, the conference was converted into a standing body of the UN, named United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) with Prébisch as its first head. The UNCTAD was meant to draw a global version of the work of the UN's Economic Commission for Latin America which became noted for its "diagnosis of structural inequality and global transformation". The UNCTAD piloted the principle of "special and differentiated responsibilities" with the hope to galvanize GATT to accord preferential treatment for developing countries.[58] In a similar manner, a few years after the NAM summit in Cairo,

56 N. Desai, Non-Alignment and the New International Economic Order, in: U. S. Bajpai (ed.), Non-Alignment (9), pp. 174-196, here p. 190.

57 According to Janez Stanovnik, a former Slovenian negotiator at the formative stages of UNCTAD, trade was a forbidden zone for the UN in the 1950s and early 1960s: "Whenever you touched trade in the UN, there was always somebody who said, 'This is not the place to discuss trade. Trade we discuss in GATT. Here we discuss general economics. Finance we discuss in the World Bank. But here we will not discuss trade.' I think that one of the great breakthroughs for the G-77 was that they imposed the trade discussion in the General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council. And willynilly, the West had to yield under the pressure of arguments based on a number of trade studies prepared within the secretariat." See: Final Transcript of interview, in: UN Voices. UN Complete Oral History Project, New York, 2007, 7-8 January 2001, p. 50.

58 V. Prashad, The Story of Raul Prebisch: Impeccable foe for the First World Power', in ZNet, A Community of People for Change, 7 November 2009, URL: http://www.zcommunications.org/the-story-of-raul-prebisch-implacable-foe-for-first-world-power-by-vijay-prashad.html, access on 16.09.2013. Its secretariat, in particular, worked hard for the case of the G-77. Gamani Corea, once chairman of the G-77 and Secretary-General of UNCTAD during

the UN established in 1967 the Industrial Development Organization, which became in 1975 a specialized agency of the UN.[59]

These developments had an effect also on the World Bank, working at the behest of the Western countries as major shareholders. In the early 1960s, even before Robert Mc-Namara assumed leadership, development was included into the mandate of the World Bank, which meant a substantial increase in the loans allocated to infrastructure projects in developing countries. During that decade the amount lent by the World Bank almost tripled from $ 390 million to $1.05 billion; in the next decade the amount quintupled to$ 5.36 billion.[60]

In another important initiative the Bank agreed in 1960 to set up a soft-loan window – the International Development Association (IDA) – to provide long-term loans to those who could not afford loans on commercial terms. In the fifty years of the IDA's operations, 65 countries received credits worth $ 233 billion – half of which went to 39 African countries, while eight countries from South Asia also largely benefited. However, encouraging these developments may be, they did not resolve the basic contradictions between the UN and the Bretton Woods systems, it even escalated to a fierce turf war between the two in the 1970s.[61]

In 1973 a new twist to the role of non-aligned countries in the UN occurred on economic development issues. The Arab-Israel War and the consequent quadrupling of crude prices drove NAM to seize the moment of crisis and draft proposals for radical changes in the international economic architecture. At the Algiers summit in September that year, the need for thorough democratization of international monetary and financial institutions was flagged as the urgent necessity, for which NAM would strive in the UN more aggressively than before. Algeria's Houari Boumediene, then leader of the movement, requested a special session of the General Assembly on raw materials and development, a move meant to pre-empt the Western countries' plans to focus only on the oil price rise. In a well-conceived tactical masterstroke, NAM placed the problem of energy

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1974–84 recalled years later very clearly: "much of the so-called agenda of the G-77 was articulated by the UN secretariats rather than the G-77 itself. I remember the time I was in UNCTAD, whatever we put down as the course of action on any issue, whether on commodities, the Common Fund, the transfer of technology, shipping – you name it, that was taken by the G-77 and made into their own platform. They negotiated down from that position." Final transcript of interview conducted by Thomas Weiss, 1 February 2000, in: UN Voices (59), p. 32.

59   E. Luard, International agencies: The Emerging Framework of Interdependence, London 1977.

60   D. Kapur / J. P. Lewis / R. Webb, The World Bank: Its first half Century, vol. 1, Washington 1997, p. 6.

61   In the context of the "comparative advantage" argument, which disfavoured the UN in economic management matters and favoured the Bretton Woods agenda, the UN bureaucracy banked upon the political support of the non-aligned countries in critiquing the policies of the Bretton Woods institutions and favouring the coordinating role of the UN over the economic and financial institutions including the World Trade Organization (WTO), see: J. E. Stiglitz, Reforming the International Monetary and Financial Systems in the Wake of the Global Crisis (Report of the UN Commission of Financial Experts), New York 2010. In the process of the wider recognition of development as the foremost agenda, the UN and other IOs have come together to formulate the Millennium Development Goals, stressing among other things the need to meet the commitments on development finance, poverty reduction, etc. For a critique from Third World perspective, see A. Ziai, The Millennium Development Goals: Back to the Future?, in: Third World Quarterly 32 (2011) 1, pp. 27-43.

in the broader context relating to raw materials. Remarkably, the intellectual foundations of both the Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order (NIEO) and the Programme of Action, adopted by the General Assembly special session in 1974, were laid in the final document of the Algiers summit, which clearly complemented the positions already taken by the G-77, UNCTAD and the UN General Assembly.[62] However, the General Assembly's declaration and programme of action resorted to a more assertive approach by calling for the establishment of the NIEO as based on equity, sovereign equality, interdependence, common interest, and cooperation, with due regard to the existence of different economic and social systems around the world. Without the contribution of NAM, surely, the outcome at the General Assembly would have been unthinkable. NAM saw itself and acted as initiator of new ideas that were later taken up by the G-77 and the UN for elaboration and endorsement.[63]

No doubt, the NIEO call did not bring anticipated changes in the real world, but this does not diminish the importance of a related development: within the UN system basically every problem area was seen through the lenses of development, not least because NAM countries had argued that the reversal of economic deprivation and poverty were critical for the mitigation of global problems in general. This clearly comes out of the programmes adopted at the series of UN-sponsored conferences in the 1970sdrawing attention to environment (Stockholm 1972), population (Bucharest 1974), food (Rome 1974), and women (Mexico City 1975), further to human settlement in 1976, water in 1977, desertification in 1977, anti-racism in 1978.[64] And the second series of global conferences – which started with the Earth Summit in 1992 in Rio de Janeiro –followed that path and perspective, linking explicitly each of the focal area to development. Even the issue of human rights had been "developmentalized"; the "right to development" became a core part of the human rights discourse at the UN.[65]

Impact in Key Policy Areas: Peacekeeping

Peacekeeping is the second policy area in which NAM countries took an invaluable part. Conceived to suppress acts or threats of aggression by collective use of military force with the permanent members in the forefront, the UN was handicapped from the very beginning by the Cold War politics of polarization. This opened up new opportunities to the UN that turned to the non-aligned and European neutral countries for help to intervene in such a manner that would keep armed conflicts in check. The resultant UN activity

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62   O. Jankowitsch / K. P. Sauvant, Initiating Role of the Non-Aligned Countries (13), p. 68.
63   N. Desai, Non-Slignment and the new International Economic Order (56), p. 193.
64   See M. G. Schechter, United Nations Global Conferences, London et al. 2005.
65   See R. Normand / S. Zaidi, Human Rights at the UN: The Political History of Universal Justice, Bloomington 2008, pp. 289-315; S. L. Hoffmann, Human Rights in the 20th century, Cambridge 2011. The New Delhi non-aligned summit conference in 1983 dubbed development as a "right" of nations as of individuals comprising them. The 1979 Senegalese initiative culminated in 1982 resolution of the General Assembly sponsored by Cuba and India. Later in 1986, the General Assembly adopted a declaration on the subject, see: R. L. Jackson, Non-Aligned (19), p. 179.

came to be known as "peacekeeping" since the 1956 when the UN and non-aligned countries worked together to peacefully bring an end to Arab-Israel War and secure the withdrawing of troops.

The UN peacekeepers are understood for long as impartial troops, contributed by countries other than the permanent members of the Security Council, deployed with the consent of the countries concerned to stop an armed conflict without using military force save in self-defence. The UN peacekeepers traditionally aimed at the following objectives: first the warring sides were to be separated and then they should be helped to return to positions they had hold before the fight, all this without losing face. The UN peacekeeping missions sent to Egypt and Israel, Lebanon, and the Congo during the late 1950s and early 1960s exemplified this approach. The underlying political goal was to prevent local conflicts from being engulfed by the "East-West" Cold War rivalry, and it seemed that the UN had drawn lesson from the Korean War (1950–51) where the threat of direct military involvement of the superpowers complicated the situation.[66] The new UN approach obviously fit well with the approach of the non-aligned countries, which sought to counter the negative effects of the bipolar world order. NAM and the UN shared interest in preserving peace and controlling violent conflicts led to an immensely fruitful cooperation in the conduct of generations of peacekeeping operations for over five decades.

Until today the UN has launched 67 peacekeeping missions in Africa, Asia, South and Central America, as well as in Europe, involving more than two million soldiers and military leaders.[67] Whether during the Cold War or afterwards, no UN peacekeeping operation could be planned or executed without the support and participation of the non-aligned in the form of supplying troops, observers, civilian police, and administrators. Until August 2012 they furnished 82% of troops, coming from 60 non-aligned countries, and the fact remains that the 10 largest contributors are NAM countries.[68] Half of the UN Emergency Force in 1956 to supervise troop withdrawal from the Suez Canal came from non-aligned countries, two-thirds of the countries contributing troops to the operation in Congo in the early 1960s belonged to NAM.[69] All in all, 29 non-aligned countries (excluding former Yugoslavia) have hosted 54 of the total 67 operations. True, the recipients or beneficiaries of an overwhelming number of UN peacekeeping missions

66 Notably India and a few other countries advocated that the UN would do well to avoid use of coercive means to enforce peace. India abstained (along with Argentina) in the vote of the UN General Assembly on the "Uniting for Peace" Resolution (3 March 1950), by contending that "it is not the time for stressing the military aspects of the United Nations. We feel that at present we should rather concentrate on improving the machinery in the United Nations for the tasks of peace", see: R. N. Berkes / M. S. Bedi, The Diplomacy of India: Indian Foreign Policy in the United Nations, Stanford 1958, p. 7.

67 The operation varied immensely in terms of size and mandate, the largest operations being the ones in former Yugoslavia (UN Protection Force), the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC), and Cambodia (UNTAC).

68 Compiled from the statistics at http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/contributors/2012/august12_1.pfd; access on 16.09.2013. The top ten countries are: Bangladesh, Pakistan, India, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Rwanda, Egypt, Nepal, Jordan, and Ghana.

69 A. James, The United Nations: Peace-keeping, and Nonalignment, in: M. S. Rajan / V. S. Mani / C. S. R. Murthy (eds.), The Nonaligned (24), pp. 93-109.

have also been member countries of NAM – whether it is Egypt, Haiti, Lebanon, Somalia, Syria, or India and Pakistan. All the past operations except for the one in Kosovo and all of the14 current ones are on duty in the territories of non-aligned UN members. In short, UN peacekeeping has long established itself as – to adapt the words Abraham Lincoln used for characterizing democratic form of government – an activity *of* the non-aligned, *by* the non-aligned, and *for* the non-aligned. At the same time, peacekeeping activities have helped UN overcome the bottlenecks in implementing the Charter provisions on collective security and prove its usefulness in arresting existential threats to (and safeguard the security interests of) the bulk of the non-aligned member countries.[70]

A lot has changed in the UN practices of UN peacekeeping since the beginning of the 1990s, with a thrust towards multidimensional peacekeeping that has often involved the use of force and generation of ambitious mandates under the enforcement provisions of Chapter VII of the Charter. NAM countries have expressed unease at this trend as this tended to dilute the traditional principles of consent of the host state, non-use of force and non-interference in internal affairs. On its part, NAM has stressed the need for the UN to continue to adhere to the principles of non-interference in internal affairs and avoidance as long as possible of using force.[71]

Conclusion

The article demonstrates the varied aspects of influence of NAM countries in major IOs, especially the United Nations. Admittedly, NAM was never a monolithic group. Yet certain core convictions bound its member countries together, viz., anti-colonialism, anti-racism, peace with economic justice, and a multipolar world managed through democratized international institutions. Remarkably the non-aligned countries did not rise against the existing array of international organizations, which were established primarily to serve the interests of the Western countries. Instead, they joined those organizations and worked actively to bring about changes in policy agendas, to enlarge membership and thus to strengthen legitimacy of UN and other IOs for effective pursuit of given functions.

The decline in the solidarity among NAM countries resulting in less effective participation in the deliberations on global issues in the recent couple of decades, therefore, may not augur well for the future of international organizations, whose role in the increasingly complex task of global governance, encompassing such vital issue areas as human security and climate change, might remain at best incomplete, if not less legitimate.

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70   A. J. Bellamy / P. D. Williams / S. Griffin, Understanding Peacekeeping, Cambridge 2010; W. J. Durch, The Evolution of UN peacekeeping: Case Studies and Comparative Analysis, New York 1993.

71   Final Declaration of the XVI NAM Summit, August 2012, paragraph 143.2. Also see: A. J. Bellamy / P. D. Williams (eds.), Providing Peacekeepers: The Politics, Challenges and Future of United Nations Operations, Oxford 2013; A. Cottey, Beyond Humanitarian Intervention: The new Politics of Peacekeeping and Intervention, in: Contemporary Politics, 14 (2008) 4, pp. 429-446; E. Aksu, The United Nations, Intra-state Peacekeeping and Normative Change, Manchester 2003; A. Bullion, India and UN Peacekeeping Operations, in: International Peacekeeping 4 (1997) 1, pp. 98-114.

Globalizing Standardization: The International Organization for Standardization

Craig N. Murphy

RESÜMEE

Unternehmen und Aktivisten im so genannten ‚globalen Süden' halten die sozialen und Umweltstandards der *Internationalen Organisation für Normierung* (ISO) für berechtigt und angemessen. Die Legitimität der Organisation resultiert aus dem zunehmenden Einschluss nichtwestlicher Akteure und Vertreter aus kolonialisierten Gesellschaften in die internationale Standardisierungsbewegung, wobei dieser Prozess lange vor der Gründung der ISO im Jahr 1946 begann. Seit den 1950er Jahren trugen die Vereinten Nationen zur Schaffung von Standardisierungsorganisationen außerhalb Europas und Nordamerikas bei, die über kurz oder lang Teil des Netzwerkes der ISO wurden. In den 1960er Jahren förderte die ISO die Partizipation aus ‚südlichen' Weltregionen, und nach dem Ende des Kalten Krieges schlossen sich nicht-westliche Standardisierungsorganisationen jenen Lobby-Gruppen an, die neue oder erneuerte Demokratien konsolidierten. Gemeinsam erreichte man, dass sich die ISO auch mit den Bereichen Umwelt und Soziales befasste.

A Puzzle

The International Organization for Standardization (ISO) is the peak association of a vast global network of volunteers (some 50,000 to 100,000 at any time)[1] who have set voluntary international product standards since the end of the Second World War. In the early 1990s, ISO entered a new field, setting environmental standards, and followed

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[1]　Different estimates of the size of the ISO network appear in: S. M. Besen / G. Saloner, Compatibility Standards and the Market for Telecommunications Services, in: R. W. Crandall / K. Flamm (eds.), Changing the Rules: Technological Change, International Competition, and Regulation in Telecommunications, Washington, D. C. 1988, pp. 177-220; W. Mattli / T. Büthe, Setting International Standards: Technical Rationality or the Primacy of Power?, in: World Politics 56 (2003) 1, pp. 1-42, p. 7.

that up with a programme of standard setting in social fields – human rights, labour, etc. – culminating in the publication of a comprehensive social responsibility standard, ISO 26000, in October 2010.[2] ISO's entry into the environmental and social standard-setting field paralleled that of dozens of other ostensibly private organizations that began to develop and promulgate voluntary international social and environmental standards in the 1990s.[3] Despite the fact that ISO was created in the 1940s to serve industrial economies, especially those in Europe, but also in North America and Japan, ISO's recent movement into new fields has been welcomed by governments, firms, and activists in China, India, and other countries throughout Asia, Africa, and Latin America. This experience suggests that, while the world's "non-Western"[4] majority may not have fully appropriated the ISO, they have become influential actors within it, working with its executive leadership to make fundamental changes in the organization's focus that may have a significant influence on the global political economy.

This article explains how this has happened, first by placing ISO's recent work on environmental and social standard setting in the context of ISO's traditional role and the larger phenomena of private standard setting in these fields. The article then discusses why ISO and its predecessors – despite their focus on Europe – have always involved actors from other world regions and how this initially incidental involvement led to the earliest globalization of industrial standard setting in the 1970s under the influence of the United Nations (UN) and an ISO executive head who had a strong interest in the developing world. Finally, the article considers how the ISO quality management standards of the 1980s and 1990s – the standards upon which ISO's social and environmental standards are based – gained legitimacy outside of Europe and North America.

Standardizing the World: The International Organization for Standardization

ISO, as well as its forerunners since the early 20th century, began as facilitators of agreements on industrial standards to create the needed infrastructure for the growing global economy.[5] ISO began as largely nongovernmental organization that brought together engineers and professionals from a few other fields to develop industrial standards, which ISO would endorse as international standards when there was a consensus of similar, national nongovernmental standard-setting bodies. Then agencies of different kinds, but

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2   C. N. Murphy / J. Yates, ISO, the International Organization for Standardization: Global Governance through Voluntary Consensus, London 2009, ISO 26000: Guidance on Social Responsibility, Geneva 2010.

3   K. W. Abbott / D. Snidal, The Governance Triangle: Regulatory Standards Institutions and the Shadow of the State, in: W. Mattli / N. Woods (eds.), The Politics of Global Regulation, Princeton 2009, pp. 44-88.

4   "Western" in this case meaning the original OECD countries and not the original Warsaw Pact and Group of 77, or "global South," members. In the historical context of this article, from the late-1940s until the end of the Cold War, the West was an organizing bloc with most global intergovernmental organizations, as was the global South. The global north, the OECD plus the Warsaw Pact, was originally the industrialized world.

5   C. N. Murphy / J. Yates, The International Organization for Standardization (2); ISO 26000, p. 1 (2).

primarily private companies, could choose to either adopt the standards or not. Thus, ISO standards were voluntary, based on consensus.

Throughout the late 19th and into the beginning of the 20th century, ISO underwent several changes: Due to the entry of many standard-setting bodies representing countries that regarded standardization to be an essential governmental task rather than something to be left to the voluntary work of various experts, ISO became more of an intergovernmental agency. In addition, it broadened its interest from industrial standards, to management systems, to standards for environmental protection, and then to more general standards for corporate social responsibility. ISO's formidable reputation as an effective and relatively impartial setter of industrial standards seemed to allow the organization to move into these more politicized fields.

Yet, it seeming effectiveness is only part of the story. ISO, formed only in 1946, grew out of a long-standing international social movement of engineers whose origins date back to the 19th century. The men, and they were almost all men, who formed the organization had long embraced the idea that establishing universal, hence international, industrial standards would help to build the most efficient global industrial economy, which was seen as a major contribution to prosperity and peace. Moreover, the standardization movement – which was the most common way in which these engineers referred to themselves – already embraced the voluntary consensus process, i.e., making standards via deliberation and consensus among experts involved in the creation and use of the things being standardized. It was seen as the fundamentally better way to create regulatory standards than the two other means that had been traditionally used, namely imposition by the state (whether republican or autocratic) or the operation of the market (whether competitive or oligopolistic).[6]

ISO's origin in this international social movement helps to explain why the organization has always been open to interests and agendas from actors of the "global South". Thus, the progressive inclusion of non-Europeans and representatives of colonized societies within the international standardization movement began long before ISO's establishment. Then, in the 1950s, the UN helped build national standards bodies throughout the developing world that became part of the ISO network. A decade later ISO began subsidizing non-Western participation in its work. And the subsequent, path-dependent sequence of ISO's involvement with standards that proved to be of interest to non-Western companies (first with quality management – ISO 9000, then with environmental systems – ISO 14000, and finally with social responsibility – ISO 26000) brings us to the situation today.

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6   See W. Higgins, Engine of Change: Standards Australia since 1922, Blackheath 2005, pp. 38-43; C. N. Murphy / J. Yates, ISO 26000, Alternative Standards, and the 'Social Movement of Engineers' involved with Standard-Setting, in: St. Ponte / P. Gibbon / J. Vestergaard (eds.), Governing through Standards: Origins, Drivers, and Limitations, London 2011, pp. 162-67.

The Sequence, the Puzzle, and the Possible Significance: Environmental and Social Standard Setting and ISO's Traditional Role

To understand how the change in focus of a relatively little-know international organization might eventually have a major role in the global economy – a role connected to the new power assumed by non-Western countries within this originally largely Western organization – it is necessary to grasp ISO's traditional role and the reasons why the phenomena of private environmental and social standard setting has taken off over the last twenty years.

ISO might seem an unlikely place to create widely legitimate rules for organizations to follow in order to mitigate harms they do to the environment or to society. ISO is far from some kind of global representative democracy. Historically, it was a creator of *industrial* standards and its standards gained legitimacy because they were formulated by representatives from (engineers from) companies that produced the products in question and from companies that purchased them. ISO is, first and foremost, an organization of *experts* – the peak organization of a global network that sets industrial standards, everything from the spacing of the threads on nuts and bolts to the standard digital codes that make the Internet possible.

Historically, ISO became a bit more representative before it concerned itself with larger social issues. The industrial standard setting performed by the national organizations in the ISO network (the oldest of which was founded shortly before the First World War) was originally done only by the engineers who designed the objects that needed to be standardized in order to allow specific industries, or entire industrial economies, to operate more efficiently. Over time, by the mid-20th century, it became commonplace to include representatives of both the companies that produced the goods in question and those that were their major purchasers.[7] It was only in 1978, in response to the consumer movement in Western Europe and North America, that ISO made room for the involvement of representatives of final consumers and it was only after 2000, with the negotiation of ISO 26000 (the social responsibility standard), that other nongovernmental groups gained access to an ISO process. Even then, the new groups that ISO welcomed into its deliberations primarily came from Europe and North America, although some nongovernmental activists from every part of the world did participate.

ISO's main decision makers, the representatives of the national standard-setting bodies, were, however, more representative, although not perfectly so.[8] ISO now has national members bodies from about 160 countries, but some 50 of these are in categories of membership that allow little active participation in policy development; most of these member bodies with little opportunity for active participation are from the developing

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7   J. Yates / C. N. Murphy, From Setting National Standards to Coordinating International Standards: The Formation of the ISO, in: Business and Economic History online, 4 (2006), pp. 1-19, pp. 7-8, 11.

8   C. Ruwet, Toward the Democratization of Standards Development? ISO 26000 as an Experiment in Democratizing ISO, presentation at the annual colloquium of the European Group for Organizational Studies, Barcelona, July 2009.

world. Marcel Heires correctly points out that, by almost any measure, representatives of African, Asian, and Latin American firms, social movement organizations, and governments are still underrepresented in most of ISO's work.[9] Nevertheless, they consider ISO social and environmental standard setting to be relatively legitimate. In a survey of participants in the 2004 meeting on the proposed ISO 26000 standard, participants from that regions argued that, in the past, such standards had been designed in the "global North" and "imposed on suppliers from developing countries … with ISO, 'developing countries can at least influence the standard.'"[10] Of course, the survey was not sent to representatives from the 50 or so ISO national member bodies that play little role in policy development. Yet, the same views are found in other surveys of firms, which included small and medium enterprises and activists with whom they work, groups that many critics of ISO processes say are those whose views are the most likely to be excluded.[11]

These somewhat puzzling findings may simply reflect the extraordinary *il*legitimacy in the eyes of non-Western companies of most of the other private processes that have been used to create global social and environmental standards since the mid-1990s. After all, even if the ISO process granted greater access to interest groups in the global North than it did to those in the South, at least *some* non-Western voices were heard, something that has rarely been the case in the standards created by Western nongovernmental organizations, despite their professed concern with global welfare.[12]

Most of the existing private social and environmental codes have been initiated by social movement organizations in Europe and North America, groups that are deeply concerned about the environmental impact of economic globalization and about its social impact, especially on less-privileged groups in their own backyards such as workers whose employers threaten to move their jobs abroad. In less-industrialized countries, the mix of interests supporting and opposing global social standards is much more complex. In theory, economic globalization should increase national wealth in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. In practice, it may have done so in many places, but almost everywhere it has increased income inequality as well. Improving environmental standards may, in the long run, be good for everyone, but, to many, there seems to be something unjust about asking a newly industrializing country to curtail its growth in order to meet environmen-

9   M. Heires, The International Organization for Standardization, in: New Political Economy, 13 (2008) 3, pp. 357-367.

10   M. A. Balzarova, The Impact of ISO 9000 and ISO 14000 on Standardisation of Social Responsibility: An Insider Perspective, in: International Journal of Production Economics 113 (2008) 1, pp. 74-87, 83.

11   O. Perera, How Material is ISO 26000 Social Responsibility to Small and Medium Enterprises?, Winnipeg, International Institute for Sustainable Development with the support of the Swiss State Secretariat for Economic Affairs, September 2008; R. Hamann / T. Agbazue / P. Kapelus / A. Hein, Universalizing Corporate Social Responsibility? South African Challenges to the International Organization for Standardization's New Social Responsibility Standard, in: Business and Society Review, 101 (2005) 1, pp. 1-19. On the relative exclusion of SMEs see: T. M. Egyedi / S. Toffaletti, Standardising Social Responsibility: Analysing ISO Representation Issues from an SME Perspective, in: K. Jakobs / E. Söderström (eds.), Proceedings of the 13th EURAS Workshop on Standardisation, Mainz 2008, pp. 121-136.

12   J. Bendell, In whose Name? The Accountability of Corporate Social Responsibility, in: Development in Practice, 15 (2005) 3-4, pp. 362-374.

tal standards necessary to remediate a problem created by the unregulated industrialization of already wealthy societies.

Many of the existing private standards for fair trade or environmental sustainability are familiar to consumers in Europe and North America, made visible via fair trade or green product labels. In fact, the power of consumers is one reason such standards have appeared, but it is just one part of a much larger story. The demand for such standards emerged with the maturation of a fundamentally new manufacturing economy based upon global supply chains, one whose enabling conditions included the radically cost-cutting innovation of containerized shipping, the widespread adoption of liberal trading norms, and the strengthening of the global free trade regime with the formation of the World Trade Organization in 1995. Social movements concerned with the environment, the rights of workers, and human rights in general joined with the secretariats of intergovernmental organizations, government agencies, and firms concerned with social responsibility (whether as part of a niche strategy or due to long-standing management commitments) to push for what John G. Ruggie has called the "re-embedding" of global trade within a set of larger social norms.[13]

As the word "re-embedding" suggests, this kind of push for the social regulation of an expanding capitalist industrial economy has occurred before. It is characteristic of the internationalization of capitalism ever since the Industrial Revolution. In earlier periods, the embedding of industrial capitalism within larger social norms was done by the *state* through the integration of a national economic space in which the disadvantages suffered by people in some regions were overcome by national policies that apply to all (as with the development of the Bismarckian welfare system and the abolition of slavery in the United States).[14] Social embedding has also been supported by *intergovernmental agreements* as was the case with the "embedded liberalism" throughout the OECD world that was the subject of Ruggie's early work on the subject.[15] This was also the case with social embedding supported by the cooperation of the industrialized states in the era of the new imperialism prior to the First World War, the era in which the public international unions, the precursors of the League of Nations and the UN, were formed.[16]

At the beginning of the current wave of economic globalization, the possibility of social regulation through the integration of a larger state was ruled out by the almost universal elite distain for the idea of "world government", something that stood in sharp contrast to the widespread embrace of the idea a generation earlier.[17] At the same time, official

13   J. G. Ruggie, Taking embedded Liberalism Global: The Corporate Connection, in: idem (ed.), Embedding Global Markets: An enduring Challenge, Aldershot 2008, pp. 231-253.
14   C. N. Murphy, Globalization and Governance: A Historical Perspective, in: R. Axtmann (ed.), Globalization in Europe, London 1998, pp. 144-163.
15   J. G. Ruggie, International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order, in: International Organization, 36 (1982) 4, pp. 379-415.
16   C. N. Murphy, International Organization and Industrial Change: Global Governance since 1850, Cambridge 1984.
17   T. G. Weiss, What happened to the Idea of World Government, in: International Studies Quarterly, 53 (2009) 2, pp. 253-271.

intergovernmental cooperation to alleviate concerns about a "race to the bottom" in social and environmental standards proved impossible, due not to the total absence of elite interest but to the lack of interest of a key player, the United States, whose Republican Party presidents (especially Ronald Reagan and George W. Bush) embraced a vision of global *laissez faire* and whose Democratic Party presidents (Bill Clinton and Barack Obama) were unwilling to use political capital to overcome the opposition of conservative legislators. In addition, the Democrats, in particular, faced a problem of reconciling the conflicting interests of the supporters of some form of re-embedding of the global economy: The Democrats' core constituents in the US labour movement wanted to use enforced global standards as a way to protect privileged labour in industries that otherwise would no longer be viable against lower-wage competitors in the developing world, whereas US advocates for the poor often saw merit in the position of most non-Western unions that the globalization of manufacturing was largely positive, but that international support for their rights to organize, strike, and bargain with employers was welcome.[18]

In a world in which official legal action to create social and environmental regulation of an economy that had grown beyond the bounds of the old order was impossible, private agreements among like-minded actors appeared to be the only alternatives, hence the recent explosion of private global social and environmental standards. Such standards could be given teeth through a variety of means: Consumers could themselves become the enforcers through their purchasing decisions. Governments, both in their role as consumers and as adjudicators of disputes between private actors, could refer to specific private standards as ones that must be met by their suppliers or as ones that would not be considered barriers on the level economic playing field that governments maintain.[19] Governments that control particularly important gateways in the world economy, such as port authorities or agencies that certify the harmlessness of goods in trade may play a particularly important role if they reference global social or environmental standards in their work.[20] In addition, companies spurred on by consumer or government pressure to adopt such standards may be able to learn how to cut cost in other areas, thus remaining competitive while normalizing achievement of the higher standards as a cost of doing business.[21] Finally, companies that have absorbed the costs of higher standards may develop an interest in a new kind of "level playing field", one that imposes the same costs on all of their competitors via strong governmental regulation.

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18   C. Candland, Core Labour Standards under the Administration of George W. Bush, in: International Labour Review, 148 (2009) 1-2, pp. 169-181.

19   S. Bernstein / E. Hannah, Non-state Global Standard Setting and the WTO: Legitimacy and the Need for Regulatory Space, in: Journal of International Economic Law 11 (2008) 3, pp. 575-608; D. A. Wirth, The International Organization for Standardization: Private Voluntary Standards as Swords and Shields (= Boston College Legal Studies Research Paper 173), Boston 2009.

20   E. R. DeSombre, Flagging Standards: Globalization and Environmental, Safety, and Labor Standards at Sea, Cambridge 2006.

21   R. M. Locke / M. Romis, The Promise and Peril of Private Voluntary Regulation: Labor Standards and Work Organization in two Mexican Garment Factories, in: Review of International Political Economy 17 (2010) 1, pp. 45-74.

Despite this wide range of mechanisms that could contribute to the effectiveness of private standards, we can only tell Panglossian tales about their *possible* impact on the social and environmental externalities of the new global economy. Overall assessments of the effect of existing codes are mixed and their adoption has been far from universal.[22] Nevertheless, if widely legitimate private environmental and social standards were to emerge, the possibility that they could become effective exists. Thus, the uniquely wide legitimacy of the standards negotiated within the International Organization for Standardization is of significance; it is the reason that the globalization of ISO standard-setting matters.

Toward an Explanation: The Early Embrace of Asian and Latin American Engineers

To explain how ISO standard setting became global in the first place, we have to go back to its beginning. ISO grew out of an international social movement of late 19th-century applied scientists and engineers. There is no doubt that setting fundamental standards (scientific constants and standard measurements) as well as creating industrial standards that would allow the products and services of different firms to work well with one another are basic, practical problems of industrial economies. As a consequence, the number of standard-setting projects over a wide range of activities accelerated throughout the 19th century. Many of the 19th-century standardizers saw no implications of their work beyond the immediate, practical problems that they faced – allowing different telegraph or rail systems to be connected, assuring that steel buildings would not collapse, and the like – but standard setters in a number of fields – especially those that were the intimately involved in recent advances in science such as electrical engineers – saw their work as something of more transcendent importance. They believed that standards would contribute to enlightenment, the improvement of the human condition (via the prosperity it would encourage), and even help establish world peace.

Many of the key figures in the global standardization movement first became acquainted with one another at the meetings aimed at creating fundamental electrical units that were held at the late 19th-century world's fairs, culminating in St. Louis in 1904.[23] They developed the goal of creating both national standard-setting bodies and global organizations that would carry out the movements' larger goals, forming the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) in 1906 and assuring the establishment of national bodies in

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22   The most comprehensive assessment has been done relative to labour standards, see: J. M. Witte, Realizing Core Labor Standards, the Potential and Limits of Voluntary Codes and Social Clauses: A Review of the Literature, Paper prepared for the Programme on social and environmental standards of the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development, 2008.

23   L. R. Lagerstrom, Constructing Uniformity: The Standardization of International Electromagnetic Measures, 1860–1912, dissertation, University of California, Berkeley, 1992; B. J. Hunt, The Ohm is where the Art is: British Telegraph Engineers and the Development of Electric Standards, in: Osiris, 2nd series, 9 (1994) 1, pp. 48-63.

most of the major industrial nations (including the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and the United States) by 1920. The leading figure in the movement, Charles Le Maistre, a British electrical engineer who began as a secretary to the heads of the discussions on fundamental units at the 19th-century world's fairs, variously served as chief of the IEC, the British national standards organization, the short-lived interwar global organization that was ISO's predecessor, and ISO itself.[24]

From its beginning, the global standards movement was multi-regional and multi-racial, due, in large part, to its connection to the electrical industry and the central role of Japan in late 19th-century innovation in that field. Toshiba's Ichisuke Fujioka (later the president of the Tokyo Electric Company) was one of the most prominent participants in standardization before the First World War. He and a number of his Japanese colleagues made the handful of foreign members of the original (British) Institution of Electrical Engineers at least as early as 1884, and his passing (in 1918) was noted with great sadness by both the British and US associations.

The centrality of the Japanese members in the group that formed the early standards movement is of particular significance because it countered the influence of the contemporary rise of "white racism". As Marilyn Lake and Henry Reynolds's masterful *Drawing the Global Colour Line: White Men's Countries and the International Challenge of Racial Inequality* (2008) makes so painfully clear, elite reaction to late 19th-century egalitarian claims made by Africans and Asians both led to the rigidifying of the racial boundary that would eventually create the "Third World".[25] As Michael Adas has argued, Japan's technological prowess created a partial but uneasy exception to the rule. "After all, the Japanese had done what no other non-Western people had been able to do: remake their society in the image of industrial Europe."[26] Within the small, almost intimate transnational community of elite electrical engineers – the seed of the standards movement – Japan's inclusion was not only less problematic it also may have contributed to a scepticism about, or at least an inattention to, the new white racist ideology that was becoming so commonplace among the global elite.

This is not to say that negative stereotypes connected with the new white racism disappeared. In the interwar years, the proselytizing LeMaistre was constantly travelling to the Americas, the Far East, India, and Africa encouraging the establishment of new national – sometimes meaning "Dominion" or "colony-wide" – standard-setting bodies and rarely succumbing to the rhetoric of Anglo-Saxon dominance. His US colleague, Paul Agnew, of the American Engineering Standards Committee (AESC), was a bit more a man of his time. From 1923 through 1925, the AESC took on the role of encouraging the

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24   J. Yates / C. N. Murphy, Charles Le Maistre: Entrepreneur in International Standardization, in: Enterprises et histoire, 51 (2008), pp. 10-57.

25   The term has been used, beginning in the 1950s, by scholars sympathetic to anti-colonial and non-aligned movements. A somewhat Western-centric backformation from that meaning the "First World" came to mean the OECD countries and the "Second World" the Warsaw Pact countries.

26   M. Adas, Machines as the Measure of Men: Science, Technology, and Ideologies of Western Dominance, Ithaca 1989, p. 365.

development of standardization associations throughout Latin America. Nevertherless, the report of the AESC representative to the first Pan-American Conference on Standardization (held in 1925) offered some cautious words about what could be expected, emphasising:

> *the importance of an understanding of the fundamental differences in the two civilizations [present in America] and in the cultural background from which they developed. Such an understanding would be necessary in any active cooperation in standardization matters. The Anglo-Saxons were chiefly concerned with and interested in processes and results. The Latin peoples and Latin-American's in particular cared less for industrial processes and results, but were more interested in the artistic and emotional side of cultural and industrial development.*[27]

Yet, it is still significant that, despite the dominance of the white ideology, engineering skill always trumped race in early 20th-century standards movement. Adas's *Machines as the Measure of Men* rather than Lake and Reynold's *Global Colour Line* was what mattered most. Later in 1925, at the third interwar "informal conference of the national standards bodies", engineers from Latin America held central positions[28] and after the Second World War, in the meetings that founded ISO, Latin American engineers were prominent, alongside a unified group of engineers from what would soon be India and Pakistan as well as an equally undivided group of standard setters representing Palestine.[29]

In 1961, Mohammed Hayath, the electrical engineer who had played a central role in the development of India's power grid since completing his studies in 1923, used the occasion of the "Seventh Charles Le Maistre Memorial Lecture" to recall this early embrace of Asian and Latin American engineers and to praise the standardization movement for creating a truly open, global scientific community whose actions were of much greater significance to the developing world than to the already industrialized nations."[30] As Hayath made clear, engineers in the developing world never questioned that their profession was a universal, global one, and they had every reason to embrace the ideals of world peace prosperity that animated the movement and to embrace the movement's organization: ISO.

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27   American Engineering Standards Committee, Minutes, 19 April 1925, #1356.
28   It was in fact the third, but it was designated as the second, because the meeting of 1921 was not considered formal enough to be called an "informal conference", American Engineering Standards Committee, Minutes, 25 November 1925, #1446.
29   See the account in L. C. Verman, Standardization: A New Discipline, Hampden (CT) 1973, p. 178.
30   M. Hayath, What the IEC means to the Developing Countries (= Seventh Charles Le Maistre Memorial Lecture), Geneva 1961.

UN Technical Assistance, Engineering Schools, and New National Standard-Setting Bodies

Arguably, at their beginnings, ISO was more open to the concerns from and in the non-European world than was the UN. Certainly, Mark Mazower's revisionist history has reminded us of the imperialist origins of the UN.[31] By the 1950s that situation reversed. In part because the Cold War conflict permeated almost everything that the UN did, the competition between the United States and the Soviet Union for support in Africa and Asia led to the UN's increasing support of decolonization and development. At the same time, because ISO remained one of the few global institutions in which the Cold War did not dominate everything else, the organization retained its focus on serving the newest industries and the countries in which they were located. Writing in 1973, Lal Chand Verman, one of ISO's great champions, noted that voices from Africa, Asia, and Latin America remained less involved in ISO's work than those from North America and Europe, even though "in some developing countries of the East, like India and Iran, considerable experience has been accumulated during the last two decades in getting the national standards movement underway."[32] Much of that promotion of the standards movement in the global South came as the result of the UN's work there.

Most people are unaware of the extent to which the UN system is a field-based organization concerned with development; about 95% of its staff focuses on the non-European world.[33] It has been this way almost since the beginning. In the 1950s, almost all of the UN agencies (from the International Civil Aviation Organization to the World Health Organization) found that the only way they could expand was by placing technical assistance experts in the Third World, an activity that was relatively well supported by the United States, other Western allies, and even the Soviet Union. A major early focus of this work was the establishment engineering institutions. Many of the campuses of the Indian Institute of Technology, Turkey's premier Middle East Technical University (METU), the University of the West Indies' Faculty of Engineering, and scores of other leading engineering schools throughout the world owe their origin to UN technical assistance projects of the 1950s and early 1960s.[34] Often at the same time the UN was establishing a country's major engineering school, it would also sponsor the work of a technical assistance advisor who helped local engineers establish a national industrial

31   M. Mazower, No Enchanted Palace: The End of Empire and the Ideological Origins of the United Nations, Princeton 2009.

32   L. C. Verman, Standardization, p. 101 (29).

33   More than 143,000 of the UN system's 179,000 civilian staff and all of the 100,000 UN peacekeepers work in the more than 165 developing countries where the UN has country offices. Moreover, at least two-thirds of the system's headquarters staff (about 24,000 of 36,000) also works on development. However, the operation of the system is spread across more than 50 different agencies, each with a separate board of member states and a separate upper administration. In the field, the chief UN officer usually only has administrative authority over the entire UN staff during periods of emergency. See: S. Browne, The United Nations Development Programme and System, London 2011, p. 2.

34   C. N. Murphy, The UN Development Programme: A Better Way?, Cambridge 2006, chapter 4; S. Francis, The IITs in India: Symbols of an Emerging Nation, in: Südasien-Chronik / South Asia-Chronicle 1 (2011), pp. 293-326.

standard-setting body. Thus, in 1954, when the UN office in Ankara helped establish METU, it also sponsored a young Swedish engineer, Olle Sturén, to help set up Turkey's national standard-setting body.[35]

Sturén later became ISO's longest serving chief executive. In that role and in the positions he filled both immediately before and shortly afterward, he was the most influential figure in the organization from the mid-1960s through the late 1980s. Throughout his tenure, he regularly travelled to promote standardization in Argentina, Bahrain, Barbados, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Cuba, Cyprus, Egypt, Ghana, Guatemala, Jamaica, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Iran, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lebanon, Liberia, Malaysia, Mauritius, Mongolia, Morocco, Nigeria, North Korea, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Seychelles, Singapore, South Africa, South Korea, Sri Lanka, Taiwan, Tanzania, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey, and Venezuela, many of them many times, between 1964 and 1985.[36] His itineraries read like the list of countries in which the UN had helped create engineering institutions ten years earlier. In 1972, Sturén appointed the head of Ghana's member body, Robert Oteng, to create a system of assistance for standard-setting bodies in these world regions, thus devoting much of the organization's budget to encouraging non-Western participation.[37]

ISO 9000, Access to Northern Markets, and the non-Western Role in ISO 14000 and 26000

During his tenure, Sturén's internationalism was supported both by the force of his own personality as well as by the legacy of the UN's development work, but it survived him due to the success of an ISO product that arrived, opportunely, just as he was leaving the scene. In 1987, ISO published the first of its quality management standards, the ISO 9000 series. The series is a set of "management systems standards" that describe how organizations can adopt an orientation toward the satisfaction of their customers or clients, then document and monitor the organization's processes, and use that information to improve what they do. Certification of ISO 9000 compliance requires an external party to report on what the organization has done and many ISO member bodies have developed extremely lucrative businesses providing that.

Few non-Western national standard-setting bodies directly benefited in this way from the ISO 9000 boom, but ISO's reputation did as well since non-Western companies gained from the standard. Most firms that adopt ISO 9000, especially those in the less industrialized world, have done so in order to increase their sales: Adherence to the standard serves as proof to foreign purchasers that a relatively unknown non-Western supplier will

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35   C. Murphy / J. Yates, The International Organization for Standardization, p. 21 (2).
36   Sturén Papers, Notebook listing travel from 1953 onwards, currently in the custody of Lars and Lolo Sturén prior to donation to the archives of the Standardiseringskommissionen i Sverige.
37   C. N. Murphy / J. Yates, The International Organization for Standardization, p. 21 (2).

be up to the task of providing high quality products.[38] The significance of the assurance that ISO 9000 provides is so great that even Japanese firms that were pioneers in Quality Management and have much better Quality Management Systems (QMS) in place, adopt ISO 9000 in order to reassure global customers.

Moreover, because ISO has continuously updated ISO 9000, Japanese QMS consultants have become deeply involved in the standard's refinement, one of the first manifestations of a Japanese interest in creating "world standards that start from Japan". [39]

Companies in the non-European world have also been able to use ISO 9000 certification as a mechanism for signalling a commitment to quality and as a way of beginning to build a QMS culture. The purchasing requirements of some EU governments seem to have provided some incentive for African, Asian, and Latin American companies to adopt the standard, but requirements of multinational firms appear to be even more important.[40] When these firms can comply with ISO 9000, they can enter some new markets and help pull their national economies up from the bottom of the supply chain. At the same time, as they gain more experience with ISO 9000, they are able to take a more active part in the formulation of related ISO standards, a major factor in the legitimacy of the environmental and social responsibility standards that have been built on the base of ISO 9000.[41]

The first of these standards, the ISO 14000 series (first published in 1995), creates a management system that allows organizations to focus on continuously diminishing their negative impact on the environment. By 2005, the weight of the accumulated evidence suggested that those firms adopting the standard were also complying more fully with existing environmental regulations than were otherwise similar firms. In addition, the ISO 14000 firms polluted less than they had in the past, and less than their competitors did.[42] Moreover, one well-designed study indicated that the desire of firms to get into markets where ISO 14000 was an important voluntary supplement to, or substitute for, strong environmental regulation was fueling the rapid adoption of the standard around the world.[43]

Until 2005, the majority of the organizations certified as ISO 14000 compliant were in Europe and North America, but this is changing rapidly. The majority are now in East Asia with almost one-quarter in China alone.[44] The ISO 14000 standards have become

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38   M. Potoski / A. Prakash, Information Asymmetries as Trade Barriers: ISO 9000 increases International Commerce, unpublished paper, University of Washington, Department of Political Science, 15 January 2008, p. 2.

39   C. Stortz, Compliance with International Standards: the EDIFACT and ISO 9000 Standards in Japan, in: Social Science Japan Journal, 10 (2007) 2, pp. 217-241, 220.

40   E. Neumayer / R. Perkins, Uneven Geographies of Organizational Practice: Explaining the Cross-National Transfer and Diffusion of ISO 9000, in: Economic Geography, 81 (2005) 3, pp. 237-60.

41   K. Nadvi / F. Wältring, Making Sense of Global Standards, Papers of the Institut für Entwicklung und Frieden der Gerhard-Mercator-Universität Duisburg, 58, 2002, pp. 1-48, 4.

42   A. Prakash / M. Potoski, The Voluntary Environmentalists: Green Clubs, ISO 14001, and Voluntary Environmental Regulation, Cambridge 2006, pp. 146-171.

43   A. Prakash / M. Potoski, Racing to the Bottom? Trade, Environmental Governance, and ISO 14001, in: American Journal of Political Science, 50 (2006) 2, pp. 350-364.

44   ISO Survey 2010: Principal findings, URL: http://www.iso.org/iso/iso-survey2010.pdf, access on 16.09.2013.

increasingly commonplace in the large and rapidly growing economies of China, Brazil, and India. "Environmental quality" has become one aspect of the identity of at least one part of the private sector in these and other rapidly industrializing countries. In China, this environmentalism was promoted by the close relationship between an environmentally committed part of the UN system, the UN Development Programme (UNDP), and many of the most politically influential economic reformers who came to power in the late 1970s.[45] The effort is reflected in the 2008 decision of Chinese regulators to require that firms listed on the Beijing Stock Exchange provide a great deal more information about their environmental impact, something that spurred the further explosion of ISO 14000 adoptions.[46]

Even greater commitment is evident in Brazil where, even without a legal requirement, over half of the major national firms publish such reports. Brazil shares some characteristics with other developing countries where reporting on environmental quality and on broader issues of corporate social responsibility has become commonplace.[47] Like China a decade earlier, Brazil in the 1990s shifted from an inward-oriented (import-substitution) development strategy to one of openness to the world market. Also like China's, Brazil's shift in economic direction was supported by close relations with UN organizations that promoted ecological and social sustainability.[48]

Some Brazilian corporate leaders argue that the country's sponsorship of the UN's 1992 Earth Summit, which took place in Rio de Janeiro, and the 2003 World Social Forum, in Porto Alegre, reflected a general commitment to the proposition that "a world that is healthy and equitable … can be built only if sustainability is integrated into the management of corporations, organizations, and the State itself."[49] This commitment reflects the power of environmental and consumer organizations and labour unions, part of a vibrant civil society that has grown since Brazil's return to electoral democracy in the 1990s, something in keeping with similar patterns in other developing countries where ISO 14000 is widely adopted.[50] In addition, part of Brazil's story is that of other rapidly industrializing countries that have faced major financial crises that originated abroad (e.g., Argentina, Indonesia, and Thailand). A history of such crises have forced Brazilian banks to have close ties to the public sector and to develop an important role in the daily

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45   C. N. Murphy, UN Development Programme, pp. 177-181 and pp. 274-275 (32).

46   Zhou Xin, China Orders Listed Firms to be Greener, in: Reuters, 25 February 2008, URL: www.reuters.com/article/environmentNews/idUSPEK13520080225.

47   S. Shanahan / S. Khagram, Dynamics of Corporate Responsibility, in: G. S. Drori / J. M. Meyer / H. Wang (eds.), Globalization and Organization: World Society and Organizational Change, Oxford 2006. They look in detail at Brazil and South Africa and present supporting data on India and Thailand.

48   These included UNDP as well as the UN Environmental Programme. In Brazil, many important parts of the government became (and still are) "UNDP projects", which allowed the new democratic leaders to displace entrenched civil servants in parts of the state structure that would not respond to the new policy directives, see: C. N. Murphy, United Nations Development Programme, pp. 211-220 (32).

49   R. Young, Dilemmas and Advances in Corporate Social Responsibility in Brazil: The Work of the Ethos Institute, in: Natural Resources Forum, 28 (2004) 4, pp. 291-301, 292. Young heads the Ethos Institute, a trade association of more than 800 companies with aggregate revenues equal to about one-third of Brazil's GDP.

50   Ibid.; S. Shanahan / S. Khagram, Dynamics of Corporate Responsibility, pp. 203, 222, (45).

life of many citizens, helping them buffer the wild fluctuations of inflation and devaluation. "Against this backdrop", argue two scholars from Harvard's Hauser Center for Non-Profit Organizations, "banking was one of the first industries in Brazil to consider its role as a corporate citizen."[51] The power of the financial sector, in turn, has influenced firms in other sectors of the Brazilian economy.

One consequence of this interest was a decision by the Brazilian national standard-setting body, Associação Brasileira de Normas Técnicas (ABNT), to establish a national corporate social responsibility standard that could be monitored and certified in the same way as ISO 9000 and ISO 14000. The standard was first published in 2004.[52] Simultaneously, ABNT joined national standard-setting bodies from other rapidly growing economies to press ISO to develop a general standard for corporate or "organizational" social responsibility, a standard that would cover environmental sustainability and the promotion of human rights, including the basic rights of workers, ISO 26000.

Two member bodies served as the secretariat of the negotiations on the standard, the one being Brazil's ABNT, the other one Sweden's national body. The heavy financial burden of the secretariat was borne by those bodies, by various ministries of the two national governments, and by a number of private firms in both countries that have been involved in the larger movement for corporate social responsibility, including Ericsson, the telecommunications giant, and Skanska, the global construction firm that is managing the renovation of the UN's New York headquarters, and companies that contribute to Brazil's Ethos Institute, a business group that has long supported social responsibility initiatives.[53]

After seven years of negotiation, the ISO process resulted in a massive document that serves as a guidance standard for social responsibility. Unlike with ISO 9000 and 14000, no system for monitoring compliance with the standard has been sanctioned by ISO. Nevertheless, relatively similar standards have been and will be made the subject of such mechanisms. Brazil's ABNT NBR 16000 series is one of the most prominent.[54] Of course, enforcement of a unified global code of corporate social responsibility will not be a panacea for all the problems of a weakly regulated global economy. A group of South African social scientists acknowledges that if a global social responsibility standard included an auditing mechanism, it would allow the South African government to husband its regulatory resources and focus on firms that are non-compliant. On the other hand, it is unlikely, they argue, that any global standard will highlight the corporate activities that are socially the most important in any particular context. For example, in South Africa, the government-mandated Black Economic Empowerment initiative is concerned with increasing the black share of the private sector and management posi-

51   S. Shanahan / S. Khagram, Dynamics of Corporate Responsibility, pp. 215-221 (45).
52   F. Duarte, Working with Social Responsibility in Brazilian Companies: the Role of Managers' values in the Maintenance of CSR Cultures, in: Journal of Business Ethics 96 (2010) 3, pp. 355-368.
53   SIS, Vägledning för Socialt ansvarstagande ISO 26000, January 2007, pp. 27, 28; GT Ethos – ISO 26000.
54   A. S. Henriques, The Brazilian Standards and Certification Programs for Social Responsibility and Forests, paper presented at the ISO 26000 conference, Quebec, 15 May 2009.

tions in all sectors, goals that are unlikely to be at the center of any global standard, and which may be prohibited by some standards.[55]

Meanwhile, the more general problem involved with establishing global social and environmental standards remains: In many fields, the interests of the majority in the global North and the majority within the global South differ. Peter Utting argues, more generally, that in most global corporate social responsibility discussions, "priority issues are often those of particular concern to activists and others in the North. […] Interests relevant to particular stakeholders in developing countries […] get short shrift."[56]

This has not happened in the discussions leading up to ISO 26000. Why? Non-Western opinions were included in the ISO discussions because representatives from that parts of the world wanted to be in the discussions, they were welcomed there, and they were capable of taking part. They wanted to be there both because (for some powerful firms in states that have recently returned to democracy) social and environmental responsibility have become part of their identity and, for many more earlier ISO management systems standards provided a relatively inexpensive entre to global markets. They were welcomed there due to the decades of support of non-Western participation encouraged by the ISO executive and by the deeper ideology of the standard-setting movement, which has always treated engineering or scientific expertise as the most important requirement for inclusion in its processes. And they were able to participate due both to the support that ISO itself has provided to the formation of national standards bodies in the non-European world and to the larger support given to non-Western engineering and standard setting by the UN system.

So What?

Arguably, ISO 26000 represents the first time that non-Western actors within ISO have used the organization to create a fundamentally new kind of standard that is likely to influence the direction of the organization's future development and that may have some impact on the global political economy. Nevertheless, this development cannot be understood as a challenge to ISO's basic framework or to the kind of "global social movement of engineers" out of which ISO developed. In many ways, the development seems like a logical extension of ISO's progressive internationalist organizational culture and history. ISO began as an organization of internationalist engineers whose work had implicitly challenged the elite racism that was typical in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Throughout ISO's history, non-Western standard setters have always been at the table, even if they were not active, and they have been increasingly at the table due to the interest of the United Nations and of the ISO leadership in promoting industry throughout the developing world. When ISO expanded its work from industrial standard setting to

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55   R. Hamann / T. Agbazue / P. Kapelus / A. Hein, Universalizing Corporate Social Responsibility? (10).
56   P. Utting, CSR and Equality, in: Third World Quarterly, 28 (2007) 4, pp. 697-712, 700-701.

management system standard setting with the ISO 9000 quality management standards, it began focusing on something in which its non-Western members had a stake. The simultaneously arising interest of many non-European firms and activists in developing environmental and social regulatory standards that took into account concerns broader than those of Western activists, made ISO and its national standard-setting bodies logical places to propose such standards, and the act of doing so made it clear that ISO standard setting has now become more, to some extent even truly global.

FORUM

Levels of Parochialism.
Welsh-Eurasian Perspectives on a German-European Debate

Chris Hann

Forty years ago Jürgen Habermas, at the time Director of a Max Planck Institute in Bavaria, published a volume titled *Legitimationsprobleme im Spätkapitalismus* (Frankfurt, Suhrkamp, 1973). The English translation followed two years later, *Legitimation Crisis* (Beacon Press, 1975). Why the reluctance on the part of the US publisher to include "late capitalism" in the title? To many students of the social sciences in those years, the end was imminent. The US government's abandoning of gold convertability in 1971 in order to pay for the Vietnam war implied the demise of the accords negotiated at Bretton Woods by John Maynard Keynes and the end of the era that is commonly tagged with his name. Oxford undergraduates still had to know their Samuelson and Keynes for examination purposes, but for many of us the *Zeitgeist* was exemplified by the radical economics of Andrew Glyn and Bob Sutcliffe.[1] We also noted the counter-current proposed by Friedrich Hayek and welcomed Keith Joseph's launch of the Centre for Policy Studies. These intellectual polarizations were sure signs of the impending revolution, we thought. Ted Heath's defeat by the miners and Richard Nixon's comeuppance following Watergate proved that Western states were ineffectual and corrupt; they evidently lacked the capacity to save capital from inexorably declining profit rates.

Not everything in this Oxford cocoon was unambiguous. For a student interested in "continental" European societies and struggling to learn their languages, it was disap-

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1   British Capitalism, Workers and the Profits Squeeze, Harmondsworth 1972.

pointing that Glyn and Sutcliffe focused so relentlessly on Britain. It was more troubling to hear Tony Benn argue powerfully from the left against membership of the Common Market: this was obviously serving the interests of capital, but could it not be reformed to promote socialist internationalism at the European level? True, the Eastern European states that proclaimed themselves socialist were by and large unattractive, and their centrally planned economies for the most part dysfunctional. But these considerations seemed secondary since it would soon become possible, we thought, to build socialism properly in the advanced capitalist states of the West (where the revolution should have taken place in the first place).

Fast forward four decades. Now, as then, Germany is an island of stability in the ocean of even later and greater capitalist turmoil. But the most acute analysis of the current crisis, combining the intellectual sophistication of Habermas with the polemical energy of Glyn and Sutcliffe, is the work of German sociologist Wolfgang Streeck, Director of the Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies in Cologne. Streeck's *Gekaufte Zeit; Die vertagte Krise des demokratischen Kapitalismus* (Frankfurt, Suhrkamp, 2013) is based on his 2012 Adorno lectures. His intellectual profile differs from that of his Frankfurt predecessors, but disciplinary boundaries have not inhibited some serious jousting with Habermas and others in recent issues of the *Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik*.[2] The stakes could hardly be higher: the future not just of the Euro but of the European project and capitalist democracy *überhaupt*. The leading protagonists are longstanding knights of the intellectual left (if such a thing still exists), who find neoliberal market society abhorrent as well as unviable. Yet their recommendations are entirely different. Jürgen Habermas and Claus Offe reaffirm Europeanism. Wolfgang Streeck argues passionately that we need to revitalise the capacities of the nation-state – but for reasons that have nothing in common with the agenda of the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP). Let me begin with the Cologne sociologist.

Wolfgang Streeck

Though he concentrates in his book on neoliberalism and the crisis which broke in 2008, Wolfgang Streeck precedes this with an incisive political economy of the entire postwar era including a critical appraisal of earlier *Kapitalismuskritik* in Frankfurt. Like others, he views the 1970s as a watershed, the end of the long post-war boom in which, contrary to earlier pessimistic prognoses such as those of Karl Polanyi, the liberal welfare state (*Sozialstaat*) proved itself capable of mitigating the destructive and socially divisive consequences of capitalist markets while maintaining respectable growth rates. The current crisis is novel, the climax of the transformation of the redistributive taxation state (*Steuerstaat*) into the debt state (*Schuldenstaat*) we know today, in which to pay for the

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2   W. Streeck, Was nun, Europa? , in: Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik 2013, no 4, pp. 57-68; J. Habermas, Demokratie oder Kapitalismus?, in: ibid., no 5, pp. 59-70.

social entitlements to which citizens have become accustomed, their states become the pawns of finance capital. The hyper-inflation of the 1970s, the privatization schemes of the 1980s, the ensuing property bubbles and explosion of private debt have all served to postpone the day of reckoning, but Armageddon is now upon us. The two Marios (Monti and Draghi) exemplify a new elite entirely lacking in democratic legitimacy which has nonetheless come to control public policy at both national and supra-national levels. Streeck emphasizes the regressive implications of current policies and asks how long such men can come up with more tricks, such as allowing the European Central Bank to buy up debt of delinquent members of the Eurozone without losing all credibility as a central bank. Finally, he analyses the obstacles to channelling citizens' moral outrage and sense of justice into "constructive opposition". The established institutions of capitalist democracy have been "sterilised" to the point that no longer work and no new ones have emerged to replace them.

This devastating diagnosis is widely shared, inside and outside Germany. What distinguishes Wolfgang Streeck from other analysts on the political left is the solution he proposes for the problems of Greece and other southern members of "Euroland" who are the principal victims of the present crisis. Since European unification has been so insidiously high-jacked by the interests of neoliberal capitalism, the only way forward is to revert to the proven capacity of the democratic state to promote the capacities and well-being of its citizens. These nation-states are evolved (*gewachsene*) entities, which must be conserved and not homogenized if democracy itself is not to be jettisoned. Streeck echoes the point that the German popular press has been making more bluntly ever since the present crisis began: how can German taxpayers be persuaded that they have a duty to bail out prodigal Greeks and Spaniards, or even an interest in doing so? Whether through bankers' sleight of hand or via more transparent mechanisms of representative government, this is just not going to work, especially since those called upon to pay the bills are not those who can afford to do so. Far better, argues Streeck, to allow the problem children of the south to manage their own national currencies again. Then they would stand a chance of addressing effectively the structural problems which condemn them to the role of eternal *Bittsteller*, begging for favours from Chancellor Merkel. The return to national currencies could be implemented by going back to Keynes' original plan to introduce the bancor as a unit of account, a proposal that was rejected in favour of the US dollar in the Bretton-Woods accords. Without denying that the European project is a nice idea, Streeck concludes his book by insisting that under present conditions it is simply impossible: the "second best solution" must therefore in practice become the first-best. These proposals are politically incorrect, to say the least. In Germany they are too radical even for *Die Linke* (though Oskar Lafontaine himself apparently endorses Streeck's analysis).

Jürgen Habermas

84 years old on 18 June 2013, Jürgen Habermas is a national treasure who commands respect across the political spectrum. Like Angela Merkel and previous Chancellors, he argues that it is in Germans' interest to orient themselves strongly. Yet he is contemptuous of his Chancellor's crisis management and the pusillanimous treatment she receives in the media. In his opinion, which coincides with that of Streeck on this point, her on-going prevarication to appease "the market(s)" serves only to sustain the power of technocratic elites in Brussels.[3] Habermas argues that only a thorough democratization ("deepening") of central EU institutions can rescue the continent from its present impasse. In short, in his eyes, the crisis is caused by the lack of democratic legitimation at the only level at which solutions can be forthcoming. The answer is not a federal "superstate" but a political union based on a new conception of dual citizenship, with a vigorous European parliament as the key institution in the formation of a "Europe-wide generalised we-perspective."

Habermas does not contest Streeck's account of the genesis and nature of the economic crisis. However, he dismantles the sociologist's arguments against the European solution and dismisses falling back on the nation-state as a "nostalgic option". That proposal is in any case contradictory on Streeck's part, since he himself concedes that not even the strongest "sovereign" states can effectively counter the integrated markets of today's global economy. No quixotic retrieval of rights long transferred to the supra-national (EU) level could make feasible Streeck's vision of a renewal of Keynesian social democracy within the framework of a new "European Bretton Woods". Habermas acknowledges that massive transfer payments from rich to poor will be necessary to overcome structural inequalities within a politically unified Europe. Unlike Streeck, he thinks that such policies can succeed if given time, citing the transformation of the former Eastern Germany as a positive example. Habermas thinks that, if only the appropriate democratic institutions are put in place, those same Germans who paid the *Solidaritätszuschlag* to support their own East will support the much larger transfers necessary to transform the south (meaning not Bavaria, but Greece, Italy, Spain and Portugal).

Jürgen Habermas does not share Wolfgang Streeck's concern that a "modernizing" convergence in terms of infrastructure and economic capacities across the continent will lead to socio-cultural homogenization. On the contrary, the diversity of the *Lebensweisen* is in Habermas's opinion such a distinctive feature of Europe vis-à-vis other continents that it could not be called into question by the deepening of political and economic unity. He dismisses the emphasis which Streeck places on "apparently 'natural' identities".[4] For Habermas, these are simply *Regressionsphänomene*. Both populist separatism in the west

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3   Habermas, Demokratie oder Kapitalismus?, p. 60.
4   Ibid., p. 67. Habermas supports his argument concerning the "fictive" nature of Streeck's "evolved" groups with a reference to DNA analysis of skeletal remains in Bavaria. Apparently, the populations of these parts in the late Völkerwanderungszeit were not as ethnically pure as formerly supposed.

and postsocialist nationalism in the east are contingent social-psychological pathologies, which will fade away once the new institutions of European unity are in place and working properly. The philosopher concludes by deploring the fact that the parties of the left are seemingly determined "to repeat their historic mistake of 1914" by failing to address the crisis on the necessary supra-national basis.[5] He welcomes the momentum of the new party Alternative für Deutschland (a more sophisticated version of the UKIP, dominated by economists) because he thinks this nationalism should galvanise the democratic Left to come up with its own, European alternative. From this perspective, and in spite of his sociological sensitivity to questions of distribution and domination, Streeck is keeping strange company. His principal error is to have fallen into the trap of prioritizing primordial loyalties, at a time when any self-respecting representative of Frankfurt's critical traditions ought instead to be coolly analysing winners and losers within a collective "we-group" of Europeans.

Claus Offe

As I write in the early summer of 2013, the philosopher Habermas and the sociologist Streeck are still slugging it out in the glare of the highbrow German media.[6] Other distinguished intellectuals have also contributed, among them sociologist Claus Offe, whose views are of particular interest because he was a *Mitstreiter* of Habermas in developing the original theory of "legitimation crisis" in the 1970s.[7] Offe's bottom line has not changed. He is even more scathing than Habermas and Streeck in his rejection of government by so-called experts, who operate in a different stratosphere from the mechanisms of democracy. Only democratic legitimation can ensure social integration, yet politicians have signally failed to play a constructive role in shaping public opinion. Instead, even the parties of the mainstream have come under electoral pressure to adopt the same nationalist blinkers as those manipulated by extremist, populist elements. Politicians are therefore unable to articulate responsible positions on the truly big issues of our age, such as climate change. Correcting the mistakes made in launching the Eurozone should also have a high priority, but Offe points out that necessary and realistic instruments, such as

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5   Ibid., p. 70.
6   For an early assessment, see T. Asshauer 'Das böse Spiel', in: *Die Zeit*, 16th May, 2013. After I had finished this summary of the first round of contributions, Wolfgang Streeck published a lengthy reply to Habermas's review: 'Vom DM-Nationalismus zum Euro-Patriotismus', in: *Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik* 2013, no. 9, pp. 75-92. In essence, Streeck restated his main arguments, refuted accusations of "nostalgia", and ended by stressing that his proposals concerning nation-states were intended as "subversive Notbehilf", a means to buy time in this moment of crisis, rather than as a long-term solution to the problem of how to build a democratic postcapitalist political economy. See also the review of Streeck's book by Christoph Deutschmann ('Warum tranken die Pferde nicht?' in: *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 25th September 2013). Like other critics, Deutschmann stresses that regular devaluations do not resolve the problems of states which fail to compete; on the contrary, such a system serves the interests of banks and hedge-funds rather than those of ordinary citizens.
7   C. Offe, 'Europa in der Falle', in: *Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik* 2013, no. 1, pp. 67-80. I have also drawn on an expanded English version, Europe Entrapped', forthcoming 2013, *European Law Journal* and thank Claus Offe for making this available to me

the creation of Eurobonds, are still widely perceived in Germany as disinterested "charity". He argues that large-scale transfers from north to south should be seen in terms of a *solidarity* that is beneficial to all. Unfortunately, such proposals only gain credence when actors are finally persuaded that it is in their *selfish* interest to adopt them. Germany is the country under the strongest moral obligation to break this deadlock, because it is the country which has profited most from the *Geburtsfehler* of the Euro.

Like Habermas, Claus Offe follows much of Streeck's economic analysis. He too is appalled by the power of the markets and the "obscenity" that banks bailed out by taxpayers (because they are considered "too big to fail") can ultimately accumulate private profits from the financial crisis they helped to bring about. Offe too argues that a return to national currencies in the south would do nothing to solve the problems, since the recalibration of existing Euro debt would still leave countries such as Greece and Italy with an impossible task. He pours cold water on the notion that much-heralded "austerity" measures can lead to the desired goals. Even if some nominal productivity gains are registered, this "poisonous medicine" will lead to further decline in GDP and catastrophic levels of unemployment. This leads Offe to address sociological distinctions between "winners" and "losers" and aspects of class. The crisis-management policies of Chancellor Merkel are, in his view, making an already grave situation worse, and not only in the basket cases of the south. Offe therefore asks why it is not possible to persuade a German voter whose job is constantly in jeopardy that he (or more likely she) has more in common with a similarly vulnerable worker in Spain or Portugal than with a compatriot fortunate enough to hold *Beamter* status.

This is reminiscent of Habermas, whereas Streeck points out that it is in the nature of the crisis to impede such understandings. As Offe himself notes, there is plenty of evidence from the Mediterranean to justify the concerns of the German popular media. *Some* Greek citizens really do enjoy more wealth and more security than the vast majority of Germans; much of the Italian state really is less transparent than its German counterpart. Beyond the easy diagnoses of corruption in the south, Offe points out that nowadays all states are limited in their capacity to deal with the super-rich, and pleads for more effective harmonization of tax regimes, and government capacity in general, to remedy this state of affairs.

The second, deeper factor which mitigates against the formation of pan-European class alliances brings us back to the issue of cultural identity. Offe suggests that a strong supranational agency might actually offer some protection for cultural diversity against the homogenizing forces of economic globalization. He emphasizes the importance of language as an impediment to the mobility of labour within Europe: while capital is "speechless", the European Union has the task of building a cohesive society on the basis of 23 officially recognized languages. For an economist who is professionally blind to the dimension of collective identities, labour mobility is the obvious solution to all the structural problems. Norman Tebbit, industry minister under Margaret Thatcher, famously urged the British unemployed to "get on your bike" and go in search of work; but this advice did not do much to resolve the structural problems of regions such as South Wales, even

though everyone here is fluent in the national language. Since then, in the decades of neoliberalism millions of Europeans have migrated across linguistic boundaries in search of work. The unskilled and low-skilled unemployed of Euroland must seek their fortune in competition with the surplus labour, legal as well as illegal, of the former socialist east. Claus Offe is obviously right that in many segments of the labour market, mobility is hardly realistic: it may be feasible to train and re-train many IT staff and engineers, but in recent years the German press has also reported poignant stories of failure, such as the Spanish optician who was simply unable to cope with the dialects in rural Bavaria where his services were sorely needed.

A higher level of parochialism?

So far I have sought to convey the central themes of an important debate without evalu-ating these arguments and engaging critically with any of the leading participants. Many German readers of these contributions will find each author convincing in his own way, irrespective of the reader's generation (Habermas has some barbed comments on those members of the generation of 1968 who have long switched allegiances and sold out to the libertarian freedoms promised by the neoliberal order). Habermas's proposed "joint government", reconciling national citizenship with European citizenship, seems ethically unimpeachable. But how realistic is this blueprint in the world of Draghi and Monti, not to mention Barroso, Cameron, Hollande and Merkel, in the world of *Realpolitik*? Here most readers will feel that the sociologist Streeck has his finger on the pulse. The identities about which he writes are fictive constructions, but they are perceived to be otherwise. Their strength has to be recognised, and is not to be brushed aside by ratio-nalist philosophy. Habermas and Offe deny that a return to the nation-state could serve progressive interests. The latter puts forward pragmatic suggestions for action, e.g. to restore the force of progressive taxation and constrain spiralling *Gini* coefficients of social inequality. Yet in some respects his is the most pessimistic diagnosis, both economically and politically. Offe concludes that only further mass protests from the (class-based) losers of the present convulsions can spur Europe's elites to genuine far-sighted reform; yet given the strength of the alliance between nation-focused politicians and parasitical multi-national technocrats, this seems to be little more than a pious hope.

What might far-sighted reform mean? All the main protagonists engage with the life-worlds of contemporary European populations. No one has the temerity to postulate a non-capitalist future for them. It is taken for granted that "the markets", in particular the unrestricted movement of capital, are here to stay. True, Wolfgang Streeck has re-course to radical rhetoric. One sometimes has the impression that he believes in the old Marxist dictum of the falling profit rate and the inevitability of the revolution. But the demise that has been postponed so often already is still not definitively upon us: Streeck is morbidly resigned to more ingenious manoeuvres ahead. All authors are disturbed by the dramatic increases in social inequality of recent decades, indeed this is an ultimate

value which they share. But they differ in how solidarity can be repaired. For Habermas and Offe, the solution lies in transfer payments in a democratically legitimated union with more central powers than anything witnessed hitherto. This is a "deepening" in the vocabulary of Habermas and a "rebuilding" in that of Offe, but the principle is the same. For Streeck, the democratic answer can only be to give weaker members back the autonomy to implement for themselves the policies that might eventually rescue them from historic backwardness and lack of competitiveness. Behind this striking policy difference lie more subtle differences in the evaluation of evolved collective identities. However, it should be stressed that Streeck's invocation of the nation has nothing in common with the demagogy of the British debates over the years. (If he lived in Britain and were exposed to the message of the UKIP, he might be inclined to rethink the emphasis he places on *gewachsene* communities.)

Compared with Britain, then, this debate in Germany is sophisticated and genuinely European. It soars above the level of Tony Benn's opposition to Europe in the 1970s, in which socialist principles were constantly muddled with Little England attitudes. The reasons why Germans are more disposed than others to think and theorise responsibly at the European level are well known and have to do both with *gewachsene* history and with Germany's contemporary economic domination. The rest of us can only look on with respect and admiration. And yet, there is something in the way this debate is unfolding which continues to smack of parochialism, albeit a higher form of parochialism than the British debate. Habermas accuses Streeck of falling back on the "nostalgic option" of the sovereign nation-state, but the Habermasian perspective on the old continent is open to a similar objection. He has a few sharp words about David Cameron, the heir to Margaret Thatcher, busy encouraging Mrs Merkel to dismantle the *Sozialstaat* for the sake of competitiveness and flexibility. But Habermas and Claus Offe are silent about eastern and northern European countries which remain outside the Eurozone. The Europe they really want to strengthen is defined by the boundaries of the Euro. Beyond Euroland, the European Union is simply the only show in town. Claus Offe argues that, for all its imperfections, the "soft" power of the EU to cajole and even to shame deviant members (such as Viktor Orbán's Hungary) makes it a force for peace and civility, the envy of the rest of the world. Wolfgang Streeck is less impressed by the political workings of any existing multinational institutions, but his argument plays out within the same framework. I want to suggest that this framework is too restricted in the light of global political economy. For all three protagonists, Europe's East-West polarity which lasted well into the post-Cold War era, has now been supplanted by a North-South polarity. But it seems to me that these distinguished German scholars write from the perspective of the broad Rhine, with a hint of nostalgia for the era when Rheinland capitalism defined the continent and democratic legitimation meant, first, refining the national institutions of the Bonner Republik and second, consolidating the long-term reconciliation with western neighbours at a new level. They are less interested in the *Blickwinkel* from the smaller Spree, or the tiny Isar – and none of them engage with those regions to the east of Passau through which the mighty Danube meanders on its course to the Black Sea.

Europe and Eurasia

Jürgen Habermas would perhaps concede that the "common European effort"[8] he urges is predicated on a notion of Europe that is hard to pin down and ultimately contingent. Europe has had various different meanings in the course of his own lifetime. But the way he and Claus Offe generalise about a distinctive continent is redolent of the same primordialist illusions which Habermas imputes to Wolfgang Streeck. Habermas and Offe do not consider the implications of their argumentation for countries outside the Eurozone, let alone for those outside the present EU altogether, but whose civilizational traditions bind them closely to the Western Christian core which they privilege. I have in mind large countries such as Russia, Turkey and Ukraine as well as numerous smaller ones.

The problems inherent in defining Europe's eastern boundary are well known. This is one of the main reasons to be suspicious of all attempts to contrast Europe and Asia as equivalent "continental" entities, from the Ancient Greeks to the Cultural Commissars in Brussels today. Comparative historians have shown that it makes much more sense to approach Europe as one of perhaps six or seven macro-regions of the world's largest landmass.[9] In the light of the economic indicators of recent decades, it is particularly instructive to compare the macro-region of Europe with the macro-region called China. None of the authors I have discussed mention China in their recent contributions, but they may well have this country in mind when they highlight the socio-cultural and linguistic diversity of Europe. Even on the most generous definition of the latter, China has more than twice as many citizens. Yet, despite the demography, China appears to have developed a degree of political and economic cohesion and solidarity that the other end of Eurasia can only envy.

Can the currently unfolding transfer of economic hegemony from the North Atlantic to the Far East be related to these *gewachsene* advantages of the Middle Kingdom? China managed to evolve complex divisions of labour over a vast territory without experiencing the political fragmentation of post-Roman Europe (crypto-colonialism at the hands of Britain in the nineteenth century and continuing divisions in the twentieth century had little impact on the idea of state – or civilizational – continuity). However, a glance at a map of the languages and religions of China shows that this Chinese state was an empire, hardly any less diverse socio-culturally than the European macro-region. The unifying characters of the script were pronounced quite differently from region to region. Large territories in the west, notably Tibet and Xinjiang, are still characterised to this day by language families and religions as different as those which divide Europeans. The Turkic-speaking Muslim Uyghurs face enormous barriers when they move outside their Autonomous Region, because very few of them are able to communicate fluently in Mandarin.

8   Habermas, Demokratie oder Kapitalismus? (2), p. 65.
9   For example: E. Farmer, D. Kopf, B. Marshall, G. Hambly, and R. Taylor, Comparative History of Civilizations in Asia, Boulder 1986, 2 vols.

China is a country in flux and much has changed in recent decades. The whole world knows about the decentralization and market-oriented reforms in the coastal provinces of the East that have lifted hundreds of millions of peasants out of their previous poverty. There is less awareness of the fact that this development has generated social inequalities reminiscent of the pre-Mao era. However, the state has acknowledged the need to address the undesirable consequences of China's variant of neoliberalism. The "Develop the West" programme has been implemented since 2000 with the ostensible goal of reducing regional disparities by improving infrastructure and generating new commercial opportunities in regions such as Tibet and Xinjiang. Major investments have been accompanied by the large-scale migration of ethnic Han into regions previously populated primarily by "national minorities". As Habermas argues for contemporary Europe, such investments seldom eliminate longstanding differences in local *Lebensformen*. Development campaigns may actually generate new differences, as anthropologists have documented in their studies of the consequences of globalization all over the world. But what happens if modernization is accompanied by heavy immigration on the part of the dominant majority, and there is little or no intermarriage with the minority? The problems become even more serious when pressure is put on the minorities to give up their own educational institutions and adopt the language and habits of the majority. They are told that this is in their own interests if they wish to have equal chances on an increasingly competitive national labour market, which for the first time in the history of Chinese civilization is being made congruent with the boundaries of the state. There is no exact parallel in Europe but it is almost as if Germans were moving en masse into Greece (or Denmark, or Hungary), investing and buying up everything of value, and requiring local populations to learn German to boot. In this way, neoliberalism with Chinese characteristics is flattening the socio-cultural diversity that evolved in all previous phases of this macro-region. This is far more dramatic than the "convergence" policies criticised by Wolfgang Streeck in neoliberal Europe. As John A. Hall has recently summed up, "… it is likely that China has the capacity to create a homogenous nation-state, unpleasant though it is to admit this."[10]

The contrast could hardly be greater. In Western Eurasia, sociocultural diversity is reflected (albeit imperfectly thanks to the vagaries of history) in political fragmentation. The result is a seemingly insuperable obstacle to attempts to control neoliberal markets through a democratically legitimated European Union. In Eastern Eurasia, Communist power holders can rule over a much larger population without needing to trouble themselves unduly about acknowledging its socio-cultural diversity (though this is skilfully manipulated in the realm of folklore, deemed to be harmless). The strategy so far has been remarkably successful, at least according to the standard economic indicators. Even if growth rates decline from the levels of the last three decades, economist Danny Quah

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10   J. A. Hall, The Importance of Being Civil, Princeton 2013, pp. 253-4. Few experts on Tibet and Xinjiang would give this sociologist's prediction credence at present, but the situation is undoubtedly changing rapidly in both regions.

sees no reason to expect China's inexorable rise to peter out in the foreseeable future.[11] Ironically, German exports to China continue to continue to grow dynamically, contributing to the transformation of consumption there, but also to the success of Germany in robustly weathering the present crisis in Europe and, indirectly, to the misfortunes of her Euroland partners. (Britain, by contrast, produces nothing that Chinese wish to consume and must content itself with luring tourists and ever younger students, the children of Communist technocrats who can afford to send them west to improve their language skills.)

Against this background, the polemics between Streeck and Habermas begin to seem a trifle parochial. No enhancing of democratic institutions in Brussels (or in Athens) is going to have much impact on the shift of power that is taking place from West to East. In any case, there is not the slightest sign that the path urged by Habermas and Offe can be followed. On the contrary, these committed Europeanists will surely have been disappointed by the latest G8 summit meeting in Northern Ireland, in June 2013. The main outcome of this gathering, in which China plays no role, was a new initiative to consolidate a single market with North American capitalism. Germany still shows no sign of living up to its responsibilities in terms of using its export surpluses to support new forms of solidarity. On the contrary, as the federal elections of September 2013 draw near, a liberal party determined to stay in power has declared itself unwilling to maintain the established Solidarity pact to support the country's reunification. Meanwhile, Hungary continues to take EU funding wherever it can while blithely ignoring (and covertly despising) the "soft" reprimands it receives from time to time from Brussels and Strasbourg. There is a more or less latent moral dimension in all the contributions that I have been discussing; but can anyone really argue that the bickering, beggar-my-neighbour political relations of the European macro-region are morally superior to the single-party aggressive developmentalism which is transforming China?

Habermas and other critics of Streeck argue that it is unrealistic to think of replacing the Euro by a return to nation-state currencies. For his part, Streeck alleges that it is unrealistic to imagine that the leaders of fractions in the European Parliament could ever attain the democratic legitimacy of national politicians. He is surely right to point out that the *gewachsene* irrationalities of present EU institutions are a formidable barrier to reform. If every realistic scenario seems so bleak, perhaps it is time to take utopian scenarios seriously. Might it be conceivable for European actors, old and new Europe together, to initiate both a new single market and the political institutions to control it *for the entire landmass of Eurasia*? Why not plan new forms of governance to unite *all* the macroregions. The aim would be to create a political and economic union, symbolised by a new single currency, which would be capable of implementing comparable standards of labour law and welfare entitlements as well as bringing capital flows under control once more. No conceivable reform of European institutions or G8 initiatives can achieve

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11   D. Quah, The global economy's shifting centre of gravity, in: Global Policy (2) 2011, no 1, pp. 3-9.

these basic goals. Beijing would be unlikely to agree that the new entity should have its capital in Brussels. After protracted wrangling, we might imagine Astana emerging as the new geopolitical and parliamentary centre (after Tashkent and Teheran withdraw their applications late in the day). The Habermasian model of dual citizenship would have to be replaced for a transitional period by a model which allowed for three levels. The philosopher would be able to retain his identities as German and as European, but like every other citizen of the landmass his primary constitutional allegiance henceforth would be to *Eurasia*.

As for identity in the old-fashioned, irrational sense, sometimes termed ethnicity, this would increasingly be confined to other registers. It would gradually lose all lingering political relevance, because everyone would reach accord on the need to respect these legacies from the pre-rational age. Thus Uyghur identity would be celebrated in Urumchi and Tibetan in Lhasa, on a par with German by the Spree, English by the Thames, and Welsh by the Taff. The new Eurasian arrangements would eradicate the evolved political anomalies of Luxemburg, Malta and the two thirds of Cyprus which are presently considered "sovereign" members of the EU, while allowing the inhabitants of these places to commemorate their traditions in whatever ways they see fit. The same would apply to peoples such as the Catalans and the Scots, not to mention Kurds and myriad "stateless peoples" scattered across all the macro-regions of Eurasia.

Recognition of all these identities in the domain of heritage would be the easy part: Beijing and Brussels both have plenty of experience of "cultural management" and submitting nominations for UNESCO lists. We could expect more troublesome negotiations in almost every corner of the Eurasian landmass when it comes to connecting these collective identities with politics and law, with educational, language, religion and labour market policies. Clause I of the new Eurasian Constitution would guarantee the institutions necessary to safeguard the status of all established local and regional groups or peoples. What would this mean in practice? It could mean, for example, that Han Chinese wishing to work in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region would have to respect more Islamic religious holidays and demonstrate some level of familiarity with the Uyghur Turkic language, notwithstanding the fact that Mandarin would doubtless remain the lingua franca for most economic activities throughout the macro-region China. The children of immigrant Han would be required to learn Uyghur at school in Urumchi, even if they might prefer to learn English for reasons of career mobility. Such measures, unthinkable at present, would cause raised eyebrows in Beijing in this utopian future. However, English-born civil servants wishing to take jobs in my home town of Cardiff have learned to live with similar constraints – either they are accepted, or members of the more powerful group must refrain from applying for jobs in this region. Han Chinese indignation in the case of Xinjiang might be assuaged by the fact that their language will increasingly replace English as the first foreign language in schools throughout the landmass.

China would have other incentives to sign up to the institutions of this imagined Eurasia. Despite the rapid expansion of its economy, which will eventually dwarf that of the USA, infrastructure and living standards in most parts of China remain poorly developed in

comparison with those of western Eurasia, and in particular the European Union. For many years, China could therefore expect to be a net beneficiary of the kind of transfer payments that Habermas and Offe envisage within Euroland. In this way, the protection of socio-cultural diversity would be rendered compatible with regional equalization. Of course, a host of further policies would be necessary to control the divisive impacts of the Eurasian single market. The mythology of endless growth will have to be exposed and rejected. At the same time, the positive impacts of economic union and voluntary mobility should not be underestimated. In place of an undignified transfer of economic power from West to East, accompanied by the continued attrition of *gewachsene* identities as well as by exploding *Gini* coefficients, the new Eurasian order I am postulating should appeal to all three of the scholars whose work I have discussed. It would provide a platform for responsible politicians to raise the level of debate to address the burning issues facing our species on this planet. With a bit of luck, the new constitutional arrangements could be put in place within a decade or two, before existing European supra-state mechanisms fall apart due to their continuing legitimation problems (the proximate cause might be inability to reach agreement on the Turkey question, or on whether or not to admit EU member Kosovo to the Eurozone). Let us be optimistic and imagine this momentous occasion in the history of the landmass being celebrated at an inaugural convention on 18th June 2029, the centenary of the birth of Jürgen Habermas. Profoundly moved by this contingency, the assembled statesmen and stateswomen would unanimously agree to proclaim Habermas Day a public holiday for all citizens of the new legal construction, Eurasia.

Conclusion

Wolfgang Streeck's radical analysis of contemporary capitalism needs to be augmented by a cosmopolitan vision of world society which is much broader than the European *Perspektivenwechsel* suggested by Jürgen Habermas and Claus Offe. Is my own suggested shift of perspective to Eurasia simply absurd? Well, perhaps, but when the contradictions between capitalism and democracy have become so entrenched, and when collegial jousting between the knights of the Left leaves no clear victor, it is high time to risk a real *Flucht nach vorne*. To focus on the Old World as I have is not entirely arbitrary. Habermas and Offe (without ever making it explicit) take Europe as a *gewachsene* historical entity at a level higher than the identities highlighted by Wolfgang Streeck. Historians, archaeologists and anthropologists have made the case for considering Eurasia as just such an entity at a still higher level, at least since the Axial Age, and arguably since even earlier urban revolutions of the late Bronze Age.[12] Eurasian identity may be even less likely to capture the hearts of the masses than European identity. But it is not my purpose to argue for a Eurasian "we-group". The point of this implausible experiment was to

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12   J. Goody, The Eurasian Miracle, Cambridge 2010.

place the current German debate in a wider context. The widest context known to me is the need over many thousands of years of complex economies to control "the market(s)" in the interests of human flourishing. On this most fundamental issue, the pan-Eurasian consensus between Aristotle and Confucius prefigures the basic consensus between Streeck, Habermas and Offe – an agreement which overshadows all their differences.

Despite this impressive pedigree (from the Axial Age to the Frankfurt School!), we should hope that the era of Eurasian governance will remain short. It will give way to the first genuine *Weltgesellschaft*. Like its predecessor, this entity will have to be introduced cautiously, allowing for a transitional period in which other, lower levels of citizenship continue to play some role in the legitimation process. With just a little bit of luck, following the final collapse of the Hayek Tea Party in Washington, the new world society could be inaugurated on Habermas Day 2129, the 200th anniversary of the birth of the great philosopher.

Aufstieg und Niedergang des kapitalistischen Weltsystems. Der Sechs-Bücher-Plan von Hartmut Elsenhans als Gegenentwurf zu Marx und Wallerstein

Ulrich Menzel

Am 2. April 1858 schrieb Karl Marx aus London einen Brief an den "Dear Frederick" in Manchester, in dem er seinen berühmten Sechs-Bücher-Plan skizzierte, der sein Lebenswerk werden sollte.[1] Die Titel der 6 geplanten Bücher lauteten: 1. Vom Kapital; 2. Grundeigentum; 3. Lohnarbeit; 4. Staat; 5. Internationaler Handel; 6. Weltmarkt. Marx entwirft hier eine systematische Gliederung zur Erklärung der Welt, die in seinem Verständnis eine kapitalistische ist bzw. werden wird. Er geht aus vom Abstrakten, dem Kapital im Allgemeinen, und endet beim Weltmarkt. Heute würde man von Globalisierung sprechen. Nachdem der Kapitalismus die ganze Welt durchdrungen hat, sind in seinem dialektischen Verständnis die Voraussetzungen zu dessen krisenbedingtem Untergang und für eine lichte sozialistische Zukunft geschaffen. Bekanntlich hat Marx zwar viele Vorstudien und Fragmente (Grundrisse) zur Realisierung seines Plans verfasst, aber nur den **ersten** Band von Buch 1 tatsächlich vollendet und damit, wenn man so will, nur ein Achtzehntel des geplanten Gesamtwerks. Engels hat immerhin aus den im Nachlass gefundenen Fragmenten mit den Bänden 2 und 3 des ersten Buchs zwei weitere Achtzehntel „rekonstruiert", wie man heute sagt.

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1   Marx Engels Werke, Bd. 29, S. 311-318.

Immanuel Wallerstein, einer der vielen Großtheoretiker in der Tradition von Marx, hat ebenfalls einen Sechs-Bücher-Plan konzipiert und ist bei dessen Realisierung bislang sehr viel weiter vorangekommen, auch wenn sein Plan im Verlauf der Arbeit mehrere nicht unwesentliche Änderungen erfahren hat. In der Einleitung zu Band 1 seines Hauptwerks „The Modern World System" formuliert Wallerstein 1974 einen Vier Bücher-Plan, der, anders als bei Marx, keiner systematischen, sondern einer chronologischen Ordnung folgt, obwohl er beansprucht, dass der Chronologie eine Systematik zugrunde liegt. Die vier Bände sollen die Zeiträume 1450–1640, 1640–1815, 1815–1917 und 1917 bis zur Gegenwart abdecken und sich danach unterscheiden, ob es sich um expansive oder kontraktive Phasen des modernen Weltsystems handelt.[2] Der geplante Auftakt für Band 4 deutet darauf hin, dass Wallerstein damals die Oktoberrevolution als den Beginn des Niedergangs des modernen Weltsystems verortet hat. Er folgt Marx demnach in mehrfacher Hinsicht: Der Kapitalismus ist in der Lage, sukzessive die gesamte Welt zu transformieren, bis das kapitalistische durch ein sozialistisches Weltsystem abgelöst wird. Die bei Marx ambivalent belassene Frage, wodurch denn die ursprüngliche Akkumulation als Vorbedingung für Kapitalismus geleistet wird, intern durch die Einhegungsbewegung und die Vertreibung der bäuerlichen Unterschicht vom Land oder durch die Fernhandelsgewinne, insbesondere aus den Kolonien, wird bei Wallerstein ganz eindeutig im Sinne des externen Beitrags beantwortet, setzt er den Beginn des „modernen Weltsystems" doch mit der Herausbildung der internationalen Arbeitsteilung Mitte des 15. Jahrhunderts gleich.

Im zweiten Band (1980 erschienen) verändert Wallerstein seine Periodisierung, indem er die Expansions- und Kontraktionsphasen sich zeitlich überlappend auffasst. Mit Erscheinen des 4. Bandes (2011) wird im Vorwort „On Writing about the Modern World System" der Vier Bücher- zu einem Sechs-Bücher-Plan erweitert: Band 1 (1450–1640); Band 2 (1600–1750); Band 3 (1730–1840er Jahre); Band 4 (1789–1914); Band 5 (1873–1968/89); Band 6 (1945/68–ca. 2050).[3] Ob es dabei bleibt, wird man sehen. Offensichtlich ist die kurz nach Erscheinen des 3. Bandes (1989) erfolgte epochale Zeitwende der Jahre 1989/90 der Anlass gewesen, den Beginn des Niedergangs von 1917 in eine ferne Zukunft zu verlegen, womöglich ihn ganz aufzugeben. Wallerstein unterscheidet sich also von Marx nicht nur darin, dass er statt eines systematischen ein chronologisches Gliederungsprinzip verfolgt, sondern auch darin, dass er der Analyse des Zirkulationsprozesses des Kapitals auf globaler Ebene Vorrang vor der Analyse von dessen Produktionsprozess auf nationaler Ebene (England) einräumt. Ob er ähnlich wie der späte Marx skeptisch wird, ob der Kapitalismus auf revolutionäre oder auf evolutionäre Weise in Richtung Sozialismus transformiert wird, wird man sehen, wenn der 6. Band erschienen ist.

Kommen wir zu Hartmut Elsenhans, der, wie es sich offenbar für einen Großtheoretiker gehört, auch seinen Sechs-Bücher-Plan zur Analyse von „Aufstieg und Niedergang

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2   Immanuel Wallerstein, The Modern World System. Bd. 1, New York 1974, S. 10 f.
3   Immanuel Wallerstein, The Modern World System. Bd. 4, Berkeley 2011, S. XI-XVII.

des Weltsystems" vorgelegt hat.[4] Die sechs Bände tragen Arbeitstitel, die bereits eine Inhaltsangabe in Stichpunkten darstellen: (1) Vorkapitalistische Produktionsweisen und die Blockierung des Übergangs zum Kapitalismus; (2) Kapitalismus als Ergebnis des Kampfs von Unterschichten gegen Rente und Ausbeutung. Industrielle Revolution als Folge der Herausbildung des inneren Massenmarkts; (3) Kapitalismus ist expansiv, aber nicht ansteckend: Expansion des europäischen Kapitalismus oder Expansion des europäischen Staatensystems in der zweiten Welle des Kolonialismus und Imperialismus im 19. Jahrhundert; (4) Gefährdung von Kapitalismus durch Schwächung von Arbeit: Die Weltwirtschaftskrise der 30er Jahre als Ausdruck der Verschärfung unterkonsumtiver Tendenzen bei wachsender Produktivität und die politische Bedrohung des Kapitalismus: Sieg des Kapitalismus wegen politischer Erschütterung durch den Faschismus und wegen ökonomischer Herausforderung durch den „real existierenden Sozialismus"; (5) Der Widerstand der unterentwickelten Welt: Erfolg bei den Renten aber Scheitern bei der Generierung von Grundlagen kapitalistischen Wachstums; (6) Die Globalisierung von Rente gegen die Globalisierung von Profit.

Wäre der Leser so belesen wie Elsenhans, wäre ihm allein bei der Lektüre dieser Stichpunkte bereits der komplette Argumentationsgang inklusive der Auseinandersetzung mit den wichtigsten Gegenargumenten klar. Methodisch verfolgt Elsenhans eine Synthese des Marxschen- und des Wallersteinschen Sechs-Bücher-Plans. Die Überschriften lassen zwar auf eine systematische Gliederung schließen, sind aber zugleich historisch angelegt, nur dass Elsenhans nicht im 15. Jahrhundert wie Wallerstein, sondern wie Marx erst mit der Industriellen Revolution im letzten Viertel des 18. Jahrhunderts einsetzt. Der erste Band sieht eine Analyse vorkapitalistischer Gesellschaften und der ihnen inhärenten Entwicklungsblockaden vor, die Elsenhans nicht ins Mittelalter oder noch weiter zurückverlegt und die in seinem Verständnis trotz internationaler Arbeitsteilung bis heute Bestand haben. Der 6. Band will den Niedergang des Kapitalismus ausgerechnet ins „Zeitalter der Globalisierung" verorten, nicht weil er, wie bei Marx und Wallerstein, an seinen inneren Widersprüchen und Krisen zugrunde geht, sondern weil er gerade nicht in der Lage ist, die gesamte Welt „durchzukapitalisieren". Stattdessen obsiegt das Beharrungsvermögen vorkapitalistischer Gesellschaftssysteme und damit die Vormoderne – ein fast schon paradoxes Ergebnis der Emanzipationsbestrebungen der ehemaligen Kolonien. Durchsetzung des Kapitalismus im Weltmaßstab und Globalisierung sind demzufolge für Elsenhans keine Synonyme. Internationale Arbeitsteilung muss nicht zwangsläufig zu Kapitalismus, zur Dominanz der Logik des Profits, sondern kann auch zur Globalisierung von alternativen Einkommen führen, die von Elsenhans in der Tradition von Ricardo als Renten bezeichnet werden. Sein Gliederungsschema folgt weder einer abstrakten Systematik (Marx), noch einer historischen Periodisierung bis zum krisenhaften Ende (Wallerstein), weil, nachdem der Kapitalismus alles durchdrungen hat, eine weitere Expansion nicht mehr möglich ist, sondern orientiert sich an den Etappen des wechsel-

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4   Aufstieg und Niedergang des kapitalistischen Weltsystems. Eine politische Ökonomie der Moderne. Disposition für ein Taschenbuch und für ein in 5 Bände zu gliederndes großes Werk. MS Leipzig 2008. 135 S.

vollen „Kampfs zweier Systeme", die durch die Logik des Profits und die Logik der Rente bestimmt werden. Am Ende steht bei Elsenhans nicht die vollständige „Durchkapitalisierung" der Welt, sondern deren Scheitern.

Trotz aller Parallelen zu Marx und Wallerstein bezieht er damit provokante Gegenpositionen, wobei letzterer nicht nur der heimliche, sondern der explizite Antipode ist, wie sich aus beider metatheoretischen Begleittexten herauslesen lässt.[5] Kapitalismus durchläuft bei Elsenhans zwar auch eine Aufstiegs- und Niedergangsphase, doch setzt diese erst etwa 300 Jahre später ein als bei Wallerstein und ist Resultat der Transformation des auf der Grundrente basierenden westeuropäischen Feudalismus im Zuge der Industriellen Revolution. Kapitalismus ist derzeit zwar dominant im „modernen Weltsystem", aber keineswegs in der Lage, die gesamte Welt zu transformieren. Auf seinen Niedergang folgt auch kein sozialistisches, sondern ein rentenbasiertes Weltsystem. Der Aufstieg war nicht das Resultat von Fernhandel und internationaler Arbeitsteilung, von Ressourcentransfers von der Peripherie ins Zentrum wie bei Wallerstein, sondern Resultat einer innergesellschaftlichen Transformation, die zur Verknappung von Arbeitskraft, technischen Innovationen zur Steigerung der Arbeitsproduktivität in Landwirtschaft und Industrie, dem Aufbau von Gegenmacht und der Herausbildung von sich erweiternden Märkten für Massenkonsumgüter geführt hat. Insofern ist für Elsenhans nicht der Zirkulations-, sondern der Produktionsprozess des Kapitals die Ebene, die darüber entscheidet, ob Kapitalismus herrscht oder nicht. Er ist zwar Ökonomist, aber kein Marxist und auch kein Weberianer, sondern Keynesianer und zugleich Ricardianer, einer, der trotz Insistierens auf komparativen Vorteilen, die die internationale Arbeitsteilung bestimmen, eine *internalistische* Erklärung für Globalisierung anbietet. Folglich will er keine Kapitalismuskritik betreiben und Kapitalismus für die Entwicklungsprobleme auf der Welt verantwortlich machen, sondern diesen geradezu verteidigen. Entwicklungsprobleme sind das Resultat von ausbleibendem, mindestens von zu wenig Kapitalismus. Damit entpuppt sich Elsenhans als Modernisierungstheoretiker mit Berührungspunkten zum Neoliberalismus. Der Marx der Indien-Schriften lässt grüßen, der die fortschrittsfördernde britische Kolonialpolitik pries, die dort im 19. Jahrhundert in der Lage gewesen sei, die Wurzeln des orientalischen Despotismus auszureißen.

Zum Verständnis seiner Thesen ist ein Rückblick auf das Elsenhanssche Gesamtwerk bis Anfang der 1970er Jahre nötig, in dem sich trotz einer kaum überschaubaren Zahl von veröffentlichten und unveröffentlichten Manuskripten nur eine einzige große Revision (wenn überhaupt) in der Argumentation identifizieren lässt. Wir erinnern uns: Die 1970er Jahre waren in der Entwicklungstheorie im Anschluss an Singer/Prebisch die große Zeit von Dependenz-, Weltmarkt- und Weltsystemtheorie, die die bis dahin dominante Modernisierungstheorie weltweit in die Defensive zu drängen vermochte. Elsenhans ist in dieser Zeit akademisch sozialisiert worden und beansprucht deshalb

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5   Immanuel Wallerstein, Wegbeschreibung der Analyse von Weltsystemen, oder: wie vermeidet man, eine Theorie zu werden?, in: Zeitschrift für Weltgeschichte 2 (2001) 2, S. 9-32; Hartmut Elsenhans, Zum Gang der Weltsystemstudien, in: Zeitschrift für Weltgeschichte 2 (2001) 2, S. 35 ff.

auch für sich, Weltsystemtheoretiker zu sein, nur folgt er einer ganz anderen Argumen-tationslogik als der Mainstream im Anschluss an Amin, Arrighi, Frank und Wallerstein, die damals als „Viererbande" bezeichnet wurden.[6]

Ausgangspunkt des Rückblicks muss seine Dissertation von 1974 „Frankreichs Algeri-enkrieg 1954–1962"[7] sein. Auf 908 Druckseiten steuert Elsenhans auf die Frage (und damals vermutlich auch auf die Hoffnung) zu, ob die nach dem Krieg an die Macht gekommene Staatsklasse, die sich aus der Befreiungsbewegung rekrutierte, in Vertretung eines kaum vorhandenen algerischen Unternehmertums in der Lage ist, die Rentenein-kommen aus dem Ölsektor zur Initiierung eines eigenständigen Entwicklungsprozesses zu nutzen, an dem die Masse der Bevölkerung durch steigende Realeinkommen partizi-piert. Die Erfolge der OPEC, die seit 1973 in der Lage war, einen wachsenden Teil der Einkommen aus dem Ölsektor als Renten zu vereinnahmen, hat Elsenhans zu der Hoffnung verleitet, dass sich hier ein Weg nachholender Entwicklung über den Export von Rohstoffen auftut, den die angelsächsischen Siedlerkolonien lange zuvor bereits be-schritten hatten.[8] In diese Frühphase fällt auch die Formulierung der Elsenhansschen Entwicklungstheorie, die entgegen dem damaligen dependenztheoretischen Mainstream nicht auf eine neue Weltwirtschaftsordnung setzt, sondern mit dem Staatsklassen- und Massenkonsumparadigma operiert.[9] Dass diese Hoffnung in Algerien und anderswo sich nicht erfüllt hat, hat womöglich die Revision seines Denkens ausgelöst.

Zweiter Baustein der Elsenhansschen Großtheorie war die Berliner Habilitationsschrift von 1976 „Geschichte und Ökonomie der europäischen Welteroberung", mit der er folgerichtig den Nachweis erbringen wollte, dass nicht der Fernhandel die europäische Welteroberung und dass nicht die Ausbeutung der Kolonien die Entwicklung des Kapita-lismus in Europa ausgelöst und vorangetrieben haben, sondern diverse, vor allem feudale Motive der Expansion zugrunde gelegen haben, so dass die Kolonien nur wenig zur He-rausbildung des Kapitalismus beizutragen vermochten. Entscheidend für die Industrielle Revolution waren vielmehr innergesellschaftliche Transformationsprozesse in Westeuro-pa. 1978 folgte mindestens noch ein zweites unveröffentlichtes Manuskript „Geschichte und Ökonomie der europäischen Welteroberung (4): Die Weltwirtschaftskrise der 30er Jahre und die Wachstumsbedingungen industriekapitalistischer Systeme".[10] Die Zäh-

6 Samin Amin/Giovanni Arrighi/Andre Gunder Frank/Immanuel Wallerstein, Dynamik der globalen Krise, Opladen 1986 (engl. 1982).

7 Frankreichs Algerienkrieg 1954–1962. Entkolonialisierungsversuch einer kapitalistischen Metropole. Zum Zu-sammenbruch der Kolonialreiche, München 1974.

8 Hartmut Elsenhans (Hrsg.), Erdöl für Europa, Hamburg 1974.

9 Vgl. dazu diverse Aufsätze, z.B. Zur Rolle der Staatsklasse bei der Überwindung von Unterentwicklung. In: Alfred Schmidt (Hrsg.), Strategien gegen Unterentwicklung. Zwischen Weltmarkt und Eigenständigkeit, Frankfurt a. M. 1976, S. 250-265; Die Staatsklasse/Staatsbourgeoisie in den unterentwickelten Ländern zwischen Privilegierung und Legitimationszwang. In: Verfassung und Recht in Übersee 10 (1977) 1, S. 29-42; Die Überwindung von Unterentwicklung durch Massenproduktion für Massenbedarf. Weiterentwicklung eines Ansatzes, in: Dieter Nohlen/Franz Nuscheler (Hrsg.), Handbuch der Dritten Welt. Bd. 1, Hamburg 1982, S. 152-182.

10 So ein Hinweis bei Harald Fuhr, Hartmut Elsenhans (*1941). Staatsklassen, Europa und Entwicklungswege, in: Entwicklung und Zusammenarbeit 41 (2000) 7/8, S. 211-214.

lung lässt darauf schließen, dass ein Sechs-Bücher-Plan damals schon bestanden hat und die Habilitationsschrift das erste Buch darstellen sollte.

Dass sie erst 31 Jahre später textgleich erschienen ist und dazu noch eines Herausgebers bedurfte,[11] obwohl hier doch das Gegenparadigma zu Amin[12] und Co. bereits ausgearbeitet vorlag, erklärt sich aus der zwischenzeitlichen (2007?) Änderung des Plans, in dem das ursprüngliche erste Buch keinen Platz mehr hatte, weil es durch die Analyse vorkapitalistischer Produktionsweisen ersetzt worden war und deshalb separat erscheinen konnte. Der Herausgeber, Matthias Middell, begründet das spätere Erscheinen wenig überzeugend mit dem Anlass des 65. Geburtstags des Autors.[13] Von Elsenhans selber veröffentlicht wurde 1979 lediglich eine argumentative Kurzfassung „Grundlagen der Entwicklung der kapitalistischen Weltwirtschaft" im 3. Band der legendären Trilogie von Dieter Senghaas „Kapitalistische Weltökonomie", in der Elsenhans im Kapitel „Positionen" prominent den Beiträgen von Wallerstein und Frank gegenübergestellt wird, sowie eine als „Einleitung", gar als „Versuch" deklarierte Schrift „Abhängiger Kapitalismus oder bürokratische Entwicklungsgesellschaft" (von 1981), deren Literaturverzeichnis allein aus 130 Druckseiten besteht.[14] Danach wendet sich Elsenhans für etwa 20 Jahre anderen Themen, anderen Schauplätzen und fernen Publikationsforen zu, was sich auch biographisch erklären lässt.[15]

Systematisch in einer Buchveröffentlichung wird der rententheoretische bzw. unterkonsumtionistische Ansatz erst 2001 in dem Band „Das Internationale System zwischen Zivilgesellschaft und Rente" und 2006 in dem Band „Globalization Between a Convoy Model and an Underconsumptionist Threat" entfaltet, in denen die zivilisatorischen Wirkung des Kapitalismus den despotischen, auf Renten basierenden, politischen Systemen gegenübergestellt wird.[16] Zeitgleich erscheint auch der zitierte, metatheoretisch angelegte, Aufsatz „Zum Gang der Weltsystemstudien", der sich explizit auf Wallersteins Aufsatz „Wegbeschreibung der Analysen von Weltsystemen" bezieht. 2004 darf Elsenhans seinen Aufsatz sogar auf Englisch in der Wallerstein-Zeitschrift „Review" veröffentlichen,[17] obwohl er ein Paradigma vertritt, das gerade nicht zum Leitbild der Zeitschrift

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11 Herausgegeben und mit einem Vorwort von Matthias Middell. Leipzig 2007.

12 Elsenhans war es auch, der Amin übersetzt und damit dem deutschen Publikum nahe gebracht hat. Vgl. dazu Samir Amin, Die ungleiche Entwicklung. Essay über die Gesellschaftsformationen des peripheren Kapitalismus. Aus dem Französischen von Hildegard und Hartmut Elsenhans, Hamburg 1975.

13 Matthias Middell, Europäischer Kapitalismus und abhängige Entwicklung, in: Elsenhans 2007, S. 11-28.

14 Grundlagen der Entwicklung der kapitalistischen Weltwirtschaft, in: Dieter Senghaas (Hrsg.), Kapitalistische Weltökonomie. Kontroversen über ihren Ursprung und ihre Entwicklungsdynamik, Frankfurt a. M: 1979, S. 103-148; ders., Abhängiger Kapitalismus oder bürokratische Entwicklungsgesellschaft. Versuch über den Staat in der Dritten Welt, Frankfurt a. M. 1981.

15 Zur Biographie vgl. den Artikel Elsenhans, Hartmut. In: Personenlexikon Internationale Beziehungen virtuell. Unter www.pibv.de

16 Hartmut Elsenhans, Das Internationale System zwischen Zivilgesellschaft und Rente. Münster 2001; ders. Globalization Between a Convoy Model and an Underconsumptionist Threat. Münster 2006; vgl. dazu auch den Aufsatz Kapitalismus und Massenkonsum in Comparativ 1 (1992) 2, S. 7-29.

17 Hartmut Elsenhans, On the Development of World-systems Studies, in: Review 28 (2004) 1, S. 1-35.

gehört. Später wird ihm allerdings der Abdruck eines zweiten Aufsatzes verweigert, der stattdessen in einer französischen Zeitschrift erscheint.[18]

Erst nach der Emeritierung bzw. nach dem Erscheinen der Habilitationsschrift (2007) scheint bei Elsenhans der Entschluss gereift, seinem „großen Werk" die endgültige Sechs-Bücher-Form zu geben, die einen Zeitaufwand verlangt, den ein amtierender Ordinarius, selbst wenn er über die eiserne Arbeitsdisziplin eines Elsenhans verfügt, nicht erübrigen kann, hat er doch den schier unglaublichen Anspruch, eine komplette Synthese aller, wirklich *aller*, irgendwie relevanten Veröffentlichungen von Ökonomen, Soziologen, Politologen, Historikern und vor allem Wirtschaftshistorikern zu leisten zur Untermauerung seiner großen Theorie[19], die bislang nur als eine sagenumwobene Menge von Zettelkästen als Ergebnis einer 50-jährigen Lese- und Exzerpierarbeit vorliegt. Zunächst sind zwei im Wesentlichen identisch argumentierende Vorab-Bände entstanden: „The Rise and Demise of the Capitalist World System" (2011) und das besagte „Taschenbuch" „Kapitalismus global"[20] (2012). Beide bilden, da das „große Werk" noch nicht vorliegt, die Grundlage für die folgenden Ausführungen, wobei ich davor warne, Elsenhans wie ein „Taschenbuch" zu lesen, das man zur Lektüre unterwegs in die Tasche gesteckt hat.

Kommen wir zu Elsenhans Paradigma, das auf einer steilen These beruht, die nicht nur Marx und Wallerstein, sondern nahezu die gesamte entwicklungstheoretische Literatur, gleichviel ob modernisierungstheoretischer, dependenztheoretischer, neoliberaler oder bürokratischer Provenienz, vor den Kopf stößt und in Frage stellt: Kapitalismus ist historisch wie aktuell die Ausnahme in der Welt und rentenbasierte politische Systeme sind die Regel. Es ist zwar richtig, hier folgt Elsenhans Wallerstein, dass das gegenwärtige Weltsystem durch Kapitalismus dominiert wird, dieser sei aber nicht in der Lage, die ganze Welt zu durchdringen und schon gar nicht zu transformieren. Da rentenbasierte Systeme wieder auf dem Vormarsch sind, seien die Tage des kapitalistischen Weltsystems gezählt. Der Nord-Süd-Konflikt wird so auf einen Verteilungskonflikt um das weltweite Einkommen zwischen Profit und Rente reduziert.

Um diese These zu begründen, argumentiert Elsenhans wie folgt: Im Kapitalismus herrscht die Logik des Profits, in der übrigen Welt herrscht die Logik der Rente. Profit resultiert aus zuvor getätigten Investitionen und dem Verkauf von Waren, die wettbewerbsfähig sein müssen und der Absatzmärkte bedürfen. Wirtschaftswachstum kann folglich nur auf sich ausweitenden Märkten für Massenkonsumgüter basieren, die wiederum wachsende Realeinkommen bei der Masse der Bevölkerung voraussetzen. Dies geschieht aber nur, wenn Arbeitskraft knapp wird und deshalb der Lohn steigt bzw.

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18   So die persönliche Mitteilung des Autors. Vgl. dazu Hartmut Elsenhans, World System Theory and Keynesian Macroeconomics: Towards an Alternative Explanation of the Rise and Fall of the Capitalist World System, in: Les Cahiers du CREAD Nr. 97, 2011, S. 5-61.

19   Daher sein Aufsatz „Kein Ende der großen Theorie", in: Asien Afrika Lateinamerika 24 (1996) 2, S. 111-146, der als Kritik an Ulrich Menzel, Das Ende der Dritten Welt und das Scheitern der großen Theorie. Frankfurt a. M. 1992 gemeint ist.

20   Hartmut Elsenhans, The Rise and Demise of the Capitalist World System. With a Foreword by Mathias Middell and Heidrun Zinecker, Leipzig 2011; ders., Kapitalismus global. Aufstieg – Grenzen – Risiken, Stuttgart 2012.

wenn Arbeitskräfte in der Lage sind, organisierte Gegenmacht zu bilden, etwa durch Bodenreformen oder freie Gewerkschaften, und so Einkommenssteigerungen politisch durchzusetzen. Dies wiederum setzt Assoziationsfreiheit, also ein demokratisches politisches System, voraus. Die „Unteren", wie sich Elsenhans häufig ausdrückt, müssen gegen die „Oberen" politisch obsiegen. Steigende Arbeitskosten zwingen Unternehmer immer wieder, einen Teil des Profits zu investieren, um laufend die Arbeitsproduktivität zu steigern. Nur so sind sie in der Lage, am Markt wettbewerbsfähig zu bleiben und über den erzielten Produktivitätszuwachs steigende Masseneinkommen zu ermöglichen. Damit lässt Elsenhans sich auf die griffige Formel reduzieren: Kapitalismus verlangt Fordismus. Bleibt der Fordismus aus, kommt es zur Unterkonsumtionskrise und am Ende zum Niedergang des Kapitalismus.

Elsenhans muss deshalb zeigen, dass diese Bedingungen nur in Westeuropa und zu allererst in England Ende des 18. Jahrhunderts aufgrund von Besonderheiten und historischen Zufälligkeiten gegeben waren und damit der in Europa herrschende rentenbasierte Feudalismus (Grundrente) zum Kapitalismus transformiert wurde. Hierzu gehört vermutlich, dass jener im Unterschied zum zentralistischen asiatischen Despotismus ein loses politisches System mit vielen Machtgruppen (Fürsten, Kirche, Orden, freie Städte, Zünfte, Gilden, etc.) war. Gerade die Bedeutung der Existenz freier Städte als Zentren gewerblicher Produktion oder einer Kirche neben dem Staat kann nicht hoch genug gewertet werden. Ein Investiturstreit, ein Bund der Hanse oder eine Ostindische Kompanie ist außerhalb Europas schwer vorstellbar. Insofern manifestiert die Magna Charta den Einstieg in eine politische Entwicklung, die am Ende und nicht zufällig zuerst in England zu Kapitalismus und freiem Unternehmertum geführt hat. Weitere Faktoren waren, dass wichtige Rohstoffe (Wolle, Kohle, Eisenerz) in England ausreichend verfügbar waren, dass die Landwirtschaft auf Regenfall und nicht auf künstlicher Bewässerung beruht, das milde Klima, die Abwanderungsmöglichkeit von Bauern und Rittern in den Ostseeraum oder die Unvereinbarkeit von Christ und Sklave. Die lange Bauzeit der Kathedralen im Vergleich zu orientalischen Palästen wertet Elsenhans als Indikator für ein geringes Mehrprodukt in Europa. Im Zuge der europäischen Siedlungsauswanderung hat sich Kapitalismus unter Zurücklassung des Feudalismus auf einen Teil der „Neuen Welt" ausgedehnt, nicht aber auf Lateinamerika, in das gerade der europäische Feudalismus und die Sklaverei exportiert wurden. Für die Entstehung des Kapitalismus waren weder eine ursprüngliche Akkumulation im Sinne von Marx, noch eine protestantische Ethik im Sinne von Weber, sondern im Sinne von Elsenhans nur Bedingungen notwendig, die steigende Masseneinkommen zur Folge hatten. Insofern ist Elsenhans Keynesianer, Ökonomist und Internalist.

In rentenbasierten Systemen hingegen entstehen Einkommen aus politischer Kontrolle über rententrächtige Ressourcen. Dazu gehört zuallererst der Boden, aber auch die im Boden vorhandenen Rohstoffe wie z. B. Öl oder Gas, der Handel mit lebensnotwendigen Gütern (z. B. Salz) oder der Außenhandel. Wer die Macht hat, ist in der Lage, sich die aus deren Bewirtschaftung resultierenden Einkommen als Renten anzueignen und den Produzenten nur so viel zu belassen, wie zum Lebensunterhalt ausreicht. Heutzutage

lassen sich Renten aus allen Aktivitäten generieren, die zur Schattenseite der Weltwirtschaft (Drogenhandel, Waffenhandel, Schutzgeld, Piraterie, Geldwäsche etc.) gehören. Selbst Entwicklungshilfe oder gar Katastrophenhilfe kann eine Quelle von Rente sein.

Um die Rente zu maximieren und ihr künftiges Aufkommen zu sichern, muss folglich ein Teil anders als im Kapitalismus nicht zur Steigerung der Arbeitsproduktivität, sondern zur Steigerung der politischen Kontrolle in Machtmittel (Leibgarde, Armee, Polizei und rivalisierende Geheimdienste) „investiert" werden. Das Übrige fließt in den Luxuskonsum der Herrschenden, wird gehortet oder für die Bauten der staatlichen Repräsentation aufgewendet, die dazu beitragen sollen, die rentenbasierte Ordnung zu legitimieren. Elsenhans nennt das die Selbstprivilegierung von Staatsklassen. Die Subventionierung des Brotpreises oder anderer Grundnahrungsmittel, heute die Subventionierung von Wasser oder Benzin, dient nur der Schaffung von Massenloyalität. Ansonsten bleiben die Einkommen der Masse der Bevölkerung niedrig, da kein expandierender Markt für Massenkonsumgüter für die Stabilität des Systems notwendig ist. Für Stabilität zu sorgen hat der Machtapparat. Luxusgüter werden ggf. importiert, Massenkonsumgüter, soweit gefertigt, werden exportiert zur Belieferung von kapitalistischen Märkten anderswo, die steigende Masseneinkommen bedienen. Deshalb setzt sich in den ölexportierenden Ländern, selbst in den asiatischen oder lateinamerikanischen Schwellenländern, auch kein Kapitalismus durch.

Die Folge ist eine hohe Konzentration der Einkommen bei denen, die die politische Macht haben, während die breite Masse der Bevölkerung nur über ein Einkommen verfügt, das kaum mehr als die Lebenshaltungskosten deckt. In den Exportsektoren müssen dauerhaft niedrige Löhne gezahlt werden, um in den arbeitsintensiven Branchen konkurrenzfähig zu sein. Sie können gezahlt werden, weil die Lebenshaltungskosten vergleichsweise niedrig sind. Soweit sich kapitalistische Ansätze in Form eines privaten Unternehmertums herausbilden, werden sie von der Bürokratie, bei Elsenhans als Staatsklasse bezeichnet, bekämpft, kontrolliert und reglementiert, um eine Transformation der Gesellschaft in Richtung Kapitalismus zu verhindern wie in Algerien im Anschluss an den Algerienkrieg passiert. So entsteht zwar ein wachsender Markt für Luxusgüter, der früher (etwa im kaiserlichen China) durch besondere handwerkliche Fähigkeiten, heute durch Importe, bedient wird, aber kein Markt für Massenkonsumgüter, der Fordismus, also deren industrielle Fertigung bei steigender Arbeitsproduktivität und steigenden Reallöhnen voraussetzt.

Rentenbasierte Systeme sind also durchaus in der Lage, eine technische und künstlerische Entwicklung in Gang zu setzen, Hochkulturen auszubilden und in der Luxusgüterproduktion im Vergleich zu Europa Spitzenleistungen zu vollbringen, nur führen diese nicht zu Freiheit und Kapitalismus, sondern zu immer elaborierteren Formen von gewaltbasierten Rentenökonomien. Kapitalismus ist deshalb nicht zufällig im gegenüber Asien (Indien und China) rückständigen und bevölkerungsarmen Europa entstanden. Man denke etwa an die Ausbreitung der Pest um 1350, die die europäische Bevölkerung drastisch reduzierte und Arbeitskraft knapp werden ließ. Noch um etwa 1800 dürfte

etwa die Hälfte des Weltsozialprodukts auf Indien und China entfallen sein, bis sich als Folge der Industriellen Revolution die wirtschaftlichen Gewichte verschoben haben.

Was heißt das für die Weltsystemtheorie? Weltsysteme hat es auch schon vor der Herausbildung des Kapitalismus in Europa und vor der europäischen Welteroberung gegeben, nur waren diese nicht kapitalistisch dominiert, sondern rentenbasiert. Man denke nur an das chinesische Tributsystem, das zu Beginn des 15. Jahrhunderts seinen Höhepunkt erreichte und sich bis in das Becken des Indiks erstreckte, etwa 80 Jahre bevor die Portugiesen in der Region aufkreuzten. Wenn aber Kapitalismus sich nicht im Weltmaßstab durchsetzt, sondern auf Westeuropa und die Gebiete europäischer Siedlungsauswanderung (also den „Westen") beschränkt bleibt, kommt es nicht zur Globalisierung des Profits, sondern am Ende zur Globalisierung der Rente. Ersteres würde im Licht des Paradigmas nämlich voraussetzen, dass Arbeitskraft im Weltmaßstab knapp zu werden hat und dass sich Gegenmacht weltweit etabliert, dass weltweit Assoziationsfreiheit herrscht. Damit wäre die Herausbildung eines kapitalistischen Weltsystems nicht das Resultat von Welthandel und internationaler Arbeitsteilung, sondern der globalen Etablierung von Gegenmacht der „Unteren", wie laut Elsenhans in den demokratisch verfassten Gesellschaften des Westens der Fall.

Er muss also in den noch zu publizierenden Büchern zeigen, dass sich weder in den Öl oder andere Rohstoffe exportierenden Ländern, zu denen heute auch wieder Russland gehört, noch in den lateinamerikanischen oder asiatischen Schwellenländern trotz deren Industrialisierung Kapitalismus durchsetzt. Im Hinblick auf China liefert er so zumindest eine Erklärung, warum die Kommunistische Partei die Macht behauptet. Obwohl Elsenhans Weltsystemtheoretiker sein will, ist er paradoxerweise radikaler Internalist. Wenn Kapitalismus aber nicht in der Lage ist, die gesamte Welt zu einem sich erweiternden Massenmarkt zu machen, dann ist sein zukünftiger Niedergang vorgezeichnet. Die aus der Logik des Kapitalismus zwingende erweiterte Reproduktion stößt irgendwann an eine Grenze. Je mehr Einkommen weltweit die Gestalt von Renten annehmen, desto weniger bleibt für steigende Masseneinkommen. Der Kapitalismus scheitert an einer Unterkonsumtion im Weltmaßstab. In einer rentenbasierten Weltwirtschaft ist nicht die überlegene Wettbewerbsfähigkeit, sondern politische Macht die entscheidende Variable. So wie die vielen Konflikte in den Ländern des Südens sich als Konflikte um den Zugriff auf Renten interpretieren lassen, müssen im Licht des Elsenhansschen Paradigmas künftige internationale Konflikte als Konflikte um die weltweite Verteilung der Renten interpretiert werden, frei nach dem Motto: „Ölmultis versus Ölscheichs".

Was hat dies alles mit Ricardo zu tun? Elsenhans folgt Ricardo insofern, als er die nicht zu leugnenden Industrialisierungsprozesse in nichtwestlichen Gesellschaften ricardianisch erklärt. Branchen werden ausgelagert, wenn anderswo komparative Vorteile, etwa bei arbeitsintensiven Produkten, gegeben sind. Bei Ricardo können alle aus der internationalen Arbeitsteilung einen Vorteil ziehen, bei Elsenhans nicht. Für den komparativen Vorteil zählen nur die niedrigen Arbeitskosten, die im kapitalistischen Westen nicht für den Lebensunterhalt ausreichen. Im rentenbasierten Süden reichen sie aber aus, da dort die Lebenshaltungskosten viel niedriger sind als im Absatzland der Waren. Nur so ist er-

klärbar, dass sich etwa in Bangladesh Arbeitskräfte für die Exportindustrie finden. Internationale Arbeitskosten messen den Preis von Arbeit in konvertierbaren Währungen. Insofern sind die Wechselkurse entscheidend, die nicht notwendig die Kaufkraftparitäten widerspiegeln. Auf diesem Unterschied zwischen niedrigen Arbeitskosten und niedrigen Reallöhnen hingewiesen zu haben, ist sicher ein Verdienst von Elsenhans. Ein Land wie China würde im Sinne seiner Theorie erst kapitalistisch, wenn dort Arbeitskraft knapp wird und sich freie Gewerkschaften bilden könnten. Beides ist angesichts von 1,4 Mrd. Menschen, einer unerschöpflichen Reservearmee und einer Kommunistischen Partei an der Macht nur schwer vorstellbar.

Noch eine Nachbemerkung: Jeder Elsenhans-Text ist gespickt mit Fußnoten. Weil seine Lektüre so exzessiv ist, kann er kein Empiriker im strengen Sinne sein. Er betreibt kein Quellenstudium, er erhebt keine Daten, benutzt auch kaum amtliche Statistik als Primärmaterial. Elsenhans' Methode ist die der Synthese dessen, was andere erarbeitet haben. Damit folgt er doch wieder einem Verfahren, das uns bei Marx, aber auch bei Frank und Wallerstein so bekannt ist.

Die beiden Kurzfassungen des „großen Werks", die bislang vorliegen, verstehen empirische Belege eher als Anekdote, verwenden statistisches Material äußerst selektiv und manchmal auch kryptisch. Insofern immunisiert sich Elsenhans gegen jegliche Kritik. Er hat alle ihm vorstellbaren Gegenargumente schon verarbeitet, bevor sie vorgebracht werden. Dies mag erklären, warum er in so viele Kontroversen geraten ist, warum sein Werk in Deutschland auf so viel Ablehnung gestoßen ist, dass er auf französische und indische Publikationsmöglichkeiten ausweichen musste. Keynes und Ricardo zu kombinieren ist durchaus innovativ, doch verharrt Elsenhans zugleich im ökonomistischen Dogmatismus der 1970er Jahre. Ob wirklich die ganze Welt aus der Perspektive eines homo oeconomicus und im Licht einer rational-choice-Theorie interpretiert werden kann und ob wirklich nur die Alternative zwischen der Logik des Profits und der Logik der Rente das menschliche Handeln bestimmt, so dass Kultur gar keine Rolle spielt, mag doch bezweifelt werden. Dennoch – Elsenhans gebührt viel mehr Aufmerksamkeit, als ihm in Deutschland gewährt wird.

FORUM

„Alle Welt ist *agrarista*, sogar die Hunde". Intellektuelle als Gewalttäter in Michoacán, Mexiko, 1920–1926

Marisol Palma Behnke / Michael Riekenberg

1. Der Gewaltraum[1]

In den frühen 1920er Jahren stand in Mexiko der Aufbau eines postrevolutionären Staates auf der politischen Tagesordnung, begleitet von starken Gewaltausbrüchen. Bereits im 19. Jahrhundert hatte in Mexiko nach dem Zusammenbruch der kolonialen Ordnung die physische Gewalttat, gemessen an der Anzahl kollektiver Gewalthandlungen und bürgerkriegsartiger Auseinandersetzungen im Land, stark zugenommen.[2] Die mexikanische Revolution von 1910 bis 1920 jedoch führte in der Akkumulation von Bürgerkriegen nochmals zu neuen Auswüchsen der Gewalt. Sie förderte das Ausgreifen der in den Dörfern anzutreffenden „male peasant violence"[3], indem sie dieser eine revolutionäre Legitimation verlieh, in die Sphäre der Politik. Zudem erzeugte die Revolution neue Organisationsformen der Gewalt. Hatten im 19. Jahrhundert Banden, dörfliche Milizen, die kriegerischen Gefolgschaften von *warlords* oder auf eigene Faust handelnde Armeeeinheiten noch weitgehend das Gesicht der kollektiven Gewaltausübung in

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1   Die Archivforschungen und empirischen Untersuchungen zum Geschehen in Michoacán in den 1920er Jahren, die diesem Text zugrunde liegen, wurden allein von Marisol Palma Behnke durchgeführt. Die begrifflichen und konzeptionellen Erwägungen dagegen, die in diesen Text Eingang fanden, beruhen auf gemeinsamen Überlegungen von Marisol Palma Behnke und Michael Riekenberg, weshalb beide als Verfasser erscheinen.

2   Vgl. Alan Knight, Habitus and Homicide: Political Culture in Revolutionary Mexico, in: Will Pansters (Hg.), Citizens of the Pyramid. Essays on Mexican Political Culture, S.107-129, hier S. 108 ff.

3   Mary K. Vaughan, Cultural Approaches to Peasant Politics in the Mexican Revolution, in: Hispanic American Historical Review 79, 2 (1999), S. 269-305, hier S. 284. Zur Problematik des peasant-Begriffs siehe Marcus Kurtz, Understanding Peasant Revolution. From Concept to Theory and Case, in: Theory and Society 29 (2000), S. 93-124.

Mexiko geprägt, so bekämpften sich im Jahr 1915 im Land Kriegsverbände, die die bis dahin in der Region unbekannte Größenordnung von bis zu 100.000 Mann umfassten.[4] Die Bevölkerungszahl Mexikos verringerte sich zwischen 1910 und 1920 als Folge der inneren Kriege und der Spanischen Grippe um fast eine Million Menschen.[5] In der Revolution kam es durch kriegsbedingte Migrationen und Verwüstungen des Landes zur Auflösung lokaler Gesellschaften. Zeitweilig stand das Land vor dem „Staatskollaps"[6]. In dieser Situation war der „[…] einzige Weg, seine Meinung wirksam zum Ausdruck zu bringen, jener der Gewalt".[7] Es entstand eine „endemische lokale politische Gewalt".[8]

Dieser Text handelt vom Zacapu-Tal, das in der Provinz Michoacán im westlichen Hochland Mexikos liegt. Diese Region war im frühen 20. Jahrhundert ein Raum, wo die Autorität des Staates brüchig und der Staat auf Verhandlungen mit lokalen Gewalten angewiesen war, wollte er seinem wenig gefestigten Herrschaftsanspruch Geltung verschaffen. Dabei war der Staat weniger ein festes System von Institutionen und Bürokratien, sondern eine anfällige Verflechtung aus Machtfraktionen, die informelle Strukturen in ihre Organisation einbanden, weil sie anders keine Wirkung zu erzielen vermochten, und regionalen Kräftezentren, die wiederum in Rivalität zueinander standen, mit formalen, jedoch von der Gesellschaft abhängigen Ämterhierarchien. Große Teile der Bevölkerung gehörten zur taraskischen Sprachgruppe und lebten in Dorfgemeinden mit korporativen Strukturen. Auf der Grundlage ihres kommunalen Besitzes (*ejidos*), von lokalen Hierarchien, in denen sich formale Ämter mit hergebrachtem Ansehen und Prestige verbanden, regiert sowie durch ethnisch gefärbte Loyalitäten integriert, verband die Dörfer eine Vorstellung von Autonomie, in die der Staat traditionell nur schwer einzudringen vermochte. Neben dem Dorf existierten im Zacapu-Tal mehrere große Landbesitzungen (*haciendas*), die ihren Besitz in den liberalen Bodenreformen im späten 19. Jahrhundert ausdehnten und dadurch die Subsistenzgrundlage der Dörfer angriffen. Schließlich lebten im Zacapu-Tal *mestizos* (Mestizen), womit im zeitgenössischen Sprachgebrauch die Teile der Landbevölkerung bezeichnet wurden, die in verstreuten Gehöften oder Weilern (*rancherias)* lebten und in den Dörfern als Außenstehende galten. „Mestize" umschrieb keine rassische Kategorie, sondern vielmehr eine aus der Perspektive des Dorfes erzeugte Abgrenzung gegenüber Fremden, die nicht zum Dorf gehörten.

Obwohl Michoacán im Vergleich zu anderen Regionen in Mexiko kein Zentrum der Gewalt in der Revolutionszeit darstellte, bewirkte die Revolution auch hier, dass die Gewaltbereitschaft der Menschen in den politischen Auseinandersetzungen wie im ge-

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4   Héctor Aguilar Camín/Lorenzo Meyer, In the Shadow of the Mexican Revolution: Contemporary Mexican History 1910–1989, Austin 1993, S. 50 f.

5   Ebenda, S. 51.

6   Alan Knight, The Peculiarities of Mexican History. Mexico Compared to Latin America 1821–1992, in: Journal of Latin American Studies 24 (1992), S. 99-144, hier S. 129.

7   Claudio Lomnitz, Ansätze zu einer Geographie des Schweigens. Provinzintellektuelle und die Soziologie des eigentlichen Mexiko, in: Stefan Karlen/Andreas Wimmer (Hg.), Integration und Transformation. Ethnische Gemeinschaften, Staat und Weltwirtschaft in Lateinamerika seit 1850, Stuttgart 1996, S. 255-283, hier S. 281.

8   Alan Knight, The Mexican Revolution: Bourgeois? Nationalist? Or just a Great Rebellion? in: Bulletin of Latin American Research 4:2 (1985), S. 1-37, hier S. 15.

sellschaftlichen Alltag offenbar zunahm, vor allem in den Gebieten, wo die Dörfer und Ortschaften von Banden, wie es damals hieß, „besucht" wurden.[9] Das Bandenwesen besaß im ruralen Mexiko eine lange Tradition. Im frühen 20. Jahrhundert und in der Zeit der Revolution geriet es zu einer Antwort ländlicher Bevölkerungen auf die herrschenden Gewaltverhältnisse und auf die wirtschaftliche Not. Gewalt wurde zu einer Überlebensstrategie angesichts der materiellen Notlage und Verelendung größerer Bevölkerungsgruppen. Die Banden verfügten über zivile Unterstützernetze, die in die Dörfer hineinreichten.

Seit 1913 kam es in Michoacán zur Bildung ziviler Selbstverteidigungsgruppen, die entweder aus den Dörfern stammten oder von den großen Landbesitzern unterhalten wurden. Auf den Haciendas wurden sog. Weiße Garden gebildet, die sich überwiegend aus der Gruppe der Mestizen rekrutierten. Sie hatten zum Ziel, den Besitz vor Angriffen Auswärtiger zu schützen. In den Dörfern richteten sich die Verteidigungsanstrengungen zumeist gegen die Armee, die mehr Angst unter der Bevölkerung auslöste als etwa die Banden. Die Armee übte ihren Machtanspruch in demonstrativen Gewalthandlungen aus. In den Dörfern wurde die Armee meist verachtet. Zwar schien Anfang der 1920er Jahre der rurale Raum Michoacáns vorübergehend recht friedlich zu sein. Jedoch lebte die ländliche Gesellschaft in einer vagen Angst vor Angriffen aus der sie umgebenden Welt.

2. Die Fragestellung

Die postrevolutionäre Staatsbildung gruppierte sich in Michoacán in den frühen 1920er Jahren um drei Problembereiche.[10] Zunächst musste der aus der Revolution erwachsene neue Staat die politische Autorität in den Dörfern gewinnen. Dörfliche Institutionen, Versammlungen oder Milizen (Nationalgarden) waren seit den liberalen Reformen im 19. Jahrhundert wichtiger Baustein „nationaler" Politik.[11] Um die „nationale" Politik ins Dorf zu tragen, nutzten die Anhänger der revolutionären Politik die Landreform, d.h. die Vergabe von Land zur gemeindlichen Nutzung (Ejidalpolitik). Seit 1920 kam es in Michoacán wie in anderen Teilen Mexikos zur Organisation und Bewaffnung der *agraristas*, die die Rekonsolidierung bzw. den Ausbau der Gemeindeländereien anstrebten. Vor dem Hintergrund der langen Bürgerkriegserfahrung in der Revolutionszeit waren die *agraristas* ebenso gewaltbereit wie ihre Widersacher, die großen Landeigentümer. Schließlich versuchte der postrevolutionäre Staat die kulturelle Hegemonie zu erobern, um seine Idee gegen die Tradition und die *moral economy* des Dorfes durchzusetzen und die Macht der überkommenen politisch-religiösen Hierarchien in den Dörfern zu bre-

9   Vgl. Alvaro Ochoa, Chavez Garcia, vivo o muerto, Morelia 2004; Rita Hernandez, Rebeldes y Bandoleros en Michoacán, 1911–1919, Morelia 1996.

10   Dies nach Jennie Purnell, Popular Movements and State Formation in Revolutionary Mexico. The Agraristas and Cristeros of Michoacán, Durham and London 1999.

11   Vgl. Claudio Lomnitz, Ritual, Rumor and Corruption in the Constitution of Polity in Modern Mexico, in: Journal of Latin American Anthropology 1,1 (1995), S. 20-47, hier S. 27 f.

chen, wozu insbesondere dem revolutionären Antiklerikalismus eine große Bedeutung beikam.[12] Gewalttätige Konflikte und innere Polarisierungen der ländlichen Gemeinden waren die Folge. Zwar barg, wie Jennie Purnell schreibt, die postrevolutionäre Situation und konkret die Ejidalpolitik für einzelne Gemeinden oder für innerdörfliche Fraktionen die Chance, Land zu gewinnen, traditionale lokale Autoritäten, deren Autorität man in Zweifel zog, zu zerstören und alte Rechnungen mit verfeindeten Nachbarn auszutragen. In anderen Teilen der Dorfbevölkerungen aber wurde diese Politik als Bedrohung der kommunalen Ressourcen, der eigenen Kultur und der anerkannten Institutionen angesehen, als Angriff auf religiöse Traditionen und lokale Identitäten des Dorfes. Ohnehin wurde der Ejidalpolitik von Teilen der Dorfbevölkerung misstraut, weil es sich um eine von der Wohltat des Staates abhängige Vergabe des Eigentums handelte. Weil man dem Staat prinzipiell misstraute, wurde auch seine Landvergabe abgelehnt.[13]

In diesem Beitrag sollen die gewalttätigen Konflikte in den Anfängen der postrevolutionären Epoche näher betrachtet und dabei die Einflüsse untersucht werden, die die historischen Akteuren ausübten, die wir als *Intellektuelle* bezeichnen. Der Begriff des Intellektuellen wird bekanntlich kontrovers diskutiert. In der Literatur gelten Intellektuelle meist als Träger von Rationalität und Aufklärer des Denkens. Dagegen wird ihnen selten zugetraut, selbst Lust und Gefallen an der körperlichen Gewaltausübung gefunden bzw. diese gar eigenhändig ausgeübt zu haben. Werden Intellektuelle mit Gewalt in Verbindung gebracht, so erscheinen sie eher als die nüchternen Planer oder als die Ideologen der Gewalt in komplexen Formen der Gewaltorganisation, nicht als deren direkte Exekutoren. Beispielhaft vertritt diese Ansicht Peter Waldmann, der schreibt, dass für das „Gewaltgeschäft im engeren Sinn", also die unmittelbar gegen den fremden Körper gerichtete physische Gewaltausübung, Intellektuelle ein „[…] oft wenig geeigneter Kreis" seien.[14] Hier dagegen betrachten wir Intellektuelle als *direkte* Gewalttäter. Wir fragen, wie sie dazu wurden, wie sie wirkten und wie sie die überkommene Gewaltorganisation, in der sie aufwuchsen, gegebenenfalls veränderten. Ebenso interessiert uns, welche Grenzen es eventuell für ihre Gewaltneigung gab.

3. Zum Begriff des Intellektuellen

Die Figur des Intellektuellen stand in der Geschichtsschreibung zu Lateinamerika lange Zeit im Blickwinkel der Ideengeschichte.[15] Der Intellektuelle interessierte als Träger eines Gedankenguts, im engen Sinn als Literat.[16] Vielleicht wurde dies dadurch begün-

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12 Vgl. Purnell, Popular Movements (Anm. 9), S. 12 f..

13 Ebenda, S. 180 f.

14 Peter Waldmann, Zur Asymmetrie von Gewaltdynamik und Friedensdynamik, in: Wilhelm Heitmeyer/ Hans-Georg Soeffner (Hg.), Gewalt. Entwicklungen, Strukturen, Analyseprobleme, Frankfurt a. M. 2004, S. 246-265, hier S. 254.

15 Vgl. James Cockroft, Intellectual Precursors of the Mexican Revolution 1900–1913, Austin/London 1968; Javier Lasarte Valcárcel (Hg.), Territorios intelectuales. Pensamiento y cultura en América Latina, Caracas 2001; Will Fowler (Hg.), Ideologues and Ideologies in Latin America, Westport 1997.

16 Vgl. Mónica Quijada/Jesús Bustamante (Hg.), Élites intelectuales y modelos colectiovos. Mundo Ibérico, siglos XVI-XIX, Madrid 2002; Horacio Labastida, Elites intelectuales en la historia de México, in: Anuario Mexicano de

stigt, dass in Lateinamerika die Intellektuellenfigur vermeintlich an die Figur des *letrado* anknüpfte, also des Universitätsabsolventen, der in den Kolonialzeit als gebildeter Städter lebte und später in den liberalen Regimen des 19. Jahrhunderts die politische Klasse der neuen Nationen stellte.[17]

Für unseren Gegenstand bildet das Werk von Gramsci einen brauchbaren Ausgangspunkt, weil Gramsci, was auf Mexiko im frühen 20. Jahrhundert übertragbar ist, auf die Intellektuellen in vorkapitalistischen, agrarischen Gesellschaften einging. In Unterschied zu anderen Autoren verstand Gramsci die Intellektuellen weder als eine eigene „Klasse" noch als eine eigenständige Ansammlung von Individuen, sondern als „class-bound",[18] d. h. als Repräsentanten einer Art sozialer Herkunftsgemeinschaft. Aus diesem Grund schlug er vor, Intellektuelle nicht nach der „Eigenart der intellektuellen Tätigkeiten" zu definieren, beispielsweise ihrer Schriftfähigkeit, sondern nach dem „System von Verhältnissen", in dem sie sich bewegen.[19] Diesen Gedanken greifen wir hier auf. Dabei unterschied Gramsci die organischen Intellektuellen, die als Spezialisten des Wissens in komplexen Funktionsteilungen und sozialen Systemen wirken, und die traditionellen Intellektuellen, die in vorkapitalistischen Gesellschaftsbedingungen als *broker* die Aufgabe haben, „die Masse der Bauern mit der staatlichen oder lokalen Verwaltung in Kontakt" zu bringen.[20] Für uns ist an dem Ansatz von Gramsci wichtig, dass es keine abstrakte Figur des Intellektuellen gibt, sondern diese sich vielmehr in Abhängigkeit von dem soziokulturellen Milieu, in dem sie ihre Wissensautorität erst erfolgreich zur Geltung zu bringen vermag, verändert.

Die Revolution in Mexiko stellte einen Zeitraum dar, der für die Genese von Intellektuellen günstig war. Weil die politische Sprache sich änderte und neue Semantiken in Gesellschaft und Kultur erzeugt wurden, benötigten die Menschen Wortführer, die ihnen halfen, die neuen Symbole zu deuten und für sich zu nutzen. Dies war das Milieu der Zeit, in dem Intellektuelle erschaffen wurden, Weltdeuter also, die die Sprache der Revolution beherrschten und diese in das lokale Wissen sowohl urbaner wie auch ethnischer und ländlicher Gemeinschaften zu übersetzen vermochten. Sprechen wir hier von Intellektuellen, so haben wir für das Zacapu-Tal Figuren vor Augen, die aus der Welt des Dorfes stammten, seit der Revolutionszeit durch ihre Teilhabe an der politischen Praxis jedoch gewillt waren, die gesellschaftliche Wirklichkeit, aus der sie kamen, zu „revolutionieren" und sich über die Tradition des Dorfes und ihre eigene Herkunft zu

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Historia de Derecho 7 (1995), S. 73-92. Eine wichtige Rolle spielt hierin auch das Bild des Kosmopoliten. Vgl. Mariano Plotkin/Ricardo González Leandri (Hg.), Localismo y Globalización. Aportes para una Historia de los Intelectuales en Iberoamérica, Madrid 2000.

17 Siehe dazu Tulio Halperin Donghi, The colonial letrado as a revolutionary intellectual, in: Mark Szuchman/Jonathan Brown (Hg.), Revolution and Restoration. The Rearrangement of Power in Argentina 1776–1860, Lincoln 1994, S. 54 ff.

18 Vgl. Charles Kurzman/Lynn Owens, The Sociology of Intellectuals, in: Annual Reviews of Sociology 28 (2002), S. 63-90, hier S. 66 f.

19 Antonio Gramsci, Gefängnishefte. Kritische Gesamtausgabe (hg. v. K. Bochmann u.a.), Bd. 7, Hamburg 1996, S. 1495–1539, hier S. 1497 f.

20 Ebenda S.1497 f., 1503 f.

stellen. In der Sprache der Zeit wurden diese Figuren von ihren Mitmenschen meist als *representantes* bezeichnet, ehe sich in der Revolutionszeit die Sprache veränderte und sie als Revolutionäre oder Agitatoren und nach 1917/18 auch als Bolschewiken bezeichnet wurden.

Bei diesen Intellektuellen handelte es sich um Figuren, die nicht, wie in der Literatur über die Intellektuellen zu lesen ist, einfach die eigenen Maßstäbe ihrer (Selbst-)Definition diktieren konnten, weil sie selbst darüber hätten befinden können, welches Verhalten und welche Attitüde als intellektuell galten, und welche nicht.[21] Vielmehr waren es Akteure, die von der lokalen Bevölkerung erst als Intellektuelle symbolisch *erzeugt* wurden, indem diese Bevölkerung ihnen Kenntnisse zusprach, die über das tradierte lokale Wissen hinausgingen. Die Menschen glaubten, dass diese Figuren ein Wissen besaßen, das Orientierung versprach in einer sich wandelnden Welt aus Krieg, Revolution und Staatsneubildung. Intellektuelle beherrschten eine Sprache, die die Menschen in den Dörfern nur vom Hörensagen kannten. Dadurch erhielten die Intellektuellen zugleich Macht, weil die Menschen in den Dörfern ihnen zutrauten, in einer sich wandelnden Welt als Autoritäten der Weltdeutung und als Kenner der Politik außerhalb der lokalen Lebenswelten zu fungieren. Insofern umfasste die Vorstellung des Intellektuellen zwei Komponenten. Zum einen waren sie „Experten", die über ein „Sonderwissen" verfügten.[22] Zum anderen waren sie politische Akteure, Aktivisten, die sich die politische Mobilisierung zu ihrem Ziel gesetzt hatten. In dieser Funktion organisierten sie auch untereinander Gesprächszusammenhänge und versuchten, Deutungsgemeinschaften zu konstituieren.

In den Dörfern des mexikanischen Hochlands konnten Intellektuelle erst unter mehreren Voraussetzungen erzeugt werden. Zunächst musste das Dorf selbst zu einem Ort der politischen Öffentlichkeit werden. Dazu war notwendig, dass im 19. Jahrhundert in Mexiko eine nationalstaatliche Ordnung errichtet wurde, die zwar als Gemeinschaft der Staatsbürger definiert war, jedoch über weite Strecken des 19. Jahrhunderts in lokale Fragmente zerfiel. Dadurch wurde das Dorf selbst zu einer „politischen Arena" (Lomnitz), so wie die politische Ordnung des Landes sich im 19. Jahrhundert als ein „Archipel von Machtpyramiden" darstellte, deren „[…] Basis die Gemeinden und dörflichen Eliten"[23] waren. Hinzu kam, dass die Dorfbevölkerungen bzw. ihre Vorsteher dem neuen, liberalen Staat im 19. Jahrhundert vielfach seine Autorität absprachen und dem Staat nicht mehr, wie es noch in der kolonialen Ordnung der Regelfall gewesen war, die Rolle einer vermittelnden Gewalt zugestanden, sondern sich stattdessen selbst als politischer

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21   Insofern ist die These fraglich, dass Intellektuelle diejenige Gesellschaftsgruppe bilden, die dank ihrer Stellung in der Öffentlichkeit über ihre eigene Selbstdefinition und ihr Ansehen befinden könnte. Vgl. Zygmunt Baumann, Unerwiderte Liebe. Die Macht, die Intellektuellen und die Macht der Intellektuellen, in: Ute Daniel/Wolfram Siemann (Hg.), Propaganda, Meinungskampf, Verführung und politische Sinnstiftung 1789–1989, Frankfurt a. M. 1997, hier S. 172.

22   Vgl. Walter Sprondel, Experte und Laie. Zur Entwicklung von Typenbegriffen in der Wissenssoziologie, in: Walter Sprondel/Richard Garthoff (Hg.), Alfred Schütz und die Idee des Alltags in den Sozialwissenschaften, Stuttgart 1979, S. 140-154, S. 140 f.

23   Raymond Buve, Transformación y patronazgo político en el México rural. Continuidad y cambio entre 1867 y 1920, in: Cuadernos de Historia Latinoamericana 1 (1993), S. 143-176, hier S. 176.

Akteur zu begreifen begannen.[24] Und schließlich musste eine revolutionäre Ideologie bereitgestellt werden, deren Ursprung nicht in der kulturellen Erinnerung der Dörfer lag, sondern Teil der „großen" Politik außerhalb des Dorfes war, zu der nur ein enger Kreis von Dorfbewohnern überhaupt Zugang besaß. Diejenigen, die diesen Zugang gewannen, etwa als Wanderarbeiter oder auch aufgrund einer selbsterworbenen Lesefähigkeit, konnten zu Intellektuellen werden, indem sie in der Revolution begannen, die Organisation (*framing)* politischer Bewegungen[25] zu betreiben, um auf diese Weise andere Bevölkerungsgruppen für die kollektive Aktion zu gewinnen.

Anders als in der Stadt beruhte die Autorität dieser dörflichen Intellektuellen zu einem gewichtigen Teil darauf, dass sie lokaler Abstammung, mit der Kultur des Dorfes vertraut und bilingual waren, d.h. neben dem Spanische die indigene Sprache sprachen.[26] Erst diese Vertrautheit mit der Kultur des Dorfes und dessen kollektivem Gedächtnis ebnete den dörflichen Intellektuellen umgekehrt den Zugang zu den Machthabern in der Welt außerhalb des Dorfes, den Eliten der „Nation". Denn dort wurden die Intellektuellen, die aus dem Dorf stammten, als Experten des Brauchtums wahrgenommen und als solche geschätzt. Die Gruppen, die den postrevolutionären Staat aufbauten, benötigten den dörflichen Intellektuellen, um über ihn Zugang zum Dorf zu finden in der Hoffnung, dadurch die Mittel in die Hand zu bekommen, eine hegemoniale, revolutionäre Kultur an die Stelle alter Institutionen und Traditionen zu setzen. In der Aufbauphase des postrevolutionären Staates vermittelten die dörflichen Intellektuellen „[…] weltläufigen Städtern, nationalen Intellektuellen und Staatsbeamten das eigentliche Mexiko, das diese erwarteten".[27] In diesem Sinn waren die dörflichen Intellektuellen *broker*. Sie sprachen zwei Sprachen und beherrschten verschiedene kulturelle Codes.

Bis heute gibt es nicht viele Arbeiten, die sich mit diesem Gegenstand befassen. Unter den wenigen sind zwei besonders hervorzuheben. Bereits in den 1950er Jahren legte der Anthropologe Paul Friedrich eine Studie über die Gewalt in der Gemeinde Naranja im Zacapu-Tal vor. Die Figur des Intellektuellen, die wir vor Augen haben, bezeichnete Friedrich als „indigenen Revolutionär".[28] Eine neuere Arbeit stellt die Untersuchung von Charles Boyer dar. Boyer spricht nicht von indigenen Revolutionären, sondern (ähnlich)

24 Florencia Mallon, Peasant and Nation: The Making of Postcolonial Mexico and Peru, Berkeley 1995; John Tutino, Peasants and Politics in Nineteenth-Century Mexico, in: Latin American Research Review 22:3 (1987), S. 237-244.

25 „They [popular intelectuals] seek to define the problems of subaltern groups, articulate their grievances, and frame their social and political demands […] They are acknowledged as producers of meaning and as representatives of collective interests by a popular group or local society". Michael Baud/Rosanne Rutten, Introduction, in: dies. (Hg.), Popular Intellectuals and Social Movements: Framing Protest in Asia, Africa, and Latin America (International Review of Social History) Vol. 49, suppl. 12 (2004), S. 1-18, hier S. 2. In der Literatur zu Lateinamerika wird diese kritische, mobilisierende Rolle von Intellektuellen häufig stark betont. Vgl. Roderic Camp, An Image of Mexican Intellectuals. Some Preliminary Observations, in: Mexican Studies/Estudios Mexicanos 1,1 (1985), S. 61-82.

26 Florencia Mallon, Intellectuals, Regional Mythologies, and the Mexican State 1850–1994, in: Polygraph 10 (1998), S. 39-78, hier S. 40 ff.

27 Lomnitz, Ansätze (Anm. 6), S. 282.

28 Paul Friedrich, Agrarian Revolt in a Mexican Village, New Jersey 1970, S. 58 f.; ders., The legitimacy of a cacique, in: Marc Swartz (Hg), Local-Level Politics, Chicago 1969; ders., An Agrarian Fighter, in: Melford und E. Spiro (Hg.), Context and Meaning in Cultural Anthropology, New York 1965; ders., The Princes of Naranja. An Essay in Anthrohistorical Method, Austin 1986.

von Dorfrevolutionären: „Village revolutionaries articulated a radical, class-based discourse that emphazised the values of class struggle and citizenship in what they imagined to be a new, postrevolutionary nation".[29] Durch die ländliche Mobilisierung und mittels des *agrarismo* hätten diese Gruppen versucht, eine neue revolutionäre Identität, die des *campesino,* im Dorf zu schaffen. Typisch für diese Dorfrevolutionäre war ihre Bereitschaft, gegebenenfalls in einer Welt, in der die Gewalt den Menschen geläufig war, ihren „Willen zur Gewaltanwendung" zu zeigen.[30]

4. Primo Tapia – ein populärer Intellektueller im ethnisch-dörflichen Milieu

Für diesen Aufsatz greifen wir aus der Gruppe der dörflichen Intellektuellen, die uns interessieren, Primo Tapia heraus. Tapia stammte aus einer angesehenen Familie in Naranja, sein Onkel, Joaquín de la Cruz[31], war dort ein einflussreicher Mann (Kazike). Lesen und Schreiben lernte Tapia in der kirchlichen Laienausbildung. Aus Gründen, die nicht bekannt sind, wurde Tapia später zu einem glühenden Feind der katholischen Kirche und Religion. Im Alter von achtzehn Jahren ging Tapia im Jahr 1907 als Wanderarbeiter in die USA, wo er in Kontakt mit der Ideologie des Anarchismus kam. Als Organisator von Streiks und als politischer Agitator pflegte er engen Kontakt zu den „International Workers of the World".[32] 1918 trat er der Kommunistischen Partei bei.[33] In der Endphase der mexikanischen Revolution kehrte er Ende 1919 nach Naranja zurück, nunmehr gewillt, die Revolution und konkret die Agrarreform voranzutreiben. 1926 wurde er ermordet. Nach seinem Tod lebte er in volkstümlichen Erinnerungen als Held und Märtyrer der Landreform fort.
Wie wertete Tapia selbst seine politische Rolle, die er zwischen 1920 und 1926 im Zacapu Tal spielte? In einem Brief an einen Freund vom 18. Juli 1923 schrieb er:

> *Die Agrarfrage schreitet voran, wenn auch bedächtig. Letzte Woche wurden die Besitzungen von Huirmaba und Puruándiro übergeben, woran ich die Ehre hatte, in Begleitung meines Generals Cárdenas teilzunehmen. Wir bereisten die Lagune von Pátzcuaro, und in Erongarícuaro erntete ich viel Beifall; vor allem kam Don Lázaro [Cárdenas[34]],*

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29 Christopher Boyer, Becoming Campesinos. Politics, Identity, and Agrarian Struggle in Postrevolutionary Michoacán 1920–1935, Stanford 2003, S. 3, S. 28.

30 Ebenda, S. 122.

31 Er war der Sohn von Ambrosio de la Cruz, Kazike von Naranja, der im späten 19. Jahrhundert die ersten politischen Schritte im Kampf um den Erwerb von Ejidalländereien initiiert hatte.

32 Boyer, Becoming Campesinos (Anm. 28), S. 129.

33 Ein Großteil des publizierten Wissens über Tapia stammt nach wie vor aus den Arbeiten Friedrichs (vgl. Anm. 27). Spätere Archivarbeiten haben eine Reihe von Daten bestätigt, die Friedrich allein von mündlicher Überlieferung ausgehend dokumentierte. Aufmerksamkeit verdient ferner die Arbeit von Arnulfo Embriz und Ricardo Leon, die eine Reihe von Unterlagen bzgl. des Dorfes Naranja auswertet: Documentos para la Historia del Agrarismo en Michoacán, Mexico 1982. Siehe ferner auch Arnulfo Embriz, La Liga de Comunidades y Sindicatos Agraristas de Michoacán. Practica politico-sindical 1919–1929, Mexico 1984.

34 Lázaro Cárdenas war ein revolutionärer Politiker, 1928 trat er das Amt des Gouverneurs in Michoacán an. Von 1934 bis 1940 war er mexikanischer Staatspräsident.

der das Bankett verließ, das ihm die kleinen Leute des Dorfes bereitet hatten, dorthin, wo ich mich mit meinen Leuten traf. Dieses Treffen war improvisiert, so daß ich nicht meine gesamte indiada *[taraskische Anhänger Tapias] herbeirufen konnte; der Ortschaft überreichte ich eine Nachricht aus Tiríndaro und Naranja, welche sie an der Gebietsgrenze dieser Dörfer mit der erwünschten Feierlichkeit in Empfang nahmen. Von dort aus nahmen sie Cárdenas mit in mein Dorf, und meine Landsleute waren zufriedener als eine Frischvermählte […] Auf dem Rückweg besuchte ich einige Dörfer; ich forderte sie auf, die Frauen mit in den Kampf einzubeziehen, da die Frauen, solange dies nicht geschieht, nicht wirklich hinter den* agraristas *stehen. Naranja verfügt über eine Gewerkschaft von 60 Frauen; […] ich war dort, das Dorf hat sich versammelt, ich habe mit ihnen gesprochen und konnte sie überzeugen […] Es nahmen einige Frauen teil, mehr als 25, und sie verpflichteten sich, die Arbeit zu unterstützen, die ich unter den Indios entwickelt habe.*[35]

Die Sprache Tapias war roh und volkstümlich. Er gebrauchte einen paternalistischen Ton und den Menschen vertraute Worte wie *mi indiada*, wenn er sich auf die ländliche und indigene Bevölkerung bezog, die ihn unterstützte. Gleichzeitig nahm er sich selbst als revolutionären Agitatoren und Organisatoren wahr, als eine Person mit einer charismatischen Macht in den Dörfern des Zacapu Tals. Der Ausbau der politisch-sozialen Organisation wie etwa die Schaffung einer örtlichen Gewerkschaft der Frauen war eine politische Besessenheit Tapias. Nach der Wahl des radikalen *agrarista* Francisco Múgica[36], dem Tapia loyal verbunden war, zum Staatsgouverneur von Michoacán, war Tapia Vertreter des staatlichen postrevolutionären Diskurses und gleichzeitig Stimmführer einer lokalen, dem Staat entzogenen politischen Kultur. Sein Quell der Macht war die Funktion des Mittlers zwischen der äußeren Welt und der inneren Welt der Dörfer, die er durchreiste. Er kannte die Kultur des Dorfes, und er beherrschte die Codes der Revolution, an die er glaubte. Aufgrund seiner Führungsqualitäten wurde er zu einem anerkannten und zugleich auch zu einem verfolgten Mann. Er organisierte politische und soziale Bewegungen in der Region, indem er sich der Verbreitung des *agrarismo* widmete, die Kirche bekämpfte und die „Indios" und Frauen mobilisierte, sich aktiv an diesem Kampf zu beteiligen.

In Zacapu und in Naranja fand Tapia viel Unterstützung. Der Vorsitzende eines Komitees zur Landreform, Luis Méndez, versicherte 1925 dem Staatspräsidenten Plutarco Elías Calles, daß es unmöglich sei, den Einfluß zu „neutralisieren", den Tapia in Teilen Michoacáns ausübte:

35   Apolinar Martínez, Primo Tapia. Semblanza de un Revolucionario, Morelia 1976, S. 212-218.

36   Francisco Múgica stammte aus Michoacán. Er war ein revolutionärer Intellektueller kleinstädtischer Herkunft und wurde ein radikaler Politiker im postrevolutionären Staat. Múgica förderte die Bildung von Bauernorganisationen, er teilte Teile des Großgrundbesitzes auf und schuf eine Behörde, die in direkter Zusammenarbeit mit den Dorfbewohnern die Landreform abwickeln sollte. Zudem förderte er die Organisation sog. *autodefensas* civiles (Zivile Selbstverteidigung), das waren die Milizen der *agraristas*.

[…] darauf, Herr Präsident, muß ich Ihnen kategorisch antworten, daß weder ich in der Lage dazu bin noch irgend jemand anders, dem Einfluß entgegenzuwirken, den Primo Tapia in einem guten Teil des Staates und in erster Linie in der Region Zacapu hat. Und ich werde Ihnen auch sagen warum: Primo Tapia ist ein Kind des Volkes, der aufgrund seiner Energie, seiner Zähigkeit und vor allem aufgrund seiner Rechtschaffenheit über die Zustimmung, die Zuneigung und den Respekt aller Indígenas der Region verfügt; die Bauern sehen in ihm ihren Anführer, der sie nie betrogen, der sie nie ausgebeutet hat und der auch in gefährlichen Situationen immer hinter ihnen steht. Sie wissen sehr genau, Herr Präsident, was für unser Volk so etwas wie ihre natürlichen Anführer sind; sie schließen sich ihnen an, ohne zu fragen, wo sie hingehen, und wenn diese Anführer sich einmal irren, wie im Falle von Primo Tapia, ihre Fehler aber rechtzeitig berichtigen, sinkt ihre Vertrauenswürdigkeit nicht, sondern sie steigt sogar noch. Ich werde Ihnen von einer kleinen Begebenheit berichten, die Ihnen den unleugbaren moralischen Einfluß Primo Tapias belegen wird: In Tiríndaro und in anderen nahe gelegenen Dörfern gibt es keine Priester mehr. Die Priester brauchen sie dort nicht mehr, und in einigen ist die Kirche Kornkammer der Gemeinde.[37]

Tapia war im Zacapu-Tal ein anerkannter politischer Anführer. Gleichzeitig lebte er in Gefahr und führte aufgrund der Verfolgungen durch politische Widersacher und persönliche Feinde zeitweilig ein Leben als Flüchtling, wovon auch die Gerichtsakten Zeugnis ablegen.[38] Als Revolutionär, Sekretär der „Liga der Gemeinschaften und Gewerkschaften der Agraristen" (*Liga de Comunidades y Sindicatos Agraristas)* und Anhänger des radikalen Gouverneurs Múgica besaß Tapia zahlreiche Feinde, übrigens nicht nur unter den Gegnern der Agrarreform, sondern auch in Institutionen des Staates selbst. So bezeichnete einer der Gewerkschaftssekretäre Tapia im März 1923 als „eine Person mit üblen Vorstrafen und Agitator *mugiquista* [Gefolgsmann von Múgica], dem es gelungen ist, vor einer unbedeutenden Zahl von Indígenas, die er eigennützig überrumpelt hat, wie ein *agrarista* zu erscheinen […]"[39]. Doch über Jahre schützte Tapia ein soziales und politisches Netzwerk, das sich aus Teilen der neuen politischen Elite in Michoacán und alten personalen Loyalitäts- und Freundschaftsbeziehungen auf lokaler Ebene zusammensetzte. Ein Beleg dafür ist ein Gefängnisaufenthalt Tapias in Morelia, wo er 1923 für einige Tage festgehalten wurde. Er war in einer Einzelzelle untergebracht, wo er Besuch von Frauen, Verwandten und anderen Persönlichkeiten empfangen durfte, die ihm u.a. Zigaretten und Geld zukommen ließen. Er genoß Privilegien wie die Möglichkeit, außerhalb des Anstaltsgeländes seine Notdurft zu verrichten, und allgemein eine bessere Behandlung als die anderen Gefangenen. Politiker vor Ort boten Tapia ihre Unterstützung an.[40]

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37 Schreiben v. 07.02.1925, zit. bei Martínez, Semblanza (Anm. 34), S. 152 f..
38 Diese Unterlagen finden sich heute im Archiv der „Casa de la Cultura Juridica" in Morelia.
39 Brief von Gilberto Valenzuela, Secretaría de Agricultura y Fomento, vom 23.März 1923. Registro Agrario Nacional (im folgenden: RAN), Cuerpo Consultivo Agrario Exp. 2738, 263 fjs. Vol. 1. Dotacion de ejidos de Naranja.
40 Casa de la Cultura Juridica. Amparos. Expediente 88: Amparo solicitado por Primo Tapia. Reclama detencion, temor fusilamiento y ser remitido a Zacapu, 20.09.1922.

In gewisser Hinsicht war Tapia ein neuer sozialer Typ, der am Rand der lokalen Gesellschaft lebte. Ein Indiz dafür war auch seine Kleidung. Tapia kleidete sich gerne als Städter, und er trat in dieser Kleidung des Kleinbürgers vor die *indiada*. Dadurch signalisierte er, dass er mit einem Fuß im Dorf und mit dem anderen in der Außenwelt der Politik und revolutionären Ideologien stand, ein Zustand, der es ihm erlaubte, zugleich als *cultural broker* zu fungieren, als Person, die die gesellschaftlichen Zwischenräume zwischen den Dörfern und der staatlichen Führung Michoacáns bzw. der „Nation" ausfüllte. Gleiches galt für die Sprache. Tapia sprach Spanisch und Tarasco. Boyer argumentiert, dass bei Figuren wie Tapia nicht von Intellektuellen gesprochen werden könne, nur von Revolutionären, da sie nicht mit den Dorflehrern, Priestern und anderen gebildeten Mitgliedern der dörflichen „Elite" vergleichbar seien.[41] Auch hätten sie nichts Schriftliches hinterlassen.[42] Figuren wie Tapia schrieben kaum, sie waren kulturelle Archive ihrer Herkunftsgemeinschaften, sie hinterließen von Briefen, Aufrufen oder Flugblättern abgesehen keine schriftlichen Zeugnisse ihrer revolutionären Utopien. Dennoch waren sie überzeugte Vertreter politischer Ideologien. Sie hielten revolutionäre Vorträge in der Absicht, die Dorfbewohner dazu zu bringen, die ländliche Mobilmachung als Klassenkampf zu betrachten, und sie ermutigten ihre Anhänger, ihr Recht als revolutionäre Bürger einzuklagen.[43] Sie schrieben wenig, aber sie besaßen ein Wissen aus der Welt außerhalb des Dorfes, das sie im lokalen Rahmen in symbolischer Hinsicht zu Intellektuellen machte.

5. Zur Ethnographie der Gewalt

Ende 1924 zog Tapia ein vorläufiges Fazit seiner revolutionären Tätigkeit: „Wir haben", schrieb er in einem Brief,

> *keinen Priester mehr, seine Diener haben ihn in allem ersetzt; die Pfarrhäuser sind jetzt Kornkammern der Gemeinden, kurz gesagt und diesen Punkt abschließend, der reaktionäre Giftzwerg ist tot in unseren Gemeinden. Die Staatsregierung ist zufrieden mit meiner Arbeit, denn nachdem sie sich bei einem Besuch, den sie uns kürzlich abstattete, zurückzog, nahm sie einen guten Eindruck mit und wußte, warum meine Feinde mich hassen. Und damit nicht genug, ich habe den trockenen Zustand [Alkoholverbot] eingeführt, und in nicht allzu langer Zeit, wenn das Glück mich nicht verläßt, werde ich Zacapu besitzen. Alle Welt ist* agrarista, *sogar die Hunde, und diejenigen, die mit meinen Ideen übereinstimmen, die ich verteidigt habe und die mich in ihrem Gebiet*

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41 Zur Rolle der Dorfschullehrer im postrevolutionären Staat vgl. Guillermo Palacios, Postrevolutionary Intellectuals, Rural Readings and the Shaping of Peasant Problem in Mexiko: "El maestro rural" 1932–1934, in: Journal of Latin American Studies 30,2 (1998), S. 309-339. .

42 Vgl. Christopher Boyer, Naranja Revisited: Agrarian Caciques and the Making of Campesino Identity in Postrevolutionary Michoacán, in: Alan Knight/Wil Pansters (Hg.), Caciquismo in Twentieth-Century Mexico, London 2005, S. 71-93.

43 Boyer, Becoming Campesinos (Anm. 29), S. 115.

kennengelernt haben; die Anderen sind im Jenseits [villa revolcada]*, weil sie hier nicht hinpassen. Ich bin Besitzer und Herr der Lage.*[44]

Knapp anderthalb Jahre später, am 27. April 1926, wurde Tapia in Naranja festgenommen und auf die Hacienda "El Cortijo" gebracht, wo er misshandelt und dann im Morgengrauen wegen „Missetaten und Morden" erschossen wurde.[45]

In der neueren mexikanischen Geschichtsschreibung herrscht die Überzeugung, dass die Anführer des *agrarismo* in den 1920er Jahren im Kontext der Zeit zwangsläufig zum Mittel der Gewalt hätten greifen müssen. Jedoch weiß man nach wie vor wenig über die Bildung neuer Räume der Gewalt in der ländlichen Gesellschaft im Gefolge der mexikanischen Revolution. Im Tal von Zacapu entzündete sich die meiste Gewalt an den Konflikten zwischen den *agraristas* und den großen Landbesitzern. Daran nahmen viele Anteil, revolutionäre *agraristas* und ihre Milizen, Banden, „Weiße Garden" der großen Landbesitzer und schließlich Einheiten der Bundesarmee, deren Offiziere verschiedentlich mit den Landbesitzern kooperierten. Im Juli 1921 beschuldigte Primo Tapia erstmals die im Zacapu-Tal agierenden Einheiten der Armee, in einer „wilden Ehe" mit der Hacienda Cantabria zu leben, was schwere Nachteile für die benachbarten Dorfbevölkerungen von Naranja, Tirindaro und Tarejero habe.[46] Zudem bedrohe die Armee zusammen mit „Weißen Garden" die Dörfer. Am 25. Oktober des Jahres, so Tapia, erschien

[…] eine Gruppe von etwa 50 Soldaten unter dem Vorwand, die Zivilverteidigung von Naranja zu entwaffnen, im Dorf. Unter diesem Vorwand begingen sie schmähliche Gewalttaten, wobei sie ungebührlich vom Gemeindepräsidenten von Zacapu unterstützt wurden […] Am 11. Dezembers desselben Jahres wurden die Kameraden Severo und Felix Espinosa, der Repräsentant und der Chef der Zivilverteidigung des Dorfes Tirindaro, sowie eine Gruppe von zwanzig Bauern, die bei den Ortswahlen von Zacapu abgestimmt hatten, von einer größeren Zahl bewaffneter Personen angegriffen, die im Dienst der Großgrundbesitzer von Cantabria standen.[47]

In der Zeit versuchte die Armee wiederholt, sich Tapias zu bemächtigen. Den Aussagen eines Oberst der Kavallerie in Cantabria vom 21.Dezember 1921 zufolge war einige Tage zuvor vom Richter in Zacapu ein Haftbefehl gegen Tapia und „andere Individuen" ausgestellt worden, weil Tapia zusammen mit anderen Männern mehrere Dorfbewohner überfallen und diese mit dem Messer bedroht hätte. Auch habe Tapia mit Waffengewalt Amtsträger widerrechtlich abgesetzt.[48] Erst im September 1922 wurde Tapia aufgrund

44   Brief von Primo Tapia an Apolinar Martinez Mugica, 19.12.1924, in: Martínez, Semblanza (Anm. 34), S.227.

45   Telegramm des Militärbefehlshabers an Elias Calles, in: Martinez, Semblanza (Anm. 34), S. 249.

46   RAN, Cuerpo Consultivo Agrario Exp. 2738, 263 fjs. Vol. 1. Dotacion de ejidos de Naranja. Brief von Primo Tapia an den Präsidenten der örtlichen Agrarkommission v. 20.07.1922.

47   RAN, Cuerpo Consultivo Agrario Exp. 2738, 263 fjs. Vol. 1. Dotación de ejidos de Naranja. 12.07.1921 bzw. 15.02.1922.

48   Casa de la Cultura Juridica. Amparos, Exp. 114. Carta del capitan de caballeria al juez de distrito de Morelia en la cual Primo Tapia aparece junto a otros desconocidos como responsables de delitos y crimenes, Hacienda de Cantabria 21.12.1924, sowie ebenda, Expediente 26: Amparo solicitado por Hilario Reyes y Eleuterio Serrato. Promueve en su nombre Primo Tapia. Reclaman acto de aprehension, 18.01.1922.

eines richterlichen Ersuchens in Morelia, wohin er geflüchtet war, festgenommen. In einem Brief an den Bezirksrichter in Morelia erklärte Tapia dazu:

> *[…] Ich bin der Überzeugung, dass der Richter von Zacapu versucht, mich aus dieser Stadt, in der ich mit gewissen Sicherheiten für mein Leben rechnen kann, hinauszuwerfen, denn außerhalb bin ich nicht sicher, um mich irgendwie verschwinden zu lassen, wenn ich einmal in seiner Gewalt bin. Herr Bezirksrichter, es ist nicht nur der Bürgermeister von Zacapu, der mir schaden will, sondern hinter seinem Rücken gibt es noch andere einflussreiche und vermögende Persönlichkeiten, für die er nur eine Marionette ist und die es darauf anlegen, dass ich verschwinde, wenn ich einmal in seiner Gewalt bin, denn ich bin der Bevollmächtigte von Tarejero, Tirindaro und Naranja sowie von anderen Orten, und natürlich sehen mich alle Großgrundbesitzer aufgrund des agrarismo mit Angst und Groll.*[49]

Seine Frau Cristina Gonzalez forderte aus Sorge um die „persönliche Sicherheit" ihres Mannes vom Polizeiinspektor in Morelia eine Schutzzusage.[50]

Am 14. März 1923 griffen „Weiße Garden" die Dörfer Tirindaro und Naranja an.[51] Im gleichen Monat führten Bundestruppen und bewaffnete Kräfte von der Besitzung Cantabria Razzien in anderen Dörfern durch. Unter den Dorfbevölkerungen wuchsen die Ängste. „Wenn uns keine Gerechtigkeit widerfährt", klagten die Einwohner von Naranja und Tirindaro, „bevorzugen wir auszuwandern, statt immer in Lebensgefahr zu sein. Unsere Situation ist hoffnungslos; wenn die staatlichen Amtsträger diesen Gewaltübergriffen keinen Einhalt gebieten, werden wir unser Heim verlassen."[52] Im gleichen Jahr beklagte Tapia, zurück im Zacapu-Tal, die Situation: „Die Situation hat sich in keinerlei Hinsicht gebessert. Die Dörfer werden nach wie vor von dem Tyrannen ‚Schwein ohne Schwanz' [Schimpfwort für den Gouverneur Pineda] unterdrückt."[53] Auch die Gewalt der *agraristas* gegen ihre Gegner nahm zu, mehrere von ihnen wurden umgebracht. Tapia und zwei seiner Mitstreiter kommentierten dies in den Worten: „[…] Kurz vor einem besseren Leben stehend, starb der berühmte Führer Natividad Torres durch die Hand unseres Freundes Eleuterio Serrato, der Torres eine Kugel in Herz versetzt hat, auf den Weg, der in die Herrlichkeit führt […]."[54] Bei den Toten handelte es sich um „Katholiken" aus Naranja und Tirindaro. Einige von ihnen hatten in der „Weißen Garde" von Cantabria mitgewirkt, die zeitweilig vom Kaplan aus Tirindaro befehligt wurde.[55] Später rühmte

49   Casa de la Cultura Juridica. Amparos. Expediente 88, 22.09.1922.

50   Casa de la Cultura Juridica. Amparos. Expediente 14, 04.03.1923: Amparo solicitado por Primo Tapia. Promueve en su nombre su esposa Cristina Gonzalez. Acto reclamado: Detención y temor de ser fusilado.

51   Telegramm von Bruno Tapia, Morelia, 14.03.1923. AGN/D.2.71-155, caja 15, exp 15. Wir verdanken diesen Quellenhinweis einem Gespräch zwischen Marisol Palma und Christopher Boyer.

52   RAN Cuerpo Consultivo Agrario Exp. 2738, 263 fjs. Vol. 1. Dotacion de ejidos de Naranja. Brief des Comité Central L.C.A. Regional an den Minister für Landwirtschaft und Entwicklung, 9.04.1923.

53   Briefe von Primo Tapia an Apolinar Martinez Mugica vom 18.07.1923 und 01.09.1923, in: Martínez, Semblanza, (Anm. 34), S.„211 ff.

54   Brief von Primo Tapia an Apolinar Martinez Mugica vom 01.09.1923, in: Martínez, Semblanza, (Anm. 34), S.211 f.

55   AGN/O.C. Vol.351, Exp. 818-N-12, Anexo III. Schreiben v. Primo Tapia, Crispin Serrato und Tomas Cruz an den Präsidenten der Republik, 04.09.1925.

sich Tapia des Mordens: „[…] es gelang uns, alle prominenten Gegner des *agrarismo* in diesem Dorf zu töten, so daß dieses Dorf frei von Heiligen [*santiagudos*] war."[56]

Am 20. Februar 1924 wurde eine Resolution des Staatspräsidenten zur Übergabe neuer Gemeindeländereien (*eijdos*) an die Dörfer erlassen, wodurch dem Dorf Naranja 716 Hektar Weideland übertragen wurden, die den Besitzungen Cantabria und Buena Vista gehört hatten. Neue Auseinandersetzungen waren die Folge. Die Familie Noriega, Eigentümer von Cantabria, sandte Bewaffnete aus, um die Gemeindeländereien der Dörfer zu zerstören.[57] Umgekehrt beklagten die Noriegas Überfälle durch die *agraristas*. Ihr Ziel sei es, „[…] ehrliche Bauern zu verfolgen und zu schädigen, die so vor die Wahl gestellt werden, in fremde Gegenden auszuwandern, wo ihnen das Ihre nicht genommen wird, um es anderen zu geben."[58] Anfang Juni 1924 wurde der kommandierende General der im Tal befindlichen Bundestruppen von der Regierung angewiesen, die Ordnung im Tal herzustellen und sowohl den *agraristas* wie den großen Landbesitzerfamilien „Sicherheiten zu erteilen".[59] In Naranja und nahe gelegenen Orten wurden in den folgenden Wochen mehrere prominente *agraristas* umgebracht.[60] Einer der Brüder Noriega, Alfredo, wandte sich Ende November des Jahres an den Staatspräsidenten und wies darauf hin, dass ein Höhepunkt der Ausschreitungen erreicht und die Wirtschaft im Tal vom Ruin bedroht sei. Die *agraristas* würden „unzählige Gewalttaten" verüben, „[…] töten, Frauen vergewaltigen und alles stehlen, was sie auf dem Weg finden."[61] Padilla zufolge begann die Epoche des „Terrors des *agrarismo*".[62]

Eine Welle der Repression, stärker als die vorangegangenen, war die Folge. Am 27. Dezember überfielen Bundestruppen und „Weiße Garden" aus Cantabria die Dörfer Naranja, Tirindaro und Tarejero. In einem Telegraphenbericht hieß es:

> *Heute morgen um fünf Uhr tauchte die Bundesarmee in dem Dorf Naranja auf und beging unbeschreibliche Grausamkeiten […] Die Mitglieder des Verwaltungskomitees wurden erhängt, die Frauen Isadora Serrato, Valentina N. Salud Moreno und María de la Cruz geschlagen". Ein Ziel der Aktion durch das 62. Regiment war es, Trinidad Calderóns habhaft zu werden, der des bewaffneten Raubüberfalls beschuldigte wurde. Zum Ortsgefängnis gebracht,, wurde Calderón dort von einem Offizier getötet: „Als sie das Gefängnis erreichten, sagte Leutnant Miguel Penaloza zu Trinidad Calderon: Es wird*

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56 Brief von Primo Tapia, 19.12.1925, in: Martínez, *Semblanza,* (Anm. 34), S. 227.

57 RAN. Fondo Cuerpo Consultivo Agrario. Exp. 2738, 263 fjs. Vol. 2. Dotacion de ejidos de Naranja. Brief von Marcelino Espinoza an den Präsidenten der Comisión Agraria, 25.05.1924.

58 Brief von A.y E. Noriega an Sidronio Sánchez Pineda v. 25.05.1924. AGN/O.C. Vol. 350 Exp. 818-N-12.

59 RAN. Fondo Cuerpo Consultivo Agrario. Exp. 2738, 263 fjs. Vol. 2. Dotacion de ejidos de Naranja, 06.06.1924.

60 Es heißt, daß Alejandro Galvan von dem Aufseher der Besitzung, Daniel de la Cruz, in Naranja „niederträchtig umgebracht" wurde. In San Agustin del Pulque und Tzintzimacato wurden weitere agraristas umgebracht: Blas Tinoco, „Erzfeind des agrarismo und bedingungsloser Anhänger der Großgrundbesitzer von Cantabria, brachte den Kollegen Arnulfo Ramírez um." RAN. Fondo Cuerpo Consultivo Agrario. Exp. 2738, 263 fjs. Vol. 2. Dotacion de ejidos de Naranja, 19.07.1924/31.07.1924.

61 Archivo Secretaria de la Defensa Nacional. Departamento de Archivo (im folgenden: ASDN), Correspondencia e Historia. Archivo de Cancelados. Exp. N. XI/111/3-963. Bericht über Beschwerden vorgebracht gegen die Bundestruppen.

62 Jose Padilla, Tirindaro, Morelia 1977, S. 73.

dir schlecht ergehen, Du Bandit, und er gab ihm eine Ohrfeige, so dass dieser auswich, und dann fügte Penaloza hinzu: Weich nicht aus, Du Schuft, und unverzüglich schoss er dreimal, bis der Andere hinfiel; dann wandte er sich an diejenigen, die im Gefängnis waren und drohte ihnen die gleiche Strafe an. Dabei beobachtete er, dass Calderon sich bewegte, und er schoss noch zweimal auf ihn, bis er richtig tot war.[63]

Während der folgenden Tage wurden die gemeinsamen Terroraktionen von Armee und „Weißen Garden" im Tal ausgeweitet. Die Quellen berichten, dass die Leichen von *agraristas* an die Tore und Pfosten der Häuser gebunden und öffentlich zur Schau gestellt wurden.[64] Primo Tapia, Crispin Serrato und Tomas Cruz klagten in einem Brief an den Staatspräsidenten, die Bevölkerung werde unterdrückt und sei Opfer von „Morden" aus „Lust an der Grausamkeit", wobei die Schuldigen unbestraft blieben.[65]

6. Kontexte der Gewalt

Die Quellen zeigen, daß Tapia nicht nur ein wichtiger Agitator und regionaler Führer des *agrarismo* war, der sich zwischen Staat und Dorf, Recht und Illegalität, Brauchtum und Revolution bewegte, sondern daß er auch direkt und unmittelbar Gewalt ausübte und überdies scheinbar von dieser Gewalt auch fasziniert war. Tapia war gemeinsam mit Anhängern und Mitstreitern in Morde, Attentate, Überfälle und gewalttätige Einschüchterungen, die überwiegend die Zivilverteidigung von Naranja zu verantworten hatte, eingebunden. Dabei geriet er immer wieder in Konflikt mit persönlichen Feinden und politischen Gegnern, wobei diese Gegner auch innerhalb der Machtfraktionen, regionalen Kräftezentren und nur lose verflochtenen Institutionen, die wir unter dem Begriff des postrevolutionären Staates zusammenfassen, selbst zu suchen waren. Der Staat war kein homogener Akteur. Auf Grundlage der Verfassung von 1917 verteilte der Staat in begrenztem Umfang Land und schuf die Agrarreform. Jedoch setzte er die Agrarreform nur zögerlich um. Nicht immer half die Armee dabei den Nutznießern der Agrarreform, den *agraristas*, sondern verschiedentlich paktierten ihre Offiziere mit den großen Landbesitzern, die ihrerseits paramilitärische Einheiten unterhielten und gegebenenfalls auch ohne den Staat das, was sie als Ordnung verstanden, durchzusetzen suchten. Vor Ort hatte das Gesetz des Staates wenig Bedeutung, soweit es um die Ausübung der politischen Macht ging. Stattdessen existierte ein Raum, in dem die Vorstellungen lokaler Bevölkerungen über die legitime Ausübung von Gewalt darüber entschieden, was rechtens war, was nicht.

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63   ASDN, Correspondencia e Historia. Archivo de Cancelados. Exp. N. XI/111/3-963, Berichte über die Todesfälle Trinidad Calderon, Hilario Bernal und Fermin Rivera.

64   ASDN, Correspondencia e Historia. Archivo de Cancelados. Exp. N. XI/111/3-963 General Brig. Felix Lopez, C. Bericht von Luis Monzon über die Vorkommnisse bei der Ermordung von Hilario Bernal und Fermin Rivera v. 11.01.1925.

65   AGN/O.C. Vol.351, Exp. 818-N-12, Anexo III. Schreiben von Primo Tapia, Crispin Serrato, Tomas Cruz an den Präsidenten der Republik, 04.09.1925.

Trotz der Präsenz von Bundestruppen und der Bewachung der Landgüter durch die „Wei-
ßen Garden" führten Tapia und seiner Anhänger immer wieder Gewaltaktionen durch,
die mit politischer wie auch mit religiöser Symbolkraft behaftet waren. Dies deutet auf
die Existenz einer politischen Kultur mit einer im lokalen Milieu entwickelten Fähig-
keit hin, die kommunikative Bedeutung einer Gewalthandlung „richtig" zu verstehen und
Gewaltepisoden zu erinnern und auf diese Weise für die symbolische Reproduktion von
Gesellschaft nutzbar zu machen. Die symbolisch gerichtete Gewalt äußerte sich besonders
deutlich in den antiklerikalen Handlungen, in der Entweihung der Kirchen, die in den
Dörfern zu Lagerhäusern gemacht wurden, und in den Angriffen auf Priester und wie es
hieß die „verhassten Katholiken" im Dorf. Jedoch war die Gewalttat anscheinend nur
gering ritualisiert. Es gibt in den Berichten der Zeit kaum Anhaltspunkte dafür, dass die
körperliche Gewalttat zu einem Zeremoniell geworden wäre, in das die Gewalttäter Ge-
duld und Zeit investiert hätten. Die Gewalt wurde in der Regel nicht aufwendig inszeniert,
sondern von kleinen Gruppen von Männern schnell zur Ausführung gebracht, durch Er-
schießungen, Messerstiche, Hiebe mit der Machete, wodurch man Feinde beseitigte.
Im Dezember 1924 und Anfang 1925 durchzog die Gewalt das gesamte Tal von Zacapu
und versetzte die Bevölkerung in Schrecken. Gewalttaten wie das Erhängen oder die
Zurschaustellung von Leichen an den Palisaden der Landbesitzungen dienten der Aus-
breitung von Angst und der Einschüchterung der Menschen. Die Gewalt zielte auf das
Heim und die Familie. Auch die vielen Plünderungen, von denen berichtet wird, zeigen
die Verletzbarkeit der Sicherheit des Hauses. Gesondert zu betrachten bleibt die Rolle
der Frau als Gewaltopfer. Die gegen den Körper und die Identität der Frau gerichtete
Gewalt war eine Form, Überlegenheit und Macht zu beweisen. Es gibt in den Quellen
Hinweise auf Vergewaltigungen von Frauen. Jedoch fällt der Mangel an Berichten darü-
ber auf. Dabei ist unklar, ob dies der Sprache der Zeit geschuldet war oder ob es ein Tabu
gab, das es im kulturellen Milieu der Dörfer verbot, davon zu erzählen.
Trotz der Atmosphäre der Einschüchterung und trotz der Entkräftung der ländlichen
Bevölkerung wurde im Lauf des Jahres 1925 eine Bodenreform durchgeführt. Diese Re-
form stand im Zacapu-Tal in engem Zusammenhang mit Tapias Wirken. Doch alsbald
kollidierten Tapias Radikalität wie auch die Autorität, die er unter seiner *indiada* besaß,
mit den autoritären Ansprüchen der Zentralregierung unter Führung des Staatspräsi-
denten Plutarco Elias Calles. Calles sah in der Landreform kaum Mehr als ein notwen-
diges Übel, das der Rhetorik des postrevolutionären Staates geschuldet war, das in seiner
tatsächlichen Durchführung aber möglichst gering zu halten war. Während Tapia sich
noch wie er schrieb als „Herr der Lage" wähnte, geriet er tatsächlich bereits ins politische
Abseits, indem ihm auf den politischen Ebenen außerhalb des Tals und oberhalb der
lokalen Gesellschaft Schutz und Unterstützung verloren gingen.
Tapia verkörperte die revolutionäre Utopie der Dörfer auf einer neuen symbolischen
Ebene. Die Einforderung der politischen Aktivität der Frau, das Auslöschen der Re-
ligion zugunsten einer neuen Idee von Bildung und Weltdeutung, die Propagierung
der gemeinschaftlichen Feldarbeit, die Veränderung der Sprache und Begriffe (Worte
wie Revolution, Klasse, Bolschewik, Gewerkschaft oder *campesino* wurden zu neuen

Leitformeln im Sprachgebrauch), schließlich der Gebrauch politischer Gewalt, all dies verknüpfte Tapia zu einer neuen, „kommunistischen" Utopie, die unter den Teilen der Bevölkerung, die in Tapia einen der Ihren sahen und ihm Gefolgschaft boten, ein großes Echo fand. Tapia entwarf das Modell einer ruralen Gesellschaft, in die weder Ausländer paßten noch Menschen, die sich seinen Ideen entgegenstellten. Im Inneren der Gemeinden sollte die Ordnung und Disziplin „guter" Revolutionäre herrschen.

Tapias Sprache war hart, wenn sie von der Gewalttat erzählte. Sätze wie: „Alle Welt ist *agrarista*, sogar die Hunde", während die Feinde der Agrarreform bald im „Himmel" seien[66], sprechen eine zynische Sprache der Gewalt. Die Gewalt stellte für Tapia eine Ressource dar, derer er sich zur Herstellung einer gewünschten Welt bediente. Dazu musste die alte Gesellschaft mit ihren Ritualen und Bedeutungen zerstört werden, um Platz zu machen für das Neue. Deshalb galt Tapias Kampf nicht zuletzt der Kirche, deren Repräsentanten er voller Haß verfolgte, und den überkommenen Symbolen und Ordnungsvorstellungen der Religion. Trotz seiner lokalen Prägung zeigte sich Tapia hier als Teil einer Internationale der Intellektuellen, die in den frühen 1920er Jahren weltweit an ganz verschiedenen Orten der Vision eines neuen Lebens nachjagten. Um dieses Ziel zu erreichen, mussten Feinde vernichtet werden. Die Gewalt war das Heilmittel im Kampf für eine neue Welt.

Die Gewalt ereignete sich zwischen Nachbarn und auch im Inneren der Familien, wie die ethnographischen Informationen zeigen, die der Anthropologe Friedrich in den 1950er Jahren auf der Grundlage der Befragung von überlebenden Zeitzeugen zusammenstellte.[67] Tapia kannte wenig Skrupel, was den Gewaltgebrauch betraf. Er umgab sich mit Männern, die bereit waren, zu töten. Auch er selbst tötete, wenngleich er meist im Hintergrund blieb. Briefe Tapias legen nahe, daß er von der Gewalt angetan war. Vielleicht berauschte sie ihn gar. Persönliche Feindschaften und politische Gegnerschaften waren dabei nicht klar zu trennen. Tapia und die Männer und Frauen, die ihn bewunderten, waren polarisierende Elemente in einer ländlichen Gesellschaft, die vor und nach der Revolution eine starke Entstrukturalisierung erlitt, mitunter in Elend, sozialer Dissolution und politischer Vernachlässigung versank. Die Parteien, Komitees und paramilitärischen Verteidigungsgruppen, die während der Revolution im Tal von Zacapu entstanden, begründeten eine neue Landschaft der Möglichkeiten politischen, gesellschaftlichen und wirtschaftlichen Aufstiegs. Die Generation junger Männer, die aus unteren sozialen Verhältnissen im Dorf stammte, häufig in Armut und Perspektivlosigkeit aufgewachsen war und in der Revolution nun die Chance zur Verbesserung der eigenen Lebenslage aufleuchten sah, bildete die Säulen der Gewaltausübung. Tapia und andere revolutionäre Intellektuelle in den Dörfern sahen in der Gewalt ein Medium, um diese Menschen zu mobilisieren. Sie knüpften dazu an den stark verwurzelten Gefühlen wie dem seit Generationen überlieferten Hass gegen Fremde an und versuchten, die daraus erwachsende Gewaltbereitschaft mit ihren aggressiven Empfindungen auf neue, im Zeitjargon revolutionäre Ziele zu lenken. Diese neue Bereitschaft zur Gewalt war der Motor, der

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66   Brief von Primo Tapia an Apolinar Martinez Mugica, 19.12.1924., in: Martínez, Semblanza, (Anm. 34), S. 227.
67   Vgl. Friedrich, Agrarian Revolt (Anm. 26), Kapitel 5; ders., Princes of Naranja (Anm. 26), S. 240.

alles Weitere in Gang setzte. Die Zerbrechlichkeit des Lebens wurde dadurch immer augenscheinlicher und beherrschte Mitte der 1920er Jahren den Alltag der Menschen in den Dörfern und Siedlungen des Tals.

7. Alte und neue Gewaltorganisation

Es scheint, dass Figuren wir Tapia hergebrachte Gewaltdispositionen aufgriffen und neu bündelten und ihnen dadurch eine neue Dynamik verliehen. Obwohl Tapia es verstand, die hergekommene Insekurität im Tal, wo die Menschen dem Recht des Staates nicht trauten, in eine politische Gewalt neuer Art zu transformieren, löste er sich jedoch nicht völlig aus den hergebrachten Mustern personal und verwandtschaftlich gebundener Gewaltorganisation, wie sie den Menschen im Tal vertraut waren. Die Gewalt, die Tapia organisierte, rankte sich um ein Netz von ihm loyalen Anführern. Manche von ihnen waren bereits seit Jahren in den Dörfern als Gewalttäter berüchtigt und hatten sich dort in Zweikämpfen und Familienfehden hervorgetan. Diese Männer stellten den besonders gewalttätigen Kern der Zivilverteidigungen der *agraristas*. Zugleich aber wurden in der postrevolutionären Zeit der innere Zusammenhalt und die lokale, auch ethnische Identität der Dörfer durch eine neue Gewaltorganisation aufgebrochen, in deren Kern eine neue Sprache stand, die sich um den Klassenkampf und die Revolution drehte und deren Korsett von im Tal wandernden, mobilen Gewalttätern gebildet wurde. Allerdings sagen die Quellen wenig über dieses Geschehen und das Nomadisieren der Gewalt aus. Vor allem wissen wir wenig über die meist jüngeren Männer, die sich im Tal und im umgrenzenden Umland bewegten, die ihre Sesshaftigkeit zumindest sporadisch aufgaben und die dem Anschein nach für einen Großteil der Gewalt in jener Zeit verantwortlich waren.

Trotz aller Eskalationen blieb die Gewalttat im Zacapu-Tal Mitte der 1920er Jahre begrenzt. Sie richtete sich auch auf ihrem Höhepunkt zumeist gegen einzelne Personen, die man kannte, mit denen es Rechnungen zu begleichen galt und deren Familien beschädigt werden sollten. Es fehlte die ungebremste, mitunter wahllose Gewalttat, die die Tötung ganzer Gruppen zum Ziel hatte. Die Gewalt hatte nach wie vor den Einzelnen zum Ziel. Vieles spricht dafür, dass sich hierin die soziale Struktur einer ländlichen Gesellschaft spiegelte, in der neben den verwandtschaftlichen Beziehungen klientelare Bindungen und personale Loyalitäten traditionsgemäß von großer Bedeutung waren, soweit es die Organisation von Gemeinschaft betraf, sowie die traditionale Kontur eines politischen Raums, in dem personenbezogene Formen politischer Auseinandersetzung nach wie vor ein starkes Gewicht besaßen. Die Individualisierung der Gewalt war die Voraussetzung dafür, dass die Gewaltbeziehungen erfolgreich durch reziproke Prinzipien steuerbar blieben.[68] Denn erst, wenn der Name eines Täters bzw. seine Identität und Familienzugehörigkeit bekannt waren, war es im zeitgenössischen Milieu der Dörfer möglich, Vergeltung zu üben.

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68   Vgl. dazu Michael Riekenberg, Gewaltsegmente, Leipzig 2004, S. 19 ff.

Aus dieser überkommenen Struktur der Gewaltorganisation erwuchsen Verhaltenszwänge, die es zu beachten galt, wollte man überleben. Das galt auch für Revolutionäre wie Tapia. Nichts zeigt dies deutlicher als seine ständigen Einforderungen von „Sicherheit" und Schutz, von denen in den Quellen immer wieder zu lesen ist. Diese Forderung nach Schutz des eigenen Lebens und es eigenen Körpers mutet wie ein Ritual an. Es zeugt von einer informellen Logik des Konfliktaustrags, die „hinter" dem Staat und dessen Recht existierte und die dazu beitrug, die Gewalttat in ihren Ausmaßen zu regulieren. Die Forderung an Andere, die eigene Sicherheit zu garantieren, appellierte an einen Verhaltenskodex, der mit dem Anspruch des Staates auf ein rechtlich verfasstes Gewaltmonopol nichts gemein hatte, sondern vielmehr eine Selbsthilfeinstitution darstellte, die sich im staatsfernen Raum erhalten hatte und die mit der Idee des Staates rivalisierte. Indem dieser Verhaltenskodex den Mächtigen dazu anhielt, Rücksicht auf den Unterlegenen zu nehmen, entweder weil es die Ehre gebot oder aber weil der Überlegene andernfalls selbst Rachehandlungen zu befürchten hatte, dämmte er, solange er funktionierte, die Gewalttat ein und verhinderte, dass die Gewalttat in eine grenzenlose Verfolgung und Vernichtung Unterlegener überging.

Die Forderung nach persönlichen Sicherheiten und Schutzgarantien entstammte also nicht allein den Unzulänglichkeiten des Staates, derer sich die Menschen bewusst waren, sondern waren eine Verhaltensgewohnheit in einer staatsfernen, ruralen Welt, in der die Menschen, weil sie dazu gezwungen waren, gelernt hatten, durch reziproke Mechanismen und wechselseitige Rituale des Drohens wie des Versprechens sich das Minimum an Schutz der eigenen Person und des eigenen Körpers zu erhandeln, das ihnen von anderer Seite nicht gegeben wurde. Denn in den labilen Gleichgewichtslagen der Gewalttat, in denen die Menschen im mexikanischen Hochland nicht erst seit der Revolutionszeit lebten, kannten sie keine beständige Sicherheit, weil niemand den Anderen von der Gewaltausübung abzuhalten vermochte. Tapia und seine Mitstreiter wie seine Gegner waren insofern nicht allein Gewalttäter, sondern sie waren zugleich auch Akteure, die in Verfolgung und Angst lebten. Insofern nährte sich das gegenseitige Einfordern von Sicherheiten aus der wechselseitigen Angst, die zwischen den Menschen existierte, und der Instabilität des menschlichen Beziehungsgeflechts, wie es in Zeiten der Gewalt in Lateinamerika vielfach existierte. Insofern war die Gewalt im Zacapu-Tal von einem Sicherheitsdilemma der Menschen bestimmt, wie es für staatsferne Räume in Lateinamerika vielfach typisch war.[69] Zugleich lag in diesem Dilemma eine Begrenzung der Gewalt begründet. Es markierte eine Grenze in der Gewalt, die auch revolutionäre Intellektuelle nicht zu überschreiten vermochten, auch um den Schutz der eigenen Person willen.

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69 Ausführlich Riekenberg, Gewaltsegmente (Anm. 68), dort auch weitere Literaturhinweise. Zum Sicherheitsdilemma vgl. auch Waldmann, Asymmetrie (Anm. 14), S. 254 f.

BERICHT

Erinnerungskulturen post-imperialer Nationen

Dietmar Rothermund

Der Ökonom Moritz Bonn veröffentlichte 1938 ein Buch mit dem Titel *The Crumbling of Empires.* Er hatte bereits 1931 das Wort „Dekolonisierung" geprägt. In seinem Buch verkündete er, dass nun einer Zeit des „empire making" eine Zeit des „empire breaking" folgen würde. Seine Voraussage erwies sich als richtig. Gleich nach dem Krieg verloren Italien und Japan ihre Kolonien. Großbritannien war nach dem Krieg nahezu bankrott und bei seiner Kolonie Indien hoch verschuldet. Da es leichter ist, einen Gläubiger als einen Schuldner in die Unabhängigkeit zu entlassen, gewährten die Briten 1947 Indien die Freiheit, nachdem freilich die indische Interimsregierung ein Moratorium unterzeichnet hatte und so auf einen sofortigen Zugriff auf Indiens Guthaben verzichtete. Die Niederlande und Frankreich, die unter Hitlers Herrschaft gelitten und erst nach dem Krieg ihre Souveränität wieder erlangt hatten, beharrten darauf, ihre Kolonialherrschaft zu erneuern und wollten dem britischen Beispiel nicht folgen. Doch schließlich sahen sie sich nach schweren Kämpfen dazu gezwungen, ihre Kolonien in Asien aufzugeben. In Afrika machten sich Frankreich und Großbritannien 1960 geradezu Konkurrenz in einem Wettrennen der Dekolonisierung. Nur Algerien blieb 1960 noch unter französischer Herrschaft und wurde erst ein Jahr später nach einem blutigen Krieg frei, der auf beiden Seiten tiefe Wunden hinterlassen hat. Belgien zog sich zu dieser Zeit überstürzt aus dem Kongo zurück und Portugal hielt unter der Diktatur Salazars unnachgiebig an seiner Kolonialherrschaft fest. Erst eine Revolution, die 1974 Portugal die Demokratie sicherte, führte auch zur Befreiung der Kolonien.

Bisher hat man die Prägung der Erinnerungskulturen dieser post-imperialen Nationen kaum miteinander verglichen. Im Mai 2013 trafen sich nun Vertreter dieser sieben Nationen im Internationalen Wissenschaftsforum Heidelberg, um einen solchen Versuch zu unternehmen. Eingeladen hatten dazu die Professoren Dietmar Rothermund und Gita Dharampal-Frick von Südasieninstitut der Universität Heidelberg. Gefördert wurde die Konferenz von der Robert-Bosch-Stiftung, Stuttgart. Aus Großbritannien kam John Darwin (Oxford), aus den Niederlanden Gert Oostindie (Director des Royal Institute of Southeast Asian and Caribbean Studies, Leiden). Belgien war durch den jungen Historiker Pedro Monaville (z.Zt. University of Michigan) vertreten. Erice Savarese (Universität Nizza) sprach über Frankreich und Antonio Coasta Pinto (Universität Lissabon) über Portugal. Schließlich ging es um die beiden Mächte, die im Krieg besiegt wurden und so ihre Kolonien verloren: Italien, vertreten durch Nicola Labanca (Universität Siena) und Japan vertreten durch Takashi Fujitani (Universität Toronto). Jedes Referat wurde sachkundig kommentiert. Die Kommentatoren seien hier nur kurz in der oben angegebenen Reihenfolge der Referate erwähnt: Astrid Erll (Frankfurt), Dietmar Rothermund, Gita Dharampal-Frick, Jan Jansen (Konstanz), Radu Carciumaru (wie die folgenden), Caroline Lüderssen, Wolfgang Seifert (alle Heidelberg). Gesamtkommentare in der Schlussdiskussion trugen Aleida Assmann (Konstanz) und Partha S. Ghosh (JNU Delhi) vor.

Es ist nicht möglich, auf die einzelnen Referate im Detail einzugehen, stattdessen sollen einige Punkte herausgegriffen werden, die in mehreren Referaten angesprochen wurden. Fast alle Referenten konnten von einer langen anfänglichen Periode des Schweigens berichten, die oft als „Amnesie" bezeichnet wurde. Doch Amnesie ist eine individuelle Krankheit. Als Bezeichnung für ein „Aussetzen" des kollektiven Gedächtnisses ist sie ungeeignet. Hier kann eher von einer Verschwörung des Schweigens gesprochen werden. Wer unter Amnesie leidet, wird versuchen, sein Gedächtnis wiederzufinden, wer sich an einer Verschwörung des Schweigens beteiligt, ist daran interessiert, dass niemand das Schweigen bricht. Wenn aber das Schweigen durch gewisse Anlässe gebrochen wird, kommt es oft zu heftigen Debatten, die sogar als „Erinnerungskriege" (guerre de mémoires) bezeichnet worden sind. Besonders in Frankreich, wo der Kampf um Algerien noch immer nachwirkt, sind die Konflikte virulent. Dort stand die rund eine Million „repatriierter" Siedler aus Algerien, die so genannten „pieds noirs" im Mittelpunkt der Auseinandersetzungen. „Erinnerungsmacher" aus diesen Kreisen haben es vermocht, die Solidarität ihrer Klientel zu sichern und den französischen Politikern einzureden, dass die „pieds noirs" als Stimmenblock wahlentscheidend sein können. Unter Präsident Chirac wurde daher 2005 ein Gesetz verabschiedet, dass die Anerkennung der französischen Leistungen in Nordafrika forderte und die Historiker dazu verpflichten sollte, dies in ihren Werken zu berücksichtigen. Das Gesetz rief einen Sturm der Entrüstung hervor. Es zeigte, mit welchen Methoden die „Erinnerungskultur" gelenkt werden sollte.

Die Anwesenheit von Immigranten aus den ehemaligen Kolonien hat die Erinnerungskultur einiger post-imperialer Nationen stark geprägt. Dabei spielten die Anlässe der Migration eine besondere Rolle. In Großbritannien hatte diese Immigration keine politischen sondern wirtschaftliche Gründe. Die Migranten suchten in Großbritannien Ar-

beit und fanden sie zunächst auch. Die Einwanderungsgesetze waren zunächst sehr liberal, weil die „Erinnerungskultur" es geradezu verlangte, die friedliche Verwandlung des „Empire" in ein „Commonwealth of Nations" zu fördern. Dazu gehörte eben auch die unbehinderte Einwanderung. Erst nach und nach wurden die entsprechenden Gesetze verschärft, wobei jedoch darauf geachtet wurde, dass der Gesetzestext keine rassische Diskriminierung enthielt. In den Niederlanden hatte die Einwanderung zunächst rein politische Gründe. Die erste Welle bestand aus den aus Indonesien vertriebenen „Europäern", darunter ehemalige Kolonialbeamte aber auch Mischlinge, so genannte „Indos". Durch Anerkennung seitens des niederländischen Vaters wurde der Mischling zum „Europäer" und hatte das Bürgerrecht, das es ihm erlaubte, in den Niederlanden zu wohnen, ihn andererseits aber auch der Vertreibung aus Indonesien aussetzte. Die zweite Welle kam, als Surinam 1975 die Unabhängigkeit erlangte und nahezu 150 000 Menschen von dort in die Niederlande übersiedelten, weil sie mit der neuen Regierung des Landes, die aus Afro-Amerikanern bestand, nicht einverstanden waren. Sie flohen vor allem deshalb so rasch, weil sie fürchteten, dass ihnen die Bürgerrechte, die ihnen den Zugang zu den Niederlanden erlaubten, vielleicht bald entzogen werden könnten. Als dritte Welle, die immer noch anhält, kamen die schwarzen Bürger der Antillen, deren Bürgerrecht erhalten blieb, weil diese Kolonien die Entlassung in die Unabhängigkeit verweigerten. Der Zugang zu den Niederlanden war ihnen wichtiger als die Selbstbestimmung. Gerade diese schwarzen Bürger haben die Erinnerungskultur der Niederlande nachhaltig geprägt, weil sie eine Entschuldigung für das alte Unrecht der Sklaverei forderten. Die niederländische Regierung hat sich entschuldigt und zudem noch ein großes Monument errichten lassen, das an die Sklaverei gemahnt.

In Belgien war eine besonders intensive Verschwörung des Schweigens zu verzeichnen, bis das Buch eines amerikanischen Autors über die Schreckensherrschaft König Leopolds im Kongo und dann das Buch eines belgischen Autors über die Komplizen, die an der Ermordung des ersten kongolesischen Premierministers Lumumba beteiligt waren, die Nation erschütterten. Immigranten aus dem Kongo spielten in Belgien keine große Rolle. Das unterschied Belgien deutlich von den benachbarten Niederlanden. Die Tatsache, das Belgien eine geteilte Nation ist, war jedoch auch für die Erinnerungskultur prägend. Die Flamen sind der Meinung, dass die Kolonialherrschaft allein eine Angelegenheit der wallonischen Bourgeoisie gewesen sei, die Bauern Flanderns hätten keinen Anteil daran gehabt.

Portugal hat ähnlich wie Belgien keine nennenswerte Einwanderung aus den Ex-Kolonien zu verzeichnen. Die portugiesischen Siedler, die aus den Kolonien zurückkehrten, waren zum Großteil noch nicht lange dort gewesen und kehrten problemlos in ihre Heimat zurück. Die portugiesische Erinnerungskultur ist von dem Stolz auf die Seefahrer und Entdeckungsreisenden geprägt, die man nicht mit den Gewalttaten der Kolonialherrschaft assoziiert. Der „Lusotropicalismus", der besagt, dass die Portugiesen nicht rassistisch sind und sich harmonisch in die Gesellschaften ihrer „überseeischen Provinzen" einfügten, findet auch heute noch ein Echo.

Die post-imperiale Erinnerungskultur Italiens war durch eine lange Verschwörung des Schweigens gekennzeichnet, die auch darin einen besonderen Grund hatte, dass der italienische Imperialismus in seiner letzten Phase faschistisch geprägt war. Die Rückkehr der Italiener aus den Kolonien spielte im Heimatland keine besondere Rolle. Sie zeigten kaum Interesse daran, sich zu organisieren. Die Einwanderung von Menschen aus den Ex-Kolonien war geringfügig. Erst in neuerer Zeit sind viele Immigranten nach Italien eingeströmt, doch sie stammen fast ausnahmslos nicht aus den früheren italienischen Kolonien. Bei der jüngsten Regierungsbildung in Italien wurde eine Afrikanerin, die aus dem Kongo stammt, zur Integrationsministerin ernannt.

Japan, das zur selben Zeit wie Italien seine Kolonien verlor, war auch durch eine lange Verschwörung des Schweigens gekennzeichnet. Wie Takashi Fujitani nachwies, wurde diese Verschwörung von der amerikanischen Siegermacht begünstigt, die Japan als Bundesgenossen im Kalten Krieg brauchte und daher kein Interesse daran hatte, die Japaner zur „Vergangenheitsbewältigung" anzuhalten. Dabei war die japanische Kolonialherrschaft über Taiwan und Korea äußerst intensiv gewesen. Rund 750 000 Japaner kehrten nach dem Krieg aus Korea zurück und fast ebenso viele Koreaner, die während des Krieges als Zwangsarbeiter nach Japan gebracht worden waren, blieben auch nach dem Krieg dort. Die „gefrorene Erinnerung" dieser Gruppen trug nichts zur Herausbildung einer Erinnerungskultur bei. In jüngster Zeit machte sich jedoch ein anti-amerikanischer japanischer Nationalismus bemerkbar, der die Verschwörung des Schweigens brach, nun aber geradezu eine Verherrlichung der japanischen Kolonialherrschaft betrieb. Der Autor Kobayashi, der mit dem populären Medium „Manga" Millionen von Lesern erreicht, ist ein Vorkämpfer dieser neuen Form der Erinnerungskultur. Moderate Wissenschaftler, denen es um eine realistische Untersuchung der japanischen Kolonialherrschaft geht, haben gegen Autoren wie Kobayashi kaum eine Chance, gehört zu werden.

Die Diskussionen über die Darstellungen der Probleme der sieben Nationen ergaben, dass eine weitere Beschäftigung mit den Verschiedenheiten der Erinnerungskulturen sehr lohnend sein dürfte. Die Bedeutung der Literatur für die Erinnerungskultur wurde nur gelegentlich behandelt. Hier könnten weitere Untersuchungen ansetzen. „Post-koloniale Studien" mit ihrer Betonung der Diskursanalyse wurde von den meisten Referenten nicht sehr geschätzt. Als Historiker oder Politologen fanden sie diese Studien zu realitätsfern.

BUCHBESPRECHUNGEN

Rezensiert von
Mairi MacDonald, Toronto

In the second introductory chapter of this rich and interesting collection of papers, François-Charles Mougel proposes that the work be seen as an approach towards a "global history of the colonial world," that one might dare to call "post-post-colonial studies" (p. 36).[1] The book is admirably broad in scope and, in its focus on empirical case studies, it does avoid the reductionist binary of dominant/dominated that lies at the heart of some post-colonial studies. However, it seems unlikely that its focus on European colonial elites will distract scholarly attention from the impact of colonial rule, either on the colonized or on the colonizer. This is not to say that the case studies are anything short of fas-

cinating. As Claire Laux, François-Joseph Ruggiu and Pierre Singaravélou point out in their introductory explanation of the approach taken in the chapters and at the conference at which they were first presented, the comparative method offers a number of fruitful analytical avenues to examining the social history of a dominating class. They define "elites" as "individuals in a given location who enjoy both mastery of local forms of power … and the social recognition that goes with it" (p. 20). The essays consider three main types of colonial elites: people in the metropole who interest themselves in the empire; metropolitans sent to administer, exploit or people the empire; and so-called créoles, whom they define as members of the local elite that were born in colonized areas. Laux et al. posit that the unique qualities of imperial elites are their polyvalence and their mobility (p. 24). By polyvalence, they mean that elites frequently occupied a number of roles simultaneously, a reaction to both material and demographic constraints. Thus an administrator may be at once judge, prosecutor, police officer and diplomat. This should not come as a surprise to any student of Europe's colonial empires, which seemed determined (at least at some times and in some places) to extract the greatest possible material benefit for the metropole at the lowest pos-

sible cost. More surprising, perhaps, is the mobility of colonial elites, both between colonies and the metropole, and among the colonies themselves.

As the editors point out (p. 25), the essays also show the interesting possibilities of comparison over time and space. For instance, L. H. Roper's examination of the Anglo-American elite in the Thirteen Colonies (and the Caribbean) offers an interesting contrast to Donald Fyson's consideration of the fate of Quebec's francophone elites after their conquest by the United Kingdom in 1761. Roper posits that in his mobility, his power and his limitations Sir John Yeamans is "a highly representative member in general of [pre-revolutionary Anglo-American] political culture" (p. 143; emphasis in original). Yeamans epitomizes a geographic and social mobility, as well as the transfer of ideas and techniques for dealing with the fundamental fact of both Barbadian and southern American plantation economies: their reliance on enslaved African labor. Fyson focuses on a very different elite: the creole – but not métis – francophone elite in Quebec or Lower Canada during the period between its conquest by the United Kingdom in 1761 and its union with Upper Canada in 1841. This elite continued to enjoy social mobility and a degree of privilege, but were restricted by religion, geography and, especially, by language.

Roper and Fyson, together with many of the other contributors to this volume, perform a most useful service. They summarize the post-colonial historiographies of the colonies in question, seeking and finding cogent explanations for why the stories of these elites have been ignored or misinterpreted. Indeed the volume can serve as an excellent introduction to post-colonial historiographies – in these two cases, emphasizing the exceptional nature of the elite and the "nation" each created; in most of the other cases, focusing on metropolitan historiography.

The volume contains eleven chapters, six in English and five in French, plus the two introductory reflections and a conclusion from Pierre Guillaume (all in French). It does, indeed, range from the sixteenth to the twentieth centuries: from Youri Akimov's exploration of Siberian warlords to the rather frustrated efforts of Mussolini and of Belgium to ensure that the "right sort" of elite would populate and control their brief imperial excursions in Ethiopia and Congo, explored respectively by Gian Luca Podestà and by Amandine Lauro and Valérie Piette. Martin Thomas provides an admirably clear exploration of the nature of the "colons" in France's North African empire, especially in Algeria. Along the way the papers take in Anglo-India (Elizabeth Buettner), modern Portuguese colonies (MafaldaSoares da Cunha), Dutch Indonesia (Elsbeth Locher-Scholten and Leonard Blussé), and the "imagined" elites of the German colonial empire (Winfried Speitkamp). Though not always edited to a standard that will prove satisfactory to the native English-speaker, the papers succeed admirably in illustrating both the diversity and the commonality of the elites of Europe's far-flung empires.

Guillaume's conclusion returns to the current battle in French scholarship over post-colonial studies. He is at pains to point out that there is no political agenda in the label "elite": it is simply a sociological observation. Nevertheless, and despite the excellent avenues for future research

that he sketches out, it seems unlikely that either this volume or this line of inquiry can defuse the emotional, political tension embedded in "post-colonial" studies. His last suggestion, to research the role of European elites in the evolution of the erstwhile "colonized", now developing nations – comes closest to grappling with that tension. Some very good work has already been done in this regard.[2] Though it promises to shed light on the transition from colonial to post-colonial, however, it has not yet transcended the binary of dominating-dominated – at least not in the popular, post-colonial, imaginary.

Notes:
1   All translations from the French are mine.
2   For example, see J. M. Hodge, Triumph of the Expert. Agrarian Doctrines of Development and the Legacies of British Colonialism, Athens OH 2007.

Michael Borgolte / Julia Dücker / Marcel Müllerburg / Paul Predatsch / Bernd Schneidmüller (Hrsg.): Europa im Geflecht der Welt. Mittelalterliche Migrationen in globalen Bezügen (= Europa im Mittelalter, Bd. 20), Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2012, 283 S.

Rezensiert von
Wolfram Drews, Münster

Auch die mediävistische Geschichtswissenschaft hat sich in den vergangenen Jahren verstärkt globalhistorischen Fragen zugewandt. In diesem Zusammenhang sind nicht nur Fernhandelsbeziehungen untersucht worden, sondern auch Reise-berichte, expandierende Reiche, imperiale Konzeptionen, unterschiedliche Zentren und ihre jeweiligen Peripherien sowie nicht zuletzt auch Migrationen. Vieles hiervon ist zwar auch schon von der älteren Forschung behandelt worden, doch geschieht dies in jüngerer Zeit verstärkt im Hinblick auf neuere Ansätze der Geschichtswissenschaft, die nicht mehr von „etablierten" Hierarchien oder vermeintlich klaren Zivilisations- bzw. Kulturgrenzen ausgeht.

Der anzuzeigende Sammelband dokumentiert die Vorträge, die auf der Berliner Abschlusstagung des DFG-Schwerpunktprogramms „Integration und Desintegration der Kulturen im europäischen Mittelalter" gehalten wurden. Das genannte SPP 1173 wurde über zwei Perioden hinweg von der DFG gefördert und umfasste insgesamt 24 Einzelprojekte aus 14 Disziplinen, die an über 20 verschiedenen deutschen Universitäten angesiedelt waren. Während der zwei Förderperioden sind zahlreiche Qualifikationsschriften abgeschlossen worden, daneben entstanden mehrere Sammelbände, die die Ergebnisse einzelner Tagungen und einer Frühlingsschule dokumentierten. Das abgelaufene Schwerpunktprogramm dürfte die mediävistische Forschung in vielen Fächern nachhaltig geprägt haben. Die beteiligten Wissenschaftlerinnen und Wissenschaftler haben durch ihre Zusammenarbeit in interdisziplinär zusammengesetzten Arbeitsgruppen vielfältige Anregungen erhalten, die ihnen neue Perspektiven eröffnet haben.

Das Thema des Abschlussbandes ist geschickt gewählt, denn Migrationen sind ein Thema, dessen Bedeutung einerseits in der Gegenwart stark zunimmt und dementsprechend in der globalgeschichtlich ausgerichteten Forschung verstärkt

aufgegriffen wird, das aber andererseits auch bereits seit langem Gegenstand der auf die Vormoderne ausgerichteten Geschichtsforschung gewesen ist. Nicht nur das Volk Israel gewann seine Identität als Gottesvolk nach dem Zeugnis der Hebräischen Bibel während einer mehrere Jahrzehnte dauernden Wanderungsperiode; auch die griechische Kolonisation löste Migrationsprozesse aus, die nachhaltige Auswirkungen aus die Sozial- und Kulturgeschichte der antiken Welt hatten. In der mittelalterlichen Geschichte ist vor allem an die so genannte Völkerwanderung zu erinnern, aber auch an die jüdische Diaspora, deren Geschichte bis in die vorrömische Zeit zurückreicht, die jedoch im Verlauf des Mittelalters in neue Räume vorstieß und für die Genese und Transformation europäischer Kulturen eine nicht zu unterschätzende Bedeutung gewann.

Insgesamt drei Beiträge des Sammelbandes sind das Resultat interdisziplinärer Zusammenarbeit verschiedener Wissenschaftlerinnen und Wissenschaftler des Schwerpunktprogramms. Der erste bestimmt den Begriff Migration im Kontext transkulturalistischer Mittelalterforschung, der zweite widmet sich der literarischen Inszenierung von Migrationen zwischen interkultureller Abschottung und transkultureller Verflechtung, der dritte thematisiert schließlich religiös motivierte Bewegungen „frommer Männer" in der mittelalterlichen Welt Europas und des Orients.

Die drei gemeinschaftlich verfassten Beiträge werden ergänzt durch zahlreiche Aufsätze jeweils einzelner Forscherinnen und Forscher, die als Gäste zur Abschlusstagung des SPP eingeladen waren und dort entweder einen Vortrag hielten oder einen Workshop veranstalteten. Eingangs untersucht Dirk Hoerder, wie Migranten Kulturen erschaffen, womit er die Begriffe Integration und Desintegration aus dem Thema des Schwerpunktprogramms problematisiert. Patrick Geary behandelt die „Völkerwanderung" als „cross-cultural interaction", wobei er methodisch Neuland betritt, insofern er die Ergebnisse neuerer naturwissenschaftlicher Forschungen zur Analyse von DNA-Strukturen einbezieht und zu durchaus überraschenden Resultaten gelangt. Nicoletta Francovich Onesti erörtert die Verflechtung germanischer und lateinischer Personennamen in der Spätantike, Rosamond McKitterick die Rolle der schriftlichen Überlieferung im Zusammenhang mit frühmittelalterlichen Wanderungsbewegungen. Uwe Israel dokumentiert die Ergebnisse eines von ihm veranstalteten Workshops zum Thema Migration und Konflikt in spätmittelalterlichen italienischen Städten. David Jacoby analysiert interkulturelle Begegnungen im lateinischen Kreuzfahrerkönigreich Jerusalem. Dynamische Grenzen, Verkehrsnetzwerke und Wanderungsbewegungen im spätmittelalterlichen und frühneuzeitlichen Mazedonien sind das Thema des Aufsatzes von Mihailo Popović. Alexander Beihammer wiederum untersucht transkulturelle Kommunikation und Identitätsbildung in den diplomatischen Beziehungen zwischen Byzanz und der islamischen Welt. Manfred Eggert vergleicht die Ansätze unterschiedlicher Disziplinen (Archäologie, Archäobotanik und Archäogenetik), die zur Erforschung der „Bantuwanderungen" im südlichen Afrika herangezogen worden sind. Hiroshi Takayama kombiniert einen migrationsgeschichtlichen mit einem komparatistischen Zugang: Er vergleicht am Beispiel Siziliens und Japans Migrati-

onsbewegungen in maritimen Kontexten. Judith Fröhlich hingegen untersucht die Wahrnehmung der mittelalterlichen Mongoleneinfälle in späterer japanischer Sicht und kommt hierbei zu überraschenden Schlussfolgerungen im Hinblick auf die Effekte von Migrationen auf Selbst- und Fremdbilder. Im abschließenden Beitrag wirft David Simo einen postkolonialen Blick auf Europa, wobei er für eine „multiperspektivische und kontrapunktische Betrachtungsweise" plädiert (S. 257). Die Beiträge des Sammelbandes präsentieren zusammen ein breites Spektrum unterschiedlicher Wissenschaftstraditionen und Deutungen, etwa im Hinblick auf die Position Japans entweder als eines abgeschotteten Inselreiches oder aber – moderneren Ansätzen folgend – als eines zum Meer hin geöffneten Archipels. Überzeugend ist die Erweiterung des Forschungsradius über Europas hinaus: Nicht nur werden Fallbeispiele aus Mittel- und Westeuropa untersucht, sondern auch solche aus dem Mittelmeerraum, vom Balkan, aus Byzanz, der islamischen Welt, aus dem südlichen Afrika und aus Ostasien.

Es ist das Verdienst dieses Sammelbandes wie auch des gesamten Schwerpunktprogramms, der mediävistischen Forschung solche multiplen Perspektiven eröffnet zu haben, wobei zu hoffen bleibt, dass globalgeschichtliche und vergleichende Ansätze einerseits in unterschiedlichen mediävistischen Disziplinen weiter verfolgt und erweitert werden, dass aber andererseits auch die Verzahnung mit der Erforschung antiker und moderner Epochen weiter ausgebaut und verstärkt wird.

Ricardo Roque / Kim A. Wagner (Hrsg.): Engaging Colonial Knowledge. Reading European Archives in World History (= Cambridge Imperial and Post-Colonial Studies Series), Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan 2012, 320 S.

Rezensiert von
Nathanael Kuck, Leipzig

Die Debatte zur historischen Diskursanalyse hatte eine zentrale Frage: Erschließt sich aus dem Studium archivalischer Quellen eine historische ‚Realität' oder lassen sich Texte grundsätzlich nur auf ihre Regelhaftigkeiten hin untersuchen und sind somit methodisch nur einer literaturwissenschaftlichen Herangehensweise zugänglich? Der vorliegende Band stellt diese Frage am Beispiel europäischer Kolonialarchive – mithin die zentralen Orte, um autoritative Aussagen zur gesamten Geschichte europäischer Expansion zu generieren. Er steht dabei für eine Absetzbewegung von dem, was die Herausgeber als mittlerweile kanonisierten Postkolonialismus verstehen, ohne dass sich die meisten Beiträge allzu weit von diesem entfernen. Vielmehr ist es ihr Bestreben, diskursanalytisch informiert wieder in die außertextliche Welt vorzudringen und dabei die Verschränkung von Wissen(-sproduktion) und Macht näher zu untersuchen.

Für dieses Vorhaben setzt der Band auf eine große Themenvielfalt mit Artikeln von jungen Forschern ebenso wie von bekannteren Namen. Zeitlich reichen die

Beiträge von der frühneuzeitlichen Expansion in Lateinamerika und Südasien bis hin zur Dekolonisation Mitte des 20. Jhs. Räumlich bildet Süd- sowie Südostasien den Schwerpunkt, vertreten sind zudem auch viele Beispiele aus den kleineren europäischen Kolonialreichen mit dem willkommenen Effekt, dass weder das französische noch das britische Empire für ‚den‘ europäischen Kolonialismus stehen müssen.

Der erste Teil des Bandes unter dem Titel ‚Epistemic Fissures‘ widmet sich der Vielstimmigkeit, den Uneindeutigkeiten und der Prekarität der kolonialen Ordnung, wie sie die archivalischen Hinterlassenschaften vermitteln. Den Anfang macht ein älterer Artikel von Ann Laura Stoler, der anhand eines Mordes an einer Pflanzerfamilie in Sumatra 1876 den verschiedenen Interpretationsmöglichkeiten der blutigen Geschehnisse nachgeht. Sie stützt sich dabei vor allem auf die Briefe eines jungen Kolonialbeamten, der die Morde weder, wie sonst üblich, eindeutig als private Racheakte noch als politische Subversion der niederländischen Herrschaft einordnet. Koloniales Wissen, so Stolers These, habe stets auf epistemologischen Ungewissheiten basiert und die auf Dichotomien abzielende Grundstruktur kolonialen Denkens sei in der historischen Realität immer wieder unterlaufen worden – was auch und gerade im kolonialen Archiv sichtbar werden kann.

Auch der zweite Beitrag von Leigh Denault beschäftigt sich mit der Vielstimmigkeit des kolonialen Archivs. Am Beispiel von Dokumenten zu Städteplanung und der häuslichen Sphäre in Nordwestindien während des 19. Jhs. versucht die Autorin nachzuweisen, wie die Kolonialbehör-

den immer wieder gezwungen waren, ihre Vorstellungen von urbaner Entwicklung zu revidieren und mit den lokalen Eliten zu verhandeln. Das koloniale Archiv vermittelt also, so Denaults Schlussfolgerung, keineswegs das Bild einer eindeutigen und hegemonialen Kolonialordnung. Vielmehr entstehe durch die Tiefe und Breite des Archivbestands mit seinen Aufzeichnungen zu gescheiterten und überarbeiteten Regierungsinterventionen gerade auf den unteren Ebenen der Administration das Bild einer notwendigerweise dialogisch hergestellten Ordnung. Somit eigne sich das koloniale Archiv gerade nicht „a straight forward, celebratory narrative of imperial progress“ (S. 84) zu erzählen.

Der dritte Beitrag von Pauline von Hellermann bewegt sich schließlich an der Schnittstelle von kolonialer Forstwissenschaft und Umweltpolitik im südlichen Nigeria der ersten Hälfte des 20. Jhs. Die Forstwissenschaft als Wissensfeld war eng an kolonialpolitische Vorgaben gebunden, die im Zuge der sich verstärkenden kolonialen Entwicklungsbemühungen einen produktiven, regulierten Wald unter staatlicher Kontrolle entstehen lassen wollten. Unfähig, geeignete Forstpraktiken zu initiieren, um dieser Zielsetzung gerecht zu werden, erzählt damit von Hellerman letztlich eine Geschichte des Scheiterns: Nicht nur erwiesen sich viele britische Vorstellungen zur Ökologie des Waldes als falsch, der kolonisierte Raum widerstand auch den Gestaltungsbemühungen der Kolonialadministration.

Anschließend an den ersten Teil, der sich vor allem mit den Denk- und Handlungsweisen der Kolonialadministration beschäftigt, wendet sich der zweite Teil des Bandes den indigenen Stimmen im Kolo-

nialarchiv zu. Besonders schwierig zu rekonstruieren sind diese für Gesellschaften wie die Azteken, deren einzige schriftliche Hinterlassenschaften unter unmittelbarem Einfluss der Kolonisatoren entstanden. Caroline Dodds Pennock argumentiert in ihrem Beitrag dennoch für die Wichtigkeit des Einbezugs dieser ‚mestizischen' Quellen in die historische Forschung, da sie, entgegen postkolonialen Bedenken, nicht vollständig in ihrem kolonialen Entstehungskontext aufgingen und gerade auf mikrohistorischer Ebene wichtige Einblicke in die aztekische Gesellschaft bieten können.

Auch das Potenzial der Kolonialarchive betonend, untersucht der Mitherausgeber Kim A. Wagner die soziale Figur der Thugs in Britisch-Indien während des 19. Jhs. Im literarischen wie auch rechtlichen Diskurs ab den 1830er Jahren stand das Phänomen der Thuggee für ein mörderisches Räubertum, dessen kriminelle Praktiken oftmals mit blutrünstigen Formen von Religiosität in Verbindung gebracht wurden. Anhand von Interviews mit Beschuldigten versucht Wagner nun nachzuweisen, dass Thugs nicht lediglich als ein Konstrukt des kolonialen Diskurses zu verstehen sind und vollständig in diesem aufgehen, sondern sich aus den Konversationen auch Fragmente des religiösen Bezugssystems, der Familienverhältnisse oder der Handlungsmotive krimineller Akteure aufzeigen lassen.

Auch in Indien angesiedelt, jedoch in der dänischen Kolonie Tranquebar, ist der Beitrag von Niels Brimnes. Der Beitrag rekonstruiert eine Auseinandersetzung aus dem Jahr 1822. in deren Zuge unterschiedliche Kastengruppen um Status und gesellschaftlichen Einfluss in der Stadt ran-

gen. Widerwillig sahen sich die dänischen Behörden gezwungen, sich als Akteure in die soziopolitische Ordnung der Stadt einzufügen und indigene Vorstellungen von Patronage- und Klientelbeziehungen zu übernehmen. Brimnes veranschaulicht damit, wie gerade in frühen, noch wenig bürokratisierten Phasen von Kolonialherrschaft die Herstellung sozialer Ordnung als Aushandlungsprozess zu fassen ist, der indigene Weltsichten integrieren musste, um erfolgreich zu sein.

Susan Bayly zeichnet nach, wie die französische Ethnologie zu Indochina von Beginn des 20. Jhs. bis zur Dekolonisierung die kolonialen Subjekte keineswegs als das ‚Andere' des französischen Selbst konstruierte, wie es kritische Studien zum britischen Orientalismus oft betont haben. Vielmehr entwarfen die Ethnologen in enger Verbindung zur französischen Geschichte ein Bild der Vietnamesen, das ihnen ein starkes Geschichts-, Territorialitäts- und Nationalbewusstsein attestierte. So überzeugend das Fallbeispiel gegen eine pauschalisierende Orientalismuskritik argumentiert, so fehl am Platz scheint der Beitrag im zweiten Teil des Bandes.

Viel eher hätte er zum dritten Teil ‚Archives of Entanglement' gepasst. Wiederum in Abgrenzung zu dekonstruktivistischen Ansätzen geht es hier nicht um eine internalistische Kritik des kolonialen Diskurses sondern um die in den Quellen sichtbar werdenden Verschränkungen von Metropole und Kolonie. Weniger als die Grenzziehungen und das damit einhergehende Abwerten des ‚Anderen' stehen also die Überschneidungen und das im Rahmen kolonialer Praktiken geschaffene Gemeinsame im Vordergrund.

Am Beispiel der frühneuzeitlichen portugiesischen Kolonialherrschaft in Sri Lanka unterzieht Alan Strathern die Implikationen der post-orientalistischen Kolonialgeschichtsschreibung einer Überprüfung. Die portugiesische Präsenz erreichte hier weder die herrschaftliche Durchdringung des modernen Kolonialismus, noch stützte sie sich auf eine verabsolutierte Alteritätskonstruktion. Den Singhalesen wurden vielmehr Handlungsweisen zugeschrieben, die sich direkt aus der politischen Geschichte Portugals herleiteten. Damit war eine gänzlich andere koloniale Situation gegeben als sie die von Foucault und Said informierte jüngere Kolonialgeschichtsschreibung häufig beschrieben hat. Zum einen dank dieser kritischen Erweiterung postkolonialer Ansätze, zum anderen aufgrund seiner herausragenden sprachlichen Gestaltung gehört dieser Beitrag sicherlich zu den lesenswertesten. Im zweiten Beitrag zum portugiesischen Kolonialreich untersucht Ricardo Roque die Kopfjagd in Osttimor an der Wende zum 20. Jh. basierend auf militärischen Ethnographien. Während sich eine ‚klassisch‘ postkoloniale Annäherung wohl primär mit der Produktion eines zivilisierten portugiesischen Selbst in Abgrenzung solcher Praktiken beschäftigt hätte, erscheint die Kopfjagd in Roques Darstellung als integraler Bestandteil des kolonialen Verhältnisses, die nicht nur für osttimorische Akteure von Bedeutung war, sondern an der auch portugiesische Akteure aktiv beteiligt waren. Der diskursanalytische Ansatz wird damit nicht redundant, der Beitrag veranschaulicht jedoch überzeugend, wie koloniales Wissen neben der Herstellung von Alterität auch als Feld für die Untersuchung von Verflechtungen fruchtbar gemacht

werden kann. Weniger ambitioniert zeigt sich der Beitrag von Nicholas Thomas, der die Darstellungen des Forschungsmalers William Hodges, die im Zuge von James Cooks zweiter Südpazifik-Reise entstanden, genauer untersucht. Der schon andernorts veröffentlichte Text bezieht sich nur lose auf das Oberthema des Bandes und begnügt sich weitgehend mit der Rekonstruktion der aufklärerischen Sichtweise auf außereuropäische Gesellschaften anhand von Hodges' Zeichnungen.

Der letzte Beitrag von Andrew Zimmerman wiederum geht deutlich über den Ansatz des Bandes hinaus und postuliert die gegenseitige Bedingtheit der Produktion von Staat, Kapital und Wissenschaft am Beispiel Tansanias und der deutschen Disziplinierungsversuche der lokalen Bevölkerung. Als ursprünglicher Akt der Disziplinierung fungierte nach Zimmerman die Bekämpfung des Maji Maji-Aufstandes zwischen 1905 und 1907, der nicht nur den Effekt hatte, den staatlichen Zugriff auf die Bevölkerung zu verstärken und die koloniale Produktion zu intensivieren, sondern auch den bestimmenden Kontext für die koloniale Wissensproduktion bildete.

Insgesamt betonen die Beiträge das Potenzial der kolonialen Archive, sich über eine diskursanalytische Kritik hinaus Zugang zu einer historischen Realität zu schaffen. Die Fallstudien weisen überzeugend auf Auslassungen der postorientalistischen Kritik hin, auch wenn der extremistische, alles in Text auflösende Postkolonialismus, der den Herausgebern als Negativfolie dient, in der Form in den Geschichtswissenschaften kaum je eine herausragende Rolle gespielt hat. So nachdrücklich der Band die Potenziale der kolonialen Archive

betont, so bleibt er bezüglich ihrer Begrenzungen, abgesehen von dem oft gelesenen Hinweis auf die asymmetrischen Entstehungsbedingungen kolonialen Wissens, relativ unspezifisch. Auch wenn Archive als ‚offener Text‘ gelesen werden können, voller Widersprüche sind und zahlreiche Interpretationsspielräume lassen, werfen diese doch ungleich mehr Schlaglichter auf die Denkweisen und Praktiken der Kolonialadministration als auf die Aneignungen und Handlungsweisen der Kolonisierten. Auch bergen die oft im Zentrum stehenden Begrifflichkeiten von ‚entanglement‘ oder ‚intertwinement‘ die Möglichkeit, die Gewaltförmigkeit des Kolonialismus allzu leicht zugunsten einer Betonung der Handlungsmacht aller Akteure verschwinden zu lassen. Ein abschließendes Nachwort hätte geholfen, einige dieser Punkte noch einmal anzusprechen. Dies soll jedoch weder die generell hohe Qualität der einzelnen Beiträge in Abrede stellen, noch dem grundlegenden theoretischen Impetus der Herausgeber widersprechen, den Strathren an einer Stelle konzise zusammenfasst: „[…] we can understand that knowledge, like human beings, is both conditioned and capable of transcending the condition of its origin“ (S. 230).

Lidia Guzy / Rainer Hatoum / Susan Kamel (Hrsg.): From Imperial Museum to Communication Centre? On the New Role of Museums as Mediators between Science and Non-Western Societies, Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann Verlag, 2010, 192 S.

Rezensiert von
Ines Keske

Aufmachung, quadratisches Buchformat sowie zahlreiche Farbabbildungen lassen bereits auf den ersten Blick erkennen, dass es sich um eine Projekt- und Tagungsdokumentation handelt. Dieses Projekt, das an der Freien Universität Berlin in Kooperation mit den Staatlichen Museen zu Berlin und der Stiftung Preußischer Kulturbesitz durchgeführt wurde, hinterfragte die aktuelle, oft ungenügende museale Arbeit im Bereich Außereuropäischer Kulturen durch die Analyse von nicht-europäischen ethnologischen Museen als Modelle für globale und nationale Trends.

Ausgangspunkt war die Beobachtung, dass viele ethnologische bzw. anthropologische Museen in Europa den Anschluss an gegenwärtige Transformationsprozesse verpasst hätten, vor allem infolge von Globalisierungsprozessen, die ein neues Selbstbewusstsein marginalisierter ethnischer Minderheiten hervorgerufen haben. Ihr Verharren in der tradierten Präsentationsästhetik, die ihre Ursprünge im europäischen Kolonialismus hat, führe nicht nur zu einem politischen Dilemma, sondern zu einem Bruch mit dem Museumspubli-

kum. Denn dieses habe sich hinsichtlich seiner Struktur und Anforderungen an die Museen bereits stark verändert und könne sich nicht mehr mit den gegenwärtigen Repräsentationen Außereuropäischer Kultur(en) identifizieren (S. 12).

Zur Auslotung einer adäquaten zukünftigen Darstellung Außereuropäischer Kultur(en) in Europa haben die drei Herausgeber des Bands, die zugleich das Projekt *From Imperial Museum to Communication Centre* initiiert und durchgeführt haben, einen Blick über den „europäischen Museumstellerrand" geworfen. Entsprechend ihres regionalen Forschungsschwerpunkts analysieren die Anthropologen Lidia Guzy und Rainer Hatoum sowie die Museumswissenschaftlerin und Arabistin Susan Kamel die Museumslandschaften Indiens, Nordamerikas und Ägyptens mit Fokus auf die ethnologischen und anthropologischen Nationalmuseen. Ihre These ist, dass sich insbesondere kulturelle Äußerungen nicht-westlicher Gesellschaften oder Bevölkerungsgruppen (wie ethnischer Minderheiten) infolge der Globalisierung grundlegend verändert hätten – und zwar in Richtung einer „Retraditionalisierung".[1]

Berlin als Heimatort von Projekt und Tagung lieferte mit dem jüngsten Museumsvorhaben im Bereich Außereuropäischer Kultur(en), dem umstrittenen Humboldt-Forum, einen perfekten Diskussionsanlass. Denn wie einst beim Deutschen Historischen Museum weht in der Hauptstadt für das Humboldt-Forum seit Bekanntwerden erster Konzeptideen im Jahr 2008 ein heftiger Gegenwind. Das Großprojekt soll 2019 in den Räumen des dann wiederaufgebauten Berliner Schlosses eröffnet werden und unter anderem das Museum für Asiatische Kunst und das Ethnologische Museum aufnehmen. Damit werden die Staatlichen Sammlungen Außereuropäischer Kultur(en) nicht nur vereint, sondern aus der Berliner Peripherie ins Stadtzentrum verlagert.

Sowohl Standort als auch Konzept sorgen allerdings für Zündstoff: Erstens wird damit aus Sicht der Kritiker in Stadtmitte eine offensichtliche räumliche Trennung der „europäischen" Kunst von jener der „restlichen" Welt vollzogen, da sich das Forum und die Berliner Museumsinsel mit ihren Museen zur europäischen Hochkultur in unmittelbarer Nähe gegenüberstehen werden. Unmut verursacht zweitens, dass das Forum mit dem Berliner Schloss in einem reaktivierten Erinnerungsort des europäischen Barock mit preußischem Ursprung untergebracht sein wird, während es Außereuropäisches präsentieren wird. Diese Sammlungen werden laut Kritikern schlicht instrumentalisiert, um Gegnern des Preußen-Revivals den Wind aus den Segeln zu nehmen. Drittens ist man besorgt, dass diese Kunst und Kultur erneut durch die Brille und Hand europäischer Akteure aufbereitet wird, allerdings mit dem Ziel, den Kosmopolitismus der Ausstellernation zu demonstrieren.[2] Um diesen Vorwürfen entgegenzuwirken, wurde zuletzt im Frühjahr 2013 im sog. Humboldt Lab mit Künstlern am Ausstellungskonzept gefeilt, die in der Erprobung möglicher Varianten der Objektpräsentation den Blick der Kuratoren und Wissenschaftler erweitern sollen.[3]

Zu neuen Erkenntnissen sollte auch die Abschlusstagung im September 2009 führen.[4] Neben der Einnahme einer deutsch-außereuropäischen vergleichenden Perspektive war es das Ziel, neue Perspektiven

und Ansätze aus nicht-westlichen Museumsdiskursen zu erschließen. Dabei überprüften sowohl die Projektmitglieder als auch Referenten die Umsetzung von Ansätzen der *New Museology* (nach Peter Vergo 1989⁵). Hauptsächlich sieht diese vor, dass Museumsverantwortliche ihre Funktion als Forscher und Lehrender in die Rolle des Mediators umwandeln, basierend auf einem interkulturellen Dialog mit den Zielgruppen ihrer Häuser. Im Falle der ethnologischen Museen ergäbe sich daraus ein Wandel vom Imperialmuseum zum Kommunikationszentrum, das auf Bedürfnisse ethnischer Minderheiten durch neue Museumsformate und Präsentationsformen reagiert.

Der Band untergliedert sich in drei Sektionen, die jeweils eine der drei von den Herausgebern untersuchten Fallregionen (Ägypten, Nordamerika und Indien) in Beziehung zu Berlin und seinen ethnologischen Sammlungen setzen. Jeder Abschnitt enthält Bildtafeln mit Innenraumaufnahmen der besprochenen Museen.

Im ersten Teil, *In Dialogue: Egypt – Berlin*, verwebt Susan Kamel ihren Projektteil zu Ägypten mit den ergänzenden Tagungsbeiträgen eindrucksvoll. Dabei gelingt es ihr, sowohl einen umfassenden Einblick in die Region zu geben, als auch den Vergleich zu Berlin zu vollziehen. Beide Regionen verharren zwar in der tradierten Repräsentation islamischer Kunst, die nach wie vor Minderheiten wie Kopten und Nubier ausschließen. Kamel weist aber auch eine erste Umorientierung ägyptischer Nationalmuseen nach, die schon längst nicht mehr nur dem Tourismus dienen sollten, sondern, wie bereits mit dem Nubischen Museum erfolgt, als Repräsentationsorte auf nationaler Ebene. Dass diese Entwick-

lung berechtigt ist, zeigt Christine Gebrich in ihrer Besucherevaluierung in vier ägyptischen Museen, womit sie in Ägypten Neuland beschritten hat. Anders als vermutet, machen die Ägypter und nicht die Touristen einen Großteil des Publikums aus. Um jedoch mehr über diese differenzierte Gruppe zu erfahren, müssen qualitative Untersuchungen folgen. Ossama Abdel Meguid, Direktor dieses Nubischen Museums in Assuan, das sich als einziges Museum des Landes ganz den Grundsätzen der *New Museology* verschrieben hat, skizziert in seinem Beitrag seinen Action Plan zur Erfüllung neuer soziokultureller Aufgaben. Innovativ ist dabei ein Programm zur Bewahrung nubischer Traditionen und Handwerke, im Rahmen dessen die ältere der jüngeren Generation das alte Wissen lehrt. Im Gegensatz dazu beschreibt Nadja Tomoum für das 2006 wiedereröffnete Koptische Museum in Kairo einen stark westlich beeinflussten Modernisierungsprozess, wie sich am Beispiel eines Trainingsprogramms ägyptischer Museumsleute durch deutsche Experten oder eines Katalogisierungsprojekts mithilfe der US-amerikanischer Museumskollegen zeigt. Der letzte Sektionsbeitrag des Direktors des Museums für Islamische Kunst stellt den Stand der Diskussionen für die Darstellung Islamischer Kunst in Deutschland vor. Stefan Weber skizziert nicht nur die komplexen Aufgaben und neuen Herausforderungen an sein Haus, das immer mehr muslimischen Gruppen ein Zuhause geben muss und nicht länger einem nationalen Publikum als Anschauungsort dient, sondern er zeigt, dass sich auch hier ein Bewusstseinswandel für neue soziale Realitäten vollzogen hat, auch wenn viele seiner Fragen unbeantwortet bleiben.

Der zweite Teil, *In Dialogue: North America – Berlin*, behandelt, auch wenn in diesem Fall beide Regionen der westlichen Welt angehören, den angemessenen musealen Umgang mit den amerikanischen Ureinwohnern, der zuweilen noch exotisierende Züge annimmt. Der Kurator Stephen Inglis schlägt, wie im Canadian Museum of Civilization erfolgt, die Re-Kanonisierung entsprechender Museumsobjekte vor, was stark an westliche Museumspraktiken erinnert. Auch der Direktor des Navajo Nation Museums, Manuelito Wheeler, beschreibt die allmähliche Transformation seines Hauses durch eine westlich geprägte Museumsarbeit (wie dem Wunsch nach Einrichtung einer Dauerausstellung). Im Gegensatz dazu steht Peter Bolz' Bericht aus seiner 20-jährigen Tätigkeit als Kurator von indianischer zeitgenössischer Kunst im Ethnologischen Museum Berlin. Darin plädiert er für einen lebendigen Umgang mit den Objekten anstelle ihrer Behandlung als Relikt. Dennoch hält Bolz für die Ausstellung indianischer Kunst in Europa nach wie vor ethnologische Museen am geeignetsten, da sie gegenüber den Kunstmuseen wichtige Kontextinformationen vermittelten. Rainer Hatoum fordert für die Repräsentation indianischer Kultur, wie es im Humboldt-Forum erfolgen wird, infolge des soziokulturellen Wandels einen konsequenten Dialog mit der Zielgruppe zu führen, bei dem beide Seiten auf einer Ebene stünden. Zwei nordamerikanische Museen, das Canadian Museum of Civilization und das National Museum of the American Indian, bezeugen den Erfolg einer Öffnung akademisch geprägter Museen hin zu engagierten Institutionen, die das tradierte indianische Wissen auf dasselbe Level heben und anerkennen wie ihr westlich geprägtes Wissen. Auch der dritte Teil, *In Dialogue: India – Berlin*, startet mit der Genese der neuen Rolle indischer Museen als Mediatoren zwischen Wissenschaft und nicht-westlicher Gesellschaft. Kalyan Kumar Chakravarty hinterfragt dabei den Einfluss der Freilichtmuseumsbewegung auf die beiden großen Nationalmuseen, dem Indian Museum, Kalkutta, und dem National Museum, Delhi. Er berichtet anhand seiner eigenen Berufsbiographie sowohl von Innovationen als auch Grenzen in der Entwicklung der indischen Museumslandschaft seit 1985. Ganesh Devy zeigt kurz anhand des Adivasi Museums, wie ein Museum gewisse Konventionen überwinden kann, auch wenn es nicht im Dialog mit der lokalen Öffentlichkeit steht. Im Gegensatz dazu plädiert Vikas Bhatt als Direktor des National Museum of Mankind, Bhopal, gerade für die Notwendigkeit einer beiderseitigen Kommunikation. Lars-Christian Koch, Berliner Phonogramm-Archiv im Ethnologischen Museum, stellt neue Repräsentationsformen südasiatischer Kultur am Beispiel von Musik vor. Ihm folgt Lidia Guzy, die Anfang der 2000er Jahre gefährdete, traditionelle Musik aus dem Bundesstaat Odisha für das Phonogramm-Archiv gesammelt und dokumentiert hat und durch die Musealisierung dieser Tondokumente einen zentralen Schritt für die Anerkennung marginalisierter indischer Musiker(gruppen) vollzogen hat. Das Hauptaugenmerk richtet Guzy in ihrem Artikel jedoch auf die aktuelle paradoxe Lage anthropologischer Museen in Indien zwischen Globalisierung sowie Modernisierung und neu erwachendem Selbstbewusstsein indigener Minderheiten. Die Anerkennung dieser ethnischen Gruppen

im Sinne der *New Museology* führe zu einer Museumstransformation und De-Musealisierung exotisierender Ausstellungen in Indien, wie Guzy an diversen alternativen Museumskonzepten (im Bereich Ethnologie und zeitgenössische Kunst) aufzeigt.

Damit endet der Band ohne eine Zusammenfassung der Tagungs- bzw. Projektergebnisse oder einem die Regionen vergleichenden Resümee. Offen bleibt, warum gerade diese drei Regionen ausgewählt wurden und welchen besonderen Mehrwert ihre Betrachtung bringt. Dies ist auch insofern bedauerlich, weil parallel zum Umfang auch der Informationsgehalt der einzelnen Beiträge von Sektion zu Sektion abnimmt. Außerdem ist im dritten Teil kaum mehr die vergleichende Perspektive zu Berlin ersichtlich, was ein abschließender Text hätte nochmals einfangen können. So besteht die Gefahr, dass die Zielstellung, dem Humboldt-Forum innovative und adäquate Vorschläge zu unterbreiten, leicht verpufft.

Ohne dass es die Autoren reflektieren, wird in fast allen Texten deutlich, dass in den drei Regionen keineswegs von einer klar von Europa abgegrenzten, „nichtwestlichen" Museumspraxis die Rede sein kann. Niemand hinterfragt dabei, dass u. a. die in Indien favorisierte Freilichtmuseumsidee und der *New Museology*-Ansatz, auf den sich viele der betrachteten Museen beziehen, aus der sog. „westlichen" Museumswelt stammen. Damit fehlt in den Beiträgen die Frage, wie diese Konzepte in anderen Teilen der Welt adaptiert bzw. angeeignet, sprich um neue Aspekte bereichert, werden.

Begrifflich unsauber gefasst ist der Fall Nordamerika, das zwar eine nicht-europäische, aber dafür zutiefst westliche Region darstellt. Allein die einleitende, sehr kurze Gegenüberstellung der Begriffspaare westlich – nicht westlich und europäisch – außereuropäisch überzeugt hier nicht (vgl. S. 13). Zur Loslösung von dieser einschränkenden Terminologie hätten die Herausgeber – statt des Blicks nach Berlin – deutlicher auf einen interregionalen Vergleich, der die Repräsentation der Kulturen marginalisierter Gruppen in den drei Regionen behandelt, fokussieren können. Dass sich darunter eine westliche Region wie Nordamerika befindet, wäre für die Entwicklung globaler Perspektiven sogar besonders wertvoll gewesen und hätte die längst überholte Unterscheidung zwischen „westlicher" und „restlicher" Welt ab absurdum geführt.

Erfrischend und durchaus vielversprechend ist der Blick auf die drei Regionen und von diesen zurück auf Berlin dennoch. Die Essenz vieler Beiträge ist, dass in den untersuchten Regionen marginalisierte Minderheiten zunehmend eine gewichtigere Stimme bei der musealen Präsentation ihre Kultur erhalten. Während in europäischen Museen oft nur theoretisch die Rede von der Schaffung interkultureller Dialoge ist, die auf lange Sicht jedoch schwer aufrechtzuerhalten sind, zeigt der Großteil der Autoren, wie Museumsakteure konsequent auf den globalen Wandel in ihrer Museums- und Ausstellungsarbeit reagieren, indem sie beispielsweise in ihren Einrichtungen eine dauerhafte Ko-Kuratorenschaft für Vertreter marginalisierter Gruppen einrichten. Dies ist insofern als eine besondere Leistung anzuerkennen, weil sich Indien und Ägypten in einem tiefgreifenden Transformations- und Modernisierungsprozess befinden, der die ge-

sellschaftliche Ausgrenzung ethnischer und religiöser Minderheiten erneut schürt.

Anmerkungen

1 Vgl. Freie Universität Berlin, Institut für Religionswissenschaft, Projektbeschreibung, URL: www.geschkult.fu-berlin.de/e/relwiss/forschung/vw-stiftung/projektbeschreibung.html (aufgerufen am 01.12.2013).
2 SCHLOSSDEBATTE.DE, Blog-Eintrag: Wozu nutzt das Humboldt-Forum? (29.06.2008), in: http://schlossdebatte.de/?p=101 (aufgerufen am 01.12.2013).
3 Vgl. u. a. A. Kilb, Berliner Humboldtforum. Gedankenscherze, in: FAZ vom 14.03.2013.
4 Regina Höfer, Tagungsbericht: From Imperial Museum to Communication Center?, in: kunsttexte.de (2010) 1, URL: http://edoc.hu-berlin.de/kunsttexte/2009-4/hoefer-regina-0/PDF/hoefer.pdf (aufgerufen am 01.12.2013).
5 P. Vergo, New Museology, London 1989.

Brendan Simms / David J. B. Trim (Hrsg.): Humanitarian Intervention. A History, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2011, 407 S.

Rezensiert von
Adamantios Skordos, Wien

Dem Thema der „humanitären Intervention" wird seitens verschiedener wissenschaftlicher Disziplinen spätestens seit dem NATO-Einsatz 1999 gegen das serbische Rumpf-Jugoslawien größte Aufmerksamkeit gewidmet. Es sind nicht nur Völkerrechtler, sondern auch Politikwissenschaftler, Philosophen und Historiker, die sich mit diesem breiten, eine Reihe von juridischen, gerechtigkeitstheoretischen, ethisch-moralischen und sicher-heitspolitischen Fragen aufwerfenden Gebiet auseinandersetzen.[1] Die Dynamik, mit der sich die Publikationsaktivität zur „humanitären Intervention" im letzten Jahrzehnt entwickelt hat, entspricht dem zunehmenden allgemeinen Interesse dafür. Zwar bleibt es weiterhin fraglich, ob und wann sich das Institut der „humanitären Intervention" in der Völkerrechtslehre und in den internationalen Beziehungen gegen das in der UN-Charta verankerte Gewaltverbot durchsetzen wird,[2] dennoch gewinnt es immer mehr an Bedeutung für die Verfechter einer weltweiten Verbreitung von Demokratie und Menschenrechten. So plädierte etwa unlängst der renommierte US-amerikanische Geschichtsprofessor Norman Naimark für die Bildung einer „internationalen Eingreiftruppe", die „den Vereinten Nationen unterstellt ist und schnellstmöglich gegen Massenmorde vorgeht, wenn der UN-Sicherheitsrat es beschließt".[3] Dass dieser Vorschlag von Seiten eines Zeithistorikers kam, ist kein Zufall. Der Blick in die Vergangenheit, hauptsächlich in das von Weltkriegen, Genozide und ethnischen Säuberungen gebrandmarkte „kurze" 20. Jh., führt einem die tragischen Folgen exzessiver Menschenrechtsverletzungen ebenso wie die Bedeutung einer entschlossenen und schnellen Einleitung von Gegenmaßnahmen vor Augen. Andererseits offenbart der Blick in die Geschichte, dass die „humanitäre Intervention" keineswegs ein erstmals nach Ende der bipolaren Weltordnung und dem Aufstieg der USA zur alleinigen Weltmacht auftretendes Phänomen ist, sondern tief in der Vergangenheit verwurzelt ist. Während vorhergegangene Studien diese Wurzeln im 19. Jh. lokalisierten,[4] ist es eines der erklärten Hauptziele des hier

zu besprechenden Sammelbands, den Aus-
gangspunkt der Geschichte der „humani-
tären Intervention" nach hinten, also in
die Frühe Neuzeit zu verlegen.

Die Berücksichtigung der Frühen Neuzeit
ist nicht das einzige Unterscheidungs-
merkmal dieses Buches im Vergleich zu
anderen Studien ähnlicher Thematik. Der
Sammelband grenzt sich von anderen auch
durch die Definition des Begriffs der „hu-
manitären Intervention" ab, die Brendan
Simms und D. J. B. Trim zur Grundlage
ihrer Konzeption nahmen und von dem
gängigen Verständnis einer „humanitären
Intervention" deutlich abweicht. Aufgrund
der zahlreichen militärischen Eingriffe mit
humanitärer Rechtfertigung seit Ende des
Kalten Krieges steht mittlerweile in der
breiten ebenso wie wissenschaftlichen Öf-
fentlichkeit der Begriff der „humanitären
Intervention" eigentlich für ausschließlich
militärisch durchgeführte Operationen
der internationalen Gemeinschaft in Kri-
senländern oder Krisenregionen, wie dies
z. B. 1999 in Kosovo oder 2011 in Libyen
der Fall war.

In klarer Abgrenzung zu dieser sich auf
die Voraussetzung militärischer Gewalt-
anwendung einschränkenden Definition
bedienen sich Simms und Trim einer brei-
ten Anwendung des Begriffs „humanitäre
Intervention". Auf diese Weise können sie
in ihren Sammelband Fallbeispiele einbe-
ziehen, die man „auf Anhieb" nicht un-
bedingt unter der Kategorie „humanitäre
Interventionen" verorten würde. Mancher
Leser wird von der einen oder anderen Si-
tuation, die hier als Fall einer „humanitären
Intervention" behandelt wird, sicherlich
überrascht sein und sich z. B. fragen, ob
es nicht doch zu gewagt sei, die Ergänzung
eines auf die Ostblockstaaten bezogenen

US-amerikanischen Handelsgesetzes aus
den 1970er Jahren mit einer Menschen-
rechtsschutzklausel als eine „humanitäre
Intervention" in die inneren Angelegen-
heiten der UdSSR zu bezeichnen.

Das Buch ist nach regionalen und/oder
epochalen Kriterien gegliedert. Teil I
„Early modern precedents" widmet sich
der Frühen Neuzeit und setzt sich aus
drei ebenso interessanten wie sich sinn-
voll ergänzenden Kapiteln zusammen.
Insbesondere thematisieren die Beiträge
von D. J. B. Trim und von Andrew C.
Thompson Interventionen religiösen Hin-
tergrunds aus dem 16., 17. und 18. Jh.,
wie beispielsweise die britischen Eingriffe
in den 1560er, 1570er und 1580er Jah-
ren in Frankreich und die Intervention in
den spanisch-niederländischen Krieg zum
Schutz protestantischer Gläubiger. Der
den ersten Teil abschließende Beitrag von
Brendan Simms demonstriert überzeu-
gend, dass der Westfälische Frieden von
1648, der als Beginn der modernen inter-
nationalen Beziehungen betrachtet und
mit der Durchsetzung des staatlichen Sou-
veränitätsprinzips als Ius Cogens eng as-
soziiert wird, ein rechtliches Vertragswerk
war, das Interventionen nicht nur – wie
häufig angenommen – verhinderte, son-
dern unter Umständen auch begünstigen
konnte. Entscheidend in dieser Hinsicht
erwiesen sich jene Bestimmungen, welche
die Diskriminierung auf religiöser Basis
explizit untersagten und die Glaubensfrei-
heit des Einzelnen garantierten. Überdies
setzte der Westfälische Vertrag in Fragen
der Beilegung katholisch-protestantischer
Dispute das Mehrheitsprinzip außer Kraft.
Die zweite Hälfte des allgemein sehr gu-
ten Beitrags von Simms ist dem britischen
Philosophen und Politiker Edmund Burke

und seiner Interventionsdoktrin gewidmet, die er mit Blick auf Ereignisse wie etwa den königlichen Putsch gegen das Parlament in Schweden 1772 und die ungefähr zeitgleich erfolgte Aufteilung Polens zwischen Russland, Preußen und Österreich ausarbeitete.

Teil II des Sammelbands „The Great Powers and the Ottoman Empire" setzt sich mit humanitären Interventionen der europäischen Großmächte im Osmanischen Reich des „langen" 19. Jhs. auseinander. John Bew zeigt, dass es ein südosteuropäisches Ereignis war, nämlich der griechische Unabhängigkeitskampf in den zwanziger Jahren des 19. Jhs. und vor allem die Angst vor einem russischen Alleingang in der Griechischen Frage, die die britische Regierung zwang, ihre außenpolitische Grundeinstellung der Nicht-Intervention in die inneren Angelegenheiten eines anderen Staates aufzugeben und 1827 gemeinsam mit Russland und Frankreich zugunsten der rebellierenden und exzessiven Repressalien ausgesetzten Griechen militärisch zu intervenieren. Eine weit weniger gut dokumentierte Interventionsgeschichte als die des griechischen Falles beschreibt Abigail Green. Sie bespricht eine Reihe von nicht-militärischen Interventionen zum Schutz der jüdischen Bevölkerung des Osmanischen Reiches zwischen 1840 und 1878 – beginnend mit der Einschaltung prominenter Vertreter der jüdischen Gemeinde Frankreichs und Großbritanniens 1840, um acht zu Unrecht eines Ritualmords beschuldigte und inhaftierte Juden in Damaskus zu befreien, bis hin zum Berliner Vertrag von 1878, der Rumänien in Hinsicht auf die Diskriminierung seiner jüdischen Bevölkerung allgemeine Minderheitenschutzverpflichtungen auf-

erlegte. Das darauf folgende Kapitel Davide Rodognos beschreibt den militärischen Eingriff einer internationalen Friedenstruppe zum Schutz der von muslimischen Angriffen bedrohten Maroniten in den Jahren 1860–1861 im osmanischen Libanon und Syrien. Wie im griechischen Fall fand die Intervention auf der Grundlage eines völkerrechtlichen Vertrags statt, der allerdings nicht nur von den fünf Mitgliedern der Heiligen Allianz, sondern auch seitens des Sultans unterzeichnet wurde. Matthias Schulz thematisiert eine weitere militärische Intervention auf dem osmanischen Balkan mit dem erklärten Ziel des Schutzes christlichen Lebens, nämlich die russische von 1877. Vorangegangen war die brutale, von Massakern begleitete und daher in Westeuropa und Russland großes Aufsehen erregende Niederschlagung der Aufstände der christlich-slawischen Bevölkerung in Bosnien, Bulgarien und in der Herzegowina durch Başıbozuk-Milizen im Dienste des Sultans. Schließlich beschäftigt sich der zweite Beitrag Davide Rodognos in diesem Teil mit den Anstrengungen der europäischen Großmächte, die zentralbalkanische Krisenregion Makedonien zu befrieden. Als sich die Hohe Pforte weigerte, die nach der blutigen Niederschlagung des Ilinden-Aufstands von 1903 seitens Russlands und Österreichs in Mürzsteg festgelegten Reformen zugunsten der christlichen Bevölkerung Makedoniens umzusetzen, erzwangen die Großmächte mittels der Besatzung der ostägäischen Inseln Mytilini und Limnos die Kooperation des Sultans.

Alle drei Beiträge, die den dritten Buchteil „Interventing in Africa" zusammensetzen, beziehen sich auf die Abschaffung der Sklaverei. Maeve Ryan beschreibt die

britischen Versuche, ab 1806 ein globales Sklavereiverbot gegen den Widerstand anderer imperialer Großmächte, vor allem Portugals und Brasiliens, durch Anwendung von Gewalt bzw. Gewaltandrohung durchzusetzen. William Mulligan behandelt ebenso die britische Politik zur Abschaffung der Sklaverei. Allerdings unterscheidet sich sein Fokus von dem Ryans sowohl in zeitlicher als auch geographischer Hinsicht insofern, dass er sich auf die britische Bekämpfung des Menschenhandels in den Gebieten des Omanischen Reiches, im Nahen Osten sowie in Ostafrika während des späten 19. Jhs. konzentriert. Teil III zu Afrika schließt mit dem Kapitel Gideon Mailers zu den Bemühungen evangelischer Missionare aus Großbritannien und den USA, Ende des 19. Jhs., vor allem durch die Errichtung von Schulen dem in der Zeit der Osmanen im Südsudan stark verbreiteten und seit 1899 illegal weiter praktizierten Sklavenhandel ein Ende zu setzen.

Der vierte Teil des Buches „Non-European states" stellt „humanitäre Interventionen" vor, die von außereuropäischen Staaten durchgeführt wurden. Mike Sewell behandelt im ersten Kapitel dieses Teiles die US-amerikanische Intervention 1898 in dem bereits 1895 begonnenen und von zahlreichen Gräueltaten begleiteten spanisch-kubanischen Krieg. Anschließend diskutiert Thomas J. W. Probert die hier einleitend bereits erwähnte Menschenrechtsschutzklausel, die der demokratische Senator Henry Jackson und der ebenso demokratische Kongressabgeordnete Charles Vanik 1974 als Ergänzung zum US-amerikanischen Handelsgesetz bezüglich der Regelung der Handelsbeziehungen zwischen den USA und den nicht marktwirtschaft-

lich organisierten Ländern durchsetzten. Es handelte sich bei dieser Gesetzesnovelle um ein im Wesentlichen gegen die Sowjetunion gerichtetes Druckmittel, das den Kreml zwingen sollte, seine Ausreisebeschränkungen gegenüber ausreisewilligen Juden aufzuheben. Sophie Quinn-Judge thematisiert schließlich die Invasion Vietnams in Kambodscha 1978 als Gegenreaktion auf die ethnische Säuberungspolitik Pol Pots gegen vietnamesische Minderheitenangehörige, Buddhisten und inländische Regimefeinde sowie als Antwort auf die Angriffe der Roten Khmer-Armee auf vietnamesische Dörfer entlang der Grenze zu Kambodscha.

Der fünfte und letzte Buchteil „Postscript" besteht aus einem Kapitel zu den humanitären Interventionen nach Ende des Kalten Krieges und einem abschließenden Resümee. Matthew Jamisons Beitrag ist vor allem deswegen lesenswert, weil darin die federführende Rolle Bill Clintons und Tony Blairs bei der Herausbildung des neuen völkerrechtlichen Instituts der Responsibility to Protect (Schutzverantwortung) besprochen wird. Die von D. J. B. Trim verfasste Schlussfolgerung stellt wiederum einen gelungenen Versuch dar, den Mehrwert dieses Sammelbands noch einmal deutlich zu machen.

Zusammenfassend ist festzuhalten, dass der Band ein überaus lesenswertes und erkenntnisreiches Buch ist. Trotz dieses im Allgemeinen positiven Urteils sollten zwei wichtige Kritikpunkte nicht unerwähnt bleiben. Neben dem Einwand gegen einen zu weit ausfallenden Begriff der „humanitären Intervention" zeichnet sich das Buch durch einen Anglozentrismus aus, der wohl auf den akademischen Werdegang der meisten Autoren und vor allem

der beiden Herausgeber zurückzuführen ist: Von den militärischen und diplomatischen Interventionen Großbritanniens in der Neuzeit zum Schutz diskriminierter protestantischer Gläubiger in katholischen Königreichen und Fürstentümern über die Einmischung Londons im 19. Jh. in das südosteuropäische Konfliktgeschehen sowie den britischen Kampf gegen den Sklavenhandel in Afrika und im Nahen Osten bis schließlich hin zu Tony Blair und seiner „liberalen" Interventionsdoktrin – durch das ganze Buch zieht sich der roten Faden einer Geschichte der „humanitären Intervention" unter ganz besonderer Berücksichtigung Großbritanniens. Eine Ausnahme stellt lediglich der vierte Teil zu „Non-European States" dar. Nichtsdestoweniger wird dieser Sammelband ein wichtiges Referenzwerk für zukünftige Arbeiten zur Geschichte der „humanitären Intervention" sein.

Anmerkungen:
1 Vgl. z. B. H. Münkler/K. Malowitz (Hrsg.), Humanitäre Intervention. Ein Instrument außenpolitischer Konfliktbearbeitung. Grundlagen und Diskussion, Wiesbaden 2008; R. Merkel (Hrsg.), Der Kosovo-Krieg und das Völkerrecht, Frankfurt am Main 2000; J. N. Wheeler, Saving Strangers. Humanitarian Intervention in International Society, Oxford 2001; A. Orford, Reading Humanitarian Intervention. Human Rights and the Use of Force in International Law, Cambridge 2003. Zu historiographischen Studien siehe hier Anm. 3.
2 Vgl. z. B. J. Isensee, Im Zweifel für den Frieden, in: Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 22.10.2012, Nr. 246, S. 7.
3 Die Welt: Norman Naimark: „Irgendwann kommt die internationale Eingreiftruppe", 6.6.2011, http://www.welt.de/kultur/literarischewelt/article13411025/Irgendwann-kommt-die-internationale-Eingreiftruppe.html (17.11.2011).
4 Vgl. N. Onuf, Humanitarian Intervention. The Early Years, in: Florida Journal of International Law 16 (2004), 4, S. 753-787; J. G. Bass,

Freedom's Battle. The Origins of Humanitarian Intervention, New York 2008; M. Swatek-Evenstein, Geschichte der „Humanitären Intervention", Baden-Baden 2008; D. Rodogno, Against Massacre: Humanitarian Interventions in the Ottoman Empire, 1815–1914, Princeton 2012.

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Jun Uchida: Brokers of Empire. Japanese Settler Colonialism in Korea, 1876–1945, Cambridge: Harvard University Press 2011, 481 S.

Rezensiert von
Klaus Dittrich, Seoul

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Mit dem von Japan erzwungenen Vertrag von 1876 begannen die modernen diplomatischen und wirtschaftlichen Beziehungen zwischen Japan und Korea. Im Zuge des Chinesisch-Japanischen Krieges von 1894, in dessen Folge Japan Taiwan annektierte, wurden bereits japanische strategische Interessen in Korea ersichtlich. Nach dem Russisch-Japanischen Krieg übernahm Japan schrittweise die äußeren und inneren Angelegenheiten der Halbinsel und richtete 1905 ein Protektorat ein. Im Jahre 1910 annektierte Japan die koreanische Halbinsel, die bis zum Zusammenbruch 1945 ein Bestandteil des japanischen Kolonialreiches blieb. Ein Aspekt dieser Beziehungen waren die japanischen Siedler, die sich seit den 1880er Jahren in Korea niederließen. Mit der Zeit formten diese Migranten eine der größten kolonialen Communities, übertroffen nur von der Anzahl französischer Siedler in Algerien. Zivilisten und Armeeangehörige

zusammengenommen, lebten bis zu über eine Million Japaner auf der koreanischen Halbinsel, bevor sie nach Ende des Zweiten Weltkriegs nahezu vollständig nach Japan repatriiert wurden.

Uchida Juns Studie schreibt die Geschichte dieser Migranten, besondere der von ihr als „Brokers of Empire" konzeptualisierten Siedlerelite: Unternehmer, Journalisten, Sozialreformer, religiöse Autoritäten und andere Akteure des non-gouvernementalen Sektors. Das Buch ist eine überarbeitete Fassung der 2005 unter gleichem Titel an der Harvard University verteidigten Dissertation. Korea als japanische Siedlungskolonie begreifend, versucht Uchida, derzeit Assistenzprofessor an der Stanford University, zu zeigen, wie kompliziert und widersprüchlich die japanische Kolonialisierung Koreas war. Der Status der „Brokers of Empire" als Agenten und Getriebene des kolonialen Staates war ambivalent, genau wie ihr Verhältnis zu Koreanern.

Die ersten beiden Kapitel haben einen eher synthetischen Charakter. Das erste Kapitel führt in die „World of Settlers" ein, wobei der Schwerpunkt auf der Zeit des noch unabhängigen Koreas liegt. Das zweite Kapitel beschreibt die Beziehungen zwischen Siedlern und Staat in der ersten Dekade der Kolonialherrschaft, welche aufgrund der drakonischen Maßnahmen von der Historiographie als „Militärherrschaft" bezeichnet wird. Die japanischen Siedler waren die Vorhut des japanischen Imperialismus. Als der Staat jedoch in ihre Fußstapfen trat, wurden sie mit der Annexion ihrer politischen und moralischen Funktionen beraubt und quasi entrechtet. Das Verhältnis der Siedler zum kolonialen Staat war somit stets von Konflikten und

Ambivalenzen geprägt. Das dritte Kapitel behandelt die Zeit nūach der Unabhängigkeitsbewegung von 1919, welche einen klaren Einschnitt darstellte. Als Reaktion auf diese Bewegung änderten die Kolonialadministratoren ihre Taktik. ‚Kulturelle Herrschaft' sowie ‚Harmonie zwischen Japanern und Koreanern' (naisen yūwa) wurden neue Schlagwörter, welche die neue Politik von Generalgouverneur Saitō Makoto charakterisierten. Siedler, zusammen mit offiziellen Stellen und kooperationsbereiten Koreanern, gründeten zahlreiche Organisationen, welche sich mit unterschiedlichem inhaltlichen Fokus einer aktiveren Zusammenarbeit widmeten. Die bekannteste dieser Organisationen war die Dōminkai (Ein-Volk-Gesellschaft), welche ab 1924 Kooperation zwischen Japanern und Koreaner fördern sollte. Sie war panasiatisch, gegen westlichen Imperialismus eingestellt und trat für gemeinsame japanisch-koreanische Projekte ein. Ein Teil der Koreaner erkannte freilich, dass es sich um eine Fortführung des hierarchischen Verhältnisses mit neuen Mitteln ging.

Kapitel vier behandelt den japanischen Diskurs über Korea und die Koreaner, die Uchida als „koloniales Archiv" (colonial archive) konzeptualisiert. Die 1908 gegründete Chōsen kenkyūkai (Vereinigung zur Erforschung Koreas) brachte die quasiwissenschaftliche Erforschung der Kolonie voran. Das auf diese Weise gesammelte Wissen vermittelte eine intime Kenntnis der koreanischen Verhältnisse und sollte bei der effizienten Verwaltung der Kolonie behilflich sein. Mit der Betonung einer anhaltenden koreanischen Rückständigkeit lieferten die Autoren zudem eine Apologie der japanischen Herrschaft über die Halbinsel und konterten koreanisch-nationa-

listische intellektuelle Diskurse. Obwohl die Forschungsaktivitäten mit einer Konjunktur aufstrebender Anthropologie und Geschichtswissenschaft zusammenfielen, handelte es sich um eine „community of amateurs" (S. 203). Diese zuerst „monologic nature of settler studies on Korea" (S. 204) mutierte in den zwanziger Jahren in einem „complex, if uneven, dialogue with Koreans" (S. 205). Ausschlaggebend hierfür war wiederum die Unabhängigkeitsbewegung von 1919, welche die Grundannahmen des Siedlerdiskurses von passiven Koreanern herausforderte und das Leitthema zunächst vom Topos der Rückständigkeit auf den des Verrats lenkte. In der Folge nahmen japanische Siedlereliten Koreaner jedoch zunehmend als Dialogpartner war, was sich in zahlreichen Übersetzungen koreanischer Publizistik ins Japanische niederschlug. Es gab sogar Debatten, welche über die ab 1919 erlaubten unabhängigen koreanischen und die japanischen Zeitungen gemeinsam ausgetragen wurden. Uchida sieht gar einen „new middle ground" (S. 220), auf dem sich japanische und koreanische Publizisten trafen, als Japaner gewisse Prämissen koreanisch-nationalistischer Bestrebungen vor dem Hintergrund eines globalen Antikolonialismus prinzipiell anerkannten und Koreaner die vermeintliche Unumkehrbarkeit der Annexion akzeptierten.

Das fünfte Kapitel „Industrializing the Peninsula" beschäftigt sich mit wirtschaftlichen Aspekten. Auch in diesem Bereich markiert das Jahr 1919 einen Einschnitt. Das Gesetz von 1911, welches jegliche privatwirtschaftliche Aktivität unter strenge staatliche Aufsicht gestellt hatte, wurde außer Kraft gesetzt. Neben der Gewerbeförderung wollten die Machthaber durch die Kooptierung führender koreanischer Wirtschaftsbürger die zentrale Konfliktlinie weg von Nationalitäts- und hin zu Klassenfragen bewegen. Es ging um „naisen yūwa in the economic realm built on a pattern of bourgeois cooperation" (S. 230). Die japanischen Unternehmer in Korea starteten zu dieser Zeit eine intensive Lobbyarbeit gegen Zollschranken und für den Ausbau des Eisenbahnnetzes. Hier zeigt sich, wie kompliziert die Interessenlagen innerhalb des Kolonialreiches waren, denn die „Brokers of Empire" kämpften gegen die dominante Vorstellung in der Metropole an, Korea lediglich als Lieferant von Reis und Absatzmarkt japanischer Industrieprodukte zu betrachteten. Japanische Siedler mutierten so „from agents of metropolitan capital into local actors with their own vested stakes and interests in the colonial periphery" (S. 260). Folglich ergaben sich auch Konstellationen, in denen japanische Siedler und Koreaner gegen das imperiale Zentrum Allianzen schlossen. Jedoch waren solche Kooperationen nicht immer konfliktfrei, wie beispielsweise koreanisch-nationalistische Aufrufe, nur genuin koreanische Waren zu kaufen, bezeugen.

Auch im sechsten Kapitel, in dem es um politische Mitspracherechte geht, zeigt Uchida eine „complex matrix of cooperation and conflict between the brokers of empire and their Korean allies" (S. 265). Die Organe der extraterritorialen lokalen Selbstverwaltung der japanischen Siedlungen im alten Korea wurden nach der Annexion aufgelöst, wodurch eine „permanently bitter and disenfranchised class of settlers" (S. 265) entstand. Erst 1919 wurden wieder Stadträte mit stark eingeschränkten Befugnissen eingerichtet. Ein weiterer Konfliktpunkt waren Mitsprache-

rechte in Reichsangelegenheiten. Bekanntlich verloren japanische Siedler in Korea und anderen Kolonien das Wahlrecht, welches sie in der Metropole genossen, wohingegen auch Koreaner und andere Kolonisierte, wenn sie sich in Japan niederließen und einen entsprechenden Zensus entrichteten, sich an Parlamentswahlen beteiligen durften. Die japanischen Siedler unternahmen eine vielfältige Lobbyarbeit, um ihre Rechte in Tokyo zu stärken. Zwei Optionen kristallisierten sich heraus: einige sprachen sich für eine komplette Angleichung der Kolonie an das eigentliche Japan, eine sogenannte Erweiterung des metropolitanen Kernlandes (naichi enchō) aus, was im wesentlichen die Forderung des Wahlrechts für Parlamentswahlen umfasste. Andere befürworteten eine Aufwertung des Status von Korea innerhalb des japanischen Reiches durch mehr Autonomie (home rule). Beide Positionen fanden sich auch unter Koreaner wieder.

Genau wie die Unabhängigkeitsbewegung von 1919 veränderte auch der Einmarsch japanischer Truppen in die Mandschurei 1931 die Situation Koreas maßgeblich. Die Halbinsel nahm nunmehr eine geographisch zentrale Position innerhalb des japanischen Reiches ein. Das siebente Kapitel arbeitet zunächst heraus, wie offizielle Stellen und Siedlereliten eine Begeisterung für die Expansion des japanischen Reiches schufen. Die Präsenz koreanischer Migranten in der Mandschurei, erlaubte es ihnen, die Expansion als gemeinsames koreanisch-japanisches Projekt zu propagieren sowie im Sinne eines Sozialimperialismus innerkoreanische Probleme nach außen zu projizieren. Des weiteren eröffnete die Mandschurei in Korea operierenden Unternehmern neue Geschäftsmöglichkeiten.

Insbesondere fanden koreanische Industrieprodukte hier erstmals einen Exportmarkt. Das Verhältnis von Regierung und den „Brokers of Empire" unterlag auch einem Wandel. Japanische Siedler „began to morph into agents of the colonial state" (p. 309). Uchida arbeitet das anhand des Kreuzuges für bunte Kleidung (Koreaner trugen traditionell ausschließlich weiße Baumwollware), an Hausfrauen gerichteten Kampagnen zur „Verbesserung" des Haushaltsmanagements, Jugendorganisationen und der immer zentraleren Rolle von Shintō-Ritualen heraus. Dieser „nexus of moral susasion" (p. 309) sollte den Alltagspraxen des Kernlandes nach Korea bringen und die Bevölkerung auf den Krieg vorbereiten.

Das achte Kapitel behandelt die Kriegszeit, als die offizielle Politik aus Japan und Korea eine Einheit (naisen ittai) machen wollte. Die japanischen Siedler waren nun „full-fledged partners of the wartime regime" (S. 358). Einige Siedlerorganisationen machten sich mit intensiver Propagandaarbeit die Förderung von naisen ittai zu eigen. Die Erfolge blieben jedoch bescheiden, wenn man bedenkt, dass auch zu Ende der Kolonialherrschaft viele Koreaner kein Japanisch sprachen und gemischte Ehen einen vernachlässigbaren Prozentsatz ausmachten. Trotzdem eigneten sich Koreaner Diskurse um naisen ittai an. Zentrale Neuerungen wie die Möglichkeit, in der Armee zu dienen, das Anrecht auf eine Schulbildung sowie die Pflicht zur Annahme eines japanischen Namens wurden von einem Teil der Koreaner – bei aller struktureller Gewalt – als Mittel zum sozialen Aufstieg und zur Anerkennung von Rechten im Rahmen des Reiches genutzt. Die Mehrheit der Siedler wertete

diese Maßnahmen einerseits als überzogen und damit potentiell destabilisierend und artikulierte andererseits ein Überlegenheitsgefühl, welches eine Distanz zu den nicht als völlig gleichwertig erachteten Koreanern als erhaltenswert ansah. Uchida spricht von einer Nullsummen-Mentalität der „Brokers of Empire", einer „pathological tendency to view any perceived gain in Korean status as their loss" (p. 388-389). Diese Einstellung reflektierte die subalterne Stellung der Siedler innerhalb des japanischen Reiches. Es war eine letztendlich konservative Einstellung, die mit den Dynamiken des Reiches nicht mithielt.

Der Verfasser dieser Rezension erforscht gerade die europäische und amerikanische Community in Korea um 1900 aus der Perspektive einer Sozialgeschichte der Globalisierung und erwartete parallele Einblicke in die Welt der japanischen Community auf der Halbinsel. Diese Erwartungen wurden nur teilweise erfüllt, denn das Buch ist keine Sozialgeschichte japanischer Siedler in Korea, wie es der Titel vielleicht erwarten lässt. Die Kultur und Alltagspraktiken der Siedler kommen nur am Rande zur Sprache. Manchmal fragt man sich gar, wo die Siedler nun sind, wenn Uchida seitenlang Regierungspolitik und koreanische Reaktionen diskutiert. Der Autorin gelingt es daher nur bedingt ihr Hauptziel einzulösen, „to reconstruct their life stories" (S. 394). Vielmehr handelt es sich um eine politikgeschichtliche Studie, der es darum geht, Aspekte der japanischen Kolonialgeschichte neu zu evaluieren. In der Tat ist der Fokus auf die Siedler als Akteure aus dieser Perspektive erkenntniserweiternd, denn sie dienen „as a critical lens with which to look into the internal mechanism of colonial power"

(S. 396). Das japanische Kolonialreich erscheint in dieser Hinsicht als ein eigentümliches und schwer zu fassendes Gebilde. Die Finalität des kolonialen Projekts war unklar, der Status der Kolonien nicht genau definiert und das Verhältnis zwischen Kolonien und Kernland musste stets neu ausgehandelt werden. Die wechselnden Allianzen der Siedler – mit Regierungsstellen und koreanischen Eliten – zeugen sowohl von den Grenzen kolonialer Herrschaft als auch der Unmöglichkeit, klare Trennlinien zwischen Kolonialherren und Kolonisierten zu ziehen. „Settlers […] represented the central paradox of Japanese colonial rule" (S. 393), da sie einerseits eine radikale Assimilierungsrhetorik predigten und sich andererseits praktisch nicht an diese hielten.

Hin und wieder führt Uchida einen Vergleich des kolonialen Korea mit dem Elsass als 1871 vom Deutschen Reich annektiertes Territorium an (S. 146). Dieser Vergleich wird freilich noch öfter in Mark E. Caprio's zwei Jahre früher erschienenem Werk Japanese Assimilation Policies in Colonial Korea, 1910–1945 angebracht, welches argumentiert, dass es sich im Falle Japans um einen „peripheral colonialism" handelt.[1] Es ist jedoch fraglich, ob des Elsass eine gute Vergleichsbasis ist, zumal das Elsass eine hochindustrialisierte und in europäische Handelsnetzwerke bestens integrierte Region war, was auf Korea nicht zutrifft. In dieser Hinsicht könnte ein Vergleich mit den von Preußen annektierten Teilen Polens gewinnbringend sein. Des weiteren könnte man nicht nur vergleichen, sondern auch empirisch Transfers ins Spiel bringen.[2] Diese Überlegungen sollen keinesfalls den großen Wert der vorliegenden Studie für die Erforschung des

kolonialen Korea mindern. Diese liefert einen wichtigen Baustein zum Verständnis des japanischen Imperialismus.

Anmerkungen:
1   M. E. Caprio, Japanese Assimilation Policies in Colonial Korea, 1910–1945, Seattle 2009.
2   A. Leschinksy/T. Kuroda, Auf der Suche nach einem geeigneten Modell für die Behandlung eines unterworfenen Volkes und die Rolle des Bildungssystems dabei. Auszüge aus einem japanischen Gutachten im Auftrag des Kolonialgouvernements für Korea aus dem Jahre 1913 über die Bildungspolitik Preußen-Deutschlands in dem von ihm annektierten Teil Polens, in: Jahrb. für hist. Bildungsforschung 13 (2007), S. 289-305; A. Nishiyama, Informationssammlung oder Modellsuche? Ein Geheimbericht über die deutsche Schulpolitik in Elsass-Lothringen an das japanische Generalgouvernement in Korea von 1913, in: A. Heinen/D. Hüser (Hrsg.), Tour de France. Eine historische Rundreise, Stuttgart 2008, S. 99-108.

Jeffrey N. Wasserstrom: Global Shanghai, 1850–2010. A history in fragments, London: Routledge 2009, 170 S.

Rezensiert von
Susanne Weigelin-Schwiedrzik, Wien

Shanghai ist eine faszinierende Stadt. Sie zieht Touristen wie Investoren an und beschäftigt seit einigen Jahren die Wissenschaft in weitaus stärkerem Maße als andere Städte in China. Jeffrey Wasserstrom, in der China-Wissenschaft als Autor vieler kulturwissenschaftlicher Untersuchungen weltweit bekannt, ist ein weiterer wichtiger Grund, sich das Buch zur globalen Verortung Shanghais vorzunehmen. Doch leider wird das Interesse an Thema und Autor enttäuscht. Trotz seiner vielfältigen Beziehungen zu Shanghai und seinen langjährigen Forschungen zu dieser Stadt hat Wasserstrom ein langweiliges und in seiner Konzeption wenig überzeugendes Buch vorgelegt. Dabei präsentiert der Autor durchaus eine recht große Zahl bisher wenig beachteter Quellen, die auch Lesern ohne Kenntnisse der chinesischen Sprache zugänglich sind und somit über den Kreis der China-Wissenschaft hinaus zur Auseinandersetzung mit Shanghai als Teil der Globalgeschichte animieren könnte, doch hat er sich auf eine Konzeption eingelassen, die Kennern der Entwicklung in China nichts Neues bietet und Leserinnen und Leser auf der Suche nach einem historischem Verständnis der Stadtentwicklung Shanghais mit Nebensächlichkeiten abspeist.

Wasserstrom hat die Zeit zwischen 1850 und 2010 so eingeteilt, dass er in Abständen von jeweils 25 Jahren ein Jahr herausgreift und über die Ereignisse in diesem Jahr unter dem Gesichtspunkt der Betrachtung Shanghais als Weltstadt berichtet. Nun hätte sein Zugriff auf die Geschichte Shanghais vielleicht zeigen können, dass wir bisher in allzu ausgetretenen Spuren an Shanghai herangegangen sind und immer die Jahre übersehen haben, die für Shanghai interessant, im Kontext der chinesischen Geschichte jedoch unwesentlich erschienen. Leider stellt sich jedoch heraus, dass die Jahre, die bei seiner Einteilung herauskommen – 1850, 1875, 1900, 1925 usw. – nicht gerade die Jahre sind, in denen sich für Shanghai und seine globale Verortung irgendetwas Wesentliches ereignet hätte. Zwar erfahren wir beispielsweise etwas über das erste Erscheinungsjahr der

englischsprachigen Zeitung North China Herold und damit durchaus über etwas, was im Kontext der Shanghaier Globalgeschichte von Bedeutung ist, doch merkt der Leser schon des ersten Kapitels, dass die von Wasserstrom gewählte Konzeption vor allem eines bewirkt: Geschichte als bloße Konstruktion zu erkennen und uns nach einer Form der Narration zu sehen, die uns Geschichte als Prozess näher bringt.

So gibt es kein Kapitel in dem Buch, das uns eines Besseren belehrt hätte. Im Gegenteil: Selbst das Jahr 1925, das im Gegensatz zu den anderen Jahren durchaus für die Geschichte Shanghais von einiger Bedeutung ist, weil hier die so genannte Bewegung des 30. Mai stattgefunden hat, erscheint in der Darstellung von Wasserstrom blass und wenig herausfordernd. Dabei hätte gerade die Streikbewegung vom Mai 1925 genügend Anlass dazu gegeben, die Stellung Shanghais im Weltsystem unter wirtschaftlichen und sozialen Gesichtspunkten zu betrachten. Statt dessen widmet Wasserstrom dieser – wie man bei Osterhammel sehr gut nachlesen kann – höchst bedeutsamen Bewegung eine knappe Seite, die er sich auch hätte sparen können.

Ganz offensichtlich ist dem Autor auch aufgefallen, dass seine „Snapshots", wie er sie nennt, nichts wirklich Interessantes zur Geschichte Shanghais zu Tage fördern. So ergeht er sich in zuweilen krampfhaften Übungen, entgegen seiner ursprünglichen Konzeption die Jahre davor und danach mit einzubeziehen, damit er überhaupt etwas von Belang mitzuteilen hat. Besondere Blüten treibt das in Kapitel 6. Hier setzt er sich mit dem Jahr 1975 auseinander und stellt sich vor, wie eine im Jahr 1950 aus

Shanghai vertriebene Engländerin und ein Chinese, der in selbigem Jahr Shanghai verlassen hatte, sich wohl auf eine Reise nach Shanghai in diesem Jahr vorbereitet hätten. Sie hätten nach Vorstellung des Autors eine Karte von Shanghai studiert und dabei herausgefunden, dass einiges sich gegenüber dem Jahr 1950 verändert hätte, anderes – man höre und staune – jedoch unverändert geblieben wäre. Der Chinese, der in der Vorstellung von Wasserstrom die Zeit seit 1950 in Hongkong verbracht hätte, wäre erstaunt darüber, wie die Menschen in Shanghai angezogen sind, und er hätte sich darüber gewundert, dass man in der Zeitung darüber belehrt wurde, wie anders Shanghai im Vergleich zu früheren Zeiten nun in der Mitte der siebziger Jahre sei. Wenn man darüber informiert ist, wie Shanghai damals in die politischen Auseinandersetzungen um die bevorstehende Nachfolge Maos involviert war, wie gleichzeitig, als man davon ausging, dass Shanghai die am radikalsten auf maoistischer Linie agierende Stadt sei, dort die ersten Vorbereitungen für die später so wichtigen Joint-Ventures und damit für die Zusammenarbeit mit Investoren aus aller Welt getroffen wurden, dort also die Wiedereingliederung in die Weltwirtschaft vorbereitet wurde, als China „offiziell" noch vom Weltmarkt abgekoppelt war, wenn man all das im Hinterkopf hat, kommt einem die etwas verkrampft wirkende Imagination potentieller Besucher aus dem Ausland vollkommen belanglos vor.

Das abschließende Kapitel mit seinen zehn Thesen zu Shanghai 2010 kommt mutig daher, nur um wieder seine Leser mit allzu eintönigen Selbstverständlichkeiten zu enttäuschen. Kurz vor der Weltausstellung 2010 geschrieben, teilt es uns mit, dass

Shanghai auch in Zukunft in der Kontinuität seiner Geschichte stehen werde, dass es sich in vielerlei Hinsicht nicht von anderen re-globalisierten Städten unterscheide und dennoch eine ganz außergewöhnliche und einmalige Stadt sei. Shanghai sei eine post-sozialistische Metropole, die wiederum auch weit über dieses Charakteristikum hinaus der Ort sei, an dem man die Zukunft erfahren könne. Dass die Stadtregierung von Shanghai mit der Weltausstellung sich selbst dazu verpflichtet hatte, diese Stadt umweltfreundlicher zu gestalten, und diese Verpflichtung auch eingehalten hat, scheint bei Wasserstrom nicht auf. Das aber wäre ein wirklich wichtiger und interessanter Ansatzpunkt gewesen, der Anlass zu einer analytischen Auseinandersetzung mit Shanghai in Gegenwart und Vergangenheit hätte sein können. Ist Shanghai ein Trendsetter, wie es sich selbst gern sieht, oder ein Moloch, in dem das Ideal des maoistischen China endgültig zu Grab getragen wird? Doch ist die Analyse sowieso in diesem schmalen Bändchen nicht zu Hause. Zwar erfahren wir viel aus englischsprachiger und wenig aus chinesisch-sprachiger Presse über Shanghai. Doch ganz offenbar ist die Nähe des Autors zu dieser Stadt so groß, dass ihm ein erhellender Blick aus der Distanz nicht gelungen ist. Wie eine uninspirierte Pflichtübung wirkt das Buch. Schade.

Martin J. Murray: City of Extremes. The Spatial Politics of Johannesburg (= Politics, History, and Culture), Durham: Duke University Press 2011, 470 S.

Reviewed by
Keith Beavon, Pretoria

Martin Murray is a former Professor of Sociology at the State University of New York in Binghamton, and most recently Professor of Urban Planning at the Taubman College of Architecture and Urban Planning. His interest with Johannesburg extends over some ten years during which time he has made several visits to the city and engaged in intensive research. The net result, journal articles aside, has been the publication of two substantial books. In 2008 Murray's first Johannesburg book appeared under the title *Taming the Disorderly City: Envisioning the Spatial Landscape of Johannesburg after Apartheid.* Then, three years later, we have the *City of Extremes: The Spatial Politics of Johannesburg.* It is not just another book about Johannesburg, indeed not. "City of Extremes" conveys some serious messages based upon both informed observation and meticulous library and archival research; as demonstrated by the 130 pages of footnotes. Running through the book as a whole is Murray's lament that, after a fraction short of 20 years since the official demise of apartheid, there is a never widening gulf between the overwhelming majority of Johannesburg's poorly serviced

residents and the elitist minority of middle and upper class residents. The latter group enjoy ready access to world-class malls and shopping services, to educational and health facilities, whereas the bulk of the black working class is still contained in the townships created in the eras of segregation and apartheid. Murray takes little comfort that the ranks of the middle and upper classes continue to grow through an inflow of a small stream of nouveau riche indigenous people known also as 'black diamonds'.

Before unpacking and laying bare the structure of the book and the essence of its Three Parts, and despite some negative issues which I refer to only in passing, it is my opinion that this book makes an excellent addition to the growing list of works that range in focus from specialised aspects of various parts of Johannesburg to the city as a whole. Murray skilfully blends architectural material, drawn from the magisterial work by Chipkin, into the evolving narrative. And readers will find the section of the book where Cosmos City (pp. 197-207) is discussed to be very interesting indeed.

The material encompassed in the book is set out and presented in three parts. Each Part contains two or three Chapters and each Part is prefaced by a discussion over some six to eight pages of text that are intended to set up the essence of the Chapters that follow. The above structure may well have helped the author during the actual writing of the book. In its completed form, however, the structure serves more to create an impression of three books in one set of covers rather than a single wide ranging treatise. The above impression is underscored by the author's irritating

tendency to repeat himself from time to time.

Part I contains matter that is related to the making and meaning of the built environment of Johannesburg during its infancy as a "Europeanized city at the edge of the British Empire " (p. xxi). And the some 30 pages of Chapter 1 contain material that ranges from the 1880s to the end of the 1930s. Whereas the author might well believe that he had established a suitable starting block for the discussion that follows it is achieved without any mention, let alone a discussion, of what others will see as fundamental to the creation of the race-space of the City.

Specifically, there is no mention of the 1923 Natives (Urban Areas) Act that was directly inspired by the Johannesburg municipal officials. And the Act is the single instrument that brought about some 90% of the racial separation in Johannesburg before the first apartheid Acts were passed. Indeed the statement, on the first page of the book's Preface, that Johannesburg was "the quintessential apartheid city" (p. xi) is fundamentally incorrect. Johannesburg of the early 1990s was the quintessential segregated city and Cape Town, that had declined the adoption of the enabling Urban Areas Act, was the quintessential apartheid city.

In Chapter 2 Murray switches his sights and takes aim at the "historically specific modes of city building in Johannesburg that sought to reconcile modern planning principles with the exclusionary practice of racial segregation" (p. xxi). Here he draws extensively and appropriately from various sources and in particular from Chipkin and van der Waal.[1] In Chapter 2 the focus is mainly on the changing skyline of

the then Central Business District and also on Hillbrow, the cosmopolitan residential area that is located on both slopes of South Africa's northern watershed and not on "flatland" (p. 66). In closing the Chapter Murray makes reference to the fact that just as the CBD had 'modernised' itself so a combination of factors, and not least the changing nature of retailing, saw businesses leaving the updated CBD and heading north into the low density and sprawling suburbs of what was then still the municipal area of Sandton.

In Part II, entitled "Unravelling Space: Centrifugal Urbanism and the Convulsive City", and in Part III, "Fortifying Space", Murray draws his readers into the meat of the book. Here he examines the patchwork cityscape that is metropolitan Johannesburg after apartheid. It covers an extremely large area with a cityscape that is increasingly being fashioned by the 'alliance' of capital and local government. Both parties are jointly determined to make and promote Johannesburg as a world-class African city but at the same time as it forges new upmarket urban space the city is spawning an ever increasing sprawl of peripheral concentrations of shacks that the poorest live in.

In the three Chapters of Part II the focus is on the "splintering metropolis" (p. 85), the hollowing out of the central area, and its transformation into an "outcast ghetto" (p. 370), and the disturbing but ever widening gap between the minority 'haves' and the vast number of 'have-nots'. Inevitably those readers who believe that the old CBD area of Johannesburg, and the city's periphery, is constantly improving, and those who are more pessimistic will read

the Chapters with different degrees of approval.

In the last of the three Parts, the emphasis is on the nature and the construction of the 'fortified' spaces that increasingly enclose residential areas, cluster complexes, and shopping malls occupied and frequented by the predominantly (but no longer exclusively white) upper classes. Murray deals in some detail with the 'fortified areas' occupied by three large banks and his conclusions about their role in 'breaking up' the old centralized CBD are similar to those made elsewhere.

In conclusion I reiterate my earlier statement that the book is an excellent addition to the literature on Johannesburg, and a must-read book for all serious scholars with an interest in the City of Gold. It is a pity that the name of the city is not part of the title but has been relegated to last place in the subtitle. Thus one is left to ponder why the title of the book was not Johannesburg: The Spatial Politics of the City of Extremes.

Note:
1 C. Chipkin, Johannesburg Style. Architecture and Society, 1880s–1960s, Cape Town 1993; G. van der Waal, From Mining Camp to Metropolis. The Building of Johannesburg, 1886–1940, Pretoria, 1987.

Holger Impekoven: Die Alexander von Humboldt-Stiftung und das Ausländerstudium in Deutschland 1925–1945. Von der „geräuschlosen Propaganda" zur Ausbildung der „geistigen Wehr" des „Neuen Europa" (= Internationale Beziehungen. Theorie und Geschichte, Buch 9), Bonn: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht unipress 2013, 522 S.

Rezensiert von
Claudia Baumann, Leipzig

Impekovens umfassende Studie zur Rolle der Alexander von Humboldt-Stiftung im Nationalsozialismus ist in den Kontext des seit Mitte der 1990er Jahre anhaltenden Trends zur geschichtswissenschaftlichen Erforschung von Wissenschaftsförderorganisationen in Deutschland zu setzen. Von besonderer Bedeutung ist hier die Hinwendung zur „auswärtigen Kulturpolitik" und der Ambivalenz zwischen Wissenschaft als per se international und zugleich intensiv beteiligt an der Verwirklichung des ultimativ Nationalen. Mit der Alexander von Humboldt-Stiftung rückt die akademische Mobilität in den Vordergrund, die Impekoven als eine «in soziales Handeln umgesetzte Ausprägung von Internationalität von Wissenschaft» definiert. Es handelt sich hier weniger um die Geschichte einer eigenständigen Institution wie beispielsweise bei der DFG, sondern um die Geschichte eines vom Auswärtigen Amt finanzierten Stipendienprogramms, das die kulturpolitische Methode des «Multiplikatorenprinzips» in den Vordergrund rückt. 1925 fand ein Wechsel in der Zielsetzung zur Förderung ausländischer Studenten statt, bei dem Preußisches Kultusministerium, das Reichsministerium des Innern und die Hochschulkonferenz gemeinsam im Auswärtigen Amt beschlossen, finanzielle Förderung weniger von karitativen Kriterien abhängig zu machen, sondern Begabung und „Deutschfreundlichkeit" zu priorisieren. Da es dem Auswärtigem Amt «aus außen- und innenpolitischen Gründen nicht zweckmäßig» schien, als Initiator und Geldgeber in Erscheinung zu treten wurde die Humboldt-Stiftung als «Camouflage» gegründet; mit einem populären Namen, der eine bereits längere Existenz der Stiftung suggerierte.

Zwischen 1925 und 1930, den ersten fünf Jahren der Stipendienarbeit, gingen bei der Alexander von Humboldt-Stiftung zwischen 250 und 320 Bewerbungen pro Jahr ein, dem eine Zahl von 50-60 Bewilligungen, größtenteils an Studenten aus Bulgarien, Jugoslawien und Ungarn, gegenüberstanden. Die geografische Präferenz erklärt Impekoven mit der „kulturpolitischen Hinwendung zum Balkan", die Teil einer Außenpolitik war, die in Südosteuropa ein „informal empire" aufzubauen plante. Impekoven lehnt die These eines schematischen Länderquotensystems allerdings ab und schlägt stattdessen, durchaus überzeugend vor, dass die Bewilligungen in einer Art Wechselwirkung zwischen Bewerberlage und außenpolitischer Intentionen gesehen werden müssen. So waren es einerseits hohe Bewerberzahlen, die durchaus Einfluss hatten als auch das aktive politische Bemühen um Studenten aus Ländern, aus denen zunächst kaum Nach-

frage bestand, wie zum Beispiel Indien. Stipendien wurden zu 60% an Geisteswissenschaftler vergeben, weil diese Studenten am ehesten als „ideale Multiplikatoren und wirkungsvolle Vertreter Deutschlands" gesehen wurden, da diese doch über die „Fähigkeit, in einer Gemeinschaft zu wirken, allgemeine Interessiertheit an politischen und kulturellen Dingen und eine gewisse Gewandtheit im Umgang mit anderen Menschen verfügten".

Impekoven versteht es, die aufwändig beschafften Datensätze zur Stipendienvergabe, in das großgeschichtliche Narrativ einzubetten und schafft es mittels Rückbindung an zentrale Akteure wie Kurt Goepel geschickt zwischen nationaler, institutioneller Ebene und individueller Ebene zu wechseln. Kurt Goepel begleitete als zentrale Figur die Stiftung von Beginn an und bestimmte die Stipendienpolitik entscheidend mit. So traf er zum Beispiel die Vorauswahl für Kandidaten, nahm an gemeinschaftlichen Ausflügen teil und wohnte im Clubhaus in Berlin. Gemäß Goepels Verständnis sollten die Eigenschaften „wissenschaftliche Fähigkeit, Interesse für allgemeine politische und andere Fragen und Gemeinschaftsgeist" besonders gefördert werden um das Ziel eines idealen Multiplikators zu verwirklichen. Der Weg dorthin in den ersten Jahren der Stipendienarbeit sollte eher eine „privat geübte Gastfreundschaft sein und keine gouvernementale" wie in Frankreich. Die Jahre 1925 bis einschließlich 1933, die Impekoven als „geräuschlose Propaganda" beschreibt, markieren einen Paradigmenwechsel in der deutschen Politik. War das Ausländerstudium im Kaiserreich zuvor hauptsächlich von skeptischen, xenophoben und rassistischen Beweggründen ge-

prägt gewesen, so trat nun der Nutzen für die Revisionspolitik und die Aufhebung politischer Isolierung in den Vordergrund. Die Methode der „pénétration pacifique", die in der Weimarer auswärtigen Kulturpolitik auf langfristige Wirkung ausgelegt war, unterschied sich wesentlich von der daraufhin folgenden nationalsozialistischen Kulturpolitik.

Dem rapiden Rückgang der ausländischen Studierenden nach Hitlers Machergreifung wurde mit einer Ausweitung des Stipendienprogramms entgegengewirkt, was im Verlauf der nächsten Jahre zehn Prozent aller ausländischen Studenten, deren Zahl sich im Jahr 1938/1939 auf 4.098 belief, zu einer Finanzierung verhalf. Obwohl Kontinuitäten in der Stipendienpolitik wie der Fokus auf Geisteswissenschaften und die Region Südosteuropa deutlich zu erkennen waren, wurde die Vergabe durch die Beteiligung nationalsozialistischer Stellen doch deutlich ideologischer. So belegt die Anweisung vom März 1935, nach der „Bewerber jüdischen Blutes (die bis dahin 18% der Stipendiaten ausmachten) von der Einreichung eines Stipendiengesuches abzuhalten sind", dass politische Aktivität im Sinne des Nationalsozialismus vor 1939 in der Humboldt-Stiftung stattfand, entgegen den Beteuerungen Goepels nach 1945. Eine Verschiebung zugunsten politischer statt wissenschaftlicher Kriterien lässt sich an zahlreichen Beispielen beobachten. So wurden flämische, ukrainische, bulgarische Studenten als auch Studenten aus dem Nahen und Mittleren Osten und Afghanistan aus kriegsstrategischen Gründen zunehmend bevorzugt.

Im letzten Teil des Buches stehen die Stipendien während des Zweiten Weltkriegs im Mittelpunkt, was, wie Impekoven be-

tont, von besonderer Bedeutung ist. Für diese Zeit bestand bisher fälschlicherweise die Annahme, dass die akademische Auslandsarbeit sukzessive zurückging. Nachgewiesenermaßen ist jedoch das Gegenteil der Fall und die Förderung von ausländischen Studenten stieg nach Kriegsbeginn signifikant an. Ziel war die Durchsetzung kultureller Hegemonie, die zur Untermauerung der politischen beitragen sollte. Mit Hilfe der Stipendien und den Deutschen Wissenschaftlichen Instituten, die in den Ländern eröffnet wurden, sollten die Eliten von der kulturellen Überlegenheit Deutschlands überzeugt werden. Dazu kamen auch kurzfristige besatzungspolitische und militärstrategische Notwendigkeiten, die eine Militarisierung der Stipendienarbeit mit sich führte. Bis März 1945 wurden die Stipendien noch ausgezahlt; danach verläuft sich die Spur vieler Stipendiaten in den Nachkriegswirren. Viele fanden sich als „displaced persons" wieder oder emigrierten nach Übersee, wie zum Beispiel der Ukrainer Ivan „John" Demjanjuk. Impekoven hat einige Quellen finden können, die auch Berichte von Studenten beinhalteten, was wesentlich zum Erkenntnisgewinn des Lesers beiträgt. Davon auszugehen, dass Stipendiaten als eine homogene Gruppe zu verstehen sind, deren alleinige Motivation politischer Natur ist, würde zu kurz greifen, insbesondere unter Berücksichtigung der langen Zeitspanne. Kurt Goepel, langjähriger Leiter der Humboldt-Stiftung wurde nach Ende des Krieges als „Mitläufer" verurteilt und galt im Bundeskanzleramt sowie im Auswärtigen Amt als weitgehend unbelasteter Experte, der sogar für die Neugründung der Alexander von Humboldt-Stiftung 1953 wieder im Gespräch war.

Insgesamt handelt es sich bei Impekovens Studie um eine eindrückliche Arbeit, die reich an Quellen und exzellent in ihrer Formulierung, nicht nur den Mehrwert einer zeitintensiven Promotion aufzeigt, sondern – und das vor allen Dingen – die Notwendigkeit deutlich macht, mit der weiterhin nationalsozialistische Vergangenheit aufgearbeitet werden muss. Kritischer Anmerkung bedarf es hier wenig: Den Beginn akademischer Mobilität mit einem Zitat von Friedrich Barbarossa schmückend auf die Ära der societas scholarium zu verorten, ist stilistisch durchaus ansprechend, unterschlägt allerdings Wanderungsbewegungen jenseits europäischer Gefilde, so z. B. zu den „ancient seats of learning" in Takshasila, Nalanda und Vikramsila im heutigen Indien aus weitentlegenen Regionen wie dem heutigen China und Korea im 7. Jh. v. Chr. Überhaupt dürfen einige Argumente, wenn vor einem globalen Kontext betrachtet, in ihrem absoluten Anspruch hinterfragt werden. „Dass kein anderes Land zwischen 1850 und 1914 für ausländische Studenten attraktiver war als Deutschland" (S. 43) und es „das Gravitationszentrum internationaler akademischer Mobilität darstellte" (S. 44), bietet zu große Angriffsfläche für Wissenschaftler, die versuchen, sich studentischer Migration näherungsweise global zu widmen. In ihrer jüngst veröffentlichten Studie sprach z. B. Gracia Liu-Farrer für den gleichen Zeitraum Japan besondere Bedeutung als Ziel chinesischer Studentenmigration zu. Zwischen 1896 und dem Beginn des Zweiten Weltkriegs waren mehrere zehntausend Chinesische Studenten nach Japan gekommen, um sich wissenschaftliches, militärisches und soziales Wissen anzueignen. Derlei Bei-

spiele finden sich mittlerweile zu häufig, was den sparsamen Gebrauch an Superlativen hinsichtlich der Sonderstellung Deutschlands empfiehlt. Abschließend sei erwähnt, dass Impekoven den Begriff „Ausländerstudium" nicht ausschließlich historisch verwendet (S. 43), womit er sich in guter Gesellschaft befindet, hat doch die Hochschulrektorenkonferenz erst im Jahr 2009 den „Nationalen Kodex für das Ausländerstudium an deutschen Hochschulen" verabschiedet. Eichenhaft überdauert dieser Begriff in so mancher deutscher Wissenschaftsinstitution die Zeit, wenngleich das Wort „Ausländer" aus dem Sprachgebrauch längst verschwunden ist und in den Begrifflichkeiten international oder global weitaus inkludierendere Varianten gefunden hat.

Roger D. Marwick / Euridice Charon Cardona: Soviet Women on the Frontline in the Second World War, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan Publishing 2012, 305 S.

Review by
Robert Dale, London

Between 1941 and 1945 over a million women saw military service in the Red Army and partisan units. This excellent book tells the story of the participation of these women in a genocidal and mysognist war of unprecedented scale and violence. Roger Markwick and Euridice Charon Cardona weave together an analysis of state

policy towards women in military service, with a social and cultural history of the everyday experience of life and death on the frontlines. The book's central objective is to explain how and why so many Soviet women came to be on the frontlines of this brutal conflict, and why they fought for the repressive Stalinist regime. This is counterbalanced by exploring the popular experience of military service: the everyday hardships, shortages, frustrations, uncertainties and risks of women's military service. In addressing these areas the book makes important contributions to the understanding of Soviet women's participation in modern industrialized warfare, the nature of the Stalinist state, and women's place within wider society.

For readers familiar with the history of other fronts and armies during the Second World War, there will be much that is unfamiliar and surprising about the history of Soviet women's military service. However, the study of Soviet women in the Red Army and partisans organizations is not uncharted territory. Anna Krylova, for example, has explored how the presence of Soviet women on the frontlines reshaped notions of gender. Her book focuses on many of the same exemplary personalities as this study, albeit with different conclusions.[1] Roger Reese has devoted two chapters of a recent book exploring the Red Army's military effectiveness to charting the historical precedents for, motivations and experience of female soldiers. Reese, like the authors of the present study, asks why so many women fought for such a repressive regime.[2] These works, and several others, are briefly referenced in the introduction. But the book would have benefitted from a more detailed historiographical

frame of reference, against which to contextualise its research findings.

The principal value of this book lays in its comprehensive approach. While there have been authoritative studies of particular branches of female military service, such as Reina Pennington's excellent study of Soviet airwomen,[3] no other book captures the full diversity and complexity of Soviet women's military participation. Women fulfilled a bewildering array of combat, technical and ancillary roles within the Red Army and partisan forces, which are explored in remarkable detail. Chapters are devoted to the frontline experiences of: nurses, pilots especially the all-female 'night-witches' bomber regiment), partisans, the Women's Volunteer Rifle Brigade and snipers. Other chapters explore the formative experiences of the female 'frontline generation', the initial surge of female volunteers in the summer of 1941, the mass mobilization of women into the military in the spring and autumn of 1942, and finally the traumatic aftermath of frontline military service. This structure allows the chronological shifts in official policy to be charted alongside a narrative of the rich variety of female military experience.

"Soviet Women on the Frontline" is based on an impressive range of source material. The official history of the mobilization of Soviet women is told through a mixture of published sources, particularly newspapers, and documents from the Komsomol archive. These materials highlight the Komsomol's central role in encouraging, channelling and in certain circumstances coercing female military participation. The authors marshal a wealth of personal testimony, including diaries, letters, memoirs and interviews to tell women's stories.

Large parts of the text are devoted to sustained analysis of frontline experiences in women's own voices. Some of these vignettes discuss well known women, such as the aviators Marina Raskova and Irina Rakobolskaya, and the sniper Lyudmila Pavlichenko, familiar from the existing literature. Others are less familiar. Indeed the authors commissioned Artem Drabkin, of the 'I Remember' website to conduct a number of additional interviews.[4] This website is developing into an increasingly valuable academic resource, used by a number of researchers including Roger Reese. These sources are supplemented by evidence from visual sources, film and literature.

What emerges over the book's nine chapters is a fascinating picture of popular patriotic enthusiasm, official condescension towards women, and remarkable heroism in the face of enormous obstacles. Soviet education, propaganda and socialization fostered a sense of entitlement to military service amongst a generation of young women. The impulse to serve was repeatedly frustrated by the state's and the military's reluctance to embrace women in the military. The mass mobilization of women was steadfastly resisted until the spring of 1942, when the disastrous losses experienced by the Red Army forced a policy change. It was, however, "never the intention of the Soviet state to deploy women en masse on the frontlines, let alone for women to become professional soldiers […]" (p. 180). Women always served within strict limits. The exemplary pilots, snipers and partisans celebrated in Soviet propaganda were the exception. Most women were consigned to mundane roles, designed to free men up for combat. Military service

was a disappointment for many women, achieved in the face of official scepticism, pervasive male discrimination, and even abuse. "The divorce between Soviet rhetoric about women's equality and the reality of daily life for women in the belligerently masculine Red Army […]," (p. 201) was striking. By 1944, once the tide of war had turned, women's opportunities for frontline service became even more restricted, further feeding women's disillusionment. The betrayal of Soviet women's patriotic enthusiasm continued beyond May 1945. Few women were able to carve out a permanent military career. Regardless of gender veterans found the transition to civilian life difficult, but former servicewomen faced additional barriers. Many were treated with distain or contempt, and were the victims of viscous rumours about their wartime sexual conduct. Markwick and Charon Cardona conclude that Soviet women's sense of entitlement to fight alongside men did not in the long run challenge gender norms. Soviet women fought first and foremost as patriots faced by an extraordinary threat. Their feminist demands were secondary and by contemporary standards rather conventional.

"Soviet Women on the Frontlines" is a well written and painstakingly researched study. It peers behind the sanitized and saccharine official Soviet narrative of women at war, to reveal a complicated and often disturbing analysis of women's military involvement. Soviet history specialists will find much of interest in this fascinating book. But it also deserves a wider audience. Scholars with an interest in the comparative history of women and warfare, or the global history of the Second World War, will find this an accessible and au-

thoritative case study of the most extreme example of women's military participation in the twentieth century.

Notes:
1   A. Krylova, Soviet Women in Combat. A History of Violence on the Eastern Front, Cambridge 2010.
2   R. R. Reese, Why Stalin's Soldiers Fought. The Red Army's Military Effectiveness in World War II, Lawrence 2011, pp. 257-305.
3   R. Pennington, Wings, Women and War. Soviet Airwomen in World War II Combat, Lawrence 2001.
4   I Remember Website, http://iremember.ru/ (last accessed 21 December 2013).

Julia Siep: Nationalisierte Mütterlichkeit als Phänomen der Moderne. Frauenzeitschriften in Japan, Deutschland und Italien in den 1930er Jahren (= Forum Kulturwissenschaften, Bd. 12), München: Martin Meidenbauer Verlag 2011, 342 S.

Rezensiert von
Ruth Merz, Frankfurt am Main

Zeitschriften und Zeitungen rücken seit zwei Jahrzehnten immer mehr in das Blickfeld von Historikerinnen. Dies hat primär nicht unbedingt etwas mit der Tatsache zu tun, dass die fortschreitende Digitalisierung und Verschlagwortung vieler Presseerzeugnisse den Zugang zu dieser vielfältigen und sperrigen Quellengattung erleichtert. Die Ursache dürfte vielmehr in der Natur des Mediums selbst zu suchen sein. Der gesteigerte Kommunikationsfluss unserer westlichen, aber auch

globalisierten Welt, mit ihrer gefühlten Individualisierung der öffentlichen Meinungsbildung hat mit der Zeit auch für deren Entstehung, Instrumentalisierung und Bildung in der Geschichte sensibilisiert. Zunehmend interessanter ist dabei auch die Einnahme eines globaleren Betrachtungswinkels geworden und mit ihm der Vergleich von Presseerzeugnissen über nationale Grenzen hinweg.

Solch einen lohnenswerten Versuch hat die wissenschaftliche Mitarbeiterin am Institut für Modernes Japan der Heinrich Heine Universität Düsseldorf, Julia Siep, mit ihrer Dissertation unternommen, die 2011 angenommen wurde. Grundlage ist die Betrachtung konservativer und regierungsnaher Frauenzeitschriften der 1930er Jahre in den Achsenmächten Italien, Japan und Deutschland. Die Relevanz der Analyse von Zeitungen und Zeitschriften als Vermittler und Überträger staatlicher Propaganda in extrem nationalistischen Diktaturen ist unumstritten – verwiesen sei auf den Vorgang der Gleichschaltung und Kontrolle der Medien und der damit verbundene Versuch, die öffentliche Meinung durch einen extrem nationalistischen Diskurs einzurahmen und zu beeinflussen (49). Ein solches Bestreben von Seiten der staatlichen Propaganda öffnete in Bezug auf die in den damaligen Medien dargestellten Idealbilder von Frauen einen Gegensatz zwischen einer simplifizierenden und glorifizierenden Tradition, in welcher Frauen und Mütter als unverdorbener und ursprünglicher beschrieben wurden, und einer bedrohlichen Moderne, die Frauen ihrer weiblichen Natur zu entfremden drohte. Die wissenschaftliche Aufforderung, alle drei Achsenmächte auf unterschiedlicher Ebene zu verglei-

chen, ist, wie die Autorin selbst anmerkt (156), nicht neu. Das Ziel der Studie ist die komparatistische Betrachtung der diskursiven und medialen Herstellung einer „nationalisierten Mütterlichkeit" in den drei Ländern, an welcher sich die dichotomen Exklusionsmerkmale moderner Nationalismen veranschaulichen lassen. Hierfür wählte Julia Siep exemplarisch regierungsnahe Frauenzeitschriften, die sie nach einer vorangestellten und orientierenden Pilotstudie für einen Zeitraum von fünf Jahren kontinuierlich betrachtete. Aus der Lektüre ergab sich so eine Quellengrundlage von insgesamt 227 zu bewertenden Artikeln, in welchen unterschiedliche Mütterlichkeitskonzepte thematisiert wurden. Die Begrenzung auf den engen, aber fortlaufenden Zeitraum sollte zum einen die Kontinuität gewährleisten. Zum anderen sollte dadurch verhindert werden, dass die Anzahl der zu berücksichtigenden Zeitschriftenartikel ins Unermessliche anwächst. Mit dem Fokus auf der Funktionalisierung von Mütterlichkeit im Dienste der rechtsextremen Staatsideologie erhofft sich Julia Siep, Rückschlüsse über den „Nexus" (S. 15) von Nation – als wichtigster Konstruktion und Kategorie der Moderne –, Gender – als einer Kategorie, die in der Moderne eine revolutionäre Neuordnung der Geschlechterverhältnisse hervorbrachte – und Kultur ziehen zu können, womit sie an eine moderne Forschungsrichtung innerhalb der Gender Studies anschließen möchte. Dabei verfolgt die Autorin die These, dass die Verbindung von Nation und Mütterlichkeit ein grenzüberschreitendes Phänomen faschistischer Staaten der Moderne gewesen sei. Die Arbeit baut auf Methoden der komparatistischen Kulturwissenschaft auf, und die zu berück-

sichtigenden Forschungsstände reichen von der Diskurstheorie über den New Historicism bis hin zu den Gender Studies. Ein Literaturverzeichnis, das eine ausführliche Auflistung der analysierten Artikel beinhaltet, sowie die Vorstellung zentraler Schlüsselbegriffe für alle drei Länder, die der Erstellung des Textkorpus dienten, und ein Glossar runden die Dissertation ab.

Die Stärken der Arbeit liegen eindeutig im sechsten und letzten Kapitel. Es gelingt der Autorin hier sehr eindrücklich, die Doppeldeutigkeit des medialen Diskurses, und damit indirekt der totalitären Ideologie, vis-à-vis von Frauen und Müttern herauszuarbeiten. Frauen wurden in allen drei Ländern als Teil der Nation beschrieben, sollten dabei jedoch unpolitisch bleiben (S. 227) – ein Widerspruch, der auch für die Frauenzeitschriften argumentativ nur schwierig aufzulösen war. Hierfür arbeitet Julia Siep präzise die enge Verflechtung der unterschiedlichen Mütterlichkeitskonzepte mit der jeweiligen Staatsideologie heraus. Dabei ergeben sich durch die Auswertung der Zeitschriftenartikel Gemeinsamkeiten, wie die Eingliederung des Privaten, Mütterlichen in den öffentlichen Raum über die jeweilige faschistische Ideologie, aber auch Unterschiede, die sich in erster Linie als Kontinuität aus der jeweils anderen historischen Tradition verstehen lassen. So wird schließlich deutlich, wie sich durch entsprechende Instrumentalisierung unterschiedlicher Traditionen, durch Nationalisierung und Monopolisierung von Frauenbildern, für Mütterlichkeit im totalitären Verständnis kein universeller, sondern ein „nationalisierter" Anspruch ableiten lässt.

In anderer Hinsicht regt die Arbeit von Julia Siep aber auch zum Nachdenken über das methodische Vorgehen an. In Bezug auf den von der Autorin gewählten Zeitrahmen, der von 1933 bis 1937 reicht, lässt sich natürlich die gern gestellte, aber wenig förderliche Frage formulieren, ob dieser Zeitraum angemessen ist, um adäquat über Brüche und Kontinuitäten im öffentlichen Diskurs zur Mütterlichkeit zu reflektieren – Vor- und Nachteile lassen sich immer für den einen oder anderen Zeitraum finden. Wesentlich kritischer in Bezug auf den zeitlichen Rahmen scheint hingegen die Tatsache zu sein, dass Julia Siep den Zweiten Weltkrieg aus der Betrachtung ausklammert mit der etwas überstrapazierten Bemerkung, dass die Auswirkungen von Krieg auf die Geschlechterverhältnisse hinlänglich erwiesen seien (S. 161). Dem lässt sich entgegnen, dass auch Friedenszeiten das Verhältnis der Geschlechter zueinander prägen, was bisher kein Grund gewesen sein sollte, diese nicht zu berücksichtigen! Hier hat Julia Siep es versäumt, durch diachrone und synchrone Vergleiche die aus der Forschung übernommene Behauptung zu überprüfen und am Beispiel der drei Länder die möglichen Mechanismen, die für solche Veränderungen verantwortlich wären, herauszuarbeiten.

Die Tatsache, dass die Dissertation zwar ein eng umgrenztes Zeitfenster wählt, räumlich jedoch eine große Perspektive einnimmt, ist uneingeschränkt zu begrüßen. Vergleiche zwischen dem faschistischen Italien und dem nationalsozialistischen Deutschland sind weitaus zahlreicher als jene, die das imperialistische Japan gleichberechtigt mitberücksichtigen. Doch in der konkreten Umsetzung ergeben sich Schwierigkeiten: Die weiträumige Perspektive wird dadurch enorm eingeschränkt, dass über lange Seiten und Kapitel hinweg jedes Land für sich betrachtet und analysiert

wird, bevor es zum eigentlichen Vergleich kommt. Hier stellt sich eine grundlegende praktische und methodische Frage: Sollte sich die komparatistische Analyse an die Darstellung eines jeden besprochenen Aspektes anschließen oder – wie im vorliegenden Fall – die Synthese in einem eigenen großen Kapitel am Ende des Buches erfolgen? Im ersten Fall lässt sich eine gewisse Redundanz natürlich nicht vermeiden, im zweiten liegt die Herausforderung darin, einen additiven Charakter bei der Vorstellung der Ergebnisse zu vermeiden – letzteres ein Vorwurf, der auch der Arbeit von Julia Siep gemacht werden kann, bevor sie ihn im sechsten Kapitel auflöst. Diese kritischen Anmerkungen sollen die Arbeit und die Ergebnisse von Julia Siep in keiner Weise schmälern. Sie hat mit ihrer Dissertation einen wichtigen und wertvollen Vorschlag gemacht, wie ein historisch medialer Diskurs zu Wahrnehmungen von Geschlechterverhältnissen, der von einer umfassenden Quellengrundlage ausgeht, komparatistisch und von einer internationalen Perspektive aus analysiert werden kann. Dennoch ergeben sich aus ihnen ganz grundsätzliche Fragen: Die strukturelle Komplexität einer solchen Studie, die wissenschaftliche Multiperspektive und die mediale Vielstimmigkeit werfen im Vorfeld konzeptuelle Fragen auf. Wie können diese gelöst werden und welche anderen Umsetzungsmöglichkeiten wären denkbar, über die von Julia Siep vorgeschlagene hinaus? Und müssen derartige Pressestudien nicht immer durch eine statistische Ausarbeitung begleitet werden, aus welcher die quantitative Grundlage hervorgeht, auf welche sich die qualitativen Aussagen stützen? Hier müssen vergleichbare Studien in Zukunft versuchen, eine Antwort zu fin-

den, und durch weitere Lösungsvorschläge dazu beitragen, dass diese Art komplexer Forschungsfragen weiterhin berücksichtigt wird.

Peter Feldbauer / Jean Paul Lehners / Bernd Hausberger (Hrsg.): Globalgeschichte. Die Welt 1000–2000, 8 Bde, Wien: Mandelbaum Verlag 2008–2011, 2902 S.[1]

Rezensiert von
Sebastian Conrad, Berlin

Das frühe 21. Jahrhundert ist die Zeit der großen globalgeschichtlichen Synthesen und der groß angelegten Weltgeschichten. In vielen Verlagen – etwa bei Cambridge, Oxford und Harvard University Press; in Deutschland von der Wissenschaftlichen Buchgesellschaft, dem Fischer-Verlag oder bei C. H. Beck – erscheinen gegenwärtig vielbändige Weltgeschichtswerke. Diese Konjunktur ist selbst ein erklärungsbedürftiges Phänomen, und man darf gespannt sein, ob die sich darin ausdrückende verlegerische Gewinnerwartung auch in kaufbereiter Resonanz des historisch interessierten Publikums niederschlägt – und inwiefern es die Fragestellungen und Perspektiven der historischen Forschung zu beeinflussen in der Lage sein wird.
Inmitten der bei namhaften Verlagen publizierten Konkurrenz könnte die in acht Teilbänden herausgegebene Globalgeschichte aus dem Mandelbaum-Verlag leicht übersehen werden. Anders als die

meisten seiner Mitbewerber liegt es seit Herbst 2011 nun abgeschlossen vor. Herausgegeben von Peter Feldbauer, Jean Paul Lehners und Bernd Hausberger, ist die Reihe aus den vielfältigen Aktivitäten der Wiener Geschichtswissenschaft hervorgegangen, die schon früh auf weltgeschichtliche Themen gesetzt hatte. Auf insgesamt beinahe 3000 Seiten und in 95 Einzelbeiträgen wird die Geschichte mehr oder weniger sämtlicher Weltregionen innerhalb des letzten Jahrtausends nachgezeichnet. Um es vorweg zu schicken: Die Reihe ist gut gelungen, informativ und insgesamt empfehlenswert. Und das, obwohl sie den Anspruch ihres Titels, eine „Globalgeschichte" der vergangenen zehn Jahrhunderte zu entwickeln, nur in Ansätzen einlösen kann.

Nur in Ansätzen – denn die Herausgeber haben sich für eine Bandstruktur entschieden, die globale Zusammenhänge eher ausblendet als in den Vordergrund rückt. Der Begriff der Globalgeschichte legt eine Perspektive nahe, die Interaktionen zwischen unterschiedlichen Regionen in den Vordergrund rückt und systematisch die Integration der Welt mit einbezieht. Die Bände dieser Reihe hingegen sind nach Jahrhunderten und nach Regionen unterteilt und müssen daher zwangsläufig die übergreifenden Perspektiven den Einleitungen überlassen – und der Syntheseleistung ihrer Leserinnen und Leser.

Die ersten beiden Bände behandeln jeweils 250 Jahre, danach wird jedes Jahrhundert separat in den Blick genommen; lediglich für das 20. Jahrhundert stehen zwei Bände zur Verfügung. Die Reihen-Herausgeber selbst sprechen von „einer im Kern pragmatischen Periodisierung"; so kann man

es auch nennen. Als wie komplex sich die Einteilung nach Jahrhunderten in der konkreten Durchführung erweisen kann, hat erst kürzlich Jürgen Osterhammel in einem schönen Kapitel seiner „Verwandlung der Welt" demonstriert. Hinter jeder Bandeinteilung verbergen sich daher systematische Fragen der Periodisierung der Weltgeschichte. Wie weit reichen globale Verflechtungen in die Vergangenheit zurück? Seit wann kann man von einer integrierten Welt sprechen? Das sind zentrale Gesichtspunkte, wenn es darum geht, die Reichweite und historischen Tiefenschärfe globalgeschichtlicher Ansätze zu bestimmen. Wie lässt sich, unter dem Gesichtspunkt grenzüberschreitender Transfers und Austauschbeziehungen, die Geschichte der Welt einteilen und periodisieren? Kann man unterscheiden zwischen einer Geschichte der überregionalen Kontakte (die sich bis in die Vorgeschichte zurückverfolgen lassen) und globalen Verflechtungen? Lassen sich diese beiden Formen der Interaktionen wiederum analytisch trennen von einer Geschichte der globalen Integration?

In der Forschung sind vor allem zwei mögliche Zäsuren diskutiert worden; beide sind auch in der vorliegenden Reihe zentrale Bezugspunkte. Die meisten Historiker setzen den Beginn eines globalen Zusammenhangs im frühen 16. Jh. an. Die europäische Eroberung der beiden Amerikas, der Beginn des Kolonialismus und der von Europa dominierten kapitalistischen Handelszusammenhänge steht dann für einen wichtigen welthistorischen Epocheneinschnitt. Im Anschluss an den Weltsystem-Ansatz von Immanuel Wallerstein beziehen sich auch die Bände der

Reihe auf die Expansion der europäischen Weltwirtschaft im 16. Jh. als Zäsur. Daneben steht, als zweiter Einschnitt, das späte 19. Jh., als nicht nur die europäische Expansion auf ihrem Höhepunkt angekommen war, sondern auch die infrastrukturelle Vernetzung und die ökonomische Globalisierung. Dies war ein Prozess, der aus der vernetzten Welt des 18. Jh.s, in der regionale Dynamiken trotz aller Austauschbeziehungen für die meisten Gesellschaften noch von primärer Bedeutung waren, ein globaler Funktionszusammenhang wurde.

Die Periodisierungsfrage bleibt jedoch angesichts der numerisch genauen Jahrhundertschritte der Bandeinteilung im Hintergrund. Ähnliches gilt für die Frage nach der räumlichen Erstreckung und geographischen Reichweite globalgeschichtlicher Perspektiven. Auch hier haben sich die Herausgeber zu einer Unterteilung durchgerungen, die sie selbst als „nicht gerade originell und der Komplexität des Gegenstandes unangemessen" bezeichnen: Pro Band etwa ein Dutzend Unterkapitel über Großregionen: Osteuropa, Lateinamerika, Afrika oder Japan. Auch hier bleiben wichtige analytische Fragen undiskutiert. Welche Rolle spielen einzelne Länder und Gesellschaften im Verhältnis zu den Großregionen? Geht es bei Regionen um kontinentale Einheiten oder eher um Interaktionsräume (wie das Mittelmeer oder den Indischen Ozean)? Oder steht bisweilen, wie bei der „islamischen Welt", auch die Vorstellung kulturell gebundener Zivilisationen dahinter? Und vor allem: Wie änderten sich die Raumbezüge und die Reichweite transregionaler Netzwerke und Verflechtungen? All diese Fragen bleiben leider, von kurzen Bemerkungen in den Einleitungen abgesehen, den Leserinnen und Lesern überlassen.

Daher ist auch nicht ganz klar, was gemeint sein könnte, wenn programmatisch verkündet wird, dass die hier vorgelegte „Version der Globalgeschichte […] angesichts der herrschenden angloamerikanischen Dominanz auf diesem Feld einen alternativen Zugang markieren [sollte]". Gewiss, die an dem Projekt beteiligten Historikerinnen und Historiker stammen beinahe ausnahmslos aus dem deutschen Sprachraum. Inwiefern damit jedoch eine spezifische Perspektive verbunden ist, bleibt unausgeführt – zumal viele Beiträge so gut wie ausschließlich auf anglophoner Forschungsliteratur beruhen.

Diese Bemerkungen sollen aber nicht das letzte Wort sein. Ähnlich kritische Beobachtungen ließen sich schließlich über viele Weltgeschichten anstellen – etwa über die Fischer-Weltgeschichte aus den 1960er Jahren, die ganz nach Großregionen aufgeteilt war und gleichwohl für breitere weltgeschichtliche Kenntnisse in Deutschland enorm viel geleistet hat. Ähnlich ist es auch hier. Die Lektüre der Bände lohnt sich, und für historisch interessierte Leser bieten sie einen verlässlichen und übersichtlichen Einstieg in die Geschichte der Welt. Besonders hervorzuheben sind dabei die Einleitungen, die – in einigen Fällen ganz vorzüglich – zentrale globalgeschichtliche Fragen und Probleme skizzieren, die für das behandelte Jahrhundert relevant sind.

Aber lohnend sind auch die zahlreichen Einzelbeiträge; in vielen Kapiteln erhalten die Leser einen guten, bisweilen sehr guten Überblick über die Geschichte der betreffenden Region. Ein besonderes Kennzeichnen vieler Aufsätze ist dabei, dass sie In-

teraktionen und „Außenbeziehungen" ein großes Gewicht beimessen, ohne darüber jedoch die internen Transformationen und Dynamiken aus dem Blick zu verlieren. Gewiss hat die räumliche Unterteilung der Kapitel ihren Preis, der in den Bänden zum 20. Jahrhundert – in dem sich viele Prozesse in regionaler Beschränkung kaum mehr erklären lassen – besonders deutlich wird. Aber auf der anderen Seite macht sie auch eine der Stärken der gesamten Reihe aus: Regionale Spezifik, häufig eines der ersten Opfer planetarischer Synthesen, bleibt hier wichtig und konstitutiv. Die Einteilung in größere Räume und Regionen leuchtet meist ein; nicht zuletzt waren Austauschbeziehungen und Netzwerke lange Zeit, und häufig auch noch in der Gegenwart, regional strukturiert. Und die Texte sind von Historikern der Regionen verfasst, nicht aus einer globalgeschichtlichen Vogelperspektive. Sie eignen sich daher gut als Einführung und Überblickswerk und werden auch im Unterricht sehr nützliche Dienste leisten.

Anmerkung:

1   P. Feldbauer/A. Schottenhammer (Hrsg.): Die Welt 1000–1250, Wien 2011; T. Ertl/ M. Limberger (Hrsg.): Die Welt 1250–1500, Wien 2009; P. Feldbauer/J. P. Lehners (Hrsg.): Die Welt im 16. Jahrhundert, Wien 2008; B. Hausberger (Hrsg.): Die Welt im 17. Jahrhundert, Wien 2008; P. Feldbauer/J. P. Lehners (Hrsg.): Die Welt im 18. Jahrhundert, Wien 2011; M. Mann (Hrsg.): Die Welt im 19. Jahrhundert, Wien 2009; H.-W. Tobler/W. Bernecker (Hrsg.): Die Welt im 20. Jahrhundert bis 1945, Wien 2010; M. Stromberger/H. Konrad (Hrsg.), Die Welt im 20. Jahrhundert nach 1945, Wien 2010.

Dominic Sachsenmaier: Global Perspectives on Global History. Theories and Approaches in a Connected World, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2011, 331 S.

Reviewed by
Robert Cole, New York

Dominic Sachsenmaier's book is a rare example of historiographical writing that invites us not only to consider the sorts of histories we write but also to think critically about the conditions under which we write them. The book offers a subtly analyzed and meticulously annotated intellectual genealogy of the recent global enthusiasm for the writing of "global history". Sachsenmaier notes that the "border-crossing perspectives" of global history have taken hold around the world at precisely the same moment that "new forms of institutionalization and interdisciplinary cooperation have started supporting historical research cutting across national and other boundaries" (pp. 2-3), and he identifies this concatenation as marking a pivotal turning point in both the content and the context of historical scholarship worldwide. Yet, despite the apparent globalization of "global history", this convergence of language may obscure the persistence both of wide methodological rifts among national historiographies and of structural inequalities that privilege certain sources of global histories over others. Drawing from his deep familiarity with historical scholarship in the United States, Germany, and

the People's Republic of China, Sachsenmaier develops a series of case studies that demonstrate the very different conceptual and political valences that "global history" has taken on in these three very different contexts.

In his study of the U.S. historiography, Sachsenmaier argues that concepts of global history emerged out of a thoroughgoing critique of Eurocentrism, which was itself made possible both by changes within the American academy and by broader cultural and political movements. In the decades following the Second World War, as students of more diverse backgrounds entered American colleges and graduate programs, they began to write histories that reflected their own diverse experiences. This new generation of historians, many of whom were actively involved in the Civil Rights, anti-colonial, and anti-war movements of the postwar decades, looked for ways to displace Europe and "the West" from their habitually central positions. Indeed, two of the most influential approaches to global history to emerge after the 1960s – specifically, dependency theory and postcolonial theory – derived much of their legitimacy from a claim to have originated outside the Western academy. Although many different approaches to writing global history have taken root in American history departments since then, Sachsenmaier sees this de-centering impulse as informing the concept's use in America. He writes, "In the main, the 'globe' emerging from global and transnational historical scholarship in the United States is not a fixed entity waiting to be filled with new master narratives but primarily an open question addressed by a myriad of individual research activities" (p. 105). While this is unquestionably a positive development, it is troubling to note, as Sachsenmaier does, that this methodological broadening has not necessarily been matched in the global circulation of scholarly work, where American scholarship continues to hold privileged status worldwide while historiographies outside the US remain largely marginalized.

The mobilization of concepts of the "global" in German historiography has been driven by very different social forces. The question of central concern to several generations of post-war German historians was the interpretation of the Nazi era. For these scholars, the German nation-state has remained of central importance, and global concepts have been relevant only to the extent that they have enabled new interpretations of German history. In Germany, Sachsenmaier writes, "many new transnational perspectives aim less to deconstruct the nation-state as a modern invention than to establish a more accurate historical understanding of the forces, processes, and contexts that shaped or characterized the German past" (p. 151). Sachsenmaier identifies two trends that have begun to challenge this: first, as European political integration has tentatively advanced, so too have attempts (encouraged in no small part by the cultural offices of the European Union) to fashion a distinct European historical identity out of its constituent national histories. Second, Germany's growing immigrant population has the potential to unleash pluralizing forces similar to those that changed the American academy in the postwar decades, evidenced most recently by growing interest within Germany in studies of diasporic and transnational communities.

Sachsenmaier's reading of the Chinese global historiography offers an important counterpoint to these first two case studies. Whereas nation-centered histories dominated American and German historical scholarship until relatively recently, the luxury that accommodated "professional negligence of global entanglements and influences from the outside world" has, in China, been "[impossible] for generations" (p. 172). Since at least the mid-nineteenth century (and, arguably, much earlier even than this), the study of world history, and of its relationship to Chinese history, has been an intellectual and political imperative for many Chinese historians. Yet the precise contours of the "world" that was of interest to Chinese historians have varied greatly over the past century. In the early twentieth century, there was a proliferation of diverse notions of globality, many of which sought to understand the relationship between China and modernity as represented by Europe, North America, and Japan, but running alongside these were powerful critiques of imperialism and feelings of solidarity with the colonized world. With the ascendance of Marxist historiography from the late 1920s, the history of the West, coupled with the revolutionary experience of the Soviet Union, were the starting points for debates about the nature of Chinese society and its stage of development. Historians of the Soviet Union continued to dominate Chinese world history departments after the founding of the People's Republic in 1949, although the souring of Sino-Soviet relations in the 1950s-60s saw their displacement by historians of Africa, South Asia, and Latin America as China attempted to position itself at the center of a Third World revo-

lutionary movement. It has only been in the decades following the death of Mao Zedong and the reforms of the 1980s that a full-throated form of nationalism has reasserted itself in the Chinese historiography. Even within these recent efforts to elucidate the distinctiveness of China's national history, however, the significance of concepts of global history has not fallen away entirely. While previous generations of PRC historians may have construed the world as a space of revolutionary potential, contemporary historians have gravitated towards post-revolutionary notions of "modernization" and "globalization" as descriptors of the global historical processes in which China is embedded. As Sachsenmaier points out, reconciling "nationalism" and "globalization" has not posed an insoluble contradiction for PRC historians; on the contrary, "many influential Chinese scholars see globalization and nation-building as complementary processes, and in a following step have come to advocate nationally specific outlooks of world history" (p. 236).

For Sachsenmaier, the unifying principle behind these disparate forms of global history is their critical reassessment of the spaces that frame our histories. Yet this assumption that concepts of the "global" are necessarily spatial excludes the possibility that global histories could be written that take concepts of time and temporality as their points of departure. One might consider Ernst Bloch's notion of "simultaneous non-simultaneity" – which describes the overlapping coexistence of multiple social temporalities – as the seminal example of this line of thought, as it gives rise to a concept of the "global" not as homogenous ("flattened") space but as heterogeneous

temporal unevenness. Similar attempts to rethink global temporality and its relationship to historical space characterize the work of theorists and historians including David Harvey, Henri Lefebvre, Reinhart Koselleck, and Wang Hui. Indeed, the basic critical thrusts of dependency theory and postcolonial theory, which Sachsenmaier presents as forerunners of today's global history trend, might be said to originate just as much in critiques of global temporality as in spatiality. A deeper engagement with this changing historiographical imbrication of global space and time would make Sachsenmaier's analysis even more revealing of the sorts of intellectual and political concerns that animate various forms of global history.

This study's greatest value lies in its powerful reminder that there is no a priori "global" that can serve as a transparent category of analysis; such categories are necessarily constructed and come freighted with assumptions and histories of their own. This reminder could not be timelier, as many of the world's academic institutions and faculties continue to grapple with the question of what the emergent "global university" should look like. Certain concepts of the global could serve to fundamentally reconfigure the academy, to bring marginalized voices into transnational discussion, and to inspire new forms of collaborative scholarship. It is, unfortunately, just as easy to imagine configurations of the global university that serve only to entrench extant forms of institutional and linguistic privilege and to reproduce a vanishingly small transnational scholarly elite. Given this danger, it is not enough for the academy to aspire to be "global"; it must know what sort of world it intends to envision

and who is to be included in its envisioning.

Ulf Engel / Matthias Middell / Stefan Troebst (Hrsg.): Erinnerungskulturen in transnationaler Perspektive (= Transnationalisierung und Regionalisierung vom 18. Jahrhundert bis zur Gegenwart, Bd. 5), Leipzig: Leipziger Universitätsverlag 2012, 253 S.

Rezensiert von
Dietmar Rothermund, Heidelberg

Dieser interessante Sammelband ist aus einer Sommerschule der Universität Leipzig hervorgegangen und umfasst 14 Aufsätze, davon die Hälfte in englischer Sprache. Erinnerungskultur ist ein neues Leitthema der Geschichtswissenschaft geworden. Meist ist die Erinnerungskultur national verankert (und beschränkt), sie aus transnationaler Perspektive zu betrachten, ist daher ein zu begrüßender neuer Ansatz. Freilich haben auch die Mehrzahl der Beiträge zu diesem Band nationale Erinnerungskulturen zum Gegenstand. Die transnationale Perspektive kann dann nur bedeuten, dass Fallbeispiele geliefert werden, die einem Vergleich dienen können. Es können hier nicht alle Beiträge besprochen werden. Es sollen nur einige Aufsätze erwähnt werden, die besonders interessante Fragestellungen enthalten. Der erste Teil des Bandes trägt die Überschrift „Die Erinnerung an den Nationalsozialismus in transnationalen Bezügen".

Hier ist der Beitrag von Melanie Eulitz über „Immigrierte Erinnerung: Das Zusammentreffen divergierender Holocausterinnerungen in den jüdischen Gemeinden Deutschlands" hervorzuheben, weil er die unterschiedliche soziale Prägung des kollektiven Gedächtnisses demonstriert. Die älteren jüdischen Gemeinden in Deutschland haben durch die Betonung der Holocausterinnerung eine „Opferrolle" internalisiert; die später eingewanderten Juden aus der Sowjetunion haben dort die „Siegerrolle" angenommen, die ihnen im Rahmen der Propaganda des „Großen Vaterländischen Kriegs" vermittelt wurde. Es fiel den jüdischen Gemeinschaften in Deutschland nicht leicht, diese beiden Rollenverständnisse miteinander zu verbinden. Ein weiterer bemerkenswerter Beitrag zu diesem Teil des Bandes ist der von Daniel Stahl zum Thema „Vom ‚Naziparadies' zum Taskforce-Mitglied. Geschichtspolitik und Holocaustgedenken in Argentinien". Unter Péron hatte Argentinien flüchtende Nazis aufgenommen. Als seine Partei später unter Präsident Menem wieder an die Macht kam, geriet sie unter internationalen Druck, diese Vergangenheit aufzuarbeiten. Der Außenminister Guido di Tella, der in den USA studiert und in Oxford gelehrt hatte, setzte sich dafür ein, dass Argentinien nicht nur seine Archive öffnete, sondern auch an der Erforschung des Verbleibs des Raubgolds der Nazis mitwirkte. Durch diese Aktivitäten erreichte es Argentinien, 2002 in die von den USA, Großbritannien und Schweden 1998 gegründete International Taskforce for International Cooperation on Holocaust Education, Remembrance and Research aufgenommen zu werden. Von der ursprünglichen Beschäftigung

mit der Debatte um die „Fluchthilfe" für Nazis war die argentinische Geschichtspolitik fortgeschritten zu einem Einsatz für das Holocaustgedenken. Diese Entwicklung der Geschichtspolitik wird von Stahl kenntnisreich rekonstruiert.

Der zweite Teil des Bandes hat den Titel „1989 und die Veränderung der Erinnerungskulturen". Kirsten Gerland betont in ihrem Beitrag über „Erinnerung, Mythos, Generation. Der Umbruch von 1989/90 in Erinnerungskonstruktionen", dass es im Unterschied zu der viel zitierten Generation der „68er" keine Generation der „89er" gibt. Die Namensgebung einer Generation braucht einen „Mythos", der sowohl bei dieser Generation selbst als auch in der Gesellschaft insgesamt Anerkennung findet. Der nächste Beitrag von Marina Renault ist den Feiern zum 20. Jahrestag des Falls der Berliner Mauer gewidmet. Der „Fall of the Wall" war ein symbolisches Ereignis, das als solches in die Geschichte eingegangen ist. Doch die Ursachen dieses Ereignisses sind so vielfältig, dass es nicht zur Begründung eines Mythos der „89er" Generation geeignet ist,

Der dritte Teil des Bandes ist den „Erinnerungskulturen in den Peripherien und Semiperipherien Europas" gewidmet. Damit sind Armenien, die Türkei, die Ukraine, Italien und Bosnien gemeint. Armenien war bereits in der Zeit von 1918 bis 1920 eine unabhängige Republik gewesen und Anahid Babayan untersucht, welche Rolle die Erinnerung daran bei der Gründung der neuen Republik 1991 gespielt hat. Patrizia Kern beschreibt „Discourses and Performative Design of Sites of Memory: The Atatürk and the War of Independence Museum in Ankara". Zwei

weitere Beiträge sind der Geschichtspolitik Wiktor Juschtschenkos in der Ukraine und der Europäisierung der nationalen Erinnerung in Italien gewidmet. Der letzte Beitrag von Marije Hristova „Framing the Transnational through Individual Memories: The Case of Spanish War Journalists in Bosnia" wird der Thematik des Bandes auf ganz besondere Weise gerecht. Hier geht es um spanische Kriegsberichterstatter, insbesondere Juan Goytisolo, die ihre Erlebnisse in Bosnien mit der Erinnerung an den spanischen Bürgerkrieg verbinden. Es ist dies ein gutes Beispiel für das, was Michael Rothberg „Multidirectional memory" genannt hat. Das Bosnien-Erlebnis fiel in eine Zeit, in der in Spanien das Tabu gebrochen wurde, das bis dahin eine Erinnerung an die Opfer des Bürgerkrieges behindert hatte. Im Interesse der nationalen Versöhnung waren die Ereignisse des Bürgerkrieges mit dem Mantel des Schweigens bedeckt worden. Nun wagte man es wieder, sich an die Opfer zu erinnern und Bosnien wurde zum „Gleichnis" für das, was in Spanien geschehen war. Die Erinnerungsarchäologie geht aber noch tiefer: Goytisolo trifft in Bosnien einen Juden, der Spanisch spricht und von den sephardischen Juden abstammt, die 1492 aus Spanien vertrieben wurden. Dieser Mann bezeichnet sich als Bosnier, Jude und Spanier und weckt in Goytisolo Erinnerungen an Aspekte seiner nationalen Geschichte, die ihm so nicht mehr bewusst waren. Die Wirksamkeit des „multidirectional memory" wird auf diese Weise besonders deutlich. Hristova untersucht auch wie die zunächst als Kriegsberichte festgehaltenen Erinnerungen an Bosnien der Schriftsteller Juan Goytisolo und Javier Reverte einige Jahre später in ihren Romanen auf neue

Weise reflektiert wurden. Man bekommt so einen Einblick in die Werkstatt der Erinnerungsgestaltung.

Sämtliche Beiträge zu diesem Band stammen von Nachwuchswissenschaftlern, die hier bezeugen, dass die Erforschung von Erinnerungskulturen eine Zukunft hat. Zugleich ist dieser Band ein Zeugnis für die wertvolle Arbeit, die das Graduiertenzentrum Geistes- und Sozialwissenschaften der Research Academy Leipzig leistet.

Petr Lozoviuk: Grenzland als Lebenswelt. Grenzkonstruktionen, Grenzwahrnehmungen und Grenzdiskurse in sächsisch-tschechischer Perspektive (= Schriften zur sächsischen Geschichte und Volkskunde, Bd. 41), Leipzig: Leipziger Universitätsverlag 2012, 354 S.

Rezensiert von
Fabian Möpert, Leipzig

Es ist jenes, von den Institutionen der Europäischen Union postulierte, ‚Europa ohne Grenzen', welches – manifestiert in den vertraglichen Regelungen zum Schengen-Raum und zu den Grundfreiheiten des europäischen Binnenmarktes – rein physisch gesehen die Präsenz der staatspolitischen Binnengrenzen in Europa zunehmend verblassen lässt. Seit der EU-Osterweiterung und dem Beitritt der ostmitteleuropäischen Staaten zum Schengener Abkommen mag dieses Postulat auch für den sächsisch-tschechischen Grenzraum gelten, in welchem das zu-

vor über lange Jahrzehnte bestehende, bis 1990 streng überwachte Grenzregime seither optisch aus der alltäglichen Präsenz nahezu verschwunden ist. Indes entfaltet die kognitive Konstruktion dieser Grenze, in welcher nicht zuletzt die dramatischen Zäsuren der deutsch-tschechischen Geschichte nachhallen, auch weiterhin eine beachtlich persistente Wirkmächtigkeit für den Alltag in diesem Gebiet. So lebe man im sächsisch-tschechischen Grenzland gewissermaßen noch immer „mit dem Rücken zur Grenze" (S. 326), resümiert der am Dresdner Institut für Sächsische Geschichte und Volkskunde ISVG wirkende Ethnologe und Historiker Petr Lozoviuk.

Den ersten Betrachtungsgegenstand dieser vom Kontruktivismus inspirierten Untersuchung bildet folglich die diskursive Konstruktion jener (kulturellen) Grenze sowie die damit verbundene Wahrnehmung der Grenzregion im Sinne eines ‚mental mapping'. Als zweites, wohl noch zentraleres Anliegen, beleuchtet die Studie ferner die daraus resultierenden Auswirkungen auf alltägliche Handlungsweisen der Bewohner dieses Grenzraums in ihren vielfältigen Facetten, vom wechselseitigen Einkaufstourismus zum Zwecke des vermeintlich günstigen Konsums von Waren und Dienstleistungen aller Art, bis hin zur latent vorhandenen Fremdenfeindlichkeit beiderseits der Grenze. Der Autor möchte seine Arbeit verstanden wissen als „Versuch […], allgemeine Phänomene der lebensweltlich aufgefassten Grenzlandlage sowie ihre Lokalspezifika an einem konkreten Beispiel aus dem sächsisch-tschechischen Grenzland zu behandeln" (S. 12). Ausgewählt hat Lozoviuk für diese Mikrostudie das sächsische Sebnitz und das tschechische Dolní Poustevna, zwei sich unmittelbar diesseits und jenseits der Grenze gegenüberliegende Ortschaften in einer ländlichen, – seit dem Niedergang der bis dato lokal ansässigen Industrie in Zuge der wirtschaftlichen Transformation der 1990er Jahre – strukturschwachen Region. Thematisch reiht sich Lozoviuks ethnografisch angelegte Arbeit ein in eine nahezu nicht mehr zu überblickende Bandbreite von Studien verschiedenster Wissenschaftsdisziplinen zur Grenzlandproblematik allgemein, jedoch wird in ihr diese Problematik außergewöhnlich kleinteilig-detailliert verfolgt.

Insgesamt ist sein neues Buch gekennzeichnet vom gelungenen Versuch einer ausgewogenen Balance zwischen theoretischer und empirischer Betrachtung sowie zwischen den Perspektiven Vergangenheit und Gegenwart. Teil I der Arbeit widmet sich den theoretischen Grundlagen und der methodischen Zugangsweise. Die empirische Datengrundlage bildet eine qualitative Inhaltsanalyse von Interviews, welche mit ‚durchschnittlichen' Bewohnern beider Ortschaften durchgeführt wurden. Hierbei fällt auf, dass es sich bei den Respondenten vorwiegend um Gewährspersonen fortgeschrittenen Alters handelt, die den Großteil ihres Lebens in der Untersuchungsregion verbracht haben und entsprechende Erinnerungen vorweisen können. Die gestellten Fragen beziehen sich auf Alltagssituationen, wobei hierfür auf das Lebensweltkonzept Edmund Husserls abgestellt wird. Als Begründung für die von ihm getroffene Wahl der Untersuchungsregion führt Lozoviuk weitgehend überzeugend an, dass die relative Überschaubarkeit dieser beiden Grenzgemeinden es ermögliche, alle „makrosozialen Ereignisse aus der intimen Nähe zu beo-

bachten, aus der Perspektive jener Menschen, die damals im Grenzland lebten und Objekt der ‚großen‘, ihnen oktroyierten Geschichte wurden" (S. 32). Geleitet wird die Betrachtung ferner von der Prämisse, dass das Leben im Grenzland von der Existenz einer eigenen Logik geprägt sei, deren lokalspezifische Regeln es aufzudecken gilt. Als kontextuell-historische Heranführung zeichnet der Autor ferner ausgehend von der vorletzten Jahrhundertwende die soziale Konstruktion der sächsisch-böhmischen Grenze in Gesellschaft und Wissenschaft nach, womit auch ein Abriss über die Entwicklungsgeschichte der ethnografischen und volkskundlichen Wissenschaften in Sachsen und Böhmen seit 1900 verbunden ist. Insbesondere werden die Rolle des sudetendeutschen Ethnografen Emil Lehmanns und des tschechischen Soziologen Emanuel Chalupný sowie die Bedeutung des Grenzlandes als Untersuchungsgegenstand an sich herausgestellt. Daran anschließend wird im Teil II die spezifisch-lokale Orts- und Grenzgeschichte der Untersuchungsregion im Kontext der deutsch-tschechoslowakischen bzw. deutsch-tschechischen Beziehungen dargestellt. Jeweils ein Kapitel behandelt den Zeitraum der zweiten Hälfte des 19. Jh.s bis zum Ersten Weltkrieg, die Zwischenkriegszeit und schließlich die große Zeitspanne seit dem Ende des Zweiten Weltkriegs, beginnend bei den tragischen Ereignissen der unmittelbaren Nachkriegszeit über die Entwicklungen während der Ära des Realsozialismus samt seines Scheiterns, bis hin zu den Europäisierungstendenzen der Gegenwart. Eindrucksvoll und bisweilen emotional zeichnet der Autor die Auswirkungen großer Politik auf die Lebenswirklichkeit einfacher Menschen

im Betrachtungsgebiet nach. Eingeflochten in die einzelnen Unterkapitel der Teile III und IV wird sodann eine Vielzahl von Motiven herausgearbeitet und eingehender analysiert. Als besonders erwähnenswerte Beispiele seien das Konsumverhalten der Grenzlandbewohner, die Rolle der jeweiligen Nachbarsprache im Alltag, oder auch die Präsenz allochthoner Minderheiten und deren Erwerbsstrategien genannt.

Zusammenfassend betrachtet, besticht Lozoviuks Studie durch die große Fülle an exemplarisch dargebotenen Informationen zu gegenwärtigen Diskursen und Handlungsrationalitäten im Grenzgebiet und ihren historischen Bezügen, sowie durch die mitunter sehr ergreifenden Schilderungen von Zeitzeugen, welche in Auszügen vielfach in den Text eingestreut sind. Die auf Tonband aufgenommenen Interviews mit den sächsischen Gesprächspartnern sind auch in der Niederschrift für die im Text verwendeten Auszüge im Dialekt wiedergegeben. Dies verleiht den zitierten Aussagen zwar Authentizität, wirkt an einigen Stellen allerdings mitunter unfreiwillig deplatziert. Auch wäre eine größere Anzahl von jüngeren Interviewpartnern, welche der Generation angehören, die nach den gesellschaftlichen Umbrüchen von 1989/90 sozialisiert wurde, für eine ausgewogenere Gesamtdarstellung sicherlich zuträglich gewesen.

Geplant war dieses Sammelwerk wohl als eine kleine Festschrift für Wilhelm Hennis, der indes vor Erscheinen und seinem 90. Geburtstag Ende 2012 überraschend verstorben ist. So stellt sich der Band nun als knappe Gedächtnisschrift dar, ohne das zu beanspruchen. Wer Hennis als akademischen Lehrer in der Vorlesung erlebt hat, etwa vor seinem Weggang aus Hamburg nach Freiburg über Walter Bagehots Englische Verfassung oder in einer Vorlesung über das Verbandswesen oder über „Amtsgedanke und Demokratiebegriff", der vergaß dieses Erlebnis, insbesondere aber die Art und Weise des Vortrags und der Analyse, nicht. Der Redner entwickelte seinen Gegenstand mit Leidenschaft, ja steigerte sich im Wege seiner Entfaltung geradezu in eine Konfrontation mit einem imaginären Gegner seiner Sicht hinein. Er arbeitete dabei seine Argumente viel deutlicher heraus, als dies in einem gemessenen, von Besonnenheit und Distanz geprägten Vortrag möglich gewesen wäre. Auch wuchs mit seinem Zorn die analytische Kraft. Trotz der Erregung gewannen die Sätze an Verständlichkeit. Diese Vorlesungen – auch zu einer Zeit, als Hennis Max Weber für sich noch nicht entdeckt hatte – waren daher ein besonderer Beitrag

zum Studium auch für Studierende aus der Nachbarschaft der Politikwissenschaft als dem engeren Studienfach, z. B. aus den Rechtswissenschaften oder der Philosophie. Angesichts des Zorns und der Kraft des Redners wunderte man sich nicht, wenn man hörte, dass er in feinen, auch gebildeten und politisch elitären Kreisen Hamburgs als in sich widersprüchlich, schwer zu verstehen und mühsam galt; hinzu kam damals, dass er die politischen Lager wechselte, was ihn für so gemessene Altersgenossen wie Helmut Schmidt schwer verständlich gemacht haben mag. So ging er dann nach Freiburg/Br., wo er blieb. Dort hat er wohl mit seinen Eigenschaften manchem das Leben nicht ganz leicht gemacht, etwa Konrad Hesse in Zeiten der Hochschulreform. Hennis wurde dort zum Opfer der, seine Erregbarkeit kalkuliert zur Verhinderung von Kompromissen nutzenden, studentischen Strategen wie Siegfried de Witt und Nicola Becker. Im zuvor noch beschaulich hanseatischen Hamburg, das allerdings nie die volle Wucht der dann doch rasch verpufften Revolte abbekam, war diese Seite seines Zorns nicht aufgefallen. Diese Ausschnitte der Erfahrungen mit Wilhelm Hennis muss man in Zusammenhang bringen mit der Vielfalt seines Lebens und seines Werdeganges, die er selbst trefflich geschildert hat.[1]

Der vorliegende Band erfasst nun nicht nur die Persönlichkeit Wilhelm Hennis, sondern auch die Erträge seiner Forschung und manches darüber hinaus. Nach einem Vorwort des Herausgebers folgen vier Abschnitte: der erste zu Politikwissenschaft und politischer Theorie, der zweite zum Regieren im modernen Staat, der dritte zur Politischen Ideengeschichte und Publi-

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zistik und der letzte, als heute offenbar unvermeidliches – man denke an Prominente wie Habermas, Fritz Stern, vor kurzem E.-W. Böckenförde und früher die Weizsäckerbrüder – Interview, hier mit Wilhelm Hennis zur existentiellen Dimension des Politischen.

Im ersten Abschnitt finden sich Analysen von P. Graf Kielmansegg zu Sinn und Ende der politischen Wissenschaft, T. Stein zum Demokratieverständnis des Geehrten, R. Mehring zu Teleologie und Topik auf dem Weg von der praktischen Philosophie zur politischen Wissenschaft und von A. Anter zu Wilhelm Hennis' Verfassungsdiagnostik i. S. v. Kritik als Beruf. Der zweite Abschnitt trägt zunächst mit einem Stück P. P. Portinaros zu „Wilhelm Hennis und die Kunst des Regierens" bei, dann einem solchen von C. Landfried zum Bundestag als „Forum der Nation", danach C. Starck zu Wilhelm Hennis und „die" (in diesen Zeichen so nur hier, d. Verf.) Legitimität als politikwissenschaftliche Kategorie. Darauf folgt ein Beitrag von K. v. Beyme zur Kritik des Geehrten am Parteienstaat, dann ein Essay von R. Voigt zu Wilhelm Hennis und der Sozialdemokratie, daran anschließend R. Graf von Westphalen zu seiner Kritik der Hochschulpolitik und dem Bologna-Prozess und schließlich eine Blütenlese von R. Wahl zu großen Entscheidungen wie Marbury v. Madison, Lüth und Costa/E.N.E.L. – hierzu muss man wissen, dass Wilhelm Hennis als ein dem Recht noch nicht ganz entlaufener Adept, der immerhin ein erstes Examen und einen juristischen Doktorgrad hinter sich hatte, Autor eines, ja des wichtigsten der Verfassungsbeschwerde als Vorlage dienenden Schriftsatzes war, den Adolf Arndt in die eingereichte Beschwerde von

Erich Lüth übernahm; eine Beschwerde, die Geschichte machte, weil sie die umfassende Normativität der Grundrechte als Elemente objektiver Ordnung begründete. Schließlich folgen im dritten Abschnitt P. Bahners zu Helmut Kohl am 9. März 2000 als Phantasiestück, darauf S. Schlak zu Demokratie, Demoskopie und dem Ringen um die öffentliche Meinung, H. Bruhns zu Wilhelm Hennis, Max Weber und der Wissenschaft vom Menschen sowie K. Tribe zu „Hennis in the English-Speaking World" und schließlich L. A. Scaff zu „Wilhelm Hennis, Max Weber and the Charisma of Political Thinking". Daran schließt sich, wie gesagt, jene heute unvermeidliche neue Gattung des Interviews an, wobei man erwarten darf, dass die nächste Generation dies noch steigern und vielleicht Festschriften in Form von talk shows präsentieren wird, sodass man Aussicht hat, den Ton und die Leichtigkeit ihrer lässigen Eleganz dann später in dem folgenden Interview schon coram einzüüben. Auch müsste dann wohl der geehrte Gelehrte in der Mitte dabei sitzen und gelegentlich segnende Worte sprechen, die den auserwählten Kreis sozusagen in seiner stetig wachsenden Selbstsicherheit sanft bestätigen. Aber vielleicht ist dieses Gespött angesichts der knappen, klaren und schlichten Antworten von Wilhelm Hennis ganz fehl am Platz, zumal sogleich – in der strengen Manier des Anhangs der klassischen Festschrift – eine umfassende Bibliographie des Gelehrten anschließt, in der sich allerdings am Ende auch seine früher gegebenen Interviews finden – vor den vielen Beiträgen zur Würdigung von Wilhelm Hennis, von Konrad Adam bis Rolf Zundel, von Andreas Anter bis Richard v. Weizsäcker. Denn Hennis war eben auch

im politischen Teil wie im Feuilleton präsent und erfuhr ein entsprechendes, weit über die Wissenschaft hinausreichendes Echo. Das zeigt vielleicht doch, um darauf enragiert noch einen Augenblick zurückzukommen, dass die talk show in der nächsten Generation Eingang in den Kanon der Bibliographien finden wird – nicht allein als Film in einer preisgünstigen Form, sondern natürlich auch als Tonskript der gesprochenen Worte. Zu begrüßen wäre diese bisher hier nur angedeutete und sich keineswegs abzeichnende Entwicklung jedenfalls unter einem Aspekt: Anders als die Festschriften würden sie weder horrende Zuschüsse erfordern noch die Bibliotheken zur Verschwendung ihrer Mittel durch den Ankauf dieser fettleibigen Bände zwingen, was an einem besseren Einsatz hindert. Sie würden schließlich auch keine mäßigen Beiträge enthalten und gleich gar nicht qualifizierte Arbeiten den Zeitschriften mit der Folge der leidigen Doppelveröffentlichung entziehen. In anderen Disziplinen als der Rechtswissenschaft mögen Festschriften auch nicht so verbreitet sein; Hennis hatte zudem eine solche schon zum 65. Geburtstag erhalten. All diese eben genannten Bedenken treffen hier ohnehin nicht zu: Die Autoren sind handverlesen nach den Themen ausgesucht und schreiben kraft Auftrags; demgemäß sind nahezu alle Beiträge gelungen und man hat sozusagen eine das ganze Feld umfassende Hennis-Fibel in der Hand, wie sie keine Festschrift sein könnte. Und hier kommt nun auch Max Weber ins Spiel, dem Hennis später drei Bücher gewidmet hat, trotz all seiner Neigung zur Abbreviatur, zum Diktum und zur alltagsorientierten Deutlichkeit.

Mithin ist der Band insgesamt eine – im Übrigen auch erschwingliche und insoweit gelungene – Hommage, die man hier nun nicht auseinander brechen sollte, indem vereinzelt Beiträge ihrer Schwäche wegen angeprangert werden. Will man von Wilhelm Hennis etwas in die Hand nehmen, das ihm gerecht wird, so ist dieser – im Gegensatz zur voluminösen Festschrift ganz und gar handliche – Band alsdann an seinem rechten Platz. Wilhelm Hennis, dessen gesammelte Aufsätze mit einer Vignette eines Kavaliers, des Prinzen Ruprecht von der Pfalz im 17. Jahrhundert, enden, der doch trotz seiner zweiten Heimat jenseits des Kanals ein heimatloser Abenteurer und trotz seiner monarchischen Legitimität durch die Nähe zum – nicht nur kraft der Umstände dann um seinen Kopf gebrachten – englischen König nicht viel mehr als ein scheiternder Projektemacher bis hin zu seinen karibischen Abenteuern als Freibeuter blieb,[2] hat zu seiner Wissenschaft wesentlich beigetragen. Seine analytische Kraft wird man lange missen, nun auch im Breisgau und darüber hinaus – wie damals schon – in Hamburg die Studierenden, als er wegging. Sein Ding waren eben nicht große Projekte – gleich gar nicht Großprojekte wie etwa die Kernkraft, deren Entsorgungsproblem er schon sehr früh als gänzlich ungelöst ansah und darin seinen studentischen Widersachern fast verbunden war – und dicke Bücher, sondern treffende konzise Analysen, die mit einem Handwerkszeug erstellt wurden, das feingliedrig greifen konnte; und sie verhalfen zu deutlichen Aussagen, die der Komplexität der Realität nahe waren und dennoch immer einen normativen Anspruch formulierten. Daher waren diese Analysen so faszinierend und zeitlos zu-

gleich, überlebten verschiedene Standorte und Bewegungen und sind so noch heute.

Anmerkungen:
1   Vgl. W. Hennis, Politikwissenschaft als Beruf. „Erzählte Erfahrung" eines Fünfundsiebzigjährigen, in: ders., Regieren im modernen Staat. Politikwissenschaftliche Abhandlungen I, Tübingen 1999, S. 381 ff.
2   Vgl. W. Hennis, Die Vernunft Goyas und das Projekt der Moderne, in: ders., Politikwissenschaft und politisches Denken, Politikwissenschaftliche Abhandlungen II, Tübingen 2000, S. 350 ff. (366 f.).

Peter Mörtenböck / Helge Mooshammer: Occupy. Räume des Protests (= X-Texte zur Kultur und Gesellschaft), Bielefeld: Transcript Verlag 2012, 191 S.

Rezensiert von
Micha Fiedlschuster, Leipzig

Die Occupy Wall Street Bewegung (OWS) bietet die Möglichkeit, den räumlichen Aspekt von Protestbewegungen in den Fokus des Forschungsinteresses zu rücken: Erstens provoziert der Modus der Besetzung eine Reflexion über die Orte und Räume von Politik und politischem Widerstand. Zweitens legt die geographische Ausbreitung und die mediale Vernetzung von Occupy sowie der Einfluss des „Arabischen Frühlings" eine globale Perspektive nahe. Peter Mörtenböck und Helge Mooshammer, die zu visueller Kultur und dem Verhältnis von Gegenwartskultur und globaler Ökonomie arbeiten, bieten

mit ihrem Buch eine der ersten Reflexionen über Occupy und dessen Räume im deutschsprachigen Raum an. Das Buch ist in der Reihe „X-Texte zur Kultur und Gesellschaft" erschienen, deren Ziel es ist, eine kritische Zeitdiagnose in einer „angenehm lesbaren Form" zu vermitteln. Das ist den Autoren auch gelungen, allerdings auf Kosten der wissenschaftlichen Tiefe. Dies zeigt sich vor allem an den spärlichen Verweisen auf Sekundärliteratur und im Verzicht auf eine eingehende Erläuterung der verwendeten Theorieansätze, womit die Chance verpasst wird, die erste umfassende Analyse von Occupy vorzulegen.

Die Autoren identifizieren die Räumlichkeit als „Programmatik des Geschehens" in Occupy (S. 8). Occupy ist ihrer Meinung nach ein „Ausdruck von Bruchlinien in der gesellschaftlichen Erfahrung" (S. 16). Im Mittelpunkt des Buches steht, „[w]ie sich im Aufbrechen und Verschwinden dieser Risse neue Räume des Spekulierens und Handelns, des Imaginierens und Experimentierens auftun" (S. 16). Raum behandeln die Autoren als „ein[en] Produktionsmechanismus der symbolischen Sphäre von Politik" (S. 19), der in der Verbindung von der Erfahrung ökonomischer Betroffenheit mit der Suche nach politischen Handlungsräumen angesiedelt ist. Die Publikation lässt sich den Urban Studies und Visual Culture Studies zuordnen, behandelt aber auch soziologische und politikwissenschaftliche Themen. Der empirische Schwerpunkt liegt auf der Occupy Bewegung in New York, gefolgt von London und Frankfurt am Main.

Das einleitende Kapitel schildert die Ereignisse in und um Occupy und entwickelt daraus einen Katalog von Fragen und Hypothesen. Ausgehend von der Position,

dass die Protestierenden nicht einfach nur gegen das „System" sein können, sondern ihre Bedürfnisse erst daraus entwickeln, stellen die Autoren zwei interessante und in Verbindung stehende Fragen in Bezug auf die globale Konstellation: „Kann es also sein, dass der von Occupy so leidenschaftlich vorgebrachte Wunsch nach einem Wiedererlangen der eigenen persönlichen Handlungsfähigkeit letztlich aus den Verlustängsten der westlichen Welt, politisch als auch wirtschaftlich an den Rand gedrängt zu werden, entspringt? Artikuliert OWS so auch den […] unbewussten Wunsch, den auf Asien und die arabische Welt gerichteten Fokus zu verschieben und die Wall Street erneut zum Zentrum der Macht zu erklären?" (S. 15). Ihre These ist, dass die „Auseinandersetzung um die Kooptierung der eigenen Wünsche und Ziele durch das kritisierte System […] sowohl vor Ort in den Lagern als auch in der medialen Geschichtsschreibung ausgetragen" wird (S. 15).

Das zweite Kapitel behandelt die Besetzungen im öffentlichen Raum. Der Versuch der physischen Besetzung durch Protestierende und die Gegenwehr der staatlichen und privaten Akteure kann als Ausdruck der Auseinandersetzung um die Deutungshoheit in einer Gesellschaft interpretiert werden. Die Autoren diskutieren in diesem Zusammenhang, wie die „Besetzung der Moral […] einen der wirksamsten Handlungsbereiche von Occupy [formt]" (S. 47). Moral und Ethik sind sowohl Selbstdisziplinierungsmechanismen im Kapitalismus, als auch Mittel des Widerstands (S. 38). Die „Besetzung der Moral" bedeutet allerdings nicht, dass Occupy einen konkreten gesellschaftlichen Gegenentwurf vorlegt. Occupy bietet lediglich einen Rahmen für den „Akt des Suchens" (S. 45), offen bleibt aber damit auch nach Meinung der Autoren, wie ernst es den Okkupisten mit der Schaffung einer anderen Gesellschaft ist (S. 48).

Das darauf folgende Kapitel vermittelt die Ordnungslogiken und Handlungsräume in Occupy. Für Mörtenböck und Mooshammer sind die Camps „nicht nur Orte zum Diskutieren und Beratschlagen, sondern rund um die Uhr stattfindende Experimente eines neu arrangierten Zusammenlebens, das auf Gemeinschaft und Vertrauen basiert" (S. 51). Die drei angeführten Handlungsräume (Küchen, Bibliotheken und Universitäten in den Occupy-Camps) stellen ihrer Meinung nach dar, wie im Zusammenspiel von Ideen und räumlicher Praxis „ein politisches Commons hervorgebracht wurde" (S. 66).

Das vierte Kapitel analysiert die Räumung der Camps als einen Streit um die Symbole der Macht. Zunächst behandeln die Autoren die Probleme des dauerhaften Campierens anhand der Situation der Obdachlosen in den Camps. Dies leitet zu der wichtigen Thematik über, dass im Laufe der Besetzungen eine Verschiebung der Wahrnehmung stattfand: von dem politischen Anliegen des Protests hin zur rechtlichen Legitimität der dauerhaften Besetzungen (S. 78). Die Räumung der Protestcamps ist für die Autoren ein Indiz für den Versuch, die politische Sprengkraft von Occupy territorial zu beherrschen (S. 88).

Das Kapitel „Onsite/Online" thematisiert das Verhältnis von physischen Besetzungen und Online-Netzwerken. Neue Informationstechnologien trugen dazu bei, dass aus „den Protesten der letzten Jahre eine führungslose, dezentral und netzwerkartig

agierende Bewegung hervorgegangen" ist (S.89). Ohne Frage bergen frei verfügbare, innovative Kommunikationswerkzeuge einen großen Nutzen für die Mobilisierung. Allerdings findet durch die postulierte „Absenz jeglicher Form von Zentrum" (S. 90) im Internet und dessen Nutzung durch Occupy eine Mystifizierung statt. Die Machtungleichgewichte unter Okkupisten sowie die Einflüsse der Mehrheitsgesellschaft, die an anderer Stelle von den Autoren thematisiert werden, scheinen sich im online-space quasi per definitionem aufzulösen. Die technologische Charakterisierung des Internets als Netzwerk wird zu schnell auf die Struktur sozialer Interaktion übertragen und verhindert die Diskussion über die Herausbildung von informellen Hierarchien.

Im sechsten Kapitel behandeln die Autoren Kunst als einen wesentlichen Teil von Occupy. Dies ist eines der überzeugendsten Kapitel des Buches. Beginnend mit einer kritischen Diskussion des „Modell[s] der kreativen Stadt" (S. 111), wird auch hier eine stadträumliche Perspektive eingenommen. Künstler_innen wurden zunehmend von der städtischen Administration in das soziale Management der Stadt eingebunden. Allerdings konnten dadurch auch Räume selbstbestimmten Handelns geschaffen werden, die es gerade in Krisen erlauben, alternative Perspektiven zu entwickeln (S. 110). Die künstlerischen Interventionen und die Ästhetik des Protests werden im Rancièreschen Sinne als eine Sinnlichmachung des ausgetragenen Konflikts gewertet (S. 116). Das Kapitel behandelt auch die Archivgruppe von OWS. Ein eigenes Archiv sollte helfen, „unbeeinflusst von der Interessenpolitik etablierter Institutionen […] eine nach-

haltige Präsenz des Protests" zu schaffen (S. 134). Die Archivierung von Occupy ist somit Teil des politischen Kampfes. Im abschließenden Kapitel reflektieren die Autoren über die Resultate von Occupy. Sie kommen zu einer maßvollen Einschätzung über deren Bedeutung. Konkrete politische Erfolge seien kaum auszumachen. Die Bewegung zeichnet sich eher dadurch aus, dass sie es ermöglicht, gesellschaftliche Konflikte überhaupt auszutragen (S. 150) und gesellschaftliche Alternativen zu formulieren (S. 158).

Raum als zentrale Kategorie in der Analyse von Occupy zu wählen, war die richtige Entscheidung der Autoren. Doch fehlt der Publikation eine Anknüpfung an Theorien des Raumes.[1] Dies hätte zu einem besseren Verständnis über die räumliche Konstitution von gesellschaftlichen Prozessen beigetragen. Auch eine Diskussion des spatial turn in den Sozialwissenschaften würde helfen, viele der dargelegten Positionen klarer erscheinen lassen.[2] Leider ignorieren die Autoren auch diejenige Literatur, die sich mit der Rolle von Camps und Freiräumen in sozialen Bewegungen auseinandergesetzt haben.[3] Die behandelten Aspekte von Occupy und die Fragestellungen sind richtig und gut gewählt, allerdings sind die Argumente mitunter empirisch und theoretisch nur spärlich abgesichert.

Anmerkungen:
1   J. Dünne/S. Günzel (Hrsg.), Raumtheorie. Grundlagentexte aus Philosophie und Kulturwissenschaften, Frankfurt a. M. 2006.
2   J. Döring/C. Thielmann (Hrsg.), Spatial Turn. Das Raumparadigma in den Kultur- und Sozialwissenschaften, Bielefeld 2008.
3   F. Frenzel, Entlegene Orte in der Mitte der Gesellschaft. Zur Geschichte der britischen Klimacamps, in: A. Brunnengräber (Hrsg.), Zivilisierung des Klimaregimes, Wiesbaden 2011,

163-185; F. Polletta, "Free spaces" in collective action, in: Theory and Society 28 (1999), S. 1-38; C. Tilly, Spaces of contention, in: Mobilization. An International Quarterly 5 (2000), S. 135-159.

Jamil Salmi: The challenge of establishing world-class universities, Washington, D. C.: World Bank 2009, 115 S.

Rezensiert von
Kathleen Schlütter, Saarbrücken

Der Bildungsforscher Philip Altbach schrieb 2004, jeder Staat wolle eine World Class University (WCU), doch wüsste niemand, was eine WCU eigentlich ausmache und noch weniger, wie eine Universität diesen Status erreichen könne.[1] Hierauf die passenden Antworten zu finden, ist das Anliegen von Jamil Salmis Buch „The Challenge of Establishing World-Class Universities".

Die Inhaltsangabe auf dem Buchrücken des Bandes klingt verheißungsvoll: Es zeige Strategien und Wege auf, um global wettbewerbsfähige Universitäten aufzubauen. Für Salmi sind diejenigen Einrichtungen „Weltklasse", die es in die einflussreichsten Rankings THE, Jingtao und Webometrics schaffen, wobei es sich aufgrund der Bewertungskriterien um dezidiert forschungsorientierte Einrichtungen handelt. Auf S. 3 geht er kurz darauf ein, dass es ein Menge wichtiger Frage gäbe, wie zum Beispiel, ob der „Weltklasse-Begriff" der westlichen Elite entspräche oder ob viele Länder nicht besser daran täten, ein lo-

kal funktionierendes System aufzubauen, ohne den globalen Vergleich zu suchen. Doch diese Frage will er mit diesem Buch nicht beantworten, stattdessen konzentriert er sich auf Wege, wie Universitäten einen solchen Weltklasse-Status erreichen können, mit dem Ziel, wie es Senior Vizepräsident Justin Lin im Vorwort ausdrückt, den Gewinn aus Höherer Bildung auf lokaler Ebene zu maximieren (S. xi).

Es ist keine Neuigkeit, dass universitäre Ausbildung zu einem Reputationsmarkt geworden ist. Doch insbesondere seit 2003 die Jiao Tong-Universität das erste so genannte Shanghai-Ranking publizierte, scheint die weltweite Reputation universitärer Einrichtungen „schwarz auf weiß" vergleichbar geworden zu sein. Die Rankings verstärken eine bereits existierende Hierarchie der Forschungsuniversitäten, an deren Spitze die anglo-amerikanische „Ivy League" steht und deren Ruf, in jeder Hinsicht die Besten zu sein, damit weiter untermauert wird.[2] Dieser vermeintliche Bias ist unter anderem damit zu erklären, dass das Shanghai-Ranking ja gerade der Versuch der Jiao Tong Universität war, herauszufinden, wo ihre eigene Einrichtung im Vergleich mit den bereits als sehr erfolgreichen eingeschätzten anglo-amerikanischen Universitäten stand.

Die Rankings haben sich in der globalen Hochschullandschaft etabliert, und wie bereits erwähnt, finden sich auf den vorderen Plätzen vor allem Einrichtungen der anglophonen Länder sowie einiger asiatischer und kontinentaleuropäischer Staaten. Als Hochschulleitung diese Ranglisten zu ignorieren, ist schwer.[3] Nationalstaatliche Regierungen, die sich mit ihren Einrichtungen dort nicht etablieren können, obwohl sie sie in ihrer Selbst-

wahrnehmung durchaus als exzellent bewerten, fragen sich zunehmend, ob und was sie ändern müssen. Reaktionen können Reformen des eigentlichen Aus- und Weiterbildungssystems sein, wie in Frankreich, oder die Entwicklung neuer, eigener Ranglisten, wie in Deutschland[4] oder Chile[5] geschehen. Nicht selten bitten Staaten dabei auch die Weltbank um Rat, die seit 1963 im Sektor der höheren Bildung aktiv ist, um Entwicklung und Wohlstand in bedürftigen Ländern zu fördern.

Der Koordinator des Weltbank-Hochschulnetzwerkes, Jamil Salmi, hat seine Erfahrungen aus fast 20 Jahren Zusammenarbeit mit verschiedenen Regierungen, die ihr Hochschulsystem reformieren wollen, im vorliegenden Buch publiziert, adressiert sich mit seinen Ergebnissen jedoch nicht nur an Schwellen- und Entwicklungsländer und deren Herausforderungen beim Aufbau eines funktionierenden tertiären Bildungssektors, sondern Salmis Publikum sind alle „policymakers, university leaders, researchers, and development practitioners" (Buchrücken).

Auf den 75 Seiten des Buches erfährt der Leser, dass für eine ranking-relevante Weltklasseuniversität vor allem „high concentration of talent", „abundant resources" und „favorable governance" gebraucht werden (S. 7) – die besten Forscher, das meiste Geld, eine überzeugte Leitungsebene, wobei der wichtigste Faktor aber das Talent sei. Begleitet werden die Faktoren von möglichen Maßnahmen der Weltbank (S. 11): Entscheidungshilfe (Was ist möglich und bezahlbar? Welche Einrichtung soll Weltklasse werden? Mit welcher spezifischen Kompetenz?); Hilfe bei der internationalen Vernetzung mit anderen Einrichtungen; finanzielle Unterstützung für

Vorabstudien. Bevor man diese Faktoren zu erfüllen beginnt, solle man sich laut Salmi entscheiden, auf welcher institutionellen Basis eine solche Spitzenposition erreicht werden soll: Man kann eine WCU völlig neu gründen, eine bestehende Einrichtung ausbauen oder verschiedene zusammenschließen. Für Salmi gibt es trotz dieser sehr konkreten Handlungsempfehlungen dennoch kein „universal recipe or magic formula for ‚making' a world-class university" (S. 12, 71).

Im ersten Kapitel erarbeitet er genauer, was er mit den Schlüsselfaktoren inhaltlich meint. Zum Thema Talent schlägt Salmi vor, Personal von außerhalb der Institution zu holen, aus dem nationalen Umfeld oder/sowie international. Wichtig dabei sei, nicht zu viele Studierende aufzunehmen und seine ‚graduate students' sorgfältig auszuwählen (S. 20 ff.). Beim Thema Finanzen nennt er die möglichen Finanzierungsquellen: Regierungsbeteiligung, Vertragsforschung mit öffentlichen Organisationen und Firmen, Stiftungsgelder und Spenden, Studiengebühren. Steht das Geld erstmal bereit, könnten gute Forscher gewonnen werden, die wiederum Forschungsgelder mitbringen oder anwerben, woraufhin noch hochkarätigere Forschende angezogen werden. Das Ziel ist ein „virtuous circle" (S. 24). Jedoch ein Kreislauf, der immer teurer wird: Schon 2004 prognostizierte Philip Altbach, dass der Aufbau einer Weltklasse-Universität etwa eine halbe Milliarde Dollar kosten würde. 2002 hat allein die School of Medicine in Qatar schon 750 Millionen Dollar gekostet (S. 36).

Das zweite Kapitel widmet sich den „Wegen des Wandels" und beschreibt kurz die Rolle des Staates, der eine klare Vision ent-

wickeln müsse, wie er seine Einrichtungen entwickeln wolle, bzw. welche besondere Nische die Universität auf dem globalen Markt besetzen soll, um dann zu entscheiden, welche der drei bereits aufgeführten institutionellen Strategien zu wählen sei (Neugründung, Ausbau, Fusionierung). Auch andere Akteure wie lokale oder regionale Autoritäten sowie privatwirtschaftliche Unternehmen sollten beachtet werden. Auf der institutionellen Ebene seien dann insbesondere die Leitungsebene der zukünftigen Weltklasse-Universität und ihre Vision wichtig, sowie ein genauer Plan, wie das Ziel erreicht werden soll. Hierzu müsse auch die Internationalisierungsstrategie der Universität einbezogen werden (S. 60). Die vorgeschlagenen Strategien erstrecken sich über ein weites Feld: 1) das Anlocken exzellenter ausländischer Studierender durch englischsprachige Kursangebote aber auch ausländischer Professoren, 2) Kooperationen mit „Topuniversitäten" in den Industrieländern, 3) erfolgreiche einheimische Wissenschaftler aus dem Ausland zurückholen, 4) die eigenen Forscher zum Publizieren auf Englisch anhalten, 5) unter Umständen einen ausländischen Hochschulmanager an die Spitze der Institution setzen.

Kapitel 3 schließlich widmet sich auf lediglich drei Seiten der Unterstützung, die die Weltbank, je nach finanzieller Lage des Landes, anbieten kann.

Der Text wird von vielen Fallbeispielen und einem umfangreichen Anhang begleitet, der unter anderem eine Checkliste enthält, anhand derer Einrichtungen und Regierungen überprüfen können, welche Merkmale einer „world-class university" sie bereits erfüllen.[6] Positiv hervorzuheben ist die deutliche Aussage des Buches, dass

Geld allein nicht genügt, um Weltklasse zu erreichen. Auch weist Salmi am Ende (S. 72) immerhin darauf hin, dass sich nicht alle exzellenten Einrichtungen in den Rankings wiederfinden würden, da diese vor allem auf die forschungsorientierte Universität fokussiert seien. So gäbe es ausgezeichnete Colleges, Fachhochschulen oder Technikinstitute, die darin wenig Beachtung fänden. Auch bräuchte nicht jeder Staat eine eigene Weltklasse-Universität.

Auch wenn es nicht Salmis Anspruch ist, sich dem Thema von Ranglisten und Weltklasse kritisch zu nähern, ist sein Mangel an Reflektion zu bedauern. Der Autor interessiert sich nicht für die historisch gewachsenen Eigenheiten der nationalen Bildungssysteme und ihrer lokalen Vorteile für Studierende oder Wissenschaftler, ihm reichen kurze Fallbeispiele zur Illustration seiner Thesen. Auch die Folgen der Dominanz des Englischen als lingua franca der Wissenschaft und dessen Rolle für die Rankingplatzierungen nicht-englisch-sprachiger Nationen sind nicht sein Thema – er weist lapidar darauf hin, dass der Erfolg einer Einrichtung auch vom Erfolg seiner Wissenschaftler abhänge, Forschungsergebnisse auf Englisch zu publizieren, denn darauf basierten die Rankings.

Das Buch fasst existierende Erkenntnisse über die Struktur in den Ranglisten bereits erfolgreicher Forschungsuniversitäten zusammen, bietet darüber hinaus aber nur wenig Neues. Es ist vielmehr als eine Art Best-Practice-Handbuch der Weltbank für Länder mit Beratungsbedarf zu werten und steht in der Linie der Entwicklungsarbeit, die die Weltbank, wie oben erwähnt, seit 1963 im Sektor der Hochschulsysteme leistet. Der Autor selbst weist zweimal drauf hin (S. 11, S. 67), dass die Weltbank

diesbezüglich häufig Anfragen von Staaten bekomme. Den dortigen politischen Entscheidern und Universitätspräsidenten kann das Buch eventuell eine Orientierungshilfe im unübersichtlichen globalen Bildungsmarkt sein. Wer jedoch verstanden hat, wie die gut bekannten Hegemonien auf dem globalen Bildungsmarkt funktionieren, muss sich immer noch fragen, wo er die unerschöpflichen Ressourcen und die exzellenten Wissenschaftler herbekommt, um Anschluss an die Weltspitze zu bekommen. Ob das vorliegende Buch hierbei hilfreich ist, kann jeder Leser selbst entscheiden, indem er sich fragt, ob die Lektüre der eigenen Hochschulleitung wohl weiterhelfen würde.

Anmerkungen:

1 P. G. Altbach, The Costs and Benefits of World-Class Universities, in: Academe 90 (2004), URL: http://www.aaup.org/AAUP/pubsres/academe/2004/JF/Feat/altb.htm (14.11.2012).

2 Ein klassisches Beispiel dafür aus den US-amerikanischen Inlandsrankings ist die Frage, welchen Rankingplatz wohl die Princeton Law School einnehmen würde. Einen sehr guten natürlich – mit dem Haken, dass die Princeton University seit 1852 keine Law School mehr hat, dazu: J. Hoffman, Judge not, Law Schools demand of a magazine that ranks them, in: New York Times, 19.02.1998, URL: http://www.nytimes.com/1998/02/19/nyregion/judge-not-law-schools-demand-of-a-magazine-that-ranks-them.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm (14.11.2012).

3 V. Meyer-Guckel, Schotten dicht. Die Uni Hamburg will sich nicht mehr an Umfragen und Rankings beteiligen. Ein Eingeständnis der Schwäche, in: DIE ZEIT, 27.09.2012, URL: http://www.zeit.de/2012/40/Universitaet-Hamburg-Rankings (14.11.2012).

4 http://www.che-ranking.de (14.11.2012)

5 C. Reyes; P. Rosso, A New Approach for Classifiying Chilean Universities, in: International Higher Education 67 (2012), S. 19–21.

6 Die Liste stammt von J. Alden; Lin G. „Benchmarking the characteristics of a world-class university. Developing an international strategy at university level, London 2004.

Autorinnen und Autoren

Claudia Baumann
M.A., Universität Leipzig
E-Mail: claudia.baumann@uni-leipzig.de

Keith Beavon
Prof. Dr., University of Pretoria
E-Mail: kbeavon@icon.co.za

Robert Cole
M.A., New York University
E-Mail: rwc245@nyu.edu

Sebastian Conrad
Prof. Dr., Freie Universität Berlin
E-Mail: sebastian.conrad@fu-berlin.de

Robert Dale
Dr., King's College, London
E-Mail: robert.1.dale@kcl.ac.uk

Klaus Dittrich
Dr., Korea University, Seoul
E-Mail: ragazzodelleuropa@hotmail.com

Wolfram Drews
Prof. Dr., Westfälische Wilhelms-Universität Münster
E-Mail: w.drews@uni-muenster.de

Klaas Dykmann
Assoc. Prof., Roskilde University
E-Mail: dykmann@ruc.dk

Micha Fiedlschuster
M.A, Universität Leipzig
E-Mail: fiedlschuster@uni-leipzig.de

Helmut Goerlich
Prof. em. Dr., Universität Leipzig
E-Mail: helmut.goerlich@gmx.de

Chris Hann
Prof. Dr., Director, Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology, Halle an der Saale
E-Mail: hann@eth.mpg.de

Ines Keske
M.A., Universität Leipzig
E-Mail: keske@uni-leipzig.de

Nathanael Kuck
M.A., Universität Leipzig
E-Mail: kuck@uni-leipzig.de

Mairi MacDonald
Prof. Dr., University of Toronto
E-Mail: mairi.macdonald@utoronto.ca

Chloe Maurel
Dr., École normale supérieure, Paris
E-Mail: chmaurel@yahoo.fr

Ulrich Menzel
Prof. Dr., Technische Universität Braunschweig
E-Mail: ulrich.menzel@tu-braunschweig.de

Ruth Merz
Dr., Frankfurt am Main
E-Mail: merz@ualberta.ca

Fabian Möpert
Leipzig
E-Mail: fabian-moe@vodafone.de

Craig N. Murphy
Prof. Dr., University of Massachusetts, Boston
E-Mail: craig.murphy@umb.edu

Changavalli S. R. Murthy
Prof. Dr., Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi
E-Mail: csrmurthy@mail.jnu.ac.in

Katja Naumann
Dr., GWZO an der Universität Leipzig
E-Mail: knaumann@uni-leipzig.de

Marisol Palma Behnke
Dr., Universidad Hurtado, Santiago de Chile
E-Mail: mpalmab@uahurtado.cl

Claudia Prinz
M.A., Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin
E-Mail: prinzc@geschichte.hu-berlin.de

Michael Riekenberg
Prof. Dr., Universität Leipzig, Historisches Seminar
E-Mail: riekenbe@rz.uni-leipzig.de

Leonie Rörich
M.A., Leipzig
E-Mail: leonie.roerich@gmail.com

Dietmar Rothermund
Prof. em. Dr., Universität Heidelberg
E-Mail: dietmar.rothermund@t-online.de

Kathleen Schlütter
M.A., Deutsch-Französische Hochschule
E-Mail: schluetter@dfh-ufa.org

Adamantios Skordos
Dr., Universität Wien
E-Mail: adamantios.skordos@univie.ac.at

Susanne Weigelin-Schwiedrzik
Prof. Dr., Universität Wien
E-Mail: susanne.weigelin-schwiedrzik@univie.ac.at