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Portals of Globalization in Africa, Asia, and Latin America

**Edited by Claudia Baumann, Antje Dietze
and Megan Maruschke**



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Portals of Globalization – An Introduction

**Claudia Baumann / Antje Dietze /
Megan Maruschke**

ABSTRACTS

Portals of globalization is an analytical category introduced in globalization research to investigate how global flows are anchored and articulated in particular places. It has been used to analyse the way flows and controls come together on multiple scales, and how actors in these places actively manage global entanglements. Consequently, the changing positionality of these places in global networks can reveal the scope, function, and transformation of global connections and shifting spatial orders. Stemming from research debates on the historicity, regional difference, and spatial complexity of globalization processes, this issue seeks to strengthen empirical insights from different disciplinary and regional perspectives. It brings together research on past and present portals of globalization to facilitate the dialogue across disciplines in the social sciences and humanities. A special focus on a variety of local and regional contexts in Africa, Asia, and Latin America allows us to re-evaluate assumptions about the centres and peripheries of globalization processes, the mechanisms and directionality of circulations, and the asymmetries in global connectedness.

Die Kategorie der Portale der Globalisierung wurde in die Globalisierungsforschung eingeführt, um die Verankerung und Artikulation globaler Ströme an bestimmten Orten zu untersuchen. So wird sichtbar, wie Grenzüberschreitung und deren Regulierung auf verschiedenen Handlungsebenen verknüpft sind, und wie Akteure an diesen Orten globale Verflechtungen lenken. Veränderungen der Position dieser Orte in globalen Netzwerken zeigen Reichweite, Funktion und Wandel globaler Verbindungen sowie Verschiebungen räumlicher Ordnungen an. Dieses Doppelheft nimmt Debatten zur Historizität, regionalen Unterschieden und räumlichen Komplexität von Globalisierungsprozessen auf und stärkt vor diesem Hintergrund die empirische Bandbreite der Forschung. Die Autoren analysieren historische und gegenwärtige Portale der

Globalisierung aus verschiedenen disziplinären Perspektiven und mit unterschiedlichen regionalen Schwerpunkten. Ein besonderer Fokus der Beiträge liegt auf Untersuchungen zu Afrika, Asien und Lateinamerika. Dies trägt dazu bei, Vorstellungen über die Zentren und Peripherien der Globalisierung, die Mechanismen und Ausrichtung von Zirkulationen, und die Asymmetrien globaler Verflechtungen zu überprüfen.

Portals of globalization is an analytical category introduced in globalization research to investigate how global interactions are anchored and managed in particular places. Despite the increasing preoccupation with global flows, circulations, and networks in academic debates, it is through particular sites – like metropolises, border checkpoints, trading places, and international conference venues – that processes of globalization become tangible. These places are not only “where the action is,” but they also turn into symbolic reference points in debates about what it means to live in an interconnected world. Therefore, those who want to understand how globalization is unfolding often look at specific locations and their role in global networks. Indeed, using place as an entry point to understand the character, mechanisms, and effects of global connectivity remains one of the most relevant conceptual and methodological approaches in research on globalization.

1. Space and Place in the Study of Globalization

Sociologist Saskia Sassen's work on global cities epitomizes this approach by focusing on local articulations of global interactions. One of her key contributions to the study of globalization is to show precisely how and why so much of today's connected world is still so place-bound. She argues – against a “world is flat” undertone to much of the rhetoric on globalization – that globalization is an uneven and partial process.¹ Within the differentiated geography of global economic flows, she identifies “control and command centers,” which she coins “global cities.”² Sassen advances research on cities like London, Chicago, New York, and Tokyo in the global/digital era, accounting for why they continue to be the main sites for the concentration of financial services, power, and capital, despite technological innovations that allow long-distance communication and global integration. Sassen contends that cities are not merely nodes but indispensable pillars of the global economy, as they provide its foundations: social connectivity and central management functions, cross-border mergers and acquisitions, and denationalized elite and agendas. The way in which cities are, in turn, incorporated into global flows is accompanied by a growing importance of city networks and a loss of previous functions

1 S. Sassen, *Spatialities and Temporalities of the Global: Elements for a Theorization*, in: *Public Culture*, 12 (2000) 1, pp. 215–232, p. 219.

2 Originally proposed in: S. Sassen, *The Global City: New York, London, Tokyo*, Princeton 1991; for a more recent take, see S. Sassen, *Territory, Authority, Rights. From Medieval to Global Assemblages*, Princeton 2006 and S. Sassen, *The Global City: Enabling Economic Intermediation and Bearing Its Costs*, in: *City & Community*, 15 (2016) 2, pp. 97–108.

and forms of integration, particularly the national role of the city. Sassen's work has been highly relevant in the way it has given inspiration to study place within the space of global flows, networks, and scales, but it also inspired criticism and additional research. Debates on the role of place in globalization processes have moved in several directions: one important strand aims to historicize global interactions by investigating earlier forms of interconnected cities and sites, thus overcoming a narrative of newness in globalization studies.³ A second debate connects the study of place in globalization with area studies and reflects on the question of how to study global connectedness in other regional contexts outside of the Global North. A third line of inquiry questions the way global places are often pitted against the nation state, rather than allowing for the possibility that state decentralization may in some cases be an active strategy by the state – not a passive reaction to global challenges.⁴ Recent research has, therefore, focused on the interplay of different spaces and scales, among them the nation state but also empires, regions, and commodity chains.⁵

Portals of globalization is one of these approaches that investigate the articulation and management of global flows in particular places. It connects all three strands, as it aims to take the study of place in globalization further in terms of paying closer attention to historically changing, regionally specific, and spatially complex ways in which this relationship between place and global networks takes shape. The concept stems from debates in historiography, but it takes inspiration from current observations of societal transformation under the global condition. In addition to the global city approach, advances in critical or new political geography and global history, as well as perspectives from different area studies, inspire this research framework. Thus, this framework aims to enable an interdisciplinary dialogue between approaches that address similar conceptual problems in researching global processes, which reflects the fact that globalization itself has become an interdisciplinary concept; it is a phenomenon that in its complexity can only be addressed from multiple disciplinary perspectives.⁶

Moreover, new perspectives in globalization research re-conceptualize globalization from a spatial lens in order to better analyse various forms of global connectivity and their

3 For approaches in transnational or global urban history, see for example S. Ewen and P.-Y. Saunier (eds.), *Another Global City. Historical Explorations into the Transnational Municipal Moment 1850–2000*, Basingstoke 2008; S. Hazareesingh, *Interconnected Synchronicities: The Production of Bombay and Glasgow as Modern Global Ports c. 1850–1880*, in: *Journal of Global History*, 4 (2009) 1, pp. 7–31; A. K. Sandoval-Strausz, N. H. Kwak (eds.), *Making Cities Global: The Transnational Turn in Urban History*, Philadelphia 2017; L. Heerten, *Ankerpunkte der Verflechtung. Hafenstädte in der neueren Globalgeschichtsschreibung*, in: *Geschichte und Gesellschaft*, 43 (2017) 1, pp. 146–175.

4 L. Kennedy, *The Politics of Economic Restructuring in India: Economic Governance and State Spatial Rescaling*, Abingdon 2013. For China, see C. Cartier, *City-Space: Scale Relations and China's Spatial Administrative Hierarchy*, in: L. Ma & F. Wu (eds.), *Restructuring the Chinese City: Changing Society, Economy and Space*, New York 2005, pp. 21–38.

5 See for instance the research program of the Collaborative Research Centre (SFB) 1199: "Processes of Spatialization under the Global Condition" at Leipzig University.

6 M. Middell, *What is Global Studies All About?*, in: *Global Europe – Basel Papers on Europe in a Global Perspective*, no. 105, Basel 2014, pp. 38–49, p. 43.

interactions. The basic assumption here is that globalization processes consist of a variety of global entanglements as well as intersecting and competing globalization projects. Together, they form a complex and dynamic geography, which can best be accessed from multiple perspectives.⁷ This research has moved beyond “flat” notions of globalization that prioritize large-scale connectivity, but has shown that different forms and scales of spatial organization are involved, and that regulation and the redrawing of boundaries also play a relevant role. As a result, some research debates in new political geography, anthropology, sociology, political science, critical area studies, and history have gradually come to quite similar observations and concepts of global interactions. They converge in their emphasis that globalization is characterized by a relationship between flows and controls, or the dialectics of de- and reterritorialization.⁸ This observation was further refined in proposals to analyse the relationship between different spatial frames of reference and fields of action, such as the shifting interactions of territory, place, scale, and network.⁹ In historiography, these changing spatial constellations have been investigated over time, especially the process in which territorial control (most notably in the form of the modern nation state) emerged and evolved in relation to circulations and flows (globalization), and how this has shaped changing forms of organizing space.¹⁰ Place, we argue, is a key vantage point for investigating these shifting spatial orders.

- 7 A. Appadurai, *Globalization and Area Studies: The Future of a False Opposition*. Wertheim Lecture, Amsterdam 2000; Jerry H. Bentley, R. Bridenthal, and A. A. Yang (eds.), *Interactions: Transregional Perspectives on World History*, Honolulu 2005; M. Geyer: *Spatial Regimes*. in: A. Iriye and P.-Y. Saunier, *Palgrave Dictionary of Transnational History*, Basingstoke 2009, pp. 962–966; U. Freitag and A. von Oppen (eds.), *Translocality. The Study of Globalising Processes from a Southern Perspective*, Leiden; Boston 2010; M. Middell and K. Naumann, *Global History and the Spatial Turn: From the Impact of Area Studies to the Study of Critical Junctures of Globalization*, in: *Journal of Global History*, 5 (2010) 1, pp. 149–170; J. Osterhammel, *Globalizations*, in: J. H. Bentley (ed.), *The Oxford Handbook of World History*, Oxford 2011, pp. 89–104.
- 8 J. Agnew, *The Territorial Trap: The Geographical Assumptions of International Relations Theory*, in: *Review of International Political Economy*, 1 (1994) 1, pp. 53–80; N. Brenner, *Beyond State-Centrism? Space, Territoriality, and Geographical Scale in Globalization Studies*, in: *Theory and Society*, 28 (1999) 1, pp. 39–78; A. Appadurai, *Sovereignty without Territoriality: Notes for a Postnational Geography*, in: S. M. Low and D. Lawrence-Zúñiga (eds.), *The Anthropology of Space and Place: Locating Culture*, Oxford 2003, pp. 337–49; N. Brenner, *New State Spaces: Urban Governance and the Rescaling of Statehood*, New York 2004; J. Agnew, *Globalization and Sovereignty*, Lanham, MD 2009; U. Engel and G. R. Olsen. *Authority, Sovereignty and Africa's Changing Regimes of Territorialization*, in: Cornelissen S., Cheru F., Shaw T.M. (eds.), *Africa and International Relations in the 21st Century*. London 2012, pp. 51–65.
- 9 E. Sheppard, *The Spaces and Times of Globalization: Place, Scale, Networks, and Positionality*, in: *Economic Geography*, 78 (2002) 3, pp. 307–330; B. Jessop, N. Brenner and M. Jones, *Theorizing Sociospatial Relations*, in: *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space*, 26 (2008), pp. 389–401.
- 10 C. Maier, *Consigning the Twentieth Century to History: Alternative Narratives for the Modern Era*, *American Historical Review*, 105 (2000) 3, pp. 807–31; C. Maier, *Transformations of Territoriality, 1600–2000*, in: G. Budde, S. Conrad and O. Janz (eds.), *Transnationale Geschichte: Themen, Tendenzen und Theorien*, Göttingen 2006, pp. 32–56; C. S. Maier, *Once Within Borders. Territories of Power, Wealth, and Belonging since 1500*. Cambridge, MA 2016. For related arguments, see: M. Geyer and C. Bright, *World History in a Global Age*, in: *The American Historical Review*, 100 (1995) 4, pp. 1034–1060; C. Bright and M. Geyer, *The Global Condition, 1850–2010*, in: D. Northrop, ed., *A Companion to World History*, Chichester 2012.

2. The Concept of Portals of Globalization

Building on these insights from different fields of research that advance a spatial perspective to study globalization, Ulf Engel and Matthias Middell have developed a research agenda to re-conceptualize historical and contemporary formations of globalization as changing regimes of territorialization. This approach identifies the concrete arenas and actors as well as the turning points of these processes in a long-term perspective.¹¹ Through the research training group “Critical Junctures of Globalization” (2006–2015), an institutional environment was created at Leipzig University to foster the application of these concepts by an interdisciplinary group of researchers, including doctoral and postdoctoral scholars.

Subsequently, several authors – Michael Geyer, Matthias Middell, and Katja Naumann – introduced the concept of “portals of globalization,” which suggests directing more attention to the concrete sites of global connections. Derived from joint discussions, they published their insights in quick succession and with slightly different emphases. Focusing on place became a promising avenue, as the interplay between different spaces and scales of global connectivity, and the actors driving those interactions become more easily accessible from this perspective. Therefore, these authors see portals as places with a high intensity of global interactions in terms of people, goods, and ideas; they understand portals to be hubs and mediating sites between global flows and territorial control. They all use these portals as an analytical category to focus on the specific sites, agents, and mechanisms of transfers and regulations. Instead of pitting the local against the global, they analyse changing spatial orders that shape the global connectedness of places over time. In this way, it is possible to relate past and present forms of global interactions and territorial control in a long-term perspective.

Geyer introduces portals of globalization as a way of capturing seemingly ubiquitous global flows by focusing on how they are channelled, directed, and controlled as they enter or exit a society.¹² He analyses how the relation between external and internal has been managed in modern societies by describing changes of this mediating function and its main actors and mechanisms over time. Geyer notes how the forms of flow and control change fundamentally with the emergence of the modern nation state during the long nineteenth century. The state gradually assumed border management and portal functions, but it was also increasingly challenged by global entanglements.

Middell (in a text that was revised and translated for this issue) adds another way of relating past and present globalizations through the long-term institutionalization of portal functions in particular places.¹³ He underlines that in portals, over time, actors

11 M. Middell and U. Engel, Bruchzonen der Globalisierung, globale Krisen und Territorialisierungsregimes – Kategorien einer Globalgeschichtsschreibung, in: *Comparativ*, 15 (2005) 5/6, pp. 5–38.

12 M. Geyer, Portale der Globalisierung, in: W. Eberhard and C. Lübke (eds.), *Die Vielfalt Europas. Identitäten und Räume*, Leipzig 2009, pp. 544–557. English version: M. Geyer, Portals of Globalization, in: W. Eberhard and C. Lübke (eds.), *The Plurality of Europe: Identities and Spaces*, Leipzig 2010, pp. 509–520.

13 M. Middell, Erinnerung an die Globalisierung? Die Portale der Globalisierung als *lieux de mémoire*: Ein Versuch,

gain experience in dealing with global connectivity and establish institutions and knowledge reservoirs to support these capacities. As a consequence, these places also acquire a particular role in collective memory and historical narratives. While the long-dominant framework of the nation state has come into question and historical narratives in both the public and academic sphere have started to shift, place has taken on a flexible quality. Places can be integrated into national historiographies – and become national sites of memory – but they can also serve as building blocks for more complex spatial arrangements and bring to light other stories and identity projects, even global ones. Portals of globalization, then, cannot only be used to historicize changing forms of spatial organization but also to trace shifts in collective narratives, as these start to coalesce around different spaces, scales, and forms of belonging.

In an article that further systematizes this research framework, Middell and Naumann argue that the category of portals of globalization takes on several functions for investigating the history of changing spatial orders through a pronounced focus on place:

It allows for analysis of how global connectedness challenges a seemingly stable territorial order by extending it to other spheres, and it invites us to look at the various means by which elites try to channel and therefore control the effects of global connectivity (among others, by the creation of political structures and social control). It examines both the production and products of new spatial orders in the places that play an important role in connecting particular territorialities, and where global entanglements are especially tangible (and therefore challenging) in the flow of goods, people, and ideas.¹⁴

They promote a closer look at the practices, institutions, and materialities of particular places, and the actors that enhance, steer, and regulate flows as part of specific political, economic, and social projects. Moreover, the authors claim, portals of globalization can also be seen as arenas of re-spatialization, that – to the degree that they advance new constellations between regimes of circulation and territorialization – take an active role in producing new spatial orders.

While these three texts are predominantly conceptual contributions seeking to advance the debate on the role of place in global interactions, researchers both in Leipzig and in other contexts have taken up this call for further inquiry. They have added empirical insights and have further diversified the understanding of portals of globalization and their variations across different world regions. For instance, Geert Castryck focused on railway towns in Africa and South Asia since the late nineteenth century.¹⁵ He argues that looking at how actors in these places used technology, infrastructure, as well as local innovations to produce global connectedness can help to counter narratives of Western

in: K. Buchinger, C. Gantet, and J. Vogel (eds.), *Europäische Erinnerungsräume*, Frankfurt am Main 2008, pp. 296–308.

14 M. Middell and K. Naumann, *Global History and the Spatial Turn*, p. 162 (fn. 7).

15 G. Castryck, Introduction: From Railway Juncture to Portal of Globalization: Making Globalization Work in African and South Asian Railway Towns, in: G. Castryck (ed.), *From Railway Juncture to Portal of Globalization: Making Globalization work in African and South Asian Railway Towns*, in: *Comparativ*, 25 (2015) 4, pp. 7–16.

technological-scientific globalization and its diffusion to the rest of the world. Instead, this research reveals the diversity of different local ways to engage in global entanglements. Holger Weiss used the framework of portals of globalization to study the production of new spatial patterns through multilateral (not just European) networks and processes of creolization in the Atlantic world.¹⁶ Alison Bashford analysed the emergence of state regulation of global flows through the example of quarantine stations on different continents.¹⁷ Megan Maruschke studied the role of India's free trade zones as state-based strategies to produce and enable globalization,¹⁸ and Claudia Baumann investigated universities in an emerging, global higher-education landscape in different world regions.¹⁹ Portals of globalization have, thus, shown their potential to foster interdisciplinary cooperation among international scholars. The institutional framework for doing so has broadened considerably with the founding of the Centre for Area Studies at Leipzig University in 2009, which provides a framework to facilitate trans-regional and global research approaches. Since 2016, the collaborative research centre "Processes of Spatialization under the Global Condition" has brought together scholars from various disciplinary and area studies backgrounds with the aim of building a typology of spatial formats as well as a historical narrative about the change of spatial orders under the condition of global connectivity. This double issue is a result of these ongoing research debates and interdisciplinary collaborations.

3. Portals of Globalization: Insights from Africa, Asia and Latin America

Stemming from the aforementioned debates on historicity, regional difference, and spatial complexity in globalization processes, this issue seeks to strengthen empirical insights from a variety of disciplinary and regional perspectives. It brings together research on past and present portals of globalization to foster not only the dialogue across disciplines in the social sciences and humanities but also to take a step further towards a more integrated approach to understanding historical and contemporary global interactions. It also adds perspectives from the Global South. Newer strands of research have emphasized an understanding of globalization(s) as heterogeneous and multipolar, and have advanced the insight that actors in different world regions played and continue to play a significant role in shaping globalization processes. This has led scholars to rethink concepts and master narratives of globalization. To mention a few, the Great Divergence debate shifted our understanding of European history by historicizing Europe's economic

16 H. Weiss, *Ports of Globalisation, Places of Creolisation. Nordic Possessions in the Atlantic World during the Era of the Slave Trade*, Leiden; Boston 2016.

17 A. Bashford (ed.), *Quarantine: Local and Global Histories*, Basingstoke 2016.

18 M. Maruschke, *Zones of Reterritorialization: India's Free Trade Zones in Comparative Perspective, 1947–1980s*, in: *Journal of Global History*, 12 (2017) 3, pp. 410–432.

19 C. Baumann (ed.), *Universities as Portals of Globalization. Crossroads of Internationalization and Area Studies*, Leipzig 2014.

performance and comparing it to that of China; postcolonial theory, especially its agenda of provincializing Europe, has re-evaluated the history of colonial and imperial relations; twentieth-century histories have demonstrated how states in the Global South shaped the contours of the Cold War; and recently, new regionalisms beyond the European model have modified concepts of regional order and sovereignty.²⁰ The contributions to this double issue add further research avenues by exploring the middle ground between concrete and site-specific empirical research and larger narratives about long-term transformations of territorialization and global connectedness. Through the lens of portals of globalization, the articles make four key contributions to empirical research on globalization processes: we highlight agency, we identify the spatial scope of global interconnections, we consider temporal change, and we specify connectivity.

First, we demonstrate the variety of actors who contribute to shaping globalization. In this issue, we focus on examples from Africa, Asia, and Latin America, thereby adding to globalization research that tends to focus on the so-called Global North. What we find, however, is that the complexity of actors in these places cannot be contained by homogeneous binaries like “Global North” and “Global South.” A number of recent historical studies, for example, have demonstrated the agency of actors from the colonies in European imperial metropolises who were able to navigate and shape both transnational and trans-imperial ties, resulting in a world order characterized by decolonization.²¹ In addition to these kinds of entanglements, shifting hierarchies, and heterogeneous positions, unexpected actors may contribute to shaping cities, states, imperial formations, and their recombinations in spatial orders.²² We aim at a differentiated analysis of these actors’ room to manoeuvre between their embeddedness in complex spatial constellations and their active role in trying to control – to foster and delimit – global connections. The investigation of portals of globalization in a variety of local and regional contexts in Africa, Asia, and Latin America allows us to re-evaluate assumptions about the centres and

20 K. Pomeranz, *The Great Divergence: China, Europe, and the Making of the Modern World Economy*, Princeton, NJ 2000; M. Middell and P. R. Rössner (eds.), *The Great Divergence Revisited*, in: *Comparativ*, 26 (2016) 3, pp. 7–24; D. Chakrabarty, *Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference*, Princeton, NJ 2000; O. Arne Westad, *The Global Cold War. Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times*, Cambridge 2007; O. Sanchez-Sibony, *Red Globalization: The Political Economy of the Soviet Cold War from Stalin to Khrushchev*, Cambridge 2014, pp. 125–169; U. Engel, H. Zinecker, F. Mattheis, A. Dietze, and T. Plötze (eds.), *The New Politics of Regionalism. Perspectives from Africa, Latin America and Asia-Pacific*, London 2016.

21 M. Goebel, *Anti-Imperial Metropolis: Interwar Paris and the Seeds of Third World Nationalism*, Cambridge, 2015; M. Matera, *Black London: The Imperial Metropolis and Decolonization in the Twentieth Century*, Oakland, CA 2015. We also take inspiration here from scholars like Coll Thrush who investigated London’s indigenous history: C. Thrush, *Indigenous London: Native Travelers at the Heart of Empire*, New Haven 2016.

22 For an example, Jonathan Bach demonstrates that “villagers” were key actors who shaped the development and success of Shenzhen Special Economic Zone in China, despite hindrances imposed on them by the authorities: “They Come in Peasants and Leave Citizens”: Urban Villages and the Making of Shenzhen, China, in: *Cultural Anthropology*, 25 (2010) 3, pp. 421–458. Similarly, Jamie Monson shows how railway porters’ work allows for small traders in Zambia and Tanzania to reach world markets through the port and railway, which had otherwise been designed to handle container traffic and therefore more significant volumes of goods: J. Monson, *Moving Goods in Kapiri Mposhi, Zambia: The Scaffolding of Stability in TAZARA’s Dry Port*, in: *Comparativ*, 15 (2015) 4, pp. 87–101.

peripheries of globalization processes, the mechanisms and directionality of circulations, and the asymmetries in global connectedness.

Secondly, we identify the particular spatial scope of the interconnections produced by these actors. Entanglements are usually bounded and specific.²³ Therefore, we find that “trans-regional” is often a better designation for the connectivity, flows, and entanglements present in these contributions.²⁴ This observation adds weight to other conceptual and empirical research on understanding the term “global.” Labelling flows or other circulations as global may hinder us from investigating the mechanisms and specificities of such flows; on the other hand, using the term global may be useful as a means to define certain types of activities or connections.²⁵ This opens questions about the particular scope and scale of a place’s global connectedness. As constellations of overlapping connections become tangible in a place, we can also see their range and directionality; and we can better assess the positionality of the place in specific spatial arrangements.

Thirdly, we address the temporal nature of globalization by including studies that focus on longer time spans, periods of transition, and historical reflections of global interactions in particular places. This issue incorporates research on contemporary globalizations with historical case studies, allowing us to see how portals, actors, and forms of connectivity have changed over time; additionally, we may see how contemporary portals rely on, mobilize, or remain bound by older forms of connectivity. The longer historical perspective goes beyond debates about “when” globalization was;²⁶ it addresses “where” we can locate which globalization(s) and at which times. Today, research focused on mobile actors and capital flows risks dislocating globalization from place. The articles in this issue reaffirm concerns that globalization is not an even and ubiquitous process but a bundle of political, social, and economic projects. In studying certain places over time, the authors of this issue analyse how portals emerge, change their function, or become irrelevant. In short, we can observe a changing character of globalization and the spatial orders within which these portals are embedded as well as how actors seek to re-arrange these frameworks and their positionality within them.

Fourthly, we specify connectivity. Using portals as a research lens not only helps to show the changing spatial dimensions of connections and circulations over time; it is also part of a turn towards empirical research on the concrete mechanisms, infrastructures, actors, and media of interaction and exchange, as well as the changing aims and strategies that are articulated in these forms. This perspective aims to overcome the problems with abstract generalities implied by invoking terms such as flows, connections, and circula-

23 As has been emphasized, for example, from an African perspective: F. Cooper, What is the Concept of Globalization good for? An African Historian’s Perspective, in: *African Affairs*, 100 (2001) 399, pp. 189–213; J. Ferguson, Seeing like an Oil Company: Space, Security, and Global Capital in Neoliberal Africa, in: *American Anthropologist*, 107 (2005) 3, pp. 377–382. See also P.-Y. Saunier, *Transnational History*, Basingstoke 2013.

24 M. Middell (ed.) *Handbook of Transregional Studies*, London (forthcoming).

25 S. Opitz and U. Tellmann, Global Territories: Zones of Economic and Legal Dis/connectivity, in: *Distinktion: Journal of Social Theory*, 13 (2013) 3, pp. 261–282.

26 For example, in economic history: K. H. O’Rourke and J. G. Williamson, *Globalization and History: The Evolution of a Nineteenth-Century Atlantic Economy*, Cambridge, MA; London 2000.

tions that often hinder us from reflecting on historical or regional differences in the way a place is embedded in overarching spatial constellations.²⁷

Moreover, portals of globalization have been defined as “entrance points for cultural transfer”.²⁸ Focusing on portals in Africa, Asia, and Latin America allow us to draw additional insights on the nature of such transfers. The term has rightly been invoked to overcome the language of diffusion and, thereby, Eurocentrism; however, without empirical depth and conceptual clarity the term may function to conceal asymmetries. Global interactions do not take place on an even playing field. A closer look at the positionality and agency of particular actors is, therefore, important in defining the character and function of portals of globalization and the corresponding regimes of circulation and control. As several case studies in this issue show, exclusions, inequality, and neglect continue to play an important role in portals of globalization. But a closer look at the scope, direction and hierarchies involved in transfers and circulations also helps to map a variety of historically overlooked or newly emerging regimes of circulation and control.

4. Contributions in this Issue

The following contributions reflect the aforementioned perspectives by investigating the particular scope of spatial connections as well as the forms of connectivity and agency in portals of globalization from various disciplinary backgrounds and regional areas of expertise. This double issue is arranged both chronologically and thematically to demonstrate to the reader on the one hand, the overlapping findings that emerge when using portals of globalization as an analytical category; on the other hand, we acknowledge that globalization and spatial orders have shifted overtime.

The first two texts deal with ports and how various actors seek to steer connectivity through them. These actors react to changing world orders; potentially, they also attempt to forge new forms of connectedness themselves. Both contributions demonstrate the benefits of a long-term perspective by analysing how the ports adapt to several dramatic shifts in spatial orders from the early 19th to the turn of the 21st century. Megan Maruschke’s article focuses on Bombay port. She examines how a free-port plan from the 1830s and a free-trade zone plan from the 1960s factor into elite’s globalization projects. Though neither plan was implemented, she demonstrates how actors sought to reposition themselves in trade networks and spatial orders by connecting their port to specific trade routes, for example, by building certain types of infrastructure or offering

27 S. Gänger, *Circulation: Reflections on Circularity, Entity, and Liquidity in the Language of Global History*, in: *Journal of Global History*, 12 (2017) 3, pp. 303–318. R. Wenzlhuemer, *The Ship, the Media, and the World: Conceptualizing Connections in Global History*, in: *Journal of Global History*, 11 (2016) 2, pp. 163–186.

28 M. Middell and K. Naumann, *Global History and the Spatial Turn*, p. 162 (fn. 7). M. Geyer defines portals in a similar way, see *Portals of Globalization*, p. 509 (fn. 12). On the concept of cultural transfer, see M. Espagne, *Les transferts culturels franco-allemands*, Paris, 1999; M. Espagne, *Comparison and Transfer*, in: M. Middell and L. Roura i Aulinas (eds.), *Transnational Challenges to National History Writing*, Basingstoke 2012, pp. 36–53.

specific incentives. She also emphasizes how different actors on the local, provincial, and national level sought to control and reorient the port. Anne Dietrich investigates Cuban ports to highlight the complex relationship between a place and its hinterland. Moreover, she connects this relationship to the port-hinterland's integration into various global networks such as the US and socialist sugar markets. She argues that, on the one hand, economic development in Cuba's hinterland during the 19th and early 20th century led to the expansion of the island's ports, while the modernization of the ports that has taken place since the second half of the 20th century allowed for Cuba's economic revival. These two contributions point out shifting means, scopes, and directions of globalization projects overtime. Certain spaces of interaction required changing technology, as international trade partners and geopolitical contexts changed. These portals were in both cases also used to strengthen and reposition the nation state in those shifting global orders.

The authors of the following two articles expand these long-term perspectives on portals of globalization. They emphasize that in addition to dealing with varying positionalities within changing spatial frameworks, portals of globalization are arenas where actors may manage the instable cultural and racial boundaries between diverse populations and articulate the legacies and memories of global connectedness. Matthias Middell's contribution is a revised version of the aforementioned text originally published in German. He suggests using portals of globalization to investigate changing regimes of territorialization and historical narratives. Moreover, he argues that portals can become *lieux de mémoire*, sites for the re-construction of memory and heritage, beyond national frameworks. He also offers a short typology of portals. They may be gateways between global connections and territorial boundedness, such as ports or trade cities; they may be metropolises where the relations between centre and periphery, imperial power and anti/post-colonial critique, and between nation and world are institutionalized and fought out; and they may be global events such as sports competitions or world exhibitions, which take on a symbolic function between Western-centric representations and an awareness of multiple modernities and differentiated global geographies. Jochen Lingelbach investigates internment camps for Polish World War II refugees in British Colonial East Africa as temporary portals of globalization. He highlights both the forced nature of this "mobility," the hierarchized social interactions enforced inside the camp, and how the camp's diversity challenged racial and national constructs which were the basis of legitimation for British political rule. Moreover, he investigates how these portals lost their function and were closed and forgotten as a result. Specific transnational and transimperial experiences, lost to national constructs in both historiography and collective public discourses, may simply remain sidelined. Both articles focus on the temporality of portals of globalization as places where the relations between various spatial orientations and different forms of cultural and social belonging are negotiated over time.

The following contributions deal with the creation of new portals of globalization and their societal impact in two contemporary trans-regional African contexts: Guinea's mining towns and their supply chains and an antiretroviral factory in Mozambique that was funded and implemented in cooperation with Brazil. Johannes Knierzinger's work on

bauxite mining towns in Guinea is an example of how portals of globalization can be forcefully established and maintained. The mining towns depend heavily on developments in the aluminum industry with headquarters in the Global North. Local and national political, social, and economic responsibility is ceded as mining corporations and their international staff usurp local forms of power. In these command centres, global inequalities are highly visible. What becomes most pronounced here, but is also present elsewhere in this issue, is a notion of how some actors can establish and control a portal, assuming functions of local, regional and state governments, leaving the local population with little to no say in how their towns and countries are connected to global supply chains. Ana Ribeiro's focus on Brazil as an emerging donor reveals different kinds of trans-regional interactions and shifting hierarchies in newly formed portals. Brazil seeks to take a more active role in managing global connections by building on former colonial relations in the Lusophone world and its own experiences with donors from the Global North, thereby redirecting aid flows from a North-South to a South-South trajectory. Ribeiro investigates the particular institutional framework and the production site that were established to make South-South development cooperation with Mozambique possible. While the project has faced challenges in securing the resources, support and capacities needed to safeguard its activities in the long term, it will potentially have wide-ranging effects on Brazil's global influence and may become a model for development cooperation in an actively constructed Global South.

The next two articles further explore how contemporary portals of globalization provide insights into active strategies of re-spatialization and the rescaling of global interactions; both emphasize regionalization and trans-regional synchronization in Africa. Nicholas Dietrich shows the intertwined nature of globalization and regionalization processes in police cooperation in Southern Africa. Investigating the emergence of the Southern African Regional Police Chiefs Cooperation Organization (SARPCCO), he argues that police are both reacting to transnational crimes but also synchronizing their knowledge production and practices through regional institution building. Dietrich finds that regionalization is a multi-scalar and multi-actor process, which reacts flexibly, assuming new kinds of control functions to respond to deterritorialized flows. In the process, new spaces are negotiated and emerge out of portals. Ulf Engel investigates the headquarters of international organizations as portals of globalization, emphasizing their growing agency in international relations and their potential role in enhancing the capacities of regional organizations. He examines the African Union Commission in Addis Ababa and its interaction with the United Nations headquarters in New York. Zooming in on particular forms of interaction and entanglement between those headquarters, he observes their impact on policy fields such as peace and security, and the emergence of new forms of transnational and trans-regional communication, knowledge production and transfer. Portals of globalization as an analytical category, he argues, is a tool to investigate those profound shifts in the management of globalization processes on multiple spatial levels. Moreover, this lens shows changing functions in these sites that have become hubs for

knowledge exchange, and thereby the synchronization of practices as well as the negotiation of new territorialized forms of power and sovereignty.

The category of portals of globalization, these contributions show, is helpful to more concretely investigate not only historical transformations of global connections and attempts to manage and control them. It also reveals how in contemporary, seemingly all-encompassing global interactions, different globalization projects interact, particular forms of de- and reterritorialization operate, and power relations and scopes for action shift. The two final contributions to this double issue deal with the emergence of new actors that shape “global” policies and discourses by appropriating and synchronizing (new) practices. Moreover, they examine how the institutionalization of these new attempts to tap “the global” can become models. Micha Fiedlschuster examines the aspirations of the anti-globalization movement, institutionalized in the World Social Forum. These anti-globalization activists seek to change social hierarchies and political world orders. Though the World Social Forum emanates from the inequality in today’s world, Fiedlschuster shows in this issue how, despite its temporary but recurring structure, the forum functions as place for the exchange of ideas and practices that seek to reshape the world we live in and the conditions of many. In sum, expressing political discontent fosters outreach and instigates synchronization processes. In her contribution, Claudia Baumann demonstrates to what extent “national” institutions, universities, both produce knowledge to tackle regional and global issues, thereby reacting to changing realities, *and* seek to manage student and staff mobility, thereby themselves contributing to shaping particular transnational flows. In the process, benchmarks and scales of academic activity are renegotiated, institutional power is redistributed between universities and states, and new regional or trans-regional spaces of research and learning emerge. Looking at concrete universities can reveal new insights about the topography of higher education in the Global South that can redraw the arbitrary map of world class universities.

In sum, using the analytical category of portals of globalization reveals that certain places can be much more than transit points for global flows, or arenas where local reactions to the impact of global forces are developed. They can be used to analyse the way flows and control come together on multiple scales, and they themselves can become arenas actors use to actively sustain and manage global entanglements. Consequently, investigating the changing position and role of these places in global networks can reveal the scope, function, and transformation of global connections and shifting spatial orders. This perspective also helps to differentiate notions about the actors who shape global processes and the entanglements between flows and controls. The contributions to this volume demonstrate that when applying a place-based perspective to detailed empirical research, a great diversity of actors appear that have not only historically and presently reacted to globalization but have also played a key role in shaping it. The portals of globalization concept thereby shows how these actors and particular places are situated in a variety of complex, overlapping, and shifting regimes of spatial organization, thus moving globalization research beyond binaries of global and local, North and South. Instead, regions,

empires, states, supply chains, cooperation agreements, etc. shape places and peoples' connectivity in a global age.

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Managing Shifting Spatial Orders: Planning Bombay's Free Port and Free Zone, 1830s–1980s

Megan Maruschke

ABSTRACTS

The free zone features frequently in research on contemporary globalization; the visible exploitation in zones reveals the inequality produced by global economic entanglement. Yet, there is very little historical research on how these practices may be related to elite and state-based globalization projects. Using official reports and correspondence from government ministries, this article examines two free-port and free-zone plans from the 1830s and the 1960s in Bombay, and follows them forward, concluding with the present port situation. These plans were never realized, but they may both serve as a lens through which we can identify the actors who pursue globalization projects, through which they seek to channel connectivity in particular places. Moreover, the concept portals of globalization draws attention to the variety of entangled spaces of what we call the global economy and how these have shifted over time.

Freizonen sind häufig Gegenstand der Forschung zur gegenwärtigen Globalisierung, da sich in ihnen die von globalen Wirtschaftsverflechtungen erzeugten Ungleichheiten besonders deutlich zeigen. Dennoch gibt es nur wenige historische Untersuchungen dazu, welche Rolle Freizonen in von gesellschaftlichen Eliten oder Staaten gelenkten Globalisierungsprojekten spielen. Auf der Grundlage offizieller Berichte und der Korrespondenz von Regierungsministerien untersucht dieser Artikel zwei Freihafen- und Freihandelszonenpläne in Bombay aus den 1830er und 1960er Jahren und begleitet die Hafenentwicklung bis zur Gegenwart. Diese Pläne wurden nie umgesetzt, aber können als Beispiele dienen, anhand derer wir die Akteure besser identifizieren können, die Globalisierungsprojekte verfolgen, um die globale Vernetzung bestimmter Orte zu steuern. Überdies lenkt das Konzept der "Portale der Globalisierung" die Aufmerksamkeit auf die verschiedenen verwobenen Räume der Weltwirtschaft und darauf, wie diese sich im Laufe der Zeit verlagert haben.

1. Introduction

In her work on global cities, Saskia Sassen indicates that free trade zones, also known as special economic zones and export-processing zones, serve important functions similar to the global city: they are nodal points through which global circuits of capital and goods enter and exit nation states.¹ Through their tax incentives, lax labour regimes, and rescinded duties, free trade zones enable (often foreign) corporations to employ low-wage workers to handle manufactures for a global marketplace. Zones are usually demarcated by a physical barrier to maintain their separate legal and tax status, as well as to guard against labour unrest and pilfering.² In 2015, *The Economist* estimated that three-quarters of countries around the world contain such zones, totalling 4,300 at the time of research.³ In connecting free trade zones and global cities, Sassen suggests that these places share a similar function in the global economy, specifically in managing processes of globalization, leading to the “unbundling” of these places from their respective nation states.⁴

Much of the research on zones stems from the social sciences and is investigated in the present context. Even so, instead of connecting free trade zones to contemporary global cities, many authors seek to express the historical continuity of contemporary zones by linking them to free ports of the past: colonial free ports, treaty ports, or Hanseatic League ports.⁵ Likewise, a recent history of Livorno’s free port around 1500 refers to it as an early example of today’s special economic zones.⁶ These statements are anecdotes to draw the reader in, not historical claims; there is no historical study to support them.

- 1 S. Sassen, *The Global City. Introducing a Concept*, in: *Brown Journal of World Affairs*, 9 (2005) 2, pp. 27–43.
- 2 A. Ong, *Zoning Technologies in East Asia*, in: *Neoliberalism as Exception: Mutations in Citizenship and Sovereignty*, Durham 2006, pp. 97–118.
- 3 *Special Economic Zones: Political Priority, Economic Gamble*, in: *The Economist*, 4 April, 2015, <http://www.economist.com/news/finance-and-economics/21647630-free-trade-zones-are-more-popular-everwith-politicians-if-not> (accessed 27 June 2016); *Special economic zones: not so special*, in: *The Economist*, 4 April, 2015, <http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21647615-world-awash-free-trade-zones-and-their-offshoots-many-are-not-worth-effort-not> (consulted 27 June 2016).
- 4 S. Sassen, *Spatialities and Temporalities of the Global: Elements for a Theorization*, in: *Public Culture*, 12 (2000), pp. 215–232, pp. 218–219.
- 5 T. Takeo, *Free Trade Zones in Southeast Asia*, in: *Monthly Review*, 29 (1978) 9, pp. 29–41, p. 30; D.L.U. Jayawardena, *Free Trade Zones*, in: *Journal of World Trade*, 17 (1983) 5, pp. 427–444; K.Y. Wong and D.K.Y. Chu, *Export Processing Zones and Special Economic Zones as Generators of Economic Development: The Asian Experience*, in: *Geografiska Annaler. Series B, Human Geography*, 66 (1984) 1, pp. 1–16, p. 1; M. Guangwen, *The Theory and Practice of Free Economic Zones: A Case Study of Tianjin*, People’s Republic of China, dissertation, Ruprecht-Karls University of Heidelberg, 2003; J.J. Wang and D. Olivier, *Port-FEZ Bundles as Spaces of Global Articulation: The Case of Tianjin, China*, in: *Environment and Planning A*, 38 (2006) 8, pp. 1487–1503, p. 1487; Ong, *Neoliberalism as Exception* (fn. 2), p. 103; P. Amitendu and S. Bhattacharjee, *Special Economic Zones in India: Myths and Realities*, London, 2008, p. 1; J. Bach, *Modernity and the Urban Imagination in Economic Zones*, in: *Theory, Culture & Society*, 28 (2011) 5, pp. 98–122, pp. 98–99; A. Aggarwal, *Social and Economic Impact of SEZs in India*, New Delhi, 2012, pp. 15–36; K. Easterling, *Extrastatecraft*, London, 2014, pp. 25–69; P. Khanna, *Connectography: Mapping the Global Network Revolution*, London 2016, pp. 279–280.
- 6 C. Tazzara, *The Free Port of Livorno and the Transformation of the Mediterranean World*, Oxford University Press, 2017; C. Tazzara, *Capitalism and the Special Economic Zone, 1590–2014*, in: R. Fredona and S. Reinert (eds.), *New Perspectives on the History of Political Economy*, London (forthcoming 2018).

What these anecdotes point to is an impression among historians and social scientists alike that specific places like ports have served and continue to serve as key nodal points in an increasingly globalizing economy; they are the places where “that which is foreign” enters the nation state.⁷ Though it may be possible to link the zone and the free port’s general functionality in the “global economy,” such a generalization supposes the global economy to be “flat” and seamlessly integrative, negating that societies enter periods of various spatial (economic and political) constellations; free ports and free zones are situated within these larger spatial orders. Using portals of globalization as a research lens helps us to focus on these particular places, in which global entanglements are dense.⁸ In doing so, we can study how the actors who plan these free ports and free zones also perceive changing spatial world orders, and seek to use these projects to reposition their place within them.⁹ Therefore, in contrast to Sassen, it is not my understanding that these zones, ports, cities, and their combinations are sites of national “unbundling.” This article examines free-port and free-zone plans from the 1830s and the 1960s in Bombay (Mumbai) and follows them forward, concluding with the present port situation. These plans were never realized, but they may both serve as a lens through which we can view how actors try to enact “globalization projects” by seeking to channel connectivity through particular places. Bombay is one of India’s primary commercial and naval ports. The port and the city became increasingly important over the course of the nineteenth century as the East India Company’s rule became more territorial, gaining Bombay’s hinterlands. In the 1840s, Bombay then became the seat for the Bombay Presidency, as the governing structure for India was formalized, leading to the eventual exit of the company in 1858. Post-independence (1947), Bombay became the capital of the state of Bombay, later the state of Maharashtra. It maintained its reputation as a primary city of commerce and remained a “major port,” a classification signifying that the port is run under the central government’s authority. It also remained a naval port for the Indian navy. Though it appears that Bombay maintained its functionality, its positionality in both of these territorializing entities – British India and India – was just as uncertain as its positionality within trading networks during the periods under investigation. In the 1830s, these uncertainties ranged from the national standardization of governing practices in British India to new free trade regulations in the British Empire, thus weakening the East India Company’s hold on certain commodities. By the mid twentieth century, planners, merchants, and business houses needed to contend with a decolonizing Cold War system of states and import substitution at home, which prioritized production for

7 M. Geyer, Portals of Globalization, in: W. Eberhard and C. Lübke (eds.), *The Plurality of Europe: Identities and Spaces*; Contributions made at an International Conference Leipzig, 6 - 9 June 2007, Leipzig 2010, pp. 509–520, p. 510.

8 M. Middell and K. Naumann, Global History and the Spatial Turn, in: *Journal of Global History*, 5 (2010) 1, p. 162.

9 M. Maruschke, Zones of Reterritorialization: India’s Free Trade Zones in Comparative Perspective, 1947 to the 1980s, in: *Journal of Global History*, 12 (2017) 3, pp. 410–432, p. 413. C. Miller, From Foreign Concessions to Special Economic Zones: Decolonization and Foreign Investment in Twentieth-Century Asia, in: L. James and E. Leake (eds.), *Decolonization and the Cold War: Negotiating Independence*, London 2015, pp. 239–253.

the domestic market. In both contexts, planners, merchants, and business houses sought to regain their positionality under new circumstances; plans to implement free ports and free zones functioned as projects to control flows of goods and capital in certain places and to reposition this port city within spatial orders.

The port sector is an interesting sector to study from a local point of view, precisely because a port's outlook must be rooted in its trading networks, its institutional embeddedness in the state, and its competition. A port needs specific types of infrastructure – at the port itself, as well as in its forward and backward linkages – to deal with trade within its circuits, and it must avoid a tariff disadvantage in comparison to port competitors. In this article, to understand how actors sought to manage the positionality of Bombay's port in its networks, competition, and spatial orders, I look first at a free-port plan from 1833.¹⁰ This plan provides a view into how merchants – themselves quite mobile – sought to reposition the city within British imperial port networks, as governance in India became more territorial and an imperial free trade system emerged. The second part of this article discusses plans for the city to deal with the aftermath of having been a nodal naval and commercial port under the British Empire. The tension lies between trying to maintain a central role in India's trade and to create a more sustainable living space that reworks, to some degree, the spatial inequalities produced in the city under colonialism. Therefore, looking at plans – even failed ones – reveal how actors sought to deal with changes in the port's connectedness and embeddedness in shifting spatial regimes.

2. A Free Port for Bombay

Bombay looks to the casual observer like an obvious location for a port city, ideally suited for commerce due to the presence of a natural harbour as well as its centrality along India's western coastline. However, a fraught process of institutionalization and infrastructure development made it into the thriving port it became. After an initially unsuccessful attempt to settle Bombay, King Charles II granted the East India Company the rights to settle the islands in 1667, which established the first factory there in 1668. However, the East India Company worked for over two centuries to eclipse Surat, another west-coast port city that hosted many European factories, and establish Bombay as the supreme trading port on India's west coast. This project was finally successful, solidified in part by the floods and fires that destroyed Surat in 1837, but it was mainly a result of the growing political power of the East India Company that diverted trade to Bombay.¹¹ Following the company and private merchants' push to shape Bombay into western India's primary port, the city and its port were soon embedded within the growing territorial rule of the company over much of India, resulting by 1858 in direct British

10 The research for this article is based on my dissertation: M. Maruschke, *Portals of Globalization: Mumbai's Free Ports and Free Zones, c. 1833–2015*, Dissertation, Universität Leipzig, 2016.

11 M. Kosambi, *Commerce, Conquest and the Colonial City: Role of Locational Factors in the Rise of Bombay*, in: *Economic and Political Weekly*, 20 (1985) 1, pp. 32–37.

rule over India; the company was dissolved soon thereafter. By the 1860s, major engineering projects reshaped the city – the construction of railways, new docking facilities, and the opening of the Suez Canal – which followed on the heels of a cotton boom. The trade boom in cotton during the American Civil War period (1861–1865),¹² but also opium trade with China, created a demand to expand port facilities along with the city itself. In short, scholars who try to understand the centrality of Bombay in British imperial and Indian trading networks agree that specific individuals, governmental institutions, and collective actors such as business houses sought to make Bombay central within these networks.¹³ They also worked hard to foster and produce these trade connections in the first place.

This section recounts one of these efforts to produce and reinforce Bombay port's centrality in colonial trading networks. It examines how business elite in Bombay sought to institute a free port in the harbour during the 1830s, during a period of shifting imperial trade and the increasing territorialization of India. My focus is on how the plan fit into these actors' strategy to both reposition the city, in terms of gaining importance in the empire, and how this repositioning would be enabled by the city playing a more central role as a key node in a British imperial trade route. The way trade was managed within the formation of "India" and in the British Empire as a whole, were major factors behind Bombay's shifting port practices.

2.1 Shifting Spatial Frameworks in India and the British Empire

As a chartered company, the East India Company controlled British trade between the so-called East Indies and Britain, while the trade within the East Indies, basically any intra-Asian trade, including that between China and India, was operated by private merchants.¹⁴ The East India Company, unlike other European trading companies, allowed extensive private participation in trade, making the organization extremely flexible.¹⁵ This private participation, however, was also necessary, as the company was forbidden from shipping opium to China, which had banned its sale through imperial edict; the company's sale of opium there would jeopardize its trading rights in China. Therefore, private traders operating "country craft" would sell Indian opium, allowing for the purchase of luxury items destined for the British market such as tea. Instead, Parsi (Zoroastrians of Persian descent living in India, especially Bombay) and European agency houses, including many in Bombay, procured the opium crop and shipped it to China,

12 S. Beckert, *Emancipation and Empire: Reconstructing the Worldwide Web of Cotton Production in the Age of the American Civil War*, in: *The American Historical Review*, 109 (2004) 5, pp. 1405–1438.

13 For example, see: M. Kosambi, *Bombay and Poona: A Socio-Ecological Study of two Indian cities; 1650–1900*, Stockholm 1980.

14 K.N. Chaudhuri, *The English East India Company: The Study of an Early Joint-Stock Company 1600–1640*, 1965 (reprint), London 1999. See also: K.N. Chaudhuri, *The Trading World of Asia and the English East India Company, 1660–1760*, 1978 (reprint), Cambridge 2006.

15 P. Marshall, *Private British Trade in the Indian Ocean before 1800*, in: A.D. Gupta and M.N. Pearson (eds.), *India and the Indian Ocean, 1500–1800*, Calcutta 1987, pp. 276–300; O. Prakash, *The English East India Company and India*, in: H.V. Bowen, M. Lincoln, and N. Rigby (eds.), *The Worlds of the East India Company*, Suffolk 2002, pp. 1–18.

a practice that by 1820 had become highly profitable.¹⁶ Bombay was an important node in the opium network along with Singapore, where opium was trans-shipped, and Canton, its destination. This position ensured both the accumulation of wealth by private individuals in Bombay and the need to create more and better docking facilities on the island.

Through the company's territorial expansion, especially from around the turn of the nineteenth century, it could control trade flows while not always participating directly in that trade itself. This territorial expansion allowed the company to control access to commodities, including opium, by channelling commodities through particular ports. Controlling the opium trade was, therefore, an important factor driving the company's territorial expansion, according to Nick Robins. The opium grown in Malwa, part of the Maratha territory, was being exported through Portuguese-controlled outposts, such as Goa, and then shipped to Macao, which depressed the price of the company's Bengal opium.¹⁷ After unsuccessfully trying to control the Malwa trade, the company allowed Malwa opium to be transported to Bombay for a small transit duty. By 1831, 90 per cent of Malwa opium passed through Bombay.¹⁸ In total, exports of opium from India to China grew from approximately 4,000 chests at the turn of the nineteenth century to 23,000 chests by 1833.¹⁹ By 1843, the company conquered Sind, the territory with the only remaining ports in India that shipped non-company opium.

In 1813 and 1833, changes within the East India Company shifted how trade was carried out throughout the empire. The company had lost its exclusive trading rights to and from Asia, due to the "free trade" lobby at Lancashire's manufacturing industries.²⁰ As the company gained power and land in India, it conversely subsided to pressure by private merchants in Britain and India, and lost its monopoly trading rights on all goods, apart from tea, through the Charter Act of 1813. The subsequent Charter Act of 1833 reorganized the East India Company's control over India: it limited the legislative powers of the governors of the Madras and Bombay presidencies, administrative units in colonial India that were two of the three major centres of British political power. This act also turned the governor general of Bengal into the governor general of India. Thus, a process of state-building was under way, which was characterized by a combination of territorial expansion, upscaling, and simultaneous state decentralization.²¹ That is to say, as more competencies fell under the authority of a growing Indian government, it was also in a process of decentralizing itself financially from the Bengal Presidency. These transitions produced many opportunities but also anxieties in Bombay.

16 J. Keay, *The Honourable Company: A History of the English East India Company*, New York 1991, pp. 454–455.

17 N. Robins, *The Corporation that Changed the World: How the East India Company Shaped the Modern Multinational*, 2nd ed., London 2012, p. 159.

18 *Ibid.*

19 *Ibid.*

20 J. Keay, *The Honourable Company* (fn. 16), pp. 451–453.

21 E. Thompson and G.T. Garratt, *Rise and Fulfilment of British Rule in India*, Allahabad 1962, p. 473.

2.2. The Free-Port Plan

Bombay merchant houses advocated a free port for Bombay based on changes in shipping within the empire, the territorial restructuring of India, as well as specific problems with shipping charges in Canton. These negotiations over the shape of the port took place at a time when it was unclear who should and would control trade and Bombay's port: private commercial actors; an emerging central government of India, or the local government of Bombay. Moreover, the port complex was not a single port. The navy controlled part of the foreshore, while other locations included private and open facilities. In short, there was not a single Bombay port to speak of.

Empire-wide changes prompted local action in Bombay. Mariam Dossal writes, "Bombay merchants felt they would be able to hold their own if trade incentives were provided, import and export duties withdrawn, and Bombay declared a free port."²² There were three proposals floated by Bombay-based merchants to the government, all of which involved changes in warehousing at the docks and customs fees. The most extensive of which, and the one perceived to be most useful, was the "Free Port or Entrepôt for China Goods" model. Doveton and Bruce, the firm that formed the committee to consider the plan, described the situation in Canton and competition as the key motivating factors. These factors external to Bombay prompted a search for models by the city's merchants to reorganize the port and customs procedures. The plan was meant to reorganize trade between Canton and Bombay and, ultimately, between Bombay and British ports. Bombay was an important port in the opium trade to Canton, as outlined previously. However, there were few goods traders could bring back to Bombay, meaning that ships were only fully laden in one direction. Furthermore, the way that ships were charged customs fees at Canton was favourable to larger vessels because ships paid similar fees, regardless of size.²³ These merchants proposed that by freely allowing goods to be imported and (re-) exported from Bombay with very limited charges, only enough to cover costs, Bombay could become an entrepôt between China and Britain. Opium traders could ship opium to Canton and return to Bombay with tea. Traders from Britain would only have to sail as far as Bombay for tea, rather than to China.

The Bombay government was not entirely drawn in by the proposal, but recognized that in the wake of the change to a free trade system, a new business environment was emerging. In 1834, the Bombay government sent a questionnaire to various firms to seek their opinion on the matter. Replies were received from some of the most prominent businesses, such as Forbes and Co., Remington and Co., Nicol and Co., B. and A. Hornusjee and Co., Leckie and Co., Adam Skinner and Co., Thomas Crawford, Roger de Faria and Co., and Jamsetjee Jejeebhoy and Co.²⁴ Many of these companies founded, just

22 M. Dossal, *Imperial Designs and Indian Realities: The Planning of Bombay City, 1845–1875*, New Delhi 1991, pp. 143–144.

23 B. Doveton and W.C. Bruce to L.R. Reid, January 20 (1834), p. 3 (Z/E/4/14/D557, 1834–1837), India Separate Revenue Department (ISR), General Correspondence (GC), India Office Records (IOR), British Library (BL).

24 M. Dossal, *Imperial Designs* (fn. 22), p. 144.

a few years later, the Bombay Chamber of Commerce and Industry, which pushed for many of the future key developments of Bombay's port.²⁵ The questionnaire asked merchants to analyse the trade situation, not only in Bombay but within the trading network of the empire. These questions related to their experience and knowledge of Singapore as a model free port, and whether such a system in Singapore was harmful to Bombay's trade, or whether Bombay should form part of a system of free ports that would link Bombay to Singapore. The questions also dealt with how to balance the interests of private traders, who were vital to the city and presidency's success, with the need for public revenue under the current shifting circumstances of Bombay as a presidency.²⁶

Popular opinion among Indian and European merchants were in favour of turning Bombay into a free port. Despite references to Singapore (without mentioning the specifics of Singapore's port), the proposal, in fact, suggested something along the lines of a modified bonded warehouse, a secured warehouse in which goods could be stored duty-free until sale or trans-shipment. The bonded warehouse system had been implemented at several ports in Britain since the early 1800s, and this was, in fact, seen as the main solution that could be tailored to Bombay, whose merchants advocated for a bonded warehouse for all goods meant for re-export. In contrast, the Bombay government advocated a bonded warehouse specifically for "China goods" that were to be re-exported, thus directing very specific trade flows without losing other customs revenue.²⁷ The debates within these letters between Bombay merchants, the government of Bombay, and the government of India relate to whether this system should be confined to "China goods"; whether only Bombay or a system of ports should be reformed, or whether other locations might be more favourable. These letters compared port practices in Calcutta and Madras to Bombay, Singapore, Canton, Cape Town, and British "home ports." They were in search of a model, but each group of actors – the government of Bombay, Bombay's merchants, and the government of India – had different motivations for controlling trade in Bombay; no model could truly satisfy all interests.

What emerged from these negotiations is that the Bombay government could no longer act entirely on its own to implement such a scheme, but needed to defer to the government of India, which, in turn, validated the argument that converting Bombay into a free port by eliminating import and export duties, would increase shipping and trade, but it objected to providing specific incentives at one Indian port without taking into consideration the acquired territory as a whole. The government of India agreed to become acquainted with the various systems of ports within the three presidencies that formed the new "British Territories in India" so that it could reform customs practices as a single, unified system, rather than a piecemeal promotion.²⁸ This view changed

25 For these developments, see: S. Hazareesingh, *Interconnected Synchronicities: The Production of Bombay and Glasgow as Modern Global Ports, c. 1850–1880*, in: *Journal of Global History*, 1 (2009) 4, pp. 7–31.

26 "Queries for Answers," *Fort William*, May 19, no. 5. Govt. Dept. (1834), ISRD, GC, IOR, BL.

27 Separate Department letter to the Court of Directors of the East India Company, July 25 (1834), ISRD, GC, IOR, BL.

28 "Note prepared by the Secretary to Government in the General Department," April 25 (1834), ISRD, GC, IOR, BL.

Bombay's position from a port within a system of ports connected through their trading patterns to a port controlled by a territorial power with an interest in its activities. Its practices no longer needed to be connected to practices in "foreign" ports, such as Canton or Singapore, but rather to other "Indian" ports. Therefore, while merchants in Bombay still saw Bombay as a port connected to its trading networks, the government began to see it as part of a territorial system that required uniform management. The framework for comparative policies shifted, leaving a territorial rather than a networked understanding of the positionality of Bombay's port.

Regardless of this decision to not turn Bombay into a free port, by the 1850s, Bombay had become an entrepôt for the export of opium to China, and by the 1860s a major cotton exporter, despite not having ever been a "free port." Bombay's first cotton mills were established by local entrepreneurs, many of whom were Parsis, using the proceeds of this trade. In the 1860s, private development of the harbour resulted in competing port facilities that dominated the foreshore. By the 1870s, the Bombay Port Trust was established, which eventually took over all of these facilities. Bombay's trade was finally controlled under a single authority, which favoured facilities for steamships, increasingly in use by British merchants by the 1870s, over the sails used by Indians. The port's infrastructure reinforced desired, imperial trade routes.²⁹

Today, the Bombay Port Trust is the largest landholder in the city, occupying approximately the same 1,800 acres it gained in the 1870s and 1880s.³⁰ It is still run by the central government as a trust. The central government, therefore, owns most of the harbour and is the largest landholder in Mumbai today. The city is managed by various subnational State³¹ institutions, leading to regular conflict with the port, i.e. central government, over the role that the port and sea-based trade should play in the city's economy.

3. A New Port, City, and Zone for Bombay

In the following, I outline how, following independence (1947), Bombay's elite and local government sought to deal with the legacy of having once been an important port city for the British Empire, which includes changing the spatial dynamics of the port in the city, but also repositioning the city in external trade networks, even under import substitution. Since independence, managing the port and industry's negative impacts on the city's space – but maintaining the port's necessary functions for Bombay and India's economy – have been key debates. These debates on how to rein in the negative effects of the port's centrality but profit from its connectivity have been connected to larger issues regarding urbanization and industrialization.

29 For details on these developments, see: Hazareesingh, *Interconnected Synchronicities* (fn. 25).

30 D. D'Monte, *Old Port Trust, Lands on the Dock*, in: *Mumbai Reader '08*, Mumbai 2009, pp. 204–209, pp. 204–205.

31 A capitalized "State" is used to refer to a subnational state rather than the state of India.

3.1 Bombay in Independent India

Bombay's port faced a number of challenges in the decades following independence. Its trade continued to flourish, and under import substitution, goods were produced in India for the domestic market. However, manufacturing inputs and machinery needed to be procured from abroad for such production. Dealing with the congestion of both the port and the city were part of key issues – including industrialization, population growth, and resulting urban planning – facing India, Bombay State (after 1960, Maharashtra State), and its capital, Bombay.

As early as the 1920s and 1930s, international organizations identified population growth in what would soon be known as “third world” countries as a potential cause for concern,³² and for planners in India, this demographic trend was seen as a challenge to overcome nationwide.³³ Following independence, the central government did not focus on urban planning, as only 16.8 per cent of India's population lived in urban areas by 1951; rather, industrialization informed urban planning.³⁴ Industries were lured away from urban centres to balance population growth and decongest urban centres developed during the British Empire, which was also meant to bring jobs to where most Indians lived, the countryside. By the 1960s and the 1970s, populations in major cities like New Delhi, Bombay, Calcutta, and Madras were growing at an annual rate of 3.3 per cent. City planning slowly became a priority of the central government as part of its demographic policy, but it was largely driven by the subnational States in which these cities were located.³⁵ By 1961, while only 17.8 per cent of Indians lived in urban spaces, 28.2 per cent of Maharashtrians did.³⁶ These numbers grew steadily: by 2001, while 27.8 per cent of Indians lived in urban areas, 42.4 per cent of Maharashtra's population was urban.³⁷ There was, therefore, significant pressure on the State of Maharashtra to create a plan to deal with urbanization, long before it became a national priority. Some of the difficulties faced in the city stemmed from the very fact that it had been so central to the British Empire, and it subsequently became independent India's prime business city.

The Bombay Plan was written in 1944 by leading Indian industrialists. This plan outlined the corporate sector's vision of independent India's business environment. It was an unsuccessful attempt to create a strategic partnership between the state and Indian business houses.³⁸ However, Bombay's business elite, including the authors of the report, influenced later developments in Bombay and the State of Maharashtra, even if their

32 A. Bashford, Population, Geopolitics and International Organizations in the Mid Twentieth Century, in: *Journal of World History*, 19 (2008) 3, pp. 327–347.

33 C.R. Unger, Towards Global Equilibrium: American Foundations and Indian Modernization, 1950s to 1970s, in: *Journal of Global History*, 6 (2011) 1, pp. 121–142, pp. 137–140.

34 C.R. Unger, *Entwicklungspfade in Indien: Eine internationale Geschichte, 1947–1980*, Göttingen 2015, p. 211. See especially section three, Industrialization and Urbanization, pp. 152–274.

35 *Ibid.*, p. 211.

36 Maharashtra is the subnational state in which Bombay is located.

37 Planning Commission, Government of India, *Maharashtra Development Report*, New Delhi 2007, p. 321.

38 M. Kudaisya, The Promise of Partnership: Indian Business, the State, and the Bombay Plan of 1944, in: *Business History Review*, 88 (2014) 1, pp. 97–131.

direct influence was not sought by the central government. The State of Maharashtra was the first subnational State in India to set up its own agencies and legislation to deal with urbanization and to increase industrialization.³⁹ The State (then Bombay State, comprising today's Gujarat and Maharashtra) held a Maharashtra Commercial and Industrial Conference in 1956 to solicit views from business interests on the State's economic problems; this conference later became a regular fixture, constituting the Maharashtra Economic Development Council (MEDC) in 1957, which was a forum for business chambers throughout the State, including the Bombay Chamber of Commerce and Industry, as well as the Indian Merchant's Chamber, one of the key institutions behind the Bombay Plan.⁴⁰ By 1978, the MEDC comprised 33 constituent members, including national associations for specific sectors, and over 300 associate members representing national and local businesses,⁴¹ some of which were subsidiaries of foreign firms.⁴² Shortly after founding the MEDC, the State set up a Board of Industrial Development in 1960, which eventually became the Maharashtra Industrial Development Corporation (MIDC) in 1962 through the Maharashtra Industrial Act.⁴³ These agencies promoted business interests and industrialization for Maharashtra.

While urbanization and industrialization became political priorities of the State in the decades following independence, the central government also began looking for ways to ease congestion at Bombay's port, which was and continues to be owned by the central government. The port trust operates independently and is financed by its own services but falls under the authority of the ministry of transport and is subject to the Port Trust Act (1873, 1879, and 1963). Bombay's port continued to be both a commercial port and a naval port, a legacy of its key role in British shipping and naval activities. By the 1950s, the Bombay Port Trust was the largest employer in the city and, even today, continues to be the city's largest landowner, as aforementioned.⁴⁴ The Mumbai Port Trust (as it is currently known) presently employs over 30,000 workers; about 80 per cent of its revenue is spent on wages.⁴⁵ The port's sheer magnitude leads to tensions: it is run by the central government but clearly plays a key role in the dynamics of public space and employment in Mumbai, a city managed by multiple subnational State agencies. Its trade is a national priority, but locals may profit from its trade they may also be hindered by the port's presence, congestion, and dominance of the foreshore.

By the 1940s, city planners in Bombay were concerned about overcrowding in the city, and sought solutions to create a counter-magnet that would attract new arrivals away

39 A. Shaw, *The Making of Navi Mumbai*, New Delhi 2004, p. 61.

40 Maharashtra Economic Development Council (MEDC), MEDC: 1957–1977, Bombay (1978), p. 1, General Reference Collection (GRC), BL.

41 Some firms operated nationwide and were headquartered in other cities and/or in Bombay.

42 MEDC, MEDC: 1957–1977 (fn. 40), pp. 10–18.

43 "About Us. History," Maharashtra Industrial Development Corporation website, <http://www.midcindia.org/about-midc> (accessed 22 December 2017).

44 D. D'Monte, *Ripping the Fabric: The Decline of Mumbai and its Mills*, New Delhi 2002, p. 236.

45 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, OECD, *The Competitiveness of Global Port-Cities*, s.l. 2014, p. 237; *Ibid.* (fn. 44), p. 241.

from Bombay and potentially also serve as a new home for many already living in the city. Because of Bombay's geography and historical development, based on the colonial city centre adjacent to the port, the southernmost part of the island served as the business centre. Every workday, people travelled from the north of the city to the south, and then returned to the north again, leading to severe congestion (this is still the case). Many of the State's industrial areas were located within the city, causing further congestion. The city and port's spatiality heavily reflected the imbalance of imperialism, which prioritized trade and defence.

3.2 Expanding Bombay Port

In 1946, the Grace Committee was appointed to reorganize the navy's only dockyard at Bombay's port and discuss the future direction of the Indian navy after independence. In 1947, the committee's report concluded that expansion of the navy's facilities at the current site was not possible, since it was restricted by a built-up city and the commercial traffic at the port. The committee suggested shifting the navy out of Bombay's port to the mainland side of Bombay's harbour (Thane Creek) at Nhava Sheva.⁴⁶ This recommendation was not followed because the site selected, though ideal for a deepwater port, was completely undeveloped: there was no electricity, no running water, no railroad, and no roads connected to the site. The navy stayed at their present location and sought to reclaim land instead, but the idea of shifting port facilities to Nhava Sheva remained in the minds of the Bombay Port Trust, which ran the commercial side of the port. Nhava Sheva and the surrounding area of Bombay's eastern-mainland side of the harbour became the focus of the State of Maharashtra's efforts to decongest Bombay's population, industry, and port, all legacies of having been an imperial port city. By the early 1950s, the government of India believed that the present site of the port had been exhausted. There were draft limitations, not to mention congestion facing the port within the harbour, and on the mainland, rail and road connections to the port. In 1964, the Bombay Port Trust master plan, undertaken by the consultants Bertlin & Partners, UK, proposed extending the port's facilities to Nhava Sheva.⁴⁷ This extension to the mainland coincided with the identification of the mainland side of Bombay's harbour as a site for a future satellite city for Bombay. The planned port at Nhava Sheva set the terms of the agreement for the location of the new satellite city.⁴⁸

46 G.M. Hiranandani, *Transition to Eminence: The Indian Navy 1976–1990*, New Delhi 2005, p. 135.

47 Ministry of Shipping and Transport, Government of India, 1969–1970, Annual Report, 42–43, Annual Reports (AR), India Office Records (IOD), Central Secretariat Library (CSL); World Bank, Project Completion Report, India. Nhava Sheva Port Project. Report Number 12189, July 14 (1993), p. 1, http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/1993/07/14/000009265_3960925200204/Rendered/PDF/multi_page.pdf (accessed 22 December 2017); and Ministry of Shipping and Transport, Government of India, 1968–1969, Annual Report, p. 35, AR, IOD, CSL.

48 R. Mehrotra, *Twin City: Navi Mumbai Thirty Years Later*, in: *Mumbai Reader '07*, Mumbai 2008, pp. 118–129, p. 119.

The proposals from the 1960s echoed a 1945 post-war development-committee recommendation that areas on the mainland across Bombay's harbour be developed to curb the city's growth; just two years later, an unofficial report by N.V. Modak and Albert Meyer urged for a policy of "industrial dispersal" out of Bombay that would be supported by housing.⁴⁹ Both publications were influential in subsequent reports and legislation that sought to restrict industrial sites through land-use zoning (districting) policies. A 1965 publication by Bombay's leading architects, Charles Correa and Pravina Mehta, as well as the engineer Shirish Patel advocated a single urban area to be developed on the mainland connected across the harbour to Bombay.⁵⁰ This article in the journal *Modern Architects Research Group* became influential and secured the idea of a "twin city" for Bombay, as a solution for its congestion and overcrowding.⁵¹ This publication was endorsed by the MEDC, which formed a study council for the development of the mainland across the harbour the following year, and invited the authors of this plan to participate. Along with academics and industry representatives, the Bombay Port Trust also sent representatives to the meeting to consider the development of a town that elaborated on the *Modern Architects Research Group* publication and referred directly to the English *New Towns Act* of 1946.⁵²

At the 1964 meeting of the MEDC, a free trade zone to be developed by the government of Maharashtra was proposed for Nhava Sheva to complement the new city and the port-expansion scheme,⁵³ which would assist in "industrial dispersal," and the influx of foreign trade would help to establish the port. The fact that this zone was proposed by a business lobby for a State government is significant; while major ports like Bombay Port Trust and free trade zones fell under the authority of the central government through the ministry of transport and the ministry of commerce and industry, the government of Maharashtra along with private-business interests there sought to play a larger role in these policy areas by linking these policies to a subnational State policy: the creation of the New Bombay satellite town on the other side of Bombay's harbour. At first, this zone proposal was rather vague:

*The Govt. [of Maharashtra] should implement the proposals for formation of State ports and shipping committee... [and] should investigate the potentialities of creating a free trade zone round one of the ports.*⁵⁴

The minor and intermediate ports were under the authority of the State, rather than the central government's ministry of transport, but congestion was so severe at Bombay Port

49 A. Shaw, *Navi Mumbai* (fn. 39), p. 63.

50 C. Correa, P. Mehta, and S. Patel, *Planning for Bombay*, in: *MARG*, 18 (1965) 3, pp. 30–56, *Indian Merchants' Chamber (IMC)*.

51 A. Shaw, *Navi Mumbai* (fn. 39), pp. 66–67.

52 *Ibid.*, pp. 74–75.

53 MEDC, *MEDC: 1957–1977* (fn. 40) p. 46.

54 *Ibid.*

(a major, central-government port) that the State played an active role in pushing for the selection of a new site for port expansion at Nhava Sheva.

In 1965, the central government established a free trade zone at Kandla, a remote port in northwest India (Gujarat).⁵⁵ When the central government intimated that it had no additional plans for zones beyond Kandla, the MEDC changed its strategy:

*The Government [of Maharashtra] should establish an industrial estate in Maharashtra where goods could be imported under bonded warehouses, processed and reexported so as to avoid the usual formalities of import duties, excise duties, etc.*⁵⁶

Describing such a policy as a “bonded” industrial estate in the above quote was strategic: the central government sanctioned State governments to implement industrial estates,⁵⁷ though, in fact, bonded warehouses were generally located on central government port-trust land and were reviewed by the central government’s ministry of finance.⁵⁸ The proposed space could, therefore, be a zone, without officially being labelled a free trade zone: the central or State government could set up an industrial estate on port-trust land (Nhava Sheva) and also label it a bonded warehouse, thus creating a zone-estate hybrid that would be equivalent to a free trade zone and would likely cater to exporting Indian businesses rather than foreign firms. These industrialists were hoping to create such a loophole.

Unlike the export-processing zone, industrial estates were widely pursued by States within India, starting with an industrial estate in 1955 in Rajkot, Gujarat. Several industrial estates set up in the 1950s and early 1960s were joint projects including Indo-American, Indo-German, Indo-Japanese, and Indo-French centres.⁵⁹ By 1972, there were already 572 industrial estates approved, 427 of which had been built, and as many as 366 were already in operation all over India;⁶⁰ these estates could be sponsored by either the central government or States, and a small percentage of estates (2 per cent by 1970) were also private.⁶¹ Within India, the industrial-estate programme was widely used to encourage small businesses to manufacture for the domestic market.⁶² This tool referenced international standards for estates promoted by the United Nations Industrial Development

55 For Kandla Free Trade Zone, see: Maruschke, *Zones of Reterritorialization* (fn. 9); P. Neveling, *Structural Continuities and Untimely Coincidences in the Making of Neoliberal India: The Kandla Free Trade Zone, 1965–91*, *Contributions to Indian Sociology*, 48 (2014) 1, pp. 17–43.

56 MEDC, MEDC (fn 40), p. 68. Found in: *Summary of Reports of the Sectional Committees as Finally Adopted at the Maharashtra Commercial and Industrial Conference, 1964* (emphasis added).

57 P.C. Alexander, *Industrial Estates in India*, Small Industry Extension Training Institute, New York; Bombay 1963, p. 17.

58 Ministry of Finance, Department of Revenue, Government of India, *Report of the Customs Reorganisation Committee*, s.l. 1958, p. 69, AR, IOD, CSL.

59 A.S.E. Iyer, *Co-operation Between and Assistance to Small-Scale units in Industrial Estates in India*, in: *Industrial Estates in Asia and the Far East*, New York 1962.

60 Report of the Working Group on Financing of Industrial Estates, Bombay 1972.

61 United Nations Industrial Development Organization. *Guidelines for the Establishment of Industrial Estates in Developing Countries*. Vienna 1978, p. 21.

62 S. Deva, *Establishment of Industrial Estates in India*, in: *Journal of Administration Overseas*, 15 (1976) 3, pp. 150–159.

Organization and championed by the Stanford Research Institute in California, United States.⁶³ The industrial-estate programme, though carried out mainly by States, was a national strategy with the explicit purpose of enabling industries to move out of cities like Bombay and Calcutta (known as “industrial dispersal”), to remove the imbalanced concentration of industries that had developed out of colonial trade relations.⁶⁴ More broadly, the estate was part of independent India's import-substitution policy, whereby production was aimed for the national rather than international market, the goal of which was to overcome the trade inequalities established by colonialism and entrenched in neocolonialism.

Through the planning of New Bombay and the Nhava Sheva port, New Bombay was extensively connected to districting development concepts, whereby decentralized residential nodes would be accompanied by industrial districts. Several industrial belts had been developed in the area by the MIDC as early as 1962, before development on the twin city began.⁶⁵ These areas were purchased by the parastatal agency, developed into plots with industrial sheds that were connected to power grids, water, etc., and were then leased to small-scale industries. These spaces were seen as serving a very local purpose of decongesting Bombay, while also creating jobs and promoting small-scale industrial production for the domestic market. They were, therefore, outlets for import substitution that simultaneously served as vehicles for local development. They operated within the domestic economy, not apart from it, and were oriented towards the even spatial distribution of domestic industrial growth. They were the impetus of the Indian import substitution drive.

In contrast, the free trade zone proposed for Nhava Sheva would serve a national purpose of generating foreign exchange through exports needed for domestic production to continue. Rather than focusing on internal connections, such a space of external articulation required, according to Indian officials, a remote location which served the purpose of shielding the new city from the externally oriented activities of the zone:

*A Free-Trade Zone should be created near a major port where ample facilities for ocean-going ships are available or can be created... It would be advantageous to the Free-Trade Zone to have such a natural boundary as would facilitate customs supervision, and thereby discourage the smuggling of goods into the country.*⁶⁶

The idea of creating a new space that would shield the area around the zone to prevent smuggling had already been fulfilled by Kandla's port and its free trade zone. Bombay had been one of the first considerations for India's first zone, but as this report indicates,

63 W. Bredo, *Industrial Estates: Tools for Industrialization*, International Industrial Development Centre, Stanford Research Institute, Glencoe, IL 1960.

64 United Nations Industrial Development Organization, *The Effectiveness of Industrial Estates in Developing Countries*, Vienna 1978, p. 57; P.C. Alexander, *Industrial Estates in India* (fn. 57), p. vii.

65 A. Shaw, *Navi Mumbai* (fn. 39), p. 117.

66 Maharashtra Economic Development Council, *Report on Free-Trade Zone in Maharashtra*, 1964 (reprint) 1970, p. 3, GRC, BL (emphasis my own).

the Free-Trade Zone Committee of the Board of Trade (ministry of commerce) found the idea of isolating any portion of Bombay's port "impossible," which is why the plan was shifted to Kandla's remote location.⁶⁷ In fact, Kandla's port was supported because of its potential to decongest Bombay's port.

The MEDC planners, Bombay's business elite, planned to turn Bombay port's woes – congestion – into a sign of its strength and importance to the Indian state. The fact that the port was so busy indicated that it should be expanded, and therefore, Bombay's population and industries should likewise follow the port across the harbour. The port-zone complex was considered an essential component of this strategy:

*All these views and ideas suggest the conclusion that the best remedy for relieving congestion in Bombay and accelerating industrialisation around Bombay is to explore the possibilities of creating a large new port near Bombay and establishing a Free-Trade Zone around such a new port. The satellite towns to be formed for relieving the congestion in Bombay should be, as the Industrial Location Panel has remarked, within a few hours' distance from the City of Bombay in order to enable industrialists and industries to maintain a close contact with the city. Such a port and Free-Trade Zone, in our view, can be created at Shewa-Neva (Sheva-Nhava) located only seven miles to the East of Bombay Harbour and situated on the Kolaba coast line of Thana Creek. This port could serve as a big import and export centre and would thereby reduce appreciably the pressure on Bombay harbor. Moreover, by virtue of its being a new port it would be free from the serious population and industrial concentration and, therefore, it would be ideal for creating a Free-Trade Zone.*⁶⁸

Bombay served a national function of connecting India to world trade and, therefore, needed to be decongested to continue serving India's industrialization drive. This report, while emphasizing the official policy of urban decongestion, acknowledged that dynamic places like Bombay were still central to Indian and local business interests. Bombay, more so than any other location within India, had the necessary skilled technicians, labourers, and entrepreneurs needed for a national export drive.⁶⁹ Promoting exports to the Western market was a key component in increasing India's foreign-exchange earnings, allowing Indian businesses to purchase the imported inputs needed for domestic production under import substitution.

MEDC planners situated Bombay as a port city of national importance, not only one that is externally connected. To do so, they referenced other important ports in the US:

Highly industrialised port-cities like New York, San Francisco, New Orleans, etc. have Free-Trade Zones which clearly suggests that it is always convenient to establish Free Tra-

67 Ibid., p. 4; see also Maruschke, *Zones of Reterritorialization* (fn. 9).

68 Maharashtra Economic Development Council, *Report on Free-Trade Zone* (fn. 66), p. 4.

69 Ibid., p. 5.

*de-Zones near industrial port towns, and that a Free-Trade Zone at Shewa-Neva which is in the proximity of Bombay City would be the ideal location.*⁷⁰

The Nhava Sheva port and free-trade-zone project enabled a natural boundary and isolation on the one hand, and connectedness on the other hand: access to markets such as West Asia (Middle East), North and East Africa, as well as Australia.⁷¹ The interplay between these two tendencies – isolation and connection – indicates a view that managing this space and the potentially connectedness it enabled was a national priority.⁷² The Indian Council of Foreign Trade concurred that Bombay's mainland contained the locational advantage for a zone: it was at once isolated and well-connected to port facilities.⁷³ Eventually the project for creating a free trade zone at Nhava Sheva was dropped and Bombay's zone was developed at Santacruz in 1973, near the airport on the island, rather than the mainland side or near the port.

3.3 A New Port City in Bombay's Harbour

Though the free-trade-zone project pursued by the State government in relation to New Bombay was dropped, the idea of a new port city was pursued further. In 1970, the State government accepted that Bombay's growth could be curbed by the proposed twin city and formed the City and Industrial Development Corporation of Maharashtra (CIDCO) to develop New Bombay. CIDCO is a limited public company listed under the Indian Company Act, which is wholly owned by the State.⁷⁴ CIDCO came up with a draft plan for the new city by 1973, which formed the basis for the city's development from the 1970s onwards. Having been developed mainly by this single parastatal agency, the new city's planning was relatively comprehensive.

The Bombay Port Trust was the main advocate of the plan to construct a satellite port on the mainland, to relieve traffic congestion at the present site. Still, in the mid 1970s, it appeared that the satellite port would be an extension of Bombay's port, rather than a separate institution, and the Bombay Port Trust was the body that moved to acquire the land at Nhava Sheva.⁷⁵ In 1973, Nhava Sheva and a port outside Calcutta, Haldia, were both selected by the ministry of transport to focus intensively on container traffic, specifically to overtake the container-handling abilities of Bombay's port.⁷⁶ By 1980 the Nhava Sheva project had only just started acquiring land, constructing the site, and receiving the necessary financing; at this point, congestion was so severe at Bombay's port that the ministry of shipping reported times when there were more than 30 ships waiting

70 Ibid., p. 5.

71 Ibid., p. 6.

72 Maruschke, *Zones of Reterritorialization* (fn. 9).

73 Report on Free-Trade Zone (fn. 66), p. 5.

74 A. Shaw, *Navi Mumbai* (fn. 39), p. 83.

75 Ministry of Shipping and Transport, Government of India, 1971–1972, Annual Report, pp. 45–46, AR, IOD, CSL; Ministry of Shipping and Transport, Government of India, 1974–1975, Annual Report, p. 39, AR, IOD, CSL.

76 Ministry of Shipping and Transport, Government of India, 1972–1973, Annual Report, p. 46, AR, IOD, CSL.

approximately one and a half months to berth at the port.⁷⁷ Though Nhava Sheva had been planned for container traffic, by 1980, the Bombay Port Trust moved to acquire additional equipment to facilitate the growth in container traffic, by which point in time Nhava Sheva became a separate port project, rather than connected to Bombay Port Trust management.⁷⁸

A clean break with old institutions influenced the development of the new port. By the 1980s, the funding and construction of Nhava Sheva was under way as a separate port, as it was recorded in ministry of shipping documents under its own section, rather than under the Bombay Port Trust.⁷⁹ According to the World Bank project completion report, Kandla and Bombay's ports were other financiers of the project, along with the central government.⁸⁰ It was also financed by loans from the World Bank, the government of the Netherlands, and the Saudi Fund for Development.⁸¹ All three provided consulting in relation to the port project. When the port opened in 1989, it was named Jawaharlal Nehru Port Trust after India's first prime minister. The name suits it: the port is nationally important in that currently almost 60 per cent of India's entire container traffic is routed through the port.⁸² It is specifically heralded as India's port of global and national importance, and in current national infrastructure drives, Narendra Modi, India's current prime minister, has given speeches to open new facilities there. Despite the new name, it is still colloquially referred to by locals as well as shippers and logistics firms as Nhava Sheva.

Today, the two trusts are both owned by the central government and were meant to be complementary. Mumbai's port was meant to focus on break-bulk cargo and petroleum, oil, and lubricants, while the Jawaharlal Nehru port would cover container traffic. Major foreign shipping companies that had frequented Mumbai's port switched their services to the Jawaharlal Nehru port during the 1990s, including Maersk, American President Lines, SeaLand, and P&O, which costed Mumbai Port Trust, according to a prominent local journalist, INR 10 million revenue per day.⁸³ Instead of dying a "natural death," as many city planners and activists in Mumbai would have liked, Mumbai's port has continued to seek new deals to expand its capacity to challenge the Jawaharlal Nehru port.⁸⁴ Mumbai's port is extending its facilities to include an offshore berth to handle container traffic, while the Jawaharlal Nehru port now has a liquid-cargo terminal and is in the

77 Ministry of Shipping and Transport, Government of India, 1980–1981, Annual Report, p. 23, AR, IOD, CSL.

78 Ibid., p. 27.

79 Ministry of Shipping and Transport, Government of India, 1984–1985, Annual Report, p. 33, AR, IOD, CSL.

80 World Bank, Project Completion Report (fn. 47), p. 20.

81 Listed here as the Saudi Fund Development Authority: Ministry of Surface Transport, Government of India, 1988–1989, Annual Report, p. 58, AR, IOD, CSL.

82 U.R. Patel and S. Bhattacharya, *Infrastructure in India: The Economics of Transition from Public to Private Provision*, in: *Journal of Comparative Economics*, 38 (2010) 1, pp. 52–70, p. 64.

83 D'Monte, *Ripping the Fabric* (fn. 44), p. 239. One crore equals ten million.

84 *Conflicting Signals*, *Financial Express*, February 8, 1998, in: D'Monte, *Ripping the Fabric* (fn. 44), p. 240.

process of adding special facilities for chemicals.⁸⁵ This complete separation in operations accounts for a significant deal of competition between the ports for carriers, which partly shapes how the ports operate today. Furthermore, while Mumbai's port is one of Mumbai's key institutions, city and State officials have little capacity to rein it in.

4. Conclusion

What we see both in the 1830s and in the post-independence period, indicates that actors on various scales situated Bombay's port as part of larger political projects. The relative strength of Bombay's port could enhance the state or empire, but it could also potentially detract from both by undermining trade controls. Various actors – merchants, business houses, associations, industrialists, and State government institutions – have planned how this port connects abroad, by focusing on building specific infrastructure necessary for certain types of trade, such as steamships and, later, containers. Furthermore, they sought to mitigate the effects of this connectedness. Following major shifts in the state and global economy in which this port is embedded, its facilities needed reworking to stay relevant and to mitigate the local effects of long-term connectedness. Indeed, the post-independence debates, though focused also on increasing trade and the port's relevance, also sought to deal with the consequences of having been nationally important for India's external trade, which, contradicting key elements of import substitution, was also necessary to enable production for the domestic economy. Siting a zone at a new port was intended to increase foreign trade, thereby creating a draw away from Bombay's port and city to decongest both. Therefore, creating a site of enhanced external connectedness, rather than “unbundling” that site from the state, can also be part of a plan to evenly develop state space, thereby serving a dual globalizing and territorializing function.

Portals of globalization as a research lens allows us to see how actors seek to manage global trading networks and produce regional or imperial connectivity by building up institutions and creating the physical and legal infrastructure for such a place. In contrast to the view that these places of intense transregional connectivity represent an “unbundling” of this place from the nation state, this article sought to demonstrate how, in fact, actors try to rearticulate their positionality and connectedness in a variety of overlapping spatial frameworks. These actors also seek to reposition themselves in a world order that is not always in reference to generating actual connectedness in terms of trade or other “flows.” These goals may refer to cultural or social constructs of great cities, ports, etc., which require benchmarks but do not try to manage globalization processes themselves. Furthermore, this fixation with creating or maintaining the functionality of key nodes through which actors manage “flows” of goods, capital, and people is to some extent

85 Port Details, Jawaharlal Nehru Port Trust website, http://www.jnport.gov.in/port_details.aspx (accessed 22 December 2017).

also driven by the remembrance and articulation of past experiences of having once been “global,” but also by the repercussions of past “globality.”⁸⁶ Once Bombay became an important port city for British India, what happens when such a system collapses? Therefore, there is also a drive to maintain important functions and deal with transitions to new spatial orders.

86 M. Middell, *Erinnerung an die Globalisierung? Eine ganz vorläufige Skizze zu den Portalen der Globalisierung als lieux de mémoire*, in: K. Buchinger, C. Gantet and J. Vogel (eds.), *Europäische Erinnerungsräume*, Frankfurt am Main 2008, pp. 296–308; A. Mah, *Port Cities and Global Legacies: Urban Identity, Waterfront Work, and Radicalism*, Basingstoke 2014.

Exploring Changes in Cuba's Ports and Hinterlands: Transition from US to Socialist Sugar Markets

Anne Dietrich

ABSTRACTS

Referring to the concept of portals of globalization, I examine Cuban ports in relation to the development of Cuba's economy and how they became integrated into various global networks. The aim of this article is to analyse the changes these ports underwent over time, starting from the early nineteenth century until today. While I focus on changes in the hinterland that took place in the nineteenth and early twentieth century – when Spanish and US investors dominated the Cuban sugar industry – in the first section of the article, I analyse port changes linked to foreign investments during the Cold War and in more recent years in the following two sections. By relating the changes at the ports to those that occurred in the hinterlands, I argue that the economic development in Cuba's hinterland during the nineteenth and early twentieth century caused the island's port expansion, while the modernization of the ports that has taken place since the second half of the twentieth century allowed Cuba's economic recovery.

Bezugnehmend auf das Konzept der "Portale der Globalisierung", analysiere ich die Verbindung zwischen Kubas Häfen und der Entwicklung der kubanischen Wirtschaft. Dabei gehe ich der Frage nach, wie diese in globale Netzwerke eingebunden wurden. Der Artikel verfolgt das Ziel, Veränderungen zu untersuchen, denen diese Häfen über einen Zeitraum, der sich vom frühen 19. Jh. bis heute erstreckt, unterlagen. Während ich mich im ersten Teil des Artikels auf jene Veränderungen konzentriere, die im 19. und frühen 20. Jh. im Hinterland stattfanden, als spanische und US-amerikanische Investoren die kubanische Zuckerindustrie dominierten, fasse ich mich in den darauffolgenden Abschnitten mit Hafenerneuerungen, die während des Kalten Krieges und in den letzten Jahren mit Hilfe ausländischer Investitionen getätigt wurden. Davon ausgehend, dass Veränderungen in den Hafenarealen mit jenen, die sich im Hinterland ereigneten, in Verbindung stehen, komme ich zu der Schlussfolgerung, dass die wirtschaftliche Entwicklung im kubanischen Hinterland im 19. und frühen 20. Jh. zu einem Ausbau der Häfen

auf der Insel führte, während die Hafenmodernisierungen in der zweiten Hälfte des 20. Jh.s wesentlich zu einem Wirtschaftsaufschwung Kubas beitrugen.

1. Introduction

Exploring how cross-border relationships actually work is still a challenge for historians, who research global phenomena. The concept “portals of globalization” can be a useful tool for highlighting relevant questions, such as, “[H]ow and where does globalisation make its way into one’s own country? Where are the transfer points between the internal and the external? Is there such a thing? Who are the mediating actors?”¹ Overseas ports can be interpreted as “places that have been centres of world trade or global communication, have served as entrance points for cultural transfer, and where institutions and practices for dealing with global connectedness have been developed.”² They have not only functioned as centres for economic exchange processes, where global networks were created or expanded, but also as contact points for merchants, migrants, and travellers from distant places. These travellers brought elements of their own culture with them, which were then adapted or reinterpreted within the local, regional, or national context.³ Furthermore, through the plurality of transnational encounters and the high density of foreign influences, the actors involved in port activities developed the cultural capital necessary to deal with globalization processes. The “portals of globalization” concept is by far not the only attempt by historians and social scientists to explain global phenomena, by highlighting the importance of certain places for developments on a worldwide scale. What distinguishes this concept from others, such as Saskia Sassen’s “global city” or Marc Augé’s “non-places,”⁴ is its consideration of the complex relationship between a specific place and its hinterland, which is either insufficiently or not at all taken into account by other approaches. Therefore, the portals of globalization approach, especially in reference to Geyer, focuses on the “portal functions that tried to bring cross-border links and national delimitation into accord,”⁵ when actors on a local, regional, national, or even supranational level seek to control flows of capital, goods, merchants, migrants, knowledge, and ideas at that very moment these flows cross borders, which could but may not necessarily be those of a nation state.⁶

Research on ports is helpful when looking for transnational or global connections and their effects on a national and local level. Thus, in this article I examine Cuban ports

1 M. Geyer, *Portals of Globalization*, in: W. Eberhard and C. Lübke (eds.), *The Plurality of Europe. Identities and Spaces*, Leipzig 2010, p. 509.

2 M. Middell and K. Naumann, *Global History and the Spatial Turn: From the Impact of Area Studies to the Study of Critical Junctures of Globalization*, in: *Journal of Global History* 5 (2010), p. 162.

3 Ibid., p. 162.

4 M. Augé, *Non-Places: Introduction to an Anthropology of Supermodernity*, London 1995; S. Sassen, *The Global City*, Princeton 2001.

5 M. Geyer (fn. 1), p. 515.

6 Ibid., pp. 513–519.

in relation to the development of Cuba's economy, and investigate how they became integrated into various global networks. My aim is to analyse the changes these ports underwent over time, starting from the early nineteenth century until today. Of course, the developments considered here can be understood as outcomes of previous transfer processes⁷ deriving from the slave trade and empire building in the Caribbean, for instance. By relating the changes at the ports to those that occurred in the hinterlands, I draw inferences about the economic, political, ecological, and demographic effects of transnational markets on the island's development. Though there is a correlation between changes in port infrastructure and the economy of Cuba's hinterland, the causal direction is unclear. I argue that the economic development in Cuba's hinterland during the nineteenth and early twentieth century caused the island's port expansion, while the modernization of the ports that has taken place since the second half of the twentieth century allowed for Cuba's economic revival. For that reason, I focus on changes in the hinterland in the first section and, subsequently, analyse port changes in the following two sections. Foreign investors played an important role throughout the whole period under consideration.

As it is not possible to discuss all variations of cross-border phenomena, I concentrate on certain commodity flows. One commodity chain in particular is central to the developments and transfer processes observed here: sugar. The beginning of the Cuban sugar economy dates back to the end of the eighteenth century. Initially, the sugar economy relied heavily on slave labour, and sugar production was not industrialized until the nineteenth century, despite the fact that sugar plantations were widespread in Cuba before this time. Only the entry of foreign capital and knowledge provided the necessary conditions to expand and industrialize the production and distribution of sugar. In Cuba, financial and commodity flows, especially related to the sugar economy, were controlled by foreign governments due to asymmetrical power relations. First, during colonial rule, the Spanish controlled Cuban imports and exports for mercantilist purposes. After the end of Spanish rule, it was not the Cuban elite but rather American investors who controlled the lion's share of the Cuban economy. The Cuban nation state, which was founded in 1902, only took direct control over its markets after the third Cuban Revolution in 1959, only to become dependent on the Soviet Union (USSR) and other Eastern bloc countries. This domination by foreign economic interests leads us to the question why Cuba was an area of interest to different powers. Due to its position close to the North American mainland, Cuba was strategically significant in terms of geopolitics, and it became the centre of the modern sugar industry after the decline of Saint-Domingue at the very end of the eighteenth century. Its ports functioned as centres of conflict, where old territorial regimes were defended and new ones were negotiated, sometimes simultaneously.⁸

7 See also M. Pernau, *Transnationale Geschichte*, Göttingen 2011, p. 45.

8 For a more detailed discussion on space, territoriality, and sovereignty, see C.S. Maier, *Transformation of Territoriality, 1600–2000*, in: *Transnationale Geschichte: Themen, Tendenzen und Theorien*. Göttingen 2006 pp. 32–55; J.

The Cuban port cities considered here are Havana, Mariel, Matanzas, Nuevitas, Puerto Padre, Cárdenas, Cienfuegos, and Santiago de Cuba. They are interpreted as points of entry and departure of not only goods but also people and ideas. Of course, other smaller ports played a role in Cuba's maritime history as well, but not as much in a transnational sense, meaning that cross-border processes mainly took place in the aforementioned ports. In the following sections, I focus on the role of commodity chains in the inter-relationship between Cuba's ports and its hinterlands from the early nineteenth century until today.

2. Transforming the Hinterland: The Emergence of the Cuban Sugar Industry

The main products Cuba exported during the middle of the nineteenth century were sugar, molasses, tobacco, coffee, and copper. It imported mostly foodstuffs and simple manufactured items, predominantly from the United States (US), Great Britain (GB), and Spain. In the period from 1826–1887, trade with these countries accounted for about 80 per cent of Cuba's imports and exports.⁹ The development of the Cuban sugar economy in the nineteenth century was characterized by an expansion of sugar cultivation and technological progress on the one hand, and breaks or crises caused by certain historical events, severe weather, and changing world market situations on the other hand.¹⁰ Since the 1830s, Cuba's plantation economy expanded towards the interior of the island, due to innovations that emerged during the industrial revolution, including railroads and steamships. These new technologies ensured that Cuba did not only have the best plantations but also the best transportation conditions at the time. The first railroad, for instance, was operational as early as 1837.¹¹ Therefore, Cuban ports served as entrance points for technology and technological know-how, which was subsequently used to modernize the hinterland. In addition to machines, human labour was required. Around that time, approximately 500,000 slaves were working on Cuban plantations.¹² The Haitian Revolution in 1791 was a decisive event for the further development of Cuba's sugar economy. After the elimination of slavery in Saint-Domingue, there were only three large slave-owning societies: the US South, which cultivated cotton and some

Agnew, *Sovereignty Regimes: Territoriality and State Authority in Contemporary World Politics*, in: *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, 95 (2005) 2, pp. 437–461; E.W. Soja, *Postmodern Geographies: The Reassertion of Space on Critical Social Theory*, London 1989; S. Günzel (ed.), *Lexikon der Raumphilosophie*, Darmstadt 2012, p. 380.

9 L.K. Salvucci and R.J. Salvucci, *Cuba and the Latin American Terms of Trade: Old Theories, New Evidence*, in: *Journal of Interdisciplinary History*, 31 (2000) 2, p. 201.

10 An interesting survey, for instance, about the impact of hurricanes on the nineteenth century Cuban agriculture and economy is: L.A. Pérez, *Winds of Change: Hurricanes & the Transformation of Nineteenth-Century Cuba*, Chapel Hill, London 2001.

11 A. Santamaría García, *Sin Azúcar no hay País: La Industria Azucarera y la Economía Cubana (1919–1939)*, Seville 2001, p. 34. Rail transport was not introduced in continental Latin America until the 1850s.

12 M. Zeuske, *Die Geschichte der Amistad: Sklavenhandel und Menschenmuggel auf dem Atlantik im 19. Jahrhundert*, Stuttgart 2012, p. 102.

sugar; the western part of Cuba, which produced coffee before focusing mainly on sugar since 1830, and southern Brazil, which produced coffee but also, to a lesser degree, sugar and cacao.¹³ As a result, Cuba became the main supplier of sugar. In the context of slavery, not only the related manpower but also the capital acquired from the slave trade played a role. The sugar industry in Cuba was built on the fortune made through slave trade, which provided the capital necessary to modernize production facilities in the nineteenth century. The abolition of slavery, in turn, required the substitution of formerly manual labour with machinery.¹⁴ As early as 1790, the first *ingenios* (sugar plantation and refinery complexes) were constructed, which were based on fully mechanized sugar factories, demonstrating the very latest technology in their day. The expansion of these modern sugar factories and their surrounding complexes of large estates, railroads, and ports continued until 1830.¹⁵

During the years between 1860–1880, a second wave of modernization gave birth to the *centrales* (industrial complexes for sugar production and processing). They were concentrated in the region of Cienfuegos because of its nearby and well-developed port, which facilitated the timely shipping of cargo. One of the largest *centrales* in Cienfuegos, Central Caracas, belonged to Tomás Terry, who had earned his money through the slave trade. He later used his wealth to build a sugar factory.¹⁶ Later, many landowners built sugar factories and simultaneously invested in the construction of railways and private ports to ship larger amounts of sugar in quick succession.¹⁷ For example, the highly politically-active J.M. Tarafa purchased the Puerto Príncipe & Nuevitas Railway in 1912 and constructed the largest wharf in the world for loading sugar in Nuevitas.¹⁸

Regarding the development of Cuban ports in general, there is a shift of priorities concerning the structure, value, and distribution of exports during this period. According to sources used by Antonio Santamaría García, the most important Cuban import and export ports (i.e. the ones with the highest trade volume) during the period from 1917–1937 were Cárdenas (imports: USD 5,790,000; exports: USD 39,964,000); Cienfuegos (imports: USD 12,248,000; exports: USD 39,334,000); Havana (imports: USD 198,908,000; exports: USD 83,254,000), and Matanzas (imports: USD 7,576,000; exports: USD 46,302,000).¹⁹ These figures demonstrate that Havana kept its traditional function as the main import port. Concerning exports, Havana's predominance is at least debatable, as the export volume of the other three ports is relatively high in comparison.²⁰ These high export figures were the result of a massive expansion of the Cuban

13 Ibid., p. 102.

14 S.W. Mintz, *Sweetness and Power: The Place of Sugar in Modern History*, New York 1985, p. 69.

15 M. Zeuske (fn. 12), p. 104, and A. Santamaría García (fn. 11), p. 24.

16 M. Zeuske (fn. 12), p. 104.

17 A. Santamaría García (fn. 11), p. 38.

18 Ibid., p. 180. For more information on Tarafa's involvement in the international sugar policy, especially during the sugar crisis of the 1920s, see G. Mikusch, *Geschichte der Internationalen Zuckerkonventionen*, Berlin 1932, pp. 47–48.

19 A. Santamaría García (fn. 11), p. 402.

20 Ibid.

sugar industry after 1900. As mentioned above, the Cuban sugar economy was linked to trends and changes in the world market; European beet sugar was just one potential threat. Since the 1840s, Cuban sugar producers had to struggle with falling prices, due to the oversupply of sugar, but according to Linda K. Salvucci and Richard J. Salvucci, at this early stage, “improvements in productivity more than compensated for falling sugar prices. In other words, Cuban producers increased supply by operating more efficiently.”²¹ That strategy was successful until the end of the nineteenth century, though not after the turn of the century. Market players were affected by financial crises, such as the sugar crisis of 1920, which caused the financial ruin of many Hispano-Cuban bankers and farmers.²² I return to the correlation between the increase in supply and falling prices on the world market later, when discussing the US protectionist policy at the beginning of the twentieth century. For now, I address the local changes that caused the Cuban sugar producers’ dependence on the US market.

To address this, it is necessary to look at the changing foreign trade relations on the one hand, and foreign investments and involvement within the Cuban economy on the other hand. I already mentioned the most important foreign trading partners above. Below, I focus on GB and the US since the former was key in establishing the Cuban sugar industry, and the latter became its driving force. GB indeed played a role that is not to be underestimated: First, the growing British demand for sugar²³ created a potential market for Cuban sugar, especially after Britain had shifted to free trade in the mid 1840s and early 1850s.²⁴ Secondly, British knowledge transfer was decisive in the process of the modernization of the Cuban sugar industry.²⁵

Indeed, most of the machinery imported to Cuba came from industrial centres in Western Europe, including Glasgow, Liverpool, and Le Havre, which were all significant port cities on the other side of the Atlantic.²⁶ Apart from this, British merchants and banks were involved in the Cuban sugar market. Being of neither Cuban nor Spanish descent, these merchants were not particularly committed to any national or imperial interest. Rather, they were involved in transnational commercial networks and were motivated by high profits on the global market.²⁷ Among those participating in the global sugar network were Drake Brothers & Co., founded by James Drake, who had emigrated from Britain to Cuba during the last decade of the eighteenth century; London’s Commyns Clan, which began investing in *ingenios* and storehouses in the hinterland of Matanzas in the 1840s, and the British bank Baring Brothers, which invested in the Cuban slave

21 L. K. Salvucci and R.J. Salvucci (fn. 9), p. 206, as well as R. J. Davis, *The Rise of the Atlantic Economies*, Ithaka, N.Y. 1973, pp. 251–252.

22 M. Zeuske, *Kleine Geschichte Kubas*, Munich 2007, p. 164. For more information about the sugar crisis, see G. Mikusch (fn. 18), pp. 47–48.

23 S. W. Mintz (fn. 14), p. 189.

24 L.K. Salvucci and R.J. Salvucci, *Cuba and the Latin American Terms of Trade* (fn. 9), p. 202.

25 J. Curry-Machado, *Rich Flames and Hired Tears: Sugar, Sub-Imperial Agents and the Cuban Phoenix of Empire*, in: *Journal of Global History* 4 (2009), pp. 40–44.

26 *Ibid.*, pp. 38–39.

27 *Ibid.*, pp. 44–45.

trade, the sugar industry, and the shipbuilding industry.²⁸ Jonathan Curry-Machado argues that these flows of money, machinery, and migrant workers therefore incorporated the island in processes of “sub-imperial globalization,” which raised the Creole elite’s hopes of liberating themselves from the Spanish Empire.²⁹

Not only British banks and merchants were involved in the Cuban sugar economy, but American ones were too. The economic influence of the US grew throughout the course of the nineteenth century as a consequence of its increasing capital investments and its new imperial policy towards the Spanish Caribbean. However, at the start of the century, the US had to compete with Spain for the Cuban market. This competition was not restricted to the Cuban sugar economy but included also Spanish and US exports, such as wheat flour and raw cotton. The defeat of the South in the American Civil War and the resulting scarcity of US raw cotton caused a commercial depression in Cuba, which forced the Creole elite to expand their trade relations with Spain, despite their aversion to them.³⁰ At this time, Spain’s consent was necessary to exchange commodities between the US and Cuba, including the colony’s export of raw or semi-refined sugar.³¹ The growing discontent in Cuba regarding its position at the periphery of the Spanish Empire led to the Cuban wars for independence (the Ten Years War, 1868–1878, and the War of Independence, 1895–1898). Although the Spanish crown succeeded in maintaining political control over its Caribbean colony after the defeat of the Cuban rebels in 1878, it was no longer able to control the island’s market. Until the end of the Ten Years War, the share of US goods in Cuba’s import market increased by only 20–30 per cent. After 1878, the US, which had previously dominated the market, permanently overtook Spain as Cuba’s largest trading partner.³² In the end, the US was able to surpass Spain in both Cuba’s import and export market. Cuba’s sugar industry and US imperial policy played a decisive role in this process. After several unsuccessful attempts during the nineteenth century, it was a war between two empires, the Spanish-American War (1898), through which Cuba finally gained its independence in 1902. However, the US did not act on behalf of Cubans without any ulterior motive.

In that same year, Theodore Roosevelt argued in favour of an agreement to enable the US to control the Cuban market and to maintain US supremacy in the Caribbean.³³ This was consolidated through the Reciprocity Treaty of 1902, which regulated the bilateral economic relations between the US and Cuba with an emphasis on Cuban sugar exports.³⁴ This general framework permitted lobbyists in the US Congress to act in their own interests in the years that followed. During the 1920s, US economic policy was

28 Ibid., p. 45, and M. Zeuske (fn. 12), pp. 222–223.

29 J. Curry-Machado (fn. 25), p. 33.

30 C.A. Bayly, *The Birth of the Modern World 1780–1914: Global Connections and Comparisons*, Malden 2001, p. 161.

31 H. Crespo, *Trade Regimes and the International Sugar Market, 1850–1980: Protectionism, Subsidies, and Regulation*, in: S. Topik et al. (eds.), *From Silver to Cocaine: Latin American Commodity Chains and the Building of the World Economy, 1500–2000*, Durham, London 2006, p. 165.

32 L.K. Salvucci and R.J. Salvucci (fn. 9), p. 208.

33 C.A. Bayly (fn. 30), pp. 459–461. Cf. H. Thomas, *Cuba: Or the Pursuit of Freedom*, London 1971, p. 468.

34 G. Mikusch (fn. 18), p. 32.

characterized by a strong focus on the protection of its own markets. This protectionism also led to the implementation of certain measures favouring beet and cane sugar producers in the continental US and its island territories: Hawaii, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines.³⁵ Several acts that raised sugar duties were passed, such as the Fordney-McCumber Act of 1922, the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930, and the Jones-Costigan Act of 1934.³⁶ Finally, the US annually fixed quotas for Cuban sugar exports, repeatedly to Cuba's disadvantage.³⁷

Latin American historians interpret the presence of American banks, merchants, and large landowners in Cuba (and supported by the US government) as a new type of imperial expansion. César J. Ayala, who focused not only on Cuba but also on Puerto Rico and the Dominican Republic, argues:

*the United States became an imperial power controlling the economic life of three nations, and the Spanish Caribbean as a whole became a sphere for U.S. direct investment, a colonial region dominated by the decisions of U.S. capitalists. ... A radical social and economic transformation took place in the islands of the Caribbean as a result of U.S. imperial expansion.*³⁸

Curry-Machado compares the resulting Cuban dependence on the US to its previous dependence on Spain:

*Cuba shook off the Spanish yoke only to replace it with another. Just as the phoenix emerges reborn from the flames that consumed it, so too did empire in Cuba from that which at one time appeared to be hastening its demise.*³⁹

Finally, US investors managed to dominate the Cuban economy in general and the sugar industry in particular, within only 30 years' time. Around 1930, 108 out of 162 *centrales* were owned by Cubans, but 44 of the largest estates belonged to US companies, such as Hershey, and the United Fruit Company. These large estates, situated mainly in the provinces of Camagüey and Oriente, produced around 50 per cent of Cuba's sugar.⁴⁰ Hershey owned three mills, and the United Fruit Company owned two sugar mills in Cuba. Together, these mills produced 2,211,617 sacks (325 pounds per sack) of sugar in 1951 alone.⁴¹

35 H. Crespo (fn. 31), p. 165.

36 Ibid., pp. 165–166.

37 M. Zeuske (fn. 22), p. 169; see also H. Crespo (fn. 31), pp. 166–167.

38 C.J. Ayala, *American Sugar Kingdom: The Plantation Economy of the Spanish Caribbean, 1898–1934*, Chapel Hill, London 1999, pp. 1–2.

39 J. Curry-Machado (fn. 26), p. 36.

40 M. Zeuske (fn. 22), p. 166. There are more precise figures on the US ownership of Cuban sugar mills for certain years. For instance, the German magazine *Der Spiegel* stated that in the year 1926, 63 per cent of the Cuban sugar mills were owned by American businessmen and investors: *Revolution aus der Hüfte: Spiegel, Report über Castros Kuba, Erwartungen und Enttäuschungen*, in: *Der Spiegel* 38/1969, 15 September 1969, <http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-45547870.html> (accessed 3 September 2013).

41 The Gilmore Manual *Azucarero de Cuba: Cuba Sugar Manual 195*, New Orleans 1951, p. 426.

Other American companies were also active in Cuba during this period. The three *centrales* operated by the Cuban-American Sugar Mills Co. produced 2,018,227 sacks of sugar in 1951 alone.⁴² Together, the US-based companies accounted for approximately 30 per cent of the total production of sugar in that year.⁴³ Following this trend, advertisements placed in *The Gilmore Manual Azucarero de Cuba* addressed their target group of Cuban sugar producers in Spanish and in English. Furthermore, the US influenced marketing language and the imagery used in advertising, since a large percentage of the companies that placed these advertisements were based in the US. These companies provided a variety of services to Cuban producers such as shipping sugar from Cuba to the US.⁴⁴

The resulting interdependency between the US and Cuba was not limited to the economic sphere. American investors and businessmen travelling or even migrating to Cuba did not only bring capital⁴⁵ or contracts with them, but also exported elements of their own culture. An example includes Havana's vibrant nightlife of the 1950s, which featured cabarets, jazz clubs, casinos, and other forms of entertainment. Furthermore, the modernization of the Cuban sugar economy would not have taken place so successfully, if there had not been favourable local conditions; it was a combination of external and internal factors that made it possible in the end. The flow of foreign capital and know-how on the one hand and the availability of large quantities of agricultural land, due to the *latifundia* system, on the other hand, facilitated the emergence of the Cuban sugar industry. Furthermore, infrastructure that had been built prior to this period was modernized, such as the expansion of Cuba's railway system to facilitate inland traffic and the development of Cuba's ports, which enabled the island's integration into new global trade networks. Through growing capacities of its seaports, the Cuban hinterland was oriented towards world markets and became vulnerable to geopolitical conflicts and changes in the global demand for sugar. In that context, ports served as channels of global connections, not only in terms of economic development but also in terms of cultural exchange.

42 Ibid., p. 426.

43 This surprisingly low estimate is based on production data available for sugar mills under group ownership or control by these companies, including not only Hershey, the United Fruit Company, and the Cuban-American Sugar Mills Co., but also the American Sugar Refining Company, the *Compañía Azucarera Atlántica del Golfo* (formerly known as Cuban Cane Sugar Corporation), the *Compañía Central Altigracia*, the General Sugar Estates Inc., the Punta Alegre Sugar Corporation, the Rionda, and the Guantanamo Sugar Company. See *The Gilmore Manual Azucarero de Cuba: Cuba Sugar Manual 1951* (fn. 41), pp. 6–9, p. 426. The total output of all sugar mills with US shares is presumably much higher.

44 Ibid., p. 429.

45 To be precise, I use the term "capital" here in the narrow sense of the word, meaning financial resources (cash, machinery, equipment, etc.) that have been invested in order to generate profit. I am not referring to other uses of the term, for instance Bourdieu's terminology, which includes cultural or social capital.

3. Cuban Ports as Portals to a Socialist World Market

The structures described above, including large sugar estates, the railroads, and the ports, were all mainly controlled by US companies. This condition was characteristic of the Cuban economy until 1959, the year of Fidel Castro's first land reform. The economic development of Cuba during the revolutionary era was characterized by extensive agrarian reforms, which led to changing patterns of landownership and other forms of expropriation. These reforms resulted in the mass exodus of US-Cuban enterprises. The consequent loss of American trading partners led the Cuban government to search for new markets. Once again, Cuba's strategic position (and, to a certain degree, also the political indecisiveness of its leaders) helped attract interest from abroad, especially from the USSR. As a result, the USSR and the other Eastern bloc countries became Cuba's most important trading partners: they imported Cuban sugar, which was boycotted by the US after 1960; in exchange, they exported crude oil, industrial goods, and everyday objects. This flow of products from socialist countries into Cuba stimulated the replacement of American raw materials and consumer goods. As early as 1961, Cuba signed a contract with the USSR regarding the import of Cuban sugar, which guaranteed higher prices than those negotiated on the world market.⁴⁶ This price policy was maintained and intensified in the 1970s. It forced the Cuban leaders to focus again on sugar as Cuba's main export, although they had initially planned to reduce its production. Due to Cuba's past dependency on the US market and the environmental and social exploitation related to the sugar industry, sugar plantations were considered responsible for the island's economic backwardness.⁴⁷

Between 1976–1980, sugar prices paid by the USSR were at least three times higher than those paid on the world market.⁴⁸ Similar contracts with other socialist countries existed as well.⁴⁹ The German Democratic Republic (GDR), for instance, imported Cuban sugar since 1961, and in return they exported tools, machinery, and later also medical and chemical products to Cuba, according to documents from the GDR's Ministry of Foreign Trade. A key product provided by the GDR, and desperately needed for Cuba's food supply, was milk powder.⁵⁰ These commodities were usually transported by sea. In

46 International Sugar Council, in: Archivo Nacional, Fondo No. 301 Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, No. de legajo 12, no. de orden 240, folio 76. See also Der Spiegel (fn. 40).

47 R. Cepero Bonilla, *The Cuban Revolution and the Sugar Markets*, Havana 1959, p. 5; B. Hoffmann, *Kuba*, Munich 2009, p. 91, and Der Spiegel (fn. 40).

48 To be precise: In the year 1976, the USSR paid USD 0.31 against a world market price of USD 0.12 for one libra (approximately 460 grams) of Cuban sugar; in 1977, 0.36 (USSR) against 0.08 (world market); in 1978, 0.41 (USSR) against 0.08 (world market); and in 1979, 0.44 (USSR) against 0.10 (world market). See: W. Leuchter, *Der Aufbau der materiell-technischen Basis des Sozialismus*, in: W. Pade (ed.), *Sozialismus in Kuba: Voraussetzungen, Resultate, Erfahrungen*, Berlin 1988, p. 109.

49 XXV Aniversario de la Revolución: va un Pueblo Entero, va la Dignidad Humana..., Havana 1983, pp. 188–189.

50 For more detailed information on the structure of the goods traded between Cuba and the GDR (including commodity lists for the years 1961, 1962, 1972, 1980, 1981, 1982, 1983, 1984, and 1985), see: *Protokolle zum Abkommen über den Warenaustausch zwischen der DDR und der Republik Kuba*, in: SAPMO-BA, DE1/21971, DL2/4244, DL2/5651, DL2/6174, DL2/11320 and DL2/12201.

1965, a new ocean route between the USSR and Cuba was established for this purpose.⁵¹ In the previous year, a floating dock had already been given to Cuba as a gift from the USSR.⁵² Even earlier, in the year 1962, the so-called Cubalco shipping line was founded, which served the overseas connection between Eastern Europe and Cuba, with the support of shipping companies from the USSR, the GDR, and Czechoslovakia.⁵³ In 1972, Cuba became a member of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon). Therefore, it was from that point onwards fully integrated into the socialist economic system, which included establishing a planned economy. The planned economic system put an end to the Cuban government's previous attempts to reform the national economy. Cuba's integration into socialist world-trade networks transformed its foreign trade balance considerably and influenced the development of Cuban ports.

The island's shifting foreign trade relations are key to understanding the transformation of Cuba's ports in this period. After the triumph of the Cuban revolutionaries in 1959, a total of 75 per cent of the imports and 66 per cent of the exports depended on the US. In this year, socialist countries' share of Cuban foreign trade accounted for just 1 per cent. This situation changed drastically during the course of the revolutionary era: in 1982, Cuba transacted 87 per cent of its foreign trade with socialist countries, and only 13 per cent with so-called First World (excluding the US) and Third World countries. The value of foreign trade grew by an average of 8.4 percent per year from 1958–1982.⁵⁴ Apart from the traditional export products such as sugar, tobacco, and nickel, Cuba began to export large amounts of citrus fruits in the 1960s. The Eastern bloc shipments, which were combined with knowledge transfers, enabled the Cuban economy to grow constantly.

Cuba's port infrastructure underwent rapid change during the last third of the twentieth century. Large amounts of money was spent to decentralize shipping operations, which had previously been concentrated in Havana, and to build new port facilities. These modernizations were financed and implemented with the assistance of the socialist world community. The citizens of the European Comecon countries did not only consume Cuban export products to support the country's national economy, but also provided their technology and knowledge in order to facilitate modernization projects throughout the Caribbean country. The GDR had an especially strong influence on the development of Cuban maritime logistics from the 1960s–1980s; GDR representatives in advisory capacity were sent to Cuba. In turn, students from Cuba went to the GDR to acquire the know-how necessary for the expansion of Cuban ports; they attended East German universities, such as the Hochschule für Verkehrswesen "Friedrich List" (University of

51 H. Neuber (ed.), *Das neue Kuba in Bildern der Nachrichtenagentur Prensa Latina 1959–1969*, Berlin 2011, p. 143.

52 *Ibid.*, pp. 146–147.

53 H. Langer, *Zärtlichkeit der Völker: Die DDR und Kuba*, Berlin 2010, p. 22.

54 *XXV Aniversario de la Revolución* (fn. 49), pp. 184–186.

Transport and Traffic Sciences) in Dresden.⁵⁵ In a broader sense, Cuban ports functioned as entry and exit points of economic exchange processes on the one hand, and allowed for cultural encounters and knowledge transfers on the other hand. Furthermore, they served as locations where technical cooperation and everyday communication took place. In the context of port modernization, experts from the GDR came into contact with Cuban or other foreign professionals to exchange technical knowledge but also to learn about other cultures and “teach” their own culture.⁵⁶ It is noteworthy to mention that localities on both sides of the Atlantic functioned as start and end points of these exchange processes. Consequently, I argue that there were at least two portals as possible entrance points for transfer processes in which reinterpretation and acculturation took place.

The flow of goods, ideas, and cultural practices from one socialist country to another was by far not unidirectional and singular. Referring to commodity flows, the aforementioned documents indicate that the GDR exported ships, marine engines, and port equipment, including cranes, forklifts, anchors, and anchor-chain cables, mostly in the 1980s.⁵⁷ The main aim of the modernization of the island’s maritime logistic capabilities was to increase the island’s sugar-shipping capacities. In 1983, there were seven modern sugar terminals in various Cuban ports, with a (total) potential shipping capacity of 5,200 tons per hour. These modern terminals included the mechanical shipping of bulk cargo, which replaced the former procedure of manually transporting bagged sugar, a practice in use before the Cuban Revolution. As a result, the loading time was considerably reduced. In the 1970s and 1980s, more than 85 per cent of Cuban sugar was transported with this system.⁵⁸ Additionally, a container terminal was installed, which allowed merchants to ship 150,000 containers per year.⁵⁹ The next section discusses the restructuring of selected Cuban ports in more detail.

A Cuban publication from 1978 ranked Cuban ports in relation to the total imports and exports in general, and the exports of sugar and its derivatives in particular: Matanzas had the largest amount of sugar exports, closely followed by Cienfuegos.⁶⁰ The leading position of Matanzas is striking here, given the fact that in 1959, it accounted for

55 M. Torres Gemeil, *Mit dem Simson-Moped zum DDR-Strand: Vielfältige Spuren in Kuba*, in: T. Kunze and T. Vogel (eds.), *Ostalgie International: Erinnerungen an die DDR von Nicaragua bis Vietnam*, Berlin 2010, p. 22.

56 A collection of memories from Cubans who spent their youth on academic exchange in the GDR was recently published: W.-D. Vogel and V. Wunderlich, *Abenteuer DDR: Kubanerinnen und Kubaner im deutschen Sozialismus*, Berlin 2011.

57 *Protokolle zum Abkommen über den Warenaustausch zwischen der DDR und der Republik Kuba in den Jahren 1981, 1982, 1983, 1984, 1985*, in: SAPMO-BA, DL2/5651, without consistent page numbers.

58 *XXV Aniversario de la Revolución* (fn. 49), pp. 34–35.

59 *Cuba’s Ports Inadequate to Handle Growing Cargo Traffic*, in: *CubaNews*, 1 October 2004, <http://www.thefree-library.com/Cuba's+ports+inadequate+to+handle+growing+cargo+traffic.-a0123491489> (accessed 19 August 2013).

60 *Atlas de Cuba: en Conmemoración al XX Aniversario del Triunfo de la Revolución Cubana 1959 – 1979*, Havana 1978, pp. 50–51.

only half of the amount exported from Havana or Cienfuegos.⁶¹ The total imports and exports were relatively equally distributed between the ports of Matanzas, Cienfuegos, Havana, and Mariel. Only the port of Santiago de Cuba was weak in all indicators.⁶² As previously mentioned, the importance of a port during the revolutionary era was closely linked to its sugar-shipping capacities. Sugar shipment was once a key activity of the port of Havana; since the 1960s, sugar had been redirected through other ports in correspondence with the decentralization of Cuba's economy.

Despite the expansion and growing importance of the previously described ports, the port of Havana was still considered Cuba's principal port. It was equipped with 27 wharfs, and had a canal 1,500 metres long and 200 metres wide, which permitted an average flow of 1,100 ships per annum.⁶³ One of its most important technological achievements was the modern terminal Haiphong, named after the Vietnamese port city. This terminal, built by the Cuban government during the course of the port's general modernization project of 1962, was based on high-tech handling, which allowed ships to be loaded and unloaded faster than conventional methods. The Haiphong terminal is still in use for general cargo and containers, and is served by railroads and trucks.⁶⁴ In addition, the port's infrastructure included the use of roll-on roll-off vessels since the 1960s. At the peak of the Cuban-Soviet cooperation in the mid 1980s, the port of Havana handled approximately 40 per cent of Cuba's foreign trade, including crude oil imports from the USSR. Directly after unloading, these oil imports were transported to Cuba's largest oil refinery in Havana.⁶⁵ The port of Matanzas was transformed extensively during the 1970s. Before modernization, loading and unloading mostly relied on physically demanding human labour. After the conversion to modern port technologies, a mechanical system was used for the shipping of bulk raw and bagged refined sugar.⁶⁶ Between 1971–1975, the total amount of cargo handled in this port grew by 10.7 per cent.⁶⁷ Considering the nearby port of Cárdenas during the very same period, the cargo handled grew by 45 per cent.⁶⁸ In that period, a considerable amount of cargo was also shipped via the port of Mariel. During the 1970s, the port in the province of Havana was also the location of the headquarters of Empresa Terminales Mambisas, the state-owned Cuban port operating company that still exists today.⁶⁹ Last but not least, the port of Cienfuegos became increasingly important during the 1970s, due to the industrial development of

61 Exportaciones de Azúcar por Puerto 1950–1959, in: Archivo Nacional, Fondo Instituto Cubano de Estabilización del Azúcar (ICEA), No. de legajo 1387, no. de orden 4.

62 Atlas de Cuba (fn. 60), pp. 50–51.

63 Cinco Años de Esfuerzos y Realizaciones: Nueva División Político-Administrativa, Havana 1983, p. 37.

64 Port of Havana: the Crown Jewel of Cuba's Ports Network, in: CubaNews, 1 January 2009, <http://www.thefree-library.com/Port+of+Havana%3A+the+crown+jewel+of+Cuba%27s+ports+network.-a0208276503> (accessed 19 August 2013).

65 Ibid.

66 Provincia Matanzas, Santiago de Cuba 1978, p. 94.

67 Ibid., p. 95.

68 Ibid., p. 96.

69 Provincia La Habana, Santiago de Cuba 1978, p. 109.

the city of Cienfuegos. Its harbour facilities were used for exporting sugar, fresh citrus fruits, and cement, and the import of metals, timber, and other materials. At the beginning of the 1980s, the investment plan for this port budgeted CUP 30 million.⁷⁰ The city of Cienfuegos was not only a centre of port activities, it also attracted attention for its cement factory, which was built in cooperation with the GDR at the end of the 1970s.⁷¹ Another cement plant in Nuevitas had already been in operation ten years prior, due to support from the GDR.⁷² Like Cienfuegos, Nuevitas was an industrial centre in revolutionary Cuba. Therefore, its port served as an entrance point for goods, especially for machinery imported from other Comecon member states, which was then used for complex construction projects in the hinterland. An example is the import of machinery required to construct a brewery in Camagüey, which was organized by the GDR in the mid 1980s.⁷³ Ports were modernized in order to give Cuban exportation new directions and to support the development of new products from the hinterland.

Naturally, there were other smaller ports that were involved in shipping especially raw sugar, such as Guayabal in the province of Camagüey, and Puerto Padre in the province of Las Tunas.⁷⁴ But the ones portrayed above were the most important ports for the development of the Cuban economy in the period between 1959–1990. The status of Cuban ports fluctuated not only in terms of economic significance but also in terms of symbolic meaning. For example, the new bulk sugar-shipping terminal at the port of Carúpano in the Las Tunas province was inaugurated by the *Comandante en Jefe* (Commander-in-chief) Fidel Castro himself in 1978.⁷⁵ In that context, the ports of revolutionary Cuba also served as the basis for the construction of a new national identity. In the perception of the Cuban government, the island had become part of a global socialist network, the aim of which was to improve the economic status of all of its members by means of mutual assistance. In conjunction with mutual assistance, mutual dependency and mutual influences emerged. Thus, Cuban ports can be seen as portals to a socialist world market, which enabled access to alternative flows of goods, people, and ideas, after the previous portals to the US market were closed.

4. Present and Future Development: Fall and Rise of Cuban Maritime Logistics?

With the collapse of the Eastern bloc after 1989, Cuba once again lost its most important trading partners, and plunged into severe commercial crisis. The time between 1990–1997, the so-called *Período Especial* (Special Period), was marked by economic

70 XXV Aniversario de la Revolución (fn. 49), pp. 156–157.

71 H. Langer, *Zärtlichkeit der Völker* (fn. 53), pp. 114–116.

72 Ibid., pp. 94–96. See also *Der Spiegel* (fn. 40).

73 H. Langer, *Zärtlichkeit der Völker* (fn. 53), p. 153.

74 Interview with René Caparrós Aguiar (German teacher at the Cátedra Humboldt, now retired. He studied in the GDR and worked as an interpreter in the Cuban sugar industry). Interview conducted by the author, Havana, Cuba, March 17, 2014.

75 Las Tunas: *Segura Hacia el Futuro*, Havana 1987, p. 22.

decline, and the island's maritime logistics came to a virtual standstill. Existing plants were not repaired, and new port facilities were not built until the early 2000s, when the government decided to invest again in its ports. External openness to trade and investment was a decisive factor, which allowed the Cuban economy and its ports to survive. In more recent times, not only the Cuban government but also foreign firms are engaged in managing and investing in ongoing projects. The port of Mariel serves as an example of this process.

Nowadays, the port of Mariel is of strategic relevance for companies interested not only in the Cuban but also in the US market. Because of its proximity to the US and the limited port capacity on the US East Coast, Mariel may become more relevant in future post-embargo times. In that context, Cuba's former geostrategic significance, first for the Spanish colonial power and then for American entrepreneurs, has again turned into an advantage for its national economy, which it had, to a certain extent, lost during the Soviet period. For that reason, Mariel has attracted several foreign investors over the last decade. Possible foreign partners for a USD 900 million joint venture with the Cuban company Almacenes Universal S.A., for the modernization of the harbour and the construction of a new container terminal, included bids from DP World, PSA International Pte Ltd., and Odebrecht S.A. The Cuban government eventually accepted the bid from Odebrecht, a Brazilian company, which recently finished the expansion of the Mariel port. Odebrecht's task, among other things, was to construct roads and railroads, and to dredge a channel for a new container terminal suitable for midsized New Panamax cargo ships, which in turn is now managed by PSA International Pte Ltd., a Singaporean firm.⁷⁶ After more than three years of work, the Port of Mariel turned into Cuba's most important cargo hub, with an annual capacity of 824,000 containers. While this figure is linked to the current, 702-metre dock, port authorities said that a future expansion of the dock of up to 2,400 metres will allow operating 3 million containers per year.⁷⁷ The new Port of Mariel is also one of the most promising Cuban Special Development Zones (*Zonas Especiales de Desarrollo*, ZEDs), created in 2013:

Promotional material for the project suggests it will resemble the special economic development zones such as those that galvanised and opened up China's and Vietnam's economies. Compared with the rest of the island, firms will face fewer restrictions on hiring,

76 Brazil's Odebrecht revives Mariel port, in: CubaNews, 1 March 2010, <http://www.thefreelibrary.com/Brazil%27s+Odebrecht+revives+Mariel+port.-a0245115597> (accessed 19 August 2013); Singapore firm plans Mariel box terminal, in: CubaNews, 1 August 2011, <http://www.thefreelibrary.com/Singapore+firm+plans+Mariel+box+terminal.-a0263992815> (accessed 19 August 2013); ZED Mariel Envisioning a Greater Role in Cuban Economy, in: Prensa Latina, 6 June 2017, <http://www.plenglish.com/index.php?o=rn&id=13833&SEO=zed-mariel-envisioning-a-greater-role-in-cuban-economy> (accessed 12 June 2017), and Cuba's Mariel port builds for bigger ships amid headwinds, in: Journal of Commerce, 7 April 2017, https://www.joc.com/port-news/international-ports/cuba%E2%80%99s-mariel-port-builds-bigger-ships-amid-headwinds_20170407.html (accessed 12 June 2017).

77 ZED Mariel Envisioning a Greater Role in Cuban Economy (fn. 76).

*lower tax burdens and no requirement to enter into joint ventures with local state-run firms.*⁷⁸

So far, the ZED Mariel attracted 24 investment projects from eleven countries, including a future Nestlé factory for the production of coffee, cookies, and cooking products.⁷⁹ Other planned port-based ZEDs of the island involve the City Port of Havana, the City Port of Matanzas, the City Port of Cienfuegos, and the City Port of Santiago de Cuba.⁸⁰ The Mariel project will serve as a model for those.

5. Conclusion

This article dealt with the changing importance of Cuban seaports, including Havana, Mariel, Matanzas, Nuevitas, Puerto Padre, Cárdenas, Santiago de Cuba, and Cienfuegos since 1830, and how these ports were embedded in the general development of the Cuban economy. Its aim was to shine light on the multiple flows of goods, people, and ideas, which arrived or departed through these ports. Although I focused primarily on commodities, mainly on sugar, consideration was given to other flows, if they were connected to the Cuban sugar economy. Examples include the flow of foreign capital and ideas, which enabled the emergence of the Cuban sugar industry in the second half of the nineteenth century and its modernization in the second half of the twentieth century. The next step was then to relate these flows to changes that occurred either in the port itself, or in the hinterland. In the case of the emergence of the Cuban sugar industry in the course of the nineteenth century, changes took place originally in the hinterland and subsequently transformed the port structures. However, in the case of the socialist transformation, port modernization preceded and allowed for changes in the hinterland. Port modernization was, in a way, the necessary condition for an economic upswing. The same holds true for the revival of Cuban port infrastructure since the 2000s.

Concerning the future development of Cuba's ports, many questions remain open, as the island's economic situation is still far from stable, especially after the former Venezuelan president Hugo Chávez's death in 2013. Although his successor in office, President Nicolás Maduro, promised to keep close relations between the two countries, the flows of raw materials coming from Venezuela are likely to shrink in the near future, due to the country's economic crisis. Besides, the election of Donald Trump might bring former US President Barack Obama's rapprochement policy to a standstill, which implicates nega-

78 Welcome to Mariel, Cuba, the New Port giving Berth to Hope, in: The Guardian, 19 January 2014, <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jan/19/welcome-mariel-port-cuba-economic-liberalisation> (accessed 15 April 2014).

79 Cuba says approved five new proposals for Mariel development zone, in: Reuters.com, 9 March 2017, <https://www.reuters.com/article/cuba-investment/cuba-says-approved-five-new-proposals-for-mariel-development-zone-id-USL5N1GM817> (accessed 12 June 2017).

80 ZEDs: Key Component of Cuba's Emerging External Sector, in: CubaNews, 1 August 2011, <http://www.thefree-library.com/ZEDs%3A+key+component+of+Cuba%27s+emerging+external+sector.-a0263992802> (accessed 19 August 2013).

tive effects on US-Cuban trade plans, including US investments in Cuban port logistics. However, the Cuban government has learned from the deep impact the collapse of the Eastern bloc left. After years of a planned economy in more recent times, a so-called “socialist market economy” is on the rise, due to several key reforms carried out by Raúl Castro since he took over from his brother in 2006. He is partly following the example of economic reforms initiated in China. But the most crucial factor for a positive future economic development and maritime industry might be Cuba’s diversification of trading partners and markets. Despite the changing political regimes over the last two centuries, ports in Cuba retained their role as gateways to global networks. These networks were spun across different power constellations, not just in a colonial north-south fashion. The ports enabled Cuba to be included in the socialist market during the Cold War, while today they might help to position Cuba within the Global South, especially with regard to its economic relations with BRICS. Understanding Cuban ports as portals of globalization is a promising approach for the analysis of transnational knowledge transfers, which impact the complex relationship between Cuba’s ports and its hinterland in the past, present, and future.

Portals of Globalization as *lieux de mémoire*¹

Matthias Middell

ABSTRACTS

When looking at global flows scholars have increasingly put emphasis on nodes and the exercise regulatory power at certain places that are central to the organization of the mobility of people, goods, capital, and cultural patterns. Some authors have even developed a whole theory around the notion of global cities, which may not only become the hubs of globalized capitalism but also the hotspots of current class confrontation. Such approaches are rather loosely and sometimes even only rhetorically related to interpretations of global processes, where the local and the global are the only poles remaining in a borderless world. There is no doubt that global processes play out at local level, but there is ample evidence that other spatial formats (both scales of territoriality and non-territorial ones) remain important as well, or even gain weight in the organization and control of global flows. What interests me in particular in this context, is the role and function of places where global flows arrive and depart, are channelled through, and leave their stamp not only in warehouses but also in the mindset of people. It seems to me a functionalist reductionism to see them only as command centres of capitalism. Instead, I propose to look at them as growing in numbers and variety, and to focus on their histories, which has left a cultural legacy and may explain the unevenness of our mental maps, when it comes to the remembrance of globalization and its effect on current global processes.

1 An earlier version was published in German as Erinnerung an die Globalisierung? Die Portale der Globalisierung als *lieux de mémoire*: Ein Versuch, in: K. Buchinger, C. Gantet and J. Vogel (eds.), Europäische Erinnerungsräume, Frankfurt a. M. 2008, pp. 296–308. I have to thank Allie Tichenor for the translation of the revised version, and Claudia Baumann, Antje Dietze, and Megan Maruschke for very helpful comments.

Forschungen über globale Ströme haben schon seit längerem die Rolle von Knoten in Netzwerken und die Möglichkeit betont, an bestimmten Orten, die zentral für die Mobilität von Menschen, Waren, Kapital und kulturellen Mustern sind, Regulierungsmacht auszuüben. Autoren wie Saskia Sassen haben daraus eine ganze Theorie um den Begriff der *Global Cities* entfaltet, die nicht nur Zentren des globalen Kapitalismus sind, sondern auch Brennpunkte der heutigen Klassenkonfrontation. Solche Ansätze sind eher lose und manchmal auch nur rhetorisch mit Interpretationen globaler Prozesse gekoppelt, in denen nur noch das Lokale und das Globale als Pole einer entgrenzten Welt übrigbleiben. Zweifellos äußern sich globale Prozesse auf der lokalen Ebene, aber es gibt eine breite Evidenz, dass andere Raumformate (sowohl Skalen des Territorialen wie nicht-territoriale) bedeutsam bleiben oder sogar an Gewicht in der Organisation und Kontrolle globaler Ströme gewinnen. Was den Autor dabei besonders interessiert, ist die Rolle und Funktion von Orten, an denen globale Ströme ankommen oder abgehen, durch die sie hindurch geleitet werden und an denen sie ihre Spuren nicht nur in den Warenlagern, sondern auch im Bewusstsein der Menschen hinterlassen. Ich halte es für einen funktionalistischen Reduktionismus, solche Orte nur als Kommandozentralen des Kapitalismus zu sehen (die dann oft in eurozentristischer Manier im Globalen Norden lokalisiert werden). Stattdessen schlage ich vor, sie in ihrer wachsenden Zahl und Varianz zu betrachten und sich auf ihre Geschichte zu konzentrieren, die ein kulturelles Erbe hinterlassen hat, das die Ungleichgewichtigkeit unserer Mental Maps erklärt, wenn es um die Erinnerung an die Globalisierung und deren Effekte auf heutige globale Prozesse geht.

Research on global flows has always put emphasis on nodes and the possibility to exercise regulatory power at certain places that are central to the organization of the mobility of people, goods, capital, and cultural patterns. Authors like Saskia Sassen have even developed a whole theory around the notion of global cities, which may not only become the hubs of globalized capitalism but also the hotspots of current class confrontation. Such approaches are rather loosely and sometimes even only rhetorically related to interpretations of global processes, where the local and the global are the only poles remaining in a borderless world. There is no doubt that global processes play out at local level, but there is ample evidence that other spatial formats (both scales of territoriality and non-territorial ones) remain important as well, or even gain weight in the organization and control of global flows. What interests me in particular in this context, is the role and function of places where global flows arrive and depart, are channelled through, and leave their stamp not only in warehouses but also in the mindset of people. It seems to me a functionalist reductionism to see them only as command centres of capitalism (often in a good old Western-centric perspective located in the Global North). Instead, I propose to look at them as growing in numbers and variety, and to focus on their histories, which has left a cultural legacy and may explain the unevenness of our mental maps when it comes to the remembrance of globalization and its effect on current global processes. This article, therefore, discusses in the first part the question of how globalization is remembered; in the second part, the necessary enlargement of Pierre Nora's concept of *lieux de mémoire* (sites of memory) is discussed, in order to conclude in the third part with a possible definition of portals of globalization and some facets of its history.

1. Global History and Global Historical Consciousness

It may seem presumptuous to reflect on the memory of globalization some 30 years after it became a central category of social theory, given that for some, it remains open to debate whether globalization is merely a genial turn of phrase, coined by social theorists who lack methodological rigour,² or a particularly perfidious project – whose attractiveness is already diminishing – of neoliberal elites.³ But if we agree with most of the scholarship in the rapidly expanding field of global history, globalization is not such a recent phenomenon and has deep roots that stretches into the past. It is, therefore, interesting how and where such roots become important again and in which ways previous layers of globalization are remembered. What does the process of remembrance have to do with new transregional or global connections, established at places where previous actors had already built far-reaching networks?

While globalization that identified itself with deregulation, privatization, and the down-sizing of welfare-state elements had found a strong opposition from the left in the alter-globalization movement of the early 2000s, right-wing populist movements currently grow on the basis of their open resistance to immigration and a nationalist agenda that finds broad support during elections; Donald Trump's "America First," the Polish and Hungarian governments' open conflict with EU immigration regulations, Marine Le Pen's Front National in France, and the Alternative für Deutschland in Germany are but a few examples of these political movements. There are good arguments to include Asian as well as African regimes into the global alliance of populist resistance and, in turn, to what is perceived as "globalization."⁴ It does not mean that such populism from the right or its argumentation against the opening of borders is a completely new phenomenon; on the contrary, right-wing populism is more and more analysed as a reaction to the global condition, and it goes back at least to the end of World War II, as Federico Finchelstein has argued.⁵

Yet, despite the all too often heated polemics surrounding globalization, it can be argued that an upsurge in the discourse on the topic since the 1980s has generated some positives: it has increased our awareness of the global condition in which humanity lives, and it produced a far more nuanced understanding of global processes than what is suggested by the popular image of a "global village" with no boundaries. Still, too often, we pay

2 The distinction established in the social sciences, some years ago, between hyper-globalizers, realists, and globalization sceptics (on this, see for example, D. Held et al., *Debating Globalization*, Cambridge 2005; D. Held and A. G. McGrew (eds.), *Globalization Theory: Approaches and Controversies*, Cambridge 2007) has in the interim proved too crude a system of classification, but it does make clear that despite the astounding speed at which this new paradigm took hold, there is a rather significant group of doubters. This scepticism extends to the concept's empirical foundations, its methodological usefulness, as well as theoretically to its explanatory and/or predictive value for past and present phenomena.

3 See, for example, U. Brand, *Gegenhegemonie: Perspektiven globalisierungskritischer Strategien*, Hamburg 2005.

4 J. Plagemann and A. Ufen, *Spielarten des Populismus in Asien* (=GIGA-Focus Asien, 7), Hamburg 2017; S. Booyesen, *Dominance and Decline. The ANC in the Time of Zuma*, Johannesburg 2015.

5 F. Finchelstein, *From Fascism to Populism in History*, Oakland, CA 2017.

insufficient attention to the distinction between globalization as a key concept of an ideology, and the many quite different globalizations as an object of empirical research.⁶ Although the two exist in close relational proximity, they are not identical and should not be conflated.

Since the term's coinage in the late 1980s, historians have recognized that globalization has a history (in fact, several different histories), and as this realization has grown, so too has discussion on global-history approaches to that history.⁷ What the two debates – the one disputing the quasi-natural character of globalization in the name of either leftist criticism towards neoliberal deregulation, and the other insisting on the multiple roots of current global processes – have in common, is the fundamental doubt in an ideology of globalization being the hidden hand behind everything that happens in today's world and against which policy cannot do a lot. Such a mystification of the global has been increasingly deconstructed over the past years, from various angles of political and academic discourses, and has led scholars to interrogate the historicity of globalization(s). Following the question of how historical globalization(s) is (are), the question immediately arises as to how former variants of global processes are remembered and what effect this remembrance may have.

These discussions, in turn, have raised the question whether the history of globalization, like that of nationalism and nation states, can be used to identify sites of memory that can structure collective memory and, thus, support ongoing changes in collective representations of the past. Charles Maier, taking stock of the twentieth century, juxtaposes two chronological perspectives in such processes of the formation of collective memory: “structural narratives” and “moral narratives.” The former, the purview of historians and social scientists, demarcate economic developments or large-scale institutional change. The latter offers a moral assessment of an era and is by no means solely (or even primarily) the purview of historians. Using the twentieth century as an example, Maier tries to convey the difficulties of relating the structural narrative to the moral one, that is, the twentieth century as “a time span in which a complex set of institutional changes takes place” to the twentieth century as an epoch of moral atrocities.⁸ Sites of memory, in this context, are the product of historical cultures within which academic historiographies have a role, but they are by far not alone in defining what is important to whom. Sites of

6 Some authors conclude from this distinction that the term globalization should be reserved to characterize a certain ideological formation (often also described as neoliberal), while others argue for the use of the plural, hence to speak of globalizations, in order to make the difference clear. See, for example, A. Eppler, Globalisierung/en. Version 1.0, in: Docupedia-Zeitgeschichte, <http://docupedia.de/zg/Globalisierung>; J. Osterhammel, Globalisierungen, in: *ibid.*, Die Flughöhe der Adler. Historische Essays zur globalen Gegenwart, München 2017, p. 31.

7 In fact, the literature on globalization has exploded. For an early overview focused largely on American historiography, see P. Manning, *Navigating World History: Historians Create a Global Past*, New York 2003, and more recently M. Lang, *Histories of Globalization(s)*, in: P. Duara, V. Murthy and A. Sartori (eds.), *A Companion to Global Historical Thought*, Malden 2014, pp. 399–411.

8 C. Maier, *Consigning the 20th Century to History: Alternative Narratives for the Modern Era*, in: *The American Historical Review*, 105 (June 2000) 3, pp. 807–831, here 812.

national memory have emerged as a result of interaction between state authorities, civil society, academia, tourist industries, and many other actors during the long process of formation and stabilization of national communities.⁹ An amazingly rich literature has taken stock of many such processes that led to catalogues of well-known sites of memory, such as described in Nora's seven-volumes-long list of French *lieux de mémoire*, which became the archetype and theoretical model for similarly complex inventories of what had been important for national communities.

These impressive catalogues lead to the question of whether the national can be remembered but the global or the transregional cannot. Is the reason for scepticism towards global sites of memory simply the lack of an (already?) well-constituted cosmopolitan community that finds expression of its common sense of belonging in places, allegories, symbols, and the like? Or does the structure of global connectedness not necessarily fit at all with the idea of sites of (collective) memory, since there is no formation of a collective actor of the global in sight?

The perspective of multiple world pasts – all “simultaneously present, colliding, interacting and intermixing” to produce a collage of contemporary histories, advocated by Michael Geyer and Charles Bright¹⁰ – requires a careful consideration of the structural narratives, as well as the moral narratives that have hitherto determined the assessment of the twentieth century. One structural narrative has focused on the rise of the nation state as the organizational form best suited for advancing democracy, industrialization, and a mass memory culture; but with this narrative, little is gained by focusing on the twentieth century, given that neither nation states' origin nor their decomposition correspond with the temporal boundaries of that century. In fact, a fixation on the twentieth century obscures from view what Maier defines as “one of the most fundamental socio-political trends of modern world development, namely, the emergence, ascendancy, and subsequent crisis of what is best labelled ‘territoriality’.” Territoriality, Maier explains, means “the properties, including power, provided by the control of bordered political space, which until recently at least created the framework for national and often ethnic identity.”¹¹ The consideration of a slowly evolving era of territoriality as a starting point for analysing the twentieth century, helps, first of all, to historicize the nation state and nationalist tendencies that have touched and influenced almost every sphere of society.¹² Moreover, it points to territoriality as an important but not the only dimension of long-term spatialization processes, which also include, for instance, the evolution of empires¹³

9 E. François, K. Konczal, R. Traba and S. Troebst (eds.), *Geschichtspolitik in Europa seit 1989 – Deutschland, Frankreich und Polen im internationalen Vergleich*, Göttingen 2012.

10 M. Geyer and C. Bright, *World History in a Global Age*, in: *The American Historical Review*, 100 (1995) 4, pp. 1034–1060, here 1043.

11 C. Maier, *Consigning the 20th Century* (fn. 8) p. 807.

12 For the comparison of various national perspectives on memory cultures, see S. Berger and J. Seiffert (eds.), *Erinnerungsorte: Chancen, Grenzen und Perspektiven eines Erfolgskonzeptes in den Kulturwissenschaften. Was ist ein Erinnerungsort und wie entsteht er?*, Essen 2014.

13 F. Hadler and M. Mesenhöller (eds.), *Vergangene Größe und Ohnmacht in Ostmitteleuropa. Repräsentationen imperialer Erfahrung in der Historiographie seit 1918*, Leipzig 2007.

and city states, and thus frees us from earlier unproductive comparisons of local and global tendencies.

The recommendation that research on global history prioritizes spatiality and spatially anchored structures of politics in societies, also results in a different periodization. If we apply this perspective, neither Eric Hobsbawm's concept of a short twentieth century corresponding to the rise and fall of socialism,¹⁴ nor Giovanni Arrighi's idea of a long twentieth century defined by the rise of capitalism is the result.¹⁵ In fact, a focus on territoriality/spatiality¹⁶ invites us not only to rethink the periodization of the last two centuries (with a deep caesura towards the emergence of the global condition in the midst of the nineteenth century, which gave territorialization a new framework), but also the relationship between nation states and empires, which is more complex than the traditional from-empire-to-nation narrative suggests.¹⁷ Prior to the 1860s, the national organization of political space could only be observed in some parts of the world, while at the same time, the first transnational constellations had slowly begun to emerge.¹⁸ As we can conclude from these few hints to a much more complex story of the historical change of spatial formats and spatial orders, it is not as easy as especially social scientists often imagine that the global and the transnational follow the national with historical distance; on the contrary, since the late eighteenth century, nationalization, transformation of empires, and the emergence of an international space and sphere of transnational interaction historically went hand in hand with converging trends (due to mutual learning processes across the globe) and effects that have increased heterogeneity, inequality, and power asymmetries in the world.

As discussions on global-history approaches in the twentieth century have taken on greater significance in historical scholarship, so too has its periodization. This interest, however, has not by any means changed the "moral narratives" of the twentieth century. According to the dominant moral narrative, the twentieth century was a "dark century" defined by unimaginable crimes, genocide, world wars, and the (potential) self-destruction

14 See E. Hobsbawm, *The Age of Extremes: A History of the World, 1914–1991*, New York 1994.

15 See G. Arrighi, *The Long Twentieth Century: Money, Power, and the Origins of Our Times*, London 1994.

16 For a more detailed discussion of synchronous changes in many parts of the world, see Geyer and Bright, *World History in a Global Age* (fn. 10); U. Engel and M. Middell, *Bruchzonen der Globalisierung, globale Krisen und Territorialitätsregimes – Kategorien einer Globalgeschichtsschreibung*, in: *Comparativ* 15 (2005) 5/6, pp. 5–38; M. Middell and K. Naumann, *Global History and the Spatial Turn: From the Impact of Area Studies to the Study of Critical Juncures of Globalization*, in: *Journal of Global History*, 5 (2010) 1, pp. 149–170, pp. 163–169.

17 C. Maier, *The Cold War as an Era of Imperial Rivalry*, in: *Reinterpreting the End of the Cold War: Issues, Interpretations, Periodizations*, ed. S. Pons and F. Romero, London 2005, pp. 13–20.

18 For a more detailed discussion, see C. Maier, *Transformations of Territoriality 1600–2000 Space, Place, Territory*, in: G. Budde, S. Conrad and O. Janz (eds.), *Transnationale Geschichte: Themen, Tendenzen und Theorien*, Göttingen 2006, pp. 32–55. On the emergence of an increasingly dense network of international organizations, see A. Iriye, *Global Community: The Role of international Organizations in the Making of the Contemporary World*, Los Angeles 2002; on the various dimensions of transnational history and connections, see K.K. Patel, *Nach der Nationalfixiertheit. Perspektiven einer transnationalen Geschichte*, Berlin 2004. For an attempt to integrate territorialization and transnationalization in an historical account of a larger region, see: F. Hadler and M. Middell (eds.), *Handbuch einer transnationalen Geschichte Ostmitteleuropas, Band I: Von der Mitte des 19. Jahrhunderts bis zum Ersten Weltkrieg*, Göttingen 2017.

tion of entire civilizations or even the world. A second moral narrative of the twentieth century emphasizes the rise of consumerism,¹⁹ technological innovation, and expanding prosperity, bringing to mind modernization theory with its emphasis on progress. Maier argues that these moral narratives could remain unaffected by the rise of a global world order. The established Western narratives of catastrophe and progress are, however, confronted by new moral designs, such as Eastern European narratives of twofold victimization (under National Socialism and Soviet imperialism), advanced by politicians in that region,²⁰ or various moral narratives emphasizing the victimization of colonial subjects under imperial rule. Yet, such predictions about future moral narratives remain risky, since they presuppose a relatively homogenous development of global historical awareness, just as the pleas for new structural narratives assume a homogenous, international academic community.

However, speculation about how future generations across the globe may remember the twentieth century need not be the only perspective of the problem; instead of seeing “globalization” as a natural process, we may think of it as a bundle of projects promoted by multiple actors, or speak of globalizations in the plural, and one could take this idea even further, i.e. seeing these globalizations as the product of a vast array of political globalization projects. These political projects are based on different world views, but what they have in common is that they advance hierarchies of power and interpretation. The various world narratives, upon which these globalization projects are based, claim universal validity, and yet they are profoundly shaped by particularism. The construction of memory and identity is a part of these world narratives and of the globalization projects based on those narratives, just as, conversely, efforts at attaining a particular position in the world necessitate new narratives of the past. Correspondingly, the history of historiography becomes interesting because of the multitudinous forces driving global history,²¹ which are understood as the expression of various global projects.²² This history of writing global history is somehow connected to a possible, albeit not yet worked out history of memory sites of globalization and the related processes of remembering earlier global connections.

19 See P.N. Stearns, *Consumerism in World History*, New York 2006. For a more critical view of consumerism, see F. Trentmann, *Beyond Consumerism: New Historical Perspectives on Consumption*, in: *Journal of Contemporary History*, 39 (2004) 3, pp. 373–401; id. (ed.), *The Oxford Handbook on the History of Consumption*, Oxford 2012.

20 S. Troebst, *Diktaturerinnerung und Geschichtskultur im östlichen und südlichen Europa. Ein Vergleich der Vergleiche*, Leipzig 2010; S. Troebst and S. Baumgartl (eds.), *Postdiktatorische Geschichtskulturen im Süden und Osten Europas. Bestandsaufnahme und Forschungsperspektiven*, Göttingen 2010.

21 S. Beckert and D. Sachsenmaier, *Global History, Globally*, forthcoming 2018; G. Rillo, *La globalisation de l'Histoire globale*, in: *RHMC* 54 (2007) 4, pp. 23–33; G. Balachandran, *Claiming Histories beyond the Nations: Situating Global History*, in: *Indian Economic and Social History Review*, 49 (2012) 2, pp. 247–72.

22 M. Middell and L. Roura, *Transnational Challenges to National History Writing*, New York 2013.

2. A Necessary Enlargement for the Concept of Sites of Memory

A history of globalization's sites of memory encounters the same fundamental problem as global history in general, namely that it would have no obvious point of orientation in a cohesive social group or in a recognizable time frame. This dilemma is by no means entirely new, having previously arisen in methodological debates concerning a history of national sites of memory. Nora acknowledged that one motivation for a history of cultural remembrance in France was to preserve and restore a cohesive national memory, that is a memory of "France in the singular."²³ The project on *lieux de mémoire*, directed by Nora, evolved over the course of its seven volumes, composed of 127 diverse essays by leading French historians. The series has lent itself to multiple reworkings, as evidenced by the two American attempts at its translation.²⁴ However, in its original form, the goal was to realize a close link between the themes of commemoration and those of place: "The sole purpose of the undertaking in its original form was to achieve a close link between a general problematique of memory with the particular theme of 'places'."²⁵ In both Maier's study of historical narrative types and the French project (at first, most likely unintended in the latter), a flexibility arises, since "places" can be connected to a spatial order that adheres to certain spatial formats, such as the national organizational pattern, i.e. clearly demarcated exteriority and interiority; the integration of interior spaces through appropriate administrative structures; the development of political participation by all citizens; the removal of internal economic barriers; the invention of a shared history, and, in many cases, enforced monolingualism. "Places," however, can also form the building blocks of different spatial political orders. They remain a constant – existing before the constitution of the nation and after its weakening by the emergence of regional, supranational, and transregional relations of loyalty – and can, thus, be integrated into completely different spatial constellations and narratives.

In the French memory project, the flexibility of the concept of place expands even further; according to their quasi-metaphorical definition, places of memory include museums, monuments, archives, legends, symbols, institutions of education and knowledge production, as well as symbols, such as emblems, flags, and hymns. "This assortment of places," Nora opined, "is filled with rather chaotic exuberance and richness." Thus, the national unity of France "lies in the highly symbolic meaning that composed and illuminated the entity called 'France'."²⁶ Yet, given the project's implicit origins in a perceived threat to the unity of France, it could possibly lead to a reworking of the building blocks of national mythology, and hence changes in the structures of remembrance. For example, following the French revolution, the self-described "patriot" and builder

23 P. Nora, General Introduction in *Rethinking France*, vol. 1, Chicago 2001, p. viii.

24 L.B. Kritzman (ed.), *Realms of Memory* 3 vols, New York, 1996–98; D.P. Jordan (ed.), *Rethinking France*, 4 vols, Chicago 2001–2004.

25 P. Nora, General Introduction, in: *Rethinking France*, vol. 1 (fn. 23) p. xx.

26 Ibid.

Pierre-François Palloy reminted the stones and iron chains of the Bastille and offered them for sale as souvenirs. Rather than commemorating the building's history, his souvenirs commemorated its destruction and the birth of a French Republic, which was well-anchored in the history of metropolitan France, but much less so in its imperial and colonial histories.²⁷

In contrast to the French project, the large-scale project of German sites of memory, initiated by Étienne François and Hagen Schulze, does not start from the premise of unity; the history of Central Europe, characterized by upheavals, divisions, and caesuras, does not support such a narrative. Instead, their study focuses on competing collective memories, the interplay between regional and national memory, and the interaction with neighbouring peoples and victims of German expansionism.²⁸ Other authors have traced the memory cultures of other European countries, and this had added urgency to the question of whether there are or will be European sites of memory, when the European Community becomes a cultural community in need of a shared memory culture.²⁹ Studies on the memory cultures of the United States (US) and of other non-European cultures have contributed to the debate on the extent to which colonial and postcolonial status can be adequately represented;³⁰ they have made the issue of addressing American self-representation as an immigrant community or “melting pot” more urgent,³¹ and even more strongly than in the intra-European context, they have drawn attention to transatlantic interdependencies.³²

However, the difficulties of such a sweeping agenda are considerable, and so, at this point in time, we are seeing the emergence of individual studies, such as David Armitage's book reflecting on the global character of the US Declaration of Independence – the first American history of the declaration to venture a global-history approach. In three loosely

27 H.-J. Lüsebrink and R. Reichardt, *Die "Bastille": Zur Symbolgeschichte von Herrschaft und Freiheit*, Frankfurt a.M. 1990. On the contradictory character of the Third Republic's relationship with the colonial legacy, see for example L. Dubois, *La république métissée: Citizenship, Colonialism, and the Borders of French History*, in: S. Howe (ed.), *New Imperial Histories Reader*, London 2010, pp. 422–434, as well as J.A. Boittin and T. Stovall, “Who is French?” in: *French Historical Studies*, 33 (2010) 3, pp. 349–356. On Germany: L. Förster, *Postkoloniale Erinnerungslandschaften. Wie Deutsche und Herero in Namibia des Kriegs von 1904 gedenken*, Frankfurt, New York 2010. Addressing the colonial dimension of historical culture across Europe: U. Fenske, D. Groth, K.-M. Guse and B.P. Kuhn (eds.), *Kolonialismus und Dekolonisation in nationalen Geschichtskulturen und Erinnerungspolitik in Europa*, Frankfurt am Main 2015.

28 F. Hartog, *Régimes d'historicité. Présentisme et expériences du temps*, Paris 2003 discusses these various dimensions under his notion of regimes of historicity, and addresses similar concerns with the many layers of remembrance.

29 S. Troebst, *Transnationale Erinnerungsorte: Nord- und südeuropäische Perspektiven*, Berlin 2009; C. Kühberger (ed.), *Europäische Geschichtskultur – Europäische Geschichtspolitik. Vom Erfinden, Entdecken, Erarbeiten der Bedeutung von Erinnerung und Geschichte für das Verständnis und Selbstverständnis Europas*, Innsbruck 2009; A. Assmann and S. Conrad, *Memory in a Global Age: Discourses, Practices and Trajectories*, Basingstoke 2010; P. de Boer et al. (eds.), *Europäische Erinnerungsorte*, Bd. 1: *Mythen und Grundbegriffe des europäischen Selbstverständnisses*; Bd. 2: *Das Haus Europa*; Bd. 3: *Europa und die Welt*, Munich 2012.

30 M. Diawara, B. Lategan and J. Rüsen (eds.), *Historical Memory in Africa. Dealing with the Past, Reaching for the Future in an Intercultural Context*, Oxford 2010.

31 J. Kempf, *Entre le regard et la trace: Pour les lieux de mémoire aux États-Unis*, in: *Annales de l'université de Savoie*, 18 (1995), pp. 13–22.

32 M. Meigs, *Optimism at Armageddon: Voices of American Participants in the First World War*, London 1997.

connected essays, he considers the world in the declaration, the declaration in the world, and the world of declarations. As Armitage notes, “no single document is so bound up with what it means to be American” as the declaration and, yet, even its earliest material form points to its international character. The printer of the first version, John Dunlop, was a native Irishman; the paper he used for most copies was Dutch paper that had been brought from England, and the raw materials of the silver inkwell, in which the signers dipped their pens, most likely came from Peru or Mexico.³³

Yet, it was as a model for other declarations of independence in North America, Africa, and Eastern Europe that it transcended the national space and became a site of memory for other states. Beginning in the late eighteenth century, a host of states chose to follow the path forged by the declaration, writing similar declarations in order to gain foreign recognition of their (often violent) struggle for legal independence. As Armitage makes clear, the US Declaration of Independence was, in actuality, a declaration of interdependence.³⁴

The global prominence of the declaration can also be explained by its strategic importance for modern world history. It marked the transition from a world of empires to one of states with a national agenda (albeit to this day, some of the most successful nation states pursue imperialist policies and hold control over places and spaces outside the metropolis, where people do not have a full spectrum of rights).³⁵ The authors of such a declaration were primarily concerned with outlining the process of state formation to the world beyond their borders, not nation-building at home. The model proved so successful that by the second half of the twentieth century, nation states claiming exclusive, internal political and legal jurisdiction over its citizenry (with a few exceptions) defined the world political order. The dissolution of the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia in the 1990s, marked a continuation of this process, and the various nationalist movements that emerged in the wake of the collapse, viewed the declaration as a source of legitimation for their cause.³⁶ But this new wave of nationalism and nation-building happened in a different context: while, during the Cold War, such processes happened under the umbrella of two powerful blocs competing with each other and, therefore, supporting sovereignty as a tool against the expansion of the other side, the post-1989 attempts to nationalize pieces of the former transnational entities worked against the tide of growing deterritorialization caused by the search for a new world order and capitalist expansion into new areas.³⁷

33 D. Armitage, *The Declaration of Independence: A Global History*, Cambridge, MA 2007, here p. 12.

34 Ibid, p. 30.

35 C. Charle, *La crise des sociétés impériales: Allemagne, France, Grande-Bretagne 1900–1940: Essai d'histoire comparée*, Paris 2001; C. Maier, *Among Empires, American Ascendancy and its Predecessors*, Cambridge 2006; J. Burbank and F. Cooper, *Empires in World History. Power and the Politics of Difference*, Princeton 2010; A.L. Stoler, *Duress: Imperial Durabilities in Our Times*, Durham 2016.

36 See the list of declarations of independence between 1776–1993 in: D. Armitage, *The Declaration* (fn. 33), pp. 145–156.

37 On the understanding of globalization as a dialectics of de- and reterritorialization in new political geography, see G. O’Tuathail and T. Luke, *Present at the (Dis)integration: Deterritorialisation and Reterritorialisation in the*

Works on the history of human rights, which likewise identify the universalization of concepts and practices as the basis for the development of a global historical consciousness, have pointed in the same direction.³⁸ While they have been the product of political conflict at certain places with a particular nationalizing agenda, they became a sort of world heritage and allowed people in many different situations to refer to them. One could attribute a similar global historical consciousness to Léopold Senghor, a founder of the Négritude movement and advocate of Africa's participation in the francophone world. Senghor, a native of Senegal, argued that his country's participation in a postcolonial francophone world did not represent its continued subjugation by its former colonial master; rather, it announced to the world Africa's right to participate in developing an idea of French civilization over which France no longer exercised sole stewardship.³⁹ Moving beyond sharp distinctions between metropole and periphery, and the diffusionist model of cultural contact, a growing number of scholars are rethinking how culture travels. Instead of a unidirectional flow from core to periphery, these studies posit a multidirectional circulation, whereby ideas and cultural practices are transformed, appropriated, and adapted, as they travelled between metropole and colonial societies, and later between metropole and postcolonial societies, as well as between societies in the colonized world or the Global South.⁴⁰ This process of cultural transfer provides the building blocks for a history of global sites of memory.⁴¹ The tango can exemplify how cultural transfer and cross-cultural transfers were accompanied by appropriation, modification, and reinterpretation. Its transfer to Paris, Berlin, and beyond at the beginning of the twentieth century entailed more than a geographic move: it also involved a social and cultural transfer. In removing it from its original context – the working-class neighbourhoods of Buenos Aires – its disseminators adapted it for European consumption, so that the dance took on new styles, forms, and traditions.⁴² Today, the tango is on the agenda of every national or international dance festival.⁴³

The tango is, of course, by no means the only example of cultural transfer; a long list of such transfers could be given here. However, the point is not to provide an arbitrary

New World (Dis)order, in: *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* (1994), pp. 381–398; N. Brenner, Beyond State-Centrism? Space, Territoriality, and Geographical Scale in Globalization Studies, in: *Theory and Society* 28 (1999), pp. 39–71; J. Agnew, Sovereignty Regimes: Territoriality and State Authority in Contemporary World Politics, in: *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 95 (2005), H. 2, pp. 437–461.

38 L. Hunt, *Inventing Human Rights: A History*, New York 2007; M.R. Ishay, *The History of Human Rights: From Ancient Times to the Globalization Era*, Berkeley 2004.

39 J. Riesz, Léopold Sédar Senghor und der afrikanische Aufbruch im 20. Jahrhundert, Wuppertal 2006.

40 S. Schaffer et al. (eds.), *The Brokered World. Go-Betweens and Global Intelligence, 1770–1820*, Sagamore Beach 2009; M. Middell (ed.), *Cultural Transfer, Encounters and Connections in the Global 18th Century*, Leipzig 2014.

41 T. Adam (ed.), *Intercultural Transfers and the Making of the Modern World, 1800–2000. Sources and Contexts*, Basingstoke 2011; P.Y. Saunier, *Transnational History*, London 2013; M. Middell, *The Intercultural Transfer Paradigm in its Transnational and Transregional Setting*, in: *Yearbook of Transnational History* 1 (2018) (forthcoming).

42 K. Lange, *Tango in Paris und Berlin: Eine Transnationale Geschichte der Metropolkultur um 1900*, Göttingen 2015.

43 For more on the dance's global transfer, see K. Maase, *Grenzenloses Vergnügen: Der Aufstieg der Massenkultur 1850–1970*, Frankfurt am Main 1997; C. Apprill, *Le tango argentin en France*, Paris 1998; R. Pelinski (ed.), *El tango nómada: Ensayos sobre la diáspora el tango*, Buenos Aires 2000.

inventory of these transfers but rather to highlight the extent to which (potential) transnational and global sites of remembrance surround us. Such a history would have to start by putting the many groups migrating across the globe centre stage. For these displaced communities, remembrance is an expression of their transnational or even global existence.⁴⁴

The structural narrative – returning once again to Maier’s category – offers sufficient material and stimulus for precisely mapping a global memory landscape because it highlights entanglements and universal projects that fundamentally challenge the “territoriality” of our view of history. But has globalization already created a global turn in historical consciousness? Put differently, has global literacy increased as a result of globalization? Recent studies suggest the answer is no.⁴⁵ Even though academic historiography has in recent years expressed harsh criticism of Eurocentric approaches to the past, this bias has persisted in media-transmitted history. A recent study based on an online survey of persons from 100 countries concluded:

*There is a strong convergence of historical perceptions in different parts of the world, and a number of events can indeed be called part of a global memory. This global ‘canon’ of events is comprised mainly of acts of political violence, like wars and revolutions. Yet world regions are very unevenly represented in world memory, and the only region to be mentioned by more than one third of the population on every continent is Europe. Additionally, many of the mentioned events that took place in other parts of the world also included Western powers on foreign soil, or are connected with the foreign policy of the United States during and after the Cold War. Africa, and even more so Latin America and Oceania hardly feature on the memory maps of our sample of the world population.*⁴⁶

While this study seemingly validates Maier’s conclusion about the persistence of moral narratives that stem from Western European societies,⁴⁷ it is possible that the increas-

44 K.J. Bade et al., *Enzyklopädie Migration in Europa: Vom 17. Jahrhundert bis zur Gegenwart*, Paderborn 2007; C. Harzig and D. Hoerder, *What is Migration History?*, Cambridge 2009. The list of books and articles on migration issues is fast expanding and addresses – often under the term of diaspora – more and more cultural dimensions as well. The contribution to the emergence of a global historical consciousness remains, however, so far understudied.

45 I. Volkmer, *News in Public Memory: An International Study of Media Memories across Generations*, New York 2006; J.W. Pennbaker, D. Pérez and J.C. Deschamps, *The Social Psychology of History: Defining the Most Important Events of the Last 10, 100, and 1000 Years*, in: *Psicologia Política* 32 (2006), pp. 15–32; H. Schuman and A.D. Corning, *Collective Knowledge of Public Events: The Soviet Era from the Great Purge to Glasnost*, in: *American Journal of Sociology*, 105 (2000), pp. 913–56; A. D. Corning, *Comparing Iraq to Vietnam. Recognition, Recall, and the Nature of Cohort Effects*, in: *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 70 (2006), pp. 78–87.

46 V. Andorfer et. al., *How Global are Our Memories? An Empirical Approach Using an Online Survey*, in: *Comparativ*, 18 (2008) 2, pp. 99–115.

47 In contrast to Western Europe, Canada, the US, and Australia have not only been always “diverse” and “migrant societies” but have insisted on this fact for a long time already, developing national memories that were mainly racial ones. The extent to which that has shifted in these societies in the last decades is much more dramatic than what we see in Western Europe. It is not necessarily, or at least not exclusively about increased diversity, as they have always been “diverse,” but it is about a new “politics of difference” that has emerged.

ingly diverse and intercultural background of students and of the general public will lead sooner rather than later to changes in how history is taught in classrooms and in seminars.⁴⁸ In short, diversity could result in a broadening of the curriculum's perspective to take into account postcolonial realities.⁴⁹ At the same time, sites of memory that refer to the presence of Europeans (and especially those connected to the colonial past) have been disputed, as the #RhodesMustFall campaign in 2015/2016 in Cape Town, South Africa, has shown dramatically.

3. Portals of Globalization

Globalization, most historians would now agree,⁵⁰ began before the formation of nation states. Historical analysis, in fact, has shown that a simple trajectory from national regulation to global governance, advanced by many in the 1990s, misrepresents the timeline of globalization.⁵¹ While historians agree that globalization predates the emergence of the nation state, pinpointing a single date of origin remains a topic of contention. Some authors speak of “archaic” globalization, that is, globalizing events and developments from the time of the earliest civilizations.⁵² However, most historians associate the era of globalization with the Age of Discovery; Jürgen Osterhammel and Niels P. Petersson explain:

*Throughout earlier periods of history, there were repeated attempts at globalization that always broke off at some point. Therefore, we can view these events as the prehistory of globalization. We agree with Immanuel Wallerstein insofar as we interpret a new globalization initiative that began around 1500 with the emergence of the Portuguese and Spanish colonial empires as the beginning of a basically irreversible process of worldwide integration.*⁵³

48 L. Hunt, *Writing History in the Global Era*, New York 2014.

49 M. Riekenberg (ed.), *Geschichts- und Politikunterricht zeitgemäß? Fragen und Bemerkungen aus der Sicht der Regionalwissenschaften*, Leipzig 2005; H. Schissler and Y.N. Soysal (eds.), *The Nation, Europe, and the World: Textbooks and Curricula in Transition*, New York 2005; J. Forster and S. Popp (eds.), *Curriculum Weltgeschichte. Globale Zugänge für den Geschichtsunterricht*, Schwalbach 2003; M. Herren, P. Manning, P.C. McCarty, M. Middell, and E. Vanhoute, *Potentials and Challenges of Global Studies for the 21st Century*, 2014.

50 The intention here is not to overlook Bruce Mazlish's concept of a new global history, which focuses on the processes that have given shape to the globalized world of the present. Mazlish posits a qualitative change in the linkage between peoples, brought about by our growing awareness of threats against which the territorial state cannot protect us (e.g. military threats such as nuclear weapons and environmental threats such as ozone holes and climate change). Yet, his approach does not focus solely on the present; instead, the development of these factors of globalization is traced over the long-term. See B. Mazlish, *The New Global History*, London 2006; see also www.newglobalhistory.org.

51 For a very good overview, see J. Osterhammel and N.P. Petersson, *Geschichte der Globalisierung. Dimensionen, Prozesse, Epochen*, München 2003.

52 C. A. Bayly, 'Archaic' and 'Modern' Globalization in the Eurasian and African Arena, c. 1750–1850, in: A.G. Hopkins (ed.), *Globalization in World History*, London 2002, pp. 47–73.

53 J. Osterhammel and N.P. Petersson, *Globalization: A Short History*, Dona Geyer (trans.) Princeton, NJ 2005, p. 28.

Still, other theories for the periodization of globalization should be taken into consideration. For example, Janet Abu-Lughod argues that the modern world system grew out of a thirteenth-century world trade system dominated by China and the Islamic Middle East.⁵⁴ In advancing this theory, she contends that Wallerstein underestimated the historic strengths of Asian and Arab economies. Other authors insist on even longer continuities.⁵⁵

Each of these proposed temporal frames for globalization, of course, also has implications for how we remember this supposed global past. Decisions about periodization are never neutral and often include implicit value judgments and hierarchies. Thus, as many authors acknowledge, their proposed periodization for globalization was an effort to move beyond the dominant Eurocentric representations of the past, even if such representations no longer explicitly devalue other cultures as “people without history.”

What counts more for a global-history approach to sites of memory, is that global history cannot be identified with any particular spatial order; rather, the focal point of global history must be an analysis of the relationship between various constellations of global currents and networks on the one hand, and the political organization of space that is created to control the flow of people, goods, and ideas on the other. Thus, this approach also addresses the relationship between global interdependencies and the transformation, renegotiation, and making anew of different spatial orders. In analysing these arenas of contact, the category of “portals of globalization” seems very useful to me, as argued already on other occasions.⁵⁶ For centuries, the development of global contacts was not uniform; instead, it was concentrated in hubs that encompassed all modes of transactions: trade relations, intellectual discussions with foreigners, military conflicts, religious proselytization and conversion, book markets, and the circulation of notions of luxury. It was at these hubs that the global context crystallized.

We can gain insights into the formation of past global networks by comparing them with contemporary regions, which only recently have been exposed to the effects of globalization and, thus, where the negotiation of cross-cultural communication remains in flux. In the present-day context, this cross-cultural negotiation is best exemplified by contact between foreign investors, representing transregional or transnational enterprises and the mayors of relatively small communities. To alleviate conflict, the expertise of consulting firms specializing in cross-cultural exchange is leaned on today. In the age of proto-industrialization, local distributors had fulfilled this function, and in the age of nationalism, state bureaucrats had been the moderators of cross-cultural encounters. But in the context of extensive global-market connections, the challenge remains to master, in a very short period of time, cultural techniques that developed over centuries (at least in part) within portals of globalization, and then applying that knowledge effectively.

54 J. Abu-Lughod, *Before European Hegemony: The World System A.D. 1250–1350*, Oxford 1989.

55 J.R. McNeill and W.H. McNeill, *The Human Web: A Bird's-Eye View of World History*, New York 2003; D. Christian, *Maps of Time: An Introduction to Big History*, Berkeley 2004; F. Spier, *The Structure of Big History: From the Big Bang until Today*, Amsterdam 1996.

56 Middell and Naumann, *Global History and the Spatial Turn* (fn. 16).

The definition of portals of globalization includes both physical locations and infrastructures, such as harbours, shipyards, warehouses, and markets, as well as institutions and political abstractions, such as citizenship rights and contractual enforcement by courts. From the standpoint of the men and women who lived and traded through such portals of globalization, these places can be seen as hubs of entrepreneurship, job markets, and even religious and political safe havens. On the other hand, they were also important sites of regulation and control, which included exclusionary practices and forced displacement.

Portals of globalization, thus, have a twofold significance for building a global memory culture. They are the places where the patterns of behaviour, institutions, social constellations, and cultural configurations that have relevance for subsequent globalizing impulses emerged. As such, they can be used to measure the scope and depth of the global experience. For present-day regions that only now are experiencing the effects of globalization, they inspire imitation as a historically successful model, or rejection as a threat to a territorialized understanding of identity. But irrespective of the reaction, portals of globalization connect the past and present experience of global networks and consequently invite exploration of their transformation into global *lieux de mémoire*.

In their book *The Human Web*, John McNeill and William McNeill highlight the long history of human webs of communication and interchange, in which port cities and relay stations on transcontinental routes (e.g. the Silk Road) served as crossroads of information, people, goods, and disease.⁵⁷ They can be seen as the first of several relevant types of portals of globalization. These port cities and trade hubs, although distinguishable from one another, exhibit important similarities in terms of the social groups involved in trade, communication, and transport.⁵⁸ As a rule, these groups were linked to cities shaped by an emerging cosmopolitanism; in a study of residents of Mediterranean port cities in the age of steam navigation, Malte Fuhrmann revealed in an exemplary way a culture of cosmopolitanism defined by contradictory social interactions, that is, interethnic sociability and confrontations.⁵⁹

The web of social relations in port cities marks the point of intersection between research on portals of globalization and that on diasporic communities.⁶⁰ Hamburg and Bremen became transit sites for transoceanic emigration in the nineteenth century. With

57 See McNeill and McNeill, *The Human Web* (fn. 55).

58 M. Haneda (ed.), *Asian Port Cities 1600–1800. Local and Foreign Cultural Interactions*, Singapore 2008; A. Mah, *Port Cities and Global Legacies. Urban Identity, Waterfront Work, and Radicalism*, Basingstoke 2014; B. Beaven, K. Bell and R. James (eds.), *Port Towns and Urban Cultures: International Histories of the Waterfront, c. 1700–2000*, London 2016; M. Maruschke, *Portals of Globalization. Mumbai's Free Ports and Free Zones, c. 1833–2015*, Leipzig Diss. Phil. 2016.

59 M. Fuhrmann, *Meeresanrainer – Weltenbürger? Zum Verhältnis von hafenstädtischer Gesellschaft und Kosmopolitismus*, in: M. Fuhrmann and L. Amenda (eds.), *Hafenstädte: Mobilität, Migration, Globalisierung*, Leipzig 2007, pp. 12–26.

60 To cite only a few examples: W. Gungwu and N. Chiu-Keong (eds.), *Maritime China in Transition 1750–1850*, Wiesbaden 2004; A. McKeown, *Chinese Migrant Networks and Cultural Change: Peru, Chicago, Hawaii 1900–1936*, Chicago 2001; K. Friedland (eds.), *Maritime Aspects of Migration*, Köln 1989. For a general overview, see W. Gungwu (ed.), *Global History and Migrations*, Boulder, CO 1997.

hinterlands that extended beyond German-speaking territories into Eastern Europe, an estimated five million people in these two cities boarded ships bound for overseas destinations between 1871–1914. These crossings, however, were not unidirectional, as many Europeans subsequently returned to Europe.⁶¹ As places of arrival and departure, and as sites for the transport of goods, port cities became portals of globalization, exercising influence on food culture, clothing styles, work processes, and forms of sociability. For example, Hong Kong, from which six million Chinese emigrated between 1866–1939, had a similar function in this respect as its Northern and Western European counterparts.⁶² Moreover African sites of the slave trade, and African and South Asian railway hubs also acted as portals of globalization.⁶³

However, any idealized representation of port cities as places of peaceful coexistence and multicultural diversity, should be viewed with a healthy dose of scepticism. The slave trade; the dubious tactics employed by companies offering overseas ship passages to migrants; the high rate of crime in port cities; xenophobic policies,⁶⁴ and outbreaks of contagious diseases were also defining features of port cities as global gateways.⁶⁵ Constant conflicts over access, high entry fees, and brutal gatekeepers were as present in these portals as cosmopolitan attitudes were.

In addition to being hubs for global trade networks, port cities were also gateways to the various spatial orders to which the hinterlands belonged.⁶⁶ This brings us to a second type of portal, the metropolitan centre of empires and territorial states, which in some cases developed into national centres in the nineteenth century. Such metropolitan centres additionally served important administrative and institutional functions, particularly in the area of knowledge collection about distant countries and cultures. For example, institutions were established that mapped the world,⁶⁷ studied foreign languages, advanced comparative anthropology, and systemized this knowledge to advance the interests of the metropolitan centre. The origins of many of these institutions can be traced, in part, to the curiosity cabinets kept by earlier generations of inhabitants of these cities. As centres of larger empires, these metropolises also became hubs of anti-imperial political movements, as recent research has shown in greater detail.⁶⁸

61 M. Wyman, *Round-Trips to America: The Immigration Return to Europe 1880–1930*, Ithaca, NY 1993.

62 R. Skeldon (ed.), *Emigration from Hong Kong: Tendencies and Impacts*, Hong Kong 1995.

63 For excellent case studies, see R. Law, *Ouidah: The Social History of a West African Slaving Port, 1727–1892*, Athens 2004; G. Castryck (ed.), *From Railway Junction to Portal of Globalization: Making Globalization Work in African and South Asian Railway Towns*, *Comparativ*, 25 (2015) 4, p. 7–16.

64 L. Amenda, "Einfallstore": Hafenstädte, Migration und Kontrolle 1890–1930, in: L. Amenda and M. Fuhrmann (eds.), *Hafenstädte: Mobilität, Migration, Globalisierung*, Leipzig 2007, pp. 27–36.

65 M. J. Echenberg, *Plague Ports: The Global Urban Impact of Bubonic Plague 1894–1901*, New York 2007.

66 T. Lane, *Liverpool: Gateway of Empire*, London 1987.

67 M. Mann, *Mapping the Country: European Geography and the Cartographical Construction of India, 1760–1790*, in: *Science, Technology and Society* 8 (2003), pp. 25–46.

68 J.A. Boitin, *Colonial Metropolis. The Urban Grounds of Feminism and Anti-Imperialism in Interwar Paris*, Lincoln 2010; M. Goebel, *Anti-Imperial Metropolis. Interwar Paris and the Seeds of Third World Nationalism*, New York 2015.

For years, it was assumed that scientific knowledge originated in Western Europe, and it was then transmitted to non-European countries via colonization; eventually, through this process of diffusion, local intellectuals had accumulated sufficient knowledge to establish indigenous centres of knowledge production.⁶⁹ Such Eurocentric diffusionism – challenged in recent years by a growing number of historians – typically results from fragmentary research on non-Western parts of the world, or the deliberate suppression of non-European experiences from the history of globalization. The British Museum and the Louvre are by no means the only portals of globalization; rather, these museums' collections of colonial artefacts, acquired by plundering imperial powers, represent a particular globalization project. The Forbidden City in Beijing, the Buddhist and Hindu temples of Borobudur and Prambanan in Indonesia, and Machu Picchu in Peru are also portals of globalization. They represent only a few examples of non-European portals; portals of globalization with their connections to state and religious institutions aimed at creating cultural cohesiveness and to modern (scientific) forms of conceptualising and visualising the past, are ubiquitous.

Higher-education institutions concerned with the dissemination of knowledge and the development of research capacity through global cooperation are often linked to these portals. Thus, Ralf Dahrendorf could describe the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE) as an institution with global reach; this descriptor could also be applied to other similar institutions in continental Europe, such as the École nationale d'administration (ENA) in France and the Deutsche Hochschule für Politik, an institution that flourished during the Weimar Republic. These sites have become global *lieux de mémoire* – emblazoned in the memory of British and Continental European students, as well as that of young scholars from the Caribbean, India, and Africa. As a portal of globalization, LSE acquired a certain functional diversity at the end of the nineteenth century: "LSE was not and could not have been the British or the National School of Economics. Its base was London, and its home the world."⁷⁰ It is no coincidence that this famous college is located at the heart of London, in close proximity to important institutions of the former British Empire, or that it has strong ties to British foreign policy, as well as close contacts with other cultural institutions, such as the British Museum and the world of finance. LSE's consistently high percentage of foreign students and instructors makes it a seemingly global institution, although there are clearly limits. As Dahrendorf acknowledged, "The School never aimed at a baseless internationalism; it is easier to be cosmopolitan for those who have passports;" yet still, he claimed, "LSE has made a major contribution to combating one of the plagues of the twentieth century, the plague of narrow and often aggressive nationalism."⁷¹

69 K. Raj, *Relocating Modern Science: Circulation and the Construction of Knowledge in South Asia and Europe, 1650–1900*, Houndmills 2007. In addition to academic institutions, the author also focuses on informal sites of information exchange, such as coffee houses and clubs.

70 R. Dahrendorf, *LSE: A History of the London School of Economics and Political Science 1895–1995*, Oxford 1995, p. 518.

71 *Ibid.*, p. 519.

The case of LSE reveals how portals such as London bore the physical and psychological imprint of an imperial history.⁷² This history is reflected in the architecture, in imperial bureaucracies, as well as in the constant mobility flows to and from the former colonies.⁷³ It is visible in the lush colossal buildings of imperial power and in the riches of a world-wide economy that flowed to the centre from the periphery.⁷⁴ But this history also marks imperial metropolises as portals and sites of memory for anti-imperialist movements and decolonization.⁷⁵ Imperial metropolises and their archives may also be paths to gaining official recognition of a pre-national identity for native groups, and specific locations may be sites of commemoration for ancestors, who remain otherwise undocumented in written accounts.⁷⁶ This history is also manifested in the traces of bloody oppression and in the days set aside to commemorate past outbreaks of racism. The mass demonstration of tens of thousands of unarmed Algerians on the streets of Paris on 17 October 1961 is but one example of the countless instances of racial conflict that defined such portals. Against the backdrop of the Algerian War and escalating racial tensions in France, the French National Police attacked a mass demonstration of roughly 30,000 pro-National Liberation Front Algerians. The death toll exceeded that of Bloody Sunday (on 30 January 1972), when British forces shot and killed 14 Irish protestors in Londonderry.⁷⁷ Thus, portals of globalization are also sites at which oppositional forces in transnational conflicts are concentrated in large numbers.

A third type of portals of globalization, touched on only briefly here, has less to do with commercial networks and the imperial past, and more to do with the advent of global events, such as world exhibitions, major international sports festivals, and the establishment of international organizations.⁷⁸ Here, too, we can easily identify an overlap between the different types of portals, given that London and Paris were among the pioneers of the exhibition movement of the nineteenth century;⁷⁹ it was soon followed by

72 J. Schneer, *London 1900: The Imperial Metropolis*, New Haven 1999.

73 For an example out of the burgeoning literature on the impact of empire on metropolises and the many traces of this past in architecture, see: F. Driver and D. Gilbert (eds.), *Imperial Cities: Landscape, Display and Identity*, Manchester; New York 1999.

74 C. Hall and S.O. Rose (eds.), *At Home with the Empire. Metropolitan Culture and the Imperial World*, Cambridge; New York 2006.

75 M. Matera, *Black London. The Imperial Metropolis and Decolonization in the Twentieth Century*, Oakland 2015. On black students in Moscow, see C. Katsakioris, *Les étudiants de pays arabes formés en Union soviétique pendant la guerre froide, 1956–1991*, in: *Revue européenne des migrations internationales* 32 (2016) 2, pp. 13–38.

76 C.-P. Thrush, *Indigenous London. Native Travelers at the Heart of Empire*, New Haven 2017.

77 J. House and N. MacMaster, *Paris 1961: Algerians, State Terror, and Memory*, Oxford 2006.

78 As an early example of such an international organization and its effect on global consciousness: V. Huber, *The Unification of the Globe by Disease? The International Sanitary Conferences on Cholera, 1851–1894*, in: *Historical Journal*, 49 (2006) 2, pp. 453–476.

79 World exhibitions have already attracted a lot of scholarly attention, and the effect of such international gatherings on the perception of global connectedness is well studied: W. Kaiser, *Vive la France! Vive la République? The Cultural Construction of French Identity at the World Exhibitions in Paris, 1855–1900*, in: *National Identities*, 1 (1999) 3, pp. 227–244; A. v. Plato, *Präsentierte Geschichte: Ausstellungskultur und Massenpublikum im Frankreich des 19. Jahrhunderts*, Frankfurt a.M. 2001; N. Levell, *Oriental Visions: Exhibitions, Travel and Collecting in the Victorian Age*, London 2001; M. Gaillard, *Les Expositions universelles de 1855 à 1937*, Paris 2003; W. Kaiser, *Cultural Transfer of Free Trade at the World Exhibitions, 1851–1862*, in: *Journal of Modern History* 77 (2005), H.

places like Istanbul, Melbourne, or Sydney.⁸⁰ Global mental maps of radio listeners and television viewers in the twentieth century shifted though, as locales not yet firmly anchored in such mapping became the hosts of world championships and Olympic Games (e.g. the 1956 Summer Olympic Games in Melbourne).⁸¹

The competition to host such international events also points to the role of memory for portals of globalization. Since the nineteenth century, cities have increasingly called upon their past global histories in order to reinvent themselves as *lieux de mémoire*,⁸² blending the structural narratives advanced by professional historians with the moral narratives advanced in popular culture.⁸³ In this endeavour, some evoke the metaphor of “gateway to the world,” others call upon the image of “a bridge to the East,” and a third group define themselves as at the crossroads of medieval trade routes, so as to emphasize the longevity and primacy of their project. In vying for contracts or bids, cities promote both their past global histories and their attributes as a modern global city, that is, air-transportation capacity, accommodation options for international tourists, the level of revenue of large banks and international business enterprises, and the size of the catchment area from which potential consumers might be drawn.⁸⁴ Over the past 20 years, this process went east and south, as examples from Beijing to Rio de Janeiro and South Africa to Qatar demonstrate. The resulting discussions about hosting mega-events and development has added a new facet to the ongoing debate about what portals of globalization might be good for.⁸⁵ Whether these locales, as Sassen has postulated, are at the centre of a new, global city system,⁸⁶ or are merely part of the continuing history of portals of globalization, is worth the joint study of sociologists and historians.

A global history that does not wish to follow the diachronic approach of modernization theory, in which the various parts of the world move along a conveyor belt towards one

3, pp. 563–590; V. Ogle, *Die Kolonisierung der Zeit: Repräsentationen französischer Kolonien auf den Pariser Weltausstellungen von 1889 und 1900*, in: *Historische Anthropologie* 13 (2005) 3, pp. 376–395.

80 Z. Çelik, *Displaying the Orient. Architecture of Islam at Nineteenth-Century World's Fairs*, Berkeley; Los Angeles; Oxford 1992; R. W. Rydell and N.E. Gwinn (eds.), *Fair Representations: World's Fairs and the Modern World*, Amsterdam 1994; A.C.T. Geppert, J. Coffey and T. Lau (eds.), *International Exhibitions, Expositions Universelles and World's Fairs, 1851–2005: A Bibliography*, Berlin 2006.

81 B. Keys, *The 1956 Melbourne Olympic Games and the Postwar International Order*, in: C. Fink, F. Hadler and T. Schramm (eds.), *1956. European and Global Perspectives*, Leipzig 2006, pp. 283–308. Again, the Olympic Games has recently been a subject of increasing research, especially by social scientists accompanying bids of hosting cities, and relating them to the formation of global rankings of cities: Olympia: 100 Years of History, 1886–1986, London 1986; S. Cornelissen, *The Geopolitics of Global Aspiration: Sport Mega-Events and Emerging Powers*, in: *The International Journal of the History of Sport*, 27 (2010) 16–18, pp. 3008–3025; J. Grix (ed.) *Leveraging Legacies from Sports Mega-Events: Concepts and Cases*, Basingstoke 2014.

82 T. Barringer and T.F. Lynn (eds.), *Colonialism and the Object: Empire, Material Culture and the Museum*, London 1998.

83 Mah, *Port Cities* (fn. 58).

84 S. Sassen, *The Global City*. New York, London, Tokyo, Princeton 2001.

85 S. Cornelissen, *More than a Sporting Chance? Appraising the Sport for Development Legacy of the 2010 FIFA World Cup*, in: *Third World Quarterly*, 32, 3 (2011), pp. 503–529.

86 See the different perspectives in S. Sassen, *Territory, Authority, Rights. From Medieval to Global Assemblages*, Princeton 2006, and J.L. Abu-Lughod, *New York, Chicago, Los Angeles. America's Global Cities*, Minneapolis, London 1999.

modernity (equated with Western-style economic, political, and cultural forms and, thus, legitimizing the domination of the West/North over the rest of the world), calls for an approach that has, as its focal point, the synchronous, yet polycentric, interpenetration of multiple modernities. Christopher Bayly has proposed the concept of “global crises” to describe such synchronous and polycentric relationships, in which global interactions intensify and lead to violent clashes.⁸⁷ The sociologist Neil Brenner, building on the work of David Harvey, has attributed these eruptions of social conflicts to dialectically intertwined processes of territorialization and deterritorialization.⁸⁸ At certain critical junctures of globalization, these conflicts converge into the emergence of a new spatial order. Portals of globalization are places where such crises can be seen very early on at the horizon, but also where the conflicts are fought in a particular explicit way.

Portals of globalization play a vital role in global processes of synchronization, in that they serve as hubs for global entanglements of all kinds, facilitate the emergence of cultural techniques and knowledge in dealing with global interconnections, and they provide information on the way in which other societies are dealing with similar challenges. Consequently, they increase awareness that the economic, political, and cultural challenges faced at home are in fact global phenomena. Thus, portals of globalization provide a theoretical frame for understanding the difference between the earliest manifestations of globalization and more recent developments. At the same time, these portals serve to organize the memory of a global experience. It seems, therefore, a promising endeavour to use the concept of portals of globalization to connect the investigation of sites of memory with the research framework of global history.

87 C. Bayly, *Die Geburt der modernen Welt: Eine Globalgeschichte (1780–1914)*, Frankfurt a. M. 2006.

88 N. Brenner, *Beyond State-Centrism? Space, Territoriality, and Geographical Scale in Globalization Studies*, in: *Theory and Society* 28 (1999), pp. 39–78.

Refugee Camps as Forgotten Portals of Globalization: Polish World War II Refugees in British Colonial East Africa

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ABSTRACTS

From 1942–1950, nearly 20,000 Polish refugees lived in over 20 camps in five British colonial territories. This article uses the concept of portals of globalization to analyze these camps in a frame that goes beyond national historiography. The interaction that took place between the Polish refugees and actors of the hosting colonial societies is regarded as a flow that local authorities tried to regulate. Colonial officials understood the poor, white refugees as a potential threat to the stability of the racially defined colonial hierarchy. The portals of globalization concept connects this local history with historical developments of global reach, which manifested in the refugee camps. This episode was, however, forgotten – i.e. did not become part of a collective memory – as it did not fit into any national narrative.

Von 1942–1950 lebten knapp 20.000 polnische Flüchtlinge in über zwanzig Lagern in fünf britischen Kolonien. Dieser Aufsatz nutzt das Konzept der „Portale der Globalisierung“, um diese Lager in einem Rahmen zu betrachten, der über nationale Geschichtsschreibung hinaus geht. Die Interaktionen, die zwischen den polnischen Flüchtlingen und Akteuren der gastgebenden kolonialen Gesellschaften stattfanden, werden dabei als *flow* betrachtet, den die lokalen Autoritäten zu regulieren versuchten. Kolonialbeamte sahen die armen weißen Flüchtlinge als eine potentielle Gefahr für die Stabilität der rassistisch definierten kolonialen Hierarchie. Das Konzept der „Portale der Globalisierung“ verbindet diese lokale Geschichte mit historischen Entwicklungen von globaler Reichweite, die sich in den Flüchtlingslagern manifestierten. Diese Episode wurde jedoch vergessen – d. h. kein Teil des kollektiven Gedächtnisses –, da sie in kein nationales Narrativ passte.

1. Introduction

This article investigates the history of around 20,000 Polish refugees, who lived from roughly 1942–1950 in the British colonies in East and Central Africa; most of them were deported from the eastern part of Poland to Soviet labour camps in 1939. In 1941, all Poles were released from the Soviet camps to form the Polish army, in order to fight alongside the Allies against the Germans. Those who were not regarded as capable of military service were eventually sent via Iran to the British colonies. They consisted largely of women and children, and were accommodated in 22 camps varying in size from 300 up to 5,000 inhabitants. The camps were established and governed by the British colonial administration and internally organized by a subordinate Polish administration. Following the war, by 1950, most of the Poles left the colonies for the United Kingdom, Poland, Canada, or Australia; only about 1,000 were allowed to settle locally.

The British administrators in the colonies accepted the Polish refugees rather reluctantly. Through their connection with the Polish armed forces and because military strategists wanted them away from the battlefields, they were brought to the colonies in East and Central Africa. The colonial authorities controlled them as much as possible, but the Polish refugees still interacted with locals around the camps. As the Poles were regarded as Allies and Europeans, they could not just be interned and completely isolated. Their interaction with locals and British colonists was regulated by local authorities, but it could not be stopped completely. The dialectic of flows and controls that emerged in the camps and their surroundings can be described in terms of portals of globalization. However, this story was largely forgotten for two reasons: First, refugee camps are generally set up as temporary structures that should dissolve when conflicts fade. Secondly, this particular story did not fit well with the overarching national narratives of the time. Emerging research approaches in global history that are not dominated by a national frame, such as portals of globalization, allow us to analyse transnational flows, and attempts to control them in places like these Polish refugee camps in British colonial Africa.

2. Polish Refugee Camps as Portals of Globalization

Common case studies on portals of globalization are urban centres, port cities, or imperial metropolises. For colonial British East Africa, these would include Nairobi, Mombasa, and Dar es Salaam. Instead, in this article, I describe refugee camps located in places like Tengeru, Koja, Masindi, Rongai, and Bwana Mkubwa as portals of globalization. These camps were set in the rural periphery of the British Empire, in places where no one would expect “global connectivity.”¹ Why does it nevertheless make sense to describe them as portals of globalization?

1 M. Middell and K. Naumann, *Global History and the Spatial Turn: From the Impact of Area Studies to the Study of Critical Junctures of Globalization*, in: *Journal of Global History* 5 (2010), 1, p. 162.

I understand portals of globalization as a concept that can frame our way of looking at transnational phenomena. The history of the Polish refugees in Africa can be told through different lenses. Others such as Krolikowski,² Piotrowski,³ and Wróbel⁴ have viewed them as part of Polish national history. This perspective frames the period in Africa as just one aspect of the suffering of the Poles, from oppression and deportation to forced displacement by Germany and the Soviet Union (USSR). From a British colonial perspective, the whole story is about an altruistic humanitarian action and the contribution of the colonies to the “commonwealth war effort.”⁵ All these perspectives overlook the various interactions between the Polish refugees and the actors within the societies around them.

Looking at the Polish refugee camps and their surroundings as portals of globalization opens the history of Polish refugees to the entanglements and interactions that took place between these refugees and other actors in the host colonial societies. Such a transnational history approach breaks up the assumed isolation of the group of refugees from the surrounding society, and investigates the interplay between social categories like nationality and race.

In this perspective, portals of globalization are places where actors with different identitarian spatial references interact. In other words, the actors in these portals refer in their identity construction to different spatial entities and, in turn, are categorized by the colonial state in reference to different spatial entities.⁶ These categorizations and self-identifications are not necessarily stable; they can vary according to the situation.

The different spatial referents of the three main groups of actors in this study are multiple and flexible.⁷ The British officials refer to a British nation that is always closely linked to its empire. Stuart Hall describes this relation and points to the peculiarity that English identity is highly exclusive and places the colonized “other”, as well as everybody else, in contrast to it.⁸ Identity construction thus not only refers to one’s “own” spatial entities but refers relationally to other spaces. The British nation can only be understood in the context of its empire. On the other hand, most of the Polish refugees referred in their identity construction to a Polish nation that did not exist as a nation state at that time. Some Polish refugees became naturalized British citizens, others became Australians. A small group of Polish refugees were not seen as Polish by others, for example when they

2 L. Krolikowski, *Stolen Childhood: A Saga of Polish War Children*, San Jose 2001.

3 T. Piotrowski, *The Polish Deportees of World War II: Recollections of Removal to the Soviet Union and Dispersal Throughout the World*, Jefferson 2004.

4 J. Wróbel, *Uchodźcy polscy ze Związku Sowieckiego 1942–1950*, Łódź 2003.

5 A.L. Pennington, *Refugees in Tanganyika during the Second World War*, *Tanganyika Notes and Records* 32 (1952), p. 52.

6 Cooper and Brubaker point to the necessity of the analytical distinction between different aspects that are subsumed under the term “identity.” See F. Cooper and R. Brubaker, *Identity*, in: F. Cooper, ed., *Colonialism in Question. Theory, Knowledge, History*, Berkeley, CA 2005, pp. 59–90.

7 This research is based on my dissertation: J. Lingelbach (2017) “Polish Refugees in British Colonial East and Central Africa during and after World War Two,” dissertation, University of Leipzig.

8 S. Hall, *The Local and the Global. Globalization and Ethnicity*, in: A.D. King (ed.) *Culture, Globalization, and the World-system: Contemporary Conditions for the Representation of Identity*, Minneapolis 1991, p. 21.

were pro-Soviet and were regarded as Russians. The refugees were in some situations regarded as Europeans (in contrast to Africans) and in other instances as Polish (in contrast to British). Finally, there are the different African actors, who may refer to other regional or local areas, or a not yet existing nation state, as anticolonial nationalism was only starting to gain momentum in this period. Within the colonial system of racial hierarchy, one could also refer to the categorization as Black/African or White/European. It is not a situation where identities were clear-cut and referenced a given set of nation states. This shows the complexity of the situation in which the Polish refugees had been placed; their arrival made this place even more complex in terms of the identitarian referents of the involved actors.

People are categorized according to spatial referents, and this categorization affects their abilities to move freely. While their categorization as Polish gave them the opportunity to be released from Soviet labour camps and cared for by the Polish exile government in London and the British colonial authorities, it also restricted their movement; they could not choose which camp they wanted to go to, and their movement within the colonies was heavily restricted. Conversely, a British citizen could quite easily move within the empire, while an African "native" was not allowed to enter a Polish refugee camp unless employed there. The colonial situation is thus signified by a whole range of different statuses, which are attached to people, and differs from a nation state where every citizen enjoys, at least theoretically, the same status and set of rights.

The issues faced in Polish refugee camps in Africa help us to problematize our understanding of portals of globalization as places where the "foreign enters our country."⁹ In a colonial context, this understanding is more than problematic because there is no "own country" (at least no nation state) and it is not clear what then should be the "foreign." Arjun Appadurai points to the problematic of the "native" in anthropology as the one who is confined to the place, while his counterpart is the mobile explorer/researcher.¹⁰ Apart from the hierarchical aspect that is connected to notions of mobility and immobility, the assumption that some people are confined to one place also hinders an inquiry into the mobility of the "natives."

The case of the Polish refugee camp Masindi/Nyabyeya in Uganda highlights this problematic.¹¹ Nyabyeya was and is a diverse community where, according to one resident, people from "26 tribes" live.¹² The community grew before the Polish refugee camp was established because of an Indian-owned sawmill that attracted workers from many places. More African workers moved there to work in the Polish camp, and the place became even more multicultural. Until today, Kiswahili is the lingua franca in Nyabyeya because there is no dominating linguistic group. The question remains what exactly the

9 M. Geyer, *Portals of Globalization*, in: W. Eberhard/C.Lübke (eds.) *The Plurality of Europe: Identities and Spaces*, Leipzig 2010, p. 512.

10 A. Appadurai, *Putting Hierarchy in its Place*, in: *Cultural Anthropology* 3 (1988), 1, p. 37.

11 In British records, the camp is usually referred to as "Masindi," the name of a nearby town, although it is located in the village of Nyabyeya.

12 Interview with Ochau Paito Ceasar, Nyabyeya, Uganda, 12 April 2013.

“foreign” is and what the “own country” means in such a context, where there is an overlap of different cultural and political units but no nation state. Nyabyeya at that time was part of the Kingdom of Bunyoro, the Protectorate of Uganda, and the British Empire. Its inhabitants shared even more diverse affiliations, and, consequently, there are many borders that could separate the “foreign” and the “own country”.¹³

I understand portals of globalization thus not as a category that can be measured with clear-cut criteria, which qualify one place and not the other as a “portal”, but rather as a perspective to look at a place and the dynamics evolving therein. Portals of globalization are described as “those places where flows and regulation come together.”¹⁴ This points to an understanding of globalization as a dialectical process of de- and reterritorialization.¹⁵ The increasing mobility of capital, goods and, in this case, human beings is accompanied by attempts to control these flows and fix them in space. Along with the increasing entanglements come attempts to control and regulate them.¹⁶ This understanding helps to frame the research on what is happening on the ground, in the portal.

In the case of Polish refugee camps, I understand the influx of migrants coming into the colonial situation and especially their interaction with the surrounding actors as the flow that is challenging the established colonial order of society. The presence of these whites who were, on arrival, destitute refugees was a threat to the image of white superiority in colonial societies, and needed to be controlled by colonial authorities. An uncontrolled intermixing of Poles and Africans was a major challenge to the colonial dichotomy of white and black. Poor whites were seen as especially problematic in undermining the image of the white prestige in many colonial contexts.¹⁷ To counter this threat, Polish refugees were placed in camps, restricted in their movement, and segregated from the colonized in their everyday lives. In the following section, I will exemplify this dialectic of flows and controls.

3. Flows and Controls in the Polish Refugee Camps

The establishment of the “segregation camp” Katambora in Northern Rhodesia is one of the more drastic examples of attempts to control Polish refugees. In 1944, the Northern Rhodesian Governor Waddington wrote a proposal in a confidential telegram to the

13 From a Eurocentric viewpoint, it is often implicitly assumed that the “global” starts when whites are interacting with non-whites, while the diversity of, in this case, Africans is overlooked; here the issue of race obviously becomes important.

14 M. Middell and K. Naumann, *Global History and the Spatial Turn* (fn. 1), p. 162.

15 N. Brenner, *Beyond State-centrism? Space, Territoriality, and Geographical Scale in Globalization Studies*, in: *Theory and Society* 28 (1999), pp. 1, 43.

16 M. Middell and K. Naumann, *Global History and the Spatial Turn* (fn. 1), p. 165.

17 See A.L. Stoler, *Rethinking Colonial Categories: European Communities and the Boundaries of Rule*, in: *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 31 (1989), 1, pp. 149–153; and H. Fischer-Tiné, *Low and Licentious Europeans: Race, Class and “White Subalternity” in Colonial India*, New Delhi 2009, p. 183.

Colonial Office in London.¹⁸ He described a series of incidents in the refugee camp Bwana Mkubwa that made it necessary to isolate some of the “unruly elements” among the Poles. He reports an “affray” in the camp in which several persons were stabbed. The heaviest criminals were arrested and four of the involved were sent to Kenya. However, according to Waddington, the camp faced more serious problems:

*One of the chief problems at the moment is the control of a number of prostitutes who were included among the evacuees. The suspicion that they were plying their trade among Africans has recently been confirmed. This is a very serious matter and might have most unpleasant repercussions.*¹⁹

The emphasis and dramatization of sexual contact with Africans shows that it was not only a problem of sexual morality, but a threat to the race-based colonial order of society. Waddington’s solution to the problem was the establishment of a segregation camp for around 50 “bad characters of both sexes.”²⁰ He suggested a site for the camp that was far enough from the other camps, as well as from Livingstone town. In order to control the inmates, there was also a unit of African police posted to Katambora. According to the Polish refugees’ Northern Rhodesian *Kronika*, the whole endeavour was not very successful, as the inmates used every possibility to cause trouble. In the end, it never became fully operational and the inmates went back to the normal camps.²¹ As this segregation camp was an attempt for a quite direct form of spatialized control, it shows quite bluntly the dialectical process of flow and control.

In the “normal” refugee camps, the situation was more nuanced. The refugees were not as completely isolated from the public as in the segregation camp. As one official put it, the Poles were regarded as Allies in the war and not as internees,²² but the life of the Polish refugees was still highly regulated and controlled: they were not allowed to live in places other than the designated camps, which were mostly located in remote areas of the colonies. Permission to work outside the camp was only granted in individual cases, and they needed permission from the British authorities, if they wanted to travel within the colony.

The hierarchical administrative structure of the camps was a reflection of the wider colonial order, with a British commandant, subordinate Polish leaders, and African workers. Before the arrival of the refugees, there was a plan to create self-governed refugee camps with Polish administrative staff only. British “reception officers” would help to settle the refugees but then cease their function. This plan was abandoned “due to a dearth of

18 Acting Governor Lusaka to Secretary of State for the Colonies, 28 February 1944, UK National Archives: Public Records Office (PRO) CO 795/132/4, p. 63.

19 Ibid.

20 Ibid.

21 “Kronika – Afryka Rodezja Północna – Polskie osiedla uchodźcze”, no page, no date, Polish Institute and Sikorski Museum, London, Kol 147/11.

22 F.A. Montague (Ag. Chief Secretary to the Government) to The Editor, East African Standard, 31 December 1943, Tanzania National Archives (TNA) W3/31798, p. 3.

English-speaking Polish Officers and for other reasons,” as one official from the central refugee administration in Dar es Salaam put it.²³ He did not explain the “other reasons,” but it all points to the question of control and regulation of the everyday life of the refugees. Eventually British camp commandants were living permanently in the camps, and were responsible to the director of refugees in the respective colonial capital. A Polish administrative structure evolved under the British camp commandant, from a Polish camp leader down to group leaders of smaller residential units.

How this administrative structure played out can be shown through the example of a conflict over the uncontrolled purchase of foodstuffs by Polish refugees in Tanganyika. Around the end of 1943 and the beginning of 1944, Europeans living near the biggest Polish camp in Tengeru complained about the rising prices that were caused by the uncontrolled purchase of goods by Polish refugees. In reaction to these complaints, the director of refugees sent a letter to the British camp commandant in May 1944 to outlaw the purchase of certain foodstuffs.²⁴ Any refugee found with illegally-obtained products would be denied permission to leave the camp for six months. If the order was not followed, the director even threatened to refuse to authorize travel to the next town for all refugees. He advised the camp commandant to communicate this order through the Polish leaders,²⁵ and the commandant issued the order as described.²⁶ This example shows that the superior power lay with the central administration in the Tanganyikan government, and the camp commandant was executing the orders through the Polish leaders. As the camp commandant had the power to grant or refuse permission to leave the camp, the regulation of movement was an important means of control.

The control of movement of African workers into the camps was enforced much more strictly. After an initial phase where African workers could freely move into the camp, the governor of Tanganyika decided that this should be regulated. The camp commandants suggested the number of workers they needed to the respective district commissioners, and issued passes for them.²⁷ The workers had to leave the camp in the afternoon, and only the guards were allowed inside the camps at night.²⁸ The British authorities restricted the movement of Africans into the camp on the grounds that it was for the safety of the Polish refugees, and these restrictions were easier to justify, as the Africans were not regarded as Allies like the refugees.

Although the British authorities had legal means to control the movement of refugees, there was a considerable amount of uncontrolled interaction with people living near the camps. The power to control the refugees was constrained from two sides: on the one

23 Pennington (for Director for Aliens and Internees) to Camp Commandants Tengeru, Kondo, Ifunda, 11 June 1943, TNA 69 782/IV.

24 Pennington (Director of Refugees) to Camp Commandant Tengeru, 2 May 1944, TNA 5/28/1.

25 Ibid.

26 Camp Commandant: Polish Settlement Tengeru – Special Camp Order No. 28, 15 May 1944, TNA 5/28/1.

27 Pennington (Director of Refugees) to Camp Commandants Tengeru, Kondo, Ifunda, Kidugala, Kigoma, Morogoro, 11 September 1943, TNA 69/782/IV.

28 Interview with Edward Sinabulya, former African worker in the camp Kojja, Uganda, 15 April 2013.

hand, the refugees were part of the Allies, and could thus not just be interned, and on the other hand, the colonial state did not have the capacity to control everything. The Ugandan camp of Koja was, due to its location on a peninsula in the region of Lake Victoria, the most easily controlled camp. It was surrounded by water and steep hills, and the only entrance was guarded by Africans, who were brought there from the distant, northern part of Acholi. Nevertheless, both interviewees who worked in the camp as youths told me about intimate meetings between Polish women and African men in the hills at night.²⁹ In the rural periphery, the colonial state apparatus was not strong enough to enforce its rules. This can be seen in the instance when the director of refugees refused a request to post a European “resident married Police officer” to the Tengeru camp due to a shortage of staff.³⁰

Apart from this, there were numerous individual interactions. Exchanges took place in the marketplaces and nearby shops, and especially the younger refugees in Tanganyika and Uganda learned Kiswahili in conversation with their African neighbours.³¹ The last few Poles who stayed in the Tengeru camp were also reported to be engaged in the illegal distilling and selling of alcohol to Africans.³² There were also refugees with communist leanings who more or less directly opposed the British Empire, and they were regarded as a serious threat when they worked with the colonized.³³ These examples show that there was a considerable amount of interaction that the colonial authorities did not and could not fully control.

When a new group of people enters a colonial situation, they need to be dealt with and “put in their place.” As Mlambo shows in the case of white immigration to Southern Rhodesia, it was not only whiteness that was important for the colonial officials but also “Britishness.”³⁴ For the British in the colony, it was of utmost importance to maintain the community’s “European standards” and, therefore, the distinction between white and black.³⁵ Afrikaners, Jews, and Europeans from Eastern and Southern Europe were seen as a threat to these standards and British predominance in the colony. They were all discriminated against, and only in the face of the threat of African domination were these

29 Interviews with Edward Sinabulya (fn. 28) and Mukeera Kasule, former African worker in the camp Koja, Uganda, 16 April 2013.

30 T.M. Skinner (for Director of Refugees) to Camp Commandant Tengeru, 8 October 1943, TNA 69/782/2/6.

31 Memories of Tadek Gruszka, Polish refugee in Ifunda, Tanganyika, in: M. Allbrook and H. Cattalini, *The General Langfitt Story: Polish Refugees Recount Their Experiences of Exile, Dispersal, and Resettlement*, 1995, 15, [accessed 25 November 2011], <http://www.immi.gov.au/media/publications/refugee/langfitt/>; Autobiography of Barbara Porajska, Polish refugee in Masindi, Uganda: B. Porajska, *From the Steppes to the Savannah*, London 1990, 122; and Campbell to D.S. Troup (Deputy PC Arusha, Northern Province), 31 October 1951, TNA 69/782.

32 Campbell (Director of Refugees) to Provincial Commissioner Central Province, Dodoma, 20 June 1952, TNA 69/782; and Josef Kobak (individual summary), 9 November 1950, PRO CO 822/146/1.

33 Helena Luczyc (individual summary), 9 November 1950, PRO CO 822/146/1; and Officer i/c Police, Usa River to Director of Refugees, 3 November 1952, TNA 69/782.

34 A. Mlambo, “Some Are More White Than Others”: Racial Chauvinism as a Factor of Rhodesian Immigration Policy, 1890–1963, in: *Zambezia* 27 (2000), 2, pp. 139–160.

35 *Ibid.*, p. 141.

whites seen as part of the same group.³⁶ Different national categorizations were thus an important feature in the structuring of society.

Yet, at the same time, Poles profited from their colonial classification as whites. They were placed in a privileged situation and benefited from the assumption that white Europeans needed a certain standard that was higher than that of the surrounding colonized population.³⁷ They were given accommodation, food, and monthly allowances that were in many cases complemented by remittances from relatives, who were soldiers in the Polish army.³⁸ They were thus in a quite comfortable position, although restricted in their freedom of movement.

The refugees found themselves in an ambivalent position: they were hosted in the colonies, but the ruling elite was not very happy to have them there. Hosting the Poles was part of their contribution to the British war effort and thus part of a wider strategic picture. The Poles had to be put somewhere and cared for, in order to maintain Polish soldiers' morale. Local colonial authorities were eager to keep the influence Poles had in their societies to a minimum, and they also opposed the idea of a large-scale settlement in the colonies after the war. Integration into the larger society was not an issue on the colonizers' agenda, and this viewpoint seems to be one that is often found in the attitudes among national authorities towards other refugee camps as well.

4. Connections to Global Historical Events

A global approach highlights the entanglements and relations between historical processes and events beyond national borders. The case of the Polish refugees in British colonial Africa can be interpreted in many national frames, but it definitely invites the researcher to think beyond simply picking one. The period of 1944–1961 can be described as a phase of increasing spatial reordering in many parts of the world.³⁹ Most important for this story is the end of the British Empire in Africa and the reordering of East-Central Europe in the immediate post-war period. The emerging bloc confrontation of the Cold War is another issue that played a role for the people in and around these refugee camps. There was a diverse range of global processes and events that materialized on the ground within these portals.⁴⁰

36 Ibid., p. 160.

37 M. Kelly, *Finding Poland. From Tavistock to Hruzdowa and Back Again*, London 2011, p. 176.

38 F.A. Montague (Ag. Chief Secretary to the Government) to The Editor, *East African Standard*, 31 December 1943, TNA W3/31798 (fn. 22), p. 3.

39 U. Engel and M. Middell, *Bruchzonen der Globalisierung, globale Krisen und Territorialitätsregimes. Kategorien einer Globalgeschichtsschreibung, Comparativ. Zeitschrift für Globalgeschichte und Vergleichende Gesellschaftsforschung* 15 (2005) 5–6, p. 31.

40 Another issue is the establishment of the international refugee regime that is reflected in the shifting responsibilities for the camps from a binational British-Polish administration to more international forms of management. The emerging international refugee organizations and their internal dynamics were, in turn, closely linked to World War II, the emerging Cold War, and the end of colonialism. See P. Gatrell, *Putting Refugees in Their Place*, in: *New Global Studies* 7 (2013), pp. 1–24.

Apart from being the cause that brought the Poles to East Africa, World War II was also a framework for the everyday encounters in the colonies. British and Polish officials especially viewed interactions with citizens of European enemy nations as a problem. The application by a German farmer in Tanganyika for the employment of a Polish refugee on his estate was refused after consultation with Polish representatives because he was classified as an “enemy alien.”⁴¹ Another “enemy alien” group was Italians, who were either interned or released on parole in Tanganyika, or as prisoners of war in Kenya. Intimate relations between Italian men and Polish women were, at least until 1945, seen as problematic by some British officials. There were some incidents of engagement between Polish female refugees and Italian prisoners of war in the Kenyan camp Rongai. The camp commandant condemned these, referring to the fact that the Italians were enemies and that Poles should stop fraternizing with them, although this incident occurred two weeks after Victory in Europe day.⁴² In 1946, the district commissioner in Iringa, Tanganyika, had no problems with relations between Polish women and Italian men, but the commandant of the nearby Ifunda camp still saw it as problematic.⁴³ It seems that the “enemy” classification took time to vanish from the minds of some British officials.

The British Empire came under increasing pressure, both internally and externally, after World War II. The rise of the two post-war superpowers, the United States and the USSR, was also the rise of two states with ideologies that were both anticolonial. Imperialism became delegitimized in the international arena, and the anticolonial struggle that led to the independence of India in 1947, called the whole British Empire even more into question.⁴⁴ For the independence movements in the African colonies, the war was an “important watershed.”⁴⁵ The problem the British faced is best illustrated by a report on the possibility of the permanent settlement of displaced persons from Europe within the British Empire in the late 1940s.⁴⁶ The results of the report showed that in most parts of the empire, officials feared a large-scale settlement of European refugees. They expected that this resettlement would be strongly opposed by the colonized people and would lead to political trouble. The findings of the report show that British decision-making within the empire was increasingly constrained.

The fear among British officials in the colonies of the presence of communist agents among Polish refugees indicates the weakness of the empire, but it also points to bloc confrontation that started to dominate world politics after the end of the war. Already in

41 C. Winnington-Ingram (for Commissioner for Aliens and Refugees) to District Commissioner, Arusha, 3 May 1943, TNA 69/782/3, 13.

42 E.R.C. Williams (Camp Commandant, Rongai, Kenya) to Karol Sander (Polish leader, Rongai), 21 May 1945, PRO ED 128/107.

43 Walden (District Commissioner Iringa) to N. Stewart, Ag. Commissioner of Police, DSM, 18 February 1946, TNA 176/87, 12B.

44 F. Cooper, *Reconstructing Empire in British and French Africa*, in: *Past & Present* 210, (2011) 6, pp.196–210.

45 A. Eckert, *African Nationalists and Human Rights, 1940s–1970s*, in: S.-L. Hoffmann (ed.) *Human Rights in the Twentieth Century – A Critical History*, Cambridge 2010, p. 290.

46 “The possibility of Foreign Settlement in the Colonial Empire,” summary of a 1946 and a 1947 enquiry, no date, PRO CO 822/145/5, p. 53.

1943, Churchill mentioned that the USSR would be the next enemy after the Germans.⁴⁷ Suspected communist agents among the refugees were seen as especially dangerous in their contact with Africans. One refugee in Tengeru was reported to be “a dangerous Communist known to have political influence over the native tribes in Arusha area.”⁴⁸ In 1952, an alleged communist was reported to have said before going to the Soviet Union that he would come back when his brothers rule the country and help them to win their fight.⁴⁹ This indicates that British rule, at least in Tanganyika, was clearly coming to an end. The British feared that Soviet agents might help their enemies in the colonies and that the newly emerging states would become part of the Soviet bloc. Given the situation, the few Polish refugees with communist leanings were regarded as a security risk. Therefore, what was happening in the Polish refugee camps in Africa was related to what was happening in other parts of the world. It might not have been the most important place to influence these historical processes of global relevance, but it was definitely influenced by them. The concept of portals of globalization offers us the opportunity to take a closer look at concrete places, where transnational connections were more intense than elsewhere.

5. “Forgotten” Portals of Globalization

In 2013, I looked for the former site of the biggest Polish camp and the remaining cemetery in the small town of Tengeru in northern Tanzania. I went to the centre by bus and asked a person at a stall where to find the Polish cemetery. He directed me up the road, and on my way, I asked quite a few people for directions until I finally reached a compound of a Christian school, where I found the graves of two German missionaries. A little disappointed, I continued searching and asked some more people in the street, who finally directed me to an old man at a carpenter’s workshop. He remembered the location of the Polish refugee camp and instructed a younger relative to take me there on a motorcycle, as it was on the opposite side of town. For the driver, it was the first time he visited the cemetery, which is nowadays well-maintained. It features a small, recently-built memorial hall, which receives several hundred visitors per year, mainly from Poland.

This anecdote illustrates three points about the remembrance of the Polish refugees: First, it is not part of the (in this case) Tanzanian collective memory, as nearly all Tanzanians I spoke to did not know about it. Secondly, it is, by contrast, remembered individually by older people, who were present at the time the refugees stayed in the area. Thirdly, there seems to be a new interest in this history coming mainly from former refugees and their

47 A. Defty, *British Anti-communist Propaganda and Cooperation with the United States, 1945–1951*, unpublished thesis, University of Salford 2002.

48 T.W.E. Roche to J.B. Howard, Undersecretary of State, Aliens Department, Home Office, 16 June 1950, PRO CO 822/145/5.

49 Officer i/c Police, Usa River to Director of Refugees DSM, 3 November 1952, TNA 69/782.

descendants, but aided in part by Polish authorities. After the nearly complete neglect of these memorial sites, some cemeteries were recently renovated, and there is growing interest in the topic.⁵⁰ In the following section, I will try to explain why this historical episode did not jump from individual memories into the official national memory.

The biggest difference from other portals of globalization in this journal issue is that these places still exist as such today, even though the last Polish refugee camp was closed down in December 1951.⁵¹ Whereas port cities, former colonial capitals, or free trade zones are still places of transnational encounter, the interaction in and around these refugee camps was not repeated afterwards, though of course other refugee camps are temporarily utilized elsewhere. Other examples of portals of globalization are world exhibitions or global sporting events;⁵² these events are by definition something that is temporary, but they are actively remembered by the wider public. They can be incorporated into national or city histories, especially through the landmark buildings they often leave behind.⁵³ In contrast, the history of the Polish refugee camps is largely forgotten. After the last Polish refugees left, the buildings were either taken over for other purposes or destroyed. Only the Polish cemeteries of the bigger camps and the Polish church in Nyabyeya remained as small sites of remembrance. As my initial anecdote illustrates, not even people living close to these sites seem to be aware of their history.

While distinguishing between different formats of memory, Aleida Assmann points to one commonality: "Selection and forgetting are as constitutive of individuals as they are of collective memory."⁵⁴ Which part of history becomes part of the political memory of a social group is not incidental, but depends on its ability to fit in the framework of contemporary interests.⁵⁵ Forms of collective memories are, on the other hand, fundamentally different from individual memories, as larger social groups and institutions such as the nation state can "repress with psychological impunity."⁵⁶ Furthermore, in contrast to individual memories, they have to actively construct a common memory through me-

50 The latest examples are a journalistic piece from Uganda, C. Abraham, *When Europeans Were Refugees in Africa*, *New African* (June 20, 2012), pp. 72–77, and a historical article from Zimbabwe: B. Tavuyanago, T. Muguti and J. Hlongwana, *Victims of the Rhodesian Immigration Policy: Polish Refugees from the Second World War*, in: *Journal of Southern African Studies* 38 (2012), 4, pp. 951–965. Canadian film-maker Jonathan Durand is currently producing a documentary about the story (see www.memoryisourhomeland.com), and British artist Emma Wolukau-Wanambwa had been working over the last few years on *Poles in Uganda* (an art piece about Kojia was recently part of the exhibition "Everything is getting better. Unknown Knowns of Polish (Post-)Colonialism" at Savvy Contemporary, Berlin in 2017).

51 Quartermaster Polish refugee camp Tengeru to Director of Refugees, 5 December 1951, TNA 69/782. Some 20 Poles' refugee status remained after the official closure of the camp.

52 M. Middell, *Erinnerung an die Globalisierung? Die Portale der Globalisierung als lieux de mémoire: Ein Versuch*, in: *Europäische Erinnerungsräume*, ed. K. Buchinger, C. Gantet, and J. Vogel, Frankfurt 2009, pp. 296–308.

53 The Eiffel Tower is maybe the most striking example, as it was built for the 1889 *Exposition Universelle* (Universal Exposition) in Paris.

54 A. Assmann, *Memory, Individual and Collective*, in: R.E. Goodin and C. Tilly (ed.) *The Oxford Handbook of Contextual Political Analysis*, Oxford 2006, p. 217.

55 L. Weissberg, *Introduction*, in: D. Ben-Amos and L. Weissberg (ed.) *Cultural Memory and the Construction of Identity*, Detroit 1999, p. 15.

56 W. Kansteiner, *Finding Meaning in Memory: A Methodological Critique of Collective Memory Studies*, *History and Theory* 41 (2002), 4, p. 186.

morial signs (symbols, texts, images, rites, ceremonies, or memorials), thereby separating the useful and relevant from the aspects that are regarded as useless and irrelevant.⁵⁷ It is thus misleading to simply apply psychological insights to collective memories but better to focus on the political, social, and cultural factors that determine what is remembered and what is forgotten.⁵⁸ These factors can also lead to an integration of stored memory, if the circumstances change. The memory that is stored in archives can be integrated into actively-communicated memories, if it makes sense in the present situation.⁵⁹

The main reason for forgetting the Polish refugee camps seems to be that there was no national narrative into which this story could fit. As Duara puts it, "History has had a special role in the national pedagogies."⁶⁰ A common national narrative is a crucial factor for claiming the status of a nation and thus sovereignty.⁶¹ Interpretation, as well as forgetting some aspects and remembering others, is part of every historical narrative.⁶² National memories are open to glorious victories and bitter defeats alike, as long as they fit into the semantic of a heroic conception of history.⁶³ Hosting Polish refugees does not fit into this semantic. Furthermore, migration can be understood as a "counter-narrative to the nation,"⁶⁴ as migrants' mobility challenges supposedly static and homogeneous national collectives. In the following, I will show why the story of the Polish refugees was forgotten by highlighting the possible national memories it could have been part of. Britain was severely weakened by World War II, and the colonial rulers were busy defending their colonies against growing anticolonial movements. The very concept of a colonial empire was increasingly under pressure from within, as well as from the outside.⁶⁵ The story of how the British altruistically helped European refugees had no use in this struggle. To legitimize colonial rule, it was more important to emphasize the help the British gave to the Africans in ruling and, allegedly, guiding them to development. The loss of the empire and the victory in World War II were the themes that dominated the political memory in the following decades.⁶⁶

57 A. Assmann, *Memory, Individual and Collective* (fn. 54), p. 216.

58 W. Kansteiner, *Finding Meaning in Memory* (fn. 56), p. 186.

59 A. Assmann, *Der lange Schatten der Vergangenheit: Erinnerungskultur und Geschichtspolitik*, München 2006, p. 57. Assmann understands both the stored and the actively remembered memory as parts of the cultural memory.

60 P. Duara, *Transnationalism and the Challenge to National Histories*, in: T. Bender (ed.) *Rethinking American History in a Global Age*, Berkeley, CA, 2002, p. 25.

61 *Ibid.*, p. 27.

62 For the importance of memory and forgetting in national historiography, see B. Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, London 2006, pp. 187–207.

63 A. Assmann, *Der lange Schatten der Vergangenheit* (fn. 59), p. 65.

64 D. Hoerder, *Migration Research in Global Perspective: Recent Developments*, in: *Sozial.Geschichte Online* 9 (2012), p. 78.

65 See F. Cooper, *Colonialism in Question. Theory, Knowledge, History*, Berkeley, CA 2005, p. 54.

66 Maybe this could change as well due to the increasing immigration of Poles to the UK since the turn of the century. As one recent article argues, the ties connecting Polish and British history date at least as far back as the Second World War. See A. Pyzik, *Poles Are Here to Stay in Britain, but It'll Take Time to Make a Cultural Splash*, last modified 12 December 2012, <http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2012/dec/12/pires-britain-cultural-splash> (accessed 15 August 2013).

For the USSR, the whole story was quite inconvenient, as the refugees were for the most part anti-communist, especially after their experiences in Soviet labour camps. The same holds true for the communist Polish government, which was aligned with the USSR. Furthermore, most of the refugees refused to go to Poland after the communists took power. These were not the sort of people or history the new Polish elite could use to construct a national narrative. While World War II was the main point of reference for the Polish post-war national memory, its focus was almost entirely on the German atrocities and the joint Polish-Soviet resistance against it.⁶⁷ The remembrance of occupation and deportation by the USSR was not part of the official discourse but mainly confined to the private sphere.⁶⁸ As the story of the Polish refugees in Africa is closely connected to these deportations, it did not become part of the official historical narrative either.

For the vanguard African nationalists, hosting Polish refugees was not of interest either. The newly independent nations were mainly engaged with nation-building, and this means the construction of a common national history. In Tanganyika/Tanzania, this is best illustrated by the first, large-scale historical research project after independence: that of the 1905–1907 Maji-Maji War. It was interpreted as an anticolonial struggle that united the people against the European/German colonialists, and it became something of a founding national narrative.⁶⁹ In Kenya, the rejection of the colonialists' description of the Mau Mau as an atavistic, savage, and tribal cult, and the insistence on its modern and nationalist character was at the core of the creation of a national narrative.⁷⁰ The story of the Polish refugees was of no use in any of these national narratives, and it was therefore largely forgotten.

With the end of communist rule in Poland, a new interest in this history emerged. It could be incorporated into the Polish national narrative that described Poland as an oppressed nation suffering from atrocities of its powerful neighbours Russia and Germany. The remembrance of historical defeat can serve as a powerful principle of national memory, as it appeals to the national feeling of solidarity.⁷¹ In the current post-communist phase, there is need for a renewal of the official national narrative and the incorporation of the years of Soviet-aligned communist rule into it. The story of the Polish refugees can thus be understood as an aside in the long history of deportations, mass murders, and oppression suffered by Poles. Furthermore, the history of Polish refugees can be used to establish Poland as a player in a globalizing world; it connects Poland to its vast diaspora around the globe. The involvement of the Polish embassy in Nairobi in a memorial event in Kojia, Uganda, in 2012 can be partly linked to the activities of a Polish oil-drilling

67 A. Orla-Bukowska, *New Threads on an Old Loom. National Memory and Social Identity in Postwar and Post-Communist Poland*, in: R. Ned Lebow, W. Kansteiner, and C. Fogu (eds.), *The Politics of Memory in Postwar Europe*, Durham NC 2006, pp. 177 and 184.

68 *Ibid.*, p. 178.

69 E. Greenstein, *Making History: Historical Narratives of the Maji Maji*, in: *Penn History Review* 17 (2010), pp. 2, 64.

70 B. J. Berman, *Nationalism, Ethnicity, and Modernity: The Paradox of Mau Mau*, in: *Canadian Journal of African Studies / Revue Canadienne Des Études Africaines* 25 (1991), p. 2, pp. 182–184.

71 A. Assmann, *Der lange Schatten der Vergangenheit* (fn. 59), p. 65.

company in the developing oil industry in Uganda.⁷² This story could partly move from the stored memory of the archives back to the actively remembered and communicated, but it remains articulated as a fleeting portal of globalization.

Nevertheless, there was considerable transnational interaction in the refugee camps and their surroundings. There was no repetition of such interactions in this particular place; experiences are not tied to space but to people and their memories. Some of the former refugees formed organizations and networks to keep in contact and commemorate their experiences. Noteworthy is that some of the younger Poles picked up Kiswahili and some Africans, who worked in the camps, learned Polish.⁷³ Some of the former refugees and their children visited the places of the former camps and still remembered the sites of their houses and where they used to hide as youngsters.⁷⁴

6. Conclusion

Understanding the Polish refugee camps and their surroundings as portals of globalization helps to frame the research in a way that goes beyond national historiography and connects it to wider processes of spatial reordering on a global scale. The insistence on the dialectical character of flows and controls can further the understanding of processes that happened in this portal. Polish refugees posed a challenge to the existing colonial order and its inherent racial hierarchies. Through the accommodation of the refugees in separate camps and restrictions on their movement, the colonial authorities tried to limit the interactions between them and the colonized population, yet numerous interactions still occurred. The maintenance and categorization of the refugees as whites helped to sustain the image of white superiority, but some of their behaviour and especially inter-racial relationships undermined such attempts.

Embedding this episode into larger processes of spatial reordering shows how global history manifested itself in everyday life, in a special part of the colonial periphery. The refugees themselves largely referred to a non-communist Polish nation that was not in existence. Through their connection with Polish soldiers, who fought alongside the Allies against Germany, they had privileges but also constraints. Overall, they were seen as a part of the white colonial community, but their status was lower than that of the British. The picture thus remains ambivalent.

This history was mainly forgotten as it could not easily be incorporated into any national political memory. Polish refugees were mostly opposed to the ruling power in their own country. For Britain, this episode was beyond the frame of reference, and the newly

72 See the report on the event on the home page of the Polish Embassy in Nairobi, http://nairobi.msz.gov.pl/en/news/opening_of_the_polish_siberians_cemetery_in_koja?sessionid=FF80CD437081B43A403353B9EE5C48FB.cmsap2p (accessed 25 May 2013).

73 The two former camp workers still knew some Polish words when I spoke to them in April 2013. See also C. Plawski, *Torn from the Homeland: Unforgettable Experiences during WWII*, Bloomington 2011, p. 144.

74 Personal communication with Edward Wakiku, Kojia, Uganda, 15 April 2013.

emerging African nations were too occupied with nation-building, which was dominated by the experience of colonial domination by Europeans. The newly awakened interest in incorporating these refugees' experiences into the Polish national narrative only followed after the end of communist rule.

The idea of "forgotten" portals of globalization cautions us not only to look at the portals that still exist but also at the "dead ends of historical processes."⁷⁵ This means that one should not limit oneself to looking back from today's places that are regarded as portals of globalization and follow their emergence in history. It also points to the temporality of portals, as refugee camps are established as a temporal solution. They are the answer to the need to house some people somewhere, and this "somewhere" is usually a remote place, where they are supposed to stay until the conflict they are escaping from has ended. As the case of Polish refugees shows, the arrival of refugees impacts the people living around the camps and the broader society. Flows of refugees are therefore controlled and incorporated into existing social orders. Framing the dialectic of flows and controls through the perspective of portals of globalization highlights the intricacies at play; it would be fruitful to expand this framework to other cases of refugee camps, as well as to other places that on the surface signify total national control – prisoner of war camps and concentration camps – but may have been host to numerous hidden and forgotten transnational encounters, too.

75 F. Cooper, *Colonialism in Question. Theory, Knowledge, History* (fn. 65), p. 18.

Mining Towns as Portals of Globalization: The Arrival of the Global Aluminium Industry in West Africa

Johannes Knierzinger

ABSTRACTS

The article discusses the cultural, political, and technical dimension of West African bauxite mining and processing towns as portals of globalization. In the analysed company towns of Fria, Sangarédi, Kamsar (all in Guinea) and Edéa (Cameroon), mining and processing went along with the emergence of new systems of rule that (1) strongly depend on profit-maximizing investors; (2) rest on transnational corporate chains of command, and (3) install new “plutocratic orders” in remote regions, where little capital has circulated before the installation of the facilities. Previously existing social orders have strongly changed with the influx of workers’ salaries and diverse measures of corporate social responsibility. Transnational mining companies and their managers on-site assume, in fact, political functions. The article questions the long-term societal impact of these portals of globalization.

Der Artikel behandelt die kulturelle, politische und technische Dimension von westafrikanischen Bauxitminenstädten als „Portale der Globalisierung“. In den untersuchten Minen- und Firmenstädten in Guinea und Kamerun ist Bergbau mit der Entstehung neuer Herrschaftsverhältnisse einhergegangen, die (1) stark von profitmaximierenden Investoren abhängen, (2) über firmeninterne transnationale Kommandoketten gesteuert werden und (3) eine „plutokratische Ordnung“ in abgelegenen Regionen etablieren. Bis zu diesem Zeitpunkt existierende lokale Machtkonstellationen änderten sich umfassend mit dem Kapitalzufluss über Arbeiterlöhne und durch Maßnahmen im Rahmen von Corporate Social Responsibility. Transnationale Konzerne und deren lokales Management wurden auf diese Weise zu dominanten politischen Akteuren vor Ort. Der Artikel geht den langfristigen gesellschaftlichen Konsequenzen solcher Portale der Globalisierung nach.

1. Introduction

In this article, I discuss how export enclaves, such as African bauxite mining and processing towns, can be considered “portals of globalization.” The core texts on this concept¹ identify three different dimensions of the places where “globalization makes its way into one’s own country:”² a cultural, political, and technical dimension. The enclave character of African company towns of the global aluminium industry can also be found in many other economic sectors in sub-Saharan Africa. John Agnew’s notion of “sovereignty regimes,” based on the rescaling of infrastructural power, helps us to define this special character.³ I analyse four important African company towns of the global aluminium industry, with the help of Agnew’s concepts and through the lens of the three aforementioned dimensions of portals of globalization. Before doing so, however, I provide an overview of the production network of the aluminium industry in Africa.

This article’s findings are mainly based on field research in Guinea in 2012 and 2014, and on research in the archive of the French aluminium company Pechiney at the Institut pour l’Histoire de l’Aluminium (IHA) in Paris.⁴ Among the most important sources was an account of the Guinean mining industry by Ibrahima Soumah,⁵ a former Guinean minister of mines, and a dissertation on the company town of Fria by Céline Pauther.⁶ As Pauther herself points out, almost all the available sources are strongly biased.⁷ Thanks to the IHA, a considerable amount of literature on the history of Pechiney in Africa has emerged, but most of it has either been written by veterans of Pechiney themselves, or was based almost exclusively on accounts of the company.⁸

1 M. Geyer, Portals of Globalization, in: W. Eberhard (ed.), *The Plurality of Europe: Identities and Spaces*, Leipziger Univ.-Verl., Leipzig 2010, pp. 509–520; M. Middell and K. Naumann, Global History and the Spatial Turn: From the Impact of Area Studies to the Study of Critical Junctures of Globalization, in: *Journal of Global History* (2010) 5, pp. 149–170.

2 Geyer (fn. 1), p. 509, 512.

3 J. Agnew, Sovereignty Regimes: Territoriality and State Authority in Contemporary World Politics, in: *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 95 (2005) 2, pp. 437–461.

4 This research is based on my dissertation research, which was later published as Johannes Knierzinger, *Bauxite Mining in Africa: Transnational Corporate Governance and Development*, Cham, 2017.

5 I. Soumah, *The Future of Mining Industry in Guinea*, Paris 2008.

6 C. Pauther, *Fria: Une ville-usine en Guinée. Des dernières années de la colonisation à la République Populaire 1956–73*, Paris, 2002.

7 See Pauther (fn. 6), pp. 4–5.

8 See for example J. Larrue, *Fria en Guinée: Des aspects humains d’une industrialisation différente*, in: *Cahiers d’histoire de l’aluminium* 7 (1991), pp. 37–49, and M. Laparra and I. Grinberg (eds.), *Alucam, An African Destiny: 50 Years of Aluminium in Cameroon, 1957–2007*, Paris: 2007. Jaques Larrue, for instance, had been *Administrateur de la France d’outre-mer* (administrator of overseas France) and *Inspecteur de Travail* (labour inspector), and had thus been part of the (post-)colonial enterprise before he wrote his book on Fria. Maurice Laparra was director of the smelter in Edéa before he wrote a book on this topic, and he later became director general of Aluminium Pechiney and president of the Institut pour l’histoire de l’aluminium. For these entanglements, see Laparra and Grinberg (fn. 8), p. 422; P. Thauré, *Péchiney vendu: grandeur et décadence du plus grand groupe industriel français*, Paris 2007, p. 10, and I. Grinberg, *Le patrimoine, nouvelle danseuse pour l’entreprise? Le cas de Pechiney*, Paris 1994.

2. Aluminium Production Network in Africa: Companies Create Cities

Primary aluminium, which has to be processed and blended before it can be used, is extracted through a high-energy consuming process from aluminium oxide (alumina), itself refined out of bauxite, the basic material of the aluminium production chain. Africa is involved in this process mainly by providing bauxite to aluminium-oxide refineries and aluminium smelters around the world. The only African aluminium-oxide refinery is located in Fria, Guinea, and has produced about one per cent of world output since the start of production in 1960. Since this time, primary aluminium has also been produced in Edéa (Cameroon), Tema (Ghana), South Africa, Mozambique, and, more recently, in Nigeria.⁹

Particularly in Guinea, the needs of the global production network of aluminium resulted in extensive social transformations; this mainly concerns the mining towns of Fria, Sangarédi, Kamsar, and Débélé. All of these towns were planned, created, and maintained by multinational corporations, and they experienced impressive population growth. Similar developments can be observed in several other African countries connected to the production network of aluminium.¹⁰ This also concerns the Cameroonian company town Edéa, which will be part of this analysis, because it was constructed by the same company that built Fria, the French aluminium company Pechiney, and also received aluminium-oxide produced in Fria. By the time the aforementioned cities blossomed in the 1960s and 1970s, Guinea had become one of the most desired targets of what could be called a global mycelium of mining enterprises. During this time, the first important Guinean mining complex, Fria, was owned by a joint venture of Guinean, French, American, Swiss, British, German, and Canadian mining companies (with changing shares). The largest African producer, the *Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinée* (CBG), comprising the company towns of Sangarédi and Kamsar, started to export bauxite in 1973 and belonged to Guinean, Canadian, American, French, German, and Italian companies. The third Guinean bauxite mining complex, the *Compagnie des Bauxites de Kindia* (CBK), started production in 1974 and still exists today; its mine in Débélé had been constructed with the help of Russian experts, was fully owned by the Guinean state, and exported almost exclusively to the Soviet Union. Today, the mines of Fria and Débélé are owned by Rusal (a Russian aluminium company), and CBG is owned by Alcoa (United States of America), Rio Tinto Alcan (Great Britain/Australia), and Dadco Alumina & Chemicals Ltd (GB/Switzerland).

This list of companies and countries includes five of the so-called “Six Sisters”: the American companies Alcoa, Reynolds, and Kaiser (the latter has never owned any facilities in Guinea); the Canadian Alcan; the Swiss Alusuisse, and Pechiney. In the 1970s, the Six Sisters produced 50–60 per cent of worldwide primary aluminium. All the firms and state enterprises working together in Guinea produced almost 70 per cent of worldwide

9 See Knierzinger (fn. 4).

10 Ibid.

primary aluminium in 1960 and more than 60 per cent in 1975.¹¹ As part of a hedging strategy against so-called resource nationalism in the 1960s and 1970s, a similar cooperation was established in all new bauxite mines. Table 1 shows the combined presence of the Six Sisters in Guinea, Australia, Jamaica, and Brazil:

Table 1: New Joint ventures of the Six Sisters in the 1970s

	Alcoa	Reynolds	Kaiser	Alcan	Pechiney	Alusuisse
Guinea	x	x		x	x	x
Australia	x	x	x			x
Jamaica	x	x	x	x		
Brazil	x	x		x		

Source: S.G. Bunker/PS. Ciccantell, *The Evolution of the World Aluminum Industry*, in: B. Barham/S.G. Bunker/D. O'Hearn (eds.), *States, firms, and raw materials: The world economy and ecology of aluminum*, Madison 1995, pp. 39–62.

Since the 1970s, the global players have, therefore, been linked from one mine to another in some sort of “intermarriage system,” which also included technology exchange. In combination with the low value-added bauxite production stage¹² and the high vertical integration of the major companies – they produce primary aluminium and often even finished products like cans out of their own bauxite – this dense network of joint ventures created something we could call a black box of global corporate interest, which makes it hard to determine where and if competition takes place. This united front of private producers would have reduced political actors to mere spectators of extensive industrial development in their own countries, had they not participated in the joint ventures themselves. This further obstructs the view on concrete interest constellations and rupture zones. Having been mainly dependent on war until the 1960s, the aluminium industry was highly entangled with public administrations from the start, and the mushrooming of joint ventures in the 1970s also led to an increase of government shares in the producer countries. The Six Sisters were, therefore, not only almost as dominant as their equivalent in the oil industry, the so-called “Seven Sisters”, but they were also highly interconnected, mainly through their shared production facilities but

11 Ibid., p. 6.

12 Because it is almost exclusively traded within companies, the price of bauxite is hard to determine. According to Norman Girvan, the production costs of bauxite account for less than 1.7 per cent of primary aluminium production and only for 0.55 per cent of semi-fabrication. Including taxes and shipping, the price for bauxite amounts to 5–12 per cent of primary aluminium. See United Nations, *Transnational Corporations in the Bauxite/Aluminium Industry*, New York 1981, p. 8; N. Girvan, *Foreign Capital and Economic Underdevelopment in Jamaica*, Kingston 1971; R. Graham, *The Aluminium Industry and the Third World: Multinational Corporations and Underdevelopment*, London, 1982, p. 78; G. Habig, *Möglichkeiten und Grenzen einer Kontrolle internationaler Rohstoffmärkte durch Entwicklungsländer. Das Beispiel des Kupfer- und Aluminiummarktes*, Hamburg 1983, p. 85, and M. Forster, *Struktur und Risiken der deutschen Nichteisen-Metallversorgung: dargestellt am Beispiel Kupfer, Aluminium, Nickel, Zink, Blei und Zinn*, Hamburg 1976, p. 133.

also through technology exchange, and they maintained strong relations with all involved governments.¹³

In Guinea and Cameroon, this global industrial network resulted in considerable migration flows: The company towns of Fria, Sangarédi, Kamsar, and Edéa all grew from several thousand to (several) hundred thousand inhabitants from their creation in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s to the 2000s. This concentration of manpower also corresponds to the companies' massive need for energy. By the start of production, the facility in Edéa, where a substantial part of the alumina from Fria was smelted to produce aluminium, consumed 50 times more energy than the largest city in Cameroon, Douala, with a population of about 250,000.¹⁴ Until its shutdown in 2012, the industrial complex of Fria consumed as much petrol as the rest of Guinea.¹⁵

3. Which Portal to Which Globalization?

According to Michael Geyer, the nation state has historically been one of the most important portals of globalization, in that the state, through particular transit points, controls flows of goods and people. At the same time, the state is portrayed as the victim of these flows and the density of connectivity that it can never fully manage.¹⁶ Geyer also addresses the following central question, which was already at the centre of the globalization debate in the late 1990s: How do states uphold political sovereignty while being increasingly confronted with what John Agnew calls the “simultaneous scaling-up and scaling-down of the relevant geographical fields of infrastructural power,”¹⁷ which criss-cross and undermine formal decision-making spaces?¹⁸ Mining towns as local manifestations of global production networks are “neat” manifestations of this deterritorialization,¹⁹ as they quite justly overlap with the subnational identity space of the city. Particularly in remote mining towns, the corporate decision space almost completely replaces the formal political space. According to their economic position as export enclaves, these cities are thereby sometimes more interlinked with the global production network of the operators than with the concentric political hierarchy of spaces in the area.

13 See for instance Graham (fn. 12), pp. 5–6.

14 J. Matter, Noël 1959, in: *Bulletin Alucam*, 9 (1959), p. 3. Today, the smelter consumes about a third of total power consumption in Cameroon. See C. Husband et al., *The Aluminum Industry in West and Central Africa: Lessons Learned and Prospects for the Future*, 1999, p. 30.

15 World Investment News, Interview avec Monsieur Ibrahima Soumah, 2009, <http://www.winne.com/topinterviews/soumah.htm> (accessed 1 March 2013).

16 Geyer (fn. 1), p. 520.

17 Agnew (fn. 3), p. 444. For a definition, see below.

18 M. Geyer, *Portale der Globalisierung*, in: W. Eberhard, C. Luebke, and M. Benthin (eds.), *Die Vielfalt Europas: Identitäten und Räume*, Leipzig 2009, pp. 545–557; C.S. Maier, *Transformations of Territoriality 1600–2000: Space, Place, Territory*, in: G. Budde (ed.), *Transnationale Geschichte: Themen, Tendenzen und Theorien*, Göttingen 2006, pp. 49–50.

19 See Middell and Naumann (fn. 1), pp. 163–166.

The company – or rather the global, privately run, public-private aluminium mycelium – thereby creates new systems of rule that (1) depend on profit-maximizing investors; (2) rest on a corporate chain of command, and (3) install new “plutocratic orders” in remote mining regions, where little capital has circulated before the installation of the facilities. In member countries of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), most workers and the surrounding population have both the option to “exit” (quit their job) or to “voice” (protest or appeal), but these options do not exist for large parts of the population of the Guinean bauxite towns.

Having been constructed and maintained almost exclusively by the global aluminium-production network, these mining towns are therefore very particular portals. They rarely have “door handles” on the inside, and if they do, they seem to be locked. The bauxite mining towns are export enclaves with few spin-off effects. In this sense, they really are portals “of” globalization rather than portals “to” globalization. The keys to these portals belong to the global investors and can be sold. Once a mining town no longer fits in a firm’s transnational network, its portal can be sealed, leaving its inhabitants without electricity, water, and social services, as was the case in Fria in 2012.²⁰

Until the recent resource boom, Africa was often said to having been left out of globalization because its share in world trade diminished or stagnated.²¹ However, a market share of a continent’s population in world trade only shows how much this population receives as remuneration in the form of profits and wages. As work is remunerated unevenly (or even not remunerated at all), these numbers do not capture the actual contribution to global wealth by Africans. It is therefore much more likely that Africa has never been left out of globalization, but only barred from its benefits. In the same way, since the turn of the millennium, with the new price peak in raw materials, a veritable euphoria took place as Africans increasingly seem to participate in world trade. In most industrial mines, however, only the yields per unit, not the number of employees, have increased significantly. With falling raw-material prices as a consequence of slower global economic growth, African elites are about to lose these windfall profits again.²²

Naturally, this exchange of unequally powerful and differently skilled actors can have a positive long-term effect: it can lead to accelerated development through the diffusion and exchange of knowledge, an effect which can be considered the technical dimension of portals. However, economic exchange between unequal partners also leads to exploitation. People with fewer social protections and less cultural capital have to work more for the same reward (consisting of rights to labour time of others). For instance, unskilled

20 J. Knierzinger, Fria in Guinea: A Dismissed Bauxite Town, in: *Stichproben – Vienna Journal of African Studies* 30 (2016), pp. 137–161.

21 Agnew also argued against the thesis of Africa “falling out” of world trade, but not on the same basis: He does not criticize the instruments of measure but the selection of countries. See J. Agnew and R. Grant, *Representing Africa: The Geography of Africa in World Trade, 1960–1992*, in: *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 86 (1996) 4, pp. 729–730.

22 See, for instance, I. Taylor, *Africa Rising?*, Oxford 2014, and B. Lee et al., *Resources Futures: A Chatham House Report*, London 2012.

dock workers around the world do have very similar jobs and often work for the same transnational companies (TNCs). However, a dock worker in Kamsar, Guinea, is only entitled to a fraction of the purchasing power of a dock worker in Hamburg.²³ From this point of view, portals of globalization are at the same time portals of command, providing the spatial setting for corporate chains of command²⁴ and unequal exchange. Following the ideas of John Agnew, these forms of direct or despotic power can be discerned from infrastructural power, derived for instance from roads, electricity, tap water, etc.,²⁵ which add to the ascribed power of what he calls a “sovereignty regime,” a concept that is centred on states but underlines the different grades of territorialization of these states.²⁶ These issues will be treated as the political dimension of portals of globalization. Based on the particular historical development of these mining towns, we can additionally discern a “cultural” dimension, which I refer to in the following section.

3.1 Cultural dimension

According to Matthias Middell and Katja Naumann, portals are “places that have been centres of world trade or global communication, have served as entrance points for cultural transfer [and] have always been known as sites of transcultural encounter and mutual influence.”²⁷ From the Guinean perspective, mining towns are without a doubt points of global encounter, but this encounter depends strongly on the handling of “culture” by corporate actors. While Pechiney, for instance, had entered the country during colonialism with a paternalist civilizing mission based on the corporatist encyclical *Rerum Novarum* of Pope Leo XIII,²⁸ North American corporations rather tried to preserve their status as private companies.²⁹ The recent shutdown of the facilities in Fria was strongly connected to the different “company cultures” of French and Russian firms.³⁰ Fria was conceived and constructed by the late colonial regime in the 1950s as part of a plan to shift industrial capacity to the colonies. As the French colonial empire was about to dissolve, Fria was to become a showcase for planned industrialization, as well as “civilization” in Africa. The self-portrait of Pechiney emphasized Christian values and com-

23 Knierzinger (fn. 4), p. 46.

24 In his work of reference, which is still in use today, Henry Fayol, director of a French iron mining enterprise around the start of the twentieth century, defines the scalar chain or chain of command as the “the chain of superiors ranging from the ultimate authority to the lowest rank.” See H. Fayol, *Allgemeine und industrielle Verwaltung*, München 1929.

25 Agnew (fn. 3), p. 443. Agnew borrows the concept from M. Mann, *The Autonomous Power of the State: its Origins, Mechanisms, and Results*, in: *European Journal of Sociology* 25 (1984) 2, p. 188.

26 Agnew discerns four different ideal types of sovereignty regimes: classic (e.g. China today); globalist (e.g. the USA during the Cold War); imperialist (e.g. colonial powers), and integrative (the EU at the time of publication). See Agnew (fn. 3), p. 445.

27 Middell and Naumann (fn. 1), p. 162.

28 C. Pauther (fn. 6), pp. 16–20. Pechiney began to question this world view in the 1960s, primarily based on economic considerations. See P. Jouven, M. Jouven, *Président de la Compagnie répond aux questions du Bulletin*, in: *Le Bulletin Pechiney* 152 (1968), pp. 1–3.

29 Research in Guinea in 2012 and 2014. Cf. M. Diallo et al., *Guinée: Pour un nouveau syndicalisme en Afrique*, Paris 1992.

30 Interviews in Fria, January 2014.

munity-building policies to fit this paternalistic image. Based on *Rerum Novarum*, the company at the same time underlined the “organic” and harmonious relation between workers and employers, and was critical of governmental intervention in economic affairs. The company advised its workers and their partners on topics like hygiene, work ethics, education, diet, polygamy, and even house work. Publications and social interventions aimed to introduce the French ideal of a core family.³¹ The employees of Alucam in Cameroon, which was constructed at the same time as Fria, were to become “agents in spreading human and social development” as “distributors of purchasing power [...] to the benefit of local and regional craftsmen and food crop growers.”³² To do so, they had to become more productive:

*And you ask yourself: Why all that agitation? Why all that noise which seems to be an eternal monotony? Well! Some people have realized that all this movement, all these manifestations, all these delights, constitute a DUTY, or even better, a LAW that obligatorily rules over all living creatures. This duty, this law, which is the real human IDEAL, is called WORK.*³³

The workers’ journals of Pechiney can therefore be read as an example of the diffusion of Weber’s spirit of capitalism, all the more as Pechiney’s mission was at the same time profoundly Christian.³⁴ Starting in the late nineteenth century, this longstanding corporatist tradition was reinforced by a shift in French colonial policies towards the end of French rule,³⁵ but it soon came into conflict with newly independent governments.³⁶ The facilities of Pechiney in Fria and Edéa were still under construction when Guinea became independent in 1958. Independence led to a total break in relations with France, with the exception of the bauxite mine and the alumina refinery in Fria, which provided aluminium oxide to a smelter in Edéa. In the case of CBG, a Guinean joint venture that started production in 1973 and has been run by the American company Alcoa since then, Soumah mentions a yearly budget for “social investments” of USD 500,000 since 1988 and direct payments to the villages.³⁷ Both in Sangarédi and in Kamsar, a considerable proportion of the non-worker population receives electricity and running water for free. CBG also announced that it would give the nearby population the right to harvest cashew-nut plantations, which were erected as part of the rehabilitation measures in areas

31 Knierzinger (fn. 4), p. 74.

32 A. Pezet et al., Corporate Social Responsibility before CSR, p.27 https://www.researchgate.net/publication/228698287_Corporate_Social_Responsibility_before_CSR (accessed 2 May 2013).

33 E. Tcheby, La page camerounaise: Causeries sur le travail, in: Bulletin Alucam 13 (1960), p. 21; translation JK, accentuation Tcheby.

34 Cf. Le Bulletin Pechiney, Noël 1957, p. 1.

35 See for example Pezet et al. (fn. 32), p. 4.

36 Cf. Pauther (fn. 6), pp. 16–23.

37 Soumah (fn. 5), p. 141.

that had already been mined.³⁸ These voluntary measures reinforce the absolute dominance of the companies in these cities.

The combined crisis of the oil shock and the regime's radicalization eventually led to the decline of Fria, which had until then been called the "little Paris" of Guinea. Fria had been visited by the Guinean elite to buy products, like foreign rice, milk, and butter, and "to rest, have fun and get medical care."³⁹ After a long general strike and public upheavals in 1975, the American run towns of Kamsar and Sangarédi became the new places to be. Soumah quotes the personal assistant to the general management at Friguia, Mrs. Benjamin, who stated that everything "went through very well" until a general strike began, which was triggered by the reduction of benefits, such as medical care and food supplies, "that were painfully felt by the overall community which also started to expand with numerous children."⁴⁰ Until today, all workers receive certain foodstuffs, like milk or rice, exclusively imported from abroad, in addition to their normal wages. This mainly came about due to the high number of expatriates during the initial launch of mining operations from the 1950s to the 1970s.

Pauther describes Fria as a "social and humanitarian success story" as compared to Edéa, being a severely segregated and heavily guarded state in the state.⁴¹ The housing estates initially consisted of one *cité* exclusively reserved for about 135 European workers, and two African *cités* for another 200 workers. Apart from that, the company built a sports court, commercial centre, kindergarten, housekeeping school, and medical centre. The extent of racist segregation was striking: the schools, the clubs of every *cité*, and even the sports teams were segregated. The only swimming pool in town was in the European *cité*.⁴² Institutionalized racism also continued in Kamsar and Sangarédi in the 1970s. There, too, swimming pools were explicitly reserved for (white) expatriates, and even today, local workers rarely use them; non-employed inhabitants are usually not allowed to enter. Soumah quotes Alfa Issa Thiam, an employee at CBG since 1968, who speaks of "total apartheid" in Kamsar until the late 1970s. Even the son of the (then) Guinean president, Ahmed Sékou Touré, was allegedly denied access to the company's swimming pool because of his skin colour.⁴³

Thiam also gives a negative account of the "Africanization" programme in Kamsar. In the beginning, 200 expatriates were employed in Kamsar, and had to train Guinean senior staff, but the training did not take place or was obstructed because, unlike in Sangarédi, these expatriates had no guarantees of retaining their jobs after successfully training the Guinean staff.⁴⁴ The initial aim of CBG to replace all expatriates with Africans within

38 Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinée, Welcome at Sangaredi. A Reference Bauxite Mine since 1973: Powerpoint presentation of CBG for visitors, Sangarédi 2012.

39 Soumah (fn. 5), p. 215.

40 Soumah (fn. 5), p. 106.

41 Pauther (fn. 6), p. 27.

42 Ibid., p. 27.

43 Soumah (fn. 5), p. 142.

44 Ibid.

five to ten years was not reached. Soumah relates this also to the strong nepotism in the recruitment of Guinean personnel, which reduced the possibility of employing skilled workers.⁴⁵

The differences in corporate governance between French and American run firms, are not as big as one would suggest and have also been reduced with the advent of corporate social responsibility (CSR). In a way, CSR was already in use in the mining sector long before it had been marketed; also, the geographically isolated facilities of American companies in the USA necessitated considerable investment in the local workforce, not only in terms of wages and basic needs. In order to compensate workers for the distance from urban centres, mining companies created benefits and pension schemes, responded to the various needs of families, and built recreation centres. This resulted in “truly autonomous cities” and “discrete communities,” as Anne Pezet et al. put it,⁴⁶ based on infrastructural power. In both French and American settings, these policies were in sharp contrast to the economizing nature of capitalist endeavours, leading to the minimization of taxation, the externalization of ecological costs,⁴⁷ and the disregard for everything that took place outside the protected realm of the enterprise. The advent of CSR in the 1990s then aggravated the paradox of these policies: while mining companies in West Africa continued to fiercely fight against taxation,⁴⁸ which would – at least in theory – have enabled local and national political institutions to function, their marketing departments began to implement proper programmes with the very funds that were openly reserved first and foremost to increase the reputation of the company with its customers.

3.2 Political Dimension: Corporate Rule

The residential areas of these company towns have running water, electricity, hospitals, well-maintained roads, etc., which have all been provided almost exclusively by the corporations. In Fria, the French colonizers managed to establish the best hospital in Guinea, and built two schools, one for expatriates and one that the company “lent” to the public administration. Most of these buildings and services were neither referred to as gifts to the state, nor did the company demand repayment. The Guinean state, having constructed neither ward nor school independently, thus became more and more indebted to the private company.⁴⁹

When production began in Fria, the city had only three representatives in government and five police officers for 200 expatriate senior officers and 500 employees on the corporate side. Already in 1957, one of the three administrators called on the government

45 Soumah (fn. 5), p. 212.

46 Pezet et al. (fn. 32), pp. 10–11.

47 Pechiney began to recognize ecological concerns much later in Guinea than in Metropolitan France. See D. Bouillet, Pechiney and the Environment, 1960–1980, in: *Les Cahiers d'histoire de l'aluminium*. 26 (2000), pp. 10–37 (fn. 32), p. 33, and Knierzinger (fn. 4), p. 79–81.

48 On transfer pricing, see T. Bauer and T. Maissen, *Silbersonne am Horizont: ALUSUISSE – eine Schweizer Kolonialgeschichte*, Zürich 1989, pp. 92–100.

49 Knierzinger (fn. 4), p. 77.

to prevent the town from becoming a “concession Pechiney.”⁵⁰ The company was apparently directly addressed by the population to construct a church and apartments for priests, and distributed permits for merchants in the shopping arcade.⁵¹ Based on similar findings, Soumah concludes that “[i]n fact it is the plant that set up the town as well as the public civil service of Fria.”⁵²

The most important momentum of control in these typically remote places, however, is the simple fact that the firm becomes the most important source of financial liquidity.⁵³ The global chains of command of the TNCs, stretching from headquarters around the world to the mine workers, is accompanied by a “plutocratic” chain of command based on “purchasing power.” Previously existing social orders, based on lineage, seniority, ethnicity, gender, religion, etc., have changed drastically with the influx of workers’ salaries, creating a “worker aristocracy” at the top that possesses much of the land, shops, and even the town’s schools. According to Soumah, wages in the Guinean mines are on average four times higher than wages in public administration, and are accompanied by numerous benefits like company cars and fuel, free medical care for workers’ families, basic foodstuffs, school libraries, sports and cultural centres, the possibility to own private property, and retirement schemes.⁵⁴ People living in these towns who are not part of this private polity, become necessarily dependent on the “working class.” The majority of the population lives mostly in huts without running water or electricity, and tries to make a living out of selling agricultural goods and artisanal products to the upper 10,000. In 2011, the CBG employed about 500 core workers and 730 contractors in Sangarédi, and maintained 489 houses in a city of about 75,000 inhabitants. In Kamsar, the reserve army of labour is even larger: the facilities there employ less than 2,500 people against 140,000 inhabitants living mainly off trade and fishing.⁵⁵ Even if we suggest that every worker “nourishes” 20 other persons, this leads to a large part of the population that is both excluded from and dependent on these production centres.

However, these control relations go far beyond company towns. The final decision-makers in a corporate chain of command are investors and, to a certain extent, consumers (especially if they are organized). Such faraway decisions can trigger the forced relocation of Guinean farmers and even the closure of whole mining towns. As a matter of fact, all of these decisions are always embedded in (inter)national regulatory frameworks.⁵⁶ Cost

50 Ibid., p. 75.

51 Ibid., pp. 74–88.

52 Soumah (fn. 5), p. 103. Cf. Knierzinger (fn. 4), p. 78.

53 Cf. Agnew (fn. 3, p. 443) underlining currency as a form of infrastructural power.

54 Soumah (fn. 5), p. 213.

55 See Knierzinger (fn. 4).

56 This argument naturally leads to a series of questions, which cannot be addressed here. Three points are important: (1) (inter)national regulation is central to the structure of these global chains of command; (2) consumers cannot be considered as fully rational and independent decision-makers, and (3) on every node of a global chain of command (e.g. from an investment decision in Austria to the relocation of a village in Guinea), actors are also “power brokers.” By passing down orders from above (e.g. the CEO of an enterprise trying to raise the profits for shareholders), they can always make use of their position for their own means.

reduction in times of decreased demand for aluminium, naturally result at first in cuts in voluntary (charity) measures for these parts of the population. Particularly in Kamsar and in Fria, living conditions have deteriorated and social unrest has augmented tremendously in the last years because of such cost reductions.⁵⁷ The plant in Fria had been managed by Rusal since 2002, and was finally bought by them in 2006. In April 2012, Rusal evacuated all its Russian personnel because of violent strikes, and did not clarify the status of the remaining Guinean workers until today. Instead of closing the factory officially, Rusal only stopped paying salaries and most basic services. According to the town's mayor, Amara Traoré, Fria

*is in danger of disappearing if the factory stops. [...] Today I've got a starving population. People are selling their property, their homes, plots of land and even furniture to survive.*⁵⁸

But these global power relations do not only affect the mining towns. In 2008, the overall number of CBG employees amounted to 3,390, subcontractors included, mainly in Kamsar and Sangarédi.⁵⁹ These employees, constituting about 0.03 per cent of the 12.5 million Guineans, generate about 70 per cent of Guinea's foreign earnings⁶⁰ and, thereby, most of the governmental budget that is not accrued from international grants. The majority of the rest of the budget comes from the other two bauxite mines in Fria and Débélé, jointly employing no more than 1,500 core workers since the lockout in Fria in 2012. Because of the all-embracing arms of the company, the representatives of the production facilities in these cities are de facto governors, partially replacing the formal apparatus of local and national politicians. With the new price peak in raw materials since the turn of the millennium, one could observe how this power struggle plays out. In 2012, the government announced that it would create fully public mining corporations and increase taxes. However, the global economic downturn since 2008 had already taken its toll: in April 2013, Guinea's President Alpha Condé announced a cut of mining profit tax from 35 to 30 per cent, and reduced taxes on bauxite from 0.55 per cent to 0.15 per cent of the international price.⁶¹ While the recent "Scramble for Africa"⁶² had enhanced the political leeway of African governments considerably, business as usual seems to have set in again since the 2008 economic downturn. In exchange for more favourable business conditions, a large portion of Guinea's debt was cancelled only recently.⁶³

57 Alfa Issa Thiam in Soumah (fn. 5), p. 143.

58 Ibid.

59 Soumah (fn. 5), p. 138.

60 S. Delasnerie and A. Diallo, Guinea: Transforming a Geological Scandal into an Economic Miracle?, in: Aluminium International Today, (2004) 6.

61 Zawya, Dark Clouds Hang Over Guinea's Bauxite Market, <http://www.worldal.com/news/others/2013-05-23/136930598342864.shtml> (accessed 29 April 2014).

62 See, for instance, Lee et al. (fn. 22), p. XI.

63 L'Express Guinée, La France annule 75 millions d'Euros de la dette guinéenne, <http://lexpressguinee.com/>

3.3 Technical Dimension: Further Processing and Spin-off Effects

During the first two stages of the aluminium chain (mining and refining), the spin-off effects of the industry are very small compared to other industries. Guinean artisanal gold mining, for instance, provides jobs to more than 100,000 people, whereas Guinean bauxite mining currently employs around 5,000, including subcontractors.⁶⁴ Backward linkages are scarcely developed. CBG's procurement agencies in Brussels and Pittsburgh very rarely order Guinean or African products.⁶⁵ Even the provision of the workers with local food has never been put into practice due to, according to CBG, the lack of stable providers of these commodities.⁶⁶ This export-enclave character enforces the mines' development into separate sovereignty regimes.

This danger was already known during independence, and it prompted the government of (former) President Touré to demand plans for further processing, as a condition for giving out mining concessions. For all three bauxite mines (and since then, in the case of at least another eight bauxite mining projects that have not been realized), these promises were made, but until now no smelter has been erected in Guinea, in spite of its vast hydroelectric potential (because of its many rivers, Guinea is often referred to as the African "water castle").⁶⁷ The Canadian firm Alcan, for instance, announced in 1974 that its part of the bauxite of CBG was not to be locally processed, as previously claimed; instead, it would be processed in Aughinish, Ireland, which would in turn produce for a smelter in Lynemouth, England. This change of plans happened in a period comparable to the rise of "resource nationalism" in the 2000s. In 1974, one year after the first oil crisis, the International Bauxite Association was formed, which encouraged producer countries to raise taxes and nationalize production. Bonnie Campbell remarks that it "would be quite impossible to explain the logic of the Aughinish project in terms of the comparative costs of the factors of production."⁶⁸

If we analyse the aluminium industry from a regional angle – as most of the African governments after independence did – Fria could nonetheless be regarded as a success story because it delivered a good part of its alumina to Alucam in Edéa, where much of it was processed into finished products. Edéa started production in 1957, several years before the completion of the alumina refinery in Fria,⁶⁹ and was thereby the first foreign direct investment of Pechiney outside Metropolitan France.⁷⁰ Part of the primary aluminium produced in Edéa was further processed by Socratal, which is still the largest

fichiers/videos5.php?langue=fr&idc=fr_Cooperation_La_France_annule_75_millions_d_Euros_de_la_dette (accessed 15 November 2017).

64 Knierzinger (fn. 4), p. 209.

65 Interviews in Guinea 2012.

66 Ibid.

67 See B. Campbell, *Negotiating the Bauxite/Aluminium Sector under Narrowing Constraints*, *Review of African Political Economy* 51 (1991), p. 29.

68 B. Campbell (ed.), *Mining in Africa: Regulation & Development*. Ottawa 2009, p. 79; see also B. Campbell, *Les enjeux de la bauxite. La Guinée face aux multinationales de l'aluminium*, Montréal 1983.

69 R. Vitry, *Éditorial*, in: *Le Bulletin Pechiney Christmas issue* (1957), pp. 2–3.

70 Pezet et al. (fn. 32), p. 28.

producer of rolled aluminium in West and Central Africa: it produced 23,000 tons per year in 2007, of which only 30 per cent is exported; the rest is used in various factories to produce finished goods. Most of these facilities – producing roofing, building materials, and household gadgets for clients in West and Central Africa – are subsidiaries of Alucam.⁷¹ A small part of Guinean bauxite production, thus, really reaches consumers in West Africa, and it most likely even goes into the recycling loop.⁷² The rest of the primary aluminium is mostly exported to Europe and the USA.

4. Conclusion

In company towns like Fria or Sangarédi, global control relations are shrunk to the size of a town: aluminium corporations need to attract technicians and managers from around the world, by offering high pay and other comforts as incentives to stay in these remote but globally integrated locations for several years or more. These bearers of high cultural capital also exchange money and, thereby, working time with people at the local markets, buy land, and send their kids to school, etc. The resulting local control relations, based on income and property, overshadow all other previously existing regimes of rule in the area, whether based on elections, ethnic ties, religion, gender, or other conventions. Analyses of portals of globalization in high-income countries show striking similarities with this situation. In her analysis of “global cities,” Saskia Sassen talks about the “beginning of transnational urban systems [being] increasingly disconnected from their broader hinterlands or even their national economies,”⁷³ and shows how strongly their functioning depends on increasingly informal and impoverished service providers.⁷⁴ Similarly, the sociologist Klaus Dörre analyses how over-exploitation (in his terms, “secondary exploitation”) has transcended former centre-periphery borders and has arrived in high-income countries.⁷⁵ However, even if the logics of exploitation are similar, their extent differs significantly. According to United Nations Development Programme estimations, in 1820, the income ratio between the poorest and the richest fifth of the world population, measured in terms of state affiliation, was only 1:3. By 1960, the gap had risen to 1:30; in 1997 it was at 1:74.⁷⁶ My own calculations showed that expatriate geologists

71 See M. Carbonell, Aluminium in Cameroon: Markets and Uses, in: Laparra/Grinberg (fn. 8), pp. 125–48; C. Husband et al., The Aluminium Industry in West and Central Africa: Lessons Learned and Prospects for the Future, 1999, p. 30; Pechiney Ugine Kuhlmann, Pechiney Ugine Kuhlmann en Afrique, in: *Fusion* 5 (1972), p. 2; E. Senghaas-Knobloch, The Internationalization of Capital and the Process of Underdevelopment: The Case of Black Africa, in: *Journal of Peace Research* 12 (1975) 4, p. 286, and Habig (fn. 12), p. 154.

72 For example, for artisanal cooking pot production in West Africa, see E. Osborn, Casting Aluminium Cooking Pots: Labour, Migration and Artisan Production in West Africa's Informal Sector, 1945–2005, in: *African Identities* 7 (2009) 3.

73 S. Sassen, The Global City: Introducing a Concept, in: *Brown Journal of World Affairs* 9 (2005) 2, p. 29.

74 Ibid.

75 K. Dörre, Social Classes in the Process of Capitalist Landnahme. On the Relevance of Secondary Exploitation, in: *Socialist Studies / Études socialistes* 6 (2010) 2, p. 50.

76 UNDP, Human Development Report 1999, New York 1999, p. 3.

buying oranges on the streets of Sangarédi, exchange working time in the ratio of up to 1:1,000 with local vendors; for working one day in the mines, a geologist gains the right to tell 1,000 street vendors what to do for him for one day. This kind of unequal exchange is probably the most visible difference between the African situation since the 1960s and mining towns in Europe and the USA dating back to the onset of industrialization. At the same time, this rising unequal exchange between workers goes hand in hand with a globally rising gap between capital and labour,⁷⁷ leading to exchange rates of working time in low-income countries like Guinea, where “purchasing power” becomes political power. The dominating global investors in possession of the aluminium companies enjoy annual incomes more than 100,000 times higher than those of the residents of Guinean mining towns.⁷⁸ This undermines local decision-making processes, as local politicians control almost no resources compared to the TNCs. Calculations in Kamsar showed that the CBG provides about 99 per cent of all investments in publicly used infrastructure and social services.⁷⁹

From this point of view, I argue that portals of globalization in low-income countries are places or institutions where unequal exchange becomes apparent because global elites and the world’s most vulnerable inhabitants (are forced to) interact in a relatively confined area. In these places, opaque and spatially separated relations of global control emerge from the hidden fabric of world economic exchange, and openly interfere with local systems of rule. While these relations of control are as real in the rest of the world as in these nodes, they are normally mediated through long commodity chains – and they are less extreme. The difference with portals of globalization in high-income countries, therefore, lies in the scope and the visibility of the “international” division of labour in these cities, and the consequences of this close interaction between unequal partners for the hierarchical order on-site. In the short and medium term, this clash of highly unequal cultural capital (in the sense of Bourdieu) leads on the one hand to exploitation, dispossession, and disempowerment, and can lead on the other hand to formal employment, better medical care, and generally better living conditions, at least for a fraction of the local population. Without this new constellation of rule, the few people who had been living in these areas before the arrival of aluminium companies would continue with small-scale farming or fishing, or migrate to other urban accumulations. The population with access to schools, wards, electricity, and running water would without a doubt be smaller.

In the long run, this also implies the possibility of knowledge transfer and spin-off effects, and therefore more self-sufficient development, which would be less affected by external crises. The latter point appears to be the most important and unsolved up to now, and corresponds to what could be called the sociopolitical aspects of the resource

77 T. Piketty, *Le Capital au XXI^e siècle*, Paris 2013.

78 J. Knierzinger, Überlegungen zu Steuerung und ungleichem Tausch in Rohstoffgüterketten mit Beispielen aus Guineas Bauxitbergbau, in: *Journal für Entwicklungspolitik*, 30 (2014) 3, p. 75.

79 Knierzinger (fn. 4), p. 172, and J. Knierzinger, *Après le boom: la laborieuse mise en œuvre de nouvelles régulations dans le secteur minier guinéen*, in: *EchoGéo* 38 (2016).

curse.⁸⁰ All mentioned consequences depend to a certain degree on the business culture of the companies, but this should not be overstated, as we have seen in the differently organized cases of Fria, Edéa, Sangarédi, and Kamsar.

There seems to be some evidence in our case studies that especially the re-emergence of “deterritorialized” sovereignty regimes – the outcome of the replacement of public services by CSR measures – has had negative long-term consequences. During colonialism, when the French empire mediated similar economic exploitation, the creation of regionally integrated chains of production was also in the interest of the colonizers.⁸¹ Resistance against this unified political system and, therefore, empowerment was easier to organize. Trade unions were the spearheads of independence and had been financed by French metropolitan parties. The success of Pechiney to create possibilities of downstream, small-scale economic activity in Edéa, depended heavily on the territorialized colonial system of rule, even if this territorialization was weak and the French empire was only just about to start with the installation of territorialized infrastructural power, when it was already on the brink of disintegration.⁸² The numerous broken promises to create integrated industrial complexes since the 1960s, on the other hand, show the meagre effects of deterritorialized systems of control in terms of mutual learning processes in portals of globalization: with a multiplicity of economic actors, all trying to hedge their own interests, the possibility for nationally or regionally integrated production chains – thus, the opposite of export enclaves – is considerably low.

To Agnew, the democratic answer to the challenge of globalization is overcoming the “normative categories of consent and legitimacy based on territorialization,”⁸³ that is, as I understand him, the deterritorialization of democratic processes as such. In the case of Guinea, this is worth contemplating because its mining towns already are transnational decision spaces controlled by mining companies. Rather than cutting the branches of this widely ramified decision space, ranging from company headquarters to mining towns around the world, why not try to democratize it in the sense of economic democracy or solidarity economy?⁸⁴ Given the current global geopolitical situation, this is

80 Cf. M.L. Ross, *The Political Economy of the Resource Curse*, World Politics 51 (1999), p. 308.

81 In the early 1950s, France still intended to create a fully integrated aviation industry in Guinea. See R. Pré, *L'avenir de la Guinée Française*, Conakry 1951. To Agnew (fn. 3), the imperialist regimes were also weakly territorialized and were based on a weak state. Corporate rule as described in this article, however, is not part of his analysis, and can surely be described as less territorialized than the French colonial empire (which does not mean that it is less regulated). Cf. B. Daviron and S. Ponte, *The coffee paradox: Global markets, commodity trade and the elusive promise of development*, London 2005, p. 85. Agnew's conceptualization also does not explicitly capture the territorial claims of localized forms of power like neotraditional rule or precolonial African states, which did not enforce clear borders but were nonetheless bound to a certain territory.

82 See L. Adamolekun, *Sekou Toure's Guinea*, London 1976, pp. 42–45; S. Amin, *Neo-Colonialism in West Africa*, Harmondsworth 1973, p. XI; A. Condé, *Guinée: Albanie d'Afrique ou néo-colonie américaine?*, Paris 1972; Daviron and Ponte (fn. 81), p. 85; M. Rempe, *Decolonization by Europeanization? The Early EEC and the Transformation of French-African Relations*, Berlin 2011, p. 7, and S. Touré, *L'Afrique et la révolution*, Paris 1967, p. 34.

83 Agnew (fn. 3), p. 439.

84 See M. Auinger, *Impetus for Democratization and Starting-Points for a Transformation of the Working Process in Brazil*, in: *Journal für Entwicklungspolitik* 21 (2005) 2, pp. 45–63.

probably a bit far-fetched, but social movements around the world, in fact, increasingly seem to organize along global commodity chains.⁸⁵

85 See for instance K. Lukas et al., *Securing Labour Rights in Global Production Networks: Legal Instruments and Policy Options*, Vienna 2010.

Brazilian Development Cooperation and Portals of Globalization

Ana Ribeiro

ABSTRACTS

This article addresses portals of globalization within the framework of Brazilian development cooperation, which serves as an engine to increase Brazil's economic and political influence in other parts of the former Portuguese empire. The text employs the concept of portals of globalization as places where cultural transfers and technology exchange occur by looking at the increased production of export goods. Development cooperation projects embody such places of transfers and exchange between the state actors directing them, while boundaries become blurred between what 'local' and 'foreign' elements are in projects' construction and practice. The case study drawn upon is that of Brazil-Mozambique development relations in the public health sector in Mozambique, as a case of South-South cooperation.

Dieser Artikel analysiert Portale der Globalisierung im Rahmen der brasilianischen Entwicklungszusammenarbeit, die Brasiliens wirtschaftlichen und politischen Einfluss in anderen Teilen des ehemaligen portugiesischen Kolonialgebiets steigern sollen. Portale der Globalisierung werden hier als Orte verstanden, an denen Kulturtransfers und Technologieaustausch stattfinden, um vor allem die Produktion von Exportgütern zu erhöhen. Projekte der Entwicklungszusammenarbeit zwischen staatlichen Akteuren werden als solche Orte des Transfers und Austauschs verstanden. Dabei wird deutlich, dass sowohl bei der Konzeption als auch bei der Umsetzung der Kooperationsprojekte die Grenzen zwischen dem "Lokalen" und "Fremden" immer wieder verschwimmen. Die Fallstudie untersucht brasilianisch-mosambikanische Entwicklungsbeziehungen im Bereich des öffentlichen Gesundheitswesens in Mosambik als Beispiel einer Süd-Süd-Kooperation.

1. Introduction

Besides contemporary economic and political aspirations, Brazil and Mozambique share a former colonizer, an official language, and commerce links stemming from the Atlantic slave trade. Government representatives from both sides have habitually used these elements to justify the pursuit of ambitious development cooperation projects between the two former Portuguese colonies and members of the Global South. However, their limited economic resources, recurring social problems, and changes in political agendas under new administrations have made the follow-up of concrete projects a challenge in their cooperation. This article focuses on the discourses, motivations, and obstacles that may shape the process of establishing such projects and, eventually, their function as portals of globalization.

The Mozambican state has been very welcoming and willing to implement international cooperation projects, which has made it a favourite among many foreign donors, including Brazilians, according to a former director of the Brazilian Cooperation Agency (Agência Brasileira de Cooperação, ABC).¹ The official discourse he espoused in 2014 promotes the Mozambican state as the biggest recipient of training and technology transfers from the Brazilian state over the past several years. ABC, established in 1987 as a wing of the Brazilian ministry of foreign affairs (more commonly known as Itamaraty), is tasked with coordinating technical cooperation, with the logistical help of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). Since Brazilian diplomats and other government officials tend to discursively reject the term ‘aid’ in favour of ‘cooperation’ (although this definition can be contested), I refer here to Brazil’s projects as ‘development cooperation’.

One of the obstacles concerning Brazilian-Mozambican development cooperation is precisely the lack of official information about these efforts, which have only over the past decade begun to be assessed in integrated financial reports by Brazilian government agencies.² Considering this, I conducted interviews and archival research in Brazil and Mozambique to piece together the project case study, as well as the framework of the two states’ development cooperation, for this article and my doctoral dissertation. In the main part of this article, I will investigate specific aspects of Brazilian development cooperation, past and present, and locate the concept of portals of globalization within it.³ These portals are not only the concrete sites where this cooperation plays out, but are also analysed here as articulations of an emerging South-South or lusophone development project. This approach is complemented by that of cultural transfers, as suggested

1 Interview with ABC’s director, Ambassador Fernando Marroni de Abreu, on 10 March 2014 in Brasília, Brazil.

2 The first of such reports was *Cooperação Brasileira para o Desenvolvimento Internacional 2005-2009*, Brasília: AE/PR, Ipea, MRE, ABC, 2010, http://www.ipea.gov.br/portal/images/stories/PDFs/Book_Cooperacao_Brasileira.pdf (accessed 12 March 2014).

3 M. Middell and K. Naumann, *Global History and the Spatial Turn: From the Impact of Area Studies to the Study of Critical Junctures of Globalization*, in: *Journal of Global History*, 5 (2010), p.162.

by Matthias Middell and Katja Naumann, to get a closer look at the concrete actors and institutions that establish and manage such portals.⁴

In the words of historian Michel Espagne, 'Research on transfers sets out to examine new possibilities for escaping cultural history's national framework by studying in a quasi micro-historical fashion the process through which an object is translated from its context of emergence into a new context of reception.'⁵ The 'portal' aspect represents the sites where interactions and exchanges occur relevant to this case study, and the transfer aspect represents how the product of such interactions and exchanges moves between locations (or cultural, political, and economic contexts). Especially relevant to the 'portals' concept, Espagne has further stated, 'Whatever the way in which one defines the context of reception or departure, one must treat these contexts during the transfer process as stable unities, between which the transfer unfolds.'⁶

After broader historical, discursive and theoretical explorations into Brazilian-Mozambican cooperation, this article turns to a medication factory, named the Mozambican Society of Medicines (Sociedade Moçambicana de Medicamentos, SMM), as an illustrative example of what can perhaps become a portal of globalization. Brazilian funds covered the factory's construction and equipment, while government agencies from both Brazil and Mozambique managed the project in its technical cooperation phase. Signed into agreement in 2003, the SMM's factory took ten years to start producing on-site. The factory, located in Matola, Mozambique, is the first publicly owned facility that produces antiretroviral drugs in Africa, and it is reportedly one of the costliest and most prominent cooperation projects Brazilian government agencies have managed so far. Objectives include selling the medications not only in Mozambique but also to neighbouring countries in Southern Africa, which has also been struggling with high rates of human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) infection.⁷

The function of the Oswaldo Cruz Foundation (also known as Fiocruz), Brazil's public medical research and innovation agency, has been to transfer technology and train Mozambican employees to produce antiretroviral drugs and other generic medications, so that the Mozambicans can take control of the factory's operation. The factory in Matola is modelled after the Farmanguinhos factory and laboratory in Rio de Janeiro, which produces the same medications. Mozambicans were invited to Farmanguinhos to experience the operation of the factory themselves, which they, according to a Fiocruz official, could then apply in their own factory.⁸ Here, there are two stable points, or 'portals',

4 Ibid.

5 M. Espagne, *Comparison and Transfer: A Question of Method*, in: M. Middell and L. Aulinas (eds.), *Transnational Challenges to National History Writing*, Basingstoke 2013, p. 11.

6 Ibid., p. 13.

7 A. Rossi, *Depois de 10 anos, fábrica de remédios contra Aids começa a produzir na África*. O Estado de S. Paulo, <http://www.estadao.com.br/noticias/cidades,depois-de-10-anos-fabrica-de-remedios-contr-aids-comeca-a-produzir-na-africa,1092215,0.htm> (accessed 2 November 2013).

8 *Fábrica em Moçambique não vai só empacotar anti-retrovirais*, Deutsche Welle, last modified 26 July 2012, <http://www.dw.de/f%C3%A1brica-em-mo%C3%A7ambique-n%C3%A3o-vai-s%C3%B3-empacotar-anti-retrovirais/a-16125078> (accessed 15 May 2013).

between which the product is being transferred: the factory in Brazil and the SMM's factory. However, their 'portal' functions still appear limited by political, bureaucratic, economic, and other obstacles surrounding cooperation between the two states. As the article progresses, the focus will be narrowed down to relevant processes and agents within the sphere of the SMM's factory.

Using an actor-based perspective – largely from the Brazilian side of the cooperative effort – and fieldwork, this article focuses on conditions around and within the factory project that qualify some political and material elements, as well as obstacles, transfers, exchanges, mediations, and regulations between the actors involved. The following two sections take a closer look at Brazilian development cooperation – which has discursively prioritized the so-called 'African Countries of Official Portuguese Language' (Países Africanos de Língua Oficial Portuguesa, PALOPs) – to integrate it with the concept of portals of globalization. The 'official Portuguese language' part of the acronym is an important designation because while Portuguese is the language of government and academia in those countries, many in the population do not consider it their first language. Still, Brazilian officials emphasize the shared language of their former colonizer as a major draw for cooperation in the PALOPs. In practical terms, development cooperation is riddled with organizational and financial issues in Brazil and the recipient countries, but the ambitious intentions of the countries' leaders, as well as key, costly projects like the SMM's factory, have so far been preserved. Their potential to become stable portals of globalization remains, provided that individual priorities, differences, political changes, and resource shortages are mitigated.

2. From Haphazard to Recognized: Brazil's Presence in Mozambique

Shortly after World War II, the widely promoted idea of modernization maintained that there were stages of development all countries went through before reaching the supposed ideal of industrialized Western countries, and that this could be reached by economically and politically 'modernizing' with outside help, with very little concern for the public or the environment in the recipient country.⁹ The Brazilian ruling elite was primarily concerned with maintaining close relations with developed states to fuel its rapid growth and achieve greater political autonomy, according to José Flávio Sombra Saraiva.¹⁰

Africa's (then) Portuguese colonies – Mozambique, Angola, Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, and São Tomé and Príncipe – held a subaltern position in the Brazilian discourse, which at times explicitly favoured Portugal (Brazil's erstwhile colonizer), celebrated colonialism itself, and even mentioned the desire to 'conquer' other places in the world in

9 J. Pieterse, *Trends in Development Theory*, in: *Development Theory*, London 2010.

10 J.F. Saraiva, *África Parceira Do Brasil Atlântico: Relações Internacionais Do Brasil e Da África No Início Do Século XXI*. Coleção Relações Internacionais, Belo Horizonte 2012.

conjunction with Portugal.¹¹ The year 1961, however, signalled major changes in the constructed lusophone, or Portuguese-influenced, political and social sphere. The liberation wars broke out in Africa then. In Brazil, new leaders came to the executive branch at the national level, from centre-left workers' parties. Regarding relations with Africa, they held similar stances to the Workers' Party (Partido dos Trabalhadores, PT), which would come to power 40 years later under Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva. Brazilian presidents and their circles in the early 1960s began to discursively challenge Brazil's close alignment with Portugal and colonialism, and turn to their advantage a narrative of colonial-derived lusophone affinities used to justify Portuguese dominance in the colonies.¹²

Brazilian agencies came to portray themselves as offering an alternative to trade and aid given by the powers that had kept the African countries in dependency – a feature of the Brazilian development discourse that has lasted to this day.¹³ Over time, the Mozambican state would turn to Brazil for aid to build public institutions affected both by wars and dependent development. As the Non-Aligned Movement and African liberation movements got under way, Marxist and Weberian-inspired strands of dependency theory caught on as a challenge to the modernization paradigm, influencing – and majorly influenced by – Brazilian and other Latin American intellectuals.¹⁴ Eventually, dependency would be incorporated into international development discourse, without dismantling the core of modernization theory.¹⁵

Activities labelled 'technical cooperation' can be found in Brazilian diplomatic documents from the 1980s, many of them focusing on providing training to Mozambicans on coal mining.¹⁶ The concept of technical cooperation gradually came to be narrowed down to training and technology transfer, without stated commercial ends by Brazilian agencies, although projects could have mixed components – such as the SMM's factory, as will be discussed in more detail later.

11 From research I conducted at Fundação Getúlio Vargas (FGV) archives in Rio de Janeiro, March 2013, i.e.: N. Lima. Documentos Contendo Entrevistas, Discursos e Mensagens de Negrão de Lima Incentivando e Comentando as Relações Luso-brasileiras. Lisboa e Rio de Janeiro. FGV/CPDOC. NL ad po 1959.12.04.

12 On the lusophone affinities narrative: lusotropicalism, Gilberto Freyre's theory that Portuguese colonizers had created a harmonious, transcontinental community through sexual intermingling and Christianization, left an indelible mark on Portuguese and Brazilian discourses, and even self-imagination. See G. Freyre, *O Luso e o Trópico: Sugestões Em Torno Dos Métodos Portugueses de Integração de Povos Autóctones e de Culturas Diferentes Da Europeia Num Complexo Novo de Civilização: O Luso-tropical*, Lisbon, Comissão Executiva das Comemorações do V Centenário da Morte do Infante D. Henrique, 1961.

13 From FGV archival research in Rio de Janeiro, March 2013, see J.S. Pereira. A Economia Do Colonialismo e Da Independência; Palestra Conferida No Curso de 'Introdução à Realidade Africana', Promovido Pelo Instituto Brasileiro de Estudos Afro-Asiáticos. FGV/CPDOC. JSP pi td Pereira, J.S. 1962.03.03. See also P. Alberto, *Terms of Inclusion: Black Intellectuals in Twentieth-century Brazil*, Chapel Hill 2011, and F. Alvaro da Costa, *Documentos Da Política Externa Independente*, Vol. 1, Fundação Alexandre Gusmão, 2007.

14 A famous book adapting dependency theory to the specific case of Latin America, as opposed to a blanket assessment, was co-authored by Fernando Henrique Cardoso, who would later become president of Brazil. See F.H. Cardoso and E. Faletto, *Dependency and Development in Latin America*, Berkeley 1979.

15 Pieterse (fn. 9), p. 26.

16 Antecedentes Section - 64.VIII.07.02 Maço III, Box 691 – Moçambique Carvão – CT; Moçambique. Arquivo Histórico do Itamaraty, Brasília 1989.

Revolutionaries from the Mozambique Liberation Front (Frente de Libertação de Moçambique, Frelimo) had come to power after the 1974 fall of Portugal's authoritarian regime and the independence of its remaining colonies in Africa and Asia, which prompted much of the Portuguese elite to flee the new state.¹⁷ While discursively promoting a socialist model for state-building (and attempting to dismantle the colonial state apparatus), Frelimo employed dependency theory to explain poverty in the country, as Sérgio Chichava describes:

*In this epoch, the poverty that afflicted Mozambicans was seen as a direct consequence of Portuguese colonialism, whose policy involved not only enriching Portugal at the expense of Mozambican sweat but also maintaining Mozambicans in perpetual dependency of metropolitan benevolence, without local rural and industrial development... Portugal's interest was to pillage Mozambique... and maintain its people in ignorance. Besides, Frelimo contended... there had been much sabotage and anarchy by the colonialists, who had transformed an already lagging economy into complete chaos.*¹⁸

As in Brazil, Mozambique still adopted Portuguese as its official language, and it resumed relations with the former colonizer not long after independence, as it sought diverse sources of financing for its reconstruction and industrialization projects. Today, Mozambique is a member of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and of the lusophone, anglophone, and francophone 'commonwealths' (the latter as an observer). As both an Indian Ocean and sub-Saharan African country, Mozambique has held a strategic position in terms of trade and politics, becoming one of the frontline actors in the liberation and anti-apartheid struggles of the twentieth century. It is a foreign investment and aid magnet, as well as a highly aid-dependent country. Like fellow former Portuguese colonies and others in Africa, the Mozambican state engaged in a socialist project that collapsed amid aggressions by neighbours, the collapse of the Soviet Union (a major aid donor), and mandated neo-liberal structural adjustments. Former colonial relationships progressed into relationships with foreign investors and a greater selection of aid donors, breeding a new cycle of dependency in Mozambique and various other African states. Brazilian government officials have since habitually espoused the rhetoric of owing a historical debt because of the forced labour of millions of Africans in households and on fields in colonial and imperial-era Brazil – a debt to be repaid by providing development aid, or 'cooperation'.¹⁹

The role of former colonizers as development aid donors is well known, but the role of Brazil and other former colonies as such is increasingly capturing the imagination of researchers from various fields. As in the discourse from fellow states of the constructed Global South, Brazilian officials like to differentiate their country's provision of develop-

17 T. Henriksen, Marxism and Mozambique, in: *African Affairs*, 77 (1978) 309, pp. 441–462.

18 My translation from: S. Chichava, 'Por que Moçambique é pobre?' Uma análise do discurso de Armando Guebuza sobre a pobreza. Conference Paper Nº19. II Conferência IESE "Dinâmicas da Pobreza e Padrões de Acumulação Económica em Moçambique", Maputo, Instituto de Estudos Sociais e Económicos (IESE), 2009. p. 6.

19 J.F. Saraiva (fn. 10).

ment cooperation from that of North-South aid, using points such as non-interference in recipients' internal affairs, a lack of conditions, and projects that are driven by demand on the recipients' side.²⁰

The governments of so-called emerging powers, such as China and Russia – and even those of socialist countries not considered major world powers or traditional donors – provided supplies to the government in Mozambique and other African countries amid liberation-related struggles for years. The Brazilian government, too, began to engage, to a smaller extent, in the provision of development aid in the 1960s and 1970s. In this period, a push from the executive and diplomatic realms of the state for Brazil's greater economic and political projection led to dedicated (though haphazard) efforts in Africa, under both Brazil's centre-leftist and subsequent right-wing military administrations.²¹ Even before Mozambique was independent, the Brazilian state established a diplomatic mission there; it received inquiries in the 1970s, largely related to industrial-level cooperation and capacity-building, and actively promoted Brazilian trade and cultural products, while keeping a close watch on foreign competition, according to Brazilian diplomatic dispatches from the period.²² Thus, despite oscillations in projects and priorities during governmental changes, the two states engaged in cooperation before Mozambique's statehood and subsequent neo-liberalization, and Brazil's consecration as a development donor through the ABC agency, following the fall of military rule in the mid-1980s. Over the past decade, international organizations and academics have recognized Brazil and other states as 'emerging' donors, welcoming their efforts as a complement or even foil to the aid of developed countries from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).²³

From an international relations point of view, political scientists were characterizing the country – during the Workers' Party's rule in Brazil (2003–16) – as a reliable, modern democracy of diplomatic and entrepreneurial finesse, and a leading BRICS member (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa).²⁴ Intertwined with this discourse is Brazil's status in-between a developing and developed country, an aid recipient and a donor, and a conflict mediator who is able to consort with diverse regimes and to respect their

20 This was a consistent discourse in interviews I conducted with Brazilian diplomats in Maputo during February 2012 and during February and March 2014 in Brasília.

21 For accounts of such diplomatic efforts before the much-reported Lula era, see J. Dávila, *Hotel Troipico: Brazil and the Challenge of African Decolonization, 1950–1980*, Durham, NC 2010.

22 From fieldwork I conducted at the Itamaraty Historical Archives, Brasília, February to March 2014. See Lourenço Marques C B Ofícios 72 01, and Lourenço Marques Ofícios C B 73 01/02/03.

23 African Economic Outlook, Africa and Its Emerging Partners. OECD, UNDP, AfDB, EU, Economic Commission for Africa, Development Centre. 2011; P. Kragelund, The Potential Role of Non-Traditional Donors' Aid in Africa, in: ICTSD Series on Trade-Supported Strategies for Sustainable Development: International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development, 2010, and H. Reisen, Emerging Partners: Anything but "Rogue Aid." Shifting Wealth: Helmut Reisen's blog, 2011, <http://shiftingwealth.blogspot.com/2011/05/emerging-partners-anything-but-roque.html> (accessed 2 November 2013).

24 The original BRIC countries, from a term coined by Jim O'Neill of Goldman Sachs in 2001, are Brazil, Russia, China, and India. O'Neill predicted their rapid economic growth and thus international weight would change the world's investment landscape. As an example of the mentioned views on Brazil in particular, see S. Burges and L. Armijo, Brazil, the Entrepreneurial and Democratic BRIC, in: *Polity*, 42 (2010) 1.

sovereignty.²⁵ Nevertheless, a comprehensive Brazilian strategy for foreign policy – a *livro branco* (white paper) – was still in the works as of the end of 2017. A forum on Brazilian foreign policy had taken place during March 2014, including themes like “cooperation” and “Africa,” but the process may have been put on hold given Brazil’s deep economic and political crises that have unfolded since then.²⁶ In February 2012, the interim Brazilian ambassador to Mozambique still described Brazil as a ‘new’ society (in its present democratic form), reacting on an ad hoc basis as interests and problems emerge, despite acting in various international areas. He said Brazil ‘is still constructing something that at some point can be a proactive strategy, as experience accumulates regarding the consequences of our position in the world ... We should not overestimate the capacity of planning of the Brazilian government and our diplomacy. We may be very good at what we do, but there is not always global planning behind it.’²⁷ The image that contemporary Brazilian leaders project is one of a country willing and able to impart to African countries experiences and models deemed successful in combating similar development challenges in Brazil. It is the image of Brazil as a teacher – a good but imperfect teacher – more so than as an equal partner, one whose discourse rejects imperialist aspirations, shows respect for its recipients’ sovereignty, and values their potential. Former President Lula da Silva – who served between 2003–2010 and has been widely credited with advancing Brazilian-African relations – has stated that:

*this relationship that Brazil intends to maintain with the countries of Africa is not a relationship of an imperialistic country with a vocation for hegemony. We are already tired, we have already been colonized, we have already liberated ourselves from hegemony. Now, we want partnerships, we want comradeship, we want to work arm in arm for the construction of equitable international politics.*²⁸

However, the idea that South America’s biggest state and regional leader has a solely anti-hegemonic demeanour is not unanimously accepted: one example relates to its immediate region, as the Brazilian state has been accused of acting against the interests of states in the Southern Common Market (Mercado Comum do Sul, Mercosul), the trade bloc it is part of, and on behalf of its own capital expansion; another example concerns implementing major extractive projects in Mozambique that could affect locals negatively, without giving them all the facts or a say in the process.²⁹ Meanwhile, former

25 The ‘middle power’ discourse was evident in interviews I conducted with Brazilian diplomats Nei Bitencourt, João Marcelo Pires, and Jandyr Santos in Maputo on 15–18 February 2012. As examples of academic sources, see C. Vidigal, *Brasil: potência cordial? A diplomacia brasileira no início do século XXI*, in: RECIS, 4 (2010) 1, pp. 36–45, and P. Kragelund (fn. 23).

26 R. Ferraço, *Livro Branco da política externa brasileira*, *Diário do poder* <http://www.diariodopoder.com.br/artigo.php?i=19580874056> (accessed 18 December 2017).

27 My translation from an interview I conducted in Maputo on 18 February 2012 with Ambassador Nei Bitencourt.

28 My translation from: *Mensagem pelo rádio do Presidente Lula à África*. Brasília, 8 de agosto de 2003, in: *Repertório de Política Externa: Posições do Brasil*. Brasília: Ministério das Relações Exteriores, Secretaria de Planejamento Diplomático/Fundação Alexandre de Gusmão, 2007, p. 158.

29 S. Krapohl, *Regional Powers as Leaders or Rambos of Regional Integration? Unilateral Actions of Brazil and South*

Mozambican President Armando Guebuza (2005–2015) had publicly welcomed the presence of foreign investors and extractive practices in the country. Guebuza's rhetoric had promoted the idea that extractive practices would increase state receipts and lead to industrialization, which would then trickle down and diversify the economy and human development by creating more jobs and productivity.³⁰

In a 2011 address and related internet forum, Guebuza came out in favour of the mining and gas industries, largely the product of foreign direct investment (FDI), labelling them

*veritable levers for the development of our beloved motherland upon introducing new technologies that propel productivity [and create jobs and profits] in their own sectors and other sectors of activity ... For example, the intensification of mining and geological exploration has stimulated an increase in investment projects in the tourism sector of Pemba, Nacala, Tete, and Beira.*³¹

Attractively for Mozambique, Brazilian foreign policy has come to espouse the aim to obliterate poverty and underdevelopment in other countries, using solutions that have worked socio-economically in Brazil while expanding both countries' political, economic, and cultural capital via development and commercial cooperation. In fora such as the World Trade Organization (WTO), Brazilian representatives have repeatedly come out in support of fellow developing states' interests. The WTO's Doha Round, initiated in 2001, has showcased Brazilian claims for leadership and political cooperation with other developing states. Brazilian representatives have advocated for farm subsidy cuts by developed states and for keeping down the prices of HIV medications, despite possible intellectual property violations.³² The latter has been an important principle underlying the Brazilian implementation of the SMM's factory in Mozambique, which is meant to produce, pack, and commercialize generic medications.³³

3. Framing Brazil's Development Cooperation

Agriculture and public health, two of the most ambitious sectors in Brazil-Mozambique cooperation, squarely match Mozambique's donor-demanded Action Plan for Poverty Reduction (Plano de Acção para Redução da Pobreza, PARP). The plan's 2011 edition

Africa and their Negative Effects on Economic Integration in South America and Southern Africa (Paper presented at University of Leipzig at New Regionalisms seminar in Summer Semester, 2013.) The latter critique came from the spokesman of Justica Ambiental, the Mozambique wing of the Friends of the Earth NGO, when I interviewed him in Maputo, 9 February 2012.

30 A. Guebuza, Moçambique: Explorando outras formas de consolidação da cidadania, 2011, <http://www.armandoguebuza.blogspot.com/> (accessed 23 July 2013).

31 My translation. Ibid.

32 B. Dhar, Doha: A Developing Country Perspective, in: *Economic and Political Weekly*, 36 (2001) 46/47, pp. 4343–4345; A. Daemrlich and A. Mussacchio, Brazil: Leading the BRICS? *Harvard Business Review* (Feb. 2, 2011), and J. Galvão, Brazil and Access to HIV/AIDS Drugs: A Question of Human Rights and Public Health, in: *American Journal of Public Health*, 95 (2005) 7, pp. 1110–1116.

33 From Skype interview in Brasília with Fiocruz's José Luiz Telles, 11 March 2014.

(for 2011–2014), cited rural underdevelopment and a high prevalence of HIV in Mozambique as the main obstacles to development, saying about the latter:

*The continuous attention to be paid to diseases such as HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria, which threaten the productivity of the work force and constrain investments, thus accelerating the vulnerability to poverty of the low-income family, is an imperative that ought to accompany the efforts towards human and social development.*³⁴

The coordinator of the factory project from Fiocruz stated in 2012 that the Guebuza government offered the political stability, structures, power, and potential technicians necessary to make the project happen.³⁵ Besides that, she added, the relative ease of communicating in Portuguese motivated the choice of Mozambique as a location for the factory over a request from Nigeria – classified as Brazil's biggest trading partner and petroleum source in Africa.³⁶ Beyond catering to the priority of combating HIV as part of attempting to increase productivity, the medication factory provides a new industry for Mozambique, which fits in with the state's economic diversification goal. As for Brazil as the factory's coordinator, the investment in the extremely long, laborious process of opening a factory in another developing country had been largely due to former President Lula da Silva's desire to boost Brazil's global political prospects.³⁷ The global fight against HIV is an area where Brazil has been able to build clout, as exemplified by its role in Doha. The state has also strengthened its image through its commitment to HIV research, free provision of antiretroviral treatment domestically, and its willingness to share techniques and equipment for the production of generic medications with developing countries, as the case with Mozambique illustrates.³⁸

The centrality of the executive branch in Brazilian politics has meant that the act of presidents agreeing on a project proposal sets the project in motion and that state agencies may begin to deploy resources; but legislative and bureaucratic hurdles, as well as changing priorities under different governments and capacity limitations on both the sides of the provider and recipient, have impeded presidential agreements on development cooperation. ABC may have made too many commitments too quickly in the first decade of the 2000s. Under the presidency of Lula da Silva's successor and protégé, Dilma Rousseff (2011–2016), ABC had to finalize what it had already started, thereby being unable to start new projects due to financial limitations, according to its director in March 2014. While the former director attributed ABC's budget cuts to the devaluing of the Brazilian real (BRL) in relation to the American dollar (USD), and denied that the Rousseff administration had given less priority to development cooperation, he also claimed that

34 My translation from: In Plano de Acção Para Redução da Pobreza (PARP), Maputo 2011, p. 16.

35 Interview with Fiocruz's Lícia de Oliveira in Maputo, 13 February 2012.

36 Ibid. for interview. On Nigeria, see M. Ncube, C. Lufumpa and D. Vencatachellum, Brazil's Economic Engagement with Africa, in: Africa Economic Brief, 2 (2011) 5, pp. 1–11

37 Interview with Oliveira (fn. 35).

38 P. Chequer and M. Simão, O Brasil e o Combate Internacional Contra a AIDS, in: O Brasil e a ONU, Brasília 2008.

ABC's smaller budget had remained flat since Rousseff came to power in 2011.³⁹ In addition, Itamaraty, responsible for ABC's budget and policy, had been embroiled in a political and financial crisis, reportedly losing a great deal of favour with Rousseff. Service abroad was negatively affected and Brazilian embassy personnel in France declared a strike over salary delays in March 2014.⁴⁰

Amid crises, technical cooperation appeared to be more of a priority on paper and in discourse than practice for the Brazilian state, equalling only a fraction of what the state spends on commercial investments abroad, even after an apparent spike in spending as a donor. Besides its apparent volatility, Brazilian development cooperation is highly decentralized, with dozens of government agencies, municipalities, and educational institutions involved in different projects, all using their own ways of reporting. Although there are measures underway to address the lack of organization, this situation has thus far made Brazilian efforts in international development hard to gauge for researchers, as well as government officials involved in the projects themselves.⁴¹ ABC's then-director said that he could not give a definitive number of current projects at the time because the agency was still calculating it, and that there could actually be 6,000 ongoing in March 2014, if one defines projects as 'activities'.⁴² The Fiocruz official heading the agency's office in Maputo in 2014 said that perhaps foreign universities have 'more knowledge of what we are doing than we do ourselves'.⁴³

In fact, it was not until December 2010 that the Brazilian government began to issue an integrated financial report on the sum of Brazilian cooperation projects through Itamaraty, the ABC, and the presidency-linked Institute of Applied Economic Research (Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada, Ipea). This report, titled *Brazilian Cooperation for International Development: 2005–2009*, found that the Brazilian government spent BRL 2.9 billion (USD 1.4 billion) on development-cooperation projects between 2005–2009. The amount spent on such cooperation projects nearly doubled within that time. The brunt of the amount, a calculated 76 per cent, went into collaborations with international organizations and regional banks, including peacekeeping operations and collective development funds. The remaining 24 per cent was divided, according to the report, into three categories: technical, scientific, and technological cooperation; scholarships for foreigners; and humanitarian assistance.⁴⁴

39 Interview in Brasília with the director of the ABC agency. 10 March 2014, in Brasília, Brazil.

40 See L. Paraguassu. Itamaraty recupera status com o Planalto: Figueiredo ainda tem problemas a resolver na diplomacia. O Estado de S. Paulo, 2 January 2014 <http://www.estadao.com.br/noticias/impreso,itamaraty-recupera-status-com-o-planalto,1114209,0.htm>, and Um calote diplomático: Funcionários do Itamaraty paralisam as atividades. Istoé, last modified 7 March 2014, http://www.istoé.com.br/reportagens/351248_UM+CALOTE+DIPLOMATICO (accessed 7 March 2014).

41 See P. Kragelund (fn. 23), and G. Rosso et al., *Brazilian Cooperation's Projects in Portuguese-Speaking African Countries*. Instituto de Higiene e Medicina Tropical Universidade Nova de Lisboa 2011.

42 Interview with ABC director (fn. 39).

43 Skype interview with Telles (fn. 33).

44 *Cooperação Brasileira para o Desenvolvimento Internacional 2005–2009* (fn. 2). Statistics in paragraph, p. 19–21.

In 2013, Ipea/Itamaraty released their second of such reports, titled *Brazilian Cooperation for International Development: 2010*. It separated ‘technical cooperation’ from ‘scientific and technological cooperation’; ‘peace-keeping operations’ from ‘expenditures with international organs’, and represented a clear shift in priorities from the previous year.⁴⁵ Technical cooperation, coordinated by ABC, made up 11.5 per cent of the Brazilian government’s total spending on development cooperation in 2009; it went down to 6.3 per cent in 2010 because funds (of BRL 92.5 million) were allocated to Haiti, after an earthquake there; it was more than the financial support received by all the other South American countries combined (BRL 83.5 million). The proportion of spending on humanitarian and peacekeeping operations more than doubled over 2009 to 53.6 per cent of the total cooperation amount. However, the five PALOPs remained the recipients who received the most financial support in terms of technical cooperation, and who received the most overall in Africa (BRL 49.5 million of BRL 64.7 million).⁴⁶ Projects with Haiti have since proven difficult to implement, and its place within Brazil’s development cooperation has diminished, according to ABC’s director.⁴⁷ The latest of such reports, released in 2016, shows a scaling down in Brazil’s development cooperation-related spending for the 2011–13 period, having peaked in 2010 after the upward trend recorded since 2005.⁴⁸

The Brazilian state, sharing a former colonizer, official language, and sometimes stated ideologies with the PALOPs, has gradually built a relationship with their elite that has translated into ambitious development cooperation and mega corporate projects. These often also feature the interests, capital, and other support from third countries, multinationals, and international organizations. Development-related projects come packaged with a variety of political and economic interests, discourses, and the influence and experience acquired by Brazilian agencies, educational institutions, and municipalities from development cooperation with foreign actors.

The sites of these projects could be said to represent portals of globalization. The concept looks at places where major transnational exchanges, transfers, and regulatory efforts occur, and where mutual influences, networks, and normative formations, as well as ‘cultural constructions’ serve to ‘challenge national affiliation in communities of migrants, merchants, and travellers from distant places’, in the words of Middell and Naumann.⁴⁹ Similarly, Michael Geyer deals with ‘portals’ as a way to examine where, how, and by whose mediation elements come in and become part of a particular society and culture.⁵⁰ Projects between states of the Global South, sometimes developed jointly with a country

45 Cooperação Brasileira para o Desenvolvimento Internacional 2010 (2nd. Ed.), Brasília 2013.

46 Statistics for this paragraph found in *ibid*, pp. 18–30.

47 Interview with ABC director (fn. 39).

48 Cooperação Brasileira para o Desenvolvimento Internacional 2011–2013, Brasília: Ipea 2016, http://www.ipea.gov.br/porta/images/stories/PDFs/livros/livros/161017_livro_cobradi_2011_2013.pdf (accessed 5 June 2017).

49 M. Middell and K. Naumann (fn. 3), p. 162.

50 M. Geyer, Portals of Globalisation, in: *The Plurality of Europe: Identities and Spaces: Contributions Made at an International Conference Leipzig, 6–9 June 2007*, Leipzig 2010, pp. 509–520.

from the Global North, are implemented in another developing country through the appropriate Brazilian government agency, such as the Brazilian Agricultural Research Corporation (Empresa Brasileira de Pesquisa Agropecuária, Embrapa) for agriculture, and Fiocruz for health. The ABC agency is charged with coordinating the technical co-operation aspect of these projects, but its lack of legislative power means that hiring and procurement have to be done by a third party, in this case UNDP.⁵¹

Brazilians had previously been mostly recipients rather than aid donors and, thus, were trained by foreign donor agencies in projects. Now, Brazilians are assuming a lead role in training employees from other developing countries, in particular practices implemented domestically. While used as tools of national projection on the international stage, such practices are themselves products of foreign technology transfers and exchanges, and their adaptation to (Brazil's) domestic environment can then be further transferred abroad. Moreover, they will, in turn, likely be appropriated by locals in recipient countries, as well as reinterpreted and adapted. The practices could cause conflicts between those bringing in these technology and cultural transfers and those receiving and modifying them, but there is also a mutually constitutive learning situation for both sides. This scenario ties into Espagne's discussion on the hybridity surrounding cultural transfers between national contexts:

*Naturally, in attempting to show that the context of reception attains, thanks to the import, a certain hybridity, research on cultural transfers begins with the idea that the context of departure as well as that of reception are hybrid forms even before the transfer ... All national constellations are the result of past hybridization.*⁵²

In Geyer's view, neither globalization nor nationalization has been a complete or independent project. These processes and projects are intertwined to the point that it is now often hard to tell what is 'foreign' and what is 'local', and what decisions are incontestably the product of national sovereignty or of an international norm now taken as common sense.⁵³ Similarly, when a development model is formed, it is often a mixture of foreign and local actors involved in its making, adapted to local conditions, modified, and then possibly transmitted further afield. Therefore, despite constant discursive attempts at distinction by Brazilian representatives, it would be difficult to define what a 'Brazilian' model of development may look like. The hybridized practices implemented in Mozambique will possibly continue to be transferred further, while imbedded in a system of practices and social ordering to be shared, used, and reshaped by the actors involved. These practices are implemented from one possible portal of globalization to another – from the factory in Brazil to the factory in Mozambique – and, possibly, in the future, also to others.

51 L. Cabral and J. Weinstock, *Brazilian Technical Cooperation for Development: Drivers, Mechanics and Future Prospects*, London 2010.

52 Espagne (fn. 5), p. 13.

53 Geyer (fn. 50).

4. The SMM's Medication Factory as a Portal of Globalization

While the previous sections have relied more or less evenly on interviews, archival research, and secondary sources, the present section is mostly based on two separate interviews with Fiocruz officials. Interviews seemed to be the most effective means to convey up-to-date information on an evolving and relatively recent project. There is still not much comprehensive scholarly research on the topic. Furthermore, archives on the project allow only limited access.⁵⁴ The first interview, which took place on 13 February 2012 in Maputo, was with Lícia de Oliveira, the coordinator of the medication factory project for Fiocruz. I visited the factory in Matola then, but equipment and operators had not yet been brought in, and I only spoke with Brazilian officials involved in the project. The second interview took place via Skype over two years later, on 11 March 2014, with the director of the Fiocruz office in Africa, José Luiz Telles.

The ABC agency does not claim the factory project as its own, although it participates in it. ABC's project analyst for Mozambique expressed scepticism towards the factory's sustainability, if state funds from either Brazil or Mozambique were to be counted on; privatization was not off the table in discussions on the Mozambican side, he added during our interview in 2014.⁵⁵ Besides the training and technology transfers that would be considered technical cooperation, the SMM's factory is meant to become a commercial enterprise, which goes beyond the ABC's direct scope. Factory construction was funded with both public and private capital, including a financial contribution from the Brazilian mining company Vale, and Brazilian capital has also funded degrees for factory employees from Brazilian and other institutions.

Oliveira said that by early 2012, it had cost the Brazilian government USD 22 million among the process of renovating the SMM factory's large shell (a serum factory), setting up administration, training staff, buying equipment abroad and assembling it, and beginning to transfer the technology for all 21 medications they were planning to replicate at the factory. She added that Vale had stepped in to cover the USD 5.4 million the Mozambican government was supposed to contribute for the factory's construction but then failed to (citing the need to use public funds to deal with an emergent food-price crisis). Oliveira said Vale was also paying the salary of a top-level director brought from Fiocruz on a two-year contract to oversee the whole process of building and equipping the factory; equipment came from abroad and was being paid for by the Brazilian ministry of health, according to Telles.

An important element involving transfers and their products are actors, including the possible carriers, mediators, and modifiers of the related model. Fiocruz brought technicians and directors (including Oliveira) to reside in Mozambique during the project's implementation phase, and there were constant visits of Brazilian and Mozambican tech-

54 At Itamaraty, during my research in February and March 2014, I could only access documents up to 2010. Although the SMM's factory project had begun then, production had not.

55 Interview with project analyst Armando Munguba Cardoso on 20 February 2014, in Brasília, Brazil.

nicians to each other's countries in connection with this and other Brazilian development-cooperation projects. At the time of the interview, Oliveira said that more than 90 per cent of the factory's employees were from Mozambique (following Mozambique's labour laws mandating that most employees be locals).

Meanwhile, Brazilian employees such as Telles were travelling back and forth between the two countries. Telles had to deal with representatives at the institutional level and constantly negotiate with them about the factory project. Some employees have learned straight from the Farmanguinhos factory in Brazil and brought these practices back to the Mozambican factory. These employees have been influenced by people, institutions, and practices in their respective environments, which are, in turn, influenced by discourses coming from a broader level, such as foreign policy and development paradigms. Telles appeared to promote the official Brazilian development discourse, stating:

Also, as raw material for knowledge production, Brazil ends up innovating in this process. It is no longer that pattern of North-South cooperation. That is, we have sought out a pattern of horizontality, of mutual learning, and this makes an enormous difference in a process like this, of qualification. Therefore, the gain is not a financial gain, is not a gain in markets but is a gain in the foreign policy of Brazil; greater external recognition, and also a learning experience for us, the first time we build a medication factory outside of Brazil.⁵⁶

Oliveira also stated that the agency already learned a lot from the experience of opening the factory in Mozambique, a process that faced many delays due to bureaucratic and infrastructural obstacles. The factory started by packaging medications produced in Brazil, but it had begun producing its own medications, including, at the time, an antiretroviral drug in its testing phase, according to Telles. Hypertension medication and folic acid were also being produced, he said.

The Brazilian agencies' work in the public health domain abroad means contributing to the structuring of systems in another country through equipment, software, and knowledge transfers to technicians and administrators. Work on such a structuring scale is new to the Brazilian state, according to Oliveira; it has been an enormous endeavour to train and adapt practices, which is 'not a linear transfer of models' Farmanguinhos in Brazil is also using the experience to hone its processes. While the setup for the transfers and exchanges are there and actions have begun, it will be the staying power and impact of the factory that will determine whether it fits the label of a portal of globalization. Contributions to a larger system of norms and practices are an important part of the definition, and tangible present and future contributions of the nascent factory to that effect appear difficult to gauge at the moment.

In portals, actors institutionalize their capacity to handle certain forms of connectivity and knowledge transfer. Fiocruz, through the Farmanguinhos factory and lab, has been

56 My translation from Skype interview with Telles (fn. 33).

producing and distributing generic medication in Brazil for years and has been exporting its technology to countries in Latin America and Africa.⁵⁷ The factory is the first one Fiocruz installed abroad, directly replicating practices of the Farmanguinhos factory in another country. According to Oliveira, the SMM's factory was also the catalyst for the opening of Fiocruz's first office abroad, located in Mozambique. This office aims to cater to the larger African region, and it plans further projects, such as free maternal milk banks – a model successful in combating infant mortality in Brazil and also listed as part of Mozambique's PARP.⁵⁸ Telles said his duties as director of the Fiocruz regional office have involved acting as liaison with local authorities, including for the factory project; acting as a representative in international fora on relevant topics; facilitating project implementation, and identifying possible issues amid the office's monitoring and prospection of Fiocruz's projects in Africa. As some of the services the office offers, the Fiocruz website lists technology transfers as a way to strengthen systems in Palop, to implement and reform Palop's health institutes, and to train through distance-learning and postgraduate courses.⁵⁹ A Lula government press note in October 2008 stated the Fiocruz office would facilitate dialogue with health sectors in African countries on starting technical cooperation projects with Brazil. The note estimated that 80 per cent of Mozambique's HIV patients did not have access to adequate treatment, underscoring the importance of the new factory to the country's health system.⁶⁰ Thus, the SMM's factory and Fiocruz's office, both possible portals of globalization, could represent venues for Brazilian agencies and institutions – including the ministry of health, to which Fiocruz is linked – to pass on their aggregated and hybridized practices and regulations further afield.

As indicated before here, the process has not been so smooth. For the first time, a Brazilian institution outside of diplomacy had asked for representation abroad, according to Telles. Discussions with different wings of the Brazilian government had been dragging on since the office's inauguration in 2008, and the office's legal statute had not yet been worked out six years later. Thus, Telles, as a public servant, could not stay more than 90 days in Mozambique while receiving pay, which forced him to constantly go back to Brazil and limited the actions of the office to its immediate realm.

Pertaining to the factory, Telles cited three levels of challenges Fiocruz has faced: the first challenge is to implement a pharmaceutical industry in a state that has no experience or higher-education qualification programme in this field. Representatives of the Brazilian state feel like they have to provide Mozambican employees with training on every level,

57 Autonomia em medicamentos, Especial: Presidente Lula Visita a Fiocruz, in: *Revista de Manguinhos*, September 2004, pp. 10–11 <https://agencia.fiocruz.br/setembro-2004> (accessed 18 December 2017).

58 Plano de Acção Para Redução da Pobreza (fn. 34).

59 Fiocruz África – Fundação Oswaldo Cruz (Fiocruz), *Ciência e Tecnologia Em Saúde Para a População Brasileira*, Portal Fiocruz, 2013, <http://portal.fiocruz.br/pt-br/content/fiocruz-%C3%A1frica> (accessed 4 March 2014).

60 Nota à Imprensa, Visita do Presidente Lula a Moçambique. Brasília, 14 de outubro de 2008. *Repertório De Política Externa: Posições Do Brasil (2008–2009)*. Brazil Ministry of External Relations/Fundação Alexandre de Gusmão, 2010, p. 245.

often sending them to Brazil, while contending with cultural differences between Brazilians and Mozambicans on-site at Matola. Despite identifying some commonalities in language and cultural background, Oliveira said there have been conflicts ranging from Mozambicans being bothered by Brazilians' lack of formality in official interactions, to feeling distrust that another perceived foreign ruler is imposing its way. Both governments have, however, made a lot of effort to overcome differences, and relations have improved significantly over time, she said. The second set of challenges has been to deal with the government representatives, who oversee the factory on the Mozambican side, and the third has involved negotiations with ministers and the president of Mozambique, which is where the Embassy of Brazil plays a very important role.

Telles characterized his own work as regularly entailing reinforcing the idea to Mozambican officials that this is a social enterprise that would bring benefits to Mozambique, in terms of reducing its dependency on outside pharmaceuticals, and more ability to negotiate prices and develop expertise in a new domestic industry. Furthermore, the factory has given Mozambique's regulatory sector the opportunity to strengthen its capacity in a new field. Training took place over the course of two years with the Brazilian National Health Surveillance Agency (Agência Nacional de Vigilância Sanitária, Anvisa), but it had not been extended or renewed in 2014. According to Telles, the SMM's factory used to be overseen by the Mozambican ministry of health (Ministério de Saúde, Misau). With a ministerial change in recent years, this responsibility was passed on to Mozambique's Institute for the Management of State Holdings (Instituto de Gestão das Participações do Estado, Igepe), which oversees businesses in which the state is a share-holder. Since then, Misau had distanced itself from the SMM's project, and its role had been reduced to buying the factory's medications, some of which were already on the local market by then, according to Telles. The focus had shifted to the sustainability of the project as a business, rather than as a public health-linked social project, and Fiocruz was in the process of evaluating the business and profitability plan. The financing of the factory has been one of the main problems being faced at that level, Telles said, adding that:

*Perhaps this is the first cooperation in which Mozambique has to disburse resources. The culture of cooperation there, especially North-South, is one of donations. So, this enterprise has the important active participation of the Mozambican government in the management and application of resources.*⁶¹

The Brazilian side had been donating the medication feedstock to the SMM's factory. The plan was for the factory to eventually purchase its own feedstock, as Farmanguinhos does from foreign companies, Telles said. The factory's operations were being maintained by Igepe, while Brazilian agencies were trying to extend their cooperation to finish the process of international certification and technology transfer for the 21 medications agreed upon. As of December 2017, the SMM's minimalist website listed the Mozambican state

61 My translation from Skype interview with Telles (fn. 33).

as owning 100 per cent of the factory – ‘proudly Mozambican’ – and Farmanguinhos as a partner on the same level as Vale, a brand identified as ‘Cinevideo’, and the local business ‘Pro-Air’, the only partner with any information about it on the partners’ page.⁶² The website gave no clear sign of Brazil’s enduring participation in the project. There was, however, a YouTube video, uploaded in 2013, with quotes from Telles and Oliveira, and a gallery picturing a visit to the factory by former President Lula da Silva, smiling while wearing a lab coat and hairnet.⁶³

On the Brazilian side, multiple agencies and institutions besides Fiocruz have been involved in health-related projects abroad over the past several years, with such projects reportedly numbering 31 in the PALOPs in 2011, according to a study commissioned by the World Health Organization (WHO).⁶⁴ The Brazilian ministry of health, traditionally relegated to domestic affairs, has taken on an important role in the implementation of Brazil’s projects abroad, including ‘advisory and consultancy services, human-resources training, technology/knowledge transference, and, in specific cases, equipment donations ... directed to areas of Brazilian proven expertise.’⁶⁵ Another key agency on the Brazilian side is Anvisa, which, although linked to the ministry of health, has administrative and financial autonomy. This institution is a good example of the mutual constitution of the domestic and foreign in development interactions (which have included training the regulatory agency in Mozambique):

*ANVISA participation in international health cooperation is conducted with the purpose of institutional strengthening of the agency and consolidating the international rule of ANVISA in the creation of networks with the sanitary authorities from other countries. These networking-cooperation activities are credited to allow ANVISA to reinforce its institutional knowledge and increase the available information about health surveillance systems, rules and legislations in other countries. On the other hand, ANVISA international cooperation also represents an opportunity for spreading their own experiences and strengthening their international reputation.*⁶⁶

Thus, priorities identified as ‘foreign’ as well as ‘domestic’ affairs have converged in the form of agency and personnel in shaping Brazil’s health-related projects, including the antiretroviral drug factory in Mozambique. The SMM’s factory has been shaped by Brazil’s experience with other medication factories in its own territory, managed by many of the same agencies involved in the factory in Mozambique. With this in mind, the sites of development cooperation projects provide a good illustration of blurred lines between what is foreign and local. The resulting bundle, a combination of what comes in and

62 Início and Parceiros, in: SMM, Sociedade Moçambicana de Medicamentos, SA <https://smm2013.jimdo.com/> (accessed 5 June 2017).

63 Galeria, Ibid.

64 Rosso et al., Brazilian Cooperation’s Projects (fn. 41).

65 Ibid., p. 21.

66 Ibid., pp. 21–22.

what is encountered, is affected by globalized discourses, as well as different levels and sources of existing policy priorities and practices.

5. Conclusion

Using the Brazil-Mozambique cooperation case study of an antiretroviral drug factory in Mozambique, this article has applied the concepts of portals of globalization and cultural transfers in a development cooperation context. These concepts appear to be fitting analytical tools for Brazil's development cooperation and its linkages, and have the potential to be used to study other projects and networks of knowledge and technical transfers and exchanges, as they focus also on the content of policy transfers between actors.⁶⁷ As briefly demonstrated, there are mutually constitutive flows and actors at work in a particular site ('portal'), where they meet and participate in the receiving and further shaping of technology and cultural transfers. Portals of globalization represent the places where these exchanges, negotiations, and other interactions occur, among various actors involved in a transnational development project. Through a 'portal', one can witness a 'bundle' of mutual constitution and practices being conveyed, absorbed, learned, and modified, to be further relayed in the future. The influence of these exchanges on a wider system of development cooperation will depend on Brazil's own growing influence and acceptance as a donor, which international agencies had been optimistic about in the past decade. It will also depend on the dialogue and negotiation ability of its government agency representatives and how they are received by representatives in the countries in which they implement projects.

Another important aspect is the achievement of a strategy for development cooperation and its prioritization in Brazilian politics. As shown here, cooperation has so far been unstable in terms of garnering support and funding – with wide variations from one government to another, from Lula da Silva to Rousseff, and potentially also after Rousseff amid political and economic turmoil – and lacks an appropriate gauge for assessing the project's effectiveness and impact.

In terms of portals of globalization, this article has analysed Brazilian development cooperation as a case of South-South development politics, whose proponents have called for the emergence of a new international regime of development, for example via a joint BRICS development bank. My contribution here to the 'portals' discussion took a detailed look at the birth of a 'portal' not only on the micro level, but also within the framework and constellation of political, economic, and other factors that must align for a 'portal' to be established. Moreover, the idea espoused here of the constant and ongoing hybridization of practices points to a larger context of transfers. Rather than the 'unilateral' transfer of one national model of development to another nation, it underlines a

67 D. Stone, *Transfer Agents and Global Networks in the 'Transnationalization' of Policy*, in: *Journal of European Public Policy*, 11 (2004) 3, pp. 545–566.

larger chain of transfers in the realm of development – first from North to South, then from South to South, with exchanges, adaptations, and hence hybridizations at every step of the way. The SMM's factory itself can come to embody a portal of globalization moulded by other sites, as well as the aforementioned agencies and the people and discourses composing their actions and flows. The nascent 'portal' is handled on the ground by largely Mozambican technicians trained by Brazilians – employees who have their own manner of doing things, which could lead to conflicts with their trainers but also to mutual learning experiences, which applies to the institutional level, as exemplified in my interviews.

How Brazilians and Mozambicans have conducted the medication factory project could contribute to constituting larger policies, standards, and norms of development cooperation aggregated from negotiations, transfers, and adaptations at different levels of interaction. The portal of globalization represents the point of entry and exit of the products of transfers, where the actors, discourses, and practices embedded in a particular project assemble in a certain spot. Projects such as this factory do appear to have the potential to become stable 'portals'. However, the political, institutional, and financial apparatus around them needs to be harmonized before that can happen. Also, development cooperation needs to be given higher priority, so that it can survive oscillations in domestic interests and politics – including the rapid commercialization of projects.

Disentangling the Regionalization of Law Enforcement in Southern Africa

Nicholas Dietrich

ABSTRACTS

This article contributes to the growing literature on new regionalism(s) in two ways: It first exposes regional police cooperation as a neglected subject area in the study of regionalism/regionalization. The case of the emergence of the Southern African Regional Police Chiefs Cooperation Organization (SARPCCO) is used to contextualize the regionalization of policing in relation to a perceived globalization of crime since the 1990s. The article then introduces the framework portals of globalization as a methodological tool to study processes of regionalization. The framework is used to deepen the analysis of SARPCCO by helping to more concretely identify the actors, places, and spaces in and through which regionalization, as a multi-actor and multilevel process, takes place.

Dieser Artikel trägt zu der sich stets erweiternden Literatur im Bereich der neuen Regionalismen in zweifacher Hinsicht bei: Zunächst wird die überregionale Polizeikooperation als bisher vernachlässigte Fachrichtung in der Regionalisierungsforschung herausgestellt. Am Beispiel der Southern African Regional Police Chiefs Cooperation Organization (SARPCCO) wird die Regionalisierung der Polizeiarbeit im südlichen Afrika erklärt, die im Zuge einer verstärkt wahrgenommenen Globalisierung von Kriminalität in den 1990er Jahren entstanden ist. Anschließend werden die Portale der Globalisierung als methodisches Hilfsmittel zur Untersuchung von Regionalisierungsprozessen miteinbezogen. Damit lassen sich konkrete Akteure, Orte und Räume identifizieren und Rückschlüsse auf die Gestaltung von Regionalisierung auf mehreren Ebenen ziehen, was der vertieften Analyse der SARPCCO zuträglich ist.

1. Introduction

Since the 1990s, authors working under the New Regionalism Approach (NRA) have made a growing contribution to the study of regionalism(s) in the post-Cold War changing global order. The NRA has exposed the multiplicity of regionalisms that coexist and which are constructed by various actors through processes of regionalization. This article contributes to this literature in two ways: The first is to introduce regional police cooperation to regionalism studies through applying the NRA to a case of regional law-enforcement cooperation in Southern Africa. Since the end of the Cold War, different regional bodies have emerged in order to tackle transnational crime by creating partnerships across sovereign jurisdictions. Although the map of international law-enforcement cooperation has at present come to include a variety of such regional cooperative ventures, they are not, as yet, present in the growing body of NRA literature. The second builds on the premise that there is room in the NRA to further conceptualize methodologies that direct attention to specific socio-spatial arenas, where processes of regionalization may be observed. Building on the recent emergence of “spatial turn” language in the NRA that attempts to investigate the globalization/regionalization nexus, this paper proposes the use of the “portals of globalization” framework, emanating from global history as a viable tool to support structural arguments through its focus on actor-based strategies that deal with processes of de- and reterritorialization.

After contextualizing the NRA and introducing the portals of globalization approach, the rest of the paper sets out in two directions: First, regionalism in international police cooperation is introduced by elaborating on the important role that the regional scale has come to play in ordering police cooperation since the end of the Cold War. Both transnational crime and the globalization of law enforcement are highlighted as key environmental factors. The paper then moves to the case study that focuses on the Southern African Regional Police Chiefs Cooperation Organization (SARPCCO) as a particular regional cooperative venture. The emergence of SARPCCO is contextualized, and specific characteristics and relationships are drawn that have played a role in solidifying the regional body as both an organization and an evolving police space. The portals of globalization framework is then used to investigate processes of regionalization in SARPCCO. The framework exposes a few socio-spatial arenas wherein different actors at different levels meet to further construct the SARPCCO project. In closing, the paper reflects on the findings by considering what regionalization has taken shape in SARPCCO and considers how the portals of globalization framework could add value to the study of regionalism and regionalization in general.

2. The NRA's Turn to Space and the Potential of Portals of Globalization

Since the 1990s, a marked interest in the practice of regionalism and processes of regionalization has re-emerged in the post-Cold War global political arena.¹ The regional level “has increasingly become an important referent for students of international relations, international political economy and development.”² Simultaneously, processes of globalization have come to represent the inexorable integration of markets, nation states, and technologies involving networks of interdependence³ that facilitate the increased movement of objects across bounded spaces.⁴ A central interest during the 1990s, in this re-emerging field of enquiry, was what has been called the globalization/regionalization nexus.⁵ Work during this period was increasingly concerned with, on the one hand, deciphering the newness of “new regionalism” compared to trends in the 1960s and 1970s, while on the other hand, determining in what manner regionalization was a reaction to processes of globalization.⁶ Björn Hettne adequately captures this in his foreword to Fredrik Söderbaum’s *The Political Economy of Regionalism: The Case of Southern Africa*, stating: “In order to improve the theory of regionalism, relevant studies must analyse the interplay of regionalism on different levels of society, as well as between regionalization and globalization.”⁷

Over the years, authors prescribing to the NRA have managed to push the study of regionalism to a new intellectual horizon through varying reflective-constructivist⁸ readings of international relations/international political economy. Such readings attempt to step away from Eurocentric⁹ and state-centric conventions.¹⁰ A rich literature has, therefore, emerged that illustrates the existence of a plurality of regionalism(s),¹¹ which

1 R. Kelly, *Security Theory in the “New Regionalism,”* in: *International Studies Review*, 9 (2007) 2, p. 197.

2 M. Bøås, M.H. Marchand and T.M. Shaw, *The Political Economy of Regions and Regionalism*, Basingstoke 2005, p. 3.

3 For example, T.L. Friedman, *The Lexus and the Olive Tree: Understanding Globalization*, New York 1999, pp. 7–8, and R.O. Keohane and J.S. Nye, *Globalization, What’s new? What’s not? (and so what)*, in: *Foreign Policy*, 118 (2000), p. 105.

4 See, for example, A. Appadurai, *The Wertheim Lecture 2000 – Globalization and Area Studies: The Future of a False Opposition*, Amsterdam 2000, p. 5.

5 See Bøås et al. (fn. 2), p. 4.

6 Ibid., p. 3.

7 B. Hettne, *Foreword*. In: F. Söderbaum, *The Political Economy of Regionalism: The Case of Southern Africa*, Basingstoke 2004, p. xiii.

8 For a mapping of the theoretical landscape of the NRA in this regard, see chapter 2 in Söderbaum (fn. 7), pp. 15–35.

9 Bøås et al. (fn. 2) p. 4.

10 Söderbaum (fn. 7), p. 49.

11 Compare for example M. Bøås et al. (fn. 2), and T. Shaw, A. J. Grant and S. Cornellisen (eds.), *The Ashgate Research Companion to Regionalism*, Farnham 2011.

encompasses a variety of state and non-state actors,¹² formal and informal processes,¹³ as well as spatial variations.¹⁴ Söderbaum sums up the NRA approach as follows:

*Contrary to dominant theories in the field, the NRA pays tribute to multidimensionality of regionalism and the fact that regions are constructed and reconstructed – intentionally or unintentionally – by state, market, civil society and external actors which come together in complex and often informal multi-actor coalitions for a variety of both positive and negative purposes.*¹⁵

The NRA has thus served to enrich regionalism studies, yet the connection between processes of globalization and regionalization is not always clear. This is illustrated by Söderbaum's following statement:

*Since globalization and regionalization form part of a larger structural change, the two may exist simultaneously and in parallel, but more often they tend to reinforce and shape one another. If and when the latter is the case, then mutually exclusive indicators may hide more than they reveal.*¹⁶

To solve this problem, Söderbaum proposes that we cease to think about space as a container¹⁷ and avoid what the geographer John Agnew has famously termed the “territorial trap.”¹⁸ This “spatial turn”¹⁹ inspired approach has been taken up in various cases and applied to different contexts, enriching the NRA's effort to expose the social construction of geographic scale²⁰ and the overlapping of regional space(s). Thinking about regionalism and regionalization as “territorial constructs” allows us to place regionalism and regionalization in the context of globalization as simultaneously encompassing, constant processes of deterritorialization²¹ and reterritorialization,²² which take place at various scales.

12 For example, F. Söderbaum and I. Taylor. *Afro-Regions: The Dynamics of Cross-Border Microregionalism in Africa*, Uppsala 2008; R. Muggah's Chapter on Transnational Gangs in Shaw et al. (fn. 11), pp. 339–359.

13 See, for example, F. Söderbaum (pp. 51–68); M. Ramutsindela (pp. 361–373) in Shaw et al. (fn. 11), 2011.

14 Compare, for example, F. Söderbaum and I. Taylor (fn. 12) 2008, where they introduce the study of micro-regionalisms, or U. Lorenz and S. Cornelissen's treatment of SADC in the “regional arena” in T. Shaw et al. (fn. 11) 2011, pp. 241–256.

15 Söderbaum (fn. 7), p. 2.

16 Ibid., p. 8.

17 Ibid., pp. 45–46.

18 J. Agnew, *The Territorial Trap: The Geographical Assumptions of International Relations Theory*, in: *Review of International Political Economy*, 1 (1994) 1, pp. 53–80.

19 For a general introduction, see B. Warf and S. Arias (eds.). *The Spatial Turn: Interdisciplinary Perspectives*, Abingdon 2009. In global history, see M. Middell and K. Naumann, *Global History and the Spatial Turn: From the Impact of Area Studies to Critical Junctures of Globalization*, in: *Journal of Global History*, 5 (2010) 1, 149–170, and in international studies, see for example U. Engel and G.R. Olsen, *Sovereignty and Africa's Regimes of Territorialization*, in: S. Cornelissen, F. Cheru and T.M. Shaw (eds.) *Africa and International Relations in the 21st Century: Still Challenging Theory?*, Ashgate 2012, pp. 51–65.

20 D. Delaney and H. Leitner. *The Political Construction of Scale*, in: *Political Geography*, 16 (1997) 2, pp. 93–97.

21 Literature under this category could include R. O'Brien, *Global Financial Integration and the End of Geography*, London 1992 and A. Appadurai, *Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalization*, Minneapolis 1996.

22 Stressing “reterritorialization”, see for example D. Brenner, *Beyond State Centricism? Space Territoriality and Geo-*

The introduction of “spatial turn” language has enriched the field of regionalism studies. However, identifying actors and their roles in the production of multiple geographies of globalization/regionalization in specific actor-based contexts remains a challenge. In this sense, the recent emergence of the methodological framework portals of globalization is seen to offer some grounding in the interest of bringing the structural processes of globalization into context through actor-based investigations. Portals of globalization as a framework emerged within global history as an attempt to “focus on the actors who experience processes of de- and re-territorialization at moments and in sociopolitical arenas where conflict of new spatial patterns is fought out.”²³ More abstractly, portals of globalization focuses on those spaces and places in which global flows converge, serving to challenge “a seemingly stable territorial order by extending it to other spheres.”²⁴ This invites us to investigate socio-spatial arenas in and through which the means to regulate and control “global connectivity” are conceived and institutionalized. More practically, as an actor-based approach, it stresses engagement, transfer, and negotiation through actor-based strategies. In line with NRA thinking, regionalization encompasses multilevel processes,²⁵ both formal and informal,²⁶ that span across boundaries with the potential to construct and/or deconstruct geographic scale.²⁷ Yet, they are simultaneously actor-driven processes in which strategies emerge to negotiate new spatial configurations, as well as the articulation of identities²⁸ and the cognitive mapping of space.²⁹ This article argues that the portals of globalization concept can be used as a lens through which entangled socio-spatial arenas are analysed. The lens can enable a scholar to locate actors and uncover interests that converge in spaces where the parameters of territoriality are negotiated; in our case, where regionalization takes place. Before applying this lens to a particular case, the next section briefly introduces regional law-enforcement cooperation as a phenomenon in the post-Cold War environment. The section highlights how both “transnational crime” and the “globalization of policing” have come to play key environmental factors that help shape regional instances of policing.

graphical Scale in Globalization Studies, in: *Theory and Society*, 28 (1999) 1, pp. 39–78; S. Elden, *Missing the Point: Globalization, Deterritorialization and the Space of the World*, in: *Transactions in the Institute of British Geographers*, 30 (2005), pp. 8–19. In terms of regional studies, see for example Bøås et al. (fn. 2), p. 8, and S. Cornelissen, *Migration and Reterritorialization: Migrant Movement, Sovereignty and Authority in Contemporary Southern Africa*, in: L. De Haan and U. Engel and P. Chabal (eds.), *African Alternatives*, Leiden 2007, pp. 119–143.

23 M. Middell and K. Naumann (fn. 19), p. 162.

24 Ibid.

25 U. Lorenz and S. Cornelissen (fn. 14), p. 242.

26 M. Ramutsindela (fn. 13), p. 362.

27 D. Delaney and H. Leitner (fn. 20), p. 125.

28 M. Bøås et al. (fn. 2), p. 9.

29 D. Bach, *Regionalism in Africa: Concepts and Context*, in: J. Henz (ed.), *Routledge Handbook of African Security*, London 2013, pp. 181–189.

3. Regionalism and International Police Cooperation: Between Transnational Crime and Global Policing

The “internationalization of criminalization” is an historical artefact, evolving over time from the nineteenth century onwards, along with the development of international norms and practices regarding slavery, piracy, smuggling, and the “white slave trade.”³⁰ On the other hand, organized crime has a more recent history: It emerged in the 1930s in the United States of America (USA) in relation to drug trafficking and hierarchically structured “Mafia”-type organizations.³¹ It includes a variety of transnational threats to state and human security, such as the trafficking of arms, drugs, people, and natural resources by networked syndicates.³² While it may be the case that old crimes simply get new names,³³ the narrative of transnational organized crime (TOC) as a security threat³⁴ has led to a wide variety of responses by actors, both state and non-state, who collaborate in an attempt to map, understand, and combat the illicit transnational movement of goods, services, money, and people, which dissect and connect different places, actors, and effects across jurisdictions. More importantly, there is an interest in dismantling the mobile criminal groups that gain enough power from the profits they generate to challenge the institutional integrity of states,³⁵ as well as threaten human security through hampering social, economic, and political development.³⁶

Since the end of the Cold War, different regional bodies have emerged in order to tackle transnational crime through partnerships across sovereign jurisdictions. The map of the international law-enforcement cooperation has at present come to include more informal but sustained regional structures such as the Association of Caribbean Commissioners of Police (ACCP) and the Southeast European Police Chiefs Association (SEPCA), as well as regional organizations at various stages of institutionalization and degrees of autonomy, including the Association of Southeast Asian Nations Chiefs of Police (ASEANAPOL); SARPCCO; the Eastern Africa Police Chiefs Cooperation Organization (EAPCCO); the Police Community of the Americas (Ameripol), and the European

30 P. Andreas and E. Nadelman, *Policing the Globe: Criminalization and Crime Control in International Relations*, Oxford 2006.

31 M. Woodiwiss, *Transnational Organized Crime: Global Reach of an American Concept*, in: A. Edwards and G.P. Gill (eds.), *Transnational Organised Crime*, 2003, pp. 13–42.

32 See, for example, UNODC, *Globalization of Crime: Transnational Organized Crime Threat Assessment*, Vienna 2010.

33 An interesting comparison could be made with the turn of the nineteenth century, when the white slave trade (human trafficking) and anarchism (terrorism) have been linked to the emergence of the first attempts to construct international police cooperation organizations, such as the Police Union of German States (1851–1866) and the International Criminal Police Commission (ICPC) in 1923, which became known as Interpol. See M. Deflem, *Policing World Society: Historical Foundations of International Police Cooperation*, Oxford 2002.

34 A. Edwards and P. Gill (fn. 31), p. 246.

35 P. Gastrow, *Termites at Work: Transnational Organized Crime and State Erosion in Kenya*, International, New York 2011, p. 1.

36 J. Cilliers and T.D. Sisk, *ISS Monograph Nr. 188 – Assessing Long Term State Fragility in Africa: Prospects for 26 ‘More Fragile Countries’*, Pretoria 2013, p. 10.

Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (Europol), to name but a few.³⁷ Components that become central in informing the conception of such regional bodies include prioritizing information and intelligence-sharing capabilities; building police professionalism; political priorities (e.g. joining elite regional communities for prestige); the need for the harmonization of laws, procedures and practices; the existence of transnational policy discourses and communities, and formal/informal networks among police professionals.³⁸ As noted by Michael D. Bayer,³⁹ informal police-to-police networks based on mutual recognition are an important professional asset in the fight against transnational threats, such as terrorism. As formal procedures in communication and assistance may retard the day-to-day function of policing, the close links built between professionals that meet in various places – training environments, workshops, or conferences – may offer the informal connectivity that allows for information to move beyond borders by building trust through engagement.

Another important reality in the geography of international law enforcement is the uneven development between national capabilities in areas of education, resources, finance, technology, and expertise.⁴⁰ Cross-border training workshops or on-the-job training during joint operations, therefore, become key processes in international cooperation, which forms the foundation for notions of cooperative security by increasing the physical interaction between law-enforcement personnel, not just on the executive level but on the operational level as well. In this environment, actors with vast resources such as the International Criminal Police Organization (ICPO-Interpol), Europol, the USA's Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), the American Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Australian Federal Police, the United Kingdom's (UK) Serious Organized Crime Agency (SOCA),⁴¹ and the South African Police Service (SAPS) may assert their authority across borders through their ability to finance the placement of police liaison officers, manage information, generate expertise, and access technological resources. This puts them in the position to influence the emerging transnational landscape of policing by offering technological assistance, intelligence, research, training, and operational support. Financial resources, technology, information, and expertise, as well as relative autonomy from the state⁴² constitute the different forms of capital that certain law-enforcement agencies in the transnational security environment can mobilize.

37 For a good list of regional organizations in this regard, see E.G Berman and K. Maze. *Handbook – Regional Organisations and the UN Programme of Action on Small Arms (PoA)*, Geneva 2012.

38 O. Marenin and A. Akgul, *Theorising Transnational Cooperation on the Police and Intelligence Fields of Security*, in: E. Aydinli (ed.), *Emerging Transnational (in)Security: A Statist Transnational Approach*, London 2010, pp. 102–123.

39 M.D. Beyer, *Blue Planet: Informal International Police Networks and National Intelligence*, Washington D.C. 2010.

40 E. van der Spuy, *Regionalism in Policing: From Lessons in Europe to Developments in Southern Africa*, in: *African Studies Review*, 6 (1997) 6, <http://www.issafrica.org/pubs/ASR/6No6/VanDerSpuy.html> (accessed 13 March 2013).

41 SOCA was disbanded in 2013.

42 M. Deflem (fn. 33), p. 20; M.D. Beyer (fn. 39), p. xvi.

Two environmental factors, therefore, have influenced the turn towards forming regional police-cooperative ventures since the end of the Cold War: The first is the functional reaction to transnational crimes, and the second is the broader globalization of policing through the increased international and transnational connectivity between police professionals. Although broader trends may influence the regionalization of law enforcement generally, each venture must be understood to have formed in its own context. Furthermore, each project has not necessarily involved the same processes or degrees of institutionalization. What also becomes clear is that cooperation takes shape in different arenas and at different levels. The negotiation of regional arrangements may on a more macro level involve state actors or police executives that negotiate the parameters of law enforcement in terms of state sovereignty, thus comprising the formal project or regionalism. Yet, once formal political partnerships are conceived, the operationalization of policing as a day-to-day approach to security may take place in both formal and informal settings between police professionals who participate at different levels of the organization's functioning. The culmination of different processes could be termed the regionalization of the organization, as new relationships emerge to order the conceived regional space.

The rest of the paper will, therefore, look at the particular case of SARPCCO, which emerged in 1995 as a cooperative venture between the police chiefs of 11 Southern African states. The first part briefly elaborates on its evolution, highlighting specific characteristics and relationships that have solidified within the context in which the organization emerged and has been evolving and maturing. The second section makes use of the portals of globalization lens to look at the regionalization of SARPCCO. Several socio-spatial arenas are exposed wherein different actors at different levels meet to further construct SARPCCO as an emerging regional police space.

4. The Evolution of SARPCCO: 20 Years of Policing across Borders in Southern Africa

With the end of the Cold War approaching in the late 1980s and the gradual demise of the apartheid regime in the early 1990s, a space opened up for a profound shift in the relationships between states in Southern Africa. A "realist paradigm of war, destabilization and distrust"⁴³ gave way to potential cooperative partnerships in the quest for regional peace and security. As the politics of regional economic integration were being negotiated between state actors in the Southern African Development Community (SADC), SARPCCO emerged in 1995 as a semi-autonomous police association. SARPCCO brought eleven police chiefs in SADC together to unite their national police forces/services under a new regional emblem; these included Angola, Botswana, Leso-

43 M. Baregu and C. Landsberg, Introduction, in: M. Baregu and C. Landsberg (eds.), *From Cape to Congo: Southern Africa's Evolving Security Challenges*, Boulder, CO 2003.

tho, Malawi, Swaziland, Mozambique, South Africa, Namibia, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.⁴⁴

SARPCCO emerged out of relationships built by police executives in the framework of the Frontline States⁴⁵ Chiefs of Police within the Interstate Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC).⁴⁶ On the other hand, it may furthermore be related back to efforts on the side of the then South African Police (SAP) to establish linkages in the region to combat problematic cross-border crimes, especially vehicle theft, prior to the end of apartheid.⁴⁷ In this post-conflict environment, police executives had to renegotiate the regional policing context. This context was characterized by interstate competition and mistrust related to state security. In order to facilitate cooperation in curbing crime, information would have to move across borders, and politics would have to be kept out of professional police relationships.

In 1997, SARPCCO was officially recognized as a regional organization⁴⁸ and furthermore institutionalized by ministers of police with the signing of the intergovernmental Agreement in Respect of Cooperation and Mutual Assistance in the Field of Crime Combating (SARPCCO Agreement) and the adoption of the first SARPCCO constitution.⁴⁹ SARPCCO was, thus, afforded legal support by its member states. Importantly, the SARPCCO Agreement allows for the operationalization of multilateral and bilateral joint operations and investigations across their sovereign jurisdictions, as well as the sharing of information, expertise, and skills between countries.⁵⁰ Furthermore, an agreement was reached on priority regional crimes that would guide further efforts to enhance police capabilities and competencies.

SARPCCO defined priority crimes in 1997 as follows:⁵¹

44 SARPCCO, 10 Years SARPCCO: The Southern African Regional Police Chiefs Cooperation Organization: 1995–2005 (2005), p. 4.

45 The Frontline States were established in 1970 to formulate a coordinated policy on apartheid South Africa and liberation movements mobilizing against this strong regional actor. For a perspective on what was happening at the time, see, for example, M. Evans, *The Frontline States, South Africa and Southern African Security: Military Prospects and Perspectives*, in: *Zambezia*, 5 (1984) 12, pp. 1–19, or more generally M. Baregu, *Economic and Military Security*, in: M. Baregu and C. Landsberg (eds.), *From Cape to Congo: Southern Africa's Evolving Security Challenges*, Boulder, CO 2003, p. 19.

46 The ISDSC was an informal structure bringing together securocrats from Frontline member states. With the evolution of SADC, the ISDSC became the informal secretariat for SADC's Organ on Politics, Defence and Security. See, for example, A. Zacarius, *Redefining Security*, in: M. Baregu and C. Landsberg (eds.), *From Cape to Congo: Southern Africa's Evolving Security Challenges*, Boulder, CO 2003, p. 39. For more recent updates, see A. van Nieuwkerk, *Security Co-operation in the Southern African Development Community: Insights from the New Institutionalism*, in: *Scientia Militaria, South African Journal of Military Studies*, 34 (2006) 2, p. 10., <http://scientia-militaria.journals.ac.za/pub/article/view/21/46> (accessed 25 March 2014).

47 This perspective is gained from consulting the Annual Report of the Commissioner of the South African Police, RP 68 – 1990; RP 68 – 1991; RP 68 – 1992. Pretoria.

48 SARPCCO (fn. 44), p. 2.

49 Ibid.

50 SAPS, *Southern African Regional Police Chiefs Co-operation Organisation (SARPCCO): Heads of Criminal Investigation Service Meeting on 1997-10-06, October 8 1997*, <http://www.info.gov.za/speeches/1997/1015AA00597.htm>. (accessed 13 April 2014).

51 Ibid.

1. smuggling of illegal firearms and ammunition, stolen motor vehicles, and illicit drugs, diamonds, and precious metals;
2. corruption in respect of transnational crimes;
3. the infiltration of illegal aliens and their involvement in criminal activities;
4. the effects of commercial crime and illegal exploitation of currency (counterfeit and money laundering), and
5. the falsification of identity documents, travel documents, and ownership documents of stolen vehicles.

By the end of the first decade of the organization's existence, after Mauritius and the Democratic Republic of Congo both joined the group, SARPCCO had managed to collect a complex mix of police forces/services under its banner – each with its own colonial criminal-justice legacies, and varying degrees of development and resources – and used English, French, and Portuguese as official working languages.

An important aspect shaping SARPCCO's identity is its initial autonomy from the more formal SADC, which has been the main driver in the region for economic and security integration, thus defining Southern Africa as a subregion of Africa. SARPCCO's autonomy relates to its symbiotic relationship with Interpol.⁵² Emerging already in 1923, Interpol describes itself as the world's largest police organization.⁵³ Interpol has no police powers on the ground, but it provides products and services to its member states through its "high-tech infrastructure of technical and operational support."⁵⁴ In this way, members are able to stay on par with the evolution of crime. Most importantly, the "neutrality" of the organization is paramount in its efforts to extend law enforcement beyond sovereign jurisdictions, and thus it is strictly forbidden – under article 3 of its constitution – to undertake any activities of a political, military, religious, or racial character.⁵⁵ Neutrality has been one of the key means through which Interpol has been able to extend its reach and power, as it strategically situates itself within the space where it can facilitate cooperation "even where diplomatic relations do not exist between countries."⁵⁶ Much of this kind of thinking has influenced SARPCCO's norms and practices⁵⁷ towards "providing the most efficient and effective international law-enforcement cooperation for a safer Southern Africa and safer world."⁵⁸

52 Personal Correspondence, Major general and brigadier in Legal Services Division, South African Police Service, Pretoria 2014.

53 INTERPOL, "Overview," <http://www.interpol.int/About-INTERPOL/Overview> (accessed 13 March 2014).

54 Ibid.

55 Constitution of the ICPO-Interpol, I/CONS/GA/1956 (2008), <https://www.interpol.int/About-INTERPOL/Legal-materials/The-Constitution> (accessed 25 March 2014).

56 Interpol, "The Constitution," <http://www.interpol.int/About-INTERPOL/Legal-materials/The-Constitution> (accessed 25 March 2014).

57 This is the author's impression gained from, among other things, comparing the different norms in SARPCCO and Interpol constitutions; the priority crimes both organizations focus on, and SARPCCO's and Interpol's standards on cooperation and political neutrality.

58 SARPCCO, "About," <http://www.sarpcco.org/index.php/about/mandate> (accessed 20 March 2014).

Interpol and SARPCCO have a strategic partnership; SARPCCO's secretariat is housed at an Interpol Subregional Bureau (SRB) established in Harare, Zimbabwe, in 1997. Personnel from the various member countries are seconded to this facility, which coordinates SARPCCO's activities, centralizes information and intelligence on regional crime trends in the form of a Regional Organized Crime Threat Assessment,⁵⁹ and offers a space in which different police professionals are both employed by Interpol, as well as exposed to a law-enforcement landscape beyond their national borders. The negotiation between the Zimbabwean government and Interpol to establish an Interpol SRB⁶⁰ must be understood in the context of the emergence of a regionalization policy in Interpol in 1985.⁶¹ Interpol has since established six regional bureaux in various parts of the world that act as central nodes to support the international network of National Central Bureaux (NCBs) in each of its now 190 member states.⁶² Moreover, the global actor gains a regional presence through which it can offer its products and services – technical tools, 24-hour response, investigative skills, and police training⁶³ – as well as propose regional operations focused on regional priorities.⁶⁴

On the level of SADC, the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security (the SADC Organ) was established in 1996 and formalized in 2001 through the signing of the Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation. Until 2007, the relationship between SARPCCO and the SADC Organ was characterized by what Elrena van der Spuy refers to as “a lack of cooperation.”⁶⁵ Although this might have kept SARPCCO out of the way of political interference,⁶⁶ according to Van der Spuy, it also left the organization to

59 Personal Correspondence, Regional Specialized Officer Interpol SRB/SARPCCO Coordination Office, Harare, 6 February 2014.

60 Interpol, Establishment of Interpol Sub-Regional Bureau in Harare, Zimbabwe: Resolution No. AGN/63/RES/21, 1994; <http://www.interpol.int/content/download/22503/211369/version/4/file/AGN-1994-RES-22%20-%20Establishment%20of%20an%20INTERPOL%20Sub-Regional%20Bureau%20in%20Nairobi,%20Kenya.pdf>, and Interpol, Adoption of the Draft Convention Between the Organization and Countries Served by the sub-Regional Bureau in Harare: Resolution No. AGN/65/RES/20, [accessed 25 March 2014], <http://www.interpol.int/content/download/22407/210391/version/4/file/65-RES-20-Ang.pdf>. (accessed 25 March 2014).

61 Interpol, Regionalization, Establishment of a Sub-Regional Bureau for South America: Resolution No. AGN/54/RES/2, 1985, <http://www.interpol.int/content/download/22809/214907/version/5/file/AGN-1985-RES-2%20-%20Regionalization%20-%20Establishment%20of%20a%20Sub-regional%20Bureau%20for%20South%20America.pdf> (accessed 25 March 2014); Interpol, Regionalization within the ICPO-Interpol: Resolution No. AGN/64/RES/07, 1995, <http://www.interpol.int/content/download/22468/210869/version/5/file/AGN-64-RES-7%20-%20Regionalization%20within%20the%20ICPO-INTERPOL.pdf>. (accessed 25 March 2014).

62 Four of those SRBs are in Africa and act as regional hubs for other regional police cooperation organisations: Abidjan (West African Police Chiefs Committee); Nairobi (Eastern Africa Regional Police Chiefs Cooperation Organisation); Harare (SARPCCO), and Yaoundé (Central African Police Chiefs Cooperation Organisation). See Interpol, “Best Practices” in Combating Terrorism: Executive Summary <http://www.un.org/en/sc/ctc/docs/best-prac-interpol.pdf>. (accessed 1 April 2014).

63 Interpol, Central African Police Chiefs Meet to Discuss Regional Security Issues, 12 January 2008, <http://www.interpol.int/News-and-media/News/2008/N20080124>. (accessed 1 April 2014).

64 For an example of Interpol-led operations, consult the Interpol News and Media Room, <http://www.interpol.int/News-and-media/Media-room>. (accessed 1 April 2014).

65 E. van der Spuy, Police Cooperation in the Southern African Region: Politics and Practicalities, in: *Crime Law Social Change*, 51 (2009), p. 245.

66 M. Shaw, Organised Crime and State Responses in Southern Africa, in: *The South African Yearbook of International Affairs*, 2001/02, Johannesburg 2001, pp. 115–120.

move forward with minimal political backing.⁶⁷ In order to “enhance the fight against organized crime and cross-border illegal activities in countries of the region,”⁶⁸ a process was set in place to integrate SARPPCO into the ISDSC under the Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ (SIPO I) that was launched in 2004. The main stated objective was to “create a peaceful and stable political and security environment through which the region will realize its objectives of socio-economic development, poverty eradication and regional integration.”⁶⁹

Described as “the general guidelines that spell out the specific activities, in accordance with the protocol’s objectives,”⁷⁰ SIPO I is an instrument to enable the implementation of the SADC development agenda.⁷¹ Four sectors – political, defence, state security, and public security – are demarcated through which the protocol is to be operationalized. The public-security sector aims to address threats associated with organized crime syndicates. It does so by coordinating the activities of law enforcement, public safety, correctional services and prisons, immigration, parks and wildlife, customs, and refugee agencies.⁷² It may, therefore, be noticed that not only has crime, especially border crossing and organized crime, become a regional security concern, but also, in theory, is connected to a broader regional development agenda centred on socio-economic development.

In 2009, SARPPCO was formally brought under the fold of SADC with a revised constitution setting out SARPPCO and SADC’s new relationship. Due to SARPPCO’s prior autonomy and aforementioned relationship with Interpol, the integration process was not smooth, requiring a longer period of negotiation already starting around 2006.⁷³ In 2012, the revised Harmonized Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ (SIPO II) was launched, with a new stand-alone police sector to support the four sectors already established under SIPO I. As the implementing institution, SARPPCO has therefore gained political recognition on a SADC level. Yet, as observed by Anthoni van Nieuwkerk,⁷⁴ SIPO II struggles to explain the purpose of the police sector in a way that distinguishes it from the public-security sector, with the list of challenges faced by both sectors being

67 Van der Spuy (fn. 65), p. 245.

68 SADC, Statement by his Excellency Jakaya Mrisho Kikwete, President of the United Republic of Tanzania and Chairman of the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security, on the occasion of the launching of the Revised Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ (SIPO), Arusha, Tanzania (20 November 2012). <https://www.google.de/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=2&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0CDoQFjAB&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.sadc.int%2Fdocuments-publications%2Fshow%2F1159&ei=2rBnU-qAG4GN4wSFwIDYAg&usq=AFQjCNERUxro bGUXRqQW-anK47BDJBHGOA&bvm=bv.65788261,d.bGQ>. (accessed 24 March 2014).

69 SADC, Strategic Indicative Plan, <http://www.sadc.int/about-sadc/overview/strategic-pl/strategic-indicative-plan-organ/>. (accessed 23 April 2014).

70 SADC, Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ on Politics Defence and Security Cooperation 2002, pp. 5, 35, http://www.sadc.int/files/9113/6492/3812/sipo_en_3.pdf. (accessed 24 March 2014).

71 Ibid.

72 Ibid., pp. 35–42.

73 Personal Correspondence, Deputy National Commissioner Detective Services South African Police Service, Pretoria 2014.

74 A. van Nieuwkerk, African Security Series No.6 – Towards Peace and Security In Southern Africa: Critical Analysis of the Revised Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation (SIPO) of the Southern African Development Community, Maputo, MZ, 2012.

virtually identical. Furthermore, SADC has thus far not found the resources to fully support SARPPCO, while the police organization has had to become part of a bigger organizational structure that dilutes its specific interests.⁷⁵ It is, therefore, not too clear what function SARPPCO fulfils in SADC's long-term security outlook. Cooperation between regional law-enforcement agencies against cross-border crime remains a key priority, but rather than outlining a clear distinction between law enforcement and the much broader function of policing, it seems that SADC is rather accommodating SARPPCO, who remains semi-autonomous in practice and focused on law-enforcement interventions against cross-border crime.

On the macro level, SARPPCO represents a particular regional organization emerging in Southern Africa in the post-apartheid context. Southern Africa here constitutes a sociopolitical arena, where interests converge over the ordering of geographic space. Central to the organization's emergence was the ability of police chiefs to reposition adversarial relationships between security agencies in a post-conflict environment and, therefore, reorder the way in which policing across the region is approached. SARPPCO's initial autonomy from the political stalemates in SADC to its positioning in the broader international system of law enforcement through Interpol has also afforded it a certain legitimacy and scope beyond its regional context, making it an actor in its own right. While SARPPCO's initial thrust to facilitate regional law-enforcement cooperation evolved outside of the formal SADC regionalism, its reluctant merger with SADC in 2009 points to the politics of regional order in the Southern African context that is still negotiated in terms of national interests of states. This does not only involve the security of states in terms of transnational threats, but the control over regional policing and regionalism as a broader political project.

Yet, to understand SARPPCO beyond its rhetorical commitments to cooperation, and to enter into the discussion of regionalization, one must take a closer look at how cooperation within and through the institution has taken place and, thus, shapes the way in which international police relationships are ordered on the regional level. The next section takes a more intimate look at the regionalization of SARPPCO by drawing on different socio-spatial arenas, where actors have engaged in processes that have come to shape SARPPCO as a cohesive regional institution.

5. Socio-spatial Arenas in the Production of SARPPCO

SARPPCO is driven by the notion that effective and successful cross-border cooperation is built upon the harmonization of legislation, the construction of a regional policing culture, the nurturing of mutual trust, and effective communication and information exchange. The organization has worked on different levels to ensure that these criteria

75 Personal Correspondence, Deputy National Commissioner Detective Services South African Police Service, Pretoria 2014.

are met;⁷⁶ these activities include: 1) information exchange and education in the form of annual meetings and training workshops; 2) joint operations on the ground directed at the most common TOCs; 3) research and development directed at ultimately influencing policy formation and the harmonization of legislation, and 4) interaction through sports and recreation in the form of the SARPCCO Games.

The architecture, as set out by its constitution,⁷⁷ consists of the Chiefs of Police Committee, Interpol SRB/SARPCCO Coordination Office, the Permanent Coordinating Sub-Committee (PCSC), the Legal Sub-Committee (LSC), the Training Sub-Committee (TSC), and the Women's Network. Beyond the Interpol SRB that was mentioned earlier, SARPCCO has no defined "place" as such where its structures are located. Rather, substructures can be thought of as "think tanks,"⁷⁸ in which police professionals, who represent their member countries, meet in various locations and times to rationalize strategies to operationalize transborder crime control and law-enforcement cooperation in the region. Through the culmination of their work, they set out the parameters of regional policing and represent sociopolitical arenas, in which regional police cooperation both takes place and through which further cooperation stems. Due to spatial constraint, not all structures and working groups within the organization can be discussed; here I focus on the three that form the backbone of operationalizing regional law-enforcement cooperation – the PCSC, the LSC, and the TSC.

5.1 The PCSC

As an operationally oriented organization, SARPCCO has been successful in negotiating priorities among members and mobilizing action on the ground through joint, simultaneous, and bilateral operations.⁷⁹ The PCSC consists of the heads of Criminal Investigative Divisions (CID), who represent officers at the forefront of practical issues regarding law enforcement on the ground in their national contexts. Through the PCSC,

76 J. Cilliers, *Monograph 43: Building Security in Southern Africa – An Update on the Evolving Architecture*, Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria 1999, n.p.

77 SARPCCO has had two constitutions. The second constitution was drawn up when SARPCCO officially became part of SADC in 2009. Until then, the council of chiefs of police (CCP) was the highest decision-making body of the organization, the permanent coordinating committee (PCC) presiding over the subcommittees. Under SADC, the PCC became a sub-committee and the CCP became a committee under the ISDSC. Information based on *The Constitution of the Southern African Regional Police Chiefs Cooperation Organisation Constitution, 1997, and Revised Constitution of the Southern African Regional Police Chiefs Cooperation Organisation Constitution, 2009*, as well as *Personal Correspondence, Major general and brigadier in Legal Services Division, South African Police Service, Pretoria 2014*.

78 *Personal Correspondence, Deputy National Commissioner Detective Services South African Police Service, Pretoria 2014*.

79 The following information is based predominantly on *Personal Correspondences: Divisional Commissioner Detective Services, South African Police Service, Pretoria, 2014*, and *Deputy National Commissioner, Detective Services, South African Police Service, Pretoria, 2014*. It is also supported by SARPCCO (Interpol), 2008, *Profile of the Southern African Police Chiefs Cooperation Organisation (SARPCCO)* <http://www.interpol.int/Public/ICPO/SRB/SARPCCO.pdf> (accessed 1 April 2014), as well as the findings in Van der Spuy (fn. 39), 2009.

objectives are aligned and issues are discussed in order to organize multilateral or bilateral law-enforcement interventions.

During the planning of the calendar year, the head detectives are expected to have three slots set out for joint operations, which will eventually have been conducted across the territories of each of the now 15 member states of the organization. The region may be divided into smaller subregional clusters, based on members that share geographic proximity or have common interests in directing attention to specific criminal activities and organizations that transcend their national jurisdictions. The spatial allocation also serves to enhance the use of limited resources and decrease the expenditure on manpower. In the planning phase, each country grouping allocates a chair that heads the coordination of further meetings, wherein priority crimes and periodization(s) are negotiated in relation to the calendar year. Operations then take place in one country at a time, where police personnel from different countries meet to cooperate on the ground and move across the region until operations have occurred in every member's sovereign territory. The SARPCCO Agreement is not only focused on multilateralism, but offers the opportunity for and urges bilateral cooperation between police forces where other legal agreements may be lacking.⁸⁰ This form of cooperation was seen to be the most constant and fruitful from interviews within SARPCCO substructures. The reason is that they are quicker to organize, as well as more specific to the needs and priorities of countries that may share an interest in a specific criminal activity. Such operations may be directly proposed by the head of a CID in one country to another through the connections made via the PCSC. The subcommittee, therefore, acts as a channel through which cooperation is more easily facilitated through informal connectivity, bridging the often lengthy processes of letter writing and requests through formal channels of diplomacy or even Interpol mechanisms.

From time to time, the Interpol SRB in Harare proposes conducting simultaneous intelligence-led operations over a specific period – normally on a quarterly basis – across the whole region. These operations, like joint operations, are directed at agreed upon priority crimes, with the operations then organized locally. In such operations, personnel from different divisions, such as uniform police, detectives, and crime intelligence collaborate in multinational environments. This either happens on the ground or through communication, as the sharing of information becomes a key to success. The Interpol SRB and the network of communication between NCBs are central in facilitating the real-time movement of information and intelligence between participating agencies and units, to coordinate activity across the wide geographic area. After the operations are conducted, the information that is collected is fed through to the Interpol SRB in Harare, where it is consolidated, in turn offering a region-wide picture of crime trends.

The PCSC, therefore, represents one of the most important arenas through which regional cooperation is formulated in SARPCCO. When the heads of CIDs engage with

80 Personal Correspondence, Major general and brigadier in Legal Services Division, South African Police Service, Pretoria 2014.

one another, SARPCCO becomes the operational entity it is intended to be. Yet, it becomes clear that the operations also constitute informal sites of interaction by police professionals on the ground. Keeping with international norms and regulations regarding sovereignty, only the host country has the power to police in its territorial jurisdiction. Extraterritorial actors, thus, play supportive roles offering expertise, knowledge, and, when needed, technological support. As noted by one police executive:

I think that among the things that these operations have, you have got some informal training that you are part of ... you have got the experts that are working together ... here you have the South Africans who may have been trained in an advanced way, but when they operate here, because they are not police officials, they do not have the power as police officials in that country, they come as advisory capacity ... the reality is that they do not have police powers in other countries, so they must be supportive of the local police, so there is this informal training that takes place, you can also call it training in the field.⁸¹

The regularization and normalization of practices are, therefore, facilitated through both planning and initiating operations. These processes may take place on different scales, yet in these arenas police professionals engage in the sharing of ideas and knowledge, while being exposed to other working environments and professional cultures. Regionalization, therefore, takes place at different levels through multiple processes facilitated through, as well as bound together by, the broader SARPCCO regionalism. To further facilitate operations and to overcome obstacles, the PCSC is importantly supported in areas of law and training.

5.2 The LSC

Sovereign jurisdiction is the key obstacle to international law-enforcement mobility. Different colonial histories across the regional space have led to a variety of criminal justice systems that emerged after independence. Differences in legal traditions, therefore, constitute boundaries to transborder law-enforcement harmonization and operationalization. According to the SARPCCO Agreement:

The parties shall consult with each other as to legislative or administrative steps that may be necessary to ... remove any legal obstacles or impediments that may be found to exist in the execution of the provisions of the agreement.⁸²

The LSC, which is comprised of the heads of legal units, supports the PCSC through attending to legal matters that may hamper police cooperation, and lobbies for harmoni-

81 Personal Correspondence, Deputy National Commissioner, Detective Services, South African Police Service, Pretoria 2014.

82 SARPCCO, Agreement in Respect of Cooperation and Mutual Assistance in the Field of Crime Combating, 1997, p. 3.

zation of regional legislation.⁸³ The LSC can only make recommendations by producing model laws that must then be negotiated on the national level to become effective. But, the SARPCCO constitution and code of conduct represent key documents setting out principles and guidelines that standardize relations between different national agencies, as well as minimum standards for professional conduct. In the case of the code of conduct, the LSC was supported by the Association for the Prevention of Torture (APT)⁸⁴ and the Human Rights Trust of Southern Africa (SAHRIT) to produce an end product that draws on various international and regional human-rights mechanisms. The code of conduct sets out the minimum professional standards for police forces/services in the region. Actual implementation on the national level is, however, inconsistent and problematic, as cases of police brutality, corruption, and the abuse of police powers by the personnel of service/forces across the region have been widely documented.⁸⁵ On the other hand, the code of conduct has opened up a space for measuring regional police forces/services against a common set of principles regarding democratic policing. This has been operationalized by civil society, especially through engagement by the African Policing Civilian Oversight Forum (APCOF) and its continental network of academics and policy professionals.⁸⁶

5.3 The TSC

Another obstacle on the operational level relates to the lack of expertise and knowledge in investigating complex, specialized forms of crime. The TSC, made up of the directors of training institutions, plays a supporting role by coordinating and conducting regional, operational, police-training needs analyses and implementing capacity-building interventions.⁸⁷

An important method supporting this diffusion of knowledge is the “train-the-trainer” method, where the focus is on educating specialists, who are then able to further diffuse knowledge nationally. Training and education, thus, serve to enhance capacity and, therefore, work towards the standardization of practices, promoting professionalism, enhancing specialization, building trust, as well as potentially relieving the police forces/services that are more experienced from having to elaborately support their partners.⁸⁸ While

83 SARPCCO (Interpol) (fn. 79) 2008.

84 See website of the Association for the Prevention Of Torture, <https://www.apr.ch/en/resources/sarpcco-code-of-conduct-for-police-officials-2001/>. (accessed 13 March 2014).

85 Police corruption, the use of force, and human rights abuses have been documented in most of the countries under the SARPCCO banner. For further reading, consult S. Tait, I. Ndung'u and T. Walker (eds.), Workshop Report: The SARPCCO Code of Conduct, Taking Stock and Mapping Out Future Action, Johannesburg, South Africa, 16–17 March, 2011, Pretoria, pp. 12–13, and A. Dissel and C. Frank (eds.), Policing Human Rights: Assessing Southern African Countries' Compliance With the SARPCCO Code of Conduct for Police Officials, Somerset West, ZA (2012), pp. 121–122.

86 A. Dissel and C. Frank (fn. 85).

87 SARPCCO Constitution (fn. 77), 2009.

88 Impressions gained from Personal Correspondence, Component Head: Management, Leadership and International Development, South African Police Service, Pretoria, 10 January 2014.

specialization is, thus, promoted on the regional level, what happens on the national level is, however, outside of SARPPCO's control. Gaps between the national and the regional scale become problematic. While specialist knowledge may be developed on the regional level, shifts in the working environment on the national level may mean that trained individuals are subsequently moved to another division. Furthermore, professionals sent to take part in training or operations may not be of that particular expert field. Further obstacles, therefore, accumulate, as knowledge that is supposed to be diffused among colleagues may be lost due to personnel or structural changes on the national scale.

Building on the first section that focused on SARPPCO's evolution and position in the Southern African arena, the preceding section attempted to shift the lens from the sociopolitical arena of SADC to the various socio-spatial arenas within the SARPPCO architecture itself. The three substructures represent some core characteristics of the globalization of policing. For SARPPCO to operationalize its approach to regional law enforcement, certain obstacles must be overcome; these include facilitating the movement of law-enforcement personnel across borders, harmonizing legislation and policies across the jurisdictions of member states, setting priorities, standardizing practices, and exchanging information and knowledge. The substructures, therefore, represent both institutions in which these different objectives are rationalized, as well as socio-spatial arenas where police executives meet and exchange ideas. The outcomes of these negotiations do not only bring into being products such as model laws, standard operating procedures, and training curricula; through concrete outcomes – including operations, meetings, and workshops – police personnel from various divisions engage in multinational environments, which exposes them to the sharing of ideas, different working environments and methods, as well as the potential of a professional collegiality that extends across borders. Informal connectivity helps to build networks of trust that may facilitate further cooperation when in the field. This deepens the perspective on processes of regionalization and broadens the base of actors involved in the regional project, as agency is located at different levels of the more formal regionalism constituted by SARPPCO.

6. Conclusion

This article introduced regional police cooperation as an interesting area of study to the broader field of regionalism studies. This was done by operationalizing the NRA's particular approach to the study of regionalisms, focusing the lens on Southern Africa and the SARPPCO project. The NRA has successfully exposed the multiplicity of regionalisms, and highlights the dynamic nature of regionalization processes. On the other hand, there is room within the NRA for further methodological development, when attempting to take into account both regionalization and globalization processes and their entanglement in what has been called the globalization/regionalization nexus. The portals of globalization framework from global history was proposed as a viable tool that may work towards this end. Due to an overlapping agreement found in the “spatial

turn,” the portals of globalization framework was deemed a fruitful methodological tool for interrogating specific arenas, where processes of regionalization and globalization meet through actor-based strategies in dealing with changing spatial relations.

Regionalism in the case of law enforcement was linked to both the increased movement of criminalized objects and their effects across sovereign jurisdictions, as well as the broader globalization of policing. Therefore, the region has become an important scale through which international police cooperation is ordered on the more abstract global level. Yet, it was stressed that in each case regional organizations emerge within specific contexts that further influence their shape and evolution. The case of SARPCCO was presented as the emergence of a specific, regional police organization in Southern Africa, in the context of changing spatial relations between states in the post-Cold War and post-apartheid Southern African context. SARPCCO itself was found to be an emerging actor that takes part in the ordering of Southern Africa as a regional sociopolitical arena in the making. The portals of globalization framework was used to deepen the investigation of the regionalization of law enforcement in SARPCCO by focusing on substructures in the organization’s architecture.

The portals of globalization lens also helped to direct attention to specific structures in the SARPCCO organization that constitute more than just organs in a body, but socio-spatial arenas through which the regionalization of SARPCCO takes place. It becomes clear that the regularization of interactions and the standardization of practices facilitated through SARPCCO have bolstered regional security cooperation in Southern Africa, as well as having opened up a space for police professionals to engage with one another across borders. This has not only been visible on the macro level through the rhetoric of regional integration and joint policy formation. More importantly, these activities are strongly centred in mid-level cooperation between police executives on the substructural level, where policy is formulated and regional initiatives are launched. Furthermore, this reaches down to the operational level, where law-enforcement agents from different divisions cooperate on the ground. Through training and joint operations, law-enforcement personnel meet and take part in the broader SARPCCO project, where they are able to make their own contacts and are exposed to the working environments of colleagues in other countries. This informal networking is probably one of the most important micro-level instances where regional partnerships are formed, ideas are diffused, and trust is built. SARPCCO has, therefore, been successful in terms of producing a sustainable operational approach towards the fight against transnational crime on the regional level. This has been strengthened through establishing an institutional memory, ensuring continuity, as well as facilitating the construction of a regional collegiality among police professionals engaged in region-level planning and operationalization.

On the other hand, there is more research that must be done with regard to the specific actors and interests that shape outcomes. For research focusing on security arenas, it remains difficult to gauge what power relations really look like in organizations such as SARPCCO, as doors are generally closed to outsiders and the rhetoric of partnership and cooperation often masks power dynamics. Furthermore, the socio-spatial arenas through

which regionalization takes shape are not necessarily found in one specific place or institutional setting. They also happen at different levels, where different types of actors and agencies may be involved, thus adding to the complexity of the study. For the researcher, gathering information becomes a difficult and tedious affair, as it involves working with different sources and methods at various stages of research and fieldwork. More thought will have to go into operationalizing further studies in this direction, which will help to deal with these complexities.

Finally, this article has shown that portals of globalization as a framework may be used beyond just the historical study of globalization processes. When applied to regionalism and studies with an interest in the production of new spatial orders, the lens helps to deepen the study of regionalization through focusing on arenas where processes of regionalization and globalization become more concrete, and where actors' interests and activities simultaneously shape and are shaped by broader socio-spatial relations.

Headquarters of International Organizations as Portals of Globalization: The African Union Commission and its Peace and Security Policies

Ulf Engel

ABSTRACTS

With a view to analyze the changing spatialities of power and shifting sovereignties in current processes of globalization, this text investigates the headquarters of the African Union. It does so through the lens of portals of globalization and a focus on (1) new, dense practices emerging in response to experiences in the field of peace and security; (2) newly established social spaces of communication, and (3) forms of cultural learning, creativity, and innovation emanating from this condition. The case study on the African Union and its partnership with the United Nations demonstrates that such an approach could add value to the understanding of international organizations and their role at the centre of managing the reterritorialization of contemporary processes of globalization.

Dieser Artikel untersucht am Beispiel der Zentrale der Afrikanischen Union die Verräumlichung von Macht und Verlagerungen von Souveränität in aktuellen Globalisierungsprozessen. Aus Perspektive der „Portale der Globalisierung“ legt er den Schwerpunkt auf 1. neue Praktiken, die in Reaktion auf Erfahrungen im Bereich Frieden und Sicherheit entwickelt wurden, 2. neu geschaffene soziale Räume der Kommunikation und 3. Formen kulturellen Lernens, von Kreativität und Innovation, die auf dieser Grundlage entstanden sind. Die Fallstudie zur Afrikanischen Union und ihrer Kooperation mit den Vereinten Nationen verdeutlicht, dass eine solche Perspektive zum besseren Verständnis von Internationalen Organisationen und deren zentraler Rolle in gegenwärtigen globalen Prozessen von Verräumlichung beitragen kann.

1. Introduction

With the changing nature of globalization processes, the headquarters (HQ) of international organizations (IOs) have changed their character, too: over the last century or so, they have developed from being relatively small entities, which were often only loosely connected to the HQ of other IOs, to huge bureaucracies with a considerable degree of actorness and connectivity in international relations (IR). Today's HQ of IOs represent hotspots of contemporary processes of globalization: they are not only the sites where a particular knowledge about how to manage globalization processes is developed, but they also became privileged hubs for the exchange of related practices; that is, they themselves have become drivers of globalization processes.

The empirical case presented in this article is the African Union Commission (AUC) that is based in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, and its interaction with the United Nations (UN) HQ in New York. In 2001, the secretariat of the African Union (AU),¹ which is a supranational organization with 55 member states, replaced the small secretariat of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), established in May 1963. While the OAU had a few dozen staff members, the AUC today has some 1,400 employees (or "Africrats", as some refer to them).² I look specifically at the policy field construed under the generic term "peace and security," in order to make a more general argument about the role and function of HQ.

I employ the concept of "portals of globalization," as it emerged in global history, as an analytical category to explore this field. The HQ of IOs are considered to be entities through and around which certain forms of social and cultural capital are generated and transferred to deal with accelerated processes of globalization. Portals of globalization have been suggested as one of a number of useful analytical categories to further this interest empirically.³ Looking through this particular lens allows for the analysis of the simultaneity of processes playing out at different spatial levels; invites us to investigate intra-, inter- and trans-locality, and other scales, and calls for an analysis of entangled spaces. According to my reading of the debate, the notion of portals of globalization introduces three concrete fields of observation for the study of globalization processes: (1) moments of densification of certain policy fields; (2) forms of transnational and trans-regional communication, and (3) cultural effects of global encounters (such as interculturality, processes of cultural learning, and the emergence of cultural capital). Claiming that portals of globalization in principle constitute a useful category for the analysis of contemporary processes of globalization, the HQ of IOs will be interrogated as a specific form of portals of globalization in this article. This means that the space-boundedness

1 Organization of African Unity, *The Constitutive Act of the African Union*, Lomé 2000, §20(1).

2 T.K. Tieku, *The Evolution of the African Union Commission and Africrats: Drivers of African Regionalism*, in T.M. Shaw, J.A. Grant, S. Cornelissen (eds.), *The Ashgate Research Companion to Regionalisms*, Farnham 2011, pp. 193–212.

3 M. Middell and K. Naumann, *Global History and the Spatial Turn: From the Impact of Area Studies to the Study of Critical Junctures of Globalization*, in: *Journal of Global History* (2010) 5, pp. 149–170.

of IOs will be taken as a point of departure for an analysis of (1) how their HQ actually become the sites of densification of policy processes – in this case, in the field of the AU's peace and security-related activities; (2) how they create entanglements with other HQ of IOs across space – in this case, the UN, and (3) how they become the incubator for a particular form of knowledge production and transfer, regarding the challenges posed by the changing nature of violent conflict in Africa and new spatialities of power.

2. State of the Art: IOs and Contemporary Processes of Globalization

In contrast to business studies and the role of HQ of transnational corporations, the HQ of IOs are surprisingly underexplored in the social sciences and humanities. In general, there is little contemporary research carried out on them, be it in public administration, IR, or international law.⁴ Therefore, I offer a brief review of the state of the art, with the intention to identify some important gaps in the academic literature on HQ of IOs. For analytical purposes, six distinct debates on the challenges posed to IOs by contemporary processes of globalization can be separated.

First, starting in the mid 1990s, the notion of “global governance” quickly gained currency as a response to the emerging post-Cold War world order and a series of peace-support operations (PSOs) in Africa, Asia, and the Balkans, which were all led by the UN.⁵ Building on an older school of thought on the relevance of transnationalism in IR,⁶ the global-governance paradigm was rapidly established. With increasing empirical evidence for the emergence of global arenas as sites of negotiations by nation states, which are mediated by global governance regimes and in which IOs play a major role, the category successfully asserted a lasting dominance beyond the political-science subfield of IR. Twenty years down the line, it seems there was little need to revise the concept.⁷

Secondly, and as a supplement to the master narrative, the dark side of global governance and some failures or dysfunctionalities of IOs have been discussed, in particular with regard to the apparent failure of an imagined “international community” to prevent

4 See B. Reinalda (ed.), *Routledge Handbook of International Organizations*, London, New York 2013.

5 For the original concept, see L. Finkelstein, *What is Global Governance?* in: *Global Governance*, 1 (1995) 3, pp. 367–372; and P.F. Diehl (ed.), *The Politics of Global Governance: International Organizations in an Interdependent World*, Boulder, CO 1997.

6 See M. Wallace, J.D. Singer, *Intergovernmental Organizations in the Global System, 1815–1964: A Quantitative Description*, in: *International Organization*, 24 (1970) 2, pp. 239–287; and R.O. Keohane, J.S. Nye, *Transgovernmental Relations and International Organizations*, in: *World Politics*, 27 (1974) 1, pp. 39–62.

7 See T.G. Weiss, L. Gordenker (eds.), *NGOs, the UN, and Global Governance*, Boulder, CO 1996; R. Väyrynen (ed.), *Globalization and Global Governance*, Lanham/Maryland 1999; and D. Held, A. McGrew (eds.), *Governing Globalization. Power, Authority and Global Governance*, Oxford 2002. Revisiting the paradigm see K. Dingwerth/P. Pattberg, *Global Governance as a Perspective on World Politics*, in: *Global Governance*, 12 (2006) 2, pp. 185–203; and T. Farer, T.D. Sisk, *Enhancing International Cooperation: Between History and Necessity*, in: *Global Governance*, 16 (2010) 1–2, pp. 1–12.

genocide and other grave crimes against humanity, like in the Balkans and Rwanda during the early and mid 1990s.⁸

Thirdly, the IR hype – as mirrored in journals such as *Global Governance* or *International Organization* (the latter, admittedly, already well-established by that time) – and the often implied “discourses of newness,” caught the attention of historians who, also motivated by a general turn towards histories of transnational entanglements and encounters, developed an interest in the history of IOs.⁹

Fourthly, at the same time, new forms of global-governance interactions were conceived in terms of emerging “network” structures, with hubs and spokes often built around IOs.¹⁰

Fifthly, the debate about the place of IOs in contemporary processes of globalization is also framed in terms of “new regionalisms” approaches, which have emerged outside Europe after the end of the Cold War.¹¹ In this debate, the constructed nature of regions has been emphasized, although, quite often, it is not always taken to its logical end.¹²

Today, nevertheless, “new regionalisms shed light on how IOs outside the Global North relate to processes of globalization.¹³ In this context, the AU is often described as one of the epicentres of new regionalisms in Africa.¹⁴

8 In particular, see study 2 of A. Surkhe, H. Adelman (eds.), *Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda 1996*, <http://www.oecd.org/countries/rwanda/50189764.pdf> (accessed 24 October 2017). See also M. Barnett, *Eyewitness to a Genocide: The United Nations and Rwanda*, Ithaca, NY 2002; and M. Barnett and M. Finnemore, *The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of International Organizations*, in: *International Organization*, 53 (1999) 4, pp. 699–732.

9 See, for instance, A. Iriye, *Global Community: The Role of International Organizations in the Making of the Contemporary World*, Los Angeles, Berkeley, CA 2002; B. Reinalda (ed.), *Routledge History of International Organizations: From 1815 to the Present Day*, New York 2009; M. Herren, *Internationale Organisationen seit 1865. Eine Globalgeschichte der internationalen Ordnung*, Darmstadt 2009; D. MacKenzie, *A World Beyond Borders: An Introduction to the History of International Organizations*, Toronto 2010; M.G. Schlechter, *Historical Dictionary of International Organizations*, Lanham, MD 2010. With an emphasis on the UN see M. Mazower, *No Enchanted Palace. The End of Empire and the Ideological Origins of the United Nations*, Princeton, NJ 2009; but also M. Barnett and M. Finnemore, *Rules for the World: Organizations in Global Politics*, Ithaca, NJ 2004. For variations within the historical narrative see K. Dykmann and K. Naumann (eds.), *Change from the “Margins”: Non-European Actors, Ideas and Strategies in International Organizations*, in: *Comparativ*, 23 (2013) 4–5, pp. 9–21.

10 Based on M. Castells, *The Rise of the Network Society: Economy, Society, and Culture*, Malden/Massachusetts 1996. See A. Chandler Jr. and B. Mazlish (eds.), *Leviathans: Multinational Corporations and the New Global History*, Cambridge 2005; B. Unfried, J. Mitta, and M. van der Linden (eds.), *Transnational Networks in the 20th Century. Ideas and Practices, Individuals and Organizations*, Leipzig 2008.

11 For early conceptualizations, see B. Hettne, *Globalisation and the New Regionalism. The Second Great Transformation*, in: B. Hettne et al. (eds.), *Globalism and the New Regionalism*, Basingstoke, NY 1999, pp. 1–24; and A. Acharya, *Regionalism and the Emerging World Orders: Sovereignty, Autonomy, Identity*, in: S. Breslin et al. (eds.), *New Regionalism in the Global Political Economy. Theories and Cases*, London 2002, pp. 20–32.

12 See U. Engel et al. (eds.), *The New Politics of Regionalism. Perspectives from Africa, Latin America and Asia-Pacific*, London 2016.

13 See A. Hurrell, *One World? Many Worlds? The Place of Regions in the Study of International Society*, in: *International Affairs*, 83 (2007) 1, pp. 127–146; F. Söderbaum and T.M. Shaw (eds.), *Theories of New Regionalism. A Palgrave Reader*, London, New York 2003. See also A.J. Grant, T.M. Shaw, and S. Cornelissen (eds.), *The Ashgate Companion to Regionalism*, Farnham 2012; and F. Söderbaum, *Rethinking Regionalism*, London 2016.

14 Though it has been analysed mainly within the confines of a traditional political science perspective on the emergence of regional peace systems, or with reference to K.W. Deutsch (1968) as a security “community” in the making, or – recalling IR regime theory – as an emerging security “regime” that is based on an emerging

And, finally, linked to this question, there is a discussion on whether IOs exercise agency and sovereignty in their own right.¹⁵ In addition, there is a debate relevant for the argument to be developed here – on how norms, policies, and practices travel internationally – that is framed by IR political scientists in terms of diffusion,¹⁶ and by others in terms of cultural transfers.¹⁷

Obviously, the notion of sovereignty employed here calls for clarification. In the past, the term has been dominated by political-science thinking, and it was associated with an imagined “Westphalian system” of sovereign nation states, in which “sovereignty” governed the interaction between given, fixed-domestic, and foreign domains.¹⁸ Contemporary processes of globalization, which according to some observers, especially in the 1990s, have challenged or even undermined the sovereignty of the nation state,¹⁹ have been met by a reassessment of the extent to which state sovereignty is exercised in the international system.²⁰ In this debate, some authors emphasize the social con-

“epistemic community”. For the security community perspective – based on E. Adler and M. Barnett (eds.), *Security Communities*, Cambridge 1998 – see D.J. Francis, *Uniting Africa: Building Regional Peace and Security Systems*, Aldershot, Burlington, VT 2006. For the security regime perspective see U. Engel and J. Gomes Porto (eds.), *Africa’s New Peace and Security Architecture. Promoting Norms, Institutionalizing Solutions*, Farnham, Burlington, VT 2010; and U. Engel and J. Gomes Porto (eds.), *Towards an African Peace and Security Regime. Continental Embeddedness, Transnational Linkages, Strategic Relevance*, Farnham, Burlington, VT 2013. On the rise of particular epistemic communities, see P.M. Haas, *Epistemic Communities and the Dynamics of International Environment Cooperation*, in: V. Rittberger et al. (eds.), *Regime Theory and International Relations*, Oxford 2002 [1993], pp. 168–201.

- 15 Traditional IR holds that IOs are only the sum of the interests of their member states. In contrast, opponents of this claim argue that IOs (and their HQ in particular) develop identity, interests, and agency of their own. The debate has mainly focused on the EU. On increasing African agency in IR in general, see, for instance, W. Brown, *A Question of Agency: Africa in International Politics*, in: *Third World Quarterly*, 10 (2012) 1, pp. 1889–1908; and S. Harman and W. Brown, *In From the Margins? The Changing Place of Africa in International Relations*, in: *International Affairs*, 89 (2013) 1, pp. 69–87. With specific reference to the AUC, see U. Engel, *The Changing Role of the AU Commission in Inter-African Relations. The Case of APSA and AGA*, in: J.W. Harbeson and D. Rothchild (eds.), *Africa in World Politics. Engaging a Changing Global Order*, 5th ed., Boulder/Colorado 2013, pp. 186–206; and H. Hardt, *From States to Secretariats: Delegation in the African Union Peace and Security Council*, in: *African Security*, 9 (2016) 3, pp. 161–187.
- 16 Out of many contradictory contributions to this debate, see A. Acharya, *How Ideas Spread: Whose Norms Matter? Norm Localization and Institutional Change in Asian Regionalism*, in: *International Organization*, 58 (2004) 2, pp. 239–275; R. De Nevers, *Imposing International Norms: Great Powers and Norm Enforcement*, in: *International Studies Review*, 9 (2007) 1, pp. 53–80; B. Greenhill, *The Company You Keep: International Socialization and the Diffusion of Human Rights Norms*, in: *International Studies Quarterly*, 54 (2010) 1, pp. 127–145; and S. Zwingel, *How Do Norms Travel? Theorizing International Women’s Rights in Transnational Perspective*, in: *International Studies Quarterly*, 56 (2012) 1, pp. 115–129.
- 17 M. Espagne, *Comparison and Transfer: A Question of Method*, in: M. Middell and L. Roura (eds.), *Transnational Challenges to National History Writing*, Basingstoke, NY 2013, pp. 36–53.
- 18 For a critical discussion, see J. Bartelson, *A Genealogy of Sovereignty*, Cambridge 1995; W.C. Opello and S.J. Rosow, *The Nation-State and Global Order. A Historical Introduction to Contemporary Politics*, 2nd ed., Boulder, CO, London 2004 [1999]; and S. Elden, *Terror and Territory: The Spatial Extent of Sovereignty*, Minneapolis/Minnesota 2009.
- 19 See, for instance, K. Ohmae, *The End of the Nation State*, London 1995.
- 20 Fairly traditional perspectives have been proffered by A. James, *The Practice of Sovereign Statehood in Contemporary International Society*, in: R. Jackson (ed.), *Sovereignty at the Millennium. Special Issue of Political Studies*, 47 (1999) 3, pp. 35–51; and A.-M. Slaughter, *Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law*, Cambridge 2005. More adept ones: E.N. Kurtulus, *State Sovereignty – Concepts, Phenomenon and Ramifications*,

structiveness of sovereignty, including the ever-present assumption of the centrality of the nation state.²¹ While this debate mainly took place within the confines of political science, other disciplines developed a radically different point of view, in particular new political geography (or critical geography). Here, the “territorial trap” of political science, i.e. its unquestioned reliance on fixed spatial entities (“containers”) and the ontological “fetishization” of space as states, has been heavily criticized.²²

This critique of what is considered to be conventional wisdom in political science was triggered by a careful reading of the so-called spatial turn in the humanities and social sciences.²³ In a variety of newly emerging academic fields – global history, new political geography, but also in many “new” sociologies ranging from “urban” to “migration” to “transnational social spaces”²⁴ – this gave rise to a reconsideration of the spatialization of power and sovereignty, with an interest in how exactly new territorializations of power and sovereignty are negotiated and how specific “regimes of territorialization” come into being.²⁵ In this reading, “globalization” is, essentially, understood as the permanent dialectic of processes of deterritorialization on the one hand and reterritorialization on the other, or the interplay between “flows” and “controls.”²⁶

To summarize, there are at least three shortcomings of contemporary research in political science on IOs and their HQ. First, little work is done on the interactions among various HQ of IOs, as a particular form of interregionalism. Secondly, the dialectic of how spe-

New York 2005, and S. Sassen, *Territory, Authority, Rights: From Medieval to Global Assemblages*, Princeton, NJ 2006.

21 See A. Hurrell, *Regionalism in Theoretical Perspective*, in: L. Fawcett and A. Hurrell (eds.), *Regionalism in World Politics*, Oxford 1995, pp. 37–73; T.J. Biersteker and C. Weber, *The Social Construction of State Sovereignty*, in: T.J. Biersteker and C. Weber (eds.), *State Sovereignty as a Social Construct*, Cambridge 1996, pp. 1–21; A. Osander, *Sovereignty, International Relations, and the Westphalian Myth*, in: *International Organization*, 55 (2001) 2, pp. 251–287, and D. Zaum, *The Sovereignty Paradox. The Norms and Politics of International Statebuilding*, Oxford 2007.

22 Important contributions have been made by, among others, J. Agnew, *The Territorial Trap: The Geographical Assumptions of International Relations Theory*, in: *Review of International Political Economy*, 1 (1994) 1, pp. 53–80; N. Brenner, *Beyond State-Centrism? Space, Territoriality, and Geographical Scale in Globalization Studies*, in: *Theory and Society*, 28 (1999) 1, pp. 39–78; A. Appadurai, *Sovereignty without Territoriality: Notes for a Postnational Geography*, in: S.M. Low and D. Lawrence-Zúñiga (eds.), *The Anthropology of Space and Place. Locating Culture*, Oxford 2003, pp. 337–349; J. Agnew, *Sovereignty Regimes: Territoriality and State Authority in Contemporary World Politics*, in: *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, 95 (2005) 2, pp. 437–461. With regards to Africa, see, for instance, A. Mbembe, *At the Edge of the World: Boundaries, Territoriality, and Sovereignty in Africa*, in: R. Beissinger and C. Young (eds.), *Beyond State Crisis?*, Washington D.C. 2002, pp. 53–80, as well as U. Engel and G.R. Olsen, *Authority, Sovereignty and Africa's Changing Regimes of Territorialisation*, in: S. Cornelissen, F. Cheru, and T.M. Shaw (eds.), *Africa and International Relations in the 21st Century: Still Challenging Theory?*, Farnham 2012, pp. 51–65.

23 H. Lefebvre, *The Production of Space*, London 1991 [1974], and E.W. Soja, *Postmodern Geographies: The Reassertion of Space on Critical Social Theory*, London 1989.

24 Some of the new sociologies stress the importance of transnational dynamics. See L. Pries (ed.), *Rethinking Transnationalism. The Meso-link of Organisations*, Abingdon, Oxford 2008.

25 See M. Middell and U. Engel, *Bruchzonen der Globalisierung, globale Krisen und Territorialitätsregimes – Kategorien einer Globalgeschichtsschreibung*, in: *Comparativ*, 15 (2005) 5/6, pp. 5–38, inter alia, developed out of reflections on C. Maier, *Consigning the Twentieth Century to History: Alternative Narratives for the Modern Era*, in: *American Historical Review*, 105 (2000) 3, pp. 807–831.

26 See Brenner (fn. 22) and Appadurai (fn. 22).

cific spatialities of power and sovereignty shape the way IOs operate, and how symbolic and social space around their HQ is created and becomes a resource or constraint for their own operations, needs to be understood both empirically and conceptually. And, thirdly, there is a need to better integrate the research on the historicity of these processes: when and under what circumstances did HQ of IOs assume the new, claimed quality of becoming hubs of globalization processes? Thus, the role and functioning of HQ of IOs in contemporary processes of globalization calls for stronger empirical grounding and further conceptualization.

3. Case Study: The AUC's Peace and Security Policies

The AU was established on 26 May 2001, as successor to the OAU. At the centre of this transformation was an evaluation of past OAU policies on peace and security, and their obvious limits.²⁷ Growing out of this debate, new norms emerged and new institutions were established, as will be detailed below. Starting with the 1992 UN secretary general's Agenda for Peace,²⁸ with its emphasis on preventive diplomacy, a process of norm-making, norm-transfer, and norm-appropriation was set into motion, in which the two IOs – the UN and the OAU / AU – influenced each other. A year later, in 1993, the OAU secretary general issued a report, titled “Resolving Conflicts in Africa. Implementation Options.”²⁹ The empirical cases for the origin of new norms were partly based in Africa – such as Rwanda, Sierra Leone, or Liberia – but even though the locus of the debate was African, there was also, to a certain extent, an intertwined process of external norm-making; most obviously, this was the case with the debate on “humanitarian interventions” and the “Responsibility to Protect” (R2P).³⁰ With the transformation of the OAU into the AU, an African version of this debate gained momentum. R2P was conceptualized in terms of the principle of “non-indifference.”³¹ As a consequence, the Constitutive Act of

27 See K. van Walraven, *Dreams of Power. The Role of the Organization of African Unity in the Politics of Africa 1963-1993*, Aldershot 1999, and K.M. Khamis, *Promoting the African Union*, Washington, DC 2008.

28 UN Secretary-General (UNSG), *An Agenda for Peace. Preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-keeping*, UN doc. A/47/277 – S/24111, 31 January 1992.

29 OAU Secretary-General, *Resolving Conflicts in Africa. Implementation Options*, Addis Ababa 1993.

30 Cf. N. Wheeler, *Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society*, Oxford 2000. See also International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), *The Responsibility to Protect. Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty*, Ottawa 2001, and United Nations, *A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility. Report of the Secretary-General's High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change*, New York 2004.

31 See B. Kioko, *The Right of Intervention Under the African Union's Constitutive Act: From Non-Interference to Non-Intervention*, in: *International Review of the Red Cross*, 85 (2003) 852, pp. 807–824; T. Murithi, *The Responsibility to Protect as Enshrined in Article 4 of the Constitutive Act of the African Union*, in: *African Security Review*, 16 (2007) 3, pp. 14–24, and P.D. Williams, *From Non-Intervention to Non-Indifference: The Origins and Development of the African Union's Security Culture*, in: *African Affairs*, 106 (2007) 423, pp. 253–280. On UN-AU relations, see R. Tavares, T. Felício, *The Responsibility to Protect by African Organizations: A New Trend in the Cooperation Between the UN and Regional Organizations*, in: Engel and Gomes Porto (eds.), *Towards an African Peace and Security Regime* (fn 14), pp. 53–70.

the African Union (2000) provides for the right of the union to intervene in the internal affairs of otherwise sovereign member states, in cases of gross human rights violations, genocide, and other crimes against humanity.³²

On the basis of this shift in norms, which guided the transformation from OAU to the AU, an African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) was designed. It is built on five institutional pillars: a Peace and Security Council (PSC); an African Standby Force (ASF); a Panel of the Wise; a Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), and a Peace Fund.³³ This architecture is matched by an African Governance Architecture (AGA), which is based on the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (see below).³⁴ Linked to processes of institutionalization and professionalization, at least in relevant pockets of the continental body,³⁵ the AUC has increasingly become an actor in its own right. Together with a coalition of like-minded member states, it is the driver of the union's new peace and security agenda.³⁶ However, it has to be noted that, over time, member states follow different and changing interests; the new norms are permanently renegotiated, and that this happens in an environment of high financial dependency on international donors and little ownership of the new institutions and norms by member states.³⁷

3.1 Densification

According to the AUC and the PSC, current processes of globalization in and around Africa have prompted specific dynamics in the field of peace and security. These dynamics are experienced as threats to "order and stability." For instance, in the biannual report on the state of peace and security on the continent presented to the AU Assembly, the PSC lists the following specific areas of concern in January 2016:³⁸

32 Organization of African Unity, Constitutive Act ... (fn. 1), §4(h).

33 Organization of African Unity, Constitutive Act ... (fn. 1), and African Union, Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union, Addis Ababa 2002. See also S.F. Makinda and F.W. Okumu, *The African Union: Challenges of Globalization, Security, and Governance*, Abingdon 2008; U. Engel and J. Gomes Porto, *The Africa Union's New Peace and Security Architecture: Towards an Evolving Security Regime?*, in: *African Security*, 2 (2009) 2/3, pp. 82–96; Engel and Gomes Porto (eds.), *Africa's New Peace and Security Architecture* (fn. 14); and U. Engel, *The African Union's Peace and Security Architecture – From Aspiration to Operationalization*, in: J. Harbeson and D. Rothchild (ed.) *Africa in World Politics*, 6th ed., Boulder, CO, pp. 262–282.

34 AU Assembly of Heads of State and Government, *African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance*. Adopted at the 8th Ordinary Session of the AU Assembly held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. Assembly/AU/Dec.147 (VIII), 30 January 2007.

35 See L.M. Fisher et al., *Moving Africa Forward. African Peace And Security Architecture (APSA). 2010 Assessment*, Addis Ababa 2010, and L. Nathan et al., *African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). 2014 Assessment Study. Final Report*, Addis Ababa 2015. With regard to the operationalization of the APSA, see also African Union, *APSA Roadmap 2016-2010*, Addis Ababa 2016.

36 Engel and Gomes Porto, *The African Union's New Peace and Security Architecture* (fn. 33).

37 Engel, *The Changing Role* (fn. 15); A. Witt, *The African Union and Contested Political Order(s)*, in: Engel and Gomes Porto, *Towards an African Peace and Security Regime* (fn. 14), pp. 11–30, and U. Engel, *The African Union finances – How Does it Work?*, Leipzig 2015.

38 AU Assembly of Heads of State and Government 2016, *Report of the Peace and Security Council on its Activities and the State of Peace and Security in Africa* [Assembly/AU/2 (XXVII)], Addis Ababa, 29 January 2016. This list, in fact, is more comprehensive than more recent ones. For an update, see AU Assembly of Heads of State and

- on-going conflicts: Abyei (Sudan), Libya, South Sudan, Western Sahara;
- PSOs: Central African Republic (CAR), Darfur (Sudan), Mali, Somalia;
- post-conflict situations: Comoros, Côte d'Ivoire, Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC, related to the M23), Eritrea/Ethiopia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau;
- unconstitutional changes of government (UCG): Burundi, Burkina Faso, CAR, Madagascar, Mali;
- terrorism and violent extremism: al-Mourabitoun, al-Qaeda in the Maghreb, Ansar Dine, Ansar Bait al-Maqdis (Egypt), Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (Mouvement pour l'unicité et le jihad en Afrique de l'Ouest, MUJAO), the so-called Islamic State Provinces (Sinai, Libya, and Tunisia), al-Shabaab, Boko Haram, the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA);
- “non-traditional security topics”: Ebola, El Niño, illicit financial flows.

These conflicts are a manifestation of changes in the nature of violent conflict in Africa since the end of the Cold War; the re-spacing of social relations in Africa, and the ongoing renegotiation of spatialities of power beyond the nation state.³⁹ In the 1990s literature, it is argued that contemporary conflicts do not typically have a precise beginning, since in the vast majority of cases there are no formal declarations of war that would indicate the initiation of hostilities; contemporary armed conflicts conspicuously lack definitive battles, decisive campaigns, and formal endings (they “typically last for decades”), and they are fought by loosely-knit groups of regulars, irregulars, cells, and frequently by locally-based warlords under little to no central authority. The London School of Economics (LSE) global-governance scholar Mary Kaldor has coined the term “new wars,”⁴⁰ for in these conflicts, organized violence targets civilians in a particular, instrumentalist way; conflict of ethnic identities has replaced ideological issues, and violent conflict often occurs within and not between states. Others observed that the distinction between war (understood as violence between states or organized political groups for political motives), organized crime, and large-scale violations of human rights is largely blurred, and that “new wars” are often related to specific political economies characterized by the plunder of natural resources (e.g. diamonds, oil, coltan); black markets for illegal trade in arms, drugs, or valuable commodities; external assistance by diaspora communities, and support from neighbouring governments.⁴¹

In the last two decades, research on violent conflict in Africa stresses the multiplicity of actor roles a single person can assume (e.g. illegal trader, “rebel,” and/or transnational jihadist); the relevance of networks rather than clear-cut groups, including transnational

Government 2017, Report of the Peace and Security Council on its Activities and the State of Peace and Security in Africa [Assembly/AU/Dec.629 (XXVIII)], Addis Ababa, 31 January 2017.

39 See U. Engel and P. Nugent (eds.), *Rescaling Africa*, Leiden, Boston, MA 2009. See also Engel and Olsen (fn. 22).

40 M. Kaldor, *New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era*, Cambridge 1999.

41 M. van Creveld, *The Transformation of War*, New York 1991, and K. Holsti, *The State, War and the State of War*, Stanford, CA 1996. For a critique of the “new wars” paradigm, see the late S. Ellis, *The Old Roots of Africa's New Wars*, in: *Internationale Politik und Gesellschaft*, (2003) 2, pp. 29–43, and S. Kalyvas, “New” and “Old” Civil Wars: A Valid Distinction?, in: *World Politics*, 51 (2001) 1, pp. 99–118.

interventions; the importance of conflicts at the margins of territories and in transnational theatres of operation (spaces in between, borderlands, etc.) rather than containerized (i.e. national or state-to-state) conflicts, and the increasing targeting of civilians, especially women and children, as well as the displacement of civilians.⁴² Often overlooked forms of violent conflict include low-level, ad hoc violence (often performed by non-state armed groups); xenophobic violence; localized violence (e.g. conflicts around cattle rustling), and routinized violence (for instance, during legitimate strikes).⁴³ In order to recontextualize these violent conflicts in current processes of globalization, proper attention should also be given to the external dynamics impacting the African continent; among others, these include the United States's Global War on Terrorism (and its successors in disguise); Wahhabi proselytizing (with adverse effects on Sufi communities); the global jihadist movement (e.g. variations of al-Qaeda or al-Shabaab, including the arrival of Western fighters following a script seen in Bosnia, Kashmir, or Chechnya); transnational drug trafficking (especially from Latin America), and local food insecurity as a result of external actors' food production strategies in Africa (more prominently referred to as "land grabbing").

In response to this multiplicity of factors shaping violent conflict on the continent, the AU has developed a set of specific practices. In this process, it has partnered with the UN (and the European Union [EU]). This strategy can be described as sovereignty boosting.⁴⁴ As Runa Reta argues, this cooperation developed against the backdrop of a re-evaluation of UN activities on the continent, after a decade of failed UN missions in Africa, because the AU offered itself as a reliable regional ally that could rally the political will of member states.⁴⁵ According to the late veteran African diplomat Margaret Vogt, relations between the OAU and the UN were rather based on comparative advantages, as the former lacked "the institutional structure, managerial capacity and resources to manage a peacekeeping operation properly."⁴⁶ Or, as a joint AU-UN panel on modalities for support to the AU peacekeeping operations put it in 2008, the partnership should be

42 See W. Reno, *Warfare in Independent Africa*, New York 2011; P.D. Williams, *War and Conflict in Africa*, Cambridge 2011, and S. Straus, *Making and Unmaking Nations. War, Leadership, and Genocide in Modern Africa*, Ithaca NY 2015.

43 See S. Straus, *Wars Do End! Changing Patterns of Political Violence in Sub-Saharan Africa*, in: *African Affairs*, 111 (2012) 444, pp. 179–201.

44 Following Agnew, *Globalization and Sovereignty* (fn. 22), and F. Söderbaum, *Modes of Regional Governance in Africa: Neoliberalism, Sovereignty-boosting and Shadow Networks*, *Global Governance*, 10 (2004) 4, pp. 419–436.

45 R. Reta, *Joint African Union-United Nations Peacekeeping Efforts: A Dangerous Liaison?*, in: *Le Panoptique*, 1 September 2007 <http://www.ia-forum.org/Content/ViewInternalDocument.cfm?ContentID=6100> (accessed 21 November 2017).

46 M.A. Vogt, *Co-operation Between the UN and the OAU in the Management of African Conflicts*, in: M. Malan (ed.) *Whither Peacekeeping in Africa?*, Pretoria 1999, Pretoria, <http://www.issafrica.org/publications/monographs/monograph-36-whither-peacekeeping-in-africa-edited-by-mark-malan> (accessed 25 August 2013). For prior relations between the UN and the OAU/AU, see also M.A. Vogt, *Conflict, Resolution and Peace-Keeping – The Organization of African Unity and the United Nations*, in G.M. Sørbo and P. Vale (eds.), *Out of Conflict. From War to Peace in Africa*, Uppsala 1997, pp. 57–78, and M.A. Vogt, *The UN and Africa's Regional Organisations*, in A. Adebajo (ed.), *From Global Apartheid to Global Village. Africa and the United Nations*, Scottsville 2009, pp. 251–268.

based on the exercise of the two organizations' respective comparative advantages (and avoidance of "the perception that the United Nations is subcontracting peacekeeping to the African Union"),⁴⁷ i.e. the AU's ability to provide a rapid response in the regions concerned and the UN's capacity for sustained operation.

Faced with what were seen as serious peace and security challenges in Africa, the emerging partnership focused on practices around two issues: peacekeeping and mediation, which were supported by development assistance to the AU.⁴⁸ To foster this partnership, the respective HQ established special formats of interaction. However, a critique has been raised that the nature of this partnership is ad hoc and technical, rather than political and strategic.⁴⁹ In 2014, the UN and the AU established a Joint United Nations-African Union Framework for an Enhanced Partnership in Peace and Security, and they are now regularly signing "UN-AU Framework[s] for an Enhanced Partnership in Peace and Security" to guide their bilateral relation.⁵⁰

The most pronounced element of the AU-UN partnership evolved around peacekeeping in the ongoing conflict in Darfur, Sudan.⁵¹ In December 2007, the AU Mission in the Sudan (AMIS) was transformed into the AU-UN Hybrid Mission in Darfur (UNAMID).⁵² As the chairperson of the AUC recalls:

As part of the transition to UNAMID, the UN provided a light and a heavy support package to AMIS, funded through UN assessed contributions. In establishing UNAMID, the two institutions ventured into the practicalities of harnessing the advantages that the UN enjoys due to its universal character and those of the AU due to its regional character

47 UN General Assembly (UNGA) and UN Security Council (UNSC), Report of the African Union-United Nations Panel on Modalities for Support to the African Union Peacekeeping Operations, A/63/666 and S/2008/813, 31 December 2008, p. 39.

48 See UNSC, Presidential Statement on the Relationship between the United Nations and Regional Organizations, in Particular the AU, in the Maintenance of International Peace and Security, S/PRST/2007/7, 28 March 2007. See also D.Y. Wondemagegnehu, The African Union-United Nations Inter-Organizational Cooperation for Peace: Unraveling an Emerging Partnership, Leipzig 2017.

49 See AUC Chairperson, Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the Partnership between the African Union and the United Nations in Peace and Security: Towards Greater Strategic and Political Coherence, PSC/PR/2 (CCCVII), 9 January 2012.

50 See Joint United Nations-African Union Framework for Enhanced Partnership in Peace and Security. New York, 19 April 2017 (mimeo). See also U. Engel, The African Union and the United Nations: Crafting international partnerships in the field of peace and security, in A. Adebajo (ed.), The African Union: Regional and Global Challenges, London, New York (forthcoming).

51 Cf. C.D. Coning, The Emerging UN/AU Peacekeeping Partnership, in: Conflict Trends, (2010) 1, pp. 3–10; Institute for Security Studies, Summary Report of Seminar on The AU Report on the AU and UN Partnership: Towards a Comprehensive Redefinition of the Interface between the Regional and the Global?, Pretoria 2012; P.D. Williams and A. Bourtellis, Partnership Peacekeeping: Challenges and Opportunities in the United Nations-African Union Relationship, in: African Affairs, 113 (2014) 451, pp. 254–278; A. Bourtellis and P. Williams, Peace Operations, the African Union, and the United Nations: Toward More Effective Partnerships in Peace Operations, New York 2013, and P.D. Williams and S.A. Dersso, Saving Strangers and Neighbors: Advancing UN-AU Cooperation on Peace Operations, New York, 2015.

52 See AU PSC, Report by the Chairperson of the Commission and the Secretary-General of the United Nations on the Hybrid Operation in Darfur, PSC 79th meeting, PSC/PR/2 (LXXIX), 22 June 2007; and UNSC, Resolution S/RES/1769, 31 July 2007.

*and other relevant factors. UNAMID is essentially an interesting experiment of marrying universalism and regionalism.*⁵³

Yet, Darfur remained the only hybrid AU-UN mission. Though the UN supports, for instance, the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), which was authorized by the AU PSC on 19 January 2007,⁵⁴ it clearly favours an African lead in this second major peace support operation of the union, which should be based on a clear though somewhat limited mandate (which, for instance, does not include antipiracy activities), as can be deduced from the current debate on the future of AMISOM.⁵⁵ In two cases – the CAR and Mali – AU-led missions have been transformed into UN-led missions: in 2013 the African-led International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA) transited to the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (Mission multidimensionnelle intégrée des Nations unies pour la stabilisation au Mali, MINUSMA), and in 2014 the International Support Mission in the CAR (Mission Internationale de Soutien à la Centrafrique sous conduite Africaine, MISCA) changed to the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the CAR (Mission multidimensionnelle intégrée des Nations unies pour la stabilisation en Centrafrique, MINUSCA). However, in Somalia, the initial vision of the AU of transitioning AMISOM to a UN peacekeeping operation has not yet taken place. Above all, the UN remained an important source of funding for AU PSOs – with an average cost of some \$7 billion per year.⁵⁶

The second area of the emerging AU-UN partnership revolves around mediation in ongoing conflicts, in particular in Darfur.⁵⁷ As the chairperson of the AUC recalls:

In May 2005, the then Chairperson of the AU Commission appointed Dr. Salim Ahmed Salim, former OAU Secretary-General, as the AU Special Envoy for the Inter-Sudanese Political Talks on Darfur. While Dr. Salim worked closely with the UN Mediator, Mr.

53 AUC Chairperson (fn. 49), §61. For more background on the field of peace support operations and the AU/UN partnership in this area see UN Secretary-General, A Regional-Global Security Partnership: Challenges and Opportunities. Report by the Secretary-General, A/61/204 – S/2006/590, 28 July 2006, and Report of the Secretary-General on the Relationship between the United Nations and Regional Organizations, in particular the African Union, in the Maintenance of International Peace and Security, S/2008/186, 7 April 2008. See also UNSC, Presidential Statement, S/PRST/2010/21, 22 October 2010; and AU PSC, Report of the Chairperson ... (fn. 50); and Note on the Report of the African Union-United Nations Panel on Modalities for Support to African Union Peacekeeping Operations, PSC 178th meeting, PSC/PR/2 (CLXXVIII), 13 September 2009.

54 AU PSC, Communiqué on AMISOM adopted at the 69th PSC meeting, PSC/PR/Comm. (LXIX), 19 January 2007, and UNSC, Report by the Chairperson of the [AU] Commission Pursuant to Paragraph 21 of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2036 (2012) on United Nations Support to the African Union Mission in Somalia, S/2012/176, 26 March 2012.

55 See AU PSC, Report of the African Union Commission on the Strategic Review of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), presented at the 356th PSC meeting, PSC/PR/2 (CCCLVI), 27 February 2013.

56 Engel, The AU Finances (fn. 37). See also UN Peacekeeping Fact Sheet <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/factsheet.shtml> (accessed 24 October 2017).

57 However, this field of mediation is not closely related to other ongoing mediation efforts by the AU and the RECs in the case of unconstitutional changes of government or election-related violence. See U. Engel (ed.), New Mediation Practices in African Conflicts, Leipzig 2012. A process of reassessing lessons learned in African mediation is currently underway and coordinated by the secretariat of the AU Panel of the Wise.

*Jan Eliasson, nonetheless it was difficult for them always to harmonize their positions. Thus the Mediators themselves argued for the need for the appointment of a single joint Mediator who would present a unified position to the parties. Thus, in June 2008, the Secretary-General of the UN and I appointed Mr. Djibril Yipènè Bassolé as the Joint AU-UN Chief Mediator for Darfur (JCM), to lead the efforts to reach a negotiated solution of the protracted conflict in Darfur.*⁵⁸

Finally, this process led to the signing of the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur on 14 July 2011. Another example of the emerging partnership in mediation was the 2007/2008 post-electoral conflict in Kenya, where Kofi Annan assumed a major role in a situation when the AU did not have a mediation unit:

*The AU and UN have embarked on successful partnerships in mediation in other theatres, most notably in Kenya in 2008. The Panel of Eminent African Personalities, which was chaired by former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, was established by the AU to mediate in the post-electoral conflict between the two main parties in Kenya, following the disputed elections of December 2007.*⁵⁹

These two forms of cooperation between the AU and the UN were supported by UN-sponsored forms of “capacity-building”: on 16 November 2006, in Addis Ababa, the chairperson of the AUC and the UN secretary general signed a Declaration on Enhancing UN-AU Cooperation: Framework for the Ten Year Capacity Building Programme for the AU,⁶⁰ which was drafted in response to the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document.

In combination, these various practices led to a densification of experiences and responses to contemporary globalization processes in the field of peace and security. Basically, through the HQ of the two IOs, joint understandings and policy responses were negotiated and facilitated, effectively leading to an advanced level of synchronization of problem perception and problem-solving strategies.

3.2 Social Space of Communication

Emerging practices in PSOs and mediation called for improved and more institutionalized channels of communication between the HQ of the AU and the UN. First and foremost, this pertained to the AU PSC and the UN Security Council (UNSC). On 14 December 2006, the union’s PSC decided to establish a coordination and consultation mechanism between itself and the UNSC.⁶¹ Two years later, a panel was established

58 AUC Chairperson (fn. 49), §72.

59 AUC Chairperson (fn. 49), §79. The AU Mediation Support Unit was finally established in 2016.

60 Ibid.

61 AU PSC, Decision on the Establishment of a Coordination and Consultation Mechanism between the African Union Peace and Security Council and the United Nations Security Council. Adopted at the 68th PSC meeting, PSC/PR/Comm. (LXVIII), 14 December 2006.

between the two.⁶² On 1 July 2010, a UN Office to the AU (UNOAU) was opened, headed by a special representative of the UN secretary general. In the same year, on 25 September 2010, the UN secretary general and the chairperson of the AUC launched the AU-UN Joint Task Force (JTF) on Peace and Security to coordinate “immediate and long-term strategic issues of common interest between the two organizations.”⁶³ Again the AUC’s chairperson summarizes:

*The PSC and the UNSC have established close links. Since 2007, the two organs have organized five consultative meetings, alternating between Addis Ababa ... and New York ... The partnership between the two Councils is based on the recognition that successful collective action relies on an effective cooperation between the two organs.*⁶⁴

And furthermore:

*Significantly, the annual consultations are not between the two Councils, but rather between the PSC and members of the UNSC. Moreover, the consultations have been limited due to time constraints.*⁶⁵

In addition, at an operational level, assessments of joint missions increasingly play a role in establishing lessons learned and best practice, at times involving additional actors, such as the EU or the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).⁶⁶ More generally, this partnership is supported by regular meetings of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Conflict Prevention and Resolution in Africa at the UN in New York. To organize communication at these different policy levels, the AU had to establish, both at strategic policy and at desk officer levels, focal points, procedures, and routines that would enable it to systematically link its HQ to that of the UN; to translate AU decisions to the UN, and to learn to read the UN.⁶⁷ Thus, the increased entanglements on peace and security issues not only linked the HQ of the AU and the UN as sites of collaboration, but also created a social space between the two IOs.

3.3 Cultural Learning

This last section offers an analysis of knowledge transfer and production, evolving around peace and security in the social space of collaboration, that has emerged between the AU and the UN. How exactly is the union making use of the social and cultural capital acquired in interaction with other HQ of IOs? The specific forms of cultural learning

62 UNGA/UNSC (fn. 47), and UNSC, Presidential Statement, S/PRST/2009/3, 18 March 2009.

63 AUC Chairperson (fn. 49), §57.

64 Ibid., §42.

65 Ibid., §44.

66 On a joint assessment mission, one year after the UGC in Guinea-Bissau on 12 April 2012 by ECOWAS, the AU, the EU, the UN, and the Community of Portuguese Language Countries (Comunidade dos Países de Língua Portuguesa, CPLP) see AU, Report of the Joint ECOWAS/AU/CPLP/EU/UN Assessment Mission to Guinea-Bissau [16–21 December 2012], Addis Ababa 2013 (mimeo).

67 See Engel, *The African Union and the United Nations* (fn. 50).

observed in this case study is looked at in two areas: conflict prevention, and the emergence of new intergovernmental norms and a related set of practices. At first glance, the common denominator in both cases is that the union is acting in a policy field, where the initial process of defining policy responses seems to rest with the UN (one could, of course, easily argue that some of the issues emerged in parallel and that there are always some African roots to a particular debate). In a second step, the AU then, through interaction with the HQ of several IOs (and not only the UN), adapts and develops concrete tailor-made solutions for its purposes. These are mainly at the level of principles and norms. In a third step, which could be described as creatively developing innovations, the AU is actually implementing certain policies of its own.

3.3.1 Conflict Prevention

The international debate on conflict prevention emerged in the mid 1990s at different places and in parallel, mainly in response to developments in the Balkans and in Rwanda. Apart from the European dialogue between the EU Commission and various advocacy international NGOs, the UN system was the most important site to frame this debate.⁶⁸ In 1998, the UN secretary general established a crucial distinction between operational conflict prevention on the one hand – involving early warning, preventive diplomacy, preventive deployment, and early humanitarian action – and structural prevention on the other, involving preventive disarmament, development, and peace building.⁶⁹ When the OAU was transformed into the AU during the years 1999–2002, the main mandate of this new institution was the prevention, management, and resolution of violent conflict; hence the core objective of the continental body is the promotion of peace, security, and stability in Africa.⁷⁰ Among others, the AU is based on the principles of peaceful resolution of conflicts among member states of the union “through such appropriate means as may be decided upon by the Assembly,” as well as “respect for democratic principles, human rights, the rule of law and good governance.”⁷¹ To further these objectives and support its principles, the union’s policies of preventive diplomacy and conflict prevention involve key actors and institutions, first and foremost but not exclusively the PSC, the AUC chairperson, the Panel of the Wise, and the CEWS.

Once member states had adopted conflict prevention as their policy (it already featured strongly in the 1993 OAU Mechanisms for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, but now really took centre stage), the AUC was tasked to develop detailed implementation roadmaps towards the operationalization of these policies. Here, a number of truly innovative decisions were taken, also in comparison to other IOs. This holds true,

68 See U. Engel, *Conflict Prevention and Early Warning*, in M. Middell (ed.), *Routledge Handbook on Transregional Studies*, London (forthcoming).

69 UNGA/UNSC, *The Causes of Conflict and the Promotion of Durable Peace and Sustainable Development in Africa*. Report of the Secretary-General, A/52/871 – S/1998/318, 13 April 1998.

70 Organization of African Unity, *Constitutive Act ...* (fn. 1), §3 (f).

71 *Ibid.*, §54 (e), (m).

for instance, for CEWS, which started to partly adopt UN templates for conflict analysis, but then changed them according to its own needs and embedded them in a far broader set of analytical and IT-driven tools.⁷² In the end, the AUC came up with a sophisticated early-warning system that is currently being coordinated and harmonized with related mechanisms of the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) and within the AUC.⁷³ Likewise, the union struggles with the concept of structural conflict prevention, especially because it is usually preoccupied in fire-fighting mode with ongoing conflicts. In fact, the PSC has drawn attention to a number of serious institutional challenges, which include

*... the lack of effective preventive structures in many African countries, inconsistency in the implementation of some of the continental policy instruments, lack of capacity and resources that could allow the AU to intervene timely in some crisis situations before they escalate, and lack of the necessary clout to dissuade actors from engaging in activities that could lead to conflict.*⁷⁴

Self-critically, the PSC posits that the Union's

*... lack of capacity constitutes a challenge for conflict prevention in that the continental body often has to rely on external support to enable it to implement many of its own policy recommendations, a situation that has at least two major consequences. One is that it is beholden to the decisions of external actors and their appreciation of the pertinence and urgency of its pronouncement. This means that many opportunities may be lost for timely action for preventive purposes. A second consequence is the message this situation sends to actors targeted by preventive action, as these actors often perceive AU's injunctions as toothless, and are therefore not deterred.*⁷⁵

Inspired by the ECOWAS, the AUC therefore has developed a Continental Structural Conflict Prevention Framework (which was endorsed by the RECs in June 2013 and the PSC in April 2014):⁷⁶

Structural prevention is composed of measures to address structural/root causes of violent conflict. ... Structural prevention activities should support inter alia the balancing of political, economic, social and cultural opportunities among all segments of society, contributing to the strengthening of democratic legitimacy, effectiveness of governance, peaceful conciliation of group interests, bridging of dividing lines among different seg-

72 Cf. E.-G. Wane et al., The Continental Early Warning System: Methodology and Approach, in: Engel and Gomes Porto, Africa's New Peace and Security Architecture (fn 14), pp. 91–111.

73 See African Union Commission, Meeting the Challenges of Conflict Prevention in Africa. Towards the Operationalization of the Continental Early Warning System, Leipzig.

74 PSC, Report of the Peace and Security Council on its Activities and the State of Peace and Security in Africa, Assembly/AU/5 (XXI), 26 May 2013, Addis Ababa, §164.

75 Ibid., §165.

76 ECOWAS, The ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework (Regulation SC/REG.1/01/08), mimeo. See AU PSC, Communiqué issued after the 502nd PSC meeting held in Addis Ababa on 29 April 2015 [PSC/PR/COMM.2(DII)].

*ments of society. It includes longer term measures designed to address the structural causes of conflict at a very early stage through: [preventive peace-building, preventive disarmament, and preventive development].*⁷⁷

The main purpose behind this process is to take the policy coordination and harmonization role described in the 2002 Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union⁷⁸ seriously and to overcome the above-mentioned deficits in operationalizing the APSA. In 2012/2013, fresh momentum was given to this debate by the political crisis in Mali, where France intervened in January 2013 to prevent a takeover of the country by armed jihadist movements.⁷⁹

3.3.2 New Intergovernmental Norms

The AU is based on a commitment to democratic values, good governance, and respect for human rights, as well as adherence to universal principles as enshrined in the 1945 UN Charter and the 1948 Universal Declaration on Human Rights.⁸⁰ Commitment of member states to these core values varies considerably; most norms are contested and constantly renegotiated. Therefore, it is of particular relevance that the AUC, in coalition with a number of like-minded member states, managed to frame an African discourse on “shared values.”⁸¹ Closely linked to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (1981), the union picked up a debate on UCGs, which the OAU had already started in the mid 1990s.⁸² In response to cases of electoral violence, debates on extra-constitutional presidential third terms, which often turn violent, and a resurgence of coups d’état, the union came up with a firm position on how to address UCGs. It developed a policy script that increasingly has been enacted since 2008.⁸³

UCGs were defined as (1) a military coup d’état against a democratically elected government; (2) an intervention by mercenaries to replace a democratically-elected govern-

77 African Union, Draft Continental Structural Conflict Prevention Framework, Addis Ababa 2013 (mimeo), §28.

78 African Union, PSC Protocol ... (fn. 33).

79 As for the recent AU debate on preventive diplomacy, see AU PSC, Communiqué issued after the 360th PSC meeting, PSC/PR/COMM (CCCLX), 22 March 2013.

80 Organization of African Unity, Constitutive Act ... (fn. 1); United Nations, Charter of the United Nations. San Francisco, 26 June 1945, <http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/>, and United Nations, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted by the UN General Assembly on 10 December 1948, <http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr> (accessed 24 October 2017).

81 AU Assembly, Declaration on the Theme of the Summit: “Towards Greater Unity and Integration through Shared Values.” Adopted at the 16th Ordinary Session of the AU Assembly held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, Assembly/AU/Decl.1 (XVI), 30–31 January 2011.

82 African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights 1981. Adopted at the 17th Ordinary Assembly of OAU Heads of States and Government held in Nairobi, Kenya, on 24–27 June 1981, CAB/LEG/67/3 rev.5, <http://www.hrcr.org/docs/Banjul/afhr.html> (accessed 24 October 2017). See I. Souaré, The AU and the Challenge of Unconstitutional Changes of Government in Africa, Pretoria 2009, and K. Sturman, Unconstitutional Changes of Government: The Democrat’s Dilemma in Africa, Johannesburg 2011.

83 AUC Chairperson, Report of the Chairperson of the Commission to the PSC on the Prevention of Unconstitutional Changes of Government and Strengthening the Capacities of the African Union to Manage Such Situations, Assembly/AU/4 (XIV), Addis Ababa 2010. See also U. Engel, The African Union and Mediation in Cases of Unconstitutional Changes of Government, 2008–2011, in: Engel, New Mediation Practices ... (fn. 57), pp. 55–82.

ment; (3) the replacement of democratically-elected governments by armed dissident groups and rebel movements, or (4) the refusal by an incumbent government to relinquish power to the winning party after free, fair, and regular elections.⁸⁴ Through the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance, which was adopted in January 2007 but only entered into force in February 2012, this definition was broadened to also include (5) “any amendment or revision of the constitution or legal instruments which is an infringement on the principles of democratic change of government.”⁸⁵

The policy script the union is applying quite rigorously in most cases now starts with a condemnation of the perpetrators of UCGs by the AUC chairperson, a meeting of the PSC, and the suspension of the perpetrators of the UCG for a six-month period from the activities of the union until constitutional order is restored. In the meantime, the chairperson makes use of fact-finding missions, seeks the contribution of African leaders and personalities, and enlists the collaboration of relevant RECs (and other IOs). If necessary, the AU Assembly, and essentially the PSC, imposes targeted sanctions to press for a restoration of constitutional order.⁸⁶

Again, the AUC buys into an international norm discourse (on democracy, elections, and governance) and develops innovative policy scripts that are increasingly applied in practice. Although this policy is openly rejected by roughly a third of member states, who (at the time of ratification) have refused to sign the African Charter,⁸⁷ it is a good example of the way in which the interaction between HQ of IOs is creating cultural capital that is creatively utilized by the AU.⁸⁸ The innovation, firstly, is in the development of norms to govern interstate relations on the continent. In this case, established practices of sovereignty and non-interference in the affairs of member states are slowly eroded and replaced by rule-based commitment to the restoration of constitutional order (whatever this order may be, though). Secondly, an innovation can also be seen in the coordination of policy responses by the union, member states, and RECs – often in close collaboration with international partners such as the UN or the EU through International Contact Groups (ICGs). This originality extends to the details of organizing new workflows and creating feedback loops between the union and its partners at very practical levels, involving different departments of the AUC but also the respective desk officers at the HQ of various IOs.⁸⁹

* * *

84 OAU, Declaration on the Framework for an OAU Response to Unconstitutional Changes of Government, AHG/Decl.5 (XXXVI), Addis Ababa 2000, p. 3.

85 AU Assembly 2007, African Charter ... (fn. 34), §23(5).

86 Ibid.

87 African Union, List of countries which have signed, ratified/acceded to the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance, Addis Ababa, 17 January 2012, <http://www.achpr.org/instruments/charter-democracy/ratification/> (accessed 21 November 2017).

88 Cf. M. Finnemore, International Organizations as Teachers of Norms: the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization and Science Policy, in: *International Organization*, 47 (1993) 4, pp. 565–597.

89 For details see Engel, *New Mediation Practices* ... (fn. 57), and A. Witt, *Order by Default. The Politics and Power of Post-Coup Interventions in Africa*, PhD. Thesis, University of Leipzig 2015.

Despite the examples of an emerging AU-UN partnership given above, fundamental differences sometimes remain with regard to policy and style, as demonstrated in the case of the jihadist insurgency in Mali. When the UN Security Council decided on 25 April 2013 to establish MINUSMA; requested “the Secretary-General to subsume the United Nations Office in Mali (UNOM) into MINUSMA, with MINUSMA assuming responsibility for the discharge of UNOM’s mandated tasks, as of the date of adoption of this resolution,” and further decided “that the authority be transferred from AFISMA to MINUSMA on 1 July 2013,”⁹⁰ the AU PSC noted on the very same day “*with concern* that Africa was not appropriately consulted in the drafting and consultation process” [emphasis UE], which led to the adoption of this resolution.⁹¹ The PSC stressed that “this situation is not in consonance with the spirit of partnership that the AU and the United Nations have been striving to promote for many years” and noted “that the [UN] resolution does not adequately take into account the foundation laid by the African stakeholders,” i.e. “the launching of the process towards the return to constitutional order, the initiation of the ECOWAS-led mediation, the adoption of the transitional roadmap and the mobilization of the support of the international community through the Support and Follow-up Group on the situation in Mali.”⁹² The PSC also pointed out that the resolution ignored “the concerns formally expressed by the AU and ECOWAS and the proposals they constructively made to facilitate a coordinated international support for the ongoing efforts by the Malian stakeholders.”⁹³

In its report on the state of peace and security in Africa to the Golden Jubilee Summit, held in May 2013 in Addis Ababa, the PSC reiterated this point. Beyond the specific case of Mali, the PSC reasoned, “the ambition of Africa to own peace efforts on the continent and to exercise leadership ... is challenged by at least two factors.” First, by insufficient funding by the continent of the initiatives of the AU and the RECs, and, secondly, by

*... the shortcomings of the partnership with the United Nations, in particular with regard to consultation with the AU before decisions on issues of fundamental importance to Africa are made by the Security Council. There are many examples, in recent years, which illustrate this regrettable situation, sometimes reducing the continent to being a mere spectator in the shaping of its own destiny, whose outlines, if not actual details, are determined elsewhere with agendas that are not always in harmony with Africa’s concerns.*⁹⁴

So what went wrong? The unusually strong statements by the AU PSC can only be understood in light of the union’s experience with the crisis in Libya in 2011, when it was deliberately sidelined by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and its allies, and essentially blocked to try “African solutions for African problems.”⁹⁵ Against

90 UNSC, Resolution S/RES/2100, 25 April 2013, §7.

91 AU PSC, Communiqué on Mali adopted at the 371st PSC meeting, PSC/PR/COM. (CCCLXXI), 25 April 2013, §10.

92 Ibid.

93 Ibid.

94 AU PSC, Report of the PSC (fn. 74), §10 (see also §132).

95 Cf. AUC Chairperson, Report by the Chairperson of the African Union Commission on Current Challenges to Peace

this background, the AUC chairperson, in a report to a PSC meeting held at the level of heads of state and government on 23 September 2013, on the fringes of the UN general assembly in New York, re-emphasized that the AU-UN partnership should be based on the following principles: (1) respect for African ownership and priority setting; (2) flexible and innovative application of the principle of subsidiarity, and (3) mutual respect and adherence to the principle of comparative advantage.⁹⁶

4. Conclusion

With a view to analyse the changing spatialities of power and shifting sovereignties in current processes of globalization, this text investigated the HQ of the AU. It did so through the lens of portals of globalization and a focus on (1) new, dense practices emerging in response to experiences in the field of peace and security; (2) newly established social spaces of communication, and (3) forms of cultural learning, creativity, and innovation emanating from this condition. The case study on the AU and its partnership with the UN demonstrates that such an approach could add value to the understanding of IOs and their role at the centre of managing the reterritorialization of contemporary processes of globalization.

But, obviously, this statement calls for some qualifications: HQ of IOs are real social entities as much as they are also symbols for the “global governance” arenas in which the conditions of global entanglements are negotiated. In practice, the actual negotiations are carried out along webs, hubs, and spokes. However, the assertion of sovereignty in current processes of globalization by the AU and the dialectic of deterritorialization and reterritorialization in the field of peace and security, call for more detailed analysis than could be provided in this text. Suffice to say that as much as the union tries, and partly also manages, to gain sovereignty over transnational and privatized forms of organized violence, at the same time member states are *de facto* ceding sovereignty to the union in the area of peace and security. Through its collaboration with the UN, the AUC is trying to boost its own sovereignty, in particular since 2007. The HQ of the two IOs are in fact at the heart of these processes, demonstrating a vivid portal agency in IR.

and Security on the Continent and the AU's efforts “Enhancing Africa's Leadership, Promoting African Solutions” to the Extraordinary Summit of Heads of State and Government, Addis Ababa 25/26 May 2011. EXT/ASSEMBLY/AU/2.

96 AUC Chairperson, Report on the African Union – United Nations Partnership: The Need for Greater Coherence, PSC/AHG/3 (CCCXCVII), 23 September 2013, §4. See also AU PSC, Communiqué on the AU/UN Partnership adopted at the 397th PSC meeting held at the level of Heads of State and Government in New York, PSC/AHG/COMM/1 (CCCXCVII), 23 September 2013. See also the Joint United Nations – African Union Framework for Enhanced Partnership in Peace and Security, New York, 19 April 2017.

The World Social Forum as a Portal of Globalization: Complex Spatialities in Social Movement Studies

Micha Fiedlschuster

ABSTRACTS

Applying the concept of portals of globalization, the goal of this paper is to capture the significance of the World Social Forum (WSF) for the alter-globalization movement. Since 2001, the WSF brings together social movements and other civil-society actors that are ideologically or geographically disconnected. It offers a transnational space for sharing experiences about globalization processes and for facilitating the flows of ideas on how to influence the course of globalization. Analysing the politics of space, place, network, and scale in the WSF, the paper shows that the concept of portals of globalization helps to capture the spatial complexity of the forum. I argue that the WSF is not simply a place of anti-neoliberalism but a portal of globalization that inhabits different actors competing for the recognition of their interpretation of the nature of globalization.

Anhand des Konzeptes „Portale der Globalisierung“ soll die Bedeutung des Weltsozialforums (WSF) für die globalisierungskritische Bewegung aufgezeigt werden. Seit 2001 bringt das Forum soziale Bewegungen und andere zivilgesellschaftliche Akteure aus verschiedensten Regionen der Welt zusammen, die zudem oft von einem unterschiedlichen ideologischen Hintergrund geprägt sind. Das Forum bietet dieser heterogenen Teilnehmerschaft einen transnationalen Ort für den Erfahrungs- und Ideenaustausch über Globalisierungsprozesse und wie diese beeinflusst werden können. Dieser Artikel analysiert die politischen Dimensionen von Raum, Netzwerk, Ort und räumliche Maßstabsebenen im WSF und zeigt, dass das Konzept „Portale der Globalisierung“ nützlich ist, die Komplexität des Forums zu erfassen. Zudem zeigt der Artikel,

1 I would like to thank Helena Flam, Matthias Middell, Ulf Engel, and the participants of the workshop “Portals of Globalization” for their helpful comments.

dass das WSF ein Portal der Globalisierung ist, in welchem verschiedene Akteure um die Anerkennung ihrer Interpretation des Wesens der Globalisierung ringen.

1. Introduction

In the autumn of 1999, a coalition of social-movement organizations and trade unions staged a series of protests during a ministerial meeting of the World Trade Organization in Seattle, in the United States (US). Protests at summits had happened before, but this one ignited a public debate in North America and Western Europe about “the very nature of the global system.”² The Seattle protests are widely considered the birth of an alter-globalization movement. This movement, which is also called the global justice movement, is not a single entity but a “movement of movements.”³ It is not characterized by a single political line, ideology, or geographical centre, but rather by the participants’ critical stance towards the contemporary form of globalization. In their view, globalization is geared towards maximizing the profits of transnational corporations, which is not to the benefit of the majority of the people. In the years following the Seattle events, networking among social movements intensified worldwide. The World Social Forum (WSF) is one of the most significant results of this process.

Since 2001, the WSF is a meeting place for social movements, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and other civil-society groups. It was initiated by a group of mainly Brazilian and European activists, as a counter-event to the World Economic Forum (WEF) in Davos, Switzerland. Oded Grajew, the then coordinator of the Brazilian Association of Entrepreneurs for Citizenship (CIVES); Bernard Cassen, the then chair of the Association for the Taxation of financial Transactions and Aid to Citizens (Association pour la taxation des transactions financières et pour l’action citoyenne, ATTAC) ; and Chico Whitaker, a Roman Catholic activist, were the key initiators of the event.⁴ The organizing process was supported by Brazilian authorities, as well as various Brazilian civil-society groups, among them trade unions, the Landless Workers’ Movement, and the Brazilian Institute of Social and Economic Analysis (Instituto Brasileiro de Análises Sociais e Econômicas, IBASE).⁵ Since then, the WSF has been supported by a geographically and thematically diverse range of social movements and NGOs, but a strong presence of Brazilian and French activists in the organizing process has remained.

The declared aim of the forum is to discuss alternatives to neoliberal policies. The alter-globalization movement rejects neoliberalism because of its social, economic, and

2 M. Kaldor, “Civilising” Globalisation? The Implications of the ‘Battle in Seattle’, in: *Millennium – Journal of International Studies* 29 (2000) 1, p. 106.

3 T. Mertes, *A Movement of Movements. Is Another World Really Possible?*, London 2004.

4 See T. Teivainen, *The World Social Forum and Global Democratisation: Learning from Porto Alegre*, in: *Third World Quarterly* 23 (2002) 4, pp. 621–632.

5 See H. Gautney, *Protest and Organization in the Alternative Globalization Era: NGOs, Social Movements, and Political Parties*, New York 2010, p. 47.

political consequences. However, as sociologist Geoffrey Pleyers argues, alter-globalization activists share many features with their neoliberal adversaries: the individuation of activists' commitment, executive careers, networked organization, and the importance of communication.⁶ Furthermore, the movement stands not in opposition to an increased global interconnectedness, but it is developing its own agenda about the nature of such interconnectedness. With regard to how they organize themselves internally, these actors value interconnectedness in the form of convergence on agendas and activities that respect diversity and promote an equal footing among participating actors. The model of convergence in the WSF – though often more an ideal than a practice – is an experiment of a non-hierarchical form of internationalism for social-movement actors.⁷

Transnational social movements are influenced by globalization processes, but they also shape such processes to some extent. According to the assessment of activists, the protests at the summits of political and economic leaders demonstrated that collective action on a global scale is possible. At the same time, activists thought that so-called “summit hopping”⁸ does not help to build the long-term strategies necessary for transnational social-movement building.⁹ These activists sought a format that would not depend on the dynamics of direct confrontational protests, but one that would still gain public attention. Their solution was to propose a meeting that would take place parallel to the WEF in Davos, but in a distant place and preferably in the Global South. The simultaneity of both events secured coverage of the WSF by the international media. The spatial distance to Davos removed the constraints of contentious protests from the organizing process of the WSF. The city of Porto Alegre, Brazil, which was chosen as the venue of the first WSF, met two important criteria for organizing the forum: it is located in the Global South, and it offered a social-movement-friendly environment. Both aspects – the spatial distance to contention and the politically friendly environment – contributed to the fact that the WSF facilitated a space for long-term strategy building. Dieter Rucht termed the WSF in this respect as a “public stage and infrastructure for global justice movements.”¹⁰ In a similar way, I hold that the organizers of the WSF have identified the need for a “portal of globalization” that would fit the purposes of the alter-globalization movement.

Portals of globalization, which has been put forward as a concept in the study of global history,¹¹ are those spaces or places in which condensed experiences of processes of glo-

6 G. Pleyers, *Alter-Globalization: Becoming Actors in the Global Age*, 2010, p. 18.

7 G. Pleyers, *The Social Forums as an Ideal Model of Convergence*, in: *International Social Science Journal* 56 (2004) 182, pp. 507–517, and J. Conway, *Edges of Global Justice: The World Social Forum and Its 'Others'*, Abingdon, Oxon; New York 2013.

8 Summit hopping is when activists follow major international policy meetings such as the G8 and the World Economic Forum in order to protest on-site.

9 J. Smith, *Social Movements for Global Democracy*, Baltimore 2008, p. 207.

10 D. Rucht, *Social Forums as Public Stage and Infrastructure of Global Justice Movements*, in: J. Smith et al. (eds.), *Handbook on World Social Forum Activism*, Boulder 2011, pp. 11–28.

11 M. Middell, *Erinnerung an die Globalisierung? Die Portale der Globalisierung als lieux de mémoire: Ein Versuch*, in: K. Buchinger, C. Gantet and J. Vogel (eds.), *Europäische Erinnerungsräume*, Frankfurt; New York 2009, pp.

balization are observable. They are incubators of cultural knowledge about globalization processes and labs for the development of social and political skills that are deemed necessary to handle such processes. In this sense, these places play a significant role in the synchronization and regulation of globalization processes. I argue that the WSF is a portal of globalization that facilitates the exchange of experiences and strategies of actors in the alter-globalization movement.¹² The concept of portals of globalization allows us to discuss the significance of the WSF for the alter-globalization movement, and it offers us a route to scrutinize the complex spatialities that are involved in the WSF.

Social-movement scholars have paid considerable attention to the spatial dimension of their research objects. Charles Tilly provides an overview of the many different strategies of protests during the seventeenth and eighteenth century in Britain and France.¹³ He shows that the particular places and routes of protests were seldom chosen by chance but according to their symbolic meaning. Analysing the meaning that movement actors and authorities attribute to contested places can be decisive for understanding the dynamics of protest.¹⁴ James Scott calls attention to the importance of spaces, where the individual experience of oppression is transformed into a “collective cultural product.”¹⁵ Resistance and mobilization do not appear out of the blue, but they are nurtured in community structures that exist out of sight of the ruling elite. His analysis is exemplary of an ongoing debate about the role and usefulness of the concept of so-called free space in collective action.¹⁶ Paul Routledge has applied John Agnew’s theory about place to Indian social movements. He argues that “[w]hile struggles are not necessarily confined to the local level [...], they do reflect the cultural and political specificity of the locale in which they occur.”¹⁷ These studies have pointed out the ways in which spatial dimensions affect the course, character, and formation of resistance.

Other scholars have scrutinized the networking and scalar dimension of social movements. Since the 1990s, the question of scale shifting has become more prominent in research. Scholars began increasingly asking, “Under what conditions does contention grow beyond its localized beginnings to become a force for transnational change?”¹⁸ Networking became a prominent part of the explanation. According to the sociologist Jackie

296–308, and M. Geyer, *Portale der Globalisierung*, in: W. Eberhard and C. Luebke (eds.), *Die Vielfalt Europas: Identitäten und Räume*, Leipzig 2009, pp. 545–559.

12 Synchronization does not necessarily have to mean that a consensus or agreement is established among the actors.

13 C. Tilly, *Spaces of Contention*, in: *Mobilization: An International Quarterly* 5 (2000) 2, pp. 135–159.

14 D.G. Martin and B. Miller, *Space and Contentious Politics*, in: *Mobilization: An International Quarterly* 8 (2003) 2, p. 148.

15 J.C. Scott, *Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts*, New Haven 1990, p. 9.

16 Cf. F. Polletta, “Free Spaces” in *Collective Action*, in: *Theory and Society* 28 (1999) 1, pp. 1–38, and F. Polletta and K. Kretschmer, *Free Spaces*, in: D.A. Snow et al. (eds.), *The Wiley-Blackwell Encyclopedia of Social and Political Movements*, Malden, MA; Oxford 2013.

17 P. Routledge, *Terrains of Resistance: Nonviolent Social Movements and the Contestation of Place in India*, 1993, p. 138.

18 S.G. Tarrow and D. McAdam, *Scale Shift in Transnational Contention*, in: D. Della Porta and S.G. Tarrow (eds.), *Transnational Protest and Global Activism*, Lanham, Md. 2005, p. 121.

Smith, social movements have started to build a “democratic globalization network.”¹⁹ In his analysis of the alter-globalization movement, Jeffrey Juris has characterized the WSF as the place where these movements demonstrate their strength and diversity to the outside and establish themselves “internally as a terrain where diverse activist networks constitute themselves and symbolically map their relationship to one another.”²⁰

Despite the many benefits of these analyses, they were not free from criticism. The geographer Helga Leitner and her colleagues have claimed that analysts of social movements do not capture the spatial complexity of their cases adequately.²¹ These geographers have identified the tendency in these approaches to overemphasize one spatial dimension over others: this was the case with “scale” in the 1990s and with “network” in the early 2000s. As a result, the co-implication of the multiple spatialities is missing. Leitner and her colleagues emphasize that activists are “creative in cobbling together different spatial imaginaries and strategies on the fly.”²² In fact, this critique has some value considering that many studies of the WSF stress its networking dimension and its design as an open space. Focusing exclusively on these aspects, we might risk missing important aspects of the specificity of the WSF. My aim is to show that the concept of portals of globalization is a tenable approach that captures the spatial complexity of the WSF without compromising analytical clarity.

2. Portals of Globalization

Portals of globalization have been proposed as part of a debate about the spatial complexities and historical dynamics of globalization processes. In historical perspective, globalization is neither a social fact nor an actual or targeted state of the world, but an indeterminate and non-teleological process. It is shaped by multiple forces that do not spread out from a single region and embody dynamic tensions.²³ Political geographers have characterized globalization processes as dialectic processes of de- and reterritorialization.²⁴ Neil Brenner, for example, has made the influential argument that deterritorialization denotes the drive of capitalism towards diminishing its place dependency, and reterritorialization is the corresponding transformation of existing – as well as the emergence of new – configurations of territorial organization that are relatively fixed.²⁵

19 J. Smith (fn. 9), p. 100.

20 J.S. Juris, *Networking Futures: The Movements against Corporate Globalization*, Durham 2008, p. 239.

21 H. Leitner, E. Sheppard and K.M. Sziarto, *The Spatialities of Contentious Politics*, in: *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers* 33 (2008) 2, pp. 157–172.

22 *Ibid.*, p. 158.

23 U. Engel and M. Middell, *Bruchzonen der Globalisierung, globale Krisen und Territorialitätsregimes – Kategorien einer Globalgeschichtsschreibung*, in: *Comparativ* 15 (2005) 56, pp. 5–38.

24 A. Appadurai, *Sovereignty without Territoriality: Notes for a Postnational Geography*, in: P. Yaeger (ed.), *The Geography of Identity. Notes for a Postnational Geography*, Ann Arbor 1996, pp. 40–58; here: pp. 54–55, and N. Brenner, *Beyond State-Centrism? Space, Territoriality, and Geographical Scale in Globalization Studies*, in: *Theory and Society* 28 (1999) 1, pp. 39–78.

25 N. Brenner (fn. 24).

In these accounts, the decentring of the nation state since the 1970s is one result of such dialectical processes.

Global historians like Matthias Middell and Katja Naumann agree with Brenner that globalization is a dialectical process of de- and reterritorialization, but they place more emphasis on the historicity of the contemporary form of globalization.²⁶ They discuss the explanatory value of the idea of “successive regimes of territorialization.”²⁷ They argue that regimes of territorialization are patterns of spatialization, which become globally accepted: “[r]egimes of territorialization [...] move certain types of spatial order into the centre of attention and shape beliefs throughout the world about what are efficient modes of organization and models worthy of emulation.”²⁸ These regimes can be used by different actors in attempts to control and regulate entanglements and flows between different spaces. Globalization appears in this approach to be less fixed and determined, but it is in fact shaped by competing political projects about the purpose and content of globalization.

These projects may result in the replacement of one regime of territorialization with another. Portals of globalization, such as the WSF, give insights into these dynamics of de- and reterritorialization, and the political struggles about them. They are those spaces or places in which a condensed experience of processes of globalization is observable. One way to study portals of globalization has been suggested by Michael Geyer, who analyses them as possible regulators of mutual influence of disparate social and political entities.²⁹ From this point of view, portals of globalization are the targets of control attempts by political elites. Others add a cultural perspective to this political dimension. Middell characterizes portals of globalization as those places where cultural knowledge, institutions, and practices that are necessary for dealing with globalization processes have been developed.³⁰ As such, portals of globalization are places where global connections crystallize.³¹ Considering the sociocultural perspective, portals of globalization can be thought of as an exchange point of global experiences. The WSF is illustrative here because it offers a place where otherwise disconnected actors can share their experiences and strategies, as well as form common actions.

Middell proposes the concept of portals of globalization as a framework for the study of global history. This framework allows, on the one hand, the analysis of different configurations of global flows and connections, and, on the other hand, the political organiza-

26 M. Middell and K. Naumann, *Global History and the Spatial Turn: From the Impact of Area Studies to the Study of Critical Junctures of Globalization*, in: *Journal of Global History* 5 (2010) 01, p. 152. They build on Charles Maier's idea of regimes of territoriality, see C.S. Maier, *Consigning the Twentieth Century to History: Alternative Narratives for the Modern Era*, in: *The American Historical Review* 105 (2000) 3, pp. 807–831; *Transformations of Territoriality, 1600–2000*, in: G. Budde, S. Conrad and O. Janz (eds.), *Transnationale Geschichte. Themen, Tendenzen und Theorien*, Göttingen 2006, pp. 32–55.

27 M. Middell and K. Naumann (fn. 26), pp. 164–165.

28 *Ibid.*, p. 166.

29 M. Geyer (fn. 11).

30 M. Middell (fn. 11), p. 302.

31 *Ibid.*, p. 301.

tion of space by which elites attempt to control people, goods, and ideas.³² Elsewhere, he defines – together with Naumann – portals of globalization as those places that “have served as entrance points for cultural transfer, and where institutions and practices for dealing with global connectedness have been developed.”³³ Both definitions are based on a dialectic of flows and control that may result in modifications or crises of regimes of territorialization. Middell and Naumann argue that portals of globalization are useful for two reasons: first, as territorial, fixed nodes in global flows, portals of globalization challenge the “seemingly stable territorial order” of their locations.³⁴ Secondly, portals of globalization provide the opportunity to analyse “the various means by which elites try to channel and therefore control the effects of global connectivity (among others, by the creation of political structures and social control).”³⁵ The dialectical character of portals of globalization suggests that it represents the spatial order that is used either to challenge or to establish a regime of territorialization, depending on the power dynamics of proponents and opponents of a particular regime. Against this background, analysing the WSF as a portal of globalization gives insights both into the transnational activities of social movements and the complex struggles over territorialization that take place at and around it. The following sections of the paper will analyse these complex spatialities, first with regard to the politics of space and network, and secondly, with a focus on the politics of place and scale.

3. The WSF as a Portal of Globalization

3.1 The Politics of Space and Network

The first WSF was held in Porto Alegre in 2001. The city offered a favourable political environment. At the time, the Workers’ Party was in power, and the city government was experimenting with participatory budgeting – an idea that seeks to increase democratic participation of citizens in the budgeting process of the city.³⁶ The local and regional government contributed USD 1.3 million in funding for the first forum, with Oxfam and the Ford Foundation providing additional funds.³⁷ Apart from the funding by Brazilian authorities, the donors of the subsequent fora were mainly located in the Global North. The organizational costs of a WSF amount to an estimated EUR 2 million on average, excluding the costs of participating organizations and individuals. The participation fees and travel costs constitute obstacles for resource-poor groups to participate in the WSF.

32 Cf. *ibid.*, p. 300.

33 M. Middell and K. Naumann (fn. 26), p. 162.

34 *Ibid.*

35 *Ibid.*

36 D. Rucht (fn. 10), p. 14; L. Avritzer, *Participatory Institutions in Democratic Brazil*, Washington, D.C.; Baltimore 2009.

37 See B. de S. Santos, *The Rise of the Global Left: The World Social Forum and Beyond*, London/New York 2006, pp. 208–209, and T. Teivainen (fn. 4), p. 624.

As a result, large NGOs and local social-movement groups are usually over-represented in these fora.

The first forum attracted approximately 20,000 participants from more than 100 countries. The fifth forum, which took place in Porto Alegre in 2005, drew 155,000 participants from over 140 countries, most from South America, the US and France.³⁸ The number of workshops, panel discussions, and cultural events increased from 420 during the first forum to roughly 2,300 in the fifth, a peak in the WSF's participation rate. The forums that took place between 2013–2016, for example, had participation rates ranging from 30,000–35,000 people. Major themes in the WSF are democratic sustainable development; human rights, diversity, and equality; political power, civil society, and democracy; the democratic world order, and militarism and peace. The variety of activities turned the WSF into a laboratory of political and social skills in the context of globalization.

The organizational format of the WSF demonstrates its portal character: the structure of the first forum involved 16 conferences with high-profile panellists, 420 self-organized workshops “intended to allow groups, and coalitions, and networks to meet, exchange experiences, interlink, plan and define strategies,” and 22 testimonies from “individuals with a distinguished record of activity on behalf of freedom and human dignity.”³⁹ These activities allowed participants to share practical skills, raised the consciousness about issues in different parts of the world, and were sometimes used to develop plans for collective action.⁴⁰ For example, the WSF was one of the crucial places for the formation of a transnational feminist network, a labour network, and anti-privatization networks.⁴¹ The WSF created a physical space for mutual engagement and networking on a scale that did not exist before.

For many social movements, it was attractive to participate in the WSF because it was constructed with the specific intention to create an open space, which is “open to people of all political persuasions.”⁴² The aim was to constitute a framework “in which groups and movements of ‘civil society’ can socialize, network, and develop their respective projects without having to adhere to a central body or political line.”⁴³ Considering the political and ideological diversity among activists of the alter-globalization movement, it was crucial for the success of the WSF to design the event as a space free of political

38 B. de S. Santos (fn. 37), p. 85.

39 H. Gautney (fn. 5), p. 48.

40 See J. Smith, et al., Introduction: Learning from the World Social Forums, in J. Smith et al. (eds.), *Handbook on World Social Forum Activism*, Boulder 2011, p. 2; W. Fisher, Th. Ponniah (eds.), *Another World is Possible: Popular Alternatives to Globalization at the World Social Forum*, London; New York 2003.

41 I. Wallerstein, *The World Social Forum: From Defense to Offense*, 2007, Internet: <https://www.tni.org/en/archives/act/16216> (accessed 2 June 2017), and G. Pleyers, *A Decade of World Social Forums: Internationalisation without Institutionalisation?*, in: M. Kaldor et al. (eds.), *Global Civil Society 2012: Ten Years of Critical Reflection*, Basingstoke 2012, p. 177.

42 H. Gautney (fn. 5), p. 101.

43 Ibid., p. 177.

affiliation. The idea of an open space, though problematic in practice, reflects activists' desire for a form of globalization that allows for ideological heterogeneity.⁴⁴

Although the organizers had the ambition to bring groups together from diverse ideological backgrounds, it has been pointed out that the WSF "is predominantly a meeting place of a leftist [...] counterelite advocating on behalf of the most deprived and poorest people."⁴⁵ Furthermore, the organizing process has been criticized by activists and scholars alike for its opaqueness, as well as its domination by a small group of self-selected activists.⁴⁶ Power imbalances between different groups in the forum constitute continuous lines of conflicts, most notably between resource-strong NGOs and resource-poor grass-roots groups,⁴⁷ as well as between proponents of more hierarchical organizational styles of the traditional Left, or big NGOs and advocates of horizontal democracy. Another cleavage runs along discussions of the purpose of the WSF in the mobilization for global social change: some activists, most notably Chico Whitaker, advocated that the WSF's purpose is restricted to the facilitation of discussions about alternatives to neoliberalism. Concrete action should be organized outside the framework of the forum. Other activists, however, sought to transform the WSF into a political actor that is "capable of deciding and carrying out collective actions in the name of the WSF."⁴⁸ This cleavage, the power imbalances, and the ideological leanings characterized the landscape of transnational activism at the beginning of the new millennium.

The model of the social forum was taken up by activists in many places in the world from the local to the regional level. In 2002, the first European Social Forum (ESF) took place in Florence, Italy, with 60,000 participants, and an adjacent protest march was organized that gathered up to 1 million protesters. In addition, more than 50 local social fora were held in Italy alone during that time.⁴⁹ During the ESF, an initial call for globally coordinated protests against the looming Iraq War had been published. This call influenced the development of the protests against the war, which was the "largest civic-driven single-day mobilization in the history of humankind."⁵⁰ It is estimated that between 2002–2006 over 160 social-forum gatherings in more than 120 cities have been held – and more than 1 million people participated in them.⁵¹ This indicates that the WSF could be considered a role model and central node in an emerging network of spaces for social movements.

In 2003, the WSF met in Porto Alegre for the third time in a row. Participation in this forum doubled. The success of the WSF in Porto Alegre in the early 2000s indicates that

44 Cf. G. Pleyers (fn. 7).

45 D. Rucht (fn. 10), p. 19.

46 For example, T. Teivainen, *The Political and Its Absence in the World Social Forum – Implications for Democracy*, in: *Development and Dialogue* (2007) 47, pp. 69–79.

47 See P. Bond, *Linking Below, Across and Against*, in: *Development Dialogue* (2007) 49, pp. 81–95.

48 For example, B. de S. Santos (fn. 37), p. 121.

49 H. Gautney (fn. 5), p. 55.

50 T. Teivainen, *Global Democratization without Hierarchy or Leadership? The World Social Forum in the Capitalist World*, in: S. Gill (ed.), *Global Crises and the Crisis of Global Leadership*, Cambridge 2012, p. 193.

51 D. Rucht (fn. 10), p. 17.

the city may be seen as an emerging portal of globalization for social movements. The yearly gatherings of activists from all over the world turned the city into a place where practices for dealing with global interconnectedness have been developed.⁵² Over the years, the city gained a reputation for its competence in hosting social movements. Until today, Porto Alegre regularly hosts thematic social fora. Social-movement organizations from around the world can build on the support and experience of local institutions and social-movement organizations in Porto Alegre.⁵³ This is why it makes sense, for example, that a social forum on Palestine in November 2012 was held in Porto Alegre, and not in an Arab-speaking country.

The organizational design and the intention of the WSF can be interpreted, first, as a space for sharing experiences about globalization processes and, secondly, as a project facilitating the flows of ideas on how to influence the course of globalization. Considering the variety of actors that are involved, the WSF is a space of mutual influence of otherwise disconnected social entities. According to the scholar and activist Hilary Wainwright, “encounters within the WSF have enabled traditionally marginalized groups that lack obvious strategic power to move from a consciousness of injustice and oppression to an awareness of feasible connections and directions through which they can achieve change.”⁵⁴ For example, the social fora have been one of the incubators of a European as well as an African network against the privatization of water, which connects locally rooted struggles.⁵⁵ In conclusion, the activities in the WSF can be considered an important step in the effort of the alter-globalization movement to become a global actor. The politics of space and networking established the WSF as a portal of globalization for the alter-globalization movement.

The city of Porto Alegre could be considered the location of this particular portal. However, Porto Alegre experienced a significant setback in this respect: since the third WSF, the Brazilian organizers were faced with an increasing critique about the style of organization and the influence of the Workers’ Party. Together with the concern about the under-representation of participants from Africa and Asia, this critique led to the decision by the International Council (the steering committee of the WSF) to rotate the location of the WSF. The rotation of the forum brought the politics of place and scale to the fore.

52 Cf. M. Middell and K. Naumann (fn. 26), p. 162.

53 To a certain extent, Porto Alegre also seems to become a *lieu de memoire* [a site of memory used to order, concentrate, and secure notions of the past] of global social-movement organization. Historians might be interested to inquire about the possible changes in city legislation that must have been necessary to accommodate an event like the WSF.

54 H. Wainwright, *Civil Society, Democracy and Power: Global Connections*, in: H.K. Anheier, M. Glasius and M. Kaldor (eds.), *Global Civil Society 2004/5*, London 2005, p. 112.

55 G. Pleyers (fn. 41), p. 177.

3.2 The Politics of Place and Scale

The rotation of the forum deepened the intended global character of the WSF. The 2004 forum took place in Mumbai, India. The choice reflected the organizers' assessment that Mumbai represents a critical intersection of economic, social, and cultural globalization processes.⁵⁶ On the one hand, the city is one of the largest financial centres in the Global South; it houses important parts of India's thriving and globally connected IT industry, and it is home to India's main film industry, Bollywood, which attracts a global audience. From this perspective, the city benefits from globalization processes. On the other hand, more than half of its inhabitants live in poverty, and the society is riveted by social and religious tensions. This side of Mumbai is a stark contrast to the economic and cultural success story of a globalized Mumbai.⁵⁷ The WSF in Mumbai articulated these contradictions and gave voice especially to the most marginalized in Indian society through the participation of an estimated 30,000 Dalits, formerly known as "untouchables." If we wanted to analyse the spatial politics of the WSF and its relation to regimes of territorialization, then we cannot start from a conceptualization of place as a physical site or area alone. Political geographers have put forward conceptualizations that interpret place as a cultural or social location, which sheds light on how places bear different meanings for different actors.⁵⁸ Others, most prominently Doreen Massey, emphasize the dynamic and changing character of place over time. In Massey's view, place is shaped by human activity but, in turn, also influences the opportunities and barriers for those who respond to broader shifts in political and economic structures.⁵⁹ Agnew has conceptualized place as a social process. He unpacks the concept into three dimensions:

*Locale, the settings in which social relations are constituted (these can be informal or institutional); location, the geographical area encompassing the settings for social interaction as defined by social and economic processes operating at a wider scale; and sense of place, the local "structure of feeling." A key tenet is that the local social worlds of place (locale) cannot be understood apart from the objective macro-order of location and the subjective territorial identity of sense of place.*⁶⁰

All three conceptualizations of place are valuable for the analysis of the WSF, but Agnew's conceptualization provides the best link between the spatial politics of movement actors and the framework of regimes of territorialization. The latter are accepted patterns of spatialization that can be used to control and regulate the entanglements and flows in a particular place. From a place perspective, such regimes represent relatively stable

56 H. Gautney (fn. 5), pp. 59–60, and B. de S. Santos (fn. 37), pp. 72–77.

57 Cf. B. de S. Santos (fn. 37), pp. 75–76.

58 For example, T. Cresswell, *In Place/Out of Place. Geography, Ideology, and Transgression*, Minneapolis 1996.

59 L.A. Staeheli, *Place*, in: J. Agnew, K. Mitchell and G. Toal (eds.), *A Companion to Political Geography*, Malden 2003, p. 162, and D.B. Massey, *For Space*, London 2005.

60 J. Agnew, *Place and Politics: The Geographical Mediation of State and Society*, Boston 1987, p. 28.

configurations of locale, location, and sense of place. From my point of view, the WSF destabilizes such configurations.

The destabilizing moment is carried out by providing a representational space for the “sense of (global) place” of marginalized groups. Holding a WSF in Mumbai – with the specific policy guideline “to democratize the organization of and participation in the WSF as much as possible, so as to render more visible the social inequalities that characterize India” – gives weight to those who are marginalized by globalization processes.⁶¹ Such a strategy has already been applied by social movements in Thailand, which brought attention to the consequences of globalization for the rural population, with the establishment of a “village of the poor” in Bangkok in 1997.⁶² The occupations of squares in North Africa, Spain, Greece, and by the Occupy movements in 2011 have followed similar strategies. The analysis of the politics of place of the WSF helps to understand how the story of marginalized local groups are becoming embedded in a narrative of competing projects about globalization.

The inclusion of marginalized groups in the WSF process is part of an endeavour to build an opposition of a “global Left” against neoliberal and corporate-driven globalization. However, this formation process is not free of power imbalances. According to Janet Conway’s assessment, the participation of subaltern subjectivities takes place in a subordinate way.⁶³ The WSF mainly provides visibility of the margins but does not sufficiently include their topics in the discourses of the WSF. For example, the 2009 WSF in Belém, Brazil, was characterized by several different discourses of crisis; the global financial crisis and the food, climate, and ecological crises were among the most prominent ones. Indigenous groups of the Amazon and other Latin American regions brought a discourse of civilizational crisis, which began with the colonization of the Americas. The idea of civilizational crisis was taken up by other groups in the forum.⁶⁴ However, as Conway points out, the indigenous discourses were “heard and incorporated insofar as they are resonant with available non-Indigenous understandings.”⁶⁵ She argues that those indigenous discourses were more readily appropriated, which “deployed political categories familiar to the global left, such as capitalism and the state.”⁶⁶ The idea of civilizational crisis was incorporated into an anti-capitalist narrative of the global Left. However, the dimension of indigenous discourses, which saw the Left itself as part of a “civilizational matrix” that has caused the crisis for indigenous people, remained under-explored in the declarations that were published during the forum in 2009.⁶⁷ The mutual influence of different dis-

61 B. de S. Santos (fn. 37), p. 73.

62 B. Missingham, *The Village of the Poor Confronts the State: A Geography of Protest in the Assembly of the Poor*, in: *Urban Studies* 39 (2002) 9, pp. 1647–1663, and *The Assembly of the Poor in Thailand*, Chiang Mai 2003.

63 J. Conway (fn. 7), p. 145.

64 See for example *Assembly of Social Movements, Declaration of the Assembly of Social Movements*, 2009 WSF – Belém, 2009, <https://www.europe-solidaire.org/spip.php?article12821> (accessed 2 June 2017).

65 J. Conway, *Global civil society as ‘contact zone’: Indigenous discourses of civilizational crisis and their reception at the World Social Forum*, San Francisco 2013, pp. 25–26.

66 *Ibid.*, p. 26.

67 J. Conway (fn. 7), p. 26.

courses in the WSF seems to take place with a power advantage of leftist interpretations of globalization. Whereas the global Left frames globalization predominantly in terms of a critique of capitalism, some indigenous groups were pushing for a view of globalization as a Western colonial project. The WSF is not simply a place of anti-neoliberalism, but it is a portal of globalization that inhabits different actors competing for the recognition of their interpretation of the nature of globalization.

Notwithstanding her critique, Conway points out many positive aspects of the WSF. Among them is the spatial praxis of the WSF. She argues that this praxis is unique because it enacts “horizontal relations among places and scales in a radically alternative vision of globalization.”⁶⁸ It is the idea that a horizontal exchange between local and global struggles is possible. Conway sees a new form of internationalism emerging, one that recognizes the right of groups to participate “regardless of the spatial scale(s) at which they operate.”⁶⁹ This parts with previous forms of internationalisms, which implied a hierarchical order of organization and networking along a relatively fixed order from the local to the global level. Similarly, Pleyers associates one of the most significant changes in global civil society in the last ten years with the WSF because it helped grass-roots networks to realize that “their internationalisation did not necessarily require NGOs.”⁷⁰ The scalar politics of the WSF is indeed noteworthy, and I wish to highlight another aspect of it. If we understand scales as socially constructed spaces of engagement, we can ask how these scales are constituted by the different actors involved.⁷¹ It follows that we can analyse how the WSF underlines claims of legitimate engagement in a socio-spatial order through scale-framing. In 2013, the WSF in Tunis, Tunisia, cut across scalar distinctions, which favoured the separation of the local/national and the global. The WSF constructed the local Tunisian civil society as a matter of global importance. Tunisia was the starting point of the so-called Arab Spring in late 2010 and, hence, it became a place of global importance for the alter-globalization movement. First of all, it should be noted that the WSF process and the alter-globalization movement had no significant impact on the Arab Spring during the confrontation of the opposition with authoritarian regimes. Hence, during the 2011 WSF, participants questioned the use of the forum as it did not seem to have contributed to the “bottom-up” regime change in the Arab region. Taking into account that the transformation process in Tunisia was still underway and precarious, the organizers of the Tunis forum saw a chance to revitalize it. The Tunisian grass-roots civil society was faced with marginalization in the transformation process. A mass gathering of social movements lent support to Tunisian civil society in the critical phase of constitutional change: first, in the form of symbolic support, by showing solidarity in demonstrations during the forum, and secondly, the networking space of the forum facilitated the transfer of skills and knowledge deemed necessary for a strong civil

68 Ibid., p. 145.

69 Ibid.

70 G. Pleyers (fn. 41), p. 176.

71 D. Harvey, *Spaces of capital: towards a critical geography*, New York 2001, p. 233.

society. The idea to revitalize the WSF as a global actor that is able to assist grass-roots struggles in democratization processes is a form of scale-framing and part of the spatial politics of the alter-globalization movement.

The support for the democratization process should not be seen as a politically neutral project. It is a democratization process as imagined (mainly) by a global Left. The organizers were critical towards the participation of what they called “fundamental Islamist groups” in the forum. Furthermore, unions had been the privileged partners at the local level. The WSF mostly benefited leftist progressive groups and unions in Tunisia. In addition, the organizational necessities of this global event resulted in an ambiguous relationship with the Tunisian government. In practice, how far the WSF in Tunis was capable and willing to support the Tunisian “grass-roots” civil society can be questioned. On a discursive level, however, the global support for Tunisian civil society through a WSF points to an important aspect of studying globalization from the perspective of social movements. The regime change gave hope that “bottom-up” social change and democratization is possible in the twenty-first century. As a result, the questions for the alter-globalization movement were, first, whether there can be a sustained influence of grass-roots civil society in the transformation process, and secondly, whether the WSF is capable of supporting grass-roots groups to maintain such an influence. As researchers, we can study how local developments become embedded in global processes through an actor that promotes a bottom-up conception of global change.

4. Conclusion

The WSF has sparked many hopes and expectations among activists of the alter-globalization movement around the world. As one observer put it, the WSF “is making striking contributions to the reinvention of global politics.”⁷² This assessment might be too optimistic, but it exemplifies the significance the alter-globalization movement attributes to the WSF.

The major aim of this paper was to capture this significance with the concept of portals of globalization. This concept enables us to describe the WSF as a place where the many different and geographically dispersed actors in the alter-globalization movement can share their experiences and strategies. The WSF is a global crystallization point of social movements, which enables researchers to study experiences of processes of globalization in a condensed way.

The open-space format of the WSF facilitated the mutual engagement of activists at the transnational level. It created a space for networking between ideologically or geographically disconnected groups, who felt or feared the negative effects of globalization processes. The forum has shown the ability to facilitate convergence on issues, and it helped to

72 Grzybowski cited in D. Rucht (fn. 10), p. 23.

build coalitions as well as global solidarity.⁷³ To varying degrees, the development of the WSF has shown that it is a learning space for civil society groups where they can acquire competences for dealing with the challenges of globalization processes.

Another major goal of this paper was to scrutinize the complex spatialities that are involved in the WSF. I argued that regimes of territorialization can be understood as relatively stable configurations of locale, location, and sense of place. The WSF is not a portal that helps to enforce such configurations but rather (discursively) destabilizes them to some respect. With the help of the example of the WSF in Mumbai, I suggested that it gave weight to alternative versions of sense of place in a globalized Mumbai. The forum provided those, who became or remain marginalized in globalization processes, with a voice. My aim was to point out the advantage of an analysis of place as social process, which may lead to an answer on how the WSF uncovers and discursively challenges the global entanglements of the social order of hierarchies in the locations where the forum takes place.

The WSF interacts with regimes of territorialization in a second sense. This interaction includes spatial imaginaries of appropriate scales of interaction. The mobility of the WSF strengthened the character of the forum as an event that can deliberately be placed into a particular location of (perceived) global importance, which interacts with the territorializing regime of that particular place and its global entanglements. The idea to revitalize the WSF as a global actor that is able to assist grass-roots struggles in democratization processes is a strategy to cross-cut scales of legitimate engagement. The spatial politics of the WSF give reasons to argue that the WSF is one of the places where the alter-globalization movement attempts to shape a “bottom-up” global social change. Whether this entails that the WSF puts forward a profoundly different regime of territorialization than other global actors, remains to be studied.

73 For the model of convergence applied here, see G. Pleyers (fn. 7).

Managing Processes of Globalization: A Spotlight on the University as a Key Institution in the 21st Century

Claudia Baumann

ABSTRACTS

This article looks at the heightened role of universities in the global knowledge age. Flows of people, ideas, and also capital in the academic realm continue to multiply, propelling global connectedness and contributing to the reshuffling of the hitherto prevailing political orders. Universities are understood as places where these flows are instigated and controlled. The article adds insight to the field of global higher education by emphasizing universities in the Global South, to better understand their role in shaping processes of globalization. Four arguments guide the reader, the first of which explains how universities have been discursively rescaled. The second argument looks at university-state relations and increased institutional power. Differentiation in the higher-education landscape and academic hierarchies are examined in the third part, while section four reveals shortcomings of mobility figures aggregated at national level.

Der Artikel thematisiert die zunehmende Bedeutung von Universitäten im Zeitalter der globalen Wissenslandschaft. Akademische Mobilität, der Austausch von Wissen und die damit verbundenen Kapitalströme tragen erheblich zur globalen Vernetzung und zur Neuordnung der Weltpolitik bei. Universitäten werden als Orte verstanden, an denen diese grenzüberschreitenden Prozesse initiiert und kontrolliert werden. Im Fokus stehen hier Universitäten im globalen Süden, was Diskussionen über deren Rolle in Globalisierungsprozessen anregt und somit das Spektrum der globalen Hochschulforschung erweitert. Der Artikel gliedert sich in vier Teile, wobei sich der erste mit einer diskursiven Neuausrichtung befasst. Zweitens werden die Beziehungen zwischen Universität und Staat vor dem Hintergrund einer Portalperspektive skizziert, bevor im dritten Teil die Relevanz von Differenzierung und akademischen Hierarchien erklärt wird. Das letzte Argument stellt die Aussagekraft von nationalen Mobilitätsstatistiken in Frage.

1. Introduction

*The supreme hall of education, the university is a platform for grooming innovative talents, a cradle for new knowledge, new ideas and new science and technology, and a spiritual home for the survival and development of humanity. In the face of the new tendency in global socio-economic development, of the new tasks for the Chinese modernization drive, and of the new trend in which diverse civilizations seek to live in harmony, our universities haven taken it upon themselves an unprecedented mission that is at once noble and historical. In the next ten years we shall strive to develop world-caliber modern higher education in a distinctly Chinese way.*¹

Liu Yandong, State Councillor, People's Republic of China, 2010

In the second decade of the twenty-first century, the world is awash with institutions that transcend borders: multinational corporations, non-governmental organizations, security and policing bureaux, arts and sports associations, and, most pertinent to the subject of this paper, universities. When one considers the extent to which the aforementioned institutions have been studied as shapers of globalization, however, there has been a comparative dearth of attention devoted to universities. What literature does exist on the subject seems largely content to simply acknowledge that universities are affected by globalization and react rather enforcedly to it.² Going as far as assigning universities an active role in initiating, accelerating, and steering processes of globalization is rather the exception than the rule. This article discusses universities as portals of globalization, showing how they use the latitude afforded to them and influence global flows of people and ideas – often on their own terms.

The article simultaneously integrates aspects about the relationship between the university and the nation state under the “global condition”. It is of paramount importance to include the state which is legally and financially responsible in the still predominantly public higher-education sector and assess what its role in the formation of portals of globalization is. It is not merely a question of supporting or limiting institutional autonomy, but about the way a state can use universities to position itself globally.

This has not been considered sufficiently in particular within the Global South. Relegated to second class through global rankings or persistent imaginaries of academic hierarchies, universities in the Global South are often displayed as poorly financed and lacking quality, obscuring other dimensions such as global connectedness. Universities in Africa, Asia, and Latin America are home to most students in the world, a fact which is only going to become more important with the massive expansion of higher education in Africa. They are points of departure for most of the globally mobile students and

1 L. Yandong, Speech on the Fourth Chinese-Foreign University Presidents Forum, Nanjing, 2 May 2010, http://old.moe.gov.cn/publicfiles/business/htmlfiles/moe/moe_2862/201008/96836.html (accessed 14 July 2017).

2 See for example J. Knight, *Higher Education in Turmoil. The Changing World of Internationalization*, Rotterdam 2008.

increasingly also a destination for students from both the Global South and North. They are hubs in which the changing directionality of student mobility becomes visible.

Another aspect about universities in the Global South which is masked by Western-centric and ahistorical assumptions about higher education and globalization, is the long-standing experience with global connectivity. Engagement across borders for universities in the Global South might not match the ideas of academic cosmopolitanism or a competitive higher-education market, but include conflicted processes of colonialism, independence, nation-building, or structural-adjustment programmes. Looking at universities as portals of globalization holds huge potential in understanding how the Global South participates in shaping the globalization of higher education and contributes to the reshuffling of the hitherto prevailing political orders.

The first part of this article demonstrates how universities have acquired a symbolic function as portals of globalization in an increasingly interconnected, global higher-education discourse. The second part underlines how universities have experienced a *de facto* growth in institutional power, as they have gained a degree of importance and developed ways in dealing with the “global condition.” In the process, the distribution of power between the universities and the nation state has changed fundamentally. Differentiation and ranking in the higher-education landscape, as laid out in the third part, has led to an unprecedented exposure of individual institutions that no longer can hide behind the relative insulation of national academic systems.

The university’s role in facilitating and steering global mobility is probably the most salient and quantifiable feature of the university as a portal, and thus receives attention in the fourth part. As a place of arrival and departure, the university is a place of transit – and in an atmosphere of heightened border regulation, it can also serve as an attractive gateway for migration, global employability, and even a potential route to citizenship. Access to these sites of global promise is limited, however, and decisions on who is granted admission are not taken arbitrarily – a decisive factor in steering global mobility.

2. Discursive Rescaling in Global Higher Education

The quotation by a former state councillor from China headlining this article is an illustrative example of how the university features in contemporary higher-education jargon. Despite the university being in a phase of unprecedented change – some might suggest in crisis, as it struggles for survival in competitive higher-education markets – government officials throughout the world continue to inflate the role of universities to unobtainable heights. Universities, they argue, are expected to remedy a whole gamut of issues, from strengthening the economy, reinvigorating government, fulfilling expectations of social mobility, providing international conflict mediation, healing cultural wounds, and promoting tolerance – all the while fulfilling their traditional objectives of providing an expansive and quality education to each student. It is an accumulation of unrealistic

expectations, which continues unabated and shows no signs of reversing.³ My first argument is that a global higher-education discourse has developed in which universities have acquired a symbolic function and serve as a focal point through which both hopes and fears in managing processes of globalization are articulated. Under the “global condition,” the university is charged with significantly more importance than in earlier times and through a discursive rescaling becomes a portal of globalization.

Talking about higher education in a global context is a form of global interaction constituted by flows of representations, narratives, and discourses.⁴ Analysing the visions, missions, and strategies set out in presidential speeches and official documents of ministries and national agencies, gives an account of the current global higher-education discourse and policies related to it. It shows that there is a hybridization of the discourse of globalization and higher education,⁵ with a distinct vocabulary. The following examples illustrate this point; they show how national and global agendas are strategically realigned by different actors in the context of a global higher-education discourse, and they demonstrate the specific challenges of accessing this realm from a position in the Global South.

Looking at the discourse on a national level in China reveals the beliefs as to how important higher education under the global condition has become. Specific elements are adjusted for a national purpose. Education is portrayed as “the most fundamental cause for a nation.”⁶ The Chinese government in its own perception sees education as a “major strategy for national development and modernization.” Rather than seeing itself as an established global power (in higher education), it shows a process under way in which the country is “rejuvenated and developed.” The response from the Chinese government to the “current trend of global expansion” is “socialist modernization” to “produce high-quality human resources” and “talented citizens with good moral, intellectual, physical and artistic qualities.”⁷ The discourse is influenced by a dichotomy of East and West, essentializing regional differences and modernization theories.⁸ This perspective can be used for a national rationale to legitimize actions such as the accumulation of capital for rapid industrialization⁹ or society-wide reforms in higher education. This perspective can also be found in academia, attesting that Chinese universities have had an internationally peripheral status for more than a century.¹⁰

3 B. R. Clark, *The Problem of Complexity in Modern Higher Education* in: S. Rothblatt and B. Wittrock (eds.), *The European and American University since 1800. Historical and Sociological Essays*, Cambridge 2008, pp. 263–279.

4 N. Fairclough, *Language and Globalization*, London 2006, p. 3.

5 *Ibid.*, 78.

6 Ministry of Education of the People's Republic of China, *Education as a Long-Term Priority*, http://www.moe.edu.cn/publicfiles/business/htmlfiles/moe/moe_2862/201010/109030.html. (accessed 22 May 2017).

7 *Ibid.*

8 L. Jie-Hyun, *Historizing the World in North East Asia* in: D. Northrop (ed.), *Companion to World History*, Oxford; Malden 2013, pp. 428–432.

9 *Ibid.*

10 L. Mei and Ch. Qiongqiong, *Globalization, Internationalization and the World-Class University Movement: the China Experience*, in: R. King, S. Marginson and R. Naidoo (eds.) *Handbook on Globalization and Higher Education*, Cheltenham 2011, pp. 242–255.

The discourse in higher education in China is embedded in a long-term context, exemplified by the statement that “the popularization of higher education marks a historical breakthrough in China’s education history” and that foundations for it were laid “thirty-three years ago, when reform and opening-up was introduced in this country, [and] the college entrance examination was restored.”¹¹ In April 2017, when the former state councillor and now vice premier of China Liu Yandong visited the Confucius Institute at the Durban University of Technology in South Africa, which marked the beginning of the “China-South Africa High-Level People-to-People Exchange Mechanism,” she emphasized that the two countries “understand and support each other in the struggle against imperialism, colonialism, and striving for independence and liberation.”¹² Common elements of the past serve as legitimization for cooperation in the present, also in higher education, which is fiercely debated as either South-South cooperation or a soft-power approach.¹³ Regardless of continuously changing bilateral trends, what becomes apparent is that the Chinese government talks about a new kind of diplomacy in which higher education and universities are of paramount importance.¹⁴

The second example is taken from Ethiopia, a country in which the higher-education sector has undergone tremendous changes, growing from just two universities at the beginning of the 1990s to 39 today.¹⁵ The vision of the ministry of education in Ethiopia is to “build an education and training system which assures quality and equity education and produces competent citizens.”¹⁶ It is seen as an “overall capacity building initiative” with a Higher Education Strategy Centre established in 2003, which advises the government “with due consideration to global situations.” It is emphasized that “Ethiopia must move into the knowledge age” and reckons that “academic and research linkage with similar institutions in the rest of the world is of paramount importance.” Despite the all too familiar vocabulary in the higher-education realm, there are specific elements due to what might be called the donor environment. The terminology used, at least when it comes to engagements with the Global North, is characterized by a language of development aid. The idea of “capacity-building” features most prominently, a concept absent from engagements within the Global South.

11 Ministry of Education of the People’s Republic of China, Education as a Long-Term Priority, http://www.moe.edu.cn/publicfiles/business/htmlfiles/moe/moe_2862/201010/109030.html. (accessed 22 May 2017).

12 Confucius Institute Headquarters (Hanban), Hanban News, 28 April 2017, http://english.hanban.org/article/2017-04/28/content_682699.htm (accessed 27 July 2017).

13 P. Kragelund and G. Hampwaye, The Confucius Institute at the University of Zambia: a new direction in the internationalisation of African higher education?, in: H.K. Adriansen, L. Møller Madsen and S. Jensen (eds.), *Higher Education and Capacity Building in Africa: The geography and power of knowledge under changing conditions*, Routledge Studies in African Development, New York 2016, pp. 94–96.

14 Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in Tanzania, Universities’ role hailed in China-US Cultural Exchange, <http://tz.chineseembassy.org/eng/chinanews/t1100862.htm> (accessed 1 March 2015).

15 Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ), Ethiopia, <https://www.giz.de/en/worldwide/18871.html> (accessed 29 July 2017).

16 Ethiopian Government, Ministry of Education, Vision, Mission and Values, <http://www.moe.gov.et/English/Information/Pages/VisionMissionandValues.aspx> (accessed 28 January 2014).

Another thread that the discourse includes is the idea that Ethiopia can be transformed into a middle-income country by a “conscious application of science, technology and innovation,” which is seen as a major instrument to create wealth.¹⁷ In 2008, the Ethiopian government initiated a reform towards a more science-and-technology-oriented system, in which universities (except Addis Ababa University [AAU]) are required to change their intake by enrolling 70 per cent of students in science and technology and 30 per cent in the humanities and social sciences. While this policy caused outcry in the academic Global North, the Africa Youth Report nominated it as one of the six best initiatives in the education sector in Africa in 2011.¹⁸

There are many more examples like these, demonstrating how universities have come to be regarded with almost mythical, curative properties whose powers can address all societal ailments. The examples above demonstrate how government officials employ the university as a platform to construct self-serving narratives addressed to both internal and external audiences. Reconciling “the national” and “the global” fulfils a dual function: in more inward-looking perspectives, it becalms the fears of those who see themselves at risk of being changed or absorbed by globalization, while in other strains of thought, it helps to orient or assert a position in the reconfiguration of the global political order.

That, however, is only one perspective of the higher-education discourse, a convenient and comparatively uncontroversial platform from which politicians pontificate. On the opposite side of the rhetoric spectrum is the harsh criticism by students and members of faculty, denouncing what they see as a violation of fundamental values in higher education, pointedly referring to the university as in crisis. Student protests against the economization of universities in many parts of the world are an expression of this discontent. For universities in the Global South, there are additional layers of crisis, including colonial legacies and neo-imperial aspirations. Particularly visible are these conflicted processes in South Africa and India, for example. The protest movement #RhodesMustFall in South Africa, which was originally directed against the statue of Cecil Rhodes at the University of Cape Town in 2015, set off heated debates about the “decolonization” (or what some coin “Africanization”¹⁹) of the curriculum. In India, debates revolve around further privatization and increased access for foreign education providers. Critics disapprove of education becoming a commodity and service, accelerating “marketization, commercialization and privatization.”²⁰ The vice chancellor of Chitkara University

17 Ethiopian Government, Education Sector Development Program IV (ESDP IV), last modified August 2010, <http://www.unesco.org/education/edurights/media/docs/574e244af3e39b830d278a2c367304af5b603109.pdf>, 11 (accessed 18 March 2015).

18 Economic Commission for Africa, Africa Youth Report 2011. Addressing the Youth Education and Employment Nexus in the New Global Economy, 50, https://www.uneca.org/sites/default/files/PublicationFiles/african_youth_report_2011_final.pdf (accessed 15 September 2011).

19 S. Jensen et al., Do ‘African’ Universities exist? Setting the Scene, in: H.K. Adriansen, L.M. Madsen and S. Jensen (eds.), Higher Education and Capacity Building in Africa: The Geography and Power of Knowledge under changing Conditions. London; New York 2016, pp. 12–32.

20 A. Kumar, Challenges Facing Indian Universities, in: Collection of Papers Based on a Seminar Organized by JUNTA in Jawaharlal Nehru University, Delhi 2004, p. 3.

(in Himachal Pradesh) adds what many fear: “India has seen numerous invaders who came and exploited our national ethos of infighting. Now the foreign universities are knocking at our doors.”²¹ This exemplifies what some scholars such as Rajani Naidoo have prompted readers to think about: cultural imperialism in academia and the fact that through border-crossing activities in higher education, power is exerted more subtly than through political and military means.²²

In assessing the discursive rescaling of universities as portals of globalization in the Global South, it is vital to look at the debates that were already led in colonial and postcolonial contexts. Much of what was debated is similar to the debates today, raising the question how much of the presumably new global discourse is actually novel in postcolonial contexts. The disputed and elevated role of universities as central actors in society has a long tradition in India, which is steeped in colonial and postcolonial history. In the light of independence, for example, literature about education in the first decades after 1947 was imbued with a high degree of pathos and introspection. The former professor and vice chancellor at Andhra University K.R. Srinivasa Iyengar wrote: “With our re-birth as a free nation, our education too should undergo the baptism of a re-birth in the spirit.”²³ He saw education as the foundation of the state that needed to be renewed and universities as “castles of indolence at their best” and “hotbeds of political action (or reaction) at their worst.” He reckoned that they were a “costly luxury, a piece of glittering foreign matter [...] that you can easily do without.” However, the same author equally passionately advocated that no education system can be imagined without universities and “rising like Phoenix from the ashes they shall grow in puissance and usefulness [...] being the state’s need more than its gift, the light of the nation and its many-chambered armory.” Reassessing the role of universities was particularly important in a postcolonial context. While elsewhere in the world, universities continued to indulge in centuries-old historical narratives and academic traditions, independence in India marked a sharp caesura that required considerable reflection about origins of academia and one’s own position. Universities were seen, on the one hand, as tools of the former oppressors and, on the other hand, as vital for reinventing the country.

Nested within global higher-education rhetoric is a wide array of perspectives. Some see universities as a key institution for boosting innovation and competition; others prefer to emphasize its conflicted role as an independent research institution with universal values, while others still point to it as a place where social conflicts and frictions are negotiated. What all of these discursive strands have in common is that the institution of the university stands at its centre, and active measures in contesting and managing its role are expected to continue from all sides. Global higher-education discourses contribute significantly to the rise of the university as a central institution in managing processes of

21 R. S. Grewal, *Bolster Higher Education*, in: *EDUTEch*, 3 (2012) 2, http://issuu.com/eduindia/docs/edu_issue-02_vol-03_february_2012/13 (accessed 18 June 2013).

22 R. Naidoo, *Rethinking Development: Higher Education and the New Imperialism* in: *Handbook on Globalization and Higher Education*, R. King, S. Marginson and R. Naidoo (eds.), Cheltenham 2011, pp. 41–42.

23 K. R. Srinivasa Iyengar, *A New Deal for Our Universities*, Calcutta 1951, pp. 2–4.

globalization. They are a constitutive element in the assessment of universities as portals of globalization.

3. The Empowered University

The question of whether a university has more power than in earlier times is subject of controversial debates. On the one hand, there are those arguing that the national level renders universities a vehicle for its goals – hence, not powerful per se but subject to power. Conversely, others emphasize that universities have learned to use their “wiggle room” to assert their preferred degree of implementation.

The notion of the empowered university is rooted in the complex landscape of changes in the 1980s and 1990s, when the growing financial constraints of public funding and the associated need for investment created new dynamics in higher education. Public-sector reforms aimed at boosting efficiency and effectiveness, provoking the emergence of the “responsive” and “entrepreneurial” university in higher education.²⁴ Barbara Sporn, for example, speaks of a new distribution of power and responsibility between the state and the university, in which universities gained considerable autonomy and capacity for self-steering; she adds that this included greater independence in decision-making over budgets and personnel, and more freedom to design and position the institution internationally, but it was, however, accompanied by more responsibility and accountability.²⁵ Burton R. Clark describes the developments in higher education as a curious mix of centralizing and decentralizing imperatives.²⁶ He argues that states take a greater interest in higher education and intend to shape their international involvement through universities. He reckons that in growing institutional complexity, the university level has become a place of interest for the state through which budgets can be allocated and foreign affairs be conducted. Simon Marginson adds more of a philosophical, place-based approach in emphasizing the paradoxical combination of place-bound concentrations of power, localized resources, and identity, with mobile and universal knowledge and discourse. This “antinomy between place and mobility,” he contends, was always an integral part of the university, but has moved to a more prominent position in contemporary globalization.²⁷ Anthony Welch describes the development for the Asia-Pacific region, where states retain a strong interest in higher education, but simultaneously move towards “devolution” at the institutional level.²⁸ He adds that accountability and rule by performance – “centralized decentralization” – might create only the illusion of institu-

24 B. Sporn, *Governance and Administration: Organizational and Structural Trends*, in: J. J. F. Forest and P. G. Altbach (eds.), *International Handbook of Higher Education: Part One: Global Themes and Contemporary Challenges*, Dordrecht 2011, pp. 144–145.

25 B. Sporn, *Governance and Administration* (fn. 24), pp. 147–153.

26 B. R. Clark, *The Problem of Complexity in Modern Higher Education* (fn. 3), p. 269.

27 S. Marginson, *Handbook of Globalization and Higher Education*, Cheltenham 2011, pp. 4–5.

28 A. Welch, *Higher Education in Southeast Asia: Blurring Borders, Changing Balance*, Abingdon 2011, p. 14.

tional freedom. Less developed is the debate about universities in countries that do not match the definition of a classic democracy. In these contexts, it is important to assess the relationships between universities and states under different conditions. Universities might simply be centralized and represent the state, which does not preclude them from being globally involved.

The assessment of scholars regarding the university's institutional role in shaping processes of globalization is hence not unanimous. Some argue that university autonomy has increased under the global condition, while others emphasize a continuous or even heightened national oversight. These discussions can easily drift into equal and mutually antagonistic ideological camps, overlooking the actual important issue: a university can be a portal acting on its own account, and it can be a portal if the government wants it to be one. In both scenarios, connectivity to the world can be strategically steered; it might just be a different set of actors with a different set of interests. In both scenarios, the university has gained significant importance and can be considered empowered under the global condition.

4. Global Rankings and Academic Hierarchy

Apart from the dynamics of state and university relations, there is another relevant vantage point from which the ascendance of the institution of the university in a global context can be analysed. With the emergence of the “entrepreneurial” and “responsive university” came the need for differentiation and, thus, a system for measuring result and output. Acting as a single institution in a competitive environment has changed the dynamics of higher education all over the world. It goes widely unnoticed that this process of globalization was instigated in East Asia. First was the central committee of the Communist Party of China, which launched Project 211 in 1995 to strengthen about 100 institutions of higher education and key disciplinary areas, with the aim of raising the international profile of Chinese higher education.²⁹ In South Korea, Brain Korea 21 was launched in 1999, while the 21st Century Centre of Excellence Programme in Japan was launched in 2002. Similar approaches such as the Exzellenzinitiative (Excellence Initiative) in Germany or the Pôle de recherche et d'enseignement supérieur (research and higher-education centres) in France followed in 2005/2006. These policies marked a significant shift from the traditional emphasis on egalitarianism among universities towards a hierarchical competition. Although it might not have been explicitly intended as such, the list of universities included for funding became a ranking method for international students, who based their decision on which university they should attend on these lists.³⁰ Today, examples can be found all over the world in which governments

29 L. Mei and Ch. Qiongqiong, *Globalization* (fn. 10), pp. 244–245.

30 Cf. E. Fernández Darraz, *Hochschulprivatisierung und akademische Freiheit. Jenseits von Markt und Staat: Hochschulen in der Weltgesellschaft*, Bielefeld 2010.

channel funds to particular institutions, aiming to make them research or world-class universities.

Global rankings, too, were instigated first in China, when in 2003 the Shanghai Jiao Tong University's Institute of Higher Education, on behalf of the Chinese government, developed a methodology to measure research universities worldwide. It was intended to better assess the performance of Chinese universities in a global comparison, but triggered a huge response and exponential growth in the field. In 2011, there were ten different global rankings with few corners of the world that "appear to be immune from the frenzy."³¹ Global rankings have become a source of information for students, parents, industrial partners, philanthropic funding, a policy instrument for governments, and a management tool for universities.³² Rankings have contributed to unprecedented exposure for individual universities, creating a situation in which they can no longer hide behind the protective shields of national academic traditions. They propel the politically heightened role of universities further.

What is less talked about is who drives the ranking process. Here, too, is room for debate. Marginson argues that rankings are shifting the power of shaping a university's identity to the ratings agencies and the market, bypassing national governments along the way.³³ While this idea of a "market" might apply to only very specific higher-education contexts, Hazelkorn's perspective of seeing universities as "fixtures" of their state and national policy that have agency and define their own strategies can be applied in a broader context.³⁴

The proliferation of global ranking systems and their corresponding influence is evident by the fervour with which top universities highlight their rankings on websites and other platforms. When the rankings emerged, criticism (especially from European universities, which were largely absent in initial rankings) was much more axiomatic than today. For example, the École Normale Supérieure (ENS) in Paris, France, tore apart the methodology of the Shanghai Ranking when it did not end up in the rankings as expected. A decade later, the website of the ENS displays its position in the QS World University Rankings, the Centre for World University Rankings (CWUR), the Shanghai and Times Higher Education Ranking.³⁵ It deserves highlighting that a prestigious European university advertises its evaluation by a ranking originating in China; it would have been unthinkable some 20 years ago, and it can be seen as change in global academic hierarchies. Individual universities are significantly more exposed than before, and those appearing frequently in global rankings even more so.

31 E. Hazelkorn, *Measuring world-class Excellence and the Global Obsession with Rankings*, in: *Handbook of Globalization and Higher Education*, Cheltenham 2011, p. 497.

32 E. Hazelkorn, *Rankings and the Battle for world-class Excellence: Institutional Strategies and Policy Choices*, in: *Higher Education Management and Policy*, 21 (2009) 1, p. 9.

33 S. Marginson, *Prospects of Higher Education: Globalization, Market Competition, Public Goods and the Future of the University*, Rotterdam: 2007, pp. 80–81; 98.

34 E. Hazelkorn, *Rankings* (fn. 32), pp. 10; 19.

35 École Normale Supérieure, *L'ENS internationalement reconnue*, <http://www.ens.fr/l-ecole-normale-superieure/chiffres-cles-et-classements-internationaux/classements-internationaux> (accessed 1 November 2014).

Similar to what Saskia Sassen stated for global cities, one could argue that these elite universities constitute nodal points in the worldwide higher-education landscape, just like global cities do in the financial sector.³⁶ They bundle the production and dissemination of knowledge and educate an elite who is in charge of instigating and controlling processes of globalization. One could suggest that these elite universities are probably best suited to be portals of globalization. In doing so, one does, however, create another Western-centric idea, as the great majority of these elite universities are not located in the Global South (only 6 of the top 100 universities in the Times Higher Education World University Rankings are not in Europe or the United States³⁷). It nourishes world views such as Ben Wildavsky's, who speaks of a widely shared understanding that world-class institutions will be closely modelled on the Western research university (and by "Western," he means the "hugely successful American research university").³⁸ For the rest of the world, he sees "Chinese Ivy Leagues," "India far behind China and other nations," and "academic mediocrity" in Western Europe. Self-centredness and claiming global pre-eminence in academia is not a prerogative of American scholars, which is exemplified also by Thorsten Nybom, who talks about a "golden English triangle" (Cambridge, London, and Oxford).³⁹

Just like in theories about economic globalization, there is the idea of a core in global academia. Higher education on a global scale is often displayed as divided into an "academic west" and an "academic rest," in affirmative as well as critical perspectives. This bipolar imagination of global academia – steeped in histories of colonial and non-colonial spaces, in the East and West of Cold War times, and globalization theories essentializing centre and periphery – obfuscates other linkages and transnational entanglements. Global rankings and the ideas of an academic centre in the West or Global North distract and do not help in understanding processes of globalization in the Global South. Instead of stiffening in reverence for a few hallowed universities, looking at universities in the Global South can reveal a very different topography of higher education.

Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU), for example, is an intellectual powerhouse and centre of area studies in India. The campus of the university is located in the capital, New Delhi, where the proximity to decision makers, as well as its reputation and institutional history after its foundation in 1969, has effectively rendered JNU a steering wheel for the greater higher-education and political sector in India. The JNU historian Rakesh Batabyal called it "perhaps India's grandest nationalist institution."⁴⁰ Graduates of this university go on to become leaders in politics, teachers throughout the country, and

36 S. Sassen, *Cities in a World Economy*, Thousand Oaks, CA 2007, p. 196.

37 Times Higher Education: World University Ranking 2015/2016, <https://www.timeshighereducation.com/world-university-rankings/2016> (accessed 20 July 2017).

38 B. Wildavsky, *The Great Brain Race. How Global Universities Are Reshaping the World*, Princeton: 2010, pp. 70–75.

39 T. Nybom, *Creative Intellectual Destruction of Destructive Political Creativity? Critical Reflections on the Future of European 'Knowledge Production'*, in: *The European Research University. A Historical Parenthesis?*, New York 2006, p. 9.

40 R. Batabyal, *JNU: The Making of a University*, Delhi 2014.

faculty in universities. This is similar to Addis Ababa University (AAU), to name another example of a highly important university, which was founded initially as a college in 1950 and became the first university in Ethiopia; it maintains its central role until today. AAU, like JNU, is a hub for the humanities, and the social and political sciences. It enjoys an exceptional reputation within Ethiopia and increasingly throughout the East African region. AAU and JNU are both elite universities within their countries and the wider region, and central in the dissemination and production of knowledge. Trying to understand Ethiopian and Indian higher education in a global context cannot be achieved without taking a closer look at those specific universities that educate their elite and provide them with knowledge about the world and their role in it.

Academic hierarchies praising American and English higher education start crumbling as rankings reveal the inequality of institutions within a country. Throughout the world, differentiation and funding of excellence and world-class universities change higher-education systems, making some universities more important than others. This requires other perspectives from which higher education can be analysed. Portals of globalization can capture this development and provides impetus for debates. Here, too, it might be particularly insightful to look at the experience in the Global South, as there are many countries in which a few or even a singular university have been remarkably central in higher education for decades.

5. The University as Mobility Hub

Migration is a key topic in globalization research, and its magnitude is reflected in the numerous theories and focus groups that have emerged. While migration has often been conceptualized as border-transgressing movements, a focus on those institutions steering and managing the flows of people is often missing but highly relevant for the portals of globalization framework. To this end, this section discusses universities and their role in student mobility.

The mobility of international students increased from 0.8 million in 1975 to 1.7 million in 1995 and 4.1 million in 2013.⁴¹ Asia has a particularly important role in this context: in 2012, 694,400 Chinese students studied abroad, meaning that one in every six internationally mobile students is now from China.⁴² China, India, and South Korea are the world's leading sources of international students, and together they account for more than a quarter of all students studying outside their home countries.⁴³ Student mobility is a process largely driven by students from non-western countries, a fact that is often overlooked by assessing impacts on host institutions or debates about brain drain.

41 UNESCO, Long-term growth of tertiary-level international students worldwide 1975-2013, https://en.unesco.org/sites/default/files/1-4_growth_international_students.pdf (accessed 18 May 2017).

42 UNESCO Science Report, Towards 2030, Paris 2015, p. 80.

43 ICEF Monitor, The State of International Student Mobility in 2015, <http://monitor.icef.com/2015/11/the-state-of-international-student-mobility-in-2015/> (accessed 18 May 2017).

Students from Africa are less mobile because of the lower overall enrolment in tertiary education. In 2015, 373,000 students from Africa studied abroad, with Nigeria and Morocco being the biggest “sending” countries.⁴⁴ Most students from sub-Saharan countries study in France and the United Kingdom, reflecting long-term trends, yet a shifting pattern of African student mobility can be observed: the percentage of those favouring a traditional European destination declined in favour of options in the Middle East and Africa itself; Saudi Arabia and Ghana had the biggest growth rates in 2015.⁴⁵ Student mobility has increased significantly, and there are no signs of abating. Universities have been brought to the fore as the institution in charge of hosting and sending these 4 million students across the globe. The role of the Global South and in particular Africa in the foreseeable future needs to be highlighted.

The most common narrative of student mobility is the one just presented: students from big “source countries” departing for the big “host countries.” Unjustly forgotten are the other perspectives not aggregated at national level. To illustrate this point, student mobility at a single university, JNU, shall serve as an example. The number of international students annually admitted at JNU is defined through an admission quota: 15%. It needs to be seen as a maximum, as the *de facto* enrolment of international students at JNU is lower and revolves around four per cent.⁴⁶ Half of seats are reserved for international students applying through an entrance examination, and the other half for candidates applying “*in absentia*,” meaning they do not have to take a test but are admitted through exchange agreements.⁴⁷ In order to facilitate entrance examinations abroad, JNU has a centre outside of India, in Kathmandu, Nepal, where applicants can take the test. Admission is granted based on merit and a fixed number of seats in each programme.⁴⁸

This is an example of mechanisms that a university developed to manage the flow of international students. Through a quota and the basis of merit, the inflow of international students is regulated. A second mechanism in steering the flows of students is the existence of a physical representation in Nepal (for entrance examinations), which increases the probability of Nepalese students being admitted, as they do not have to finance a costly trip to New Delhi. There are no such centres in other neighbouring countries. This has an impact on border-transcending mobility and shapes the fabric of the international student body at JNU. A third mechanism is that half of the international students can be admitted “*in absentia*,” which provides leeway to enrol students who join through exchange agreements that JNU signed with cooperation partners; these students do not have to take an entrance exam. The admission mechanisms, therefore, have fixed and

44 La mobilité internationale des étudiants africains, in: Campus France, 16 (2017), http://ressources.campusfrance.org/publi_institu/etude_prospect/mobilite_continent/fr/note_16_hs_fr.pdf (accessed 18 May 2017).

45 ICEF Monitor, New study highlights shifting patterns of African student mobility, 2016, <http://monitor.icef.com/2016/12/new-study-highlights-shifting-patterns-african-student-mobility/> (accessed 18 May 2017).

46 JNU, Annual Reports 2014–2015 and 2015–2016, <https://www.jnu.ac.in/report> (accessed 28 May 2017).


47 JNU, Annual Report, 2015–2016, https://www.jnu.ac.in/sites/default/files/46AnnualReport_Eng_0.pdf, 16 (accessed 28 May 2017).

48 JNU, Annual Report, 2014–2015, https://www.jnu.ac.in/sites/default/files/45AnnualReport_Eng.pdf, 4 (accessed 28 May 2017).

flexible components. Admission to JNU is highly contested, as it is a sought-after elite university, which is why the selection procedures for local and international students had to be clearly defined. Yet, at the same time, they had to remain flexible to ensure a diverse background of international students. These admission mechanisms are continuously negotiated at the university, underlining the role it has in shaping the flow of international students.

Further insight into student mobility can be drawn from a juxtaposition of incoming international students at national and university level. To this end, Figure 1 below illustrates the countries of origin of international students in India and at JNU.

Figure 1: International Students in India and at Jawaharlal Nehru University, Countries of Origin, National vs. University Level, 2015/2016⁴⁹



At national as well as university level, the international student body can be considered diverse, as opposed to universities where students come from predominantly two or three countries. Another similarity that the comparison highlights, is the significance of students from Nepal; they are the largest group of international students in India and third at JNU. India shares a border with Nepal, where higher education at graduate level faces severe challenges. The prevalence of Nepalese students might, therefore, not come as a surprise, given the geographical proximity. JNU, however, located in New Delhi, not far from the border and with a centre for entrance examinations in Kathmandu, could have justified equal or even higher enrolment numbers from Nepal, which is, however, not the case. The major difference in the comparison are students from South Korea and China, who do not register at any significant level in India in general, but form big groups of international students at JNU. This can be explained by the close cooperation that JNU maintains with Chinese and Korean higher-education institutions, a particularity which holds true for JNU but not at national level. Another JNU particularity is the number

49 Institute of International Education, Project Atlas, Association of Indian Universities, <https://www.iie.org/en/Research-and-Insights/Project-Atlas/Explore-Data/India> (accessed 18 May 2017).

of students from Tibet, which form the biggest group of international students; they have been among the biggest groups of international students at JNU for years. These students are the progeny of the Tibetan diaspora, who followed the Dalai Lama into exile during the first wave of emigration in 1959. They are members of the second and third generation, who were born and grew up in the north of India without Chinese or Indian citizenship. A member of the diaspora, who was once a student at JNU, explained in an interview that the enrolment of students with this background caused political frictions on campus, when the question first came up about ten years ago.⁵⁰ Administrators and professors discussed the political ramifications of the inclusion of these students. Once a precedent was created, more students from the diaspora joined JNU, which makes this university probably the single most important institution in educating the Tibetan elite in India, an insight that could not have been revealed by looking solely at the national level of student mobility.

The annual reports at JNU list the countries of origin of international students. In previous years, Tibet was mentioned as one of them, which is no longer the case. According to the former representative of the International Students Association⁵¹, this is a sign of how admission is continuously contested. The unclarified citizenship of Tibetan students created difficulties as to which category these students belong: should they count as Indian or international students? Given that not all seats of international students could be filled with qualified candidates, the Tibetan students were counted as international students, leaving sought-after seats in the other category to Indian students. This explains how the category “Tibet” came into existence among the countries of origin, even though it is not a country. In 2015, however, this category, which existed for about ten years, was renamed and is now called “Indian” – within the international-student category.

Three conclusions can be derived from the juxtaposition of mobility data on national and university level. First, mobility figures for entire countries can hide university-specific global connectedness. Exemplified by JNU is the concentration of students from South Korea, China, and the Tibetan diaspora, which gives insights as to which universities and regions the university is most connected to in terms of student mobility. Secondly, the mechanisms of admission and statistics about countries of origin, show how universities influence the quantity and directionality of international-student mobility, showing that they strategically steer global flows and are, thus, functioning as portals of globalization. Thirdly, universities might have to deal with the fallouts from global political conflicts, exemplified here by the conflicts about enrolling students from the Tibetan community. This is nothing less than the manifestation and negotiation of a global political conflict. Unresolved by states, the university had to deal with the matter, taking on yet another function in actively shaping globalization processes.

50 Interview conducted in spring 2011 with a former Tibetan student at JNU.

51 Information acquired through e-mail exchange in summer 2017.

6. Conclusion

This article argued that a perspective on universities as portals of globalization and a special emphasis on the Global South can be useful to uncover complex re-spatialization and rescaling processes in global higher education. The first point showed how universities receive greater attention through discursive rescaling. A discourse in higher education has developed in which the same set of ideas and keywords can be found all over the world. Universities have ascended in the hierarchy of institutions that are expected to master the challenges of globalization. This is the essence of my first argument: universities are portals of globalization because governments all over the world charge higher-education institutions with monumental importance and expect them to ensure the competitiveness of their nations in the knowledge age. However, this does not necessarily mean that all of what is said turns into reality. Moreover, in this discourse of newness lies the danger of overlooking historical experience, as much of what is argued today resembles the debates from the independence and postcolonial era in the Global South.

The second argument revolves around a new distribution of power and responsibility between the state and the university. Newly gained institutional power in combination with increased competition put universities at the centre of the political agenda, enabling them to shape processes of globalization more than ever before, and in some respects rendering the national level less influential. While universities acquired new agency on the global stage, nation states developed new strategies of making use of them as portals of globalization.

A third argument looked at the role of global rankings and how they created greater exposure and awareness of individual universities. Propelled by governmental funding of high-calibre institutes, differentiation in higher education continues, raising questions as to how useful aggregated data on the national level still is. Understanding universities and their role in shaping processes of globalization requires institution-specific research. Global rankings and conventional imaginations of academic hierarchies continue to exist, leaving portals of the Global South unexplored. This is a missed opportunity, as there are many universities that are highly relevant in shaping national as well as global developments. Particularly rich is the history of universities in the Global South, as they had to continuously manage global involvement in imperial, colonial, postcolonial, Cold War, and Washington Consensus times.

The fourth argument concerns student mobility which has increased significantly, and universities have been brought to the fore as the institution in charge of hosting and sending. The portal is actively used to steer the quantity and directionality of student mobility. Some of the processes are instigated by the universities that strategically shape their international profiles, by focusing on specific regions or disciplines through establishing and negotiating quotas and terms of admission, and by actively looking for cooperation partners. Some processes emerge from the outside, might be connected to greater political affairs, and are forced upon the university, which then has to deal with it. Universities have always facilitated border-transcending mobility, but the significant

increase in quantity has made the university one of the most important institutions in channelling and shaping the flow of people.

The four arguments of this article provide grounds to see the university as a vital part in shaping processes of globalization. Depending on the university, there might be limitations, and going as far as calling every university a portal of globalization is probably too absolute. One might be more inclined to see it as a methodological lens rather than a static definition in globalization theory. The benefits of this place-based approach are, however, obvious: there is no getting around the university in understanding how globalization works in the knowledge age.

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