comparativ

ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR GLOBALGESCHICHTE UND
VERGLEICHENDE GESELLSCHAFTSFORSCHUNG

Herausgegeben im Auftrag der
Karl-Lamprecht-Gesellschaft e. V. (KLG) / European Network in
Universal and Global History (ENIUGH) von
Matthias Middell und Hannes Siegrist

Anschrift der Redaktion

Universität Leipzig, Centre for Area Studies
Redaktion COMPARATIV
IPF 169001
D – 04081 Leipzig

Tel.: +49 / (0)341 / 97 30 230
E-Mail: comparativ@uni-leipzig.de
Internet: www.uni-leipzig.de/comparativ/

Redaktionssekretärin: Katja Naumann
(knaumann@uni-leipzig.de)

Comparativ erscheint sechsmal jährlich mit einem Umfang von jeweils ca. 140 Seiten. Einzelheft: 12.00 €; Doppelheft 22.00 €; Jahresabonnement 50.00 €; ermäßigtes Abonnement 25.00 €. Für Mitglieder der KLG / ENIUGH ist das Abonnement im Mitgliedsbeitrag enthalten.

Zuschriften und Manuskripte senden Sie bitte an die Redaktion. Bestellungen richten Sie an den Buchhandel oder direkt an den Verlag. Ein Bestellformular finden Sie unter: http://www.uni-leipzig.de/comparativ/

Leipziger Universitätsverlag GmbH
Oststraße 41
D – 04317 Leipzig
Tel. / Fax: +49 / (0)341 / 990 04 40
info@univerlag-leipzig.de
www.univerlag-leipzig.de

Africa's Transregional Conflicts

Ed. by Ulf Engel

Leipziger Universitätsverlag

Comparativ.
Zeitschrift für Globalgeschichte und vergleichende Gesellschaftsforschung / hrsg. von Matthias Middell und Hannes Siegrist – Leipzig: Leipziger Univ.-Verl.
ISSN 0940-3566
Jg. 28, H. 6. Africa's Transregional Conflicts. – 2018

Africa's Transregional Conflicts. Ed. by Ulf Engel – Leipzig: Leipziger Univ.-Verl., 2018
(Comparativ; Jg. 28, H. 6)
ISBN 978-3-96023-243-8

Comparativ.
Zeitschrift für Globalgeschichte und vergleichende Gesellschaftsforschung 28 (2018) 6
ISSN 0940-3566
ISBN 978-3-96023-243-8

Inhaltsverzeichnis

Aufsätze

Buchbesprechungen

Introduction: Africa's Transregional Conflicts

Ulf Engel

ABSTRACTS

Diese Ausgabe von Comparativ schlägt eine neue analytische Kategorie für das Studium einer bestimmten Gruppe von gewaltsamen Konflikten in Afrika und Versuchen ihrer Lösung vor – transregionale Konflikte. Ontologisch ist diese Kategorie abgegrenzt von breiter gefassten und zugleich unbestimmteren Begriffen wie „international", „transnational" oder „global", epistemologisch impliziert sie ein unterschiedliches Verständnis transregionaler Konflikte, wie sie im Lake Chad Basin, im Gebiet der Großen Seen oder am Horn von Afrika zu beobachten sind. Die ‚Bunker' der traditionellen Wissensorganisation mit ihrer Einteilung in verschiedene Regionen als Untersuchungsfeld der Area Studies (im Gegensatz zu den so genannten systematischen Disziplinen) werden verlassen, stattdessen werden transdisziplinäre Studien angeregt, die nach der sozialen Konstruktion von „Regionen" fragen.

Transregional conflicts – this collection of articles introduces this new analytical category for the study of a specific group of violent conflicts in Africa while providing perspectives on possible resolutions. Ontologically, this proposed category is distinct from broader, more fuzzy terms such as "international", "transnational", or "global". And epistemologically it implies a different understanding of the way in which transregional conflicts such as, for instance, the ones around the Lake Chad Basin, the Great Lakes region, or the Horn of Africa can be studied. Accordingly, this category of transregional conflicts: leaves the silos of the traditional organization of knowledge, with its division between different areas as studied through area studies (as opposed to the so-called systematic disciplines), and rather engages in cross- and transdisciplinary exercises to unpack the way how "regions" are socially constructed.

Comparativ | Zeitschrift für Globalgeschichte und vergleichende Gesellschaftsforschung 28 (2018) Heft 6, S. 7–26.

> *We investigated the extent to which armed conflicts conventionally regarded – and coded – as 'internal' had, in reality, an internationalized component. We discovered a very high level of clandestine cross-border military operations and various forms of support to proxies by neighboring countries (some covert, some openly acknowledged), not captured in the existing characterization. This analysis caused us to redefine the paradigmatic African armed conflicts from 'internal' to 'internal conflicts with important internationalized political and military components.' Competition and contestation among states emerged as an important feature of the African political landscape.* […]
> *One of the striking features of this analysis was the extent to which neighborly engagement in peace processes – both conflict mediation and also PSOs* [peace support operations] *– reflected earlier patterns of political-military involvement.* […]
> *This pattern of inter-state competition has significant consequences for how the AU* [African Union] *engages in armed conflicts in the 'shared spaces' of the Mediterranean-North Africa and the Red Sea-Gulf of Aden. These contexts are adversely affected by Middle East inter-state competitions that are fuelling conflicts across the region, a phenomenon that has been particularly marked in the case of Libya.*[1]

1. The Problem

Arguably most academic observers and practitioners would agree that the nature of violent conflict as well as related African and external interventions on the continent have changed since the end of the Cold War.[2] Some would also argue that within these past 30 years, or so, substantial changes can be observed in more than one way – from the rise of "complex political emergencies"[3] to "new wars",[4] not to forget "terrorism and violent extremism"[5], as well as from the ascent of "emerging security regimes"[6] to "regional security complexes".[7] Looking at today's balance sheet some of the recent improvements in the peace and security situation on the continent, if any, may be attributed to the rather

1 African Politics, African Peace. Report submitted to the African Union by the World Peace Foundation. Preface by Thabo Mbeki and Lakhdar Brahimi, [Medford MA]: The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, 2016, §§41, 42, 42d.

2 See J. J. Hentz, The Routledge Handbook of African Security, Abingdon, New York 2014.

3 J. Macrae and A. B. Zwi (eds.), War and Hunger: Rethinking International Responses to Complex Emergencies, London 1995; L. Cliffe and R. Luckham, Complex political emergencies and the state: failure and the fate of the state, in: Third World Quarterly 20 (1999) 1, pp. 27–50.

4 M. Kaldor, New and Old Wars. Organized Violence in a Global Era, Stanford CA 1999.

5 AUC Chairperson, Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on Terrorism and Violent Extremism in Africa, PSC/AHG/2(CDLV), Addis Ababa: African Union, 2014.

6 K. Booth, A Security Regime in Southern Africa: Theoretical considerations, Bellville 1994; K. Powell, The African Union's Emerging Peace and Security Regime: Opportunities and Challenges for Delivering on the responsibility to Protect (= ISS Monograph 119), Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies 2005; S. A. Dersso, The quest for Pax Africana: The Case of the African Union's peace and security regime, in: African Journal on Conflict Resolution 12 (2012) 2, pp. 11–47; Ch. Bueger, Communities of Security Practice at Work? The Emerging African Maritime Security Regime, in: African Security 6 (2013) 3/4, pp. 171–190.

7 M. Brosig, The emerging peace and security regime in Africa: the role of the EU, in: European Foreign Affairs Review 16 (2013) 1, pp. 89–105; I. Castellano Da Silva, Southern Africa Regional Security Complex: The Emergence of

successful transformation of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) to the African Union from 1999 to 2002 and the post-2007 emergence of international "strategic" partnerships between the African Union, on the one hand, and the United Nations (UN) and the European Union (EU), on the other. However at the same time, on the downside one could also think of the fallout of the Arab Spring and forced regime change in Libya as well as the related rise of radical insurgencies and violent extremism such as Boko Haram in the Lake Chad Basin, al-Qaida in the Maghreb, or, somewhat earlier, al-Shabaab in the Horn of Africa. Both the positive and the negative changes on the continent – has opened up the African continent for all kinds of external intervention.

Against this background, and very generally speaking, two distinguishable strands of academic debate have received broader attention. First, there is a body of literature that is focusing on the changing nature of violent conflict on the continent.[8] Second, there is an interest in how over time the conditions for peacekeeping in Africa have become more cooperative.[9] The languages used in these analyses establishes some common ground between the two debates: both make use of a spatial vocabulary in which notions of border- and region-crossing entanglements, interconnectedness and complexity are interwoven. In most cases, and may be for good reasons, this has remained fairly descriptive. "Transnational" seems to be the single most relevant catchphrase in this respect.

A good example of emphasizing seemingly new spatial entanglements that empirically had already emerged over many centuries[10] is Mali, which has recently been reimagined in terms of its "transnational" connectiveness.[11] In this case, attention is being paid to the involvement of "terrorists" into all kind of trafficking: arms, cars, cigarettes, cocaine, heroin, people, etc. The focus on transnational organized crime (TOC) is one of the key threads of a discourse that interprets most forms of border-crossing dynamics as "transnational".[12] The other key thread of the debate is migration.[13] In a similar way, and

Bipolarity? (= SAIIA Occasional Paper 15), Pretoria: Africa institute of South Africa 2012; Ch. Hendricks and N.. Keïta, Introduction: Security Regimes in Africa: Prospects and Challenges, in: Africa Development 42 (2017) 3, pp. 1–12.

8 For general perspectives W. Reno, Warfare in Independent Africa, New York 2011; P. D. Williams, War and Conflict in Africa, Cambridge 2011; S. Straus, Making and Unmaking Nations. War, Leadership, and Genocide in Modern Africa, Ithaca NY 2015.

9 R. Tavares, Regional Security: The Capacity of International Organizations, London, New York 2010; M. Brosig, Cooperative Peacekeeping in Africa: Exploring regime complexity, Abingdon, New York 2015; C. De Coning, L. Gelot and J. Karlsrud (eds.), The future of African peace operations. From the Janjaweed to Boko Haram, Uppsala, London 2016.

10 R. Austin, Trans-Saharan Africa in Global History, Oxford 2010.

11 See S. Shaw, Fallout in the Sahel: The geographic spread of conflict from Libya to Mali, in: Canadian Foreign Policy Journal 19 (2013) 2, pp. 199–210; E. Kwesi Aning, Transnational Security Threats and Challenges to Peacekeeping in Mali, in: Conflict Trends (2014) 2, pp. 11–17; T. Hüsken and G. Klute, Political Orders in the Making: Emerging Forms of Political Organization from Libya to Northern Mali, in: African Security 8 (2015) 4, pp. 320–337.

12 See, for instance, C. Blum, Transnational organized crime in Southern Africa and Mozambique, Maputo 2016; A. L. Mazzitelli, Transnational organized crime in West Africa: The additional challenge, in: International Affairs 83 (2007), 6, pp. 1071–1090. This, of course, is amplified by politics. See UNODC Annual Report 2016, Vienna: UN Office on Drugs and Crime, 2017 and UN Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on transnational organized crime and drug trafficking in West Africa and the Sahel region, New York 2013, UN doc. S/2013/359, 17 June 2013.

13 R. Black / R. King (eds.), Transnational migration, return and development in West Africa, Special issue of Popula-

all over Africa, "insurgencies",[14] "armed groups",[15] "extremism,", "security challenges,"[16] "security threats",[17] or "security governance"[18] are imagined in terms of their "transnational" properties.[19] In all these cases, the "transnational" basically is part of a descriptive vocabulary, or a signifier, that denotes border- and/or region-crossing links, connections, entanglements and a somehow felt inability to isolate "cases" or "units of analysis".
In addition to the spatial marking of these interwoven entanglements, they are often also described as "complex" or reference is made to their "complexity". This may be illustrated by two quotes from books that are certainly considered to be standards in their respective fields:

> *Highly complex and dynamic conflict systems are placing significant demands on African peace and security institutions. In response, new practices and cooperative models are emerging in an attempt to try to shape a more peaceful and stable continent … From experiences to date, a pattern of complex hybridity emerges*.[20]

And to the same tune:

> *The bad news is that the rising number and interconnected complexity of these conflicts will make it impossible for African countries – even with extensive international assistance – to address all of these conflict situations effectively*.[21]

Of course, this raises the question what the nature of this particular "complexity" is and what follows from its observation in analytical terms: how best to study "conflict complexes" and the very nature of their "complexity" in Africa (and elsewhere)?

tion, Space and Place 10 (2004) 2, pp. 75–174; I. Freemantle, Exploring transnational spaces of Chinese migrants in Africa", in: Africa Insight 40 (2010) 1, pp. 31–48.

14 D. Deltenre / M. Liégeois, Filling a leaking bathtub? Peacekeeping in Africa and the challenge of transnational armed rebellions, in: African Security 9 (2016) 1, pp. 1–20.

15 M. Brubacher / E. K. Damman / Ch. Day, The AU Task Forces: An African response to transnational armed groups, in: Journal of Modern African Studies 55 (2017) 2, pp. 275–299.

16 P. N. N. Addo, Ghana's foreign policy and transnational security challenges in West Africa, in: Journal of Contemporary African Studies 26 (2008) 2, pp. 197–211.

17 C. Obi, Nigeria's foreign policy and transnational security challenges in West Africa, in: Journal of Contemporary African Studies 26 (2008) 2, pp. 183–196.

18 J. Hönke and M.-M. Müller, Governing (in)security in a postcolonial world: Transnational entanglements and the worldliness of "local" practice, in: Security Dialogue 43 (2012) 5, pp. 383–401.

19 For a more reflected analysis of the spatial entanglements of the conflicts in and around Mali, which is informed by new political geography, see K. P. W. Döring, The changing ASF geography: from the intervention experience in Mali to the African capacity for immediate response to crises and the Nouakchott process, in: African Security 11 (2018) 1, pp. 32–58. See also the sound analysis by B. Charbonneau, Intervention in Mali: building peace between peacekeeping and counterterrorism, in: Journal of Cotemporary African Studies 35 (2017) 4, pp. 415–431 on the blurred boundaries between "counter-terrorism and "peace-keeping". Both authors show how agency and space are closely linked. See also the solid overview by the OECD: An Atlas of the Sahara-Sahel Geography, Economics and Security, Paris 2014.

20 De Coning et al. (eds.), The future of African peace operations, p. 1.

21 S. Emerson and H. Solomon, African security in the twenty-first century. Challenges and opportunities, Manchester 2018, p. 253.

This volume is trying to address the dual description of conflict in Africa and related interventions[22] as "complex" and "transnational", by questioning both denotations and developing an alternative angle for examining the material. In the following section, debates about border- and/or region-crossing entanglements of conflict will be briefly addressed. In the second section of this introduction, a very brief history of the various ways to make sense of interconnections and entanglements, that is to say the "complex" nature of things, in the study of African conflicts will be presented. This is followed in section three by an overview on the spatial vocabulary that is mobilized in this respect. Both of this is done with a view to advance, in the fourth section of this introduction, the conceptual debate about the place of "regions" in the understanding of African conflict dynamics. On this basis, in the fifth section, the term "transregional" will be discussed. First, it will be argued that this term not only introduces a so far neglected spatial category of analysis, but also provides a more encompassing perspective, that it is also better suited to engage with the "complex" nature of the subject matter. The spatial lens introduced through the term "transregional", so the main argument goes, facilitates new relational perspectives that are more precise than, for instance, "transnational", and have the potential to bridge some of the divides that are addressed in the following section. By bringing in the transregional, a more shared language can be found that may open up the way for further theorizing. Second, the way "transregional" is used here also problematizes the way research is organized on different world regions in what is called area studies, such as African studies. Seen from this perspective, "transregional" is not only an invitation, but surely also a challenge to work across the borders of commonly accepted "regions" and the academic borders authoritatively dealing with them. Finally, in the last section of this introduction, an outline of the organization of this volume is provided.

2. Imagining Etangled Conflicts in Africa

Since the end of the Cold War 30 years ago,[23] research has tried to make sense of fluid and compound peace and security situations in Africa by introducing a series of terms – some mainly descriptive, a few also analytical. The current debate about how to imagine Africa's conflict-related entanglements actually started in the mid-1990s with increasing observations of *complex emergencies*. Addressing the nexus between war on the one hand and hunger and famine on the other, Johanna Macrae and Anthony B. Zwi[24] seem to be the first authors to make use of the term in an African context.[25] Parts of the debate con-

22 For an overview see E. Schmidt, Select Foreign Intervention in Africa: From the Cold War to the War on Terror, Cambridge 2013.

23 For Africa see U. Engel, Africa's "1989", in: U. Engel, F. Hadler and M. Middell (eds.), 1989 in a Global Perspective, Leipzig 2015, pp. 331–348.

24 Macrae and Zwi (eds.), War and Hunger.

25 The Ngram Viewer, which allows the PDFs of books to be analysed by Google, indicates that the phrase was first used in 1976 (which does not preclude its use in articles before). It gained currency in the first half of the 1990s and peaked in 1999. See Ngram Viewer on "complex emergencies", <https://books.google.com/ngrams/…> (accessed 1 March 2019).

tinued to focus on this dimension of human security,[26] while others were more interested in the link between conflict and stateness. For instance, this was discussed extensively in 1999 in a special issue of the *Third World Quarterly*.[27] In this volume Lionel Cliffe and Robin Luckham[28] sketch a "typology of situations […] on the basis of the state and its dynamics and of the origins, forms and trajectory of the CPE [complex political emergencies] and of interventions into it",[29] using CPE as a heuristic tool beyond the African continent and arguing that conflict situations and outcomes in these countries are mediated through the nature of the state (the latter is discussed in terms of the state failure" paradigm that gained currency in those days).[30]

While the term *complex emergency* remained in the realm of humanitarian assistance and was related to a notion of human security,[31] *complex political emergency* was used by those with a long-standing interest in the interplay of various conflict drivers.[32] More recently, this has also been addressed by Dossou D. Zounmenou and Reine S. Loua[33] as well as by Festus Aubyn[34] who, however, focuses on *complex political crisis*. In contrast, Jakkie K. Cilliers and Greg Mills locate the idea of complex emergencies in the context of UN peacekeeping.[35] In the same vein, Kwesi Aning,[36] through this perspective, considers

26 See J. Macrae, Shifting sands: The search for 'coherence' between political and humanitarian responses to complex emergencies, London 2000; L. Gelot (neé Bergholm), A role for the UN in Africa in the 21st century? The limits of the UN peace operations principles: The case of Congo and the challenge of a complex humanitarian emergency, PhD, Department of International Relations, University of Wales, Aberystwyth 2005.

27 L. Cliffe, Regional dimensions of conflict in the Horn of Africa, in: Third World Quarterly 20 (1999) 1, pp. 89–111 (Special Issue: Complex political emergencies).

28 Cliffe and Luckham, Complex political emergencies, p. 36.

29 Ibid., p. 27.

30 Again, according to the Ngram Viewer, the combination "complex political emergency" in the singular showed up first in 1995, with a peak in 2003 and increasing again after 2007. However, when used in the plural, "complex political emergencies" already showed up first four years earlier, in 1991, with a peak in 2003, too, and another surge beginning in 2005. See <https://books.google.com/ngrams/…> (accessed 1 March 2019).

31 See Ch. Hendricks, From State Security to Human Security in Southern Africa: Policy Research and Capacity Building Challenges (= ISS Monograph 122), Pretoria 2006; A. Abass (ed.), Protecting Human Security in Africa, Oxford 2010.

32 See, for instance, Ch. Scherrer, Genocide and Crisis in Central Africa: Conflict Roots, Mass Violence, and Regional War, Westport CN 2002, or C. Obi, Nigeria's Niger Delta: Understanding the Complex Drivers of Violent Oil-related Conflict, in: Africa Development 34 (2009) 2, pp. 103–128.

33 D. D. Zounmenou and R. S. Loua, Confronting complex political crises in West Africa: An analysis of ECOWAS responses to Niger and Côte d'Ivoire (= ISS Paper 230), Pretoria 2011.

34 F. Aubyn, Managing complex political dilemmas in West Africa: ECOWAS and the 2012 crisis in Guinea-Bissau, in: Conflict Trends (2013) 4, pp. 26–32.

35 J. K. Cilliers and G. Mills (eds.), From Peacekeeping to Complex Emergencies. Peace Support Missions in Africa, Johannesburg 1999. See also F. B. Aboagye (ed.), Complex Emergencies in the 21st Century. Challenges of New Africa's Strategic Peace and Security Issues (= IPSS Monographs 134), Pretoria 2007; Id., Confronting complex emergencies in Africa: Imperatives of a search for a new doctrine of humanitarian "security" interventions" (= ISS Paper 204), Pretoria 2009. In his presentation of a "complex peace-building model" de Coning (C. De Coning, Coherence and integration in the planning, implementation and evaluation of complex peace-building operations, in: Conflict Trends [2004] 1, pp. 41–48, here 42f.) also suggests this dichotomy between a relief and a peacekeeping community. As regards the archaeology of the debate on emergencies, the debate seems less clear-cut and more ambivalent.

36 E. Kwesi Aning, The challenge of civil wars to multilateral interventions: UN, ECOWAS, and complex political emergencies in West Africa; a critical analysis, in: African and Asian Studies 4 (2005), 1–2, pp. 1–20.

UN and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) interventions in West Africa. Discussing the temporality of emergencies, Mark O'Keefe et al. talk about *chronic* emergencies.[37]

The identification of "(regional) conflict complexes" goes beyond the discussion of complex emergencies, highlighting the relative permanence of protracted violent conflict constellations and their border-crossing effects and specific entanglements that link "internal" and "external" actors.[38] More recently, Mikael Erikson has employed the idea of regional conflict complexes with regard to the situation that has developed in and around Libya after the forced removal of Muammar Gaddafi in October 2011.[39] In any case, from here the debate took a more analytical route. Somewhat addressing similar empirical observations the terms coined in recent years include "emerging (peace and) security regimes", "regional security complex theory", "regime complexity" and "security assemblages".

Some authors simply focus on *emerging security regimes*[40] or – considering approaches adopted by the regional economic communities (RECs) – on *collaborative security regimes*.[41] In this context security regimes are simply used as a short form for the dynamics surrounding the negotiation and establishment of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA).[42] The understanding of regime often draws on a combination of James Rosenau's and Göran Hyden's works.[43] And in doing so, varying justice is done to the

37 M. O'Keefe, M.-L. Martina and S. P. Reyna, From war on terror to war on weather?: Rethinking humanitarianism in a new era of chronic emergencies, in: Third World Quarterly 31 (2010) 8, pp. 1223–1357.

38 Iconic in this respect P. Wallensteen and M. Sollenberg, Armed Conflict and Regional Conflict Complexes, 1989–97, in: Journal of Peace Research 35 (1998) 5, pp. 621–634. See also A. Silve and T. Verdier, A theory of regional conflict complexes, in: Journal of Development Economics 133 (2018) C, pp. 434–447. Basically, this is looking at the other side of the coin of "regional security complexes" as discussed by D. A. Lake, Regional Security Complexes: A Systems Approach, in: D. A. Lake and P. M. Morgan (eds.), Regional Orders: Building Security in a New World, University Park PA 1997, pp. 45–67; P. M. Morgan, Regional Security Complexes and Regional Orders, ibid., pp. 20–42; B. Hettne, Regionalism, Security and Development: A Comparative Perspective, in: B. Hettne, A. Inotai and O. Sunke (eds.), Comparing Regionalisms: Implications for Global Development, Basingstoke/Hampshire 2001, pp. 1–53; Id., Security Regionalism in Theory and Practice, in: H. G. Brauch et al. (eds.), Globalization and Environmental Challenges: Reconceptualizing Security in the 21st Century, Berlin, Heidelberg 2008, pp. 403–412, or M. Legrenzi and F. H. Lawson, Regional security complexes and organizations, in: A. Gheciu and W. C. Wohlforth (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of International Security, Oxford 2018.

39 M. Erikson, A Fratricidal Libya: Making Sense of a Conflict Complex, in: Small Arms & Insurgencies 27 (2016) 5, pp. 817–836.

40 Powell, The African Union's Emerging Peace and Security Regime; U. Engel and J. Gomes Porto (eds.), Towards an African Peace and Security Regime. Continental Embeddedness, Transnational Linkages, Strategic Relevance, Farnham and Burlington VT 2013; but also Brosig, The emerging peace and security regime in Africa; M. Brosig and D. Motsama, Modelling cooperative peacekeeping: Exchange theory and the African peace and security regime, in: Journal of International Peacekeeping 18 (2014) 1/2, pp. 45–68.

41 Sh. Field (ed.), Peace in Africa: Towards a collaborative security regime, Johannesburg 2004.

42 See U. Engel and J. Gomes Porto (eds.), Africa's New Peace and Security Architecture. Promoting Norms, Institutionalizing Solutions, Farnham/Burlington VT 2010.

43 J. N. Rosenau, Governance in a New Global Order, in: D. Held and A. McGrew (eds.), Governing Globalization. Power, Authority and Global Governance, Oxford 2002, pp. 70–86, and G. Hyden, Governance and the Reconstitution of Political Order, in: R. Joseph (ed.), State, Conflict and Democracy in Africa, Boulder CO 1999, pp. 179–195. See also G. Hyden, J. Court and K. Mease (eds.), Making Sense of Governance: Empirical Evidence from Sixteen Developing Countries, Boulder CO 2004.

conceptual debate about regimes. These contributions to the debate first and foremost aim at empirical reconstructions of an emerging field.

Somewhat differently, Barry G. Buzan and Ole Wæver[44] as well as Malte Brosig[45] are trying to make theoretical claims. In their *regional security complex theory* the most known representatives of the Copenhagen school on security studies and securitization, Buzan and Wæver argue that in the post-Cold War period distinct security regimes have emerged in many regions of the world, including Southern Africa.[46] Their point decidedly brings in the role of "regions" in international security – as opposed to "international" or "global" (in more detail on this point see the next two sections of this introduction).[47] Already in his monograph on *People, States and Fear*, originally published in 1991, Buzan defines a security complex as "a group of states whose primary security concerns link together sufficiently closely that their national securities cannot realistically be considered apart from one another".[48] While the idea quickly became fashionable in other parts of the world,[49] it took some time for scholars working on Africa to discuss the merits of regional security complexes. For example, in his discussion of dynamics within the Horn of Africa, Barouk Mesfin, who at that time was with the Pretoria-based Institute for Security Studies (ISS), rather affirmatively relates to regional security complex theory.[50] In contrast, in his analysis on the emergence of a security complex in Southern Africa, Igor Castellano da Silva criticizes the way Buzan and Wæver have constructed a single security regime in the region, without discussing the empirical limits of the concept's operationalization.[51] Another more sceptical discussion of the concept can also be found in a special issue of the journal *Africa Development*, edited by Cheryl Hendricks and Naffet Keïta.[52]

44 B. Buzan and O. Wæver, Regions and Power. The Structure of International Security, Cambridge 2003.

45 Brosig, Cooperative Peacekeeping in Africa.

46 Buzan and Wæver, Regions and Power.

47 For the use of the similar term in a totally different context – concerning the rising density of international institutions in the field of plant generic resources – see K. Raustiala and D. G. Victor, The Regime Complex for Plant Generic Resources, in: International Organization 58 (2004) 2, pp. 277–309. Their focus is on the emergence of a collective of partially overlapping and non-hierarchical regimes.

48 B. Buzan, People, States and Fear. An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era, London 1991, p. 190.

49 For instance, T. Kahrs, Regional security complex theory and Chinese policy towards North Korea, in: East Asia 4 (2004) 12, pp. 64–82. More recently the concept has also been applied to the policy of Turkey (A. Barrinha, The ambitious insulator: revisiting Turkey's position in regional security complex theory, in: Mediterranean Politics 19 [2014] 2, pp. 165–182) as well as interactions between the Middle East and North Africa (R. Hanau Santini, A new regional cold war in the Middle East and North Africa: regional security complex theory revisited, in: The International Spectator 52 [2017] 4, pp. 93–111). According to the Ngram Viewer, the combination "regional security complex" was first mentioned in 1983, with a huge increase in 1994, a peak in 2000, and another surge beginning in 2002 – though at a lower rate of growth. See <https://books.google.com/ngrams/…> (accessed: 1 March 2019).

50 B. Mesfin, The Horn of Africa security complex, in: R. Sharamo and B. Mesfin (eds.), Regional Security in the post-Cold War Horn of Africa, Pretoria 2011, pp. 1–29.

51 Da Silva, Southern Africa Regional Security Complex.

52 Hendricks and Keïta, Introduction. Security Regimes in Africa.

Another attempt to theorize regions and conflict in Africa has been undertaken by Brosig, an associate professor in International Relations (IR) at the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg. He builds on Buzan and Wæver to introduce his own concept of *regime complexity*.[53] Researching recent dynamics of international peace-keeping in Africa involving the UN, the EU, and African regional organizations, Brosig's main argument is that "these actors are partially converging and forming a regime complex that is reaching beyond dyadic relations".[54] Accordingly, today

> *security governance in Africa is characterised by regime complexity in which individual actors, mostly IOs* [international organizations]*, jointly manage security issues addressing a broad range of questions ranging for example from conflict management and mediation to peacekeeping or post-conflict peacebuilding activities*.[55]

With Kal Raustiala and David G. Victor,[56] Brosig argues that regime complexity is "being constituted by a number of actors that are starkly interconnected and thus not fully decomposable to its component units".[57] In addition, and following a rational, functional approach, Brosig strongly relates his model to the evolving literature on inter-regionalism and inter-organizational studies,[58] which, he claims, is marked by the "absence of a coherent single theory".[59] It is noteworthy that in this debate the terms "complex" and "complexity" are often used interchangeably, without venturing into the broad field of complexity theory itself and a discussion of the merits of using, for instance, network analysis or discussing fractals, and the like.[60]

In addition to regime complexity, the notion of *security assemblages* has become somewhat attractive.[61] Building on the works of the French philosophers Gilles Deleuze (1925–1995) and Félix Guattari (1930–1992), assemblages are considered to be a "bridging concept", an equivalent term to Foucault's epistemes, Kuhn's paradigms, or Callon, Law,

53 M. Brosig, The African Security Regime Complex: Exploring Converging Actors and Policies, African Security 6 (2013) 3–4), pp. 171–190; Brosig, Cooperative Peacekeeping in Africa.

54 Ibid., p. 3.

55 Ibid., p. 5.

56 Raustiala and Victor, The Regime Complex for Plant Generic Resources.

57 Brosig, Cooperative Peacekeeping in Africa, p. 5.

58 See, for instance, R. Biermann and J. Koops (eds.), The Palgrave Handbook of Interregional Relations, London 2015.

59 Brosig, Cooperative Peacekeeping in Africa, p. 21.

60 In the social sciences complexity theory is increasingly discussed in relation to public administration. See, for instance, E.-H. Klijn, Complexity Theory and Public Administration: What's New? Key concepts in complexity theory compared to their counterparts in public administration research, in: Public Management Review 10 (2008) 3, pp. 299–317, and J. W. Meek (ed.), Emergence: Complexity & Organization 12 (2010) 1 (Special Issue: Complexity Theory for Public Administration and Policy). On its application to the field of peace and security see Ph. vos Fellman, Y. Bar-Yam and A. A. Minai (eds.), Conflict and Complexity. Countering Terrorism, Insurgency, Ethnic and Regional Violence, Berlin 2015, who utilize a particular version of complexity theory to examine terrorism, specifically terrorist networks. I owe my introduction to transdisciplinary complexity theory to the late Paul Cilliers, Stellenbosch University (1956–2011). On the substance of complexity theory see P. Cilliers, Complexity and postmodernism. Understanding complex systems, London, New York 1998.

61 See T. Baker and P. McGuirk, Assemblage thinking as methodology: commitments and practices for critical policy research, in: Territory, Politics, Governance 5 (2017) 4, pp. 425–442.

and Latour's actor-network-theory.[62] Assemblage thinking as outlined in *A Thousand Plateaus*[63] highlights the fluidity and multiple borders of complex social situations. In the social sciences, the US sociologist Saskia Sassen has been instrumental in framing the assemblage approach as a way of dealing with complexity ("complex systems"), though using it "in its most descriptive sense".[64] Drawing on Sassen, Ottawa-based political scientists Rita Abrahams and Michael C. Williams[65] utilize this approach to situate private security companies in Nigeria and South Africa in global governance vis-à-vis the role of states, thereby coining the term "global security assemblages".[66] Actually, in the field of Critical Security Studies assemblage thinking became "part of the new materialist turn".[67] Adam Sandor, who did his PhD with Abrahams, has recently used the concept to analyse drug trafficking in West Africa.[68] Likewise Paul Higate and Mats Utas base their discussion of private security providers in Africa on the notion of global assemblages:

> *Complex and fluid networks through and by which assemblages are configured are largely invisible to consumers and perhaps less so providers, yet remain visceral in their sometimes violent materiality. Ultimately, these hybridized forms of governance seek order in the name of capital accumulation* […].[69]

By drawing attention to the methodological need to be aware of the fluidity and contingency of social constellations, the concept of assemblage offers an interesting lens for conducting research. However, it also seems difficult to operationalize in comparative research on peace and security in Africa. For the purpose of this volume, we, therefore, will settle on differentiating between the *adjective* of something described as *being complex* – as in "complicated", "compound", "convoluted", "heterogeneous", "intricate", "mosaic", "multiplex", "sophisticated", or whatever the antonyms are – and the *noun* complex, that is to say something that is composed of more than one thing and that can be discussed in terms of its *complexness*.

62 R. Luckhurst, Bruno Latour's Scientification: Networks, Assemblages, and Tangled Objects, in: Science Fiction Studies 33 (2006) 1, pp. 4–17.

63 G. Deleuze and F. Guattari. A Thousand Plateaus. Capitalism and Schizophrenia, Minneapolis MN 1987 [1980].

64 S. Sassen, Territory, Authority, Rights. From Medieval to Global Assemblages, Princeton NJ 2006, p. 5, fn 1. For the political science field of International Relations see the reader edited by M. Acuto (ed.), Reassembling International Theory: Assemblage Thinking and International Relations, Basingstoke 2013.

65 R. Abrahamsen and M. C. Williams, Security Beyond the State: Global Security Assemblages in International Politics, in: International Political Sociology 1 (2009) 3, pp. 1–17.

66 See also R. Abrahamsen and M. C. Williams, The changing contours of Africa's security governance, in: Review of African Political Economy 35 (2008) 118, pp. 539–553; Id., Security Beyond the State: Private Security in International Politics, Cambridge 2011.

67 O. Bures, Private Security Companies. Transforming Politics and Security in the Czech Republic, in: European Review of International Studies (2016) 1, pp. 123–126.

68 A. Sandor, Assemblages of Intervention: Politics, Security, and Drug Trafficking in West Africa, London and Uppsala 2017, p. 2.

69 P. Higate and M. Utas (eds.), Private Security in Africa: From the Global Assemblage to the Everyday, London and Uppsala 2017, p. 2.

3. Talking Space and Scales

So how are the various entanglements and interconnections of, in, and around Africa typically imagined in the academic literature? After the end of the Cold War a proliferation of spatial references in works dealing with Africa can be observed. This may be a reflection of uncertainty about the emerging new global order and Africa's place therein. But in most cases, it certainly does not reflect the advent of the spatial turn in the social sciences and humanities in African studies.[70] Broadly speaking, the following descriptors seem to dominate the field: "cross-border", "regional", "inter-regional", "transnational", "continental", and "global". In this list, frequently an assumed hierarchy of scales is implied; the scales themselves sometimes become containers of social life. The following examples are totally random, just illustrative and not meant to be representative. They are taken from a cross-reading of the Uppsala-based Nordic Africa Institute's online library catalogue.[71] Certainly, the following observations cannot replace a detailed analysis of the development of spatial language and designations as well as their constructed nature and changes over time in the various disciplines dealing with peace and security on the African continent. This will remain a desideratum for digital humanities and big data entrepreneurs.

In many disciplines *cross-border* or *border-crossing* is used as a signifier to denote social or other relations that are cutting across a border. This is often related to the flow of people – as in migration, flight, trafficking or displacement. But it can also be linked to spiritual moves across borders or to the flow of goods. This interest in borders was institutionalized in 2007 when, in Edinburgh, the African Borderlands Research Network was founded.[72] While the general literature on cross-border is mostly descriptive, borderland studies often looks into how borders can constitute identities and interests, that is to say used in an analytical way that usually reflects some constructivist argument.

The *regional* can be found almost everywhere. Unlike in human geography, the term is not used usually to discuss sub-national regions (for instance, governance units in federal systems), but mainly with reference to the dynamics within seemingly given geographical units – such as "West Africa"[73] or "East Africa"[74] – or between groups of countries that claim to form a region,[75] that is to say RECs such as ECOWAS or the Southern African Development Community (SADC). Primarily, the coding of something as "regional" is coupled with issues like investment, traffic, infrastructures, food insecurity, climate change, development assistance, cooperation, etc. – and, most importantly, "regional

70 On the latter see U. Engel and P. Nugent (eds.), Respacing Africa, Leiden/Boston MA: 2009; U. Engel et al., Africa in the Globalizing World – A Research Agenda, in: Comparativ 27 (2018) 1, pp. 107–119.

71 Nordic Africa Institute Library, <http://nai.uu.se/library/> (accessed: 1 March 2019).

72 The African Borderlands Research Network website. <http://www.aborne.org> (accessed: 31 July 2018).

73 E.g. A. Marc, N. Verjee and S. Mogaka, The Challenge of Stability and Security in West Africa, Washington DC 2015.

74 E.g. East Africa Regional Conflict and Instability Assessment. Final Report. Burlington VT: Tetra Tech ARD, prepared for US Agency for International Development.

75 See G. M. Khadiagala, Regional Cooperation on Democratization and Conflict Management in Africa, Washington DC 2018.

integration". In large part, "regional" is meant to be descriptive. Usually in this kind of literature the constructed nature of region is not addressed at all. Likewise, the term *inter-regional* or *inter-regionalism* is used to discuss cooperation and conflict between these regions.[76]

The most widespread form to discuss conflict and conflict resolution in Africa through a spatial vocabulary seems to be in terms of *transnational* dynamics.[77] Mainly the term is used for describing connections and interactions among a number of African countries or by relating things that happen on the African continent and somewhere else. So, the notion may be used when it comes to communication, conflict, diasporas, ideologies, infrastructures, medicine, migration, terrorism, trafficking, etc. But it is also employed when discussing resource extraction and the role of foreign (read as non-African) companies. Otherwise anything that remains within the confines of "Africa" and, at least potentially, could affect all African countries is usually referred to as *continental*. This is not only in the context of ideologies and ideas (such as Pan-Africanism), but also with reference to material infrastructures such as transport corridors or peace and security as well as governance "architectures". As a side note, the term continental also pops up quite frequently in analysis of post-apartheid South African attempts to define its role in Africa and beyond. The term *international*, however, is only used less prominently when referring to entangled conflicts.[78]

Finally, the *global* serves as a code word for discussing "Africa's" relations with the rest of the world, be it in terms of aspirations, dependency, global order, identity, security, and so on. In this respect, very different understandings of "globalization" appear with regard to its historicity (is it recent or does it at least go back to the mid-19th century?), to its content (is it just economics or in addition somethings else?), to its nature (is it one process or many?), and to its geographical centre (is it spreading from the Western trials and leading to homogeneity or are we talking about multiple non-convergent processes that are developing everywhere?). A relational use of the term "global" that does not assume a process of homogenization and accepts the idea of multiple, competing globalization "projects" would then raise the question of how to study Africa in the world and the world in Africa in a different way.[79]

76 According to the Ngram Viewer, the term "inter-regional" has seen its heydays in the 1970s and 1980s (obviously linked to the booming literature on the European Union); while the term inter-regionalism started its ascend in 1998 – after a huge increase in numbers a first peak was reached in 2005. See <https://books.google.com/ngrams/…> (accessed: 1 March 2019). Momodu actually uses the term pan-regionalism, see R. Momodu, Nationalism Underpinned by Pan-Regionalism: African Foreign Policies in ECOWAS in An Era of Anti-Globalization, in: J. Warner and T.M. Shaw (eds.) African Foreign Policies in International Institutions, London 2018, pp. 95–112, at 201.

77 As shown by the Ngram Viewer, internationally the term appears for the first time in 1870, though not really playing a role until around 1967/68. A first peak of its use is in 1983, with a sharp increase after 1990/91. See <https://books.google.com/ngrams/…> (accessed: 1 March 2019).

78 That is if one disregards references to the International Criminal Court, international norm diffusion and other forms. This somehow contradicts attempts to embed African peace and security relations into "international relations". See T. Murithi (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Africa's International Relations, Abingdon 2014.

79 See A. Appadurai, Globalization and Area Studies: The Future of a False Opposition (= The Wertheim Lecture

This incomplete look at a spectrum of spatial references and the need to explore all of them in far more detail, is neatly summarized by Brosig,[80] when he stated:

> *De facto we need to analyse events that are "multilateral, transnational, global, continental, regional, interregional, national, and subregional* […] *overlapping interrelated and interconnected"*.[81]

So before offering a critical assessment of some of these spatial imaginations and their presumptions in the section after next, let us quickly turn to the question of how "regions" relate to all of this.

4. Discovering Regions

Prima facie, the relevance of regions as units of analysis in African peace and security studies is nothing new. It has been established a seemingly long time ago, mainly with a view to the liberation struggles in Southern Africa in the 1970s and 1980s.[82] "Regions" usually were treated as much as containers of social action as nations, being static and bounded, and thus, by extension, of John Agnew's argument facing a "territorial trap".[83] These conflicts, and also the international diplomacy surrounding them, sometimes have also been imagined in terms of transnational entanglements.[84] Recently, the same theme has been re-invoked with regard to the Horn of Africa.[85] After 2000, some authors have stimulated a debate about the interplay of regions vis-à-vis processes of globalization.[86] So, acknowledging the relative importance of regions, the question was posed how these regions relate both in practical and in theoretical terms to what commonly is conceived of as "globalization".[87] A succinct example of such an enquiry is the article by University

2000), Amsterdam 2000; R. Abrahamsen, Africa and international relations: Assembling Africa, studying the world, in: African Affairs 116 (2017) 462, pp. 125–139; Engel et al., Africa in the Globalizing World.

80 Actually quoting R. Roloff, Interregionalism in theoretical perspective, in: H. Hänggi, R. Roloff and J. Rüland (eds.) Interregionalism and International Relations, London, New York 2006, pp. 17–30, at 18, 24.

81 Brosig, Cooperative Peacekeeping in Africa, p. 11.

82 See, for instance, D. Geldenhuys and W. Gutteridge, Instability and conflict in Southern Africa: South Africa's role in regional security, London 1983; A. F. Isaacman, Mozambique and the regional conflict in Southern Africa, in: Current History 86 (1987) 520, pp. 213–216, 230–234; Ch. Brown, Regional conflict in southern Africa and the role of third party mediators, International Journal 45 (1990) 2, pp. 334–359.

83 J. Agnew, The territorial trap: the geographical assumptions of international relations theory, in: Review of International Political Economy 1 (1994) 1, pp. 53–80.

84 See G. W. Shepherd (Jr.), Anti-Apartheid: Transnational Conflict and Western Policy in the Liberation of South Africa, Westport CN 1977.

85 R. Sharamo and B. Mesfin (eds.), Regional Security in the post-Cold War Horn of Africa, Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies (= ISS Monograph 178) 2011.

86 See, among many others, A. Acharya, Regionalism and the emerging world orders: sovereignty, autonomy, identity, in: S. Breslin et al. (eds.), New Regionalism in the Global Political Economy. Theories and Cases, London 2002, pp. 20–32; G. Buzan, Security architecture in Asia: The interplay of regional and global levels, in: The Pacific Review 16 (2003) 2, pp. 143–173, and A. Hurrell, One World? Many Worlds? The Place of Regions in the Study of International Society, in: International Affairs 83 (2007) 1, pp. 127–146; on "comparative regionalism" also T. Börzel and T. Risse (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Regionalism, Oxford 2016.

87 For an excellent overview J. Agnew, Evolution of the regional concept, in: A. Paasi, J. Harrison and M. Jones (eds.) Handbook on the Geographies of Regions and Territories, Cheltenham, Northampton MA 2018, pp. 23–33.

of Sussex scholars Caitriona Dowd and Clionadh Raleigh on the interplay between "the global" and "the local" in "Islamic terrorism".[88]

The debate on what exactly constitutes a "region" has developed intensively since the launch of a discourse on "new regionalisms" around the turn of the millennium.[89] Essentially, the argument was advanced that after 1989/90 a proliferation of regional organizations, regional integration processes and regionalisms outside the traditional role model of regional integration, that is to say the European Union (EU), took place.[90] However, on balance there is little consensus in the research community on the nature of regions and the processes leading to their successful constitution,[91] apart from the somewhat constructivist idea that regions are socially constructed, hence always contingent and necessarily fluid[92] – as any other spatial frame of reference. This insight, by the way, is discussed at very different levels of meta-theoretical reasoning and with varying degrees of alignment to the spatial turn in the social sciences and humanities.[93]

And in addition to this theoretical irritation, real world developments often defy the permanence of neatly carved regions. In fact, in many cases the borders of regions have become blurred exactly because of th unfolding of transregional dynamics. The situation between the Horn of Africa and the Gulf region is a case in point.[94] But the same can also be said about ECOWAS, to name but one other example from the world of formal regionalisms: In 2017, Morocco (which had been admitted to the African Union in January 2017 after years of absence from the OAU since 1984) expressed its intention to join the West African group of states, thereby adding an interesting touch to this regional project, and Tunisia followed suit aiming at some form of cooperation agreement – as both do not share a common border with ECOWAS member states.[95]

88 C. Dowd and C. Raleigh, The myth of global islamic terrorism and local conflict in Mali and the Sahel, in: African Affairs 112 (2013) 448, pp. 498–509. For general overviews on regionalism in Africa see D. Bach, Regionalism in Africa. Genealogies, Institutions, and Trans-State Networks, London, New York 2015, and F. Mattheis, African regionalism, in: A. Paasi, J. Harrison and M. Jones (eds.) Handbook on the Geographies of Regions and Territories. Cheltenham and Northampton MA 2018, pp. 457–467.

89 See, for instance, E. D. Mansfield and H. V. Milner, The New Wave of Regionalism, in: International Organization 53 (1999) 3, pp. 589–627; B. Hettne and F. Söderbaum, Theorising the Rise of Regionness, in: New Political Economy 5 (2000) 3, pp. 457–474; F. Söderbaum and T. M. Shaw (eds.), Theories of New Regionalism: A Palgrave Reader, Basingstoke, New York 2003.

90 For a critique of the underlying assumptions see U. Engel et al., Introduction. The challenge of emerging regionalisms outside Europe, in: U. Engel et al. (eds.) The New Politics of Regionalism. Perspectives from Africa, Latin America and Asia-Pacific, London, New York 2016, pp. 1–15.

91 For example, as institutions, see J. Branch, Territory as an institution: spatial ideas, practices and technologies, in: Territory, Politics, Governance 5 (2017) 2, pp. 131–144.

92 U. Engel, Regionalismen, Berlin 2018.

93 See H. Lefebvre, The Production of Space, London 1991 [1974]; E. W. Soja, Postmodern Geographies: The Reassertion of Space in Critical Social Theory, London 1989; D. Massey, J. Allen and Philip Sarre (eds.), Human Geography Today. Cambridge, Malden MA 2005 [1999]; and J. Murdoch, Post-Structuralist Geography. A Guide to Relational Space, London, Thousand Oaks, CA 2006.

94 See R. Abusharaf (ed.), Africa and the Gulf Region: Blurred Boundaries and Shifting Ties, Berlin 2015.

95 There are very few regionalisms with member states not sharing common borders, such as the Lusophone Community of Portuguese Language Countries (CPLP) where in fact none of the members has a common border.

5. Developing a Transregional Perspective

In this second to last section of the introduction, a short critique of some of the proposed spatial denotations will be discussed on the basis of the spatial turn in the social sciences and humanities and, against this background, perspectives on a transregional studies agenda will be developed.

In the context of the conflicts considered, reference to the "international" does not add much in terms of analysis, but if taken seriously, it rather limits the discussion to only a certain type of actors and dynamics between them. True, many of the conflicts discussed in this volume indeed also happen in the international realm and it is states – both African and others – as well as international organizations that respond to them.[96] But this space is only comprised by and between states. Ontologically "international" is just an extension of the "national", that is to say it is taking these containers for granted. They appear as "frozen frameworks where social life occurs".[97] But rather, relational thinking on space reminds us,

> *they are made, given meanings, and destroyed in social and individual action. Hence, they are typically contested and actively negotiated.* […] *Spatial organizations, meanings of space, and the territorial use of space are historically contingent and their histories are closely interrelated.*[98]

In our case, they are contested by non-state insurgencies, forms of violent extremism, organized trafficking, and the like, with little or no interest in national boundaries. So, the reference to the "inter"-national sphere is an inept way of conceptualizing the specific kinds of conflicts that are at the heart of this edited volume. The same holds true for the term "inter-regionalism", which usually refers to relations between regions organized on a state-by-state basis. Somewhat similar, one could argue that reference to the "global" takes it a step too far, as it is often assumed without any question that certain dynamics are indeed of a global character, such as the "global war on terror".[99]

Thus, to avoid some of these connotations and possible pitfalls, many authors have reverted to using the term "transnational" – but mostly without discussing the underlying spatial implications. And, undoubtedly, the prefix "trans-" does not solve the problem of underlying methodological nationalism.[100] Also, the term "transnational" sometimes

96 On Africa in international relations Murithi (ed.), Handbook of Africa's International Relations; S. Cornelissen, F. Cheru and T. M. Shaw (eds.), Africa and International Relations in the 21st Century, Basingstoke 2015; J. W. Harbeson and D. Rothchild (eds.), Africa in World Politics. Engaging in a Changing Global Order, 6th ed., Boulder, CO 2016.

97 A. Paasi, Territory, in: J. Agnew, K. Mitchell and G. Toal (eds.) A Companion to Political Geography, Malden MA etc. 2003, pp. 109–122, at 110.

98 Ibid.

99 On Africa in global international relations see P. H. Bischoff, Kwesi Aning and A. Acharya (eds.), Africa in Global International Relations. Emerging approaches and to theory and practice, London, New York 2016.

100 The prefix "trans-" goes back to the Latin word for "across" (also: "beyond", "through", "changing thoroughly" or "transverse").

is indeed blurring the boundaries of the described topic, diverting attention away from specific actors and their spatial embeddedness.

Alternatively, the term "transregional" has two ontological and two epistemological advantages. First, "transregional" can accommodate both formal political regions (as in RECs) as well as informal, cultural, or geographical regions that are not made up of states but made by shared imaginations. These regions refer to commonly understood spaces that are transcending nations (that is to say, also do not include sub-national entities). This could be regions within Africa comprising geographical consensus on regionness (for example, "West Africa" or the "Sahara") – though debates on what exactly makes up the "Horn of Africa" already indicate how fluid and contested regions can be over time.[101] This understanding of regions could also involve entities that are arranged through political or economic projects, like the RECs. In this case, "transregional" would refer to dynamics between these African regions. The transregional conflicts that are emerging at the interface of African geographical, cultural, and political regions cut across those institutionalized RECs that are representing the regions politically (such as ECOWAS, the Economic Community of Central African States [ECCAS], the East African Community [EAC], the Intergovernmental Authority on Development [IGAD], and SADC). They are producing their own, new regions. In fact, to talk about transregional, rather than transnational, entanglements in and around Africa is nothing entirely new,[102] but it seems to have got lost over the past decades.[103]

Second, the assertion that something is "transregional" in nature is delimited by claims of processes of globalization. It is an open invitation to empirically validate which dynamics are truly global (that is to say encompassing the world) and which are "just" transcending a certain (world) region but are not (yet) truly global. Mainstream perspectives on the global, we would argue, are actually hiding transregional processes. A detailed examination of the transregional will thus not only produce more accurate descriptions, but as an analytical category it also has the potential to differentiate often fairly abstract theories on globalization and capture in a more detailed way the entanglements of different scales of space and activity. In this case one could think of relations between regions – "Africa" vis-à-vis "Europe" – that may entail formal organizations, such as AU and EU, as well as

101 See K. Mengisteab, The Horn of Africa, Cambridge 2014; A. De Waal, The Real Politics of the Horn of Africa. Money, War and the Business of Power, Cambridge 2015; Ch. Clapham, The Horn of Africa: State formation and Decay. London 2017.

102 D. E. Lampert, Patterns of transregional relations, in: D. E. Lampert, Comparative regional systems: West and East Europe, North America, the Middle East, and developing countries, New York 1980, pp. 429–481, or W. T. Tow, U.S. alliance policies and Asian-Pacific security: a transregional approach, in: W. T. Tow and W. R. Feeney (eds.), U.S. foreign policy and Asian-Pacific security, Boulder CO 1982, pp. 17–67, and more recently A. B. Tickner and A. Mason, Mapping transregional security structures in the Andean region, in: Alternatives: Global, local, political 28 (2003) 3, pp. 359–391; H. Loewen and D. Nabers, Transregional security cooperation, in: Asia Europe Journal 3 (2005) 3, pp. 333-346, and also G. Segell, A Decade of African Union and European Union Transregional Security Relations, in: South African Journal of Military Studies 38 (2010) 1, pp. 25–44.

103 According to the Ngram Viewer, the term "transregional" has been in use since 1927, showing smaller waves of wider use in the mid-1930s as well as in the 1950s. It really took off in 1970 with an exponential rise in the 1990s, reaching a first peak 2004. See <https://books.google.com/ngrams/…> (accessed: 31 July 2018).

non-state actors, such as migrant smugglers, narcotraffickers, proselytizing groups, and special forces – or what Latham (though in the context of a debate on transnationalism) has called "transterritorial deployments".[104]

Third, "transregional" also is a chance to rethink the organization of knowledge construction established through seemingly given regions, such a "sub-Sahara Africa", "Northern Africa and Middle East", "Europe" and so on. Transregional entanglements, being one conclusion coming from the spatial turn, not only transcend existing regions, but they are also creating new ones. The emerging field of transregional studies therefore seems particularly suitable to reflect on the kind of conceptual Eurocentrism that still dominates research in non-European cultures.[105] Thinking about transregional entanglements calls into question the essentialization of taken-for-granted "world regions" that have been established "long ago". Existing research on transregionalism indicates that maybe a new epistemology also has to be developed, as no single discipline alone any longer is able to meaningfully deal with transregional topics. This requires some form of intellectual as well as organizational innovation in trans- and interdisciplinarity, including a solid practice of "doing research with" rather than "doing research on" non-Western regions.

And, fourth, thinking "transregional conflict" also allows one to focus on the social processes involved in making things transregional, such as in assemblage. Accordingly, emphasis is placed on the actors involved, their interest, repertoires, and means of communicating the "transregional" character of something – be it through naming and framing or be it through violent action or intervention.

Interestingly, for a number of disciplines or fields transregional studies is not that novel. After the beginning of the new millennium, global history and cultural studies have begun to nurture a transregional studies agenda.[106] The term is also quite common in some "niche" IR sub-fields, for instance in works on the relations between the former territories of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) as well as with countries to their east.[107] Also, research in learning and knowledge management increasingly seems to be expressed in terms of transregionalism. However, one may have to question the extent to which the last two examples are merely characterized by adopting a new vocabulary, rather than really defining a new perspective of how to conduct research on regions and their interactions in the social sciences and humanities.

In any case, this volume is developed around a set of ontological and epistemological assumptions that are rather new to African studies and neighbouring fields of research. The editors have asked contributors to map conflict dynamics and interventions pertaining to their case study through a transregional perspective, and through comparison to substantiate this perspective. In order to disentangle hybridity, complexity, interconnec-

104 R. Latham, Identifying the Contours of Transboundary Political Life, in: T. Callaghy, R. Kassimir and R. Latham, Intervention & Transnationalism in Africa: global-local networks of power, Cambridge 2001, pp. 69–92.

105 See M. Middell (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Transregional Studies, Abingdon 2012.

106 See ibid.

107 Nordic Africa Institute Library, <http://nai.uu.se/library/> (accessed: 1 March 2019).

tivity, and overlaps – as opposed to the rather static view on "regions" – they were also asked not only to look into the historicity of the dynamics playing out today, but also to describe dominant entrepreneurs of transregional dynamics and the emergence of new alliances in more detail. Furthermore, contributors to this volume were asked to analyze the emerging forms of governance in their respective case studies.

In more practical terms, the African Union, as the continent's most important multilateral actor, has started reflecting these developments in terms of conflict prevention and mediation: In the past eight years or so, the AU has increasingly acknowledged the relevance of transregional conflicts. While in the 2000s the chairperson of the AU Commission (AUC) appointed special envoys or high-level representatives only for specific country-based conflicts, there has been a more recent trend to appoint these representatives for transnational and even transregional conflicts. Thus, out of the currently 13 special envoys, some are responsible for Guinea (appointed in 2009), Tunisia (2013), or Darfur in Sudan (2012), whereas others are addressing "Mali and the Sahel" as well as the "Great Lakes region", respectively (both 2012).[108]

Increasingly the language of "transregional" is also entering the world of policy analysis and response option formulation. For instance, in its section on policy recommendations, the 2016 Word Peace Foundation report on "African Politics, African Peace" – which was quoted at the very beginning of this introduction – concludes on the topic of "AU-Trans-Regional and Extra-Regional Organizations":

> *The AU and T/XROs* [transregional and extra-regional organizations] *such as the Arab League, OIC* [Organization of Islamic Cooperation], *GCC* [Gulf Cooperation Council], *EU and NATO* [North Atlantic Treaty Organization], *need mechanisms for the shared spaces such as the Mediterranean Sea and its southern littoral, and the Red Sea-Gulf of Aden.* […] *A host of issues in relation to the "shared spaces" need to be addressed in such forums. These include: resolving the Libya conflict; addressing the migration and refugee crisis; tackling transnational organized crime; addressing the conflict in Yemen and the Red Sea-Gulf of Aden crisis; responding to threats of maritime terrorism and piracy.*[109]

Although this volume concentrates on the African continent and the transregional entanglements of conflicts playing out on African soil, the ideas developed here are certainly meant to be relevant for other world regions too, as the cases of Syria or Iraq in their respective transregional entanglements clearly demonstrate.

108 See "Special Envoys of the Chairperson of the Commission". ULR: <https://au.int/en/cpauc/envoys> (accessed: 31 July 2018).

109 African Politics, African Peace. Report submitted to the African Union by the World Peace Foundation. Preface by Thabo Mbeki and Lakhdar Brahimi, [Medford MA]: The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, 2016, §§194, 195. The primary authors of this report are Mulugeta Gebrehiwot (Addis Ababa) and Alex de Waal (Medford MA). A conceptual definition for "AU-Trans-Regional and Extra-Regional Organizations", however, is not developed.

6. Organization of this Volume

In the following article, Nickson Bondo offers an analysis of the conflicts in the Great Lakes region. He focuses on attempts to mitigate violent conflicts that have broken out after the 1994 genocide in Rwanda and the subsequent Congo wars of 1996/97 and 1998–2003 through the establishment of a new intergovernmental organization, the International Conference of the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR), which is headquartered in Bujumbura (Burundi). The ICGLR cuts across existing RECs such as the SADC, the EAC, and ECCAS. The following two articles discuss African transregional conflicts-in-the-making. Katharina Döring explores whether the deployment of the G5 intervention force in Burkina Faso, Mali, Mauritania, Niger and Chad in 2017[110] actually started a process of region-building that will lead to the emergence of another transregional conflict in the Lake Chad Basin. This is followed by Jens Herpolsheimer who enquires if and how the maritime security debate on the Gulf of Guinea, the so-called Yaoundé Process, which cuts across ECOWAS and ECCAS, can be analysed in terms of an emerging transregional conflict. The next article is on a transregional conflict that links Africa with another world region: Dawit Yohannes and Fana Gebresenbet investigate the emerging transregional conflict that is connecting the Horn of Africa across the Red Sea to conflict dynamics that are determined by, among others, Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Qatar and currently mainly playing out in Yemen.

110 Döring, The changing ASF geography; K. P. W. Döring/J. Herpolsheimer, The spaces of intervention for Mali and Guinea-Bissau, in: South African Journal of International Affairs 25 (2018) 1, pp. 61–82; Finding the right role for the G5 Sahel Joint Force, Brussels: International Crisis Group, 12 December 2017.

Transregional Conflict in the Great Lakes Region

Nickson Bondo Museka

ABSTRACTS

In diesem Kapitel werden die Hauptursachen des Konflikts um die Großen Seen und die Rolle der Internationalen Konferenz „Große Seen" (ICGLR) bei der Berücksichtigung seiner regionalen Dimensionen erläutert. Die ethnische Spaltung wurde als Hauptursache der Konflikte in Ruanda, Burundi, Uganda und in geringerem Maße in der Demokratischen Republik Kongo diskutiert. Das Versagen der staatlichen Institutionen in der Auseinandersetzung mit Ethnizität und ihren auslösenden Faktoren verursachte Bürgerkriege, Massaker und Genozid, was zu einer gewaltigen Flüchtlingsbewegung aus einem Land der Great Lakes in Nachbarländer und andere Länder führte. Dies erklärt den Ausbruch des Great Lakes-Krieges zwischen der Demokratischen Republik Kongo und Ruanda, Uganda und Burundi von August 1998 bis 2003 und die anhaltende Instabilität in der Region. Vor diesem Hintergrund wurde im Dezember 2006 die ICGLR gegründet, um die Ursachen der Konflikte und deren regionale Dimensionen anzugehen. Trotz der Unterzeichnung des Pakts für Sicherheit, Stabilität und Entwicklung durch die Länder der Großen Seen ist die ICGLR immer noch mit ernsthaften Herausforderungen konfrontiert, die ihre Fähigkeit zur Förderung von nachhaltigem Frieden und Sicherheit in der Region untergraben.

This contribution explained the main root causes of the Great Lakes conflict and the role played by the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) in addressing its regional dimensions. Ethnic division was discussed as the main root of conflicts in Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda, and to a less extent in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The failure of state institutions to address ethnicity and its triggering factors caused internal civil wars, massacres and genocide which led to a huge movement of refugees from one Great Lakes country to other neighbouring and countries. This explains the outbreak of the Great Lakes war between the DRC and Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi from August 1998 to 2003 and the ongoing instability in the region. Against this background, the ICGLR was established in December 2006 in a bid to address the root causes of the conflicts and its regional dimensions. Despite the signing of the

Comparativ | Zeitschrift für Globalgeschichte und vergleichende Gesellschaftsforschung 28 (2018) Heft 6, S. 26–48.

Pact for Security, Stability and Development by Great Lakes countries, the ICGLR is still facing serious challenges which undermine its capacity to promote sustainable peace and security in the region.

This article focuses on attempts to mitigate transregional conflicts that brougth in countries from Angola to Uganda and from Zambia to Sudan as well as cut across a number of African regional economic communities (RECs). Ultimately, the international processes of dealing with the aftermath of the 1994 genocide in Rwanda and the subsequent Congo wars of 1996/97 and 1998–2003 led to the creation of the International Conference of the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR), headquartered in Bujumbura, Burundi. The article analyses the root causes of the conflicts and attempts at region-making by the ICGLR in a bid to promote sustainable peace and security in the region. The article is subdivided into six sections. First, a brief description of the Great Lakes region is provided. Second, the root causes and triggering factors of the Great Lakes conflicts, including their interconnectedness and complexity are discussed. Third, the regional dimensions of the Great Lakes conflicts are presented. Fourth, the establishment of the ICGLR and its conflict interventions are analysed. Fifth, the ICGLR's role in mediating conflicts in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is singled out.[1] And, sixth, the ICGLR's challenges and limitations in promoting sustainable peace and security in the region are discussed.

1. The Great Lakes Region

The Great Lakes region is known as the Great Rift Valley along the Congo-Nile crest which constitutes the area between and around lakes Victoria, Tanganyika, Kioga, Kivu, Edward, and Albert.[2] Lake Victoria actually does not lie in the Great Rift Valley, but between its main and western branches.[3] While the definition remains the same, there are several descriptions of the Great Lakes region. This article focuses on the current description of the Great Lakes region, which has been constituted as an area occupied by Burundi, Congo (Brazzaville), the DRC, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda as well as Angola, the Central African Republic (CAR), Sudan, South Sudan, and Zambia.[4] The security interdependence among the Great Lakes countries makes this region, what Barry Buzan describes as a regional security complex (RSC) or, in terms of this volume, a

1 There has also been a role of the ICGLR in Burundi, in 2010 and 2015–2016. However, for a variety of reasons in these cases the lead was with the East African Community (EAC) and the African Union (on the latter see Wilén and Williams 2018).

2 G.P. Mpangala, Ethnic conflicts in the region oft he Great Lakes: origins and prospects for change, Dar-es-Salaam 2000.

3 R. Lemarchand, The Dynamics of Violence in Central Africa, Pennsylvania PA 2009.

4 M. Baregu (ed.), Understanding Obstacles to Peace: Actors, Interests, and Strategies in Africa's Great Lakes Region, Kampala 2011.

transregional conflict.[5] As a geographic entity, according to the ICGLR,[6] the Great Lakes region is made up security complex zones characterized by artificial, porous, proximate and long physical borders. The proximity and porous nature of the region, allows foreign illegal armed groups, local rebels, and militias to drive insecurity and enmity from one state to the other. The huge movement of refugees and illegal armed groups has caused permanent insecurity in the 1980s, 1990s, and from 2003 to 2015. Internal civil wars in Angola, Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda have had a direct impact on the security situation of the DRC and other neighbouring countries. In turn, insurgencies have used the eastern DRC as a rear base to destabilize neighbouring countries.

2. Root Causes and Triggering Factors of Great Lakes Conflicts

Politicized Ethnicity

Several authors explain the root causes of armed conflicts and civil wars in the Great Lakes with reference to "ethnic divisions" that have been created by colonial powers.[7] While some scholars blame colonial administrations for creating ethnic divisions,[8] others argue that ethnicity was manipulated by post-independence political elites as a means to have access to power and control the state apparatus.[9] Firstly, this article argues that ethnicity on its own does not explain the root causes of armed conflicts and civil wars in Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda. "Ethnicity" has been socially constructed by colonial masters and exploited by post-independence political elites to gain support from both Hutu and Tutsi "ethnic groups".[10]

Secondly, this article argues that far from promoting reconciliation and social cohesion, post-independence political elites have used ethnicity as a means to establish authoritarian, predatory, and discriminatory regimes led by one ethnic group against another, depending on which ethnic group dominates and rules the state apparatus. Vidal, for instance, argues that conflicts in Rwanda and Burundi should not be simply understood as a manifestation of ethnic differences between Hutus and Tutsis as created by colonial masters, but ones that were exacerbated and manipulated by extremist politicians

5 B. Buzan, People, states and fear: an agenda for international security studies in the post-cold war era, New York 1991.

6 ICGLR, Annual Report 2010–2011 of the Executive Secretary, Amb. Liberata Mulamula, Bujumbura 2011.

7 Cf. G. Prunier, Africa's world war: Congo, the Rwandan genocide, and the making of a continental catastrophe, Oxford 2009; R. Lemarchand, The Report of the National Commission to Study the Question of National Unity in Burundi: a Critical Comment, in: The Journal of Modern African Studies 27 (1989) 4, pp. 685–690; J. Bigagaza et al., Land Distribution and Conflicts in Rwanda, in: J. Lind and K. Sturman (eds.), Scarcity and Surfeit: The Ecology of Africa's Conflict, Pretoria 2002, pp. 51–84; C. Vidal, Le génocide des Rwandais tutsi et l'usage public de l'histoire, in: Afrique Contemporaine 17 (1995) 2, pp. 53–663.

8 For instance Bigagaza et al., Land Distribution and Conflicts in Rwanda; J. Gahama, Les Causes des Violences Ethniques Contemporaines dans l'Afrique des Grands Lacs: Une Analyse Historique et Sociopolitique, in: Afrika Zamani (13 & 14) (2006), pp.101–115.

9 Lemarchand, Report of the National Commission; Vidal, Le génocide des Rwandais tutsi, pp. 53–663; J. Chrétien, The great lakes of Africa: two thousand years of history, New York 2003.

10 Gahama, Les Causes des Violences Ethniques.

to maintain popular support and have control of the state.[11] In Rwanda, for instance, the 1959 Hutu revolution was indeed grounded in the post Hutu-Tutsi ethnic division created by the Belgian administration.[12] However, this ethnic division was later exploited by the Hutu post-independence political elites, who managed to establish what they described as *the Hutu power* and aimed to turn the racist ideology against Tutsis.[13] The *Hutu power* was conceived of as the legitimate revenge of the indigenous Ba Hutu against the Tutsi minority previously portrayed by colonial administrations and missionary rhetoric as superior.[14]

Once in power, new Hutu leaders engaged themselves in a political process whose aim was to replace the privileged Tutsi elites by Hutus and one oppressive regime by another. In order to suppress political ambitions of the Tutsi elites in the postcolonial era, new Hutu leaders established a hegemonic regime characterized by the systematic persecution of Tutsis and the increasing destabilization of democratic institutions at the benefit of Hutu nationalist leaders and agendas. This resulted in many post-independence conflicts, which left about 500 Tutsis killed, 22,000 internally displaced, and about 130,000 refugees in neighbouring countries during the early 1960s. Furthermore, the failure of respective governments to address ethnic divisions and promote national cohesion exacerbated ethnic violence, internal civil wars and armed conflicts in the region. Each regime change in Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda resulted in massive cross-border movements of Tutsis or Hutu refugees.

Contrary to Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda, ethnicity is not viewed as the most important root cause of conflicts in the DRC. The Congolese community did not experience major ethnic conflicts during its post-independence era until escalation of ethnic violence in neighbouring countries were driven by the huge movement of refugees and illegal armed groups into the eastern DRC. The DRC comprises over three hundred "ethnic groups", which co-existed peacefully until ethnic conflicts in neighbouring countries triggered ethnic violence in the eastern DRC. Between 1990–1994, the Congolese community witnessed a "tribal" conflict between the Katangese and Kasaien communities living in the Katanga province.[15] This was more a xenophobic crisis than an ethnic conflict. It was triggered by the Katangese political elite such as Gabriel Kyungu-wa-Kumwanza, with the tacit support of President Mobutu Sese Seko.

The escalation of ethnic violence in Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda during the early 1990s fuelled ethnic conflict and extreme violence in the eastern DRC. The Hutu-Tutsi conflicts were transplanted by the massive movement of refugees into the North and

11 Vidal, Le génocide des Rwandais tutsi.

12 Ibid.

13 Chrétien, The Great Lakes of Africa.

14 M. Mamdani, Understanding the crisis in Kivu: report of the CODESRIA mission to the Democratic Republic of Congo, September 1997, Dakar 2001.

15 D. Dibwe dia Mwembu, État de la question sur le conflit Katangais-Kasaïen dans la province du Katanga (1990–1994), in: B. Jewsiewicki and L. N'sanda Buleli (eds.), Constructions, négociations et dérives des identités régionales dans les États des Grands Lacs africains: approche comparative, Québec 1990, pp. 9–48, http://www.congoforum.be/upldocs/approche_comp(1).pdf (accessed 27 November 2013).

South Kivu provinces.[16] Before the independence of the DRC, both Hutus and Tutsis from Rwanda and Burundi were encouraged by the Belgian colonial masters to work in mining corporations in the eastern part of the country. This decision prompted the emergence of the Banyamulenge ethnic group in the North and South Kivu provinces. With the majority originating from Rwanda, the Banyamulenge (Tutsi Congolese) became Congolese citizens following the adoption of the first Constitution of Luluabourg, which granted citizenship to all people and ethnic groups found on the Congolese territory before its independence on 30 June 1960.

However, the Banyamulenge's citizenship was contested by other Congolese ethnic identity groups and their rights to land, traditional authority, as well as local, provincial, and national leaderships were denied.[17] Even though lower level ethnic conflicts did exist between the Banyamulenge (Tutsi Congolese) and other Congolese ethnic groups fighting over citizenship and land ownership in South and North Kivu provinces, these never escalated into serious wars.[18] The 1972 Citizenship Decree, the 1981 Citizen Law as well as the 1991–1992 Sovereign National Conference addressed the Banyamulenge's citizenship issue by recognizing them as bein of Congolese origin. Thus, until the 1994 Rwandan genocide ethnicity in the DRC never led to serious civil wars.

Land Disputes as a Triggering Factor of Ethnic Conflicts

The failure of states institutions to implement the equal distribution of scarce land resources aggravated ethnic tensions and violence in the Great Lakes countries. Bigagaza et al., for instance, explain the dynamics of conflicts in Rwanda by examining the struggle between Hutus and Tutsi elites and communities over limited land resources.[19] They demonstrate the significant role played by competition for and control over land in triggering wars and ethnic conflicts in Rwanda. Accordingly access to land contributed to conflict in two ways. First, the population pressure led to competition for land. Furthermore, there was an inequitable distribution of land, most of which was controlled by elites. As demonstrated by Bigagaza et al., access to land resources has been a serious problem in the history of Rwanda, where over 90 per cent of the population earn their living from agricultural activities.[20] The demographic pressure makes it very difficult for the population to find enough arable land for farming activities. Rwanda is described as having the highest density in Africa.[21] Homer-Dixon argues that in 1991, for instance, the Rwandan population was estimated at about 7.5 million, growing at 3.3 per cent per year, and 271 persons living per square kilometre. Of the overall population, 95 per

16 Mamdani, Understanding the Crisis in the Kivu.
17 Ibid.
18 Ibid.
19 Bigagaza et al., Land Distribution and Conflicts in Rwanda, pp. 51–84.
20 Ibid.
21 T. Homer-Dixon, Environmental scarcities and violent conflict: Evidence from cases, in: International Security 19 (1994) 1, pp. 5–40.

cent inhabited 43 per cent of the total cultivated land.[22] This resulted in an inequitable distribution of land, which demonstrates a clear linkage between access to land and ethnic conflicts. Thus, control over scarce land resources is at the core of the power struggle between political elites in Rwanda and it is framed along ethnic lines.

In Uganda the post-independence elites inherited a fractured state embedded in north/south divisions. Despite the attempt of the post-independence elites to bring unity, the country has remained divided along ethnic lines. Milton Obote formed an alliance between his political party, the Ugandan People's Convention (UPC), and the Buganda monarchy party, Kabasa Pekka. This led to a power-sharing arrangement with Obote as premier minister and King Kabaka Mutesa II as president and head of state. However, this political arrangement collapsed soon after the establishment of the post-independence government. The land disputes between the Buganda and Bunyoro kingdoms over lost counties precipitated the divorce between the Obote and Mutesa and plunged the country into a serious political crisis. Obote dismissed the king and detained five ministers originating from the Bantu (northern Uganda) region. He took over as president of the republic, forced Mutesa into exile, and changed the 1962 Constitution. The power struggle between these two political leaders quickly accelerated and transformed into a Bantu versus non-Bantu (Nilotic) ethnic conflict. Similar ethnic grievances were raised by Museveni to fight the Obote regime.

3. The Regional Dimensions of the Great Lakes Conflicts

The Refugee Problem

The refugee problem is a crucial factor that triggered and escalated ethnic conflict and internal civil wars from one Great Lakes country to another. For instance, as early as 1960, Tutsi refugees felt marginalized and started military incursions from Burundi into Rwanda. In December 1963, Rwandan refugees launched a surprise attack from the Burundian camps with the support of the Tutsi-dominated government in Burundi.[23] With the support of Belgian troops, former Rwandan President (1962–1973) Grégoire Kayibanda and his government managed to repulse the military offensive. This was followed by a massive repression against the Tutsi community. About 10,000 Tutsis were killed between December 1963 and January 1964, including all the remaining Tutsi politicians. This increased the number of Tutsi refugees to 336,000 or 75 per cent of the Tutsi population fleeing to neighbouring countries by the end of 1964. About 200,000 more Tutsi refugees fled to Burundi and 78,000 to Uganda. Like during the 1960s and 1990s, the recent aborted military coup in Burundi in 2015 resulted in a huge movement of refugees into neighbouring countries. Since then, the government of Burundi as well as the UN Group of Experts have accused the Rwandan government of recruiting

22 Ibid.

23 Mamdani, Understanding the Crisis in the Kivu.

Burundian refugees from camps and train them to launch military attacks against Hutu-dominated Bujumbura.[24]

Similarly, ethnic conflict in Rwanda resulted in Tutsi refugees which had an impact on armed conflicts during the 1980s in Uganda. The conflicts of 1959 and 1963 forced a number of Tutsi into exile.[25] They were denied the right of return by the regime of Juvenal Habyarimana. The civil wars in 1963 and the 1990s between the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) and the Rwandan government, which escalated into the 1994 genocide, was in part caused by the denial of the right to return of Tutsi refugees to Rwanda.[26] Thousands of Rwandan refugees were recruited from camps in Uganda by the then leader of the National Resistance Army (NRA) to fight against the Obote regime in Kampala. Once in power, Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni helped Tutsi refugees to form the RPF, which, under the leadership of Paul Kagame, launched military campaigns into Rwanda.[27] In the early 1990s, the 1993 Arusha Ceasefire Agreement was signed between the RPF leader Kagame and the former Rwandan President Habyarimana.

Following the assassination of President Habyarimana in a plane crash on 6 April 1994, the Hutu-dominated army and militias conducted the systematic extermination of over 800,000 Tutsis and moderate Hutus within 100 days. In so doing, the Rwandan interim government left the RPF with no choice but to launch a military incursion to reverse the Hutu regime and stop the genocide. Even though Rwandan rebels (RPF) managed, since July 1994, to establish a Tutsi regime, no successful reconciliation process took place. By contrast, the coming into power of the RPF changed the balance of power in favour of the Tutsi ethnic group sending into exile several hundreds of thousands of the Hutu refugees, militias, and armed groups into in the eastern DRC. This is discussed further in next section of this article.

Like in Rwanda, internal civil wars in Angola, Burundi, and Uganda resulted into a substantial movement of refugees which took these conflicts into the eastern part of the DRC. It triggered insecurity and ethnic violence in the eastern DRC in general and the north and south provinces in particular.[28] The existence of the defeated former Rwandan national army (ex-Rwandan Armed Forces [French: FAR] / Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda [French: FDLR]) and Burundian rebels (National Council for the Defence of Democracy [French: CNDD]-Forces for the Defence of Democracy [FDD]) on Congolese territory increased tensions between ex-Zaire on the one hand, and Rwanda and Burundi on the other. These military groups started using the eastern DRC as a rear base to launch military attacks against Rwanda and Burundi.[29] And in

24 A. Ntumba Luaba, Interview by the author with the ICGLR Executive Secretary. Bujumbura, 30 July 2015; UNSC, Final report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo, UN doc. S/2015/19 (2015), https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2015_19.pdf (accessed 3 April 2019).

25 See Bigagaza et al., Land Distribution and Conflicts in Rwanda.

26 Ibid.

27 G. Nzongola-Ntalaja and M. Lee, The State and Democracy in Africa, Harare 1997.

28 Ibid.

29 Ibid.

addition, the fact that the FDLR and CNDD-FDD rebel movements were mainly composed of Hutus from Rwanda and Burundi triggered ethnic violence between Hutu and Tutsi Congolese in the North and South Kivu provinces.[30]

A Weak DRC Government

The weakness of the DRC government to address the security grievances posed by neighbouring countries – including Angola, Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda – explains to a great extent the complexity of the conflicts in the Great Lakes region. The failure of the Mobutu regime to disarm Rwandan and Burundian forces and to initiate in his capacity as a key leader of the Economic Community for the Great Lakes Countries (French: CEPGL), a serious dialogue for their repatriation worsened the climate of mistrust and suspicion between president Mobutu and his two new colleagues, Pasteur Bizimungu and Pierre Buyoya, precipitating the collapse of this regional organization.[31] Mobutu was accused by Bizimungu and Buyoya of supporting and allowing these rebel forces to illegally operate in the eastern DRC. During late 1994 and early 1996, ex-FAR and CNDD-FDD militias launched several military attacks against the new regimes in Rwanda and Burundi. The Mobutu regime failed to stop these foreign forces to use its territory as a rear base against neighbouring countries. Thus, the Pluralistic Security Community, imagined by Mobutu, Habyarimana, and Bagaza, did not materialize. Instead, in 1996 the CEPGL collapsed.

As a response to what they described as Mobutu's aggressive behaviour, Burundi and Rwanda, together with other Great Lakes countries such as Angola, Sudan, and Uganda, supported the Congolese rebel group Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo (French: AFDL). The AFDL managed to oust Mobutu in May 1997, and Laurent-Désiré Kabila became president.[32] Rwanda, Uganda, and Burundi raised similar security grievances, supported other Congolese rebels such as the Congolese Rally for Democracy based in Goma (French: RCD-Goma), the Movement of the Liberation of Congo (MLC), the Congolese Rally for Democracy-National (RCD-N), and the Congolese Rally for Democracy-Kisangani Liberation Movement (RCD-KLM) against their former ally. This second Congolese war started on 2 August 1998 with a presidential decree authorizing the withdrawal of all Rwandan, Burundian, and Ugandan military forces who accompanied Kabila in his military struggle against the Mobutu regime.

By August 1998, a similar issue was raised by Rwandan and Ugandan government to justify their military invasions and support to other Congolese rebel movements, such as the RCD-Goma, MLC, the National Congress for the Defence of the People (French: CNDP), and the Movement of 23 March (M23), against their former ally Kabila. This

30 Mamdani, Understanding the Crisis in the Kivu.

31 A. Ntumba Luaba, Interview; A.M. Bwenge, D'une CEPGL à une autre: quelles alternatives dans les stratégies actuelles d'intégration et de coopération pour le développement? Dakar 2010, http://www.codesria.org/IMG/pdf/5-_Bwenge.pdf (accessed 27 November 2013).

32 Nzongola-Ntalaja and Lee, The State and Democracy in Africa.

created a climate of insecurity in the region, resulting in the first regional war fought by nine countries in the eastern DRC. Two fighting blocs were created: the DRC government supported by Angola, Namibia, Zimbabwe, and Chad versus the RCD-Goma and MLC rebel movements supported by Rwanda, Uganda, and Burundi.[33] Only a few years after the signing of the Sun City Agreement (ICPN 2003), which put an end the 1998–2003 war, the governments of Rwanda and Uganda started supporting rebel groups such as the CNDP and M23 rebels (see below).

Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources

Many observers view the illegal exploitation of natural resources as the most important underlying factor that motivated the Rwandan and Ugandan support to several Congolese rebel groups involved in armed conflicts in the eastern DRC. When analysing the underlying root causes of the transregional conflict, it becomes clear that the security grievance was used by Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda to cover their economic greediness in the eastern DRC. Since 1996, the governments of Rwanda, Burundi, and Uganda have justified their military interventions in the eastern DRC and support to rebel forces because of security concerns. On several occasions, the presidents of Uganda and Rwanda claimed that their military interventions in the eastern DRC sought to dismantle the FDLR, the Allied Democratic Forces-National Army for the Liberation of Uganda (ADF-NALU), and the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), operating near their respective borders.[34] Yet, since 1997 the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA) never launched any serious military offensive against the FDLR in their operational zones, but rather targeted mining sites.[35]

In the past, all actors involved in the Congolese conflict had engaged in the illegal exploitation of natural resources, including the M23 and Rwanda.[36] They continued to be involved in the illegal exploitation of natural resources – despite the signing of the Lusaka Declaration by all ICGLR member states.[37] Thus, interests in natural resources remain the genuine underlying reason for Rwandan military interventions in the eastern DRC, though they are often hidden by security concerns. On several occasions, the RPA entered the DRC, either in support of Congolese rebels or the Congolese national army, but it never seized this opportunity to completely eradicate FDLR rebels. For instance, joint DRC-Rwanda military operations against FDLR rebels – such as the Kmia 1 and 2, Amani leo and Amani kamilifu – failed to eradicate them.

33 Ibid.; M. Malan and J. Gomes Porto (eds.), Challenges of Peace Implementation: the UN mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Pretoria 2004.

34 Nzongola-Ntalaja and M. Lee, The State and Democracy in Africa.

35 T. Dagne, The Democratic Republic of Congo: Background and Current Development, Washington DC 2011; O. Lanotte, République Démocratique du Congo: Guerre sans frontiers, Paris 2003.

36 UNSC, Final report; Baregu et al., Understanding Obstacles to Peace.

37 ICGLR, Lusaka Declaration of the ICGLR Special Summit to Fight Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources in the Creat [sic!] Lakes Region, 15 December 2010, https://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/mne/47143500.pdf (accessed 15 November 2013).

4. The ICGLR Peace and Security Architecture

Historical Background

The ICGLR was established in December 2006 by the heads of states and government as an institutional framework to address the regional and national dimensions of the Great Lakes conflicts. Following the 1994 genocide in Rwanda and interstate wars in the eastern DRC, the United Nations and the African Union (AU) pushed for an ad hoc International Conference on the Great Lakes Region to address the root causes of conflicts and their transregional dimensions and also to promote sustainable peace, security, stability, and economic development in the region.[38] On 30 December 1999, the UN secretary-general appointed Berhnu Dinka as his special representative for the Great Lakes region and instructed him to consult with regional leaders on the project. Subsequently, the UN Security Council recalled in all its resolutions on the DRC the importance of organizing a conference on the region, under the auspices of the UN and AU. Thus, initially the ICGLR was not initiated as a permanent, but as an ad hoc institution to address issues concerning peace, security, and development.

Three main reasons motivated the UN to transform the ICGLR into a permanent regional institution. First, there were the transregional dimensions of the DRC conflict in terms of the root causes and actors involved. Second, it was believed that the existence of ethnic, social, political, cultural, and linguistic ties between peoples of the Great Lakes region would make it easier for instability caused by internal factors to quickly spread through the entire region. Third, the regional approach was believed to be more suitable in finding sustainable solutions to internal conflicts and instability in each of the countries of the region. However, the conference idea was received with deep scepticism and strong resistance by regional stakeholders in general and Rwanda and Uganda in particular. The latter believed that such a regional initiative could only succeed if the security issues in the eastern DRC were effectively addressed. For other observers, the ICGLR was perceived as a Western strategy to weaken existing regional initiatives.[39] Despite their resistance, the UN Security Council pushed the conference idea by adopting Resolutions 1292 and 1304 in 2000, which called for the implementation of such a regional project. In April and May 2002, the UNSC deployed its work team in the region.[40]

After this, the official process of establishing the ICGLR started in June 2003, soon after signing the Sun City Agreement in South Africa to end war in the DRC.[41] This dem-

38 G. Khadiagala, Mediation efforts in Africa's Great Lakes Region, Africa mediator's retreat, 23 April 2007, https://www.hdcentre.org/wpcontent/uploads/2016/08/112MediationeffortsinAfricas_GreatLakesRegion-April-2007.pdf (accessed 4 January 2017).

39 F. Grignon, Economic Agendas in the Congolese Peace Process, in: M. Nest (ed.) The Democratic Republic of Congo: Economic Dimensions of War and Peace, Boulder CO 2006, pp. 63–98.

40 UNSC, Report on Exploitation of Resources of Democratic Republic of Congo is Challenged in Security Council, UN doc. SC/7561 (2002), https://www.un.org/press/en/2002/SC7561.doc.htm (accessed 3 April 2019).

41 ICPN (Inter-Congolese Political Negotiations), The Final Act, Pretoria, 2 April 2003, https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/CD_030402_SunCityAgreement.pdf (accessed 3 November 2014).

onstrates the direct link between peace initiatives in the DRC and the process relating to the establishment of the ICGLR. Firstly, the Sun City Agreement paved the way for the establishment of the ICGLR. The addendum to the Final Act of the accords called for the organization of an "International Conference on Peace, Security and Development in the Great Lakes Region and Central Africa".[42] Secondly, the agreement was preceded by the signing in 2002 of the Pretoria Accord between Rwanda and the DRC and the Luanda Agreement between Uganda and the DRC. Through these two agreements, Rwanda and Uganda committed themselves to withdraw their military forces from the eastern DRC. The DRC government on its part, committed to disarm, demobilize and repatriate Rwandan and Ugandan rebels (FDLR, ADF-NALU) operating in the North and South Kivu provinces to destabilize the Kampala and Kigali regimes.[43] These two agreements addressed Rwandan and Ugandan security concerns as a prerequisite for establishing the ICGLR.

After the signing of the Pretoria, Luanda, and Sun City agreements, the idea to establish the ICGLR materialized in November 2004 with the holding of the first meeting of heads of states and government of eleven countries of the Great Lakes region in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, and the signing of a declaration.[44] Two years later, regional leaders met in Nairobi in December 2006 and signed the Pact on Security, Stability and Development. It entered into force in May 2007 and marked the operationalization of the ICGLR, followed by the establishment of its Executive Secretariat in Bujumbura as a coordinating body of the organization.[45]

The ICGLR's Peace and Security Architecture

The December 2006 pact was signed with the intention to transform the Great Lakes region from a space of wars into a space of sustainable peace and security.[46] Basically, the institutional framework of the ICGLR's peace and security architecture was inspired by the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) model.[47] The ICGLR pact established a Regional Programme for Peace and Security under the coordination of the ICGLR's Executive Secretary. It aims are

> *to promote the joint management of the security of common borders; to promote, maintain and enhance cooperation in the field of peace, conflict prevention, and peaceful settlement of disputes; and to promote inter-states cooperation on general security issues including combating the illicit proliferation of small arms and light weapons, preventing and combating organized transnational criminal activities and terrorism*.[48]

42 Ibid.
43 Ibid.
44 E. Mokodopo, Interview by the author with senior ICGLR officer for Gender, Women and Children Programme, Bujumbura, 15 December 2015.
45 ICPN, The Final Act.
46 CGLR, Pact on Security, Stability and Development (PSSD) in the Great Lakes Region, 14–15 December 2006, https://www.icglr.org (accessed 1 March 2019).
47 Khadiagala, Mediation efforts.
48 CGLR, Pact on Security, Stability and Development.

With the adoption of the ICGLR's pact, the stated policies and priority guiding principles were translated into sub-programmes and projects. Three main sub-programmes were designed to address the regional dimensions of the Great Lakes countries, namely the Joint Security Management of Common Borders, the Inter-State Cooperation on All Security related Issues, and the Conflict Prevention, Management and Peaceful Settlement of Disputes. The sub-programme on Joint Security Management of Common Borders and its related projects aimed at managing and improving the security situation in twelve border zones within the region identified by ICGLR member states.

5. ICGLR Mediation between DRC Government and Armed Groups in Eastern DRC

The ICGLR has been involved on several occasions in conflict mediation between the DRC government and Congolese rebel groups. This sub-section analyses the role played by the ICGLR in mediating peace processes in the DRC – namely the 2008 Goma Agreement, the 2009 Nairobi Communiqué, the 23 March 2009 Peace Agreement, the 2013 Addis Ababa Agreement, and the 2012/13 Kampala Dialogue.

The 2008 Goma Agreement

The ICGLR was actively involved in facilitating the 2008 Goma Agreement between the DRC government and several insurgencies groups that were operating in the provinces of North Kivu and South Kivu provinces. Following the outbreak of the conflict between the DRC government and the CNDP, the ICGLR on 7 November convened an extra-ordinary summit to address the root causes of the conflict.[49] In her capacity as the Executive Secretary of the ICGLR, Ambassador Liberata Mulamula worked closely with two co-facilitators appointed by the ICGLR Summit, namely former Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo, representing the UN secretary-general, and former Tanzanian President Benjamin William Mkapa, as ICGLR chairperson.[50] The Goma conference brought together the DRC government and about 22 armed groups, including the CNDP and other local militias. It addressed a number of issues, including a cease-fire and a progressive disengagement of major rebel forces and several Mai-Mai militia groups.
Besides the specifically military aspect, the Goma Agreement also addressed a political component with a draft amnesty law that the government agreed to present to the DRC parliament. In the end, on 23 January 2008 all parties signed an "act of engagement". The agreement also created an environment conducive to the signing the Nairobi Communiqué on 17 January 2009 between the DRC government and its three neighbour-

49 ICGLR, Annual Report 2011–2012 of the Executive Secretary, Prof Alphonse Ntumba Luaba, Bujumbura 2012; A. Sumaili, La CIRGL et le Reglement des Differends dans la Region des Grands-Lacs: Cas de la Rebellion du M23, in: Revue québécoise de droit international 28 (2016) 1, pp. 203–218.

50 Ibid.

ing countries. Known as Tripartite Plus, the Nairobi regional peace initiative led to the deployment of joint military operations between the DRC and Rwanda and between the DRC and Uganda to eradicate all foreign and local rebel forces.[51] These joint military operations contained these forces only for a short time but never managed to completely eradicate them. Foreign rebel forces such as the FDLR, ADF-NALU, and the National Liberation Forces (French: FNL) were dislodged from their military positions and headquarters, but they regained them shortly after the end of the joint military operations. The DRC army and the UN Stabilization Mission in the DRC (Fench: MONUSCO) had failed to enforce security and maintain state authority after Rwandan and Ugandan national armies were withdrawn.

The Goma conference also led to the signing of the peace agreement between the DRC government and the CNDP in March 2009 in which the two parties agreed to work together to fight against foreign rebel forces.[52] In addition, the ICGLR Executive Secretariat also organized a mini summit in Addis Ababa in February 2010, in which the co-mediators concluded their mission and presented their final report with recommendations to leaders of the region. However, the implementation of these agreements came to a sudden halt with the creation of the M23 (see below).

The 23 March 2009 Agreement

The ICGLR has played an active role in mediating the conflict between the DRC and the CNDP rebel movement. This resulted in the signing on 23 March 2009 of a peaceful agreement between belligerents, the integration of former CNDP combatants into the DRC national army, and the government. In his capacity as the chairperson of the ICGLR summit, Mkapa played a significant role in mediating and co-facilitating the signing of the 23 March 2009 Peace Agreement between the CNDP and the DRC. Before the signing of the final agreement, preparatory meetings were convened at several occasions in Goma and Nairobi.[53] The primary aim of the agreement was to stop the fighting between the DRC army and CNDP rebels.[54] First, the two parties agreed on the "transformation of the CNDP" into a political party.[55] The CNDP committed itself to "integrate its police elements and armed units respectively into the Congolese National Police and the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo"; "become a political party and fulfill the formalities required for this purpose"; and "to solve all problems

51 Ibid.; Dagne, The Democratic Republic of Congo.

52 DRC (Democratic Republic of Congo), Peace Agreement between the Local Government and Le Congress National Pour la Defense du Peuple (CNDP), Goma 23 March 2009, https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/CD_090323_Peace%20Agreement%20between%20the%20Government%20and%20the%20CNDP.pdf (accessed 15 March 2013).

53 Sumaili, La CIRGL et le Reglement des Differends; Dagne, The Democratic Republic of Congo; ICGLR, Annual Report 2011–2012.

54 DRC, Peace Agreement.

55 Ibid., Article 1.

by strictly political means in full respect of the institutional order and the laws of the Republic".[56]

Second, the two parties agreed on the release of political prisoners, mainly CNDP combatants.[57] As a first step, the CNDP was to provide the government with a list of these prisoners. In the same vein, the two parties agreed on the proposal of a decentralization model that should lead to the creation of fifteen new provinces in addition to the eleven existing provinces in the country. The aim was to promote the rapprochement and reconciliation between administrators and the administered.

Third, the agreement also laid the foundation for the establishment of a national mechanism to enable a safe return of Congolese refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) in the DRC. The DRC government pledged to revive in the shortest time possible, tripartite commissions on Congolese refugees and to undertake necessary action for their repatriation, rehabilitation, and reintegration into their respective communities.[58]

Fourth, belligerents agreed to declare the provinces of North and South Kivu "disaster areas", which should benefit integration and development projects starting with the most affected territories and residences of demobilized soldiers, returning refugees, and IDPs.[59] It was also agreed that integration and development projects should draw its workforce among IDPs and refugees returning in their territories.

Fifth, the agreement also included the reform of the national army and other security services as well as the integration of CNDP forces into the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo (French: FARDC) and the Congolese National Police (French: PNC), with the recognition of their grades.[60] The agreement also called for the liberation of prisoners.[61] and an amnesty law in favour of combatants, covering the period from June 2003 until the date of its promulgation.[62]

Finally, the CNDP and the government agreed on the need to establish reliable and effective national and local mechanisms for reconciliation of communities at the local and national levels as well as promote good governance at all levels and in all fields, including the certification, operation, evaluation and control of natural resources.[63] Three years later, leaders of the former CNDP rebel movement accused the DRC government of violating the agreement and started a new war against Kinshasa.[64] In May 2012, about one battalion of former CNDP combatants withdrew from the national army and started a mutiny which later resulted into the creation of the M23 rebel movement in the North and South Kivu provinces. Leaders of the M23 accused the government of not respecting its engagements. Thus, the agreement was not 100 per cent respected by either

56 Ibid.
57 Ibid., Article 2.
58 Ibid.
59 Ibid., Article 6.
60 Ibid., Article 10.
61 Ibid., Article 2.
62 Ibid., Article 4.
63 Ibid., Articles 4–5.
64 HRW 2012; Dagne, The Democratic Republic of Congo; Sumaili, La CIRGL et le Reglement des Differends.

side. While the DRC government honoured about 60 per cent of its commitments, the CNDP leadership violated almost the majority of its commitments under the 23 March 2009 Peace Agreement.

Among other commitments, the DRC government recognized the CNDP as a political party. In 2010, the CNDP joined the Alliance for the Presidential Majority (MP), a platform that supported President Joseph Kabila during the 2011 elections (he had followed his assassinated father into office in January 2001). The CNDP had remained a MP member and some of its militants had obtained important positions in national and provincial institutions as well as the army until its withdrawal in May 2012. Regarding the release of political prisoners, the CNDP provided the list to the government and most of them were released and taken back to their homes.[65] Furthermore, the amnesty law was adopted on 5 May 2009 by the parliament and promulgated two days later. It covered "acts of war and insurrection committed in the provinces of North Kivu and South Kivu" between January 2003 and May 2009.[66] It should be noted that even before the promulgation of this law, on 9 February 2009 a circular issued by the minister of justice already called for the end of all prosecutions and investigations involving the members of the CNDP. Following the adoption of the law, the amnesty was granted to "all Congolese residing in the territory of the DRC or abroad", but it excluded acts of genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity.[67] As pointed out by Mwamba, the national coordinator of the Steering Committee of the Addis Ababa Agreement, not a single member of the CNDP has been prosecuted by the DRC judicial system for the acts that are the subject of this law.[68]

International crimes claimed against members of the CNDP, all well documented by the UN and non-governmental organizations, have not (yet) been prosecuted by the Congolese judiciary. The International Center for Transitional Justice (ICJT) and others criticized the government for promoting impunity.[69] The DRC government honoured other parts of its commitment by establishing "permanent local conciliation committees" and later on national consultation, as stipulated in Articles 4 and 5 of the 23 March 2009 Agreement.[70] Local reconciliation committees were established in the North Kivu province in order to prevent forms of extrajudicial resolution of conflicts. These committees were operational for more than eight months, but they only had limited impacts in reconciling the Banyamulenge ethnic (Tutsi Congolese) group with other ethnic groups in the North Kivu province.[71]

65 F. Mwamba Tshishimbi, Notes by the author on press conference by the National Coordinator of the Follow Up Mechanism of the Addis Ababa Accords, Kinshasa, 30 July 2015.
66 Ibid.
67 Ibid.
68 Ibid.
69 L. Waldorf, Transitional Justice and DDR. The Case of Rwanda, New York: International Centre for Transitional Justice.
70 Mwamba Tshishimbi, Notes by the author.
71 Sumaili, La CIRGL et le Reglement des Differends.

Similarly, national consultations were held in Kinshasa from 7 to 30 September 2013, but not all opposition parties took part in this political dialogue.[72] Major opposition parties, such as the Union of Democrats for Social Progress (French: UDPS), the Union for the Congolese Nation (French: UNC), and the Movement for the Liberation of Congo boycotted this political forum. Regarding the return of refugees and IDPs, the government established tripartite commissions on Congolese refugees in neighbouring countries and initiated necessary rehabilitation actions for their reintegration.[73] However, since 2009 only very few Congolese refugees have returned from neighbouring countries in general, and particularly from Rwanda where more than 50,000 refugees (mainly Tutsi) are hosted. The persistence of insecurity caused by the FDLR and Congolese armed groups in the territories of Masisi and, to a lesser extent, Rutshuru have continued to be the main obstacle to the return of refugees and displaced persons.[74]

Pertaining to the security sector reform, CNDP elements were integrated into the PNC and the FARDC until the outbreak of hostilities in March 2014. However, most of these CNDP combatants refused to be redeployed outside North Kivu.[75] This attitude clearly showed a hidden political agenda on the side of the CNDP leadership, that is to say maintaining control over the territory previously under their control, thereby leading to a future regression to violence. This fact made it easier for its dissident leaders and combatants to start a new rebellion. At the creation of the rebel movement in 2003, the CNDP's leader Laurent Nkunda Batware claimed to protect the minority Tutsi Congolese against military attacks of the FDLR and other Hutu militias in the Kivus.[76] Later on, this argument appeared to be less convincing – even within the Tutsi communities themselves – to justify a new rebellion.[77] Tutsi elites were still occupying important positions in the Kabila government, the FADRC, and the PNC before the outbreak of the M23 rebellion.

While the CNDP leaders Runiga and Makenga accused the DRC government of violating the 23 March 2009 Peace Agreement, this allegation seemed not to be true. As demonstrated in the previous paragraphs, most important CNDP grievances such as ethnic discrimination and tensions were addressed by the government through the signing of the agreement and even prior to it. CNDP leaders lacked clear political grievance to justify their insurrection.[78] After the capture of Goma, the M23 expanded its claims

72 Radio Okapi, 2013.

73 Mwamba Tshishimbi, Notes by the author.

74 Ibid.

75 Ibid.; Dagne, The Democratic Republic of Congo; E. Kets and H. de Vries, Limits to Supporting Security Sector Interventions in the DRC, Pretoria 2014.

76 The New Humanitarian, Interview with rebel general Laurent Nkunda, 2 September 2004, http://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/report/51228/drc-interview-rebel-general-laurent-nkunda (accessed 4 April 2014); IPIS (International Peace Information Service), Mapping Conflict Motives: M23, Antwerp, November 2012, http://ipisresearch.be/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/20121231_Mapping_Conflict_MotivesM23.pdf (accessed 30 July 2014).

77 IPIS, Mapping Conflict Motives.

78 Ibid.; Dagne, The Democratic Republic of Congo.

to human rights issues, democracy, and good governance, accusing Kabila of cheating in the elections in November 2011 that kept him in power until 2016 (actually he stayed on until January 2019). Rather, the M23 rebellion seem to have been motivated by economic greed Only after the arrest of CNDP military chief of staff Bosco Tanganda and his transfer to the International Criminal Court were political grievances added to the M23 agenda.[79]

The Kampala Dialogue 2012–2013

The ICGLR has held seven extraordinary summits in Kampala in search of a solution to the crisis between the Congolese government and the M23 rebel movement. After six failed attempts, the seventh Kampala summit resulted in the resumption of negotiations between the government and M23 in October 2013. In his capacity as the ICGLR chairperson, Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni was actively involved in mediating and facilitating the Kampala peace process during December 2012 and December 2013.[80] Started in December 2012, the Kampala Dialogue was concluded on 12 December 2013 with the signing of the Nairobi Declaration which officially put an end to armed conflict between government and M23. The negotiations included M23 leadership, the representatives of the opposition, civil society and the Congolese diaspora. The Kampala negotiations process was supported by the good offices of the international community, including the he UN Special Representative Mary Robinson, MONUSCO head Martin Kobler, AU Special Representative Boubacar Diarra, EU Senior Coordinator Koen Vervaeke, and the US Special Representative Russell Feingold.[81]

The Kampala mediation process was also strengthened by several bilateral DRC/Uganda and DRC / Rwanda meetings as well as multilateral meetings within the ICGLR framework. These efforts led to the signing on 7 November 2013 of the Kampala Declaration which was, later on, endorsed by the Nairobi Declaration, separately signed on 12 December 2013.[82] The Kampala summits contributed to the resolution of the crisis in the North Kivu province. It was at the end of these successive summits that the ICGLR proposed the deployment of a neutral international force to disarm the M23 and other

79 IPIS, Mapping Conflict Motives; HRW 2012.

80 Sumaili, La CIRGL et le Reglement des Differends; T. Perriello, Final Speech as US Special Envoy, Washington DC, 15 December 2016, https://2009-2017.state.gov/s/greatlakes_drc/releases/2016/265727.htm (accessed 20 November 2014); UNSG, Report of the Secretary General on the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo submitted pursuant to article 39 of Security Council resolution 2147 (2014), UN doc. S/2014/957 (2014), https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2014_957.pdf (accessed 4 April 2019).

81 Perriello, Final Speech as US Special Envoy; UNSG, Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, UN doc. S/2015/1031 (2015), https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2015_1031.pdf (accessed 4 April 2019).

82 L. Burakuvia, Interview by the author with senior ICGLR officer in charge of documentation and conferences, Bujumbura 12 July 2015.

illegal armed groups operating in eastern DRC.[83] It was also under the pressure of the extraordinary ICGLR Summit that the M23 had been ordered to leave the city of Goma, which it had conquered on 20 November 2013. This idea of force was later recovered by the UNSC which created, through Resolution 2098 in 2013, the United Nations Force Intervention Brigade (FIB), incorporated into MONUSCO and holding an offensive mandate.[84]

Even though the two parties signed separately, the Nairobi Declaration revolved around eleven key issues on the M23 conflict. These include the end of the M23 rebellion, amnesty, return and resettlement of refugees and IDPs, justice and national reconciliation, the monitoring implementation mechanism, governance and social-economic reforms, and the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of ex-M23 combatants.[85] The last point is the most important, calling for justice to be done in order to hold accountable those responsible for war crimes and crimes against humanity.[86]

Contrary to previous agreement, the Nairobi Declaration did not grant a blanket amnesty to M23 for mass atrocities. It further did not include any provisions for their reintegration into the FADRC. Despite its focus on the key of issues of the conflict, the implementation of the Nairobi Declaration has remained slow. Both the DRC government and M23 have accused each other mutually of violating the declaration, especially regarding the repatriation of former M23 combatants. The amnesty law to speed up the repatriation of M23 ex-combatants from Uganda and Rwanda was voted upon and promulgated by the DRC on 11 February 2014.[87]

Similarly, the government took over one and half years before, sending a technical team to Uganda and Rwanda, in April and July 2014 respectively, to identify former ex-M23 combatants prior to their repatriation. This identification took place in the presence of representatives of the Office of the Special Envoys of the UN, MONUSCO and the ICGLR.[88] The government delegation met on 5 December 2014 with Rwandan and Ugandan officials in order to discuss the way forward on how to grant amnesty and repatriate ex-M23 combatants and their dependents. The Congolese delegation identified and registered a number of former M23 combatants who were present in their cantonments at the time of the visit.[89]

However, after the delegation's report, the government was reluctant to accept all 2000 combatants kept in refugee camps in Uganda and Rwanda as ex-M23 combatants.[90] This attitude raised suspicions, tensions and mistrust between the DRC and Rwanda and Uganda. The DRC accused Rwanda and Uganda of recruiting, training and re-

83 Ibid.; UNSG, Report 2014.
84 Sumaili, La CIRGL et le Reglement des Differends.
85 ICGLR and SADC, Joint ICGLR-SADC Final Communiqué on the Kampala Dialogue, Nairobi, 12 December 2013, https://www.peaceagreementsorg/masterdocument/793 (accessed 3 November 2014).
86 Ibid.
87 UNSG, Report 2014.
88 Ibid.
89 Ibid.
90 Mwamba Tshishimbi, Notes by the author.

organizing defeated former M23 troops to start a new war against the DRC.[91] On his part, M23 leader Betrain Bisimwa accused the DRC government of failing to comply with the provisions of the Nairobi Declaration, namely regarding the voluntary repatriation its troops.[92] Coordinator Mwamba rejected M23 accusations, arguing that the DRC government was still fully engaged and committed to implementing the Nairobi Declaration.[93] These controversies led to the signing of the Protocol Agreement between the DRC, Uganda, the ICGLR, and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) to regulate a voluntary repatriation of ex-M23 combatants and their dependents. As demonstrated in the next section, only few ex-M23 combatants have been voluntarily repatriated to the DRC, while many more refuse to be repatriated and are still in Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi despite the fact that these governments have threatened to grant refugee status to remaining combatants.[94]

6. ICGLR's Challenges and Limitations in Addressing Peace and Security

Despite major progress made thus far, peace and security have remained fragile for the last ten years following the establishment of the ICGLR and the signing of its Pact on Security, Stability and Development, several protocols, and declarations. The ICGLR has a well-designed peace and security architecture that could enable this regional organization to achieve its objectives. However, it is facing several challenges that undermine its capacity to promote sustainable peace and security in the region (this section draws on Museka 2017).[95] These include the lack of political will of the heads of state and government as a major obstacle to sustainable peace and security in the Great Lakes region; the lack of coercive measures to oblige member states to abide with norms, values, and principles; the persistence of armed groups and insecurity in the Great Lakes region; the weakness of state institutions in countries such as the Burundi, the CAR, the DRC, and South Sudan and its negative impacts on peace and security; the persistence of mistrust and suspicions between member states; double standards of the ICGLR and the international community in addressing peace and security issues in the Great Lakes region; and the multiple membership of Great Lakes countries in several other RECs at the same time undermine the capacity of the ICGLR in addressing peace and security issues.

91 Ibid.
92 B. Bisimwa, Press conference on Radio Okapi, 2014, https://www.radiookapi.net (accessed: 10 November 2015).
93 Mwamba Tshishimbi, Notes by the author.
94 Bisimwa, Press conference on Radio Okapi 2014.
95 N. Bondo Museka, The Establishment of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region: From Wars to Sustainable Peace and Security?, Saarbrücken 2017.

Lack of Political Will of Heads of State and Government

The lack of political will to fully implement the pact and its ten protocols severely undermines the capacity of the ICGLR in promoting sustainable peace and security in the region. Many principles, norms and values enshrined in the pact and its protocols are violated by the same leaders who voluntarily have signed them. Great Lakes countries such as Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda, the DRC, South Sudan, and Sudan have been accusing each other of violating the pact and its Protocol on Non-Aggression and Mutual Defence by supporting illegal armed groups against each other. These mutual accusations have led to a continual climate of mistrust, suspicion, and serious tensions between ICGLR member states. The same argument applies to lack of respect for democratic values enshrined in the ICGLR's pact and its Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance. A number of heads of state and government of Great Lakes countries such as Burundi, Rwanda, Uganda, Congo (Brazzaville), and Angola have changed the constitution of their respective countries to enable them to remain in power beyond the two presidential terms in violation of the Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance, which promotes democratic principles, norms, and values.

In the DRC, several attempts have been undertaken to change the constitution in order to allow President Joseph Kabila to contest the presidential elections previously scheduled for December 2016, extended to 2018, for a third time. Article 70 of the Congolese Constitution limits the presidential mandate to one term, which is renewable once.[96] Yet, several members of the ruling party (the Party of People for Reconstruction and Development, PPRD) claimed on several occasions that Kabila could contest presidential elections for a third time until the deadline for submitting names of presidential candidates to the National Independent Commission. Due to national, regional, and international pressure, Kabila has finally decided to appoint the permanent secretary of his ruling political party as a presidential candidate. In the end, Kabila settled opposition politician Felix Tshisikedi, who surprisingly won the poll held in January 2019.

Lack of Coercive Mechanisms

The ICGLR has no coercive mechanism to oblige heads of state and government to abide with the pact and its several protocols. The implementation of these instruments is left to their free will. The summit is the highest and most important organ of the ICGLR in terms of the decision-making. However, this organ is chaired and co-chaired within the Troika framework by leaders who have installed authoritarian regimes in their home countries for over three decades, for instance in Angola or Uganda. This makes it difficult for the summit to oblige other member states to abide with democratic principles, norms and values of the ICGLR.

96 Constitute, Congo (Democratic Republic of)'s Constitution of 2005 with Amendments through 2011 (2012), https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Democratic_Republic_of_the_Congo_2011.pdf?lang=en (accessed 24 April 2019).

Weakness of State Institutions

The weakness of state institutions and national armies to dismantle foreign and local rebel forces and to establish the state monopoly of violence explains to a great extent the persistence of illegal armed groups – for instance in the DRC, the CAR, Burundi, and South Sudan. While the ICGLR has established security cooperation mechanisms to strengthen individual state capacity in addressing the security threat perceived along common borders, it has no authority to change their security and defence apparatus. Maintaining national defence and security still remains the primary responsibility of each sovereign member state. Once it fails to do so, the ICGLR has the mandate to support state efforts, but not taking over its sovereign responsibility or imposing a security sector reform without the consent of the incumbent government.

In the same vein, through its Protocol on the Fight against Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources, the ICGLR has put in place regional mechanisms to eradicate illegal exploitation of natural resources often used by illegal armed groups to fuel violence and armed conflicts in the region.[97] However, the domestication and implementation of these tools remain the responsibility of individual states. The cases of the DRC, the CAR, and South Sudan have proved that in the absence of a state monopoly over the means violence, illegal armed forces and officers of national armies as well as some government officials can easily continue to illegally exploit and trade natural resources to finance their military activities or pursue their political ambitions. Thus, in spite of the six tools put in place by the ICGLR to eradicate illegal exploitation of natural resources in the region, natural resources continue to be illegally exploited and exported from neighbouring countries to international markets.

Double Standards of the International Community

Both the United Nations and the African Union apply double standards when it comes to dealing with Great Lake countries in conflict. While on several occasions pressure was put on the governments of some countries – such as the Burundi, the CAR, the DRC, and South Sudan – to negotiate with their armed and non-armed opposition in a bid to ensure sustainable peace, security and sustainability in the region, this has never been the case with other countries such as Rwanda and Uganda. Yet, all these countries are facing similar security challenges due to the persistence of illegal armed groups. These groups such as ADF-NALU, LRA, and FDLR have conditioned their voluntary disarmament on political dialogue processes in their respective countries. However, neither the UN nor the AU have taken seriously these requests, putting pressure on Rwanda and Uganda to hold a political dialogue that can enable these groups to voluntarily disarm. In the absence of a political dialogue between these groups and their respective governments, namely Rwanda and Uganda, the ICGLR will be simply address the symptoms and consequences of the Great Lakes conflicts instead of solving its underlying root causes.

97 ICGLR, Lusaka Declaration.

Lack of Effective Coordination between the ICGLR and other RECs and the UN

Even though an effective approach in addressing peace and security in the Great Lakes region, the regional-global partnership approach adopted by the ICGLR has shown some limitations in practice. Among other limitations, this regional-global partnership approach poses a serious problem of institutional coordination between the ICGLR and a wide range of stakeholders, including the UN Security Council, UN agencies, MONUSCO, the African Union and the various RECs, as well as civil society organizations. Furthermore, several partners such as the Office of the Special Envoy of the UN secretary-general, the AU, the East African Community (EAC), the Inter-Governmental Authority Development (IGAD), and the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) have played a significant role in supporting the ICGLR efforts in promoting sustainable peace and security. However, the lack of an effective coordination has sometimes led to a duplication and even competition between the ICGLR and its international and regional partners in addressing peace and security issues in the Great Lakes region. The role of the ICGLR in mediating conflicts in some Great Lakes countries has been either hindered or duplicated by other regional organizations.

For instance, the ICGLR has only played a secondary role in mediating internal conflicts in South Sudan, the CAR and the ongoing political crisis in Burundi. In the case of South Sudan, the conflict was mainly mediated by the IGAD, with the ICGLR only providing technical support. In the CAR, the entire mediation process and peacekeeping operations were subsequently conducted by the ECCAS and the African Union. The ongoing mediation process in Burundi was initiated by Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni in his capacity as EAC chairperson. While its Executive Secretariat is headquartered in Bujumbura, the ICGLR's role in mediating the ongoing political crisis in Burundi has remained unclear and controversial.

Far from complementing each other, the ICGLR and the Office of the UN Special Envoy to the Great Lakes region are following contending agendas. Although having the same agenda – addressing peace and security related matters –, the coordination between these two organizations has remained insignificant and unclear. While the ICGLR Executive Secretary reports to the chairperson of the Summit of Heads of State and Government, the special envoy reports directly to the UN secretary-general. There is still lack of coordination and harmonization of views between the ICGLR and the Office of the UN Special Envoy to the Great Lakes region. The reality on the ground gives the impression that the Office of the UN Special Envoy is more empowered and financed than the ICGLR it is meant to support. This argument applies to the crucial competing role played by the SADC within the Force Intervention Brigade. All the three troop-contributing countries (South Africa, Tanzania, and Malawi) are SADC member states. With the exception of Tanzania, which is both a member of the ICGLR and SADC, none of the ICGLR member states provided troops and military equipment to support the joint FIB-DRC army in their military operations against rebel forces in the eastern DRC.

The Multiple Membership of ICGLR Member States

The multiple membership of Great Lakes countries in several RECs hinders the ICGLR's effectiveness in promoting sustainable peace and security in the region. Since 2010, the ICGLR has been experiencing serious financial challenges. After a failed attempt within the financial round table, organized in 2008 by the ICGLR, to mobilize funds, the running of day-to-day activities of the Executive Secretariat became the responsibility of member states themselves.[98] Given the financial constraints facing most Great Lakes countries coupled with their multiple membership in several other RECs, each government wants to prioritize the organization that safeguards most of its political and economic interests – at the detriment of the ICGLR. Member states fail to pay regularly and on time the full amount of their annual contributions.[99] Member states are engaged a various levels depending on which organization better serves them and their interests. The DRC, for instance, shows more commitment towards the SADC than the ICGLR. This is partly because of its strong economic relationship with South Africa than other ICGLR member states.[100] In the same vein, Rwanda, Uganda, Burundi, Kenya, and Tanzania have more political and economic interests in the EAC than in the ICGLR.[101] The CAR and Congo (Brazzaville) seem to have more economic and political interests in the ECCAS and the Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa (French: CEMAC) than in the ICGLR. Sudan and South Sudan are more committed to the IGAD than they are to the ICGLR. Thus, the multiple membership, linked with the lack of political will and interests of individual member states vis-à-vis the ICGLR, explains to a great extent the delays and lack of regular financial contributions to the Executive Secretariat and the Special Development Fund since 2010 to date. This undermines the capacity of the Executive Secretariat to implement efficiently and effectively its programmes of action, projects, and activities.

98 N.B. Museka, International Conference of the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR), in: U. Engel and F. Mattheis (eds.), The finances of regional organisations in the Global South – Follow the money, Abingdon (in print).
99 Ibid.
100 Ibid.
101 Ibid.

Regional and Transregional Currents in the Shallows of Lake Chad

Katharina P. W. Döring

ABSTRACTS

Der Beitrag analysiert die Spannung zwischen der Interpretation eines Konflikts und den regionalen oder transregionalen Reaktionen darauf. Den empirischen Fokus bildet das militärische Vorgehen der Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) – Benin, Kamerun, Tschad, Niger und Nigeria – gegen Boko Haram. Dieses Vorgehen ist zwar in einem regionalen Kontext verankert und wird von der Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC) koordiniert, doch zugleich auch in einem transregionalen Kontext, im Rahmen der Kooperation zwischen zwei Regional Economic Communities, der Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) und der Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS). Keine dieser beiden räumlichen Verankerungen sind einfach gegeben, vielmehr sind es bestimmte Akteure, die den regionalen oder transregionalen Charakter des Konflikts und der entsprechenden Reaktionen produzieren und reproduzieren.

This article addresses the tension between the conception of a conflict and the ensuing response as regional or as transregional. The empirical focus is the military response within the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) – comprised of Benin, Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Nigeria – against Boko Haram. This response is situated in a regional context, as its coordinating forum is the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC), but also in a transregional one, through the cooperation between two Regional Economic Communities (RECs), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS). This article cautions that neither of these two framings is a given. Rather, particular actors produce and reproduce the regional or respectively transregional character of a security concern as well as its response.

Comparativ | Zeitschrift für Globalgeschichte und vergleichende Gesellschaftsforschung 28 (2018) Heft 6, S. 49–67.

1. Introduction

This article addresses the tension between the conception of a conflict and the ensuing response as regional or as transregional. The empirical focus is the military response within the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) against Boko Haram,[1] which is situated both in a regional context, as its coordinating forum is the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC), and in a transregional one, through the cooperation between two regional economic communities (RECs), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS). The article cautions that neither of these two framings is a given. Rather, specific actors produce and reproduce the regional or respectively transregional character of a security concern as well as its response.

The body of literature on these and related empirical issues is substantial. One strand of it analyses the violence in the Lake Chad Basin by taking into account water and environmental issues and their impact on local livelihoods, for example focusing on the interlinkages between environmental change, vulnerability, and security issues.[2] Other authors emphasize particular governance forms that evolved from the historical entanglements between the evolving nation state and the military-economic nexus in the border areas.[3] Regarding Boko Haram, authors focus on the rise of the group in Nigeria, often attributed to bad governance and corruption.[4] Further, its impact on Nigerian society[5]

1 For practical reasons and because this non-state armed group is not the focus of this analysis, I will simply refer to it as Boko Haram, as do most of the actors and agencies that are the focus here, such as the African Union and United Nations. Nevertheless, the phenomenon commonly captured in the label Boko Harm includes more than simply the activities of the institutionalized strand(s) of this group. Boko Haram has become a catchall category for criminal and sinister activities and all that is bad, so that thieves, kidnappers and subsistence criminals have often been assumed under the label of the group. For an in-depth account on the origins of the group, which used to call itself Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati wal-Jihad (JASLWJ), the current dynamics within the movement as well as its fractioning and alliances see e.g. L. Ploch Blanchard and K. T. Cavigelli, Boko Haram and the Islamic State's West Africa Province, in: Focus, 28 June 2018. Congressional Research Service. Washington, DC.; O. S. Mahmood, Ch. A. Ndubuisi, Factional Dynamics within Boko Haram, Institute for Security Studies, ISS Research Report July 2018.

2 U. T. Okpara, L. C. Stringer, A. J. Dougill and M. D. Bila, Conflicts about water in Lake Chad: Are environmental, vulnerability and security issues linked?, in: Progress in Development Studies 15 (2015) 4, pp. 308–325. The article focuses on the political construction of the region, not on ecological or geophysical aspects. However, these often surface in arguments for or against a certain spatiality of the (political) region. This observation should be explored further by retracing the evolution of the debates within the natural sciences on the Lake Chad Basin and their entanglement with developmental and environmental discourses over time.

3 J. Roitman, La garnison-entrepôt: une manière de gouverner dans le bassin du lac Tchad, in: Critique internationale 2 (2003) 19, pp. 93–115. Id., The Garrison-Entrepôt, in: Cahiers d'études africaines 38 (1998) 150–152, pp. 297–329.

4 M. N. Suleiman/M. A. Karim, Cycle of bad governance and corruption: The rise of boko haram in Nigeria, in: SAGE Open 5 (2015) 1, pp. 1–11. For a more historical focus on the pre-existing religious movements see A. Walker, 'Eat the Heart of the Infidel': The Harrowing of Nigeria and the Rise of Boko Haram, London 2016; V. Comolli, Boko Haram: Nigeria's Islamist Insurgency, Oxford 2015.

5 D. E. Agbiboa and B. Maiangwa, Boko Haram, Religious Violence, and the Crisis of National Identity in Nigeria: Towards a Non-killing Approach, in: Journal of Developing Societies 29 (2013) 4, pp. 379–403; O. Tade and P. Ch. Nwanosike, "Nobody is sure of tomorrow": Using the Health Belief Model to explain safety behaviours among Boko Haram victims in Kano, Nigeria, in: International Review of Victimology 22 (2016) 3, pp. 339–355.

and reception in Nigerian and international media[6] is discussed. Eka Ikpe, senior lecturer in development economics in Africa at King's College London, analyses the impact of the group's activities on the economic development on the national and subnational level.[7] Oluwaseun Tella from the Department of Political Sciences at the University of South Africa, Pretoria, examines the soft power of Boko Haram that appeals to certain Nigerians and the potential for the inclusion of a corresponding approach in current counter-terrorism measures.[8] Other authors assess the Nigerian governments' efforts to combat Boko Haram[9] and the importance of political leadership in the fight against Boko Haram, for example by assessing the different responses under President Goodluck Jonathan vis-à-vis President Muhammadu Buhari.[10] Akinbode Fasakin from the African Leadership Centre at King's College London draws attention to the impact of the United States (US) "War on Terror" on Nigerian leadership and the intersection with its own security agendas and argues for a shift towards a more citizen-centred processual approach in countering the violence of the armed group.[11] Elysée Martin Atangana in turn focuses on the Chadian leadership and argues for its primacy in the process of reviving the MNJTF.[12] Apart from the cooperation between Nigeria and its neighbouring states in the fight against Boko Haram,[13] the various forms of international engagement have also been discussed.[14] Regarding the LCBC, its history[15] and its qualities as nascent security architecture within a regional security complex have received attention.[16] Olawale (Wale) Ismail, also from the African Leadership Centre at King's College London, and

6 A. Osisanwo, Discursive representation of Boko Haram terrorism in selected Nigerian newspapers, in: Discourse and Communication 10 (2016) 4, pp. 341–362; E. Połońska-Kimunguyi and M. Gillespie, European international broadcasting and Islamist terrorism in Africa: The case of Boko Haram on France 24; Deutsche Welle, in: International Communication Gazette 79 (2017) 3, pp. 245–275.

7 E. Ikpe, Counting the development costs of the conflict in North-Eastern Nigeria: the economic impact of the Boko Haram-led insurgency, in: Conflict, Security and Development 17 (2017) 5, pp. 381–409.

8 O. Tella, Boko Haram Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism: The Soft Power Context, in: Journal of Asian and African Studies 53 (2018) 6, pp. 815–829.

9 Comolli, Boko Haram.

10 H. Onapajo, Has Nigeria defeated Boko Haram? An appraisal of the counter-terrorism approach under the Buhari administration, in: Strategic Analysis 41 (2017) 1, pp. 61–73.

11 A. Fasakin, Leadership and national security: an interrogation of the Boko Haram violence in Nigeria, in: African Security Review 26 (2017) 1, pp. 87–108.

12 E. M. Atangana, The underlying reasons for the emerging dynamic of regional security cooperation against Boko Haram, in: Africa Review 10 (2018) 2, pp. 206–215.

13 B. F. Obamamoye, Insurgency and Nigeria's Relations with Her Immediate Neighbors in the Twenty-first Century, in: Jadavpur Journal of International Relations 20 (2017) 2, pp. 157–177; O. Ogunnubi, H. Onapajo and Ch. Isike, A Failing Regional Power? Nigeria's International Status in the Age of Boko Haram, in: Politikon 44 (2017) 3, pp. 446–465.

14 S. Omotuyi, Russo/Nigerian Relations in the Context of Counterinsurgency Operation in Nigeria, in: Jadavpur Journal of International Relations (2018), pp. 1–21; Ogunnubi et al., A Failing Regional Power?.

15 M. Z. Njeuma and D. Malaquais, Coopération internationale et tansformation du Bassin du Lac Tchad: Le cas de la Commission du bassin du lac Tchad, in: Politique africaine 94 (2004) 2, pp. 23–41.

16 U. A. Tar and M. Mustapha, The emerging architecture of a regional security complex in the lake Chad basin, in: Africa Development 42 (2017) 3, pp. 99–118.

Alagaw Ababu Kife, research associate at the African Leadership Centre, Nairobi, analyse the MNJTF from a perspective of "collective security".[17]

Conceptually, some authors draw on Buzan and Waever's "regional security complex theory" to capture "the intertwined regional security issues and peculiarities in the Lake Chad region."[18]. However, aside from highlighting transnational entanglements of security concerns, this concept is little utilized by the authors and the main value of the articles is their focus on more pressing empirical problems as well as ethical or political concerns. Moreover, the "regional security complex theory" assumes an almost teleological end state for such a region. It thus fails to account for dynamics of change and multiplicity as well as agency in the making of different regions, when actors drive particular regional projects based on their spatial imaginations and manifesting in practices of region-making.[19]

None of the publications on the MNJTF or the cooperation across the Lake Chad Basin address in more broad strokes the tension between the different spatial semantics chosen by actors in framing either their assessment of the conflict or their response.[20] Or, in other words, none ask: how to understand the coexistence of different framings of the violence – seen by some as regional and by others as transregional – in the Lake Chad Basin?

I propose to approach these two different conflict framings from the perspective of those who respond to it,[21] that is to say national political and military elites as well as organizations such as the LCBC, the African Union (AU), ECOWAS, ECCAS, or the United Nations and its United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). The LCBC addresses the violence through the regional lens, supported by international organizations such as the UNDP, while for the two bordering RECs, ECOWAS and ECCAS, the development and coordination of their counter-terrorism policies towards armed groups like Boko Haram has become a transregional challenge – with implication for the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). Then again, the troop contributing countries of the MNJTF (Benin, Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria) in their fight against Boko Haram strategically engage in this ambivalence to access resources while maintaining the maximal control possible over their national troops and security politics.

17 O. Ismail and A. A. Kife, New Collective Security Arrangements in the Sahel: a comparative study of the MNJTF and G-5 Sahel. Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Peace and Security Centre of Competence Sub-Saharan Africa, Dakar-Fann 2018.

18 B. Buzan and O. Wæver, Regions and Power. The Structure of International Security, Cambridge 2003; B. F. Obamamoye, Counter-terrorism, Multinational Joint Task Force and the missing components, in: African Identities 15 (2017) 4, pp. 428–440, at 429; Atangana, The underlying reasons for the emerging dynamic, 208.

19 U. Engel, Regionalismen, Berlin and Boston 2018, p. 26.

20 On "Raumsemantiken", i.a. spatial semantics, see ibid.

21 It is also necessary to be conscious of this perspective, as there is little information on the spatial imaginations of the leadership within Boko Haram (or its current fractions), apart from reports of a desire to establish a West African caliphate or its pledged allegiances to the Islamic State (see e.g. Ploch Blanchard and Cavigelli, Boko Haram and the Islamic State's West Africa Province).

All these aforementioned actors and organizations contribute to the *becoming* of a region. Here, the term becoming not so much refers to a teleological development towards a postulated essential endstate, but rather highlights an open-ended and ongoing process.[22] In imagining, creating, making, and shaping different institutions, actors form multiple relations between them. The product of these interrelations is spatial, a space that is "always under construction", open, and preconditioned by multiplicity.[23] The multiplicity and at times simultaneity of the becoming of different regional organizations, institutions, and structures can result in friction once these different projects interact. This article analyses these processes of becoming for the Lake Chad Basin as a region; the creation, neglect, and revival of the LCBC; and the interaction between this regional organization with its MNJTF and the APSA structure, which potentially result in consequences for the African Union.

The article proceeds in three parts. In the first part, the (re)production of the Lake Chad Basin as a region is addressed as an ongoing becoming. In the second part, the Lake Chad Basin Commission, as a regional organization, and the Multinational Joint Task Force are introduced. In the third part, the hitherto very successful regionalization of ECOWAS and ECCAS within the APSA process is introduced together with the impact on its structure by the alternative regionalization discussed in part two.

2. Becoming the Lake Chad Basin Region

Spatial semantics concerning the Lake Chad Basin abound. In most publications, it is referred to as the "Lake Chad region".[24] The "Lake Chad region" is, in these cases, determined by a set of neighbouring countries: Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria.[25] Nevertheless, some authors also include Benin, which is also a troop contributing country to the MNJTF against Boko Haram.[26] In this context, the group is described as a "transnational threat,"[27] "transregional / regional problem",[28] "transnational insurgency",[29] or as a "regionalised problem" that necessitates the engagement of Nigeria's neighbouring coun-

22 See among others E. Grosz (ed.), Becomings. Explorations in time, memory, and futures, Ithaka1999; https://books.google.de/books?id=aBAfJyJUCRAC&printsec=frontcover&hl=fr&source=gbs_ge_summary_r&cad=0#v=onepage&q&f=false.

23 D. B. Massey, For space, repr. London: SAGE 2015, pp. 9, 59, 91.

24 Obamamoye, Counter-terrorism, p. 429; F. Krampe, Climate-Fragility Risks in the Lake Chad Region: Scope for Conflict Prevention and Resilience Building, Stockholm 2017; Onapajo, Has Nigeria defeated Boko Haram?; S. Oyewole, Boko Haram: Insurgency and the War against Terrorism in the Lake Chad Region, in: Strategic Analysis 39 (2015), 4, pp. 428–432, at 428.

25 Krampe, Climate-Fragility Risks in the Lake Chad Region.

26 See e.g. Onapajo, Has Nigeria defeated Boko Haram?.

27 E. M. Atangana, Le Bassin du Lac Tchad face aux nouvelles formes de menace: La difficile dynamique de réponse régionale face à la montée en puissance du groupe terroriste islamiste Boko Haram, Université de Montréal, Montréal 2017.

28 Obamamoye, Counter-terrorism, p. 428.

29 M. Brubacher, E. K. Damman and Ch. Day, The AU Task Forces: an African response to transnational armed groups, in: The Journal of Modern African Studies 55 (2017) 2, pp. 275–299, at 294.

tries.[30] Thus, Boko Haram itself is seen as the constituting feature that creates the region, whereby the security concern defines the common ground.[31] However, depending on the position of the observer, Boko Haram is described as a threat to the "West African subregion" or is grouped among the security concerns facing the Central African region.[32]
In addition, there are further designations that each imply different underlying assumptions about the spatial order in the region and highlight different political, social, or economic aspects. The International Crisis Group (ICG), for example, in a 2015 report drew attention to the "Central Sahel", which encompasses the "the Fezzan in Libya's south, Niger and the Lake Chad Basin".[33] Here, a wider regional lens connects the conflict dynamics in the Lake Chad Basin – most prominently associated with the activities of Boko Haram – with those in the Sahel. A region often characterized by concerns about transnational organized crime (TOC) as well as the activities of groups such as al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) or Jama'at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM), especially since the 2012 escalation of the conflict in Mali. Such a wider regional frame does justice to the dynamics of arms and weapons circulation from former Libyan depots after the disintegration of the Gaddafi regime in 2011 as well as the reports of connections between the various armed groups in the area.
Apart from the spatial semantics that provide the conceptual frame for the Lake Chad Basin, it is worth noting that there are a number of recurring issues that are used to characterize the region. These characteristics, which organizations, think tanks, analysts, and

30 Ibid., p. 91.

31 See, in general, N. Ansorg, Wars without borders: Conditions for the development of regional conflict systems in sub-Saharan Africa, in: International Area Studies Review 17 (2014) 3, pp. 295–312. Specific to Boko Haram among others Atangana, The underlying reasons for the emerging dynamic, p. 208; V. Comolli, The Regional Problem of Boko Haram, in: Survival 57 (2015) 4, pp. 109–117. This kind of regionalization-by-armed-group could also be observed in the Sahel with the creation of the G5 Sahel (and later its Joint Force). There, the European Union, for example worked with a particular definition of where the area of activity of al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) was located and drew its Sahel strategy accordingly to include, apart from Mali, also Burkina Faso, Chad, Niger, and Mauritania, the five countries that eventually formed the G5 Sahel, see European Union External Action Service 2011. Both with regard to Boko Haram as well as AQIM, it is noteworthy that it is not so much the armed group itself (or alone) that drives this kind of regionalization, but rather (or also) the actors responding to its activity to define their space for intervention, see K. P. W. Döring and J. Herpolsheimer, The spaces of intervention for Mali and Guinea-Bissau, in: South African Journal of International Affairs 25 (3018) 1, pp. 61–82.

32 See Onapajo, Has Nigeria defeated Boko Haram? On Boko Haram as a security concern in Central Africa, see, e.g., the Reports of the Secretary-General on the situation in Central Africa and the activities of the United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa: "Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Central Africa and the activities of the United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa (S/2015/339)", New York, 14 May 2015; "Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Central Africa and the activities of the United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa (S/2015/914)", New York, 30 November 2015; "Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Central Africa and the activities of the United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa (S/2017/465)", New York, 31 May 2017. In addition, the Lord's Resistance Army and piracy of the Gulf of Guinea are mentioned as cross-border concerns. Regarding the latter, see the article by Jens Herpolsheimer on maritime security cooperation in this volume.

33 International Crisis Group (Brussels), The Central Sahel: A Perfect Sandstorm, in: Africa Report (2015) 227, p. i, https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/west-africa/niger/central-sahel-perfect-sandstorm.

policy-makers invoke in describing the region, are framed in challenges (security, social, developmental, environmental, or otherwise) that constituted this region.

Transnational organized crime (TOC), kidnapping for ransom, as well as all kinds of cross-border trade or smuggling and trafficking have been reported. This has been observed at times in close connection with activities of armed groups, described as terrorist. These phenomena are countered by initiatives to increase border controls and security, police work, counter-terrorism, and military cooperation. As terrorism is increasingly understood as not only a military but also a social phenomenon, violent extremism has become a major concern. This has led to numerous attempts in countering violent extremism (CVE) in the region. In addition to the violence caused by Boko Haram, farmer-herder conflicts as well as racial and ethnic tensions have added instances of armed violence, so that the mobility and immobility of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) has become a major concern.[34] As both cause and consequence, a dire economic situation, unemployment, the so-called youth bulge,[35] ecological degradation, arid conditions and a fluctuating lake volume, food insecurity, and state failure are frequently mentioned. This staggering array of challenges is completed with a reference to climate change. Far from positive visions of development and prosperity, in a manner of resignation, mere "resilience" is left as the goal. In short, the "Lake Chad region" (with Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria) is characterized as a space where "unemployment, depleted resources, poverty and conflict interact with climate change".[36]

The validity of these concerns notwithstanding, they are by no way exclusive to the Lake Chad Basin. Other regions, such as the Sahel, the Horn of Africa, or the Great Lakes region (see the respective articles in this edited volume) are described in similar terms. Thus, rather than defining or delineating features of a region, these issues are emblematic of contemporary forms of understanding societal and political issues and of current security and development discourses.

These developmental and security concerns are selected – not created in themselves, but selected as concerns – by particular actors that created knowledge on them and respond to them. One major international actor in this regard is the UNDP. The UNDP continues to play a role in the becoming of the Lake Chad Basin which it defines through the four littoral countries Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria.[37] The UNDP has country offices in all four capitals and suboffices in the areas much closer to the lake. In addition,

34 S. O. Oginni, M. P. Opoku and B. A. Alupo, Terrorism in the Lake Chad Region: Integration of Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons, in: Journal of Borderlands Studies 30 (2018) 1, pp. 1–17; A.-N. Mbiyozo, Fleeing terror, fighting terror. The truth about refugees and violent extremism. Institute for Security Studies (ISS), East Africa Report, 17 (2018).

35 J. Gow, F. Olonisakin and E. Dijxhoorn, Deep history and international security: social conditions and competition, militancy and violence in West Africa, in: Conflict, Security & Development 13 (2013), 2, pp. 231–258.

36 Krampe, Climate-Fragility Risks in the Lake Chad Region.

37 UNDP and OCHA, Background paper on Resilience for Sustainable Development in the Lake Chad Basin, 2018, https://lakechadberlin.de/wp-eb6f4-content/uploads/2018/09/UN_Background-Paper_Resilience-LCB.pdf.

the UNDP works closely with the LCBC, supports its capacity-building and contributed to such vital processes as the development of the LCBC-AU regional strategy.[38]
Over the last decades, the UNDP has mainly drawn attention to the significance of urban spaces in its publications and work.[39] An internal mapping exercise by the organization revealed certain hubs of activity around the urban centres in the countries, with the border areas often receiving less attention. Support programmes for job creation and entrepreneurship, for example, largely targeted urban populations with more suitable educational backgrounds. Internal reflections in recent years have raised awareness of the potential detrimental influence of reinforcing inequalities in such a way.[40]
In particular, since the UNDP's study on radicalization and violent extremism, "Journey to Extremism in Africa", it has emerged as common wisdom that those neglected national peripheries have increasingly impacted national security and development agendas. Accordingly, the study formulates one of the key findings like this:

> *Starting with the "accident of geography" that is place of childhood, experiences related to living in highly peripheral regions of Africa – often borderlands and traditionally marginalized regions – begin to shape individuals' worldview and vulnerability. Long-standing realities of "centre/periphery" divides have, if anything, been exacerbated by the recent economic growth enjoyed overall in Africa.*[41]

Given that all littoral states have such marginalized areas in their countries and that some of them border the Lake Chad Basin, it makes sense from the perspective of humanitarian and developmental actors to address the issues around the Lake Chad from a joint regional perspective emphasizing this commonality instead of just through country programmes. At the same time, this is part of a periodic renewal of assumptions about development and foci in aid policies. Hence, after the UNDP study "Journey to Extremism", the periphery has been highlighted.[42]
By working through the frame of the Lake Chad Basin, developmental actors co-create this region. Another practice that maintains and creates the Lake Chad Basin region is

38 Communiqué (PSC/PR/COMM [DCCCXVI]), 816th Meeting, Addis Ababa, 5 December 2018. Interview with UNDP Senior Staff, New York, 4 December 2018.

39 D. A. Rondinelli, UNDP assistance for urban development: an assessment of institution-building efforts in developing countries, in: International Review of Administrative Sciences 58 (1992), pp. 519–537; UNDP, Sustainable Urbanization Strategy. UNDP's support to sustainable, inclusive and resilient cities in the developing world, New York 2016.

40 Interview with UNDP Senior Staff, New York, 4 December 2018.

41 UNDP, Journey to extremism in africa, New York 2017, p. 4; http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/librarypage/democratic-governance/journey-to-extremism.html.

42 This trend regarding the region around the Lake Chad Basin is mirrored by similar spatial semantics regarding the Sahel. Depiction of this region are laced with references to "ungoverned spaces", "remote areas", and a sense of conflicts originating from peripheral areas that affect the urban centres, most importantly the capital. This is epitomized in the justification given for the Franco-Chadian Operation Serval in Mali in 2013, where the movement of the non-state armed groups from the north (traditionally associated in Mali with remoteness and rebellion of ethnically different groups of people) towards the south, and Bamako is given as the final trigger for troop deployment.

the corresponding regional organization, the Lake Chad Basin Commission, which will be discussed in the following section.

3. The Lake Chad Basin Commission and the Multi-national Joint Task Force

The Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC) was founded in 1964 by the littoral countries of the Lake Chad, Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria. A summit meeting in 1985 resulted in efforts to enlarge the organization, which led to admitting of the Central African Republic into the commission in 1996 due to plans for an interbasin water transfer from the Oubangui River.[43] In 2008, Libya was admitted into the organization as the sixth member state.[44] Gaddafi sought to use the LCBC to further promote his Pan-Africanist ambitions and to potentially access new freshwater reserves.[45] In addition, Sudan, Egypt, the Republic of Congo, and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) have status as observatory members.[46]

The regional organization, with its Executive Secretariat in N'Djamena, Chad, has the mandate to ensure the sustainable and equitable water resource management among the member states, primarily concerning the Lake Chad Basin, but also extending to related water sources. This includes the preservation of the basin's ecosystem as well as the promotion of economic and infrastructural integration as well as the concern for trans-border peace and security.[47]

The early history of the organization was still marked by the legacy of British, French, and German colonial expansion in the area. While there was some coordination among the three concerning their interests in the Lake Chad Basin, this was reduced to cooperation between Britain and France after Germany lost its colonial territories in the aftermath of World War I.[48] Once Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria had gained independence, they followed the path towards coordinated resources management of the Lake Chad Basin. France had an immediate influence in the establishment of the LCBC by financially and technically supporting the first summit.[49]

The commission was confronted with severe strain and conflict between its member states, which hampered its effectiveness and reach. Among others, the colonial legacy

43 G. Galeazzi, A. Medinilla, T.C. Ebiede, and S. Desmidt, Understanding the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC): Water and security at inter-regional cross-roads. ECDPM – European Centre for Development Policy Management (Political Economy Dynamics of Regional Organisations [PEDRO]) 2017, p. 7; https://ecdpm.org/wp-content/uploads/LCBC-Background-Paper-Pedro-Political-Economy-Dynamics-Regional-Organisations-Africa-ecdpm-2017.pdf.

44 La Commission du Basin du Lac Tchad, 2018, http://www.cblt.org/fr/la-commission-du-bassin-du-lac-tchad (accessed 31 December 2018).

45 Galeazzi et al., Understanding the Lake Chad Basin Commission, p. 17.

46 Commission du Basin du Lac Tchad, 2018.

47 Ibid.

48 M. Z. Njeuma and D. Malaquais, Coopération internationale et transformation du Bassin du Lac Tchad: Le cas de la Commission du bassin du lac Tchad, in: Politique africaine 94 (2004) 2, pp. 23–41.

49 Ibid.

transformed into an anglophone-francophone divide between the member states. Further, the simultaneous development of two other regional organizations with a focus on economic integration, ECOWAS and ECCAS, exacerbated the division between the LCBC member states, with Niger and Nigeria belonging to the former and Cameroon and Chad to the latter. Another strain on the relations among the LCBC member states was the mistrust between them, such as between Nigeria and Cameroon as well as Nigeria and Chad over joint border issues.[50]

The LCBC is organized into three organs, the Summit of Heads of State and Government, the Council of Ministers, and the Executive Secretariat with the Executive Secretary and the Departments, headed by directors-general.[51] The position of Executive Secretary is central in the execution of policies and decision-making within the Executive Secretariat and "de facto the only decision-making figure as power is not delegated to staff in the Secretariat".[52] The Executive Secretary's mandate is limited to three years with the possibility of renewal for one additional term.[53] Under Abubakar Bobboi Jauro, Executive Secretary from 1988 to 2000, however, this period was extended, together with his personal influence.[54] Like Abubakar Bobboi Jauro, all the other Executive Secretaries were Nigerian (with the exception of M. Mustafa Sam, 1982–1988, who was Cameroonian[55]), while the Under Secretaries have been Cameroonian.[56]

New impetus for increasing the very limited activities of the commission came in 1998, when Chad, Niger, and Nigeria established the Multinational Joint Security Force (MNJSF) to address cross-border crime and banditry.[57] Since 2009, the activities and strength of Boko Haram has increased and spread across the borders of Nigeria.[58] For a long time, Boko Haram had been considered a Nigerian problem and engaged mostly national security forces. Over time, the activities have spilled over to Cameroon and to a lesser extent to Chad and Niger.[59] Subsequently, in 2012, the MNJSF was relaunched as the Multinational Joint Task Force with the added task of conducting counter-terrorism operations against the group. However, the task force remained Nigerian-led.[60]

At the same time, there were some bilateral military agreements between the states involved, such as between Chad and Nigeria[61] or the bilateral permit of Nigeria's President

50 I. O. Albert, Rethinking the functionality of the multinational joint task force in managing the boko haram crisis in the lake Chad basin, in: Africa Development 42 (2017) 3, pp. 119–135.
51 Galeazzi et al., Understanding the Lake Chad Basin Commission, p. 10.
52 Ibid.
53 Jeuma and Malaquais, Coopération internationale et transformation du Bassin du Lac Tchad, p. 32.
54 Ibid., p. 33.
55 This was not specified on the Lake Chad Basin Commission homepage, but it could be cross-checked with a list of delegates to an event of the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) of the United Nations, see Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations 2019.
56 Commission du Basin du Lac Tchad 2019.
57 Galeazzi et al., Understanding the Lake Chad Basin Commission, p. 8.
58 Atangana, The underlying reasons for the emerging dynamic, p. 207.
59 Oyewole, Boko Haram: Insurgency and the War against Terrorism, p. 430.
60 Galeazzi et al., Understanding the Lake Chad Basin Commission, p. 17.
61 Oyewole, Boko Haram: Insurgency and the War against Terrorism; Brubacher, Damman, and Day, The AU Task Forces.

Jonathan, which allowed troops from Chad and Niger to pursue into Nigerian territory during an operation against Boko Haram.[62] However, all the different attempts lacked the operational and logistical capacity to be decisive. The mismatch between the MNJTF and Boko Haram was forcefully brought home when the group attacked the MNJTF headquarters on 3 January 2015.[63] This major caesura ended the initial multi-lateral security cooperation against Boko Haram.

The leadership in the participating countries immediately set out to resurrect the force, only this time it would be decisively within the institutional structure of APSA. During a meeting in Niamey on 20 January 2015, the ministers of foreign affairs and defence of Chad, Nigeria, and Niger plus Benin formally requested the AU to create a revised MNJTF. Just over a week later, on 29 January 2015, the Peace and Security Council (PSC) authorized the MNJTF, with an initial troop strength of 7,500, which was increased to 10,000 later in March.[64] The area of operation was divided into four sectors, one based at Mora in Cameroon, the second at Baga-Sola in Chad, the third at Baga in Nigeria, and the fourth sector with a base in Diffa in Niger.[65]

The revival of the MNJTF and increased willingness for cooperation between the neighbouring states was not just due to the urgency of fighting Boko Haram, but was also facilitated by some shifts in the concerns, interests, and attitudes of the leadership of the involved troop contributing countries.

For the Cameroonian political leadership, Boko Haram had long been a negligible issue, as the group was perceived as a Nigerian problem, despite linguistic and communal continuities across the join border areas. Moreover, Cameroon and Nigeria were in long-standing disputes over border issues. The ensuing mistrust prevented Cameroon from participating in the joint force in the 1990s and even in the later fight against Boko Haram – as late as 2013 – Cameroon did not allow the Nigerian army the right to cross its borders in hot pursuit. This disinterest from the Cameroonian leadership drastically changed when local politicians were kidnapped. Thereafter, Cameroonian military presence was increased in the north; curfews as well as other regulatory security measures were introduced, such as a ban on full-face veils; and the border to Nigeria was at times also closed. Beyond the national realm, Cameroon re-engaged its neighbours, bilaterally in a joint operation with Chad and within the MNJTF and the LCBC while even starting information sharing and coordination with Nigeria.[66]

The main concern of the Chadian leadership in light of Boko Haram's activities is to maintain internal stability and to protect its economic and trade interests.[67] The coun-

62 Galeazzi et al., Understanding the Lake Chad Basin Commission, p. 18.
63 Brubacher, Damman, and Day, The AU Task Forces, p. 292.
64 Ibid.
65 Atangana, The underlying reasons for the emerging dynamic, p. 212.
66 Galeazzi et al., Understanding the Lake Chad Basin Commission, p. 18. The potential intersection of all this with the current armed conflict around separatist ambitions by groups of anglophone Cameroonians has received no attention so far.
67 Ibid., p. 19.

try's military is capable and influential and has an international reputation for its commitment to multilateral and international missions, like the United Nations Mission in Mali (MINUSMA). At the same time, the army has a deplorable human rights record. Chad is a traditional ally of the USA, with its military engagement in the region, and is a notorious ally of French military activities in the Sahel and across West Africa. In recent years, President Idriss Déby has prominently pursued ambitions to position his country as a regional and continental (security) power house as he pushed for the revival of the MNJTF.[68] Additionally, Chad contributes to another regional counter-terrorism task force, the G5 Sahel Joint Force, and the election of the Chadian politician Moussa Faki Mahamat as the African Union Commission chairperson is widely seen as another success of Déby's ambitions.

Since 2016, Niger has witnessed increasing activities by Boko Haram as well as armed groups from Mali. However, the country's military is overstretched and has had to rely on a deployment of 2,000 Chadian troops to Bosso (an area bordering Nigeria and the Lake Chad) to control the armed group.[69] Large parts of the country's population face pressing food insecurity, making humanitarian crises a constant threat. US and French counter-terrorism activities in the Sahel rely heavily on Niger for hosting their bases and the European Union has deployed and EU Capacity Building Mission (EUCAP) Sahel to Niamey. However, the military contribution by Niger to the MNJTF is seen as insignificant.[70]

Simultaneously, the Nigerian attitude towards an internationally coordinated response to Boko Haram had changed with the election of the new president Buhari. Before, Nigeria was reluctant to give any entry point to international organizations and their missions on its territory in the fight against Boko Haram. Nigeria itself exercises significant influence over other countries within and through ECOWAS and knows the organization's power, so that it has been reluctant as the established regional power house to submit itself under ECOWAS control. Moreover, Nigeria's then President Jonathan had been against any AU involvement.[71] However, this isolated approach in the response against Boko Haram had its limits. In August 2014, Nigerian troops were disarmed by their Cameroonian counter parts after crossing unilaterally into the neighbours territory in hot pursuit of Boko Haram, which clearly demonstrate the necessity of effective regional coordination and even cooperation.[72] When Buhari was elected, he actively sought the support of neighbouring countries to revive the LCBC, which may have been part of an attempt to improve Nigeria's international reputation.[73] Despite this change in attitudes,

68 Atangana, The underlying reasons for the emerging dynamic, p. 207f.; A. Tisseron, Tchad: L'émergence d'une puissance régionale? Institut Thomas More, Brussels/Paris 2015, Note d'actualité, p. 34.

69 Galeazzi et al., Understanding the Lake Chad Basin Commission, p. 19.

70 Ibid.

71 Brubacher, Damman, and Day, The AU Task Forces, p. 292.

72 Galeazzi et al., Understanding the Lake Chad Basin Commission, pp. 17f.

73 Onapajo, Has Nigeria defeated Boko Haram?: Under Jonathan, corruption in the military and mismanagement led to a failure of his military offensive (as well as the parallel development programme and educational programme); this incuded altercations with the US over human rights abuses and a subsequent discontinuation of

Nigeria – who has the largest military capacities in the region – continues to seek to steer and control the multilateral MNJTF. Grand gestures, like the contribution of USD 100 million, pledged during the June 2015 LCBC Summit of Heads of State and Government, as well as persistence in keeping MNJTF leadership demonstrate this.[74]

Despite being under the aegis of the LCBC, the MNJTF membership diverges from that of the commission. Libya and the Central African Republic do not contribute to the force, but Benin does.

The involvement of Benin in the MNJTF has mostly been attributed to the country's close ties with Nigeria or a general sense of regional security responsibility,[75] which can be backed up by a long bilateral history of Beninese support for Nigerian politics within ECOWAS. However, another factor in Benin's involvement was the arrest of Beninese citizens active in Boko Haram in the north of Nigeria[76]. This is apparently linked to concerns within Benin over the growing popularity of more conservative Islam fractions.[77] Benin, which also contributes to MINUSMA, has deployed 150 troops to the MNJTF, mainly tasked with securing the MNJTF main base and escort services for the force.[78]

The MNJTF receives support from a number of non-African security actors, both bilaterally and through the LCBC directly. The US, for example, provides intelligence and military support to the Nigerian army in its fight against Boko Haram, as does the United Kingdom.[79] Also, France works through bilateral support, first and foremost with Chad. The European Union assists with funds through the African Peace Facility. Such multilateral support avenues only opened through the formal authorization of the MNJTF by the African Union's Peace and Security Council. While Nigeria remained sceptical of the potential loss of independence, Chad and some members of the Peace and Security Council even pushed for a Chapter VII mandate by the United Nations Security Council, which would have given the force access to the full United Nations logistics and financial support.[80]

In the bow wave of the LCBC's renewed importance to access international support structures, several donors / partners have adapted their engagement in the region and through the commission. Much of this is driven by an attempt to counterbalance the narrow military focus of the MNJTF. The UNDP, for example, not only has country projects concerned with the violence around the Lake Chad, but also has programmes

arms trading. Buhari then rearranged the military leadership, exchanged top brass, and led an anti-corruption campaign and re-established relationship with US (see also previous illegal arms deals and deals with Russia and China). Buhari also sought the support of Nigeria's neighbours, which lead to the revival of the LCBC. Perhaps the "transregional" formation of the MNJTF was part of Buhari's attempt to improve Nigeria's international reputation.

74 Galeazzi et al., Understanding the Lake Chad Basin Commission, p. 18.

75 Atangana, The underlying reasons for the emerging dynamic, p. 213.

76 Interview, ECOWAS Standby Force Chief of Staff, Abuja, 24 September 2018.

77 Galeazzi et al., Understanding the Lake Chad Basin Commission, p. 19.

78 Ibid.

79 Oyewole, Boko Haram: Insurgency and the War against Terrorism, p. 430f.

80 Brubacher, Damman, and Day, The AU Task Forces, p. 293.

directly with and through the LCBC. However, as the commission's staff is often appointed in a non-transparent way and rather based on internal politics than merit, the absorption capacities of the Executive Secretariat in face of the many different bilateral and multilateral projects and programmes are strongly limited.[81] This deficiency is also exhibited by the inability of the LCBC Excecutive Secretary to be decisive in his role as the civilian head of mission of the MNJTF. The UNDP has decided to second one senior officers to the Executive Secretariat in an attempt to increase the commission's capacities.[82] In wake of increased donor investment in the LCBC, the commission, which thus far was merely a political forum for coordination of the littoral heads of state and government, might develop a noticeable capacity to act at the Executive Secretariat. If this remains only for the processing of funds or might over time contribute to the development of a distinct bureaucratic agency remains to be seen.

Through revival of the MNJTF, the activities around the LCBC were started again. While the commission remains mainly a political forum for the littoral heads of state and government to coordinate their counter-terrorist activities in the region, the authorization of the MNJTF by the PSC has increased the recognition and formal role of the LCBC. On the one hand, this has strengthened the regional organization and its status, yet, on the other hand, has brought the military response to Boko Haram into the APSA structure. The next section considers the implication of this.

4. Transregional Dynamics Around a Regional Force: African Peace and Security Architecture and the MNJTF

Long before the transformation of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) into the African Union and the subsequent establishment of the African Peace and Security Architecture in the early 2000s, the continent had already seen different waves of establishing regional organizations. Some of these focused on agriculture, ecology, and environmental issues, like the LCBC; others on monetary integration; and those most prominent on economic integration. The latter led to the creation of RECs, which were set up in West and Central Africa. ECOWAS was established in 1975 and ECCAS in 1983. The establishment of APSA was driven by the creation of the African Union's Peace and Security Council as well as different institutions to support its work; among them, the African Standby Force (ASF) was designed for multidimensional conflict interventions. The ASF was envisioned not as a standing army but as a multi-dimensional force with civilian, military, and police components and divided into regional brigades (today called forces) to which member states pledge military capacities. The regional forces were established each for North, East, South, Central and West Africa and related to corresponding pre-existing RECs. The East and North African regions were an exception as there was no

81 Galeazzi et al., Understanding the Lake Chad Basin Commission, p. 10.
82 Interview with UNDP Senior Staff, New York, 4 December 2018.

one suitable REC. As a result, the ASF's specific regional mechanisms were created. Under APSA, eight RECs are privileged partners of the AU[83] in addressing matters of peace and security on the continent and for the ASF there are three RECs plus two RMs.[84]
The overlapping multiplicity of regional organizations with their ongoing changes in relevance has become a fluctuating constant within African regionalism. Actors, mostly heads of state and government and to a lesser extent civil society organizations (or their networks), may at times be highly engaged by working through one organization and / or then again shifting their focus to another or alter their commitment. This ebbing and flowing of different topical issues or the currents of changing alliances was to some degree channelled by the APSA. The process of establishing this policy structure manifested the relevance of eight regional organizations for continental peace and security. In addition, the creation of the ASF in the form of five regional forces, each with the respective responsibility for North, East, South, Central and West Africa, inscribed a certain ASF-geography.[85]
This attempt to fix a particular spatial imagination created a spatial order that has become very successful. The intersecting of key legal texts has defined a particular relationship between African and non-African organizations with regard to peace and security on the continent, which is manifested in the building of technical and institutional capacities (e.g. African Union-United Nations relations). This included the creation of the five regional forces of the ASF and the development of the structures and capacities of the African Union Peace Support Operations (PSO), such as the Peace Support Operations Division at the African Union Commission, as well as trainings at the regional training centres of excellence and through continental exercises. The ASF was modelled after the multi-dimensional peacekeeping paradigm that was sought by organizations like the United Nations at the time to confront armed violence on the continent.
The establishment of the MNJTF showed that – at least the involved – heads of state and government with their national military leadership desired a different model for military collaboration in the region. The MNJTF was a convenient tool for Nigeria to gain legitimacy and support through the African Union and United Nations while maintaining firm control over its military and the operations against Boko Haram. In a similar vein, the MNJTF format allowed the governments of Biya in Cameroon and Déby in Chad to access training and funding arrangements for their national armies, which boosted their performance and increased domestic legitimacy. And, as within the MNJTF, the contributing armies operate mostly in their own territories with support that could be obtained

83 These eight regional organizations that are officially recognized as partners of the African Union under APSA are ECOWAS, SADC, ECCAS, IGAD, EAC, AMU, CEN-SAD and COMESA.

84 Protocol Relaing to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union (1st Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the AU), 9 July 2002, Durban, South Africa; Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation in the Area of Peace and Security between the African Union, Regional Economic Communities and the Coordinating Mechanisms of the Regional Standby Brigades of Eastern Africa and Northern Africa, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 2008.

85 K. P. W. Döring, The changing ASF geography: From the intervention experience in Mali to the African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises and the Nouakchott Process, in: African Security 11 (2018) 1, pp. 32–58.

through the multilateral format, which translated into national military successes that could be claimed by the presidents.[86]

The primary responsibility for the MNJTF lies formally with the LCBC, in cooperation with the African Union. However, as the commission does not have experience in conducting such operations, the task force essentially liaises with the African Union Commission in Addis Ababa when necessary.[87] Yet, the two major RECs bordering the force's area of operation, ECOWAS and ECCAS, were marginal to the establishment of the force and have only recently found a joint format for engagement with it.

At the time ECOWAS and ECCAS were established, those two RECs were the preferred structures for cooperation by the political leadership. Later, the creation of the MNJTF indicates that these preferences have changed, certainly regarding military deployment, as the concerned heads of state and government did not purse cooperation through ECOWAS or ECCAS in their fight against Boko Haram.

ECOWAS was not involved in the establishment of the MNJTF beyond expressions of support. Instead, rather the AU became the strategic partner for the MNJTF in terms of logistics and finances with a strategic support office established in Addis Ababa to coordinated, among other issues, donor assistance.[88] The European Union, the United Kingdom, and the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD) were among the donors, most of them pledging support during the February 2016 donors' conference in Addis Ababa.[89] Nevertheless, the financial burden was mostly carried by the MNJTF member states themselves, first and foremost Nigeria.[90]

ECCAS, instead, promised CFA (XAF) 50,000 billion (about USD 87 million) during an extraordinary summit of the Central African Peace and Security Council (COPAX) in Yaoundé, Caameroon, in February 2015 – at a time when Chadian President Idriss Déby Itno held the chair of ECCAS.[91] The same meeting also called for a joint ECOWAS-ECCAS summit on a common strategy against Boko Haram.[92] The joint summit that was initially scheduled for October 2015 only took place in July 2018, despite repeated encouragement towards such a joint summit and offers of support in organizing it by the United Nations secretary-general and the United Nations Security Council.[93]

86 Brubacher, Damman, and Day, The AU Task Forces, p. 294.

87 PSC, Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the Implementation of Communiqué PSC/AHG/COMM.2(CDLXXXIV) on the Boko Haram Terrorist Group and on other Related International Efforts, 489th Meeting, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 3 March 2015; PSC, Communiqué (PSC/AHG/COMM.2[CDLXXXIV]), 484th Meeting, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 29 January 2015; Galeazzi et al., Understanding the Lake Chad Basin Commission, p. 8.

88 W. Assanvo, J. E. A. Abatan, W. A. Sawadogo, Institute for Security Studies Cape Town, G, Pretoria, Assessing the Multinational Joint Task Force against Boko Haram, Institute for Security Studies (ISS) 2016, p. 5.

89 Press Release: The African Union Commission holds a donors' conference in support of the Multinational Joint task force operations against Boko Haram terrorist group, Addis Ababa, 1 February 2016.

90 Assanvo et al., Assessing the Multinational Joint Task Force, 9.

91 M. J. Nsang, The ECCAS will provide one hundred million dollars to fight against Boko Haram, 2015; https://www.guineaecuatorialpress.com/noticia.php?id=6261&lang=en (accessed 7 January 2019).

92 Ibid.; United Nations Security Council: para. 64.

93 See United Nations Security Council: Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Central Africa and the activities of the United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa (S/2015/914), New York, 30 November 2015, para. 22, 81; Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Central Africa and the activities of the United

During the joint summit in Lomé, the heads of state and government of ECOWAS and ECCAS signed the Lomé Declaration on Peace, Security, Stability and the Fight Against Terrorism and Violent Extremism.[94] After the joint summit in June 2013 in Yaoundé on maritime security, this was another step towards transregional or interregional cooperation in matters of peace and security.[95]

While there are different ways of coordinating and realigning multinational forces like the MNJTF, with the AU PSO standards and ASF aims, some avenues are not explored (at all). There could have been a cooperation between the West African Standby Force (ESF) and the Central African Standby Force (FOMAC). Moreover, it would have been possible that one REC takes the lead and cooperates with the bordering neighbour states. ECOWAS could have engaged Chad and Cameroon to deploy a sort of ESF-*plus*.

The African Union maintains primary responsibility for peace and security on the continent[96] and derives much of its recognition from this default position. As such, it has a coordinating role and the task to respond to security challenges when just one regional organization alone is not able to.

In addition to the MNJTF, also the G5 Sahel Joint Force (comprised of Burkina Faso, Chad, Niger, Mali and Mauritania) has confronted the African Union with a military cooperation effort outside the APSA structures. The African Union has responded with a Peace and Security Council Communique that – while authorizing this force – reminded everyone about the importance of APSA and ECOWAS.[97] Further, a Peace and Security Council Communique was released in November 2017 concerning both "ad hoc regional initiatives" and their relationship to APSA, acknowledging the need "for the AU and Member states including the RECs to explore ways and means to adapt AU instruments in the framework of the APSA".[98] This attempt to reconcile some member states drive for ad hoc deployments with the longstanding development of the regional standby forces and APSA had already influenced the debates within the Nouakchott Process, initiated by the African Union Commission in early 2013.[99]

Nations Regional Office for Central Africa (S/2017/465), New York, 31 May 2017; Report of the Secretary-General on the activities of the United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel (S/2017/563), New York, 30 June 2017, para. 43; Resolution 2349, Adopted by the Security Council at its 7911th meeting (S/RES/2349), New York, 31 March 2017, para. 25.

94 Lomé Declaration on Peace, Security, Stability and the Fight against Terrorism and Violent Extremism, Joint Summit of ECOWAS and ECCAS Heads of State and Government, Lomé, Togo, 30 July 2018.

95 Final Communiqué, Joint Summit of ECOWAS and ECCAS Heads of State and Government on Peace, Security, Stability and the Fight against Terrorism and Violent Extremism, Lomé, Togo, 30 July 2018.

96 Protocol Relaing to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union" (1st Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the AU), 9 July 2002, Durban, South Africa; Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation in the Area of Peace and Security between the African Union, Regional Economic Communities and the Coordinating Mechanisms of the Regional Standby Brigades of Eastern Africa and Northern Africa, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 2008.

97 Communiqué (PSC/PR/COMM [DCLXXIX]), 679th Meeting, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 13 April 2017.

98 Communiqué (PSC/PR/COMM. [DCCXXXIII]), 733th Meeting, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 13 November 2017, para. 13.

99 Ministerial Meeting on the Enhancement of Security Cooperation and the Operationalisation of the African Peace and Security Architecture in the Sahelo-Saharan Region: Nouakchott Conclusions, 17 March 2013.

These efforts to hold on to existing security arrangements on the continent notwithstanding, currently it seems that the five regional standby forces have merely a sort of routine legacy support from some member states. An influential member state of ECOWAS and the AU, Nigeria was opposed to the establishment of the African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises (ACIRC),[100] which it saw as detrimental to the operationalization of the ASF. Yet, at the same time it did not support the deployment of the ECOWAS Standby Force in the context of its own fight against Boko Haram.[101] Member states, like Nigeria and Chad, seem to prefer to deploy their troops through an arrangement like the MNJTF which allows them to maintain more control over their troops and face less scrutiny regarding human rights standards, as it would be within an African Union Peace Support Operations or United Nations Peacekeeping Mission. In the context of this trend, the African Union will continue to face the challenges in accommodating simultaneous processes of spatialization through different transregional arrangements.

5. Conclusion

This article set out to caution against a naturalization of spatial imaginations of different regions. Instead of taking for granted pre-given regions that are easily definable, I contend that specific actors produce and reproduce the regional or respectively transregional character of a security concern as well as its response. The three parts of the article sought to understand the co-existence of the framing of the violence in the Lake Chad Basin as regional and as transregional. Part one gave an overview of the abundant spatial semantics that invoke different locations and regionalizations of the security concerns in the area. Here, the role of an organization like the UNDP in co-creating regional structures was chosen as an example. The second part focused on the becoming of the Lake Chad Basin Commission and the Multinational Joint Task Force, highlighting some of the concerns and interests of the heads of state and government that contribute troops to this force. Finally, the third part examined the establishment of the African Peace and Security Architecture, with its particular regional division. As ECOWAS and ECCAS seek transregional cooperation in their counter-terrorism efforts, the African Union tries to bridge the tension between this very successful regionalization project and the current restarting of alternative projects, here exemplified by the revival of the LCBC.

100 The African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises (ACIRC) is a proposal for an lead-nation based coalition of willing states to deploy in a more flexible manner than through the prearranged regional forces, see Sixth Ordinary Meeting, Preparatory Meeting of Chiefs of Staff: Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the Operationalisation of the Rapid Deplyoment Capability of the African Standby Force and the Establishment of an "African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises", RPT/Exp/VI/STCDSS/(i-a)2013 (29-30 April 2013). It was introduced by the African Union Commission Chairperson, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma and greatly supported by South Africa, who had a successful experience of a coalition-based intervention against the armed groups M23 in the Democratic Republic of Congo, together with Tanzania and Malawi.

101 Yet, the ESF was still deployed in a national context, as in Guinea-Bissau and Gambia.

As noted in the introductory literature overview, when discussing the security responses by governments and international organizations in the Lake Chad Basin the spatial semantics in delineating the appropriate regional (or transregional) frame are not reflected upon. A fruitful avenue for future research would be to focus on these framings and trace which actors desire which regional framing, why at a given time, and how they co-produce it.

The limited space of this article allowed only for a cursory overview while highlighting some aspects or rather sketching out an entry point for future analysis of the spatial imaginations and semantics that drive the becoming of regions. Such an analysis needs to take into account the following interlinked aspects. First, the becoming of regions are not pregiven but instead social artefacts that are desired, shaped, and made by actors over time. Second, these actors may have different understandings of what or where the region is and what it is constituted by and that those understandings may, also, change over time. Third, the different understandings of the region may be similar to those of other actors or different from them, which in turn affects the possibility for cooperation and / or competition. Fourth, while there might be a topical concurrence among the actors (e.g. counter-Boko Haram stance among the African Union, ECOWAS, ECCAS, the LCBC, or the UNDP) or a shared assessment of the conflict situation, their spatial imaginations of the issue may vary and may increase tensions between them or introduce difficulties for collaboration.

Transregional Conflicts and the Re-spatialization of Regions "at Sea": The Yaoundé Process in the Gulf of Guinea

Jens Herpolsheimer

ABSTRACTS

Seit den 2000er Jahren haben regionale und internationale Akteure in West- und Zentralafrika den Golf von Guinea zunehmend als einen Raum von strategischer Bedeutung angesehen, geplagt von „maritimer Unsicherheit", die sich über etablierte regionale Grenzen erstreckt. Als Reaktion darauf haben ECOWAS, ECCAS und die Gulf of Guinea Commission sowie deren Mitgliedsstaaten und „internationale Partner" neue Formen der transregionalen Kooperation gesucht. Dies hat im Juni 2013 zur Gründung des Yaoundé-Prozesses geführt. Da maritime Themen bzw. Räume in den Security Studies wie auch der Regionalismusforschung wenig Beachtung gefunden haben, befasst sich der vorliegende Beitrag mit dem Ursprung, den Hauptakteuren sowie den globalen Verflechtungen des Yaoundé-Prozesses und argumentiert, dass all dies eng mit Versuchen verknüpft ist, trans- und interregionale Räume zu gestalten und zu ordnen, sowohl „auf See" als auch „an Land".

Since the 2000s, actors in but also beyond West and Central Africa have increasingly identified the Gulf of Guinea as a space of strategic importance, beset by "maritime insecurity" reaching across established regional boundaries. Consequently, especially ECOWAS, ECCAS, and the Gulf of Guinea Commission, their member states, and "international partners" have sought new ways of transregional cooperation, leading to the creation of the Yaoundé Process in June 2013. Responding to a lack of attention to maritime issues / sea space in security studies and regionalism literature, this article analyzes the Yaoundé Process. Applying a spatial perspective, the article traces its origins / emergence, main actors and entanglement in trans-more global dynamics. It argues that this process has intimately linked to the formatting and ordering of trans- and interregional space(s) both "at sea" and "on land".

Comparativ | Zeitschrift für Globalgeschichte und vergleichende Gesellschaftsforschung 28 (2018) Heft 6, S. 68–89.

1. Introduction

As Africa's "new danger zone"[1] – "waiting to explode"[2] – the Gulf of Guinea has gained increasing attention since the early 2010s, named in th same breath together with the developing crisis in the Sahel as a major international security challenge.[3] Identified as a region of increasing strategic importance,[4] various actors and initiatives have sought to secure the vast stretch of water spanning Central and West Africa, however with limited results. Therefore, the Yaoundé Summit in June 2013 and the complete operationalization of the Interregional Coordination Center (ICC) for the Maritime Safety and Security in the Gulf of Guinea, in Yaoundé in February 2017 (after considerable delays) have met with keen anticipation by regional and international actors – moving ahead what some now call the Yaoundé Process.[5] This process brings together member states of the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and the Gulf of Guinea Commission (GGC) to jointly tackle insecurity in their maritime domains.[6]

According to practitioners and the limited literature that touches upon the issue, two related developments have triggered the Yaoundé Process. On the one hand, increasing attacks on ships in the waters of ECCAS and ECOWAS member states (most often referred to as "piracy") have caused regional heads of state to look for help and new strategies to increase their capacity and capability to monitor and patrol their maritime domain – by also transcending state borders just as the threats they face. On the other hand, concerns raised by regional stakeholders have also caused the UN Secretariat and the UN Security Council (UNSC) to get involved, calling for cooperation and a joint approach to confront common challenges – by also transcending regional borders.[7]

1 International Crisis Group (ICG), The Gulf of Guinea: The New Danger Zone, Africa Report 195 (2012), https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/west-africa/guinea/gulf-guinea-new-danger-zone (accessed 4 April 2019).

2 P. K. Gosh, Waiting to Explode: Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea, in: Observer Research Foundation Occasional Paper 46, September 2013, https://www.orfonline.org/research/waiting-to-explode-piracy-in-the-gulf-of-guinea/ (accessed 4 April 2019).

3 UN Security Council, Record of the 6723rd meeting (S/PV.6723), 27 February 2012, pp. 2, 4–5.

4 In fact, the Gulf of Guinea has been of strategic importance since colonial times (cf. K. Ali, Maritime Security Cooperation in the Gulf of Guinea: Prospects and Challenges, University of Wollongong Thesis Collection, 2014, http://ro.uow.edu.au/ (accessed 11 December 2018) K. Ali, Maritime Security Cooperation in the Gulf of Guinea: Prospects and Challenges, University of Wollongong Thesis Collection, 2014, http://ro.uow.edu.au/ (accessed 11 December 2018).

5 Whereas sometimes Yaoundé Process refers only to the Code of Conduct, in this article, the phrase refers to the entire dynamic ensuing from the Yaoundé Summit in June 2013 (similar to the understanding expressed in UN Security Council, Statement by the President of the Security Council, S/PRST/2016/4 (2016), pp. 2–3, https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_prst_2016_4.pdf [accessed 16 April 2019]).

6 ECCAS, ECOWAS and GGC, Final Communiqué: The Summit of Heads of State and Government of the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Gulf of Guinea Commission (GGC) on Maritime Security and Safety in the Gulf of Guinea, 25 June 2013, https://au.int/sites/default/files/newsevents/pressreleases/27463-pr-maritime_summit-_final_communique.pdf (accessed 4 April 2019).

7 C. Ukeje and W. Mvomo Ela, African approaches to maritime security: The Gulf of Guinea. Abuja 2013; Cf. interview with senior ECOWAS staff, Abuja, 23 February 2018; interview with senior UNODC staff, Dakar, 25 April 2017.

Consequently, while continuing to insist on the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of member states, the Yaoundé Process revolves around finding the right actors (or "partners"), a common strategy and the right kind and degree of inter-regional cooperation (and integration) to confront a threat that is not only transnational, but also transregional in nature.[8] Most importantly, there are concerns over "transnational organized crime" (TOC), in particular, but not exclusively, trafficking in arms and drugs, human trafficking, piracy, and armed robbery at sea. All of these are considered to pose threats to both socio-economic development of regional countries and international peace and stability.[9] The ICC, therefore, constitutes the top level of a hierarchical structure of inter-regional, regional (multinational), and national maritime coordination and operation centres in West and Central Africa. This structure is supposed to promote joint activities and close partnerships, regular exchange of information and expertise, the harmonization of laws and procedures, as well as the adoption and implementation of common methodology.[10]

As such, the Yaoundé Process presents us with an interesting case of regional cooperation / integration "at sea", which is relevant to academic debates for two reasons. Firstly, the Yaoundé Process focuses on regional cooperation (or else) *in* the maritime domain – something that so far has received only scant scholarly interest. In that respect, Bueger and Edmunds talk about "sea-blindness" in international security studies, calling for a new research agenda in maritime security studies.[11] Practitioners share the view that maritime security issues so far have been neglected – often failing to receive the attention given to land-based conflicts – although they are of key importance, in many cases also for land-based conflicts.[12]

Secondly, the Yaoundé Process highlights space more generally as a central dimension of political (social, economic, etc.) inter-action that is not quasi-naturally given, but socially constructed and continuously contested, therefore constantly "in the making". Like "sea space", "space" more generally has rarely received explicit scholarly interest as an explanatory factor and / or an analytical dimension to include in research (neither in peace and security studies, nor in regionalism literature). Therefore, in this article, I argue that adopting an approach that is sensitive to space allows the Yaoundé Process to bee understood as being intimately linked to the (re-)formatting and / or (re-)ordering of regional space(s) as well as inter-regional relations "at sea". I use quotation marks here

8 ECCAS, ECOWAS and GGC, Declaration of the Heads of State and Government of Central and West African States on Maritime Safety and Security in their Common Maritime Domain, 25 June 2013, pp. 1–2.

9 Ibid., p. 1.

10 Ibid., pp. 3–4.

11 Bueger and Edmunds point to the very recent emergence of a broader understanding of "maritime security", the term being coined only in the 1990s, and receiving more attention since the early 2000s, in particular in the wake of attacks on ships off the coast of Somalia (C. Bueger and T. Edmunds, Beyond seablindness: a new agenda for maritime security studies, in: International Affairs 93 (2017) 6, pp. 1293–1311, at 1296–1297). Before that, interest had mainly been in states' military power and competition, as well as legal structures to avoid warfare at sea (i.e. international order at sea), ibid., pp. 1295–1296.

12 Interview with ECOWAS staff, Abuja, 26 October 2018; interview with AU staff, Addis Ababa, 26 September 2018.

to point to the simultaneous processes of integrating the sea into regional space(s) and at the same time contributing to the construction of (inter-)regional space "on land".
In order to substantiate these points further, while filling in a fundamental gap in our knowledge of the Yaoundé Process and its origins, this article proceeds as follows: The first section analyses the nature and main themes that help to identify the Gulf of Guinea as a transregional conflict complex. It also delves in more depth into the different ways in which space matters when imagining, talking about, and acting upon maritime (in) security in the Gulf of Guinea. The second section retraces the antecedents and major inputs that led up to the Yaoundé Process, before the third section turns to its actual emergence and early stages of implementation. Since the primary interest in this article is with processes of (re-)spatialization, it does not go into detail about the current state of implementation of the ICC and the regional centres. Instead, section four reflects upon the significance of the Yaoundé Process beyond West and Central Africa and how it relates to other agendas pursued and initiatives taken at the continental level – that is to say by the AU – and beyond Africa.[13]

2. Maritime "Insecurity" in the Gulf of Guinea and Processes of Re-spatialization

Only very few publications directly touch upon the Yaoundé Process in at least some detail,[14] with most only referring to it in passing. So far, none of these contributions has focused on the actual *process* that led to the Yaoundé Summit, and the emergence of the Yaoundé Process. In contrast, a large number of contributions (mostly by think tanks) deal with the various aspects of maritime (in)security in the Gulf of Guinea. These assess causes, historical development, as well as the current security situation and how it seems to affect states in West and Central Africa (especially regarding their socio-economic development). They also identify challenges of those states and international actors in tackling the issue, making recommendations about how to move towards possible solutions.[15] In addition, several publications try to compare and share lessons from experiences in the Indian Ocean, in particular off the coast of Somalia.[16]

13 This article is based on interviews conducted in Addis Ababa (September 2016 and September 2018), Abuja (February 2017 and October 2018), and Dakar (April / May 2017). It also heavily draws on official texts produced by the involved regional organizations as well as secondary literature and media reports.

14 See, e.g., K. Ali, Maritime Security Cooperation in the Gulf of Guinea: Prospects and Challenges, University of Wollongong Thesis Collection, 2014, http://ro.uow.edu.au/ (accessed 11 December 2018); S.M. Hasan and D. Hassan, Current Arrangements to Combat Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea Region: An Evaluation, in: Journal of Maritime Law and Commerce 47 (2016) 2, pp.171–217; K.L. Jacobsen and J.R. Nordby, Maritime Security in the Gulf of Guinea. Copenhagen 2015; Ukeje and Mvomo Ela, African approaches to maritime security; F. Vreÿ, Good Order at Sea off West Africa, in: F. Vreÿ and T. Mandrup (eds.), Towards Good Order at Sea, Stellenbosch 2015, pp. 183–206.

15 Exemplary for a wide range of publications see R. Gilpin, Enhancing Maritime Security in the Gulf of Guinea, in: Strategic Insights 6 (2007) 1, https://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/11174 (accessed 11 December 2018); P.K. Gosh, Waiting to Explode; A.A. Osinowo, Combating Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea, Washington D.C 2015; P. Sartre, Responding to Insecurity in the Gulf of Guinea, New York 2014; T. Walker, Maritime security in West Africa, in: African Security Review 22 (2013) 2, pp. 85–91.

16 See, e.g., A. Anyimadu, Maritime Security in the Gulf of Guinea: Lessons Learned from the Indian Ocean, London 2013;

However, regional (as well as inter- or transregional) cooperation, although frequently referred to, has received little detailed analysis, regarding its (internal) functioning, actors, and dynamics.[17] Moreover, although much of this literature is replete with spatial references, so far it has not explicitly reflected upon the inherent spatial imaginations and related processes of re-spatialization. However, as I argue in this article, the Yaoundé Process needs to be understood in this context and as the result of different actors trying to re-spatialize – that is to say, re-format and re-order space. Consequently, the following section do not aim to give a comprehensive overview of the literature on maritime (in)security in the Gulf of Guinea.[18] Instead, it aims to outline briefly its transregional dimension, before analysing how this is intimately linked to particular spatial imaginations, formats, and processes of re-spatialization.

3. Identifying the Situation in the Gulf of Guinea as a Transregional Conflict

Although looking back at a longer history of maritime crimes especially off the coast of Nigeria, the issue of maritime insecurity in the Gulf of Guinea became a transregional conflict specifically since the mid-2000s, with a first peak in violence around 2007, followed by Nigerian counter-measures pushing piracy first eastward (towards Central Africa) and since about 2011 towards its neighbours in West Africa (first Benin and later Togo and Ghana).[19]

The reasons for the emergence of piracy (etc.) in the Gulf of Guinea, according to a large consensus in the literature, are, firstly, the emergence of the Gulf of Guinea as region of geostrategic importance due to the discovery of vast reserves of natural resources in the early 2000s – mostly oil and gas, but also fish) – and shifts in the global political and economic context, that is to say, the conflict in the Middle East and emergence of new big consumers, such as Brazil, China, and India.[20] Secondly, lacking, "weak" and/or "poor" governance (referring to a lack of interest or awareness as well as lacking or weak policy and physical control)[21] have allowed "criminals" to fill the "vacuum",[22] resulting in "bad order at sea".[23] Lastly, various structural factors have left states and populations

M. Fiorelli, Piracy in Africa: The Case of the Gulf of Guinea, in: KAIPTC Occasion paper 37 (August 2014), https://www.africaportal.org/publications/piracy-in-africa-the-case-of-the-gulf-of-guinea/ (accessed 11 April 2019); J. Piedade, From Politicization to Securitization of Maritime Security in the Gulf of Guinea, in: Croatian International Relations Review 22 (2016) 75, pp. 69–85; F. Vreÿ, Bad order at sea: From the Gulf of Aden to the Gulf of Guinea, in: African Security Review 18 (2009) 3, pp. 17–30.

17 For example, despite large membership overlaps (e.g. between ECCAS and the GGC, as well as ECOWAS, ECCAS, and MOWCA), authors usually treat these organizations as separate and independent actors.

18 For a good literature review see E.L. Lucia, Fragility, Violence and Criminality in the Gulf of Guinea: Rapid literature review, Birmingham 2015.

19 Cf. Ali, Maritime Security Cooperation, pp. 185; International Crisis Group, The Gulf of Guinea, p. 1.

20 Ali, Maritime Security Cooperation, p. 49; Ukeje and Mvomo Ela, African approaches to maritime security, pp. 13–14.

21 ICG, The Gulf of Guinea, p. 4; Ukeje and Mvomo Ela, African approaches to maritime security, pp. 17, 19.

22 ICG, The Gulf of Guinea, p. 5.

23 Vreÿ, Bad order at sea; F. Vreÿ and T. Mandrup, Introduction, in: F. Vreÿ and T. Mandrup (eds.), Towards Good Order at Sea: African experiences, Stellenbosch 2015, pp. 5–18.

in the Gulf of Guinea vulnerable, resulting in dependency on primary resources, poverty, as well as economic and political marginalization or exclusion.[24]

While piracy or variants thereof have been the most common reference,[25] maritime insecurity in the Gulf of Guinea comprises a large array of activities that are considered "illicit / illegal", "criminal", or may otherwise affect stability in the region. Many publications propose a broad conceptualization of maritime "security", along with, for example, violence at sea (e.g. piracy or robbery) as well as the trafficking of illicit goods (e.g. arms or drugs), illegal fishing, and environmental degradation.[26] Therefore, a still widespread, narrow focus on piracy, together with emphasis on military intervention and repression, may distract from more fundamental problems, such as illegal fishing, both to local and European interests,[27] as these pose threats to individual, group, and national livelihoods or development.[28] Moreover, underlying dynamics of maritime insecurity and its results are widely considered as inherently transnational, and consequently cannot be tackled by any single state, instead requiring regional and international cooperation.[29]

From the above mentioned points, it becomes clear that maritime insecurity in the Gulf of Guinea is a concern not only for states in the region, but also extends to various non-African regional and global actors. The strategies adopted and support provided by the US, European states (especially France) and the European Union (EU), as well as the International Maritime Organization (IMO) reflect the strategic importance of the Gulf of Guinea, making it a space of action linked to the maritime security agendas of these actors. As a result, the international community has shown stong interest in the Yaoundé Process.[30] Since the early 2000s, the goal has been to build some sort of maritime security "architecture" in West and Central Africa in order to produce "good order at sea" in that region.[31] So far, despite various agreements and initiatives, we still only see very few operational results. Not only do states continue to lack even the most basic equipment, such as fuel, not to talk of ships and patrol boats, regional cooperation is also hampered by a long list of factors, including, among others, corruption, border disputes over natural resources, differences in the assessment of impacts and problems, different languages and colonial legacies, "bureaucratic cultures", (degrees of) regulations and their implementa-

24 This mirrors common themes in land-based debates, reflecting the securitization of various dynamics in and large parts of Africa (see below). Cf. Ukeje and Mvomo Ela, African approaches to maritime security, pp. 18–19.

25 Vreÿ and Mandrup, Introduction, pp. 6–7.

26 Ibid., pp. 7–8; Ali, Maritime Security Cooperation, p. 96; Ukeje and Mvomo Ela, African approaches to maritime security, pp. 21–22.

27 Cf. interview with senior UNODC staff, Dakar, 25 April 2017. See also Ali, Maritime Security Cooperation, p. 66.

28 For more detailed overviews of the effects of maritime insecurity in the Gulf of Guinea, see Vreÿ, Good Order at Sea off West Africa, pp. 190–192; Ali, Maritime Security Cooperation, p. 204.

29 Cf. C. Bueger, Communities of Security Practice at Work? The Emerging African Maritime Security Regime, in: African Security 6 (2013) 3–4, pp. 297–316, at 298; Vreÿ, Good Order at Sea off West Africa, pp. 184, 192–193.

30 Cf. ICG, The Gulf of Guinea, pp. 21–23.

31 Vreÿ and Mandrup, Introduction, p. 6. For example, facing a prosecution problem, international actors have sought (creative) solutions (e.g. EU-Seychelles Agreement). Until today, many states in the Gulf of Guinea do not implement or apply international frameworks and agreements (i.e. UN Conventions, such as on Law of the Sea, for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts, and against Illicit Drug Trafficking); Ali, Maritime Security Cooperation, pp. 222 and 297.

tion, different capacities, fears of domination, as well as competition for donor funds.[32] Therefore, hopes for the Yaoundé Process have been high.[33]

4. Spatial Imaginations, Spatial Formats, and Processes of Re-spatialization

The overview of the common understanding and portrayal of the transregional conflict in the Gulf of Guinea shows that space plays an important role in several ways. Based on several spatial imaginations, different actors frame what appear to be problems as well as how best to respond to them.[34] In this way, "space" influences social action. In turn, and often simultaneously, these responses also contribute to the (re-)construction – formatting and ordering – of one or several spaces.[35]

To illustrate this point, the fundamental problem at the basis of the transregional conflict in the Gulf of Guinea, according to academics, practitioners and politicians, is a lack of control and "good governance" of the maritime domain. Similar to debates about African states "on land", their "statehood" or "stateness",[36] many authors identify a serious lack or limitation of state capacity and capability as a key concern, warning of "ungoverned spaces" at sea.[37] Thus, the spatial format "nation-state" also extends to the sea, and is organized around a set of (legal) notions, ranging from "territorial waters", which extend twelve nautical miles from the coastline to a "contiguous zone" of an additional twelve nautical miles to the exclusive economic zone (EEZ), covering 200 nautical miles off the coastline.[38] Much of the discussion about maritime security, in the Gulf of Guinea and elsewhere, revolves around the widely shared assumption that nation-states – and their

32 Ibid., p. 318; ICG, The Gulf of Guinea; Ukeje and Mvomo Ela, African approaches to maritime security; Vreÿ, Good Order at Sea off West Africa, p. 200.

33 UN Security Council, Record of the 6723rd meeting, S/PV.6723 (2012), https://undocs.org/en/S/PV.6723 (accessed 15 April 2019).

34 U. Engel, Regionalismen, Berlin 2018, pp. 3–5; The term "imaginations" does not make any judgements as to whether something is "real" or not. Instead it points to the ideational dimension of space-making, that is how actors see/perceive, frame, and/or communicate "space".

35 The notion of space as political and continuously constructed through the social interaction and interrelation of different actors (i.e. space as relational), involving different practices and knowledge-power constellations is drawn from critical / post-structuralist geography (see, for instance, J. Allen, Topologies of power: Beyond territory and networks, London 2016; D.B. Massey, For space, London 2005; G. Ó Tuathail, Critical Geopolitics: The Politics of Writing Global Space, Minneapolis MN 1996. For a comprehensive overview, see J. Murdoch, Post-structuralist Geography: A Guide to Relational Space, London 2006.

36 C. Clapham, Degrees of Statehood, in: Review of International Studies 24 (1998) 2, pp. 143–157; R.H. Jackson and C.G. Rosberg, Why Africa's Weak States Persist: The Empirical and the Juridical in Statehood, in: World Politics 35 (1982) 1, pp. 1–24.

37 Vreÿ, Bad order at sea, p. 22; For example, until the end of the 1990s many maritime borders of states in the Gulf of Guinea had not been demarcated, leading to border disputes, especially when oil reserves were discovered in the early 2000s, cf. ICG, The Gulf of Guinea, pp. 4–5.

38 Cf. UNCLOS, United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Montego Bay 1982, Part II, sections 2 and 4, https://treaties.un.org/doc/Treaties/1994/11/19941116%2005-26%20AM/Ch_XXI_06p.pdf (accessed 15 April 2019).

extension at sea – should be the primary spatial unit to tackle maritime insecurity[39] and to produce "good order at sea"[40] – the maritime pendant of "good governance".

Furthermore, the imperative need to control and govern the maritime domain, according to many authors, arises from the intimate link between land and sea space. Positively, this relates to the various resources that the sea hosts or provides, which if properly exploited, governed and secured could contribute significantly to the economies and "development" of African states. This realization is most visibly reflected in the emergence of "blue economy" debates and conferences as well as the development of (more or less) comprehensive "integrated maritime strategies", which go far beyond "security" issues.[41] At the same time, negatively, this speaks to the (potential) threats to security "on land" coming from the sea (e.g. drugs and arms) or, *vice versa,* insecurity "flowing between land and sea", with the potential to "spill over" into neighbouring territories.[42] In this line of argument, sea space becomes an element that may also connect different land spaces, for good (e.g. key trade routes) or for bad (e.g. smuggling or trafficking networks).

If we accept these aspects as the underlying spatial imaginations that trigger responses by different state and regional actors, we can subsequently observe how these have related to different projects and efforts or processes of re-spatialization. In other words: if we understand the Yaoundé Process as an initiative (or several initiatives) aiming to tackle issues that defy established spatial boundaries and formats (both at sea and on land), we can also see how during this process different actors (e.g. individual, state, and regional) try to re-organize, re-order and thus contribute to the (re-)construction of space(s) in and around the Gulf of Guinea. Here, the term "transregional" alerts us to remain sensitive to space as something that is continuously "in the making", often going beyond what seem to be "established" spaces.

For example, what constitutes the "Gulf of Guinea" has been subject to multiple definitions (e.g. geographical, economic, and political), relating to different projects and agendas (e.g. GGC and ECCAS-ECOWAS collaboration).[43] The outcome of such processes of re-spatialization, for example, may be the adaptation of existing "regionalisms" as well as the emergence of "inter-regionalism" or "new" regionalisms.[44] Interestingly, according the understanding most commonly adopted, the Gulf of Guinea region comprises almost half of Africa, including both coastal and land-locked states.[45]

39 UN Security Council, Resolution 2018 (2011): Adopted by the Security Council at its 6645th meeting, on 31 October 2011, S/RES/2018 (2011), http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/doc/2018 (accessed 15 April 2019); UN Security Council, Resolution 2039: Adopted by the Security Council at its 6727th meeting, on 29 February 2012, S/RES/2039 (2012), http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/doc/2039 (accessed 15 April 2019).

40 Vreÿ and Mandrup, Introduction.

41 U. Engel, The African Union, the African Peace and Security Architecture, and Maritime Security, in: African Security 7 (2014) 3, pp. 207–227.

42 Vreÿ, Bad order at sea, p. 20; Vreÿ, Good Order at Sea off West Africa, p. 184. Some have described this such descriptions as subsequent processes of politicization and securitization (e.g. Piedade, From Politicization to Securitization of Maritime Security).

43 Ali, Maritime Security Cooperation, p. 19; ICG, The Gulf of Guinea, p. 2, fn 7.

44 Here understood in the double meaning of more of the "old" or with new characteristics / qualities.

45 Interview with senior ECOWAS staff, Abuja, 29 October 2018. See also Ali, Maritime Security Cooperation, p. 1.

5. The Antecedents of the Yaoundé Process

The Yaoundé Process has its origins in the emergence since the mid-2000s of increased activities commonly termed "piracy" in the extended maritime space known as the Gulf of Guinea. Around that time, observers in both academia and politics started to become aware of a situation similar to the one that had emerged previously along the East Africa coast, especially at the Horn of Africa. ECCAS was the first regional organization to react. Later, facilitated by support from US Africa Command (AFRICOM), ECOWAS joined in an effort to come up with a joint approach. The remainder of this section briefly outlines the origins and initial efforts of ECCAS and ECOWAS regarding maritime security.

Economic Community of Central African States

Within ECCAS, cooperation regarding maritime security became an issue during the mid-2000s after all of the coastal countries had discovered oil in their respective maritime domains.[46] Among other things, Central African heads of states were concerned about their access to offshore oil facilities, illicit trafficking of arms and drugs, illegal fishing, and migration. However, it was only after piracy had started to spread eastwards from Nigeria (around 2007/08), in particular after attacks on banks in coastal areas of Cameroon, as well as the seaborne attack on the presidential palace in Malabo (Equatorial Guinea) that these countries gave more serious concern to the issue.[47]

Reacting to these developments, in February 2008, the Central African Peace and Security Council (French: COPAX) at its second ministerial meeting, in Libreville, tasked the ECCAS Secretariat with preparing a draft for a "strategy to secure the vital maritime interests of ECCAS member states in the Gulf of Guinea", based on COPAX decisions and remarkably already showing an interest in developing synergies with ECOWAS and the GGC.[48] In May 2008, the ECCAS Defense and Security Commission at its 8th session, in Yaoundé, approuved the terms of reference before approving the strategy in December 2008 at its 9th session, in Kinshasa. Subsequently, COPAX validated the document in February 2009 and adopted a draft protocol relating to the strategy at its 3rd ministerial session, in Brazzaville.[49] In October 2009, the ECCAS heads of state and government at their 14th ordinary summit, in Kinshasa, adopted the strategy and signed the related

46 For more information on ECCAS in general, see http://ceeac-eccas.org/index.php/fr/ (accessed 13 November 2018).

47 ICG, Implementing Peace and Security Architecture (I): Central Africa, Africa report 181 (2011), https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/central-africa/implementing-peace-and-security-architecture-i-central-africa (accessed 15 April 2019); ICG, The Gulf of Guinea; J. V. Ntuda Ebodé (ed.), Terrorisme et piraterie: De nouveaux enjeux sécuritaires en Afrique Centrale, Yaoundé 2010.

48 ECCAS, Protocole relatif à la Stratégie de Sécurisation des Inérèts Vitaux en Mer des Etats de la CEEAC du Golfe de Guinée, Kinshasa, 24 October 2009, p. 10.

49 C. S. Atonfack Guemo, La mutualisation des moyens de lutte contre les actes de piraterie dans la sous région CEEAC, in: J.V. Ntuda Ebodé (ed.), Terrorisme et piraterie: De nouveaux enjeux sécuritaires en Afrique Centrale, Yaoundé 2010, pp. 123–149, at 140.

protocol, creating a Regional Center for Maritime Security in Central Africa (French: CRESMAC) at Pointe Noire (Congo), working under the ECCAS Secretariat.[50]

The protocol divides ECCAS into three "zones", each with a Multinational Coordination Center in the lead state, linking national maritime operational centres.[51] Zone A was supposed to comprise Angola (lead) and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC); Zone B with Angola, Congo (lead), and Gabon; and Zone D with Cameroon (lead), Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, and Sao Tomé and Principe.[52] An earlier draft, apparently, had foreseen four zones, explaining why Zone C was missing in the protocol. Originally, Gabon was supposed to lead Zone C.[53] However, it appears that struggles over maritime boundaries between Equatorial Guinea and Gabon led to the latter joining Zones C and D. Similarly, seeking to maintain control over its Cabinda enclave, Angola joined Zones A and B.[54] During the process, then, first Zone C and more recently Zone B have merged into Zones A and D, apparently to save costs.[55] These dynamics are indicative of the processes and efforts of spatialization within ECCAS, showing how different heads of state have sought to establish or maintain control over specific spaces.

Already before the final adoption of the Protocol, Zone D took up its collaboration, as it found itself as most affected by maritime insecurity. Thus, following a recommendation by COPAX, ministers of Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon and São Tomé and Príncipe met in Yaoundé in May 2009, and signed a technical cooperation agreement on the maritime surveillance of Zone D, followed by a first "symbolic" joint patrol (from Douala). In the same month, they inaugurated the multinational coordination centre in Douala (Cameroon). In August 2009, the staff of the chiefs of defense of Zone D signed a joint surveillance plan (SECMAR1) in Malabo (Equatorial Guinea), and in September 2009, joint patrols started from Malabo (although with very few boats). Deemed a success, a follow-up plan (SECMAR2) was adopted in January 2011, this time aspiring (but not yet succeeding) to also include air surveillance.[56]

Simultaneously, first attempts to approach ECOWAS and the GGC emerged. To this end, the US (AFRICOM, etc.), which had heavily supported the maritime security process within ECCAS, was again instrumental (e.g. inviting Nigeria to its "Obangame Express" exercise; for more detail see below).[57] The main target of these efforts was to

50 ECCAS, Protocole relatif à la Stratégie de Sécurisation, Art. 4–5; The Protocol also refers to and establishes several additional maritime "mechanisms", less known and unclear regarding their state of implementation (e.g. maritime sessions at the levels of COPAX and DSC), ibid., Art. 3, 10.

51 Ibid., Art. 5, 7.

52 Ibid., Art. 7.

53 Ibid., Art. 5.

54 Ali, Maritime Security Cooperation, pp. 316–317.

55 Interview with senior ECOWAS staff, Abuja, 29 October 2018; see also http://cresmacpointenoire.org/?lang=en (accessed 11 December 2018).

56 Atonfack Guemo, La mutualisation des moyens, p. 142; Ntuda Ebodé, La nouvelle posture géopolitique du Cameroun, pp. 83–85.

57 The whole evolution of maritime security efforts and initiatives in the Gulf of Guinea cannot be understood without the involvement of international actors, such as France and the US, who have actively sought to influence processes of (re-)spatialization in the region(s) (e.g. through big naval exercises, Obangame Express and Nemo).

engage Nigeria, because of its crucial role regarding both the problem of maritime insecurity and its solution. However, at the same time, many Central African states, and Cameroon in particular, regarded Nigeria with a lot of suspicion.[58] Therefore, the challenge was trying to find the right spatial and organizational framework to involve, but also check Nigeria (see below).

Economic Community of West African States

Around the same time that ECCAS started implementing its maritime security strategy, operationalizing Zone D and the regional centre (CRESMAC), staff at the ECOWAS Commission (Department for Political Affairs Peace and Security, DPAPS) also took up the issue to start to discuss an ECOWAS policy of its own, and to draft respective documents.[59] With support from France, they travelled to ECCAS' Zone D in late 2009, to see what they were doing and to learn from it.[60] Subsequently, they sought to generate attention and awareness among ECOWAS member states, increase the respective capacity at the DPAPS, and get donor support. A first draft for an ECOWAS maritime strategy was already discussed internally in 2009.[61] However, it was only with the spread of piracy activity from Nigeria into neighbouring West African waters that the process within ECOWAS gained more momentum.[62]

Around 2011, increased efforts by the Nigerian navy to tackle piracy in its territorial waters appear to have pushed the problem westwards, first into the waters of Benin and later towards Togo and Côte d'Ivoire.[63] Consequently, reacting to a significant drop in revenue of the Benin Port Authority and a threat to the economic livelihood of its population, President Boni Yayi of Benin called on his Nigerian counterpart, Goodluck Jonathan at the time, for help. Both presidents agreed to cooperate and launched Operation Prosperity in September 2011, starting joint patrols in the waters of Benin.[64] Later,

However, due to the limited scope, this article primarily focuses on the agency of African actors, and their efforts to re-spatialize.

58 ICG, Implementing Peace and Security Architecture, at 14–15; ICG, The Gulf of Guinea, p. 21.

59 For more general information on ECOWAS, see http://ecowas.int (accessed 13 November 2018).

60 Interview with senior ECOWAS staff, Abuja, 23 February 2017.

61 Interview with senior ECOWAS staff, Abuja 29 October 2018. This draft was subsequently further developed with the help of a consultant from the Institute of Security Studies (based in Pretoria). West African heads of state ultimately adopted the ECOWAS Integrated Maritime Strategy in 2014.

62 ECOWAS, West African Defence Chiefs intensify efforts on maritime security, Press Release 188/2011, 5 October 2011, http://news.ecowas.int/presseshow.php?nb=188&lang=en&annee=2011 (accessed 16 April 2019); ECOWAS, ECOWAS urged to arrest rising spate of piracy, terrorism in the region, Press Release 228/2011, 16 November 2011, http://news.ecowas.int/presseshow.php?nb=228&lang=en&annee=2011 (accessed 16 April 2019); ECOWAS, ECOWAS summit for integrated response against piracy, Press Release 230/2011, 18 November 2011, http://news.ecowas.int/presseshow.php?nb=230&lang=en&annee=2011 (accessed 16 April 2019); ECOWAS, Final Communiqué: 40th ordinary session of the Authority of Heads of State and Government, ECW/HOSG/ABJ/40, 16–17 February 2012, at 4, http://www.ecowas.int/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/40tht-ECOWAS-Summit-Abuja-16-17-Feb-20121.pdf (accessed 16 April 2019).

63 Ali, Maritime Security Cooperation, p. 185; ICG, The Gulf of Guinea, p. 15.

64 Hasan and Hassan, Current Arrangements to Combat Piracy, p. 203; Institute for Security Studies (ISS), Benin's maritime security challenges in the Gulf of Guinea, West Africa Report 12 (2015), pp. 1–10, at 4–5.

in February 2012, Nigeria, Benin, and Togo signed an agreement to tackle the issue together; in September 2012, Ghana signed a similar cooperation agreement with Benin.[65] At the same time, Nigeria developed an interest to join the mechanism for maritime security of ECCAS, in particular Zone D. However, it was rejected on formal grounds, namely that as an individual state it could not join what was conceived of as a regional mechanism. Apparently, feeling threatened by Nigerian dominance, Central African states, Cameroon in particular, suggested as a solution that Nigeria should bring in ECOWAS.[66] Thus, mobilizing "ECOWAS / West Africa" has allowed Nigeria to re-scale – and thereby re-spatialize – its action.

Early ECOWAS-ECCAS Cooperation

Triggered by mutual interests, an AFRICOM consultant invited staff from the commissions and secretariats of ECCAS, ECOWAS, and the African Union to Stuttgart in early 2011 for a brainstorming session on possibilities for future collaboration. During this meeting, the representatives of the three organizations agreed that effective cooperation would require formal agreements on three levels. The first would be political, meaning a document that would signal the commitment of member states and provide a general "political umbrella" for the process. The second would be of a technical nature, a memorandum of understanding (MoU) organizing the relationship between the two regional organizations. The third document, a multilateral agreement, would provide the legal basis for joint operations. This idea was further pursued during a follow-up seminar in Garmisch-Partenkirchen in July 2011, which, again facilitated by AFRICOM, brought together representatives of ECCAS and ECOWAS. The result of this seminar were three draft documents reflecting three inter-related dimensions (that is to say, political, technical, and operational).[67]

After these initial meetings, ECOWAS Commission staff continued working on these drafts, supported by technical and legal experts from the US (e.g. from the US State Department, coast guard, and navy). Progress was continuously discussed in a series of meetings between ECCAS and ECOWAS, supported by the US between August 2011 and March 2013 (e.g. in Accra, Dakar, Washington, D.C., and Lomé). During these meetings, the experts involved in the drafting process worked towards reaching a consensus on the technical level before bringing it to the political level.[68]

However, despite all preparation efforts, it was at the political level that fundamental differences threatened the progress already achieved. At the inter-ministerial meeting in Cotonou (March 2013),[69] disagreement emerged especially between Nigeria and Camer-

65 Hasan and Hassan, Current Arrangements to Combat Piracy, p. 208.
66 Interview with senior ECOWAS staff, Abuja, 23 February 2017.
67 Interview with senior ECOWAS staff, Abuja 29 October 2018.
68 Interview with senior ECOWAS staff, Abuja 29 October 2018.
69 See http://www.defenceweb.co.za/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=24739:eccas-and-eco-

oun. The strong role of ECOWAS staff in drafting the three key documents had already raised suspicion about West African hegemonic ambitions.[70] In particular the prospect of Nigerian navy ships being allowed to sail into Cameroonian waters (as foreseen in the multilateral agreement) caused strong resistance from the representatives of Cameroon, further exacerbating already existing tensions over the Bakassi Peninsula[71] as well as the Nigerian role in the internal divisions between the anglophone and francophone parts of Cameroon.[72] In the end, it was only the persistent interventions by the technical staff that saved the third element (the operational document), which would otherwise have been discarded entirely, by transforming it into a "code of conduct". Similar to the Djibouti Code of Conduct, this document, while not being legally binding on signatories, nevertheless could provide operational guidance.[73]

6. The Emergence and Evolution of the Yaoundé Process to Date

In parallel but independent of the process described so far, feeling increased pressure from attacks in its waters, the president of Benin, Boni Yayi, also called on the UN Secretariat and the Security Council for an intervention. This subsequently led to two resolutions by the UNSC, which, in turn, would ultimately lead to the Summit of Heads of State and Government of ECCAS, ECOWAS, and the Gulf of Guinea Commission in Yaoundé, on 25 June 2013 – setting off the Yaoundé Process. This section retraces the main dynamics related to that process and outlines the institutional structure that has emerged (or is yet to emerge) from it.

Benin, the UN Secretariat, and the UNSC

As mentioned above, the increase and spatial shifts of pirate, or other illegal, activity in the Gulf of Guinea, especially around 2011/12, triggered several actors to reconsider their approach towards maritime (in)security – to this end, also looking beyond their own state borders. It was against this backdrop that Boni Yayi also turned to the UN in July 2011, requesting assistance from the UN Secretary-General (SG), Ban Ki-moon. Based on that request, the Under-SG for Political Affairs B. Lynn Pascoe briefed, on 23 August 2011 (during the monthly horizon scanning), the UN Security Council on the issue of piracy in the Gulf of Guinea.[74] As a result, the UNSC issued a press statement,

was-take-steps-to-improve-maritime-security&catid=56:diplomacy-a-peace&Itemid=111 (accessed 5 December 2018).

70 Interview with UNODC staff, Dakar, 25 April 2017.

71 ICG, Cameroon: Fragile State? Africa Report 160 (2010), https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/central-africa/cameroon/cameroon-fragile-state (accessed 16 April 2019); ICG, The Gulf of Guinea, pp. 13–14.

72 Interview with senior ECOWAS staff, Abuja, 23 February 2017.

73 Interview with senior ECOWAS staff, Abuja, 29 October 2018.

74 UN Security Council, Report of the UN assessment mission on piracy in the Gulf of Guinea (7 to 24 November 2011), S/2012/45 (2012), pp. 1–20, at 2, https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/AUUN%20S%202012%2045.pdf (accessed 16 April 2019).

on 30 August 2011, expressing its concern "over the increase in piracy, maritime armed robbery and reports of hostage-taking in the Gulf of Guinea and its damaging impact on security, trade and economic activities in the subregion".[75]

This was followed by an open UNSC debate on "Peace and Security in Africa: Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea", convened by Nigeria on 19 October 2011 (then the UNSC president). During the debate, the SG appealed to ECOWAS, ECCAS, and interestingly also to the GGC and the Maritime Organization for West and Central Africa (MOWCA) to "work together to develop a comprehensive and integrated regional anti-piracy strategy".[76] Their cooperation would build on the existing MoU between MOWCA and the International Maritime Organization on the creation of a "subregional"-integrated coastguard network in West and Central Africa.[77] These calls were subsequently underlined in Resolution 2018, adopted by the UNSC on 31 October 2011.[78] The resolution not only repeated the concerns about the impact of piracy and armed robbery at sea on "international navigation, security and the economic development of states in the region".[79] It also called upon states of ECOWAS, ECCAS and the GGC (mentioning these three regional organizations specifically but not MOWCA) to consult, coordinate, and develop a "comprehensive" response strategy "in the region" / "at the regional level" (apparently referring to the "Gulf of Guinea") and with international support.[80]

In the resolution, the UNSC also welcomed the SG's intention (already expressed in August) to dispatch a UN assessment mission, which thereafter deployed from 7 to 24 November 2011 and submitted a 19-pages report to the UNSC president on 18 January 2012. Half of this report dealt with the situation in Benin: the other half dealt with piracy in the Gulf of Guinea more broadly, outlining counter-measures taken by the IMO and MOWCA, ECCAS, ECOWAS, and the GGC respectively. Overall, the report identified five major shortcomings (or requirements, put more positively), namely the lack of collective surveillance, sustainable funding for equipment and activities, systematic information gathering and exchange, adequate legal frameworks, and maritime awareness.[81] Based on this assessment it recommended to overcome these obstacles, suggesting, among other things, to quickly follow through on the proposed inter-regional

75 UN Security Council, Press Statement on Piracy, Maritime Armed Robbery in Gulf of Guinea, SC/10372-AFR/2236 (2011), https://www.un.org/press/en/2011/sc10372.doc.htm (accessed 16 April 2019).

76 UN Security Council, Report of the UN assessment mission, p. 2.

77 Ibid., p. 2; MOWCA and the IMO have tried since 2003 to increase cooperation / integration among regional coast guards (cf. Ali, Maritime Security Cooperation, pp. 303–305). However, implementation has stalled due to a lack of commitment by members states, and because cooperation has emerged on the level of transport ministries. Apparently, these have been less influential with regard to maritime security than their military counter parts.

78 Apparently, Nigeria has pushed the issue within the UNSC, supported by the US. Moreover, France, the UK, China, and Gabon have also shown a "robust interest", UN Security Council 2011, p. 14.

79 UN Security Council, Resolution 2018, p. 1.

80 Ibid., p. 2.

81 UN Security Council, Report of the UN assessment mission, pp. 16–17.

summit, to set up a joint coordinating centre for ECOWAS (following the ECCAS example), to coordinate with the AU, and to support existing IMO / MOWCA initiative.[82] The assessment report crucially fed into Resolution 2039, adopted by the UNSC on 29 February 2012.[83] In this resolution, the UNSC once more put its weight behind the call for a collaborative approach among states of ECCAS, ECOWAS, and the GGC, working towards a comprehensive regional anti-piracy strategy, in cooperation with the African Union (MOWCA is no longer mentioned at this point).[84] This call was later reiterated in November 2012, in a more general statement by the UNSC president.[85]

Completing the ECCAS / ECOWAS Initiative: Enter the GGC

The core group of individuals from ECCAS and ECOWAS that had been involved in the drafting of the key documents outlining the cooperation between the two organizations suddenly faced the UN taking on some leadership of the cooperation process in the Gulf of Guinea. This brought in more actors that so far had not been involved, thereby creating confusion and competition. ECOWAS and ECCAS insisted on the continuation of their ongoing efforts, in particular on maintaining the three key documents already developed, and eventually succeeded to prevail, and on having the UN pursue their approach.[86]

In the meantime, as hinted at above, disagreement had emerged at the political level, affecting the relations between ECOWAS and ECCAS and threatening the process. Leading up to the Yaoundé Summit, ECCAS staff started another round of drafting, adjusting the documents, without consulting their counterparts at ECOWAS. This led to intense last-minute negotiations and changes, just before the summit.[87] Nevertheless, in June 2013, the heads of state and government of ECCAS, ECOWAS, and the GGC adopted the Yaoundé Declaration, the heads of the three regional organizations signed the MoU, and the maritime or foreign affairs ministers of ECCAS, ECOWAS, and GGC member states signed the Code of Conduct.[88]

82 Ibid., pp. 17–19.

83 UN Security Council, Resolution 2039, p. 2.

84 Ibid., p. 3.

85 UN Security Council, Statement by the President of the Security Council, S/PRST/2012/24 (2012), https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_prst_2012_24.pdf (accessed 16 April 2019).

86 Interview with senior ECOWAS staff, Abuja 29 October 2018.

87 Ibid.

88 At the summit, 25 states were represented including thirteen heads of state; Cf. ECCAS, ECOWAS and GGC, Declaration of the Heads of State and Government; ECCAS, ECOWAS and GGC, Memorandum of Understanding among the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Gulf of Guinea Commission (GGC) on Maritime Safety and Security in Central and West Africa, 25 June 2013, http://cicyaounde.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/Yaound%C3%A9-MoU_EN.pdf (accessed 16 April 2019); ECCAS, ECOWAS, and GGC, Code of Conduct Concerning the Repression of Piracy, Armed Robbery Against Ships, and Illicit Maritime Activity in West and Central Africa, 25 June 2013, http://cicyaounde.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/CodeofConduct-EN.pdf (accessed 16 April 2019).

What is interesting at this point, are the roles played by the two existing regional organizations that already (try to) bridge the gap between Central and West Africa. Whereas the inclusion of MOWCA[89] seems intuitive, considering its pioneering maritime security work, the addition of the GGC[90] does not appear as straight forward, since it only comprises member states already included in ECCAS and ECOWAS,[91] and so far it has not been able to implement any of its declared objectives. Since the beginning, disputes between Nigeria and Cameroon (as well as Equatorial Guinea)[92] have hampered the creation and functioning of the GGC.[93] In addition, fear of domination held by smaller member states towards Nigeria and Angola has also negatively affected intra-regional collaboration.[94] Remarkably, against this backdrop, the GGC eventually joined the Yaoundé Process, whereas MOWCA refused to. While it appears that joining has been a matter of survival for the GGC, for MOWCA it might have meant a loss of relevance, as it was not clear how the new initiative would relate to its existing efforts.[95]

Implementing the (Inter-)regional Structure

In the wake of the emerging Yaoundé Process, ECOWAS has begun to set up a structure for West Africa, mirroring the one of ECCAS described above. In this line, ECOWAS decided to create three "zones", called E, F, and G (continuing the counting of the ECCAS zones). Each of these zones shall eventually have one multilateral maritime coordination centre (MMCC). The coordination of these three MMCCs, in turn, con-

89 For more information on MOWCA, see http://www.amssa.net/framework/MOWCA.aspx (accessed 5 December 2018).

90 For more information on the GGC, see https://cggrps.com/en/ (accessed 13 November 2018).

91 Pushed for by Gabon's president, then Omar Bongo, the GGC was founded in 2001 by Angola, Congo, Gabon, Nigeria, and Sao Tome and Principe, Equatorial Guinea joining soon after (cf. WikiLeaks, Gulf of Guinea Commission SecGen Ready to Assume Responsibilities (07Libreville49_a), 29 January 2007, Par. 2, 4, https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/07LIBREVILLE49_a.html). However, the founding treaty entered into force only in 2006 (after ratification, and deposit by two-thirds of the parties). Subsequently, Cameroon and the DRC joined the organization in 2008. More recently, several West African states have showed an interested or already joined the GGC (e.g. Ghana applied in 2013 and was accepted in 2015). To date, scientific analysis of the actual purpose and functioning of the GGC is still wanting.

92 Ali, Maritime Security Cooperation, p. 335.

93 WikiLeaks, Gulf of Guinea Commission.

94 Atonfack Guemo, La mutualisation des moyens, p. 139; ICG, The Gulf of Guinea, at 21. We need to understand the GGC as an ambiguous effort to bridge the gap between Central and West Africa: potential gains vs. threats. Ultimately, the GGC has remained paralysed by mutual suspicions and seeming disinterest even by its founding states, despite more recent efforts to revive the organization (cf. A. Ebo'o, Can the Gulf of Guinea Commission step up to maritime threats? Enact Observers, 22 March 2018, https://enactafrica.org/enact-observer/can-the-gulf-of-guinea-commission-step-up-to-maritime-threats (accessed 12 November 2018); C. Udeh and O.H. Obaze, Imperatives of Nigeria's Leadership in the Gulf of Guinea By Chiagozie Udeh And Oseloka H. Obaze, Sahara Reporters, 16 May 2018, http://saharareporters.com/2018/05/16/imperatives-nigeria%E2%80%99s-leadership-gulf-guinea-chiagozie-udeh-and-oseloka-h-obaze (accessed 11 December 2018). The overlap with SADC membership (i.e. Angola and the DRC), so far, has been completely ignored (for very limited info see E.A. Penha, Angola's Geopolitical Dilemma: Between the African „Heartland" and the South Atlantic, in: Tensões Mundiais 12 (2016) 22, pp. 177–202). In maritime security literature on SADC, Angola is hardly mentioned; South Africa dominates, see M. Blaine and J. Sinovich, Ensuring the SADC Maritime Interest through Good Order at Sea, in: F. Vreÿ and T. Mandrup (eds.), Towards Good Order at Sea: African Experiences, Stellenbosch 2015, pp. 207–287.

95 Cf. interview with senior ECOWAS staff, Abuja, 23 February 2017.

stitutes the objective of a Regional Center for Maritime Security in West Africa (French: CRESMAO).[96] Upon full operationalization, CRESMAO will become the counterpart of CRESMAC, both of which are supposed to operate under the Inter-regional Coordination Centre (ICC) in Yaoundé.

Several considerations have been important in the delimitation of the ECOWAS zones. For Zone E, the existing interaction and cooperation between Benin and Nigeria has become the core, which was then complemented by Togo and Niger (as landlocked country). The MMCC for Zone E has taken up operations in Cotonou. Concerns about competition between Nigeria and Ghana led the technical staff to include Ghana in Zone F as the lead state and Accra as the seat of the zone's MMCC.[97] Thus, it was grouped together with the states of the Mano River Union (Guinea, Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Côte d'Ivoire), three of which were post-conflict states and Côte d'Ivoire being under a UN arms embargo. Burkina-Faso joined the group as the only landlocked country. Consequently, Zone G comprises Senegal, Gambia, Guinea-Bissau (the "Senegambia" area), Cabo Verde, and Mali (landlocked). Praia in Cabo Verde will become the seat of the MMCC of Zone G.[98]

This delimitation of the ECOWAS zone presents us with an interesting case of space-making and ordering within the ECOWAS region, as it is at the same time based on existing spatial imaginations and regional bodies, as well as on very practical considerations regarding state capacities. Moreover, the decision to include landlocked countries reflects new thinking (e.g. not yet reflected in ECCAS) that sees security "at sea" and "on land" as intimately connected, and threats as transnational (i.e. not stopping at borders).[99]

Currently, the maritime zones and centres in West and Central Africa are at very different stages of implementation and operationalization. As mentioned above, within ECCAS, the pilot zone (Zone D) is the only one that is currently operational. The status of Zone A is still unclear.[100] At the regional level, CRESMAC has taken up its operations in October 2014.[101] Within ECOWAS, Zone E has been chosen as the pilot zone, and at the time of writing, it was the only one fully operational, meaning that it has been fully equipped and staffed. Zones F and G both have signed headquarter agreements with the host countries (Ghana and Cabo Verde) and are in the process of staff pledging. Ghana has provided interim staff for the MMCC in Accra. Full operationalization of Zones F and G is expected for 2019. The same goes for CRESMAO, which is currently set up in

96 ECOWAS, ECOWAS Integrated Maritime Strategy (EIMS), Draft, para. 84–87, http://www.edup.ecowas.int/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/ECOWAS-INTEGRATED-MARITIME-STRATEGY-.docx (accessed 16 April 2019)/ or ECOWAS, Strategie Maritime Integree (SMI) De La CEDEAO, Yamoussoukro, 29 March 2014, para. 84–87, http://cicyaounde.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/ECOWASstrategy_FR.pdf (accessed 16 April 2019).

97 Interview with senior ECOWAS staff, Abuja, 23 February 2017.

98 Ibid. See also ECOWAS Integrated Maritime Strategy, Par. 84.

99 Interview with ECOWAS staff, Abuja, 26 October 2018; interview with AU staff, Addis Ababa, 26 September 2018.

100 The MMCC of Zone A will be hosted by Angola, but it appears that there is still no hosting agreement and no specific location assigned (cf. http://cresmacpointenoire.org/?lang=en, accessed 11 December 2018).

101 ULR: http://cresmacpointenoire.org/?lang=en (accessed: 11 December 2018).

Abidjan.[102] The ICC in Yaoundé itself, as mentioned in the introduction, became fully operational in February 2017, after tumultuous years and varying implementation efforts since its initial inauguration in September 2014.[103]

In this way, despite delays in implementation, regional and inter-regional interaction, coordination and cooperation has increased, thereby contributing to the construction of regional and inter-regional space(s), both at sea and on land. More recently, this has been visible in coordination and cooperation efforts by ECOWAS and ECCAS moving beyond (and to some extent away from) maritime security.[104] At the same time, commission staff continues working towards increasing awareness of maritime security issues and related regional policies, trying to create more expertise and capacity within the involved organizations. Moreover, efforts are underway aiming to make the Yaoundé Code of Conduct binding on member states.[105]

However, despite these achievements, challenges continue to hamper implementation, putting the high hopes for the Yaoundé Process into question. Especially the ICC has suffered from a lack of buy in by ECOWAS and ECCAS member states. Until recently, this has resulted in a lack of support and resources. Moreover, a corruption scandal involving the head of Cameroon's Navy (diverting some FCFA 300 million) has challenged the viability of the ICC, which has put off donors.[106] Nevertheless, the UNSC (and others, e.g. the IMO), led by African members with the support from the Security Council's Permant 5 member states, has continued to push for full implementation.[107]

102 Interview with ECOWAS staff, Abuja, 26 October 2018.

103 Despite its official inauguration in September 2014 (staffed ad interim), it has been only with the assumption of office of the first round of statutory appointees and the adoption of a four-year work programme (2017–2020) that the decision taken at the Yaoundé Summit in June 2013 came to full fruition, ULR: http://cicyaounde.org/ (accessed: 14 December 2018).

104 ECOWAS, and ECCAS, Final Communiqué: Joint Summit of ECOWAS and ECCAS Heads of State and Government on Peace, Security, Stability and the Fight against Terrorism and Violent Extremism, 30 July 2018, http://www.ecowas.int/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/Final-communiqu%C3%A9-ECOWAS-ECCAS-Joint-Summit-in-Lome.doc (accessed 16 April 2019).

105 Interview with ECOWAS staff, Abuja, 26 October 2018.

106 E.g. CamerounWeb, 310 millions détournés au ministère de la Défense, 10 December 2015, https://www.camerounweb.com/CameroonHomePage/NewsArchive/310-millions-détournés-au-ministère-de-la-Défense-347956 (accessed: 14 December 2018).

107 UN Security Council, Statement by the President of the Security Council, S/PRST/2016/4; What's in Blue, Open Debate and Presidential Statement on Gulf of Guinea Piracy, 22 April 2016, https://www.whatsinblue.org/2016/04/open-debate-and-presidential-statement-on-gulf-of-guinea-piracy.php (accessed 11 December 2018); What's in Blue, Maritime Crime as a Threat to International Peace and Security: Arria-formula Meeting, 12 June 2018, https://www.whatsinblue.org/2018/06/maritime-crime-as-a-threat-to-international-peace-and-security-arria-formula-meeting.php (accessed 11 December 2018). However, maritime security has not been and continues not to be strong within the UN Secretariat, showing little political dynamic and hardly any technical expertise or responsibility. In contrast, the regional offices in West Africa (UNOWAS) and Central Africa (UNOCA) have been more involved (Personal communication with UN Secretariat staff, 28 November and 4 December 2018).

Beyond Yaoundé and beyond Africa

If we understand the Yaoundé Process as a joint effort to coordinate and bring together different actors and initiatives across regional boundaries, the question arises why to stop at an extended definition of the Gulf of Guinea (covering the entire coastline from Senegal down to Angola)? How does the cooperation and integration process of Yaoundé relate to other initiatives around the African continent and beyond? Therefore, this section very briefly embeds the West and Central African initiative in larger continental and international / global efforts aiming at maritime security and ordering sea space.

The African Union as a Critical Link?

At the continental level within the African Union, maritime security became an issue around 2008/09 as well, triggered by increased numbers of piracy incidents around the continent. Then, the AU Commission (AUC) took up the issue, convincing member states of the need for a common strategic approach. Based on a commissioned paper (undertaken by the Brenthurst Foundation collaborating with the African Center for Strategic Studies), the AU Assembly subsequently tasked the AUC in August 2009 to develop a comprehensive strategic document. This would eventually become the AU's Integrated Maritime Strategy (AIMS) 2050, adopted in January 2014 along with a Strategic Plan of Action.[108] The AIMS 2050, however, embeds maritime security within a more general concern about managing the maritime domain, effectively prioritizing economic over security issues.[109] Moreover, only one year after its adoption, Togo began to push for the drafting and eventually the adoption of what came to be the African Charter on Maritime Security and Safety and Development in Africa (that is to say, the Lomé Charter). However, similar to AIMS 2050, the charter only includes "security" (in the more conventional sense) as one issue among many.[110] What is more ongoing negotiations among member states seem to indicate a prioritizing of economic issues, with maritime security cooperation, once more, falling by the wayside.[111]

108 Engel, The African Union; J. Potgieter and T. Walker, The 2050 African Integrated Maritime Strategy (AIMS): Content and Progress, in: F. Vreÿ and T. Mandrup, Towards Good Order at Sea: African Experiences, Stellenbosch 2015, pp. 97–113, at 102. For more details on the origins and drafting process of the AIMS 2050 as well as the role of consultants therein, see Engel, The African Union; Potgieter and Walker, The 2050 African Integrated Maritime Strategy, p. 103.

109 Engel, The African Union. This is also reflected in the AUC's main point person for maritime (security) affairs moving from the PSD to the Office of the Deputy Chairperson. Later, the AIMS portfolio was attached to the Office of the Chairperson, where it now resides with the Legal Counsel (and the STC on Legal Affairs) (cf. interview with AU staff, Addis Ababa, 19 September 2018).

110 African Union, African Charter on Maritime Security and Safety and Development in Africa, 15 October 2016, https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/33128-treaty-0060_-_lome_charter_e.pdf (accessed 16 April 2019).

111 Most clearly, this is visible in the drafting of the so-called Annexes of the Lomé Charter, which are supposed to provide the legal framework to the otherwise "technical" charter (cf. interview with UNODC staff, Dakar, 25 April 2017; interview with AU staff, Addis Ababa, 19 September 2018). Initially, AU PSD staff was tasked to draft an Annex on maritime security but is no longer required to do so, apparently because member states do not want to touch the issue. Overall, the entire process appears to be stuck, due to a lack of maritime expertise at the AU's Legal Counsel, and because of political difficulties surrounding the Annexes in general (cf. interview with AU staff, Addis Ababa, 19 September 2018; interview with AU staff, Addis Ababa 24 September 2018).

While the RECs have been involved in the drafting process of AIMS 2050 and the Lomé Charter, most of them have not been very active. Although ECOWAS, the Southern African Development Community (SADC), and especially the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) have been among those more involved, overall, coordination between the AU and the RECs has been limited. Thus, the challenge remains to integrate the many different, parallel initiatives and processes taking shape around the continent. In principle, the AU has demonstrated its aspiration to guide and lead on the issue.[112] However, despite the proclaimed strategic importance of maritime security, and many claims to the contrary,[113] the AUC and AU member states still only pay limited attention to maritime issues, as land-based conflicts continue to eclipse them.[114]
In the meantime, despite the absence of clear political guidance on maritime security, (individual) staff at the AU Commission has continued efforts to assume at least some leadership and assist RECs. Thus, they have tried to position the AU somehow as an intermediary between different actors and processes, continuously travelling the continent and talking about the need for coordination. At the AU Commission, they are in the process of setting up an information centre on maritime security within the Peace and Security Department (PSD), which is supposed to provide information about ongoing efforts around the continent, working towards interoperability and to monitor the security situation in African waters.[115] Although the RECs will continue to pursue their own agendas, the AUC receives reports and tries to coordinate activities. While such a view is shared for example by staff at the ECOWAS Commission, it is also apparent that the ambition of the AU is yet to be realized. In the Yaoundé Process, the AU has tried to position itself at its centre.[116] However, to date this has been mainly rhetorical, with little or no actual contribution. In fact, some have criticized recent AU efforts (that is to say, the Lomé Charter) as competing with the Yaoundé Process.[117]

The Yaoundé Process as Part of Larger Maritime Security Agendas and Spaces

Although this article has focused on the agency of African actors (both states and regional organizations) and their efforts to re-spatialize their action around transregional conflict in the Gulf of Guinea, neither the build-up to the Yaoundé Summit nor the (limited) implementation of the Yaoundé Process thereafter would have been possible without support from the "outside". Most importantly, the US and France, as well as other European countries (e.g. Germany, Spain and Portugal), China, and Brazil, together with

112 African Union, Summit of Heads of State and Government on Maritime Safety and Security in the Gulf of Guinea, 24–25 June 2013, https://au.int/en/newsevents/20130624 (accessed 11 December 2018); see also Potgieter and Walker, The 2050 African Integrated Maritime Strategy, pp. 105–106.
113 Vreÿ, Good Order at Sea Off West Africa, pp. 183–184.
114 Interview with ECOWAS staff, Abuja, 26 October 2018; Interview with AU staff, Addis Ababa, 26 September 2018.
115 Interview with AU staff, Addis Ababa, 26 September 2018. The centre is supposed to collaborate with the AU Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), using some of its tools.
116 African Union, Summit of Heads of State and Government.
117 Interview with senior ECOWAS staff, Abuja, 29 October 2018.

regional and international organizations (e.g. the EU, the IMO, and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime [UNODC]) have played critical roles, providing technical guidance and material support.[118]

This involvement powerfully drives home the key importance of "external" actors in processes of (re-)spatialization, that is to say the (re-)construction and (re-)ordering of space(s) in and beyond the Gulf of Guinea. In that regard, their role and spatializing effects have been twofold. First, their interventions and support provided, on the one hand, has aimed to strengthen established spatial formats, that is to say nation-states (bordering the Gulf of Guinea) and regions (in particular those organized through ECCAS, ECOWAS, the GGC, and MOWCA). On the other hand, they have contributed to constructing the inter-regional platform, and potential new region linked to the Yaoundé Process.

Second, in the attempt to support maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea, more or less directly attached to the Yaoundé Process, regional and international actors have also created new, innovative forms of coordination and cooperation. For Somalia, Bueger and Edmunds have described the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS) as "a process-driven, informal organization that work[s] on principles of inclusivity rather than representation", instead of rule enforcement focusing "on problem solving and policy learning".[119] The outcome of these processes may be new communities ("communities of practice" as Bueger has conceptualized them elsewhere),[120] bringing together a vast array of actors, some of which may even be antagonistic.[121]

For the Gulf of Guinea, such a flexible, process-driven approach has manifested in the G7++ Friends of the Gulf of Guinea (G7++ FOGG). This grouping, extends cooperation beyond West and Central African states, as well as ECCAS, ECOWAS, and the GGC while including Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the UK, and the US (the G7) as well as Australia, Belgium, South Korea, Denmark, Norway, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and Switzerland (++). The main objectives of the G7++FOGG are to share information, coordinate efforts, and increase consistency in their "political messaging".[122] Facilitated by regular meetings of the group as well as an online coordination and communication platform, this group has started to contribute to the emergence of a community of practice with the potential of creating a (new) transregional space centreing on the Gulf of Guinea but reaching far beyond West and Central Africa.

118 Ali, Maritime Security Cooperation, p. 359; ICG, The Gulf of Guinea, pp. 21–23; Jacobsen and Nordby, Maritime Security in the Gulf of Guinea, p. 40; Ukeje and Mvomo Ela, African approaches to maritime security, p. 25; Vreÿ, Good Order at Sea Off West Africa, p. 198.

119 Bueger and Edmunds, Beyond seablindness, p. 1304.

120 Bueger, Communities of Security Practice at Work.

121 Ibid.

122 M. Massoni, The G7++ Friends of the Gulf of Guinea Rome Declaration, in: Osservatorio Strategico (2017) 4, pp. 25–33, https://www.difesa.it/SMD_/CASD/IM/CeMiSS/DocumentiVis/OS_Pubb_File_Singoli_per_Area/Sahel_e_Africa_SubSahariana/2017/05_Massoni_OS_04_2017_ENG.pdf (accessed 16 April 2019); Ukeje and Mvomo Ela, African approaches to maritime security, pp. 27–28.

7. Conclusion

Taking a closer look at the developments leading up to and emerging from the Yaoundé Summit in June 2013, the article has described the Yaoundé Process as a process of re-spatialization around transregional conflict in the Gulf of Guinea. It has argued that member states and secretariat staff of ECCAS and ECOWAS as well as "outside" actors, such as the US, France, and the EU, have sought to (re-)construct – format and order – regional space(s) at sea. Responding to piracy and maritime insecurity more largely, spreading from Nigerian waters not only across state but also across regional boundaries, they have both tried to stabilize existing spatial formats such as the nation-state and the region, while enhancing inter-regional coordination and cooperation. It is the latter that this article has focused on in particular, showing how ECCAS and ECOWAS (and to a much lesser extent the GGC) have interacted and, at the same time, habe worked towards organizing their own respective regional spaces "at sea", thereby constructing a new inter-regional space and ordering relations among them. Through the involvement of "outside" actors, the Yaoundé Process has also related to larger efforts to regionalize and order sea space.

With a strong emphasis on flexibility and inclusivity, allowinging confidence to be established among otherwise unlikely partners, the character of process of the developments described in this article reflects more general developments around the African continent (and beyond?). Similar dynamics can be observed, for example, around the Nouakchott Process and the Djibouti Process. Studying these and similar phenomena will further contribute to a better understanding of the diverse and complex (multi-actor and multi-dimensional) processes of (re-)spatialization around (transregional) conflict in and beyond Africa.

Transregional Conflict Crossing the Red Sea: The Horn of Africa

Dawit Yohannes / Fana Gebresenbet

ABSTRACTS

In diesem Beitrag werden die Sicherheitsinterdependenzen und Freund-Feind-Muster zwischen den Akteuren am Horn und am Golf diskutiert, um einige der besonders komplexen Konflikte am Horn von Afrika zu erklären. Der Einfluss der Golfstaaten auf die Konfliktdynamik am Horn steigt wieder und wird immer wichtiger. Dieser Einfluss ist nicht nur einseitig. Akteure am Horn treten zunehmend in der Rivalität am Golf auf. Einige Golfstaaten, vor allem Saudi-Arabien und die Emirate, zielen darauf ab, den Einfluss des Iran, der Türkei und Katars in der Region einzudämmen. Dies wird anhand von drei Fallbeispielen veranschaulicht: Die Sicherheit des Roten Meeres, die Intervention der Golfstaaten in die Konfliktdynamik in Somalia und der Golffaktor bei der jüngsten Annäherung zwischen Äthiopien und Eritrea. Diese Fälle und zusätzlich die zunehmenden militärischen, diplomatischen und wirtschaftlichen Interventionen der Golfstaaten am Horn deuten darauf hin, dass beide Regionen enger zusammenrücken. Was wir also haben, ist eine aufkommende Sicherheitsinterdependenz, die durch ein sich zunehmend verfestigendes Muster von Freundschaft / Feindschaft gekennzeichnet ist. Da dies zwei Regionen umfasst, ist ein Regulierungssystem vermittels einer kooperativen Plattform erforderlich, die Staaten und Organisationen der aufstrebenden Region zusammenbringt.

This contribution argues security interdependence and patterns of amity / enmity between Horn and Gulf actors help in explaining some of the peculiarly complex conflicts in the Horn of Africa. Gulf influence on conflict dynamics in the Horn is resurging, and is becoming more consequential. The influence is not merely unidirectional. Actors in the Horn are increasingly featuring in the Gulf's own rivalry. Some Gulf countries, primarily Saudi Arabia and the Emirates, aim to curb the influence of Iran, Turkey and Qatar in the region. This is illustrated using three case studies: the Red Sea's maritime security; Gulf intervention in conflict dynamics in Somalia, and the Gulf 'factor' in the recent Ethio-Eritrea rapprochement. These cases, on top of the Gulf's increasing military, diplomatic and economic interventions in the Horn, indicate that the two regions are being knit tightly closer. What we have thus is an emergent security interdepen-

Comparativ | Zeitschrift für Globalgeschichte und vergleichende Gesellschaftsforschung 28 (2018) Heft 6, S. 90–108.

dence marked by an increasingly solidifying pattern of amity/enmity. As this straddles two regions, it calls for a regulatory scheme through a cooperative platform that brings together states and organizations representing the emerging region.

1. Introduction

In his most recent foray into understanding politics and statehood, *The Horn of Africa: State Formation and Decay*, the British scholar Christopher Clapham attempts to get to the roots of the undergirding factors explaining the peculiarity of the region from the rest of Africa. The Horn has experienced more inter-state and intra-state conflict and the only two successful secessions on the continent. Clapham,[1] bordering on ecological determinism, found the reason in the Horn's political geography, mainly Ethiopia's high plateaus and their affordances for creation and sustenance of a strong state.

Many also take the Horn as the "most conflict-ridden region in the world"[2] and attribute its predicament to internal regional dynamics of enmity, subversion, and (rapidly shifting) alliances and counter-alliances.[3] In terms of understanding actors and processes shaping the security dynamics in the Horn, Berouk Mesfin[4] went the farthest from these group of authors by stressing that the London School of Economics International Relations emeritus professor Barry Buzan's[5] regional security complex (RSC) is a "conceptual framework [… that] fits the Horn of Africa like a glove",[6] after analysing regional amity and enmity dynamics over more than half a century.

We argue that currently available explanations do not sufficiently account for "extra-regional" factors and processes, mainly from across the Red Sea. We complement this effort with what others consider as "spillover" of political, economic, and security considerations from the Gulf.[7] Rather, we take the presence of Gulf countries as an inherent feature of conflict and security dynamics in the Horn of Africa. From an analytical point of view, consideration of Gulf actors as external to the Horn security dynamics could mainly be attributed to the conceptualization of space as "container" and "medium" of

1 C. Clapham, The Horn of Africa. State Formation and Decay, London 2017.

2 D. Shinn, Horn of Africa: priorities and recommendations. Testimony to the Subcommittee on State and Foreign Operations, Washington DC 2009, at 1, quoted in: B. Mesfin, The Horn of Africa security complex, in: R. Sharamo and B. Mesfin (eds.), Regional Security in the post-Cold War Horn of Africa (ISS Monograph 178) (2011), pp. 1–29, at 4.

3 S. Healy, Lost opportunities in the Horn of Africa: How Conflicts Connect and Peace Agreements Unravel, Horn of Africa Group Report (2008); B. Mesfin, The Horn of Africa security complex, in: R. Sharamo and B. Mesfin (eds.), Regional Security in the post-Cold War Horn of Africa, ISS Monograph 178 (2011), pp. 1–29; R. Sharamo and B. Mesfin (eds.), Regional Security in the post-Cold War Horn of Africa, ISS Monograph 178 (2011).

4 Mesfin, The Horn of Africa security complex.

5 B. Buzan, People, States & Fear. An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era, London 1991.

6 Mesfin, The Horn of Africa security complex, p. 23.

7 See J. Meester, W. van den Berg and H. Verhoeven, Riyal Politik: The political economy of Gulf investments in the Horn of Africa, CRU Report (April 2018), https://www.clingendael.org/sites/default/files/2018-04/riyal-politik.pdf (accessed 23 January 2019).

socio-economic and political relations.[8] This limitation has led to bounding RSCs predominantly with geographical features, for example the Sahara, as dividing sub-Saharan Africa from North Africa, and the Red Sea, as a dividing line between the Horn and the Gulf. As such, the RSC in the Horn of Africa was conceptualized as analytically and empirically different from security and conflict dynamics across the Red Sea, which at its farthest point is not more than 355 km wide.

We depart from this perspective by adopting a constructivist understanding of space,[9] viewing regions (and RSCs) as products of regionalizing logics of conflict and security dynamics.[10] Following a transregional perspective to understand contemporary conflicts in and around the African continent, we argue that the Horn's own "patches" of transregional conflicts are being shaped and defined by dynamics across the Horn as much as by what is conventionally determined as intra-regional dynamics.

Our alternative conception is based on an expanded version of the RSC, which is essentially rooted in the assumption that "all the states in a system are enmeshed in a global web of security interdependence".[11] Following the same assumption, the analytical category of transregional conflicts that we apply in this article introduces a transregional perspective to understand security interdependence between the Horn and the Gulf. Buzan's revised conception defines RSC as "a set of units whose major processes of securitization, desecuritization, or both, are so interlinked that their security problems cannot reasonably be analysed or resolved apart from one another".[12] In this article, we sketch similar processes of interdependent security dynamics on the two sides of the Red Sea.

The article is structured as follows. Following this introduction, we present three cases to illustrate the security relationship that links conflicts in the Gulf to the Horn as they unfold. Next, we briefly sketch the contours and dimensions of transregional conflict in the Horn of Africa, based on transregional security interdependence with the Gulf. This section also shows that alliances are being continuously made and broken, enmeshing states in the two regions in broad patterns of amity and enmity similar to the regional security complexes conceptualized by Buzan and colleagues. The last section concludes the article and highlights some policy implications.

2. The Gulf in the Horn: Understanding Transregional Security Dynamics

This section presents three case studies to highlight that security dynamics in the Horn of Africa are inextricably connected to interests and influences coming from the Gulf. As the cases demonstrate, this interdependence has been growing and patterns of amity /

8 J. Agnew, The territorial trap: the geographical assumptions of international relations theory, in: Review of International Political Economy 1 (1994) 1, pp. 53–80.

9 Ibid.

10 See Engel's introduction, this volume.

11 B. Buzan and O. Wæver, Regions and Power. The Structure of International Security, Cambridge 2003, p. 141.

12 B. Buzan, O. Wæver and J. de Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis, Boulder CO 1998, p. 201.

enmity have been shifting over the past decade. The cases focus on three different issue areas: on maritime security of the Red Sea, on stabilization and rebuilding Somalia, and on the most recent rapprochement between Ethiopia and Eritrea.

(In)Security of the Red Sea

Arguably one of the most poignant indicators of the emergence of a transregional security complex between the Horn and the Gulf is the issue of maritime security of the Red Sea. Maritime security of the region is underpinned by the strategic significance of the Red Sea passage shared by the Horn and the Gulf and further amplified by the agency of actors on both sides to impact security dynamics along the sea lanes and the littoral areas. The Red Sea is a vital gateway for international commerce almost hosting "all of the seaborne trade between Europe and Asia to the tune of $700 Billion every year"[13] and more than ten per cent of world trade.[14] Along the Red Sea, the Bab-el-Mandeb is the most strategic point that connects the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden between Yemen and Djibouti. As such, control of this narrow strait is tantamount to choking the trade route along the Red Sea passing to the Indian Ocean and beyond. In addition to the global implications, the immediate threat of such an event will affect the oil exporting Gulf countries.

Various states have vested interests in the stability of the Red Sea and the trade route that extends southward. The Suez Canal has always been an object of great powers' interest. In 1882, Britain had launched a military attack on Egypt for defaulting on its debt accrued in the process of constructing the canal. The attack on Egypt by Israel, the United Kingdom and France during the second Arab-Israeli war, in 1956, is another stark historical reminder of great power's interest that had extended throughout the Cold War period. The end of the Cold War with the attendant decline of interest and presence of the United States in the region and the increasing bifurcation of the international order had paved the way for competition among a plethora of new players, not least between aspiring regional players such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Iran as well as involving emerging global players, notably China and Turkey. The ensuing rivalry is in part responsible for the ironical accolade the Red Sea arena has received as being "increasingly fractious".[15]

For Egypt, maritime security of the Red Sea is vital as "any disruption to shipping through the Bab-el-Mandeb would immediately impact traffic to the Suez Canal, which is one of Egypt's most important sources of revenue".[16] The country is currently embark-

13 A. De Waal, New Challenges for the Horn of Africa, in: Discourse 1 (2017) 1, pp. 22–25, at 23.

14 F. al Rasheed, Red Sea – artery of global trade, in: Arab News, 12 February 2018, http://www.arabnews.com/columns/news/879221 (accessed 23 January 2019).

15 A. De Waal, Beyond the Red Sea: A new driving force in the politics of the Horn, in: African Arguments, 11 July 2018, https://africanarguments.org/2018/07/11/beyond-red-sea-new-driving-force-politics-horn-africa (accessed 23 January 2019).

16 T. Von Lossow and S. Roll, Egypt's Nile Water Policy under Sisi Security Interests Promote Rapprochement with Ethiopia: Security Interests Promote Rapprochement with Ethiopia, SWP Comments 11 (2015), p. 3, https://

ing on a massive expansion of the Suez Canal aiming to increase its annual revenue. It is therefore not surprising if Egypt gets increasingly wary of developments in the region, such as the civil war in Yemen, lest the conflict would have repercussions on shipping lanes along the Red Sea, due to militant Islamists assuming power and entrenching the Iranian influence in the area.[17] Egypt is responding to growing threats in the Middle East and the Red Sea pathways by expanding its navy, which recently included the formation of Southern Fleet Command, tasked with ensuring the safety and stability of maritime traffic at Bab Al-Mandeb and navigation through the Suez Canal.[18]

Likewise, Saudi Arabia has been reliant on the Red Sea for exporting oil, which is behind the country's much touted wealth. From the perspective of maritime security, Saudi Arabia's principal fear stems from Iran and the possibility that – because of the stiff competition between Sunni and Shia denominations of Islam – it might interrupt the shipment of oil through the Straits of Hormuz to Saudi Arabia's east.[19] Saudi Arabia is therefore constructing pipelines and oil refineries along the Red Sea coast, therefore needing security at both ends of the Red Sea.[20] The UAE similarly shares a concern of expanding Iranian influence in the region lest it would not infringe its strategic economic interest in the Red Sea. Iran, which is competing for regional hegemony with Saudi Arabia, is naturally on the opposite side of the "aisle" and is a reference point against which the Saudis and the Emiratis calibrate the different facets of their interests in the region (i.e. culturally, economically, politically, and military).

In addition to these Middle Eastern countries, some of the coastal countries in the Horn have been benefitting from the trade and commercial activity in the Red Sea area. Of late, Sudan, Eritrea, Djibouti, and Somaliland raised their stakes by leasing military and naval bases along their coasts to external powers and by hosting massive port expansion projects, which were considered a welcome addition to their local economies.

From the perspective of maritime security, the Red Sea is increasingly confronted by multifaceted threats, in part as a result of the exportation of regional rivalry in the Gulf and in part due to the instability arising from the coastal countries on both sides. Militarization and securitization of the Red Sea is the net effect of such regional rivalry, manifested with a spike in military and naval bases along the African coast, which lately included landlocked Ethiopia's ambition of (re-)establishing a navy after nearly three decades. The above context is more or less emblematic of a "traditional conception of

www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/comments/2015C11_lsw_rll.pdf (accessed 23 January 2019).

17 Ibid.

18 World Tribune, Egypt expands navy with formation of Southern Fleet Command, 15 January 2017, https://www.worldtribune.com/egypt-expands-navy-with-formation-of-southern-fleet-command/ (accessed 23 January 2019).

19 De Waal, Beyond the Red Sea.

20 S. Oneko, East Africa: Arab Gulf States in the Horn of Africa – What Role Do They Play?, Deutsche Welle, 23 September 2018, https://www.dw.com/en/arab-gulf-states-in-the-horn-of-africa-what-role-do-they-play/a-45602930 (accessed 23 January 2019).

maritime security that is linked inextricably to the projection of naval-military power over the sea".[21]

Other sources of maritime insecurity of the Red Sea area, in part due to the instability of coastal countries in the Horn, broadly encompass

> [the] *illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing, dumping of chemical and toxic waste in the waters off the Somali coast, illegal migration and human trafficking over Somali waters and the Gulf of Aden and the illegal trade or trafficking in small arms and light weapons* [and] *piracy*.[22]

More importantly, piracy has emerged as conventionally the most glaring manifestation of maritime insecurity in the region.[23] At the peak of the crisis of what came to be known as the Somalia piracy saga around 2011/12, piracy as a notable maritime security threat had warranted and drawn unprecedented and coordinated response from a wide array of international actors, including the US, EU, China, Japan, and others.

Of late, Yemen (which constitutes the northern shore of the strategic Bab-el-Mandeb) has become the space where this regional rivalry is unfolding in its various forms with evident adverse consequences on the maritime security of the Red Sea. Leaving the details of the crisis aside, the implications of the war in Yemen, which involves states on both sides of the Red Sea divide, has added to existing concerns of maritime security. These include collateral damage and alleged deliberate targeting of ships using anti-ship missiles, sea mines, and Water-borne Improvised Explosive Devices.[24]

In essence, as Gulf states jostle among themselves for having strategic control over the Red Sea and ensuring their maritime security, their footprints are directly impacting the conflict complex in the Horn. In some cases, the Gulf countries' presence augmented the strategic relevance of countries, such as Sudan and Eritrea, enabling them to better withstand international pressure in the past. As will be discussed in the next section, the UAE's concerns for maritime security and the ensuing expansion of ports in Somaliland buttressed the latter's quest for international recognition, though exacerbating its tense relation with Somalia. In the case of Eritrea, and combined with the reform policies in Ethiopia under Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed since 2018, it almost helped ending Asmara's predicament as a pariah state in the face of United Nation Security Council sanctions.[25]

21 F. Demessie, Regional Approaches to Maritime Security in the Horn of Africa, FES Peace and Security Series 16 (2014), p. 11, http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/aethiopien/10880.pdf (accessed 23 January 2019).

22 Ibid.

23 Ibid.

24 IMO (International Maritime Organisation), Interim Guidance on Maritime Security in the Southern Red Sea and Bab al-Mandeb (2018), http://www.imo.org/en/OurWork/Security/Documents/Maritime%20Security%20in%20The%20Southern%20Red%20Sea%20and%20Bab%20al-Mandeb.pdf (accessed 23 January 2019).

25 Key informant interview, Horn expert, Addis Ababa, 11 January 2019.

Gulf Countries in Somalia: Impacting the Horn's Protracted Conflict

Somalia's lingering conflict is another microcosm to analyse the revived trend of growing security interdependence between the Horn of African and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). Different forms of entanglements between Somalia and the Gulf countries are underpinned by geographic contiguity and cultural affinity and most importantly by spillovers from the Gulf's own geopolitical rivalry and protection of emerging economic interests in the Red Sea. Conversely, spillovers from Somalia's protracted fragility impacts on the Gulf's security through, for example, inability to control its land and maritime territory. This leads to arms flow, human trafficking and unfettered presence of violent extremist groups/terrorists.

Arab power has always considered Somalia as part of the Muslim *umma* (community) and view Somalia's strategic location as crucial for protecting the "Arab homeland" and *al-amn al qawmi al-Arabi* (Arab national security).[26] Historically, Islam as a religion has bound the two sides together. With a rise in Salafist version of Islam, some of the GCC countries had been increasingly wary of the Muslim Brotherhood's possible rise to power in Somalia.[27] Somalia has also been at the centre of the Gulf's recurrent internal rivalry even long before the outbreak of the current standoff between the Saudi / UAE bloc, on the one hand, and Qatar, on the other. At the close of the 20th century, Somalia sided with Saudi Arabia and its allies during the first Gulf war and used its ports for US-led coalition forces.[28] As with other countries in the Horn, Somalia therefore became an extension of the geopolitical rivalry among the Gulf countries, which was pitting Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, backed by the US allied coalition against Iraq. Perhaps as a possible remake of another round of exportation of the Gulf's geopolitical rivalry, Somalia has continued to be courted by competing Gulf countries in the 21st century: this time around, the rivalry shifting first between Saudi Arabia and Iran and of late expanded to include Qatar and Turkey.

In the early 2000s, the Gulf countries were also part of the stop-and-go process of rebuilding the Somalian state in the midst of the civil war that unfolded after the fall of Mohamed Siad Barre in 1991. Recently, the Gulf states' engagement in Somalia's volatile political and security dynamics have percolated into various forms reflecting a shifting interest in the Horn of African country. From the perspective of peacemaking in Somalia, Qatar, albeit with limited success, in 2007 attempted to reconcile the Islamic Court Union and the Somali government and also tried to mediate different Somali factions.[29] The UAE had trained regional and national security forces, including Puntland's anti-piracy maritime force. Similarly, Saudi Arabia had pledged to offer training to Somalia

26 A. Rashid, A Dangerous Gulf in the Horn: How the Inter-Arab Crisis is Fuelling Regional Tensions, ICG Commentary, 3 August 2017, https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/gulf-and-arabian-peninsula/dangerous-gulf-horn-how-inter-arab-crisis-fuelling-regional-tensions (accessed 14 April 2019).

27 M. Mehari Tadele, The UAE and its Relations with the HoA, in: Discourse 1 (2017) 1, pp. 36–49.

28 Ibid.

29 D. Shinn, Horn of Africa and the Gulf States, in: Discourse 1 (2017) 1, pp. 25–35.

as part of Islamic Military Counterterrorism Coalition.[30] Among other diverse engagements, Turkey was also involved in the construction of military encampment facilities for the Somalia National Security Forces.

The Gulf countries' engagement in Somalia is indeed multifaceted and it has been driven by a number of imperatives. For the major part, the Gulf countries have "jockeyed for influence in a country of enormous strategic value, given its proximity to the Gulf, centrality to Red Sea security and string of ports with vantages on key shipping routes".[31] These long-standing strategic economic and security interests were further amplified by a newly emerging shared interest to fight violent extremist groups, in this case, fighting al-Shabaab and other Islamist militant and religious groups based in Somalia.

Notwithstanding some positive contributions, the role of some Gulf countries towards the re-establishment of a political and security order in Somalia proved to be an ambiguous one, especially following the outbreak of the Yemen conflict and the Gulf crisis. Ironically, protagonists on the different sides of the Yemen conflict used Somalia for furthering their military interests in Yemen. Nearly, all the major Gulf countries at one time or another maintained military or naval bases on Somalia's coasts. There were allegations that Iranians used access to Somalia as a principal gateway for smuggling arms and supplies to the Houthi rebels fighting against the Saudi-backed Yemeni government.[32] This appears to change later as Somalia, as with other countries in the Horn, used its airspaces, waters and military bases for the war for the Saudi-led coalition against Houthi rebels.[33] This came after Mogadishu broke its ties with Iran in 2016 when Saudi Arabia offered USD 50 million.

It has become more evident that Gulf countries' recent foray in Somalia is having profound shortcomings and part of it nearly upended in the aftermath of the GCC crisis. Following the crisis, despite the professed interest to support the security forces of the fledgling Somalia government and countering violent extremism, the training and capacity building support offered by some Gulf countries was prematurely interrupted, though the support of Turkey and the UAE went on unimpeded. Evidently, external support was entangled within the Gulf's own political turmoil in Somalia, especially as evinced by the case of the UAE and Saudi Arabia. Refusal by the Somali President Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed (Farmajo) to support Saudi Arabia and the UAE in their avowal of imposing a blockade on Qatar, reportedly turning down a large aid package, escalated into a diplomatic spat resulting in the UAE increasing its support for Somalia's federal states instead and ending a military training programme in Mogadishu.[34] This

30 For details see G. Feierstein and C. Greathead, The Fight for Africa: The new focus of the Saudi-Iranian rivalry, in: Middle East Institute Policy Focus (2017) 2, https://www.mei.edu/sites/default/files/publications/ PF2_Feierstein_AfricaSaudiIran_web_4.pdf (accessed 23 January 2019).

31 ICG (International Crisis Group), Somalia and the Gulf Crisis, Africa Report 260 (2018), p. 1, https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/somalia/260-somalia-and-gulf-crisis (accessed 23 January 2019).

32 Feierstein and Greathead, The Fight for Africa.

33 Oneko, East Africa.

34 W. Todman, The Gulf Scramble for Africa. GCC States' Foreign Policy Laboratory, Center for Strategic and Interna-

move was widely condemned, including by the EU, since it would deprive Somalia of regular budgetary support payments and destabilize the country by weakening the government's ability to pay its security forces.[35]

Therefore, despite its initial intent of fostering security links, the presence of some of these Gulf countries appears to have the adverse effect of fomenting instability and heightening Somalia's vulnerability.[36] The rivalry and the fallout from the GCC crisis and the attendant quest for clients in Somalia complicated Somalia's "centre-periphery" relation. As Gulf countries cajole Somali politicians to choose sides in the Gulf crisis, the existing political crisis deepened with the Mogadishu based federal government maintaining its neutrality in the crisis while some of the regional states openly opted to side with the Saudis and the Emiratis.[37] Related to this, the "federal" tensions in Somalia became intertwined with "local" tensions, for example as in Galmudug, which each (federal government and member states) picking a side in the dispute. Though the Gulf influence is not so direct on Galmudug, it was more an exacerbating factor as it made the federal-member state relationship so bad, which in turn is playing out via proxy in Galmudug.[38] As such, this distracted the country from focusing on one of the major tasks of defeating al-Shabaab and consolidating the unity of the Somali state.[39]

In addition, the aggressive economic and military venture by some of the Gulf countries, notably by the UAE, led to a deterioration of the relationship between Somalia and the self-proclaimed breakaway region of Somaliland. Though Somalia and Somaliland were not on best of terms even before the UAE's "advent", at least they were participating in a series of talks and negotiations, which had gradually fizzled out in 2016. The coming of new national administrations both in Mogadishu and Hargeissa in 2017 led to positive indications that the two sides were desirous of continuing the discussion, if not to resolve the big issues but at least to work on less critical issues of shared interests such as managing the air space control rights and undertaking other confidence-building measures. However, the planned talk were suddenly interrupted in March 2018 with the announcement of the news of the UAE venturing into upgrading and expanding the port of Berbera and building military bases and specifically the official announcement that the port of Berbera would give Ethiopia a 19 per cent stake. This set off another round

tional Studies Briefs (2018), https://www.csis.org/analysis/gulf-scramble-africa-gcc-states-foreign-policy-laboratory (accessed 23 January 2019).

35 Ibid.

36 Key informant interview, Horn expert, Addis Ababa, 11 January 2019.

37 Puntland, Hirshabelle, Southwest, and Galmudug announced they were breaking from the Somali government's position of neutrality, citing their strategic relationships with Saudi Arabia and the UAE (SIDRA, The Gulf Crisis: Why Somalia should take a Critical Distance, Somalia Institute for Development and Research Analysis SIDRA Policy Brief No. 6 [2017], p. 2, https://sidrainstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/The_Gulf_Crisis.pdf [accessed 23 January 2019]).

38 Key informant interview, Horn expert, Addis Ababa, 11 January 2019.

39 Ibid.. This view was similarly reflected by the analysis conducted by the Somalia Institute for Development and Research Analysis, which concluded, "In a way, the political differences in Hirshabeel and Galmudug are a result of the Gulf conflict" (SIDRA, The Gulf Crisis, at 3).

of war of words, with Somaliland this time seemingly emboldened by having this sort of international backing.

Overall, one could observe the Gulf's engagement in Somalia – driven by the overriding imperative of preserving the self-interest of these external actors and less in dealing with the country's deep-rooted and protracted challenges – is to an extent shaping the conflict dynamics in the country. In this case, curtailing Iranian influence and of late isolating Qatar took precedence over the idea of contributing to Somalia's long-term security. Furthermore, Gulf countries recent venture into Somalia amplified intra-Somali disputes[40] as it was not thoroughly conscious of the existing complexities of Somalia's protracted conflict. Despite some piecemeal gains here and there, the net effect of the various engagements of the Gulf countries in Somalia therefore appears to have fostered the latter's instability. In the final analysis, the diverse implications of the Gulf's engagement in Somalia, as highlighted above, should not be lost as indicators of a transregional security interdependence across the Red Sea divide, a relationship that is significantly shaping the nature of conflict complexes in the Horn.

Ethio-Eritrean Relations: The Gulf Factor

Following the 1998–2000 "border war", one of the major successes of Ethiopia's foreign policy was "containing" and "isolating" Eritrea. This materialized through a UNSC Resolution 1907 in 2009, which punished Eritrea for training and arming groups, including al-Shabaab, in Somalia and the border conflict with Djibouti.[41]

Eritrea was taken as "Africa's North Korea",[42] and was known for its destabilizing role in the region. According to Tanja Müller,[43] "Eritrea's assertive and often rather un-diplomatic foreign policy overtures" should be understood within the constraints of the context of the Horn of Africa and Ethiopia's ambitions to be a regional hegemon. At any rate, however, Eritrea became a pariah state for most of the past two decades. Many saw an opportunity to change this state of affairs in 2013, following the death of Ethiopia's long-time strongman, Meles Zenawi, in August 2012. Following statements from Meles' successor, Prime Minister Haile Mariam Dessalegn, calls have been made that the time has come to "bring Eritrea in from the cold".[44] These calls were not heeded, even though

40 ICG, Somalia and the Gulf Crisis.

41 R. Bereketeab, The Morality of the U.N. Security Council Sanctions against Eritrea: Defensibility, Political Objectives, and Consequences, in: African Studies Review, 56 (2013) 2, pp. 145–161; H. Cohen, Time to Bring Eritrea in from the Cold, in: African Arguments, 16 December 2013 https://africanarguments.org/2013/12/16/time-to-bring-eritrea-in-from-the-cold-by-hank-cohen (accessed 23 January 2019).

42 See, for example, The Economist, Why Eritrea is called Africa's North Korea, 14 August 2018, https://www.economist.com/the-economist-explains/2018/08/14/why-eritrea-is-called-africas-north-korea (accessed 3 February 2019).

43 T.R. Müller, Assertive foreign policy in a 'bad neigbourhood': Eritrean foreign policy making, Paper presented at the International Conference on Eritrean Studies, 20–22 July 2016, Asmara, Eritrea, 2016, p. 1.

44 Cohen, Time to Bring Eritrea in from the Cold; see also G. Gebreleul and K. Tronvoll, Ethiopia and Eritrea: brothers at war no more, Al Jazeera, 8 December 2013, https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2013/12/ethiopia-eritrea-brothers-at-war-no-more-201312111228604587.html (accessed 23 January 2019).

there was no hard evidence of Eritrea supporting al-Shabaab at least since 2016, an accusation that triggered UNSC sanctions.[45] As such, the sanctions against Eritrea kept being extended.

The time for Eritrea to "come in from the cold" was in mid-2018. Martin Plaut,[46] a long-time observer of Eritrean politics, attributed this to lack of evidence of Eritrean support to al-Shabaab, Eritrea's alliances with Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates (over the war in Yemen) and with Europe (over migration),[47] and the reconfiguration of the political landscape in Ethiopia. Without reducing the importance of the contribution of political changes in Ethiopia, we want to highlight here the contribution of Saudi Arabia and the UAE.

These Gulf countries for long were concerned about the alleged use of Eritrean ports by Iranian ships to supply weapons to the Houthi in Yemen.[48] Another concern was the Qatari assertive foreign policy, expressed in the negotiated settlement of the border contestation between Eritrea and Djibouti under the auspices of Qatar and then the stationing of Qatari peacekeepers to oversee implementation (Qatar also attempted to do the same in Darfur and Red Sea states of Sudan, and Somalia). The Qatari peacekeepers returned when Eritrea chose to side with Saudi Arabia in the Gulf crisis in June 2017.[49] Furthermore, Eritrea in addition to leasing army bases to Saudi Arabia and the UAE for the Yemen war has sent troops to fight in Yemen (Sudan did the same).

It is these dynamics that contributed to direct Gulf influence in how the Ethio-Eritrea stalemate has been resolved. In fact, Abiy Ahmed's first visit outside Africa has been to Saudi Arabia on 18 May 2018, some six weeks into his premiership. On 15 June, Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Mohammad Bin Zayed Al Nahyan was in Addis Ababa,[50] following discussions the UAE pledged to give USD 3 billion in aid and investment, relieving the severe foreign currency shortage at the time.[51] Similarly, the Eritrean president visited the UAE and Saudi Arabia in July 2018.[52] It is in between these two major trips that the

45 Tesfa News, Security Council Expresses Intention to Review Eritrea Sanctions, 11 November 2016, https://www.tesfanews.net/security-council-intention-review-eritrea-sanctions/ (accessed 23 January 2019).

46 M. Plaut, After decades of UN and self-imposed isolation, Eritrea is coming in from the cold, Quartz Africa, 14 November 2018, https://qz.com/africa/1463506/un-security-council-lifts-eritrea-sanctions-arms-embargo (accessed 23 January 2019).

47 Eritreans make up among the largest group of migrants reaching Europe (mainly through Italy), and Eritrea has also been referred to "the fastest emptying nation" (Guardian, 28 September 2016, Trapped and bereft in the world's "fastest emptying country", https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/sep/28/eritrea-military-service-life-people-left-behind (accessed 23 January 2019)). Europe aimed to counter this by giving aid packages to the Eritrean government.

48 A.J. Lefebvre, Iran in the Horn of Africa: Outflanking U.S. Allies, in: Middle East Policy 19 (2012) 2, pp. 117–133.

49 Reuters 2017. Qatar withdraws troops from Djibouti-Eritrea border mission, 14 June 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-gulf-qatar-djibouti/qatar-withdraws-troops-from-djibouti-eritrea-border-mission-idUSKBN1950W5 (accessed 23 January 2019).

50 Gulf News, Mohammad Bin Zayed and Ethiopian PM hold talks, 15 June 2018, https://gulfnews.com/uae/government/mohammad-bin-zayed-and-ethiopian-pm-hold-talks-1.2237480 (accessed 23 January 2019).

51 A. Maasho, UAE to give Ethiopia $ 3 billion in aid and investments, Reuters, 16 January 2018, https://af.reuters.com/article/africaTech/idAFKBN1JC07G-OZABS (accessed 23 January 2019).

52 Arab News, Saudi Arabia's King Salman meets Eritrean President, 23 July 2018, http://www.arabnews.com/node/1344056/saudi-arabia (accessed 23 January 2019).

government of the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front announced the commitment to unconditionally accept the peace deal on 5 June 2018.[53] Another testament of the extent to which Saudi Arabia and the UAE had influenced the process is the fact that the agreement was signed at a summit in Saudi Arabia in mid-September 2018. After the conclusion of the agreements, both Prime Minister Abiy and President Isaias Afwerki appreciated the role played by Saudi Arabia and the UAE and received the Order of Zayed at the Abu Dhabi summit, and the highest Saudi Arabian award.[54]
This definitely tells of the increasing influence of these Gulf countries on security complexes in the Horn of Africa, while others simply state that the Saudis mainly wanted to use the opportunity to have a good "publicity time", taking respite from bad publicity related to the Yemen war.[55] At any rate, one can argue that their increasing reliance on Eritrea to continue (and hopefully win) the war in Yemen triggered them to take bold actions. But this is not to say that the Horn was simply at the receiving end: Ethiopia's desire to change its Eritrea policy was stated before 2018. As such, this might not be the first time rapprochement was attempted from Ethiopia's side. The point here is that, as de Waal[56] observed, "Eritrea […] used its links with Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Egypt to escape from its isolation imposed by Ethiopia."

3. Analysing Security Interdependence and Emergence of a New Security Space

The analytical category of transregional conflict, which the editor of this volume seek to develop, stems from recognizing the merits of a transregional perspective to understanding conflict complexes. A key thrust of the transregional approach is a desire to disentangle hybridity, complexity, interconnectivity, and overlaps among world regions, both formal and informal (see the introduction of this volume). It is an epistemological and methodological critique of extant approaches' inability to capture the complexity of contemporary conflicts. Such perspective seems to aptly fit to attempts of unravelling the security entanglements between the Horn and the Gulf countries, a phenomenon with historical precedents but is currently resurging in full force. But what are some of the various dimensions of the transregional conflicts in the Horn, both as an analytical category and as an empirically observed regionalizing process, which is bringing the Horn and the Gulf into intricate security relations?

53 R. Gladstone, Ethiopia to 'Fully Accept' Eritrea Peace Deal from 2000", 5 June 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/05/world/africa/ethiopia-eritrea-peace-deal.html (accessed 23 January 2019).

54 See http://hornofafrica.de/president-isaias-afwerki-and-prime-minister-abiy-ahmed-presented-with-highest-saudi-arabia-award/ (accessed 23 January 2019).

55 Authors' note from an oral presentation of a senior African peace and security expert, ISS Seminar on "Impact of closer links between the Gulf and the Horn", Sheraton Hotel, Addis Ababa, 5 December 2018.

56 De Waal, Beyond the Red Sea.

Explaining Interdependence

One of the essential features in defining an RSC is boundary.[57] As such, the existence of neighbouring RSCs, such as the Horn of Africa RSC and the Middle East (be it across the Red Sea or between Sudan and Egypt), implies a conceptualization of where one ends and another begins. Buzan and Wæver[58] also add that there are insulator and buffer states, defining the outer limit of a region.

What we see in the case of the Horn and the Gulf, however, is a complex interplay between key states in the two regions, to the extent that the security region's boundary is nearly irrelevant. The original conceptualisation and further refinements of RSC by Buzan and colleagues did not fully capture security independence between neighbouring regions (see the critique of RSC by Engel in this volume). This characterization barely captures security dynamics and conflict complexes linking the Horn and the Gulf. Many authors recognized the "influence" of Middle Eastern countries in security dynamics of the Horn RSC, which became more visible in more recent years.[59] The intense security relationship, interdependence and complexity of the past decade (as illustrated in the cases above) however push us to go beyond a mere description of it as "influence"/"interference".

After defining regions as neatly categorized, having buffer or insulating states in between, Buzan and Wæver[60] use concepts of "penetration" and "overlay" to capture external influences in a RSC. These concepts purely define unidirectional interferences of external powers in the dynamics of a certain region, not interdependence. Moreover, the Gulf is not powerful enough to overwhelm and reduce security interdependence in the Horn to invisibility (like during the times of the Cold War), thus "overlay" will not be a proper characterization of the reality.

As illustrated in the above three cases, the Gulf countries' security is affected by security dynamics in the Horn. Geographic proximity, coupled with other drivers of security interdependence, meant security dynamics occurring on one side will pull states on the other side into it. The case with isolation of Qatar, the war in Yemen, and re-building the Somali state illustrate this. Of course, we are not denying that the Horn is much weaker and more dependent than the Gulf countries. In this, we are in agreement with Ethiopia's veteran diplomat, Tekeda Alemu,[61] who recently argued that "the relationship is asymmetrical requires no elaboration. It is as clear as noonday". That, however, should not automatically make the Horn of Africa a victim.

57 Buzan and Wæver, Regions and Power, p. 53.

58 Ibid.

59 Mesfin, The Horn of Africa security complex; De Waal, New Challenges for the Horn of Africa; De Waal, Beyond the Red Sea; Shinn, Horn of Africa and the Gulf States.

60 Buzan and Wæver, Regions and Power.

61 T. Alemu, The conundrum of present Ethiopian foreign policy – in search of a roadmap for Ethiopia's Foreign and National Security Policy and Strategy, in: Centre for Dialogue, Research and Cooperation (CDRC) Digest 4 (2019) 1, pp. 2–17, at 14, http://www.cdrcethiopia.org/index.php/resorces/publications/send/2-cdrc-digest/25-cdrc-digest-january-2019 (accessed 25 April 2019).

From the façade, it looks like countries in the Horn are mere supplicants or clients to their Gulf principals,[62] and there is a general expectation for continuance of the prevailing trend. But one must also appreciate the increasing leverage or agency of the latter to impact security dynamics of the Gulf states, as evidenced, for example, in the selective leasing of naval and military bases along their coasts or in the indispensable role they play, for instance, in fighting piracy and ensuring maritime security.

A country as small as Djibouti gave the marching orders to the UAE's DP World despite its decades-long investment in the country. Likewise, Somalia's federal government, regardless of its political and security predicament, banned the UAE's DP World from operating in Somalia. Countries in the Horn indeed jockeyed between alternative suitors such as Saudi Arabia versus Iran or Saudi Arabia / UAE versus Qatar. Sudan was able to withstand pressure from Saudi Arabia and the UAE to severe ties with Qatar mainly leveraging its participation in the Yemen war.[63] Even the fledgling Somali federal government aspired to remain neutral in the GCC crisis, despite facing resistance from its regional governments. All of these, combined with the fact that the Horn emerged as base for some of Africa's biggest military interventions hosting military and naval bases for Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Turkey, and Qatar, seem to confirm Alex de Waal's assertion that "every coastal state in the Red Sea-Gulf of Aden has suddenly increased its strategic value".[64]

As such, neither side is immune to the security dynamics of the other, meaning we do not have isolated cases of "intervention". What we have instead is a complex pattern of security interdependence between the two regions, whether in the context of the discussion of maritime security of the Red Sea or within the complexities of the protracted Somali and Yemen conflicts. This transregional security relation is a function of both the structural context of the competitive international order of the post-Cold War period and the ensuing imperative to maximize the self-interest of states within their immediate neighbourhood, as agents within such structural milieu. Tekeda Alemu made a succinct observation of this emerging security interconnectivity between the two regions and the increasing leverage of countries in the Horn exercise:

> *The Red Sea area's geopolitical situation has been transformed so thoroughly that occasionally one sees the tail wagging the dog. For pecuniary reasons sometimes the small are observed holding the hands of the big, and the result is not more but less readiness to use wisdom in the exercise of power. Yemen is a good example and a warning of what might happen to others – not in the same way, certainly, but as a result of a variety of manifestations of the irresponsible use of power. The chaotic situation in Somalia, which has become a theatre in which the rivalry among middle powers is on display, is another facet of this change under way in the region*.[65]

62 De Waal, Beyond the Red Sea.
63 Key informant interview, Horn expert, Addis Ababa, 11 January 2019.
64 De Waal, Beyond the Red Sea, p. 23.
65 Alemu, The conundrum of present Ethiopian foreign policy, p. 4.

This interdependence between the two regions can further be elucidated through the patterns of amity and enmity and converging securitization / desecuritization dynamics, discussed below.

Patterns of Amity and Enmity

The various cases explored in this article are meant to illustrate an emerging security interdependence that links the Horn of Africa across the Red Sea to conflict dynamics that are determined by some of the key actors, such as Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Iran, and Qatar. The prevalence of a complex and constantly shifting pattern of amity and enmity is one of the key features of the cluster of conflicts in the Horn, where each conflict is linked to others in the region and is increasingly bringing on board players from the Gulf. The idea of amity and enmity, as applied to understanding conflict dynamics on a much broader scale than the state level, was borrowed from its application by Buzan and Wæver.[66]

Just like within Buzan and Wæver's RSC, amity and enmity are critical to structuring the transregional patterns of interdependence between the Horn and the Gulf countries, and these patterns have both positive and negative implications. In this case, shifting alliances across the Red Sea divide are recurrent and are emblematic of the security relations between the Horn and the Gulf states. The quest for one's allegiance, recently taking very aggressive dimension of overt financial incentives and sometimes coercive measures, has become profoundly clear in the Somalia case discussed in this article. Though not thoroughly treated in this article, the Nile hydro-power politics, which entangles upstream and downstream countries, is another indication of continual making and remaking of fragile alliances. Major protagonists in securitizing the Nile, namely Egypt and Ethiopia, have been competing to align other states, notably Sudan and South Sudan, in the recent past. For Ethiopia, getting the support of these countries, particularly Sudan, was pivotal for the construction of its Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) on the Nile. On the converse side, the pledge of support by these countries was tantamount to vexing Egypt and by extension its Gulf allies. Likewise, the Ethio-Eritrea conflict, which is one of the most protracted crises in the Horn, had featured a similar pattern of amity and enmity, bringing on board state actors across the Red Sea divide. For instance, the rocky relation between Ethiopia and Qatar was illustrative of this. The two countries severed their diplomatic ties in 2008, Ethiopia accusing Qatar of supporting Eritrea and arming insurgent groups opposed to Ethiopian troops in Somalia.[67] Qatar had responded to these allegations, claiming that Ethiopia threatened stability and security in the Horn.[68] As we are to see later, the relation between the two countries was to significantly improve as evinced, for example, by the various investment agreements concluded between Qatar

66 Buzan and Wæver, Regions and Power.
67 Shinn, Horn of Africa and the Gulf States.
68 Ibid.

and Ethiopia.[69] This is a clear indicator of changing relations that swing between the different extremes of amity and enmity and everything else in between. These changing relations are driven by states drawn from both sides, concurrently securitizing/desecuritizing particular issues, state/non-state actors, and processes.

In the broader scheme of the Gulf's own rivalry, states in the Horn also defining their relation along the amity-enmity spectrum, both vis-à-vis Iran and of late Qatar. It is interesting to see the role of state actors in the Horn in shaping relations, especially in shaping alliances, not just as passive recipients of support but also sometimes in the way they manage different Gulf actors. This could be illustrated, for example, by President Omar al-Bashir's most recent attempt to manoeuvre support from Qatar and the UAE within few days as a way out of Sudan's crisis in the midst of mass protests. Bashir was alleged to have quickly turned "to the UAE for aid, as he leaves Qatar empty-handed".[70] If existing trends are any indication, one can deduce the security implication of Bashir's manoeuvre as Sudan is "the centre of a geopolitical competition between different camps mainly Turkey and Qatar from one side, Saudi Arabia and the UAE from another".[71]

The Emergence of a New Security Space

Recognizing existing patterns of security interdependence, amity and enmity, and intertwined processes of securitization / desecuritization, and taking a social constructivist view of regional space as an outcome of security actions, we want to further ask whether the current division between the Horn and Gulf states in security thinking and practice would have materialized if the Red Sea was a landmass. Academics and policy analysts are simply being trapped on their respective sides of the sea, despite the recognized security interdependence.

Alex de Waal recently made a strong case for transcending this "artificial" dichotomization of the Gulf and the Horn's security dynamics and the attendant epistemological barrier by calling for a strong focus on Red Sea politics by academic and policy analysts.[72] He went on to attribute this to the "thin line of water [the Red Sea] act[ing] as a deep gulf which has proven remarkably hard to cross". He further strengthens his argument on what Ali Mazrui wrote in 1986 about what he called Africa's three religious-cultural heritage in *The Africans: A Triple Heritage*. The argument is that if the "Sahara desert joins North Africa with sub-Saharan Africa as much as it divides them", the Red Sea could do that as well. The division is more due to the "thin line of water" than other geographical, cultural, or historical attributes.

69 See https://debirhan.com/2017/02/qatar-eyes-build-five-star-hotel-near-au-addis-350-million/ (accessed 23 January 2019).

70 The New Arab, Sudan turns to UAE for aid, as Bashir leaves Qatar empty-handed, 23 January 2019, https://www.alaraby.co.uk/english/news/2019/1/23/sudan-seeks-uae-aid-after-leaving-qatar-empty-handed (accessed 3 February 2019).

71 Ibid.

72 De Waal, Beyond the Red Sea.

Our three cases further substantiate Mazrui's and de Waal's arguments. Security and conflict complexes in the Horn are not insulated from influences coming from across the Red Sea. Empirical observations show that this "thin line of water" is not "a deep gulf difficult to cross". That is true only in our academic and policy analyses, which are yet to catch up and adopt a more comprehensive understanding of reality in the region. What we see is the emergence of a new security space – an "emerging region" – in which the conflicts in the Horn are significantly shaped by dynamics/influences from the Gulf (and, to an extent, vice versa).

Transregional Conflict Complexes in the Horn and the Gulf Influence: Ungoverned Security Spaces

As argued throughout this article, a mutually impactful security interdependence has resurged between the Horn and the Gulf regions. Nevertheless, growing security relations between the two regions is unfolding amidst deficits of institutions and frameworks governing these relations. Both the Horn and the Gulf have their own cooperation platforms in the form of IGAD and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), with largely "internal" mandates only. However, these institutions are to a large extent paralysed to effectively manage broader transregional security dynamics, in part due to their own intra-regional rivalry and to an extent due to the lack of capacity and political will of member states. In addition, there is little interface between these institutions to regulate their security relations, in contrast to some attempts of working on "soft" matters of shared interest such as migration.[73] One can conclude that these institutions would not serve as platforms for governing transregional security relations, at least in the current context, where each was considered as an extension of regional competition.

Likewise, the African Union, though a platform for various strategic partnerships with other regions such as EU and other global players for managing security relations, has been either largely side-lined or lacks the mandate to deal with transregional security dynamics between the Horn and the Gulf.[74] While Gulf actors such as Saudi Arabia and the UAE are considered to have played a key role in peace making processes in the region, the AU was largely absent and its role was "unrecognized or totally dismissed".[75] A most recent reminder of this will be the glaring absence of AU's representation at the signing of Ethio-Eritrea peace agreement in Riyadh, in the presence of Saudi king and crown prince and the UN secretary general. Alex de Waal emphasized the implication of this by arguing "this is an interesting and significant symbolic switch from the peace and security of the Horn of Africa being grounded in African institutions and to being

73 The IGAD Migration Programme, for instance, includes convening high-level dialogue between IGAD member states and relevant countries from the Gulf on issues related to labour migration and advocating the placement of a labour attaché for IGAD member states in the GCC Countries.

74 See de Waal, New Challenges for the Horn of Africa; Alemu, The conundrum of present Ethiopian foreign policy.

75 Alemu, The conundrum of present Ethiopian foreign policy, p. 5.

grounded in Middle Eastern principles and processes".[76] In addition other attempts to form institutions and platforms of security cooperation – such as the Saudi-led attempt of forging a new political bloc along the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden, comprising Egypt, Djibouti, Somalia, Sudan, Yemen, and Jordan[77] – could be the least preferred option for managing transregional security relations between the Horn and the Gulf. This is mainly as the effectiveness of such platform for managing transregional relations is undercut from the very outset, not least for lack of inclusivity and the ensuing question concerning the impartiality of the initiative. It will likely be seen as an attempt to exclude and "gang up" against Ethiopia, the aspiring hegemon of the Horn. In a manner of sorts, this will be the déjà *vu* of what Ethiopia did with (mainly) Yemen to further isolate Eritrea by establishing the inactive (not to say stillborn) Sana'a Forum in 2002.

4. Conclusions

The three cases presented here show that what made conflict and security dynamics more complex and fragile in the Horn of Africa is their intermeshing with more powerful actors and processes from the Gulf. Indeed, no major security situation in the Horn is without some alliance from the Gulf. Similarly, changing security situations in the Gulf often bring the Horn of African states into the mix. This is unique to the Horn. From the continent, it is only the Horn and North African states that are exposed to such permanent external non-African actor influences. Buzan and Wæver place Northern African states (i.e. Morocco, Tunisia, Libya, and Egypt) in the Middle Eastern RSC.[78] These North African states have Europe to their north, which does not expose them to negative security externalities comparable to the Gulf's onto the Horn. As such, what explains the nature of contemporary conflicts in the Horn is the complex, intermeshed security relationship and interdependence with the Gulf.

The patterns of security interdependence and amity / enmity relations between states of the Horn of Africa and the Gulf are decades old, but they are getting stronger with the increasing Gulf's economic wealth, diplomatic presence, and ambition to project power and influence across the Red Sea. The trend of consolidation of the patterns of interdependence and amity / enmity relations will add new layers, cementing and reifying the relationships. Taking space as socially constructed, we can then argue that a security region linking the Horn and the Gulf is in-the-making. The concrete security discourses and practices are contributing to the creation of this region.

76 See All Africa, East Africa: Arab Gulf States in the Horn of Africa – What Role Do They Play?, 23 September 2018, https://allafrica.com/stories/201809240210.html (accessed 23 January 2019).

77 Riyadh-Asharq Al-Awsat, Saudi Arabia Announces New Political Bloc for Red Sea, Gulf of Aden States, 12 December 2018, https://aawsat.com/english/home/article/1501906/saudi-arabia-announces-new-political-bloc-red-sea-gulf-aden-states (accessed 23 January 2019).

78 Buzan and Wæver, Regions and Power.

What does this mean for academic and policy analyses regarding the Horn's conflict and security dynamics? The crucial implication is the need to readjust our optics, and properly view and start understanding and analysing the emerging region. Security relations and (counter) alliances of states of the Horn with Gulf States should no longer be seen as external to the Horn's security complex. The emergent regionalization logic linking the Horn of African RSC and the Gulf sub-region makes both entities present in the security affairs of each other. One's security cannot be developed, and fully understood, without considering influences coming from the other side. As such, we argue that a conflict compex straddling the borders of the two regions is emerging. There are no effective boundaries, buffers, or insulators between the two. Policy should also be of this emergent security space, with the implication that the AU and IGAD should collaborate with the Arab League and the GCC to effectively govern such security dynamics.

BUCHBESPRECHUNGEN

Roland Wenzlhuemer: Globalgeschichte schreiben. Eine Einführung in sechs Episoden, Konstanz: UVK Verlagsgesellschaft mbH 2017, 302 S.

Rezensiert von
Matthias Middell, Leipzig

This volume is meant to be an introduction to global history; it does not, however, present its subject in form of a textbook but rather as a series of notes taken by the author during his own process of doing global history. Therefore, the title should not be misread as a guide to writing global history in all its different dimensions but as a guide to topics that are central to Wenzlhuemer's work, which has focused thus far on the telegraph cable network emerging in the late nineteenth century and the global communication processes that were becoming possible through these new means of transregional connections.
He starts the journey – to which he invites novices of global history – with the quite frustrating message that a large part of the literature that has argued in favour of decentring history and overcoming Eurocentrism as well as methodological nationalism has not yet achieved to define its own ambitions in a positive manner, tending to be over-optimistic with regard to the changes in the historical culture towards global perspectives. To become a global historian is obviously more difficult than the repetition of a series of sympathetic claims suggest. Here is the starting point for Wenzlhuemer, who intends to propose a trustworthy bridge between theoretical ambition and empirical operationalization; or in other words, his goal is a translation of the conviction that global history is necessary into a plausible research strategy that meets the standards of today's professional historical sciences. He is, undeniably, not the first author to raise this issue, and he is well aware of this fact as the footnotes and listed books demonstrate, which provide an additional wealth of information and further reading that complement the author's own research examples that he uses in the six chapters of the book. All the stories are chronologically located between 1789 (the mutiny on the Bounty) and the early twentieth century, when Dr Crippen, following the murder of his wife, took a ship to Montreal but was pursued by Scotland Yard as well as the international press, which, due to fact that the telegraph allowed communication on sea, was able to follow him by making use of the many ships that transferred the news to the next

station. A long nineteenth century is thus covered, and the episodes reported are all to one degree or the other media scandals that provide insights into not only the new possibilities and risks but also the unevenness of communication that used new technologies, which helped to enormously speed up the circulation of news.

Before he comes to these examples, Roland Wenzlhuemer argues in the first part of the book, considering Sebastian Conrad's recent introduction to the field (Princeton 2016), that global history is a perspective that can be practiced both as a larger synthesis as well as more narrowly designed case studies. In both cases, events, structures, and connections at the centre of the narrative are contextualized globally. But he disagrees explicitly with Conrad's (and others') claim that global history can and (perhaps should) address the different degrees of connectedness. He further objects that it would be very difficult – if not impossible – to define a point of no return where global integration goes beyond the sheer existence of transborder connections and has reached a level where it cannot be completely dismantled again. The scepticism towards the existence of, or the possibility to define, such a historical moment when the world entered the global condition and can be distinguished from "archaic" globalization (as Christopher Baily [2002] puts it) does not come with a longer explanation referring to the relevant literature but with an extensive methodological consideration about the gap in historiography concerning the ways in which people connect globally. This serves as an opening to the subsequent chapters, introducing the reader to possible avenues for research on how connectedness comes into existence. – The first of these substantial chapters reconstructs the rumour around the "discovery" of human beings on the moon, attributed by the New York-based newspaper Sun to the well-recognized British scientist Sir John Herschel. This early version of fake news, meant to increase the number of copies sold of the newspaper, serves as an excellent example of the use of already existing global (better perhaps, transregional) connections (real and imagined) that produced, for example, the global fame of the British scholar, while the readers of the Sun had no chance to check, at least at short notice, the reference made to academic publications. This asynchronicity helped the journalist at the Sun to make his audience believe in the reported news. What Wenzlhuemer argues here is the unevenness of global connections, which gave (and still give until today) enough room to manoeuvre to play with geographically far-reaching imaginations that remain uncheckable for larger parts of the media audience.

The following chapter goes back to Wenzlhuemer's special field of expertise: the role of the telegraph in the construction of new ways to perceive space and time in the nineteenth century.1 The telegraph facilitated connections between places that were far away from each other faster than for places nearby but not connected through the new means of communication. The relations between different spaces were therefore perceived as more complex and probably more problematic than in the past, especially when – as the author presents with telling examples – people were able to profit from this difference between geographical and communicative distance for the purpose of financial spec-

ulation. The tension between connected peoples and those remaining in the relative isolation of remote places and regions is again nothing that only applies to the nineteenth century – it can be observed up until today and remains a challenge for the interpretation of the seemingly ever increasing global connected world. More recently, we can even observe an enormous potential to mobilize against a liberal version of globalization when referring to this tension and the insistence on the differences between a cosmopolitan elite and a rather bounded majority of people.

In another episode, the author addresses the central terms of social history, namely structures and actors. He stresses the role of individuals as actors of and intermediaries in connections who constitute (some of) the (many) relationships at play in such an entangled world while they are themselves constituted by the connections and many of their professions are a product of the connected world. Wenzlhuemer illustrates this with the mutiny on the Bounty, famously known from various film versions of the mutiny itself, while still surprisingly disputed when looking at the archives of reports for the event provided by the many different intermediaries.

Structures are discussed here with regard to the example of the railway through and over Mont Cenis, which increasingly became the very last obstacle to an efficient route between Europe and Asia made possible by the opening of the Suez Canal. The story can also be read as one of the dramatically felt impacts of global connections on local infrastructural configurations.

The last episode presented is the flight of Dr Crippen, who had killed his wife in London and tried to escape Scotland Yard's pressure via Antwerp to the New World by ship. Since the captain had already recognized him during embarkment and informed the police, it was possible for the police officer to overtake him with the help of a much faster ship before Crippen even arrived in Canada. Wenzlhuemer uses the again well-known story for more theoretical considerations concerning media coverage, the situation of transit between two worlds now increasingly under the (still incomplete) control of communicating bureaucracies. Crippen was recognized by the captain right when he came aboard in Antwerp because there were already portrayals of him in the British press and he had no chance to flee afterwards since he became a "prisoner in transit" (p. 242) on the Montrose liner and was arrested even before arriving in Montreal.

As one can see, Wenzlhuemer profits from episodes that had not only been subject to larger reports in the contemporary press but had, in most cases, also attracted film directors and novelists afterwards. He therefore can reduce the narrative to the necessary in order to awake the reader's memory of the one or the other film and can switch from the historical anecdote to his own theoretical conclusion. This connects very well the anecdotal evidence with such conclusions and is clearly intended to invite students following this path by identifying similar episodes and turn them into something meaningful for global history interpretations.

Roland Wenzlhuemer is a gifted storyteller. He likes to narrate anecdotes, but he does so for a theoretical purpose. The chapters therefore are organized in almost the same way. At the beginning of each

chapter, a problem is raised that could also be addressed by more abstract considerations but is presented in the form of fascinating stories of individuals experiencing the new global condition of the nineteenth century. This allows the author afterwards to make a conclusion that brings him back to his original idea of presenting the reader his thoughts about how to do global history.

It is not quite clear if this book targets undergraduates as a sort of "appetizer" to the field of global history not yet very well anchored at this level in German university curricula or if it rather addresses graduate students with a language of theoretical sophistication that presupposes a certain preparatory reading. The latter will probably discover that Wenzlhuemer's ideas are embedded in a larger literature he refers to only to the degree a textbook for undergraduates may allow. But one can also take the book as evidence that the clear distinction between undergraduate and graduate training that has been transferred and translated from the Anglo-Saxon model to Germany's universities has not yet arrived in full. If this a disadvantage or advantage is another matter of dispute for which this review is not the right place.

Note:

1 R. Wenzlhuemer (Hg.), Global Communication. Telecommunication and Global Flows of Information in the Late 19th and Early 20th Century, Cologne 2010; R. Wenzlhuemer, Connecting the Nineteenth-Century World. The Telegraph and Globalization, Cambridge/New York 2013.

Jürgen Osterhammel: Unfabling the East. The Enlightenment's Encounter with Asia, Princeton / Oxford: Princeton University Press 2018, 696 p.

Rezensiert von
Sven Trakulhun, Konstanz

Unfabling the East von Jürgen Osterhammel ist zuerst 1998 unter dem Titel *Die Entzauberung Asiens* erschienen. Vor zwanzig Jahren war die deutschsprachige Fachwelt von diesem Buch tief beeindruckt. Es war ein erster systematischer Überblick über die geistige Erfassung Asiens im langen 18. Jh. und zugleich ein meisterhaftes Epochenportrait Europas im Spiegel der „Anderen". Allein das Verzeichnis der Quellen und Forschungsliteratur wirkte auf den damals noch weitgehend analogen Forschungsbetrieb geradezu einschüchternd. Ich spreche aus eigener Erfahrung, als jemand, der das Buch als Student gelesen hat und der später zeitweilig auch ein Mitarbeiter Osterhammels an der Universität Konstanz gewesen ist. Die große Wirkung der *Entzauberung* lässt sich aber kaum bestreiten. Große Belesenheit, Formbewusstsein und sprachliches Feingefühl fanden darin glücklich zusammen. Wer sich im deutschsprachigen Raum fortan wissenschaftlich mit der Geschichte der Beziehungen zwischen Asien und Europa beschäftigen wollte, musste dieses Buch kennen.

Worum geht es? Osterhammel greift mit *Unfabling the East* eine Kontroverse auf,

die durch Edward W. Saids 1978 erschienenes Buch *Orientalism* ausgelöst worden war. Said hatte darin die These vertreten, westliche Vorstellungen des „Orients" (bei ihm der Nahe und Mittlere Osten) seien lediglich interessengeleitete Konstruktionen, ersonnen und in eine systematische Ordnung gebracht von europäischen Kolonialherren zum Zwecke der Herrschaft über den Orient. Damit begründete er eine ganze Forschungsrichtung, die Postcolonial Studies, die bald in praktisch alle Kulturwissenschaften ausstrahlten. Osterhammel hingegen hält Saids Fundamentalkritik an westlichen Repräsentationsweisen des Orients, denen im Grunde jede empirische Brauchbarkeit abgesprochen wird, für ungenau und zu pauschal. Er will ihr ein differenzierteres Bild entgegenstellen, eines, das auf sorgfältige close readings und die historisch möglichst präzise Kontextualisierung der von ihm benutzten Texte setzt.

Mit *Unfabling the East* wählt Osterhammel dafür die große Form. Sein Interesse gilt ganz Europa und ganz Asien. Daher behandelt er in seinen Analysen ein breites Spektrum an Quellen, lässt in seinen Kapiteln ein ganzes Heer europäischer Autoren (und einige Autorinnen) aufmarschieren. Osterhammel erweist sich dabei als exzellenter Kenner sowohl der europäischen Reiseliteratur als auch der Werke der Leitfiguren der Aufklärung wie Montesquieu, Voltaire, Edmund Burke oder Immanuel Kant. Er durchforstet mit deutscher Gründlichkeit die Berichte britischer Kolonialbeamter wie William Jones und John Malcolm und behandelt ausführlich die Schriften deutscher Aufklärer wie Matthias Christian Sprengel, Arnold Heeren oder August Ludwig Schlözer.

Als theoretische Grundlage dient Osterhammel ein eklektischer Mix aus Begriffsgeschichte, *intellectual history* angelsächsischer Prägung, kritisch angeeigneter Diskursgeschichte und Weberianismus, der den teils poststrukturalistischen, teils diskurstheoretischen, teils marxistischen Ansätzen der Postcolonial Studies ziemlich fernsteht. Zudem liegt der Untersuchungszeitraum von *Unfabling the East* – die Aufklärungsepoche von etwa 1680 bis 1830 – *vor* der Etablierung der großen Kolonialreiche im Zeitalter des Hochimperialismus. Er stand daher nie im Zentrum postkolonialer Kritik.

Doch in diesen 150 Jahren geschah, was Osterhammel im Deutschen eine „Entzauberung" Asiens nennt. Der Begriff ist von Max Weber geborgt und beschreibt einen Prozess der Rationalisierung, der vernunftgeleiteten, zunehmend wissenschaftlichen Durchdringung der Welt, ihre Verwandlung in etwas Messbares und Zählbares. Für Weber war dieser Prozess etwas genuin Westlich-Europäisches, und man darf annehmen, dass Osterhammel das auch so sieht. Denn er rekonstruiert im ersten Teil seines Buches akribisch und mit spürbarer Faszination die „pathways of knowledge", d. h. die pan-europäische Logistik der Beschaffung, Verbreitung und Verarbeitung von Wissen über Asien. Osterhammel entdeckt dabei überraschende ideengeschichtliche Zusammenhänge, ermittelt vergessene Diskursstränge und rekonstruiert oft verschlungene Überlieferungstraditionen und Textfiliationen.

Der zweite Teil („The present and the past") zeichnet in sechs großen Kapiteln die Entwicklung dieses Wissens nach. Nicht alles daran wirkt heute noch neu, doch hier finden sich virtuose Interpreta-

tionen einzelner Begriffe und Konzepte, die von bleibendem Wert sind. Dazu gehört, um nur ein Beispiel zu nennen, das Kapitel X („Real and unreal despots") über den Begriff der orientalischen Despotie, in dem Osterhammel zeigt, wie sich europäische Vorstellungen von asiatischen Herrschaftsformen immer weiter von ihren empirischen Grundlagen lösten, um sich im 19. Jh. zu einem weitgehend erfahrungsfernen Stereotyp zu verfestigen.

Osterhammel begegnet seinen Quellen gleichsam auf mittlerer Flughöhe. Seine Beobachtungen sind immer pointiert, auf das Wesentliche beschränkt, legen jeweils nur wenige Schichten frei. Sein Thema ist die große geistesgeschichtliche Linie, nicht das archivalische Detail. Das verleiht dem Buch einen fast kompendienhaften Charakter. *Unfabling the East* ist ein pointilistisches Panoramabild aus europäischen Texten über die Zivilisationen und Kulturen Asiens, das sich im Laufe der Zeit auf entscheidende Weise verschiebt: Je genauer Asien beobachtet und beschrieben werden konnte, so Osterhammels These, desto mehr verlor der einst so märchenhafte Orient in den Augen Europas seinen Glanz. Asien wurde *entzaubert*.

Da Osterhammel wohl spürte, dass er mit diesem Begriff in die Nähe der Modernisierungstheorien des 20. Jh.s geraten war, baute er in die englische Fassung ein Moment der Distanz ein (unfabling, nicht disenchantment, wie es in englischen Weber-Übersetzungen heißt). Für ihn ist der Prozess der Entzauberung auch höchst ambivalent. Einerseits erscheinen die Heroen der europäischen Asienerkundung als aufgeklärte Kosmopoliten – reisende Philosophen, die scharfsinnig, gelehrt und teilweise unter großen persönlichen Entbehrungen die Länder Asiens besucht, beobachtet und beschrieben haben. Andererseits zogen schon am Ende des Jahrhunderts die dunklen Wolken des westlichen Imperialismus herauf. Europa meinte bald, genug von Asien verstanden zu haben. Die Arroganz des Westens begann im 19. Jh. den Blick auf die Zivilisationen des Ostens zu vernebeln (S. 27–29).

Zumindest in diesem Punkt besteht eigentlich Einigkeit zwischen Osterhammel und den postkolonialen Kritikern des westlichen Asiendiskurses. Anders als diesen geht es Osterhammel freilich nicht darum, die beklagenswerten Ergebnisse des europäischen Sinneswandels an immer neuen Beispielen zu illustrieren, sondern kritisch seine Kosten zu bilanzieren.

Diese Perspektive führt ihn in das Zeitalter der Aufklärung zurück. Das ist nicht zwingend, denn die wesentlichen Mechanismen der systematischen Erforschung Asiens haben sich in Europa schon früher ausgebildet.[1] Dennoch wurden im 18. Jh. in dieser Hinsicht wichtige Weichen gestellt. Europas Triumph, so Osterhammel, wurde mit einem markanten Verlust an Weltoffenheit erkauft. *Unfabling the East* erzählt von einer verlorenen Welt alternativer Denkmöglichkeiten und humanistischer Traditionen, die sich im 19. Jh. gegen die bornierte Engstirnigkeit kolonialer Diskurse nicht behaupten konnten. Der Grundton des Buches ist daher dezent nostalgisch.

Andererseits bleibt das europäische „Asienbild" auch im Fluss. Denn heute, so schreibt Osterhammel gleich zu Anfang, scheint der Westen wieder in der Lage zu sein, die Zivilisationen Asiens zu respektieren, wenn nicht gar zu fürchten: „In the first quarter of the twenty-first century, the

world is taking back many of the outcomes of the nineteenth" (S. 1).

Vor zwanzig Jahren rannte Osterhammel mit seinem Buch bei den meisten offene Türen ein. Denn zumindest in der deutschsprachigen Geschichtswissenschaft lehnte damals die überwiegende Mehrheit Saids Thesen ab. Osterhammel hat die Fußnoten seines Buches für die englische Übersetzung aktualisiert und einige Passagen überarbeitet. Trotz solcher Änderungen im Detail sind jedoch die Struktur und Argumentationslinien des Originals erhalten geblieben. 1998 war die *Entzauberung Asiens* ein wichtiges Buch. Wird es ein englischsprachiges Publikum, nach weiteren zwanzig Jahren kulturwissenschaftlicher Diskussionen, heute anders lesen? Dazu abschließend vier Anmerkungen.

Erstens: Die postkoloniale Auseinandersetzung mit dem geistigen Erbe der europäischen Aufklärung verlief in der englischsprachigen Fachöffentlichkeit kritischer als die deutsche Diskussion. Sie hat aber ebenfalls nicht zu einer grundsätzlichen Neubewertung der Aufklärung geführt, obwohl es durchaus einige Attacken gegen manche ihrer Protagonisten gegeben hat.[2] Insofern haben Osterhammels Leitthesen die Zeit gut überstanden. Seine Einwände gegen manche Positionen postkolonialer Theoretiker sind auch keineswegs unberechtigt. Wer alle europäischen Äußerungen über Asien (oder andere frühere Kolonialländer) unter Ideologieverdacht stellt, kann sich im Extremfall nur noch in die Sackgasse einer restriktiven Identitätspolitik flüchten, die jeden interkulturellen Dialog erstickt.

Dennoch kann man die Epoche auch kritischer sehen als Osterhammel. Trotz aller Universalismen war „Aufklärung" für die meisten europäischen Gelehrten des 18. Jh.s doch nur etwas für weiße, männliche Europäer. Manche werden daher bei *Unfabling the East* vielleicht den kritischen Stachel vermissen.[3]

Zweitens hat sich die internationale Diskussion auch weiterbewegt. Historische und postkoloniale Studien jüngeren Datums haben sich inzwischen von einer allzu einseitigen Fixierung auf die Dekonstruktion europäischer kolonialer Denkstrukturen gelöst und dabei Wege eingeschlagen, die stärker den Polyzentrismus des europäisch-asiatischen Verhältnisses in den Mittelpunkt rücken. Geschichts- und Kulturwissenschaftler wie Michael H. Fisher, Sanjay Subrahmanyam oder (schon früher) Homi Bhabha räumen den Stimmen der asiatischen „Anderen" weit mehr Platz ein als Osterhammel dies tun kann, weil *Unfabling the East* im Kern ein Buch über Europa ist. Darum muss Osterhammel auch zwangsläufig die meisten asiatischen Akteure übersehen, das heißt all die Munshis und Dolmetscher, Gelehrten und Geistlichen, die als *native informants* den europäischen Beobachtern ihre Kultur nahezubringen versuchten. Die Zeugnisse der asiatischen Seite sind noch immer weniger leicht zugänglich als die europäischen, weniger zahlreich, oftmals auch nur noch indirekt greifbar. Doch es wird immer klarer, dass die „Anderen" keineswegs stumm gewesen sind. Gab es in Asien möglicherweise auch eine gleichzeitige oder wenig später einsetzende „Entzauberung Europas"? Das weiß noch niemand so genau, man wüsste es aber gern. Es ist daher zu vermuten (und zu hoffen), dass sich künftig die historische Forschung unter anderem stärker in eine multiperspektivische Richtung bewegen wird.[4]

Drittens gibt es in *Unfabling the East* charakteristische blinde Flecken, die mit der Themenwahl zu tun haben. Am meisten macht sich das Fehlen einer religionshistorischen Perspektive bemerkbar, nicht zuletzt, weil Europas Asienkenntnisse sehr oft auf den Schriften christlicher Missionare oder auf religionsvergleichenden Studien der frühen Orientalistik beruhten. Darum vollzogen sich die Prozesse von Wissensaneignung und Wissensaustausch im europäisch-asiatischen Kontext sehr häufig im Medium religiöser Kommunikation. Es gab eben viele Aufklärungen, auch solche, die sich im gar nicht so leicht zu entzaubernden Bereich von Mythos und Glauben bewegten. Weil diese Dimension bei Osterhammel weitgehend unsichtbar bleibt, entgehen ihm die vielfältigen, auch wechselseitigen Impulse kultureller Aneignungen auf einem wichtigen Feld sozialer und intellektueller Interaktion. Er kann sie in ihren Auswirkungen auf das westliche Denken lediglich als Zerrbild zwielichtiger Hippiefantasien wahrnehmen.[5]

Und viertens schließlich ist Osterhammels Welt des 18. Jh.s ein ziemlich geschlossener Kosmos aus Texten und Denkmotiven europäischer Gelehrter und Forschungsreisender. Bilder, Karten, fiktionale Literatur, Theater und andere Formen europäischer Repräsentationen Asiens spielen darin keine Rolle. Darum bewegt sich *Unfabling the East* methodisch noch im eher konventionellen Rahmen einer „klassischen" Ideengeschichte. Weil Osterhammel sie aber in interkulturell gewendeter Form präsentiert, kommen bei ihm viele Texte in den Blick, die selbst den Kennern der Epoche noch nicht ohne weiteres bekannt sein dürften. Das gilt im englischsprachigen Raum besonders für die vielen deutschsprachigen Autoren, die in seinem Buch zu Wort kommen. Allerdings gibt es inzwischen auch hier Konkurrenz, zum Beispiel das monumentale Werk von Han F. Vermeulen über die Ursprünge von Ethnographie und Ethnologie in der deutschen Aufklärung.[6]

Trotz dieser Einwände ist es gut, dass die *Entzauberung Asiens* nun in der nuancierten Übersetzung von Robert Savage erschienen ist. Es ist dem Werk zu wünschen, dass es auf Englisch ähnlich inspirierend wirken wird, wie es dies einst auf Deutsch getan hat.

Anmerkungen:

1 Siehe J.-P. Rubiés, Travel and Ethnology in the Renaissance. South India Through European Eyes, 1250–1625, Cambridge 2000.

2 Vgl. pars pro toto die Kantkritik bei G. C. Spivak, A Critique of Postcolonial Reason. Toward a History of the Vanishing Present, Cambridge, Mass./London 1999, S. 1–37.

3 Siehe etwa die Beiträge in D. Carey/L. Festa (Hg.), The Postcolonial Enlightenment. Eighteenth-Century Colonialism and Postcolonial Theory, Oxford 2009; D. Tricoire (Hg.), Enlightened Colonialism. Civilization Narratives and Imperial Politics in the Age of Reason, London 2017.

4 M. H. Fisher, Counterflows to Colonialism. Indian Travellers and Settlers in Britain, 1600–1857, Delhi 2004; S. Subrahmanyam, Europe's India. Worlds, People, Empires 1500–1800, Cambridge, Mass. / London 2017; H. Bhabha, The Location of Culture, London/New York 1994; siehe auch die Beiträge in K. Chatterjee / C. Hawes (Hg.), Europe Observed. Multiple Gazes in Early Modern Encounters, Cranbury, NJ 2010.

5 Siehe z. B. R. King, Orientalism and Religion. Postcolonial Theory, India and "The Mystic East", London 1999; neuerdings auch W. Bulma, Anglican Enlightenment. Orientalism, Religion and Politics in England and Its Empire, 1648–1715, Cambridge 2015.

6 H. F. Vermeulen, Before Boas. The Genesis of Ethnography and Ethnology in the German Enlightenment, Lincoln / London 2015.

Maggie Clinton: Revolutionary Nativism. Fascism and Culture in China, 1925–1937, Durham: Duke University Press 2017, 268 p.

Reviewed by
Thorben Pelzer, Leipzig

When Commandant Chiang Kai-shek (1887–1975) formalized the reunification of a fragmented China in 1928, he led a regime that observers have struggled to classify. Neo-Confucian authoritarian, corporatist, militarist, Leninist, fascist or fascistic are just some of the attributes that academics have bestowed upon Nationalist China's one-party rule. Author Maggie Clinton, associate professor of history at Middlebury College offers a closer examination of the eponymous *Revolutionary Nativism* disseminated by fascists within the party and around the party's vicinity during an extended pre-war Nanjing decade (1925–1937). Clinton uses the term "fascism" in the singular form, thereby arguing for similarities and synergies between different forms of militarist and technocratic ideologies. To her aim, she utilizes primary sources consisting of pamphlets, articles, speeches, and memoirs of a selected group of fascist authors. She also frequently remarks on relevant secondary literature and theories.

Clinton divides her study into five chapters. In the first chapter, she elaborates on the background of the fascistic groups, which, though not formally institutionalized by the Nationalist party, spearheaded fascist influences within the political regime. While the CC Clique (an acronym referring either to the leading brothers Chen or meaning "Central Club") was a civil think-tank and political faction, the Blue Shirts (officially the "Three Principles Society") were a backhand militia. Clinton makes clear that both groups established and disseminated an anti-conservative, anti-communist vision of state rule and social order. The author further provides biographic introductions to their actors. Among these are Chen Guofu (1892–1951), Chen Lifu (1900–2001), Dai Jitao (1891–1949), and Xu Enzeng ("Enceng" in Clinton's transcription; 1896–1985). She gives an overview of associated journals, such as *Sweat and Blood Weekly* (*Hanxue zhoukan*), *Cultural Construction* (*Wenhua jianshe*), and *New Life* (*Xin shengming*), and contextualises their themes against the political background of the post-Sun China.

Chapter two is a careful analysis of the conservatism within pre-war fascism. As Clinton later summarises, the ideology in question was "a regional variant of fascism that […] named Confucianism as the nation's cultural core" (p. 194). The "Janus-faced" ideology – alluding to Chinese traditions while hailing progressiveness – allowed for the utilization of a Confucian-derived system of thought which opposed the emancipation of genders and classes while at the same time envisioning a "modern," industrialist future (p. 64). Clinton then discusses links between fascism and the thought of a revered "father of the nation" Sun Yat-sen (1866–1925), and how the latter was made compatible through fascist interpretations. For Clinton, Chinese fascism was "revolutionary,"

but replaced Marxist class struggle with a propagated harmony between the classes.

Clinton's most compelling arguments can be found in the following chapter. It centres on the othering and dehumanization of communist insurgents. She links these efforts to cultural conflicts of gender, sexuality, and social orders. Communists were framed as inhibiting a "compromised masculinity", as sexual libertines, and as ideologically foreign (p. 112). Their immoral, beast-like behaviour would eventually justify purges, executions, and assassinations. The non-secretive nature of their punitive confinement "normalized the idea that political dissent was criminal" (p. 126).

The author then discusses the policing of the public, concentrating locally on the city of Nanchang, and thematically on the 1930s New Life Movement (*Xin shenghuo yundong*). Fascist commentators criticised dancehalls and promoted uniforms. Rationalization and subordination aimed at the nationalisation of labour. Clinton argues that the movement targeted "maximal efficiency by concentrating power in the hands of experts" and describes the ideal citizens as "cogs in a well-oiled national machine" (pp. 137–138).

The final chapter examines the fascist stance on popular culture. Chen Lifu authored a pamphlet on cinema and its use for mass propaganda. Clinton also explores the failed logic behind the 1933 kidnapping of socialist author Ding Ling (1904–1986). While the chapter remains a little short on actual examples of fascist popular fiction, it includes some of the most interesting visual material of the book. Fascist publications often drew on imaginations of a degenerate lifestyle for their magazine covers, "grant[ing] themselves license to enjoy images that they deemed unhealthy for others" (p. 176).

The book would have profited from additional editing. The "conclusions" ending each main chapter often introduce new information instead of discussing the chapter (e.g. pp. 96–97, 188–189). A few quotes lack citation or are miscited (e.g. Sun on p. 166; p. 182, footnote 63), prominent terms are absent from the list of characters (e.g. *Wenhua jianshe*), indexed page numbers are not properly ordered (Xu, p. 268), inconsistently linked and italicized, and persons and terms are introduced more than once (e.g. Dai, pp. 27, 79; Xu, pp. 31–32, 114; Confucian bonds, pp. 86, 130, 133). Latter repetitions are owed to the (otherwise reasonable) structure of the book. Because chapters are arranged loosely by theme rather than groups or actors, threads are often abandoned and picked up later on. The Duke University layout further tarnishes the readability as there is little aid to distinguish between unnumbered subheadings and sub-subheadings.

While Clinton compares her findings to international forms of fascism and frequently contrasts them to left-wing voices in China, there is a lack of information about dissent by moderate, conservative, and cosmopolitan capitalist actors within the Nationalist camp. While communism was arguably fascism's most iconic counterdraft, it was hardly the only model fascists had to deal with.

Clinton's study serves as an important reminder that what Chinese historiography usually refers to as the "Republican era" was more complex and contested than the term conveys. It is insufficient to characterise Nationalist politics as either fragmented and incompetent or to focus solely

on the development of economy and infrastructure. The author's cultural approach of identifying and analysing fascist elements while resisting the temptation of imposing the label on the entire government will help us in developing a more differentiated understanding of China's first incarnation of one-party-rule.
For readers outside the field of Chinese history, the study provides a state-of-the-art overview of Nationalist China's fascist endeavours and invites for further comparative studies of fascist theory on a global, non-Eurocentric level. Clinton lays out a starting ground through recurring references to Hitler Germany, Fascist Italy, and US Fordism. Her portrayal of Chinese fascism as a rule of experts, with some leading figures coming from an educational background in engineering, may also act as a basis for future comparative research on technocratic governance or in reference to C. P. Snow's "two cultures" dichotomy. The general brevity of both the studied period and the study itself will allow for future researchers to focus on particular actors and publications in detail or to expand in time by exploring Chinese fascism's precursors and legacy.

Ralf Banken / Ben Wubs (eds.): The Rhine. A Transnational Economic History, Baden-Baden: Nomos 2017, 384 S.

Reviewed by
Christian Henrich-Franke, Siegen

The volume is a summary of scientific debates that took place at the first period of conferences organized by the transnational 'RHIN(e)' network. Since 2009, this network brought together scholars from different disciplines in order to bring together research on the economic history of the Rhine. The Rhine has been an economic axis, a borderline of empires, and a place for trade since ancient times. It has been and still is important for large parts of Western Europe. It was even so important for its surrounding economies that the first international organization of modern style – the Central Commission for Navigation on the Rhine (CCNR) – was sat up to regulate inland navigation on the Rhine and to enhance trade alongside the river. Still today, these regions are among the most economically advanced in Europe.
The RHIN(e) network put a number of research questions on its agenda, which were also relevant to the volume to be discussed here. What exactly is the Rhine region or the Rhine economy? What are its spatial dimensions? What are its borders and did they change over time? Was the Rhine one single or different heterogeneous regions? Were the different regions like

Rhine-Neckar, the Ruhr area or the Rotterdam area separate entities, even though, they were densely linked by transport net- works? To what extent was the Rhine the structuring element? The approach to answer these questions is an interregional and a transnational one at the same time in order to avoid a 'traditional study' of regions and their trade relations.

The volume is structured according to the themes and topics of the RHIN(e) conferences and the network's scientific agenda. In an introductory contribution, the editors Ralf Banken and Ben Wubs map the field of the Rhine and the Rhine economy. The first section then turns towards the origins of current day Rhine regulation and trade. It discusses the role of liberal policies, which at the turn of the 18th to the 19th century aimed at limiting tolls and taxes on barging on the Rhine. To guarantee free navigation on the Rhine, the Congress of Vienna set up the CCNR in 1815. In addition, the development of Upper Rhine coal markets between Mannheim and Basel is portrayed as part of regional industrialization. The second section zooms in on the private enterprises and cartels, which played an important role for the development of the Rhine economy. Two contributions deal with the examples of Dutch multinationals in Germany and the Rhenish-Westphalian Coal Syndicate between 1893 and 1945. In the third section, traders and manufacturers of colonial goods and the Rhenish lignite industry are analyzed as individual clusters and sectors of the Rhine economy in the second half of the 19th century. Section four assembles three contributions on infrastructures and ports (oil pipelines, banking and urban restructuring) in the second half of the 20th century. The fifth section explores transport relations and interdependencies throughout the 20th century by discussing container barge transport between the Rhine and the gateway ports in the Rhine-Scheldt Delta and the structure of transport flows on the Rhine in the interwar period. The final section discusses canalization and pollution in the Rhine region from an environmental history perspective. It is, of course, not possible to discuss the fourteen individual chapters of such a voluminous work within this review article. From a very personal perspective I would like to underline that I have still enjoyed reading Nil Disco's article on the BASF's attempts to clean up the Rhine since the 1970s. The article raises interesting questions about the tensions between the company's costs calculations, the water laws of Rhineland-Pfalz, and the international regulations by the European Community and the international Commission for the Protection of the Rhine against Pollution (ICPR).

For me the volume clearly mirrors the intermediate character of the RHIN(e) network. The individual sections mostly cover small periods of the last two centuries – a long term perspective on earlier times is completely missing. The volume has no summary or conclusion, even though, the introduction raises a number of overarching questions and the individual contributions offer rich material and insights. As is often the case in edited volumes, the reader is left alone in compiling his own synopsis. The few sentences at the introduction's end are hardly satisfactory for the reader. What do these articles tell us about the Rhine region and the Rhine economy? Which answers do they give to

the questions that had been discussed by the RHIN(e) network? The editors, in a way, even apologize for only giving a few general and preliminary observations. Unfortunately, the introduction lists the contribution by Christopher Kobrack in the wrong section of the book.

Besides some critical remarks the volume offers rich insights into a field and a topic of (economic) historical research that has been understudied for quite a long time. Therefore, the book is highly recommended.

Hilda Sabato: Republics of the New World. The Revolutionary Political Experiment in Nineteenth-Century Latin America, Princeton: Princeton University Press 2018, 240 p.

Reviewed by
Federica Morelli, Turin

A specialist of the nineteenth-century political history of Argentina, Hilda Sabato offers a valuable and necessary synthetic study of republicanism in nineteenth-century Latin America. This highly readable and accessible volume – full of examples and scarce in footnotes – is suitable for readers who are not necessarily specialists of this particular area and for undergraduates. However, its contributions can equally be useful for those who pursue research on this subject. The author's main objective is explaining the establishment of the republican order as the result of a historical process – the "republican experiment" as she defines it – rather than the application of an intellectual tradition on republicanism. It is not a book on political philosophy, but on the political and social history of nineteenth-century Latin America. Actually, Sabato's volume focuses on mainland Spanish America in the first fifty years after independence, when a common republican pattern developed and prevailed from the 1820s to the 1870s. Therefore, the Caribbean and Brazil are largely neglected.

For a long period, scholars have considered the pervasive volatility of nineteenth-century Spanish American politics as a symptom of the "failed" modernization of the new polities. The narrative of postcolonial failure belongs to a traditional story, according to which the Global South plays either the laggard or the victim to the historical leadership provided by Europe and the United States. The narrative also has a homegrown, Latin American genealogy that goes back to the end of the nineteenth century when oligarchic governments and their supporters found it convenient to discredit the republican experiments they had recently replaced or abandoned. In recent years, however, historians have been leaving behind the teleological perspectives that informed those views and, rather than try to detect obstacles presumably impeding the road to progress, they now explore how politics actually functioned. No longer considered as an exception, Latin American political history is understood in its own terms and part of the wider history of the republic. Nevertheless, both the master narratives of nineteenth-century Latin America and general world histories do not reflect this

historiographical revolution: they still tend to see nineteenth-century Latin American republicanism as merely a façade masking corruption, fraud, and caudillos serving elite interests.[1] Sabato's book succeeds in replacing this older master narrative with a new story in which Latin America's nineteenth-century republics are exciting, often successful experiments in creating new political cultures and practices.

The book is divided in five chapters. Sabato's starting point in the first chapter is the adoption of the principle of popular sovereignty during the independence era and the two problems this engendered: how to legitimize a new political authority and how to define the territorial limits of the new polities. She then explores three fields of practice in which popular sovereignty came to be exercised and contested in postcolonial Latin America: elections, armed citizenship, and public opinion. These three dimensions are analysed in the following three chapters.

Elections, explored in chapter two, had long been ignored, dismissed as meaningless fraudulent pantomimes. Yet, in comparison to nineteenth-century standards, the franchise in Latin American was impressively wide: in most places, all free, nondependent, adult men were enfranchised. Although not all potential voters actually attended the polls, those who did came from a wide social spectrum. Male workers, as well as native and free black people, were able to cast their votes while in Europe or in the United States they were kept from the urns by property or racial restrictions. Sabato carefully reviews how elections worked, the purposes they served, and how they meditated between elite and popular groups. Furthermore, she notes that concerning suffrage rights, participation rates, contested outcomes, fraud, and machine politics, there were more similarities than differences with the United States and Europe.

As the ultimate source of power, the people were not only in charge of electing governments, but also of controlling them regularly. This control rested mainly in the hands of public opinion, on the one hand, and the citizens in arms, on the other. As guardians of popular sovereignty, citizens had the right and the obligation to defend freedom and to bear arms in the face of any abuses of power. This exercise was channelled through the institutions of militias, separate from professional army, analysed in chapter three. It intervened in times of elections and performed important functions in the civic rituals of the republic. Above all, it was a decisive player in the revolutions that became a regular and frequent means to challenge the existing authorities on the charge of alleged despotism. Sabato argues that civil wars, uprising, and caudillos were not exceptional or only representing atavistic, pre-modern violence, but simply part of the nineteenth century's repertoire of politics, emerging out of "complex webs of political transformation brought about by the transition to modernity" (p. 175).

Public opinion is the subject of the last of Sabato's thematic chapters. Formed in the press, on the streets, and in a proliferating web of voluntary associations (such as political clubs, freemasons, guilds, mutual aid associations, patriotic societies), public opinion had a more oblique relation to popular sovereignty than did elections or armed citizenship. It was a crucial source of legitimacy for governments, yet also

stood apart from the direct exercise of power. Even though the periodical press, the association movement, and other instances of public action were sometimes highly politicized, public opinion was at least partially independent from politics, and Sabato argues that it became more so over time.

The last chapter puts together the different dimensions explored in the previous three and advances an interpretation of the shaping of Spanish American republics with a focus on the relationships between the people and the government and the boundaries of inclusion and exclusion from the polity. Sabato posits that the terms of how authority was legitimised were worked through negotiations between the "few" and the "many". The latter had their own agendas to defend and were not mere puppets manipulated by the ruling elites. These dynamics ended in the last third of the nineteenth century, when governments either restricted the franchise or abolished the civic militias or put them under the control of increasingly centralized armies. As Latin America entered the twentieth century, the ideal of popular sovereignty was on the wane and the continent was dominated by centralizing oligarchies with strong anti-liberal tendencies.

Based on an immense new literature on political history of postcolonial Latin America, Sabato's impressive work largely contributes to correct and update the master narrative of politics in the nineteenth century. While most histories of republicanism focus on Europe and the United States, Sabato shows that Spanish American republics can no longer be ignored; instead, their daring adoption of republicanism must be central to any transformations of the nineteenth-century world.

Notes:

1 See for example, J. Osterhammel, The Transformation of the World. A Global History of the Nineteenth Century, trans. P. Camiller, Princeton 2014, p. 478; C. A. Bayly, The Birth of the Modern World 1780–1914. Global Connections and Comparisons, Malden, MA 2004, p. 147.

Steven Seegel: Map Men. Transnational Lives and Deaths of Geographers in the Making of East Central Europe, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press 2018, 346 p.

Reviewed by
George W. White, Brookings

Steven Seegel presents a fascinating telling of the professional lives of five prominent geographers, how their lives intertwined, strengthened, and strained with the ebb and flow of peace and war. He calls it a love story. The five are Albrecht Penck (German) (1858–1945), Eugeniusz Romer (Polish) (1871–1954), Stepan Rudnyst'kyi (Ukrainian) (1877–1937), Isaiah Bowman (American) (1878–1950), and Count Pál Teleki (Hungarian) (1879–1941). As Chapter One's title indicates, "Professor Penck's Pupils", Albrecht Penck was a mentor to the others. Not only was Penck older than the others, his language and culture was German, the core of a broader "East Central Europe" ("Ostmitteleuropa") culture. Modern academic structures and thinking were framed by

Ostmitteleuropa's culture and remain largely intact today. Because the others also were products of Ostmitteleuropa culture, indeed they also could understand German, Seegel labels them "Anglophile Germans" and "transnational Germans".

Within the academic culture of Ostmitteleuropa was the discipline of geography with its own particular language of maps. Seegel's interest in these five geographers lies in their abilities to "speak map" and in how they employed their map-speaking abilities to advance up the rungs of academia and society. His interests lead him to discover the human beings hidden behind these men's professional personas and how their human frailties compromised their integrities. In his own words, "The book's core argument is that interest in maps was often pathological, a sign of frustration and unfulfilled personal ambition along with a lot of other emotions – fear, petty jealousy, and resentment – that nestled inside provincial, contradictory, and closed professional worlds of privilege, learning, and authority" (p. 3). In pursuing his goal, Seegel structures his book around four points: "(1) the place-based *homo geographicus* who 'spoke map'; (2) the basic, illiberal tasks of geographers and geography as a science; (3) state-side geography as revisionist; and (4) geography as affective, in and through letters".

Seegel constructs the personalities of these five men through his analysis of their personal writings: letters, memoirs, archival documents, etc. Though gaps in material existed, he was able to collect numerous documents, enough to write captivating biographies of these men. Seegel narrates the stories of these five men in seven chapters plus an introduction and a conclusion. He could have devoted a chapter to each man, but this would have put more of a burden on the reader to connect these men's lives afterwards. Interestingly, Seegel juggles these men's stories through the entire book, continually switching between individuals in every few pages. A potentially confusing method for the reader to follow, Seegel's deft writing skill makes such a narration work. The reader is able to clearly see how these men's lives intertwined and how their relationships evolved over time. Chapter 1 introduces the men by revealing their family backgrounds and places of origin. Their backgrounds varied, ranging from Isaiah Bowman's family of preachers, teachers, and farmers to Pál Teleki's aristocratic origins. Entering the elite echelons of academia, Seegel describes these men as ambitiously wanting to become more than who they were. The rest of the chapters flesh out this narrative theme.

Seegel labels the five map men members as a "confraternity of scientists across borders" who developed their deep bonds before World War I. In the colonial tradition, they even met for grand excursions such as the Transcontinental Excursion (of America) in 1912. World War I then divided the confraternity into winners and losers. On the winning side were Bowman (America) and Romer (Polish), who both then rose to prominence. As the director of the American Geographical Society, Bowman became the chief territorial specialist for the American delegation at the Paris Peace Conference. He oversaw the creation of the maps that informed the diplomats who redrew Europe's boundaries. For Poland, he relied on Romer's Polish map narrations. In contrast, Penck (German) and Teleki (Hungarian) were os-

tracized and their geographical work was ignored outside their respective countries. For example, German geographers were either banned from or boycotted meetings of the International Geographical Union well into the 1930s. Stepan Rudnyts'kyi also was excluded by Bowman and Romer because his pro-Ukrainian map narrations conflicted with Romer's pro-Polish ones. After the war, the city of Lwow (Lviv) was incorporated into the new Poland and its university Polonized. Rudnyts'kyi felt unable to return to this city. Instead, he moved to Kharkov (Kharkiv) and became a professor of geography, but was arrested by the Bolsheviks in 1933 and executed in 1937.

Despite the divisions created by the war, these men appeared to do what they could to maintain their confraternity that was born during illiberal imperial-colonial times. However, Seegel argues that these men revised themselves into the liberal international order of the nation-state that emerged after 1918. Subsequently, these men increasingly championed their nations' causes until their national loyalties intertwined with their personal and professional ambitions. Consequently, their nations' rivalries created professional rivalries along the identical fault lines that divided their nations. The divisions, as described above, deepened until the differences became irreconcilable, especially with World War II.

The book's greatest weakness is that Seegel never mentions the concept of environmental determinism though it was one of geography's dominant paradigms in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Even those geographers who did not subscribe to it had to acknowledge and contend with it. Like eugenics and many other ideas of that time, it was inspired by Darwinism and made geography very much a part of the family of disciplines. Eventually, environmental determinism, eugenics, and other ideas were found wanting and were abandoned as scientific knowledge advanced as is the case with many paradigms. The challenge with reconstructing the lives of historical figures is to accurately depict the context of an earlier time. Environmental determinism was an aspect of that context, but Seegel never mentions it though he provides numerous quotes that succinctly illustrate it. Consequently, he fills the vacuum that he creates with a mixture of general historical context of colonialism turned nationalism and the petty egotism of social and scientific wannabees. The latter is driven by a critical theory perspective that does not see beyond personal agendas and highlights sexism, biological racism, anti-communism, anti-Semitism, Western civilization chauvinism, etc. Certainly, these existed and already have been investigated by others. Seegel adds little to the discussions of these concepts though he frequently bandies about these terms. For example, concerning sexism, he only notes that Bowman "did not regard his daughter Olive as worthy of the same professional training" as his two sons (p. 102). In short, Seegel finds the five map men guilty of being men of their times. Perhaps a hundred years from now, an academic will look back and claim that academics at this time also led transnational lives: born and educated in the pre-digital age, yet desirous of success in the digital age while being driven forward by "unfulfilled personal ambition along with lots of other emotions". In other words, we too may

be judged guilty of being products of our time.
Seegel's book has two components. The first is a well-researched reconstruction of the professional lives of five historical figures. The second is critical theory commentary unnecessarily draped over the lives of these five men. Seegel's book is highly recommended for its first component.

Arnošt Štanzel: Wasserträume und Wasserräume im Staatssozialismus. Ein umwelthistorischer Vergleich anhand der tschechoslowakischen und rumänischen Wasserwirtschaft 1948–1989, Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht 2017, 378 S.

Rezensiert von
Luminita Gatejel, Regensburg

Arnošt Štanzels Dissertation analysiert den Umgang der tschechoslowakischen und rumänischen staatssozialistischen Eliten mit der Wasserwirtschaft und bietet eine umwelthistorische Perspektive auf die infrastrukturelle Erschließung von Naturräumen. Gleich zu Anfang distanziert sich der Autor zu Recht vom Topos des Ökozids und vermeidet somit einen verzerrten Blick auf das Mensch-Natur-Verhältnis im Ostblock. Anhand von mehreren Einzelbeispielen, gleichmäßig verteilt über die gesamte staatssozialistische Periode, gelingt dieser Studie eine facettenreiche Untersuchung dieses so wichtigen Themas für aufkommende oder gestandene Industriegesellschaften des 20. Jhs.
Die Monographie verfolgt zwei Analyseebenen. Erstens vergleicht die Studie das Verhältnis der kommunistischen Eliten in der Tschechoslowakei und in Rumänien zur Natur, um Gemeinsamkeiten und Unterschiede innerhalb des Ostblocks auszuarbeiten. Anderseits fragt sie, ob es ein spezifisches Naturverhältnis im Ostblock gab, und platziert die staatssozialistische Umwandlung der Natur allgemein in den Kontext der Moderne. Die Arbeit ist in drei Themenschwerpunkte gegliedert, die sich auf Eingriffe in den Bergen, die Nutzung der Donau und die Wasserverschmutzung beziehen. Die ersten beiden Themen sind in zwei Länderkapitel unterteilt, die wiederum vor allem im rumänischen Teil mehrere Fallbeispiele vorstellen. Allerdings unterbricht diese Kleinteiligkeit nicht nur den Lesefluss, sie verursacht auch Redundanzen. Ein etwas ausführlicher dargestelltes Beispiel pro Land hätte wohl genügt, um die Thesen der Arbeit zu untermauern. Der Bau von Staudämmen in den Bergen bietet tiefe Einblicke in frühe Bemühungen die osteuropäischen Länder, nach stalinistischem Modell umzubauen. Der Traum von der Elektrifizierung beflügelte Planer und Entscheidungsträger, daran zu glauben, dass sie die sozio-ökonomische Zusammensetzung sowohl der umliegenden Region als auch des ganzen Landes grundlegend verändern könnten. Daran war das Versprechen vom Wohlstand und der Anhebung des Lebensstandards geknüpft. Ausgehend von diesen gemeinsamen Voraussetzungen konnte die spätere Nutzung der Staudämme in den beiden Ländern nicht unterschiedlicher ausfallen. In Rumänien wurden die Vidraru- und

Bicaz-Staudämme zu wichtigen Energie- und Wasserlieferanten für die Tiefebene, um dort eine intensive Landwirtschaft zu ermöglichen. In der Tschechoslowakei bewirkte der Orava-Damm eine zaghafte Industrialisierung in der unmittelbaren Umgebung. Die wichtigste Erneuerung, die das Bauwerk einleitete, war jedoch die touristische Erschließung der Karpatenregion. Eine weitere Folge dieser Neugestaltung war, dass immer größere Flächen unter Naturschutz gestellt wurden. In der Bewertung dieser divergierenden Entwicklungen, verbindet der Autor den Naturschutz mit Nachhaltigkeit und das Fehlen derartiger Bestrebungen in Rumänien mit Ressourcenausbeutung. Allerdings stellt sich die Frage, ob Naturschutz und Ausbeutungen, die einzigen zur Verfügung stehenden Alternativen sind und ob die beiden Begriffe so eindeutig diametral sind, wenn man bedenkt, dass sowohl Industrialisierung als auch Naturschutz schwerwiegende soziale und ökonomische Konflikte verursachen können.

Der zweite thematische Schwerpunkt, die Umgestaltung der Donau, bietet v. a. Einblicke in die hoch komplexen Aushandlungsprozesse innerhalb des Staatsapparates oder zwischen regionalen und zentralen Behörden, die den „entwickelten Sozialismus“ charakterisierten. Im Hinblick auf die Regulierung der slowakischen Donaustrecke steht im Mittelpunkt der Untersuchung der Austausch zwischen Regierung und planenden Experten. Mit Bezug auf den Bau des Wasserkraftwerks Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros und die angestrebte Trockenlegung der Donauauen gelingt dem Autor eine differenzierte Analyse der vielen Faktoren, die einen erfolgreichen Abschluss dieser Projekte ermöglichten. Neben der großen Abhängigkeit von Fachwissen bei der Entscheidungsfindung wird noch auf die bilateralen tschechoslowakisch-ungarischen Verhandlungen, die Zusammenarbeit im RGW, den Einfluss vor allem ungarischer Umweltaktivisten und die agency des Flusses selbst eingegangen. Štanzels Fazit lautet, dass die tschechoslowakische politische und technische Elite, obwohl sie an dem Glauben festhielt, die Natur durch ihre Eingriffe verbessern zu können, keine rücksichtslose Umgestaltung durchsetzte.

Die Darstellung zur rumänischen Donau ist wesentlich fragmentierter und kommt gegenüber der Darstellung tschechoslowakischer Verhältnisse oft zu kurz. Wichtige Aspekte werden nur erwähnt. Der Bau des Staudamms am Eisernen Tor weist die meisten Ähnlichkeiten mit dem slowakischen Fall auf, eignet sich aber schlecht für einen Vergleich mit dem Bau des Schwarzmeerkanals, der anderen staatswirtschaftlichen Zwecken diente und auf einer anderen Expertise beruhte. Der Abschnitt zur Trockenlegung ist zeitlich und räumlich zersplittert und lässt sich nur schwer in eine Arbeit einordnen, die einen dezidiert vergleichenden Ansatz verfolgt. Ohne die Befunde zu den einzelnen Fallbeispielen in Frage zu stellen, kann ihr Mehrwert aus dem Vergleich bezweifelt werden. Zum Beispiel spielten Planer und Wissenschaftler auch in Rumänien eine wichtige Rolle bei der Ausführung dieser Projekte, aber deren Einfluss wird nur sporadisch erwähnt und nicht systematisch analysiert wie im slowakischen Fall. Auch werden die Verhandlungen zwischen Rumänien und Jugoslawien im Fall des Staudamms am Eisernen Tor nicht denjenigen zwischen der Tschechoslowakei und

Ungarn gegenübergestellt. Gefragt wird ebenfalls nicht, ob die flächendeckende Gewinnung von neuem Ackerland entlang der rumänischen Donau im Vergleich zu den viel bescheideneren Eingriffen in der Slowakei auch gravierendere soziale Konflikte verursachte.

Der dritte thematische Schwerpunkt zur Wasserversorgung ist auch der homogenste von allen, weil er auf eine ähnliche Entwicklung in beiden Ländern hinweist. Die Wasserverschmutzung wurde in beiden Ländern zunehmend zu einem Problem; trotz einzelner Versuche zu ihrer Bekämpfung war wegen des angestrebten Wirtschaftswachstums kein effektiver Schutz der Gewässer und des Grundwassers möglich. An dieser Stelle rechnet Štanzel endgültig mit der immer noch weit verbreiteten Annahme ab, dass im Ostblock keine Vorstellungen und auch keine Praktiken von Nachhaltigkeit existierten. Die Wasserqualität stand vermehrt im Fokus mehrerer legislativer und politischer Entscheidungen, die auch die aktive Beteiligung der Bevölkerung ermöglichten. Ein Grund für das partielle Scheitern dieser Kampagnen war der Geld- und Arbeitskräftemangel, der verhinderte, dass genügend Kläranlagen gebaut wurden. In der Darstellung zu Rumänien geht der Autor auf tiefgreifende Konflikte innerhalb der Bürokratien ein, weil sich mehrere Ministerien weigerten, Geld aus dem Produktionsprozess umzuwidmen. Auch in diesem Fall würde eine ausführlichere Untersuchung dieser Konflikte genauere Einblicke in Entscheidungsprozesse staatssozialistischer Regierungen ermöglichen, die keineswegs monolithisch, sondern von vielschichtigen Aushandlungsmechanismen gekennzeichnet waren.

In der Schlussfolgerung hält der Autor wichtige Erkenntnisse für die Historiographie des Ostblocks fest. Erstens, dass das Mensch-Natur-Verhältnis der beiden Länder sich über die Zeit wandelte und sich vor allem in der Tschechoslowakei hin zu mehr Nachhaltigkeit entwickelte. Zweitens distanziert er sich von einem spezifischen staatssozialistischen Umgang mit der Natur, indem er starke Parallelen zu kapitalistischen Gesellschaften benennt. In diesem Zusammenhang plädiert er dafür, die Umgestaltung der Natur in den allgemeinen Kontext der Moderne zu platzieren statt nach vermeintlichen Alleinstellungsmerkmalen im Ostblock zu suchen. Und drittens veranschaulicht der Autor, dass der Umgang mit der Natur viel dynamischer vonstattenging, als es die ältere Literatur dargestellt hatte. An diese sehr wertvollen Ergebnisse können jetzt weitere Studien anknüpfen und vor allem auf die sozialen Konflikte eingehen, die eine so radikale Umgestaltung verursacht haben.

Sebastian Berg: Intellectual Radicalism After 1989. Crisis and Re-Orientation in the British and the American Left, Bielefeld: Transkript 2016, 344 S.

Reviewed by
A. Shahid Stover, New York

As a significant study and measured intellectual history of Marxist theory and socialist discourse bleeding out of mainstream Leftist journals in response to the geopolitical collapse of the Soviet Union and the subsequent demise of the Eastern Bloc, *Intellectual Radicalism After 1989* clinically refuses to indulge in any grand pronouncements akin to Francis Fukuyama's infamous claim of the 'end of history'.[1] Instead, Sebastian Berg exhibits an analytical temperament of numbing glacial objectivity as he tediously mines a vast array of epistemological tensions and political apologetics engaged in by the mainstream Left to account for its historic failure at consummating and sustaining an authentic socialist political project within Western Europe or the United States.

To be clear, the value of this work lies not in its novelty, but rather in Berg's remarkable achievement of meticulously cataloging oppositional thought, as exemplified and filtered through the political orientations and theoretical trajectories of *New Left Review* and *Socialist Register* in Great Britain and *Monthly Review* and *Dissent* in the United States, against the globalized tide of advanced neo-liberal capitalist hegemony. However, Berg is extremely careful in refusing to confront the historical crisis of orthodox Leftist perspectives that he surveys head on. Rather, his prose discloses a deconstructive methodology which, "considering the narrative intention of the texts, it nevertheless reads them with questions in mind that are in many cases different from the questions the writers addressed in their articles and from the purposes their texts served" (p. 17). This strategy has the effect, desired or not, of allowing the editorial decisions and theoretical preoccupations of such notable figures like Irving Howe, Paul Sweezy, Perry Anderson, and Ralph Miliband to ultimately contribute towards a quieting condemnation of whatever combined vestiges of Marxist theory and socialist democracy they still creatively endorsed in the immediate aftermath of the political dissolution of Soviet style nation-state communism in 1989.

Of key importance to understanding the scope of this work is a fundamental paradox introduced into Leftist thought by the failed project of Soviet communism particularly to radical orientations existing in Western Europe and the United States. For as Berg asserts, "this constitutes a paradox because Western Marxism in most of its shades had for a long time distanced itself from really existing socialism" (p. 7). Indeed, can anyone really dispute that Western Marxism had been at least consistently critical, if not openly hostile to "really existing socialism" (p. 7), be it manifest in closed social formations of Eastern Europe or within open social formations of the imperial mainstream in Western metropoles? As such, Berg's study presents enough evidentiary momentum

towards suggesting that the geopolitical trajectory of socialist projects themselves lent even more historical credence to a discursive abandonment of once untouchable dogmatic pillars of Marxist theory. The lived implausibility of economic determinism, dialectical materialism, and blind messianic faith in the working-class as the singular motor of linear historical progress thus fueled Post-Marxism as poststructuralist inflected reconfigurations that ultimately obscure if not completely abandon such blatant theoretical vulnerabilities of Marxist thought.

What eventually comes to the fore, however, is a disconcerting geopolitical complicity of Marxism, which though in historical opposition to capital, finds itself alarmingly at peace with Empire, or as Marx himself discloses, "in fact the veiled slavery of the wage labourers in Europe needed the unqualified slavery of the New World as its pedestal."[2]

As such, fundamental to this Post-Marxist orientation is a quietist resignation to the parliamentary democratic simulacrum of a civil society that is predicated upon racist dehumanization and coloniality.[3] As Berg's work notably documents, "Marxism's anti-imperialist internationalism has been replaced by an acceptance of the capitalist world system which again can only be changed incrementally" (p. 44). Post-Marxism thus indulges in a cathartic liberal disavowal of the revolutionary human agency required to overthrow unjust structural-inert power, as inherently totalitarian. Of course, then, "it follows from this approach that the traditional Marxist conception of revolution has run its course" (p. 43).

A question never the less arises to the astute reader. In what sense then can such contemporary orientations of Marxism still be considered radical? Or if we are to take DuBois[4] seriously, or even Foucault[5], just how radical was Marxism itself in relation to modernity as imposed by western imperialist power? Berg himself accurately captures this tension as "between radical critique and moderate recommendations" (p. 309) which is damning in its accurate depiction of the obvious stalemate which encompasses any claim to radicalism within the imperial mainstream to say the least. Intellectual Radicalism after 1989 is a scholarly testament to Berg's clear-sighted devotion to the primacy of empirical research as he compiles an impressive array of theoretical wreckage and geopolitical failure as aspirations towards a socialism, which by its sheer historical emphasis on a materialist causality, never actually materializes in history. And yet, simultaneously implicit in the work itself is an unremitting persistence of Marxist critique as an emancipatory imperative of redemption within modernity itself as a concerted systematic opposition to the contemporary behemoth of globalized capital.

However, was it not Sartre who warned us explicitly, that "you cannot, with impunity, form generations of men by imbuing them with successful, but false, ideas. What will happen if materialism stifles the revolutionary design to death one day?"[6] If we are too follow the epistemological implications of Berg's work, indeed, it would seem that such a day is now upon us.

Notes

1 F. Fukuyama, The End of History and The Last Man, New York 1992.

2 Karl Marx, Capital, vol. 1, New York [1867] 1990, p. 925.

3 A. Quijano, "Coloniality of Power, Eurocentrism and Latin America", in: M. Morana, E. Dussel, and C. A. Juaregui (eds.), Coloniality at Large, Durham 2008, pp. 181–224.

4 "Modern imperialism and modern industrialism are one and the same system; root and branch of the same tree. The race problem is the other side of labor problem; … remembering always that empire is the heavy hand of capital abroad … this almost naïve setting of the darker races beyond the pale of democracy and of modern humanity … involves two things – acquiescence of the darker peoples and agreement between capital and labor in white democracies." W. E. B. DuBois, "The Negro Mind Reaches Out", in: The New Negro, ed. by A. Locke, New York [1925] 1992, pp. 386, 402. Emphasis mine.

5 "At the deepest level of Western knowledge, Marxism introduced no real discontinuity; it found its place without difficulty, as a full, quiet, comfortable and, goodness knows, satisfying form for a time (its own), within an epistemological arrangement that welcomed it gladly (since it was this arrangement that was in fact making room for it) and that it, in return, had no intention of disturbing and, above all, no power to modify, even one jot, since it rested entirely upon it." M. Foucault, The Order of Things, New York 1966, 1994, p. 261.

6 J.-P. Sartre, Materialism and Revolution, Literary and Philosophical Essays, New York 1946, 1962, p. 256.

Inhaltsverzeichnis des 28. Jahrgangs 2018

Aufsätze

Forum

Buchbesprechungen

Autorinnen und Autoren

Nickson Bondo Museka
PhD, Ottawa
nicksonmuseka@gmail.com

Katharina P. W. Döring
M. A., Universität Leipzig
katharina.doering@uni-leipzig.de

Ulf Engel
Prof. Dr., Universität Leipzig
uengel@uni-leipzig.de

Luminita Gatejel
Dr., Institut für Ost- und Südosteuropaforschung Regensburg
gatejel@ios-regensburg.de

Fana Gebresenbet Erda
PhD, Addis Ababa University
fana.g@ipss-addis.org

Christian Henrich-Franke
PhD, Universität Siegen
franke@geschichte.uni-siegen.de

Jens Herpolsheimer
M. A., Universität Leipzig
jens.herpolsheimer@uni-leipzig.de

Matthias Middell
Prof. Dr., Universität Leipzig
middell@uni-leipzig.de

Federica Morelli
PhD, University of Turin
federica.morelli@unito.it

Thorben Pelzer
M. A., Universität Leipzig
thorben.pelzer@uni-leipzig.de

A. Shahid Stover
PhD, The Brotherwise Dispatch, New York City
brotherwisedispatch@gmail.com

Sven Trakulhun
PD. Dr., Universität Konstanz
sven.trakulhun@uni-konstanz.de

George W. White
Prof. Dr., South Dakota State University
george.white@sdstate.edu

Dawit Yohannes Wondemagegnehu
PhD, Institute for Security Studies, Addis Ababa
dawiyohalv@gmail.com