

comparativ

ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR GLOBALGESCHICHTE UND
VERGLEICHENDE GESELLSCHAFTSFORSCHUNG

Katrin Bromber/Jakob Kraus (Eds.)

**Shaping the "New Man" in Africa,
Asia and the Middle East: Practices,
Networks and Mobilization
(1940s–1960s)**

comparativ

ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR GLOBALGESCHICHTE UND
VERGLEICHENDE GESELLSCHAFTSFORSCHUNG

Herausgegeben im Auftrag der
Karl-Lamprecht-Gesellschaft e. V. (KLG) / European Network in
Universal and Global History (ENIUGH) von
Matthias Middell und Hannes Siegrist

Redaktion

Gerald Diesener (Leipzig), Andreas Eckert (Berlin), Ulf
Engel (Leipzig), Harald Fischer-Tiné (Zürich), Marc
Frey (München), Eckhardt Fuchs (Braunschweig), Frank
Hadler (Leipzig), Silke Hensel (Münster), Madeleine
Herren (Basel), Michael Mann (Berlin), Astrid Meier
(Beirut), Katharina Middell (Leipzig), Matthias
Middell (Leipzig), Ursula Rao (Leipzig), Dominic
Sachsenmaier (Göttingen), Hannes Siegrist (Leipzig),
Stefan Troebst (Leipzig), Michael Zeuske (Köln)

Anschrift der Redaktion

Universität Leipzig, Centre for Area Studies
Redaktion COMPARATIV
IPF 169001
D – 04081 Leipzig

Tel.: +49 / (0)341 / 97 30 230
E-Mail: comparativ@uni-leipzig.de
Internet: www.uni-leipzig.de/comparativ/

Redaktionssekretärin: Katja Naumann
(knaumann@uni-leipzig.de)

Comparativ erscheint sechsmal jährlich mit einem Umfang von
jeweils ca. 140 Seiten. Einzelheft: 12.00 €; Doppelheft 22.00 €;
Jahresabonnement 50.00 €; ermäßigtes Abonnement 25.00 €.
Für Mitglieder der KLG / ENIUGH ist das Abonnement
im Mitgliedsbeitrag enthalten.

Zuschriften und Manuskripte senden Sie bitte an die
Redaktion. Bestellungen richten Sie an den Buchhandel oder
direkt an den Verlag. Ein Bestellformular finden Sie unter:
<http://www.uni-leipzig.de/comparativ/>

Wissenschaftlicher Beirat

Nadia Al-Bagdadi (Budapest), Stefano Bellucci (Leiden / Amsterdam), Zaur Gasimov (Istanbul), Michael Geyer (Chicago), Giovanni Gozzini (Siena), Margarete Grandner (Vienna), Konrad H. Jarausch (Chapel Hill), Hartmut Kaelble (Berlin), Markéta Krížová (Prag), Wolfgang Küttler (Berlin), Marcel van der Linden (Amsterdam), Hans-Jürgen Lüsebrink (Saarbrücken), Mikhail Lipkin (Moskau), Barbara Lüthi (Köln), Attila Melegh (Budapest), Hagen Schulz-Forberg (Aarhus), Sujit Sivasundaram (Cambridge), Alessandro Stanziani (Paris), Edoardo Tortarolo (Turin), Eric Vanhaute (Gent), Holger Weiss (Turku), Susan Zimmermann (Budapest)

Leipziger Universitätsverlag GmbH
Oststraße 41
D – 04317 Leipzig
Tel./ Fax: +49 / (0)341 / 990 04 40
info@univerlag-leipzig.de
www.univerlag-leipzig.de

**Shaping the “New Man” in Africa,
Asia and the Middle East:
Practices, Networks and Mobilization
(1940s–1960s)**

**Ed. by
Katrin Bromber and Jakob Kraus**



Leipziger Universitätsverlag

Comparativ.

Zeitschrift für Globalgeschichte und vergleichende Gesellschaftsforschung / hrsg. von
Matthias Middell und Hannes Siegrist – Leipzig: Leipziger Univ.-Verl.

ISSN 0940-3566

Jg. 28, H. 5. Shaping the “New Man” in Africa, Asia and the Middle East: Practices,
Networks and Mobilization (1940s–1960s). – 2018

**Shaping the “New Man” in Africa, Asia and the Middle East: Practices, Networks
and Mobilization (1940s–1960s).** Ed. by Katrin Bromber and Jakob Krais – Leipzig:

Leipziger Univ.-Verl., 2018

(Comparativ; Jg. 28, H. 5)

ISBN 978-3-96023-264-3

© Leipziger Universitätsverlag GmbH, Leipzig 2019

Comparativ.

Zeitschrift für Globalgeschichte und vergleichende Gesellschaftsforschung 28 (2018) 5

ISSN 0940-3566

ISBN 978-3-96023-264-3

Inhaltsverzeichnis

Aufsätze

Katrin Bromber/Jakob Krajs

Introduction: Shaping the “New Man” in South Asia, Africa and the Middle East. Practices between Hope and Anxiety (1940s–1960s) 7

Katrin Bromber

Scouting: Training the “New Man” in Post-liberation Ethiopia 22

Jakob Krajs

A “New Man” for a New Nation: Activism and Physical Culture in Late Colonial Algeria 38

De-Valera N. Y. M. Botchway

“There is a New African in the World!” – Kwame Nkrumah and the Making of a “New African (Wo)Man” in Ghana 1957–1966 59

Miguel Bandeira Jerónimo

Restoring Order, Inducing Change: Imagining a “New (Wo)man” in the Belgian Colonial Empire in the 1950s 77

Anandita Bajpai

Making the New Indian Citizen in Times of the Jawan (Soldier) and the Kisan (Farmer), 1962–1965 97

Forum

Hugo Silveira Pereira

Railways as Portals of Globalisation: The Case of the Portuguese Mainland and Colonial Rail Networks (1850–1915) 121

Autorinnen und Autoren 139

Introduction: Shaping the “New Man” in South Asia, Africa and the Middle East. Practices between Hope and Anxiety (1940s–1960s)

Katrin Bromber / Jakob Krais¹

ABSTRACTS

Dieses Heft untersucht die sozialen Praktiken zur Schaffung des „Neuen Menschen“ von den 1940er bis zu den 1960er Jahren anhand von fünf Fallstudien aus Südasien, Afrika und dem Nahen Osten. Entgegen häufig verwendeter, tendenziell eurozentrischer Periodisierungen wird für die Persistenz des Konzepts nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg und jenseits des faschistischen und des sowjetischen Modells argumentiert. Außerdem geht der Kontext von spätkolonialer und erster postkolonialer Entwicklungspolitik sowie nation-building über geschichtswissenschaftliche Paradigmen wie die Zeitalter des Faschismus, der Dekolonisierung oder des Kalten Kriegs hinaus. Unter Berücksichtigung sowohl lokaler Besonderheiten als auch transnationaler Verbindungen werden Fortschrittsideen in Bezug auf die Schaffung „Neuer Menschen“ besonders im Zusammenhang mit den Themen Körper, Räume und Symbole betrachtet.

This special issue investigates the social practices of shaping the “New Man” between the 1940s and 1960s, through five case studies from South Asia, Africa, and the Middle East. Objecting to somewhat Eurocentric periodizations in common use, it argues for the persistence of the concept after World War II, and beyond the fascist and Soviet models. The context of late colonial

1 This introduction is to a large extent influenced by the fruitful conversations we had at various stages with our colleagues of the research unit “Progress: Ideas, Agents, Symbols” (Leibniz-Zentrum Moderner Orient (ZMO), Berlin); these are in alphabetical order Paolo Gaibazzi, Malte Fuhrmann, Sophia Hoffmann, Kyara Klausmann, Rana von Mende Altaylı, Izabela Orlowska, Franziska Roy, Abdoulaye Sounaye and Julian Tadesse. We discussed the theme extensively during the conference “New Man” in Africa, Asia and the Middle East: Practices, Networks and Mobilization in the 20th Century (ZMO, 27–29 September 2017). Thus, we are grateful to all participants for their inspiring contributions. We would like to thank Rakiya El Matine and Ferdinand Schlechta for their help with the editorial work.

and early post-colonial developmentalism and nation-building also transcends historiographic paradigms, such as the eras of fascism, decolonization, or the Cold War. Looking for local specificities as well as for transnational links, ideas of Progress related to the formation of “New Men” are studied especially in connection with the issues of the body, of spaces, and of symbols.

1. The Rationale

This special issue investigates the social practices of shaping the “New Man” which evolved within a mood of hopes and hunger for change and development, the growing strength of anti-colonial movements, the introduction of welfare-measures and the strong influence of the developmentalist promise and the first wave of post-colonialism. Simultaneously, great anxieties were gaining ground that these socio-political projects, which grew out of a huge socio-political optimism, might fail.²

We explicitly employ the term “New Man” to counter the argument that the concept and larger societal projects of engineering a “new human being” had fallen out of use after the second half of the twentieth century. We argue that this perception is to a large part the result of Eurocentric discussions of the theme that has largely focused on the “Fascist New Man” (notably German and Italian and, to some extent, British and French) and the “Socialist (Soviet) Man.”³ Current research on the “New Man” of the radical right during the inter-war period and the Second World War, which includes Latin America, Japan or Eastern Europe, already gives a more nuanced picture.⁴ These studies are not denying that authoritarian and often brutal regimes such as those under Salazar in Portugal, Perón in Argentina or Vargas in Brazil were fascinated with Italian or German fascist answers to perceived degenerative effects of modernity and the “communist threat.”⁵

- 2 The English term “New Man” is misleading because of the semantic overlaps of man/male and man/person. Fully acknowledging the gendered and generational differences, we definitely understand the “New Man” in the more general sense as *Neuer Mensch* (German), *addis sew* (Amharic), *mtu mpya* (Swahili), *insân jadid* (Arabic), *naya admi* (Hindi) or *novo humano* (Portuguese). As a conceptual container, it included women and especially children. The supposedly most malleable part of the population – youth – often constituted an ideal target for social experimentation. For discussions about “New Women” in this context see e.g. J. Kraiss, *Girl Guides, Athletes, and Educators: Women and the National Body in Late Colonial Algeria*, in: *Journal of Middle East Women's Studies* 15 (2019) 2, pp. 199–215.
- 3 For a comparative discussion see, P. Fritzsche and J. Hellbeck, *The New Man in Stalinist Russia and Nazi Germany*, in: M. Geyer and S. Fitzpatrick (eds.), *Beyond Totalitarianism. Stalinism and Nazism Compared*, Cambridge, New York 2009, pp. 302–341 and J. Dagnino, M. Feldman and P. Stocker, *Building illiberal subjects. The New Man and the Radical Right Universe, 1919–45*, in: J. Dagnino, M. Feldman and P. Stocker (eds.), *The “New Man” in Radical Right Ideology and Practice, 1919–45*, London 2018, p. 3, and for anthropo-political perspectives on the “New Man” in the Soviet Union see T. Tetzner, *Der kollektive Gott. Zur Ideengeschichte des “Neuen Menschen” in Russland*, Göttingen 2013, pp. 219–370.
- 4 See the contributions by R. Almeida de Carvalho and A. Costa Pinto, A. Spektorowsky, A. Kallis in: Dagnino, Feldman and Stocker, *The “New Man”*.
- 5 Recent scholarship on the fascist “New Man” argues that the concept always included different aspects that were being highlighted in different circumstances, even within Italian Fascism: see L. Klinkhammer and P. Bernhard, *L’uomo nuovo del fascismo. Tra progetto e azione*, in: P. Bernhard and L. Klinkhammer (eds.), *L’uomo nuovo del fascismo. La costruzione di un progetto totalitario*, Rome 2017, pp. 9–27.

However, they show that by opening the analytical lens a little wider we see very different ideas about the “New State” and the “New Man” which resulted in other practices in these cases.

A similar argument on the multiplicity of ideas and practices can be made with regard to the “Socialist Man.” While the Soviet Union and, later, other socialist states remained a strong source of inspiration and support, Maoist China provided an “Uncorrupted Socialist Man,” which gained currency amongst the revolutionary and independence movements worldwide.⁶ Furthermore, from the late 1960s onwards, Cuba provided a socialist-internationalist version of the “New Man” through its concrete involvement in various parts of Africa, most notably Angola, which went far beyond military assistance, but included especially the medical and educational sector.⁷

Discussing concrete examples from South Asia, Africa and the Middle East, which focus on the historical period between the 1940s and the 1960s, we argue that these complexities resulted in specific practices of “New Man” formation, which despite continuities inherited from earlier attempts by colonial powers, had new qualities and answered to new and radically different necessities. We further argue that the study of the “New Man” in post- or late-colonial contexts reveals important aspects of the dialectics between optimism and belief in socio-economic “Progress”⁸ and fears of unpreparedness against internal and external threats. Such an approach links directly with an earlier argument that “progress as an idea and a project of social transformation is partially grounded in actors’ recognition that things could be/come otherwise. This recognition is then articulated as a specific *modus* to apprehend, limit, navigate or exploit the horizon of wayward, possible scenarios envisioned at a given place and time.”⁹

On the global level, the historical period we are concerned with was, on the one hand, influenced by experiences of the devastating effects of two world wars and the threat of a nuclear annihilation during the Cold War period. On the other hand, the inter-war as well as the post-World War II period saw huge waves of optimism and internationalism, especially in the Global South. The formation of the non-aligned movement, emerging Pan-African or Pan-Arab movements are among the most prominent examples. This era was marked by an unprecedented wave of nation-building projects in Africa, Asia and the Middle East many of which proclaimed high ethical standards that also served to set them apart from former political regimes. At the same time, developmentalist ideas had gained ground on a global scale, which set in motion the reliance on transnational

6 For the influence of the Maoist “New Man” on Cuba see chapter four (The global impact of the communist New Man) in Y. Cheng, *Creating the New Man. From Enlightenment Ideals to Socialist Realities*, Honolulu 2009, pp. 190–213.

7 C. Hatzky, *Cubans in Angola. South-South Cooperation and Transfer of Knowledge*, Madison 2015.

8 As laid out earlier, we differentiate between “Progress” as teleological idea, which indicates linearity and temporal orderliness of social change and “progress” as a “horizon of possibilities, a temporal blank screen upon which visions of reality can be projected”. (K. Bromber, P. Gaibazzi, F. Roy, A. Sounaye, J. Tadesse: “The Possibilities Are Endless”. Progress and the Taming of Contingency, ZMO Programmatic Texts No. 9, p. 1) <https://www.zmo.de/publikationen/ProgrammaticTexts/progress2015.pdf> (accessed 8 March 2019).

9 Ibid.

agents. These experts, who by no means only came from the Western and Eastern Blocs but also from within the Global South, were heavily involved in projects of social engineering which came with the package of building new nation states.

If we agree that the vital question about what the future should look like evoked multiple and often contradicting answers and projects, we cannot do justice to this multiplicity by forcing the equally varied “New Man” practices into the straightjacket of a single socio-historical category such as “decolonization,” although colonialism certainly played a major role in various relevant projects – be it colonial reform policies, anti-colonial activism, or early post-colonial nation-building efforts. Looking at five very different case studies from South Asia, Africa and the Middle East, we rather suggest using the “New Man” as a conceptual lens to better understand the “contemporaneity of the non-contemporaneous” – the simultaneity of late colonialism, recolonization, decolonization and post-independence – and, thus, the continuities as well as changes pertaining to the practices of subject formation.

By foregrounding the multiplicity of “New Men” ideas and practices beyond the Eurocentric bias, this special issue is not only in full support of an empirical and conceptual opening of the theme. The case studies are also situated at a historical moment of transformation from the late colonial order to the world of independent nation states. But this was a long and complicated process that cannot be easily matched with common periodizations (which also often tend to be somewhat Eurocentric). While discourses and practices in post-liberation Ethiopia were influenced by the experience of Fascist occupation between 1935 and 1941, the decolonization of the Congo and Algeria in the early 1960s occurred at a moment when completely different paradigms of development had been in use for a long time. Programmes to shape “New Men” were set up in Ethiopia, a state with an imperial tradition going back millennia, as well as in Algeria, whose very existence as a nation was still being questioned around 1960. But as the individual contributions show, for all the local specificities, there were striking similarities and inspirations from different models available during the “fascist,” “Cold War,” or “decolonization” periods which are not neatly separable. We therefore also suggest a specific periodization for the study of the “New Man”: it starts during the interwar period when, on a global level, concrete attempts of social engineering proliferated through diverse internationalisms as well as the growth of “moral Empires”¹⁰ such as the Scouts movement, the Young Men’s Christian Association (YMCA) or the Red Cross. We argue that these attempts were instrumental to ideas and, especially, practices of shaping “New Men” at a time when independence and liberation produced hopes and fears about radical change or a power vacuum. Often conceived as *tabula rasa*, this vacuum had to be filled with new leaders, new citizens and new economies that would fundamentally reshape social relations. In contrast to “New Man” ideologies and practices in Europe or Latin America which entailed a radical break with a perceived decadent past, the ruptures

10 Although Ian Tyrrell coined this term in relation to the American YMCA, it makes sense to use it for other volunteer movements, which aim to spread moral values through public engagement.

in the cases discussed in this special issue were brought about by a break with a (violent) colonial past. This did not exclude a certain self-critical attitude, though, which led to a clear orientation towards a “modern” future. On the one hand, “New Man” projects in Africa, South Asia or the Middle East did not advocate a “return” to pre-colonial models but rather an “authentic” form of “Progress”, which implied a definite break with a past tainted by compromises with colonialism. On the other hand, the colonial setting had already offered possibilities for planners to enact their programs, which were often deemed unfeasible in the metropolises.¹¹ While of course inverting ideological contents, anti- and post-colonial actors could well borrow aspects of such earlier projects during the period in question.

We suggest that this period of “New Man” projects ended with the disillusionment with the leadership that robbed it from the legitimacy it had enjoyed during the immediate aftermath of independence. Utopian or even millenarian hopes connected to the decolonization project itself set it up for disappointment when the promises of freedom, equality and universally better standards of living did not materialize. Although, disillusionment appeared in different post-colonial countries at different times it can be linked to the neoliberal operationalization of attitudes and skills and the growing economization of life, in general, from the late 1970s. It was the time of student protests, rural uprisings and military coups. It was a period when a new wave of ethno-nationalist tendencies and religious reform started as a consequence of this disillusionment with the “New Man” of the post-independence era. In many parts of Africa, Asia and the Middle East, people realized that the “New Man,” under the control of post-colonial elites, had become corrupted or even a “Reactionary Man” of the past.

2. Qualities of the “New Man” between Continuities and Changes

In contrast to arguments that the (historically overloaded) term “New Man” had fallen out of fashion by the second half of the twentieth century, then, the contributions of this special issue demonstrate that the term, its derivatives and, most importantly, the ideas associated with it gained new momentum. The need for large-scale social engineering and the creation of the right type of personality not only persisted but also acquired new urgency, especially, in recently decolonized nation-states and their various nation-building projects. We argue that this time of intense socio-political transformation demanded a vanguard that not only worked for a larger aim, but was also specifically trained to cope with changing circumstances. In Algeria after 1945, for instance, the potential young vanguard trained in the Scout movement had to be ready for violent conflict and

11 Apart from Jerónimo's contribution to this issue see also for the case of North Africa M. H. Davis, “The Transformation of Man” in French Algeria: Economic Planning and the Postwar Social Sciences, 1958-62, in: *Journal of Contemporary History* 52 (2017) 1, pp. 73-94; J. Kraus, *Mastering the Wheel of Chance: Motor Racing in French Algeria and Italian Libya*, in: *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East* 39 (2019) 1, pp. 143-158.

an anti-colonial insurrection, which many nationalists deemed imminent. At the same time, they were supposed to prepare for new options offered by colonial reforms and the opening up of new political horizons.

Similar to earlier “New Men” myths, ideologies, and practices emerging throughout the twentieth century, also the cases discussed in this volume targeted children and youth. They represented purity, vitality and offered a hope to form radically different subjectivities for radically different times. The focus on youth as the prime target should not override cases which conceptualized the “New Men” in terms of “conversion” or “rebirth” as well as geniality. First prime ministers or presidents of newly independent states in Africa such as Julius K. Nyerere, Amílcar L. Cabral or Léopold Sédar Senghor were and still are referred to as the “New African Men.” In contrast to leaders such as Mussolini, Stalin or Mao, they did not emphasize bodily traits or youthfulness. They rather represented the “Civilized Man” as well as “philosopher king.”¹² Furthermore, the people who worked and lived in villagization projects of sorts were by no means all young in terms of age. Whole families were relocated. Arguably, the forward-looking character of these projects as well as the (perceived) necessary strength to implement them conveyed a sense of youthfulness to all those who were involved.

“New Men” were thought of as a vanguard, a force that was already tamed and, thus, itself a potential taming force counteracting all kinds of deviation from the “right path” to “Progress”. “New Men” were conceived as both, “mass men” in organicist models of society that were widespread in the nineteenth and early twentieth century and, especially in the post-world war contexts, as leaders and good examples, often highly educated.

The training courses of leaders, cadres and experts mushroomed all over the Global South. However, the focus on internationally circulating training courses does not do justice to local initiatives, which even requires separate analysis. With its Pan-African outlook, the *Kwame Nkrumah Institute of Ideology* in Ghana explicitly targeted all “African Freedom Fighters,” as Botchway’s contribution to this special issue shows. Similarly, student migrations between Algeria, France, and Arab countries, particularly Egypt, made the formation of future leaders in late colonial North Africa into a transnational endeavour. The growing body of literature on students and student movements in countries outside of Western Europe or North America will further testify to the internationalist nature of student life as well as to differences in the nationalist elite production.

“New Men” were supposed to embody both, discipline and individual responsibility. They acquired these character traits in specialized units such as clubs and associations. These might be directed by the (colonial or independent) state through educational institutions or “modernization” programmes. But they might also be part of civil society initiatives from below that explicitly aimed at challenging a system of colonial domination. The “New Man” was, in any case, associational in nature and formed through a wide range of extra-curricular activities in schools and universities, or through regularly

12 S. Chan, The New African Men. Lecture Series in African Political Thought: part 3. <https://africanarguments.org/2015/10/15/african-political-thought-part-3-the-new-african-man>, (accessed 7 March 2019).

organized community work, which might rely on earlier structures. Furthermore, there was no uniform or single "New Man" model. According to the specific context, the category could mean members of the educated elite or university students, or, as in Bajpai's contribution, citizen-soldiers and citizen-farmers. Changing political contexts, such as the threat of war, re-appropriated and reshaped "New Man" concepts according to immediate necessities.

In contrast to current neoliberal ideas, the individual responsibility of the "New Man" we are talking about was inextricably linked to notions of the greater good and common goals rather than to a rhetoric of individualistic self-optimization. We argue that this combination of discipline and individual responsibility for the community or nation constituted a fundamental difference to earlier concepts of the "New Man."

The "New Man" was to be an (ideal) citizen. This special issue looks at transitions from (colonial, imperial) subjects to citizens of formally independent nation-states. According to the specific context, this could mean very different things. Obviously, citizenship could be acquired only through learning and training and was, thus, relegated for most people to the future. Those already advanced in that process served as good examples and, hence, as educators. Furthermore, Boy Scouts Associations, which were well established in various countries in Africa, Asia, and the Middle East, inculcated in children at a very early age notions of the ideal citizen, which incorporated elements of the soldier-citizen. These ideals became also part and parcel of the "patriotic citizen" in anti-colonial movements and post-colonial states for which violent conflict constituted a concrete experience. On the one hand, this militarized form of social reform, with its emphasis on patriotism, moral character, and physical strength, tapped into a "set of rhetorical conventions" around duty and privilege, responsibility, and opportunity to support and even sacrifice for a greater idea or goal.¹³ On the other hand, tying existing militarized youth movements to ideas of citizenship and nation-building provided the opportunity to demilitarize and control youth in immediate post-independence settings when volatile and semi-military outfits constituted concrete threats to newly established governments. Thus, the "New Men" in post-colonial environments tended to be epitomized by teachers who received special leadership training rather than generals who commanded (para) military contingents.

In the Ethiopian example, the Boy Scout Association combined civic education with the militaristic ethos of the monarchy's elite which consisted, to a large extent, of army officers. These "New Men" were, thus, individuals who served in the educational system but had strong links to the Armed Forces.¹⁴ In Algeria, the Muslim Scout movement was ac-

13 R. R. Krebs, *The Citizen-Soldier Tradition in the United States. Has Its Demise Been Greatly Exaggerated?*, in: *Armed Forces and Society* 36 (2009) 1, p. 161.

14 For the embeddedness of Scouting in formal education and its adaptation to local and especially colonial contexts in the Middle East and Africa, see J. Dueck, *A Muslim Jamboree. Scouting and Youth Culture in Lebanon under the French Mandate*, in: *French Historical Studies* 30 (2007), pp. 485-516 or W.C. Jacob, *Working Out Egypt, Effendi Masculinity and Subject Formation in Colonial Modernity, 1870-1940*, Durham 2011, pp. 107-124 and T. Parsons, *Race, Resistance, and the Boy Scout Movement in British Colonial Africa*, Athens 2004, especially p. 115.

tive at the intersection of the Arabic school system and paramilitary associations working for independence. Under colonial rule, the education system in question was private and run by the Islamic reformist movement. The paramilitary groups, which tried to make the Scouts into “the soldiers of the future,” were clandestine organizations set up by the radical nationalists. Although reformists and nationalists differed in their approaches, both stressed the need to educate the “citizens of tomorrow.”

As discipline was increasingly complemented with a sense of responsibility and initiative, the soldier, obeying orders, was not the only model any more. As future leaders, “New Men” of the decolonization era had to be experts endowed with a capacity for rational planning. Although discourses and practices around hygiene continued to play a role, social engineering projects were not predominantly relying on biologicistic approaches or eugenicist designs any longer. Rather, such projects tended to follow a technocratic approach: natural and social sciences laid the groundwork for national development plans, for which experts (mostly from abroad) were supposed to produce the “New Man” in the form of cadres. However, the formation of cadres and experts was often also based on transnational networks that transferred relevant knowledge within the Global South.¹⁵ The global development (aid) “market” did not only offer various models and ways for implementation. It also proliferated in terms of an exchange of practical knowledge gained in the various colonial territories, as Jerónimo rightly argues in his contribution. Jerónimo’s case study from Belgian colonialism in Africa further indicates that, despite all perceptions that link “New Men” exclusively to the urban, they were in fact also rural. We here second Nicole Sackley’s argument that, especially during the 1950s and 1960s, the village became the site of social experimentation and, in fact, the focal point of decentralized nation-building – regardless whether the nation was still colonial or an independent nation-state, or where on the ideological spectrum it was situated.¹⁶ Jerónimo’s case study reminds of the Salazarist ideal of “New (Portuguese) Man” that was part of a rural utopia.¹⁷

In fact, all contributions to this volume demonstrate that “New Men” were, in some way, tied to “the soil.” Late colonial and early post-colonial settlement schemes, for instance, tried to establish model villages for a “modernized” agricultural society, which served as laboratories of large-scale socio-economic transformations as well as “miniatures,” i.e. “a more easily controlled micro-order.”¹⁸ Post-colonial model village schemes substantially built on the colonial experience that “Progress” (often understood as welfare) in the rural

15 When re-establishing the Boy Scout movement in Ethiopia in 1948, for example, the Imperial Government relied on experienced personnel from the Global North as well as from India and, increasingly, Kenya. Furthermore, “Western” experts had mostly served elsewhere in the Global South, which had shaped their ideas about Scouting in the (colonial) tropics.

16 N. Sackley, *The Village as Cold War Site. Experts, Development, and the History of Rural Reconstruction*, in: *Journal of Global History* 6 (2011), pp. 481–504.

17 R. Almeida de Carvalho and A. Costa Pinto, *The “Everyman” of the Portuguese New State*, in: Dagnino, et al. (eds.), *“New Man” in Radical Right Ideology and Practice*, pp. 135–137.

18 J. Scott, *Seeing Like a State. How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed*, New Haven 1998, p. 4.

areas was the responsibility of the local population, as the well-researched example of the *Ujamaa* villages in Tanzania shows.¹⁹ “The Workers Brigades,” to mention another prominent example from Ghana, did not only work at construction sites such as the Akosombo High Dam but also at collective state farms.²⁰ Since the majority of the population in Africa, Asia and the Middle East lived in rural areas and the model of a large industrial working class as the driving force of “Progress” was not applicable, farmers became the target of social engineering. This does not only refer to the post-independence period but, as Jerónimo’s contribution shows, especially to the time of late colonialism. Thus, instead of portraying the rural population as backward, farmers became a symbol of “Progress” across a wide ideological spectrum. In India, farmers represented one ideal type of the post-colonial model citizen, because of their strategic function of feeding the population and, most importantly, the armed forces. Bajpai’s contribution details how this trope was foregrounded by official propaganda in times of anticipated or actual armed conflict.

Rural areas also became the training ground for the intelligentsia. Thousands of students in various countries of the world did compulsory agricultural service during or immediately after their university studies, often supervised and accompanied by staff members. “Land to the Tiller!”, the slogan of the Ethiopian student movement of the late 1960s, laid the ideological ground for a specific practice of compulsory service in rural areas.²¹ The first *zāmāṣa*, the “development-through-cooperation campaign” in Ethiopia (1975–1976), is but one example how the post-revolutionary government turned the central demand of the student movement for a fundamental land reform into a mechanism of “encadrement.”²² Thousands of students went out to “revolutionize the countryside” by educating the rural masses.²³ Arguably, they were inspired by widespread Maoist ideas that the village was the lynchpin for the socialist revolution. Research into campaigns which were conducted in post-revolutionary or post-independence rural contexts offers the possibility for understanding historical continuities in forming “New Men” through tying them to “the soil.” However, the importance attached to “the soil” was not confined to revolutionary actors or proponents of agricultural reform. In various countries, youth movements based in the major urban centers “discovered” the countryside – with multiple aims in mind: a “return” to nature or the rustic “authenticity” of peasant life, an examination of living conditions and future potentials, necessary for the aspiring planner.

19 E. Hunter, *Voluntarism, Virtuous Citizenship, and Nation-Building in Late Colonial and Early Postcolonial Tanzania*, in: *African Studies Review* 58 (2015) 2, pp. 48–51.

20 P. Hodge, *The Ghana Workers Brigade: A Project for Unemployed Youth*, in: *The British Journal of Sociology* 15 (1964) 2, pp. 113–128.

21 Bahru Zewde, *The Quest for a Socialist Ethiopia. The Ethiopian Student Movement, C. 1960–1974*, Suffolk 2014, pp. 18–26.

22 Dereje Feyissa, *The Ethnic Self and the National Other. Anywaa Identity Politics in Reference to the Ethiopian State System*, in: Bahru Zewde (ed.), *Society and State in African History*, Addis Ababa 2008, p. 132; R. Rønning Balsvik, *Addis Ababa University in the Shadow of the Derg*, in: S. Ege, H. Aspen, B. Teferre and S. Bekele (eds.), *Proceedings of the 16th International Conference of Ethiopian Studies*, Trondheim 2009, pp. 260–264.

23 D. L. Donham, *Marxist Modern. An Ethnographic History of the Ethiopian Revolution*, Oxford 1999.

The “New Man” was, furthermore, a volunteer. Apart from volunteering to sacrifice one’s life as the most important element of the “patriotic citizen” figure, volunteering as such often featured as an attribute of the “New Man.” The Scouts with their emphasis on unconditional loyalty, strict hierarchies, and (national) defence are a good example. Their understanding of volunteering, which was linked to the notion of sacrifice for God, the King/Emperor, and the nation, makes existential questions about life and death a component of the formation of “New Men.” Furthermore, the historical moment of decolonization, global post-war reconstruction, and Cold War politics not only saw an aid boom in countries of the Global South, but also the growing influx of volunteers, such as the Peace Corps workers from the United States. They personified the “work on the self” as professionals-in-the-making in an internationalist context of aid and development interventions. We should, however, not overemphasize the influence of “newcomers from the North” on the perception and practice of volunteering in the Global South, but rather look at local agents, which forms a huge gap in historical research on volunteering.²⁴ Looking at volunteering in late colonial and early post-colonial Tanzania, Emma Hunter demonstrates how volunteering as a concept as well as social practice shifted according to changing conceptualizations of state, authority, and economy. She argues that complexities arise especially from the concept’s inherent duality of meaning. On the one hand, volunteering taps into the rhetoric about virtuousness and duty towards the wider community that we have already described as a central characteristic of the idea of the “New Man.” This rhetoric reveals a conceptual and persuasive continuity from the colonial to the post-colonial context and, arguably, continues into the present. The other way to conceive volunteer work, according to Hunter, is as service which the state has difficulties to provide, bringing it close to unpaid labour. She argues that conceiving the modern personality as the “virtuous” or “patriotic” citizen of a (post-colonial) nation state in the making was a way to balance this contested nature of volunteering.²⁵ Thus, it is no wonder that youth organizations such as the Scouts, the YMCA, or the Youth Brigades included volunteering as part of citizenship training. In the case of Ethiopia in the 1950s and 1960s, for example, volunteers took an active part in citizenship training at the YMCA, which meant that they offered basic education to the poor that the state was not able to provide.²⁶ In the case of Ghana, people who gained experience as volunteers in organizations such as the Boy Scouts or the YMCA, became cadres in post-independence youth organizations which cultivated volunteering as a virtue of the “New (socialist) African.”

The contributions to this special issue approach the “New Man” as umbrella category predominantly used by states or institutions to bring about social transformation. Thus, they discuss examples of an instrumentalist reading of the term that relies on authority.

24 The role and aspirations of local volunteers in current Africa, Asia and the Middle East has been widely discussed. The use of relevant conceptual approaches for historical cases is still to be explored.

25 Hunter, *Voluntarism, Virtuous Citizenship, and Nation-Building*, pp. 44–45.

26 K. Bromber, *Make Them Better Citizens: YMCA Training in Late Imperial Ethiopia (1950s–1970s)*, in: *Annales d’Éthiopie* 32 (2019), forthcoming.

What we do not see are aberrant concepts of the “New Man” that did not fit the state or developmental agendas.

3. Practices

Throughout this special issue, we argue and demonstrate that the qualitative changes, described above, were brought about by context-related practices of subject formation. They could be completely new, reframed and adapted or continue older precedents. Earlier practices of shaping the “New Man” persisted, to be sure: physical training and soldiering to form the militarized “New Man” remained important, especially in times of anticipated military conflict or recently experienced defeat. However, they changed to become more technocratic. Preparedness became the order of the day instilling a permanent sense of not being prepared enough. The Boy Scouts with their motto “Be prepared!” (and its different translations) always placed preparedness high on the agenda. In the context of decolonization, where independence seemed an inevitable outcome – albeit one that still had to be fought for with determination –, preparing the youth now meant to prepare them for their role in the post-colonial nation-state to come. The problem of preparedness did not stop with independence, though: in Ethiopia after the Italian occupation or in India between the wars with China and Pakistan in the 1960s, governments and public discourse alike always stressed the need to be prepared for the next conflict. Activities such as Scouting were imagined to prepare for an uncertain future by promising the holistic development of the individual – morally, physically, and mentally – who would in this way be prepared for all eventualities.

Such a holistic education, which was supposed to form a moral character, physical fitness, and mental strength, required specific practices. The contributions of this special issue look into practices that we might broadly categorize under the following three labels: *body, space, symbols*.

Practices, explicitly targeting the *human body*,²⁷ comprised activities such as camping or hiking that, on the one hand, increased physical fitness and alertness and, on the other, related the (fit) human to a specific geography (*Heimat*, nation-state, etc.). Hiking, cultivated mostly, but not exclusively, in Boy Scout and Girl Guide movements, established a specific relation of the human to “(national) soil” through self-reliance, physical exposure to hardship, and forming bonds of brother- and sisterhood or solidarity. Baden-Powell’s militarized ideas on hiking and camping in the Scout movement, which explicitly aimed at survival and character-cum-citizenship training, are often contrasted to Germany’s *Wandervogel* movement, which saw hiking and contact with nature as a romanticized way of liberating the human being from social conventions. The examples in this special

27 We forego an explicit elaboration on the works of Michel Foucault or Norbert Elias on practices of subject formation. For a comparative perspective, see C. Dahlmanns, *Die Geschichte des modernen Subjekts*. Michel Foucault und Norbert Elias im Vergleich, Münster 2008.

issue offer a nuanced perspective on hiking as one practice of shaping the “New Man” in contexts that are not (exclusively) shaped by Western imports, but have their own history of moving and surviving.

A favorite practice in several youth movements was hiking.²⁸ But, as the example of Algeria shows, in the context of “modernization” and individual strengthening through educational reform hiking and camping were also seen as a preparation for the national struggle. Apart from that, in predominantly Muslim society Scouts’ activities in the open could serve to instill a new sense for nature as God’s creation. The religious dimension inherent in Baden-Powell’s original concept of Scouting adapted itself rather well to Muslim contexts. Here, the Prophet Muhammad and early Islamic history with its military exploits actually often provided the models for physical fitness, strength, and bodily training. Prayers were as much part of a Boy Scout’s camp routine as games or walks. At the same time, a “modern” body was a central characteristic of a “New Man,” as can be seen from Kraiss’s contribution on Algeria. The muscular version of the Prophet was specifically employed to counter Orientalist stereotypes that viewed Muslims as weak, passive, and effeminate. Algerian nationalists, in particular, adopted these stereotypes to distance themselves from the “old men” of traditional authority: it was, above all, fit and athletic bodies – wearing modern dress – that distinguished “new” Muslim men socialized in the Scout movement.²⁹ Bromber’s contribution about post-liberation Scouting in Ethiopia shows that hiking and camping combined a number of bodily survival practices such as swimming and running. Furthermore, marching and singing, especially in front of the Emperor, were both bodily and highly symbolic. Going to the cinema (in Dirre Dawa in 1949) as part of the programme linked Scouting to an urban modernity, which was increasingly defined through modern leisure practices.

The bodily practices mentioned so far are at the same time *spatial practices*. Hiking, camping and, in Bromber’s case, flying³⁰ are practices by which space is constructed through movement. Camp orders regulate in-and-outward movement mostly in combination with strict temporal regimes. The spatial practice of camping also includes the transformation of an urban site, a factory, a school, or a rural place along the way. Hiking required map reading and drawing, which, in turn, required the ability to abstract space into a two-dimensional miniature. Signalling, which became especially important in Scouts’ exercises that directly prepared for hikes or para-military contexts, was at the same time bodily, spatial and symbolic, when used in official presentations of skills.

Whereas Scout camps were temporary spaces to discipline youth, the model villages described in Jerónimo’s contribution narrate a (global) history of disciplinary spatial practices that aimed at transforming larger parts of the rural population. He describes

28 See also Y. Kesler and Y. Goldstein, Hiking as an Educational Tool of Zionist Youth Movements in Mandate Palestine, in: Australian Journal of Jewish Studies 29 (2015-16), pp. 43-74.

29 See also K. D. Watenpugh, Scouting in the Interwar Arab Middle East: Youth, Colonialism and the Problem of Middle-Class Modernity, in: N. R. Block and T. M. Proctor (eds.), Scouting Frontiers: Youth and the Scout Movement’s First Century, Newcastle 2009, pp. 89-105.

30 Bromber’s contribution also hints at constructions of the aviator as “New Man”.

practices that were experimental by nature and primarily targeted people’s efficiency in the production process. As Fisher-Tahir and Wagenhofer point out, and Jerónimo exemplifies, “disciplinary spaces” are not only “locally situated and territorially bounded [but also] structured by global-local dependencies”³¹ and knowledge production. The nexus between knowledge production and transfer, discipline and space is also demonstrated in Botchway’s contribution on Ghana, especially in the case of the *Kwame Nkrumah Ideological Institute* (KNII), which became a national and regional center for specific hominization practices.

The movement or placement of human bodies in space as well as the construction of model villages or institutes contain highly *symbolic* acts of power. Dressing in uniforms, singing songs about a “New Time” and “New People,” rendering oaths, and especially acts of venerating leaders such as Kwame Nkrumah or Emperor Haile Selassie are cases in point. They draw on a repertoire of linguistic tropes and visual elements which link the “New Man” to an explicit expression of preparedness. “Be prepared!” or “Be ready!” – the slogan of the Scouts movement – is a telling example. Spoken, sung, shouted, written as part of the national emblems or as part of newspaper headlines and banners – the words became omnipresent at schools or during public festivals, when patrols were responsible for security issues. Uniforms and badges, which indicated ranks, as well as large sticks as weapons, belonged to this symbolic repertoire of preparedness. Contingents of Youth Brigadiers, dressed in khaki overalls and carrying spades and shovels over their shoulders became symbols of the power of the people (and their leaders) when they marched through settlements to their work places or paraded on the sports grounds on public holidays commemorating revolution or independence. The symbolic affinity to the military was often legitimized by referring to formal independence as the beginning of a struggle against internal and external enemies and, most importantly, individual shortcomings, reminiscent of Marxist-Leninists’ theoretical claims about “permanent revolution” or “revolution and counter-revolution.” In this context, Bajpai’s contribution demonstrates how propaganda could tap into and re-shape an existing repertoire about “New Men” for total mobilization in times of conflict.

The focus of the individual contributions on concrete practices of shaping the “New Man” in very specific local and temporal contexts allows to ask (and partially answer) questions about continuities, changes and adaptations of transferred or local knowledge regarding preparedness, development and specific notions of “progress” that speak explicitly to the contingent nature of social transformation.

31 A. Fisher-Tahir and S. Wagenhofer, Spatial Control, Disciplinary Power and Assimilation. The Inevitable Side-Effects of “Progress” and Capitalist “Modernity”, in: A. Fisher-Tahir and Sophie Wagenhofer (eds.), *Disciplinary Spaces. Spatial Control, Forced Assimilation and the Narratives of Progress in the 19th Century*, Bielefeld 2017, p. 15.

4. The Contributions in Context

The contributions to this special issue present case studies from Belgian Congo, Ghana, Ethiopia, Algeria, and India. They ask which specific practices, often based on globally produced and circulated knowledge, were adapted to local contexts as well as highly contingent political situations and how they became important in shaping “New Men” for “New Times.” Looking into the specificities, they ask about the mechanisms and agents of these adaptations and transformations. What were the continuities from earlier practices of (self)optimizing and where can we see radical changes? Who was selected as suitable “human material,” by whom, what for, and under which concrete historical circumstances?

Katrin Bromber’s contribution on Ethiopia looks at the years following the liberation from the Italian Fascist occupation during World War II (1935–1941). The Italian aggressors killed most of the modern intelligentsia that had loyally supported Emperor Haile Selassie’s projects of social and economic change. Upon his return from British exile in 1941 with the help of British Empire Forces, the Emperor was severely threatened by internal enemies who questioned the legitimacy of his rule. Thus, he needed a new generation, well-educated and trained, centrally organized and, above all, loyal. Scouting with its emphasis on God, Emperor, and nation seemed to be an ideal locus of “New Man” formation. Haile Selassie explicitly framed the movement as a pre-military school during this uncertain moment and pushed for the establishment of Scouting as one important element in the formation of an avant-garde – the joints and motors of “Progress”. A similar preoccupation with the formation of future leaders through Scouting can be found in the case study from the Arab world. In late colonial Algeria, as Jakob Kraiss demonstrates, we encounter the Boy Scouts once again as a central feature of indigenous civil society. Whereas Ethiopia had an official youth movement, in Algeria the Scouts acted in opposition to both the colonial authorities and equivalent associations of the European population. This country, in particular, witnessed a strong feeling of uncertainty during the period of decolonization, where the process of nation-building remained tenuous and multiple trajectories towards the future seemed possible.

In contrast to Algeria’s undecided future, Kwame Nkrumah and his Convention People’s Party conceived and enacted a very clear trajectory for Ghana’s post-independence future of the late 1950s and early 1960s; the party envisaged the complete liberation of Africa within a socialist bracket, as De-Valera Botchway’s contribution shows. Similar to other (colonial) states on the continent, people in Gold Coast/Ghana also conceived independence and modernization in an instrumentalist way, i.e. that it would translate directly into the reduction and erasure of poverty, the creation of economic possibilities and evenly distributed access to the benefits of the welfare state. The threat of political instability potentially brought about by disappointed youth made a clear cut youth policy and institutions to implement them such as the Worker’s Brigade or the Ghana Young Pioneers movement an urgent matter.

At a time, when the call for independence was gaining more and more ground on the African continent during the post-World War II decade, colonial powers re-configured themselves within developmentalist and welfare agendas. Miguel Jerónimo’s example of the late colonial period in Belgian territory highlights the emerging global developmentalist knowledge “market.” This market offered various recipes of and trained experts in transforming the colonial subject into an effective and controllable “human resource” through welfare measures linked to spatial control in rural areas.

In India – Anandita Bajpai’s case study – decolonization resulted from a long nationalist struggle for independence in 1947. In the initial post-independence years, the new post-colonial nation-state attempted to streamline the diverse sub-national identities through a nationalized vocabulary of nation-building. The slogan “Unity in Diversity” thus became one of the unifying means to craft a sense of nation-ness beyond regional and linguistic realms whereas the “Temples of Modern India,” as Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru announced them (dams, industrial plants, universities), were seen as the motor of establishing self-sufficiency. By the 1960s and over a decade of independence, the state had already established an altered register for citizens to become the ideal “New Men.” However, crises such as food grain shortages and wars (with China and Pakistan) inserted a new terminology in the pre-existing catalogue of industrialization, scientific temper, and economic self-reliance. This is a period when a war had just ended (1962), the first and only Prime Minister so far, Nehru, had died while in office (1964), food grain scarcity was looming large, and another conflict was brewing up (1965). The category of the “New Man,” an ideal citizen, was now re-loaded with the established repertoire of security, vigilance, working, protecting and fighting for the motherland. This state-directed vision was not only directed at the farmers who filled the granaries to feed the nation or the soldiers who would defend the nation, but incorporated one and all. Discipline, producing for the nation, acting in unity and consuming frugally thus came to define the “New Man” of a nation under threat.

Scouting: Training the “New Man” in Post-liberation Ethiopia

Katrin Bromber¹

ABSTRACTS

Ogleich in Äthiopien Pfadfindereinheiten bereits 1919 entstanden, gewann die Bewegung erst nach dem Ende der italienischen Okkupation (1935–1941) an Bedeutung. Die Eingliederung der Pfadfinderorganisation in die Abteilung für Sporterziehung im Ministerium für Bildung und Kunst demonstriert seine Position als Teil des staatlichen Schulwesens. In diesem Zusammenhang lassen sich Wandern und Camping als spezielle Praxen untersuchen, mit denen die Pfadfinder (nationales) Territorium körperlich erfahren und mit Techniken des Überlebens und Führens verbinden konnten. In diesem Zusammenhang organisierte Begegnungen der Scouts mit hochrangigen Vertretern von Militär, Polizei und Regierung zeigen, dass der „Neue Mensch“ wesentlich über eine demographisch verstandene Kategorie „Jugend“ hinausgeht.

Although Boy Scouting emerged in Ethiopia as early as 1919, it was after the end of the Italian occupation (1935–41) that the movement gained momentum as an important part of youth training. The re-organization of the Boy Scouts under the Ministry of Education and Fine Arts as well as its coupling with Sports and Physical Education hints at the fact that Boy Scouting and, later, Girl Guiding were considered an integral part of education. The article looks at hiking and camping as a specific practice to link the youth to the (national) soil, to train survival and to instil leadership. It further shows that the “New Man” is not restricted to the demographic category of youth, but can include Ethiopian officials up to the highest ranks as well as local and foreign experts who re-organized the movement in Ethiopia.

1 This article is the result of an ongoing research project, “Progressive Citizen Bodies: Sports and Modernity in Ethiopia 1920–1974,” at Leibniz-Zentrum Moderner Orient, Berlin. I am grateful to Bahru Zewde and Franziska Roy for their critical comments on an earlier version of the article. I am deeply indebted to my Amharic teacher Seyoum Mulugeta, who carefully checked and discussed my translations.

1. Introduction

On 6 August 1949, a group of 85 Boy Scouts from Addis Ababa travelled by train to Dire Dawa, the most important town on the railway line between the Ethiopian capital and Djibouti. There and in the neighbouring town of Harar, they would undergo various trainings, examinations, and competitions, as well as have meetings with top officials from the Ethiopian Government, before returning to the capital. When the patrols of Scouts got back to Addis Ababa in the early afternoon of 3 September, they had already spent more than three hours singing and marching along the way from the town of Bishoftu. The boys seemed to be proud and overwhelmed by their experiences during the first camp organized by the not yet officially recognized Boy Scouts Association of Ethiopia. This article argues that such hiking within the Scout Movement was a cornerstone in tying together a number of practices that led to the creation of “New (Ethiopian) Men” – equipped with practical and theoretical knowledge, disciplined, loyal, and fit for leadership.

The first section explains the socio-political context, in which Scouting in Ethiopia emerged as a number of specific and interrelated practices of shaping “New Men.” Ideas about modernization and Westernization of the Ethiopian Empire had gained substantial ground in the first half of the twentieth century. They conceptualized the “New Man” in terms of “modern civilization” (*zāmānawī-sələṭṭane*).² Modern schools, established from 1908 onwards, became the main sites for forming young males into “modern men.” During the Italian fascist occupation (1936–1941), the first generation of these “civilized” and highly educated “modern men” had been nearly completely wiped out. Thus, the post-liberation era, which Emperor Haile Selassie I declared as “New Time” (*addis zāmān*),³ again needed “New Men.” This section will reveal the multiple actors who facilitated the reorganization of the Scout Movement after Ethiopia’s liberation from Italian occupation in 1941.

Zooming in on the well-documented hiking event mentioned above, the next section analyses the training in physical as well as mental practices that the organizers identified as important for shaping a specific version of the “New Man,” namely a militarized one. The section shows the close relations of the movement to the military, in this specific example, but also more generally to the Ethiopian Air Force.

The third section reflects on the meaning of hiking beyond the physical activity of moving between places. Arguably, hiking was one of the most efficient practices in binding the Scouting “New Man” to the soil, facilitating his interaction with the “common peo-

2 “[T]he image of the new political order was drawn in terms of a new ideology: *Zamanawī seletane* (modernity), which meant modern institutions, modern schooling, and modern thinking [...] the Amharic word *Zamanawī-seletane* has an anti-clerical connotation. Emperor Tewodros first introduced *Zamanawī-seletane* to Ethiopia but the word did not come into general use until the reign of Emperor Haile Selassie.” (P. Milkias, *Haile Selassie, Western Education, and Political Revolution in Ethiopia*, London, Amherst, New York 2006, pp. 54–55).

3 “This day is for Ethiopia the beginning of a new time [...] where things begin which we will all finish,” Haile Selassie, *Yäaddis zāmān gazeta mägāmār* (The “New Times” Newspaper Started), in: *Addis Zāmān* 30 Gānbot 1933 E.C. (7 June 1941), p. 1.

ple” and, thus, fostering a sense of national belonging. It offered a possibility to showcase and boost morale, to volunteer, and to socialize. The article further argues that Scouting is an ideal lens through which to observe that although practices of shaping the “New Man” targeted youth, the category had a considerable reach beyond this demographic and included teachers as well as ministerial officials.⁴

2. How Scouting Arrived in Ethiopia

Scouting in Ethiopia started at a particular juncture in history, when fears and discourses about urbanity, degeneracy, and decline, and a growing sense of nationalism were proliferating on a global scale and resulted in a variety of attempts to discipline and militarize the male youth. From the mid-nineteenth century onwards, institutionalized measures of correcting and disciplining young people mushroomed globally and found forceful expressions in cadet schools and (militarized) volunteer movements. The growing body of literature on Muscular Christianity and Scouting beyond Europe and North America has drawn academic attention to the globality of this process.

During the first decades of the twentieth century, the Ethiopian modern intelligentsia raised the issue of backwardness in their society.⁵ They expressed the need for reform from above in order to turn Ethiopia into a modern empire, preferably emulating the Japanese example. Although modernization started earlier, it was under Ras Taferi, later Haile Selassie I, that this reform process gained momentum.

The armed forces and the educational system became important sites of modernizing the Ethiopian Empire.⁶ Therefore, it makes sense to see early Scouting as part of this process of reform. Looking back at his accomplishments as an emperor, Haile Selassie I emphasized that he had stood behind the establishment of the Scout Movement in the country as early as 1919, while he was still Governor of Harar and, later, *Balemulu 'Inderase* (Regent Plenipotentiary). Ras Taferi, as he was called before his coronation in 1930, was very much attracted by Sir Robert Baden-Powell's ideas of instilling values such as patriotism, discipline, loyalty, self-help, and self-defence into male youth. The Emperor later interpreted the movement as site of moulding youth into potential cadets for Holeta military college [est. 1935].⁷

It is still unclear when and to what extent Boy Scout activities became part of the school curriculum. A clear step in this direction was taken in 1934: with the consent of the Emperor, a so-called Boy Scout School was established in Gulele (the north-western outskirts

4 The article makes extensive use of the Robert N. Thompson Papers, which are located in the archives of the Trinity Western University in Langley, Canada (further referred to RNT TWU), and documents at Institute of Ethiopian Studies (IES), Addis Ababa University.

5 For this process, see Bahru Zewde, *Pioneers of Change in Ethiopia: The Reformist Intellectuals of the Early Twentieth Century*, Oxford 2002.

6 Modern schools had started already under Menelik II in 1905.

7 Haile Selassie I, *My Life and Ethiopia's Progress, 1892-1937*. Translated and annotated by Edward Ullendorff, New York, London: Oxford University Press 1976, p. 12.

of Addis Ababa), which later became Medhane Alem School.⁸ According to the popular narrative, the founding director was a Lebanese, Frederick Kamal; the language used was French and “typical Boy Scout activities” were a fixed part of the curriculum.⁹ Financial support came from Mr Moriaitas,¹⁰ an influential businessman in Addis Ababa’s large Greek community, who established the first Scout headquarters opposite the school, which accommodated 375 boys.¹¹ The Greek community in Ethiopia already had its own Scout division. Interestingly, Scouting also became a selling point for a “modern” Ethiopia as part of the German propaganda campaign to highlight Ethiopia’s march to modernity in the early 1930s; the illustrated book *Das ist Abessinien* [This is Abyssinia] published numerous images of well-equipped Boy Scouts being trained in the bush.¹² These early Scouting activities came to an abrupt end when fascist Italy occupied Ethiopia in 1935. Existing modern educational institutions were closed and, instead, schools were set up by the fascist administration for children of the local nobility. These schools resembled the Italian template, the *Balilla*. Ironically, Baden-Powell himself had described the *Balillas* as a great example of successfully integrating general education and Boy Scouting.¹³ Here, paramilitary units of the fascist youth movement Wolves of Ethiopia trained in uniforms that resembled the dress of the Scouts. The plethora of paramilitary activities in schools during the occupation produced a negative attitude among the Ethiopian population towards any Scouting activity in the post-occupation period. In 1957, the Emperor still felt the need to stress in public that the Ethiopian Scouts had actively resisted the Italian occupation.¹⁴ The negative popular perception of the Scouts was the main reason that, in contrast to other volunteer organizations such as the Ethiopian Red Cross (est. 1935) or the YMCA (est. 1947), the process of (re-)establishing an Ethiopian Boy Scout Movement did not occur until 1948 – seven years after the liberation.¹⁵

8 Bädaredawa yä’äskawtočč yä’ägär kwas čäwata (Football Competition of the Scouts in Dire Dawa), in: Addis Zämän 12 Təqəmt 1941 E.C. (23 October 1949).

9 R. Pankhurst, Educational Developments of the 1930s, in: Link Ethiopia, <https://www.linkethiopia.org/blog/article/educational-developments-of-the-1930s> (accessed 6 February 2019). According to Pankhurst, Frederick Kamal had taught at the School of the Redeemer for Orphans (est. 1932). It is still unclear how he came to Ethiopia. Kamal might have been connected to the Greek Orthodox community in Lebanon and came to Ethiopia via translocal business relations. He might have got his training in one of the schools run by the Mission laïque, which cooperated very closely with the Greek Orthodox community from the early twentieth century onwards. Since the mission was active in Egypt, too, it might not be impossible that he belonged to the Egyptian educational mission to Ethiopia, which included three Lebanese teachers, who taught at Teferi Mekonnen School (est. 1925); H. Erlikh, The Egyptian Teachers of Ethiopia – Identities and Education along the Nile, in: Walter Raunig, Asfa-Wossen Aserate (eds.): Äthiopien zwischen Orient und Okzident, Berlin 2004, p. 129.

10 After the liberation, when he was employed in the Agricultural Bank of Ethiopia, Moriaitas was one of the most active persons in reorganizing the Scout Movement in Ethiopia (R.N. Thompson to Col. J.S. Wilson (Director, Boy Scouts International Bureau, London) 5 December 1949).

11 It later became Madhane Alem School. Bäfäqadä Selase Fantaye, Salä boy eskowt agälgəlot (Boy Scout Service) Addis Ababa 1955, p. 3.

12 Das ist Abessinien, Leipzig 1935, pp. 40–42.

13 T. Jeal, Baden-Powell: Founder of the Boy Scouts, New Haven 1989, p. 545.

14 H. Selassie I, Address to the Boy Scout Movement on 6 June 1959, in: The Imperial Ethiopian Ministry of Information (ed.), Selected Speeches of His Imperial Majesty Haile Selassie First, 1918 to 1967, Addis Ababa 1967, p. 648.

15 R.N. Thompson to Col. J.S. Wilson, Director, Boy Scouts International Bureau, London 5 Dec 1949, p. 1 RNT TWU.

Initial attempts to bring Scouting back to Ethiopia coincided with the establishment of physical education as an integral part of the educational system. Since Scouting emphasized physical fitness, it seemed more than logical to form a Department of Physical Education *and* Boy Scouting within the Ministry of Education and Fine Arts (MoE). Emperor Haile Selassie I later recalled this step as follows:

*Even in the future, the development of the physical and spiritual strength of Our nation is dependent on her youth obtaining scout and military training along with their academic studies, thus combining in themselves the heroism and spirit of determination of their fathers with military training and modern scientific knowledge; and it is for this reason that We have commanded Our Vice-Minister of Education to establish facilities for military training in all Our educational institutions.*¹⁶

In 1948, work started to reorganize the Boy Scouts of Ethiopia. This meant that all the necessary structures and committees, such as a National Council and an Executive Board, had to be built, a charter drafted, and Scoutmaster courses started. Some Scouting activities had already commenced in various schools in the capital through private initiatives; they had to be identified, institutionalized, and standardized.¹⁷ Although the first patrols had been formed by Mignon Innes Ford, headmistress of Princess Zenebe Worq School, who had come to Ethiopia in the 1930s as part of the Pan-African movement,¹⁸ plans for establishing the Girl Scout Association of Ethiopia were not officially considered prior to 1950.¹⁹ Existing Girl Scout patrols were integrated into the structures and activities of the Boy Scouts.

Within the MoE, the Canadian Dr Robert N. Thompson was identified as the ideal person to facilitate the reorganization process. Having served as an instructor in the Commonwealth Air Training Plan during World War II, Thompson and his family were relocated to Ethiopia through the offices of the Sudan Interior Mission in 1943. He served in the Ethiopian Air Force and later became secondary school teacher and headmaster of Haile Selassie I Secondary School.²⁰ In 1948, Thompson was seconded to the MoE, where he acted as Director of Provincial Schools until 1952. His personal connections to the armed forces as well as to various decision-makers and potential allies within the Ethiopian educational system were as important for the job as his experience as a Scout. Thus, Haile Selassie's most favourite son Prince Mekonnen, Chief Scout and Patron of the Movement in Ethiopia, assigned Thompson to act as commissioner in the absence of

16 H. Selassie I, Address to the Boy Scout Movement on 6 June 1959, in: The Imperial Ethiopian Ministry of Information (Hg.), Selected Speeches of His Imperial Majesty Haile Selassie First, 1918 to 1967, Addis Ababa 1967, p. 649.

17 Regulations for the Establishment of Boy Scout Troops, RNT TWU.

18 G. Bonacci, Back to Ethiopia: African-American and West-Indian Returnees in Ethiopia (1896–2010), in: Kwesi Kwaa Prah (ed.), Back to Africa Volume II, The Ideology and Practice of the African Returnee Phenomenon from the Caribbean and North America to Africa, Cape Town 2012, pp. 360–361.

19 Documents located in Thompson Papers (RNT TWU) complain about the extremely slow process of establishing the Ethiopian Girl Guides.

20 R.N. Thompson, Down a Memory Lane from Ethiopia, in: World Scouting, 4 (1965) 1, p. 10.

a National Council. He gave the Canadian free reign in choosing the right personnel to re-establish the Ethiopian Scout Movement.²¹

Thompson first and foremost based his choice on the candidates' previous experience as Scouts and on their political influence. Thus, the first boards and committees consisted of Ethiopians (mostly high-ranking individuals from diverse ministries as well as the armed forces), members of the so-called foreign communities (mostly Indian and Greek), and expatriates from Canada, Sweden, North America, Egypt, France, Britain, and Sudan who served in various capacities in the educational sector.²² Furthermore, the main drivers of the re-establishment such as Oni Niskanen, Aberra Jembere or Michael Wassef were not only experienced Scouts.²³ They were also active in the Red Cross Society or the YMCA of Ethiopia and, thus, facilitated cooperation between these organizations.

In 1949, Aberra Jembere had been appointed as General Secretary, Akalework Haptewold (Vice-Minister of Education) acted as Chairman and Thompson became Deputy Commissioner.²⁴ In late 1950, a National Council, which 99 per cent consisted of high-ranking Ethiopian officials, and an Executive Council with multinational members was established, and a charter and constitution drafted, approved, and published. The Ethiopian Government officially recognized the Boy Scout Association of Ethiopia in 1950.²⁵ After a delay of almost 20 years, Ethiopia finally became a recognized member of the World Organization of the Scout Movement in 1969.

Notwithstanding administrative and structural issues, a six-week Scoutmaster's training course (combined with a physical training master's course) was held on the premises of Tafari Makonnen School in July 1949.²⁶ Three months later, the Scoutmasters had their first regular meeting held in Addis Ababa and apparently received regular training thereafter.

The search for permanent headquarters as well as financial issues had also to be solved.²⁷ The Emperor had gifted \$47,000 Eth., with the intention that the Boy Scouts should be

21 Crown Prince to R.N. Thompson, 10 January 1948, RNT TWU.

22 R.N. Thompson to Col. J.S. Wilson (Director, Boy Scouts International Bureau, London) 5 December 1949, p. 2 RNT TWU.

23 The Egyptian Michell Wassef, formerly physical training instructor at Teferi Makonnen School and later supervisor of physical training for Addis Ababa Schools became the first General Secretary of the YMCA in Ethiopia. Aberra Jembere, the first General Secretary of the Ethiopian Boy Scout Association, was an active board member of the Ethiopian YMCA. Oni Niskanen, who gained fame as the Abebe Bikila's coach, was Finnish by birth and came to Ethiopia as part of a Swedish military mission in 1946. He served as sports officer at the cadet school of the Imperial Body Guard and on the Air Force Base in Debre Zeit. In 1948, he was appointed physical education instructor at Haile Selassie I Secondary School in Kotebe, before he changed into the MoE and became the first Director of the newly established Department of Physical Education (later Department of Physical Education and Boy Scouting) in 1950. He remained in this capacity until 1954 and, again, from 1956 until 1959.

24 R.N. Thompson to Aberra Jembere, 27 July 1949, RNT TWU.

25 R.N. Thompson to H. Pratten, New York 22 November 1950, p. 1, RNT TWU.

26 Minutes Meeting of Executive Board, 28 July 1949, RNT TWU.

27 Various documents in the Thompson papers reveal that ideas circulated around a room at the Ethiopian Red Cross Society or the American Institute, a building at liberty square that was under the disposal of the YMCA, a house offered by the Duke of Harar, which needed a lot of repair, or Ejeressa Cinema.

financially independent like the Red Cross and the YMCA.²⁸ Thompson's relation to the North American Scout Movement facilitated the provision of badges, books, and caps.²⁹ Who actually were these Boy and Girl Scouts and how did they become members? Organized through the education system, Scouting became most prominent among young educated strata of the population. Children were not forced to become Scouts and, often, the expensive accoutrements (uniforms, badges, etc.) might have prevented them from joining the movement.³⁰ However, when the first national jamboree took place at Jan Meda race ground on 13–14 May 1950, the Boy Scouts Association of Ethiopia had grown from 8 to 18 officially approved patrols, mostly located in modern schools in the capital, within two years.³¹ The Boy and Girl Scouts who performed in this major event before the Emperor Haile Selassie I and other high-ranking officials, came exclusively from Addis Ababa schools.³²

The next part of this article will focus on perhaps the most important event that took place during this period – the already mentioned Boy Scout camp in Dire Dawa and Harar during August 1949. It relies on three sources that describe the event from three different perspectives, with different aims and audiences in mind. First, there is the report by the camp leader, Capt. Oni Niskanen,³³ which he filed by mid-September 1949 prior to a meeting of the Executive Committee. Second, a newspaper report by the Quartermaster and General Secretary, Aberra Jembere, which was published by *Addis Zāmān* – the official Amharic government newspaper – in October 1949.³⁴ Third, a letter by Niskanen published in the annual magazine of the Swedish sports club Duvbo in 1951.³⁵

3. Leaving for Dire Dawa

On the train that left the capital on 6 August 1949, 81 boys from seven schools in Addis Ababa were looking forward to a two-week camp in Dire Dawa and its surroundings.³⁶ A budget of \$5,946 Eth. was set aside from funds provided by the Ministry of Education, the participating schools, and private patrons (including the Emperor).³⁷ The boys were accompanied by the camp leader, Oni Niskanen, assistant camp leader Harry James,

28 Minutes, Executive Board Meeting, 5 October 1949, RNT TWU.

29 Minutes, Executive Board Meeting, 20 June 1949, RNT TWU.

30 I am grateful to Seyoum Mulugeta for this information.

31 No author, The History of Scouting in Ethiopia, typescript, RNT TWU.

32 R.N. Thompson to Col. J.S. Wilson (Director, Boy Scouts International Bureau, London GB) 14 March 1950; R.N. Thompson to H. Patten, Director World Friendship Fund (Boy Scouts, USA), 15 March 1950, RNT TWU.

33 O. Niskanen, The Boy Scout Camp in Dire Dawa [sic] and Harar during August 1949, 15 September 1949. RNT TWU.

34 Bädaredawa yā'ā skawtočč yā'āgər kwas čāwata (Football Competition of the Scouts in Dire Dawa), in: Addis Zāmān 12 Təqəmt 1941 E.C. (23 October 1949).

35 O. Niskanen, The Scout Movement on the March, Letter from Oni Niskanen, in: Duvbo IK's Annual Magazine 1951, http://onniniskanen.se/eng/scout_eng.php (accessed 18 February 2019).

36 Haile Selassie I Secondary School, Menelik II School, Commercial School, Medhane Alem School, Technical School, Princess Zenebe-Worq School, and Beyene Merid School (Niskanen, Boy Scout Camp), p. 7.

37 Niskanen, Boy Scout Camp, p. 6.

programme master T.R. Mahalingham,³⁸ and quartermaster Aberra Jembere. When the party reached the capital of the homonymous sub-province, which lies 346 km east of Addis Ababa, the next day, the weather was good. They took their equipment and marched to a campsite described as “an acacia scrub jungle south of the Dire Dawa cement factory.”³⁹ Before they reached the campsite, it started to rain heavily. They crossed a stream that had turned into a river, encumbered by all their equipment. Two years later, Oni Niskanen remembered this moment:

*While we were lugging our things across a dried up river channel, we suddenly saw a wave rushing along the previously bone-dry riverbed, which was around 20 metres wide. Before we knew it, the swirling water masses had separated us, where we stood on opposite sides of the river [...] The water rose higher and higher. I sent out scouts in both directions to see if there was a place to cross, but it looked hopeless. The darkness was falling and something had to be done. After searching for a short while, I found a place where the river did not seem so deep. I tied a stone at the end of a rope and after a few misses I managed to throw it across to the boys on the other side. We fixed the rope level with the water line on both sides and I made an attempt to cross over. It was not easy. At the deepest part, the water reached up to my chest. The gushing water masses knocked my legs away and I had great difficulty getting across. We threw over two more ropes, making three in total, before I dared to let the boys cross. After a few hours of work, all of us had crossed, properly beaten black and blue by logs and stones that were dragged along by the water masses.*⁴⁰

It was *keremt*, the rainy season, which lasts from July to September and turns even places such as Dire Dawa with its high average temperature of 31.7 Celsius (1962–1964) and very scanty rainfall of 606.6 mm (1955–1965) into demanding terrain.⁴¹

Despite the heavy rainfall and the discomfort it entailed, the Scouts followed a programme that combined technical and physical training as well as exercise in spectacles of public performance. The camp was not only aimed at passing tests, receiving badges, and acquiring the next rank in the Scout hierarchy. It also served to instil pride and to convey a sense of what Scouting means for a potential future (military) career. Thus, the boys practised training the senses, games, signalling, pioneering, and participated in exercises that combined treasure hunts and tracking. They also received swimming lessons in the pool of the nearby Dire Dawa cement factory, so that nearly half of them passed the swimming exam. A competition with a focus on topography served as training for patrol leaders – i.e., leadership training. During a hiking tour to Harar and Aremaya, the boys were tested on their skills in areas as diverse as tracking, cooking, and estimating distances to receive their first- and second-class or tenderfoot badges. The most de-

38 Harry James (American) and T.R. Mahalingham (of Indian origin) were teachers and very active members of the association's first Executive Board.

39 Niskanen, *Boy Scout Camp*, p. 1.

40 O. Niskanen, *Scout Movement on the March*.

41 Imperial Ethiopian Government: Ministry of Interior. Municipalities Department. General Analysis and the Report on the Master Plan for Dire Dawa. Consultants: Barucci – Di Gaddo – Sacco, 1967, IES 71.1.4 INT.

manding part, however, was the 35 km hike back to Dire Dawa during the rainy season. Having covered the distance within five hours, the 84 participants were congratulated on their accomplishment, which was declared an “elite hike.”⁴² Apart from technical training, endurance seems to have been an essential part of most of the exercises. The “real” test turned out to be the return journey to Addis Ababa, however, when due to a railway strike most of the Scouts travelled by lorry or on foot through a difficult terrain. They had to repair bad roads, which were not passable, before continuing their journey. The bridges between Dire Dawa and Awash were so fragile that other passages had to be found and prepared to cross the 135 rivers and streams which lay between them and their destination. Above all, the area through which they travelled was not considered safe.

*At the time when we were ready to leave, everyone came around to warn us of travelling. The route we had to travel went through difficult country and the rainy season was still on in higher grounds. There were also some disturbances between a few of the tribes along the way and Government troops had been sent out to try to sort things out. After conferring with the boys, we decided to go in spite of all warnings.*⁴³

The railway strike not only caused the camp to run on for another week, it also triggered further competitions such as running and football matches. Dire Dawa was a nodal point on the railway line and had developed into an important industrial town with a cotton mill, a cement factory, and diverse workshops for the railway. The labour union (Railroad Workers Syndicate) that was founded in 1947 might have encouraged sports as a welfare amenity. The enthusiasm and lavish financial support from the Italian owners of the cement and cotton factories had led to football teams being established early on. By 1947, Dire Dawa had its own league and the Tafari team, which represented the province, entered the Ethiopian Championship series the same year.⁴⁴ Thus, when the Boy Scouts competed against local athletes and cadets from the Air Force training centre in Debre Zeit, who spent their holidays in Dire Dawa, people congregated and cheered on the teams in the Asfa Wossen football ground and on the streets.⁴⁵ Since Niskanen had served as sports officer in Debre Zeit before he entered the educational sector, he could use his personal contacts to motivate the Swedish officers and the cadets to participate in the competition. What is more, these relations facilitated extraordinary rewards for the victorious Boy Scouts: aeroplane rides over the town. The close contact between the Air Force and Boy Scouts also served to arouse interest in a military career. Recent studies on “New Man” ideologies in interwar Europe argue that “ideologues of all persuasions looked at the airman as a prototype, as the embodiment of new dawn that

42 Niskanen, *Boy Scout Camp*, p. 3.

43 Niskanen, *Scout Movement on the March*.

44 Nordic Africa Institute, http://www.nai.uu.se/library/resources/dossiers/local_history_of_ethiopia (accessed 11 March 2019).

45 Football Competition, Addis Zāmān, 23 October 1949.

they were aiming to induce.”⁴⁶ In fascist Italy, for example, aviation became a “metaphor for Fascism itself” with Mussolini as top aviator.⁴⁷ Ethiopia experienced the Italian occupation especially through air attacks and fascist propaganda in the Amharic press as well as in open-air film shows in Addis Ababa which celebrated Italian and Nazi-German aviators.⁴⁸ The photographs of Haile Selassie I manning an anti-aircraft gun at Battle of Maychew (31 March 1936) or in defence of Dessie were widely distributed, portraying him as an active defender of his country. Furthermore, the Emperor’s fascination with aviation was displayed whenever possible. Thus, the cooperation between Scouts and the Air Force came as no surprise.

The main purpose of the competitions, however, was neither entertainment nor physical fitness training. As Niskanen revealed later, they were in fact a pragmatic way to generate money for food.⁴⁹ What Niskanen omitted from his letter was the help by the director of the Dire Dawa cement factory, Negatu Woldegeorgis, who provided meat (three goats) for the boys. Abera Jembere’s newspaper article not only mentioned this aspect, but highlighted the local participation and assistance in a broader sense. He stressed, for example, that the Scouts got free access to local cinemas in order to “re-generate their minds” (*mānfäsačewn lämadaddäs*).⁵⁰

Besides practising self-help or passing tests to move up to the next rank, Scout training also included spectacles of public performance. Apart from marching on several occasions, the Boy Scouts acquired knowledge about how to perform during official visits so as to convey an image of preparedness and alertness. On 11 August 1949, a short visit by the Emperor, the Crown Prince, the Prime Minister, and other high-ranking officials provided an excellent opportunity to display their presentation skills. It started with a Guard of Honour, which is a global military practice. Although performance of semaphore signalling, first aid, and tying knots presented Scouts-related practices, the official guests were not expected to understand these things – as Niskanen commented in his letter to Duvbo, it sufficed to be impressed. The performance of readiness was also meant to show attentiveness. Patrol cries⁵¹ at the flagstaff signalled that the boys were ready to listen to the Emperor’s address. One of the Scouts would answer with a message of thanks and conveyed Scouting paraphernalia as presents to the Emperor. The spectacle ended with three cheers to the Emperor. When Prince Mekonnen, the Duke of Harar and Chief Scout, visited the camp for the Scout investiture ceremony a week later, the

46 F. Esposito, The Aviator as New Man, in: J. Dagnino, M. Feldman and P. Stocker (eds.), The “New Man” in Radical Right Ideology and Practice, 1919–45, London et al. 2018, p. 65.

47 M. Isnenghi, L’Italia del Fascio, Florence 1996, p. 233; cited in F. Esposito, The Aviator as New Man, in: J. Dagnino, M. Feldman and P. Stocker (eds.), The “New Man” in Radical Right Ideology and Practice, 1919–45, London, Oxford, New York, New Delhi, Sidney 2018, p. 65.

48 The film advertisements in Yäqesar Mängäst Mälakteñña (Announcer of the Imperial Government) reveal that the open-air screenings in particular, which took place twice a week (Tuesdays and Saturdays) in the market area were propaganda films, especially celebrating the effectiveness of airborne battles.

49 Niskanen, Scout Movement on the March.

50 Football Competition, Addis Zämän, 23 October 1949.

51 Patrols are usually named after an animal and the patrol cry imitates the sound made by the animal.

protocol was absolute identical. Beyond the formalities, the Prince invited the boys to a party at the palace.

The Scout camp in Dire Dawa provides an opportunity to discuss what kind of “New Man” these practices might have shaped in the Ethiopian context more generally. Could we say that those who organized the camp and implemented the programme were also “New Men?” And one could ask whether the Emperor and his son, Prince Mekonnen, also conformed to the ideal of “New Men.” The following section offers some thoughts about these issues by linking them to the concrete practices of hiking.

4. Be Prepared! The Scouting Way of Life

Hiking and camping became part and parcel and sometimes even the epitome of the “Scouting way of life.” They offered the possibility to test theoretical and practical knowledge such as orienteering or building necessary items out of what could be found in nature. Hiking firmly tied the human body to the soil in general, and to the national soil in particular. The Dire Dawa Scout Camp experience demonstrates this quite well. As a group of boys belonging to a certain school and patrol, equipped with uniforms and specific skills, sworn to serve God, Emperor, and nation, the national soil superseded the local, ethnically defined terrain. Although we can assume that most hikes explored the immediate surroundings, there were some documented round trips. Whereas the former served to integrate the city and the rural hinterland, round trips worked towards instilling nationalism. Under Ras Taferi, Ethiopia began its transformation from an Empire into an imperial nation state. Immediately following the liberation and his return from exile in Britain in 1941, Haile Selassie I started to centralize power. Furthermore, through a UN mandate of 1952, Eritrea was federated with Ethiopia and annexed in 1961. Among his attempts to forge the nation anew, the Emperor personally urged volunteer organizations such as the YMCA to give priority to the establishment of branches in Eritrea (Asmara, Keren, and Massawa).⁵² By the mid-1960s, the Scouts Association of Ethiopia seems to have been well established along the lines of the educational system. Scout hikes to the north included Eritrea and could rely on schools all over the country. Due to the shortage of sources from the post-liberation period, a later example will demonstrate this mechanism.

In 1966, a group of 17 older Scouts (Rovers) and their leader from Taferi Mekonnen School in Addis Ababa went on a round trip to the northern part of the Empire. They left Addis by lorry, took the road to the northeast (via Dessie, Mekelle, and Adigrat), visited the Eritrean cities of Asmara, Massawa, and Keren, and returned to the capital via Axum, Gondar, Bahr Dar, and Debre Markos. A detailed description of the trip and, especially, the people they encountered can be found in a booklet that was later published by the

52 Report Dalton McClelland to Herbert P. Lansdale about his visit to Ethiopia, 13 November 1952, Kautz Family YMCA Archives, Minneapolis.

Ministry of Education.⁵³ The Scouts were not only tasked to keep a diary, they also had to carry out a “social survey” by interviewing people from various social strata on issues such as history, labour, or the composition of the population in the six provinces they passed through.⁵⁴ As the Scouts repeatedly emphasized in the booklet, the aim of the trip was not “tourism.” Knowing the country through hiking meant something completely different to them: “training.”

This Rover Scouts contingent acquired the organizational skills necessary to prepare an event of this size nearly a year beforehand. It included drawing maps and carefully selecting campsites. During the trip, the group appointed on a daily basis a new leader to gain experience in leadership, “which was not always easy” as they commented.⁵⁵ A Boy Scout show, which included first aid and tying knots, was performed at all the places they stayed overnight in order to spread the ideas and principles of the movement.⁵⁶ Meeting other Scouts based in the places they passed through was not a priority; only in Gondar did the Rovers sit down with local Scouts around a campfire.⁵⁷ Instead, they tended to meet with government officials. As Rovers, these Scouts were about to leave secondary school and begin higher education or enter a profession. They therefore visited institutions of higher education such as Gondar Health College or military institutions such as Kagnew – a US military radio outpost near Asmara – and the Naval Base of Massawa. Rather than sleeping in schools, they were often offered facilities next to police stations. Thus, it does not come as a surprise that at least half the officials they met or who assisted them in some capacity were from the armed forces. It would be to miss the point, though, to assume that the whole journey was a way to draw these young men into military service. The armed forces had their own channels for recruitment.⁵⁸ Yet, the facilities they availed themselves of during the hiking trip relied to a large extent on a network of people belonging to the police and the army.

In contrast to the booklet about the Rovers’ hiking trip to the north, other documents stressed hiking as part of survival training necessary to defend the nation. In order to better understand what survival entailed and what position hiking took in this kind of training, let us look at the first book in Amharic on Scouting in Ethiopia.⁵⁹ Published in 1955, it aimed to explain the Scout Movement to a wider Amharic-speaking audience. Tests for the second Scout rank explicitly demanded participation in at least three hiking and camping events. The requirements for the first rank further specified that applicants needed to be physically capable of completing a hike of at least 25 km, as well as to accurately render the route as a hand-drawn map – thus demanding both physical and

53 Scouts Summer Vacation 1966, Teferi Makonnen School Addis Ababa, published by Ministry of Education and Fine Arts 1967, IES PER 69.43 ADD TF.

54 Scouts Summer vacation 1966, pp. 25–31.

55 Ibid., p. 39.

56 The Scouts were not always welcome and even occasionally were considered spies, *ibid.*, p. 25.

57 Ibid., p. 17.

58 I am grateful to Bahru Zewde for this observation.

59 Bäfäqadä Selase Fantaye, *Salä boy eskowt agälgälot. Ačär mägläča* (On the Boy Scout Service. A Short Explanation), Addis Ababa 1955, p. 11.

cognitive abilities. Rescue skills and first aid knowledge could be applied during training or in order to survive during hiking and camping trips. Especially during the first years of reorganized Scouting in the country, there was very close cooperation between the Red Cross and the Boy Scout Association of Ethiopia due to shared personnel. These close links were particularly visible during performances such as the annual Orange Day (January), when Scouts sold oranges to raise funds, as well as at national jamborees (usually in May). Red Cross units were systematically included, indicating the joint interest in first aid. All these techniques were necessary to meet the basic requirements of being a Scout, namely to be a patriot (*arbännä*).⁶⁰

Swimming was another of the important bodily techniques a Scout had to master. Since large parts of Ethiopia are rich in lakes and rivers, swimming has a long history in the country, including the development of local styles as shown in certain pieces of art.⁶¹ In Addis Ababa, natural pools served as locations to learn swimming.⁶² With the proliferation of hotels, modern schools, and armed forces institutions in the 1950s and 1960s, the number of swimming pools increased along with the number of swimming clubs. We therefore know that more swimming facilities were available from the 1950s onwards, but we do not know exactly how widespread the practice was among the Scouts, or how many of the boys actually learnt to swim. This is partially due to the skewed nature of the source corpus, which is predominantly occupied with Scouting in the capital.

Survival also meant the provision of food. This included activities such as collecting firewood and cooking skills. We can assume that this did not occur seamlessly in Ethiopia, because these activities were strongly associated with women's work. In general, it would be interesting to know how (young) people reacted when the notions of a (universal) curriculum were translated into their particular context.

Above all, hiking proved an excellent way simultaneously to pursue other aims that were part of the "Scouting way of life," such as carrying out welfare work and, thus, moulding young people into being active citizens of their country. So as to expand the choice of food in their canteen, Scouts at the Teacher Training School in Debre Berhan reared local varieties fish in a pool which they had constructed.⁶³ As a prerequisite to participate in the already-mentioned round trip through the northern part of the Empire, the Rovers had to do one year of extracurricular teaching of 500 children from second to eighth grade, who were attending their school as part of the National Literacy Campaign. Apart from teaching reading and writing, the Rovers (who were still students themselves) had the additional assignment to inculcate discipline and morale in their pupils and advertise Scouting as useful recreation.⁶⁴ Yearbooks from schools in the capital and other towns around the country portray Scouting as the most efficient way to imbue morals and

60 Ibid., p. 3.

61 Such as Neber Hailu, *Alltag im Dorf* (Everyday life in a village), Frobenius Institut Frankfurt/M., Reg. 34.

62 In his memoirs *Yäpiasa laḡ* (Piazza Child) Addis Ababa 2009, p. 31, Fiqru Kidan mentions a smaller (topolino) and a bigger and deeper pool (trenta quatro) in Addis Ababa.

63 Bulletin Teacher Training Institute, Debre Berhan 1970, p. 31, IES 371.805 DAB TEA.

64 Scouts Summer Vacation 1966, p. 4.

discipline among youth by keeping them off the streets and away from “undesirable” things, such as bars, brothels, or gangs. After all, the youth were not only perceived as the malleable future, but also as a potential danger to the social order. Thus, Scouts were supposed to be a good example to their schoolmates as well as to the surrounding community. The yearbook of the Haile Mariam Mamo Secondary School emphasized that “[t]hough this association is not able to help others with money, it is always assisting the community through labor and morale.”⁶⁵ The description of leisure activities at the Technical School in Addis Ababa foregrounded “hiking, helping people, [and] group work” as major activities of Scouting.⁶⁶

The “Scouting way of life” was considered a healthy way of life. Thus, the physical education teachers who were supposed to further the development of the movement were expected to combine both aspects in their teaching. Since the early 1960s, a two-year diploma course at Haile Selassie I University, with a major in physical education and a minor in health education, offered “a complete course for leaders in scouting with special emphasis on organization, objectives and scout activities.”⁶⁷ These physical education teachers, who gradually replaced the foreign teaching personnel as well as the retired Ethiopian sergeants who taught a kind of military drill in place of sports at public schools, were “New Men,” too. As argued in the introduction, teachers served as good examples and as translators and multipliers of “New Man” ideas. School yearbooks praise them for their engagement in both physical education and Scouting.

Hiking not only involved survival, engagement with nature, and acquiring knowledge about regional or national territory. As both the example of the camp in Dire Dawa as well as the tour to the northern part of the Empire reveals, hiking included the acquisition of knowledge about official “protocol.” This refers to both the personalities of high rank (including the Emperor and the Prince) and the Scouts. Semi-formal meetings, such as the abovementioned party at Dire Dawa palace, would be interesting cases to consider. Since all reports are silent about this event, another example from this early period will serve the purpose.

In May 1953, *Addis Zämān* reported extensively on the occasion of the Emperor receiving 35 Boy Scouts from Ras Abate School in Kāmbata (in southern Ethiopia) in the MoE. Haile Selassie I not only asked about the development of the school, but also expressed his expectations regarding the Scouts’ unconditional loyalty in accordance with the Scouting Oath, and ordered a pair of shoes for each of them as an imperial gift. He also allowed himself to be photographed with the boys, portraying himself as the “Emperor of the Youth” as he stood among them, quite within their reach. The same is true for the meeting with Prince Makonnen, who had invited the Scouts into his home. *Addis Zämān* highlighted the talks with individual Scouts while tea and cookies were

65 Yearbook of the Haile Mariam Mamo Secondary School 1958 EC (1964), p. 11, IES 371.805 DAB HAI.

66 Student Publications Technical School Addis Ababa, 1964–65, p. 70, IES 371.805 ADD TEC.

67 Department of Health and Physical Education, Haile Selassie I University Catalogue, May 1965, p. 196, IES 378.006 GEN.

served. Such media coverage was an attempt to convey the image of the Emperor and his favourite son as “New Men” at the top – approachable to those parts of the youth who promised to become the vanguard in modernizing and strengthening the Ethiopian nation.⁶⁸ These close encounters have to be set apart from the annual reception during the Orthodox Christmas celebrations, when Scouts and other schoolchildren marched through the capital in order to receive small gifts from the Emperor. If any link to established rituals could be drawn at all, these big occasions might come close to the *geber*, the courtly banquet organized by the ruler for his people in accordance with their position on the social ladder. *Geber* was a show by the ruling classes of their generosity and, at the same time, a demonstration of loyalty and re-enactment of social order.⁶⁹ The invitation of the 35 Scouts from Kāmbata might rather be understood as part of a new media strategy to portray the Emperor (and Prince Makonnen) as modern heads of state.

5. Conclusion

What kinds of “New Man” and ways of shaping him do we see through the lens of Scouting in post-liberation Ethiopia and the study of hiking as way of tying together a number of practices towards creating this new sort of Ethiopian? First, we see young boys (and girls) with access to modern education. They receive training that aims at survival in natural surroundings through gaining skills in physical fitness, first aid, and topographical knowledge as well as the ability to use available resources. We identified attempts to instil in them a sense of national belonging and patriotism through walking or travelling through the national territory, especially after the annexation of Eritrea. These hiking trips offered the possibility to have close contact with the armed forces, but did not automatically lead to a military career. We also see voluntary work as a prerequisite for the participation in hiking. Official visits along the way served the purpose of displaying Scouting skills and to internalize the rules of the spectacle of power.

Such official visits bring to the fore a second kind of “New Man” – namely, the high-ranking Ethiopian officials and, most important, the Emperor and Prince Makonnen. Combining the symbols and legitimization of traditional rulers with that of a modern head of state, they constructed themselves as “new” by being supportive of and reachable to the Scouts. These (close) encounters served to convey the message and expectation that a young patriotic and well-educated generation should bring about the Empire’s progress and development, but all through imperial guidance.

A third kind of “New Man” to appear, if we look at the establishment of the Boy Scout Association in Ethiopia before and after the liberation in 1941, is the “expert.” Serving as teachers or advisors in the MoE, these men and women had different social and

68 Yāras abate tamhart bet boy askawtočč kākāmbata wädä Addis Ababa (Boy Scouts of Ras Abate School from Kāmbata to Addis Ababa), in: Addis Zāmān, 28 Miyazia 1945 (6 May 1953), p. 2.

69 For a change of *geber* under Haile Selassie, see: I. Orlowska, Feasting and Political Change: Tafari’s Ascent to Power and Early 20th Century *geber*, in: Annales d’Ethiopie, 28 (2013), pp. 45–67.

geographical backgrounds. Most of them had come to Ethiopia through one of the numerous (aid) missions. Some of them were active in other volunteer movements, too, and could use their networks for combined aims, such as training first aid among the Scouts and the Red Cross volunteers. Access to school compounds facilitated the training of Scoutmasters, and individuals’ careers enabled close relations to the armed forces. Personal contacts in the MoE facilitated the exchange of knowledge about and facilities for hiking and camping across the volunteer movements. These “experts” of the post-liberation period, who mostly came from Europe and North America, were gradually replaced by Ethiopians and training of Scoutmasters was increasingly provided by African Scouting “experts” from the East Africa Division of the World Organization of the Scout Movement, located in Nairobi.⁷⁰ In 1971, two years after the official recognition of the Boy Scouts Movement of Ethiopia, the World Organization of the Scout Movement made Emperor Haile Selassie I its “Honorary Patron.”⁷¹ Three years later, a revolution removed him from the throne and dissolved the organization. Obviously, its philosophy and loyalty to God, the Emperor, and the Imperial nation were incompatible with the ideas of the “New Man” of the socialist Ethiopia.

70 Kəftāña yāskawt kors tākəfātā (Higher scout course started), in: Addis Zämän 5 Gənbot 1955 (13 May 1963).

71 Honorary Membership H.S.I, Ethiopian National Archives 1.2.52.03.

A “New Man” for a New Nation: Activism and Physical Culture in Late Colonial Algeria

Jakob Kraiss

ABSTRACTS

Während französische Entwicklungsprogramme im spätkolonialen Algerien gut erforscht sind, haben einheimische Ideen über eine Transformation der Gesellschaft während dieser Zeit deutlich weniger Aufmerksamkeit erfahren. Der Aufsatz diskutiert die Gedanken zweier prominenter Intellektueller, des islamischen Reformisten Malek Bennabi und des Marxisten Frantz Fanon, zum „Neuen Menschen.“ Für den Zeitraum der beiden letzten Jahrzehnte französischer Herrschaft in Algerien (1942–1962) werden außerdem Prozesse der Schaffung des „Neuen Menschen“ in reformistischen und nationalistischen Kreisen analysiert, besonders in der muslimischen Pfadfinderbewegung sowie in Bezug auf Sport. Schließlich wird die Generationendimension des algerischen Antikolonialismus betrachtet, die Jugendaktivismus dem Traditionalismus „alter Menschen“ gegenüber stellte.

While French development schemes in late colonial Algeria are well studied, much less attention has been devoted to indigenous ideas around a transformation of society in this period. The article discusses the thought of two prominent intellectuals, the Islamic reformist Malek Bennabi and the Marxist Frantz Fanon, on the “New Man.” Looking at the last two decades of French rule in Algeria (1942–62), it also analyses processes of shaping “New Men” in reformist and nationalist circles, in particular in the Muslim scout movement and with regard to sports. Finally, it takes into consideration the generational dimension of Algerian anticolonialism, which opposed youth activism to the traditionalism of “old men.”

1. Introduction: Making "New Men" in Colonial Algeria

Colonial Algeria represented a place on which French planners and reformers of different political persuasions projected their visions for the future and ideas about shaping "New Men" from early on.¹ Already shortly after colonization had begun in 1830, the Saint-Simonians perceived the North African territory as the ideal site to realize their utopian socialism.² But it was during the late colonial period after World War II that development plans and grandiose designs for a transformation of Algerian society became ever more numerous. Over the last two decades of French rule, experts on urbanism and social scientists intensified their efforts to "modernize" the country and especially the indigenous Muslim population which they saw as "backward."³ The latest phase of colonial rule, the war of independence between 1954 and 1962, witnessed a further proliferation of development schemes, which now were part of the propagandistic and psychological aspects of France's counterinsurgency strategy. Marnia Lazreg has argued that, during the war, the French military employed both violent and psychological means to make the restive "natives" into "New Men."⁴ During this last period of particular uncertainty regarding the future of Algeria scientific planning was supposed to prepare administrators for all possible outcomes. Even when the prospects of keeping the colonial possession seemed more and more unlikely, plans were drawn up to salvage certain interests and bring about at least an "expert decolonization."⁵

The Constantine Plan of 1958, which General Charles de Gaulle had proclaimed in this eastern Algerian city shortly after the war had brought him back to power, promised an industrialization of the country, the creation of employment in the form of modern salaried labour for hundreds of thousands of indigenous Algerians and a partial Algerianization of the administration. The ambitious Plan aimed at nothing less than a complete "modernization" of Muslim society, which effectively meant forming "New Men." It stated explicitly: *"But only the transformation of man will make a decisive difference and will be able to make development irreversible."*⁶ At the same time, special army units, the *Sections administratives spécialisées* (SAS), were tasked with resettling large parts of the indigenous population in new model villages. This "resettling" combined the military

1 The term "New Man" here and throughout the article is meant in the gender neutral sense of "new human being" (as in the Arabic *insān*). Nevertheless, I retain the term "man" instead of "human being" because of its use in the sources from the period (in French: *homme*). On this question see also the introduction to this issue.

2 See A. Zouache, *Socialism, Liberalism and Inequality: The Colonial Economics of the Saint-Simonians in 19th-Century Algeria*, in: *Review of Social Economy* 67 (2009) 4, pp. 431-456.

3 See Z. Çelik, *Urban Forms and Colonial Confrontations: Algiers under French Rule*, Berkeley 1997, pp. 79-87, 143-179; M. H. Davis, "The Transformation of Man" in French Algeria: Economic Planning and the Postwar Social Sciences, 1958-62, in: *Journal of Contemporary History* 52 (2017) 1, pp. 73-94.

4 M. Lazreg, *Torture and the Twilight of Empire: From Algiers to Baghdad*, Princeton 2008, p. 72.

5 A. Asseraf, "A New Israel": Colonial Comparisons and the Algerian Partition That Never Happened, in: *French Historical Studies* 41 (2018) 1, pp. 95-120, at 106.

6 M. Davis, *The Transformation of Man*, p. 77 (italics in original). On the Constantine Plan see also M. H. Davis, *Restaging Mise en Valeur: "Postwar Imperialism" and The Plan de Constantine*, in: *Review of Middle East Studies* 44 (2010) 2, pp. 176-186.

dimension of control, to prevent guerrilla fighters from merging with civilians, and of “modernization,” to “win over” Algerians to the French side by an improvement of their living conditions. According to their instigators, the radical “compression of time” in these programmes would enable Algerians to overcome their retardation and become modern beings in just a couple of years.⁷ Civilian and military planners and administrators accorded particular importance to measures targeting women and children who were viewed as being key to a transformation of society. Unveiling campaigns and other social reforms that were supposed to lead to an “emancipation” of Muslim women should convince them of the advantages of “modernization” and bring them closer to French culture.⁸ The same was true of holiday camps and exchange programmes which would bring young Algerians to metropolitan France.⁹

While these colonial development schemes are rather well studied, anticolonial attempts at forming “New Men” during the later period of French rule in Algeria have received almost no attention so far.¹⁰ Moritz Feichtinger and Stephan Malinowski even show a certain perplexity when asking for indigenous agency in colonial modernization projects.¹¹ This contribution aims at filling this gap by a change in perspective: it might be hard to gather traces of Algerians’ reactions to colonial development policies, but if we look at initiatives of the so-called natives themselves, the picture changes. Although most of the studies cited so far deal with the latest phase of colonial rule, namely the war of independence with its “compression of time,” it is worthwhile to take into consideration also the history of anticolonial discourses and activities in the decades before the war.

I will focus on the time between 1942 and 1962. The Allied landing in North Africa of 1942 and then the end of World War II mark a turning point also for Algeria: in May 1945, nationalist demonstrations on the occasion of Allied victory in Europe escalated into a riot that was then severely repressed by French security forces and settler militias. This event is often described to be at the origin of the radical independence movement, which would start the armed insurrection in 1954 and, finally, win national sovereignty in 1962.¹² True, when the French had celebrated their first century of colonial rule over Algeria, in 1930, North African Muslims had seemingly been broken up. Independence had appeared all but impossible for the foreseeable future. But at the same time Muslim civil society and new middle classes had begun to organize, reform efforts and political movements had been gaining ground. Since then, social reformers and activists started

7 See M. Feichtinger and S. Malinowski, „Eine Million Algerier lernen im 20. Jahrhundert zu leben“: Umsiedlungslager und Zwangsmodernisierung im Algerienkrieg 1954–1962, in: *Journal of Modern European History* 8 (2010) 1, pp. 107–135; Lazreg, *Torture*, pp. 34–76.

8 See e.g. R. Seferdjeli, French “Reforms” and Muslim Women’s Emancipation during the Algerian War, in: *The Journal of North African Studies* 9 (2004) 4, pp. 19–61.

9 See L. Hardt, Ferienlager gegen die Rebellion. Jumelages und Colonies de vacances im Algerienkrieg (1959–1962), in: *Journal of Modern European History* 11 (2013) 3, pp. 351–374.

10 On attempts at creating “New Men” from the side of late colonial planning see also Jerónimo’s contribution to this issue.

11 Feichtinger and Malinowski, *Eine Million Algerier*, pp. 129–130.

12 See J. McDougall, *A History of Algeria*, Cambridge, UK 2017, pp. 179–234.

asking how “New Men” could be formed, men who would be capable to shake off colonialism one day. Central in this endeavour were new initiatives directed towards the young, from a private Arabic education system to Boy Scout troops and sports clubs. Youth movements and athletic associations with their concern for physical strength became major pillars in anticolonial efforts for the reform of society.¹³

This article discusses the ideas of two prominent thinkers, the Muslim intellectual Malek Bennabi and Frantz Fanon, certainly the best-known theoretician of the Algerian revolution, about the “New Man.” Taking their concepts as a basic grid, it also examines the consequences of such notions in actual practice, as related mainly in autobiographical sources from the late colonial period. How were “New Men” shaped? What were the spaces and symbols associated with it, e.g. in the new youth movements? And what did it mean for individuals to become “New Men”? The following sections will show that both thinkers and activists advocated a new vitality, physical and mental, to overcome the perceived passivity of colonial subjects.

2. Bennabi and Fanon: History as Thought and Action

2.1 Decolonizing the Subject

Bennabi and Fanon both developed ideas about what it meant to decolonize the subject, and thus form “New Men,” in the late colonial period. Malek Bennabi was a Muslim intellectual trained in Islamic law in 1920s Constantine which was then a stronghold of the reformist (*iṣlāḥ*) movement around the renowned scholar Abdelhamid Ben Badis.¹⁴ He left Algeria in 1930 to return only after independence and wrote most of his works during his stays in France and Egypt.¹⁵ In his 1954 book *Vocation de l'Islam*, Bennabi made a withering assessment of the situation of his country and the Muslim world, in general. He regarded it as caught in chaos and stagnation and dominated by uncertainty. The central problem, for Bennabi, was what he called “colonizability”: a result of the “decadence” of Muslim society in the “post-Almohad” period, i.e. since the fall of the Almohad caliphate in the thirteenth century. Colonizability is not the same as colonialism; in fact, for Bennabi it precedes actual colonial rule, both chronologically and logically, and refers to the situation of society and the state of mind of individuals. According to Bennabi, with the end of the Almohad caliphate, which represented the last indigenous empire of North Africa as well as a religious movement of renewal and puritanism (the term Almohad is derived from *al-muwahhidūn*, pertaining to the movement's strict monotheism, *taḥīd*), Islamic civilization lost all its creative vigour – since

13 For an overview see *ibid.*, pp. 134–166.

14 On this movement see J. McDougall, Abdelhamid Ben Badis et l'association des oulémas, in: A. Bouchène et al. (eds.), *Histoire de l'Algérie à la période coloniale 1830–1962*, Paris 2014, pp. 387–392.

15 On Bennabi see J. Kraiss, Bennabi, Malek, in: K. Fleet et al. (eds.), *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, 3rd edn, vol. 2018–6, Leiden 2018, pp. 27–30.

then, Muslims had fallen back into a state of vegetative life with almost no culture left.¹⁶ Colonialism, then, was not the cause, but the consequence of the bad shape the Muslim world found itself in. Accordingly, the aim should not be only the achievement of formal political independence – which in many cases, for Bennabi, was a mere appearance –, but rather thorough self-reform to overcome the condition of colonizability. To get rid of colonialism, the Muslim individual, “the disintegrated man [...] living in a dissolved society that no longer furnishes his existence with either moral or material base,” or, in one word, “post-Almohad man,” had to change.¹⁷

For Frantz Fanon, the Martinican Marxist who had come to the Algerian town of Blida as a psychiatrist in 1953, it was the process of decolonization which would bring about a new human being.¹⁸ In his view, the liberation from colonialism constituted an absolute rupture with the past. In his major work *Les damnés de la terre* from 1961 he defined the decolonized country as a “kind of *tabula rasa*”:

*Decolonization [...] influences individuals and modifies them fundamentally. It transforms spectators crushed with their inessentiality into privileged actors, with the grandiose glare of history's floodlights upon them. It brings a natural rhythm into existence, introduced by new men, and with it a new language and a new humanity. Decolonization is the veritable creation of new men. But this creation owes nothing of its legitimacy to any supernatural power; the 'thing' which has been colonized becomes man during the same process by which it frees itself.*¹⁹

The “New Man,” for Fanon, came into being in an act of self-liberation. More concretely, it was violent action that enabled the colonized to “embody history in his own person” or – as the original text has it – “be history in actions” (*être l'histoire en actes*).²⁰ With this initiative the colonized could finally assume the history of their country – which until then had been occupied exclusively by the colonizers – as their own and bring about a new beginning. At the end of his manifesto for the Third World Fanon rejected all notions of catch-up development, because they would consist in a mere imitation of Europe and hence, we can assume, compromise the radical novelty necessary for a truly decolonized world. Instead, a “New Man” was needed to overcome the inferiority complex of the colonized. A decolonized person, then, was not someone mimicking the West, but a totally new being: “Let us decide not to imitate Europe; let us combine our muscles and our brains in a new direction. Let us try to create the whole man [*l'homme total*].”²¹

16 See M. Bennabi, *Vocation de l'Islam* [Islam in History and Society], A. Rashid (trans.), Islamabad 1988, pp. 5–18.

17 Ibid., p. 10.

18 On Fanon see A. Cherki, *Frantz Fanon, portrait*, Paris 2000.

19 F. Fanon, *Les damnés de la terre* [The Wretched of the Earth], C. Farrington (trans.), New York 1991, pp. 35–37.

20 Ibid., p. 40.

21 Ibid., p. 313; especially on the inferiority complex see also F. Fanon, *Peau noire, masques blancs* [Black Skin, White Masks], C. L. Markmann (trans.), London 2008.

Whereas Fanon envisaged a "whole man," Bennabi talked about "integral man" as the ideal historical actor.²² As for the revolutionary socialist, historical agency was a central theme for the Islamic reformer, too:²³ Bennabi's "New Man" was "the man in his plenitude who 'strains' himself, goes beyond his nature because he constantly modifies it. In such a case, his word is a will, an act that expresses a just relationship between words and realities."²⁴ Against the actual politicians of his time, whom he saw caught in pointless debate and mere talking, Bennabi imagined a man whose word was automatically translated, by his will, into action. For him, it was not need that should guide one's behaviour, but action itself, because only agency opened up new possibilities. Similarly, he claimed, before demanding rights, one should accept one's duties, assume one's responsibilities.²⁵

2.2 "New Men" between Planning and Spontaneity

In their theories, both Bennabi and Fanon stressed time and again the prevalence of action. But how did this theoretical urge for action translate into practice, i.e. into actual action? In fact, the importance of action as such is also found in autobiographical accounts of the period that are dealing with young people's activism in political movements, scout associations etc. The historian Mohammed Harbi, himself a young nationalist activist in the 1940s, stressed the fact that his engagement in politics was "spontaneous, so to say natural," not motivated by ideological considerations. He even contrasted the Movement for the Triumph of Democratic Freedoms (Mouvement pour le Triomphe des Libertés Démocratiques, MTLTD), the major nationalist party of the postwar years, as a movement of sheer, undogmatic activism with the ideology-based Algerian Communist Party (Parti Communiste Algérien, PCA):

*Contrary to the PCA, the MTLTD did not have any doctrine. [...] There did not exist, at the MTLTD, cadre training schools which are often, in ideological militant movements, schools to uproot and form 'new men,' mystic functionaries of secular religion. [...] The life of the movement depended entirely on the activities of its members.*²⁶

Another young activist, Hocine Aït Ahmed, who would become one of the historic leaders of the National Liberation Front (Front de Libération Nationale, FLN), recalled the enthusiasm of scouts for the demonstrations of May 1945, youngsters "who, from the beginning of their scouting activities, had had only one word on their lips: 'action.'" He concluded:

22 Bennabi, *Vocation de l'Islam*, p. 10.

23 On the similarities between Bennabi and Fanon see P. C. Naylor, *The Formative Influence of French Colonialism on the Life and Thought of Malek Bennabi* (Malik bn Nabi), in: *French Colonial History* 7 (2006), pp. 129-142.

24 Bennabi, *Vocation de l'Islam*, p. 34.

25 See *ibid.*, pp. 30-36.

26 M. Harbi, *Une vie debout. Mémoires politiques*, vol. I: 1945-1962, Paris 2001, pp. 75, 77. If not stated otherwise, translations are by the author.

Relatively autonomous with regard to the PPA leadership,²⁷ we, the young militants from Kabylia, lived these exalting moments of accord between ideas and actions. From this time on, I have refused the priority of ritual over faith, of dogmatism over spirit, of talk over lived experience.²⁸

While Bennabi lamented the absence of planning as the cause for the chaos of the Muslim world, Harbi and Aït Ahmed rather emphasized the power of spontaneity.²⁹ The former aimed at “technically utilising man, soil and time for producing a social synthesis.” He even seemed to have in mind the notion of human material which can be examined and moulded accordingly:

When one wants to find the flaws of a steel bar which is intended to serve as the central motor of a machine, one submits it to an analysis – for example, a mellographical examination, in order to study its internal structure. [...] Similarly when one wishes to know man as the motor of social life, conditions are such on the human plane that one must have recourse to a search of conscience that alone would reveal the intimate articulations of the human personality in its movement and action. Only by this method, one could explore the innermost recesses of the post-al-Muwahhid soul to know where the transformations are needed.³⁰

Opposed to such ideas that seem to echo the scientifically grounded development plans of colonial technocrats, Harbi rejected the idea of producing “New Men” in some kind of top-down process; for him, action had to spring up naturally from below. The difference here might have to do with the generational dimension, which set apart a more radical generation of 1945 (born in the 1920s and 1930s) from the rather intellectual and reform-oriented nationalist leaders of the interwar period.³¹

The common enemies for both generations remained – apart from France, obviously – the old notables, reproached with a fatalist reluctance to actively make history. The guerrilla fighter Zohra Drif described this attitude, with regard to the family of her friend (and soon fellow militant) Samia Lakhdari:

27 The PPA (Parti du Peuple Algérien, or Algerian People's Party) had been banned by the French authorities in 1939, but continued to operate clandestinely, and finally reconstituted itself as the MTLN in 1946 (McDougall, A History, pp. 166–178; M. Rahal, Du PPA-MTLN au FLN?, in: A. Bouchène et al. (eds.), Histoire de l'Algérie à la période coloniale 1830–1962, Paris 2014, pp. 547–552).

28 H. Aït Ahmed, Mémoires d'un combattant. L'esprit de l'indépendance 1942–1952, Paris 1983, pp. 38, 69.

29 The value of revolutionary spontaneity is discussed at length in Fanon, Les damnés de la terre, pp. 107–147.

30 Bennabi, Vocation de l'Islam, p. 82.

31 See also O. Carlier, Les générations PPA de la deuxième guerre mondiale: le cas d'Alger (1939–1947), in: O. Siari-Tengour and A. Kadri (eds.), Générations engagées et Mouvements nationaux: Le XXe siècle au Maghreb. Hommage à Mahfoud Kaddache, Oran 2012, pp. 25–51. Bennabi who was born in 1905, for his part, acquired his political consciousness during the early 1920s in the intellectual environment of Constantine, as he describes in his memoir (M. Bennabi, Mémoires d'un témoin du siècle. L'enfant – l'étudiant – l'écrivain – les carnets, N. Boukrouh (ed.), Algiers 2006, pp. 73–89; see also Aït Ahmed, Mémoires, pp. 44–46). On the other hand, the nationalist leader Ali Kafi, who was born in 1928 and was, thus, even a little younger than Aït Ahmed, also stresses the importance of organization and planning as a prerequisite for success (A. Kafi, Du militant politique au dirigeant militaire. Mémoires (1946–1962), Algiers 2002, pp. 25–26).

*Samia's father believed neither in Man nor in his ability to change the course of History, let alone in the principle of free will. [...] For him, the colonial system with its host of evils inflicted on our people on a daily basis was a multitude of trials which Allah sent us to test our faith; our liberation was subject to divine will. This philosophy constituted a great point of disagreement with his wife and daughter.*³²

In contrast to these men of the past, all reformers and independence activists considered themselves to be on the right side of history. If colonialism had succeeded in "halting the march of the peoples towards light" for a certain period,³³ this stage was now definitively over: colonialists might struggle as they liked, they were being surpassed, once and for all, by the progress of history.³⁴

3. From Boy Scout to Leader: Preparing Youth for the Future

3.1 Youthfulness and Social Reform

However, this progress was not something just to be waited for like "divine will," it had to be actively made. Paradoxically, Algerian anticolonialists like Bennabi subscribed in principle to a colonialist discourse about the decline of the Muslim world and to Orientalist stereotypes about its fatalist passivity.³⁵ But, of course, these thinkers and activists had in mind solutions very different from the colonizers' civilizing mission ideology. Bennabi, for instance, was clear about the potential of Muslim society and Islamic religion to create the "New Man" necessary for a recovery out of itself:

*[...] for reviving its vigour to the world [pour refaire une jeunesse au monde], there must be a new man capable of assuming the responsibilities of his existence, morally and materially, both as a witness and an actor. The post-al-Muwahhid man is certainly too old, too decrepit; but the Muslim world, nonetheless, contains a large share of this necessary youthfulness [de cette jeunesse nécessaire].*³⁶

The term *jeunesse* (youth) might be meant metaphorically here, but all actual attempts at a reform of Algerian society had, at least since the 1920s, targeted the young sectors of the Muslim population in particular. The new spaces the *iṣlāḥ* movement created from the mid-1930s on ranged from a private Arabic school system and the scout movement to cultural associations and sports teams – all places where the youth would be prepared for a future leadership role.³⁷ As Harbi recalled, private schools (*médersas* / *madāris*) and,

32 Z. Drif, *Mémoires d'une combattante de l'ALN*. Zone Autonome d'Alger, 2nd edn, Algiers 2014, p. 195.

33 Bennabi, *Vocation de l'Islam*, p. 56.

34 See e.g. S. Azzedine, *On nous appelait fellaghas*, Paris 1976, pp. 120, 190; Sh. Bin Jadid, *Mudhakirāt al-Shādhili* Bin Jadīd, vol. I: *Malāmiḥ ḥayāt*, 1929–1979, Algiers 2011, p. 57.

35 On French Orientalist discourse see E. Burke III, *France and the Classical Sociology of Islam, 1798–1962*, in: *The Journal of North African Studies* 12 (2007) 4, pp. 551–561.

36 Bennabi, *Vocation de l'Islam*, p. 92.

37 See B. Amouchi, *Mémoires d'un éducateur de la jeunesse*, Constantine 1991. On the reformist school system see also C. Courreye, *L'école musulmane algérienne de Ibn Bādīs dans les années 1930, de l'alphabétisation de tous*

even more so, scout troops were the main sites for the socialization of a new generation of nationalists: “The *medersa* stimulated me less than scouting with its open-air activities, its debates, the learning of patriotic songs with Abderrahmane Kerbouche who was in charge of the Wolf Cubs and made me head of a Six.” He went on to specify the importance of chants, in particular: “Through songs, scouting had taught us patriotism. They exalted the role of youth: ‘We are the youth. We are the future with its sacred glory. We have religion in our heart and light in our eyes.’”³⁸ Not only intellectuals like Harbi or Mahfoud Kaddache, who would gain repute as historians of the nationalist movement, started their careers as scout leaders, but also many of the active fighters in the independence war, such as Larbi Ben M’hidi who is today considered one of the central “martyrs” and national heroes in Algerian public memory.³⁹

In 1948, the Algerian scout movement split: the more radical and activist strand, dominated by the nationalists, took control of the Algerian Muslim Scouts (Scouts Musulmans Algériens, SMA), while the more cautious Islamic reformist tendency formed the Algerian Muslim Boy Scouts (Boy Scouts Musulmans Algériens, BSMA), who continued on the allegedly nonpolitical path of social reform. Still, the members of both organizations were widely perceived by reformers and community leaders as the cadres of tomorrow.⁴⁰ Although Bennabi was not actively engaged in any of the initiatives mentioned, in a short remark in his book *Les conditions de la renaissance* from 1949 he saw the Muslim scouts as a sort of vanguard that could instil a new work ethic in a society held back by colonialism. There, he demanded from a scout:

*That he leaves behind electoral palavers, rolls up his sleeves and, silently and courageously, enters the building site where we have to lay the foundations of a civilization, starting from scratch [...]. The Algerian scout must become the instigator of a people that has unlearned everything, even how one laughs and how one walks the street. The Algerian scout must sow the seeds, promote the idea of knowledge.*⁴¹

3.2 Training Leaders

But how could this kind of vanguard of “New Men” who would simply “roll up their sleeves” and create a new society be formed? The notion of preparedness lay at the heart of the education of a new generation in the scout movements. After 1945, in a late co-

comme enjeu politique, in: *Revue des mondes musulmans et de la Méditerranée* 136 (2014), remmm.revues.org/8500 (accessed 21 April 2019).

38 Harbi, *Une vie debout*, pp. 42, 45.

39 See J.-J. Gauthé, *Le scout est loyal envers son pays... Mouvements scouts et nationalismes en Europe et aux colonies (1909–1962)*, in: G. Cholvy (ed.), *Le scoutisme: un mouvement d’éducation au XXe siècle. Dimensions internationales*, Montpellier 2002, pp. 219–247; S. Watanabe, *Organizational Changes in the Algerian National Movement as Seen through the Muslim Boy Scouts in the 1930s and 1940s: The Struggle for Influence between the Association of Ulama and the PPA-MTLD*, in: *Journal of Sophia Asian Studies* 30 (2012), pp. 41–69.

40 See also S. Watanabe, *The Party of God: The Association of Algerian Muslim ‘Ulama’ in Contention with the Nationalist Movement after World War II*, in: *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 50 (2018) 2, pp. 271–290.

41 M. Bennabi, *Les conditions de la renaissance. Problème d’une civilisation*, Algiers 2005, pp. 130–131.

lonial context where independence – or, at the very least, a thorough reform of political and social structures that would effectively end colonial domination – seemed all but inevitably in principle, being prepared for the new situation, which was deemed imminent, though its concrete outlook remained uncertain, represented a major concern for educators. The scouts, with their motto “be prepared,” were ideally placed to offer the sort of holistic education needed for young people who were expected to guide a nation one day.⁴² In a publication of the SMA troop “Emir Khaled” from the Algiers neighbourhood of Belcourt (today, Belouizdad) the aims of the youth movement were summarized as educational, patriotic, cultural, and social. In concrete terms it was supposed to connect the ethical formation of character and a nationalist consciousness – both to a large extent through physical education – with the learning of the Arabic language and volunteer service in the Muslim community.⁴³ The combination of physical as well as mental fitness, the acquisition of knowledge, ethical character formation, the practice of solidarity and aid work, and, finally, the raising of political consciousness were all meant to prepare exemplary citizens who could also lead others.

A report in the SMA bulletin from 1951 gave an overview over the training of the older scouts (from age 18 onwards): they had to follow classes on religious, civic, and geographical subjects, practice several specific sports (*hébertisme* or gymnastics, swimming, cycling, and a team game), acquire the practical knowledge related to outdoor activity and camp life (such as orientation, cooking etc.) and be competent in first aid as well as in “general hygiene.” Through this programme, the young adults should strive to fulfil five ideals: the scouts were to have “noble aspirations” and a “noble mission” in society, they had to be “the model patriot” as well as “the example of the good Muslim” – in one word: they should become “a perfect man.”⁴⁴ In a Muslim context, the notion of the perfect man (or human being, Arabic: *al-insān al-kāmil*) evoked the Prophet Muhammad – although the term’s Sufist genealogy might render it a little odd in the *iṣlāhī* context.⁴⁵ Nevertheless, scout educators often presented the Prophet as a role model for the young: they depicted Muhammad not only as the “original über-scout” (as Wilson Jacob has put it with regard to Egyptian youth movements),⁴⁶ but, in a sense, also as the first “New Man,” whose example just had to be followed.⁴⁷ The concomitant idea of a return to religious purity within concepts of shaping the “New Man” had its roots in the

42 Interestingly, the scout motto was translated differently into Arabic, according to the political tendency of the association: while the more nationalist SMA used the literal translation “kun musta’iddan” (“be prepared”), the BSMA, close to the Islamic reformists, employed a line from the Qur’an (verse 8:60), “wa-a’iddū” (“and prepare”).

43 A. Aroua and M.T. Illoul, Le groupe Emir Khaled de Belcourt. Un maillon des Scouts Musulmans Algériens 1946–1962, Algiers 1991, pp. 103–5.

44 S. Louanchi, La Route S.M.A., in: Bulletin d’Information – Scouts Musulmans Algériens 5 (1951), pp. 19–25, at 20–22.

45 See R. Arnaldez, al-Insān al-Kāmil, in: P. Bearman et al. (eds.), Encyclopaedia of Islam, 2nd edn, dx.doi.org/10.1163/1573-3912_islam_COM_0375 (accessed 22 February 2019).

46 W. C. Jacob, Working Out Egypt: Effendi Masculinity and Subject Formation in Colonial Modernity, 1870–1940, Durham 2011, p. 109.

47 See e.g. M. Bouzouzou, Le dernier messenger, Algiers 1950; A. Baghli, L’itinéraire d’un Chef de Meute: Khaled Merzouk. Scouts Musulmans Algériens, Groupe El Mansourah de Tlemcen 1936–1962, Tlemcen 2000, pp. 19–21.

intellectual background of Algerian scout associations in twentieth-century modernist-Salafist reform.

The Muslim scout associations established different spaces – called “Preparatory Camp Schools” (*Camps-écoles préparatoires*, CEP) or simply *camps de formation* – with the aim of training young men and women and prepare them for their role as future leaders. The SMA summer camp near the Atlas town of Médéa in 1948 was fittingly entitled “Camp Future” (*mukhayyam al-mustaqbal*): under the general motto “the future to the youth” (*al-mustaqbal lil-shabāb*) the general educational aim was “brotherhood” (*fraternité*), with one daily subject being “discipline.”⁴⁸ A BSMA training camp that took place in Kabylia in 1951, on the other hand, put the emphasis on practical knowledge needed for the betterment of society or the construction of a new nation.

The BSMA leader Chikh Bouamrane detailed the activities during this “flying camp” (*camp volant*) in his report:

*The physical effort, 20 to 25 km of walking each day, corresponds to the necessities and the age of the youngsters in the middle of their development. Apart from that, the flying camp is the best way to discover a new country and an extremely generous population [...]. In general, we debated technical, cultural, economic, spiritual and other problems ... starting from a living and concrete enquiry. For example, before discussing the industrialization of the country, we visited extensively the new hydro-electric plant of Souk-Djemaâ. The study of Sainte Eugénie Hospital at Beni Meguellat preceded the question of first aid and the struggle against illness. Examining the School for Professional Formation of Oued Aïssi where qualified workers for carpentry, woodwork, mechanics, and electricity are trained ... was the starting point for a debate about workshops, professional orientation and unemployment.*⁴⁹

The programme, thus, included walking for purposes of physical training, but the practice of hiking in the countryside was also meant to acquaint young scouts, who came usually from larger towns or cities, with the realities of their country. Part of it was certainly a nationalist impetus to make the nation (which was still being built) a tangible space. On the other hand, to get to know the living conditions of (presumably) poor peasants, who made up the vast majority of the Algerian population, would also contribute to an almost sociological or ethnographic study and lead to a sharpening of political consciousness, in particular regarding the socio-economic inequalities of the colonial system. The visit of plants, hospitals, and schools, finally, would prepare the young participants for a time when they would take over the posts of experts and planners from colonial administrators.

In fact, Bouamrane concluded his report with a definition of the sort of leadership qualities scouts were to learn:

48 Aroua and Illoul, *Le groupe Emir Khaled*, pp. 147–56. The nationalist party PPA-MTLD during these years also operated a school called “El Moustaqbal” (Kafi, *Du militant politique au dirigeant militaire*, p. 20).

49 C. Bouamrane and M. Djidjelli, *Scouts Musulmans Algériens (1935–1955)*, Algiers 2010, p. 309.

The role of a leader is sometimes misunderstood. There are some who want to make of him an infallible, authoritarian, uncontested guide who alone is responsible for his subordinates. At the end of the camp, everyone recognized that a leader has to convince and resonate [rayonner], inspire initiatives and not turn them down and create executors. [... The camp] served the trainees to complete their formation, on the one hand, and, on the other, to acquire a consciousness of the huge tasks awaiting the men of good will to make out of this country and the Algerian youth a country and a youth worthy of fulfilling their obligations in a modern world and in the Islamic community.⁵⁰

The notions of modernization and development that the colonial state put forward during the same period were, thus, widely accepted among young scouts and activists. In retrospect, Harbi was able to put this drive into context:

I was fascinated with the dream of modernization. My generation did not hesitate to try and engage our people, if necessary by force, against those who refused our cult of science, our belief in reason and progress. [...] It is no coincidence, then, that the idea of authoritarian modernization became integrated into the independent Algerian state. As a young man, I was unaware that this path suited perfectly the strata in the process of social ascension, all directed towards the future.⁵¹

The Muslim scouts, "soldiers of the future," as Kaddache called them,⁵² would effectively form the backbone of the militant independence movement that organized itself as the FLN with the beginning of the independence war in 1954. But even as they fought an armed struggle against colonial rule, the young were presented as always being ahead of their times: in April 1960 the FLN representative M'hammed Yazid addressed the African Youth Seminar in Tunis, detailing the role of youth during the war. The member of Algeria's government-in-exile asserted that "our Algerian youth, just as African youth, has already surpassed the present stadium of our national liberation struggle and dedicates itself to preparing the construction of independence." The new contact of young intellectuals and students with farmers and workers during the fight for independence had, according to Yazid, started a process of forming new cadres for the nation to build, which would essentially be "a country of the young" (*un pays de jeunes*). In short: "The future of Algeria will be what the youth wants it to be."⁵³

50 Ibid., p. 310.

51 Harbi, *Une vie debout*, p. 81.

52 M. Kaddache, "Les soldats de l'avenir:" Les Scouts musulmans algériens (1930–1962), in: N. Bancel, D. Denis and Y. Fatès (eds.), *De l'Indochine à l'Algérie: La jeunesse en mouvements des deux côtés du miroir colonial, 1940–1962*, Paris 2003, pp. 68–77, at 69.

53 M. Yazid, *La jeunesse algérienne dans la révolution*, in: El Moudjahid, 25 April 1960, p. 8.

4. Symbolic Bodies: Vitalism and Vitality

4.1 Organic Unity and the National Body

The idea of “a country of the young” certainly implied a country full of vitality: “New Men” with new bodies would form a reinvigorated national body. This also suggested a kind of organic unity of the youth, whose activism would also be directed against the political style of traditional notables or of liberal “moderate” nationalists. Both the technocratic and moralistic approach of the scouts – who saw experts and guides as the nation’s future leaders – and the underlying conception of history with its assumption of quasi-scientific laws of Progress led to a pronounced antipolitical stance: moral imperatives or the laws of history, in this view, would always override tactical considerations, pragmatic compromises, or the power struggles of plural party politics. While Fanon, for instance, proposed an organic popular unity of the nation against the partisanship of bourgeois politicians,⁵⁴ Bennabi referred to actual politics only in a derogatory way by the colloquial Algerian term *boulitique*.⁵⁵ His perspective always went beyond the vicissitudes of concrete political manoeuvres and compromises; in his memoir he defined his approach in opposition to that of a friend: “He saw things politically, I saw them in terms of civilization.”⁵⁶

This is not the place to delve into the details of Bennabi’s elaborate theory on the rise and fall of civilizations.⁵⁷ What is obvious, though, is his organicist understanding of civilization and its evolution. Marwa Elshakry has shown that evolutionism was an important point of reference for Arab socialists and Muslim modernists alike during the first half of the twentieth century.⁵⁸ Bennabi was no exception: although he explicitly rejected social Darwinism, his analysis was based on terms from evolutionary theory (in the French-speaking context often associated with Jean-Baptiste Lamarck, rather than Charles Darwin).⁵⁹ The Islamic thinker talked about post-Almohad man even as a sort of congenital disease, transmitted by “sociological heredity”:

*[...] the symptoms that could be discerned in urban or political affairs were but the expression of a nearly pathological state of the new man – the post-al-Muwahhid man who had succeeded the man of Muslim civilization, and who carried in himself the germs whence would sprout, in succession and sporadically, all the problems since faced by the Muslim world.*⁶⁰

54 See F. Fanon, *Sociologie d’une révolution* [A Dying Colonialism], H. Chevalier (trans.), New York 2007, pp. 148–205.

55 See Bennabi, *Vocation de l’Islam*, p. 51.

56 Bennabi, *Mémoires*, p. 166.

57 The theory, which is inspired by Ibn Khaldun, is developed mainly in Bennabi, *Les conditions de la renaissance* and M. Bennabi, *Le problème des idées dans le monde musulman*, Algiers 1990 (first published in 1971).

58 See M. Elshakry, *Reading Darwin in Arabic, 1860–1950*, Chicago 2014, pp. 161–260.

59 See Bennabi, *Vocation de l’Islam*, pp. 42–43; also Harbi, *Une vie debout*, p. 82.

60 Bennabi, *Vocation de l’Islam*, p. 13.

What was needed to overcome this situation and bring into being the next "New Man," the "integral man" to revive the vigour of original Muslim civilization, in Bennabi's words, was adaptation: "[...] man [...] adapts himself by an *over-effort*, that is, by a conscious and technical organisation of his life against cold, hunger and other contingencies."⁶¹ Another clearly detectable influence on Bennabi's work is vitalism, more precisely the philosophy of Henri Bergson, with which the author came certainly into contact during his student days in 1930s Paris. For Bergson, "evolution is actualization, actualization is creation" (as Gilles Deleuze sums up his thought).⁶² We have already seen that Bennabi stressed the creative force of actions over preexisting needs; he also contrasted the "entropic evolution" (which consumes without producing) the colonizable Muslim countries found themselves trapped in with the energy and creativity which would "render the civilised man superior."⁶³ In this sense, "the necessary youthfulness" of Muslim society he talked about was a sort of Bergsonian virtuality which needed to be actualized by the creative spirit of "New Men."⁶⁴

Did these organicist and vitalist tendencies translate into a concrete propagation of vitality as a characteristic for "New Men," into a practice of physical culture? In fact, in some sense "New Men" also needed new bodies. The doctor Fanon, for his part, saw colonialism, above all, as a system of everyday repression, affecting both psyche and body. Hence, the reaction of the colonized to break out of this system by vital force was natural:

This is why the dreams of the native are always of muscular prowess; his dreams are of action and of aggression. I dream I am jumping, swimming, running, climbing; I dream that I burst out laughing, that I span a river in one stride, or that I am followed by a flood of motorcars which never catch up with me.

Fanon continued by asserting: "The native's muscles are always tensed."⁶⁵ This led to periodic outbursts of violence which, at first, were mainly self-destructive, though – the repressed energies present in the colonized body had to be channelled towards the right goals, "from the North African's criminal impulsivity to the war of national Liberation."⁶⁶

4.2 "New Men" and New Bodies

Where the right actualization of youthful potentials in this sense could lead, is attested in autobiographical sources from the period. They suggest that physical fitness was widely perceived, at the same time, as a marker for the new generation that would make his-

61 Ibid., p. 50.

62 G. Deleuze, *Le Bergsonisme* [Bergsonism], H. Tomlinson and B. Habberjam (trans.), New York 1991, p. 98.

63 Bennabi, *Vocation de l'Islam*, pp. 32, 46.

64 There exist more parallels between the thought of Bergson and Bennabi's theories, which cannot all be discussed here, e.g. the emphasis on the finality, rather than the causality in history or the call for a new mysticism (that the reformist Muslim intellectual formulates in spite of his strong anti-Sufist leanings).

65 Fanon, *Les damnés de la terre*, pp. 52–53.

66 Ibid., p. 293. Translation modified (the English translation here says "Criminal impulses found in North Africans which have their origin in the national war of liberation," gravely distorting the original *De l'impulsivité criminelle du Nord-Africain à la guerre de Libération nationale*).

tory and as a prerequisite to overcoming one's colonized (or colonizable) condition and achieving independence. Ali Kafi, an important commander in the independence war (who thirty years later would even become Algerian head of state), pinpointed the qualities of the ideal activist, when talking about one particular fighter: "[...] she was a living example of dynamism, initiative, and selflessness."⁶⁷ Several authors mentioned the ideal of endurance which in the end made them superior to the colonizers.⁶⁸ Si Azzedine, another prominent commander in the independence war, related how taking to the *maquis* made him "a New Man." Apart from adopting a new name (Si Azzedine had been born as Rabah Zerari), this included the development of an almost superhuman physique that made possible several apparently miraculous healings after he had been wounded in combat: his utmost fear not being death but an invalidity that would prevent him from playing football, Azzedine succeeded, according to his account, in curing himself, to the astonishment of physicians, by sheer discipline.⁶⁹ His fellow guerrilla fighter Louisette Ighilahriz recounted a similar tale of discipline and endurance: hit by five bullets, one of which had never been removed, she refused to use even a cane until relatively old age.⁷⁰ Before the armed independence struggle the scout troops, discussed above, and the new sports clubs, that emerged in large numbers all over Algeria from about World War I on and were also often connected to nationalist or reformist activities,⁷¹ had offered a place to channel youthful energies and muscular tensions.⁷² In a certain sense, the first Muslim Algerian sports stars who rose to prominence during the late colonial period were also the first "New Men."⁷³ Although intellectuals like Fanon and Bennabi did not have a particular appreciation for sports, successful athletes were actually the first Algerians to be accepted as achieving individuals on an equal footing by the French. Already in 1928, Ahmed El Ouafi had shaken colonial feelings of superiority, when he won the gold medal in the marathon at the Amsterdam Olympics.⁷⁴ After World War II professional athletes, such as cyclist Abdelkader Zaaf, boxer Chérif Hamia or footballer Rachid Mekhloufi came to be regarded as major stars of French sports.⁷⁵ As such, ordinary colonized people perceived them as potent symbols, breaking out of the seemingly eternal inferiority. The

67 Kafi, *Du militant politique au dirigeant militaire*, p. 158.

68 See e.g. Aït Ahmed, *Mémoires*, pp. 65-66, 152-153; Drif, *Mémoires*, p. 55; L. Ighilahriz, *Algérienne*, Paris 2001, pp. 32, 94.

69 See Azzedine, *On nous appelait fellaghas*, pp. 15, 52, 76, 252-253.

70 See Ighilahriz, *Algérienne*, pp. 105, 253.

71 See Y. Fatès, *Le club sportif, structure d'encadrement et de formation nationaliste de la jeunesse musulmane pendant la période coloniale*, in: N. Bancel, D. Denis and Y. Fatès (eds.), *De l'Indochine à l'Algérie. La jeunesse en mouvements des deux côtés du miroir colonial, 1940-1962*, Paris 2003, pp. 150-162.

72 See e.g. Amouchi, *Mémoires*, pp. 10-13; Harbi, *Une vie debout*, pp. 68-69, 86-87.

73 See also S. Dufraisse, *Le champion, incarnation de l'homme nouveau soviétique: une genèse (1934-1953)*, in: Georges Bensoussan et al. (eds.), *Sport, corps et sociétés de masse. Le projet d'un homme nouveau*, Paris 2012, pp. 217-230.

74 See T. Terret and A. Roger, *Managing Colonial Contradictions: French Attitudes toward El Ouafi's 1928 Olympic Victory*, in: *Journal of Sports History* 36 (2009) 1, pp. 3-18.

75 See F. Chehat, *La fabuleuse histoire du sport algérien*, vol. 1: *Les moissons de l'exil 1912-1962*, Algiers 2016.

writer Kaddour M'Hamsadji remembered how, as an adolescent, he heard about the first Algerian cyclist to compete in the Tour de France (in 1947):

*For us, this was proof, once again, for the physical and mental capacity of the 'Arab' to rise, even regardless of his political stance to the Algerian problem, up to the sportive level of any French athlete of the colonial period.*⁷⁶

This meant that successful self-reform was possible and that physical activity was a means to achieve it. Among those who regarded sports as a formative influence on their personal development was also Algeria's first president after independence, Ahmed Ben Bella. In his memoir (actually a long interview) he prided himself of having played briefly football with Olympique Marseilles, "at the time the champions of France and maybe one of the best teams at the European level." Ben Bella later hinted at his discipline and healthy lifestyle, which according to him, were necessary as much for sports as for political engagement.⁷⁷ In fact, the FLN's ban on smoking and alcohol cannot only be explained as a tax boycott or an instance of Islamic identity politics,⁷⁸ but also as a measure to promote health, fitness, and discipline among "New Men" against the decadence of the old guard.⁷⁹

Maybe the best example for the juxtaposition of "new" and "old" men by their bodily shape is to be found in Aït Ahmed's memoir: he first described an informer of the French authorities and his ridiculous appearance, both physically and with regard to his – traditional – dress. He concluded: "If he had not been so resentful, this person would have been just grotesque. Of small height, always wearing large woollen *gandouras* and a camel-hair *burnous*, he displayed an enormous moustache." This description of the "old" man was directly followed by the story of a "New Man," the young nationalist activist Sid Ali Halit, incarcerated in Algiers:

*[...] the torturer on duty first refuses to open his cell, then he complies, as he does not have to fear an evasion, with Sid Ali in such a miserable state. He is not able to keep himself up, so running ... Well, he could run! He had finally found in his desperation – or hope – the willpower and the physical resources to leave hell. Zigzagging like crazy, he ran [...] at least three kilometres.*⁸⁰

The insistence on bodily fitness did not mean, of course, that forming a "New Man" was simply about outward appearances. Bennabi, for one, was very clear about that, when he said with respect to post-Almohad man:

One encounters this haunting figure of our past [...] also under the deceptive aspect of the son of a millionaire, of a diploma-holder, who has apparently acquired all the etiquettes

76 K. M'Hamsadji, *Le petit café de mon père. Récits au passé*, Algiers 2011, p. 195.

77 A. Bin Balla, *Hadith ma'rifi shāmil*, M. Khalifa (ed.), Beirut 1985, pp. 45, 62.

78 Cf. Kafi, *Du militant politique au dirigeant militaire*, p. 156.

79 See also Azzedine, *On nous appelait fellaghas*, pp. 41–42, 77.

80 Aït Ahmed, *Mémoires*, pp. 46–47.

*of modern life. His diploma or the wealth of his father gives him, at times, the aspect of a 'new man,' but if one scrutinises his manners, sentiments and thoughts, one would easily perceive that he is none other than the 'post-al-Muwahhid man.' [...] But it is evidently more difficult to know and make the man of a civilization than to manufacture a motor or to teach a monkey to carry a tie.*⁸¹

In a colonial situation of constant struggle with its permanent latent enmity between colonizer and colonized – as Fanon saw it –, physical strength was the necessary complement of new mental capacities: the sound body could not be separated from a sound mind. As a consequence, the “new bio-historical synthesis,” for Bennabi, was not just the way out of colonizability for Muslim Algerians, it was, in fact, intended to solve the problems of all humankind, not least of a Western world that might have been strong, but that over technological progress had gradually lost its soul and, thereby, its vitality.⁸²

5. Generations: New Men and Old Men

5.1 Anti-Colonialism as Generational Conflict

As mentioned before, many thinkers and activists at the time emphasized the necessity of a clear break with the past, a rupture that would set apart the “New Men” not only from colonialism but equally from earlier generations of “old men” within their own society. Kafi, for example, saw the war of independence as “a decisive shortcut and a complete transformation in the middle of society.”⁸³ This terminology could well have been applied to the Constantine Plan by French technocrats, but now it was the revolution that would bring about a completely new society almost overnight. For Yazid, Kafi’s comrade in the FLN, the war was to lead to “a total break with the backward past,” as he put it in his Tunis speech. It was thus not only a struggle for liberation from colonial rule, but also a revolutionary transformation of society:

*The youth has benefitted from the exceptional circumstances created by the Revolution. The Revolution has broken up all colonial structures and progressively eliminated feudal structures and residues. For example, we have seen the young man leaving his family, escaping the traditionalist authority of his father, escaping the burden of family, insofar as this burden has been sometimes politically backward.*⁸⁴

The FLN functionary here hinted at a phenomenon that Fanon analysed in more detail. He devoted a large part of his *Sociologie d’une révolution*, originally published in 1959, to the changing family structures and gender relations in Algerian Muslim society. For the Marxist-inspired thinker – again, not unlike the late colonial planners with their social

81 Bennabi, *Vocation de l’Islam*, p. 13.

82 See *ibid.*, pp. 9, 61–71.

83 Kafi, *Du militant politique au dirigeant militaire*, p. 155.

84 Yazid, *La jeunesse algérienne*, p. 8.

scientific expertise – social structures perceived as retrograde or even reactionary were a major obstacle for the progression of colonized peoples towards their independent future. It was the liberation war which would not only lead to freedom from colonialism, but also to a general liberation in society. Fanon, the psychoanalyst, described how sons would, for the first time, challenge the authority of their fathers by their political actions and thereby supersede the older generations that were stuck in traditionalist stagnation, on the one hand, and colonial subordination, on the other. Finally, all family members were able to break out of the restraining structures and to assert themselves as new persons:

*Individual persons have found themselves facing new choices, new decisions. The customary and highly structured patterns of behaviour that were the crystallization of traditional ideas suddenly proved ineffective and were abandoned.*⁸⁵

In fact, there was a marked generational dimension in anti-colonial activism during the last two decades of French rule in Algeria. Fanon remarked: “It was the young Algerian who swept the family into the vast national liberation movement.”⁸⁶ Many independence activists in their recollections singled out the events of May 1945 as a point of no return and the moment of definite rupture with the legalist and compromising approaches of an older generation of nationalist politicians.⁸⁷ Harbi even connected the generational conflict in Algeria with a world-historical change of power: according to him, the challenge to traditional authority began after Operation Torch in November 1942, when Allied troops ousted the French administration loyal to the Vichy Regime. The entry of the United States, the future global power, onto the North African stage for the historian marked the beginning of a new era. With the demise of the ultra-conservative Vichy Regime, headed by 86-year-old Marshal Philippe Pétain (a hero of World War I), in the minds of young activists, it was time to go for other men of the past as well, namely the old Algerian notables and traditional leaders that had sustained the colonial order for decades.⁸⁸

The “New Men” of the younger generation could also be “New Women.” According to Fanon, it was the female members of society that challenged traditional authority the strongest and brought about the most radical transformation: by assuming an active role in the national struggle, women would shake off traditional patriarchy and even acquire a “new personality.”⁸⁹ Drif described how her friend Samia (together with her mother) would defy the role of the father – a *cadi* (*qāḍī*) and thus a traditional authority well-established in the colonial system – by surpassing him in nationalist zeal and political

85 Fanon, *Sociologie d’une révolution*, pp. 99-100.

86 *Ibid.*, p. 104.

87 See Azzedine, *On nous appelait fellaghas*, p. 31; Bin Jadīd, *Mudhakkirāt*, pp. 46-49; M. Boudiaf, *La préparation du 1er novembre*, suivi de *La lettre ouverte aux Algériens*, Paris 1976, pp. 10-25; Drif, *Mémoires*, pp. 45, 72. The events of May 1945 are described with great detail by Ait Ahmed, *Mémoires*, pp. 38-46.

88 See Harbi, *Une vie debout*, p. 43.

89 Fanon, *Sociologie d’une révolution*, p. 109.

activism.⁹⁰ Azzedine related the story of his niece Zehor who gained autonomy from her father (a patriarchal figure also for Azzedine) through her political engagement and her insistence on discussing important matters with all family members.⁹¹ These autobiographical recollections confirm to a large extent Fanon's findings about the shift in gender relations.⁹²

5.2 The Break with Tradition

The opponent in this fight for a "New Man" and a new society, which, in Bennabi's terms, would no longer be colonizable, was obviously "tradition," especially in the form of old notables, like Samia Lakhdari's *cadi* father, deemed too prone to compromise with colonialism. Interestingly, "tradition" acquired such a negative connotation not only for French developmentalists, and not just for the national revolutionary liberation movement with its socialist leanings, but also for distinctly Islamic thinkers and reformers. In Bennabi's eyes, it was one of the main problems that Muslim society held tradition in such high esteem, that it confused stagnation with religious authenticity. Just as the Muslim scouts with their reinterpretation of the Prophet's role, Bennabi, too, did not want to discard the exemplarity of early Islam, in spite of his critique of Muslims' "constant obsession with the past." Instead, he combined authenticity and modernization by the Salafist argument that a revolutionary renewal of Muslim society could only be achieved through a return to the purity of an original Islam, devoid of all later "superstitions."⁹³ The attack on tradition was all the more important, as the latter lay at the basis of colonial domination (as Fanon, too, stressed time and again):

Colonialism is methodic: [...] It eliminates the veritable elite – not the one its particular favour has designated for representing the people – but the natural elite that testify to the highest virtues of a people. That it may not reform itself, that it may not emerge anew, there is installed a system of perversion, debasement and destruction directed against all dignity, all nobility and all modesty. [...] The Muslim renaissance, particularly since Afghani shattered the post-al-Muwahhid equilibrium, could not but excite its most passionate interest, and its unbounded power and ambition has inspired it with the mad and tragic idea of halting the march of civilisation in the colonised country. To counter tajdid it has set up an artificial archaism as a theatre scene wherein its puppets – marabouts,

90 See Drif, *Mémoires*, pp. 64-66, 195.

91 See Azzedine, *On nous appelait fellaghas*, pp. 203-232.

92 See Fanon, *Sociologie d'une révolution*, pp. 35-64, 105-118. It has to be noted, though, that Fanon's analysis remains firmly anchored in a male perspective and even a certain paternalism, which is very present in the whole discourse on women's "emancipation" (F. Lalami, *L'enjeu du statut des femmes durant la période coloniale en Algérie*, in: *Nouvelles Questions Féministes* 27 [2008] 3, pp. 16-27). A similar attitude is present in Bennabi's writings (Bennabi, *Les conditions de la renaissance*, pp. 123-128; M. Bennabi, *Colonisabilité. Problèmes de la civilisation*, A. Benamara [ed.], pp. 200-213).

93 Bennabi, *Vocation de l'Islam*, p. 28.

*pashas, fake âlems or University degreeholders – must play the scene of the ‘Islamic tradition,’ – ‘tradition’ that has become the pass-word of the entire colonial policy.*⁹⁴

For Bennabi, as for the religious reformists before him, the major negative symbol was certainly “maraboutism,” so-called popular Islam with its traditionalist authorities from the Sufi brotherhoods.⁹⁵ It should again be noted that the reformers’ impetus against “maraboutism” which was made responsible for Muslim backwardness, fatalism, and passivity was very much in line with classic Orientalist discourse about Islam – but now with an anticolonial twist. The general idea about the necessity of “modernization” was, thus, fully concordant with colonialist discussions around the transformation of an Islamic society that was perceived as being stuck in the middle ages into a modern French one.⁹⁶

For the thinkers analysing Algerian society during the last phase of French rule, as well as for those actively engaged in the anti-colonial struggle, the break with tradition and all its old structures was at least as important as the actual fight against foreign domination. Maybe this is also a reason for the universalist impetus present in Fanon, who concluded *Les damnés de la terre* with the following sentence: “For Europe, for ourselves, and for humanity, comrades, we must turn over a new leaf, we must work out new concepts, and try to set afoot a new man.”⁹⁷

6. Conclusion

The “New Man” appeared in late colonial Algeria explicitly in the programmatic writings of anticolonial intellectuals: for Fanon, it was decolonized man who, by liberating himself, would become whole and restart history from scratch. Bennabi, in a similar dialectic argument, called for a “New Man” to overcome colonizability in a creative synthesis of Islamic spirit and modern reason.

The reading of autobiographical texts on the period in light of these arguments has helped to connect the theories about “New Men” to practices of shaping them: the Muslim scout movement, in particular, combined in its outdoor activities physical exercise with an experience of the nation and a study of development problems. With an education that made them physically, mentally, and morally fit, young scouts would then be prepared to become leaders of the independent state. Although the three dimensions of fitness were inseparable, physical appearance distinguished “New Men” who were set to bring new vitality to society from the old men who were accused of having kept it backward with their traditionalist immobility. A strong body also reflected moral im-

94 Ibid., p. 56.

95 See e.g. ‘A. Bin Bādīs, al-Islām al-dhātī wal-islām al-wirāthī: ayyuhumā yanhaḍ bil-umam, in: ‘A. al-Ṭālibī (ed.), Kitāb āthār Ibn Bādīs, vol. II.1: Maqālāt ijtīmā’iyya tarbawiyya akhlāqiyya dīniyya siyāsiyya, Algiers 1388/1968, pp. 240-242.

96 See Feichtinger and Malinowski, Eine Million Algerier, p. 126.

97 Fanon, Les damnés de la terre, p. 316.

provement. Accordingly, we find notions of the “New Man,” explicitly and implicitly, in autobiographical recollections: guerrilla fighters were considered to have become “New Men,” and the newness of the young generation of activists, as opposed to a traditional elite out of date, is very pronounced in all accounts. The young nationalists distinguished themselves by their action (almost for its own sake), just as athletes stood out for their sportive success. The “New Man,” then, combined strength and willpower, creativity and action with discipline, endurance, and reason. These attributes also pertained to “New Women,” whose move against patriarchy made the break with the backward past even more vigorous.

Although there existed a certain tension between young activists and their spontaneous creativity from below and planned reform efforts from above, the idea of shaping “New Men” in an almost scientific manner seems to have been more widespread. Youth associations like the boy scouts put great emphasis on the preparation of future leaders as the main goal of their educational efforts. And in the end, it was the generation socialized in these movements that actually brought about the transition from late colonial “modernization” programmes to postcolonial developmentalism.⁹⁸

98 See also R. Gallissot, *Génération intellectuelle au Maghreb: existe-t-il une génération intellectuelle de l'indépendance avant le triomphe du développementalisme national après les indépendances (années 1960–1970)?*, in: O. Siari-Tengour and A. Kadri (eds.), *Génération engagée et Mouvements nationaux: Le XXe siècle au Maghreb. Hommage à Mahfoud Kaddache*, Oran 2012, pp. 37–54.

“There is a New African in the World!” – Kwame Nkrumah and the Making of a “New African (Wo)Man” in Ghana 1957–1966

De-Valera N. Y. M. Botchway

ABSTRACTS

An der Schwelle zu Ghanas Unabhängigkeit am 6. März 1957 wandte sich Kwame Nkrumah, Anführer der afrikanischen Regierung des Landes, mit seiner historischen Rede „Ghana is free forever“ an die Welt. Diese herausragende Figur der pan-afrikanischen Bewegung erklärte unter anderem: „[W]e shall no more go back to sleep [...] [F]rom now on, there is a new African in the world[!]“ Wie unterschied er zwischen einem „neuen“ und einem „alten“ Afrikaner? Dieser Beitrag untersucht den Charakter dieser Vision eines „New African“. Nkrumah glaubte nicht an dessen Existenz *per se*. Vielmehr musste eine gezielte Homonisierung dieses neuen Wesens erfolgen. Daher fügte Nkrumah Folgendes hinzu: „[F]rom [...] today, we [Ghanaians] must change our attitudes, our minds [and] realise that [...] we are no more a colonial but a free and independent people!“ Veränderung bedeutete für ihn eine Anthropogenese, um der Welt zu zeigen, „that [...] the African [...] is somebody!“ und „capable of managing his [or her] own affairs.“ Nkrumahs Ansicht nach musste sich Ghana, das er bis 1966 regierte, für die vollständige Dekolonialisierung Afrikas, die Einheit des Kontinents, die Entwicklung des Geistes einer afrikanischen Persönlichkeit sowie für die Wiedererlangung der afrikanischen Selbstkontrolle und Kreativität einsetzen. Dies erforderte, dass die Hominisierung des „New African“ von Ghana ausging. Welche Initiativen und Prozesse wurden angestoßen, um diese Transformation der Einstellungen und eine intellektuelle Wiedergeburt in Ghana zu erreichen? Dieser Artikel bietet eine historische Untersuchung der Bildungs- und Kulturinitiativen sowie der politisch-ideologischen Trainings und Kaderschulen, insbesondere des *Ghana Young Pioneers Movement* und des *Kwame Nkrumah Ideological Institute*, die Nkrumah, Afrikas „Man of the Millennium“, mit dem Ziel ins Leben rief, die Herausbildung der Einstellungen und des Geistes eines „New African“ in Ghana im Zeitraum von 1957 bis 1966 voranzutreiben.

On the eve of Ghana's independence on 6 March 1957, Kwame Nkrumah, leader of the African government of that country, made his "Ghana is free forever" historic speech to the world. This Pan-Africanist extraordinaire declared, *inter alia*, that: "[W]e shall no more go back to sleep [...] [F]rom now on, there is a new African in the world[!]" How did he differentiate between a new and old African? This study, interested in the character of this envisioned "new African," perceives that Nkrumah did not think that this African already existed. Rather, a purposeful hominisation of this "new" being needed to occur. Hence, Nkrumah added that: "[F]rom [...] today, we [Ghanaians] must change our attitudes, our minds [and] realise that [...] we are no more a colonial but a free and independent people!" Change, as he emphasised, meant an anthropogenesis for the "new" being to "prove," as Nkrumah added, "to the world that [...] the African [...] is somebody!" and "capable of managing his [or her] own affairs." In Nkrumah's view, Ghana, which he ruled until 1966, had to champion the total decolonization of Africa, continental unity, development of the spirit of African Personality and renaissance of African self-possession and creativity. This, therefore, required that the hominisation of the "New African" had to start from Ghana. What initiatives and processes were offered to engender this transformative attitudinal and intellectual rebirth in Ghana? This article offers a historical examination of the educational and cultural initiatives and political-ideological training movements and cadre schools, especially the *Ghana Young Pioneers Movement* and *Kwame Nkrumah Ideological Institute*, which Nkrumah, Africa's "Man of the Millennium," provided intentionally to help bring about the necessary attitudinal and intellectual moulding of a "New African" in Ghana from 1957–1966.

1. Introduction

Kwame Nkrumah, the first president of Ghana and voted Africa's "Man of the Millennium" by the British Broadcasting Corporation,¹ engaged in nationalist and Pan-African projects to bring sustainable independence to Ghana, and to Africa as a whole. His central notions were that Africans should become critically conscious of imperialism and colonialism and resist them; surmount defeatist attitudes, self-pity, and the colonial myth of African inferiority; and unite to build and uplift Africa politically, economically, and culturally. This required a state-led conscientization intervention for the people.² Nkrumah and his Convention People's Party (CPP) government endeavoured to start this conscientization in Ghana, and began to work with other African leaders to create a continental government that would expand conscientization in a united Africa.

1 BBC World Service, 14 September 2000, http://www.bbc.co.uk/worldservice/people/highlights/000914_nkrumah.shtml (accessed 12 January 2019).

2 I use M. Ledwith's definition of conscientization here, which is, "[T]he process whereby people become aware of the political, socioeconomic and cultural contradictions that interact in a hegemonic way to diminish their lives. This awareness, which is based on critical insight, leads to collective consciousness" (p. 100). It makes people become critical thinkers and helps them to unpack and dismantle dominant oppressive thoughts produced by the cycle of socialization (M. Ledwith, *Community Development: A Critical Approach*, Bristol 2011).

Declaring Ghana's independence on 6 March 1957,³ Nkrumah averred that "independence is meaningless unless it is linked with the total liberation of Africa."⁴ As a Pan-Africanist, he envisaged Ghana's new status as inspiring a total decolonization of Africa, continental unity, development of the spirit of African Personality,⁵ and a renaissance of African self-possession and creativity for a "new" rather than a colonial African. Importantly, he stated that: "We shall no more go back to sleep [from] now on, there is a new African in the world."⁶ Nkrumah also asserted: "[F]rom [...] today, we [Ghanaians] must change our attitudes, our minds [and] realise that [...] we are no more a colonial but a free and independent people!"⁷ Clearly, he emphasized change not as biological hominization and a political rebirth of a people, but rather as being mentally reborn through processes that transform attitude and intellect. Nkrumah saw independence as a process that did not end with the formal proclamation of independence. It was a continuous struggle, a mental decolonization, in which the people could sustain valuable aspects of African traditions and institutions, and purge themselves of colonial attitudes, backward ideas, and divisive notions to become free. Freedom is essential in order to gain self-respect. Nkrumah saw it not only as denoting national autonomy, politico-economic independence, and infrastructural growth, but also sovereignty of mind. Freedom of mind required the destruction of what Nkrumah's followers called the "colonial mentality" problem.⁸ Thus, apart from pursuing the utilitarian goal of strengthening political and economic autonomy, Nkrumah also had a vision of creating a "new African," initially in Ghana, by shaping a nationalist psychology and attitude, Pan-Africanist character, and freedom mentality in the people. Nkrumah knew that the world was keen to view Ghana's independence as a crucial test of Africans' ability to be self-determining.⁹ His agenda for creating a new African via a mental and attitudinal rebirth simultaneously involved Ghana's politics and Pan-African political and cultural configurations.¹⁰ He hoped for a vital anthropogenesis to "prove to the world that when the African is given a chance he [or she] can show the world that he [or she] is somebody" and "capable of managing his [or her] own affairs."¹¹

This article offers a history of the educational and cultural initiatives, political-ideological training movements and schools that Nkrumah provided with the intention to help

3 See K. Nkrumah, *I Speak of Freedom: A Statement of African Ideology*, New York 1962 [1961], pp. 106–108.

4 *Ibid.*, p. 107.

5 O. Gill summarizes how Nkrumah viewed this concept as a philosophy of "common Africanism" that was intended to express 'the present-day African thinking, aspiration, and way of life' in order to 'bind our [different African nations] various parties together in the [sic] unity and oneness of purpose' against 'economic imperialism and racial discrimination' (See O. Gill, 'Ghana and Africa Need a New Type of man': Youth, Nationalism and Masculinity in Gold Coast/Ghana c. 1948–1966, Master in Global History thesis, Freie Universität Berlin, 2017, p. 6).

6 K. Nkrumah, *I Speak of Freedom*, p. 107.

7 *Ibid.*, p. 106.

8 E.B. Laramie, *Political Freedom in Unity*, Accra 1962, quoted in: B.S. Monfils, *A Multifaceted Image: Kwame Nkrumah's Extrinsic Rhetorical Strategies*, in: *Journal of Black Studies* 7 (1977) 3, p. 313.

9 *Ibid.*, p. 110.

10 *Ibid.*

11 *Ibid.*

mould the mind of the new African, particularly during the second phase of his political career.¹² Firstly, we will briefly scan Nkrumah's general understanding of education and his view on the imperative of ideological training, and secondly we will shed some light on two vibrant institutions – the Ghana Young Pioneers Movement (GYP) and Kwame Nkrumah Ideological Institute (KNII) – established by him in 1960 and 1961 respectively, to provide ideological training for children and adults.¹³

2. Nkrumah and the Making of an Independent African: Means and Methods of the Struggle

Nkrumah considered the colonial mentality to be a major problem: “What [is] independence [...] if we throw off political bondage and remain in [...] mental subservience?”¹⁴ In line with this view, Operation Psychology was initiated shortly after the proclamation of independence,¹⁵ to use “visual aids” to interpret “the soul and spirit of independence,”¹⁶ and to bolster the leader image of Nkrumah and his ideas, defined as Nkrumaism (or Nkrumahism),¹⁷ to inspire the people to move away from a colonial mentality, a problem that exposed them to neo-colonialism,¹⁸ and nurture valuable African traditions and creativity. Nkrumah used psychological strategies to become an empowering illustrative model. For instance, his head was depicted on Ghana's stamps and coins.¹⁹ Explaining the psychological goal of this, he averred that “many of my people cannot read or write. They've got to be shown [...] they are [...] independent. [...] [T]hey will see my picture – an African like themselves – and they will say: ‘Look, here is our leader on the stamps. We are truly a free people!’” Furthermore, “[M]y statue also is being built, I am sure the Queen will understand that many of my people still do not believe that we are truly independent. Some [...] expected the Queen to [...] crown me.”²⁰ In addition, Nkrumah

12 The first major part of his career was from 1947 to 1957, when he returned from England to the Gold Coast and spearheaded the local struggle to independence. The second was from 1957 to 1966, when he sought to build an economically independent and socialist state in Ghana. A coup d'état, orchestrated by some Ghanaians with CIA involvement, overthrew his government in 1966. He died in exile in 1972.

13 A. Biney, *The Political and Social Thought of Kwame Nkrumah*, New York 2011, p. 102; K. Nkrumah, *Africa Must Unite*, New York 1963, p. 130.

14 K. Nkrumah, *Speech at the Fourth Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference*, Winneba, Ghana, 10 May 1965, quoted in: K. Nkrumah, *Axioms of Kwame Nkrumah*, London 1967, p. 55.

15 *Evening News*, 22 June 1957, p. 2, quoted in: Monfils, *A Multifaceted Image*, p. 313.

16 *Ibid.*

17 Nkrumaism or Nkrumahism was deemed an African philosophical response to the Western and Eastern philosophies. The two spellings are used interchangeably in this paper.

18 For more on how Nkrumah exposes the nature of neo-colonialism, see K. Nkrumah, *Neocolonialism, the Last Stage of Imperialism*, London 1965.

19 B. S. Monfils, *A Multifaceted Image*, pp. 313–330.

20 *Daily Graphic*, 21 June 1957, p. 1, quoted in: Monfils, *A Multifaceted Image*, p. 325.

harnessed Ghana's national dance music, that is, highlife, to interpret and inculcate the spirit of independence.²¹

Nkrumah also believed that Ghana, and Africa as a whole, needed "a new ideology, socialist in content and continental [that is, Pan-African] in outlook,"²² to prevent neo-colonialism and produce a conscientized new African who was a revolutionary socialist-oriented democratic patriot, nationalist, and Pan-Africanist. To this end, some statal and parastatal organizations and systems – educational, indoctrinating and ideological – were established to preach an ideological orthodoxy that was intended to mould a new African in Ghana. Organizations that were strongly affiliated to this project included the National Association of Socialist Students Organization (NASSO), which was "officially described as the 'ideological wing of the [Convention People's] Party',"²³ the Bureau of African Affairs, the Ghana Women's League (GWL), the League of Ghana Patriots, the CPP Vanguard Activists, the Workers Brigade (WB), the Kwame Nkrumah Leadership Centre, the United Ghana Farmers' Council, the Young Farmers League, the National Council of Ghana Women (which was a merger of GWL and the National Federation of Gold Coast Women), and the Trade Union Congress. Members of these groups were encouraged to be ideologically disciplined. An example of the practice of shaping was that the Workers Brigade, a type of paramilitary group that also performed construction works and projects and operated state farms, required enlisted members to frequently recite the pledge of the Brigade:

*I pledge my efforts to strive from day to day for the ideals of this Nation of Ghana; I pledge my heart to loyalty to our nation and to the Brigade; I pledge my talents to individual perfection and Social Betterment; I pledge my mind to a greater understanding of my duty as a citizen; I pledge my hands to service to the Community through hard work.*²⁴

Nkrumah also appreciated the media's power to influence. Consequently, he supported a guided use of radio addresses, film, the party press, and state owned media in his venture to educate, ideologize, and mobilize people in Ghana.²⁵ State TV was advised to see education as its objective.²⁶ Nkrumah considered that the propagation of his agenda in the country and on the continent also required an ideological journal or journals.²⁷ Hence,

21 N. Plageman, *Highlife Saturday Night: Popular Music and Social Change in Urban Ghana*, Bloomington 2013, pp. 147–182.

22 K. Nkrumah, *Why the Spark?*, Accra 1964, p. 3; Nkrumah, *Africa Must Unite*, p. 130.

23 C. Legum, *Socialism in Ghana: A Political Interpretation*, in: W.H. Friedland and C.G. Rosberg, Jr. (eds.), *African Socialism*, Stanford 1964, p. 138.

24 See P. Hodge, *The Ghana Workers Brigade: A Project for Unemployed Youth*, in: *The British Journal of Sociology* 15 (1964) 2, pp. 113–128.

25 K. Nkrumah, *Ghana: The Autobiography of Kwame Nkrumah*, London 1957, p. 75; K. Nkrumah, *Africa Must Unite*, pp. 55–56; K. Nkrumah, *The Voice of Africa*, Speech for the Opening of the Ghana External Broadcasting Service, 22 October 1961, <http://nkrumahinfobank.org/article.php?id=469&c=46> (accessed 12 January 2019); K. Nkrumah, *Speech on the Inauguration of GBC-TV*, Accra 1965.

26 K. Nkrumah, *Speech on State Opening of Ghana's Parliament*, 15 October 1963.

27 K. Nkrumah, *Why I Founded the Spark*, in: *Spark* 100, 13 November 1964, p. 1.

he established *The Spark* in 1962,²⁸ which had a socialist devotion to the liberation and unification of Africa,²⁹ and also discussed the African socialist revolution.³⁰ It was designed “[t]o spell out the content of socialism,” and analyse notions such as African socialism, so that the people would understand “the [...] meaning of socialism and the correct way to [...] achieving it.”³¹ The editors, K. Batsa, a Ghanaian, and S. G. Ikoku, a Nigerian Marxist in Ghana, were tasked “to crystallize Nkrumah’s ... specific policies and to describe the issues each week in ways which reflected his thinking [...].”³²

3. Nkrumah and Education

In addition to this ideological indoctrination, Nkrumah also considered that the necessary attitudinal and intellectual shaping of a “new” Ghanaian, rather than a colonial subject of the Gold Coast, must flourish within a state-led education system. In 1951 his party campaigned for “a unified system of education, free and compulsory elementary, secondary and technical education up to the age of 16 years” and an Adult Education programme that would remove illiteracy as quickly as possible.³³ Unprecedentedly assuming full responsibility for educational policy and practice, his government supported the view that religious and private schools would not be supported by public funds unless prior approval was obtained from the relevant local authority and the central government department.³⁴ Non-public schools were to be closed down by law if their structures and curricula were not considered morally healthy for the pupils. These policies were partially intended to eradicate the strong colonial influence that especially missionary schools had wielded in education, mainly at the primary level. Consequently, many churches took a back seat, and although they attached their names to schools they did not exercise any influence over them. The government expanded school facilities at the primary, middle, secondary grammar and secondary technical levels, while technical institutes, professional training colleges, and universities offered further education and also developed other skills,³⁵ such as new creative ideas, which helped to improve productivity,³⁶ and technical education, which assisted Ghana’s industrialization; they also inspired a decolonized mentality.³⁷

28 This was similar to the *Iskra* of Russia.

29 See Biney, *Political and Social Thought of Kwame Nkrumah*, p. 93.

30 *Spark* 1, 15 December 1962, p. 1.

31 K. Nkrumah, *Why the Spark?*, pp. 3–4.

32 K. Batsa, *The Spark: Times Behind Me: From Kwame Nkrumah to Hilla Limann*, London 1985, p. 15.

33 K.O. Hagan, *Mass Education and Community Development in Ghana: A Study in Retrospect 1943–1968*, Legon 1975, p. 15.

34 See K. Botwe-Asamoah, *Kwame Nkrumah’s Cultural Thought and Policies*, New York/London 2005, p. 182; Gold Coast Educational Department, *Accelerated Development Plan for Education*, Accra 1951.

35 Ghana Office of the Planning Commission, *Seven-Year Plan for National Reconstruction and Development 1963–64 to 1969–70*, Accra 1964.

36 *Ibid.*

37 For an understanding of decoloniality, see S.J. Ndlovu-Gatsheni, *Decoloniality as the Future of Africa*, in: *History*

Higher education, especially in universities, which were inherited from the colonial regime, was deemed to be not very useful by Nkrumah's government. The university system was therefore mandated to offer a wide array of courses that were more relevant to the country's needs.³⁸ In addition, more African professors were appointed,³⁹ and patriotism and true academic freedom (intellectual freedom compatible with service and loyalty to the community "to which it belongs,"⁴⁰ and its interests) were encouraged.⁴¹ Universities were tasked with supporting good citizenship, public morality, and appropriate behaviour, as well as seeking the people's welfare, solving their economic, cultural, technological, and scientific problems,⁴² and freeing them from ignorance and laziness.⁴³ Accordingly, Nkrumah built a university in Cape Coast in 1962, his first in Ghana, to provide teacher education and educational research for "the enlightenment and upliftment of our people and at wiping out the legacy of illiteracy, miseducation, superstition, distortion and false values."⁴⁴ He also formally opened the Institute of African Studies at the University of Ghana in 1963, and mandated it to facilitate the:

*[S]tudy [of] the history, culture and institutions, languages and arts of Ghana and of Africa in new African – centred ways – in entire freedom from the propositions and pre-suppositions of colonial epoch, and [...] definitions of [...] European studies [...] [W]e must reassess and assert the glories and achievements of our African past and inspire our generation and succeeding generations, with a vision of a better future.*⁴⁵

Nkrumah was interested in building a modernized industrialized society,⁴⁶ yet he wanted the people to learn about what he perceived as Africa's precolonial past for inspiration and to help solve problems in the postcolonial moment. It was in this spirit that he named his country after the ancient state of Ghana. He opined: "Ghana [...] reborn will be, like the Ghana of old, a centre to which all the peoples [...] and [...] cultures of Africa may meet,"⁴⁷ in "majesty."⁴⁸ Ghana "kindles in the imagination [...] the achieve-

Compass 13 (2015) 10, pp. 485–496, <https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/hic3.12264> (accessed 5 March 2019).

38 K. Nkrumah, *The Noble Task of Teaching*, Accra 1961, p. 3.

39 T. Adamafo, *By Nkrumah's Side: The Labour and the Wounds*, Accra/London 1982, p. 67.

40 K. Nkrumah, Speech at the University of Ghana, Legon, 24 February 1963.

41 Nkrumah, *The Noble Task*, p. 167.

42 Nkrumah, Speech at the University of Ghana, Legon, 24 February 1963.

43 Nkrumah, *The Role of Universities*, Accra 1963, p. 1.

44 Nkrumah, Speech for the Opening Ceremony of University of Cape Coast (Read by Kojo Botsio), 15 December 1962, Cape Coast, quoted in: D.A. Dwarko and K.O. Kwarteng, *A History of University of Cape Coast*, Accra 2003, p. 11.

45 Nkrumah, *Strength and Power*, Accra 1963, p. 3.

46 Nkrumah, *Africa Must Unite*, p. 23; K. Nkrumah, Speech at the Seminar for Senior Civil Servants at Winneba, 14 April 1962, quoted in: Nkrumah, *Axioms*, p. 56; K. Nkrumah, Speech at the Laying of Foundation Stone of the Atomic Reactor at Kwabenya, 25 November 1964, quoted in: Nkrumah, *Axioms*, p. 57.

47 Nkrumah, *I Speak of Freedom*, p. 96.

48 Nkrumah, *Ghana: The Autobiography*, p. 163.

ment of a great [...] civilisation which our ancestors developed [...] before European penetration and [...] domination of Africa.”⁴⁹

It is noteworthy that Nkrumah believed education should be holistic, measured not only by the knowledge or skill that a person can utilize, but rather: “in terms of the soundness of his judgement [...] his power to [...] appreciate the needs of his fellow-men, and to be of service to them [and] be so sensitive to the conditions around him [and] endeavour to improve those conditions for the good of all.”⁵⁰

Thus, Nkrumah also paid attention to non-classroom education (whether it was in schools or outside them). The Plan for Mass Literacy and Mass Education was launched in 1952 under the Department of Social Welfare and Community Development to support community development and to “teach people, not merely how to read and write, but how to live.”⁵¹ Nkrumah supported the use of non-formal education, such as students reciting the National Pledge and saluting the National Flag at morning school parades, as well as engaging in pre- and post-secondary school and post-university national training,⁵² to teach them values that led to high standards of moral conduct and behaviour: service, responsibility, devotion to Ghana and Africa, respect for superiors, self-discipline, and earnestness.⁵³

As well as supporting formal classroom and informal education, Nkrumah also greatly favoured a state-led ideological indoctrination programme that would help to create the “new” Ghanaian.

4. Nkrumah on Ideological Training

Ideological training was important to Nkrumah. Ideology was a guide to action, hence his dictum that: “Practice without thought is blind, and thought without practice is empty.”⁵⁴ The fundamental ideology that his regime promoted became popularly known as “Nkrumaism”.⁵⁵ As a philosophical guide to action, Nkrumaism was a distillation of his political and socioeconomic ideas for Africa’s self-determination, growth, and well-being. The language of this plan was “clearly a language of socialism, progress and development,”⁵⁶ which S. Carmichael described as “scientific socialism applied to countries emerging from colonialism, and specifically African countries where the Marxist

49 Nkrumah, Speech in Legislative Assembly Moving the Adoption of the Government’s White Paper, 18 May 1956, quoted in: Nkrumah, *Axioms*, p. 47.

50 Nkrumah, Speech at the Opening of the Institute of African Studies, 25 October 1963.

51 Hagan, *Mass Education*, p. 20.

52 Nkrumah, *Revive our Virtues*, Accra 1963.

53 *Ibid.*

54 G. Martin, *African Political Thought*, Basingstoke/New York 2012, p. 87.

55 He called it African Socialism. Later (before 1960) it was designated as Nkrumaism, after 1960, the term Consciencism was also used to refer to the corpus of Nkrumah’s ideology.

56 D. Apter, quoted in: H.L. Bretton, *The Rise and Fall of Kwame Nkrumah*, London 1966, p. 87.

capital-labor conflict is only one of a number of fundamental conflicts."⁵⁷ T. Szamueli, a tutor at the KNII, revealed that the Institute considered it as:

*[I]deology of the New Africa [...] free from imperialism, organised on a continental scale, founded upon the conception of [a] one and united Africa drawing its strength from modern science and technology, and from the traditional African belief that the free development of each is the condition for the free development of all.*⁵⁸

Furthermore, Nkrumaism was a political call to the common people to rise "from the scum of the earth to take their place in the sun, a theory springing from a people with a long tradition of collectivisation and faith in majority rule and Democratic centralism."⁵⁹ It was deemed by the CPP, first, as "a constructive alternative [...] to the hypocrisy [...] we have known for 2,000 years of Christendom (European imperialism),"⁶⁰ and, second, "the highest form of Christianity, etc. [...] which teaches that you must remove [...] causes of hate and jealousy among haves and have-nots in order to [...] 'love one's neighbour as one's self'."⁶¹ The *Ghanaian Times* called it "the new African ideology [...] to save our continent from [...] neo-colonialism and show the way for African unity,"⁶² and "solve all [our] problems."⁶³

In summary, Nkrumaism, which was promoted within cadre ideological movements and institutions such as GYP and KNII, generally focused on the rejection of colonialism; attainment of complete independence; positive action as a force against colonialism; the use of violence when positive action is militarily repressed; Pan-Africanism; African continental unity; African cultural and moral renaissance; African nationalism; socialist-inclined non-exploitative African economic methods; democracy and universal adult suffrage; and the positive neutrality of Africa in Cold War politics.

5. Life and Afterlife of the Kwame Nkrumah Ideological Institute

When opening the Trade Union Hall in 1960, Nkrumah revealed the completion of "plans for the immediate establishment of a school [...], the Kwame Nkrumah Ideological Institute [...] [to] give ideological training to Party activists, trade union officials and our co-operators of the National Co-operative Council." For the sake of Pan-Africanism, KNII, dubbed "the Mecca of the African Revolution,"⁶⁴ was also to "train freedom fight-

57 S. Carmichael, Marxism-Leninism and Nkrumahism, in: *The Black Scholar* 4 (1973) 5, pp. 41–43.

58 T. Szamueli, The Prophet of the Utterly Absurd, in: *The Spectator*, 1966, quoted in: H.L. Bretton, *Rise and Fall*, p. 163.

59 *Evening News*, 20 November 1959, p. 2.

60 *Ibid.*, 23 March 1960, p. 2.

61 *Ibid.*, 26 January 1960, p. 2.

62 *Ghanaian Times*, 2 January 1962, p. 2.

63 *Ibid.*, 3 January 1962, p. 6.

64 S. Ryan, The Theory and Practice of African One Partyism: The CPP Re-Examined, in: *Canadian Journal of African Studies / Revue Canadienne des Études Africaines* 4 (1970) 2, p. 162.

ers [...] for ideological and educational orientation,”⁶⁵ “counteract [...] miseducation [...] and [...] effectively direct the freedom movement for African emancipation,”⁶⁶ and “end [...] the reactionary era in Ghana [...] by conscious ideological education.”⁶⁷ KNII, as E.O. Addo has indicated, marked an important point in “ideological evolution in Ghana since Nkrumah appeared on the political arena in 1949.”⁶⁸ Inaugurated on 18 February 1961, KNII was established to offer two-year courses. K. Addison and J. K. Nsarko were respectively appointed director and deputy director.⁶⁹ KNII comprised two sections: “[T]he Positive Action Training Centre and the Ideological Training Centre, was placed under the exclusive supervision of the Central Committee of CPP, and not the regulation of the Education Department or Ghana Education Trust.”⁷⁰ According to K. Darkwah, this autonomy was deemed relevant because of the curriculum offered by the Institute.⁷¹ It was intended, as Nkrumah put it in 1961, to condition the “comrade” to perpetually uphold the principle “I live not for myself but for the good of the whole.”⁷² Thus, during the five years of its existence, it trained cadres from Ghana and other African countries, such as Nigeria, Kenya, Tanzania, Malawi, and Zimbabwe,⁷³ to become more sophisticated politically and to refine their ideologies. There were students from the rank and file of the CPP, Trades Union Congress (TUC) activists, and officials of agencies such as GYP, United Ghana Farmers’ Council (UGFC), National Council of Ghana Women (NCGW), and the Ghana Armed Forces.⁷⁴ Students’ ages ranged from 21 to 51. They possessed qualifications that included Teacher Certificate “A,” Secondary and Middle School Certificates, London Chamber of Commerce and City and Guild of London credentials, and degrees in different vocational, technical, and professional disciplines. Some key subjects studied at the Institute were Economics, Government, History, and Philosophy, albeit with an orientation to Nkrumaism. Tutors included some Ghanaian socialist stalwarts, who were popularly known as “socialist boys.” They included editors, journalists, and directors from the state media, and organizers of some government and party agencies. Some tutors came from Senegal and Nigeria,⁷⁵ while communist and socialist teachers from Britain and Eastern Europe also taught there. Lecturers delivered papers on topical issues such as “Nkrumah’s Political Ideology” and “African Unity.”⁷⁶

65 Nkrumah, Speech at the Opening of the Hall of Trade Unions, Accra 1960, p. 6.

66 Ibid.

67 D. Rooney, Kwame Nkrumah: Vision and Tragedy, Accra 2007[1988], p. 243.

68 W.H. Friedland, Four Sociological Trends in African Socialism, in: *Africa Report* 8 (1963) 5, p. 10, quoted in: E.O. Addo, Kwame Nkrumah: A Case Study of Religion and Politics in Ghana, Lanham, NY/Oxford 1999[1997] p. 156.

69 K. Darkwah, Kwame Nkrumah and his ‘Ideological Institute’ at Winneba, in: B. Lundt and C. Marx (eds.), *Kwame Nkrumah 1909–1972. A Controversial African Visionary*, Stuttgart 2016, p. 45.

70 Nkrumah, Speech at the Opening of the Hall of Trade Unions, p. 6.

71 Darkwah, Kwame Nkrumah, p. 43.

72 Nkrumah, Laying the Foundation Stone of the Kwame Nkrumah Ideological Institute, Accra 1961, quoted in: E.O. Addo, Kwame Nkrumah, p. 155.

73 Darkwah, Kwame Nkrumah, p. 43.

74 Biney, Political and Social Thought of Kwame Nkrumah, p. 102.

75 Darkwah, Kwame Nkrumah, p. 45.

76 Biney, Political and Social Thought of Kwame Nkrumah, p. 102.

Nkrumah also occasionally lectured.⁷⁷ KNII offered short courses, workshops, and conferences, such as the All African Freedom Fighters Conference in 1962,⁷⁸ for occasional students, consisting of government officials, civil servants, and African revolutionaries. The life of KNII was brought to a close when a military junta overthrew Nkrumah in 1966. Its documents were vandalized and tutors persecuted, with Nkrumah's detractors condemning it as a propaganda machine that enhanced the personality cult of an authoritarian.⁷⁹ KNII was not revived by successive governments. Although its success in fulfilling Nkrumah's goals was difficult to quantify, one evaluation claims that it did not produce disciplined cadres or effective propagandists, except for a few who performed creditably, and its courses were theoretical rather than practical, which meant its impact was marginal.⁸⁰ Other views are more ambivalent,⁸¹ with A. Biney reporting that it "had less success [due to a] lack of the qualified instructors"; nonetheless, KNII "certainly gave useful training to active party workers and some of its graduates achieved rapid promotion in the party hierarchy or in the state corporations."⁸² M. Frehiwot notes that it usefully "served as a conduit of Pan-African education throughout the nation and continent [...] and elevated the struggle for independence from a micro-nationalist slant to a continental approach."⁸³ However, like that of all human institutions, the work of KNII had its limitations. For example, CPP's *Evening News* even indicated that the work ethic of some of the graduates was inadequate.⁸⁴

Nevertheless, KNII encouraged and trained many people to understand and continue Nkrumah's ideas about the need for a new Ghanaian and African, as Darkwah has argued. Its work also inspired the establishment of the Lumumba Institute in Kenya – this was an ideological institute along the lines of the KNII,⁸⁵ and offered logistical support to cadres and Pan-Africanists in several African liberation organizations.

6. The Establishment of the Ghana Young Pioneers Movement

After Nkrumah broached a plan to disseminate his conscientization project to Ghanaian youngsters, his cabinet agreed on 4 August 1959 that the GYP should be established for boys and girls.⁸⁶ In 1960 the government decided to discipline and ideologically

77 Darkwah, Kwame Nkrumah, p. 45.

78 Ibid.

79 See, e.g., H. L. Bretton, *Rise and Fall*.

80 Ryan, *Theory and Practice*, pp. 162–163.

81 See, e.g., A. Biney, *Political and Social Thought of Kwame Nkrumah*, p. 102.

82 Rooney, Kwame Nkrumah, p. 240.

83 M. Frehiwot, *Pan-African Education: A Case Study of the Kwame Nkrumah Ideological Institute, Print Media and the Young Pioneer Movement*, in: Charles Quist-Adade and Vincent Doodoo (eds.), *Africa's Many Divides and Africa's Future*, Newcastle upon Tyne 2015, p. 317.

84 *Evening News*, 1 October 1965, quoted in: T. Jones, *Ghana's First Republic 1960–1966*, London, 1976, p. 61, quoted in: Darkwah, Kwame Nkrumah, p. 47.

85 Darkwah, Kwame Nkrumah, pp. 47–48.

86 A short descriptive article is in *West Africa*, no. 2, 278, 28 January 1961.

condition Ghanaian youths to “prepare them for future leadership,”⁸⁷ in the same way as similar organizations had done in burgeoning socialist and communist countries in Eastern Europe and Asia.⁸⁸

Organizations such as the Boy Scouts and Girl Guides, which Nkrumah considered to be relics of colonialism,⁸⁹ the Young Men’s Christian Association (YMCA), and the Catholic Youth Organisation still existed, but Nkrumah did not find them suitable for offering youth political socialization within the context of Nkrumahist ideological training for nationalism and African pride. A CPP foot soldier in Accra, Z. B. Shardow, became the GYP’s national organizer, with B. A. Quarcoo, a veteran teacher and Boy Scouts commissioner, as his deputy. The leader and life patron was Nkrumah. Rev. Dr. J. S. A. Stephens of the Methodist Church and chairman of the Christian Council Youth Committee became the organization’s chaplain. The Christian Council supported GYP, but some key officers in the Church later condemned aspects of the GYP philosophy, especially its metaphorical allusion to Nkrumah as Messiah and Saviour.⁹⁰ We shall discuss this shortly.

The first 300 members, in Accra, were aged between 8 and 16; they received instruction in Nkrumah’s ideas: basic seamanship, airmanship, soldiering, telecommunications, first aid, and physical education. GYP aimed to make membership compulsory for all children in primary, middle, and secondary schools, just as Ghanaian elementary education was obligatory. Thus, schools were asked to open branches. Two years after its establishment, the membership numbered about 500,000, including 190,000 girls.⁹¹ Students in training colleges and business schools were also recruited. GYP had about one million members by June 1963.⁹²

GYP encompassed three age-determined sub-groups. The first was Nkrumah Youth. Constituting those aged between 17 and 25, its members received technical training in areas such as farming and telecommunications, alongside ideological guidance. Members of the second group – Young Pioneers – were aged between 9 and 16. They specialized in activities such as drama, driving, and crafts. Lastly, the African Personality group included children aged four or five. They sang songs and recited poems about GYP and Nkrumah.⁹³

Monitored by the GYP Authority, and later the Ghana Youth Authority,⁹⁴ under the Ministry of Education, GYP instructors had a reasonable amount of free choice and initiative: the ministry did not determine what the Pioneers had to learn. The initial instructors, including teachers and youth leaders, were volunteers. They eventually re-

87 Adamafio, *By Nkrumah’s Side*, p. 121.

88 *Ibid.*

89 Addo, Kwame Nkrumah, p. 142.

90 *Ibid.*, p. 143.

91 *Evening News*, 14 June 1962, quoted in: E.O. Addo, Kwame Nkrumah, p. 143.

92 Biney, *Political and Social Thought of Kwame Nkrumah*, p. 102.

93 Addo, Kwame Nkrumah, p. 143.

94 Youth groups such as Boy Scouts and Girl Guides also came under the GYA. The Ministry of Social Welfare cared for such youth groups as the YMCA.

ceived organizational and ideological training at the leadership training centre in Accra so that GYP would function effectively.

GYP provided members with opportunities for comradeship and national service during their leisure and recreation. They wore a smart ceremonial and working uniform – greyish khaki, with a red, white, and green neck scarf – to give a feeling of comradeship and equality. They received training in military precision to give them regimented discipline alongside instruction in politics, diplomacy, and culture. Some members were sent overseas to socialist countries to acquire vocational skills.⁹⁵ Everyone was taught to memorize and live by codes of discipline and ethics: these revolved around values such as love of country and work; punctuality, discipline, obedience, honesty and morality; field craft (a hobby, handiwork or skill that could easily become an income generator), reliability and secrecy; protection of state property; comradeship and forbearance; unaffectedness; self-control; and the quest for excellence. The members were taught to internalize the ideals of the GYP pledge in order to live by Nkrumah's ideals; to safeguard Ghana's independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity from external and internal aggression; to support Ghana and Africa's socio-economic reconstruction; to work for the liberation and unification of Africa; to support workers, farmers, co-operatives, and all other aspects of Ghana; and to accept the CPP's ideals and political supremacy.⁹⁶

GYP's community service activities, such as providing assistance for community development projects and committees, training seminars, and camp courses on the basics of Nkrumahism, leadership, African independence, oratory, and the singing of GYP songs, mainly occurred after school, at weekends, and during school holidays. These were intended to provide members with knowledge that would allow them to organize and sustain a national consciousness that would lead to national growth in their schools and communities. Regular GYP youth sports festivals, rallies, African music and dance events, foot-drill competitions, and award ceremonies were organized at district, regional, and national levels to promote interethnic comradeship and a common Ghanaianess, what E. O. Addo calls "mega-tribe,"⁹⁷ among members, and to create public awareness of GYP's activities. Members also took excursions to learn about Ghana's geography, cultures, demography, and historical sites, thereby honing their national consciousness. They also took practical and theoretical tests and were awarded badges and certificates of merit.

95 Biney, *Political and Social Thought*, p. 102.

96 Addo, Kwame Nkrumah, p. 144.

97 *Ibid.*, p. 112.

7. The Impact of GYP

Was GYP useful? In 1982, T. Adamafo, one of Nkrumah's ministers and close confidants,⁹⁸ who was later imprisoned by Nkrumah,⁹⁹ revealed that he supported the creation of the movement "not because their leader was my personal friend" but because: "I had great hopes for the Ghana Young Pioneers as future leaders [...] [s]tepping into our shoes and crushing successfully the bribery and corruption [...] nepotism, favouritism, tribalism and all [...] vicious 'isms' plaguing [...] Ghana."¹⁰⁰

Even though it had been formed so that a former colony would be in a position to thrive, free from neo-colonialism, the GYP did not escape criticism and demonization by Nkrumah's opponents. It did not survive the 1966 coup. However, before 1966, the movement's patrons had defended it from criticism.¹⁰¹ For example, when the Anglican Bishop of Accra criticized the organization as "godless" in 1962, Adamafo and other leading patrons and government officials immediately ordered his deportation to Britain in August that year for trying to incite conflict between state and church. The bishop had been critical of the "Osagyefo" (lit. Victorious Leader or Saviour / Messiah) personality that the government had created for Nkrumah and was preaching to the youth. For example, GYP members were taught Nkrumah's maxim for political independence: "Seek ye first the political kingdom and all others shall be added"; and they often cheered their political leader with appellations such as "Nkrumah Never Dies" and "Nkrumah is our Messiah" because of their ideological training, which was designed to prioritize national self-determination, confidence in their leader, and a vision of themselves as potential "saviours." In 1961, the *Evening News* explained the "Messiah" metaphor:

*Whoever, see his brothers needs and supplies it [...] is the Messiah, [...] the Christ. [...] This demonstration by no means ended with Jesus. Why? Karl Marx demonstrated the Christ, and so did Lenin [...], Ghandi [...], and [...] Nkrumah. When our history is recorded, [...] Nkrumah will be [...] the Messiah, the Christ of our day, whose first love for mankind wrought changes in Ghana, [...] Africa, and [...] the world.*¹⁰²

Nevertheless, some Protestant leaders agreed with the bishop's opposition. The government strongly reprimanded this, and religion was cautioned to march in the ranks with loyalty of Nkrumah or to march out;¹⁰³ among other invective the bishop was called a "neo-colonialist Lucifer."¹⁰⁴ He was later forgiven by the government and allowed to return in November 1962. Nevertheless, his initial accusation dented the movement's

98 He was once the General Secretary of CPP, Minister of Information, and Minister for Presidential Affairs.

99 Nkrumah suspected that he was part of an assassination attempt made on his life in Kulungugu in Ghana in 1962. Adamafo vehemently denied the charges and was freed.

100 Adamafo, *By Nkrumah's Side*, p. 123.

101 These included, for example, the Rev. Dr. J.S.A. Stephens, Kofi Baako, Krobo Edusei, Prof. Abrahams, Kofi Batsa, and Mowbray Elliot. They had all helped to build the movement.

102 *Evening News*, 23 October 1961, quoted in: E.O. Addo, Kwame Nkrumah, p. 144.

103 *Ghanaian Times*, 14 August 1962; *West Africa*, 11 August 1962, p. 887.

104 *Ghanaian Times*, 9 August 1962, quoted in: E.O. Addo, Kwame Nkrumah, pp. 145–146.

image and the appeal of Nkrumahism in the view of many Ghanaians, who by their indigenous ethnic cultures or religious affiliations subscribed to the idea of a spiritual God or Jesus as the only Messiah. No wonder the charge of teaching godlessness was used by supporters of the 1966 coup. GYP came under much attack after 1966 from the coupists and other anti-Nkrumah groups and parties whose ideological differences with Nkrumah dated from when he established his party in 1949.

Even though GYP was ostensibly formed to allow the youth to become citizens who were energized with the concept of African Personality and filled with godliness (GYP had a chaplain until 1966), respect, and patriotism, it created a range of impressions among different groups of Ghanaians.¹⁰⁵ One view was that GYP taught Marxist materialism, so that the youth would become atheists. This charge was either a misunderstanding or a deliberately concocted fallacy about the movement's philosophy, which emphasized that through hard work, intellectual power, collective strength and effort, patriotism, loyalty to the leader, his vision and country, and loyalty to Ghana, Africa, and Pan-Africanism, the youths could become "saviours" and build a paradise in Ghana, Africa, and globally. Additionally, GYP was viewed as a group of young atheists used by the president for espionage, even to spy on their parents and report them to the authorities, and to amass popular support and idolization for Nkrumah among the youth. However, I have found no record that indicates that the art of espionage was taught in the movement. Perhaps some members "spied" and made reports because they deemed it their patriotic duty to expose people whose actions and utterances they considered to be detrimental to the security of their leader and state, and Ghana's sovereignty.

Conversely, other views considered GYP to be a positive mobilization movement that used civic education and activities to inculcate Nkrumaism and the attitudes and intellectual values that were needed to bring sustainable independence to the new nation. Significantly, Adamafo, who maintained that Nkrumah did him wrong by imprisoning him and became his nemesis, did not criticize GYP when he appraised it in 1982. Because of GYP, "many juvenile delinquents [...] became good boys and girls."¹⁰⁶ Members developed "national pride and patriotism [...] and their loyalty to the Party was remarkable indeed."¹⁰⁷ Hence, the "Youth [...] were unnecessarily feared."¹⁰⁸

GYP had an impact on the lives of many people and the country in various ways. Many of its members developed a love for country and state. This would perhaps have continued if the group had not been banned and there had not been conscious policies to de-Nkrumahize Ghana after 1966. Accordingly, Adamafo, while complaining about considerable indiscipline among Ghanaian youth,¹⁰⁹ indicated that GYP admirably instilled discipline in Ghana's youth, "and at the present time [1982] many key posi-

105 The category of youth is defined generally as those between the ages of 15 and 30, though this can be broadened to 10–35.

106 Adamafo, *By Nkrumah's Side*, p. 121.

107 *Ibid.*, p. 122.

108 See Adamafo, *By Nkrumah's Side*.

109 *Ibid.*, p. 124.

tions in the nation are manned by former members of the Young Pioneers which was so foolishly abolished by the National Liberation Council (NLC).¹¹⁰ The NLC junta wantonly destroyed CPP projects because of an unfettered hatred for Nkrumah.¹¹¹ This de-Nkrumahization project vilified Nkrumah and his ideas, and his followers were persecuted. Fear gripped many loyalists as gun-toting soldiers and police ruled and then proscribed CPP and its political organs after the coup.¹¹² Hence, like Peter who denounced Jesus three times, many frightened Ghanaians denounced Nkrumah. GYP organizers remained silent or went into hiding and exile. With the youth under its control, the new regime compelled some GYP members to reverse their respectful opinions of Nkrumah and their commitment to GYP by forcing them to march around with banners bearing anti-Nkrumah inscriptions, such as “Nkrumah is NOT our Messiah.” Even some frightened party members started to praise the new regime and criticize Nkrumah.¹¹³ Dr. K.A. Busia, a political arch-rival of Nkrumah, and his civilian government took over from the junta between 1969 and 1972. Busia’s government was elitist and conservative, so it did not stop vilifying Nkrumah and his administration’s revolutionary ways. Nevertheless, several people whom I spoke to revealed that GYP, of which they had been members, had the potential to assist in the making and nurturing of Ghana’s new citizens. A clan head in Axim said: “We were taught to love Ghana first, God second and self third [...] today many people don’t have that teaching and such love.”¹¹⁴ Significantly, GYP’s work, and its novelty value, attracted some African countries, including Gambia (in 1961), to send personnel to Ghana to study its structure and activities for replication. Commenting on the relevance of a national youth movement such as GYP, Adamafio observed:

*Youth organisation is one of the most difficult problems confronting any government [...] and unless [...] Governments of Ghana [...] tackle the problem with determination and proper know-how, I do not see much hope for our country in the production of disciplined leaders and citizens in the future.*¹¹⁵

It is worth noting that some members of the military government that overthrew the Busia government wanted to re-establish GYP. However, it could not be revived owing to the lack of trained organizers, a well-thought-out ideology, and potential leaders. Other leaders and their governments have tried to set up youth movements, albeit not with the

110 Ibid., pp. 123–124.

111 For understanding about the political perspective of the junta and the group’s hatred for Nkrumah, see: Ghana Information Services, *The Military Take-Over in Ghana*: broadcast speech by Gen. J.A. Ankrah, chairman of the National Liberation Council, Accra, 28 February 1966; Ghana Ministry of Information, *The Rebirth of Ghana: The End of Tyranny*, Accra 1966; K. Nkrumah, *Dark Days in Ghana*, Accra [1968] 2017.

112 See, e.g., K. Nkrumah, *Dark Days in Ghana*.

113 For some further understanding about how people altered their ideological consensus and attitudes to Nkrumah after his fall, see Jack Goody, *Consensus and Dissent in Ghana*, in: *Political Science Quarterly* 83 (1968) 3, pp. 337–352.

114 Audio recording from Kofi Christopher to author, Cape Coast 2017.

115 Adamafio, *By Nkrumah’s Side*, p. 124.

Nkrumahist ideological vision. For example, Flt. Lt. J. J. Rawlings set up the Democratic Youth League of Ghana and African Youth Brigade to create cadres for his Provisional National Defence Council (1981–1992).¹¹⁶ J. A. Kuffour and the New Patriotic Party government administration of 2001–2009 organized the National Youth Employment Programme to mobilize youth, especially the unemployed, to provide jobs for them.

8. Concluding Remarks

Nkrumah's vision for a revolutionary ideologization programme through the KNII and GYP simultaneously attracted many youths and repelled many of Nkrumah's colleagues, who found it subversive or too impracticable. Regardless of this range of views and the extent to which the KNII and GYP succeeded in their work, Ghanaian and African leaders have not stopped searching for methods that will cause positive attitudinal transformation in their citizens.

Nkrumah's programme was designed to follow socialist principles that were conducive to "the conditions of Ghana and the historical and social conditions and circumstances of Africa as a whole,"¹¹⁷ not to capitalism, as this is friendly to colonialism and neo-colonialism and also a complex system for a newly independent nation to embrace. Regardless of his oscillations between African socialism and doctrinaire scientific socialism, one thing is clear: Nkrumah wanted to create a new African who was a devoted nationalist and a dedicated Pan-Africanist, as well as possessing a socialist commitment, in a created "socialist society in which each would give according to his ability and receive according to his needs."¹¹⁸ This new person would be the antithesis of the traditional and conservative colonial subject. GYP and KNII, which served children, youth, and adults, became ideological tools for this hominisation project. If this project is evaluated as a specific event over a specified timeframe, then it failed; but seen as an ongoing process, initiated by Nkrumah, then it did not. However, it would have been more active and visible through institutions such as GYP and KNII had Nkrumah not been overthrown. Nevertheless, Nkrumah has been criticized by some of his hard-line detractors such as H. L. Bretton for failing the youth of Ghana,¹¹⁹ by not instilling a sense of political integrity, civic devotion, and dedication to public life into them.¹²⁰ Yet it is evident that many became patriotic and proud of their leader. Many of such Ghanaians reminisce nostalgically, cherishing the selflessness and love for country and Africa that was cultivated under Nkrumah's government, and complain about the lack of discipline and patriotism today. For example, Adamafio strongly argues that the attempt to create

116 O.Y. Asamoah, *The Political History of Ghana: (1950–2013) The Experience of a Non-Conformist*, Bloomington, IN 2014, pp. 313–314.

117 Ghana National Assembly Parliamentary Debates, 18 April 1961, pp. 2–3.

118 Nkrumah, *Revolutionary Path*, New York 1973, p. 161.

119 Bretton, *Rise and Fall*, p. 148.

120 *Ibid.*

a new African through GYP started well. Bretton has also suggested that the youth came to lack or lacked a “fount of honour;” and had no other example of an inspirational leader than Nkrumah.¹²¹ This was also true when Nkrumah was no longer in power, although openly chanting “Nkrumah is our Messiah” after his downfall would have been impossible; additionally, it would have been unwise for members of KNII to continue advocating their support for Nkrumah’s vision.

Despite criticism of Nkrumah, no African leader and government has latterly found an alternative system to successfully free the citizenry from their colonial mentality. His ideas are still attractive to many people in Ghana and Africa. As early as 1962 a call was made for “the immediate establishment of a chair for the study of Nkrumaism – embracing the life and teachings of the great and immortal Kwame Nkrumah” and furthermore to stress “the people’s forward march to the promised land through socialist reconstruction.”¹²² Although the chair was not established at that time, this call was partly fulfilled by the launching of the Kwame Nkrumah Endowed Chair in African Studies at the University of Ghana, Legon, in 2007.¹²³ Clearly, the task that Nkrumah began was a process, in which the new person is still being created.

This article, which has examined two of Nkrumah’s institutions for citizen mobilization, can potentially be expanded with a study of the periods of the military government and Second Republic, which tried to de-Nkrumahize Ghana and “uncreate” a new (wo)man. Furthermore, studies of other citizen mobilization programmes after 1966 could enrich the discussion that has started here concerning the creation of a new African in Ghana. Finally, there is scope for a comparative study of other African revolutionary regimes that have sought to create a new (wo)man, such as those of Muammar Gaddafi and Thomas Sankara in Libya and Burkina Faso respectively.

121 Ibid.

122 Ghanaian Times, 2 January 1962, p. 2.

123 The University of Ghana established the chair in 2005, first to honour Nkrumah for his significant intellectual contributions to African thought, and for his vision and commitment to the liberation and development of Africans worldwide; and second to promote research, teaching, and promotion of African Studies. See <http://ias.ug.edu.gh/about-us/kwame-nkrumah-chair> (accessed 5 March 2019).

Restoring Order, Inducing Change: Imagining a “New (Wo)man” in the Belgian Colonial Empire in the 1950s*

Miguel Bandeira Jerónimo

ABSTRACTS

Kennzeichnend für den kolonialen Kontext für die Zeit nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg ist eine spezifische Ausdrucksweise im Zusammenhang mit sozialen Interventionen. Europäische Kolonialadministrationen planten auf unterschiedliche Weise die Erneuerung imperialer politischer und moralischer Ökonomien. Diese Dynamik manifestierte sich in der Durchsetzung einer Entwicklungs- und Wohlfahrtsrhetorik sowie entsprechender politischer Vorgaben. Die soziale Beeinflussung von Individuen und Kollektiven auf der Grundlage von Ideen vom “Neuen Menschen” wurden von einer ganzen Bandbreite an Institutionen und Netzwerken betrieben. Diese verfolgten nicht nur divergierende Ziele, sondern setzten unterschiedliche Ressourcen ein. So beanspruchten im belgischen Kolonialreich viele Akteure das *savoir-développer* oder das *savoir-transformer* für sich, um ihre Experimente zur „umfassenden gesellschaftlichen Entwicklung“ zu rechtfertigen. Obgleich sie als Wandel ausgelegt wurden, zielten diese Projekte auf den Erhalt der bestehenden Ordnung ab. Dieser Beitrag befasst sich mit dieser Dynamik, indem er die Rolle internationaler und inter-imperialer Organisationen in den Blick nimmt.

The post-WWII momentum was characterized by the emergence of specific languages and repertoires of societal intervention in colonial contexts. Given the new (geo)political circumstances, renewed imperial political and moral economies were envisaged by European colonial authorities, albeit in dissimilar ways. The establishment of a developmentalist and welfarist rhetoric and the formulation of related policies, which entailed political, economic, and socio-cultural calculations and objectives, was one manifestation of these dynamics. The efforts of social engineering, at individual and collective levels, in which the imagination of ‘new (wo) man’ and communities was fundamental, were carried by multiple institutions and networks, with diverse motivations, resources and agendas, operating on many levels. In the Belgium co-

lonial empire, the *savoir-développer* and the *savoir-transformer* were claimed by many, in order to advocate or justify experiments in “comprehensive social development”, mainly designed to induce change with a view to restore order. This paper addresses these issues and explores this case, emphasizing the significant role played by international, interimperial organizations.

1. Introduction

The post-WWII momentum was characterized by the emergence of (more or less) novel idioms and repertoires of societal intervention in colonial contexts, although building on interwar debates, proposals and projects. Given the new (geo)political circumstances, renewed imperial political economies were envisaged by European colonial authorities, albeit in distinct ways. Fresh moral economies were imagined, in relation to revived forms of imperial and colonial legitimation, domestically and internationally. The establishment of a developmentalist and welfarist rhetoric and the formulation of related policies, which entailed political, economic and sociocultural calculations and intents, is just one of manifestations of these dynamics. The efforts of social and societal intervention, at individual and collective levels, were carried out by multiple institutions and networks, with diverse motivations, means, modalities of action, and impact. The imagination of “New (Wo)Man” and communities was not uniform, or linear.¹

The historical trajectories of late colonial developmentalism were therefore plural, responding to national traditions, political contexts, human and financial resources, at home and overseas, among other important aspects.² Similarly to what happened in other cases, from the British and French to the Portuguese, the voices, arguments and repertoires of the “arts and sciences” of development of the Belgian colonial empire were not homogeneous. Those claiming to possess the *savoir-développer*, in the name of science or faith, or both, were numerous, and focused on different topics, with dissimilar competences, resources and agendas.³ The “imperialism of knowledge” was constituted

* I would like to thank Daniel Tödt, Amandine Lauro, Miles Larmer, José Pedro Monteiro, Martin Thomas, Damiano Matasci, Hugo Does, and Karin Bromber for many useful critical comments and suggestions regarding the ideas contained in this text. This research was co-financed by FEDER – Fundo Europeu de Desenvolvimento Regional through COMPETE 2020 – Programa Operacional Competitividade e Internacionalização (POCI) and by national funds through FCT – Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia, in association with the research project “The worlds of (under)development: processes and legacies of the Portuguese colonial empire in a comparative perspective (1945–1975)” (PTDC/HAR-HIS/31906/2017 | POCI-01-0145-FEDER-031906).

1 M. B. Jerónimo, Repressive developmentalisms: idioms, repertoires, trajectories in late colonialism, in: A. Thompson and M. Thomas (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of the Ends of Empire*, Oxford 2018, pp. 537–554.

2 For an overview of the history of developmentalism in Africa see J. M. Hodge, G. Hodl and M. Kopf (eds.), *Developing Africa. Concepts and practices in twentieth-century colonialism*, Manchester 2014. See also C. Bonneuil, *Development as Experiment: Science and State Building in Late Colonial and Postcolonial Africa, 1930–1970*, in: *Osiris* 15 (2000), pp. 1501–1520.

3 M. Poncelet, *Colonisation, développement et sciences sociales. Éléments pour une sociologie de la constitution du champ des “arts et sciences du développement” dans les sciences sociales francophones belges*, in: *Bulletin de l'APAD* 6 (1993).

by an heterogeneous corpus.⁴ The objects of schemes of social engineering also varied. For instance, (social, political, and economic) development and welfarism was definitely gendered. The idioms, methods, and instruments to enact them, and the concrete projects that embodied those schemes, from the *centres extra-coutumiers* and the *foyeurs sociaux* to the rural *centres sociaux*, were also not a coherent whole.⁵

But common languages, approaches and techniques were nonetheless shared, within and outside national and colonial frontiers. Certainly with different emphasis, given discrete goals, the shaping of a “New (Wo)man” in Africa was a collective ambition within the metropole and the colonies, generating a particular momentum in knowledge production, transfer and appropriation, in which the human and social sciences participated actively. In many ways, for many, change became a way to reinstate a modicum of social and political order. Social transformative intervention was seen as able to generate political, securitarian, and economic equilibriums. The main disputes were about the ways to achieve these major goals. As importantly, these idioms, methods and instruments circulated internationally and transnationally, being formulated, debated, resisted, or tailored to particular contexts in different forums. Despite the fact that they were *nationalized*, being submitted to processes of domestic appropriation and inter-national or inter-imperial differentiation (see, for instance, the attempts to differentiate the “French” *animation rurale* from the “British” and “American” *community development*⁶) and causing *national* versions of colonial developmentalism and welfarism, those idioms, methods, and instruments were a by-product of the dynamics of internationalization, which included renewed forms of interimperial collaboration, the emergence of “international development” (as a discipline and as a programme), and the growing intersection between modalities of imperialism and internationalism, despite the multifaceted and increasingly global “crises of empire”.⁷

This text explores some of these ideas and analyses some of these dynamics, taking the case of Belgian colonialism in the 1950s as its main focus.

4 F. Cooper, *Modernizing Bureaucrats, Backward Africans, and the Development concept*, in: F. Cooper and R. Packard (eds.), *International Development and the Social Sciences: Essays in the History and Politics of Knowledge*, Berkeley 1997, pp. 64–92, at p. 64.

5 For the policy of the centres extra-coutumiers see J. Kassa, *Politiques Agricoles et Promotion Rurale au Congo-Zaire (1885–1997)*, Paris 1998, pp. 135–182.

6 See, for instance, A. Meister, *Développement communautaire et animation rurale en Afrique*, in: *L’Homme et la société* 19 (1971), pp. 121–138.

7 For the internationalization of colonialism see J. Kent, *The Internationalisation of Colonialism. Britain, France and Black Africa, 1939–56*, Oxford 1992. For the connections between imperialism and internationalism see M. B. Jerónimo and J. P. Monteiro (eds.), *Internationalism, Imperialism and the Formation of the Contemporary World*, London 2017. For the forms of interimperial collaboration see V. Barth and R. Cvetkovski (eds.), *Imperial Cooperation and Transfer, 1870–1930. Empires and Encounters*, London 2015. For the internationalization of development, see M. Frey, S. Kunkel, and C. Unger (eds.), *International Organizations and Development (1945–1990)*, Basingstoke 2014, and C. Unger, *International Development: A Postwar History*, London 2018. For the crises of empire see M. Thomas, B. Moore and L. Butler, *Crises of Empire*, London 2008.

2. The Disciplines of (Psycho)social Transformation

2.1 “Perfecting her Role as Woman, Wife, Mother”

Between 20 November and 4 December 1961, Kampala (Uganda) welcomed the second Symposium on Community Development. One of the most important contributions was offered by Marie-Elisabeth Ysaye. “Experience de service social au Congo (ex belge)” summarized the efforts made at a *foyer social* created in Stanleyville (today, Kisangani) in 1954, “in the middle of the forest.” The *foyer social* was placed in the important urban *Centre Extra-Coutumier*, which had around 100,000 “natives” and 4,000 to 5,000 Belgians and Europeans. It operated in the “most deprived” neighbourhood, “less affected by civilization,” in the left margin of the Congo river. According to Ysaye, its population, made up by around 50 “tribes,” with a predominance of “Arabized” and “Bantous,” included “elements running away from the censuses” being made on the other shore. Adults were mostly illiterate, and worked mainly in public works, in bakeries and garages. They were bricklayers and mechanics, with no instruction. Some were “boys,” domestic servants of European families. Children had access to primary education, but the latter was not mandatory. There were two primary schools in the zone, both administered by the catholic church, one just for girls. The area had no “official, administrative, medical services,” no “post office, bank, stores.” The accommodations were “primitive,” no water or electricity was provided. The river proximity helped to minimize the poor sanitary conditions. There was a hospital, run by the company *Chemin de Fer des Grands Lacs*, which also had three “camps for workers” in the area, and a small medical dispensary, in which a Belgian nurse supervised a “native” male nurse. Around sixty babies benefitted from a “weekly oversight” given by a *consultation de nourrissons* (baby medical checks), initiatives with which the *foyer* collaborated. Two missions operated in the area, one run by the Baptist Missionary Society, the other catholic, the “Mission de Stanleyville Rive Gauche.” One “military camp” (called “Prince Charles”), with “voluntary” soldiers that received a seven-year preparation, was also located in the neighbourhood. In the surroundings, seven villages formed by groups of Wagenia (Enya) fishermen and some others in the forest, “consumed by kitawalism (a secret xenophobe sect),” added to the social universe described by Ysaye, which was within the reach of the *foyer social*. In 1954, 20,000 persons were declared to interact with its personnel, a number that grew considerably in the next years.⁸

What “was the goal of a *foyer social*” in such circumstances? In 1951, in a general assessment of the existing social policies (and of those that should be implemented), an

8 Archives Diplomatiques, Archives Africaines (AA), AGRI 281 – Organismes Internationaux et Inter africains. CCTA/CSA, M.-E. Ysaye, Experience de service social au Congo (ex belge), in: 2ème Colloque sur le développement communautaire (Kampala, 20 Nov.–4 dec 1961), pp. 1–2. For Stanleyville, among others, see the classic by V. Pons, Stanleyville: An African Urban Community Under Belgian Administration, Oxford 1969 and B. Verhaegen, Le Centre extra-coutumier de Stanleyville (1940–1945), Brussels 1981. For the maternal and infant supervision and regulation and its history see the classic by N. R. Hunt, A Colonial Lexicon of Birth Ritual, Medicalization, and Mobility in the Congo, Durham, NC 1999.

adviser of the Belgian Minister of Colonies argued that their main target were, or should be, women. In certain aspects, Julien Van Hove recuperated debates that were present in publications such as the *Bulletin de l'Union des Femmes Coloniales*, organ of the *Union des Femmes Coloniales* (Union of Colonial Women, since 1923), founded after a research mission made by Emilie Alvin to the Belgian colony in 1920-1921 and sponsored by a *Fonds spécial du Roi* (King's Special Fund). He also revived ideas discussed at the 1930 Congrès Colonial National, which included a commission dealing with the "protection of the native woman." According to him, the goal was to "help and educate the women, who find it more difficulty to adapt themselves to the new life than do the men." Women were seen as the "educators of the future generations." For that reason, a "formation centre" for women native social auxiliaries was created in Usumbura (Ruanda-Urundi), encompassing four years of study.⁹

Years later, Ysaye's answer to the question – what "was the goal of a *foyer social*"? – was clear: "the promotion of the native woman," the "perfecting of her role as woman, wife, mother" and the replacement of her "tribal servitude by an autonomy of thought, of action." That is, changing her role in the "family cell" and, therefore, in society. To create a new woman. This entailed some obstacles, namely those originated in religious beliefs (the reference made pointed to "Arabized" communities). Other more general traditional obstructions were also active, such as those raised by local males. The result was a recurrent suspicion towards the institution's initiatives. Nonetheless, the numbers were not insignificant: in 1954, 250 women enrolled; 500 in 1955; 750 in 1956; 1250 in 1957; 1750 in 1958; over 2250 in 1959. The motivations for that considerable adhesion were perhaps not the most exciting – "certain women only come to follow others and leave, for an instant, the *ennui* felt at home" – but the attendance was not negligible. The guiding principles of the *foyer social* in Stanleyville aimed at "mass education," that is, the transmission of basic subjects, of what was "possible to teach an illiterate" audience. In the beginning, *tricot*, which entailed "manual precision," sewing, and childcare were the main topics. For those that attended regularly, and persisted in their engagement with the *foyer social*, reading and writing was also offered. But the main goal rested elsewhere: "psychological transformation," facilitating the "acquisition of an attitude," proactive and *modern*, towards hygiene, education, namely of children, the spread of "urbanity in social relations," and learning how to have "pride" in achieving an "end." Of course, this should be accompanied by household governance: lessons about the kitchen (cooking, etc.), on how to ensure a *grand nettoyage* at home, ironing and tidying-up.¹⁰

No references were made to research activities focused on women, as happened in the *foyer social* at Ruashi commune (1955), in Elisabethville (today, Lubumbashi), under the

9 J. Van Hove, Social Service in the Belgian Congo: Present situation and future plans, in: *Civilisations* 1 (1951) 1, pp. 22–27, at p. 22, 26; C. Jacques and V. Piette, *L'Union des femmes coloniales (1923–1940). Une association au service de la colonisation*, in: A. Hugon (ed.), *Histoire des femmes en situation coloniale: Afrique et Asie, XXe siècle*, Paris 2004, pp. 95–117; Comité Permanent du Congrès Colonial National, *IIIème Congrès Colonial National, Bruxelles 6 et 7 décembre 1930*, vol. I: Rapports; vol. II: Comptes rendus, Brussels 1930 and 1931.

10 Ysaye, *Experience de service social au Congo (ex belge)*, pp. 3–5.

auspices of the *Institut de Sociologie Solvay*. This institution was carrying several studies at the time, from analysing family living standards to the study of “social morphology,” with a view to facilitate schemes of community development. The Ruashi commune was a product of the ongoing *Ten-Year Plan for the Economic and Social Development of the Belgian Congo (1949–1959)* and of the measures taken by *Office des Cités Africaines*. In 1954, the *Office* designed a neighbourhood for around 32,000 inhabitants, to be divided into five sub-quarters, with clear administrative and securitarian aims, and economic preoccupations, given the proximity to a crucial moneymaking mining area of the Belgian colony (Katanga). This surely helped to explain the presence of the *Institut de Sociologie Solvay* in the area.¹¹

2.2 Inducing “Controlled Crises” (and Surveying Their Impacts)

Since the early twentieth-century, a *Groupe d'Études Coloniales*, sponsored by the *Institut de Sociologie Solvay*, focused on many colonial topics, publishing its results on the *Bulletin de la Société d'Études Coloniales*. These included debates about the “perfectibility” of the “primitive mind,” in which social engineering concerns were already dominant, namely through the advocacy of a series of “controlled crises” in Congolese communities to foster social change. As expected, the study of the “native labour” problem was also a topic of interest.¹²

In the post-war momentum, similar guidelines persisted, as a consequence of the fact that the Institute concentrated its initiatives in Africa. Two were the areas of intervention: welfare work and the training of local leaders in this field, and sociological research, including a “sociology of labour.” The latter, especially due to the works of Arthur Doucy, a former director of the Belgian Office for Social Security and expert on labour productivity and social economy, became preeminent, perhaps unsurprisingly, giving the centrality it had on all European colonial empires’ “native policies.” His mission to Katanga to assess local “social problems” in the early 1950s led to several contributions on labour themes, but also to wider issues of social intervention and regulation. He was associated with the creation of *foyers sociaux* for African females and was a leading figure in the combination of paternalism and reformism that characterized the late Belgian

11 For the foyer social at Ruashi see G. E. J.-B. Brausch, The Solvay Institute of Sociology in Belgian Africa, in: *International Social Science Journal* 11 (1959) 2, pp. 238–250; for the development plan see G. Vanthemse, *Genèse et portée du “Plan décennal” du Congo belge (1949–1959)*, Brussels 1994; for the urban area and its evolution see S. Boonen and J. Lagae, Ruashi, a Pessac in Congo? On the Design, Inhabitation, and Transformation of a 1950s Neighbourhood in Lubumbashi, Democratic Republic of the Congo, in: K. Rüther, et al. (eds.), *The Politics of Housing in (Post-)Colonial Africa*. Online: <https://opr.degruyter.com/the-politics-of-housing-in-colonial-and-postcolonial-africa/sofie-boonen-and-johan-lagae-ruashi-a-pessac-in-congo-on-the-design-inhabitation-and-transformation-of-a-1950s-neighborhood-in-lubumbashi-democratic-republic-of-the-congo/> (last visited 21 May 2019); B. Fetter, *The Creation of Elisabethville, 1910–1940*, Stanford 1976; M. A. Mpala-Lutebele (ed.), *Lubumbashi: Cent d’ans d’histoire*, Paris 2013.

12 For the Institut Solvay de Sociologie, see R. Vanderstraeten and K. Louckx, *Sociology in Belgium: A Sociological History*, London 2018 and P. de Bie, *Les débuts de la sociologie en Belgique. I: La fondation du premier institut de sociologie Solvay*, in: *Recherches Sociologiques* 14 (1983) 2, pp. 109–140. For the research group see M. Poncelet, *L’invention des sciences coloniales belges*, Paris 2008, pp. 155–166.

colonial policy, simultaneously highlighting its shortcomings, proposing developmental solutions, and reinstating arguments of unpreparedness of the Congolese to deal with social change and, of course, political change, without a sociological tutorship. His early Congo works were clear on this: the consideration of the Congolese “social level” advised gradual reform, as their “sociological hinterland” prevailed in contact with modern forms of social and economic organization, as he argued in his co-authored *Problèmes du travail et politique sociale au Congo Belge* (1952). Late in the 1950s, the “customary influences” were still highlighted as crucial in the interaction of the *Bantou* with the rhythms of modern social change. In the 1960s he was director of the *Institut de Sociologie Solvay* and took part in the famous Belgo-Congolese *table ronde* (1960), as an adviser of the *Association Générale des Baluba du Katanga* (BALUBAKAT), favouring a moderate reformism (later he became an adviser of Mobutu).¹³

Doucy was not alone. René Clémens (University of Liege) was another important figure. He went to Elisabethville in 1956 to enact a project of social action and research in a neighbourhood of the respective *Centre extra-coutumier* (Katuba). This project included works of social psychology about the local population’s adaptation to urban life. He also fostered projects of community development, created *foyer sociaux* and even an “experimental village,” financed by the *Union Minière* and by the *Centre d’Etude des Problèmes sociaux indigènes* (CEPSI), which aimed at the creation of a “new Bantou farmer.” With Clémens, Doucy played a major role in the affirmation of the Institute as a centre of colonial knowledge-production, expertise and policy-making.¹⁴ The Institute, backed by the Belgian Minister of Colonies, Auguste Buisseret (1954–1958), became responsible for several institutions, from the “homecraft centre” (1955) and the educational facilities (1956) in the Ruashi commune, in Elisabethville, to two rural social centres, at Bongandanga (province of Equator, 1956) and Pangi (Kivu province, 1957), and a social research centre in Elisabethville, in 1956. The latter, an important focus of knowledge-production, promoted a “survey of the psychological reactions of African women,” generating several contributions about the best ways to carry it on.¹⁵

One of them was by the senior welfare officer in the region, Yvette Pirlot, who aimed to convince the experts of the institute to use puppet theatre in their enquiries. Based on the contribution of a pioneer of group psychotherapy and initiator of the method of

13 A. Doucy, Le rôle des influences coutumières sur les travailleurs du Congo, in: *Revue de l’Institut de Sociologie Solvay* 27 (1954), pp. 817–830; idem, Les causes instabilité des travailleurs indigènes, in: *Bulletin International de Sciences Sociologiques* (1954), pp. 494–503; A. Doucy and P. Feldheim, *Problèmes du travail et politique sociale au Congo Belge*, Brussels 1952; idem, *Travailleurs indigènes et productivité du travail au Congo Belge*, Brussels 1958. Doucy also co-edited, with P. Bouvier, *Introduction à l’économie sociale du Tiers Monde*, Brussels 1970. For Doucy see B. Rubbers and M. Poncelet, *Sociologie coloniale au Congo belge. Les études sur le Katanga industriel et urbain à la veille de l’Indépendance*, in: *Genèses* 2 (2015) 99, pp. 93–112; and, for his participation at the roundtable, J. Brassinne, *Les conseillers à la Table ronde belgo-congolaise*, in: *Courrier hebdomadaire du CRISP* 38–39 (1989) 1263–1264, pp. 1–62, esp. pp. 40–42. See also J. Nicaise, *Applied Anthropology in the Congo and Ruanda-Urundi*, in: *Human Organization* 19 (1960) 3, pp. 112–117.

14 For Clémens see Rubbers and Poncelet, *Sociologie coloniale au Congo belge*, p. 98.

15 Brausch, *The Solvay Institute of Sociology in Belgian Africa and also his Quelques expériences d’action sociale dans divers pays en voie de développement*, in: *Revue de l’Institut de Sociologie* 4 (1958), pp. 731–775.

psychodrama, the Romanian-American psychiatrist Jacob L. Moreno, Pirlot aimed to contribute to the definition of effective ways to induce the much-desired “psychological transformation.” The adapted use of specific psycho-social-dramatic techniques, puppet theatre being just one of them, was sold as being an efficient way to have access to crucial information about the tenets of “native” life. To know them better was to facilitate social change, and also enhance social order. The transposition of a method credited with being highly effective in solving the pressing (and violent) social conflicts in the United States of America to the Belgian Congo was considered a major example of innovation and scientifically-oriented social intervention by the institute and, by extension, of the Belgian colonial authorities.¹⁶

2.3 An “Experiment in Comprehensive Social Development”

Returning to Ysaye’s précis, and despite the apparent lack of a scientific approach, similar concerns were noticeable: how to induce psychological and social transformation? How relevant could the *foyers sociaux* be in this respect? For women the answer went from an active politics of reproduction, to a certain extent replicating western conceptions of family, domesticity, and womanhood, to a politics of socio-political integration, aiming to administer novel gender relations and the emergence of an urban “elite,” as the case of the *foyer social* of Usumbura exemplified.¹⁷

But the *foyers* dealt with a larger audience and were just a piece of a larger *system* of planned sociocultural, political and economic engineering. They were not strictly restricted to women (or to urban spaces).¹⁸ They involved male auxiliaries in the respective teams. Indeed, there were *foyers* that had men playing an active role, such as the one at Bagira (Bukavu), which was controlled by the *Union Belge de Service Social au Congo* (UBSSAC) until 1957, and then became administered by the *Institut de Sociologie Solvay*. The same happened with the government rural welfare centre at Bambesa, where there was an important station of the *Institut National pour l’Étude Agronomique du Congo belge* (INEAC). The formation of “mixed social development teams” in the rural social centres at Bongandanga (1956) and Pangi (1957) was another important, and effective, example. The opening of a Social Centre for men in Ruashi (April 1956) was another milestone: the “whole family,” and therefore the whole community and society, was now covered. In fact, for some social workers with local responsibilities the focus on women caused significant problems, hindering the overall grand scheme of societal transformation. For instance, Pirlot considered that that one of the obstacles to the spread of social work

16 Brausch, *The Solvay Institute of Sociology in Belgian Africa*, p. 241, including n2. Despite the positive reference made in this text, two years later Brausch lamented the scarcity of similar “experiments” in the Congo in his *Belgian Administration in the Congo*, London 1961, pp. 56–57.

17 N. Hunt, *Domesticity and colonialism in Belgian Africa: Usumbura’s Foyer Social, 1946–1960*, in: *Signs* 15 (1990) 3, pp. 447–474, esp. pp. 448–449.

18 Not least because the social and even spatial delimitation of the rural-urban “divide” was frequently hard to determine, despite the political and scientific efforts to do so. Moreover, there were *foyers sociaux* in urban and also in rural areas.

in the Congo was precisely its limitation to women and “housewifery training.” But, as she also acknowledged, their operation engaged with many other actors and institutions (as Ysaye noted abundantly) and its success depended heavily on this plurality. After all, this was an “experiment in comprehensive social development focused on the entire community.” One example mentioned by Pirlot was obvious: the stand adopted by men in a given context was crucial to the effectiveness of the social workers’ psycho-social intervention. The “need for social development amongst men” was clear and the husband was “the person best fitted to assist those concerned with his wife’s education.” According to Ysaye, in the Stanleyville *foyer social* that issue was directly addressed: every three months, a meeting with “husbands” was promoted, aiming to convince them of the utility of the *foyer*, but also to hear their position in relation to new ways of childcare and education and, also, household governance.¹⁹

But there was more to consider, not necessarily under the responsibility of the *foyer social* but surely with reverberations in its activity. If the *foyers* were part of a larger project of social transformation and control, they were surely conditioned by the social and political contexts in which they operated. The intervention on male constituencies shaped and was shaped by projects and techniques of intervention more focused on women. For the “native” male, games were seen as crucial. The professed “incapacity to play” of the “Bantous” supposedly entailed an “intellectual retardation”. Games, organized and disciplined games (crucial aspect), could counteract years of undesired effects, and pave the ways for individual *and* collective change. For the male teenagers, seen as critically “inactive,” a “practical education,” for instance through gardening or farming lessons with the district agronomist or applied reading and arithmetic, was privileged. As in other contexts, rural development was seen in socio-political terms, not merely in economic ones. In all educational efforts, the relevance of audio-visual means was praised: posters, drawings, “bricolages” and, in tune with the time, the use of mobile teams that brought movies to the communities. Ysaye did not mention puppet theatre, but similar ideas transpired in the text: the need to be creative in the techniques used to foster “psychological transformation” and to think systemically about the variegated role of the *foyers*, pondering about its articulation with other institutions.²⁰

The involvement of local communities was proclaimed to be at the centre of the *foyer social*, replicating some basic organizing principles of the doctrines of community development elsewhere.²¹ In the *reports and recommendations* of the Kampala conference, A. R. G. Prosser, the Deputy Secretary in the Ministry of Social Development and Labour

19 I. Pirlot, Urban community development in Ruashi, Elisabethville, in: Community Development Bulletin 12 (1961) 13, pp. 78–84, at pp. 78–80; Ysaye, *Experience de service social au Congo (ex belge)*, pp. 7–8.

20 Ibid., pp. 4–7. For rural development in the Belgian Congo in the 1950s see, for instance, P. Clement, Rural Development in the Belgian Congo. The Late-colonial “Indigenous Peasantry” Programme and its Implementation in the Equateur District (1950s), in: Académie Royale des Sciences d’Outre-Mer. Bulletin des Séances 60 (2014) 2, pp. 251–286.

21 D. Immerwahr, *Thinking Small: The United States and the Lure of Community Development*, Cambridge, MA 2015.

of Uganda, emphasized this same issue, appreciating the knowledge gathered in the previous decade about the formation of cadres and, also, valuing the “development regarding the techniques of motivation of communities attached to their tradition, to make them act.”²² In the case of Ysaye’s *foyer*, the institutional structure aimed to facilitate that participation. Its council gathered the director and seven “natives,” selected by their perceived representativeness of the population and by their ability to facilitate the diversity of the *foyer*’s activities. In the beginning, the team was composed only of two European social workers. It ended up with four of them and 33 “natives.” As Ysaye argued, without the growing participation of locals, fostering “professional conscience,” “initiative”, “discipline,” not “material accomplishments,” nothing fruitful would happen. What about the results, taking into consideration that her appraisal was written in 1961, one year after the Congo’s independence? Were those transformative, social engineering efforts a “failure”? “*Non, mille fois non!*,” she stated. The “actual situation was the result of an awakening of a submissive population to the imperatives of an international context.”²³

3. Common Imaginaries ... and Shared Developments

3.1 From “Protection” to “Promotion”

The international contexts and dimensions, including those of an interimperial nature, were important for other reasons. These comprehensive experiments, as Pirlot and many others considered them, were significantly moulded by international dynamics. Their understanding is crucial to any assessment of the post-WWII projects of engineering “New Men” and “Women” in colonial Africa (and elsewhere). These were not solely national or colonial histories, far from it: they were related to common imaginaries (economic and social), shared idioms, and repertoires of political action, and, also, similar purposes, notwithstanding all the different traditions in imperial and colonial statecraft, national political cultures and available human and financial resources. It is a fact that the topic of “colonial women” had a long genealogy in Belgium and in the Belgian Congo, at least since the 1920s and 1930s. The “protection” of women in colonial contexts debated at the 1930 Colonial Congress and the creation of the first *foyer social* in Leopoldville in 1933, related to Christian women’s circles, paved the way for a more systematic and institutionalized approach to issues of social service in the Belgian Congo and to the place of women in those efforts. In the beginning of the 1950s, partially as a result of the pressure exerted by the *Union des Femmes Coloniales*, a commission on social service in the colonies was formed, in order to devise new policy options. The creation of a department on the subject, responsible for the coordination of the *foyers sociaux*, deciding the general strategy, funding and in charge of their regulation and inspection, was

22 CCTA/CSA L(62) 15, Reports and recommendations. Second Symposium on Community Development (Kampala: 20th–30th November 1961).

23 Ysaye, *Experience de service social au Congo (ex belge)*, pp. 11–12.

just one accomplishment. Minister of the Colonies Pierre Wigny’s words – “it is through women that the achievements of civilization are transmitted from generation to generation” – became a motto for many.²⁴

From “protection” to “promotion,” the focus on women in colonial contexts grew, meriting an entire session of the National Colonial Congress in 1956, entitled *La promotion de la femme au Congo et au Ruanda-Urundi*. As one of the *rapporteurs* argued, the “problem” of woman was “perhaps the most important of the social problems in our time.”²⁵ Surely, there were national specificities, starting with those related to the particularities of a given “colonial situation” or those resulting from domestic tensions, in the metropole, between competing ideologies and political parties, or between the church and the state. But, as argued in the introduction, they were also formed by the discrete post-WWII processes of internationalization. Below are three examples that offer a glimpse into this more comprehensive and complex picture, which is not reducible to national or colonial histories. The arguments and repertoires of action regarding social policies, focused or not on women, entailed more voices and institutions, operating in different but inter-connected spaces.

3.2 “Old Traditions and a New Doctrine”

The first example is related to one interimperial and international organization, the *Institut International des Civilisations Différentes* (INCIDI, International Institute of Differing Civilizations), successor of the *Institut Colonial International* (International Colonial Institute, ICI).²⁶ The INCIDI was a private association populated by imperial and colonial authorities and experts, some more close to national governments than others. As Pierre Wigny noted in 1951, in one of its meetings, the INCIDI “had old traditions and a new doctrine.” Like its predecessor, the INCIDI’s members proclaimed to be guided, essentially, by a techno-scientific reasoning, not by political instructions and purposes. But all the numerous meetings of the organization questioned that standpoint. The “old traditions” were essentially a result of an accumulated knowledge on imperial and colonial statecraft and, for its members, they should guide those who wanted to transform colonial or postcolonial societies. This principle was manifest in the ways in which the INCIDI rivalled with the United Nations and their specialized agencies and commissions, on many issues. For instance, in its XVIth meeting (1951) one of the themes was the “Study of the various means of supporting the plans of cultural, economic, and social development for insufficiently developed territories.” The idea of development animated

24 G. Mianda, L’État, le genre et l’iconographie : l’image de la femme au Congo belge, in: I. Ndaywel è Nziem and E. Mudimbe-Boyi (eds.), *Images, mémoires et savoirs. Une histoire en partage avec Bogumil Koss Jewsiewicki*, Paris 2009, pp. 515–537, at p. 527.

25 *Congres Colonial National, La promotion de la femme au Congo et au Ruanda-Urundi. Xlle session – 1956. Rapport et Comptes Rendus*, Brussels 1956, p. 258 (M. G. Rhodius, *L’Assistance sociale comme moyen éducatif de la femme autochtone en territoires belges d’Afrique*, pp. 252–324).

26 For the ICI see F. Wagner, *Colonial Internationalism: How Cooperation among Experts Reshaped Colonialism (1830s–1950s)*, Ph.D. Thesis, Florence 2016.

multiple international agencies and their potential intervention on colonial societies should be counteracted by those who mastered the old traditions and also learned the new doctrine.²⁷

One of the Belgian contributions in Paris was made by Adolphe Ruwet, president of the *Association des Intérêts Coloniaux Belges* (Association of the Belgian Colonial Interests). Ruwet stressed the institutions focused on *œuvres sociales*, from the *Fonds du Bien-Être Indigène* (FBEI, Native Welfare Fund), created in 1947, to the above mentioned CEPSE, created in 1946 by reformist groups in Elisabethville, and the *foyers sociaux* under the administration of numerous organizations, private and public, scientific, academic, or economic. The *Ten-Year Plan* was also highlighted, being considered the dynamo of the general efforts to provide a sound and effective colonial social policy, capable of contributing to “the efforts of the United Nations.” The multiplication of institutions competing to deliver the Plan’s proclaimed principles and purposes regarding the social question was presented as a proof of the level of commitment of Belgian society, at home and in the colonies. These institutions were actively collaborating with the government to achieve the “moral and social recovery of the de-tribalized blacks in the Belgian Congo and in Ruanda-Urundi.” The efforts directed towards social issues were accompanied by other developmental schemes, on agriculture, with the *paysannat indigène* and the promotion of “native cooperatives,” or in the industrial sector. It was a comprehensive experiment, indeed.²⁸

In the 1958 meeting, in Brussels, the theme was “Women’s role in the development of tropical and sub-tropical countries,” which was recurrently addressed in previous gatherings. Other international forums were scrutinizing the topic and, again, the INCIDI aimed to intervene in the ongoing debates, claiming precedence and authority, aspiring to shape the international developmentalist agenda dealing with colonial societies. Acting as both Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs and Secretary-General of the INCIDI, Pierre Wigny delivered one of the opening speeches, side by side with King Leopold III and Sarmiento Rodrigues, the former Minister of the Overseas provinces of Portugal and First Vice-chairman of the INCIDI. To Wigny, a civilization was “not founded solely upon a set of ideas but also upon an inclination towards intellectual activities of a certain kind, on modes of reasoning and on a rhythm of mental activity peculiar to that civilization.” Women needed to be brought into this “intellectual and spiritual climate,” as the “neglect” of the “education of one half of the human race” was an “astonishing waste of human resources.” For many reasons, surely not only “moral,” this had to change.²⁹

The report about the situation in the Belgian Congo was authored by Denise Soyer-Poskin, president of the *Commission du Congo Belge et du Ruanda-Urundi* of the influential *Conseil National des Femmes Belges*, building upon the works and the debates

27 INCIDI, *Compte rendu de la XXVIe session tenue à Paris les 12, 13, 14 et 15 mars 1951*, Brussels 1951, p. 69.

28 A. Ruwet, *Étude des divers modes de soutien des plans de développement culturel, économique et social du Congo Belge et du Ruanda-Urundi*, in: INCIDI, *Compte rendu de la XXVIe session*, pp. 229–251, cit. pp. 229, 236.

29 INCIDI, *Women’s role in the development of tropical and sub-tropical countries. Report of the XXXIth meeting held in Brussels on 17th, 18th, 19th and 20th September 1958*, Brussels 1959, pp. 24–25 (Wigny).

that marked the 1956 National Colonial Congress, in which she participated actively, and her participation on the *Congrès mondial de la famille* (World Congress of Families, 1958), where she was one of the rapporteurs. Her main goal was to differentiate the role of Congolese and European women in the colonial contexts, trying to explain the causes behind it. Juridical aspects such as the effects of “customary law” on the status of Congolese women, their rights and duties regarding marriage, including the question of the dowry and polygamy, were signalled as important dimensions to be fully understood if individual and collective change was a goal. So were the economic ones, from women’s role in urban and rural contexts to domestic work. Naturally, the theme of education and social assistance also merited special places in her analysis. Offering a statistical summary, Soyer-Poskin argued that the education of women was far less developed than that of men: in 1955–1956, from a school-age population of 1,282,646 students, only 264,146 were girls (and the disproportion of school attendance in *centres extra-coutumiers* and rural areas was significant). In relation to social work, the role played by *foyer sociaux*, in urban areas, and by “rural social services,” in which social action was, or should be, a “vast global and multiforme action,” was highlighted. They were crucial to deal with a major trial: the colonial woman had to “modify her attitudes, her personality,” in contexts of “considerable moral and material difficulties.” “Less educated,” she was not properly prepared to face such challenges. Many of these ideas were shared at the conference, as the extensive “general report” by Marie-Hélène Lefaucheux, president of the International Council of Women (since 1957) and one of the driving forces behind the UN Commission on the Status of Women, which she chaired from 1948 to 1953, demonstrates. The collective discussions are other good examples of the plurality of voices, arguments, case-studies, motivations and interests involved in the definition of (international, inter-imperial, national, colonial) policies focused on the “promotion” of women in “tropical and sub-tropical territories.”³⁰

3.3 Searching for the Homo Oeconomicus

A second example was provided the study made by Doucy and his assistant Feldheim about “human factors of productivity,” intimately associated with the collective inter-imperial project of the Inter-African Institute of Labour (*Institut interafricain du travail*) of the Commission for Technical Co-operation in Africa South of the Sahara (CCTA), to which we will return below.³¹ Doucy and Feldheim’s participation at the 1954 UN-ESCO conference on the *Social implications of industrialization and urbanization in Africa South of the Sahara*, which took place in Abidjan (Côte d’Ivoire) and was prepared

30 D. Soyer-Poskin, Congo Belge and M.-H. Lefaucheux, Le rôle de la femme dans le développement des pays tropicaux et subtropicaux. Aspect social et culturel, in: INCIDI, Women’s role in the development of tropical and sub-tropical countries, pp. 126–150, at pp. 138–139 and 421–455, respectively. For an assessment of the centrality of gender in Portuguese late colonialism see A. Stucki, Violence and Gender in Africa’s Iberian Colonies. Feminizing the Portuguese and Spanish Empire, 1950s–1970s, London 2019.

31 Doucy and Feldheim, Travailleurs indigènes et productivité du travail au Congo Belge. See also Rubbers and Poncelet, Sociologie coloniale au Congo belge, pp. 98, 101–103.

by the London-based International African Institute (IAI), surely made a difference in the international integration of Belgian colonial “epistemic communities,” reinforcing dynamics that were visible in the interwar period. The 1930s arguments for the need to systematically assess the “social conditions” in African urban and industrial contexts gained new momentum in the 1950s. And, again, this was certainly an outcome of the internationalization of colonialism and the intensification of instances of interimperial cooperation.³²

In October 1952, in London, an international team composed by an ethnographer (Pierre Clément), a psychologist (Nelly Xydias), a statistical sociologist (Valdo G. Pons), and three field researchers met for three months, under the supervision of Daryll Forde, a renowned anthropologist and director of the IAI, to prepare the major enquiry associated with the UNESCO aims. They also went to Brussels, to receive logistical and intellectual advice. The focus of the enquiry would be Stanleyville, considered a match to the main criteria of the project (for instance, be a “well-established and diversified urban centre showing a considerable variety of full-time occupations and levels of skill,” not that big, being manageable for the designed research). In Brussels they were welcomed by Guy Malengreau, professor in Louvain, author of an important study on the need to engineer – socially, politically, and economically – a “native peasantry” and a key figure in the Native Welfare Fund. They spent a year and a half in Stanleyville and were responsible for the delivery of a substantial report in Abidjan, at a conference that gathered experts but also governments and international organizations.³³

Alongside other international and imperial experts of the time – such as Forde (responsible for the introductory survey), Georges Balandier, C. H. Northcott (expert on “labour efficiency”) or James Clyde Mitchell –, Doucy and Feldheim offered a paper that dealt with the impact of industrialization in the Equator province. Several other experts on the Belgian Congo were also present, such as Fernand Grévisse, author of an important volume about the *Centre Extra-Coutumier d’Elisabethville*. Pons, of the University of Cape Town and later author of a book on Stanleyville, Xydias, director of the Service of *Psychotechnique* in the Institute of Psychology of the University of Paris, Clément, which ended up close to Patrice Lumumba (who was his assistant), and Guy Malengreau were also present.³⁴

32 G. St. J. Orde Browne, *The African Labourer*, Oxford 1933; J. Merle Davies (ed.), *Modern Industry and the African: An Inquiry into the Effect of the Copper Mines of Central Africa upon Native Society and the Work of Christian Missions*, London 1933; C. Schayegh, *The Expanding Overlap of Imperial, International, and Transnational Political Activities, 1920s–1930s: A Belgian Case Study*, in: *International Politics* 55 (2018) 6, pp. 782–802.

33 D. Forde, *Social Aspects of Urbanization and Industrialization in Africa: A General View*, in: UNESCO/The International African Institute (eds.), *Social Implications of Industrialization and Urbanization in Africa South of the Sahara*, Paris 1956, pp. 16–17; G. Malengreau, *Vers un Paysannat Indigène: Les Lotissements Agricoles au Congo Belge*, Brussels 1949. For a classic appraisal of the policy see B. Jewsiewicki, *African Peasants in the Totalitarian Colonial Society of the Belgian Congo*, in: M. Klein (ed.), *Peasants in Africa*, Beverly Hills 1980, pp. 45–75.

34 F. Grévisse, *The African Centre at Elisabethville*; V. Pons, N. Xydias and P. Clément, *Part Three: Social Effects of Urbanization in Stanleyville, Belgian Congo: Preliminary Report of the Field Research Team of the International African Institute*; G. Malengreau, *Sociological Researches in African Urban Centres, with Reference to the Situation in the Belgian Congo*; V. G. Pons, *The Changing Significance of Ethnic Affiliation and of Westernization in the*

Pons, Xydias, and Clément were collectively responsible for a lengthy report on the “social effects of urbanization in Stanleyville,” assessing social and demographic aspects and labour dynamics, including about the “attitudes” of the “natives,” work that came out of a 1952–1953 mission to study the *effets sociaux de l’industrialisation et de l’urbanisation sur les Noirs*. Echoing dynamics seen in other empire-states, namely in the British empire, psychology and its tests of “personality” and “intelligence” became crucial to the scientific understanding but also to the political assessment of late colonial societies, in a context marked by doctrines and repertoires of developmentalism and welfarism.³⁵ In his contribution, Xydias addressed the importance of a “serious study of mental aptitudes,” and used Raymond B. Cattell’s *Culture Fair Intelligence Test* (CFIT), in its Scale 2 (For children aged 8–14 as well as average adults), in his research with Pons and Clément. The test was applied to workers and schoolchildren, albeit differently.³⁶ Malengreau also emphasized the study of the “psychological factor” as crucial to solve many social “problems,” starting with the “spiritual confusion” affecting “natives in non-traditional groupings,” which was contributing to a “low output of native workers in industry.” The lack of education, malnutrition and scarce wages were relevant, but the fact that work was “meaningless” for the Congolese worker was considered more important.³⁷

Malengreau praised the works of André Ombredane – namely “Principes pour une étude psychologique des noirs du Congo Belge,” which were connected to a seminar about psychological research on “the blacks of the Congo” he held at the Université Libre de Bruxelles, where he was a professor in Psychology, after having had a chair in Experimental Psychology at the University of Rio de Janeiro (Brazil) in 1939. Ombredane’s argument that “the inducements offered by the White man are still of uncertain value among people who have not yet entirely shaken off the influence of their tribal customs” was particularly noted. In the late 1940s, Ombredane called for the need to carry on “missions of psychological studies” that could facilitate the understanding of the “factors” that constrained the “behaviour of blacks.” In the 1950s he spent his holidays in the Belgian Congo, responding to a growing demand for psychosocial knowledge capable of improving labour “productivity” or of enhancing social change at an individual and collective level, and stressing the possibilities of both through better education and social intervention.³⁸ Malengreau was more concerned with “inertia,” a “final symptom of the

African Settlement Patterns in Stanleyville; A. Doucy and P. Feldheim, Some Effects of Industrialization in Two Districts of Equatoria Province (Belgian Congo), all in: UNESCO/The International African Institute, Social Implications of Industrialization and Urbanization in Africa South of the Sahara, pp. 161–166, pp. 229–492, pp. 624–638, pp. 638–669, and pp. 670–692 (pp. 684–685 for the social services), respectively. See also F. Grévisse, Le Centre Extra-Coutumier d’Elisabethville, Brussels 1951; V. Pons, Stanleyville; P. Clément, Patrice Lumumba (Stanleyville 1952–1953), in: *Présence Africaine* 40 (1962), pp. 57–78.

35 E. Linstrum, *Ruling Minds. Psychology in the British Empire*, Cambridge, MA 2016. For the context, M. B. Jerónimo, *Repressive developmentalisms*.

36 Xydias, *Labour: Conditions, Aptitudes, Training*, at p. 333.

37 Malengreau, *Sociological Researches in African Urban Centres*, at pp. 633–634.

38 A. Ombredane, *Principes pour une étude psychologique des noirs du Congo Belge*, in: *L’Année psychologique* 50 (1949), pp. 521–547, at p. 534, 547. See also his *L’exploration de la mentalité des Noirs congolais au moyen d’une épreuve projective*. Le Congo T.A.T, Brussels 1954. For Ombredane and the context see P.-M. Schuhl, *André*

crisis” supposedly affecting “native society,” due to the “methods of colonial government,” namely “paternalism,” which “killed all initiative among Africans.” The “social malady” should be understood sociologically, that is, comprehensively and shaped by an “utilitarian standpoint,” with the help of psychology and its instruments, allowing a surgical social transformation of the existing “modes of behaviour,” “restoring social order.” And “social integration” should be the main aim of the expert. The “sickness” of the new cityscapes was “much more moral than physical.” The exemplary case offered by Malengreau was that of the *évolués*, which were declared to be essentially affected by “problems of acculturation,” not by “housing conditions or wage levels.”³⁹

The perspectives offered and the claims made at *La voix du Congolais* (The voice of the Congolese), the journal of the male educated group, were cautiously appraised by some experts and authorities, despite the fact that they more or less reproduced “western” codes regarding gender relations or “civilizational” arguments.⁴⁰ Perfectibility and social engineering had many obstacles, but also many consequences. Sometimes, schemes of social engineering were needed to halt the unintended consequences of other, previous schemes of social engineering. Efforts to create “New Men” and “New Women”, and new “communities” and “societies,” responded to similar processes. Arguments for psychosocial transformation might aim at minimizing, or redirecting, existing dynamics of social change. Indeed, as was stated in Accra, development could mean the refinement of tradition. Inducing change to restore, promoting crisis envisioning the renovation of order. And, in a context marked by growing anticolonial challenges, to change, *develop* and *modernize* was to increase the possibilities to remain (a colonial power), as happened in the Portuguese case.⁴¹ The colonial state and administration were “nervous,” for sure, partially as a consequence of the “crises” they induced, partially as a result of the ability of local actors to provoke anxiety.⁴² The intense projection of tranquillity in the colonies, obscuring significant internal tensions, was not sufficient to appease those anxieties.⁴³

As mentioned above, Doucy and Feldheim authored an important contribution about the question of the “productivity” of African workers and the “human factors” that affected it, *Travailleurs indigènes et productivité du travail au Congo Belge*. As in other em-

Ombredane (1898–1958), in: *Revue Philosophique de la France et de l'Étranger* 149 (1959), pp. 278–280, and A. Lauro, *Sur les traces de la “psychologie ethnique”* (2/2), <https://amandinelauro.wordpress.com> (consulted on 24 May 2019).

39 Malengreau, *Sociological Researches in African Urban Centres*, pp. 635–637. For the *évolués* see D. Tödt, “Les Noirs Perfectionnés: Cultural Embourgeoisement in Belgian Congo during the 1940s and 1950s,” in: *Working Papers des Sonderforschungsbereiches* 640, 4/2012, <http://edoc.huberlin.de/series/sfb-640-papers/2012-4/PDF/4.pdf>. See also his *Elitenbildung und Dekolonisierung: die Évolués in Belgisch-Kongo 1944–1960*, Göttingen 2018 and J.-M. Mutamba-Makombo, *Du Congo belge au Congo indépendant, 1940–1960. Émergence des évolués et gènes du nationalisme*, Kinshasa 1998.

40 G. Mianda, *Colonialism, Education, and Gender Relations in the Belgian Congo: The Évolué Case*, in: J. Allman, S. Gerger and N. Musisi (eds.), *Women in African Colonial Histories*, Bloomington 2002, pp. 144–163.

41 For the latter see M. B. Jerónimo and A. Costa Pinto, *A Modernizing Empire? Politics, Culture and Economy in Portuguese Late Colonialism*, in: id. (eds.), *The Ends of European Colonial Empires*, London 2015, pp. 51–80.

42 N. R. Hunt, *A Nervous State: Violence, Remedies, and Reverie in Colonial Congo*, Durham, NC 2016.

43 M. G. Stanard, *Revisiting Bula Matari and the Congo Crisis: Successes and Anxieties in Belgium's Late Colonial State*, in: *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 46 (2018) 1, pp. 144–168.

pire-states, the debates about “productivity,” “instability,” and “absenteeism” of African manpower were pivotal in those about the economics of development. They were also fundamental to the discussions about its socio-political dimensions, that is, the disputes about how they could enhance projects of social and political transformation, not merely improve economic performance. Doucy and Feldheim’s contribution was surely influenced by years of thinking about Belgian social policy at the Université Libre de Bruxelles, which included works by some of Doucy’s students or researchers, such as Maryse Périn-Hockers, author of *L’absentéisme des travailleurs africains et l’instabilité dans les entreprises de la région d’Elisabethville* (1958; introduction by Doucy) and Robert Poupart, author of *Facteurs de productivité de la main-d’œuvre autochtone à Elisabethville*, this one published on the eve of decolonization and still replicating “old traditions,” particularly references to the “traditional rhythm” of the African worker. Périn-Hockers clearly placed her contributing within a genealogy of ideas and debates that characterized the Inter-African Institute of Labour in all meetings, starting with the one in Jos (Nigeria, 1949; see below) and ending with the ones in Beira (Mozambique, 1955) and Lusaka (at the time Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, 1957).⁴⁴ Doucy and Feldheim, and many others searched for the *homo oeconomicus* in Africa, which Thomas Haighton, the director of the Inter-African Institute of Labour, considered “even more fictitious in Africa than elsewhere.” To find him, or to create him through schemes of social engineering, was a priority. A new (productive, disciplined, with “notions of time”) man was in need.⁴⁵

3.4 The “Improvement of Tradition”

A third example is also related to the CCTA, the institution that organized a Regional Symposium on Community Development in Accra (Ghana), in April 1959.⁴⁶ The meeting followed many others that since the late 1940s had shaped the competing but also collaborative ways in which European colonial powers, and international and interimperial organizations, imagined colonial developmentalism and welfarism, reflecting as well on how the latter could transform colonial societies and respective socio-political relations. Already in 1949, before the formal establishment of the CCTA, in a conference on Indigenous Rural Economy, in Jos (Nigeria), the centrality of methods to ensure the “raising of morale” via “literacy, films and broadcasting” was advocated. To convince

44 Doucy and Feldheim, *Travailleurs indigènes*; M. Périn-Hockers, *L’absentéisme des travailleurs africains et l’instabilité dans les entreprises de la région d’Elisabethville*, Brussels 1958 and R. Poupart, *Facteurs de productivité de la main-d’œuvre autochtone à Elisabethville*, Brussels 1960. For more see Rubbers and Poncelet, *Sociologie coloniale au Congo belge*, at p. 102. For the context see F. Cooper, *Decolonization and African Society: The Labor Question in French and British Africa*, Cambridge, UK 1996, pp. 361–382.

45 T. Haighton, *Introdução*, in: CCTA/Inter-African Institute of Labour (ed.), *Factores humanos da produtividade em África. Inquérito preliminar*, Lisbon 1956, pp. 9–11. See also CCTA/Inter-African Institute of Labour, *Conferência Interafricana do Trabalho. 4ª Sessão, Beira, 1955, vol. II*, Lisbon 1955.

46 For the CCTA see Kent, *The Internationalisation of Colonialism*.

colonial populations of the benefits of a “policy of self-help” was mandatory.⁴⁷ In certain ways, the 1959 meeting echoed some of the most important debates that animated previous events, for instance those around the meaning and application of “community development,” confronting the ones promoted in 1954, at the Ashridge Conference on Social Development, and those advanced by the United Nations in 1956. Those in Accra preferred the Ashridge perspective, perhaps as a consequence of the rivalry that, like the INCIDI, the CCTA had with some of the United Nations agencies, for instance, the International Labour Organization and the World Health Organization. An important point made in Accra was that “community development” was essentially an “improvement of tradition,” a balance between progress and tradition. “Ancient forms” could be the “vehicle of new ideas,” the “traditions of war” could be used “for peace.” The ways to reach that balance were alphabetization and education of adults, an active intervention “near women and in the *foyer*,” and activities of “vulgarization,” all entailing local cooperation and consultation, to enhance their effectiveness as igniters of individual and collective change.⁴⁸

In order to meet these purposes, some principles and techniques were highlighted as crucial, clearly similar to those being argued for by the likes of Pirlot or Ysaye, among many other voices. In what related to the intervention on the *foyers*, with women, it was stressed that their education “should not be intellectual or scholastic,” especially if that meant “making her unable to fulfil her role as wife, mother and educator,” which was the rule in rural contexts. At the same time, her “growing economic and political influence should not be underestimated.” In order to enhance the efforts of psychosocial intervention and societal change, and, we may argue, of the *utility* of that economic and political influence, all techniques that could positively contribute to that aim were praised. That was the case of “audio-visual techniques,” adapted to local circumstances: posters, theatre plays, puppets, films, group discussions, and radio. Films were deemed “too elaborated and quick to be understood by the village spectators.” The creation of “community camps” where “music and dance” or the collective “administration of common resources” could be promoted was also mentioned, but the preferred techniques were theatre and radio. Pirlot was surely aware of this fact: her emphasis on puppet theatre was not singular. One of the most important documents of the time, the UN’s *Social progress through community development* (1955), known by all involved in social service, also highlighted the centrality of new “methods” available to enhance social transformation at individual and collective levels. Regarding the “methods of communication,” “live and puppet theatres, pageant and amateur folk-theatres” were indicated as fruitful techniques to “dramatize campaigns in health education, to convey a social message and to stir a desire for improvements.” Simultaneously, both Pirlot and Ysaye, and many others, were

47 Final report, in: National Archives, United Kingdom, CO 852/1226/5, International African Conference on Rural Indigenous Economy held at Jos in Nigeria (November 1949) – matters arising.

48 Report. Rural Welfare. Regional Symposium on Community Development in West Africa. Accra, 6–15 1959, CCTA, L. (59) 68, 28 april 1959, p. 8.

also aware of the concern that the political authorities and the experts on developmentalism and welfarism had regarding the levels of local participation. This was clear in Accra. The “indifference of the public” should be combatted and for this to happen, beside an effective indoctrination with new techniques, it was crucial to form “benevolent local leaders” and foster an active “cooperation with local and consuetudinary authorities.”⁴⁹

4. Conclusion

This necessarily brief excursion through problems, arguments, institutions, and events that shaped the imagination of the “New (Wo)Man” and communities in the Belgian colonial empire illustrates the diversity of idioms and repertoires of sociocultural, political and economic development focused on their psychosocial transformation. Discourses and schemes of psychological and social engineering concentrated on colonial populations had multiple origins, voices, purposes, competing to demonstrate exclusive and exceptional aptitudes in the production and mastering of the *savoir-développer*, of the *savoir-transformer* needed to induce change, and, crucially, restore order. The experiments in “comprehensive social development” entailed diverse methods and techniques, from strategies of sociospatial (re)settlement and control (e.g. the *centres extra-coutumiers* or the *foyers sociaux*) to instruments of indoctrination, some more subtle than others. This text also shows that our understanding of these dynamics cannot be reduced to single geographical, national, or institutional analytical frameworks. International and transnational processes significantly influenced these experiments, and were influenced by them. These colonial experiments, which aimed at individual and collective social change, were a product of vast and interconnected, but competing, actors, networks, and institutions that were active at many levels, from imperial-states and inter-imperial coalitions to international, hybrid, and transnational organizations, from the *Union des Femmes Coloniales* or the *Institut de Sociologie Solvay* to the INCIDI and the CCTA, and the UN’s specialized agencies. Of course, they were also active on the ground, in colonial urban and rural contexts, facing specific challenges and addressing particular communities. The latter surely conditioned the enactment of more or less grandiose schemes of psychological and social engineering.⁵⁰

But the role of international, interimperial organizations was pivotal in the diversification of voices, arguments and projects of social change, as the INCIDI and the CCTA demonstrate. They were not only forums in which national and colonial cases were presented, described and evaluated. They were not mere repositories of national experiments in “comprehensive social development.” They were spaces in which those experiments

49 Ibid., pp. 8–9, 13, 15–16. For the UN’s official perspective, see United Nations, *Social Progress through Community Development*, New York 1955, pp. 236–282, at p. 85. See also A. L. Sayward, *The United Nations in International History*, London 2017.

50 Hunt, *A Nervous State*; A. Eckert, *Regulating the Social: Social Security, Social Welfare and the State in Late Colonial Tanzania*, in: *Journal of African History* 45 (2004), pp. 467–89.

were significantly shaped and reshaped, through the circulation and transfer of “old traditions,” but also through the co-construction of new doctrines and modalities of *savoir-développer* and *savoir-transformer*. This collaborative project, which of course did not erase competition and forms of interimperial and intercolonial differentiation, was partially encouraged by the need to counteract the growing intervention of the United Nations and its commissions and agencies, in which anticolonial projects were gradually gaining track. Numerous summits were organized (increasingly in colonial contexts), several epistemic communities focused on colonial or “dependent” territories were promoted, plenty of research works and policy papers were commissioned, published, and widely spread on the international level. These included surveys of the “psychological reactions of African women,” the search for the African *homo oeconomicus*, the study of how to transform the African *homo ruralis* or *homo industrialis* (here including women), and the pondering of the best ways to administer the socio-political effects of urbanization and “de-tribalization,” which had a clear gendered nature and required devising policies of rural welfare. Their influence on policy-making is yet to be thoroughly established, but there are evidences of their important impact in the production of knowledge, in the setting of norms, in the redefinition of legislation and in the formulation of social, developmental, and securitarian policies in late colonialism, in the Belgian colonial empire as in others. Our understanding of the tentative creation of “New (Wo)Man” in late colonialism, in the post-war momentum, needs to include their role and influence.⁵¹

51 M. B. Jerónimo, Competing Knowledge? Interimperial Cooperation in Late Colonial Developmentalism (1940s–1950s), in: G. Castryck and K. Naumann (eds.), Divided Entanglements of Colonial Knowledge. International, Interimperial, and Intercolonial Production of Knowledge, 1880s–1960s (forthcoming).

Making the New Indian Citizen in Times of the Jawan (Soldier) and the Kisan (Farmer), 1962–1965

Anandita Bajpai

ABSTRACTS

Der Artikel befasst sich mit der Figur des „Neuen Menschen“ im unabhängigen Indien und dessen Veränderung und spezifischen Formung unter Kriegsbedingungen und Nahrungsmittelknappheit. Es nimmt die Kategorie des idealen Staatsbürgers eines „Neuen Indiens“ in den Blick, wie sie während der Amtszeit von Jawaharlal Nehru, dem ersten Premierminister des unabhängigen Indiens, propagiert wurde. In den Jahren zwischen zwei militärischen Konflikten mit China bzw. Pakistan (1962–1965) und vor allem in Zeiten akuter Nahrungsmittelknappheit in mehreren Bundesstaaten prägte der zweite Ministerpräsident, Lal Bahadur Shastri, den Slogan Jai Jawan! Jai Kisan! (Sieg für den Soldaten! Sieg für den Bauern!). Dieser Slogan feierte beide Figuren als ikonischen Helden der Nation. Alle anderen Register des Nationenaufbaus wurden in dieser Periode den übergreifenden Themen Verteidigung und Entwicklung zugeordnet. Der Artikel fragt danach, wie Unsicherheit und Nervosität des Staates Diskurse über Wachsamkeit und Opfer hervorgebracht. Er zeichnet die Veränderungen des Topos vom idealen Staatsbürger durch die Konstruktion eines Raumes der Ehrfurcht nach. Ehrfurcht vor den Bauern, die Getreidespeicher der Nation füllten, und den Soldaten, die Grenzen verteidigten. Aber auch diejenigen, die nicht in der Armee dienten oder in der Landwirtschaft arbeiteten, wurden aufgerufen sich zu „Neuen Menschen“ einer Nation in der Krise zu entwickeln. Anhand von Abbildungen aus den englischsprachigen Wochenzeitschriften *Link* und *New India* analysiert der Beitrag die Vorstellung des Staates über den „Neuen Menschen“ und damit verbundene Einschreibungen von Selbstaufopferung, Nationalismus, Wachsamkeit, Bereitschaft und Arbeit für die Nation.

This article engages with the shaping of the “New Man” figure in independent India and how this image was morphed and re-shaped by conditions of war and food shortages. It traces the category of the ideal citizen of a “New India”, as expounded during the term of Jawaharlal Nehru, independent India’s first Prime Minister. During the interim years between two wars with

China and Pakistan respectively (1962–1965), and especially in times of acute food grain shortages in several federal states, the second Prime Minister, Lal Bahadur Shastri, raised the slogan *Jai Jawan! Jai Kisan* (Victory to the Soldier! Victory to the Farmer!), hailing both as iconic heroes of the nation. During this time, all other nation-building registers merged into the overarching categories of defence and development. How did the mood of insecurity and the nervousness of the state produce discourses of vigilance and sacrifice? The article traces the transformations in the trope of the ideal citizen, the revered space accorded to farmers as men who supplanted the nation's granaries and soldiers as men who defended its borders, and, finally, how the non-farmers and non-soldiers were also called upon to become the "New Men" of a nation in crisis. The last section analyses images from two English-language weekly newspaper magazines – *Link* and *New India* to shed light on the state's vision of the trope of the "New Man" and how it was inscribed with the qualities of self-sacrifice, nationalism, vigilance, preparedness and work for the nation.

This article engages with the shaping of the "New Man" figure in independent India and how this image was morphed and re-shaped by conditions of war and food shortages. It probes into the making of the category of the ideal citizen of a "New India" during Jawaharlal Nehru's prime ministership. Further, it shows how citizens who were neither soldiers nor farmers, both of whom had been hailed as the iconic heroes of the nation, were called upon by the state to become the "New Men" of India.

The first section outlines some of the important co-ordinates of Nehru's envisioned "New India", a roadmap for the nation to progress along the lines of economic self-sufficiency, industrialization, higher education and agricultural productivity. The register of growth and postcolonial nation-building was intertwined here with the figure of the ideal citizen, the "New Man" of the state-tutored New India. The article traces how the tropes of scientific temper and expertise, unity in diversity, development through the so-called "Temples of Modern India" entangled and mutually informed the category of the ideal citizen, as envisioned by the state. The second section points to the gradually changing geo-political contexts. In terms of foreign policy, the Non-Aligned Movement and peaceful coexistence had been hailed as the cornerstones of the Nehruvian consensus. The border dispute between India and China in 1962 altered the vocabulary of mutual non-aggression, which would in turn impact the expectations ascribed to the nation's "New Men".

The next section specifically sheds light on the time period between 1962 and 1965, when the overall mood of nationalism was defined by the context of two wars (with China in 1962 and Pakistan in 1965) and acute food grain shortages in several parts of the country. Here I emphasize the merging of all other nation-building registers into the overarching categories of defence and development. A mood of insecurity and the nervousness of the state merges into discourses of vigilance and sacrifice through the second Prime Minister's famous slogan of "Jai Jawan! Jai Kisan!" (Victory to the Soldier! Victory to the Farmer!).

The last section analyses images from two English-language weekly newspaper magazines – *Link* and *New India* during the interim period of the two wars. The objective here is to elucidate how in times of “national crises”, citizens who were neither soldiers nor farmers were called upon to serve the nation and become the “New Men” of India.

1. Nehruvian India's Ideal Citizen – Some Historical Insights

*We must start with the machine which makes the machine.*¹

In a newly independent India, the first Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, a “founding father figure”² of the postcolonial state, played a central role in designing the vision of a ‘New India’. An important constituent of this nation-building vocabulary was what Nehru called the ‘Temples of Modern India:’ new dam projects, new laboratories, new industries. New centres of research (universities and laboratories), energy (dams) and production units (new industries, plants, Public Sector Units) were projected as the stepping-stones to a much-desired ‘self-sufficiency’³ for an envisioned socialist democracy. These were seen as a natural pathway that would materialize the nation’s dreams to “step out from the old to the new, when an age ends, and when the soul of a nation, long suppressed, finds utterance”, as Nehru noted in his famous speech *A Tryst with Destiny* on the eve of independence in 1947.⁴ Thus, *manufacturing* engineers, atomic energy reactors, research institutes, dams, or even steel was seen as part of manufacturing a New India. Whereas the nation’s trajectory of progress was framed in an overarching register of economic self-reliance through a planned economy and increased production, it was the figure of the new citizen that became the active site of investment in performing the ideal nation. Crafting “New India” thus simultaneously also entailed the making of the new Indian. This idealized prototype was not just a figure fabricated overnight, but one whose constitution embodied the laborious work of transforming colonial subjects into citizens of a nation-state through a plethora of statist channels. In the Indian context, the making of the “New Man” is therefore intricately tied to the shaping of state visions and neither can be seen exclusively. In this section, I list some of the entangled and parallel registers that informed the category of New India as well as that of the ideal new citizen during the first decade after independence (1947–57). Both become entwined instruments for producing (1) a sense of nation-ness and national belonging, and more importantly, (2) the legitimacy of the postcolonial state as the organizer, unifier and authoritative face of the nation.

1 J. L. Nehru, Open-Minded Approach, Address to the Conference of the All-India Manufacturers’ Organization, New Delhi, April 14, 1956, in: Jawaharlal Nehru’s Speeches, Vol. 3, 1953–57, New Delhi 1958, pp. 87–88.

2 P. Ahluwalia, Founding Father Presidencies and the Rise of Authoritarianism. Kenya: A Case Study, in: *Africa Quarterly* 36 (1996) 4, pp. 45–72.

3 This phrase acquires a figurative quality in contemporary India, symbolic of the socialist habitus and phraseology much associated with Nehru’s visions and policies.

4 J. L. Nehru, *A Tryst With Destiny*, Speech delivered on the eve of India’s independence, 00:00hrs, August 14, 1947.

Two key characteristics that Nehru emphasized were the inculcation of ‘scientific expertise’ for the nation and that of ‘scientific temper’ in the ideal national citizen. Scientific expertise related to the “[i]dentity of the new India [...] defined in terms of the privileged place it accorded to science and technology in all arenas of life. For instance, techno-scientific artifacts such as dams, steel plants, and atomic reactors were hailed as the icons of the new nation-state.”⁵ This implied developing scientific manpower through institutes that produced qualified individuals to implement and design development plans, the Indian Institutes of Technology being a prime example of the same. Scientific temper, on the other hand, was defined as “the search for truth and new knowledge, the refusal to accept anything without testing and trial [...]” “[...] scientific approach and temper are, or should be, a way of life, a process of thinking, a method of acting and associating with our fellow men.”⁶ The vision behind the critically thinking, scientifically-tempered, “New Man” was, however, marred with inherent contradictions. On the one hand, Nehru was critical of the ‘unscientific scientist’, qualified scientist-citizens who were nonetheless marred in ‘superstitions’ and religious worlds in their everyday lives. They had still not internalized the spirit of scientific temper in their private lives. On the other hand, the state generally discouraged participation by the same scientists in politics proper through political mobilizations and trade unionism.⁷ Citizens were thus encouraged to be curious, critical and raise questions in general, but never quite question the intentions and doings of the state.

This discouragement of questioning the state’s development plans can be graphically captured in the 1954 production of the Films’ Division of India (Ministry of Information and Broadcasting), titled *The Case of Mr. Critic*,⁸ a documentary that shows the caricature of a common man, who is skeptical and critical of ‘the good visions’ of the state. The film is a journey of the figure of Mr. Critic, who by the end realizes the futility and ills of ‘unnecessarily’ critiquing the state, a message made all too clear to receiving Indian citizens in a period when there were no other television channels except for the state-run *Doordarshan*. Nehru’s New India was a place of manufacture, productivity, self-sufficiency and scientific manpower and the “New Man” of New India was a scientifically tempered individual, who would be quick to question the limits of his superstitious private life but never the objectives of the state.

5 S. Roy, *Beyond Belief: India and the Politics of Postcolonial Nationalism*, Durham, NC 2007, p. 114.

6 *Ibid.*, pp. 123–124.

7 This is well pointed out in Srirupa Roy’s *Beyond Belief* through the case of the Association of Scientific Workers, a collective of state employed scientists who criticized the Planning Commission for not inviting their participation in the third five-year plan, “The Association was asked to bear in mind the difference between science and industry, and to consequently resist from organizing scientific workers along trade union lines. The argument was that they would be better placed if they devoted their energies to the pursuit of science, since ‘thus only they can advance themselves. When scientific expansion takes place in India, there will be more opportunities for work and more jobs’” (*ibid.*, p. 121).

8 R. Prakash, *The Case of Mr. Critic*, Films’ Division of India, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, 1954, See: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Co7Vf9LLD4g&t=338s> (accessed 17 July 2018).

Another theme that subsumed diverse Indian identities and became a recurring coordinate of the “New Men” of independent India, as can be captured in state produced documentary films, classroom wall charts and political oratory, was the trope of “Unity in Diversity.” In a context where independence was accompanied by the violence of Partition and the simultaneous birth of two nation-states India and Pakistan, based on religious lines (Hindu and Muslim), this trope offered the much-needed clever solution to merge and cement religious, class, caste, regional and linguistic divides. Rather than pitch for flattened commonalities, or least common denominators, which were impossible to locate across the highly heterogenous sub-continent, Nehru used the trope to forward the “logic of newness as bricolage”⁹, with diversity as the one commonality and founding principle of nationhood and Indian uniqueness. In this way, diversity was not concealed –neither in classroom wall-charts, which showed different kinds of Indians, nor in the cultural tableaux of the Republic and Independence Day parades in New Delhi, that exhibited the diverse regional cultures spread across the geographical length and breadth of the country. Rather, difference was naturalized, emphasized and even celebrated. The trope became a useful instrument in two ways (1) It encouraged the idea that one did not need to be identical to other citizens in the nation along class, caste, religious, regional or linguistic lines in order to lay claims to being *Indian*, with development being the overarching grid of nationhood that defined and encapsulated all Indians; and (2) the trope helped consolidate the authority of the state as the legitimate unifier and manager of the nation with all its encompassing multiplicities. The new citizen of the new India was thus, from the very outset, a category that rose above divides and diversities, that stood in a spirit of unquestioned unity of the nation, and which subordinated or submitted itself to the larger entity called the nation-state. It was the state that became the care taker of its citizens and the project of making the “New Man” was essentially a statist project.

2. Geo-political Contexts

Internationally, the Indian state’s self-positioning was informed by the larger context of the Cold War. The Non-Aligned Movement became a crucial hallmark of the Indian state’s international self-positioning. With its iconic beginnings at the Bandung conference of 1955, and with Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru as one of its founding figures (along with Yasser from Egypt, Tito from Yugoslavia and Sukarno from Egypt), non-alignment became a political means, especially for the newly decolonized nations across Africa and Asia, to maintain an official political stance of not becoming a satellite of either of the two power blocks during the Cold War. The movement is often criticized for merely being an official position maintained in state rhetoric within the international comity of nations, which in effect, showed signs of a tilt towards the Soviet bloc in the

Indian case. Nonetheless, it did become an umbrella space for a collective international voice, replenished with the vocabulary of “anti-imperialism”, “anti-colonialism”, “anti-fascism”, “world peace” and especially “Afro-Asian solidarity”. When asked about the Non-Aligned Movement, Nehru had publicly declared that “[i]t is not a wise policy to put all our eggs in one basket.”¹⁰ Important for the context of this paper, is the movement’s vocabulary of mutual non-aggression and mutual co-existence.

Precedents of the same, that is, mutual non-intervention (in domestic affairs of other nations) and non-aggression can be found in the landmark Panchsheel Agreement, which was signed between the states of India and China in 1954. The five principles (*Panch* connoting five, and *Sheel* standing for virtues) emphasized – (1) Mutual respect for each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty; (2) Mutual non-aggression; (3) Mutual non-interference in each other’s internal affairs; (4) Equality and cooperation for mutual benefit; (5) Peaceful co-existence. These registers of world peace and non-intervention, which were celebrated themes in Indian foreign policy and a persistent feature of its political leaders’ oratory, would recede in national importance during the period of 1962–65. The border dispute with China was seen as a breach of the Panchsheel Agreement and would lead to the development of a new nationalizing vocabulary whereby the focus shifted from mutual benefit and non-aggression to a discourse of insecurity, vigilance and discipline. This renewed and gradually embroiling context becomes important in understanding the backdrop that informs transitions in the trope of the “New Man”.

3. *Jai Jawan, Jai Kisan!* Histories of a Slogan and the “New Man” in Times of Conflict and Scarcity

It is in times of perceived national, especially territorial, crises that the need to protect, produce, re-iterate nationhood and its encompassing nationalism(s) becomes a pressing necessity for states. Perceived threats and insecurities often become instruments that are utilized by states to forcefully re-induce sentiments of belonging and the need to belong. If, following Anderson, nations are “an imagined political community –and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign”¹¹ then parades, flags, national anthems, state bureaucracies, government offices, television and print media, state-produced documentaries and political oratory are instructive material sites where the nation is performed daily. They are, to borrow Achille Mbembe’s metaphorical vocabulary, part of the state’s

10 J. L. Nehru, Speech in Constituent Assembly, March 8, 1948. Over the decades following the initiation of the Non-Aligned Movement, it would become lucidly clear that welcoming aid was visibly not relegated to one of the power blocs solely by the Indian state. This can graphically be inferred from the example of the several Steel Plants or the Indian Institutes of Technology (IITs), which were part of the imagined Temples of Modern New India and which saw a flow of technical and financial assistance from the USA, USSR, Britain as well as West Germany (Each of the five of these institutes was funded by one of the powers).

11 B. Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, London/New York 1983.

“liturgical calendar” and a repertoire that “makes state power highly visible.”¹² Similarly, sports (one needs to imagine the tensions running high in football/cricket world cups or Olympics) or the daily vocabularies of ‘us’, ‘we’, and ‘them’, are expressions of banal nationalisms.¹³ Wars and the legitimizing rhetoric for warfare re-ignite national solidarity *par excellence*.

The time frame between 1962–65, witnessed reinforced vocabularies of nationalism, which resulted from the context of two wars with China and Pakistan, and a nervousness of the state that built upon territorial and cartographic anxieties over border disputes. This period also marks a national sense of insecurity and loss due the death of the first Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru (May 27, 1964), who had become the iconic face of the state and the nation for 17 years as the political head of India. The sense of urgency was surmounted further with acute food grain shortages faced in several federal states of the country. It is in such circumstances that the second Prime Minister, Lal Bahadur Shastri (in office after Nehru’s death from June 9, 1964 – January 11, 1966) coined the slogan “*Jai Jawan! Jai Kisan!*” – Victory to the Soldier! Victory to the Farmer! (particularly during the war with Pakistan in 1965)¹⁴. The slogan brought the farmer and the soldier to share the same revered space as national heroes at the time of war and scarcity of food grains. In a speech delivered in October 1965, Shastri stated:

*The nation cannot afford to relax. It is difficult to say what the future holds for us. Pakistan has not yet given up her policy of aggression. The duty of the nation is, therefore, clear. The country’s defences have to be strengthened. The people should spare no efforts to strengthen the defences. Side by side, food production has to be increased. Food self-sufficiency is as important as a strong defence system. It is for this reason that I raised the slogan: Jai Jawan, Jai Kisan. The Kisan is as much a soldier as the Jawan.*¹⁵

Whereas soldiers were called upon in times of war to defend the motherland, farmers were deemed equally important in filling the granaries of the nation in times of food shortages. Both the figures were metaphorically and literally merged into the trope of the “New Man” and projected as the common emblem of ideal citizenship. That the slogan has continued to inform the repertoire of Prime Ministerial oratory since its coinage is reflective of its continual lexical weight in India. Besides being re-quoted very often by several Prime Ministers after Shastri, decades later, Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee used it with an addition – “Jai Jawan, Jai Kisan aur Jai Vigyan (“Victory to the Soldier! Victory to the Farmer! Victory to Science!”) in the aftermath of nuclear tests that were conducted in May 1998. More recently, the current Prime Minister, who like Vajpayee

12 A. Mbembe, Provisional Notes on the Postcolony, in: *Africa: Journal of the International African Institute*, 62 (1992) 1, p. 17.

13 M. Billig, *Banal Nationalism*, London 1995.

14 The term *Jai* may be translated both as Hail or Victory.

15 L.B. Shastri, *Jai Jawan, Jai Kisan*, Speech delivered at the 83rd death Anniversary of Swami Dayanand Saraswati in New Delhi on October 24, 1965, in: *Selected Speeches of Lal Bahadur Shastri*, June 11, 1964 – January 10, 1966, New Delhi (1974), pp. 359.

belongs to the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), the key opposition party to Shastri's Congress, added yet another extension to the slogan – “Jai Jawan! Jai Kisan! Jai Vigyan! Jai Anusandhan!” (“Victory to the Soldier! Victory to the Farmer! Victory to Science! Victory to Research!”).¹⁶ Two statues also commemorate Lal Bahadur Shastri and the slogan in present day Mumbai (for example, see figure 1 below).



Figure 1: Shastri's statue in Mumbai, India with the slogan *Jai Jawan, Jai Kisan* inscribed on it, which is also depicted through a rifle and a sickle.¹⁷

16 N.D Modi, Future India: Science and Technology, Speech delivered at the 106th Science Congress, Jalandhar, January 3, 2019.

17 Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Mumbai_Shastri_statue.jpg

4. The “New Man” betwixt the *Jawan* and the *Kisan*

Whereas the soldier and the farmer became the iconic figures of sacrifice for the motherland, a daunting task facing the state was how to address the vast majority of citizens who were neither farmers nor soldiers in order to make crisis a lived, felt reality that required them to play their part as well. In order to call upon *all* citizens to support the nation in times of war and food grain scarcity, the state-driven vision of the “New Man” was announced through a plethora of channels like documentary films, political rhetoric and iconography. In all of these projections, those not belonging to the soldier-farmer duo were made to fit statist visions of the “New Man”. This was a trope squeezed between the farmer, who was toiling for India on the fields, and the soldier, who was laboring to defend it at the borders.

Shortly after his usage of the slogan in 1965, Prime Minister Shastri, appealed to *all* citizens to play their role for the nation as can be ciphered from the following excerpt from his speech delivered in the Indian parliament during the war:

*I know that at this hour every Indian is asking himself only one question; what can I do for my country and how can I participate in the nation's endeavor to defend our freedom and territorial integrity? To all Indians, to all our people, I want to address this appeal: Wherever you are and whatever your vocation, you should work with true dedication, bring out the best in you and serve the country selflessly. The supreme need of the hour is national unity – unity not of the word but of the heart. All Indians, of whatever faith or profession, have to stand solidly together and prepare themselves for hardships and sacrifices. Let us give no quarter to any ideas that tend to divide us. Let us all work together with a new sense of national discipline and with an inspired feeling of dedication to the cause of the country's freedom and integrity.*¹⁸

We thus find the Prime Minister appealing to citizens to be united. Keywords that repetitively occur in his oratory, as in the lines above, are national unity, selflessness, dedication, sacrifice and discipline. As this section will show, these also inform the world of images.

As an illustration of how the trope of the “New Man” was produced for the non-soldier-farmer citizen, this section will analyze images published in two weekly magazines *Link* and *New India* during 1962–1964. The weeklies were edited by Edatata Narayanan and Kunduru Iswara Dutt respectively, both of whom had prolific careers in Indian journalism. Narayanan had been a member of the Congress party during the nationalist movement for independence and eventually came to join the Socialist Party in 1948, eventually moving to the Communist Party of India (CPI) which he also quit in 1956, following Khrushchev's denouncement of Stalin. He maintained a pro-left, pro-CPI but also a pro-Nehru stance throughout his journalistic career. He was also the founder of

18 L.B. Shastri, Pakistan's Designs, in Kutch, Speech delivered in Lok Sabha, New Delhi on April 28, 1965, in: Selected Speeches of Lal Bahadur Shastri, June 11, 1964 – January 10, 1966, New Delhi 1974, p. 294.

the daily newspaper *The Patriot* (1963). K. Iswara Dutt was known for his prolific writing through books like *The Street of Ink* (1956) and the renowned *Congress Cyclopaedia: The Indian Nation Congress, 1885–1920* (1967). He had previously served as the editor of the newspaper *The Leader* and was one of the founding members of the Journalists Association of Delhi (1949). Both the weeklies show a pro-Nehru, and generally a pro-government editorial policy, with greater sensitivities towards the Left rather than the Hindu Right. This also explains the presence of these images in the magazines.

The caricatures, textual messages or a combination of both, were published on a regular basis during 1963–1965 and each weekly issue is replete with illustrations. Whereas in some cases, the sponsors of the advertising space can be discerned (for example, federal state governments, or specific ministries within the government), in most cases, this crucial information is largely missing. Usually no credits are provided for the creators of the cartoons and the repetitive phrases that accompany them. Thus, the inventors of the slogans used, selectors of the quotations published beside the images (for example one by Nehru which repetitively appears next to the images), designers of the text messages and the sketchers of the caricatures remain anonymous to consumers.¹⁹ Readers, a specific audience which could read in English, could have had the impression of either being addressed by the state directly or that the magazines were used as a medium by their sponsors and editorial boards for furthering statist visions. This especially so because there are striking parallels between the messages conveyed by the images and the political oratory of the time.

All citizens were called upon by the state to be like the sacrificing soldiers, who had devoted their lives to the motherland. This message of dedication and sacrifice materialized in the call to the common man to donate for the nation. Gold, which also has a specific cultural weight in the Indian context, especially became a means for proving one's spirit of sacrifice. The "New Man" of an India at war was one who unhesitatingly donated gold to the reserves of the national banks. The advertisement below, published in *New India* for example (figure 2), tells readers where and how to donate gold for the nation, also making it explicit that this sacrifice is necessary to support warfare. The lighter background shows several faceless hands donating gold ornaments in order to make for the main darker image which is a hand (of a soldier) that firmly holds a gun.

In fact, sacrificing gold is equated with directly investing in one's freedom as can be seen in figure 3. The ideal citizen was therein one who valued freedom and selflessly donated gold to the nation.

19 This calls for a deeper study of the creative designers and their relationship to the magazines as well as the government authorities, which is beyond the scope of this paper. It would be rewarding to engage in a micro-history of political iconography during the Cold War years, the underlying details of everyday creative processes and how these did or did not speak to other iconographies transnationally. Though caricature history has been the focus of some research (see for example, R.G. Khanduri, *Caricaturing Culture in India: Cartoons and History in the Modern World*, Cambridge 2007), it has rarely been researched in the Indian context in terms of transnational entanglements and artistic circles of creators especially during the Cold War years.



Figure 2: *New India*, November 28, 1962, Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, New Delhi.

This spirit of sacrifice is also lucidly depicted in the 1962 Films' Division documentary titled *Gift for the Nation*, where one sees a woman, who has recently been gifted a gold necklace, reminiscing the sacrifices of the soldiers of the nation. Her facial expressions transform in the one minute thirty-six seconds long film clip from those of a soft smile to a resolute look, as audiences are made to hear war trumpets and what appears to be the sound of gun firing. It is clear that she has resolved to donate her latest gift to the nation. A voice-over announces "A necklace given, a ring donated, a bangle placed on the national altar. Each shall be a shining diadem, each a contribution to the certain victory."²⁰ One sees a collection of gold jewelry, whereby different ornaments form the word "Victory" to mark the end of the video. The nation becomes the holy space that demands the donation of the citizens' gold ornaments to ensure victory at war.

20 D. Jamdar, *Gift for the Nation*, Documentary produced by the Films' Division of India, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, New Delhi, 1962, See: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_PVmuRmgzrs (accessed 17 July 2018).




Figure 3: *New India*, March 20, 1963, Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, New Delhi.

This subordination of the citizen through the act of sacrificing personal wealth for the nation, especially in times of war, is also known from other contexts. For example, the “nail men”, which became material markers of performing such self-sacrifice across the German Empire during WWI.

[C]itizens hammered large nails into wooden statues placed in all the larger towns on town squares and market squares in exchange for a donation (to fund the war effort). The martial sculptures with their millions of nails, covering them in a kind of nail armour, became cult objects to which one made a pilgrimage and, accompanied by ritual oaths of devotion, made a financial offering for the war, in order to have one's own nail driven in among the others.²¹

In India, during both the wars, citizens were called upon to invest in war efforts by purchasing National Defence Certificates which would be a direct contribution for supplies and equipment for defense. The “New Man” was thus one who did not hold himself back from devoting all his resources to the government defense securities. In the image below, for example, we literally see money donated by smiling citizens being transformed into missiles. The caption “They also serve who save” may misleadingly appear to be a call to save but, in fact, is a plea to save in order to then only invest in the nation. The non-soldier and the non-farmer could thus prove their loyalty to the nation by “investing in freedom.” (figure 4). Similarly, as shown in the figure 5, citizens are told that it is good to save and be thrifty, but it is even better if those savings are invested directly in national defense.



Figure 4: *New India*, August 14, 1963, Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, New Delhi.



Figure 5: *New India*, February 5, 1964, Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, New Delhi.

One of the images depicts the picture of a knitting woman, with the question in the frame reading “But what can I do to help?” A long text beneath the image encourages women to contribute to the National Defence Fund. A special call here is “[d]o not buy gold. Give your gold for country’s cause” (figure 6). In another such image, this time picturing a man, the message is “Give your gold in the country’s service – Buy Gold Bonds. Rouse yourself from Apathy, and Take Action” (figure 7).



Figure 6: *New India*, March 13, 1963, Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, New Delhi.

In both the adverts, several messages are combined within the same frame. The theme of donating gold for the nation smoothly runs into another important message for the non-farmer-soldier citizen. The nation is called upon to “Be Vigilant”, and, “[–] take part in national preparedness.” Though war and conflict are not used explicitly as terms, a general mood of insecurity is produced. Preparedness here, on the one hand, stands for supporting the Indian state for its defence policy, but it also hints at the presence of an inherent insecurity, a disquiet and anxious uneasiness.



Figure 7: *New India*, February 20, 1963, Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, New Delhi.

This sense of uncertainty becomes essential to produce the necessary link between what is happening at the borders or on the fields, in times of war and food shortage respectively, and the otherwise disconnected citizen. The images illustrate how an English speaking and reading audience, that did not belong to the category of the soldier-farmer duo, were made to relate to conditions of crisis. Once this mood of crisis had been made relatable, the urgency of the moment established, citizens could then be asked to come into action and be the “New Men” who would subordinate themselves to the nation. In another telling image, we find a man quite literally being vigilant by keeping guard at night with a lantern in his hands.




Figure 8: *Link*, September 29, 1963, P.C. Joshi Archives, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi.

The “New Men” of India are asked here to be on guard, to show “[n]o complacency, no slackening of effort to strengthen defence in every way.” The main instruction is to be aware of the external danger (here referring to China) and to ensure that each citizen of the nation keeps a vigilant eye on that danger. In several images this sense of danger is further sanctioned by relying upon the words of the Prime Minister, which are usually placed in the top part of the frame, and remind citizens of the threat to national freedom (“Freedom is in peril. Defend it with all your might.”).

The slogan *Jai Jawan, Jai Kisan* was also inscribed into the shaping of “New Men” who were neither farmers nor soldiers. This translated into the message of labouring or toiling like the iconic farmer and being disciplined and self-sacrificing like the iconic soldier. Hence, all citizens were asked to “Work Resolutely.” Regardless of their professional standing, ideal citizens were those who toiled for the nation to produce “[t]wice as much as before and then SOME MORE.” This idea of exceeding one’s capacities to produce, whether in the field, the factory or any other office for stronger defence services of the nation also attests that citizens were called upon to sacrifice not just materially, through donations to the nation, but also by devoting their bodily labour towards strengthening the country’s security forces. The individual (whether an office-goer, a farmer or a factory worker) depicted in the two images below with a smiling face, was thus subordinated to the nation and becomes a cog in the wheel of national movement and development.



Figure 9: *Link*, August 30, 1964, P.C. Joshi Archives, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi.

The “New Men” of the nation therein appear to be almost faceless in the images, in spite of being photographed or caricatured individuals from real-life (in that they could be anyone and anywhere in the country and would still be similar to their co-professionals everywhere). They could indeed be defined as a monolithic entity, as imagined and shaped by the state, and characterised by the common trait of striving endlessly for the nation. Thus, an ideal citizen was one whose existence was subordinate to that of the nation, as is emphasized in the advert below where the message in the frame makes it very clear that “[y]our job is a job done for India. [...] You, your life, the work you do – all are part of an India striving today for efficiency.”




Figure 10: *New India*, April 3, 1963, Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, New Delhi.

The spirit of devoted labour in times of war was explicitly attributed to the strengthening of defence above all else. Hence, we see in the text below, how subscribers of the two magazines, an English speaking / reading audience, are explained that they need to work resolutely so that the *jawans* at the war fronts could be equipped in order to defend the nation.

Whereas the farmer's hard labour on the field was written onto the trope of the "New Man" on the one hand, it was simultaneously fused with the soldier's discipline on the other. The body of the non-farmer-soldier was thus inscribed with the ethic of hard work and determination as well as unflinching discipline that had no room for "slackness" (figure 12). Thus, the two qualities associated with the *jawan* and the *kisan*, also came to be translated for the "New Man", regardless of what he or she did professionally.




Figure 11: *New India*, November 13, 1963, Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, New Delhi.

However, it was also made lucidly clear that national defense and security took precedence above all else and were clearly the first among equals. In the image below, we see how discipline is inscribed on to the “New Man”’s body whereby an army of faceless civilians quite literally carry the weight of a soldier’s arms and ammunitions (a grenade, cartridges and a rifle) on their shoulders. The size of the soldier’s figure in the image is disproportionately larger than that of the miniscule human figures that carry his weapons for him. They are also clearly following his lead and respond to his commands, indicating how a sense of discipline is necessary in order for the nation to be strong. Besides, the size of the ammunitions they shoulder (in comparison to their own bodies) suggests that they carry more weight than that allowed by their physical capacities. Thus, while being disciplined like the *jawans*, they are working resolutely like the *kisan* in surpassing their physical limits.




Figure 12: *New India*, September 4, 1963, Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, New Delhi.

That the trope of the “New Man” was duly impacted by a statist discourse of insecurity and threat to the integrity of the nation and its boundaries, which need to be guarded and defended, is also captured in the image below. One sees citizens belonging to varied professions— a scientist, a lawyer, a farmer and a factory worker— all reporting to the soldier. All stand at guard and attention. The text in the frame clarifies that “[A] nation which is economically strong and productive can meet any danger.” Security thus becomes top priority and the “New Men” of India are called upon to produce more in order to contribute in making the nation more secure.



Figure 13: Link, October 27, 1963, P.C. Joshi Archives, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi.

Another important message for the “New Man” was to conserve resources and avoid any waste and extravagance. In the figure below (14), the smiling citizen is quite literally materializing Nehru’s words on the top left corner of the frame, that is, defending freedom with all his might, by building a wall that keeps the threat of the Chinese dragon at bay. Extravagance is projected as an ill that “[w]ill injure the nation.” Conserving and being cautious of waste is produced as necessary for protecting national freedom. This slogan (“Preserve freedom with all your strength”) also hints at the weight of the word freedom, at a time when independence was barely two decades old, for a generation that had witnessed the nation’s liberation from colonial rule, which was not too distant a reality. Thus, “New Men” were instructed to preserve resources so that they could be used for the nation and help preserve freedom.

Whereas it is common that citizens are called upon to spend more and contribute to public expenditure in times of economic crisis, in the Indian context, the message to

citizens was a different one. Here the state called for a fundamental shift in the citizens' life style. New men were called upon to spend only on necessities, in order that savings could then be used for the overall benefit of the nation.




Figure 14: *New India*, July 31, 1963, Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, New Delhi.

Women especially became the target audience for the messages of donating jewelry and avoid waste, almost generalized and solely bracketed into the role of home-makers, who had control over their own as well as their families' consumption patterns. A telling illustration of this message can be seen in the image below (figure 15), where we are informed that a woman refuses to throw a lavish party at her only son's wedding in order to avoid waste. She thus sets an example against "hoarders and profiteers." The main message is to be austere, simplistic and to consume only as much as "necessary."

This overall message of being austere, almost in an ascetic minimalism was projected as a necessity for the nation's ongoing independence and development. In figure 16, we see a woman, clearly tempted to purchase what looks like an expensive saree, being directed by her partner to not consume unnecessarily and indulge in extravagance (as indicated by his firm grip on her elbow). The text reads "By avoiding all extravagance and wasteful expenditure, you help make more resources available for rapid development of the country." It is, however, only left for readers to infer that making resources available for the country effectively stands for material contributions to the national funds.

At stake here in the three figures 14, 15, and 16 is a basic understanding of consumption as an exercise fundamentally rooted in selfish, individual-centric interests, which incorporates usage and depletion (of resources) rather than contribution and productivity. New men and new women of India were asked to not consume and deplete but to contribute and donate.



Figure 15: *Link*, February 28, 1964, P.C. Joshi Archives, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi.




Figure 16: *New India*, October 10, 1963, Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, New Delhi.

Conclusion

This article has traced the trajectory of the figure of the “New Man” in independent India and how it was morphed, transformed and recast in times of crises. In postcolonial India, the making of the “New Man” has been intricately tied to the shaping of state visions and neither can be seen exclusively. Nehru’s envisioned “New India” was a roadmap for progress along the lines of economic self-sufficiency, industrialization, higher education and agricultural productivity. This register of growth and postcolonial nation-building was intertwined with the figure of the ideal citizen, the “New Man” of the state-tutored New India. The article has traced how the tropes of scientific temper and expertise, unity in diversity, development through the so-called “Temples of Modern India”, entangled and mutually informed the category of the ideal citizen as envisioned by the state.

The time frame between 1962–65, witnessed reinforced vocabularies of nationalism, which resulted from the context of two wars with China (1962) and Pakistan (1965), and a nervousness of the state that built upon cartographic anxieties over border disputes. The death of Nehru in 1964 and acute food grain shortages compounded the sense of insecurity. It is in such circumstances that the second Prime Minister, Lal Bahadur Shastri coined the slogan “*Jai Jawan! Jai Kisan!*”—Victory to the Soldier! Victory to the Farmer! (particularly during the war with Pakistan in 1965). The slogan brought the farmer and the soldier to share the same revered space as national heroes in times of war and scarcity of food grains.

A noteworthy transition from the Nehruvian period was the change in the figure of the “New Man” from being the citizen-subject to the subordinate, self-sacrificing citizen; from the questioning citizen (who is paradoxically asked not to participate in politics proper) to the uncritical, unquestioning citizen who follows the interests of the nation lineated by the state as irrefutable. We also see a dramatic shift from discourses on scientific expertise, temper and self-sufficiency to those prioritizing defense and security above everything else.

Whereas the soldier and the farmer became the iconic figures of sacrifice for the motherland, a daunting task facing the state was how to address the vast majority of citizens who were neither farmers nor soldiers in order to make crisis a lived, felt reality that required them to play their part as well. In order to call upon *all* citizens to support the nation in times of war and food grain scarcity, the state-driven vision of the “New Man” was announced through a plethora of channels. This was a trope squeezed between and betwixt the farmer, who was toiling for India on the fields, and the soldier who was laboring to defend its borders.

The advertisements from the magazines have shown how the (non-farmer-soldier) “New Man” was circumscribed and defined within the ambit of national freedom, which when in peril, needed to be defended by him. Hence, the vocabulary of being vigilant and prepared at all times and sacrificing oneself for the nation if freedom was in danger. Regardless of his profession, the “New Man” worked resolutely, was disciplined and did not engage in luxurious extravagance. She/he was called upon to donate materially to the

nation by investing in defence bonds and certificates, donating gold and respecting the army. All his efforts led to the singular aim of strengthening defence. The non-soldier / farmer “New Men” were envisioned to labour or toil like the iconic farmer and be disciplined and self-sacrificing like the iconic soldier. They were asked to be austere and introduce a fundamental shift in their life styles, whereby the nation became the revered holy space of toil and endless sacrifice. All that was saved was for the nation. The trope of the *jawan-kisan*, popularized by the second Prime Minister, was thus also inscribed onto the body of the “New Man”.

Railways as Portals of Globalisation: The Case of the Portuguese Mainland and Colonial Rail Networks (1850–1915)

Hugo Silveira Pereira

In der Literatur über Eisenbahngeschichte werden Eisenbahnbahnen üblicherweise als Motoren des Fortschritts und der Moderne, als Pioniere der Zivilisation, Eroberer von Raum und Zeit, einzigartige Förderer von Migrationen und des Güterfernverkehrs oder als Werkzeuge des Imperiums bezeichnet. Weniger häufig werden sie als Agenten der Globalisierung dargestellt. In diesem Beitrag wird analysiert, wie die Eisenbahn die Rolle als Förderer der globalen Ströme in Portugal und auf dem Territorium ihrer ehemaligen Kolonien Angola, Mosambik und Goa (Indien) übernahm, obgleich die Entwicklung des Nationalstaats und das Wachstum nationalistischer Gefühle (kennzeichnend für die zweite Hälfte des 19. Jahrhunderts und die ersten Jahre des 20. Jahrhunderts) diese Flüsse behinderten. Dabei wird das Konzept der Globalisierung in einem sehr weiten Sinn verwendet: Es werden nicht nur Handels- und kommerzielle Bewegungen inbegriffen, sondern auch der transnationale/grenzüberschreitende Verkehr von Ideen, Fachwissen, Fähigkeiten, Kapital, Arbeitern, Pendlern und Touristen. Die Methodik basiert auf dem Konzept der Portale der Globalisierung, wie sie von Matthias Middell und Katja Naumann definiert wurden. Es wird auf die vorhandene Literatur über portugiesische Eisenbahnen und eine Vielzahl von Quellen angewendet, einschließlich technischer Berichte von portugiesischen Festland- und Kolonialbehörden und verschiedene Statistiken des Eisenbahnbetriebs.

Literature about railway history usually describes railways as promoters of progress and modernity, pioneers of civilization, conquerors of time and space, unrivalled promoters of migrations and long-distance freight haulage or tools of empire. Not as frequent is their depiction as agents of globalization. In this paper, I analyse how railways took on the role of promoters of global flows in Portugal and the territory of its former colonies of Angola, Mozambique and Goa (India), albeit the development of the Nation-State and the growth of nationalistic feelings (that characterized the second half of the nineteenth century and early years of the twentieth century) hampered those fluxes. In my analysis, the concept of globalization is used in a very broad sense, including not only trade and commercial movements, but also the transnational/cross-border circulation of ideas, expertise, skills, capital, workers, commuters, and tourists. The methodology I used is based on the concept of portals of globalization, as defined by Matthias Middell and Katja Naumann, which is applied to the existing literature about Portuguese railways and a wide array of sources, including technical reports by Portuguese mainland and colonial authorities and assorted statistics of railway operation.

1. Introduction: Methodology and Research Object

The nineteenth and early twentieth centuries witnessed a large expansion of land and maritime transport networks that promoted traffic, commerce, migrations and financial flows to unprecedented levels.¹ Simultaneously, it observed the rise of nationalisms and the concept of Nation-State. The national dimension offered by the Nation-State presented itself as the most efficient way to exert sovereignty and it prevailed over any other spatial dimension (local, regional, continental, and international).²

For the study of these conflicting processes, the concept/methodology of “portals of globalisation” is very useful. The term was used by the first time by Ekberg in a 2003 paper about the role of airports as globalising infrastructures, where social and cultural values were entirely redefined.³ Nonetheless, it was Middell and Naumann who developed a broader definition. In their 2010 article, they defined portals of globalisation as “those places that have been centres of world trade or global communication, have served as entrance points for cultural transfer, and where institutions and practices for dealing with global connectedness have been developed.”⁴ In these sites, one can observe not only commercial or financial transactions, but also exchanges of ideologies and social/cultural/symbolical constructions that challenge the very core of national agendas, with bidirectional fluxes that promote transcultural encounters and where local/global agents/actors influence each other.⁵

Following in the footsteps of Middell and Naumann’s work, other researchers analysed different historical contexts of globalisation and added to the original definition of the concept. Maruschke highlighted the high density of global connections as a defining trait of those portals;⁶ Baumann stressed how they gather the necessary conditions for the creation of globalising processes;⁷ Baumert and Herren recalled that global fluxes within portals of globalisation may be controlled or restricted by national regulations or transnational/international agreements.⁸

1 P. Bairoch, *Commerce extérieur et développement économique de l’Europe au XIXe siècle*, Paris 1976, pp. 33–36; D. R. Headrick, *The Tentacles of Progress. Technology Transfer in the Age of Imperialism, 1850–1940*, New York 1988, p. 23.

2 M. Geyer, *Portals of Globalization*, in: W. Eberhard and C. Lübke (eds.), *The Plurality of Europe. Identities and Spaces*, Leipzig 2010, p. 513; M. Middell and K. Naumann, *Global History and the Spatial Turn: From the Impact of Area Studies to the Study of Critical Junctures of Globalization*, in: *Journal of Global History* 5 (2010), p. 162.

3 B. Ekberg, *Life in Transit – A Global Condition*, in: *Topia. Canadian Journal of Cultural Studies* 9 (2003), pp. 83–96.

4 Middell and Naumann, *Global History*, p. 162.

5 *Ibid.*, pp. 162–163.

6 M. Maruschke, *Zones of Reterritorialization: India’s Free Trade Zones in Comparative Perspective, 1947 to the 1980s*, in: *Journal of Global History* 12 (2017), p. 422.

7 C. Baumann, *Introduction*, in: C. Baumann (ed.), *Universities as Portals of Globalization. Crossroads of Internationalization and Area Studies*, Leipzig 2014, p. 7.

8 S. C. Baumert, *University Politics Under the Impact of Societal Transformation and Global Processes – South Africa and Stellenbosch University, 1990–2010*, Ph.D. Thesis, Leipzig University and Stellenbosch University, 2014, p. 4; M. Herren, *European Global Studies: The Historicity of Europe’s Global Entanglements with a Focus on Interdisciplinary Research*, in: M. Herren et al. (eds.), *Potentials and Challenges of Global Studies for the 21st Century*, Bern 2014, p. 11.

In this sense, portals of globalisation may include schools, fairs, quarantine stations, book stores, workshops, construction sites, religious missions, and any other place that registers global interconnections. Additionally, portals of globalisation need not be physical places; they can also include economic/financial or military interventions and cultural innovations.⁹

Of course, railways can also be included in this list.¹⁰ Hyslop, in his study about the Durban harbour, argued that they acted as promoters of globalisation.¹¹ However, railways can also be portals of globalisation themselves, as they were crucial promoters of regional and international exchanges.¹²

In this paper, I will use the concept of portals of globalisation to analyse the frictions between globalisation and nationalism, using as research object the railways Portugal built in its European territory and in its overseas domains (Angola, Mozambique, and India).¹³ Even though these two contexts are completely different in administrative, economic, and geographical terms, one cannot be fully understood without the other. The experience Portuguese technocrats gathered with railway construction in the mainland was subsequently transferred to the colonies. Moreover, the evolution of railway building in the colonies had implications in the mainland's finances, politics and diplomacy. Portugal began the construction of railways in its mainland in 1853 in Lisbon. In the colonies, the laying of rails commenced in 1881 in Goa (India).¹⁴ In the eve of the First World War, the metropolitan network had grown to around 3,000 km; in the Portuguese overseas domains, track mileage reached 3,500 km.¹⁵

9 For a general overview of the uses of portals of globalisation, see: H. S. Pereira, *Portais de globalização: portos e caminhos de ferro no contexto colonial português (1870–1910)*, in: *Revista Portuguesa de História* 49 (2018), pp. 255–273. Further readings include: A. Bashford (ed.), *Quarantine: Local and Global histories*, Basingstoke 2016, p. 10; J. M. Brophy, *Bookshops, Forbidden Print and Urban Political Culture in Central Europe, 1800–1850*, in: *German History* 35 (2017) 3, pp. 403–430; G. Castryck, *Ex-Centring the Global: Liminality and Interconnectedness in Urban Kigoma*, in: M. Middell (ed.), *Self-Reflexive Area Studies*, Leipzig 2013, p. 62; G. Castryck, *Introduction – From Railway Juncture to Portal of Globalization: Making Globalization Work in African and South Asian Railway Towns*, in: *Comparativ* 25 (2015) 4, p. 7; G. Castryck and N. Sieveking, *Introduction: Performing Space in Urban Africa*, in: *Africa* 84 (2014) 1, pp. 1–16.

10 Castryck, *Introduction*, pp. 7–16.

11 J. Hyslop, *Durban as Portal of Globalization: Mines, Railways, Docks and Steamships in the Empire of Otto Siedle's Natal Direct Line, c. 1879–1929*, in: *Comparativ* 25 (2015) 4, pp. 35–50.

12 Castryck, *Introduction*, pp. 7–16; G. Castryck, *The Belgian Base at Kigoma's Railhead (1820s–1930s). Territorial Ambivalence in an Inland Indian Ocean Port*, in: *Comparativ* 25 (2015) 4, p. 78.

13 For a preliminary study about colonial ports and railways as portals of globalisation, see Pereira, *Portais*.

14 M. F. Alegria, *A organização dos transportes em Portugal (1850–1910). As vias e o tráfego*, Lisbon 1990, p. 249; I. J. Kerr and H. S. Pereira, *India and Portugal: The Mormugão and the Tua Railways Compared*, in: Anne McCants et al. (eds.), *Railroads in Historical Context*, Porto 2011–2013, vol. 2, p. 183.

15 Ministério das Colónias, *Estatística dos Caminhos de Ferro das Colónias Portuguesas de 1888 a 1911*, Lisbon 1913; N. Valério (ed.), *Estatísticas Históricas Portuguesas*, Lisbon 2001, p. 373.



Figure 1: The Portuguese mainland network in 1914. Source: sharemap.org and own making

Railways in Portugal and its empire exhibit the contradiction between globalisation and nationalism. Portugal invested in railways to attract to its mainland harbours the bulk of traffic flowing between the Old and the New Worlds.¹⁶ The same strategy was envisaged for the colonies, where railways should tap into the endless repositories of richness Portuguese authorities imagined in the colonial hinterlands and conduct them to the global markets of commodities.¹⁷ At the same time, railways should promote a technological-based nationalism in the mainland and affirm Portuguese presence in the overseas territories that were coveted by other, more powerful, European nations.¹⁸

16 Alegria, *A organização*, p. 485.

17 V. Alexandre and J. Dias, *O Império Africano 1825–1890*, in: J. Serrão and A. H. O. Marques (eds.), *Nova História da Expansão Portuguesa*, Lisbon 1998, vol. 10, pp. 39–48.

18 B. J. N. Marçal, *Um império projectado pelo “silvo da locomotiva”: O papel da engenharia portuguesa na apropriação do espaço colonial africano. Angola e Moçambique (1869–1930)*, Ph.D. thesis, Universidade NOVA de Lisboa, 2016, pp. 459–461; T. Saraiva, *Inventing the Technological Nation: The Example of Portugal (1851–1898)*, in: *History and Technology* 23 (2017) 3, pp. 263–273.



Figure 2: The Angolan railway system in 1914. Source: sharemap.org and own making



Figure 3: The Mozambican railway system in 1914. Source: sharemap.org and own making

2. A Globalised Idea of Progress

Even before construction, railways were a result of transnational circuits of knowledge transfer. Portuguese engineers attended prestigious engineering schools since the 1820s, more notably the *École Nationale des Ponts et Chaussées*, in Paris.¹⁹ In the 1830s–1840s, they were joined by several of their countrymen who fled the Portuguese political instability. All could observe first-hand the sublime of trains that travelled across the European countryside. The wonder before these technical accomplishments became evident in the Portuguese parliamentary debates of the second half of the nineteenth century.²⁰ These men did more than just behold the expansion of railway grids in Europe. Many attended engineering schools, where they acquired technical skills and brought them back home with them. Additionally, they engaged closely with the Saint-Simonianist ideology,²¹ a movement that considered science and technology as the most driving forces for social change and proposed the construction of large transport networks to enhance circulation of people, goods, and capital. In Europe and North America, science and technology became the gauge to measure each nation present value and past worth, and to affirm Western dominance over the territories and peoples of Africa and Asia. In this sense, railways, in particular, were deemed the personification of progress and the best tool to unify distant countries, promote cooperation and peace, and create civilisations of circulation.²²

Portuguese engineers took these beliefs back to Portugal, where, together with the political elites, they envisioned a plan to build railways from the Portuguese harbours in the coast to the frontier with Spain and thence to France. Until 1888, five transnational tracks were built across the border with Spain,²³ which attests their faith in a utopia of a “global brotherhood of economic integration.”²⁴ From the late 1870s onward, Portuguese technocrats sought a similar goal in the colonies, connecting the harbours of Angola, Mozambique and India to their hinterlands.

Both plans followed the Saint-Simonianist creed and the practical examples provided by other nations that sought to capture a sizable portion of international traffic and direct it to their transport systems. Belgium set its rail network towards the border to attract

19 A. C. Matos, Asserting the Portuguese Civil Engineering Identity: The Role Played by the *École des Ponts et Chaussées*, in: A. C. Matos et al. (eds.), *The Quest for a Professional Identity: Engineers between Training and Action*, Lisbon 2009, p. 180.

20 H. S. Pereira, *A política ferroviária nacional (1845–1899)*, Ph.D. thesis, Universidade do Porto, 2012, pp. 82–153.

21 M. C. de Macedo, *Projectar e Construir a Nação: Engenheiros e Território em Portugal (1837–1893)*, Ph.D. thesis, Universidade de Coimbra, 2009, p. 5. Matos, Asserting, pp. 180–185.

22 M. Adas, *Machines as the Measure of Men. Science, Technology, and Ideologies of Western Dominance*, Ithaca, NY 1989, p. 134; E. van der Vleuten, *Understanding Network Societies. Two Decades of Large Technical System Studies*, in: E. van der Vleuten and A. Kaijser (eds.), *Networking Europe. Transnational Infrastructures and the Shaping of Europe, 1850–2000*, Sagamore Beach, MA 2006, p. 289.

23 H. S. Pereira, *The Technodiplomacy of Iberian Transnational Railways in the Second Half of the Nineteenth Century*, in: *History and Technology* 33 (2017) 2, pp. 178–186.

24 N. Sinha, *Railway Imperialism. A Small Town Perspective on Global History, Jamalpur, 1860s–1900s*, in: *Comparativ* 25 (2015) 4, p. 31.

international traffic to Anvers, while Switzerland drilled the Saint Gothard tunnel to maintain its status as a through-transit country in Central Europe.²⁵ In the imperial setting, colonial powers used railroads to exploit and control the hinterlands of its ports.²⁶

3. Entering the Global Money Markets

Construction of railways demanded massive amounts of capital that Portugal did not have. In the first half of the nineteenth century, political instability limited the exchequer's credit and rendered investments in private companies too risky. In 1854, Portugal adhered to the gold-standard, which promoted the country as an attractive target for foreign direct investment and allowed it to easily raise capital through State bonds, placing it in the global circuits of finance.²⁷

In the 1850s, the London Stock Exchange was the main source of capital for the Portuguese railway programme. English financiers supported the first companies that operated in Portugal (Central Peninsular and South Eastern). From the early 1860s onwards, after a succession of disappointments with British capital, Portugal turned to French investors, who controlled the three important firms of the system: Companhia Real (founded in 1860, with the support of House Camondo, managed a network with more than 1,000 km), Companhia da Beira Alta (1878, Société Financière de Paris, operated the most important transnational track, from Figueira da Foz across the border to Salamanca), and Compagnie pour la Construction et Exploitation des Chemins de Fer à l'Étranger (ran short narrow-gauge tracks around Aveiro).

Portuguese capital entered these financing schemes as well, backing the formation of three small companies that operated short narrow-gauge lines in the Portuguese countryside (Companhia do Porto à Póvoa e Famalicão, Companhia de Guimarães and Companhia Nacional).

The State also played a relevant role in the system, either by subsidising private companies or operating new tracks itself (by the end of the nineteenth century, public railway sector accounted for 40 per cent of total mileage).²⁸ Money for these investments was raised with State bonds issued mainly in London and Paris.²⁹

Overseas, the presence of British money was overwhelming. In the late 1870s, in Goa, the Duke of Sutherland, one of the wealthiest men in the City of London, promoted

25 B. v. d. Hertem, M. v. Meerten and G. Verbeurg, *Le Temps du Train. 175 ans de chemins de fer en Belgique*, Louvain 2001, pp. 38–82; J. Schueler, *Travelling Towards the "Mountain that has borne a State": The Swiss Gotthard Railways*, in: Vleuten and Kaijser, *Networking Europe*, p. 71.

26 R. Lee, *Potential railway world heritage sites in Asia and the Pacific*, in: *Working Papers in Railway Studies* 5 (1999), p. 15.

27 L. A. Santos, *A crise financeira de 1891: uma tentativa de explicação*, in: *Análise Social* 36 (2001) 158/159, pp. 188–189.

28 Minho and Douro lines, connecting Porto to the northern and eastern frontier with Spain, and South and South-eastern lines, from Barreiro, across the Tagus from Lisbon, to the southern provinces of Alentejo and Algarve (Alegria, *A organização*, pp. 305–326).

29 A. L. Vieira, *A política de especulação: uma introdução aos investimentos britânicos e franceses nos caminhos-de-ferro portugueses*, in: *Análise Social* 24 (1988) 101/102, pp. 723–744.

the formation of the West of India Railway Company, which capital was fully raised in London.³⁰ In the 1880s, the concessionaire of the Luanda-Ambaca / Malange line (built in 1886–1899) raised its capital issuing bonds in London.³¹ In Mozambique, American and English investors backed the construction of the line from Lourenço Marques (now Maputo) to the Transvaal (1886–1895). After the nationalisation of the line in 1889 by the Portuguese government and a long legal dispute that ended in 1900, Portugal paid a compensation of GBP 1,000,000, raised in Paris.³² Further North, a railway linking the harbour of Beira to Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) was built in the 1890s under the financial umbrella of the British South Africa Company with money raised in the London Stock Exchange.³³ In 1902, the railway from the harbour of Lobito / Benguela in the coast of Angola to the frontier with Belgian Congo was granted to an Aberdonian businessman, Robert Williams, who was funded by a British firm, Tanganyika Concessions.³⁴ A few years later, English capital financed the construction of a new line in Mozambique towards Nyasaland across the Zambezi valley.³⁵

The Portuguese government also invested directly in railway building in the colonies, in two short lines, either directly by the State budget (the Moçâmedes line in southern Angola) or through a Portuguese bank loan (the line from Lourenço Marques to Swaziland).³⁶

4. A Globalised Stage of Construction

Construction yards promoted the establishment of global communications and cultural transfers, as they attracted different agents/actors from assorted nations.

Even though Portuguese engineers had acquired the skills to build and operate railroads, in the 1850s–1860s, Portugal entrusted construction and operation to foreign technicians (British and French). Portuguese engineers were employed in other activities: they planned the investment programme in the Conselho Superior de Obras Públicas (the advisory board of the ministry of Public Works), they negotiated the contracts with the operators, they surveyed the land looking for the best route, and they inspected the contractors work. Only when foreign engineers failed, did Portuguese technicians stepped in and managed the work, but only temporarily until the government found another foreign expert to resume the task.³⁷ From the 1870s onwards, Portuguese engineers played a more relevant role in the sector. They directed the construction and operation of State

30 Kerr and Pereira, *India*, pp. 171 and 176–177.

31 Marçal, *Um império*, p. 245.

32 *Ibid.*, pp. 302–315.

33 J. Lunn, *Capital and Labour on the Rhodesian Railway System, 1888–1947*, London 1997, pp. 26–34.

34 T. S. Lopes and V. C. Simões, *Foreign Investment in Portugal and Knowledge Spillovers: From the Methuen Treaty to the 21st Century*, in: *Business History*, forthcoming, DOI: 10.1080/00076791.2017.1386177.

35 Marçal, *Um império*, p. 362.

36 *Ibid.*, pp. 317 and 391–393.

37 M. Pinheiro, *Cidade e Caminhos de Ferro*, Lisbon 2008, pp. 166–167.

railways and they even took managing positions in private operators:³⁸ in 1872, engineer Espregueira was nominated general-manager of Companhia Real, and in 1883, engineer Almeida Pinheiro became director of Companhia Nacional.³⁹ Foreign engineers were still hired to work in Portugal (they excelled in the construction of the Beira Alta line in 1878–1882),⁴⁰ thus maintaining a flow of knowledge transfer from the European centre to its periphery.

In the imperial scenario, British expertise dominated until the end of the nineteenth century. The construction of the Mormugão, Lourenço Marques, and Beira railways fell under the responsibility of English engineers: Hawkshaw, Son & Hayter and Ernest Sawyer in India; Thomas Tancred and the Pauling brothers in Mozambique. Portuguese experts surveyed the land and overlooked their foreign comrades work, but that was all.⁴¹ In the beginning of the twentieth century, there was an effort to rely exclusively on nationals to build new railroads (Moçâmedes and Swaziland),⁴² but it was quite impossible to prohibit the entrance of foreign technicians: in Angola, a British team of experts (John Metcalfe, Douglas Fox, and the Paulings) was hired to build and operate the Benguela line.⁴³

The work-yards became dynamic sites to establish global flows of technical knowledge. Even when they were not directing construction, Portuguese engineers worked closely with their foreign colleagues, learning new skills and practising those they acquired during training. Foreign influence became especially visible in technical terms that entered Portuguese language from its English or French original: *jim crow* (jargon for rail straightener) became *genicró* (ʒənikrɔ); gauge (distance between rails) became *guel[i]ja* (gʷ[i]ʒɐ); sleepers turned into *chulipas* (ʃu'lipɐʃ) and train into *trem* ('trɛj).⁴⁴ French terms like *tirefond* (chair screws) became *tira-fundo* (tirɐ'fũdu), while *éclisse* (fishplate) entered directly into the Portuguese lexicon.

Foreign influence was also crucial in the introduction of narrow-gauge railways in Portugal, a low-cost solution to build lines in hilly regions. In 1874, Companhia do Porto à

38 Macedo, *Projectar*, pp. 193–230; A. C. Matos and M. P. Diogo, *From the École des Ponts et Chaussées to Portuguese Railways: The Transfer of Technological Knowledge and Practices*, in: M. Pinheiro (ed.), *Railway Modernization: A Historical Perspective* (19th–20th centuries), Lisbon 2009, pp. 86–87.

39 H. S. Pereira, *Contributo para a análise da elite tecnocrática portuguesa de Oitocentos: esboço biográfico do engenheiro Manuel Afonso Espregueira (1833–1917)*, in: *História: Revista da FLUP* 4 (2017) 7–2, pp. 78–79; H. S. Pereira and J. M. L. Cordeiro, *Protagonistas: Almeida Pinheiro, José Beça e Dinis Moreira da Mota*, in: H. S. Pereira (ed.), *A Linha do Tua (1851–2008)*, Porto 2017, pp. 135–140.

40 H. S. Pereira, *Um estrangeiro na inauguração da linha da Beira Alta*, in: *Revista de História da Sociedade e da Cultura* 12 (2012), p. 352.

41 Kerr and Pereira, *India*, pp. 178–189; Marçal, *Um império*, pp. 234–244, 280–315 and 330–342. Only the Ambaca railroad was built under the supervision of Portuguese engineers.

42 H. S. Pereira, *Identidade e Tecnologia: o caminho de ferro da Suazilândia (1900–1914)*, in: *Anais de História de Além-Mar* 18 (2017), pp. 143–176. H. S. Pereira, *O caminho de ferro de Moçâmedes: entre projeto militar, instrumento tecnodiplomático e ferramenta de apropriação colonial (1881–1914)*, in: *Revista de História da Sociedade e da Cultura* 18 (2018), pp. 157–183.

43 Marçal, *Um império*, p. 416.

44 This word was used in nineteenth-century Portugal, but it fell out of use, replaced by *comboio*. It is still widely used in Brazilian Portuguese, though.

Póvoa imported it from the Welsh Fairlie Engine Company. A few years later, Portuguese engineers, Xavier Cordeiro and Sousa Brandão, visited France, Italy and Switzerland to acquire new skills to expand the Portuguese network to the hilliest areas of the country and the colonies.⁴⁵

Besides engineers, work-yards were teeming with gangs of hundreds of petty contractors, foremen, and labourers that did most heavy and pick-and-axe labour. These men and women, hailing from different backgrounds and nationalities, also promoted globalisation and circulation of expertise in the lower ranks of construction.⁴⁶ In the mainland, in the Northern line (Lisbon–Porto), Italian and Irish drillers used their previous experience in the tunnel under the Thames to build the tunnel of Albergaria through what was at the time deemed a mountain of sand and water.⁴⁷ In the railway from Porto to Salamanca (Douro line), many tasks were assigned to Spanish, French, German, and Italian contractors, as there were not enough Portuguese skilled labourers available.⁴⁸ The same happened in the South and South-eastern railways, where Spanish and British contractors were hired to lay the rails to the southern regions of Portugal.⁴⁹ In the North-eastern province of Trás-os-Montes, Galician workers, managed by Catalan contractors built a small narrow-gauge track to Bragança.⁵⁰ Like in other contexts,⁵¹ many stayed in the area, married, and brought up a family locally.⁵²

Overseas, Spanish, French, British, Belgian, German, Italian, Swedish, Russian, Greek, American, and Indian workers could be found across the colonial work sites, besides, of course, Portuguese navvies and African natives.⁵³ The circulation of natives – a common trait in other colonial areas⁵⁴ – also occurred in the Portuguese colonies. The Benguela railway was built by workers from Senegal, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Ghana, Congo, Guinea, Cape Verde, and South Africa.⁵⁵ In Mozambique, natives from the northern province of Zambezi were brought south to work in the construction of the Swaziland railway. They

45 H. S. Pereira and B. J. Navarro, The implementation and Development of Narrow Gauge Railways in Portugal as a Case of Knowledge Transfer (c. 1850–c. 1910), in: *The Journal of Transport History* 39 (2018) 3, pp. 355–380, DOI: 10.1177/0022526618791726.

46 On the importance of labour as promoter of globalisation, see S. Boonen and J. Lagae, A City Constructed by “des gens d’ailleurs”. Urban Development and Migration Policies in Colonial Lubumbashi, 1910–1930, in: *Comparativ* 25 (2015) 4, pp. 52–53; J. Monson, Moving Goods in Kapiri Mposhi, Zambia: The Scaffolding of Stability in TAZARA’s Dry Port, in: *ibid.*, p. 88; Sinha, *Railway Imperialism*, pp. 18, 22 and 29.

47 A. S. Rosário, O túnel de Albergaria, in: *Boletim da CP* 36 (1964) 148, pp. 11–13.

48 Macedo, *Projectar*, p. 209.

49 H. S. Pereira, *Rede férrea alentejana revisitada (1845–1899)*, in: P. Petrov et al. (eds.), *Avanços em Literatura e Cultura Portuguesas Da Idade Média ao século XIX*, Santiago de Compostela, 2011, p. 479.

50 H. S. Pereira, *Os Beças, João da Cruz e Costa Serrão: protagonistas da linha de Bragança*, Porto 2014, p. 48.

51 Boonen and Lagae, *A City*, pp. 62–64.

52 M. O. Lage, O. Silva and M. Silva, Demographics of the Tua Valley: Evidences from Parish Record Books During the Construction of the Railway (1878–1897), in: McCants et al., *Railroads*, vol. 3, pp. 218–222.

53 Marçal, *Um império*, pp. 239, 392 and 417–419.

54 Boonen and Lagae, *A City*, p. 53.

55 Marçal, *Um império*, p. 417.

did not adapt to the colder weather of the region and they fell ill frequently.⁵⁶ In India, workers from Ceylon and Afghanistan flocked to Goa to build the Mormugão railway.⁵⁷

5. Promoting Global Trade Flows

Portugal did not have basic raw materials to build and operate railroads. Portuguese coal and iron were of poor quality and were not mass produced. Only timber and rock were relatively abundant. In Africa, ore deposits were still untapped. Most infrastructure components (rails, fastenings, bridges and viaducts pieces) and rolling stock were not produced internally. Therefore, these materials had to be imported. Throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries France, Britain, Belgium, and Germany were the main suppliers of railways both in Portugal and in the colonies.⁵⁸ Considering that Portugal did not possess a strong manufacture industry, the nationality of the technology and raw materials for railways was not a major concern, which contrasts clearly with industrial nations, like Britain, that fought against the globalisation of supplies to its colonies.⁵⁹

The know-how to manufacture some of the rail components slowly entered the country. From 1860 onwards, Portuguese firms began manufacturing small utensils for the sector (spikes, splints, treenails, fishplates) and since the 1870s Companhia Real's workshops and those of the State started making their own wagons. Locomotives and coaches were never produced in Portugal in the nineteenth century,⁶⁰ although one Portuguese engineer, Dinis da Mota, became famous for assembling in Portugal a steamer his employer (Companhia Nacional) bought from the Kessler factory, surprising the German technicians when they arrived in Portugal to set the engine up.⁶¹

When the lines were operational, they reinforced their role as portals of globalisation, although they did not serve every region of the kingdom and the Empire equally.⁶² By the end of the nineteenth century, Portuguese railways in the mainland transported 2,706,000 t, 15-fold the value registered in 1868 (the first included in the official statistics). In the eve of World War I, the grand total reached almost 6,000,000 t.⁶³ The net-

56 Arquivo Histórico Ultramarino (AHU), box 1576 1L, report 30 July 1907.

57 J. B. A. Gracias, *Caminho de ferro e porto de Mormugão*, Bastorá 1940, pp. 249 and 269–70.

58 Marçal, *Um império*, p. 419; Pereira, *O caminho*; M. Pinheiro, *A construção dos caminhos-de-ferro e a encomenda de produtos industriais em Portugal (1855–1890)*, in: *Análise Social* 24 (1988), 101/102, pp. 749 and 762.

59 Sinha, *Railway*, p. 31.

60 Production of coaches began in Portugal in the first years of the twentieth century (F. M. C. Pedreira, *Material Circulante*, in: A. Antunes et al. [eds.], 1910–2010: o Caminho de Ferro em Portugal, Lisbon 2011, pp. 76–77; Pinheiro, *A construção*, pp. 751–752).

61 J. M. L. Cordeiro, *The Man Behind the Tua Railway: Chief Engineer Dinis Moreira da Mota*, in: McCants et al., *Railroads*, vol. 2, p. 285.

62 For an assessment of the efficiency of the Portuguese mainland network, see L. E. Silveira et al., *Population and railways in Portugal, 1801–1930*, in: *The Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 42 (2011) 1, pp. 29–52. No such study exists for the colonies, but areas that did not benefit from railways were certainly larger.

63 Valério, *Estatísticas*, pp. 372–373.

work was designed to favour international traffic, however transnational flows were never significant. Nonetheless, railways promoted the integration of the Portuguese economy in the global market, in cooperation with harbours (specially Lisbon's). A large portion of the traffic of goods was set between the coast and the Portuguese hinterland.⁶⁴ Railways transported goods from the Portuguese hinterland to the harbours from where they entered the global circuits of trade (cork, leather, marble, olive oil, timber and wine). On the opposite direction, imported goods were forwarded to the regions of the Portuguese countryside (grain, fodder, coal, fertilisers, metals, minerals, and sundry manufactured goods).⁶⁵

In the colonies, the first year of operation registered 78,208 t, transported in the lines of Lourenço Marques and Mormugão. By 1900 that figure doubled to 150,474 t but in 1913 a grand sum of 1,507,133 t was registered.⁶⁶ An exhaustive exam of the flows of goods of Portuguese colonial railways is yet to be done, but some partial studies and available primary sources seem to indicate these infrastructures enhanced the integration of the overseas domains in the global market.

Mormugão became a valid choice for producers of manganese in southern India, especially in the first years of the 1900s.⁶⁷ The port and railway of Lourenço Marques promoted the exportation of gold and minerals from the Transvaalian mines and the migration of Mozambican workers to the Boer territory.⁶⁸ From 1899 onwards, the Beira railway became one of the corridors of exportation of Rhodesia (the other being the railway that extended from Salisbury to Cape Town).⁶⁹ In Angola, exportation of rubber, coffee, leather and grain was enhanced with the railway of Ambaca/Malange.⁷⁰ Similarly, further South, the Moçâmedes line facilitated the transport of sugar, cotton and grain from the Chela plateau to the port of Moçâmedes.⁷¹ Finally, the Benguela line was crucial for the transportation of copper (from the Congolese mines of Katanga), wax and corn (from the hinterland of the province) to the harbour of Lobito/Benguela.⁷² Portugal absorbed the bulk of the exports from Angola (average of 88 per cent in 1909–1913), but it is likely that most of these goods were re-exported to other markets. Britain, Germany, Belgium, The Netherlands and Norway were the other destinations.⁷³

64 Alegria, *A organização*, pp. 359 and 470–472; Pinheiro, *Cidade*, pp. 44–53 and 63.

65 Alegria, *A organização*, pp. 183–187, 363–387 and 468–482.

66 AHU, pack 52 1G and book 927 1N. Ministério das Colónias, *Estatística*.

67 Gracias, *Caminho*, pp. 278–292 and 327–336.

68 F. Bouene and M. Santos, *O modus vivendi entre Moçambique e o Transvaal (1901–1909). Um caso de "imperialismo ferroviário"*, in: *Africana Studia* 9 (2006), pp. 246–248 and 260–261.

69 AHU, pack 579 1E. *Boletim da Companhia de Moçambique (1893–1910). Boletim do Governo do Território da Companhia de Moçambique (1911–1915). Boletins Estatísticos do Movimento Comercial e Marítimo no Território de Manica e Sofala (1908–1910)*. Lunns, *Capital*, pp. 36–41.

70 AHU, packs 2463 1B, 2507 1B, 2559 1B, 2701 1B and 2756 1B.

71 Pereira, *O caminho*, pp. 77–78.

72 E. Esteves, *O caminho-de-ferro de Bengela e o impacto económico, social e cultural na sua zona de influência (1902–1952)*, in: *Africana Studia* 3 (2000), pp. 62–63.

73 João Mesquita, *Dados estatísticos para o estudo das pautas de Angola, Luanda 1918*.

The railways of Mormugão, Lourenço Marques and Benguela were largely dependent of neighbouring regions; in this sense, they acted as subordinate portals of globalisation in a hierarchy where British India, the Transvaal and Congo were the main portals.⁷⁴

In the opposite direction, from Europe to the colonies, went brandy, wine, building materials, clothing, coal, salt, and assorted items that were carried to the colonial hinterland by railways to support the colonisation of Africa.⁷⁵ In Angola, Portugal was the main supplier (average of 52 percent in 1909–1913), followed by Britain (23 per cent) and Germany (14 per cent).⁷⁶

Available figures from the colonial harbours and customhouses (Luanda, Lobito/Benguela, Moçâmedes and Beira) also illustrate the evolution of globalising flows promoted by colonial railways (and ports). The movement of the Angolan customhouses rose from 6,646 *contos* (today's USD 193,000,000) in 1888 to 12,570 *contos* (USD 283,000,000) in 1913.⁷⁷ Harbours with rail links accounted for an average of 82 per cent of the overall traffic between 1909 and 1913.⁷⁸ In Beira, the movement of the port was almost negligible before the arriving of the train, but it escalated to more than 140,000 *contos* (over USD 3,000,000,000) in 1913.⁷⁹

As for the transit of passengers, 300,000 men, women and children rode the Portuguese trains in the maiden year of operation (1856). In 1900, more than 12,000,000 people (over two-fold the Portuguese mainland population at the time) used the railway for their mobility needs, a figure that rose to 19,000,000 in the eve of the First World War.⁸⁰ These flows included different types of mobility of a local, regional, national scope: neo-realist Portuguese author, Alves Redol, in his 1946 novel, "Porto Manso", identified some of them as "traders, prostitutes, thieves, technicians, an assorted mix of humanity."⁸¹ Migrants looking for work in other provinces of the kingdom or abroad, and workers commuting to their jobs (specially in Porto, Lisbon, and industrial city of Barreiro located in the South bank of the Tagus, opposite to Lisbon) also used the new form of mobility offered by the trains.⁸²

For the purposes of this paper, however, one flow is particularly relevant: leisure trips made by tourists, a flux usually associated with portals of globalisation.⁸³ Railways boost-

74 For hierarchy of portals, see Hyslop, Durban, pp. 36, 38 and 43.

75 AHU, box 301 1H and packs 2463 1B, 2507 1B, 2559 1B, 2564 1B, 2676 1B, 2701 1B and 2756 1B. Pereira, O caminho.

76 Mesquita, Dados.

77 For the exchange rates until the 1891 bankruptcy, 1 conto = 1,000,000 réis = GBP 222.222. See M. E. Mata, As finanças públicas portuguesas da Regeneração à Primeira Guerra Mundial, Lisbon 1993. From 1892 onwards, I used the historical series of exchange rates provided by the Bank of Portugal, <https://www.bportugal.pt/EstatisticasWeb> (accessed 5 September 2018). For the conversion from GBP to current USD I used the online tool provided by L. H. Officer and S. H. Williamson, https://www.measuringworth.com/calculators/exchange/result_exchange.php (accessed 5 September 2018).

78 Mesquita, Dados.

79 See note 69.

80 Valério, Estatísticas, pp. 372–373.

81 A. Redol, Porto Manso, Lisbon 1946, p. 353.

82 Pinheiro, Cidade, pp. 51, 68–69 and 77; Silveira et al., Population, p. 52.

83 Hyslop, Durban^{p. 47}.

ed tourism, an activity that until then had little or no relevance at all. Naturally, those leisurely travels included nationals, but foreigners also came to Portugal by rail to visit the Portuguese beaches, spas, and cultural heritage sites.

Small towns like Sintra or Cascais, in the outskirts of Lisbon, became touristic attractions.⁸⁴ In Lisbon, the central station of Rossio, with its audacious and progressive architecture, became a lavishing entry point for tourists that arrive in Portugal, coming from France and Spain, in the Beira Alta and Eastern lines in the trains of the *Compagnie Internationale des Wagons-Lits* (that since the late 1880s operated the Sud-Express route). Right next to the station, travellers could check-in in the luxurious Avenida Palace Hotel (still in operation today).⁸⁵

Further up North, the Beira Alta railway that traversed Portugal in an East-West direction across the central provinces of Portugal since 1882 also brought wanderers from Spain to the beaches of Figueira da Foz. From 1884 onwards, tourists benefited from a brand-new attraction, local theatre Teatro-Circo Saraiva de Carvalho, upgraded to a casino (Grande Casino Peninsular) in 1895.⁸⁶

As time went by, railways added new touristic attractions in Portugal to their offer (beaches, bullfights, castles, cities with important cultural and historical heritage, county fairs, exhibitions, mountain and health resorts, pilgrimages, spas, and so on). Since 1888, the beginning of the publication of the “*Gazeta dos Caminhos de Ferro*” broadened the advertisement of those places and how to get there by train, occasionally offering promotional tickets to its readers. Inversely, both the Gazette and railway companies also promoted travels abroad. For instance, in 1889, the *Companhia Real* offered to its users GBP 5 (USD 700) return tickets to visit the World Exhibition in Paris.⁸⁷

Numbers of passenger traffic in the imperial railways are much lower, albeit significant as far as imperial mobility is concerned. The first year of operation (1888) registered 230,000 travellers; in the turn of the century (1900) that figure rose to 305,000, whilst in 1913 almost 750,000 passengers rode the trains in the colonies.⁸⁸ The nature of the circulation of people promoted by railways was far more simple than that that occurred in the mainland, albeit it also contributed to a globalising process, as it brought together people from many different origins.⁸⁹ Similarly to what happened with goods, flows of passengers followed in two directions: upwards to the hinterlands and downwards to the coast. A recent study speculates that upwards movements were much superior, which

84 Pinheiro, *Cidade*, p. 77.

85 *Ibid.*, p. 76.

86 I. Vaquinhas, *Saber Perdurar. Grandes linhas de evolução do Casino da Figueira (1884–1978)*, Figueira da Foz 2015, pp. 5–6.

87 E. F. Ribeiro, *A Gazeta dos Caminhos de Ferro e a Promoção do Turismo em Portugal (1888–1940)*, in: *Biblio 3W* 14, 837 (2009), www.ub.edu/geocrit/b3w-837.htm (accessed 4 September 2018) Saraiva, *Inventing*, p. 268. The price was steep but affordable to some classes of workers. It was equivalent to 22,500 réis. For instance, a typographer working in Lisbon earned 1800 réis/day. For a worker of the vineyards of Vila Real, however, with a daily salary ranging from 139 to 185 réis, such voyage was an unaffordable luxury (C. A. Martins, *Trabalho e condições de vida em Portugal [1850–1913]*, in: *Análise Social* 32 [1997] 142, p. 486).

88 AHU, pack 52 1G and book 927 1N. Ministério das Colónias, *Estatística*.

89 Boonen and Lagae, *A City*, p. 54.

may suggest that the railway contributed to a European settlement of the Portuguese colonies.⁹⁰

Besides goods and people, railways, which were the result of the globalisation of the idea of progress, promoted themselves the globalisation of ideas. This is also a subject that requires further studies, but it is likely that railways brought with them new concepts, authors, books, and literature, at least if we take into consideration Portuguese diplomat, Eça de Queiroz, writings:

*railways transported each day torrents of brand new things, ideas, systems, aesthetics, forms, feelings, humanitarian interests... Each morning brought its own revelation, as if they were a new Sun. It was Michelet that arrived in Portugal, and Hegel, Vico and Proudhon; and Hugo, announced as a prophet and a king slayer; and Balzac with his wicked and languid world; and Goethe, vast as the Universe; and Poe, Heine, Darwin – I believe – and so many others!*⁹¹

6. The Conflict with the Nation-State

The pressures exerted by railways towards the setting of global flows were faced and to an extent contradicted by the emergence of the Nation-State, either during the operation but also during the decision-making and construction processes. In the colonies, the tensions of empire also originated obstacles to globalisation processes.⁹²

In the Iberian Peninsula, the Portuguese goal of building the most direct route between Lisbon and the French border clashed with the Spanish agenda that favoured internal traffic rather than transnational freight. The first transnational line opened in 1863 meandered about in the Spanish countryside before arriving to the French border. Moreover, Spain privileged railway construction towards its own harbours instead of building lines towards Portugal. Additionally, after 1870, Madrid realised that the ideology that argued for the union of both nations into one single country was completely unpopular in Portugal and it closed negotiations to build more cross-border links. Until the end of the 1880s, four additional lines were open across the frontier, most of them set by the intervention of private agents. Two were built by a consortium of Portuguese banks (seeded in Porto) that financed the extension of the lines in Spain. However, after the inauguration of these lines, traffic was low, as an adverse fare policy executed by Spanish railway companies diverted freight from those transnational vectors.⁹³ Globalisation of commerce in Portugal was forced to choose a different route, by sea.⁹⁴

90 Pereira, O caminho.

91 Quoted in: A. C. Matos, Eça de Queiroz: uma biografia, Porto 2009, p. 60.

92 For a handful of examples, see Vleuten and Kaisjer, Networking Europe; Geyer, Portals, p. 513; Herren, European, p. 11; Middell and Naumann, Global, p. 150; Sinha, Railway, pp. 18, 29 and 32.

93 Pereira, The Technodiplomacy, pp. 186–187.

94 Alegria, A organização, pp. 196–212 and 486.

Similar predicaments occurred in the colonies, where railways were counting on international traffic to feed the colonial harbours of Delagoa Bay / Lourenço Marques, Beira (in Mozambique), Lobito/Benguela (Angola) and Mormugão (India). In all these projects, the border appeared as larger obstacle than the highest mountain or the deepest valley. Even though the concept of Nation-State was not as strong as in Europe,⁹⁵ the context of the scramble for Africa took European rivalries to the colonial setting. Diplomatic negotiations to build the lines were long and hard, because neighbouring administrations also had ports that could serve as outlets of the colonial hinterlands (Mormugão suffered the competition of Bombay, whereas Beira and Delagoa Bay / Lourenço Marques had to compete with the Cape, Port Elizabeth, Durban and East London, and Lobito/Benguela with Matadi). Additionally, the colonial specificity during the scramble for Africa turned railways into trumps to determine the sovereignty over a given territory. Eventually these disputes were settled by international agreements and the rails were laid.⁹⁶ After inauguration, national rivalries diverted traffic from the border, but, as mentioned before, as time went by those lines promoted transnational flows: in Delagoa Bay / Lourenço Marques, these flows were favoured by an economic agreement that supplied the Transvaalian mines with cheap labour from southern Mozambique in exchange for a percentage of traffic directed to the Portuguese colonial harbour; further North, the line that connected Rhodesia with South Africa could not handle all the Rhodesian traffic, which had to be directed to the Portuguese harbour of Beira; in Angola, the Benguela line was the quickest route to the sea offered to the copper mines of Katanga; finally, in India, cross-border traffic flourished when the Portuguese line was leased to the railway company that operated its extension in British India.

Foreign presence overseas was a consequence of the growing globalisation process that different Nation-States tried to avoid or control.⁹⁷ From the mid-1890s onwards, Portugal also tried to counter the presence of foreigners (especially the British) in the colonies, as it could jeopardise Portuguese sovereignty on the region. The disputes arisen in these areas were not handled directly by the Portuguese and British State, but by local organisations.⁹⁸ In the lines of Goa and Delagoa Bay / Lourenço Marques, fiscal directors frequently countered British engineers and contractors in an effort to affirm Portuguese authority in those areas.⁹⁹ The feud was particularly serious in Delagoa Bay / Lourenço Marques, in the process that led to the nationalisation of the line, during which force had to be employed by the local Portuguese authorities against British contractors (who even applied for the help of three vessels of the British Navy docked in the bay).¹⁰⁰ In the provinces traversed by the Beira line (Manica and Sofala), the conflict was set between

95 Hyslop, Durban, p. 38.

96 H. S. Pereira, *Fronteiras e caminhos-de-ferro: da quimera saint-simoniana ao desencanto tecnodiplomático* (c. 1850–c. 1900), in: *Revista de História das Ideias* 35 (2017), pp. 227–259.

97 Boonen and Lagae, *A City*, pp. 54 and 66; Castryck, *The Belgian*, p. 79; Hyslop, Durban, p. 37.

98 For examples of such disputes in other context, see: Hyslop, Durban, p. 41.

99 Kerr and Pereira, *India*, pp. 185–186.

100 Marçal, *Um império*, pp. 302–303.

Cecil Rhodes' chartered, British South African Company, on one side, and Portuguese chartered, Companhia de Moçambique, on the other, each trying to protect its own interests (and hence the interests of their own countries) in the area.¹⁰¹ As I said before, in the early years of the 1900s, there was a strong effort to use exclusively Portuguese capital and Portuguese know-how in the construction of new colonial railways and to completely bar entrance to foreign agents in Angola. However, this strategy worked for small enterprises only.

7. Conclusion

Portuguese railways illustrate well the contradiction between the creation of globalising flows and the ascension of the Nation-State that characterised the nineteenth century. In Europe, the decision-making process and operation of transnational rail links (suggested by the Saint-Simonianists to promote circulation and globalising flows) had in the political border of the Nation-State its most unsurmountable obstacle. Different technological agendas (favouring internal or international traffic), opposing economic interests (feeding national harbours), private corporations goals (that favoured longer routes in internal railways towards ports) complicated the setup of fluid cross-border flows. The same obstacles existed in the colonies, where the scramble for Africa contributed to complicate the process even further. Even though imperial railways could favour global flows of capital, people and goods, they were also tools of empire, indispensable to affirm different colonial powers sovereignty over those territories.

Nonetheless, railways were able to overcome these obstacles and act as portals of globalisation, promoting the flow of capital, workers, tourists, settlers, assorted goods (primary, colonial, manufactured), and ideas.

Initially, railways were the result of a global idea of progress based on technology. They were the token that Portugal and its experts were up to date the most modern technical knowledge that was changing the economy and the society of the European and North American nations. By building railways, Portugal was presenting itself as a modern nation, willing to enter in the global concert of technological nations promised by the Saint-Simonianist prophets who trained the Portuguese engineers. In the colonial context, railways proved that Portugal was willing to join the effort of colonising and “civilising” Africa and was indeed an imperial nation.

Construction and operation quickened these intents and hastened global flows. Railways were a capital-intensive industry that required vast sums of money for construction and operation. Benefiting from its adherence to the gold-standard, Portugal also entered the global flows of finance that had its centre in London and Paris. Both were present in the Portuguese investment programme either in the mainland (the latter) and in the colonies (the former).

101 Ibid., pp. 327–341.

Construction of railways brought to Portugal and its imperial possessions thousands of engineers, contractors, and workers from different backgrounds and nationalities that contributed to the transfer of technical knowledge (both in the higher and in the lower ranks of construction) and to increase the diversity of the Portuguese cultural and society: railways brought new terms to the language and new people to the Portuguese demographics.

Operation intensified this globalisation process, by placing Portugal in global trade flows. In cooperation with harbours, railways augmented the circulation of foreign goods in the mainland and the colonies and they facilitated the placement of national and colonial goods in international markets. In this sense, the Portuguese metropolis acted as a guiding force of the colonial globalising flows.¹⁰² Railways also accelerated the communication of ideas that arrived from the European centre to the Portuguese periphery much more quickly than before.

102 About this role of the metropolis, see Hyslop, Durban, p. 39.

Autorinnen und Autoren

Anandita Bajpai

PhD in Global Studies, Faculty at the Department of South Asian Studies, Institute for Asian and African Studies, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin; Research Fellow at the Leibniz-Zentrum Moderner Orient (ZMO), Berlin.

bajpai.anandita@hu-berlin.de; anandita.bajpai@zmo.de

De-Valera N. Y. M. Botchway

PhD in History, Associate Professor of History (Africa and the African Diaspora) at the University of Cape Coast, Ghana.

de-valera.botchway@ucc.edu.gh

Katrin Bromber

PhD in African Linguistics and Habilitation in African Studies, Senior Research Fellow at the Leibniz-Zentrum Moderner Orient (ZMO), Berlin.

katrin.bromber@zmo.de

Miguel Bandeira Jerónimo

PhD in History, Senior Research Fellow at the Centre for Social Studies, University of Coimbra, Portugal.

mbjeronimo@ces.uc.pt; <https://uc-pt.academia.edu/MiguelBandeiraJerónimo>

Jakob Krajs

PhD in Islamic Studies, Research Fellow with the special programme “Islam, the Modern Nation-State, and Transnational Movements,” Gerda Henkel Stiftung.

jakob.krais@fu-berlin.de

Hugo Silveira Pereira

PhD in History, Assistant Researcher, Interuniversity Center for the History of Sciences and Technology, Faculty of Sciences and Technology, University NOVA of Lisbon

hugo jose.pereira@gmail.com

