comparativ

ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR GLOBALGESCHICHTE UND
VERGLEICHENDE GESELLSCHAFTSFORSCHUNG

Herausgegeben im Auftrag der
Karl-Lamprecht-Gesellschaft e. V. (KLG) / European Network in Universal and Global History (ENIUGH) von
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Anschrift der Redaktion

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Comparativ erscheint sechsmal jährlich mit einem Umfang von jeweils ca. 140 Seiten. Einzelheft: 12.00 €; Doppelheft 22.00 €; Jahresabonnement 50.00 €; ermäßigtes Abonnement 25.00 €. Für Mitglieder der KLG / ENIUGH ist das Abonnement im Mitgliedsbeitrag enthalten.

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From Railway Juncture to Portal of Globalization: Making Globalization Work in African and South Asian Railway Towns

Edited by
Geert Castryck

Leipziger Universitätsverlag

Comparativ.
Zeitschrift für Globalgeschichte und vergleichende Gesellschaftsforschung / hrsg. von Matthias Middell und Hannes Siegrist – Leipzig: Leipziger Univ.-Verl.
ISSN 0940-3566
Jg. 25, H. 4. From Railway Juncture to Portal of Globalization: Making Globalization Work in African and South Asian Railway Towns. – 2015

From Railway Juncture to Portal of Globalization: Making Globalization Work in African and South Asian Railway Towns. Ed. by Geert Castryck – Leipzig: Leipziger Univ.-Verl., 2015
(Comparativ; Jg. 25, H. 4)
ISBN 978-3-96023-014-4

Comparativ.
Zeitschrift für Globalgeschichte und vergleichende Gesellschaftsforschung 25 (2015) 4
ISSN 0940-3566
ISBN 978-3-96023-014-4

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Introduction – From Railway Juncture to Portal of Globalization: Making Globalization Work in African and South Asian Railway Towns

Geert Castryck

The papers collected in this issue illustrate how people have shaped global connectedness in five African and South Asian railway towns. It is not the railway and the material connections enabled by it that are at the heart of these histories, but rather how people made productive use of local conditions and the availability of the railway. At first sight, a northern English labour force in the Jamalpur locomotive workshop (India), the entrepreneurship of Otto Siedle in Durban (South Africa), cosmopolitan residential patterns in Elisabethville (present-day Lubumbashi, Democratic Republic of the Congo), the Belgian concession port in British-ruled Kigoma (Tanzania), and the self-organization of railway porters in Kapiri Mposhi (Zambia) are not the striking success stories of globalization. However, they tell us much about how globalization is produced and how processes of globalization are interlocked.

Creative responses, building on locality, longevity, and long-distance connectivity, turned these places into centres of activity where at a particular time specific ways of globalization were produced. In order to understand globalization processes, we need to grasp these historically specific and distinctly local features that produce globalization. We take this as a starting point in an effort to bring together the historiographies on railways and on globalization. Moreover, we do so in African and South Asian contexts.

Comparativ | Zeitschrift für Globalgeschichte und vergleichende Gesellschaftsforschung 25 (2015) Heft 3, S. 7–16.

Global Histories of the Railway

A stereotypical narrative of globalization would place Western European technological breakthroughs in the decades around 1800 up front, and continue with the submission of the rest of the world to European or Western supremacy. In such a narrative, the railway and globalization fit together well, since the railway is then both a product and a carrier of industrialization, which on top of that facilitates connectedness, mobility, as well as the spread of ideas, people, and probably control. I do not want to give too much attention to such a seemingly self-explanatory story of diffusion of a science- and technology-based, global system led by Europe or the West. This is not meant to discard the serious, empirical research that convincingly demonstrates the role of the railway as an instrument of state-building, as a tool of empire, or as a technology that profoundly altered the perception of time and space.[1] These are undeniably important aspects of the constitution of global connectedness and interaction, both when it comes to the imperialistic ways of seeing the world, and concerning the material imposition of imperial or state rule over contained territories and over long distances. Although this train of thoughts offers an evident link between railway technology and globalization, it pays less attention to the locally and historically specific dimension of the production of global connectedness. Why and how do globalization processes unfold and how does the railway play a role in historically and locally specific circumstances are not the prime concerns of narratives that explain spread or hegemony.

Another strand of literature likewise brings together the railway and historical events of global importance. Several historians have demonstrated the role of railway workers in politics, trade unionism, and decolonization.[2] In this research, the railway is interpreted as a tool of anti-empire. These stories show how the railway can work against the will of those who decided to build it, and that the railway empowers those who work or run it. The railway is used by people to overturn imperial rule and to redefine the state in ways that alter the order and power relations on a global scale.

In this issue, we add a third angle by addressing the dual question of how the railway and how globalization work in relation to each other. Assuming neither a self-evident Western hegemony nor a self-emanating power of the railway, the following questions arise: which kinds of global connectedness were produced in the wake of the railway;

1 Patrick O'Brien, The New Economic History of the Railways, London 2014 (first published 1977); Patrick O'Brien (ed.), Railways and the Economic Development of Western Europe, 1830–1914, London 1985; Wolfgang Schivelbusch, The Railway Journey: The Industrialization of Time and Space in the 19th Century, Berkeley & Los Angeles 1986; Clarence B. Davis, Kenneth E. Wilburn, and Ronald E. Robinson (eds.), Railway imperialism, Westport, London 1991; David Wolff, To the Harbin Station: The Liberal Alternative in Russian Manchuria, 1898–1914, Stanford 1999; Irene Anastasiadou, Constructing Iron Europe: Transnationalism and Railways in the Interbellum, Amsterdam 2011; Bruce Elleman and Stephen Kotkin (eds.), Manchurian Railways and the Opening of China: An International History: An International History, London 2015.

2 Frederick Cooper,‚Our Strike': Equality, Anticolonial Politics and the 1947-48 Railway Strike in French West Africa, in: The Journal of African History, 37 (1996) 1, pp. 81-118; Jim Jones, Industrial Labor in the Colonial World: Workers of the Chemin de Fer Dakar-Niger, 1881–1963, London 2002; Ahmad Alawad Sikainga, City of Steel and Fire: A Social History of Atbara, Sudan's Railway Town, 1906–1984, London 2003.

how did the railway fit in the cocktail of decisions to shape global connectedness; how did rail-facilitated mobility of people from across the world subvert the local orders that were planned for them; in how far were local strategies decisive in making the railway run; and which local historical circumstances facilitated how people made global connectedness effective? When zooming in on local specifics, it turns out that there are many globalizations and many ways the train runs. The examples collected in this issue show particular ways in which people combine the operation of the railway and the production of global connectedness. To sum up, our focus on the local production of globalization in connection with the railway – however, without reproducing the narrative of diffusion of industrial technology and transportation revolution – provides the meeting point of multiple globalizations that characterizes the railway towns in Africa and South Asia that are presented in this issue.

Along these lines, Nitin Sinha tells us the story of Jamalpur during the second half of the nineteenth century. This Northeast Indian town was home to an important railway workshop and drew heavily on skilled blacksmithing labour from the nearby town of Monghyr as well as on imported railway workers from northern England. He especially focuses on the tensions between an imperial policy of insularity and moral superiority of the 'white working class' on one hand, and the growing dependence on and connections with other parts of town, region, subcontinent, and empire on the other hand. Of interest, as such, are not the actual connections and mobility but rather the enabling mechanisms and processes that allow Jamalpur's specificity to be interpreted as making connections on different scales work.

Jonathan Hyslop reconstructs the story of Otto Siedle, a German-born and British-minded employee of the London-based Natal Direct Line who worked in the South African port town of Durban. Making use of the position of Durban, Siedle turned the place into an interface between coal mines to the north, Transvaal gold mines to the west, steamship connections with London and India, and the supply of indentured labour from India to Natal. As coal was crucial to make the interface work, he pushed forward the construction of the railroad, which was a decisive instrument to make coal mines, gold mines, ocean steamers, and politics on local, regional, national, and imperial scales interlock. Rather than claiming the centrality of Durban in the imperial constellation, Hyslop stresses the indispensability of Siedle's Durban in a hierarchical relatedness with powerhouses like London or Johannesburg.

Sofie Boonen and Johan Lagae investigate the spatial organization of the Congolese town of Lubumbashi (then Elisabethville) against the background of a booming mining industry. Interestingly, they do not concentrate on the mining industry but on how Jewish and Greek immigrants made intercultural life and a degree of cosmopolitanism in town possible. The railway connection with Southern Africa, meant to ship out ore and bring in mineworkers, brought "second-rate whites" who made a living from their intermediary position in town. At odds with segregationist colonial policies, their strategies allowed the urban economy of Lubumbashi to flourish while at the same time blurring racial boundaries. The agency of the migrants led to a cosmopolitan city that was more

directly linked to cities like Bulawayo, Beira, and Cape Town than to Kinshasa (then Léopoldville).

Geert Castryck analyses the rise and decline of the Belgian concession port of Kigoma during the interwar period. An Anglo-Belgian agreement after the First World War had granted privileges to Belgians on traffic between the Indian Ocean and Lake Tanganyika via the Dar es Salaam-Kigoma railway. This connection and the port of Kigoma in particular were booming in the years around 1930. This inland Indian Ocean port not only provided the shortest link connecting eastern Congo and the mineral rich region of Katanga with the world market, but was also completely Belgian-controlled. Castryck argues that the success of this connection had been made possible by the pragmatism and informality of the local administrators and operators, who did not insist too much on the formal Belgian rights.

Jamie Monson, finally, zooms in on casual labour by porters in a Zambian railway hub. The Chinese-sponsored TAZARA railway between Dar es Salaam and Kapiri Mposhi has gone through different phases of liberalization,[3] which have jeopardized the operation of the railway connection between East-Central Africa and the Indian Ocean. In the end, the self-organization of casualized teams of porters, who take care of transhipment between means of transport, has turned out to be a crucial factor to ensure the operation of the railway. Drawing on age-old strategies of mutual aid, they have stabilized both their own livelihoods and the TAZARA connection, and in so doing they are as crucial as container ships or the railway itself to make global connectedness work in this part of the world.

In each of these cases, the creativity or pragmatism of people in combination with particular characteristics of the place in question made globalization work in historically and locally specific ways. In each of these cases, the railway could only contribute to different forms of global connectedness because of how people made use of the locally available technology, infrastructure, institutions, material and cultural resources, social relations, traditions, and so on. The railway juncture, understood here as both the material junction and the pivotal moment at which the railway became effective, is interpreted in its local historical setting. In so doing, globalization does not spread from the West to the rest carried by as well as carrying industrial technology, but is produced in different guises wherever local historical conditions provide the fertile ground for people on the spot.

Portals of Globalization

I suggest to analyse these places – where local historical features, the agency of people, and available technology or infrastructure come together – as portals of globalization. With this suggestion I build on the idea developed by Matthias Middell and Katja Naumann in 2010. In their article on *Global History and the Spatial Turn*, they paid special

3 TAZARA stands for Tanzania Zambia Railway Authority.

attention to the spatial, historical, and discontinuous character of globalization. Their understanding of globalization processes combines a focus on the reconfiguration of political space with attention for the historicity of territoriality. Drawing on the ideas of Charles Maier,[4] they are interested in how territorial orders have been produced, controlled, and challenged in historical processes of de- and re-territorialization, and how these processes have led to global convergence. Moreover, in order to facilitate empirical research along these lines, they developed a vocabulary to talk about spatial-temporal arenas of accelerated and intensified transformation (critical junctures of globalization), about the places where globalization processes crystallize or pop up repeatedly over time (portals of globalization), and about the converging redefinitions of political-spatial orders that characterize critical junctures of globalization (regimes of territorialization).[5]

My use of the words "railway juncture" is loosely inspired by the spatial-temporal idea of accelerated transformation accompanying the introduction of the railway. Above all, however, I pick up on the idea of "portal of globalization." Middell and Naumann characterize such portals as "those places that have been centres of world trade or global communication, have served as entrance points for cultural transfer, and where institutions and practices for dealing with global connectedness have been developed." They stress the longevity of portals of globalization when pointing out that "such places have *always been known* as sites of transcultural encounter and mutual influence."[6]

This category is deemed useful because it "allows for analysis of how global connectedness challenges a seemingly stable territorial order by extending it to other spheres," and because "it invites us to look at the various means by which elites try to channel and therefore control the effects of global connectivity." For them, an investigation of portals of globalization is tantamount to "an examination of those places where flows and regulation come together." Add to this their plea for empirical research, for a focus on actors, and for a combination of local and global aspects, and it is indeed tempting to build "a theoretically coherent and empirically sophisticated programme of research and historical interpretation of globalization" on the basis of the research categories just mentioned, and spatially concentrated in portals of globalization.[7]

However, this agenda comes with a couple of drawbacks. Firstly, as Hyslop questions elsewhere in this issue, one can wonder in how far the periodization and convergence of a nation-state-based regime of territorialization, which figures prominently in Middell and Naumann's article and which allegedly became prominent in the course of the nineteenth century, can be considered to be global. Hyslop makes a case for a simultaneous

4 Charles Maier, Consigning the twentieth century to history: alternative narratives for the modern era, in: American Historical Review, 105 (2000) 3, pp. 807-831, and Charles Maier, Transformations of territoriality, 1600–2000, in: Gunilla Budde, Sebastian Conrad, and Oliver Janz (eds.), Transnationale Geschichte: Themen, Tendenzen und Theorien, Göttingen 2006, pp. 32-56.

5 Matthias Middell and Katja Naumann, Global history and the spatial turn: from the impact of area studies to the study of critical junctures of globalization, in: Journal of Global History, 5 (March 2010) 1, pp. 149-170.

6 Middell & Naumann, Global history, p. 162. Emphasis added.

7 Middell & Naumann, Global history, p. 162.

prominence of different territorial orders in different parts of the world that are nevertheless connected. Imperial and national territorial orders not only coexisted side by side but were interdependent. In fact, Hyslop's reading does not have to be at odds with Middell and Naumann. They even emphasize that Europe and other parts of the world do not necessarily fit into one historical narrative of territoriality.[8] Nevertheless, Hyslop does point out that their chronology and the demonstration of convergence relies heavily on the European example.

A similar consideration can, secondly, be made about their empirical and actor-oriented awareness. The actors who use and make the portals of globalization and who are successful in establishing and managing a specific spatial constellation at a certain time are at the heart of Middell and Naumann's projected empirical programme.[9] Their focus on elites as the ones who try to channel and control the effects of global connectedness, however, threatens to eclipse the instances, presented elsewhere in this issue, where elites' attempted control was undermined by Greek and Jewish intermediaries in colonial Lubumbashi (Boonen & Lagae), or blocked rather than facilitated connectivity in the port of Kigoma (Castryck), or was intentionally meant to inhibit rather than to enable transcultural encounter in Jamalpur (Sinha). In Kapiri Mposhi, the ones channelling, stabilizing, and enabling global connectedness are everything but elites (Monson). Otto Siedle, who was a branch holder of a London-based company, can somehow be considered to be part of an elite, but he was flipping the decisive switches in a place that was not at all a centre until he made it into an indispensable interface for global connectivity (Hyslop). As a matter of fact, being an interface rather than a centre applies to most if not all of the places discussed in this issue.

The combination of these critiques urges us to take the category 'portal of globalization' further – even more empirical, more actor-oriented, and more local. Middell and Naumann in fact already indicated that the category portal of globalization can be applied beyond elites and 'important places' and that it can be used to focus on a whole range of concrete historical actors, on perspectives "from below," or on small towns.[10] There is, indeed, an inherent tension in their description of "portals of globalization," oscillating between a European bias in the empirical examples and a categorical openness to historical and regional difference, as well as adopting a primarily centric and elitist view in the description of the category while opening up to small towns and bottom-up approaches

8 Middell & Naumann, Global history, pp. 163-164. The attention for the diversity of globalization echoes the work of Charles Bright and Michael Geyer, upon who Middell and Naumann approvingly draw. See for instance: Charles Bright and Michael Geyer, Regimes of World Order: Global Integration and the Production of Difference in Twentieth-Century World History, in: Jerry H. Bentley, Renate Bridenthal and Anand A. Yang (eds.), Interactions: Transregional Perspectives on World History, Honolulu 2005, pp. 202-238.

9 Middell & Naumann, Global history, pp. 164-165. The same is true for Michael Geyer, who also uses the concept "portal of globalization" and pays special attention to agency in making transfers between national and global work. In Geyer's approach, the national-global interaction is at the heart of his understanding of portal of globalization. Michael Geyer, Portals of globalization, in: Winfried Eberhard, and Christian Lübke (eds.), The Plurality of Europe: Identities and Spaces, Leipzig 2010, pp. 509-520.

10 Middell & Naumann, Global history, p. 164.

when displaying its potential uses. Since they wrote their article as an inviting programmatic text, we take this tension as a productive one, and suggest to understand a portal of globalization as a place or a space where globalization is produced by actors who develop practices or institutions for dealing with global connectedness, thereby drawing on creativity, local assets, and the actual presence of connectivity in the form of infrastructure, technology, and cultural interaction – or put otherwise, in the form of the mobility of goods, ideas, and people.

The distinction between place and space is included here in order to leave it open whether, for instance, the category of the railway town (a space), the railway line or network (a space), or locally specific railway towns (places) are scrutinized as portals where people, place/space, and connectedness come together. Four of the contributions to this issue were presented at a conference panel at the 2014 European Social Science History Conference (ESSHC) in Vienna,[11] which dealt particularly with the relation between the empirical findings in historically specific railway towns, the railway town as a generic space, the railway juncture as a pivotal time of transformation, and the longevity or path dependency of a town as a portal of globalization. The idea was further elaborated during a panel at the Fourth European Congress on World and Global History in Paris, which applied the same approach to peripheral port cities, and which was enriched by comments from Abdul Sheriff and Ulf Engel.[12] The participants in the ESSHC panel, which was commented upon by Matthias Middell and whose contributions have been revised and brought together in this issue, clearly tended towards the specificity of the place in its local, historical and globally connected contexts. This should not preclude, though, approaching spaces like the ones mentioned above or, for instance, universities as portals of globalization.[13]

Is everything global?

What came out of both panels is that the historical actors, the specific place or space, as well as the global interaction and integration are prerequisites to make a portal of globalization. This is reflected in our reformulated description of a portal of globalization and invites empirical research as to how globalization is made locally. Our new definition has at least one serious drawback: if the whole world is living under the global condition, then every place and every space can end up being called a portal of globalization. For

11 The panel 'Railway Towns as Portals of Globalization' took place on April 25, 2014. You can find the panel line-up via the following link: https://esshc.socialhistory.org/esshc-user/programme/2014?day=14&time=26&session=390 (last accessed on January 11, 2016).

12 The panel 'Peripheral port-cities as portals of globalization' took place on September 6-7, 2014. You can find the panel line-up via the following link: http://research.uni-leipzig.de/~eniugh/congress/programme/event/?tx_seminars_pi1[showUid]=115 (last accessed on January 11, 2016).

13 For an attempt to apply the category portal of globalization on universities, see Claudia Baumann (ed.), Universities as Portals of Globalization: Crossroads of Internationalization and Area Studies, Leipzig 2014 (CAS Working Paper Series No 4).

this reason, portal of globalization should not be seen as a label but rather be used as an analytical category in order to empirically gauge the interplay of locality, originality, and connectivity in making globalization work. It can and must not be ruled out that this interplay can be found everywhere, but it would still not mean that it applies to everything. The local and historical particularity of the place, the idiosyncratic creativity of the actors, and the specific ways in which connectedness operates draw empirical attention to the heart of the production of globalization. The sites where practices and institutions that enable the making and managing of global connectedness are concentrated do not necessarily coincide with the railway town as a whole, are at the same time constitutive to the spatial organization of that town, and are crucial for its spatial connectedness. This understanding accentuates the local and historical specificity of every portal of globalization and to the diversity of processes and mechanisms of globalization.

About the underlying concept of globalization, a similar objection – a warning for the loss of meaning if the concept becomes too vast – has been made by Frederick Cooper in 2001. In his article "What is the Concept of Globalization Good For? An African Historian's Perspective,"[14] he made a plea for historical research about interactions and connections on all spatial levels, thereby echoing his earlier plea for "constantly shifting the scale of analysis from the most spatially specific […] to the most spatially diffuse."[15] In this research, historians must pay attention to increasing as well as decreasing intensities of connectedness. However, in his opinion it makes no sense to label all these historical, non-linear and multilevel processes of interaction and connection globalization. "Global," so he argues, suggests an all-encompassing, homogeneous telos, which is not in line with historical experience, and "-ization" suggests a linear and deterministic trajectory towards this telos, which is equally not historical. I subscribe to both his plea for historical research on different scales and his refusal of homogeneous linear teleologies. Nevertheless, and notwithstanding the fact that three authors in this issue approvingly cite Cooper's 2001 piece, we do use globalization as a historical concept. Indeed, globalization must not be self-explanatory, and therefore it requires qualification, scrutiny, and historical analysis along the lines suggested by Cooper, and not rebuttal. As a matter of fact, he had anticipated that there would be people like us. He wrote that one could use the term "globalization" for all the interactions and connections on all levels and with ups and downs over a long time, but then, so he stated, it would mean that everything therefore would be meaningless. That is where I do not agree. The connections and interactions under scrutiny have become entangled to a degree that they cannot be studied as discrete instances of connectedness. That is the moment when a disdain towards globalization as a linear, homogenizing teleology paradoxically tends to confirm this read-

14 Frederick Cooper, What Is the Concept of Globalization Good for? An African Historian's Perspective, in: African Affairs, 100 (April, 2001) 399, pp. 189-213.

15 Frederick Cooper, Conflict and Connection: Rethinking Colonial African History, in: The American Historical Review, 99 (Dec., 1994) 5, p. 1539.

ing. It is not at all meaningless to disregard the "everything" in multilevel and long-term processes of connection and interaction.

By bringing together an empirical approach to people producing globalization in locally and historically specific circumstances, with a theme that seems to fit remarkably well in the simplistic linear diffusion discourse of Western industrial globalization, we illustrate that different instances of connectedness are themselves entangled. It is important not to look away from the places where these entanglements are made productive by people who pull together the strings of material and technological infrastructure, local and historical resource, and their own imagination and initiative. The capacity of individuals, groups, or communities to manage the coming together of different strands of spatial connectedness and historical trajectories implies that globalization does not merely spread but is produced and altered in these places. Therefore, the characteristics and the history of this capacity to produce globalization merit our attention. With the introduction of the railway, the global positionality of several African and South Asian towns was redefined. Long-distance mobility and connectedness as well as perhaps a feeling of promise or technological pride were corollaries of this introduction, but the meaning, impact, and use of the railway was produced locally, building on deep histories, leaving long-lasting consequences, and mobilizing long-distance connections. Globalization did not merely spread along the railway; local "institutions and practices for dealing with global connectedness have been developed" in the wake of the railway, which in turn enabled this global connectedness to gain substance.[16] An understanding of globalization has to include these local and historical faculties, which make places pivotal and – within a certain domain, radius, or period – turn them into portals of globalization.

The historical dimension of such a place includes the antecedents, the unfolding of agency, and the ensuing legacy that can underpin a place's long-term identity and provide the germ for future creativity and inventiveness in the context of another critical juncture of globalization. As such, the experience of making globalization work can also lead to a symbolic status of global *lieu de mémoire* (memory space).[17] Due to the focus on scrutinizing the specific ways in which globalization processes are made in specific African and South Asian railway towns, this long-term aspect of portals of globalization has only marginally been touched upon in summary references to the role of Monghyr in the development of Jamalpur (Sinha), to the nineteenth-century caravan trade in the urban area around Kigoma (Castryck), to the position of Kapiri Mposhi in the Zambian national railway network (Monson), or to the traces in present-day Lubumbashi of Jewish urban activity in the 1920s (Boonen & Lagae). It would be worthwhile, though, to take this idea of *lieu de mémoire* and longevity as the starting point for a future special issue of this journal.

16 The quote comes from Middell & Naumann, Global history, p. 162.

17 See Matthias Middell, Erinnerung an die Globalisierung? die Portale der Globalisierung als ‚lieux de meìmoire' – ein Versuch, in: Kirstin Buchinger, Claire Gantet , and Jakob Vogel (eds.), Europäische Erinnerungsräume. Frankfurt/Main & New York 2009, pp. 296-308.

For now, we focus on places where global connectedness is produced by empirically identifiable people who act both locally and globally in interaction with the availability of the railway. In order to identify interesting portals of globalization, we first and foremost have to localize, to historicize, and to diversify our understanding of globalization. At the same time, it allows us to understand idiosyncratic spaces of connectedness and integration beyond the usual political and economic global powerhouses. The advantage of this understanding of portals, therefore, is both that it does not only encompass the usual suspects of globalization narratives, like imperial metropoles and industrial technologies, and that it does not reduce globalization to political and economic processes at the expense of cultural and social dynamics. This ipso facto means that our understanding of globalization needs to be diversified. The forces that make globalization work are decentred and the appearances of globalization multiplied and dehomogenized. The acknowledgment of the synchronicity of multiple globalizations and the intricate entanglement of these globalizations allows us to get beyond too one-dimensional and unidirectional narratives of global integration without having to discard the partial explanatory potential of existing narratives. The juncture or the pivotal moment of the invention or introduction of the railway, for instance, matters still, but does not determine. What actually happens is made by people on the spot, making use of creativity and deep-rooted local assets or resources. Seeing these specific places as portals of globalization provides an inspiring approach to act as a bridge between the particularity of the individual instance and a better understanding of globalization in practice.

Acknowledgements

The panels on "Railway Towns as Portals of Globalization" at the European Social Science History Conference in Vienna on 25 April 2014 and on "Peripheral Port Cities as Portals of Globalization" at the Fourth European Congress on World and Global History in Paris on 6–7 September 2014 have been indispensable in developing the ideas incorporated in this introduction and issue. I am grateful to the participants in these panels and especially to the three discussants, Matthias Middell, Abdul Sheriff, and Ulf Engel, for their thoughtful input. I also thank Katja Naumann, Antje Dietze, and Forrest Kilimnik for their useful comments on earlier versions of this introduction. It goes without saying that any flaw or loose end in the final version is entirely the responsibility of the author.

Railway Imperialism. A Small Town Perspective on Global History, Jamalpur, 1860s–1900s*

Nitin Sinha

RESÜMEE

Jamalpur ist eine der ältesten Eisenbahnstädte in Indien. Dieser Artikel befasst sich anhand von Gründungsgeschichten der Stadt mit den ersten vier Jahrzehnten ihres Bestehens (1860er–1900er Jahre), um so das Zusammenspiel der stadtspezifischen, regionalen und imperialen Faktoren, die das Entstehen der Stadt geprägt haben, zu verstehen. Er konzentriert sich insbesondere auf die Spannungen zwischen einer imperialen Politik der Abschottung und der moralischen Überlegenheit einer‚weißen Arbeiterklasse' einerseits und der Angewiesenheit auf andere Bevölkerungsgruppen in der Stadt, der Region und dem Empire andererseits.
Es wird argumentiert, dass es notwendig ist, über einen Lokal-Global-Gegensatz hinwegzukommen, um sowohl Einzelheiten als auch Zusammenhänge verstehen zu können. Der Artikel fordert dazu auf, Prozesse und Mechanismen zu lokalisieren und zu analysieren, die nicht nur Verbindungen und scheinbare Einheitlichkeit, sondern auch Abgrenzungen und Brüche erklären. Das Zusammenführen von scheinbaren Gegensätzen ermöglicht es, die Stadtgeschichte unter Berücksichtigung der Vielschichtigkeit von räumlichen Bezügen neu zu schreiben.

Being hailed in the railway administrative writings as the largest and the most important railway town of India, Jamalpur presents a challenging case to simultaneously explore the larger connectedness as well as local specifics of a town whose history stands at the intersecting levels of urban, transport, technological, and not least, imperial histories. In this

* I am thankful to Geert Castryck for inviting me to present the first draft of this paper at European Social Science History Congress, Vienna 2014. I am also thankful to my friends Sadia Bajwa, Katharina Schembs, Andreas Weiss for their comments on subsequent drafts. Long discussions with Maria Framke and Nitin Varma have enriched the paper.

this paper I explore some of these themes for the first four decades of the town's existence. In particular, I look into the early history of Jamalpur at three levels. First, I focus on the newly developing labour force of migrant Europeans around the Jamalpur railway workshop. Rudyard Kipling's description of Jamalpur as the 'Crewe of India' was perhaps not only a literary symbolism; the fact that most of these skilled workers came from northern England can be usefully reconstructed to explore the connections across the empire.
Second, I explore the concerns and debates around providing a proper physical and moral environment for them, thereby producing imperial ideals and colonial contradictions in the urban / moral setting. The tensions of empire became apparent in the paradoxes between an attempted moral superiority and insularity of the 'white working class' and the reliance on and connectivity with Indians in town. Third, speaking of a railway workshop town, the 'transfer of technology' was as important as the movement of people. The potential of 'global' connectedness is explored here in the backdrop of close imperial ties that existed between India and Britain. How far the imperial and the global aided each other or in fact competed against each other is the core question.

Two foundational stories

Jamalpur has two foundational stories. Let us begin by probing these stories in order to unravel its history. Before the first railway had steamed into Jamalpur on 8th February 1862, D. W. Campbell, the locomotive superintendent of the East Indian Railway Company (EIRC), had decided to shift the locomotive workshop from Howrah to Jamalpur.[1] It was said that in doing so he was guided by the urgency to induce a better work ethic amongst British workforce that comprized of engineers, mechanics, engine drivers, station masters and guards. Reportedly, during their working hours these men disappeared to pubs and billiard rooms of hotels and lodges spread across Howrah and Calcutta. This information was orally passed on from Campbell to his successor, from whom it reached G. Huddleston. Huddleston, who started his career as a junior clerk at Jamalpur in 1880, reproduced Campbell's information in his book published in 1906.[2]
In my earlier essay I used this personally communicated story from one generation of engineers to another, which was subsequently retold in published accounts, merely as an anecdote,[3] but surely one can draw more out of such stories. Perusal of private papers of some of the members of British railway workforce in India adds corroboratory weight

1 In 1854, both locomotive and carriage & wagon shops were established at Howrah. S. A. H. Abidi, Hundred Years of Jamalpur Workshops, s. l., e.a., p. 1.
2 George Huddleston, History of the East Indian Railway, Calcutta 1906, p. 241. In 1907, he rose to the position of general traffic manager of the EIR. "New Traffic Manager for the East Indian Railway", in: The Railway Magazine, XXI, July-December 1907, pp. 81-82 [henceforth RM].
3 Nitin Sinha, "Entering the Black Hole: Between 'mini-England' and 'smell-like rotten potato', the railway workshop town of Jamalpur, 1860s–1940s," in: South Asian History and Culture, 3 (2012) 3, pp. 317-347.

to this anecdote and also opens up other possibilities of rethinking histories of connections.

Amongst these, those of George Cole are extremely revealing.[4] Cole had come to India in 1861 as an engine driver with at least two other mechanics. He was based at Howrah, where one of the others, Jim Bench, was also based in the same job. [5] Soon, they fell out. Bench was found drunk on duty and had assaulted his foreman, James Higby. The reason of the fall out is unclear but interesting is the fact that Cole's name did the rounds of the drunken assaulter in the Stratford railway community of England where they both came from. We should not infer from this that Cole's life in India was based upon piety, discipline and sobriety – the projected hallmarks of imperial lifestyle which the government and the Company advocated for its 'white working class'.[6] In this particular case, Cole either became the victim of mistaken identity or of a conspiracy but the patchy private archives of these working class men and women settled across empire provide a refracted glimpse into lives whose histories were often framed along the trails of facts and gossip; lives which appear in flashes but seem to be intertwined. I call it patchy because both Cole and Bench stopped appearing in the bi-annual list of employees from January 1863. Bench because he was sacked; Cole's reason is unknown.[7]

The news and stories that circulated in the imperial gossip bazaar through letters, personal visits and word of mouth were both of private and professional nature. They circulated through distinct but overlapping networks of friends, relatives and not-so-reliable well wishers. The word 'private' as is assumed with sources such as memoirs and letters does not indicate in this case a process of construction and cultivation of individualized 'self'. These working class 'ego-documents', in contrast, are 'open' texts, which were not only read communally by family and friends but also written so.[8]

Lucy, the wife of Cole, did not like Mrs. Bench but they both questioned their own husbands about the other's and it was through this strategy that Lucy came to know about the heavy drinking habit of her husband. Cole in return projected himself as a faithful husband, reminding her not to believe the tales that carried back home. She accepted, in fact promised not to believe in all she hears, but she hardly meant it. She reminded

4 Mss Eur F133/42, British Library. Reconstructing historical biography of 'ordinary' people is as difficult as that of a small town. Besides his patchy series of private letters, I have used employment registers of the railway company to trace him and his friends, which adds interesting but contradictory details. All references starting with this signature are from British Library.

5 In the January 1862 list, the date of appointment for both of them was 20 July 1861. In the June 1862 list, however, Cole's date was changed to 20 July 1860. Bench's remained the same. From Cole's private letters, however, it is clear that they knew each other (if not were friends) from England. Lists in IOR/L/AG/46/11/138. British Library. All references starting with IOR are from this library.

6 For the general overview of white subalterns in India see, Harald Fischer-Tiné, Low and Licentious Europeans: Race, Class and 'White Subalternity' in colonial India, New Delhi 2009.

7 Cole's private papers, which comprise more of his wife's letters than his, are also fragmentary. His name appears in a later source of a list of 181 people of army men, railway men and surgeons who died in India between 1802 and 1893. Mss Eur F133.

8 A remarkable source to notice this is private papers of James Palmer, Mss Eur F133/113.

him that 'actions speak louder than words'.[9] Letters after letters, she lamented about her general financial difficulties, which eventually forced her to keep three male lodgers to take care of herself and her three children. Cole in turn tried to divert the discussion by raising questions about her character. Cole's sister took sides with Lucy, described her as the steadiest woman in the Kingdom and mildly reproached her brother for drinking, gambling and fancying women in India. The financial distress of separated wives and families stood in contrast to what skilled male workers earned in India, and how they spent it. Cole's bills of rum and brandy (preserved in his papers) tell their own stories.

Keeping in view the family needs, the company employees were allowed to draw a part of their salary in England. Bench provisioned for the payment of four pounds a month, which partly explains why Lucy did not like his wife much. If we go by Company records, Lucy also got money from Cole but her private papers convincingly show that the payment was very irregular.[10] However, even if these mechanics arranged for partial payment, the drinking expenses did not disappear. Out of his salary of Rs 236, John Refoy, a foreman bricklayer in Howrah, arranged for a generous sum of Rs 109 to be paid in England.[11] Yet, from his remaining amount, he not only maintained a *bibi* (the Indian wife) but also spent, as his fragmented household expense diary suggests, Rs 20 to 30 a month on alcohol. He occasionally indulged in good quality cheese and ham; the latter cost him as much as a case of brandy.[12] We don't know what cost him his life at the age of 42; his burial certificate simply mentioned 'disease of the heart'.[13]

In our attempt to explore the historical tangents of one of the anecdotal reasons behind establishing the workshop in Jamalpur, we can safely assume that Campbell was not inventing the fact of widespread drunkenness amongst British railway employees in India. A Scottish by origin, who was trained in the locomotive workshop of the Caledonian Railways, Campbell started his Indian career in November 1858 from Allahabad, moved to Howrah in 1863, and finally settled in Jamalpur from 1865 onwards. Proximity to railway hands at different places perhaps helped him know well the problems of white migrant workers.[14]

In recent years, scholars have begun to write on social lives of non-official English and European people in India amongst whom drinking was quite common. It was primarily seen as a moral problem of the British empire because class threatened to expose the cracks in racial affinity.[15] Stories of people such as Cole, Bench and Refoy are, however,

9 In a letter dated 26 February 1862, Mss Eur F133/42.

10 In the same list in which the date of appointment was changed, a handwritten addition was made of seven pounds drawn in England. IOR/L/AG/46/11/138.

11 Mss Eur F133/119-24.

12 Mss Eur F133/121.

13 Mss Eur F133/124.

14 Just after the rebellion of 1857, he joined the service as an assistant locomotive superintendent at Allahabad. In 1887, he became the agent to the EIRC in India. "Honours to a Scotch Railway Engineer in India", in: Aberdeen Evening Express, Tuesday 08 November 1887, p. 2. Also, IOR/L/AG/46/11/138.

15 Harald Fischer-Tine, Low and Licentious (note 6); Elizabeth Kolsky, Colonial Justice in British India: White Violence and the Rule of Law, Cambridge 2010; Satoshi Mizutani, The Meaning of White: Race, Class and the 'Domiciled

not just about white subalterns getting drunk in the colonies. They tell us about imperial lives, colonial careers, separated families, new bonding (with bibis, for instance) and social and professional networks that spanned across empire.[16] In fact, for families like Cole, the limits exceeded the empire. While George Cole left for India, which his sister described as the 'crowning point to his mad pranks', his brother Thomas Cole, left for North America to find a job.

These life stories bring out the complexities of nineteenth and twentieth century histories, which we fashionably but inadequately classify as 'local' or 'global'. To me, they point at imperial movements that involved familial dislocations, (they point) at private, communal and oral circulation of news, information, tales and rumour in the age of communication revolution that emphasized speed and accuracy, and they point at the fostering of a stable sociability of a metropolitan workforce which was located in the colony. Let me park these observations and introduce the other foundational story.

Situated at a distance of six miles from Jamalpur was the pre-colonial town of Monghyr. The town had lost its importance as the frontier-fortress capital and principal military station which it was in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries but remained famous for a variety of skilled workers such as tailors, gardeners, carpenters and shoe-makers. The principal place of fame nonetheless was reserved for blacksmiths, who produced guns, pistols, table-knives and other products at a remarkably low price.[17] This earned Monghyr the epithet of 'Birmingham and Manchester of India'.[18] One of the reasons behind selecting Jamalpur as the site of the railway workshop, whose pre-colonial past still remains unclear, was its proximity to Monghyr. Jamalpur did not have a stable water supply, it was not even close to the coalfields or iron mines of Bihar and Bengal, but according to this story, it had what was needed the most: cheap and skilled labour. Similar to the first story, this one is also a bureaucratic-administrative reasoning repeatedly produced in the writings of railway officials from both colonial and postcolonial periods.[19]

This in itself is no reason to mistrust these accounts but therein lies a tension between these two foundational stories of Jamalpur: if the first suggests that the locomotive superintendent, Campbell's interest in moving the British workforce away from the distractions of big cities of Howrah and Calcutta were served by making Jamalpur a self-sufficient 'railway colony', the second shows how the town, right from its inception, was

Community' in British India 1858–1930, Oxford 2011; also see, Nitin Sinha, 'Opinion' and 'Violence': Whiteness, Empire and State-Formation in Colonial India, South Asia Chronicle 4 (2014), pp. 322-52.

16 A highly useful text in this field is of David Lambert and Alan Lester (eds.), Colonial Lives Across the British Empire: Imperial Careering in the Long Nineteenth Century, Cambridge 2006

17 Numerous administrative reports, travelogues and unpublished accounts talk in length of Monghyr's craftsmanship. To get an idea, see, "Mofussil Stations: Monghyr", in: The Asiatic Journal and Monthly Register for British and Foreign India, China, and Australasia, XIV (New Series), 1834, pp. 119-30. According to an early nineteenth-century estimate, 5,000 blacksmiths resided in Monghyr. George Hamilton, East India Gazetteer, p. 238.

18 Joseph Hooker labelled Monghyr as the 'Birmingham of Bengal'. L. S. S. O'Malley, District Gazetteer of Monghyr, revised edn. Patna 1926, p. 236. Samuel Carrington, a railway engineer who arrived in India in the middle of the rebellion of 1857, nevertheless did not find Monghyr's comparison with Manchester justified. Mss Eur B212.

19 Huddleston, History of the East Indian Railway (note 2), p. 240; Abidi, Hundred Years of Jamalpur Workshops (note 1).

based upon its regional linkages for the supply of men and material. If the first points toward the 'insularity' of a 'railway town or a colony' which had no significant pre-colonial past, the second reminds us that our historical quest to understand Jamalpur's history would remain frustratingly incomplete if we ignore the manifold spatial and temporal linkages it intrinsically was and gradually became a part of. If the first seductively draws us towards retelling the stories of white subalterns who also were sahibs, the latter unfailingly reminds us that the history of bungalows, streets and gymkhana in Jamalpur will ever remain incomplete without the history of *bastis*, villages and shrines spread all around Jamalpur. It is only in this constant bind of (apparent) oppositions that networks of empire, movement of personnel, politics of colonialism, choices made around technology, and cultures of belief make sense as probable gateways to write the history of Jamalpur – and inversely, to take up the history of Jamalpur as a vantage point from where to unfold our understanding of mechanisms of 'globalization' processes.

Tensions and oppositions are important devices to grasp and explain the coming into being of connectedness, but the posited juxtaposition between insularity and connectivity should not be confused with absolute historical reality; they merely serve as heuristic analytical frameworks to explore the complex trajectories of a town that had a significant number of skilled immigrant population (not only of those coming from Britain but also from within India); and a town, which was based upon an imported technology of railway locomotive repair and maintenance. In other words, this paper uses the twin factors of people and technology to tell the multi-sited history of Jamalpur.

The 'insular' Jamalpur: people and institutions

Let us consider insularity first. The largest railway settlement of India developed around the nucleus of the workshop, which started growing from 1862. The insularity of the town was not only implicit in Campbell's concern but was explicitly underscored by Rudyard Kipling, the most celebrated chronicler of the British empire. He described the town as 'unadulteratedly Railway'.[20] He claimed that a non-railway person would feel like an interloper or a stranger. Writing almost seventeen years later, George Cecil echoed Kipling's remarks by generically describing railway towns in India as unique; in his own words, 'in no other country such a thing exist'.[21]

Kipling's observations on Jamalpur were, of course, based upon the 'white' part of the town. When he talked of the 'railway settlement', he meant the Railway Colony which was adjacent to the workshop and was inhabited by superior grade officers who were mostly British. The racial character of colonial urbanism is something that has been widely explored in the existing literature. Debates on sanitation, hygiene, defence, recre-

20 Rudyard Kipling, 'A Railway Settlement', in: The City of Dreadful Nights and Other Essays, London 1891, pp. 91-100, here p. 91.

21 George Cecil, "Railway Settlements in India", in: RM, xvi, Jan-June 1905, pp. 111-13.

ation and morality show that in spite of transgressions, Jamalpur shared with other towns the feature of racially-inflected division of physical and social space.[22]
A slew of measures were adopted to improve the living conditions of the white population in the town. A section of the report presented in both Houses of the British Parliament by Juland Danvers, the government director of the Indian railway companies, is noteworthy:

> *At Jumalpore, the great workshop of the line, a large European population has been planted, which is constantly on the increase. This settlement…has been laid out with neatness and regularity, the drainage is complete, and the houses, both for men and officers have been erected on the most advanced principles of sanitary science. There are two Christian churches, a mechanics' institute, a library, recreation grounds, a racket court, and a band, supplied with instruments from a fine and forfeit fund, and in fact every appliance which could conduce to the rational enjoyment of the men off duty. It is the object of the Company to extend these advantages as far as possible to other stations in proportion to the European population.*[23]

Of the population of about 18,000 at the end of the nineteenth century, the number of Europeans and Anglo-Indians was not more than one thousand by any moderate estimate.[24] This meant that the expansion of town inevitably included the creation of native quarters and tenements despite the unambiguous proclamation by the government that forbade 'a native bazaar springing up close to and around the station'.[25] The government in fact sanctioned the white railwaymen hygienic seclusion, claiming that the municipal commissioner, if necessary, could demolish native huts in the township area. The government also denied the railway company from applying for land for the native part of the town because this fell under the concern of the municipal board.[26] The irony was that the municipal board itself was largely pre-occupied with matters that concerned only non-native inhabitants. Creating a small island of white colony within a small town of Jamalpur was perhaps on the mind of Kipling when he chided native meat hawkers trespassing into the railway colony on a daily basis. He instead asked for butchery.[27]
We will return to such transgressions but to continue with Jamalpur: the growth of the town was based upon the expansion of the workshop. The rolling mill shop in 1879, two shops for point crossing and signal and interlocking in 1894 and one again a little

22 Racial segregation became a typical characteristic of colonial but also pre-colonial towns where European quarters gradually emerged. See, for instance, O'Malley, in: DGM, p. 236 for Monghyr; for Lucknow, Veena Oldenburg, The Making of Colonial Lucknow, 1856–1877, Princeton 1984, pp. 52-60; for Calcutta, Pradip Sinha, Calcutta in Urban History, Calcutta 1978; for Delhi, Narayani Gupta, Delhi Between Two Empires 1803–1931: Society, Government and Urban Growth, New Delhi 1981.

23 Report to the Secretary of State for India in Council on Railways in India, for the year 1867–68, in: The Quarterly Review, July 1868, p. 70.

24 See Sinha, "Entering the Black Hole" (note 3) for a detailed account of town's population and workforce ratio along race, ethnicity and gender lines.

25 Bengal Railway Proceedings, 49, January 1863, P/163/30. British library.

26 Ibid., Prodg. 50.

27 Kipling, 'The Mighty Shops', in: The City of Dreadful Nights (note 20) pp. 101-02.

later, and a steel foundry in 1898, were among the many additions.[28] In physical terms, the workshop expanded from less than 50 acres (c. 20 ha) in 1881 to an area of about 100 acres (c. 40ha) in 1906. Another set of figures corroborates this expansion: in 1863, the total engine stock at Jamalpur was 247; it rose to 952 in 1906. In 1890, the total wages of the employees was Rs 4,15,093; in 1906, it increased to Rs 11,00,000.[29] The workforce increased threefold from around 3000 to 9000 between the 1860s and the turn of the century.

The expansion in physical area and increase in labour force signalled a growth in administrative and civic institutions in Jamalpur – municipality, an apprentice school and hostel, a dispensary and cemetery, cricket and riffle grounds, and, inns and restrooms – all these meant that the social life of Europeans and Anglo-Indians became quite Jamalpur-centric.

The seclusion of physical spaces went hand in hand with entrenchment of social and economic privileges. Sharp distinctions in pay structure confirm this.

Payment differentiation in the workshop

Category of workers	Erecting shops (fitters and mechanics)	Carpenters' shops	Blacksmiths' shops
English	Rs 70-218	–	Rs 100
Anglo-Indian	Rs 30-60	Rs 50-80	–
Native	Rs 5-20	Rs 12-18	Rs 12.06

Source: First report of special commissioner on the affairs of EIR by G.N. Taylor, submitted, 8 July 1863, Appendix A, in BRP, 3, September 1863, P/163/31.

There indeed existed a complex layer of differentiations within each of the racially/ethnically formed 'homogeneous' groups. The rather sandwiched position of Anglo-Indians which became highly politicized during the Indianization of the services debate in the early twentieth century made them the object of both criticism and protection; criticism from Indians and protection from colonial rule. However, after the rebellion of 1857 when railway construction acquired acceleration, the colonial state and railway companies thought it wise to employ Anglo-Indians in a greater number, thinking perhaps that one half of their 'racial' descent would keep them at least half loyal.

The Europeans who worked on the railways were also internally fractured. Those who came from Britain were recruited under four-year contract system by the EIRC.[30] Largely, they belonged to the profession of engine drivers, firemen and mechanics. The last category had workers such as fitters, boiler makers and blacksmiths. The class which they came from, usually the working class of northern England was distinct from the one

28 Huddleston, The History of the East Indian Railway (note 2), pp. 246-49. See Abdi, Hundred Years (note 1), pp. 3-7 for an institutional account of growth.

29 Huddleston, The History of the East Indian Railway (note 2), pp. 243-44.

30 See the contracts between individuals and the EIRC in L/AG/46/11. British Library.

from which engineers and superior grade officers came to India. Some Europeans who worked as contractors had usually come to India on their own. Another set of Europeans who easily got recruited on the railways were old soldiers and their sons residing in India. By the turn of the century, they occupied the position of guards in significant number.[31] They usually, together with Anglo-Indian 'lads' entered into a five year contract of apprenticeship before becoming a journeyman mechanic or joining the branch of engine operation (fireman, shunter and finally a driver) or as stated above, becoming guards.

Creating a common work culture out of this motley was a critical and significant task for both colonial state and railway companies. Moral staging of proper whiteness was indeed crucial but equally important was the idea of work and safety, an aspect that has remained unexplored in the literature on whiteness and vices. The discourse that climate and consumption enfeebled the European body had its antecedents even in the eighteenth century. In respect to railways, however, debates around the conduct of British workforce in India were equally and firmly rooted in the nature of their work. After all, Campbell's immediate concern was to prevent these men from sneaking out to play and drink during their working hours.

India's first Railway Act (of 1854) laid down that 'the first and most important duty of all the Company's Officers and servants, is to provide for the Public safety'.[32] Further, of various regulations in the Act, provisions against intoxication seem to be the strictest. Drinking was prohibited when at work or on the railway premises or at any work attached to the railways. If intoxication led to the neglect or omission of duty, fine not exceeding Rs 50 was applicable. If it threatened public safety, the person was 'liable to imprisonment, with or without hard labour, for a term not exceeding one year, or to fine, or to both'.[33] There was a legal provision also to man the moral boundaries; apart from violent altercation and threats, 'swearing and immoral and indecorous language' was strictly prohibited.[34]

There was a definite class anxiety in the minds of state officials and company administrators. People such as Coles and Benches who had left their families behind were the direct target of such provisions. Drunkenness and insubordination was reportedly high and so were accidents.[35] In order to better both the working and social life of these workers, new institutions were set up. One such that acted as a pivot to organize the railway life in a railway colony was the Mechanic Institute. First set up in Lahore in 1864 and then in Jamalpur in 1866, the institute was planned to provide healthy amusement and recreation after working hours.[36] With amenities such as spacious swimming bath, read-

31 Huddleston, "The East Indian Railway", in: RM, Jan-June, 1906, p. 504.

32 "East Indian Railway Company, Rules and Regulations of the East Indian Railway Company, together with the Act for regulating railways in British India", Calcutta 1854, p. 10. The copy was found in Mss Eur F133/140.

33 Ibid., pp. 9, 105. There was also a fine of Rs 20 on smoking either in the premises or in or upon any railway carriage. Ibid., p. 42.

34 Ibid., pp. 12-3.

35 Financial (Railway) Department, no. 25 of 1855, 19 September, IOR/E/4/832.

36 PWD, Rly-A, Prodgs. 51–54, February 1866. Files of PWD series are from National Archives, Delhi.

ing room, billiard rooms, and entertainment halls, the authorities hoped that 'healthy amusement' would 'serve to withdraw them gradually from the habits of idleness and intemperance, frequently indulged in by this class of men'.[37] Members were supplied only iced-water gratuitously during the warm season and soda water and lemonade at a cost but no wine, spirits or intoxicating liquor of any kind was allowed. Also, in line with the above-mentioned Railway Act, another bye-law prohibited the use of 'violent language, quarrel, and other improper actions'.[38]

These institutes aimed at disciplining the European workforce. Recreational facilities together with moral values (for instance, of observing decent language) made these institutes a *social* extension of the *industrial* workplace. Together they defined the rhythm of the town; to paraphrase Kipling, in Jamalpur the day began with two steam buzzers around 7 a.m. signalling the time to arrive at the workshop, and once the workshop had 'soaked up their thousands of natives and hundreds of Europeans' the roads donned a 'holy calm'. One could hear 'nothing louder than the croon of some bearer playing with a child in the veranda or the faint tinkle of a piano'. This tranquillity was broken at eleven in the morning again with the 'howl of the "buzzer"' signalling the lunch break. The 'trampling of tiffin-seeking feet' made Jamalpur come alive, which though lasted for only one hour, after which the town once again 'sleeps through the afternoon till four or half-past', at which it 'rouses for tennis at the institute'.[39]

The second objective was to re-create and preserve 'imperial lives' in a colonial location. 'Recreation' became the buzzword for enacting a superior physical and moral order, facilitated by building amenities for staging and performing imperial identity. Comfort of these men was often kept in mind; While proposing two baths each 8 feet deep, it was emphatically added that since 'we intend to accommodate men superior to the general European private soldiers, we must provide a comfortable and roomy bath to induce them to take use of it'.[40] The homogeneity of this European sociability was, however, very palpable and subject to class- and rank-based preferences. 'Precedence' created 'heated disputes, jealousies and heart burnings'. The chief storekeeper might get affronted because he was asked at dinner-party to 'take in the assistant engineer's wife instead of the agent's "lady"'. Or, the wife of the general traffic manager might decline to patronize the officer's club because she might meet there the assistant storekeeper's sister, 'a person who she considers her social inferior'.[41]

As it did for imperially mobile workmen, technological modernity refracted through colonial power created its own set of anxieties for indigenous groups. Apart from Kipling's stories, Jamalpur also left traces in vernacular prose texts. A Bengali farcical text described the journey of the gods of Hindu pantheon to different industrial centres in

37 P/163/36, August 1865, Prodgs. 164-65.
38 PWD, Rly-A, Prodgs. 18–22, August 1865.
39 Kipling, 'A Railway Settlement' (note 20), p. 95.
40 PWD, Rly-A, Prodgs. 51–54, Feb. 1866.
41 Cecil, "Railway Settlements" (note 21), p. 111.

eastern India.[42] Jamalpur with its workshop put them in awe. The industrial work culture and town life, interestingly here also, were woven around the howl of the steam-whistle but rather than leading to a holy calm, the buzzer terrorized the lives of the Bengali *babus* (clerks). Getting up at three in the morning, the babu would also wake up his wife and ask for tea. He would then have a quick bath and chant the mantra 'bring rice, bring rice, its about time'. For Bramha, the creator of the universe, colonial modernity was rapidly leaving its ineradicable traces. Despite of being terrorized by industrial time discipline, *babus* ate foreign biscuits, drank lemonade, played cards, wore boots, and consumed alcohol. Appalled by this, the creator thought of destroying his own creation.

Both Kipling and the Hindu gods visited Jamalpur in the same year (and I am here going by the date of their publication, which is 1888) but both gave two diverse accounts. Between Kipling's Jamalpur, which was specklessly neat and Brahma's Jamalpur which was irredeemably blasphemous lay the trajectories of the historical development of the town. For instance, the first points toward the colonial history of municipalization, health, sanitation and hygiene, the second towards the social history of how natives related to modernity. The same railway colony which had King's Road, Queen's Road, Prince's Road, Victoria Road and Steam Road that reminded Kipling of how loyal Jamalpur was to its industrial and imperial provenance, was in native parlance called *sahibpara*, *sahib* meaning paternalistic master, and *para* a locality. In this attempt to construct the history of Jamalpur by working through its apparent oppositional binds, the methodological thinking is to explore the temporal developments through multiple sites of the same spatial location, that is, Jamalpur.

Beyond insularity: Regions and communities

The above approach helps to question and refine the projected insularity. The growth in town and its secluded European quarters with various amenities went hand in hand with the emergence of *bastis* (tenements). Kipling himself had alluded to a 'dreary bustee' in the neighbourhood of the Railway Colony which was allegedly prone to cholera epidemics.[43] I have not come across any direct reference to any epidemic emerging out of this basti, but surely we do have references of huts of a native colony set up just one mile away from the railway station (possibly the same place Kipling had alluded to), gutted in fire in 1884.[44]

Be it the liquor shops on the Jamalpur-Monghyr road where workers gathered to drink on their way back home,[45] be it the crime which was hatched in an inn of Jamalpur,

42 Durgacharan Ray, Debganer Mortye Aagman, Calcutta 1886.

43 Kipling, 'A Railway Settlement' (note 20), p. 94.

44 For five consecutive days fire broke out leading to one death and loss of property worth more than Rs 20,000. Keshopur, where more than hundred of huts were burnt, was described as a 'desert'. 'Serious Fires at Jamalpur', in: Times of India, 7 April 1884.

45 Excise Administration Report.

executed in the running train and discovered some 120 miles away at Dinapore,[46] be it accidents and illness that required the Monghyr establishment of police force, hospitals and medicines, and be it a section of babus who commuted to Jamalpur from Monghyr, in each of these cases the history of Jamalpur was integrally tied to its region. The threads of those ties could be social, cultural, administrative and historical. After 1897, the link further diversified when three coolie trains started bringing workers from three nearby villages.

As the town gained vertical depth through its new institutions, it simultaneously expanded horizontally. The Jamalpur 'railway settlement' attracted people from outside, for both work and leisure. In 1921, about 50 percent of the workforce lived on the outskirts of the town. So figuratively speaking, it was the workers who came riding the coolie trains into Jamalpur every morning but it was the Jamalpur town and the workshop that went back with them every evening to their villages. The state and the railway company did not want to dislocate the workers from their 'natural' environment. The share of industrial and agricultural employment in the livelihoods of these men needs to be established through further research. Likewise, if the reviewer of Kipling's work in the *Derby Mercury Reader*, published from Derby in England, exhorted its railway readers not to miss reading the description of Jamalpur,[47] then the Lancashire humour, depicted in literary writings and songs of Benjamin Brierley, the most popular Lancashire writer, was shared and enjoyed by immigrant white workers during the work breaks. These varied examples related either to the livelihood of native labouring groups or to the literary taste of European workforce do not necessarily take 'railways' out of Jamalpur but they do suggest that Jamalpur was linked to the wider economic, social and cultural institutions and practices. It is no surprise then that even in this small town institutions and practices had a fascinating similarity with what happened in railway towns of England and North America. Clubs, debating societies, lantern lectures, sports, YMCA, churches, and other social, recreational and educational activities had a shared and connected history.

And simultaneously, new practices were institutionalized through these expansive associations. The presence of Bengalis kicked off the celebration of the Durga Puja. Different sects of the nineteenth century reform movements from regions as diverse as Bengal and the Punjab came to Jamalpur and Monghyr. Arya Samaj, Brahmo Samaj, Sanatan Dharma Sabha, Hari Sabahas, all had their branches in these two neighbouring towns. Some of them spatially left a mark; one of the residential quarters which Kipling had described as the 'dreary bustee' was named after the renowned Brahmo social reformer Keshab Chandra Sen. A locality which for Kipling-esque sensibility was either to be sanitized or to be removed, had a different meaning for its inhabitants. For them, perhaps, it implied fixity of memory of their cherished leader and reformer.

Towns such as Howrah, Jamalpur and Allahabad formed their distinct characteristics in relation to their regional surroundings but together they also created a bigger railway

46 Prodgs. 19-20, November 1865, P/163/36.

47 The Derby Mercury, Wednesday, March 28, 1900.

community. The role of railway tracks is highly interesting in this regard. The relationship between space, capital and railways has been variously described in terms of compression of time and space. The homogenization of territory was arguably the result of the nineteenth century technological advancement. The nexus between transport, technology and capital did create new spatialities but significantly of multiple natures.

One form of this spatiality was the linear connection established along the tracks that ran for some 1,020 miles between Calcutta and Delhi. A railway community was forged along the tracks in which the members of the British workforce travelled to Jamalpur to attend Sunday services, meet friends, spend weekends, and to participate in the drill and parade of the East India Railway Voluntary Rifle Corps.[48] In fact, one of the five clauses of the five-year contract required apprentices to 'attend regularly some place of Worship on Sundays'.[49] An in-depth history of the EIR Voluntary corps, which was set up in the 1860s in the aftermath of the rebellion of 1857 will reveal transnational connections.[50] The corps had supplied a detachment to Lumsden Horse which was raised in India to take part in the Second Boer war in 1900. Once again, we can notice that the specific colonial context of raising a self-protective force to quell any future 'rebellion' like situation became part of the wider historical connections.

However, to come back to the railway tracks: they not only forged a/the 'railway community' but also brought diverse people together. Jamalpur was the meeting point between the lower and upper sections of the EIR line that ran between Calcutta and Allahabad. In the first quarter of 1863, 26,995 up passengers (from Howrah) arrived to Jamalpur and 26,849 down passengers arrived at Jamalpur.[51] The passengers here were rebooked to carry on their onward journey. This practice ensured a big floating population who lived in inns and lodges.[52]

The same linear tracks that helped build extended connections of mobility and sociability, also created divisions. Jamalpur displayed typical characteristics of colonial urbanism; the tracks divided the town into white and black parts. The European establishments were concentrated to the eastern, the native settlements to the western. And finally, as the tracks multiplied, so did spatialities and their inter-relationship. With the opening of the Chord Line in the 1870s, Assansole emerged as the new happening railway centre. Starting as the changing station, by the turn of the century, it possessed one of the largest locomotive sheds. Both engines and people migrated to Assansole from places such as Jamalpur and Howrah. Expenses on housing provisions and workshop expansion at existing places were cut down.[53] The effect was that now Jamalpur donned a new identity

48 Samuel Carrington's letters are most useful in forming an idea about the railway community. Mss Eur B212.

49 See the contract signed by Frederick Mccullagh on 15.07.1890, Mss Eur C532.

50 Jamalpur was the head quarter of the Corps. In 1908, out of the combined strength of 7,344 Europeans and 9,951 Anglo-Indians employed on the whole of the British Indian railways, 13,911 (that is, more than 80 per cent) were enrolled as volunteers. "What Foreign and Colonial Railways are Doing", in: RM, 1908, p. 295.

51 Prodg. 86, September 1864, IOR/P/191/11.

52 The victim of the murder conspiracy above alluded to was one such thoroughfare passenger.

53 Prodgs. 1-4, March 1872, IOR/P/556.

because the tracks acquired a new name and function. The erstwhile main line became the 'loop line' handling mainly the flow of local goods. Jamalpur retained its coveted place as one of the biggest railway settlements of India but after this shift it also became the town 'on the siding'. The effect of this change is more perverse than appears at the first sight: travellers' accounts became more and more sparse as direct travelling between Calcutta and north India happened via the Chord Line.

Jamalpur: Technology and the 'global' railway age

Speaking of a railway town, the theme of technology is of great significance.[54] The railways both in terms of construction and operation were an imported technology. However, the historiography that suggested that colonies were mute recipients of metropolitan technology is a thing of past. Questions which we pose around the theme of technology shape our narratives. In a highly perceptive observation, Ian Kerr draws a difference between two types of inquiries, and I paraphrase him: to questions such as what was to be built, when it was to be built and where, the British imperial role and 'technology transfer' becomes important.[55] However, if we ask how the railways were built, one finds Indians and pre-existing Indian technologies playing a major role.[56] Kerr also proposed to distinguish between the construction and operational sides of the railway technology. In the former the intermingling of technology was of higher order; in the latter, which included works done in locomotive shops, dependence on imported technology was high.

Let us stick to the bigger picture of technology and its transfer by looking at the politics of locomotive supply and construction.[57] Between 1850 and 1910, 94 per cent of Indian broad gauge locomotives were built in Britain and only 2.5 per cent in India. Within this period of sixty years there was a moment in the 1860s and 1870s when Indian railway

54 Very few historians have worked on Indian railways from the viewpoint of technology and its transfer. The standard framework has been of railways being the imported technology in India that aided the process of imperial consolidation leading not to development but underdevelopment of the colony. The older nationalist writings as well as newer works in the 1980s both concur with this view. For a standard nationalist account of railways as a tool of economic exploitation, see Bipan Chandra, The Rise and Growth of Economic Nationalism in India: economic Policies of Indian National Leadership, 1880–1905, New Delhi 1966; for, railways as a tool of empire, Daniel Headrick, The Tools of Empire: Technology and European Imperialism in the Nineteenth Century, New York 1981; Id., The Tentacles of Progress: Technology Transfer in the Age of Imperialism, 1850–1940, New York 1988.

55 Ian J. Kerr, "Colonialism and Technological Choice: The Case of the Railways of India", in: Itinerario, 19, 2, 1995, pp. 91-111.

56 For the blend of technology in railway bridge-building, see Ian Derbyshire, "The Building of India's Railways: The Application of Western Technology in the Colonial Periphery 1850–1920", in: Roy MacLeod and Deepak Kumar (eds.), Technology and the Raj: Western Technology and Technical transfers to India 1700–1947, New Delhi, Thousand Oaks and London 1995.

57 This paragraph is based on two essays of Fredrick Lehmann which although dated are still the best on locomotive transfer to colonial India. "Railway Workshops, Technology Transfer, and Skilled Labour Recruitment in Colonial India", in: Journal of Historical Research, 20, 1, 1977, pp. 49-61 & "Great Britain and the Supply of Railway Locomotives to India: A Case Study of Economic Imperialism", in: Indian Economic and Social History Review, 2 (1965) 4.

industry turned to other players, most importantly Germany and the United States. This was not for promoting technological exchange but for procuring built locomotives at a cheaper cost. It was the first time in 1869 that 10 locomotives from Switzerland and 20 from Germany were supplied to the EIR.[58] Once again, in the beginning of the twentieth century, German firms such as Hanomag, Henschel and Borsig tried to enter the import market of India. A huge debate, almost a scandal, however, engulfed the British political and industrial class when orders were given to German firms for the supply of about 50 locomotives to India. The secretary of state for India, George Hamilton, reasoned that the growing demand from the colonies – India and South Africa – had put pressure on the home production. The firm from Hanover instead offered to deliver the locomotives at a price 25 per cent less than that of British firms and also in half the time.[59] The British press echoed the sentiments of British firms stating that 'what is cheapest in first cost is not always cheapest in the long run.'[60] 'Being beaten' by German firms did not go well with the British imperial interests and the protectionist policies to support British firms. Some other voices were less jingoistic. The success of German firms was explained through Germany going through recession and hence in the spirit of global entanglement of the economy, one newspaper report claimed that the moral of the story is that 'we should rejoice when other nations are full of work, for depression in one country means depression in another.'[61] However, the imperial preferences cut down this utopian take on global brotherhood of economic integration. As a result, prior to independence, India imported 14,420 locomotives from Britain, built 707 itself, and purchased less than 3000 from other countries. The majority of the purchases done from outside of Britain came during the period of the Second World War.

Where does this picture of imperial patronage or global denial leave us in relation to Jamalpur? Going by the writings of engineers, it appears that the Jamalpur railway workshop had the full potential of building its own locomotives. This did not happen until 1899 when it rolled out its first home-built engine at the cost of Rs 33,000 as compared to the imported cost of Rs 47,897.[62] Some of the contemporary and scarce secondary writings alleged that the skill of Indian workers and the lack of proper training of workshop staff were the reasons for this long dependence on imports. Once again, if we turn to internalist voices of mechanics and engineers who shared their everyday working lives with native workers of different types, we see that skill was highly praised and in fact termed 'irreplaceable'.[63] The native skill to handle imported heavy machineries such as

58 Frank C. Perkins, "British East India Uses German-Built Locomotives", in: Boiler Maker, 01 June 1917.

59 "British Locomotive Builders and Export Trade", in: Railroad Gazette, November 08 1901. In 1913 more orders were placed bringing the total number supplied from Germany to 78. Perkins, "British East India". However, amazingly interesting is the fact that due to non-metric measurements prevalent both in England and India, the German productions were supervised by the famous British firm, Rendel & Robertson, later renamed Rendel, Palmer and Tritton of London.

60 "Engineering Contracts", in: The Bedfordshire Advertiser, 01 November 1901.

61 "German Depression and Indian Engines", in: The Cornishman, 24 July 1902.

62 Abidi, Hundred Years.

63 Excise Report, 1888.

steam hammers, rolling mills and cranes was praised.[64] In one rare mention of Jamalpur in a travel account from the late nineteenth-century, the author-traveller recalled his conversation with the manager of the shop over the topic of repair of one particular locomotive: "No English fitter in the world could do that. That job takes a native to do it."[65] However, in contrast to this, there also persisted the view that Indians would innately be inept in running the railways.[66]

The story of Jamalpur therefore serves to illustrate that although empire itself was part of the increasing and intensifying global entanglement in which people, knowledge and products circulated yet it also demonstrates that the priorities of imperial formations created asymmetrical paths in which those very people, knowledge and products moved.

Conclusions

While working on this town, I have remained engaged with two historiographical issues. One operates at the level of South Asian history writing in which 'Urban Studies' has predominantly remained focussed on big towns and mega cities. My quest, on the other, is to write a small-town history and still meaningfully contribute to the debates on urbanity in colonial India. The second engagement is of broader scope: how to write a global history of a small town? Rather than applying any theoretical model in a 'top-down' manner, at this stage of my research, I remain convinced and committed that the history of Jamalpur needs to be told through stories – stories that tell us about people and objects, about lives, events and actions, about rumours, habits and practices. Some stories relate directly to Jamalpur; others form part of the indispensible historical context.

In having presented two sets of stories, one related to imperial mobility and town centric-insularity and two to the expanding linkages of the town based on labour movement, migration, and changing spatial connections, my objective was to give an idea of the different scales at which the history of Jamalpur unfolded. The town, the region and the empire were interlinked and interrelated through the *processes* of movement of people. I emphasize the word processes because it is important to examine them and not just chronicle the movement.[67] What did it mean for village-based industrial proletariat to work in India's foremost railway workshop? Did the workshop and recruitment pattern intrinsically and ironically reproduce village, caste, and kinship ties? Similarly, did the mobility of mechanics and engineers from Britain mean the replication of their home-based work culture or was it the case that the colonial location produced structures of differences?

64 "India: From a Correspondent", in: The Daily News, Thursday, March 19, 1868, p. 5.

65 Ibid.

66 See the satirical text The Koochpurwanaypore Swadeshi Railway, by Jo. Hookm, Calcutta n.d. Internal evidence suggest it was published immediately after the second world war.

67 Frederick Cooper, "What is the Concept of Globalization Good for? An African Historian's Perspective", in: African Affairs, 100, 399, pp. 189-213.

In any discussion on scales of spatiality, it must be emphasized that the flows and counterflows that bind them together are crucial elements for understanding social formations of and within each of them. Intersected through the issues of race, class, language, rank and physical locations, the spatial homogenization along the interlinked units is neither complete nor consummate. Both extraordinary and quotidian practices create ruptures in spatial homogenization. For instance, the racial characteristic of physical dualism of colonial towns was mundanely trespassed by the presence of native servants in colonial bungalows.[68] The physical dualism was also routinely transgressed by daily meat hawking by natives for their white consumers. The native colony in which the houses were gutted in fire was inhabited by well paid Anglo-Indians and Bengali clerks. Race and class at times joined hands to consolidate hierarchical structures; in other moments, they opposed each other.

In this series of reflections, we also need to ask what effects the imperial dislocation produced when British men went back to their homes? If Jamalpur was fondly called the 'Crewe of India' referring to the leading railway town in northern England,[69] can the postcolonial perspective enable us to trace the effects of Jamalpur back on places such as Stratford? Exploring the contours of this reverse flow and effect will help in writing the history of connections in a non-linear way. Some court cases in England involving returned workers suggest that the marital and familial separation engendered by mobility did not get stabilized. To give just one example from the Stratford railway community itself, which bears striking similarity to Lucy's condition, one wife named Ann, had taken in a lodger to support herself and her children.[70] The husband who had just returned after spending two years in India physically assaulted the lodger on the pretext of him having physical intimacy with his wife. In the court, the wife deposed against her husband leading to his imprisonment. Of course, if such cases were widespread, then Jamalpur would not be a name to be fondly invoked in British railway communities as Crewe was amongst the British Indian railway community. India did come to Lucy's dreams but as a source of anxiety. She was told by her friend that every woman ought to be with her husband if the latter is in India.

This shows how differentiated notions of space emerge and thrive within structures of connections. Cecil's remarks on the nature of social life in railway towns are very perceptive in this regard. Labelling it as a 'hum drum existence' he says, 'after four or five years of Jamalpore or Tundla [another railway town in north India], many an assistant traffic superintendent or district engineer wishes himself back on an English line, in spite of the

68 It is remarkable to observe that in Cecil's account of railway settlements in India, which was very similar to Kipling's, the only native figure that appears is of a mali (gardener), who almost every sahib would employ individually or on a share with his neighbour. Cecil, "Railway Settlements" (note 21), p. 111.

69 This is how Kipling famously described it, which became the standard way of referring to Jamalpur in subsequent railway and popular writings. Amusingly, for the British railway and railway enthusiast readers, Kipling himself was described as the 'Dickens of India'. "The Railway in India", in: RM, July-Dec. 1904, p. 114.

70 A newspaper clipping giving details of this case is found in Cole's manuscript, Mss Eur F133/42.

larger salary which is to be earned in India.'[71] But this longing for 'home' from the location of 'exile' did not mean that the home had remained unchanged. The fact remained that wives did get lodgers and children occasionally ended up in juvenile courts. The 'exile' itself changed its nature. In another essay, Cecil accepted that after a few years a majority of English clerks preferred to spend their holidays at hill stations in India rather than returning to England; in his words, 'the exile begins, oddly enough, to prefer India to England.'[72]

This brief window on the history of Jamalpur shows that 'small' need not be treated as 'isolated'. On the other hand, my quest is not to instrumentally 'reveal' global in the local. Marking or showing connections is useful but inadequate as long as they don't explain the mechanisms of connections. Further, these mechanisms can only have relevant analytical value as long as they also explain the counter-argument of disconnections and differences. Global or imperial did not mean 'sameness'. Some of these mechanics and engineers who developed 'love' for India never stopped longing for their 'home' in England. And alternately, in spite of being an imported technology, technological and innovative changes made in India caught attention and were proposed to be brought back to the metropole.[73] In the highly connected world of technology, personnel and work in the nineteenth century, there remained, therefore, differentiated worlds of home and colony, east and west. They remained connected but in an asymmetrical way. After all, it was Jamalpur and Monghyr that were called the Crewe and Manchester of India, and not the other way round. In short, there remained differentiated worlds of 'Crewe' and 'Jamalpur'.

If places, people and ideas were connected even in asymmetrical ways, how should we explain singularity and specificity? Was Jamalpur atypical or typical? Once again, our answer will depend on the type of questions we pose. If our point of entry is colonial capital and imperial protection, then the history of Howrah, Jamalpur and Allahabad may look similar. But if approached from the aspects of how work and labour was organized, how cultural practices developed, how racial, ethnic and class relationships were managed, then distinctions are visible. Jamalpur did prove to become a better place than Howrah to manage European workforce; both gunshots of voluntary corps and church hymns filled the landscape surrounded by hills on three sides, making it attractive for railway families, friends and employees to visit it. It did provide better options for attending Sunday services than other neighbouring places. Specificity does not need to stand in opposition to connection or comparison. They can go hand in hand as historical phenomenon and also as our analytical framework.

71 Cecil, "Railway Settlements" (note 21), p. 113.

72 Cecil, "Railway Clerks in India", *RM*, p. 25.

73 As early as 1868, a traveller in India pointed out the benefits of convertible seats into sleeping berths and hoped that 'it may catch the eye of one of our railway directors at home'. "India: From a Correspondent", in: The Daily News, Thursday, March 19, 1868, p. 5.

Durban as a Portal of Globalization: Mines, Railways, Docks and Steamships in the Empire of Otto Siedle's Natal Direct Line, c. 1879–1929

Jonathan Hyslop

RESÜMEE

Zwischen den 1880er und frühen 1920er Jahren hat Durban sich vom unbedeutenden Hafen der britischen Kolonie Natal zum Haupthafen des neuen südafrikanischen Staates gewandelt. Dieser Artikel untersucht die Schlüsselrolle, die Otto Siedle, der in Deutschland geborene, aber in London aufgewachsene Agent des Schifffahrtsunternehmens Natal Direct Line, in diesem Prozess gespielt hat. Durch die Entwicklung von Hafenanlagen, Kohlebergwerken und Eisenbahnen hat der Konzern bei der Umwandlung von Durban in die maritime Verbindung zwischen den wirtschaftlich wichtigen Goldminen in Witwatersrand und der Weltwirtschaft eine führende Rolle gespielt. Der Beitrag untersucht diese Veränderungen mithilfe des Konzeptes der‚Portale der Globalisierung'. Er findet den Begriff für die Analyse der Einbindung von Natal in globale Netzwerke hilfreich, plädiert aber gleichzeitig dafür, Portale hierarchisch zu verstehen und die Bedeutung von Imperien im Gegensatz zu Nationalstaaten im Auge zu behalten. Die Fallstudie stützt die Ansicht, dass die Rolle lokaler Siedlerkapitalisten für die Gestaltung globaler Verbindungen innerhalb des britischen Empire erheblich war und dass es deshalb ein Fehler wäre, sich bei der Analyse des Aufbaus der imperialen Wirtschaft übermäßig auf *the City of London* zu konzentrieren.

In the half century between the mid 1870s and the mid 1920s, Durban was transformed from the marginal port of the very minor British settler colony of Natal, to the most important harbour of an increasingly powerful, industrializing, South African state. This article seeks to understand how that transition, which was premised on the connection of coal, gold and ocean via rail, came about. It explores the case of Durban's development through a biographical focus on the career of one individual, Otto Siedle, who stood at

Comparativ | Zeitschrift für Globalgeschichte und vergleichende Gesellschaftsforschung 25 (2015) Heft 4, S. 35–50.

a confluence of the macro-institutions of our period, as a central figure in shipping, the transformation of Durban harbour, rail connections to the hinterland, the Natal coal industry, Indian indentured labour and imperial politics.

The analysis that follows draws (although not uncritically) on the theoretical framework associated with the notion of 'portals of globalization'. Middell and Naumann[1] define these as "places which have been centres of world trade or global communication, have served as entrance points for cultural transfer, and where institutions and practices for dealing with global connectedness have developed". There, "a whole range of symbolic and cultural constructions challenge national affiliation in communities of migrants, merchants and travellers …" In Middell and Naumann's view the portal idea enables us to analyze how "global connectedness challenges a seemingly stable territorial order … and invites us to look at the various means by which elites try to channel and therefore control the effects of global connectivity …"

In Middell and Naumann's article, the portal concept is related to two other key theoretical terms: 'critical junctures of globalization' and 'de-territorialization'/ 're-territorialization'. There are global moments of crisis – 'junctures' – in which actors struggle to reconfigure global territorial arrangements. World orders always emerge in a context of competition: there are rival aspirations amongst intellectuals, politicians and others to reduce the complexity of global flows and forms to a single pattern. Such struggles give birth to new 'regimes of territorialization'. Middell and Naumann appear to see the late nineteenth century as the moment at which a nation-state version of territorialization was established.[2]

Durban certainly developed many of the features associated with a 'portal of globalization' in this late nineteenth-century period. The city played a crucial role in connecting the explosive industrialization of southern Africa to the world. In the middle of the 1870s Natal was a colony ruled from London, with a tiny British population and thin economic links into the interior. Ox-wagons were required for all inland transport. The powerful Zulu kingdom to the north remained autonomous until its defeat by the British Army in 1879. But with the start of the Rand gold-rush in 1886 the orientation of Durban shifted toward the Transvaal, leading to a dynamic new role for the port. Durban's economic elite was highly active in shaping this connection – especially in three, inter-related ways; their development of a regional coal industry; their support for the colonial state's activity as a railway builder, and their promotion of the reconstruction of Durban harbour. With the completion of the Durban-Johannesburg railway line in 1895, Durban became an important conduit of trade for the most vital economic centre of sub-Saharan Africa. This laid the foundation for future development of Durban as the region's greatest port, which it remains today.

1 Matthias Middell and Katja Naumann, "Global History and the Spatial Turn: from the Impact of Area Studies to the Study of Critical Junctures of Globalization", in: Journal of Global History, 5 (2010), pp. 149-170.

2 As does Michael Geyer, "Portals of Globalization", in Winifred Eberhard and Christian Lübke (eds.), The Plurality of Europe: Identities and Spaces, Leipzig 2010, pp. 509-521.

The politics of Durban was centrally concerned with the regulation of global flows – and especially of flows of population. The social composition of the colony was being transformed by the large scale importation of Indian indentured labour. Begun in 1860, this process was intensified at the turn of the century, and was accompanied by the voluntary migration of large numbers of Indian merchants, especially from Gujarat. This demographic change was accompanied by the consolidation of dense connections to Indian ports, especially Bombay. However, British settlers both needed Indian workers and were afraid of their economic competition. So Natal acquired one of the fiercest and most bureaucratic regimes of immigration regulation in the world, excluding not only many would-be Asian settlers, but also, to a remarkable extent, white sailors and casual labourers. This institutional apparatus became an internationally influential model for other white Anglophone polities resisting Asian immigration.[3] In the later part of our period, regulation of population flows into Durban became focused on African migrant labour from Zululand and elsewhere in the interior. Up to the first decade of the twentieth century, although some African people had come to work in the city, the colonists had struggled to procure adequate supplies of labour. Only with the collapse of African subsistence agriculture did white Natal business and agriculture obtain a plentiful flow of workers from within the region. But white Natalians, driven by racial ideology, resisted permanent African urbanization. No family housing was provided for African workers, confining them to 'compounds' – labour barracks – and slum accommodation, and to a life of permanent migrancy. A rigid pass system enforced their status.

Natal underwent drastic forms of re-territorialization at frequent intervals. In 1893 the crown colony became a self-governing settler colony with an exclusively white electorate. This political system was temporarily disrupted as Natal came under British military rule during the Boer War, but then restored. In 1906 southern Africa entered a period of severe economic crisis. Subsequent economic pressures propelled the reluctant Natal colonists into political combination with the other major settler states of the region, to form the Union of South Africa in 1910.

And there certainly were crucial 'global moments' in the city's evolution, meaning that there was a synchronicity and interrelatedness of events in different places across the world, though they may not quite fit with the notion of 'critical junctures of globalization'. The social and political order was constantly affected by Durban's connection to broader, global patterns. The Zulu War was a key point in the commencement of the 'Scramble for Africa' and the socio-political re-configuration of the continent under European dominance. The political crises around the Transvaal in the 1890s, which constantly destabilized the region, were undoubtedly related to the crucial role of the gold supply, in a world financial system based on the Gold Standard. The Boer War devastated the region economically and socially damaged Britain's credibility as an imperial power, but ultimately permitted the full incorporation of southern Africa under British

3 Marilyn Lake and Henry Reynolds, Drawing the Global Colour Line: White Men's Countries and the International Challenge of Racial Equality, Cambridge 2008.

hegemony and enabled the Union to take place. The First World War briefly divided white South Africans over whether to ally with Britain or Germany, but with this matter resolved in favour of British allegiance, boosted South African inward industrialization and improved the political standing of the country within the imperial polity.

To this extent, combining the dynamics in town and country with the broader historical context of the time, Durban could be understood to be an example of a portal of globalization. However, there are two problems in a straightforward application of the 'portal' perspective.

Firstly, as a portal, Durban had a distinctly subordinate role to southern Transvaal in the globalization of southern Africa. Durban certainly played a part, but it was one that was primarily supportive of the real powerhouse of this process, centred around Johannesburg.[4] As a portal of globalization Durban simply was not in the same league as Johannesburg. It was not nearly as important in the world economy, was far less of a centre of global and regional migration, did not have anything like as advanced a financial and commercial apparatus, and was relatively marginal to the administrative and political links of the South African state to London. But on the other hand, Durban did become absolutely crucial to the functioning of the Johannesburg region. The gold mining, and later industrial, centre of the country became reliant on Durban's port and rail facilities. In a sense then, Durban became a portal of globalization, but only in relation to Johannesburg, to which it was an indispensable supportive instance. What this suggests then is the need for both a differentiated treatment of the regional centres in terms of their role in globalization, and for a kind of hierarchical relatedness of portals.

The second problem in applying the portal framework is to do with the apparent insistence of Middell and Naumann that an international nation-state regime of territorialization was fully established by the end of the nineteenth century.

This view obviously works very well for Europe, and to a large extent for the Americas. But I would suggest that it sits somewhat uncomfortably in the context of the European empires. And this is especially the case for the British settler colonies. The settler elite of Durban, for example, occupied a very ambiguous position towards the idea of the nation-state. They were fervently 'British' in their self-definition, and had no interest in breaking away from the empire, yet in the period of colonial self-rule from 1893 to 1910, they sometimes clashed bitterly with Whitehall over policy, especially in relation to their management of Indian immigration and their treatment of African people. Forced into the Union of South Africa, they longed to re-assert their British connection. It was far from clear then, that the nation-state principle had triumphed in Natal politics.

I would suggest therefore that the 'portal of globalization' approach needs to take greater cognizance of the complexities posed for an understanding of regimes of territorialization by the political dynamics of empire. Globalization did not flow like a liquid over an even surface, but was channelled into specific grooves by political and cultural con-

4 Charles van Onselen, New Babylon, New Nineveh: Everyday Life on the Witwatersrand, 1886–1914, Johannesburg 2001, is the outstanding account of Johannesburg in this period.

nections. The British state and its imperial extensions were a significant force in guiding the paths of global economic linkages.[5] British migration and political and social commonalities linked the settler societies with Britain and with each other. British immigrant actors saw themselves as part of a global 'British' polity, and this reinforced both British linkages and connections to other Dominions (in Durban's case, especially Australia). This recognition of how membership in a particular worldwide political constellation may have modified the actions of local actors, is important for our understanding of how globalization played out in British colonies. We also need to take into account that there was a quality of contingency and conflict in the imperial connections: the ways they operated were constantly being remade and could be undone. Global links were made, but those were inhabited by elite rivalries and social and political conflicts.[6]

A Case Study

Taking up this modified understanding of the concept, I now turn to consider the career of Otto Siedle and the part he played in initiating Durban's transformation into a portal of globalization. Why focus on the role of one individual, and a locally based one at that, rather than on organizations at the centre of imperial power? Too often, the effectivity of 'peripherally' based capitalists in the imperial world has been denied. For example, in the influential work of Cain and Hopkins, the importance of industrialism in driving imperialism is played down and there is an overwhelming emphasis on the power of the City of London with its banking, financial, insurance and shipping houses.[7] But in fact, in some cases, expatriate British merchants used their role in colonial port development as a base from which to become crucial initiators of empire-shaping economic activity.[8] In Durban, Siedle had a major part in the creation of a port development-mining-rail-shipping nexus which remodelled Natal's position in the global economy. This is not of course to say that Siedle and his Durban cohorts could act as they wished. There were, as we will see, some decisions for which they remained reliant on the metropolis. But to a great extent they were active in forming their own environment, as a link in the imperial chain.
Otto Siedle came out of London's high Victorian middle class. He was born there in 1856 to German parents who had emigrated to Britain and lived in Woolwich. His father, who came from a small village in the Black Forest region, had established a successful business as a watchmaker and jeweller. Contrary to stereotypes of 19th century British and German parents, Otto's family seemed to have instilled into him an overweening self-confidence that is apparent in both his business communications and his inadvertently

5 A point well understood by the 'British World' school of historians. See for example, Carl Bridge and Kent Fedorowich (eds.), The British World: Diaspora, Culture and Identity London 2003.
6 Tamson Pietsch, "Rethinking the British World", in: Journal of British Studies, 52 (2013), pp. 441-463.
7 P.J. Cain and A.G. Hopkins, British Imperialism: Innovation and Expansion 1688–1914, Harlow 1993.
8 Sandip Harazeesingh, "Interconnected Synchronicities: the Production of Bombay and Glasgow as Modern Global Ports c. 1850–1880", in: Journal of Global History 4 (2009), pp. 7-31.

revealing autobiography. In 1871, at 14, Otto was sent as an apprentice to a watchmaker in Stuttgart, and saw something of the aftermath of the Franco-Prussian War. The boy returned to London in 1874 and worked for a watchmaker in Camberwell.[9]

This background immediately points to a complexity of identity. Otto never presented himself as anything but a loyal Briton and imperialist. But clearly there was a process of self-fashioning at work: at some stage the family name shifted from the German pronunciation to an Anglicised version (phonetically, 'Seedlee'). Otto's entry into the shipping business was at one level accidental, but at another reflected his father's successful integration into London's commercial world. Amongst the friends of the elder Siedle was Daniel King, son of the founder of Bullard King (BK), a shipping firm which had its head office at St. Mary Axe, a street in the City of London which was a hub of maritime businesses. By Otto's account, one day in 1882, King's son asked him "How would you like to go out to Natal? I understand Maydon needs a book-keeper".[10] BK had been operating ships to Durban for many years. 'Maydon' was King junior's brother in law, J.G. Maydon, the company's agent in the port. In Maydon, BK had a formidably capable employee, who was to become a dominating figure in Durban politics, was ultimately to occupy the senior cabinet position in the government of the Natal Colony, and whose name to this day is still given to a major wharf in Durban harbour.[11] Otto was not the only member of the family whose trajectory was affected by globalizing processes. Both transatlantic connections and the empire offered opportunities to enterprising members of the British middle class. One of Otto's brothers, Edward, became the technical director of the Metropolitan Opera in New York,[12] while another brother, Louis, became a successful gem trader in Ceylon.[13]

The Natal in which Otto came in 1883 was undergoing crucial transformations in its articulation with the world economy, linked to the changing role of two crucial technologies – the steamship and the telegraph.

Up to the end of the 1870s, BK had exclusively used sailing ships in their Indian Ocean operations: now the company had begun the shift to coal power. Across the world, this was the decade when the change took place. After 50 years of inefficient design, advances in engineering and maritime architecture had at last made the steamer an attractive proposition, and the proportion of sail on the seas began a precipitous decline. In 1879, BK had begun to move their Indian Ocean operations from sail to steam, when they launched their first steamship, the *SS Pongola*. She was small enough to clear Durban harbour's notorious sandbar. She was followed by the *SS Limpopo* and the *SS Congella*. The new steamers were by now being billed as the Natal Direct Line (NDL). Over the next three decades the company's selling point was that it offered a service that went di-

9 Otto Siedle, Siedle Saga: Reminiscences and Reflections, Durban 1940, pp. 9-19.
10 Siedle, Saga, p. 40.
11 Siedle, Saga, pp. 82-3.
12 Perla Gibson Siedle, Durban's Lady in White: An Autobiography, Ridgeway 1991, p. 29.
13 Siedle, Lady in White, 29; Anonymous, Twentieth Century Impressions of Ceylon, New Delhi [1907] 1999, p. 472.

rectly from the East India Dock in London to Durban and back, avoiding the 'vexatious delays' associated with other services, which usually went first to Cape Town.[14]

In 1881 Maydon created the new firm of King and Sons as a new structure for representing the parent firm's interest in Durban.[15] One has a strong impression that this apparently innocuous move actually represented a move to shift the balance within the Natal Direct Line away from the London headquarters and toward its southern African 'agents'. Sixty years later, though BK was by then no longer much of a factor in the maritime world, King and Sons had the agency of 16 different shipping lines in the port – a shipping empire of its own.[16] Portals of globalization were not just places along which power flowed from the imperial metropolis, but also places where local forces could contend for power.

In the years immediately preceding Siedle's arrival in Durban, a major step in constructing Durban as a portal had taken place with the city's linking to the global telegraph network. The telegraph was the most advanced – and expensive – form of global communication of the late nineteenth century. No local economic or political force in Natal had the power to initiate the vast expenditures that were required to connect to the empire's emerging cable networks. As of the 1870s, Durban was far too unimportant economically and too geographically remote to justify the laying of a cable. But during that decade, the British Army and Navy gained a major degree of influence on state policy on telegraphs, influencing decisions in this field on the basis of claims of strategic necessity. It was in this context of an increasingly military-driven telegraph policy, that the decision was taken during the Zulu War to lay a cable connecting Durban with the Eastern Telegraph Company's station at Aden. This was a crucial moment in Durban's evolution as a portal of globalization. And strategic as the motivation for the cable may have been, it conferred on Durban's bourgeoisie the huge economic advantages of near-instantaneous direct communication with the United Kingdom, India and the wider world.[17] Both the City and Durban's merchant houses were able to benefit from this development. In particular it enabled British shipping companies and local traders to incorporate Durban as part of the new world transport network provided by tramp steamers. This sector of the British merchant fleet was growing explosively, by 1914 comprising half of British shipping tonnage.[18] In order to utilize their ships effectively, masters needed to know where cargoes were available, and plan to keep the time spent in port to a minimum, and the telegraph provided them with a solution to that problem. For the local agents of shipping companies in Durban, the new technological tool changed their organizational relationship to their head offices dramatically, as the speed of communications was reduced from

14 A. Forsyth Ingram, The Story of an African Seaport**,** Durban 1899, p. 164.
15 Siedle, Saga, pp. 82-3.
16 Siedle, Saga, p. 84.
17 P.M. Kennedy, "Imperial Cable Communications and Strategy', in: The English Historical Review, 86 (1971) 431, pp. 728-752.
18 Byron Lew and Bruce Cater, "The Telegraph, Co-ordination of Tramp Shipping, and the Growth in World Trade, 1870–1910", in: European Review of Economic History, 10 (2006), p. 149.

weeks to hours. Local agents could now communicate the availability of shipping capacity and cargo in port to their London offices and make scheduling arrangements in a way that was previously impossible.[19] The telegraph provided a crucial instrument for the local shipping agents and harbour merchants who were flourishing on Durban's Point by the turn of the century – Wm. H. Savory, Chiazzari & Co., Geo. Mann and Stainbank, W. Dunn and Co., and the African Boating Company.[20]

At the time of Otto's arrival in Durban, the obstacles to the city fulfilling its potential as a portal of globalization were still considerable. They centred on three inter-related problems – harbour facilities, coal and overland transport. Large ships could not enter Durban harbour because of the sandbar at its mouth, which meant that they had to be moored offshore and their cargoes loaded into lighters. This was a time-consuming and expensive process, and one that exposed the vessels to danger in stormy conditions. Steamers calling at Durban needed coal. But coal was not available locally and had to be shipped in from abroad, making it very expensive. These factors continued to restrict the attractiveness of Durban as a port. Natal railway development had just begun. The lack of local coal supplies was a problem here as well. The absence of adequate rail lines into the interior meant that the potential markets of the Orange Free State and the Transvaal had to be supplied by ox-wagon – delivery was very slow and the cost of shipments was high.

The solution of the problems of fuel, rail and harbour facilities did require local initiative, even though this usually had to be backed by capital raised in the City of London. Over the next few decades Maydon and Siedle were to be central in dealing with these questions. Like much of the Durban bourgeoisie, they were strongly emotionally invested in the imperial project. Through the crises of the 1890s and the Boer War, Maydon and Siedle made conspicuous displays of loyalism (Maydon was wounded while serving as a war correspondent). Sometimes patriotism was nicely combined with self-interest, as when, during the war, Siedle secured an exclusive berth for NDL ships in the harbour on the basis that NDL had been contracted to carry the mail from Cape Town and thus the spot on the quay was necessary for the company to play its part in the war effort.[21]

After his arrival in Durban, Otto became Maydon's indispensable lieutenant. Colonial society replicated, to a remarkable extent, the social practices of contemporary Britain. For elites, this was an important source of their social cohesion. Siedle was popular amongst the younger members of Durban's British immigrant and settler-born elite. His enthusiasm for sport and for music (an 'amateur basso' in Gilbert and Sullivan performances) and his companionability on picnics were appreciated. He became part of a social and commercial circle which included members of Durban families with money from agriculture, retail, land and commerce – G.M. Sutton, Joseph Baynes, Charles Hitchins, Benjamin Greenacre, Robert Jameson and Sam Campbell.[22] This was a politically influ-

19 Lew and Cater, "The Telegraph", p. 150.
20 Ingram, African Port, pp. 183-184.
21 Siedle, Saga, p. 81.
22 Siedle, Saga, p. 28.

ential group – a number were active in Durban politics and Sutton was Prime Minister of the Colony from 1903 to 1905.

Colonial Durban's wealthy were able to enact fantasies of pseudo-aristocratic grandeur which would have been hard to achieve in the metropolis. One might speculate that this feudal tinge to colonial culture was fed by the glorification of rural life and of an imagined organic social order presided over by a squirearchy, which was such a feature of mid to late nineteenth century English culture. In later years Otto lived in a mansion on South Ridge Road, along the Berea, which overlooked the city, and where sea breezes mitigated the semi-tropical heat. He prided himself on continuing the somewhat recent 'traditions' of the so-called 'Old Natal families'. Eight Zulu workers (whom Otto referred to as his 'loyal servitors') and (when the automobile arrived), a white chauffeur, kept the family in the condition to which they had become accustomed.[23]

It is striking quite how mobile the Siedles were across the world. The Natal, Ceylonese and British branches of the family had a reunion in London in around 1901. Oscar, with his wife Amelia, and family, went on to visit the New York brother. Oscar's daughter Perla trained as an opera singer in Berlin. Amelia and Perla visited the Ceylon relatives in 1911. The family's upward mobility was reflected in Perla's delight at getting invited to the wedding of one of the Kaiser's sons and to the Members' enclosure at Sandown Park Race Course, presided over by Edward VII.[24] The perhaps surprising extent to which these members of the Durban elite were integrated into the metropolitan upper classes, suggests how the organization of the city as portal of globalization was deeply connected to the larger world patterns of social power.

In 1886 the economic opportunities for Durban were revolutionized by the Rand gold-rush and the subsequent establishment of the world's greatest gold mining centre on the Transvaal Highveld. In a curious way the Durban bourgeoisie did not make the strides they could have in this moment, as they did not get in on the ground floor of investment in the Transvaal mines. Siedle attributed this to their having earlier burned their fingers in the delusionary, earlier Barberton gold rush.[25] However Durban did a competent job of benefiting from its position as transport route to the gold fields. The Kimberley diamond magnates and new European incomers were able to seize the economic initiative on the Rand, and the Durban business class, with lesser resources at their disposal and less acute financial judgement, did not. This was to have enormous long-term consequences in consigning the Durbanites to a permanently subordinate position amongst South African capitalists. Yet, a subordinate position does not preclude a role as portal of globalization; or put otherwise: as a link in the construction of global connectivity.

The Natal colonial government developed a successful strategy of railway building, which enabled the next step in globalizing the Natal economy. The crucial break-through in the unleashing of a new energy economy in Natal came in the late 1880s, when the Natal

23 Siedle, Saga, p. 48.
24 Siedle, Lady in White, pp. 15-35.
25 Siedle, Saga, p. 110.

Government Railways (NGR) connected Durban to the northern Natal coalfield. The tracks reached the southern edge of the coalfield at Ladysmith in 1886 and its heart at Dundee in 1889. This provided the rail system itself with access to coal, dropping prices massively compared with existing imported coal supplies. But it also opened an uninterrupted flow of cheap coal to the Durban dockside. Another vital rail breakthrough was the completion of the rail line to Johannesburg in 1895. While the Transvaal made greater use of the shorter rail line to Delagoa Bay in Portuguese East Africa for many years thereafter, the new connection gave Durban its first real chance to take a big share of the Rand transportation market. During 1896, Natal's railway revenue more than doubled as a result of the new Transvaal trade.[26] This was the real beginning of a long struggle by Durban to capture the flow of goods to and from the Rand.

The expansion of coal mining enabled by this new rail configuration was phenomenal. In 1889, total annual production was at an unimpressive 25 609 tons; by 1901 it stood at half a million tons, and by the end of the first decade of the new century it had risen to a staggering 1 786 583 tons.[27] With the railways providing cheap coal, Durban could become an important steamship port. By 1899 bunkering (ships taking on coal as fuel) at Durban had risen from a minimal amount at the start of the decade to 156 267 tons. In 1905 Durban supplied ships with over 800 000 tons of bunker coal. There was a successful breakthrough into large scale exporting of coal, both a very large one abroad by sea and a more modest one to other territories in southern Africa. In addition Natalians themselves were burning vast amounts of coal. In 1908 over 250 000 tons was used by the NGR and over 150 000 tons by other businesses and consumers in the province.[28]

In 1897, with Maydon's retirement, Siedle took over the leadership of King and Sons in partnership with a King family grandson; but one has the strong impression that Oscar called the shots.[29] By the time of the Boer War, NDL was to have seven steamers providing fortnightly service in each direction between London's East India Dock and Durban.[30] None of the ships was bigger than 2 500 tons, which enabled them to come in to the Durban quayside. The company's publicists were able to boast that all passenger accommodation had access to the deck, that the ships were lit with electricity, and that they offered 'viands' of 'the best quality'.[31] Rennie's Aberdeen Line did offer a similarly direct route as well, but a cosy agreement with BK allowed both to profit.[32] The German East Africa Line was making a bold challenge with its service via the Mediterranean, the Suez Canal and the East African ports. But it did not have access to the crucial British

26 Hein Heydenrych, "Rail Development in Natal to 1895", in: Bill Guest and John M. Sellers (eds.), Enterprise and Exploitation in a Victorian Colony: Aspects of the Economic and Social History of Colonial Natal, Pietermaritzburg 1985, pp. 47-69.

27 Ruth Edgecombe and Bill Guest, "An Introduction to the Pre-Union Natal Coal Industry", in: Guest and Sellers, Enterprise and Exploitation, p. 337.

28 Edgecombe and Guest, "Introduction", p. 338.

29 Siedle, Saga, p. 84.

30 Ingram, African Port, p. 187.

31 Ingram, African Port, p. 164.

32 Natal Almanac and Directory and Yearly Registry 1900, Cape Town 1900, p. xvii.

market, and after 1914 was politically shut out. More ominous was the formation in 1900 of the Union Castle Line, which was to develop greater financial muscle than its competitors, and ultimately to triumph over them.

Siedle's network was able to parlay its business influence into a leading role in the coal industry. J.G. Maydon was in at the start of the Natal coal boom, with fingers in more than one mine, and Siedle was right behind him. BK claimed to have championed the use of local coal well before other shipping companies. Siedle ultimately became Chairman of the Dundee Colliery, the biggest of the Natal mines during the 1890s. Three of Siedle's personal social circle were directors of Dundee – Greenacre (the first chairman), Sutton and Hitchens – as were the sugar baron Marshall Campbell and other leading lights of the Durban bourgeoisie.[33] The Dundee company had a close relationship with NGR, and there were a number of allegations by rival companies in the decade after the Boer War, that the company had been favoured in the award of railway contracts, had charged excessive prices for their coal and had been given preference in the allocation of railway trucks. By the early 1900s each of the major Durban shipping agencies had a close connection with a particular mine. In 1909 a Coal Owners Association was established, largely at Siedle's initiative, and he was chosen as its chairman.[34]

In 1889 NDL secured the government contract to become the sole carrier of Indian indentured labour to Natal.[35] This provided the company with a guaranteed source of profit, from them until 1911, when the Government of India prohibited this trade. By 1899, NDL had six steamers running on its three-weekly India services, which also called at Ceylon and East African ports.[36] Whereas the NDL services to the United Kingdom employed mainly British and north European crews, the ships on the eastern routes used much cheaper Indian labour, under British officers.[37]

Although the Indian indentured workers were initially intended for agriculture, they were increasingly siphoned off into the mines. The expansion of Natal coal mining was achieved with a small workforce; there were only about 600 workers in 1890 and about 9000 workers in 1910. There was a fourfold increase in output per worker in this period, a tribute to mechanization and a lesson in the extremities of exploitation. Mechanization of coal cutting was pioneered by Dundee and Elandslaagte mines. Up until 1895, there were less than a thousand workers on the mines in all, the vast majority of them black. By then, the demand for unskilled labour was going up sharply. But for African workers, subsistence agriculture was still a viable option and the dangerous nature of colliery work was well known. Moreover, many of those were willing to take the risks of mine work preferred the better-paying Transvaal mines. Africans, then, were not flocking into the coalfields. Indian indentured workers on the other hand did not have the option of

33 Siedle, Saga, pp 88-92.
34 Siedle, Saga, p. 135.
35 Siedle, p. 79.
36 Ingram, African Port, 187; Natal Almanac, p. 364.
37 This assertion is based on a reading of crew lists in the National Maritime Museum, London and the Memorial University of Newfoundland.

going elsewhere. Their unfree status meant that their wages were lower than those needed to attract Africans, and they were in an effectively captive position. These factors made indentured labourers the mine owners' preferred option. Between 1895 and the next year, the percentage of Indians employed by the mines jumped from 8.72% to 20.39% and then to 30.26% the year after, peaking at 44.5% in 1902.[38]

With a largely rightless workforce, Natal was able to introduce levels of colliery mechanization far in advance of those prevalent in Britain, where strong unions, which feared job losses, resisted new equipment. Colliery conditions were appalling, and, at least until after Union, enforcement of safety procedures was quite inadequate. Between 1897 and 1909 there were 33 major explosions on Natal coal mines, resulting in 146 deaths, and there were 197 other accidental fatalities.[39] Housing conditions were squalid, and food and medical attention poor. Consequently, there were high death rates from tuberculosis and gastro-intestinal diseases, especially amongst Indian workers. The coal industry was a crucial part of the 'portal' that entered on British Durban. But such portals did not come into being without a very unevenly-paid cost.

Marketing Natal coal to shipping companies was somewhat difficult. Metropolitan companies distrusted southern hemisphere coal varieties, which had indeed been demonstrated by researchers to burn less efficiently than the product of the Welsh collieries. Moreover it was widely claimed that Natal coal was more prone to the serious danger of spontaneous combustion in the ships holds than other varieties; and certainly fires in the coal bunkers of tramp steamers were common.[40] Many ship's engineers were deeply opposed to using the Natal product. However, in the end cheapness and convenience won out, and the engineers had to make do with the coal they took on at Durban.

Durban shipping and commercial interests had long been agitating for the development of the harbour, and by the 1890s, steady improvements were being achieved in the depth of the draft of the ships which could be accommodated. After the death of the major proponent of this project, Harry Escombe, Maydon became the most important political leader in driving the harbour works. In 1904, Durban harbour was finally opened up to the largest vessels operating in the southern hemisphere, when it became deep enough for Union Castle's 13 000 ton liners to enter. Subsequently, Maydon, now Colonial Secretary in the Natal government, pushed through an expansion of the port facilities on the western side of the harbour. Sophisticated dredgers were brought in to create the necessary channel through the thick clay soil across the lagoon. This deepening, however, meant that in order for the full potentialities of the port as a refuelling stop to be exploited, coaling facilities had to be expanded. Using dredging and land reclamation techniques, a platform was constructed on the Bluff, near the harbour mouth, for

38 Edgecombe and Guest, "Introduction", p. 340.
39 Edgecombe and Guest, "Introduction", p. 342.
40 Richard Woodman, Fiddler's Green: The Great Squandering 1921–2010, Stroud 2010, p. 75.

a mechanical coaling appliance with a 10 000 ton capacity. Later a conveyer belt and a 700 foot quay were added.[41]

What needs to be noted here is the success of the shipping-coal nexus, resting on the benefits of the overland rail connection, in getting the colonial state to pursue the policies that they wanted. And the extensive size of the harbour works and the equipment necessary to maintain and service the port is also significant. Public works on the harbour created local economic demand and stimulated the business of harbour-based entrepreneurs. There was a constant interlocking of the shipping and coal interests in the process. John Leuchars, for example, was both one of the Directors of the Dundee Company and a major investor in the land used to build a new wharf.[42]

There was a striking increase in goods shipped after these changes to the harbour. Between 1904 and 1906, the value of exports leaving the port more than doubled.[43] By this time the harbour's equipment for handling goods had been greatly increased with over 50 cranes of various types, including a massive 50 ton hydraulic crane, a twenty ton 'shears', three ten ton steam cranes and a ten ton travelling hydraulic crane. There was now 100 000 tons of shed capacity, and the wharves were illuminated at night.[44] No less than 18 dredgers kept the harbour clear.[45] A particular sign of the ability of the harbour to handle bulk cargoes was the rise of maize exports, which grew from 116 228 bags in 1905 to 1 001 081 bags in 1909.[46]

The town also reconfigured its inland linkages, in the aftermath of the Boer War, by making itself into a seaside tourist centre for the growing middle class of the Transvaal towns and cities. Between 1906 and 1909 the seafront was developed. This involved the construction of a giant, horseshoe-shaped 'safety-bathing enclosure' on the waters' edge. Publicists were able to reassure tourists that this structure presented "an impregnable barrier to sharks".[47] Thus the replication of European models of leisure consumption gave the city's elite new paths of accumulation.

This process of port development was not to stop. Later came other projects – including, in 1925, the Prince Edward Dock, one of the biggest ship repair docks in the world.

The ultimate dissolution of Natal Colony into the Union of South Africa in 1910 raised a number of very difficult problems for the Durban elite, which crucially problematized their relation to imperial political and economic structures and to the role of Durban as a portal of globalization. The very considerable success which they had had in shaping the relationship of Durban to globalization declined after Union. In a sense this was quite logical. In the days of the Natal Colony the Durban bourgeoisie were a relatively

41 Siedle, Saga, p. 117.
42 Siedle, Saga, p. 119.
43 Natal Province: Descriptive Guide and Official Handbook, Durban, South African Railways 1911, p. 45.
44 C.W. Francis Harrison, Port Natal Illustrated: Handbook of General Information Relating to Durban Port Natal and Railways in Connection, London1905, p. 15.
45 Harrison, Port Natal, p. 16.
46 Natal Province: Descriptive Guide and Official Handbook, Durban 1911, p. 47.
47 Descriptive Guide, p. 73.

great economic power within a small polity. In the context of the Union, they were dwarfed financially by the Rand magnates and politically threatened by Afrikaner numbers. Moreover, both of those forces were less ideologically tied to the empire than they. Though much of the structure of Durban as a portal of globalization, which they had largely created, remained, their ability to shape it in the future declined.

Siedle and his circle had exercised really substantial political agency. But their room for movement was starting to close. White Natalians were great British loyalists. This was true across classes, and such jingoism was not incompatible with a lively white working class support for an emerging labour politics in the colony – working men demand their rights as Britons. But the Campbell-Bannerman and Asquith governments pushed the colony toward unity with the rest of South Africa. The more economically powerful Transvaal capitalists and the politically powerful Afrikaner leadership did as well. And the severe recession which hit the region from 1906, although affecting all parts of it, highlighted the relative economic weakness of Natal and its complete reliance on serving as a conduit for the trade of the Rand.

Grudgingly, the Durban bourgeoisie reconciled itself to getting the best deal it could within the new amalgamation. This began with attempts to push for a looser federation, rather than the more monolithic Union. Siedle and Maydon worked assiduously to position Natal economic interests for maximum political influence in the new state. The line up for the forthcoming 1910 elections was dominated by the South African Party of Jan Smuts and Louis Botha, Afrikaner-dominated although largely conciliatory toward the empire, and the Unionist Party, headed up by Leander Starr Jameson,[48] and suspected of being the agent of the Rand mine owners. The Natal elite feared being crushed between these two blocks. Maydon and Siedle were involved in a number of abortive attempts to establish a distinct Natal political party. Siedle played a part in setting up the Mercantile League, representing Durban business, which supported this regionalist approach. The other hope was that political leverage could be used to reduce the share of Rand trade going through to Delagoa Bay and Cape Town, in favour of Durban. An "Intercolonial Railway Agreement" as part of the constitutional negotiations allocated 30% of the Transvaal's rail traffic to Durban. Natalians regarded this as inadequate, but were even more disappointed when the final agreement amounted to an even lower share.[49]

In the end, Maydon and Siedle played something of a double game. They appeared on a platform with Botha in Durban shortly before the first Union election, endorsing the unity project, but at the same time a slate of independents ran for Natal seats. These candidates were remarkably successful, winning 10 out of 16 Natal constituencies, including Maydon's victory in the largely working class Durban constituency of Greyville.[50] Even after Union, Maydon, together with Siedle's friend Joseph Baynes, pursued the pos-

48 Jameson was Cecil Rhodes' right-hand man during the conquest of Rhodesia in the 1890s, leader of the infamous 1895-6 Jameson Raid, and Prime Minister of the Cape Colony 1904-1908.

49 P.S. Thompson, Natalians First: Separatism in South Africa, Johannesburg 1990, pp. 1-14.

50 Thompson, Natalians First, p. 1-14.

sibility of finding a political vehicle for pursuing the federal model, but in the end were forced to admit defeat.[51]

For Durban, the First World War was a moment of dramatic shifts. Briefly the future of the region seemed up in the air, as in late 1914 and early 1915, Afrikaner rebels backed by the Germans in South West Africa fought government troops and German commerce raiders stalked British shipping in the Indian Ocean. It took some time for a sense of imperial stability to be restored, with the suppression of the rebellion, the South African military seizure of South West and the sinking of the German warships. Durban got a burst of inward industrialization from the war. Those local capitalists participating in this process included Otto Siedle. Siedle became centrally involved in the creation of a successful glass industry.[52] In 1911, manufactures in Natal – most of which were produced within Durban itself – were worth £ 4 434 000; by 1918 they were up to £ 15 796 000 – allowing for inflation, more than double in real value.[53]

The NDL though was doomed. It had already been weakened by the loss of the steady income provided by the Indian indentured labour contract. In the war, it lost a number of its commandeered ships to enemy action. But most importantly, it could not compete with the financial might of the Union Castle. The little ships of the NDL on the UK run were outmatched by the speed and luxury of the other company's big liners. In 1919, NDL became a subsidiary part of the shipping empire of Lord Kylsant, Union Castle's owner. In the post-war world, Union Castle would exercise a near-monopoly of the South African passenger traffic. The flow of British passenger traffic to Durban now came from Southampton, not London. The war thus catalysed a shift in the pattern of imperial networks.

Otto Siedle though survived the war well, as King and Sons was now the agent of multiple shipping companies. During the War Otto's wife, Amelia was to become a leader of charitable works in Durban, and an active city councillor in the 1920s. They were not spared tragedy however – a son, Karl, was killed in World War One. But Siedle later enjoyed the pride and prestige of his other son, Basil, becoming a member of the national 'Springbok' Cricket team.[54]

In 1926-7, Durban experienced a remarkable reconfiguration of politics, pointing to the past and to the future. On the one hand, the British Natalians furiously protested the introduction by the Afrikaner Nationalist government of a new national flag. In mass meetings, the white Durbanites proclaimed their loyalty to the Union Jack and the Britishness for which it stood.[55] But it was by now clear that there was a gradual migration of political power from London to the governments of the settler states. And the British state was itself conceding this. In that sense the links to the centre were mutating

51 Thompson, Natalians First, pp. 15-28.

52 Killie Cambell Library, Durban, Siedle Family Papers, Anonymous (probably Otto Siedle), "Brief History of the Glass Industry in Natal".

53 Eric Rosenthal, Schooners and Skyscrapers, Cape Town 1963, p. 194.

54 Siedle, Saga, p. 50.

55 Thompson, Natalians First, pp. 15-48.

under the pressures of colonial nationalism, and indeed the settler colonies were increasingly formalizing lateral links between themselves. On the other hand, in a town where African workers had been largely quiescent, a young man called A.W.G. Champion was pushing forward the ideas of the Industrial and Commercial Workers' Union (ICU), a radical black movement which had been sweeping the countryside in the immediately preceding period. The ICU was in some respects a home-grown movement, but recent research has demonstrated its links to both Garveyism and Syndicalism, ideas brought by American and Caribbean sailors.[56] Thus the Durban portal of globalization had brought a politics which destabilized imperial links. By the end of the 1920s the African working class of Durban had entered into a pattern of militancy with continuities which can be traced down to the present. Though the Natal British separatist cause did not entirely die out until the 1960s, it was clearly a politics the time of which had passed, while the incipient African nationalist radicalism of the ICU pointed to a future post-colonial state. Thus by the late 1920s – but not earlier – a nation-state regime of territorialization was establishing its hegemony in Durban. By the same token, Durban, and the Empire of Otto Siedle's Natal Direct Line within it, had primarily been a portal of globalization under the previous, British imperial, regime of territorialization.

Within South Africa, Durban's supremacy as a port was now unquestioned. By the end of the 1920s, about 60% of all cargo handled at South African ports went through it.[57] However, our attempt to apply the portal concept has thrown up two complications. Firstly, the subordination of Durban to the Johannesburg area in southern Africa's global connections implies that we need a more complicated typology or hierarchy of 'portals'. And secondly, Durban's embeddedness within a British Empire context implies a need for a more modulated account of how imperial frameworks inter-connected with nationalism and a questioning of the presumed triumph of a nation-state regime of territorialization.

Nevertheless, we can say that out of the complex political economy of Natal, Otto Siedle and his circle did create a nexus, building from shipping and rail connections to mining and port development which did play a part in transforming the region. They created new linkages between Durban, its Natal and Transvaal hinterland, the empire and the wider world. They inaugurated a structure, in which Durban served as a vital support to the Rand and its periphery, which persists to the present. After 1910 the power, although not necessarily the wealth, of the old Durban elite declined. But their trajectory makes clear that the patterns of globalization in the British empire were not just shaped in the City of London, but also by capitalists in port cities and railway towns around the colonial world.

56 Lucien van der Walt, "The First Globalization and Transnational Labour Activism in Southern Africa: White Labourism, the IWW, and the ICU 1904–1934", in: African Studies, 66 (2007) 2-3, pp. 223-251; Robert Trent Vinson, The Americans are Coming!: Dreams of African American Liberation in Segregationist South Africa, Athens OH 2012.

57 Industrial Durban: Opportunities at Port Natal, Durban 1930, p. 21.

A City Constructed by '*des gens d'ailleurs*'. Urban Development and Migration Policies in Colonial Lubumbashi, 1910–1930

Sofie Boonen / Johan Lagae

RESÜMEE

Die Gründung der Stadt Lubumbashi (damals Elisabethville) kann als geopolitischer Akt der belgischen Regierung verstanden werden, um ihren Anspruch auf ein mineralreiches Gebiet zu sichern und den britischen Einfluss aus dem Süden zurückzudrängen. Doch die erste und bis zum Ende der 1920er Jahre einzige Eisenbahn, die Lubumbashi mit der Außenwelt verbunden hat, blieb weiterhin ein wichtiger Vektor für den Zustrom von Waren, Menschen, Ideen und Praktiken aus dem Süden.

Dieser Artikel kartiert die Siedlungsmuster der ‚*second rate whites*' (Griechen, Juden …) im europäischen Stadtzentrum auf Grundlage der Grundbucharchive und zeigt so, wie die ‚*gens d'ailleurs*' (Menschen von anderswo) auf Rassenkonzepten beruhende Trennungen von Bevölkerungsgruppen in Lubumbashi verwischt haben. Obwohl die Kolonialbehörden räumliche Strategien entwickelt hatten, um den Zustrom von Zuwanderern zu kontrollieren, um ihre Siedlungsgewohnheiten zu kanalisieren und die Interaktion zwischen segregierten Gruppen einzudämmen, trugen diese Mittelgruppen dazu bei, Lubumbashi als ‚weltoffene' Stadt auszuprägen.

A nationalist project or a cosmopolitan city?

Although the Belgian king Leopold II had put a claim on the Katanga region in 1884–1885 during the famous Berlin Conference,[1] the territory would only become officially part of the *État Indépendant du Congo* (É.I.C.) a few years later, in 1891, after a period of intense Belgian and British mining prospections, which had demonstrated the economic

1 B. Fetter, The Creation of Elisabethville, 1910–1940, Stanford 1976, pp. 13-17.

potential of the region.[2] As noted by several authors, the choice of erecting the future city of Lubumbashi in the southern part of Katanga in 1910, only two years after the transfer of the E.I.C. to the Belgian government,[3] should be understood as a geopolitical strategy of the latter to control the British influences coming from Rhodesia (the current Zambia and Zimbabwe) and South Africa, in particular as a result of the construction of a railroad coming from these southern regions.[4] As this railroad became Katanga's first and main link to the outside world till the late 1920s, the influx of people, goods and ideas it engendered was both a crucial vector of the city's early development[5] and a threat to the very strategy of turning Lubumbashi into a 'Belgian' colonial city. Since its foundation, the city had indeed stronger ties via this railroad to cities like Bulawayo and Salisbury, and even further to Cape Town (South Africa) or Beira (Mozambique), than with Boma or Léopoldville (today Kinshasa), the successive capitals of the Belgian Congo. Already in the 1910s prominent figures of the Belgian colonial establishment emphasized the crucial importance of a 'national' railroad that would allow the transportation of mineral resources to the Atlantic coast via a trajectory completely falling within the boundaries of the colonial territory. However, this became only possible in the late 1920s with the realization of the track of the so-called *Chemin de fer du Bas-Congo au Katanga* (B.C.K). Yet, even then the railway line connecting Katanga with the port city of Lobito in Portuguese Angola, known as the Benguelian axis, offered a more plausible alternative in terms of efficiency.[6]

Situated in 1910 at the extremity of a railroad network covering Southern Africa, Lubumbashi thus witnessed a strong Anglophone influence. The first newspapers were bilingual (French / English) and English was a common language in everyday parlance well into the early 1920s.[7] The railway moreover facilitated important migration flows to the young and promising mining city resulting in a very heterogeneous population. Since its early days, English, Greek, Jewish and Italian communities were prominent components of *Lushois* society and at the end of the 1940s approximately 30% of the city's white

2 For a synthesis of the period of the É.I.C., see: I. Ndaywel è Nziem, Histoire générale du Congo: de l'héritage ancien à la république démocratique, Brussels 1998. On the suppression of M'Siri and the seizure of Katanga, see among others R. Cornevin, Histoire du Zaïre des origines à nos jours, Brussels 1989, pp. 102 ff.

3 Up until 1908, the colonisation of Central Africa was an operation directed by the Belgian king and a small committee of industrials and military officials.

4 See among others: B. Fetter, The Creation of Elisabethville (note 1); B. De Meulder, Kuvuande Mbote. Een eeuw koloniale architectuur en stedenbouw in Kongo, Antwerp 2000, pp. 73-76.

5 S.E. Katzenellenbogen, Miner's frontier, transport and economic development, in: P. Duignan and L.H. Gann (eds.), Colonialism in Africa, 1870–1960: the economics of colonialism, Cambridge 1975.

6 Georges Moulaert already stressed the importance of building the 'national' track of the *chemin de fer du Bas-Congo* in 1913, see G. Moulaert, Problèmes coloniaux d'hier et d'aujourd'hui (pages oubliés). 38 années d'activité coloniale, Brussels 1939, pp. 65-66. See also C. Metcalfe, Railway Development of Africa, Present and Future, in: The geographical journal, 47 (January 1916) 1; R. Williams, The Cape to Cairo Railway, in: Journal of the Royal African Society, 20 (July 1921) 80.

7 R. Cornet, Terre Katangaise. Cinquantième anniversaire du Comité Spécial du Katanga, 1900–1950, s.l. 1950, pp. 181-182. For an analysis of colonial language in Katanga, see J. Fabian, Language and Colonial Power. The Appropriation of Swahili in the Former Belgian Congo 1880–1938, Berkeley 1986.

population were of non-Belgian origin.[8] Consequently, contemporary observers at times described Lubumbashi as a 'cosmopolitan' town.[9] Moreover, the heterogeneous nature of Lubumbashi's urban population was not limited to the white community. In order to respond to the lack of local labour, large enterprises had been implementing a recruitment policy resulting in major migration flows of African workers coerced to come initially from Rhodesia and South Africa and, from the 1920s onwards, also from different regions in Congo, Rwanda or as far as Senegal.[10]

As the prospering mining city was initially attracting flocks of white adventurers and treasure seekers, contemporary (Belgian) sources often described it as a 'Far West'.[11] In one of the first discussions on the topic of architecture in the Belgian Congo, published in *Tekhné*, a leading professional journal of the time, the frenzied nature of Lubumbashi's early development is clearly articulated:

> *In Congo, at lot is going to be built; there is in fact, already a feverish construction activity in the extreme south, in Katanga* […] *At this very moment, the development of Congolese cities is occurring, at least for the case of Katanga, in a way similar to South-African, Australian and Californian cities: very quickly and very… horribly!*[12]

The author of the article lamented not only the emergence of an urban landscape of questionable quality, but also the absence of Belgian architects and planners. The making and shaping of Lubumbashi, he noted, was an affair of '*des gens d'ailleurs*' ('people coming from elsewhere') who constructed '*à la diable*' ('in a devilish manner').[13] Indeed, up until the 1920s, Italians and Greeks dominated the city's building industry.[14] But the railroad not only created an incoming flow of people. As *Lushois* urban memory reminds us, building materials and construction expertise also were imported from the South.[15]

8 N.A. Van Malleghem, Livre IV. L'Urbanisation d'Élisabethville, in: Ministry of Colonies (ed.), Urbanisme au Congo, Brussels 1950 [s. p.].

9 When in the mid-1910s the Benedictine Fathers were discussing the construction of a cathedral in Lubumbashi, they conceived the project as a "monument that will raise admiration among this cosmopolitan population of blacks and whites". Amicus, Une cathédrale au Congo, in: Bulletin des Missions, V (1913–1914), 250-252. In 1931, at the occasion of the International Exhibition, Jean Sepulchre, editor-in-chief of the local publication *Essor du Congo* presented the city of Lubumbashi as a kind of "Babel" which despite its heterogeneous population was pervaded by a "hospitable harmony", Essor du Congo, Album edited on the occasion of the International Exposition of Elisabethville, May 1931, s. p.

10 J. Higginson, A working class in the making. Belgian colonial labor policy, private enterprise, and the African mineworker, 1907–1951, Wisconsin 1989; C. Perrings, Black mineworkers in Central Africa: industrial strategies and the evolution of an African proletariat in the Copperbelt, 1911–41, London 1979.

11 For information on the composition of the population of Lubumbashi, see the yearly editions of the *Bulletin Officiel* of the Ministry of Colonies, as well as J. Sohier, Quelques traits de la physionomie de la population européenne d'Elisabethville, Brussel 1953.

12 A. De Hertogh, Page coloniale. Pour commencer, in: Tekhné, 1 (1911) 1, 10-11. Unless otherwise noted, all translations are ours.

13 A. De Hertogh, Page coloniale (note 10), 11.

14 N. Esgain, La vie quotidienne à Elisabethville (1912–1932): émergence d'une culture urbaine (unpublished master dissertation), Université Catholique de Louvain 1997, pp. 25-27.

15 J. Lagae and S. Boonen, Un regard africain sur le paysage urbain d'une ville colonial belge. Architecture et urbanisme dans le 'Vocabulaire de ville de Elisabethville' d'André Yav, in: B. Jewsiewicki, D. Dibwe dia Mwembu and R. Giordano (eds.), Lubumbashi 1910–1920. Mémoire d'une ville industrielle, Paris 2010, pp. 107-124.

As a railroad city, Lubumbashi was part of a Southern African sphere of influence since its very foundation. The Belgian colonial government took a rather ambivalent position vis-à-vis the migration flows coming from the south. While the resulting cosmopolitan nature of the city's society was often seen by Belgian observers as a threat to its colonial project and the claim on the Katangese territory in particular, local authorities understood only too well that the influx of 'foreigners' was crucial for the city's development and the sustainability of its economy, as small trade and commerce was to a large extent an affair of Italians, Greeks and Jews. In that respect, the case of Lubumbashi forms a poignant illustration of what Frederick Cooper once described as the 'ambiguous structure' of empire in relation to networks and discourses, namely that the empire is

> *possibly too big, too hard to control, too ambiguous in its moral constitution to be immune from widespread mobilization* […]. *In the twentieth century, the empire tried to exclude some forms of cross-regional networking – pan-Arabism, for instance – while allowing others, such as Indian traders in East Africa.*[16]

People and goods from all over the world were present in the railway and mining town of Lubumbashi, and the big question was in how far they could be kept in check. In this paper, we discuss how on the one hand colonial authorities, both those of the *métropole* and those residing locally, tried to deal with migration flows attracted by economic opportunities and made possible by the rail connections. On the other hand, we reconstruct how these migrants or '*gens d'ailleurs*' were able to create a space of manoeuvre within the Belgian colonial city and mark their presence in the urban landscape. We argue that focussing on the making and shaping of Lubumbashi's built environment from the perspective of how urban migration was subject to forms of 'spatial governmentality' allows us to rewrite the narrative of a city that has so far been predominantly depicted as a Belgian colonial mining town.[17] The confrontation between official spatial policies of control and the opposing migrants' settlement strategies shows how global connectedness was locally put in practice by the '*gens d'ailleurs*'. Lubumbashi indeed cannot be understood as a neatly segregated city, even if its spatial configuration was clearly laid out according to the common practice of colonial urban planning to create a dual city, with separate quarters for colonizers and colonized.

Selecting migrants

Belgian colonial authorities generally did not aim for settler colonialism. The colonisation in the Belgian Congo was focused first and foremost at economic exploitation,

16 F. Cooper, Networks, moral discourse, and history, in: T. Callaghy, R. Kassimir and R. Latham (eds.), Intervention & Transnationalism in Africa. Global-Local Networks of Power, Cambridge 2001, p. 38.

17 For examples of recent studies investigating issues of spatial governmentality in colonial cities, see S. Legg, Spaces of Colonialism: Delhi's Urban Governmentalities, Oxford 2007; K. Prashant, The Making of an Indian Metropolis. Colonial Governance and Public Culture in Bombay, 1890–1920, Ashgate 2007; L. Schler, The strangers of New Bell: immigration, public space and community in colonial Douala, Cameroon, 1914–1960, Pretoria 2008; G. Myers, Verandahs of Power. Colonialism and Space in Urban Africa, New York 2003.

with the appointment of Belgians via short-term contracts used as an instrument to discourage them to settle permanently in the colony.[18] However, in the first years of Lubumbashi's existence, as well as in the other parts of the Katanga region, the colonial government tried to create a stable Belgian urban population as a counterpart to the many non-Belgian European migrants arriving in the city.[19] A propaganda program was set up and financial help was given to potential candidate-colonists.[20] The approach was also reflected in local politics. In line with the example of the British South-African colonies, local administrators in Katanga were eager to have a completely independent administration, permitting them to communicate directly with the metropolitan authorities instead of having to pass via the general governor in Boma, the then administrative capital city of the Belgian Congo. Yet a real elective communal administration was never established in order to prevent white, non-Belgian residents from participating actively in local politics.[21] The efforts did not result in an immediate effect and the number of Belgians willing to settle permanently in the Colony only augmented slowly: in 1912, the Belgians only constituted 40 % of Lubumbashi's total European population and it would take until 1919 until a majority of 60 % was attained.

Parallel to strategies of promoting a Belgian settlement, migration flows were strictly controlled by the provincial Migration Service who introduced a socio-economic selection among Europeans willing to settle in the city. The Belgian colonial authorities were convinced that the establishment of a white 'middle class' had to be avoided; only well-educated colonials were accepted and from the 1920s onwards an explicit policy was implemented to hinder access to the colony for so-called 'poor Whites'. In the mid-1930s the then general governor Pierre Ryckmans still legitimized this policy in philanthropic terms, stating that 'the "poor whites", "*blancs pauvres*", are pariahs […]. Sending emigrants to Congo in order for them to reconstruct their lifes equals condemning them to the destiny of the natives. Those who criticize the Government not to commit to such a [migration] policy cannot have another excuse than their ignorance.'[22] Yet, this policy was in fact as much triggered by the social unrest that had shaken up the mining industry

18 Only in the early 1950s, the metropolitan authorities spoke of a '*politique de présence*' that did no longer exclude an important growth of the Belgian population in the colony, provided that this growth took place 'in pace with Congo's needs'. In 1951, the journal *Pourquoi Pas ?* published two interviews on this '*Politique de presence*' with the then minister of Colonies A. Dequae and his two predecessors R. Godding and P. Wigny. Cf. Pourquoi Pas? (1951), 3234-3235; 3480-3481 and 4036-4037. On immigration policies in the Belgian Congo during the interwar years, see also V. Foutry, Belgisch-Kongo tijdens het Interbellum: een immigratiebeleid gericht op sociale controle, in: Belgisch Tijdschrift voor Nieuwste Geschiedenis, 14 (1983) 3-4, pp. 461-448.

19 Rapport du Comité Spécial du Katanga. Exercice 1920, Brussels 1921, p. 41.

20 Travel to the Colony as well as lodging and provision for the fifteen days following the arrival in Katanga were offered for free by the colonial authorities. On the migration politics in the first years of the city's existence, see the work of Anatole de Bauw, director of the provincial *Service de l'Industrie et du Travail* and responsible for the creation of the *Service de Migration*: A. De Bauw, Le Katanga: notes sur le pays, ses ressources et l'avenir de la colonisation belge, Brussels 1920, p. 156.

21 See for instance : 34. Ajournement pour le Katanga de la création d'institutions communales proprement dites, in: Africa Archives Brussels (hereafter A.A.), RACBGG (910), 2e session 1920 (347). Procès-verbal de la 5e séance, 27 April 1920.

22 Petits colons, in: Allô! Congo! Chroniques radiophoniques par Pierre Ryckmans, Brussels [1934?].

in Rhodesia and South Africa a decade earlier. The migration legislation also implicitly contained a selection along racial lines. Access to the Colony was prevented to all persons unable to read or write in any European language.[23] Moreover, this clause could be reinforced by the first article of the same law stating that people could be classified as 'undesirable' because of their 'style of living'. As such, the legislation applied in Katanga targeted 'Arabs', 'Muslims' and 'Asians', as was the case with similar laws introduced in other regions of Belgium's Africa.[24] Throughout the colonial period, an increasingly strict control was also enforced on non-Belgian Europeans willing to enter the Belgian Colony. In order to assure an effective control of the passengers of the new railway lines between Katanga and the Atlantic Ocean, the 'Benguelian axis' coming from Lobito in Angola and the '*voie nationale*' of the B.C.K. coming from Matadi, responsibilities were given to train chefs. Also hotels had to keep a visitors list up to date.[25] However, controlling and channelling migration is not just a matter of legislation. Control of flows had to be negotiated on the ground. Therefore, the modalities of global mobility were a local affair, and, so we will argue, also a spatial one.

Spatializing urban segregation

In 1910, Émile Wangermée, vice governor of the Katanga province, and Halewijck, representative of the *Union Minière du Haut-Katanga (U.M.H.K.)*, designed the first urban plan for Lubumbashi's European quarter in collaboration with the Swiss engineer Itten and the architect Mortier.[26] The basis of the plan, a grid pattern of orthogonal *Avenues* dividing the city's 450 hectares in equal blocks of 250 by 120 meters, is said to have been based on city patterns applied in centres like Bulawayo, the city in Southern Rhodesia along the 1910 railway closest to Lubumbashi.[27] The grid testifies to the economic logic underlying the spatial organisation of the urban territory. Organizing the city according

23 Décret réglant la police de l'immigration, August 8th, 1922, art. 2.

24 For the explicit anti-Islamic motivation of these criteria, see: G. Castryck, Moslims in Usumbura (1897–1962). Sociale geschiedenis van de islamitische gemeenschappen van Usumbura in de koloniale tijd, unpublished PhD dissertation, Ghent University 2006, p. 95.

25 These measures were defined in the ordinance of the general governor on September16th, 1925. A series of fiches filled in by hotel managers with information on the different hotel guests are held in the Africa Archives: cf. A.A., GG. 1.213 Fiches d'occupation successives habitations colonies blocs 28-41 Élisabethville (1951-58). Applications to enter the territory submitted by Belgian colonists were deliberately favoured over those from non-Belgian migrants. A.A., GG. 20.434 Police territoriale Élisabethville immigration et immatriculation; GG. 13.733 État-civil Élisabethville Service Population Blanche immigration; A.A., GG. 17.299 Police Élisabethville expulsions 1930/34 immigration et immatriculation 1943/45.

26 See the map 'Plan Parcellaire d'Élisabethville', C.S.K., scale 1/5.000, Élisabethville, November 22th, 1910, in: A.A., Cartes (295).

27 Émile Wangermée was familiar with these cities in Southern Africa and their spatial layout of which he spoke in a favourable way. See: É. Wangermée, Grands Lacs Africains et Katanga. Souvenirs de voyages, Brussels 1909; B. Fetter, The Creation of Elisabethville (note 1), p. 29. In his analysis of Lubumbashi's urbanisation in the 1910s, Bruno De Meulder mentions, among others, a 1913 quote of F. Vander Elst that underlines the relation with Bulawayo's plan '*en forme de grille*'. For an urban history on Bulawayo, see: T. Ranger, Bulawayo Burning. The Social History of a Southern African City, 1893–1960, Woodbridge 2010.

to lots enabled the *Comité Spécial du Katanga* (C.S.K.)[28] to valorise the 900 parcels in an efficient way. As Bruno De Meulder has already suggested, early urban planning practice in Lubumbashi should be considered first and foremost as a real estate operation.[29]

Only one year after Lubumbashi's foundation in 1910, an African quarter emerged next to the European '*ville*', from which it was separated by a zone of 170 meters wide.[30] A spatial policy was introduced in order to assure the segregation of the city along neat racial lines, with a prison being erected in this in-between space.[31] In spatial terms, however, a neat binary structure of the urban form only became explicit a few years later, with the implementation in the 1920s of a so-called '*zone neutre*' or '*cordon sanitaire*' of 500 meters wide, separating the European city from the newly built native town *commune Albert I^er^*. In line with the discourse on colonial urban planning elsewhere,[32] this urban operation was argued for on the basis of concerns of sanitation and hygiene,[33] but it was also underscored by a growing anxiety among the city's European population for what it considered a risk of 'promiscuity' between the two urban communities.[34] This neat spatial segregation would significantly structure the development of the city's urban form in the following decades to the point that of all Congolese cities, Lubumbashi is one of the most telling cases to demonstrate the segregationist nature of Belgian colonial urban planning.

Colonial authorities thus vigorously attempted to keep the population mix in this bustling town segregated. However, Lubumbashi's spatial organisation cannot be reduced to a too simplistic binary scheme of a divided colonial city. While a strict control of the migration flows by the Migration Service was intended to ensure a social-economic selection within the European urban population, land legislation and the monopoly of the C.S.K. over the land market provided additional tools for implementing a social stratification within the urban grid as well. Even before the final urban plan for the city was finished, a juridical fundament for the land tenure system was established in the form of a sale and renting legislation that already informed negotiations when the first parcels in the city were bought or rented.[35] The strict requirement to erect a construc-

28 The C.S.K.'s headquarters, the president and the high administration's offices, were situated in Brussels, Belgium. In Lubumbashi, the committee was represented by a general director, accompanied by an administration, which has progressively expanded during the colonial period.

29 B. De Meulder, Kuvuande Mbote (note 4), 77-78.

30 See the maps of the city's first African quarter: Cité indigène d'Élisabethville, C.S.K. scale 1/2.500, [1910s, update 1921], in: A.A., GG. 15.840 Hôpital des Noirs/Indigènes à Élisabethville. Adjudication et plans (1920-22); Élisabethville. Plan cadastral, scale 1/2.000, Élisabethville, 10 November 1914, in: A.A., Cartes X 5634.

31 F. Grévisse, Le centre extra-coutumier d'Élisabethville: quelques aspects de la politique indigène du Haut-Katanga industriel, Brussels 1951.

32 For a discussion of the practice of urban segregation on a worldwide scale in these years, see C. Nightingale, Segregation. A Global History of Divided Cities, Chicago 2012.

33 Contemporary sources, for instance, explain the zone's width in relation to the maximum flight radius of the mosquito transmitting malaria. R. Hins, L'Urbanisme au Katanga, in: Essor du Congo, (May 1931), s.p.

34 N. Esgain, Scènes de la vie quotidienne à Elisabethville dans les années vingt, in: J.-L. Vellut (ed.), Itinéraires croisés de la modernité. Congo belge (1920–1950), Tervuren/Paris 2000, 57-70.

35 Terres. Règlements, ventes et locations. Pièces de 23/1/01 au 8/6/11, Instructions pour la vente et la location des terres, in: Archives of the Royal Museum for Central Africa (Tervuren, Belgium) (hereafter R.M.C.A.), Funds of

tion in durable materials on the parcel within six months after the land transaction was meant to encourage a rapid development of the young mining city. By defining specific directions about the desired destination of each parcel, the C.S.K. furthermore introduced a functional zoning in Lubumbashi's quasi-uniform grid pattern. Moreover, each functional zone was to be differentiated by its formal appearance, which was determined by a particular building legislation. On the *place Royale*, all public buildings related to the colonial power were situated: the pavilion of major Wangermée, the court house, the headquarters of the *Banque du Congo belge*, and the *Cercle Albert et Élisabeth*, meeting place *par excellence* for the colonial elite.[36] The *place Royale* thus constituted an administrative and political node, situated on the symmetrical axis of the European town's grid, which itself was bordered to the east by the governor's palace and the cathedral.[37] A commercial zone, the streetscape of which was defined by one-storey buildings with arcades, was created next to the railway station. The remaining parts of the urban grid constituted the residential zone, characterized by parcels consisting of a one-family house surrounded by a large garden.

By fixing and permanently adapting the prices of building lots, and at times even artificially creating scarcity of lots for sale, the C.S.K. had the power to not only stimulate but also redirect the spatial development within the European quarter. In the early years following the city's foundation, for instance, the center of commercial activity had spontaneously developed along the *Avenue du Moero*, one of the most intensively used streets since it connected the railway station and the site of the U.M.H.K.factory. The C.S.K. soon intervened by directing the main commercial activity to the *Avenues de l'Étoile du Congo* and *Royale* in order to strengthen the status of the geometric centre of the urban grid. The *Avenue Royale* was the only street diagonally cutting through the uniform grid plan, linking the railway station to the *place Royale* where the colonial power was reflected in the construction of representative buildings. By supporting the construction of large commercial buildings and hotels, and by strategically locating the post office on the *Avenue Royale*, this street was transformed into one of the city's most prestigious commercial and animated axes.[38]

the C.S.K. (hereafter C.S.K.), inv. 3, n°579, dossier 563-1. The legislation was revised in 1920 and 1949, cf. Terres. Rapports pour l'année 1910, Rapport sur la marche des opérations du C.S.K. depuis le 11 septembre 1910, 3 [General director C.S.K.], in: R.M.C.A., Funds C.S.K., inv. 12, n° 232, Terres. Rapports pour l'année 1910, 1911, 1912.

36 The initial court house, erected on the lot occupied nowadays by the town hall, has been replaced between 1928 and 1931 by the actual building on the opposite lot. The construction of the town hall was only finished after 1960.

37 We have described the *Avenue du Katanga*, later also known as the *Avenue de Tabora,* elsewhere as the city's 'axis of power'. See J. Lagae, S. Boonen et. al., Des pierres qui (nous) parlent… Une histoire visuelle de la ville de Lubumbashi, in: S. Njami (ed.), Catalogue Rencontres Picha – 2ème Biennale de la Photographie et d'Art Vidéo, Lubumbashi 2010, Paris 2012, pp. 21-56.

38 The reports of the C.S.K. testify of this evolution. See for instance: Rapport du Comité Spécial du Katanga. Exercice 1920, Brussels 1921, p. 46.

Locating the '*gens de couleur*'

If we thus can divide Lubumbashi's European town in a representative, a residential and a commercial zone, the monthly reports of the general director of the C.S.K. to his president in Brussels, however, contain multiple references to the existence of a fourth 'distinct and clearly determined' zone which is not described in functional but rather in racial terms: 'Adjacent to the native quarter, we find the quarter of the coloured people, mostly traders of goods for natives.'[39] In Belgian colonial legislation, the term '*gens de couleur*' was commonly used to denote Italian, Greek and Portuguese retail traders who conducted business with both the city's African and European communities, but targeted especially an African clientele. Because of their status of small traders, their close commercial contacts with the city's African population and their willingness to learn and adopt local languages, practices and customs, colonial administration sometimes referred to them in internal communication as 'second rate whites'.[40] The African population regarded these traders as holding a different, more intermediary position than Belgian colonizers did.[41] So-called '*Indous*', i.e. migrants coming from British India, and '*arabisés*' were also counted among the '*gens de couleur*'. Colonial authorities often used the denomination '*asiatiques*' as a synonym, regardless of the particular origin and background of those described by this label. This particular colonial lexicon, then, demonstrates that the attitude of the Belgian colonial authorities vis-à-vis these migrant communities was not unlike that of French colonizers confronted with a Lebanese diaspora in West-Africa, members of which were commonly described as "interlopers of empire".[42] As such, these people were as much vectors of global connectedness in Lubumbashi as the U.M.H.K. was, since they facilitated interaction between people and exchange of goods from across the world.

'Second rate whites' were intermediaries between the black and white communities not only in social, but also in spatial terms. Despite its mainly commercial character, the zone for '*gens de couleur*' was not counted as part of the European town's commercial zone. Indeed, one of the rare existing maps of Lubumbashi's first African quarter demonstrates the existence of a specific quarter for them situated in the 170 meters wide zone separating the African and European quarter in the first ten years of the city's existence.[43] When racial segregation was reinforced in the 1920s by the creation of a new, more explicit '*zone neutre*', the existing quarter for '*gens de couleur*' was demolished and replaced by a number of particular zones located throughout the city. The extreme southern part of the

39 Avant-projet de rapport général, in: R.M.C.A., Funds C.S.K., inv. 3, n° 548, Rapports généraux, rapports contentieux, rapports généraux publiés en Belgique. 546-54 : Rapports 1913–1923.

40 M. Lwamba Bilonda, Histoire de l'onomastique d'avenues et de places publiques de la ville de Lubumbashi (de 1910 à nos jours), Lubumbashi 2001, p. 28.

41 See the introduction of Antoine Lumenganeso in G. Antippas, Pionniers méconnus du Congo Belge, Brussels 2008.

42 Andrew Arsan, Interlopers of Empire. The Lebanese Diaspora in Colonial French West Africa, London 2013.

43 Cité indigène d'Élisabethville, Comité Spécial du Katanga, scale 1/2.500, [1910s, update 1921], in: A.A., GG. 15.840 Hôpital des Noirs/Indigènes à Élisabethville. Adjudication et plans (1920-22).

European quarter's commercial zone was delimited as a zone for 'coloured' detail retailers that, according to the C.S.K.'s annual reports, was to be separated from the 'official' commercial zone by the *Avenue du Moero*.

Several 1920s land deeds relating to the 'coloured' and 'white' commercial quarters demonstrate that land attribution was indeed first and foremost done along racial lines, as a special clause was included in order to control the border between both areas; it stipulated that a special authorization of the colonial administration was necessary to allow for a land transfer between two individuals one of whom was a 'coloured person'.[44] Three other so-called zones for '*gens de couleur*' were introduced in Lubumbashi's urban structure, each of them clearly separated from the European quarter. The first urban plans and the reports of the C.S.K. on the construction of the African quarter *Albert I^er^* indicate that a zone for '*Hindous*' was situated next to parcels attributed to '*commerçants indigènes*' and '*évolués*' in areas touching the road that linked the African neighbourhood to the European town. *Lushois* urban memory informs us about two other zones for 'second rate whites', the quarters *Bakoa* and *de la route Munama*.[45] The quarter *Bakoa*, created in 1925, was a triangular zone situated relatively close to the eastern border of the European quarter, but separated from it by the industrial quarter and the railway line. The quarter's name bears a particular reference to non-Belgian communities, in particular the Indo-Pakistani population who, according to oral history, would have habited this quarter. Similarly, the quarter *de la route Munama,* situated along the extension of the street linking the European and the native quarter but separated from the latter by the railway line going towards Sakania and Southern Africa, is said to have been inhabited by mainly Greek and Jewish people.

While specific forms of trade, such as the selling of fish, were deliberately expelled from the city centre for pragmatic reasons,[46] there seems to be a more consistent pattern. On the basis of fragments of information drawn from different sources, one can indeed start to discern buffer zones inhabited mainly by '*gens de couleur*' located in between the European and African neighbourhoods, which add a layer to the spatial segregation in Lubumbashi's urban form, as they testify both of a colonial attempt to introduce a social stratification within the European community and of a policy of enforcing racial segregation through spatial distribution.[47] While the *Avenues de l'Étoile* and *Royale* offered more qualitative and luxurious products responding to the demands of the urban European

44 Several land deeds contain the following passage: 'The terrain to which this registration certificate relates is sold under the strict condition that it will not be passed on to a member of the coloured community without prior consent of a representative of the *Comité Spécial du Katanga* or of one of his delegates'.

45 We were informed on this by members of the 'Mémoires de Lubumbashi'-research group at the University of Lubumbashi, in particular prof. Michel Lwamba Bilonda, prof. Donatien Dibwe Dia Mwembu and Serge Songa Songa.

46 In several reports of Lubumbashi's *Comité Urbain* we can find applications of so-called '*Hindous*' requiring permission to open trade houses and warehouses for selling fish in or near the Bakoa quarter.

47 Archival material does not allow to affirm firmly that these areas were actually planned by the local authorities as zones for 'second white rates', yet some fragmentary files, fieldwork observations and oral accounts provide convincing elements that these were indeed trade zones particularly occupied by Greeks, Italians and others.

population, the stores on the *Avenues Moero* and *du Sankuru* sold products destined to the city's African population, to the African domestic personnel living in the European quarter as well as to the inhabitants of the native quarter. The '*gens de couleur*"s commercial zone thus attracted the African population, while at the same time limiting the need – and opportunities – for Africans to circulate in the other parts of the European city.
The same local dynamics, however, can also be read in the opposite way. Not only the attempted control and containment from the side of the colonial authorities shaped the urban space, but also the agency of the '*gens the couleur*' to facilitate global connectedness, both in the form of their own migration and networks, in the form of the goods traded in their small shops, and in the form of intercultural contact with African people and languages.
As we discuss in more detail elsewhere,[48] the reality on the ground did not comply with the binary spatial strategies of colonial governmentality as prescribed in the *métropole*. Local authorities were, for instance, forced to be quite creative to provide Belgian colonists with an opportunity to settle in a context geared by strict guidelines. Reports of the C.S.K. demonstrate how Belgian colonists upon arrival in Congo were strongly privileged in their access to the real estate market.[49] More than once, however, the C.S.K. saw itself confronted with speculative transactions from Belgian residents who sought to take direct advantage of the opportunities they were granted.[50] Thereupon, workers' houses were constructed and rented at a very low price. Interestingly enough, the committee no longer provided such solutions on the best situated parcels in town, but for economic reasons rather opted for less favourable lots.[51] As a result Belgian settlers started to reside predominantly at the margins of the grid, rather than in its centre.

"Second rate whites" occupying the city center

At the same time that the streetscapes at the margins of the European town were developed, Lubumbashi's city centre was taking shape through the construction of a number of buildings that defined the new urban image of a colonial city as it was being presented in visual propaganda of the time under the label '*le Katanga ultra moderne*': the post office, the palace of justice, a cinema, and several hotels. What the official discourse more often than not veiled was that the city's centre became gradually occupied by non-Belgian migrants, large parts of which fell within the category of 'second rate whites'. The

48 See our forthcoming PhD dissertation to be defended at Ghent University at the end of 2015, S. Boonen, Fixer, franchir et reconsidérer les limites. Gouvernance et développement urbain à Élisabethville coloniale (RDC).

49 Rapports sur la marche des opérations pendant le mois d'avril 1911, Élisabethville, 30 April 1911, 2, in: R.M.C.A., Funds C.S.K., inv. 12 n° 232.

50 Rapport circonstancie sur la marche des opérations concernant la location et la vente des terrains à Élisabethville. Mois de décembre 1910, 6-7, in: ibidem; letter of M. Scheyvaerts to the minister of Colonies, n° 12668, 19 July 1918, in: R.M.C.A., Funds C.S.K., n° 314 Société Immobilière du Katanga.

51 Rapport circonstancie sur les opérations du Service des terres pendant le mois d'août 1911, 4, in: R.M.C.A., Funds C.S.K., inv. 12 n° 232.

Greek community forms a telling case to discuss the rather ambivalent attitude of local authorities vis-à-vis this phenomenon.

Most of the Greeks that settled in Lubumbashi in the early days had worked on the construction of the railroad and succeeded to build up a sufficient solid community in the city that could take in new family members and relatives coming over from the regions of origin. Throughout the colonial era, the Greeks remained one of the city's largest non-Belgian European communities.[52] *Lushois* urban memory suggests that Greeks were confined to the so-called zone for '*gens de couleur*', to the extent that the zone has been called the '*zone grecque*' by several authors.[53] Reports of the C.S.K. further inform us on a initial mistrust towards the Greek population on behalf of the local authorities. Already in the year of the city's foundation, the general director of C.S.K. pronounced his concerns about the *immatriculation* of Greek migrants, which in his view would lead to the development of an instable urban population unable to fulfil the obligations that were being enforced on owners and renters:

> *… We have here a bunch of Greeks, Egyptians, and so forth, who were engaged to help construct the railway. They have been able to save enough money to rent a plot and build a house of adobe to establish a retail store, a shop where you can buy flour, for instance, or a bar. When the time frame to comply with the building ordinance [requiring to build in durable materials] will have come to an end, these individuals no doubt will abandon their businesses to go to Rhodesia or Southern Africa without us having any means to prevent them. We will then be obliged to demolish their shacks at our expense. We also have to consider the extension of the railway towards Kambove. All these individuals are contractors who change course according to shifting circumstances and regarding the registration and immigration services as they are currently organized, it will become very difficult for us to require them to fulfil their obligations as tenants.*[54]

Reports on land transfers inform us that transactions with certain Greeks considered 'little recommendable' were often labeled as 'speculative manoeuvers' and hence rejected, a decision that the director general described as 'favorable in view of an appropriate occupation of the city'. Interestingly enough, the documents reveal that there was a remarkable willingness to help financially other non-Belgian migrants as well as Belgians

52 Only the British and Italian migrants outnumbered the Greek community. With its 124 members in 1923, the Greek community constituted 5,7 % of the European population (compared to 61,3 % Belgians, 13,5 % Italians and 13,5 % British), corresponding to 14,6 % of the non-Belgian European population ; after the economic crisis, in 1934, there were 102 Greeks in the city, i.e. 4,5 % of the city's European population (compared to 70,8 % Belgians, 15,2 % Italians and 6,1 % British), corresponding to 12,8 % of the non-Belgian European population; in 1951, there were 364 Greeks residing in the city, i.e. 4,3 % of the European population (compared to 77,1 % Belgians, 9,4 % Italians and 4,3 % British), corresponding to 18,8 % of the non-Belgian European population.

53 See, for instance, J.-C. Bruneau, Lubumbashi, capital du cuivre. Ville et citadins au Zaïre méridional , unpublished PhD dissertation, Bordeaux 1990, 376.

54 Rapport sur la marche des opérations concernant la location et la vente. December 1910 (note 33).

who, despite of being in the same financial situation as the Greeks, were considered 'honourable'.[55]

Nevertheless, the power of local authorities remained limited in practice. An analysis of the land deeds of Greek properties in Lubumbashi during the period 1910-1930 demonstrate that a large proportion of the Greek properties were situated outside the so-called zones for 'second rate whites'. Land deeds covering the European quarter reveal that in the first ten years of the city's existence, ten Greek stores were erected outside of the first zone for '*gens de couleur*'. After the introduction in the 1920s of a more neat spatial separation between the European and African quarters, there still existed a dispersed Greek occupancy within the former, even if several Greek properties were also situated in the newly designated 'coloured' buffer zone in the extreme south of the European quarter.

Despite its efforts, the C.S.K. thus failed in implementing a strict control of access to land. 'Coloured persons' with means at their disposal could present themselves at public auctions to acquire a parcel on a localization of their choice, and the C.S.K was unable to decline an offer on explicit racial criteria. Moreover, the C.S.K. was eager to make exceptions to the common guidelines, as for instance in the case of those businesses which were potentially promising for the urban economy and society as a whole. This explains the presence of some constructions built by the Greek community in the 'official' commercial zone. Greeks, for instance, ran several hotels that became crucial components of Lushois urban culture: the 'Hôtel Makris', which became the meeting place of Lubumbashi's Greek community, the 'Hôtel Central' and the 'Hôtel de Bruxelles', situated on the prestigious *Avenue de l'Étoile.*[56] The 'Théâtre Parthénon', situated along the *Avenue de l'Étoile*, near to the *Place de la Poste* was established in 1920 by a Greek citizen, Bombas.[57] It became one of the most frequented places in town.[58] Providing a diverse program appealing to a European clientele, the theatre constituted a crucial cultural and social venue for *Lushois* urban life during the interwar years. As one contemporary observer noted during a visit to the city in 1923, every evening its façade in Greek style was illuminated 'as those of the most beautiful movie theaters in Brussels'. Together with the Greek Orthodox Church that was built in 1956, the 'Théâtre Parthénon' formed a tangible reminder of the importance of Greeks in Lubumbashi's colonial society.

If the origin of the Greek presence in Lubumbashi should be traced to the construction of the railroad coming from the south, the acquisition of land by members of this com-

55 C.S.K.'s local representative, Service des terres. Rapport sur la marche des opérations pendant le mois février 1911, 2, in: ibid.

56 In this way, the Greek community reinforced the important role it had already played in the hotel business since the city's creation. Indeed, the Greek Stratis G. Bombas established in 1910 one of the city's first hotels, 'Au jardin du Katanga', and transformed it in 1914 in the 'Hôtel Aristocratique'.

57 The exact location of the 'Théâtre Parthénon' has been found through our research in the funds of the Land Registration Service. See the land deed XIIf 77 of the parcel with communal number 37i on name of the *Banque Commerciale du Congo*, October 17th, 1919, signed by Dufour, in: Land Registration funds of the Katanga province, volume XIIf, folio 77, A.A.

58 G. Antippas, Pionniers méconnus du Congo Belge, Brussels 2008. The original building doesn't exist anymore. Nowadays, the parcel is occupied by the Banque Congolaise.

munity clearly demonstrates their long lasting impact on the making and shaping of the city, and their crucial role in sustaining the urban economy via small trade. One could make a similar argument for the Italian community, which from the 1920s onwards became a crucial actor in the construction industry. Lubumbashi also experienced a strong Jewish presence since the early days of the city's existence, yet the Jews presented a pattern of migration that is somewhat more complex as it shifted considerably over time, bringing in people of different origins, nationalities and social status over the years.

Lubumbashi, a land of promise?

The core of the Jewish community in Lubumbashi was composed of Ashkenazi originating mainly from the Russian empire and having passed through South-Africa and Rhodesia. After the establishment of the *Union Minière* in 1907, they crossed the Belgian-British border in order to settle near the mining sites.[59] Despite the Ashkenazi's quantitative superiority, a growing number of Sephardic Jews, coming mainly from the Island of Rhodes,[60] started to settle in Lubumbashi from 1911 onwards. Many had already lived in South Africa or Rhodesia for quite some time before entering Congo by rail.

When the C.S.K.'s local representative communicated his concerns to the committee's general director in Brussels regarding the difficulties Belgians met in their effort of settling permanently in the colony, he pointed out the difference with the two Jewish communities who both seemed to have succeeded in making their life in Katanga, even if they had a very different social status in *Lushois* urban society:[61] At one end, he made notice of the 'people who were accustomed to South-African life', who had an 'audacity' and a 'light-heartedness' which the Belgian candidate-settlers in his view lacked. He was thereby referring to Sephardic Jews (but he also mentioned in this respect Italians and Portuguese) who were attracted by the young promising mining city, and usually arriving with few or no means, and most often even lacking the necessary funds to return home in case of failure. Similar to the case of the Greeks, migration and settlement of the Sephardic community was as such largely made possible by private networks (family, relatives…) in which mutual aid (financial and social) and determination were main factors for success. Nevertheless, they launched themselves in the establishment of small businesses, put up with meagre funding or via credits obtained via relatives. At the other end of the spectrum stood those migrants, who 'have funds, and many of them have business in Rhodesia or South Africa, which makes things still easier for them.'[62] The

59 Other important Jewish communities settled in Bulawayo (1894), Salisbury (1895) and Gwelo (1901). On the Jewish communities in Rhodesia, see: H. MacMillan and F. Shapiro, Zion in Africa. The Jews of Zambia, Londres/New York 1999.

60 At the time, the Island of Rhodes was a colony of Italy.

61 Terres. Rapport pour l'année 1910, 5, in: R.M.C.A., Funds C.S.K., inv. 12 n° 232.

62 Rapport sur les opérations du Service des terres pendant le mois d'août 1911 (note 49), p. 7.

Ashkenazi indeed very often possessed a certain capital, had good connections or were in service of large, mainly British, enterprises assuring the necessary financial support for their settlement in the city. Very often, they were able to establish large commercial businesses on the important commercial axes in the city centre.

A mapping of all the land purchases by the two Jewish communities spanning the period 1910–1930 reveals how from the very beginning these migrants occupied the most favourable and promising parcels in Lubumbashi. Only a limited number of properties were situated in the zones for '*gens de couleur*', while most were to be found across the whole commercial zone and even in the residential zone of the European quarter. The different social statuses of the two Jewish communities are also clearly reflected in the settlement patterns. The focal point of the purchases by Sephardi was clearly situated more in the southern parts of the urban grid, while the parcels belonging to the Ashkenazi could be found along the prestigious commercial axis of the *Avenue de l'Étoile du Congo* and around the *Place de la Poste* and *the Place Royale*. The importance of the presence of the Jewish community was furthermore marked by the construction in 1929 of a synagogue on a prominent site in the European city centre, on a square at the end of the *Avenue Tabora* and situated nearby the railway station. Designed by one of the leading colonial architects of the time, the building still stands today as an important reminder of the role of the Ashkenazis in *Lushois* urban society.

In this respect, it is somewhat ironic that the synagogue was built exactly at the time that Askhenazi presence in Lubumbashi would diminish significantly as a result of the 1929 worldwide economic crisis that hit the industrial province of Katanga hard. While in the beginning of the 1920s, the number of Ashkenazi purchases of parcels was growing steadily, no purchase was registered after 1929. As a result of the crisis, many wealthy Europeans (including Ashkenazi) left Lubumbashi, and the European population rate dropped from 4.170 persons in 1931 to 2.874 in 1935.[63] Not having the necessary funds to leave the country, however, many of the non-Belgian European communities (for example the Greeks or the Sephardic Jews) did not have another possibility than to stay and try, with the creation and help of local associations, to overcome the crisis.[64] If Lubumbashi became in the early 1930s a 'ghost city'[65] it nevertheless retained a certain 'cosmopolitan' feel.

63 See also: B. Fetter, The creation of Elisabethville (note 1); M. Bourla Errera, Moïse Levy, un Rabbin au Congo (1937–1991), Brussels 2000; J. Sohier, Quelques traits (note 9).

64 Following the example of Rhodesia's Greek community in 1923, the *Union des Hellènes du Congo Belge* was constituted under the presidency of Jean Tatalias, director of the Katanga Congo Motors. This organisation focused in particular on supporting members suffering from health conditions. In 1928, a Greek consulate was founded. In 1942-43, the association changed its name into the *Union Hellénique Orthodoxe d'Élisabethville*. Only in 1947, it was recognized by Belgium by Royal Decree. See: G. Antippas, Pionniers méconnus (note 56), p. 77.

65 J. Stengers, Combien le Congo a-t-il coûté la Belgique ?, Brussels 1957.

Lubumbashi as a "portal of globalisation"

A visit to the Jewish cemetery in Lubumbashi today provides a poignant reminder that the common narrative depicting the city first and foremost as an urban environment completely dominated by the mining industry needs at least some nuance. Of course, the Union Minière du Haut Katanga (later renamed Gécamines) played a crucial role in *Lushios* everyday life and it is thus no surprise that the notion of *Kazi* or paid labour occupies such a prominent place in local urban memory,[66] but as we have demonstrated in this contribution the city's landscape also very clearly testifies of the 'cosmopolitan' nature of its urban society. Despite the Belgian colonial policy of segregation, the '*gens d'ailleurs*' fulfilled a mediating role that facilitated exchange of goods and interaction between people from around the world. Rather than considering Lubumbashi as a Belgian colonial city, it makes more sense to recognize a 'portal of globalisation' in the cracks of the Belgian colonial attempts to socially and spatially control the town. Paraphrasing the characterization of 'portals of globalization', we can see at work how colonial authorities tried 'to channel and therefore control the effects of global connectedness' and how the presence in town of globally connected people challenged this attempted colonial order.[67]

This invites us to broaden the spectrum of agents that were crucial in making and shaping Lubumbashi's urban landscape. Its urban culture was the product of various spheres of influence, some coming from the metropole while others originated in the immediate vicinity, in nearby regions and colonies, in Southern Europe, India and beyond. The mobility and interaction between these spheres, both locally and over long distances, has in the end been at least as decisive as the Belgian colonial attempts to inhibit and curtail these exchanges, and contributed as much to the global connectedness of Lubumbashi as the *Union Minière* or the railway as such.

By presenting Lubumbashi as a city constructed by '*des gens d'ailleurs*', and discussing how Belgian colonial authorities responded to the flows of migrants whose presence was considered unsettling yet necessary to sustain the local urban economy, we comply with what Jean-Luc Vellut already noted years ago, in his critical review of Isidore Ndaywel's 1998 magnum opus *Histoire générale du Congo*, namely that we cannot write Congo's colonial history without taking into account its transnational and trans-local dimensions.[68]

66 See in this respect the work of the Congolese historian Donatien Dibwe Dia Mwembu: Bana Shaba abandonnés par leur père : structures de l'autorité et histoire sociale de la famille ouvrière au Katanga 1910-1997, Paris 2001 ; Idem, Le travail, hier et aujourd'hui: mémoires de Lubumbashi, Paris 2004.

67 M. Middell and K. Naumann, Global history and the spatial turn: from the impact of area studies to the study of critical junctures of globalization, in: Journal of Global Studies, 5 (2010) 1, p. 162.

68 J.-L. Vellut, "Prestige et pauvreté de l'histoire nationale. A propos d'une histoire générale du Congo", in: Revue belge de philologie et d'histoire, 77 (1999), pp. 480-517.

Ill. 1.: Map of Lubumbashi/Elisabethville, situation 1920s, with an indication of the commercial zone and zones reserved for 'gens de couleur'. Drawing by Sam Lanckriet, Ghent University, 2015.



Ill. 2.: Mapping of properties of Greeks, Sepharades & Ashkenaze in Lubumbashi/ Elisabethville, situation 1920s. Drawing by Sam Lanckriet, Ghent University, 2015.



Acknowledgements

This paper results from research conducted since 2000 in archives both in Belgium and the Democratic Republic of the Congo and via fieldwork. First of all we thank the staff of the Afrika Archives (Brussels), in particular Pierre Dandoy and Rafaël Storme, who, over the years, have been helpful in identifying particular files related to our topic of research. We would like to express our gratitude to those who have accompanied us on our many trips in Lubumbashi and helped us gaining an understanding of the city's morphology and its inhabitants, in particular some members of the "Mémoires de Lubumbashi"-group: prof. Donatien Dibwe Mia Mwembu, prof. Michel Lwamba Bilonda, and research assistant Serge SongaSonga Mitwa of the University of Lubumbashi, as well as prof. em. Bogumil Jewsiewicki of the University of Laval, Québec, whose work has been extremely inspiring. We would also like to thank Patrick Mudekereza, Sammy Baloji, Georges Senga and all the other artists at Picha, as well as the late Hubert Maheux, Marc Pabois, Marine Issumo and Moïse Panga. Our research has been supported by the FWO under grant number G.0786.09N ("City, architecture and colonial space in Matadi and Lubumbashi, Congo. A historical analysis from a translocal perspective"), while additional funding for conducting fieldwork was provided by Picha, the Flemish Community and the Dept. of Architecture and Urban Planning of Ghent University. Finally we would like to thank Geert Castryck for having invited us to participate in the session he organized at the European Social Science History Conference (23-26 April 2014, Vienna), where we presented a preliminary version of this paper.

The Belgian Base at Kigoma's Railhead (1920s–1930s). Territorial Ambivalence in an Inland Indian Ocean Port[1]

Geert Castryck

RESÜMEE

Das Stadtgebiet um Kigoma dient seit der Mitte des 19. Jahrhunderts als Drehscheibe zwischen der Region um den Tanganjikasee und dem Indischen Ozean. Obwohl es seither insgesamt an globaler Bedeutung verloren hat, bewirkten die von den Deutschen gebaute Eisenbahn zwischen Dar es Salaam und Kigoma und der belgische Konzessionshafen am Kopfbahnhof Kigomas in den Jahren bis 1930 einen kurzzeitigen Aufschwung. Kigoma als mit dem Indischen Ozean verbundener Inlandshafen stellte die kürzeste Verbindung zwischen der mineralreichen Region Katanga und dem Weltmarkt dar. Im Rahmen eines belgisch-britischen Abkommens nach dem Ersten Weltkrieg wurde diese Verbindung unter belgische Führung gestellt.
Dieser Artikel argumentiert, dass der kurzlebige Erfolg von Kigoma um 1930 durch Pragmatismus ermöglicht wurde. Statt auf formalen Rechten zu beharren, haben alle Beteiligten vor Ort einen reibungslosen Betrieb des Hafens bevorzugt. Sobald das Ausmaß der belgischen extraterritorialen Rechte und die Eingrenzungen der britischen Souveränität aber klar wurden, verlor der Hafen wieder an globaler Bedeutung.

In the historical comedy *Black Adder the Third*, Blackadder asks his servant Baldrick if he has any idea what irony is. Baldrick answers: "Yeah! It's like goldy and bronzy, only it's made of iron." Irony and history go together well, as in the case of the *Eisenbahn* (literally iron road) constructed by the German colonial government in order to connect Dar es

1 An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 2nd International AEGIS Thematic Conference on Africa and the Indian Ocean, Lisbon, 9 April 2015. I thank the Centre for Area Studies at Leipzig University for supporting my research on the urban history of Kigoma-Ujiji, and I thank Katja Naumann, Forrest Kilimnik, and the participants at the Lisbon conference for comments on earlier versions of this paper.

Salaam with Kigoma on Lake Tanganyika, and hence with eastern Congo. The railway reached Kigoma on 1 February 1914. On Tuesday, 30 June 1914, the line was handed over from the construction company to the railway company.[2] On the previous Sunday, the heir to the Austro-Hungarian throne had been shot in Sarajevo. The subsequent whims of history would inhibit the Germans from using their brand-new railway for what it was meant for: transporting riches from Congo to the Indian Ocean.[3]

The First World War was soon exported to the European colonies in Africa. From the Belgian Congo, which had become a Belgian colony less than six years before the war started, troops under Belgian command invaded German East Africa in 1916 and the town of Kigoma fell in Belgian hands on 28 July of that year. What is now known as the Kigoma urban area has been the main hub connecting the lands and people around Lake Tanganyika with the Indian Ocean and the world economy since around the mid-nineteenth century. First centred in the historical town of Ujiji and linked to Bagamoyo via the central caravan route,[4] later centred in the Bay of Kigoma and linked with Dar es Salaam via the central railway line, the Kigoma urban area as a whole remained the infrastructural pivot for traffic to and from East-Central Africa until this day. This role as hub for the region explains why the Germans chose this place as railhead for their iron road to the riches of the Congo. However, this regional and historical importance does not mean that the global commercial and strategic importance of the region continued unabatedly. Long-distance trade activities had seen ups and downs in the nineteenth century and the same is true for the period under scrutiny in this paper. A new boom in the economic and commercial domain was short-lived but nevertheless undeniable for almost a decade that lasted from the mid-1920s until the Great Depression. By then, however, Kigoma was no longer under Belgian control, but, remarkably, its port still was.

In 1921 the Belgians handed over the area under military occupation, including the town of Kigoma, to the British, but they were granted privileges and a concession in Kigoma's port. This was part of the deal to have the Belgians evacuate the territory they had occupied during the war. This deal, further including a Belgian port in Dar es Salaam on the Indian Ocean shores and a privileged use of the central railway, gave the Belgian Congo and the new Belgian mandate territories of Ruanda-Urundi an all-Belgian outlet to the Indian Ocean. Legally, this Anglo-Belgian agreement is quite straightforward; granting the Belgians some privileges and concessions on the Tanganyika Territory, which had become a British mandate territory in the aftermath of the war. However, the implementation on the ground opened a window of opportunities for all parties involved. This led to

2 Bodleian Library of Commonwealth and African Studies at Rhodes House, Oxford (RHO), MSS. Afr. s. 900 (1), History of Central Railway by C. Gillman.

3 Chrétien, Jean-Pierre, "Le «désenclavement» de la région des Grands Lacs dans les projets économiques allemands au début du XXe siècle", in: Département d'histoire de l'Université du Burundi (eds.), Histoire sociale de l'Afrique de l'Est (XIXe-XXe siècle): actes du colloque de Bujumbura (17-24 octobre 1989), Paris 1991, p. 342-343.

4 For more information on the nineteenth-century history of the area, see: Norman R. Bennett, Arab Versus European: Diplomacy and War in Nineteenth-Century East Central Africa, New York 1986, and Beverly B. Brown, Ujiji: The History of a Lakeside Town, Boston University 1973 (PhD Thesis).

a short-lived boom of the Kigoma-Dar es Salaam connection in the late 1920s and early 1930s. One could expect Kigoma to be the minor one of the two ports, funnelling goods to and from the proper Indian Ocean port at Dar es Salaam, but in fact it was the other way around with Kigoma being the place where the formalities, transactions, logistics, shipping, and handling were primarily taken care of, hence being the actual command centre of the Belgian bases (also referred to as Belbases).

In this paper, the focus is on the heydays of Kigoma's role as an inland Indian Ocean port in the 1920s and early 1930s. The success was made possible by both stretching and not insisting too much on the legal rights of the Belgians in the port of Kigoma, which de facto meant that on the one hand all port activities took place in the Belgian-run port, and on the other hand the Belgians did not make use of prerogatives which would have required a distinction between Belgian and British port activities. Thus, not only could the agreement as such be seen as an exception to a territorial order in the narrow sense, but also locally, within the port of Kigoma, the spatial organization and the operation of the port was kept ambivalent.

Kigoma's long tradition of connecting worlds, its infrastructural connectivity, and the institutional peculiarities of the "Belgian" port, which is at the heart of this article, make the town a fine example of what Matthias Middell and Katja Naumann described as portals of globalization, namely "places that have been centres of world trade or global communication, have served as entrance points for cultural transfer, and where institutions and practices for dealing with global connectedness have been developed."[5] This paper in particular focuses on the institutional and informal construction of the lake port of Kigoma as a Belgian Indian Ocean port on British territory. The story starts with the Belgian occupation during and immediately after the First World War, followed by privileged presence guaranteed by a British-Belgian treaty, and reaching a decisive turning point in the early 1930s. Primarily highlighting the interwar period, I reveal how territorial ambiguity and improvised pragmatism defied the lines of sovereignty and territoriality in the colonial period, both on the local and the international level. As such, this paper can be seen as an exercise in colonial history after the spatial turn.

First World War: Settling European Scores (1914–1921)

During the First World War, troops under Belgian command conquered parts of German East Africa as far east as Morogoro, less than 200 km from the Indian Ocean coast. However, only in the westernmost part of the colony, including Kigoma and its port, did they install an occupation government, leaving the rest of the territory to the British.[6] By the end of the war, though, it became clear that the Belgians would not be allowed

5 Matthias Middell, and Katja Naumann, "Global history and the spatial turn: from the impact of area studies to the study of critical junctures of globalization", in: Journal of Global History, 5 (March 2010) 1, pp. 162-163.

6 Hew Strachan, The First World War in Africa, Oxford 2004.

to maintain their control in the area. As a matter of fact, the northwestern part of the former German East Africa had never been Belgium's first priority; they had hoped to use these territories as diplomatic currency in order to obtain land close to the mouth of the Congo or to loosen the free trade obligations placed on the Belgian Congo.[7] In the end, however, the Paris Peace Conference would result in Belgium getting the mandate over Rwanda and Burundi, as well as a perpetual lease, for one Belgian franc per year, of the port sites in Dar es Salaam and Kigoma, allowing Belgian transit to and from the Belgian Congo, Rwanda, and Burundi, free of dues, fees, deposits, or guarantees of any description. In one way or another, the port of Kigoma would stay under Belgian management for almost 80 years, despite British rule and Tanzanian independence.[8]

The extraterritorial Belgian privileges in the British mandate territory of Tanganyika that was about to be founded were the result of an often neglected chapter of the 1919 Paris peace negotiations, which dealt with the parts of German East Africa the Belgian-led troops had conquered and still occupied at the time. The Belgian-Congolese troops had already given up Tabora but still occupied the western part of the former German East Africa, from Karema in the south to the Ugandan border in the north, including 250 km of the railway, and still having access to Lake Victoria. Against this background, the Belgian and British negotiators, Pierre Orts and Lord Alfred Milner, started their negotiations. They both had a strictly territorial agenda. The outcome of their negotiations also fitted nicely within the legal framework of imperial territoriality. The British got the whole of Lake Victoria and almost all of Lake Tanganyika's eastern shore, including the railhead at Kigoma. Belgium got the mandate over Rwanda and Burundi, two semi-autonomous districts in the northwest of the former colony.[9] Territorially the Belgians got just over five per cent of German East Africa's total surface, but demographically this represented over 40 per cent of the population.[10] Up until this point, Orts and Milner practised business as usual, carving up the colonial cake amongst European colonizers, thereby respecting the power relations between them.

The devil, however, is in the details. The compromise Orts and Milner struck about Kigoma and Belgian access to the Indian Ocean met both the territorial strategic desires of the British and the economic strategic desires of the Belgians. Roughly speaking, the Belgians relinquished the land, but could do what they wanted on – from then on – British territory. This led to a port of Kigoma – as well as a section of the port of Dar es

7 Afrikaans Archief, Brussel (AAB), Affaires Étrangères (AE/II), 3289 (1854), Accords Milner-Orts.

8 Guido Fallentheyn, Belbases in Tanzania, http://www.fallentheyn.be/EN/Guido_Belbases.html (accessed 18 January 2016).

9 O. Lauwers, "Hommage à Pierre Orts (3 novembre 1872–12 juin 1958) ", in: Koninklijke Academie voor Koloniale Wetenschappen – Mededelingen der Zittingen (Nieuwe Reeks), IV (1958) 4, pp. 913-916; W. Ganshof van der Meersch, "Orts (Pierre-Charles-Auguste-Raphaël", in: Biographie Belge d'Outre-Mer, Vol. VII-A, 1973, pp. 367-368; Bonaventure Bandira, "Les négociations belgo-britanniques au sujet des concessions belges à Dar-es-Salaam et Kigoma", in: Histoire sociale de l'Afrique de l'Est…, p. 364-367.

10 Chrétien, "Le « désenclavement » …", p. 352.

Salaam – that was nominally British but Belgian in its operations. The outcome was an extraterritorial Belgian Indian Ocean port more than 1000 km from that ocean.[11]

The Orts-Milner Agreement was an agreement of principle, which was signed on 30 May 1919 and accepted by the Paris Peace Conference. The most important part of the agreement was undoubtedly the Belgian mandate over Ruanda-Urundi, which became part of the 1923 mandate agreements of the League of Nations. In the context of this research, however, we are more interested in the deal on Belgian traffic through East Africa, including concessions in Kigoma and Dar es Salaam. This part of the agreement was turned into the Convention between Great Britain and Belgium with a View to Facilitate Belgian Traffic through the Territories of East Africa on 15 March 1921.[12] The convention consists of a preamble and 12 articles.[13] In the preamble, the contracting parties declare that the convention, which gives effect to the agreement of principle mentioned above, is an outcome of the joint efforts in Africa during the First World War and is meant to give access to the sea to portions of the Belgian Congo as well as to the mandate territories of Ruanda-Urundi.

The central article of the convention was Article 2, which specified the underlying principle of freedom of transit to and from the Belgian Congo and Ruanda-Urundi across East Africa. Additionally, it stated that there shall be no distinction with how British persons, mail, goods, ships, railway carriages, and trucks were to be treated. Traffic to and from the Belgian Congo and Ruanda-Urundi was exempt from all customs duty or other similar duties, except for a charge of 25 cents per parcel. However, if the transit passed through the Belgian concession ports of Kigoma and Dar es Salaam, even this 25 cents charge was not due.

Article 5 stipulated the perpetual lease of suitable sites in the ports of Kigoma and Dar es Salaam for an annual rent of 1 Belgian franc. Apart from compliance with British law and order, the Belgians were free to do as they consider suitable within the limits of these sites, and had the right to entrust the workings of the sites to concessionaires for durations of up to 25 years (Article 6).

Article 9 freed the Belgian sites from any interference from the British customs authorities for goods in transit to or from the Belgian Congo and Ruanda-Urundi. Moreover, Belgian-sealed trucks or wagons on the Kigoma–Dar es Salaam railway were also exempt from all British customs formalities (Article 10). This meant that the Belgians could act independently from British interference as far as transit to and from Belgian colonial

11 William Roger Louis, Ends of British Imperialism: The Scramble for Empire, Suez, and Decolonization – Collected Essays, London / New York 2006, pp. 218-221. That the Belgians could do what they wanted within the concession was stated by Milner during the negotiations (AAB, AE/II, 2948 (717), Lettre du Ministre des Colonies au Ministre des Affaires Étrangères, 19 novembre 1930).

12 For the negotiations to turn the agreement of principle into a binding convention, see Bandira, "Les négociations belgo-britanniques…".

13 For the English version of the convention, see: The National Archives of the UK, Kew (TNA-UK), Colonial Office (CO), 691/121/8, Belgian leased sites at Dar es Salaam and Kigoma, 1932.

territories through the concession sites and using the central railway was concerned. The British merely had the right to be present at all times.
The convention was signed in London on 15 March 1921. One week later, the Belgians ended their occupation that had lasted for five years, and handed over the District of Kigoma to the governor of Tanganyika.[14] Upon return from Kigoma, the governor-general of the Belgian Congo wrote to the minister of colonies: "Les Anglais se rendent compte que Kigoma n'a d'intérêt que pour nous" (The English are aware that Kigoma is only of interest to us).[15] What he omitted, though, is that the Belgian interest in Kigoma was also limited only to the port and railway.

Territorial Ambivalence and Improvised Globalization in the Golden Decade of the Belgian Base

Pierre Ryckmans, who would become the most influential governor-general and chief ideologist of Belgian colonialism in the decades to come,[16] stayed in Kigoma in 1918. Congolese troops returned from the military operation of Mahenge with meningitis, which led to a forced quarantine during which Ryckmans kept himself busy with investigations into the history of the region under German occupation. His focus was on Burundi, not on Kigoma.[17] Kigoma was a suitable place from where to look into areas of interest, but did not attract much attention itself. Similarly, it would become a pivotal place through which to connect areas of interest, but was not seen as a place of interest for its own sake – or put otherwise, its interest lay in its capacity to connect and dispatch, and it is precisely this attribute that became or remained Belgian. Although it did not lead to genuine Belgian interest in the local affairs and populations of Kigoma, the crucial function in linking eastern Congo with the Indian Ocean via the lake and the railway was soon recognized by this advocate of Belgian colonialism. In a letter to the minister of colonies in the summer of 1921, Ryckmans – by then resident and acting royal commissioner in Ruanda-Urundi, and in this capacity responsible for the administration of the Belgian bases in Kigoma and Dar es Salaam[18] – made a strong plea to make maximal use of the Belgian connection to the Indian Ocean via Kigoma, Dar es Salaam, and the central railway. He considered Kigoma and Dar es Salaam to be the most "Belgian" connection between Belgium and the Belgian Congo, second only to Matadi ("la plus belge de toutes sauf Matadi").[19]

14 AAB, AE/II, 3288 (1850), Évacuation et remise des territoires aux Anglais.
15 AAB, AE/II, 2890 (200), Lettre du Gouverneur Général du Congo belge au Ministre des Colonies, 8 août 1921.
16 See: Pierre Ryckmans, Dominer pour servir, Bruxelles 1931.
17 Pierre Ryckmans, Une page d'histoire coloniale: L'occupation allemande dans l'Urundi, Bruxelles 1953, p. 3.
18 The management of the Belgian bases in Kigoma and Dar es Salaam had been given to the administration of Ruanda-Urundi and not the Belgian Congo (AAB, AE/II, 2948 (713), Lettre du Résident de l'Urundi au Ministre des Colonies, 29 août 1921).
19 Tanzania National Archives, Dar es Salaam (TanNA), Tanganyika Territory (TT), District Officer's Reports, Kigoma District, 1933, p. 17.

Against the background of the intended private concession over the Belgian bases in Kigoma and Dar es Salaam to be given to the Agence commercial belge de l'Est Africain (ABEA), Ryckmans pleaded for a Belgian representation by accredited diplomats and customs officials in both towns.[20] The risk of blurring the distinction between official Belgian representation and private commercial interests would lead to several confrontations with the British authorities as well as with some private companies a decade later. It is likely, although never explicitly confirmed, that this explains why the Belgians hesitated an entire decade before they finally formalized the running of the Belbases. No sooner than 1930 were the Belbases given by concession to the ABEA, although de facto the ABEA in Dar es Salaam and the Compagnie des Chemins de Fer du Congo supérieur aux Grands Lacs africains (CFL) in Kigoma were already running the sites since the beginning of the 1920s. Paradoxically, the decade of improvisation would turn out to be the golden decade.

Ryckmans' letter to the minister of colonies was a visionary one, to which the minister responded mainly positively. It also was a letter of a colonial official who was sympathetic to the Belgian extraterritorial privileges in Kigoma, and who was willing to make use of them as a tool of global – or trans-imperial, trans-regional, and trans-national – connectedness. However, Ryckmans was not the sole Belgian voice expressing his opinion about the Belgian extraterritorial rights; several other Belgian voices were highly sceptical – not to mention the British, who would increasingly object to what they had agreed to.

In the 1924 annual report on customs in Kigoma, Georges Delaunoit, the head of the Belgian customs in Kigoma at the time, considered it to be a blatant mistake to concentrate Belgian customs in the port of Kigoma, which he understood as nothing more than a lease that every private party could also acquire, albeit most likely at a higher price than 1 Belgian franc per year. Moreover, in his opinion, the Belgian government faced substantial additional costs in their own bases, which were not applicable in ports like Beira, Port Elizabeth, or Cape Town.[21] Inadvertently, he expressed the British interpretation, which actually would prove to be wrong by the time the British openly proclaimed it, as we will see later. Nevertheless, at that time it was relevant that the head of the Belgian customs on Lake Tanganyika criticized the privileges for which he was locally in charge.

In general, the Belgians struggled with their unusual privileges. If Delaunoit would have been right in his judgement that the Belgian leased sites were something any private company could get as well, then it would also have been clear and easy what to do with these sites: have them run as, and possible also by, a private company. However, the extraterritorial nature of the bases did not only mean that the Belgian ports of Kigoma and Dar es Salaam were outside of Belgian territory, but at least as much that British sovereignty was limited in these zones.[22] The Belgians could virtually do whatever they

20 AAB, AE/II, 2948 (713), Lettre du Résident de l'Urundi au Ministre des Colonies, 29 août 1921.

21 AAB, AE/II, 2890 (200), Douanes Kigoma – Rapport Annuel 1924; AAB, AE/II, 2948 (712), Annexe à la lettre du Commissaire Royal N° 1442/A/6 du 18 mai 1925, Avis et considérations.

22 Article 6 of the Anglo-Belgian Convention of 15 March 1921.

wanted within their premises, as Lord Milner already exclaimed during the 1919 negotiations.[23] This may sound like an appealing situation for the Belgians, but in fact it was not. The extraterritorial semi-sovereignty was as much unfamiliar terrain for them as it would have been for anyone else during the high days of national and imperial territoriality. Clearly, there were some commercial advantages in unlocking landlocked Ruanda-Urundi as well as eastern Congo via Lake Tanganyika, Kigoma, the central railway, and Dar es Salaam. With the infrastructure of 1920, this route took two months, in contrast to six months, when opting for the western trajectory through the Congo and via Boma or Matadi, as well as took three transloading operations less.[24] Accordingly, the coordination and administration of Belgium's East African trade were concentrated in Kigoma, which made this lakeside town rather than Dar es Salaam the main Indian Ocean port of the Belgian Congo. In 1924, for instance, 4.4 million Belgian francs in customs revenues were generated in Kigoma compared to 1.6 million Belgian francs in the second most important customs station on the lake, Albertville. Moreover, all traffic that was cleared in Albertville or Uvira still had to go through the Belbase in Kigoma.[25]

Having a closer look at the port activities during the 1920s, the exported goods being shipped through the Belgian concession consisted primarily of palm oil, hides, rice, and other local foodstuffs.[26] However, the annual report of Belgian customs at Kigoma in 1924 indicates that the export from Congo and Ruanda-Urundi of local foodstuffs as well as cow hides was in decline because of cattle plague and anti-famine measures. On the other hand, cottons were the most desired import: printed cotton like *kitenge* and *kanga* were in vogue in the urban, or so-called European, centres, whereas Japanese-made *merikani* and Indian *chadder* were in demand in the interior.[27] In the course of the 1920s, the product range diversified and increasingly included raw cotton shipped from the port of Uvira in the Kivu, coffee coming from the ports of Nyanza-Lac and Rumonge in Ruanda-Urundi, and especially copper from Katanga, shipped by lake from Albertville to Kigoma.[28] Furthermore, with the arrival of the railway the trade in *dagaa* (dried small fish) would extend its range and become an important long-distance trade good from Kigoma.[29] However, this local produce was not part of the transit trade through the Belgian bases, and therefore did not appear in the Belgian customs statistics. The fact that not all trade in Kigoma was transit trade, would lead to problems in the exploitation of

23 TNA-UK, CO, 691/115/8, Lettre du Ministre des Affaires Étrangères (belge) à l'ambassadeur britannique, 31 décembre 1930.

24 AAB, RA/R-U, 0b (31), Tanganyika Territory, Annual Report 1919-1920, p. 13; Chrétien, "Le « désenclavement » …", p. 342-343.

25 AAB, AE/II, 2890 (200), Douanes Kigoma – Rapport Annuel 1924.

26 AAB, AE/II, 2948 (713), Lettre du Résident de l'Urundi au Ministre des Colonies, 29 août1921. Salt was another important export product from the Kigoma region and was loaded on the train directly at the salt pan of Uvinza, hence it did not pass through Kigoma and its Belgian base. See TanNA, TT, District Officer's Reports, Kigoma District 1931, p.13.

27 AAB, AE/II, 2890 (200), Douanes Kigoma – Rapport Annuel 1924.

28 TanNA, TT, District Officer's Reports, Kigoma District 1927, p. 16.

29 RHO, MSS. Afr. s. 503, John Rooke Johnston, Kigoma District Handing Over Report, 1940, p. 96.

the Belgian port, to which I return later. This combination of regional and global trade had already been a feature of the market of nearby Ujiji in the nineteenth century.[30] Although the goods involved had – partly – changed, the twentieth-century port of Kigoma was also, or still, characterized by a stable stream of trade in local produce, accompanied by booming and eventually declining or collapsing long-distance trade passing through the strategically situated port.

Concerning copper, shedding some light on figures gives an idea of the significance of this trade through Kigoma. Based on statistics from Tanganyika Railways, 29,997 tonnes of copper in 1928/29 were shipped from the Congo through Kigoma, and after a dip in 1929/30 (18,538 tonnes), the copper traffic reached a peak of 30,844 tonnes in 1930/31.[31] For comparison, based on the Belgian customs' figures, in the year 1929 – all goods combined – a total of 32,200 tonnes was shipped through the Belgian base of Kigoma to Congo and Ruanda-Urundi, whereas 26,672 tonnes of export came from Ruanda-Urundi. Exports from the Congo, including copper, were not registered in Kigoma since these were declared in Albertville or Uvira.[32] It is clear from these figures, though, that the amount of exported copper roughly corresponded to all imports to the Congo and Ruanda-Urundi combined, or all exports from Ruanda-Urundi. Another telling figure was the earnings from traffic to and from the Congo, which represented 55 per cent of the total earnings of the entire central railway.[33]

The predominant copper-producing enterprise in the Belgian Congo, the Union Minière du Haut Katanga (UMHK), was founded in 1906, boomed in the 1920s, and reached a total production of 139,000 tonnes of copper in 1930.[34] Read in combination with the figures from Tanganyika Railways for 1930, this means that the Congolese copper export via the Kigoma connection was close to a quarter of the total production of the UMHK. Kigoma's future looked bright and that future was inextricably linked with the copper industry in Katanga. The fact that by the end of the 1920s the political control over of the Belgian base at Kigoma was moved from the administration of Ruanda-Urundi to the Province of Katanga, is a further indication of the growing importance of copper for the port of Kigoma.[35] Kigoma had evolved from a regional trade centre around Lake Tanganyika into a small gateway in the global copper trade.

30 Philip Gooding, "Ujiji: Urban Frontier in the Era of Long-Distance Commerce, East and Central Africa, c.1830–1890", Presentation at The International Graduate Historical Studies Conference, Central Michigan University, 2013 (https://soas.academia.edu/PhilipGooding – accessed 18 January 2016).

31 RHO, MSS. Afr. s. 900 (1), Clement Gillman, Important Events in the History of the Railways.

32 AAB, AE/II, 2948 (717), Rapport par le Contrôleur Principal des douanes à Kigoma 1930, 30 janvier 1931.

33 RHO, MSS. Afr. s. 900 (1), Clement Gillman, Important Events in the History of the Railways.

34 Jan-Frederik, Abbeloos, "Belgium's Expansionist History between 1870 and 1930: Imperialism and the Globalisation of Belgian Business", in: Mary N. Harris and Csaba Lévai (eds.), Europe and its Empires, Pisa 2008, p. 118; Bogumil Jewsiewicki (translated by Yvonne Brett and Andrew Roberts), "Belgian Africa", in: J.D. Fage and Roland Anthony Oliver (eds.), The Cambridge History of Africa, Volume 7, p. 482. For a deeper insight in the town of Lubumbashi in this period, see Boonen & Lagae in this issue.

35 AAB, AE/II, 2948 (717), Rapport par le Contrôleur Principal des douanes à Kigoma 1930, 30 janvier 1931; AAB, FRED (Direction de l'énergie, des travaux publics et des communications), 1180, Lettre de l'inspecteur des douanes au Gouverneur du Katanga, 30 janvier 1931.

In order to accommodate this booming trade the Belgians invested considerably in their port and supporting infrastructure. The leased site in 1921 had a lake frontage of 250 m and was 60 to 70 m deep, roughly the size of two football fields.[36] By the end of the decade, Kigoma was on the rise and this was reflected in Belgian investments in a new wharfage system, quays, a two-storey building comprising offices and warehouses, and five steam cranes, and a 25-tonne derrick between 1928 and 1930.[37] On top of that, Belgians built / opened a wireless telegraph station, a Belgian bank, a vice-consulate, as well as a central customs authority for Ruanda-Urundi and eastern Congo in Kigoma in the course of the 1920s. As early as 1928, which is only seven and a half years after the Belgian bases were established, the Belgians already requested an extension of their Kigoma site, primarily for safety reasons and more specifically to be able to store explosives and combustible goods. The British realized that from the point of view of railway traffic it was in their interest that the Belgians expand their use of the Kigoma-Dar es Salaam connection; however, they were reluctant to give the Belgians more or even the best parts of the harbour.[38] On the ground, however, pragmatism reigned and the British de facto operated their comparably small businesses through the Belgian site.

The depiction so far could give the false impression that the British were merely passive bystanders. In fact, they supported and became involved with the Belgian port activities through investments and entrepreneurship of their own. The fleet on the lake was primarily British, and the new slipway, constructed in 1929, did the maintenance of all ships, including the Belgian ones.[39] At the same time, the British-run railways were undoubtedly the crucial link in the entire connection from Congo to the Indian Ocean and back.

In addition to Belgians and British, it is important to stress the role of other international trade actors. Arab, Indian, and Swahili traders had already played a significant role in pre- and early colonial times, and were still numerous at the time of Belgian conquest in 1916.[40] By 1930, Indian traders, most of them from Gujarat or the region around Bombay, numbered up to 250 men, about half of them with families. There were 100 Arab traders in Kigoma in 1930, most of them Omani and about one-third of them with families. Greeks numbered around 20 in Kigoma in the late 1920s. [41] Indian and Arab traders primarily took care of the intricate connections with the surrounding region and its markets, and remained important for the commerce around Lake Tanganyika until long after the decline of the Belgian base set in in the early 1930s.[42]

36 TNA-UK, CO, 691/100/14, Request by Belgian Government for extension of concession of trade sites at Kigoma.
37 TanNA, Kigoma Provincial Book, Kigoma District, Vol. II; Fallentheyn, Belbases in Tanzania…
38 TNA-UK, CO, 691/100/14, Request by Belgian Government for extension of concession of trade sites at Kigoma; TanNA, Native Affairs General – Tanganyika Secretariat (Sec.), (K.) Foreign Affairs, 12912, Vol. I, Belgian Concessions at Kigoma (1927–1936).
39 TanNA, Kigoma Provincial Book, Kigoma District, Vol. II.
40 AAB, RA/R-U, 0b (24), Rapport sur la situation économique du district d'Udjidji [1918].
41 TanNA, Kigoma Provincial Book, Kigoma District, Vol. II.
42 Geert Castryck, Moslims in Usumbura (1897–1962): Sociale geschiedenis van de islamitische gemeenschappen van Usumbura in de koloniale tijd, Universiteit Gent 2006 (PhD Thesis), pp. 163-182.

The Formalization of the Concession Throws Spanner in the Works

At the height of the Belbases' success, the concession over the sites was given to the ABEA. A management agreement was signed on 11 December 1929; the contract was approved by the Belgian and the British government, and took effect on 31 January 1931.[43] At that time, however, nobody knew that the times of plenty were drawing to a close. Although the British welcomed the clarity of the new situation and the improved management that was expected from ABEA in comparison to the CFL,[44] the de facto privatization and formalization of the exploitation of the Belbases triggered disputes about customs procedures, delays in clearing and handling shipments, unequal competition between private companies, and the demarcation of the Belgian premises in Kigoma. The pragmatic or cooperative attitude of the 1920s was substituted for strict formalism in line with the letter of the 1921 convention. Only now did the British start to discover how much the convention actually entailed while also firmly discarding what was at odds with the convention. The British complaints resonated with the sceptic positions that had been proclaimed by some Belgians since the early 1920s. In the end, the height of Belgian operations in Kigoma would also be a decisive turning point, leading to a piecemeal Belgian withdrawal from Kigoma during the first half of the 1930s. By the end of 1931, the copper traffic through Kigoma drastically decreased. In comparison to the previous year, the amount had dropped from over 30,000 to 16,343 tonnes.[45] This was not only due to the Great Depression but also because newer, cheaper, and faster – in short, better – connections linking mineral-rich Katanga with the Atlantic ports of the Belgian Congo became available at about this time.[46] Likewise, Kigoma's Indian merchants, whose businesses had branches along the lake in Bujumbura and Rumonge, suffered a chain of bankruptcies in the first half of the 1930s[47] while local trade around the lake also suffered heavily due to a combination of economic crisis, locust, and drought.[48] Occurring together, an already raging global economic crisis was further exacerbated by the partial Belgian retreat from Kigoma. As had been the case in the second half of the nineteenth century in Ujiji,[49] the boom in long-distance trade in interwar Kigoma had

43 AAB, FRED, 1180, Organisation douanière Ruanda Urundi, 13 janvier 1931; AAB, AE/II, 2948 (717), Concessions belges à Dar es Salaam et à Kigoma; TNA-UK, CO, 691/109/10, Concessions to Belgian Government at Kigoma and Dar es Salaam, 1930; TanNA, Sec., (K) 19652, Traffic through Belgian leased sites at Dar es Salaam and Kigoma, Vol. I

44 TNA-UK, CO, 691/109/10, Concessions to Belgian Government at Kigoma and Dar es Salaam, 1930.

45 AAB, FRED, 1181 (9), Renseignements statistiques. Documentation, 1931.

46 Piet Clement, "Het bezoek van Koning Albert I aan Belgisch Congo, 1928: Tussen propaganda en realiteit", in: Belgisch Tijdschrift voor Nieuwste Geschiedenis, 37 (2007) 1-2, pp. 178-183.

47 Castryck, Moslims in Usumbura, pp. 163-182.

48 TanNA, TT, District Officer's Reports, Kigoma District 1931, p. 14; TanNA, Kigoma Regional Office (523), M5/23, Food Shortage – Kigoma, Letter from District Commissioner Kigoma to Provincial Commissioner Tabora and Kigoma Provinces, 9 February 1932.

49 Brown, Ujiji…; Philip Gooding, "Ujiji c.1860–1890: The rise and decline of a Swahili Frontier Town", Presentation at the Indian Ocean World Centre, McGill University on 8 May 2014 (https://soas.academia.edu/PhilipGooding – accessed 18 January 2016).

been an ephemeral phenomenon. Kigoma fell back on its role as regional trade centre for the people living around the lake and the Belgian bases became the transit sites the British and some Belgians had wished them to be from the very beginning.

Interestingly, this decline is remarkably evident in the Belgian, British, and Tanganyikan archives. Whereas a wealth of files on the Belgian bases is available for the 1920s and early 1930s, the source base all but vanishes by the mid-1930s. Apart from some necessary revisions of old policy measures or contracts that had to be adapted to new uncertain circumstances,[50] a handful of references to tensions regarding the war effort in the early 1940s,[51] and the occasional Belgian representative in the Kigoma Township Authority,[52] the Belgians in Kigoma left hardly any traces in the archives between 1935 and 1950. Apart from the obvious continuation of the local administration of the urban area, Kigoma as such also virtually disappeared from the archives, which indicates that the town was no longer considered of interest by administrators in London, Brussels, or even Dar es Salaam. That lasted until the 1950s when some activity around the port of Kigoma could again be discerned, but it would never again reach the promising dynamics of 1930.[53] The turning point for Kigoma was 1930/31 and in the following pages we will have a look at the changes and disputes that took place then.

At the beginning of 1930 the Belgians requested the British government's formal approval in order to give the port sites in Kigoma and Dar es Salaam by concession to the ABEA. This coincided with, on the one hand, some British grudging when they understood that the Belgians could and did use their base in Kigoma as the *de facto* port of entry into the Congo and Ruanda-Urundi, and, on the other hand, the Belgian announcement that they were considering to further expand the customs activities at Kigoma, thereby turning the Belgian base into the *de jure* port of entry. Given the already existing British dissatisfaction, this only exacerbated the situation.[54] Practical, legal, and economic arguments came together in a discussion that would last until 1932, but by then the economic and commercial situation on local and global scales had become a profoundly different one.

Belgians had already been discussing the use – or uselessness – of their bases since the early 1920s, and by the end of the decade, at a time when the port of Kigoma grew spectacularly, some British also started reflecting how best to organize traffic and the limited space at the port of Kigoma. A couple of months before the Belgians gave their bases

50 TanNA, Western Province (Regional Office Tabora) (63), L.2/354, Kigoma Township Plots, Vol. II: 1937–1958; Fallentheyn, Belbases in Tanzania…

51 TanNA, Sec., (K) 12912. Vol II: Belgian Concessions at Kigoma (1941); AAB, AE/II, 3289 (1857–1858), Accords Milner-Orts.

52 TanNA, Sec., 19408, Kigoma Township Authority, Vol. II: 1941–1953.

53 TanNA, TT, District Officer's Reports, Kigoma District 1950, p. 5; 1953, p. 5; 1955, p. 6, 9.

54 AAB, AE/II, 2948 (717), Concessions belges à Dar es Salaam et Kigoma; AAB, FRED, 1180, Lettre du Gouverneur Général du Congo belge au Ministre des Colonies, 27 février 1931 (with three annexes); TNA-UK, CO, 691/109/10, Concessions to Belgian Government at Kigoma and Dar es Salaam, 1930; TNA-UK, CO, 691/115/8, Letter from the Belgian Chief Comptroller of customs at Kigoma to the Head of customs of Tanganyika Territory at Dar es Salaam, 27 December 1929.

by concession to the ABEA, the general manager of Tanganyika Railways had listed the problems and opportunities in Kigoma, albeit seen from his particular point of view. The port of Kigoma had become a bottleneck and was too small to absorb the rapidly increasing flows of goods. In his view, the most convenient solution would be that the Belgians use their base as a transit port only, in other words ship everything as quickly as possible across the lake or in the opposite direction to the coast – on his trains. In his opinion, the main cause of the delays in the Kigoma port was the inefficient if not incompetent operation of the port by the commercial company CFL in combination with allegedly time-consuming Belgian customs formalities, which made Kigoma into a port of entry into the Congo and Ruanda-Urundi instead of a mere transit site. He was convinced that the use as a transit site had always been the intended and still the only appropriate use of the Belgian port sites. Therefore, he called for the use of Kigoma's Belbase as a transit site only, an efficient management under – Belgian – government control, and a better physical organization of the harbour, with fences around the Belgian site.[55]

Undoubtedly, his envisaged reorganization would have served the needs and interests of the railway company. However, he overlooked the economic and commercial interests that were involved in the transhipment and clearing activities taking place in Kigoma. The formalities in Kigoma were not so much threatening the port activity but were the economic backbone of Kigoma's commercial sector. The primarily British, including Indian, enterprises of Kigoma depended heavily on activities in relation to handling, clearing, and forwarding in the Belgian port. It was in the British interest that more happened in Kigoma than only taking goods from train to ship and from ship to train. This shared interest between Belgian and British companies and authorities also explains why nobody had so far felt the need to fence off the Belgian port.

Ironically, the Belgians seemed to have overlooked the exact same issue, albeit from another angle. Not only if the port became a mere transit site, but also when the whole site came under the monopoly of one private company, the economic opportunities would drastically decrease. The management was expected to be more efficient through the ABEA concession, but at the same time the direct government control was reduced and distrust amongst commercial competitors complicated the handling and clearing activities of all companies other than ABEA. The Belgians had underestimated how the ABEA concession would create a monopoly situation at the expense of other firms in Kigoma.

Two records in the colonial archives of the Belgian customs and foreign affairs, together with two notes in the British archives of the Colonial Office, give an insightful analysis of the conflict between Belgians and British that arose at the time the Belgians expressed their intention to give the Belbases by concession to ABEA and to concentrate their customs for entry into eastern Congo and Ruanda-Urundi in Kigoma.[56] In a letter from

55 TNA-UK, CO, 691/109/10, Letter from the General Manager of Tanganyika Railways to the Chief Secretary to the Government of Dar es Salaam, 24 October 1929.

56 AAB, AE/II, 2948 (717), Concessions belges à Dar es Salaam et Kigoma; AAB, FRED, 1180, Divers Kigoma, 1929–1958; TNA-UK, CO, 691/109/10, Note by Brigade-General Hammond to Under-Secretary of State Colonial Office, 31 March 1930; TNA-UK, CO, 691/115/8, Note by Under-Secretary of State Colonial Office, 2 May 1931.

the British Embassy in Brussels to the Belgian minister of foreign affairs, the British Foreign Office accused the Belgians of contravention of the Anglo-Belgian Convention of 15 March 1921.[57] According to the British, the Belgians were not entitled to levy customs duties on British soil. Since Kigoma was situated in British territory and entirely surrounded either by British territory or by British waters, performing Belgian customs formalities in the port of Kigoma was allegedly in breach of territorial sovereignty. Moreover, in their reading, Article 2 of the convention expressly forbid all "customs duty or other similar duties" as well as "any delays or unnecessary restrictions" for goods in transit across East Africa. The exemption of customs duties was, moreover, reiterated specifically for the port of Kigoma in Article 9 of the convention. The Belgian government disagreed and argued that the Orts-Milner Agreement was nothing more and nothing less than a limitation of the British sovereignty in the Belgian-leased sites in Kigoma and Dar es Salaam. The convention limited the British right to levy duties on goods in transit to and from Congo and Ruanda-Urundi, not the Belgian right to do so.[58]

Interestingly, the weaknesses of their own positions were discussed openly in the confidential correspondence on both sides, but not communicated to the other. Despite the initial strong accusation, the British soon understood that the Belgians were probably right. Rather than admitting this, they tried to reach the desired outcome based on practical and economic considerations instead of legal and political ones. The Belgians were quite confident that they were right, but were aware that the weakness in their position was that strictly speaking it only applied to goods in transit through, and not coming from or destined, to East Africa. They had no solution for regional trade around the lake or otherwise goods coming from or going to the British territories in East Africa. Throughout the 1920s, as long as Belgians and British had conducted business in a pragmatic way, convinced of their shared interests, this distinction had not been made, thereby avoiding complications for all parties involved. Once the formalist legal card was played, this completely changed. Clarity was detrimental to the successful operation of the inland Indian Ocean port at Kigoma.

Apart from the Belgian and British authorities, the third party were the private firms operating in and around Kigoma. For a number of reasons, they did not like the Belgian idea to concentrate customs in Kigoma, and they opposed the ABEA concession. They knew that legally there was nothing wrong with this concession per se; nevertheless, the combination with the envisaged obligatory customs formalities, which would have to take place within the ABEA-run Belbase, was indeed questionable. For more than two years, the British authorities continued to receive private complaints. They distrusted

57 AAB, AE/II, 2948 (717), Letter from the British Ambassador to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, 18 August 1930. Same letter in: TNA-UK, CO, 691/109/10, Concessions to Belgian Government at Kigoma and Dar es Salaam, 1930.

58 AAB, AE/II, 2948 (717), Lettre du Ministre des Colonies au Ministre des Affaires Étrangères, 19 novembre 1930; TNA-UK, CO, 691/109/10, Letter from Under-Secretary of State Foreign Office to Under-Secretary of State Colonial Office, 18 June 1930; TNA-UK, CO, 691/115/8, Concessions to Belgian Government at Kigoma and Dar es Salaam, 1931.

the semi-official status of their competitor, whom they could not avoid when trading through or handling in the Belgian bases. That the ABEA had secured the monopoly on certain activities in the port was one thing, but that for the sake of customs formalities other agents would have to disclose their invoices, hence business secrets, was inadmissible. What is more, when the effects of the Great Depression struck ever harder and made all business activities difficult, the private companies requested the same tariffs and exemptions as the traffic through the Belgian sites in order to circumvent them in a still profitable way. The British authorities were not willing to grant them services that would cost money to the government; nevertheless, the whole situation did lead to the perceived necessity to more clearly distinguish between and demarcate the Belgian and the British parts of the port, hence undoing the territorial ambiguity on the ground.[59]
Yet, if customs procedures had to take place in the ABEA-run Belbase anyway, as was envisaged by the Belgian authorities, not much would be gained with a British "open" port. The catch-22 situation in Kigoma was the simultaneous decision to give the port by concession to ABEA and to concentrate customs in the port. The Belgians had hoped to save costs by concentrating all customs formalities for trade with eastern Congo and Ruanda-Urundi via Lake Tanganyika in one place. In the 1920s, a hybrid situation had existed, necessitating customs stations in the lake ports of Albertville, Uvira, and Kigoma while leaving ambiguities in Bujumbura, Nyanza-Lac, Rumonge, and Baraka. Until 1923, everything had taken place in a legal vacuum. From then onwards, imports into the Congo could be cleared in Kigoma, but this was not compulsory. Traders could freely decide whether they opted for Kigoma, Albertville, or Uvira, in other words, for clearing before or after crossing the lake. For exports from the Congo, Kigoma was not authorized as a customs station. One year later the same regulation also applied for Ruanda-Urundi, although de facto there was no operational customs office on the lake in Urundi that could have served as an alternative for Kigoma. In 1927, a new ordinance by the governor of Ruanda-Urundi stated that all customs clearing to and from Ruanda-Urundi via Lake Tanganyika must take place in Kigoma. This situation was both expensive and complicated. By the late 1920s, the Belgian customs authorities were investigating the centralization of their dealings for traffic via Lake Tanganyika in one place, and that place could only be Kigoma's Belbase because that was the only place where one could reasonably expect that all goods to and from eastern Congo and Ruanda-Urundi would pass through. Not all were in favour of this solution though, because firstly the existing installation in Albertville would become obsolete, secondly the port of Kigoma was deemed too small – an argument also expressed by the British – and thirdly the Belgian expats living and working in Kigoma would benefit more to the British than to the Belgians. Moreover, on the one hand trade to and from British East Africa was excluded from the Belbase privileges, and on the other hand the Belgians were not allowed to operate

59 TNA-UK, CO, 691/121/8, Belgian leased sites at Dar es Salaam and Kigoma, 1932; TNA-UK, CO, 691/127/6, Belgian leased sites at Dar es Salaam and Kigoma, 1933.

outside of the Belbases. Therefore, to impose all customs formalities in Kigoma would require lenience from the British, which they were no longer willing to grant.
In the end, although the Belgians had international law on their side, customs have never been concentrated in Kigoma and on the contrary the Belgians declared on 25 August 1931 that the customs station in Kigoma would be closed completely in 1932.[60] The Banque du Congo Belge in Kigoma closed on 30 September 1934,[61] the wireless telegraph station was dismantled, and by early 1933 only four Belgians still resided in Kigoma. Meanwhile, the Belgian base was still there and was still handling most of the traffic going through Kigoma, but apart from that the Belgian presence in town seemed to have been reduced to the annual laying of a wreath on the Belgian cenotaph on 11 November.[62] The Belgian presence was reduced rapidly and drastically. The next time mention is made in archival sources of the Belgian base in Kigoma is when in 1937 the Belgian authorities put their warehouses at the disposal of the Tanganyika Railways Administration.[63] The days in which the Belgians lacked space in their concessions were far gone. The remaining, primarily Indian, business men in town renegotiated their ground tax obligations, indicating that the economic opportunities in Kigoma no longer allowed them to pay what had seemed reasonable in the late 1920s. The provincial commissioner of the Western Province agreed that there were no grounds to levy ground rents in Kigoma, which were twice as high as in Mwanza at Lake Victoria for instance, and stated: "It is quite obvious that the former prosperity as a railhead will never return to Kigoma."[64]

Conclusion

Yet again, irony and history go together well. As soon as the extraterritorial half-sovereignty was formally acknowledged, it did not work any longer. Throughout the 1920s, although the Belgians had an extraordinary array of extraterritorial rights at their disposal, all parties involved in the port of Kigoma improvised pragmatically without bothering too much about the full extent of the Belgian legal prerogatives. A mishmash of customs regulations coexisted, port and railway premises were not clearly demarcated, and an informal openness allowed everyone everywhere to do all that was needed to make the port run smoothly. This mode of operation had turned the Indian Ocean port of Kigoma into a functioning Belgian enclave that was still perceived as British by the British. When the Belgians tried to formalize customs regulations and the exploitation of the port, the extraordinary scope of their extraterritorial rights was disclosed in principle, but instantly closed in practice.

60 AAB, AE/II, 2948 (717), Note – Dédouanement des marchandises à Kigoma: Rétroactes de la question; Ordonnance 25 août 1931, N°64/DOU.
61 TanNA, TT, District Officer's Reports, Kigoma District 1934, p. 20.
62 RHO, MSS. Afr. s. 503, John Rooke Johnston, Kigoma District – Handing Over Report, 1940.
63 TNA-UK, CO, 691/154/6, Tanganyika Railways use of Belgian leased sites at Dar es Salaam and Kigoma, 1937.
64 TanNA, 63, L.2/354, Minutes by the Governor, 22 March 1937.

There was one legal loophole – the exclusion of trade to and from East Africa from the Belgian extraterritorial rights – but in the end the economic and practical objections turned out to be the most decisive. Private firms objected against the ABEA concession and against the concentration of Belgian customs in Kigoma. On top of that the growth of the port and of traffic across the lake had made the informal approach of the 1920s untenable. Ironically, the world economic crisis would abruptly halt the unprecedented growth at the same time the Belgians were in vain trying to cope with it.

Despite the ultimate failure, I do claim that during this episode the Belgian base in Kigoma can be characterized as a portal of globalization. The territorial ambiguity during the 1920s had not only been one of Belgian extraterritorial presence in Kigoma but also of ambiguity in the operation of the port itself. The Belgian site had not been fenced off, which actually extended the territorial ambiguity into the port. Belgian and British as well as Indian, Greek, and other firms were active in the port, which made this inland Indian Ocean port a site of global integration both in its local operations and in its handling of material flows. And while the management was taken care of by the customs authorities, technical matters were dealt with by a railway company from the Congo, but without clear legal formalization of this division of labour.

The territorial ambivalence was effective as long as ambivalence was also allowed in the operation of the port itself, and there lies – even if only short-lived – the innovativeness in dealing with and thereby facilitating global interaction. Building on the historical tradition and infrastructure of Kigoma as a regional trade hub with intermittent phases of booming long-distance trade, the first decade of the Belgian Base in Kigoma offers a peculiar instance of how local pragmatism enabled an increase in global flows, by both extending and not fully exhausting what had been laid down in the Anglo-Belgian Convention of 1921.

Moving Goods in Kapiri Mposhi, Zambia: The Scaffolding of Stability in TAZARA's Dry Port

Jamie Monson

RESÜMEE

In den 1970er Jahren wurde die TAZARA mit chinesischer Unterstützung gebaut, um den sambischen Kupfergürtel mit dem Indischen Ozean zu verbinden. Die Linie verbindet Dar es Salaam mit Kapiri Mposhi, zu dieser Zeit eine wenig bekannte Endstation der Eisenbahnlinie. Für Sambier jedoch ist Kapiri Mposhi kein Endpunkt, sondern ein Zentrum.

Dieser Artikel untersucht die Geschichte von Kapiri Mposhi als Eisenbahnstadt aus der Perspektive des Lastentransports. Im TAZARA-Trockenhafen ist der Umschlag abhängig von Teams von Lastenträgern. Für die Träger im Eisenbahnbetrieb von Kapiri Mposhi wurde der Lebensunterhalt allerdings im Laufe der Zeit unzuverlässig. Als Reaktion auf die Unsicherheit gründeten die Träger Vereine, die versuchen, sowohl die soziale Sicherheit ihrer Mitglieder zu gewährleisten als auch die Auswirkungen der schwankenden Warenströme und des ungleichmäßigen Eisenbahnbetriebs auf ihre Arbeit zu lindern. Somit ermöglichen sie das Funktionieren dieses für Mittelafrika entscheidenden Zugangs zu transnationalen Handelsnetzwerken.

Introduction

When the TAZARA railway was built in the 1970s with Chinese development assistance, it was called the "Freedom Railway" because it was intended to liberate landlocked Zambia from its dependency on white-settler-ruled states to the south. On the TAZARA line, which stretches from the Indian Ocean port of Dar es Salaam to the Zambian copperbelt, the primary geography of commodity movement was imagined to be from the interior to the coast, mirroring the patterns of earlier colonial arteries that moved African products into global markets. The terminus at New Kapiri Mposhi station in Zambia, therefore, was mainly envisioned as a collection point for Zambian

Comparativ | Zeitschrift für Globalgeschichte und vergleichende Gesellschaftsforschung 25 (2015) Heft 4, S. 87–101.

mineral resources, especially copper, to be shipped from the mines to the railway, and via TAZARA to the sea.

Kapiri Mposhi was a railway town for Zambia Railways, with a history dating back to the colonial period. When the town was selected as the final station for TAZARA and junction between the two lines, the TAZARA station was called 'New Kapiri Mposhi' station to distinguish it from the smaller ZRL station located nearby.[1]

Over the decades since TAZARA's construction the global movement of commodities has developed in unexpected directions. This has in turn affected transport and mobility at New Kapiri Mposhi . In the process, the TAZARA railway station at New Kapiri Mposhi has become a space of transshipment and mobility characterized by flows of goods and frictions of globalization.[2] I analyze this new space of global exchange through the lens of labour, using the lived experience of TAZARA's railway porters to trace the interconnected histories of work and transshipment at global and local scales. This paper takes the theme of "dock labour" beyond the seaport and into the interior to include not only the dry port at the TAZARA station but also the station platform itself. These are the new spaces for global circulation of goods; transnational and intercultural encounters; and labour innovation. I show that while casualized "dock labour" has been one of the outcomes of neoliberalizing global trends in railway and port economies, TAZARA's railway porters have responded to casualization by developing new social institutions and labour practices. I will argue here that the labour innovation, the concomitant social institutionalization, as well as the networking of Kapiri Mposhi's petty entrepreneurs are indispensible to make global connectedness work. Grafted on a long history of infrastructure and on global currents of liberalization, it is this creative adaptation that merits our attention, and justifies viewing Kapiri Mposhi's dry port as a portal of globalization.[3]

Porter Labour in Global Commodity Circulation

In the decade of the 1980s, TAZARA's export business was affected by the global collapse in copper prices. Zambia's economy was weakened at the same time that a major source of income for the railway had faltered.[4] Liberalization policies adopted during the same time period contributed to a shift towards commodity trading along TAZARA, especially in Tanzania where imports were arriving through the port of Dar es Salaam. Through the

1 J. Lunn, The Political Economy of Primary Railway Construction in the Rhodesias, 1890–1911, in: The Journal of African History, 33 (1992) 2, pp. 239-254.

2 Anna Tsing, Friction: An Ethnography of Global Connection, Princeton 2005; Frederick Cooper, "What is the Concept of Globalization Good for? An African Historian's Perspective," in: African Affairs, 100 (2001) 399, p. 189; Jeanne Pennvenne, African workers and colonial racism: Mozambican strategies and struggles in Lourencão Marques, 1877–1962, London 1995.

3 For the idea of 'portal of globalization' and the importance of institutionalization and creative adaptation, see: M. Middell and K. Naumann, Global history and the spatial turn: from the impact of area studies to the study of critical junctures of globalization, in: Journal of Global Studies, 5 (2010) 1, p. 162.

4 James Ferguson, Expectations of modernity: myths and meanings of urban life on the Zambian Copperbelt, Los Angeles and Berkeley 1999.

1990s, as alternative transport routes to the south were opened up, TAZARA managers adopted commercialization measures designed to further commercialize and diversify TAZARA shipments.[5] By the end of the decade, therefore, TAZARA trains were just as likely to be carrying shipments of manufactured goods into Zambia from Dar es Salaam as they were to be sending copper out. Many of these goods shipments were being carried by small-scale traders including TAZARA employees and their family members who had free passes to travel on the train.

My earlier work on small-scale traders in southern Tanzania demonstrated that, when aggregated, the circulation of small- and medium-scale loads known as 'parcels' on TAZARA made a significant contribution to African lives and livelihoods, especially after economic liberalization.[6] The patterns of circulation of these kinds of shipments have not been fixed, but are continuously re-orienting in response to a range of local, regional and global conditions. Shipments on TAZARA move in multiple directions and in diverse carriages – not only are containers and copper-bearing flat cars carrying commodities, but passenger luggage wagons are just as likely to be packed with goods.

Over time, the station and railway town of Kapiri Mposhi has come to look less like a terminus and more like a hub in a complex network of eastern, central and southern African exchange routes. Thus New Kapiri Mposhi station is not the "end of the line" but a link, where goods shipments that arrive by train from the Indian Ocean are offloaded onto a diverse assortment of transport vehicles including lorries, buses, vans, pickup trucks, bicycles and pushcarts. The spaces of transshipment at New Kapiri Mposhi station are occupied by shipping and forwarding agents, truck drivers and traders. In their midst are teams of railway porters who do the hard physical labour of moving loads from one form of transport to another.

In the station's dry port, large-scale goods shipments are transferred between road and rail. The dry port was constructed originally in the early 1990s, when the Zambia Railways network was suffering from poor performance. Customers with large shipments from Zambia started hauling by road to New Kapiri Mposhi station, where they offloaded onto TAZARA wagons and then carried to the coast. Shipments from the Tanzanian side, especially sacks of maize and fertilizer, also arrived in the dry port for offloading. These sacks were moved by porter labour, according to TAZARA officials, because they are small and require careful packing onto flatbed trucks. Two cranes, one static and one mobile, were installed in the dry port for moving heavier goods. But over time this mechanization system failed and shippers began to rely even more heavily on manual labour

5 "Reasons for commercialization of TAZARA: Highway transportation and the change in Southern African trade patterns," Reports of Meetings between Tanzania, Zambia and China on Operational Performance 1989/90–1991/92, TAZARA Chinese Expert Team Archives, Dar es Salaam; Jamie Monson, "Remembering Work on the Tazara Railway in Africa and China, 1965–2011: When "New Men" Grow Old," African Studies Review, 56 (2013) 1, pp. 45-64.

6 Jamie Monson, Africa's Freedom Railway: How a Chinese Development Project Changed Lives and Livelihoods in Tanzania, Bloomington 2009.

to transship their loads.[7] Today, therefore, TAZARA's dry port is more likely to be filled with workers than with fork-loaders – teams of porters use their bodies to move sacks of flour, rice or fertilizer from containers to truck beds. The huge cranes that were designed to lift and transfer containers stand immobile in the background.

TAZARA's dry port is located behind high walls beyond the platform and at the end of the switching yard. The work of transshipment there is consequently hidden from view. On the station platform on the other hand, in the midst of passenger traffic and the day-to-day activities of railway operations, the movement of diverse and multi-scaled goods shipments is highly visible. Here on the platform bundles of shoes, stacked cartons of floor and ceiling tiles, gunny sacks of dried fish and many other commodities are offloaded from luggage wagons to be processed by customs agents and sent on their way. The goods that are being offloaded by porters today have travelled through the port of Dar es Salaam from as far away as China and Thailand, often through the wholesale markets of Dubai. From Kapiri Mposhi they will be moved onwards to the Zambian copperbelt, to the Congolese border, to Malawi or to Beitbridge.

I view the station as a portal through the lens of railway work, in particular the work of porterage that is critical to the movement of goods across borders and across lines of transit.[8] Seeing the place from the vantage point of the railway porter allows us to notice continuities with the spaces and structures of transport in pre-colonial and colonial East Africa – from the Nyamwezi caravanserai of nineteenth century trade routes to the Mombasa waterfront.[9] At the same time, post-colonial transport is shaped by neo-liberal forces of globalization, resulting in casualization of labour and a rise of informality in the social relations of trade and transport.[10] On the colonial waterfront at Mombasa, Frederick Cooper argued, colonial authorities sought to professionalize dock labour in order to stabilize urban disorder and defuse worker struggles. Colonial dockworker stability was instituted through provision of a regular wage, housing, medical care and controlled union activities. At Kapiri Mposhi in the 2000s, it is the porters themselves who are constructing the scaffolding of stability in the dry port, through collective worker associations.

TAZARA's railway porters may occupy a marginal position in the social spaces of work at Kapiri Mposhi station. But they are located at the centre of the logistic operations in Kapiri Mposhi, both physically and economically. They are the carriers of goods shipped by traders who use diverse transport networks and vehicles at small and intermediate scales. They are also the carriers of thousands of sacks of flour, rice and fertilizer that make up the large-scale shipments of multi-national traders, goods that must be moved from

7 Interview with Austin Kaluba, TAZARA Head of Commercial Services for Zambia, New Kapiri Mposhi, August 2014

8 In his work on porterage in the nineteenth century, Steve Rockel writes that porters "illustrate multiple conceptions of labor crossings," as not only goods but also workers cross boundaries of space, time, identities through porterage. Stephen Rockel , "Slavery and Freedom in Nineteenth Century East Africa: The Case of Waungwana Caravan Porters," in: African Studies, 68 (2009) 1, p. 87.

9 Frederick Cooper, On the African waterfront : urban disorder and the transformation of work in colonial Mombasa, Yale 1987; Stephen Rockel, Carriers of Culture: Labor on the Road in Nineteenth Century East Africa, London 2006.

10 Eileen Moyer, "Popular Cartographies: Youthful Imaginings of the Global in the Streets of Dar es Salaam, Tanzania," in: City & Society, 16 (2004) 2, pp. 117-143 .

container to flatbed lorry. Porters are "casual" workers in a workspace that is both segmented and differentiated, as were the colonial East African dockworkers. Yet the porters have also organized themselves into associations, with the encouragement of TAZARA authorities, which gives them greater control over their labour power. The porter associations provide a useable structure for organizing the labour of transshipment on the platform and in the dry port, a structure that facilitates contracting between the railway authority, shipping and forwarding agents, traders and transporters. These associations are used by the porters themselves to push back against the precarity of casualization through the pursuit of collective contracts and livelihood security.

The presence of porters carrying headloads in the dry dock of New Kapiri Mposhi station could be viewed as evidence of declension – after all, colonial railways were supposed to have displaced the porter labour of the nineteenth century caravan routes, and post-colonial containerization should have brought the efficiency of logistics into present-day commodity flows. Porterage might therefore be read as a backward form of labour, resulting from a failure of modernization in the transport sector; logistical inefficiencies; or backlogged mechanical maintenance in the yards.

I will argue here that porter labour in the dry port, while showing continuities with the past, is a post-modern profession in a world of rapidly changing markets, flows of goods and capital, and diverse actors. Porter work has many facets and many contradictions. It facilitates the flow of goods in "globalization from below," as argued by Ribeiro and Matthews,[11] because porter labour of aggregating and disaggregating loads allows low barriers to entry for small-scale traders in global commodity chains. At the same time, casualized transshipment labour reduces costs for large-scale shippers who use the dry dock for off-loading port-to-port containers. The stabilization practices of porter associations not only reduce risk for the porters themselves, they also contribute to smooth and regular handling of goods for the railway authority, facilitating load contracting as well as everyday rail and carriage operations. In this sense, we may see that the porter associations formed to address the precarities of railway town casualization may also support and stabilize the very institutions that earn profits from their informal labour conditions. As I historically situate TAZARA locally and globally, I show the ways that railway porters associations serve a combination of local and regional collective needs while facilitating global connectedness.

The TAZARA Railway

The TAZARA railway was constructed between 1970 and 1975 following a two-year survey and design effort. Its primary function was to link the landlocked Zambian copperbelt with the Indian Ocean port city of Dar es Salaam in Tanzania. The full 1865-kilometer rail line was built with financing and support from China amounting to over

11 G. Matthews, G. Ribeiro and C. Vega (eds.), Globalization from Below: The World's Other Economy, London 2012.

$400 million in the form of a long-term, interest-free loan. China had agreed to finance and support the railway project in 1967 after several requests for assistance from western donors and from the Soviet Union had been rejected. At the time of construction it was heavily influenced by the politics of the Cold War – not only in terms of competing ideologies of development but also strategically, as it was located on the frontlines of southern African liberation struggles. The deep legacy of global and geopolitical contexts and significance is also reflected in the conjunctures of the operations of the railway.

TAZARA passenger services were inaugurated in 1976, with speeches and celebrations at the New Kapiri Mposhi terminus attended by distinguished regional African leaders and representatives from China. Yet during the first decade of operations there were already serious performance constraints that limited services for both short and long-haul transporters. From the mid-1970s through the mid-1980s the decline of the copper market severely limited revenue. Oil prices raised operating costs at the same time. There was a succession of performance breakdowns during the same period, many of them related to technological malfunctions and management failures. And rural economic growth was stagnating throughout the decade, affecting shipments of agricultural inputs and farm produce. By the end of 1978, only two trains were operating daily and as many as half of the available locomotives were stranded in workshops and out of service.

Offloading and transshipment times at New Kapiri Mposhi were also slow, causing delays in the return of wagons into Tanzania. There were inefficiencies and corruption at the port in Dar es Salaam that caused shipments destined for Zambia, including time-sensitive fertilizers for maize farmers, to be drastically delayed. In October 1978, Kenneth Kaunda announced to "jubilation" that he would reopen routes to the south to allow fertilizers and foodstuffs to enter through Southern Rhodesia. Routes were reopened for a period of time before they were closed again.

This initial period of decline was followed by a short-lived era of optimism. For less than a decade from 1985 to the early 1990s, there were improvements in TAZARA's performance thanks to infusions of development assistance not only from China but also from a coalition of western donors. TAZARA "bounced back" during this period, showing that projects to rehabilitate everything from the track to the wagon fleet could have a positive effect. Yet through the remainder of the 1990s TAZARA declined again as low traffic levels, management problems, escalating fuel prices and neglected maintenance took their toll. The wars in Eastern Congo contributed to the difficulties of transshipment, as wagons that were forwarded northwards via the Zambia Railways line to Katanga simply did not return, sometimes for years. As a result, shipments to Eastern Congo began increasingly to be offloaded onto road transporters in the New Kapiri Mposhi dry port from the mid-1990s onwards.[12]

During the 1990s there were two parallel developments that had an impact on the railway's fortunes. One was the opening up of routes to the south as South Africa gained

12 Interview with Lewis Kaluba, New Kapiri Mposhi August 2014.

independence from white settler rule, after Zimbabwe had already done in 1980/1. In response to this new competition, TAZARA authorities decided to focus on commercialization and marketing strategies in an "aggressive campaign".[13] Commercialization was launched in 1994 and 1995, through rationalization of management and worker layoffs. The program created two profit and loss centres, one in Tanzania and one in Zambia. The railway was officially re-inaugurated as a commercial enterprise. The commercialization had a direct effect on porter labour at Kapiri Mposhi station. Before the mid-1990s, porters were hired through TAZARA and were salaried employees. Afterwards the porters were casualized along with other workers, but with a difference – they were now hired by the investor shipping the goods, rather than by the railway authority. As one TAZARA official explained, "they have reduced the manpower of the porters. Initially, the people on the platform were TAZARA workers, but now the owner of the goods must employ [their own] porters and take all of the risks."[14]

The second of these developments was the introduction of economic liberalization and structural adjustment policies, beginning in 1985 in Tanzania. With new open-market policies for the agricultural sector in particular, TAZARA was forced into price wars with buses and trucks. With unstable copper prices in the 1990s, as well as conflict in Katanga, the railway was all the more dependent upon a diversified customer base. The commercialization plan called for a new vision of the line that would rationalize management, reduce labour costs and re-imagine the train as a link in regional networks rather than a line that brought copper to the sea. No longer a cold war strategic railway to liberate landlocked mining resources from dependency on the south, TAZARA was reborn as a "market-oriented facility," wrote one journalist, an infrastructure that was waking up at long last to the realities of regional transport competition.[15]

In my first book on the history of TAZARA, I demonstrated the ways that this conjuncture of regional economic liberalization, transport competition with reopened southern routes, and commercialization of the railway's management system contributed to a rise in local traffic in Tanzania. I focused my study on the small-scale traders in the "passenger belt" where the train became an important resource for rural lives and livelihoods. In response to insecurities in formal sectors of employment, and to disruptions in payments of pensions and other entitlements, traders and farmers developed new livelihood strategies that depended upon the multiple forms of mobility provided by the train.[16]

In this study of railway porters, I am turning my attention now to the ways the same processes changed the experience and organization of work on the railway and in the station at New Kapiri Mposhi. I show that casualization of the labour force combined with liberalized markets and new global commodity circuits have contributed to the

13 Daily News, Wednesday March 8, 1995, p. 1, "TAZARA to lay-off 2,600."

14 Commercialization and privatization of African railways took place throughout the continent in the mid-1990s, beginning in 1995. R. Bullock, The Results of Railway Privatisation in Africa, Washington D.C. 2005.

15 Daily News, Thursday March 9, 1995, p. 1., "Tazara lay-offs no surprise," front page editorial without attribution.

16 Many of those who were part of this process were in fact railway employees, either retirees or laid-off workers who decided to stay put along the railway corridor and expand their farming and trading enterprises.

centrality of porterage in the dry port and on the platform. At the same time, these forces contribute to instabilities in livelihoods of porters, working conditions that they seek to counteract through forming associations.

Porterage and "Globalization from below"

Transport economists predicted in the 1970s that structural adjustment and market liberalization in Africa would result in rapid containerization and the spread of efficiency in logistics.[17] As state marketing authorities were liberalized in Tanzania in the 1980s and 1990s, reorganization and restructuring of logistics was made possible, allowing potentially for the development of a new integration between production, trade and transport. Older infrastructures based on port-to-port shipment could be replaced with highly integrated multi-modal systems. In his analysis of three case studies, however, Ove Pederson showed that in African markets, especially in rural and regional transport, we don't see the kind of smooth integration and efficiency in transport that had been expected, for complex reasons that are local, regional and global. Instead of flows we see bumps, frictions and jerks. Pederson's diagrams of farm-to-port transport illustrate that human powered transport – what he calls headloads – has remained important in the global circulation of African agricultural goods.

I focus here on the aspect of logistics that most directly affects the work of railway porters at Kapiri Mposhi: containerization. Containers have been slow to enter transport chains in African markets despite liberalization. During the 1970s, only high-value imports were containerized, thus there were discounted rates offered for export shipments of bulk commodities from African markets to ensure that containers were not returned empty. In the 1980s containers continued to be used not only for imports but also for export products including bulk grain, coffee, cotton and cocoa. Most containerization, however, took place in ports where goods were transferred from truck to container or vice versa. Part of this was due to customs regulations, which required that loads be unloaded for inspection and then reloaded. But it was also the result of low labour costs at the ports, according to Ove Pederson:

> *low labor costs … make the loading and unloading of containers and trucks much less costly than in the industrialized countries. At the same time, the truck often can carry more goods without the container. Therefore, African countries have generally benefited less from containerization than industrialized countries, and there have been few attempts to integrate shipping and inland transport.*[18]

17 Paul Ove Pedersen, The Logistical Revolution and the Changing Structure of Agriculturally Based Commodity Chains in Africa," in: Niels Fold and Marianne Nylandsted Larsen (eds.), Globalization and Restructuring of African Commodity Flows, Uppsala 2008, p. 210-240. Gina Porter, "Transport services and their impact on poverty and growth in rural Sub-Saharan Africa: a review of recent research and future research needs," in: Transport Review, 34 (2014) 1.

18 Pederson, p. 223-4.

The workers who have provided this cheap labour are the porters. It is interesting that Pederson does not explicitly name porters or headloads in his description of the African docks; in his diagrams of logistical flows he locates headloading as a "primary" form of transport only in the rural areas where products are carried from farms to collection points. However, porters' presence at the ports – including the dry ports – is a key factor in the economy of logistics for African exports and imports, where containers of cocoa, maize and other commodities are moved.

Porters are not simply packing and unpacking single loads or single commodities. Porterage allows traders to bring goods together to form a load for shipment, or to divide up a load that is being disaggregated for onward forwarding. Traders shipping loads at small and medium scales – everything from a consignment of five poultry incubators from Pakistan to a truckload of finishing hardware for a construction site – must be tracked, sorted and moved to the appropriate waiting vehicles. Porter work thus allows for the consolidation and disaggregation of loads as part of a spatialized economy that is local, regional and global. Porterage as a form of logistics labour undergirds "globalization from below" because it contributes to the fragmented, decentred circulation of commodities in the 21st century.[19]

The presence of porters in the spaces of transshipment not only facilitates the shipments of bulk products by large-scale commodities traders in East Africa. It is also critical for the pursuit of livelihoods by small or intermediate scale entrepreneurs who are shipping multiple small loads or following segmented paths of shipment. For the small or intermediate trader who is not sending out fleets of trucks or rail cars, the presence of multiple "intermediate transport" options connected by rail and porterage facilitates entry and exit, recombination of loads and other forms of flexibility. But there is also risk in this environment, for traders and for porters alike, at Kapiri Mposhi station. For the small- and medium-scale traders who may have low levels of capital and influence in the port, there is risk to the security of handling and storage of their goods. For the porters, the uneven flows of shipments, irregular timetables of trains, delays in customs and clearing can all contribute to precarity. Associations are one way that they manage the unevenness and insecurity of their engagement. As we will see, associations also play a role in stabilizing operations for the TAZARA authority.

The Lives of Porters

Writing about the nineteenth century caravan trade in East Africa, Stephen Rockel argued "that professional porters were at the cutting edge of African engagement with international capitalism, that they were the prime movers in the economic, social and cultural network building of the period, and that they expressed an alternative East Af-

19 Mathews, Ribeiro and Vega (eds.), Globalization from Below.

rican modernity."[20] While the porters of the Nyamwezi caravan trade had very different lives and circumstances from the porters of the Kapiri Mposhi dry port, some of the characteristics of their labour do show similarities. TAZARA's railway porters view their work as a profession through which they can gain masculine respectability, build wealth and honour, and achieve social mobility. They are "prime movers" of goods and of relationship networks as they forge critical links from the local to the global.

Within the station and the dry port, the labour force of goods shipment is both segmented (i.e. divided into salaried and non-salaried workers) and differentiated by social status. Porters occupy a low level within this stratification, doing work that is unskilled and casual. Those who become porters are often young men who have few other livelihood options, for barriers to entry are very low in porterage and the work is physically demanding. Porters work on a casual basis and have no formal security – if they are injured or become ill they are unable to continue working and lose their income. Their position may therefore be seen as socially marginal, a status that is also spatially represented through restrictions on access and mobility within the station complex. Provided they are "at work," porters may enter into spaces such as the dry port or the station platform. When they are waiting for new contracts, on the other hand, the porters gather outside in front of the station in the shade of a large sculpture of a shovel, erected in honour of the workers who constructed the line in the 1970s. When one approaches the New Kapiri Mposhi station, there is a contradictory juxtaposition of casualized porters waiting for work, in the shadow of an artwork erected to commemorate TAZARA's first worker generation.

The spaces of the station and the immediate surrounding station complex are marked by spaces of inclusion and exclusion: there are "lines of exclusion" that demarcate where different activities take place and also where specific workers may and may not go. Temporary workers are the most restricted group of workers in the station complex, restricted by physical barriers and security guards, on the one hand, and also by understandings or meanings of space as these are established by authorities. These restrictions have to do with their labour position (i.e. as casual workers rather than railway authority employees, clients or customers of the authority). Even their place of residence has spatial connotations; most of the porters we interviewed reside in an informal settlement walking distance from the station known as "Soweto," a reference to the township in Johannesburg.

The station and the dry dock and the surrounding settlements shape the geographies of everyday mobilities in which porters live and work. These are to a large extent governed by rules established by the railway authority and enforced by security police. Porters move in and out of restricted and unrestricted spaces, in another example of what Rockel called "labor crossing." They may move into the high-security space of the dry dock for off-loading, then move out of the station past armed guards to their gathering point outside beneath the shovel sculpture. This mobility of the porters may be another way of transcending status or worker segmentation within the station. Porters also aspire to

20 Stephen Rockel, "Slavery and Freedom, p. 89.

social mobilities, as they may move through the accumulation of some capital to combine porterage with trading and, ultimately, move into trade more fully and eventually to farming. The associations they form facilitate the accumulation of capital through savings, while to some extent cushioning times of hardship. At the same time, these associations displace risk and contribute to efficiencies for the railway authority.[21]

The casualization of porter labour following the railway's commercial turn transferred the responsibility for moving goods from TAZARA to private clients. The private investor employment of casual porter labour reduced the costs to TAZARA of maintaining a permanent staff of porters, at a time when traffic levels were highly uneven. Thus the TAZARA authority successfully offloaded both the responsibility and risks of transshipment at the same time that they reduced permanent staff. Yet this policy also brought new risks for the station. Casualization meant that the number of unofficial people on the platform – referred to by one station manager as "intruders" – increased as porters, small-scale traders, vehicle drivers and agents all crowded the platform. This created a security problem with increased incidence of theft and damage to goods. The formation of porters' associations helped to alleviate these security problems by creating a more orderly and legible process for transshipment. Associations registered with the government, worked under the supervision of a chairman, and negotiated collectively with traders and agents through a single spokesman.[22]

More significantly, the porter associations also brought benefits to members. Mr. Chifwembe was the TAZARA Passenger Services Officer in 1998 when the first group was formed, named Twikatane Association. Twikatane was intended to serve as a mechanism for coordinating contracting and labour activities within the station, on the one hand, and for providing social support for porters and their families on the other. Members of the association pooled a portion of their earnings every month into a shared savings purse or a *chilimba* that they deposited into an account at the town's ZANACO bank. The purpose of the account was to share a percentage of group resources "so that they could eat something" when times were hard, said Mr. Chifwembe, for example when traffic was slow and there was not enough work to go around. They also used the shared funds to pay for burials for family members, contributing towards the costs of buying a coffin and transporting the body.

Twikatane Association used savings to make investments on behalf of the membership, for example they opened a small retail grocery shop in the nearby market. They purchased a minibus as a commercial enterprise and also started a football club. The association helped its members to begin acquiring plots and build permanent houses in the neighbourhoods of Soweto and Riverside near the station where most porters stay. At its most active Twikatane had over forty members, divided into smaller groups that were intended to share the work contracts fairly. They even secured a contract from

21 Railway workers have formed similar clubs and associations in Africa, including football clubs, see Ahmad A. Sikainga, "City of Steel and Fire:" A Social History of Atbara, Sudan's Railway Town, 1906–1984, London 2002, pp. 77-85.

22 Interview with Mr. Chifwembe, retired passenger services officer, New Kapiri Mposhi station, August 2014.

TAZARA to clean and maintain the station grounds: "at that time the station was very clean," remembers Mr. Chifwembe. While Twikatane apparently disbanded sometime after Mr. Chifwembe's retirement in 2005, other groups of porters have continued to form associations over time.

John Kasonde is the chairman of the TAZARA Express Association, one of the groups that has continued to operate at the station following the decline of Twikatane in 2005. He was born in Kasama, Zambia and came to live in Kapiri Mposhi with his father when he was a boy. After his father passed away Kasonde needed to support his family and he came to the TAZARA station to find work as a porter. "I didn't start lifting heavy things," he explained in an interview, "I started lifting light things." Kasonde described a period of apprenticeship in which he learned to lift and carry goods from more experienced porters.[23] He formed the TAZARA Express Association in 2009 together with other porters in order to facilitate contracting with the railway authority, with traders and with clearing and forwarding agents. The members of the association are young men, many of whom had to leave school when family financial circumstances made it difficult for them to pay school fees.

The TAZARA Express Association has a positive reputation on the TAZARA platform and in the dry port, where these young men seek to be collectively known for hard work, careful handling and honesty.[24] Being able to keep up this reputation is part of what the Association seeks to achieve in order to secure contracts and retain loyal partners. The Association addresses the needs of the railway authority and its contractual partners by recruiting, training and mobilizing the teams of casual workers. The Association is also a means of providing for professionalization, sustainability and stability for the porters, as it gives its members some measure of control over their own labour.

The association also functions as a social support network for its members, like Twikatane did, in the way of a rotating savings and credit society. When payment is made to the association leader for fulfilling a loading or off-loading contract, a percentage of the wage of each worker is contributed to a central social security fund. This fund is then used to provide support for members who experience hardship, for example illness. Many of the members of the group are single and young men who may be living far from family or other networks that could support them. The association's social function therefore acts as a form of security that evens out periods of insecurity and creates not only stability for the individual members of the porters' association, but also for the group as a whole. Providing for the needs of members also means that there is more sustainability and continuity among the porters, and this brings respectability and professional status to individual members and to the group.

23 Apprenticeship in the transport industry has been documented most recently by Jennifer Hart and Joshua Grace, see Jennifer Hart, „Suffer to gain" : citizenship, accumulation, and motor transportation in late-colonial and postcolonial Ghana," Ph.D. thesis, Indiana University, 2011; Joshua Grace, "Heroes of the Road: Race, Gender and the Politics of Mobility in Twentieth Century Tanzania," in: Africa, 83 (2013) 3, pp. 403-425.

24 Interviews with George Kasonde, leader of TAZARA Express Association, 2011 and 2012. Conversation with Lewis Kaluba, New Kapiri Mposhi, August 2014.

Port and Platform at Kapiri

There are two main spaces at the Kapiri Mposhi station where the porters load and offload goods: the dry port and the passenger platform. The dry port is located some distance from the platform within a walled enclosure, thus not in view of the public. Within this space the porters move the contents of containers onto flat bed trucks, most often carrying sacks of bulk commodities like wheat flour, rice or fertilizer. On days that I have been present in the dry port I have viewed shipments of wheat flour and rice destined for Eastern Congo, and fertilizers being forwarded within Zambia. The porter labour in the dry port is used, as Pederson predicted, to reduce the costs of shipment by shifting loads from containers to trucks. In the dry port following the arrival of a train there are often large trucks, drivers, porters, forwarding agents, shipment agents and TAZARA workers. All of these diverse people in the dry port are actively engaged in getting the goods offloaded from containers and into their onward moving transport. The language of the dry port is Swahili, once again inviting comparisons with the caravan era when, as a German observer noted of the port cities of Dar es Salaam and Tanga, "one is betrayed and swindled if one doesn't know at least some Swahili."[25] There is a Swahili culture in the dry port in part because it is a meeting point of truck drivers from towns of the East African coast, (in particular the same port cities of Dar es Salaam and Tanga mentioned above) and traders from Eastern Congo also speak Swahili there, as do most of the porters and TAZARA officials.

The dry port brings other benefits to the local community in New Kapiri Mposhi. When sacks of grain are being offloaded from containers and repacked onto lorries, there is naturally some breakage and spillage. The TAZARA authority allows local women to glean from the containers and the yard; grain that they clean by winnowing and then either sell or use at home. The lorry drivers also eat their meals at small local restaurants, stay in guest houses and patronize shops and other establishments, "in this way the whole community benefits from the dry port," according to Mr. Kaluba. [26]

Smaller-scale traders do not use the dry port for their shipping, because they may not have aggregated sufficient loads for filling several containers. These traders are found in New Kapiri Mposhi station on the passenger platform. Goods that arrive and depart from the platform are normally consolidated as "parcel" rather than container shipments, and carried in a specially designed luggage wagon. While the trader or agent that has consigned a parcel shipment may accompany his or her load when it is part of a passenger train, it is not necessary. Goods offloaded onto the platform at Kapiri Mposhi may be smaller or less bulky than those found in the dry port – finishing hardware for building construction, for example, or dried fish and agricultural products. Items that are fragile or perishable are normally handled by porters on the platform.

25 Willhelm Folmer, Die deutsche Sprache in den deutschen Kolonien," in: Koloniale Zeitschrift, 23, (24 April 1914).

26 Interview with Lewis Kaluba, New Kapiri Mposhi Station, August 2014; Interviews with porters, traders and lorry drivers, 2010–2014, New Kapiri Mposhi Station.

During summer fieldwork from 2011 through 2014, we observed regular shipments of construction materials offloaded onto the platform at Kapiri Mposhi. Boxes of floor tiles, ceramic plumbing fixtures, door and window hardware and other finishing materials had travelled from China to Dubai, from Dubai to Dar es Salaam, and from Dar es Salaam to Kapiri. From the station platform, according to a young man who was preparing to load materials into a hired truck, these materials would be taken to the copperbelt where there was a housing boom. The housing developments were the consequence of expanding settlements around newly re-opened copper mines, many of which were operated by Chinese investors. The Chinese-built train from the era of the Cold War had now become a vehicle for the import of Chinese-made housing materials (via Dubai) that were in turn a response to Chinese mining investment in Zambia.

On the platform and on trains during the last two years we have interviewed traders and shipping agents involved in this trade in Chinese goods marketed through Dubai. We spoke with a young man named Vasco who was moving his shipment of Chinese home building supplies into a truck bound for the copper mines. Vasco is the junior partner in a venture with an older relative who takes care of the buying (in Dubai) and clearing process (in Dar es Salaam); Vasco will now sell these goods to people building new homes on the Copperbelt at Solwezi. The truck driver who has contracted with Vasco to carry these goods is a Tanzanian from Dar es Salaam who drives a circuit all over East Africa. After he drops Vasco's load at Solwezi, he will pick up a shipment of copper there and bring it back to Dar es Salaam. From there it will be transferred to a ship at the port and set sail for China.

Conclusion

Just as porterage as a form of "labor crossing" has continuities with porter labour on the caravan routes, labour associations in the railway town also have a long history in Africa. Railway workers from the colonial period onwards have used associations to establish extensive social networks, regional associations, mutual aid institutions and cooperative societies.[27] The role of railway worker solidarities in decolonizing struggles across Africa has been well documented. Yet the majority of these associations have been established by salaried workers, in fact historians have argued that the stability of railway workers was a key factor in their development of corporate identity and in their labour militancy. In this study I have tried to highlight another side of labour in the railway town, a side often hidden behind the walls of the dry port or misunderstood as simply one of many casual labour activities in the "informal" transport sector including that of touts and conductors.

27 Ahmad Sikainga, "Organized Labor in Contemporary Sudan: The Story of the Railway Workers of Atbara," in: South Atlantic Quarterly 109 (2010) 1; R.D. Grillo, African railwaymen: solidarity and opposition in an East African labour force, Cambridge 1973; Frederick Cooper, Decolonization and African society: the labor question in French and British Africa, Cambridge 1996.

I have argued here that the work of railway porters at Kapiri Mposhi in Zambia facilitates the transshipment of goods from rail to road. Their labour reduces costs of long-haul logistics while physically smoothing out the bumps and frictions of port-to-port containerization. Their embodied practice of "hand-carrying" loads of fragile products such as ceramic tiles and bathroom fixtures allows traders such as Vasco to participate in the economy of "globalization from below". The porters both facilitate this form of globalization and they benefit from it: porterage provides for a form of livelihood in a context of much precarity for young men without a strong education background.

Their labour takes place within a space of work – the station platform and the dry port – that is both segmented and differentiated. They are "casual workers" at the lowest end of the work hierarchy; their status is evidenced not just by the kinds of casual work arrangements they endure but also by the physical spaces they can and cannot move in. In response to these working conditions, porters have formed their own associations to do several things: to gain more control over the labour process; to give them a more collective form of negotiation in contracts; to professionalize their work; and to establish a social security function that flattens out the ups and downs of their precariousness.

New practices and organizations are grafted upon a railway infrastructure that has been developed in Kapiri Mposhi over more than a century. The self-organization of porters in this inland port institutionalizes the relative stability and reliability of a 'parcel-ization' of global trade connections and hence facilitates East Central African access to world markets, and vice versa. The "institutions and practices for dealing with global connectedness," including transcultural encounters and the adoption of Swahili as a lingua franca, make this trading hub and its idiosyncratic mix of precariousness and security just as much an indispensable 'portal of globalization' as containerization or the world's main seaports are.[28]

Just as their labour of "hand-carrying" goods is of benefit to traders who may be shipping small loads of fragile items that need to be carried again and again, their sociality practice is also beneficial, because the social security means that they do not need to pilfer or steal; they are not out sick or leaving irregularly to find odd jobs elsewhere. Their associational practice provides stability for themselves and benefits for traders. As this enhances their reputation for honesty and hard work, they are no longer viewed just as ordinary "casual workers" but through their associations they garner respect and are even sought after by clients. Their forms of sociality enable them to pursue aspirations of masculine respectability and providerhood. Yet this very providerhood remains constrained by the precarity and adversity of the railway authority, local and regional economies, agricultural production and mining. If the trains are not running regularly, or only carrying partial loads, porters are out of work.

28 M. Middell and K. Naumann, Global history and the spatial turn: from the impact of area studies to the study of critical junctures of globalization, in: Journal of Global Studies, 5 (2010) 1, p. 162.

FORUM

„68“ als politische Herausforderung. Der Einfluss der 68er-Bewegung auf den Wandel der politischen Parteien in Frankreich und in der Bundesrepublik

Mathieu Dubois

> *Es gibt eine lange Tradition der Parteien, in der sozialdemokratischen, der konservativen, den liberalen Parteien; ohne die jetzt geschichtlich aufzurollen, haben wir nach 1945 eine sehr klare Entwicklung der Parteien, wo die Parteien nicht mehr Instrumente sind, um das Bewusstsein der Gesamtheit der Menschen in dieser Gesellschaft zu heben, sondern nur noch Instrumente, um die bestehende Ordnung zu stabilisieren* […] *– ich meine, viele Menschen sind nicht mehr bereit, in den Parteien mitzuarbeiten, und auch diejenigen, die noch zur Wahl gehen, haben ein großes Unbehagen über die bestehenden Parteien.* […] *Grundsätzlicher Unterschied, dass wir begonnen haben, Organisationen aufzubauen, die sich von den Parteistrukturen unterscheiden dadurch, dass in unseren Organisationen keine Berufspolitiker tätig sind, dass bei uns kein Apparat entsteht, dass bei uns die Interessen und die Bedürfnisse der an der Institution Beteiligten repräsentiert sind, während in den Parteien ein Apparat vorhanden ist, der die Interessen der Bevölkerung manipuliert, aber nicht Ausdruck dieser Interessen ist.*[1]

So formulierte Rudi Dutschke im Dezember 1967 seine Kritik der Parteien als überholtes und elitäres Modell des politischen Engagements, Hüter der Gesellschaftsordnung und Instrumente der Massenkontrolle. Damit war auch gleichzeitig die Veränderung

1 Rudi Dutschke, Gespräch mit Günter Gaus in der ARD-Sendung „Zu Protokoll“ vom 3. Dezember 1967.

Comparativ | Zeitschrift für Globalgeschichte und vergleichende Gesellschaftsforschung 25 (2015) Heft 4, S. 102–115.

der Politik eine grundsätzliche Etappe des „Marsches durch die Institutionen"[2] und eine Herausforderung für die politischen Parteien, derer Existenz durch einen Teil der protestierenden Jugend in der Bundesrepublik sowie in Frankreich in Frage gestellt wurde. Diese radikale und dauerhafte Kritik an den Parteien in der Zeit der Studentenbewegung und danach[3] darf nicht aus den Augen verlieren lassen, dass diese Herausforderung wahrgenommen worden ist. Das gilt nicht nur für die Linksparteien, sondern auch für Parteien aus dem gesamten politischen Spektrum der beiden Länder. Ganz im Gegensatz zu Dutschkes Vorstellung, die später von linksradikalen Erben der Studentenbewegung gern kolportiert wurde,[4] erlebten die parlamentarische Demokratie und das Parteiensystem in den siebziger Jahren eine wahre Blütezeit. Die gesamte Mitgliedschaft der etablierten Parteien verdoppelte sich und erreichte 1976 968 000 Mitglieder in Frankreich und 1 954 000 in der Bundesrepublik.[5] Auch wenn dieser Frühling der politischen Beteiligung andere europäischen Länder (Belgien, Schweden, Finnland) ebenso betraf, war er nirgendwo so spektakulär.[6] Angesichts dieser Elemente, erscheinen die französischen und westdeutschen Parteien als die Hauptbegünstigten der massiven Politisierung der jungen Generation in den Jahren um 1968.

Dies widerspricht dem Bild von „68" als Abschwächung der Legitimität der Parteien und der parlamentarischen Demokratie im Allgemeinen insofern, als die Protestbewegung für die französischen und westdeutschen Parteien eher einer Wandlungsphase entsprach, in der die Berücksichtigung der politischen Bestrebungen der Massen und die Distanzierung von einem elitären Politikmodell den Leitfaden darstellten.[7] Daher stellt sich die Frage nach den Bedingungen und Konsequenzen dieses Wandels innerhalb der Parteien. Es geht hier also darum, die Modalitäten dieser teilweise erfolgreichen Integration der Massen in die Politik am Wendepunkt der sechziger und siebziger Jahre zu beleuchten. Ziel ist nicht, den Einfluss der Protestbewegung auf die Veränderung politischer Ideen oder auf die Entwicklung des politischen Spektrums beider Länder zu ermitteln, sondern ihre

2 Über diesen Begriff siehe W. Kraushaar, 1968 als Mythos, Chiffre und Zäsur, Hamburg 2000, S. 81-88.

3 Die westdeutsche Studentenbewegung kennzeichnete sich durch ihre Dauer zwischen Juni 1967 und Mai 1968, während die französische Bewegung sich auf „Mai 68" konzentrierte und von der Beteiligung der Arbeiter und dem massiven Streik bekräftigt wurde. Über die 68er-Bewegung in den beiden Ländern siehe u. a. G. Dreyfus-Armand et al. (Hrsg.), Les Années 1968, le temps de la contestation, Paris 2000; I. Gilcher-Holtey, Die 68er Bewegung: Deutschland – Westeuropa – USA, München 2001; „1968. Une histoire comparée: l'Allemagne fédérale et ses partenaires occidentaux, in: Revue d'Allemagne et des pays de langue allemande, Nr. 2, April-Juni 2003; C. von Hodenberg / D. Siegfried (Hrsg.), Eine „zweite Gründung?" „1968" und die langen 60er Jahre in der Geschichte der Bundesrepublik, Göttingen 2006; H. Miard-Delacroix, „1968 dans une perspective franco-allemande", in: R. Zschachlitz (Hrsg.), „1968 – Quarante ans plus tard", in: Cahiers d'études germaniques, Bd. 54 (1/2008), S. 36-51.

4 Dieses Bild hat auch die Geschichtsschreibung über „68" teilweise beeinflusst. Die Studentenbewegung wurde manchmal als Ausgangspunkt des Zerfalls mancher Parteien u. a. des PCF beschrieben. Siehe H. Hamon/P. Rotman, Génération, Bd. 1, Les années de rêve, Paris 1987 und Bd. 2, Les années de poudre, Paris, 1988.

5 P. Delwit, „Still in Decline? Party Membership in Europe", in: É. Van Haute (Hrsg.), Party Membership in Europe: Exploration into anthills of Party Politics, Brussels 2011, S. 30.

6 In den meisten westeuropäischen Parteien sanken die Mitgliederzahlen mehr oder weniger kontinuierlich seit Kriegsende (ibid.).

7 A. Doering-Manteuffel, „Politische Kultur im Wandel. Die Bedeutung der sechziger Jahre in der Geschichte der Bundesrepublik", in: A. Dornheim/S. Greiffenhagen (Hrsg.), Identität und Politische Kultur, Stuttgart 2003, S. 146-158.

Rolle innerhalb des strukturellen und inneren Wandlungsprozesses der politischen Parteien in den „langen sechziger Jahren" aufzuzeigen. Diese Fragestellung ermöglicht, die 68er-Bewegung in die politische Geschichte ihrer Zeit einzuordnen bzw. in eine Periode der Stabilisierung des Modells der parteilichen Demokratie in Europa.[8]

Ein Wandlungsprozess, der bereits vor„68" begann

Die allmählich stärkere Bedeutung der politischen Parteien im Laufe der sechziger Jahre wird umso deutlicher, wenn man die Beschränkung ihrer Rolle in der ersten Hälfte dieses Jahrzehnts in Betracht zieht. Damals waren die zwei wichtigsten Figuren der politischen Szene beider Länder noch keiner Partei beigetreten. Während Präsident Charles de Gaulle seine fundamentale Ablehnung dieser Form der Volksvertretung offen zeigte, trat Ludwig Erhard erst der CDU bei, um die Präsidentschaft der Partei 1966–1967 zu übernehmen, d. h. drei Jahre nach seiner Ernennung zum Bundeskanzler.
Die Stärkung der politischen Parteien sollte sich langsam tatsächlich durchsetzen, obwohl sie schon in den Texten vorbereitet wurde. Nach 1945 sollten die Parteien den Eckstein einer Stabilisierung der Demokratie bilden. In der Bundesrepublik ermächtigte schon das Grundgesetz 1949 die politischen Parteien, „bei der politischen Willensbildung des Volkes" mitzuwirken.[9] Trotz de Gaulles Misstrauen gegenüber den Parteien erkannte ihnen 1958 die Verfassung der Fünften Republik zum ersten Mal in Frankreich eine offizielle Rolle bzw. die Mitwirkung „bei der Wahlentscheidung" zu.[10] In der Bundesrepublik sollte diese verfassungsrechtliche Anerkennung mit einer Demokratisierung der internen Funktionsweise der Parteien einhergehen. Erst mit dem Parteiengesetz vom 24. Juli 1967 verpflichteten sich die Parteien selbst, ein Programm vorzulegen, sich nach einer demokratischen Satzung zu richten und eine transparente Finanzierung zu gewährleisten. Die von diesem Gesetz organisierte öffentliche Finanzierung der Parteien stellte auch einen wichtigen Schritt für die Anerkennung ihrer Rolle in der Bundesrepublik dar. Ein ähnliches Gesetz über den Status und die Finanzierung der Parteien sollte es in Frankreich nicht vor 1988 geben. Die französischen Parteien waren bislang einfache Vereine (*associations*), die immer noch nach dem Gesetz von 1901 reglementiert waren. Dieser Unterschied spiegelte die größere politische sowie soziale Bedeutung der Parteien in der deutschen Gesellschaft seit Ende des 19. Jahrhunderts wider.[11] Dazu wurde der Wandlungsprozess der deutschen politischen Parteien nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg durch das

8 M. Conway,„Democracy in Postwar Modern Europe: Triumph of a Political Model", in: European History Quarterly, 32, 1, 2002, S. 59-84; Id.,„Rise en Fall of Western Europe's ***Democratic Age, 1945–1973"***, in: Contemporary European History, Bd. 13 (2004), S. 67-88.

9 Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland in der Fassung vom 23. Mai 1949, Artikel 21-1.

10 „Les partis et les groupements politiques concourent à l'expression du suffrage." Verfassung der Fünften Republik in der Fassung vom 4. Oktober 1958, Artikel 4.

11 Siehe dazu A.-M. Saint-Gille (Hrsg.), Cultures politiques et partis aux XIXe et XXe siècles: l'exemple allemand, Lyon 2005; C. Demesmay / M. Glaab (Hrsg.), L'Avenir des partis politiques en France et en Allemagne, Villeneuve d'Ascq 2009.

Gebot der Demokratisierung schon sehr früh in Gang gesetzt. Ihre Richtlinien waren ab den fünfziger Jahren von demokratischen Prinzipien geprägt, u. a. der Wahl der Mandatsträger und Vorstandsmitglieder, der Offenlegung von jährlichen Rechenschaftsberichten, der Öffentlichkeit von Debatten und Entscheidungen, der regelmäßigen Einberufung von Parteitagen. Auch wenn all diese Eigenarten der westdeutschen Demokratie noch sehr formell funktionierten, verschafften sie ihr einen deutlichen Vorsprung gegenüber den meisten ihrer europäischen bzw. französischen Pendants.[12]

In beiden Ländern erfolgte der Wandlungsprozess des politischen Lebens allerdings weniger durch die Gesetzgebung als durch eine Neugestaltung des Parteiensystems. In der Bundesrepublik führte die Renaissance der Sozialdemokratie nach dem Godesberger Parteitag 1959 zum ersten Machtwechsel im Rahmen der Großen Koalition (1966) und später der sozial-liberalen Koalition (1969).[13] In Frankreich zwang die Einführung der allgemeinen und direkten Wahl des Präsidenten 1965 die Parteien, sich anzupassen und Bündnisse zu knüpfen.[14]

Diese Neugestaltung des Parteiensystems beschleunigte gleichzeitig den Wandlungsprozess der Parteien in das Modell der Volkspartei.[15] Dieser Prozess betraf zuerst die Parteien des linken Spektrums, die sich Anfang der sechziger Jahre in der Opposition befanden. Wenn der Godesberger Parteitag die ausschlaggebende Wende für die programmatische Entwicklung der Sozialdemokratie darstellte, hatte schon ein Jahr zuvor der Stuttgarter Parteitag neue Richtlinien für die Funktionsweise der SPD verabschiedet, die die Macht des Parteivorstands zugunsten der Fraktion und des Präsidiums verringerte.[16] Nach dem Tod von Maurice Thorez 1964 begann das *aggiornamento* des PCF, das gleichzeitig eine programmatische Erneuerung und grundsätzliche Veränderung des innerparteilichen Lebens einleitete. Anlässlich der Sitzung des Zentralkomitees in Argenteuil im März 1966 wurde die Entwicklung des internen Pluralismus und der Theoriedebatten gefördert mit dem Ziel, einen breiten und offenen Dialog mit den Massen zu eröffnen.[17] Innerhalb

12 Dieser Unterschied erklärt auch teilweise die Diskrepanz des verfügbaren Archivmaterials zwischen den westdeutschen und französischen Parteien in der Nachkriegszeit. Auch wenn die Erhaltungsarbeit der deutschen Parteistiftungen eine wesentliche Rolle dabei gespielt hat, war das Archivmaterial ursprünglich umfangreicher auf deutscher Seite, weil die innerparteilichen Diskussionsgremien regelmäßiger tagten, ihre Gespräche und Ergebnisse formeller protokolliert waren und oft sogar veröffentlicht wurden.

13 K. Schönhoven, Wendejahre: die Sozialdemokratie in der Zeit der Großen Koalition (1966–1969), Bonn 2004.

14 G. Richard / J. Sainclivier (Hrsg.), Les partis et la République. La recomposition du système partisan 1956–1967, Rennes 2007; Id., Les partis à l'épreuve de 68. L'émergence de nouveaux clivages, 1971–1974, Rennes 2012.

15 Siehe dazu M. Duverger, Les partis politiques, Paris 1951; J. Charlot, Les partis politiques, Paris 1971; O. Kirchheimer, „Der Wandel des westeuropäischen Parteiensystems", in: Politische Vierteljahresschrift, 1 (1965), S. 20-41. K. Rudolph, „Die 60er Jahre – das Jahrzehnt der Volksparteien?", in: A. Schildt/D. Siegfried/K. C. Lammers (Hrsg.), Dynamische Zeiten: die 60er Jahre in den beiden deutschen Gesellschaften, Hamburg 2000, S. 471-491.

16 T. Großbölting, „Als Laien und Genossen das Fragen lernten. Neue Formen institutioneller Öffentlichkeit im Katholizismus und in der Arbeiterbewegung der sechziger Jahre", in: M. Frese/J. Paulus/K. Teppe (Hrsg.), Demokratisierung und gesellschaftlicher Aufbruch. Die sechziger Jahre als Wendezeit der Bundesrepublik, Paderborn 2003, S. 166-167. Siehe auch P. Lösche / F. Walter, Die SPD. Klassenpartei – Volkspartei – Quotenpartei. Zur Entwicklung der Sozialdemokratie von Weimar bis zur deutschen Vereinigung, Darmstadt 1992.

17 J. Vigreux, „Waldeck Rochet et les intellectuels – à propos du comité central d'Argenteuil du PCF (1966)", in: Nouvelles Fondations, 3/4 (2006), S. 139-141.

der nichtkommunistischen Linken stützte sich auch die Gründung der Fédération de la gauche démocratique et socialiste (FGDS) 1966 auf die Ablehnung der sehr hierarchischen und autoritären Machtverhältnisse der alten SFIO. Auf der anderen Seite des politischen Spektrums beschleunigte die Perspektive eines Ausscheidens der historischen Figuren den Wandlungsprozess der Parteien. Der Rücktritt Konrad Adenauers im Oktober 1963 gab der Modernisierung der CDU einen neuen Antrieb. Die Einführung von mehr Transparenz und Beteiligung der Mitgliederbasis in den Entscheidungsprozessen führte zu einem „kleinen ‚1968'" innerhalb der Christdemokratie.[18] Nachdem de Gaulle bei der Präsidentschaftswahl im Dezember 1965 in die Stichwahl gezwungen wurde, begann sich die Union des Démocrates pour la République unter der Führung Georges Pompidous allmählich zu strukturieren.[19]

Dieser Wandlungsprozess entsprach folglich nicht nur der Neugestaltung des Parteiensystems, sondern eher einer grundsätzlichen Veränderung der innerparteilichen Strukturen und Funktionsweise. So unterschiedlich diese Veränderung in den verschiedenen politischen Kulturen sein mochte, ging sie allgemein in Richtung einer breiteren Selbstständigkeit innerparteilichen Strukturen, einer größeren Mitgliederbeteiligung und dem Ziel, alle Wählerschichten anzusprechen. Dies begünstigte die Entwicklung kategorialer Vereinigungen oder Arbeitsgemeinschaften. Frauenorganisationen wurden gegründet, z. B. die Union des femmes françaises des PCF (1944), die Frauenvereinigung der CDU (1956), der Centre féminin d'étude et d'information der Gaullisten (1965), die Arbeitsgemeinschaft sozialdemokratischer Frauen der SPD (1972).[20] Noch drängender war damals die Gründung von Jugendorganisationen, die über eine breitere Autonomie verfügten.[21] Schon 1953 erhielten die Jungdemokraten von der FDP eine sehr große Bewegungsfreiheit als unabhängiger Jugendverband. Kurz danach gewährte die CDU 1956 der Jungen Union selbständige Richtlinien und den privilegierten Status einer Vereinigung. In ähnlicher Weise bewilligte die SPD zwischen 1959 und 1963 den Jungsozialisten neue Richtlinien, die die Selbständigkeit des Verbands begründeten. Mitte der sechziger Jahre ernannten die drei westdeutschen Jugendorganisationen ihre Vorstände durch demokratische Wahlprozesse und konnten ihre eigene politische Orientierung im Rahmen der Parteilinie bestimmen. Obwohl die meisten französischen Jugendorganisationen vor den neunziger Jahren über einen solchen Spielraum nicht verfügten, erlebten auch sie in den sechziger Jahren eine deutliche Veränderung ihrer Abhängigkeit zur Par-

18 F. Bösch, Macht und Machtverlust. Die Geschichte der CDU, Stuttgart 2002, S. 96.

19 J. Pozzi, Les mouvements gaullistes. Partis, associations et réseaux (1958 à 1976), Paris 2011, S. 290-291.

20 S. Fayolle, L'Union des Femmes Françaises: une organisation féminine de masse du parti communiste français (1945–1965), Diss. der Université Paris 1-Panthéon-Sorbonne 2005; F. Matonti, Intellectuels communistes: essai sur l'obéissance politique: la Nouvelle critique (1967–1980), Paris 2005; C. Kiefert, Politik ist eine viel zu ernste Sache, als dass man sie allein den Männern überlassen könnte. Die Frauenorganisationen in den deutschen Parteien, Baden-Baden 2011.

21 W. Krabbe, Parteijugend in Deutschland: Junge Union, Jungsozialisten und Jungdemokraten 1945–1980, Wiesbaden 2002. Über einen Vergleich der westdeutschen und französischen Jugendorganisationen, siehe M. Dubois, Génération politique: „les années 1968" dans les jeunesses des partis politiques en France et en RFA, Paris 2014.

tei. 1965 wurde die Union des Jeunes pour le Progrès (UJP) von der gaullistischen Partei als autonomer Jugendverband gegründet. Ein Jahr später wurde der Mouvement de la Jeunesse communiste de France (MJCF) vom PCF umgestaltet, um dem Verband einen größeren Freiraum im organisatorischen Rahmen zu gewähren.
Diese Entwicklungen veranschaulichen das Bemühen der westdeutschen und französischen Parteien, sich der Notwendigkeit des Gewinns neuer Wählerschichten und der Massenmobilisierung anzupassen. Diese langfristige Evolution überschritt den nationalen Rahmen und die Grenzen der politischen Familien. Angefangen in den fünfziger und sechziger Jahren, war dieser Wandlungsprozess allerdings am Vorabend der Studentenbewegung weit davon entfernt, beendet zu sein. Konservative Tendenzen hatten immer noch das Wort und konnten die laufenden Entwicklungen wirksam bremsen. Sie schätzten andere Modelle der Parteigestaltung wie erneuerte Formen der Honoratiorenpartei oder das gaullistische „compagnonnage". Überall war der Wandel zumindest zaghaft. Indem die Protestbewegung die Weiterentwicklung der Parteimodernisierung als unerlässlich erscheinen ließ, trug sie dazu bei, diesen Wandlungsprozess im folgenden Jahrzehnt zu beschleunigen.

Die 68er-Bewegung als Beschleuniger des Parteienwandels

Die 68er-Bewegung bzw. die APO in der Bundesrepublik und die Mai-Ereignisse in Frankreich stellten eine Herausforderung an die parlamentarische Demokratie und das etablierte Parteiensystem dar. Die Prinzipien der parlamentarischen Vertretung sollten durch neue und direkte Mittel der Meinungsäußerung ersetzt werden. Außer der Kritik ihrer Unfähigkeit, die Massen zu vertreten, waren die Parteien vor Ort vom Aktivismus der Studentengruppen überfordert. Die Beweglichkeit, die Schnelligkeit, die Kreativität dieser aus ein paar hunderten Mitgliedern bestehenden Gruppen bildete zur geringen Aktionsfähigkeit der Parteien einen starken Kontrast. Die regelmäßigen Störungen bei Auftritten von Kurt Georg Kiesinger im Wahlkampf in Baden-Württemberg im April 1968 trafen die CDU völlig unvorbereitet.[22] Im selben Monat hatte der kommunistische Abgeordnete und Mitglied des Politbüros des PCF, Pierre Juquin, unter den Buhrufen der Maoisten vom Campus von Nanterre fliehen müssen. Solche Szenen illustrierten konkret das Infragestellen der Autorität der Parteien durch die protestierende Jugend.
Angesichts der Häufigkeit der Studentendemonstrationen[23] versuchten die Parteien quantitativ zu reagieren und mobilisierten massiv ihre Mitglieder. Besonders bemerkenswert ist, dass die größten Demonstrationen des Jahres 1968 auf Initiative von Links- und Rechtsparteien organisiert wurden. Die vom PCF und der CGT ausgerufene Demons-

22 G. Buchstab (Hrsg.), Kiesinger: „Wir leben in einer veränderten Welt" – Die Protokolle des CDU-Bundesvorstands 1965–1969, Düsseldorf 2005, S. 877-878.

23 J. Reulecke, „Jugendprotest – ein Kennzeichen des 20. Jahrhunderts ?", in: D. Dowe (Hrsg.), Jugendprotest und Generationskonflikt in Europa im 20. Jahrhundert. Deutschland, England, Frankreich und Italien im Vergleich, Bonn 1986, S. 1-11.

tration am 13. Mai eröffnete in Frankreich die zweite Phase der Bewegung mit dem Beginn des Generalstreiks. Ebenso setzte die Gegendemonstration der Gaullisten am 30. Mai dem aufständischen Zustand ein Ende.[24] In der Bundesrepublik hatte die von der lokalen CDU und SPD organisierte Gegendemonstration in Westberlin am 21. Februar mehr Demonstranten mobilisiert als die Protestzüge gegen den Vietnamkrieg drei Tage zuvor.[25] Zahlreiche Parteimitglieder nahmen am Protest gegen die Verabschiedung der Notstandsgesetzgebung im Mai teil.

Außerdem stimulierte die Protestbewegung in allen Parteien das Freisetzen neuer Initiativen und die Erprobung neuer Formen des politischen Handelns. Die fehlende Reaktion abwesender und schweigender Führungsstäbe oder sogar der zeitweilige Bruch mit ihnen regte zahlreiche lokale Vorstände oder einfache Mitglieder an, selbst die Initiative zu ergreifen. Das war vor allem in Frankreich der Fall, wo der Generalstreik die Kommunikation zwischen den verschiedenen Gliederungen der Parteien wochenlang lahmlegte. In der gaullistischen Bewegung wurde dieser spontane oder lokal organisierte Aktivismus später zur Basis der Gründung der Comités de défense de la république (CDR).[26] Gleichzeitig versuchten die lokalen Kreise des PCF, Komitees für „un gouvernement populaire d'union démocratique" aufzubauen.[27] Die Studenten- und Jugendorganisationen der Parteien spielten eine wichtige Rolle in dieser Mobilisierung. Schon vor dem Einstieg des PCF in die Bewegung nahmen die kommunistischen Studenten- und Jugendverbände an den Protestzügen in den Universitäten und Gymnasien teil. In der Bundesrepublik beteiligten sich gegen die Anweisungen ihrer Parteien zahlreiche Jungdemokraten und Jungsozialisten bereits ab Juni 1967 an den Demonstrationen. Manche Gruppen der Jungen Union und des RCDS organisierten ihrerseits Hearings und Debatten mit Vertretern der APO und versuchten sich mit den radikalisierten Gruppierungen auseinanderzusetzen.[28] Solche Experimente sollten für die aktiven Mitglieder der Parteien den Maßstab setzen und schufen im folgenden Jahrzehnt die Grundlage einer Erneuerung der Basisarbeit innerhalb der Parteien. In diesem Zusammenhang wurde auch „68" zum Motor vieler Veränderungen.

Trotz dieser punktuellen Anpassungen an die neuen Forderungen der Politik hatte die Protestbewegung die fehlende Reaktivität und Mobilisierungskraft der meisten Parteien, ihre verstaubte Propaganda, die Schwerfälligkeit ihrer hierarchischen Funktionsweise ans Licht gebracht. Nach der Bestürzung im Kern der Krise kam die Zeit der Bilanz. In den Jahren 1968–1969 fanden in allen Parteien intensive Debatten über die Notwendigkeit

24 F. Georgi, „Le pouvoir est dans la rue. La manifestation gaulliste des Champs-Élysées, 30 mai 1968", Vingtième Siècle, 48 (1995), S. 46-60.

25 T. Nick, Protest movements in 1960s in West-Germany: a social history of dissent and democracy, Oxford 2003, S. 160.

26 F. Audigier, Histoire du SAC. La part d'ombre du gaullisme, Paris 2003, S. 139-147.

27 S. Courtois/M. Lazar, Histoire du Parti communiste français, Paris 1995, S. 347-349.

28 W. Streeck/S. Streeck, „Die‚Gruppe 70': Grenzen konservativer Mobilisierung", in: id., Parteisystem und Status quo. Drei Studien zum innerparteilichen Konflikt, p. 145-167; M. Kittel, Marsch durch die Institutionen? Politik und Kultur in Frankfurt-am-Main nach 1968, München 2011, S. 76-95; M. Dubois, „La Junge Union et le mouvement étudiant (1967–1969)", in: Revue d'Allemagne et des pays de langue allemande, 1 (2009), S. 89-103.

einer Modernisierung statt. Am 8./9. Juli 1968 wurde die Sitzung des Zentralkomitees des PCF Anlass einer kontroversen Diskussion über den Vorschlag des offiziellen Philosophen der Partei, Roger Garaudy, einen „Dialog neuen Stils mit den Massen" zu eröffnen. Die Diskussion setzte sich während der Dezembersitzung des Zentralkomitees fort und mündete in die Verabschiedung des Champigny-Manifestes über den „französischen Weg zum Sozialismus".[29] Beim XIX. Kongress des PCF in Nanterre im Februar 1970 konnte Roger Garaudy eine divergierende Stimme zur offiziellen Linie der Parteiführung zu Gehör bringen, was seit 1926 nicht mehr geschehen war.[30] Das Zentralkomitee der gaullistischen Partei kritisierte im Oktober 1968 ebenfalls das Handeln der Partei während der Mai-Ereignisse.[31] Das im November 1968 verabschiedete Berliner Programm der CDU bestand auf einer Verstärkung der kritischen Beteiligung der Bürger in der Demokratie:

> *Der Staatsbürger muß sich stärker an der politischen Meinungsbildung beteiligen können; die Parteien müssen sich als Forum der Aussprache verstehen.* […] *Das kritische Engagement, insbesondere der jungen Generation, ist ein notwendiger Beitrag zur Weiterentwicklung unserer Demokratie.*[32]

Kurz danach organisierte die SPD 1969 in einer Fragebogenaktion eine breite Konsultation ihrer jungen Mitglieder, um neue Formen der Zusammenarbeit mit der Jugend zu gestalten.[33] Überall eröffnete die Protestbewegung umfassende Überlegungen, die die Reformansätze der früheren Jahre festigten.

In manchen Parteien hatte jedoch diese Infragestellung keine unmittelbare Wirkung. Erst nach Wahlniederlagen konnten sich oft die von der Protestbewegung beschleunigten Reformen schließlich durchsetzen. Dies war vor allem der Fall in der CDU nach dem Wahldebakel im Dezember 1972. Interne Kritiken wurden freigesetzt und ermöglichten den Sieg der Modernisierungstendenzen um Helmut Kohl und Gerhard Stoltenberg, die die Parteiführung beim Bonner Parteitag im Juni 1973 übernahmen.[34] In Frankreich verblieb die gaullistische Union des démocrates pour la république bis zur Niederlage ihres Spitzenkandidaten beim ersten Wahlgang der Präsidentschaftswahl im Mai 1974 lange eher zurückhaltend. Sechs Monate später setzte die Übernahme der Parteiführung von Jacques Chirac eine rapide Veränderung der parteilichen Organisation in Gang. Nach heftigen Debatten über die Funktionsweise der gaullistischen Bewegung, insbesondere

29 Archives départementales de Seine-Saint-Denis (AD93), Archives du comité central du PCF, 261 J 2 / 44, séances du comité central des 8-9 juillet et des 5-6 décembre 1968.

30 Courtois/Lazar, S. 356.

31 R. Grossmann, L'Appel du gaullisme. De Charles de Gaulle à Nicolas Sarkozy 1958-2007, Monaco 2008, S. 216.

32 Bundesvorstand der CDU, 16. Bundesparteitag der Christlich Demokratischen Union Deutschlands. Berlin, 4.–7. November 1968. Teil 1 – Niederschrift, Teil 2 – das Berliner Programm, Bonn, 1968, S. 78.

33 Archiv der Sozialen Demokratie (AdSD), SPD-PV-Protokolle, Sitzung des Parteirats – 4.3.1969. Über den Umgang der SPD mit der 68er-Bewegung siehe Robert Philipps, Zwischen Konfrontation und Integration. Die SPD und die Auseinandersetzung mit der 68er-Bewegung, Diss. der Rheinische-Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität Bonn 2009.

34 21. Bundesparteitag der Christlich Demokratischen Union Deutschlands. Bonn, 12. Juni 1973. Niederschrift, Bonn, 1973.

anlässlich der Sitzung des Zentralkomitees im Juni 1975, entschied man sich 1976 zur Gründung des Rassemblement pour la république nach dem Vorbild der Volkspartei.[35] Direkt oder indirekt zwang „68" die Parteien, ihre Modernisierung bzw. ihre Veränderung zur Volkspartei zu beschleunigen. In der Hoffnung, von der massiven Politisierung zu profitieren, versuchten die Parteien einen breiten Partizipationsrahmen anzubieten. Obwohl die Protestbewegung auch eine unmittelbare Inspirationsquelle für die Veränderung der Basisarbeit war, blieb die Beschleunigung der internen Modernisierung die Hauptantwort der Parteien auf „68".

Die Partei modernisieren: Integration der Massen in das politische Leben

Diese Modernisierung stützte sich in allen Parteien auf drei Elemente, die die verschiedenen parteilichen Kulturen mehr oder weniger beeinflussten. Das erste war die Verstärkung eines zentralen Vorstands, der nun imstande war, eine gemeinsame Linie festzulegen und durchzusetzen. Das zweite war die Entwicklung einer modernen Kommunikation, die allen Wählerschichten gewidmet war. Das dritte war die steigende Beteiligung der Mitgliederbasis an allen Aktivitäten der Partei. All dies diente überall einem einzigen Ziel: einer höheren Effizienz der Partei in der Mobilisierung der Massen.

Die Verstärkung der Parteivorstände bedingte die Schaffung oder die Entwicklung spezifischer Leitungs- und Koordinierungsorgane. Paradebeispiel dafür ist die CDU, die sich erst 1967 nach einer jahrelangen Debatte einen Generalsekretär gab, was allmählich die Entwicklung der Parteizentrale ermöglichte.[36] Im selben Jahr reformierte Georges Pompidou die Union pour la Nouvelle République (UNR) und schuf die Stelle eines Generalsekretärs.[37] Nach einer schwierigen Debatte entschied sich schließlich der im Juli 1969 neugegründete Parti socialiste für die Wahl eines Ersten Sekretärs anstatt eines kollegialen Vorstands.[38] Diese Funktion sollte sich in den nächsten Jahren durch die Autorität von François Mitterrand durchsetzen.

In allen Parteien war diese Periode durch eine Flut von Richtlinien, Anweisungen und internen Briefwechseln sowie Mitteilungsblättern geprägt, die heute noch das Archivmaterial der siebziger Jahre von dem der früheren Jahrzehnte unterscheidet. Neue Instrumente wie elektronische Mitgliederkarteien verschafften den Vorständen ein genaueres Bild der verfügbaren Kräfte.

Unter dem Einfluss des Marketings und der privaten Kommunikation wurde auch die politische Propaganda grundsätzlich erneuert. Die Parteien, die noch nicht darüber ver-

35 F. Audigier,„La chiraquisation de l'UDR: une remise en cause du modèle militant gaulliste", in: Richard/Sainclivier, Les partis à l'épreuve de 68, S. 195-207.

36 Siehe die Debatten des CDU-Bundesvorstands in Buchstab, Die Protokolle des CDU-Bundesvorstands 1965–1969, S. 450-502.

37 Pozzi, Les mouvements gaullistes, S. 216.

38 P. Serne, Le Parti socialiste 1965–1971, Paris 2003, S. 64.

fügten, gründeten vollwertige Presseämter.[39] Die Propagandamittel wurden vielfältiger und überschwemmten bald die Wahlkämpfe mit Stiften, T-Shirts, Ballons oder Schmuck in den Farben der Partei.[40] Ein besonderes Augenmerk lag auf Parteilogos, die fast überall permanent neu bearbeitet wurden. Slogans wie „Das Leben verändern!" oder „Mehr Demokratie wagen" bildeten nunmehr den Kern der Wahlkämpfe.

Vor allem stellte diese Periode einen Wendepunkt in der Produktion von politischen Plakaten und Flugblättern dar. Die Verbreitung der nötigen Ausstattung ermöglichte den lokalen Arbeitsgemeinschaften, hektographierte Propagandamittel selbst zu produzieren. Der Inhalt wurde immer mehr von der Werbung beeinflusst. Anwendung von Fotos, Vereinfachung der Texte, Einsatz von Humor kontrastierten mit den oft komplexen und glanzlosen Plakaten der früheren Jahre und machten die Botschaften noch überzeugender. Auch das während der Studentenbewegung popularisierte Flugblatt wurde zum „Ausdrucksmittel politischer Emanzipation von unten".[41] All dies illustrierte eine wesentliche Veränderung in der Übertragung der politischen Botschaft.[42]

Grundlage dieser Übertragung wurde immer mehr das politische Programm, das jetzt in der ganzen Mitgliedschaft bekannt und verbreitet war. Im Laufe der siebzieger Jahre gaben sich die meisten Parteien Langzeitprogramme, die die politischen Perspektiven für die nächsten Jahrzehnte setzten und den Mitgliedern eine vollständige Argumentation für die Mobilisierungsarbeit brachten. Obwohl die Parteien schon seit Ende des 19. Jahrhunderts über Programme verfügten, beschränkten sich diese in der Nachkriegszeit oft auf Orientierungsrichtlinien für die Unterstützung oder Ablehnung der Regierungspolitik. Langfristige Perspektiven waren in den programmatischen Leitsätzen der fünfziger und sechziger Jahre kaum zu finden. Erst 1978 verabschiedete die CDU ihr erstes Grundsatzprogramm nach einer zehnjährigen Diskussion, die das interne Leben der Partei eine Dekade lang prägte.[43] Auch die SPD hatte 1975 einen „Orientierungsrahmen 85" – ebenfalls „Langzeitprogramm" benannt – angenommen. In Frankreich waren die siebziger Jahre die Zeit des *Programm commun de la Gauche*, das 1972 von PCF, PS und dem Mouvement des radicaux de gauche unterzeichnet wurde.[44] Im Gegensatz zu früheren programmatischen Texten, die bisher hauptsächlich für die Kader bestimmt waren, dienten diese Programme in erster Linie der Mobilisierung der Massen und gehörten zum Werbungsmaterial für die Basisarbeit. Die jungen Kommunisten gaben sich

39 Courtois/Lazar, S. 387.

40 J. Angster, „Der neue Stil. Die Amerikanisierung des Wahlkampfs und der Wandel im Politikverständnis bei CDU und SPD in den 1960er Jahren", in: A. Dornheim/S. Greiffenhagen (Hrsg.), Identität und Politische Kultur, Stuttgart 2003, S. 181-204.

41 K. Wernecke, „Flugblatt und Flugschrift in der Studentenbewegung der sechziger Jahre", in: W. Faulstich (Hrsg.), Die Kultur der 60er Jahre, München 2003, S. 165-176.

42 T. Mergel, Propaganda nach Hitler. Eine Kulturgeschichte des Wahlkampfs in der Bundesrepublik 1949–1990, Göttingen 2010.

43 Bösch, Macht und Machtverlust, S. 37-44.

44 Programme commun de gouvernement du Parti communiste français et du Parti socialiste (27 juin 1972), Paris 1972. D. Tartakowsky / A. Bergougnioux (Hrsg.), L'Union sans unité: le Programme commun de la gauche, 1963–1978, Rennes 2012.

damals den Slogan: „Une seule solution, la Révolution! Un seul chemin, le Programme commun!“[45]

Die Parteien versuchten auch, sich der Jugend direkter hinzuwenden. Angesichts des latenten Generationskonflikts stützten sie ihre Aktion auf Jugend- und Studentenverbände, denen sie eine bisher unbekannte Autonomie gewährten. Diese Organisationen erlebten in den siebziger Jahren ein goldenes Zeitalter. In der Bundesrepublik verstanden sich die Jungsozialisten und die Jungdemokraten als Sammelbecken der APO und radikalisierten sich unter dem Einfluss der linken Studentenorganisationen.[46] Die Junge Union ihrerseits bezeichnete sich selbst als „Sprachrohr der jungen Generation“ und beabsichtigte gleichzeitig, eine alternative Stimme der Jugend zu erheben und ihr innerhalb der CDU Gehör zu verschaffen.[47] In Frankreich wurden die jungen Kommunisten (MJCF) im Dezember 1970 umstrukturiert, um ihnen breiteren Handlungsspielraum zu verschaffen.[48] 1971 wurden die französischen Jungsozialisten (MJS) im Fahrwasser des Parti socialiste im Zeichen der Autonomie neugegründet.[49] Die erste Hälfte der siebziger Jahre repräsentiert infolgedessen in der Geschichte aller parteilichen Jugendverbände eine Referenzperiode.

Diese Modernisierung der Parteien erlaubte eine steigende Beteiligung ihrer Basis und die Erneuerung der Parteiarbeit unter dem Einfluss neuer, von der Studentenbewegung eingesetzter Mobilisierungsformen. Diese Entwicklung wirkte mehr oder weniger in allen Parteien – je nach ihrer politischen Kultur. Mitglieder der CDU beteiligten sich nun und organisierten Protestdemonstrationen wie z. B. anlässlich des Treffens zwischen Willy Brandt und Willi Stoph in Kassel im Mai 1970. In Universitätsstädten wie West-Berlin und Frankfurt / Main bildeten junge Mitglieder der CDU Aktionsgruppen mit dem Ziel, die Arbeit ihrer linken Gegner zu stören und eine grundsätzliche Reform der Partei zu fordern.[50] In Frankreich entwickelte sich durch das Experiment der im Mai 68 gegründenten *Comités de défense de la République* (CDR) ein neuer Aktivismus innerhalb der gaullistischen Partei.[51] Eine ähnliche Veränderung betraf die nicht-kommunistische Linke wie die Gewerkschaften und die Selbstverwaltungsbewegung (*mouvement autogestionnaire*) im Rahmen lokaler Aktionsstrukturen wie den *Groupes d'action municipaux* (*GAM*).[52] In den meisten Parteien wäre ein solches Engagement ein Jahrzehnt zuvor noch kaum vorstellbar gewesen. Die Verbreitung neuer Mobilisierungsformen und die

45 „Eine einzige Lösung, die Revolution! Ein einziger Weg, das gemeinsame Programm!“

46 Krabbe, Parteijugend.

47 Archiv der christlich-demokratischen Partei (ACDP), IV-007-024/1, „Deutschlandtag vom 1-3 Oktober 1971 in Bremen“, „Ergebnisse des Deutschlandtages 1971 der Jungen Union Deutschlands, Rechenschaftsbericht von Jürgen Echternach“.

48 AD93, Fonds Roland Leroy, 263 J 37, „Congrès National du Mouvement de la Jeunesse Communiste de France – statuts“. Siehe auch M. Dubois, „Mai 68 et la relance des jeunesses communistes: fin de la jeunesse ouvière et renouveau identitaire“, in: Revue d'histoire critique, 2014.

49 J.-F. Claudon/J. Guérin, Cheveux longs et poings levés. Les Jeunes du CERES de 1971 à 1981, Paris 2012, S. 113-114.

50 Über Frankfurt siehe Kittel, Marsch durch die Institutionen?, S. 30-48.

51 Audigier, „La chiraquisation de l'UDR“, S. 202.

52 H. Hartzfeld, Faire de la politique autrement. Les expériences inachevées des années 1970, Rennes 2005.

Systematisierung der politischen Tätigkeit in den Parteien spiegelten die Banalisierung der Mobilisierungsarbeit und die Normalisierung des Aktivismus wider.
Mit dieser steigenden Rolle der Mitgliederbasis innerhalb der Parteien wurde nun ihre Ausbildung besonders berücksichtigt. Während diese bislang eher den Parteikadern gewidmet war, richteten sich die Ausbildungsstrukturen jetzt an die Basis. Die Anzahl der föderalen Schulen des PCF und deren Teilnehmer stieg zum Beispiel von 131 Schulen und 1 591 Teilnehmer im Jahr 1967 / 1968 auf 1 968 Schulen und 2 410 Teilnehmer im Jahr 1969 / 1970.[53] Die Inhalte der Ausbildung waren nunmehr weniger nach dem Vorbild des Schulunterrichts gestaltet und bevorzugten die Verbreitung konkreter Mobilisierungsmethoden sowie die Beteiligung an der politischen Diskussion.
Eine größere Rolle in den Entscheidungsprozessen wurde auch der Basis zugesprochen. Das beste Beispiel dafür war die wachsende Bedeutung der Parteitage für das politische Leben der verschiedenen Gliederungen der Partei. Bis in die sechziger Jahre waren die meisten Parteitage bloße Applausveranstaltungen, bei denen sich die Parteiprominenz sehen ließ. Ab Ende des Jahrzehnts verwandelte die Politisierung der Diskussionen diese Treffen in breite Diskussionsforen, wo die verschiedenen Richtungstendenzen der Partei zu Wort kommen konnten. Die steigende Anzahl der Anträge veranschaulichte diese Entwicklung. Auf den Parteitagen der SPD wuchs sie von 95 Anträgen 1962 auf 281 1966 und explodierte nach 1968 mit 1 343 beim Parteitag 1973.[54] Auch auf den unteren Ebenen war die Diskussionsbereitschaft einfacher Mitglieder größer geworden.[55] Die Orts- oder Kreistreffen fanden regelmäßiger statt und sammelten jetzt einen bedeutenden Anteil der lokalen Mitgliedschaft. Parallel zur Anzahl der aktiven Mitglieder erhöhte sich die Zahl der Parteifunktionäre und der parteilichen Mandatsträger. Selbst wenn diese Entwicklung der internen Diskussionen nicht unbedingt einen größeren Einfluss der Basis auf die Entscheidungsprozesse bedeutete, war sie ein Zeichen der neuen Beteiligung der ganzen Mitgliedschaft in der innerparteilichen Demokratie.
Schließlich verursachte die Beitrittswelle eine dauerhafte Veränderung der Mitgliederstruktur der Parteien. Der massive Beitritt junger Leute vor und nach der Studentenbewegung gewährte ihrer Generation eine beherrschende Stellung in den folgenden Jahrzehnten. Dies war unter anderem der Fall bei dem PCF, wo die Mitglieder unter vierzig Jahren 1979 zum ersten Mal in der Mehrheit waren.[56] Nach dem brutalen Rückgang der

53 N. Éthuin, À l'école du parti. L'éducation et la formation des militants et des cadres au parti communiste français (1970–2003), Diss. der Université Lille 2 2003, S. 112.

54 Vorstand der SPD, Parteitag der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands vom 26. bis 30. Mai 1962 in Köln, Bonn 1962; id., Parteitag der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands vom 17. bis 21. März 1968 in Nürnberg, Bonn 1968; id., Parteitag der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands vom 10. bis 14. April 1973 in Hannover, Bonn 1973. Siehe auch T. Großbölting, „Als Laien und Genossen das Fragen lernten. Neue Formen institutioneller Öffentlichkeit im Katholizismus und in der Arbeiterbewegung der sechziger Jahre", in: M. Frese / J. Paulus / K. Teppe (Hrsg.), Demokratisierung und gesellschaftlicher Aufbruch. Die sechziger Jahre als Wendezeit der Bundesrepublik, Schöningh 2003, S. 168.

55 W. Falke, Die Mitglieder der CDU - Eine empirische Studie zum Verhältnis von Mitglieder- und Organisation der CDU 1971–1977, Berlin 1982.

56 P. Buton,„Les effectifs des communistes en Europe occidentale depuis 1968", in: Communisme, 17 (1988), S. 16-17.

Beitritte ab den achtziger Jahren, stellte die „68er Generation" 1997 32,7 % der Mitgliedschaft dar, damit weit vor den älteren und jüngeren Generationen.[57]
Diese Beitrittswelle junger Mitglieder veränderte auch die Auswahlweise des politischen Personals. Die politische Laufbahn innerhalb der Partei u.a. die Mitgliedschaft in ihrer Jugendorganisation wurden zum bevorzugten Zugangsweg in die politische Karriere.[58] Dies akzentuierte die Funktion der Nachwuchsorganisationen als „Rekrutendepot" für die Parteien und die Regierungsgremien.[59] Die größere Rolle der Parteibasis in den innerparteilichen Wahlprozessen verschaffte nun den Kandidaten mit einer langen aktiven Mitgliedschaft einen gewissen Vorsprung, da diese eine erfolgreiche Laufbahn in der Partei und in die politischen Ämter vereinfachte. Noch erfolgreicher als die „Schröder-Generation" zwischen 1998 und 2005[60] wurden die ehemaligen JU-Mitglieder. Zu Beginn des Jahres 2012 wurden drei der vier höchsten Staatsämter der Bundesrepublik von ehemaligen JU-Mitgliedern der siebziger Jahre bekleidet: das des Bundespräsidenten (Christian Wulff), des Präsidenten des Bundestages (Norbert Lammert) und des Präsidenten des Bundesrates (Horst Seehofer). Eine ähnliche Entwicklung fand in Frankreich statt. Die zwei höchsten Vertreter der Republik zwischen 2008 und 2011, der Präsident Nicolas Sarkozy und der Präsident des Senats Gérard Larcher, hatten ihre politische Karriere bei den jungen Gaullisten begonnen. Ebenso waren die ehemaligen Mitglieder der Jugendorganisationen besonders stark vertreten. Von den 52 Mitgliedern des Kabinetts Merkel II zwischen 2009 und 2013 hatten 35 ihre Karriere in einer Jugendorganisation angefangen, d. h. 67,3 %. Obgleich der Anteil in Frankreich deutlich niedriger liegt, ist er dennoch hoch. Von 68 Mitgliedern der drei Kabinette Fillon unter der Präsidentschaft Sarkozys zwischen 2007 und 2012 hatten 17 einer politischen Jugend- oder Studentenorganisation angehört, d. h. 25 %. Diese Entwicklung illustriert die größere Rolle der Parteien und ihrer Verbände innerhalb der Demokratie.
Die Zeit vor und nach der 68er-Bewegung war also ein entscheidender Moment der Konsolidierung der Mitwirkung politischer Parteien in der deutschen und französischen Demokratie. Ihre verstärkte Stellung in der Gesellschaft der sechziger und siebzieger Jahre hinterließ dauerhafte Zeichen in der Städtelandschaft. Imposante Gebäude moderner Architektur wurden damals für die Sitze der Parteizentralen gebaut und verkörperten deren Macht. Gute Beispiele dafür sind den Sitz des PCF (1971) in Paris, das Konrad-Adenauer-Haus (1972) und das Erich-Ollenhauer-Haus (1975) in Bonn.
Die neuen rechtlichen und finanziellen Mittel, die den Parteien in den zwei Jahrzehnten der Nachkriegszeit beschert wurden, stellten die nötigen Bedingungen für einen Wandel der Wähler- in Mitgliederparteien durch die Integration der 68er-Politisierungswelle in

57 F. Platone / J. Ranger, „Les adhérents du Parti communiste français en 1997", in: Cahiers du CEVIPOF, 27 (2000), S. 99.
58 M. Offerlé / F. Sawicki (Hrsg.), „Entrées en politique: apprentissages et savoir-faire", in: Politix, 35 (1996); G. Le Béguec, „Les circuits de formation du personnel politique", in: S. Berstein / P. Milza (Hrsg.), Axes et méthodes de l'histoire politique, Paris 1998, S. 303-318.
59 W. Krabbe, „‚Rekrutendepot', oder politische Alternative ?", in: Geschichte und Gesellschaft, 27 (2001), S. 274-307.
60 Kraushaar, 1968 als Mythos, S. 245-246.

die parteiliche Demokratie her. Nach dieser Ansicht hat die 68er-Bewegung weniger dazu geführt, die politischen Parteien in Frage zu stellen, als sie indirekt zu institutionalisieren. Die massive Politisierung der Jugend machte sie für die Mobilisierung und Vertretung erforderlicher denn je, was dem in den Nachkriegsjahren errichteten Rahmen der Parteiendemokratie ihre wahre Bedeutung verlieh. Die Antwort der politischen Parteien auf die Herausforderung der Protestbewegung war also eine Beschleunigung und Vertiefung des bereits in Gang befindlichen innerparteilichen Wandlungsprozesses. Die wachsende Autonomie der internen Gliederungen, die größere Beteiligung der Mitgliederbasis, die Entwicklung des Aktivismus, die Modernisierung der Verbreitung der politischen Botschaft, die Veränderung der Auswahlweise des politischen Personals stellten Grundelemente dieser Wandel dar.

In vielen Bereichen trat dieser Wandel frühzeitiger und grundsätzlicher in der Bundesrepublik ein, wo das Demokratisierungsgebot der Nachkriegsjahre eine wesentliche Rolle im Aufbau des Parteiensystems spielte. Der frühe Demokratisierungsprozess der Parteistrukturen und -funktionsweisen in den fünfziger und sechziger Jahren akzentuierte die seit Ende des 19. Jahrhunderts wesentliche Stellung der Parteien in der deutschen Gesellschaft. Im Gegensatz dazu befanden sich die französischen Parteien in vielen Aspekten im Rückstand und wurden deswegen von der 68er-Bewegung weniger beeinflusst.

Dennoch bildete der Wandel der politischen Parteien in dieser Zeit ein wesentliches Element der Konvergenz beider Gesellschaften.[61] In der Bundesrepublik wie in Frankreich erforderte die Infragestellung der parteilichen Demokratie eine Aktualisierung der Integrationsweise der Massen in die Demokratie.

61 H. Kaelble, Nachbarn am Rhein. Entfremdung und Annäherung der französischen und deutschen Gesellschaft seit 1880, München 1991; H. Miard-Delacroix/R. Hudemann (Hrsg.), Wandel und Integration. Deutsch-Französische Annäherungen der fünfziger Jahre – Mutations et intégration. Les rapprochements franco-allemands dans les années cinquante, München 2005.

BUCHBESPRECHUNGEN

Douglas Northrop (Hrsg.): A Companion to World History, London: Wiley-Blackwell 2012, 617 S.

Rezensiert von
William Bowman, Gettysburg

For many years now, Wiley-Blackwell has been publishing highly useful companion volumes for a wide variety of historical fields and subfields. These one-volume texts have covered topics in American, European, and global history. Now comes perhaps the most ambitious volume of all: *A Companion to World History* under the editorship of Douglas Northrop. Although world history has become an introductory course in many colleges and universities and in more than a few high schools, it is, in many ways, the most conceptually challenging of all historical fields. Anyone who has taught a course in world history quickly realizes that there are always a number of strategic and intellectual choices to be made. What is the chronology of world history? What themes or topics should one use to drive a course on world history? Can one give adequate treatment to various regions of the world and still maintain a compelling and convincing core narrative to a world history class or textbook? From whose perspective should world history be taught?

This volume addresses all of these questions and issues and much more and should serve as a good guide to world history for both the novice in the field and those who have labored in it for quite some time. Indeed, Douglas Northrop and the editorial staff at Wiley-Blackwell have brought together many leading figures in world history (Michael Adas, Felipe Fernández-Armesto, Ken Pomeranz, Heather Streets-Salter, Xinru Liu and many others) to contribute to this volume. Thus, many of the essays in it are not only good statements of past developments in world history, but also good indications of where the field is likely to go in the next decade or so.

The book is also smartly divided into thematic parts, each of which tackles difficult questions about world history. Moreover, Northrop provides a good overall introduction to the volume, which simultaneously leads the reader into the various parts and surveys important developments in the evolution of world history, especially in the United States. In the introduction, Northrop either discusses or references such foundational figures in the field as William McNeill, Jerry Bentley, Patrick Manning, and Peter Stearns. Northrop is

right to emphasize that world history has come a long way in the last thirty or forty years, but that many difficult conceptual issues still remain to be addressed and that this volume, while extensive in its approach, does not claim to have resolved all of the issues in the field. It sees itself rather as making important contributions to ongoing debates in world history.

Part I is titled "Trajectories and Practices." The essays collected here are of great value as they survey the state of world history teaching and training. For example, Streets-Salter discusses graduate training in world history and placement in the academic world. In North American colleges and universities there is sometimes the assumption that every academic, regardless of training or background, can shift from teaching western civilization or regional history courses to teaching world history. This is, of course, not always a good assumption and the results of this type of approach can be highly mixed. Streets-Salter, on the other hand, has been hard at work for several years now preparing students at the graduate level specifically for careers in world history and she shares her experiences and insights in her contribution to the volume. Its pragmatic, practical advice should be taken very seriously.

Barbara Weinstein tackles an equally difficult issue in her piece on the sources for world history. Because academic historians are always trained to do research in primary materials and especially in archives, critics of world history have sometimes challenged the field by suggesting that it is difficult to know what the sources should be for research projects in world history. How does one do original work in a field as global and seemingly abstract as world history? Weinstein takes this perspective on in her contribution to the volume and discusses the myriad sources, narrative choices, and research strategies available to the world historian without diminishing the challenges inherent in the field. She is almost certainly right that genuinely collaborative or collective research in the field remains elusive. At the same time, she points out that world history as a research field has served to correct many Eurocentric narratives.

It is difficult to even summarize the parts of a volume as rich and challenging as those in *A Companion to World History*. In other sections of the text, leading scholars take on questions such as the relationship between ecology and environmental studies to world history; the emergence of "big history" that argues that human activity can best be understood in a long historical continuum that looks at topics such as evolution, geology, and even astronomy; the importance of regional studies to world history; and the interaction between global and local events.

Further, the volume explores crucial dimensions of comparing and connecting topics in world history. For example, Adas takes on the issue of doing comparative history within a convincing and accessible grand narrative. Xinru Liu looks at race and linguistics in nomad cultures and Mrinalini Sinha discusses the way power is formed, maintained, and projected among empires and colonies. There is much rich material for the student of world history in all of these essays.

Equally interesting are the essays collected in the section called "Connecting" in world history. These essays focus on issues such as the spread of objects, peoples, reli-

gious ideas, and diseases. Some very fruitful suggestions about conceptualizing and eventually teaching world history topics and courses emerge from these contributions.

The final section of essays takes on the crucial issue of perspective and asks the provocative and fundamental question of whose view or vantage point is used in fashioning any world history narrative. Scholars examine global narratives as they might look from Oceania, China, Northeast Asia, Africa, the Islamic world, Latin America, and Europe. These studies are all well done and challenge the student and teacher of world history to consider and reconsider the underlying assumptions we all make in trying to write persuasive historical accounts. Finally, Douglas Northrop writes a concluding essay that highlights the complexity but also the rewards to be won in considering changing perspectives on the global past.

All in all, *A Companion to World History* is a first-rate and cutting-edge contribution to the field of world history. It also contains a large and up-to-date bibliography. Serious scholars in the field will want to add it to their collection of basic reference books. It also belongs in every research library. The one drawback to the book is the rather hefty price (120 British pounds) for the hardcover edition. Paperback versions of the text can be purchased, however, at a substantially lower price.

Dierk Walter: Organisierte Gewalt in der europäischen Expansion. Gestalt und Logik des Imperialkrieges, Hamburg: Hamburger Edition, HIS Verlag 2014, 414 S.

Rezensiert von
Herfried Münkler, Berlin

Der Historiker Dierk Walter ist in Deutschland sicherlich der beste Kenner der imperialen Expansionskriege, die von den europäischen Mächten zwischen dem 15. und 20. Jh. geführt worden sind. In seiner Berner Habilitationsschrift hat er nunmehr die Summe seiner jahrelangen Beschäftigung mit diesem Thema gezogen. Dabei hat er dieses halbe Jahrtausend kriegerischer Expansion nicht in diachroner Perspektive dargestellt, sondern nach Maßgabe systematischer Fragestellungen analysiert. Das verlangt einiges an theoretisch-methodischer Sensibilität, denn die Eroberung der neuen Welt durch die spanischen Conquistadoren erfolgte mit anderen Mitteln und unter anderen Imperativen als das langsame Vordringen russischer Pelzhändler in Sibirien, oder die Errichtung von *seaborn empires* durch Portugiesen und Niederländer, oder die Durchsetzung einer Globalökonomie auf Grundlage des Freihandels durch die Briten. Alle diese imperialen Mächte bedienten sich der Gewalt, aber die Gewalt hatte jeweils einen anderen Stellenwert bei der Errichtung der (Kolonial-)Imperien: Bei den Conquistadoren war sie das zentrale Element und die unabdingbare Vor-

aussetzung der Expansion, bei den Briten hingegen war sie – in der Regel – ein so lange wie möglich zu vermeidendes Mittel, auf das man nur ungern zurückgriff, weil es die Kosten der Beherrschung eines Raumes in die Höhe schnellen ließ.

Bei der Planung und Führung von Imperialkriegen hing also alles davon ab, aus welchem Blickwinkel man sie betrachtete: aus dem des Zentrums, das die Gesamtlasten – und -kosten des Imperiums im Auge zu behalten und die Risiken „imperialer Überdehnung" (Paul Kennedy) zu begrenzen hatte, oder aus dem der Männer an der Peripherie, denen es häufig um Macht und Reichtum sowie ihr persönliches Prestige ging und die bloß die unmittelbar in ihrem Blickfeld liegenden Expansionsräume im Auge hatten. Für beide war der Krieg ein Mittel bei der Verfolgung ihrer Ziele und Zwecke, aber die Evaluation dieses Mittels erfolgte nach sehr unterschiedlichen Prinzipien. Walter weiß um diese Differenz, erwähnt sie gelegentlich auch, billigt ihr aber keine größere Relevanz zu. Es ist eine Phänomenologie der Imperialkriege, die er vorgelegt hat, abzüglich einer imperialtheoretischen Einbettung und einer politiktheoretischen Perspektive. Auf diese Weise kann man zwar, um den Untertitel des Buches aufzunehmen, die „Gestalt", aber nicht die „Logik" des Imperialkrieges erforschen.

Walter hat seine Arbeit in vier Kapitel gegliedert: Das erste beschäftigt sich mit dem Problem der Peripherie, das darin besteht, dass es für die europäischen Imperien nie um die Frage ihrer Fortexistenz ging, während die Akteure an der Peripherie der europäischen Kolonialimperien fast immer um den Fortbestand als politische Einheit kämpften. Die Frage des Raumes ist mit der nach der Zeit verbunden: Imperien verfügen in der Regel über größere Zeithorizonte, und wenn sie sich dieses Mal nicht zur Expansion entschlossen, dann konnten sie es doch in einigen Jahrzehnten tun. Diese Raum- und Zeitsouveränität verschaffte den Mächten des Zentrums eine Überlegenheit, der die Akteure der Peripherie außer ihrer klimatischen Angepasstheit und der Vertrautheit mit dem Gelände nichts Vergleichbares entgegenzusetzen hatten. Das erklärt, warum die Imperien über die längste Zeit den indigenen Akteuren des Randes überlegen waren, wiewohl letztere fast immer zahlenmäßig überlegene Kräfte aufzubieten vermochten und es für sie nicht um machtpolitische Optionen, sondern um eine existenzielle Herausforderung ging.

Das wird von Walter umsichtig herausgearbeitet und anhand einer Fülle von Beispielen belegt. Offen bleibt in seiner Arbeit dagegen die Frage, wie das Zentrum zum Zentrum und die Peripherie zur Peripherie wurden, also wie politische Akteure Raum- und Zeitsouveränität erlangten. Um diese Frage beantworten zu können, hätte sich Walter freilich nicht auf die europäische Expansion beschränken dürfen, sondern sie – beispielsweise – mit den arabischen Eroberungen seit dem 8. Jh., der osmanischen Expansion seit dem 14. Jh. oder der mongolischen Weltreichsbildung des 13. und 14. Jh.s vergleichen müssen. Dabei wäre er vermutlich darauf gestoßen, das Krieg und Gewalt bei der europäischen Expansion eine systemisch geringere Rolle gespielt haben als bei den aufgeführten Beispielen, dass sie aber wichtiger waren als bei der chinesischen Großreichsbildung. Dass Walter auf diese Ebene des Vergleichs grundsätzlich verzichtet und sogleich bei

Europa angesetzt hat, kann man als „negativen Europazentrismus“ bezeichnen.
Das zweite Kapitel beschäftigt sich mit den Zielen und Legitimationen der europäischen Expansion. Von Strafexpeditionen über Raub- bis zu Unterwerfungskriegen wird hier eine breite Palette europäischer Kriegsziele vorgeführt, wobei Walter aber auch zeigt, dass die Europäer häufig an der Peripherie ihrer Kolonialimperien auf ebenfalls imperiale Ordnungen gestoßen sind, die ihrerseits einen Teil der indigenen Bevölkerung unterworfen hatten, was zur Folge hatte, die Europäer als deren Befreier und Beschützer auftreten konnten. Zugleich gewannen sie dadurch Verbündete aus den Reihen der Indigenen des Expansionsraums, und diese Unterstützung war für den Ausgang eines Krieges oftmals wichtiger als die waffentechnische und militärorganisatorische Überlegenheit der europäischen Truppen, deren Bedeutung, so Walter, zumeist überschätzt wird. Daraus hätte sich eine leitende These entwickeln lassen, die neben die militärischen Kapazitäten der europäischen Mächte deren politisches Raffinement stellt. Aber mit solchen Leitthesen ist Walter zurückhaltend.
Eine der wichtigsten Unterscheidungen bei der Evaluation von Imperialkriegen wird im dritten Kapitel bearbeitet, nämlich die Differenz zwischen Kriegen, bei denen europäische Siedler eine zentrale Rolle spielen, und solchen, die nur von den merkantilen Interessen der Handelskompanien oder der Beutegier einiger Eroberer angetrieben wurden. Sobald Siedler ins Spiel kamen, wurde der Krieg vom Eroberungs- und Ausplünderungskrieg zum Vernichtungskrieg. Diese Transformation ist jedoch nicht aus der „Logik“ des Krieges selbst, sondern aus der Konfrontation von Produktionsweisen (Ackerbau und Weidewirtschaft gegen die Reproduktionsform von Jäger- und Sammlergesellschaften) und demographischen Reproduktionsraten zu erklären: Nordamerika und Australien sind „europäisiert“ worden, Afrika nicht, und in Südamerika kam es nur zu einer Teileuropäisierung. Die militärische Gewalt spielt bei der Erklärung dieser Differenz nur eine untergeordnete Rolle, und die Direktionsgewalt über die Entwicklung geht auf andere Faktoren der Macht über. Walter spricht das immer wieder an, erlegt sich aber eine zu große Zurückhaltung auf, dies in die Systematik seiner Analyse aufzunehmen.
Das vierte und letzte Kapitel beschäftigt sich mit den Anpassungs- und Lernprozessen der aufeinandertreffenden Akteure. Es ist dies das Kapitel, das sich vor allem mit den Problemen der Transkulturalität bzw. Asymmetrie von Imperialkriegen beschäftigt. Viele der Fragen, die Walter hier mit Blick auf eine Zeitspanne von fünf Jahrhunderten bearbeitet, stellen sich auch bei heutigen Interventionen in peripheren Räumen, von der politischen Legitimation bis zur militärischen Asymmetrie. Diese Kontinuitäten dürften dazu beigetragen haben, dass Walter die These vertritt, die humanitären Interventionen des späten 20./frühen 21. Jh.s unterschieden sich nicht wesentlich von den Imperialkriegen der europäischen Expansion. Darüber kann man trefflich streiten, doch ist bei einer solchen Debatte im Auge zu behalten, dass Walters These auf einer phänomenologischen Herangehensweise beruht, die politischen Konstellationen wenig Beachtung schenkt. In diesem Kapitel hätte dem Asymmetriebegriff eine definitorische Schärfung gut getan – etwa durch die

Unterscheidung zwischen Asymmetrien, die durch genuin nichtmilitärische Faktoren entstehen, wie Technik, Ökonomie und Demographie, und einer genuin militärischen Asymmetrierung infolge strategischer Kreativität. Beides wird als Asymmetrie bezeichnet, ist deswegen aber keineswegs dasselbe.

Walters Buch hinterlässt einen ambivalenten Eindruck: Einerseits ist es eine ungemein materialgesättigte Arbeit, eine wahre Fundgrube für alle, die sich mit der Geschichte und Struktur von Imperialkriegen beschäftigen. Für sie ist die Lektüre von Dierk Walters Arbeit ein „Muss". Andererseits fällt es schwer zu sagen, was dessen leitende Thesen und die Summe der aufwändigen Untersuchung sind. Dem steht das fortgesetzte „Einerseits-Andererseits" der Darstellung entgegen, mit dem sich Walter, sobald er einen Gedanken entwickelt und materialiter unterfüttert hat, immer wieder selbst ins Wort fällt. Das mag in vielen Fällen durch die Ambiguität des Materials bzw. der einzelnen Beobachtungen begründet sein. Aber dann drängt sich doch auch wieder den Eindruck auf, dass Walter vor dem Ausarbeiten einer eindeutigen Position zurückschreckt. Er will zuviel: politisch korrekt sein, dem Material Rechnung tragen, sich kritisch von früheren Arbeiten absetzen, Kontinuitätslinien zur Gegenwart herstellen und zugleich die ultimative Analyse über ein halbes Jahrtausend Imperialkriege vorlegen. Der Preis, den er für dieses „Zuviel" zu zahlen hat, ist hoch: Was ein Gebäude werden sollte, ist ein Bauplatz geblieben.

Stephan Wendehorst (Hrsg.): Die Anatomie frühneuzeitlicher Imperien, Herrschaftsmanagement jenseits von Staat und Nation. Institutionen, Personal und Techniken (Bibliothek Altes Reich, Bd. 5), Berlin: de Gruyter 2015, 491 S.

Rezensiert von
Oliver Krause, Leipzig

Stephan Wendehorsts Auseinandersetzung mit der Geschichte des Heiligen Römischen Reichs, den Definitionsgeschichten des Reichs- und Imperiums-Begriffs sowie des Einflusses der geschichtswissenschaftlichen Strömung des *imperial turn* mündete nach langer Vorbereitungszeit in diesen Sammelband der Reihe *Bibliothek Altes Reich*, zu dessen Herausgebern Wendehorst zählt. In drei Sektionen wird darstellt, was die „Untersuchung der ‚Alten Reiche' für die Imperienforschung leisten kann und, umgekehrt, welche Anstöße der *imperial turn* für das Verständnis der Geschichte dieser Reiche verspricht […]" (S. 19). Der den inhaltlichen Sektionen vorangestellte Beitrag Wendehorsts unter dem Themenschwerpunkt Theorie und Historiographie umreißt die Programmatik des Bandes, ohne explizit auf die folgenden Beiträge einzugehen. Wendehorst lehnt im einleitenden Beitrag die Abgrenzung gegen eine rein definitionsbasierte Beschäftigung mit politischen Ordnungen ab. Er verweist explizit auf den Gewinn der Untersuchung von Herrschaftsstrategien in frühneuzeitlichen Imperien und Reichen, aus deren

Analyse Erkenntnisse erwachsen, wie politische Ordnungen abseits von Staats- und Nationalstaatsbildung erfolgreich funktionierten. Die fehlende Vereinheitlichung in Reichen und Imperien im Gegensatz zur festgefügten, staatlichen Ordnung sieht Wendehorst als Voraussetzung für das flexible und dadurch erfolgreiche Handeln der imperialen Eliten. Die Schlussfolgerung ist die Ausdifferenzierung von Untersuchungsebenen – imperiale Institutionen, imperiales Personal, imperiale Herrschaftstechniken – zur Erarbeitung eines Modells, mit dem auch gegenwärtige, überstaatliche Ordnungen wie die EU und die Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika beschrieben werden können. Wendehorst argumentiert für einen Wechsel des Paradigmas in der Analyse von politischen Strukturen in der Frühen Neuzeit. Das neue Paradigma bewegt sich weg von der Zentrierung auf die Entstehung von Staat- und Nationalstaatlichkeit in der Forschung zu frühneuzeitlichen politischen Transformationen und wendet sich der Beschreibung der Diversität politischer Ordnungen in der Frühen Neuzeit zu, um deren imperialen Charakter zu betonen.

Jede der drei Sektionen des Bandes gilt einer der von Wendehorst identifizierten Untersuchungsebenen. Dem inhaltlichen Teil des Bandes sind das Autorenverzeichnis und die englische Zusammenfassung der einzelnen Beiträge angeschlossen.

Die Beiträge in den Sektionen gehen zum Großteil auf Tagungen zurück, die bereits 2006 und 2007 stattfanden. Alle Aufsätze des Bandes befassen sich mit dem 17. und/oder 18. Jh. Die erste Sektion des Bands, mit fünf Beiträgen die am wenigsten umfangreiche, widmet sich den imperialen Institutionen. Die regionalen Untersuchungen in allen Sektionen konzentrieren sich auf Dänemark-Norwegen, Polen-Litauen, das Heilige Römische Reich (HRR), das Osmanische Reich, Schweden sowie das Reich der Habsburger außerhalb des Heiligen Römischen Reichs. Eine regionale Ausnahme bildet England. Finnland und die Schweizer Eidgenossenschaft finden im Vergleich mit Schweden bzw. dem Reich Erwähnung.

Ronald Aschs Beitrag in der ersten Sektion behandelt die Herrschaft Jakob des (VI.) I. im frühen 17. Jh. unter dem Aspekt des Erfolgs von imperialer Herrschaft am Beispiel der Personalunion Jakobs als König von Schottland und England. Entgegen der konzeptionellen Dreiteilung verbindet Asch das Wirken der Akteure mit den jeweiligen Herrschaftstechniken, die sich letztlich auch in einer spezifisch englischen Institutionalisierung der Königsherrschaft manifestiert. Bereits in der ersten Sektion zeigt sich das Problem, dass die verschiedenen Sektionen zwar theoretisch für die Analyse getrennt werden, in der Betrachtung der einzelnen Untersuchungsgegenstände indes nicht voneinander zu separieren sind. Wenn Olga Khavanova Joseph von Sonnenfeld als Schlüsselfigur für die universitäre Ausbildung der administrativen Elite in der Habsburgermonarchie in der ersten Sektion beschreibt, vermischt sich die Untersuchung der Universität als Institution der Ausbildung zwangsläufig mit der Betrachtung des Wirkens Sonnenfelds als Mitglied des imperialen Personals. Der gleichen Zwangsläufigkeit unterliegen die Beiträge Tulay Artans zum Agieren der Großwesire gegenüber dem osmanischen Sultan während des 18. Jh.s und Astrid von Schlachtas Untersuchung des Verhältnisses zwischen Landständen und Obrig-

keit in Ostfriesland und Tirol im selben Jahrhundert. Einzig Michael Bregnsbos Aufsatz zur lutherischen Staatskirche im dänischen Imperium bleibt, ohne konkret auf einzelne Pfarrer einzugehen, eine abstrakte Darstellung der Kirche als imperiale Institution. Die Beiträge der Sektion gehen weit über die Beschreibung von imperialen Institutionen hinaus. Eine regionale Gliederung wäre bei der bestehenden Konzentration auf bestimmte Territorien ebenso möglich gewesen, wodurch die Sektionen thematisch homogener gestaltet gewesen wären.

Die zweite Sektion unter dem Titel „imperiales Personal" gibt einen Einblick in das Wirken einzelner Akteure und Gruppen. In der umfangreichsten Sektion des Bandes stehen Polen-Litauen und das Reich im Mittelpunkt der Betrachtungen. Fikret Adamir trägt eine Untersuchung zu den Ayan – einer Gruppe von einflussreichen Personen auf dem osmanisch beherrschten Balkan im 17. Jh. – zur Sektion bei. Stefan Ehrenpreis, Thomas Lau, Matthias Schnettger und Stephan Wendehorst selbst erweitern die Sektion mit Untersuchungen zum imperialen Personal im HRR. Zu den frühneuzeitlichen Akteuren in Polen-Litauen steuerten Hans-Jürgen Bömelburg, Bogusław Dybaś und Jürgen Heyde Aufsätze bei. Die zweite Sektion ist ob des inhaltlichen Zusammenhangs und der innertextlichen Struktur der einzelnen Beiträge die gewinnbringendste des Bandes, die gleichzeitig eindringlich das Potential aufzeigt, das der Austausch zwischen Reichs- und Imperiumsforschung erbringt.

Die Aufsätze der dritten Sektion beschäftigen sich mit „imperialen Herrschaftstechniken". Karl Härters einleitender Beitrag zum Rechtssystem des HRR bespricht die rechtlichen Rahmenbedingungen für den Einsatz der Herrschaftstechniken. Die regionalen Schwerpunkte bilden das HRR und Schweden. Anna Ziemlewska führt den regionalen Schwerpunkt Polen-Litauen mit einer Untersuchung zu den „Kalenderunruhen" in Riga (1584–1589) weiter. Thomas Lau bespricht in seinem zweiten Beitrag zum Sammelband das Verhältnis zwischen dem HRR und der Schweizer Eidgenossenschaft. Auffällig an den Untersuchungen zu den imperialen Herrschaftstechniken ist die Konzentration auf die Sprache als Instrument der Vereinheitlichung in frühneuzeitlichen Reichen und Imperien. Die Sprache, das Rechtssystem, die europäische Diplomatie am Ende des Westfälischen Friedens sowie die Vereinheitlichung des Kalenders als Mittel zur Verbesserung der Administration werden vordergründig als imperiale Herrschaftstechniken in der Frühen Neuzeit identifiziert. Die Netzwerkbildung zwischen den herrschenden Eliten, die Bildungspolitik und die Beachtung individueller Bedürfnisse verschiedener Volksgruppen bilden indes immer die Grundlage für die Durchsetzung der jeweiligen politischen Ziele.

Insgesamt betrachtet gibt es große Unterschiede zwischen den einzelnen Beiträgen. Sowohl klar strukturierte Einzelstudien als auch Darstellungen detaillierter Einzelaspekte größerer Untersuchungen finden sich im Band wieder. Der thematische Bezug der Beiträge zur jeweiligen Sektion ist in der zweiten und dritten Sektion eindeutiger, obwohl auch dort logische Überschneidungen zu anderen Sektionen innerhalb der Beiträge auftreten. Der letzte inhaltliche Beitrag von Torbjörn Eng zur Transformation der politischen Ord-

nung in Schweden zeigt exemplarisch die Problematik, die mit der Verwendung der Begriffe Altes Reich, „Alte Reiche" und Imperium verbunden ist. Wendehorsts Bestreben, die Funktionsweise dieser Untersuchungsgegenstände zu analysieren und die Ergebnisse in einem abstrakten Modell zusammenzufassen, verdrängt die Unterschiede der Begrifflichkeiten in den verschiedenen Sprachen. Eng verweist zu Beginn seines Beitrags auf den schwedischen Begriff *välde*, für den es im Deutschen keine Entsprechung gibt, der aber letztlich das schwedische Verständnis der Herrschaftsordnung in Schweden besser auszudrücken vermag als *rike* (Reich).

Damit stellt sich die Frage, welche Bedeutung im internationalen Vergleich die Begriffe Reich oder Imperium besitzen und ob es für die Vergleichbarkeit politischer Ordnungen sinnvoller wäre, sich auf die Untersuchung der Institutionen, des Personals und der Herrschaftstechniken zu konzentrieren, ohne im Voraus den Begriff Imperium einzuführen, der eine Definition voraussetzt. Die Verwendung von Kategorien wie Reich oder Imperium hat immer Ausschlüsse zur Folge, woraus sich letztlich die gleichen Probleme für die Untersuchung ergeben, wie sie in der Forschung zu frühneuzeitlicher Staatlichkeit bestehen. Wendehorsts Versuch, Staatlichkeit als Vorläufer und integralen Bestandteil von Imperien zu betrachten, um die Betrachtung von politischen Ordnungen in der Frühen Neuzeit per se als imperiale Geschichte beschreiben zu können, werden begriffsgeschichtliche und etymologische Grenzen im europäischen Vergleich gesetzt.

Die Beiträge des Sammelbandes spiegeln die klare Trennlinie wider, die zwischen der Forschung zu Staatlichkeit und der Untersuchung von Reichen und Imperien besteht, auch wenn einige Beiträge Staatlichkeit als integralen Bestandteil imperialer Herrschaft beschreiben. Die Konzentration auf die Akteure, Techniken und Institutionen in den Beiträgen zeigt indes das Potential eines Modells, das sich eben über eine kategoriale Eingrenzung der Untersuchungsgegenstände hinwegsetzen würde.

In Bezug auf die Reichs- und Imperienforschung zeigt der Band das Potential der Wechselwirkungen zwischen beiden Forschungsbereichen, auch wenn die Sektionen thematisch nur in Ansätzen überzeugend konzipiert sind. Der Großteil der Autoren gliedert die eigenen Beiträge in Wendehorsts Programmatik ein. Ist dies nicht der Fall, bietet der theoretische Einführungsbeitrag des Hg. hinreichende Anknüpfungspunkte für die Einordnung der Beiträge.

Bei der langen Vorbereitungszeit des Sammelbandes wäre ein sorgfältigeres Lektorat vor allem im einleitenden Beitrag von Stephan Wendehorst wünschenswert gewesen (siehe S. 29, 30, 45).

Der Band bietet einen vielfältigen Überblick zum angesprochenen Forschungsgebiet. Konzeptionell hat der Band einige Schwächen, die aber für Wendehorsts Anliegen, das Potential seines Modells aufzuzeigen, nicht hinderlich sind.

Heinz Thoma (Hrsg.): Handbuch Europäische Aufklärung. Begriffe, Konzepte, Wirkung, Stuttgart: J. B. Metzler 2015, 608 S.

Rezensiert von
Bernard Wiaderny, Berlin

Bei dem rezensierten Werk handelt es sich um das erste deutschsprachige Handbuch zur Geschichte der Aufklärung. Es ist das Ergebnis eines Forschungsprojekts des Interdisziplinären Zentrums für die Erforschung der Europäischen Aufklärung (IZEA) der Martin-Luther-Universität Halle-Wittenberg. Bis auf wenige Ausnahmen stammen die etwa fünfzig präsentierten Begriffe aus der Feder deutschsprachiger Autoren. Querverweise, umfangreiche Quellen- und Literaturhinweise sowie ein detailliertes Sachregister erleichtern die Nutzung des Bandes.

Bereits bei der ersten Lektüre fällt auf, dass das Handbuch sich in keinem Fall auf die Darstellung der Epoche der Aufklärung beschränkt: die präsentierten Themen werden sowohl in ihrer Vorgeschichte erläutert, die nicht selten bis zur Antike zurückverfolgt wird (dabei wird auch die Etymologie der Begriffe ausführlich erklärt). Ebenfalls wird ihre Weiterentwicklung thematisiert, manchmal bis hin zum 21. Jh. Dies ist ohne weiteres eine Stärke. Allerdings ist ein − wahrscheinlich ungewolltes − Ergebnis einer solchen Vorgehensweise die Tatsache, dass in manchen Fällen die Darstellung eines Begriffes in der Periode der Aufklärung selbst vom Umfang hier knapper ausfällt als seine Vor- und Nachgeschichte (z. B. das Lemma Bürger/Bürgerlichkeit, S. 123-131).

Über die Wahl der Begriffe lässt sich natürlich streiten. Sehr wünschenswert wäre eine separate Darstellung der Freimaurerei gewesen, die so typisch sowohl für die Aufklärung als auch deren Rezeption war und ist. Stattdessen werden einige knappe Informationen zur Geschichte dieses Geheimbundes in dem Lemma Esoterik angeboten (S. 172-180, hier S. 174 f.). Erstaunlich wenig präsent ist die österreichische Aufklärung, z. B. mit ihren spezifischen, staatlich gelenkten Bemühungen um die Reformierung der katholischen Kirche. Wiederholungen wären vermeidbar gewesen, wie ähnliche Informationen zur Öffentlichkeit in mehreren Begriffen (Aufklärung, Bürger, Literatur etc.)

Die Aufklärung war eine „genuin europäische Bewegung“ (S. 194), die jedoch in jedem Land anders verlief und sich gleichzeitig durch ständigen Ideen- und Wissenstransfer gegenseitig beeinflusste. Mit Recht sprechen die Autoren des Bandes, unter anderem Ulrich Barth in seinem gelungenen Beitrag über die Religion, über die Aufklärungen in Plural, um diese Unterschiede hervorzuheben (S. 439). Als Hauptländer der Aufklärung gelten England, Frankreich und Deutschland. Dabei ist das Bemühen der Autoren sichtbar, die führende Rolle Englands, das auch für die Zeitzeugen selbst den Charakter eines „Mutterlandes“ der aufklärerischen Ideale besaß (S. 61), immer wieder zu betonen. Bei der Hervorhebung der ländereigenen Spezifika wird im Falle Deutschlands darauf hingewiesen, dass die dortige Aufklärung sich grundsätzlich außerhalb der Zentren der politischen Macht und der

höfischen Kultur entwickelte. Ebenfalls schwach kam der Antiklerikalismus zum Vorschein, was wohl unter anderem daran lag, dass das Land die Erfahrung der Reformation hinter sich hatte (vgl. S. 88 f. und 445). In Polen wiederum, das sich in einer schweren Krise befand, betraf das Hauptthema der Aufklärer, ganz anders als in Westeuropa, die Festigung der zentralen Staatsmacht (S. 113). In Bezug auf Russlands Katharinas II. wird von „Aufklärung von oben" (S. 115) gesprochen. Dort haben die Bemühungen dieser Herrscherin einerseits und die Tätigkeit der adligen Freimaurerei sowie der Gelehrten der Moskauer Universität andererseits eine intensive und originäre russische Aufklärung entstehen lassen.

Eine Sonderstellung nimmt die jüdische Aufklärung ein (siehe den gleichnamigen Beitrag von Mathias Berek, S. 102-107). Die Haskala – so hieß sie auf hebräisch – war nicht länderspezifisch begrenzt, sondern erfasste weite Teile Mittel-, Ostmittel- und Osteuropas und blieb religiös bestimmt. Ihr Ziel war es, das spezifisch Jüdische nach außen zu verteidigen und das Universale innerhalb der jüdischen Bevölkerung akzeptabel zu machen.

Die Aufklärer mussten sich auch der Erfahrung der außereuropäischen Zivilisationen stellen (vgl. die Begriffe Europa, Exotisch, Kolonialismus). So kam es im 18. Jh. zur politischen und kulturellen Neueinschätzung der kolonialen Expansion. Dabei kam es zu langfristigen, gegenseitigen Prozessen des Ideen- und Wissenstransfers. In Europa bildete sich ein kolonialkritischer Diskurs heraus, der durch die Amerikanische Revolution (1763–1783) und die Haitianische Unabhängigkeitserklärung (1804) befördert wurde. Wie mit Recht betont wird (siehe Hans-Jürgen Lüsebrink, Kolonialismus, S. 289-299, hier: S. 297), beeinflusste dieser Diskurs die Beziehungen zwischen Europa und der außeneuropäischen Welt im 19. und 20. Jh. nachhaltig. Solche Persönlichkeiten wie Ho Chi Minh und Simon Bolivar beriefen sich ausdrücklich in ihrem Unabhängigkeitskampf auf die Inhalte der europäischen Aufklärung.

In der zweiten Hälfte des 18. Jh.s entstanden auch zahlreiche enzyklopädisch angelegte Werke, mit der Zielsetzung, das Wissen über die Kolonien zu systematisieren. Auch schalteten sich die Vertreter dieser Länder, wie z. B. Thomas Paine, einer der Gründerväter der Vereinigen Staaten von Amerika, immer mehr in den europäischen Diskurs ein.

Im Werk wird das Material in Form von Lemmata präsentiert. Dies macht dem Leser das Eindringen in die Geschichte der Aufklärung nicht leicht. Vor allem ist der politische Hintergrund ihrer Entwicklung, die mit den Spanischen Erbfolgekrieg (1700–1713) den ersten Höhepunkt erreichte und mit der napoleonischen Zeit endete, schwer erschließbar. Ein chronologischer Überblick der Ereignisse im 18. Jh. wäre sehr hilfreich gewesen.

Eine weitere Barriere bildet die Sprache der Beiträge, die in vielen Fällen mit Fremdworten unnötig überladen wird. Mit Sicherheit richtet sich das Handbuch nicht an ein breites Publikum. Auch Studenten der Anfangssemester werden Schwierigkeiten im Umgang mit ihm haben. Nützlich dagegen ist es für Spezialisten, vor allem wegen der erwähnten langzeitigen Darstellung der besprochenen Entwicklungen und Phänomene.

Frédéric Régent / Jean-François Niort / Pierre Serna (Hrsg.) : Les colonies, la Révolution française, la loi, Rennes: Presses Universitaires de Rennes 2014, 297 S.

Rezensiert von
Matthias Middell, Leipzig

Die Erforschung der Kolonialgeschichte vor und während der Französischen Revolution ist in den letzten Jahren nicht nur in den USA, wo das Interesse an Plantagenwirtschaft und Abolition schon seit einiger Zeit prominenter Teil der Nationalgeschichtsschreibung ist, sondern auch in Frankreich in Gang gekommen. Mit Frédéric Régent verfügt inzwischen auch das Institut d'Histoire la Révolution française über einen ausgewiesenen Spezialisten zur karibischen Geschichte.[1]

Der vorliegende Band dokumentiert den Ertrag einer Tagung, die an der Sorbonne im September 2011 stattfand und sich auf die lange Geschichte von Frankreichs Umgang mit den Kolonien und deren rechtliche Position im Ancien Régime konzentrierte. Waren die überseeischen Besitzungen, die zunächst von Piraten und privaten Unternehmungen eingerichtet und alsbald unter einem wenig durchsichtigen System königlicher Privilegierung verwaltet wurden, aber zwischen 1663 (Kanada) und 1766 (La Réunion und Mauritius) dem Königreich direkt einverleibt worden waren, den Gesetzen der Metropole unterworfen? Aus Sicht der absolutistischen Verwaltung in Versailles war das sicherlich der Fall. Die Besitzer der Plantagen dachten allerdings nicht daran, sich entsprechend dieser Stellung als königliche Untertanen den Regeln in Frankreichs Metropole einfach unterzuordnen und machten insbesondere ökonomische, soziale und politische Kriterien geltend, die fernab des Hexagon ganz anders wirkten als in Paris oder Marseille. Entsprechend lehnten sie die Anwendung der Regeln, die in Versailles formuliert wurden, mehr oder minder offen ab. So trugen zwar die administrativen Strukturen und die Inhaber offizieller Ämter in den Kolonien die gleichen Namen wie in Frankreich. Es gab Gouverneure, Sénéchaussées und Intendanten. Aber die soziale Lage, die ganz wesentlich auf der Ausbeutung unfreier Arbeit beruhte, unterschied sich nicht nur graduell. Entsprechend beharrte die Pflanzerelite auf der Spezifik der Kolonien und wollte vom Universalismus der absolutistischen Gesetzgebung nur in dem Maße wissen, wie es für politische Unterstützung aus der Metropole unabdingbar schien. Als plausible Argumente für eine solche Sicht der Dinge konnten auch die Entfernung und die Schwierigkeit einer langsamen Kommunikation in Anschlag gebracht werden– wer wollte bei drei bis vier Monaten Reisedauer in nur einer Richtung die Einhaltung etwaiger Anweisungen wirklich effizient durchsetzen?

Dazu ließ sich jederzeit auf den wirtschaftlichen und geopolitischen Nutzen der Kolonien verweisen, wenn die Regelungswut in Versailles aus Sicht der Pflanzer überhand nahm. Seit 1685 in einem Edikt die Sklaverei offiziell anerkannt worden war, bildete die sozioökonomische Grundlage der Kolonien eine nicht überbrückbare Differenz zur Metropole, die zwar feudale

Abhängigkeit, aber keine Sklaverei kannte.

Von diesem Ausgangspunkt verfolgt der vorbildlich komponierte Band, der keineswegs dem verbreiteten (und manchmal gerechtfertigten) Vorurteil der nur vom Buchbinder zusammen gehaltenen Synthese folgt, die verschiedenen Phasen, Räume und Dimensionen des Kolonialrechts bis zur Revolutionsperiode. Pierre Boulle zeichnet die Gesetzgebung im 18. Jh. nach, Erick Noël wertet die von ihm zusammengetragenen Informationen über freie Farbige in Frankreich im Jahr 1789 aus.[2]

Die Revolution brachte die inhärente Widersprüchlichkeit der Kolonialgesetze des Ancien Régime wie in einem Brennglas zur Sichtbarkeit. Die Konstituante war angesichts des gut orchestrierten Widerstands der Pflanzer ganz offensichtlich nicht bereit, die Probleme, die diese Widersprüchlichkeit aufwarf, konsequent anzugehen und schob das Bündel ungelöster Probleme generös den Nachfolgern in der 1791 zusammentretenden Legislative auf den Tisch. Auch zu diesem wohl bekannten Zögern bietet der Band eine Reihe neuer Informationen, besonders in den Beiträgen von Manuel Covo und Yann-Arzel Durelle-Marc, der das liberale Ideal der Verfassungsgebenden Versammlung gerade in der Kolonialfrage auf dem Prüfstand sieht. Allerdings riss den Kombattanten auf den Inseln in der Karibik und insbesondere auf Saint-Domingue bald der Geduldsfaden, und sie nahmen ihr Schicksal bekanntermaßen selbst in die Hand. Die Pflanzer plädierten notfalls für Eigenständigkeit und die aufständischen „gens de couleur" praktizierten ihrerseits alsbald eine neue Rechtsordnung, die man in Paris schließlich gesetzgeberisch nur noch nachvollziehen konnte. Zahlreiche neue Einsichten zur Phase des Konvents und zum Directoire ergeben die Beiträge von Frédéric Charlin, Frédéric Régent und Eric de Mari. Dabei ist insbesondere der Vergleich zwischen Saint-Domingue und Guadeloupe erhellend.

Im folgenden Teil des Bandes geht es um die Rückkehr zu einem reaktionären Kolonialrecht unter dem Konsulat und im Kaiserreich. Yerri Urban bringt die Ereignisse in der Karibik mit der napoleonischen Expedition nach Ägypten in Zusammenhang und zeigt Nordafrika als das eigentliche Testfeld für die Politik in Frankreichs zweiter kolonialer Expansionswelle bezüglich der Probleme von Bürgerrecht und Rechtsstatus der Einheimischen. Jean-François Niort und Jérémy Richard widmen sich in einem gemeinsamen Aufsatz schließlich der konservativen Wende Napoleons in Richtung Wiedererrichtung der Sklaverei (1802), de facto verbunden mit einer Rückkehr zur Politik des Ancien Régime mit der Folge einer seltsamen Zwittergesetzgebung, die bis 1848 fortbestehen sollte. Die Kolonien erscheinen so als juristisch nur fragmentarisch integrierter Teil der französischen Rechtsordnung. Ein Sklavenaufstand auf La Réunion 1811 dient Sudel Fuma als Testfall für diese neue Rechtssituation und belegt die brisante Mischung aus altem und neuem Recht.

Der letzte Teil des Bandes geht schließlich den Wirkungen der legislativen Neuerungen auf die Gesetzgebung in den nicht-französischen Besitzungen nach. Allerdings steht Fredrik Thomassons Beitrag über die schwedische Reaktion auf die revolutionäre Gesetzgebung seltsam allein

neben zwei eher allgemeinen Beiträgen, die die Befunde der ersten Teile einzuordnen bemüht sind: Olivier Grenouilleau untersucht die Folgen für den internationalen Abolitionismus, Pierre Serna diskutiert das Verhältnis von Republikanismus und Empire.

Insgesamt handelt es sich um einen in seiner empirischen Detailliertheit und theoretischen Klarheit außerordentlich hilfreichen Band, dessen Ergebnissen man nur einen möglichst raschen Eingang in die internationale Forschungsdiskussion wünschen kann, die sich immer mehr in die englische Sprache verschiebt. Seine Stärken hat der Band ganz zweifellos in der Auswertung französischer Archive (einschließlich derer in den französischen Kolonien) und der sehr präzisen Diskussion jener Widersprüchlichkeit, die die Revolution in Bezug auf diese Kolonien produzierte. Was dem Band möglicherweise als Ergänzung noch hinzugefügt hätte werden können, ist eine vergleichende Analyse des Umgangs konkurrierender Imperien mit Sklaverei und der rechtlichen Stellung ihrer Kolonien. In diesem Falle wäre die französische Entwicklung vielleicht nicht als ganz so einzigartig erschienen, wie sie das in den Argumenten der Beiträge dieses Bandes zuweilen tut.

Anmerkungen:

1 F. Régent / L. Dubois, La période révolutionnaire dans les Antilles françaises, in : D. Bégot (Hrsg.), Guide de la recherche en histoire antillaise et guyanaise, Bd. 1, Paris 2011, S. 513-605; F. Régent, Esclavage, métissage, liberté. La Révolution française à la Guadeloupe 1789–1802, Paris 2004.

2 Vgl. E. Noël, Etre noir en France au XVIIIe siècle, Paris 2006, und das von ihm herausgegebene „Dictionnaire des gens de couleur dans la France moderne" (2 Bde.), Genf 2011/13.

Carsten Gräbel: Die Erforschung der Kolonien. Expeditionen und koloniale Wissenskultur deutscher Geographen, 1884–1919, Bielefeld: transcript 2015, 404 S.

Rezensiert von
Hans-Dietrich Schultz, Berlin

Kolonialgeschichte hat Konjunktur, wozu auch Geographen beigetragen haben. Umso mehr überrascht das Fehlen einer Gesamtdarstellung der „Kolonialgeographie", die der Geograph und Historiker Carsten Gräbel hier als Dissertation gewagt hat – leider ohne Referat zum Forschungsstand, aber mit einem Ergebnis, das sich sehen lassen kann.

Schon der erste Eindruck lässt staunen, welches Meer an Informationen auf- und durchgearbeitet, kritisch bewertet und in eine gut gegliederte, lesbare Form gebracht wurde. Erstmals als Quellen herangezogen wurden die während der Expeditionen in den Kolonien angelegten Tagebücher. Und obwohl die einzelnen Kapitel in ihrer Abfolge aufeinander verweisen, kann man mit der Lektüre auch mittendrin beginnen und sich mit wachsender Neugier, vor- und zurückgehend, immer tiefer in die Materie hineinziehen lassen, so dass am Ende ein satter Gesamteindruck entsteht. Gleichwohl wird Gräbels Lust an Verallgemeinerungen, die mit „Die Geographie …" oder „Die Geographen …" beginnen, Skepsis bis Widerspruch provozieren: Die komplexe Realität geht selten glatt in solchen Formulierungen auf.

Zentralbegriff der Arbeit ist der Breitband-Begriff der „Wissenskultur", dessen explikationsbedürftige Bestandteile allerdings undiskutiert bleiben. Gräbel begnügt sich damit, ihn als „Zusammenspiel von theoretischen Ansätzen, wissenschaftlichen Praktiken, etablierten Routinen, institutionellen Netzwerken, sozioökonomischen Rahmenbedingungen und politischen Mentalitäten" (S. 21) zu umschreiben. Wer mehr zu diesem theoretischen Konzept und seiner Leistungsfähigkeit für die Disziplingeschichte wissen will, wird auf neuere Literaturen verwiesen. Ferner mag man bedauern, dass nicht auf die Unterschiede zwischen dem Begriff der „Kolonisation" und den verschiedenen politischen „Kolonialismen" eingegangen wird, so wie auch eine Klärung des Begriffs der „Akademisierung" nützlich gewesen wäre.

Geboten werden in drei Paketen „eine Geschichte der Institutionen, Theorien und disziplinären Selbstverständnisse am Anfang, das Alltagshandeln und die Forschungstechniken in den Kolonien im Mittelteil und ein Panorama der kolonialgeographischen Wissensbestände am Ende" (S. 22). Meist treffsicher werden die Kolonialgeographien in die allgemeine Disziplinentwicklung eingeordnet; kriterienorientiert und gut begründet ist die Konzentration auf eine kolonialgeographisch arbeitende Kerngruppe von Geographen. Als kluger Schachzug erweist sich ferner, die Antrittsvorlesungen einiger Protagonisten der Kolonialgeographie miteinander zu vergleichen. Wer gedacht hätte, dass Kolonialgeographie nur Kolonialideologie war, wird enttäuscht. Mehrfach betont Gräbel, dass ihre Vertreter nicht nur Kolonialpropaganda, sondern Wissenschaft betrieben. So pflegten sie zwar einen rassistisch motivierten Überlegenheitsdünkel, der den Untergang angeblich inferiorer Völker als naturgewollten Beitrag zum Fortschritt der Menschheit verklärte, sorgten aber zugleich „vorwiegend" (S. 45) für eine (auch kartographische) Landesaufnahme und -beschreibung sowie die Aufdeckung von kausalen Zusammenhängen. Welchen Kontrast dazu bilden die Landschaftsschilderungen, in denen sich die ästhetischen Vorlieben und Ideen der Beschreiber spiegeln!

Besonders spannend dürfte für viele Leser der Mittelteil der Arbeit sein, der die Expeditionsplanungen, den Expeditionsalltag und die Verschriftlichung der erhobenen Informationen und Messdaten bringt und über die mentale Aneignung der Kolonien als Produktion und Ordnung von Räumen berichtet. Wer hätte sich vorher vorgestellt, welche Strapazen die mit mühevoller Arbeit ausgefüllten Expeditionstage für die Teilnehmer mit sich brachten, welchen psychischen Stress sie aushalten mussten? Darüber hinaus erfährt der Leser, dass die beteiligten Geographen sich nicht etwa als Produzenten der beschriebenen Räume sahen, sondern nur als Vermittler von deren Existenz, denn ihre Länderkunden erwecken „den Anschein, als offenbarten sich die geographischen Phänomene und Räume dem Leser selbst" (S. 219). Den Transformationsprozess der Tagebuch-Eintragungen bei der späteren Verarbeitung und die Veränderungen dabei hätte ich gerne durch mehrere ausführliche Beispiele belegt gesehen.

Neben den Texten interessieren Gräbel die Fotos, die „in Europa skandalös gewesen" (S. 280) wären, im Dienste der Wissenschaft aber als gerechtfertigt galten. Für die gravierenden Defizite bei der Darstel-

lung der kolonialen Völker macht er außer der asymmetrischen Kommunikation zwischen Kolonisierern und Kolonisierten einen ständigen Rückfall in „gedankenlose Stereotype" (S. 299) verantwortlich, was er zum Teil dem klassischen geographischen Mensch-Natur-Denken anlastet, das die ethnische Verschiedenheit auch der Prägekraft der Landesnatur zuschrieb. Als eine wesentliche Aufgabe der Ethnographie erkennt er, „die Kolonialherrschaft zu legitimieren", um die Bevölkerungen „zum eigenen Vorteil auszunutzen und sich ihrer Ressourcen zu bemächtigen". „Mit dem Thema ‚Erziehung und Arbeit' ließen sich beide Positionen miteinander verbinden" (S. 309). Dieser Gedanke wurde, so sei hinzugefügt, später von Geographen auf den europäischen Osten übertragen, wo nunmehr statt der „Neger" die Slaven gewaltsam den Segen deutscher Arbeit erfuhren.

Nicht zu überzeugen vermag mich Gräbels pejoratives Urteil über die jüngere Geographiegeschichtsschreibung zum Kolonialthema. Es lautet im Modus der Anklage: „Solange Geographen sich abmühen, die koloniale Geschichte ihrer Disziplin zu relativieren oder im anderen Extrem in den Selbstbeschreibungen und Diskursen aus der Epoche verharren, anstatt sie historisch-kritisch zu analysieren, ist der Weg zu einer zeitgemäßen Historiographie der deutschen Geographie noch weit" (S. 17). Eine Relativierung liegt für ihn schon dann vor, wenn die Akademisierung des Faches – was er darunter versteht, bleibt offen – nicht als ein direktes Produkt des Kolonialismus erscheint. Damit dürfte der Verfasser beim Leser zwar spontan auf Zustimmung stoßen, zumal sein Urteil politisch-moralische Korrektheit signalisiert. Tatsächlich deuten die bisher bekannten Umstände der Akademisierung der Geographie jedoch auf einen anderen Zusammenhang hin. Indem Gräbel als gelernter Diplomgeograph die schulische Tradition des Faches, die lange Zeit auch dessen Image und Profil als Wissenschaft prägte, nicht ernst nimmt, begibt er sich statt auf einen „zeitgemäßen" auf einen Holzweg.

Richtig ist, dass die Geographie nach der Gründung des Reiches und seinem Eintritt in die Weltpolitik in den deutschen Einzelstaaten schrittweise mit Lehrstühlen versehen wurde und auch qualitativ einen Sprung machte. Ungeachtet dessen und trotz aller Berufungen auf Carl Ritter und jetzt mehr noch Alexander von Humboldt wurde sie ihren traditionellen Ruf nur schwer los, kaum mehr als eine minderwertige Schulwissenschaft zu sein, die das Gedächtnis mit topographischem und statistischem Sperrmüll vollstopfe. Anders als von manchem Historiker und von Gräbel angenommen, basierte der universitäre Aufschwung des Faches jedoch keineswegs darauf, dass akademisch ausgebildete Geographen für eine kolonialbezogene Tätigkeit als Fachleute dringend gebraucht wurden, zumal die aktive Kolonialpolitik des Deutschen Reiches erst 1884 begann. Schon die auffällige Besetzung der Professuren mit überwiegend fachfremden „Stubengelehrten" (Oberlehrern) statt erfahrenen Forschungsreisenden (von Ausnahmen abgesehen) macht stutzig und weist in eine andere Richtung.

Als dünnen Beleg für seine Position präsentiert Gräbel lediglich eine Äußerung Philippsons, der ihm mit seinen im KZ Theresienstadt geschriebenen Erinnerungen als glaubwürdiger Kronzeuge dient, weil er selbst nicht kolonialpolitisch ge-

arbeitet habe. Das Zitat bestätigt tatsächlich einen Kausalnexus zwischen dem „Erwerb der Kolonien" und der Einrichtung „ordentlicher Professuren der Geographie" „seit Ende der siebziger Jahre" (S. 33). Doch Philippson irrt, wie die Stenographischen Berichte der Debatte des Preußischen Abgeordnetenhauses vom 9. März 1875 über die Entscheidung des Kultusministers Falk zeigen, an allen preußischen Universitäten Geographie-Professuren einzurichten. Nicht imperiale und kolonialpolitische Motive standen demnach vornan, sondern bildungspolitische. Spitzenvertreter der Wissenschaft, wie Mommsen und Virchow, die auch Abgeordnete waren, sahen darin den Beginn einer abschüssigen Entwicklung der Universität in Richtung einer populären Volksbildungsanstalt. Die Geographie war für sie keine satisfaktionsfähige Disziplin, sondern nur eine enzyklopädische Handbuch- und Schulwissenschaft.

Hermann Wagner, einer der neu berufenen „Falk-Professoren" und Oberlehrer, der die angestrengten Bemühungen seiner Kollegen um eine methodologische Konsolidierung des Faches im „Geographischen Taschenbuch" kritisch begleitete, hat dies exakt festgehalten. Mehrfach erinnerte er bei einschlägigen Anlässen daran, „daß man geographische Professuren zu Beginn der siebenziger Jahre wie auch später in erster Linie im Interesse einer besseren Ausbildung von geographischen Fachlehrern an höheren Schulen errichtete." Hätten die Unterrichtsverwaltungen einzelner deutscher Staaten „den schreienden Gegensatz" zwischen „der geographischen Bildung unseres Volkes" und der veränderten Lage des „Deutschtums auf dem Erdball" nicht registriert, hätte die Akademisierung der Geographie „wohl noch einige Zeit auf sich warten lassen".[1] Aus den Äußerungen anderer Geographen lässt sich entnehmen, dass eine große Unsicherheit darüber herrschte, für welche Berufe denn neben dem alles dominierenden Lehramt an höheren Schulen Geographen ausgebildet werden sollten. So scheint noch immer die bekannte Vermutung zuzutreffen, dass die Geographievertreter versucht haben, sich über einen Einstieg in kolonialgeographische Forschungen der Politik als unentbehrlich zu empfehlen, als dass umgekehrt die Politik in kolonialpolitischen Fragen brennend auf Geographen setzte und deshalb das Fach in den akademischen Sattel hob.

Gräbels Appell, dass es der Geographie „zum Vorteil" gereiche, „vergangene Versäumnisse und kollektive Fehlleistungen" zu reflektieren, statt sie zu beschönigen", um für „zukünftige Praktiken und Forschungsdesigns [zu] sensibilisieren", und auch seine Warnung vor einem „selbstgerechten Blick zurück" angesichts der heutigen „Abhängigkeit der Wissenschaft von Drittmitteln" (S. 356): Wer wollte dem nicht zustimmen? Doch die Gefahr von Voreingenommenheit lauert immer, frei ist niemand davon. Eine „Rezeptionsgeschichte des [kolonial-] geographischen Wissens", die „erst noch geschrieben werden" (S. 352) müsse, wäre zweifellos zu begrüßen. Erste Arbeiten für den Bereich der Schulgeographie existieren bereits.

Abschließend möchte ich noch einmal bekräftigen: Dieses Buch verdient neben kritischen Rezensenten auch viele Leser. Es erweitert in seinen detail- und facettenreichen, an- und aufregenden Befunden und seinem lebendigen Schreibstil den Blick auf einen Bereich der deutschen

Geographiegeschichte, der so umfassend bisher noch nicht möglich war. Wissenschaftsgeschichte ist hier keine Geschichte der großen Männer und einsamen Helden, sondern eingebunden in Standards, Konventionen, Regelwerke, Diskurse, Konkurrenzen innerhalb der eigenen und gegenüber anderen Disziplinen und weiteres mehr. Leider fehlt ein Register, dass die wissenschaftliche Ausbeute der Gräbelschen Arbeit erheblich erleichtern würde, doch alle kritischen Einwände, von denen ich einige vorgebracht habe, können die Vorzüge dieser Studie, die ich – selbst im Widerspruch – mit Gewinn gelesen habe, nicht verdunkeln.

Anmerkung

1 H. Wagner, Geographie nebst Meereskunde und Ethnographie, in: W. Lexis (Hrsg.), Das Unterrichtswesen im Deutschen Reich, Bd. 1, Berlin 1904, S. 225-242, hier S. 225.

Boris Belge / Martin Deuerlein (Hrsg.): Goldenes Zeitalter der Stagnation? Perspektiven auf die sowjetische Ordnung der Brežnev-Ära (Bedrohte Ordnungen, Bd. 2), Tübingen: Mohr-Siebeck 2014, 329 S.

Rezensiert von
Katharina Schwinde, Jena

Mit der Aufgabe die Brežnev-Ära abseits lähmender und verstaubter historischer Signaturen zu beleuchten, sind Boris Belge und Martin Deuerlein in guter Gesellschaft der neueren Sowjetunionsforschung. Die längste aller Epochen der Sowjetgeschichte hat nach langen Jahren der Vernachlässigung ihren festen Platz in der Forschung gefunden. In diesem Zusammenhang ist auch der Sammelband von Belge und Deuerlein zu werten, der aus einem von den Autoren organisierten Workshop der Universität Tübingen aus dem Jahr 2012 hervorgegangen ist. Das von Ihnen herausgegebene Buch verweist bereits im Titel „Goldenes Zeitalter der Stagnation?“ auf das Hauptanliegen des Bandes. Ziel ist es, die immer noch vorherrschenden Topoi zur Brežnev-Ära kritisch zu hinterfragen und sie auf deren Haltbarkeit zu prüfen. Dabei geht es den Autoren um nicht weniger, als um eine „zeitliche und räumliche Perspektiverweiterung“ anhand neuester Forschungsergebnisse (S. 8).

Die starken Fluchtpunkte des Bandes stellen die Einleitung der Herausgeber und der Schlussbeitrag von Klaus Gestwa dar. Belge und Deuerlein geben in ihrer Einführung nicht nur einen profunden Überblick über die aktuellen Forschungsdebatten und die Forschungsliteratur. Sie diskutieren neben der Historisierung zeitgenössischer Deutungen zudem die Entwicklung eines neuen, übergreifenden Epochenbegriffes. Anlehnend an die Forschungen von Susanne Schattenberg und Juliane Fürst, die den Alternativbegriff der „Normalität“ geprägt haben und den Forschungen zur Ritualisierung des öffentlichen Lebens nach Yurchak, führen die Autoren den Analyseterminus der „Hyperstabilität“ ein.[1] Belge und Deuerlein zufolge wird dieser als eine „über Kommunikation vermittelte soziale und kulturelle Konstruktion von Normalität und Stabilität“ definiert (S. 13). Die Ausrichtung des sowjetischen Staates auf diese Prinzipien habe die unbeabsichtigte Ausdifferenzierung und Pluralisierung ge-

sellschaftlicher Gruppen zur Folge gehabt. So kam es neben der Herstellung von personellen Kontinuitäten, die Korruption und Vetternwirtschaft begünstigten, zur Ausbildung von Dissidenz. Dieser Argumentation zufolge ist die Perestroika das Produkt einer sozialen Ausdifferenzierung, die in der Brežnev-Ära bereits begonnen hatte. An diesem Punkt setzt Klaus Gestwas Beitrag, der nicht nur umfänglich den Charakter eines eigenen Schlusskapitels hat, ein. Entlang der bereits seit langem geführten Krisendiskussion und der Frage, ob der Zusammenbruch der Sowjetunion unausweichlich war bzw. wann dieser begonnen hat, macht Gestwa vor allem das Jahr 1982 als Krisenjahr aus. Neben anderen Faktoren unterstreicht Gestwa anhand einer soziologischen Studie von 1983, wie weit sich die sowjetische Gesellschaft zum Ende der Regierungszeit Brežnevs bereits vom sowjetischen Staat und dem sozialistischen Erwerbsprozess entfremdet hatte.

Die übrigen Aufsätze gliedern sich in zwei Kapitel. Der erste Hauptteil des Buches, der unter der Überschrift „Die Brežnev-Ära einordnen: Erinnerungspolitik und Zukunftsentwürfe“ steht, vereint sowohl bekannte, als auch neue Themen der Forschung miteinander. Neben der Erinnerung an den Zweiten Weltkrieg und dessen Mobilisierungspotenzial im Hinblick auf regionale Identitäten (Ivo Mijnssen), verortet Ada Raev den Aufbruch künstlerischer Bewegungen abseits vom offiziellen Diskurs bereits in der Mitte der 1970er Jahre. In einem ähnlichen Spannungsfeld zwischen Legalität und Untergrund agierte die linke politische Opposition der späten Brežnev-Ära, der sich Ewgeniy Kasakow widmet. Bisher von der Forschung vernachlässigt, entstanden diese Gruppen Ende der 1970er-Jahre. Aus Enttäuschung über den sowjetischen „Staatskapitalismus“ der Brežnev-Jahre (S. 79), orientierten sie sich an alternativen Sozialismusinterpretationen. Während die Gruppen in Perm‘ für bessere Arbeitsbedingungen in den regionalen Betrieben stritten und sich in ihren Forderungen an der polnischen Solidarność-Bewegung orientierten, reflektierten andere Gruppen Theorien der Neuen Linken, agierten in der Tradition der chinesischen Kulturrevolution oder hofften auf „demokratische Reformen von oben“. In der kasachischen Atomstadt Ševčenko hingegen, lebten deren Bewohner die sowjetische Vision der kommunistischen Zukunft. Stefan Guth kann in seinem Aufsatz überzeugend darlegen, wie sich Ševčenko zur konkreten Materialisierung der technokratischen Vision der Brežnev-Ära entwickelte. Erst die Perestroika offenbarte tiefe Risse in der kommunistischen Utopie von einer Modellstadt, deren Funktionalität an „Mittel und Prioritäten des Stalinismus“ (S. 117) gebunden war. Fehlende Facharbeiter wurden in den 1970er und 1980er Jahren in erheblichem Maße durch Zwangsarbeiter ersetzt. Und neben der wirtschaftlichen Dysfunktionalität des Industriekomplexes, wurden zunehmend die massiven Umweltschäden sichtbar.

Im zweiten Kapitel „Die Brežnev-Zeit verorten: Internationale Verflechtungen und Regionalisierung“ thematisiert der Sammelband ein wichtiges Thema der Brežnev-Forschung der letzten Jahre. Die Frage nach einer zweiten „korenizacija“ bzw. „Neo-korenizacija“, einer verstärkten Integrations- und Mobilisierungspolitik regionaler, nichtrussischer Kader über die Förderung der Nationalkultur. In seinem

Beitrag zur Litauischen Sowjetrepublik macht Malte Rolf deutlich, dass es die Politik Moskaus war, die schließlich zur Abnahme der Integrationskraft der Sowjetunion beitrug (S. 223). Die gezielte Lituanisierungspolitik der 1960er-Jahre, die zur Entwicklung einer starken litauischen Elite führte, wurde in den 1970er-Jahren aus Angst vor Kontrollverlust stark zurückgefahren. Eben diese politische Kehrtwende habe zu einer Ablehnung der russischen Leitkultur geführt, die in eine Fundamentalopposition zum sowjetischen Staat mündete. Gänzlich anders wirkte sich die nationale Förderung in der Kirgisischen ASSR aus. Moritz Florin sieht in der nationalen Förderung und der hohen sozialen Mobilität Gründe dafür, weshalb sich in Kirgistan nur wenige in Opposition zum Regime stehende Kreise ausbildeten. Hier verstand vor allem die lokale Parteiführung zwischen Moskau und den Nationalisten im eigenen Land zu vermitteln und damit Konflikte zu entschärfen. Esther Meier kann für die Tatarische ASSR eine lediglich quantitativ gelungene „Neokorenizacija" konstatieren. Ihrer Studie zum Lastwagenkraftwerk KamAZ zufolge blieben die sozialen Unterschiede zwischen Russen und Tataren bis zum Ende der Brežnev-Zeit enorm.

In Bezug auf Forschungen zu anderen Großprojekten[2] der späten Sowjetunion kann Meier zeigen, dass das Projekt KamAZ für die Gruppe der sowjetischen Ingenieure großes Mobilisierungspotenzial barg. Privilegien, Kooperationsprojekte mit ausländischen Firmen und in diesem Zusammenhang auch Dienstreisen in den Westen öffneten ihnen ein „Fenster" zur Welt, das sich erst in den Jahren der Perestroika wieder verschließen sollte. Während auch der sowjetische Schlager (Estrada) durch westliche Musikpraktiken beeinflusst wurde (Ingo Grabowsky), konnte das Fenster in die Dritte Welt von den sowjetischen Auslandsexperten, den so genannten „Meždunarodniki" aufgestoßen werden. Der Beitrag von Tobias Rupprecht zu den sowjetischen Lateinamerikanisten offenbart deren wichtige Rolle in der Vertretung der Sowjetunion nach außen, und als Förderer des sowjetischen Engagements in der Dritten Welt.

Auch wenn der Blick abseits der „Ost-West-Achse" (S. 234) wie immer etwas zu kurz kommt: Der Anspruch der Herausgeber, die Brežnev-Ära als eigenständige Epoche zu betrachten, ohne vorausgegangene oder nachfolgende Epochen der Sowjetgeschichte und deren Verflechtungen außer Acht zu lassen, wurde eingelöst. So zeigen die einzelnen Fallstudien deutlich, dass über eine Binnenperiodisierung der 1960er Jahre nachgedacht werden sollte. Gleichzeitig können die späten Jahre der Brežnev-Periode nicht ohne die Reformen der Perestroika gedacht werden. Insgesamt ist es dem Sammelband anzumerken, wie stark alle Autoren gegen das „zastoj"– Paradigma argumentieren. Das fällt besonders sprachlich ins Gewicht, wenn die Herausgeber bereits in ihrer Einleitung betonen, der Sammelband sei ein Beitrag, die Brežnev-Ära „ambivalenter", „dynamischer", „differenzierter", „heterogener" und „komplexer" darzustellen. Auch wenn das an manchen Stellen etwas aufgesetzt anmutet, so ist den Doktoranden aus Tübingen mit ihrem Buch genau das gelungen.

Anmerkungen:

1 J. Fürst, Where did all the normal people go? Another look at the Soviet 1970s, in: Kritika.

Explorations in Russian and Eurasian history, 14 (2013), 3, S. 621-64; S. Schattenberg, Von Chruščev zu Gorbačev. Die Sowjetunion zwischen Reform und Zusammenbruch, in: Neue Politische Literatur 2 (2010), S. 255-284; A. Yurchak, Everything was forever, until it was no more. The Last Soviet Generation, Princeton 2006.

2 Siehe dazu z. B. J. Grützmacher, Die Baikal-Amur-Magistrale. Vom stalinistischen Lager zum Mobilisierungsprojekt unter Brežnev, München 2012.

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