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Ideas of Empire after the First World War: Redefining Identity and Citizenship in Colonial Empires

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Leipziger Universitätsverlag

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Introduction.
The First World War and
the Global Transformation
of Colonial Empires*

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ABSTRACT

Die Einleitung bietet einen Überblick über die Entwicklung der Kolonialreiche nach dem Ersten Weltkrieg. Sie legt dar, wie in den 1920er Jahren das koloniale Ideal neu formuliert wurde. Durch die Schilderung der Folgen des Weltkriege in Afrika und im Nahen Osten deckt sie auf, wie der Friede von Paris 1919 und der daraus entstehende Völkerbund neue koloniale Machtstrukturen formalisierten. Anhand von britischen, französischen, deutschen und italienischen Fallbeispielen wird deutlich gemacht, dass die Politik der Nachkriegszeit, anstatt Emanzipation zu fördern, Konzepte von Rasse, Geschlecht und Staatsangehörigkeit verwendete, um neue konservative Strategien für den Erhalt imperialer Einheit zu artikulieren und institutionalisieren.

The essays in this special issue deal with the transformative power of the First World War on imperial identity. Empires, as Jürgen Osterhammel fittingly defines, are large, hierarchical structures of domination comprising multiple ethnic and religious differences, whose coherence is secured by threats of violence, unified administration, indigenous collaboration, and the universalist programme and symbols of an imperial elite.[1] More specifically, the empires considered here are colonial empires, which, according to Charles Maier, are states which rule dependencies by authoritarian methods while

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1 J. Osterhammel, Europamodelle und imperiale Kontexte,, in: Journal of Modern European History 2 (2004): 157–81.

governing their homelands by representative systems.[2] The articles in this issue discuss how colonial empires reshaped their policies towards colonial subjects after the global transformation at the wake of the First World War.

The narrative of the First World War as a watershed for empires is a classic one. The consequences of the war were more dramatic in Europe than in the colonies, given the collapse of the three land empires, Habsburg, Russian, and Ottoman. According to the standard narrative, the Great War marked the beginning of the end of an international system dominated by empires, soon to be replaced by an international system of nation-states on the Westphalian model. It was a turning point for colonial empires because it had a corrosive impact on imperial legitimacy.[3] However, the First World War had its origins in an era of high imperialism, was fought by imperial powers to determine who would dominate Europe and the wider world, and ended with the preservation of European imperialism for another generation.[4] It did transmit a sense of urgency that eventually helped accelerating the dissolution of colonial empires. But during the war, and even in its aftermath, 'the Empire was not only something to die for, it was an ideal to live for'.[5]

Although not fought primarily in or for colonial possessions, the First World War was a war of multi-ethnic, global empires.[6] It was global in nature mainly because from its inception the war involved colonial possessions. The European powers' imperial interests precipitated armed conflict in eastern, western, and southern Africa, in the Middle East, and on a smaller scale in Asia. Britain attacked German colonies in Africa before engaging in European fronts. In the Middle East, Allied forces confronted Turkish armies very early on. In Asia, Japan joined the war against Germany as early as August 1914. European and non-European soldiers from the colonies fought both in Europe as well as around the globe. The use of colonial soldiers to fight on the Western Front aroused the spectre of the demise of European supremacy. The participation of African and Asian troops in the slaughter of white men, their access to white women in ways before unthinkable and, finally, the use of black soldiers in the post-war occupation all threatened the traditional imperial order of racial supremacy.[7]

In Africa, the introduction of conscription was labelled as "blood tax." The war caused the largest movement of Africans since the Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade. It caused revolts,

2   C. S. Maier, Among Empires: American Ascendancy And Its Predecessors, Harvard University Press, Cambridge MA, 2006, p. 5.

3   E. Manela, The Wilsonian Moment, Oxford University Press, 2007; see R. Gerwarth and E. Manela, The Great War as a Global War: Imperial Conflict and the Reconfiguration of World Order, 1911–1923, in: Diplomatic History (2014) 38 (4): 786-800, here p. 787.

4   J. H. Morrow jr, The Imperial Framework, in J. Winter (ed.), The Cambridge History of the First World War, vol. I, p. 428. On the caution adopted in the British Empire as for mobilisation of non white troops see B. Nasson, British Imperial Africa, in: R. Gerwarth and E. Manela, Empires at War: 1911–1923, Oxford, Oxford University Press 2014, pp. 130-151, here p. 405.

5   P. Yeandle, Citizenship, Nation, Empire: the Politics of History Teaching in England, 1870–1930, Manchester, Manchester University Press, 2015.

6   Gerwarth and Manela, Empires at War: 1911–1923, Introduction.

7   J. H. Morrow jr, The Imperial Framework.

and sunk the paternalistic myth of an untroubled civilising mission. During the war, colonial powers compressed produce prices and wages, thus affecting the living standards of producers and workers. Economic hardship and social distress soon fuelled social upheaval in the colonies. Demands from the colonial power included army conscription, forced labour service, pillaging of peasant homes, requisition of goods and compulsory cultivation of prescribed crops.[8] The war in Africa led to famine, disease, destruction and depopulation, and bolstered anticolonial politicisation. More than a million African soldiers who fought on various fronts participated in protest politics after the war, disillusioned at home by a system of African chiefly rule collaborating with colonial power. West Indian soldiers' service in their regiments in Africa and the Middle East stimulated the rise of Black Nationalism as they began the struggle for national liberation in the British West Indies. In Asia, non-white troops mainly served along the British in East Africa, Mesopotamia, Palestine and Egypt.[9] When not admitted as soldiers, Asians were used as foreign workers. Britain was sceptical of using Chinese labour, since it had been a problem in South Africa before the war, and instead insisted on the protection of white labour in the Empire. France was less worried about the use of Vietnamese labourers and soldiers.

The First World War drastically changed the global balance of power. At the end of the conflict, economic indexes suggested that the old colonial powers, namely Germany, Great Britain, France and Belgium, were regressing. The Habsburg and the Ottoman empires had collapsed, and Tsarist Empire had given way to the Soviet Union, a polity which called itself anti-imperialist. Yet, while in theory peace-making in Paris recommended the self-determining nation state as the only legitimate form of statehood, the victor states were all empires in one form or another. This was the case for Britain and France, whose empires expanded further, gathering important pieces of Ottoman Empire and appropriating previously German colonies through the new legal instrument of the mandates, which reconfigured the idea of the civilising mission as an international treaty law.[10] The latecomer aspiring empires, Italy and Japan, tried to catch up in a new great imperial game in the years after 1918. Even the United States was an empire, with its sovereignty extending to Alaska, Hawaii, Puerto Rico, Panama and the Philippines.[11] After the war, empires not only survived but also expanded their sphere of action.

Imperial structures could find a cosy place in the League of Nations, which became a "guardian of empire" or even a sounding board for imperial governance, as pictured in Susan Pedersen's *The Guardians* or in Mark Mazower's *No Enchanted Palace*.[12] After the

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8   B. Nasson, Africa, in: J. Winter (ed.), The Cambridge History of the First World War, I, pp. 433-458, here p. 449

9   G. Xu, Asia, ibid., 479-510, here p. 489

10   S. Pedersen, The Guardians : The League of Nations and the Crisis of Empire, New York, NY, Oxford University Press, 2015.

11   R. Gerwarth, The Vanquished: Why the First World War Failed to End, 1917–1923, London, Allen Lane, 2016, pp. 176-177.

12   M. Mazower, No Enchanted Palace: The End of Empire and the Ideological Origins of the United Nations, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2009.

war, the major colonial empires, France and Britain, set forth to execute their war plans for the Middle East, adapting to the new methods suggested by international law. In January 1919 the British Empire reached its peak, with a million additional square miles acquired in former Ottoman territories. In 1920 the French took control of Syria as a first step to their rule over Syria and Lebanon. After riots in Egypt (1919) and a revolt in Iraq (1920), the British government granted both regions limited autonomy in 1922. That same year, Britain acquired the League mandate over Palestine.

Peace-making in Paris after 1918 did not crush colonialism – rather, it formalised colonial power. Requests for the abolition of the colonial system, stemming not only from socialist movements and philanthropies but also from nascent pan African and pan Asian movements fell into deaf ears. The Covenant of the League of Nations, signed as Part I of the 1919 Versailles Treaty, specifically protected the colonial mind-set in two articles. Article 22 is the most well-known, because it is the article that introduced the mandate system, which entrusted to a specific great power territories that claimed independence but were not considered mature enough for it. In fact, it was the institutionalisation of the civilising mission under international supervision. But more explicitly the full endorsement of colonialism can be found in article 23, which lists the duties of colonial powers, including the just treatment of natives, the prevention of trafficking of women, children, drugs and arms, and the containment of disease. International law, the "gentle civiliser" of nations[13], civilised even racial prevarication, and formalised multiple standards, applying differential standards with respect to a civilisational ranking. The "mature" (white) civilisations were assigned the civilising mission; the new nationalities in Central and Eastern Europe had to enter obligations for the protection of minorities, while coloured races had no responsibility at all.

In the 1920s, the anticolonial rhetoric championed by Woodrow Wilson disappeared, and the word "empire" was trendy again. The colonial ideology was revived, now dominated by new ideas on the economic value of the colonies and new arguments about the administration of empire. Sir Frederick Lugard's 1922 book *Dual Mandate in Tropical Africa* described Britain's indirect rule. In France, the Overseas Minister Albert Sarraut published *La mise en valeur des colonies françaises* in 1923, arguing for modernising imperial administration and its economy. Even Italy declared its own empire as soon as it reached acceptable dimensions, following the conquest of Ethiopia in 1936. In the 1930s, German claims to get back the colonies failed to make much of an impression: many in the League of Nations, including peace movements, requested a colonial redistribution to compensate for Versailles diktat.[14]

With the economic and financial crisis in 1929, the sense for promoting a new imperial harmony became widespread. "Unity in diversity" became the new slogan by anthro-

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13   The reference is to M. Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations: The Rise and Fall of International Law 1870–1960. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2001.

14   C. Metzger, L'empire colonial français dans la stratégie du Troisième Reich (1936–1945), Peter Lang, Bern 2002, pp. 14–54.

pologists who advocated respect for local traditions and ecologies. Colonial exhibitions offered an idyllic picture that hardly reflected reality. Peace after conquest was nothing but fictional, with armed resistance being the rule. Indeed, protests were crushed with violence. Such military operations in the colonies were known under the term pacification; the Amritsar massacre in Punjab (1919), Abd el Krim's revolt in Morocco between 1921 and 1926, upheavals in Java and Sumatra in 1926-27 and in Indochina in 1930 were notable instances. Restructuring empires required the extraction of more resources, which reinforced local protests. Younger generations' turning towards anticolonial nationalism and communism was a severe blow for the imperial system[15]. *Evolué* intellectuals worked to dismantle colonial ideology, and criticised the concept of western superiority. During the war, some members of the élites had seen the adversaries of the imperial system, such as Germany, the United States, and the Bolsheviks, as their natural allies. In the interwar years, Japanese ascendancy, Sun Yat-sen's China and Gandhian nationalism became models for political organisation and non-cooperation with colonial power. While the new ideologies combined traditions with imported liberal or Marxist influences, in the Middle East Islam forged important political connections.

This collection of essays represents a coherent selection of papers presented at the conference "Empires after the First World War: Ideas of Empire, Identity and Citizenship" held at the University of Trento on 19-20 May 2016. The contributions focus on how empires responded to the challenges of imperial identity following the Great War. Broadly, they argue that reform and not revolution had been of the agenda of those who criticised the existing imperial structures. Although the decline of empires has been portrayed as a historical inevitability, few people in 1914 or 1918 saw the fall of imperialism as inevitable. The papers agree that at the beginning and also at the end of the war, empire was to persist both for the colonial powers and the colonised peoples, notably in Africa. They also show that all colonial empires made an effort to rethink parts of their sovereignty, especially concepts of citizenship. In this way they accommodated requests from the colonised territories, which, in contrast, rarely claimed full equality in rights and duties- often considering adoption of Western models as immoral. This ensued reforms and actually revived imperial ideas for some time, forcing the imperial powers to export the welfare state in the colonies. The war of 1914–18, far from fulfilling Wilson's hope for a world safe for democracy, ended by protecting and enhancing the global rule of whites over other races. For an imperialist mind, military victories, the conquests of great territories and their subject populations became evidence of the racial and moral superiority of the conquerors.[16]

In most of the cases discussed here, colonial administrators represented the war as a unifying moment. This was done most clearly through the elaboration of new statutes for citizenship, a something typical and peculiar instrument of empires.[17] During the First

15   C. S. Maier, Among Empires, p. 134.
16   J. H. Morrow jr, The Imperial Framework, pp. 405-406.
17   J. Burbank and F. Cooper, Empires, in: World History. Power and the Politics of Difference, Princeton, Princeton

World War basic assumptions about race, gender, citizenship, and rights were fundamentally reconsidered.[18] The war affected citizenship in several ways. It created national communities transcending barriers of class, extended welfare, strengthened and expanded formal citizenship because of the broader conscription and introduced restrictions against enemy aliens.[19] The war had been in many cases a battle to prove loyalty, leading to promote imperial citizenship as a valid prospect. Multi-layered identities could find a synthesis in imperial nationalism more than in imperial disruption. Dan Gorman's paper on the ideas of imperial citizenship in the British Empire makes a strong case for this. The war, Gorman explains, intensified both imperial loyalty and anti-colonial nationalism. It accelerated imperial fragmentation, while the post-war emergence of international governance and the intensification of public and private international networks provided alternate supra-national modes of identification for imperial subjects. As a reaction, the war's most important legacy for the British Empire was to bring under the same hat the various and disparate imperial ideas and identities which had circulated before the war, thus forcing Britain to deal with questions of imperial citizenship within a unified field of vision.

In his essay on colonial reform in Algeria, Donal Hassett shows how Algerian political actors saw participation in the war as an opportunity to adjust the colonial system in their favour. Their vision of post-war society did not call into question imperial rule, nor did it fully embrace the principle of self-determination and the prospect of mass nationalist political movements. Activists in Algeria largely opted to pursue a programme for reform within the framework of a reconfigured French Empire. This translated into self-government for settlers, and in improved citizenship rights for natives. In the North African context, argues Hassett, the Wilsonian moment was realised because of a process of imitation. The Wafd Party in Egypt, for instance, triggered Wilsonian appeals as a mark of conformism while local leaders (such as Emir Khaled in Algeria) were not acting in the expectation of self-determination.

The British and the French faced similar predicaments and adopted double standards in dealing with native communities. In the British Empire, both in the dominions and in the white settler communities, service in the war promised a future of greater autonomy. This also meant greater sovereignty over immigration, including the possibility of introducing openly racist policies, which were not necessarily officially endorsed at all-imperial level. In other colonies, instead, the extension of citizenship rights prevailed. In the French Empire, as shown in Hassett's piece on France's most important colony, Algeria, the war created two sets of obligations. The central problem was the designing of a reform, which would placate indigenous elites without alienating the European settlers.

University Press, 2010; A. Miller and S. Berger, Nationalizing Empires, Budapest, Central European University Press, 2014. p. 8.

18   D. Ekbladh, Introduction: Legacies of World War I, Commemorative Issue, in: Diplomatic History (2014) 38 (4): 696-699 and H-Diplo Forum on "Legacies of World War I Commemorative Issue." Available at https://networks.h-net.org/node/28443/discussions/67763/h-diplo-article-review-522-forum-%E2%80%9Clegacies-world-war-i.

19   A. Fahrmeir, Citizenship: the Rise and Fall of a Modern Concept, New Heaven, Yale University Press, 2007, p. 119.

Paradoxically, Muslim identity offered a fantastic way out: extending full French citizenship was not acceptable for Muslim colonial subjects, who were comfortable keeping personal and family law within tradition.

This was the case of Italian colonies as well, as shown in the essay by Federico Cresti. In Libya, just as in Algeria, colonial empires were building on the accommodating tradition of Ottoman rule, where segmented categories of belonging could coexist. Given the plurality of religions and languages, collective and individual rights articulated in various ways. In his paper on post-war prospects for Libya, Cresti deals with the discussions that took place in government circles, political parties, and in the public sphere right after the war. The adoption of Italian Civil Law was not acceptable for the local population, who saw in the extension of Italian citizenship an "unbearable moral coercion". Both Muslim and Jewish traditions were to be maintained. After the war, Italian authorities preferred indirect rule to military direct annexation. Agreements negotiated with local authorities included prohibition of Muslim women to marry outside their religious group, application of family law according to religious tradition, acknowledgement of religious endowments, and non-applicability of laws on conscription and military service. The statutes granted to Tripolitania and Cyrenaica in 1919 mentioned the uplifting "to the moral and political dignity of citizens". They stressed equality before the law and the guarantee of the Italian bill of rights (individual freedom, inviolability of domicile an property), the right to vote and to serve in the civil service and in the military, the right of emigration and the right to acquire metropolitan citizenship. At the same time, they allowed for differentiated personal law regimes and granted local education systems.

Sabina Donati addresses specific issues connected with personal law from the point of view of native women in several colonial settings. Her paper is a review article on the connections between gender identities and the imperial dimension. It has at its core the problems of interracial unions in Africa, with a focus on the Italian colonies there. It also discusses at length how citizenship was ruled for children born in mixed marriages. From the perspective of gender history, this paper reinforces the conclusions of the previous essays collected here, and makes it further clear that the racial divide was stronger than any other form of obligation or political necessity.

How the racial dimension prevaricated any other possible political consideration stands out especially in the paper by Florian Wagner on the German racist and potentially anti-Colonial Empire. After an interesting analysis on the cultural blindness that affected several important representatives of African pride, from W.E.B. Du Bois to Léopold Senghor and Aimé Cesaire, all fascinated by German culture and by the theories of the German anthropologist Leo Frobenius, Wagner explains why Germans were not able to pursue a consequent strategy using the support they could boost in former colonial territories in Africa (and beyond) in order to destabilise enemy empires. They did not even try to turn Berlin or Hamburg into anti-colonial metropolis, leaving the role of the *prima donna* to Paris. Wagner argues that the Germans were too racist to use solidarity with anticolonial movements as a political weapon. They firmly believed in the inferior-

ity of natives and did not even dream of challenging the principle of the international solidarity of the colonial powers.

As Akira Iryie contends, the Great War did not fundamentally alter the main tenets of its age. It did not change leaders' focus on geopolitics, the salience of the state, or the general segregation of the world's population.[20] The case studies collected here largely conform to Iryie's conclusion. Rather than planting seeds for the future collapse of colonial domination or engendering revolutionary understandings of modernity, the Great War as a global phenomenon served as an opportunity to promote conservative strategies of imperial unity while managing an increasing awareness of diversity. It disclosed the reality of reinforcing global rule of whites over other races, while paying lip service to ideas of cosmopolitan togetherness in rearranged plans of empire.

20   A. Iriye, The Historiographic Impact of the Great War, Diplomatic History (2014) 38 (4): 751-762.

Fractured Empire: Ideas of Imperial Citizenship in the British Empire after the First World War

Dan Gorman

ABSTRACT

Der Erste Weltkrieg brachte Bürger aus Großbritannien, und Untertanen aus den britischen Dominions und dem Kolonialreich zusammen, sowohl auf dem Schlachtfeld als auch hinter der Kampffont. Er hat sie auch unter einem historischen Rahmen vereinigt, was in den Nachkriegsjahren zu einer intensiven Beschäftigung mit den rassischen und legalen Widersprüchen der Staatsbürgerschaft des Britischen Empire führte. Der Krieg verursachte eine engere Zusammenarbeit zwischen Großbritannien und den Dominions an Fragen von gemeinsamem Interesse, vertieft durch eine gemeinsame Loyalität zum britischen Empire, eine Verbundenheit der weißen Rassen, und eine gemeinsame Kriegserfahrung. Immerhin verlangten die Politiker aus den Dominions größere Autonomie auf Grund derer Kriegsleistungen und Nationalisten in den Kolonien setzten sich für mehr Bürgerechte für ihre Wählerschaft ein. Dieser Artikel untersucht die rhetorischen, rechtlichen, moralischen, und materiellen Aspekte der Staatsbürgerschaft des Britischen Empire während des Ersten Weltkriegs und in den Jahren danach. Die verschiedenen Formen der Loyalität zum Britischen Empire und der koloniale Nationalismus, die die Untertanen des Empire zur Teilnahme an Großbritanniens globalen Krieg motivierten, werden erläutert. Auch untersucht wird wie der Krieg größere Zusammenarbeit sowie mehr Konflikte innerhalb des Britischen Empire verursachte, und die Entstehung in der Zwischenkriegszeit von antikolonialen Loyalitäten sowie weißen Loyalitäten zum Britischen Empire.

The First World War was a global conflict, in no small part due to the British Empire's participation. Imperial subjects were united through common allegiance to the Crown, and were at war when Britain entered the conflict in 1914. India contributed over 1.3 million soldiers and labourers to the war effort. Canada sent 620,000 Canadians to Eu-

rope, while 420,000 Australians, 130,000 New Zealanders, and 136,000 South Africans served in the Mediterranean, North Africa, and on the western front. The campaigns in east, west, and southern Africa were explicitly imperial, and drew over 100,000 Africans into the conflict mainly as soldiers, porters, and labourers.[1] Yet, as demonstrated by conscription debates in Canada and Australia, South African tensions between imperialists and Afrikaner nationalists, and the Easter Rebellion in Ireland in 1916, imperial loyalty was not an uncontested identity. Even those imperial subjects who fought willingly for "King and Empire" often interpreted the latter through colonial nationalist rather than pan-imperial or British terms.

The war was a crucible. It fostered closer imperial cooperation in the short term between Britain and the Dominions on issues of shared interest, cemented by a shared sense of imperial loyalty and white racial affinity buttressed by the common experience of war sacrifice. At the same time, the war's intensity created fissures that progressively widened through the interwar years. Dominion politicians appealed to their societies' wartime service in claims for greater autonomy as constituent polities within the British Empire, while colonial nationalists pressed for expanded imperial citizenship rights for their constituents. As a result, the ideal of imperial citizenship gained greater rhetorical, legal, moral, and material form after the war. Yet, ironically, this very process of substantiation served to dissolve the bonds of imperial loyalty to which imperial citizenship appealed. Ideas of imperial loyalty had always been strongest as sentiment and cultural attachment. They resonated in the abstract, and began to dissolve under pressure. This dynamic was evident during the Second South African War (1899–1902). While the settlement colonies sent regiments to fight alongside the British, the war also occasioned anti-imperial opposition in Britain (the pro-Boers, whose ranks included David Lloyd George) and in the Empire (especially amongst non-British subjects, such as Quebeçois nationalists led by Henri Bourassa).

The experience of the First World War brought together imperial subjects from Britain, the Dominions, and the colonial empire on the battlefield and behind the lines in British towns and cities. It also united them within a single historical framework, which necessitated in the postwar years an active engagement with the racial and legal inconsistencies of imperial citizenship. Interwar imperial thinkers considered means of overcoming these inconsistencies by devising frameworks which could incorporate non-white colonial elites, as well as privileging local authorities as a means of weakening colonial subjects'

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1   J. Beaumont, "Unitedly we have fought": Imperial Loyalty and the Australian War Effort, in: International Affairs 90 (2014) 2, 398; History of the Great War: Based on Official Documents: Military Operations, France and Belgium, 1914, London, Macmillan, 1925, pp. 20-24; R. Gerwarth and E. Manela (eds.), Empires at War, 1911–1923, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014; J. Winter (ed.), Cambridge History of the First World War, Vol. I: The Global War, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2014; L. Sondhaus, World War One: The Global Revolution, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2011; M. Neiberg, Fighting the Great War: A Global History, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006; J. Morrow, The Great War: An Imperial History, New York: Routledge, 2004; H. Strachan, The First World War, Vol. I: To Arms, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001.

claims to a common imperial citizenship.[2] Rather than foster greater imperial cohesion, however, the former alienated imperial nationalists from their colonial nationalist peers, while the latter served to isolate colonies from each other and circumvent the possibility of significant pan-imperial anti-colonial activism.

Imperial Loyalty, Colonial Nationalism, and the British Empire's Global War

The First World War intensified both imperial loyalty and colonial nationalism in the Dominions. National commemorative initiatives began before the war's end. Australians and New Zealanders marked the first ANZAC day on 25 April 1916 to honour their countrymen who died at Gallipoli. After the war, Dominion war memorials were unveiled in Europe at battlefields such as Delville Wood (South Africa, 1926) and Vimy Ridge (Canada, 1936), in Dominion capitals such as Canberra (Australia, 1941), as well as in local town squares across the Empire. Perhaps the most intensive case of postwar imperial cooperation was the Imperial War Graves Commission (IWGC), founded in 1917 by Fabian Ware, a British Red Cross mobile unit commander, to identify and provide burial grounds for the millions of Commonwealth dead across Europe and the Middle East. The IWGC's signature initiative was the Thiepval Memorial, which commemorates the 72,195 British and Commonwealth soldiers who died on the Somme battlefields. The IWGC was the first autonomous imperial partnership, with Britain and the Dominions each making financial contributions. The Australian Prime Minister Stanley Bruce even proposed (unsuccessfully) in 1924 that a fully-fledged Imperial Secretariat be created on the IWGC model.[3] IWGC cemeteries became markers of imperial sacrifice; in Ware's description in 1923, they constituted an empire of "honour around the world."[4] They were also, however, symbols of personal and national sacrifice, with Canadian soldiers' graves marked with a maple leaf and South Africans' with a springbok.

Similar multiple meanings became attached to the thousands of collected war relics and souvenirs that found their way into imperial, national and local museums, and soldiers' private homes. The British War Office collected material for the Imperial War Museum in London, opened by King George V on 9 June 1920 as "as lasting memorial of common effort and common sacrifice." It served this purpose through the interwar years, first at its initial grounds at the Crystal Palace (where it attracted 1,433,981 visitors in its first nine months), then in South Kensington, and finally from 1936 at its present location in Lambeth. Dominion war offices such as the Australian War Records Section also

2   A. Behm, Imperial History in Britain, 1880–1940: Pasts, Politics and the Making of a Field, PhD Dissertation, Yale University, 2012, pp. 257-61, pp. 265-71.
3   F. Ware, The Immortal Heritage: An Account of the Work and Policy of the Imperial War Graves Commission During Twenty Years, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1937; G. E.H. Palmer, Consultation and Cooperation in the British Commonwealth, London: Oxford University Press, 1934, pp. 210-11. The IWGC was renamed the Commonwealth War Graves Commission in 1960.
4   W. Taylor, War Remains: Contributions of the Imperial War Graves Commission and the Australian War Records Section to Material and National Cultures of Conflict and Commemoration, National Identities 17 (2015) 2, p. 224.

collected materials for national war memorials, illustrating how the war's imperial legacy was interpreted through nationalist perspectives. Interwar British Empire exhibitions also celebrated imperialism, particularly the purported benefits of imperial trade. Displays such as the West Africa exhibit at the 1924 Wembley exhibition (which included African craftsmen who lived on site), however, ironically demonstrated the period racism which undermined claims to inclusive imperial citizenship. While some Africans and Indians embraced the Exhibition out of imperial loyalty, others boycotted it or pointed to it as a call for imperial reform.[5]

A different form of commemoration emerged with the postwar publication of official histories of the imperial war effort. These included the *British Official History* (twenty-nine volumes published between 1922 and 1948), the *Official History of the South African Brigade* (1924), *The Official History of Australia in the War of 1914–1918* (edited by Charles Bean from 1920-42), and the *Official History of the New Zealand Effort in the Great War* (four volumes published from 1921-3).[6] Each of these projects stressed in part the shared imperial nature of the war, particularly from an operational standpoint. They drew on official documents, and like similar projects carried out in other protagonist states, they were conceived as both nation-building exercises and early efforts in international public diplomacy.

Collectively these memorial practices encouraged a shared sense of imperial citizenship, especially amongst veterans and those close to men lost at war. The prominent Canadian writer and imperialist Stephen Leacock, for instance, argued in 1932 that the Empire should cancel all war payments and create an imperial tariff zone within which capital, migrants, and trade could circulate freely.[7] The war also gave rise to alternate nationalist identities, however. The Canadian parliamentarian Agnes Macphail criticized the consensus view that Canada's war dead had made a sacrifice for a just and noble cause, namely the defense of the empire, pointing to the war's more prosaic economic causes instead.[8] While her views were shouted down in the House as "spiritually desolate," Macphail's criticism of the emerging postwar Canadian nationalist myth that the war had helped forge the nation illustrates how ideas of "the nation" were contested even in the war's immediate aftermath. Similar views were offered by the Canadian nationalist John S. Ewart, who criticized the postwar celebration of Empire Day as an objectionable

5   T. Charman, "A Museum of Man's Greatest Lunatic Folly': The Imperial War Museum and its Commemoration of the Great War, 1917–2008 in A Part of History: Aspects of the British Experience of the First World War, London, Continuum, 2008, pp. 99-100, p. 102; Taylor, War Remains, p. 225, pp. 229-34; D. Simonelli, '[L]aughing nations of happy children who have never grown up': Race, the Concept of Commonwealth and the 1924–25 British Empire Exhibition, in: Journal of Colonialism and Colonial History 10 (2009) 1; D. Stephen, The Empire of Progress: West Africans, Indians, and Britons at the British Empire Exhibition, 1924-25, London, Palgrave, 2013, pp. 98-101, pp. 118-20.

6   A. Green, Writing the Great War, London, Frank Cass, 2003, pp. 5-20. The Official History of the Canadian Army in the First World War was not published until 1962.

7   S. Leacock, Back to Prosperity, Toronto, Macmillan, 1932, p. 17, pp. 20-6, pp. 34-9.

8   J. Vance, Death so Noble: Memory, Meaning, and the First World War, Vancouver: UBC Press, 1997, pp. 262-3.

"glorification of imperialistic acquisitions."[9] He called for Canada to exert its independence by holding its own counsel on whether to join future imperial wars. It ultimately did so first during the Chanak Crisis in 1922, when it refused Lloyd George's call for imperial aid in proposed military action against Turkey, and then in 1939 when it waited a week after Britain to declare war on Germany after a parliamentary debate.

Antipodean responses to the war were equally mixed. Imperial loyalist organizations such as the Returned and Services League of Australia and the New Zealand Returned Servicemen's Association called attention to servicemen's demonstration of imperial citizenship during the war. Political leaders invoked the war in their calls for broader imperial partnership, as in 1923 when New Zealand Prime Minister William Massey called a Belfast audience's attention to their countries' shared "patriotic spirit of loyalty to the Crown and love and appreciation for the empire which our [common] ancestors built up."[10] Yet the pre-war invented tradition of Empire Day was largely neglected in postwar Australia and New Zealand in favour of ANZAC Day, which served as both a patriotic celebration and a day to commemorate fallen soldiers. For many returned diggers themselves, it was mateship and local considerations rather than imperial sentiment that framed their war memories. In the Australian veteran Fred Farrall's account, ANZAC Day served "to cultivate a spirit of war in the community. Of admiration or respect or honour or something for war." National pride, race patriotism, and imperial loyalty became intermixed in postwar Australia, which lost the highest proportion of its troops (19%). Stephen Garton has termed this hybrid postwar identity "Empire nationalism."[11] The Australian *School Paper*, used widely by teachers, increasingly featured nationalist songs and internationalist themes instead of imperial materials.[12] The decline of British and imperial sentiment was also caused by demographics, as the percentage of native-born Australian and New Zealand citizens increased as compared to British migrants, and rising American cultural and naval defense ties. In a war fought for the defense of empire, it was national, international, and local identities that developed most intensely.

The complicated dynamics of imperial citizenship can also be seen in the war service of indigenous peoples. Although indigenous peoples were British subjects, they faced various racially-motivated barriers to full citizenship in the Dominions. First Nations people in Canada were thus not conscripted, but approximately 4,000 enlisted voluntarily, and groups such as the Six Nations Women's Patriotic League provided supplies and raised money for the war effort. The latter experience shaped Six Nations women's postwar social reform activities, a domestic legacy of their wartime patriotic service. The New

9   J. S. Ewart, The Independence Papers, Vol. I, Ottawa, 1925, p. 74.
10   Massey quoted in K. Jeffery, Distance and Proximity in Service to the Empire: Ulster and New Zealand between the Wars, in: Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 36 (2008) 3, p. 461.
11   S. Garton, Demobilization and Empire: Empire Nationalism and Soldier Citizenship in Australia after the First World War – in Dominion Context, in: Journal of Contemporary History 50 (2015) 1, 128-9.
12   F. Farrall quoted in A. Thomson, Anzac Memories, 2nd edition, Clayton, Monash University Publishing, 2013, p. 202; Beaumont, "Unitedly we have fought", pp. 398-400; J. Griffiths, Imperial Culture in Antipodean Cities, 1880–1939, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014, pp. 67-8, p. 158.

Zealand government authorized a Maori Pioneer Battalion in 1915, following Britain's decision to mobilize Indian troops. The government saw the Maori as fellow imperial citizens liable for the responsibility of service, while many of the 2,200 Maori who served at Gallipoli and in France saw the war as an opportunity to express both their imperial and Maori identities. As the Maori medical officer Peter Buck (Te Rangih‾iroa) declared, the Maori were "a fighting race."[13] Even in Australia, where Aborigines were precluded from active enlistment on racially prejudicial grounds, between 800–1000 Aborigines volunteered during the war. Many of them counterintuitively cited imperial loyalty as their motivation, and pressed (unsuccessfully) for postwar benefits on the grounds of their imperial citizenship service.[14]

Indians served in the Sinai and Mesopotamia (where 8,000 found themselves besieged at Kut from December 1915–April 1916), and replaced most of the Australian, New Zealand, and Irish troops in the Egyptian Expeditionary Force (EEF) in Palestine in 1918, which also included a small French colonial force in a case of intra-imperial cooperation. They also served behind the lines in France, and many wounded sepoys convalesced at hospitals in Britain. The personal bond of loyalty to the King-Emperor was important for many of these men, such as the soldier who professed to be "in Paradise" after George V visited wounded Indian soldiers in Brighton in early 1915.[15] Some Indians were motivated by imperial, or at least nationalist, motivations to serve, and used the language of imperial loyalty against Britons they encountered who had not enlisted. Yusuf Khan, writing from a Brighton hospital in 1915, recounted a fellow Indian asking Britons "if they were not ashamed to see us come from India to help the King while they, who were of the same race, were refusing to fight for him."[16] While united by imperial service and the racial disdain displayed by many white soldiers and officers, Indian soldiers were also divided by caste, religious, and regional differences. While not as significant as the Indian National Army in the next war, a small minority of Indians expressed their autonomy through direct opposition to Britain, such as the mutineers of the 5th Light Infantry in Singapore in February 1915.[17] Exaggerated British fears of Muslim troops' vulnerability to Ottoman calls of *jihad*, in response to the Sanussiyya Sufi order's *jihad* against Egypt in 1915-17 and portrayed in popular works such as John Buchan's novel

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13   A. Fletcher, Recruitment and Service of Mâori Soldiers in World War One, in: Itinerario 38 (2014) 3, p. 59; T. Winegard, For King and Kanata, Winnipeg, University of Manitoba Press, 2012, p. 6.

14   T. Winegard, Indigenous Peoples of the British Dominions and the First World War, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2012; A. Norman, "In Defense of the Empire": The Six Nations of the Grand River and the Great War, in: S. Glassford and A. Shaw (eds.), A Sisterhood of Suffering and Service, Vancouver, UBC Press, 2012, pp. 33-9, 44-5; N. Riseman, Enduring Silences, Enduring Prejudices: Australian Aboriginal Participation in the First World War, in: D. Monger et al. (eds.), Endurance and the First World War: Experiences and Legacies in New Zealand and Australia, Newcastle, Cambridge Scholars, 2014, pp. 178-9, pp. 190-2.

15   D. Omissi, Europe through Indian Eyes: Indian Soldiers Encounter England and France, 1914 – 1918, in: English Historical Review CXXII (2007) 496, p. 381.

16   Yusuf Khan quoted in Gajendra Singh, in: The Testimonies of Indian Soldiers and the Two World War, London, Bloomsbury, 2014, p. 80.

17   Singh, pp. 130-54.

Greenmantle (1916), furthered weakened imperial bonds.[18] They also influenced postwar debates about the impact of the end of the Caliphate on Indians' imperial citizenship rights and loyalty.

The tension between imperial loyalty and racialized identities characterized Indians' postwar experiences, as illustrated by their postwar imperial development work in Iraq. Indian troops and labourers, alongside British colonial officials, rebuilt roads and expanded irrigation works during and after the war. The Indian Tata Steel Company provided large supplies of steel for the literal postwar reconstruction of Iraq, a project that involved approximately 20,000 Indian labourers. Indian aid in postwar Iraq demonstrates how the Empire facilitated (inadvertently) an early form of South-South cooperation.[19] This was one of the ways in which colonial subjects were able to use the infrastructure and levers of empire against itself. As Priya Satia has argued, "the imperial principle…impinged even on the aspirations of anti-imperial nationalism."[20] The Iraq project demonstrated Indians' capacity for governance and, alongside Indian soldiers' wartime service, strengthened Indian nationalism and further undermined Britain's pretensions to imperial rule in the subcontinent.

The British also drew on the principle of imperial loyalty in recruitment campaigns in Africa and the West Indies, although there as elsewhere this was only one of many motivations for enlistment. The East African Expeditionary Force suffered 17,646 casualties, as well as a further 44,572 Indian and African followers. These official statistics do not include the estimated 100,000 African porters who died during the war from disease. While the war did not create mass anti-colonial activism in Africa – most demobilized Africans returned to village lives where their newfound military skills were of little use – there were exceptions such as John Chilembwe's anti-British rebellion in Nyasaland in 1915 and small scale postwar urban trade union activism in African cities.[21] If anything, Britain's intensified interventions into African society during the war led to extended colonial governance in the interwar years. The British, unlike the French, were reticent to use black colonial troops in combat in Europe itself. From 1917, however, approximately 25,000 black South Africans did enlist in labour battalions for service in France, 600 of whom drowned when the transport SS *Mendi* sank in the English Channel in February 1917.[22] These men served alongside Indians, Egyptians, West Indians, and

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18   E. C. Woodfin, Camp and Combat on the Sinai and Palestine Front, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012, pp. 115-20; J. Slight, British Understandings of the Sanussiyya Sufi Order's Jihad against Egypt, 1915–17, The Round Table 103:2, 2014, pp. 236-8; E. Rogan, The Fall of the Ottomans, New York, Basic Books, 2015, pp. 70-1.

19   P. Satia, Developing Iraq: Britain, India and the Redemption of Empire and Technology in the First World War, in: Past & Present 197 (2007) 1, pp. 230-1, pp. 240-1.

20   Satia, p. 214.

21   History of the Great War: Medical Services General History, Vol. IV, London, His Majesty's Stationary Office, 1924, p. 504; R. S. Fogarty and D. Killingray, Demobilization in British and French Africa at the End of the First World War, in: Journal of Contemporary History 50 (2015) 1, pp. 105-7; B. Nasson, British Imperial Africa, in Gerwarth and Manela, pp. 148-51.

22   K. Jeffery, 1916: A Global History, London, Bloomsbury, 2015, p. 235; C. Koller, The Recruitment of Colonial Troops in Africa and Asia and the Deployment in Europe during the First World War, in: Immigrants & Minorities 26 (2008) 1/2, p. 113, pp. 127-8.

Chinese labour battalions. The latter were particularly significant from a global histori-cal perspective, as historians now believe they carried an avian flu virus that sparked the postwar influenza pandemic.[23]

Across the Atlantic, West Indian troops garrisoned their own islands early in the war, with the German light cruisers the *Dresden* and *Karlsruhe* active in the Atlantic. Later in the war the West India Regiment, which dated to the American War of Independence, sent men to East and West Africa. A separate British West Indies Regiment raised eleven battalions, with a combined force of over 15,000 men, who served in Europe, the Mid-dle East, and Africa. West Indian colonies lost 1,256 men to combat or sickness. The war's legacy in the region was mixed. Local colonial authorities pointed to West Indians' war service as a symbol of imperial loyalty and erected memorials in Kingston and other cities, and many returning soldiers (who were often better educated than the Tommies alongside whom they served) pressed for better treatment (such as land allotments) as British subjects. Meanwhile, colonial nationalists, pan-Africanists such as the Jamaican activist Marcus Garvey, and trade unionists invoked a shared sense of racial conscious-ness rather than imperial service for their respective causes, pointing to the racism many West Indians faced during the war.[24]

Non-white soldiers experienced the war as individuals, of course, but common themes shaped the war's legacy in the colonial world. Some colonial servicemen perceived the limitations of their own societies through war service, especially those who served in Europe or alongside Europeans. This inspired some to call for modernization after the war, while others such as the 1,500 Africans who served in the Africa Native Medical Corps returned with specialist skills of their own which they could contribute to their communities.[25] Racism was a common feature of all these men's war service, perhaps the war's most lasting influence in India, sub-Saharan Africa and the West Indies. Imperial authority was weakened by black soldiers' witness of the war's carnage, social and per-sonal relations with white women both undermined and exacerbated British imperial fears of miscegenation, and the wartime exploitation of colonial soldiers and labourers stirred colonial nationalist sentiments that would come to fruition a generation later after the next war.[26]

23   B. C. Hacker, White Man's War, Coloured Man's Labour: Working for the British Army on the Western Front, in: Iti-nerario 38:3, 2014, pp. 29-33; Xu Guoqi, China and the Great War, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2005, pp. 122-40.

24   C.P. Lucas (ed.), The Empire at War, London: Oxford University Press, 1923, pp. 331-2, p. 335; R. Smith, The Multicu-ltural First World War: Memories of the West Indian contribution in Contemporary Britain, in: Journal of European Studies 45:4, 2015, pp. 348-56; A. Rush, Bonds of Empire: West Indians and Britishness from Victoria to Decoloni-zation, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2011, pp. 123-8.

25   History of the Great War: Medical Services General History, Vol. IV, pp. 494-5.

26   J. Morrow, The Imperial Framework, in: Winter, p. 428.

Interwar Imperial Cooperation and Conflict

The war had a corrosive effect on imperial legitimacy, governance, loyalty, and cohesion. A heightened sense of nationalism (especially in the Dominions) and a weakened sense of racial deference in the colonial world accelerated imperial fragmentation, while the postwar emergence of international governance and the intensification of public and private international networks provided alternate supra-national modes of identification for imperial subjects. After 1918 Britain had to balance imperial governance, shifting international conceptions of sovereignty, and imperial subjects' shifting relationships with the empire. One means of tracing the war's imperial legacies for questions of imperial loyalty and allegiance is through a selective analysis of the issues debated at imperial conferences from the Imperial War Cabinet deliberations in 1917-18 through to the Statute of Westminster and Round Table Conference on India in 1931.

The ideal of organized imperial unity first flourished in the 1870s and 1880s. The Imperial Federation League, advocates of a revived Colonial Committee of the Privy Council, and others published a steady stream of works. Britain and the settlement colonies convened the first Colonial Conference in 1887. It established an informal institutional forum within which Britain could discuss imperial affairs with representatives of the settlement colonies).[27] These late-Victorian initiatives, however, never gained significant political or popular support. In the barrister and novelist Edward Jenkins' description, the empire was a "barrel without the hoops," united in form but lacking the infrastructure, habits of loyalty, and common interests to bind it together.[28]

Imperial conferences were held beginning in 1909, when Britain and the Dominions discussed closer military and naval integration "for the defense of the Empire as a whole."[29] The nomenclature shift marked a more expansive view of the Empire's inter-connections and a greater commitment on participants' part to take measures to implement conference resolutions in domestic legislation or enforcement.[30] The 1911 Imperial Conference established the governance framework that imperial politicians used to negotiate questions of imperial affairs after the war. It focused on two key questions. The first was intra-imperial political and economic relations, especially the complex issues of jurisdiction over foreign affairs and naturalization. The latter issue, over which the settlement colonies made strong claims to autonomy, spoke directly to the idea of imperial citizen-

27 A.L. Burt, Imperial Architects; Being an Account of Proposals in the Direction of a Closer Imperial Union, Made Previous to the Opening of the First Colonial Conference of 1887, Oxford, B. H. Blackwell, 1913 [1888], p. 205, pp. 208-13; Imperial Federation League, Report of the conference held July 29, 1884, London, Cassell, 1884. Colonial conferences were also held in 1894, 1897, 1902, and 1907.

28 E. Jenkins, The Colonies and Imperial Unity, or, The "Barrel without the Hoops," inaugural address delivered at the Conference on Colonial Questions, London, July 19, 20 and 21, 1871, London, Strahan, 1871, p. 16; D. Bell, The Idea of Greater Britain, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2007.

29 The Imperial Conference of 1909 in: M. Ollivier, The Colonial and Imperial Conferences from 1887–1937 Vol. II Ottawa, Queen's Printer, 1954, p. 8.

30 J. Kendle, The Colonial and Imperial Conferences, 1887–1911, London, Longmans, 1967, pp. 12-13, pp. 169-76.

ship. The second was imperial cooperation concerning functional issues such as postal reform, income tax reciprocity, shipping conventions, and the harmonization of laws.

The 1911 Conference also established a Dominions Royal Commission to investigate the state of intra-imperial trade, resource extraction, and food supply. It reported in 1917, and was thus able to survey the closer intra-imperial cooperation that had developed during the first years of the war. The Commission recommended the creation of an Imperial Development Board, a full survey of the empire's natural resources in the interests of promoting their scientific development, closer imperial commercial ties (such as an improved imperial statistical system and the broader employment of the Dominions' consular systems for trade), more efficient imperial transport and communication measures to facilitate the shipping of goods, the creation of Dominion research institutes, and a redirection of the Imperial Institute's focus towards India and the Crown Colonies.[31]

The Dominions and India participated in the 1917 and 1918 Imperial War Cabinets.[32] The Dominions' massive war contribution and sacrifice forced Britain to acknowledge their de facto national autonomy after the war, even if many Dominion subjects continued to identify as British and constitutional independence would not come for another decade. As the Prince of Wales told the Empire and Canadian Clubs in Toronto on 4 November, 1919, "the old idea of an Empire … of a mother country surrounded by daughter states, is entirely obsolete now … Our Empire has taken a new and far grander form. It exists as a single state of commonwealth, composed of sister nations of different origins and of different languages."[33]

Imperial politicians recognized that the war had altered the empire's internal dynamics, as well as its collective position in international affairs. During the war, liberal thinkers and politicians such as Lord Bryce and Lord Phillimore offered proposals for both a future League of Nations and a more confederal British Commonwealth of Nations. Amongst Dominion members of the Imperial War Cabinet, these initiatives were supported most strongly by South Africa's Jan Smuts, who had transitioned from Britain's opponent during the South African War to a convinced imperialist who led Empire troops against the German General Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck's *askari* in German East Africa in 1916.[34] Smuts played a leading role at Versailles, alongside Woodrow Wilson, in drafting the League's Covenant. In imperial affairs, he seconded Canadian Prime Minister Robert Borden's desire that the Dominions be recognized as "autonomous nations of an Imperial Commonwealth." He rejected a more formal imperial state, however, on the grounds that the British Empire was not a single community, but "a whole world

31   Final Report of the Royal Commission on the Natural Resources, Trade, and Legislation of Certain Portions of His Majesty's Dominions, 1917, Cd. 8462, pp. 76-9, pp. 108-24, pp. 148-51, pp. 160-2.
32   W. D. McIntyre, The Britannic Vision, London, Palgrave, 2009, pp. 122-7.
33   Prince of Wales, Impressions of My Canadian Tour, in: The Empire Club of Canada Addresses, Toronto, Empire Club, 1919, p. 387.
34   Committee on the League of Nations [Phillimore Report], 20 March 1918, Willoughby Dickinson Papers, Bodleian Library, Oxford, MS Eng. Hist. c. 407; S. Mitchell, Jan Smuts, Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck and the Great War in German East Africa, in: J. Krause (ed.), The Greater War, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2014, pp. 110-16.

by ourselves, consisting of many nations, of many States, and all sorts of communities, under one flag."[35]

The war's most significant political outcome was the Dominions' and India's claim to international status. Canada, South Africa, Australia, New Zealand, and India were all independent signatories to the Versailles peace Treaty in 1919, and the Dominions sent delegates to the Washington Naval Conference in 1921-2 (although they were represented officially by Britain). League membership gave them standing in the League Assembly as independent entities, as well as the right to be elected to a non-permanent seat on the League Council. The Dominions also embraced internationalist undertakings after the war. Canada contributed money and supplies exceeding $3 million to the Belgian Relief Fund, and Dominion troops participating in the joint Allied operation in support of the White Russian forces.[36]

While the Imperial War Cabinet as such was dissolved at war's end, reverting to its prewar status as the Committee of Imperial Defense, its spirit of imperial collaboration continued in practice through the series of interwar Imperial Conferences that resumed in 1921.[37] The most important decision taken at the 1921 Imperial Conference was the rejection of the proposal advanced at the 1917 War Conference for an Imperial Constitution in favour of continuing the model of cooperation by conference established at the 1911 Imperial Conference. The conference thus established the doctrine of inter-se as imperial policy (the assertion that imperial affairs constituted internal rather than foreign affairs).[38] This decision reflected the Dominions' collective assertion of their individual autonomy after the war. As the always blunt Australian Prime Minister Billy Hughes told the conference, "I know of no power that the Prime Minister of Britain has, that General Smuts [and thus the other Dominion prime ministers] has not. Our presence here round this table…the basis of equality on which we meet, these things speak in trumpet tones that this Conference of free democratic nations is, as Mr. Lloyd George said yesterday, a living force."[39] India was a conference participant for the first time, reflecting the greater (though still partial and circumscribed) autonomy it had gained through its war contributions.

The conference also discussed ways of continuing patterns of imperial cooperation that had deepened or appeared during the war. These included imperial air communication, where imperial representatives (save for Canada, which pursued a North American policy) pledged to fund air communication between Britain, India, Africa, Australia and New Zealand. They also solicited interests in imperial civil aviation operations, an is-

35   "A Speech delivered by General Smuts at the Banquet given in his honour by members of both Houses of Parliament, 15 May 1917," in: J.C. Smuts, War-time Speeches, London, Hodder and Stoughton, 1917, p. 31.

36   Lucas, The Empire at War, p. 78; I. C.D. Moffat, The Allied Intervention in Russia, 1918–1920: The Diplomacy of Chaos, London, Palgrave, 2015.

37   Palmer, Consultation and Cooperation, pp. 109-14.

38   L. Lloyd, Loosening the Apron Strings: The Dominions and Britain in the Interwar Years, in: The Round Table 92 (2003) 369, pp. 283-5.

39   The Imperial Conference of 1921, Appendix I: Opening Speeches, in: M. Ollivier, The Colonial and Imperial Conferences from1887–1937, Vol. II, Ottawa, Queen's Printer, 1954, p. 423.

sue which took on greater importance in future years.[40] The Empire Press Union and the Newspaper Proprietors' Association called for cheaper inter-imperial cable rates and the return of the deferred press rates that had been curtailed during the war on the grounds of economy. They made their case in part by an appeal to "maintaining a good understanding between all peoples of the Empire."[41] Questions of nationality and imperial cooperation had been addressed at a Colonial Office Conference on State-Aided Empire Settlement earlier in 1921. Viscount Milner, who served in Lloyd George's War Cabinet and was now President of Britain's Oversea Settlement Committee, proclaimed the delegates' shared commitment that British migrants "should have opportunities for settlement under the flag, in countries British in spirit and British in their institutions." Britain sought help in managing the risk of unemployment at home, while the Dominions were eager to grow their populations with British settlers, particularly those with agricultural or industrial skills. Britain and the Dominions agreed to cooperate in disseminating information on migration, providing loans for overseas passage (or paying it outright in the case of state-assisted child migrants), and encouraging imperial migration over foreign immigration.

The Dominions operated organized emigration schemes in the 1920s aimed directly at returning servicemen, such as the 3,000 Family Scheme which facilitated British migration to rural Canada.[42] For its part, the British government operated a Free Passage Scheme from 1919-22 through which 82,196 ex-servicemen, ex-servicewomen, and their dependents emigrated to the Dominions. It was followed by the Empire Settlement Scheme launched in 1922. Demobilized soldiers were also offered land if they settled in Kenya. The British government made a brief effort from 1919-20 to mobilize Britishness amongst the global expatriate community through the Committee on British Communities Abroad, which anticipated some of the later public diplomacy work of the British Council.[43] Despite their official imprimatur, however, organized emigration schemes failed to attract the numbers hoped for by the Colonial Office. British and Dominion governments often differed over their preferred "type" of migrant, while women who had served during the war were reluctant to emigrate to become domestic labourers.[44]

The question of imperial nationality prefigured interwar imperial controversies. Indian imperial nationalists were confident that their countrymen's sizable wartime service

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40   Appendix III: Report of the Imperial Air Communications Committee, Conference of Prime Ministers and Representatives of the United Kingdom, the Dominions, and India, 1921, Cmd. 1474, pp. 45-7; External Affairs, Canada, "Memorandum on Air Communication," 22 December 1926, Library and Archives Canada, RG 25, Vol. 792, Reel T-1802-1803, File 440.

41   "Appendix IV: The Intercommunication and Dissemination of News within the British Empire," Conference of Prime Ministers and Representatives of the United Kingdom, the Dominions, and India, 1921, Cmd. 1474, p. 56.

42   R.J. Mancuso, Three Thousand Families: English Canada's Colonizing Vision and British Family Settlement, 1919–1939, in: Journal of Canadian Studies 45 (2011) 3, pp. 11-15.

43   J. Fisher, 'A Call to Action': The Committee on British Communities Abroad, 1919-20, in: Canadian Journal of History 44 (2009) 2, pp. 265-6.

44   L. Noakes, From War Service to Domestic Service: Ex-Servicewomen and the Free Passage Scheme, 1919-22, in: Twentieth Century British History 22 (2011) 1, 2, pp. 19-21; K. Fedorowich, Unfit for Heroes: Reconstruction and Soldier Settlement in the Empire Between the Wars, Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1995.

would result in expanded postwar rights and respect. These hopes were realized in a limited manner with the opening of the King's Commission to Indian officers in 1918, the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms (1919), and Indian representatives' junior participation at Versailles. The Maharajah of Bikaner signed the peace treaty and secured India's membership in the League of Nations despite the Covenant's declaration limiting membership "to fully self-governing countries including dominions and colonies."[45] Head of the Indian Council of Princes and a member of the Imperial War Cabinet, Bikaner represented the moderate Indian nationalist camp that desired greater autonomy, preferably Dominion status, within the Empire.

Indians' evolving imperial status was reflected in postwar debates about imperial citizenship, especially concerning Indians living in other parts of the Empire. V.S. Srinivasa Sastri, one of India's representatives at the 1921 Imperial Conference, highlighted India's wartime supply of wheat, "money contributions out of our poverty," and manpower "to the tune of 1,274,000, which comes up to over one-half of the total overseas forces employed in the War." These contributions, Sastri argued, entitled overseas Indians to "a full enjoyment of citizenship within the British Empire." In response to Lloyd George's description of the Empire as "a Confederation of Races into which willing and free peoples had been admitted," Sastri argued that "freedom necessarily implies admission of all people to the rights of citizenship without reservation."[46] Sastri's argument placed Winston Churchill, then Colonial Secretary and Britain's representative at the conference, in a difficult position. He lauded the colonies' economic contributions to the war effort (Malayan tin, Honduran mahogany and West Indian cotton used for airplane construction, West African oils and fats), but was also forced to acquiesce to the Dominions' collective insistence on sovereignty over their respective immigration policies. Churchill thus equivocated, declaring that while "there should be no barrier of race, colour, or creed which should prevent any man by merit from reaching any station *if he is fitted for it* [emphasis added]," local principles need to be respected regarding a race-blind imperial citizenship lest "local feelings are excited" and "extraordinary social stresses arise when populations are intimately mingled."[47] Indians' imperial citizenship rights were recognized in principal through a resolution at the 1921 conference, but in practice British and Dominion autonomy over their respective immigration policies meant that overseas Indians continued to face discrimination and restrictions on mobility. This was true even beyond the Dominions, as for instance for Tamil plantation workers in Malaya. Their status was determined by a complex nexus of the newly created Agent of the Government of India, Malay authorities, and workers' *kangany*, the Tamil

45   H. Purcell, Maharajah of Bikaner, India: The Makers of the Modern World, London, Haus, 2010, pp. 88-102; The Covenant of the League of Nations, Article 7, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/leagcov.asp.

46   Conference of Prime Ministers and Representatives of the United Kingdom, the Dominions, and India, 1921, Cmd. 1474, p. 33.

47   Ibid., pp. 36, 39.

village recruiter who continued to arrange labour migration after the end of indentured labour occasioned by the war.[48]

Indian imperial citizenship rights came to a head at the 1923 Imperial Conference, occasioned by anti-Indian campaigns by British settlers in Kenya. Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru spoke of India's integral role in the Empire, and implored the conference to honour the 1921 resolution by ensuring Indians equal status throughout the empire. He identified himself "as a subject of King George, and I fight for a place in his household, and I will not be content with a place in his stables." He appealed to the shared principle of imperial loyalty: "I claim, and let me know very plain, not as a matter of grace, but as a matter of right, as the King's subject, to have an honourable place in his household, a position of equality and honour with the Empire, wherever it may be."[49] Moderate Indian nationalists' appeals for equal treatment within the empire were ultimately frustrated. The Dominions (with South Africa most vocal) continued to define their own de facto national citizenships through restrictive immigration legislation that disadvantaged Indians (as well as other racial minorities), and Britain passed the Devonshire Declaration (1923) which declared Kenya an African colony (thereby sidelining the political claims of both Indians and white settlers). These defeats, coming on the heels of the Amritsar massacre in 1919, helped fuel the rise of interwar Indian nationalism. As in Ireland, the British increasingly relied on violence in India to maintain their position even as they negotiated the path to devolution. The racial anxieties provoked by these actions continued to shape Anglo-Indian negotiations over citizenship rights even after Partition in 1947.[50] The postwar focus on Indian imperial citizenship rights, however, also indirectly opened up Indian society. As Mrinalini Sinha and Sukanya Banerjee have shown, domestic social reform campaigns to improve the treatment of women in India drew in part on the individualism and universalism present in the broader discourse on imperial citizenship rights.[51]

The 1926 Imperial Conference was the seminal interwar imperial constitutional moment. It resulted in the Balfour Declaration that the Dominions were "autonomous communities within the British Empire" united by "a common allegiance to the Crown, and freely associated as members of the British Commonwealth of Nations." Delegates then set about clarifying various constitutional and legal complications to make this declaration a political reality.[52] Resolutions were passed to ensure the Dominions had the power to give extra-territorial operation to their legislation, and to repeal the Colonial Laws Va-

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48   S. Amrith, Indians Overseas?: Governing Tamil Migration to Malaya, 1870–1941, in: Past & Present 208 (2010) 1, pp. 246-53; S. Ansari, Subjects or Citizens: India, Pakistan and the 1948 British Nationality Act, in: Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 41 (2013) 2, pp. 285-312.

49   Statement by Sir Tej Baduhur Sapru, Imperial Conference, 1923, Appendices to the Summary of Proceedings, Cmd. 1988, 1924, Appendix V, pp. 50, 51.

50   See S. Ilahi, Imperial Violence and the Path to Independence: India, Ireland and the Crisis of Empire, London, I.B. Tauris, 2016.

51   M. Sinha, Spectres of Mother India: The Global Restructuring of Empire, Durham, NC, Duke University Press, 2006; S. Banerjee, Becoming Imperial Citizens, Durham, NC, Duke University Press, 2010.

52   A. L. Lowell and H. D. Hall, The British Commonwealth of Nations, Boston, World Peace Foundation, 1927, p. 656.

lidity Act (1865). The latter, which allowed Westminster to declare void any Dominion legislation that was repugnant to common law principles or British legislation, was rarely used in practice. Britain, for instance, did not apply its merchant shipping and navigation legislation to the Dominions after 1911, one of many tacit acknowledgements of Dominion sovereignty in the decades before the Statute of Westminster (1931) granted their constitutional sovereignty over their own foreign affairs. The Law's repeal, however, removed a potential legal impediment to the expansion of an imperial commonwealth based on the free association of its (white) members. It was also symbolically important, as was the principle agreed to at the 1926 conference that "any alteration in the law touching the succession to the Throne or the Royal Style and Titles" would require the assent of Dominion Parliaments as well as Westminster.[53] The latter declaration assumed broader constitutional significance after 1949 when the Crown was "divided" to exist separately in different parts of the Empire. This measure was an acknowledgement that the passage of independent Nationality Acts in the Dominions and Britain, the Republic of Ireland's departure from the Commonwealth in 1948, and the independence of India and Pakistan in 1947 had finally made redundant the bond of "common allegiance" to the Crown which had served as the core of imperial citizenship.[54]

Imperial functional cooperation also continued after the First World War, a legacy of both Victorian imperial networks for issues such as telegraph and postal communication and the logistical cooperation developed amongst imperial partners during the war. It also paralleled the broader spirit of postwar functional internationalism, most evident at the League of Nations, which the League official and political theorist David Mitrany described as the welding together of "the common interests of all without interfering unduly with the particular ways of each."[55] Some imperial functional conferences dealt with revolutionary technological advances which the empire had confronted during the war, and which intensified in the globalizing years of the 1920s.[56] The Second Imperial Press Conference, held in Ottawa in 1920, drew press barons and editors from across the Empire. It built on the patterns of imperial information sharing developed during the war. Delegates crisscrossed Canada visiting local dignitaries, many of whom, the Irish journalist John Glendenning noted, were "most anxious to maintain the Anglo-Saxon type of [their] population."[57] The rising spirit of colonial nationalism, however, was also apparent. As the conference's chair, Viscount Burnham, observed, "no resolution would bind the whole unless it had been framed with due safeguards for autonomous arrangements."[58] Robert Donald, President of the Imperial Press Union, spoke of the press's

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53   Report of the Conference on the Operation of Dominion Legislation and Merchant Shipping Legislation, 1929, Cmd. 3479, 7-9, 19.

54   W. D. McIntyre, The Britannic Vision, pp. 249-57; P. Murphy, Monarchy & the End of Empire, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2013, pp. 40-8.

55   D. Mitrany, A Working Peace System (1943) in: Mitrany, A Working Peace System, Chicago, Quadrangle, 1966, p. 104.

56   See R. Carr and B. W. Hart, The Global 1920s, London, Routledge, 2016.

57   J. Glendenning, "Oh! Canada": Personal Impressions as a Delegate to the Imperial Press Conference of 1920, Londonderry, The Derry Standard, 1921.

58   R. Donald, The Imperial Press Conference in Canada, London, Hodder and Stoughton, 1920, p. xv.

important role "in interpreting one part of the Empire to another," and delegates passed resolutions calling for the return of cheaper imperial postal rates, the expansion of imperial wireless facilities, travel scholarships for young journalists, and broader cooperation in "the dissemination of Empire news."[59] By the later 1920s imperial press cooperation was reinforced by the emergence of the BBC, as well as public and private broadcasters in the Dominions, which helped establish a more extensive imperial information and cultural nexus.[60]

Functional imperial conferences brought British, Dominion, and colonial officials into contact with experts and private sector actors in an array of fields as wide as that addressed by the League and international bodies in Geneva. These cooperative initiatives were closely aligned with the spirit of imperial economic cooperation that had developed during the war for logistical reasons. The British Empire Forestry Conferences, which began in 1920, included trade commissioners, entomologists, and pulp and paper industry representatives in addition to government officials from Britain, the Dominions, India, and colonial Africa. It sought to standardize forest terminology and conservation practices throughout the empire, and to make the empire as self-sufficient in forest products as possible. The Imperial Agricultural Research Conference in 1927 was even grander in scale. It brought Dominion and colonial actors into closer contact with the work done in Britain by the Royal Botanic Gardens and the Imperial Bureaux of Entomology and Mycology, tied imperial agricultural research with the work of the Empire Marketing Board (which funded the conference, and was itself an important vehicle for the expansion of both imperial and Dominion identities), and engendered imperial cooperation on veterinary science, animal nutrition and genetics, plant pathology, and fruit and dairy research. Sir William Furse of the Imperial Institute pointed to its utility as an imperial information clearing house, a governance function of increasing significance in an age of growing information complexity.[61]

Imperial experts also discussed cooperation in research and natural resource extraction concerning sectors such as wool, sugar cane, and horticulture in advance of the 1932 Imperial Economic Conference in Ottawa that adopted a system of imperial preference.[62] Wartime imperial cooperation on scientific and industrial research continued after 1918, as did collaboration on issues such as hygiene and tropical diseases, patents, shipping, and medical research. Imperialists' quest for standardization and harmonization in these various fields mirrored the concerns of interwar international governance more broadly,

59   Ibid., pp. 62, 284.
60   S. Potter, Broadcasting Empire, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2014, pp. 26-44; T. Hajkowski, The BBC and National Identity in Britain, 1922-53, Manchester, Manchester University Press, 2010), pp. 22-42.
61   British Empire Forestry Conference, 1923, Summary Report and Resolutions, Ottawa, 1923, p. 7, pp. 10-11; Imperial Agricultural Research Conference, 1927, Report and Summary of Proceedings, London, 1928, 5, p. 73; F. Barnes, Bringing Another Empire Alive? The Empire Marketing Board and the Construction of Dominion Identity, 1926–33, in: Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 42 (2014) 1, pp. 61-85.
62   Proceedings of the First Imperial Horticultural Conference, London, August 1930, London, 1930; Imperial Wool Conference, Report of Proceedings, London, 1931; Imperial Sugar Cane Research Conference, London: 1931, Report of Proceedings, London, 1932.

as evident in both the League of Nations' activities and the multitude of transnational civil society campaigns.

Finally, there were many instances of private imperial cooperation in these years. Imperial civil society networks intensified their cooperative activity after the war, often with an expressly internationalist outlook. Frances Younghusband, the explorer and army officer who led the British expedition to Tibet in 1903-4, told the Religions of the Empire conference held at the Imperial Institute in 1924, that the Empire provided "an example in practical life before the eyes of all the world of what can be done to achieve at least orderliness of living."[63] The Imperial War Relief Fund combined the efforts of British and Dominion humanitarian organizations to provide postwar relief in Europe, as did the more internationally-orientated Save the Children Fund which was created by the British activists Dorothy Buxton and Eglantyne Jebb in 1919. The Universities' Bureau of the British Empire (created in 1912) fostered interaction and a shared imperial worldview amongst the Empire's larger universities. Imperial loyalism was also furthered through Dominion university curricula, and the teaching and public advocacy of prominent academics such as the Canadian historian George Wrong.[64]

Anti-Colonial and Imperial Identities

The First World War exacerbated both anti-colonial and imperial nationalisms. Opponents and critics of empire pursued ideas of self-determination after the war, inspired variously by the visions of Wilson and Lenin and also as a reaction against the intensification of the imperial state's coercive wartime presence. More moderate "imperial nationalists" appealed for a greater role for their countrymen within the empire on the grounds of their war service. While this group ultimately lost the longer-term political battle to their anti-imperial brethren, in the interwar years they were in fact more numerous and the incremental gains they made, uneven and circumscribed as they were, gave cause to believe that the British Empire could be reformed to the benefit of colonial subjects from within, rather than overthrown.

Britain's reliance on colonial troops, labourers, and resources to fight on multiple fronts was both a demonstration of power and, in making apparent its dependence on colonial subjects, of weakness. Egypt provides a case in point. Approximately 18,000 Egyptians were impressed into labour service in Europe and the Middle East in 1916, and in 1918 a further 135,000 served in the Egyptian Expeditionary Force as labourers and camel

63   W. L. Hare, ed., Religions of the Empire: A Conference on Some Living Religions within the Empire, New York, The Macmillan Co., 1925, 17.

64   E. Baughan, The Imperial War Relief Fund and the All-British Appeal: Commonwealth, Conflict and Conservatism within the British Humanitarian Movement, in: Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 40 (2012) 5, pp. 847-52; Tamson Pietsch, Empire of Scholars, Manchester, Manchester University Press, 2013, pp. 152-70; Paul Phillips, Britain's Past in Canada, Vancouver, UBC Press, 1989, p. 57.

transport drivers.[65] War service intensified Egyptian nationalism. Britain unilaterally terminated its Protectorate over Egypt in 1922, but preserved the status quo regarding its special interests in Egypt due to its strategic imperial importance.

This strategic importance had been demonstrated during the war, when Cairo served as Britain's regional command centre. It also explains Britain's repression of Egyptian nationalist resistance. Britain detained Saad Zaghlul, the leader of the Wafd Party, in Malta to dissuade him from travelling to Versailles to press for Egyptian independence, precipitating the Egyptian uprising of 1919. When Zaghlul eventually made it Paris, he was denied an audience at the conference. In 1921 Lord Allenby, then High Commissioner of Egypt, exiled him under martial law to the Seychelles due to his refusal to curtail his political activities. Zaghlul protested attempts to silence his political activity as "a tyrannical order," and asserted that any actions "used against our lawful endeavours will only help the country to realise her aspirations to complete independence."[66] His deportation order triggered violent demonstrations, and the Wafd Party's anti-British publications were also suppressed. Allenby lamented to the Foreign Secretary, Lord Curzon, in January 1922 that Britain should "abandon the hope of finding any body of Egyptians of no matter what class, party, or creed who will be willing to cooperate with us if the policy which I am recommending [the abandonment of the Protectorate] is rejected."[67]

In the event, Zaghlul was back in Egypt in 1923 and elected President in 1924. While Egyptian nationalists gained a foothold in their struggle for independence, the hopes of Arabs elsewhere in the region were disappointed. As T. E. Lawrence wrote in his memoir *Seven Pillars of Wisdom* (1926), "after the victory [the seizure of Damascus in 1918] there came a slow time of disillusion, and then a night in which the fighting men found that all their hopes had failed them."[68] Britain had used Arabs as de facto imperial citizens during the Arab Revolt, but its diplomatic double-dealing during and after the war left them with precarious postwar citizenship rights in the new and, in the case of Palestine, ultimately violent mandate territories.

These examples reveal the racial divisions, and underlying imperial identity of whiteness, which continued to determine bonds of imperial citizenship during and after the war. A strain of "racial utopianism" was present in the thought of interwar British imperialists such as Lionel Curtis, who were convinced that international peace was possible under a united Anglo-Saxon global leadership. Curtis envisioned a reinvigorated empire – what he termed the "project of a commonwealth" – based on an ideal of imperial citizenship which would unite the empire's subjects within the aegis of a shared imperial state. These aspirational ideas were more rhetorical than policy prescriptive, reliant on an assumed pan-imperial bond of Anglo-Saxonism which largely ignored the empire's vast non-white

65   A. Jackson, Sir Charles Lucas and The Empire at War, in: Round Table 103 (2014) 2, p. 170.
66   Saad Zaghlul, telegram, copied in Allenby – Curzon, 23 December, 1921, in: Correspondence respecting Affairs in Egypt, Cmd. 1592, 1922, p. 14.
67   Allenby – Curzon, 20 January, 1922, ibid., p. 24.
68   T.E. Lawrence, Seven Pillars of Wisdom London, Penguin, 1975 [1926], p. 53.

population and which had been fractured by the war. The racial essence of these political ideas found its material parallel in interwar British campaigns for physical culture, seen by its proponents as a metric of imperial vitality.[69]

Ideas of race and civilisation as the ideological and ideational underpinnings of empire came under increased stress after the war, indicative of the erosion of late Victorian certainties and the growing logical inconsistency of the Empire's constitutional structure. The result was a process of uneven devolution, whereby the Dominions asserted their autonomy but remained (in the case of Éire, temporarily) within the Empire, India was granted piecemeal and incremental sovereignty through the constitutional device of diarchy (by which Indians were granted a measure of autonomy over domestic and local issues), and the "dual mandate" proclaimed by Lord Lugard for Nigeria signaled the Colonial Office's embrace of indirect rule as its new governing strategy across much of colonial Africa.

Each of these constitutional transitions expressed regional variations of an empire-wide expansion of a diluted form of imperial "whiteness," whereby attempts were made to expand the dominant pre-war imperial identity to include non-white elites and other "loyal" demographic groups. In India this entailed the cultivation of the "Montagu-Moderates," imperial nationalists whose loyalty Britain hoped could be maintained through the extension of limited citizenship rights. Yet the unsettled nature of imperial governance precipitated by the war also opened up space for alternate forms of Indian identity. Alongside an anti-imperial Indian nationalism led by Gandhi were alternate nationalisms that did not aspire to the emerging postcolonial goal of an independent nation state, such as the anti-indentured labour movement. Its advocates were largely village-level Indians who called attention to the impact of indentured labour on Indian society itself, and who conjured a "bottom-up" anticolonial mass politics in which the "nation" had no concrete form at all.[70]

Perceived bonds of imperial whiteness also shaped the scores of interwar social and cultural initiatives that brought together men and women from around the empire. The first British Empire Games were held in Hamilton, Ontario, in 1930, and imperial sports officials even debated creating a British Empire Olympic team. Imperial teacher exchanges offered educators, often young women, the opportunity to work and live in another part of the Empire, while pro-empire (and often conservative) social and associational organizations like the Imperial Orders of Daughters of the Empire, the League of Empire, and the Girl Guide Movement stressed themes of sacrifice and voluntarism which matched those of war service. They also offered opportunities for imperial subjects of all

69   L. Curtis, The Commonwealth of Nations, Vol. III, London, Macmillan, 1916; M. Lake and H. Reynolds, Drawing the Global Colour Line: White Men's Countries and the International Challenge of Racial Equality, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2008; D. Bell, Before the Democratic Peace: Racial Utopianism, Empire and the Abolition of War, in: European Journal of International Relations 20 (2014) 4, pp. 657-58; I. Zweiniger-Bargielowska, Building a British Superman: physical Culture in Interwar Britain, in: Journal of Contemporary History 41 (2006) 4, pp. 602-4.

70   M. Sinha, Premonitions of the Past, in: The Journal of Asian Studies 74 (2015) 4, pp. 827-30.

ages to demonstrate and affirm their sense of imperial loyalty.[71] Many of these initiatives and organizations predated the war. Yet like official intra-imperial cooperation, these efforts were buoyed by the large-scale wartime intermingling of imperial subjects on the battlefield and behind the lines, as well as the broader "internationalist moment" of the 1920s. Insomuch as the Empire was itself an "international" body, it provided a similar set of pathways, outlooks, and resources for imperial subjects to transcend their local experiences.

The interplay of imperial and international influences also shaped postwar race relations in Britain itself. Interwar non-white immigration was small compared to later decades, yet here too the war provoked upheaval. Non-white sailors and servicemen in port cities like Liverpool, where one in seven of the city's black colonial residents had enlisted in a demonstration of pan-racial imperial loyalism, faced riots caused by economic anxiety amongst white labourers struggling with the postwar contraction of commodity trades and racist calls to repatriate black servicemen to their colonies of origin. Many West Indian, Indian, and African students in Britain, meanwhile, were attracted to ideas of pan-Africanism. This sense of "black internationalism" had origins in the prewar Universal Races Congress (1911) and American civil rights discourse, but its immediate spur was the postwar language of self-determination and the broad disillusionment with white imperial rule provoked by black soldiers' service with whites during the war and the explicit rejection of racial equality at the Versailles negotiations.[72]

Conclusion

The American writer J. D. Whelpley opined in 1924 that "two paths now lie open before the present Government of the British Empire. One leads to the bolder policy of a return to first principles, freedom of trade and a possible return to prewar conditions after much travail. The other leads to a more quiet and peaceful haven through the adoption of a protective policy and a consequent relinquishment of all claims to vigorous and self-assertive leadership in international affairs."[73] In reality, neither option was feasible.

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71   Ma. Llewellyn, Dominion Nationalism or Imperial Patriotism?: Citizenship, Race, and the Proposed British Empire Olympic Team, in: Journal of Sport History 39 (2012) 1, pp. 45-62; K. Pickles, Female Imperialism and National Identity: Imperial Order Daughters of the Empire, Manchester, Manchester University Press, 2002; J. Greenlee, Education and Imperial Unity, 1901–1926, New York, Garland, 1987, pp. 181-7; M. Hendley, Organized Patriotism and the Crucible of War: Popular Imperialism in Britain, 1914–1932, Montreal & Kingston, McGill-Queen's University Press, 2012; Kristine Alexander, The Girl Guide Movement and Imperial Internationalism during the 1920s and 1930s, in: The Journal of the History of Childhood and Youth 2 (2008) 1, p. 42.

72   J. Jenkinson, "All in the Same Uniform"? The Participation of Black Colonial Residents in the British Armed Forces in the First World War, in: Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 40 (2012) 2, pp. 207-30; M. Matera, Black Intellectuals in the Imperial Metropolis and the Debate over Race and Empire in Sanders of the River, in: L. Beers and G. Thomas, Brave New World: Imperial and Democratic Nation-Building in Britain between the Wars, London, Institute of Historical Research, 2011, pp. 229-30, p. 234; M. Adas, Contested Hegemony: The Great War and the Afro-Asian Assault on the Civilizing Mission Ideology, in: Journal of World History 15 (2004) 1, pp. 56-61.

73   J. D. Whelpley, Reconstruction, New York, Funk and Wagnalls Co., 1925, pp. 200-1.

A return to "prewar conditions" was impossible, given the development of colonial nationalism and the disaggregating forces of postwar technological progress and emerging practices of international governance. For the same reasons, the ideas of imperial autarky and economic protectionism advocated by imperialists like Leopold Amery were also impractical. Imperial tariffs could be raised, but the multiple and increasingly global flows of people, ideas, and commodities in the interwar years could not be staunched so easily.

Instead, British imperial decision-makers pursued multiple strategies in response to the dislocation of imperial sovereignty caused by the war. The imperial state expanded in Africa and the Middle East, employing repressive violence and the new technology of air power to cement its authority, yet simultaneously diluted its sovereign power through its participation in the mandates system and its strategic embrace of indirect rule. While the Dominions developed the independence their soldiers had claimed on the battlefield in incremental constitutional steps after the war, such devolution paralleled a dense network of intra-imperial cooperation on all manner of economic, cultural, and political issues. It was telling of these shifts that the British Commonwealth Relations Conference, held in Sydney in 1938, was organized around the "national interests of the member nations" of the Commonwealth, with the bonds of empire discussed through the vague formulation "diversity in cooperation."[74] India, always sui generis, nonetheless also followed this Janus-faced pattern in the interwar years. Both moderates and revolutionary nationalists sought the respect, equality, and equanimity they believed their due as fellow imperial citizens, and campaigned for different versions of greater autonomy, stretching from Dominion status within the empire to outright independence.

A common feature in all of these relationships was the Empire's collective contribution to Britain's war effort. This legacy, in combination with the increased postwar political importance of public opinion due to the end of secret diplomacy and the internationalization of many political issues, meant imperial subjects were better equipped to press their individual and collective claims after the war. For some, this meant a more equitable and autonomous place within the empire; others experimented with new ways to contest imperial rule.

Earlier attempts to give the idea of imperial citizenship a material form, such as efforts by the Colonial Office and the General Register Office in 1911 to conduct a comprehensive imperial census, had proved excessively complicated and often incomplete.[75] The Empire was too decentralized, and even in the crown colonies where Whitehall theoretically exercised control, the "on-the-ground" necessity of indirect rule meant its administrative abilities were circumscribed by reliance on local rulers who had their own interests.

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74   H.V. Hodson (ed.), The British Commonwealth and the Future: Proceedings of the Second Unofficial Conference on British Commonwealth Relations, London, Oxford University Press, 1939, pp. 135-66, p. 278.

75   A.J. Christopher, The Quest for a Census of the British Empire c.1840–1940, in: Journal of Historical Geography 34 (2008) 2, pp. 280-2.

The British government's will and ability to govern empire diminished after the war. Liberals and socialists at home called for imperial reform, the Dominions pressed for autonomy, and colonial nationalist sentiment increased in Egypt, India, and the British mandates of Iraq and Palestine, and began to stir in sub-Saharan Africa. While the centenary commemorations of the First World War in the United Kingdom have tended to focus on the English experience, the Scottish, Welsh, Irish, Dominion, Indian, and African contributions were collectively immense and deserve to be remembered as part of the broader "British" war effort.[76] The war's most important legacy for the British Empire was to bring the various and disparate imperial ideas and identities which had circulated before the war into a single frame. Britain was now forced to deal with questions of imperial citizenship within a unified field of vision, rather than the ad hoc and "absent-minded" fashion of pre-war imperial governance.

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76   A. Mycock, The First World War Centenary in the UK: 'A Truly National Commemoration?, Round Table 103:2, 2014, pp. 153-63.

Reinventing Empire in the Wake of the Great War: Imperial Citizenship and the "Wilsonian Moment" in Colonial Algeria

Donal Hassett

ABSTRACT

Anfang 1919 beriefen sich in Algerien sowohl die Anführer der europäischen Siedler als auch die Wortführer der indigenen Gruppen auf ihre jeweiligen Kriegstoten, um bei der Pariser Friedenskonferenz eine Interessenvertretung anerkannt zu bekommen. Obwohl die politischen Projekte, für welche sich diese zwei politischen Eliten einsetzten, diametral entgegengesetzt waren, glaubten doch beide ihren Machtspielraum erweitern zu können, indem sie vor dem starken Mann der Stunde, Woodrow Wilson, ihre Ansprüche geltend machten. Dieser Artikel untersucht, inwieweit der Rückgriff auf die Ideen Wilsons durch Akteure in Algerien tatsächlich einen Versuch darstellte, die koloniale Ordnung radikal zu verändern. Er zeigt, dass die Koketterie mit dem Selbstbestimmungsrecht seitens der politischen Anführer der Siedler als auch der indigenen Bevölkerung kurzlebig und frei gestaltbar war. Vielmehr wird hier angenommen, dass die Hauptzielrichtung der Neuerfindung der imperialen Ordnung in der Nachkriegszeit auf die Entwicklung einer neuen, imperialen Form von Staatsangehörigkeit abzielte.

In May 1919, a new wave of popular contestation swept the colonial world. From Egypt to Korea, as Erez Manela has eloquently shown us, political actors in the colonies embraced the principle of self-determination, giving rise to a "Wilsonian Moment."[1] As the leaders of the old imperial powers met in Paris to divvy up the world among themselves yet again, the American President held out the promise of a new world order in which the voices of the colonial peoples would no longer go unheard. After all, had he not com-

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[1]   E. Manela, The Wilsonian Moment: Self-Determination and the International Origins of Anticolonial Nationalism, Oxford, 2007.

mitted in the fifth of his famous Fourteen Points to ensuring that the "interests" of colonial populations "must have equitable weight" with the interests of their colonial masters?[2] Furthermore, the principle of self-determination, the essential foundation block of Wilson's vision of a just postwar order, offered hope to those who sought to legitimize mass campaigns to cast off resented forms of imperial power. Finally, the emergence of a new international politics that was committed, in theory, to the equal recognition of the rights of national groups seemed to offer a new and powerful forum to those challenging the imperial status quo.[3]

The sense of excitement about Wilson and his declaration among colonial peoples, a "largely unintended but eager audience for this rhetoric",[4] had a certain resonance in France's most important colony, Algeria. Prominent actors from both of the colony's communities, the settler "Europeans" and the indigenous "Algerians", saw that the future of the postwar world and their place in it was being decided in their imperial capital. Both sides actively sought to secure a place, or, at the very least, a sympathetic ear at the conference table. Nevertheless, as this article will show, their efforts to renegotiate Empire through the framework of Wilsonian concepts of self-determination were ephemeral. If there was a "Wilsonian Moment" in postwar Algeria, it was short-lived. This was largely because the political actors in the colony focussed not on disputing sovereignty but rather on conquering new rights within the existing power structure of Empire. For those seeking to reconfigure the imperial polity in French Algeria in the years immediately following the Great War, the quest for a new imperial citizenship was far more important than embracing Wilsonian self-determination.

In order to understand this strategic choice on the part of political actors in the colony, this article will begin with an introduction to the history of sovereignty and citizenship in French Algeria. It will subsequently trace the transformative effect of the Great War on the colony and, in particular, on the relationship between citizens, subjects and the colonial authorities. The main body of the article will focus on the postwar campaigns to restructure the colonial relationship, acknowledging the influence of Wilsonian self-determination yet asking why it proved so fleeting compared to the drive for a new form of imperial citizenship.

Citizenship and Subjecthood in Colonial Algeria

Algeria was always a colony apart in the French Empire. The conquest of the colony, a long and bloody process, took place in the 1830s, making Algeria a sort of bridge between the first colonial empire in the New World and the second soon to be established in sub-Saharan Africa, across the Maghreb and in South-East Asia. This intermediary

2   W. Wilson, President Wilson's Fourteen Points, 8 January 1918 in: The Avalon Project, Documents in Law, History and Diplomacy, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/wilson14.asp (accessed 17 January 2017).
3   Manela, The Wilsonian Moment, p. 4.
4   Ibid.

position was also evident in the political status accorded to its inhabitants. While the residents of the 'old colonies' enjoyed the rights of citizenship and the populations of the new colonies were colonial subjects, the situation in Algeria was more complex. Since 1848, Algeria had been legally integrated into the administrative framework of the metropole as an integral part of the French Republic. The *sénatus-consulte* of 1865 set about clarifying the legal status of the colony's inhabitants.[5] Those settlers who came from France obviously retained their citizenship when they moved to the colony, while other European settlers would have to go through the complex process of applying for naturalization. The indigenous Algerians (Jews and Muslims) were classed as French nationals but not French citizens, governed by their personal status as subjects of Koranic or Mosaic Law. Strict criteria were imposed to regulate the naturalization process for indigenous peoples, including the requirement to renounce their personal status, a policy that in practice rendered naturalization both almost practically impossible and culturally repugnant to the vast majority of the indigenous Muslim population.[6] Subsequently, the French authorities would naturalize the colony's Jewish population *en masse* (1870) and facilitate the accession to citizenship of non-French European settlers through the new Nationality Code (1889). This expansion of citizenship rights in the colony did not, however, apply to the vast majority of the population, the indigenous Algerians, whose personal status as Muslims supposedly excluded them from participation in the imperial polity. The law secured the position of non-French Europeans within the power structure of the colonial regime by drawing a clear line between those considered worthy of French citizenship and those whose cultural, religious and/or racial identity was deemed incompatible with the exercise of French citizenship. Thus, the dichotomy between citizen and subject became the defining feature of both politics and daily life in the colony.

The Great War and the Boundaries of Citizenship in Algeria

The shadow of an impending conflict, which increasingly loomed over politics in France and its Empire in the years before the Great War, gave rise to an important debate in Algeria over the impermeability of the boundary between citizen and subject. Unsurprisingly, given the context of the increasing militarization of French society, this debate crystallized around questions of military service and conscription. France, more than any other European country, had a long tradition of tying citizenship to military service, going all the way back to the *levées-en-masse* of the revolutionary period.[7] If military action to defend the integrity of the national borders was the ultimate act of sovereignty, participating in defence as a citizen-soldier was, at least in France, the essential act of

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5   See P. Weil, How to Be French: Nationality in the Making Since 1789, trans. Catherine Porter, London: Duke University Press, 2008 (First published in French 2002), pp. 152-167.

6   J. McDougall, History and the Culture of Nationalism in Algeria, Cambridge, 2006, p. 91.

7   J. Horne L'impôt du sang: Republican rhetoric and industrial warfare in France, 1914–1918, in: Social History 14, (1989), pp. 201-223, p. 215.

citizenship. Thus, the debate around the application of conscription in the colony would offer rival groups the opportunity to define the boundaries between subject and citizen in their favour.

The distinction between citizen and subject initially resulted in a relatively simple application of the metropolitan conscription regime to the colony. Colonial citizens were required to carry out military service under the same conditions as their metropolitan equivalents, while indigenous subjects were exempted from obligatory service. However, senior figures in both the French military and in the colonial service had long discussed the possibility of applying conscription to the indigenous population of Algeria in line with the broader effort to build France's military capacity through recruitment in the Empire. It would take the climate of international tension in the years before the Great War for the issue to enter wider public discourse. The defenders of the imposition of conscription in the colony found vocal allies in the *Jeune Algérien* movement, an informal grouping of educated elite Algerians. Convinced that conscription would inevitably lead to the extension of citizenship rights, these intellectuals sought to persuade a sceptical, and in some cases openly hostile,[8] indigenous public, that conscription would bring many benefits and automatically enhance the political rights of the indigenous elite.[9] At the heart of their claims stood the argument that France had always tied military service to citizenship. This same assertion was also central to the bitter opposition of the leadership of the European community to any extension of conscription to cover the indigenous population. They too believed that conscription would open the door to citizenship for at least part of the Algerian population and thus, fundamentally breach the essential boundary between citizenship and subjecthood. [10]

The policy ultimately adopted by the French government would prioritize the maintenance of European hegemony in the colony over any attempt to recognize the political rights of the indigenous population within the imperial polity. The 1912 law applying conscription to indigenous Algerians imposed conditions of service that marked them out as notably different from other conscripts. Military service was to be rewarded with money, not extended political rights, and indigenous Algerians would enter the army as subject-soldiers, with no enhanced prospect of acquiring citizenship.[11] As a result, indigenous Algerians serving in the French Army on the eve of the Great War occupied a somewhat ambiguous position, "between hired mercenaries and full French citizens".[12] The boundary between subject and citizen survived the introduction of conscription intact, but how did it fare when faced with the mass mobilization of a colonial society at war?

With the French Empire's entry into the Great War in August 1914, theoretical debates over the political status of Algeria's inhabitants became less important than ensuring the

8   B. Recham, Les musulmans algériens dans l'armée française 1919–1945, Paris, 1996, p. 19.
9   G. Meynier, L'Algérie Révélé: La guerre de 1914–1918 et le premier quart du XXe siècle, Geneva, 1981, p. 95.
10   Ibid, pp. 92-94.
11   Ibid, pp. 96-97.
12   R. Fogarty, Race and War in France: Colonial Subjects in the French Army, 1914–1918, Baltimore, 2008, p. 53.

colony's contribution to the war effort. A specifically colonial *Union Sacrée* came into being in Algeria, with the tacit understanding that political disputes over colonial reform would be suspended until the future of the Empire had been secured on the battlefields of Europe with the help of Algeria's inhabitants.[13] Over the course of the war, about 73000 Europeans served as French citizens on the battlefields of France and the Eastern Front, a proportion roughly equal to that of metropolitan France.[14] In total, some 173000 indigenous soldiers had served in French forces by the end of war, with slightly more than half of these enlisting as "volunteers",[15] though this term is questionable given the recruitment practices employed by colonial administrators.[16] Of these subject-soldiers, 125000 saw action on the European battlefields over the course of the war.[17] Estimates for European deaths range between 12000[18] and 22000[19] while the number of indigenous deaths is generally put somewhere around 26000.[20] Furthermore, thousands of indigenous workers took up positions in factories in France, freeing up men to serve at the Front and playing an important role in maintaining the supply of essential military and industrial equipment.[21] This mass mobilization of colonial manpower would have important implications for how Algeria's inhabitants understood their place in the imperial polity and how they would seek to improve it in the years following the war.

For the colony's European community, participation in the Great War placed their entitlement to the privileges of French citizenship beyond doubt. Any question around the loyalty of the newly assimilated settler populations of non-French origins were dispelled by their sacrifices on the battlefields of Europe. For the political leaders of the European community, their sacrifice in defence of the Empire sacralised the special relationship between the colony and the metropole giving rise to a "blood pact" that bound the two together for eternity. In the eyes of the European political class, this relationship of "reciprocal national obligation", a defining feature of the social contract underpinning wartime service across the belligerent countries,[22] obliged the metropolitan government to maintaining European hegemony in the colony. Indeed, as we shall see, the most vocal European leaders believed that their communal contribution to the war effort merited an expansion of European hegemony that could only be realized through a reconfiguration of the imperial polity.

13   J. Jansen, Une autre "Union Sacrée"? Commémorer la Grande Guerre dans l'Algérie colonisée (1918–1939), A. Jommier (trans.), in: Revue d'histoire moderne et contemporaine 61-62 (2014) 2, pp. 32-60, p. 34.
14   J. Frémeaux, Les Colonies dans la Grande Guerre : Combats et Epreuves des Peuples d'Outre-Mer, Paris, 2006, p. 55.
15   Stora, Algeria 1830–2000, p. 18.
16   For a detailed account of the abuses involved in the recruitment process see Meynier, L'Algérie Révélée, pp. 393-404.
17   Frémaux, Les Colonies dans la Grande Guerre, p. 63.
18   Ibid., p. 202.
19   Stora, Algeria 1830–2000, p. 18.
20   Frémaux gives the figure 26000 while Stora offers the figure 25000, Frémaux, Les Colonies dans la Grande Guerre, p. 202 and Stora, Algeria 1830–2000, p. 18.
21   Frémaux, Les Colonies dans la Grande Guerre, pp. 73-74.
22   John Horne, Labour at War: France and Britain, 1914–1918, Oxford, 1991, p. 351.

For Algeria's indigenous population, the experience of the war crystallized the ambiguity of their place in the French national community. Military policy towards indigenous troops was shaped by "conflicting impulses" blending racial prejudice, paternalism, respect for difference and a rhetorical commitment to republican equality.[23] The Army, though it was permeated by racist discrimination, was a "relatively egalitarian social order" compared to colonial society in Algeria, and this limited equality would leave a lasting impression on those who survived the war.[24] This was also true for the interaction of indigenous Algerians with the metropolitan French, whether in the trenches or behind the front lines. While some soldiers reported incidents of racial discrimination, others celebrated the respect and friendship with which they were treated by their officers and by French civilians.[25] These experiences demonstrated to indigenous Algerians and their political leaders both the possibilities and the limits of a potentially more egalitarian post-war order. In the years that followed the Armistice, they would brandish the wartime contribution of their community in an effort to secure new rights within the imperial polity. At the heart of their campaign stood the contention that their wartime service granted them the right to a new form of citizenship that could simultaneously reconcile French republican equality with the cultural and racial difference that defined Empire.

Rival Visions of Colonial Reform

While the leaders of both the European and indigenous communities would seek to impose their own visions of a just post-war colonial order, the immediate task of passing colonial reform fell to the metropolitan government in Paris. Georges Clemenceau, the fiery Prime Minister who had led France to victory in the war, had long harboured scepticism, if not a certain hostility, towards the colonial enterprise. During the war, he had strongly advocated rewarding the military service of imperial subjects with expanded political rights.[26] His reappointment of noted reformer Charles Jonnart to his former position as Governor General of Algeria reinforced the impression that the government was committed to fundamental colonial reform. Nevertheless, this zeal for reform would be tempered by a combination of political pressure from the colonial lobby and the decline in prominence of colonial issues following the Armistice. The final project, known as the *Loi Jonnart*, extended a limited form of franchise at the local level to certain categories of the indigenous population, including veterans. As a result, some 421000 indigenous men now enjoyed the right to vote, albeit in a restrictive system that never called into

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23   Fogarty, Race and War, pp. 126-130, p. 272.

24   Ibid., 7.

25   G. Meynier, L'Algérie révélée : la guerre de 1914–1918 et le 1er quart du XXe siècle, Lille, 1984, Thesis defended 1979, p. 421 and p. 436.

26   Meynier, L'Algérie révélée, Annexe CLXXV-CLXXVI.

question European hegemony in the colony.[27] While Jonnart presented the project in terms that deliberately blurred the lines between citizen and subject, suggesting that the new law created an "intermediary status", the essential distinction underpinning the power structure of the colonial regime remained intact.[28] Faced with the competing interests of Algeria's different communities and their rival claims for legitimacy grounded in their wartime service, the metropolitan government opted for a reform designed to placate the indigenous political elites without provoking the ire of the political leaders of the European community. Ultimately, this balancing act would fail to satisfy political elites from both sides of the ethnic divide in the colony. Both would seek to articulate their own visions of colonial reform, hoping that the unique opportunity offered by the post-war moment would allow them to restructure the Empire in their favour.

For the defenders of further reform in favour of the indigenous, the *Loi Jonnart* was a minor sign of progress but went nowhere near compensating the mass sacrifice the indigenous community had made for the defence of France. Gathered around the charismatic figure of the Emir Khaled, grandson of the leader of resistance to the French conquest, the Emir Abd-el-Kader, and the only non-naturalized indigenous soldier to reach the rank of captain, the supporters of indigenous reform showed little enthusiasm for the government's efforts. While *L'Ikdam*, the group's newspaper, initially referred to the *Loi Jonnart* as "a step forward"[29] and claimed it was testament to the goodwill felt by the Algerian administration to the indigenous community,[30] it soon began to clamour for a more expansive reform package. The Emir and his supporters sought a reconfiguration of the imperial polity that could recognize the political rights of indigenous Algerians won on the battlefields of the Great War without alienating them from their Islamic identity. This quest for a form of "equality in difference" translated, in concrete policy terms, into the demand for indigenous representation in Parliament, the abolition of all measures of exception in the colony and, most importantly, the naturalization of indigenous people as French citizens without the renunciation of their personal status.[31] This programme and the campaign around it attracted much popular support among the politically aware sections of the colony's population. But where does this mobilization fit in the broader schema of the 'Wilsonian Moment' and to what extent did the Emir and his followers embrace Wilsonian self-determination?

Before we attempt this question, we must also consider the European community's efforts to promote its vision of a new post-war order in Algeria. The reforms of the *Loi Jonnart,* focused solely on the political status of the colony's indigenous population, did nothing to answer the calls for a new political dispensation that would recognize and reward the European community's contribution to the war effort. Indeed, some of the

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27 Ch.-R.Ageron, Une politique algérienne libérale sous la troisième République (1912–1919): Étude historique de la loi du 4 février 1919 in: Revue d'histoire moderne et contemporaine 6 :2 (April-June, 1959), pp. 121-151, p. 144.

28 Fogarty, Race and War, p. 258.

29 A nos lecteurs et amis in: L'Ikdam, 07 March 1919.

30 Kherroubi, Appel aux Patriotes in: L'Ikdam, 15 March 1919.

31 A. Koulakssis and G. Meynier, L 'Emir Khaled: premier za'îm?, Paris, 1987, p. 198.

more radical leaders of the community condemned the reform as "treacherous", painting it as the first step in a wider attack on European hegemony within the colony. While much of the energy of the European political class in the colony went into the campaign to oppose and/or dilute the provisions of the *Loi Jonnart*, with a certain degree of success, the leaders of the European community also developed their own vision of a just postwar colonial order. At the heart of this vision stood the demand for Algerian autonomy, for the right of the European community in Algeria to decide their own future within the French Empire. Here the influence of some form of Wilsonian self-determination seems evident. But, once more, we must ask, to what extent did the European leadership actually understand their efforts to redefine Empire in Algeria as part of a wider "Wilsonian Moment"?

The Wilsonian Strategy

When assessing the influence of the "Wilsonian Moment" on campaigns for colonial reform in Algeria, the seeming comparisons with other parts of the colonial world are striking. The practice of post-war claims in Algeria seems to fit into a wider pattern of colonial populations, whether settlers or subjects, asserting a right to self-determination born of their wartime service. When it comes to those seeking a new settlement for colonial subjects, the superficial parallels between activism in the immediate post-war period in British-controlled Egypt and French Algeria seem convincing. Around the same time when the figure of Sa'd Zaghlul and his Wafd Party were mobilising Wilsonian self-determination against the British authorities, the charismatic Emir Khaled was rallying the indigenous population of Algeria against the crudest forms of French colonial rule. Similarly, just as Britain's White Dominions were asserting their control over their own affairs, the European community in Algeria was also demanding autonomy from the imperial metropole. Yet, when we look beyond superficial comparisons, do they actually constitute proof of Algeria's embrace of the "Wilsonian Moment"? Moreover, what evidence do we have, beyond the circumstantial and the comparative, to attest to a real engagement with Wilsonian self-determination by political actors in the Algeria of the immediate post-war period?

If we turn first to the case of the Emir Khaled and his supporters, there is one key document that demonstrates a clear Wilsonian impulse underpinning their campaign. In May 1919, the Emir himself addressed a petition directly to "the honourable President of the Free America" in an effort to win his support for the cause of the Algerian people.[32] The petition, drawn up by a committee dominated by close allies of the Emir, was approved at a meeting in Algiers.[33] Unsurprisingly, given the target audience of the petition, the

32   Pétition de l'Emir Khaled au Président des Etats-Unis Wilson in: L'Emir Khaled : Documents et témoignages, M. Kaddache and M. Guennanèche (eds.), pp. 121-124, p. 121.

33   M. Kaddache, Histoire du nationalisme algérien, Tome I, 1919–1939, Algiers, 2003, p. 94.

Emir's arguments were steeped in the language of Wilsonian self-determination. His petition began with an account of the usurpation of Algerian sovereignty as a result of the French "occupation". He then detailed the numerous legal guarantees granted to the Algerians by the various French regimes over the year who had committed to "respect our laws, our customs, our religions", and lamented that "these beautiful promises turned out to be only words".[34] Here, the Emir was clearly attempting to place the case of Algeria in the nascent international legal order, underlining the illegality of the practice of French rule in his homeland. When it came to expressing his most radical opinion, the belief that the happiness of Algeria's indigenous population could only be secured outside of the existing imperial polity, he choose to evoke Wilson's own words:

> *Defeated and resigned to our fate, we have endured all these calamities in the hope of brighter days to come. Your solemn declaration in May 1917, in your message to Russia, that 'no people can be forced to live under a sovereignty it repudiates' gives us hope that these days have arrived.*[35]

This was followed by a concrete proposition that was, once more, heavily rooted in Wilsonian theories. The Emir argued that French sovereignty in Algeria should be replaced with the temporary stewardship of the League of Nations, pending the free decision by the people of Algeria on their "future destiny". The petition ends with a celebration of the famous Fourteen Points, which the Emir claims will serve "to liberate all the small oppressed peoples, regardless of race or religion" and a tribute to Wilson, the "flag-carrier of law and justice" for all the peoples of the world.[36] This glowing tribute to Wilson demonstrates the extent to which the Emir and his followers believed the American President could potentially deliver the most radical re-configuration of the post-war colonial order by bringing an end to French rule and reinstalling indigenous sovereignty.

The contents of this document place the Emir and his supporters at the heart of the global moment of anti-colonial claims-making so convincingly described by Erez Manela. It is, in many ways, the archetype of the "flood of declarations, petitions and memoranda" that various anti-colonial groups issued in Paris in early 1919.[37] Firstly, the Emir's strategy of presenting Algeria's case in the nascent language of an international political system grounded in legalism, self-determination and the respect for the equal voice of sovereign peoples, was a defining feature of this type of petition. Secondly, the praise lavished on Wilson and his Fourteen Points, coupled with the use of his own words to justify the Algerian case for self-determination, was again typical of the appeals directed by anti-colonial activists towards the American delegation at the Paris Peace Conference.[38] Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the confident sense that Wilson's theories and declarations were wholly applicable to colonial situations, evident throughout the Emir's

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34   Pétition de l'Emir Khaled in : L'Emir Khaled, p. 122.
35   Ibid., p. 123.
36   Ibid., p. 124.
37   Manela, The Wilsonian Moment, p. 4.
38   Ibid., p. 5.

petition, was the essential foundation underpinning the "Wilsonian Moment" across the colonial world. The fact that Wilson barely even considered the colonial word in the development of his theories and showed little enthusiasm for extending the principle of self-determination beyond the borders of Europe, meant that, contrary to the hopes of the petitioners, he would not lead the effort to bring an end to the colonial order.[39] The petitions, thus, would fall on deaf ears. This failure to secure change notwithstanding, these petitions do offer us great insight into the way those seeking to transform the colonial world understood their place in the wider framework of an emergent global polity. For the Emir Khaled and his supporters, and indeed, for many other political actors around the colonial world, the presence of Wilson at the conference table in Paris was too good an opportunity to be missed.

Yet, despite the clear enthusiasm for Wilson and his theories evident in this petition, the concept of self-determination and calls for an end to French sovereignty were extremely marginal in the political action of the Emir Khaled and his supporters in the immediate postwar period. While political elites in the indigenous community did share the optimism of their equivalents in Egypt and farther afield in the colonial world that the war would radically transform the colonial world, they did not believe that a defence of Wilsonian self-determination was the best strategy to secure change. Indeed, the Emir's initiative of petitioning President Wilson was not widely publicized in the colony and would be a source of tension within the indigenous elite, with some moderates denouncing the Emir's actions.[40] The political leaders of the indigenous community recognized that Algeria's position in the Empire, as an integral part of the French Republic, coupled with the presence of a numerically significant and politically influential settler population, forestalled any prospect of a renegotiation of sovereignty in the colony. Furthermore, many figures within the elite owed their status in part to their relationship to the French colonial authorities, whether as local notables, elected officials or part of a nascent professional class working for the colonial state. Their central aim was not to call French sovereignty into question but rather to secure for themselves a role in the exercise of this sovereignty through the acquisition of the rights of French citizenship. Even the more radical voices around the Emir had a somewhat ambiguous attitude towards the prospect of ending French sovereignty and opted to eschew a campaign of full-throated opposition to colonial rule in favour of the demand for a reconfiguration of the imperial polity and a new form of imperial citizenship.

The contrast between the cases of Egypt and Algeria in this period is indicative of the fleeting nature of the "Wilsonian Moment" in the French colony. Of course, this is not a case of comparing like with like. Both the legal structures and the history of colonial rule in the two North African territories were quite distinct. British occupation of Egypt began fifty years after the French invaded Algeria and the resultant polity was organized as a protectorate, not a settler colony. Egypt's position as a centre of both Mediterranean

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39   Ibid., p. 10.
40   Kaddache, Histoire du nationalisme algérien, p. 95.

and East-West trade, as well as the long history of Cairo as one of the intellectual capitals of the Arab world, marked it out from the relative backwater status of Algeria in this period. It was home to an emergent middle class of modern Egyptians, or *efendiyya*, who sought a place for their nation in the new global order.[41] These differences were reflected in the practice of politics in both territories. Egypt was home to a much more politically active elite that was better plugged into global political networks whereas formal indigenous political activism in Algeria was a relatively new phenomenon in a colony where the coercive power of the colonial state and of the settler population weighed particularly heavily on the subject population. These factors undoubtedly influenced the strategic choices of political leaders in both territories in the wake of the Great War, shaping their attitudes towards Wilson and the concept of self-determination.

In Egypt, the movement for reform was unabashedly committed to the drive for self-determination and held the restoration of indigenous sovereignty above all other political goals. Even the name chosen by the new party they founded, the "Wafd" or "delegation" party was a nod to the Egyptians' desire to participate in the new global political order grounded in negotiations and mutual recognitions of sovereignty.[42] The movement in Algeria, in contrast, was never formally organized into a party and generally shied away from a public embrace of self-determination. The kind of popular adulation of Wilson that became a driving force of the movement in Egypt was notable by its absence in Algeria. While Wilson and his theories were omnipresent in the Egyptian press, even the most avid supporters of colonial reform in Algeria rarely referred to Wilsonian doctrine.[43] Over the course of 1919, only one prominent article in *L'Ikdam* made reference to "Wilsonian principles" and even then, the theme was evoked only in passing.[44] The Emir's petition stands out as the only example of a direct appeal to Wilson by indigenous Algerians in the period, again contrasting with the numerous attempts by the Wafd and its supporters to win Wilson's approval.[45] While the Emir and his supporters quickly abandoned efforts to secure an international intervention in their colony, the Egyptians persisted in demanding that their voice be heard at the Paris Peace Conference leading to the mass mobilization of the 1919 Revolution.

Even the declaration by the American government that it recognised the legitimacy of the protectorate, albeit acknowledging the Egyptians' right to campaign for further self-government, did not signal the end for Wilsonian rhetoric among Egypt's nationalists.[46] The very fact that the American government was forced to clarify its position on Egypt shows the extent to which the Wilsonian Moment had come to define politics in Egypt. This was most definitely not the case in Algeria, a territory the American government continued to recognize as an integral part of France until its independence in 1962.

41   L. Ryzova, The Age of the Efendiyya: Passages to Modernity in National-Colonial Egypt, Oxford, 2014, pp. 4-6.
42   Manela, The Wilsonian Moment, p. 70.
43   Ibid.
44   Abou-el-Hack, La guerre continue in: L'Ikdam, 05 April 1919.
45   Manela, The Wilsonian Moment, pp. 72-74.
46   Ibid., p. 149.

The legacies of the "Wilsonian Moment" defined politics in interwar Egypt, as activists continued to defend a sort of "Wilsonianism without Wilson" well after their exclusion from the Paris Peace Conference.[47] In contrast, the brief flirtation of Algeria's indigenous political activists with the rhetoric of liberal, Wilsonian self-determination left little trace in the political culture of the colony. The "Wilsonian Moment" was not a foundational event for Algeria's future nationalist movement.

When addressing the drive for a new post-war order by the leaders of Algeria's European community, it might seem counterintuitive to suggest that these staunch opponents of any form of majoritarian rule might embrace Wilsonian rhetoric. After all, surely the principle of self-determination, if applied in Algeria, would automatically bring an end to their hegemonic position in the colony. Nevertheless, as both American policy in Egypt and the President's deep personal commitment to racial segregation in America showed,[48] Wilsonian principles were not necessarily incompatible with a political regime based on racial exclusion. While the leadership of the European community never directly appealed to Wilson, and indeed roundly condemned the Emir Khaled for having done so,[49] their campaign for enhanced autonomy bore some of the hallmarks of the "Wilsonian Moment". In particular, prominent figures from the European political class staked a claim for Algerian representation at the Paris Peace Conference, the epicentre of the "Wilsonian Moment". An article in *L'Echo d'Alger* in February 1919 set out a clear case for the seating of an Algerian delegation alongside those of the British Dominions. After all, the author asked, was Algeria not "worth the same as Australia, New Zealand and Canada?" Were her "sacrifices" in men and money "less than that of the Dominions of England?"[50] The demand for Algerian representation was not, however, solely motivated by a desire for equal treatment between the constituent parts of the victorious Empires. The author also stressed the importance of Algerian representation to ensure the colony was not "sacrificed in the wheeling and dealing of the diplomats".[51] Like their opponents grouped around the Emir Khaled and their equivalents across the colonial world, the leaders of Algeria's European community understood that a new global political order was being shaped in Paris. Their exclusion from the conference was held up as evidence of the 'little attention' paid to their concerns by those in the metropole. Indeed, the language used to articulate their frustration closely paralleled the rhetoric of both the Emir Khaled in his petition and the slogans of the Wafd Party in Egypt. The denunciation of the "close control" exercised by the metropole, which supposedly amounted to a form of "subjugation" would not have been out of place in a speech by Sa'd Zeghlul.[52]

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47   Ibid., p. 157.
48   Ibid., p. 26.
49   Le Problème de l'Entente et de la Coopération des Races in: La Dépêche Algérienne, 15 November 1922.
50   Les problèmes économiques et la politique : La représentation de l'Algérie à la conférence de la paix in: L'Echo d'Alger, 06 February 1919.
51   Ibid.
52   Ibid.

Wilsonian rhetoric had clearly entered the vocabulary of the leaders of Algeria's European community.

The drive to secure a place at the negotiating table in Paris was just one element of the much wider campaign to expand settler autonomy in the colony. Here again the language employed by the European leaders clearly echoed the petitions sent to Wilson. In an editorial entitled "Algerian Freedoms: Autonomy", the newspaper *L'Évolution Nord-Africaine* asserted that "Algeria has reached the age of majority and can no longer live under [the metropole's] guardianship" with its "odious regime of exception that, all too often, enforce all the duties without giving all the rights." Defending its claim for an autonomous Algeria, the newspaper rejected accusations of separatism by drawing comparisons with the British Empire, asking "have the freedoms enjoyed by the English Dominions made separatists of them?"[53] Another prominent supporter of autonomy, writing in *L'Echo d'Alger*, envisaged a settlement for Algeria that seemed to draw inspiration from both the situation of the Dominions and that of Wilson's homeland, advocating a "free Algeria, under a French protectorate, with a democracy modelled on America".[54] The evocation of the relative autonomy of the British Dominions may seem quite distant from the soaring rhetoric of Wilsonian self-determination. It does, however, bear testimony to the settler leadership's desire to negotiate some form of sovereignty for the colony's European population and its recognition that the postwar moment offered a potential global audience to their cause.

This brief flirtation with Wilsonian rhetoric was even more limited among the leadership of Algeria's European community than for the Emir Khaled and his supporters. The demographic position of the European community as a small minority (circa 13% in 1930)[55] made them absolutely dependent on the coercive power of the French state to maintain their racial hegemony in the colony. In colonial Algeria, the protection of settler primacy always took precedence over efforts to expand settler sovereignty.[56] This was not the case in Australia, Canada and New Zealand, where the eliminatory logic of settler colonialism had established a polity in which settler hegemony was a given and settler sovereignty a goal. These Dominions would defend their own specifically imperial vision of self-determination in the wake of the Great War to successfully expand on their already significant autonomy, securing equality of status under the Balfour Formula of 1926 and then full legislative authority under the Statute of Westminster in 1931.[57] Such concessions were unimaginable in an Algeria that was both an integral part of the French Republic and a majority-indigenous settler colony. Given the limits of the po-

53   Libertés algériennes: l'autonomie in: L'Évolution Nord-Africaine, 05 July 1919.

54   E. Baïlac, L'Algérie libre in: L'Echo d'Alger, 22 April 1919.

55   Percentage calculated from the Census of the Population in 1931, from the Archives Nationales d'Outre-Mer, Aix-en-Provence, ANOM GGA/3CAB/95.

56   For more on the distinction between these concepts see D. Hassett, Proud Colons, Proud Frenchmen: Settler Colonialism and the Extreme Right in Interwar Algeria, in: Settler Colonial Studies 17:1 (2017), pp. 1–19, pp. 3-4.

57   For an account of post-war claims-making and the restructuring of the British Empire see J. Darwin, A Third British Empire? The Dominion Idea in Imperial Politics, in: The Oxford History of the British Empire, Vol. IV, The Twentieth Century, J. Brown and W. R. Louis, Oxford, 1999, pp. 64-87, pp. 68-75.

litical space in which they operated, the partisans of autonomy in Algeria would prove far less comfortable with imperial adaptations of Wilsonian rhetoric, choosing to frame their demands in a way that more clearly rooted them in the imperial polity.

The Drive for a New Imperial Citizenship

For political leaders in Algeria the quest for new rights would be expressed in terms of a new form of citizenship, not an extension of new forms of sovereignty. Both the defenders of indigenous reform and the leaders of the European community cast their postwar political projects as a restructuring of the imperial polity that would reward past sacrifice and promote future development. Although they were critical of aspects of the colonial system, especially the metropole's seeming indifference towards life in the colony, they largely eschewed calls to weaken the essential link between France and Algeria. Rather, what they sought was a new model of Empire that could reconcile the particularity of Algeria with the universality of the French Republic. This aspiration for a new place within the French imperial polity meant that the language of Wilsonian self-determination lost out to other rhetorical strategies more clearly grounded in French political tradition.

First and foremost among the rhetorical strategies used by actors from both of Algeria's communities to frame their postwar demands was the French concept of the *impôt du sang* or "blood tax". As the debates around conscription had shown, the notion that rights of citizenship were corollaries of duties of military service had a powerful resonance in French political life. Unsurprisingly, then, Emir Khaled and his followers evoked their wartime service repeatedly to promote their right to citizenship within the personal status while their opponents in the European community pointed to their wartime contribution to defend their right to a differentiated form of settler citizenship.

For the Emir Khaled, who had served with distinction in the war, the communal contribution of the indigenous population was the primary justification for his calls for a new dispensation in the colony. When outlining his manifesto, just one month after sending his petition to Wilson, the Emir defended his call for naturalization within the status with the assertion that "by spilling their blood for France, they have acquired indisputable rights".[58] This message was reinforced repeatedly by his supporters, who constantly evoked the war dead in their defence of the concession of an imperial form of citizenship compatible with the personal status.[59] Any extension of French citizenship that would require the renunciation of this personal status would be nothing more than a "convoluted means of keeping them under the yoke [of oppression]".[60] Close allies of the Emir pointed out that the French government had not been so concerned about the personal status of indigenous Algerians when they sent them into battle.[61] As one Euro-

58   Emir Khaled, Réponse à M. Jean Mélia, in: L'Ikdam, 21-28 June 1919.
59   M. Thomas, The French Empire between the Wars: Imperialism, Politics and Society, Manchester, 2005, p. 248.
60   L'Ikdam, 24 May 1919.
61   For more details on this argument see D. Hassett, 'Defining Imperial Citizenship in the Shadow of World War I:

pean sympathizer of the Emir put it "were they made to renounce their personal status so that they could be sent to be riddled with bullets … for us?"[62] References to the *impôt du sang* proved the perfect rhetorical strategy for Khaled and his supporters allowing them to build on French political tradition to stake a claim for citizenship while pointing to the particularity of the conditions of indigenous wartime service to defend the personal status. Furthermore, in contrast to the perceived radicalism of the rhetoric of Wilsonian self-determination, a language articulated around the *impôt du sang* was more likely to find a friendly audience among the metropolitan political class with whom the power to change the imperial polity rested.

The leaders of the European community also recognized the potential effectiveness of framing their demands in terms of their wartime contribution. Their programme for a new settler citizenship that complemented the general rights of the French citizens with rights specific to the colony would be repeatedly justified by the evocation of the community's participation in the war. Gustave Mercier, a leading proponent of Algerian autonomy, justified his call for an enhancement of the rights of Europeans by asserting "Algeria earned the right to this emancipation through unlimited support for France during the war".[63] While the Emir and his supporters had emphasised the participation of the indigenous community despite their lack of citizenship, the European community's leaders trumpeted their contribution as full citizens of France. They pointed out that Algeria's Europeans had served in proportionally the same numbers as their metropolitan counterparts, which was not the case for the indigenous community.[64] Thus, they argued, the European community should have primacy when it came to reshaping the post-war colonial order.[65] Granting Europeans a new political status specific to the colony, which would complement their status as French citizens, would allow France to "give some credit" to those who had proven themselves "worthy of the *Patrie*".[66] For the European leadership, evoking the war dead allowed them to simultaneously assert their right to compensation and their commitment to the continuation of French sovereignty. Whereas Wilsonian rhetoric, or even evocations of Dominion status, stressed the increasing independence of colonies, the defenders of autonomy, who depended on French coercive power, preferred a language grounded in an imperial form of "reciprocal national obligation". [67]

Indeed, this desire on the part of the European leadership to minimize any potential perception of separatism among metropolitan elites meant that they often sought to frame their project primarily in economic, rather than political, terms. As the editor

Equality in Difference in the Debates around Postwar Colonial Reform in Algeria', in, G. Barry, E. Del Lago, R. Healy, (eds.), Small Nations and Colonial Peripheries in World War I, (Leiden, 2016), pp. 263-280, p. 270.

62   Victor Speilmann, La question indigène au Conseil Supérieur in: L'Ikdam, 06 January 1922.
63   Gustave Mercier, L'autonomie algérienne et la Fédération Nord-Africaine in: L'Echo d'Alger, 25 May 1919.
64   Ferdinand Anecy, La Question Indigène au Congrès des Colons in: L'Evolution Nord-Africaine, 21 June 1919.
65   F. Ancey, La Question Indigène in: La Voix des Colons, 20-27 July1919 ; Gustave Mercier, L'Autonomie Algérienne, Le Contrôle Métropolitain in: L'Echo d'Alger, 21 January 1920.
66   Gustave Mercier, L'Autonomie Algérienne, Le Contrôle Métropolitain in : L'Echo d'Alger, 21 January 1920.
67   Horne, Labour at War, 351.

of *l'Echo d'Alger* asserted, "a free Algeria is not a separatist conception: it is a regionalist formula based on modern economic science".[68] Extending autonomy, it was argued, would allow the colony to recover from the havoc of the war and play its role in the future development of the Empire.[69] An autonomous Algeria could transform "the institutions that hamper" the development of the economy and thus cause "a loss of trade to the Motherland".[70] This economic focus chimed with the vision, championed by the Radical politician Albert Sarraut, of a postwar France that would flourish through the development of the resources of its Empire.[71] This strategy sought to place a settler-led Algeria in the vanguard of the imperial project, solidifying its position as a bridge between the metropole and the Empire. The political impulse of the European leaders was to strengthen, and not weaken, the imperial polity.

Algeria's position within the broader framework of the French Empire was also the source of a key argument deployed by those who supported of naturalization within personal status. While the Emir and his supporters may have drawn inspiration from the anticolonial forces around the world who participated in the "Wilsonian Moment", their main point of reference was internal to the French Empire. In support of their claim for naturalization within the status, the proponents of radical indigenous reform constantly cited the imperial precedent, especially the case of the *originaires* of Senegal.[72] The wartime accession of the indigenous Senegalese of the Four Communes of Dakar, Rufisque, Gorée and St. Louis to full citizenship rights without renouncing their personal status was a source of both inspiration and resentment for supporters of reform in Algeria. Recalling the "multiple promises" made by "democratic and republican France" during the war, they demanded "equal treatment" to that given to their "fellow Muslims in Senegal".[73] If, as the Emir put it, the "blacks of Senegal" could enjoy the rights of citizenship without renouncing their personal status, then why not the Algerians, who had "indisputably proven their attachment to France"?[74] The Emir and his followers wanted to expand this precedent into a new form of imperial citizenship around which they could reconfigure the Empire and claim the compensation due to them for their wartime service. Indeed, throughout this period the Emir and his supporters were vigilant in their efforts to ensure that they, who had so valiantly fought for France, should receive priority in any expansion of rights across the imperial polity.[75] Thus, it is clear that while they may briefly have sought to stake their claims in the emerging global political order at the

68   E Baïlac, L'Algérie libre in : L'Echo d'Alger, 22 April 1919.
69   Algérie, Tunisie, Maroc in : La Dépêche Algérienne, 14 January 1919.
70   Discours de M. Giraud in : La Dépêche Algérienne, 07 March 1930.
71   For more on this see Martin Thomas, Albert Sarraut, French Colonial Development, and the Communist Threat, 1919–1930 in: The Journal of Modern History 77 (2005) 4, pp. 917-955.
72   See: Réponse à l'Echo d'Alger in: L'Ikdam, 29 March 1919; Emir Khaled, Ne pourrions-nous pas avoir voix au chapitre? in: L'Ikdam, 27 January 1919; Emir Khaled, Riposte de l'Emir Khaled au journal 'L'Algérie' in: L'Ikdam, 09 June 1922; Problèmes Musulmans d'Algérie, une conversation avec l'Emir Khaled in: L'Ikdam, 22 December1922.
73   Zaouaoui, L'ère nouvelle in: L'Ikdam, 04 August 1922.
74   Emir Khaled, Ne pourrions-nous pas avoir voix au chapitre ? in: L'Ikdam, 27 January 1919.
75   Hassett, 'Defining Imperial Citizenship, in: Small Nations and Colonial Peripheries, 273.

Peace Conferences, supporters of indigenous reform looked within the Empire to shape and to defend their vision of a postwar just order for Algeria.

Conclusion

It would be a mistake to dismiss the idea that the colonial world experienced a "Wilsonian Moment" in the aftermath of the Great War. Like the work of a good global historian, Erez Manela's study is, by necessity, broad in the nature of the geographical spaces it covers and narrow in its conception of political claims-making, in this case focusing on anti-colonial nationalism. It does not claim to establish an incontrovertible model through which all efforts to reimagine the colonial world must be understood nor does it exclude the possibility of political actors simultaneously pursuing multiple, and often contradictory, strategies to challenge colonial rule.[76] If anything, it throws down the gauntlet to colonial historians and asks us to write the history of post-war claims of specific colonies. It in this spirit that this article has explored the resonance of the "Wilsonian Moment" in colonial Algeria.

It is clear that ideas of Wilsonian self-determination, however vague they may have been, did play a role in shaping and framing the postwar claims made by political actors from both the European and the indigenous community in Algeria. They shared with their equivalents across the colonial world a common sense that the future global order was being built around the conference table in Paris and they too sought to have their say. The Emir Khaled's petition may have been somewhat anomalous in the wider scheme of post-war claims by indigenous actors, but it shows both an awareness of and a desire to take part in a new global community of nation states. It also speaks to the ambiguity at the heart of the nascent political movement among the colony's indigenous population, torn between a desire to reclaim the sovereignty the French had usurped and a belief that Algeria's future was bound to that of France and her Empire. A similar tension was evident in the European political elite's attempt to assert their right to control Algeria's future. The desire to cast off the control of an interfering metropole was tempered by the knowledge that European hegemony was utterly dependant on French coercive power. When European leaders envied the status of the Dominions, it was as much about lamenting the continued demographic dominance of the indigenous in the colony as it was about longing for a French version of the Commonwealth. Wilson's own reticence in applying his theories to people of colour notwithstanding, the political leaders of Algeria's European community recognized the limits of the rhetoric of self-determination in a minority settler colony. In both cases, Wilsonian rhetoric may have captured the ultimate aspirations of certain political actors but they did not believe it to be the best means of securing an immediate and advantageous restructuring of the post-war colonial order.

76   Manela, The Wilsonian Moment, p. 6.

The quest for a new imperial citizenship far outweighed any drive for Wilsonian self-determination in post-war colonial Algeria. A restructuring of the imperial polity, whether to the benefit of the settler or the indigenous population, was seen as a more immediately achievable and, perhaps, a more desirable political goal in the wake of the war. To justify the accordance of new rights that acknowledged colonial specificity, both European and indigenous elites evoked the particularly French understanding of the link between citizenship and military service. This argument could find an audience among decision makers in the imperial capital without provoking repression on the part of the colonial authorities. Both groups also framed their demands in terms of the wider imperial polity, recognising Algeria's intermediary position between the metropole and the Empire. If the postwar Empire was to be successful, it would have to reconfigure its political institutions, whether by extending the limited existing forms of citizenship within the status or by granting economic and political autonomy to a settler-led Algeria. Regardless of the specifics of these rival visions of a just postwar order in Algeria, it is clear that the driving force behind political claims-making in the colony was the desire to wield more political power within the imperial polity, not the demand for some form of disentanglement from Empire. The goal was to become a new form of colonial citizen, not a citizen of some form of postcolonial state.

Much like those across the colonial world who hoped Wilsonian self-determination would deliver for them, the proponents of a new form of imperial citizenship in Algeria would ultimately be disappointed. The colonial state proved unwilling to further undermine the essential boundary between citizenship and subject and would eventually banish Emir Khaled from the colony. In exile, he would come to wholeheartedly advocate self-determination, long after the "Wilsonian Moment" had passed and, through his alliance with French Communists, would lay the foundation blocks for the next generation of revolutionary nationalists.[77] In the colony, however, indigenous elites continued to hope well into the 1930s that the metropolitan government would accord some form of imperial citizenship.[78] Within the political elite of the European community, arguments for autonomy persisted throughout the 1920s to no avail, and were quickly forgotten in the advent of the mass mobilization of the indigenous community 1930 onwards. The desire to maintain French sovereignty, and its perceived corollary, European hegemony, became the dominant force in politics among the European community, all the way up to independence in 1962.[79] Ironically, new forms of Wilsonian rhetoric around self-determination and the rights of minorities, along with Wilson-inspired institutions such as the United Nations, would play a key role in the eight year war that led to the end of

77   G. Meynier, L'Emir Khaled, « premier nationaliste algérien »? in: Abderrahmane Bouchène, Jean-Pierre, Peyroulou, Ounnassa Siari Tengour and Sylvie Thénault (eds.), Histoire de l'Algérie à la période coloniale, Paris, 2012, pp. 439-442.

78   See Kaddache, Histoire du nationalisme algérien, 419-433.

79   See Hassett, Proud Colons, Proud Frenchmen, in: Settler Colonial Studies 17:1 (2017), pp. 1–19.

French colonial rule in Algeria.[80] Indeed, while one can convincingly argue that Algeria was at the very heart of the "moment of revolutionary decolonization" in the post-WWII era, this article has demonstrated that the resonance of the post-WWI "Wilsonian Moment" was extremely limited in the colony.

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80 See M. Connelly, A Diplomatic Revolution: Algeria's Fight for Independence and the Origins of the Post-Cold War Era, Oxford, 2002.

An Anti-Colonial Empire?
Non-European Perspectives on
the Weimar Republic and
the German Dream of Empire
(1919–1930s)

Florian Wagner

ABSTRACT

Der Erste Weltkrieg beseitigte nicht nur Deutschlands Status als Kolonialmacht. Er bewegte auch die deutsche Regierung dazu, mit antikolonialen Bewegungen in der ganzen Welt zu ko-operieren, um die Imperien ihrer Kriegsgegner zu destabilisieren. Es nimmt darum nicht Wun-der, dass antikoloniale Intellektuelle nach dem Krieg ihre Hoffnungen auf das scheinbar deko-lonisierte und potenziell antikoloniale Deutschland setzten. Diese Erwartung gab der Weimarer Republik die Gelegenheit, sich als antikoloniale Macht zu etablieren und gleichzeitig ihren in-direkten Einfluss auf die nicht-europäische Welt auszudehnen. Dieser Artikel fragt, warum das Deutschland der Zwischenkriegszeit das Angebot ablehnte, sich als „antikoloniales Imperium" bei den Siegern von 1919 zu revanchieren. Entgegen gängigen Interpretationen wird dabei gezeigt, dass selbst Revanchisten darauf vertrauten, weiterhin eine europäische Kolonialmacht zu bleiben. Zudem verhinderten rassistische Einbürgerungsgesetze einen praktischen Wandel Deutschlands zur „antikolonialen Metropole".

Why did Germany not style itself as an anti-colonial power during the Weimar Repub-lic? This article claims that it could have easily done so, since many colonised peoples set their hopes on the first imperial power that was "decolonised," and occasionally even un-derstood itself as a country colonised by the other Western powers. For almost a century, historians interpreted the decolonisation of Germany by the Treaty of Versailles as a dis-possession and deprivation that provoked an ultranationalist and revisionist movement within Germany. Although accurate, this understanding accounts for a Eurocentric, if not a Germanocentric point of view. This article shows that anti-colonial international-

ists and colonised peoples interpreted the German decolonisation in a different way and thought of it as a chance to increase their own agency.

It is the following interpretation of German interwar history that enjoys widespread currency among European historians: After Germany had been deprived of its colonies in the First World War, colonial nostalgia shaped the political culture of the Weimar Republic. Colonial propaganda soared and over a million Germans joined neo-colonial lobby groups. Their fierce opposition to the Treaty of Versailles, which had downgraded the former imperial power, ultimately won the Nazis the votes necessary to establish a new empire that exceeded all others in cruelty and inhumanity.[1] This reading is yet another version of the teleological "Sonderweg" approach that portrays German history as a pre-history of the Nazi empire.[2] Scrutinizing this linear approach, I show in this article that expectations concerning the colonial role of the Weimar Republic were much more contingent.

Seen from a different angle, including the perspective of the colonised, the story unfolds like this: The war had triggered German desire to engage in anti-colonial struggle and its diplomats established vast networks with the leaders of anti-colonial movements. The most prominent case of encouraging an anti-colonial movement was the so called Hindu-German conspiracy in the First World War: The German government supplied Bengali and Ghadar party nationalists with arms, money, and military expertise to organize a revolt in British India.[3] The main plotters were specialists employed by the Foreign Ministry, like the orientalist Max von Oppenheim. Apart from unsettling India, Oppenheim developed schemes to incite Muslims in Africa to launch a jihad against the British and French colonial rulers.[4] The outcome of these German initiatives was poor, in India because of British vigilance and in Africa because few Africans were interested in completely overthrowing the colonial regime. But German politicians knew that they might learn from failure as much as from success. When the war was over, the contacts with the anti-colonial forces were still fresh and peace facilitated the communication with them.

As late as 1919, the German Foreign Ministry looked for inhabitants from the former colonies who had settled in Germany. They were to be used to disprove the Allies' allegations that German colonial rule had been particularly violent and uncivilised. Moreover, the Allies feared that Weimar colonial revisionists would smuggle Africans into the

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1   On the colonial designs of National Socialists: A. Kum'a N'dumbé III, Hitler voulait l'Afrique. Le projet du IIIe Reich sur le continent africain, Paris 1980; K. Hildebrand, Vom Reich zum Weltreich. Hitler, NSDAP und koloniale Frage, Munich 1969; K. Linné, Deutschland jenseits des Äquators? Die NS-Kolonialplanungen für Afrika, Berlin 2008; C. Metzger, L'empire colonial français dans la stratégie du troisième Reich, Brussels 2002.

2   See the pioneering work on the colonial origins of National Socialist policies: J. Zimmerer, Von Windhuk nach Auschwitz? Beiträge zum Verhältnis von Kolonialismus und Holocaust, Berlin 2011. It is also a major concern of the contributions in Bradley Naranch, Geoff Eley, (eds.) German Colonialism in a Global Age, Durham 2015.

3   T.G. Fraser, Germany and Indian Revolution, 1914–1918, in: Journal of Contemporary History, 12 (1977) 2, pp. 255-272.

4   R. Habermas, Debates on Islam in Imperial Germany, in: David Motadel (ed.), Islam and the European Empires, Oxford 2014, p. 249.

former German colonies that had become mandates of the League of Nations, to engineer a revolt. Not without a reason, the French, who received the mandates over Togo and Cameroon, were so terrified of German *agents provocateurs* that they banned all Africans who had lived in Germany after the war from entering their new possessions.[5] Although the German government had no idea how many Africans from their former colonies actually lived in Germany and found no more than thirty of them, the danger of Afro-German conspirators entering the British and French mandates seemed real.[6]

Indeed, German institutions tried in various ways to use former colonial subjects in order to influence world politics, ignoring the fact that Germany had officially been banned from having a say in matters of global dimension. A powerful colonial lobby created the image of the loyal colonial subjects who had fought for Germany in the war and longed for the return of the ancient masters. In 1924, the Foreign Ministry re-established the colonial department to bring about the restitution of the colonies. Former subjects were supposed to play an important role in denouncing other colonial empires, while substantiating Germany's claims to restitution.[7] Unlike the French or British parties of the left, German socialists hired speakers such as the Tanzanian Mdachi bin Sharifu, who proclaimed that the colonial project was due to aggressive imperialism and capitalism, and could only be overthrown by a worldwide revolution.[8]

Such initiatives, however, were overshadowed by the aggressive propaganda against the so called "black troops" from Africa that France used in its occupation of the Rhineland. The Rhineland occupation provoked a paradoxical reaction in Germany: Its denunciation in German media was full of racist stereotypes but simultaneously nationalists claimed to be "colonised" by France. Resistance groups formed and claimed to lead an anti-colonial struggle to shake off the French yoke.[9] The combination of racism and an anti-colonial agenda raised the question whether the Weimar Republic could develop into the first racist but anti-colonial empire in history.

In this contingent historical situation, different German interest groups tried to use the victims of colonial and racist regimes for their own purposes. Some accused the French of exploiting Africans by turning them into soldiers to delegitimize the French occupation. Some fraternized with their former „loyal" subjects. Others such as the parties of the left gave them the possibility to speak for the first time, although the white masters still prescribed what they should say. But in all cases the "subalterns" were occasionally given the opportunity to speak up. Those subalterns who really spoke for themselves

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5   See the case of Kwassi Bruce: CAOM, FM, affaires politiques, carton 613, dossier K.
6   A. Aitken and E. Rosenhaft, Black Germany: The Making and Unmaking of a Diaspora Community, Cambridge 2013, p. 68.
7   M. Schubert, Der schwarze Fremde: das Bild des Schwarzafrikaners in der parlamentarischen und publizistischen Kolonialdiskussion in Deutschland von den 1870er bis in die 1930er Jahre, Stuttgart 2003, p. 320.
8   L. Wimmelbücker, Mtoro Bin Mwinyi Bakari (c. 1869–1927): Swahili Lecturer and Author in Germany, Dar es Salam 2009, p. 91.
9   Sandra Maß, Weiße Helden, Schwarze Krieger: Zur Geschichte Kolonialer Männlichkeit in Deutschland 1918–1964, Cologne 2006; C. Koller, „Von Wilden aller Rassen niedergemetzelt": die Diskussion um die Verwendung von Kolonialtruppen in Europa, Stuttgart 2001, pp. 201-341.

surprised the Germans. Many thought about the Germans in a positive way and tried to win them over for common projects. As I show in the first part, they set hopes on a "decolonised" and "anti-colonial" Germany that was imagined as free to choose its political partner with disregard to the latter's origin or alleged civilisational status. The victims of colonialism and racial discrimination from around the world wished for an anti-colonial Germany. However, instead of being full of joy and pride, the Germans ultimately refused to accept the hand that the colonised offered them. Why they declined the offer of collaboration will be explained in part two.

1. Germanophile Anti-Colonialists

Weimar Germany raised hopes among the colonised and anti-colonialists from all over the world that it would support their anti-racist and anti-colonial struggle. Their expectations were as different as their own experiences with Germany. One of the first and probably most fervent admirer of German permissiveness was the Pan-Africanist W.E.B. du Bois. Despite experiencing a racist and intolerant Germany, he opposed it to his native USA that seemed to him even more racist and intolerant.

Du Bois had become a Germanophile after he had spent two years at the Friedrich-Wilhelm-Universität Berlin from 1892 to 1893.[10] Unlike in the USA, his colour did not prevent him from attending the best universities, and he became familiar with German *Geisteswissenschaften*. He had taken seminars with Gustav Schmoller and Adolph Wagner, while he heard Treitschke (the "fire-eating Pan-German"), Weber and Sering. "Under these teachers", Du Bois wrote in his autobiography, "I began to see the race problem in America, the problem of the peoples of Africa and Asia, and the political development of Europe as one."[11] Despite or perhaps because of the Anti-Semitism, Pan-Germanism and colonial racism in the works of his teachers, Du Bois developed a sense for the global significance of these ideologies. Oblivious to their bigotry, he took pride in the German scholars training him in history, sociology, and economics and teaching him to use their methods in the humanists' style. In his own words, he "began to unite" his "economics and politics."[12] Notwithstanding the racist environment of the *Kaiserreich*, Du Bois found white Germans less racist than white Americans, seeing their will to accept him as a student. This experience would lead to Du Bois' paradoxical linking German academia to anti-racist thinking. In accordance with his highly selective perception of German culture, he did not mention German colonies at all, even though they were omnipresent in the media of the 1890s.

Du Bois' positive experience in Berlin derived from an alleged German "rehabilitation" of the Africans and influenced his writings on race in the interwar period. When Du Bois argued in the 1920s and 1930s that race was a cultural construct and not an inescapable

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10   K. Barkin, W. E. B. Du Bois' Love Affair with Imperial Germany, in: German Studies Review 28 (2005) 2, pp. 285-302.
11   W.E.B. Du Bois, Dusk of Dawn: An Essay Toward an Autobiography of a Race Concept, Oxford 2007, pp. 23-24.
12   Du Bois, Dusk of Dawn, p. 24.

biological predisposition that could be identified with scientific methods, he referred predominantly to scholars of German origin. He cited ethnologist Felix von Luschan, who explained in his "Anthropological View of Race" that "the question of the number of human races has quite lost its raison d'être, and has become a subject rather of philosophical speculation than of scientific research." Luschan added that there were no "inferior races" but merely groups who were better adapted to the environment they live in.[13] To support this argument, Du Bois quoted German-American anthropologist Franz Boas, who agreed that "an unbiased estimate of the anthropological evidence so far brought forward does not permit us to countenance the belief in a racial inferiority which would unfit an individual of the Negro race to take his part in modern civilization."[14]

More importantly and more surprisingly, Du Bois invoked the fathers of German racism and Nazism, Eugen Fischer and Friedrich Ratzel, to substantiate his anti-racist claims. Fischer had published an anthropometric study of the Rehoboth community in German South-West Africa in 1913 that denounced miscegenation and stated the inferiority of "Negro races."[15] Du Bois however, borrowed a sentence from Fischer in which he claimed that the Rehoboth people, whom racists used as an example of mixing white and black races, were "a strong, healthy, and fruitful people, i.e. they show a common indication of hybrid vigour."[16] This selective perception of German racists runs like a red thread through Du Bois writings.

In his writings on race, Du Bois deliberately misread the mastermind of German *Lebensraum* ideology, Friedrich Ratzel, and turned him into a castigator of racist and colonialist bias. From Ratzel he borrowed the statement that "there is only one species of man, the variations are numerous, but do not go deep." Even more so, he made Ratzel the principal authority on African civilisation by invoking his claim that Africans also shaped the history of mankind: "There are those, nevertheless, who would write universal history and leave out Africa. But how, asks Ratzel, can one leave out the land of Egypt and Carthage?" Such attitudes, Du Bois concluded, can often be found in the works of German scholars, such as the anthropologist Leo Frobenius: "And Frobenius declares that in future Africa must more and more be regarded as an integral part of the great movement of world history."[17]

Du Bois went as far as relativizing German anti-Semitism, even when Hitler came to power and institutionalized the racist segregation and discrimination of Jews. As late as 1935, Du Bois observed that "in Germany, Hitler's renaissance of anti-Semitism is simply a part of the general resentment and suffering in Germany because of the results of the war and of the treaty of Versailles."[18]

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13   W.E.B. Du Bois, Miscegenation, in: H. Aptheker (ed.), Against Racism: Unpublished Essays, Papers, Addresses 1887–1961 by W.E.B. Du Bois, Amherst 1985, pp. 90-102: 90.

14   Du Bois, Miscegenation, p. 91.

15   E. Fischer, Die Rehobother Bastards und das Bastardisierungsproblem beim Menschen, Jena 1913.

16   Du Bois, Miscegenation, p. 94.

17   W.E.B. Du Bois, The Negro 1868–1963, Philadelphia 1915, pp. 9-10.

18   Du Bois, Miscegenation, p. 95.

Du Bois' selective perception of German scholarship was to a certain extent strategic because it delivered the proof that even racist theorists admitted the absurdity of racist and colonialist arguments. But it was also a striking misinterpretation of German anthropology, geography, and historiography, sciences that were born in a colonial context and were infested with racism. Nevertheless, Du Bois' readings offered the German scholars in the interwar period the opportunity to reinterpret their intellectual history according to anti-racist and anti-colonial ideas.

Du Bois' understanding of German scholarship would fall on fertile ground among the intellectual fathers of the emancipatory *Négritude* movement in the French empire. Aimé Césaire, who would become the most eloquent critic of European colonial racism, and Léopold Senghor, who glorified the autonomy and power of the black race in his widely-read poetry, claimed that their agenda originated in the anthropological theories of Leo Frobenius. Frobenius was the first scholar of renown to dismiss the idea that Europeans were more civilised than Africans. The complexities of his theory aside, Frobenius claimed that Africans had an equal share in shaping the world's cultural achievements. According to him, their epistemological contribution to rationalism was based on emotion and intuition. The idea of intuitive reason was what brought them in line with German philosophy that also combined romanticism and reason. When Frobenius compartmentalized the world into different civilisations (*Kulturkreise*), one of them was an Afro-German civilisation.[19]

According to Senghor, the *Négritude* movement would not have been possible without the German anthropologist: "Frobenius was like a sudden burst of thunder," he wrote, "It is Leo Frobenius more than anyone else who clarified for us words such as emotion, art, myth, Eurafrica."[20] To the *Négritude* activists, not only Frobenius but also Germany appeared as the conjunction that might connect Europe and Africa, whose inhabitants shared similar values and should met on equal terms. Like Du Bois, who had invoked Frobenius' theory long before Senghor and Césaire, the pioneers of *Négritude* offered an unfamiliar definition of German intellectual traditions. Their appreciation for German erudition seems to be at odds with the *Sonderweg* interpretation of German history that draws a direct line from German anthropological science to the ideology of the Nazis. Curiously, Senghor and Césaire realized that this tradition could be used as an argument in favour of decolonisation while the Nazis rose to power in the 1930s. Without knowing it, German academic tradition had become an instigator for anti-colonial activism.

Du Bois' fascination with German scholarship was not necessarily shared by all Pan-Africanists who took up residence in Germany. In 1930, the Trinidadian grandson of a slave George Padmore, who combined Pan-Africanism and communist internationalism, organized the First International Conference of the Negro Workers in Hamburg. Among

19   R. Sylvain, Leo Frobenius: From Kulturkreis to Kulturmorphologie, in: Anthropos 91 (1996), pp. 483-494; S. Adell, Double Consciousness/Double Bind: Theoretical Issues in Twentieth-Century Black Literature, Urbana 1994, p. 32; D. Chidester, Empire of Religion: Imperialism and Comparative Religion, Chicago 2014, p. 215

20   Cited in G. Wilder, The French Imperial Nation State: Négritude and Colonial Humanism Between the Two World Wars, Chicago 2005, p. 156.

the participants figured the future president of Kenya, Johnston "Jomo" Kenyatta, and the South African syndicalist and communist T.W. Thibedi. They dismissed Du Bois' ingratiation as "bourgeois" and opposed it to a program that aligned to the Comintern's anti-capitalist program. While Du Bois allegedly "betrayed the interests of the Negro Workers," their most important purpose was to end the "capitalist exploitation and imperialist oppression upon the Negro masses" by bringing about "freedom and self-determination of the oppressed nationalities and minorities".[21] Padmore's conference did not put any hope in the German state as an anti-colonial power. But the delegates benefitted from the relative liberalism of the city of Hamburg towards the presence of Africans and Afro-Americans.

After the First World War, Hamburg had become home to a small but significant African community, due to the port city's close ties with the colonial world it had helped to build. Despite the important role Hamburg played in establishing colonies and promoting racist attitudes, the presence of non-Europeans seemed more natural in Hamburg than anywhere else in Germany. The First International Conference of the Negro Workers had been banned from London but was accepted in Hamburg, a city less concerned about anti-racist activity.

This was also due to Hamburg's relatively permissive naturalization policy. As early as the 1890s the city had authorized the naturalization of Mandenga Dick, an "assimilated" Cameroonian who lived in Hamburg.[22] Following a subsidiarity system of German federalism, colonial subjects had to apply for citizenship in one of the federal states to be granted German citizenship subsequently. The federal state of Hamburg was more likely to grant citizenship than more conservative states within Germany, such as Bavaria, Thuringia, and Württemberg. Occasionally, those states even vetoed the naturalization of Africans who had been declared citizens of Hamburg.[23] That does not mean that Hamburg was more tolerant than other German states; it was less intolerant at best. Only about a dozen Africans had actually been naturalized in Hamburg between the 1890s and the 1930s. But it was certainly a less biased place to start for an African who arrived in Germany or Europe in general.

For Padmore, the city opened up opportunities and he moved to Hamburg in the aftermath of the First International Conference of the Negro Workers. Sponsored by Comintern networks, he established a "Negro Bureau" and published the *Negro Worker*, a periodical that declared class struggle the precondition of the emancipation of the colonised peoples. The *Negro Worker* was meant to appeal to the Afro-German community

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21   Historical Papers Research Archive at the University of Witwatersrand, AD 1715, International Trade Union Comittee of Negro Workers (ed.), A Report of Proceedings and Decisions of the First International Conference of Negro Workers at Hamburg Germany/July 1930, Hamburg 1930, pp. 5-11.

22   Staatsarchiv Hamburg, Staatsangehörigkeitssachen, 132-1 I_2906, „Gesuch des aus Kamerun gebürtigen Mandenga Dick um Verleihung der Reichsangehörigkeit und um Unterstützung, u. a. bei seiner Bewerbung um eine Stelle als Dolmetscher beim Gouvernement in Kamerun, 1895–1900."

23   F. El-Tayeb, Schwarze Deutsche und deutscher Rassismus: Oxymoron oder verdrängte Geschichte, Frankfurt 2001, p. 142; R. Aitken and E. Rosenhaft, Black Germany, pp. 72-73.

in Hamburg and African sailors alike. The latter, Padmore reckoned, would spread his words via the shipping lines that bound Hamburg to Africa and Afro-America.

Padmore was a magnet for anti-colonial forces worldwide and provided yet another opportunity for the Germans to use the explosive power of anti-colonial agitation. But neither the German government nor the German socialists, who were responsible for giving colonialism a bad press since Bebel's times, showed any interest in Padmore's project. Yet it was rather his intransigent communist attitude than his anti-colonial rhetoric that gave him a pariah status even among the German left. Dwelling in Hamburg for four years, fascist hooligans destroyed Padmore's Negro Office immediately after Hitler came to power. He was forced to leave Germany and dedicated himself entirely to anti-colonial activity in Paris and London, where his ideas found fertile ground.[24]

In Hamburg, Pan-Africanists like Padmore encountered an African diaspora that had been well-established. Among the Africans in Hamburg was Alexandre Manga Bell from Cameroon, the son of the Douala leader Rudolph Manga Bell who had been executed by the German colonial administration in 1914 for staging a coup. Alexandre Manga Bell had come to Germany as early as 1902, was raised there, and cut all his ties with his Cameroonian origins. Not able to speak Douala anymore, he was entirely German and even served in the country's army. He married into a cocoa trading family in Hamburg and led an extravagant life in Europe. Among the Douala in Cameroon, however, Alexandre Manga Bell was still considered to be the legal successor to his father as the head of the Douala dynasty.[25]

His royal blood made Alexandra Manga Bell an ideal candidate to undermine French rule over Cameroon. France had received the former German colony as a mandate from the League of Nations in 1920 and had struggled to gain control over the territory. German propaganda constantly questioned its legitimacy and demanded to let the "natives" determine themselves who should rule them.[26] As loyalty was not a priority in Manga Bell's life, he did not blame the German government for executing his father, and was open to collaboration with the Germans. But neither the colonial lobby that wanted to delegitimize French rule in former German colonies nor the allegedly anti-colonial left approached him. And the government in Berlin did not even think about granting former colonial subjects like Manga Bell German citizenship to assure their loyalty.

While the Germans failed to use Manga Bell as an *agent provocateur*, the French government was quick at converting him to a defender of their colonial rule. In January 1919, the new French Governor of Cameroon wrote to Paris that Alexandre Manga Bell should be won over to stabilize French rule. He would be brought to Paris before being sent to

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24   C. Lusane, Hitler's Black Victims: The Historical Experiences of Afro-Germans, European Blacks, Africans, and African Americans in the Nazi Era, New York 2003, pp. 76-81; S.D. Pennybacker, From Scottsboro to Munich: race and political culture in 1930s Britain, Princeton 2009 , pp.6-7.

25   Der Spiegel 34, 1950, pp.19-22.

26   J. Derrick, The 'Germanophone' Elite of Douala under the French Mandate, in: The Journal of African History 21 (1980) 2, pp. 255-267; F. Wagner, Regards croisés sur le Togo. Les enjeux du débat franco-allemand dans l'entre-deux guerres (1919–1939), in: Recherche en Anthropologie et en Histoire de l'Afrique 25 (2007–2008).

Cameroon. The governor of French Cameroon deemed it "absolutely necessary" that "he learns to speak French" but also that "he is broken loose of the mentality that his former masters had taught him during his long stay in Germany."[27] The French contacted him, paid his trip to Paris, gave him free French classes and prepared him to rule their mandate according to French interests. During Manga Bell's three years in Paris, French intelligence officers tried to find out whether he was a German spy, as they could hardly believe that Berlin had not used his prestige to gain influence in the Cameroons. Although they remained sceptical towards his real intentions, they finally dispatched him to Cameroon. Upon arrival in the mandate, Manga Bell proclaimed himself 'Prince' and demanded from the French to return the land possessions that the Germans had expropriated from his father. His insubordination raised once again the concern of his inclination to anti-colonialism. But soon the French government realized that Manga Bell aimed predominantly at financing his lavish lifestyle. After 1945, he became a deputy for Cameroon in the French National Assembly and represented the country in the United Nations, where he ousted the Cameroonian nationalists who demanded independence.[28]

Unlike German colonial schemers, the French had learned in the interwar period to concede restricted autonomy to their colonial subjects in order to stabilize and legitimize colonial rule. Germans who had the intention to regain the country's former colonies, could have equally made use of them to unsettle British, French, and Belgian rule in Cameroon, Togo, Ruanda, and Tanzania. Yet, Germans did not pursue this strategy in a consistent way. Even the expressions of loyalty and the appeals for help from Togolese and Cameroonians fell on deaf ears. Serious attempt was made to destabilize the empires of other countries. This is best revealed in the case of Togo.

In 1926 the *Stuttgarter Tagblatt* published a "German cry for help from Togo."[29] A group of Togolese had written a petition in favour of the return of Germany as a colonial power in Togo. The *Stuttgarter Tagblatt* celebrated the "brothers in Togo who are firm and loyal friends of Germany."[30] Indeed, both in Togo and in Cameroon, pro-German individuals had formed lobby groups that openly worked in favour of the return of the German colonial government.

The *Deutscher Togobund* was the most active and important pro-German lobby group. Founded in 1924 by Johannes Agboka who had "served as a forwarding clerk for the German government and was unemployed since Germans had left the country,"[31] the *Deutscher Togobund* had established its headquarters in Accra in British Gold Coast to avoid persecution by the new French government in Togo. It is hard to estimate its mem-

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27   Letter to „Monsieur le Ministre des Colonies" from 31.1.1919, cited in: J. Richard, The Royal Pretender: Prince Douala Manga Bell in Paris, 1919–1922, in: Cahiers d'études africaines, 14 (1974) 54, pp. 339-358: 342.

28   Richard, The Royal Pretender.

29   CAOM, FM, Affaires Politiques, carton 614, Stuttgarter Tageblatt dating from 17 March 1926.

30   Ibid.

31   CAOM, Rapport n° 230 du Commissaire de la République française au Togo, du 7 novembre 1929, in: FM, affaires politiques, carton 1038, dossier: Appel adressé à l'Allemagne par des indigènes du Togo 1926; Commissaire de la République française au Togo à Ministre des Colonies, sur les activités du Bund der Deutschen Togoländer, du 10 décembre 1927, in : CAOM, FM, affaires politiques, carton 1038, dossier activités allemandes dans colonies.

bership because most members remained anonymous and registered with false names. French intelligence services agreed that the *Togobund* was only a small group of about ten people in the inner circle.[32]

In programmatic circular letters, the *Togobund* demanded that the Togolese should choose their own rulers and be granted a seat in the League of Nations to work for the comeback of the Germans.[33] In the 1930s, two protestant priests, Koffi Paku and A.D. Baeta, appeared publicly as leaders of the *Togobund*. They had close ties with the *Norddeutsche Mission* in Bremen and merchants from Northern Germany. Koffi Paku claimed that the Togobund occasionally received commodity contributions and sometimes even money from Germany.

A French report dating from 1929 suspected the German consul in Gold Coast to have funded the *Togobund*.[34] But this support was more an act of charity than a political move, since the leaders of the *Togobund* lived penniless in their Ghanaian exile. It was not until 1936 that the German merchant Robert Riegermann officially joined the *Togobund*; his presence, however, was largely inconsequential.[35] The only official German support for the *Togobund* was a radio set sent by the NSDAP Ministry of Propaganda after the *Togobund* had appealed to the Nazis for help in sheer desperation.[36]

Graduates from German missionary schools, war veterans who had fought for Germany, and downgraded Germanized elites founded similar groups in the Cameroons, notably the *Kamerun Eingeborenen Deutsch Gesinnten Verein*. Most of the Germanophones were Douala. Some Doaula, such as Alexandre Manga Bell, had been even trained in Germany. They had left the colony of *Kamerun* for Germany and came back to the mandate of *Cameroun* governed by the French. Quickly they realized that they had been victims of the absurdity of assimilation to the European "culture": they had assimilated themselves to the wrong Europe, spoke the wrong language, and had created the wrong networks. Both in Cameroon and in Togo, the assimilated Germanophones became regularly Germanophiles. Both the the Togobund and the *Kamerun Eingeborenen Deutsch Gesinnten Verein* approached Germans for help. But their appeals were mostly in vain and the French fears of agents provocateurs controlled by the German state were mostly unfounded.

For most of the 1920s, Germanophiles invoked the German "threat" whenever they were dissatisfied with French policies, be it with taxation or economic regulations. But in the late 1920s, they grew tired of this strategy and developed a proto-nationalist discontent that could be expressed without making reference to Germany.[37] When important chiefs,

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32   CAOM, Rapport n° 230 du Commissaire de la République française au Togo, du 7 novembre 1929.
33   D.H. Simatro, Le Togo Musterkolonie, Aix-en-Provence 1982, pp. 396-397.
34   CAOM, Rapport n° 230 du Commissaire de la République française au Togo, du 7 novembre 1929.
35   Interviews with Erhardt Koffi Paku,cited in Simatro, Musterkolonie, p.436.
36   H. Stoecker, Germanophilie und Hoffnung auf Hitler in Togo und Kamerun zwischen den Weltkriegen, in: P. Heine and U. Van der Heyden (eds.), Studien zur Geschichte des deutschen Kolonialismus in Afrika, Pfaffenweiler 1995, p. 496.
37   Derrick, The 'Germanophone' Elite.

among them Germanophiles, sent a petition to the French government and the League of Nations in December 1929, they called for self-government under the League of Nations and not for the return of the Germans anymore (although the petition was still written in German).[38] The Germans had missed yet another opportunity to undermine the colonial empires of the signatories of the Versailles treaty.

In all these cases, colonised Africans and anti-colonial internationalists set their hopes on Germany, but despite paying lip service to an anti-colonial policy, its representatives failed to intrigue against other colonial powers. This reluctance requires explanation.

2. German Priorities: Colonial Internationalism and the Colour Bar

Why did German colonial revisionists who made concrete plans of destabilising colonial empires not avail themselves of this opportunity? Anti-colonial internationalists, former colonial subjects in Germany, and pro-German lobby groups had different agendas but all of them could have been used in one way or the other to cause turmoil in the former colonies. These forms of anti-colonialism provided German revisionists with the possibility to pursue an international escalation policy, ranging from assistance for pro-German groups to create a new German empire to supporting outright nationalists.

Two reasons can be advanced to explain their reluctance to support non-Europeans. First, the priority of German colonial revisionists was a reintegration into the international community of colonising countries. Despite the defeat in the war and the exclusion from the League of Nations (and therefore from the possibility to receive a mandate over colonised territory), they never lost faith in their comeback as an imperial power. This optimism was due to the long history of German participation in projects of a shared colonial internationalism. Second, and related to Germany's allegiance to the colonising "West," Germans were reluctant to turn cosmopolitan cities like Hamburg or Berlin into anti-colonial metropoles. While the centre of French colonial policy, Paris, paradoxically favoured the development of a critical mass of anti-colonial and anti-racist activity in the wake of the First World War, Hamburg and Berlin did not take the chance to compete with the French capital in this matter.[39] Racial prejudice in general and the legacy of an institutionalized colonial racism in particular impeded their role as the heart of anti-colonialism.

a) Internationalist Optimism of Colonial Restitution

Unlike the Pan-German nationalists in the metropole, German colonial experts overseas had traditionally participated in international cooperation with other colonising countries. Starting in the 1870s, the founders and propagandists of a German colonial empire, such as Hermann von Wissmann, Alexander von Danckelmann, and Gustav Nachtigal

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38   Ibid., p. 261.
39   M. Goebel, Anti-Imperial Metropolis: Interwar Paris and the Seeds of Third World Nationalism, Cambridge 2015.

had been trained in the Congo colony, established by the Belgian King Leopold, and in French possessions in North Africa.[40] Germans joined Leopold's International African Association in the 1870s and in 1884/5 Bismarck hosted the International conference on West-Africa, where Europeans agreed on the rules to partition the African continent.[41] Moreover, Germans were leading the way in the International Colonial Institute that had been founded in 1893 in Brussels and brought together around 150 colonial experts from thirteen colonising countries. German members were particularly active in the Institute before the First World War and had established links with colleagues from Belgium, the Netherlands, France, Great Britain, and Italy. Colonial experts realized that they could learn from each other, and personal friendships developed across colonial borders. Even the German Colonial Minister, Bernhard Dernburg, joined the Institute.[42] Dernburg travelled to East Africa in 1907 and met British colleagues there, but he was not the only one who undertook extensive expeditions to colonies of other colonial powers.[43] The Governor of German East Africa between 1912 and 1919, Heinrich Schnee, was one of those German colonial experts who was in permanent contact with colonial administrators from other countries. His wife Ada was British, and when the First World War started, Schnee let the adjacent British and Belgian colonies know that he preferred a sort of neutrality to avoid a war that would discredit European rule over Africans.[44]

After the First World War, Schnee launched a rather nationalistic and aggressive campaign against the Versailles Treaty, which allegedly blamed Germany for its violent colonial administration and accused it of having failed in its civilising mission. Schnee's seminal pamphlet against the *Koloniale Schuldlüge* (colonial guilt lie) was re-edited twelve times in the interwar period and translated into French, English, Italian, and Spanish.[45] Schnee himself gave lectures on the topic in several countries, including Great Britain. Not a stranger to colonial circles across the Channel, he managed to make British colonial circles rethink their agenda. Thus, in an ironic turn, the *Schuldlüge* debate inaugurated a transnational dialogue rather than causing serious confrontations over colonial

40   Institut für Länderkunde Leipzig, Archiv: Nachlass Gustav Nachtigal: 1869–1875 Reise in den Sudan und die Sahara: Briefe; A. Thys, L'expansion coloniale belge conférence donnée à Liège le 3 novembre 1905, Brussels 1905, pp. 27-29; A. Danckelmann, Association Internationale du Congo. Mémoire sur les observations météorologiques faites à Vivi (Congo inférieur) et sur la climatologie de la côte sud-ouest d'Afrique en general, Berlin 1884.

41   É. Banning, L'Association Internationale Africaine et le Comité des Hautes Études d'Haut-Congo 1877–1882, Brussels, 1882; S. Förster, W.J. Mommsen, and R. Robinson (eds.), Bismarck, Europe, and Africa: The Berlin Africa Conference 1884–1885 and the Onset of Partition, Oxford and New York, 1988.

42   BArch, R 1001 6187 ICI, Nr. 9: Dernburg to Vohsen from 23.3.1907.

43   See Institut Colonial International (ed.), Compte Rendu de la Session tenue en 1913, Paris 1913; U. Lindner, Koloniale Begegnungen: Deutschland und Großbritannien als Imperialmächte in Afrika, Frankfurt 2011, pp. 139-159.

44   It is not clear, however, whether he really aimed at neutrality: T. Bührer, Die Kaiserliche Schutztruppe für Deutsch-Ostafrika. Koloniale Sicherheitspolitik und transkulturelle Kriegführung, 1885 bis 1918, München 2011.

45   H. Schnee, German colonization past and future the truth about the German colonies, London 1926; La colonización alemana el pasado y el futuro; la verdad sobre las colonias alemanas, Madrid 1928; La question des colonies allemandes, Paris 1928; La colonizzazione germanica il suo passato ed il suo futuro. Versione ital. di Cesare Santoro, Roma 1932.

matters. While Germans like Schnee asserted their nationalist position, the international community engaged in a policy of appeasement – the British government, for example, ordered the blue books that listed the German "atrocities" in its former colonies to be destroyed and banned it from reprinting.[46]

In the long term, clashes over the German colonial dispossession provided the basis for new transnational dialogues. As early as 1919, British historian William Harbutt Dawson joined Schnee's campaign and tried to convince the British that: "it is to the interest of Great Britain more than of any other country that Germany should be encouraged and even assisted to colonise, and to acquire a rightful 'place in the sun.'"[47] Mary Townsend, a lecturer at Columbia University and the first non-German historian of colonial Germany, aligned to the view that "German treatment of the natives has been unjustly indicted." She prompted the colonial experts of the League of Nations' Permanent Mandate Commission to acknowledge the facts and to condemn the falsification of militarization and cruelty reproaches.[48] Both Townsend and Dawson held close ties with the German colonial lobby and had personally met its leading members.

Even in France, colonial administrators such as the future governor of Togo, Robert Cornevin, spoke favorably about the "Germanophilia in Togo, expressed not only by certain old men who still spoke a few words of German and evoked with emotion their youthful memories, but also by intellectuals in the prime of life whose families had taught them to respect the German colonial achievement."[49] Therefore, he turned against the idea that the Germans had not fulfilled their civilising mission. International support for Germany's colonial cause obviously did not restore Germany's colonial empire. But it raised hopes among the Germans that restitution might be possible in the future.

But more was done to appease the German colonial revisionists. In 1926, Germany was allowed to join the League of Nations, which theoretically opened up the opportunity to receive a colonial mandate. In the same year, German colonial companies that had been based in the Reich's possessions before the war were readmitted to the former German colonies. They benefitted from the international character of the mandates and participated in the exploitation of their resources.[50] Finally, the League of Nations employed the most fervent colonial revisionist, Heinrich Schnee. He was sent on a fact-finding mission as far as Manchuria, to know why Japan seized Manchuria from China.[51] Japan had also received former German colonies in Micronesia as a mandate from the League,

46   J. Silvester and J. Gewald, Words cannot be found: German Colonial Rule in Namibia. An Annotated Reprint of the 1918 Blue Book, Leiden 2003.
47   W.H. Dawson, Problems of the peace, London 1919, p. 214.
48   Townsend, Schnee and Dawson, German Colonization, p. 624; Her pioneering study of German colonialism: M.E. Townsend, Origins of modern German colonialism, 1871–1885, New York 1921.
49   R. Cornevin, The Germans in Africa before 1918, in: L. H. Gann and P. Duignan, Colonialism in Africa, 1870–1960, London 1969, pp. 383-419: 384.
50   Derrick, The 'Germanophone' Elite, p. 260.
51   League of Nations Archive: C.663.M.320.1932.VI, League of Nations, Appeal by the Chinese Government. Report of the Commission of Enquiry; Geheimes Staatsarchiv Preußischer Kulturbesitz: Heinrich Schnee, als Mitglied der Mandschurei-Kommission des Völkerbundes, an seine Frau Ada aus dem Fernen Osten, VI. HA, Nl Schnee, H., Nr. 6.

but Schnee remarked in his usual ambiguous way that he was not interested in recovering Germany's former Asian colonies, while he hoped to use the League for the restitution of the African ones.[52] Far from turning against the League, Schnee wanted to benefit from its neocolonial mandate policies.[53]

The readmission of Germany into the international community kept the German belief in the country's colonial future alive. Germany's past as an active and respected member of the international community of colonising nations made this dream more likely. Personal friendships had been established, and occasionally other imperial powers even depended on German expertise. The increased necessity to "develop" the colonies economically, for example, was one reason for the readmission of experienced German plantation companies.

Experts such as the German missionary and linguist Diedrich Westermann, who became the director of the International Institute of African Languages and Culture in London in 1926, were in demand for their internationally renowned proficiency in African languages.[54] Heinrich Schnee, a judge by profession and former governor of German New Guinea, Samoa, and German East Africa, had the international and colonial experience that the League of Nation needed when he was hired to investigate China's role in Manchuria. Germany's commitment to colonial internationalism was one way to participate in the colonial projects of the interwar period. Consequently, although Germany was not a colonising power anymore, the Germans did not break with the solidarity among the colonising countries, which helped to keep the colonised in check. As before the First World War, they did not denounce colonialism *per se*, but only criticised its varieties.

At the same time, German colonial internationalism made an alliance with the colonised peoples and anti-colonial activists unlikely. Although qualified as "uncivilised" themselves by the Allies during and after the First World War, German revisionists did not call the concept of civilisation in question. They firmly believed in the inferiority of the colonised peoples and did not challenge the racist worldview inherent to all colonial projects. As I will show in the next section, the official policy of the Weimar period was in fact slightly more racist than the policy of other European governments.

b) The Colour Bar in the Weimar Republic

While Germany did not annul its membership in the international community of colonising countries, it continued to ban colonised peoples from participating in German public life. One way to accept colonised peoples would have been to give them access to citizenship and the privileges naturalization entailed. Unlike the German empire, which

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52   H. Schnee, Völker und Mächte im Fernen Osten : Eindrücke von der Reise mit der Mandschurei-Kommission, Berlin 1933.

53   Schnee permanently oscillated between nationalist activity and international engagement. When Hitler came to power, he supported him and used his expertise in international law to justify the cause of the "Auslandsdeutsche" and Hitler's annexation of Eastern European territory.

54   E.W. Smith, Diedrich Westermann, in: Africa 26,4 (1956), p. 331.

had been a colonial empire, the Weimar Republic seemed generally more open to extend citizenship rights to a restricted number of former colonial subjects. Once the legal distinction between German citizens in the metropole and German subjects in the colonies had ended, new forms of legal integration were thinkable.

However, the prospect of the restitution of German colonies led the German government to put all reforms on hold. Individuals who had been colonial subjects before the war kept their passports that qualified them as "former inhabitant of the colonial protectorates." Their civil status was similar to the pre-war period, when they were *Schutzgebietsangehörige* who were protected by the German sovereign but not *Staatsangehörige*, who received full citizenship. One Dualla Misipo, for example, who was allowed to travel from Cameroon to Germany in 1913 on a "Native Travel Passport" (*Eingeborenen-Reisepass*) still used this passport in 1939.[55]

Even the so-called "*Mischlinge*" who were qualified to be of "mixed blood" and had a German mother but an African father were not granted full citizenship. A prohibition of so-called mixed marriages dating from 1905, for instance, explicitly aimed at preventing children of "mixed" parents from becoming German citizens. The German hope that its colonial empire could be re-established led them to keep part of the legislation regarding the "*Mischlinge*."

The case of Theodor Michael, born to a Cameroonian father and a German mother, illustrates the insecure status of the "*Mischlinge*." Michael was born in Germany and was a young boy in the interwar period. His mother had apparently died, and as a child Michael worked with his father in circuses and ethnographic exhibitions, until the child protective services gave him into foster care. According to German law, he attended school. But his status as a citizen was unclear. His Cameroonian father officially remained an "inhabitant of the colonial protectorate" throughout the interwar period. The status of his children was unclear until they tried to emigrate to France when the Nazis came to power. They received the information that they were "stateless," as the former German colonies did not exist anymore and the racist color bar established by the 1935 citizenship laws of the Nazis did not allow them to become German citizens because of their "race."[56]

Adding to the insecure civil status in the mid-1920s, the aggressive propaganda against the French post-war occupation of the Rhineland with the help of African troops resulted in a surge of violent racism. All over the country, coloured inhabitants lost their jobs and were deprived of the few opportunities to participate in public life that they had before. A majority of the Africans in Germany, many of them from the former colonies, had to accept jobs in ethnological expositions, human zoos, and circuses. There they had to pretend to live a primitive life that they never had seen before.[57] While inhabitants of the colonies were allowed to attend universities in France and Great Britain under certain

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55   Aitken and Rosenhaft, Black Germany, p. 70.
56   Th. Michael, Deutsch sein und Schwarz dazu. Erinnerungen eines Afro-Deutschen, München 2015, pp. 33-44.
57   Ibid., pp. 18-19.

circumstances, Africans rarely had access to higher education in Germany. Their situation was significantly worse than before the war. Many of them left for France if granted passports by German authorities.

France, despite being a colonial power, had a less restrictive policy of access to citizenship than Germany without colonies. Rogers Brubaker's distinction between an inclusive "civic" nationalism in France and an exclusive "ethnic" nationalism in Germany, otherwise deficient, works quite well in this context. German policies were indeed more racist than the French.[58] The "assimilated" Senegalese Léopold Senghor recognized and celebrated that, in interwar France, "the absence of a legal color bar meant that black students had access to metropolitan political life."[59] This general accessibility provided the basis for Paris to develop into an "anti-imperial metropolis" in the 1920s, with most anti-racists and independence leaders gathering there and inspiring each other. Germany, or at least Hamburg and Berlin, failed to play a similar role.[60]

Conclusion

Seen from the perspective of anti-colonial and Panafricanist activists, Germany was not only deprived of its colonies in 1919 but effectively de-colonised. Being a non-colonising country cherished by W.E.B. Du Bois, Leopold Senghor, George Padmore, the *Deutscher Togo Bund,* and the *Kamerun Deutsch Gesinnter Verein* between 1919 and 1930, Germany could have styled itself as the leader of the anti-colonial world. But the German colonial activists believed firmly in a shared European ideal of a common colonial mission. The country's long history as a leader of colonial internationalism led the Weimar government to believe that its former colonies would be restituted after it had served its sentence, the temporary ban from the international community being lifted. Those defined as "Africans" by law (even if they were born in Germany) were therefore treated as racially inferior colonial subjects and refused citizenship. In German imagination, the empire continued to exist well into the interwar period. A racist color bar prevented the colonised from taking part in public life. Internationalism and the color bar led Germany to decline the offer of becoming an anti-colonial empire.

Curiously, this changed slightly when the Nazis came to power. The Nazi leaders were not consistent in treating the inhabitants of the former colonial possessions. They also tried to leave the door open to use them for destabilizing the colonial ideology of British and French empires. Martin Bormann even wrote to the Foreign ministry in 1935 that Hitler did not want "that the former colonial negroes [*Kolonialneger*], a majority of whom had fought for Germany, have troubles finding work and receiving sufficient food. They should not be molested in any way." This protection order did not safeguard all of

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58   R. Brubaker Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany, Cambridge, MA. 1992.

59   G. Wilder, The French Imperial Nation State: Négritude and Colonial Humanism Between the Two World Wars, Chicago 2005, p. 155.

60   M. Goebel, Anti-Imperial Metropolis: Interwar Paris and the Seeds of Third World Nationalism, Cambridge 2015.

the around twelve Africans from former German colonies from racist persecution and assassination.[61] But compared to the mass murder of Jews, the Nazis were less consistent in applying their rigid racist theory of extermination to Africans in Germany. Equally, they stopped respecting the international solidarity among colonising powers. To some extent, their imperial logic also contained anti-colonial elements, which they used to wage war on other Europeans but not to support anti-imperial struggles. A figure no lesser than Aimé Césaire pointed out this paradox in his "Discourse on Colonialism" (1950), noting that only the Nazis destroyed the international solidarity of colonising countries. Condemning Hitler for destroying Europe, but failing to criticize Europe for destroying the colonised peoples, Césaire complained, revealed the hypocrisy of modern Europeans.[62] The constant reluctance of Germans to engage in anti-colonial struggles proved Césaire right.

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61   T. Morlang, Askari und Fitafita: "Farbige" Söldner in den deutschen Kolonien, Berlin 2008, p.155.
62   A. Césaire, Discours sur le colonialisme, Paris 1950.

What Future for Italian Libya? The Debate on Colonial Policy, 1918–1920

Federico Cresti

ABSTRACT

Am Ende des Ersten Weltkrieges wurde die Zukunft der Kolonien global ein bedeutendes Thema. Dem Beispiel von Lloyd George und Woodrow Wilson folgend, begannen auch die italienischen Politiker dieses Thema zu diskutieren. Im Zentrum stand besonders Libyen, wo während des Krieges ein breitflächiger Aufstand stattfand und dessen Zukunft besonders unentschieden schien. An der Diskussion war hauptsächlich die Kolonialverwaltung beteiligt, allerdings fand die Debatte auch in der Zivilgesellschaft Widerhall. Man wurde sich der vergangenen Fehler bewusst: die rücksichtslose Unterdrückung des Widerstandes der Einheimischen sowie der Despotismus des Militärregimes, weswegen die Frage nach indigener Beteiligung und Selbstverwaltung vernachlässigt worden war. Am Ende des Krieges wurden die *Statuti Libici* verkündet. Es waren drei regionale Verfassungen, die eine neue Form der indirekten Verwaltung in den kolonisierten Gebieten und eine offene Haltung gegenüber den lokalen Repräsentationsorganen vorsahen.

In the final year of the First World War, the debate on the future of colonial territories emerged in a new form, invoking the principle of self-determination. On 5 January 1918, the British Prime Minister Lloyd George referred to the future of the German colonies, affirming that:

> *The governing consideration* […] *in all these cases must be that the inhabitants should be placed under the control of an administration, acceptable to themselves, one of whose main purposes will be to prevent their exploitation for the benefit of European capitalists*

or governments. The natives live in their various tribal organizations under chiefs and councils who are competent to consult and speak for their tribes and members and thus to represent their wishes and interests in regard to their disposal. The general principle of national self-determination is, therefore, as applicable in their cases as in those of occupied European territories.[1]

On 9 January, Woodrow Wilson, the President of the United States, sent a message for "world peace", outlining a new vision for colonial empires. Published at a time when the fate of the postwar world was not clear, Wilson's message proposed a universal goal:

What we demand in this war […] is nothing peculiar to ourselves. It is that the world be made fit and safe to live in; and particularly that it be made safe for every peace-loving nation which, like our own, wishes to live its own life, determine its own institutions, be assured of justice and fair dealing by the other peoples of the world as against force and selfish aggression.[2]

Wilson proposed fourteen points for the recovery of world peace. These points were to be implemented through an agreement among all countries. For the colonial territories, the fifth point was particularly important, which affirmed the need for

A free, open-minded, and absolutely impartial adjustment of all colonial claims, based upon a strict observance of the principle that in determining all such questions of sovereignty the interests of the populations concerned must have equal weight with the equitable claims of the government whose title is to be determined.[3]

The twelfth point also concerned colonial matters, particularly Italian territories in Libya:

the […] nationalities which are now under Turkish rule should be assured an undoubted security of life and an absolutely unmolested opportunity of autonomous development.[4]

The colonial question was also debated within the British left. The issue was discussed by the Labour Party and the Trade Unions at the beginning of 1918. On 16 January, the Labour Party sent the Russian people a message which stated that "the British people accept[ed] the principle of self-determination with respect to the British empire"[5]. German Chancellor Hertling also addressed the issue in replying to Wilson and Lloyd

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1   British War Aims. Statement by the Right Honourable David Lloyd George […]. Authorized Version as published by the British Government, New York 1918, p. 6. It is interesting to remark that the Lloyd George's speech is copied in the diary of the Italian Minister of the Colonies, Gaspare Colosimo. See V. Clodomiro (ed.), Il diario di Gaspare Colosimo Ministro delle Colonie (1916–1919), Roma 2012, p. 442. David Lloyd George (1863–1945) played a prominent role in the peace conference that led to the Treaty of Versailles (29 June 1919), where were taken initial steps towards the establishment of the League of Nations.

2   T. W. Wilson (1856–1924) was elected president in 1912 and reelected in 1916. He decided to enter the war (6 April 1917) and was the main promoter of the League of Nations. Ibid., p. 397.

3   Ibid, p. 397.

4   Ibid.

5   Ibid, p. 443 and 506.

George. During a session of the Reichstag on 25 January, he noted that Wilson's fifth point would bring serious difficulties for Britain and France, the two major imperialist powers allied with the United States. He even promised that a victorious Germany would raise the issue in the peace conference, thereby redefining the destinies of the colonial territories and their administrations.[6]

It was Wilson's speech, which aroused the greatest echo in international political circles. In Italy, the points on colonial possessions did not provoke an immediate reflection. The Ministry of the Colonies, however, did not overlook that Turkey could deploy Wilsonian principles and "bring up again into question the Libyan issue"[7]. Internationally, the Libyan question had already been reopened by the Ottoman Porte immediately after the Italian declaration of war: the Turkish government had notified the Italians that it no longer accepted the agreement of Ouchy[8] and considered the Libyan territories as parts of its Empire.

This paper analyzes the Italian debate on the future of the colonies during the last years of the First World War, and its consequences in colonial policy. Particularly, it focusses on the Libyan territories, which posed the most urging problems. While Eritrea and Somalia did not witness conflicts serious enough to question colonial government, Libya saw profound upheavals and conflicts. These unrests highlighted the shortcomings in political management, especially in relation to the local population. These shortcomings and errors, combined with the local political forces' almost universal support for the Ottoman Porte and the Central Empires, resulted in almost all of Libya escaping from Italian control during the conflict. In the most dramatic moments of the war, especially after the disaster of Caporetto, Italy even thought of abandoning it [9]. After deciding to retain its presence in Libya, the Italian government made profound revisions to its colonial policy. The result of these policies was a slightly liberal opening, which involved the Libyan population and their representatives in a form of indirect rule, and gave wider space to local autonomy and political expression.

When Italy declared war (24 May 1915), Tripolitania and Cyrenaica were in a critical situation. From the last months of 1914, all of the Fezzan (the Saharan region that constituted a large part of the territory claimed by Italy), had been in the hands of the 'rebels'. The 'rebellion'[10] extended to the North of Tripolitania. In the first months of 1915, the Italian garrisons were under attack almost anywhere. Rome, for its part, echoed the government's position on the withdrawal of the garrisons. In fact, preparations

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6   George Earl of Hertling (1843–1919) was the German Chancellor from November 1917 to October of the following year. Idib., p. 444.

7   Ibid., p. 427.

8   After about a year of war, the Ottoman government had to come to terms with the Italian government by signing 18 October 1912 in Ouchy (near Lausanne) a peace treaty and withdrawing his troops from Libya.

9   The government opposed the request by General Cadorna: a Council of Ministers on 3 November 1917, unanimously voted that the troops could "not either in whole or in part, be removed from Tripolitania and Cyrenaica". See Ibid., p. 339.

10   The 'rebellion' was so defined by journalism and colonial discourse, with a term that emphasized illegality. We assume it, on the contrary, as an act of resistance fully legitimate: hence, our quotation marks.

for the war foreshadowed the movement of troops in the battlefields of Europe. During the summer, the troops were ordered to retreat to the coast; only the two maritime bases of Tripoli and al-Khums (Homs) remained under the control of the army.

Retreat had been ordered even in Cyrenaica, and in October 1915 Italian troops held only Benghazi, Darnah and Tubruq. The government of the *tariqa al-Sanusiyya* under Ahmad al-Sharif effectively controlled the rest of the territory[11].

This situation did not change for about a year, but in 1916, some events signalled a turning point for the Italian government. In Tripolitania, a part of the Berber population surrendered, and Italian troops occupied the town of Zuara, west of Tripoli. In Cyrenaica, Muhammad Hilal, one of the Sanusi family members, defected. Italy therefore could peacefully occupy Burd Sulayman (Porto Bardia) and part of the internal area. Ahmad al-Sharif, refusing all Italian approaches for a peaceful settlement, committed most of his forces with Turkish and German military commands, organizing an armed campaign against Egypt[12]. The *shaykh al-kabir* reached the oasis of Dakhla, but his campaign ended disastrously in early 1917, and the remnants of his militia retreated to Cyrenaica.

This failed expedition badly shook the authority of the Sanusi chief, who moved westward to the region of Surt, continuing the fight alongside the Ottoman caliphate. Control over the brotherhood in Cyrenaica passed into the hands of Muhmmad Idris[13], who was more inclined to negotiations with Britain and Italy. In April 1917, an agreement was devised in Bir 'Akrama, near Tubruk. Muhammad Idris and the tribes loyal to him agreed to a proposal of *modus vivendi* with Italy upon the end of the war, thereby ensuring peace in Eastern Libya.

In Tripolitania, the situation remained difficult. Despite the occupation of Zuara, the 'Arab rebels' under the leadership of Sulayman al-Baruni[14] and other chiefs (such as Ramadan al-Suwayhili[15]) and assisted by Turkish and German officers had established their logistic centre in Misrata. They kept all territory firmly in control, besieging the coastal towns occupied by colonial forces.

In 1918, the colonial administration began to reflect on the program proposed by Wilson and others about the future of the colonies. The Colonial Secretary Gaspare Colosimo,[16] in a message to the Minister of Foreign Affairs in February 1918, analysed the various positions, claiming not to see

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11   Through the initiative of its founder, Muhammad b. 'Ali al-Sanusi, from the mid-nineteenth century the tariqa al-sanusiyya (or Sanusi brotherhood) spread gradually the net of its zawaya in eastern Libya. It was the only organized institution truly present in a territory barely controlled by Istanbul.

12   See F. Cresti, La Tariqa al-sanusiyya nella Prima Guerra Mondiale. La Campagna d'Egitto di Ahmad al-Sharif al-Sanusi (novembre 1915–february 1917) secondo i documenti d'archivio italiani, in: Studi Magrebini, XI (2013), pp. 41-93.

13   Muhammad Idris (1890–1983) became the independent ruler of Libya in 1951.

14   Sulayman al-Baruni (1872–1940) had been elected to Parliament in Istanbul after the coup of the Committee of Union and Progress (1908).

15   Ramadan al-Shitiwi al-Suwayhili had inflicted the greatest defeat in Libya to the Italian army at Qasr Bu Hadi (29 April 1915).

16   Gaspare Colosimo (1859–1944) was the Colonial Secretary from 1916 to 1919.

how the principle of self-determinationcan can be practically implemented; this kind of indigenous referendum would be of little value even among well-evolved populations[17].

Considering that Britain and France had the greatest risk if this principle was applied, he affirmed his clear opposition to it:

I do not hesitate to declare that it is in the common interest of the Entente to not bring the argument of self decision to the discussion [in the future Peace Congress][18].

It was evident that the colonial question would have great importance in the international agreements about the future of the world. The Italian government needed to arrive prepared at the negotiations, and to resist being pushed aside by France and Britain in the debate on colonial territories.[19]

The situation in Tripolitania influenced Colosimo's opposition to the self-determination hypothesis. If self-determination was upheld, Tripolitania, in all probability, would be lost. In his analysis, the minister noted that Eritrea and Somalia had proven loyalty to Italy. Cyrenaica, however, could possibly remain with Italy. The minister believed that the treaties with the Sanusi brotherhood, the new politics of luring tribes with money, and the development of local representative institutions had created a new situation "which gave hope that the people don't have to regret the ancient Turkish domination."[20]

This analysis appears quite optimistic, if not wrong, for Cyrenaica. The minister was more cautious in his report to the Parliament a few days later, affirming that the situation passed

through a very delicate political moment, in which our government must dominate, combine and organize. It's impossibile to make predictions, always fallacious […] but, whatever the events, we can say that since the start of the good relations with the Sanusis we have had a year of peace. Life in the colony, for the first time since our occupation (since1911) began to throb in works of peace, agriculture and trade, even during the war, leaving behind the memory of a wretched life linked to the coast garrisons, unable to develop any fruitful relationship with the interior and of any government action.[21]

The reasoning seemed more consistent for Tripolitania, also involving the neighboring French and British territories:

Although appropriate providences of indigenous politics have been introduced in Tripoli, with the establishment of local advisory committees, with the code of the Jewish community, with the organization of Aukaf and other provisions, the conditions are very

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17   Colosimo to Minister of Foreign Affairs, 15 February 1918; see V. Clodomiro (ed.), Il diario di Gaspare Colosimo, p. 444).

18   Ibid.

19   Colosimo to Minister of Foreign Affairs, 3 June 1918, in Ibid., p. 507.

20   Ibid., p. 445.

21   Relazione sulla situazione economica, politica ed amministrativa delle Colonie italiane presentata dal Ministro delle Colonie (Colosimo) nella tornata del 23 febbraio 1918, in: Atti Parlamentari, XXIV, 1913–1918, n. LV, Roma 1918, p. 14 [hereinafter Colosimo Report].

different in the region where the rebellion of 1915 has reduced us to the coast and only to a part of it, making us lose all control over populations outside the walls of the coastal cities. One application of the criteria set out in the above discourse, as it were possible, would be a serious danger not only for Italians interests, but also for those of neighboring French and British possessions[22].

While it was in Italy's interest to not introduce the question of self determination at the Peace Congress, the minister accepted that the issue might be raised in other forums. In any case, it was important for the government to discuss the problem, gathering all the information and facts needed for a valid defense, in case the affair took directions unfavorable to Italian interests.

Beyond the debate on Wilson's points, which some saw as a philosophical pronouncement difficult to enact politically, some liberal opening in European colonial policies had begun to take shape.

France had not yet made official statements on the proposals of Wilson. However, with the arrival of Clemenceau[23], some administrative reforms for Algeria's Muslim population were announced. On 29 January 1918, France promised partial electoral rights to the Muslim population. Unlike the previous legislation, this measure recognized a kind of naturalization to the *indigènes* without the obligation of renouncing their personal status. It promised the establishment of the Advisory Council for Algeria in Paris, composed of six Muslims and fifteen French members[24].

The decree was issued on 4 February 1919. It created an indigenous citizen status through which some categories of Algerian Muslims became eligible voters in municipal constituencies. French politicians who promoted this liberal reform defended their position by citing generally progressive political principles and by noting the need to recognize and repay a military debt that France had contracted towards the Muslim subjects of Algeria. Thousands had been enrolled and had fought (indeed, were still fighting) for the motherland, shedding their blood in trenches and battlefields of Europe. It is interesting to note that even in the report presented to the Italian Parliament on the situation of the colonies at the end of February 1918, Colosimo stressed the important effort made by the Libyans during the war in favor of the motherland[25]. Since 1917, indigenous Libyans had been sent to Italy. They worked in major industries engaged in war production; more than 4,700 workers worked in the large industrial centers, and in southern cities.[26] The number of Libyan workers brought in Italy was not conspicuous in absolute terms, especially in comparison with the other countries. But taking into account the small size

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22   Ibid.
23   Georges Clemenceau (1841–1929) from 1917 to 1919 was Prime Minister in a cabinet of national unity.
24   On the debate about this reform proposal, see Ch.-R. Ageron, Histoire de l'Algérie Contemporaine, vol. II, Paris 1919, pp. 270-276.
25   Colosimo Report, p. 31.
26   See F. Cresti, La Prima Emigrazione di Lavoratori Maghrebini in Italia, in: M. Aymard, F. Barca (eds.), Conflitti, Migrazioni e Diritti dell'Uomo, Soveria Mannelli 2002, pp. 47-59.

of the area effectively controlled by Italy, Libyans constituted a substantial part of its adult male population.

 Colosimo devoted great attention to the future of colonial administration, especially regarding measures to foster a policy of collaboration with indigenous peoples. He mentioned the *Ordinamento Bertolin,* the first decrees issued for governing the colony. The Bertolini system comprised two decrees, issued in 1913 and 1914[27]; the second one, in particular, recommended governing the country with the cooperation of indigenous leaders[28]. However, Bertolini's administrative structure gave the Libyans only a role of practical execution, while decision-making and management were reserved for Italian officials. The local councils were meant to facilitate the expression of Libyan aspirations, but in the short period separing the first Italian-Turkish conflict from the World War, the *Ordinamento* had not fostered any real participation of Libyan representatives. Instead, a succession of military governors had retained highly centralized and authoritarian powers, repressing all dissent.

The Minister cited many excuses for the failure of Bertolini's laws: the lack of time, the continuing instability in the country, the outbreak of the 'rebellion' in Tripolitania and the inability to control the territory in Cyrenaica. The beginning of the First World War subsequently led to the suspension of all civilian measures. Nevertheless, the theory formulated before the war remained sound, although subsequent events in 1915 had invalidated it.

> *In Libya we are few among many, like in most African and Indian colonies, and [...] we must proceed by guiding the people, not putting them aside*[29].

The position expressed by the minister and his considerations presaged a more liberal direction in Libyan politics. This position resulted from a lively debate on indigenous policy. The question of the relations with the Muslim population had attracted the interest of politicians since the conquest of Tripoli. The most debated issues were the religious affiliation of the population and the degree to which the history, legal tradition and Muslim institutions had to be preserved to make Italian rule acceptable. In case of Cyrenaica, the history of the Sanusiyya, its resistance to the occupation, its internal organization and its relations with the Italian government had aroused interest.

 All such analyses argued for active participation of the indigenous population in governmental bodies, and the recognition of wider civil rights. The jurist Savino Acquaviva, for exemple, contradicted a widely held view by affirming that the Libyan uprising and its support for the Ottoman Empire and the Entente powers had not been caused by well-organized propaganda, but was in fact the result of a colonial policy which had

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27   Decreto 39, 9 January 1913 and Decreto 35, 15 January 1914. See the texts in Ministero delle Colonie, Ordinamenti della Libia, Roma 1914.

28   Ministero delle Colonie, Nel primo anno di vita del Ministero delle Colonie. Relazione dell'on. Pietro Bertolini, Roma 1914, p. VI [hereinafter Bertolini Report].

29   Ibid. See also A. Del Boca, Gli Italiani in Libia. Tripoli Bel Suol d'Amore 1860–1922, Milano, 1997, p. 356.

degraded Libyans from citizenship to subjecthood with no political rights[30]. According to Acquaviva, the way forward was a policy of cooperation and affirmation of the just demands for the country's progress, along with an ultimate acceptance of Libya's political and religious independence. That did not mean the complete detachment of the Libyan territories from Italy: these could still remain parts of the Italian Empire, just as Australia and Canada were parts of the British Empire. It was thus appropriate to move towards an indirect rule policy, following Great Britain's example.

Beyond the theoretical debate, even the military government of the colony during the war years was increasingly convinced of the necessity of establishing advisory bodies, permitting Libyans to express their opinions and wishes. In April 1916, General Ameglio (who ran the government of the two colonies during the war) proposed an administrative reform along such lines.[31] The Ministry of Colonies implemented his proposal, creating the Indigenous Advisory Committees (*Comitati consultivi indigeni*) in Tripoli and Benghazi in March 1917. A Joint Central Advisory Committee for Libya (*Comitato centrale consultivo misto per la Libia*), based in Rome, was later joined to the latter.

Alongside the debate on the future of the colonies, the Italian government created the 'Committee for the study of the measures for the transition from the state of war to that of peace' on 21 March 1918[32]. The committee was divided into different sections. Section VII advised on the study of 'Colonial Issues' (*Questioni coloniali*), enlightening the public and counselling the government on policies to be adopted after the war. It included experts, members of the Academy, members of Parliament and senior ministry officials, and published its reports in 1919[33].

The first session was inaugurated by the Minister of the Colonies, who recalled the dramatic situation caused by the war, and hoped that the League of Nations, "like a ray of light in the terrible tragedy of the world", would solve all international problems and usher in an era of peace. For that to happen, however, it was necessary to find solutions to problems which maintained divisions between peoples and nations. Here the colonial question was of paramount importance[34]. For Italy, the Mediterranean remained the center of interest and the future of Libya was a key question. Hence, the members of the section dealt chiefly with territories on the southern shore of the Mediterranean (Tripolitania and Cyrenaica), tackling issues relating to the relations with the populations of the two colonies:

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30   S. Acquaviva, Il Problema Libico e il Senussismo, Roma 1917, passim.

31   Archivio storico-diplomatico del ministero degli Affari esteri [hereinafter: ASDMAE], Archivio storico del ministero dell'Africa italiana [hereinafter: ASMAI], Libia 126/1, b. 6. See also S. Behre, Notabili Libici e Funzionari Italiani: l'Amministrazione Coloniale in Tripolitania (1912–1919), PhD Thesis, XXIV cycle (2009–2011), University of Messina, pp. 301-308.

32   Documents of the Commissione per lo studio dei provvedimenti occorrenti per il passaggio dallo stato di guerra a quello di pace in Archivio Centrale dello Stato [hereinafter ACS], Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri [hereinafter: PCM] (Gabinetto, Affari generali), Guerra Europea, b. 269 bis, 304.

33   Ministero delle Colonie, Relazione della VII sezione della commissione del dopo-guerra (Quistioni coloniali), Roma 1919 [hereinafter: Section VII Report], p. 1.

34   Ibid., p. 7-8.

Our Muslim politics. Here's an interesting problem […] *concerning* […] *the road we have traveled, worrying about remaining faithful to the policy of collaboration that according to the needs of the times and the maturity of the peoples,* allows them a gradual development of their civilization*; and respects the special contents of the Muslim religion* […]*. The future* […] *of our colonies* […] *will depend largely on our Muslim policy and our indigenous policy*[35].

In his reply to the minister, the section president Carlo Schanzer remembered the colonial events of the past decades and concluded

hoping that Italy, not slavishly following the methods of the other nations, will know how to give his own imprint to a colonial policy responding to its civilization and special aptitudes, so that this work becomes the effective instrument of our colonial expansion corresponding to the position and mission of Italy in the world[36].

The arguments of Section VII covered a very broad field. Schanzer covered the Ministry of the Colonies and its advisory bodies. His report was critical of the Indigenous advisory committees for Tripolitania and Cyrenaica, which the minister Colosimo had hailed as crucial elements of the new indigenous policy.

These committees sought to involve "the indigenous element, and in particular the Muslims" in the colonial government bodies, fulfilling the pledges taken since the beginning of the conquest of Tripoli[37]. However, the real representation of indigenous interests was somewhat problematic. Committee members were appointed by the government, which chose between "notables welcomed by the Governor and those proposed by him"[38]. It was possible that the members had no real independence, but were just puppets in the hands of Italian officials. The people regarded them as agents of the colonial power, not as their representatives.

The *Convegno nazionale coloniale*, held in Rome in January 1919, discussed the creation of a truly representative body of indigenous interests. Section VII also proposed an elected assembly, stressing that future "indigenous advisory committees will be based entirely on the election"[39].

Among the reports of Section VII, the one by Carlo Alfonso Nallino'[40] stands out, titled *Treatment of the Natives and their participation in the colonial administration. Political and administrative system*[41].

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35   Ibid, p. 9.
36   Ibid., p. 18.
37   Ibid., p. 12. On the civil legislation enacted by the first colonial governments in Libya, see D. Caruso Inghilleri, I Primi Ordinamenti Civili della Libia (5 ottobre 1911–9 gennaio 1913). Contributo alla Storia della Conquista, Roma 1914.
38   Section VII Report, p. 53.
39   Ibid.
40   Carlo Alfonso Nallino was one of the most illustrious orientalists, and professor of Arabic in the University of Rome.
41   Section VII Report, p. 111-124

Nallino devoted most of his report to Libya, stating that it was not necessary to introduce major political and administrative transformations in other colonies. He recalled that the Ministry of Colonies had agreed to this and had repeatedly stressed the need for implementation and development of the measures since 1914. On the issue of the political status of the Libyan population, it was necessary to examine a classic conundrum: should Italy preserve the institute of *sudditanza* (subjection)[42], or move towards a model of *cittadinanza* (citizenship)? In other words, was it possible to unify the legal status of Italian and indigenous citizens?

Nallino stressed that the concept of *sudditanza* was not acceptable in Libya, and that the situation must evolve toward *cittadinanza*. There would be a particular Libyan citizenship for the entire native population, distinct from metropolitan citizenship. The distinction was based on the observation that Libyans would not accept the Italian Civil Law, since its acceptance would mean the abandonment of the rules related to Muslim or Jewish law.

The personal property and inheritance laws in Muslim and Jewish legal traditions were often different from those applied in Italy, so it was impossible for one to subscribe to both. On the other hand, Nallino remembered that from the beginning of the conquest the government's agreements with the main Libyan leaders had shown the differential treatment of Italians and Libyans. Muslim women were prohibited from marrying into other religions, laws on conscription and military service were non-applicable, family laws corresponding to their religious tradition were enforced, and religious endowments (*awqaf*) received special treatment[43]. This made it clear that even the Muslims did not wish to be completely assimilated with the Italians.

According to Nallino, citizenship for Libyans needed to be based on a juridical status guaranteeing the essential rights, "without prejudice to their personal property and inheritance law, as established respectively by the Muslim and the Jewish laws"[44]. Nallino thought that the example of French Algeria must not be followed in Libya. The law allowing Algerians to access full French nationality through an explicit renunciation of their Muslim status, if applied to Libya, "[would] stir up the natives of Libya against us, since it is an invitation to apostasy"[45].

Nallino criticized the indigenous advisory committees. He thought that they were results of the conflict between the central and the colonial governments, the latter excluding the elective principle and leaving the choice of the members to the Governor. The Governor had the right to dismiss them and to suspend their payments, and therefore the members

42 The rd. 6 Avril 1913 already cited, introduced the institute of sudditanza for the entire native population. The sudditanza took away any political right for the Libyans, while under Ottoman rule, starting from 1908, they had enjoyed full citizenship.
43 See G. Bourbon del Monte Santa Maria, L'Islamismo e la Confraternita dei Senussi, Città di Castello, 1912, p. 233-238.
44 Section VII Report, p. 114.
45 Ibid., p. 115.

of the committees had no independence. This state could only be changed by introducing the election of the members.

The rapporteur opposed joint assemblies, since the diversity of cultures and political agendas might result in perpetual disagreement between the Italian and Libyan members[46]. All ideas of assimilation were to be abandoned, since they "would not only be doomed to failure, but also create a violent hostility against us". Finally, Nallino recommended the elimination of assimilative tendencies, the introduction of a 'Libyan citizenship' for all the natives, their right to work in public service, the extension of the representative system, the preservation of differentiated administrative systems, and the study "of Bedouin or nomadic societies, which constitutes a very serious problem of internal Cyrenaica and in part of Fezzan"[47].

There was a paradox in the debate within Section VII. While it advocated a policy of association and collaboration with the Muslim population, no Libyan representative was consulted. Nallino did not think that members of Libyan society had expressed their wishes independently, voicing aspirations which contradicted the scholars. For example, some notables of Tripoli had requested rights equivalent with those of metropolitan citizens after the Peace of Ouchy. They had also called for the establishment of mixed representative bodies, having sent a memorial to the head of the Italian Government, Giovanni Giolitti, and asking that the Arabs

> be not considered as a colonized people, but be given perfect equality of treatment with right to vote and representation, by organizing local power on the basis of a mixed board composed of Arabs and Italian and provided with broad powers[48].

Other politicians for independence, like Sulayman al-Baruni, had a more radical attitude. In the last months of 1912, he declared the Berber region and the entire southern Tripolitanian region independent, executing "the desire of the majority of the coastal population of Tripoli, and of all the inhabitants of Jebel Garbi, of south of Tripoli till the Sahara and Fezzan". Enacting the text of a Sultan's firman "clearly granting independence to the people of Tripoli," al-Baruni proclaimed the birth of "a government founded on the law of the Koran and on principles inspired by civilization and progress that will be modulated on those of civilized nations"[49].

This proclamation was the first instance of independence of a part of Libya. It followed the meeting of several Berber notables organized by al-Baruni in Yefren on 8 November 1912. We do not know if this republican idea was widespread among Berber notables;

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46   "Mixed Assemblies seem premature and harmful", Ibid., p. 120.
47   Ibid., pp. 123-124.
48   G. Mondaini, Manuale di Storia e Legislazione Coloniale del Regno d'Italia, I vol., Roma, 1924, p. 328.
49   ASDMAE, ASMAI, Libia 150/14-59: Ufficio politico-militare del governo della Tripolitania, Notizie su Suleimàn el-Barùni, att. n. 4, p. 39. The proclamation is presented as a logical consequence of the Sultan's firman that, two days before signing the Treaty of Ouchy, gave Libya a full and complete autonomy. See F. Cresti, Due Volte Minoranza: i Berberi Ibaditi del Jabal Nafűsa nella Visione Coloniale, in: F. Cresti (ed.), Minoranze, Pluralismo, Stato nell'Africa Mediterranea e nel Sahel, Roma, 2015, p. 33.

we are also not sure if it was merely al-Baruni's tool for realizing personal ambitions, or even a reformulation of an earlier idea about an independent Berber State[50]. In effect, the Yefren republic was short-lived, and disappeared a few months later due to colonial occupation.

In Tripolitania, the republican idea probably had other stimuli, such as Wilson's Fourteen Points and, later, the military command of the colony statement, which wanted the country's future to be determined by a political solution and with the agreement of the population[51]. The republican idea found a new expression on 16 November 1918. During a meeting of the main military leaders of Tripolitania in al-Qusabat, Sulayman al-Baruni and 'Abd al-Rahman 'Azzam[52] proclaimed the Tripolitanian Republic *(jumhuriyya al-tarabulusiyya)*.

According to Lisa Anderson[53], the formation of a republican government was not a product of the ideology of the al-Qusabat conference participants, but rather a reflection of disagreements on who should head the independent state. Temporarily, a quadrumvirate was formed, composed of Sulayman al-Baruni, Ramadan al-Suwayhili, Abd al-Nabi Bilkhayr and Ahmad al-Murayyid, along with an advisory board of 24 members. According to the reconstruction of Simona Behre

> the adoption of the republican formula was an obligatory choice; it was an attempt to defuse the centrifugal forces that threatened to trigger a new civil war. The decision to set up a collegial summit confirmed that this danger was a real one. The composition of the Quadrumvirate perfectly captured the political dynamics of the country[54].

While Anderson and Behre see the Tripolitanian republic as a tool for maintaining the balance of power among the main political factions of the country, Mondaini explains it as "a wartime artificial Turkish-German creation", which led to future peace negotiations, but also responded to the political ideas of its time, such as the renewal movement spreading from Turkey to the entire Islamic world through the Young Turks, the spread of Wilsonian principles of freedom and self-determination of peoples, and the liberal political reforms of the post-war in the French and English colonies.[55]

In fact, when the Ottoman command left the scene after the Armistice of Mudros (30 October 1918), the quadrumvirs autonomously ruled the territory that they could control. The republic was not the result of a common political vision beyond the leaders' as-

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50   See F. Corò, Suleiman El Baruni, il Sogno di un Principato Berbero e la Battaglia di Asàaba (1913), in: Gli Annali dell'Africa italiana, 1 (1938) 3-4, p. 958.

51   See E. De Leone, La Colonizzazione dell'Africa del Nord, 2 vols., Padova 1960, vol. II, p. 481-482.

52   The Egyptian ,Abd al-Rahman ,Azzam studied medicine in Britain. During World War I he went to Libya, becoming the counsellor of Ramadan al-Suwayhili. Many years later, in 1945, he was elected the first Secretary General of the Arab League.

53   L. Anderson, The Tripoli Republic, 1918–1922, in: E.G.H. Joffé, K.S. Maclachlan (eds.), Social and Economic Development of Libya, London 1982, p. 43-66.

54   S. Behre, Notabili Libici e Funzionari Italiani: l'Amministrazione Coloniale in Tripolitania (1912–1919), Soveria Mannelli, 2015, p. 269.

55   G. Mondaini, Manuale di Storia e Legislazione Coloniale del Regno d'Italia, p. 424.

pirations to supremacy. Al-Suwayhili, an inspiration for 'Azzam, probably had the major role in the Republican project formulation. With this tool, he had

> *the possibility of dismissing the regional leader's clothes to rise to the rank of national leader, extending his hegemony over entire Tripolitania. The implementation of this plan called for a renewal of institutional structures, as the organization that [...] had implanted in and around Misrâta could not support the weight of governing the whole country*[56].

However, several other actors with similar ambitions competed with him, and no one was willing to give way to others. The following events of the Tripolitanian republic demonstrate that while the supporters of the republic hoped to express their aspirations for independence at the Peace conference, their efforts were in vain.

The *shaykh al-kabir* of the Sanusiyya, Ahmad al-Sharif, hoped that Wilson's fifth point could be used to gain the autonomy of Libyan territories. When the war events did signal a defeat for the Turko-German forces, he journeyed to Istanbul to plead his cause (September 1918)[57]. We do not know how Ahmad al-Sharif carried out his action in Istanbul. However, messages sent by the British Embassy in Rome to the Ministry of the Colonies in November 1918 made the Italian Government fear that the Ottomans wanted to apply the principle of self-determination during post-war negotiations regarding the future of its former African territories.

> *The Sultan of Turkey would appoint Sidi Ahmad al-Sharif as the deputy sultan of Tripoli, with the intention and hope to intervene in the treaties of peace with a request of evacuation of the Libyan territories, under the pretext that the occupation of this country is contrary to the will of the population and therefore not in accordance with the principles of the US President*[58].

Whether this information was true or not, the Italian government was on guard against the maneuvers that could jeopardize the future of Libya[59].

In Cyrenaica, Idris al-Sanusi assumed the control of the brotherhood and aspired to a broad autonomy, if not complete independence. He wished to be titled "Emir" of his territory. He had repeatedly asked for the creation of "a Sanusi kingdom under Italian protectorate (like the Khedive in Egypt)"[60], recognizing the political and military free-

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56   Ibid.

57   E.A.V. De Candole, The Life and Times of King Idris of Libya, Publ. by Mohamed Ben Ghalbon, Manchester, 1990, p. 35-36.

58   ASDMAE, ASMAI, Libia 140/3, fasc. 19: Rodd to Agnesa, 11 January 1918.

59   A Turkish official statement addressed to the Italian government through the embassy of Spain in Istanbul in April 1918, with the reassertion of Ottoman suzerainty over Libya, made the Minister of the Colonies believe that "basically, Turkey prepares the ground for reopening the issue of Libya in the Peace congress, trying to demonstrate the territorial reconquest of Tripolitania", See V. Clodomiro (ed.), Il Diario di Gaspare Colosimo, pp. 495-496.

60   ASDMAE, ASMAI, Libia 138/2, f. 14: Relazione Piacentini-Villa sulle trattative di Zuetina (oct. 1916), p. 11. See also ibid., Libia 143/3, f. 27: Serra to Ministero degli Esteri, 27 March 1916.

dom of the internal regions of Cyrenaica. For the Italian Ministry of Colonies, the concessions were further reduced for a certain administrative autonomy of the southernmost territory of Cyrenaica. But Idris had stuck to his initial plan even after the conclusion of the *modus vivendi* of 1917. Even in early 1919, he wanted the title "*amir dawakhil Libya*" (Emir of the internal regions of Libya), but the ministry saw in this request a "Wilsonian maneuver" and was ready to concede only the less binding title of "*sceikh al-tariqa*" (Head of Sanusi brotherhood), with administrative autonomy in the oases of Kufra and Jalu[61].

The positions of the Italian Ministry of Colonies and the most active political forces in Libya were therefore quite distant at the end of the First World War. It took diplomatic approaches, plea bargains and mutual concessions to reach an agreement that led to the proclamation of the *Legge fondamentale* (*qanun al-asasi* or Basic Law) for Tripolitania and for Cyrenaica, better known as *Statuti libici*.

The negotiations with the members of the Republican Quadrumvirate of Tripolitania began in March 1919 at Qal'at al-Zaytun, and reached an agreement based on reciprocal concessions. The Quadrumvirate returned Italian prisoners and pacified the territory with gradual disarmament of the armed forces of the republic. Italy, in turn, established new administrative rules that guaranteed the population a broad institutional participation in governing the country. The benefits were mutual: the Italian government avoided the military action in the colonies, while the leaders of the republic obtained substantial appanages without yielding power and autonomy, but recognizing a sort of protectorate to Italy. Moreover, Libyan leaders were aware that, with the Ottoman Empire and its allies withdrawing at the end of the war, their ability to support a further war effort, such as obtaining supplies and arms, would be very limited.

The agreement was enforced by Ramadan al-Suwayhili, who persuaded the other leaders to sign it on April 21, 1919. It sparked controversy in Italy, especially when the political strategy advocated by the statutes proved unsuccessful. Many claimed that Italy should conquer the territory by military force, since the end of the European war allowed to move the necessary troops into the colony. Those who supported this line were convinced of the inability of the Libyan leaders to understand the actual value of the concession made by Italy peacefully. It was regarded as an act of weakness, for they were accustomed to acknowledge only the logic of force[62].

The ideology of the Italian Government played a decisive role in its policy. The judgment of Gennaro Mondaini, who witnessed the debate of that era (and also participated in the drafting of the postwar policy as a member of the Committee), is well balanced:

> *Italy, where democratic ideals in domestic as well as in International and colonial politics had been among the most striking and effective coefficients of the heroic deeds [of World War], [was] politically and psychologically prepared for a great liberal political reform to*

61   ASDMAE, ASMAI, Libia 144/4, f. 26: Ministero delle Colonie [hereinafter: MC] to Arcari, tel. 1204, 4 April 1919; Arcari to MC, tel. 912, 16 April 1919.

62   See G. Mondaini, Manuale di Storia e Legislazione Coloniale del Regno d'Italia, vol. I, p. 425.

ensure the pacification of Tripolitania without having to reconquer it, especially as it was bound by the commitments made in the first Peace of Lausanne with Turkey and by the solemn promises repeatedly made to natives in the early years of the occupation[63].

On June 1, 1919, a proclamation of General Vincenzo Garioni, the new governor of Tripolitania,[64] announced to the population the opening of a new era:

His Majesty the King has signed and the minister of the Colonies has countersigned the decree that establishes the FUNDAMENTAL PACT for the people of Tripolitania.
It consecrates with intangible rules the wide and loyal fulfillment of those commitments, which due to known events beyond the will of the Italian government had been delayed, but not forgotten. By virtue of this Act, the inhabitants of Tripolitania are elevated to the moral and political dignity of citizens, guaranteed by the same rights recognized to Italian citizens and are called to contribute to the governance of public affairs and the administration of the territory in a wider and more concrete form in a regime of freedom and social progress, for them a sure pledge of a peaceful future[65].

The *Patto fondamentale* for Tripolitania was a real Constitution. It was the first constitution in the Libyan territories, and it was also defined as such by the local population. It consists of forty articles[66] and defines the criteria for recognizing Tripolitanian Italian citizenship. It claims, among other things, that all persons born in Tripolitania at the date of the decree, are considered Italian citizens (art. 1). All citizens are equal before the law, will maintain their own status concerning the right of the individual and the inheritance, and will enjoy the following civil and political rights: guarantee of individual freedom, inviolability of home and property, the right to participate in civil and military offices, free professional practice in Italy (on condition of having the necessary qualifications), the right to vote and to stand for the right of petition to the national Parliament, the right of residence, and the right to emigration.

In addition to guaranteeing respect for the religious traditions and local customs, the Pact recognizes freedom of press and assembly. As for military service, citizens cannot be forced to enrol, but they may enlist volunteers to form local armed forces. Tolls set by the Parliament must be used exclusively for the needs of Tripolitania.

As for education, the government would ensure the freedom of education and establish schools for compulsory primary education (being "restricted to males only" for Muslims), set up courses for secondary and higher education. For Muslims, all elementary education and secondary scientific subjects would be taught in Arabic, while Italian would be compulsory; it would be forbidden to teach principles in conflict with Islam.

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63   Ibid., p. 424-425.
64   Garioni (who had already been governor of Tripolitania in the years 1913 and 1914) replaced Giovanni Ameglio, from August 1918 until August of the following year.
65   Ibid. A copy of the notice in ASDMAE, ASMAI, Libia 122/22, f. 196.
66   Legge fondamentale per la Tripolitania. Al-qanun al-asasi li'l-qathar al-tarabulusi, 1st of June 1919, in ASDMAE, Asmai, Libia 122/22, fasc. 196.

Articles 13 to 26 concerned the government and its administration. The government was to be formed by a governor appointed by the king and by a local parliament elected by the people for a four year term (the voters must be more than twenty years old) ; the number of members by right and gubernatorial appointment was not to exceed one-sixth of the elected members; the members must be older than thirty years and be Tripolitanian citizens; they were to be elected on the basis of one for every twenty thousand inhabitants, and the chairman would be among the members of Muslim religion. Immunity was granted to the members of Parliament (art. 19).

Administratively, the territory was divided into regions (*liuà*), provinces (*cazà*) and districts (*nahia*), headed respectively by a regional commissioner (*mutassarif*), a delegate of the province (*caimacams*) and a district agent (*mudir*). These officials would be appointed "by decree of the Governor, after consultation with a special committee, called the Council of Government", and renewed upon each new election of the local parliament (art. 25).

Italian citizens of Tripolitania might ask for metropolitan citizenship, if more than 21 years old, monogamous or unmarried, having a clean record and residing for at least five years in Italy or in Tripoli. Apart from these general conditions, they must belong to one of a number of special categories, including having past affiliation to a military body of the state, Italian educational qualification (at least primary school) or the job of a government official.

 The text is largely identical in Cyrenaica, where the statute was enacted a few months later (31 October 1919). One variance is in article 13 ("The Government of Cyrenaica and its self-administration"), which defines the local parliament, "consisting of representatives of local tribes and urban centers, as a friendly federation of all tribes and peoples of the country". The text seems to recognize the importance of tribes and nomads in the social rubric of the territory, the autonomy of each tribe and the assembly's federal character. It echoes the observations that Nallino had expressed in his report to the Post-war commission, where he had affirmed the need to recognize the specificities of Bedouin society.

There was another peculiarity is the composition of the parliament: "about fifty representatives […] in the proportion of one in every four thousand members [of the tribe] or inhabitants". The vagueness of the number of the members of parliament was due to the imprecision of the available data on the population, about two hundred thousand according to this statement, but possibly much less. A subsequent decree[67] determinated the number of voters using calculations of recognized leaders of different fractions and the *shuyukh* of the tribes, following a complex administrative mechanism pending the establishment of the registry office in the colony. If the tribes or their autonomous fractions (and the villages of the interior oases) had less than four thousand members, it

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67   Rd. 270, 25 March 1920: Norme per l'elezione al Parlamento locale e agli altri Consigli elettivi della Cirenaica. See Gazzetta ufficiale del Regno d'Italia, 19 May 1920.

was considered sufficient to reach fifteen hundred to send a representative to the parliament.

Yet another difference concerns the division of the territory. While Tripolitania is divided into regions, provinces, and districts within specific territorial limits, the population of Cyrenaica, according to its traditional constitution, is divided into tribes, sub-tribes and their subdivisions. The administration of each sub-tribe was to be left to a chief, and the control of each tribe to a chief of chiefs (art. 21). The leaders would continue to be designated "according to traditional rules", and would then be recognized by a government decree. The creation of the parliament was not to repeal other existing bodies according to traditional rules. Particularly, the powers of the council of elders were confirmed, in order to oversee "the order and security in the area pertaining to the tribe," and to be "responsible […] in front of the Government" (art. 22). The entire colony is divided into districts "for the protection, development and progress of the local interests of each territory": if a district has its capital in a built-up center, it will be a city district or municipality, with an administration consisting of a mayor and a council elected every three years (art. 26-27).

As for the other chapters (such as financial administration, justice, and metropolitan citizenship) the Cyrenaican statute was not significantly different from that of Tripolitania. Ultimately, the main difference between the two statutes was constituted by the

> *territorial representation rather than the purely individual which was established in Cyrenaica, in homage to the still predominantly gentilitial constitution of the country in comparison to the more developed neighbouring colony*[68].

The events that followed the promulgation of the statutes soon made clear the practical impossibilities of fully implementing them. The parliament never worked in Tripolitania, and in Cyrenaica it worked for only about two years, from 30 April 1921, to early 1923.

While in Libya the anti-colonial resistance movement was growing more and more radical, with demands for autonomy and independence becoming stronger, the political developments in Italy were ominously affirming nationalist forces which would reject all prospects of compromise and prefer the use of force and military domination. The impossibility of a peaceful recognition of Italian supremacy began a long and bloody confrontation anew, which would end only with the 'pacification of Libya' at the beginning of 1932.

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68   G. Mondaini, *Manuale di Storia e Legislazione Coloniale del Regno d'Italia*, vol. I, p. 463.

Gender, Empire and Citizenship Issues: A Survey of Research Paths and Scholarly Debates on the Italian Case Study in Comparative Perspective*

Sabina Donati

ABSTRACT

Diese Sammelbesprechung untersucht eine Auswahl an einschlägigen Werken, die sich mit den kaum zu trennenden Themenfeldern Gender, Empire und Staatsangehörigkeit innerhalb der italienischen Kolonialerfahrung auseinandersetzen. Der Untersuchungszeitraum umfasst die 1920er und 1930er Jahre, mit vereinzelten Rückblenden in die vorausgehenden liberalen Jahrzehnte. Es werden insbesondere Veröffentlichungen in italienischer und englischer Sprache besprochen, um darin vorkommende Forschungstraditionen und akademische Debatten herauszuheben die sich mit dem italienischen Fall beschäftigen. Diese werden wiederum vergleichend betrachtet und in Relation zu der etablierten Forschung zum britischen und französischen Imperialismus gesetzt, zu der sie Ähnlichkeiten, aber auch Unterschiede aufweisen.

Gender, empire, and citizenship are intertwined issues that have been studied together only in relatively recent times, within a growing literature that promises to be fertile ground for new scholarly discoveries. This neglect and late arrival on the academic roundtable is not surprising bearing in mind that "gender", a useful category of historical analysis, has become the object of systematic reflection merely in the last four decades, and most notably following the 1975 pioneering research of Natalie Zemon Davis, and the famous 1986 article of Joan W. Scott.[1] Moreover, whereas a gendered reading

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of citizenship has already produced a well-established scholarship,[2] the research strand taking into consideration the gender and citizenship variables in relation to empire has been less substantial, and in certain national historiographies has still a rather marginal place. In the Italian context in particular, one should additionally bear in mind that non-hagiographic and non-ideological Italian scholarship about colonialism and imperialism in general started only from the 1970s onwards, due to certain myths, suppressions, and denials of the Italian colonial past, as Angelo Del Boca has highlighted.[3]

The purpose of this review is to offer a survey of research paths and academic debates that have delved into the multifaceted phenomenon of Italian imperialism from the perspective of gender, and, in diverse forms, through notions of citizenship and colonial subjecthood as well. Since scholars have mainly focussed on the African sites of the Italian empire, Part One explores the scholarship concerning the Horn of Africa and colonial Libya. In Part Two, in order to encourage the comparative approach, the review turns to some of the academic works on the British and the French empires, and underlines a number of similarities and differences with the debates about the Italian case. The overall objectives of this article are to point at those discussions that have started challenging readers to look at Italian imperialism with new eyes, from the fresh and refreshing perspectives of gender studies and citizenship; to draw attention to the Italian-language scholarship that for linguistic reasons might be less known to the wider international and non-Italian readership; and finally, to appreciate the use of the comparative focal lens so as to emphasise parallels and variations across the scholarly dialogue on "minor" and "major" imperial cases.

Before starting our review, however, it is useful to clarify the terms "gender" and "citizenship". Studying "gender" not only means acknowledging the actions and presence of women as historical protagonists (victims or agents) left voiceless and invisible for a long time, but also entails taking a *gendered* perspective to explore women and men as *gendered* beings. In other words, it involves examining the cultural and social understandings of sexual differences (i.e. women and men's gender roles) along with related constructions of femininity and masculinity as they were shaped within the imperial context.[4] "Citizenship," as applied to colonial times, refers to a many-sided political

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1   N. Zemon Davis, Society and Culture in Early Modern France: Eight Essays, Stanford 1975; J. W. Scott, Gender: A Useful Category of Historical Analysis, in: American Historical Review 91 (1986) 5, pp. 1053–1075.

2   See, among many, U. Vogel, Is Citizenship Gender-Specific?, in: U. Vogel and M. Moran (eds.), The Frontiers of Citizenship, London 1991, pp. 58–85; U. Vogel, Marriage and the Boundaries of Citizenship, in: B. van Steenbergen (ed.), The Condition of Citizenship, London 1994, pp. 76–89; D. T. Evans, Sexual Citizenship: The Material Construction of Sexualities, London 1993; and N. Yuval-Davis, Women, Citizenship and Difference, in: Feminist Review 57 (1997) 1, pp. 4–27.

3   A. Del Boca, The Myths, Suppressions, Denials, and Defaults of Italian Colonialism, in: P. Palumbo (ed.), A Place in the Sun: Africa in Italian Colonial Culture from Post-Unification to the Present, Berkeley 2003, pp. 17–36.

4   See the reflections of P. Levine, Introduction: Why Gender and Empire?, in: P. Levine (ed.), Gender and Empire, Oxford 2004, pp. 1–2. As Margaret Strobel notes, "[…] Gender history can be about men, even exclusively about men, if it deals with men as gendered beings, with masculinity." M. Strobel, Women's History, Gender History, and European Colonialism, in: G. Blue, M. Bunton, and R. Croizier (eds.), Colonialism and the Modern World: Selected Studies, New York 2002, p. 52.

and legal institution stretching from the metropole to the overseas empire, which incorporated "metropolitan citizens", "colonial citizens", and "colonial subjects" in different ways. Each of these three expressions carries a specific historical meaning, is shaped by specific rules of acquisition (such as, jus sanguinis, jus soli, marriage), points to specific rights and duties, and provides in various manners a multi-layered identity in relation to the national and/or imperial community under examination.[5]

Part One: Literature on gender, empire and citizenship issues in the Horn of Africa and colonial Libya

Scholarly investigations on the history of Italian imperialism from the above-mentioned perspectives have largely focussed on the African continent. The major monographs and articles pertain to the Horn of Africa (i.e. Eritrea, Somalia, Ethiopia /later Italian East Africa) and to North Africa (i.e. Cyrenaica and Tripolitania /later Libya). Most of them cover the liberal and the fascist epochs of Italian colonialism, including therefore the 1920s and the 1930s, with a majority of publications examining the late fascist era, and more particularly the years that followed the 1935 invasion of Ethiopia. These works are built upon a variety of methodological frameworks, providing a set of literature that, albeit less substantial than the scholarships concerning the British and the French empires, is stimulating and rich with insights. Most importantly, bearing in mind that Italian colonialism, as other European examples, has been dealt with in the past by (mainly) military and political historians and on the basis of (mainly) European colonial archives, it is pertinent to stress that the historiography of the Italian empire – like that of other imperial countries – is slowly opening up to new concepts and instruments of historical analysis, allowing extension of inquiries from military and political aspects to social and cultural facets.

The pioneering book *Parole e corpi* by Barbara Sòrgoni[6] deserves merit for first stimulating this field of study in Italy, and inspiring in multiple ways most of the research surveyed here. In her monograph, Sòrgoni employs the approach of historical anthropology to offer a vivid account of the anthropological and juridical discourses produced during Italian colonialism on sexuality and interracial unions between the Italian colonizers and African colonial subjects in Eritrea, and on so-called *meticci* (mixed-race children) born in the colony. Largely based on unexplored ethnological writings of authors who had direct contact with the indigenous populations, Sòrgoni's work sheds light on metropolitan ideas and representations surrounding the *madamato* phenomenon (i.e. interracial relationships) and marriage issues, as well as the ambiguous citizenship position of the

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5   For a recent discussion on citizenship as a "term" and as a "concept" in historical perspective, see S. Donati, A Political History of National Citizenship and Identity in Italy, 1861–1950, Stanford 2013, especially pp. 1–3, pp. 8–20 and pp. 121–122.

6   B. Sòrgoni, Parole e corpi: Antropologia, discorso giuridico e politiche sessuali interrazziali nella colonia Eritrea (1890–1941), Naples 1998.

Italo-Eritrean progeny. The chosen periodization is also worth noting, because Sòrgoni's inquiry covers two periods of colonial rule – 1890–1934 and 1935–1941 – with the turning point being not so much the First World War or the rise of Fascism to power in 1922, but the invasion of Ethiopia in 1935.

Whereas Sòrgoni excavates Italian anthropological and juridical discourse, leaving aside the direct voice of colonial women ("[…]we talk about them and their bodies, but we do not hear their voice")[7], Giulia Barrera takes the perspective of social history and recovers some of the voices and experiences of the African women. In her 1996 study *Dangerous Liaisons*,[8] the author attends to the history of *madamato* across the liberal and the fascist periods, as well as enriches her narrative with a number of interviews from Italy and Eritrea. These female testimonies, though limited in number, are very useful, since they include the Eritrean wife of a *ascari* husband (i.e. indigenous soldier within Italian troops); an Italo-Eritrean woman (a *meticcia*), born in Asmara in 1917, and brought up in the empire throughout the entire fascist colonial period; and another former *madama* who had a metis boy from an Italian father, and who was abandoned by the latter. Subsequently, in two further works that detail the upbringing, identity and citizenship issues of metis children on the one hand, as well as questions of citizenship, sexuality, and the state in colonial Eritrea on the other, Barrera deepens her historical examination of the liberal years and the fascist *ventennio*, drawing on untapped archival documents and oral history, the latter giving voice to several Italo-Eritreans born in the colony during the 1930s and the 1940s, and to their African mothers.[9]

Along with the approaches of historical anthropology and social history, further cross-disciplinary perspectives have been adopted in the literature, bridging gender studies and cultural history. In her monograph *Colonia per maschi*, published in 2007, Giulietta Stefani investigates Italy's colonial experience as it was lived by Italian militaries and civilians in Ethiopia during the 1930s, and examines it through the innovative lens of *mascolinità* (masculinity).[10] Since the latter concept is "invisible" in many sources, Stefani skilfully uses and creatively rereads a variety of scattered material, including colonial archives' documents, contemporary newspaper articles, a corpus of diaries, as well as the famous postcolonial novel of Ennio Flaiano, *Tempo di uccidere (Time to kill)*. Thanks to this multiplicity of sources, the author is able to discuss both public discourse and private memory with the aim of complicating the story of the Italian empire with a colourful mosaic of male experiences and male perceptions on the Italo-African encounter.

7   Ibid., p. 7.
8   G. Barrera, Dangerous Liaisons: Colonial Concubinage in Eritrea, 1890–1941, Program of African Studies Working Paper 1 (1996), pp. 1–79.
9   G. Barrera, Patrilinearità, razza e identità: L'educazione degli italo-eritrei durante il colonialismo italiano (1885–1934), in: Quaderni storici 109 (2002) 1, pp. 21–53; G. Barrera, Sex, Citizenship and the State: The Construction of the Public and Private Spheres in Colonial Eritrea, in: P. Wilson (ed.), Gender, Family and Sexuality: The Private Sphere in Italy, 1860–1945, Basingstoke 2004, pp. 157–172.
10   G. Stefani, Colonia per maschi. Italiani in Africa Orientale: Una storia di genere, Verona 2007.

Moving from Italy's East African colonies to the North African context of Tripolitania and Cyrenaica, Barbara Spadaro thoughtfully addresses not only the history of women between Italy and Libya to make the female protagonists "visible", but also the relational construction of gender and related notions of femininity, shaped historically by class, religion, culture and race.[11] In particular she sets herself the task of examining the imperial *imaginaire* of the Italian female colonizers, with an emphasis on representations and auto-representations by the Italian bourgeoisie and the colonial world of administrators, traders, professionals and teachers in Libya, from the beginning of Italian occupation in 1911 to the eve of World War Two. In line with the methodological challenges faced by the other scholars, Spadaro also emphasises the marginality of women in colonial archives, and reiterates the necessity to look for complementary historical sources. She therefore combines an analysis of contemporary press and memoirs with an examination of colonial private photographs and family albums.   Her research is enhanced by several personal interviews with Italian colons who lived in Libya for years (the owners of the family albums), providing the reader with multiple gazes on imperial realities.

1a. Representations of women, gender roles, and men within the Italian imperial context

Imperialism meant encounters. In studying the interaction between the Italian colonizers and the colonized Africans through the lenses of gender and citizenship, most of the works under review pay particular attention to Italian representations and perceptions about the "African Other". Sòrgoni tackles the question of how East African women were perceived by Italian men; Spadaro deals with the way in which female Libyans were depicted by their Italian metropolitan "sisters"; Stefani discusses how male indigenous soldiers (the *ascari*) were portrayed by Italian military men.[12] This emphasis on cultural constructions and representations is of great importance because, as Stefani reminds us, forms of knowledge and subjective perceptions are valuable instruments of analysis to grasp the political, economic and social processes of imperialism, in line with Michel Foucault's philosophical writings and Edward Said's *Orientalism*.[13]

Through the eyes of Italian colonial observers and related ethnological writings, Sòrgoni's research underlines the image of the indigenous African woman as the exotic and the erotic Black Venus always seductive and available, as well as the numerous descriptions of the gender roles that the encountered female colonial subjects were perceived to have in their local society. In particular, the scholar helps readers to comprehend the way in which the Italians, in the colony and in the metropole, presumed and understood the sexual and matrimonial relations of the colonized populations, and consequently construed indigenous women's behaviour and attitude. All these discourses pertained to female colonial subjects and their bodies, and provided the "information" that Italian

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11   B. Spadaro, Una colonia italiana. Incontri, memorie e rappresentazioni tra Italia e Libia, Milan 2013.
12   Sòrgoni, Parole e corpi; Spadaro, Una colonia italiana; Stefani, Colonia per maschi.
13   Stefani, Colonia per maschi, pp. 20–21.

officials, administrating the colony, used extensively in order to define and prescribe licit and illicit forms of contact between the Italian citizens and the East African subjects.[14] Concentrating on the encounter between female Italians and their Libyan "sisters", Spadaro considers instead the contours and the content of representations and auto-representations endorsed by Italy's metropolitan women. More particularly, thanks to the diaries of two female Italians who travelled to different parts of Libya with their respective Italian husbands in the 1910s and in the 1930s, Spadaro is able to underscore the moral order, gender ideas, and models of femininity that were regarded by these Italian women as appropriate for the definition of the colonizers' whiteness (*bianchezza*) and their belonging to Europe.[15] Within this female vision of (Christian) Europeans, one can remark that ideas of marriage, love and sexual relations were used to measure the level of civilisation of "the Other", a point equally raised by Sòrgoni.[16] So, the Muslim women of Bengasi, to take an example discussed in Spadaro's research, are described in Orientalist terms, denied any subjectivity, and seen as passive creatures within arranged marriages.[17] Also, the picture is further complicated by the encounter of female Italians with indigenous feminine sensuality, either at the sight of black *sciarmutte* (prostitutes) in the town of Murzuck in the Fezzan area, or in watching the belly dance performances of Arabic women in Tripoli. In these occasions, the words and the photos of the Italian female protagonist stigmatize different types of North-African nudity as primitive and degrading in order to highlight the distance between "them," local women of low rung, and the Italian metropolitan "ladies".[18]

These scholarly debates touching upon discursive representations about African women in the East and in the North of Italy's African empire have now been extended to African men too, and in particular to the group of the *ascari*. The military policy to recruit local African soldiers within a European Power's Army was very common in the colonial era, based on the tactic of choosing some ethnic, linguistic, and social groups to conquer other native populations. As convincingly demonstrated by Stefani, this military strategy was often accompanied by a discourse that tended to praise or to depreciate the quality of a particular group through representations of their supposed "masculine" or "feminine" characteristics.[19] The objective of this "discursive politics" was to create precise hierarchies, not only between the colonizer and the colonized but also within the different populations making up the multi-ethnic imperial community. How were the *ascari* perceived by those Italian military men who shared a variety of experiences with them within a context of domination? Stefani discusses this point by emphasizing how the colonizers' discourse was shaped not only by notions of racial difference and superiority, but also by the concept of gender and related notions of *femminilità* and *mascolinità*. In

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14   Sòrgoni, Parole e corpi.
15   Spadaro, Una colonia italiana.
16   Sòrgoni, Parole e corpi.
17   Spadaro, Una colonia italiana.
18   Ibid.
19   Stefani, Colonia per maschi.

particular, she argues that Italian discourses "feminised" at times these indigenous men but not in a denigrating way. In fact, in the majority of the cases these soldiers were represented in positive terms and with "masculine connotations," specifically exalting their stature as warriors. This praising Italian discourse was instrumental, says Stefani, to the politics of military recruitment, and also important for justifying to Italian public opinion the presence of Africans by the site of Italians. Stefani also asks why the late fascist regime did not embrace in its discourse the "feminisation of the colonized enemy" (i.e. the Ethiopians) as opposed to the "masculinisation of the colonized friend and ally" (i.e. the *ascari*), within the usual logic of *divide et impera.* Why didn't the Italians describe the Abissinians as "women" in order to defame them? Stefani does not give a definitive answer to the question, but she formulates several hypotheses that are certainly pertinent: the weakness of Italian colonialism can explain Italy's politics of discourse as more direct to get allies through eulogy, rather than to denigrate enemies; also, the foes to colonize were the Ethiopians who had defeated the Italians in Adowa – it was therefore more appropriate to imagine them as "cruel men" rather than women, to avoid a double historical shame.[20]

1b. Interracial unions, formal marriage, and the wife's citizenship status

Imperialism not only provided the background for the Italo-African encounter, shaping representations and auto-representations of protagonists; it also framed the physical, political and juridical issues of sexuality, interracial unions, formal marriages, and female citizenship position, so central to the actual politics of managing imperial relations. The research of Sòrgoni and Barrera on East Africa are fundamental in this respect,[21] and both authors identify how controversial and debated these themes were among Italian officialdom. From the viewpoint of the colonizers, what kind of relationships, "morally acceptable" and "politically appropriate", could the metropolitan (male and female) citizens have with the colonial subjects? Also, what consequences would the citizenship status of women have upon marriage – a question that already concerned the wife in the metropole, and was now stretching across the imperial territories?

An important aspect to underline is that the thinking and talking about these matters, alongside regulations and norms, were shaped in the empire by a basic and constant discrimination to differentiate the unions of white men with African women on the one hand, and the unions of white women with black colonial subjects on the other. Both unions were interracial, involving "white" Italians and "black" Africans, but the two types of relationship were not dealt with in the same way.

As regards the widespread cases of the Italian man in union with an African woman, the literature highlights the fact that Italy's politics favoured the temporary informal partnerships of *madamato* as well as discouraged formal marriages indirectly, by giving the

20   Ibid.
21   Sòrgoni, Parole e corpi; Barrera, Sex, Citizenship and the State; Barrera, Patrilinearità, razza e identità; Barrera, Dangerous Liaisons.

opportunity to the Italian male citizen to opt for the indigenous tradition of short-term arrangements, and to legitimize his metis children without having to marry the black mother, as was the case in the metropole. The formal marriage with an African woman was in fact perceived as "improper" and "inappropriate", thus to be disapproved of, even though in reality marriages between male Italians and African women were very rare, purely religious, with no legal validity, and often celebrated *in articulo mortis.* As part of an imperial strategy, these guidelines encompassed both the liberal and the fascist eras of Italian colonialism until the historical breakpoint of the invasion of Ethiopia and the consequent demographic changes within the empire led to the well-known radicalised program of the late fascist regime (i.e. the 1937 legislation making *madamato* a crime, and the 1938 norms prohibiting the marriage between Italian Aryans and a person belonging to another race).

Also, even if infrequent, the marriage of an Italian man with an African woman had to be discussed and regulated because it had an impact on the citizenship status of the indigenous wife. In general, upon marriage a woman always followed the citizenship of her husband: this principle was in force in the metropole, as the notion of "family unity in citizenship matters" made female citizenship dependent upon the nationality of the bridegroom. In the East African colonies, though, the picture was more complicated, as specified by Sòrgoni;[22] in fact, in a 1905 project of colonial civil code for Eritrea, a proposition was made not to apply this tenet so that the female African subject who married an Italian citizen did *not* acquire Italian metropolitan status. Subsequently, though, in the final text that was approved in 1909, a different rule was introduced for making the African woman an Italian metropolitan citizen upon marriage with an Italian. Upon widowhood, however, she would lose the metropolitan status on the basis of the belief that the widow of a white man went back to her original African tribe and "semi-barbarous" status. Notions of imperial prestige, intertwined with concepts of European civilisation, African barbarity, race and gender, framed all these directives and debates.[23]

Regarding the union between the Italian woman and the black African subject, Sòrgoni notes that Italy's imperial politics was largely not challenged by this type of relationship, since practically it was extremely rare, and, at the beginning of the colonial period, almost inexistent. However, the issue came to be discussed and controlled because both informal unions and formal marriages involving female Italian citizens were regarded as "more problematic" than those concerning Italian men, on the basis of the already-mentioned discourses about imperial dignity, racial superiority, and gender. This is why in 1905 specific norms were formulated to explicitly prohibit the marriage between an Italian woman and a black colonial subject.

Subsequently, the related issue of Italian women's citizenship status upon marriage was also debated. In the case of a mixed marriage between an Italian female citizen and an African male subject, it was asked, should the Italian woman lose her Italian metropoli-

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22   Sòrgoni, Parole e corpi.
23   Ibid.; Barrera, Sex, Citizenship and the State; Barrera, Patrilinearità, razza e identità; Barrera, Dangerous Liaisons.

tan citizenship to follow the native status of her black husband on the basis of gender considerations upheld in the metropole? Or should the racial ideology be predominant so that the Italian woman would keep her Italian citizenship upon marriage with an African, and acquire juridical independence from her black husband in the name of white superiority and European civilisation, but contrary to her Italian sisters living in the Italian peninsula? Sòrgoni points out variations and changes of historical importance: the racial ideology seems to have been the determining factor in the 1909 text of colonial code; in the 1933 legislation and subsequent 1936 norms, priority is given to gender principles; following the radical turn of the late fascist regime, marriages were prohibited between Aryan Italians and African stocks.[24]

1c. Metis children (boys and girls) and their citizenship status

Sexual encounters between Italians and Africans resulted in the birth of thousands of *meticci*, the mixed-race progeny of Italy's empire. In discussing the issue of *meticciato* in East Africa together with related questions of citizenship, Sòrgoni[25] highlights how in the colonial settings the presence of the metis, boys and girls alike, threatened to destabilize Italian national identity and imperial categories of ruler and ruled. The *meticci* made up the "grey zone" of imperialism – the intermediary zone between whites and blacks, and between those who commanded and those who were ruled – since they ambiguously straddled, crossed and menaced the imperial divides. Like in other colonial settings, these kids challenged racial frontiers, cultural borders, notions of European family order, concepts of paternity and maternity, as well as contours of metropolitan citizenship and ideas of colonial subjecthood.

As to the viewpoints and norms framing this progeny's juridical status, Sòrgoni and Barrera draw attention to the fact that until the 1920s, it was widely thought that metis children born to an Italian father and an African woman were "whiter" than those born to the inverse union, and that the features of the male parent prevailed over those of the mother, so that the sexual, racial and moral superiorities of the white fathers were predominant. Racial and gender ideologies were thus combined in thinking and talking about mixed-race offspring.[26] Until the 1920s, Italian imperial politics was relatively open vis-à-vis these infants, trying to find a place for them in the Italian colonial community. For instance, the children of an Italian father and born within marriage were automatically Italian citizens; but this was extremely rare because informal *madamato* was actually the rule. Hence faced with the issue of illegitimate children of Italian fathers, Italy introduced in the colonies the possibility of legitimizing the kids without the father having to marry the African mother. Furthermore, legal acknowledgement by the father was an alternative way of making the child an Italian metropolitan citizen, but many irresponsible Italians did not recognise their mixed-race children and actually abandoned

24   Sòrgoni, Parole e corpi.
25   Ibid.
26   Ibid.; Barrera, Dangerous Liaisons; Barrera, Patrilinearità, razza e identità.

them. In response to this problem, a gubernatorial circular was introduced in Eritrea in 1917 to invite colonial judges to attribute Italian metropolitan citizenship to *meticci* of unknown parents, even in the absence of paternal legal acknowledgement.[27] The majority of these children, however, continued to be abandoned by the male parent, a selfish attitude that transformed *meticciato* into a severe social problem for Italian authorities and also for the local indigenous society.

Subsequently, from the 1930s onwards and within the radicalised context of the late fascist regime, additional discourses and practices were endorsed, as it was believed that in mixed-race children maternal characteristics were more predominant than the paternal ones, and, that the union of a white men and an African woman resulted in a deterioration of the white race. A new politics was also introduced in the colonial territories from 1936, pushing *meticciato* back to its indigenous world through the following measures: the 1936 regulation for Italian East Africa was silent about *meticci*, a juridical silence that no longer allowed them to ask for Italian metropolitan citizenship at the age of majority and under certain meritocratic conditions previously enshrined in a 1933 law; the already-known restrictive norms of 1937 and 1938 about *madamato* and marriage, as they were introduced to avoid the birth of metis citizens too; finally, the notorious 1940 directive clearly defining the *meticci* as native colonial subjects who could not be recognised by the Italian metropolitan citizen, nor have the surname of the metropolitan parent, nor acquire Italian metropolitan status.[28]

Finally, several considerations made in Barrera's works deserve particular attention for the historical analysis of this phenomenon: first, throughout the entire Italian colonial period, many Italian colonisers assumed that mixed-race girls tended to become prostitute while mixed-race boys became criminals. The opinion about an innate degeneracy of the metis child was in fact upheld in different quarters, although a minority of voices opposed the ideas about the racial inferiority and the natural inclination of the metis toward crime, suggesting instead that the high rate of criminality among them had social origins (i.e. the abandonment of irresponsible Italian fathers alongside the resentment of African families for whom, traditionally, it was the father who held responsibility to care for the offspring).[29] Secondly, the majority of *meticci* suffered hardship, destitution, marginalisation and abandonment; but a number of documented exceptions also exist, such as the example of a *meticcia* girl, born in Eritrea to an Italian father, recognised by the latter, attending Italian schools, marrying an Italian lawyer and representing a story of a middle-class Italo-Eritrean milieu with a successful integration into the Italian community.[30] Thirdly, an interesting colonial paradox concerning the *italianità* (Italianness) of the metis kids should be remarked: the Italianisation of Italo-Eritrean children was made possible in the colony thanks to the local indigenous society and their African mothers.[31]

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27   Sòrgoni, Parole e corpi; Barrera, Patrilinearità, razza e identità.
28   Ibid.
29   Barrera, Dangerous Liaisons.
30   Barrera, Sex, Citizenship and the State; Barrera, Patrilinearità, razza e identità.
31   Barrera, Patrilinearità, razza e identità.

In fact, paradoxically, on behalf of honouring social African norms about paternal filiation and identity, African women – even those who were abandoned by their Italian partners – encouraged their metis progeny to embrace and identify with the Italian paternal culture. This was due to the fact that for the local Tigrinya society, Italo-Eritreans were Italian *tout court*, being generated by an Italian father. This explains why, in the cases pertinently discussed by Barrera, the Italo-Eritrean children were brought up as Catholics, whereas most of their native mothers remained Orthodox Christians; the children ate Italian food and wore Italian dresses, whereas their native mothers never gave up their local food, dress and traditional hair styles; the kids spoke the Italian language and received an Italian upbringing, and many African women accepted, and even encouraged, the education of their children in institutes for metis, run by Catholic missionaries. The result is a historical and painful paradox: beside the Italian state, it is especially Eritrean women – the female colonized and the most fragile agents in the colonial hierarchy – who contributed the most to the realisation of the project on *italianità.* Obviously, this point makes the concepts of gender, resistance, adaptation and complicity, interesting notions of debate for historians of imperialism.[32]

1d. The Italian "citizen-soldier" through the First World War and the colonial wars

A marginal, yet interesting, debate on Italian imperialism joining the gender and the citizenship dimensions concerns the ideal of the Italian "citizen-soldier". Thanks to Stefani's research focussing on masculinity,[33] one can appreciate how the gender variable is intertwined with concepts of citizenship and identity in relation to the Great War and to Italy's colonial conflicts in Libya and in Ethiopia. In particular, drawing on scholarly works about male identity crisis and male degeneration within the context of accelerated modernity in the West, Stefani discusses the Italian case and emphasises how the nationalist rhetoric of the liberal period as well as subsequent radical fascist propaganda of the 1920s and the 1930s regarded the dramatic experience of "war" as *the* instrument of regeneration and resurrection for the Italian male community. War reinvigorated male Italians in terms of courage, discipline, heroism, and virility; this is a malleable discourse that in the Italian context was applied in diverse ways vis-à-vis the Great War, the Libyan war of 1911–1912 and, more aggressively, the Italo-Ethiopian war of 1935–1936.

In reference to the latter military event, Stefani is right in noting that it became one of the founding pillars of Mussolini's project of the *uomo nuovo* (the New Man): this colonial war would be both a training ground to affirm the full masculinity of the Italians as well as a proof of their total devotion to the fascist cause. So, after the "peace" of the interwar period, the Italo-Ethiopian conflict was seen by the fascist dictatorship as a way to mould the young generations and to educate the "citizen-soldier" through military pa-

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32   Ibid.
33   Stefani, Colonia per maschi.

triotism. This conquest of Africa was also presented to Italians younger than 30 years as a chance to get rid of a special sense of "inferiority": these young Italians had taken part neither in the Great War nor in the March on Rome, and often regarded themselves as "inferior" vis-à-vis their older Italian brothers who had gone through the War of 1915–1918 and the first years of *squadrismo* (Fascist squads). The Ethiopian invasion provided the youngest with an opportunity, both in the search of success and material wealth, and in the emulation of those who had fought in WWI or participated in the events of 1922. Interestingly, the ideal of Italian masculinity was realized in a *colonial* war, therefore not only through the submission of an enemy but through a process of racial differentiation between the male Italian identity of the colonizers and the colonized Africans. So, colonialism and the colonial wars were to strengthen notions of (male) *italianità* and (male) metropolitan citizenship vis-à-vis indigenous subjects.

In concluding the first part of this review article, it is important to note that different research paths and lively academic discussions have addressed the history of Italy's African empire from the viewpoints of gender and citizenship, enriching our understanding of the dynamics of Empire. The scholarship surveyed here shows the beauty of cross-pollination through interdisciplinary perspectives, since the historical methodological framework has been enhanced by methods taken from anthropology, social history, gender and cultural studies. As we have seen, scholarly debates on the Italian case have focussed on four principal directions for examining the relationship of gender, empire and citizenship. These include issues of representation and auto-representation; interracial unions, marriage, and citizenship of wives; mixed-race children and their ambiguous citizenship position; and masculinity and related identities. In this literature, the First World War does not seem to be a watershed for the Italian empire. Indeed, many similarities and continuities can be highlighted before and after that conflict. Also, after World War One Mussolini's empire expanded its sphere of action, and if we really need to indicate a turning point, it would certainly be the invasion of Ethiopia and the consequent demographic changes of Italy's African empire, and not the War of 1915–1918.

Part Two: Cherishing historical comparisons with the empires of Great Britain and France

Within the literature reviewed in the preceding section, only Stefani's monograph contains an explicit comparative analysis of several pages devoted to the "feminisation" and/ or "masculinisation" of certain groups of colonial subjects under British rule.[34] In order to appreciate the comparative approach, and make it visible within this review article, the survey shall now turn attention to a number of influential works on empire, gender, and citizenship in the British and the French experiences, and highlight some interesting similarities and differences with the Italian historiography. Indeed, thinking about

34   Ibid., pp. 109–121.

History comparatively helps scholars emphasize commonalities, varieties and differentiations between and across cases. The benefits of comparison were well elaborated years ago by Raymond Grew in his article "The Case for Comparing Histories,"[35] and they are still appropriate.

The literature on Italy's African empire tells us that Italian colonial discourses and perceptions were gendered vis-à-vis "*ascari* – the friends" and "Ethiopians – the enemies", and in most cases were characterized by a "masculinisation" of Italy's indigenous soldiers.[36] In the British Empire, gendered representations were likewise widespread, but as pertinently explained by Stefani, scholarly discussions on the British discourse about indigenous militaries joining imperial troops bring to light the pervasiveness of "denigrating metaphors of feminisation". The politics of "feminising discourses" was similarly deployed by British authorities for political and military reasons linked to colonial rule and power relations. Two accomplished studies provide useful details and analyses in this regard. In his monograph *Warrior Gentlemen*, historical anthropologist Lionel Caplan explores and discusses the British construction of the myth of the masculine and naturally martial Gurkhas (i.e. Nepalese soldiers who served in the British imperial armies), in opposition to so-called "feminine traits" of cowardliness and unreliability applied to men of other ethnic and enemy groups.[37] This was a way for the British to foment rivalry between indigenous groups in colonial India, and indirectly strengthen imperial rule. Focussing on the same colonial territory, long regarded as the "Jewel in the Crown", historian Mrinalini Sinha ruminates upon British "politics of discourse" in her book pertaining to content and contours of colonial masculinity, and convincingly argues that stigmatizing feminine metaphors were present in British imagery and discourses when depicting and denigrating the "effeminate Bengali subjects" vis-à-vis the "manly Englishman"; in other words, the elite within the colonized and the elite within the colonizers.[38]

As regards the other broad subjects highlighted in our previous pages (i.e. interracial unions, formal marriage and women's citizenship), we saw that Italian scholarly debates have mainly concentrated on the specific issue of *madamato* and on the juridical position of the Italian or African wife upon marriage with a colonial subject or a metropolitan citizen. By moving geographically to the British Empire we can underscore several parallels but also a number of variations due to the difference in colonial contexts. As emphasised by historian Barbara Bush, interracial unions and liaisons between male colonizers and local women had been very common in the British territories, and continued despite the important demographic changes in the post-WWI British Empire, following large waves of emigration by British women from the metropole to colonial outposts and Dominions.[39] Inspiring directly some of the debates on the Italian case, historian Philippa

35   R. Grew, The Case for Comparing Histories, in: American Historical Review 85 (1980) 4, pp. 763–778.
36   Stefani, Colonia per maschi.
37   L. Caplan, Warrior Gentlemen: 'Gurkhas' in the Western Imagination, New York 1995.
38   M. Sinha, Colonial Masculinity: The 'Manly Englishman' and the 'Effeminate Bengali' in the Late Nineteenth Century, Manchester 1995.
39   B. Bush, Gender and Empire: The Twentieth Century, in: Levine (ed.), Gender and Empire, p. 93.

Levine has convincingly demonstrated that sex was a "significant imperial policy issue" and "a key site of colonial anxieties," a point that she reiterated in her research on the British case from the sixteenth through the twentieth centuries.[40] In effect, as part of imperial politics and as central to the functioning of imperial governance, sexuality was something that "needed regulating and managing," for it could endanger Empire's building and notions of British supremacy,[41] an argument that Italian scholars have also made. Moreover, with a different chronology in comparison to the Italian example, but shaped by similar discriminatory principles, it is apposite to highlight the prohibitions or accepted practices that Levine mentions in her work: in colonial Hong Kong marriage between government servants and local women was not formally forbidden, but was discouraged through disincentives; concubinage also had its advocates, including the British military commanders of the Meerut division in India who supported the practice in the 1870s; and finally, having a local concubine could cost a government employee his promotion, as in the British Colonial Service in Africa in 1909.[42]

Keeping our attention on the interracial relationships of Europeans with Africans, further analogies and dissimilarities can be drawn between the Italian and the British experiences. In the context of the Italian-Libyan encounter, as discussed by Spadaro, specific gender criteria and ideas about marriage, love and sexual relations circulated among Italian metropolitan women – ideas that were used to measure the civilisation of a non-European society. This is quite similar to the British case. For instance, as highlighted in Levine's research,[43] the British had a view on marriage as a Christian covenant between a man and a woman, so an "exclusive", "sanctified" and "heterosexual" union. This viewpoint though was not always shared by the colonial subjects living in the various territories under British rule, where the meaning and nature of human sexual relations were based on profoundly different ideas that could be far from Western values. In fact, in many territories short-term temporary marriages were quite common – an aspect that also concerned the Italian East African case. The heterogeneity of sexuality that the British found in other cultures, including man-man marriages and woman-woman marriages, was seen as "an index of savagery" and "perversion", and was quickly condemned as abhorrent. In this respect, we can mention the marriages between older and younger males in African mining communities, as in Zimbabwe, where this kind of temporary arrangement provided not only companionship but also a way to accumulate assets for a later heterosexual marriage of the younger man. And we can also mention the existence in colonial Africa of "female husbands" within the indigenous institution of woman-woman marriage, in which, as explained by the historian Margaret Strobel, a biological woman living in a patrilineal society and who wanted to create her own lineage could adopt the gender role of "husband" by paying bride-wealth for a wife; the latter would

40   P. Levine, Sexuality, Gender, and Empire, in: Levine (ed.), Gender and Empire, p. 134.
41   Ibid., pp. 134–137.
42   Ibid., pp. 138–139.
43   Ibid., pp. 141–142 and pp. 151–153.

then conceive children through sexual relations with a man; the biological father would have no claim on the children, and the latter would belong to the lineage of the "female husband."[44] So, in this case the indigenous society separated "gender" from biological sex, allowing women to be "husbands" to wives, and consequently to be "males" in relation to their wives. Clearly, the encounter between the British colonizers and the more expansive sexualities of their colonial subjects rose issues about gender roles and sexual preferences which in Western culture were perceived as fixed and rigid rather than flexible and fluid – with these factors becoming civilizational yardsticks.[45]

Regarding the debate on imperial citizenship, this encounter also points to the interesting scholarly discussion about the citizenship status of women upon marriage – a discussion that takes for granted heterosexual marriages, and that would certainly be complicated if extended to the man-man, or woman-woman, marriage. In reference to the citizenship of women, we saw in Part One that scholar Sòrgoni has examined and discussed the status of the wife, both in the case of an African woman (a female colonial subject) marrying an Italian colonizer, or an Italian woman (a metropolitan citizen) marrying a male native. This academic debate can be extended and revived by considering the larger landscape of British imperialism. As examined by M. Page Baldwin in his legal-historical account on the conditional marital nationality of women within the British empire in the post-1914 era,[46] a British woman who married an alien followed the nationality of her husband, and thus became an alien herself, on the basis of the "principle of family unity", so much cherished at that time not only in Britain, but in many other European countries including Italy.[47] With the loss of British nationality, the British-born wife was treated as an outcaste as she obviously lost all the rights and privileges accorded to her previous status, including municipal and parliamentary franchises, the new welfare benefits of the twentieth century, her passport and diplomatic protection, as well as the legal identity of Britishness that British women cherished in Britain and overseas. Interestingly, during the 1920s and the 1930s, British feminists from around the Empire attempted to change this 1914 regulation, but only in 1948 were women in the United Kingdom granted the right to "their own" nationality regardless of their marital status so that they would not automatically lose their Britishness upon marriage with an imperial outsider. One of the major reasons why this was to be a longer feminist struggle than expected is that the citizenship norms for British women were determined in Britain with respect to wider imperial considerations, perceived by the various British governments as crucial for maintaining the Empire together. So, British married women's nationality

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44 Strobel, Women's History, pp. 53–54.
45 Levine, Sexuality, Gender, and Empire, pp. 141–142 and pp. 151–153.
46 M. Page Baldwin, Subject to Empire: Married Women and the British Nationality and Status of Aliens Act, in: Journal of British Studies 40 (2001) 4, pp. 522–556.
47 In this research Page Baldwin uses the legal term "nationality" as synonym with "subjecthood" in line with the historical evolution of the British case and its related notion of "allegiance to the Crown"; yet, we remind the reader that in certain languages and countries, the words "nationality", "citizenship" and "subjecthood" do not mean, and have not necessarily meant, the same thing in historical perspective. On this variety of terminology, see Donati, A Political History, pp. 8–11.

had to be sacrificed across the Channel not only to the unity of the family as in Italy, but also to the unity of the empire, at least until 1948 when the United Kingdom finally introduced a law according to which marriage would have no effect on a British woman's nationality status.

By setting aside the citizenship of women, and turning attention to mixed-race children and their juridical position, we can highlight further points of comparison and conclude this section. Scholarly discussions on the Italian case have emphasised the ambiguous and complex figure of the *meticci*, mixed-blood progeny. If we leave the British territories and we move to the French empire, some similarities and differences can be noted with the French category of the *métis*. For instance, by focussing on French Indochina at the turn of the nineteenth century and during the 1930s, the influential historical anthropologist Ann Laura Stoler argues that discourses about the "metis problem" expressed a "fundamental contradiction of imperial domination: the tension between a form of domination simultaneously predicated on both incorporation and distancing."[48] As she explains, some *métis* were candidates for incorporation and metropolitan citizenship, but others were categorised as colonial subjects. Stoler takes up historical examples such as the child of a French father and a Vietnamese mother, in order to discuss how in 1898 French court authorities refused to consider the boy a French citizen on the basis of concerns about his cultural identity, French linguistic competence, levels of patriotism vis-à-vis the French *patrie*, and notions of French upbringing in the colonial milieu. The whole debate at the time teemed with allusions to the "inappropriate behaviour" of a French father, loving a child who was ignorant of the French idiom and who had grown up as Indo-Chinese despite being legally recognised by the French male parent. Specific imperial boundaries of culture and race were clearly in place.

In mentioning the 1928 decree pertaining to mixed-race children of unknown parents born in Indochina, Stoler equally emphasizes how French citizenship was not open to all metis but restricted by a "scientific" and a "moral" judgement that the child was non-indigene. These "scientific" and "moral" evaluations were based on two aspects: the child's physical features or race, to be evaluated by a medical-legal expert, as well as the moral certainty derived from the fact that the child had a French name, French upbringing and French descent. Bearing in mind the discussions on the Italian case, however, it is apposite to note further gender considerations that, detailed in Stoler's research, were circulating in the 1930s between the French metropole and the colony, this time in reference to the channelling of metis young girls into special state institutions.[49] As proposed by a number of French feminist representatives in 1931, these metis young women could marry with Frenchmen, would be acclimatized to the tropical milieus while being attached at the same time to France, and therefore contribute positively to

48   A.L. Stoler, Sexual Affronts and Racial Frontiers: European Identities and the Cultural Politics of Exclusion in Colonial Southeast Asia, in: F. Cooper and A.L. Stoler (eds.), Tensions of Empire: Colonial Cultures in a Bourgeois World, Berkeley 1997, pp. 198–237. The citation is on p. 202.
49   Stoler, Sexual Affronts and Racial Frontiers.

the strengthening of the imperial project. This was a rather optimistic vision that, as Stoler rightly underlines, echoed the widespread opinion according to which if metis girls were rescued in time they could avoid their "usual" destination (i.e. prostitution) and be educated to become good wives of a settlers' Indochina in the service of France. At the bottom of these diverse discussions, though, there was a concern that we also saw in Italian Africa: the ambiguous position of the metis which could make them – boys and girls alike – either a dangerous menace to or an effective instrument of the imperial state. This shows that similar discourses and anxieties were mapped onto vastly different social and political landscapes ranging from Italian East Africa to French Southeast Asia, and that children, the most fragile category of the European empires, could shake colonial rule at its foundation if the progeny under discussion was of Italo-African or French-Asian "blood".

Conclusion

This review article has offered a survey of the literature pertaining to the Italian case, and then discussed it in comparative perspective with works about British and French imperialisms. All the publications mentioned here challenge us to reconsider how attention to gender and citizenship can help reframing our knowledge of European empires. By providing new and alternative focal lenses, they make possible analyses of the imperial past from fresh perspectives. Also, in different ways, all these studies point at those "tensions" of empire which have become major aspects of academic discussion since the publication of the well-known interdisciplinary volume edited by Frederick Cooper and Ann Laura Stoler.[50]

From this general overview covering the Italian experience in comparison with other colonial settings, one can see that notions of gender, femininity, and masculinity cannot be universalized as if they were archetypal terms to cross borders, cultures, and language without difficulty; they are actually notions that have been determined locally and defined by the time, culture, context and local settings of a particular space.[51] Similarly, concepts of citizenship and colonial subjecthood need to be historically and geographically contextualised, as the two terms have rarely meant the same in different historical periods and colonial milieus. Flexible and changing over time and space, categories like gender and citizenship are useful instruments to grasp the multi-faceted dimensions of imperialism. They are also valuable for drawing parallels and noting variations between and across different colonial environments. Undoubtedly, the literature reviewed here contributes to re-shaping our vision of, and ideas about, Empire.

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50   Cooper and Stoler (eds.), Tensions of Empire.
51   This point is also emphasized by Levine, Introduction: Why Gender and Empire?, pp. 2–4.

FORUM

From Western History to Miscellaneous History and Memory Activism in Postcolonial Korea – An Interview with Jie-Hyun Lim[1]

No, not Finland. In whichever way you look at it, it's beneath, yes, beneath Finland. Can I not put it this way? To those to my east I come from the west, but to those to my west, I come from the east.
Sławomir Mrożek

What did "Western History" mean to you as a historian trained in the South Korean / East Asian context?

I'm listed under the "Western history" section in the Korea Researcher Information (KRI) webpage. So one may say my area of specialization, branches into "East European history," "Western contemporary history," "Western historiography," and "history of Western thought."[2] Whether Eastern Europe is deemed part of the "West" remains a question, but East European history is placed as a subcategory of Western history un-

der the current disciplinary structure of history in the Korean academia. As the Polish dramatist Slawomir Mrożek displaced East and West wittily in the above, Koreans who are to the Poland's east tend to think Poland belongs to the West. When I published a review of the book *Vergangene Grösse und Ohnmacht in Ostmitteleuropa: Repräsentationen imperialer Erfahrung in der Historiographie seit 1918* (2007), in a Korean journal, Frank Hadler, one of the book's editors, confessed to me they were bewildered that a journal named "*The Western History* Review" published a review of their book on Central-Eastern Europe. I found Hadler's remark to be a good indication of the fluidity of East and West in the imaginative geography of historical writing.

When I look back, I think the meandering course I took as a historian was a path of escaping from "Western history" as a discipline. Originally I chose "Western history" as my field after grappling with how to narrow the historical gap between the West and Korea. The West as the universal model of historical development had to be explored to understand the particularity of the Korean course. Thus the origin of my academic journey was lodged expressly in Eurocentrism. I have not entirely failed to unsettle the rigid identity of Western history, though. I have escaped from the Eurocentrism inherent in Western history by identifying myself as a transnational historian with a focus on Eastern Europe and East Asia, but still I am wondering if I overcame the strange discipline of "Western history" or was overcome by its disciplinary power. A couple of years ago, I wrote a paper to answer the question put forth by the Korean Historical Association (KHA), that is, "what is a historian's identity in Korea?" But I tweaked the question a little.

Instead of treating one's identity as a fixed status, I wanted to investigate the identity as a process – "when," "why," and "how" such a (self-) identity was formed and deformed. If you were to ask Korean historians to identify their occupation, nine out of ten times, they will provide their answer in line with the tripartite classification of "national history," "Oriental history," and "Western history." It's embarrassing to witness that historians tend to let their identity dictated by this tripartite configuration. However, a historian's identity is a product of interaction between the institutional identity framed externally and what the self-identity engendered internally. In inquiring about one's identity as a historian, it is more suitable to conduct a genealogical analysis of *identification* rather than to stop at the essentialist understanding of identity. While the question of identity leads historians to accept the tripartite identity of national history, Oriental history, and Western history as a fixed attribute, the notion of identification questions the process of historians' constructing identities.[3]

Can you explain a little bit further what do you understand by identification in contrast to identity?

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3   I was inspired by Frederick Cooper's superb argument spurring on the transition of the focus of historical analysis from identity to identification. F. Cooper, Colonialism in Question: Theory, Knowledge, History (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005), pp. 59-90.

Identification entails a complicated endeavor to probe the political dynamics of the process wherein the tripartite division of national history, Oriental history, and Western history constitutes a historian's identity. In explaining the emergence of history as a modern discipline and historians' self-identification in East Asia, we can point out the ideological complicity of a nation-state and historiography, the co-figuration of world history and national history, the establishment of "Oriental history" as a Japanese version of Orientalism, the confrontation between, and the cross-penetration of, colonial historiography and nationalist historiography, and the advent of postcolonial historiography as an amalgam of colonial, nationalist, and Marxian strains.[4] Identification as a process demands an effort to delve into the political nature of relations that make a researcher's personal positionality and the structural force of the discipline correspond, combine, conflict, and confront with each other.[3] The interaction of the structural force of the discipline and the agency of an individual historian identifies who is who.

My journey as a historian is closely interwoven with a postcolonial critique of the Korean historiography. It all starts with the belated awakening that my disciplinary position of Western history in the Korean academia identifies who I am as a historian. Am I a "Western historian"? Does my work on the transnational history of Eastern Europe and East Asia, belong to the Western history in Korea? If not, is it subsumed under the rubric of East Asian history, which deals with the modern East Asian historiography? Or, is it part of "postcolonial history of the Korean academia," an heir to imperial Japan's tripartite disciplinary division of national history, Oriental history, and Western history? Rather, is it not best described by "miscellaneous history," which can be none and all at the same time?

What has been your intellectual journey so far to make you a "miscellaneous historian"?

I attended college in the late 1970s when the developmental dictatorship was at its peak. Back in the 1970s, most universities maintained a unitary system of history department with the exception of the Seoul National University where history department was divided into the tripartite structure of national, Oriental and Western history. I remember some senior academicians at SNU such as the late professors Seok-hong Min and Byeong-wu Yang claiming in the mid-1980s that the "departmental division" was intended to assure the establishment of "national history department" as an independent entity. According

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4   For an analysis of the political dynamics of identity regarding modern historiography, see S. Tanaka, Japan's Orient: Rendering Pasts into History (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1995); P. A. Cohen, Discovering History in China: American Historical Writing on the Recent Chinese Past (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996); P. Duara, Rescuing History from the Nation-Questioning Narratives of Modern China (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995); J.-H. Lim, "The Configuration of Orient and Occident in the Global Chain of National Histories: Writing National Histories in Northeast Asia" in S. Berger et. al. eds. Narrating the Nation: Representations in History, Media and the Arts (New York: Berghahn Books, 2008), pp. 288-305; J.-H. Lim, "Historicizing the World in East Asia" in: D. Northrop (ed.), A Companion to World History (Chicester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2012), pp. 418-432; J-H. Lim and S. Lee, Kuksaŭi Shinhwarŭl Nŏmŏsŏ (Beyond the Myth of National History) (Seoul: Humanist, 2004); For European historiography and its politics of identity, see Writing National Histories, a 9-volume series published by Palgrave Macmillan UK.

to them, the regime's original plan stipulated the binary division of national history and foreign history but when it ran across strong pushback from the so-called "miscellaneous (non-national history)" historians it settled for what is currently known as the tripartite departmental system. The "Yushin (Regeneration)" as the ideological backbone of the dictatorship in Korea in the 1970s had been implemented through the "nationalization of masses." This included the proclamation of the "Charter of National Education," the reinforcement of activities of "national ceremony' by introducing, for example, saluting the national flag, the strengthening of "national subjectivity" and "education emphasizing national identity," and the emergence of the state-designated official national history textbook. The safeguarding of the independence of national history in terms of departmental formation was most urgently needed to bolster the national subjectivity with an aim to confer the legitimacy on the nationalist mobilization by the dictatorship regime. The formation of a unitary history department that most universities maintained was not much different from the tripartite departmental formation. The difference mattered only at the undergraduate level. Once admitted to the graduate program, students first had to select a spatial compartment among national history, Oriental history, and Western history. Then, they were to narrow down their field by period in a given spatial compartment, such as ancient Oriental history, medieval Western history, and contemporary Korean history, or by thematic, such as Korean socioeconomic history, Oriental intellectual history, and Western women's history. This disciplinary formation was originally modeled after imperial Japan's curricula. In its tripartite division of history, "history of the Orient" rendered Korea and China into objects of a Japanese Orientalism, whereas "national history" was an ideology invented to justify the historical exceptionalism of Japan, which argued for the departure from Asia and the submersion in Europe. In this view Japan had achieved a western-style modernization unlike other stagnated Oriental societies.

Since majoring history in college, I had been unremittingly interested in the transition from feudalism to capitalism in Korea. Korean society at the time seemed like an exact representation of the process of primitive capital accumulation described by Karl Marx in *Das Kapital*. Naturally, Marxism appealed to me as a persuasive framework for interpreting Korean society at the time as well as because of its *narodnikist* sympathy for the oppressed. The way capitalism unfolded in South Korea, fueled by developmental dictatorship, looked to me patently different from the classic path of Western capitalism. It almost assumed the status of a credo at the time to think that the "Prussian path" of capitalist development would aptly explain the peculiarities of South Korean capitalism as exemplified by stubborn vestiges of colonialism and feudal system, political weakness and semi-feudal traits of the bourgeoisie, violent political machinations of developmental dictatorship, the working class deprived of basic labor and social rights and thus remaining inert as "class in itself," frailty of parliamentary democracy, presence of overbearing warden-like state, immaturity of modern individual subjectivity, and so forth.

This strand of thinking has been directly passed on to some leftists in Korea today. As can be seen in the examination of the 2012 presidential election based on Antonio Gramsci's

"passive revolution," it is still used as a framework for analyzing the current political topography of Korea. According to an analysis, for instance, unlike the revolutionary bourgeoisie of France, but much like the Italian bourgeoisie in the nineteenth century who contented themselves with bringing about passive transformation in cahoots with the conservative force, the vulnerable state of the South Korean bourgeoisie tilted toward conservatism led to the electoral victory of the extremely conservative Saenuri (New Frontier) Party.

So, the original interest was understanding the particularities of a Korean path to modernity?

Yes, my interest in capitalist transition in Korea generally sprang from a question of what constituted the particularity of Korean history that set apart the Korean process from the classic path of Western capitalist development. The underlying idea was that the problems entrenched in Korean society in the 1970s and 1980s, such as underdevelopment, dictatorship, and division of the Korean peninsula, could be ascribed to the particularity of Korean history of capitalist development. This idea hardened into a conviction as I took in theoretical nourishment from Maurice Dobb's *Studies in the Development of Capitalism*, the debate on the transition from feudalism to capitalism, also known as the Dobb-Sweezy Debate, Japanese Marxian studies of economic history led by the *Kōza-ha* (Lecture's faction) Marxist faction and Takahashi Kohachiro, and the *Sonderweg* thesis in postwar German historiography. A common thread to all these discussions, seemingly disparate from one another, was a comparative historical approach that established the capitalist development of England as a universal model against which the backwardness or particularity of capitalist development in Japan, Germany, Korea, China, India, the Middle East, South America, Africa, and "other miscellaneous" non-Western parts of the world was investigated.

In the *Sonderweg* debate in German historiography, Ralph Dahrendorf's question, "Why was Germany not England?" is a sterling example of directly demonstrating the comparative historical framework of universality-particularity dichotomy. Lurking around the edge of this question is a mental attitude intended to explicate the particularity of German history that went through an abnormal and fascist deviation in the light of the history of England as a model democracy. It presupposes the history of capitalist development in England as the hegemonic mirror of German history. As it turns out, the question raised by Dahrendorf can also be found in a narrative tendency of Eastern European history to assess one's particularity (backwardness) on the basis of its distance from the model development path of the West or in Japan's modern history of thought to construct the discourse of Japanese particularity by positing the Japanese identity or nationality in terms of the gap between Japan and the putative West. Monika Baar has demonstrated it very convincingly for East-Central Europe and Naoki Sakai for Japan. This tendency is not just limited to the historical narratives of both regions. I feel the

discussions on the particularity of Korean history, too, may have set forth the hegemonic mirror of Western history as an epistemological underpinning.

But there are differences between the various Sonderwege, when looking from the West or looking from the East, right?

The trouble is, the minute a non-Western society reflects itself on the hegemonic mirror of the West, singularity of its history is conflated with particularity as shown by Gavin Walker in his 2011 essay on Marxist interpretations of Japanese capitalism. As a consequence, a historical difference, neither superior nor inferior to another difference, becomes incorporated into the hierarchy of historical development with the West on the top and subsequently assigned a rank according to the extent of deviation and distance from Western universality. The dichotomy of "universality and particularity" is formulated into the antipodes of the West-universal-American path and the East-particular-Prussian path in the mainstream Marxist historiography. The statement "countries that are more industrially advanced only show to the less developed the image of their own future" in the preface to *Das Kapital* encapsulates the crux of Marxian "historicism." The unilinear schema of historicism, according to which world history follows a unitary path of historical development, has the effect of temporalizing space by arranging all histories of the world in a global linear time axis. From this it follows that the spatial differences between the West and the East are morphed into the evolutionist temporal differences marked by forwardness and backwardness.

What does that mean for historians?

I think that non-Western historians mired in historicism are bound to strive to spot in their history the hallmarks of Western development, such as rationalism, scientific progress, liberty and equality, middle class, development of cities, human rights and political franchise, and, above all, capitalist mode of production. It is a sort of struggle for recognition to prove that the non-West is as much "peoples with history" as the West. In the Korean historiography, this struggle can be exemplified by the thesis of "sprouts of capitalism," endogenous capitalist development, and the school of *Silhak* (Practical Learning) as a native modernist Enlightenment. However, this struggle devolves into a narrative of tragedy because the chasm between the West and the East can be narrowed somewhat but never bridged. The qualities that one manages to find akin to those of Western history after combing through one's history only have the semblance of sameness but can never be identical to them. The more closely one looks at the so-called similarities to the universal history of the West, the more striking the disparities between the original and fakes become.

In this historicist scheme the gulf between the advanced West and the backward non-West is doomed to perpetuate. From a postcolonial perspective, the struggle for recognition, an effort to evince that a former colony is able to usher in modernity on its own and to earn proper recognition of such development, set off from the outset with a

consequential Eurocentrism engrained in it. This is an illustration of the contradiction of non-Western nationalism in which it becomes increasingly Eurocentric as it intensifies. In retrospect, I feel that, when I chose to focus on Western history at graduate school, my epistemological foundation may have come closest to a naive form of Eurocentrism, as I thought I could investigate Korean society by gaining solid understanding of the West as the hegemonic mirror. In order to prove the thesis of sprouts of Korean capitalism, my thinking went, the understanding of the history of capitalist transition in England should be attained as prior condition. Or queries on the modernity of *Silhak* should be preceded by further investigation of the Enlightenment. Western history was to provide a rationale for national history in Korea.

In terms of theoretical abstraction, I failed to break loose from Eurocentrism lodged in the unilinear schema of Marxist historicism and red Orientalism. When I decided to major in Western history in a bid to gauge the deviated modernity of Korea for its distance from the model modernity of the West, my concern itself was framed by Marxist historicism. An interesting wrinkle that cropped up, however, was a striking coincidence between Marxist historicism and a Whig interpretation of history in which the history of England was a manifestation of an ideal of capitalist development. This is exactly what Geoff Eley pointed out in his critique on the German *Sonderweg* discourse years later as the hermeneutical complicity of Marxism and the Whigs in explaining bourgeois revolution.

Marxian historicism and Eurocentrism had dominated my PhD dissertation in 1988 too. My dissertation was spurred by the idea that a coherent understanding of the NL (Nationalist Liberation) – PD (People's Democracy) debate, which had engulfed the Korean left-wing movement in the 1980s, could be achieved by going back to Marx and Engels's theory of nationalism. In my dissertation of *Marx and Engels on the National Question* I enlisted a newly coined word, "capitalo-centrism," to advocate the Marxian Eurocentrism. As long as the advent of socialism required the material basis of mature capitalism, Eurocentrism would be an unwanted companion to capitalo-centrism. Confronting Marx and Engels's conception of colonial modernization, which, to my great perplexity, gave a nod to colonial Britain, France, and America from a viewpoint of progress of civilization, I accentuated capitalo-centrism as a theoretical rationale. I had been roaming in the orbit of Marxist historicism, consequential Eurocentrism, and self-Orientalism.[5] As a matter of fact, postcolonialism, post-Marxism, and postmodernism were not found in my history recipes as yet.

How have things evolved then?

The passage quoted at the opening of our interview is part of a character's lines quoted from *Kontrakt* (*the Contract*), a play by the Polish playwright Sławomir Mrożek. Bereźnica Wyżna, the hometown of one of the characters, is a hamlet with a little fewer than three

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5   J.-H. Lim, *Markŭs.enggelsŭwa Minjongmunje* (Marx-Engels and the National Question), (Seoul: Tamgudang, 1990) and "Marx's Theory of Imperialism and the Irish National Question," *Science & Society* 56 (Summer, 1992).

hundred people, nestled in the Carpathian Mountains stretching through the border zones of Poland, Slovakia, and Ukraine. This tiny village, not widely known to even Polish people, has salient features of floating identities in the typical *kresy* (borderland). No other evidence is as intriguing as the Polish census of 1931. Asked of their ethnicity, many *kresy* respondents identified themselves as *tutejszy* (we are from here), but as neither Polish nor Ukrainian or Belorussian.

As indicated in his fictive figure from neither the East nor the West but from both, Mrożek is masterful in disconcerting the complacency of our common sense with the implement of his pithy, biting lines. From a macro perspective, this play can be appraised as a text of intellectual history, testifying to the discursive location of Poland, a country that can belong to neither the East nor the West and yet both at the same time.

What brought you to Poland?

It was Rosa Luxemburg, a Polish-Jewish Marxist exalted as the most brilliant mind since Marx, who lured me to Poland. While reading Rosa Luxemburg, I came to learn about the fierce debates on the national question amongst Polish socialists at the turn of the twentieth century. The way the "PPS" (Polish Socialist Party) with Polish independence as its platform locked its horns with the "SDKPiL" (Social Democracy of the Kingdom of Poland and Lithuania) looking to the Russian Revolution for the resolution of the Polish question, in many respects, reminded me of the aforementioned NL-PD debate that was framed in the dichotomy of national and class struggles with national reunification and social revolution in Korea set as their respective priority in the 1980s.[6] Throughout the decade of the 1990s, I flew to Poland whenever I could – including my first sabbatical. A first-hand experience of the locus of really existed socialism in Poland made me ponder over the surreal absurdity of socialism as a historical reality, which contributed to adjusting my critical gaze on Eurocentric Marxism, red Orientalism, and Marxist historicism. Probably, it was from that moment that I started to cross over the boundaries of the discipline of Western history by criticizing Marxist historicism. Without the fall of the Cold War, none of this would have happened.

What have you been impressed by most when visiting Poland?

As I became conversant with Polish local affairs, my interest in Polish history became far broader in scope. Before I embarked on a book entitled, *Kŭtaetŭlŭi Chayu, Wuritŭlŭi Chayu – P'ollandŭ Minjokhaepangwundongsa* (*For Your Freedom and Our Freedom – the*

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6   The following studies resulted from that period: "Rosa Luxemburg on the Dialectics of Proletarian Internationalism and Social Patriotism," Science & Society 59, no.4 (winter, 1995/96); "The 'Good Old Cause' in the New Polish Left Historiography," Science & Society 61, no.2 (winter, 1997); "Labour and the National Question in Poland," in Nationalism, Labour and Ethnicity 1870–1939, eds. S. Berger and A. Smith (Manchester: Manchester Univ. Press, 1999); "'P'ollandŭ Sahoetang (PPS) gwa P'ollandŭwangguk Sahoeminjutang' (SDKPiL)ŭi Minjongmunjenonjaeng – Ch'angdangsiki (1892–1894) rŭl Chungsimŭro (The Debates on the National Question between the PPS and the SDKPiL – focused on the period of establishing the parties [1892–1894])," Yŏksahakpo 134-135 (September, 1992).

History of Polish Irredentist Movement) (1999), I had a chance to extensively read the modern and contemporary history of Poland. Along the way, I often found myself viewing the history of national movement in Korea through the prism of Polish history. It was an experience quite different from the conventional comparative history which examines the particularity of the Korean national movement history in comparison with the Western universality. I was able to make critical reassessment of nationalist narratives of Korea and Poland by making the two different historical "singularities" of peripheries collide on a leveled ground of comparison. This experience – critical understanding of Polish national movement that prompted more thoughtful reflection on Korean nationalist narratives and, in turn, critical engagement in the Korean national historiography that led to deconstruction of Polish nationalist narratives – was certainly a novelty. From this critical interaction resulted a paper, which I presented in the International Congress of Historical Sciences in Oslo in 2000 to expound on how the party historiographies of People's Poland and North Korea were nationalist narratives masqueraded as socialism.[7] "A Critical Examination of National Narratives in the Korean Historiography," published in *Historical Criticism* (summer, 1994), was another product stemming from the critical examination of Polish historiography. The paper was not entirely free from the grip of Eurocentrism or red Orientalism, but I think it may have differed, albeit slightly, from the existing comparative historical studies that reflected the particularity of Korean national movement on the West's hegemonic mirror. The paper attempted to defy the nationalist narrative of Korean historiography by means of alluding to similar historiographical context of Eastern Europe more than theoretical criticism of cultural studies or postcolonialism. But the self-defensive reactions from the Korean historical academia brought home to me the implacability of the wall between Korean history and Western history once again.

You moved then on to labour history and the history of the workers movement?

Yes, my studies of Polish socialists' debate on national question began to make progress by degrees. It was around this time when I first participated as part of the Polish delegation in the International Conference of Labor and Social History (ITH) held annually in Linz, Austria. I still remember, like it was yesterday, the delightful journey I took with some of the prominent Polish experts of labor history and socialist movement and the deep friendship I forged with them. Amid this excitement, I was shaken by an incident which made me realize once again the presence of Eurocentrism deeply etched on my mind. After publishing the paper on Rosa Luxemburg and the national question in *Science and Society* in 1995, I was asked to contribute a section on Poland to *Nationalism, Labour, and Ethnicity 1870–1939* (1999), a book project edited by Stefan Berger and Angel Smith. Among the comments I got as feedback on my draft I was frightened by

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7   J.-H. Lim, "The Nationalist Message in Socialist Code: On Court Historiography in People's Poland and North Korea," in Making Sense of Global History: The 19th International Congress of Historical Sciences Commemorative Volume, ed. S. Sogner (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 2001).

Smith's. He asked me point-blank if I still believe in the validity of the German *Sonderweg* thesis. He was referring to the part where I epitomized the historical peculiarities of the Polish labor movement as the Prussian path of capitalist development. Right at that moment I became fully aware that the major Polish historiography I had consulted is the Polish version of the *Sonderweg* thesis.

When a British historian of the Spanish Civil War pointed out that my interpretation of the Polish labor history reiterated that thesis, I was at a loss for what to express about the oddity and the heft of my shock. I suspect that Smith's keen sensibility toward the *Sonderweg* emanated from his scholarly focus on the history of Spain, another "Orient" of Europe. In retrospect, a crack in the thesis opened by the clashing of concrete experiences of Spain, Poland, and Korea was indeed a way out of the tyranny of Eurocentrism. And yet, what astounded me more was his far-reaching perspective that enabled him to move beyond his focus on the Spanish Civil War and use the *Sonderweg* thesis as a lever to ferret out the very problem of the dominant narratives of the Polish historiography.

At the time I still found it difficult to fully reflect the implication of his feedback in my writings on the Polish labor history. It was because I lacked, above all, the insightful knowledge to invalidate the prevailing interpretation of Polish historiography by formulating an alternative narrative.

What have you found appealing beyond the Sonderweg thesis?

Years after the awakening of the Polish *Sonderweg*, I had a chance to talk about the possibility of extending the approach of subaltern studies to the Polish historiography by the invitation of the Japanese Society for Eastern European History. I was able to think of such a thematic thanks to Smith's critique which induced me to a wide-ranging transversality of historical thinking beyond regional borders and historical specificities. One thing that figured clearly in my mind, though, was an idea of tackling modern and contemporary history of Central and Eastern Europe from a postcolonial angle. "A Postcolonial Reading of the *Sonderweg*: Marxist Historicism Revisited" (2014) was my very much delayed attempt to finally do the age-long homework given by Smith.[8]

Another precious outcome from a history lab of Poland was that I came to view "West", "East", "Europe" or "Asia" as imaginative geography, a politico-historical construction. The geographical categorization of Polish studies, designated as *Ostforschung* (Eastern Studies) in Germany, and German studies, labeled as *Studia Zachodnie* (Western Studies) in Poland, carries imaginative geography tellingly. When national history is placed in the global chain of historical thinking, say, France-Germany-Poland-Russia, the fluidity of the East and the West as imaginative geography becomes clearer. In German historical consciousness, in which German *Kultur* was pitted against French *civilisation*, France was deemed as the West, whereas it was Germany that took the position of the West in

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8   J-H. Lim, "A Postcolonial Reading of the German *Sonderweg*: Marxist Historicism Resivited," Journal of Modern European History vol. 12, No. 2 (2014).

German *Ostforschung*, i.e. Orientalist studies on Poland. In contrast, Poland as a German East considered itself as the West in relation to "Asiatic" Russia, which was denigrated as Tartars by the West and which in turn claimed the membership of the West vis à vis its Asian neighbors. In the wake of the Russo-Japanese War, Japan went so far as to treat its northern foe as part of the Orient, positing itself as the West.

Far from being a geo-positivist fixations, "West" and "East" are the liquid concepts flowing and shifting according to its discursive location. My understanding of the fluidity of the East and the West at the intersection of Korea and Poland may have come from my being able to investigate Western Europe, Eastern Europe, and East Asia in conjunction with one another.[9] The unique status of Polish socialist movement as a bridge between the pragmatism of German Social Democratic Party's reformist platform and the radicalism of the Bolsheviks' revolutionary voluntarism can be understood in the same vein. Stuck between Russia and Germany, Polish socialists could not but feel alienated as they perceived Germany's reform policy to be unrealistic, while not bothering to conceal their strong self-assurance in the face of Lenin's "Tartar Marxism." It is by no means a coincidence that a body of excellent studies on the insoluble dilemma of Polish socialism was published under the title of *Między wschodem a zachodem* (*Between East and West*) in 1995 by Pawel Samuś and Andrzej Grabski. Seen from "between the East and the West," their parameters that appeared unyielding were, in fact, only imagined boundaries that were constantly in flux.

What did Poland mean to a Korean leftist intellectual who confessed to me that he had felt odd at the sight of white people living in such dire poverty during his East European trip after the Fall? Was it the East? Or the West? How disparate was his perception from the mindset of a Nazi who flatly referred to Ukrainians as "white Negros"? What were the feelings that came across Japanese soldiers when they confronted Russians in the conflicts such as the Russo-Japanese War and the Japanese Siberian Intervention? What to make of Polish intellectuals' entreaties to use the appellation of Central Europe or Central Eastern Europe instead of Eastern Europe? As the delimitation of West and East that seemed like an obstinate geographical reality began crumbling down in my mind, perhaps I was able to move on to the perspectives of "global history," "transnational history," "histoire croiseé," "border history," and so forth. In the 1990s, though, I still had to grope my way around in the dark.

How have you moved out of that trap?

What I experienced in the 1990s while grappling with Polish history was dear to me in many ways. I was lucky to live through the illusion of the transition from capitalism to socialism under the developmental dictatorship in Korea and witness a "reverse transition" from socialism to capitalism in Poland after the Fall of 1989. Not many historians

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9   J.-H. Lim, "Displacing East and West: Towards a postcolonial reading of "*Ostforschung*" and "Myśl Zachodnia" in www.trranseuropeennes.eu/en/articles/354/Displacing_East_and_West.

would be fortunate enough to experience the two divergent courses of transition in such a short interval. Having experienced the opposite transformations in Poland and Korea, I could not but seize upon the question of historical transformation. My wishful thinking that a society would change for the better if a social revolution were driven by a good hegemony such as that of the Bolshevik Revolution was too naïve. Social revolution and system change, even in its fundamental sense, would not simply usher in a new world. The purview of Marxist paradigm of revolution seemed confined within the realms of relations of production and related institutions, thus lacking critical understanding of the domination and exploitation of power in everyday life. The worst outcome of such failure was to let the party nomenklatura legitimize their power.

A great deal of reflection and soul-searching led me to put together a special issue of *Tangtaepip'yŏng* (*Contemporary Criticism*), a Korean journal of criticisms on social, political, and economic issues, and compose an essay titled "Reading the Code of Everyday Fascism." Unless accompanied by democratization of everyday thinking and practice, the process of which goes beyond modification of legal and institutional aspects, I contended, the democratization of Korean society would not be free from everyday fascism.[10] It came from my reflection on the history of the People's Poland. In formulating everyday fascism, I got a lot of methodological inspiration from "new cultural history" including Lynn Hunt's writings on the French Revolution. Upon reading new cultural history of the French Revolution, I formed an opinion, though inchoate, that this method could be directly applied to the Bolshevik Revolution. Unfortunately, however, the new cultural history, once introduced in Korea, was misunderstood by scholars engaged in the conventional style of social history as a conservative political agenda in a new cloak that would leave a social structure intact. At the same time, much to my regret, it was those bringing the new cultural history to Korea that may have ended up "depoliticizing" the topic. Though I am not an expert in the field, it still grieves me that the lack of understanding from both sides of the argument brought to naught the transformative potential of the new cultural history.

You then went on to the analysis of mass dictatorship. What is meant by this term and what has been the motivation behind that move?

The thesis of "mass dictatorship" was an attempt to apply the issue of everyday fascism to scholarship on dictatorships in the twentieth century.[11] In formulating mass dictatorship, I was inspired by the thought-provoking essays on People's Poland in *ofiary czy współwinny* (*Victims or Accomplices?*) (1997) that criticized the martyrdom-view of history steeped in people's sublime sacrifices and heroic struggles. Its argument that the mass could be not only the victims of dictatorship but also its accomplices was still

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10   J.-H. Lim et al., Uri Anŭi P'asisŭm (Fascism in Us) (Seoul: Samin, 2000).

11   The Mass Dictatorship series is the 5-volume project published by Palgrave Macmillan and dealing with "gender politics," "modernity," "cultural imagination," "politics of memory" and "history of everyday lives". In addition the Palgrave Handbook of Mass Dictatorship has been published more recently.

more of a hypothesis, but Copernican enough. Then I was stunned yet another time by the social memory of the developmental dictatorship under the rule of Park Chung-hee. The controversy set off in 1999 by the project of building a memorial for the dictator Park under the Kim Dae-jung government was an outright testament to the nostalgia for Park's reign deeply rooted in the public memory. Reading news articles and reports that an overwhelming majority favored a memorial project of Park Chung-hee and that he was ranked as the top historical figure to emulate in a survey of students at the leading universities in Seoul, I had to reassess the conventional way of thinking about dictatorship – that is, a form of government in which a few bad men rule innocent people through the apparatus of coercion and violence.

Parallels to German debates come to mind again …

Indeed, it was an interesting coincidence that the Center for Contemporary History (ZZF) in Potsdam, Germany, presented a body of research interpreting GDR's really existed socialism and Nazism as a "welfare dictatorship" (*Fürsorgediktatur*) and a "dictatorship by consent" (*Konsensdiktatur*) respectively. Studies on fascist Italy with an emphasis on "consent" from below further propelled me to revisit the very assumptions of dictatorship in the twentieth century. In 2000, a year after raising the issue of "everyday fascism," I published a historico-political essay titled "War of Position and Dictatorship by Consent in Fascism" in *Tangtaepip'yŏng*. However, the essay drew severe reactions from both the left and the right. The former could not stomach the idea of popular endorsement of Nazism or the Park Chung-hee dictatorship, whereas the latter was indignant over the indication that Stalinism and the Kim Il-sung regime were maintained with the support of the masses. Still, I strove to press ahead with the debate, since I thought that, instead of simply accepting the belief in the moral righteousness of people, gazing directly in "dictatorship from below" enabled by grass-roots support could be a first step in making critical memories about the dictatorship's past.

Interestingly, there is an uncanny symmetry between Polish right-wing critics' reaction to Victims or Accomplices? and that of Korean leftist intellectuals to mass dictatorship. The baseline of their thinking was the moral inconceivability of popular support, whether in Poland or in Korea, for such evil regimes as real socialism or the Park's developmental dictatorship. Through this transnational experience, I was able to understand dictatorship, leftist and rightist alike, as a response to global modernity – a perception that subsequently developed into a view treating mass dictatorship as a transnational social formation. As I came to note the continuity of colonial practice and violence between Western colonialism and mass dictatorship, I could challenge commonsensical categorization of world history in which democracy and dictatorship are equated with such dichotomies as the West and the non-West, the modern and the premodern, or normality and aber-

ration. Western liberal democracy and non-Western mass dictatorship were not so much historical opposites as both sides of the same coin called global history of modernity.[12]

But the turn towards world history and the critique of national history writing went hand in hand?

In the meantime, I launched a joint criticism of "national history" at a regional level of East Asia by organizing the East Asian History Forum for Criticism and Solidarity. This move was met with harsh reactions that warned against the perils of disarming Korean nationalism at a time when the tide of historical revisionism and nationalist reactionary tendency was rising high in Japan. On the contrary, the East Asian History Forum's critique of national history, which simultaneously engaged Korea, China, and Japan, stemmed from the need of deconstructing an "antagonistic complicity" of nationalisms. I was convinced that a critical appraisal of Korean nationalism would break the links of the antagonistic complicity and it would constitute a fundamental rebuke to Japan's historical revisionism. Underneath my conviction lay a suspicion that a holy alliance between the Japanese left-wing intellectuals and the Korean nationalist intelligentsia with the aim of criticizing Japanese imperial nationalism ended up justifying nationalism of the Korean peninsula and, in turn, reinforcing and validating that of Japan. The Japanese partners at the History Forum kept the criticism cautious even on Korean nationalism, compared to "conscientious intellectuals" who lambasted their country's nationalism while showing a boundless generosity for their neighbor's nationalism.

Why at that point your interest in the culture and politics of history and memory started anew and focused now on the educational system and East Asian textbook quarrels?

It is intriguing to notice that *Sankei Shinbun*, a conservative Japanese daily newspaper that fully supported the revisionist Japanese "*New History Textbook*" (*Atarashii rekishi kyōkasho*), published a peculiar series of articles analyzing South Korean history textbooks in 2001. While clearly the stance in the Korean textbooks on Japan's colonization of the Korean peninsula differed markedly from the neo-nationalist Japanese account, the tone of the articles was not negative at all; indeed, Korean history textbooks were praised by the *Sankei Shinbun*'s Seoul correspondent for their firm basis in ethnocentric national history. In dozens of articles dedicated to the analysis of Asian history textbooks, the *Sankei* correspondent justified the *New History Textbook* by referring repeatedly to ethnocentric Korean history textbooks. In comparing Korean and Japanese history textbooks, he located a master narrative common to both, one in which "our nation" is the subject of history. Korean history textbooks thus confirmed his conviction that history textbooks

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12   See J.-H. Lim, "Series Introduction: Mapping Mass Dictatorship: Towards a Transnational History of Twentieth-Century Dictatorship," in Jie-Hyun Lim and Karen Petrone (eds.), Gender Politics and Mass Dictatorship: Global Perspectives (Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), pp. 1-22.

should teach children of all nationalities "national pride" and "love for our own history."[13] This seemingly ironic episode helps to illuminate the topography of competing national histories in East Asia. Leaving aside some obvious falsehoods, distortions, and intentional silences, the history textbook conflict in East Asia appears not as a question of "right or wrong" to be proven by objective facts, but as the inevitable collision of conflicting nation-centered interpretations. If reality is a cognitive construction, then historical facts – in this context at least – may be said to be constructed by the nationalist *episteme*; that is, the reality of the past is constructed by the present idea of the nation. I named this a "nationalist phenomenology" because nationalism not only informs, but actually determines the construction of historical narratives in East Asian history textbooks. The methodological naivety of closing eyes to the nationalist episteme undergirding both Korean and Japanese national histories is not helpful at all. A critical assessment of the epistemological logic of the *New History Textbook*, the scope of which goes beyond mere positivistic criticism, would be compelling only if it were followed by criticism of the epistemological basis shared between the concrete historical narratives of the Korean state-approved textbook and the Japanese textbook. That was the starting point of the History Forum.

The controversy over the history of Kokuryŏ between China and Korea, triggered by the Northeast Project in China, transpired under similar circumstances. It only seemed a matter of time before the framework of the Chinese history textbook delimiting the current territory of People's Republic of China as the spatial category of Chinese history were bound to clash with that of the Korean history textbook equating the spatial category of Korean history with the historical space of Korean people. Both sides shared the same *episteme* of "national history" that tried to appropriate Kokuryŏ by applying the concept of modern nation-state's border to a distant past. I convened the international conference of "Frontiers or Borders?" in 2004, with its slogan of "Kokuryŏ History to Kokuryŏ People!" By introducing the frame of the reference of border history, I tried to rescue the history from nation by presenting "border history of cross-cultural diversity, complexity, and dynamics" as the alternative to national history.[14] The Lithuanian historian Linas Eriksonas's response still reverberates in my memory when he was asked to talk about the issue of frontiers and borders in Eastern Europe. I remember being embarrassed by his remark that Eastern Europe had long been done with such puerile debates and that it was just amazing to see East Asia still engaged in them. Come to think of it, though, European history, too, was strewn with countless controversies akin to those concerning Kokuryŏ history. Among the examples of the arguments are the dissensions between Germany and Poland over Gdańsk / Danzig and over Śląsk / Schlesien or the disputes between Poland and Lithuania over Vilnius / Wilno, or between Poland and Ukraine over L'viv / Lwów. The discord over history of

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13   Sankei Shinbun, 25/06 and 26/06/2001.
14   Jie-Hyun Lim (ed.), Kŭndaeŭi Kukkyŏng, Yŏksaŭi Pyŏn'gyŏng – Pyŏn'gyŏnge sŏsŏ Yŏksarŭl Parapoda (Frontiers or Borders – History Seen from Borders), (Seoul: Humanist, 2004).

the "Visigoths" that had embroiled historians of Spain and Norway, the countries not even sharing borders but separated thousands of kilometers from each other, sounds more interesting. Visigoths had settled in the today's Spain after departing from southern Scandinavia. The history of historiography in a broad perspective shows that disagreement on the history of Kokuryŏ is a contention endemic to ways of thinking about national history rather than an indication of the particularity of East Asian history. The "Frontiers or Borders?" conference was organized as an effort in search of an alternative beyond mere critiquing of national history. Obviously, Western history or Eastern history could not be an answer. "Comparative history," "history of civilization," and "world history" each came up short to be an alternative to the national history paradigm. What helped relieve me of these concerns over an alternative was my first-hand observation of a large-scale history project sponsored by the European Science Foundation, "Representation of Past: Writing National Histories in Europe," as I participated as an outside expert. In the course of the project, I was impressed by the efforts of these European historians to shift away from the convention of "history of international relations" to the novelty of "border history," "entangled history," "overlapping history," "transnational history," and "global history" – particularly by the sheer scale of the organization and financial support for the project, as well as the research methodology and other substantial aspects of their studies.

What were your contacts with the global history movement – if there is one and not a multitude of approaches?

One of the formative experiences in my academic growth was when I was fortunate enough to take part in "Global History, Globally" – a project led jointly by Sven Beckert and Dominic Sachsenmaier. It gave me an opportunity to think about and discuss global history or transnational history as an alternative to national history. The most beneficial takeaway for me was that global history carries with it a political agenda of the "globalization from below" instead of capital-led globalization from above. The project made it clear that global history is a way of the periphery challenging the metropole. It also emphasized global history, whose ambition had been nourished with dependency theory, Subaltern Studies, Marxian theory of world system, and feminist theory, as a non-Western alternative to the way the West thinks of history. When one examines the post-nineteenth century history of modern historiography from a global perspective, it indicates that the so-called national history, originated from Europe's modern nation-states, spread to the peripheries along the paths of colonialism. From a postcolonial perspective that views the resistance nationalism as the mirroring effect of colonialism, the periphery's national history is an exact reiteration of Eurocentric or colonial discourse under the cover of nationalism.

How would you describe your position between the professional historian and the memory activist?

In an essay written in the waning years of his life, Raul Hilberg asked, "[Then] is it not equally barbaric to write footnotes after Auschwitz?" Even the title of the essay, "I was Not There," is not ordinary.[15] The question that reads certainly like a variation of Adorno's dictum about poetry and Auschwitz is surprising, even more so when it is raised by a pioneering historian known for his rigorous and solid empirical studies on the Holocaust. It is difficult to imagine that a historian of his standing posed such a question in order to negate the duty of a historian to come to grips with historical facts. To me, instead, he appears to emphasize that finding the truth about the Holocaust, an endeavor which often needs to rely on survivors' testimonies and memories alone, is different from a general process of examining historical facts on the basis of visible evidence and written materials. Since the accuracy of testimonies, as deposits of memory, is often called into question, they are destined to be put at a disadvantage as compared to written records in a truth game of history that requires representation of facts.

Then, a situation, where the perpetrators / oppressors monopolize narratives and history with the victims / oppressed left only with experiences and testimonies, poses a grave ethical problem in representation of history. After all, Hilberg's query, posed as if asking back whether stories told, however "inaccurate," would not be more important than "accurate" evidence, converges toward an issue of how to define the nature of relationship between the episteme of history and morality. For now, I think an answer to Hilberg's question can be found in the "aporia of Auschwitz." The epistemological task given to a historian by the Auschwitz experience is to choose which position to take in the face of the irresoluble contradiction between fact and truth.

For instance, when one female Holocaust survivor, while recollecting the armed uprising by some of the Auschwitz inmates, said, "[W]e saw four chimneys going up in flames, exploding," her testimony was adjudicated as false by the historians testifying to the fact that there was only one chimney in the crematorium in her camp. In defense of the testifier, however, Dori Laub, a Jewish Romanian psychologist, pointed out that her memory became inevitably exaggerated in relating the unbelievable event she had witnessed. While "intellectual memory" is compatible with fact, "deep memory" such as trauma tends to be contrary to fact in the swirl of stirred emotions. It is nevertheless hard to deny that deep memory is regarded more authentic as memory than intellectual memory. When our attention is turned on East Asia, a view driven by crude positivism, as it tries to paint the Comfort Women's testimonies as lies on the ground that they cannot be verified, clearly fails to understand the "aporia of Auschwitz."

Whenever I read testimonies of Holocaust survivors or comfort women forced into sexual slavery by the Japanese army, I realize that it is not that the subaltern cannot speak (as Spivak's famous article suggests) but that historians cannot listen. The duty of the historian, when the victim of the trauma of genocide or sexual slavery speaks, I think, is to listen as a "memory activist" to their deep memory – precisely because of, not despite,

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15   Raul Hilberg, "I was not there," in Writing and the Holocaust , ed. Berel Lang (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1988), pp. 17, 20, 25.

their words being inconsistent with fact – and help recover the authenticity of their memory, rather than as an "interrogator" subject their memory to a polygraph test by wielding the much-treasured sword of written hard evidence. The transposition from a historian to a memory activist, for me, is primarily a corollary of what the episteme of memory entails, but at the same time a conclusion I have reached after thinking over the role of a historian in East Asia's history wars that are becoming increasingly pitiable. The historian's work is to construct social memories of the past, and in this sense they are memory activist whether they want it or not.

More recently I realize that after having shifted my position from a Western historian to a historian, I have been attempting another change--from historian to memory activist-- since embarking on the "transnational memory" project.[16] When I confront East Asia as a warring memory space, I have to make clearer my position as a memory activist. This invites to think about the possibility of maintaining a critical tension between history and memory studies. Is history beginning to change? Or am I the one to simply leave history behind? And is this transition desirable academically, politically, and morally? What are the conditions that enable the historian and the memory activist to hold both identities in healthy check and nurture each other?

These questions, with no ready answers, can be frustrating, but I think that solutions are all the harder to find for the desperation with which the queries are raised. One thing that I hope for is that should I find these answers in years later, I will be able to talk about how my identity as a historian has been changing and what were the circumstantial delimitation inducing and constructing each of my multiple identities and its political implication.

16   In the following writings on "transnational memory," I tried to articulate my stance as a "memory activist" who thinks about history beyond national boundaries: "Second World War in Global Memory Space," in Cambridge History of Second World War, eds. M. Geyer and A. Tooze (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015); "Victim-hood Nationalism in Contested Memories-Mourning Nations and Global Accountability" in Memory in a Global Age: Discourses, Practices and Trajectories, eds. A. Assmann and S. Conrad (Palgrave Macmillan, 2010).

2016
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