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The Invention of the European

**Edited by
Matthias Middell**



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Constructing *Homo Europaeus* from Inside and Outside the European Continent

Matthias Middell

This collection of articles are part of a larger project on the invention of the European run by four German institutes. At the initiative of Kiran Klaus Patel and Veronika Lipphardt (at the time both at Humboldt University in Berlin but in the meantime moved to Maastricht and Freiburg respectively), a research network of cultural historians, anthropologists, and historians of science and technology came together with the aim of exploring the many arenas where the European had been invented – a still ongoing process – and of identifying the many actors involved in that process.¹ In contrast to the rich research on the invention of Europe, which already has a long-standing tradition that functions like an exceptional list of keywords,² the interest in the European has rather recently grown. While there is literature on mythological figures representing Europe, the network that was funded by the Federal Ministry of Education and Research for a period of four years was intended to examine more recent processes of how the European was conceived. The University of Leipzig's Centre for Advanced Study, at the time a place for interdisciplinary research on transregional processes,³ was invited by the project leaders to contribute with its expertise on global history and to discuss in particular how the European was invented in non-European areas. Since it is rather difficult to separate

1 As the main publication, see L. Bluche, V. Lipphardt and K. K. Patel (eds), *Der Europäer – ein Konstrukt. Wissensbestände, Diskurse, Praktiken*, Göttingen 2009.

2 This is the idea expressed by Rolf Petri in an article where he inspiringly interprets "Europe" as a file-card box from which keywords and narrative patterns are taken time again and again for recombination: R. Petri, *Europa? Ein Zitatensystem*, in: *Comparativ* 14 (2004) 3, pp. 15-49.

3 The centre was dismantled by the Rectorate of the University of Leipzig at the end of 2008 and the research team had to move to the newly founded Global and European Studies Institute. This resulted in a longer period of uncertainty and institutional fragility, which is one of the reasons for the very late publication of the results from this project.

European and non-European history – at least for the last centuries, given the ever-increasing entanglements between Europe on the one hand and Africa, the Americas, Asia, and Oceania on the other, together with the often brutal interventions of Europeans into the development of other areas as well as the influence on and mobility towards Europe from outside – it seems evident that this construction of the European has to be analysed as an entangled coproduction by many actors from almost everywhere in the world.

Two case studies were selected to address the overall aims of the project on *Homo Europaeus*: Mandy Kretzschmar investigated twentieth-century Australia and its struggle for an identity that was both geographically far away from and mentally very close to Europe.⁴ Klaas Dykmann focused on international organizations as a place where people from many origins come together and form specific organizational cultures but may also weaken the distinction between their origins and characteristics. Focusing on the World Health Organization, he examined an example where Western medicine met the global challenges of stymieing epidemics of all kinds and the lack of resources in many countries to deal with such diseases in a European way – the ideal precondition for a permanent debate on what makes the European unique.⁵

Besides these two case studies, our aim was also to not only bring the participants of all the four groups⁶ a part of the collaborative network together for a workshop but to confront their findings with those from various area studies – ranging from East and South Asian studies to African as well as North and Latin American studies. This workshop was held in late 2009 at the then just inaugurated Centre for Area Studies of the University of Leipzig. Similar to the overall project, the workshop focused on a detailed analysis of the processes that have led to the construction of the European. To insist on such constructedness seems particularly relevant at times when essentialism – which was formerly characteristic of the representation of citizens from individual nations – is somehow transferred onto the European. The more European integration advances and people populating the European Union (EU) identify with Europe instead of or complementary to their nation, the more a legacy of Europeaness is being mobilized to make more or less clear distinctions with any “Other,” which is vaguely defined as the “non-European” and associated with a wide range of connotations. This becomes especially important with increasing mobility – for touristic and professional reasons as well as migration in general – and the resulting multiplication of cultural encounters with that “Other.”

4 Her PhD was defended under the title “Narrating the Other. Cultural Constructions of the European in the Australian Press” (cotutelle between the University of Leipzig and Macquarie University in Sydney, 2012).

5 Following his article in this issue, Klaas Dykmann prepares a monograph on the global health organization in its capacity to negotiate different concepts of medical treatment and to adjust to the manifold preconditions for its application when confronted with pandemics.

6 The two groups at Humboldt University’s History Department (Kiran Klaus Patel, Veronika Lipphardt) and its Institute of European Ethnology under the leadership of Stefan Beck, whose premature death during a visit to Australia in 2015 was a shock for all the participants of the project, and Leonore Scholze-Irritz – also comprising Susanne Bauer, Stephan Gabriel Haufe, and Christine Kleiber-Bischof – were complemented by a group based at Ludwig Maximilians University in Munich led by Hellmuth Trischler and consisting of Paul Erker, Nikola Schmidt and Markus Speidel, as well as the above-mentioned people in Leipzig.

While contacts within Europe often mobilize the remains of former nationalisms, contact in the global arena strengthens the self-identification of the “European.” Historical investigation helps us to understand the legacies that are mobilized in these past and current processes. Identification processes contain many of these overlapping legacies and it is through their advancement that legacies that are still alive and seem useful to certain actors for their present purposes become visible.

When reading contributions to the workshop on today’s nutrition and biopolitical regimes – which was the focus area of the Berlin Institute of European Ethnology together with those on colonial medicine by Manuela Bauche, who defended her PhD on malaria control both in Germany and German colonies in Central and East Africa recently at the University of Leipzig – we become aware of (obviously politically incorrect) continuities as well as of the rearrangement of arguments for new contexts and users. Global commodity and value chains are quite different from colonial imperialism, but they are nevertheless characterized by hierarchical relations and patterns of massive exploitation often legitimized by discourses about the difference between the European and the “Other.”

Considering the construction of the European, it is not easy to say when it began. One could argue that ancient Greeks already used the figure of Europe to distinguish themselves from their opponents in Asia Minor; however, we should avoid any linear story from there to the current discourses about the European as there were too many phases of complete disinterest in a distinct Europeaness, especially at times of Christian Universalism emerging slowly at the end of the Roman Empire and lasting for more than eight centuries.⁷ What followed were two periods of particular importance with regard to the construction of the European: during the Enlightenment, the idea of civilization – and the corresponding topos of the non-civilized populating areas outside Europe – became a defining element,⁸ with the then introduced historicism⁹ making civilization a product of progressing human development, thus the perfectibility of man as the ultimate goal of that development. But this partial redefinition of the European in Europe itself happened at times of very intensified contact with people from other continents. Global conflicts and expanding communication¹⁰ went hand in hand with a re-evaluation of Asia and especially China,¹¹ which a century before was undisputed as being relevant for European elites, as Timothy Brook has shown with regard to the taste of Dutch merchants for Chinese products.¹²

7 Petri, *Europa?* (note 2), p. 19–21.

8 H.-J. Lüsebrink (ed.), *Das Europa der Aufklärung und die außereuropäische koloniale Welt*, Göttingen 2006.

9 For a well argued redefinition of historicism as the product of enlightened philosophy: R. Blänkner, *Geschichte und Geschehen. Zur Historizität der „Geschichte“ als Wissensform*, in: F.W. Graf/E. Hanke/B. Picht (eds), *Geschichte intellektuell. Theoriegeschichtliche Perspektiven*, Tübingen 2015, S. 38–55.

10 M. Middell (ed.), *Cultural Transfers, Encounters and Connections in the Global 18th Century*, Leipzig 2014.

11 J. Osterhammel, *Die Entzauberung Asiens. Europa und die asiatischen Reiche im 18. Jahrhundert*, München 1998.

12 T. Brook, *Vermeer’s hat. The seventeenth century and the dawn of the global world*, London 2009.

The second period, starting in the early nineteenth century but reaching its apogee only at the end of the same century, was even more characterized by the idea of a huge difference between the European – undisputed in a historically exceptional world superiority – and the “Others.” That period had for a long list of interpreters its material basis in the “European miracle” (Eric Jones),¹³ which gave rise to the idea of a civilizing mission that was attributed to Europeans.¹⁴ The experience of Europeans travelling to all corners of the world was one of military superiority due to the mastering of an industrial process of arms production. It was an experience that resulted in genocidal wars and the phantasm of Europeans settling in empty spaces like the American West or Australia and New Zealand. Overseas colonial domination and the new patterns of mass society – and the emerging welfare state – went hand in hand, thereby deepening the impression of a substantial difference not only in the living conditions in Europe and in other parts of the world but in the essence of what Europeans are and what the “Others” are.

This period ended definitively with World War I,¹⁵ with the Europeans having to reorient themselves in a world that became increasingly dominated by the US and challenged by its opponent: the Soviet Union. The identification with a larger West, seen as fundamentally European (at least European in origin), and the distinction from an East, whose population was more and more excluded from a core understanding of the European, worked pretty well during the Cold War and has most recently seen some trends of renewal with the crisis around the question of Ukraine’s future position towards “Europe.” This will for sure not be the last chapter of a redefinition of the European, which we can already conclude from the current debate about the refugees coming to Europe from Syria, Afghanistan, and other places of conflicts that were products of Western intervention. This encounter with global mobility makes the strong identification between space and people more and more problematic. It is no longer the Europeans primarily reaching out to various parts of the world but it is now at least to the same degree the world’s population coming to Europe. This introduces again new conditions for the construction of the European while new chapters in that ongoing process of writing the identity of the “European” have just been opened and we can look forward to – or even participate in – that debate.

All in all, what made our predecessors European was an immense collection of practices – starting with migration to the small continent at the northwestern end of Asia already in prehistorical times and evidently not ending with very recent claims for European citi-

13 E. L. Jones, *The European miracle. Environments, economies, and geopolitics in the history of Europe and Asia*, Cambridge, New York 1981. More recent research, however, disputes more and more openly the uniqueness of such a miracle and uses the metaphor against its original meaning to insist on the path dependency of what is by some ironically called “the great divergence”: J. Goody, *The Eurasian miracle*, Cambridge, Malden 2010; K. Sugihara, *The European Miracle and the East Asian Miracle: Towards a New Global Economic History*, in: K. Pomeranz (ed.), *The Pacific in the Age of Early Industrialization*, Farnham 2009, pp. 1–22.

14 B. Barth/J. Osterhammel (eds.), *Zivilisierungsmissionen. Imperiale Weltverbesserung seit dem 18. Jahrhundert*, Konstanz 2005.

15 For the reasons of that decline, see with a focus on American hegemony in global finance specifically J. A. Tooze, *The deluge. The Great War and the remaking of global order 1916–1931*, London, New York 2014.

zenship and a common passport for all Europeans. Kiran Klaus Patel examined the fact, and the associated consequences, that people inhabiting “Europe” have been addressed as “Europeans” only for a relatively short period of time, at least much shorter than the term Europe has been in use. Are the “Europeans” a product of very recent political integration processes aiming at the production of EU citizens, or do we have to go back to the times when Frankish and Burgundian forces – called “Europenses” by some contemporaries – fought Islamic expansion into Europe during the Battle of Tours in 732, an event that was interpreted later as a turning point in the history of the continent’s identification with Christianity.

Patel argues that even in early modern times – a period of discovery and intensified encounters – Europeaness did not become a central reference point. The slow introduction of the term “European” was an effect of related processes of territorialization at home, invasion of the territories of the “Others,” and identification of people with territory instead of religion or culture. Attributes like race or ethnic origin, civilization, and language became territorialized, which was the decisive precondition for the semantic stabilization of a terminology that allowed for a distinction of Europeans from other people. This stabilization met with attempts to systematize the descriptive outcome of travel and observation during the period of Enlightenment (as did Linné with the term *Homo Europaeus*). Even so, according to Patel it is only since the nineteenth century that the “European” became a category meaningful for more than a few educated people interested in taxonomies.

What is interesting in the subsequent processes of social construction of Europeans is, however, not their assumed ubiquity but, on the contrary, the concrete circumstances, the actors, their motivations and interests, the implications and effects, as well as the persistence of such constructions. And since the term “European” covers many such constructions, it may also be of interest to look behind the surface and to reconstruct which encounter or perception was at the origin of the specific European imagined under certain circumstances – did they come from the Balkans or from the British Isles, did they have military uniforms or have they shown up first as prisoners, etc. While this will not help to overcome the vagueness that is characteristic of the category of the European, it may support efforts to distinguish historically different types of Europeans intervening in the lives of others and making their careers in different corners of the world.

What becomes visible in this manner is the coalescence of Europeaness with other characteristics – be it social, geographic, religious, or ethnic – which makes the European plural and polyvalent. All this flexibility in the use of the term is taken for granted, which Patel alluded to in the end of his article with a question that became ever more relevant over the recent years with increasing migration to the EU: “Is it possible for a person of a completely different ethnic, cultural, or geographical background to ‘become’ European?” The answer – as provisional as it can be right now with the current crisis around the topic of refugees still ongoing – reads rather sceptically. There is obviously enormous resistance already to open up to the “new Europeans” from states having joined the EU more the ten years ago while exclusionist patterns towards Eastern Europeans, Turks, or

people from the southern shores of the Mediterranean Sea are on the rise to such a degree that even second- or third-generation immigrants see their Europeaness disputed at times of political crisis as reactions to the recent terrorist attacks in France have shown. Debora Gerstenberger opens the series of case studies with the very special case of the Portuguese court being transferred from what was the centre of one of the most powerful European empires to its Brazilian outpost in Rio de Janeiro at the moment when Napoleon's troops invaded the Iberian Peninsula. What happened to the 15,000 Europeans (aristocratic elites, bureaucrats, and servants) on the other side of the Atlantic? How much Europeaness was still possible in the tropics? And how was the other perceived when it no longer lived "overseas" but was very close by? These questions were not only of relevance to the community of unfortunate travellers fleeing the revolutionary ghost of militarized Jacobinism at the beginning of the nineteenth century but also for subsequent national histories in both Portugal and Brazil, which interpreted the court in Rio as a "huge laboratory of civilization" where constructing and policing the difference between European and non-Europeans became a challenge of so far unknown complexity and in the end not accepted as being successful by the Portuguese elites who asked the king to return to Lisbon after the liberal revolution in 1821.¹⁶

Michael Mann joins Debora Gerstenberger in analysing the colonial context and investigates the British civilizing mission in South Asia as one of the most powerful sources of inspiration for the invention of the European and its counterparts. These examples demonstrate that social constructions are discursive practices but are not only limited to speech acts. Processes of standardization concerning certain characteristics of the "average European" result in models as highlighted by the contributions to this thematic issue by Manuela Bauche (comparing German and African places in the fight against malaria), Veronika Lipphardt (discussing the role of life sciences in the invention of the European), and Mathias Mesenhöller (with regard to racist concepts or biomedical indicators), or as Paul Erker shows in his article when looking at crash test dummies used in the car industry. Situations are as different as the German colonial empire in parts of Africa before 1918, the classificatory power of migratory regimes that gave (among many other effects) birth to the European as a particular category of migrant, and modern technologies that help to reduce the risk of illness or accident.

Mandy Kretzschmar visits Australia as a former settler colony where negotiations of the future of the white Australians' European past go hand in hand with the debate over the role of Aborigines in Australian nation-building. Dominic Sachsenmaier, in contrast, looks at China and evaluates the standards by which Chinese intellectuals measured their experiences with Europeans between the seventeenth and the early twentieth century. The diachronic comparison in his case shows that in the beginning there was a situation where even those Chinese authors who accepted Europeans as being of similar or even superior character than Chinese were able to stay within the framework of a Confucian

16 See also D. Gerstenberger, *Gouvernementalität im Zeichen der globalen Krise. Der Transfer des portugiesischen Königshofes nach Brasilien*, Köln/Weimar/Wien: Böhlau 2013.

language. Two centuries later, an intense debate confronted those who argued in favour of “adapting modernity” by following European standards and the Japanese model with those who advocated profound reform on the basis of traditional moral standards. What was at stake in this discussion is the role of universalism as the basis for cultural learning and what the author can demonstrate is the dissolution of such universal standards already long before the European was replaced by the American in Chinese imaginaries as the role model for the particularly successful actor in world history.

Europe has often been presented as the place where international agreements and international organizations first came into existence and then expanded into the global sphere they organize today. But this underestimates the role of competing agreements elsewhere that express a different understanding of the matter to be regulated as Isabella Löhr demonstrates with regard to the difficulties Europeans faced when trying to universalize their idea of authorship as a global standard. Developed and expanded since the eighteenth century against the background of the idea of individual creativity to be protected by copyright, it turned into a binding international agreement with the Berne Convention in 1886. Efforts were made to spread the European regime to other world regions, which they were successful in doing with the exception of North and South America, refusing for various reasons to grant European authors far-reaching rights. It came to the fore that the European solution reflected not only a particular European philosophical and legislative tradition but also a particular advantage of its cultural industries over (especially the South) American ones. The idea of the writing genius being the proper owner of the cultural product gained further importance in the development of different models of capitalism when applied to inventions made by engineers. Despite global agreements after World War II, such as the World Intellectual Property Organization founded in 1967, the writing genius, focused upon and protected by specific copyright regulations, remained a European and this had long-lasting consequences on his self-perception and relationship to concepts of creativity.

This leads directly to the problematic addressed by Klaas Dykmann in his contribution, asking whether an idealized European man was at the origin of concepts of international organizations (IO). He analyses the consequences of such a hypothesis with regard to the norms and values set for bureaucracies such as the international civil service, to the conceptualization of people targeted by IOs such as the World Health Organization, and to the ideological foundations such as those expressed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. In all three cases briefly introduced, he comes to the conclusion that the European is of the utmost importance in creating a benchmark for IOs, making the Western *Homo bureaucraticus* the role model for all their employees and making the European feel at home more than other people in these organizations. This is not to say that non-Europeans are not recruited; rather, it is quite the contrary. Nevertheless, they are more accepted the more they follow the role model dominating the organization. This has substantial consequences not only for the internal functioning of the organizations but also for their perception of the challenges they have been created to address,

be it health or development, famine or labour conditions, or statistics or environmental issues.

Susanne Bauer and Christine Kleiber-Bischof take a closer look at another production site where the European is conceived: research centres on nutrition and health. First, these centres produce the European – often implicitly – as a statistical figure within their thousands of studies and compare the knowledge generated with data about other people around the world. As a consequence, they then address him or her as an object of intervention. The European organization of research (funding) facilitates both processes; however, the creation of global consortia funded by institutions inside and outside the EU reintroduces confusion, which is observable in Mathias Mesenhöller's discussion of categories applied to immigrants since the late nineteenth century. As a result, the striving for ever bigger data sets conflicts with the argument that pooling all data into one global mega-study would destroy any possibility of falsifying the results from competing studies – difference is presented as a resource and the European with his/her regionally specific dietary habits seem to be exactly different enough for these purposes. This is also confirmed with Paul Erker's analysis of crash test dummies in the automotive industry – European standardization replaces step by step traditional national models. Additionally, in car production we observe that with computer simulation there is a countertrend of re-individualization as well. Europeanization here remains a side effect due to doubts in the universal liability of data provided by US companies. For the needs of an industry that produces at a global scale and for very individual users, the European, however, is not of primary importance.

As we can see from these examples, the debate about the European has a history – even when not as long as Europe – and it is still ongoing. Its importance stems from the fact that it helps to introduce distinctions from other people in the world for various purposes and to open an umbrella of a heterogeneity-characterizing people across the European continent. It can therefore be used as an indicator for further integration or disintegration at home and for repositioning in global contexts.

The Making of *Homo Europaeus*: Problems, Approaches and Perspectives

Kiran Klaus Patel

RESÜMEE

Erst seit relativ kurzer Zeit, so die These dieses Beitrags, sprechen Menschen über sich und andere als „Europäer“. Bis in die Frühe Neuzeit hinein blieb dieser Begriff zur Selbst- und Fremdbeschreibung weitgehend unbedeutend, was angesichts seiner heutigen Allgegenwärtigkeit verwundern mag. Der Artikel geht zunächst den Schlüsselmomenten nach, in denen der Begriff an Bedeutung gewann, und er schlüsselt seine Kerndimensionen auf. Danach diskutiert er verschiedene Konzepte, um der Geschichte des „Europäers“ und der „Europäerin“ angemessen nachgehen zu können. Schließlich werden mit Schwerpunkt auf das 20. Jahrhundert einige Arbeitshypothesen zur Geschichte des „Homo Europaeus“ vorgestellt.

Some thirty-five years ago, British cultural historian Peter Burke published an article with the provocative title: “Did Europe exist before 1700?”* Rather than treating “Europe” as a neutral geographical entity or as a presupposed cultural or social reality, he was interested in how the term “Europe” was used in the past and the extent to which it expressed a sense of shared experiences or even of belonging in different historical contexts. Burke claimed that outside the very limited circles of intellectuals and politicians, an awareness of “Europe” only emerged in the late seventeenth century. Even if the term was coming to fruition during the Early Modern period, older concepts such as Christendom or local and regional identity markers were still much more important than identification with Europe. Seen from the perspective of a history of *mentalités collectives*, as he called it, Burke thus warned us against too easily imposing our understanding of the concept on earlier epochs.¹

* I would like to thank the other project members as well as Benoît Challand, Mia Saugman and Johan Schot.

1 P. Burke, Did Europe Exist before 1700?, in: History of European Ideas 1 (1980), pp. 21-29; now also see e.g., O.

This article argues that we must arrive at a similar conclusion if we consider the people inhabiting the continent. The time that has elapsed since they began being referred to as “Europeans” is surprisingly short, much shorter than the rather common use of the term “Europe” – even if most research in European history has tended to neglect this fact and its consequences. This article will first look at some key moments in and features of the history of the discussions and social practices related to *Homo Europaeus* and to Europeanness.² It will then discuss conceptual strategies for analyzing the way in which the “European man” was imagined and implemented – thus taking into account the history of the *mentalités collectives* Burke concentrated on, but also opening other avenues of approach. Thirdly, it will propose some working hypotheses on how the construction of *Homo Europaeus* can be conceived and interpreted if one focuses on the twentieth century.

* * *

Today, the self- and hetero-identification as European seems to be ubiquitous. Not in the least due to the strength of the European integration process, the term is very often used to describe a particular population. These days, it is frequently employed as shorthand for EU citizens, thus giving it strong political overtones. However, there are also other layers and dimensions.³ For example, the identification of individuals or groups as the “first Europeans” takes us far back into history. Intellectuals have often described Charlemagne, Cicero or Moses as the first European or the “father of Europe.”⁴ At the same time, paleontologists and life scientists of various disciplines regularly provide new insights into the origins and attributes of the “first Europeans” – that they immigrated to Europe via Asia rather than directly from Africa, or that Cro-Magnons might indeed have been direct ancestors of present-day Europeans. Thus, very different criteria are used to identify Europeans – political in the sense of belonging to a political union, moral as an embodiment of particular qualities or biological vis-à-vis other populations. Also, the level of concreteness varies widely – from metaphorical rhetoric to scientific proof. Therefore, vagueness abounds. Yet, there is still some common ground between these different fields of discussion (and several others that could be mentioned): the

Asbach, Europa, vom Mythos zur Imagined Community? Zur historischen Semantik “Europas” von der Antike bis ins 17. Jahrhundert, Hannover 2011 and and particularly K. Oschema, Bilder von Europa im Mittelalter, Ostfildern 2013. While Oschema’s book qualifies the older literature’s argument that the term “Europe” was only used rarely in medieval times, also he finds only few uses of “European” to denote a specific form of identity or group of people.

- 2 On the concept of Europeanness, now also see K. K. Patel, Where and when was Europe? Europeanness and its relationship to migration, in: National Identities 15 (2013), pp. 21–32.
- 3 The English wikipedia entry for “European” differentiates three main subcategories: “a person or attribute of the continent of Europe”; “a person or attribute of the European Union”; and “a person descended from a European ethnic group”; see <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European> (consulted on 10 October 2012).
- 4 See e.g., R. G. Hesse, Aristide Briand, premier européen, Paris 1939; A. Barbero, Carlo Magno. Un padre dell’Europa, Rome 2000; H. Berve, Gestaltende Kräfte der Antike: Aufsätze zur griechischen und römischen Geschichte, Munich 1949, 186 (on Cicero); Hannes Stein, Moses der Europäer, in: Berliner Zeitung, 10 March 1999.

implicit or explicit claim that “European” is a useful category for classifying individuals and populations.⁵

However, throughout most of human history, people have not used the term “European” to identify themselves or others. Admittedly, the first ideas about the “European man” – or rather woman! – can be traced back to antiquity and the mythical figure of Εὐρώπη, a Phoenician princess whose name the continent was given. Greek authors of the fifth century BC, such as Herodotus or Hippocrates, provide lengthy descriptions of a geographical entity of that name, and for them the continent was largely defined by the particular characteristics of its inhabitants. Newer research has shown, however, that the use in these Greek sources of “European” to denote a specific group of people remained vague and inconsistent, contradictory and contested.⁶ During the subsequent period characterized by Rome’s rise and fall, “Europeanness” was not a very meaningful category. For instance, Europe does not figure at all among the dozens of geographical names Caesar lists in “*De Bello Gallico*,” such as Gallia, Helvetia, and Germania.⁷

“Europenses” was then famously used to describe the Frankish and Burgundian forces under Charles Martel who defeated the army of Muslims led by Abdul Rahman Al Ghafiqi at the battle of Tours in 732. Later on, the military clash came to be characterized as bringing a halt to Islamic expansionism in Europe; today, the event is often regarded as a turning point in both European and world history. Still, it is interesting that most contemporary chronicles paid no particular attention to the incident or its “European” actors. At the time, it was just one Spanish chronicler who used the term “europenses” to label the Christian armies – and even he stressed that after their victory, “Europenses ... se ... recipiunt in patrias.” Obviously, their identification as Europeans remained rather ephemeral.⁸

In line with this volatility, some traits that later on became quite typical for characterizing Europeans had not yet been established in the late Middle Ages and the Renaissance. The first Western travelers to China considered the Chinese to be white-skinned, particularly similar to the Germans – of all peoples! Also, early European travelers to Japan perceived the skin color and manners of the inhabitants there to be “just like us” – and

5 See e.g., *Erste Europäer kamen über Asien*, in: Spiegel, 7 August 2007; Christian Thomas, *Der erste Europäer*, in: Frankfurter Rundschau, 17 July 2008.

6 See entry “Europe” in: Paulys Realencyclopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft, vol. VI, 1, Stuttgart 1907, 1287–1309; on this, now also see G. Jonker, *Naming the West: The Production of Europe as a Locality 750 BC to 750 CE*, in: Contexts: The Journal of Educational Media, Memory, and Society, 1 (2009), 34–59 e.g., also see Herodotus, *Historien*, vol. I, ed. by J. Feix (German and Greek), Düsseldorf 2000, I 15; I 16; IV 11; R. Thomas, *Herodotus in Context: Ethnography, Science and the Art of Persuasion*, Cambridge 2000, especially pp. 75–101.

7 G. I. Caesar, *The Gallic War*, with an English Translation by H. J. Edwards, London 1970.

8 *Monumenta Germaniae Historica, Chronica Minora saec. IV. V. VI. (II)*, p. 362: “moved back into their fatherlands” (own translation); e.g., also see U. Nonn, *Die Schlacht bei Poitiers 732. Probleme historischer Urteilsbildung*, in: R. Schieffer (ed.), *Beiträge zur Geschichte des Regnum Francorum*, Sigmaringen 1990, pp. 37–56; E. J. Schoenfeld, *Battle of Poitiers*, in: R. Cowley and G. Parker (eds.), *The Reader’s Companion to Military History*, New York 2001, p. 366; as examples for how this source is referred to today, see e.g., O. Issing, *The Euro – A Currency without a State*, Center for Financial Studies Working Paper, No. 2008/51, p. 15; D. Scholz, *Europa. Herkunft und Gegenwart*, Münster 2008, p. 27; V. D. Hanson, *Carnage and Culture: Landmark Battles in the Rise of Western Power*, New York 2001.

often did not even bother to describe physical differences. When Christopher Columbus reached the New World, he did not find the skin of the indigenous people strange; rather, it reminded him of the inhabitants of the Canary Islands. Hence, new experiences did not always lead to the creation of new categories; rather, they were integrated in existing ones. This way of seeing the other, which is sometimes referred to as “nostrification,” only slowly gave way to a clear-cut understanding of Europeanness as a distinct quality differentiating some people(s) from others; accordingly, it was only later that these “non-European” peoples came to be perceived as yellow or red, and uncivilized or inferior.⁹ This process of differentiation ran parallel to the gradual replacement of the Ptolemaic worldview by Copernican heliocentrism, the latter contributing to man’s increased ability to conceive of other worlds, cultures, or peoples as distinct and different entities.¹⁰ Certainly, some ideas about “Europeanness” can also be detected in fourteenth-, fifteenth- and sixteenth-century sources. However, the main distinction between “Them” and “Us” remained between Christians and “pagans.” Many sources of the late Middle Ages and the Early Modern period speak – if at all – of the “European peoples” rather than “Europeans,” thus implying a lower level of aggregation and homogeneity. Dante Alighieri (1265–1321), for example, wrote of “Asyani” and “Affricani,” but not of “Europaei”: instead, he used the description “Europam colentes,” *i.e.*, “those who live in Europe.” The use of “apud nos Europæos” by Francis Bacon (1561–1626) when philosophizing about the importance of naval potency for the rise of the states in his day seems quite accidental – the term appears just once in the whole book.¹¹ For most of the Early Modern period “Europeanness” was not central, and reference to Europe remained more common when differentiating the variety of human existence than for identifying one population directly with the category “Europeans.”¹² This trend also holds true for the debates that drove the rise of this category among literati in subsequent centuries, *i.e.*, the increasing contact with individuals and groups from

- 9 See, e.g., M. Keevak, *Becoming Yellow: A Short History of Racial Thinking*, Princeton 2011; P. Münch, *Wie aus Menschen Weiße, Schwarze, Gelbe und Rote wurden*, in: *Essener Unikat*, 6/7 (1995), pp. 87–97; W. Demel, *Wie die Chinesen gelb wurden. Ein Beitrag zur Frühgeschichte der Rassentheorien*, in: *Historische Zeitschrift*, 225 (1992), pp. 625–666; R. Kowner, *Skin as a Metaphor: Early European Racial Views on Japan, 1548–1853*, in: *Ethnohistory*, 51 (2004), pp. 751–778; more generally, also see M. Adas, *Machines as the Measure of Men: Science, Technology, and Ideologies of Western Dominance*, Ithaca 1998, pp. 21–32 on the closeness of technological practices and world views between Europeans and the peoples whom they met in these first encounters.
- 10 A. Pagden, *The Fall of Natural Man: The American Indian and the Origins of Comparative Ethnology*, Cambridge 1982; D. N. Livingstone, *The Geographical Tradition: Episodes in the History of a Contested Enterprise*, Oxford 1992; J. N. Wilford, *The Mapmakers: The Story of the Great Pioneers in Cartography from Antiquity to the Space Age*, London 2002.
- 11 Dante Alighieri, *De Monarchia*, 3, p. 13, e.g., in: *Studienausgabe*, ed. by R. Imbach and C. Flüeler (Latin-German), Stuttgart 2007, p. 236; F. Bacon, *De Augmentis Scientiarum*, in: *The Works of Francis Bacon*, ed. by J. Spedding, R. L. Elles and D. D. Heath, vol. I, London 1858, p. 801; also see W. Schulze, *Europa in der frühen Neuzeit – Begriffsgeschichtliche Befunde*, in: H. Durcharadt and A. Kunz (eds.), *Europäische Geschichte als historiographisches Problem*, Mainz 1997, pp. 35–65.
- 12 Many examples in H. Gollwitzer, *Europabild und Europagedanke. Beiträge zur deutschen Geistesgeschichte des 18. und 19. Jahrhunderts*, München 1964, pp. 27–38; also see Wolfgang Schmale, *Geschichte Europas*, Wien 2001, pp. 11–40.

different parts of the world. Albeit slow, cultural encounters would eventually stabilize the idea of “Europeans” as a distinct category. In these acts of delimitation and inclusion, three sub-dimensions can be differentiated.

Firstly – and most importantly in the long run – people started to recognize themselves as Europeans when they invaded other territories. Brazil is a good example: one preoccupation of sixteenth-century visitors to and commentators on South America was to reflect on differences and similarities to their home cultures. Some, like André Thevet (ca. 1502–1590), emphasized the differences between the “savages” and “nostre Europe”;¹³ others, like Jean de Léry (ca. 1536–1613), highlighted the similarities, both in manners and in physical constitution:

*The Tupinamba ... are no taller, fatter, or smaller in stature than we Europeans are; their bodies are neither monstrous nor prodigious with respect to ours. In fact, they are stronger, more robust and well filled-out, more nimble, less subject to disease, there are almost none among them who are lame, one-eyed, deformed, or disfigured.*¹⁴

Léry’s rather positive description of non-Europeans is more the exception than the rule. In most cases, the differentiation between “Them” and “Us” was now used to establish, legitimize, and enforce the physical, intellectual and moral superiority of Europeans. Still, these new contacts with peoples from hitherto unknown parts of the world strengthened the tendency to use “Europe” and, in the long run, also “European” as an identity marker.¹⁵

This is also true if one turns to the second dimension: self-identification as European when invaded by “non-European” others. The “Turkish threat” is the most obvious example in this context. Enea Silvio Piccolomini (1405–1464), the Tuscan humanist, historian, poet and scholar who was to become Pope Pius II, offers good early examples of this. In “De Europa,” one of the earliest attempts to write a European history, he notes: “apud Europeos et, qui nomine christiano censentur” (moving Europeanness very closely together with Christian belief).¹⁶ Still, the ambivalences should not be overlooked. Even if Piccolomini contributed tremendously to “othering” the Turks by decoupling them from Troy as the cradle of a whole host of Western peoples and placing them among the “barbarians,” the term “Europeans” was still not central for him. Instead, he praised individual European peoples for their qualities and their particular roles in the fight against

13 A. Thevet, *Les singularitez de la France antarctique, autrement nommée Amérique*, Paris 1556, p. 390: “our Europe”.

14 J. de Léry, *History of a voyage to the land of Brazil, otherwise called America: containing the navigation and the remarkable things seen on the sea by the author; the behavior of Villegagnon in that country; the customs and strange ways of life of the American savages; together with the description of various animals, trees, plants, and other singular things completely unknown over here*, Berkeley 1992 (1580), p. 56. In the French original, it reads: “que nous sommes en l’Europe”, see J. de Léry, *Histoire d’un voyage fait en la terre du Brésil – 1557*, ed. by F. Lestringant, Montpellier 1992 (1580), p. 85.

15 Another notable exception are Early Modern views of Japan: The Italian Jesuit Alessandro Valignano (1539–1606) found them even superior the Europeans; see D. F. Lach, *Asia and the Making of Europe*, Chicago 1993 (1965), p. 685.

16 E. S. Piccolomini (later Pope Pius II), *De Europa*, ed. by A. van Heck, Rome 2001, p. 27.

the Turks. A more direct equation between the anti-Turkish forces and Europeans was reserved for later authors and centuries.¹⁷

Thirdly, “Europeanness” was evoked to bridge the deep political and confessional divisions of the continent. For instance, Amos Comenius (1592–1670) emphasized in “Panegersia” that all Europeans were sailing on one ship and that at the same time, “the Asians, Africans and others are floating on their own ships in the same ocean of the world.”¹⁸ Maybe even more important than delimitation from the non-European other was that Comenius tried to stress inner-European communalities in an attempt to overcome the confessional divide that was, at the time, devouring the continent from within. Clearly, there were many overlaps and synergies between these different debates, and in incremental and contorted processes they gave rise to the idea of identifying a specific population as “Europeans.”

Having said this, it would be problematic to ignore the voices of those who were “othered” in these processes – even if, so far, we have very little research on how those who were not part of this in-group used, dismissed or negotiated this label. In general, it is quite impossible to generalize how “non-Europeans” named and perceived “Europeans” in these cultural encounters. A few vignettes have to suffice. As is well known, it did not take very long before sixteenth-century Aztecs downgraded the Spanish conquerors from “gods” to regular and rather fierce humans.¹⁹ Quite generally, one can identify a development from integrating the newcomers into existing social or mythological concepts to a mental reorientation with more experience-driven and sometimes also hybrid categories – not just, as said before, for the “European” side but also for the “non-Europeans.” A good example for the latter are the Arabic terms “Ifraṅṅ”, “Afraṅṅ” and “Farāṅṅ” which translate as “Franks” and which were widely used by Arab writers from the time of the Crusades onwards to refer to Christian Europeans regardless of their nationality. The term also found its way into Persian (farangi and farangistan for Europe), Turkish (Frenk) and other languages, primarily meaning (Christian) Europeans, and it may also be related to the Thai Farang. From its non-European contexts, the expression then also travelled back into European sources. For example, the German “Herders Conversations-Lexikon” of 1856 defined concisely: “die sich in der Türkei aufhaltenden Europäer

17 J. Helmuth, Enea Silvio Piccolomini (Pius II.) – ein Humanist als Vater des Europagedankens?, in: R. Hohls, I. Schröder and H. Siegrist (eds.), *Europa und die Europäer. Quellen und Essays zur modernen europäischen Geschichte*, Stuttgart 2005, pp. 361–369; D. Mertens, “Europa, id est patria, domus propria, sedes nostra...” Funktionen und Überlieferung lateinischer Türkenreden im 15. Jahrhundert, in: F.-R. Erkens (ed.), *Europa und die osmanische Expansion im ausgehenden Mittelalter*, Berlin 1997, pp. 38–58, here pp. 54–55.

18 I. A. Comenius, *De Rerum Humanarum Emendatione, Consultatio Catholica*, vol. I, Prague 1966, pp. 30–31: “Nos nimirum Europaei unâ qvali communi vehimur Navi: contemplamurque Alianos, Africanos, Americanos, caeterosque ut luis Naviculis in eodem communi Mundi et Mundanarum calamitatum ... Oceano fluctuantes”.

19 See J. Lockhart (ed.), *We People here: Nahuatl Accounts of the Conquest of Mexico*, Eugene 1993, particularly p. 58, with an account in Nahuatl (from the Florentine Codex); on the broader context, see J. Lockhart, *The Nahuas after the Conquest: A Social and Cultural History of the Indians of Central Mexico, Sixteenth through Eighteenth Centuries*, Stanford 1992. On this topic in general, now also see J. Becker and B. Stanley (eds.), *Europe as the Other: External Perspectives on European Christianity*, Göttingen 2014.

heißen Franken.”²⁰ Things were even more complicated, however, because Arabs also used the word “Rum” to distinguish the Orthodox Christians from the Franks. All in all, the term “Europeans” thus seems to have been coined, and for the longest time also used, primarily as a concept of self-definition. This is also confirmed by sources from China: Particularly since the seventeenth century, Europeans – as well as persons from other Western countries – were often referred to as “foreign devils” (*yang guizi*). This is a sharp reminder that non-Europeans often did not see Europeans through European eyes but used their own concepts and terminology to speak about the “other”. In some cases, finally, any kind of clear-cut distinction between “European” and “non-European” even collapses, for instance if one studies members of the colonized elites visiting or even living in the metropolises of their respective empires during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.²¹

The propagandistic pamphlets and travel accounts, literary texts and encyclopedias mentioned so far also stood in close dialogue with another form of knowledge production, *i.e.*, with the scholarly world. The Swedish botanist, physician and zoologist Carl Linnaeus (1707–1778) was the first to use *Homo Europaeus* as a genuinely scientific concept – although simultaneously drawing heavily from travel accounts and other forms of knowledge production that today would be labeled as non-scientific. In “Systema Naturae” (1735), Linnaeus treated mankind as one species, called *Homo sapiens*, which he loosely divided into four types. In the tenth edition (1758), however, Linnaeus elaborated on the description of races and attributed to them specific moral, emotional, physical and cultural characteristics: *Homo americanus* (red, choleric, erect); *Homo africanus* (black, phlegmatic, indulgent); and *Homo asiaticus* (sallow, melancholic, covered with loose garments and ruled by opinions). The peculiarities of *Homo Europaeus*, finally, were “white skin, a full-blooded and sanguine temperament and a fleshy body. The hair is yellowish and curly, the eyes blue, the emotions fickle, rational and preordained for inventiveness. They wear close-fitting clothes and are ruled by laws.”²²

Thus, Linnaeus gave new dignity to this category by turning it into a scientific concept. His system of human taxonomy promoted a European racial awareness and a sense of superiority. At the same time, his work was part of a much larger literature on the study of human races that grew enormously in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. François

20 See e.g., C. Niall, The Origins of Suffixed Invocations of God’s Curse on the Franks in Muslim Sources for the Crusades, in: *Arabica*, 48 (2001), pp. 254–266; B. Lewis, Some Reflections on the Decline of the Ottoman Empire, in: *Studia Islamica*, 9 (1958), pp. 111–127; Herders Conversations-Lexikon, vol. 4, Freiburg 1856, p. 420: “all Europeans residing in Turkey are called Franks” (own translation); on Arabic views on the crusaders, see Amin Maalouf, *Les croisades vues par les Arabes*, Paris 1983.

21 See T. Klein, The Missionary as Devil: Anti-Missionary Demonology in China, 1860–1930, in: J. Becker and B. Stanley, *Europe* (see footnote 19); K. Rüther, *Europa im späten 19. und frühen 20. Jahrhundert: Afrikaner in Großbritannien und Deutschland*. Presentation at the Historikertag in Mainz, Germany, 26 September 2012; more generally, also see M. Wintle (ed.), *Imagining Europe: Europe and European Civilisation as Seen from its Margins and by the Rest of the World, in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries*, Brussels 2008.

22 Latin original: C. von Linné, *Systema naturae per regna tria naturae, secundum classes, ordines, genera, species, cum characteribus differentiis, synonymis, locis*, vol. 1, 10th edition 1766 (1735), p. 29 (English is own translation); on Linnaeus’ changing nomenclature, see W. Demel, *Chinesen* (see footnote 9), pp. 625–666.

Bernier (1625–1688), for example, wrote about a “first race” that encompassed the inhabitants of Europe, North Africa, the Middle East and parts of Asia. Johann Friedrich Blumenbach (1752–1840) later introduced a racial classification system that highlighted the “Caucasian race,” which – at least in his earlier works – he saw as superior to all other races. Even if Blumenbach’s term has survived in a modified form to this very day – as its use in American English might exemplify – Linnaeus’ concept also turned out to be highly influential for later developments, *i.e.*, to differentiate between “We, the Europeans” and “They, the others.”²³

The nineteenth century, especially, saw the rise of the idea of European racial superiority in a development heralded in 1799 by Charles White’s (1728–1813) often-cited “An Account of the Regular Gradation in Man,” in which he praised Europeaness on the basis of ideas of racial and physiognomic hierarchy.²⁴

Still, it has to be said that the ascription of “European” continued to be just one among many. For a long time, religion and estates had been criteria of differentiation; increasingly, ethnic and national criteria started to play a role. However, there were also many other attributions – racial sub-categories, micro- and macro-region or, for example, as members of Western civilization. All of these concepts partially overlapped with and partially rivaled that of *Homo Europaeus*. Thus, the latter was only one of many attempts to understand and to organize the variety of human existence hierarchically.

Particularly since the nineteenth century, the concept of the “European” has travelled beyond the narrow circles of the educated few to become a truly meaningful category of attribution and differentiation.²⁵ Today, the terms “European” and “Europeans” have permeated every aspect of daily life. One example of the recent trend is a brochure published by the European Union in 2001, whose title, “How Europeans See Themselves,” not only implies the existence of Europeans, but also that they are united by specific views, including a shared perception of themselves and that it is indeed possible to gain access to this perception. The brochure summarizes public opinion surveys conducted by the European Commission since the 1970s and arrives at the conclusion that while a relative majority of the interviewees do not think that a common European identity exists, most of them feel “to some extent European.” The brochure also includes a graph detailing “the values of Europeans,” showing that the most important value that Europeans share is “to help others.”²⁶

These findings almost sound like a late echo of the German novelist Heinrich Mann (1871–1950), whose essay “Der Europäer” (1916) began:

23 See, e.g., S. Stuurman, François Bernier and the Invention of Racial Classification, in: *History Workshop Journal*, 50 (2000), pp. 1–21; B. Baum, *The Rise and Fall of the Caucasian Race: A Political History of Racial Identity*, New York 2006; T. Todorov, *Nous et les autres: La Réflexion française sur la diversité humaine*, Paris 1989.

24 See C. White, *An Account of the Regular Gradation in Man and in Different Animals and Vegetables*, London 1799, particularly pp. 41–68; also see C. L. Brace, *Chain of Being*, in: F. Spencer (ed.), *A History of Physical Anthropology: An Encyclopaedia*, New York 1997, pp. 259–265.

25 Also see W. Schmale, *Geschichte Europas* (see footnote 12), p. 39.

26 European Commission, *How Europeans See Themselves: Looking through the Mirror with Public Opinion Surveys*, Luxembourg 2001, 10, 8.

*His spirit has many potentials but he is determined by reason and industriousness. We love proportion and usefulness. Between the self-destructive ecstatic and the saint who wants to help others, we see as European not the enchanted but the helper.*²⁷

However, not everybody thought so positively about Europeans. Charles Darwin (1809–1882), for instance, complained: “Wherever the European has trod, death seems to pursue the aboriginal.”²⁸ Although it is obvious that the core characteristics that define Europeanness on the individual and group levels have remained contested, the British naturalist of the nineteenth century, the German novelist of the twentieth century, and the recent document from Brussels all share an implicit consensus that the category “European” is meaningful and consequential.

This brief overview of how the term “European” has been used throughout history has demonstrated that *Homo Europaeus* is very often characterized by a combination of physical, mental and socio-cultural qualities. Concepts of the “European man” position this creature between metaphysically charged poles, for example between determinism and self-determination, universality and particularity or nature and nurture. Europeans are thus identified by a whole cornucopia of features – genetically, culturally and socially, and even more often by a combination of these factors with all the ensuing unifying, as well as divisive, consequences.

* * *

There are several ways of studying the history of *Homo Europaeus*, the history of the discourses and the practices of “Europeanness.” The main current of research starts from an implicit and common-sense notion and analyzes the history of Europeans, within Europe and beyond, without paying particular attention to defining them. Most grand narratives of European history – even the most recent ones – start from such a premise; also, many studies on global encounters adopt this take.²⁹ It is obvious that these literatures have borne much fruit and have enriched our knowledge tremendously. Still, there is also the danger of anachronisms that might even produce a distorted teleology, or consciously or unconsciously legitimating later ideas and practices such as the European integration process of today.

Therefore, I would argue that the more interesting approach to studying ideas and social practices surrounding *Homo Europaeus* must adopt an explicit social constructivism.

27 H. Mann, *Macht und Mensch. Essays*, Frankfurt am Main 1987, p. 129, „sein Geist trägt alle Keime, bestimmt aber wird er durch Vernunft und Fleiß. Wir lieben das Maß und den Nutzen. Zwischen einem selbstzerstörerischen Ekstatiker und einem Heiligen, der anderen helfen will, empfinden wir als europäisch nicht den Verzückten, sondern den Helfer“ (own translation).

28 C. Darwin, *Voyage of the Beagle*, London 1989 (1839), p. 322.

29 E.g., see N. Davies, *Europe: A History*, Oxford 1996; B. Wasserstein, *Barbarism and Civilization: A History of Europe in our Time*, Oxford 2007; U. Bitterli, *Cultures in Conflict: Encounters between European and non-European Cultures, 1492–1800*, Cambridge 1989; J. Darwin, *After Tamerlane: The Global History of Empire since 1405*, New York 2007, particularly pp. 14–27.

Here, Europeans are seen not as a stable, clear-cut group whose individual members can be identified consistently, but rather as the discursive and practical result of endless exchanges of people, ideas and institutions all around the world. The main reason for this is the simple fact that there have always been question marks over who actually belongs to this population. Any answer to the question of which nationalities, ethnicities or groups are to be included is based on cultural assumptions. When one refers to Europe – be it defined by geography, history or culture – one is using criteria that are themselves socially constructed because most historians today would agree that no stable vision of Europe can be identified: the delineation of Europe’s eastern frontier as the Ural Mountains, for instance, is an eighteenth-century invention, supporting Russia’s claim to be one of the great European powers. Ever since antiquity, the definition of Europe’s borders has been contested. Similarly, ideas of how to categorize humans have also been quite volatile. For example, Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) and some of his contemporaries thought that the Arabs belonged to the same category of people as the inhabitants of the northern shores of the Mediterranean.³⁰ Nor can modern biology provide adequate unambiguous criteria to define *Homo Europaeus* because genetic and other bio-scientific methods are incapable of defining precisely what “Europeanness” constitutes.³¹

The social constructivist approach is not interested in what is European about *Homo Europaeus*, i.e., how he became what he “is.” Rather, it focuses on how and why ideas of Europeanness have evolved, how they circulate and change in relationship to other such concepts of organizing human diversity, and on the practical consequences for those affected. At the same time, a social constructivist approach does not deny the power and implications of the emergence of this “imagined community.” More than twenty years ago, Benedict Anderson noted, “all communities larger than primordial villages of face-to-face contact (and maybe even these) are imagined.” Therefore, one should not endeavor to distinguish between “genuine” and “false” communities, but rather between different styles of imagining and enacting such entities; social constructivism is simply a viable means to analyze them from a perspective that transcends essentialist approaches that would see them as presupposed, eternal unities.³² In sum, people understand themselves and are seen by others as Europeans, and they behave as such. They attribute meaning and prestige to this category, create specifically European habitats and treat others as non-Europeans. They thus represent imagined – and living – creatures and communities. Hence, *Homo Europaeus* does exist after all. However, the social constructivist understanding of its epistemic status differs from the essentialist models.

30 See e.g., M. Todorova, *Imagining the Balkans*, New York 1997; F. B. Schenk, *Mental Maps: Die Konstruktion von geographischen Räumen in Europa seit der Aufklärung. Literaturbericht*, in: *Geschichte und Gesellschaft*, 28 (2002), pp. 493–514.

31 V. Lipphardt and K. K. Patel, *Auf der Suche nach dem Europäer. Wissenschaftliche Konstruktionen des Homo Europaeus*. In: *Themenportal Europäische Geschichte* (2007), in: <http://www.europa.clio-online.de/2007/Article=204> (consulted on 10 October 2012).

32 B. Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism*, New York 1991, p. 6.

At the same time, one has to face the dilemma that when working on this issue, one cannot avoid attributing further meaning to it. By describing and analyzing this social construct, one also adds to its very creation. Without the process of European unification under the banner of the EEC and the EU since the middle of the twentieth century, the whole topic would be less relevant. Therefore, one could argue that any interest in *Homo Europaeus* risks simply affirming the EU of our days. It might even seem that the most sophisticated take would be to ignore the whole topic. However, this is exactly what has been done so far, leading to a lack of critical studies. Trappist silence has rarely been a sound, scientific strategy. Even if the analysis of *Homo Europaeus* delineated here is quite new, there are several lines of research on which one can build.

A first point of reference for such a take is the constructivist literature on nationalism already mentioned above. Anderson coined the term “imagined communities” in the context of this specific literature, and together with authors such as Ernest Gellner and Eric Hobsbawm, he provides a solid basis for tackling essentialist concepts of identity and group affiliation.³³ Thus, the constructivist literature on nationalism can serve as a major point of orientation when studying *Homo Europaeus*.

However, there are also some reservations. Anderson, Gellner and others wrote about nationalism and nations, not about the “European man” – which does not necessarily mean a group, but can also be singular. Even more importantly, there is the danger of false analogies: Europe is not a nation, let alone a nation-state; as a point of reference for *Homo Europaeus*, it lacks many of the characteristics of a nation. Research on nationalism is, for example, very much geared towards a political model and an institutional framework, whereas the term “European” draws a good part of its vagueness from the fact that these political and institutional dimensions have played no important role for most of its history. In addition, even if one finds identical criteria of classification, they are often hierarchized and organized differently than in nationalism. All in all, it is therefore highly fruitful to use the works of Anderson, Gellner, Hobsbawm and others as a source of inspiration, while remembering that they can also be misleading.

The ongoing research on European identity can be seen as a second point of reference. This literature experienced a first climax in the 1950s and the 1960s, with studies by authors such as Federico Chabod, Heinz Gollwitzer, Denys Hay and Denis de Rougemont. One major motivation of their work was to search for viable alternatives to the extreme forms of nationalism and resulting catastrophes that they themselves had experienced. Eruditely, they searched for past visions and concrete concepts of European integration as an alternative past to the dominant nation-centered narrative, and the volume and diversity of the sources they unearthed in the process is still impressive today. It is obvious, however, that they were looking for a usable past, and any such process implies certain blinkers. In line with broader historiographical trends of the time, they privileged great

33 See, e.g., B. Anderson, *Communities* (see footnote 32); E. Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*, Ithaca 1983; E. Hobsbawm and T. Ranger (eds.), *The Invention of Tradition*, New York 1983.

minds and were less interested in the social reach of ideas in popular culture or in social practices. Also, they were primarily focused on ideas of Europe, not of the European.³⁴ Newer studies, especially since the 1990s, have introduced a more critical dimension. They often refer explicitly or implicitly to constructivist concepts. They have demonstrated the extent to which European identity – both as a self- and as a hetero-perception – has been subject to historical change, even in recent centuries and decades. Recently identified traits include not only feelings of superiority but also of crisis: strong communalities vis-à-vis non-Europeans on the one hand, yet an insistence on internal differences on the other. Methodologically, many historical works on European identity are part of a – more or less socially grounded – intellectual history, for example, in the books and projects by Hartmut Kaelble, Robert Frank and Gérard Bossuat or Anthony Pagden.³⁵ This take is highly fruitful, particularly if it transcends the concentration on Western European sources that has characterized it for a long time. Of particular value are the works of Bo Stråth and others who have also adopted an explicitly constructivist approach.³⁶

However, not only historians have contributed to this research on European identity. Sociologists, political scientists, anthropologists and many others have also written about this issue. Very often, however, they have a rather presentistic tendency and focus primarily on political identities or the politics of identity – and thus on only one subset of possible questions. Still, many of their studies are highly valuable, especially because they tend toward multiple, nested identities and highlight the ephemeral and situational qualities of European identity.³⁷

A third literature that is highly fruitful comes from cultural studies and focuses on performative acts and cultural practices. It thus leads beyond a focus on ideas, concepts, and debates to the question of the material practices of abstract discourses, as well as social action more generally. Performances might then be seen as “acts, gestures, enactments” that purport identity as “fabrications manufactured and sustained through corporal signs

34 See, e.g., F. Chabod, *Storia dell'idea d'Europa*, Bari 1995 (first 1961); H. Gollwitzer, *Europabild* (see footnote 12); D. Hay, *Europe: The Emergence of an Idea*, Edinburgh 1968 (first 1957); D. de Rougemont, *Europa. Vom Mythos zur Wirklichkeit*, München 1962; C. Curcio, *Europa. Storia di un'idea*, Florence 1979; also see W. Fritzemeyer, *Christenheit und Europa. Zur Geschichte des europäischen Gemeinschaftsgefühls von Dante bis Leibniz*, München 1931. Many of these authors are portrayed in: H. Duchhardt, M. Morawiec, W. Schmale and W. Schulze (eds.), *Europa-Historiker. Ein biographisches Handbuch*, 3 vols., Göttingen 2006/2007.

35 See, e.g., H. Kaelble, *Europäer über Europa. Die Entstehung des europäischen Selbstverständnisses im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert*, Frankfurt a.M./New York 2001; R. Frank (ed.), *Les identités européennes au XXe siècle: diversité, convergences et solidarités*, Paris 2004; W. Schmale, *Geschichte und Zukunft der Europäischen Identität*, Stuttgart 2008; A. Pagden (ed.), *The Idea of Europe: From Antiquity to the European Union*, New York 2002; A. Pagden (ed.), *Facing Each Other: The World's Perception of Europe and Europe's Perception of the World*, 2 vols., Aldershot 2000; M. Wintle, *The Image of Europe: Visualizing Europe in Cartography and Iconography throughout the Ages*, Cambridge 2009.

36 B. Stråth (ed.), *Europe and the Other and Europe as the Other*, Brussels 2000.

37 See, e.g., T. Risse, *A Community of Europeans? Transnational Identities and Public Spheres*, Ithaca 2010; J. T. Checkel and P. J. Katzenstein (eds.), *European Identity*, New York 2009; R. K. Herrmann, T. Risse and M. B. Brewer (eds.), *Transnational Identities: Becoming European in the EU*, Lanham 2004.

and other discursive means.”³⁸ Certainly, within the specific field, “performance” means different things to different people. More interesting than the fight over nuances might be the fact that the discussion opens up whole new horizons of analysis, and that for the concrete case under study here, it could be particularly interesting to research “*Homo Europaeus* in the Making.” Wolfgang Schmale is one of the very first to have worked with such an approach to our subject. His “Geschichte Europas” is not the rather general account of European history its title might suggest. Rather, Schmale analyzes instances in which “people imagine and visualize Europe,” thus seeing Europe as a “result of discourses and performative acts.”³⁹ A few others have also already worked with such a social constructivist approach and emphasized material practices by focusing on “Europe.” Johan Schot and Thomas Misa, for instance, highlight the role of technology by analyzing how “actors design and use technology to constitute and enact European integration (or fragmentation).”⁴⁰ Yet, for images and social practices regarding Europeans, there is still a lot to do.

* * *

Building upon recent findings on this issue, the final part of this article outlines four more general characteristics for discourses and practices on *Homo Europaeus*.⁴¹ It is generated primarily from research focusing on the twentieth century. In a further step, it might be worth relating these to the experiences of other centuries and other contexts, but that is beyond the scope of this article.

Firstly, I argue that ideas and practices constructed around the “European man” have always remained plural, fragmented, and polyvalent. Even in the course of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, “Europeanness” has been only one of many attributions used to differentiate between groups of people. National, religious, confessional and many other criteria also existed, and sometimes they coalesced with “Europeanness,” but in many contexts these other attributions proved to be more relevant for thoughts and modes of action. In addition, a person who might have identified him- or herself as a European at one moment might have seen him- or herself as a Catalan or a Catholic, a conservative or a consumer in the next. Furthermore, certain characteristics and criteria used to define Europeans might be important in some fields and at some times, but much less so in others. For example, life scientists tend to use different categories than intellectuals

38 J. Butler, *Gender Troubles: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity*, New York 1999 (1990), 173; e.g., also see E. Fischer-Lichte and C. Wulf (eds.), *Praktiken des Performativen*, Berlin 2004.

39 W. Schmale, *Geschichte Europas* (see footnote 12), pp. 14-15: “Menschen Europa imaginieren und visualisieren”; “Ergebnis von Diskursen und performativen Akten” (own translations); also see W. Schmale, *The Making of Homo Europaeus*, in: *Comparare*, 1 (2001), pp. 165-184, and now for example also F. Bösch, A. Brill and F. Greiner (eds.), *Europa-Bilder im 20. Jahrhundert*, Göttingen 2012..

40 See J. Schot and T. J. Misa, *Inventing Europe: Technology and the Hidden Integration of Europe*, in: *History and Technology*, 21 (2005), pp. 1-19, here p. 8.

41 Basically drawn from L. Bluche, V. Lipphardt and K. K. Patel (eds.), *Der Europäer – ein Konstrukt. Wissensbestände, Diskurse, Praktiken*, Göttingen 2009.

in order to define Europeans. The 1920s, for example, saw a lively debate among biologists on whether Europeans were united by a specific type of blood that distinguished them markedly from other populations on the globe. Even if culturally grounded, these debates were deeply rooted in serology, bacteriology, and other fields of medicine and, more generally, natural science.⁴² Intellectuals such as the German social democrat Carlo Schmid (1896–1979) resorted to completely different categories. Instead of biological evidence, Schmid saw shared experiences and values as the central common denominator for the gradual emergence of the “European man”:

*Which traits characterize this European man? ... For the first time there emerged a creature gifted with a hitherto unknown degree of freedom: the freedom of choice – and to choose implies the possibility to say ‘no’! Since then man has the possibility to resist the imperative of fate, the yoke of causality.*⁴³

The juxtaposition of these very different notions of “Europeanness” also demonstrates that the criteria used pass through different cycles over time. Today, the idea of Europeans being defined by bondage of blood is obsolete. Schmid’s *bildungsbürgerliche* and Eurocentric invocation certainly has also gained some patina, but the rhetoric of defining Europeanness by freedom and indeterminism is far from forgotten. Therefore, it is highly interesting not just to look at the popularity of particular ideas or practices. Special attention should also be paid to the question of where different notions and practices of Europeanness meet, how they are negotiated and how they conflict or coalesce. At the same time, it is important to notice that every field of discussion generally has its own vision and practice of what it means to be a European.

Secondly, even when used, *Homo Europaeus* often appears to be an unclearly defined category of knowledge. Also, one finds many cases in which criteria of one specific group are used to characterize all Europeans. With regard to Europe – and not to Europeans – Peter Burke once characterized this vagueness as a “historical synecdoche” (A synecdoche is a figure of speech where a part of something is used to refer to the whole, similar to the Latin expression *pars pro toto*).⁴⁴ This idea can also be found in discourses and practices that have to do with Europeans – e.g., when ancient Greeks were seen as defending Europe against Persian invaders at the Bosphorus – whereas the question of the other boundaries of this “Europe” and the exact gestalt of its population were quite

42 For details, see M. Spörri, Das Blut in den Adern des Homo Europaeus. Zur sprachlichen und visuellen Konstruktion der Blutgruppe A als europäisch, in: L. Bluche, V. Lipphardt and K. K. Patel, Europäer (see footnote 41), pp. 73–96.

43 C. Schmid, Über den europäischen Menschen, in: D. de Rougemont, Europa, p. 361. “Welche Eigenschaften kennzeichnen den europäischen Menschen? ... So entstand zum ersten Mal ein Wesen, das mit einer bisher unerhörten Freiheit begabt ist: der Freiheit, wählen zu können – und wählen heißt: ‘nein’ sagen können! Seitdem hat der Mensch das Vermögen, sich gegen alles aufzurichten, was nichts ist als der Imperativ des Verhängnisses oder die Zwingherrschaft der Ursachenreihen.” (own translation); on the context of this statement and similar positions at the time see Wolfgang Schmale, Vom Homo Europaeus zum Homo Europeanus. Zur Debatte über “den europäischen Menschen” in den 1940er und 1950er Jahren, in: L. Bluche, V. Lipphardt and K. K. Patel, Europäer (see footnote 41), pp. 118–134.

44 P. Burke, Europe, p. 22.

unimportant. But it is not just discourses that relate to a distant past in which the trope of *pars pro toto* can be found. For example, national entities continue to play an important role, such that different nations might experience quite dissimilar discussions about the key characteristics and qualities of *Homo Europaeus*, each of them driven by their own national experiences and needs. Again, in such contexts specific claims – vis-à-vis a certain, quite clearly defined “other” – are often more important than the motivation to reach a holistic and precise definition of Europeanness.⁴⁵

Quite often, the person who speaks also happens to be part of this subgroup of “Europeans” – especially if Europeanness is seen as a positive category. An example of reflection on an extreme example of this kind is provided by Emil Janvier, a French resistance fighter during World War II:

*Since the luck of the battlefield turned against him, Herr Hitler has discovered that his vocation is to be a “European”. Of course it is perhaps a bit late to be a “European”, but it sounds well. ... What he wants is to save the whole of Europe – lock, stock and barrel – from the Judaeo-pluto-democratico-sovietico-Freemasons who have it in their grip. ... Certainly this is quite attractively put, and above all it is well orchestrated.*⁴⁶

“Europeanness” often also remains a historical synecdoche because it is closely linked to common sense. Common sense can be defined as a basis of knowledge and trust, of experience and expectation that a certain group shares and considers to be sound and convincing. It is obvious that common sense can mean different things at different times and in different cultures. Many modern societies seem to have developed a common-sense notion about Europeanness. As a common understanding, this often remains part of implicit knowledge – simply because most speakers think or believe that the audience will understand the message without going into too many details.

Thirdly, *Homo Europaeus* is always associated with specific notions of time and space. Often, different concepts of time mix, bringing together linear and cyclical understandings of time. Frequently, the European man is seen as a perennial category, who has existed since a (undefined) beginning. At the same time, he is often perceived as a future project, with a certain population on the way to the realization of an ever-more-perfect model. And yet, this process is often also seen as the return to an earlier stage. For example, the Polish dissident Romuald Szeremietiew wrote in 1987, “Poland is part of Europe, and Poles are Europeans,” explaining that “nobody had to wonder that we wanted to be where freedom, democracy and prosperity rule.”⁴⁷ The quotation is so interesting

45 For a discussion of these distinct national traits and their links see e.g., L. Bluche and K. K. Patel, *Der Europäer als Bauer. Das Motiv des bäuerlichen Familienbetriebs im Westeuropa nach 1945*, in: L. Bluche, V. Lipphardt and K. K. Patel, *Europäer* (see footnote 41), pp. 135-157; also see M. Rempe, *Crashkurs zum europäischen Entwicklungsexperten? Das Praktikantenprogramm der EWG-Kommission für afrikanische Beamte in den 1960er Jahren*, in: *Ibid.*, pp. 207-228.

46 E. Janvier, *Pan-Europe* (1943), reprinted in: W. Lipgens (ed.), *Documents on the History of European Integration*, vol. I. *Continental Plans for European Union*, New York 1985, pp. 320-321; on the context, see M. Mazower, *Hitler's Empire: Nazi Rule in Occupied Europe*, London 2008, pp. 553-575.

47 Rada Naczelna Polskiej Partii Niepodległościowej/Romuald Szeremietiew, *Powstań Polsko! Zarys myśli progra-*

because it alternates between characterizing a certain population with specific, intrinsic “European” qualities, while at the same time defining these very qualities as a future goal for this group of people.

These notions of time frequently coexist with the idea of certain spaces – seen as places of geographical origin and, particularly important during the modern period, as spaces of expansion for which Europeans have to be prepared accordingly. Colonial history might be a particularly suitable example: here, Europeans entered regions they perceived as markedly different from what they knew back home. Especially in the tropics, they were faced with many challenges. With the idea of racial superiority looming large and confronted with the fact that local populations had often found good ways of accommodating themselves to their environment, Europeans had to invent new techniques to legitimize their claim of predominance. It was very often in light of these situations that rival colonialisms found a common ground and language: they did not seek solutions for the British, the French or the Belgians, but rather for Europeans vis-à-vis indigenous populations – this again reinforced and reinvigorated the relevance of “Europeanness” as a useful category.⁴⁸

Fourthly and finally, *Homo Europaeus* is often used as a positive concept by the respective in-group, but it remains rather exclusivist. Three sub-dimensions can be differentiated. The first one has to do with the *other as part of us*. Becoming European is thus seen as a process of perfecting one’s own qualities or those of a peer group. People with the potential to become European are thus turning into Europeans; “underdeveloped” Europeans become “real” or even “super” Europeans – or might not, if they fail to act appropriately. The discourses and practices that have to do with Eastern Europe offer many examples of this – where there have been changing needs to be more or less European. One can find this in Early Modern times, but also in the context of EU enlargement discussions today. Generally, it has often remained doubtful whether a person or a group really belongs to the Europeans, and this very instability of the category adds to its dynamism, and perhaps also to its attractiveness.⁴⁹

As a second sub-dimension, there is the question of the *others here with us*. In a nutshell: is it possible for a person of a completely different ethnic, cultural, or geographical background to “become” European? At first glance, racist or ethnic considerations seem to be a thing of the past. Today, it is – at least technically – possible to become a citizen of the EU, regardless of one’s background. But, can one also become a European? The

mowej nowej prawicy polskiej, Warsaw 1987, 59, quoted in: C. Domnitz, Europäische Vorstellungswelten im Ostblock. Eine Topologie von Europeanarrationen im Staatssozialismus, in: J. M. Faraldo, P. Gulińska-Jurgiel and C. Domnitz (eds.), *Europe in the Eastern Bloc. Imaginations and Discourses (1945–1991)*, Köln 2008, pp. 68–69.

48 See e.g., S. Maß, *Weißer Mann – was nun?* Ethnische Selbstverortung zwischen kontinentaler Solidarität und nationaler Identifikation nach dem Ersten Weltkrieg, in: L. Bluche, V. Lipphardt and K. K. Patel, *Europäer* (see footnote 41), pp. 57–72; U. Lindner, Colonialism as a European project in Africa before 1914? British and German concepts of colonial rule in sub-Saharan Africa, in: *Comparativ*, 19 (2009) 1, pp. 88–106.

49 See, e.g., J. M. Faraldo, *Das Europa der Gentlemen. Eine polnische Konstruktion des Europäers in den 1950er Jahren*, in: L. Bluche, V. Lipphardt and K. K. Patel, *Europäer* (see footnote 41), pp. 187–206; E. von Rautenfeld, *Die Anrufung zum “lernenden Europäer” in der EU-Bildungspolitik*, in: *Ibid.*, pp. 255–272.

phrase “new Europeans” continues to sound like an oxymoron and, at least in English, it is today often used with regard to people from the EU’s new member states.⁵⁰ Therefore, there is little evidence that “becoming European” in the most radical sense was or is a true option.⁵¹

As a third sub-dimension, we can discuss the relationship between *oneself and the other elsewhere*. As explained above, Marco Polo, Christopher Columbus, and others who had first encounters with “non-European” others did not always differentiate between Europeans and non-Europeans. Today, Eurocentric ideas of superiority may have been divested of their narrow, imperialist tropes. The language of globalization now dominates, situating the European in global markets as a hopefully successful competitor – without clear and explicit delimitations of others. Still, Europeaness does not seem to be a very open category.⁵²

To conclude, *Homo Europaeus* might best be understood as the product of moments of crisis, in which other identifications for individuals or groups fail. No matter if Europeaness is defined by blood, skin color, culture or other criteria, *Homo Europaeus* is forged as a subject – and not a mere object – of history, *i.e.*, a creature that is able to project itself and its power into the world, that is recognized and distinguished from others, and that “exists.” Certainly, this fundamental claim has also characterized many other projects and practices of identification. Yet, apart from national affiliation, “Europeaness” exerted the biggest influence in the more recent past, at least during the twentieth century.

50 See e.g., What Do “New Europeans” Think about Turkey, in: Euroactiv, 30 September 2005; New Europeans “prop up rural UK”, in: BBC News, 9 November 2004; The Birth of New “Europeans”, in: The American, 27 April 2007.

51 E. Kudraß, Kultur-Körper. Der ausgestellte Europäer, in: L. Bluche, V. Lipphardt and K. K. Patel, *Europäer* (see footnote 41), pp. 229–254.

52 See, e.g., K. Poehls, Performing Europeaness. Kategorien und Praxen sozialer Differenzierung am Europakolleg, in: *Ibid.*, pp. 273–298.

Europe in the Tropics? The Transfer of the Portuguese Royal Court to Brazil (1807/08) and the Adaptation of European Ideals in the New Imperial Capital

Debora Gerstenberger

RESÜMEE

Als napoleonische Truppen 1807 in Lissabon einmarschierten, segelte der portugiesische Monarch João (VI) samt 15.000 Personen im Gefolge gen Brasilien. Rio de Janeiro wurde zum Zentrum des portugiesischen Reiches, es kam zu einer „Umkehrung“ des Verhältnisses von Mutterland und Kolonie. Dieser Aufsatz beleuchtet zunächst die geopolitischen und kulturellen Voraussetzungen dafür, dass die portugiesische politische Elite mit relativer Leichtigkeit ihren Sitz in Europa zugunsten einer neuen Hauptstadt in den Tropen verlassen konnte. Danach werden auf der Basis von Polizeidokumenten jene Herrschaftspraktiken analysiert, die aus der Kolonialstadt eine imperiale Hauptstadt machen sollten. Hierbei fungierten europäische Verhältnisse als Vorbild. Deutlich wird aber auch, dass die in Europa geltenden Standards – je nach politischer Lage und ökonomischen Interessen – stark an die Begebenheiten in Brasilien angepasst werden konnten.

When Napoleon charged across Europe, he put in motion vast changes in the political, social and economic order. During the Napoleonic wars (1792–1815), a period that is often described as a “time of global crisis,” states and empires were radically altered and new borders were drawn.¹ However, not all European countries completely changed geographical shape and political order. Of all the states, Portugal managed not only to save

1 Christopher Bayly refers to the time between 1780 and 1820 as the time of the “first global crisis”, Ch. Bayly, *The Birth of the modern World, 1780–1914. Global Connections and Comparisons*, Oxford 2004, p. 91 and passim. This article is based on archival research conducted for my PhD dissertation on the transfer of the Portuguese Royal Court to Brazil, which was published in German in 2013: D. Gerstenberger, *Gouvernementalität im Zeichen der globalen Krise. Der Transfer des portugiesischen Königshofes nach Brasilien*, Köln/Weimar/Wien: Böhlau 2013. I would like to thank Karim Elawar for his assistance with the proofreading of an early version of this article.

its throne from Napoleonic usurpation (unlike its larger neighbor, Spain) but also kept together its multi-continental empire. How did the Portuguese resist these revolutionary changes? The answer lies – at least in part – in the willingness to create a “possible Europe” beyond the actual borders of Europe.

On the face of it, the situation seemed hopeless. Traditionally allied with Great Britain, Portugal ran into mischief as Napoleon Bonaparte intended to implement the “Continental Blockade” (November 21st, 1806) as his supreme weapon against his greatest enemy.² The Portuguese government could neither choose between British and French demands, nor could they resist them. As the summer and fall of 1807 wore on, “Portugal [got] caught like a shellfish in a tempest between the waves of England’s sea power and the rock of Napoleon’s armies,” as Alan K. Manchester put it.³ When French troops under the command of General Andoche Junot marched against Lisbon in order to take over the Portuguese Crown in November 1807, the Portuguese Prince Regent, D. João, undertook the remarkable venture of transferring the entire Royal Court from Lisbon to Rio de Janeiro. He took with him all of the state paraphernalia, the archives and the treasure, as well as the ministers of government and a large part of the ruling classes. All in all, some 15,000 people accompanied the monarch. In short, he transferred all that was needed for the creation of a new capital in the New World.⁴ For the first and only time, a European colonial power moved its seat of government and thus its capital to a distant, peripheral territory. This solution to the “Napoleonic Problem” was, without any doubt, an extremely innovative one. It is commonly argued that the transfer of the seat of government equaled an inversion of the colonial relation: after 1808, Brazil turned into the center of the empire and Portugal was now its colony⁵ or, as some contemporaries lamented, a “colony of the colony.”⁶

What is surprising at first glance is the willingness of the Portuguese Crown and the elites to leave Europe behind. In the face of the Napoleonic threat, their European roots and cultural ties seemed to not have held them back. Where does this remarkable disposition come from? In the first section of this paper, I shall explain the preconditions that made the transfer of the Portuguese court possible. More precisely, I propose to deal with the question of how the events of November 1807 were linked to a particular vision of the

2 A. K. Manchester, *The Transfer of the Court to Brazil*, in: H. H. Keith and S. F. Edwards (eds.), *Conflict and Continuity in Brazilian Society*, Columbia 1969, pp. 148-190.

3 A. K. Manchester, *British Preëminence in Brazil: Its Rise and Decline*, Chapel Hill 1933, p. 54.

4 For further details on the transfer see: F. de Paulo Leite Pinto, *A saída da família real portuguesa para o Brasil a 29 de Novembro de 1807*, Lisbon 1992; V. Alexandre, *Os sentidos do Império. Questão Nacional e Questão Colonial na Crise do Antigo Regime Português*, Porto 1993, pp. 167-180.

5 For early accounts of the “inversion”-theory see: S. Romero, *História da Literatura Brasileira*, Rio de Janeiro 1943 vol. III, passim; R. Garcia, *Ensaio da história poética e administrativa do Brasil*, Rio de Janeiro 1956, p. 282. For an historiographical overview on this theory see: J. M. Paschoal Guimarães, *A Historiografia e a Transferência da Corte portuguesa para o Brasil*, in: *Revista do Instituto Histórico Geográfico Brasileiro*, 168 (2007) 436, pp. 15-28, p. 20; A. Wehling, *Estado, Governo e administração no Brasil joanino*, in: *Revista do Instituto Histórico Geográfico Brasileiro*, 168 (2007) 436, pp. 75-92, p. 79-80.

6 Wilcken, *A Colony of a Colony. The Portuguese Royal Court in Brazil*, in: *Common Knowledge*, 11 (2005) 2, pp. 249-263.

European part of the empire as its “weak spot.” Leaving Europe behind, however, did not mean abandoning European ideals and norms. In fact, conceptions and ideals of European civilization and society played a crucial role in the construction of the new Portuguese capital in Brazil as soon as the monarch’s fleet arrived. Therefore, the second part of this paper will focus on the concrete measures undertaken by the authorities in order to construct an “adequate” center of the empire in the (former) colony. Some historians argue that following the court’s arrival, Rio de Janeiro was subject to a “Europeanization” or even “Re-Europeanization”⁷ and that the project of establishing the Portuguese capital in the tropics also entailed the construction of an (alternative) “possible Europe.”⁸ But what did “Europeanization” actually mean and how would it be achieved? The measures undertaken by the authorities were, as shall be argued in the second part, by no means always coherent or without contradictions but rather were characterized by conflicting tendencies. In any case, they were also characterized by the partial adaptation – but also rejection – of what was conceived as European.

1. The European mother country as the weak spot of the Portuguese Empire

The transfer of the Court in 1807/1808 cannot be analyzed without considering the structure of the Portuguese seaborne empire and especially the geopolitical outlook that developed out of the voyages of discovery since the fifteenth century. The Portuguese empire was the earliest and the longest-lived of the modern European colonial empires, spanning almost six centuries from the capture of Ceuta in 1415 to the handover of Macau in 1999. Despite ruling over territories in all parts of the world, the mother country itself has always been vulnerable: The small territory of Portugal at the edge of Europe has at all times been threatened by the more powerful neighbor Castile (later Spain) and was therefore considered weak and rather insufficient by the Portuguese themselves.

In fact, the idea of moving the Portuguese capital to the New World of America in order to achieve a better geopolitical foothold arose beginning in the late sixteenth century when Portugal was annexed by Castile (the Iberian “Union” lasted sixty years from 1580 to 1640). Since then, clerics and politicians repeatedly recommended the establishment of the capital of the Portuguese Empire in the New World.⁹ In the seventeenth century, Jesuit António Vieira (1608–1697) promoted the image of Brazil as the biblical “Fifth Empire” (Dan 2; 7) and the “Promised Land.”¹⁰ In his opinion, the transfer of the Court

7 F. C. Falcón and I. R. de Mattos, *O Processo de Independência no Rio de Janeiro*, in: C. G. Mota (ed.), 1822: *Dimensões*, São Paulo 1972, pp. 292–339, p. 293.

8 A. C. Marques dos Santos, *A Fundação de uma Europa Possível*, in: V. L. Bottrel Tostes and J. Neves Bittencourt (eds.), *D. João VI: Um Rei Aclamado na América*, Rio de Janeiro 2000, pp. 9–17.

9 J. H. Saraiva, *História concisa de Portugal*, Mem Martins 1993, p. 267; A. R. C. da Silva, *Inventando a Nação. Intelectuais Ilustrados e Estadistas Luso-brasileiros na Crise do Antigo Regime Português: 1750–1822*, São Paulo 2006, p. 191; M. L. Oliveira, *Aquele imenso Portugal: a transferência da Corte para o Brasil (séculos XVII–XVIII)*, in: L. V. de Oliveira and R. Ricupero (eds.), *A Abertura dos Portos*, São Paulo 2007, pp. 284–305; D. Magnoli, *O corpo da pátria: imaginação geográfica e política externa no Brasil (1808–1912)*, São Paulo 1997, p. 81.

10 M. de Lourdes Viana Lyra, *A utopia do poderoso império: Portugal e Brasil: Bastidores da política 1798–1822*, Rio

would be capable of renewing and strengthening the whole empire. In the eighteenth century, with the findings of gold and diamonds, the colony of Brazil definitely turned into the most important part of the Portuguese empire: the “crown jewel.” The diplomat Luís da Cunha (1696–1749) advised King João V (father of João VI) that it was time to take “people of both sexes” to the “well-populated continent of Brazil” where he would achieve the title of “Emperor of the West.” In da Cunhas’ opinion, the most suitable place for the king’s residence was the city of Rio de Janeiro, which would soon become more opulent than Lisbon. According to him, Portugal was the “weak spot” of the Portuguese empire: the mother country could not survive without Brazil, whereas Brazil could survive perfectly well without Portugal.¹¹ After the great earthquake of 1755, which destroyed Lisbon and killed up to 100,000 people, the “almighty” minister Marquês de Pombal (1750–1782) also gave serious thought to a new capital in America.¹² The Portuguese historian A. H. Oliveira Marques summarized the importance of the American colony to the European mother country by explaining that from the late seventeenth century until 1822 (the year of Brazilian independence), Brazil was not only the centerpiece of the Portuguese colonial empire, but in fact the “essence of Portugal itself.”¹³ On the economic level, it can be argued that Portugal indeed was a “monocolonial empire.”¹⁴ Much of the state income depended on its possessions in America.¹⁵ In the face of the “international convulsions” in the early nineteenth century¹⁶, the idea of moving the Portuguese capital to the New World of America was not only based on economic principles, but also, in large part, driven by geopolitical considerations.¹⁷ The Portuguese diplomat in Berlin, Silvestre Pinheiro Ferreira, advised Prince Regent João in 1803 that it would be wise to seek “asylum” in his colonies because in Europe the “hydra”

de Janeiro 1994, p. 121. See also V. F. Muraro, *O Brasil de António Vieira. Cenário do Quinto Império*, in: *Brotéria. Cristianismo e cultura*, 156 (2003) 4, pp. 351–365; D. Alden, *Some Reflections on Antonio Vieira: Seventeenth-Century Troubleshooter and Troublemaker*, in: *Luso-Brazilian Review* 40 (2003), pp. 7–16; M. V. Jordán, *The Empire of the Future and the Chosen People: Father António Vieira and the Prophetic Tradition in the Hispanic World*, in: *Luso-Brazilian Review*, 40 (2003), pp. 45–57.

- 11 L. da Cunha, *Instruções Ineditas de D. Luís da Cunha e Marco António de Azevedo Coutinho*, Coimbra 1929, pp. 211–212. See also Silva, *Inventando a Nação*, p. 87.
- 12 D. Magnoli, *O Corpo da Pátria* (see footnote 9), p. 81; A. K. Manchester, *The Transfer of the Court* (see footnote 2), p. 174.
- 13 A. H. de Oliveira Marques, *Geschichte Portugals und des portugiesischen Weltreichs*, Stuttgart 2001, p. 335.
- 14 M. M. Lucas, *Organização do Império*, in: L. R. Torgal and J. L. Roque (eds.), *História de Portugal vol. 5: O Liberalismo (1807–1890)*, Lisbon [1993], pp. 285–311, p. 285.
- 15 There are some excellent works on Luso-Brazilian history which outline the importance of Brazil in the Portuguese colonial system especially in the 18th century and/or discuss the critical effects of the breakdown of it at the beginning of the 19th century, J. J. de Andrade Arruda, *O Brasil no comércio colonial*, São Paulo 1980; F. Novais, *Portugal e Brasil na crise do antigo sistema colonial (1777–1808)*. São Paulo 1979; J. M. Pedreira, *From Growth to Collapse: Portugal, Brazil, and the Breakdown of the Old Colonial System (1760–1830)*, in: *Hispanic American Historical Review*, 80 (2000) 4, pp. 839–864.
- 16 For a detailed account on the “vulnerable position” of Portugal at the end of the 18th and the beginning of the 19th century see V. Alexandre, *Os sentidos do império* (see footnote 4), chapter 1: “Um sistema vulnerável: o império face às convulsões internacionais”, pp. 93–165.
- 17 According to João Fragoso and Manolo Florentino, the idea of Brazil as centre of the empire has always been rooted in geopolitical rather than economic thoughts, J. Fragoso and M. Florentino, *O arcaísmo como projeto. Mercado Atlântico, Sociedade Agrária e Elite Mercantil no Rio de Janeiro (1790–1840)*, Rio de Janeiro 1993, p. 63.

of Napoleon was about to destroy the old European dynasties.¹⁸ In the same year, Rodrigo de Souza Coutinho, one of João's most influential ministers, stated that considering the precarious situation in Europe, the "only chance" the sovereign and his people had would be to transfer the seat of government to the vast and rich Brazil. From there, one could establish a "powerful empire" (*poderoso Imperio*) from which territories lost in Europe could easily be recaptured.¹⁹ The basic argument used by him and other politicians was that the transfer of the court would be capable of renewing and strengthening the empire as a whole and thus – at least in theory – also contribute to a better situation for the Portuguese in Europe.²⁰

To be sure, the transfer of the Portuguese Royal Court was a "dramatic and extraordinary" answer to the global crisis.²¹ As the Napoleonic invasion provided the impetus to put into action the old plan of transferring the seat of government to Brazil, the transfer is a perfect example, firstly, of global crises setting free energy for innovative spatial concepts,²² and secondly of innovative spatial concepts emerging smoothly from tradition. The venture would not have been possible if members of the Portuguese political elites had not repeatedly stated that leaving the cradle of the monarchy behind and transferring the seat of government to the rich New World would be an appropriate measure to create a "vast and powerful" empire.²³ This "utopia" was deeply rooted in the imagination of the politicians, whether they were members of the British or the French "parties" (*partido francês/partido inglês*), that is, whether they principally favored alliance either with the continental or the maritime power. In the debates preceding the departure, all ministers of state, despite their numerous differences of opinion, agreed on the policy that the "best" part of the Portuguese possessions should by no means be put at risk. They were all driven by a perspective that Ana Rosa Clacet da Silva has called the "global vision of empire."²⁴ While sticking to the imperative of holding together the Portuguese possessions at all costs, none of them thought of the European part as the basis and center of political sovereignty – over the centuries this role had clearly been assigned to Brazil.²⁵ If it should be a principle of imperial elites to stick to the core in times of crisis

18 M. B. N. da Silva, *D. João VI. Príncipe e rei no Brasil*, Lisbon 2008, p. 9.

19 R. de Souza Coutinho, *Quadro da Situação Política da Europa*, Lissabon am 16. August 1803, in: P. Ângelo (ed.), *D. João VI, Príncipe e Rei vol. 1: A Retirada da Família Real para o Brasil* (1807), Lisbon 1953, pp. 127-136, p. 131.

20 M. O. da Silva Dias, *A interiorização da metrópole*, in: C. G. Mota (ed.), *Dimensões 1822*, São Paulo 1972, pp. 160-184, p. 167.

21 K. Schultz, *Royal Authority, Empire and the Critique of Colonialism: Political Discourse in Rio de Janeiro* (1808–1821), p. 7.

22 "Critical junctures of globalisation" (like the one Portugal faced when the Napoleonic army approached) do not only indicate specific problems, but also produce specific resources for social and cultural action and can ultimately lead to new spatial concepts, U. Engel and M. Middell, *Bruchzonen der Globalisierung, globale Krisen und Territorialitätsregimes – Kategorien einer Globalgeschichtsschreibung*, in: *Comparativ*, 5 (2005) 6, pp. 5-38.

23 M. Viana Lyra, *A utopia do poderoso império: Portugal e Brasil: Bastidores da política 1798–1822*, Rio de Janeiro 1994; K. Maxwell, *The Generation of the 1790s and the Idea of a Luso-Brazilian Empire*, in: D. Alden (ed.), *Colonial Roots of Modern Brazil*, Berkeley 1973, pp. 107-146.

24 A. R. C. da Silva, *Inventando a Nação* (see footnote 9), p. 181f.

25 Edward Said established the thesis that imperialism is in large parts driven by geopolitical imagination: E. Said, *Orientalism*, New York 1979. Since then, many historians and political scientists have referred to the power of

and to abandon the peripheries if necessary,²⁶ this certainly holds true for the Portuguese empire, as well – except for the peculiarity that the (imagined) center was not the mother country, Portugal, but the colony, Brazil. The relocation and renegotiation of oppositions and boundaries that characterized the European colonial project in general allowed Europeans, in this specific case, to forego Europe itself.²⁷

When João and his courtiers reached their final destination in March 1808, the Portuguese hopes and dreams came, at least partly, true: Brazil turned into a safe haven for the beleaguered Portuguese monarchy,²⁸ and within a few years the city of Rio de Janeiro was turned into a “Tropical Versailles.”²⁹ For the emigrated Prince Regent and the ruling elites, the new spatial order with the capital in the tropics worked out so well that, after the Congress of Vienna in 1815, when general peace was achieved and Napoleon banished, they refused to return to Lisbon (contrary to the promise the monarch had made when he left) and preferred to stay in Rio instead. This provoked heated debates on both sides of the Atlantic; the location of the sovereign was what the statesman Silvestre Pinheiro Ferreira called the decade’s great “question of state.”³⁰ The two main reasons for the decision to stay were the fear of the emergence of an independence movement in Brazil should the Royal Court be removed (some Spanish colonies had meanwhile declared independence), and the danger of general political turmoil in Europe (“terrifying” notices about expanding liberal movements were numerous).³¹ All in all, Europe at that time was seen as (and surely was) a dangerous place for an absolute (non-constitutional) monarch whereas Brazil served as a “fortress of absolutism,” as Maria Odila Silva Dias has put it.³² Moreover, the ministers of state were convinced of the wisdom of the policy of taking advantage of the riches “in which this fortunate and opulent country [Brazil] abounds.”³³ In December 1815, João ended the colonial status of Brazil by proclaiming the “United

discourses in the construction of empires and states. See, for instance: G. Ó Tuathail and J. Agnew, *Geopolitics and Discourse: Practical Geopolitical Reasoning in American Foreign Policy*, in: *Political Geography*, 11 (1992) 2, pp. 190-204; S. Dalby, *Imperialism, Domination, Culture: The continued relevance of Critical Geopolitics*, in: *Geopolitics*, 3 (2008) 3, pp. 413-436.

26 J. Osterhammel, *Die Verwandlung der Welt. Eine Geschichte des 19. Jahrhunderts*, Munich 2009, p. 608.

27 G. Prakash, Introduction, in Idem (ed.), *After Colonialism, Imperial Histories and Postcolonial Displacements*, Princeton 1995, pp. 3-4 as cited in K. Schultz, *Tropical Versailles: Empire, Monarchy, and the Portuguese Royal Court in Rio de Janeiro, 1808–1821*, New York 2001, p. 80. For the relativity of centres and peripheries, see also A. J. R. Russell-Wood, *Centers and peripheries in the Luso-Brazilian World, 1500–1808*, in: Ch. Daniels (ed.), *Negotiated empires. Centers and peripheries in the Americas, 1500–1820*, New York et al 2002, pp. 105-142.

28 K. Schultz, *Tropical Versailles* (see footnote 27), p. 29.

29 The term “Tropical Versailles” was first used by Manuel de Oliveira Lima in 1908 and again by the above cited US-American historian Kirsten Schultz, see M. de Oliveira Lima, *D. João VI. no Brasil, Rio de Janeiro 2006* [first published 1908].

30 K. Schultz, *Tropical Versailles* (see footnote 27), p. 196-197.

31 For a detailed overview on the discussions, if the monarch should stay or leave, see Silva, *Inventando a Nação*, pp. 247-287; V. Alexandre, *Os Sentidos do Império* (see footnote 4), especially the chapter “Uma alternativa para o Império (1815–1820)”, pp. 329-372.

32 M. O. Silva Dias, *The Establishment of the Royal Court in Brazil*, in: A. J. R. Russell-Wood (ed.), *From Colony to Nation. Essays on the Independence of Brazil*, Baltimore and London 1975, pp. 89-108, p. 96.

33 Decree of November 24, 1913, as cited in: J. M. Pereira da Silva, *História da fundação do império brasileiro* (7 volumes) vol. 3, Paris 1864–1868, pp. 348-359.

Kingdom of Portugal, Brazil and the Algarve.” Technically, Brazil was now a coequal part of a European state – or, perhaps, Portugal was part of an American state. Prince Regent D. João (VI) continued to rule from Brazil as a legitimate monarch until he was forced to return to Portugal in 1821. His son Pedro (I), who stayed in Rio de Janeiro, declared independence in September 1822, and it was only then that the empire broke apart.

2. European ideals and the construction of a new capital in the tropics

As Brazilian historian Afonso Carlos Marques dos Santos has pointed out, the transfer of the court was not only a geopolitical project. Once put into motion, it also involved a “civilizing mission.” According to him, Rio de Janeiro, the new seat of government and center of power *par excellence*, was transformed into a “huge laboratory of civilization.”³⁴ The metamorphosis from a colonial capital³⁵ into the capital of the empire first of all required a new state apparatus that was modeled off of the former European capital: The Crown immediately established duplicates of the government institutions still existing in Lisbon.³⁶ Due to steady immigration, the population of Rio de Janeiro almost doubled from about 60,000 inhabitants in 1808 to about 113,000 inhabitants in 1821,³⁷ to mention just one of the greater structural alterations during the process of the “metropolitanization of the colony.”³⁸ In the following part, it is my intention to demonstrate how European ideals and principles came into play in this laboratory. I shall examine some of the measures concerning aesthetics and social engineering in a close reading of police documents of the time. As part of the analysis, I want to address the following questions: What and who was perceived as European? How were European ideals adapted and implemented and when and why did certain ideals and notions change?

Following the court’s arrival and during the following years (from 1808 to 1821), the city of Rio de Janeiro became subject to various changes in regard to social and cultural organization: in order to project an image of royal power and notions of order, enlightenment and progress, European standards had to be implemented. As many scholars have pointed out, one of the most important institutions for the establishment of modern statehood in the eighteenth century was the police.³⁹ The same seems to hold true for empires. In fact, one of the first things the Portuguese Monarch did when he arrived in

34 A. C. Marques dos Santos, *A Fundação de uma Europa Possível* (see footnote 8), p. 10.

35 From 1763 on, Rio de Janeiro had been the capital of the Viceroyalty of Brazil and thus seat of the Viceroy.

36 See R. Barman, *Brazil. The Forging of a Nation, 1798–1852*, Stanford 1988, p. 46f; A. C. Delgado Martins, *Governança e Arquivos: D. João VI no Brasil*, Lisbon 2007, p. 120f; A. K. Manchester, *The Growth of Bureaucracy in Brazil, 1808–1821*, in: *Journal of Latin American Studies*, 4 (1972) 1, pp. 77–83, p. 79; A. Wehling, *Estado, Governo e administração no Brasil joanino*, in: *Revista do Instituto Histórico Geográfico Brasileiro*, 168 (2007) 436, pp. 75–92.

37 M. de Almeida Abreu, *A evolução urbana do Rio de Janeiro*, Rio de Janeiro 1987, p. 39; M. B. Nizza da Silva, *A Gazeta do Rio de Janeiro (1808–1822): Cultura e Sociedade*, Rio de Janeiro 2007, p. 31.

38 M. O. Silva Dias, *The Establishment of the Royal Court in Brazil* (see footnote 32), p. 97.

39 See, among many others, M. Foucault, *Sicherheit, Territorium, Bevölkerung. Geschichte der Gouvernementalität*, Frankfurt am Main 2006, pp. 449–519; W. Reinhard, Wolfgang, *Geschichte der Staatsgewalt. Eine vergleichende Verfassungsgeschichte Europas von den Anfängen bis zur Gegenwart*, München 1999, especially pp. 363–366.

Rio de Janeiro in 1808 was to establish a Police Intendancy modeled off of the Lisbon Police, which in turn had been modeled off of the French policing system.⁴⁰ The police chief (*intendente geral da polícia*), Paulo Fernandes Vianna (1808–1821), subsequently became known as the “chief civilizer” of the urban area as it was he who initiated all “civilizing measures” concerning infrastructure, social engineering, and urban development.⁴¹ Consistent with colonial administrative practice, his office combined legislative, executive, and judicial powers. Being one of the closest counselors of Prince Regent João and, thus, in a sense representing the authority of the absolute monarch, the police chief became one of the most important builders and custodians of the new order in the city. Under Vianna’s rule, Rio was reconstructed and made more “glamorous” so it could fulfill its role as the new seat of the Royal Court and compete with the capitals of other European states and empires.⁴²

One of the police chief’s first concerns was the aesthetics of the new capital. In 1809, he determined that the wooden lattices (or window shutters), a relic of Arab architecture that formerly prevailed in Portugal, had to disappear from the residential buildings of the center of the city. The “ugly lattices” were seen as gothic, deformed and unhealthy. According to the police chief, they were nothing but evidence of the “lacking civilization of the inhabitants.” The respective police decree read that, “having elevated this city to the highest hierarchy of court of Brazil,” it was no longer possible to maintain “old customs that could be tolerated only when Brazil was reputed to be a colony.” The explicit aim of the removal of supposedly colonial attributes was to make Rio de Janeiro “more beautiful in the eyes of strangers.”⁴³ Quite a few inhabitants complained about this measure because the window shutters had not been for nothing, but rather had served to protect the houses’ interior from the tropical sun. However, the complaints of those who could not afford other protective installations (such as “civilized” glass windows) were useless: in this specific case, the aesthetics of the new capital seemed to have been more important than the well-being of some residents. As the window shutters were symbols of Arab colonialism, it is quite evident (even if not explicitly stated) that the signs of “non-civilization” were equated with “non-European.”

40 The Intendência Geral da Polícia was established on April 5, 1808, the Police Chief (Intendente Geral da Polícia) was nominated on May 10, 1808, R. Macedo, Paulo Fernandes Viana. *Administração do Primeiro Intendente-Geral da Polícia*, Rio de Janeiro 1956, p. 22.

41 For general information about the Intendência Geral da Polícia see M. B. Nizza da Silva, *A Intendência-Geral da Polícia: 1808–1821*, in: *Acervo*, 1 (1986) 2, pp. 187–204, p. 187; J. C. Pinheiro, Paulo Fernandes Vianna e a Polícia de seu Tempo. *Memória apresentada ao Instituto Histórico Geográfico Brasileiro*, in: *Revista do Instituto Histórico e Geográfico Brasileiro*, 39 (1876) 2, pp. 65–77; L. Gonçalves dos Santos, *Memórias para servir a História do Reino do Brasil vol. 1*, Rio de Janeiro 1943, p. 251; Th. H. Holloway, *Policing Rio de Janeiro. Repression and resistance in a 19th-century city*, Stanford 1993, p. 32; F. A. Cotta, *Polícia para quem precisa*, in: *Revista de História da Biblioteca Nacional*, 14 (2006), pp. 64–68.

42 K. Schultz, *Tropical Versailles* (see footnote 27), especially chapter four “The New City of Rio de Janeiro: Reconstructing the Portuguese Royal Court”, pp. 101–149.

43 “Edital” by Paulo Fernandes Vianna, Rio de Janeiro, June 11, 1809, *Arquivo Nacional do Rio de Janeiro* (hereafter: ANRJ) *Polícia da Corte Cód. 323 vol. 1*, pp. 88–89. See also M. B. N. da Silva, *Intendência-Geral da Polícia* (see footnote 41), p. 200; J. C. Pinheiro, Paulo Fernandes e a Polícia de seu Tempo (see footnote 41), p. 73–76.

Some other (attempted) adaptations of European standards were inspired by both aesthetic and pragmatic considerations. As the police chief stated in 1811, the streets of Rio had to be broader and better paved because “in all countries”, this was a sign of “good police.” Broader streets would be advantageous for commerce, as well. From Vianna’s point of view, the streets in their current condition were only fit for the “passage of animals,” not for proper coach traffic. The police chief was well aware, however, that the proposed measures of enlarging the streets would “not yet” please all inhabitants of the city.⁴⁴ Some of them would suffer loss of property, and as some other documents reveal, the residents were frequently ordered to help with the construction by providing their own (or their slave’s) manpower.⁴⁵ The expression “not yet” is highly revealing. It underlines Vienna’s assumption that European norms were both superior and would eventually come to be accepted in Rio de Janeiro (and Brazil).⁴⁶ The improvement of the city’s illumination (*iluminação da Cidade*) also was “very important for its vigilance and safety.” By comparing Rio de Janeiro with Lisbon, Vianna lamented the scarcity of skilled workers and iron foundries for the production of street lamps, a situation that in his opinion would not change in the foreseeable future.⁴⁷ The issue of the street lamps serves as an example of the perception, or more precisely the *construction* of deficiency: the absence of iron street lamps was repeatedly indicated as a problem, yet no attempt was made to search for alternatives. The illumination of the city remained poor in the eyes of Vianna until at least 1819.⁴⁸

Besides improving the infrastructure, safety and security and guaranteeing the aesthetics, one of the most important concerns of the government was to increase immigration to Brazil. In order to extract the riches of the “vast continent” of Brazil and to increase the utility of the soil, there had to be *more people*. Therefore, the monarch issued a decree that allowed “all foreigners regardless of their religion” to settle down in Brazil on equal terms as Portuguese vassals.⁴⁹ In reality, the immigration policy was not as liberal. Rather, Paulo Fernandes Vianna pursued the goal of “whitening and ennobling” the population of Brazil. Therefore, he tried to attract people from Portugal and the Azores, offering favorable conditions in Brazil by providing new settlers with land, tools, financial support (subsidies for the first two years were granted by the government) and the payment for the passage from Europe to America.⁵⁰ He especially sought the transfer of experts and skilled

44 Police intendant Paulo Fernandes Vianna to the minister of interior, Conde de Aguiar, Rio de Janeiro, September 4, 1811, ANRJ Polícia da Corte Cód. 323 vol. 3, p. 69v.

45 Police intendant Paulo Fernandes Vianna to Lieutenant João da Silva e Almeida, Rio de Janeiro, May 1, 1808, ANRJ Polícia da Corte Códice 318, pp. 9-9v.

46 As Dipesh Chakrabarty has prominently argued, historicism and the notion of the “not yet” was particularly prevalent in the 19th century, D. Chakrabarty, *Provincialising Europe*, Princeton 2000, p. 8.

47 Police intendant Paulo Fernandes Vianna to the minister of foreign affairs and war, Conde de Linhares, Rio de Janeiro July 16, 1811, ANRJ Polícia da Corte Códice 323 vol. 3, p. 59.

48 Police intendant Paulo Fernandes Vianna to the minister of interior, Tomás António Villanova Portugal, Rio de Janeiro, November 3, 1819, Polícia da Corte Cód. 323 vol. 5, p. 147. See also “Livro de registro de receitas e despesas da iluminação da cidade do Rio de Janeiro, compreendidos entre os anos de 1808 e 1813”, Rio de Janeiro [1808–1813], ANRJ Polícia da Corte Códice 391, pp. 3-28.

49 A. K. Manchester, *British Preëminence* (see footnote 3), p. 75.

50 Police intendant Paulo Fernandes Vianna to the minister of overseas, Conde de Gálveas, Rio de Janeiro, February

laborers from Europe to improve agriculture and advance the manufacturing industry.⁵¹ What at that time was called “good police” (*boa polícia*), was directly linked to the new status of Brazil: *because* the Monarch now resided in Brazil, the police chief wrote in 1810, the country urgently needed “better police” and “more perfect” agriculture. By attracting “unfortunate” peasants from Europe and offering them “more favorable” livelihoods in the New World, the police chief sought to make a “useful” deal and serve the monarch in “all parts” of the Empire.⁵² As becomes evident in quite a few sources, it was Vianna’s explicit plan to “improve” the agriculture and to “increase the white population” of the provinces of Rio de Janeiro, Minas Gerais, and São Paulo.⁵³ The “great utility” (*maior utilidade*) particularly ascribed to the Azorean immigrants is frequently mentioned in the police documents.⁵⁴ Remarkably, during these years there is no evidence of any attempt by the authorities to make use of the expertise of Brazilian natives. In other cases, they did consult indigenous people and used their knowledge about the environment and the jungle, for instance when it came to hunting runaway slaves.⁵⁵ Concerning farming matters, however, Portuguese authorities acted as if the soil in Europe was similar to the soil in the tropics and as if only European experts were able to improve Brazilian agriculture. In other words, the immigration policy was obviously driven by the belief of the superiority of European agriculture.

In culture and especially higher education, Europe also continued to serve as the example. Despite the fact that the monarch now resided in Brazil, there was no effort to establish a university. In contrast to the Spanish possessions, and due to the educational policy of the Portuguese Crown that sought to centralize the production of knowledge, no university existed in Brazil during the entire colonial period.⁵⁶ Coimbra in Portugal remained the “intellectual center” of the Portuguese world, while the former colony re-

25, 1811, ANRJ Polícia da Corte Cód. 323 vol. 3, pp. 22v-23; Idem to the minister of interior, Villanova Portugal, Rio de Janeiro, April 26, 1820, ANRJ Polícia da Corte Cód. 323 vol. 5, p. 182v.

51 Police intendant Paulo Fernandes Vianna to the minister of the interior, Fernando José de Portugal, Rio de Janeiro, October 8, 1808, ANRJ Diversos GIF 6J – 78, Polícia da Corte 1808, without pagination.

52 Police intendant Paulo Fernandes Vianna to the adjutant of the Intendência Geral da Polícia, Jerônimo Francisco Lobo, Rio de Janeiro, December 29, 1810, ANRJ Polícia da Corte, Códice 323 vol. 2, pp. 52-53. See also K. Schultz, *Tropical Versailles* (see footnote 27), p. 84.

53 Police intendant Paulo Fernandes Vianna to the minister of overseas, Conde de Gálveas, Rio de Janeiro, February 25, 1811, ANRJ Polícia da Corte Códice 323 vol. 3, pp. 22v-23.

54 Police intendant Paulo Fernandes Vianna to the minister of the interior, Villanova Portugal, Rio de Janeiro, April 26, 1820, ANRJ Polícia da Corte Códice 323 vol. 5, p. 182v.

55 The groups of slave hunters were usually mixed groups and consisted of negros forros (“freed negroes”), “mulattoes” and índios, Police intendant Paulo Fernandes Vianna to the minister of foreign affairs and war, Conde de Linhares, Rio de Janeiro, December 19, 1810, ANRJ Polícia da Corte código 323, vol. 2, pp. 38v-39. Upon returning a runaway to an owner, the hunters received a fee of 8\$000 réis in 1836, see M. Karasch, *Slave life in Rio 1808–1850*, Princeton 1987, p. 315.

56 José Murilo de Carvalho sees the territorial integration of Brazil as a result of this educational policy: “I am arguing that the presence in Brazil by the time of independence of an elite that by the place and content of training, by career pattern and occupational experience, constituted a closely united group of people, ideologically homogeneous, statist oriented, and practical in government matters, was a basic factor in the maintenance of the unity of the former colony and in the adoption of a centralized monarchical system”, J. M. de Carvalho, *Political Elites and State Building. The Case of Nineteenth-Century Brazil*, in: *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 24 (1982) 3, pp. 378-399, p. 390.

mained peripheral in this respect. Sons of wealthy families still had to cross the Atlantic to pursue higher education.⁵⁷ As it was the intent of the police chief to also increase the number of educated persons in Brazil, he supported parents who could not pay for the passage of their children. In September 1819, he asked the government to comply with a letter of request by a mother who could not afford her son's journey and stay in Coimbra. According to Vianna, who assured the government that he had gathered "all available information" about him, the boy Jozé Vilela de Barros showed "good behavior" and was thus worth the patronage of the Crown. In the police chief's eyes, the state could profit from "talents like him" after his return to Brazil.⁵⁸ Here, too, the orientation of the ruling elites in Rio de Janeiro towards European intellectual standards in the construction of Brazilian society is evident.

However obvious the attempts of "Europeanizing" and "whitening" Brazilian society might have been – not all Europeans were welcome. While the war against Napoleon raged in Europe, the French were persecuted for being *qua nationality* "subversive elements" and for fostering revolution in Brazil. The police chief's explicit plan, as he stated in 1811, was to "purge" the Brazilian soil of the "French race," which he viewed as "very dangerous."⁵⁹ The French may have been European, but for the time being they could not be part of the process of Brazilian civilization for political reasons. The situation radically changed after the Congress of Vienna in 1815, when peace was restored in Europe. The authorities initiated what became known as the "French Cultural Mission"; more than a dozen French artisans and artists were to make Rio still "more glamorous" and to bring "high culture" to the former colony. Men, such as the painter Jean Baptiste Debret and the architect Auguste Montigny, came to the new capital and provided the Crown with a vision of civilization, progress, and order inspired by French neoclassicism.⁶⁰ Jeffrey Needell has explained the "French Cultural Mission" with the "linkage between state and culture" assumed by the monarch and his government; for the Portuguese or "Brazilian" elites, the French culture was "simply the most advanced example of a civilization they considered universal."⁶¹ This reveals an important pattern in the construction of the new capital: Europeanizing measures were by no means inflexible imperatives but depended on contingent political matters and thus were subject to – sometimes radical

57 A. J. R. Russell-Wood, *Centers and Peripheries* (see footnote 27), p. 138; R. Barman, *The Forging of a Nation* (see footnote 36), p. 44.

58 Police intendant Paulo Fernandes Vianna to the minister of state, Villanova Portugal, Rio de Janeiro, September 1, 1819, ANRJ Polícia da Corte Cód. 323 vol. 5, p. 138.

59 Police intendant Paulo Fernandes Vianna to the minister of foreign affairs and war, Conde de Linhares, Rio de Janeiro, July 30, 1811, ANRJ Polícia da Corte Cód. 323 vol. 3, pp. 60-60v.

60 K. Schultz, *Tropical Versailles* (see footnote 27), p. 104. For information on the "French Mission" see also: F. Alambert, *Portugal e Brasil na crise das artes: da Abertura dos Portos à Missão Francesa*, in: L. V. de Oliveira and R. Ricupero (eds.), *A Abertura dos Portos*, São Paulo 2007, pp. 148-165. J. N. Bittencourt, *Iluminando a Colônia para a Corte. O Museu Real e Missão Francesa como marcos exemplares da política de administração portuguesa no Brasil*, in: Vera Lúcia Bottrel Tostes and José Neves Bittencourt (eds.), *D. João VI: Um Rei Aclamado na América*, Rio de Janeiro 2000, pp. 114-122.

61 J. D. Needell, *The domestic civilizing mission. The cultural role of the State in Brazil, 1808-1930*, in: *Luso-Brazilian review*, 36 (1999) 1, pp. 1-18, p. 2.

– changes. It is possible to state that the conception of “Europeanness” could, and did, drastically alter from one moment to another, for instance by first rejecting and then including French culture as part of “Europeanness.”

The attempt to make the city of Rio de Janeiro “more glamorous” included both striving for an “adequate” racial composition of Brazilian society and also attempting to impose the “right” behavior on the people within the urban area. A major problem the police chief faced from the beginning was the “homens vadios,” the vagabonds in the streets of Rio, that is, men moving in public space without an apparent destination. A “vadio” was defined as a man without master, occupation, or home.⁶² The explicit goal of the police, as Vianna described it in 1809, was to “eliminate the vagabonds” (*sendo dos cuidados da Polícia expurgar os vadios*).⁶³ These people were perceived as a threat because they interfered with the “good order” and “glamour” of Rio de Janeiro. The undirected, uncontrolled movement was to be stopped especially in the capital city, which explicitly served as a role model for the rest of the territory. Of course, vagabonds had been persecuted in Brazil before the arrival of the monarch in 1808, and, to be sure, the negative attitude towards vagrants had been a general Western European phenomenon since the fifteenth century.⁶⁴ In Portugal, for instance, vagrancy was considered contrary to public well-being and described as a crime in the “orders of the kingdom” in the eighteenth century.⁶⁵ This notion was also transferred to the Portuguese colonies. From the day the monarch stepped onto the city’s soil, the persecution became much more severe, and the reason was clear: the capital of an empire could not afford vagabonds in its streets, for they smudged the fame not only of the city but also of the empire. Thus, one can state that the establishment of the Court in the New World and the transformation of Rio from a peripheral, colonial town into a metropolis and center of politics coincided with a more negative attitude towards movement of individuals in urban space in general, and the so-called vagabonds in particular.

The paradoxical situation in Brazil was that the authorities could not live with the vagabonds, but they could not live without them either. Their work force was needed to protect and fortify the Brazilian borders against invaders coming from Spanish dominions. So-called “recruitment” became a common practice. It meant capturing vagabonds in the streets of Rio, deporting them and compelling them into military service. In 1811, the minister of state, Conde de Linhares, instructed the police to capture 400 vagabonds because the troops in the Extreme South of Brazil needed reinforcement to secure (and expand) the territory against Spanish rivals. In his reply, police chief Vianna, who was

62 A. C. de Almeida Santos, *Vadios e política de povoamento na América portuguesa na segunda metade do século XVIII*, in: *Estudos Ibero-Americanos*, 27 (2001) 2, pp. 7–30, p. 25.

63 Police intendant Paulo Fernandes Vianna to José Constantino Lobo Botelho, Rio de Janeiro, May 9, 1809, ANRJ *Polícia da Corte* Cód. 323 vol. 1, p. 43.

64 L. Lucassen, Leo, *Eternal Vagrants? State Formation, Migration, and Travelling Groups in Western-Europe, 1350–1914*, in: L. Lucassen and J. Lucassen (eds.), *Migration, Migration History, History. Old Paradigms and New Perspectives*, Bern et al 2005, pp. 225–251, p. 230.

65 A. C. de Almeida Santos, *Vadios e política de povoamento* (see footnote 62), p. 7.

a native of Rio de Janeiro (but had studied in Coimbra, Portugal), suggested that the minister of state, who was a native of Portugal, had very limited knowledge of the social structure of the new capital. In one night, he respectfully reported that 132 men actually had been captured, but only 15 of them turned out to be “real” vagabonds and thus fit for recruitment – all the others were men who had strolled the streets of the city without a license (*licença*), but who eventually could prove they had a legitimate occupation.⁶⁶ This incident shows the paradox in the enforcement of European norms and laws: at times they were enforced not for the sake of “civilization” but because the state was actually in need of people who *infringed* these rules, as trespassers could be forced into military service.

The best example of the limits of the project of constructing a European capital is perhaps the handling of African slavery. The most striking difference between the old court in Lisbon and the new one in Rio was the fact that half of the population of the new court consisted of enslaved persons. Yet, slavery since the eighteenth century was an exclusively colonial practice, that is, it actually meant the *opposite* of “Europeanness” or “civilization.” It was a practice associated with backwardness, and in Portugal itself, slavery had been abolished as early as 1761. If making Rio de Janeiro into a metropolitan court meant breaking with a colonial past, then the use of slave labor would have to be forgone.⁶⁷ Due to the fact that the whole economic and social system in Brazil was dependent on slavery, however, there was no way to abolish this institution without destroying the whole monarchy. The presence of African slaves in Brazil remained a fact until 1888.⁶⁸ Thus, making the new, metropolitan city of Rio also required the tolerance of old, *unmetropolitan* and certainly *non-European* practices. As Kirsten Schultz has argued, the only way of dealing with this contradiction was to “metropolitanize” slavery. According to her, this task was most important for the maintenance of the *Ancien Régime* in the tropics.⁶⁹ The police intendant and other royal officials believed that slavery could become courtly and fashionable if the slaves’ presence in the city was carefully controlled.⁷⁰ Besides eliminating “capoeira-rounds” (*rodas de capoeira*), an Afro-Brazilian art form which combines martial arts, music and dance⁷¹ and extinguishing the *quilombos* (settlements of freed slaves and fugitives that were considered a “danger” to “public tranquility”⁷²), the officials tried to implement more rigid rules concerning the slave’s mobil-

66 Paulo Fernandes Vianna to the minister of foreign affairs and war, Conde de Linhares, Rio de Janeiro, July 3, 1811, ANRJ Polícia da Corte Cód. 323 vol. 3, p. 57.

67 K. Schultz, *Tropical Versailles* (see footnote 27), p. 121.

68 *Ibid.*, p. 128.

69 K. Schultz, *Perfeita civilização: a transferência da corte, a escravidão e o desejo de metropolizar uma capital colonial*. Rio de Janeiro, 1808–1821, in: *Tempo 12* (2008) 24, pp. 5–27.

70 L. Mezan Algranti, *Slave crimes: The use of Police Power to Control the Slave Population of Rio de Janeiro*, in: *Luso-Brazilian Review*, 25 (1988) 1, pp. 27–48, p. 28.

71 *Ibid.*, pp. 27–29; Macedo, Paulo Fernandes Vianna (see footnote 40), pp. 54–56.

72 Police intendant Paulo Fernandes Vianna to the minister of foreign affairs and war, Conde de Linhares, Rio de Janeiro, May 2, 1809, ANRJ Polícia da Corte Códice 323 vol. 1, pp. 34–34v. For the construction of quilombos as “criminalized space,” see for instance: A. Campos, *Do quilombo à favela. A produção do “espaço criminalizado” no Rio de Janeiro*, Rio de Janeiro 2005.

ity in the streets as well as social segregation. Dom João's government no longer tolerated gatherings at public squares, and police persecution eliminated many African dances in the public space.⁷³ Especially during symbolically charged religious feast days and ceremonies crucial to the monarchy and state (such as court mourning), it was imperative that the slaves did not practice *capoeira* or commit other "disorders" (*desordens*).⁷⁴ As many of the sources reveal, it was an intensification of colonialism and an intensification of "othering" that made the "new city" of Rio de Janeiro imperial in nature.⁷⁵ It is in the very paradoxical attitude towards slavery that the limits of the Europeanization and civilizing mission become most evident.

3. Conclusions

Since the sixteenth century, respective Portuguese rulers, politicians, and clerics considered the European part of the Portuguese Empire weak and insufficient. However, the project of the creation of a "powerful empire" in Brazil was by no means linked to striving after a completely different, "non-European" empire. Rather, the transfer of the Royal Court from Lisbon to Rio de Janeiro in 1807/1808 also meant the transfer of the concepts of "good order" and "good government" from the Old to the New World. Yet, "Europe" or "Europeanness" were categories hardly ever used by Portuguese authorities. During the construction of the new capital, they rather referred to overarching categories such as "civilization" or to specific European sub-groups such as "Portuguese," "Azorian" or "French." Nevertheless, one can easily detect European principles in the process of "civilizing" the Brazilian society, which were, however, by no means implemented en bloc, but in very different ways and for different reasons.

The adaptation of some of these principles seems to have occurred as a "natural" or "logical" consequence of the transfer; that is, they seem to have been adapted almost unconsciously. The measures undertaken concerning aesthetics and security, for instance, aimed to make Rio de Janeiro as "civilized" as any European capital. The police chief used European societies and cultures as role models. The streets had to be broadened because this was a sign for "good police" in "all countries" (on the European continent); the "ugly" lattices had to be removed because they befitted only a colony (not a mother country); more street lamps needed to be established because Lisbon had plenty; and society and agriculture needed to be improved by white European settlers because only they were considered apt to till a field. These measures were hardly ever questioned, but were seen as steps towards universally valid ideals that were to be achieved in the future.

73 M. C. Karasch, Rio de Janeiro: From Colonial Town to Imperial Capital, in: R. Ross and G. Telkamp (eds.), *Colonial Cities: Essays on Urbanism in a Colonial Context. Comparative studies in overseas history* 5, Dordrecht 1985, pp. 123-150, p. 131.

74 Police intendant Paulo Fernandes Vianna to colonel José Maria Rebello de Andrade Vasconcelos e Souza, Rio de Janeiro, April 6, 1816, ANRJ Polícia da Corte código 327 vol. 1, p. 67.

75 K. Schultz, *Tropical Versailles* (see footnote 27), p. 131.

Some other principles and measures were not unconsciously adapted, but restricted by and actively designed for the *local* political, social and economic needs and thus subject to changes. Whereas the “French Race” was considered “dangerous” as long as the war against Napoleon was going on in Europe, the image of the French changed from one day to the next after the Congress of Vienna. In other words, *who* was considered an ideal European and *what* was conceived as the European ideal heavily depended on (political) circumstances. In some cases, the implementation of (more rigid) European standards and rules did not only, or not even primarily, serve the higher aspiration to “civilization” but above all the economic interests of the state: after all, trespassers could be used for military or public service. Finally, the institution of slavery brought to light the very paradox of civilization and Europeanization. Due to the fact that the Brazilian society and economy was “compromised” by slavery⁷⁶, the only expedient the Portuguese authorities saw just was the intensification of old colonial practices.

In fact, there hardly was a “possible Europe” to be found or founded in the tropics. At least in the eyes of the Portuguese who remained in Portugal, Brazil was not and could never be European. The Europeanization of the colony, seen from the European perspective, remained an illusion. When the liberal revolution broke out in Portugal in August 1820, members of the Portuguese elites demanded that the king return to the “legitimate” metropolis of the Portuguese Empire, that is the European “cradle of the Monarchy.” In this context, Manoel Fernandes Thomaz, one of the leading Portuguese liberals, called Brazil a “land of monkeys, bananas and of small negroes caught on the shores of Africa” (*terra de macacos, de negrinhos apanhados na costa da Africa, e de bananas*)⁷⁷. Portuguese journalists, now making full use of the new liberty of the press, repeatedly wrote about Brazil as the “land of Negroes, mulattos, goats and mestizos.” Obviously, Europeans referred to the ethnic diversity of Brazil as the most important feature and at the same time as the most evident proof of the lack of civilization.⁷⁸ In fact, the Portuguese king complied with the demand and returned to Lisbon in 1821. The Portuguese historian, Nuno Gonçalo Monteiro, found that all the members of the high nobility that had accompanied the monarch to Brazil returned en bloc as well and that the amalgamation of Brazilian and Portuguese aristocracy during the stay of the Court in Brazil was virtually nul.⁷⁹ If after 1808 Brazil had been equated with the “good order” of absolutism and Europe with revolutionary changes and liberalism, the monarch and large parts of the elites in 1821 were ready to face the changes and to opt for Europe all the same. Ultimately, it seems “original” European roots mattered to them.

76 J. L. Ribeiro Fragoso and M. Florentino, *O arcaísmo como projeto. Mercado Atlântico, Sociedade Agrária e Elite Mercantil no Rio de Janeiro (1790–1840)*, Rio de Janeiro 1993, p. 88; E. Viotti da Costa, *Political Emancipation of Brazil*, A. J. R. Russell-Wood (ed.), *From Colony to Nation. Essays on the Independence of Brazil*, Baltimore and London 1975, pp. 43–88, p. 65.

77 Cf. L. Bethell, *The independence of Brazil*, in: *Idem, The independence of Latin America*, Cambridge et al. 1987, pp. 155–194, p. 181.

78 I. Lustosa, *Insultos impressos. A guerra dos jornalistas na Independência (1821–1823)*, São Paulo 2000, p. 40.

79 N. G. Monteiro, *Elites e Poder. Entre o Antigo Regime e o Liberalismo*, Lisbon 2003.

Invented Superiority: British Self-Perception and Indian Responses in Colonial South Asia

Michael Mann

RESÜMEE

Mit Beginn ihrer kolonialen Expansion nach Irland, Nordamerika und schließlich nach Süd-asien ab dem 16. Jahrhundert entwickelten die herrschenden politischen und wirtschaftlichen Klassen Englands ein dezidiertes Verständnis von der eigenen kulturellen und zivilisatorischen Überlegenheit. Im Wesentlichen bestand die Erzeugung dieses Überlegenheitsgefühls im sogenannten „Othering“, also der dezidierten Definition anderer Gesellschaften und Kulturen als rückständig, degeneriert und daher unterlegen. In Britisch-Indien sollte sich dieses Gefühl, und letztlich die Überzeugung einer europäischen Superiorität, an drei Punkten zeigen. Zum einen über die Konstruktion des „zeitlosen indischen Dorfes“, das pars pro toto für die Statik des Orients stand. Zum zweiten über der Hierarchisierung der „indischen Gesellschaft“ aufgrund der brahmanisch-britischen Erfindung des „Kastensystems“, das ebenfalls für die Unveränderlichkeit, aber auch Rückständigkeit der homogenisierten und essentialisierten indischen Gesellschaften stand. Und zum dritten mittels der behaupteten Überlegenheit europäischen Medizinwissens, das nur durch administrative Regulierung durchgesetzt werden konnte. Im kolonialen Kontext Britisch-Indiens ist der *homo europaeus* geradezu erfunden und letztlich erfolgreich konstruiert worden – mit nachhaltiger Wirkung.

1. Introduction: The Civilizing Mission in Ireland, America and India

From the middle of the eighteenth century onwards the British began to create as well as to conceptualize colonial rule in South Asia. Starting from Bengal in 1757, British territory on the South Asian Subcontinent expanded continuously until the end of the nineteenth century. This did not happen without serious setbacks, for example, the rebellion in Bihar and Bengal from 1781 to 1784, the Kabul catastrophe in 1842, or the Great Rebellion from 1857 to 1859; the first and the last events almost terminated British rule

in India. Despite such setbacks, at the end of World War I the British Empire in South Asia spanned from Peshawar in the northwest to Tennasserim on the Malay Peninsula in the southeast and from Kashmir in the Himalaya to Point Galle on the island of Ceylon in the south. Yet, both expansion and setbacks shaped and sharpened British self-perception as a civilized nation, a superior race, while simultaneously also as a vulnerable species. Hence the British were convinced that they had to protect themselves against the evils of climatic, animal and human threats in South Asia as elsewhere in their mostly tropical colonial empire.

From the beginning of territorial rule in South Asia, the British imagined themselves as superior beings with respect to culture and civilization, in particular in regard to the “modern” state and its legal system, moral values, rational sciences and Protestantism. Like other western European “nations-in-the-making,” the British developed or, rather, invented the catalogue of characteristics according to which that superiority could be claimed. This self-estimation was particularly true for the English “nation.” Neighboring peoples such as the Scots, as all Celts, were regarded as substantially inferior to English civilization standards. The Irish were seen as the most savage people at the westernmost fringe of Europe. From the turn of the sixteenth century, when the crown and parliament of England transformed Ireland into a colony, they became an object of policing and punishment which the English regarded as an appropriate means for the former’s civil and moral uplifting.¹

At the same time, the English started to colonize Chesapeake Bay in Virginia then, some years later, New Hampshire and other parts of the North American subcontinent, thereby transplanting that recently developed ideology of a civilizing mission from Ireland to North America.² American Indians were also seen as savages and, at best, they were termed “naturals.” Whilst stories about Pocahontas and John Rolfe became part of a modern myth, they too often romanticized early “cultural encounters” as rare but, nevertheless, true love stories in an otherwise rather harsh colonial environment.³ A second, similarly important ingredient of the early colonizing ideology was embodied in the idea of a Protestant empire across the Atlantic. It was to be an empire independent of the Catholic Holy-Roman Empire, allegedly supported by the Pope and dominated by the worldwide successful colonizing “southern” Spanish Habsburgs. At the beginning of the seventeenth century, public statements demanded the “northern” countries (in

1 E. Campion et al., *Two histories of Ireland*. The one written by Edmond Campion, the other by Meredith Hammer Dr of Divinity, Dublin: Printed by the Society of Stationers [and London: by Thomas Harper] 1633. E. Spenser, *The fairy queen* disposed into twelve books, fashioning XII moral virtues. London: Printed for William Posonbie 1590, vol. I, pp. 12-13.

2 N. P. Canny, *The Ideology of English Colonisation: From Ireland to America*, in: *William and Mary Quarterly* 40 (1973), 4, pp. 575-98.

3 B. Woolley, *Savage Kingdom. Virginia & The Founding of English America*, London 2007, offers a different history. See the film “*The New World*” (Producer: Terrence Malick 2005), which for the first time contradicts that modern myth – which Walt Disney’s production “*Pocahontas*” of 1995 had just retold a decade before.

particular that of England's, the Netherlands' and Scandinavia) kingdoms' right for such a Protestant empire.⁴

Like all colonizing empires, the English also soon developed the idea of a civilizing mission as an integrated ideology for their colonial program. With regard to America, civilization was seen as the only salvation for the native inhabitants. Early English colonists in North America defended their violent and sometimes even brutal treatment of Amerindians, arguing that the violence and injury by the Romans on Europe was part of their historical mission of civil uplifting. Without the encounter with the Romans, Britons would still live as a rude and untutored people, wandering in the woods or dwelling in caves, hunting for their dinners as wild beasts hunt in the forests for their prey, prostituting their daughters to strangers and sacrificing their children to idols. The Romans' treatment therefore, it was maintained, turned the land of savages into the land of Shakespeare.⁵ When Lord Delaware, the designated first governor of the newly founded colony of Virginia, left England to set the fledgling colony on a sound footing, he was publically praised as civilizer and apostle. The priestly sermon again drew on the idea of the Romans for civilization and, additionally, on the Apostles for religion.⁶

The backbone of that religion was Protestant Puritanism as it trans-shipped, for example, the Atlantic with the well-known Pilgrim Fathers. Such Protestant and Puritan identity became particularly important during the seventeenth century and the Stuart Restoration.⁷ Additionally, by the end of that century, Protestant belief and an ideology justifying at least a mission on a global scale was placed on the agenda of the *Franckesche Stiftungen* in Halle, a small town located in the middle of Europe, which, however, hosted Prussia's first university and the country's largest orphanage. August Herman Francke (1663–1727), professor of theology at the aforementioned university, priest of a local church and president of the orphanage, became one of the leading figures in what was to become known as *Pietismus*. Related to English Puritanism for its rather "pure" practicing principles, Pietists were famous for their "*Christentum der Tat*."⁸

Faced with dramatic poverty and misery in large parts of central Europe, an ongoing result of the Thirty Years War (1618–48), as well as significant suppression of Protestants throughout Europe as in England during the Stuart Restoration and in France after the Edict of Nantes which forced the Huguenots to leave the country in 1684, Pietists set out

4 E. Sandys, *Europaea speculum. Or, A review or survey of the state of religion in the western parts of the world wherein the roman religion, and the pregnant policies of the Church of Rome to support the same, are notably displayed*. Hagae-Comitis: Printed for Michael Sparke, London 1629, pp. 188-9 and 195. T. K. Rabb, *Jacobean Gentleman: Sir Edwin Sandys, 1561–1630*, Princeton 1998, pp. 34sq. As it has been suggested recently the "American Revolution" was to establish that empire independently from England, cf. F. Jennings, *The Creation of America. Through Revolution to Empire*, Cambridge 2002.

5 E. Campion, *Two histories of Ireland*, 'Edmund Spenser's View of the State of Ireland' (see note 1), p. 9.

6 W. Crashaw, *A sermon preached in London for the right honourable the Lord Lawarree, Lord Gouvernor and Capitaine Generall of Virginia and others of his Majesties Counsel for that kingdom, and the rest of the adventurers in that plantation. At the said Lord General his leaue taking of England his native vountrey, and departure for Virginia*, Febr. 21. 1609. London: Printed (by W. Hall) for William Welby 1610, Dv, Liv-r.

7 S. H. Moore, *Puritanism. New World Settlements and the Call of Home*, New Haven and London 2007.

8 K. Deppermann, *Der hallesche Pietismus und der preußische Staat unter Friedrich III.* (I.), Göttingen 1961.

to reform Protestantism and developed an outwardly oriented religious practice. Making God's grace visible through good deeds became the core of this new religious approach. Pietists in Halle conferred themselves to an inner mission, which aimed to relieve poor people and particularly orphans from their misery.⁹ An essential part of that mission was, of course, preaching the gospels. This kind of mission was soon to be expanded to all people, as it was (again) believed that, for example, "Indians" in the east and west, as well as "Mongols" in Siberia or "Negroes" in Africa desperately needed religious instruction for their moral and material improvement, the latter being a new aspect in the Protestant missionaries' civilizing ideology.¹⁰

It was against this background that in 1706 the Danish-English-Halle Mission was founded, and soon after, two Halle Pietists were sent as missionaries to Tranquebar, the Danish fort and settlement close to present day Madras/Chennai. From the very beginning the mission was logistically and financially supported by the London based Society for the Promotion of Christian Knowledge. Protestant missionary activities created a Protestant network in a northern European dimension. Yet, since the royal charter of the English East India Company (EIC) prohibited missionary activities within its territories, the mission remained restricted to Tranquebar and Serampur, the Danish settlement in Bengal close to Calcutta.¹¹ In England, however, it was the awakening movement in the mid-eighteenth century and eventually the so-called Evangelicals that gave a fresh impetus to colonization and the civilizing mission in the closing decades of the eighteenth century. Like Halle Pietists, London Evangelicals also promoted the idea of both inner and outer moral and material betterment. Local British, mostly urban, as well as Indian societies were turned into an object of missionary activities whilst the extended ideology of the civilization mission enhanced the idea of an imagined English and Protestant superiority, be it in Ireland, in America or in India.¹²

In other words, within the colonial landscape of the British Isles and early colonization of North America, the imagined superiority of the English people's tastes, manners, morals and religion also helped to shape the likewise imagined superiority in what was to become British India. An example of such related attitudes may be seen in the English administration system of Ireland during the nineteenth century, since legislation for that part of the British Empire often became the blueprint for a similar legislation in British India.¹³ Even the colonial personnel served in all three colonies. Charles Lord

9 In fact, the Franckesche Stiftungen were an orphanage established by August Hermann Francke in 1698 and opened in 1701, subsequently supported by many aristocratic persons and privileged by the king of Prussia who regarded the orphanage as a "plantation" for the state's future personnel, cf. H. Obst, A. H. Francke und die Franckeschen Stiftungen in Halle, Göttingen 2002.

10 Th. Fuchs, *Die Anfänge der protestantischen Missionsbewegung im 18. Jahrhundert*, in: M. Mann (ed.), *Aufgeklärter Geist und evangelische Missionen in Indien*, Heidelberg 2008, pp. 23-38.

11 A. Gross, Y.V. Kumaradoss, and H. Liebau (eds), *Halle and the Beginning of Protestant Christianity in India*, 3 vols, Halle 2006.

12 Cf. B. Hilton, *The Age of Atonement. The Influence of Evangelism on Social and Economic Thought, 1785-1865*. Oxford 1988, esp. pp. 3-70.

13 S.B. Cook, *Imperial Affinities. Nineteenth Century Analogies and Exchanges between India and Ireland*, New

Cornwallis, for example, the defeated general of the British forces at Yorktown, Virginia, which terminated the war of the American colonists in 1782, became Governor General of British India between 1786 and 1793. After this term he was appointed Viceroy of Ireland, where he stayed from 1795 to 1801. He then returned for a second term as Governor General of British India in 1805. However, he died a couple of months after his arrival in Calcutta.¹⁴

Within this global colonial setting the British invented a catalogue of characteristics as a civilized and a civilizing people. Equipped with the above-mentioned values, Evangelicals further developed the idea of a self-burdened civilizing mission at the turn of the eighteenth century. Protagonists like William Wilberforce and Charles Grant started a global program for human relief with a campaign against slavery and the slave trade. It became the trans-Atlantic topic from 1807 when the slave trade was officially prohibited in the British Empire until the closing decades of the nineteenth century when Brazil abolished slavery in 1889.¹⁵ In South Asia and bordering regions, however, the Christian mission became the object of Evangelical agitation.¹⁶ Yet, even when the Protestant mission was permitted after the renewal of the charter for the EIC in 1813, missionaries from various missionary organizations faced a world of many beliefs in this part of the globe which limited their activities as well as the number of conversions.¹⁷

In fact, what was actually needed as ideology legitimizing colonial rule in British India was not the Bible and Christian books but moral values based on what was regarded to be Christian principles. The civilizing mission was never a means solely for the salvation of people stigmatized as savage and uncivilized but, simultaneously, a means for the salvation of that part of British society that was seen as “fallen,” such as prostitutes, loafers, vagrants, and drunkards, many of whom belonged to the poor, paupers and socially deprived.¹⁸ However, these values basically reflected Victorian *christlich-bürgerliche* values of discipline, punctuality, controlled sexuality, rational behavior and sociability, which were regarded as essentials for a strong character as well as the precondition for physical

Delhi, Newbury Park, and London 1993. Barry Crosby, *Irish Imperial Networks. Migration, Social Communication in Nineteenth-Century India*. Cambridge 2012

14 F. and M. Wickwire, *Lord Cornwallis and the War of Independence*, London 1971. Idem, *Cornwallis. The Imperial Years*, Chapel Hill 1980. Cornwallis not only fought successfully in Tipu Sultan of Maisur in 1792, thus defeating the then most potent army and declared enemy of the British on the South Asian subcontinent, but Cornwallis also subdued the Irish revolt in 1801. See also Kate O'Malley, *Ireland, India and Empire. Indo-Irish Racial Connections, 1919–1964*. Manchester and New York 2008.

15 J. Meissner, U. Mücke, K. Weber, *Schwarzes Amerika. Eine Geschichte der Sklaverei*, München 2008, pp. 161–239.

16 Ch. Grant, *Observations on the State of Society among the Asiatic Subjects of Great Britain, particularly in respect to Morals; and on the means of improving it* (written chiefly in 1792, first publ. 1797) in: *Parliamentary Papers. Report from the Select Committee on the Affairs of the East India Company vol. VIII, 1831–32, Colonies East India*, vol. 5. Reprint Shannon 1970, General Appendix, No. I. M. Mann, *Sahibs, Sklaven und Soldaten. Geschichte des Menschenhandels rund um den Indischen Ozean*, Wiesbaden 2012, pp. 161–9.

17 Cf. M. Mann (ed.), *Europäische Aufklärung und protestantische Mission in Indien*, Heidelberg 2006 and idem., *Aufgeklärter Geist und evangelische Missionen in Indien* (see note 10).

18 H. Fischer-Tiné, *Low and Licentious Europeans. Race, Class and 'White Subalternity' in Colonial India*, New Delhi 2009.

strength.¹⁹ Both mental and physical strength were seen as fundamental for white superiority throughout the world. Therefore, the civilizing mission, coupled with Christian charity, set out to save the world.²⁰ For colonial South Asia, the following examples illustrate the self-alleged European superiority in the colonial world of the British Empire in India and Indian responses towards such attitudes.

2. The Imagined Indian Village Republic and the Self-Perception of European Modernity

Comments on the Indian village and its seemingly permanent existence throughout history appeared from time to time before the end of the eighteenth century. Yet, with growing territorial-colonial rule in South Asia, the British, in the reports on the country, categorized the Indian village as revenue making and therefore as an administrative unit. To stabilize the colonial regime which was based on agriculture, the British soon started to mold the description of Indian villages into a totalizing, homogenizing and essentializing image. This image became part of what Edward Said has identified as Orientalism.²¹ Apart from this “Eurocentric” approach, it is, however, interesting to note how the British, on the one hand, perceived Indian social and economic life and, on the other hand, how Indians adopted that stereotype and used it for their own political ends. “Traditional” India, as will be seen, continues to be connected with the Indian village whilst urban city life is associated with “modernity.”

Yet, how did the essence of Indian culture and economy come into existence? As mentioned above, it was the colonial state’s administrative needs that produced the idea of a stable village community. At the beginning of the nineteenth century the Fifth Report on the Affairs of the EIC, compiled by a parliamentary commission, stated:

*The country is divided into villages. A village, geographically, is a trade of country comprising some hundreds or thousands of acres of arable and waste land; – a village, politically, is a little republic, or rather a corporation, having with itself, municipal officers and corporate artificers: its boundaries are seldom altered; and though sometimes injured, or even desolated by war, famine, and even families, continue for ages.*²²

A few decades later, the well-known British administrator of Delhi and its hinterland towards the Panjab, Charles Metcalfe (1785–1846) discussed the Indian village:

19 Idem, ‘Character Building and Manly Games’. Viktorianische Konzepte von Männlichkeit und ihre Aneignung im frühen Hindu Nationalismus.” in: Historische Anthropologie, 9 (3), 2001, pp. 432–55.

20 Idem, Reclaiming savages in, ‘Darkest England’ and, ‘Darkest India’: The Salvation Army as transnational agent of the civilizing mission’ in: Carey A. Watt and Michael Mann (eds), *Civilizing Missions in Colonial and Postcolonial South Asia*, London 2011, pp. 125–65.

21 E. Said, *Orientalism. Western Concepts of the Orient*, London 1978.

22 W. K. Firminger (ed.), *The Fifth Report on the Affairs of the East India Company of 1812*, 3 vols, London 1918, reprint New York 1969. Vol. III, Appendix No. 30: Report of Board of Revenue and Proceedings of Madras, dated 25th April and 25th May 1808, p. 431, para. 6.

*The Village Communities are little Republics, having nearly everything that they want within themselves, and almost independent from foreign relations. They seem to last where nothing lasts. Dynasty after dynasty tumbles down; revolution succeeds revolution; Hindu, Pathan, Moghal, Mahratta, Sikh, English, are masters in turn; but the Village Communities remain the same...*²³

As if the contents of the two statements could not be claimed for England or any other village of the world, Karl Marx identified these characteristics as unique to India. In *Das Kapital* (1867) he wrote:

*Jene uraltertümlichen, kleinen indischen Gemeinwesen, die zum Teil noch fortexistieren, beruhen auf gemeinschaftlichem Besitz des Grund und Bodens, auf der unmittelbaren Verbindung von Agrikultur und Handwerk ... Der einfache produktive Organismus dieser selbstgenügsamen Gemeinwesen, die sich beständig in derselben Form reproduzieren und, wenn zufällig zerstört, mit demselben Namen, wieder aufbauen.*²⁴

At the beginning of the twentieth century, Max Weber was convinced that “Indien ist und war, ganz im Gegensatz zu China, das Land der Dörfer...”²⁵ At the same time in India, leading politicians also became deeply influenced by this orientalist discourse. Mohandas K. Gandhi (1869–1948), from 1930 onwards also known as Mahatma, condemned urbanization and all forms of urban life as an evil western influence upon India. Big cities in India as elsewhere were not regarded as melting pots of cultures but seen as hot spots of violence, crime, disease and degeneration.²⁶ It is rather superfluous to mention that the British, too, perceived Indian cities as dirty, filthy and chaotic places. On the other hand, only the planned and clean cantonments, the civil and military stations were regarded as sanitary and therefore civilized places in British India. Superior town planning was set in sharp contrast to overcrowded Indian cities. Yet it must be noted that serious concerns about the negative effects of urbanization in Europe were also formulated by contemporary European critiques. The garden city movement with its attitudes of rustic life was the most prominent outcome of such discontent with urbanization.²⁷ Romanticized English village life also influenced the construction of the peaceful, paradise-like and eternal Indian village, particularly during the second half of the nineteenth century.²⁸ For Gandhi the village was the kernel of South Asia’s societies, a marker of “India’s” national identity as well as the perfect economic unit. According to him the village was able to provide all inhabitants with their daily needs as peasants and artificers

23 Ch. Metcalfe, Minute dated 7 November 1830, quoted in R. Dutt, *The Economic History of India*, 2. vols, London 1906, vol. 1, pp. 255–6.

24 K. Marx, *Das Kapital*, in: K. Marx/F. Engels Werke, Band 23, *Das Kapital*, Erster Band, Berlin 1962, pp. 378–9.

25 M. Weber, *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religionssoziologie*. Band II (ed. by Marianne Weber) *Hinduismus und Buddhismus*. Tübingen 1921, p. 1.

26 M. K. Gandhi, *Hind Swaraj* (1909), in: *Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi*, vol. X. Allahabad 1983, pp. 1–64, esp. pp. 26–60 *passim*.

27 S. Meacham, *Regaining Paradise. Englishness and the Early Garden City Movement*, New Haven 1999.

28 C. Dewey, *Images of the Village Community: A Study in Anglo-Indian Ideology*, in: *Modern Asian Studies* 6 (1972), pp. 291–328.

constitute one community and work in harmony.²⁹ On the other hand, many Indians concerned about modernizing India did not rely solely upon the village but on large scale industrialization. As the British had only developed specific industries like cotton weaving in Bombay and Ahmedabad and jute weaving in Calcutta, Indian nationalists regarded full-blown industrialization as the only remedy to cure India's overall poverty. Jawaharlal Nehru (1889–1964) especially argued in favor of India's industrialization after independence by initiating many discussions between himself and Gandhi during the 1930s and 1940s.³⁰ During the 1950s and early 1960s, Nehru and the Congress Party organized India's modernization by founding industrial plants and "model towns."³¹ It is interesting to note that meanwhile Nehru had adopted European views of his own with regards to urban sanitation and civilization to radically solve the problem demonstrated by Delhi's "slums."³²

As will be seen in the next section of this chapter, most urban Indian dwellers regarded the city as an exciting and promising place. In colonial South Asia, the town and city also represented modernity during the nineteenth and twentieth century. Cities were seen as places of encounter and exchange and set in contrast to backward villages and villagers. In the perception of the Indian educated classes the dichotomy of "urban" and "civilized" and "rural" and "uncivilized" also accounted for South Asia. Yet, the British idea of superiority did not work particularly well in the urban environment as Indians seemingly shared the same or at least similar values. For the British, of course, that perception did not matter at all as they insisted upon their concepts of superior town planning, advanced urban sanitary politics and the creation of a healthy urban environment in an otherwise unhealthy and therefore dangerous sub-continental Indian environment.³³ British civil and military stations were self-constructed islands of an alleged "modernity;" this term was used as a synonym for civilization and superiority. Yet, it was only in the colonial setting that the British could create and demonstrate an image of self-claimed superiority.

3. Brahman and British Images of an Ideal British-Indian Society

According a regionally north-Indian Brahman ideal created some 2000 years ago, the imagined Hindu-society consisted of four *varna*, that is, groups ranked according to their social standing. Actually *varna* means "color," yet it seems unclear whether color

29 K. Sames, Swadeshi. Der Unabhängigkeitsgedanke in Gandhis Wirtschaftskonzept, Stuttgart 1998.

30 Vide, for example, J. Nehru, A Bunch of Old Letters. Being Mostly Written to Jawaharlal Nehru and Some Written by Him, Bombay 1960, pp. 505-10.

31 Cf. the industrial towns of Bhilai and Roukhela in eastern India, B. R. Tomlinson, The Economy of Modern India, 1860–1970 (The New Cambridge History of India, III,3), Cambridge 1993, pp. 177-213 *passim*.

32 Slums of Old Delhi. Report of the Socio-Economic Survey of the Slum Dwellers of Old Delhi City. (Conducted by Bharat Sevak Samaj) With a Foreword by Jawaharlal Nehru, Delhi 1958, pp. 1-2.

33 S. Patel, Urban Studies: An Exploration in Theories and Practices, in: S. Patel and K. Deb (eds.) Urban Studies. Oxford etc. 2006, pp. 1-38, esp. pp. 22-5. M. Mann, Delhi's Belly: The Management of Water, Sewerage and Excreta in a Changing Urban Environment during the Nineteenth Century, in: Studies in History 23,1 (2007), pp. 1-31.

refers only to the color of human skin or whether it (also) refers to religious purity and, therefore, this term reflects South Asian ritual practices rather than European racist concepts of the nineteenth century. The four *varna* comprised the *brahman* (commonly translated as “priest”), the *kshatria* (dubbed as “warrior”), the *vaishya* (“merchant” and “trader”), the *shudra* (basically all peasants, artificers and servants) and finally the *panchama*, “untouchables” comprising all persons not belonging to the *varna*-system and therefore termed “outcast” by Europeans. However, the *panchama* were (and still are) by far the most numerous group of the population. Apart from this system, the sub-category *jati* denominated a genealogical as well as occupational order, which, in a very restricted sense, may be compared to European guilds.³⁴

At any time, South Asian societies consisted of hundreds of *jati* which the British named “caste.” “Caste,” however, was a phrase the Portuguese used to depict their Luso-American society. *Castas*, “ranks,” described the social order of colonial intermarriages between the Portuguese, Amerindians and Africans and, accordingly, also the lightness (or darkness) of the skin’s color. This system placed the “white” Portuguese at the top and the “black” African at the bottom of the social hierarchy. From their American territorial possessions the Portuguese transferred the term and the concept to South Asia to indiscriminately denominate a system which they regarded to be the general order of all Hindu-societies. Yet, when the British were about to politically dominate the South Asian subcontinent from the beginning of the nineteenth century, they had no clear idea of what they, the British, meant by “caste,” as “caste” was often synonymously used with “tribe,” “family,” “clan,” “class” or “occupational group.”³⁵

For administrative reasons the British referred to the term “caste” as a means to classify the society of their Indian empire. The census which took place every decade after 1871 referred to “caste” as the decisive marker of South Asia’s societies. During the following decades “caste” became a more and more rigid category culminating in the Census of India in 1901 and 1911 when caste was turned into a rigid unit strictly demarcating South Asia’s social groups and societies. In the decades to come, this invented “caste-system” became an unchangeable and impregnable order, a uniform grid indiscriminately placed over all South Asian Hindu-societies. The “caste-system” was a bureaucratic construction of British colonial administrators relying on European Indologists’ and British administrators’ expertise to systematize, homogenize, and to ultimately police and govern scarcely known South Asian societies. As a modern sociological entity, the “caste-system” tells more about the colonial states’ and its bureaucratic representatives’ need for governance than it actually reveals about South Asian societies.³⁶

34 H. v. Stietencron, *Der Hinduismus*, München 2001, pp. 93-101.

35 G. Dharampal-Frick, *Shifting Categories in the Discourse on Caste: Some Historical Observations*, in: V. Dalmia and H. v. Stietencron (eds), *Representing Hinduism. The Construction of Religious Traditions and National Identity*, New Delhi, Thousand Oaks and London 1995, pp. 82-100. R. Inden, *Imagining India*, Cambridge, Massachusetts 1990, pp. 49-84.

36 N. G. Barrier, *The Census in British India. New Perspectives*, New Delhi 1981. B. S. Cohn, *The Census, Social Struc-*

The strength of this orientalist discourse is demonstrated in the convergence of the Brahman and the British perception of the “Indian society” in the environment of urban Calcutta during the second half of the nineteenth century. At that time Calcutta was not only the seat of British power in India, the hub of a distinguished Bengal literary culture and an industrializing city, but it also became the place where indentured laborers, commonly called “coolies,”³⁷ were concentrated in depots for their shipment to the plantation colonies in the Indian Ocean and the Caribbean. Most kulis originated from the so-called backward regions of mountainous South Asia; they were dispossessed and impoverished members of tribal societies in Chota Nagpur, situated in the present federal states Jharkand and Chattisgarh of the Indian Union.³⁸ Gangs of recruited kulis were driven through the streets of Calcutta towards the depots. Members of the *bhadralog*, the middling class and *nouveau riches*, as well as the old Bengal *zamindar*-elite (absentee landlords) of the urban society regarded these people as the scum of the Indian populace as well as the society.³⁹

Only recently, the *bhadralog* had adopted British perceptions of the “Indian society” in concordance with Brahman ideals of purity as well as British classifications of a likewise idealist “Indian society” merged into a common perception of the lower and lowest stratum of the colonial society. Tribal members in the city of Calcutta disturbed the image of the urban society which was supposed to be rational, organized, and therefore modern. Though Bengalis were not particularly fair skinned people, the dark(er) skinned and, according to their understanding, certainly less civilized tribal members represented the “Other” of Bengal’s colonial society. This perception supported the British construction of white dominance as the upper stratum of the Bengal urban population, which aligned itself with the ruling British class for reasons of social acknowledgement and political participation. This did not mean that the *bhadralog* did not possess a distinguished image of itself that in many ways set itself apart from the colonial British society. Yet, adopting and/or integrating images of the British with respect to the latter’s perception of the “Indian society” was a means of the former’s self-understanding.⁴⁰ In the same way, neighboring Orissa urbanites of Puri and Katak (Cuttack) helped to legitimize the colonial regime by supporting its sanitation and health policy with regard to leprosy.

ture and Objectification in South Asia, in: Idem., *An Anthropologist among the Historians and Other Essays*, Delhi etc. 1987, pp. 224-54.

- 37 The term “coolie” is derived from the Tamil “kuli” meaning laborer as well as wage laborer, vide H. Yule and A.C. Burnell, *Hobson-Jobson: A Glossary of Colloquial Anglo-Indian Words and Phrases, And of Kindred Terms, Etymological, Historical and Discursive* (orig. publ. London 1889, new edition ed. by W. Crooke, London 1903, reprint London 1989), pp. 249-50.
- 38 K. Oraon, *Dimension of Religion, Magic, and Festivals of Indian Tribe the Munda*, New Delhi 2002; R. Parkin, *The Munda of Central India: An Account of their Social Organization*, Delhi 1992. P.P. Mohapatra, *Coolies and Colliers: A Study of the Agrarian Context of Labour Migration from Chotanagpur, 1880–1920*, in: *Studies in History* 1 (1985), 2, pp. 247-303.
- 39 P.C. Emmer, *The Meek Hindu. The Recruitment of Indian Indentured Labourers for Service Overseas, 1870–1916*, in: Idem (ed.), *Colonialism and Migration*, pp. 187-207.
- 40 S. Chattopadhyay, *Representing Calcutta. Modernity, Nationalism, and the Colonial Uncanny*, London and New York 2005.

British officials segregated and removed the infected from public spaces particularly in pilgrim centers. Moreover, the isolation of patients in newly constructed leprosy asylums in order to protect the overall population often took place with the approval of the Orissa middling class and elite.⁴¹

However, sharing common values with “Indians,” thus blurring racial differences, was substantially threatening to the British self-understanding of moral and racial superiority. Due to the tropical climate, Bengalis were regarded as effeminate, meaning physically as well as mentally weak people.⁴² This contrasted to the notion of South Asia’s “martial races,” the bellicose Ghurkhas and Sikhs. After the Great Rebellion of 1857–59, when Indian soldiers in the British-Indian army rebelled or mutinied (which is why that war is still called “The Mutiny” in many histories on South Asia) soon to be supported by peasants and merchants throughout large parts of northern India, the British reorganized their Indian-army personnel. Instead of recruiting “sipahis” as Indian soldiers to the British service from Hindustan (the region between Delhi and Patna), who had been disbanded due to their disloyalty, the British now preferred soldiers which they had beaten in their war against Nepal in 1814–16 and the Sikhs in 1846–48.⁴³ Since the latter helped to suppress the “Mutiny,” they were regarded as trustworthy and therefore preferred as recruits until the end of British rule in India.⁴⁴ The same counted for the Ghurkhas of southern Nepal who were recruited because of their fierce fighting habits.⁴⁵

Apart from the acknowledged martiality of some “Indian races,” the British, of course, insisted upon their superiority with respect to military technology and modern warfare. This superiority was again based upon European civilization and as a significant marker of European “whiteness.” However, this concept was challenged when the British encountered Pakhtun tribes during their campaigns in Afghanistan in 1880–82. Some of the “warriors” had red hair, freckles and light colored eyes which made them, according to the then existing western racial concepts, members of the “Caucasian” race.⁴⁶ At least in the mountains of the Hindukush, European constructions of races and self-claimed superiority seemed to have come to a preliminary end. Instead, the British turned to an interior civilizing mission. As Bengalis were regarded as effeminate and therefore not worthy of being civilized, attention was drawn to the savage peoples such as the Bhils of Khandesh or other “tribes” which, due to their allegedly most uncivilized way of life, were often regarded as criminals by birth.⁴⁷ Here, white superiority was seemingly easier

41 B. Pati and Ch. P. Nanda, ‘The Leprosy Patient and Society. Colonial Orissa, 1870–1940s’, in B. Pati and M. Harrison (eds.), *The Social History of Health and Medicine in Colonial India*. London and New York: Routledge 2009, pp. 113–28, esp. p. 119.

42 M. Sinha, *Colonial Masculinity: The ‘Manly Englishman’ and the ‘Effeminate Bengali’ in the Late Nineteenth Century*, New Delhi 1995.

43 D. Omissi, *The Sepoy and the Raj: The Indian Army, 1860–1940*, Basingstoke and London, 1994.

44 R. K. Mazumdar, *The Indian Army and the Making of the Punjab*, Delhi 2003.

45 L. Caplan, *Warrior Gentlemen: ‘Gurkhas’ in the Western Imagination*, Providence, RI and Oxford 1995.

46 It may still be noted today that UK and US immigration forms ask about racial categories; “Caucasian” is mentioned on the top of the list.

47 R. Tolen, *Colonising and Transforming the Criminal Tribesman: The Salvation Army in British India*, in: J. Terry and

to be maintained. With respect to the civilizing efforts of the Salvation Army, the colonial regime could demonstrate its accomplished civilizing mission, since few “uncivilized” people were transformed into “orderly” inhabitants.⁴⁸

More threatening than sharing common perceptions of the colonial society was the fact that quite a number of Europeans did not fit into the overall picture of the superior white ruler. This was particularly true with European prostitutes working in the big port cities of Bombay, Calcutta, Karachi, Rangun and Colombo, yet also in some up-country cantonments like Lahore, Agra and Kanpur. Since the early 1820s, British officers complained about British soldiers’ wives drinking too much and pursuing a rather liberal lifestyle which was not regarded as appropriate for a member of the ruling class. After 1869, when the “European Vagrancy Act” had been resolved, the colonial government deported British women from time to time because of their disgraceful life of prostitution and drunkenness. Already in 1865, the Bombay government had established a “saving asylum” to prevent poor British women from prostitution. Three decades later a meeting of the “Calcutta Social Purity Committee” still complained about European prostitutes as disgraceful to civilization and an insult to British manhood.⁴⁹

White women offering their body to men in front of allegedly inferior races or, far worse, selling their bodies to Indian men was unbearable for British men in India and Great Britain. Against the background of the pretended unbridgeable racial gap, European prostitutes were seen as “misfits.” Their mere existence seemed to undermine the imperial politics of racial superiority, which rendered segregation of British and Indians necessary. The prostitution of European women challenged, attacked and threatened the very core of colonial legitimacy which was based on the ideology of superiority with respect to race, morals and values, in short: higher civilization. Agitation in Great Britain as well as in India tried to stop human trafficking, yet governments in British India as well as in Ceylon seemed indifferent and ambiguous. Many of the prostitutes’ customers had a governmental or military background and especially the upper ranks of the colonial administration visited white prostitutes, mirroring the “double-morale” of the ruling class.

Virtually all prostitutes from Europe originated from the eastern regions, in particular from Poland, eastern Germany, the eastern parts of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, Romania and some from Greece. Many of the young women were Jews, as were the

J. Urla (eds), *Deviant Bodies: Critical Perspectives on Difference in Science and Popular Culture*, Bloomington 1996, pp. 79–107.

48 H. Fischer-Tiné, “Meeting the lowest India on its lowest level”. Frederick Booth-Tucker und die Anfänge der Heilsarmee in Britisch-Indien (1882–1919), in: M. Mann (ed.), *Aufgeklärter Geist und evangelische Missionen in Indien*, Heidelberg 2008, pp. 169–91.

49 This and the following paragraphs are based on H. Fisher-Tiné, “White women degrading themselves to the lowest depths”: European Networks of Prostitution and Colonial Anxieties in British India and Ceylon ca. 1880–1914, in: *Indian Economic and Social History Review* 40,2 (2003), pp. 163–90. A shorter German version has appeared as “The greatest blot on British rule in the East”: ‘Weißer Sklavenhandel’ und die britische Kolonialherrschaft in Indien (ca. 1870–1920), in: *Comparativ* 13 (2003), 4, pp. 114–37.

pimps organizing human trafficking.⁵⁰ They were part of a globally organized prostitution market covering the Atlantic on the one side and the Indian Ocean up to Shanghai on the other side.⁵¹ Peripatetic pimps and prostitutes were part of growing global human migration patterns during the second half of the nineteenth century. Looking at British India, most of the brothels were owned and run by former prostitutes: “mistresses.” The distribution of brothels and prostitutes also indicates the customers’ social standing since first class brothels were situated in the wealthier parts of a city while second and third class brothels were to be found in the poor quarters. As may be expected, wealthy Indians also used to visit European prostitutes. Seemingly white women had a kind of “exotic attraction” which to “possess” was often seen as some sort of “revenge” or compensation for the British territorial possession of South Asia, including the humiliations South Asians had to endure.⁵²

Despite the overall critique, most British (men) thought that white prostitutes may ventilate white men’s sexual desires, which is why it would be inappropriate to prohibit white prostitution and deport the prostitutes. This also helps to explain the government’s ambiguity. However, to self-justify that opinion, British administrators resorted to the existing inner-European racism with respect to Slaves and Jews. Pimps were regarded as the lowest class of continental Jews, their business being disgraceful to the Anglo-Saxon race. Likewise, prostitutes became “orientalized” when, according to a police officer in Colombo, prostitutes of eastern Europe had nothing in common with British “memsahibs.” Though there were never more than 350 white prostitutes in South Asia, some representatives of the British government and particularly non-governmental organizations were still deeply concerned about their presence. In 1913 a British officer in the Panjab stated:

*The prestige of the ruling race is affected by the degeneration of its members, especially if they are females. It matters not that the Austrians, Poles and Russian Jewesses who are the victims of the trade are wholly alien to the British race. In the eyes of the general population, the distinction is not recognised. These women with their white skins come from the West, whence come the rulers of this country, and the whole European community has to bear the shame of their presence.*⁵³

In Ceylon, white prostitution was prohibited in 1912, followed by Burma in 1921. All prostitutes were deported to Europe, yet only after some massive campaigning of purity activists. In British India local authorities canalized the “problem” by segregating and

50 E. J. Bristow, *Prostitution and Prejudice. The Jewish Fight against White Slavery, 1870–1939*, Oxford 1982, esp. pp. 85–108.

51 For a brief history of that part of the market vide Th. Fischer, *Der Weg nach Buenos Aires – Frauenhandel und Prostitution in den 1920er Jahren*, in: *Comparativ* 13,4 (2003), pp. 138–53.

52 A. Nandy, *The Intimate Enemy. Loss and Recovery of Self under Colonialism*, Delhi etc. 2006.

53 Letter No. 44, Lahore 8 January 1913, Government, Punjab to Government of India, as quoted in H. Fischer-Tiné, *Flotsam and Jetsam of the Empire? European Seamen and Spaces of Disease and Disorder in Mid-Nineteenth Century Calcutta*, in: A. Tambe and idem. (eds), *The Limits of Colonial Control in South Asia. Spaces of Disorder in the Indian Ocean Region*, London and New York, pp. 121–54, cf. p. 183, fn. 126.

controlling white prostitutes in a limited number of brothels. In Calcutta, for example, the infamous “German barracks” were shifted from a rather central part of town to the southern periphery. Only in 1915 were a great number of European prostitutes deported, yet not because of their profession but because they had either German or Austrian passports and were therefore regarded as “hostile aliens.”

Apart from white prostitution, many European, mostly British, sailors and soldiers became part of the Calcutta poor, living as loafers, beggars and drunkards in the city’s suburbs. This also happened in other towns of British India, yet the problem was most challenging in Calcutta as it was the seat of British power. The problem of European sailors became prevalent after the Great Rebellion/“Mutiny.” Some 2,500 seamen had been recruited to support the regular troops of the British Indian army. During their stay up-country, the maritime troops became infamous for their disorderly behavior. The situation became worse when they were disbanded and sent back to Calcutta in March 1859, where they stayed, unemployed, for months. Additionally, the number of deserters from merchant ships was fairly high, thus aggravating the problem of drunken, violent and begging seamen. Most of the time, however, they were to be found loitering around crowded Bow Bazar area and sleeping on the open ground of centrally situated Maidan, or visiting the city’s brothels. The situation only improved when the majority of the seamen could finally find work on merchant ships as trade activities increased enormously after the end of the Rebellion.

The same situation reoccurred after a severe cyclone ravaged the Bay of Bengal in 1864. Thirty six ships were completely destroyed and some one hundred were severely damaged. More than 1,000 seamen sought shelter in Calcutta. By July 1865, still more than 500 seamen were unemployed, which caused the same problems as in 1859. British officials again felt extremely uncomfortable with the situation as the disorderly, and in some instances, criminal seamen undermined the image of British racial superiority. Seamen seemed to be a constant source for annoyance, trouble and shame. Their behavior brought them close to the (maintained) uncivilized state of the lower class Indians regarded as dangerous. More importantly, however, was the fact that the European seamen threatened to blur the otherwise strictly drawn line between the ruling class and the ruled classes. Under such circumstances rule seemed to be not a matter of race but of class. This is emphasized by the fact that the upper classes of Calcutta’s Indian urban society were shocked by the public behavior of the seamen and condemned it strongly, again aligning themselves with the British.⁵⁴

However, it was not only the European seamen that caused severe problems, but also the many unemployed Europeans which aggravated the situation of begging, loitering and vagrancy in the major towns of British India. The problem became particularly prominent after immigration laws were dissolved in 1833. As a result of technological constructions such as the railways, the telegraph, and canals, many Europeans found

54 The preceding paragraphs are based on H. Fischer-Tiné as indicated in the previous footnote.

employment in India. Indians were regarded as being unfamiliar with western technology and therefore only engaged in simple earth works. Until the 1870s, thousands of Europeans emigrated to British India, and in 1871 some 80,000 “non-official” Europeans worked on the building sites of the empire. As more and more Indians were employed due to racial categories of salaries, making them comparatively cheaper, many Europeans became unemployed. Like the seamen, they became a public nuisance, living as loafers, begging in the white quarters of South Asian towns.

Additionally, severe sickness and accidents were often other reasons for social deprivation. Many of the unemployed became alcoholics. These Europeans also threatened not only the public order but also the political structure of the colonial edifice as the drunken, begging and roaming seamen had. To prevent it from collapsing, the British government in India passed the “European Vagrancy Act” in 1869. The law, it was argued, was necessary because vagrancy was “a grave political danger through the discredit which it casts upon the entire British race.”⁵⁵ Apart from two amendments in 1871 and 1874 the law remained on the statute books until the end of British rule in India. According to the Vagrancy Act, any person being found begging or loafing could be arrested by the police, summoned before the magistrate and sent to the workhouse. If such a person failed to find employment within a certain time he could be deported to Europe. Between 1876 and 1895, a total of 5682 people were registered as loafers, just below 300 people on an annual average. Yet, it is very likely that the real number of loafers in British India amounted to some 3,000 annually.

Apparently the colonial administration had difficulties in dealing with European vagrants, seamen and prostitutes. The Vagrancy Act was a weak solution to the grave problem (at least the British ruling elite as well as the Indian elite saw it as a grave problem) because the law was never strictly implemented as the number of “unofficial” vagrants indicates. Deportation was the last resort whilst most people registered under the Vagrancy Act were sought to be “disciplined” and “civilized” through the strict regime of the workhouse for Europeans. However, surveillance, punishment and reform as major components of this disciplining regime were never rigidly enforced. On the contrary, it seems very likely that the colonial regime rather kept and hid European misfits from the Indian public. Apart from the fact that the Indian elite, as has been shown above, found itself seriously disturbed if not threatened by the “uncivilized” behavior of lower class Europeans, it seems that this problem only existed in the mind of the British elite who suspected that the colonial regime lacked any form of hegemony and that the colonial edifice existed exclusively upon the point of the bayonets.⁵⁶

55 As quoted in H. Fischer-Tiné, *Englands innere Zivilisierungsmission. Arbeitshäuser für Europäer im kolonialen Indien* (ca. 1860–1914), in: B. Barth and J. Osterhammel (eds), *Zivilisierungsmissionen. Imperiale Weltverbesserung seit dem 18. Jahrhundert*, Konstanz 2005, pp. 169–200, cf. p. 181, fn. 51.

56 Cf. Ranajit Guha, *Dominance without Hegemony. History and Power in Colonial India*, Cambridge, Mass. and London 1997.

4. Allopathy versus Ayurveda and Unani Tibb

During the nineteenth century, medicine became a spacious field on which the colonial state challenged Indian medical systems like *Unani tibb* and *ayurveda* as well as its practitioners, hakims and vaidyas. From the beginning of what has been termed the “colonial encounter” in South Asia at the turn of the sixteenth century, western doctors were interested in South Asian medical systems including botanical and geological knowledge. During the following three centuries the initial encounter and mutual interest changed into the rejection of South Asian medical treatment methods.⁵⁷ It was only for political reasons that western allopathy was gradually recognized as the sole scientific medical system. And again it was the colonial regimes’ claimed superiority, now with respect to science and in particular medicine, which rendered such a political decision necessary. South Asian Unani tibb and ayurveda had to be excluded from the tableau of medical systems for they also threatened British colonial cultural and racial self-understanding. Finally, and after long struggles, this was accomplished in 1912 with the Registration of Medical Practitioners Act, which unilaterally granted the approbation of medical practitioners educated according to western medical “standards.”⁵⁸

The Indian Medical Service (IMS) became the most powerful instrument to implement the colonial state’s medical policy in the course of the nineteenth century. The IMS owed its origins to the medical requirements of the EIC’s mercantile personnel in India. With the territorial expansion of the EIC and the growing permanent civil and military establishment from the middle of the eighteenth century, a permanent medical establishment was required to meet the medical needs of the EIC, in particular that of the army. At the end of the eighteenth century, the IMS comprised 234 surgeons and assistant surgeons. After years of constant warfare and expansion, the number of IMS doctors had risen to roughly 650 by 1824, and thereafter its number of members fluctuated between 650 and 820. From the 1830s onwards, various newly founded medical colleges trained Indians in the science of western medicine in order to enlarge the number of assistant doctors. For racial reasons the IMS remained a “white” organization until the end of the nineteenth century, and it was only British candidates’ lack of interest that necessitated the opening of the IMS for Indian candidates.⁵⁹

However, the IMS was never the homogeneous cadre which it was supposed to be. During the first half of the nineteenth century, debates about the values of *Unani tibb* and *ayurveda* were still ongoing. Even at the end of the nineteenth century, European medical practitioners acknowledged the values of South Asian medicine. At the time when allopathy became established as a separate scientific discipline within the universities

57 M. Harrison, *Medicine and Orientalism: Perspectives on Europe’s Encounter with Indian Medical Systems*, in: B. Paty and Idem (eds.), *Health, Medicine and Empire. Perspectives on Colonial India*, Hyderabad 2001, pp. 37–87.

58 M. Ramanna, *Perception of Sanitation and Medicine in Bombay, 1900–1914*, in: H. Fischer-Tiné and M. Mann (eds.), *Colonialism as Civilizing Mission. Cultural Ideology in British India*, London 2004, pp. 205–25, esp. pp. 219–22.

59 D. Arnold, *Science, Technology and Medicine in Colonial India* (=The New Cambridge History of India III, 5) Cambridge 2000, pp. 57–61.

of Europe, allopathy was set in sharp contrast to the existing medical systems of South Asia. *Unani tibb*, it was argued by IMS officials, was still based on ancient Greek medical knowledge and, additionally, was connected with religion (*i.e.*, Islam), which is why *Unani* medicine could no longer be regarded as a scientific medical system. Likewise, *ayurveda* was seen as unscientific for it was linked too closely with the Hindu religion, which is why it too had to be repelled as a non-scientific medical system. Both medical systems, it was maintained, may have had some practical value in the past but presently their degeneration, like the Indian society and culture at large, was undeniable. It was then for purely ideological reasons that *Unani tibb* and *ayurveda* were denied the status of science.⁶⁰

Some examples may illustrate how the British implemented allopathy as an official medical system in British-India. On the one hand, tuberculosis and smallpox were diseases which were not specifically tropical as they also occurred in Europe as in other parts of the world. Western medicine could, therefore, demonstrate its universal validity as a globally applicable medical treatment and successful remedy. On the other hand, malaria and especially cholera were regarded as tropical diseases, the latter occurred endemically in Bengal despite having spread pandemically all over the globe during the 1830s. It was maintained by a British politician however that disease in India was not disease in England (meaning Europe) because cultural habits, personal hygiene, living conditions, and religious beliefs were fundamentally different. Despite the latest findings by Robert Koch who had visited Calcutta in 1882 and who recognized the “comma-bacillus” as the transmitter of cholera and water as the method of transmission, the superintendent of the IMS, James Cuninghame, opposed any such theory. Since he was a strict adherent of the miasmatic and localized theory, he prevented British doctors in the provinces of British India from publishing their findings that would have confirmed Koch’s bacteriological theory.⁶¹ Additionally, officials in British India systematically veiled the problems of cholera.⁶²

At the same time, the British imperial government in London was not particularly interested in any bacteriological theory as the agreements of the International Health Conventions would have stipulated the strict implementation of quarantine regulations in the ports of the British Empire. For commerce and security, as well as military reasons, such measures were to be avoided. Indeed, disease in India had to be different from disease in England. Whereas in Europe cholera infections could be controlled by generally applied sanitary measures, cholera in India continued to cause high mortality rates even at the beginning of the twentieth century. Even more significantly, the number of cholera

60 M. Harrison, *Medicine and Orientalism*, pp. 56-58.

61 M. Harrison, *A Question of Locality: The Identity of Cholera in British India, 1860–1890*, in: D. Arnold (ed.), *Warm Climates and Western Medicine: The Emergence of Tropical Medicine, 1500–1900*, Amsterdam etc. 1996, pp. 133-59.

62 Dh. K. Singh, “Clouds of Cholera” and Clouds around Cholera, 1817–70, in: D. Kumar (ed.), *Disease and Medicine in India. An Historical Overview*. Indian History Congress, Delhi 2001, pp. 144-65.

victims was decreasing in the military cantonments of the British soldiers in India while it increased in the barracks of the Indian soldiers.⁶³

Smallpox seems of particular interest as variolation⁶⁴ was the generally acknowledged and therefore applied method of prophylaxis by both the south Indian medical practitioners as well as by members of the IMS.⁶⁵ Vaccination was introduced to the staff of the IMC in the Madras Presidency at the beginning of the nineteenth century, and serial variolation campaigns started after smallpox appeared on a large scale in 1802. Fierce debates took place between south Indian medical practitioners and British doctors about the appropriate method of variolation, as vaccination was rejected by many upper class Hindus because of the use of cow-lymph. At the same time, British doctors argued that for cultural reasons as well as reasons of political acceptance, variolation should be kept on the list of officially recommended prophylactic methods. For some time the IMC of the Madras Presidency seems to have followed this strategy, stressing however that variolation was only acceptable after British medical practitioners had improved the method according to western scientific standards. Yet, within a few years, the colonial authorities redirected their campaign to promote vaccination with specific reference to the benevolence and humanity of the European medical community.⁶⁶

Given the fact that vaccination, in contradistinction to variolation, was indeed safer because cow-pox material did not cause the outbreak of smallpox as sometimes happened with human material, it can be concluded that it was not for medical but for political reasons that variolation was acknowledged officially, namely to establish the superiority of European civilization. The same arguments were brought forward at the end of the nineteenth century when tuberculosis was diagnosed for the first time in British India. By 1910, when the Madras government dealt with the imminent problem of tuberculosis in many of the Presidency's cities, it had become clear that first, the disease was spreading more rapidly than first thought, second, it affected new regions, and third, more people than ever, particularly in urban settlements, were affected by the new disease. It was this scenario which placed tuberculosis on the agenda of the colonial state, while the likewise expanding imperial sciences of medicine became another tool with which to rule.⁶⁷

The British could hardly control, let alone explain, the prolific disease. Since the disease occurred mostly in growing towns and there in the most congested areas, it was argued that tuberculosis was not necessarily the price of progress but a disease of the improperly

63 M. Mann, *Cholera in den Zeiten der Globalisierung. Oder wie die Welt in zwei Teile zerfällt*, in: ders. und J. G. Nagel (Hg), *Europa jenseits der Grenzen*. Heidelberg 2015, pp. 389-431.

64 Variolation means the use of smallpox material from infected humans, whilst vaccination uses lymph material from infected cows.

65 For a general background see Arnold, *Science, Technology and Medicine*, pp. 71-3.

66 Neils Brimnes, "The Sympathizing Heart and the Healing Hand": Smallpox Prevention and Medical Benevolence in Early Colonial South India, in: H. Fischer-Tiné and M. Mann (eds.), *Colonialism as Civilizing Mission*, (see note 54), pp. 191-204.

67 B. E. Rao, From Rajayak S(h)ma ('Disease of kings') to 'Blackman's Plague': Perceptions on the Prevalence and Aetiology of Tuberculosis in the Madras Presidency, 1882-1947, in: *Indian Economic and Social History Review* 43 (2006), 4, pp. 457-85.

civilized. Again, while European cities were regarded as places of progress where industry, culture and civilization culminated, the very same phenomenon was turned against the Indian urban inhabitants. Against this background, the Secretary of State for India, Lord Morley, stated in 1909 that the IMS was a wonderful institution and that its members were doing glorious work, yet there were only two things in India which were bad: the climate and the natives. Racism assisted in marking the difference: while the white European race was strong and healthy and could, therefore, efficiently deal with diseases like tuberculosis, it was the degenerated Indian who made the attempted treatments and remedies come to naught.⁶⁸

Indian medical practitioners reacted strongly against the general onslaught of Indian culture and civilization. During the Swadeshi Movement (1905-8, *swadeshi*: *swa*: self; *desh*: country, meaning economic production for one's own country), there were efforts to revitalize Ayurvedic medicine, following an agenda to systematize knowledge, establish training institutions and standardize a medical system. Indian medical practitioners founded medical schools and dispensaries. They also produced a counter-aetiology stressing that western medicine originated and was developed in an alien culture and environment and was, therefore, not suitable for the body and mind of South Asians. Stressing the holistic arguments of *Unani tibb* and *ayurveda* according to which the whole human body had to be considered when diagnosing, treating and curing its ailments, the revivalist movements brought physiological and moral elements into the medical discourse. Looking closely at the arguments, it seems that promoters and protagonists used British-European aspects of a degenerated Indian race now, *vice versa*, maintaining that it was the British who had thrown the Indian society into a crisis, destroying moral values and, in the long run, the physical and psychical health of its members.⁶⁹

Critique and protest against western medicine was uttered in many Indian newspapers. Most of which were published in English (yet owned by Indians). However, vernacular newspaper articles also dealt with *Unani* medicine. Particularly in the big metropolises of British India where the problems of sanitation and medical care became most salient, the press published the opinions of medical practitioners and politicians.⁷⁰ Almost all Indian doctors trained according to western allopathy echoed the "standards" of western medicine with respect to sanitation and public health. Yet there existed many dissenting voices. Essentially, Indian critique complained about the insufficient financial support from the government. With respect to preventive measures, critics opposed any form of forced inoculation campaigns by the IMS. Yet, *hakims* and *vaidyas* vehemently protested against the Registration of Medical Practitioners Act of 1912. They argued that most Indians had unshaken confidence in the healing power of that medicine. At least, *hakims*

68 Ibid., pp. 478-80.

69 Ibid., pp. 472-4.

70 S. Alavi, *Unani Medicine in the Nineteenth-Century Public Sphere: Urdu Texts in the Oudh Akhbar*, in: *Indian Economic and Social History Review* 42 (2005), 1, pp. 101-29. M. Ramanna, *Perception of Sanitation and Medicine in Bombay* (see note 54), *passim*.

and *vaidyas* wanted recognition of the death certificates they issued and the right to sue patients for failure to pay their bills, which was never granted.⁷¹

Even the otherwise generally accepted European surgery was opposed with severe critique. According to one opinion, most Indians go to the hospital only to die where British doctors mercilessly hack and hew instead of treating the body as the native doctors do with drugs and balsams. Indigenous medicine was regarded as best suited to the Indian climate and constitution.⁷² Moreover, *doctory ilaj*, which was the Urdu-term for western medical treatment, was criticized for its only scientific methods, ignoring other methods of medicine. Among the *Unani tibb* and some *ayurveda* medical practitioners, four positions of how to react to the colonial state's challenge became prominent. First, the modernists unanimously and uncritically favored western medicine. Second, the purists simply rejected all forms and knowledge of western allopathy. Third, the reformists who sought to reform the existing medical systems thereby included the best from the west. And finally the synthetists, who favored a general merger of all existing medical systems.⁷³

In any case, it must be noted that in the urban environment of the big cities where doctors who practiced allopathy were available, only ten percent of the population visited such doctors whereas the "rest" preferred Indian *hakims* and *vaidyas*. Almost all people living in the countryside had no access to *doctory* and had to rely on *Unani tibb* and *ayurveda*. In some ways the history of medicine in British India, the story about *Unani tibb* and *ayurveda* versus allopathy, reflects a purely colonial discourse. Part of this colonial discourse and public critique was the invention of *ayurveda* as a national Indian health system which systematized and homogenized local and regional variants with the emergent national movement between 1880 and 1930.⁷⁴ Even today most Indians prefer or have to, for pecuniary reasons, consult *hakims* and *vaidyas*. Only surgery has been accepted by most people in South Asia as a beneficial medical treatment.

5. Summary: On the Creation of a Modern Myth

At the same time the English started to colonize countries and societies across the sea, they created an ideology of having a superior civilization. Colonial rule was for the benefit of the subdued people, whether they were Irish, Amerindians or, later, Indians. Initially claimed cultural superiority was, from the middle of the nineteenth century onwards, "strengthened" by racial ideology, marking the difference between white superiority and "colored" inferiority. Within the European context it seemed rather easy to maintain this alleged superiority of the *Homo Europaeus*, for non-European people were depicted as

71 Ibid., p. 221.

72 Ibid.

73 N. Quaiser, Politics, Culture and Colonialism: Unani's Debate with Doctory, in: B. Paty and M. Harrison (eds), Health, Medicine and Empire. Perspectives on Colonial India. Hyderabad 2001, pp. 317-55, part. pp. 320-22, 335-39.

74 H. Fischer-Tiné, „Pidgin-Knowledge“: Kolonialismus und Wissenszirkulation. Berlin, 2013, pp. 45-7.

savages, their manners and morals un-developed, and their societies rude; in short, they were uncivilized. However, within the colonial setting, that superiority was often difficult to maintain. At least the Indian case demonstrates that creating the modern myth of cultural and racial superiority only partially worked, as could be exemplified with Gandhi's and Nehru's inversion of the discourse on modernization.

Generally seen, the claimed superiority was permanently challenged by Indian middle and upper classes. According to their manners and morals (be they of "Indian" origin or developed in the colonial urban context), they aligned themselves with the British ruling elite. This was, on the one hand, regarded as a positive effect as it helped to stabilize the colonial regime. On the other hand, such an "alliance" blurred the claimed cultural and racial superiority. For the British, however, it was difficult to create the *Homo Europaeus* image within South Asian societies – which they probably did not aim to do. Hegemony was never on the agenda of the British colonial regime.⁷⁵ This is in sharp contrast to the image the British ruling class in India had of itself. Many administrative, legal, and social efforts were undertaken to uphold that myth. Nevertheless, it worked in one respect, namely that of a strong people commanding a seemingly invincible army. Yet, the carnage of European armies in the trenches of Flanders during World War I terminated the ideology of the civilizing mission in British India as well as the myth of a superior civilization represented by the *Homo Europaeus*.

75 Guha, *Dominance without Hegemony* (see note 56)

Homo Europaeus migrans. From “White Man” via Chinese Encyclopedia to EU citizen?

Mathias Mesenhöller

RESÜMEE

Mit der „Exit Revolution“ des 19. Jahrhunderts verschob sich das dominante Kontrollanliegen europäisch-atlantischer Migrationsregime vom Abwanderungsverbot zur Zutrittsregulierung. Dabei avancierten ethnisch-kulturelle bzw. räumlich-rassische Metaphern sozialer Wünschbarkeit mit der Zeit zu eigenbedeutsamen Selektionsinstrumenten. Unter diesen wiederum illustriert die Kategorie „Europäer“ den Stellenwert politisch verfasster Räume für Design und Applikation entsprechender Kollektivzuschreibungen: Erst nach der Institutionalisierung einer Europäischen Pass- und Rechteunion trat der *Homo Europaeus* in Konkurrenz zu älteren, von imperial- oder nationalstaatlicher (Binnen-) Differenzierung instruierten Hierarchien. Seither sind die In-/Exklusionschiffren „weiß“ und „Europa“ zu einem wanderungspolitischen Kulturogem konvergiert – und erneut von einem bio-areal indifferenten Paradigma individueller wirtschaftlich-sozialer „Fitness“ überholt worden.

It took Europe to make the *Homo Europaeus*. More specifically, it took the European political union to bring about a category of migrants that had not existed before: Europeans. In the interplay of global flows and controls, it thus appears that classificatory power ultimately lies with the controllers.

Modern migratory regimes are institutional fabricates, designed by public authorities in order to register and administer large quantities of individual acts through categorizing and regulating them. Facing the amorphous phenomenon of human mobility, they strive for calculability and control – or at least an illusion of both. In doing so, authorities are inclined to construe tables of classifications that privilege institutional findings and institutionally generated knowledge over the (self-) perceptions, interpretations, and nar-

ratives held by the classified themselves. In other words, confronted with the relatively unknown, with the outlandish in a literal sense, migratory regimes more often than not structure the world along the lines of political entities and circumstances on the one hand, and according to scientific assumptions on the other hand, which again are prone to reflect political-institutional contexts. While being potent, maybe prototypical machineries of ascription, at the same time, migratory regimes appear remarkably self-referential.

It is this specific self-referentiality of the institutional sphere that underlies the circular structure of the argument I will present here. It comes down to the contention that “the European” as a recognized category in the sphere of North Atlantic migration only appeared as a consequence of the erection of “Europe” in terms of an institutionalized entity.

Yet, *Homo Europaeus* has a genealogy, albeit a shared one with other national and (post-) imperial classes of migrants with whom he coexisted and continues to coexist in the realm of migratory regimes (As a matter of fact, such coexistence frequently takes place in one and the same agent). This essay intends to shed some light on this genealogy.

The (almost) open universe of ethnic indifference

Up to the turn of the nineteenth century, early modern, mercantilist European states abhorred the loss of population and had put up legal and moral barriers on such acts of “desertion.”¹ Thus, the “irruption into the Atlantic world of an under-populated republic that arrogated to itself an immense reserve of temperate lands – and determined to capitalize on this unique asset by marketing it to all comers – was a truly revolutionary event.”² Indeed, Europeans considered the “routinized and accessible naturalization law” of the newly independent United States of America a breach of the law of nations.³

Originating in Britain only after the Napoleonic Wars, an ever growing, pauperized, and increasingly unruly population slowly turned the elites emigrationist, a process that was still fostered by a general turn towards economic liberalism. Over the following decades, much of Europe experienced an “Exit Revolution” (A. Zolberg), the successive elimination of restrictions to leave one’s country or territory of birth.⁴

At the same time, though, authorities in most countries continued to treat *immigration* largely in the way the early modern territorial state had approached its – or its neighbors’ – subjects. If at all, social and economic criteria like estate, profession, or income played a role in assessing the desirability of newcomers, while lack of means to sustain themselves,

1 Aristide R. Zolberg, *The Exit Revolution*, in: Nancy L. Green / François Weil (eds), *Citizenship and Those Who Leave: The Politics of Emigration and Expatriation*, Urbana 2007, pp. 33–60, ct. p. 36.

2 Zolberg, *Exit Revolution*, p. 33.

3 Ibid., p. 40.

4 Ibid., pp. 41, 49–53. The most prominent exception from the pattern was France.

criminal records or politically subversive activity provided reasons for expulsion.⁵ Ethnicity, in contrast, only slowly grew from serving as a form of metaphor, or abbreviation, for concrete socio-political concerns – *e.g.*, in the case of pauperized Irish in England⁶ – into an issue of its own, of national homogeneity, for instance the Poles in Germany.⁷

Basically the same tradition, yet modified and partially nationalized, can be observed in the administration of residence rights, expulsion, and according passport-systems that were developed in revolutionary France and soon spread elsewhere. The main idea was to single out political enemies, spies, and other subversive elements.⁸

Finally, a similar pattern of social evaluation ranking over cultural ascription characterized US legal approaches towards migration. With the Naturalization Act of 1790 conceding the right to naturalization to any “free white person” of “good character,” attempts to restrict the immigration of undesirables became subject to a variety of federal and state legislations.¹⁰

Generally speaking, exclusion followed an assessment of individual properties, which targeted the (mentally) disabled, criminals, and those who seemed unable to support themselves; later professional beggars, polygamists, and anarchists were added to the list.¹¹ Incurable or infectious disease became a ground for rejection, while admission

5 Frank Caestecker, The Transformation of Nineteenth-Century West European Expulsion Policy, 1880–1914, in: Andreas Fahrmeir / Olivier Faron / Patrick Weil (eds), *Migration Control in the North Atlantic World. The Evolution of State Practices in Europe and the United States from the French Revolution to the Interwar Period*, New York / Oxford 2003, pp. 120–137, here pp. 121–123.

6 David Feldman, Was the Nineteenth Century a Golden age for Immigrants? The Changing Articulation of National, Local, and Voluntary Controls, in: Andreas Fahrmeir / Olivier Faron / Patrick Weil (eds), *Migration Control in the North Atlantic World. The Evolution of State Practices in Europe and the United States from the French Revolution to the Interwar Period*, New York / Oxford 2003, pp. 167–177, here pp. 169–170.

7 Ulrich Herbert, *A History of Foreign Labor in Germany, 1880–1980. Seasonal Workers, Forced Laborers, Guest Workers*, Ann Arbor 1990 (1st German ed. “Geschichte der Ausländerbeschäftigung in Deutschland”, Berlin / Bonn 1986), pp. 9–37; Dieter Gosewinkel, *Einbürgern und Ausschließen. Die Nationalisierung der Staatsangehörigkeit vom Deutschen Bund bis zur Bundesrepublik Deutschland*, Göttingen 2001, pp. 211–218. – Admittedly, this is a very abridged, typified representation of a “picture [...] of migration control in the nineteenth century [that] is one of extreme diversity” as fits an “age of experimentation” in this concern: Andreas Fahrmeir / Olivier Faron / Patrick Weil, Introduction, in: the same (eds), *Migration Control in the North Atlantic World. The Evolution of State Practices in Europe and the United States from the French Revolution to the Interwar Period*, New York / Oxford 2003, pp. 1–7, here p. 2.

8 Andreas Fahrmeir / Olivier Faron / Patrick Weil (eds), *Migration Control in the North Atlantic World. The Evolution of State Practices in Europe and the United States from the French Revolution to the Interwar Period*, New York / Oxford 2003, chapters 1, 3, and 4.

9 After a period of residence, at that time of two years: *United States Statutes at Large*, vol. 1, p. 103.

10 Dorothee Schneider, The United States government and the investigation of European emigration in the open door era, in: Nancy L. Green / François Weil (eds), *Citizenship and Those Who Leave: The Politics of Emigration and Expatriation*, Urbana 2007, pp. 195–210; Gerald L. Neumann, Qualitative Migration Controls in the Antebellum United States, in: Andreas Fahrmeir / Olivier Faron / Patrick Weil (eds), *Migration Control in the North Atlantic World. The Evolution of State Practices in Europe and the United States from the French Revolution to the Interwar Period*, New York / Oxford 2003, pp. 106–119.

11 Patrick Weil, Races at the Gate. Racial Distinctions in Immigration Policy. A Comparison between France and the United States, in: Andreas Fahrmeir / Olivier Faron / Patrick Weil (eds), *Migration Control in the North Atlantic World. The Evolution of State Practices in Europe and the United States from the French Revolution to the Interwar Period*, New York / Oxford 2003, pp. 271–297, here p. 273.

after quarantine and a restoration of health were rather common practice.¹² Collective categories such as ethnicity, religion, or social background did not come into consideration, at least not lawfully.

The act made manifest a line of exclusion that was repeatedly drawn and redrawn, which was negotiated in Europe, as well: that of race.¹³ Evidently, there is an early echo of "Europe" as a category of origin in this. Still, the accent here is on the fundamental divide between "free" and "un-free." In the face of weak immigration from other parts of the world, the central idea was to deny slaves of generally African origin – as well as "native" Americans – naturalization as citizens. A ban on immigration was derived from this after the abolition of the slave trade; in 1808, slave states barred the entry of free blacks, while "free" states chose diverse regimes, from the protection to the exclusion of all people of African origin.¹⁴ Shortly after, legislation engaged the rights and acceptability of indentured servants in general, including Europeans¹⁵, thus illustrating that the main concern was with liberty (and commercial relations) rather than with race. From this point of view, it appears only consistent that after the abolition of slavery, citizenship was granted to all those born on American soil (the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments), and in 1870, eligibility was extended to Africans in general.¹⁶ Following a comparable logic, Britain had allowed colonials to settle on the isle after its own ban on slavery in 1833.¹⁷

From Atlantic to Pacific Racism and back

If post-Civil War America turned towards "Atlantic Universalism," it soon saw the intensification of inhibitive policies towards Asian immigrants that then produced constrictions explicitly addressing racially or culturally defined collectives. At about the same time, European migratory regimes became increasingly dominated by the category of nation. The reason was twofold.

First, in most countries the state developed from an institution that primarily took (taxes, conscripts) into one that also gave, allotting civic, political, and social rights and entitlements.¹⁸ The more such instruments of participation and inclusion on the supra-local level were implemented, the more urgent it became to ascertain who exactly was to profit

12 M. Kraut, *Silent Travellers. Germs, Genes, and the Immigrant Menace*, New York 1994, p. 62.

13 Cf. Andreas Fahrmeir/Olivier Faron/Patrick Weil (eds), *Migration Control in the North Atlantic World. The Evolution of State Practices in Europe and the United States from the French Revolution to the Interwar Period*, New York/Oxford 2003, chapter 2.

14 Neumann, *Qualitative Migration Controls*, pp. 112–113, 115–117.

15 *Ibid.*, pp. 113–114.

16 *United States Statutes at Large*, vol. 16, p. 256; see also Donna Gabaccia, *The "Yellow Peril" and the Chinese of Europe: Global Perspectives on Race and Labor, 1815–1930*, in: Jan Lucassen/Leo Lucassen (eds), *Migration, Migration History, History: Old Paradigms and New Perspectives*, Bern et al. 3rd ed. 2005, pp. 177–196, here p. 191.

17 Frank Düvell, *United Kingdom*, in: Ruby Gropas/Anna Triandafyllidou (eds), *European Immigration. A Sourcebook*, Aldershot 2007, pp. 346–359, here p. 347.

18 Caestecker, *Transformation*, p. 130: „While, for most of the nineteenth century, the state was principally something that took (taxes and conscripts), by the end of the century it also gave.“

from the according provisions and who was not.¹⁹ It was less the system of migratory regimes in a narrower sense, which long remained comparatively liberal, or indifferent, but the problem of undesirable, mostly destitute individuals on the spot, from which a significant change in the administration of mobility originated.²⁰ While self-dependent persons of means continued to enjoy relative freedom of movement, it was the developing national welfare state of the German *Reich* that began elevating nationality to the status of a key category in practices of admission and expulsion. Between 1888 and 1906, international conventions codified the principle.²¹ According to these stipulations, an individual rejected elsewhere had to be admitted back into his or her country of origin. Respectively, any “foreigner” could be transferred to his “home” country.²² Moreover, it was this order of re-admission, in contrast to the older practice of expulsion over just any border,²³ which rendered national affiliation key in the classification of the mobile population²⁴ – and an oft-contested one. Intense research and prolonged struggles over the national identity of an undesired migrant, and thus over the responsibility for supporting him, became a widespread phenomenon.²⁵

To put the rule to the test, the Habsburg Empire is a case where welfare remained a strictly municipal, or local, function. Here, needy migrants were addressed as non-eligible “strangers” (*Fremde*) without further classification or regard for their territorial origin. Only in the “constitutional” period of the 1860s, with widening political rights, were attempts made to define and restrict the rights of alien residents – without any consistent legislative result. The tense multiethnic situation of the empire suggested to leave the issue pending, all the more as the monarchy did not experience large-scale immigration anyway.²⁶

This leads to the second and more obvious reason for the rise of ethnic or racial categories in the structure of migratory regimes: a general expansion of migration flows, their gradual interweavement into a globally interdependent system, and a corresponding increase in the heterogeneity of regions of origin.

Up to the 1860s, immigration to the USA had its source mainly in North Western and German speaking Europe, which supplied ninety-five percent of the new arrivals between 1851 and 1860. By the first decade of the twentieth century, though, their share dropped to twenty percent.²⁷ Ranking high among the areas of origin that now domi-

19 Rogers Brubaker, *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany*, Cambridge 1992, pp. 63–70.

20 Cf. Caestecker, *Transformation*, S. 129.

21 Ibid., p. 126–127.

22 Ibid., p. 126–127.

23 Ibid., p. 123.

24 Cf. Ibid., p. 128.

25 Ibid., pp. 128, 130.

26 Birgitta Bader-Zaar, *Foreigners and the Law in Nineteenth-Century Austria. Juridical Concepts and Legal Rights in the Light of the Development of Citizenship*, in: Andreas Fahrmeir/Olivier Faron/Patrick Weil (eds), *Migration Control in the North Atlantic World. The Evolution of State Practices in Europe and the United States from the French Revolution to the Interwar Period*, New York/Oxford 2003, pp. 138–152.

27 Aristide R. Zolberg, *The Great Wall Against China: Responses to the First Immigration Crisis, 1885–1925*, in: Jan

nated the statistics were the Mediterranean and Eastern Europe (Italy, the Habsburg Monarchy, Russia, and also Spain and Portugal), and notably China.²⁸ As a matter of fact, it was Chinese immigration that provoked a change in the US migratory regime over the latter decades of the century, soon affecting migrants from other parts of the world, and namely from Europe.²⁹

If post Civil War legislation conceded naturalization rights to all those born on US soil and quickly extended the option to immigrants from Africa, the same law generally denied such rights to those arriving from Asia.³⁰ In 1882, the "Chinese Exclusion Act" banned the entry of Chinese contract laborers, and in 1885, the law was extended to exclude all "un-free" work and toilers irrespective of their origin.³¹ Thus, the underlying pattern of racial exclusion at first remained untouched: The motivating argument behind the anti-Chinese reformulation of the migratory regime was provided and propagated by early trade union campaigns, which undertook to fend off the transpacific influx of cheap labor, stressing its un-free character. The "coolie trade," or so the argument ran, operated under conditions that resembled those of the just abolished slave system, threatening American "free labor."³²

Cultural, racial and juridical allegations were amalgamated to a degree that let "non-white" and "un-free" appear almost congruent – albeit such semantics were neither covered by the reality of Chinese work migration,³³ nor were they consistent with that of emancipated "black" African Americans.³⁴

Nonetheless, Chinese became associated with imaginations of dependency, closely linked to those of cultural inferiority, and specifically of a devious, effeminate collective character.³⁵ "A distinct and antagonistic race,"³⁶ they were marked as Un-American and, what is more, as inaccessible to Americanization. At the hands of Chinese migrants, US immigration policies first began to develop and to test judicial and administrative

Lucassen/Leo Lucassen (eds), *Migration, Migration History, History. Old Paradigms and New Perspectives*, Bern et al. 3rd ed. 2005, pp. 291–315, here p. 314.

28 Zolberg, *Great Wall*, pp. 298–303.

29 Gabaccia, "Yellow Peril", p. 180; Matthew James Conelly, *Seeing beyond the State: The Population Control Movement and the Problem of Sovereignty*, in: *Past and Present* 193 (2006), 197–233, here p. 206.

30 Weil, *Races at the Gate*, p. 273. For a comprehensive, comparative study of the perception and political use of the "Yellow Peril" in the United States and Germany, see Ute Mehnert, *Deutschland, Amerika und die „Gelbe Gefahr“*. Zur Karriere eines Schlagworts in der Großen Politik, 1905–1917, Stuttgart 1995.

31 Gabaccia, "Yellow Peril", pp. 191–192.

32 Ibid., p. 186; Karen J. Leong, "A Distinct and Antagonistic Race". *Constructions of Chinese Manhood in the Exclusionist Debates, 1869–1878*, in: Donna R. Gabaccia/Vicki L. Ruiz (eds), *American Dreaming, Global Realities. Rethinking U. S. Immigration History*, Urbana/Chicago 2006, pp. 141–157, here pp. 141–142; Alexander Saxton, *The Indispensable Enemy. Labor and the Anti-Chinese Movement in California*, Berkeley 1971.

33 Adam McKeown, *Global Migration, 1846–1940*, in: *Journal of World History* 15 (2004, 2), 155–189, here pp. 170–175.

34 Cf. David R. Roediger, *The Wages of Whiteness. Race and the Making of the American Working Class*, London 1992.

35 Cf. Clare Sears, *All that Glitters. Trans-ing California's Gold Rush Migration*, in: *GLQ. A Journal on Lesbian and Gay Studies* 14 (2008, 2-3), pp. 383–402.

36 Cf. Leong, "A Distinct and Antagonistic Race".

mechanisms aimed at the exclusion of whole ethnically and culturally defined groups as “unfit for America.”³⁷

Yet, the racially charged Sinophobe discourses, legislation, and practices induced by no means the construction of (desirable) “Europeans” *ex negativo*. On the contrary, “white” was incongruent with “European,” and “color” proved to be a quite shaded concept.³⁸

Donna Gabaccia has shown this in a striking manner for the case of the Italians, whose experience soon was to be shared by other groups of immigrants.³⁹ Exclusionist legislation on “yellow” Chinese “coolies” was only just established when the supposedly equally, or almost equally, “un-free” Italian migrants, suffering from adhesion contracts and exerting pressure on wages, fell to stigmatizations as “swarthy,” or “olive” and ultimately to the pointed verdict that they represent “the Chinese of Europe.”⁴⁰

Thus, the concept of “European” in these debates on immigration to the United States is at best an implicit and normative one. If “Europeans” ideally were “free” and “white,” or used to be, they now proved in large numbers not to be – that is, organized interest and discourses of self-affirmation came to represent it that way. Incongruent with an assumed “fitness for America,” the category of “European” could not serve to define the US migratory regime.

Instead, legislative experience with the exclusion of an ethnically defined collective that was perceived as economic competition⁴¹ and successfully was marked as “distinct” and “antagonistic” towards US-nativist self-assumptions,⁴² stimulated attempts to close the door for other groups whose profile of origin differed from that of the bulk of earlier immigrants, as well.⁴³ Southern and Eastern Europeans, and among these, specifically Jews were the major targets.⁴⁴ According legislation passed through Congress first in 1896, but was blocked by presidential veto until 1917.⁴⁵

Yet, just as the Chinese Exclusion Act – albeit named tellingly enough – did not primarily rely on its ethnical content but drew on concepts of “free” and “un-free” labor, it was now literacy that was to serve the purpose. The bill envisioned a reading test to guarantee minimum standards that large strata of the Mediterranean and East European

37 Leong, “A distinct and Antagonistic Race”, pp. 141–142; Zolberg, *Great Wall*, pp. 291, 304–309; Conelly, *Seeing beyond the State*, p. 206. I here will pass over the interdependence with corresponding policies in Canada and Australia (Zolberg, *Great Wall*, p. 292), as well as over the systematic interrelation of capitalism, modernisation, modernisation anxiety, and xenophobia (cf. Lynn Dumenil, *The Modern Temper. American Culture and Society in the 1920s*, New York 1995, p. 204).

38 On the social base of color also cf. Matt Wray, *Not Quite White. White Trash and the Boundaries of Whiteness*, Durham/London 2006.

39 Gabaccia, “Yellow Peril”, p. 178; also cf. Roediger, *Wages of Whiteness*, pp. 133–156, on the “Whitening” of the Irish.

40 Gabaccia, “Yellow Peril”, p. 178.

41 Zolberg, *Great Wall*, pp. 304–305.

42 *Ibid.*, pp. 307–308.

43 Among other Filipinos and Japanese, whom interested employers soon had begun to hire as replacements for the excluded Chinese: Zolberg, *Great Wall*, p. 306.

44 Dumenil, *Modern Temper*, pp. 203–217; Zolberg, *Great Wall*, p. 304.

45 Zolberg, *Great Wall*, p. 307.

populations could be expected to fail, implying the desired ethno-regional exclusion.⁴⁶ When the law finally was enacted at the end of World War I, with transatlantic migration picking up again, it showed itself impotent due to exceptions providing for family reunions, but mostly since educational standards in the targeted areas had significantly improved.⁴⁷

Only then, among an atmosphere of Red Scare and massive nativist reaction against "non-whites" (and non-protestants), generally against the backdrop of an increasingly aggressive mood towards various deviances from a narrowly contoured set of normative WASP style concepts,⁴⁸ did ethnic restriction come forward to articulate its goals bluntly and extensively. From 1921/24 onward, the law commanded Asians to be rejected altogether and Europeans to be permitted only according to a quota system that in the long run would allow reestablishing the US society's ethnic composition before the latest "wave" of immigration.⁴⁹

The basis upon which the necessary classification rested, and which instructed the quota system of the 1920s, was a "list of races and peoples"⁵⁰ that had served since 1898 to gather statistical information on immigration to the US. Before, only the country of origin had been asked to be reported,⁵¹ which often was a multinational empire. Thus, seemingly grave misinterpretations had come to light, *e. g.*, in a number of 40,000 immigrants from Russia in 1898, only 200 proved to be "actual" Russians, the vast majority declared themselves Jews or Poles.⁵²

This enlightening list strongly reminds one of the "Chinese Encyclopedia" famously quoted by Jorge Luis Borges.⁵³ It contained among other the ascriptions: African (black), Armenian, Bohemian, Moravian, Bulgarian, Serbian, Montenegrin, Chinese, Croatian and Slovenian, Cuban, Dalmatian, Bosnian and Herzegovian, Dutch and Flemish, East Indian, English, Finnish, French, German, Greek, Hebrew, Irish, Italian (North), Italian (South), Japanese, Korean, Lithuanian, Magyar, Mexican, Pacific Islander, Polish, Portuguese, Russian, Ruthenian (Russnik), Scandinavian (Norwegians, Danes and Swedes), Scottish, and Welsh.⁵⁴ What is of interest here is less the intriguing mixture of political, geographical, lingual, confessional, biological and other criteria and assumptions the list reflects, nor its alternation of keen attention for the slightest differentials with rather crudely encompassing classes, and neither the motivation and mechanisms that

46 Ibid.

47 Ibid., p. 307–308.

48 Dumenil, *Modern Temper*, pp. 201–249; Zolberg, *Great Wall*, p. 308; also cf. Julian B. Carter, *The Heart of Whiteness. Normal Sexuality and Race in America, 1880–1940*, Durham/London 2007.

49 Zolberg, *Great Wall*, p. 308.

50 Both terms were used largely indiscriminate up to World War II: Weil, *Races at the Gate*, p. 277. For the semantic change of "nation" and "race" over the 19th century, including the invention of the "Caucasian", also see Patrick Manning, *Migration in World History*, London/New York, 2005, p. 139.

51 Weil, *Races at the Gate*, p. 273.

52 Ibid., p. 274.

53 Michel Foucault, *The Order of Things. An Archaeology of Human Sciences*, New York 1970 (1st French ed. "Les mots et les choses", Paris 1966), p. xv.

54 Weil, *Races at the Gate*, pp. 273, 275.

made US officials fabricate their 1898 racial map of the globe.⁵⁵ What is of relevance for the argument here is the fact that when US immigration authorities began to construe and employ categories of ethno-cultural belonging, the “free white person” of 1790 did not at all evolve into a *Homo Europaeus* but rather was disassembled into innumerable subgroups of “races and peoples”; the most obvious privilege was their elaborate division into incomparably smaller segments than the “rest of the world” could hope to be hierarchically organized along.

The quotas established in 1921/24 were about ethno-cultural hierarchic ordering. They translated the 1898 catalogue into a rank of desirability, with North Western Europeans first, limited numbers of East and South Europeans grudgingly accepted, and Asians had the door slammed on them.⁵⁶

As time went by, political circumstances induced the introduction of Latvian, Estonian, and Albanian “races” in 1936, as well as the belated unification of “Southern” and “Northern” Italy by US immigration authorities “with respect to the Italian people,” that is, to Mussolini.⁵⁷ “African (black)” became “Negro” since the majority of the individuals in question arrived from the West Indies. Pressure by the Mexican government brought their co-nationals into the meta category “white”; analogous efforts from lobby groups earned the Celtic “race” of the Manx special mentioning, while in 1943 this same category with regard to the Jews was abolished – after years of fruitless protest against such irreverence of context or conversion.⁵⁸ At that point, the corresponding report came to acknowledge that “scientists are in hopeless confusion and contradiction as to the criteria of race.”⁵⁹

Still, it took another twenty years before the ethno-racial ranking of US immigrants was dropped. In 1965, the gargantuan list was replaced by a migratory regime that – again – rewarded individual properties.⁶⁰ By then, migration control in the Old World was entering an era of categorical change, too.

Races, Nations, and Empires

Just like in the United States, Sino-obsession rose to prominence in late nineteenth century European reactions to modern mobility. Yet, while English xenophobes during the debates on restrictionism that took off around 1900 pictured Chinese as “the truest of al-

55 Nor, we should admit, the likelihood of our own conceptions of “the world” being an equally rewarding source of scholarly amusement.

56 Weil, *Races at the Gate*, pp. 276–277; Leslie P. Moch, *Moving Europeans. Migration in Western Europe since 1650*, 2nd ed. Bloomington/Indianapolis 2003 (1st ed. 1992), p. 166.

57 Weil, *Races at the Gate*, p. 277.

58 Ibid.

59 Ibid., p. 278.

60 Dirk Hoerder, *Cultures in Contact. World Migration in the Second Millennium*, Durham/London 2002, pp. 523–524.

iens,"⁶¹ German estate owners, in 1895, explicitly suggested recruiting Chinese seasonal toilers – with reactions by German unions similar to those of organized labor across the Atlantic.⁶²

No more than was the case in America, neither controversy simply produced a binary understanding of "Yellow Peril" vs. "European Civilization," let alone according migratory regimes. Instead, the background for suggestions to bring "coolies" to Germany was provided by distinct anti-Polish resentments.⁶³ Also, Prussian and Whig exclusionism equally focused on Galician and Russian Jews, differing from patterns of Chinese-bashing slightly at best.⁶⁴ In England, "Jew" and "immigrant" came close to being used as synonyms, leaving behind even the time-honored despise for the nominally British Irish.⁶⁵

In another parallel to US practices, late nineteenth century French scholars drew up a catalogue of ethnic hierarchy to structure the migratory regime.⁶⁶ Obviously, in this incident the intention was not so much to (re-)stabilize the ethnic composition of the nation. Rather, the classification relied on blood groups and their compatibility and paid particular attention to the various groups' faculty to assimilate into the job market. The resulting gradient was quite similar to that of the American racial map: It ran from North West to South East across the European continent and beyond, assembling on the lowest rungs of desirability Jews, Eastern Slavs, Armenians, and Africans. In contrast to the United States, though, this order of peoples never materialized into legislation. After decades of controversy in changing political contexts, liberated France in 1945 ultimately implemented a racially egalitarian migratory regime – twenty years before the US swung back into the same path.

The one thing all these regulatory attempts – or their mentioned absence as in the case of the Habsburg Empire until its downfall in 1918 –, failed or successful, had in common, was that they did not conceive a positively defined *Homo Europaeus*. The idea of an overarching "white race" was indeed widely spread and so were assumptions of its almost self evident superiority. But by far, not all Europeans were treated as fully-fledged "white" in this normative sense. The geographical and historical idea of "Europe" had no distinct and coherent equivalent in terms of ethnic or social imagination primarily because it was lacking a political and institutional distinction.

Larger-than-nation political structures, though, did exist in the form of the European colonial empires, and respective post-colonial spaces and organizations. These did have an impact on migratory regimes, especially when many of the countries to the West

61 Zolberg, *Great Wall*, p. 311.

62 Sebastian Conrad/Klaus Mùhlhahn, *Globale Mobilität und Nationalismus. Chinesische Migration und die Re-Territorialisierung des Nationalen um 1900*, in: Birgit Schäbler (ed.), *Area Studies und die Welt. Weltregionen und neue Globalgeschichte*, Wien 2007, pp. 217–251, here pp. 222–225; but see also Mehnert, *Deutschland, Amerika und die "Gelbe Gefahr"*, for the more general, anxious reaction.

63 Conrad/Mùhlhahn, *Globale Mobilität*, pp. 224–225.

64 Zolberg, *Great Wall*, p. 311; Conrad/Mùhlhahn, *Globale Mobilität*, pp. 224–225.

65 Zolberg, *Great Wall*, pp. 312–313; Moch, *Moving Europeans*, p. 167.

66 Weil, *Races at the Gate* 281–288.

and the North of the continent irrevocably and on a large scale changed from sending to predominantly receiving societies after World War II.⁶⁷ In Britain, this led to the divorce of the Commonwealth citizenship from unhindered mobility in 1961⁶⁸, undoing the long standing freedom of residence established across the empire in 1833 following the abolition of slavery.⁶⁹ A complex interplay of restrictions and privileges concerning rights of entry and settlement, to welfare and integration programs, and of integration and exclusion came to characterize the migratory regimes of most (post-) imperial nation states with regard to the populations of their actual or former colonies.⁷⁰ This holds true for countries that over time developed shortages of labor, like Britain, France, and the Netherlands, but also for the sending societies of Portugal and Spain, and remnants of this historical legacy remain in effect to date.⁷¹

At the same time, these countries, but also nations without – accessible – post-imperial supplementary areas, such as Germany, concluded recruitment contracts with partners mainly around the Mediterranean basin to fill labor shortages. As a rule, such agreements were bilateral,⁷² while the scope of partners was not limited to what geographically or culturally was then commonly perceived as Europe. Rather, they reached beyond Southern Europe to North Africa as well as to various regions of the Near East and East Asia.⁷³ Again, these specific migratory regimes did not operate with the category of a European man.

Homo Europaeus

The Europeanization of Europe set in just about when the European overseas empires faced accelerating decolonization. In this context, “Europeanization” alludes less to the thesis of a “continually shrinking influence of national governments,”⁷⁴ but rather refers to the emergence of the European Community as an institutional entity and thereby as a player of potential relevance in migration politics.

The first step was made by the European Economic Community, founded in 1957, when in 1961 its members – France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxembourg – agreed to grant their citizens general freedom of movement within each other’s territory.⁷⁵ Since then, the processes of integration and expansion have transformed con-

67 Moch, *Moving Europeans*, pp. 176–177; South Western Europe followed suit in the late 1970s: *ibid.*, p. 190–191.

68 Hoerder, *Cultures in Contact*, p. 502.

69 See above, ann. 17.

70 Hoerder, *Cultures in Contact*, pp. 502–504, 522, 528.

71 See below.

72 Ruby Gropas/Anna Triandafyllidou, *Concluding Remarks*, in: the same (eds), *European Immigration. A Sourcebook*, Aldershot 2007, pp. 361–376, here p. 369.

73 Gropas/Triandafyllidou, *Concluding Remarks*, p. 362; Moch, *Moving Europeans*, pp. 162–163, 178–180, 184.

74 Roland Verwiebe, *Transnationale Mobilität innerhalb Europas. Eine Studie zu den sozialstrukturellen Effekten der Europäisierung*, Berlin 2004, p. 16.

75 Moch, *Moving Europeans*, p. 177.

tinental mobility from a legal point of view into internal migration.⁷⁶ More specifically, the Single European Act of 1986⁷⁷, and the Maastricht Treaty that took effect on January 1, 1994, have provided the framework for unrestricted mobility within the Union⁷⁸ – temporary curtails and delay clauses notwithstanding, which accompanied the “eastern enlargements” since 2004⁷⁹, in particular. The Maastricht Treaty also created a European citizenship by according all member state citizens – and only them – a certain set of rights, including free choice of residence, suffrage in local and European elections at the place of residence, diplomatic protection in third countries, and the right to petition to the European Parliament.⁸⁰

Yet, one issue the treaty neglected, or codified to the lowest possible degree, was the competence of European authorities over regulations concerning the immigration of non-EU nationals into the union, that is, its member states.⁸¹ Nonetheless, the common institutions over the following decade managed to pass a number of acts that bind the nation states in this concern. On the one hand, it soon became manifest that a zone of unrestricted mobility with a common external border runs into functional difficulty if no provisions are set for who is to have access to this zone and which rights and entitlements they receive within. On the other hand, national governments realized that the partial Europeanization actually accommodated their increasingly restrictive purposes.⁸² As a consequence, the constitutional project of the later 2000s envisaged a further delegation of authority over the migratory regime to the common institutions, even though a clause carried by Germany reserves every national government’s right to legislate a general cap on immigration into its territory.⁸³

Thus, the EU-27 countries differentiate between national citizens, EU citizens, and third state nationals, with the civic and political⁸⁴ rights and entitlements of the latter varying strongly from country to country.⁸⁵ Similarly, national concepts of citizenship and naturalization practices remain strongly heterogeneous.⁸⁶ Last but not least, this is the

76 Ibid., pp. 177–178.

77 Adam Luedtke, *The European Union dimension: Supranational integration, free movement of persons, and immigration politics*, in: Craig A. Parsons/Timothy M. Smeeding (eds), *Immigration and the Transformation of Europe*, Cambridge et al. 2006, pp. 419–441, here p. 422.

78 Verwiebe, *Transnationale Mobilität*, p. 18.

79 Ibid., p. 19.

80 Marco Martiniello, *European citizenship, European identity and migrants: towards the post-national state?*, in: Robert Miles/Dietrich Thränhardt (eds), *Migration and European Integration. The Dynamics of Inclusion and Exclusion*, London 1995, pp. 37–52, here p. 38; Elspeth Guild, *The Legal Framework of Citizenship of the European Union*, in: David Cesarani/Mary Fulbrook (eds), *Citizenship, Nationality and Migration in Europe*, London/New York 1996, pp. 30–54.

81 Luedtke, *European Union dimension*, pp. 420, 423.

82 Ibid., p. 420–421, 424; Moch, *Moving Europeans*, p. 163–164.

83 Ibid., pp. 420, 424–425.

84 Especially concerning active and passive suffrage at the local level: Gropas/Triandafyllidou, *Concluding Remarks*, p. 374.

85 Gropas/Triandafyllidou, *Concluding Remarks*, p. 372.

86 Ruby Gropas/Anna Triandafyllidou/Dita Vogel, *Introduction*, in: Ruby Gropas/Anna Triandafyllidou (eds), *European Immigration. A Sourcebook*, Aldershot 2007, pp. 1–17, here p. 7.

realm in which diverse imperial or quasi-imperial pasts display a long afterlife, *e. g.*, in the form of facilitated naturalization for German *Spätaussiedler*, or repatriates from the East European German speaking minorities, for Filipinos, Equatorial-Guineans and others in Spain, or for PALOP⁸⁷-nationals in Portugal.⁸⁸

However, those reverberations of the past appear to be phasing out. More or less in parallel to their opening up for “Europeans,” most post-colonial centers gradually have adopted more restrictionist, or even exclusivist migratory regimes towards the former imperial peripheries. Regardless of the persisting differences, there is one distinction that has gained thorough acceptance throughout the Union’s legislatures: that between “Europeans” and *Extracomunitari*⁸⁹ (non-EU immigrants). In other words, synchronously to the reduction of the European empires European migratory regimes finally brought about *Homo Europaeus*. On the other hand, it is to be remembered that his habitat is politically limited to the local and supranational level, while in national affairs, even a European foreigner remains just a foreigner.

Another somewhat ironic aspect of this turn of the Europeans towards themselves is that at the very moment they started creating *Homo Europaeus migrans*, their historical counterpart in negotiations over access classifications dropped the approach of ethnic or origin criteria altogether. As aforementioned, in 1965 the USA chose to implement a migratory regime based on individual properties so that the category of European in terms of migration remains limited to one side of the North Atlantic (travel and visa regulations render a different picture, of course).

Even with regard to the European continent, the concept is *de facto* and by no means wholeheartedly inclusivist. There always has been, and continues to be, the hierarchy of access between EC/EU insiders and other continentals. More tellingly, and somewhat reminding of the earlier shades of “whiteness,” negotiations over enlargement since 1989/90 have carried strong ethnocentric, if not openly racist undertones that still linger in the delay of full freedom of mobility for East European member-state citizens – let alone non-member state nationals – and that are awkwardly manifest in the debate over a possible admission of Turkey. Not accidentally, this struggle over membership, affiliation, or outright exclusion is centered on prospective migrant flows. At its core, the discussion is on whose mobility deserves warm approval as free internal migration, and whose entry ought be blocked to prevent culturally “foreign” infiltration. Thus, the migratory regime definition of who is, or can be, a European – who is culturally “fit for Europe,” to take up the early twentieth-century American phrase – has seized a constitutive place in the fabrication of European identity. If *Homo Europaeus* is a result of political Europe, the self-interpretation of the supra-national community proves highly dependent on the ethnic profile of this new figure in the world of migratory regimes. The legacy of the White Man is still with us in his descendant.

87 “Países Africanos de Língua Oficial Portuguesa”, or “Portuguese-Speaking African Countries”.

88 Gropas/Triandafyllidou, Concluding Remarks, p. 373.

89 Gropas/Triandafyllidou/Vogel, Introduction, p. 11.

Drawing Geographies of Belonging: Representations of the European in the Australian Press of the 1920s and the 1960s

Mandy Kretzschmar

RESÜMEE

Der Artikel vergleicht die Position, die „Europäer“ im öffentlichen Diskurs Australiens in den 1920er und in den 1960er Jahren einnahmen und stützt sich dabei auf die Auswertung von Wochenmagazinen wie *The Bulletin*, *Smith's Weekly*, *The Australian Worker* und *Nation*. Die gewählten Untersuchungszeiträume sind für die Formierung einer australischen Identität besonders relevant und markieren Stufen in einem Prozess der Auseinandersetzung mit der europäischen Abstammung der weißen Australier und mit der Rolle, die den Aborigines im australischen Nationsbildungsprozess spielen sollen. Es wird argumentiert, dass das Label *Europäer* eine spezifische Position in der kulturellen Logik australischer kollektiver Identität hat und sowohl der Betonung von Zugehörigkeit als auch der Abgrenzung dienen kann.

In November 1934, Egon Erwin Kisch, a Czechoslovak writer and journalist, travelled to Australia as a delegate and speaker at the Peace Congress of the *Movement Against War and Fascism*. Known as a campaigner of the *Communist International*, the right-wing Australian government declared him to be an alleged revolutionary and undesirable alien and denied him entry upon arrival. Kisch tried to defy the ban by jumping onto the wharf in Melbourne.¹ Despite fracturing his leg, he was taken into custody but later released on the order of the High Court. The tug-of-war continued as the conservative Lyons Government repeatedly attempted to exclude Kisch by means of the *Immigration*

1 Kisch gave detailed account on his visit to Australia in his book *Landung in Australien* (published under the English title *Australian Landfall*) in 1937.

Restriction Act. As a component of the *White Australia Policy*, the legislative measure allowed for a dictation test in any European language, infinitely repeatable and primarily aimed at restricting those considered 'non-white' from immigration by feigning to test English language competence but was occasionally misused to enforce political preferences.² The polyglot activist was requested to write the Lord's Prayer in Scottish Gaelic, and as expected, he failed. The Australian High Court over-ruled this decision arguing that Scottish Gaelic was not a European language within the meaning of the Act and thence unlawful, providing Kisch with the opportunity to address the crowds attracted by the publicity.³ Apart from illustrating the arbitrariness of governmental action, this episode exemplifies the processes of negotiating belonging and modes of *Othering* to carve out boundaries of citizenship to the imagined national community. Kisch's European descent did not ensure that he was welcomed to Australia. His political attitude was of more immediate concern to the ruling Government. The *Kisch Affair* not only exposed the will to curtail free speech and undermine democracy but also alluded to the significance of the category 'European'⁴ as a valuable tool to create social cohesion in larger narratives of Australian nation building.

The imagining of 'Europe' and the construction of the European person have received increased academic attention. Fundamental social and political changes initiated by the end of the Cold War and the widening of the European Union toward the East have stimulated interest in questions of collective identity formation. Dipesh Chakrabarty's pioneering study *Provincializing Europe* (2000) has explored how the mythical figure of Europe saturates postcolonial thought and Wolfgang Schmale has traced the advent of ideas of the 'European' back to antiquity, asserting that the European was a historical subject whose emergence and manifestations are in need of documentation and historical explanation.⁵ Recently, this research field has been enlarged as historians place greater emphasis on how the *Other* features within processes of imagining 'Europe'.⁶ However, scholars are so far reluctant to devote their attention to places and communities beyond the geographical entity Europe, where the imagined 'European' evolved as a device within a larger rhetoric of nation building. Australian historians on the other hand have interrogated the historical development, definition and deployment of similar categorisations – 'white' and 'British' in particular – in Australian settler society, and have highlighted the significance of these categories in the problematic search for national self-definition. But there is as yet no study that has been exclusively concerned with notions of the 'European', and the label's functionality and significance as an axis along

2 H. Zogbaum, *Kisch in Australia. The Untold Story*, Carlton 2004, p. 41.

3 F. Farrell, *International Socialism and Australian Labour: The Left in Australia 1919–1939*, Sydney 1981.

4 I use inverted commas throughout this article to specify when I refer to constructions of 'Europe' or the 'European'.

5 D. Chakrabarty, *Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference*, Princeton 2000.; W. Schmale, *Die Konstruktion des Homo Europaeus*, in: *Comparative European History Review* (2001), pp. 165–184.

6 Notable works include: I. Neumann, *Uses of the Other: The „East“ in European Identity Formation*, Minneapolis 1999.; J. Osterhammel, *Europa Um 1900: Auf der Suche nach einer Sicht „von Außen“*, Bochum 2008.; B. Stråth, *Europe and the Other and Europe as the Other*, Bruxelles 2000.

which differentiation and belonging could be negotiated in the Australian context. Recently, David Dutton and Ann Curthoys have acknowledged the potential of examining the 'European', but mainly as part of larger studies dedicated to Australian immigration history and the problematic issue of 'racialising' specific groups of arrivals.⁷

This article is concerned with the currency and connotations of the 'European', arguing that the term has often been used as an undeniable given rather than an imagined construct. I argue that the label holds a specific position in the cultural logic of Australian collective identity. This article will examine the label's deployment in the 1920s and the 1960s in the Australian press, specifically in weekly magazines such as *The Bulletin*, *Smith's Weekly*, *The Australian Worker* and *Nation*. Metaphorically speaking, the aim is to take a returning gaze through the Australian mirror investigating how press correspondents and readers consolidated representations of the 'European' in diverse media contexts to suit contemporary political imperatives. It will be shown that the 'European' as a category of classification and differentiation did not fit neatly into a Manichean divide, where representation is constructed in opposition. Rather, I argue, the 'European' served as a blanket-term that could operate to either emphasise belonging or to highlight demarcation with regard to understandings of being 'Australian' in different contexts. An introductory overview on the changing nature of Anglo-Australian relations at the turn of the twentieth century will precede the empirical findings. To reconstruct the versatility of representations, this paper will then compare selected examples from the 1920s and 1960s. Both decades mark decisive periods of radical social and cultural change in Australia, and are characterised by intensified nation building. I argue that over a brief period of a few decades the 'European' gradually shifts in the Australian national imaginary from being constructed as part of the *Self* to being seen as an *Other* among *Others*, without being understood this way completely.

Locating the European: The Australian case

Benedict Anderson has identified the interplay between the *Self* and the *Other*, identity and alterity, as essential to the cultural creation of *imagined communities*.⁸ He specifies that every *Self* – a person, group or nation – has a set of *Others* against whom it identifies itself either in opposition or in alliance, but only a few of these *Others* are utilized at a specific time. Despite acknowledging the significance of *Others* while reflecting underlying asymmetries of power and being critically aware that categorizations are based on cultural presuppositions, few studies have examined representations of the 'European' as created and circulated in societies beyond the perceived geographical borders of the continent.⁹ The case of Australia as a settler society that has been formed by fragments

7 D. Dutton, *One of Us? A Century of Australian Citizenship*, Sydney 2002; A. Curthoys, *White, British, and European: Historicizing Identity in Settler Colonies*, in: J. Carey and C. McLisky, *Creating White Australia*, Sydney 2009.

8 B. Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, London 1983.

9 For exceptions see among others: D. Sachsenmaier / J. Riedel, *Reflections on Multiple Modernities. European, Chinese and Other Interpretations*, Leiden 2002.

of European diaspora challenges any simplistic binarism such as *Us* versus *Them* or *East* versus *West*. The fundamental tension of cultural closeness to Britain and self-understanding as a 'white', Western society and geographical remoteness in an Asian, non-European location and the problematic relations to the Indigenous peoples characterized by a history of loss, violence and suppression, indicate the complexity and fragmentation of processes of identity construction taking place in the ex-colonies. Following Said's criticism about the western representation of the *Other* and by implication, the creation of self-identity, recent scholarship emphasizes the need to study these multiple entanglements and exchanges between European and non-European societies in history. This approach is regarded as a promising alternative to *Eurocentrism*, respectively contributing to the decentralization of the West in historical narratives.¹⁰

By way of detailing the rhetorical deployment and underlying meanings of the category 'European', I examine how and for what purposes social boundaries between different groups have been drawn. An academic inquiry into constructions of the 'European' in Australia requires an understanding of the significance of selective immigration as a central means of internal and external processes of *Othering*. From its colonial beginnings, Australia's economic and social development as a 'white nation' relied on attracting settlers. Colour consciousness shaped the composition of transoceanic migration flows. Those who were to make the newly established colonies their home were almost exclusively 'white' and British. The commitment to whiteness as the decisive feature of society was enacted into law in 1901. Restrictive legislation was implemented on a national level to ensure the prevalence of a high degree of racial and cultural homogeneity of the Australian society for future generations. Within this context of channeling population movements, different cohorts of migrants were constructed as either welcome or undesirable. Social, political and economic groups within Australia frequently mobilized aspects of collectively held ideas of the 'European' to mark out either a distinctive 'Australian-ness', or a cultural closeness as a Western nation, thereby marginalizing segments of the population. By the end of the Second World War, successive Australian governments gradually allowed for changes in the composition of migration intake. Racial ideas were discredited and Australia aimed to become an integral part of Asia. I argue in this article that although Australian policy makers mainly understood 'whiteness' as a racially inscribed 'Europeanness' in the first decades of the twentieth century, these terms were neither synonymous nor interchangeable. Further, the categorisation 'European' was not always perceived *per se* as different to the label 'Australian'. Rather, the category is used context-specifically and its meaning is subject to a constant remoulding. My main argument is that the 'European' was forged through engagement with a 'movable pool' of exclusionary and inclusive attributions, and became a powerful tool that could be utilized to claim entitlements, to form self-understandings and to manage populations.

10 S. Conrad/S. Randeria, *Geteilte Geschichten – Europa in einer postkolonialen Welt*, in: Idem (eds), *Jenseits des Eurozentrismus. Postkoloniale Perspektiven in den Geschichts- und Kulturwissenschaften*, Frankfurt am Main 2002, pp. 9–49.

Knowledge of the 'European' was, for example, germinated within and disseminated by the printed press, a site within which social boundaries were drawn. Newspapers reflect and are influenced by public opinion. As the central authority of mediation of discursive processes and knowledge, the media participate in how different individuals or groups are integrated into or excluded from society via the selective use of language and images.¹¹ The analysis of media manifestations therefore aims to shed light on diverging representations and perennial themes referring to the 'European' and linguistic specifics in constructing self-images and images of the *Other*. In order to provide depth and breadth of data, articles and political cartoons from leading weekly newspapers have been collected, covering the broad spectrum of political opinion. Between 1880 and 2008, *The Bulletin* was probably the most significant weekly magazine in Australia. Especially in its earlier years, it held a nationalist, protectionist and overwhelmingly racist attitude, providing well-informed business and political news. Likewise, *Smith's Weekly* aimed at close interaction with its (mainly male) readers, but held a more moderate view towards the Labor party. In contrast, the independent bi-weekly journal *Nation*, published between 1958–72, represented minority views strongly opposing the restrictive immigration legislation. Lastly, the union-based newspaper *The Australian Worker*, representative of the political Left, provided a wide range of national as well as local news through both decades of research.

Imagining the new nation: A British White Australia

Racial exclusion formed the basis of the evolving Australian nationalism and significantly shaped the way in which Australians imagined themselves and *Others*. In 1901, the six separate British colonies consolidated into the *Commonwealth of Australia*. Among the first legal enactments of the newly formed parliament, the *Immigration Restriction Act* passed into law constituting the cornerstone of the *White Australia policy*. Disguised in the form of a dictation test, non-Europeans were excluded on racial grounds from entering the country:

*The immigration into the Commonwealth of the persons described in any of the following paragraphs of this section (herein-after called "prohibited immigrants") is prohibited, namely: (a) Any person who when asked to do so by an officer fails to write out a dictation and sign in the presence of the officer a passage of fifty words in length in an European language directed by the officer.*¹²

These boundaries affected the composition of the population and reaffirmed its Anglo-Saxon character. As illustrated earlier in the Kisch case, the Act was also employed

11 M. Jäger, Zweierlei Maß. Die Berichterstattung über Straftaten von Deutschen und MigrantInnen in den Printmedien und das Dilemma der JournalistInnen, in: K. Liebhart, E. Menasse and H. Steinert (eds), *Fremdbilder – Feindbilder – Zerrbilder*, Klagenfurt 2002, pp. 57–77.

12 Immigration Restriction Act, National Archives of Australia, NAA: A1559/1, 1901/17, 1901.

deliberately against people who though they were racially considered 'European' were regarded as political opponents and therefore had to be prevented from entering the country. Thus, the restrictive immigration legislation stipulated categories of inclusion and exclusion. Furthermore, the adoption of racial determinism and the notion of whiteness reshaped the complex emotional identifications of Australians. In general, Australians thought of themselves as primarily a British people, and likewise Britishness remained the central defining idea of the Australian community up until the late 1950s.¹³ However, in addition, the notion of 'White Australia' cultivated a sense of national unity among the general public.

The desire to build a society founded upon racial and cultural homogeneity emerged out of a set of hybrid Western racial theories.¹⁴ Linked by the doctrines of Social Darwinism, Australian ethnocentrism was a composition of European imperialism, Caucasian racism and an emerging Australian nationalism.¹⁵ Exclusivist tendencies date back to the early days of colonial settlement and intensified with increased global mobility that caused closer encounters with the extra-European *Other*. At the beginning of European occupation, access to the colonies was almost solely permitted to British subjects, but with the end of convict transportation, the need for a cheap workforce to ensure territorial and economic development could not be met with free labour migration only. A trade in indentured labor began with Pacific Islanders working in Queensland's sugar industry constituting the largest group.¹⁶ Further, the discovery of gold during the 1850s attracted large numbers of Chinese to Australia. In the eyes of the colonists, the surge in arrivals was identified as a competition for resources and employment and sparked a series of riots. As a consequence colonial governments enacted legislation to reduce the number of non-European newcomers to a minimum. The growing trade union and Labor movement championed the idea of a *White Australia*, but liberal forces equally accepted it, arguing that certain groups were incapable of becoming part of an egalitarian, democratic society.¹⁷ The economic repression of the 1890s, followed by a rapid increase in unemployment, evoked hostilities toward non-Europeans once more. Together with spatial fears provoked by the imperial invasion of Germany and France in the immediate Pacific region, this provided a new push for the federal movement and with the creation of a restrictive immigration policy of national scope at the top of the agenda.

Gwenda Tavan, Andrew Markus, James Jupp and others have illuminated the ways in which the *White Australia* ideal has been expressed with the intention to create and maintain a homogeneous 'white society': the demand for restrictive immigration laws,

13 A. Hopkins, Rethinking Decolonization, in: Past and Present, no. 200 (2008), p. 221.

14 R. Evans, The White Australia Policy, in: J. Jupp, The Australian People: An Encyclopaedia of the Nation, its People and their Origins, Cambridge 2001, pp. 44-49, here p. 45.

15 D. Wyndham, Eugenics in Australia: Striving for National Fitness, London 2003, p. 23.

16 E. Richards, Migrations: The Career of British White Australia, pp. 163-185, in: D. Schreuder and S. Ward (eds), The Oxford History of the British Empire: Australia's Empire, Oxford 2008, p. 165.

17 A. Curthoys, Liberalism and Exclusionism, in: D. Walker/J. Gothard/L. Jayasuriya (eds), Legacies of White Australia: Race, Culture and Nation, Crawley 2003, pp. 8-32, here p. 29.

the repatriation of indentured laborers, the segregation of Indigenous Australians on reserves and the pursuit of Eugenic programs to “breed out color.”¹⁸ In addition, David Walker has examined how the image of an external Asian aggressor has been used to serve nation-building processes, arguing that the establishment of the policy was a statement about its future racial destiny and exemplified its position in the world. In *Drawing the Global Colour Line* (2008) Marilyn Lake and Henry Reynolds have been concerned with the growth and dissemination of racial thought in late nineteenth century, tying the ‘white men’s countries’ – Australia, Canada, New Zealand, South Africa and the United States – together in a struggle over securing their territories against possible ‘non-white’ intrusions.¹⁹ Historians have acknowledged overlapping meanings of what it meant to be ‘white’, Australian, and/or British within this context, yet the role of the ‘European’ has not been conceptualized as in need of separate explanation. This is surprising as a close reading of the historical sources suggests that the label though utilized to a lesser extent than other categorisations provided for an alternative method of framing subjectivity within the debate on immigration, giving indication of Australian self-understandings.

The 1920s: Focus on self-confidence and cultural closeness

Framed by the Great War and the Depression, the 1920s marked a time of contradiction for the Australian population and a period of intensive nation building. Urbanisation continued as more people were drawn to the cities. The majority of the (‘white’ and ‘British’) Australian society began to take pleasure in the advantages of a new age of prosperous living, but only those belonging to the middle class could enjoy the full extent of the rise in consumerism.²⁰ Uncertainty prevailed and was fostered by industrial unrest and prolonged unemployment. At the political level, the leading Nationalist government under Stanley Bruce (1923–29) experienced a threatening growth in support for Communism and Fascism. With regard to foreign politics, Australia remained financially dependent on Britain, economically vulnerable to shortfall in external markets. Anxieties were met with a perceived need to increase population and productivity, but in the mind of the Australian public, future prosperity and national cohesion remained intrinsically linked to racial and territorial integrity. Australia was still imagined as a ‘white country only’ and immigration was only selectively encouraged. The commitment to a ‘White British Australia’ necessarily involved the stereotypical labelling of groups of people to set their status of belonging in relation to the nation at large. Still, whiteness was not synonymous with Europeanness. In fact, those considered ‘European’ became subject to classification and racialisation in the 1920s.

18 G. Smithers, *Science, Sexuality, and Race in the U.S. and Australia, 1780s–1890s*, New York 2009, pp. 191–192.

19 M. Lake/H. Reynolds, *Drawing the Global Colour Line: White Men’s Countries and the International Challenge of Racial Equality*, Cambridge 2008.

20 D. Denoon/P. Mein-Smith/M. Wyndham, *A History of Australia, New Zealand and the Pacific*, Oxford 2000, p. 291.

Representations of the 'European' dominate three intertwining debates in the Australian news coverage. Firstly, the label is frequently utilised in regard to the project of developing the tropical north. Political leaders began to stress that more comprehensive settlement of the entire landmass was vital to Australia's future in the Pacific. In their view, the success of the project would determine whether national commitment to selective immigration could be justified both at home and in the international arena. However, the argument that the tropical climate caused racial degeneration still had credibility. With the support of scientific research, this argument was to be dismantled. In proving that the 'white' man, not necessarily the 'European', was capable of living and working in the tropics without the assistance of 'coloured labour', Australia's commitment to the survival of racial homogeneity and territorial integrity could be justified. Closely linked to the topic of settlement, the issue of European immigration to Australia was repeatedly discussed in the news headlines. While the exclusion of non-Europeans had been the foremost concern, comparatively little interest surrounded the terms and conditions under which non-British Europeans were to enter the country. After the First World War, the classification of continental Europeans as either 'desired' or 'unwanted' migrants suddenly moved into the centre of attention. Politicians and interest groups (such as trade unions) stressed the need to implement a systematic immigration policy toward so-called 'white aliens', a term that referred predominantly to people of Southern European origin.²¹ The questionable racial status of these 'Europeans' emanated from the perceived threat they posed to Australia's commitment to racial purity. Despite the small number of arrivals, the clustering of these immigrants in certain industries (especially in the Australian north) was exploited through media misrepresentation to evoke the sense of a steady influx. Lastly, the 'European' emerges in debates about Australia's administrative role in its external territorial holdings of Papua and New Guinea. In the late 1800s, Australian colonies had developed an increased interest in these islands as possible 'buffer zones' against an imagined Asian invasion and as sources of cheap labour that could be accessed for physically demanding work in the sugar industry on the Australian mainland. In its coverage on territory-related issues, the Australian press frequently labelled Australian expatriates residing in Papua and New Guinea as 'European'.

The First World War had an unsettling impact on almost every nation in the world. European domination came to an end and the United States of America evolved as a new global player. In addition, the growing power of Japan in the Pacific reinforced existing security concerns in Australia. Apart from the new spatial realignment not limited geographically to the European continent, the war experience triggered profound changes in previous self-understandings of Europe.²² In the past, Europe had represented the center of civilization, but in the light of the war atrocities, its position as a moral role model was gradually questioned. This severe crisis in European self-understanding was

21 Dutton, *One of Us?*, p. 50.

22 H. Kaelble, *Eine europäische Geschichte der Repräsentationen des Eigenen und des Anderen*, in: J. Baberowski / H. Kaelble / J. Schriewer (eds), *Selbstbilder und Fremdbilder*, Frankfurt am Main 2008, p. 67-81, here p. 72.

also perceived in Australia and reflected in the press. In September 1923, a political cartoon titled *The European Menagerie* appeared on *The Bulletin's* cover page.²³ On top of a vantage point, secure behind a fence, stands a little boy, embodying Australia as revealed by the lettering on his hat. The so-called *Little Boy at Manly* observes the scene below with some curiosity: an ensemble of animals and birds, each a stereotypical symbol for a European nation, deliver each other fierce blows. The French tiger snaps at the tail of the German eagle, calmly observed by the British lion. The Spanish bull is already wounded, whereas the Italian frog is ready to jump at the Greek fly. The Australian boy comments the situation stating that he has the best position after all. Although Australia's self-image reflects both immaturity and a feeling of inferiority as evident in its depiction as a child, it remains the only human player in the illustration, ascribing ideas of reason, common sense and morality compared to the pugnacity of the present European crowd. Moreover, the young boy's gaze onto the complexity of the shifting image(s) presented to him indicate the 'European's significant place in the Australian social imaginary.

A stronger focus on national interests linked with claiming recognition for Australia's war contribution marked the 1920s. Following the Canadian lead, Prime Minister Billy Hughes pressed for individual representation at the peace negotiations in Versailles, as well as separate membership in the *League of Nations*.²⁴ Australia was also conferred the status of a colonizing nation. Apart from being given a mandate to administer the former German part of New Guinea, Papua as an External Territory of the Australian Commonwealth created a buffer zone against the believed possibility of an Asiatic invasion. It is within this context of reporting on the situation in the new territorial holdings that Australians made frequent references to themselves as 'Europeans'. In both territories, the division between social groups was enforced in a similar way. The settler population, which ruled on behalf of the Australian government, dominated the economy and enforced discriminatory legislation against the natives. Australian policy makers sought to establish a new framework for relations with the native populace in their external territorial holdings, aiming to abandon the coercive and brutal system of colonial practice. During the previous decade, colonialism had been undergoing a striking redefinition into a philanthropic project, distinguished by humanitarianism, morality and rationality.²⁵ This change only gradually seeped into the mind of colonizing agents and the public. The adherence to established mentalities continued to reverberate in the way indigenous people were depicted and the expatriate community was portrayed. To be identified as 'European' was linked to a set of associated norms and obligations, equated to being educated, civilized and morally superior, and highlighted specific responsibilities of those subsumed under this term towards the native populace. A common prevailing view can be obtained in *Smith's Weekly*, which advocated a strong patriotism with

23 P. A. Leason, *The European Menagerie*, in: *The Bulletin*, 27 September 1923, cover page.

24 S. Macintyre, *The Oxford History of Australia*, Vol. 4: 1901–1942: *The Succeeding Age*, Oxford 2006, p. 180.

25 A. Lattas, *Humanitarianism and Australian Nationalism in Colonial Papua: Hubert Murray and the Project of Caring for the Self of the Coloniser and Colonised*, in: *The Australian Journal of Anthropology*, vol. 2, no. 2 (1996), pp.147.

a tendency towards the right-wing political spectrum. In the article “A White Man’s Burden”²⁶ as published in January 1923, criticism is raised about the legal situation of the natives, who were able to wrongly accuse members of the expatriate community of physical violence and press charges before the *Native Affairs Department*. This reverse representation of victim-perpetrator, the Papuans as barbarians rather than noble savages, served to undermine the necessity to keep the process of civilizing under control. On the one hand, indigenous people were characterized as cunning and audacious. On the other hand, they were pitied as naïve and childlike in their behavior, unaware of the consequence of their accusations, whereas ‘Europeans’ were reserved the role of guardians and patient teachers. Representations of the *Self* and the *Others* thus remained geared to the maintenance of unequal power relations.

Positive portrayals of the ‘European community’ were at the forefront of news coverage, but infrequently, press correspondents drew attention to the appalling working conditions and physical violence towards natives. The left-wing *The Australian Worker* stands out in its direct criticism of what it perceived as slavery-like relations in the territories. Papuans were looked at with regret as the victims of the continued colonial relationship. Drawing a comparison to the Australian aborigines, the native population was regarded as “doomed by the white man’s ‘civilisation.’”²⁷ Disease, alcohol and drug abuse were identified as the causes of high mortality among them, introduced by the colonists. Moreover, there are – but highlighted as single cases – references to maltreatment of native workers on European plantations:

*Natives were continually struck and beaten by the Europeans in charge of them. [...] We have on us the responsibility of seeing that the native population of our Pacific Islands are not oppressed or enslaved; and if we are worth a tuppenny damn as a civilised nation, we won’t (either) shirk that responsibility [...]*²⁸

Here, ‘Europeans’ were depicted as violent, taking advantage of their superior position by unjust means and thus counteracting their responsibility as “benevolent civilizers”. The media denounced the described behaviour, because it ran contrary to what was expected of a reliable colonial agent. These deviances could threaten the legitimacy of the colonial project and Australia’s reputation in the international arena. As can be seen in the debate on Papua and New Guinea, competing representations of the ‘European’ as benevolent coloniser on the one hand, and violent, brutal supervisor of native labour on the other, reflect that the category was subject to social and historical variation. Interestingly, Australians did not stress their national affiliation within this context, but emphasised cultural belonging. In the process of promoting a new imperialist morality, Australians labelled themselves first and foremost as ‘Europeans’.

26 White Man’s Burden, in: Smith’s Weekly, 6 January 1923, p. 3.

27 Australia and Papua, in: The Australian Worker, 4 August 1921, p. 10.

28 J. M., A Papuan Horror, in: The Australian Worker, 6 May 1920, p. 7.

Constructions of the 'European' also frequently occurred in the press debate about the development of the northern parts of Australia adjunct to the question, if the tropics were to be permanently settled and cultivated only by 'white labour'. The media showed an avid interest in the publication and evaluation of scientific opinions and frequently quoted medical reports to either support scientific views or discredit ideas that did not agree with the papers' agenda. Adopting the academic language of the day, the press predominantly deployed 'European' as a biological-cultural grouping or racial category, used to qualify the term 'white race'. By the 1920s, the concept of a 'European race' (or 'European races'), defined by a set of specific physical and behavioural characteristics, was well established and popularised. Correspondents repeatedly cited internationally recognised scholarly publications on racial theory, such as Madison Grant's *The Passing of the Great Race* (1916) and Lothrop Stoddard's *Racial Realities in Europe* (1924), to advance their own arguments for the permanent settlement of the tropical regions. This practice is exemplified in a *Bulletin* editorial published in 1925:

*The white man, who has been settled in the tropics for four centuries or so, has done nothing to prove that the tropics are unfit for his habitation. [...] Yet the white man who has been longest in the tropics, when his blood is still pure European, hasn't fallen away from the merits (nor from some of the defects) of his ancestors in any noticeable way, either physical or mental.*²⁹

In contrast to the loose definition of 'white', the qualification "pure European" operated as a genealogical signifier to validate ideas of robustness and resilience. Thus, journalists did not simply adopt the pre-existing academic vocabulary, but supplemented the label's use as a racial category with ideas of discipline, bodily strength, hygiene and healthy lifestyle.

For those who utilised the label, the 'European' served to create a sense of social cohesion against perceived threats, real or imagined, such as the possibility of an Asian invasion. The label facilitated solidarity at the frontier of settlement. Previous research has reasoned that the term 'white' referred to a "finely graded spectrum of national types" in the context of tropical Australia.³⁰ These findings only partially coincide with the operation and functionality of the category 'European' in the press. Popular journals regularly revisited the topic of north Australia's development along multi-ethnic lines. The Sydney *Bulletin* and *Smith's Weekly* exploited the "deep unease of southern Australians"³¹ by carrying stories about the inconceivable normalcy of close social interactions between ethnicities, drawing particular attention to the 'problematic' of inter-racial sexual relations and the consequence of mixed-raced offspring. In the sensationalised reporting, the 'European' was utilised as an umbrella term to summarise those of 'white' racial background residing

29 N.N., There Are Really, in: *The Bulletin*, 25 June 1925, p. 12.

30 Bashford, 'Is White Australia Possible?' Race, Colonialism and Tropical Medicine, in: *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, vol. 23, no. 2 (2000), pp. 248-271, here p. 63.

31 H. Reynolds, *North of Capricorn: The Untold Story of the People of Australia's North*, Crows Nest 2005, p. 145.

at the national margins. At a public school in Darwin, as a *Bulletin* correspondent noted in dismay, the enrolments of “46 English-speaking Europeans, 17 Malay half-castes, 38 Chinese and 27 Greeks”³² illustrated the realities of racial intermingling. Interestingly, Greeks were not labelled as ‘white’.³³ The journalist further limits belonging to the category ‘European’ by command of language. Full particulars were not given for the national background of those classified as ‘English-speaking Europeans’, although it can be assumed that this group did include students of non-British European heritage. The decision to abstain from separate enumeration of individual nationalities illustrates that the main concern was to draw audiences’ attention to the pressing issue of racial mixture in public institutions and to criticise the government’s failure to intervene. The southern press readily assumed the role of a watchdog that monitored the destitute conditions under which ‘Europeans’ were perceived to live and work in the north. Journalists emphasised the economic deficiency of the region, its lack of infrastructure and industrial investment. In so doing, the press willingly exerted the nation’s obsession with ideas of racial purity. Concerns rested with indigenous Australians, Asians and other non-whites residing in the north. For the press and their targeted audience, these groups’ presence in the north posed a more immediate threat to racial homogeneity than non-British Europeans.

Ideas of racial differences between those considered ‘European’ were disregarded in the debate on the economic development of the sparsely populated tropical North, but highlighted in media discussions on preferential migrants. The distinction between Northern and Southern Europeans drawn along geographical lines, but subtextually associated with grouping along assumed racial differences, sparked increased interest in the interwar years. A lively debate over preferential arrivals evolved among policy makers, trade unions and the general public. ‘Southern Europeans’ were stigmatised as *Others*. Although their geographical and cultural affiliation as ‘Europeans’ classified them as ‘white’, their phenotypic attributes distinguished them as ‘dark’ or ‘semi-white’ (or ‘olive’). This ambiguity reflects the different parameters of Australian ‘whiteness’, and, furthermore, highlights the arbitrariness of taking political action to limit the migration of individual ethnic groups.³⁴ These physical differences were readily emphasised to set Southern Europeans racially apart from Anglo-Australians or Northern Europeans, in general, and to reason why they were less desirable immigrants. This practice of demarcation is exemplified in the coverage of *The Bulletin* and *The Australian Worker*:

The Dago may be a European, but the fact remains that we are subsidising a backward white race which is largely unassimilable to run pure Britishers out of the industry. At

32 „Wallaby“, The Last Published Report, in: *The Bulletin*, 23 June 1921, p. 28.

33 According to Martinez, Greeks endured the most prejudice from British Australians. Antagonism was sparked by the perceived ‘ambiguous position’ of Greece in the First World War. – See J. Martinez, Questioning ‘White Australia’: Unionism and ‘Coloured’ Labour, 1911–1937, in: *Labour History*, no. 76 (May 1999), p. 6.

34 C. Dewhurst, Collaborating on Whiteness: Representing Italians in Early White Australia, in: *Journal of Australian Studies*, vol. 32, no. 1 (2008), pp. 33–49, here p. 35.

*the present rate of going it is only a matter of time before all Australian-grown sugar will be produced by Italians.*³⁵

*Italian immigrants are a damage to our White Australia policy, because we have no guarantee whatever that they are white men, or even that they have been domiciled in Europe for any length of time.*³⁶

Despite categorising Italians as ‘Europeans’, published opinions considered such ethnicities as deviant from one’s racial norm of ‘whiteness’, describing them as biologically unfit or rejecting them for cultural differences. This ambiguous classification relegated Southern Europeans to a state of social limbo. The articles deduce that as their racial status was unclear, particular groups of migrants posed a ‘threat’ to Australia’s ideal of being a ‘white nation’. This drawing of a ‘colour line’ within Europe amplified the specificity of racial categorisation and initialised a period of defining ‘White Australia’ in more exclusive terms.

In summary, the label ‘European’ functioned as a gate-keeping mechanism in the 1920s, by which the circle of eligibility to become an Australian citizen could be expanded, to include the expatriate community in the offshore territories of Papua and New Guinea, or narrowed, to exclude ‘Southern Europeans’ as undesired immigrants. The category served as a discursive tool to carve out Australia’s identity as a ‘white’ and mature nation, riddled with anxieties about territorial vulnerability and racial purity.

The 1960s: Towards new horizons – Being Australian (and still ‘European’)

The end of the Second World War triggered transformations on an unprecedented scale, affecting both domestic matters and the nation’s relations with the wider world alike. Political, financial and economic ties with Britain remained strong, but Australia’s collaboration with the United States as principal military ally in the Pacific indicated that both countries were parting from each other’s company. Australian governments were confronted with arising Cold War rivalries, in particular in the politically unsettled Southeast Asian region. Colonial rule in Papua New Guinea was drawing to a close and Australia’s governing elite was forced to prepare the Melanesian territory for self-government. At home a large majority of post war society experienced a growing affluence but was also subject to “tensions, contradictions and inequalities”.³⁷ Aware that the nation’s economic development would require a labour force that could not be covered by the existing population, the Chifley Government launched a large-scale assisted immigration scheme drawing newcomers from Continental Europe. To mitigate citizens’ anxieties that changes in the ethnic composition of society would devalue the British Australian ideal, newcomers were forced to quickly and smoothly adopt into the Australian ‘way

35 „Cleveland”, I Am One of Those, in: The Bulletin, 3 August 1922, p. 18.

36 W., The Latest Black Threat, in: The Australian Worker, 18 March 1925, p. 5.

37 A. Haebich, Spinning the Dream. Assimilation in Australia 1950–1970, Fremantle 2008, p. 27.

of life'. On the other end of the social spectrum, political activism among indigenous Australians, who had long endured harsh discrimination, sparked with raised demands for equal citizenship rights and acknowledgement of their land title. The 1960s marked a decade in which Australians stood at the crossroads faced with the need to forge new policies and alliances, and to redefine their position and self-understanding as an independent nation and foreign actor.

The press remained one major site where the reorientation and redefinition of the national imaginary took place. It is here that the categories 'European' and 'Europe' continue to be mobilised as significant tools for identity construction and *Othering*. The 'European' emerges once more as an essential category of identification in the coverage of Australia's administrative responsibilities in PNG. Further, the label is frequently utilised in discussions over shifts in immigration policy, in detail the contentious debates about the abolishment of the *White Australia* ideal and the idea of becoming a multicultural society. Lastly, the winding down of the British Empire and Britain's decision to secure its future as part of Europe forced Australian Governments to form new political and economic partnerships in the immediate Asia-Pacific neighbourhood. The media coverage of how the Anglo-Australian relationship evolved during the 1960s occasionally made reference to the 'European' and 'Europe' as threatening *Other(s)*, that interfered with traditional Commonwealth bonds.

Industrialisation and urban development were the impetuses to construct a modern, progressive Australia in the aftermath of the Second World War. There was bipartisan consensus that the nation's future, economic prosperity as much as national security, depended on a significant increase in population. Australian policymakers were forced to locate new migrant sources at Europe's fringe areas when Winston Churchill refused to support British emigration to the same extent as before the war. Arthur Calwell, the first Australian *Minister for Immigration and Information*, initiated an extensive campaign under the slogan *Populate or perish* to increase the number of newcomers: The 1947 *Mass Migration Act* enabled thousands of Europeans from the Netherlands, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Latvia, Scandinavia and others, to settle as *New Australians*.³⁸ Soon thereafter, Italian, Greek, Yugoslavian and other Mediterranean immigrants followed as the immigration programs were extended.³⁹ Against the backdrop of mass European immigration and the gradual erosion of discriminatory legislation toward Asian migrants, the unifying ideal of 'white' Britishness lost currency. In the light of changing circumstances, anxieties about what it meant to be 'Australian' fermented among existing citizens and were articulated in the Australian press. The leftist *Nation* took a vanguard role in disseminating the change of mood in public opinion and the political course that was under way. An editorial published in July 1960 reasoned why a change of policy was vital:

38 The term was adopted in the press and even inspired further neologisms such as "European Naussies." – Cf. F. Snow, *Migrants and the Law*, in: *The Bulletin*, 30 March 1960, pp. 46-47.

39 Denoon, p. 350.

*While Australians are entitled to preserve their inherited Western culture [...], we also need Asian migrants to increase our understanding of neighbouring countries [...].*⁴⁰

Xenophobic views and attitudes that had been a fundamental component of Australian 'white' identities still prevailed. In November 1961, *The Australian Worker* argued that the policy was to be maintained as a means of preventing the danger of tensions that was thought would arise within a multi-racial society. The idea of introducing a quota for non-European arrivals was also rejected on a number of reasons, whereby one stands out:

*Those who want to allow Asians and Africans to enter Australia in limited numbers, or on the same terms as Europeans, suggest that educated or skilled persons be admitted. Such people are the very ones that Asia and Africa can least afford to lose [...] The duty of such people is to their own, and if they wish to avoid their obligations and go elsewhere they are escapists and deserters.*⁴¹

In assuming that the number of Africans and Asians who have received further education is significantly smaller compared to that of educated Europeans, the argument that those skilled people cannot be spared by their home countries is utilized to support the maintenance of immigration restrictions. Again, the label 'Europeans' holds positive connotations: 'Europeans' are preferred migrants; educated, skilled labourers with the potential to contribute to society and to adopt the 'Australian way of life'. Reading in between the lines, the article carries the tone of the civilizer who speaks in a noble manner, acting "correctly," as the immigration policy provides a means to prevent "brain drain" migration from less developed countries. This is most evident when those educated Asians and Africans who even consider leaving their home for Australia, are degraded as "escapists" and "deserters". Similarly, *The Bulletin* espoused antagonistic views towards any non-British arrivals, arguing their non-assimilability into Australian society:

*It is questionable whether the present Australian immigration policy, based on a theory that numbers are the prime factor and that any European will do, is the right one for this country. [...] It would be better to go slowly than to dilute the fibre of the British races which were hardening into a solid core of Australian nationalism before World War II.*⁴²

In the course of its radical modernisation in 1961 into a respected mainstream magazine, the *Bulletin's* new editor Donald Horne however was eager to draw attention to the cultural mentality of Australia's Asian neighbors through a series of articles titled "What Asians Think of Us."⁴³ Arguing for a more liberal approach to Asian migration, the label

40 'Colour Blindness', in: *Nation*, 2 July 1960, p. 3-4.

41 'White Australia' Policy – Echo of Pre-Federation Days. Where Labor Stands, in: *The Australian Worker*, 22 November 1961, p. 11.

42 'Untapped Immigration', in: *The Bulletin*, 3 August 1960, p. 6.

43 N. McInnes, What Asians Think of Us: To Indians: Distant, Insignificant, in: *The Bulletin*, 28 December 1960, vol. 81, no. 4220; A. Soon, What Malaysians Think of Us: Young Brother to Tuan Besar, in: *The Bulletin*, 4 January 1961, vol.

'Non-European' would gradually move closer to that of the 'European' through the ascription of a set of more favourable attributions within the media coverage.

Concurrently, the 'European' was still applied as a figuration of identity for the Australian expatriate community. The nation's unease about the direction and pace in leading Papua New Guineans to self-government, coupled with aspirations to secure its future in the Asian-Pacific region, reverberated in the versatile deployment of the category. The label 'European' offered flexibility to manage different sections of the settler community, often positively connoted as a role model and teacher for the indigene. These colonialist representations became subject to vehement criticism in the left-leaning press, which challenged out-dated understandings that still underpinned politics of exclusion, contrasting them with representations of the exploitative 'European businessman' and the arrogant 'European settler'. Coverage emphasised the injustice of the two-wage policy and the appreciation of indigenous mimicry of 'European' habits and behaviour. *Nation's* intellectual contributors, including Amirah Inglis, targeted the continued existence of discriminatory legislation and the practice of segregation, dissecting the society of PNG as one of

*two worlds: the world of white skins (expatriates; Europeans or overseas officers are some of the euphemisms used) and the world of dark-skinned (natives, indigene or local officers). For the most part the worlds are completely separate.*⁴⁴

The press tendency to deliberately choose a vocabulary of deviance and affinity that largely refrained from references to national affiliation can be argued as a means to expose the discursive reaffirmation of ideas of racial differences. 'European' was not synonymous with 'white'; however, the use of the label implied a cultural closeness among its subsumed members. The self-aggrandising narrative of the 'European' as morally superior, as much as prevailing attitudes of high-mindedness, were exposed as myth, and condemned as a means to retain control over the indigenous *Other*. The unmasking of these earlier attributions to the category 'European' in *Nation*, and, later, *The Bulletin*, were testament to changes to the prevailing social orders as PNG moved towards independence.

Representations of the 'European' and 'Europe' also featured in the press discussion on how Australia figured as a non-European, formerly British Dominion, in the light of the newly formed community of Europe and Britain's protracted bid to become a vital part of this community. The Australian political elite and general public alike saw this involvement as an affront to the validity of the nation's ties with Britain and the imperial notion of Anglo-Saxon unity. For Australians, the notion of Britishness remained central to how they thought of themselves and how they related to other parts of the world. The Macmillan Government's decision to integrate Britain into a politically united and economically exclusive Europe thus constituted, as Australian historians unanimously

82, no. 4221; C. Meeking, 'What Indonesians Think of Us: Little or Nothing', in: *The Bulletin*, 25 January 1961, vol. 82, no. 4224.

44 A. Inglis, 'Tale of Two Cities', in: *Nation*, 8 June 1968, p. 5-7.

agree, a decisive moment of reorientation, prompting a crisis of identity and search for a new one.⁴⁵ Both the labour and liberal press utilised the categories 'Europe' and 'European' as part of a larger rhetoric of anxiety that differed in its degree and intensity of concern. 'Europe' (and the 'European') could emerge to describe a political ally, an economic competitor, or a cultural entity. Conversely, the labels' attributed competing meanings, indicating an uncertainty and hesitancy on behalf of the press correspondents in articulating self-understandings that were specifically 'Australian'. This struggle over self-definition, and the distancing of oneself from the notion of being a (geographically displaced) 'British people', was a wider trend within Australian society that was slow to unfold. In October, less than a year before Britain's first attempt to join a united European community, *The Bulletin* ran the editorial "A Third Force" (1960). The article favourably commented on the economic recovery of Western Europe since the end of the Second World War, and noted its ascent as a new centre of power outside the US and the USSR:

*The most notable change in the state of world politics seems to be the shifting relationships of Western Europe and the emergence of de Gaulle as an aspiring leader of a Continental bloc [...], a Europe with a concerted trade policy, or even with a sort of federation politically, but a Europe limited to the Continent and not necessarily the United Kingdom.*⁴⁶

Distinctly aware of Britain's proximity to the European Continent, the paper nevertheless stressed Britain's traditional commitments to the Commonwealth, including Australia. In this view, widely shared within the Australian public, 'Europe' connoted a geopolitical space, that of Western Europe, an alliance of capitalist democracies who collaborated economically, with France leading the way. The conception of a continental or mainland 'Europe' was enveloped by tangible markers in the form of sea borders, which excluded the United Kingdom. The article exemplified the press' power to preserve a specific image of 'Europe' in the Australian public mind, that of 'Europe' as a distinct non-British *Other*.

The positive attitude of the Australian media towards the bonding of EEC members however was challenged in 1961 when the Macmillan Government announced its aim to join the alliance. The press indeed held contrasting views on the strategies of Australia's governing elite to cope with the arising situation, in particular concerns about the economic consequences that the nation could face as a major primary produce exporter to Britain. In a *Bulletin* article in April 1962, foreign correspondent Neil McInnes adopted a reassuring tone, informing the Australian audience that

45 J. Curran and S. Ward, *The Unknown Nation: Australia After Empire*, Melbourne 2010; D. Goldsworthy, Menzies, Macmillan and Europe, in: *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, 51, no. 2 (1997).

46 'A Third Force', in: *The Bulletin*, 26 October 1960, p. 4.

*[...] Europeans are aware of their responsibilities and are ready to arrange matters so that Australia suffers no loss when Britain enters the Common Market. [...] That's why ECM officials say there is no need for Australia to appear in person to argue her case [...].*⁴⁷

McInnes' representations of the 'European' as attentive and sympathetic to Commonwealth interest, but also as not complying with the national demands of the Commonwealth states at the expense of Europe's own interests, differ from the local media coverage in *The Bulletin*. Rarely did local Australian journalists identify the people behind the political mechanisms as 'Europeans'. In general, the distancing and objective label 'Europe' was deployed instead. Furthermore, the conservative paper resorted to a more anxious tone than that of the foreign correspondent when informing its audience about Menzies' visit to London to discuss the political consequences Britain's membership might have:

*For the political consequences of Britain's entry into the ECM must be immense. When Britain enters ECM it will be accepting heavy responsibilities in Europe. [...] As an inexorable necessity, Australia must be driven into closer association with other countries, such as the United States and Japan.*⁴⁸

The left-leaning press adopted a more optimistic outlook. Reporting in *The Australian Worker* and *Nation* did not deny that Britain's repositioning would affect the Australian export market, but both magazines were receptive to new possibilities arising from Britain's move. *The Australian Worker* first diverted its readers' attention to the fact that also a major outlet for British exports Australia was in a bargaining position to "insist that equally satisfactory arrangements are made for her goods to enter British and other EEC markets".⁴⁹ The journal sharply criticised the Liberal government for not anticipating the European situation, and engaged eagerly in a discussion about the need to search for supplementary markets in Asia. As early as May 1962, *The Australian Worker* delivered a sobering summary:

*Mr. McEwen set out to teach Europe the position as he saw it but he admitted ruefully that instead Europe had taught him.*⁵⁰

The Australian Worker and *Nation* closely followed the evolution of the Anglo-Australian conflict of interests in the negotiation process. In their coverage, 'Europe' was presented as a powerful international unit of nations. Moreover, in its institutionalised form as the EEC, it presented a single economic competitor and significant trade partner, with the potential to harm Australia's exporting industry, and with whom the Australian Government therefore needed to be on good terms to ensure future benefits. This portrayal indicated respect and attention towards a serious actor in foreign politics, and generated

47 N. McInnes, 'Mr McEwen Pushes In', in: *The Bulletin*, 14 April 1962, pp. 22-23.

48 A. Reid, 'Menzies' Bundle for Britain', in: *The Bulletin*, 26 May 1962, pp. 6-7.

49 'U.K. Goes into Space', in: *The Australian Worker*, 2 August 1961, p. 1.

50 'It Costs Us 10,000 for McEwen's Somersault', in: *The Australian Worker*, 9 May 1962, p. 3.

reasonable doubts about Australia's power to influence the outcomes of the EEC membership negotiations. By the end of the decade, when the Australian press had grown weary of the issue, 'Europe' was portrayed as a closed, inwardly disintegrating community, and reservations about Britain's desire to join this alliance were expressed across the media landscape.

Conclusion

The scope, complexity and challenge of a Pacific history that simultaneously is and is not a history of a Western civilization, which extends beyond Europe but is inevitably connected to it and is indeed a history of Europeans as has been emphasized by British historian J. G. A. Pocock.⁵¹ By virtue of Australia's largely European cultural heritage since its 'white' settlement but with regard to the original owners of the land, the Indigenous peoples, and the reality of its geographical position, the question of Australia's belonging to either 'the West' or Asia is an exceptional one and is closely linked to and reflected in multiple, competing representations of the 'European' circulating within society at any given time. Serving as categories of belonging and demarcation, these representations were formed in a triangle of definition and demarcation of the Indigenous populations within, the inhabitants of the surrounding Pacific region and the Australians themselves. As the analysis has shown, constructions of the 'European' did not fit a predetermined template. The label was subject to shifts in meaning and always served situation- and context-specific needs of those who deployed it. Nevertheless, in its various deployments, the 'European' served as a rhetorical device in the larger vocabulary of Australian identity formation, forged through engagement with a moveable pool of exclusionary and inclusive attributions. In so doing, the 'European' served as a powerful tool to form self-understandings, to manage populations and to create social cohesion. Gradually over time, the 'European' emerged from a category that identified segments of the Australian population – such as in the media debates on tropical settlement – to a category that ascribed those considered outside of Australia's imagined community – as in the press correspondence on the Australian reaction to Britain's application to the EEC. Although it is possible to trace an evolution in textual constructions of the 'European' – from being constructed as part of the *Self* to being seen as an *Other* among *Others* – this did not occur in a linear way. As is evident in the debate on Australia's role in its offshore territories in the 1960s, the 'European' becomes an Other in the Australian social imaginary, without being understood this way completely.

Australia has yet to come to terms with the political and social legacies of the Empire. As suggested, the impact of European colonialism and the following emancipation process have been reflected in changing Australian media images of the European. An analysis of these representations provides a valuable contribution to historical narratives of the

51 J. G. A. Pocock, *Deconstructing Europe*, in: *History of European Ideas*, 18, no. 3 (1994), p. 331.

formation and implementation of Australian cultural identities. Although the end of the *White Australia Policy* and changes in the perceptions of Asia have led to an abandonment of a homogeneous British “White Australia,” the process of redefining itself as a multi-cultural society, future Eurasian nation and/or a nation with a modified British heritage is still in full force.⁵² Since the late 1990s, the *History Wars* have been an incessant public debate about how to write Australian history correctly. The history writing of left-orientated historians has been criticized as *black armband history*, aiming to evoke an unjustified sense of shame among the “white” Australian society. In contrast, right wing historians have argued that empirical dates have been falsified within historical publications in order to promote reconciliation and mourning. The recent formal apology by the Australian Government to the Stolen Generations might have been a defining moment in the nation’s history. However, the interpretation of the British colonization and its impact on Australia and her geographies of belonging remains an ongoing debate, in which an uncovering of the hidden and complex layers of meaning that mark the label ‘European’ proves to be a valuable path to extend our knowledge of the evolution of the Australian social imaginary.

52 N. Meaney, ‘The End of ‘White Australia’ and Australia’s Changing Perceptions of Asia, 1945–1990’, in: *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, 49, no. 2 (1995), p. 188.

Chinese Definitions of the European – Some Historical Examples

Dominic Sachsenmaier

RESÜMEE

Der Artikel analysiert chinesische Europabilder während des 17. Jahrhunderts und des frühen 20. Jahrhunderts. Hierbei geht der Autor für den ersten Betrachtungszeitraum vor allem auf Meinungsbilder innerhalb christlicher Kreise ein. Für den zweiten Betrachtungszeitraum, insbesondere die 1920er Jahre, werden vornehmlich Stimmen aus dem Lager entschiedener Modernisierer untersucht. Diese werden wiederum mit den Positionen chinesischer Denker verglichen, welche das Ziel einer kulturspezifischen, nachhaltigen Form der chinesischen Moderne vertraten. Unter anderem ergibt der diachrone Vergleich, dass im 17. Jahrhundert – selbst unter chinesischen Christen – positive Europabilder nach konfuzianischen Maßstäben bemessen waren. Anfang des 20. Jahrhunderts wurde die Relevanz des Konfuzianismus im Hinblick auf Europa nicht mehr vorausgesetzt, sondern vielmehr kritisch debattiert.

In recent years, academic research has witnessed a growing interest in the history of the idea of “Europe” and related concepts. Case study after case study has added new facets to our understanding of how the concept of “Europe” varied according to specific situations and historical contexts.¹ Given such an interest in this topic, however, it is rather surprising that research thus far mainly focused on the image of Europe in the eyes of Europeans.² Certainly, quite a number of studies have explored images of Europe emerging from cross-cultural encounters. Yet in most cases, the historical agents under investigation were groups such as European travellers who, when interacting with different

1 For example, H. Kaelble, *Europäer über Europa*, Frankfurt a. M. 2001; K. Wilson and J. v. d. Dussen (eds), *The History of the Idea of Europe*, London 1993; D. Heater, *The Idea of European Unity*, New York 1992; A. Assmann, *Europe: A Community of Memory?*, in: *Bulletin of the German Historical Institute* 40 (2007), pp. 11-26.

2 See also S. Conrad, *Vorwort: ‘Europa’ aus Sicht nichtwestlicher Eliten*, in: *Journal of Modern European History* 4-2 (2006), pp. 157-180.

world regions, were particularly prone to transgress national identities and express what in their eyes constituted the main contours of the European experience³. Comparatively few studies have investigated how Chinese, Latin American, Middle Eastern, and other historical agents conceptualized “the European” in direct encounters or in other relevant situations.

It goes without saying that also in other parts of the world, tropes of “Europe” and the “European” played a significant role in intellectual, political, social and economic life. In many societies, it was particularly during the age of colonialism and imperialism that concepts such as “the European” came to acquire a meaning much larger than their ethnic or geographical connotations. They could be closely related to tropes surrounding topics ranging from colonial subjugation to prospects of liberty and national awakening. In that sense, the terms “Europe” and “the European” did often not point primarily to a distant world region but rather figured prominently in domestic debates about collective threats and possibilities⁴. For a long time, different political groupings in many parts of the world operated with peculiar images of “Europe” and the “European,” and they used them for their own purposes. Moreover, in many countries advocates of urgent change referred to a necessary, an unavoidable “Europeanization.”

Concepts such as “Europe” or the “European” were only part of much larger sets of images and semantic fields that were accompanying discourses of self-mobilization and impeding transformations. In many societies ranging from India to Korea, concepts such as the “European” were tied to terms such as “modernity,” “newness,” “civilization,” and even “technology.” In addition, the notion of “Europe” was not the only geographically defined term which figured prominently in the debates surrounding concepts such as modernity and civilization. Also concepts such as “the West” or stereotyped visions of single countries like Germany, France or Britain and their alleged national characters played an important role. How images of “the West” and Europe were related to each other in different societies and languages, has thus far been hardly assessed by modern research. The same is true for the associations between particular national stereotypes such as the Romantic Frenchman or the mercantile Englishman, and images of Europe at large.

This article will certainly not be able to fill these rather wide research gaps. It will primarily focus on visions of “Europe” and “the European” in the eyes of some groups of Chinese scholars and students during the first two or three decades of the twentieth century, a time when European imperialism had long been a significant factor in the region. More

3 For example, J. Osterhammel, *Die Entzauberung Asiens. Europa und die asiatischen Reiche im 18. Jahrhundert*, Munich 1998; and I. Kamps and J. Singh, *Travel Knowledge: European ‘Discoveries’ in the Early Modern Period*, New York 2001.

4 See for example D. Chakrabarty, *Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference*, Princeton 2000; F. Mallon, *The Promise and Dilemma of Subaltern Studies: Perspectives from Latin American History*, in: *American Historical Review* 99 (1994), 5, pp. 1491-1515; and B. Xu, *From Modernity to Chineseness: The Rise of Nativist Cultural Theory in Post-1989 China*, in: *Positions* 6 (1998), 1, pp. 203-237. About the trans-cultural dimensions of these positions see D. Sachsenmaier, *Global History and Critiques of Western Perspectives*, in: *Comparative Education* 42 (2006), 3, pp. 451-470.

specifically, I will compare images of Europe among some key protagonists of the “New Culture Movement” with voices who were more doubtful of what they interpreted as the key facets of European modernity. In this context, I will particularly focus on some Chinese intellectuals who during and after the Great War argued that the idea of Europe as a global teaching civilization had taken a great hit. As I will further point out, these and other Chinese groups were actually in close contact with Europeans, and in many cases, Chinese images of “the European” actually emerged from transnational networks rather than constituting home-grown concepts and ideas. Before turning to the twentieth century, however, I will provide a brief outlook of images of Europe that were circulating in seventeenth-century China. At that time, encounters between Chinese and Europeans were not yet framed by a colonial nexus of economic dominance and political suppression. In that sense, late Ming and early Qing images of Europe provide a good contrast foil in order to accentuate the implicit and explicit visions of world order in which Chinese notions of Europe were situated during the early twentieth century.

Some Chinese Images of Europe during the Seventeenth Century

During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, China and Europe came into more sustained direct contacts with one another. These were not only confined to merchant transactions in a world in which naval trading routes started becoming longer and part of global networks of exchanges. Of great significance were also the new religious and scholarly exchanges between China and Europe as well as, more generally, the growing amount of information about one another on both sides of the Eurasian landmass.

Jesuit missionaries who came in close contact with Confucian literati played an important role in establishing high-level scholarly encounters between the Middle Kingdom and the West.⁵ In their effort to gain converts among the upper crust of Chinese society, Jesuit Fathers studied Mandarin as well as the Confucian classics. While for a long time academic research treated prominent Jesuits like Matteo Ricci as the sole creators of the so-called Jesuit “accommodation method” in China, reality was far more complex and interactive. In fact, the Confucian-Christian synthesis through which the Jesuits tried to find inroads into Chinese society (particularly its upper classes) was the result of a close collaboration between European missionaries and converted Chinese literati. Its overall structure was supposed to navigate between the manifold political and cultural constraints which existed on both the European and the Chinese side of this encounter. The main thrust of the accommodation approach was to interpret ancient Confucianism as a purely secular ethical system which, similarly to Greek philosophy in scholasticism, could be understood as a natural religion and hence was ultimately compatible with the revealed truth of Christianity. In principle, this approach could also be related to Confu-

5 See L. Brockey, *Journey to the East. The Jesuit Mission to China, 1579–1724*, Cambridge 2007.

cian reform movements which sought to return the alleged true teaching during the days of the master himself.

In the pro-Christian literature during seventeenth-century China, images of “Europe” (at the time often transcribed as *Ouluoba*) were being disseminated in many parts of Chinese society. In the Chinese public, they found a rather receptive audience even outside of the circles of those individuals and families who had an interest in the Christian message *per se*. As a matter of fact, information about Europe and other parts of the world was much sought after in seventeenth-century China. For example, a Jesuit world map in Chinese, which was first published by Matteo Ricci in 1602, sold over eight editions within 25 years⁶. Similarly successful were books such as the *Zhifang Waiji* (*Records of [the World] Outside (the Scope) of the Court Geographer*), which was produced by the Jesuit missionary Giulio Aleni in 1623.⁷ Taking note of such tendencies, recent studies have departed even further from the stereotyped depiction of the Chinese literati elite as a culturally introverted upper class that had remained unchallenged by other internal and external forces.⁸

Nevertheless, in contrast to the twentieth century, the concepts of Europe and the European didn't play a major role in the main political and cultural debates during the Ming-Qing transition period. Rather, Europe and its peoples still mattered more as an object of a more general Chinese *curiositas* about other parts of the world. This is not to say, however, that the Jesuits' geographical works and world maps primarily sought to cater to this more general interest within the educated Chinese public. Quite to the contrary, many seventeenth-century works published under the name of Jesuit missionaries or Chinese converts actually disseminated some highly idealized images of Europe⁹, and they did so in order to raise the appreciation of Christianity in parts of Chinese society.

For instance, the aforementioned *Zhifang Waiji* (*Records of [the World] Outside [the Scope] of the Court Geographer*) contain a lengthy depiction of Europe which portrays the continent in the Far West as a harbour of truth and peace, where no dynasty had fallen for a long time, where people did not need to lock their doors at night, and where no one would pick up lost money on the street. The text goes on to mention that the soil of Europe was fertile, the fauna rich, and nature's overall resources so abundant that people could afford to live in palaces, wear precious clothes and eat only precious foods. Other pro-Christian texts portrayed the Jesuits as typical representatives of the European scholarly elite, and they did so by assigning them attributes of the ideal gentleman (*junzi*), a figure frequently evoked in the Confucian classics.

It seems somewhat ironic to read these accounts since they were published around the time of the Thirty Years War, which killed approximately 30 per cent of the entire popu-

6 D. Mungello, *The Great Encounter of China and the West, 1500–1800*, New York 1999, chapter 1.

7 See for example E. Zürcher, *China and the West: The Image of Europe and Its Impact*, in: S. Uhalley / X. Wu, *China and Christianity: Burdened Past, Hopeful Future*, New York 2001.

8 See for example, J. Waley-Cohen, *The Sextants of Beijing. Global Currents in Chinese History*, New York 1999.

9 See for example N. Standaert, *Yang Tingyun, Confucian and Christian in Late Ming China: His Life and Thought*, Leiden 1988.

lation of Central Europe. Still, such portraits of Europe in pro-Christian texts were more than simple inventions. In an extremely complex way, these images were themselves the products of negotiations between the Jesuits and their Chinese literati supporters as social groups from two different cultures who shared a common goal. For example, the aforementioned text segment of Aleni's work in fact paraphrases a passage in a Confucian classic, namely the *Book of Rites* (*Liji*).¹⁰ This passage describes an allegedly ideal state of life in China during the time of the sage kings, which in the Confucian worldview figured as a symbol for the pristine times of China, before the onset of an overall moral decay set in which supposedly interrupted the proper transmission of the Way (*Dao*).

Hence in the *Zhifang Waiji*, the image of Europe and the behaviour of the Europeans come close to a portrait of China during the supposedly lost Golden Age in early antiquity. If believed, such a depiction suggested that the revealed truth of God was actually the true and that Christianity was indeed the only teaching that could complement Confucianism, restore its moral authority and hence lead China back to the long-lost, allegedly ideal social conditions of the ancient past. Some Chinese Christians, such as the local literati Zhu Zongyuan, a convert who died in 1660, directly contrasted this idealized vision of Europe with the moral, political, and social conditions in China and arrived at the conclusion that in all respects China fell short of the continent in the Far West.¹¹ For example, in one of his works Zhu Zongyuan provides a whole list of comparisons, and in each and every one he ends with the provocative conclusion that compared to Europe, "the conditions in our China are not as good." He finishes his chapter by stating that "if one regards the spirit and the habits of these people, I fear that it is not *they* who are the barbarians [but us]." Such words openly ran counter to Sino-centric currents of his time which tended to denigrate all peoples outside the Middle Kingdom as morally and culturally inferior.¹²

Certainly, such arguments are indicative of the criticism the idealized images of Europe and the Europeans faced in seventeenth-century China.¹³ After all, calling a distant continent's civilization superior was unusual and often even considered to be politically subversive in the Chinese context. Moreover, a strong number of critics pointed to European colonialism on the Philippines and elsewhere in the region as well as, more generally, to the behaviour of some Europeans on Chinese soil. Still, idealizations of Europe and the Europeans based on Confucian claims were an important trope in the pro-Christian literature in late Ming China, just as similar idealizations of India had been rather common in Buddhist writings as early as about a thousand years earlier.¹⁴

10 Liji, chapter one (Liyun).

11 See D. Sachsenmaier, *Die Aufnahme europäischer Inhalte in die chinesische Kultur durch Zhu Zongyuan* (ca. 1616–1660), Nettetal 2001.

12 Zhu Zongyuan, *Da Kewen* [Answers to a Guest's Questions], ca. 1643, p. 51b.

13 See J. Gernet, *Chine et Christianisme. Action et réaction*, Paris 1982.

14 See for example the "classic" work by E. Zürcher, *The Buddhist Conquest of China. The Spread and Adaption of Buddhism in Early Medieval China*, Leiden 1959.

In this context it is important to note that the image of European superiority could be entirely expressed through Chinese concepts. The standards of evaluation, which were necessary for comparing China and Europe as two civilizational realms, were entirely couched in a Confucian language. In many regards, the image of Europe in these pro-Christian texts was at its core a geographical projection of Chinese ideals. Here Christianity was represented as the fulfilment of the trajectories of Confucianism; Europeans were being depicted as living under the same moral and ethico-political conditions as China had during its alleged long bygone golden age. In other words, in these portraits Confucianism's cultural values and utopias were still taken as universal values. They were not yet part of programs to fundamentally change Confucian concepts, ideas, and ways of thinking about China and the world at large. Neither was there a notion that Confucianism was somewhat parochial and not an expression of universal values.

The Early Twentieth Century

About two hundred years later, at the beginning of the twentieth century, the situation had changed dramatically.¹⁵ The new geopolitical and geo-cultural environment no longer allowed for a worldview defining China as a cultural star circled by minor satellites. It was not even possible for Chinese opinion makers to continue assuming that the former Middle Kingdom was a fully equal member in a new international world. A significant part of the Chinese elites regarded China not even as one among many nation states but rather opined that its international standing had degraded to the position of a sleeping giant who was in danger of becoming colonized by technologically more advanced powers. A sense of an imminent and necessary historical discontinuity and of radical changes dominated many debates among Chinese politicians and intellectuals.¹⁶ Even the staunchest defenders of a certain Chinese “cultural essence” did so increasingly in the spirit of mobilizing a counterforce against the overwhelming spirit of the time. In contrast to the seventeenth century, many key agents on China's political and intellectual scene now saw their country as being endangered and confronted by a foreign civilization. In the eyes of many, the ever-growing presence of Western powers seemed to make it necessary to take over essential aspects of this new civilization. Japan, which was often regarded as a successful model of adapting “modernity” to an Asian context and started showing its own imperialist ambitions, was often interpreted along similar lines. Particularly after the crushing defeat in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895, the voices of those grew stronger who demanded that China should follow similar self-transformation programs as Japan had since the middle of the nineteenth century.

15 See for example, W. Kirby, *The Internationalization of China*, in: *China Quarterly* 150 (1997), p. 433–458.

16 R. Mitter, *A Bitter Revolution. China's Struggle with the Modern World*, Oxford 2004; and V. Schwarcz, *The Chinese Enlightenment: Intellectuals and the Legacy of the May Fourth Movement of 1919*, Berkeley 1986.

In addition to this changing intellectual and political climate, Europeans were no longer rare visitors or restrained foreign dwellers in China; rather, their presence was growing significantly in the coastal cities, treaty ports, and even in the most remote hinterlands.¹⁷ Moreover, due the series of unequal treaties starting from the Opium Wars, citizens of several European nations enjoyed legal privileges that clearly distinguished them – together with US-American and Japanese citizens – from the Chinese populations as well as almost all other foreign communities in China. Also, the living standards and technological facilities of many Europeans had started to clearly differentiate many European foreigners on Chinese soil from the vast majority of the Chinese population, including much of the country's privileged classes. In addition, technologies that were at least partly associated with Europe changed China: steamships patrolled the Chinese rivers, railways crossed the land, and city-life started to change with daily newspapers,¹⁸ international fashion, and even shopping malls.

In a parallel process, new kinds and amounts of information about Europe and the Europeans were becoming available within China's rapidly changing public spheres. Foreign- and Chinese-owned schools offering education in fields such as English, engineering, or law mushroomed on Chinese soil during the decades around the turn of the twentieth century. As a consequence, Chinese society witnessed a strong growth of young intellectual elite circles who had been primarily trained following a "modern" rather than a Confucian curriculum. In addition, many young professionals and students who had spent parts of their education overseas were becoming a more vociferous group in China. While Japan attracted the largest number of Chinese students¹⁹, most young intellectuals still self-identified primarily with Europe or the United States. Although Japan was often regarded as a successful non-Western modernizer, the growing Sino-Japanese antagonism certainly dwarfed the number of those who referred to Japan as a model for China's future. In this context, terms such as "Europe" or "the European" took a central place on the mental maps referred to in the debates.²⁰

Nevertheless, not many serious advocates of "Westernization" in early twentieth-century China portrayed Europe and the United States solely as harbingers of personal freedom, global peace and joint human progress. In the eyes of many, one also needed to view the contemporary world through the perspectives of Social Darwinism. In the Chinese translation by the scholar Yan Fu, Social Darwinism appeared even more ruthless and merciless than in the original by Herbert Spencer.²¹ For Yan, the "survival of the fittest" was the law of the time, and it seemed to express the actions of the colonial powers in

17 J. Osterhammel, *China und die Weltgesellschaft vom 18. Jahrhundert bis in die Gegenwart*, München 1989.

18 See for example N. Vittinghoff, *Networks of News: Power, Language and Transnational Dimensions of the Chinese Press, 1850–1949*, in: *The China Review* 4 (2004), 1, pp. 1–10.

19 Ye, Weili *Seeking Modernity in China's Name: Chinese Students in the United States, 1920–1927*, Stanford 2001.

20 See Huang Hui, *Overseas Chinese Studies and the Rise of Foreign Cultural Capital in Modern China*, in: *International Sociology* 17 (March 2002), 1, pp. 35–55.

21 Xiao, Xiaosu, "China Encounters Darwinism: A Case of Intercultural Rhetoric", in: *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 81 (1995), 1, pp. 83–99.

the East. The ambivalence of threat and promise, of attraction and estrangement, which characterized the Chinese upper and middle classes' perceptions of the ongoing transformations, made it no longer possible to sustain the traditional Confucian education system: it was abolished in 1905.

From the beginning, the increasing outward orientation of numerous Chinese intellectuals was accompanied by decidedly critical attitudes towards Chinese history and tradition. As a positive or negative benchmark for China, the term "Europe" was used rather interchangeably with "the West" (xifang), "modernity" (xiandai or jinshi) or with "EuroAmerica" (Oumei), a Chinese synthesis of the main characters of the Chinese terms for "Europe" and "America." For example, in one of his many articles for the journal *New Youth* (*Xin Qingnian*), a key forum of the New Culture Movement, its founder Chen Duxiu expressed this widely shared sentiment among urban students in the following way:

*There are two radically different types of culture in the world: The Oriental cultures and the Occidental cultures. In essence [the Oriental cultures] have not moved out of the ancient traces of civilization, therefore they are the remains of old civilization. What can be really called modern culture is the Occidental culture uniquely possessed by the Europeans; it is known as European and Western culture. ... The Western culture possesses characteristics that are radically different from those of the ancient cultures and give people a sense of freshness.*²²

Also for Chen the terms "modern culture," "Occidental culture," "Western culture," and "European culture" were closely related if not even identical with each other. Clearly he mainly attributed this culture to Europe by stating that it is "uniquely possessed by the Europeans." While in his writings he certainly included the United States into the orbit of modern Western civilization, he obviously defined Europe as the origin and epicentre of a civilization whose "freshness" left older cultural patterns behind. In that sense, also the "European" had become far more than a citizen of Europe in Chen's account: he or she figured as the representative of a dynamic civilization which had its attractions while at the same time posing an imperialist threat to China as a polity, economy and culture.

In another article, Chen argued that Western culture cherished freedom and self-expression, whereas Oriental culture was hierarchical and authoritarian, and that while Western technology was continuously pushing for new territories, Oriental culture would aim at preserving the status quo. He drew the conclusion that if China did not overcome its ancient civilization, it was doomed to disappear from history. Noting his highly critical attitude towards Chinese culture, one should pay attention to some of the key concepts with which Chen Duxiu evaluated the alleged shortcomings of China. Positing Chinese or Oriental culture as polar opposites of Western dynamism and the forceful character

22 Chen Duxiu, The French and Modern Civilization, in: *Xin Qingnian* 1 (1915).

of Europeans and Americans, his method of evaluating China's backwardness emanated from his specific interpretation of "the West." In Chen's portraits, China appeared to be a suppressive apparatus stifling creativity and individual fulfilment, thus paralyzing the society as a whole. Europe and the Europeans figured as an essential part of a "West" which Chen saw as dynamic on an individual and on a collective level.

Also the Great War, which certainly was quite a publicized event in Chinese newspapers,²³ did not significantly change the attitudes of most New Culture Movement protagonists to what they defined as Chinese customs and traditions.²⁴ A closer look at some journals such as *New Youth* (*Xin Qingnian*), *Eastern Miscellaneous* (*Dongfang Zazhi*), or *Young China* (*Shaonian Zhongguo*) reveals that many authors continued referring to the alleged superiority of Europeans when making postulates for a new China. For example, in an article written for *Shaonian Zhongguo* in 1921, Wei Shizhen, who had recently travelled in Europe, compared the Europeans and the Chinese in the following way:

*The Europeans are big and well-built while the Chinese are extremely small. The Europeans are energetic while the Chinese are lethargic. Without mentioning other aspects, the physical difference alone can doom the Chinese to fail when they compete with the Europeans. Thus, if the Chinese are seeking to fight for survival, trying to improve our race becomes an important task.*²⁵

In the same article, he continued praising the positive effects of European life, marriage patterns, and different methods of education as well as even baby care. This led him to the conclusion that China needed to adopt such aspects of European culture if it wanted to grow stronger. Along similar lines, Hua Lu interpreted the Great War more or less as a confirmation of European superiority in a world governed by warfare and struggle. As late as 1924, he argued that the war had heightened national sentiments among Europeans, which is why it rallied whole nations to stand together, providing them with the necessary strength to survive in a merciless world.²⁶ According to others, the West remained superior because of its revolutionary energy, its individual commitment, and its scientific, progressive culture that generated material advantages. For example, in the liberal camp, intellectuals such as Hu Shi, Cai Yuanpei,²⁷ or lesser-known figures like Tao Lügong basically followed the official French, English, and American interpretation of

23 Xu, Guoqi, *China and the Great War: China's Pursuit of a New National Identity and Internationalization*. Cambridge 2005.

24 See for example D. Sachsenmaier, *Alternative Visions of World Order in the Aftermath of World War I – Global Perspectives on Chinese Approaches*, in: S. Conrad and D. Sachsenmaier (eds), *Competing Visions of World Order. Global Moments and Movements, 1880–1935*, New York 2007, pp. 151–180.

25 Wei Shizhen (and Wei Siluan), *Lude riji* [Diaries during my trip to Germany], in: *Shaonian Zhongguo* 11 (1921), pp. 29–40. In other parts of this series, Wei refers to Spengler and implicitly argues that each culture has to mobilize its own resources.

26 Hua, Lu, *Lessons and Warnings derived from WW1*, in: *Dongfang Zazhi* 21 (1924), 14, pp. 17–22.

27 Cai, Yuanpei, "Ouzhan yu zhexue [The European War and Philosophy]," *Xin Qingnian* 5 (1918), 5, pp. 491–6. See also W. Meissner, *China zwischen nationalem 'Sonderweg' und universaler Modernisierung: Zur Rezeption westlichen Denkens in China*, München 1994.

the war as the triumph of democracy and cooperative internationalism over militarism, authoritarianism and imperialism.²⁸

In any case, hardly any advocate of the New Culture Movement aimed at Westernization in the sense of China mimicking European or Euro-American civilization. Most of the movement's main advocates opined that China needed to find its own way to modernity but that it would need to do so after an inevitable process of profound cultural self-criticism and civilizational learning. In the eyes of many key thinkers of the New Culture Movement or the May Fourth Movement, Western civilization was only partly the outcome of old European traditions. Rather, Western civilization was first and foremost conceptualized as the outcome of a historical rupture which, based on modern individualism and scientism, had left earlier traditional constraints behind. In a certain sense, they demanded that China learn from what they regarded as Europe's historical discontinuities rather than its cultural continuities in the sense of traditions.

For key figures of the New Culture Movement like Chen Duxiu it was particularly the realm of mores, norms, values and behavioural patterns which impeded China from transforming itself into a modern society. For him, individualism and other alleged behavioural principles of modern European societies were foundational to building modern and future-oriented countries. Others were more doubtful about referring to European mores, ethics and socio-political values as inspirational examples for China. For example, in an article for the journal *Young China* (*Shaonian Zhongguo*), one of its regular contributors, Shen Yi, wrote the following thoughts from his travels in Europe:

*Since I am abroad I realize that there is no other nation in the world as good as the Chinese in regards to morality, tolerance, and love for others. ... Following these great qualities we should be able to contribute to the coming of world peace. The others might be awakened, the path towards the future might still be unpaved, but I firmly believe that the day will come when our nation will be able to demonstrate its own ability and to achieve its ideals.*²⁹

The discourse of a Chinese moral superiority was particularly prominent in the camp of scholars who advocated more cautious paths to modernity,³⁰ which would be based more on continuities than on discontinuities. For this group, which stood somewhat apart from the New Culture Movement's main currents, the Great War became a rather

28 Tao, Lügong, Guanyu Ouzhan de yanshuo san pian – Ouzhan yi hou de zhengzhi, [Three Lectures about the European War – Post-War European Politics], in: Xin Qingnian [New Youth] 5 (1918), 5, pp. 470-2.

29 Shen Yi, Zhanhou deguo zhi zhenxiang [The real condition of Germany after WWI], in: Shaonian Zhongguo (1922–1926), pp. 24-34. For a closely related discussion of this subject matter see D. Sachsenmaier, Chinese Debates on Modernization and the West after the Great War, in J. Gienow-Hecht (ed.), *Decentering American History*, New York 2008, pp. 109-131.

30 Zhang Limin, Wenhua xuanze de chongtu – wusi shiqi dongxi wenhua lunzhan de sixiangjia [Conflicts Among Cultural Choices – Theoreticians Involved in Cultural Debates on East and West During the May Fourth Era], Beijing 1990. Zhang distinguishes three schools of conservatives: a) the Eastern Culture School (*Dongfang Wenhua pai*) around Liang Shuming, b) a group centred on Liang Qichao and Zhang Junli who later became the so-called Xuanxue School, and c) A group called after the journal *Xueheng* which included Mei Guandi and Wu Mi.

prominent topos.³¹ For them, the disasters in Europe revealed that some often idealized facets of European modernity carried not only promises but also dangers and destructive potentials. In fact, some major figures of the Chinese intellectual scene such as Yan Fu and Liang Qichao who certainly had been advocates of national self-strengthening programs, now viewed the European experience as a Faustian process that had gotten out of control.³² Rather openly they interpreted the war as the end of a misguided European trajectory. Consequently for them, the Europeans of today could no longer symbolize the world of tomorrow; rather, the East of yesterday could help the Europe of today. Like many others, they started to emphasize that China needed to preserve some of its cultural heritage and even cultivate some of its traditional core values.

Quite a substantial number of intellectuals belonging to this camp were able to acquire personal impressions of Europe in the years after 1918. Some of them were visiting scholars at European universities, whereas others were students or diplomatic delegates. The historian and public intellectual Liang Qichao and the philosopher Zhang Junmai (otherwise known as Carson Chang), for example, were among the cultural delegates of the Chinese mission at the negotiations in Versailles. During their stay, both travelled extensively through various countries and met European intellectuals such as Romain Rolland, René Guénon, or Rudolf Eucken. Zhang Junmai was actually so impressed by the parallels between Eucken's and his own work that he decided to stay in Jena for several years in order to work on several common projects. Zhang and Eucken even co-authored the book, *The Problem of Life in China and Europe*, which was published in Germany and in China.³³ Like other works by Zhang Junmai and by Rudolf Eucken, this joint publication advocated a continued modernization and yet, at the same time, it warned of blindly following the British and the American way. It depicted both nations as unwilling to accept any alternative approaches to modernity, and on this basis, it called for German idealism and Chinese traditionalism to join forces. Since both authors were careful to distinguish between Anglo-Saxon and German nationhood, the term "Europe" did not figure in a foundational way in their philosophical system.

After his return to China, Zhang Junmai followed up on his intellectual agenda. In later writings such as *My Political Impressions During my Stay in Europe From 1919–1921* (1919 zhi 1921 nian lü Ouzhou zhi zhengzhi yinxiang),³⁴ he warned of blindly Europeanizing China and argued that Europeans now, after having suffered heavy blows, had to learn from the civilizations of the East. A similar change of opinions can be observed in the case of Liang Qichao. In his historical writings produced before World War I,

31 J. Osterhammel, Shanghai, 30. Mai 1925. Die chinesische Revolution, München 1997.

32 See for example Tang, Xiaobing, Global Space and the Nationalist Discourse of Modernity: The Historical Thinking of Liang Qichao, Stanford 1996; and B. Schwarz, In Search of Wealth and Power: Yen Fu and the West, Cambridge 1964.

33 R. Eucken and Chang, Carsun, Das Lebensproblem in Europa und China, Leipzig 1922.

34 Zhang Junmai, 1919 zhi 1921 nian lü Ouzhou zhizhi zhengzhi yinxiang ji wuren suo de zhi jiaoxun [The Political Impressions I arrived at During my Stay in Europe from 1919 to 1921 and the Lessons that I have Learned], in: Xinlu 5 (1928), 1, pp. 19–27.

the great thinker had depicted the basic patterns of the European past as a trajectory of innovations and transformations, both at a social and a cultural level. In comparison to the culture of the Europeans, Liang had argued then, China was not only rather stagnant and isolated – it was also stricken by blindness, since it could not even recognize the common human progress emanating from its epicentre in the West.³⁵ He added that while a mature sociopolitical culture enabled Europeans to sustain modern states and civil societies, the Chinese masses would have to be led slowly towards a culture of liberalism and socially responsible individualism. At the same time, Liang was weary of being too naive about the possibility of a shortcut to European modernity.

After returning home from his travels in Europe from 1919–1920, during which he visited several countries (among them England, France, and Germany), Liang published a book under the title *Impressions of Travels in Europe* (*Ouzhou xinying lu*), which is divided into two parts.³⁶ The first one, *Europe before and after the Great War*, contains an account of his travels in Europe and delivers an analysis of the conditions he observed. The second one, *The Self-Awakening of the Chinese People*, outlines the implications of the new geopolitical constellation for China and its future course. In the first part, Liang provided some rather graphical accounts of how European living conditions had deteriorated during the war. For example, he described his arrival in London in the following way: *As soon as we landed, nothing but images of poverty and destruction opened in front of our eyes.*

Liang goes on to recount that despite the winter season, his hotel room had no heat, and that during breakfast sugar was so precious that the Chinese delegation to which he belonged had to negotiate with only half-empty stomachs at best. Already, these images of hunger and despair in a Chinese description of Europe indicated a revision of an otherwise dominant trope: European superiority in fields like technology and living standards was obviously no longer given. In the same text, he asks his readership:

*Who could have imagined [before the war] that America would be able to take charge on the other side of the Atlantic and who would have expected that European countries and their populations would suffer the fate of poverty as we do? And who could have imagined those wealthy English, French, and Germans would also start crying out about their poverty and in their lives would start depending on high-interest loans?*³⁷

There was a certain reversal of international hierarchies in Liang's account – Europeans as the formerly privileged part of the global population had sunken down to the state of the disadvantaged ones. In a similar way, one can understand Liang's detailed discussions of widespread pessimism among European intellectuals. He actually regarded the overall dark cultural and intellectual mood among European thinkers as a more severe symptom

35 See for example Tang, Xiaobing, *Global Space and the Nationalist Discourse of Modernity: The Historical Thinking of Liang Qichao*. Stanford 1996.

36 Liang Qichao, *Ouyou xinying lu jielu* [Thoughts about My Travels in Europe], in: idem, *Yinbingshi heji* 7 (repr. Beijing 1989).

37 Ouyou Xinying lu, p. 2969.

of crisis than material shortage or war destructions. For him, Europe was a continent out of breath, yet still looking desperately for a new direction. Before the war, he had always praised Europe's endless resources of ambitious energies, its continuous endeavour to discover the new and unknown as a major advantage over China.

In his following reflections, Liang problematized Europe's fate from different angles, though all of these angles led back to a common line of interpretation – a dynamic process that had gotten out of control. According to Liang, Europe's revolutionary restlessness (which he had praised before) was now in the process of dissecting itself into a multitude of national and class-related protest movements, which in essence meant that the revolutionary energy had started to turn against itself. He added that it was mainly this modern belief in systematic scientific doubts that had robbed Europeans of their spiritual strongholds. He further stated that the consequences of a scientific culture such as industrialization, urbanization, and proletarianization had eaten away the communal spirit among European residents. In this context he wrote:

*As a result of the development of science, the organization of industrial production underwent fundamental innovations. Changes were carried out at such a fast speed, with such a sudden force, and on such a large scale, that people were always and everywhere at a loss when they tried to make agree their inner life with their outer life.*³⁸

In the *Impressions of Travels in Europe*, such passages are flanked by descriptions of the social fragmentation of European cities, the growing gaps not only between the social classes, but also between urban and rural areas. For Liang, the consequences of these bundled yet extremely contradictory forces were the spread of Social Darwinism on all levels, especially among social classes, religions, and nations. Like revolutionary energy, Liang had previously admired the implicit cultural logics of Social Darwinism as a major cultural force behind Europe's success.

For Liang Qichao, the rest of the world could no longer learn from the Europeans in a holistic manner; rather they now also needed to draw important lessons from Europe's crisis. This meant that the status of countries such as China as a latecomer in modern development now became at least partly an advantage, a possibility of steering a changing society into more stable directions. Differing from advocates of the New Culture Movement, Liang held that the main indigenous elements, which China needed to maintain or even revitalize, were particularly some of its key values and communal ties. In his eyes, these supposed features of Chinese civilization had the potential to enrich a modern culture based on pure scientism, instrumental reason and progress-oriented mentalities. Through such a synthesis, the forces of modern dynamism would be prevented from turning against themselves and from heading toward an empty space devoid of any sense and meaning.

38 Tang, Xiaobing. *Global Space and the Nationalist Discourse of Modernity: The Historical Thinking of Liang Qichao*, Stanford 1996, p. 181.

Still, Liang did not simply prophesy the decline of Europe and the Europeans. By contrast, he predicted that European culture would eventually turn around and approach a more cautious, humble, and gentle form of modernity. It would eventually learn to listen to the voices of softer and more moderate cultures. Within this intellectual framework, Europe had not only been dethroned as the only teaching civilization but was placed in the role of the student. Liang Qichao theorized rather extensively about the potential contributions of Chinese values to help Europe rediscover and recreate a stable sociopolitical culture. Such thoughts provided the background for appeals, such as the following call to Chinese students:

Our beloved youth! Please pay attention! March on! On the other side of the great land-mass, in Europe, millions are suffering from the bankruptcy of material culture and are desperately calling for help. They are waiting for you to come and save them.

In passages of this kind, Europeans certainly no longer figured as the representatives of a teaching civilization that had shaken the fundamentals of all other cultures around the world. Rather, in Liang's account it was now the Europeans who had to face the stark choice between a major civilizational change and disaster – a situation that in principle did not differ from the one in which many critical Chinese thinkers saw their own country.

Conclusion

At any stage of history, there was not one monolithic Chinese image of Europe and the Europeans. The perceptions of the continent in the Far West differed between various social, political, and intellectual actors, and as images they were embedded within wider worldviews, value-systems and sociopolitical agendas.

One of the key differences between the discussed images of Europeans during the seventeenth century and the early twentieth century was their underlying notions of normativity, universality and interpretational authority. During the seventeenth century, both Chinese Christians and Jesuit missionaries expressed the alleged achievements of European civilizations in Confucian terms. Consequently, in the pro-Christian literature of that time the moral and social qualities of Europeans were being depicted in a manner that openly referred to China's mythical golden age as it was described in the Confucian classics.

By contrast, during the early twentieth century pro-Westernization forces operated on the assumption that Europe formed the heart of a modern, allegedly universalizable modern culture. In many Chinese accounts from that time period, Europeans tended to figure as the representatives of an advanced world, and their ideas as well as social values were often seen as paradigmatic for China's future. For other camps of thinkers during the aftermath of World War I, however, the notion of universality looked far more problematic and at the same time far less desirable. Many prominent Chinese thinkers regarded the war as the failure of the Enlightenment program and forcefully maintained

that Europeans now had to learn how to learn from other civilizations. In their eyes, it was particularly some ethical standards and social principles which China needed to preserve rather than overcome. However, also thinkers like Liang Qichao, Zhang Junmai or Yan Fu were not inimical to the idea of changing China, and they operated with terms and concepts that were an integral part of China's modernization discourses of that time. However, their views differed from many key protagonists of the New Culture Movement in what they identified as the necessary realms and scopes of China's future transformations.

All of the perceptions of Europeans that I discussed were not generated in a solipsistic manner but were rather disseminated and partly created by translocal communities of likeminded people. This was the case with the Jesuits and their elite converts in Ming-Qing China, and the same was true during the beginning of the twentieth century when Chinese visions of radical modernization were closely tied to globally circulating intellectual currents and political programs. As I have argued elsewhere in more detail, many "Chinese" reactions to World War I were also at least partly the products of transnational intellectual networks that included a significant number of prominent European thinkers.³⁹

Today, the background of Chinese perceptions of Europeans is very different. Long gone are the days when Europe would still be considered the centre of global modernity and a key reference space for intellectual and political debates in China. In the past thirty years it was particularly the United States which figured in the latter role. During that same time period, however, the Chinese intellectual climate has changed. More voices are now calling for a „Chinese model“ as a unique and particularly promising path. In this context, many groups have come to challenge the idea of any Western reference space for China's debates about its domestic future and international roles. Rather, problematizing global hierarchies of knowledge and the West's epistemological dominance has come to be an important element in many academic and intellectual debates in contemporary China.

39 D. Sachsenmaier, *Searching For Alternatives to Western Modernity. Cross-Cultural Approaches in the Aftermath of World War I*, in: *Journal of Modern European History* 4 (2006), 2, pp. 241-259; and idem, *Alternative Visions of World Order in the Aftermath of World War I – Global Perspectives on Chinese Approaches* (see note 24). Parts of this article are based on these two publications.

Race, Class or Culture? The Construction of the European in Colonial Malaria Control

Manuela Bauche

RESÜMEE

Der Aufsatz untersucht, auf welche Weise Ärzte im kolonialen Kontext den „Europäer“ dachten. Er nimmt dafür zeitgenössische Debatten über die Disposition bestimmter „Bevölkerungsgruppen“ für Krankheiten wie Malaria und Schlafkrankheit in den Blick sowie die Praxis der Malaria-bekämpfung in der Kolonie Deutsch-Ostafrika zu Beginn des 20. Jahrhunderts, in der „Europäer“ und „Farbige“ unterschiedlich behandelt wurden. Es wird gezeigt, wie „Europäer“ und „Farbige“ als Phänomene konstruiert wurden und immer wieder argumentativ und praktisch voneinander abgegrenzt werden mussten. Am Beispiel der dabei produzierten „Grenzfälle“ der „Goanesen“ und „Buren“ arbeite ich heraus, dass in der Idee des „Europäers“ das Konzept biologisch definierbarer „Rassen“ auch für Ärzte untrennbar mit Vorstellungen von „Kultur“ sowie mit Klasse verknüpft war.

Introduction

Historians of colonialism often face the dilemma of being provided a vast amount of sources left behind by agents of colonialism, while being interested in the perspectives of the colonized. They then need to read documents against the grain in order to discern what Africans, Indians, Filipinos and others might have said, thought or done. Compared to this challenge, this paper's aim, to look for "the European" in colonial sources, may appear a rather comfortable exercise. However, this is misleading: First, authors of colonial reports, while conceiving themselves as "Europeans," rarely did so explicitly. Second, they mostly remained silent about how they defined this category. While they devoted much space to comments on assumed differentiations within the "Coloured population" (*Farbige*) – setting "indigenous Coloureds" (*eingeborene Farbige*) apart from

“non-indigenous Coloureds” (*nicht-eingeborene Farbige*) and detailing whether “Africans,” “Arabs,” “Sudanese”¹ and so on belonged to one or the other category – defining “Europeans” or the “White population” seemed unnecessary to them. Third, their idea of the European revealed inconsistencies. That colonial officials often used “European” interchangeably with “White” and “Non-Native” indicates one of these inconsistencies, for these were uneasy synonyms – with “White” building on the idea of distinct bodily markers while “Non-Native” referred to a category of colonial law. This inconsistency at times caused some people to be counted as Europeans but only to be reluctantly recognized as Whites.²

The use of the term “European” was common for colonial officials as much as for the protagonists of this paper: colonial doctors. Although one might expect the latter to have been interested in drawing clear, biological lines around the European and other “groups” – after all, nineteenth and twentieth century medicine mingled with the racial taxonomies of anthropology and eugenics³ – doctors were not explicitly concerned with defining the European. Thus, they generally remained elusive on the question of whom and what they understood as such. On the other hand, their writings reveal that they took the existence of the group “European” for granted and that they at least tried to account for its existence by both drawing on medical knowledge and in their day-to-day practice.

Focusing on German East Africa, this paper traces colonial physicians’ attempts to delimit the European. It asks which lines colonial physicians drew around the European and which criteria they put forward in order to include and exclude individuals from this category. One can expect biology and medicine to have played an important role in physicians’ ideas on the European and the following section will comment on their impact. Yet, physicians in German East Africa were not only medical workers or scientists, but also members of the colonial administration and elite, embedded in structures of colonial rule. How did this impact their idea of the European? How was this concept informed by colonial ideas of culture and of social order? And how were these non-scientific ideas reconciled with medical theories in their imaginations of the European?

I will investigate these questions by concentrating on those physicians who were involved in the control of malaria in German East Africa, from the end of the nineteenth century to the beginning of the First World War. Malaria control and research provide a good

1 I use quotation marks in some cases to emphasize the constructed character of these and other categories. However, even in cases in which I forego this emphasis, I take “European,” “Coloureds,” “Africans,” “Boers,” etc. as constructed categories – not as given groups. All translations are by the author.

2 See among others: Reichs-Kolonialamt (ed.), *Die deutschen Schutzgebiete in Afrika und der Südsee 1912/1913. Amtliche Jahresberichte*, Berlin 1914, pp. 8-12; H. Schnee (ed.), *Deutsches Kolonial-Lexikon*. Vol. 3, Leipzig 1920, p. 318.

3 On the links between German colonial anthropology, eugenics, medicine and colonialism, see: P. Grosse, *Kolonialismus, Eugenik und bürgerliche Gesellschaft in Deutschland 1850–1918*, Frankfurt and New York 2000; P. Grosse, *Turning Native? Anthropology, German Colonialism, and the Paradoxes of the ‘Acclimatization Question’ 1885–1918*, in: G. Penny and M. Bunzl (eds), *Worldly Provincialism. German Anthropology in the Age of Empire*, Ann Arbor 2003, pp. 179-197.

focus for an investigation of the scientific construction of the European, for their practice built upon the idea of biological differences between “groups,” thus setting the European apart from others on the grounds that he⁴ reacted differently to the disease. However, these ideas were not stable, but subject to constant revision in accordance with social, economic and political realities in the colony. Indeed, physicians’ conceptions of the European provide a particularly good starting point for our investigation as they illustrate the tension between scientific classifications on the one hand and social categorization on the other, the struggle to establish a scientific basis and to reify what was essentially socially and politically constructed and negotiated.

For my analysis, I draw mainly on the annual medical reports, compiled and edited by the Colonial Ministry from 1903 to 1914, which are based on reports written by physicians working in the colonies. Far from providing an exhaustive investigation into the construction of the European by colonial doctors, this paper sees itself as a twofold exercise: first as an exercise in critically accounting for what Rogers Brubaker has termed “group-making,” that is, in tracing the process from categorization to the enactment of imagined categories in everyday life.⁵ Thus, I do not understand “European” as referring to a given group of individuals. Instead, I take it to be a category that had first to be created and then to be enacted and reified in everyday life. Second, this paper sees itself as an exercise in “rethinking colonial categories”⁶ such as “race,” “colonizer” and “colonized” that are so often taken for granted in research on colonial history. Following the appeal issued by Ann L. Stoler, instead of conceiving of the European as a homogenous, stable and uncontested category, I highlight the ways in which colonial doctors differentiated within this category.

Obviously, this article is also an enquiry on colonial racism. This makes it difficult to do without quoting its language. I am well aware that many terms I quote are highly racist. However, I do so with the explicit aim to critically deconstruct these ideas, as my very aim is to show that, far from being innocent, they are the product of politics guided by the racist project of colonialism. Nevertheless, granting defaming language so much space seems unsatisfactory. I am grateful for suggestions on how to adequately deal with this dilemma.

4 Since I am concerned with “the European” as a constructed category, I understand “it” as being the most appropriate pronoun to refer to this concept. However, in order to provide an easier reading, I chose to use “he” – being well aware of the analytical inconsistency this compromise implies as well as of the fact that the pronoun hides differences, especially of gender, within the imagined group.

5 Here I follow Rogers Brubaker’s understanding of “group-making as a social, cultural, and political project, aimed at transforming categories into groups or increasing levels of groupness.” Brubaker points out that “a category is not a group. It is at best a potential basis for group-formation of ‘groupness.’ [...] By distinguishing consistently between categories and groups, we can problematize – rather than presume – the relation between them. We can ask about the degree of groupness associated with a particular category in a particular setting, and about the political, social, cultural, and psychological processes through which categories are invested with groupness. We can ask how people – and organizations – do things with categories.” R. Brubaker, *Ethnicity without Groups*, Cambridge/MA 2004, pp.12-13.

6 See the argument in: A. L. Stoler, *Rethinking Colonial Categories. European Communities and the Boundaries of Rule*, in: *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 31 (1989) 1, pp. 134-161.

1. Drawing boundaries

“European” was an omnipresent category in German East Africa’s medical reports. The reports contained sections on each colony that commented first on the number of medical personnel and medical facilities in the territory, then on the number of individuals treated in the hospitals and medical stations, and finally on case histories concerning different diseases. As a matter of principle, each smaller section was differentiated within – between the initial comments relating to “Europeans” (*Europäer*) and the comments relating to “Coloureds” (*Farbige*) that concluded each section. This differentiation did not always seem necessary to physicians in their scientific publications – often they understood their descriptions as applying to humans in general. However, when they referred to assumed differences in the disposition to disease, “European” generally was one of the categories they alluded to, besides “Coloureds,” “Negroes” “Natives” or more detailed terms referring to ethnic differentiations. Occasionally, “White”⁷ or “Non-Native”⁸ were used as synonyms for “European.” However, on the whole, these were exceptions.

Nevertheless, the European was not invented by colonial doctors. Moreover, defining the European was not a main concern of colonial physicians. Rather, “European” was a category that pervaded many domains of German rule in East Africa such as colonial administrative work, politics and law. It designated those who were to be judged according to “Non-Native Law,” as opposed to those subjected to “Native Law”; furthermore, it defined those who had access to the main political institutions of the colonial state. Therefore, doctors took “the European” for granted. At the same time, they echoed his construction and reproduced it in their descriptions as well as in their medical practice. This is also true for the dichotomy that accompanied German rule. For however inconsistent definitions of the European were, one of his features was at least obvious: he was defined in an essentially negative way, that is in opposition to an Other – or rather to Others. In German East Africa (GEA), the European’s Others were “Farbige,” “Coloureds” – for administrators as well as for physicians.

1.1 A crooked line: biology

That medical doctors assumed that the dichotomy of “European”/“Coloured” had a biological foundation comes as no great surprise. For the colonial Philippines, Warwick Anderson has shown that “race” was the category that suggested itself to account for patterns of disease occurrence; medical ideas on racial immunity, Anderson argued, provided a “cognitive framework”⁹ that could make sense out of the colonists’ disease experience.

7 See among others: Reichs-Kolonialamt (ed.), *Medizinal-Berichte über die Deutschen Schutzgebiete Deutsch-Ostafrika, Kamerun, Togo, Deutsch-Südwestafrika, -Neu-Guinea, Karolinen-, Marschall-Inseln und Samoa 1905/06*, Berlin 1907, p. 21.

8 O. Panse, *Schwarzwasserfieber*, in: *Zeitschrift für Hygiene und Infektionskrankheiten*, 42 (1903), p. 1.

9 W. Anderson, *Immunities of Empire. Race, Disease, and the New Tropical medicine, 1900–1920*, in: *Bulletin of the History of Medicine* 70 (1996) 1, p. 101.

In colonial Africa, too, physicians seemed to assume that one way to account for the omnipresence of the differentiation between the European and his Others was to point out the fact that this distinction was reflected in differential dispositions to diseases. This is not only documented for malaria, but also for sleeping sickness and blackwater fever, two other diseases that received considerable attention from doctors in the colony.

Before the terms “sleeping sickness” and “trypanosomiasis” became established for the disease that we today understand as being transferred by the tsetse fly, it had been described as “Negro lethargy,” revealing the underlying assumption that it would affect Africans only. French and German medical scientists echoed this labeling by inventing terms that would generally go with a genitive attribute – such as “narcotisme des nègres” and “Schlafkrankheit der Neger” (“Negro narcotism,” “Negro sleeping sickness”).¹⁰ Until the first years of the twentieth century, the main German manuals on tropical medicine believed that “sleeping sickness is an affliction of the Negro race [that] has never been observed in other Coloureds or in Europeans.”¹¹ Interestingly, although since 1902 physicians agreed on the idea that sleeping sickness was caused by micro organisms termed trypanosomes, and although cases were known in which trypanosomes had been found in the blood of Europeans, this did not lead physicians to diagnose sleeping sickness. Instead, they defined infections with trypanosomes in Europeans as “trypanosomiasis,” while they reserved “sleeping sickness” for Africans.¹²

Sleeping sickness’ counterpart was blackwater fever. The etiology of the disease was hotly debated at the beginning of the twentieth century. Most medical scientists agreed that it was linked to malaria, and a considerable number believed that it was, more particularly, the result of intoxication by the most popular anti-malaria drug, quinine, usually following irregular or inadequate dosage of the medicine.¹³ The disease derived its name from its most striking symptom, the presence of blood in the urine, a result of the deterioration of red blood cells that rapidly weakened the body. A considerable number of those affected succumbed to the disease.¹⁴ According to the medical reports on German East Africa, the highest toll of infections and deaths from blackwater fever concerned “Europeans.” While physicians noted that the disease affected “Asians,” too, they assumed that it spared “Africans”: “it has only been observed in Non-Natives,” asserted Otto Panse in

10 S. Ehlers, *Trypanosomen transnational. Europäisch und afrikanisch in den internationalen Schlafkrankheitsforschungen vor dem Ersten Weltkrieg*, Unpublished Magister thesis, Berlin 2009, p. 52.

11 B. Scheube, cited in Ehlers, *Trypanosomen* (see note 10), p. 53. All translations by the author.

12 Ehlers, *Trypanosomen* (see note 10), pp. 55–56.

13 R. Koch, *Aerztliche Beobachtungen in den Tropen*. Vortrag, in: Deutsche Kolonial-Gesellschaft. Verhandlungen, 7 (1898), pp. 301–303; J. Schwalbe (ed.), *Gesammelte Werke von Robert Koch*, Leipzig 1912, pp. 337–338.

14 The medical reports for German East Africa indicate that around 5 per cent of “Europeans” infected by blackwater fever died of it. See among others: Kolonial-Abteilung des Auswärtigen Amts (ed.), *Medizinal-Berichte 1904/05*, p. 89; Reichs-Kolonialamt (ed.), *Medizinal-Berichte 1909/10*, p. 213; Reichs-Kolonialamt (ed.), *Medizinal-Berichte 1910/11*, p. 351; Reichs-Kolonialamt (ed.), *Medizinal-Berichte 1911/12*, p. 234.

1903;¹⁵ others assumed that, at least in some regions, “[t]he Negro race enjoys, if not a complete, then at least an extensive immunity against it.”¹⁶

Regarding malaria, things were more complicated: while around 1900 a consensus had been reached on the idea that malaria was caused by micro organisms (*plasmodia*) and transmitted by the anopheles fly, a variety of questions triggered hot debates, which rarely led to a consensus. One of these questions was how to explain the differential occurrence and course of malaria in humans. Physicians occasionally put forward the idea that Africans were endowed with complete immunity against malaria; evidence against this assumption, however, was so obvious that the idea had to be revised. The theory of complete racial immunity was rejected,¹⁷ but medical reports still suggested that “Coloureds” and “Negroes” in particular were less seriously affected by the disease than “Europeans”: “Indeed, there seems to exist a difference between the races in favour of the Negro race,”¹⁸ noted Hans Ziemann in his handbook on malaria. Whereas malaria was presented as a highly visible and often fatal infection for “Europeans,” it was conceived as a latent and minor one for “Coloureds” and “Negroes.” The idea was that “Negroes” might have “by birth been endowed with a certain degree of immunity,”¹⁹ and that even if this was not the case, they must be able to *develop* a certain degree of immunity during the course of their lives, while it remained open to debate whether the same applied to “Europeans.”²⁰

However, drawing clear lines between Europeans and Others was not easy. Indeed, while it might come as no surprise that physicians attempted to account for differences between these categories by identifying biological differences, it is striking how reluctant they were to abandon such an undertaking, as their assumptions were repeatedly contradicted. From 1903 onward, the idea that sleeping sickness was an “African disease” was openly contested. In December 1903, the *British Medical Journal* published a report titled “Sleeping Sickness and Trypanosomiasis in a European: Death: Preliminary Note.” The article caused a stir in the medical world as it presented evidence that “trypanosomiasis” in Europeans and “African sleeping sickness” constituted the same disease. The author of the report was Patrick Manson, one of the United Kingdom’s stars of tropical

15 Panse, Schwarzwasserfieber (see note 8), p. 1.

16 This is what Friedrich Plehn, for instance, assumed for German Cameroon, although he acknowledged that cases of blackwater fever in “Negroes” had been observed in other territories. F. Plehn, *Die Kamerun-Küste. Studien zur Klimatologie, Physiologie und Pathologie in den Tropen*, Berlin 1898, p. 105.

17 Robert Koch, for instance, clearly stated: “There exists no human race which as a matter of principle is immune [to malaria].” Koch, *Aerztliche Beobachtungen* (see note 13), p. 341.

18 H. Ziemann, *Malaria*, in: C. Mense (ed.), *Handbuch der Tropenkrankheiten*, Vol. 5, 1, Leipzig 1917, p. 277.

19 Koch, *Aerztliche Beobachtungen* (see note 13), p. 342.

20 While for Friedrich Plehn it was clear that in order to explain malaria infections of “Negroes,” one had to consider that they could develop an immunity against the disease when regularly exposed to it, he was much more cautious to apply this idea to Europeans. He argued that for Europeans, too, “a certain degree of local acclimatisation without any doubt has some importance”. However, it did not occur to him to treat acclimatization of “Europeans” and “Negroes” as one and the same issue. Instead he devoted separate sections to the issue. Interestingly, the section including Europeans was titled “Individual disposition,” while the one referring mainly to “Negroes” bore the title “Racial disposition.” Plehn, *Kamerun-Küste* (see note 16), pp. 81–84.

medicine. The report's protagonist was "Mrs. S.": Mrs. S. had been the wife of a missionary working in the French Congo. In late 1901, an insect had bitten her on her left leg, the spot had become infected, and she thereafter had contracted a fever. On return to England, Patrick Manson at the London School of Tropical Medicine examined her. Manson diagnosed an infection with trypanosomiasis and prescribed a therapy with arsenics, the only cure known at the time, to provide at least some relief from the disease. However, Mrs. S. did not recover; instead Manson and his colleague, George Carmichael Low, who observed her condition over the course of one year, identified the classical symptoms of sleeping sickness. An autopsy conducted on the day she died in 1903 confirmed the scientists' late diagnosis.²¹

In the case of Mrs. S., physicians' attempts to cling to the difference between the European and the African by differentiating between supposedly European trypanosomiasis and African sleeping sickness became obsolete. In the following years, more and more cases of sleeping sickness in Europeans would be described in medical journals.²² The biological line between the European and his African Other was severely blurred.

Blackwater fever met a similar fate. If, at some point, the affliction of blackwater fever had provided a boundary along which the European could be separated, if not against Coloured people in general, then at least against the African in particular, physicians now had to admit that "an absolute immunity to blackwater fever cannot be found in any race."²³ Indeed, several scientists as well as the medical reports on the German colonies reported cases of "blackwater fever in Negroes."²⁴

Here again, the boundaries around the European were blurred. For medical scientists, this meant that they had to adjust their statistics. But it had more serious implications, too. The extraordinary attention Manson and Low devoted to one single case of sleeping sickness in a European reveals their uneasiness towards the idea of blurred boundaries, as well as the physicians' reluctance to accept the new evidence of blackwater fever in "Africans." Cases concerning "Africans" or "Natives" (*Eingeborene*) continued to arouse physicians' interest – such as that of Dr. Heinrich Ollwig in Dar es Salaam, who regretted that the only case of blackwater fever concerning an "African" had not been well documented before the sufferer passed away.²⁵ Also, the often-awkward conclusions on the issue reveal an unwillingness to break completely with the initial theory. Hans Ziemann in his compendium on the issue summarized statistical findings on blackwater fever in "Americans," "Europeans" and "Negroes" in a rather roundabout way. He noted: "Thus,

21 Ehlers, Trypanosomen (see note 10), pp. 56-59.

22 Ibid., p. 58; see also Sarah Ehlers' thorough analysis of the construction of the European in reports on sleeping sickness: Ehlers, Trypanosomen (see note 10), pp. 84-90.

23 H. Ziemann, Schwarzwasserfieber, in: C. Mense (ed.), Handbuch der Tropenkrankheiten, Vol. 5.1, Leipzig 1917, p. 495.

24 Reichs-Kolonialamt (ed.), Medizinal-Berichte über die deutschen Schutzgebiete Deutsch-Ostafrika, Kamerun, Togo, Deutsch-Südwestafrika, -Neu-Guinea, Karolinen-, Marshall-Inseln, Marianen und Samoa für das Jahr 1909/10, Berlin 1911, p. 116; other cases are mentioned in the same report on pp. 117 (German East Africa), 288 (Cameroon); Hans Ziemann provides a review of publications that mention cases of blackwater fever in Africans: H. Ziemann, Schwarzwasserfieber (see note 23), pp. 495-496.

25 Reichs-Kolonialamt (ed.), Medizinal-Berichte 1905/06, pp. 39-40.

we observe the remarkable relative sparing of the Negro race.”²⁶ Although the idea of an absolute immunity had been replaced by that of different degrees of disposition to the disease, “race” still provided the line along which these dispositions were explained. Thus, to Ziemann, the degree of “the single races’ share [in blackwater fever]” (*Beteiligung der einzelnen Rassen*)²⁷ still seemed worth commenting on. Dissolving the categories “European” and “Coloureds” was not on the agenda.

The question of differential dispositions to malaria, finally, had from the start been and remained a controversial issue. However, at least in some German colonies,²⁸ a growing consensus seemed to develop on the idea that Non-Europeans, too, suffered considerably from the disease, even though reports continued to devote by far the most space to comments on malaria affecting Europeans.²⁹

Thus, in medical research, the European was constantly created and dissolved again: evidence revealed that he was not anymore the sole victim of malaria; neither did his affliction with blackwater fever set him apart from the African, nor was he immune against the allegedly “African” disease of sleeping sickness. Medical scientists struggled hard to present straightforward biological accounts of the European. But repeatedly, they had to realize that biology did not provide a reliable basis for stable boundaries.

1.2 Straightening the line: medical practice

However unstable the boundaries were in medical theory, medical practice promised to strengthen them, for it had the power to enact and enforce desired categories, to make them relevant in everyday life, or in Rogers Brubaker’s words, to transform categories into groups.³⁰ The practice of malaria control, as we shall see, did this by administering differential treatment to German East Africa’s population.

The European: the main concern of health policies

When in the 1890s medical facilities for civilians began to be established in German East Africa by the colonial administration, it was taken for granted that it was necessary to differentiate between medical service for “Europeans” and for “Non-Europeans”.³¹ When

26 German original: “Wir sehen also das außerordentlich relative Verschontbleiben der Negerrasse.” H. Ziemann, *Schwarzwasserfieber* (see note 23), p. 496.

27 *Ibid.*, p. 495.

28 In Cameroon, for instance, physicians pointed out that Africans often suffered from malaria as well as from spleen pains accompanying the disease. In contrast, physicians in German East Africa seem to have maintained their virtually exclusive focus on European health. See among others: Eckart, *Regierungsärztlicher Bericht für die Zeit vom 1. April bis 30. Juni 1911*, Ebolowa, 12.7.1911, in: *Archives Nationales de Yaoundé* FA 1/877, p. 243.

29 See among others: *Kolonial-Abteilung des Auswärtigen Amtes* (ed.), *Medizinal-Berichte 1904/05*, p. 24.

30 Brubaker, *Ethnicity* (see note 5), pp. 12–13.

31 In the following, I deal with facilities established by the colonial government only – not with the system of health care that missions introduced to German East Africa, since this was explicitly aimed at serving the colonized population. For this, see among others: W. U. Eckart, *Medizin und Kolonialimperialismus. Deutschland 1884–1945*, Paderborn 1997, pp. 354–386.

it was decided to establish a governmental hospital in Tanga, an important coastal base of the colonial administration, discussion arose on several issues, such as whether the building, which had previously been used as a hotel, was adequate for a hospital. But it was taken as a matter of common sense by both officials and physicians that “Europeans” and “Coloureds” had to be accommodated and treated in separate sections. Thus, the first floor was reserved for “Europeans” while “Coloureds” were to be put on the ground floor. For the rooms on the first floor “6 beds including mosquito net”³² were requested, whereas for the ground floor “12 simple wooden mats”³³ were considered sufficient.

This pattern of segregation was applied to the governmental medical service in general: in Dar es Salaam, the colony’s main port and its capital since 1889, the governmental hospital served “Europeans” only, while “Coloureds” were supposed to be treated at Sewa Hadji Hospital.³⁴ Moreover, the sanatorium opened in September 1904 in the Usambara Mountains in the north of the territory was reserved for the recovery of “Europeans” only.³⁵

Clearly, the European was privileged, but most importantly, he was the one whose health was the main concern of medical policies. The main objective, stated the medical report for 1909/10, was to “create bearable conditions in the coastal stretches in which Europeans need to stay permanently”³⁶ as well as to rid and keep those stretches of land that had been reserved for European settlers free from disease, mainly in the northern parts of the territory. The aim to secure the European’s health was linked to the conception of the European as constantly threatened by disease. This was, as the case of malaria control in German East Africa will illustrate, the main attribute with which the European was endowed and which served to set him apart from his Others which were in contrast conceived as threats.

Malaria control: the European as threatened by disease

An overall plan for controlling malaria in German East Africa did not exist. Usually, the physician in charge of a certain region would autonomously decide which measures were to administered, selecting from a wide range of possibilities. In most places, authorities aimed to reduce the amount of stagnant water which was believed to provide breeding places for anopheles mosquitoes. For the same reason, bush was cut down in other regions, the use of quinine as a prophylaxis against malaria was also encouraged, and blood testing was utilized in order to identify individuals infected with malaria and to treat them afterwards.

32 Plehn to Wissmann, Tanga, 18.11.1895, in: TNA G5/4, p. 12.

33 Ibid.

34 The hospital had been financed by the Indian trader Sewa Hadji, who had also given the institution his name. See for instance: Kolonial-Abteilung des Auswärtigen Amts (ed.), *Medizinal-Berichte* 1904/05, p. 9.

35 Ibid., 12-16; Kolonial-Abteilung des Auswärtigen Amts (ed.), *Medizinal-Berichte* 1905/06, pp. 17-20.

36 Reichs-Kolonialamt (ed.), *Medizinal-Berichte* 1909/10, p. 40.

Dar es Salaam and Tanga were the only places in which malaria control schemes were established that claimed to operate systematically. The Dar es Salaam program started in 1901, its pendant in Tanga four years later, and both followed the same rationale: the cities were divided into working districts (in Dar es Salaam five bigger or 22 smaller sections respectively; in Tanga three sections) in which the medical staff would assess the prevalence of malaria by regular visits which would allow them to collect blood samples from inhabitants. Those individuals whose blood samples tested positive for malaria parasites at the hospital lab would be registered as infected and administered quinine treatment and medical post-treatment. After the Dar es Salaam scheme had been heavily criticized as ineffective, it was terminated in 1912. Later attempts to prevent malaria focused on mosquito control through nets, larvicide and the drainage of swamps. The campaign in Tanga had the same fate, being discarded as ineffective shortly before the outbreak of the First World War.³⁷

To claim that medical staff collected blood samples from “inhabitants” of Dar es Salaam and Tanga is imprecise, for only those listed as “Non-Europeans” were submitted to blood tests. Admittedly, the Dar es Salaam malaria commission not only toured districts inhabited by Africans and Asians, but also included the European part of the city. The main concern here, however, was not with administering quinine to Europeans but with the danger thought to emanate from the “Europäerboys,” local men employed as domestic workers in European homes. Since anopheles mosquitoes were frequent in the district inhabited by Europeans and thus malaria could be transmitted to Europeans, if only the flies were provided with infectious matter, Dr. Robert Kudicke, the physician supervising the malaria campaign after 1905, concluded:

*[A]lso among Europeans, even under favourable climatic conditions, [malaria] infections will continue to occur, as long as no effort is made to ban the Coloureds from the European quarters.*³⁸

This reasoning depicted Coloureds as those providing the “infectious matter,” as carriers of disease and the source of infection; Europeans, on the other hand, figured as the disease’s victims. Mosquitoes were conceived of as the link between the source and its victim.

As has been noted, around 1900 medical scientists had agreed on the premise that the transmission of malaria parasites from one human to another was only possible through the bite of the anopheles mosquito. What physicians described was a cycle of infection roughly following the pattern “(parasite in) human <> (parasite in) mosquito <> (parasite in) human <> (parasite in) mosquito” and so on. The cycle could be described as starting either with “(parasite in) human” or with “(parasite in) mosquito” and ending with one of the two stages – this did not affect the cycle’s structure.

37 A. Beck, *Medicine and Society in Tanganyika 1890–1930. A Historical Inquiry*, Philadelphia 1977, pp. 15–16; D. F. Clyde, *History of the Medical Services of Tanganyika*, Dar es Salaam 1962, pp. 16–45.

38 Kolonial-Abteilung des Auswärtigen Amtes (ed.), *Medizinal-Berichte 1904/05*, p. 31.

The practice of malaria control, however, reveals that this conception of the cycle had been transformed. The omnipresent categories “European” and “Coloured” were integrated into the cycle of infection. In fact, it was no longer a cycle, but was molded into a chain with a clear starting point and, more importantly, a clear end. At its beginning stood the cause of infection and at its end the alleged victim of infection, the European. At the same time, just as “human” was equated with “European,” the “parasite” or cause of infection was equated with “Coloured.” The chain of infection thus followed the pattern: “Coloured > mosquito > European.”

This reasoning pervaded physicians’ concerns. Not only did Dr. Kudicke warn that Europeans would only be freed from malaria when their domestic workers had been banned from the European residential areas. He furthermore pointed out that the increase in malaria infections among Europeans in 1905 was due to the fact that the curfew imposed on Africans had been abolished at the beginning of the year, with the effect that they “had been allowed full scope to move also at night, thus favouring the spread of malaria.”³⁹ The notion of Africans and Coloureds constituting the sources of infection was not merely something people talked about: the measures initiated against malaria were in perfect accordance with this idea. With the exception of one year, blood tests in Dar es Salaam and Tanga were taken from those defined as “Coloureds” only, while “Europeans” were not examined. Moreover, whereas “Europeans” were only *advised* to take quinine both as a prophylaxis and for treatment, “Coloureds” found to be affected by malaria were not left to decide for themselves, but instead were submitted to compulsory treatment with quinine and to subsequent monitoring of the treatments’ results through repeated blood tests. From such a policy, physicians expected quick improvements in Europeans’ health conditions. One of them described its effects upon the rural area of Bismarckburg (today Kasanga) south of Lake Tanganyika as follows:

*All Coloureds who slept at night at the boma [military camp] near the European quarters were, during the rainy season, submitted to severe quinine surveillance [Chininkontrolle] (every 10th and 11th day they received 1.0 g of quinine each), which may be the reason why neither a boy nor a European contracted malaria.*⁴⁰

There was hardly any difference between trying to render harmless “the Coloureds” or the parasites.⁴¹

39 Ibid., p. 28.

40 Kolonial-Abteilung des Auswärtigen Amtes (ed.), *Medizinal-Berichte* 1903/04, p. 30.

41 Many historians of medicine have shown that early 20th century medicine and bacteriology in particular provided ideas of infection and contagion that could be used as metaphors in campaigns against political and social enemies. See for instance: P. Sarasin, *Die Visualisierung des Feindes. Über metaphorische Technologien der frühen Bakteriologie*, in: *Geschichte und Gesellschaft*, 30, 2 (2004), pp. 250–276; P. Weindling, *A Virulent Strain. German Bacteriology as Scientific Racism, 1890–1920*, in: W. Ernst and B. Harris (eds), *Race, Science and Medicine, 1700–1960*, London (1999), pp. 218–234; C. Gradmann, *Unsichtbare Feinde. Bakteriologie und politische Sprache im deutschen Kaiserreich*, in: P. Sarasin, S. Berger, M. Hänseler, and M. Spörri (eds), *Bakteriologie und Moderne. Studien zur Biopolitik des Unsichtbaren, 1870–1920*, Frankfurt a. M. 2007, pp. 327–353.

Creating boundaries

Malaria control did not invent the distinction between “Europeans” and “Coloureds”. However, the practice of malaria control confirmed, reproduced and enforced these distinctions by supporting them with arguments of disease control. Thus, according to medical reasoning, Coloureds and Europeans had to be separated in order to prevent the latter from being infected. However, there was more to the argument than the threat of disease. Studies of medical segregation in colonial Africa have shown that the impetus for creating physical distance was closely linked to concerns about social distance.⁴² Malaria control in German East Africa, too, reveals this concern. Here, not only were Coloureds pathologized, but so, too was the breaching of boundaries between Coloureds and Europeans. Heinrich Ollwig, the doctor supervising the Dar es Salaam anti-malaria operations, illustrates this poignantly when commenting on the death from malaria of an eleven-year-old “European” boy,

*who, after the sudden death of his father let himself go [verwahrloste] and dealt only with Negro boys with whom he often ate, too, and in whose huts he even stayed in the evenings. [...] In his blood and in the capillaries of his brain numerous malaria parasites were found. We can definitively assume that his infection occurred in one of the Negro huts.*⁴³

One could argue that either the Coloureds “themselves constitute a degenerate race or it is their presence and contact with them or indeed their condition itself which constitutes a crucible of degeneracy,” to borrow from Etienne Balibar’s description of (class) racism.⁴⁴ Typically, reports on Europeans suffering from malaria in German East Africa provide details on the place of infection and even note the assumed date of infection.⁴⁵ Interestingly, in the case of the European boy, Ollwig abandoned such a detailed reconstruction of the events. From his perspective, the main cause of the boy’s death was that he had dared to blur the boundaries.

The case of the European boy points at something else: the boundaries between the European and his Others were not given. They were above all desired boundaries that had to be created, constantly enacted and reproduced. One way of creating such boundaries was to divide Dar es Salaam into working sections and to adjust this division to assumed

42 See especially: A. Wirz, Malaria-Prophylaxe und kolonialer Städtebau. Fortschritt als Rückschritt?, in: Gesnerus, 37 (1980), pp. 215-234; and also: J. W. Cell, Anglo-Indian Medical Theory and the Origins of Segregation in West Africa, in: The American Historical Review, 91 (1986) 2, pp. 307-335; S. Frenkel, J. Western, Pretext or Prophylaxis? Racial Segregation and Malarial Mosquitos in a British Tropical Colony: Sierra Leone, in: Annals of the Association of American Geographers 78 (1988) 2, pp. 211-228; O. Goerg, From Hill Station (Freetown) to Downtown Conakry (First Ward). Comparing French and British Approaches to Segregation in Colonial Cities at the Beginning of the Twentieth Century, in: Canadian Journal of African Studies, 32 (1998), pp. 1-31.

43 H. Ollwig, Bericht über die Tätigkeit der nach Ostafrika zur Bekämpfung der Malaria entsandten Expedition, in: Zeitschrift für Hygiene und Infektionskrankheiten, 45 (1903) 3, p. 430.

44 E. Balibar and I. Wallerstein, Race, Class, Nation. Ambiguous Identities, London and New York 1991, p. 209.

45 For instance: Reichs-Kolonialamt (ed.), Medizinal-Berichte 1909/10, p. 29, 37, 39.

differences of culture, architecture and lifestyle. Consequently, according to the physician in charge of the malaria program, “working section A” consisted of the “European quarter” and contained massive buildings such as the military camp, the prison, the catholic mission, etc. – while “working section D,” hosting a “mainly Negro population,” showed a “maze of mud huts that revealed more or less unclean courtyards in between.” “[W]orking section E” finally, was made of “a jumble of compounds inhabited entirely by Negroes.”⁴⁶ The description reveals three interesting points. First, ideas of race and racial boundaries were built on ideas of “culture.” Second, the listing followed and at the same time reiterated political and social hierarchies, with the “European quarters” on top of the list and the “Negro quarters” at its bottom. It would have been as plausible to begin the description with the “Coloured quarters.” to continue on the “Negro quarters” and to end with the “European quarter.” In this way, even a seemingly innocent description of medical working sections helped to reify desired groups and boundaries. Third, as this description provided the basis for medical practice, medical personnel enacted these imagined boundaries by touring the city.

However, as the case of the eleven-year-old boy illustrates, not all attempts to build up and enact boundaries in the colony were successful. The following sections take a closer look at these limitations.

2. Boundaries blurred

From a physician’s point of view, “Europeans” were those whose health had to be protected, while “Coloureds” were the ones who threatened Europeans’ health. While it is clear that the line was drawn between victims and sources of disease, who exactly was standing on which side of the line, who was counted as European and who was not, remained elusive. Indeed, defining victims and sources was not always a straightforward business. Two examples of what might be called “borderline cases”⁴⁷ will illustrate this.

2.1 “Goans”

In German East Africa, “Goans” (*Goanesen*) were conceived of as being associated with the Portuguese colony Goa on the Indian subcontinent. The annual report for 1912/13 listed Goans in the section on “White population” and detailed:

*these [Goans] are partly half casts of today’s Portuguese and Indians, partly descendants of such half casts from the former height of Portuguese rule in India (Goa, Ormus, Diu, Daman, etc.), partly descendants of these Goans themselves, again mixed with Indian blood.*⁴⁸

46 Kolonial-Abteilung des Auswärtigen Amts (ed.), *Medizinal-Berichte*, 1904/05, p. 26.

47 See Dominik Nagl’s notion of „Grenzfälle“: D. Nagl, *Grenzfälle. Staatsangehörigkeit, Rassismus und nationale Identität unter deutscher Kolonialherrschaft*, Frankfurt a. M. 2007.

48 Reichs-Kolonialamt (ed.), *Schutzgebiete* 1912/13, p. 8.

The administration counted only very few “Goans”: for 1902, they listed 205 individuals in this category for the whole territory, observing that over half of them lived in Dar es Salaam; in 1913, 656 Goans were counted. Goans were described as working as traders and petit businessmen who mainly served the European market. Portuguese names were considered as being one of the Goans’ typical markers, as was the adherence to Catholicism and the adoption of Western habits. Individuals counted as Goans observed the same rights and political privileges as did those counted as Europeans or Non-Natives – as opposed to those subject to Native Law (*Eingeborenenrecht*). They also had access to some institutions of political representation such as the district councils (*Bezirksräte*) administering communal funds and the government council (*Gouvernementsrat*) advising the colonial government. Yet, in reports and address books, Goans were frequently listed as “Indians” or “Asians,” who fell under Native Law.⁴⁹

This controversial status was reflected in medical reports. While the annual medical reports for German East Africa, clearly following the all-pervading dichotomy, first dealt with the health of “Europeans,” then with that of “Coloureds,” it occurred that the category “Goans” figured in both sections. In part, this might have been a matter of organizing statistics, but it reflected an inconsistency in treatment, too: The medical report for 1903/04 for instance documents that Dar es Salaam’s hospital treated some individuals termed “Goans” in the Europeans’ section and others in the part reserved for Coloureds. Similarly, in 1906/07, a small number of Goans is again said to have been treated in the European section of Dar es Salaam hospital, while in the Tanga hospital, Goans are reported to have been treated in the Coloureds’ ward.⁵⁰

Other evidence suggests that physicians classed “Goans” equal to “Europeans”: They took it for granted that Goans contracted blackwater fever⁵¹ – while, as has been shown, they considered cases of this disease in “Africans” as highly exceptional. Thus, Goans were considered as contracting the same diseases as Europeans. They were also granted “European” treatment: For the first years of the Dar es Salaam malaria campaign, it was reported that while Coloureds had been administered quinine pills, “Europeans and Goans” had received quinine injections – “according to the wish of those who were hindered in their work because of side effects of the quinine treatment.”⁵² Most importantly, the Goan was treated as the one whose health, too, had to be secured: on one hand, when Ollwig detailed which measures against malaria would apply to which “groups,” he counted Goans among the “Asian population”; on the other hand, he exempted them from those measures which he had reserved for “Indians” and all

49 H. Schnee (ed.), *Deutsches Kolonial-Lexikon*. Vol. 1, Leipzig 1920, p. 742; J. Becher, *Dar es Salaam, Tanga und Tabora. Stadtentwicklung in Tansania unter deutscher Kolonialherrschaft (1885–1914)*, Stuttgart 1997, pp. 141–142; J. Iliffe, *Tanganyika under German Rule. 1905–1912*, Nairobi 1973, pp. 112–115; J. Iliffe, *A Modern History of Tanganyika*, Cambridge 1979, pp. 148–149.

50 Kolonial-Abteilung des Auswärtigen Amts (ed.), *Medizinal-Berichte 1903/04*, p. 7–10; Kolonial-Abteilung des Auswärtigen Amts (ed.), *Medizinal-Berichte 1906/07*, p. 37–39.

51 Kolonial-Abteilung des Auswärtigen Amts (ed.), *Medizinal-Berichte, 1906/07*, pp. 37–39; Reichs-Kolonialamt (ed.), *Medizinal-Berichte 1912/13*, p. 11.

52 Ollwig, Bericht (see note 43), p. 424.

the other individuals subsumed as “Asians.” Goans would not have to be submitted to blood tests, thus did not fall prey to the suspicion of being infected. Instead, Ollwig explained, the servants employed at Goan pubs (*Goanesenwirtschaften*) located in the “exposed districts” should be tested for malaria, arguing, “a considerable number of the Goans gets infected”⁵³ in these pubs. The European’s Other was also the Goan’s Other. However, the Goan was not always that easily incorporated into the category of the European. At times, doctors’ expressed doubts about the Goan’s position in the social hierarchy shined through. For instance, Dr. Otto Dempwolff, who supervised the Dar es Salaam scheme for one year, expressed surprise over the observation that “the Indians show more understanding in the usefulness of malaria control than the Goans, since they often notify their sickness when they have fever attacks.”⁵⁴ “Indolence”, the disinterest in medical treatment, was a trait with which physicians classically described those they considered and wanted to mark as distinct from their own assumed status, a status they conceived of as highly civilized. Obviously, Dempwolff was irritated by the fact that Goans, enjoying European privileges, showed a behavior that made it less plausible to classify them as “European.”

That Dempwolff, like many of his colleagues,⁵⁵ subsumed Goans under the broader category of “Asians” also reflects physicians’ reluctance to grant them recognition as Europeans. Those Goans who were employed as assistants at the Dar es Salaam malaria program, too, were unlikely to have been accepted in the ranks of the European: While Ollwig admitted that they were much more useful than their African colleagues, he made clear that it was nevertheless “difficult to introduce them into the technique of microscopic diagnosis” and that the “German nurses” were the most valuable workers.⁵⁶ From these observations we can derive two conclusions. First, Goans were granted European rights, but were repeatedly classified as “Asians,” which hints at the importance of the concept of biologically distinct races for their classification and for the idea of the European. This assumption is underscored by the colonial administration’s definition of the Goan: The officer commenting on the development of the colony’s population in the annual report for 1912/13 obviously had had some trouble finding an adequate place for comments on the Goans in the section on the colony’s population. In previous reports, this section was structured after a clear dichotomy, commenting first on the “White population,” then on “Coloureds.”⁵⁷ Where should the Goans be placed? The officer in charge included them in the paragraph on Whites, however he significantly placed them only at its very end. In this way, the Goans provided the bridge to the Coloureds. Obviously, the officer had not felt comfortable with fully including them into the White, but had not dared count them as part of to the Coloureds, given their official legal status as Non-Natives / Europeans.

53 Ibid., p. 445.

54 Reichs-Kolonialamt (ed.), *Medizinal-Berichte* 1907/08, p. 49.

55 See also Ollwig, Bericht (see note 43), p. 414.

56 Ibid., p. 443.

57 Reichs-Kolonialamt (ed.), *Schutzgebiete* 1912/1913, pp. 7-8.

Here, the relationship between the terms “White” and “European” becomes apparent: The section that in other reports, for instance in medical reports, is headed “Europeans,” is headed “Whites” in the annual report, implying a synonymous relation between the two terms. European thus was not only understood as a judicial category, but was imagined as being marked by bodily characteristics, too. Here, the concept of biologically defined race, was at work. The European was – or at least ideally should have been – White.

However, the case of the Goans reveals that “White” and “European” were hardly true synonyms, indeed but rather terms of different quality. For not all of those who were officially classified as Europeans and granted the same rights were without contest recognized as Whites. Whiteness indeed seems to have operated as an instrument with which positions within the European could be negotiated, enabling the assignment of an ambiguous status within the European to those undesired or less desired, such as the Goans.

Another way to place the Goans at the margins of the European was to present them as being, in the first place, of Indian descent. The comments on the Goans in the annual report make clear that administrators were concerned with distinguishing them from “*pure Portuguese*”:

*Some Goans, whose fathers were pure Portuguese, presented themselves as Portuguese, therefore the statistics on Europeans still erroneously list some Portuguese, who from now on are accounted for separately as Goans. Pure Portuguese are not at all present in the colony.*⁵⁸

True they received recognition as Europeans, but only with the special status “Goans” which set them visibly apart from members of European nations. This was done on the grounds of reasoning similar to what has been termed the “one drop rule,” which refers to racist classifications in the United States around 1900. It was clearly the concept of race, more precisely, of race in its biological meaning, that put Goans at the margins of both the European and the White. For the European, this meant that he was imagined as a race that could be distinguished from others on the grounds of biology.

The second conclusion that can be derived from the Goans’ case is that, nevertheless, biological race was not the only criterion available to classify people – neither for administrators nor for physicians. The annual reports, relating to “Coloureds”, repeatedly commented that “mixing” made it difficult to clearly differentiate between “Swahili,” considered to be indigenous to the territory, and “Arabs”:

*Often religion and higher standard of living [Lebenshaltung] resolves the matter. Obviously, the well off, fair skinned man from the coast loves to present himself as an Arab, even if he has only little Arab blood.*⁵⁹

58 Ibid., p. 8.

59 Ibid., p. 12; see also: Reichs-Kolonialamt (ed.), Schutzgebiete 1911/12, p. 5.

Here, it was acknowledged that “standard of living” or “lifestyle” (*Lebenshaltung*) could provide a criterion for classification of individuals. In the case of the Goans, too, *Lebenshaltung* seems to have been a relevant marker: Goans not observing the medical advices issued were shifted at least towards the margins of the ruling elite. *Lebenshaltung* might also have allowed the employment of individual “Goans” as medical assistants, an occupation that clearly set them apart from their (uncontestedly) European employers, while bringing them closer to their African colleagues. In these cases, the lifestyle of the Goans concerned might not have been “high” enough to include them into the ruling elite and to grant them a more respectable occupation. Indeed, not only (biologically defined) race, but class, too, was the obstacle for the inclusion into the European. The following example will illustrate that this could be the case even when membership in terms of biological race was not contested.

2.2 “Boers”

The category “Boers,” like that of “Goans,” held an uncomfortable relationship towards the category “European.” Around 1905, around 200 Afrikaner refugees, fleeing the conflicts with the British in South Africa, applied for land in German East Africa and were granted some ground in the northern Kilimanjaro and Mount Meru regions. These “Boers,” most of them poor, settled down as farmers, later some of them also engaged in the transport business. Soon, however, conflicts arose with the colonial administration. The authorities complained about the “Boers” hunting activities, which they thought infringed the regulations for the conservation of game; the administration also feared that the Boers might set up autonomous political structures. The administration therefore repeatedly rejected new demands for land by the Boers and tried to allocate spare land to German settlers instead.⁶⁰

In terms of legal status and political rights, Boers clearly counted as Europeans. In colonial reports however – and this applies to medical reports, too – Boers attracted considerable attention under the heading “European population”. They were thus singled out as a special group, and the reports’ wording reveals that the – German – physicians compiling the reports set themselves apart from them. Dr. Penschke, for instance, the physician stationed in the northern town of Moschi, complained that the Boers’ “peculiarities” (*Eigenheiten*) prevented effective action against malaria in the districts in which they settled. Such peculiarities, according to him, included letting the surroundings of their houses become marshy, acting “completely disinterested” in medical advice and countering the theory of malaria transmission by mosquitoes, with “only an incredulous smile”:

60 R. Tetzlaff, *Koloniale Entwicklung und Ausbeutung. Wirtschafts- und Sozialgeschichte Deutsch-Ostafrikas 1885–1914*, Berlin 1970, p. 110; Iliffe, *Tanganyika* (see note 49), pp. 59–61.

*Only few can be convinced about the dangerousness of mosquitoes. "The fever comes with one wind and leaves with another!" This is their conviction and they don't let themselves deter from it.*⁶¹

Warwick Anderson has shown that medical scientists in the colonies constructed differences between the races by differing between reactions to disease not only by pointing at assumed given features. Not only did doctors point at qualified assumed fixed, such as inherited immunity, but also argued that differences were due to specific behavior pertaining to hygiene. Filipinos, for instance, were said to contract cholera more easily than Europeans because they lacked the appropriate behavior to counter the threat of disease. Still, although the criteria "behavior" suggests a more flexible approach to differences, it was inextricably linked to "race." Filipinos were marked as behaving non-hygienically – and unhygienic behavior became the marker for Filipinos.⁶² That Boers were pictured as not observing the rules of hygiene hints at their contested position within colonial hierarchies. Their "lifestyle" was pictured in the same way as the lifestyle of many of those termed "Native": as rural, pre-industrial and lacking rational and scientific knowledge. At the turn of the twentieth century, a number of surveys were conducted in order to investigate the hotly debated question of whether Europeans in the tropics had achieved and could achieve some degree of "acclimatization," that is, whether they could get used to climatic and other conditions understood as being specific to the "tropics." Questionnaires used in German East Africa for that aim attempted to register whether the lifestyle (*Lebenshaltung*) of settlers in the colony was "reaching towards European lifestyle," towards "lower European lifestyle" or towards "Native lifestyle."⁶³ The results indicated that 49 individuals were observing higher European lifestyle, none a Native one, but that most settlers tended towards lower European lifestyle. Commenting on this last category, the physician made sure to detail that "among them [were] 69 individuals of Boer descent".⁶⁴ Thus, even if Boers were not categorically barred from membership in the European, their position within this category was problematic. What made it problematic was not – as in the Goanese's case – their biological race, but their way of life, their culture. The Boers' unclear position is also reflected by the fact that doctors involved in malaria control, instead of granting them the position of victims of disease that they granted to Europeans, endowed them with features attributed to the Coloureds: Penschke, in his report on health in the region of Moshi, made clear that the Boers had to be made responsible for the occurrence of malaria in the district. He argued, "the Boers in the shortest of times succeeded in systematically infesting the hitherto completely healthy regions. On their treks towards Buiko [in the northern Usambara Mountains] they brought malaria and anopheles with them and lodged them in [nistet ein] thoroughly."⁶⁵ Previous re-

61 Reichs-Kolonialamt (ed.), *Medizinal-Berichte* 1909/10, p. 33.

62 Anderson, *Immunities* (see note 9).

63 Reichs-Kolonialamt (ed.), *Medizinal-Berichte* 1910/11, p. 110.

64 Ibid.

65 Reichs-Kolonialamt (ed.), *Medizinal-Berichte* 1909/10, p. 32.

ports, too, had accounted for the increase of malaria infections in the northern districts by pointing at the importance of “travellers passing through,” among them 102 Boers affected with malaria.⁶⁶

Clearly, Boers were conceived as sources of infection, not as their victims – in analogy to “Coloureds” and in contrast to those who in medical reports were labeled “Europeans.” However, Boers did differ from Coloureds in one aspect: while the latter were as a matter of principle pictured as threats to the health of Europeans, Boers were usually blamed for diseasing themselves.⁶⁷ They provided, as one report argued, a good example for the fact that “lack of knowledge on the transmission of malaria through mosquitoes can lead to self-made harm.”⁶⁸ Boers were not infecting Europeans, but only themselves – this was the reasoning that set them apart from Coloureds. Also, the importance of the concept of biological race seems to have prevented the Boers from being categorically excluded from the European. However, it is obvious that physicians only granted them a position at the margins of Europeanness.

3. Conclusion

What does this tell us about German colonial physicians’ ideas of the European, about the lines and criteria for its construction? As has been shown, doctors in German East Africa as a matter of principle defined the European in opposition to his Coloured Other. They did so on the one hand in medical theory, by attempting to endow the European with specific biological traits such as disposition to or immunity against diseases. On the other hand, they did it in their day-to-day practice, by granting privileges in medical care to the European while providing modest service for his Other, and, in malaria control, by treating the European as a victim of disease that had to be protected by deploying control measures targeting his Coloured Other that was conceived as the source of disease.

The categories “Goans” and “Boers” have illustrated that, even from the perspectives of medical doctors, who was granted membership as European was far from self-evident, but had to be constantly negotiated. Additionally, they reveal on what grounds physicians negotiated membership in the “European”: they described Boers as having unhygienic habits, a pre-industrial way of life and as being poorly educated. The descriptions reveal that doctors conceived of themselves as the Boers’ opposite – as individuals respecting the rules of hygiene, being modern and being highly educated. What, from the physicians’ point of view, set both of them apart from Boers was lifestyle, culture

66 Kolonial-Abteilung des Auswärtigen Amts (ed.), *Medizinal-Berichte 1905/06*, p. 35.

67 This idea has been termed „Selbstschuld-Paradigma“ in the research on medicalisation and the working classes in imperial Germany. See: U. Frevert, *Krankheit als politisches Problem 1770–1880. Soziale Unterschichten in Preußen zwischen medizinischer Polizei und staatlicher Sozialversicherung*, Göttingen 1984, p. 136; J. Reulecke, A. Castell Rüdtenhausen, *Von der ‚Hygienisierung‘ der Unterschichten zur kommunalen Gesundheitspolitik*, in: J. Reulecke, A. Castell Rüdtenhausen (eds), *Stadt und Gesundheit. Zum Wandel von ‚Volksgesundheit‘ und kommunaler Gesundheitspolitik im 19. und frühen 20. Jahrhundert*, Stuttgart 1991, pp. 12–14.

68 Reichs-Kolonialamt (ed.), *Medizinal-Berichte 1908/09*, p. 14.

and class. Indeed, we find other evidence for class having been considered as a relevant marker for difference in German East Africa: For instance, Europeans had to provide proof of sufficient financial means if they wanted to settle in German East Africa. The colonial government explicitly discouraged immigration of “destitute Europeans,”⁶⁹ and influential colonial lobbyists advocated the settlement of members of the higher educated European classes in order to build a settler aristocracy in the colony.⁷⁰ Interestingly, too, when the governmental hospital was set up in Tanga, the European section was provided with “3 big rooms for the division of patients of different ranks” (*3 größere Krankenräume zur Abtheilung der Patienten unterschiedlicher Stände*).⁷¹ We can presume that “the Boers” whom Penschke described in Moshi would not have been bedded in the rooms reserved for the highest ranks. At the same time, the case of the urban, Christian, *petit entrepreneur* and Western-styled Goans shows that culture and class did not always suffice to successfully claim membership to the “European.” From both the administrators’ and the physicians’ perspectives, the concept of biological race, expressed through ideas of whiteness and blood bonds, was used to keep Goans at arms length from the European and to create the Goans as “not quite European.”

Thus, colonial physicians used a combination of biology, class and culture in order to draw boundaries around the European. Was the European then a race, class or culture? To pose the question this way would be to fall prey to the illusion that the concept of race can be isolated from class and culture and to fall prey to the idea that in contrast to the latter obviously social categories, race holds some kind of primordially given, natural quality. It has repeatedly been shown that the concept of race neither initially denoted a biological category, nor always referred to color. Instead, it developed from the eighteenth century on as a term with which conservative observers commented on social change in Europe. As such, the notion of race was, as Kenan Malik explains, “most imprecise”: “The idea of ‘peoples’, ‘nations’, ‘classes’ and ‘races’ all merged together.”⁷² Race served to point out differences within European society, to assign a place to “‘the primitive’ areas and groups within the home country,”⁷³ most notably to the working class. Its transfer to the Colonized and its, however still not exclusive, association with color developed only in the late nineteenth century argues Malik, for the British context. Etienne Balibar puts the emphasis not so much on the historical sequence of the different meanings of “race,” but instead on the continuity of its multiple layers, that is its economic and social aspects. He points out that the focus on bodily markers is far from being characteristic only of what he terms “ethnic racism,” but is at the core of anti-working class discourse, of “class racism”, too. For him, both forms of racism build on attempts to “somatise,”

69 Governor Götzen, cited in: R. Tetzlaff, *Koloniale Entwicklung* (see note 60), p. 105.

70 B. Kundrus, *Moderne Imperialisten. Das Kaiserreich im Spiegel seiner Kolonien*, Köln 2003, pp. 112–113; R. Tetzlaff, *Koloniale Entwicklung* (see note 60), pp. 103–106; B. Zurstrassen, ‘Ein Stück deutscher Erde schaffen’. *Koloniale Beamte in Togo 1884–1914*, Frankfurt a. M. 2008, p. 53.

71 Plehn to Wissmann, Tanga, 18.11.1895, in: TNA G5/4, p. 11.

72 K. Malik, *The Meaning of Race. History and Culture in Western Society*, London 1996, p. 80.

73 D. Pick, cited in: Malik, *The Meaning of Race* (see note 72), p. 81.

that is to reduce both the worker and the immigrant or Colonized to bodies in order to make them available as work force. According to him, race and class have from the start been intertwined, and continue to be.⁷⁴

Thus race, far from being clearly demarcated, is a “multi-faceted concept.”⁷⁵ Therefore, I propose not to assume that, when physicians conceived of the European as a race, they defined him as a biologically distinct phenomenon only. Instead, it would be more appropriate to conclude that physicians conceived of the European as a race that they set apart from others on the grounds of biology, class and culture.

The invention of the European in German East Africa was not the privilege of colonial physicians. The category was omnipresent. It figured in administrative reports, in anthropological descriptions, in colonial novels and much more. In its invention by the colonial administration, it operated as a political category: the European was the one who was granted specific political rights. He was able to apply for land for settlement and he could vote for and become a member of a number of political institutions. It is the enactment of these privileges that transformed the category of “European” into a group in whose name individuals were able to claim rights and advance requests. The European, thus, was not a medical invention. However, physicians contributed in reifying this category through their medical theories on biological differences and through their practice of differential treatment, based on ideas of culture and perceptions of class differences. Just as the administration had to constantly reinforce the category of “European” by creating a legal dualism, by barring Africans from participation in political institutions, by designing regulations on architecture and city planning (*Bauordnungen*) that contributed to segregating cities, and by restricting agricultural activities of the colonized, the medical doctors reproduced the European in the same way by insisting on segregating hospitals, treatment and statistics. The cases of the Boers and Goans highlight the fictive character and the fragility of this boundary making.

These cases also illustrate that the definition of the European was negotiated on the basis of who was desired as a member of the ruling elite and who was not. Thus, the European was a political category. Colonial doctors did nothing more than to reproduce and enact this category through their practice and to attempt to back it with biological meaning – just as anthropologists backed it with culture. All these endeavors – political, anthropological and medical – were attempts to differentiate people into citizens and subjects on the basis of racist ideologies that were built on class, ideas of culture and ideas of bodies. The European, in conclusion, was first and foremost, for administrations as well as for medical experts, a category of colonial rule.

74 Balibar, *Class, Race* (see note 44), pp. 211-212.

75 Malik, *The Meaning of Race* (see note 72), p. 71.

Europeans” and “Whites”: Biomedical Knowledge about the “European Race” in Early Twentieth Century Colonial Contexts

Veronika Lipphardt

RESÜMEE

Akademische und Alltagsdiskurse über „den Europäer“ haben selten einen empirischen Gehalt. Die Lebenswissenschaften bieten eine wichtige Ausnahme zu dieser Regel. Seit dem Beginn des 18. Jahrhunderts bis heute betonen Wissenschaftler, dass Europäer sich in biologischer Hinsicht von anderen Menschen unterscheiden. Hinzu kommt, dass die Überzeugung von einem biologischen Kern des Europäerseins immer wieder in Alltagsdiskurse eindringt. Neuere historische Arbeiten haben die Bedeutung der Rassenanthropologie für die Herausbildung nationaler Identitäten und die schrecklichen politischen Folgen, die sich daraus ergeben haben, herausgestellt. Indes geht die Bedeutung der Rassenanthropologie weit über den Nationalismus hinaus. Ich untersuche in diesem Beitrag die Rolle der Rassenanthropologie und der Rassenklassifikationen für die europäische Identitätskonstruktion, wobei ich mich vor allem auf die Kolonialmedizin des frühen 20. Jahrhunderts konzentriere. „Weiße“ und „Europäer“ waren keine austauschbaren Begriffe in der biomedizinischen Wissensproduktion. Das heißt nicht, dass sie nicht gelegentlich verwechselt wurden. Aber sie transportierten verschiedene Bedeutungen. „Weiße“ scheinen hauptsächlich biologische Konnotationen gehabt zu haben, während sowohl eine Beachtung von Natur als auch von Kultur notwendig gewesen ist, um das Europäische des „Europäers“ zu erfassen.

Academic and popular discourses about “the European” rarely draw on empirical accounts. The life sciences offer a prominent exception to this observation: beginning in the eighteenth century and carrying forward to the present, scientists in this field have maintained that Europeans differ in biological terms from other human beings. Additionally, the assertion of a biological essence to “Europeanness” continues to pervade

popular discourses. Recent historical accounts have devoted considerable attention to the history of racial anthropology. In these inquiries, the focus has been on two interrelated subjects: constructions of national identity and the disastrous political consequences that flowed from them.¹ However, as I will argue, racial anthropology was used for much more than nationalistic purposes.

In this paper, I examine and critique the role of racial anthropology in European identity construction, focusing mainly on early twentieth-century colonial contexts. My investigation leads me to conclude that the current historiographical focus on *racial* anthropology alone is too narrow. The focus of scholarly interest should, in my view, be replaced by a wider exploration of the history of scientific investigations of human “racial”, or “genetic”, variation (or, as scientists prefer to put it since the 1950s, human genetic diversity). As I will explain, this focus reveals long-neglected continuities across time (especially the twentieth century) and space (particularly transnational dimensions).²

In order to trace these continuities, differing meanings of “knowledge” need to be taken into account. Today, scientific knowledge enjoys a place of prominence in our “knowledge-based societies.” However, scientific knowledge in the past – as in the present – was informed by other sources of understanding such as oral traditions, implicit learning, or everyday life experiences. With very minor exceptions, knowledge about human (genetic) diversity has always been produced in the midst of society; scientific findings have easily made their way into non-scientific, popular understandings and representations of human diversity, and vice versa. In the case of human diversity, the divide between scientific and non-scientific knowledge is not only weak and permeable; its very existence is questionable. In colonial contexts, constructing knowledge about “Europeans” was not just an academic undertaking, but of great practical importance. It was mainly for medical purposes or in medical institutions that colonial scientists investigated “Europeans” and “Natives” – as the latter were often called at that time – in comparison to one another.³

Curiously enough, biomedical scientists frequently used the term “European,” only occasionally the term “White” and very rarely “Caucasian.” In recent historical accounts, the three terms are by and large used interchangeably.⁴ One can perhaps argue that in general discourse today they are in deed used interchangeably, however, this can not simply be assumed for historical times. Questioning this assumption, I show that all three terms were by no means fully interchangeable. Instead, I aim to demonstrate that they represent quite different concepts employed in specific historical contexts.

1 To give but one out of numerous references: Ch. Geulen, *Wahlverwandte. Rassendiskurs und Nationalismus im späten 19. Jahrhundert*, Hamburg 2004.

2 Recently, a number of historical studies with some relevance for this paper have appeared; regrettably, they can not fully be considered for this paper.

3 C. Bruck, *Die biologische Differenzierung von Affenarten und menschlichen Rassen durch spezifische Blutreaktionen*, in: *Berliner klinische Wochenschrift* 26, 1907, pp. 793-797.

4 See for example B. Baum, *The fall and rise of the Caucasian Race*, New York 2006.

The findings I present here are part of the results of a research project on bio-scientific constructions of the European throughout the twentieth century. This project has addressed other empirical and conceptual aspects of the same topic, such as visualizations of human diversity,⁵ scientific representations of the "European" in German and European academic books after the Second World War,⁶ narrations of the evolutionary events leading to the emergence of the European,⁷ and transfers of knowledge about Europeans between bio-scientific, biomedical, and social or political contexts.⁸ It is important to note that, regarding the issue of "Europeans," "Caucasians" and "Whites" and whether these are all used interchangeably, there are significant differences between US-American and European discourses that have hitherto been underestimated. While in the US, for good reason, historians have focused on the relations between "Blacks" and "Whites," European historians have understandably ignored the "color line" as irrelevant in Europe and have instead concentrated on the nationalist anthropologies of their respective nation.⁹

Before turning to the empirical topic, it may be useful to very briefly sketch the history of biological knowledge about "Europeans" from 1700 to the present. Since notions of the "European" are often linked to notions of human "racial" or genetic diversity in general, I will have to jump between scientific considerations of human diversity and those of Europeans. When scientists first described "Europeans" and others as biological organisms around 1700, they rarely drew on direct observation. Rather, their accounts were based more on reports and drawings of research explorers – as well as crania (skulls). The "European" – or *Homo Europaeus* – represented one out of four races in these early classifications.¹⁰ However, writing in 1795, Johann Friedrich Blumenbach argued that the Europeans represented only a subset of one of five human races; this larger race, comprising "Europeans" next to other groups, he called "Caucasians". The Caucasians, in his view, displayed, in addition to white skin, the most beautifully formed skulls; the "original Caucasians," from which all other Caucasians ostensibly derived, traced their

5 In textbooks, encyclopedias, popular books; as phylogenetic trees, photographs, maps, drawings etc.

6 V. Lipphardt, Von der "europäischen Rasse" zu den "Europiden." Wissen um die biologische Beschaffenheit des Europäers in Sach- und Lehrbüchern, 1950–1989, in: L. Bluche, V. Lipphardt, K. Patel (eds.), *Der Europäer – ein Konstrukt. Wissensbestände, Diskurse, Praktiken*, Göttingen 2009, pp. 158–186.

7 For example, narrations about the European continent and its formative power; about the point of time when the ancestors of the "first Europeans" settled on the continent; and how they evolved from immigrants to "Europeans."

8 V. Lipphardt, J. Niewöhner, Producing difference in an age of biosociality. Biohistorical narratives, standardisation and resistance as translations, in: *Science, Technology & Innovation Studies*, 3 (2007), 1, pp. 45–65.

9 V. Lipphardt, *Knowing Europe, Europeanising Knowledge. The Making of "Homo Europaeus" in the Life Sciences*, in: Martin Conway, Kiran Klaus Patel (eds.), *Europeanization in the twentieth century: Historical Approaches*, London: Palgrave 2010, pp. 64–83.

10 On Bernier: S. Stuurman, François Bernier and the Invention of Racial Classification, in: *History Workshop Journal* 50 (2000), pp. 1–21; see also W. Schmale, *Geschichte Europas*, Wien 2001, pp. 39sq., pp. 145–155; C. von Linné, *Systema naturae per regna tria naturae, secundum classes, ordines, genera, species, cum characteribus differentiis, synonymis, locis*, vol.1, Paris 1766/10 (1735), p. 29; for a German translation see H. Schulze/ I. Paul, *Europäische Geschichte*, München, 1994, pp. 56sq.; see also W. Demel, *Wie die Chinesen gelb wurden. Ein Beitrag zur Frühgeschichte der Rassen-theorien*, in: *Historische Zeitschrift* 225 (1992), pp. 625–666.

roots to the South Caucasus. In this geographically defined history of humanity, the Caucasian peoples assumed center stage, playing a more important role than any other.¹¹ Both ways of sorting humans from Europe into a biological classification of humankind (as “Europeans” or as “Caucasians”) remain influential until today.

By the mid-nineteenth century, knowledge about human diversity was being cast in new frameworks. Whereas crania had been the focus of attention in the previous period, now living individuals were increasingly subjected to measurement. Researchers noted, however, that this method was unsatisfactory, as members of the same European nation could belong to different “European races.” Their aim was not so much to develop a coherent story about the history of human diversity, but rather to study empirically intra-European differences that were not necessarily identical with national borders.¹²

After 1900, empirical and biological approaches received an additional boost. The collection of numerous anatomical, physiological, pathological, psychological, as well as other mental and physical data followed. Scholarly interest in the differences between “European races” faded, as the distinctions between Europeans and all other human beings (“non-Europeans”) assumed greater significance. In the colonies, researchers located plenty of “raw material” for their studies, and new laboratory methods provided an additional impetus to scientific observation. Systematic comparison of objects such as brain structures, blood composition, and stool samples ensued. Other popular comparisons included adaptability to tropical climates, susceptibility to disease, and immunities. Whereas in the past experts had known little about the “European” beyond basic information about body and skull size, new accounts boasted a range of “exact” data. Miscegenation, “racial mixing,” also came to the fore as a topic of special scientific interest.

During the 1920s, non-scholarly treatments of human (genetic) diversity gained popularity, as witnessed by the proliferation of family trees, maps, school books, non-fiction treatments, illustrations, photos, and other picture books. In these accounts, Europeans constituted a single race, defined first and foremost by their common skin color; various other characteristics, for example mental or cultural, were subsequently correlated with skin color. At the beginning of the 1930s, European scientists divided humanity into three, sometime four, parts; during this period, Europeans were described for the first time as “Europids” (and contrasted with “Negroids” or “Mongolids”).¹³ However, at that time, nationalist attitudes dominated anthropological discourses, and thus the discussion of racial classification concentrated on differentiations within Europe as well as between “Aryans” and “Non-Aryans.”

After the Second World War, Anglo-American biological scientists led efforts – including several supported by various UNESCO initiatives – to adopt new, anti-racist approaches

11 Baum, *Caucasian Race*, pp. 73-82, pp. 109-117 and p. 135.

12 See, for example, W. Z., Ripley, *The Races of Europe. A Sociological Survey*, London 1899. Cf. Baum, *Caucasian Race*, pp. 144-151.

13 E. Baur, E. Fischer and F. Lenz, *Grundriß der menschlichen Erblichkeitslehre und Rassenhygiene*, München 1927, pp. 135sq.

to human diversity research.¹⁴ Initially, scientists rejected racial classifications with nationalist undertones, but continued to assert the existence of three main human races, one of them being called "Europeans," "Europids," "Caucasians" or "Whites"; however, they now emphasized overlaps between the three main races, acknowledging a growing body of evidence about genetic complexity and increasingly questioning the scientific usefulness of the term "race."¹⁵

Since the 1970s, population genetics has provided further arguments to question the notion of race.¹⁶ Nevertheless, the category of "European" remained intact throughout this population-genetic phase. Both science and popular science emphasized the limitations and possibilities of population genetics, a viewpoint often coupled with anti-racist assertions. At the same time, the accumulation of knowledge about "the European race" or "the Europeans," now increasingly called "Europids" or "Caucasians," continued. Comparisons between "Europids"/"Caucasians," "Mongolids," and "Negroids" also continued to be part of this era's discourse.

During the past fifteen years or so, human diversity research has entered a new phase. Molecular genetic research, large-scale genome projects, the production of prescription drugs for particular ethnic groups, and growing interest in genetic genealogy have re-kindled fierce debates – mainly in the US – about whether races exist.¹⁷ For the large group of "Whites," many terms are used in medical and scientific practice: Caucasians, European Americans, White Americans. All of these terms are imprecise and not easily

- 14 E. Barkan, *The Politics of the Science of Race: Ashley Montagu and UNESCO's Anti-racist Declarations*, in: L. T. Reynolds and L. Lieberman (eds), *Race and other Misadventures: Essays in Honour of Ashley Montagu in his Ninetieth Year*, New York 1996, pp. 96-105. The original texts are reprinted in: L. C. Dunn: *The Race Question in modern Science*, in: *ibid.* (ed.), *Race, Science and Society*, Paris/London 1951, pp. 343-364; S. Müller-Wille, *Was ist Rasse?* Die UNESCO-Erklärungen von 1950 und 1951, in: P. Lutz (ed.), *Der (im-) perfekte Mensch. Metamorphosen von Normalität und Abweichung*, Köln 2003, pp. 79-93; J. Marks, *Race: Past, Present, and Future*, in: B. A. Koenig, S. S. Lee and S. S. Richardson (eds), *Revisiting Race in a Genomic Age*, New Brunswick 2008, pp. 21-38; K. Palm, *Der "Rasse"-Begriff in der Biologie nach 1945*, in: *AG gegen Rassismus in den Lebenswissenschaften* (ed.), *Gemachte Differenz. Kontinuitäten biologischer "Rasse"-Konzepte*, Münster 2009, pp. 240-255, particularly pp. 247sq.; J. Reardon, *Race to the Finish. Identity and Governance in an Age of Genomics*, Princeton 2005.
- 15 T. Brückmann, F. Maetzy, and T. Plümecke, *Rassifizierte Gene. Zur Aktualität biologischer "Rasse"-Konzepte in den neuen Lebenswissenschaften*, in: *AG gegen Rassismus in den Lebenswissenschaften* (ed.), *Gemachte Differenz. Kontinuitäten biologischer "Rasse"-Konzepte*, Münster 2009, pp. 20-64; L. Gannett, J. R. Griesemer, *The ABO Blood Groups: Mapping the History and Geography of Genes in Homo Sapiens*, in: H.-J. Rheinberger and J.-P. Gaudillière (eds), *Classical Genetic Research and its Legacy. The Mapping Cultures of Twentieth-Century Genetics*, London/New York 2004, pp. 119-172; L. Gannett, *Race and Human Genome Diversity Research: The Ethical Limits of Population Thinking*, in: *Philosophy of Science* 68 (2001), 3, pp. 479-492; D. Haraway, *Primate Visions: Gender, Race and Nature in the World of Modern Science*, New York 1989; J. Marks, *The Legacy of Serological Studies in American Physical Anthropology*, in: *History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences* 18 (1996), pp. 345-362; Marks, *Race: Past, Present, and Future* (note 12); A. M'Charek, *The Human Genome Diversity Project. An Ethnography of Scientific Practice*, Cambridge 2005; Reardon, *Race to the Finish* (note 12); R. Silverman, *The Blood Group "Fad" in Post-War Racial Anthropology*, in: J. Marks (ed.), *Kroeber Anthropological Society Papers*, Berkeley 2000, pp. 11-27.
- 16 Brückmann, Maetzy, and Plümecke, *Rassifizierte Gene* (note 13); Marks, *Race: Past, Present, and Future* (note 12).
- 17 *AG gegen Rassismus in den Lebenswissenschaften* (ed.), *Gemachte Differenz. Kontinuitäten biologischer "Rasse"-Konzepte*, Münster 2009; B. A. Koenig, S. S. Lee, S. S. Richardson (eds), *Revisiting Race in a Genomic Age*, New Brunswick 2008.

transferable to other national contexts. The debate, however, does not center on such classificatory problems, but rather on ethical issues.

Let's now turn the clock back to the beginning of the twentieth century, and to the question of whether or not the terms "White," "Caucasian" and "European," when used in biomedical contexts, were then meant to express essentially the same thing. To answer this question, I draw primarily on articles and reviews printed in "Archiv für Schiffs- und Tropenhygiene" ("Archive for the hygiene of boats and the tropics"), a medical journal in which tropical disease specialists published studies about the colonies. Reviews appeared in German, French, English, and Italian; articles were mostly, but not exclusively, written in German. Most of the articles cover pharmaceutical, chemical, or technical topics. That being said, a fair number of contributions addressed bodily differences between various "races," with reference to hygiene and living conditions in tropical climates. Most authors use the term "European" and not "White" – arguably no coincidence.

A 1916 article by Kurt Hintze, entitled "What Influence Does the Tropical Climate Exert on Members of the White Race?"¹⁸ appears to suggest a preference for the term "White." However, the text contains only observations about "Europeans" in the colonies. The author reports on heat tolerance, red blood cell counts, hemoglobin concentration, metabolism, food requirements, bodily capacities, dress, sexual drive, and alcohol consumption of Europeans living in the colonies and concludes:

*The healthy European, who happily avoids the pitfalls mentioned above, is in our opinion indeed quite capable of adapting to the tropical climate without falling prey to those difficulties which are often deemed unavoidable.*¹⁹

Hence, it was the life style of the individual that made Europeans "European." Although adapting one's life style to tropical conditions was an indispensable necessity, the adapting European did not therefore become a "Native": The appropriate life style for Europeans in the tropics had to be, and manifestly so, a particularly European one.

Only in one passage does the author speak of "Whites." Here, his attention turns to reproduction, or what he describes as "breeding in the tropical belt."²⁰ Hintze lists examples of colonial settlements where "Whites" from one single nation had ostensibly remained, in reproductive terms, isolated and thus "pure" since the arrival of the first settlers. According to Hintze, this development was actually problematic, as it might lead to inbreeding and degeneration. In other cases, he continued, there had been "such a thorough mixing with the native population" that one could no longer speak of reproduction within the "white race."²¹ Only in the case of a colony in Brazil that had avoided mixing with the native population does Hintze offer a positive assessment. However, in this case, the colony consisted of various "German tribes" along with people from the

18 K. Hintze, Welchen Einfluß hat das Tropenklima auf Angehörige der weißen Rasse? in: Archiv für Tropen- und Schiffshygiene 20 (1916), vol. 4-6, pp. 91-104, 122-138, and 148-172.

19 Ibid., p. 155 (translation: V. Lipphardt).

20 Ibid., p. 158.

21 Ibid., p. 162.

Netherlands, Switzerland, Luxembourg, and the region of Tirol. All these people had allegedly mixed favorably – "a fortunate mixture" (eine glückliche Mischung), as the author puts it.²²

Why did the author for this very specific topic switch from "Europeans" to "Whites"? As soon as the biological function of reproduction was at stake, where questions of life style, shaped by culture, seemed to fade into the background, light skin emerged as the primary criterion to describe humans. The parallel to Gregor Johann Mendel's genetic experiments, rediscovered in 1900, is striking: Mendel had mixed plants with two strikingly different blossom colors and quantified the outcome in the offspring's blossoms. Hence, in the arena of biological considerations the skin color – presumably a feature that could be measured scientifically and objectively – was favored over cultural designations.

Around 1900, life scientists generally regarded biological dispositions as more deeply rooted than culture. With respect to the genuinely biological problem of determining population reproduction, observing skin colors was deemed an essential tool. But, even the life scientist recognized that for a civilized and politically successful population, nature alone would not suffice: to be white *and* to maintain a European life style marked one as European, a creature reducible neither to nature nor to nurture. Against the backdrop of the political situation "at home," Hintze's utopia makes for quite an interesting read, warning as he does against national isolation and pretentious urban life styles, favoring instead European rural cooperation. In Europe, however, rural communities were not the most likely place to encounter a mixture of healthy Europeans: thus the colonies emerged as the only place where such ideal communities might be realized. In the European discourse about living conditions for Europeans in the colonies, we might conclude from Hintze's example that national differences played a minor role and that larger identifications, "European" or "White," were not used interchangeably but rather to describe and project different aspects of colonial life.

Discourses, however, are but one side of the story. How was the distinction between "Europeans" and "Natives" practiced on the spot – or in situ, as scientists would call it? A 1910 administrative report to the German Imperial Colonial Office (Reichskolonialamt) about "Pestilence in Dar es Salaam"²³ describes in detail housing conditions in this East African city, home to immigrants and colonists from many countries. The author claimed, "the historical evolution of Dar es Salaam has brought about a situation whereby Natives of all kinds, immigrants from Asia, and also some Europeans reside all mixed together."²⁴ Furthermore, he complained that this was one reason why pestilence was able to spread so easily across the city.

City maps show Daressalam's residential mix at that time.²⁵ For each single building complex, one can learn whether Europeans or other groups resided there; or, if more

22 Ibid., p. 163.

23 Today: Daressalam, Tansania; in 1910: Dar es Salaam, Deutsch-Ostafrika. Amtlicher Bericht an das Reichskolonialamt, Die Pest in Daressalam 1908/09, in: Archiv für Schiffs- und Tropenhygiene 14 (1910), 1, pp. 1-11.

24 Ibid., p. 3 (translation: V. Lipphardt).

25 Ibid., panel 1.

than one group resided in one building complex, as in public buildings, which of the groups predominated. The nationality of the Europeans living in Dar es Salam was not especially important, nor would skin color have sufficed as a criterion: this map was explicitly devoted to shared hygienic habits, that is, to cultural similarities. The distinction between Europeans and all others seemed obviously so significant that it justified a representation of spatial segregation. With this visual tool at hand, it seemed plausible to the author to argue for a total spatial separation of the various population groups.

It is important to recognize that the distinction between “Europeans” and “Non-Europeans” did not rely on rigid scientific categorization; rather, it was a very visible social practice that emerged in an ethnically heterogeneous city. In this way, the distinction suggested itself as a natural basis for medical statistics.

The relevance of spatial segregation for medical studies also holds true for a 1914 study entitled “Examination of stools of Europeans and Chinese in Shanghai.”²⁶ The author, Walter Fischer, considered it highly important to comparatively investigate intestinal parasites across diverse human populations in order to learn about human diversity. The most difficult problem, however, was to get hold of comparable material. The Chinese proved, in his experience, to be very skeptical of European doctors. Fischer reported that he was only able to examine “fresh material” due to the fact that the Institute for Pathology, where he worked, was located next to a hospital used by many Chinese. His “European material” came from the European General Hospital and other medical practices in the city. The internal social structure of each group, European and Chinese, remained unexamined.²⁷

The results, in part, confirmed the expectations of the author: “The Chinese proved to be, as expected, to a higher degree tainted by ascarids (roundworms).”²⁸ In other respects, however, the infection rates of the Chinese subjects were significantly lower than those of the Europeans, or at least below his expectations. This led the author to provide additional information about each group; he thus explained that his Chinese subjects were part of the urban population, and that, for example, their comparatively low rate of hookworm infection was thus unrepresentative.²⁹ The three cases of “Chinese liver fluke” he discovered among Europeans led him to submit that these individuals were not actually “Europeans,” but instead “crossbreds,” meaning offspring from “mixed marriages” between Europeans and Chinese.³⁰

Even the dysentery caused by amebic colitis was, contrary to expectations, much more common among Europeans than among Chinese. As Fischer argued, these results were insignificant as most of the Europeans under examination were already being treated for intestinal disorders – an explanation for their body’s weak defenses against other intesti-

26 W. Fischer, *Über Stuhluntersuchungen bei Europäern und Chinesen in Shanghai*, in: *Archiv für Schiffs- und Tropen-Hygiene* 18 (1914), 18, pp. 615–634.

27 *Ibid.*, pp. 615–618.

28 *Ibid.*, p. 619.

29 *Ibid.*, p. 622.

30 *Ibid.*, p. 623.

nal disorders like dysentery. The same held true for the examined Chinese patients, but the author failed to report this. The case histories of Chinese were, in his estimation, "at least somewhat unreliable" because they would not report correctly to the doctor. But, while other medical experts attributed the dysentery infection to the water supply, this author believed that direct contact infection should not be underestimated; in his words, "the dirty finger of a Chinaman seems to me just as dangerous as contaminated water."³¹ Ironically enough, one would have had to put it just the other way around: Most "dangerous" was the dirty finger of a European, who was much more likely to carry the infection.

Finally, the author silently dispensed with a conclusion that would have taken up his initial statement how important it was to distinguish between Chinese and Europeans. This is hardly surprising: The observable differences were far from being as clear cut as he had wished for. Results were ambiguous or counter-intuitive; sampling of test groups remained arbitrary. The social practice of difference served as the basis for the production of biomedical knowledge, distinguishing, as this example illustrates, "Europeans" from "others." Characterizations of "European" test groups, to which the authors themselves belonged, could not always be expressed in terms of skin color alone. Rather, one's life style, culture, civilization, and hygiene played important roles in these definitions.

"Arabs," for example, were also considered to be white, but they were believed to lack European culture. Studies by North American authors divided their subjects into groups of "Blacks" and "Whites"; that being said, scientists from the United States did not regard themselves as representatives of a European culture and way of life. However, in those instances where U.S. citizens residing in European colonies were included in biomedical studies, they were invariably lumped together with "Europeans."

None of the authors I have presented here drew on the essentialist notion of Europeans constituting a separate race. That was not what they sought to prove; rather, it was an underlying assumption in their endeavors. They did not formulate explicit distinction criteria because it seemed more or less evident who was to be regarded as a European and who was not. Nevertheless, how did such unreflective notions become explicitly formulated knowledge about Europeans?

An illuminating example of this transition is provided by the studies of Carl Bruck, who examined representatives of various "races" in Java: Europeans, Malays, Chinese, Arabs, as well as one Orangutan, with serological methods.³² The Europeans consisted mainly of "Dutchmen". Through his agglutination (the clumping of cells) experiments, Bruck claimed to have proven that the blood of a "superior" race reacted in a very specific way with the blood of an "inferior" race. His results were received with much interest in Germany, with several renowned scientists describing his efforts as promising steps toward a bio-chemical method to distinguish human races via laboratory work.

31 Ibid., p. 631.

32 C. Bruck, Die biologische Differenzierung von Affenarten und menschlichen Rassen durch spezifische Blutreaktionen, in: Berliner klinische Wochenschrift 26 (1907), pp. 793-797.

In conclusion, “White” and “European” were not interchangeable terms in biomedical knowledge production and representation. That does not mean that they were not occasionally conflated. Since they actually conveyed different meanings, I would suggest instead that these two terms, “White” and “European,” were complementary. A consideration of both nature *and* culture were indispensable to capture the “Europeanness” of Europeans. In all examples, the authors took for granted the fact that their participant groups were reasonably categorized into Europeans and others. This assumption rested mainly on non-scientific knowledge about diversity as it was socially practiced, as especially the examinations of stools (scatoscopies) carried out by Fischer in Shanghai make clear. As a basis for distinguishing between groups, scientists used what they considered the most visible, evident, and natural criterion: the social border represented most strikingly by the spatial separation of housing or medical treatment; between Europeans and Non-Europeans in the colonies; between Blacks and Whites in the U.S.; and between various alleged “racial types” in Europe. In any event, the difference that mattered to scientists was not between nations – a distinction which obviously seemed irrelevant to early twentieth-century biomedical investigators working in the tropics.

The Writing Genius and his Publisher: The Concept of European Authorship as the Global Standard?

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RESÜMEE

Ein Grund für die kontroverse Diskussion geistiger Eigentumsrechte im Kontext existierender und geplanter Handelsabkommen ist das diesen Rechten zugrunde liegende Verständnis von Autor- und Urheberschaft. Diese internationalen Abkommen reden einer exklusiven Urheberschaft das Wort, die individuelle Kreativität als treibende Kraft für technische oder kulturelle Neuerungen sieht und entsprechend starke Ausschlussrechte gegenüber Dritten gewährt. Der Aufsatz beschäftigt sich mit den Gründen für dieses Rechtsverständnis. Beginnend mit den ersten modernen Urheberrechtsgesetzen in Großbritannien, Frankreich und Deutschland wird argumentiert, dass diese im Verlauf des 18. Jahrhunderts entwickelte Rechtsfigur in aufklärerischen Denkweisen und romantischen Vorstellungen von Schöpfung und Individualität und damit in einem zutiefst europäischem Verständnis von Individuum und Gesellschaft wurzelte. Im Unterschied zu heutigen Abkommen scheiterte zu Beginn des 20. Jahrhunderts allerdings noch der Versuch, diese Rechtsfigur als universalen und weltweit gültigen Standard zu implementieren. Ausschlaggebend hierfür war der Widerstand nord- und südamerikanischer Staaten, die diesem Autorverständnis eigene wirtschaftliche Interessen entgegensetzten und es damit als spezifisch europäische Rechtsfigur auf die Ränge verwiesen.

1 Introduction

In 1759 the English poet Edward Young noted:

[...] for what, for the most part, mean we by Genius, but the Power of accomplishing great things without the means generally reputed necessary to that end? A Genius differs from a good Understanding, as a Magician from a good Architect; That raises his struc-

*ture by means invisible; This by the skilful use of common tools. Hence Genius has ever been supposed to partake of something Devine.*¹

Edward Young's "Conjectures on the Original Composition" belonged to the most prominent texts in the controversial discussions on the origins of authorship, which revolves around the question of the economic reward and the cultural acknowledgement an author deserves for his work in eighteenth century Britain. Young strongly advocated the idea that an author stood out against any kind of manual laborer. He described the author as a genius: The genius creates texts or other works of art due to his ingenious skills, which are beyond description but contribute decisively to the progress of culture, education and society.

Young not only confined himself, however, to work out philosophical and aesthetical arguments for his conception of artistic and cultural innovation. His emphasis on the writing genius was also deeply rooted in contemporary debates between authors, publishers and legal experts on the question of who owned a manuscript and who, as a consequence, was entitled to publish a work and to make a profit out of the publication. At the end of the eighteenth century, British authors, publishers and lawyers had worked out the concept of the writing genius as the only legitimate basis to decide on the rights of disposal and handling of cultural goods. By focusing on the author's personal and economic rights the involved groups settled the conditions for the professionalization of the creative branches during the course of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries by underscoring the notion of the author's personality as the only valid standard for explaining and acknowledging creativity.

The paper will argue that a certain esteem for individual creativity that arose in the course of the Enlightenment and early romanticism in Europe served as the starting point for the regulation of the modes to produce, disseminate and receive culture and information, which today are regulated by intellectual property rights regimes on the national and the international level. The idea of the writing genius as the core concept of cultural creativity appeared for the first time in eighteenth century Britain. Initially contested, the figure of the individual author was the outcome of severe disputes between the former publisher's guild, authors and publishers outside London. Subsequently, the individual author made its entrance in the British copyright legislation in the second half of the eighteenth century and, since then, the notion of the individual author significantly shaped the perception and organization of culture as chapter two will show. Following this British development other European countries also focused on the individual author as the nucleus for the question: who is the driving force behind the progress in culture and science?

As chapter three will outline, an idealized notion of the author's outstanding skills, raising him above other kinds of labor, acted as the model for the institutionalization of

1 E. Young, Conjectures on Original Composition in a Letter to the Author of Sir Charles Grandison, Dublin 1759, p. 16.

culture in terms of property and ownership throughout Europe during the nineteenth century. In spite of the claims of legislators, authors, publishers and the public to center on the author's person as the core concept to organize science and culture, a glance on the national paths in Britain, France and Germany will show, however, that there were significant national differences regarding the legally acknowledged scope for action of the individual author towards the cultural industries, the public and the state. Despite the notion of the writing genius serving as a blueprint for the social, cultural and legal organization of the cultural field in Europe and – since the end of the nineteenth century – on a global scale, the Europeanness of this figure was not immediately evident at its inception. Until the beginning of the twentieth century, the writing genius was never perceived as an originally European concept but as a universal one as chapters four and five will show. Taking the international conventions for the protection of author's rights as a starting point, the chapter will analyze the problems the European states faced when they tried to extend their idea of the writing genius to the USA and Latin America. Both regions flatly refused to take over the notion of the individual author because of its social, cultural and economic implications, which in their eyes served European interests best but not Latin or North American ones. Thus, the paper will show how European societies developed a shared idea of the writing genius, which was the outcome of a certain set of cultural and legal practices that they, at the same time, perceived as universal. However, they failed to reproduce this exclusive concept of individuality outside Europe in the uncolonized world. The outcome saw the writing genius regionalized as “European” during the twentieth century when its proponents tried to politically implement their notion of authorship outside the European sphere of influence.

2 The Birth of the Writing Genius in Legal Theory and Practice in Eighteenth Century Britain

Since the eighteenth century, the rights of authors, musicians, composers or artists to protect the production, dissemination and reception of their works have been part of modern Western societies. Between 1750 and 1850, modern intellectual property law was established as a bundle of individual rights, which has since developed in secular, market economy and liberally organized societies. As with politics, the economy, society and culture became both nationalized and legalized; the intellectual property rights of authors and other artists too became a fundamental institution in national culture. It was meant to guarantee and standardize the rights of artists, publishers, the public and the state to engage in scientific, cultural and social competition and to provide cooperation in the production, dissemination and reception of culture and knowledge for all with a secure contractual foundation.² Crucial to the codification and implementation of the

2 L. Bently and B. Sherman, *Intellectual Property Law*, Oxford 2008; P. E. Geller, *Copyright History and the Future: What's Culture Got to do With it?*, in: *Journal of the Copyright Society of the USA* 47 (2000), pp. 209-264; H.

author's rights was the increasing use of books, works of art and music, which rose to ever greater heights especially during the nineteenth century. Due to the alphabetization of broad sections of the population, there were new technical opportunities to produce and reproduce cultural works. Furthermore, due to the emancipation of the middle classes, books, music and works of art became increasingly popular and objects of trade.³ Thus, modern liberal societies and states had to deal increasingly with questions over who was entitled to publish, exploit and receive literary and artistic works, which were simultaneously cultural, political and mercantile goods.

For the first time, these questions were legally settled with the *Statute of Anne*, the first modern copyright law enacted in 1710 in Britain. The *Statute* was of great importance for the introduction of the writing genius as the principal concept for the legal, economic and social regulation of the cultural field: It fundamentally altered the hierarchy between author and publisher and thus enabled the rise of the writing genius as the superordinate authority for writing and publishing in European societies, even though it took about half a century until the author's person was generally accepted as the legitimate owner of his text in legal theory, aesthetics, book trade and by the public.⁴

The *Statute of Anne* replaced the common law concerning traditions and the privileges, which until then had legitimized the publisher's claims to own a manuscript after having purchased it from the writer. Instead, the *Statute* introduced statutory law and restricted the publisher's right to own a manuscript for an unlimited period of time in two respects. First, the publisher received the right to copy a work of art for fourteen years only with the option to prolong this time once only for a further fourteen years. As an "act for the encouragement of learning" the *Statute* prescribed the expiry of any property claims after the maximum of twenty-eight years of copyright protection. Thereafter any copyrighted material entered the *public domain*. Second, and the most important for further developments, was the changing hierarchy between authors and publishers. No longer did the publisher independently decide on his own list. Rather, the *Statute* appointed the author to be the original owner of the manuscript so that he was the only person who was able to entrust the publisher with the distribution of the text.⁵ The regulations of

Siegrist, Geschichte des geistigen Eigentums und der Urheberrechte. Kulturelle Handlungsrechte in der Moderne, in: J. Hofmann (ed.), Wissen und Eigentum. Geschichte, Recht und Ökonomie stoffloser Güter, Bonn 2006, pp. 64-80.

3 C. M. Cipolla, Literacy and Development in the West, London 1969; P. Burke, A Social History of Knowledge: From Gutenberg to Diderot, Cambridge 2000; D. Vincent, The Rise of Mass Literacy. Reading and Writing in Modern Europe, Cambridge 2000.

4 For the pioneering function of the *Statute of Anne* for the further development of literary property see: G. Boytha, Die historischen Wurzeln der Vielfältigkeit des Schutzes von Rechten an Urheberwerken, in: R. Dittich (ed.), Die Notwendigkeit des Urheberrechtes im Lichte seiner Geschichte, Wien 1991, p. 78sq.; R. Deazley, What's New About the Statute of Anne? Or Six Observations in Search of an Act, in: L. Bently (ed.), Global Copyright, Three Hundred Years Since the Statute of Anne from 1709 to Cyberspace, Cheltenham 2010, pp. 26-53; S. Ricketson, M. Richardson and M. Davison, Intellectual Property. Cases, Materials and Commentary, Chatswood 2012, pp. 39sq.; M. Rose, Authors and Owners. The Invention of Copyright, Cambridge/Mass., London 1993, pp. 31-48.

5 Statute of Anne: An Act for the Encouragement of Learning, by Vesting the Copies of Printed Books in the Authors or Purchasers of such Copies, During the Times Therein Mentioned, 1710, 8 Anne, c.19, in: Primary Sources

the *Statute of Anne* triggered severe discussions among publishers, authors, legal experts and the government about the reasons and aims of writing and publishing. These debates were of major importance for the history of authorship. In the course of the eighteenth century they led to the strengthening of the author's position so that, at the end of the century, the writing genius was generally acknowledged as the main paradigm for the legal, cultural and economic institutionalization of artistic works in terms of property and ownership.

When the fourteen year period of copyright expired for the first time in the middle of the 1840s the *Stationer's Company*, the publisher's guild that had formerly monopolized the printing and publishing rights, attempted to defend their property claims against the authors who grew stronger due to the new statutory law and through further legislation amending the *Statute of Anne*.⁶ These struggles resulted in a series of legal proceedings that fundamentally attempted to answer the question of who was the owner of a text, a composition or a piece of art. In a more general point of view, the legal proceedings triggered off a lively discussion about the origins of authorship and resulted in the notion of the modern author that spread European-wide and mainly contributed to the construction of the individual and, simultaneously, the genius author as a social, cultural and legal standard for a typical European perception of culture.⁷ The so called *battle of the booksellers* provoked extended philosophical and legal discussions not only between experts and those affected but also in the public sphere. The crucial and, at the same time, contested issue was the relationship between the author and his text: Did the authorial function consist of something extraordinarily strong enough to legitimate the author's literary property and, at the same time, the priority of statutory law over common law? Proponents of the idea to establish the author as the key figure to decide on the publication and distribution of cultural goods, such as Edward Young, directed the discussion towards the relationship between the materiality and immateriality of a text. Arguing morally and aesthetically, they stressed on the uniqueness of character, style and form of a text. Instead of merely presenting content, texts were perceived as the unrepeatable result of exceptional authorial skills. Out of this argumentation, proponents drew two conclusions: First a text could not be seriously restricted to the material manuscript; quite the opposite, the manuscript was interpreted as a pure vehicle for the author's imagination. Second, against this background, each text had to be interpreted as an integral part of

on Copyright (1450–1900), http://copy.law.cam.ac.uk/cam/tools/request/showRecord.php?id=record_uk_1710 (19th of October 2012).

6 For the following see: P. Jaszi, Toward a Theory of Copyright. The Metamorphoses of "Authorship", in: Duke Law Journal (1991), pp. 455–502; C. May and S. K. Sell, Intellectual Property Rights. A Critical History, Boulder/Colorado 2006, pp. 87–106; L. R. Patterson, Copyright and Author's Rights. A Look at History, in: Harvard Library Bulletin 16 (1968), pp. 370–384; M. Rose, The Author in Court. Pope vs. Curll (1741), in: Cardozo Arts & Entertainments Law Journal 10 (1992) 2, pp. 475–493; D. Saunders, Authorship and Copyright, London 1992; B. Sherman and A. Strowell (eds.), Of Authors and Origins: Essays on Copyright Law, Oxford 1994; M. Woodmansee, The Genius and the Copyright. Economic and Legal Conditions of the Emergence of the Author, in: Eighteenth-Century Studies 17 (1984), pp. 425–448.

7 Bently (ed.), Global Copyright (see note 4).

the author's personality and, as a consequence, no one else other than the author himself could ever own a text.

In legal practice this dispute was settled with the cases of *Millar v. Taylor* in 1769 and *Donaldson v. Beckett* in 1774, cases that, according to Christopher May and Susan K. Sell, "have a totemic importance in all histories of copyright."⁸ In *Millar v. Taylor*, The Court of King's Bench acknowledged the existence of a unique relationship between texts and authors. Nevertheless, the court gave priority to the publisher's rights to publication. Consequently, the court decided in favor of common law and ascribed the right to copy to the author's contractual partners, the publishers.⁹ This decision was fundamentally revised in *Donaldson v. Beckett* in 1774, a verdict that introduced the "belief in the genius of creation" as a main idea in legal, cultural and economic practice.¹⁰ In this case, the House of Lords introduced three major paradigms in the discussion that signaled the way ahead for the identification of the author's person with any right to possess a text or a piece of art. The first two decisions restricted the rights of authors and publishers in favor of the public: The judges rejected the notion of a common copyright law vested in authors or publishers in favor of a limited copyright protection already envisaged by the *Statute of Anne*. Second, they highlighted the statute's original intention to function as an "act for the encouragement of learning" and emphasized the aim to balance public and private interests in order to stimulate creativity, to support education and to promote the public interest in a free flow of cultural goods.¹¹ However, despite the strengthening of public interests the verdict fundamentally contributed to the increase in the influence of the individual author. Most important was the conclusion the judges drew regarding who was entitled by statutory law to be the first owner of a text. In this matter, the judges distinguished between the material and the immaterial dimensions of a text. They rejected the comparison between literary property and real estate by asserting the author's "act of creation"¹² as the only plausible and legitimate act to justify property in cultural goods. The judges rigorously conceded the author to be the first owner of a text because of the extraordinary abilities aesthetic theories ascribed to the authorial genius. By merging economic and philosophical arguments they finally contributed to the construction of the idea of individual authorship and initiated the shift from the publisher's trading interests to the exclusiveness of authorial work and the author's personality.¹³

8 May and Sell, *Intellectual Property Rights*, p. 94 (see note 6).

9 G. Davies, *Copyright and the Public Interest*, Weinheim, New York 1994, p. 20.

10 B. Sherman and L. Bently, *The Making of Modern Intellectual Property Law. The British Experience, 1760–1911*, Cambridge 1999, p. 16sq.

11 Davies, *Copyright and the Public Interest*, p. 19ff (see note 9); D. J. Halbert, *Intellectual Property in the Information Age. The Politics of Expanding Ownership Rights*, Westport Connecticut, London 1999, p. 7sq.

12 May and Sell, *Intellectual Property Rights*, p. 93 (see note 6).

13 E. Earle, *The Effect of Romanticism on the 19th Century Development of Copyright Law*, in: *Intellectual Property Journal* 6 (1991), pp. 269–290; F. Kawohl, *Originalität, Charakteristik und Eigentümlichkeit. Zur Begriffsbildung in Ästhetik und Urheberrecht des frühen 19. Jahrhunderts*, in: O. Schwab-Felisch, C. Thorau, and M. Polth (eds.), *Individualität in der Musik*, Stuttgart 2002, pp. 295–306.

3 The Writing Genius as Legal Standard in European Conceptions of Literary Property – The Cases of Britain, France and Germany

In the course of the eighteenth and nineteenth century, the conception of the writing genius became the prevailing narrative for determining the author's dominant legal position in the field of the cultural industries throughout Europe. Since then European concepts of literary property have centered on the author and granted him exclusive rights in the process of the production, dissemination and reception of literary or artistic works. Nevertheless, the realization of a European-wide notion of an extraordinarily gifted authorial genius that primarily decides on a text, composition or piece of art should not obscure the fact that the national legislators, legal experts, judges, authors and publishers designed copyright rules which emerged from the domestic political, social, cultural and economic demands, thus sketching a slightly different picture of the writing genius each time. Furthermore, each demand found different remits with which to handle the limitation of copyright claims in time, to prescribe the extent to socially and legally acknowledge the public interests, and to balance the distribution of copyright entitlements between authors and publishers. This chapter will sketch the common features of the author's outstanding social, cultural and legal position as well as the national differences that became manifest in the process of formulating the author's sphere of influence in the course of the eighteenth and nineteenth century.

The conversion of the printing privileges regulating the copying and the distribution of a manuscript into an author-centered law that transformed the author into a holder of social, cultural and economic rights and allowed him to be competitive on a liberalizing literary market took place in Britain during the eighteenth century, in France following the French Revolution and in Germany in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century.¹⁴ The legal, social and cultural acknowledgement of the author's genius shared at least three common principles. First, the idea of individual authorship was legally embodied as an irrevocable cultural and social standard in European societies. In the course of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries the notion of the author's genius became the leading concept in aesthetic thinking and cultural theory and, at the same time, served as a foundation for the legal enforcement of the author's exclusive economic and moral rights. Second, the author was simultaneously perceived as a holder of cultural, political and economic rights. Consequently, literary property laws mainly contributed to the institutionalization of culture, information and knowledge along the principles of a market economy: The author was invited to risk business activity and he was awarded with exclusive rights of disposal over commercially utilized cultural goods. Third, the European legislators all included the public interest to have a far-reaching access to cul-

14 Introducing the term 'propertization': H. Siegrist, Strategien und Prozesse der „Propertisierung“ kultureller Beziehungen. Die Rolle von Urheber- und geistigen Eigentumsrechten in der Institutionalisierung moderner europäischer Kulturen, in: S. Leible, A. Ohly, and H. Zech (eds.), Wissen, Märkte, geistiges Eigentum, Tübingen 2010, pp. 3-36.

ture, knowledge and information in order to encourage education, science and cultural progress. Consequently, from its beginning, national legislators had to balance the individual claims of authors to be entitled with exclusive economic, cultural and social rights while at the same time the public and state interests required the relaxation of the liberal idea of original authorship.¹⁵

Britain was a pioneer when it replaced the publishers' unlimited property claims in favor of the author as the legal proprietor of his text and introduced a time-limited copyright that transformed protected works into public goods after a certain period of time.¹⁶ In contrast to the developments on the European continent, the British legislators did not draft the legal protection of authors in terms of a property right initially. Rather, at its inception it was meant as a right to copy. That is to say, it did not recognize any moral or personal rights of the author, based in the act of creation, but only granted the right to publish and distribute a text. This limitation of legal entitlements rooted in a discussion about the liberalization of the English book trade in the aftermath of the English Revolution. In 1710, the *Statute of Anne* aimed at breaking down the monopoly of the English publishing guild, the *Stationer's Company*, in order to replace it by anti-monopolistic commercial laws. Due to the relatively short protection of copyright entitlements (fourteen years and a one-time extension option of an additional fourteen years), its objective to stimulate creativity and to reward authorial labor, the British copyright law kept its character as a primarily commercial law until the beginning of the nineteenth century – despite the fact that since 1774, jurisdiction had already acknowledged the notion of the authorial genius as a principle foundation of any literary property rights. It was not until the middle of the nineteenth century that the main concern of British copyright law to prevent monopolies in book trade was challenged by the notion of the original author. In the 1840s the legislator, law scholars, authors and publishers controversially discussed the prolongation of copyright law up to 42 years or, alternatively, for the author's life-span plus seven years *post mortem auctoris*. The amendment was of major importance because it put the act of creation as the starting point for any copyright protection and enhanced the esteem for the author's skills. In this way, the 1842 copyright act reoriented the architecture of copyright law by giving absolute priority to the author.

15 C. Geiger, Author's Right, Copyright and the Public's Right to Information: A Complex Relationship, in: F. Macmillan (ed.), *New Directions in Copyright Law*, vol 5, Cheltenham 2007, pp. 24-44; N. W. Netanel, Why has Copyright Expanded? Analysis and Critique, in: F. Macmillan (ed.), *New Directions in Copyright Law*, vol 6, Cheltenham 2007, pp. 3-34.

16 For the British case see: R. Deazley, *On the Origin of the Right to Copy. Charting the Movement of Copyright Law in Eighteenth Century Britain, 1695-1775*, Oxford 2004; J. Feather, From Rights in Copies to Copyright. The Recognition of Author's Rights in English Law and Practice in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Century, in: *Carodozo Arts & Entertainment Law Journal* 10 (1992) 2, pp. 455-473; Patterson, Copyright and Author's Rights, pp. 370-384 (see note 6); L. R. Patterson and S. W. Lindberg, The Nature of Copyright: A Law of User's Rights, Athens Georgia 1991; M. Rose, The Author as Proprietor. *Donaldson v. Beckett* and the Genealogy of Modern Authorship, in: *Representations* 23 (1988), pp. 51-85; C. Seville, Literary Copyright Reform in Early Victorian England. The Framing of the 1842 Copyright Act, Cambridge 1999; Sherman and Bently, The Making of Modern Intellectual Property Law (see note 10); M. Woodmansee, The Cultural Work of Copyright. Legislating Authorship in Britain 1837-1842, in: A. Sarat and T. R. Kearns (eds.), *Law in the Domains of Culture*, Ann Arbor 1998, pp. 65-96.

The law withdrew from the anti-monopolistic objectives of the former laws and, for the first time, consolidated the author's supremacy for the institutionalization and regulation of culture. The introduction of the writing genius in British legislation reaffirmed the author's gradual emancipation from a writer to the original genius who was morally and aesthetically legitimized to dispose of the reproduction and distribution of his work. However, in contrast to the developments on the European continent, the British law did not codify any moral rights. As such, British law today remains a copy-centered law that provides incentives for authors and publishers to risk business activities and aims at a just reward.

In revolutionary France the laws of authorship were fundamentally reformed in 1791 and 1793 after the freedom of speech and the freedom of the press had been declared, the printing privileges had been abolished, the powerful printing guilds in Paris had been marginalized and the market for literary goods had been completely liberalized.¹⁷ In contrast to the British *Statute of Anne*, however, the French copyright did not regulate the copying and distribution of literary works, but centered on the author. Although the new political regime reformed the organizational structures of the literary market, redefined the hierarchies between the concerned groups and revalued the importance of literary works for broader sections of the population, the legislators drew on concepts of authorship, which were already discussed during the *ancien régime*. The revolutionary laws put emphasis on the author as a creative individual by assuming that he enjoyed certain rights for his efforts. Thereby, they reinforced the idea that literary property rights were derived from some conception of natural law. Consequently, the law was perceived as a *droit d'auteur*. It acknowledged the author's natural right and took the authorial act of creation as the starting point for legislation. The author was viewed as an individual. As the primary beneficiary of the *droit d'auteur* he was awarded exclusive property rights due to his outstanding creative skills and his service to the public domain. Crucial to the further institutionalization of French literary property rights was the decision to subsume literary works into a secular and liberally organized property rights regime governed by the principles of market economy. The so called *propriété littéraire et artistique* protected all sorts of texts for the author's life-span plus ten years *post mortem auctoris*.

17 For the French case see: R. Chartier and H.-J. Martin (eds.), *Histoire de l'édition française*. Vol. 2: *Le Livre triomphant, 1660–1830*, Paris 1990; R. Darnton and D. Roche (eds.), *Revolution in Print. The Press in France 1775–1800*, Berkeley 1989; M.-C. Dock, *Contribution historique à l'étude des droits d'auteurs*, Paris 1962; C. Geiger, *The Influence (Past and Present) of the Statute of Anne in France*, in: Bently (ed.), *Global Copyright*, pp. 122–135 (see note 4); A. Götz von Olenhusen, *Balzac und das Urheber- und Verlagsrecht*, in: UFITA. Archiv für Urheber- und Medienrecht (2008) 2, pp. 441–463; C. Hesse, *Enlightenment Epistemology and the Laws of Authorship in Revolutionary France 1777–1793*, in: *Representations* 30 (1990), pp. 109–137; C. Hesse, *Publishing and Cultural Politics in Revolutionary Paris 1789–1810*, Berkeley 1991; J.-Y. Mollier, *Les mutations de l'espace éditorial français du XVIIIe au XXe siècle*. Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales 126/127 (1999), pp. 29–38; J. Schmidt-Szalewski, *Evolution du droit d'auteur en France*, in: E. Wadle (ed.), *Historische Studien zum Urheberrecht in Europa. Entwicklungslinien und Grundfragen*, Berlin 1993, pp. 151–166; A. Viala, *Naissance de l'écrivain. Sociologie de la littérature à l'âge classique*, Paris 1985; E. Wadle, *Entwicklungsschritte des Geistigen Eigentums in Frankreich und Deutschland. Eine vergleichende Studie*, in: H. Siegrist and D. Sugarman (eds.), *Eigentum im internationalen Vergleich (18.–20. Jahrhundert)*, Göttingen 1999, pp. 245–263.

This way, the author was transformed into an exclusive property rights holder; the rights of publishers and the public were conceived of only as secondary rights derived from the authorial genius. Nevertheless, initially the *propriété littéraire et artistique* focused on financial aspects. It was not until the middle of the nineteenth century that the French legislators became receptive to the author's so called *droit moral*, which permitted him not only to decide on the publishing, exploitation and distribution of his work but also to prohibit any alterations of the text.

A glance at the author's rights in Germany reveals a similar growth of esteem for the individual author.¹⁸ This emphasis on the writing genius was initiated by a change in aesthetical and philosophical thinking during Enlightenment and resulted in the author's emancipation from his economic and social dependence on the publishing industry. However, the path to an author-centered literary property right that stressed the importance of individual authorship for the progress of society was not direct. The main problem with German legislation was the plurality of the individual states whose legislations had had priority over federal law since 1648. Consequently, printing privileges were in force only in the territory of the respective sovereign. This restriction of the printing privilege's geographical reach led to serious problems for both authors and publishers. Since 1760 the literary market expanded rapidly without authors or publishers having any legal instruments with which to prohibit unauthorized copying. However, disagreement in economic policy between publishers in Prussia and Saxony on the one hand and publishers in South Germany on the other hand prevented an early agreement for the protection of literary and artistic works on the level of the federal state. Additionally, it was not until the beginning of the nineteenth century that publishers gave up their efforts to hinder authors from claiming the right of reward and ownership of their texts. In contrast to Britain and France where an author-centered legislation was established early for political reasons – the anti-monopolistic policy in Britain and principal considerations concerning the freedom of speech and the freedom of the press in France – German publishers had no reason to voluntarily renounce their right to print and sell manuscripts. Rather, they benefited from concepts in common law that subsumed manuscripts under material property. According to this idea a manuscript could be sold once,

18 For Germany see: K. Bandilla, *Urheberrecht im Kaiserreich. Der Weg zum Gesetz betreffend das Urheberrecht an Werken der Literatur und Tonkunst vom 19. Juni 1901*, Frankfurt a. M. 2005; H. Bosse, *Autorschaft ist Werkherrschaft. Über die Entstehung des Urheberrechts aus dem Geist der Goethezeit*, Paderborn 1981; M. Estermann and G. Jäger, *Geschichtliche Grundlagen und Entwicklung des Buchhandels im Deutschen Reich bis 1871*, in: G. Jäger (ed.), *Geschichte des deutschen Buchhandels im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert*. Vol. 1: *Das Kaiserreich 1870–1918*, Frankfurt a. M. 2001, pp. 17–41; A. and I. Götz von Olenhusen (eds.), *Von Goethe zu Google. Geistiges Eigentum in drei Jahrhunderten*, Düsseldorf 2012; E. Höffner, *Geschichte und Wesen des Urheberrechts*, München 2010; F. Kawohl, *Urheberrecht und Musik in Preußen (1820–1840)*, Tutzingen 2002; M. Rehbinder, *Kein Urheberrecht ohne Gesetzesrecht. Zum Urheberschutz um die Mitte des 19. Jahrhunderts*, in: R. Dittrich (ed.), *Woher kommt das Urheberrecht und wohin geht es? Wurzeln, geschichtlicher Ursprung, geistesgeschichtlicher Hintergrund und Zukunft des Urheberrechts*, Wien 1988, pp. 99–116; M. Vogel, *Der literarische Markt und die Entstehung des Verlags- und Urheberrechts bis zum Jahre 1800*, in: GRUR 6 (1973), pp. 303–311; E. Wadle, *Der langsame Abschied vom Privileg: Das Beispiel des Urheberrechts*, in: B. Dölemeyer and H. Mohnhaupt (eds.), *Das Privileg im europäischen Vergleich*, vol. 1, Frankfurt a. M. 1997, pp. 377–399.

thereafter the former owner could no longer lay claim to the manuscript. The writing genius manifested in a text, composition or piece of art, however, was not introduced to the discussion before the beginning of the nineteenth century. Since then, legal scholars have incorporated aesthetic theories that promote the notion of individual authorship and have perceived literary or artistic works as emanating from the extraordinary skills of an artistic genius. This philosophical esteem for the individual led German legal scholars to conclude that the writing of a text was the original act legitimating all rights of ownership in cultural goods. As a consequence, the writing genius was perceived as the only legally entitled person to own a work while the rights of exploiters and distributors were interpreted as secondary rights. Nevertheless, in the course of the nineteenth century the development of legal doctrines and legislation did not proceed simultaneously. It was not until 1871 that the German legislators passed a law for the protection of literary and artistic property that explicitly acknowledged the author's individual right to exclusively decide on the exploitation and distribution of his work. On the other side, German jurisprudence was at the forefront of working out the concept of the author's moral rights by combining aspects of natural law theory, the aesthetic notion of the genius and the idea of personal property derived from the right to live one's own life. In the course of the twentieth century the idea of moral rights made its entrance into international law. It became one of the most important arguments for the extension of the author's rights on a global scale, while it was simultaneously highly contested because of its specifically European perception of individuality and authorial labor.

4 The Europeanization of the Writing Genius in the Course of the Nineteenth Century

As soon as national legislators had successfully installed the first legal systems for the protection of author's rights, they faced another fundamental problem: The newly drafted literary property laws provided regulations only on the national level but did not provide any regulations for the acknowledgement of the author's exclusive rights on a European level. Once books and other printed works were exchanged in significant quantities between different states and different legal and linguistic areas, thus transcending national spheres of legal influence, the necessity for authors, publishers and legislators in Europe not only to draught national laws but also to endeavor simultaneously to create international regulations for the strengthening of the author's personal rights to decide on the publication of his works became fundamental. From the 1820s onwards the rising trade with literary works forced authors, publishers and lawyers to search for bi- or multilateral contracts in order to handle copyright litigations abroad and to standardize the distribution of copyright entitlements between authors, publishers and the public on a European scale. An early attempt to solve this problem included bilateral trade agreements.¹⁹ Since

19 G. Boytha, Urheber- und Verlegerinteressen im Entstehungsprozess des internationalen Urheberrechts, in: UFI-

the middle of the nineteenth century, these agreements determined mutual acknowledgement of protection from reprinting between different European states.²⁰

However, the bilateral agreements were restricted to short term arrangements and their implementation was uneven. Furthermore, for the most part they were part of trade agreements, which achieved the legal protection of cultural works abroad by making concessions to custom tariffs or other economic sectors. Consequently, the first bilateral agreements were mainly guided by pragmatic considerations, which did not take into account the complex legal, cultural, social and economic reflections put forward by authors, publishers and legal scholars on the national level – the focus on the author's personality and the philosophical and aesthetical esteem for his skills, the question of just reward for authorial labor and the social reflection on the value of individual authorship for education and cultural progress of national societies.²¹ Therefore, from the beginning of the 1850s onwards authors and publishers mainly from the major European book trading countries such as France, Great Britain, Germany, Switzerland and Belgium pushed their national legislators to introduce long-term legal standards that covered the most comprehensive area possible on a European level. They sought for multilateral agreements that would overcome the existing bilateral trade agreements in favor of international legal doctrines that would introduce the writing genius as the only legitimate concept that granted the author the exclusive right to own his texts on a European level.²²

In 1858, European authors and publishers met for the first time in order to discuss the lack of a European-wide legal concept of authorship and authorial work at an international congress for authors and artists in Brussels. Intensifying their efforts for the acknowledgement of the author's individual rights as a matter of international law, further congresses followed in Antwerp in 1861 and 1877. However, it was not until the World Exposition in 1878 in Paris that authors and publishers successfully founded an international association of authors, the *Association Littéraire Internationale* with Victor Hugo as president, renamed the *Association Littéraire et Artistique Internationale* (ALAI) in 1884.²³ The ALAI was composed of renowned authors and major publishing houses that campaigned for the exclusive rights of authors to decide on the text, the publication, the distribution, and, to a certain extent, the modes of reception of their works. Thereby, they focused on the notion of the individual author perceived as a genius. For them the

TA. Archiv für Urheber- und Medienrecht 85 (1979), pp. 1-35. S. P. Ladas, *The International Copyright Protection of Literary and Artistic Property in Two Volumes*, New York 1938, pp. 44-68.

20 H. Siegrist, *Geistiges Eigentum im Spannungsfeld von Individualisierung, Nationalisierung und Internationalisierung. Der Weg zur Berner Übereinkunft von 1886*, in: R. Hohls, I. Schröder, and H. Siegrist (eds.), *Europa und die Europäer. Quellen und Essays zur modernen europäischen Geschichte*, Wiesbaden 2005, p. 55.

21 B. Dölemeyer, *Urheber- und Verlagsrecht*, in: H. Coing (ed.), *Handbuch der Quellen und Literatur der neueren europäischen Privatrechtsgeschichte. Vol III: Das 19. Jahrhundert*, München 1986, p. 4059sq.

22 M. Vec, *Weltverträge für Weltliteratur. Das Geistige Eigentum im System der rechtsetzenden Konventionen des 19. Jahrhunderts*, in: L. Pahlow and J. Eisfeld (eds.), *Grundlagen und Grundfragen des geistigen Eigentums*, Tübingen 2008, pp. 107-130; S. Ricketson, *International Copyright and Neighbouring Rights. The Berne Convention and Beyond*, Oxford 2006, paras. 2.01-2.07.

23 R.-V. Blaustein, *L'Association littéraire et artistique internationale*, in: *Le Droit d'Auteur* 91 (1978) 2, pp. 71-72; C. Masouyé, *Le rôle de l'ALAI dans l'évolution du droit d'auteur*, in: *Le Droit d'Auteur* 91 (1978) 4, pp. 122-128.

genius' importance for the progress of society and culture was justification enough to restrict the free trade of cultural goods and to subordinate the cultural industries with a transnational reach to an international trade regime. The ALAI continued its campaigns with a series of subsequent meetings in London (1879), in Lisbon (1880), in Vienna (1881), in Rome (1882) and finally in Bern in 1883. The last meeting was the most important as the Swiss government agreed to pick up the initiative and to summon an international diplomatic congress that would ideally result in an international convention for the protection of the author's individual rights that would be signed by the major European book trading countries.²⁴

In 1886, these efforts resulted in the Berne Convention, a multilateral contract for the legal protection of literary and artistic works.²⁵ The Berne Convention signalled a breakthrough for the idea of individual authorship as the principal basis for cultural and societal progress in literature, art, science and education. The convention universalized the concept of the individual author by means of an internationally negotiated standard consisting of at least three main components.²⁶ First, the Berne Convention guaranteed that the work of each author who was a citizen of a member state and published his works in another member state of the Convention was treated on an equal legal standing with domestic authors. In doing so, the Berne Convention affirmed the principle of national treatment of authors and artists abroad; It gives the author's moral and economic interests priority over the cultural industries in foreign countries. Second, from its outset it was possible for foreign authors to have better legal conditions than native citizens due to the rights the convention granted to the former. In these cases most legal experts agreed to focus on the author's benefit instead of giving preferential treatment to domestic law and state interests. This interpretation of international law was innovative. It replaced the principle of *lex posteriori* – the priority of the treaty, which had been concluded last – with the idea to center on the rights and needs of the individual author despite his nationality.²⁷ Finally, the revision conferences, which took place irregularly in order to continuously adjust the convention to technical, cultural and political innovation,

24 H. Püschel, Internationales Urheberrecht, Berlin 1982, p. 31; E. Ulmer, Hundert Jahre Berner Konvention, in: International Publisher's Association and Börsenverein (eds.), Internationales Urheberrechtssymposium, Heidelberg 24.-25. April 1986, München 1986, p. 33.

25 S. Ricketson, The Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works: 1886–1986, London 1987; J. Cavalli, La genèse de la Convention de Berne pour la protection des œuvres littéraires et artistiques du 9 septembre 1886, Lausanne 1986.

26 For the following see: W. Bappert and E. Wagner, Internationales Urheberrecht. Kommentar zur revidierten Berner Übereinkunft, München, Berlin 1956, pp. 37–46; P. Buck, Geistiges Eigentum und Völkerrecht. Beiträge des Völkerrechts zur Fortentwicklung des Schutzes von geistigem Eigentum, Berlin 1994; B. Mentha, Berne Convention, in: H. L. Pinner (ed.), World Copyright. An Encyclopedia, Leyden 1953, pp. 1029–1070; H. Püschel, 100 Jahre Berner Union. Gedanken, Dokumente, Erinnerungen, Leipzig 1986; R. Plaisant, L'évolution des conventions de propriété intellectuelle, in: Les unions internationales pour la protection de la propriété industrielle, littéraire et artistique, 1883–1963, Genève 1962, pp. 47–88; E. Röthlisberger, Die Berner Übereinkunft zum Schutz der Werke der Literatur und Kunst und die Zusatzabkommen. Geschichtlich und rechtlich beleuchtet und kommentiert, Bern 1906; E. Ulmer, Urheber- und Verlagsrecht, Berlin, Heidelberg, New York 1980.

27 E. Brem, Das Verhältnis der Berner Übereinkunft zu anderen völkerrechtlichen Verträgen, in: Schweizerische Vereinigung für Urheberrecht (ed.), Die Berner Übereinkunft und die Schweiz. Schweizerische Festschrift zum

gradually strengthened the author's legal position. In 1908 the copyright protection *post mortem auctoris* was extended to fifty years, and in 1928 the member states introduced the author's moral right into the convention. By acknowledging a text, composition or piece of art to be closely interconnected to the author's personality, the member states interpreted artistic or literary works as part of the authorial genius and introduced this notion irrevocably in international law.²⁸ The effectiveness of the Berne Convention, however, was rooted in the pre-existing consensus of the member states to privilege and codify a shared and unique European idea of the individual and genius author, a practice that domestic laws had already legitimated about a century before. In order to introduce the individual author as a legal standard, at least on the European level, the states boosted the scope of their national rights by institutionalizing the notion of the writing genius as an international legal standard for the economic, social, cultural, legal and political handling of literature, art or music.²⁹

5 The Writing Genius – A European or Universal Concept?

Until the beginning of the twentieth century, authors, publishers and governments in Europe perceived the writing genius not as an originally European concept but as universal. They strongly advocated the achievements of this concept for the public, which in their eyes was mainly rooted in the commitments of a highly gifted individual to enhance culture and society. Consequently, authors, publishers and governments in Europe sought to apply the concept of individual authorship, incorporated in the Berne Convention, to all regions in the world. The aim was also to implement the genius author in non-European territories in order to guarantee the return flow of royalties from abroad and to derive a secure contractual foundation for the increase of the author's and publishers' business activities on a global scale. Therefore, authors, publishers and states in Europe intended to gradually expand the geographical reach of the Berne Convention. After nine member states had signed the convention in 1886, the convention grew rapidly, and at the beginning of the 1920s it had thirty-six member states and covered the whole territory of Europe, Africa, Australia and Asia including the European colonies and dependent territories in India, the Middle East and parts of Africa.³⁰ Nevertheless, the convention's effectiveness suffered from the absence of the American states. For the

ein hundredjährigen Bestehen der Berner Übereinkunft zum Schutze von Werken der Literatur und Kunst, Bern 1986, p. 103; Mentha, Berne Convention, p. 1056sq. (see note 26).

28 M. Plaisant and O. Pichot, La conférence de Rome. Commentaire pratique de la nouvelle convention pour la protection internationale de la propriété littéraire et artistique, Paris 1934.

29 F. Ruffini, De la protection internationale des droits sur les œuvres littéraires et artistiques, in: Recueil des cours de l'Académie de Droit International de La Haye, Paris 1926, p. 444-456; L'Union internationale pour la protection des œuvres littéraires et artistiques: Sa fondation et son développement. Mémoire publié par le bureau de l'union, Berne 1936.

30 Tableau des pays de l'union au 1er novembre 1928, in: Union internationale pour la protection des œuvres littéraires et artistiques (ed.), Actes de la conférence réunie à Rome du 7 mai au 2 juin 1928, Neuchâtel 1929, p. 9sq.

most part they refused to take over the specifically European figure of the writing genius because of its social, economic and political implications, which in their eyes best served European authors but not Latin or North American interests: Whereas the USA refused to accede because of a divergent legal tradition, Latin American states referred to the absence of economically and socially independent authors comparable to the European author and argued that their cultural industries were still in the process of development and thus not able to afford preferential treatment of a single author. In the course of these struggles, however, it became obvious that the European societies had developed a shared and originally European idea of the writing genius. It was the outcome of a certain set of cultural and legal practices that were obviously not reproducible outside the European sphere of influence so that in the end, the writing genius lost his universal connotation and became a European.

From the end of the nineteenth century, European states had tried several times either to include the American states into the legal regime of the Berne Convention or to conclude bilateral agreements that could have bridged the gap between the European idea to exclusively acknowledge and protect the individual author and the refusal of American states to extensively grant individual rights to the Europeans.³¹ The United States continuously refused to grant European authors extensive rights. The majority of authors, publishers and the state rejected the idea that a book, a composition or a piece of art was necessarily related to the author's personality. Even though authors, publishers and legal experts did not question the author's imagination and his creative skills as the driving force for the creation of literary or artistic works, they did not agree with their European colleagues on the extraordinary legal status authors held in European legislation.³² As the cases of France and Germany have shown, the author's exclusive rights to decide on the production, dissemination and reception of his works was rooted in natural rights theory. This approach closely linked the author's person to his rights to decide on his works with the result that state legislation was only able to legally acknowledge a pre-existing right. This emphasis on the author's moral rights, which – at least in the European perception – even existed outside state authority, was codified in the Berne Convention in 1928. Since then it became increasingly unlikely to reconcile the European notion of the writing genius with the US author who was always subordinate to American legislation as the only legitimate authority that could grant rights or take them away.³³ In addition to the question of the author's moral rights, US legislation refused to acknowledge the universal character of the writing genius in terms of space. Whereas authors, publishers and

31 B. Dölemeyer, „Geistiges Eigentum“ zwischen „Commerzien“ und Informationsgesellschaft. Einzelstaatliche Gesetzgebung und internationaler Standard, in: Pahlow and Eisfeld (eds.), *Grundlagen und Grundfragen*, pp. 107–130 (see note 22); E. Röthlisberger, *Der interne und der internationale Schutz des Urheberrechts in den Ländern des Erdballs*, Leipzig 1914, p. 16.

32 K. N. Peifer, *Moral Rights in den USA*, in: ZUM (1993) 7, p. 325; C. Seville, *The Internationalisation of Copyright Law. Books, Buccaneers and the Black Flag in the Nineteenth Century*, Cambridge 2006, pp. 146sq.

33 Halbert, *Intellectual Property*, p. 12sq (see note 11); W. W. Fisher III, *Geistiges Eigentum – ein ausufernder Rechtsbereich. Die Geschichte des Ideenschutzes in den Vereinigten Staaten*, in: Siegrist and Sugarman (eds.), *Eigentum im internationalen Vergleich*, pp. 262–289 (see note 17).

governments in Europe highlighted the act of creation and perceived all rights to print and distribute a work as secondary rights, the US legislation stressed the place where a book or a composition was printed. Since 1891 the rights of authors within the US territory could only be granted if the work was printed in US-territory.³⁴ Eventually, this regulation was relaxed in 1909 through several bilateral agreements; the USA concurred with European countries, which lessened the negative effects for European authors.³⁵ These disputes revealed the deeply European origin of the writing genius and uncovered the failed attempts of European authors and publishers to universalize the specific set of cultural, social, legal and economic practices that mainly contributed to the notion of the extraordinary gifted and personally autonomous writing genius.

Regarding Latin America, the European states faced comparable problems, which in the end resulted in the same, namely the regionalization of the writing genius as a European citizen. Since the middle of the nineteenth century Latin American societies have vested authors with the right to decide independently on the publication of their work. In addition to the national laws, the Latin American states passed a first Inter-American agreement for the protection of authors rights in 1889, followed by a series of multilateral agreements that guaranteed authors and publishers special rights for the writing and disseminating of artistic or cultural works.³⁶ However, in the perspective of European authors and publishers the Latin American book market remained problematic as the multilateral agreements only provided legal protection for Latin American authors and explicitly excluded authors from Europe.³⁷ Authors, publishers and governments in Europe tried to alter this situation by either concluding bilateral agreements or by acceding to the multilateral contracts. As the examples of France and Germany show, neither possibility materialized. On the one side, states such as Chile, Cuba and Brazil³⁸ rejected bilateral agreements with France because of the different position authors held in society. Whereas French authors were perceived as profiting from the writing and publishing of their works, these states argued that they did not possess complex cultural industries that allowed authors to live from their work adequately and to contribute to the knowledge production of their society. Consequently, they insisted on having relatively free access to the works of European authors with the aim to support their own authors and to motivate them to emancipate themselves culturally, economically and politically from their European colleagues.³⁹ On the other side, states such as Germany failed to accede to one of the Inter-American agreements. Comparable to the French case, signatory states

34 Davies, *Copyright and the Public Interest*, p. 53 (see note 9).

35 C. Royer, *La protection international du droit d'auteur en Amérique et les tentatives de rapprochement des conventions panaméricaines et de la convention de Berne*, Toulouse 1942, pp. 95-100.

36 M. Canyes, P. A. Colborn and L. Guillermo Piazza, *Copyright Protection in the Americas. Under National Legislation and Inter-American Treaties*, Washington 1950.

37 Ricketson, *International Copyright and Neighbouring Rights*, p. 1175 (see note 22).

38 Finally the Brazilian government agreed to conclude a bilateral agreement with France in 1913; Röthlisberger, *Der interne und der internationale Schutz*, pp. 13-17 (see note 31)

39 For the several attempts of the French government to conclude bilateral agreements with Latin American states at the beginning of the 20th Century see: Archives Nationales Paris F/17/13491/6.

such as Uruguay, Peru and Argentina refused the German request and declared that European authors were privileged compared to their own authors because of the extended cultural landscape in Europe that allowed European authors – at least theoretically – to live from their writing.⁴⁰ For this reason they rejected the originally European idea that authors should be protected against illegal reprints worldwide. Instead, they pointed out the different economic situation of authors in Europe and Latin America and drew the attention to the dissimilar social and cultural practices that enabled European authors to appear as a highly independent and gifted individual with exclusive social, cultural and economic rights whereas authors in most of the Latin American states were not embedded socially, culturally and economically enough to make their living through writing and publishing. Therefore, these states insisted that the writing genius was not a universal phenomenon but an originally European one, and in order to enable authors from South America to emancipate themselves, especially economically, these states refused to acknowledge literary property rights of the European writing genius on their own territory.

6 Conclusion

Edward Young's reflections on original composition, published in 1759, were an important contribution to the contemporary debate on the origins of creativity. Young strongly emphasized the author's exceptional intellectual skills and took them as the starting point for each kind of creative work. In his view, innovation and progress in culture, science and art were deeply rooted in the individual, and therefore he strived for the acknowledgment of texts not merely as a material object or commodity that can be purchased and sold by publishers but rather as an integral part of the author's personality. Nowadays, aesthetic theories on the original author are no longer discussed seriously after aesthetics, art history and philosophical writings have contested the notion of the autonomous artist in favor of concepts of collective authorship, reflections on the impact of cultural traditions on individual creativity and the audience's role in the social and cultural construction of categories such as "quality," "value" and "relevance".⁴¹ Nevertheless, Young gave rise to a certain perception of the author's person, which has vividly survived in the legal doctrines of European societies. Since the second half of the eighteenth century the image of "the" European author appeared in national and international literary property rights: Therein the proponents drew the picture of the individual, a creative and an extraordinarily gifted person who contributed fundamentally to the social and cultural progress of society. From the middle of the nineteenth century onwards, the

40 For the German attempts to accede to the convention of Montevideo in 1926 and 127 see: Archive of the German Foreign Office R 43761.

41 M. Foucault, *Qu'est-ce qu'un auteur ?*, in: D. Défert and F. Éwald (eds.), *Michel Foucault: Dits et écrits I, 1954–1969*, Paris 1994, pp. 789–820; R. Barthes, *La mort de l'auteur*, in: R. Barthes, *Le bruissement de la langue*, Paris 1984, pp. 61–67.

writing genius became the core concept for the institutionalization of the cultural field in modern European societies, and since then innovation and progress in the fields of culture, science and education was personalized and conceived of as the success of a creative and liberalized individual. However, the European dimension of this concept did not become obvious before European authors, publishers and governments sought to implement the appropriate legal regime in the USA and in the states of South America. This attempt revealed that the notion of authorship put forward by the European actors was not a universal conception of authorship applicable to all regions, societies and cultures worldwide. On the contrary, European authors, publishers and lawyers were confronted either with different legal conceptions of individuality and individual rights – the case of the USA – or with completely different social, economic and cultural circumstances for authors – the case of the Latin American states. In both cases the differences in theory and practice gave the political actors in the Americas several arguments to prefer their national authors and to neglect European authors and the idea of the writing genius. Even though these conflicts were settled after World War II by means of several international agreements for the protection of author's rights on a global scale – the Universal Copyright Convention in 1952 and the foundation of the *World Intellectual Property Organization* in 1967 – they revealed without a doubt that authors, publishers and governments in Europe pursued a shared notion of the author and of authorship, which was the outcome of a certain set of cultural, social, political, economic and intellectual practices which could not be easily universalized and implemented outside the European sphere of influence.

The *Homo Europaeus* as a Blueprint for International Organizations?

Klaas Dykmann

RESÜMEE

Heute wird vor allem von internationalen Organisationen erwartet, dass sie die mit der „Globalisierung“ verbundenen Herausforderungen und Probleme angehen. In dem vorliegenden Aufsatz beabsichtige ich eine Übersicht zu verschiedenen Themenbereichen zu liefern, welche die Frage zu beantworten helfen soll, inwieweit ein konstruierter „Europäer“ den Grundentwurf für die Konzeption dieser Organisationen darstellte. Zunächst definiere ich den Begriff *Homo Europaeus*, welcher den vorgestellten Europäer widerspiegelt und in verschiedenen Bereichen und in unterschiedlichen historischen Perioden konstruiert wurde. Anschließend formuliere ich meine drei Hauptfragen, gefolgt von einer kurzen Übersicht zur Historiographie internationaler Organisationen. Ein Aufriss der Geschichte internationaler Organisationen soll diese Einrichtungen in der Globalgeschichte verorten. Abschließend behandle ich einige Eigenschaften von IO: die Dimension des Völkerrechtes, der Bürokratie und Standardisierung sowie die Politikbereiche Menschenrechte und Gesundheitspolitik.

Today, it is above all international organizations (IOs) that are expected to tackle the challenges and problems of “globalization” in an “effective”¹ way, while the very nature of these institutions has remained rather uncontested. In this article, I aspire to provide an overview of various subjects that promise to approach the question of to what extent a constructed “European” has been a blueprint for the conception of IOs, as well as a standard addressee of the latter’s policies. To operationalize this enormous endeavor, I will present a working definition of the term *Homo Europaeus* that reflects the imagined European, which has been constructed in different areas and in different historical peri-

1 C. N. Murphy, *Global Institutions, Marginalization, and Development*. Oxon (Canada)/New York 2005, p. 16.

ods. Then, I will outline my three major questions, followed by a short overview of the historiography of international organizations. A brief history of international organizations places these institutions in global history. Subsequently, I will address some features in this regard, namely the dimension of international law, bureaucracy and standardization for the prevailing image of man in IOs as well as the policy areas of human rights and medicine.²

Attempting a definition

Here, the “imagined European” figures only as an idealized model, which does not refer to an established concept and obviously differs from reality and the entirety of its hybrid forms. The notion of *Homo Europaeus* comprises both imagined Europeans as well as North Americans, or, generally the individuals broadly considered “Westerners.” However, whether Europeans themselves invented this imagined European is a different question. In accordance, this broad interpretation of *Homo Europaeus* does not refer to Europeans by birth but includes the “imagined European,” who can live in other parts of the world but at least shares the same patterns as this constructed “European.” No distinction is made between affiliations to different social classes, but as IOs can largely be regarded as elitist projects, although they also reflect various societies’ wishes for international management, the educated middle and upper classes are considered by this expression. The term shall help to distinguish the imagined individual implicitly or directly addressed in international organizations and their policies: To what extent can the cultural heritage – in this case European/Western – be identified as a dominant belief and reference system? The working definition of *Homo Europaeus* used for this article does not refer to a fixed construction but to an ever-progressing result of continuous mixings of Western and non-Western knowledge, values, assumptions and perceptions. Likewise, the terms “Western” and “non-Western” are rather working definitions that do not fully reflect the mutually influential negotiation processes that have had an impact in Europe and other world regions. Particularly since the beginning of the twentieth century, the European has been increasingly defined in cultural terms and progressively less determined as a biologically and phenotypically defined group of people; it is an ascription that has become gradually detached from territorial references. Hence, cultural patterns, values and norms as well as socio-economic conditions seem to have become more important for this group than genetic or racial questions.

2 Apart from reviewing the bibliography, IO publications and basic documents such as charters, statutes, and archive material, I have further conducted interviews with former and current IO employees, directors of human resources, academics and think tank experts in Geneva, Washington, New York and New Delhi. These expert interviews helped to organize and systematize my approach to the subject. As all the interviewees were granted anonymity, I only refer to them by providing the month, year and the location where the conversations took place.

The following questions will be addressed in this article: To what extent is the very conception of IOs based on an image of man dominated by the *Homo Europaeus*? Were the major policy areas covered by IOs designed after the *Homo Europaeus* as a blueprint and directed to the “European” as a standard addressee? Can we identify different phases of the *Homo Europaeus* in international organizations?

International organizations and the *Homo Europaeus*

Historians have, by and large, neglected international organizations as a field of research until recently. Besides the rather theory-based political science works and procedure-related law analyses, many historical studies still limit their approach to a more or less critical history of institutions at best. This can be partly explained by the fact that international organizations have long been regarded as merely venues for policy-making by states, not as actors themselves. However, there have also been some critical studies on specific organizations, which allow for the formulation of conclusions on the phenomenon of IOs in global history in general. Certainly, *Global Community* by Akira Iriye is a pioneering study, for it constitutes one of the first attempts to analyze the emergence of IOs from a global history point of view, although it can hardly be considered as critical on the Western role.³ Madeleine Herren’s introduction to a global history view of international organizations is highly valuable but needs to be followed up by more empirical studies.⁴ Mark Mazower’s *Governing the World* is certainly worth reading, as it focuses on the intellectual origins of internationalism and the corresponding institutions.⁵ In addition, there are other books that provide more or less useful overviews.⁶ The United Nations system and the preceding League of Nations have become subjects of more critical research in the past years. The United Nations Intellectual History Project (UNIHP), based at the Ralph Bunche Institute of the City University of New York, has published several monographs on topics related to this subject and thus promises interesting findings for the quest of the imagined European in international organizations.⁷

Commonly, scholars have explained the emergence of international organizations with the increase of international travel, trade, the extension of epidemic diseases and a general tendency of growing global networks – the developments that are usually referred to

3 A. Iriye, *Global Community. The Role of International Organizations in the Making of the Contemporary World*. Berkeley 2002.

4 M. Herren, *Internationale Organisationen seit 1865. Eine Globalgeschichte der internationalen Ordnung*. Darmstadt 2009.

5 M. Mazower, *Governing the World. The History of an Idea*. New York 2012.

6 B. Reinalda, *Routledge History of International Organizations. From 1815 to the Present Day*. London/New York 2009; D. MacKenzie, *A World Beyond Borders. An Introduction to the History of International Organizations*. University of Toronto Press 2010.

7 The UNIHP inquires the following global challenges: human rights, international trade and finance, international development strategies, the global commons, global governance, quantifying the world, transnational corporations, development assistance, the gender revolution, human security, and development perspectives from the regional commissions.

as “globalization.” According to this functionalist narrative, these processes of networks and intertwining required coordination, the standardization of global trade and communication flows or technical methods beyond bilateral agreements.⁸ The non-Western criticism on this dominant account can roughly be categorized into two groups. The first group of scholars reject the prevailing narrative of the Western origin of international law and organizations, hinting at bases of these in ancient civilizations in China, India, Egypt and Assyria, long before the Westphalian System was established in the seventeenth century. The second group of critical scholars maintains that IOs are of European origin, but argue that this is exactly the problem. In their view, modern IOs mirror the complex legacies of colonialism.⁹ This selective historical account of functional narratives must be corrected and, in addition, non-European perspectives should complement or relativize these accounts.¹⁰ In sum, there are some studies that help to question the role of the imagined European in IOs, but as of yet, no explicit research endeavor has been undertaken in this regard.

According to Stuart Hall, colonialism and postcolonialism refer to a field of force of power and knowledge. In fact, colonial discourse is based on a fixation of meaning, which finds expression in the construction and fixation of the “other.” The violent representation of the “other” as irrevocably different was the necessary element in the construction of sovereign, dominant European states.¹¹ Is this also true for the European as an imagined individual? In general, the *Homo Europaeus* has always needed a rather blurred “other,” tentatively labeled *Homo extra-europaeus*, but also, in specific cases, more concrete constructions of the *Homo americanus*, *africanus* or *asiaticus*; all European imaginations of the “regionalized” other.

After World War II, direct European control over their colonies appeared to be no longer justifiable, although it took the imperial powers up to two decades to accept this. As Young outlines, the new system was much more subtle, but still represented an indirect version of the old one.¹² Numerous theorizations of the postcolonial situation analyzed this post-war period from the left (neo-colonialism, dependency theory, world systems theory) and from the capitalist view (Keynesianism, monetarism and neoliberalism). “Development” somehow served as a sort of “mediator” between these groups since it was regarded as “... the way forward after the successful realization of the anti-colonial struggles.”¹³ Development, as defined by Young, represents “a way of describing the as-

8 For instance, A. Hopkins, *The History of Globalization – And the Globalization of History?*, in: A. Hopkins (ed.), *Globalization in World History*. New York/ London 2002, p. 38; I. L. Claude, Jr., *Swords into Plowshares. The Problems and Progress of International Organization*, New York 1974, p. 34.

9 See, for example, A. Anghie, *Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law*, Cambridge 2004; B. Rajagopal, *International Law from Below. Development, Social Movements and Third World Resistance*. Cambridge/New York 2003; A. Anghie/B. Chimni/K. Mickelson/O. Okafor (eds), *The Third World and International Order. Law, Politics and Globalization*. Leiden/Boston 2003.

10 J. Alvarez, *International Organizations as Law-Makers*, pp. 39sq.

11 M. do Mar Castro Varela/N. Dhawan, *Postkoloniale Theorie. Eine kritische Einführung*. Bielefeld 2005, p. 16.

12 R. C. Young, *Postcolonialism. An Historical Introduction*. Oxford/Malden (MA) 2001, p. 44.

13 Ibid.

sumed necessity of incorporating the rest of the world into the realm of modernity, that is, the western economic system, in which capitalism produces progressive economic growth.” The overall goal of development was modernization, which was equated with the “Westernization” (and nowadays read “globalization”) of the Third World.¹⁴

It is fair to say that European historicism had facilitated Europe’s domination of the world during the nineteenth century.¹⁵ The postcolonial turn in historiography led to a tremor of the totalizing approaches of Western historicism, its linear history of progress and its master narrative of the globally-encompassing European modern age. This master narrative has perpetuated the enduring exclusion of non-European cultures in dominant historiography and the insinuation of “peoples without history.” Concepts such as civil rights, the state, civil society, public space, human rights, the individual, a differentiation between public and private, the imagination of the subject, democracy, social justice, scientific rationality, etc., are all linked to European thoughts and history: “These concepts entail an unavoidable – and in a sense indispensable – universal and secular vision of the human”.¹⁶ Spivak spoke of the “worlding” (making of the world) in the former colonies as copies of the “mother country,” with which she sought to express both the “production” as well as the “violation” of the “Third World.”¹⁷ Consequently, postcolonial studies accomplished that for the first time, “... tricontinental knowledge, cultural and political practices, have asserted and achieved more or less equal institutional status with any other.”¹⁸

Benedict Anderson’s path-breaking work *Imagined Communities* certainly highlighted the construction of the nation-state and the corresponding “national identities.” Some of his critics, for instance Partha Chatterjee, disapprove of Anderson’s conclusion that in the process of nation-building, the former colonies simply copied the European model or that the resistance movements were shaped by European thoughts. Chatterjee speaks of an “ideological strainer” through which anti-colonial nationalists filtered European ideas. In accordance, Chatterjee holds that anti-colonial nationalism is not a copy of the Western model but represents the manifold imaginations of freedom and humanity developed throughout the period of the struggles for independence.¹⁹ The ideas of “tradition” and “culture” were continuously (re-) invented on both sides: the colonizers and nationalists. Dipesh Chakrabarty thus describes the process between European imperialism and Third World nationalisms as connected in the goal of the common achievement of an “universalisation of the nation-state as the most-wanted form of political community.”²⁰ In a way, postcolonial theory takes the challenge of a transnational historiography seriously. Consequently, it investigates imperialism as both a European, as well as

14 Ibid., p. 49.

15 D. Chakrabarty, *Provincializing Europe. Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference*. Princeton 2000, p. 7.

16 Ibid., p. 4.

17 M. Do Mar Castro Varela/N. Dhawan, p. 13.

18 R. Young, p. 63.

19 M. Do Mar Castro Varela/N. Dhawan, pp. 17-19.

20 Ibid., p. 19.

an extra-European, encompassing phenomenon.²¹ Nevertheless, can the assumption of a differentiated understanding of nations, identity, culture, etc., be translated into the context of international organizations and their prevailing image of man? Is this rather a homogeneously imagined *Homo Europaeus*, or the result of a continuous blending of concepts passed through an “ideological strainer”? The tentative concern of this article is to pave the way for such a new perspective.

Brief history of international organizations

Like other authors, global historian Bruce Mazlish distinguishes between two aspects of global history: the history of globalization and the investigation of processes at the global rather than the local, national or regional level.²² Here, a not entirely congruent analogy for the study of IOs may be helpful: the history of international organization (singular) as a likely element of and/or reaction to globalization and the development of international organizations (internal and external processes and intertwining) as a concrete subject of investigation of global history. Thus, it seems quite helpful to distinguish between international organization and organizations. The first term describes the global process, the latter the concrete institutions.²³

Although there were historical forerunners and ancient or colonial empires showed similar features, modern intergovernmental organizations, based on the very concept of the nation-state, and nongovernmental institutions did not emerge before the mid-nineteenth century. Usually, the International Telegraphic Union (1865) and the Universal Postal Union (1874) are named as the first IOs. The first IOs established the structural pattern of bureau, council, and conference that still serves more or less as the organizational blueprint for IOs.²⁴ After the First World War, the League of Nations and the International Labour Organisation, among others, were established more as a continuation of preceding tendencies than, what is widely believed, as an exclusive result of Wilsonian ideas. As a reaction to the human tragedy during the two world wars and in view of the crimes committed by the National Socialists, numerous new institutions were established after 1945, above all, the United Nations Organisation (UNO) and its specialized institutions. In contrast to the League of Nations, which was mostly composed of European countries and dominated by French and British officials, IOs after World War II “... were far more global in scope than before the war.”²⁵ Nevertheless, the League of Nations and the succeeding United Nations were still structured according to a European understanding not only of international law but also of administrative organization. Some further argue that

21 Ibid., p. 24.

22 B. Mazlish, Comparing Global History and World History, in: Journal of Interdisciplinary History, XXVIII:3 (1998), p. 389.

23 See A. J. R. Groom, The setting in world society, in: A. J. R. Groom and P. Taylor (eds), Frameworks for International Cooperation, London 1990, pp. 7-10; Herren, Internationale Organisationen seit 1865; Claude Jr., Swords into Plowshares, p. 4.

24 Ibid., p. 36.

25 A. Iriye, Global Community, p. 22.

both, the League and the UN perpetuated the concept of empire in an internationalised version.²⁶ The very concept of international organizations can thus be considered a truly European enterprise, supposedly taking the European individual as a standard.

After 1945, the establishment of the United Nations was highly influenced by the emergence of human rights as an important element of international relations (as result of the Holocaust and other atrocities of the Second World War – but not explicitly of crimes committed by colonial powers against “natives” in their “overseas” territories), the belief in economic growth and development as outlined in the modernization theory, and the necessity to avoid what were labeled “world wars.”

The European and international law

International law is comprised of the entirety of legal rules laid down in treaties or customary law, which regulate the rights and duties of states and other subjects of international law regarding their existence and integrity. Tracing back to the Roman *jus gentium* and Canon law (which referred to natural law), modern international law has its roots in the European Middle Ages where it developed with the establishment of sovereign territorial states, especially in the sixteenth and seventeenth century. Until the nineteenth century, it was binding as a regional Christian European law only for the European states, the Holy Sea and later also for the American states. With the Peace of Paris (1856), the Ottoman Empire was incorporated as the first non-Christian state. In the course of the creation of the League of Nations, its jurisdiction was expanded to almost all existing states on the globe. Through this expansion, it became universal international law.²⁷ Here, the extension of a European concept of law to non-European regions also suggests that the *Homo Europaeus* as the supposed standard of international law was transferred.²⁸ This implicit European image of man was accompanied by an implicit comprehension of “natives,” which refers to people living in colonized territories. The predominant natural law view was later replaced by positivism. Both law schools directed the philosophical debate on international law until the early twentieth century.²⁹ In the beginning of the twentieth century, international law mostly consisted of rules for the acquisition of territory, international law offences, maritime law, law of war and the right to neutrality. Since then, international law has started to cover all areas of inter-state relations including human rights, space law, international organizations, the prohibition of the use of violence, non-intervention and the right to self-determination. Besides the Westphalian Peace Treaty (1648) and the Final Act of the Vienna Congress (1815), the entry-into-

26 See M. Mazower, *No Enchanted Palace. The End of Empire and the Ideological Origins of the United Nations*. Princeton 2009; and M. Mazower, *Governing the world*.

27 See T. Buergerthal/H. G. Maier, *Public International Law in a Nutshell*, St. Paul/MN 1902.

28 Although there are other European jurists with merits in this regard, the Dutch scholar Hugo Grotius (1583-1645) is largely seen as the “father” of modern international law, particularly on the law of war and peace. Buergerthal/Maier, *Public International Law in a Nutshell* (see note 24), p. 13.

29 *Ibid.*, pp. 13-15.

force of the League of Nations' Covenant in 1920 could also be regarded as a landmark in the development of international law. The creation of the League of Nations was not only the first permanently established framework of (supra-regional) inter-governmental institutionalized cooperation but also resulted in the modern law of international organizations.³⁰

Inter-governmental organizations are defined as international institutions established by treaty and governed by international law with an international legal personality to perform the functions entrusted to them and, to that extent, represent subjects of international law.³¹ International organizations set standards and norms through political declarations or guidelines: "Such forms of IO-generated 'soft law'" is an oxymoron that seeks "unprecedented expansion of the concept of law into areas of normative regulation, which have never been considered as belonging to the law proper," risks "normative confusion and uncertainty," and "erodes the concept of legal obligation."³² Alvarez holds that international organizations claiming universal participation changed firstly, the processes by which international norms were generated, secondly, the character of the actors producing these rules, and lastly, the substance of a considerable part of public international law.³³

The previous view on the development of the international law system should be complemented by critical and postcolonial perspectives. Mohammad Bedjaoui, a prominent proponent of the New International Economic Order, already criticized international law in 1979 as it consisted of mostly European, Christian, mercantilist rules inspired by imperialist interests.³⁴ His criticism was fundamentally focused on the Western model, but strangely enough he also called for catching up on development in line with the western ideal. Balakrishnan Rajagopal identifies this contradiction as the probably symptomatic double identity of Third World lawyers in postcolonial times.³⁵ The final result, according to Rajagopal, is that institutions gained space and extended their activities, while the radical demands that helped these bodies to be established in the first place were contained. The initiative of the Third World radicalized the institutions by converting these into arenas of political and ideological struggle on matters of power, distribu-

30 Ibid., pp. 15-17.

31 Ibid., p. 36. Here, it seems helpful to mention critical voices (the so-called crits) from the Third World that refused the Western notion of international law as promoting particular ideologies, mostly those linked to Western capitalism: "These historical accounts serve to highlight the bias and blindspots of those Europeans and Americans 'present at the creation', as well as the ways their institutions and approaches to law have served the needs of their rich states of origin, and may even be perpetuating the colonist project through institutions with a global reach." J. E. Alvarez, 'Legal Perspectives'. In: T. G. Weiss/S. Daws (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook on the United Nations*. United Nations Association of the UK/United Nations Intellectual History Project, Ralph Bunche Institute for International Studies, The CUNY Graduate Center, Oxford/New York 2007, p. 73.

32 J. E. Alvarez, *International Organizations as Law-Makers*, New York 2005, p. 48.

33 Ibid., p. 17.

34 M. Bedjaoui, *Towards a new international economic order*. UNESCO, New York/London 1979, p. 50; cited by B. Rajagopal, *International Law from Below*, p. 90.

35 Ibid. p. 92.

tion and justice. On the other hand, the most radical currents of Third World criticism were tamed by concentrating on the reform of international institutions.³⁶

Article 22 of the League of Nations' Charter provides an illustrative example of the civilizing mission inherent in international law and put forward by IOs:

*To those colonies and territories which as a consequence of the late war have ceased to be under the sovereignty of the States which formerly governed them and which are inhabited by peoples not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world, there should be applied the principle that the well-being and development of such peoples form a sacred trust of civilisation and that securities for the performance of this trust should be embodied in this Covenant.*³⁷

This article held that former colonies should be governed by tutelage through developed states. Naturally, the social fabric and economic development in the newly independent states was considered fragile (by Western standards), but also, the non-European person was implicitly deemed unfit to run a country and build up a national economy (of Western design).³⁸ To both Westerners and many non-Western people, this "tutelage" seemed to be beneficial in the first place, as the European ideal remained largely uncontested despite sometimes-fierce struggles for independence from European rule.³⁹

Rajagopal concludes that the League's Mandate System significantly contributed to the controversial relationship between colonialism and the new paradigm of development in the interwar years as the system legitimized development and well-being of the "natives" as international principle, indicating the change from exploitative colonialism (imperialism) to cooperative colonialism (development).⁴⁰

Antony Anghie argues, "... colonialism profoundly shaped the character of international institutions at their formative stage and that, by examining the history of how this occurred we might illuminate the operations and character of contemporary international institutions." The colonial confrontation seemed utterly important for the making of international law. It was shaped according to European design and then became global and also applicable to the societies in Africa, Asia and the Pacific despite their different cultures, belief systems and differing political and economic institutions: "It was principally through colonial expansion in the nineteenth century that international law became universal in this sense."⁴¹ In Anghie's view, former colonies did not simply adopt

36 Ibid., p. 94.

37 Covenant of the League of Nations, Article 22.

38 "The phrase 'organized peoples' in the preamble to the Covenant of the League of Nations implied the existence of non-organized or less civilized peoples, whereas the UN Charter refers to the sovereign equality of all states." B. Reinalda, *Routledge History of International Organizations. From 1815 to the Present Day*. London/New York 2009, p. 290.

39 Article 22 further highlighted the prohibition of "military training of the natives for other than police purposes and the defence of territory," especially in middle Africa – apparently they were not considered sufficiently "mature," i.e., not as "cautious" and "wise" as the *Homo Europaeus* (particularly demonstrated between 1914 and 1945) in the use of weaponry.

40 Rajagopal, *International Law from Below*, p. 71.

41 A. Anghie, *Colonialism and the Birth of International Institutions: Sovereignty, Economy, and the Mandate Sy-*

“sovereignty” as the concept defined by Western countries, but rather a different form of “sovereignty” that maintained their dependence on their former colonial masters. For this, the Mandate System served to protect the “...interests of backward people, to promote their welfare and development, and to guide them toward self-government and, in certain cases, independence.”⁴²

The UN Charter did not challenge the “... fundamental tenets of legal positivism to which most international lawyers subscribed in 1945.”⁴³ However, this positivist credo of the United Nations has been subject to changes.⁴⁴ The Charter stresses the idea of development. In article 73, dealing with the “Declaration regarding non-self-governing territories,” the Charter employs a language that advocates modernization through the development of political institutions – supposedly following Western models of autonomous governance. Article 76 on the international trusteeship system also refers to the so-called trust territories (*i.e.*, the colonies) and calls for the promotion of “political, economic, social and educational advancement of the inhabitants”.⁴⁵

If we only take the League of Nations’ Covenant and the UN Charter as representative sources mirroring an image of man, we can easily identify that the language, the target group, the self-image and the intellectual-historical surrounding that encompassed the authors of these foundational documents reflect a European and North American, albeit internationalist, still genuinely Western perspective. The attempt to “humanize” the colonial system, to turn to socially acceptable rights and norms, and peaceful means for the international conduct of states, clearly refers to a truly European liberal understanding of world affairs, social relations and, last but not least, the very individual. Europeans and North Americans came to be accustomed to fixing the rights and duties of persons, entities and societies by (positive) law, which served as source of legitimation for a Western world order based on legal provisions benefiting the Westerners.

In general, international law was established by Europeans and has regarded the *Homo Europaeus* as both a basic understanding of the imagined individual and the standard addressee of international law that was then universalized as the desirable role model. In addition to the European-centered origins of international law, diplomacy as a concept and diplomatic etiquettes, rules, protocol provisions, etc., should also be reviewed with the aim to locate the imagined European.

stem of the League of Nations, in: New York University Journal of International Law and Politics, 34 (3), December 2002, p. 516.

42 Ibid., p. 523.

43 J. E. Alvarez, Legal Perspectives, p. 59.

44 Ibid., pp. 62/63.

45 Charter of the United Nations, signed on 26 June 1945, in San Francisco, at the conclusion of the United Nations Conference on International Organization.

International bureaucracies and norm-setting

The bodies of international organizations can be seen as "... first and foremost sovereignty-based institutions where rules, norms, principles, and procedures reflected and reinforced traditional Western statecraft."⁴⁶ Usually, international organizations consist of a permanent secretariat, which somewhat mirrors the executive at the national level of Western democracies, as well as a General Assembly, which to a certain extent resembles national parliaments.⁴⁷ Furthermore, a Secretary General or General Director heads the secretariat and serves as a principal official of the corresponding organization – sanctioned by the member states of the latter. An imagination of Western bureaucracy (and thus individual bureaucrats) seems to prevail that highlights rationality but also efficiency and effectiveness for the public servant; these concepts are clearly determined by European and North American standards, following a Weberian understanding of bureaucracy.

The bureaucracy is important, as IOs have a forceful norm-setting competence, which makes it more powerful than national bureaucracies due to the international (and thus potentially universal) field of application. Barnett and Finnemore hold that IOs as bureaucracies define norms and set standards, which influence the behavior of states⁴⁸ – here, I would add individuals, both within IO bureaucracies and those affected by their norms. For instance, the reports of the former UN Human Rights Commission, outlining shortcomings of governments and defining abuses and rights, exercised, at times, considerable impact as well as the "best practices" and "good governance" definitions shaping the policies of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank.⁴⁹ International organizations have facilitated the determination not only of the perpetrators of human rights violations, but have also defined human rights and measures to promote or protect them. In accordance, IOs form a model of how the world is composed and what the agendas for action are.⁵⁰ Another example are the structural adjustment policies of the IMF, which prescribed rigid liberalization programs on highly indebted Third World countries and thus implicitly imposed the Western notion of a *Homo economicus*⁵¹ in these regions. Another example is the construction of "economic rationality" by the World Bank and the attempt to "... transform existing institutions, attitudes, norms, and patterns of conduct."⁵²

46 D. J. Puchala/K. Verlin Laatikainen/R. A. Coate, *United Nations Politics. International Organization in a Divided World*. Upper Saddle River/ NJ 2007, p. 21.

47 See M. J. Peterson, General Assembly, in: Weiss and Daws (eds), *The Oxford Handbook on the United Nations*, p. 98.

48 M. Barnett and M. Finnemore, *Rules for the World. International Organizations in Global Politics*, Ithaca / London 2004.

49 Ibid., pp. 7, 9.

50 Ibid.

51 The *homo economicus* is the concept in several theories of the human as a rational-minded and self-interested actor who desires wealth, avoids unnecessary labor, and has the ability to make judgments towards those ends.

52 D. Williams, *Constructing the Economic Space: The World Bank and the Making of Homo Oeconomicus*, in: *Millennium, Journal of International Studies* 28 (1999), 1, pp. 97/98.

Barnett and Finnemore argue that the power of international organizations goes beyond regulation:

*IOs can also constitute the world as they define new categories of problems to be governed and create new norms, interests, actors, and shared social tasks. This constitutive power of IOs has not been explored or well understood by IR scholars but has profound consequences, among them a consistent tendency of IOs to create a world that subsequently licenses yet more intervention by IOs.*⁵³

Therefore, if the definitional and regulatory competences of IOs are much broader than usually recognized, and as bureaucracies they are both composed of and creators of rules,⁵⁴ is an image of man based on the constructed European the foundation of the standards and norms generated by international institutions?

Besides the internal rules making the bureaucracies work, there are rules that determine the bureaucrats' perception of the world: "Rules define, categorize, and classify the world."⁵⁵ Rational-legal authority accordingly represents IOs as it provides them with a form (bureaucracy) and enables them to proceed in specific ways (in general, "impersonal rule making").⁵⁶ One may argue that the standard international civil servant was supposed to internalize a conception of man that can be tentatively labeled the *Homo bureaucraticus*. The bureaucrats from the early IOs up through the personnel of the League of Nations were mostly inspired by a Western-liberal form of internationalism that sought to improve the world⁵⁷ and, thus, can be critically considered as driven by an "enlightened colonialism" or implicitly as a universal version of the "civilizing mission." Both the employee and the recipient of IO policies seem to be basically considered as a rational individual: rather obedient to rules set up at a higher level of hierarchy and seek to be efficient and effective. The human being, according to international organizations, must therefore ideally be respectful of human rights and basically be a *Homo economicus* – two essential concepts that are closely related to each other within the Western reference system based on market economy and democracy. For the Third World, these concepts should also turn into imperatives, which were linked to the concept of development.⁵⁸

53 Barnett and Finnemore, Rules for the World (note 48), p. 17.

54 Ibid., p. 18.

55 Ibid. "Their rules define shared tasks (like "development"), create and define new categories of actors (like "refugees"), and create new interests for actors (like "promoting human rights"). Ibid.

56 Ibid., p. 21.

57 See Herren, Internationale Organisationen seit 1865, pp. 43-48; A. L. S. Staples, The Birth of Development. How the World Bank, Food and Agriculture Organization, and World Health Organization Changed the World, 1945–1965, Kent/OH 2006, pp. 1-21.

58 See B. Rajagopal, International Law from Below'.

The international civil service and global standards

Designed after the British (League of Nations) and United States civil service (UN), the international civil service, first introduced by the League of Nations in 1919/20, mostly follows the Weberian ideal of the bureaucrat who establishes rules and norms for the imagined average citizen. Most literature on the so-called international civil service focuses on the employees' qualifications and capacities, the difficult question of independence from governments, their international status (including privileges and immunities), their efficiency and effectiveness, or the problem of corruption. No study seems to exist that inquires about the constructed "average" international civil servant as a supposedly Western concept. This is understandable as the information is hard to obtain and interviewees are very cautious about this subject.

The recruitment standards have differed among the various international institutions, although nowadays some common standards seem to prevail. In the earlier days, it was probably more difficult to hire people from non-Western regions, not only due to the lack of "appropriately qualified" candidates, but also simply because of deficient information on these opportunities in the corresponding regions. After the League of Nations' Covenant remained silent about the issue, the UN Charter states:

*The paramount consideration in the employment of the staff and in the determination of the conditions of service shall be the necessity of securing the highest standards of efficiency, competence, and integrity. Due regard shall be paid to the importance of recruiting the staff on as wide a geographical basis as possible.*⁵⁹

Here, we can identify the factors of efficiency and competence, obviously close to Weber's ideal bureaucrat, as the main criteria. The goal of geographical distribution is put into perspective twice, by the words "due regard" and "as wide as possible," while efficiency and competence seem to be uncontested core attributes of the international civil service. In the period after World War II, the UN system established a system of geographic distribution, which guaranteed optimal representation of the world's nations in the international civil service. This became increasingly important in the period of decolonization when newly independent countries demanded more say and better representation of their nationals in UN institutions. Later, the gender issue was added and quotas for women were established. In view of the lack of enough "qualified" candidates from some "less developed" countries, Honig held in 1954:

*While it may have been necessary to adopt the principle of equitable geographical distribution in order to secure the greatest possible universality of the organization, the principle itself is nevertheless one which may in practice militate against the attainment of that high degree of efficiency which is postulated in the Charter.*⁶⁰

59 UN Charter, article 101.3.

60 F. Honig, *The International Civil Service. Basic Problems and Contemporary Difficulties*, in: *International Affairs* (Royal Institute of International Affairs), 30 (1954), 2, p. 177.

In 1965, Winchmore emphasized that the

*... necessity to adapt the composition of the staff to the expanding membership of the United Nations has led since 1960 on the one hand to a greater emphasis on nationality on matters of recruitment and on the other hand to the more extensive use of the fixed-term contract as a means of ensuring greater flexibility in composition.*⁶¹

Thus, there seemed to be a conflict between the original core requirements (efficiency, competence, integrity) and geographical distribution. The need to introduce more Third World points of view seemed to prevail:

*For example, the Chairman of the Group of 77 for the [World Food] Conference, Edmundo Flores, was critical of the FAO's performance and proposed the use of more brown, black, and yellow functionaries instead of the Western Europeans who, he asserted, possessed an anachronistic world view...*⁶²

Besides the prevalence of European colonial languages (English, French and Spanish) in the UN system over Arabic, Chinese and Russian, changes of staff regulations, for instance, reflect debates on political correctness mainly discussed in Western societies ("best practice," for instance).⁶³ If we regard IOs as creators of global rules and standardization, the composition of the administration is noteworthy.

Akira Iriye accurately states that international cooperation emerged during the nineteenth century in order to establish common rules "... to standardize weights and measures, to adopt uniform postal and telegraphic rates, and to cope with the danger of communicable diseases."⁶⁴ Jürgen Osterhammel, however, correctly remarks that technical standardization took place but not everywhere; it was an extensive process, but not a global one as the individual function systems showed various levels of complexity and cultural and political resistance differed.⁶⁵ Above all, the first international organizations focused on the establishment of internationally valid norms regarding radio frequencies, shipping and air traffic routes, copyright, or health regulations. From the rather technical norms and standards set up in the nineteenth and early twentieth century on telecommunication, aviation frequencies or sea routes, which all addressed the interests of European customers, travelers, merchants, militaries or politicians, to the benevolent norms enshrined in human rights standards, gender equality, or good governance, Europeans were the driving force of these definitions, and the *Homo Europaeus* has always been at the center.

According to Ward, the establishment of a commonly accepted statistical system and of a universal framework for the collection and compilation of figures in conformity with the

61 C. Winchmore, The Secretariat: Retrospect and Prospect, in: International Organization, 19 (1965), 3, p. 626.

62 T. G. Weiss and R. S. Jordan, Bureaucratic Politics and the World Food Conference, in: World Politics, 28 (1976), 3, p. 429.

63 Interviews, New York City, September 2007.

64 Iriye, p. 10.

65 J. Osterhammel, Die Verwandlung der Welt. Eine Geschichte des 19. Jahrhunderts. München 2009, p. 731.

recognized professional standards at the international and national level was “one of the great and mostly unsung successes of the UN organization.”⁶⁶ The intellectual pioneers of the League of Nations, the International Labour Organisation, the UN Statistical Office and the UN system as such were confident that statistics served as the basis for decision-making. In order to “quantify the world appropriately,” it seemed crucial to set up general standards, homogeneous classifications and in particular generally accepted concepts to authorize the UN to assume an international mandate to gather global statistics.⁶⁷ In the early years of the UN, the US was a leading world power and seen as a “recognized statistical authority” with an impact on UN data policy: “The concepts of value added, growth, gross domestic product (GDP), and gross national product (GNP per capita) quickly became the hallmarks of economic progress.” Ward normatively concludes that the role of the UN regarding the international harmonization of statistical models and classifications “...has been impressive and invaluable.”⁶⁸ Rajagopal also refers to the collection of data and mentions two important innovations of the League of Nations Mandate System: First, these extensive data were *compared systematically* to draw lessons and formulate standards and principles in these areas. Comparative statistical and informational analysis, which is one of the essential prerequisites to global governance, was systematized in the Mandates. Second, as a corollary of this, a new “science of colonial administration” at the international level, based on a deductive and experimental method, was born.

This science of colonial administration can be regarded as the predecessor of what Rajagopal labels the “science of development,” which followed after 1945.⁶⁹

At the outset, when the UN consisted of only forty-six member countries, it inherited the priorities and agendas of the politically powerful and industrially advanced countries. It took time to shake off some of this influence and to turn more attention to providing statistical support to countries with weaker data capabilities.⁷⁰

Hence, the UN established its classification and statistical systems on the existing models of the richer and more politically influential countries – and the main task then seemed to be to bring the economically poorer countries to adopt these concepts, and less so to consider alternative classification schemes from the latter. Even before World War II, most national official data was collected in an incoherent manner, without much coordination and centralization. Likewise, there was no routine dissemination of the compiled data to the public.⁷¹ This made the UN’s task even more important to “quantify the world” – following a European model.⁷² In sum, it remains important to emphasize the

66 M. Ward, *Quantifying the World. UN Ideas and Statistics*. United Nations Intellectual History Project, Bloomington 2004, p. 2.

67 *Ibid.*, pp. 5sq.

68 *Ibid.*, p. 22.

69 Rajagopal, *International Law from Below*, p. 61.

70 Ward, *Quantifying the World*, p. 34.

71 *Ibid.*, p. 35.

72 See Rajagopal, *International Law from Below*, p. 52.

role of IOs with regard to the facilitation of internationally comparative statistics on measurements, preferences, and cultural and political attributes.

Example: The Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the right to development

From a postcolonial standpoint, Rajagopal argues that the human rights system after 1945 had its roots in the petition right of the League's Mandate System, which allowed people in the colonies to file complaints, albeit with different results. Although the Permanent Mandates Commission (PMC) cannot be judged as the governor of colonialism, "[t]he key aspect of the PMC, which is to be found in all latter petition mechanisms, is this: that, disputes/grievances from the mandate-inhabitants get converted into questions of institutional self-preservation and identity at the PMC."⁷³

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), issued on December 10, 1948 in the course of the establishment of the United Nations, clearly defines the human rights of the individual. It is a telling sign that the UDHR was adopted as a non-binding declaration and not as a compulsory legal instrument for nation-states because national sovereignty was considered more important. In its preamble, the Declaration refers to the "acts of barbarism" committed during the Second World War, from which the authors derive the necessity to strengthen each individual's basic rights. While the Second World War, initiated by Germany and mostly affecting European countries, serves as a point of reference here, the crimes of colonial powers are merely indirectly addressed in the Universal Declaration. Normand and Zaidi clearly state that the sources for the first draft versions of the Declaration can be labeled "exclusively western, and the overall paradigm was based on the Western model of individual rights."⁷⁴ Furthermore, these authors hold that the Declaration was evidently based principally on "Western philosophical models, legal traditions, and geopolitical imperatives (although strangely enough, the conventional view of human rights has still not come around to acknowledge the full implications of this fact)." Background materials were almost exclusively in English and all derived from the "democratic West;" Accordingly, the ideological basis was Western, liberal und individualistic.⁷⁵

The UDHR has the individual at its center – obviously a very European philosophical and political concept. In accordance, it hardly mirrors other images of man besides the *Homo Europaeus*. Although economic, social and cultural rights entered into the Declaration too, these concepts also trace back to Social Democratic concepts and Socialist beliefs, which are predominantly of European origin. The Declaration implicitly excludes other concepts of man from non-Western cultures – a criticism often brought up in debates regarding cultural relativism. Cultural relativists contest the universality

73 Ibid., pp. 67, 70.

74 R. Normand/S. Zaidi, *Human Rights at the UN. The Political History of Universal Justice*, Bloomington 2008, p. 140.

75 Ibid., p. 195.

of the Western human rights ideal: The extreme antithesis to positive international law is that political behavior – and with it the interpretation of human rights – depends on culture. Largely simplified, the individualistic image of the Western man is contrasted with a group- and community-oriented mentality of several non-Western societies in order to legitimize deviations from the notion of human rights.⁷⁶

Article 2 vests every human being with human rights, independent of his/her race, skin color, gender, language, religion, political or other convictions, national or social background, fortune, or origin. Here, the Declaration contrasts with the upcoming modernization theory, which clearly identified the economically poorer countries and their peoples as “underdeveloped.” These countries (and their inhabitants) should be promoted to “develop,” *i.e.*, follow the Western path of modernization, particularly regarding the economic dimension (“growth”). Directly speaking, an individual of the so-called “underdeveloped” regions seemed to be not (yet) acknowledged (in reality) as equal with Europeans or other Westerners, although that person officially enjoyed the same basic rights.

Article 23 of the UDHR goes beyond the classic rights, which protect the individual from undue interventions of the state, as it formulates the right to work and other economic and social rights, such as the creation of labor unions. Here, as well as in the following articles, it becomes obvious that the labor movement and Socialist thought inspired this view. However, the right to holiday and a proper standard of living (articles 24 and 25) could not really be considered as realistic claims especially for people in many economically poorer, non-Western regions. For this, article 28 is of interest: It proclaims the right (of the individual!) to a social and international order in which the aforementioned rights and freedoms can be fully attained. This section seems to anticipate the later demand for the just New International Economic Order put forward by speakers of the Third World beginning in the early 1970s.⁷⁷

Since the 1970s, a third generation of solidarity rights was pursued; this struggle took place especially within the UN system. Rights subsumed under the third generation include the right to development, the right to self-determination, the right to peace, the right to communicate, the right to be different, the right to a healthy and balanced environment, the right to benefit from the common heritage of mankind and the right to humanitarian assistance.⁷⁸ Together with the solidarity rights approach published by UNESCO in 1977, the new conception was worked out during a UNESCO meeting of

76 L. Kühnhardt, *Die Universalität der Menschenrechte*. Bonn 19912, p. 135. For instance, the Indian caste (*varna*) system and the *dharma* duties contradict with the universal human rights of the individual. However, the Indian struggle for independence employed human rights to fight the colonial rulers. See *ibid.*, pp. 158-174.

77 United Nations General Assembly, Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order, Resolution 3201 (S-VII). Adopted without vote at the Sixth Special Session, 2229th plenary meeting, May 1, 1974. *The American Journal of International Law*, Vol. 68, No. 4 (Oct., 1974), pp. 798-801.

78 The precise origin of the third generation concept is indistinct, although it is believed to have been raised for the first time in 1971. The Senegalese M'Baye was the first who tried to define the right to development. See: K. M'Baye, *Le droit au développement comme un droit de l'homme*, in: *Revue des droits de l'homme: droit international et droit comparé* (1972), pp. 505-534.

experts (1978) and detailed in the report of the International Commission for the Study of Communication Problems; it was also the subject of an international colloquium in Mexico in 1980.⁷⁹ The right to be different and to development found expression in the Declaration on Race and Racial Prejudice adopted by the General Conference of UNESCO in November 1978.⁸⁰ Alston opposed the third human rights generation as it threatened to subordinate the first two, while he considered the rights of the third generation as, partly, already included in the previous generations:

*In many respects the concept of third generation rights smacks rather too strongly of a tactical endeavour to bring together, under the rubric of human rights, many of the most pressing concerns on the international agenda and to construct an artificial international consensus in favour of human rights by appealing to the 'favourite' concerns of each of the main geopolitical blocs. In this respect the concept could be viewed as the human rights equivalent of a caricature of Uncle Sam, looking like a bear, but dressed only in a Gandhian loin cloth.*⁸¹

Besides the criticism from international law on the concept, other concerns were also brought forward: A more important criticism holds that the third generation of solidarity rights represents an approach that is fundamentally detached from the idea of individual human rights. Kühnhardt finds that this results in an ideologization and new meaning of the human rights idea, which blatantly contradicts the latter's civil-liberal genesis.⁸² A new order of worldwide economic relations between industrialized and "developing" countries was regarded as the precondition to realize the right to development. In 1986, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution mentioning the right to development as a human right.⁸³ The Declaration on the Right to Development declares in article 2.1, "... the human person is the central subject of development and should be the active participant and beneficiary of the right to development." Besides building a bridge between Western individualism in the understanding of human rights and the solidarity rights of the third generation, the proponents of the right to development failed to design an alternative concept to the *Homo Europaeus*: Here, the individualism and Western-focused bias of the international economic system faces opposition, but the advocates of the right to development passed up the opportunity to question equally Western concepts as "development," thus implicitly aiming for an imagined individual according to the *Homo Europaeus*, whose main attributes here might be "wealthy" (in contrast to "poor") and "modern" (in contrast to "backward") (see article 1.2). In accordance, the declaration implicitly calls on economically rich countries to assist "developing

79 P. Alston, A third generation of solidarity rights: Progressive development or obfuscation of international human rights law?, in: Netherlands International Law Review, 29 (1982), p. 309.

80 Ibid., pp. 307-309.

81 Ibid., pp. 311, 322.

82 Kühnhardt, Die Universalität der Menschenrechte, pp. 250 sq.

83 Only the United States voted against this document, while Belgium, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Israel, Luxemburg, Malawi and Great Britain abstained. Ibid., p. 256.

countries” to “foster their comprehensive development” (article 4.2).⁸⁴ Here, the same tenor prevails as in the Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order in 1974, which also stressed the need for economically poorer countries to “develop” and the richer countries’ obligation to support their endeavors.⁸⁵ This strikes a chord with the idea of the redistribution of wealth rather than presenting an alternative to the existing system.

So the question remains, is the formulation of a third generation of human rights essentially the non-Western attempt to introduce something of their own into the European-dominated international (legal) system by which the Third World implicitly accepts the latter, or is it rather a clever way to use the West’s legal tradition to beat them with their own weapons? I think both explanations are partly true. The third generation is not a truly non-Western counter-concept, although the original aims targeted the *Homo Europaeus* and Western individualism (and the maintenance of the international status quo) as hitherto largely exclusive references.

Example: Health policy of the World Health Organization

In this section, I will inquire into the dissemination of powerful medicine models based on specific cultural conceptions of health and medicine. Besides a look at prevailing medicine concepts and practices, the question emerges as to what extent the health policy of the World Health Organization (WHO) and its predecessors focused on particular populations/sections of populations, or specific problems, and which interests formed the basis of this orientation.

I regard scientific or Western medicine as the dominant concept for international organizations. Western medicine can be associated with the concepts of hospital and laboratory, which together constitute the two elements of scientific medicine still dominating international health policies.⁸⁶ Here, the treatment of diseases is the priority; that is, Western medicine cherishes the idea of health, which largely defines health as the absence of disease. Furthermore, the academically trained physician as a scientific (*i.e.*, considered as rational and thus superior) expert is granted inherent authority. In accordance, we can interpret the Western physician as the prevailing *Homo Europaeus*. On the other side of the spectrum, concepts of non-Western (often also addressed as “traditional”) medicine that concentrate more on holistic approaches to health have often been disparaged by numerous representatives of Western medicine as “unscientific.”⁸⁷

84 United Nations General Assembly, Declaration on the Right to Development, Adopted by General Assembly resolution 41/128 of 4 December 1986.

85 United Nations General Assembly, Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order (1974). See articles 4(i), (l) and (r).

86 A. Cunningham/B. Andrews (eds.), *Western Medicine as contested knowledge*. Manchester 1997, p. 8.

87 See *Ibid.*, pp. 24-45.

The World Health Organization (WHO) was created in 1946 in the aftermath of World War II. Unlike its predecessors, the WHO was no longer an institution brought into line with European interests, but it maintained the orientation on Western medicine as the starting point for the organization's policy.⁸⁸ Due to the prevailing belief in modernization, the WHO favored the "doctrine" of technical assistance: The organization trained medical assistants in former colonies, sent out advisors and launched big campaigns to eradicate great plagues such as malaria or smallpox. According to Lee, the ideology and activities of the WHO between 1948 and the early 1970s mirrored the paternalistic views of colonial times. The organization was seen as at war with diseases; thus its task was to impart knowledge to guide the people in the former colonies towards a Western model of society.⁸⁹

In the 1960s, many newly independent African countries joined the WHO – the majority of which struggled with big economic, social and health problems.⁹⁰ The new elites saw themselves mostly aligned with the West and thus followed the prevailing paradigm of development. In contrast, the "indigenous way" was seen as "backward."⁹¹

The division of labor within the UN system resulted in a dissociation of health questions from the broader social and economic progress. Therefore, WHO and UNICEF (United Nations Children's Fund), FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization of the UN) and UNDP (United Nations Development Program) hardly cooperated.⁹² Due to the fact that the endeavors of WHO and UNICEF followed biomedical methods, the connection between health and social and economic development was rarely stressed. This narrow interpretation of health as merely the freedom from sickness seemed to contradict the definition contained in the WHO's Constitution:⁹³ "Health is a state of complete physical, mental and social well-being and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity."⁹⁴

During the WHO's first thirty years, Western or Western-trained/-oriented physicians dominated the knowledge order of the organization and controlled the practice of the health politics. As the Western concept of "world health" was not seriously challenged, Lee speaks of a process of adaptation at the international level for which the WHO served as a stage, an instrument and a regulator for the transfer of knowledge to non-Western countries.⁹⁵ It is important to stress the distinction made between Europeans and non-Europeans: In contrast to Europeans, the non-European peoples were rather

88 See *ibid.*, pp. 5sq.

89 S. Lee, WHO and the developing world: the contest for ideology, in: *Ibid.*, p. 26.

90 Y. Beigbeder, L'Organisation Mondiale de la Santé. Avec la collaboration de Mahyar Nashat, Marie-Antoinette Orsini et Jean-François Tiercy. Paris 1995, p. 35; Lee, WHO and the developing world, p. 26.

91 Lee, WHO and the developing world, p. 26.

92 R. M. Packard, Post-Colonial Medicine. In: R. Cooter/J. Pickstone (eds.), *Medicine in the Twentieth Century*. Amsterdam 2000, p. 103.

93 *Ibid.*, p. 104.

94 Constitution of the World Health Organization, Preamble, New York, 22 July 1946. See M. Brady, S. Kunitz, and D. Nash, WHO's definition? Australian Aborigines, conceptualisations of health and the World Health Organisation, in: L. Marks and M. Worboys (eds.), *Migrants, Minorities and Health. Historical and contemporary studies*. London/New York 1997, p. 272.

95 Lee, WHO and the developing world, p. 24.

dealt with as anonymous masses and, in case of doubt, also forced to mass vaccinations, for example.⁹⁶

In the 1970s, endeavors to challenge the Western dominance internationally, thus also within IOs, condensed. The consideration of the problem of poverty in non-Western societies became more important, although, as critics say, much remained rhetoric and it has always been added to reports or resolutions as an afterthought.⁹⁷ With regard to health politics, we can speak of a historical shift. The entry of the People's Republic of China into the WHO in 1973 and the popularity of the concept of "barefoot doctors" – health workers trained in traditional Chinese and biomedicine to serve the rural population⁹⁸ – figured as important factors that contributed to a re-orientation of the WHO's health policies.

In 1974, the first oil price shock occurred, which resulted in the demand of the UN General Assembly for a New International Economic Order to give the (economically) poorer countries a more just share of the world trade and wealth. More than ever before, the connection between health and development in all its forms was emphasized.⁹⁹ The role of the Soviet Union's leadership was decisive on the path to the Declaration of Alma Ata in 1978 ("Health for all in the year 2000"), which called for a primary health care.¹⁰⁰ The Declaration holds that the existing "crass inequality" of health conditions, particularly between "developed" and "developing" countries, as well as within countries, was seen as politically, socially and economically unacceptable. Economic and social development, based on a New International Economic Order,⁹⁸ was assigned fundamental importance for the fullest achievement of health for all and to reduce the gap of the health situation between "developed" and ¹⁰¹"developing" countries.¹⁰² In other words, a horizontal, basic health care model challenged the vertical, disease-centered approach. The *Primary Health Care* (PHC) approach called for investments in basic health infrastructure and at the local level. PHC strengthened the role of traditional medicine and also emphasized the necessary participation of the local population in poorer regions in health planning and the implementation of the corresponding policies. Finally, PHC recognized that it was essential to fight the social and economic causes for a bad health situation.¹⁰³ Therefore, we can regard the rise of a sort of *Homo extra-europaeus* – in contrast to the construction

96 See S. S. Amrith, *Decolonizing International Health. India and Southeast Asia, 1930-65*. Houndsmills/New York 2006; Interviews, New-Delhi, March 2008.

97 Interviews, New Delhi, March 2008.

98 See F. Bray, *The Chinese Experience*, in: R. Cooter/J. Pickstone (eds.), *Companion to Medicine in the Twentieth Century*. London/New York 2003, pp. 719-738, here: pp. 727, 729.

99 Beigbeder, *L'OMS*, p. 23. See, for instance, V.T. Heart Gunaratne, *Voyage Towards Health*. Regional Office for South-East Asia, The World Health Organization. New Delhi 1980, p. 5.

100 Lee, *WHO and the developing world*, p. 39.

101 Pannenberg discussed a New International Health Order, linked to the NIEO. See C. O. Pannenberg, *A New International Health Order. An Inquiry into the International Relations of World Health and Medical Care*. Diss., Groningen 1978.

102 Declaration of Alma-Ata. International Conference on Primary Health Care, Alma-Ata, USSR, 6-12 September 1978.

103 Packard, 'Post-Colonial Medicine', p. 108.

of “anonymous masses” of non-Europeans with a positive connotation – on the agenda of the WHO as a counter-concept to the imagined European as the main addressee of world health policies.

One key concept of the PHC approach was the (rural) health worker that implicitly weakened the elevated position of academically trained physicians. In a document from the WHO's archives, a fitting comparison with regard to the basic health tasks to be offered in the country-side is provided: “If we take an analogy from transport we can say that we want bus drivers to drive buses and not professors of transportation.”¹⁰⁴ Although others, such as healers or midwives, were given a role, (Western) physicians seemed mostly to be eager to maintain their dominant position in the health area, despite the acknowledged need to adjust it to more basic health needs.¹⁰⁵ The selection of health workers in rural areas was difficult because no rigid and universally accepted rules could be set up. Here, a general problem of the PHC approach became visible: While emphasizing the local approach to local health needs, the model aspired to be accepted as a general concept on a global scale. This implied that PHC as a global conception always needed a regional and a local definition as circumstances and cultural, socio-economic conditions varied considerably. The main problem seemed to be that PHC as a challenge to universally applicable Western medicine also attempted to become a universal concept. This implicit contradiction was used by the PHC's opponents, who then seemed to heed the WHO's wishes for concrete rules and established main concerns with selective programs that, as such, went against the loosely defined PHC model by setting priorities.

Broader connections between health and the socio-economic general conditions found almost no consideration in practice during the 1980s – also as a consequence of the conservative tendencies in the course of the North-South and East-West conflicts.¹⁰⁶ Shortly after the meeting at Alma Ata, the idealism assigned with PHC was questioned and the concept was criticized as “unrealistic.” The discrediting process began in 1979 at a small conference in Bellagio (Italy), sponsored by the Rockefeller Foundation with support from the World Bank. The conference proposed a Selective Primary Health Care concept (SPHC), which comprised pragmatic, reasonable technical innovations that were limited in their field of application and were easy to observe and to evaluate. Thanks to UNICEF especially, this SPHC was operationalized under the abbreviation GOBI.¹⁰⁷ According

104 Second draft of the Brochure for the Conference in Alma Ata 1978 (?), without date (WHO files), p. 8.

105 Memorandum, From R.H. Strudwick, FHE, to Dr. A. El Bindari Hammad, PHC; Dr. S. Litsios, PHC; Dr. A. Benyoussef, PHC; Dr. A. Zahre, CDS; Dr. D. Tejada-de-Rivero, ADG. Subject: Primary Health Care Brochure, 8 August 1977 (WHO files).

106 Here we can refer to the conservative governments of US Presidents Reagan and Bush, the aggravation of the East-West conflict in the early 1980s, the oil crisis in 1979 as well as the new orientation of several non-Western countries after the outbreak of the debt crisis in 1982. The electoral victory of Margaret Thatcher in Great Britain, the revolutions in Nicaragua and Iran and the invasion of the Soviet army in Afghanistan also contributed to this change.

107 T. M. Brown/ M. Cueto/ E. Fee, The World Health Organization and the Transition from ‘International’ to ‘Global’ Public Health, JLI Working Paper 1-1, A Joint Learning Initiative: Human Resources for Health and Development, March 2004, pp. 11sq. GOBI means: Growth Monitoring, Oral Rehydration, Breast Feeding, Immunisation.

to Packard, similar to the campaigns of the 1950s and 1960s to eradicate Malaria and other epidemic diseases, SPHC did not consider the root causes of poor health. The stress on local participation of the PHC approach was abandoned. Socioeconomic causes for health problems were again – like in the first decades of the WHO's existence – mostly neglected: Health was once more defined as the absence of disease.¹⁰⁸ There were several factors that led to the restoration of Western models in the WHO's politics: Accompanying a general conservative change of atmosphere in the early 1980s and the diminishing solidarity among Third World countries in the wake of the debt crisis, there was a lack of support from Western donors, fierce opposition by the pharmaceutical industry and physicians' associations, as well as several problems with the implementation of PHC programs.

With regard to health policies of the WHO, the *Homo Europaeus* was thus challenged particularly in the 1970s and faced a modification benefiting non-Western images of man, but through the powerful and subtle intervention of Western countries seemed to have survived in a refined form.

Conclusions

In the introduction, the question was raised as to whether the assumption in postcolonial studies implying a differentiated understanding of nations, identity, culture, etc., can be transferred to the context of international organizations and their prevailing image of man. To a certain extent, this can be done. The main features (international law, diplomacy, bureaucracy, education, recruitment, concepts such as “good governance,” etc.) of international organizations implicitly refer to a certain type of idealized civil servant as an agent of progress. We can identify the *Homo Europaeus* as the Western *Homo bureaucratiscus*, who has to live (or at least respect) all the presupposed characteristics of an IO employee. It becomes clearer if we look at the concrete policies of IOs. The standard themes of the outgoing twentieth century illustrated the globally prevailing image of man: global governance, rule of law, democracy, human rights, intellectual property, etc. To a certain degree, all of these concepts refer to an internationalized and enlightened European. Although these ideas certainly contain achievements for large parts of the world's population, it can still be beneficial to review them from a postcolonial perspective.

In accordance, the universal claim of international law, human rights, Western medicine, etc., stem from the Western-liberal belief in social and economic progress, which implicitly perpetuates a form of “enlightened colonialism” as the “advanced” West is seen as the role model – despite the benevolent motives behind these endeavors.

To what extent is the very conception of IOs based on an image of man dominated by the *Homo Europaeus*? The conception of the initial IOs, but also to a certain extent the UN system, are clearly based on an image of man influenced by *Homo Europaeus*. However,

108 Packard, ‘Post-Colonial Medicine’, p. 109.

this view was expanded, although some “European” origins still prevail. One might further concede that many non-Western IO employees were trained in the “West” and thus became somehow “Westernized” – and implicitly the very concept of *Homo Europaeus* experienced a further deterritorialization. However, there is no clear-cut dichotomy separating non-Western and “Western” staff members, as both have modified the standard role model of the international public servant. Additionally, the “West,” *i.e.*, particularly Europe and North America, have also continued to adopt external influences. However, although the bureaucracy, diplomacy, staff regulations, etc., have been modernized, the *Homo Europaeus* as a blueprint is still visible. All the changes happened within the pre-defined model – postcolonial criticisms on Weberian bureaucracy, labor understood as “paid labor,” codes of conduct or the influence and bias of standards, norms and statistics have hardly had any serious impact on the very concept of international organizations. A consistent postcolonial counter-concept to the *Homo Europaeus*-based IO system as such has not been outlined. Although Western and non-Western cultures cannot be sharply separated, as most cultures rather progress(ed) through diffusion with others, one can note the maintenance of a more refined Western order organized through IOs.

Were the major policy areas covered by IOs also designed after the *Homo Europaeus* as a blueprint and directed to the “European” as a standard addressee? Development has not only served as an ideological umbrella to bring non-Western societies “progress,” but also to maintain a Western-dominated approach (and world order) and was hardly confronted with fundamental challenges. The concept of development implies a distinction between Western societies (“developed”) and “catching up” or “developing” societies, which by and large should follow Western models to reach (mostly economic) prosperity, but also other advances such as good health and human rights. The examples of human rights and health have shown that the *Homo Europaeus* used to be the blueprint of the original IO policies and then became challenged by alternative concepts – New International Economic Order, third human rights generation, and Primary Health Care. To some extent, a hybridization took place, although the Western model has always been the basis of changing imaginations.

It is a telling sign that alternative, non-Western concepts that challenged the “imagined European” as the dominant image of man for IO policies still moved within the reference systems that had originally produced the *Homo Europaeus*: The very concept of development/ modernization, based on markets and the *Homo economicus* was less questioned than the existing unfair conditions of the trade system; the third generation of human rights implicitly accepted the notion and thus also the first two rights generations; and the Primary Health Care approach did not dispute the “world health policy” fundamentally, although it challenged the prevailing Western dominance. To be clear, no alternative reference systems were set up in a coherent form.

Can we identify different phases of the *Homo Europaeus* in international organizations? In general, various phases of European domination can roughly be identified: The first phase is direct colonial rule in the nineteenth century during which IOs set norms and standards to facilitate European world trade. In the nineteenth century, the European

dominance and thus implicitly the *Homo Europaeus* as the prevailing image of man in IOs remained uncontested. This was also reflected in the predominant European membership of the initial organizations.

In the second phase, the first half of the twentieth century, the geographical diversity in international institutions increased, but the European still served as the largely undisputed main reference. The Mandate System of the League of Nations sanctioned the civilizing missions of European colonial powers. The colonies were no longer dominated for exploitation but rather to assist their populations towards self-government and to promote economic, political and social progress. The League of Nations and the United Nations Organization seemed to be new, but with regard to the image of man shaping its institutional “self-image,” the “imagined European” remained dominant.

In the third phase, the UN system internalized modernization theory and prescribed the development doctrine: The industrialized countries should help “developing countries” to become like rich countries through development aid. Thus the UN implicitly instructed non-Western countries to follow the economically successful Western way of life, including the behavior of a *Homo Europaeus* as *Homo modernus* and *Homo economicus*. Consequently, previous European endeavors to civilize the still barbaric “others” turned into a universal civilizing mission with IOs as the main civilizers.

Fourthly, after the decolonization phase in the 1960, non-Western criticism arose, but it was less a frontal opposition against Western values as such than it was a demand for a fairer (not an entirely different!) international economic system and for more financial support to build up nations after the Western model. The creation of UNCTAD in 1964 as the first IO established by Third World countries constituted a symbolic step, but despite some rhetoric, the Western orientation regarding concepts (development) and terminology persisted. The demand for a New International Economic Order in 1974, the call for a third generation of (solidarity) human rights (including the right to development) and the rise of the Primary Health Care concept that defied Western medicine can be regarded as challenges of Western predominance.

In the fifth phase, due to the conservative wave in the early 1980s and the debt crisis, the seemingly united front of Third World countries faced new challenges. The alternative approaches lost impact – also as a result of a more or less fierce opposition against these by Western countries. It was again the latter that had the most say in the Bretton Woods organizations on which many economically poorer and indebted countries depended, rather than on the UN institutions.

In sum, as regards some IO policy areas, we can state that the prevailing *Homo Europaeus* was challenged in the 1960s and 1970s, however this was not the case regarding the imagined European as a concept for the very IOs as such. I would argue that a more de-territorialized and “diversified” *Homo Europaeus* still functions as a basic reference system for the structure, the recruitment policies, the organization culture and the institutional “identity” or “management culture” of IOs in general. All the new concepts that have been introduced (gender mainstreaming, best practice, transparency obligations, anti-corruption policies, etc.) have their origin in Western societies. Although an intercultural

“filter” may have modified and adapted these to the international context, the very idea of the ideal IO employee – certainly not always corresponding to reality – is still an internationalized, inter-culturally adept public servant who speaks at least English, has a college degree and is able to “work” efficiently and effectively.

Is the *Homo Europaeus* still the central reference of IOs and their policies, or is it the result of a continuous blending of concepts passed through an “ideological strainer”? While standardization, the *Homo bureaucraticus*, *Homo economicus*, the belief in statistics, etc., have not been challenged fundamentally, in various policy areas non-Western countries have tried to alter the *Homo Europaeus* as the basic concept of man in IO policies. The outline of international organizations has changed, but a modified or “cosmopolitanized” *Homo Europaeus* is still implicitly at the center of their very conception. IO policies, however, have been more contested. Here, a finer “strainer” may have been in use; regarding the fabric of IOs as such, the ideological filter was rather wide-meshed.

Risk Assessors and Bio-Participants: *Homo Europaeus* in Contemporary Nutrition and Health Research

Susanne Bauer / Christine Kleiber-Bischof

RESÜMEE

Dieser Beitrag untersucht die Konstitution des *Homo Europaeus* durch die Wissensgenerierung im Feld Ernährung und Gesundheit. Hierzu fokussieren wir die konkreten Arbeitsweisen, Kategorisierungen und Standardisierungen in der biomedizinischen und gesundheitswissenschaftlichen Forschung sowie deren Differenzproduktion. Wir folgen den wissenschaftlichen Verfahren, durch die das „Europäische“ als performative Kategorie in Gesundheitswissenschaft und Präventionspolitik hervorgebracht, kritisiert, hinterfragt und erneuert wird. Die demografisch-epidemiologische Erhebung des Europäischen wird dabei weniger als Realität abbildend sondern als Realität hervorbringend untersucht – insbesondere im Hinblick auf ihr Neu-Konfigurieren des Verständnisses von Bürgerschaft. Hierfür spielen technokratische Praktiken der Risikoabschätzung sowie neue Formen der Arbeit und Partizipation an der Wissensbildung eine zentrale Rolle. In den Verfahren der Wissensproduktion selbst konstituiert sich der *Homo Europaeus* nicht zuletzt als Datenproduzent und -konsument.

European intervention trials, European nutrient databases and European nutrigenomics networks – such are the biomedical infrastructures that convey a sense of a *European* science of nutrition and health. Beyond the *EUropeanness* of its organizational networks, these biomedical projects also produce segmentations of European populations in terms of biological difference, *e.g.* in statements such as, “half of the Europeans express no GSTM1 enzyme” or “nearly half of the Europeans are slow acetylators.”¹ These com-

1 Annual Report of the German Institute of Human Nutrition, 1997/1998, pp. 52-53.

munications perform the “European” as at least one among many reference categories in biomedical research. However, late 20th century biomedical research does not envision this “European” as made up by typological characteristics, but rather along sets and segments of statistical frequencies. Often, a host of differences within, rather than any unifying characteristics, are exposed. Beyond addressing the “European” explicitly, much of the actual production of the “European” is rather implicit. Key mechanisms here include the effects of EU-wide standardizations of knowledge production, and the stabilization of a universalized rationality as well as a certain *habitus* of the European citizen and consumer.

This article examines the production, imagination and reification of a contemporary *Homo Europaeus* at several levels: While there is a somehow presupposed and at times bio-statistically described “European” on the one hand, there is a continued re-emergence of the “European” produced at a bureaucratic level of the European Union harmonization processes on the other hand. We will describe some features of how this “European” is configured as risk manager and bio-participant in the field of nutrition and health, in particular, in a research setting of nutritional epidemiology.

Much of biomedical research has been driven by “applied” research fields, such as “nutrition and health”. Technologies of sequencing and bio-banking have prompted a host of sub-disciplines and approaches. These emerging research fields frame nutrition and health in terms of risk factors and markers that have emerged from genomic technologies, such as nutritional genomics, transcriptomics, proteomics, metabolomics, and bio-informatics,² to name a few of these highly specialized, technology-bound research areas. Beyond the techniques of molecular biology, formalizations of nutrition studies take place in population studies of “modern epidemiology”³. We refer to the approach of risk factor epidemiology as extended laboratory of epidemiological studies that include surveys, observational studies and prevention trials conducted in defined samples of the population.

Today, millions of people in Europe participate in epidemiological studies. Epidemiological studies often include large samples of the population in defined geographic areas and collect individual data on lifestyle and dietary habits. Moreover, they ask participants to undergo basic physical examinations and consent to make their medical records accessible to the study. While at the collective level, epidemiological reasoning is part of a culture of statistical risk assessment, these practices do not go without reconfiguring the ways in which the body, health and disease are understood and concepts of being a citizen-participant and a (potential) patient conceptualized and lived. In order to understand these regimes of knowledge generation, we examine the emergent *Homo Europaeus* as a result of the actual research set-up and practices.

2 These terms stand for emerging fields of biomedical research in the postgenomic age, i.e., the era after completion of the human genome project. Here, the focus is not only on genes but also on, e.g., proteins (proteomics) and on functional understanding and the complexity of epigenetic mechanisms.

3 “Modern epidemiology” is defined as “the study of distributions and determinants of health and disease in populations and subpopulations,” see J.M. Last, *Dictionary of Epidemiology*. New York 2001.

This article broadens the perspective to include the more implicit processes of how the contemporary *Homo Europaeus* is constituted, as individuals and groups become subject to and engage with practices and processes labeled “EUropean.” We explore how research into nutrition and health produces the “European” both in generating scientific knowledge about a European population and in developing and performing a “European approach” within “global” biomedicine. Recent research into the history of ‘the European’ has mostly focused on social constructions of the *Homo Europaeus* in institutions and specific policy settings.⁴ Social scientists and anthropologists have examined how “eating and drinking are acts of identification, differentiation and integration, particularly in the social areas of ethnicity and national identity.”⁵ These studies describe eating and drinking cultures as key to the negotiation of belonging to a certain group or imagined community. In our case, we ask how eating and drinking of the “European” is transformed into an object of quantitative knowledge production. In other words, we explore how contemporary biomedical sciences make sense of nutrition and health and how, in this process, they reconfigure and perform the “European.” By looking closely at the methods of recruitment, data collecting and risk assessments, this approach can highlight not only the reconfiguration of notions of food and health, but also focus the re-territorializations that take place in relation to the contemporary *Homo Europaeus*. The modes of knowledge production and consumption discussed in this article are by no means only European, but they are *made European* in the ways they are performed and enacted within a European infrastructure.

This article is divided into four sections: we will first look into the making of data infrastructures by researchers and participants of a multicentre European study; second, we follow the research practices from recruitment to statistical modeling. We then discuss how, in global research consortia of contemporary nutritional epidemiology, Europeans are construed in opposition to non-Europeans; we trace the categories of interests to epidemiology, along which subpopulations are constructed. Finally, we look into health policy contexts for the ways in which the study results circulate back to “European” societies, *e.g.*, in nutrition and health monitoring and in “targeted” public health interventions.

1. Doing the epidemiological assemblage: researchers and participants

For the exploration of epidemiological studies, we found inspiration in the concept of “assemblage”⁶ to think about the heterogeneity of epidemiological practices. In the heterogeneous assemblage of nutritional epidemiology otherwise disparate contexts and vari-

4 L. Bluche, V. Lipphardt, K. Patel, *Der Europäer – ein Konstrukt. Wissensbestände, Diskurse, Praktiken*, Göttingen 2009.

5 T.M. Wilson, Food, drink and identity in Europe: Consumption and the construction of local, national and cosmopolitan culture, in: *European Studies*, 22, 2006, pp. 11–29, here p. 26.

6 G. Deleuze, G., F. Guattari, *A thousand plateaus*, London, 1988; P. Rabinow, *Anthropos Today. Reflections on modern equipment*. Princeton 2003.

ables meet, when exposure data on nutrition, genetics, and lifestyle are examined for statistical associations with disease frequencies. While data variables from different contexts can become statistical “risk factors”, the conceptual matrix of disease causation is under incessant negotiation. In their inherent knowledge economy, successful epidemiological studies need to be open enough to integrate new variables and generate novel etiological hypotheses. In that sense, they function as productive research systems,⁷ as constellations within which new research questions can emerge. Epidemiological research systems include the study designs, questionnaires, protocols, collaborators, institutions, repositories of data and samples, offices, hardware and software. Our case – the EPIC study, a European multicenter study in nutritional epidemiology – was implemented in the early 1990s with combined funding that included a major contribution from the European Union’s, then new, public health research agenda of 1992, as part of the program “Europe Against Cancer.” The overall number of participants from 12 European countries amounts to more than half a million. In what follows, we refer mostly to two centers in Germany and in Denmark, where our empirical research took place. In this first section, we approach the epidemiological assemblage through its human actors – researchers and participants.

A principle investigator describes the European dimension of the study first and foremost as a “fantastic long-term collaboration of very different people, opinions and perspectives over 20 years,” and as a highly productive project in terms of publications, produced by many working groups using the data resources for their specific topics. Thus it is the research infrastructure on the one hand that is European, due to its financial support for infrastructure building, which provided research groups in Europe with the means to set up and implement a population study using standardized techniques. On the other hand, in the very process of this research, “Europeans” become a specific population targeted by biomedical research. Hence, “EUrope” is more than a funding institution, the European population is both the “object” of research, as well as the “funder” and, later, the targeted “consumer” of results. Professional practitioners of risk assessment represent one contemporary version of the *Homo Europaeus* as risk assessors aiming at optimizing European population health.

Managed encounters: recruitment and participation

The first contact between researchers and participants takes place during recruitment.⁸ Participants are contacted with a letter of invitation that introduces the aims of the study and proposes an appointment. In both the former East German study center and in Denmark, the study was presented in public as mainly a local project. In the German case, this was a deliberate consideration in the early 1990s, addressing the recent change in the economic system after the reunification. As a researcher from the German study

7 We use the term “research system” in analogy to the notion of “experimental systems” introduced in H.-J. Rheinberger, *Towards a theory of epistemic things. Synthesizing proteins in the test tube*. Stanford 1997.

8 In most centers, the “sampling procedure” for the study drew on national civil registration systems.

ponders, confronting participants with the idea that “now it is about Europe” just four years after the reunification would hardly have worked. In the Danish case, this was different and the emphasis was on the local level⁹ and the study was given the Danish title “Kost, kræft og helbred (Diet, Cancer and Health)”. Like the other Scandinavian EPIC projects, it was first and foremost conducted as a local study, but also embedded in the European network from the beginning. The fact that this was a multicenter study at the European level did not play a major role in communications for recruitment, but was an important feature for the researchers from the beginning. To epidemiologists, it was clear that only very large numbers would allow investigations into small differences in dietary habits and their role in disease causation, particularly in rare cancers and the then emergent field of gene-lifestyle interactions. Framing this process in the terms of actor-network-theory, the *interessement*¹⁰ that draws researchers to the study is in the database as empirical resource for biomedical research. The negotiations of *interessement* for participants are less straightforward and those agreeing to participate often expect benefits and, even though at no point promised by the study, some diagnostic results that would be relevant to their own health.

Within Europe, the working infrastructures in which the epidemiological studies are embedded differ depending on context and on country and region – this was also the case for the EPIC study. As to the situation in Germany, recruitment for epidemiological studies is generally viewed as difficult and epidemiologists are often struggling with low response rates.¹¹ The implications of low and differential response are a major concern as to the validity of any epidemiological study, leading to different strategies of framing the study in public communications. In both cases, the fact that the study was part of a European multicenter study was not emphasized. In the East German case, the Institute for Nutrition Research that conducted the study had already been renowned in East Germany before 1989. Officially recognized in the “Blue List” of those research institutes selected to obtain continued state funding while much of the East German research infrastructure was closed down, the institute stood to some extent for continuity, which was valued by residents in the region and local nutrition scientists. Thus for participants from the region, the research institute, with the inception of a new study in 1993, gave a sense of stability beyond the radical political and economic restructuring that led to disappearance of nearly the entire former societal institutions of the GDR.

In Denmark the inception of the study started as an entirely local project under the title “Kost, Kræft og Helbred” (Diet, Cancer, and Health) with Danish funding. That there

9 When the network was started, Danish epidemiologists knew that they could secure local funds for such a study.

10 For the terms “interessement” and “enrolment” as part of translation processes, see: M. Callon, Some Elements of a Sociology of Translation: Domestication of the Scallops and the Fishermen of Saint Brieuc Bay, in: J. Law (ed.) *Power, Action and Belief: a new Sociology of Knowledge?* Sociological Review Monograph. London 1986, pp. 196-233.

11 U. Latza, A. Stang, M. Bergmann, A. Kroke, S. Sauer, R. Holle, P. Kamtsiuris, C. Terschüren, W. Hoffmann, Zum Problem der Response in epidemiologischen Studien in Deutschland, in: *Gesundheitswesen* 66 (2004), pp. 326-336.

was an add-on through the European study only played a minor role in the implementation of the study. Studies on research participation in Denmark also showed that most citizens view their participation in medical research as “giving something back” to the state health care system from which they benefit.¹² There is also a major difference in conditions for epidemiological projects between Germany and Denmark: Whereas in many countries data on diagnoses need to be collected and obtained via questionnaires and individual consent needs to be obtained, epidemiologists in the Nordic countries can draw on central registries via record linkage, for instance to obtain information on cancer diagnoses. This feature of a central registry infrastructure made the conditions for the Scandinavian EPIC studies particularly favourable.¹³

Together the different local recruitment efforts conducted for the multicenter study have resulted in a European population study on nutrition and health. Once all variables were quantified and transformed into databases, an epidemiological research platform¹⁴ became available for statistical scrutiny and modeling of population health.

Transforming eating and drinking into numerical datasets

In order to create an empirical knowledge base, nutrition scientists need to establish and maintain logistics to enroll thousands of participants in examinations and in questionnaire surveys. Nutrition questionnaires play a key role as an instrument to transform the everyday eating habits of individual participants into quantitative variables. By means of this transformation, nutrition data is integrated into the framework of risk factor epidemiology.¹⁵ Filling in these questionnaires can take several hours and requires an active translation of one's eating and drinking practices into the categories on the questionnaire. The study design also comprised standardized medical and anthropometric examinations and detailed questionnaires on nutrition, lifestyle and health. Several interviewed participants stated that they enjoy completing the questionnaires and that the latter do not pose particular problems. Others found that the questions relating to frequency of eating particular food items or consumption of beverages were not that straightforward, as they required a particular mode of knowledge production and transfer. For instance, the questionnaires demand average consumptions and gave little space for the irregularities of everyday life that make up the social realities of eating and drinking habits. One of the informants pointed out that she can eat a whole bar of chocolate during one evening, but then will not touch any for a whole month. Thus, completing the questionnaire required

12 U. Lind, T. Mose, L.E. Knudsen, Participation in environmental health research by placenta donation – a perception study, in: *Environmental Health* 6 (2007), p. 36.

13 J.H. Olsen, L. Møllekjær, S. Friis, 2004, Fra kræfttælling til cancerregister, in: *Ugeskrift for Læger*, 166 (2004), 15–16, pp. 1458–1459.

14 For the notion of “biomedical platform,” see: P. Keating, A. Cambrosio, *Biomedical platforms. Realigning the normal and the pathological in late-twentieth-century medicine*, Cambridge, MA 2003.

15 On risk factor epidemiology in the US, see R. Aronowitz, *Making sense of illness. Science, society, and disease*, Cambridge 1998. For the “multifactorial model” as a black box, see J. Shim, *Understanding the routinized inclusion of race, socioeconomic status, and sex in epidemiology: The utility of concepts from technoscience studies*, in: *Sociology of Health and Illness* 24 (2002) 2, pp.129–150.

to estimate averages over longer periods of time and doing abstractions from the irregular realities of everyday life in which many different social circumstances and constellations of work and leisure activities can be spontaneous rather than habitual. Much of nutrition seems to resist quantification and notions of regularity. Participants sometimes felt that they had to adapt their accounts to the items on the questionnaires “in order to bring their practices of everyday life into the format of a statistical average.” The participants we interviewed were well aware of this “translation” of much more complex realities of their everyday lives while striving to deliver the required data on average intakes. A participant in the Danish pilot study pointed out that she and her husband enthusiastically complete every questionnaire from health authorities as well as from marketing surveys and that it was interesting to see how many details of everyday life are of relevance to these scientific studies. Together with the desire to do something useful for science, there were also moments of exploration of these categories as to one’s everyday life, which was about playing with and probing the categories of the questionnaire. Knowledge exchange was conceived of as giving something back to medical science, but also to tentatively adopt an outside, “scientific” perspective on one’s own life.

Filling in a standardized questionnaire required participants to engage with the categories and standards of the study. Participants who repeatedly were asked to complete follow-up questionnaires experienced this, once enrolled in the study, as an obligation. There is both reassurance and a sense of imposed duty that was reported with having made the “choice” of participation. When they were late filling in the questionnaires they had obtained via mail participants described having “a bad conscience”; they felt obliged to comply with the study protocol as participant. The multiple written reminders and subsequently phone calls they obtain from the institute also reinforce these obligations. These can function in the mode of interpellation, described by Althusser to enroll subjects into the authority exercised by an apparatus that calls them to act in particular ways.¹⁶

Bioparticipation: Samples for future research

Like many epidemiological studies in the age of genomics, the EPIC study also included storage of DNA in a biobank. Most of the centers collected and stored blood samples, while some centers, among them the Danish study, additionally collected more biological materials, including urine, adipose tissue and toenail clippings from each participant. While, like in genomics, there is much hype in the emerging field of “molecular epidemiology”, biobanking practices have raised controversy, in particular as to the informed consent process with regard to the future, largely yet unknown usages of these repositor-

16 J. Althusser, *Ideology and Ideological State Apparatus (Notes Towards an Investigation)*, in: J. Althusser, *Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays*, New York 1971. For the notion of interpellation in recruitment by complementary techniques of distance and techniques of presence, see L. Koch, M. N. Svendsen, *Between Neutrality and Engagement: A Case Study of Recruitment to Pharmacogenomics Research*, in: *BioSocieties* 3 (2008), pp. 399-418.

ies.¹⁷ Interestingly, research with blood samples is not considered to require informed consent in the US, while the European bioethics position foresees an explicit informed consent procedure or, at least opt-out possibilities, for secondary studies that reuse materials. Thus, human biological samples do not have the same status – what they are and how they are to be dealt with may differ, not only between scientists and the public, but also between European and North American regulatory frameworks.¹⁸

When samples are stored as material resources even beyond the lives of individual participants, there is a specific configuration of temporal regimes – there seems to be a suspension of time with the freezing of samples. Participants' samples are stored to remain there for the future – in that sense, relations of participants with the study are preserved via frozen samples. There is a continued “frozen participation” – with this – a term with which we also allude to the highly regulated ways epidemiological research takes place and in which participants as research subjects have but little agency. The samples of a biobank are linked to the epidemiological database, which contains data on dietary habits and health of the people who donated the samples to research. With as of yet unclear future usage of these samples, new biomarkers are expected to become relevant; here, this inherent notion of scientific progress creates the infrastructures, co-shaping what will be possible in future research.

The remaking of citizens with biotechnologies in the age of biomedicine has been addressed with the concepts of biosociality¹⁹ and in particular bio-citizenship.²⁰ Some studies have conceptualized biocitizenship as a mode of enacting citizenship by participating in a study or survey; others criticize the concept for reducing more important debates on citizenship into notions of choice or duty and argue for a closer look at the complex social relations in which these are entrenched.²¹ We propose the term “bio-participation” to account for the ambivalence of becoming a research subject. With the notion of bio-participation, we are not arguing for improved regimes of accountability to participants; we propose to use the term as an analytical device to explore and understand how “participation” in epidemiological studies is enacted. Significantly, in the categorization as “active participants” in the follow-up routines of epidemiological studies, being “active” seems to go together with being passive in terms of subjecting oneself to the highly regulated procedures and protocols that participants cannot influence. However, modes of

17 See K. Hoeyer, “Science is Really Needed – That’s All I Know.” Informed Consent and the Non-Verbal Practice of Collecting Blood for Genetic Research, in: *New Genetics and Society* 22(2003) 3, pp. 229-244; H. Gottweis, A.R. Petersen, *Biobanks. Governance in Comparative Perspective*, London 2008.

18 For meanings invested in human biological materials, see e.g., C. Palmer, *The Human and object, subject and thing: the troublesome nature of human biological material*, in: S. Bauer, A. Wahlberg, *Contested Categories. Life Sciences in Society*, Farnham 2009, pp. 15-30.

19 P. Rabinow, *Artificiality and Enlightenment: from Sociobiology to Biosociality*, in: *Essays on the Anthropology of Reason*, Princeton 1996, pp. 91-112.

20 N. Rose, C. Novas, *Biological Citizenship*, in: A. Ong, S.J. Collier (eds), *Global Assemblages: Technology, Politics, and Ethics as Anthropological Problems*. London, 2005, 439-463.

21 For a critical account of bio-citizenship, see A. Plows and P. Boddington, *Trouble with biocitizenship?*, in: *Genomics, Society and Policy* 2(2006) 3, pp. 115-135.

participation are heterogeneous and there are multiple ways of dealing with, handling, or resisting the “choices” or “duties” to serve biomedical research.²² The visits and interaction with staff of the institute as well as their letters and reminders enact a duty to participate. This duty blends into understandings of modes of citizenship, co-constructed by participation as representation in surveys. In the mode of bio-participation, participants are, rather than acting as citizen-participants, *subjected to* a regime of biocitizenship. In that context, filling in a questionnaire, donating a blood sample for research, receiving recommendations and adopting an attitude of prevention are part of a regime of technologies of the self and a mode of contemporary citizenship co-shaped by European bureaucratic processes.²³

2. Data work: calibrating, follow-up, modeling

Drawing attention to the mundane techniques that play a key role in what biotechnologies do, Hannah Landecker has proposed to take as point of departure the technological practices which are routinely described in the “materials and methods” sections of research publications.²⁴ We adopt the approach for the cultural study of biosciences by examining the materials and methods of data work in epidemiology. Here, the knowledge production setting entails a sequence of steps, comprised of study design, recruitment, data gathering, validation and risk modeling. In what follows, we discuss those for the calibrations, follow-up of participants for data and the development of data platforms for hypotheses testing. Infrastructure building and the recombination of data are prerequisites of epidemiological studies. The routine infrastructures of data storing and classifying play a key role in health research and clinical practice.²⁵

European calibrations: the quantification of nutrition

The scientific approach to nutrition comprises the quantification of food intake as a first and crucial step; once quantified, they can serve as a cumulative exposure estimate for epidemiological studies. Epidemiologists operationalize nutrition in various formats, for instance as consumed nutrients or energy intake calculated for each food item and frequencies. By calculating these units based on energy intake or food items, eating habits

22 For an empirical account of modes of participation, see: E. Haimes, M. Whong-Barr, Levels and styles of participation in a genetic database. A case study of the North Cumbria Community Genetics Project, in: R. Tutton, R. Corrigan (eds), *Genetic databases. Socio-ethical issues in the collection and use of DNA*, London 2004, pp. 57-77.

23 M. Foucault, *Political Technologies of the Individuals and the Self*, in: L.H. Martin, H. Gutman, P.H. Hutton (eds), *Technologies of the Self. A seminar with Michel Foucault*, Amherst 1988, pp. 19-49.

24 For instance, cryotechnology has shaped much of later cloning and stem cell research, see: H. Landecker, *Living Differently in Time: Plasticity, Temporality and Cellular Biotechnologies*, in: J. Edwards, P. Harvey, P. Wade (eds), *Technologized Images, Technologized Bodies: Anthropological Approaches to a New Politics of Vision*, New York 2010, pp. 211-234. See also H. Landecker: *Culturing Life: How Cells Became Technologies*, Cambridge 2007.

25 G. Bowker, S.L. Star, *Sorting Things Out. Classification and its consequences*, Cambridge 1999.

become a set of quantitative exposure variables. These can be calculated and rendered comparable in standardized modes based on the data obtained by participants' responses in the questionnaires. Thus, as a first step, nutritional epidemiology generates quantitative data on consumed food products for each individual, using standardized measures. Epidemiologists calculate nutrients and energy intake based on questionnaire data on the various food groups – from meat to salad dressings, and from bread to fruits, with detailed amounts of single items such as apples or citrus fruits.

The challenges of such a study are mostly in the harmonization of data and methods to “measure” nutrition, in particular for the pooled European dataset. In the EPIC study, the questionnaires contain standardized core modules, but also allow for local variation between countries in order to cover regionally specific diets. Ensuring compatibility between different questionnaires required much standardization. This includes conducting so-called *calibration studies* for a subsample of participants from all centers. In calibration studies two methods of measurement are compared, by introducing a third questionnaire for comparison as a reference. For a calibration study within the EPIC network, 40,000 participants of the study were randomly selected from all local cohorts.²⁶ They were then asked to fill in an additional questionnaire, now exactly the same one for all different centers. The purpose of this additional exercise was to calibrate the instruments with which data have been recorded. For example, the questionnaires on fruit and vegetable consumption in countries such as Norway and Greece are not directly compatible, since questionnaires are developed locally and take into account the specificities of local eating cultures. In this situation, calibration via the standard made compatible different instruments without introducing systematic errors.

Following participants for data: follow-up and record linkage

The respective conditions for epidemiological research differ between participating European centers, *e.g.*, between Scandinavian countries with central population registries and countries without cancer registries. For instance in Germany, there is no central cancer registry and therefore direct record linkage to obtain information on cancer diagnoses among participants is not possible. To obtain health-related data, a complex data collection protocol needs to be developed that is based on self-reported data from questionnaires and informed consent for contacting GPs and hospitals in order for confirmation. In our interviews with epidemiologists in Denmark, researchers stressed the fact that they do not need to do follow-up studies, for there are central population registries they can link up with (via unique person-numbers). Registries include the “cancer registry, the hospital discharge registry, the cause of death registry, CPR for addresses and relocations, Statistics Denmark for socio-economic data a database for school health records through the Institute for Preventive Medicine, from which we get birth weight and weight during

26 The recruited sample was weighted by expected cancer rates, which was estimated based on total rates by age and gender.

years at school, ... and the prescriptions registry.”²⁷ Registry research has a long tradition in Denmark and represents a major part of epidemiological activities.²⁸ Similar to other Nordic countries, the use of this health care system data for public health research is largely unquestioned. These “ideal conditions for research in which the whole country can be conceived as a cohort”²⁹ for epidemiological research are often considered a competitive resource in international comparison.

From descriptive analyses to platforms for hypotheses testing

In comparison to other factors, the overall influence of nutrition on chronic disease is considered to be weak. Therefore a certain variation in nutrition, as it is the case within a multicenter European study are considered advantageous and, for instance, there is considerable variation as to fruit and vegetable consumption between Northern Europe and Greece. Descriptive data on these differences, *e.g.*, the range of vegetable consumption, was published as reference material for the study. In these descriptive presentations, columns of numerical data on average intakes of food groups such as fruits, vegetables or meat products in grams per day, adjusted by age, season and day of the week are presented. Displayed in a standardized way, the intake of certain foods becomes comparable between countries and study regions.³⁰ A quantitative inventory of nutrition is produced for the population under study, which generates composite measures that can be compared across the different study centers in Europe. The choice of regions listed in the table is that of the participating study centers and their recruitment strategies. The study populations were mostly from regions adjacent to the involved research centers; this also reflects institutional and personal networks between scientists.

While such descriptive analyses are often presented as part of the materials and methods sections, the actual aim of cohort studies, however, is to investigate the associations between exposures/risk factors and disease. In order to test etiological hypotheses, the influences of dietary habits, markers of genetic variation such as polymorphisms, and haplotypes in relation to disease outcomes are modeled, thereby calculating *e.g.*, the risk of disease, based on the data collected during follow-ups. The modeling is statistically complex. The final configuration of model parameters is based on careful assessment of correlations between variables and statistical significance tests. Technically, risk estimates can be derived from these models in terms of subgroup-specific risk or overall risk estimates for the entire study population (then usually under adjustment for age, gender, etc.). While in the description of the population under study, the country, region or

27 Interview 1, researcher.

28 See: J. H. Olsen, L. Mellemkjær, S. Friis, *Fra kræfttælling til cancerregister*, in: *Ugeskrift Læger*, 166 (2004) 15/16, pp. 1458–1459 and P.B. Mortensen, *Registerforskning i Danmark*, in: *Norsk Epidemiologi* 14 (2004) 1, pp. 121–124.

29 L. Frank, *Epidemiology. When an entire country is a cohort*, in: *Science*, 287 (2002) 5462, pp. 2398–9.

30 A. Agudo, N. Slimani, M.C. Ocké, et al., *Consumption of fruits, vegetables and other plant food in the European Prospective Investigation into Cancer and Nutrition (EPIC) cohorts from 10 European countries*, *Public Health Nutrition* 68 (2002) 5, pp. 1179–1196, here p. 1188.

study center are listed in tables, the variables “region / center” or “country” are invisible in the actual reporting of results.³¹ The hypotheses are about nutrition, lifestyle, genetics and health outcomes, while center or region is only a technical or instrumental variable in the logistics of the study in order to secure “sufficient difference in exposure.”

Agudo et al. (2006) have then stratified for genetic polymorphism and smoking in order to investigate possible interactions; this is one of the gene-lifestyle interactions studies in further analyses. The empirical database of the study population is the resource to scrutinize novel hypotheses; in that way, the central database of a multicenter study functions as a testing platform for parameters that influence population health. Large multicenter studies are – despite the complex standardization processes such as calibration of instruments – of importance to epidemiologists in order to study the influence of ‘weak’ risk factors such as particular food groups or to study rare cancers. In this context, the European network provides research opportunities in terms of jointly observing and comparing a large overall study population with different dietary habits.

3. “European diversity” as a resource for knowledge production

The Endeavours to study complex associations between genetics, lifestyle and nutrition and disease aim for even larger data structures. Only very large studies can achieve the sample sizes required to perform statistically meaningful hypotheses testing to address the challenge of multifactorial models with a host of weak but interacting factors. This is due to new variables emerging from genomics, the plethora of biomarkers in the field of molecular epidemiology and renewed attention to complex interactions. So far, this article has followed the local epidemiological studies up towards the European level. In this part, we explore how this European database, as constituted in the study, is then integrated into more global, universalizing knowledge production about disease causation. As in genomics and biobanking, epidemiologists have established international data infrastructures in the quest for ever-larger samples that pool data from millions of participants to study complex “gene-environment interactions” in genomic epidemiology.³² The pooling of datasets in so-called “global consortia” is a rather novel phenomenon, which became possible with data sharing technologies. Information technologies have been instrumental in making epidemiology – previously, from rather local research at the community level – a “big science”³³ conducted in large multinational consortia.

31 A. Agudo, N. Sala, G. Pera et al., Polymorphisms in Metabolic Genes Related to Tobacco Smoke and the Risk of Gastric Cancer in the European Prospective Investigation into Cancer and Nutrition, in: *Cancer Epidemiology, Biomarkers, Prevention* 15 (2006) 12, pp. 2427-2434, here p. 2431.

32 See e.g., Emerging Risk Factors Collaboration (writing committee J. Danesh, S. Erqou, M. Walker, S.G. Thompson), Analysis of individual data on lipid, inflammatory and other markers in over 1.1 million participants in 104 prospective studies of cardiovascular disease, in: *European Journal of Epidemiology* 22 (2007) 12, pp. 839–869.

33 See e.g., R. N. Hoover, The evolution of epidemiologic science. From cottage industry to “big” science, in: *Epidemiology* 18 (2007) 1, pp. 13-17.

The reification of the “European” as a biomedical category

With genomic epidemiology developing into “big science,” researchers increasingly need to attach their study to larger consortia in order to keep up with methodological requirements. The hypotheses formalized in these global consortia range from the influence of genetic polymorphisms or haplotypes, combined with lifestyle variables on cancer,³⁴ to consortia that examine BMI (body mass index) and mortality in population samples large enough to study, like in toxicology, dose-response relationships, for instance between a lifestyle variable and cancer incidence.³⁵ These projects pool dozens of very large cohorts, mostly from North American, European and Asian studies. In these pooled datasets the notion of the “European” re-emerges, persists and circulates. In some pooling projects the “Europeans” are referred to, jointly with “white Americans”, as “Caucasians”.³⁶ The latter categories are used until the present in censuses and much of the biomedical research conducted in North America since the mid-1990s. They became routine with the implementation of guidelines at the level of the US National Institutes of Health, which demand specification and inclusion of “minority” populations in biomedical research.³⁷ Since European researchers produce publications and data for an international knowledge economy, they frame their own data in the terms and formats that are compatible with international standards and categories. For studies conducted in Europe, authors add to their methods descriptions attributes such as “among mostly Caucasian Germans” or “in more than 95% of Caucasians.” This is to facilitate inclusion in global meta-analyses³⁸ and in order to make the studies compatible with the predominant biomedical categories of globalized biomedicine, which often use the US census classification as a standard. How these categories of “European, White, and Caucasian” are operationalized, however, can remain rather open: While in biomedicine these population categories sometimes run synonymously with ethnicity, in epidemiology they are often used as a flexible surrogate variable,³⁹ which stand for something else: for further differentiation that can be conceptualized as biological or social. Often, the self-identified US-census category “race” is routinely included⁴⁰ and then, sometimes tacitly, interpreted in terms of difference either in exposure, social status or genetics.

34 See studies by the Breast and Prostate Cancer Cohort Consortium (BPC3): www.epi.grants.cancer.gov/BPC3/ (accessed 30 June 2009)

35 For mortality studies, the categorization derives from the main groups of the International Classification of Diseases (ICD) and includes “all causes of death,” “all cancers,” “all cardiovascular conditions.”

36 The category “Caucasian” was introduced by Blumenbach in the early nineteenth century for people from Europe, Northern Africa, the Middle East and parts of central and southern Asia.

37 For the effects of inclusion in biomedicine, see S. Epstein, *Inclusion. The politics of difference in medical research*, Chicago 2007.

38 Meta-analyses combine the results of several studies addressing the same research question; a meta-analysis is conducted to estimate overall effect sizes as a combined quantitative result.

39 Surrogate variables use already existing variables as “proxies” to approximately represent the variable of interest.

40 See J. Shim, *Understanding the routinized inclusion of race, socioeconomic status, and sex in epidemiology: The utility of concepts from technoscience studies*, in: *Sociology of Health and Illness* 24 (2002) 2, pp. 129-150.

Hence, the European as a population category, only emerges in the comparison to a non-European “other”: Asian, African populations, or Caucasian North Americans. The construction of the category of European as different from a non-European “other,” be it the oriental, the Asian, the African, has a colonial history in which western biomedicine is deeply entrenched.⁴¹ Europe is constructed as homogeneous in certain ways, at least when viewed from outside or in comparison with the non-European “other.” While region and regional diversity are of significance within Europe, the “European” remains heterogeneous unless the data is pooled with American cohorts: Then, the European becomes homogeneous, sometimes reifying categories of Euro-American „race science“, such as racialized labels “Caucasian”.

Difference as a resource: creating a European research platform

While epidemiology has increasingly developed into big science, with large-scale multicenter studies prioritized for reasons of statistical power, some researchers have expressed concerns about limitations of these very large studies. Their concerns include monopolization effects if all studies are pooled into a global mega-study. One of the concerns here is that once all data are synthesized, the findings cannot be challenged by competing studies and, given just one global pool, there would be no independent database left to test these results. While mainstream science aims to establish ever larger data structures that allow multiple statistical tests, others question the sole aim of increasing the sample size and argue for several consortia. Referring to the principle of falsification, it is argued that there should be opportunities to “compare these findings in a second study and could ... benefit from a test-retest situation”.⁴²

Quantitative comparison and the estimation of difference are the principle tools in epidemiological research. This requires differentials that can be used for calibration and that ensure that variation becomes measurable. Nutritional epidemiologists stress that “Europeans”, as a study population, exhibit regionally specific, quite different dietary habits, which they see as advantage of their study population. Differences in dietary patterns that result from the regional diversity of food products are operationalized for epidemiological association studies to link exposure variables such as nutrition to health and disease at the population level. Research questions posed to the data include whether there are regional influences, for example if being overweight is a regional phenomenon, *i.e.*, whether there is a higher risk in Italy, Greece and Spain or in Northern Europe – and whether there are differences in latency periods. Epidemiologists require some degree of heterogeneity in exposure and “diversities” in nutrition habits within Europe, which is

41 For analyses of inherent eurocentrisms and othering, postcolonial studies have been instrumental, see e.g., H. Bhabha, *The Location of Culture*. London 1994; S. Hall, When Was “the Post-colonial”? Thinking at the Limit, in: L. Curti and I. Chambers (eds) *The Post-colonial Question: Common Skies, Divided Horizons*. London 1996, pp. 242-260; G.C. Spivak, *Explanation and Culture: Marginalia*, in: D. Landry, G. MacLean (eds) *The Spivak Reader*, New York 1996, pp. 29-51.

42 Interview 2, researcher.

conceived as a quasi-experimental opportunity to study the influence of nutrition on human health in a much more general sense. These opportunities are used to estimate differences in disease risks between flexible subgroups with different dietary habits. In the context of epidemiological studies, regional characteristics – different from the emphasis on place and the local in notions of *terroir*⁴³ – function rather instrumentally: difference is “taken advantage” of for study purposes – in the textbook tradition of “natural experiments.”⁴⁴ Regional difference in eating cultures is transformed into a “quasi-experiment,” which then can be used as a matrix to generate and test novel hypotheses. The geographic differentiation of the initial stage is transformed into another flexible segmentation of the population according to epidemiological variables.

4. The re-circulation of European nutrition and health estimates into society

In addition to the investigation of the role of nutrition in disease causation, the European Commission has funded applied projects aimed at developing nutrition recommendations. A large-scale project titled EuroDiet (1998–2000)⁴⁵ was set up with the goal of “translating” scientific knowledge, *e.g.*, from studies in nutritional epidemiology, into public health policy. For these translations into policies, risk estimates are used to estimate the reduction of risk by a particular change or intervention. This implies that epidemiological findings are considered robust enough to be transferred to another setting, *e.g.*, made relevant to population health in general. If this is the case, risk estimates – *e.g.*, of a reduction in relative risk of developing a disease when eating a certain amount of fruits and vegetables by some precise factor – leave the epidemiological research and begin circulating as “immutable mobiles”.⁴⁶ In this way, they enter health policies but also clinical medicine.

EuroDiet: from research to policy

The field of public health has played an important role in the European funding frameworks since 1992, when the Maastricht Public Health Framework, including five specific action programs – cancer, Aids, drug dependency, health promotion and health monitoring – was adopted. A good example of the research strategies of the European framework provides the project “EuroDiet” and its aim to develop tools in order to enable “the considerable body of scientific evidence on healthy nutrition and lifestyles...

43 For the term “terroir” see P. Laville, *Le terroir, un concept indispensable à l’élaboration et à la protection des appellations d’origine comme à la gestation des vignobles: le cas de la France*, in: *Bull. OIV* 217 (1990), pp. 709–710. In particular, the notion of heterogeneity and diversity “in unity” was of significance with respect to regional food products.

44 See *e.g.*, C.J. Roberts, *Epidemiology for Clinicians*, London 1978.

45 The project was followed by specific single-issue projects and campaigns, *e.g.*, on reduction of alcohol or increase of physical activity, have been developed. These are coordinated by the European Commission’s Agency for Health and Consumers.

46 B. Latour, *Science in Action: How to Follow Scientists and Engineers Through Society*, Milton Keynes 1987.

to inform health policy.”⁴⁷ The goal of “EuroDiet” was the “development of European dietary guidelines, which will provide a framework for the development by member states of national food-based dietary targets”,⁴⁸ and it included leading scientists, policy advisors, national and European agencies, NGOs, food industry, educational, social, cultural consumer organisations.

To achieve the translation from research to policy, four groups to work on “health & nutrients,” “nutrients & food,” “foods & people,” and “people & policies” were set up. The design of these successive work packages moves “from nutrients to people,” thus taking the opposite approach of epidemiological studies: The epidemiologic research process, translates everyday life habits into data on eating and drinking, obtained via questionnaire. These undergo transformation through multivariate modeling, resulting in aggregate risk estimates. In the opposite way, the step-wise translation agenda of “EuroDiet” takes the risk estimates and translates them back to modify and optimize the eating and drinking practices in order to improve population health. The division of the project into work packages is organized along stages of these translations: its point of departure are the risk estimates for nutrients in relation to health; from there the project recontextualized that format of knowledge in terms of actual food and food groups; subsequently, “foods and people” and “people and policies” take these results to policies and to the individual citizen. This conceptualization renders risk estimates as a European knowledge base for successive translation into dietary policy. That this scientific “Europeanness” is performed across administrative and policy levels evokes a homogeneous scientific dietary principle. Based on the health patterns in Europe and associations with dietary patterns measured in nutrients, scientists formulate nutrient targets for “effective food-based dietary recommendations,” which in turn are consulted for “health promoting changes in eating and physical activity patterns”.⁴⁹ The latter then enter a re-design of the broader policy framework. As those are based on evidence from risk factor epidemiology, this successive translation pushes frameworks of prevention from socio-economic factors toward individualized notions of “lifestyle choices”.

Evidence-based medicine and evidence-based policy as European governance model?

“Practical European guidelines for diet-related disease prevention and health promotion”⁵⁰ were developed to translate the scientific evidence into European policy frameworks. Analyzing the tactics to make such translations happen can shed some light on the processes that stabilize both scientific knowledge and European policies.⁵¹ In view of

47 EuroDiet report <http://eurodiet.med.uoc.gr/first.html>, p.1 (accessed 30 June 2009).

48 EuroDiet report <http://eurodiet.med.uoc.gr/first.html>, p.1 (accessed 30 June 2009).

49 EuroDiet report <http://eurodiet.med.uoc.gr/first.html> (accessed 30 June 2009).

50 EuroDiet report <http://eurodiet.med.uoc.gr/first.html> (accessed 30 June 2009).

51 S. L. Star, *Triangulating Clinical and Basic Research: British Localizationists, 1870–1906*, in: *History of Science* 24 (1986), pp. 29–48. Janet Shim has analyzed the role of triangulation as to the management of uncertainty in the process of epidemiologic knowledge generation. See J.K. Shim, *Understanding the routinised inclusion of race*,

multiple uncertainties, these are managed in order to successfully establish a theory or a connection by simultaneously employing several methods that provide a cumulative or “global certainty,” even though knowledge of local fields might be uncertain. A further tactic identified by Leigh Star and described for epidemiology by Janet Shim is the “displacement of epistemological questions with lower-level technical debates.”⁵² With this “scientification” of health policy and economic accountability, much decision-making is based or justified by drawing on epidemiologic findings. This, however, is not a specifically EU-European path, but a general trend of Western governance models. These modes of governance increasingly draw on “scientific evidence” and adopt a model similar to evidence-based medicine,⁵³ but now in the context of policy-making.

Other domains in which epidemiological studies circulate back to society include risk assessments in clinical and preventive medicine. A number of scores for clinical risk assessments are in use, but only a few of them take nutrition into account. Rather, most of them address nutrition-related factors in terms of biomarkers measured in blood, such as cholesterol levels.⁵⁴ The European cardiovascular risk score, “Systematic Coronary Risk Evaluation” (SCORE), recommended by the European Society of Cardiology, is one such tool. Displayed on color, paper charts or in electronic format, the tool provides a system of classification stratified by gender, age, smoker/non-smoker and gives risk figures⁵⁵ for the 10 year risk of fatal CVD in populations at high or low risk. The score is based on cohort and mortality data in Europe and calculates risk estimates for high and low risk countries – it performs a division of Europe into high risk (Northern Europe) and low risk (Mediterranean) countries. This can be viewed as a “biomedicalized reterritorialization” of Europe into high and low-risk countries with respect to cardiovascular risk. This difference in risk is then enacted in clinical practice, which may lead to different clinical decisions for patients with otherwise the same profile, depending on whether he/she lives in high or low risk countries, *i.e.*, Germany or Switzerland, Belgium or France. Physicians working with evidence-based medicine and drawing on these studies actively use these categories when talking to the public and to patients. In these re-individualizations, the categories of the research design are looped back into doctor-patient encounters.

socioeconomic status and sex in epidemiology: the utility of concepts from technoscience studies, in: *Sociology of Health & Illness* 24 (2002) 2, pp. 129–150.

52 Ibid., p. 138.

53 In evidence-based medicine (EBM) evidence hierarchies are based on biostatistical criteria – with systematic reviews of randomised clinical trials at the top, observational cohort studies in observational epidemiology as intermediate level and bench science or expert opinions at the lower end of the hierarchy; for an account of EBM, see: G. Weisz, From clinical counting to evidence-based medicine, in: G. Jorland, A. Opinel, G. Weisz (eds.), *Body counts. Medical quantification in historical & sociological perspectives*, Montreal 2005, pp. 377–393. For a discussion in medical science context, see: D. L. Sackett, W.M.C. Rosenberg, J.A.M. Gray, R.B. Haynes, W.S. Richardson, *Evidence Based Medicine*, *British Medical Journal* 312 (1996), pp. 71–72.

54 In terms of action, these tools foresee the prescription of drugs to lower cholesterol levels – while other lifestyle factors (physical activity) are addressed in terms of recommendations for individualized lifestyle changes rather than focusing on change of nutrition habits.

55 The calculation is based on mortality data.

In the field of nutrition and health, public health recommendations are part of primary prevention policies. However, only a few nutrition-related factors are considered as having enough support by scientific evidence. While, for instance, salt intake, folic acid, and iodine supplementation are included in EU policies and recommendations, only the increase of breastfeeding, fruit & vegetable consumption and physical activity are considered robust enough in terms of the available evidence. Already in the EuroDiet report, it is these three factors that remain in terms of specific goals after the “translation process” and consideration of the “evidence base.” Given the high profile of biomedical nutrition research, these key areas of policy action seem rather modest. Increasing fruit consumption is one such recommendation – at an international level a campaign to increase fruit and vegetable consumption has been conducted – the “5 Per Day” campaign. The German Nutrition Society follows that global recommendation after a WHO study on prevention of chronic disease recommended to eat 400 grams fruits/vegetables a day or more. In Denmark, a similar campaign called “6 Per Day” was started by the Danish Cancer Society and the Danish Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Fisheries. The Danish “6 Per Day” website explains core strategies of the Danish campaign: From “maybe 600 grams or more” to “6 Per Day,”⁵⁶ they see as necessary a science of behavior change, intervention research, communication science, but also lobbying and coalition-building and fundraising skills to reach the goal of increasing the consumption of fruits and vegetables. Following the most efficient strategy, changing behavior instead of changing attitudes first, their strategy is to make it possible to include free food at workplaces. The “5 Per Day” recommendation of fruits and vegetables is also referred to in a 2001 article in the German popular nutrition journal “Ernährungsumschau (Nutrition Survey)”; however, the article states that the “scientific proof” for the effect of such changes in dietary habits is still lacking – that observational cohort studies will help provide such evidence.⁵⁷ Large observational cohort studies are seen as a way to empirically establish proof of the effect of nutritional changes that will count as evidence for policy. The fact that for a lot of diet recommendations, there is no detailed formal proof in accordance with the latest standards, keeps the “need” for further studies to continue. This shows the data work and translation exercises conducted for rather straightforward recommendations (such as “eat more fruits and vegetables”) for their implementation into health promotion policies. Rather than new approaches or breakthroughs, the performative effects of these activities are in the establishment of a novel culture of accounting and accountability in public health that is shaped by evidence-based reasoning in policy.

56 <http://6omdagen.dk> (accessed 30 June 2009).

57 N. Krahel, M. Bergmann, K. Kohlenberg-Müller, H. Boeing, Einflussfaktoren auf Ernährungsänderungen in der EPIC-Potsdam-Studie. *Ernährungsumschau* 12 (2001), 1, p. 479.

Diversity managed: the creation of a common space by harmonizing instruments

Moreover, quantitative epidemiological risk estimates can be integrated in economic modeling and in cost benefit reasoning. For instance, the cost of a public health intervention is measured in terms of reduction of risk in the target population. Conceptualizations such as “the cost of sedentary lifestyles,” calculations of “disability-adjusted life years (DALYs)” and the “burden of disease in a population” bear witness to the influence of economic models used in the governance of population health.

The need for comparable statistics as a prerequisite for policy has reached a status of being demanded by the public and much part of common sense. This justifies the huge effort to develop “harmonized” methods for dietary surveys, health surveys and the monitoring of food. As in other fields where Europeanization takes place, a large part of the effort is in standardizing or “harmonizing” methods and instruments in order to enable comparisons within the EU. The first step towards a unified space of European product standards and health policy is the harmonization of methods.⁵⁸ Translated into statistics with “harmonized methods,” diversity and regional character become visible and manageable, as an apparatus of continual data generation is developing. In that sense, common or compatible measurement techniques, *i.e.*, difference measured with a common standard, produce diversity in unity. In turn, these new modes of accountability justify policies using the means of scientific statistical evidence and cost-benefit calculations. Much of the production of statistics was part and parcel of techniques of government since the beginning of political arithmetic, population statistics and social statistics including epidemiological studies. At the same time though, health-related statistics can open up a space for public debate on health as a societal issue in novel ways.⁵⁹ It is in this “triangle” of applied health research, EU policy and bureaucracy and health governance through the participation of citizens that the contemporary *Homo Europaeus* is configured. The mode of accountability and concepts of citizenship that include “active” bio-participation, however, entail at the same time rather “passive” subject positions. In an opening statement too the website by the “Directorate for Health and Consumers” of the European Commission this reads: “Our job is to help make Europe’s citizens healthier, safer and more confident.”⁶⁰

58 For the creation of a common space through methods harmonization, see: A. Desrosières, Comment fabriquer un espace de commune mesure? Harmonisations des statistiques et réalisme de leurs usages, in: M. Lallement, J. Spurk (eds) *Stratégies de la comparaison internationale*, Paris 2003, pp. 151-166.

59 For an analysis of statistics as a space for public debate, see: A. Desrosières, *The Politics of Large Numbers. A History of Statistical Reasoning*, Cambridge 1988; S. Bauer, Transparency or surveillance? The datascares of European public health statistics, in: C. Reiche, A. Sick; *Do not exist. Women, Europe, Digital Medium*. Bremen 2008, pp. 189-203.

60 http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/health_consumer/whoweare_en.htm (accessed 28 July 2009).

Conclusions

This article has looked at settings and practices of epidemiological research in the field of nutrition and health as a contemporary site in which the *Homo Europaeus* is co-produced and negotiated. Rather than following preconceived notions of a “European,” we have focused on the processes through which the “European” becomes a performative category in contemporary biomedical science and in public health policies. In this context, the epidemiological study itself and its design – an observational cohort study – is a powerful actant: the study design is an infrastructural device and epistemic grid that co-determines the kinds of epistemological and social relations that are possible between researchers and those researched within this setting. With its rules of observation and bio-statistical “requirements,” the study co-organizes this relationship – in epistemological, practical and social terms.

It is through the epidemiological study on nutrition and health that the emergence of the “European” takes place: The research platform and infrastructure is “EUropean” in terms of its organization; moreover, the “European” is performed, when a “European” study population is established, or a “European” repository of biological samples, *i.e.*, when parts of the population function as the extended laboratory for biomedical research. Health scientists use this European datascape⁶¹ to measure, calculate, visualize, and eventually govern diversity. While the “European” as a fixed biological category only emerges in the comparison with the “non-European,” much of the reconfigurations of the European take place in implicit ways – through the ways in which patients are subjected to individual profiling and engaged in risk assessment in treatment decisions. Furthermore, it is also via the epidemiological study that the *Homo Europaeus* is constituted as a citizen both in the mode of the risk manager and bioparticipant. Heterogeneity and difference are made use of as a resource for knowledge production. It is precisely the establishment of databases that bring about Europe as unified in diversity – as a space of harmonized data generation.

Thus, the contemporary European is constituted as a data producer and data consumer – risk manager, bioparticipant, citizen-patient – in a society that is co-shaped by regimes and practices of risk assessment in terms of its culture of decision-making and preventive risk optimization. Increasingly, the consumers themselves ask for evaluations of population health. Beyond being a target population for health policies and governance by the EU and national governments, this “confident” *Homo Europaeus* actively enrolls into research and the improvement of “population health.” The ubiquity of risk assessment rationality and ideas about accountable, evidence-based policy-making as well as a new mode of “bioparticipation” co-shape the contemporary features of the *Homo EUropaeus*.

61 For the use of the term “scapes,” see: A. Appadurai: *Modernity At Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalization*. Minneapolis 1996.

Templates, Crash Test Dummies and Digitalization: European Models of Man in the Car Industry


Paul Erker

1. Introduction

The *Homo Europaeus* does exist, at least in industrial anthropometry since 1998, at the latest. Based on the standard DIN EN ISO 7250, an abundance of body measurements for the Human Anthropometrics of the European was recorded, the result of which is, obviously, clearly male.¹


Körpermeßwerte des Europamenschen

Maß-Nr. (lt. Abb.)	Beschreibung des Maßes	Perzentile		
		5	50	95
9	Sitzhöhe (Körpersitzhöhe, Stammlänge)	790	905	985
10	Augenhöhe	580	790	860
11	Schulterhöhe	510	623	695
12	Schulter-Ellenbogen-Länge	288	346	410
13	Ellenbogenhöhe	190	243	289
14	Oberschenkelhöhe	112	146	170
15	Ellenbogen-Handgelenk-Länge	240	279	313
16	Breite über den Ellenbogen	390	478	540
17	Schulterbreite (Bialettdi)	395	474	485
18	Schulterbreite (biacromia)	320	380	425
19	Hüftbreite	393	468	440
20	Länge des Unterschenkels mit Fuß	380	444	495
21	Bauchtiefe	195	237	350
22	Kniehöhe	400	530	602



Körpermeßwerte des Europamenschen

Maß-Nr. (lt. Abb.)	Beschreibung des Maßes	Perzentile		
		5	50	95
23	Handlänge	164	182	202
24	Handflächenlänge	94	107	119
25	Handbreite (ohne Daumen)	72	81	92
26	Zeigefingerbreite, proximal	16	20	24
27	Zeigefingerlänge	64	73	80
28	Fußbreite	84	96	110
29	Fußlänge	232	255	280
30	Kopflänge	176	192	207
31	Kopfumfang	526	560	594
32	Gesichtshöhe	99	112	127
33	Kopfbreite	135	149	156



The *Homo Europaeus* does exist, not only as a record and value table, but now also as a three-dimensional, computer-simulated human model, even in competing versions – as

¹ See H. W. Jürgens et al., Internationale anthropometrische Daten als Voraussetzung für die Gestaltung von Arbeitsplätzen und Maschinen, in: Arbeitswissenschaftliche Erkenntnisse 108, Dortmund 1998, pp. 1-11.

Humos 2 (Human Model for Safety), or as a RAMSIS (*Rechnergestütztes Anthropometrisch-Mathematisches System zur Insassen-Simulation or: computer-supported mathematical-anthropological system for vehicle occupant simulation*). Both “anthropomorphic test devices” are widely used in research, development and construction within the European automotive industry.

This closer look at the development, scientific design, technical configuration, and industrial application of this average European or “standardized Euro-Man” in the context of the project “Imagined Europeans” is guided by a number of different paths of access and aspects of problems. The spectrum of the relevant man-machine concepts and (later) views on this was and is huge. They range from specific engineering perspectives, to medical, technology history and critical cultural approaches. Thus, at first glance it is an approach done by studying the history of scientific disciplines (the history of biomechanics), especially in view of the history of anthropometrics and ergonomics that are no longer only used for economic history (research of the history of industrialization), but also for the history of technology, meaning the emergence and development of applied ergonomics and industrial anthropology. German scientists and researchers in the development of European standards and conspicuous models have played a prominent role including Hans W. Jürgens and his Anthropological Institute at the University of Kiel, Professor Henry Dupuis at the Max Planck Institute for Work Physiology in Dortmund, researchers from the Technical University of Munich, the automotive industry and the engineering company Human Solutions GmbH for the development of the digital human model RAMSIS. It is here that a history of the European Re-conquering of anthropometric standards is made, as all human models and anthropometric data used in the automotive industry were subject to quasi Americanization. German automobile companies developed, designed and tested their vehicles in the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s according to American passenger and driver data.

One can gain access to the matter at hand by studying the history of specific industries, which means path dependencies and economic as well as technical developments in the European automotive industry, both in the context of identifying specific European developments of this industry and in terms of the history of passive safety. In the late 1960s the European automotive industry began to call for scientific body data on the European. The starting point and the central problem was the car seat. The diversity of not yet standardized seats in the various European nations has been increasingly replaced by a standard Euro-seat.

However, ergonomics also expanded broadly in other parts of car production, particularly in all areas of safety. The man moved to the center of development and production through a combination of precise measurements, accurate simulation, and continuous integration into existing processes. That this was not always the case is made clear by three brief, interesting (especially in view of gender history) stories from the 1950s, the 1980s and the 1990s, one of which is Borgward.

In 1954, the Bremen car constructor, Borgward, developed a car, “Isabella,” which did not fit the average German body. Most buyers, especially women, sank in the car seat.

Almost every normal driver could barely see the road from the seat. A little background explains the situation: Borgward himself was only 1.66 meters tall but had a giant seat. Despite this fault, the car model did not sell poorly, but in 1961 Borgward went bankrupt. The other example is from the British car industry: In a book edited in 1986, *Bodyspace, Anthropometry, Ergonomics and Design*,² Stephen Pheasant questioned, “Can the application of ergonomics to the design of the driver’s workstation help reduce the safety problem?” “Hard evidence is scant” and so the answer was as follows:

*But at least one influential consumer is convinced. Attending an exhibition at the Design Centre in London, the Prime Minister, Mrs. Margaret Thatcher, sat at the wheel of a prototype motor car and said ‘I don’t like it, I cannot see the front. Redesign it for me. I like to see where the front of the car is so I don’t bang into the back of a bus. If I was in insurance I would put up the premium’. Mrs. Thatcher is 1600 mm in stature – the 44th percentile for British women.*³

The last story comes from the United States:

*Most of the airbag deaths involve infants, children, and females of small stature. This has led to speculation that, because the government’s airbag compliance tests require the use of 50th percentile male dummies, the bags are designed to protect adult males but not smaller occupants. This is not correct. Serious airbag inflation injuries occur primarily because of occupants’ positions when the bags begin to inflate – not because of people’s sizes. Anyone on top of, or very close to, an airbag when it begins to inflate is at risk of serious inflation injury.*⁴

It was with these remarks that Brian O’Neill, president of the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety, tried to disperse public concerns about the safety of airbags at a Senate hearing in 1997. Even if the statement was factually correct, that the conclusion could be reversed: drivers with short legs are at an increased security risk of the airbag because in order to reach the pedals, they unavoidably must sit close to the airbags, which are primarily installed in the steering wheel.

Vehicle engineers like Prof. Dr. Hans-Jürgen Förster from Daimler-Benz dealt with the driver under the perspective of man as an integral component function of the automobile, as a “control person” upon whose conduct the effect of the technical product, the Automotive, depends: the driver as *Homo instrumentalis*.⁵ This conception of the driver influenced the development of computer-simulated driver models, such as VEHUN-

2 See S. Pheasant, *Bodyspace. Anthropometry, Ergonomics and Design*, London 1986, esp. chapter 13, p. 198 sq.: The driver’s workstation.

3 Ibid., p. 198, report in the *Daily Telegraph*, 27 March 1984.

4 Quoted in J. M. Wetmore, *Redefining Risks and Redistributing Responsibilities. Building Networks to Increase Automobile Safety*, in: *Science, Technology, & Human Values* 29 (2004) 3, pp. 377–405, here p. 396.

5 See H.-J. Förster, *Der Stellenwert der Verkehrssicherheit im Straßenverkehr der 80er Jahre aus der Sicht der Fahrzeugtechnik und Automobilindustrie*, 23 pages manuscript 1983, in: *Historisches Archiv Daimler-Benz sowie Idem., Der Fahrzeugführer, ein Homo Instrumentalis*, in: VDI-Gesellschaft für Fahrzeugtechnik (ed.), *Das Mensch-Maschine-System im Verkehr*, Düsseldorf 1992, pp. 379–425.

CULUS, being developed in the mid-1980s at the Institute for Vehicle Technology of the TU Berlin. The aim was less about body measurements and more about making predictions regarding senso-motoric information processing and the resulting actions of the driver.⁶ The “Design Driver,” “Human Factors in Vehicle Design”, as well as the “Anthropometry in the Design of the Driver’s Workspace” and “the integration of man-machine-environment components into a cohesive unit or system” – these and similar aspects have already been in play for a long time – at least since the famous study of McFarland and Stoudt from 1961 for the American Society of Automobile Engineers (SAE) – as central in the thinking and working of the automotive engineers.

The perspective of historians of technology is, on the other hand, quite different. The man-machine relationship in its historical dimension is, for example, a theme of a new history of the body or a history of the changing relationships between technology and the physical human body. Hybrid techno bodies, dissolving boundaries between body and technology, symbolic and visual representations of the body, the historical approach to the question of how man was measured and the necessary gear and mutual influence of tools, procedures, discourses, actors and media as well as the “opening of the body for biometric and biopolitical interventions” (Theile), have all been and are being historicized.⁷ On the other hand, the historical debate about the changing relationship between technology and users, in order to investigate the “consumption junction” and a complex, multiple feedback process, influenced innovation history to play a role in which users are involved as co-producers of technology. The design of the passenger compartment of the automobile can be considered a description of the negotiation process, including cultural traditions that demonstrated considerable persistence.⁸

Whatever the perspective, at least the scientific construction of the driver resulted in the development of standards, mannequins, templates, and anthropomorphic test devices as dummies and digital human models. To be able to coordinate man and machine, developers need the most accurate data of the user. Knowledge in the field of anthropology and ergonomics is transformed in the field of production. How, and in which way did this process happen? Which anthropometric data were and are introduced in the automotive development? How have these standards and models been developed and used? There are, therefore, three important types of human models, which in turn can be subdivided into several types: templates, dummies and digital human models.

6 See particularly Ibid, p. 227.

7 See B. Orland (ed.), *Artifizielle Körper – Lebendige Technik. Technische Modellierungen des Körpers in historischer Perspektive*, Zürich 2005, p. 9sq. and G. Theile (ed.), *Anthropometrie. Vermessung des Menschen von Lavater bis Avater*, München 2005, especially p. 12. From a gender perspective: H. J. Schmidt, *Menschengeschlecht als normatives Ziel politisch gesteuerter Inkorporierung des Technischen*, Manuskript für das AGT-Kolleg der Hans Böckler Stiftung am MZWTG. See also P. Sarasin, *Reizbare Maschinen. Eine Geschichte des Körpers 1765–1914*, Frankfurt a. M. 2001 and more recently the literature review by D. Siemens, *Von Marmorleibern und Maschinenmenschen. Neue Literatur zur Körpergeschichte in Deutschland zwischen 1900 und 1936*, in: *AfS* 47(2007), pp. 639–682.

8 See K. Möser, *The driver in the machine: changing interiors of the car*, in: H. Trischler and S. Zeilinger (eds.), *Tackling Transport*, London 2003, pp. 61–80.


2. The beginnings of anthropometric thinking in the automotive industry and the long road to templates (Kiel Dummy)

Six trends and issues should be taken into consideration:

First, the beginnings of anthropometric thinking in the automotive industry reach back to the second half of the 1950s. In a way, the annual meeting of the Section Vehicle Technology of the VDI held in March 1957 signaled a starting point, which dealt with the problem of adapting the vehicle to the people. It was the design of the seats, which developed with the intention to optimize the passenger area on the basis of different seat-mass data (mass-leg length, thigh-length mass, shoulder-width mass, *etc.*) from which a “key figure for the convenience” has been elaborated. Dieter Dieckmann from the Max-Planck-Institute for Work Physiology in Dortmund presented research findings on “The effect of vibrations on man,” which later resulted in an extensive research project for VW (“investigations and improvement of a Volkswagen front seat model 1957/58”).

The work of physiologist Henry Dupuis, who headed the former Max Planck Institute for Agriculture and Agricultural Labor, who had his own working group about *Anthropotechnik* and who had delivered a paper on the “The situation of work physiology in the drivers cab” at the VDI session, finally brought things to a head when he demanded that the “previous practice in the industry, first to build a vehicle and finally to squeeze in the driver” must be replaced by a fundamental rethinking.⁹



With the development of the American Standard SAE J 826 (1962), on the one hand, and the “Kiel Dummy” from 1975, on the other, one finds something of a history of the German / European-American competition in the development and use of body-shape templates in the automotive industry.



The creator of the Kiel Dummy, Professor Jürgens, was soon encouraged to note that the templates according to DIN 33408 had been developed for the design of seats of all

9 See VDI-Tagungsbericht in: BTÜ (Betrieb und Technische Überwachung) 2 (1957), p. 150.

kinds, not just specifically for automotive seats. In fact, it was primarily the automotive industry that “has for some years been working successfully with the templates according to DIN 33408 Part 1.” Thus, in the templates, development experience had been incorporated particularly from the automotive industry, but also from the Federal Bureau for Defense Technology and Procurement. Some representatives of other industries, notably from Bosch and Bayer, had criticized this. The suitability of the Kiel puppet for the design requirements in their companies was firmly denied.¹⁰ The design of seats with only a two-dimensional template, or in fact a total of eighteen templates (six each for the front, side and top view), was regarded as too expensive and indeed seen possible only in special cases.¹¹



The so-called “Kieler Puppe” for men and women. (DIN 33408-1:1981, Privat)

At last, in September 1981, they presented a separate proposal for the standard “representation scheme of the human figure.”¹²

Regarding the collection of whole body measurements, the main task then was to grasp body measurements for foreign workers in the Federal Republic. In June 1984, finally a revised standard of DIN 33402 was submitted, “Part 5: Dimensions of the Human Body; values of Italian, Yugoslav and Turkish workers in the Federal Republic of Germany presented.” There were also other complementary volumes to DIN 33402, and from all this arose the need for the “further development of the templates” and especially of the Kiel Dummy. Therefore, in May 1982, tested models of the side view, top view and front view were finally presented. It was, however, also clear that as a working tool, templates now clearly showed their limits. The intention to simulate a variety of body

10 See Brief Bayer an den FNErg vom 13.5.1981 sowie auch Brief Bosch vom 30.6.1981, in: ebd.

11 See Protokoll vom 29.9.1981, S. 3.

12 On that discussion see: Bericht über die Einspruchsverhandlungen zu den Norm-Entwürfen Körpermaße des Menschen und Körperumrißschablonen für Sitzplätze, 9 December 1980, p. 5sq.

positions had led to increasingly complex patterns, and the high number of stacked stencil parts made handling increasingly difficult.¹³

Entwurf DIN 33 408 Teil 1 A1 Seite 3




Bild 2. Gelenkwinkel nach dem funktionstechnischen Meßsystem (Draufsicht)

Fifth, in the various expert groups and working committees of DIN, CEN and ISO, a multitude of (sometimes differing) standards have developed. As in all these areas, from the form and execution of the driver placement, grip force, visibility and seat heights, universal standards only sporadically were available, so “these definitions are based on a variety of scientific, more or less secure documents and consequently differ from or are sometimes even contradictory.”¹⁴ In September 1981, Germans put together a 95-page synopsis of “Design of the driver seats: Compilation and comparative examination of the currently present standards and regulations in this area.” With this document, they led, in some ways, the transnational harmonization efforts for ergonomic standards. The leading role that Germany played here was already demonstrated by the fact that the formation of the international ergonomics committee of ISO (with 33 member countries) on April 3rd, 1975 had been held in the German capital, Bonn.¹⁵ Additionally, these examples demonstrate how long and difficult – not only in the field of ergonomics, but especially in body measurements – the way to overcome the “competitive norm” and to find a single standard or norm in Europe had been.

Sixth, as far as the international data collection was concerned, in 1979 Jürgens presented for the first time body mass data, namely from France, Poland, Italy and the USA, and one year later he added data from Belgium, Germany, Britain, Canada and the Netherlands. Jürgens’ International Body Mass Database increased rapidly in size and

13 See Besprechungsprotokoll, 7 May 1982.

14 Attachment 4 to the Report for 1980.

15 See Tätigkeitsbericht FNErg für die internationale Normungsarbeit im Jahre 1975, p. 1.

complexity. “In this context it is to recognize,” said the anthropometric expert, that “export-oriented countries make major efforts to gain an early knowledge of body size data from foreign countries.”¹⁶ In 1982, he proudly stated that the German rules and technical regulations in (Ergonomics-) standards were by far the largest and the only ones that cover all areas of engineering.¹⁷ The Kiel Dummy, adapted to the SAE mannequin, advanced to the dominant template in the German and Austrian automotive industry, and was only replaced in the mid-nineties by virtual dummies. The German man-model also formed the basis for the 1988 to 2005 efforts that were made in the development and standardization of a two-dimensional “European Template.” It was in a number of characteristics similar to the American standard model, the male template of the 50th Percentile according to SAE J 826, for example, in the h(ip)-point location. Then again, there were also significant differences. The knees and ankles were corrected because of recent anthropometric studies and now had 15 mm greater leg length.¹⁸

3. “The misery with the Dummies.” Development and use of “Anthropomorphic Test Devices” (aspects of European-American competition in the field of crash test dummies) since the 1960s

While the two-dimensional templates were used especially in the product development (the driver’s seat and driver’s workplace) of the automotive industry, in the field of passive safety/accident research, other human models are used: first simple, then increasingly complex test mannequins or crash test dummies. There are, in the context of our specific interest, some interesting findings and noteworthy aspects.

First, in regard to the question of security research, very different philosophies existed between the German or European and American automobile industries. Unlike the European automotive companies, the U.S. automakers, until the mid 1960s, had worked only incidentally on Accident Safety Research. In 1964, GM spent just 1.25 million U.S. dollars for this purpose. Investigating the accident safety by systematic crash-test series were for years seen as pointless in the eyes of the leading managers of the development departments in Detroit, even though the casualty figures rose steadily.¹⁹ Especially in the U.S., there was a clear emphasis on passive safety, and accident prevention was only second on the priority list, while in Europe it was the other way around. Nevertheless, America and the American auto industry and the influential SAE soon took the lead in dummy technology for many years to come. Again, this is an early example of Americanization and Europeanization in man-machine systems.

Secondly it is remarkable that, although in the 1970s the third generation dummy was developed (first “Sierra Sam,” then the VIP Series, “Sierra Stan” and “Sierra Susie,” main-

16 FNErg Tätigkeitsbericht über die internationale Normungsarbeit im Jahre 1980, p. 4.

17 Tätigkeitsbericht 1982, p. 14.

18 See FNErg Jahresbericht für 2005, p. 11, Anhang A.

19 See SPIEGEL Nr. 37, 1973, p. 62sq.

ly developed by GM, soon followed worldwide by the Hybrid Model II), the German automobile industry, especially Daimler Benz, expressed considerable skepticism towards the use of crash test dummies (“The misery of the Dummies”). It favored, on the other hand, until well into the 1970s, to crash test with corpses (cadaver tests) – following the motto: Better a German/European cadaver than an American test dummy. Self-testing (*i.e.*, the engineers put themselves in the impact sled) at times even played a role, and it was not until 1967 when Daimler-Benz made an effort to acquire more test dummies. They maintained close contact at that time with the U.S. manufacturers, investigated intensively in the then-existing crash test dummies, and compared their possibilities of application. According to Gerhard Fuld, who was for many years the “dummy head” of Daimler-Benz, one worked with dummies of different suppliers because, up into the 1970s, no standards for design or properties of dummies existed and each dummy model showed a different behavior. Again and again, the question of the reproducibility of test results dominated the discussions. “The biggest gap,” the then Daimler-development chief Hans Scherenberg complained in a SPIEGEL interview in mid-1973,

*is the unknown relation between the human body and the test dummy. Furthermore, a single dummy's tests are the same but [with] different values, different dummies also give different values, [which] is also a degree of aging. We have variations of up to plus or minus 35 percent, and so of course what ultimately provides no reliable values.*²⁰

How should the safety engineers recognize a difference in the risk of injury by 10 or 20 percent when the readings of the experimental puppet fluctuated by 35 percent? “It is therefore an extremely urgent task,” wrote the Daimler engineer Karl Wilfert in a report in March 1972, “to standardize a test dummy to the best of current knowledge, to define the correlation for living people and ensure reproducibility.”²¹ The already mentioned problem of reproducibility of the measurement was related, in the early 1970s, to the dummies and not to the test cadavers. However, there were also (not only moral) problems in this field:

*The majority of cadavers available were older European American adults who had died non-violent deaths; they did not represent a demographic cross-section of accident victims. Deceased accident victims could not be employed because any data that might be collected from such experimental subjects would be compromised by the cadaver's previous injuries. Since no two cadavers are the same, and since any specific part of a cadaver could only be used once, it was extremely difficult to achieve reliable comparison data.*²²

20 See SPIEGEL Nr. 37, 1973, p. 82sq. See also H. Scherenberg, The Development of the ESV as seen by Daimler-Benz, in: Report on the Second International Technical Conference on Experimental Safety Vehicles, 26. bis 29. 10. 1971 (in Sindelfingen bei DB), p. 2/67-2/72, here Scherenberg criticized for the first time heavily the use of dummies.

21 K. Wilfert, Kritische Auseinandersetzung mit dem Personen-Sicherheitswagen, Manuscript for a presentation on March, 17, 1972 at the VDO-conference, in: HIC Daimler, Bestand Wilfert, Vorträge 4, 1969-72. See also K. Wilfert, Sicherheitsfortschritte im Autobau, in: Automobil Revue 31 (1973), pp. 1-10.

22 See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Crash_test_dummy as well as M. Roach, Stiff. The Curious Lives of Human Cadavers, N.Y. 2003.

Third, since the mid/end of the 1970s, Crash Test Dummies prevailed, and until the mid-1980s automotive designers and engineers closely followed the American safety standard specifications in terms of the size, appearance, *etc.* of the dummies, while also evaluating the collected data of the crash test programs that were concerned. There were also European efforts on the part of the automotive companies as well as at the institutional level, but nothing happened at the legislative level.



Pictures from the Daimler Benz Archive
Stuttgart, Bestand Barenji 6.

The efforts to develop and deploy the dummies always became greater in each case, but they were unsuccessful in significantly narrowing the gap between crash tests and real accidents. The major unknown remained the relation between the human body and the test dummy. Here, simply basic biomechanical research was lacking. There were, though, quite a few activities at the European level. In October 1970, the European Experimental Vehicle Committee was established, not in the least as a response to the American initiative, with the aim “to co-ordinate the car safety technical activities of the European participants in international programs.”²³ Member countries of the EEVC were France, Germany, Italy, England and Sweden. Since its foundation, the Committee had tried “to define on the basis of European experience a sufficiently common view of the future needs for car safety in Europe.” This referred particularly to the test procedure)²⁴ Finally, a working group (WG3-Human Tolerance Levels and occupying protection evaluation techniques) was established which included, *inter alia*, representatives of the French automobile companies as well as representatives of Daimler Benz, Fiat and Vauxhall Motors UK Ltd. This working group dealt *inter alia*, with anthropomorphic dummies. “All dummies currently commercially available have limitations when assessed against the requirements for an ideal test dummy,” according to a first interim report. Problems have arisen, for example, with the Hybrid II dummy, which was originally intended only

23 See the extensive discussion at the EEVC-workshop on „The future for car safety in Europe“, June 1974 in London, in: HIC DB, Bestand Automobil und Sicherheit 1971-84.

24 Ibid., p. 5.

for evaluating airbags.²⁵ Since about October 1971, there was also a European working group of automobile companies on “biomechanics and accident research,” with representatives from VW, Fiat, Daimler-Benz, Peugeot and Renault – at first remarkably without English experts, and even without any Swedes.²⁶ On the third meeting in April 1972, the British (British Leyland engineers) received access, and all participants praised the “valuable experience” and the “open and fair manner in which all parties discussed more or less common problems.”²⁷ Indeed, the automobile companies exchanged details about the problems with reproducibility of the dummy data from seatbelt tests, airbag tests, head acceleration data and the problems arising from the different constructions of the dummy neck.²⁸ Since 1977, this working group has been supplemented by a European biomechanics research connection. Through this connection, the European automobile manufacturers cooperate with domestic and foreign research institutes. “The goal of this alliance is to determine the correlation of tolerance and protection criteria,” according to a status report of the Federal Republic of Germany from the 7th ESV Conference in June, 1979, Paris. Selected crash tests and accidents are costly to reproduce and simulated in laboratory experiments both with cadavers and dummies.²⁹ The competition of real and artificial human models in the R & D in the automotive industry, thus, continued through the late 1970s.



Picture from VW Report 2: Sicherheit. Forschung und Entwicklung im Dienste des Autofahrers (1975), p. 14/15.

Fourth, since the early 1990s, independent European activities began, both in the dummy and dummy-technology development (*e.g.*, EuroSID; TNO TNO Q3 or-10) as well as in cross-enterprise exchange and publishing, *i.e.*, the harmonization and standardization

25 Ibid.

26 An application for the membership of Volvo had been refused, arguing: “No-EEC country, little influence on government, prejudice for accession of other small companies such as Alfa Romeo, BMW, etc.”

27 See Aktennotiz vom 14.4.1972, in: DB-Archiv.

28 See on that matter also Aktennotiz 1682 and 1759 as well as the Protokoll der 4. und 5. Sitzung der Biomechanik-Gruppe am 18./19. 7. 1972 und am 26./27. 10. 1972, in: DB Archiv, o. Sign.

29 See Statusbericht in: DB-Archiv, o. Sign..

of crash-test data (PROMETHEUS; Partnership for Dummy Technology and Biomechanics-PDB). For the verification or development of occupant protection systems with MADYMO3D, for example, only three different dummy sizes existed at that time. The size classification of these dummies, however, did not reflect the real distribution of body size and mass of the European population. A closer look at the distribution of body mass and height of the northern European populations of both sexes clearly demonstrates that the three standard dummies did not cover the whole range of physiques. Furthermore, the populations in southern Europe and Asia, on average, are up to 8 cm smaller and lighter than the population of northern Europe, but the standard dummies are far from this type of anatomy. The present simulation dummies do not cover especially small and corpulent persons. They represent an extreme however, due to their short legs and arms, which shorten the distance between the driver's seat and the steering wheel. This case is similar with very slim and large people. The aim of the study was, therefore, to expand the range of the existing three MADYMO3D dummies by new-scaled anthropometric dummies.

Meanwhile, there is an almost overwhelming wealth of different dummy models, thus concluding: the *Homo Europaeus* as an anthropomorphic test model or crash test dummy became a reality.

4. From experimental improvisation to 3 D computer simulation. Digital human models (ANTHROPOS, RAMSIS; HUMOS)

Not only because of high costs, but also due to the ambiguity of existing data in the automotive industry, numerical crash simulations were performed in addition to real crash tests. In addition to hardware-dummies, numerical dummy models were also used. This practice began in the 1960s, in connection with the advent of modern CAD technologies in the U.S. In Germany, this happened somewhat later. Around the end of 1972 Daimler-Benz thought about creating an algorithm to describe the movement of a vehicle occupant.³⁰ There are several factors to consider.

First, there are methodological issues. The main problem was to derive from the static, collected, often for other purposes, metrics of the human body and form a dynamically consistent human model. The requirement to collect dynamic body measurements and to show and reproduce them in the form of movement spaces implied numerous methodological problems.³¹ For a long time, anthropologists shied away from the claim to deliver and create anthropometric data for computer-aided human modeling. Yet, real dummies, like their numerical representatives, formed the human body inadequately. Thus, the various human tissues such as bones, muscles, ligaments or skin had been reconstructed by using industrial materials like metals and plastics. The degree of biofidel-

30 See Aktennotiz Nr. 1818 vom 13.12.1972, in: DB-Archiv.

31 See K. Erichsen and H.W. Jürgens, Human Body Measures – Dynamic Body Measures, Bremerhaven 1993.

ity, *i.e.*, the figure of the human body by the hardware or software dummies was lacking from the perspective of the engineers and medical experts, despite the elaborate evaluation efforts in several comparison tests with living volunteers and cadavers.³²

Second, at least since 1985, the call for three-dimensional mathematical models (3D-doll) with anthropometrically correct representation of the shape and of the joints was getting louder in German automotive companies. The tools that were used at that time were anthropometric templates SAE (SAE J 826), SAE-measuring machines, mannequins and templates according to DIN 33408 (Kiel puppet), as well as U.S. crash dummies part 572nd. Therefore, the industry worked almost exclusively with non-European data. For example, the SAE-template and measuring machine was based on completely outdated U.S. body mass data prior to 1962, and the anthropometric reproduction was poor due to the use of simplified swivels instead of joint paths (*Gelenkbahnen*). Moreover, the torso portion of the stencil of a 50% of man-size, head and arms were not available. The outer areas of the basin and back shell of the measuring machine were not derived anthropometrically but defined arbitrarily. The “Kiel” puppet still represented the state of the art, though it also worked with earlier data from 1975 (the acceleration per decade was at least 23 mm). Also, the crash dummies had simplified joints, based on outdated body measurements, and above all, they were not compatible with the SAE template and SAE measuring machine! Thus, the anthropometric equipment of the automobile companies in the mid-80s pretty was desolate. Therefore, the demand for new mathematical and computer simulated human models was understandable. However, it was surprising that for Daimler Benz, as a basis for the urgent need to redefine 3D mannequins, German or European body data should not be applied, but “taking into account the acceleration, the development time of new development and the lifetime of the vehicle two 3D puppets to the year 2005 ‘grossed-up’ were to define, that is for the 5% Japanese and the 95% U.S. men.”³³

Since the early 1980s, more and more European computer-human models also appeared on the market, such as the human model Ergoman, developed in 1984 at the University of Paris in the Laboratoire d’Anthropologie et d’Ecole Humaine. It was based on a vast international database of anthropometric measurements (40,000 people) and was even used in the automotive industry. In Germany, also in the mid-1980s, computer-based human models were developed, especially within the framework of a BMBF-funded research program conducted by the TH Darmstadt. These included the models “Franky,” “Heiner” and “Anybody.” By the late 1980s, the number of the developed and used computer models of man worldwide was already so great that the Kiel Anthropometrie-Pope Jürgens, on behalf of the Federal Office for Defense Technology and Procurement,

32 See K. v. Merten et al., Computergestützte Analyse von Verletzungsmechanismen. Numerische Menschmodelle zur Untersuchung von Verletzungsmechanismen bei stumpfer Gewalt, in: Rechtsmedizin 6 (2008), pp. 431-436.

33 Forschungsantrag DB an den FAT-Forschungsbeirat vom 6.8.1985, in: DB-Archiv.

prepared an overview study. There are now real genealogies of generations of human models since the 1960s.³⁴




Abb. 35
REINER ist ein modular aufgebautes Menschenmodell, das an der TU Braunschweig entwickelt wurde (nach Schaub & Rehnert, 1988).




Abb. 32
Die Körpermaße des OSCAR-Nachfolgers ANYBODY sind DIN 55 402 entnommen (nach Lippmann, 1988).

The result of this study was twofold. First, beyond the traditional focus of development work in the U.S., a surprisingly great diversity and great number of computer-based models of man could be concluded in Europe. There were not only the German and French models, but also developments in Finland, Hungary, Romania, England and the Netherlands. Secondly, the problem was that it was far from any uniform standards. Island solutions prevailed, “which is desirable neither from the point of computerized technical perspective (compatibility) nor in anthropometric view (comparability and reliability of data bases).”³⁵

Third, since about the beginning of the 1990s, a fundamental shift took place: from dummy models to realistic human body models, *i.e.*, direct numerical representations of the human body. The statements about the probability of occurrence of injuries in traffic accidents with crash test dummies could be made only indirectly by statistical evaluations of individual technical measurements related to specific body parts. Hardly any relevant statements could be made regarding the injury of broken bones and internal organs. With the help of two newly developed numerical modeling methods, most of these problems could be overcome. When using multi-body system models (MBS), the kinematics and the joints in the various acting forces can be calculated. When using numerical human models on the basis of the other method, the finite element method (FEM) also imposed burdens on all organ systems, for example, individual bones. It


34 H. W. Jürgens, Computermodelle des menschlichen Körpers, Kiel 1989.

35 Ibid., p. 1.

could even calculate the effects on the aorta. Thus, it is possible to significantly increase the knowledge of injuries that occur during an accident.³⁶

Fourth, The Germans (automotive engineers, such as university researchers) played an important and crucial role in the research and development of digital human models at the European level, accompanied by the French. In close cooperation with the German car companies and the Technical University of Munich, the digital human model RAMSIS was developed between 1987 and 1994, which, in a way, set a world standard. It was built on an extensive database of newly collected (approximately 7000 persons were measured using a novel method of body mass scaling) data, supplemented by other large, international anthropometric databases at the University of Potsdam with statistical data on populations from Europe, North and South America, China, Japan, Korea and India and realized by innovative statistical procedures, a typology of anthropometry, posture and comfort.³⁷

The close anthropometric measurement and innovative measurement techniques, without any interface combination of 3D modeling (outer skin and inner skeleton model), and the newly developed software gave RAMSIS a competitive edge over other relevant systems. The system thus contains a typology of persons, which is much more realistic concerning the population than a percentage of several parts of the human body.³⁸



Fifthly, although there was and is perfect trans-national/international cooperation, ultimately the R & D activities for Dummy Technology and industrially usable digital human models can be broken down into triadic projects: The European Humos 2 Project,

36 See also H. Mutschler, *Menschmodelle bei niedrigen Beschleunigungen*, Diss. Universität Tübingen 2007.

37 See J. Hudelmaier, „Das Menschmodell RAMSIS“, in: http://www.lfe.mw.tum.de/forschung/humanmodeling/Ramsis_Flyer.pdf; FAT-Bericht 123: „RAMSIS- ein System zur Erhebung und Vermessung dreidimensionaler Körperhaltungen von Menschen zur ergonomischen Auslegung von Bedien- und Sitzplätzen im Auto“ Frankfurt a.M. 1995; FAT-Bericht 135: „Mathematische Nachbildung des Menschen – RAMSIS 3D-Softdummy“, Frankfurt a.M. 1997.

38 More in detail A. Seidl, H. Bubb et al., *RAMSIS: 3D-Menschmodell und integriertes Konzept zur Erhebung und konstruktiven Nutzung von Ergonomie-Daten*, in: VDI-Kongress, *Mensch-Maschine*, Frankfurt a. M. 1992, pp. 297-309.

the American Global Human Body Model Consortium, and the Japanese Human Body Model Project (JAMA). The development of digital human model Humos (Human Model for Safety) was truly a European project. In 1998, the European vehicle passive safety network (EVPSN) was established; working with EU funds from 2002 to 2006, they collected biomechanical data and launched the mathematical modeling of the complex geometries of the human body. The automobile companies and several universities partnered with the project: the Eindhoven Technical University, the University of Heidelberg, a number of French universities and from industry, Renault, Volvo, VW and Peugeot/Citroën. “The objective of the project is,” according to a paper on this partnership, “to develop human body numerical models representing a large range of the European population and allowing an accurate injury risk prediction.” In practice, the Humos project means that a corpse has been frozen and then cut piece by piece into thin slices, scanning each in detail and then digitizing. Again, it is therefore the case that research is done with real (dead) people, however, not directly but indirectly as the aim is to continuously improve and validate the computer models.

5. Conclusion and outlook

First, the computer simulation of the human body made it possible for the database to no longer represent a kind of *Homo Europaeus*. Now, depending on the application-specific database, individually shaped people can be “created,” for example, German men, French women, or Italian children.

Secondly, the development and marketing of digital human models is now a global business. Innovative engineering and software companies, such as the German Human Solutions GmbH, Carhs GmbH and the First American Technology, now offer a wide range of products and services (see, for example, the annual RAMSIS user conferences). Carhs, under the label eDummy, according to its own statements, offers “the first dummy for numerical simulation in Vehicle Security.” There is another European project, DHErgo, which focuses especially on the simulation of human musculature and the skeleton. The objective is not only to simulate complex movements and the changes of movements with increasing age, but also the interaction of man with his environment. Since 2002, there is also a Partnership for Dummy Technology and Biomechanics (PDB) in which the five genuine German automobile companies (excluding Opel and Ford) and the First American Technology Group work together to improve the crash test dummy technology. The R & D laboratories deal with issues such as the validation of a MADYMO occupant-simulation model to real crash tests using stochastic optimization processes.³⁹ Even after more than fifty years of crash-test dummy supported research, the experts

39 Overview in E. Haug et al., Human Models for Crash and Impact Simulation, in: N. Ayache (ed.), Handbook of Numerical Analysis, Vol. XII: Special Volume: Computational Models for the Human Body, Amsterdam 2004, pp. 231-450.

in the automotive companies do not really know much about what happens inside a human body if, for example, a car with a speed of 50 km/h hits a tree frontally. Crash test dummies still differ significantly from real human bodies.⁴⁰ More and more, experts criticize the increasing efforts to perform crash test simulation techniques, the exploration of the stochastic nature of the crash phenomenon and the logic behind it: “that the crashworthiness optimization of vehicle is possible.”⁴¹ Despite this, another powerful consortium of science and industry was erected in 2006, the U.S. Global Human Body Models Consortium (GHBMC). The members were the former American automobile companies GM, Ford, Daimler-Chrysler and the Japanese car companies Toyota, Honda and Nissan (and the Korean Hyundai Group). European members include the French manufacturers Renault and PSA Peugeot Citroën, and also two suppliers, TRW and Takata. The representatives of science are the Wake Forest University NC (Center for Injury Biomechanics), the Wayne State University, Michigan, the University of Waterloo, Canada and the Virginia Tech University, supported by the European Center for Safety Studies and Risk Analysis (CEESAR) and the French National Institute for Transportation and Safety Research (INRETS). The goal of this project is described as follows: “We are changing our philosophy of designing cars for crash test dummies to designing for humans...”

The cases of the SAE-template, the “Kiel puppet,” Euro-SID dummy and RAMSIS illustrate very clearly the professionalization of the user design within the automotive industry. To that end, particularly the transfer of anthropological standards into the production sphere contributed substantially. They also show, however, the differences between science and practice. Digital human models cannot only be implemented earlier in the development process, but allow for greater individualization and the consideration of biomechanical properties such as weight and body part areas. This can be done through the involvement of medical knowledge such as crash tests, or for the necessary homologation test scenarios, thus significantly reducing costs. However, real crash tests and dummies still cannot be renounced, so that the latter, as well as virtual human models need to be implemented in an analysis of the construction of scientific users in the automotive industry. In other words:

Auto-safety experts use a mix of tools today to measure and improve crashworthiness, including dummies, computer models and even human cadavers. Automakers routinely use exact computer models of their vehicles and parts to run hundreds of virtual crash tests, making small changes later verified with actual crash tests.

Without taking into account operational factors, the interest of the company to design a scientific user remains frightening and ambiguous. It is not about the control of the user

40 J. Wismanns et al., Computational Human Body Models, in: M. D. Gilchrist (ed.), IUTAM Proceedings on Impact Biomechanics: From Fundamental Insights to Applications, Amsterdam 2005, pp. 417-429.

41 J. Marczyk for example criticised under the headline “Automotive Crash: From Bifurcations to Chaos” that the „phenomena that may be catalogued as chaotic and/or random in nature, are inherently deprived of any form of predictability.” J. Marczyk, Automotive Crash Simulation: A Personal Perspective, sl. 2001, pp. 1-12.

but to control the costs. Without taking into account technical factors in the historical interpretation of the human models and the products, the potential of user designs remains in the dark. All human models are fed from data, which can be generated in the human sciences such as anthropology, medicine, and ergonomics. Last but not least, the actors of the specific networks in which the scientific design of user images takes place must be identified and the negotiation processes should be analyzed.

A Europeanization of knowledge of the (West) European automotive industry on the anthropology of its users, for a long time, appeared only as an implicit goal. Europeanization is a contingent outcome of the tense interplay between national and global factors. In the experiment they increasingly felt that the overall liability of the U.S. automobile industry, their standards, and the scientific basis of their approach were lacking. The auto companies in Western Europe began, only by the late twentieth century, to come to an understanding of common technical standards on the basis of an integration of their knowledge about the *Homo Europaeus* as an automobile user. However, this understanding of technology is actually already becoming obsolete. Additionally, the automobile industry develops, ultimately, more and more cars for specific user groups (Smarts, SUVs, vans, electric car, cars for older drivers, cars for heavy and tall people, *etc.*). There is a potential departure occurring from the *Homo Europaeus* to a *Homo Mobilis*: people driving cars, which are designed to their specific and individual (not only in color) needs and constitutions. They are tailor-made cars that are developed by first collecting the individual body measurements and then by taking acceleration into account.

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