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Lynn Schler / Ulf Engel (Eds.)

The Momentous 1960s – Reflections on an African Decade

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Ed. by
Lynn Schler and Ulf Engel

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Rezensionen

Editorial

Writing the history of containers – national, regional, or continental – looks rather outdated today. World and global histories search for connections between societies and for common features that characterize the development of such societies. But this exercise proves difficult for many reasons. One of them is a very practical challenge: to master the necessary languages to access both sources and specialized literature for more than a few societies quickly reaches its limits. Collective work of specialists with different regional expertise has become the attractive modus to overcome this difficulty. Another challenge is the fact that connections not only increase in number but also overlap and become confusing the larger the timespan investigated. A solution to this problem seems to be a focus on single years or decades. Consequently, the number of books dealing with "global years" and combing secondary literature for as many regions as possible to discover the links between them for a specific twelve-month period has increased since global history has become à la mode.

This often goes hand in hand with the assumption that this particular year is a caesura for more than one society and world region while revealing broader transformation of, for example, the international system – as is the case with the Seven Years' War as the opening of the Anglo-French competition for worldwide hegemony or with the two world wars of the twentieth century – or major revolutions – such as the American, the French, or the Russian ones in 1776, 1789, and 1917 respectively. A similar point of no return has obviously been 1989 as the end of a short twentieth century or the end of the Cold War. But other authors relativize the character of such a punctual caesura and use the concept of the "global year" to undermine the importance of another year. Such an approach occurred with studies on 1979 – with the parallel challenge to the two superpowers' hegemony by the Iranian revolution and the Mujahedin in Afghanistan as well as by the election of the Polish pope and the opening of China's economy – which is presented as similarly decisive as 1989.

Comparativ | Zeitschrift für Globalgeschichte und vergleichende Gesellschaftsforschung 29 (2019) Heft 4, S. 7–8.

For those who are not satisfied with the singular focus on one year, the next scale is obviously the decade. Once again, the growing number of books and even series addressing global change as taking place over a period of less than a dozen years demonstrates that such a framing also allows for productive cross-cultural studies. While the study of a year unquestionably privileges events over structures and processes, the decade as a preferred framework invites a more balanced view on events. This view uncovers the process of gaining global importance, which often only happens in retrospective when the departing processes become transparent for more than a few places and when we get access to material that allows the significance attributed to those events to be measured by the contemporaries and the first cohort of commentators. Only from this perspective are we able to apply a semi-constructivist approach to global moments. Such moments obviously do not exist per se – but they are full of potential to be seen as such. But this potential has to be realized before we can call them global moments. Neither natural catastrophes nor pandemics and neither wars nor sensational technological innovations intrinsically constitute global moments. Actors are needed that make these moments important by loading them with meaning beyond the individual facts, therefore anchoring them in collective consciousness and memory.

Investigating a decade and its meaning for a world region, as is the case here with the sixties and Africa, contributes to a better understanding of such processes. It does not mean that it is a global moment, but it may be a moment full of potential to be absorbed into the collective memory of Africans, of pan-Africanists all over the world, of those seeking decolonization and independence, or of those interested in the establishment of new transregional ties or the new ways of integrating a region into world economy. But underlining the potential of a moment of global importance also invites a rethinking of the processes of forgetting. In the light of later development, the original powerful interpretation loses attractiveness or is consciously overwritten by other interpretations. Political independence has not led to economic sovereignty – the dreams connected to decolonization are in conflict with the ongoing neglect of recognition. Evidently, these traumata work on the collective perception of the sixties and have led to remembrance that differs from the original enthusiasm. But while a potential meaning has not necessarily materialized, the mechanism works the other way around as well: the meaning attributed to a historical period in the following decades can change later on again. Insofar, historiographical reconstruction, as provided in this thematic issue, is an invitation to reconsider the narratives that have become powerful.

Matthias Middell / Katja Naumann

Introduction: The Momentous 1960s – Reflections on an African Decade

Lynn Schler / Ulf Engel

On 6–8 January 2019 the Tamar Golan Africa Centre at Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Beer Sheva, the "Apartheid Stops" European Research Council Project at Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Jerusalem, and the Centre for Area Studies / Collaborative Research Centre (SFB) 1199 at Leipzig University organised an interdisciplinary international conference on the 1960s in Africa. The conference was held at both the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Israel. More than 50 scholars and students from Africa, the African diaspora, the United States, Israel and Germany participated and discussed some 30 presentations.[1]

The 1960s was a decade of revolutionary changes throughout Africa. At this juncture across the continent, histories of colonialism, decolonization, the Cold War, nationalism, pan-Africanism and independence intermingled, with critical consequences for nations, communities and individuals. More than any other period of the 20th century, the 1960s was an era of immense, radical and contradictory possibilities. A massive range of ideologies, political agendas, economic developments, cultural styles and social changes were experimented with, and a sense of opportunity found expression everywhere. From the newly decolonized to those enduring the most extreme forms of racist minority rule, the 1960s was an era of heightened expectations and aspirations – some fulfilled and others held in abeyance. This conference aimed at consolidating a growing body of work

1 For the programme see <https://in.bgu.ac.il/SiteAssets/Pages/events/african-60s/Momentous-60s.pdf> (accessed 8 February 2020).

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addressing the 1960s in Africa as an era of monumental significance that requires more scrutiny and analysis.[2]

Focusing on the 1960s opens up new opportunities for understanding how local, national, transnational and international phenomena intersect and give birth to new kinds of circulations, imaginaries, and initiatives. A wide-ranging examination of this era brought into focus the intersections and overlaps between local experiences across the continent at this time, despite the immense diversity that characterized the political, economic and cultural histories of the period. Participants discussed how the 1960s serves as a framework of analysis for understanding changes and continuities. Among others, debates centred on the following questions: What kinds of opportunities and innovations were unique to this era, and how were other alliances made obsolete at this time? How do we adjudicate the success or failure of momentous events or social movements, and at what scale of resolution-local, national, or transnational? How have African actors aimed at repositioning the continent and their societies in a new way in the changing global order? How did actors in other parts of the world re-evaluate the role of Africa in the potentially emergent new world order?[3] How does the period look when we refrain from focusing exclusively on the behaviour of political elites? How do events in Africa impact events elsewhere, in anticipating, for instance, the revolutionary ferment of May 1968 in Europe, as recent scholarship is beginning to suggest? How have dynamics on the African continent challenged the position and strategies of former metropoles as well as those of the emerging superpowers of the Cold War? Might we develop arguments for the "long 1960s" modelled on notions of the "long civil rights movement" in the United States, for instance, to suggest that in some respects at least, the 1960s in Africa began in the late 1950s?[4]

As scholars increasingly grapple with the consequences of decolonisation, nation-building, liberation struggles, social development and economic expansion that characterised much of the continent's history at this time, this conference enabled new understandings of both commonalities and exceptions in current research. Some emergent paradigms with regard to histories of the 1960s in Africa were successfully consolidated, and new models and trends introduced.

In this volume of Comparative, five articles are published which were developed from presentations at the "The Momentous Sixties: Reflections on an African Decade". They are representative of the broad spectrum of topics discussed at the conference. First, in her article "'A new phase of anti-imperialist cooperation': The making of liberation alliances in 1960s' (unliberated) Southern Africa" Ana Moledo from the Centre of Area Studies at Leipzig University traces the most significant forms of cooperation that existed

2 See, for instance, B. Talton, Introduction: 1960s Africa in Historical Perspective: An Introduction, in: Journal of Black Studies 43 (2012) 1, pp. 3–10.

3 A point that has been raised by, among others, P. Manning, African and World Historiography, in: Journal of African History 54 (2013) 3, pp. 319–330. See also A. Eckert, Scenes from a Marriage. African History and Global History, in: Comparativ 29 (2019) 2, pp. 36–51.

4 C.B. Strain, The Long Sixties: America, 1955–1973, Hoboken 2016.

among Southern African liberation movements over the decade and examines the agency of the movements themselves vis-à-vis the interference of international organisations in the creation of these alliances as well as their immediate outcomes. Second, in her contribution "Between Ideology and Policy: Dilemmas of Leadership in the Postcolonial 1960s in Zambia" Lynn Schler, a senior lecturer in African history in the Department of Politics and Government and the director of the Tamar Golan Africa Centre at Ben-Gurion University of the Negev in Israel, investigates the rise and fall of the Kafuba and Kafulafuta cooperative settlements established in the Zambian Copperbelt regime under the regime of President Kenneth Kaunda. Against the backdrop of both Kaunda's ideology of humanism and Israeli-Zambian development cooperation, these cooperatives were modelled on Israeli *moshav* settlements, and established and run under the supervision of Israeli technical advisors who were brought to Zambia. The article focusses on the period 1968 to 1973 when the Organisation of African Unity called on member states to cut ties with Israel. Third, Ulf Engel from the Institute of African Studies at Leipzig University revisits the early history of the Organisation of African Unity (1963–1969). Four broad topics are discussed: the political aims of the organisation; the continental body's role in global politics and the way independent African states have impacted on the United Nations, the Non-Aligned Movement and the Commonwealth; the development of intra-African relations; and possible reasons for the general underperformance of the OAU's in particular with regard to violent conflict on the continent in those years. Fourth, Hakeem Ibikunle Tijani, based at the National Open University of Nigeria, discussed the International Labour Organisation and its Bureau for Workers' Activities (ACTRAV) in Sub-Saharan Africa on the eve of independence. This article examines ILO's roles and impacts in some African nations in the mid- to late-1950s as it strived to make a mark in the merging independent nations. It examines challenges and accomplishments particularly in the area of labour union education. Fifth, Jean-Lémon Koné from the ÉHESS Paris discusses how independence accelerated the careers of Ivorian Teachers, 1958–1974. Using a biographical history approach within a micro history of primary education on Côte d'Ivoire, Koné reconstructs the opportunities to Francophone Africa in terms of recomposition of civic and institutional statuses that where intrinsic to colonialism.

Many questions raised by the conference, *The Momentous 60s: Reflections on an African Decade*, still need to be explored in more detail. From a comparative historiographical perspective, focusing on a decade may seem arbitrary, despite the major societal and cultural changes that took place across the continent in the Sixties. Yet, our collaboration confirmed that a decade provides a new lens from which to look at African history. Going forward, we should draw inspiration and comparisons from research rooted in other places, such as the vast body of studies looking at, or seeing through, the "60s" in the West.[5] In the study of the 1960s in Africa, there are many that lingering questions

5 See, for instance, M.J. Heale, The Sixties as History: A Review of the Political Historiography, in: Reviews in American History 33 (2005) 1, pp. 133–152; H. Simon, Framing the American 1960s: A historiographical review, in:

that can serve as the foundation for more work: What are the key trajectories around the processes of decolonisation (also as compared to the academic state of the art of the 1960s and 1970s)? Where have political and institutional path-dependencies developed, and how can the concrete historic entanglements of various African and non-African actors be accounted for? How exactly are developments in Africa embedded in the global dynamics of the 1960s – how did changes in Africa, for instance, relate to mass movements for social and political change in what then was called "the first world"? And what are the various shadows the 1960s have cast onto the future? The early 1960s were clearly marked by collective and individual anticipation about future prospects in many fields, but by the late 1960s, these were already replaced by disenchantment in view of closed political and societal opportunities? And what about the 1970s? We suggest that looking at the 1970s also promises to trigger news ways of understanding African histories in all their complexity.

We will continue the debate.

European Journal of American Culture 31 (2012) 1, pp. 5–23; L. Robinson / C. Warne, Investigating the Sixties at a sixties institution: teaching as historiography, in: Historical Research 87 (2014) 235, pp. 154–177; and L. Netter / O. Gruner, Steal this History: historiography, the Sixties and the comic, in: Rethinking History 21 (2017) 4, pp. 506–528.

"A New Phase of Anti-Imperialist Cooperation":[1] The Making of Liberation Alliances in 1960s' (Unliberated) Southern Africa

Ana Moledo

ABSTRACTS

Seit ihrem Beginn in den 1960er Jahren waren die Befreiungskämpfe im südlichen Afrika in ihrem Charakter transnational und transregional. Neben den Beziehungen zu den Mächten des Kalten Krieges gewannen gegen Ende der Dekade die Beziehungen der Befreiungsbewegungen untereinander an Bedeutung. Dieser Artikel untersucht die wichtigsten Kooperationsabkommen zwischen den Bewegungen und den Prozess, der 1969 in Khartum zur Konsolidierung einer Allianz der Befreiungsbewegungen des südlichen Afrikas führte. Diese „revolutionären Partnerschaften" waren Ergebnis sowohl der Bemühungen externer Unterstützer wie auch der Führung der Befreiungsbewegungen, die sich mit Fragen von Repräsentation und Legitimation konfrontiert sahen. Obwohl es Bemühungen für eine stärkere militärische und politische Zusammenarbeit gab, zielte die Khartum-Allianz vor allem auf die Mobilisierung der internationalen öffentlichen Meinung und deren Unterstützung der „authentischen" Befreiungsbewegungen des südlichen Afrikas.

Liberation struggles in Southern Africa were transnational and transregional since its inception in the early 1960s. Besides the involvement with Cold War powers and international actors, cooperation between liberation movements in the region became increasingly prominent towards the end of the decade. This article addresses the main cooperative arrangements and the process that led towards the consolidation of an alliance of Southern African liberation move-

1 Sechaba, Official organ of the African National Congress of South Africa, Commentary. The Khartoum Conference, March 1969, p. 3.

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ments in 1969 in Khartoum. The forging of "revolutionary partnerships" was as much boosted by external supporters as pursued by the leadership of the liberation movements themselves, that sought to overcome hurdles of representation and legitimacy. Despite strategic aspirations for a stronger cooperation in the military and political realms, the Khartoum alliance was mainly oriented towards mobilizing the international public opinion in favour of this assemblage of "authentic" Southern African liberation movements.

The euphoria and optimistic expectations brought by the Wind of Change[2] in great part of the African continent in the early 1960s quickly transformed into mixed feelings and scepticism as the decade went by.[3] Despite growing claims for emancipation, decolonization was held in abeyance in the Portuguese colonies and white minority-ruled territories of Southern Africa. Nationalist oriented liberation movements emerged within each colony or territory as well as in exile. At different times, they engaged in armed struggles against the respective colonial and racist regimes. Although cooperation between the diverse liberation movements in the region might look like a *fait accompli*, their relations were in fact unsteady and informal until the very end of the 1960s and early 1970s. The reality of the armed struggle in each territory, internal conflicts or exile politics are some of the aspects that differentiated their trajectories and simultaneously had an impact in their coming together. This article traces the most significant forms of cooperation that existed among Southern African liberation movements over the decade and examines the agency of the movements themselves vis-à-vis the interference of international organisations in the creation of these alliances as well as their immediate outcomes.
Recent literature on the transnational dimensions of Southern African liberation movements has opened new avenues for investigation on their regional entanglements as well as their cooperation with Eastern bloc actors within a Cold War framework.[4] The study of more institutionalised attempts to consolidating the partnership between Southern African liberation movements in the long 1960s thus follows the lead of this emergent body of research in order to flesh out joint representational strategies that contributed to reinforce the rhetoric of a solid ensemble of Southern African liberation struggles.

1. Early Lusophone Interterritorial Fronts: United Against Portuguese Colonialism

The cooperation between anti-colonialists from the African territories under Portuguese rule dates back beyond the emergence of different national liberation movements.[5] Simi-

2 SAHO, Speech made to the South Africa Parliament on 3 February 1960 by Harold Macmillan. South African History Online, <https://www.sahistory.org.za/archive/wind-change-speech-made-south-africa-parliament-3-february-1960-harold-macmillan> (accessed 7 February 2020).

3 See also Engel in this volume.

4 J. Alexander / J. McGregor / B.-M. Tendi (eds.), Transnational Histories of Southern Africa's Liberation Movements, New York 2019; and L. Dallywater / C. Saunders / H.A. Fonseca (eds.) Southern African Liberation Movements and the Global Cold War 'East'. Transnational Activism 1960–1990, Berlin / Boston 2019.

5 The author follows the broadly definition of national liberation movements (NLMs) as summarized by Samir

lar to histories of anticolonialism in other imperial frameworks, African Lusophone anticolonialism has its own debt with diaspora groups in the metropolis and across African borders. National liberation movements, such as the Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola MPLA) or the Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (Mozambican Liberation Front, FRELIMO), were the product of the mobilisation of an *assimilado* / urban-based population, whose leadership was mainly educated in Portugal, France, and the United States. They were first organised externally, mainly from Europe,[6] but once the first African countries gained independence, they started to relocate their operational bases closer to their respective territories with the support granted by newly independent states.[7] Based on published correspondence and memories,[8] it is possible to confirm the common origins and the high level of coordination that existed between the nationalist movements from Angola, Guinea-Bissau, and Mozambique operating externally. Indeed, a common agenda weighed upon separate nationalist undertakings well into 1960. Anticolonial activities in the last years of the 1950s were carried out under the flag of the Movimento Anticolonialista (Anticolonialist Movement, MAC), an interterritorial liberation front that gathered the main anticolonial activists in the diaspora and coordinated their representative actions at the international level.[9] According to its mission statement (1957), the main goal of the movement was in general terms "to stimulate, develop, and coordinate African unity

Amin as "diverse socio-political movements which share the aim of establishing an independent state for what they consider their nation within the borders of a territory recognized by the international community". S. Amin, National Liberation movements, in: N.J. Smelser / P.B. Baltes (eds.), International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences, 2nd edn, New York 2001, pp. 10309–10314, at p. 10309. The cases under consideration here are Southern African movements in the post-WW II context. Robert Young refers to this type of anticolonial resistance as "nationalist liberation struggles". R.J.C. Young, Postcolonialism: An Historical Introduction, New Jersey 2016, pp. 161–166. Drawing on these various conceptual interpretations, the term nationalist and national liberation movements are used interchangeably in this text.

6 On the European origins of Lusophone liberation movements see D.C. Mateus, A Luta pela independência: a formação das elites fundadoras da FRELIMO, MPLA e PAIGC, Lisbon 1999; E. Rocha, Angola: Contribuição ao estudo da génese do nacionalismo moderno angolano, período de 1950–1964 (testemunho e estudo documental), Luanda 2003.

7 Several authors have contributed to enriching the literature on the African detours and external basis of Lusophone national liberation movements in the 1960s and early 1970s. See for instance G. Roberts, The assassination of Eduardo Mondlane: FRELIMO, Tanzania, and the politics of exile in Dar es Salaam, in: Cold War History 17 (2017) 1, pp. 1–19; E. Burton, Hubs of decolonization. African Liberation Movements and Eastern Connections in Cairo, Accra and Dar es Salaam, in: Dallywater et al. (eds.), Southern African liberation movements, pp. 25–56; E. George, The Cuban Intervention in Angola 1965–1991: From Che Guevara to Cuito Canavale, London 2005; F.A. Guimaraes, The origins of the Angolan Civil War: Foreign Intervention and Domestic Political Conflict, 1961–76, London 1998, pp. 58–82.

8 L. Lara, Um amplo movimento, documentos e comentários para a história do MPLA (até fev. 1961) vol. I, Lisbon 1999; L. Lara, Um amplo movimento, Itinerário do MPLA através de documentos de Lúcio Lara, vol. II (1961–1962), Luanda 2006; L. Lara, Um amplo movimento, Itinerário do MPLA através de documentos de Lúcio Lara, vol. III (1963–1964), Luanda 2008; M.P. de Andrade, Uma entrevista dada a Michel Laban, Lisbon 1997; E. Rocha, Angola: Contribuição ao estudo da génese do nacionalismo moderno angolano, período de 1950–1964 (testemunho e estudo documental), Luanda 2003.

9 J.S. Sousa, Os movimentos unitários anti-colonialistas (1954–1960) O contributo de Amílcar Cabral, in: Revista Estudos do Século XX. Colonialismo, Anticolonialismo e Identidades Nacionais 3 (2003), pp. 339–341.

against Portuguese colonialism".[10] Hence, the MAC members appealed to a certain extent to the Pan-Africanist tradition of a shared historical fate that forged the ties to resist and combat European imperialism, as it had been previously done but diasporic pan-African figures like Ghana's President Kwame Nkrumah. No wonder then that Ghana's government was among the first contacts of the MAC[11] at a time in which they were seeking support to establish representations in the African continent. At the same time, MAC activists strove for diversifying their networking strategies and used every possibility to engage in conversations with potential sponsors such as the Committee of African Organizations in London or the permanent committee of the Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Organization (AAPSO) in Cairo, Egypt.[12]

However, despite the collective endeavours of the MAC, the 'nation' and consequently nationalist denominations became predominant by the early 1960s. The Anticolonialist Movement shifted into the Frente Revolucionária Africana para a Independência Nacional (African Revolutionary Front for National Independence, FRAIN) after its participation in the 1960 All African People's Conference (AAPC) in Tunis, Tunisia, clearly driven by the revolutionary mood set off by the Algerian war of independence. The general enthusiasm that followed after the non-violent decolonisation in Ghana in 1957 and that inspired the first AAPC, turned in Tunis into calls to direct action by any means. On this "historical occasion" that "opened the African doors",[13] the representatives of the MAC encountered heads of state of independent African countries as well as members of liberation movements, political organisations and labour unions of the whole continent. But it was precisely the exchange with Cameroonian and Algerian freedom fighters that left the strongest and lasting impression as they were encouraged by the very self-same Frantz Fanon[14] to start the armed struggle in Angola without delay. Despite the invitations extended by the Algerian Front de Libération Nationale (National Liberation Front, FLN) to African freedom fighters "to join the struggle in Algeria and learn techniques for fighting their own battles",[15] the FRAIN continued to stick to "nonviolent methods but civil disobedience"[16] in their fight for the liberation of the territories under Portuguese colonialism. Tunis meant however a turning point in their multinational anticolonial approach to liberation. The existing nationalist formations at that time – the Partido Africano para a Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde (African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde, PAIGC) and MPLA – had a more prominent role within the common front, and as recognized in its foundational

10 Lara, Um amplo movimento vol. I, p. 655.
11 Ibid., pp. 116–121.
12 Ibid., p. 271.
13 Ibid., p. 334.
14 The Martinican born psychiatrist and writer set the intellectual cornerstone of bitter criticism against European colonialism in the 1950s with his book *Peau noire, masques blancs* (1952). Between the mid-1950s and the early 1960s he held several positions as FLN representative.
15 G. Houser, No One Can Stop The Rain: Glimpses of Africa's Liberation Struggle, New York 1989, p. 74.
16 Lara, Um amplo movimento vol. I, p. 349.

charter, the revolutionary front became indeed "an alliance of political parties and mass organizations".[17]

In fact, the "nationalisation" of the liberation movements became quite obvious with the start of the armed struggle in Angola in 1961. The MPLA attacked several police stations in the capital, Luanda, while the União das Populações de Angola (Union of Populations of Angola, UPA) stirred up a revolt in the rural north. Both parties carried out their insurgency activities with little success on the attempts to unite against the Portuguese. Nevertheless, the MPLA found a basis of support and legitimacy in the common front with the liberation movements from other colonial territories. The old motto that "union makes for strength"[18] gained new life with the constitution of the Conferência das Organizações Nacionalistas das Colónias Portuguesas (Conference of the Nationalist Organizations of the Portuguese Colonies, CONCP) in April 1961 in Casablanca, Morocco. Unlike its forerunner, the FRAIN established in Tunis one year before, the Conference had a clear sponsor in the African chess of newly independent states – the Casablanca group[19] and, more precisely, the Moroccan monarchy –; a recognizable infrastructure with an advisory board and permanent secretariat in Rabat; as well as wider representation with ten different political organizations, among them, the Goa League or Goan People's Party, and labour movements like the National Union of Angolan Workers.[20]

The Conference's final declaration in 1961 stands out for its call to "unity, solidarity and cooperation", with a particular appeal to the nationalist organizations that had not taken part in the conference to "adhere immediately to its principles".[21] Although this implied reference to the Angolan UPA[22] left the door open for future negotiations with opposition groups and thus emphasized the flexible nature of their partnership, in practice the renewed alliance served as a sort of legitimizing instrument against the very same rivals.

The institutionalization of the nationalist front brought along a visible enlargement of the international contacts and solidarity. The CONCP headquarters in Rabat became a "*carrefour des militants nationalistes*"[23] ("crossroads of nationalist militants") in the words of the Angolan Mário Pinto de Andrade, president of the CONCP advisory board. Ben

17 Ibid., p. 348.

18 A. Cabral, Unity and Struggle: Speeches and Writings of Amilcar Cabral, London 1979, p. 30.

19 The alliance, established in 1961, comprised the governments of Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Libya, Morocco and the United Arab Republic that advocated for a radical course of action to put an end on European colonialism and foreign interference in Africa. The Casablanca bloc was one of the three ideological and political families that merged within the Organisation of African Unity in 1963. In turn, the Monrovia group and the Brazzaville group kept moderate stances towards decolonization, favouring the negotiation with the respective colonial powers. See also Engel in this volume.

20 Lara, Um amplo movimento vol. II, pp. 63–64.

21 Ibid., p. 78.

22 The MPLA had previously made numerous attempts to create a united Angolan nationalist front, a reality that did not materialize despite the multiple external pressures that African leaders such Nkrumah exerted.

23 Fundação Mário Soares, Arquivo Mário Pinto de Andrade, Mohammed V et L'Afrique – Témoignage. Statement from Mário Pinto de Andrade about Mohammed V (1987), <http://hdl.handle.net/11002/fms_dc_83594> (accessed 7 February 2020).

Bella and other historical militants of the Algerian FLN as well as Nelson Mandela and Robert Resha from the South African African National Congress (ANC) were just some of the activists that visited its offices in 1962. The increasing alignment of the front with other African struggles for freedom, and particularly with those oppressed by the apartheid policy in South Africa and the Southern African territories of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, should not be reduced to simple rhetoric. With the commencement of the armed struggle in Angola and instability in Mozambique looming large, members of the CONCP were certainly aware of the interventionist threats posed by the regimes in the neighbouring minority-ruled territories and the real need for better cooperation with those fighting them. Yet, it was not until the late 1960s that solidarity and cooperation with the movements fighting across Southern African borders became a prominent issue of their mutual liberation agendas.

The relocation of operational centres southward that came along with an intensification of the conflict in Angola and the eruption of the struggle in Guinea-Bissau in 1963 and Mozambique in 1964, gave centre stage to the respective nationalist organizations and overshadowed the role of the CONCP. Rabat was "not a feasible meeting point any longer, either for reasons of political nature […] or for issues of economic and pragmatic order".[24] At a time of unrelenting political change in which several "hubs of decolonization"[25] emerged, together with the advent of the first African intergovernmental organisation, opportunities to engage in dialogue with a broader array of sponsors and collaborators multiplied. Notwithstanding the critiques about the inefficiency of the common front,[26] the CONCP and thus the willingness to coordinate the agendas of the different nationalist movements endured.

A second conference in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, in 1965 aimed at attuning the CONCP to broader schemes of continental collaboration. Home and rear-base to political refugees and liberation movements from all over Africa, the Tanzanian capital hosted also the headquarters of the Liberation Committee, a subsidiary organ of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), strongly promoted by President Julius Nyerere. Operating under the guidance of the governing board of member states, the Committee provided funding, logistic support, training and publicity to those movements officially recognized by the OAU. Hence, it seemed quite opportune for a feeble CONCP to close ranks around the decision centre of African liberation politics. Reinforcing the position of the interterritorial front with its participant organisations as a legitimate interlocutor vis-à-vis the OAU was a pressing need particularly for the MPLA, weakened by the internal dissensions among high ranks of the party and ostracized by the official recognition of the rival Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola / Governo Revolucionário de Angola no Exilio (FNLA/GRAE) as the legitimate liberation movement of Angola. It was also crucial for all the members to display their strength as a united group in order to keep their own

24 Lara, Um amplo movimento vol. III, p. 320.
25 Burton, Hubs of decolonization, p. 26.
26 Lara, Um amplo movimento vol. III, pp. 391, 685 and 688.

autonomy with regard to the OAU's attempts to control the mobility and co-opt the external representations of the nationalist movements.[27] The CONCP members were, to say the least, sceptical about the plans orchestrated within the intergovernmental organisation for shaping the liberation paths of their own territories. The conference reports, published in Algiers a year later (i.e. in 1966), included an extensive review of the African political conjuncture, with enough space for critiques to

> *certain African states engaged in broadening the internal contradictions for the African unity – contradictions about political regimes or development paths – that are in reality a weapon at the service of imperialists which aim at perpetuating the balkanisation of the continent*.[28]

In this context, and by framing their struggles of national liberation as "a focal point of the African unity"[29], they launched an appeal to the OAU to be vigilant in order to avoid discrepancies and channel its support to their nationalist organisations for these claimed to be the exclusive and legitimate representatives of the people's will.

Bearing in mind the internal leadership crisis of some of the member organizations and the disadvantage this could create in face of their rivalry with other factions fighting for the liberation of the same territories, the CONCP tried to achieve by the mid-1960s an intermediary role between the individual nationalist movements and regional bodies of political decision-making. The common front was far from being a primary representational scheme, as it was the case with the original MAC and till a certain extent the FRAIN in the early 1960s, yet membership lent some sort of political legitimacy. The international projection as well as the social and political capital that figures such as Amílcar Cabral (Guinea-Bissau, Cape Verde) or Eduardo Mondlane (Mozambique) had cultivated over the years in the realm of revolutionary politics certainly benefited the public image of the common front. However, the old saying of "union makes for strength" gained different interpretations over time. For member organisations such as the MPLA, the CONCP carried a more pragmatic meaning, thus bringing it a step closer to the OAU and strengthening its basis of support against its rival, the officially recognized FNLA. For others like the PAIGC, with a successful record of guerrilla operations against the Portuguese and no real competitor in the struggle for independence, it had probably a symbolic value, a sort of commemoration of the common roots of their struggles. Still, these formats of coordinated action allowed the member organisations some room of manoeuvre for collective bargaining in a context of tighter arbitration in African liberation politics.

27 Ibid., p. 685.

28 Fundação Mário Soares, Arquivo Mário Pinto de Andrade, L' Afrique et la Lutte de Libération Nationale dans les Colonies Portugaises. Conférence de Dar-es-Salaam. Documents de base (1966), <http://hdl.handle.net/11002/fms_dc_83618> (accessed 7 February 2020), p. 46.

29 Ibid., p. 47.

2. Enlarging the Partnership to "the Progressive Movements of Southern Africa"[30]

All through the early 1960s the liberation movements of the Portuguese colonies and those of other Southern African territories kept their relations at a low profile. The leaders of these movements occasionally exchanged at international conferences[31] and paid visits to each other's external delegations in Algiers or Rabat.[32] Meanwhile, rank and file as well as high-level cadres met at training camps in Tanzania, Egypt, Algeria or the USSR.[33] Their shared exile experiences promoted personal friendships that fed a sort of informal solidarity between the movements.[34] Although the ANC recognized as early as 1962 the relevance of strengthening the relations with the CONCP movements,[35] there is no evidence of formal contacts in that regard until 1964. A report by the MPLA delegation to the Cairo Conference of Nonaligned Nations (1964) described a meeting between the Angolan nationalists and representatives of the ANC in which the latter "pointed the necessity for collaboration among the progressive movements of Southern Africa".[36]

Alliances were though not to be built with whatever liberation movement. In the 1960s Southern African context, Angola was not the only territory whose liberation was disputed between competing groups. The rivalry in Southern Rhodesia between the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) and its splinter the Zimbabwean African National Union (ZANU),[37] in Mozambique between FRELIMO and the Revolutionary Committee of Mozambique (COREMO)[38] or in South Africa between the ANC and the

30 Lara, Um amplo movimento vol. III, p. 687.

31 I.e. the Pan-African Freedom Movement for East and Central Africa (PAFMECSA) Conference in 1962 in Addis Ababa. See Lara, Um amplo movimento vol II, p. 541.

32 For instance, the visit of Mandela and Resha to the CONCP in Rabat, see Fundação Mário Soares, Arquivo Mário Pinto de Andrade, Robert Resha, Marcelino dos Santos, Amália Fonseca, Nelson Mandela, Mário Pinto de Andrade e Aquino de Bragança, Rabat (1962), <http://casacomum.net/cc/visualizador?pasta=07223.002.033> (accessed 7 February 2020). For more information about the exchanges in Algiers, where several Southern African liberation movements kept permanent representations, see J.J. Byrne, Mecca of Revolution. Algeria, Decolonization, and the Third World Order, Oxford 2016, p. 249.

33 S. Ellis, External Mission: The ANC in Exile, 1960–1990, London 2012, p. 111; and A.R. Saúte Saíde, Mozambique's solidarity with the National Liberation Struggle in South Africa, in: The Road to Democracy in South Africa, vol. 5, part 2, Pretoria 2014, p. 737.

34 Saúte Saíde points to the friendly relations of Joaquim Chissano and Oliver Tambo as well as connections between Marcelino dos Santos and several ANC representatives as a result of his marriage with the South African Pamela Beira in 1968. See Saúte Saíde, Mozambique's solidarity, pp. 736–737.

35 T. Scott, The Diplomacy of Liberation: The International Relations of the African National Congress of South Africa, 1960–1965, PhD thesis, University of London 1989, p. 58. <http://etheses.lse.ac.uk/1206/> (accessed 7 February 2020).

36 Lara, Um amplo movimento vol. III, p. 687.

37 G.C. Mazarire, ZANU's External Networks 1963–1979: An Appraisal, in: Journal of Southern African Studies 43 (2017) 1, pp. 83–106.

38 W.C. Opello Jr., Pluralism and Elite Conflict in an Independence Movement: FRELIMO in the 1960s, in: Journal of Southern African Studies 2 (1975) 1, pp. 66–82; and S.F. Jackson, China's Third World Foreign Policy: The Case of Angola and Mozambique, 1961–93, in: The China Quarterly 142 (1995), pp. 388–422.

Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC),[39] led to intense fights for international recognition and support. However, it was the confrontation of Cold War antagonist forces that contributed to distinguish between authentic and unauthentic movements in the course of the 1960s. The Sino-Soviet split and the following competition between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China for being at the vanguard of national liberation in Africa[40] eventually dragged the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organisation (AAPSO) to the Soviet side. Thus, those considered pro-Chinese movements were outcasted,[41] while those with closer ties with the Soviet bloc were gradually imbued with recognition as the outright representatives of Southern African people's will.[42] Besides directly funding the activities of liberation movements throughout Africa, AAPSO also provided financial support for the OAU Liberation Committee, which had been acting as a sort of legitimacy grantor.[43] In that regard, labelling was not exclusively a matter of Cold War allegiance, but trickled down to pan-African politics and determined the very political and economic survival of liberation movements.

The interest and efforts by the ANC to break through the *cordon sanitaire*[44] around South Africa and consolidate cooperation ties with kindred liberation movements became evident after the military campaigns it conducted together with the ZAPU in Southern Rhodesia in 1967 and 1968.[45] Although these attempts to secure routes for infiltration into South African territory failed, they were recognized and transformed into a major milestone for the interrelation of regional liberation forces.[46] The leader of FRELIMO, Eduardo Mondlane, referred to it as "the best example" of the closer cooperation that was being achieved between the nationalist struggles in Southern Africa.[47] Although he still

39 A. Lissoni, The South African liberation movements in exile, c.1945-1970, PhD thesis, University of London, 2008, pp. 102 and 120. <https://www.sahistory.org.za/sites/default/files/Arianna_Lissoni_PhD_thesis.pdf> (accessed 7 February 2020).

40 L. Lüthi, The Sino-Soviet Split: Cold War in the Communist World, New Jersey 2008, p. 223.

41 This included the abovementioned ZANU, PAC, and COREMO.

42 Drawing the line between authentic and unauthentic movements was not as simple and fast a process, and it was usually done on a case-by-case basis. In the first half of the 1960s, competing movements such as FRELIMO and COREMO were simultaneously receiving Chinese support. FRELIMO was nonetheless diversifying its portfolio of sponsors over the decade and towards the late 1960s the Chinese connections seem to have weakened. See D.H. Shinn / J. Eisenman, China and Africa: A Century of Engagement, Philadelphia 2012, p. 335.

43 M. Shaw, The international status of national liberation movements, in: Liverpool Law Rev 5 (1983), pp. 19–34; and Mazarire, ZANU's External Networks, p. 86.

44 During the 1960s, the South African government pursued a foreign policy informed by national security strategies that envisaged the protection of white-rule in South Africa from the advance of African nationalism through their support to buffer states controlled by white minorities (the Portuguese colonies, Southern Rhodesia, and South West Africa) and the British protectorates of Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland. See J. Miller, An African Volk: The Apartheid Regime and its Search for Survival, New York 2016, pp. 4 and 6.

45 A. Lissoni, Transformations in the ANC External Mission and Umkhonto we Sizwe, c. 1960–1969, in: Journal of Southern African Studies 35 (2009) 2, p. 298.

46 The declaration adopted at the ANC's Morogoro Conference (1969) extols the "historic ZAPU/ANC-Alliance […] a unique form of cooperation […] which unites the huge potential of the oppressed people in both South Africa and Zimbabwe", see ANC Historical Documents Archive, African National Congress 1969. Strategy and Tactics of the ANC, <https://www.marxists.org/subject/africa/anc/1969/strategy-tactics.htm> (accessed 7 February 2020).

47 E. Mondlane, The Struggle for Mozambique, London 1969, p. 211.

regarded the CONCP as the paramount alliance between "all forces fighting the same enemy", he also acknowledged that "the next stage of unity must be (sic) unity between the members of the CONCP and the forces fighting in these countries [South Africa and Southern Rhodesia, Portugal's most immediate allies]".[48]

News on the inception of an "unholy alliance" between the regimes in power in Portugal, Southern Rhodesia and South Africa spread in the international press since the early 1960s and provoked the first coordinated reactions in the revolutionary milieu.[49] The idea that future survival of white-minority rule in Southern Africa rested on the success of Portugal in its colonial wars, led to stronger military and economic cooperation among the governments of these countries.[50] This translated in the late 1960s and early 1970s in effective collaboration and strategic assistance to the military campaigns conducted by the Portuguese army as well as the joint development of security projects to block the advance of liberation movements as epitomized by the contested construction of the Cabora Bassa dam.[51] FRELIMO and other CONCP member organisations engaged in public campaigns to denounce this infrastructure project and the overall cooperation schemes between the oppressor regimes.[52] The ANC picked up on the same issues and exhibited its full support to the liberation movements of the Portuguese colonies through its official information organ, Sechaba.[53] Yet, the strongest denunciation came from activist movements and campaigning pressure groups closely bound up to the liberation movements. The Unholy Alliance conference organised as early as 1962 by the British Anti-Apartheid Movement (AAM) together with the Movement for Colonial Freedom

48 Ibid.

49 A. Neves de Souto, Relações entre Portugal, África do Sul e Rodésia do Sul e o Exercício ALCORA: Elementos fundamentais na estratégia da condução da guerra, 1960–1974, in: M.P. Meneses / B. Sena Martins (eds.), As lutas de libertação e os sonhos coloniais: Alianças secretas, mapas imaginados, Coimbra 2013, p. 149.

50 Portugal was a founding member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and as such it also profited from the military support and political assistance of NATO allies like France and Western Germany. However, the support of European allies seemed to have diminish in the late 1960s and early 1970s due to international pressure that the Portuguese colonial question faced at the UN as well as a result of shifting Cold War politics (i.e. East and West Germany's admission to the UN on 18 September 1973, etc.). Portugal's lack of support from former European continental allies might have been determining to closing ranks with South Africa and Rhodesia as evidenced by the Alcora military exercise (1970). See A. Afonso, Exercício Alcora: Um projeto para a África Austral, in: Meneses / Sena Martins (eds.), As lutas de libertação e os sonhos coloniais, p. 112; and A. M. Fonseca / D. Marcos, Cold War Constraints: France, West Germany and Portuguese Decolonization, in: Portuguese Studies 29 (2013) 2, pp. 209–226.

51 "In 1965, Portugal, Southern Rhodesia and South Africa signed a secret agreement on the defence and security of 'white Africa' which provided for the organization of joint defence operations against nationalist and subversive communist groups". Saúte Saíde, Mozambique's solidarity, p. 734. See also A. F. Isaacman / B.S. Isaacman, Extending South Africa's Tentacles of Empire: The Deterritorialisation of Cahora Bassa Dam, in: Journal of Southern African Studies 41 (2015) 3, pp. 541–560, at p. 542.

52 FRELIMO, Armed struggle in Tete, in: FRELIMO bulletin (April 1968); Fundação Mário Soares / Arquivo Mário Pinto de Andrade, Le projet Portugual-Afrique du Sud pour l'Amenagement du Fleuve Kunene. Departement d'Information et Propagande du MPLA, Mission Permanente en Algérie, s.d. <http://hdl.handle.net/11002/fms_dc_83877> (accessed 7 February 2020).

53 Regular reports on the spread of South Africa's influence and intervention in the neighbouring Portuguese colonies, the Lisbon-Salisbury-Pretoria alliance and calls for united revolutionary resistance featured on the magazine since the first number in 1967. See for instance: Sechaba, Bastion of white supremacy, Part II: The Unholy alliance and resistance, March 1967, pp. 7–8; Sechaba, High stakes at Cabora Bassa, December 1969, pp. 14–18.

and the Council for Freedom in Portugal and its Colonies[54] was a powerful expression of the coordination efforts envisaged by diverse support groups. The cooperation between the AAM and the committees for the liberation of the Portuguese colonies intensified towards the end of the 1960s with the "Support the Freedom Fighters" campaign[55] that brought together representatives of the ANC, ZAPU and MPLA in London or in the early 1970s with the "End of Alliance" campaign.[56] Considering the involvement of historic figures of the South African Communist Party / ANC with the AAM, such as Joe Slovo or Ruth First,[57] and that of Janet and Eduardo Mondlane or Marcelino dos Santos with the UK Committee for Freedom in Mozambique, Angola and Guinea Bissau (CFMAG),[58] is reasonable to assume that collaboration in the transnational activist milieu contributed to cement the relations between the different liberation movements and propelled them to work out a more tangible partnership.

While the white minority regimes organised its opposition to African nationalism, the liberation movements took the first steps towards the consolidation of their transnational cooperation. Although the group formed by the ANC, FRELIMO, MPLA, SWAPO, PAIGC and ZAPU was increasingly backed up by the Soviets and the AAPSO, the quest for international political legitimacy and genuine representation within intergovernmental decision-making arenas like the OAU or the UN was a pressing concern that called for the ultimate "revolutionary coalition". Several authors have put the emphasis on the driving role of the ANC in the process of coalition-building,[59] without careful consideration for the actions undertook by other movements. However, the understudied common strategic plan devised by the CONCP 1968[60] is a concrete example of the efforts that the Lusophone liberation movements invested in the regional revolutionary context. Compiled by Mário Pinto de Andrade, MPLA's leader and member of the advisory committee of the CONCP, in 1968 in Algiers, the document seemed to have circulated widely at the time and even oriented a regional approach to the guerrilla training in Algeria.[61] This analysis foresaw the creation of an umbrella structure with a recog-

54 Forward to Freedom. The history of the British Anti-Apartheid Movement 1959–1994, The Anti-Apartheid Movement in the 1960s, <https://www.aamarchives.org/history/1960s.html#click-here-to-read-more-about-the-aam-in-the-1960s> (accessed 7 February 2020).

55 Ibid.

56 CFMAG/2 End of Alliance Campaign, Committee for Freedom in Mozambique, Angola and Guinea Bissau archives, Bishopsgate Institute London.

57 A. Wieder, Ruth First and Joe Slovo in the War Against Apartheid, New York 2013, pp. 145–146.

58 CFMAG/3/2/ correspondence between CFMAG and Mozambique Institute/Janet Mondlane and Polly Gaster. Committee for Freedom in Mozambique, Angola and Guinea Bissau archives, Bishopsgate Institute London.

59 M. Graham, The ANC and the Myth of Liberation Solidarity: 'Othering' in Post-Apartheid South(ern) Africa, in: Africa Insight 44 (2014) 1, pp. 176–190; and Scott, The Diplomacy of Liberation, pp. 57–70.

60 Fundação Mário Soares, Arquivo Mário Pinto de Andrade, La lutte de libération en Afrique australe. Éléments pour une stratégie, pour Mário Pinto de Andrade (1968), <http://hdl.handle.net/11002/fms_dc_83644> (accessed 7 February 2020).

61 Byrne includes a reference to the document, obtained in the Algerian National Archives, in his book Mecca of Revolution (2016) to sustain the argument that Algerian instructors in charge of the training of southern African liberation guerrillas "stressed the need to form a progressive alliance" […] "[t]hey faced a common multiheaded foe, and therefore they needed to unite their struggle too." Byrne, Mecca of Revolution, pp. 249 and 255.

nizable steering board responsible for operationalising the cooperation between Southern African liberation movements and harmonising their external policies.[62] Indeed, the proposal as a whole may be interpreted as an attempt to enlarge the existing CONCP with the integration of the other "authentic" Southern African liberation movements. By considering Southern Africa as "a single theatre of operations", Andrade envisaged the mobilisation and engagement of each member beyond its own national borders. The essay is a revealing source of the level of commitment that the movements were willing to take in order to institutionalise their union and the potential role that such an alliance would have at multiple levels. The fight against the imperialist coalition of Portugal, South Africa and Southern Rhodesia was at the core of this joint strategy but it was far from being the only concern. The "contradictory power games"[63] that prevailed within the OAU, the ambiguous attitude of some progressive African countries with regard to liberation movements[64] and the need to mobilise broader international audiences across ideological divides were burning issues for all the potential front members.

Representational matters at the OAU became an unavoidable concern and urged the liberation movements to make their debut as a coalition at the 5th Ordinary Assembly of OAU Heads of State and Government held on 13–16 September 1968 in Algiers. The MPLA, FRELIMO, ANC, ZAPU, PAIGC and the South West African People's Organisation (SWAPO) of Namibia used the occasion to bring some of their common proposals regarding the OAU's proceedings to the table. Their Joint Statement was a clear call for more efficient aid and support from the pan-African organisation:

> *The situation in the fighting zones is constantly changing. Africa must therefore find means to ensure that there are swift responses to requests for help and in the facilities provided. Delays and red-tape should not stand in the way of victory in the battles we are fighting.*[65]

This was accompanied by a strong appeal for shrinking bureaucracy when it came to differentiate between "real movements that are (sic) effective and have the support of the masses" and "those that are (sic) bogus and corrupt […] sponsored by the imperialists to hamper established movements". Their critique also extended to individual African states that "flouting or circumventing the obligations of the OAU Charter and by referring

62 Fundação Mário Soares, Arquivo Mário Pinto de Andrade, La lutte de libération en Afrique australe, p. 5.

63 According to Pinto de Andrade, these shaped the political decisions of the OAU and more particularly those of the Liberation Committee, that was responsible for the distribution of assistance to the liberation movements. Thus, the alliance of Southern African liberation movements "should focus on orienting its [the Liberation Committee] actions together with the progressive countries, with the aim of eliminating the antagonist movements that distort political and ideological choices; controlling its inner functioning and working to increase and reinforce the support to those movements really determined to fight against imperialism." Fundação Mário Soares, Arquivo Mário Pinto de Andrade, La lutte de libération en Afrique australe, p. 7.

64 Pinto de Andrade refers to the case of Tanzania, that hosted and provided extensive support to FRELIMO but "contradictorily" refused to support other regional movements like ZAPU or ZANU. Fundação Mário Soares, Arquivo Mário Pinto de Andrade, La lutte de libération en Afrique australe, p. 5.

65 Sechaba, We shall win!, December 1968, p. 3.

to their problems and necessities"[66] maintained relations with the regimes in Portugal, Southern Rhodesia and South Africa. The coalition warned the leaders of independent Africa about the expansionist military, economic and political aims of the apartheid state and its allies that would eventually end up creating neo-colonialist traps. In this vein, the growing unity among the liberation movements of Southern Africa was presented as "a welcome development"[67] that would serve as the best defence for truly African freedom, both in the immediate neighbourhood as well as in the rest of the continent.

3. The Road to Khartoum: A United Southern African Front in the Global Struggle Against Imperialism

The formation of a united front of Southern African liberation movements did not answer exclusively to the critical need of fighting a common enemy and getting the support of immediate neighbours. Acquiring international projection and anchoring the common front in "the progressive world movement against imperialism"[68] were goals already pursued externally by the supporting networks of the liberation movements[69] and thence became increasingly prominent in the public agendas of the movements themselves. The idea of consolidating the liberation struggles of Southern Africa as a united whole was the task at hand and received the encouragement of other "anti-imperialist world forces". The conference "Against Racism and Neo-Colonialism, for the Liberation of Southern Africa", organised in May 1968 in East Berlin, GDR, was a case in point. It gathered scientists, economists and sociologists from different socialist countries[70] as well as representatives of the ANC, ZAPU, FRELIMO, MPLA, PAIGC and SWAPO to address the ensemble of Southern African struggles from a "scientific approach". According to the conference declaration, the escalation of violence and exploitation in Southern Africa was a consequence of the intervention of international finance capital, directed by a number of states, among them West Germany, "which assigned to them an important role in their global strategy against the forces of democracy, of national liberation and socialism".[71] Representatives of the Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee of the GDR stressed the parallels between the menacing situations that the liberation movements and the socialist world faced by comparing the New Africa Policy with the New Eastern Policy of the West German government. For the conference hosts these two were "closely linked" and represented

66 Ibid., p. 2.
67 Ibid., p. 3.
68 Fundação Mário Soares, Arquivo Mário Pinto de Andrade, La lutte de libération en Afrique australe, p. 8.
69 A case in point is the Committee for Freedom in Mozambique, Angola and Guinea, that maintained "close relations with the Anti-Apartheid Movement, and encouraged a regional perspective for the future of Southern Africa", CFMAG finding aids 2014, p. 3. CFMAG archives, Bishopsgate Institute London.
70 Sechaba reports on participants from the GDR, the USSR, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Poland, and Hungary. Sechaba, Against Racism and Neo-colonialism, For the Liberation of Southern Africa, August 1968, p. 12.
71 Ibid., p. 13.

> *attempts to "soften up" certain sections of independent Africa and of the socialist world – without however changing in the least their basic support for fascist Southern Africa and annexationist tendency towards the GDR.*[72]

By handling the threats of the socialist East and those of anti-imperialist Southern Africa as these were comparable issues and units, and vesting them with scientific recognition, the conference organisers endowed with legitimacy the joint regional approach of their guests. Likewise, they welcomed them as a building block in the group of progressive countries that fought fascism and imperialism, thus underscoring the blatant division between a socialist anti-imperialist front and a capitalist imperialist one. Such a discourse transcended the sheer ideological East / West divide and focused instead in the unequal and outrageous relations between the first and the second / third worlds. It is this anti-imperialist rhetoric what underpinned the collaboration between socialist countries and the liberation movements, with regard to the financial and material support the former provided to the latter[73] as well as the publicity and sponsorship for the Southern African revolution.

The 1969 Khartoum Conference of Solidarity with the Peoples of Southern Africa and the Portuguese colonies marked the culmination of several years of attempts to form a distinguishable united bloc of regional liberation movements. The fact that it was sponsored by the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization (AAPSO) and the World Peace Council (WPC) earned it careful consideration in specialist literature that tended to overstate Soviet intervention in formalising the coming together of the "Marxist-backed movements of Southern Africa".[74] This focus on external driving forces neglects the interests of the liberation movements as well as the different efforts they invested over the years to bring the parties together, as described above.

This official meeting of the "authentic" liberation movements in Khartoum was a call to mobilise support beyond the socialist camp, which had already shown its commitment. It served as a wider appeal to all the anti-imperialist groups and individuals across the main ideological divide of the time. In the report submitted to the conference, the leader of the ANC delegation, Robert Resha, recognised the degree of internationalisation that Southern African struggles had obtained and praised the actions of anti-apartheid and activist movements, yet he called for new, concerted and intensified forms of support.[75] Similarly, the speeches delivered by Agostinho Neto (MPLA), Eduardo Mondlane (FRELIMO) and Amílcar Cabral (PAIGC) emphasized the need to strengthen the mobi-

72 Ibid., p. 12.

73 Pinto de Andrade referred in his plan for a joint regional strategy to the relations of a potential Southern African alliance with "the progressive world movement against imperialism" and advocated for restricting the sources of support to the forces in this field. The same anti-imperialist identifications that preceded socialist ones in the Berlin conference appear as well in his writing. Fundação Mário Soares, Arquivo Mário Pinto de Andrade, La lutte de libération en Afrique australe, p. 4.

74 Graham, The ANC and the Myth of Liberation Solidarity, p. 7; Scott, The Diplomacy of Liberation, pp. 64–65.

75 Sechaba, Apartheid – The World Must Act. Edited version of a report submitted to the Khartoum Conference by Robert Resha, leader of the ANC delegation, March 1969, p. 10.

lization of the world's public opinion.[76] By calling to "a new phase of anti-imperialist cooperation"[77] the liberation movements aimed at attuning the anti-imperial and anti-colonial traditions of the 1950s and early 1960s to deal with emergent challenges that resulted from the entanglement of global Cold War dynamics[78] with regional re-structuring processes and conflicts.

The global outreach of the conference's sponsors, AAPSO and the WPC, the latter with several western European committees and peace organisations on board, offered first and foremost a convenient infrastructure to spearheading a new wave of coordinated solidarity campaigns. Although Soviet positions and policies had an echo in these organisations, reducing their institutional and membership complexity to the label of Soviet front organisations prevents us from taking autonomous dynamics and cracks in their organisational fabric seriously. It was precisely the heterogeneity in their activist positions what allowed for a certain room of manoeuvre that connected the WPC with the Southern African struggles.[79] Besides members of the sponsoring organisations and the governments of socialist countries, a number of personalities from Western Europe and North America representing political parties and activist movements took part in this conference.[80] It would be an oversimplification assuming that all of the 200 delegates from 54 countries shared a homogeneous political agenda driven by Soviet interests.

The mobilisation committee organised at the conference delivered a set of practical measures to consolidate international support networks that included the formation of national committees and the establishment of an ad-hoc mobilisation board in Cairo, chaired on a rotation basis by the liberation movements, to coordinate the exchange of information between national groups.[81] An example that illustrates the response of Western European actors to the appeal made in Khartoum was the creation of the *Comité de Soutien à la Lutte contre le Colonialisme et l'Apartheid* in Waterloo (Belgium), that organised diverse conferences and debates, engaged in campaigns of humanitarian support

76 Fundação Mário Soares, Documentos Vítor Cabrita Neto, Agostinho Neto, Eduardo Mondlane, Amilcar Cabral (1970), <http://hdl.handle.net/11002/fms_dc_152439> (accessed 7 February 2020).

77 Sechaba, Commentary. The Khartoum Conference, March 1969, p. 3.

78 O.A. Westad, The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times, New York 2005.

79 G. Wernicke, The Unity of Peace and Socialism? The World Peace Council and a Cold War Tightrope between the Peace Struggle and Intrasystemic Communist Conflicts, in: Peace & Change 26 (2001) 3, pp. 332– 351, at p. 342. Günther includes an example of the internal tensions between national peace groups when it came to differentiate between just and unjust wars to support liberation movements in different parts of the world. Romesh Chandra, general secretary of the WCP and the All-Indian Peace Committee, moved away from "traditional WCP positions" to justify the support to Angolan, Mozambican or Zimbabwean liberation movements, while several Eastern European peace committees rejected this because it challenged official détente and disarmament approaches.

80 For instance: François Houtart, Professor at the University of Louvain (Belgium); Peter Hellyer, representative of the National League of Young Liberals (United Kingdom); Osmo Kock, MP at the Finish Parliament; Benat Allan Ahlsen from the Swedish Social Democratic Party; or Wilfred Ussery, representative of the Congress of Racial Equality (United States). For the complete list of participants see Permanent Secretariat of the AAPSO, International Conference in Support of Portuguese Colonies and Southern Africa. Khartoum, 18–20 January 1969, Cairo 1970, International Institute of Social History Archives (Amsterdam), Bro 78/20.

81 Permanent Secretariat of the AAPSO, Bro 78/20, pp. 37–45.

to the populations living in liberated areas of Southern Africa and enabled the visits and encounters of representatives of liberation movements with national media, politicians and trade unions.[82] Similarly, it was possible to identify as a result of the orientations for solidarity work provided in Khartoum a higher degree of transnational cooperation between existing activist groups and newly created national committees across Europe, as epitomised by the participation of West and Eastern European organisations in conferences organised in the Netherlands, Sweden and the United Kingdom between 1970 and 1974.[83]

4. Conclusion

The materialisation of an alliance of Southern African liberation movements as accomplished in Khartoum had mainly an impact in the realms of international representation and public diplomacy. Unlike previous attempts of transnational military cooperation as that of ANC and ZAPU in 1967–1968 or the strategy sketched by Mário Pinto de Andrade that envisioned more institutionalised forms of political collaboration among the progressive forces fighting for independence in the region, the outcomes of Khartoum are to be found in the solidarity infrastructures set up in the Western and Eastern worlds to mobilize public opinion, lobby in favour of the bloc of regional liberation movements and condemn the fascist and racist regimes of the unholy alliance.

The closer alignment of the Southern African liberation movements over the 1960s, from earlier informal contacts in exile to their own international conferences and declarations, was as much a product of the strategic interests of the liberation movements as the intervention of external networks and actors.[84] As the case of the early Lusophone interterritorial fronts shows, the union and belonging to a group with similar ideological leanings and ideas of post-colonial futures represented an opportunity for getting recognition and legitimacy against rival organisations as well as in the regional and international context. Thus, in a changing political setting, with the proliferation of friends and foes and the OAU thwarting the participation and aspirations of certain movements, anticolonial and anti-apartheid cooperation at a sub-regional level was a means for leveraging the trust and positive relations of individual movements and counterbalancing OAU's bottlenecks. As for the external encouragement to consolidate a visible assemblage of

82 Fundação Mário Soares, Arquivo Mário Pinto de Andrade, Première Conférence Internationale de Soutien à la Lutte de Libération des Peuples des Colonies Portugaises et de l'Afrique Australe, Khartoum janvier 1969 (1970), <http://hdl.handle.net/11002/fms_dc_84489> (accessed 7 February 2020).

83 Afro-Asian solidarity committees from Eastern European countries were also invited to the solidarity conference that gathered representatives from support committees the UK, France, the Netherlands, Italy, etc. The documents include copies of telegrams asking for the visas of the Soviet Committee's representatives. CFMAG archives, Bishopsgate Institute London. CFMAG/1/6 Organisation of the Oxford Conference 1974.

84 Although the financial, material and diplomatic support of AAPSO and the OAU, as well as the Soviet Union and other Eastern European countries did certainly prove decisive to raised certain movements and backed them up as the authentic liberation movements of Southern Africa.

Southern Africa revolutionary struggles, this came both from the socialist countries that provided material assistance to the different movements as well as from the own activist networks formed around the liberation movements, which had already a certain degree of influence in their propaganda and lobby strategies.

Thus, the new phase of anti-imperialist cooperation announced at the Khartoum conference was not exclusively tied to the coming together of liberation movements but to a rapprochement between East and West activist movements, Afro-Asian solidarity committees and other anti-imperialist entities that found in the Southern African revolutionary alliance a strong action frame where domestic and international battles conflated.

This article traced the beginnings of the cooperation between Southern African liberation movements in the 1960s. However, the history of regional solidarity between Southern African liberation movements did not stopped there but lived through the political shifts of decolonisation and the end of apartheid and paved the ground for regional collaboration schemes of liberation movements in power in more recent decades.[85] Likewise, the legacies of their alliances in the 1960s and early 1970s linger in national discourses that mythicize the history of the movements and bestow them with the legitimacy for continuous tenure,[86] somehow echoing some of the demands for recognition they had during the liberation struggles.

85 After the formal independence of the Portuguese colonies of Angola and Mozambique in 1975, and with Zimbabwe achieving majority rule in 1980, these countries became known as frontline states (together with Botswana, Zambia, and Tanzania) for their joint opposition to minority-ruled South Africa. The collapse of Apartheid in South Africa and the advent of majority rule saw the rebranding of the frontline states into the Former Liberation Movements of Southern Africa (FMLSA) organisation of support between current liberation movements, all of which have been in power since independence (ANC, SWAPO, ZANU-PF, MPLA, FRELIMO, and CCM of Tanzania).

86 Graham, The ANC and the Myth of Liberation Solidarity, pp. 176–190.

Between Ideology and Policy: Dilemmas of Leadership in the Postcolonial 1960s in Zambia

Lynn Schler

ABSTRACTS

Im postkolonialen Afrika wurden Prozesse des nation-building in zahlreichen Staaten mit sozialistischen Strategien zur wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung angegangen. Nach einer Dekade jedoch waren diese sozialistischen Entwicklungspläne gescheitert und wurden dann aufgegeben. Das Schicksal dieser Projekte verkörpert viele der größeren politischen Herausforderungen in den 1960er Jahren. Kafuba und Kafulafuta waren von Israelis gegründete Kooperativensiedlungen im Kupfergürtel Zambias, die den isrelischen Moshav-Siedlungen nachgebildet waren. Sie wurden zu Vorzeigeprojekten der Ideologie des humanistischen Sozialismus unter Kenneth Kaunda, wurden aber aufgegeben, als sie in Konflikt mit Zambias übergeordneten geopolitischen Ansichten gerieten. Diese Fallstudie veranschaulicht, wie politische Führer zwischen Ideologie und Politik verhandelten und letztendlich zentrale Aspekte ihrer nationalistischen Ideologie aufgaben.

Throughout postcolonial Africa, processes of nation-building were inaugurated with socialist strategies for achieving economic development, but by the end of the first decade of independence, socialist development schemes had failed to produce anticipated benefits and were abandoned. The fate of these projects embodied many of the broader challenges facing postcolonial leadership in the 1960s. Kafuba and Kafulafuta were cooperative settlements established by Israelis in the Zambian Copperbelt and modelled on the Israeli moshav. These successful schemes became the flagship models of Kenneth Kaunda's humanist ideology, but Kaunda cancelled the projects when they came into conflict with Zambia's broader geopolitical concerns. This case study provides insights into how leaders negotiated between ideology and politics, and ultimately abandoned key aspects of their nationalist ideologies.

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In many parts of the world, the 1960s are remembered as a time of revolutionary change. Particularly in the United States and Europe, the 1960s was a time of new possibilities, new solidarities, new ideologies of liberation. As an era characterized by Jameson as one of "unexpected political innovation" and shifting "conditions of possibility", the 1960s saw the emergence of social and political forces staking out new claims for various kinds of freedom and justice.[1] Jameson places Africa at the centre of global forces setting the radicalized tone, and claims that resistance to colonialism was a trigger for mass movements for social and political change in the first world.[2] For historians of Africa, the charge that the roots of the revolutionary era in the West can be found in the process of decolonization in British and French Africa can raise some serious questions about what kinds of revolutions were actually brought about within the continent itself over the course of the 1960s. Looking back at this era from African vantage points, we see a highly divergent trajectory from the leftist, anti-war, feminist, and civil rights rebellions that left indelible marks on societies in North America and Europe. As Allman wrote claimed, "for African countries that won their independence in the decade before 1968, the late sixties and early seventies were, more than anything and with few exceptions, years of reversal and retrenchment."[3] Indeed, by the end of first decade of decolonization, it seemed that the idealist visions of national liberation had given birth to a host of disappointments, reversals, and broken promises.

Historians are increasingly turning to the 1960s to answer the question, "what went wrong?" How did lofty visions of social justice and freedom so quickly produce a host of authoritarian, gatekeeper, and patrimonial regimes that discarded popular agendas in struggles for consolidation and survival? Why did visionary leaders give up (so quickly and completely) on the political, economic, and social imaginaries of decolonization, and immerse themselves instead a narrow set of deliberations that reflected immeasurable ideological and practical concessions and compromises?

Particularly with regard to socialist agendas, the dramatic failures and abandonments of the visions that ushered in decolonization was particularly pronounced. Throughout postcolonial Africa, processes of nation-building were inaugurated with socialist strategies for achieving economic development and social justice, but by the end of the first decade of independence, the failures of socialism to produce material and social benefits led to disillusionment and disappointment across the continent. Leadership was unable to successfully mobilize socialist strategies to deliver on the promises of anti-colonial resistance, and the reasons for these failures have increasingly preoccupied historians. We have much to learn from close scrutiny of postcolonial policies and their abandonment. The fate of socialist projects in postcolonial Africa embodied many of the broader paradigms and trajectories that characterized the 1960s in general. Thus, an investigation of

1 F. Jameson, Periodizing the 60s, in: Social Text 9/10 (1984), pp. 178–209, at pp. 182–183.
2 Ibid., p. 180.
3 J. Allman, The Fate of All of Us: African Counterrevolutions and the Ends of 1968, in: The American Historical Review 123 (2018) 3, pp. 728–732, at p. 730.

these agendas and their outcomes can provide a useful point of entry for understanding the broader dilemmas and challenges that shadowed and curtailed the imagined futures of national liberation movements.

This article will investigate the rise and fall of the Kafuba and Kafulafuta cooperative settlements established in the Zambian Copperbelt regime under the regime of President Kenneth Kaunda (b. 1924). These cooperative settlements were modelled on Israeli *moshav* settlements, and established and run under the supervision of Israeli technical advisors who were brought to Zambia. After overcoming some initial obstacles, the schemes emerged as highly successful producers of surpluses in the agricultural and poultry sectors. Kaunda was immensely pleased with this success, and he often boasted that the Israeli-led settlements were the key to the success of his vision for democratic socialism known as "humanism". But on the eve of plans to expand the Israeli-led cooperative programme throughout Zambia, Kaunda suddenly reversed course and severed ties with Israel, sending the technical experts home and bringing an abrupt end to the *moshav* programme.

It could be argued that Kaunda was simply following a directive of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) that mandated member states to sever ties with Israel in the wake of the 1973 October War. But Kaunda's decision to follow suit with the OAU order must be understood within the specific geopolitical context that characterized the history of Zambia in the first decade of independence. Kaunda's willingness to abandon a programme that he embraced as the flagship of his humanist agenda was rooted in a broader range of political and economic calculations. Thus, the history of the establishment, expansion and demise of the Israeli-led schemes teaches us that socialist agendas were often only one part of a complex web of policies and priorities facing postcolonial leadership in Africa. This article will trace the history of the rise and fall of the Copperbelt cooperatives in the first decade of Zambian independence. This case study provides poignant testimony of how postcolonial negotiations between ideology and politics often resulted in the abandonment of imaginaries that could not be realized autonomously from regional and international relations.

1. Kenneth Kaunda's Humanism

The processes of decolonization and nation-building in postcolonial Africa were primarily shaped by leaders and their cohorts who assumed control following the departure of colonial powers. As Crawford Young wrote, "From the earliest postcolonial moments the central role of the political leader became apparent."[4] Robert Rotberg also emphasized the pivotal role played by leadership in determining the course of history for postcolonial states, claiming "leaders matter as much as do many external influences, internal

4 C. Young, The Postcolonial State in Africa: Fifty Years of Independence, 1960–2010, Madison 2012, p. 78.

structures, and institution constraints."[5] Postcolonial leaders viewed their obligations in broad terms, and embraced a set of responsibilities that included not just formulating policies but also conveying "a vision" for postcolonial society. In most cases, leaders saw it their duty to promote an ideological platform as the foundation to their political and economic agenda. Young described these efforts as leaders' response to "the legitimation imperative" that weighed on upon them.[6] To broaden and solidify their appeal among the masses, political leaders offered an inspirational set of ideas that enabled an epistemological liberation from colonial rule, a process defined by Ndlovu-Gatsheni as the "decolonial epistemic." The decolonial epistemic encouraged the masses to imagine and then construct a different future by embracing "alternative ways of knowing."[7] According to Rotberg, the most effective leaders were able to articulate and convey their ideologies in accessible terms, even in the absence of a practical strategy for realizing them. As he wrote,

> *they have a grand but simple plan. They deal in destinies, dreams, and ultimate purposes, not necessarily in pedestrian and practical goals. They know what they want to achieve in large sweeps and yet often without exact specifics, for their nations and peoples. They also purport to know what their citizens want and value, incorporating those never-before-appreciated wants and values into a new vision*.[8]

Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia was indeed one of the postcolonial leaders who embraced his role as a moral visionary. Kaunda developed a vision for postcolonial Zambia through a philosophy that he called "humanism." The main tenets of humanism were outlined in Kaunda's book, *A Humanist in Africa* (1966), and the philosophy was promoted as a set of guiding principles for nation-building after independence.[9] According the Meebelo, humanism was both future-oriented and rooted in the values and norms of precolonial societies.[10] As Kaunda wrote in 1968,

> *Zambian Humanism is something that evolved from what you might call the normal way of life of a man in a traditional society. At the same time that it takes into consideration the very changed environment in which he lives*.[11]

5 R.I. Rotberg, Transformative Political Leadership: Making a Difference in the Developing World, Chicago 2012, p. 6.

6 Young, The Postcolonial State in Africa, p. 131.

7 S.J. Ndlovu-Gatsheni, Decolonial Epistemic Perspective and Pan-African Unity in the 21st Century, in: M. Muchie / P. Lukhele-Olorunju / O.B. Akpor (eds.), The African Union Ten Years After: Solving African Problems with Pan-Africanism and the African Renaissance, Pretoria 2013, pp. 385–409, at pp. 396–397.

8 Rotberg, Transformative Political Leadership, p. 21.

9 K.L. Stevinson, Humanism as Political Ideology: A Study Of Its Role In The Evolution Of The Leadership Of Kenneth Kaunda Of Zambia, MA thesis, Haverford College 1985 (<http://hdl.handle.net/10066/6162>), p. 2; and A. Sekwat, Beyond African Humanism: Economic Reform in Post-Independent Zambia, in: International Journal of Organisation Theory and Behaviour 3 (2000), pp. 521–546, at p. 523. See also K. Kaunda, Zambia Shall be Free: An Autobiography, London 1962.

10 H.S. Meebelo, Main Currents of Zambian Humanist Thought, Lusaka 1973, p. 1.

11 Zambian Mail, 5 January 1968, quoted in Meebelo, Main Currents of Zambian Humanist Thought, p. 1.

Kaunda merged socialist, Christian, and traditional African values into set of ideas that celebrated social harmony and tolerance.[12] A modern articulation of a heritage deeply rooted in traditional societies, humanism emphasized communalism, egalitarianism, and mutual-aid. At the centre of Kaunda's ideas was the notion of a society that recognized "the high value of man and respect for human dignity" and an "intense belief in the possibilities of Man."[13] As he said in his address to the UN General Assembly in December 1964:

> *Our African personality contains elements of simplicity, of service, of community which all the world needs. … This is the African substitute for the capitalism, socialism, and communism of the East and West. We offer it as our contribution to the world sum of experience*.[14]

Tordoff and Molten claimed that the humanist philosophy was the foundation Kaunda's most important political achievements, as it initiated a process for redefining the dominant values of society in the postcolonial era. They claimed that humanism's emphasis on individual welfare became both a collective goal and a blueprint for government policy. As they wrote,

> *The state is obliged, as are political leaders and other institutions, to serve the interest of ordinary workers and villagers. The economic system must exist to benefit primarily the citizens of the country and, within the country, the State must limit exploitation. The Humanist's assertion of the importance of every man leads on to a belief in non-racialism and non-violence, and a desire to avoid sectional and class conflict. This absence of conflict in turn enables stress to be placed on communal cooperation for economic development, social betterment, and national security*.[15]

Tordoff and Molten applauded Kaunda for engendering a process that inspired Zambian citizens to reflect upon what kind of society they wanted to create.[16] Likewise, Mkandawire has credited humanism as a key to the evolution of a national identity in postcolonial Zambia.

Some scholars have been less enthusiastic about the significance of humanism in shaping postcolonial policy of the Zambian state. Kaunda's critics claim that humanism was an inconsistent blending of many ideas, resulting in a philosophy that was largely abstract and hollow. Kaunda relied on romanticised portrayals of traditional African values and modes of living. As he wrote,

12 I.A. Kanu, Kenneth Kaunda and the Quest for An African Humanist Philosophy, in: International Journal of Scientific Research 3 (2014) 8, pp. 375–377, at p. 376.

13 J.M. Mwanakatwe, End of Kaunda Era, Lusaka 1994, p. 50; Kaunda, A Humanist in Africa, p. 21.

14 C. Legum (ed.), Zambia: From Independence to Beyond: The Speeches of Kenneth Kaunda, London 1966, p. 195.

15 T. Mkandawire, African Intellectuals: Rethinking Politics, Language, Gender and Development, London 2005, p. 197.

16 R. Molten / W. Tordoff, Independent Zambia: achievements and prospects, in: W. Tordoff (ed.), Politics in Zambia, Manchester 1974, pp. 370–371.

> *Africans are great optimists; they have a sunny outlook and hate gloom and pessimism. This is why a humanist outlook accords well with our temperament whilst grim Marxism and the narrow Christianity which preaches endlessly about the depravation of Man do not.*[17]

Many have criticized the elusiveness of humanism as a set of ideas. Kaunda's sweeping claims included vague statements such as, "Africa may be the last place where Man can still be Man."[18] Likewise, Kaunda's pronunciations of a "man-centred society," were non-specific:

> *We in Zambia intend to do everything in our power to keep our society Man-centred. For it is in that what might be described as African civilisation is embodied and indeed if modern Africa has anything to contribute to this troubled world, it is in this direction that it should be.*[19]

Both Kaunda's contemporaries as well as scholars of later generations have engaged with humanism by merely echoing some of its ambiguity, such as Mwanakatwe's description: "It puts man at the centre of all activity."[20] Pronunciations such as these led Martin to conclude,

> *The weakness of humanism, and it is a serious one, is that* [it is] *extremely vague and lacking in determinate application to concrete situations. The humanist umbrella is so wide as to leave very few specific policy alternatives out in the rain.*[21]

Despite the ambiguities, Kaunda went to great lengths to promote humanism. In a variety of mediums including books, speeches, newspaper articles, and interviews, he passionately espoused the tenets of humanism as the national ideology.[22] It was mandated that humanism be built into the curriculum of schools and universities. Civil servants were required to demonstrate their knowledge of the philosophy in order to be promoted, and the media was required to popularize the ideas. The Ministry of National Guidance was also created to educate the public on humanism through the organization of seminars and conferences.[23] According to Chan, Kaunda had to rely on a handful of foreigners to elaborate on the philosophy in order to give humanism some "intellectual flesh."[24] But the doctrine remained largely abstract, and according to Chan, few Zambian scholars had any expertise or interest in humanism. Discontent with the relentless promotion of

17 Kaunda, A Humanist in Africa, p. 36.
18 Ibid., p. 22.
19 J. Hatch, Two African Statesmen, Chicago IL 1976, p. 214.
20 Mwanakatwe, End of the Kaunda Era, p. 49.
21 A. Martin, Minding Their Own Business: Zambia, New York 1975, p. 107.
22 S. Chan, Kaunda and Southern Africa: Image and Reality in Foreign Policy, London 1992, p. 18.
23 Mwanakatwe, End of the Kaunda Era, p. 50.
24 Chan, Kaunda and Southern Africa, p. 20.

the ideology could be seen in 1982, when Zambian students protested the requirement to study the philosophy that they denounced as "an unscientific sham."[25]
For Kaunda, the very articulation of his own philosophy had political and symbolic importance. In promoting humanism, Kaunda nurtured his image as a postcolonial leader of great stature, similarly to Julius Nyerere and Kwame Nkrumah.[26] At the same time, according to Hatch, Kaunda hoped that his philosophy would help to distinguish him from the other leaders, particularly Nyerere. Thus, while Nyerere's socialism was centred on institutions that would foster social harmony, Kaunda emphasized individual responsibility, and "a personal conversion to spiritual principles."[27] Kaunda acknowledged the echoes of more general streams of African socialism that were apparent in his philosophy:

> *One cannot be a Humanist without being a socialist. It is virtually impossible. This is so because socialism, to a Humanist, is the stage of Human development attained just before that of the final one which is Humanism. On the other hand, one can be a socialist without being a Humanist.*[28]

Despite these similarities with African socialism, Kaunda insisted that his humanism was a homegrown philosophy deeply rooted in local traditions, and the central tenets of humanism – communalism, inclusiveness, egalitarianism, and mutual-aid – were in fact features of precolonial societies.[29] As he said in his address to the UN General Assembly following independence:

> *Our economic life has always been based on what I should like to describe as traditional cooperative way of living. This the African substitute for the capitalism, socialism and communism of the East and West. We offer it as our contribution to the world sum of experience.*[30]

Kaunda's claims that humanism was based on communalism and egalitarianism enabled an easy embrace of cooperatives as the building blocks for economic development. Similarily to socialist regimes elsewhere, Kaunda's party, the United National Independence Party (UNIP), upheld cooperatives as the key instrument for massive investments in economic and social structures in post-independence Zambia. At independence, Kaunda's government was confronted with increasing numbers of youths migrating to cities in search of work, leading to unemployment and food shortages. Hoping to encourage young men back to return to rural areas and agricultural work, Kaunda announced the Chifubu Appeal in 1965.[31] This programme offered citizens incentives to establishment

25 Ibid., p. 21.
26 Ibid., p. 18.
27 Hatch, Two African Statesmen, p. 247.
28 Ibid., p. 245.
29 Meebelo, Main Currents of Zambian Humanist Thought, pp. 1–5.
30 Legum, Zambia: From Independence to Beyond, p. 195.
31 F. Albinson, Cooperative Education in Zambia, in: F. Albinson / J. Norbeck / R. Sundén (eds.), Folk Development Education and Democracy in a Development Perspective, Stockholm 2002, pp. 13–29, at p. 23.

government-sponsored cooperatives, and Kaunda appealed to directly to Zambians to take part in the initiative:

> *I want* [a] *kind of cooperative society … to produce vegetables only, on the Copperbelt. I am ready to go forward and those who are interested may come forward. Vegetable growers on the Copperbelt must join with those interested in growing fruit around the Copperbelt. These people must come together. The money is there and the know-how is there. We have lined up these things. We are waiting for the response from the country. The money is there for those who are prepared to work hard. To work hard with their hands, their brains, their minds, their hearts. It is a challenge to you, not to me. I am giving you the money. Come forward. I want to see you … For the vegetables and fruit cooperatives, I want the first twenty-four volunteers next week. For egg producing societies – I want the first volunteers – twenty-four – next week. We shall enlarge on numbers as times goes on. There is no time to be lost. What are you doing in town – loafing? There is a farm waiting for you.*[32]

In the framework of the Chifubu Appeal, the government provided a range of grants and subsidies for establishing producer cooperatives, and thousands of Zambians mobilized to take advantage of these resources. By 1968, there were 609 farming cooperatives registered, with a membership of 11,500 farmers.[33] Newly founded cooperatives were offered generous subsidies for each acre of land that underwent stumping, and this led thousands of farmers to clear land for agriculture. However, these lands were never actually cultivated, as peasants had merely sought to take advantage of the £15 offered by the Department of Cooperatives for every acre that had been cleared. It was soon apparent that huge sums had been wasted on the initiative aimed at increasing cultivation. Most of the cooperatives that had been established under the Appeal were non-operational, as peasants had no knowledge or training with regard to cooperative farming.[34] René Dumont, a French agronomist who conducted a survey of agricultural development in Zambia at this time, summed up his estimation of the initiative: "The Zambian peasants have gone in for co-operative farming not because of their African tradition of mutual help, but because they realised it was the best way to get money out of the government." He estimated that the average peasant was able to £6,000 in subsidies through the loans and grants offered by the government.[35] Beyond material assistance, the Department of Cooperatives did not offer any instruction or support for cooperative farming.[36] As Dumont wrote, "It would be rash to say that the African peasants want to move towards socialism, because first they have to have a clearer idea of what it is."[37]

32 Legum, Zambia: From Independence to Beyond, p. 212.
33 S.C. Lombard, The Growth of Cooperatives in Zambia, 1914–1971, Lusaka 1971, p. 18.
34 S.A. Quick, Humanism or Technocracy? Zambia's Farming Cooperatives, 1965–1972, Lusaka 1978, pp. 50–51.
35 R. Dumont / M. Mazoyer, Socialisms and Development, London 1973, p. 128.
36 Quick, Humanism or Technocracy?, p. 56.
37 Dumont / Mazoyer, Socialisms and Development, p. 135.

Kaunda's critics have charged that the failures of policies such as the Chifubu Appeal were linked to the more general gaps between rhetoric and policy that largely characterized his leadership. Scholars have highlighted the ambiguous links between Kaunda's promotions of humanist ideology in principle, alongside his wavering commitment to successfully turning these lofty ideas into practical solutions for Zambian development. Mwanakatwe has claimed that this inconsistency was Kaunda's greatest weakness, and he failed to follow through on a clear policy agenda for addressing Zambia's economic problems.[38] With regard to initiatives such as the Chifubu Appeal subsidies, both Macola and Bowman have argued that Kaunda and his party, the UNIP, were in fact more motivated by their desire to broaden their political base and appease supporters than actually succeed in a policy initiative.[39]

Others have been more sympathetic to Kaunda, claiming that Kaunda did not in fact have the autonomy to implement Zambian humanism to its fullest potential. Shaw, for example, argued that Kaunda's authority and control were highly limited by Zambia's economic and political dependence upon international and regional markets and politics. Shaw hold that Zambia's dependence meant that Kaunda was limited in both his choices and his power to influence, and as a result, Humanism was never to become "either a revolution or a reality."[40] The following examination of Kaunda's efforts to promote his domestic agenda for development based on the Israeli *moshav* model demonstrates these broader dynamics. It will be seen that Kaunda's commitment to his own socialist agenda was curtailed by priorities and concerns that were located beyond Zambia's borders. By the end of the first decade of independence, it was clear that domestic issues in postcolonial Zambia were inherently tied to political and economic struggles far beyond Kaunda's influence.

2. Israeli Aid to Zambia

Months before Zambian independence, Israeli representatives arrived in Lusaka to extend an offer of technical assistance in anticipation of the formal departure of the British. The Israelis proposed programmes in education, communications, and security. These overtures to Zambia were part of a broader, massive outreach that Israel was making in Africa in the 1960s. Through its international aid agency, MASHAV, established in 1958, Israel sought to nurture ties with newly-independent African states. Between 1958 and 1973, thousands of Africans attended seminars and courses sponsored by MASHAV in Israel and Africa, and thousands of Israeli technical experts worked in local communi-

38 Mwanakatwe, End of the Kaunda Era, p. 61.

39 G. Macola, Liberal Nationalism in Central Africa: A Biography of Harry Mwaanga Nkumbula, New York 2010; A. Bowman, Mass Production or Production by the Masses? Tractors, Cooperatives, and the Politics of Rural Development in Post-independence Zambia, in: The Journal of African History 52 (2011) 2, pp. 201–221.

40 T.M. Shaw, The Foreign Policy of Zambia: ideology and interests, in: The Journal of Modern African Studies 14 (1976) 1, pp. 79–105, at pp. 79–80.

ties in every region of the continent.[41] Israel hoped that these new relationships would produce diplomatic revenues, and off-set international critiques of Israeli policies within the framework of the Arab-Israeli conflict. One of MASHAV's flagship aid programmes involved assistance in regional planning for the establishment and running of cooperative agricultural schemes. These schemes were based on the Israeli *moshav*-cooperative agricultural settlements based on small-holder farmers. As Israel was aware of Kaunda's enthusiasm for cooperative farming, it offered Zambia assistance with the faltering Chifubu Appeal.[42]

For Zambian politicians, relations to Israel were always conducted under the shadow of the Middle East conflict, and some were concerned about the diplomatic fallout of establishing strong ties to Israel after independence. Kaunda had asserted that Zambia's humanist foreign policy would nurture good relations with all nations and be strictly non-aligned. As he wrote on the eve of Independence:

> *Zambia's policy of positive nonalignment, entered around our philosophy of the inherent worth and dignity of man as man … is an affirmation that Africa's way must be neither for East more West, but initially directed towards the emancipation of the continent and her people. In this task of fostering the African revolution, the morality of an action counts more than its form or conditions.*[43]

Despite Kaunda's proclamations, within the Zambian Foreign Ministry, there were some reluctance to accept Israeli offers of aid. A fear of appearing to take sides in the Middle East conflict loomed in the early relations between the two countries, as reflected in a circular from the Foreign Ministry:

> *The President said that Zambia's policy was complete non-alignment and that aid would be accepted from anyone provided it was useful and provided there were no strings attached. However, the sense of recent Cabinet minutes indicates that there is still a reluctance to accept aid from Israel.* [44]

One official recommended rejecting Israeli aid because it could "spoil our name."[45] Ultimately, Kaunda's secretary of Home Affairs, Aaron Milner, swayed official policy by asserting that Zambia would adhere to Kaunda's policy of "aid from anywhere" and accept Israel's offer for assistance.[46] For some officials, this final determination was welcomed, as the Israelis were seen as an opportune alternative to the British.

41 A. Oded, Africa Ve'Israel, Yehudiut Vetahapuhot Be'Yehase Hutz shel Israel [Africa and Israel. A Unique case of Radical Changes in Foreign Policy], Jerusalem 2013.

42 M. Schwartz / A.P. Hare, Foreign Experts and Unsustainable Development: Transferring Israeli Technology to Zambia, Nigeria and Nepal, London 2000, p. 18.

43 D.G. Anglin / T.M. Shaw, Zambia's Foreign Policy: Studies in Diplomacy and Dependence, Boulder 1979, p. 27.

44 Zambia National Archives (hereafter ZNA) ZNA NCDP 2/3/2 Aid Israel Permanent Secretary of the Foreign Ministry, 23 December 1964.

45 ZNA NCDP 2/3/2 Aid Israel, 30 April 1965.

46 ZNA NCDP 2/3/2 Aid Israel.

In the area of cooperatives, Israel had earned a reputation for overcoming tremendous challenges in order to achieve food security in a relatively short period of time. Some Zambians officials were eager to learn from Israel's experience, as the success of the *kibbutz* and *moshav* models were internationally known.[47] Zambia, along with many other newly independent countries in Africa, was hoping that these Israeli models would enable local farmers to achieve the same kinds of successes. Thus, it was decided in June 1966 that Israeli technical experts would try to salvage a few of the failing cooperatives that had been established under the Chifubu Appeal. Israeli advisors arrived to take control over two cooperatives near Lusaka, *Tubalanga* and *Zambia Independence*, and a refugee settlement in Mkushi. In addition to these smaller projects, the Israelis were asked to send experts to the Kafubu Block, a group of cooperative settlements established outside of Luanshya in the Copperbelt that was being abandoned by disillusioned settlers. The Department of Mines and Cooperatives also asked Israel to implement a new large-scale cooperative farming scheme in an area south of Kafubu known as Kafulafuta.[48]

3. Israeli Cooperative Models Implemented in Zambia

The farming cooperatives that had been established under the Chifubu Appeal prior to the arrival of the Israelis had been built along a communal model, with settlers contributing their labour to communal lands and dividing revenues among them. The Israeli technical experts who arrived in 1966 recommended that the settlements under their supervision be converted to the *moshav* model – cooperative settlements based on individual small-holder farms. The Israelis argued that this shift was would boost individual motivation, which had been missing in the communal system. At first, Zambian officials resisted these changes as straying from Kaunda's humanist ideals. Israelis convinced them to experiment with the small-holder model at one settlement, *Zambia Independence*, where Kaunda himself was a member. These changes were immediately effective, and within one growing season, production had significantly improved. This paved the way to the implementation of the Israeli model in all the settlements under their control.[49]
The Copperbelt settlements became the centrepiece of Israeli technical assistance to Zambian cooperatives. For Kaunda, this region was of pivotal importance, as growing unemployment and food shortages that resulted from the unstopped flow of migrants to the towns were increasingly threatening to become a source of destabilization.[50] The magnitude of the problems gave birth to grandiose plans for addressing them. Thus, the Department of Cooperatives asked the Israelis to plan and implement a new, large settlement block in Kafulafuta, 40 miles south of the city of Luanshya. In addition, the

47 ZNA NCDP 2/3/2 Aid Israel memorandum of Vice President, n.d.
48 For an overview see D. Yadin, Three Years of Israeli Agricultural Aid in Zambia. Report submitted to the Israeli Foreign Ministry, n.p. 1969.
49 Yadin, Three Years of Israeli Agricultural Aid in Zambia, p. 29.
50 W. Tordoff (ed.), Politics in Zambia, Manchester 1974, p. 376.

Israelis were to take control over the already-established Kafubu block, which was on the brink of collapse.[51]

The Kafubu settlement was hastily established by the government in 1966 with insufficient planning and oversight. Although the close proximity to Luanshya made this an attractive option for relocating migrants to the Copperbelt, the area was not optimal for cultivation, and only 5,000 of the 12,000 acres were suitable to farming. Tree roots were hard to remove and the water supply was inadequate. Those settled in the area lacked knowledge and resources needed to run a cooperative, and the government never fulfilled promises to provide training.[52] By the time the Israelis arrived, many of the first settlers had already abandoned the area and the project was near collapse. [53] The settlers who remained were not initially enthusiastic about the Israeli intervention. According to the Israeli team leader, Dan Yadin, settlers had become used to living off government grants, and resented Israeli efforts to take control over the finances and administration of the settlement.[54]

These early hostilities soon abated when the Israeli methods proved to be successful. The settlement underwent a total reorganization, and Israelis began close oversight over production, land allocation, housing, capital, and equipment. Although the first growing season did not produce results, the changes introduced began to bear fruit in the second year. Despite early resistance, the model based on the production of family units enabled the majority of farmers to generate a surplus of crops. The Israelis recommended moving away from maize and introduced a larger crop variety, including several kinds of fruits and vegetables. In 1967–1968, a total of 650 acres were sown with good results, while in 1968–1969 there were evening higher yields on 1,000 acres, and by 1969, 3,000 acres were yielding crops.[55] Families began marketing their vegetables in town and earning income from the surpluses.

The poultry sector was particularly successful, with 1,500 broilers and 3,750 layers introduced in June 1967. According to Yitzhak Abt, a project manager from MASHAV, Israel often promoted poultry programmes because they were reliable generators of income.[56] This strategy worked in Kafubu, where within four months, chickens were laying eggs at the same yield level that had been achieved in Israel. Families involved in the poultry sector soon became a source of envy, as they invested their earnings in brick houses, and Yadin reported on new social tensions that surrounded this great success.[57] Despite these frictions, the poultry branch became the showcase project of the entire Kafubu block. Production was so great that it generated an unprecedented surplus of six million eggs. Yitzhak Abt appealed to Kaunda to find consumers for the overflowing storage houses,

51 Yadin, Three Years of Israeli Agricultural Aid in Zambia, p. 4.
52 Ibid., p. 35.
53 M. Schwartz et al. (ed.), Israeli Settlement Assistance to Zambia, Nigeria and Nepal, Amsterdam 2002, pp. 80–81.
54 Yadin, Three Years of Israeli Agricultural Aid in Zambia, p. 37.
55 Ibid., p. 38.
56 Interview with Yitzhak Abt, Kiryat Gat, Israel, 19 March 2019.
57 Yadin, Three Years of Israeli Agricultural Aid in Zambia, pp. 40–41.

and Kaunda immediately took to the airwaves, directing Zambians to eat more eggs. This was an especially significant achievement for Kaunda, who had made a campaign promise to provide Zambians with an egg a day.[58]

The Kafulafuta project did not experience the same tensions as Kafubu, as Israelis planned the settlement in close coordination with local leadership who allocated land for the scheme. Settlers worked with Israelis to clear large trees and prepare 3000 acres for cultivation.[59] Pig farming was introduced in Kafulafuta and became a profitable sector, along with poultry and vegetable cultivation. From 1970 until 1973, production gradually increased at both the Copperbelt settlements, and farmers' gross income per capita reached 130 kwacha per annum, which was five times higher than the average rural income elsewhere in Zambia.[60]

These results were celebrated by Kaunda, whose own cooperative initiative had failed, and he bestowed great praise on the Israelis. In a 1971 *Observer* article entitled "African Kibbutz," Kaunda described the Israeli schemes as "the pride of our nation."[61] In another interview, he proclaimed: "This is an achievement which deserves the admiration of the country as a whole … here we maybe be pretty close to the answer to grassroots development for which we have been searching since independence."[62] Kaunda acknowledge the role Israel had played in advancing his domestic agenda to the incoming Israeli ambassador in 1971:

> *One of our cornerstones in the country is the construction through the cooperative effort and we do realise that in this respect you are one of the few who specialise, and indeed we have learned from our experience here, that those areas where our Israeli friends have worked alongside with their Zambian brothers we have succeeded in creating a successful cooperative effort in the Republic. We appreciate this very much indeed.*[63]

Israeli technical advisors and experts at the settlements were more measured in their assessments of the schemes, and believed that the fate of the programme would only be tested when the experts finished their work and the programme would have stand on its own. As Shimon Amir wrote,

> *We do not want to perpetuate our presence anywhere, because really we do not know whether a project has been successful or not, until the experts have left. Then it will show whether they paid enough attention to train Zambians. So on the one hand we must phase out, on the other hand we must continue and expand a successful scheme. This is our dilemma.*[64]

58 Schwartz, Israeli Settlement Assistance to Zambia, Nigeria and Nepal, p. 94.
59 Ibid., p. 89.
60 Ibid., p. 91.
61 The Observer, 15 December 1971.
62 Zambian Farmer, 17 August 1971, quoted in S. Amir, Israel's Development Cooperation with Africa, Asia and Latin America, New York 1974, p. 32.
63 INA 4581/39 Report of the ceremony of the arrival of the new Israeli ambassador, 14 October 1971.
64 ZNA NCDP/213/11 External Aid Policy Israel Minutes of a meeting, 29 July 1969.

Much to their surprise, the Israelis would discover in 1973 just how unsustainable their investment in Zambians cooperatives was. Following the October War, Kaunda followed a directive of the OAU and cut ties with Israel, sending the entire delegation home. Within a few weeks, the Israelis departed with their capital resources and expertise, and within less than a year, the projects began to fail. Farmers struggled with debts and lack of access to more loans, and equipment was sold, stolen, or repossessed by banks. By the end of 1976, both Kafubu and Kafulafuta cooperatives had collapsed completely.

4. Between Ideology and Policy in the Years of Decolonization

Following the October War of 1973, nearly every country in Africa fell in line with the directive of the OAU to cut ties to Israel. According to Levey, there were many motivating factors, including a desire to maintain unity on the continent, and a fear of rising oil prices.[65] In writing the history of the rise and fall of Israel-Africa relations in the first decade of independence, some historians have avoided generalized analyses, and suggest instead that we focus on specific factors and circumstances motivating individual states in the decision to cut ties.[66] The case of Zambia provides a poignant example of the benefits of taking a bottom-up approach to unpack this history. Kaunda's decision to sever relations with Israel came at the cost of a domestic cooperative scheme that had become a centrepiece of his efforts to implement his humanist ideology. This decision thus requires interrogation. Was this another aspect of what Richard Hall labelled "High Price of Principles" that shaped Kaunda's rule?[67]

Kaunda's government used Zambian policies and positions regarding the Middle East conflict as an opportunity to advocate for positions that could be leveraged in contexts closer to home. As many scholars have noted, Kaunda's main foreign policy concern was the situation in southern Africa. At the time of independence, land-locked Zambia shared a border with four white-minority regimes: Rhodesia, Mozambique, Namibia, and Angola. This situation posed political and ideological challenges, but in 1965, the Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) in Rhodesia created a full-blown crisis and serious threat to Zambia's economic survival. Struggles against colonialism in Southern Africa threatened Zambia's stability, with eruptions of violence that spilled over into Zambia over time, leading to heightened tensions and economic shortages. As Mwanakatwe summarized it, "no other independent country in the southern Africa sub-region experienced as much loss and suffering from liberation wars than Zambia."[68] From the beginning of the UDI, Kaunda attempted to rally international support for intervention and assistance in opposing the colonial regimes and minority rule on his borders. Kaunda's strategies were focused on international organizations and forums,

65 Z. Levey, Israel in Africa: 1956–1976, Dordrecht 2012, pp. 157–158.
66 See, for example, J. Peters, Israel and Africa: The Problematic Friendship, London 1992.
67 R.S. Hall, The High Price of Principles: Kaunda and the White South, London 1969.
68 Mwanakatwe, End of the Kaunda Era, p. 66.

where he continually worked to build support for liberation movements.[69] While sympathetic to Kaunda's mission, some Zambians believed that his relentless appeals to the United Nations and the Organization of Africa Unity to rally support for the liberation of southern Africa ultimately drew his energies away from Zambia's domestic interests.[70] An examination of Zambia's positions regarding the Middle East conflict, and relations with Israel, reflected Kaunda's party's anxieties about the minority-rule regimes that surrounded Zambia. The watershed was the June War of 1967, which resulted in the Israeli invasion and occupation of Arab lands. For Israel and Zambia, this was the point at which the scales began to tip from relations of cooperation and affinity to relations fraught with tensions and critique. From this time, some Zambian politicians, such as United Nations Ambassador Banda, condemned Zionism as a form of settler colonialism, and rejected the Zionist movement's historic-religious claim over the Jewish homeland. The belief that the land of Israel had been promised to Abraham in biblical times was, according to Banda, "as ridiculous as it is absurd". Banda was highly sympathetic to Arabs who had been living in Palestine for thousands of years, and were now victims of Zionism's "monstrous crimes against humanity". He argued that Africans had to stand up against the expulsion of Arabs from Palestine, as similar actions were being taken against Africans in Africa. As he wrote,

> *Very soon Zambia will be told to accept that whites must rule Rhodesia. Africa will be asked after a few more years to accept the fait accompli of white South Africa. We must reject superficial power-based righteousness.*[71]

The Middle East conflict was a sobering lesson for Zambian politicians, and they feared the repercussions of letting violations of human rights go unchecked,

> *The Middle East situation, if it is to serve any purpose, it is to show a young African country very clearly the amount of resources that the United States government is prepared to put into any situation the serves their interest. Of course, we have the old example of Vietnam, but the Middle East, unlike Vietnam, is much more important to everyone and especially Africa because besides being the meeting point of three main continents is the main entry point into our continent.*[72]

Likewise, in Ambassador Mwenba's address to the Emergency session of the UN General Assembly on 27 June 1967, it is possible to see that Zambia's interest goes beyond the Middle East conflict:

> *The Middle East has cooperated with my country in its effort to solve economic, social and cultural and other human problems. The government and the people of Zambia have no quarrel with Israel. …* [but] *aggression in the eyes of Zambia is inadmissible and worth*

69 Shaw, The Foreign Policy of Zambia, p. 83.
70 Anglin and Shaw, Zambia's Foreign Policy, p. 13.
71 ZNA FA/1/208 Israel-UAR Conflict – Middle East Crisis 30 June 1967 (Banda in Washington DC to Kapwepwe).
72 ZNA FA/1/208 Israel-UAR Conflict – Middle East Crisis, 7 July 1967 (Banda in Washington DC to Kapwepwe).

> *nothing but strong condemnation. It should not be said that some states adhere to the United Nations charter only when it suits them. Members of a club must stick to the rules of the club without which the club is dead.*[73]

The links between Zambia's concerns in southern Africa and its position regarding the Middle East conflict were clear in Mwemba's remarks:

> *My delegation is greatly alarmed by the report that Israel [has] appointed governors in certain of the occupied areas. We are even more concerned at press reports that Israel intends on setting up a new regime in pursuance of the imperialist policy of "Divide and Rule." It is this Israeli policy of territorial aggrandisement and expansionism that my delegation strong deplores and condemns. In the second half of the 20th century, Zambia cannot and will not lend itself to the law of the jungle which can only give comfort to the enemies of self-determination, freedom, and human dignity.*[74]

While the 1967 war was the beginning of a shift in Zambia's position regarding Israel, but it did not lead to the complete souring of relations. Until October 1973, Kaunda believed that he could make his concerns about the political situation in the Middle East known, but still maintain fruitful relations with Israel. As he told the Israeli ambassador:

> *… we are more worried than ever before by the situation in the Middle East, just like we are worried about the situation in the southern continent of Africa. … Israel is putting up obstacles in the way of realising UN resolutions. Other countries in Africa have cut they relations with Israel and other are threatening to do so, but we are among those who think that by maintaining relations with both sides, we can offer the moderate suggestions of a friend.*[75]

These "moderate suggestions" came in the form of increasing vocal criticism in the international sphere, while at home, Kaunda adopted a business-as-usual attitude towards Israeli cooperative assistance. Thus, Zambia continued to foster strong ties with Israel, and even hoped to expand upon Israeli involvement in Zambia's domestic development efforts.

Throughout the period under question, the Israelis were confounded by this rigidity that gave birth to Zambia's harsh critique voiced against Israel in international forums at the same time that the Zambian government made plans for expanding upon Israel technical assistance. Israeli officials in both Lusaka and Jerusalem were continually frustrated by the stark dissonance between their relations with Zambia in the area of development aid on the one hand, and in the position, Zambia consistently took against Israel in the United Nations. Again and again, the Israelis confronted the reality that the extension of aid would not translate into unconditional support in the United Nations and elsewhere. Despite all the success of Israeli interventions in Zambia, and the centrality of the aid

73 Ibid.
74 Ibid.
75 Israeli National Archives (hereafter INA) 4832/2, 24 September 1973.

programme in helping Kaunda realise his humanist vision for cooperative development, the Zambians played a leading role in international alliances that opposed Israeli policies. The Israeli Foreign Ministry continually urged its ambassadors in Lusaka to register a complaint with local officials. Some Zambian officials responded by minimizing the significance of Zambia's stance in international forums. In one instance, for example, Israeli Ambassador Tahan met Deputy Minister Tembu at a cocktail party, and the Zambian official told him that the Israelis should not give back one inch of the conquered territory. When Tahan wondered how to reconcile these comments with Zambia's voting record at the UN, Tembu remarked, "The UN Is a just club for arguments and nothing that is said there is worth anything!"[76]

These comments revealed that Zambians believed that it was possible to operate on two parallel tracks in their relations with Israel, and the Israelis ultimately had little choice but to accept this duality. From 1964 to 1973, Israeli assistance in domestic aid programmes were gradually expanded, while Zambia's international position toward Israel hardened toward more hostility. Particularly from the June War in 1967, the international condemnations were matched by newly signed agreements for agricultural and industrial schemes. Thus, months after the June War, an agreement was signed for Israel to build a textile factory in Zambia. The Vice President visited the cooperatives at this time and gave an enthusiastic speech praising the projects and the Israeli government. In October 1967, Israeli Ambassador Tahan claimed that in Lusaka, Israelis enjoyed an open door to most government ministries, and he cited his ability to arrange a meeting with the Foreign Minister "within hours". Acknowledging the dualism in Zambia's approach, he advised that Israel had no choice but to live with it.[77] The Israelis understood that the development programmes in the domestic sphere ultimately did not function in isolation from international politics. Ambassador Elron summed up the dilemma in a 1971 report:

> *Israel has two options in her relations with Zambia. She can express her dissatisfaction through a purposeful limiting of our relations, which would include a reduction in our aid activity. Or, we can accept the situation, as it is important for us to maintain good relations with Zambia and Kaunda not because of them per se, but because of their weight and influence in Africa and their influence on the Arab-Asian alliance in the UN.*[78]

Kenneth Kaunda held on to power for the first twenty-five years of Zambian independence, and subsequently, an extensive body of critique has taken shape with regard to his rule and his legacy. Scholars, politicians, and activists have expressed harsh disapproval of Kaunda as an opportunistic and ineffective leader whose ideological positions flip-flopped. This criticism of Kaunda's rule draws upon a long history of leadership that became increasingly authoritarian and corrupt. The importance of this critique not-

76 INA 4025/19, 8 August 1967.
77 INA 4025/16 a report of internal matters in Zambia, 31 October 1967.
78 INA 4025/16 Report on Israel-Zambia relations, 7 June 1971.

withstanding, we can gain a more nuanced perspective by a close investigation of the conflicting interests that plagued Kaunda and his policies of the first decade following decolonization. The history of Israeli cooperative assistance in Zambia from 1964 to 1973 reveals that Kaunda's socialist development agenda was only one part of a broad spectrum of geopolitical concerns facing post-colonial Zambia. Kaunda struggled with conflicting priorities and eventually, achievements in the area of socialist development were side-lined for other urgencies.

The Organisation of African Unity in the 1960s: From Euphoria to Disenchantment

Ulf Engel

ABSTRACTS

Dieser Artikel greift die Entwicklung der Organisationen der Afrikanischen Einheit (OAU) in den 1960er Jahren auf, die eine Bruchzone der Globalisierung darstellen. Vier Themen werden diskutiert: (1) die politischen Ziele der Organisation, (2) die Rolle der OAU in der globalen Politik und die Frage, wir sie Einfluss auf die Vereinten Nationen, das Commonwealth und die Bewegung der Blockfreien genommen hat, (3) die Entwicklung der zwischenstaatlichen Beziehungen auf dem afrikanischen Kontinent, und (4) die möglichen Gründe für die geringe Performanz der OAU insbesondere in Fällen von gewaltsamen Konflikten in Afrika.

This article revisits the early history of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) which emerged at a critical juncture of globalisation in the 1960s. Four broad topics are discussed: (1) the political aims of the organisation, (2) the continental body's role in global politics and the way independent African states have impacted on the United Nations, the Non-Aligned Movement and the Commonwealth, (3) the development of intra-African relations, and (4) possible reasons for the general underperformance of the OAU's in particular with regard to violent conflict on the continent in those years.

1. Introduction

This article revisits the early history of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) which was founded in May 1963 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. The long 1960s can be seen as a *critical juncture of globalization*[1] in which a dominant regime of territorialisation, the

1 M. Middell / U. Engel, Bruchzonen der Globalisierung, globale Krisen und Territorialitätsregimes – Kategorien einer Globalgeschichtsschreibung, in: Comparativ 15 (2005) 2, pp. 5–38.

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colonial empire, was replaced by independent nation states which had to find their way in what by then had become a bipolar world order. International organizations played a particular role in this period as they allowed for representation and provided a stage to the newly independent states. This arena become a major site of protest and negotiation for African states; it allowed them to define their own globalization projects.

This article interrogates four broad themes: First, the political ambitions of the OAU will be scrutinized through a content analysis of the OAU Charter and the decisions of both the OAU Heads of State and Government as well as the Council of Ministers in the years 1963 to 1969. Second, Africa's place in the Cold War global order of the 1960s[2] will be discussed from a global history perspective with a view to understand, if and how OAU positions made it into international politics at the level of the United Nations, the Non-Aligned Movement, and the Commonwealth. Politically, the newly independent countries of Africa aimed at positioning themselves globally, in the midst of the Cold War, by adopting the principle of non-alignment. The key topics initially put on the international agenda were the call for complete decolonisation of the continent, the struggle against apartheid in South Africa and support for the Southern African liberation movements, but soon the civil war in Nigeria (1967–1970) and the Arab/Israel war (1967) came to dominate the continent's agenda. Third, the development of intra-African relations will be recaptured, in particular with a view to violent conflicts developing on the African continent and the way the OAU dealt with these conflicts, or not. And, fourth, the reasons for the obvious failure of the continental body to address violent conflict in and between member states, to build-up the capacity of the OAU as well as to develop a strong developmental agenda will be discussed. This analysis is followed by conclusions.

2. Political Ambitions

Three African countries achieved independent before 1951 (Liberia, Egypt, and Libya), five in 1956, one in 1957 and two in 1958 (see tab. 2). The "wave of independence", the *wind of change*[3] gained momentum in 1960 when 17 countries received full sovereignty. In the following two years another six states followed. And from 1963 to 1969 nine more African countries gained independence. Fourteen territories, mainly the Portuguese colonies and the European settler regimes in Southern Africa, still had to wait for this moment – some for more than 30 years.[4]

2 O.A. Westad (ed.), Reviewing the Cold War. Approaches, Interpretations, Theory, London 2000; R. van Dijk et al. (eds.), Encyclopedia of the Cold War, 2 vols, New York 2008.

3 This phrase goes back to a speech given by the British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan to the South Africa Parliament on 3 February 1960. SAHO, Speech made to the South Africa Parliament on 3 February 1960 by Harold Macmillan. South African History Online, <https://www.sahistory.org.za/archive/wind-change-speech-made-south-africa-parliament-3-february-1960-harold-macmillan> (accessed 30 December 2019). See R. Ovendale, Macmillan and the Wind of Change in Africa, 1957–1960, in: The Historical Journal 38 (1995) 2, pp. 455–477.

4 Technically speaking, South Africa was an independent country since the formation of the Union in 1910, and

The prehistory of the establishment of the Organisation of African Unity has been described elsewhere; it is based on decades of Pan-African aspirations and, after independence, different visions of continental unity.[5] The Dutch historian Klaas van Walraven has detailed how – from the conference of independent states held in Accra, Ghana, in April 1959 to the preparatory conference of African foreign ministers held in Addis Ababa on 15–21 May 1963 – the positions between "radical" (Casablanca), "conservative" (Brazzaville) and "moderate" (Monrovia) groups of African states have finally been reconciled through the compromise that led to the establishment of the OAU.[6] While the Casablanca group around leftist presidents Gamal Abdel-Nasser (Egypt), Kwame Nkrumah (Ghana), and Sékou Touré (Guinea)[7] favoured a model of regionalism that was based on sovereignty transfers by members states to a political federation, including the establishment of an African High Command for a joint defence policy,[8] the conservative Brazzaville group[9] insisted on the principle of absolute sovereignty of independent countries. These diverging interests were mediated by a group that established itself as "moderates", including Ethiopia and Nigeria. In the end, competing models of regionalism and sovereignty were negotiated, and different ideas of the spatial format "region" were imagined, discovered, and pondered, which led to the emergence of a specific spatial format of regionalism, the Organization of African Unity in which member states kept most, if not all of their newly won sovereignty.[10]

The *Charter of the Organization of African Unity* is a rather lean text that comes in 32 articles on eleven pages.[11] The Heads of State and Government were

Southern Rhodesia had declared "unilateral independence" from the United Kingdom in 1965. Both countries, plus South African-occupied Namibia, were settler regimes.

5 See, for instance, Ghanaian president N. Nkrumah, Africa Must Unite, New York 1963; and the first African president of the UN General Assembly, A. Quaison-Sackey, Africa Unbound: Reflections of an African Statesman, New York 1963, pp. 91–97. On the history of Pan-Africanism see R. Emerson, Pan-Africanism, in: International Organization 16 (1962) 2, pp. 275–290; C. Legum, Pan-Africanism: A Short Political Guide, 2nd edn, New York et al. 1965 [1962]; I. Geiss, The Pan-African Movement, London 1974 (in German 1968); T. Falola, Nationalism and African Intellectuals, New York 2001; and more recently H. Adi, Pan-Africanism: A History, London 2018.

6 K. van Walraven, Dreams of Power. The Role of the Organization of African Unity in the Politics of Africa 1963–1993, Ridderkerk 1996. For documentation and analysis, see Legum, Pan-Africanism. See also A.F. Addona, The Organization of African Unity, Cleveland et al. 1969; S.O. Agbi, The Organization of African Unity and African Diplomacy, 1963–1979, Ibadan1986; Y. el Ayouty, The Organization of African Unity After Ten Years: Comparative Perspectives, New York 1976. See also Moledo in this volume.

7 Other members of the group included Algeria, Libya, Mali, and Morocco. See van Walraven, Dreams of Power, p. 103.

8 T.A. Imobighe, An African High Command: The Search for a Feasible Strategy of Continental Defence, African Affairs 79 (1980) 315, pp. 241–254.

9 The group included the French-speaking countries of Benin (then still: Dahomey), Burkina Faso (then still: Upper Volta), Cameroon, CAR, Chad, Congo (Brazzaville), Côte d'Ivoire, Gabon, Madagascar, Mauretania, Niger, and Senegal. See van Walraven, Dreams of Power, p. 103.

10 This section is aligned to the analytical vocabulary developed by the Collaborative Research Centre (DFG-Sonderforschungsbereich) 1199, ULR: <https://research.uni-leipzig.de/~sfb1199/?id=7> (accessed: 30 December 2019). See M. Middell, Category of Spatial Formats: To What End?, in: S. Marung / M. Middell (eds.), Spatial Formats under the Global Condition, Berlin / Boston 2019, pp. 15–47.

11 OAU, The Charter of the Organisation of African Unity, 23 May 1963, Addis Ababa. See Z. Červenka, The Organisation of African Unity and its Charter, London 1969. In the original version, the OAU used American English. Later documents interchangeable also use British English. In comparison, the *Constitutive Act of the African Union* is of

Convinced that it is the inalienable right of all people to control their own destiny,
Conscious of the fact that freedom, equality, justice and dignity are essential objectives for the achievement of the legitimate aspirations of the African peoples,
Conscious of our responsibility to harness the natural and human resources of our continent for the total advancement of our peoples in all spheres of human endeavour, …
Convinced that, in order to translate this determination into a dynamic force in the cause of human progress, conditions for peace and security must be established and maintained,
Determined to safeguard and consolidate the hard-won independence as well as the sovereignty and territorial integrity of our states, and to fight against neo-colonialism in all its forms, …
Persuaded that the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, to the Principles of which we reaffirm our adherence, provide a solid foundation for peaceful and positive cooperation among States, …[12]

Based on these convictions, as an institution the OAU aimed to:

(a) To promote the unity and solidarity of the African States;
(b) To coordinate and intensify their cooperation and efforts to achieve a better life for the peoples of Africa;
(c) To defend their sovereignty, their territorial integrity and independence;
(d) To eradicate all forms of colonialism from Africa; and
(e) To promote international cooperation, having due regard to the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.[13]

The OAU then spelled out a set of principles that were decisive for the development of the organisation in the coming decades, most importantly the principle of sovereign equality of member states, non-interference in the internal affairs of member states, and respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each member state.[14] In terms of global positioning, the OAU dedicated herself "to the total emancipation of the African territories which are still dependent" and pledged to adhere to the principle of non-alignment "with regard to all blocs" (which were not mentioned by name).[15] Importantly the OAU also decided to settle disputes among member states peacefully by negotiation, mediation, conciliation or arbitration.[16] To this end the OAU established a Commission

the same length and has just one paragraph more. See OAU, Constitutive Act of the African Union, 7 July 2000, Lomé.

12 OAU, The Charter, p. 1.00.

13 OAU, The Charter, §2 (1) a–e.

14 OAU, The Charter, §3 (1–3). See A.B. Akinyemi, The Organization of African Unity and the Concept of Non-Interference in Internal Affairs of Member-States, in: British Yearbook of International Law 46 (1972–1973), pp. 392–400. The OAU also unreservedly condemned, "in all its forms, of political assassination as well as of subversive activities on the part of neighbouring States or any other States". Ibid., §3 (4).

15 OAU, The Charter, §3 (6–7).

16 Ibid.

of Mediation, Conciliation, and Arbitration.[17] Apart from the summit, the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs and the General Secretariat, this was the only "principal institution" of the continental body. Originally, staff size was 18 (1964), but by 1972 already some 288 people worked at the General Secretariat of the OAU.[18]

At the First Conference of Independent African Heads of State and Government, that was held in Addis Ababa from 22 to 25 May 1963, and which led to the establishment of the OAU, ten resolutions were adopted.[19] Read today, the decisions are refreshingly visionary and almost euphoric. On the first agenda item "decolonization" the conference declared:

> *that the forcible imposition by the colonial powers of the settlers to control the governments and administrations of the dependent territories is a flagrant violation of the inalienable rights of the legitimate inhabitants of the territories concerned.*[20]

The regional focus was in particularly on Southern Rhodesia, South-West Africa (Namibia), and African territories under Portuguese domination. It was decided to break-off diplomatic and consular relations between all African states and the governments of Portugal and South Africa. In addition a boycott was introduced on imports from these countries, African ports and airports were closed to their ships and planes, and planes from those two countries were forbidden to overfly the territories or all African states.[21] Furthermore, in support of the liberation movements operating in South Africa and Portuguese colonies a Co-ordinating Committee and a Special Fund were established with headquarters in Dar es Salaam, Tanganyika – the OAU Liberation Committee which initially consisted of Algeria, Egypt, Ethiopia, Guinea, Congo (Léopoldville),[22] Nigeria, Senegal, Tanganyika, and Uganda.[23] On 25 May was declared "African Liberation Day". The OAU member states offered their territories to "nationalists from liberation movements in order to give them training in all sectors and afford young people all the assistance they need for their education and vocational training".[24]

On the second item on the agenda, the issue of "apartheid and racial discrimination", the summit *inter alia* agreed "to grant scholarships, educational facilities, and possibilities of employment in African government services to refugees from South Africa"; to lobby at the UN Security Council (UNSC) and to "co-ordinate concerted measures of sanction against the Government of South Africa".[25] Other decisions were taken on Africa's rela-

17 OAU, The Charter, §19. See T.O. Elias, The Commission of Mediation, Conciliation, and Arbitration of the Organisation of African Unity, in: British Yearbook of International Law 40 (1964), pp. 336–354.
18 Van Walraven, Dreams of Power, p. 166.
19 CIAS, First Conference of Independent African Heads of State and Government. Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 22–25 May 1963, Addis Ababa.
20 CIAS, First Conference, CIAS/Plen.2/Rev.2.
21 Ibid.
22 Renamed Kinshasa in 1966.
23 T. Huysmans, The Liberation Committee of the Organisation of African Unity, Nijmegen 1979.
24 CIAS/Plen.2/Rev.2.
25 Ibid.

tions to the United Nations (already introducing the notion of equitable representation in principal UN organs, including the UNSC), disarmament (including declaring Africa a Denuclearized Zone), economic co-operation, etc.

In the 1960s the OAU Assembly discussed a wide range of topics, from Apartheid and Southern Africa to disarmament / denuclearisation, from African border disputes and conflicts to forms of Pan-African cooperation.[26] It also focussed on its own institutional development and relations with international organisations. Finally, the OAU summits pronounced themselves on global matters. While the range of topics was widening in 1964 and 1965, during the following summits one can see a gradual reduction in the scope of topics the OAU has been dealing with (see tab 1). In 1964 at the 1st Ordinary Summit a new, and in later years recurrent item on the agenda was the "Consideration of a proposal for the establishment of a Union Government of Africa", as submitted by the Government of Ghana.[27]

Apartheid, racial discrimination, South Africa, Southern Rhodesia, South West Africa, and the Portuguese occupied territories remained a strong concern during the first years of the organisation. Another area of initial concern was the OAU's own institutional development, with decisions on the future of the organisation (1963), a Union Government for Africa, a Transport and Communications Commission, interim financing of the Secretariat (all 1964), OAU privileges and immunities, the establishment of an OAU executive body, sponsorship of the next Assembly meeting, rules of procedure of the Africa Group at the UN, sponsorship of African positions in the UN system, adjustment of the scale of assessment for membership contributions, and the Pan African News Agency, PANA (all 1965).

On African conflicts and in view of the fact "that border problems constitute a grave and permanent factor of dissention", but at the same time "that the borders of African States, on the day of their independence, constitute a tangible reality",[28] the OAU adopted a decision on African border disputes. In particular it addressed border disputes between Ghana and Upper Volta, and Algeria and Morocco, respectively (both 1964). Among the other conflicts the organisation addressed, are the conflicts between Kenya, Ethiopia, and Somalia (1967), and the Biafra war in Nigeria (1967–1970; see below section 5).

Another major field of discussion have been OAU relations to other international bodies, mainly the United Nations, but also Afro-Asian cooperation. Interestingly, the OAU also pronounced itself on global policy questions, including racial discrimination in the United States (1964) and the Six-Day War between Egypt and Israel (5–10 June 1967,

26 The calendar of activities was not as dense as from 2003 onwards when the African Union started meeting twice a year at the level of Assembly. In the 1960s the summit would be held anytime between May and November. Meetings took far longer than from the 1990s onwards (e.g. in 1965 a Council could sit for almost two weeks, rather than for three as nowadays.

27 OAU, Resolutions adopted by the First Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government held in Cairo, UAR, from 17 to 21 July 1964, Addis Ababa.

28 Ibid.

see below section 4). However, little was actually said by the Assembly or the Council on the effects of the Cold War on OAU member states.

Tab. 1: Content analysis of OAU Assembly decisions, 1963–1969

Issue/year	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969
Apartheid and Southern Africa(1)	x	x	x	–	x	–	–
Disarmament / denuclearisation	x	x	–	–	–	–	–
African border disputes and conflicts(2)	–	x	x	–	x	x	x
Pan-African cooperation(3)	x	–	–	x	–	–	x
OAU institutional development(4)	x	x	x	x	–	–	–
OAU and international organisations(5)	x	x	x	x	–	–	–
Pronouncements on global matters(6)	–	x	–	–	x	x	x

Notes:
(1) Including racial discrimination (1963–1964), apartheid, South Africa, Southern Rhodesia, Portuguese occupied territories (all 1963–1965), territorial integrity of Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland (1964–1965), support to the Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola – Partido do Trabalho (MPLA) in Angola (1964), the OAU Liberation Committee (1963–1965), and support to the South-West African, i.e. Namibian case (1965, 1967).
(2) Including border disputes in general, the dispute between Ghana and Upper Volta (both 1964), the ad hoc commission of the Alegro-Moroccan border dispute, subversion of governments, the problem of refugees (all 1965), mercenaries (1967), on conflict between Kenya and Somalia (1967), and the Biafra war in Nigeria (1967–1969).
(3) Including economic cooperation; health, sanitation and nutrition; social and labour; and education and culture (all 1963), social and economic cooperation (1966), and on assistance to Equatorial-Guinea (1969).
(4) Including the future of the organisation (1963), a Union Government for Africa, a Transport and Communications Commission, interim financing of the Secretariat (all 1964), OAU privileges and immunities, establishing an OAU executive body, sponsorship of next Assembly meeting, rules of procedure Africa Group at UN, sponsorship of African positions in the UN system, adjusting the scale of assessment for membership contributions, the Pan African News Agency, PANA (all 1965).
(5) Including AU and United Nations (1963–1965), financing UN PKOs (1964), the 2nd Conference of African-Asian States (1964), relations between the OAU and the UN Commission for Africa (1965), the World Conference on Trade and Development (1966).
(6) Including racial discrimination in the USA (1964) and – initially without mentioning Israel by name (1967–1968) – on the preventive strike that later was called the "Israeli aggression" (1969) against Egypt, Jordan and Syria.
Sources: CIAS, First Conference of Independent African Heads of State and Government. Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 22–25 May 1963, Addis Ababa; OAU, Resolutions adopted by the First Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government held in Cairo, UAR, from 17 to 21 July 1964, Addis Ababa; OAU, Resolutions adopted by the Second Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government held in Accra, Ghana, from 21 to 26 October 1965, Addis Ababa; OAU, Resolutions adopted by the Third Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, from 5 to 9 November 1966, Addis Ababa; OAU, Resolutions adopted by the Fourth Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government held in Kinshasa, Congo, from 11 to 14 September 1967, Addis Ababa; OAU, Resolutions adopted by the Third Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government held in Algiers, [Algeria], from 13 to 16 September 1968, Addis Ababa; and OAU, Resolutions adopted by the Third Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government held in Addis Ababa, [Ethiopia], from 6 to 10 September 1969, Addis Ababa.

How does the picture change when taking into account the OAU Council of Ministers that met twice a year? First of all, the Council has produced considerable more resolutions over time, with the 9th Ordinary Session in 1967 being the most productive one. It has covered all fields of OAU engagement, but with some interesting changes over time. Pronouncements on disarmament and denuclearisation stopped after 1964, and the same goes for references to African border disputes and conflicts after 1967 (see below, section 5). In contrast, the Egypt / Israeli Six-Day War in 1967 prompted the Council in 1968 to take its first decision on global matters[29] – but none, for instance on the war in Vietnam or any other global issue. On the organisation's institutional development, the Council remained ceased with the matter throughout the period under review, while the Assembly stopped taking decisions on this question in 1966. Throughout the Council also remained engaged with Africa's international relations, especially with the United Nations, while the Assembly took its last decision on this cooperation in 1966. In fact, in this respect the division of labour between Assembly and Council remained vague and has been an issue since.

Tab. 2: Content analysis of OAU Council of Ministers decisions, 1963–1969

Issue/year	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969
Apartheid and Southern Africa(1)	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Disarmament / denuclearisation	x	x	–	–	–	–	–
African border disputes and conflicts	x	x	x	x	x	–	–
Pan-African cooperation	–	x	x	–	x	x	x
OAU institutional development	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
OAU and international organisations	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Pronouncements on global matters	–	–	–	–	–	x	–

Note: (1) And other cases of decolonisation such as, for instance and though less frequently, the Comoros.
Sources: OAU, Resolutions and Recommendations of the Ordinary Session of the Council of Ministers held in Dakar, Senegal from 2 to 11 August 1963, Addis Ababa; OAU, Resolutions and Recommendations of the First Extra-Ordinary Session of the Council of Ministers held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, from 15 to 18 November 1963, Addis Ababa; OAU, Resolutions and Recommendations of the Second Ordinary Session of the Council of Ministers held in Lagos, Nigeria, from 24 to 29 February 1964, Addis Ababa; OAU, Resolutions and Recommendations of the Third Ordinary Session of the Council of Ministers held in Cairo, (U.A.R.), from 13 to 17 July 1964, Addis Ababa; OAU, Resolutions and Recommendations of the Second Extra-Ordinary Session of the Council of Ministers held in Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania, from 12 to 15 February 1964, Addis Ababa; OAU, Resolutions of the Fourth Extra Ordinary Ses-sion of the Council of Ministers held in New York from 16 to 21 December 1964, Addis Ababa [note: following the inaugural meeting, this must actually have been the 3rd extra-ordinary session]; OAU, Resolutions and Recommenda-tions of the Fourth Ordinary Session of the Council of Ministers held in Nairobi, Kenya, from 26 February to 9 March 1965, Addis Ababa; OAU, Resolutions of the Fifth Ordinary Session of the Council of Ministers held in Accra, Ghana, from 14 to

29 OAU, Resolutions adopted by Tenth Ordinary Session the Council of Ministers held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, from 20 to 24 February 1968, Addis Ababa.

21 October 1965, Addis Ababa; OAU, Resolutions of the Sixth Ordinary Session of the Council of Ministers held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia from 28 February to 6 March 1966, Addis Ababa; OAU, Resolutions of the Sev-enth Ordinary Session of the Council of Ministers held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia from 31 October to 4 November 1966, Addis Ababa; OAU, Resolutions of the Eighth Ordinary Session of the Council of Ministers held in Addis Aba-ba, Ethiopia from 27 February to 4 March 1967, Addis Ababa; OAU, Resolutions adopted by the Council of Ministers at its Ninth Ordinary Session held in Kinshasa, Congo from 4 to 10 September 1967, Addis Ababa; OAU, Resolutions adopted by Tenth Ordinary Session the Council of Ministers held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, from 20 to 24 February 1968, Addis Ababa; OAU, Resolutions adopted by Eleventh Ordinary Session the Council of Ministers held in Algiers, Algeria, from 4 to 12 September. 1968, Addis Ababa; OAU, Declarations, Recommendations and Resolutions of the Council of Ministers['] Meeting in its Twelfth Ordinary Session held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia from 17 to 22 February 1969, Addis Ababa; OAU, Resolutions adopted by Thirteenth Ordinary Session the Council of Ministers held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia from 27 August to 6 September 1969, Addis Ababa.

3. Global Positioning

As any other independent state, African states made use of international policy arenas to voice their concerns and follow their interests. The most relevant bodies in this respect have been the United Nations (UN), the British Commonwealth, and the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). With many states gaining independence in the early 1960s, Africa first and foremost had become a substantial voting bloc in the UN General Assembly. 17 years after the foundation of the United Nations for the first time an African caucus was recognised, the Group of African States at the UN.[30] In 1945 African votes (excluding the Union of South Africa) accounted for 5.88 percent of all the 51 UN founding member states (Asian votes: 9.8%). In 1959, on the eve of the *wind of change*, African states held 10.98 percent of all votes (Asia: 19,51%, the highest thus far).[31] In 1960, and with by now 99 UN member states, this increased to 20.25 percent of African votes, and in 1962 to 29.02 per cent. By the end of the 1960s, African countries controlled almost one-third of the votes in the UN General Assembly (32.45%). In 1969 the Afro-Asian bloc of countries commanded 47.62 percent of all 126 votes (see graph 1). By then it had a become a force in global politics to reckon with.

30 J.H. Spencer, Africa at the UN: Some Observations, in: International Organization 16 (1962) 2, pp. 375–386, at p. 375f. From 1943 to 1961, Spencer, a Professor of International Law and Diplomacy at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, was actually Senior Adviser in Foreign Affairs to the Ethiopian government. See also W. Ellis / J. Salzberg, Africa in the UN: A Statistical Note, in: American Behavioral Scientist 8 (1966) 8, pp. 30–32. Meyers recalls that the Africa caucus was already established in 1958 by Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Liberia, Libya, Morocco, Sudan, and Tunisia. See B.D. Meyers, African Voting in the United Nations General Assembly, in: Journal of Modern African Studies 4 (1966) 2, pp. 213–227, at p. 214.

31 Meyers also reminds us that during the 18th UNGA session there was a division among African states, with some belonging to the Arab caucus (Algeria, Libya, Morocco, Sudan, and Tunisia) and others to the Commonwealth caucus (Ghana, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Tanganyika, and Uganda). See Meyers, African Voting, p. 215.



Notes: Zanzibar was a UN member from December 1963 until unification with Tanganyika in April 1964, but is not listed here. Also excluding the Union of South Africa which was a founding member of the UN in 1945.
Source: Based on United Nations, "Growth in United Nations membership, 1945-present", <http://www.un.org/en/sections/member-states/growth-united-nations-membership-1945-present/index.html> (accessed: 30 December 2019).

This had implications for procedural, but also substantive politics: In October 1961 the Africa group managed to prevent South Africa's participation in the UNGA. Writing in 1962, Spencer argues on the general direction of African votes:

> *The record shows that most of the African vote more or less closely with the Western powers on a wide range of issues when they first became independent. As time has passed group pressures, anti-colonialist sentiments, desires to demonstrate complete independence, and an "African view," as well as suasion by external arguments and blandishments have led many of the states to part company with the Western delegations and to vote differently.*[32]

These changes, Spencer holds, can be seen in three broad field: colonial issues, East-West struggles and what he dubs "other questions".[33] With regard to the first issue area, African states' "are quite understandably heated, emphatic, and vigorous show of strength at was is identified against as the colonialist policy or action".[34] And on Cold War issues

> *… divisions have occurred among the African Members. Some have inclined to move progressively in the direction of an Eastward orientation, lining up their votes time and*

32 Spencer, Africa at the UN, p. 376.
33 Ibid.
34 Ibid.

> *again with the Soviet bloc. This has been particularly characteristic of the Casablanca grouping.*[35]

And on the question of bloc affiliation, during the 15th and 16th sessions of the UN General Assembly,

> *voting alignments of Asian and African states on a number of highly political issues seemed to imply that a majority of these states were "pro-Eastern."* But this interpretation can be deceptive.[36]

Indeed, let's look at a more systematic approach to the study of African voting behaviour at the United Nations. In the mid-1960s a comparative foreign policy method was introduced in mainstream (US) political science that systematically analysed voting patterns, called roll-call analysis.[37] Out of the rich literature on UN voting blocs and patterns in the 1950s and 1960s, three articles will be looked at in more detail – Newcombe et al. on "United Nations Voting Patterns", Meyers on African voting at the UNGA, and Russett on "Discovering Voting Groups in the United Nations" –, as they are particularly relevant for at least the first part of the 1960s.[38] The data and interpretation provided would make it worthwhile to follow up on this tradition of research and conduct some roll-call analysis for the second part of the 1960s. It is interesting in itself that this kind of comparative research on African voting patterns has somewhat stopped in the second half of the 1960s and that most of the later research is anecdotal and circumstantial in style.[39] For the period 1961 to 1963, the Ontario / Canada-based researchers around Newcombe, and much in line with Spencer, argue that

> *there was a partial merger of the Afro-Asian and the Soviet blocs, with the latter loading about equally on its own bloc and on the Afro-Asian bloc. Also* [in the same period] *some of the imperial nations had negative loadings on the Afro-Asian bloc, showing that they opposed it in voting.*[40]

Confirming earlier research, Newcombe et al. state that

35 Spencer, Africa at the UN, p. 377.

36 Ibid., p. 379, emphasis UE.

37 J.N. Rosenau, Comparative Foreign Policy: Fad, Fantasy, or Field, in: International Studies Quarterly 12 (1968) 3, pp. 296–329. With an interest in predicting voting patterns, based on national attributes, see J.E. Vincent, Predicting Voting Patterns in the General Assembly, in: American Political Science Review 65 (1971) 2, pp. 471–498. For a later testing of Rosenau's "pretheory on foreign policy" with regard to the foreign policy behaviour of African states at the UN, see R. Vengroff, Instability and Foreign Policy Behavior: Black Africa in the UN, in: American Journal of Political Science 20 (1976) 3, pp. 425–438.

38 H. Newcombe / M. Ross / A.G. Newcombe, United Nations Voting Patterns, in: International Organization 24 (1970) 1, pp. 100–112; Meyers, African Voting; B.M. Russett, Discovering Voting Groups in the United Nations, in: American Political Science Review 60 (1966) 2, pp. 327–339.

39 In fact, after years of negligence of roll-call analysis, the rise of the BRICS in international politics has led to a revival of this method. See P. Ferdinand, Rising powers at the UN: an analysis of the voting behaviour of BRICS in the General Assembly, in: Third World Quarterly 35 (2014) 3, pp. 376–391; and B. Hooisjmaaijers / S. Keukeleire, Voting Cohesion of the BRICS Countries in the UN General Assembly, 2006–2014: A BRICS Too Far?, in: Global Governance 22 (2016) 3, pp. 389–407.

40 Newcombe et al., United Nations Voting Patterns, p. 102. See Spencer, Africa at the UN.

> [the] *main pattern discovered in the changes in nation blocs over time is a trend toward bipolarization: The Latin American nations joined the West while the Afro-Asian states joined the Soviet bloc*.[41]

Likewise, Bruce M. Russet, in those days on a junior fellowship at Yale University, with an analysis of the 18th UNGA session (1963–1964) discusses the Afro-Asian Group vote as a case that can be compared to "the Commonwealth" or "the communists".[42] He, too, confirms, that in their actual voting behaviour most African states took positions more aligned with the Soviet bloc.[43] But Russet also drew attention to the fact that the Cold War "issue" and the questions of Southern Africa – apartheid, Southern Rhodesia, South-West Africa, and the territories under Portuguese domination – account for most of the variation in the voting pattern of all UN member states.[44]

Social science has produced only very little knowledge on the role of African states on the UN Security Council in the 1960s, this remains an academic void. An academic state of the art on the role of African countries in the UN Security Council only started developing in the 1970s. Egypt was the first African country to sit on the council (1946, 1949–1950). Between 1951 and 1958, no African country was on the UNSC.[45] And between 1959 and 1962, only one African country at a time was allowed to be a council member.[46] In 1963, for the first time two African UN member states were elected to the UNSC.[47] And it was only in 1966 that the current practice was introduced to have three non-permanent member on the UN Security Council coming from Africa (the so-called A3).[48]

Apart from the United Nations, important arenas for galvanizing support for African positions in international affairs have been the and the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM).[49] In academia, thinking about the relationship between African countries and the Commonwealth mainly is a debate of the late 1970s, early 1980s when anti-apartheid policies gained more traction.[50]

41 Newcombe et al., United Nations Voting Patterns, p. 121.

42 Russet, Discovering Voting Groups, p. 327. Surely, this kind of social science is a child of its time and has always been far from being "objective", "neutral", or anything similar – as indicated by Russet's categorization of introduction of "Haiti [as] (Negro, very under-developed)". This critique also goes for the way that he is constructing voting blocs. See Russet, Discovering Voting Groups, p. 334.

43 Ibid.

44 Ibid., p. 336.

45 Here and in the following UNSC, Search Membership by Region, <http://www.un.org/en/sc/inc/list_eng_region.asp?region=af> (accessed 30 December 2019).

46 Tunisia (1959–1960), Liberia (1961), and Ghana (1962).

47 Ghana and Morocco. In 1964, it was Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire (in 1965 the latter, again, was the only African country on the council).

48 In 1966 it was Mali, Nigeria, and Uganda; in 1967 Ethiopia, Mali, and Nigeria; in 1968 Algeria, Ethiopia, and Senegal; and in 1969 Algeria, Senegal, and Zambia.

49 The international organisation La Francophonie or *Communauté française*, which mainly – but these days not exclusively – is made up of France's former African colonies, was only created in 1970.

50 For an early exception see J. Holmes, The Impact on the Commonwealth of the Emergence of Africa, in: International Organization 16 (1962) 2, pp. 291–302.

The British Commonwealth was constituted on 31 December 1931 by the United Kingdom, the Union of South Africa, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand.[51] Until 1960 membership remained fairly limited, with India and Pakistan joining in 1947, Sri Lanka in 1948, and Malaysia (then Malaya) in 1957.[52] In the same year Ghana became the first African country to join the Commonwealth. As more and more of the former colonies gained independence in the 1960s, the organisation grew – and, again, African states changed membership composition considerably (see graph 2). Until the end of the 1960s, African membership in the Commonwealth grew to 12 out of 28 (or a combined share of the votes of almost 43%).[53] By 1969, African, Asian, Caribbean, and Pacific countries commanded 78.57 per cent of the club's votes. These new majorities soon had a clear impact. Following a constitutional referendum in South Africa on whether the Union should become a republic, at the initiative of its two African members (Ghana and Nigeria) as well as India, Malaysia, and Canada the Commonwealth rejected the country's request to remain a member because of its apartheid policy. The government of the Republic of South African then decided to withdraw its membership application.[54] Ever since, the Commonwealth has become an important place for the Organization of African Unity to lobby for the imposition of sanctions against South Africa.



Notes: On 31 May 1961 South Africa withdrew its membership from the Commonwealth. After the end of apartheid, the country rejoined the club on 1 June 1994. See E. Anyaoku, The Commonwealth and South

51 Plus, at that time, the Irish Free State and Newfoundland.

52 The impact on the Commonwealth of the emergence of Africa is the topic of an article by Holmes who holds that Africa has "given the Commonwealth a new sense of mission, and injected into it a needed dose of ebullient African vitality". See Holmes, The Impact on the Commonwealth, p. 291.

53 These included Ghana (1957), Nigeria (1960), Sierra Leone, Tanzania (both 1961), Uganda (1962), Kenya (1963), Malawi, Zambia (both 1964), Botswana, Lesotho (both 1966), Mauritius, and Swaziland (both 1968)

54 Again, a topic that was hardly discussed in academia in those days. See E. Anyaoku, The Commonwealth and South Africa: Restoring a relationship, in: South African Journal of International Affairs 1 (1993) 1, pp. 1–8.

Africa: Restoring a relationship, in: South African Journal of International Affairs 1 (1993) 1, pp. 1–8. And excluding the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland (1953–1963) as well as Southern Rhodesia (1964–1969). Source: Commonwealth, Commonwealth Network, <http://www.commonwealthofnations.org> (accessed 30 December 2019).

The OAU explicitly stated non-alignment as one of its guiding principles.[55] It was therefore not too surprising that many independent African states joined the Non-Aligned Movement.[56] Following the Bandung conference held on 18–24 April 1955 in Indonesia, initially it was mainly African and Asian countries trying to formulate politics that stayed away from the Cold War bloc competition.[57] The NAM was formally established in June 1956 in Belgrade.[58] The first NAM summit was held in the same town in 1961, the second one in 1964 in Cairo, and the third 1970 in Lusaka. Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser served as first secretary-general of the organization (1964–1970).[59] As regards membership, African countries were admitted through the summits, meaning that membership did not correlate with the year of independence. African membership increased from 11 in 1961 (out of a total of 22), 30 in 1964 (out of 42) to 36 in 1970 (out of 54).[60]

In the United Nations, the Non-Aligned Movement, and the Commonwealth, the 1960s have been a period in which African countries started harmonizing their foreign policies to push some themes that they could easily agree upon: the complete decolonization of the African continent and the struggle against apartheid being the most important ones.[61] As a collective of states, African countries learned quickly how to make use of these arenas. The global politics of African states became an important sovereignty strat-

55 OAU, The Charter, §3 (6–7).

56 See A. Ajala, The Organization of African Unity and Non-Alignment, in: Nigerian Journal of International Affairs 7 (1981) 1–2, pp. 103–117.

57 African participants (out of 30 nations) included Egypt, Ethiopia, the Gold Coast (i.e. Ghana), Liberia, Libya, and Sudan.

58 See P. Willetts, The Non-Aligned Movement. The Origins of a Third World Alliance, New York / London 1978; J. Dinkel, The Non-Aligned Movement. Genesis, Organization and Politics (1927–1992), Leiden / Boston 2019.

59 Whether African governments in practice have taken non-aligned positions has been empirically tested for the period January 1963 to January 1966 through regression correlations on the intensity of interactions with the Soviet bloc by P.J. McGowan, Africa and Non-Alignment: A Comparative Study of Foreign Policy, in: International Studies Quarterly 12 (1968) 3, pp. 262–295, based on criteria developed by R.C. Good, Changing Patterns of African International Relations, in: American Political Science Review 58 (1964) 3, pp. 632–641. Accordingly, Algeria, Egypt, Somalia, Ghana, and Congo (Brazzaville) had the highest levels of interaction while "but most African states evidenced little or no contact". McGowan, Africa and Non-Alignment, pp. 282 and 289. For the period 1958 to 1962, Hovet counted that African states voted identically with the Soviet Union 66.4 % of the time and with the United States only 36.8 %. See T. Hovet, Africa in the United Nations, Evanston 1963.

60 Out of the 41 independent African countries in 1969, by 1970 the following five were not a member of the NAM: Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Madagascar, Mauritius, and Niger – but they all joined in 1973.

61 See D. Thiam, La politique étrangère des etats africaines, Paris 1963 [English The Foreign Policy of African States: Ideological Bases, Present Realities, Future Prospects, London 1965]; F. Ansprenger, Die Befreiungspolitik der Organisation für Afrikanische Einheit (OAU) 1963–1975, München / Mainz 1975; R.A. Akindele, Reflections on the Preoccupation and Conduct of African Diplomacy, in: Journal of Modern African Studies 14 (1976) 4, pp. 557–576; O. Aluko (ed.), The Foreign Policies of African States, London 1977.

egy.[62] Often it was built-up from the OAU Liberation Committee to the level of Council and Assembly, and then introduced into the global arenas where African states controlled a substantial number of votes.[63]

4. Intra-African Relations

The development of relations between the independent African states was characterized by few activities to build-up on Pan-African principles,[64] and soon were overshadowed by violent conflicts which ranged from inter-state clashes over territory to civil wars, and violent attempts of secession to armed liberation struggles.[65] As time went by, increasingly the OAU Assembly of Heads of State and Government ceased to be a site of decision-making (less important and also often intra-organizational matters were left to the Council of Ministers – see graph. 3).[66] After 1965 the OAU moved into inertia. Furthermore, when looking at the politics of the OAU as an international organization, soon gaps between rhetoric and practice showed up. First, very few initiatives were launched to developed intra-African relations in practice. And, second, those initiatives taken were only lukewarmly supported. In the period 1963 to 1969 only four instruments were adopted by the OAU which in itself is an indicator for little concrete work and a tendency to avoid entering into binding decisions at continental level. The first of these texts, the *Phyto-Sanitary Convention for Africa* which was adopted in Congo (Léopoldville) on 13 September 1967, did not require signatures (and had no day for entering into force).[67] Hence it was ratified by only twelve OAU member states – some did so as late as 2016 (these twelve member states also deposited the legal instruments).

62 On the notion, see J. Agnew, Sovereignty Regimes: Territoriality and State Authority in Contemporary World Politics, in: Annals of American Geographers 95 (2005) 2, pp. 437–461.

63 G.A. Nweke, Harmonization of African Foreign Policies, 1955–1975: The Political Economy of African Diplomacy, Boston 1980. For general reflections of the early foreign policies of African states see N.J. Padelford / R. Emerson (eds.), Africa and World Order. New York 1963; Hovet, Africa in the United Nations; V. McKay, Africa in World Politics. New York 1963; V. McKay (ed.), African Diplomacy: Studies in the Determinants of Foreign Policy, New York 1996; I.W. Zartman, Decision-Making Among African Governments on Inter-African Affairs, in: Journal of Development Studies 2 (1966) 1, pp. 98–119; I.W. Zartman, International Relations in the New Africa. Englewood Cliffs 1966; K. Ingham (ed.), Foreign Relations of African States, London 1974.

64 For a fairly optimistic account of the institution's capacity and policies, see John Markakis who at that point in time was assistant professor in the Department of Political Science at Haile Selassie I University, Addis Ababa. J. Markakis, The Organisation of African Unity: A Progress Report, in: Journal of Modern African Studies 4 (1966) 2, pp. 135–153.

65 For general introductions into the history of violent conflict in Africa, see W. Reno, Warfare in Independent Africa, New York 2011; P.D. Williams, War & Conflict in Africa, Cambridge 2011; S. Straus, Making and Unmaking Nations. War, Leadership, and Genocide in Modern Africa, Ithaca 2015; T.J. Stapleton, Africa. War and Conflict in the Twentieth Century, London 2018.

66 Furthermore, in the 1960s the OAU did not meet for any extra-ordinary summit, yet the Council held three extra-ordinary meetings in this period. Attendance of the OAU Assembly left much to be desired. So, for instance, in 1966 only 13 presidents and 3 prime ministers out of 38 member states attended the summit. See van Walraven, Dreams of Power, p. 189.

67 Usually legal documents enter into force upon signature by fifteen member states.

The *African Convention on the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources* was adopted in Algiers, Algeria, on 15 September 1968 and entered into force on 16 June 1969.



Note: The Council of Ministers was meeting twice a year (i.e. the graph shows an average). And in both cases, often including at least one motion of thanks to the hosts of the meeting. Sources: See tab. 1 and 2.

And when it comes to the ratification of OAU legal instruments, member states usually have been reluctant to ratify decisions that they have had approved in the Assembly before. Out of the 40 OAU member states at that moment in time, only 27 have ratified and deposited the legal instruments – mainly in the mid- to late 1970s. The *Constitution for the African Civil Aviation Commission*, which was adopted on 17 January 1969, entered into force on 15 March 1972. But the legal instruments were only ratified and deposited by 6 out of then 41 OAU member states, and as late as in the 2010s. And, finally, the *OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa* was adopted in Addis Ababa on 10 September 1969 and entered into force on 20 January 1974. 35 out of 41 member states at the time ratified and deposited, often years later. There is no consistent pattern, apart from the fact that Niger is the only member state that deposited the instruments for the legal documents of the OAU in the 1960s, and Libya, Mauritius, and Somalia did not deposit any.

The second main characteristic of intra-African developments in the 1960s was violent conflict in and among member states. Thus, violent conflict broke out between neighbours over attempts to annex territory, including the Sand War in October 1963 between Morocco and Algeria over the latter's Tindouf and Béchar provinces. Repression and contestation of the powers of the centre developed into fully-fledged civil wars in Sudan (1955–1972), Congo / Léopoldville (1960–1965), Mali (1962–1964), and Chad (1965–1979). The conflict in Congo, which included the ousting and killing of Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba (1960 and 1961, respectively), added a new dimension to

violent conflict in Africa as it became one of the first proxy wars in Africa during the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union.

In some newly independent countries, parts of the territory wanted to secede. The Katanga insurgency in Congo / Léopoldville started in 1960. In Nigeria, following a coup, a counter-coup and pogroms against Igbo people working in the Northern parts of the country, on 30 May 1967 the eastern state of Biafra declared its independence. The federal Nigerian troops recaptured Biafra in a war that lasted until January 1970. And on a smaller scale from 1963 to 1967 Kenya was fighting ethnic Somali secessionists who thrived for a Greater Somali in the Northern Frontier District.

The independence of quite a number of OAU member states was the result of liberation struggles, for instance in Tunisia (1952–1954), Algeria (1954–1962), or the Mau Mau uprising in Kenya (1952–1964). And as the *wind of change* did not led to majority rule all over the continent and the *UN Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and people*[68] was ignored in some parts of Africa, wars of independence were started in Eritrea against the Ethiopian empire (1960–1991), in the Portuguese colonies of Guinea-Bissau (1956–1974), Cape Verde (1956–1974), Angola (1961–1974), São Tomé and Príncipe (1961–1974), Guinea (1962–1974), and Mozambique (1964–1974) as well as in South Africa (1961–1993), Southern Rhodesia (1964–1979), and Namibia (1966–1990).

In 1960–1961, African countries at the United Nations were seriously divided over policies towards Algeria and Congo (Brazzaville). The newly independent Francophone countries clearly opposed other African states' positions.[69] It was only after 1962 that African states managed to reconcile their positions – but mainly at the cost of rarely speaking up on issues of violent conflict among member states.[70] Save for a few decisions taken by the Assembly or the Council, the OAU could rarely agree to intervene in conflicts.[71] Regarding the clash between Morocco and Algeria the OAU appointed an ad hoc commission of seven states to arbitrate the conflict. In 1964 the Council of Ministers dealt with both this case and the Kenya / Somalia conflict.[72] And on the Congo crisis in 1964, OAU interventions were futile.[73] But otherwise, the OAU simply called upon member states to end conflict and seek some form of reconciliation (for instance in

68 UNGA, UNGA Resolution 1514 on the granting of independence to colonial countries and people". 947th Plenary meeting, 9 December 1960, New York.

69 Hove, Africa in the United Nations; and van Walraven, Dreams of Power, p. 118.

70 Zartman, Decision-Making Among African Governments; M. Povolny, Africa in Search for Unity: Model and Reality, in: Background 9 (1966) 4, pp. 297–318; B. Andemicael, Peaceful Settlement Among African States: Roles of the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity, New York 1972; D.H. Johns, The "Normalization" of Intra-African Diplomatic Activity, in: Journal of Modern African Studies 10 (1972) 4, pp. 597–610; Z. Červenka, The settlement of disputes among members of the Organisation of African Unity, in: Verfassung und Recht in Übersee 7 (1974) 2, pp. 117–138.

71 See Červenka, The settlement of disputes.

72 Markakis, The Organisation of African Unity, p. 141

73 Ibid., p. 146. See Akinyemi, The Organization of African Unity.

the case of Nigeria's Biafra conflict).[74] The Commission of Mediation, Conciliation, and Arbitration "was never presented with a single case for resolution" and therefore "largely moribund".[75] However, forms of informal diplomacy and "good offices" emerged. And with regard to conflict *within* member states, insistence on the principle of non-interference in internal affairs became a pretext not to engage with violent conflict (see Akinyemi 1972–1973).[76] Rather, the OAU engaged in shadow-fighting, by ritually addressing conflict beyond its borders: after the Six-Day War between Egypt and Israel (5–10 June 1967), every year the OAU Assembly pronounced itself against what was termed the "Israeli aggression".

5. Explaining Disenchantment

The *wind of change* had created a spirit of optimism across the African continent. However, the euphoria did not last long. The main reason for this was a dramatical deterioration in regime quality. The OAU soon earned its title as a "club of dictators". Authoritarian rule became the standard, rather than the exception (see graph 4). In the 1960s most independent African countries saw a shift from formal multi-partyism to one-party rule, or military dictatorship – actually, some tried both, and others entered this road in the 1970s. And in another four states there had been non-democratic monarchies anyway (including Ethiopia). By the end of 1969, out of 41 independent African states only Botswana, Equatorial-Guinea, Gambia, Madagascar, Mauritius and Zambia had managed to maintain the principle of competitive multi-party elections – and most of them should drop it soon thereafter.[77] In 1969 the number of one-party states had increased from 6 in 1960 to 14, and the number of military regimes from 1 to 17. Within a decade the share of formally democratic OAU member states had decreased from slightly over 60 percent to well below 20 percent.

The majority of non-democratic governments had little interest in intervening in fellow African countries' affairs or investing into the OAU's capacity to resolve violent conflict, because in the long run this could have only worked against them. In this respect, the OAU had clearly reached its limits.

74 G.E. Akuchu, The Organization of African Unity Peacemaking Machinery and the Nigerian-Biafran conflict, PhD thesis, University of Denver 1974.

75 M. Muyangwa/M.A Vogt, An Assessment of the OAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, 1993–2000, New York 2000, p. 7.

76 Van Walraven (Dreams of Power, p. 286) counts ten African conflicts for the 1960s. In seven cases OAU mediation interventions were successful, but they failed in the cases of the conflicts between Kenya, Ethiopia, and Somalia in 1963, the Congo crisis in 1964, and the Nigerian civil war (1967–1970). For a more positive assessment of the OAU's mediation record in the 1960s, see Muyangwa/Vogt, An Assessment of the OAU Mechanism, p. 5.

77 Equatorial-Guinea in 1970, Gambia in 1994, Madagascar and Zambia both in 1972.



Notes: By and large, following the typology of M. Bratton and N. van de Walle, Democratic Experiments in Africa, Regime Transitions in Comparative Perspective, Cambridge 1997. Excluding South Africa and Southern Rhodesia. Source: D. Nohlen, M. Krennerich and B. Thibaut (eds.), Elections in Africa. A Data Handbook, Oxford 1999.

6. Conclusions

By the end of the 1960s, the Organization of African Unity had become a bifurcated regional body. On the one hand, in global politics is had successfully asserted itself as a voice of African liberation movements that were fighting apartheid, settler colonialism and other forms of European colonialism within the international arenas in which African states commanded a considerable number of votes – the United Nations, the Commonwealth, and Non-Aligned Movement (though until 1969 little progress was made in substance). On the other, the OAU did not live up to the aspirations of its founding members. It may have selectively promoted "the unity and solidarity of the African States" and also contributed substantially towards eradicating "all forms of colonialism from Africa" as promised in the OAU Charter,[78] but it had failed to intensify African "cooperation and efforts to achieve a better life for the peoples of Africa", and "having due regard to the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights".[79] Regime change across the continent – from forms of multi-partyism towards one-party and military rule – led to a situation in which neither the OAU nor its

78 OAU, The Charter, §2 (1) a, d.
79 OAU, The Charter, §2 (1) b, e.

Commission Mediation, Conciliation, and Arbitration[80] were capacitated to effectively address violent conflict on the continent. The human rights record of many African governments decreased considerably, and many more regimes went along the same trajectory in the 1970s and 1980s.

In 1963 the OAU had materialised as a compromise over diverging models of regionalism. By the end of the decade, insistence on the principles of non-interference and respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each member state[81] had won the day over any forms of sovereignty sharing, let alone transfer, and responsibility for African people living under conditions of (non-colonial) authoritarian rule. The majority of illiberal OAU member states had reached a consensus to keep the OAU Secretariat and its other institutions weak.[82] The momentous 1960s have been an African decade, but then again, they haven't. Against this background it is not without irony that periodic attempts to discuss other forms of regionalism which would centre around Pan-Africanist visions were introduced by authoritarian regimes such as Libya.[83] It was only after the end of the Cold War and the second wind of democratic change in Africa, but also the genocide in Rwanda in 1994, that the practices and institutions of the OAU were thoroughly revisited – ultimately leading to the transformation of the continental body into the African Union in 2001. Importantly, while keeping many of the OAU principles, the newly shaped Union introduced its right

> … *to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity.*[84]

In this respect, the momentous 1960s casted a long shadow into the 21st century.

80 OAU, The Charter, §19.

81 OAU, The Charter, §3 (1–3).

82 See, for instance, K.M. Khamis, Promoting the African Union, Washington 2008, pp. 9–20; and K.D. Magliveras / G.J. Naldi, The African Union, 2nd edn, Alphen aan den Rijn 2018, pp. 23–24.

83 On the failed project for the advancement of the "United States of Africa", see U. Engel, The Changing Role of the AU Commission in Inter-African Relations. The Case of APSA and AGA, in: J.W. Harbeson / D. Rothchild (eds.), Africa in World Politics. Engaging a Changing Global Order, 5th edn, Boulder 2013, pp. 186–206, at pp. 188–194.

84 OAU, Constitutive Act, §4(h).

The International Labour Organisation and its Bureau for Workers' Activities (ACTRAV) in Africa on the Eve of the "Glorious" 1960s[1]

Hakeem Ibikunle Tijani

ABSTRACTS

Dieser Artikel untersucht die Rolle und Bedeutung der International Labour Organisation (ILO) in den Arbeitsbeziehungen und bei der Arbeiterbildung im südlichen Afrika während der „glorreichen" 1960er Jahre. Die Entstehung, Herausforderungen und Errungenschaften der ACTRAV-Aktiviäten in diesem Bereich werden historisiert. Die erfolgreiche Setzung internationaler Standards unterscheidet die ILO von vielen anderen internationalen Organisationen. Der Artikel untersucht den Stellenwert des subsaharischen Afrikas in den jährlichen Tagungen des International Labour Congress (ILC) und seinen 200 Konventionen und Empfehlungen am Vorabend der 1960er Jahre. Während diese Standards ursprünglich darauf zielten, direkte Arbeitnehmerrechte zu schützen, hat die ILO seit den 1930er Jahren begonnen, diese Funktion auf andere Felder wie soziale Sicherheit oder Beschäftigungspolitik auszuweiten. Der Artikel untersucht die Blaupause der ILO in Bezug auf den Aufbruch Afrikas in den 1960er Jahren und die ACTRAV-Ausbildungsmaßnahmen.

This article examines the International Labour Organisation's (ILO) roles and impacts in labour relations and education in sub-Saharan Africa during the "glorious" 1960s. It historicise the genesis, challenges, and accomplishments in the area of labour union education – ACTRAV activities, its technical assistance programmes, Decent Work Projects, and its resolve to set interna-

1 This article partly draws on D.R. Maul / L. Puddu / H.I. Tijani, The International Labour Organization, in: S. Bellucci / A. Eckert (eds.), General Labour History of Africa: Workers, Employers and Governments, 20th–21st Centuries, London 2019, pp. 222–264, at pp. 222–230.

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tional labour standards in sub-Saharan Africa. The setting of international labour standards is perhaps what separates the ILO from other international organisations as sub-Saharan colonies witnessed different levels of decolonisation during the post-World War II era. The article interrogates the place of sub-Saharan Africa in the mix of many annual sessions of the International Labour Congress (ILC) and its 200 conventions and a similar number of recommendations before the dawn of the 1960s. While the standards adopted in the early years were intended predominantly to protect workers in the physical performance of their work, as early as the 1930s the ILO had began to extend its standard-setting to a wider field of social policy, covering areas ranging from systems of social security to employment policy. The article examines the ILO's Blueprint as it relates to its momentum in Africa and ACTRAV's labour union education during the 1960s.

1. Introduction

In the Preamble to its Constitution, the ILO notes that, "Whereas also the failure of any nation to adopt humane conditions of labour is an obstacle in the way of other nations which desire to improve the conditions in their own countries."[2] The Constitution further notes that in the annexed Declaration as follows:

> *Labour is not a commodity*
> *Freedom of expression and of association are essential to sustain progress*
> *Poverty anywhere constitutes a danger to prosperity everywhere; and that,*
> *The war against want requires to be carried on with unrelenting vigour within each nation, and by continuous and concerted international effort in which the representatives of workers and employers, enjoying equal status with those of governments, join with them in free expression and democratic decision with a view to the promotion of the common welfare.*[3]

This declaration fits into its goal of promoting decent work, social justice, economic stability, and the protection of human rights through its constituent unit, ACTRAV, throughout the world. Despite what we can describe as ILO's "low" activity in Africa during the inter-war years (except for intervention in the Liberia forced labour scandal in 1930),[4] the organisation seems to have rejuvenated and pursued the actualisation of its goals in Africa between early 1959 and the late 1960s.[5]

The ILO and its ACTRAV mantra was not perfunctory in Africa, even before the glorious 1960s. This decade was momentous indeed and the push by the ILO seems to have

2 See ILO Constitution, 1 April 1919. <https://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:62:0::NO:62:P62_LIST_ENTRIE_ID:2453907:NO> (accessed 31 January 2020).

3 Quoted from C.C. Joyner, The United States' Withdrawal from the ILO: International Politics in the Labor Arena, in: The International Lawyer 12 (1978) 4, pp. 721–739.

4 Liberia became the first African nation to join the ILO in 1919. It was followed by Ethiopia in 1923.

5 See H.I. Tijani, Building "Sound" Industrial Relations in Nigeria: The British and Organised Labour, 1940s to 1960, in: Lagos Historical Review 11 (2011), pp. 21–36; D. Maul, Human Rights, Development and Decolonisation: The International Labour Organisation, 1940–1970, London 2012, pp. 168–172.

gained strides with the Wind of Change from 1960 onward. African nations south of the Sahara marked a record emancipation from the colonial powers in the 1960s, except in areas controlled by the Portuguese, Belgians, and the apartheid regime in South Africa.
In 1946, the United Nations formally recognised the ILO as a specialised agency for labour matters globally. This nomenclature strengthened its status as an agent of workers well-being throughout the world. The ILO remained a global force in labour matters through its sustained union education, gender equality at workplace, sound industrial relations, and the sponsorship of social and economic transformation programmes aimed at the well-being of the working population worldwide and most especially its Decent Work agenda.
Since the end of World War II (and the imminent colonial reforms, decolonisation, and the transfer of power [planned or forced] by European powers in Africa), the ILO made positive impacts through its conventions and regulations in building and shaping sound industrial relations between employers and employees. In addition, through its provision of technical assistance to emerging ministries of labour and employment in independent African nations it became relevant in labour policy matters and beyond across Africa.[6]
This article examines ILO's roles and impacts in some African nations during the 1960s as it strives to make a mark in the merging independent nations. It examines challenges and accomplishments particularly in the area of labour union education, that is ACTRAV activities, its technical assistance programmes, and Decent Work Projects, and not to the least efforts at setting international labour standards. The latter is perhaps what separates the ILO from other international organisations. In fact, its original task, which remains one of its main fields of activity, was to define international labour standards. Since 1919, the annual ILC sessions have adopted nearly 200 conventions and a similar number of recommendations to this end (instruments that are not binding under international law).
In the period after the World War II, human rights issues such as freedom of association and protection from discrimination at work increasingly became the object of the organisation's normative activities. During the same period onward, the ILO also began to function as an agency of technical cooperation in areas such as vocational training and the formulation of social policy. Finally, the International Labour Office has, since its inception, acted as an institution of research into global social problems. Its authority as a source of information on social issues and compiler of labour and social statistics for governments cannot be underestimated. This, indeed, remains one of its assets as an international organisation.

6 See Maul et al., The International Labour Organization, pp. 222–264.

2. The Context: What is ACTRAV?

The ILO tripartite role engages the workers on like any other international institutions. The Bureau for Workers' Activities (ACTRAV) remained the main link between the ILO and the world of work through one of its constituents: workers' organizations. Thus, ACTRAV is positioned to ensure that the interests of workers' organizations globally are central to its policy development and activities setting the standard for governments and other agencies that employed labour. From its headquarters in Geneva, the ILO facilitates the realization of the activities of ACTRAV through labour union education, technical assistance, particularly in developing economies like African nations.

In addition, ACTRAV serves as ILO's agent supporting workers' organisations in the defence and promotion of workers' rights, with Decent Work Country Programmes (DWCP) offices were opened in regional areas like Eastern, Southern, and Western Africa for effective implementation of earmarked projects and activities during the first decade tagged "Africa's Glorious" age. The idea of Decent Work is to protect workers, and at the same time ensuring that employers are responsible. Suffice it to say that a living wage based on meaningful work is projected as rights of workers to be protected globally. The nexus between ACTRAV, Decent Work, and workers' organisations is central to ILO's activities analysed in the following.

Tijani et al. have analysed the origin and changing role of the ILO in labour relations in Africa and its driving motif for labour relations predicated on sound labour relations in the workplace, decent work, social justice, and responsibility.[7] The colonial experiences of African nations before the 1960s seems to align it with ILO's mission and vision.[8] The experience, however, differs depending on the policies of the colonising power, or as in the case of Ethiopia and Liberia, the prevailing world market and events in neighbouring countries that had multiplying effect.[9] Thus, in order to explain how ILO have shaped labour relations in Africa, a thematic approach is adopted in this analysis.

It is pertinent to define the phrase "labour relation" in order to contextualise the significance of ILO activities generally, and in Africa in particular. Labour relation is defined as the relationship between the employers and employees. By extension, it is the relationship between the employers and the unions where there is one. It is also the relationship between the employees as well. It also takes into cognisance the effect of such relationship on production and the well-being of the employees. Generally, labour relations are about the tools put in place to ensure sound industrial relations. These tools include communication, processing of grievances or disputes, collective bargaining, benefits, welfare etc. Above all, it is primarily the study of how employers and employees work together to create a conducive workplace. To contextualise ILO's shaping of labour

7 Ibid.

8 H.I. Tijani, Union Education in Nigeria: Labour, Empire, and Decolonisation since 1945, London 2012.

9 The two nations were never colonised by Europeans, despite of the occupation of Ethiopia by Italy between 1936 and 1941.

relations in Africa, as elsewhere, this article explains some key areas of its activities and principles – technical assistance, social dialogue, sound industrial relations, social justice and decent work.

The ideology of social justice radiates all activities of the ILO, as it is succinctly stated in its constitution thus, "universal and lasting peace can be established only if it is based on social justice."[10] Work is central to people's well-being. In addition to providing income, work can pave way for broader social and economic development, strengthening individuals, their families and communities. Such progress hinges on "decent work" for the workers. Decent work sums up the aspirations of people in their working lives. It involves opportunities for work that is productive and delivers a fair income, security in the workplace, and social protection for families. Decent work means better prospects for personal development and social integration as well as freedom for people to express their concerns, organise and participate in the decisions that affect their lives. It entails equality of opportunity and treatment for all women and men.

Decent work therefore is regarded as the key to the eradication of poverty hoping that access to it would bring prosperity and goodness. To the ILO, access to decent work therefore is crucial in making globalisation and its gains a reality in developing African nations. As noted in one of its official publications, the ILO opined that "creating decent employment must therefore be at the heart of development policy."[11] In this vain, the ILO works actively with the United Nations and other multilateral agencies to develop policies and programmes that support the creation of decent work opportunities. Notable amongst its several programmes in Africa are decent jobs for Egypt's young people, the Dakar, Pretoria, and Yaoundé programmes to mention but a few. In fact, technical teams are located across Africa for effective implementation of projects and coordination of personnel. Invariably, decent work implies social justice for the worker and by implication the sustenance of sound industrial relations. With these in place, the ILO seems to ensure the success of its major task of peaceful labour relations in the workplace throughout Africa as elsewhere. It is no coincidence that labour relations today form an integral part of all country programmes that are run under the decent work agenda.[12]

3. The ILO in Africa in the 1930 and 1940s

The ILO is a remarkable institution for many reasons. Its position within the network of UN organisations alone is exceptional in two respects.[13] First, the ILO is the oldest by

10 See ILO Constitution, Preamble.

11 ILO, The ILO at a Glance, Geneva 2007, p. 3.

12 ILO, Decent Work Country Programmes (DWCPs), Geneva n.d., <http://www.ilo.org/public/english/bureau/program/dwcp/countries/index.htm> (accessed 31 January 2020).

13 J. van Daele, The International Labour Organization in Past and Present Research, in: International Review of Social History 53 (2008) 3, pp. 485–511; J. van Daele et al. (eds.), ILO Histories. Essays on the International Labour Organization and its Impact on the World During the Twentieth Century, Bern et al. 2010. I should note that the following section substantially draws on Maul et al., The International Labour Organization, pp. 222–230.

far of all the constituent parts of the present-day system of international organisations under the umbrella of the UN family. Set up in 1919 under the Treaty of Versailles and run under the auspices of the League of Nations before the World War II, it was given the status of a UN specialized agency in 1946 – the only institution connected to the League to have survived the war unscathed. The ILO's original mandate to improve the conditions of working men and women, the world over, was partly a reflection of demands voiced by European philanthropists and social reformers. The World War I had then provided the political environment favourable enough for action to be taken. The integration of the reformist workers movement into the war effort in many countries and the Russian October Revolution of 1917 convinced even hesitant forces among the Great Powers that some concessions had to be made to the moderate parts of the labour movement in order to reward its war time contribution and calm its revolutionary potential. Beyond there was a widely held recognition of the need for state intervention in the reconstruction of national economies destroyed by the war. Many held the ILO to be a suitable institution for the coordination of these efforts.[14] The ILO is also distinguished within the UN system by its unique tripartite structure, an organisational principle made manifest in the fact that the delegations sent by each member state to the political bodies of the organisation include, as well as two government envoys, one representative each of the country's employers' and workers' associations, both of whom have full voting rights. Unlike other international agencies, the ILO is thus not a purely intergovernmental forum. It is the only international organisation, which fully involves non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in its decision-making processes. Tripartism has always been more than a mere structural principle to the ILO. The organisation's makeup has lent a special element to all the discussions taking place in its forums and tripartism has always been treated by ILO officials (as well as by a significant proportion of the ILO's constituents, in particular the workers) as one of the main ideological pillars on which the ILO rests. Aside from the tripartite aspect, the ILO's structure mirrors that of the UN and other international organisations. It has a permanent secretariat, the International Labour Office (often referred to here as "the Office"), headed by a Director-General and employing a permanent staff of international civil servants who work in the Geneva headquarters or in one of the ILO's regional and field offices. In its 100 years history, it has grown in bounds and lengths, but with major challenge on the continent of Africa because of its peculiar colonial rule and policies unfavourable to ILO's activities.

It is now a common knowledge that the ILO faced more barriers entering the African space before the 1960s. Before this period, the colonial powers resisted ILO in all forms rendering its international observation of colonial policies the territories null except on a somewhat humanitarian deal about "Native labour", i.e. the systematic use of forced labour. The focus on forced labour lead to the creation of the "Native Labour Code"

14 For an account of the period leading up to the establishment of the ILO and the early days of the organisation, see A. Alcock, History of the International Labor Organisation, New York 1971, pp. 1–49; B. Reinalda, Routledge History of International Organisations: From 1815 to the Present, London 2009, pp. 137–177 and 221–268.

(1930–1939) as a collection of conventions that defined the limits to the abuse of "native labour", at the same time circling in an area separated from the general international labour code and thus outside the realm of "the social". The installation of a non-tripartite Committee of Experts on Native Labour, helped to prepare the said conventions, mainly consisting of colonial administrators and colonial economic interests, among them Lord Lugard, Albrecht Gohr from the Belgian Ministry of Colonies, Martial Marlin, former governor of various French Colonies, and Freiherr von Rechenberg, former Governor of German East Africa underpinned the patronizing character of this work.[15]

Between the middle of World War II and the immediate post-war period, the ILO made a quantum leap in its treatment of the social problems of the colonial territories. Attached to its hallmark Declaration of Philadelphia of 1944, in which the ILO, on the side of the Allied powers, claimed a comprehensive role in social and economic post-war planning based on the idea of universal social rights, was a programme of colonial reform to be enshrined in a series of recommendations and conventions to be adopted between 1944 and 1948. In the course of this process pre-war "native labour" became "social policy in dependent territories" and the colonial powers committed themselves to develop their territories in line with a broad social objective.[16]

The conventions reflected the growing influence of colonial reformist development thinking on the official mind and was also a result of the propaganda value the metropoles saw in a colonial "fresh start" on the basis of social rights vis-à-vis colonial populations and their American Allies alike, on whose good-will their return into imperial power depended to a large degree. At the same time the colonial powers still resisted the full application of the international labour code to the colonies. Mainly for two reasons: For one applying schemes of social security wholesale to the colonies, in other words to build the colonial welfare state as a parallel operation to European post-war reforms was regarded as being way too costly. Colonial economic and social policy post-1945 in Africa started partly with ambitious schemes, in particular in the French territories, but came around very quickly to more sober calculations.[17] Secondly there were political reasons, which became particularly evident in the area of trade union freedoms, an issue to which the attitude of the colonial powers was especially ambivalent. Although trade unions were encouraged, both the colonial bureaucracies and the officials on the ground did their utmost to limit their activities to such an extent that they could be guaranteed not to grow into a political threat. As a result, even after World War II's remaining

15 S. Zimmermann, Special Circumstances in Geneva. The ILO and the World of Non-Metropolitan Labour in the Inter-war Years, in: van Daele et al. (eds.), ILO Histories, pp. 221–250. See also J.P. Daughton, ILO Expertise and Colonial Violence in the Inter-War Years, in: S. Kott / J. Droux (eds.), Globalizing Social Rights, Basingstoke 2013, pp. 85–97.

16 See Maul et al., The International Labour Organization, p. 231.

17 F. Cooper, Decolonization and African Society. The Labor Question in French and British Africa, Cambridge 1996; A. Eckert, Exportschlager Wohlfahrtsstaat? Europäische Sozialstaatlichkeit und Kolonialismus in Afrika nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg, in: Geschichte und Gesellschaft 32 (2006) 4, pp. 467–488.

colonies continued to represent a world apart, or in other words, a sphere to which less stringent rules applied.[18]

4. The ILO and Africa approaching the 1960s

As new Director-General the American David A. Morse from 1948 onwards launched wide-scale technical assistance programmes catering to the developing countries. The ILO's centre of gravity shifted to Latin America, Asia, and the Middle East.[19] In Africa, however, the colonial powers showed no inclination to allow the ILO unfiltered access in labour matters or any colonial matters. They rejected the ILO's offer of technical assistance and they generally were keen to avoid at all costs any further "internationalisation" of colonial policy and the increased accountability they feared it would bring – especially in the light of the growing strength of independence movements in the colonies after the war and the colonial powers' tendency in many places to resort to defending their claim to power by force of arms. Instead they started to build up alternative bodies of inter-colonial cooperation like the Commission for Technical Co-operation in Africa South of Sahara (CCTA) in order to fence off against an internationalisation of colonial social policy. The forum which the United Nations offered at the same time to critics of colonialism only served to reinforce the colonial powers' sensitivity to "interference" by international organisations. As a result, in Africa in particular, the ILO found itself banging on closed doors in the 1950s. The ILO had to fight a whole series of difficult battles in the course of the 1950s before it managed to get even one foot in the door to Africa. This was illustrated particularly clearly in 1952 when the ILO first began to try to convince the colonial powers of the idea of an African field office, which, like those in Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East, would be used mainly to coordinate technical assistance programmes on the African continent.

Since the ILO officials foresaw difficulties they remained in the background and let the Workers' group be charged with raising the proposal in the Governing Body.[20] As expected, the initiative was not received with much enthusiasm by the colonial powers. The British Colonial Office, asked the Office to proceed "very carefully" and warned that there were still the other members of the CCTA to think about, who were all, in general, extremely apprehensive of ILO activities in Africa.[21] While Britain pleaded for a firm but diplomatic approach, the other CCTA powers were more categorical in their rejection of the ILO's plans. The French, perhaps, were just sceptical, but the Belgians, Portuguese, Rhodesians, and the South African government did not tolerate any direct involvement in Africa by

18 Maul et al., The International Labour Organization, pp. 59–119.

19 Ibid., pp. 131–151.

20 Jenks to Morse, 20 December 1951, in: Historical Archives International Labour Organisation, Geneva (in the following: ILOA)-MF Z 1/1/1/13: Mr. Jenks – Africa.

21 Watson to Gavin, 19 January 1952, in: ILOA-NL 1002: Second Session of the Committee of Experts on Social Policy in Non-Metropolitan Territories 1951.

international organisations. The hostility of the CCTA states towards "interference" by the ILO was so strong that it led on occasion to serious tensions between the colonial powers themselves.[22] In 1953, for instance, the British were reproached bitterly by the French for permitting an ILO mission to West Africa to investigate, among other things, the explosive issue of industrial relations and union freedoms.[23] France had been as good as forced to open its territories to the mission, and was so incensed by the ILO's critical findings that Paris attempted to get the CCTA states to address a joint letter of protest to Geneva. It took all the effort and skill the British could muster to dissuade them from the idea.[24]
When the ILO took stock at the end of 1953, it found that "in no case has there been the slightest indication that any of them [Britain, France, Belgium] would give any support to the idea of establishing an ILO field office in Africa".[25] It was the Workers' group that opened the discussion again with a criticism against what they perceived as the ILO's too soft approach. They were proven partly right by the talks Wilfred Jenks, the ILO Assistant Director-General had with the Portuguese dictator António de Oliveira Salazar on the fringes of an expert committee meeting on colonial social policy that took place in Lisbon in which Jenks did everything he could to obtain Portugal's cooperation by attempting to convince Salazar of the benefits of a "positive policy of international action." If Portugal ratified the ILO's colonial conventions and opened its African territories up to the technical assistance offered by the organisation, it would thereby strengthen not only Portugal's own position, but that of all the colonial powers against the anti-colonial tendencies now manifesting themselves in every international body. Jenks used the imminent accession of the Soviet Union (due in 1954) to the ILO as another good reason for strengthening active cooperation between the Western countries, and tried to make the most of the fact that the ILO's entire approach up to this point, unlike that of the UN, had been "based essentially on an attempt to act with the fullest co-operation of the colonial powers". This last point at least was fully acknowledged by Salazar, who told Jenks to make sure to continue in future to defend the organisation's autonomy from the UN at all costs. Apart from this, however, Jenks failed to obtain any real concessions from the Portuguese dictator, and could only hope that the exchange had made a positive contribution to the long-term prospects of the ILO's plans.[26]
At the same time, the Lisbon meeting made clear to the Office that it could not continue to ignore the criticism voiced by the workers' group. The observers from the international trade union federations had caused a stir in the Portuguese capital by lodging an

22 The ministerial officer responsible for social and ILO-related matters in the French Overseas Ministry, Guelfi, accused Britain of having "sold the pass to the ILO" after the country had approved Gavin's West Africa mission without consulting the CCTA first. Watson to Tennant (MOL), 25 February 1953, in: CO 859/367: International Labour Organisation, Committee of Experts on Social Policy in Non-Metropolitan Territories, 3rd Session, Lisbon 4–19 December 1953.

23 Ibid.

24 Watson to Tennant (MOL), 25 February 1953, in: PRO-CO 859/367; Watson to Guelfi, 14 February 1953, in: PRO-CO 859/348: International Labour Office, Visit of Officials to West Africa 1953.

25 Gavin to Morse, 21 November 1952, in: ILOA-MF Z 11: Africa General.

26 Jenks to Morse, 23 December 1953, in: ILOA-MF Z 1/1/1/13.

open protest during the Lisbon meeting against the ILO's lack of involvement in the African continent. [27] To prevent the Office from being put in such an unpleasant position again, Jenks believed it had to take the initiative itself so as at least to be able to point to some modest short-term success. With the authorisation of the Director-General, Jenks travelled immediately after the Lisbon meeting to London, Paris, and Brussels to campaign among colonial politicians for an agreement concerning the ILO's future policy on Africa, which was to be based essentially on the proposals put forward by the workers' group in the Governing Body (GB). Cautiously, Jenks tried to make clear to the British, French, and Belgian representatives that an agreement of this nature, which he argued would be in the colonial powers' own best interests with a view to avoiding future conflicts, could not be reached "unless the metropolitan powers felt able to make a substantial contribution towards securing it by offering a positive programme." [28]

The next year, 1955 marked a change in the ILO's Africa policy. In the run-up to another expert meeting on colonial social policy, which took place at the end of the year in Dakar (then French West Africa) the ICFTU took the initiative in the GB and demanded that the committee of experts would be transformed into a representative, tripartite body. Among the factors behind this demand were the disputes within the ICFTU regarding its position on colonial issues in Africa, which would reach a new climax in the middle of the decade. According to the US trade union federation AFL-CIO, the ICFTU was doing less and less justice to its role in tackling communism in Africa. This accusation was directed primarily at the British. The Americans believed that Africa was where the battle of the systems would next be played out, in the very near future at that, and the AFL-CIO now began to use threats to strengthen its demands that the ICFTU develop a clearer anti-colonial profile. If need be, the AFL-CIO would take independent action in Africa rather than wait for the ICFTU.[29] The ICFTU now attempted in the GB to use the ILO to extend its own influence in Africa, and in doing so eventually dragged the ILO in the same direction.

Firstly, the ICFTU called for the Committee of Experts to be turned into an African equivalent of the tripartite Asian Advisory Committee (AAC) that had been set up at

27 Ibid.

28 Jenks to Morse, 24 January 1954, in: ILOA-MF Z 1/1/1/13.

29 The underlying dispute between the AFL and the TUC at this time surrounded the question of which trade union movements should be supported in Africa. While the TUC was determined to stick to its approach of taking things slowly and creating "real" trade unions from the ground up whose activities were entirely apolitical, the AFL tended, in the name of the fight against communism, also to support groups whose activities had a political element or whose work was even predominantly political – that is anti-colonial. The AFL's main priority was to acquire partners capable of forming a protective bastion against communist influences. See A. Carew, Conflict within the ICFTU: Anti-Colonialism and Anti-Communism in the 1950, in: International Review of Social History 41 (1996) 2, pp. 147–181. On the conflicts between the ICFTU and the AFL-CIO in Africa from the mid 1950s see the biography of the Afro-American trade unionist and civil rights activist Maida Springer, who paints a different picture from Carew's of the disputes. While Carew emphasizes the political objectives of and secret service involvement in the AFL-CIO's work in Africa, Richards sees the experience of Maida Springer as being typical of the conflicts between the (predominantly Afro-American) representatives of the AFL-CIO in Africa and the representatives of the ICFTU, who were often British and whose familiarity with the colonial administrations was too great for America's liking. See Y. Richards, Pan-Africanist and International Labor Leader, Pittsburgh 2000.

the beginning of the 1950s. This was an ingenious proposal as it had further-reaching implications than a mere change in the size and structure of the COESP: an African Advisory Committee (AFAC) would incorporate both the African colonial territories and the independent States of the region under the same auspices, and thus, in a roundabout way, effectively formally integrate the colonies into the organisation. The second demand brought the idea of an African field office back on to the agenda, and the third was for an African Regional Conference (AFRC) to be held as soon as possible.[30] The ILO leadership was temporarily overwhelmed by the new demands coming from the workers' group and other anti-colonial elements within the ILO's membership. Director-General Morse complained about the lack of understanding shown by its critics of the difficulties the Office faced with regard to its policy on Africa. "The ILO," he stated, "cannot deal with African issues like a pressure group. It cannot overreach the realities of the political situation."[31]
Shortly afterwards, on the fringes of the ILC in 1956, Morse's envoys Jenks and Robert Gavin (the head of the Non-Metropolitan Labour Section), held two confidential meetings with the CCTA powers. Jenks told the representatives that the ILO was facing ever more frequent accusations that it was "the instrument of the colonial powers". In addition, the workers' group was "increasingly restless and liable at any time to suggest far-reaching proposals". In order to avoid Africa within the ILO turning into the "sport of political forces", the colonial powers had to move.[32] As a first step slowly after the colonial powers gave in to the founding of an African Advisory Committee.[33]
It revealed the first cracks in the united front, which the colonial powers had been presenting against the ILO's involvement there. The increased pressure from the international trade union movement was not the only factor behind this change. More fundamentally significant was the fact that in the early years of the decade the very foundations of colonial rule, renewed so determinedly after the war, began to crumble. The wave of nationalism sweeping the colonies shook colonial confidence in the metropoles badly. War-like conflicts such as those in Algeria and Kenya, coupled with the disappointing economic results of the colonial powers' development offensives after the war, triggered discussions in the metropoles regarding the wisdom of continued imperial rule. Even if relinquishing their territories entirely was far from the minds of those in Paris and London – and even further from the minds of those in Brussels and Lisbon – change was in the air. France gave up its South-East Asian possessions in 1954 (out of necessity, following its defeat against the Vietminh on the battlefield of Dien Bien Phu), and shortly

30 This idea came from the relatively small International Federation of Christian Trade Unions (IFCTU). By this point, the organisation was holding regular, tripartite regional conferences for Europe, North and South America, Asia, and the Far East and there had been a preparatory one for the Middle East. This latter took place in 1947 in Istanbul and was not actually followed by any regular conferences, because the Arab states refused to take part if Israel was included. See ILO Governing Body, 131 (1956), p. 41.

31 Cabinet meeting, 12 January 1956, in: ILOA-MF Z8/1/32: Meetings of the Director-General, Notes, Minutes, 1951–1957.

32 The minutes of the meetings of 19 June 1956 and 26 June 1956 are recorded by the Office in: ILOAMF Z 11: Africa General and in PRO-LAB 13/984: ILO and Africa 1955–1957.

33 ILO Governing Body,131 (1956), RoP, p. 27.

afterwards granted independence to its North African protectorates Morocco and Tunisia. At almost the same time, Britain handed over power in Malaya. The most significant event in Africa was the British initiation of a transfer of power south of the Sahara. Ghana, as the Gold Coast was now called under Prime Minister Kwame Nkrumah, was the first country to be given its independence (1957) in what were, at times, hard-bitten negotiations, and Nigeria followed in 1960.[34]

These developments not only provided further inspiration for nationalist movements in the remaining colonies, they also opened up new opportunities for the African and Asian States in international forums. As the Afro-Asian bloc grew, so did the force of the demands it raised within the ILO and all the other parts of the UN system for an end to colonial rule.[35] The new strength of this group of states inevitably affected the colonial powers' approach to colonial questions. On top of this, in the mid-1950s the US government renewed its criticism of its Western allies' colonial involvement – a response to the Soviet Union's new strategy of courting the newly independent nations regardless of their political orientation. From Washington's point of view, the slow pace of reform and the colonial powers' apparent inability to maintain political control by peaceful means simply played into communist hands. Britain and France experienced the full force of the United States' lack of trust in their abilities when it compelled them to abandon their commando action against Nasser's Egypt during the Suez crisis at the end of 1956.

At the ILC in 1956, these developments culminated in attacks against the colonial powers more acrimonious than had ever previously been seen inside the ILO. With the Algerian conflict still raging, France, inevitably, came off worse than the others. What was most galling for the colonial powers, though, was the fact that US representatives mercilessly used this, their hour of need, to call on them not to obstruct plans for an African field office for too much longer.[36] The icy calculation behind this move caused fury in the colonial metropoles, as Jenks reported to Morse.[37] One French representative declared himself to be dismayed by the "hatred of the colonial people against the white people and the West" he had experienced at the conference, but equally disappointed by the fact that the United States had shown no sympathy whatsoever for the problems of the colonial powers and had joined in the banging of the anti-colonial drum.[38]

True enough, these events made the ILO realise that it would now have to give up its previous caution, as any further delay could do severe damage to the ILO and its future

34 On the complex interplay of metropolitan, colonial, and international factors which accelerated the political decolonisation process in the mid 1950s, see W.D. McIntyre, British Decolonization, 1946–1997: When, Why and How Did the British Empire Fall?, Basingstoke 1998, pp. 79–101; R.F. Betts, France and Decolonisation, 1900–1960, Basingstoke 1991, pp. 78–114.

35 A mind-provoking view on the alliances within the post-colonial world under the banner of Afro-Asian or "Third World" solidarity is taken by V. Prashad, The Darker Nations. A People's History of the Third World, New York/London 2007.

36 ILC 40 (1957), RoP, pp. 235f.

37 Meeting between Morse, Jenks and Cox 6 July 1956, in: ILOA-MF Z8/1/32.

38 Discussion between Morse and Alexandre Parodi, French observer at the Conference and then-NATO ambassador of his country. Morse's memoirs, 16 August 1956, in: DAMP, B 89, F 14: Reflections.

position in Africa.[39] A meeting of the ICFTU in the Ghanaian capital Accra in January 1957, marked again by harsh anti-colonial criticism, provided more impetus for the ILO to take action. The ICFTU condemned the CCTA in no uncertain terms and demanded that Africa be opened up to international organisations. It renewed calls for an ILO field office in Africa as soon as possible, and asked for speedy preparations to be made for a Regional Conference. [40]
Shortly afterwards, a CO memorandum spoke in entirely new tones of the ILO's work:

> *The aims of the ILO are worthy, much of its technical work is first-rate, and it has considerable prestige, particularly of course among organised labour. Moreover, it is not conspicuously anti-colonial or prominent, in spite of the special representation of organised labour in the Organisation, among those agencies, which seek to interfere in the affairs of dependent territories. We consider that we ought not to attempt to insulate our dependent territories from the Organisation. On grounds of general principle, therefore, we are not disposed to obstruct the orderly development of ILO activities in Africa South of the Sahara*.[41]

Soon afterwards, Morse indicated to British delegates in the Governing Body that he would be agreeing to the Egyptian Government representative Said Salama's proposal to incorporate the costs of setting up an African field office into the ILO's budget for 1958. Once again, the British delegates attempted "by private pressure" and "urgent representations" to dissuade Morse from the idea,[42] but before long the first signals were received that, whatever they felt about it, London would not block the budget.[43]
Similar developments were observed with regard to the creation of a tripartite African Advisory Committee on the model of the one already in place in Asia. The British came around to the opinion, that the AFAC that it had fought so bitterly to prevent might well turn out to be a "safety valve for the expression of African hopes and aspirations".[44] In the course of 1957, most of the other CCTA powers also came round to this new position. They saw the increasing interest in African issues the Soviet Union was displaying in international forums, and the danger that, if they remained inflexible, the communist-dominated World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) might get its claws into the young trade union movement in Africa, as good arguments for a change of course. Eventually the question of an African Field Office came up again. Even something short of a contest broke out among the colonial powers over where it should be located. Both

39 Portugal and France already suspected that an agreement between the Office and the State Department was behind the Wilkins Initiative, and they attempted to get the other CCTA powers to unite in a joint protest against this interference. Morris (CO) to Kunzle (FO-UN), in: PRO-LAB 13/984: ILO and Africa 1955–1957.
40 Carew, Conflict within the ICFTU, p. 162.
41 Memorandum from the CO (anon.), "The ILO and Africa", 22 January 1957, in: PRO-LAB 13/984.
42 Robertson to Morris, 12 March 1957, in: PRO-LAB 13/984.
43 Memorandum by Robertson (MOL), "The ILO and Africa", 13 June 1957, in: PRO-LAB 13/984.
44 Robertson thought he could hear "sympathetic noises" coming out of the CO to the effect that Britain would vote for the AFAC and a regional office at the June 1957 meeting of the Governing Body, but not for a Regional Conference. PRO-LAB 13/984.

the British and the French made it clear to Morse that they would like to see it situated in one of their territories. Even Brussels declared its desire to play host in the Belgian Congo [45] The Portuguese had no particular intentions in this respect but were by no means dismissive either, and even issued an invitation for the first meeting of the AFAC to be held on Portuguese territory in Africa.[46]

Morse's final choice of location for the field office was Lagos, Nigeria, where it began work in January 1959.[47] This choice was motivated by the fact that Nigeria was shortly to become independent and its leaders, unlike those of the alternative option, Ghana, displayed no ambitions to spearhead the anti-colonial movement. Establishing the office in Ghana may, in the light of the line followed by Nkrumah, have led to a re-politicising of the issue of the ILO's involvement in Africa, which was the last thing the Office wanted. In August, Morse announced his decision on the office's location to the governments.

More positively, the choice of Nigeria was of course also related to its fledging position in the continent and among former British colonies. It is the largest south of the Sahara, and the most populated nation in Africa. It should be noted that ILO officials had engaged with a few liberal nationalists in colonial Gold Coast and Nigeria before their independence in 1957 and 1960 respectively. No doubt, it successfully persuaded most labour leaders to eschew leftist ideology for the Western model tagged "sound industrial relations."[48] Despite the movement of the regional office from Lagos to Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, the organisation continues to provide technical assistance, training, and education to countries throughout the continent. From Lagos, later Abuja, the ILO implements its activities for the West African countries, while similar base in Algiers, Antananarivo, Dar el Salaam, Harare, Kinshasa, and Lusaka serves Central, Eastern, Northern, and Southern regions, respectively. These regional offices work closely with ILO's constituents or partners such as the governments, employers, and workers organisations in other to promote decent work projects, ensure effective implementation of its conventions and treaties, as well as impart the idea of sound industrial relations across the continent.

The same year it opened the office, the AFAC met for its first meeting in the Angolan capital, Luanda, and preparations began for the first AFRC, to be held as soon as logistically possible. On a long trip to Africa in 1959, Jenks noted with satisfaction that the ILO's expansion into Africa now had the wide support of all the main powers represent-

45 Jenks' notes on the meeting about Morse's trip to Brussels with the ministers Troclet, Fafchamps, Buisseret (colonial minister), 14 January 1958 (Note 16/1), in: PRO-LAB 13/984.

46 Jef Rens' notes on the meeting with the Portuguese foreign minister Paula Cunha and the colonial minister Ventura 5/2/1958 (trip 1-4.2.), in: PRO-LAB 13/984.

47 Morse's note to George Tobias informing the US government about the Office's African plans, 21 August 1958, in: NARA – RG 174.5 (Bureau of International Labor Affairs), B 20: General Correspondence, 1953–1967.

48 See <https://www.ilo.org/africa/about-us/offices/abuja/lang--en/index.htm> (accessed 2 November 2013). In addition, see H.I. Tijani, McCarthyism in Colonial Nigeria: The Ban on the Employment of Communists, in: A. Oyebade (ed.), The Foundations of Nigeria, Trenton 2003, pp. 647–668; Tijani, Building "sound" industrial relations in Nigeria: The British and organised labour, 1940s to 1960, in: Lagos Historical Review 11 (2012), pp. 21–36.

ed on the continent.[49] On the eve of African decolonization even the hostility towards the ILO's technical assistance programmes lessened. In a meeting Morse had with the French President de Gaulle in 1960, the President let it be known "que moi, de Gaulle, et la France, sommes en complet accord avec votre œuvre d'assistance technique, et vous soutiendrons dans tout ce que vous faites et ferez en Afrique française."[50]

In summary, the ILO's position on the problem of colonial social policy during the 1950s essentially remained the one it had taken during the reform phase of the war and the immediate post-war period. Its success in having integrated the colonial territories into a generally universalistic discourse was countered by its long-term failure to vanquish the double standard which the colonial powers continued to make use of within their domains. After the war, the double standard had manifested itself in the adoption of specifically colonial conventions, while now it was reflected in the very existence of a separate committee concerned with social policy in dependent territories. It continued to manifest itself in the "gradual universalism" which characterised the findings of the committee, and in the ILO's powerlessness to overcome the colonial powers' resistance to its involvement in Africa. Almost until the very end of their rule in Africa, the colonial powers thus managed to uphold their contention that under colonial conditions, a different set of rules applied to the path of modernisation process than those the ILO claimed to be of a universal nature.

It is pertinent to state also that the Bureau of Workers' Activities (ACTRAV) in labour union education gained greater momentum during the late 1950s. As noted somewhere else,[51] in 1950 the ILO began to deliberate on ways to educate workers throughout the world. ACTRAV became the focal point for pedagogy, methodology, and content in all matters relating to labour union education. It was not until 1956, however, that a systematic workers' education programme began in its office in Geneva. The scope of the ILO's workers' education was based on its organisational structure and its competence in social and economic subjects in the labour field. The curricular was designed to educate workers about industrial relations, social security, working conditions, occupational health and safety, and similar issues. In addition, educating the workers involve better understanding of the role of the machines and their adaptation to the changing industrial environment in the age of globalisation.

Labour education is non-traditional (largely during the colonial phase), nonconventional, not structured, and not credential- or degree-oriented. Yet, it is the pathway to workers' promotion, to better opportunities and to job security. It was an opportunity for most workers with primary-level education to garner skills at the end of the training. Labour union education transcends skills acquisition because it involves mental development. As a form of education in the workplace, its pedagogy is often hands-on or cooperative in nature. It is also about increasing workers' productivity without neces-

49 Report by Jenks, 29 April 1959, in: ILOA-MF-Z 1/1/1/13.

50 Minutes of talks between Morse and General De Gaulle, 15 January 1960, in: DAMP, B 4, F 4: France.

51 Tijani, Building "sound" industrial relations in Nigeria.

sarily being dogmatic or ideological. Although coloured during the colonial era by the ideological race, it is ultimately about access to information and means for workers to improve themselves. Such improvement, it could be argued, was ultimately beneficial to the employers (government and the foreign capitals) in that it ensured profit maximisation.
Labour union education is not only tailored for specific country need, it generally aimed at workers' success through access to information and skill acquisition. Skill acquisition, access to information, and sound industrial relations at the workplace were central to the success of the non-traditional or informal nature of labour union education throughout Africa before the 1960s.[52] This, however, has changed since post-independent because of the dynamism and changing nature of labour relations throughout Africa. Ghosh opined that workers' education is "all kinds of educational activities which seek to provide workers with the equipment that will help them to develop fully their potentialities and enable them to fulfil more adequately their trade unions and related functions."[53]
The idea of labour union education therefore is contextualised in a variety of ways. Scholars have given various explanations to buttress their point of view.[54] Such view, as the history of Nigeria's labour union education shows, is often based on ideological position. In addition, the type and modules of education is based on changing social, economic, and political situation on one hand, and the nature of industrial relations on the other hand. Despite these varieties, one agrees with Whitehouse that,

> *workers' education or labour education is a structure and process specifically designed to involve trade union members in education programmes and activities directly through their trade unions, or in joint cooperative developments with workers' organisations.*[55]

5. Conclusion

This article has presented a post-colonial account of the role of ILO with particular reference to the activities of the Bureau of Workers' Activities, known as ACTRAV on the eve of independence in Sub-Saharan Africa. Despite the challenges during post-World War II era, the ILO remained steadfast in its efforts at ensuring decent work, social justice, and labour union education throughout Africa. The 1960s mark another epoch in the history of relationship between Africa and international organisations, including the ILO. Each African nation during the 1960s had the latitude to shape its destiny in policy formulation, relations, labour issues in a Cold War environment. The 1960s laid the foundation for what happened thereafter in different parts of the continent.

52 Tijani, Union Education in Nigeria.
53 P. Ghosh, Current problems and practices in workers education, in: International Labour Review 14 (1953), pp. 14–46.
54 Tijani, Union Education in Nigeria.
55 J.R.W. Whitehouse, New dimension of workers' education, Workers' Education CBWE, December 1977.

How Independence Accelerated the Careers of Ivorian Teachers: A Connected History of Education in Côte d'Ivoire, 1958–1974

Jean-Lémon Koné

ABSTRACTS

In diesem Artikel wird die Veränderung von der kolonialen zur postkolonialen Lage des Bildungssystems der Elfenbeinküste von Ende der 1950er bis Mitte der 1970er Jahre untersucht. Übergangsmechanismen werden aus der Perspektive der Karrierewege von Grundschullehrern beobachtet. Warum und wie hat die Unabhängigkeit des Landes die Karrierewege afrikanischer Lehrer beschleunigt, die unter der Kolonialregierung ausgebildet wurden? Und inwieweit widerspiegeln diese individuellen Wege den politischen Wandel von der kolonialen Föderation Französisch-Westafrikas hin zu separaten unabhängigen Staaten in Bezug auf Bildung? Die Beantwortung dieser Fragen erfordert große Aufmerksamkeit für (1) Entscheidungsprozesse, einschließlich der Neuzuweisung von Personal und Arbeitsplätzen, der Nationalisierung und Neuausrichtung des französischen Lehrerausbildungsmodells, (2) der Unterschiede in den internationalen Beziehungen zu Frankreich zu ehemaligen Kolonien und neuen postkoloniale Partner, (3) die nationalen Entwicklungsstrategien, (4) die Handlungsmacht individueller und kollektiver Akteure in der aufstrebenden Zivilgesellschaft.

This paper assesses the shift between the colonial to the post-colonial situation in the educational system of Côte d'Ivoire from the late 1950's to the mid-1970's. Transitioning mechanisms are observed from the perspective of primary teachers' career pathways. Why and how did the turn of independence catalyse the career pathways of African teachers trained under the colonial situation? And to what extent do these individual pathways reflect the political-scale change from the colonial federation of French West Africa to separate independent states in terms of education? Answering these questions requires paying great attention to (1) decision making processes including the reassignment of staff and places, the nationalisation and repurposing of the teacher training model inherited from the French Rule, (2) the variations in

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the international relations with France, other former colonies and new postcolonial partners, (3) the national strategies towards development, (4) the agency of individual and collective actors in the emerging civil society.

1. Introduction

The 1960 decade in the broad sense was the theatre of major changes in African educational systems. 73 percent of the continent achieved independence within the decade, from 1956 to 1968. This resulted in a global dynamic wave of decolonisation, with 38 new sovereign states popping up in the international community[1] and hence the necessary recomposition of diplomatic relations and public governance authorities.[2] Prior to this, the educational authority had remained under the colonial rule, however, the massive decolonisation that swept through the world, brought up new challenges to the educational systems. One of these challenges was to come up with solutions to overcome the colonial paradigm, while training qualified nationals to replace European staff and administrators.[3] In the meantime, the new sovereign states realized that they shared a common pan-African destiny regarding education, through their participation in the series of International Conferences on the Development of Education in Africa, which began to be held on a regular basis under the aegis of the UN and the UNESCO following the 1961 Addis Ababa conference.[4] In the context of the Cold War and the polarization of international relations, those conferences proved unifying, setting education as a common priority; the aim being to facilitate social and economic development. In that regard, a goal of universal primary education was mutually set, combined with national plans, as well as north-south and south-south cooperation programmes. Besides, African education became also utterly determined by the emergence of foreign development aid, launched by both the Western and Eastern Blocs in the wake of independence.[5]
Francophone Africa is a striking instance of this pivotal moment between the colonial and postcolonial situations. The years from the post-war era to the 1960s brought an explosion of opportunities to Francophone Africa in terms of recomposition of civic and

1 See RFI, Chronologie des indépendances africaines, 31 December 2009, <http://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20091231-chronologie-independances-africaines> (accessed 10 February 2020).
2 A. Peshkin, Educational Reform in Colonial and Independent Africa, in: African Affairs 64 (1965) 256, pp. 210–216.
3 M.-A. De Suremain, Africaniser la formation des professeurs de géographie: les Dopedocs de l'École normale supérieure de Dakar, in: C. Labrune-Badiane et. al., L'École en situation postcoloniale (=Cahiers Afrique n°27), Paris 2012, pp. 119–140; A. Fall, Recrutement de volontaires de l'Éducation au Sénégal: regard rétrospectif sur une experience controversée, ibid., pp. 159–182.
4 Conference of African States on the Development of Education in Africa, 15–25 May 1961, Addis Ababa, <https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000077416> (accessed 10 February 2020).
5 E. Frankema / M. Van Waijenburg, The Great Convergence. Skill Accumulation and Mass Education in Africa and Asia, 1870–2010, in: CEPR Discussion Paper n°DP14150, London 2019.

institutional statuses that were intrinsic to colonialism,[6] the formation of public policies,[7] and the emergence of civil society supported by a new emerging elite: the colonial intermediaries.[8] Over this period, the order of relationships between the former colonies and mainland France, and even the political ecosystem of France itself, were deeply transfigured by a series of events. In 1958, the escalating Algerian war led to serious political crises in France, causing the fall of the Fourth French Republic (1946–1958), replaced by President Charles De Gaulle's Fifth Republic, with a strengthened presidency and new policies towards Africa. The same year, the French Community (*Communauté française*) was founded (October 1958), initiating an association of former French colonies, mostly from Africa. The member states were federated by a citizenship of the French Community, but were no territories of the French Republic as they were recognized as autonomous States with autonomous governments. However, equality between member states proved limited by the fact that fundamental sectors, such as foreign affairs, defence, the currency, economic policies, control of raw materials, and education remained, *de facto*, in the *domaine commun*; all sectors that a genuine state wished to control. Though short-lived, due to the emergence of independences less than two years after its creation, the Community durably impacted Franco-African relationships. Through the action of French long-lasting Secretary-General for African and Malagasy Affairs, Jacques Foccart, those relationships shifted from the Colonial Situation to the new paradigm of post-colonial Franco-African assistance (*Coopération*), involving the sectors of culture and education, finance and economy, as well as the military. However, Foccart's action also contributed to extending France's sphere of influence in sub-Saharan Africa (or Françafrique) beyond independence, by building a dense web of personal networks that underpinned the informal and family-like relationships between French and African leaders.[9]

But beyond political matters, in those years, a new generation of Africans emerged as key actors of postcolonial developing Francophone Africa. All of them were young adults upon independence. Born between the late 1910s to the 1940s, raised under colonial situation, they embodied the very transition between the colonial to the "post", since they came out of an era to build a new one. Addressing the transitioning mechanisms of the society to which they belonged from their own viewpoint should contribute to better understanding the inner history and chronology of the formation of African public policies. Therefore, studying social objects in Africa through this perspective, – especially public services such as education, public health, the army etc. – , allows addressing at the same time (1) political decision-making processes, (2) the variations in the international relations with France, other former colonies and new postcolonial partners, (3) the na-

6 F. Cooper, Citizenship between Empire and Nation: Remaking France and French Africa, 1945–1960, Princeton 2014.

7 L. Manière, La politique française pour l'adaptation de l'enseignement en Afrique après les indépendances (1958–1964), in: Histoire de l'éducation (2010) 128, pp. 163–190.

8 J.-H. Jézéquel, Les enseignants comme élite politique en AOF (1930–1945), in: Cahiers d'études africaines (2005) 178, pp. 519–544.

9 J.-P. Bat, La Fabrique des barbouzes: Histoire des réseaux Foccart en Afrique, Paris 2017.

tional strategies towards development, (4) the agency of individual and collective actors in the emerging civil society.

This paper aims at drawing a connected microhistory of primary education in Côte d'Ivoire, from the late 1950s to the mid-1970s, based on the individual itinerary of my own grandfather, teacher Koutia Lémon, together with those of other Ivorian teachers from his generation. To what extent did the turn of the 1960s catalyse the career pathways of this generation of Ivorian teachers trained under the colonial situation? And how can individual pathways reflect the political-scale change from colonial federation to separate independent states in terms of educational systems, including the reassignment of staff and places, the nationalization and repurposing of the fundamental French teacher training model, as well as the implementation of international cooperation programmes?

Koutia Lémon was born in Abidjan, Côte d'Ivoire in 1918 and trained at the rural normal school of Dabou. He worked as a village school principal, then, upon his return from in-service training in France in Autumn 1959, was assigned to supervise the creation of the first three Écoles Primaires et Préscolaires (EPP, Primary and Pre-Schools) of the country in elite neighbourhood Cocody-Abidjan. Generationally, his profile is representative of his peers. Most of them were originally trained around the 1930/1940s under the policy of Educational Adaptation, launched in the early 1930s by the French Administration to meet the purported needs of "*indigènes*" for rural employability through practice-based curricula.[10] Selected to upgrade their professional skills in mainland France on the eve of independence, they later achieved executive positions in the Ivorian system after independence.

Beyond genealogy and biographical research, the approach through individual pathways is very representative of this generational group, which was numerically limited (there were only 5,080 Ivorian teachers in 1960), with homogenous socio-professional profiles and career paths. Such approach allows:

– rethinking the internal mechanisms and the continuity between several disjoint institutions that nonetheless belonged to the same educational system: normal schools, in-service trainings, primary and pre-schools, and the administration.
– reassessing the agency of Ivorian teachers, as intermediaries in the transition from the colonial to the postcolonial situation;
– rethinking the long-term chronology of Ivorian education policies by disentangling from the colonial/postcolonial paradigm, focusing rather on the generational approach, and long-term institutional, pedagogical, and ideological variations since the early 20th century;
– accessing unprecedented and/or under explored sources, linked with the itineraries of the teachers: private and family archives, schools' archives etc.

This work is based on three archival discoveries, intimately linked to the itinerary of teacher Koutia Lémon. Among them are:

10 H. Gamble, Peasants of the Empire. Rural Schools and the Colonial Imaginary in 1930s French West Africa, in: Cahiers d'études africaines (2009) 195, pp. 775–804.

– the former Rural Normal School of Dabou, where Koutia was trained. The archives include founding documents since the creation of the school in 1937, every staff and students' registration books since 1946, every annual headmaster's reports since 1947, and every ledgers since 1960;
– the first three Primary and Preschools of the country. Those schools were created in the early 1960s under the supervision of Principal Koutia Lémon. They were at the same time pedagogical laboratories and showcases for the regime of Côte d'Ivoire's long-lasting president, Félix Houphouët-Boigny. The sources required to write the history of the schools' creation and first years of existence (registration and matriculation books, copybooks, etc.) are still available. They remained untouched since then except for occasional administrative uses;
– Koutia's private archives, including official degrees, correspondence, and a journal, as well as numerous photographs from the early 1940s onwards. Such sources provide a rare inner view of the condition of this generation of African teachers.

By confronting these archives with a series of oral sources collected in fieldwork, together with traces of decision-making processes, this paper is aimed at examining the commencement of the careers of this generation of Ivorian teachers through (I) the case study of an in Service training in France, as an insight into the making of Franco-Ivorian cooperation, (II), the invention of the ideal Ivorian rural teacher through the re-appropriation of the normal school of Dabou and (III) the Socio-spatial influence of schools and teachers' housing in the planning of postcolonial Abidjan.

2. In-Service Trainings through Foreign Assistance: A Breakaway from Educational Colonialism?

The 1958 emergence of the French Community accelerated the end of the colonial situation *stricto sensu* and triggered the state-to-state cooperation with France. Although the French Community and cooperation involved new forms of pre-eminence and intervention of France in the African educational governance through the "Françafrique system",[11] they also brought renewal in terms of political structures and socio-professional development for African elites. It redefined the prerogatives of French ministries and decision-makers in general, including allowing greater latitude to African leaders. At an individual scale, it also opened new windows of opportunities for career development for Ivorian teachers. As a matter of fact, political autonomy (and later independence) did not mean the end of links between France and the African part of its former Empire, especially Côte d'Ivoire. As shown by Laurent Manière, as early as 1958, the Franco-African Cooperation launched a whole set of intensive courses and training sessions for educational administrators, executives, and teachers.[12] The aim was to facilitate the transition

11 Bat, La Fabrique des barbouzes.
12 Manière, La politique française.

towards independence and the progressive replacement of the colonial staff, with Ivorian nationals in the education authority.
Within primary teacher education, one of the Franco-African cooperation programmes that proved particularly crucial was the in-service trainings in France. The training completed by Koutia's group took place in 1958/1959, at the very dawn of the newly sealed cooperation. The archives and oral sources on Koutia allow to shed light on the institutional context of the programme and on inner views in the individual experiences of the interns.

Franco-African Cooperation in the Making

In the 1950s, when the in-service trainings started, the programmes only lasted a couple of months, being specifically designed to develop targeted skills. These programmes were progressively extended to one to two years, assigned with degree certificates and set under the aegis of the French Ministry of Cooperation. Below is Koutia's certificate, delivered in 1959. The programme he attended was an in-between case, as it took place during the pivotal year of 1958/1959, the year when the French Community was created. Several details of the document underline this transitioning context.

RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE

MINISTÈRE DE L'ÉDUCATION NATIONALE — MINISTÈRE DE LA FRANCE D'OUTRE-MER

Le Ministre de l'Education Nationale et le Ministre de la France d'Outre-Mer certifient que M onsieur Kouka Lemon a accompli à l'Ecole Normale d Instituteurs de Caen et au centre International d'Etudes Pédagogiques de Sèvres le stage d'information pédagogique organisé en 1959 à l'intention des membres du personnel enseignant outre-mer.

LE MINISTRE DE L'ÉDUCATION NATIONALE — LE MINISTRE DE LA FRANCE D'OUTRE-MER

p. a. Le Directeur du Service Universitaire des relations avec l'Etranger et l'Outre-Mer : — p. a. Le Directeur de l'Enseignement et de la Jeunesse :

Le Titulaire :

This certificate highlights a peculiar division of authority between the French Ministry of National Education and that of Overseas Affairs as it was stamped by both institutions. This division of authorities was inspired by the institutional reforms that swept through the French Empire post WW 2, a distinctive deviation from the arbitrary power of the single, omnipotent colonial administration.[13] In fact, since 1946 a new deal in the divi-

13 H. Gamble, The Education Crisis in French West Africa 1944–1950, in: Histoire de l'éducation 4 (2010) 128, p. 25.

sion of power was established between the young Ministry of Overseas France (whose missions hardly differed from the former Ministry of the Colonies) and the French Ministry of National Education. Such reconfiguration proved a long-term process, including intense rivalry between both institutions, as analysed by Gamble.[14] Since the post-war period, in the context of curricula assimilation to the French model, the Ministry of National Education endeavoured to expand its scope of action to Francophone Africa, while restraining the power of the colonial administration. For instance, in May 1946, the Higher Council of National Education was reformed and assigned with the supervision of educational policies in Africa, which reduced the Overseas Affairs' administrative responsibilities in this field.

Such division of power also had consequences in the organisation of training programmes. Beyond institutional rivalry, the 1958/1959 in-service training was above all an instance of partnership and practical collaboration, as it required deep commitment on both sides. The Ministry of National Education provided with staff and places (the Normal School of Caen and the International Center for Pedagogical Studies of Sèvres), while the Ministry of Overseas France took care of the travels and teacher replacement back in Côte d'Ivoire.

In the following years, the responsibility of the training programmes was handed over to the Office for Cultural and Technical Cooperation, as part of the French Ministry of Cooperation created in 1959. This brand-new administration was designed to fill the institutional gap in France's educational policy towards postcolonial Africa. However, the very existence of a French Ministry of cooperation itself highlighted the paradox of Francophone Africa's sovereignty regarding education: though theoretically autonomous since 1958, the educational systems remained dependent on France's policies, due to a lack of infrastructures and professional trainings as well as a teacher shortage. Most Francophone countries achieved independence in 1960. They could have engaged in classic diplomatic relationships with the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, like every other foreign state. Instead, their relationships with France remained regulated by the exceptional regime of Cooperation, with the specific goal of maintaining close ties with the newly independent young nations while facilitating their development.[15] In fact, the Ministry of Cooperation existed until 1999, the year when it was merged into the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Opening Windows of Opportunities for African Teachers

In most cases, Ivorian primary teachers from Koutia's generation had been originally trained during the 1930s to the 1940s, under the policy of educational adaptation, to teach practice-based curricula, with mere rudiments of reading, writing and calculation,

14 Ibid.

15 P. Jacquemot, Cinquante ans de coopération française avec l'Afrique subsaharienne. Une mise en perspective (deuxième partie), in: Afrique contemporaine 3 (2011) 239, pp. 23–34.

together with further elements of farming and health education.[16] Their mission was to prepare rural children for direct employability in their own milieu, which left very little latitude for personal development, except for socio-professional agency – that is to say committing to trade unions and teachers' associations[17] – and individual strategies for social mobility.[18] The Koutia generation's skills were mainly practice-based, and witnessed shortcomings in disciplinary knowledge. Hence, one of the purposes of the in-service trainings was to upgrade their skills and knowledge. The programmes also aimed at training qualified national executives and major actors committed to the development of their own countries. At least is it the impression held from the archives, oral sources and academic works.

Upgrading skills and knowledge implied delivering the same learning contents as those delivered in France's normal schools. At that time, the standards of teacher education in France involved disciplinary courses, introductions to psycho-pedagogy and apprenticeship sessions *in vivo* in primary schools.[19] On this point, Virginie Tapa-Kodombré, a former colleague of Koutia who underwent a similar in-service training in 1961, recalled:

> *The French welcomed us well when we arrived. There was nothing wrong between us. I don't remember experiencing any racism from them at all, to be honest. We got along well with each other. They were very friendly and helpful. Sometimes when we asked them questions about their classes, or about French children, they answered frankly. We often exchanged advice to keep our class running smoothly.*[20]

This general impression is common to most of the interviews with Koutia's former colleagues led in fieldwork since 2016.

Another aspect of the training consisted in introducing African teachers to public and corporate leading experts in the field of African education. For instance, as shown in the photograph below, on 9 July 1959, the Ivorian trainees took part in a conference in Paris with the board of French publishing company *ISTRA*.

ISTRA was a leading publishing company specialized in children's literature and handbooks for African schools. During the interwar period, it launched the best-selling handbook series *Mamadou & Bineta*, broadly circulated all around Francophone West Africa and still used in classes by the end of the 20th century.[21] Such meetings aimed to integrate African teachers into a network of key actors actively committed to the global

16 D. Bouche, L'École rurale en Afrique occidentale française, in: D. N. Baker / P. J. Harrigan (eds.), The Making of Frenchmen: Current Directions in the History of Education in France, 1679–1979 (Historical Reflections / Réflexions historiques 7 [1980] 2/3), pp. 207–219.

17 J.-H. Jézéquel, Les enseignants comme élite politique en AOF (1930–1945). Des "meneurs de galopins" dans l'arène politique, in: Cahiers d'études africaines 2 (2005) 178, pp. 519–544.

18 C. Labrune-Badiane / E. Smith, Les Hussards noirs de la colonie. Instituteurs africains et "petites patries" en AOF (1913–1960), Paris 2018.

19 G. Laprévote, Les écoles normales primaires en France 1879–1979. Splendeurs et misères de la formation des maîtres, Lyon 1984.

20 Interview with Virginie Tapa-Kodombré, Abidjan, 6 September 2017.

21 H. Kloeckner, À quand une édition scolaire africaine ?, in: Africultures 4 (2003) 57, pp. 71–85.

renewal of pedagogy and the advancement of African education. ISTRA, for instance, deeply contributed to the creation of the African and Malagasy Pedagogical Institute (IPAM) in 1965, in collaboration with French publishing companies Hachette, Presses Universitaires de France, and Larousse. Those African teachers were thus given the opportunity to be included in the reflection on the renewal of African education.

It seems that another purpose of the programmes was to give the trainees an opportunity to discover France and Europe, and to get used to collaborating on an equal footing with white fellows, as illustrated by testimonies such as that of Virginie Tapa-Kodombré (see above). Though hypothetical, this view seems all the more probable, as most trainees were assigned with executive positions upon their return back home, including working with and/or supervising French *coopérants*. As a matter of fact, Koutia's private archives give an inkling of how the trainees visited France and Europe. In the postcard below sent to his wife and family from Marseille on 26 June 1959, Koutia described his whole trip throughout the country and continent, having already been to Paris, Tours, Limoges, Périgueux, Carcassonne, Bordeaux, Marseille, and still planning to head for Nice, Monaco, Spain, and Italy. Given that this generation of African teachers was born, bred, and trained in the cultural framework of colonization, it was necessary to deconstruct certain social codes and habits in order to allow fruitful collaborations. Obviously, addressing the issue of what Frantz Fanon identified as "the complex of the colonized"[22] became a deeply practical

22 F. Fanon, Peau noire, masques blancs, Paris 1952, pp. 67–87.

priority. However, it isn't clear whether this was an intentional goal or an accidental consequence of the programmes. The overall effect was nonetheless that the African teachers of this generation who had undergone in-service training in France were sociologically prepared to live and work in the postcolonial situation, while actively contributing to building their young countries.


Marseille ce 26-6-39

Ma chère épouse

Je t'écris ce jour de Marseille - car je continue mon voyage - j'ai déjà vu plusieurs villes de France dont les plus importantes: Paris - Tours - Limoges - Périgueux - Carcassonne - Bordeaux - Marseille - Le voyage continue - Dans deux jours je serai à Nice - puis à Monaco - j'ai déjà fait un tour en Espagne où j'ai pu visiter San Sébastian - Il se peut que je fasse un tour en Italie - Donne moi des nouvelles de la famille et surtout le résultat du C.E.P.E de Salamata - N'étant pas sur place, je te demande d'adresser mes lettres à l'adresse suivante - Koutia Léon Instituteur direction enseignement 27, rue Oudinot Paris 7 Bonjour à vous tous bien

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ary

3. Dealing with the Memory of the Rural Normal School of Dabou: The Invention of the Ideal Ivorian Rural Teacher

General Teacher Training in French West Africa

Before attending in-service training in France, most teachers from Koutia's generation (i.e roughly born between 1920–1940) had been originally trained in one of the normal schools of the federation.[23] Since the 1930's, French West Africa was equipped with a network of five territorially complementary normal schools, which were assigned to developing specific areas of specialisation in teacher training: French assimilated training (i.e. similar to mainland France's curricula) for men in William Ponty (1903) and females in Rufisque (1938), Senegal, savannah farming in Katibougou (1935), and Sévaré (1939), French Sudan, and palm-forest farming in Dabou (1937), Côte d'Ivoire.

Koutia attended the Rural Normal School of Dabou between Fall 1937 to Summer 1940. Rural normal schools (Katibougou, Dabou, and Sévaré) were founded in the middle of the 1930's to support the policy of Adapted Education, launched by French Governor-General Jules Brévié and Inspector General for Primary Education Albert Charton

23 This proves less true when it comes to female teachers, whose training remained scarcely professionalized until the creation of the "assimilated" normal school of Rufisque, Senegal in 1938.

to meet the purported needs of "indigènes" for rural employability through practice-based curricula.[24] They were conceived as small training centres for apprentice teachers from all around the sub-region to learn how to teach practice-based curricula to rural "indigènes". Though quickly aborted in the post-war era – as France intended to boost the development and assimilation of African education in recognition of the continent's active participation in the war effort – , the rural normal schools experience lasted a decade and a half, and deeply influenced the tradition of technical and agricultural education, which was especially looked up to in post-independence Côte d'Ivoire.

In the tradition of Jules Ferry and Ferdinand Buisson in late 19th-century France, trainee teachers were meant to be at the same time social educators in the broad sense, and political go-betweens. Therefore, their training involved deep moral transformation in order to inspire African teachers with professional ethics and faith in their mission.[25] They were taught westernised habitus, including cultural, clothing, and hygiene practices etc., so that they could become role models in "indigene" societies once in office. Such habitus were acquired by coexisting together during a few years training (three years in Dabou) in boarding schools. Prolonged coexistence in a confined space allowed providing the students with 'total education'. Rural trainee teachers' curriculum was based on cultural proximity with the rural world, focusing on pupils' employability rather than theoretical education, and aiming at modernising rural societies. Dabou's trainees were specifically trained to teach in village schools where "indigènes" children completed a five-years primary education, including two years of rudimental reading, writing, and calculation, together with further elements of agriculture, forest crops, and health education in the last three years. The efficiency of the professional training mainly relied on the teachers' ability to adapt to realities in the field.

By the turn of the 1950s, rural normal schools were gradually standardised and their curriculum became assimilated to that of mainland France, focusing on Baccalauréat training. The number of students began to increase significantly. In Dabou, for instance, there were three times more students in the late 1940s than in the early 1960s.[26] Another change occurred a decade later, in the wake of the 1960 independences: the nationalisation of normal schools, together with the re-territorialisation of apprentice teacher recruitment. Among the young sovereign African states, those which had been previously equipped with teacher training infrastructures maintained a certain dynamic in terms of academic standards and the professionalisation of teaching. It was notably the case of Côte d'Ivoire, whose single normal school had over 300 resident students every year.

24 Gamble, Peasants of the Empire.

25 J.-H. Jézéquel, L'éthique sous les tropiques: réflexions sur la formation du bon enseignant dans la République coloniale, in: J.-F. Dupeyron (ed.), Éthique et déontologie dans l'Éducation nationale, Paris 2013, pp. 15–32, at pp. 15–17.

26 Dabou Fonds, Ledgers, 4 October 1962.

The Ambiguous Legacy of Dabou

After independence, Côte d'Ivoire found itself in a particular situation shared with no other former colony of FWA, except Senegal and Mali. As it had previously been equipped with large teacher training infrastructure functioning at full capacity, the young state was to reappropriate the whole institution, while dealing with an uneasy legacy, which stood for both the tradition of academic prestige and the trace of France's colonial presence. On the whole, this was representative of the Houphouët administration›s dilemma towards France. Côte d'Ivoire was at the same time a leading light for postcolonial panafricanism and yet the main architect of the "Françafrique system".[27] President Houphouët responded to this paradox with political pragmatism and calculated symbols of power (ambitious urban planning, academic programmes etc.) to demonstrate the state's ability to overcome the colonial model. Houphouet's strategy shall be kept in mind when addressing the issue of the memory of Dabou.

To date, in Ivorian society, the former normal school seems remembered as both a prestigious school, where a great number of Ivorian leaders were educated, and the place where the "good old" first primary teachers were trained to teach adapted rural curricula. Both memories are based on tangible facts. The generation of students who attended the normal school between the late 1950's to the early 1970s (that is to say roughly born between 1935 to 1955), experienced the Golden Age of Dabou, as it was the only place in the country that trained students for the *Baccalauréat*, while offering them direct employment as teachers and a chance to pursue higher education in universities abroad. Those circumstances account for the production of many national elites in a row. The current principal holds a list of notable alumni, including former President Henri Konan Bédié, former Ministers Charles Konan Banny, Laurent Dona Fologo, and Paul Akoto Yao. As for the other side of the memory, nowadays, in administrator's discourses, there seems to be some nostalgia for the training model and the professionalism of the *vieux maîtres* (good old teachers), whose action had consequences well into the second half of the twentieth century. It is specifically the case among those who attended primary school when the former rural teachers were still active, between the 1940s and the 1980s. They are the 1935–1955 generation mentioned above. A growing number of published memoirs testify their special attachment to the old teachers, see for instance *The Founders of Education in Côte d'Ivoire* (Les Bâtisseurs de l'enseignement en Côte d'Ivoire) by Touré Abdoulaye Jabali (1985).[28]

Somehow, both memories of Dabou seem deeply concatenated today, mistaking the tradition of rural training excellence for the prestige of the 1935–1955 alumni generation. However, it is not clear whether this confusion is due to the genuine degradation

27 According to Jean-Pierre Bat, the expression "Françafrique" was even coined by President Houphouët-Boigny himself (see J. Tilouine, Le Monde, 22 January 2015, https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2015/02/06/l-ombre-d-houphouet-boigny-plane-toujours-sur-la-cote-d-ivoire_4571219_3212.html).

28 T. A. Touré, Les Bâtisseurs de l'enseignement en Côte d'Ivoire, 1942–1958, Abidjan 1984.

of memory over time, or if it results from a political intent to repurpose the legacy of the former rural normal school. It is conceivable that the Houphouët administration might have purposely designed a political narrative (if not an etiological myth) on the origins and success of the Ivorian educational system, enhancing the legacy of the normal school of Dabou. This would be a way of symbolically combining the academic prestige of the rising elites of the regime, the celebration of the country's rural roots, as well as the long-lasting tradition of partnership with France. Though hypothetical, this point is yet to be clarified by consulting national press archives, especially those of *Fraternité Matin* looking for comments on the contemporaneous valorization of Dabou, for instance in 1975, when the normal school was officially reallocated as an elite high school.

4. Shaping the Postcolonial City around the Social Figures of Teachers

Another aspect of President Houphouët's postcolonial policy relied on urban planning. The goal was to come up with meaningful symbols of power for the young regime, while breaking away from the colonial city model, which implied race-based residential segregation. In Abidjan, for instance, except for intermediaries, Africans were expelled from the central Plateau quarter, which was the centre of government administration, reserved for colonists.[29] The colonial intermediaries stayed in the quarter called "Adjamé" in the North of the Plateau, and the other "indigènes" in the southern quarter of Treichville, geographically separated by the Ébrié Lagoon (see the map below).



Source : Antoine P. & Herry C., 1983 La population d'Abidjan dans ses murs : dynamique urbaine et évolution des structures démographiques entre 1955-1978

290 A. Mehretu / C. Mutambirwa, Cities of Sub-Saharan Africa, in: S. D. Brunn / J. F. Williams / D. J. Zeigler (eds.), Cities of the World: World Regional Urban Development. Lanham 2003, pp. 293–330.

In the wake of independence, as shown in Hashimshony-Yaffe's paper in the Momentous 60s conference,[30] the Houphouët administration launched an urban policy which consisted in erecting new places of power – such as the Presidential Palace in 1961 –, implementing major architectural projects to symbolize the State's modernity – such as the Houphouët-Boigny Bridge in 1957 –, as well as opening many new public schools, which were perceived as a most efficient medium for development. The commune of Cocody, Abidjan clearly illustrates such strategy. It encompasses the oldest three primary and pre-schools of the country, the elite suburb of *Cocody 2 Plateaux*, and many marketplaces and facilities. Koutia Lémon worked and lived there with his family since 1960. As attested by Koutia's private archives, together with oral sources and various testimonies on the microhistory of the neighbourhood, the schools' creation, and the neighbouring presence of the teachers' houses deeply impacted the growth of Cocody.

The Impact of the Creation of New Schools

Originally, Cocody was a small Akan village in the Northeast of Abidjan. It began to grow, as Abidjan was designated the colony's new capital in August 1933. In those years, Cocody merely included the Blohorn palm oil factory, a few villas near the main road to Bingerville, and many cassava and coffee plantations. The rest of the area was covered by forest. During the 1950s, in the context of strong urbanization due to the opening of the Autonomous Port of Abidjan (1951), which triggered massive sub-regional immigration, the population and amount of buildings increased exponentially. There were indeed six times more inhabitants in Abidjan in 1956 than in 1936.[31] The first three primary and preschools of the country were created in Cocody – *Cocody Est* (1960), *Chateau d'eau* (1961), and *Cocody Sud* (1965) – , under the supervision of principal Koutia Lémon, in this context of rapid urbanization and high demand for education.

Below is an aerial view of Cocody, Abidjan in 1960 (see next page). The photograph is available online on the website of the Town Hall of Cocody. It comes with the following caption: "The first infrastructures of Cocody in 1960. 160 buildings were designed to house Ivorian civil servants".[32] Among the 160 houses were those of the teaching staff of the three schools. They were built in a row of two-storey houses, equidistant from the primary and preschools.

30 N. Hashimshony-Yaffe / T. Abramovich, The Intense 1960's: Planning the independent State, paper to the Momentous 60s Conference, Ben Gurion University of the Negev, Israel, 6 January 2019.

31 See Unsigned Article, En soixante ans, la ville d'Abidjan est devenue une véritable métropole, in: Le Monde Diplomatique, Octobre 1959, Dossier Côte d'Ivoire, pp. 9–10.

32 See Historique de la Commune, 10 February 2020, <http://mairiecocody.com/historique/historique-de-la-commune/> (accessed 10 February 2020).



The creation of the schools and of the teachers' houses was pioneer in Cocody. It opened the way to the urban expansion of the commune. In his 1985 article, French geographer Philippe Haeringer analyzed how, since 1959, the *Société d'Urbanisme et de Construction de Côte d'Ivoire* (SUCCI) developed an ambitious urban plan for Cocody, aiming both to symbolically overcome the colonial city model and to boost the advancement of the emerging national elite. He described these buildings as a brand-new kind of fine autonomous urban planning:

> *A very modern architecture, quite sought after, which deversified the volumes and types of housing, from the courtyard apartment (therefore on the ground floor), to the upstairs apartment (a risky innovation at the time), via the "duplex apartments" in strips, is associated with a landscape research whose ingredients, in addition to pedestrian walkways, trees, lawns and playgrounds, include a fairly wide range of social facilities (school, maternity, etc.) or entertainment (market, shopping mall) as well as administrative services (police station, post office, etc.).*[33]

The urbanistic approach to this neighbourhood underlines how symbolic, modern and influential Cocody was meant to be right after independence.

Defining the Social Identity of Cocody

Not only did the construction of the schools and teachers' houses determined the urban planning of Cocody, but it also deeply impacted its socio-spatial identity. The popula-

33 P. Haeringer, Vingt-cinq ans de politiques urbaine à Abidjan ou la tentation de l'urbanisme intégral, in: Politique africaine (1985) 17, pp. 20–40, at 23.

tion of the whole commune was mostly composed of civil servants, including public teachers, executives of the PDCI-RDA single-party and other rich Africans, especially in the upper-class neighbourhood of *Cocody, 2 Plateaux*, near the schools. Those three schools became particularly attractive to the emerging elite of Abidjan, being the places to which most of them would send their children.[34] They served as showcases for the regime of Côte d'Ivoire's long-lasting president, Félix Houphouët-Boigny. Until the middle of the 1970s, the teaching staff was mostly composed of French *coopérants* (in 1964, for instance, 80% of the teaching staff in Cocody – Sud's EPP were French),[35] and classes were shared by black and white pupils, mainly the children of European *coopérants*. The coexistence of European and African students in the same classes implied high academic standards and the mutual recognition of curricula with France, to ensure that *coopérants*' children could benefit from the same quality of education as they would in their home country. In fact, it is hard to say whether the three schools became socially attractive because of their success, or particularly successful because of the privileged social background of their students.

Even African expatriates living in Abidjan used to send their children to those schools. For example, below is the registration file of Princess Anne de Berengo, one of Jean-Bedel Bokassa's daughters, who attended the school of Cocody-Est in 1981, as her parents fled from the Central African Republic. Funnily enough, the "father's name and occupation" sections were filled in as follow: "Bokassa I, Ex-Emperor".



REPUBLIQUE DE COTE D'IVOIRE

MINISTÈRE
DE L'ENSEIGNEMENT PRIMAIRE
ET DE LA TÉLÉVISION EDUCATIVE

FICHE SCOLAIRE

N° Matricule 3579

NOM Bokassa Prénoms Princesse Anne de Berengo
Né (e) le 2-11-76 à Bangui Sous-Préfecture de Bangui
Acte de naissance
ou jugement supplétif n° ..... délivré le ..... à .....

	Du père	De la mère	Du tuteur (en cas de décès du père)
Nom et prénoms	Bokassa 1er	Gabriella Iziamba	
Profession	Ex Empereur 1er		
Domicile	Cocody	Cocody	

Lien de parenté .....

ANNEE SCOLAIRE	1981-1982	19—-19—	19—-19—	19—-19—	19—-19—	19—-19—	19—-19—	19—-19—
Année de scolarité	1re	2e	3e	4e	5e	6e	7e	8e
Niveau du cours	CI							
Moyenne annuelle	3,85							
Classement	57e							
Effectif de la classe (ou du cours)	73							

34 M. Le Pape / C. Vidal, L'École à tout prix: strategies éducatives dans la petite bourgeoisie d'Abidjan, in: Actes de la recherché en sciences sociales (1987) 70, pp. 64–73.

35 "Coopérants" were foreign civil servants (mostly technicians, teachers, and private soldiers) seconded to overseas developing countries for international cooperation. Statistics held from the archives of South-Cocody's Primary and Preschool, 1964 registration book.

5. Conclusion

All in all, the careers of the first generation of Ivorian teachers were catalysed by independence, as the new sovereign administration needed to replace colonial staff with qualified nationals. At the eve of independence, there were only 5,080 qualified teachers in Côte d'Ivoire for the entire population. The administration was left no choice than to upskill the existing teachers and assign them to higher responsibilities. This phenomenon therefore resulted in the "Koutia Generation" of teachers being collectively leapfrogged from the status of "second class" rural teachers (that is to say trained to teach practice-based curricula) to pioneer actors of Houphouët's post-independence schools.

Their responsibilities were expanded, beyond teaching, to administration, policy implementation, teacher training as well as project supervision. This expansion of responsibilities was triggered by the postcolonial strategic policy of the Ivorian government to massively invest in education to foster social and economic development. This stimulated a huge demand for education and put pressure on the existing infrastructure and personnel available for this service. Consequently, the need to recruit and train new generations of teachers became of top-most priority to the administration, leading to the optimization of the teacher training system,[36] as well as skill transference from the "Koutia generation" to the new cohorts of teachers.

The quest for understanding the transition to the postcolonial educational system unveils the historical horizons of crosscutting themes of colonialism, agency, independence, nationalization, cooperation and interdependency between Francophone Africa and France. The approach of following the individual itineraries of the "Koutia generation" of teachers allows for the examination of colonial and postcolonial impacts under the following contexts: 1) local, 2) national, and 3) transnational. At the local level, the social (and socio-spatial) influence of teachers to the Ivorization agenda became a serious mandate to be delivered by all teachers at all community levels. This responsibility for inspiring, equipping, and rebuilding a new cadre of citizens for political, social, and economic empowerment fell on the shoulders of teachers, reinforcing their roles as architects of the future. At the national level, the definition of the ideal teacher and the theorization of the educational system became shaped. This was part of the strategic policy decisions made by the Houphouët administration prioritize education as a medium for development, resulting in investments in teacher training, educational infrastructure, massive school enrolment etc. At the transnational level, the interdependence between France and its former African colonies caused the transfiguration of France's relationship to Africa, as well as its own political ecosystem, administrative organisation of government through ministries, departments and agencies. It is worthy of note that the shift to the 5th French Republic, which is ongoing till date, originated the Algerian war.

36 J.-L. Koné, The Emergence of the National in Francophone West African Education. The case of the Rural Normal School of Dabou, Côte d'Ivoire (1937–1975), Abingdon 2020 (forthcoming).

The approach of documenting individual itineraries of Ivorian teachers produced significant discoveries in their social mobility. However, one limitation of this approach is the class discrimination in its subject of study. There is a high propensity to study African literates who possess the skills and habitus of producing and storing archives. This leaves a vacuum in the situated knowledge that could have been explored and captured were they documented and stored by a majority of other Africans who were neither educated nor appreciative of history.

FORUM

Religionsfreiheit und Säkularität – im Kontext von Seminaren und Tagungen

Helmut Goerlich

Maßstäbe, die erlauben, die Entwicklungslinien der Sicht der Religionsfreiheit in der jüngeren Literatur zu beurteilen, können aus einer distanzierten Sicht der Bedeutung der Religionsfreiheit in einer säkularen Verfassung und ihrem Gemeinwesen entwickelt werden.

Die Religionsfreiheit prägt zugleich auch die Säkularität des Gemeinwesens, wenn diese Säkularität für sich als maßgebliches Merkmal gesehen wird. Dann hat die Religionsfreiheit strukturelles Gewicht. Daher bedarf ein solches Gemeinwesen eines Religionsverfassungsrechts, um Religionen und Weltanschauungen nebeneinander beherbergen zu können. Anders war dies im konfessionellen Staat, der eine Religion oder Konfession einer Religion sozusagen als „Staatskirche" privilegierte und zu seiner Grundlage machte. In ihm diente die Religionsfreiheit vor allem und in der Regel als Instrument des Schutzes für die Minderheiten, die nicht Teil der Staatsreligion sind oder waren – gewissermaßen als Schutzschild gegenüber diesem Staat, der ein Staatskirchenrecht pflegte, um seine anerkannte Staatsreligion rechtlich zu fassen und vor allem ihr den öffentlichen Raum zu sichern, während die Minderheiten mehr oder weniger in den privaten Raum verwiesen wurden.

Das Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland kennt gemäß seines Art. 140 in Verbindung mit Art. 137 Abs. 1 der Weimarer Reichsverfassung von 1919 keine Staatskirche. Es hat das konfessionelle Zeitalter, wie zuvor schon die Weimarer Republik dank

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ihrer Verfassung für sich – nun durch das Grundgesetz erneuert und bekräftigt –, verabschiedet. Daher kann die Rechtsordnung unter dieser Verfassung nur dem Modell einer Religionsfreiheit folgen, wie sie in einem säkularen Gemeinwesen wirkt. Damit wird die Religionsfreiheit insoweit zum archimedischen Punkt seiner Ordnung. Denn sie soll ersichtlich allen – Religionen wie Weltanschauungen – gleichermaßen zur Seite stehen. Daraus folgt die These, dass Säkularität zur Steigerung der normativen Kraft der Religionsfreiheit beiträgt. Und umgekehrt: Religionsfreiheit führt letztlich in ein säkulares Gemeinwesen, da sie sich in ihm am besten in gleicher Freiheit im öffentlichen Raum für alle, die sie beanspruchen können, entfalten kann.[1] Säkular sind schließlich Verfassungen heute selbst dann, wenn sie zeitgeschichtlich bedingt in ihrer rechtlich nicht verbindlichen Präambel noch einen Gottesbezug enthalten.[2]

Der Wandel der Funktion der Religionsfreiheit wurde in den Verfassungsstaaten Europas erst nach und nach wahrgenommen. Dies lag daran, dass sich auch der Wandel vom konfessionellen zum säkularen Zeitalter dieser Verfassungsstaaten nur allmählich und anfangs eher unterschwellig vollzog. Deshalb spielte die internationale Ebene eine wirkmächtige Rolle in der Wahrnehmung dieser Veränderung. Dies zumal, nachdem der Europäische Gerichtshof für Menschenrechte zunehmend auch Einfluss auf die innerstaatliche Entwicklung der Konventionsstaaten der Europäischen Konvention zum Schutze der Menschenrechte und Grundfreiheiten von 1950 (EMRK) gewann. Dem vorausgegangen war zunächst 1948 die Allgemeine Erklärung der Menschenrechte, letztere noch ein rechtlich unverbindlicher Text, der aber auf die Gestaltung der EMRK erheblichen Einfluss hatte und am Anfang einer Entwicklung steht, die in den Menschenrechtspakte von 1966 keineswegs ein Ende gefunden hat.

Innerstaatlich wirkt diese Entwicklung in unterschiedlicher Weise auch dort, wo die Verfassung zunächst die Staatskirche nicht beseitigt hatte, also etwa in den skandinavischen Ländern und selbst in Großbritannien; soweit dort immer noch eine Staatskirche besteht, ist sie selbst immer häufiger bereit, der neuen Entfaltung der Religionsfreiheit auch in der Öffentlichkeit Raum zu überlassen. Ja, selbst in Frankreich, das seit 1905 den öffentlichen Raum von der Religionsausübung frei zu halten suchte, wandelt sich die *laicité* in eine *sécularité* ganz eigener Art, die allerdings noch nicht als solche bezeichnet wird, sondern offenbar unter dem bisherigen Begriff der *laicité* firmiert. Nichts anderes gilt auch für die Türkei, die damit zudem jenseits der rein völkerrechtlichen Verpflichtung aus dem Vertrag von Lausanne von 1923 dem Schutz der Religion näherkommt. So wird auch in der Türkei inzwischen neben demjenigen der Laizität der Begriff der Säkularität in der Diskussion herangezogen, der im englischen Sprachraum allein maßgeblich ist, da es in der englischen Sprache keine wörtliche Entsprechung zum Begriff der *laicité* – Laizität gibt. Selbst die französische Laizität respektiert indes zunehmend,

1 Früher dazu H. Goerlich, Säkularität – Religiosität – Egalität in einer nicht nur auf die Grenzen verfasster Rechte fixierten Perspektive, in: Denkströme. Journal der Sächsischen Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Leipzig, Heft 7 (2011), S. 33 ff.

2 Dazu eingehend H. Goerlich, Der Gottesbezug in Verfassungen (2004), jetzt in: ders., Zur zugewandten Säkularität – Beiträge auf dem Weg dahin, hg. v. M. Kotzur u. a., Berlin 2013, S. 47 ff.

dass alle Religion immer auch öffentlich stattfindet, zumal ihr Ansehen erst durch ihre Öffentlichkeit geprägt wird und ein säkularer Staat dies im Gegensatz zu verborgener konsoziativer Religiosität zu fördern geneigt sein wird. Der Staat bezieht sich dabei als säkularer Staat auf den öffentlichen Raum, den er gewährleistet. In diesem Raum sind religiöse Auffassungen und ihre Gemeinschaften gleichberechtigt und konkurrieren mit säkularen Sichtweisen und solchen Vereinigungen. So wird ein gewisser Pluralismus auch in Religionsangelegenheiten zur Grundlage dieser Säkularität – und zwar in Interpretation eines Gesetzes oder der verschiedenen französischen und türkischen Verfassungen des letzten Jahrhunderts. Ein solcher Pluralismus ist selbst dort jetzt schon oft berufene Tradition, wo eine stabile und überaus selbstbewusste Mehrheit das Feld beherrscht und manchmal zu diskriminierenden Hoheitsakten neigt, wie etwa in Indien, dessen nationale Verfassung von 1950 eine rechtsverbindliche und insoweit darüber hinaus unabänderliche Klausel in ihrer Präambel enthält, die diesen Verfassungsstaat als *secular republic* bezeichnet. Semisäkulare Verfassungsordnungen wie diejenigen Israels und Indonesiens lassen erkennen, dass auch sie Konflikte durch jedenfalls eine gewisse Anerkennung von Vielfalt zu lösen suchen. „Semisäkular" sind sie, da sie entweder ganze Rechtsbereiche dem religiösen Recht ohne die in die Verfassung aufgenommene Absicht künftiger staatlicher Gesetzgebung überlassen wie im Falle Israels oder aber eine abstrahierte Form der Gläubigkeit in die Grundordnung ihrer Verfassung aufnehmen, wie dies in Indonesien mit der Aufnahme der Gottgläubigkeit geschehen ist.

I.

Im Licht der heutigen Wirkungen der Religionsfreiheit seit 1948 ist das knappe Buch „Regulierungen der Religionsfreiheit" von *Hans G. Kippenberg*[3] von Interesse. Er ist Religionswissenschaftler und Soziologe, nicht Jurist. Der für den Fachjuristen etwas befremdliche Titel des Buches – er scheint vorauszusetzen, dass man ein Freiheitsrecht „regulieren" kann – erfasst die Veränderung, die die Funktionsweise der Religionsfreiheit durchlaufen hat, nicht. Dies tut das Buch aber in der Sache. Der Untertitel deutet diesen Weg nicht an. Dennoch weist die internationale Ebene auf innerstaatliche Entwicklungen hin. Diese Ebene war schließlich Ausgangspunkt und Anknüpfung für die innerstaatlichen Veränderungen. Daher ist auf sie mit Hilfe des Buches hinzuführen, das aus Seminaren an der *Jakobs Universität* in Bremen heraus entstanden ist.
Kippenberg berichtet in einer Einleitung zunächst. Religion erscheint dem Soziologen einerseits als Konstrukt ihrer Vorstellungen, andererseits als soziale Realität. Auf der europäischen Bühne sieht er unterschiedliche Funktionsweisen der Religionsfreiheit; einerseits nämlich diese Freiheit als Garant des privaten Vollzugs von Religion, andererseits diese Freiheit als Basis der öffentlichen Ausübung von Religion. Der spätere National-

3 Vgl. H. G. Kippenberg, Regulierungen der Religionsfreiheit. Von der Allgemeinen Erklärung der Menschenrechte zu den Urteilen des Europäischen Gerichtshofes für Menschenrechte, Baden-Baden 2019.

staat unternahm die Privatisierung und Entpolitisierung von Religion insgesamt, sei es durch ihre Erhebung zur Staatsreligion im Wege einer Konfessionalisierung des Staates, sei es durch ihre Abdrängung in einen mehr oder minder ausgestatteten Minderheitenstatus, was andere Varianten angeht. Der moderne säkulare Staat gewährt hingegen den Religionen insgesamt Öffentlichkeit. Der heutige Staat reguliert nach *Kippenberg* die Religionsfreiheit ebenso, wie er Marktfreiheiten Regeln unterwirft. Zu diesen Regeln gehört die freie Wahl der Religion, also eine deutliche Austritts- und eine transparente Zugangsfreiheit. Darüber hinaus drängt er unerwünschte Effekte von Religion zurück, also etwa Proselytismus und Intoleranz. Jenseits dieser elementaren Regeln orchestriert der Staat religiöses Verhalten – teils selbst, teils mit Hilfe internationaler Organisationen – durch Beteiligung, Mitwirkung, Delegation und Internationalisierung als Elementen mittelbarer Steuerung. Dadurch werden zugleich Normen durchgesetzt und zwar auf weiche Weise, teils durch intermediäre Gruppen, Akteure, Funktionsträger und Gremien. Das geschieht etwa mit Hilfe der Vereinten Nationen, der Europäischen Union oder des Europarats, nicht zuletzt durch dessen Gerichtshof zum Schutze der Menschenrechte und Grundfreiheiten, der in Auslegung von Garantien der EMRK Normen erzeugt, die in den Konventionsstaaten berücksichtigt und zunehmend anerkannt werden. Regulierung im Sinne des Buchtitels meint diese Mechanismen, die sich rechtlich als Vorgänge der Auslegung, Einschränkung und Anwendung von Rechtsgarantien darstellen.[4]

Dann setzt der Band nicht etwa mit den historischen Vorläufern der Religionsfreiheit im 17. Jahrhundert, darunter insbesondere *Roger Williams*, ein,[5] sondern mit den Erklärungen von Menschenrechten von 1776 in Virginia und 1789 in Frankreich. Das führt sodann über Erläuterungen des Wandels der Religionsfreiheit von einer Pflicht des Staates zu einem unantastbaren Menschenrecht in das 19. Jahrhundert und die in diesem zunächst noch überwiegend rein völkerrechtlich an die Staaten gerichteten Verpflichtungen zum Schutz der Religion. Für diese Zeit, die bis nach 1945 nachwirkte, zeigen das Beispiele. Man findet Bezüge auf elementare Menschenrechte eher versteckt. So etwa ist dies deutlich, wenn im Rahmen der Dreyfus-Affäre in Frankreich Staatsräson und Vernunft den Zugriff auf die Person des Bürgers verbieten sollen, nicht etwa ein Menschenrecht. Trotz der menschenrechtlich motivierten „Trennung" von Staat und Religion werden Schüler in den Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika und ihren Gliedstaaten gemäß dem täglich zu leistenden Treueid in der Schule auf ein Leben „*under God*" verpflichtet; und die dortige Wissenschaft hatte sich der Schöpfungsgeschichte zu fügen, andernfalls durfte man sie nicht lehren. Eine fatale Rolle spielte dabei zugleich immer auch die Ablehnung der Menschenrechtstradition seitens der katholischen Kirche bis

4 Hier verweist Kippenberg erstmals auf den umfangreichen Anhang des Buches, der die einschlägigen völkerrechtlichen Schutzklauseln und freiheitlichen Garantien der Religionsrechte in englischer Sprache wiedergibt.

5 Zu diesem Autor und den „Stiefkindern der Reformation": H. Dreier, Zur Bedeutung der Reformation bei der Formierung des säkularen Staates, in: M. Reichel u. a. (Hrsg.), Reformation und Politik, Halle/Saale 2015, S. 301 (332 ff.); als Quellenband mit einem Abdruck eines Auszugs von R. Williams' Hauptschrift siehe A. S. P. Woodhouse (ed.), Puritanism and Liberty. Being the Army Debates (1647-9) from the Clarke Mss. with Supplementary Documents (1938), 2. Aufl., Chicago 1974, S. 266 ff.

Anfang der 1960er-Jahre, neben der Fortführung der monarchistischen Tradition des religiös gebundenen Konfessionsstaates in Zentraleuropa. Bis 1918 und noch eine Generation darüber hinaus blieb der Schutz der Religion Sache der vertraglichen Pflichtigkeit dieser Staaten und wurde daher oft zum Spielball der Außenpolitik. Daneben blieben Instrumente der Machtpolitik des Nationalstaates virulent, bis hin zum sogenannten Bevölkerungsaustausch und zum „*ethnic cleansing*", die erst seit 1945 endgültig als rechtswidrig angesehen werden.

Die Religionsfreiheit wurde erst mit der Gründung der Vereinten Nationen Thema rechtlicher Neugestaltung. Der Gehalt der Religionsfreiheit veränderte sich. Es wurde nicht mehr zwischen Mehrheits- und Minderheitsreligion, zwischen Staatsreligion und geduldeten Religionsgemeinschaften unterschieden. Der Religionsbegriff weitete sich, es blieb aber bei Anforderungen der Ernsthaftigkeit, der Seriosität, Konsistenz und Bedeutung im Sinne eines universalen Deutungsmusters für den Menschen in der Welt, mithin aber auch in einer gewissen Öffnung zur bloßen „Weltanschauung". Hinzu trat nunmehr außerdem der freie Religionswechsel, obwohl nahezu alle großen Religionen ihn bis dahin verweigerten. Er ist noch keineswegs durchgesetzt, und zwar in ganz unterschiedlichen kulturell-religiösen Zusammenhängen. Verrechtlicht wurden schließlich 1966/73 auch Garantien der öffentlichen Bekundung von Religion. Der Nationalstaat wurde zum Garanten einer so verstandenen weiten Religionsfreiheit, wie *Kippenberg* im Einzelnen anhand der UN-Pakte von 1966 darstellt. Der Nationalstaat ist damit auch gezwungen, seine innerstaatliche Ordnung diesen Anforderungen anzupassen. Zudem wurden Verfahren und Klagen zum Schutze der Religionsfreiheit vor internationalen Kommissionen und Gerichtshöfen möglich. Während zugleich die Staatskirchen, also vor allem das offizielle Christentum, an Bedeutung verloren, trat an Stelle des alten, unauflöslichen Bündnisses zwischen Thron und Altar eine offene Partnerschaft zwischen dem säkularen demokratischen Staat und jedenfalls christlichen Gemeinschaften, wie man in Europa beobachten kann. Dieser Staat sucht solche Beziehungen auch mit anderen Religionen zu erzielen, etwa mit dem Islam in Frankreich und in Deutschland, wie man anmerken muss.

Auf dieser Grundlage aufbauend erörtert das Buch sodann einzelne Bereiche der Anwendung ihrer Ergebnisse im Grundsätzlichen, also – zunächst ausgehend von den UN – etwa das Problem einer konsequenten Nichtdiskriminierung hin zu einem Konzept gemeinschaftlicher Religionsrechte, einer Erweiterung des Rechts religiöser Gemeinschaften auf der Basis der UN-Erklärung über die Beseitigung aller Formen von Intoleranz und Diskriminierung von 1981, bis hinein in Praxisfelder und die säkulare Öffentlichkeit als Aktionsebene und schließlich zur religiösen Hassrede als Gewalt-Handlung. Auch der hybride Charakter religiös fundierter NGOs der UN wird ebenso erörtert wie die Religionsfreiheit im Dienste der Außenpolitik der USA, die sie zur Ideologie verwandelt. In einer Zusammenfassung werden sodann so gewonnene universale Standards mit lokalen Praktiken konfrontiert. Nach dieser weltweiten Perspektive nimmt die Untersuchung den europäischen Faden wieder auf und diskutiert die Judikatur des Gerichtshofs in Straßburg zur EMRK, zunächst geleitet vom geschriebenen Normbestand, dann an

Hand von exemplarischen Urteilen, auch im Licht des weiten Ermessensspielraums der Konventionsstaaten, der Schrankenformel der EMRK selbst – die dieses Recht begrenzt – und schließlich der Rechte von autonomen religiösen Organisationen, die religiöse Pluralität als Folge der Rechtsnorm einfordern, sodann zu christlichen Symbolen in der Schule und zu islamischen Praktiken in der Öffentlichkeit sowie letztlich zur, auch im Licht der Meinungsfreiheit anderer zu fassenden, Blasphemie als Schutztatbestand einer Religion, um am Ende eine Dialektik der Religionsregulierungen zu entwickeln, die sich aus neuen Widersprüchen der nachgezeichneten und in ihrer Entwicklung auf neuen Pfaden unumkehrbaren Rechtsfortbildungsprozesse ergibt – trotz aller Defizite der Durchsetzung des neuen Rechts der Religionsfreiheit.

II.

Viel bescheidener setzt der anzuzeigende Tagungsband aus Luzern ein.[6] Das liegt schon daran, dass er von einer spezifischen nationalen religionsverfassungsrechtlichen Ordnung aus aufgebaut ist und als Vergleichsebene eine verwandte europäische Ordnung dieser Art heranzieht, bevor er in die Ferne schaut. Diese Ferne allerdings, die am Ende des Bandes durch einen Beitrag von *H. Bielefeldt* , heute Hochschullehrer in Erlangen, repräsentiert wird, rückt sehr nah, wenn man all die Menschenrechtsverletzungen und ihre religiösen Aspekte als Teil menschlichen Lebens vor sich sieht, von denen dort berichtet wird. Die vorausgehenden Beiträge sind demgegenüber im Garten des Menschlichen der eher saturierten und vor allem auch reichen Gesellschaften mit ihren beherrschbaren Problemen befasst.

Allerdings setzt der Band ganz aus der nationalen Perspektive der Schweiz mit einem Beitrag von *J. Hänni* ein, Assistenzprofessorin für Öffentliches Recht, Europarecht und Rechtsphilosophie sowie Co-Direktorin des Instituts für Religionsverfassungsrecht an der Universität Luzern, zur Glaubens- und Gewissensfreiheit gemäß Art. 15 der schweizerischen Bundesverfassung. Darauf folgt der Text eines zweiten Referats, hier von *S. Heselhaus*, Lehrstuhl für Völkerrecht, Europarecht, Öffentliches Recht und Rechtsvergleichung in Luzern, einem weiteren Herausgeber des Bandes, zur Religionsfreiheit nach Art. 9 EMRK als Rahmen von aktuellen Rechtsfragen in der Schweiz. Dann folgen Beiträge zu einzelnen Fragen, so von *A. Kühler*, Oberassistentin und Habilitandin in Zürich, zur Religionsfreiheit als Herausforderung am Beispiel der sogenannten Handschlagaffäre in der Schweiz, bei der es darum ging, dass Schüler, die einer bestimmten Religion angehörten, der Lehrerin den in der Schweiz allgemein üblichen persönlichen Handschlag verweigerten. Darauf findet man einen Text von *P. Karlen*, Bundesrichter in Lausanne, zum offenen Religionsbegriff im säkularen Staat, sodann einen von *D. Buser*, Titularprofessorin für kantonales Staatsrecht an der Universität Basel, zur Frage, ob Reli-

6 J. Hänni / S. Heselhaus / A. Loretan (Hrsg.), Religionsfreiheit im säkularen Staat. Aktuelle Auslegungsfragen in der Schweiz, in Deutschland und weltweit, Baden-Baden / Zürich / St. Gallen 2019, 210 S.

gionsgemeinschaften Frauen beim Zugang zu religiösen Ämtern diskriminieren dürfen. Darauf folgt aus deutscher Sicht *P. Unruh*, Präsident eines Landeskirchenamtes und apl. Professor in Göttingen, mit seinem Beitrag zu Grundlagen und aktuellen Problemen der Religionsfreiheit in Deutschland. Anschließt aus nun weniger juristischer Perspektive *A. Liedhegener*, Professor für Politik und Religion am Zentrum Religion – Wirtschaft – Politik in Luzern, mit seinem Beitrag zu „Religionspolitik in der Schweiz. Bund – Kanton – Gemeinde seit 1990" und schließlich *A. Loretan*, Kanonist und Theologe sowie Co-Leiter des Zentrums für Religionsverfassungsrecht in Luzern und dritter Herausgeber des Bandes, zur Frage von Grundrechten innerhalb von Religionsgemeinschaften – oder Individuum contra Kollektiv, wie er das nennt.

Die Beiträge sind regelmäßig mit aktuellen Fall-Konstellationen befasst. Sehr häufig spielen heute Diskriminierungsverbote eine Rolle, die traditionelle Privilegien in Frage stellen. Dass dabei nicht immer diese Verbote Oberhand gewinnen, das versteht sich von selbst. Auf der anderen Seite sind die traditionellen Bastionen bisheriger Selbstverständlichkeiten nicht mehr ein sicherer Hort gegen eine kritische Prüfung. Im Ganzen zeigt sich, dass schließlich auch etablierte Dogmen von Angehörigen der betreffenden Religionsgemeinschaft hinterfragt werden. Umso fragwürdiger wird es, Probleme zu verschweigen und nur herkömmliche Linien der rechten juristischen Lehre nachzuzeichnen. Damit wird man auf Dauer nicht mehr juristisch Land gewinnen.

III.

Gemäß der Entwicklung vom Staatskirchenrecht hin zu einem für alle Religionen offenen Religionsverfassungsrecht stellt sich der letzte hier vorzustellende Band der Grundfrage, ob dieser Weg in einer gegenseitigen Gleichgültig- oder Erwartungslosigkeit von „Staat" und „Religionen" mündet.[7] Dieser Titel, der gewiss die Realität der wechselseitigen Perspektiven kaum spiegelt, ist wohl eher provokativ gemeint. Auch er diente als Rahmen einer Tagung aus Anlass eines Jubiläums des Instituts für Theologie und Sozialethik in Darmstadt, deren Beiträge in dem Band versammelt sind.

Diese Beiträge sind in vier verschiedenen, schon in den Überschriften vielsagenden Abschnitten untergebracht; der erste handelt von der Nachkriegssituation und von dem Wandel, den der Wechsel von der Bonner zur Berliner Republik unter ein und derselben Verfassung mit sich gebracht haben könnte, in einem Wechselspiel von Distanz, Akzeptanz und Über-Legitimation. Es folgen im zweiten Abschnitt „Selbstverständigungsbemühungen" der christlichen Kirchen, dann der dritte Untertitel mit den Überschrift „Einweisung in die Indifferenz? Religionsverfassungsrecht und Religionspolitik in nachchristentümlicher Zeit" und schließlich als letzter Abschnitt schlicht unter der

7 Vgl. H.-J. Kracht / G. Schreiber (Hrsg.), Wechselseitige Erwartungslosigkeit? Die Kirchen und der Staat des Grundgesetzes – Gestern, Heute, Morgen, Berlin / Boston 2019.

Überschrift „Die Kirchen und der säkulare Staat – Ausblicke zu einem spannungsreichen Verhältnis".

Dabei fällt zunächst auf, dass es stets vor allem um Kirchen, nicht um andere Religionsgemeinschaften zu gehen scheint, also in einer Art Nabelschau der bisherigen Volkskirchen, denen viele Selbstverständlichkeiten entgleiten. Das würde doch etwas erstaunen, mag aber Programm gewesen sein, wiewohl sich in den einzelnen Beiträgen zeigt, dass die zunehmende Präsenz weiterer Gruppen, Religionen und Gemeinschaften gar nicht mehr ausgeblendet werden kann, nicht zu schweigen von der großen Gruppe der areligiös-konfessionslosen Landsleute in Ost und West. Der Band selbst wirbt für sich allerdings in den Perspektiven des Wandels des Verhältnisses von Staat und Kirchen, von der nach 1945 latent im Raum stehenden „Rechristianisierung" bis hin zu den „Säkularisierungsschüben" der Berliner Republik nach 1989. Er fragt von einer interdisziplinären Warte aus, was Staat und Kirchen unter demselben Grundgesetz heute voneinander erwarten und erwarten können.

Ausgehend von der Bikonfessionalität der Nachkriegszeit in Westdeutschland wird zunächst der Weg der beiden früheren Großkirchen hin zur Demokratie des Grundgesetzes nachgezeichnet. Nach einer Einführung in die anfangs gegebene Distanz der Kirchen zum Grundgesetz, die nahezu in eine Enttäuschung mündete – dazu *C. Dipper*, früher Historiker in Darmstadt –, legen nach Konfession getrennt verschiedene Autoren die Ausgangspositionen dar; so auch *K. Buchna* von der Theodor-Heuss-Stiftung für die evangelischen Kirchen samt ihrem Bevollmächtigten in Bonn, Bischof *Kunst*, in seiner Sonderrolle und *A. v. Scheliha*, ev. Ethiker in Münster, für die ev. Theologie und den Protestantismus mit besonderem Bezug auf Ausnahmeerscheinungen wie *E. Wolf* und *H. Gollwitzer*; dann folgen für die katholische Seite *C. Kösters* von der Kommission für Zeitgeschichte in Bonn, für das katholische Büro von 1948-1965 mit dem Pendant, Prälat *Böhler*, sowie *K. Große Kracht*, vom einschlägigen Exzellenzcluster in Münster, zur Positionierung der katholischen Laien. Sodann folgen in einer weiteren Phase des Verhältnisses zum Staat – wiederum in konfessioneller *itio in partes* – Beiträge von *G. Schreiber* und *H.-J. Kracht*, also den Mitherausgebern und Veranstaltern, zu den allmählichen Annäherungen an den Staat des Grundgesetzes. Darauf folgt ein juristischer Abschnitt zur Fortführung des Staatskirchenrechts aus unterschiedlichen Perspektiven, einmal von dem oben schon erwähnten Praktiker und erfolgreichen Lehrbuchautor *P. Unruh* auch mit Blick auf den Einfluss des Rechts der EU, dann von dem früheren Richter und stets konsequenten Autor *G. Czermak* zu sensiblen Bereichen der Religions- und Weltanschauungsfreiheit auch jenseits der beiden Konfessionen, wobei er das geltende Staatskirchenrecht durchweg ohne Rücksicht auf offenere Entwicklungslinien kritisiert und oft mit dem Bann der Verfassungswidrigkeit belegt. Dem schließt sich ein Beitrag von *S. Korioth*, einem führenden Kopf des Gebiets, an, der hier die These von der Indifferenz von Staat und Kirchen hinterfragt; er nutzt dafür die Stichworte Religion als öffentliche Angelegenheit, institutioneller Diskurs und inhaltliche Verbindung, Präsenz neben Gleichgültigkeit, rechtliche Gewährleistungen in den Flanken, ihre Entwicklungsoffenheit und fortwährender Dialog statt wechselseitiger Indifferenz. *Korioth*

tritt also gegen den provokanten Buchtitel an. Zum Schluss liefert *J. Hahn*, katholische Kirchenrechtlerin in Bochum, Thesen dazu, weshalb Berlin religionsverfassungsrechtlich nicht Bonn sei. Ein letzter großer Abschnitt widmet sich der Perspektive der Kirchen im säkularen Staat, so wie er sich heute darstellt. *M. Haus*, Politologe in Heidelberg, schreibt zu den Motiven einer Neudeutung des demokratischen Projekts im Lichte des Themas des Bandes; dann tragen *C. Albrecht,* Homiletiker und Medienmann, sowie *R. Anselm*, Systematiker und Ethiker, beide in München, zu einem Programm eines öffentlichen Protestantismus in Gesellschaft und Politik aus evangelischer Sicht bei; darauf folgt aus katholischer Sicht *G. Essen*, Dogmatiker und Historiker in Bochum, mit dem Thema seiner Kirche in ihrem Verhältnis zum liberal-demokratischen Verfassungsstaat, das er als eine ungeklärte Beziehung ohne Zukunftsperspektive sieht. Als Schlussstein findet man *H. Dreier*, Rechtsphilosoph und Staatsrechtler in Würzburg, mit seinen Beitrag „Religion im Grundgesetz – Integrationsfaktor oder Konfliktherd?" Eine seiner jüngeren Veröffentlichungen hatte sozusagen ein Programm auf der Basis des geltenden Rechts vorgezeichnet.[8] Für die Zukunft des Religionsverfassungsrechts stellt er fünf Elemente in den Vordergrund, nämlich Gleichheit für alle Religionen, Flexibilisierung der bisherigen staatskirchenrechtlichen Instrumente, erforderlichenfalls – was in jüngerer Zeit sichtbar wurde – durch den Gebrauch gefahrenabwehrrechtlicher Mittel gegenüber religiös auftretenden radikalen Gruppen, Freiheit des gesamtgesellschaftlichen Diskurses und schließlich strikte Neutralität des dank seiner Verfassung säkularen Staates.
Insgesamt ist damit der Bogen einer Entwicklung gespannt, die mehr und mehr auf der Religions- und Weltanschauungsfreiheit aufbaut, Diskriminierungsverbote respektiert und Modalitäten der Neutralität des Staates unter einer normativen säkularen Verfassung ernst nimmt. Die anfangs angedeutete Entwicklung bestätigt sich. Es handelt sich jedoch um einen Prozess auf dem Weg eines „fragilen Rechts" der religiösen Freiheit (*T. Gutmann*), die als „gleiche Freiheit" auf ihre rechtliche Entfaltung angewiesen ist. Das macht dieser Tagungsband deutlich. Er erweist sich dabei als ein Buch, das mehr als eine bloße Dokumentation darstellt.

IV.

Blickt man auf die drei hier angezeigten Veröffentlichungen zurück, so zeigt sich auch, wie lange große Religionsverbände ebenso wie die Staaten, die doch einer offenen Gesellschaft dienen, verhaftet blieben in ihren traditionellen Vorstellungen. Schon deshalb kann sich die Rechtsfortbildung nur allmählich vollziehen. Die institutionellen Elemente der Freiheitsgewährleistung standen daher lange im Vordergrund. Sie sind weiterhin notwendig, müssen aber, soll das normative Ziel gleicher Freiheit wirklich werden, auch Minderheiten zur Verfügung stehen. Die Gewissens-, Glaubens-, Religions- und Welt-

8 Vgl. H. Dreier, Staat ohne Gott. Religion in der säkularen Moderne, München 2018; dazu die Rezension H. Goerlich, Deutsches Verwaltungsblatt 2019, S. 99 ff.

anschauungsfreiheit der Person geht damit einher. Die normative Kraft der Säkularität des modernen Verfassungsrechts ist dafür eine notwendige Voraussetzung. Dies ist der Grund, weshalb selbst im Staatskirchentum verharrende Ordnungen einen Weg darzustellen suchen, dass sie keinen Glauben mehr zurücksetzen – so etwa im Sinne der Erwägung, dass der künftige britische Monarch nicht mehr den Ehrentitel *Defender of the Faith* führen solle, sondern dieser der heutigen, wie bisher weithin ungeschriebenen, Verfassung anzupassen, also etwa als *Defender of Faiths* zu fassen sei – ein Gehalt, der in der lateinischen Fassung bisher nicht zum Ausdruck kam, der aber selbst in der tradierten englischen Version schon im Commonwealth angesichts der religiösen Vielfalt fragwürdig erscheinen musste und sich allenfalls auf das frühere Mutterland beziehen konnte. Damit hätte die Monarchie den Vorzug, ähnlich dem *Common Law* eher säkular[9] zu erscheinen – ein Recht, dessen Juristen immer schon nicht im römischen und nicht im kanonischen Recht ausgebildet sein mussten.[10]

9 Zur Säkularität des Common Law: H. J. Berman, Law and Revolution. The Formation of the Western Legal Tradition, Cambridge / London 1983, S. 275 ff., 440 ff.

10 Vgl. U. Kischel, Rechtsvergleichung, München 2015, S. 297 ff.; H. P. Glenn, Legal Traditions of the World, 5. Aufl., Oxford 2014, S. 240 u. passim.

REZENSIONEN

Boris B. Gorshkov: Peasants in Russia from Serfdom to Stalin. Accommodation, Survival, Resistance (The Bloomsbury History of Modern Russia Series), London: Bloomsbury Academic 2018, 236 pp.

Rezensiert von
Katja Bruisch, Dublin

Die Geschichte Russlands ist nicht zuletzt die Geschichte von hunderten Millionen von Bauern, die offiziellen Statistiken zufolge bis in das 20. Jahrhundert die dominierende Bevölkerungsgruppe des Landes bildeten. Um diesem Umstand Rechnung zu tragen, widmet sich Boris Gorshkov in seinem Überblickswerk den Lebenswelten, Anpassungsstrategien und Widerstandsformen der bäuerlichen Bevölkerung von den Anfängen der Leibeigenschaft bis zur Kollektivierung. Sein Hauptanliegen besteht darin, die Bauern als historische Akteure zu würdigen, die sozialen, ökonomischen und politischen Wandel aktiv gestalteten, bis die Politik der Bolschewiki ihre mitunter mühsam erkämpften Handlungsspielräume gewaltsam einschränkte. Das Buch richtet sich explizit an ein studentisches Lesepublikum und ist übersichtlich in 13 kurze Kapitel gegliedert. Fußnoten werden sparsam eingesetzt. Stattdessen enthält jedes Kapitel eine Liste mit einigen einschlägigen Titeln und ermöglicht Lesern ohne Spezialwissen einen einfachen Einstieg in das Thema.

Gorshkov möchte gegen das Bild von den Bauern als einer in sich geschlossenen sozialen Gruppe anschreiben, deren kollektivistische und fortschrittsfeindliche Mentalität die Entwicklung Russlands behinderte. Stattdessen, so argumentiert Gorshkov, bildete die bäuerliche Bevölkerung den eigentlichen Motor jenes wirtschaftlichen und sozialen Wandels, der das Wachstum von Industrie, Landwirtschaft und Städten ermöglichte. Anhand zahlreicher Beispiele verweist der Autor auf die Vielfalt der Lebens- und Wirtschaftsweisen sowie die soziale und geographische Mobilität der Bauern und zeigt, dass Erfindergeist, Unternehmerwillen und ein erklärter Wille zur gesellschaftlichen Mitbestimmung bereits lange vor dem Ende der Leibeigenschaft fest in der bäuerlichen Kultur verankert waren. In der späten Zarenzeit hätten Bauern in den lokalen Selbstverwaltungen und der Politik neu entstehende Spielräume aktiv zur Artikulierung eigener Interessen genutzt, auch wenn sie in der Lokalverwaltung oder der Duma letztlich immer unterrepräsentiert

blieben. Die sowjetische Politik habe diese Selbstbestimmungsmöglichkeiten dann systematisch eingeschränkt, bis die gewaltsame Zerstörung bäuerlicher Wirtschaftsformen und Lebenswelten während der dramatischen Jahre der Kollektivierung schließlich den Niedergang der russischen Bauern besiegelten.

Gorshkovs Buch erzählt die Geschichte einer sukzessiven bäuerlichen Selbstbefreiung, auf die nach der Revolution von 1917 die Dominierung der Bauern durch den sowjetischen Staat folgte. Die Ausführungen zur Rolle der Saisonarbeit, zum Handwerk und zum gesellschaftlichen Engagement präsentieren die ländliche Bevölkerung als marktorientierte, rational handelnde und vorausschauende Akteure. Entsprechend beschreibt das Buch die Aufhebung der Leibeigenschaft nicht als einen politischen Bruch, sondern als Ergebnis eines längerfristigen Prozesses, in dessen Verlauf die Bauern die Neudefinierung ihrer gesellschaftlichen und ökonomischen Stellung einforderten und ihre Handlungsmöglichkeiten (z. B. in Bezug auf die Freizügigkeit) erfolgreich ausweiteten. Während diese Interpretation eine wichtige Ergänzung zu top-down Narrativen über das Ende der Leibeigenschaft darstellt, so scheint es, als würde der Autor in den Kapiteln über die Zeit vor 1917 die Handlungsmöglichkeiten der Bauern über- und den Einfluss der Eliten unterbewerten: Die staatliche Durchdringung ländlicher Räume während des 19. Jahrhunderts findet in dieser Interpretation ebenso wenig Platz wie Elitendiskurse, die in Form von Gesetzen, Steuern oder auch der wachsenden Bedeutung von Beamten und Agrarexperten die Realität der Dörfer prägten. Die Darstellung vernachlässigt zudem, dass bäuerliches Handeln immer in einen imperialen Kontext eingebettet war. Angesichts der ethnischen und religiösen Vielfalt des Russländischen Reichs irritiert zum einem die Engführung auf die russisch-orthodoxen Bauern. Zum anderen vermeidet das Buch eine systematische Auseinandersetzung mit dem Umstand, dass russisch-orthodoxe Bauern in den Steppenregionen und in Sibirien aktiv in die Konsolidierung des imperialen Raums involviert waren. Sie trugen damit nicht nur zur Verdrängung nomadischer Lebensweisen bei, sondern veränderten auch die Landschaften dieser Regionen. Die leicht verklärende Sicht auf die Zeit vor 1917 erklärt sich somit auch dadurch, dass das Buch die Bedeutung des Imperiums als Ermöglichungsraum für die Bauern weitgehend unbeachtet lässt.

Gorshkov charakterisiert die zentralen Phasen in der Geschichte der russischen Bauern mit den Begriffen der „bäuerlichen Ökologie“ und der „Realpolitik“. Während das Konzept der „bäuerlichen Ökologie“ auf die Interdependenzen zwischen Bauern und ihrer natürlichen, geographischen und sozialen Umwelt abhebt, steht „Realpolitik“ für die sowjetischen Maßnahmen zur Kontrolle der bäuerlichen Bevölkerung. Beide Begriffe sind nicht ganz unproblematisch. Zwar erwähnt Gorshkov, dass die Bauern ihre landwirtschaftlichen Praktiken dank ihres reichen Erfahrungswissens auf die jeweilige Umgebung abstimmten. Von hier auf eine „bäuerliche ökologische Mentalität“ (S. 9) zu schließen, wirkt jedoch etwas anachronistisch. Zudem ist der Begriff der „Realpolitik“ in seiner hiesigen Verwendung etwas irreführend. Spätestens seit Beginn der Kollektivierungskampagne ging es der

sowjetischen Führung nicht mehr um ein pragmatisches („realpolitisches") Arrangement mit den Bauern, sondern um die Transformation des Dorfes zur Mobilisierung der Ressourcen für die übergeordneten Ziele des Staates. Das methodische Gerüst dieser Darstellung ist damit wenig hilfreich, um den historischen Wandel bäuerlicher Lebenswelten zu erklären. Vielmehr spiegelt es den Perspektivwechsel des Autors, der staatliches Handeln in den Kapiteln zur vorrevolutionären Zeit weitgehend ausklammert, sich dem Zeitraum vom Bürgerkrieg bis zur Kollektivierung jedoch fast ausschließlich durch das Prisma der staatlichen Politik zuwendet.

Abgesehen von diesen Einwänden wirft die Aufmachung des Buches Fragen auf. Auffällig ist insbesondere die unkritische Verwendung von visuellen Quellen aus der bildenden Kunst oder der Fotographie. So sucht man vergeblich nach Angaben zu den Künstlern oder Fotographen, dem Entstehungsjahr und -ort oder dem Publikations- bzw. Aufbewahrungsort der verwendeten Bildquellen. Dies ist beileibe kein triviales Problem: Wie kann dieser als Lehrbuch deklarierte Text an eine kritische Geschichtsschreibung heranführen, wenn grundlegende Regeln für den Umgang mit historischen Quellen verletzt werden? Etwas unglücklich ist auch die Auswahl des Titelbilds. In sozialistisch realistischer Manier zeigt das auf das Jahr 1950 datierte Gemälde (der Künstler Andrej Myl'nikov wird nicht genannt) strahlende Frauen bei der Feldarbeit. Das Bild steht im direkten Widerspruch zum Hauptgedanken des Buches, demzufolge die Politik des sowjetischen Staates das Ende der russischen Bauern einleitete. Warum der Verleger ausgerechnet ein stalinistisches Kunstwerk auswählte, um Gorshkovs Geschichte der Bauern in Russland zu illustrieren, erschließt sich leider nicht.

Insgesamt hinterlässt das Buch einen ambivalenten Eindruck. Das Anliegen, der ländlichen Bevölkerung in Synthesen zur russländischen Geschichte einen prominenteren Platz zu geben, ist durchaus nachvollziehbar. Ein solcher Zugang bietet das Potential, die Sozialgeschichte der ländlichen Bevölkerung Russlands zu normalisieren. Die Belege für das eigenmächtige und eigensinnige Handeln der Bauern sind dienlich, um die Vorstellung vom vorrevolutionären Russland als Kontinent passiver und ungebildeter Dorfbewohner zu korrigieren und die Geschichte Russlands für Perspektiven „von unten" zu öffnen. Man könnte dem Autor allerdings vorhalten, dass sein Bild von der aktuellen Forschungslage allzu düster ausfällt. Einige wichtige Beiträge zur Rolle der Bauern in Wirtschaft, Staat und Öffentlichkeit bleiben unerwähnt.[1] Auch der Zusammenhang von Landwirtschaft und Umwelt, den Gorshkov letztlich nur beiläufig behandelt, ist in der historischen Forschung kein absolutes Neuland mehr.[2] Eine stärker differenzierte Sicht auf die Forschungslage, eine ausgewogenere Darstellung und ein sorgfältigeres Lektorat hätten den Wert dieser Arbeit als Lehrbuch für Studierende der Geschichtswissenschaften daher ohne Zweifel erhöht.

Anmerkungen:

1 I. V. Gerasimov, Modernism and Public Reform in Late Imperial Russia. Rural Professionals and Self-Organization 1905–1930, Houndmills 2009; K. Gestwa, Proto-Industrialisierung in Rußland. Wirtschaft, Herrschaft und Kultur in Ivanovo und Pavlovo 1741–1932, Göttingen 1999; J. Herzberg, Gegenarchive. Bäuerliche Autobiographik zwischen Zarenreich und So-

wjetunion, Bielefeld 2013; Y. Kotsonis, Making Peasants Backward. Agricultural Cooperatives and the Agrarian Question in Russia, 1861–1914, New York 1999; F. Schedewie, Selbstverwaltung und sozialer Wandel in der russischen Provinz: Bauern und Zemstvo in Voronez, 1864–1914, Heidelberg 2006.

2 Vgl. D. Moon, The Plow that Broke the Steppes. Agriculture and Environment on Russia's Grasslands, 1700–1914, Oxford 2013; N. Dronin, E. Bellinger, Climate Dependence and Food Problems in Russia 1900–1990. The Interaction of Climate and Agricultural Policy and Their Effect on Food Problems, Budapest 2005.

Susanne Schattenberg: Leonid Breschnew. Staatsmann und Schauspieler im Schatten Stalins. Eine Biographie, Köln / Weimar / Wien: Böhlau Verlag 2017, 661 S.

Rezensiert von
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Im Gegensatz zu Vladimir I. Lenin und Iosif V. Stalin, aber auch zu Michail S. Gorbačëv, ist Leonid I. Brežnev (1906–1982), ähnlich wie der von ihm in Pension geschickte Nikita S. Chruščëv, vom biographischen Genre stiefmütterlich behandelt worden. Das ist insofern verwunderlich, als seine Amtszeit an der Spitze der Kommunistischen Partei der Sowjetunion die zweitlängste war – von 1964 bis 1982. „Zu seinem 35. Todestag im November 2017", so der Klappentext des anzuzeigenden massiven Bandes, hat die Bremer Russland- und Sowjetunion-Historikerin Susanne Schattenberg nun die erste umfassende sowie auf einen breiten Fundus sowjetischer Quellen gestützte Biographie Brežnevs vorgelegt. In ihrer mit unverkennbarer Sympathie verfassten Lebensbeschreibung plädiert sie für eine unverstellte und somit neue Sicht auf ihr biographisches Objekt: Dessen auf konsensuale Entscheidungen innerhalb einer kollektiven Führung basierende Herrschaftspraxis in den Jahren an der Parteispitze ist der Vf.in zufolge vor der Negativfolie des grausam-tyrannischen Stalin und des sprunghaft-cholerischen Chruščëv in positivem Licht zu sehen, und dies ungeachtet einer stringenten Patronage-Politik, welche aus den langjährigen Erfahrungen Brežnevs in seinen Partei- und Staatsfunktionen vor 1964 gespeist wurde.

Besondere Bedeutung misst die Autorin dabei dem ursprünglichen Berufswunsch des jugendlichen Leonid zu, nämlich Schauspieler zu werden. Sein durchaus theatertaugliches Talent, so ihre These, nutzte er gezielt in sämtlichen seiner zahlreichen Funktionen und Positionen – bis hin zur obersten Karrierestufe als KPdSU-Generalsekretär. Das Erreichen dieses Amtes habe er dann dazu genutzt, die Sowjetunion im Innern zum einem Wohlfahrtsstaat mit auskömmlichen Gehältern, ausreichendem Wohnraum, niedrigen Mieten, existenzsichernden Renten, flächendeckender Versorgung und großzügigem Urlaubsanspruch für alle zu transformieren sowie nach außen zu Zeiten des Kalten Kriegs eine Friedenspolitik zu propagieren, die 1975 in Helsinki in Gestalt der Schlussakte der Konferenz für Sicherheit und Zusammenarbeit in Europa in einen Ausgleich mit „dem Westen" resultierte.

So märchenhaft-rosarot diese Erzählung über einen „großen Mann" mitunter auch klingt, so beachtlich ist die Recherchelei-

stung der Autorin zu Brežnevs typisch „allsowjetischer“ Karriere vor dem von ihm mitorganisierten Sturz Chruščëvs. Nahezu lückenlos gelingt es ihr, diese quellenmäßig zu rekonstruieren und zu zeigen, wie aus einem unpolitischen Russophonen in der Ostukraine ein bilderbuchartiger „Sowjetmensch“ (post-)bolschewistischer Prägung wurde.[1] Dass die Autorin, wie es in der Überschrift zu einem SPIEGEL-Interview mit ihr heißt, „zugleich die Geschichte der Sowjetunion neu erzählt“,[2] ist indes um einiges zu hoch gegriffen. Denn Oktoberumsturz, Bürgerkrieg, Kriegskommunismus, Neue Ökonomische Politik, Zwangskollektivierung, Großer Terror, deutsch-sowjetischer Krieg, Spätstalinismus und Entstalinisierung werden nur insoweit behandelt, als sie unmittelbare Auswirkungen auf Brežnevs Person und Karriere hatten. In der Tat „neu erzählt“ wird von der Autorin allerdings das Innenleben des engsten Machtzirkels der Jahre 1960 bis 1982, in denen ihr biographisches Objekt an der Spitze zunächst des Staates, dann der Partei stand. Dabei rückt mitunter „der Mensch hinter dem KP-Apparatschik“ so stark in den Vordergrund, dass er den Generalsekretär nahezu verdeckt. Dies gilt vor allem für die ständigen Hinweise darauf, dass Brežnev aufgrund der von seiner Umwelt zunächst nicht wahrgenommenen, später dann unkontrollierbar gewordenen Sucht nach Schlaf- und Beruhigungsmitteln zunehmend gesundheitlich gehandicapt und schließlich kaum noch handlungsfähig war. Diese These gipfelt in der Formulierung des Klappentextes: „seine innen- und außenpolitische Entspannungspolitik und sein Friedenskurs scheiterten schließlich an seiner Tablettenabhängigkeit“ – also nicht am Einmarsch der Warschauer Pakt-Truppen in die ČSSR, der Stationierung der SS 20-Raketen und der militärischen Intervention der sowjetischen Luft- und Landstreitkräfte in Afghanistan. Während die Autorin die Schuld am 21. August 1968 primär dem ihr zufolge obstinaten KPČ-Chef Alexander Dubček zuweist, macht sie für die Militäroperation am Hindukusch die Hardliner im KPdSU-Politbüro verantwortlich. In beiden Fällen habe Brežnev für ein sanfteres Vorgehen optiert, sich aber gegen Widerstände nicht durchsetzen können.

Die farbige Wissenschaftsprosa der Autorin macht die Lektüre des Bandes ungeachtet seines Umfangs zum Vergnügen und lässt über die zahlreichen Wiederholungen einschließlich des mitunter aufdringlichen Einhämmerns von ihr identifizierter Brežnevscher Eigenschaften und Charakterzüge – gutes Aussehen, „westliche“ Kleidung, joviale Umgangsformen, kollegialer Führungsstil, Eitelkeit, Frauenschwarm, gezielt eingesetztes Macho-Gehabe, Sammler (westlicher) Luxusautos,[3] durch Medikamentenmissbrauch bedingte Labilität – hinwegsehen. Originell ist die Idee der Autorin, an den Anfang jedes der neun chronologischen Großkapitel ein bis zwei zeitgenössische Fotografien Brežnevs zu stellen sowie diese jeweils mit einer Deutung zu versehen. Das ist mitunter erhellend, gleitet aber manchmal in allzu vereinfachendes Psychologisieren ab. Auch ist zu vermuten, dass Brežnev in seiner Zeit an der Macht seine fotografische Selbstdarstellung sorgsam kontrollierte bzw. kontrollieren ließ und auch einen deutlichen Unterschied bezüglich Bildmaterials für den sowjetischen Hausgebrauch und für solches, das für den westlichen „Markt“

bestimmt war, machte. Das berühmte sonnenbebrillte Foto mit Willy Brandt auf dem Boot auf dem Schwarzen Meer war ausschließlich für außersowjetische PR, nicht hingegen für die einheimische Verwendung bestimmt. Hier kamen Porträts in ordensgeschmückter Uniform zur Verwendung – was das sarkastische (sowjetische!) Bonmot von einer „operativen Brustvergrößerung" des Generalsekretärs zwecks Platzschaffens zum Anheften zahlreicher weiterer Orden zur Folge hatte. Auch eine westdeutsche Anekdote deutet darauf hin, dass Brežnevs engere Umgebung ihn als deutlich weniger locker und lässig wahrnahm, als er dies zumindest bei seinen Westreisen vermittelte.[4]

Regelrecht danebengegangen ist der Autorin allerdings der Einstieg in ihre Einleitung, in dem der Grund für den Wechsel an der KPdSU-Spitze von Chruščëv zu Brežnev 1964 mit demjenigen der Ablösung von Klaus Wowereit an der Berliner SPD-Spitze durch Michael Müller 50 Jahre später verglichen wird: Sowohl der zum „Hänseln" neigende Nikita als auch der sich durch „Schnoddrigkeit" auszeichnende Klaus seien ihren jeweiligen Genossen in den Führungsgremien dermaßen auf die Nerven gegangen, dass sie der personellen Alternative mit Freuden zugestimmt haben (S. 9). Da hätte wohl eher ein Vergleich mit dem qua Impeachment gleichfalls erzwungenen Wechsel im US-amerikanischen Präsidentenamt 1974 von Richard Nixon zu seinem Vize Gerald Ford oder mit der Ablösung des erratisch-brutalen Mao Zedong durch den geschmeidigeren Deng Xiaoping 1976 in China nicht nur zeitlich nähergelegen. Die beiden Letztgenannten tauchen in dem Buch übrigens nicht auf, was mit Blick auf den sich zu Beginn von Brežnevs Amtszeit dramatisch bis zur militärischen Konfrontation 1969 am Ussuri / Wusuli zuspitzenden sino-sowjetischen Konflikt Wunder nimmt.

Eine veritable Lücke klafft überdies bezüglich des 1976 in Angriff genommenen Brežnevschen Lieblings- und Vorzeigeprojekts in der tatarischen Retortenstadt Naberežnye Čelny an der Kama, nämlich des gigantischen Lastwagen-, Motoren- und Panzerwerks KamAZ, über das Esther Meier unlängst eine profunde Monographie vorgelegt hat.[5] Das war gleich dem noch größer dimensionierten Brežnevschen Projekt der Bajkal-Amur-Magistrale (BAM) eine Unternehmung, die an Stalinsche Zeiten von Magnitogorsk oder Weißmeerkanal erinnerte. Nach Brežnevs Tod wurde Naberežnye Čelny – auch das eine Reminiszenz an die Stalinzeit – in „Brežnev" umbenannt, erhielt aber bereits 1988 seinen ursprünglichen artifiziellen Namen zurück.

Susanne Schattenbergs Brežnev-Biographie ist ein großer Wurf – voll von neuen und überraschenden Details, quellengesättigt, enzyklopädisch, meinungsfreudig und thesenstark, wenngleich nicht immer überzeugend. Die Latte für die russländische und internationale Sowjetunion-Historiographie liegt jetzt bezüglich des maßgeblich von Leonid Il'ič geprägten „Goldenen Zeitalters der Stagnation" hoch.

Anmerkungen

1 Der 20-seitige Abschnitt zu Brežnevs Jahren in Zaporož'e und Dnepropetrovsk 1946–1947 im Kapitel 3, „Im Schatten Stalins oder: Lehrjahre eines Generalsekretärs I", findet sich auch als Download auf der Verlagswebsite, allerdings ohne Belegstellen: URL http://www.boehlau-verlag.

com/download/164855/978-3-412-50209-6_Leseprobe.pdf.

2 SPIEGEL-Gespräch: „Ein Schauspieler im Kreml". Die Historikerin Susanne Schattenberg erkundet Leonid Breschnew, den Menschen hinter dem KP-Apparatschik, und erzählt zugleich die Geschichte der Sowjetunion neu, in: Der Spiegel Nr. 1/2018, 30. Dezember 2017, S. 28–31.

3 Bei seinem ersten Besuch in der Bundesrepublik fünf Jahre zuvor, im Mai 1973, soll Brežnev sein Gastgeschenk, ein Mercedes-Cabrio 450 SLC, gleich nach der Übergabe am Gästehaus der Bundesregierung auf dem Petersberg bei Bonn auf der Probefahrt nach wenigen Metern mittels Fahrfehler beschädigt haben. Die Medienberichte dazu weichen inhaltlich allerdings stark von einander ab. Unverkennbar indes hatten die Gastgeber den Geschmack des hohen Gastes getroffen, da er sich umgehend hinter das Steuer setze und los fuhr.

4 „Diese vagabundierende Anekdote spielt am 4. Mai 1978: Leonid Breschnew, Staatschef der damaligen Sowjetunion ist in Deutschland auf Staatsbesuch. Viele Menschen säumen die Straßen. Breschnew befragt über seinen Dolmetscher den Außenminister Genscher: „Haben Sie die Leute bestellt zur Ehre des sowjetischen Volkes?" Über den deutschen Dolmetscher antwortet Genscher: „Nein, die Leute haben heute frei. Es ist Himmelfahrt." Nur dem deutschen Dolmetscher fällt das Zögern auf, mit dem der russische Dolmetscher das übersetzt: „Sie feiern den Tag der internationalen Raumfahrt" (nach Ralf Drews). C. Gruber, Wort zur Woche vom 26.05.2014 – Himmelfahrt = Tag der Internationalen Raumfahrt?, in: Website der Evangelischen Kirchengemeinde Empfingen 2014, http://www.evangelisch-in-empfingen.de/wort-zur-woche-vom-26-05-2014-himmelfahrt-tag-der-internationalen-raumfahrt/ (Zugriff 6. März 2020). Seit 1962 wurde in der UdSSR der 12. April als „Tag der Kosmonauten" (Den' kosmonavtiki) begangen. Offenkundig scheute sich sein Dolmetscher, Brežnev gegenüber den religiösen Charakter des auch in der Russischen Orthodoxen Kirche begangenen Feiertags Christi Himmelfahrt (*Voznesenie Isusa Christa*) zu benennen.

5 E. Meier, Breschnews Boomtown: Alltag und Mobilisierung in der Stadt der LKWs. Paderborn 2016; Dies.: Brežnevs Ingenieure: Die Stadt Naberežnye Čelny und das Lastwagenwerk KamAZ, in: B. Belge / M. Deuerlein (Hrsg.), Goldenes Zeitalter der Stagnation? Perspektiven auf die sowjetische Ordnung der Brežnev-Ära, Tübingen 2014, S. 156-177.

Hendrik Schulte Nordholt: China and the Barbarians. Resisting the Western World Order. Leiden: Leiden University Press 2018, 464 pp.

Reviewed by
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Hendrik Schulte Nordholt provides an informed account of the conflicting narratives, traditions, and cultural idiosyncrasies that co-determine China's fate in the 21st century. His book, which is an updated translation of his original monograph in Dutch from 2015, could be organised differently, but that is most of all a matter of taste and preferences.

Chapter 1 deals with the "lofty classical order" and focuses on the Qin and Han kingdoms and the concept of "All under Heaven", elevating morality over the law. This understanding of "regional governance" as we would probably label it today, found expression in the tributary system, in which closer "barbarians" (neighbouring peoples) had to pay to the centre to get protection. The compelling lessons of the corresponding "mandate from heaven" made the emperor's power absolute but also performance-based (at least in theory). If the "son of heaven" did not act to the satisfaction of the people, he could theoretically be removed (or he killed his

opponents). Another interesting aspect is that "all under heaven" originally only meant the "Sinitic" sphere, which also served as the reference for the world – a limited perception of global politics that led to a harsh encounter with the "western barbarians" in the 19th century. Accordingly, the second chapter deals with a very powerful narrative that still is in use today: The "century of humiliation" by western powers and Japan (1839–1949). The naïve expectation that the western imperialists could, as other foreign powers before, be seduced and tamed by the Chinese culture, turned out a "fatal miscalculation" (p. 45). Four foreign attacks on Chinese sovereignty constitute the century of humiliation: the two opium wars, the crackdown of the Boxer Rebellion and the Japanese aggression in the 1930s. Chapter 3 then moves to "A New Beginning" starting with Sun Yatsen's presidency of the new Republic of China in 1912. The ROC built on three principles: nationalism, welfare for the people and power to the people (pp. 71–73). Chapter 4 tackles present president Xi Jinping's dream and provides an interesting description of Xi and his father – including surrounding narratives. Schulte Nordholt enlightens the reader knowledgeably about the changing factions managing China's fate for the past seventy and more years. He reckons that even though Xi Jinping seems to have adopted a new leadership style, his behaviour is also in line with old traditions. One preferred notion the author employs is "old wine in new bottles" (p. 97) – nothing new under the Chinese sun (p. 112). Even though Xi Jinping has attained additional titles (core leader, commander-in-chief, among others), that make him only comparable to Mao (and in some aspects even surpass the Great Leader), Schulte Nordholt sees more continuity. "The eternal party" is the title of chapter 5, which explores the nature of the Chinese Communist Party and the party system including its prospects. The CCP's future rests on four pillars (domestic security agencies, military, party organisation and propaganda) (p. 126). The party system's future will largely depend on its performance: "[…] the core question is whether the political system is capable of solving the country's gigantic social and economic problems" (p. 113). The author further assumes that Marx would approve some aspects of today's China, while Orwell would understand it but then also tellingly asks whether China is (still) Marxist and if Marxism is western (pp. 123f.). Chapter 6 tackles "An Alternative to the Party?" and refers to David Shambaugh's seven schools of thought (of the hundred that reportedly existed during the Golden Age of philosophy). Schulte Nordholt reports on eight interviews with exceptional Chinese personalities (all men): a diplomat, a legal expert, a philosopher, a mathematician, a writer, a Buddhist, an economist and an anthropologist. Rather interesting reading, but style-wise and in argumentative terms quite different than the other chapters. In chapter 7, the author then goes back to history (he never really abandons it) and discusses "The Perception of History: From Supremacy to Shame". Schulte Nordholt provides a very insightful summary of the historical memory in China: Even though Marxism and Maoism reject China's past as feudal, the historical references to Chinese imperial greatness fill much more these days (p. 177). Chapter 8 tackles Mao's and Deng's

foreign policy: "From Rebellion to Harmony" and jumps a bit from Mao's wars and swinging relationships with India, the Soviet Union/Russian Federation and the United States to today's situation. The author provides quite perceptive accounts of Sino-American (most important but also most complex) and Russian-Chinese relations (today reversed roles: "Little Bear and Big Panda"). Under Xi, "to hide brightness and cherish obscurity" as a precondition for a silent rise (as preached by Deng) appears to be of the past (p. 229). While the West concluded that sovereignty did not prevent the two world wars, they established international organisations: "The founding of the United Nations, the European Union and countless other international organisations proves that the transfer of power from national states to supranational institutions is irreversible. The success of that process is not universal, and certainly hotly disputed, but the days of absolute sovereignty in the West are numbered." The Chinese seem to have drawn opposite conclusions from history: "Not the excess, but rather the shortage of sovereignty caused the string of plagues inflicted by foreigners upon the ancient empire […]" (Opium Wars, Boxer rebellion, Japanese aggression, p. 230). "The New Nationalism" is subject of the ninth chapter and starts off with stating that the People's Republic is not willing to take the lead in world politics. The author cannot even ascertain a "Chinese Monroe doctrine" for Asia, but sees reason for concern: "At the beginning of the twenty-first century, Chinese nationalism has devolved into a complex cocktail of complacent paternalism, pent-up resentment and racial superiority endangering the peace and security of the region" (p. 255). "The Party on a Dead-End Street" is the title of Chapter number ten. It deals with the problematic redefinition of terms such as democracy, human rights, and rule of law that lose their original meaning in the Party's new interpretation. Nonetheless, Schulte Nordholt deems the days of the Communist Party to be numbered due to institutional and cultural corruption, nepotism, the absence of virtue and respect for the small people, and last, but not least, the gap between language and reality (pp. 266–273). "The Third Way" (chapter 11) provides philosophical reflections on human nature and the ideal state – in western and eastern traditions. According to Confucius, the "world of great harmony" once existed and Hu Angang, a prominent academic predicting China's new rise, expects that the renewed "Great Harmony" will be realised by 2030. Zhao Tingyang, the first advocate of a "All under Heaven" model for the 21st century, sees it as a "vaguer vision for the future in which virtue and harmony prevail, and which is led by a global government." This chapter is a captivating read and leads to the final one, "The World of the Great Harmony" (chapter 12), pointing at internal contradictions (preaching great harmony abroad, causing great disharmony in East Asia, p. 293). The author expects five foreign policy priorities to receive more attention: the transformation of the South China Sea into a Chinese inland sea; waging a permanent "Cold War" with Japan, compelling the US to recognise China as East Asia's dominant power; the creation of an own international order; and conducting a more active soft power policy (pp. 294–297). In short, "Globalisation with

Chinese characteristics means that the free flow of goods and services is embraced, but not the flow of ideas" (p. 297).

The author excels as a knowledgeable Sinologist who often shows the (western) reader, where the European or North American mind-set is challenged to comprehend the internal contradictions in Chinese self-image and visions of world order. In the very beginning, Schulte Nordholt quotes philosopher Tu Weiming, who regards China as a battlefield of socialism, liberalism and Confucianism. Samuel Huntington had once predicted that China would eventually go back to its own traditions and abandon socialism and liberalism, as they constitute western concepts.[1] On the other hand, the book later demonstrates the very Chinese outlook, when it again refers to Tu Weiming's suggestion, that China should aim at a combination of the three (pp. 282f.) – an idea, that would conventionally be considered as impossible in western eyes.

Sometimes, the author writes a bit elusively that Xi has introduced a new authoritarian way, and then again partly discharges this as a narrative. The same holds true for the motives behind the large-scale anti-corruption campaign: a true fight against wide-spread graft to please the masses or a popular measure to purge the party and leadership from supports of his predecessor, Jiang Zemin? He concludes: probably both (pp. 107f.). One shortcoming is that the author writes with authority – certainly based on decade-long insights into the political intrigues of Chinese politics – but often without references. This makes it difficult for the non-expert and the specialists to know whether his assumptions are unprovable facts or simply interpretations – competing with other narratives in the guessing game.

One of the critical aspects could be that the book does not entirely live up to its title (but in a way achieves more): It discusses the traditional distinction of Chinese civilisation into three circles (civilized centre, close barbarians, far-away barbarians, with the close ones able to be "Sinicized", that is, civilized). But it doesn't go deeper into that narrative when it comes to China's struggle with weak soft power or the re-invented Mandate from Heaven in a 21st century version of the imperial notion of tianxia (All Under Heaven). The very book title insinuates that China (still) regards the west as barbarians – in turn, the Sinitic world counts as centre of civilisation. If we then turn to debates on Chinese-led world order, a corresponding civilising mission would be the obvious conclusion. Here, the literature on civilising projects in and from China could be covered more.[2] While the original Dutch title only mentioned "China and the Barbarians", the English version added the resistance to western world order. For scholars of International Relations, the debates on US American decline, the end of "Pax Americana" and the (potential) rise of a global "Pax Sinica" are probably not satisfactorily dealt with. But it is not the point of the book to engage exhaustively in western IR debates[3] – it rather tries to give the reader an intimate and puzzling insight into China's philosophical debates, the consequences of instrumentalised historical referencing, the various sources of legitimacy for the Party and the problems of the People's Republic to deal with multiple identities.

In sum, this is a very good read for everyone trying to understand China's identity struggles and where the Middle Kingdom may be heading in the 21st century.

Notes

1 S. P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, New York 1996, pp. 9–19.

2 See S. Harrell, Introduction: Civilizing Projects and the Reaction to Them, in: St. Harrell (ed.), Cultural Encounters on China's Ethnic Frontiers. Seattle 1995; P. Nyíri, The Yellow Man's Burden: Chinese Migrants on a Civilizing Mission, in: The China Journal 56 (2006); T. Heberer, The Contention between Han "Civilizers" and Yi "Civilizees" over Environmental Governance: A Case Study of Liangshan Prefecture in Sichuan, in: The China Quarterly 219 (2014), pp. 736–759; H. R. Clark, The Sinitic Encounter in Southeast China Through the First Millennium CE, Berlin 2015; J. Schneider, Missionizing, Civilizing, and Nationizing. Linked Concepts of Compelled Change, in: Chen-tian Kuo (ed.), Religion and Nationalism in Chinese Societies. Amsterdam 2017.

3 See, for instance, Y. Xuetong, Ancient Chinese Thought, Modern Chinese Power, ed. by D. A. Bell, S. Zhe, translated by E. Ryden, Princeton 2011; G. J. Ikenberry, W. Jisi, Z. Feng (eds.), America, China, and the Struggle for World Order. Ideas, Traditions, Historical Legacies, and Global Visions, New York 2015; D. Shambaugh, China Goes Global, Oxford 2013; B. Wang (ed.), Chinese Visions of World Order. Tianxia, Culture and World Politics, Durham 2017; K. Brown, China's World. What does China want?, London 2017; W. A. Callahan, E. Barabantseva (eds.), China Orders the World. Normative Soft Power and Foreign Policy, Washington 2011; F.-L. Wang, The China Order. Centralia, World Empire, and the Nature of Chinese Power, Albany 2017.

David C. Engerman: The Price of Aid: The Economic Cold War in India, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 2018, 501 pp.

Reviewed by
Oscar Sanchez-Sibony, Hong Kong

For a long time, studies of the Cold War reflected two theoretical currents buried deep in the foundations of Cold War historiography. The first was an aversion to the use of interpretive frameworks born of political economy, particularly after the bitter fight that banished the so-called revisionists – in fact the first generation of historians – from the field. The second current was the international relations theory of realism that in effect engendered and became part of the genetic code of Cold War studies. This theory accommodated many contending arguments but generally saw the state as monolithic, and acting in an international arena according to a set of established interests. Because states were unitary actors, policies such as international aid were seen to be coherent expressions of these predetermined state interests, and therefore they could be analysed as easily understood expressions of the ideological competition that organized the Cold War world. Other fields of historical study, meanwhile, were busy producing historiographical innovations. Studies in British imperial history fragmented the state, seeing in it a conglomerate of diverse constituents, visions, purpose and outcomes. Postcolonial studies provincialized Euro-

centric perspectives and gave agency to a Global South that Cold War tracks too often depicted – echoing US documentary sources – as empty, infantilized vessels susceptible to superpower tutoring. After the 1990s, these conceptual frameworks slowly migrated to the field of Cold War studies, starting in particular with treatments of US Cold War policies in Latin America. This process was still young two decades ago in the Cold War field, but is now well advanced. Engerman's new study, *The Price of Aid*: *The Economic Cold War in India*, is both a welcome new addition to this general development, and a model for how to write a Cold War narrative without assuming a unitary state.

The book examines superpower aid policies in India from the late 1940s to the early 1970s. It covers what Engerman calls the heyday of aid politics – from the mid-1950s to the mid-1960s – until what he sees as its corrosive denouement a decade after that. In approaching this general narrative arch, Engerman makes two assumptions that continuously pay insightful dividends. The first is to assume that state agents are rather more entrepreneurial than their usual portrayal as spokespersons representing a coherent state project – i.e. he disaggregates the state. The second assumption is of a kind of historical dynamism that views practice as constitutive of policy, rather than the mere outcome of pre-established policy choices. This approach, for example, views India not just as the subject of aid policies generated by fixed ideological approaches, but rather as the generator of those approaches in both East and West, and a fluid arena for the changes these policies underwent over time. To illustrate, Engerman proposes the interesting hypothesis that the Soviet aid agency, GKES, was appreciably fashioned out of negotiations for aid to India – or in the author's words, "the case of India […] expanded […] the concept of Soviet 'economic cooperation' efforts" (p. 84).

The statistician Prasanta Chandra Mahalanobis is Engerman's paradigmatic model of a bureaucratic impresario. From his position in the innocuous Indian Statistical Institute (ISI), Mahalanobis emerges as an influential agent who used foreign advisors from East and West to further his own political project. The second five-year plan, in Engerman's narrative, is not merely the consequence of Soviet inspiration, but the outcome of what he calls "development politics," which decentres the Cold War struggle away from the epic ideological narratives of the superpowers, and views the struggle from the perspective of Indian economic officials, for whom "superpower sponsors were a weapon for fighting internal battles to advance their own economic interests and visions" (p. 119). At this more empirical level of analysis, the most important external influence in the implementation of the second five-year plan was not Soviet ideological example and subversion, but the humble work of Norwegian econometrician, and first Nobel-prize co-recipient, Ragnar Frisch.

Mahalanobis and "development politics" are the main subject of the third chapter, after which Engerman moves on to the actual practice of development aid. It begins with the building of the Bhilai Steel Plant, the project that inaugurated Cold War development politics. Engerman argues that these kinds of large projects were a propagandistic coup for the Soviets that the US had a hard time countering, even if Soviet

inefficiencies meant the actual plant became a Cold War hybrid: A Soviet exterior with important Soviet technological input patched together by Western equipment (elevators, air conditioners, cranes and PR work, all from Western firms). Engerman here challenges newly proliferating work that insists in seeing socialist aid as peculiarly socialist, and confirms work done from the perspective of recipient countries, where factories and other aid projects were seen as neither socialist nor capitalist, or in Engerman's bon mot: "While the Soviets pursued steel as a path to friendship, those Indians who supported the project pursued Soviet friendship, in large part, as a path to steel" (p. 34). As he moves to discuss other aid projects, Engerman establishes that successful projects were sustained not by abstract ideological commitment from both sides, but when they found constituencies among givers and recipients – here Engerman juxtaposes Bhilai's resounding success with a Soviet failure to promote mechanized farming in Suratgarh, and the success of American grain deliveries under the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act with the failure of the Community Development projects the US pushed in villages throughout India.

As development politics themselves developed, aid moved in directions that would become detrimental to India's political and economic vitality. Soviet aid became militarized, which is to say, rather than borrowing money from the Soviet Union to make productive investments, India developed a foreign debt with the East on the back of unproductive weapons purchases. Moreover, the public sector the Soviets had nurtured came under criticism from all sides, including from the Soviets themselves, which undermined the ability of Indian economic organs to course correct. Meanwhile, US aid became financialized, moving away from negotiating and managing specific projects and toward financing other people's projects, all within the context of a general disenchantment on both sides that reduced the scale and stakes of American aid to India.

Aid in Engerman's telling had an ultimately corrosive influence on India. Likewise, the author's framing devices have a corrosive effect to some of the very foundations upon which the book itself is premised. For example, the author erodes the insistence, still so prevalent in the field, in the absolute, structuring power of the ideological bipolarity that organized international relations during the Cold War. This is not quite intended; there is a constant tension between Engerman's evidence-based narrative, and the expressly bipolar framework of the study. The author begins the book by making a case about the structuring power of ideas. But he proceeds by making a call for the study of aid as it was practiced on the ground, which, he argues, had often little to do with commonly held ideological visions, as we have seen. In fact, Engerman seems more interested in the fate of the Indian state than in the Cold War itself. He does not just want to argue that states should be disaggregated in order to analyse them better, but that aid itself had a disaggregating effect on the state. Aid allowed for forms of political entrepreneurship that circumvented democratic state institutions, created bureaucratic power bases and fractured state unity of vision and action. This contrasts with the goal professed by both the US and USSR that

aid aimed to generate Indian economic independence and prosperity.

Engerman is only able to sustain a measure of coherence for the bipolar framework by eliding the question of scale. He only briefly addresses the fact that Soviet aid amounted to a fraction of Western aid, instead levelling the difference by arguing that the Soviets used fewer resources to much bigger propagandistic effect (pp. 121–22). This, however, is difficult to square with the more material argument at the core of the concept of "development politics." In the struggle to enlist international resources to fight domestic battles, Engerman gives little indication of the scale of these resources, or the ways in which these differences materially mattered to the bureaucratic struggles at the centre of the analysis. The constant retreat to Cold War bipolarity badly simplifies what Engerman has already shown to be complex.

If statistical evidence is lacking to uphold the bipolar framework, Engerman proves beyond doubt that bilateral and multilateral studies of the Cold War would do well to start from an assumption of fragmented states. *Price of Aid* also shows the benefits of assuming historical dynamism, rather than the older insistence in assigning an established logic to a country's foreign policy and seeing it applied unchangingly throughout the Cold War. The book will leave a stamp on its readers and on the field as a whole.

Günther Pallaver / Michael Gehler / Maurizio Cau: Populists, and the Crisis of Political Parties. A Comparison of Italy, Austria and Germany 1990–2015 (= Jahrbuch des italienisch-deutschen historischen Instituts in Trient, Beiträge 34), Berlin: Duncker & Humblot 2018, 338 S.

Rezensiert von
Gert Pickel, Leipzig

Neben gesellschaftlichem Zusammenhalt ist Populismus der wohl mittlerweile am häufigsten verwendete Begriff in den Sozialwissenschaften und der Zeitgeschichte. Dies kommt nicht von ungefähr. Spätestens seit 2015 ist ein Aufschwung und Bedeutungsgewinn von populistischen Argumenten und Akteuren nicht mehr zu leugnen. Zwar ist nicht immer jedem klar, was Populismus von verwandten Phänomenen, wie beispielsweise Extremismus, unterscheidet, gänzlich unbestimmt ist es allerdings nicht, wer ein Populist bzw. eine Populistin ist und wer nicht.[1] Gleichzeitig besteht Informationsbedarf über die Gründe des Aufkommens populistischer Akteure und deren Ziele.[2] Dies gilt vor allem vor dem Hintergrund ihrer Erfolge seit 2015 in den Parlamenten der Länder Europas.

Der 2018 erschienene Herausgeberband von Günther Pallaver und Kollegen beschäftigt sich genau mit diesen Fragestellungen. Was das Buch von der steigenden Publikationsbreite zum Thema Populismus abhebt, ist der Einbezug einer ver-

gleichenden Perspektive. So handelt es sich – nicht nur nach Ansicht der Herausgeber – bei Populismus um ein globales, oder zumindest überregionales Phänomen. Die 16 Beiträge von namhaften und thematisch ausgewiesenen Experten und Expertinnen unterlegen die vergleichende Zugangsweise mit einer analytischen Tiefenbohrung in drei Ländern – Italien, Österreich und Deutschland. Zudem setzen die Beiträge nicht rein aktualistisch an, sondern nehmen den Zeitraum von 1990 bis 2015 in den Blick.

Diese historisch und komparativ angelegte Vorgehensweise führt zu drei Diskussionslinien, die sich in drei Abschnitten des Buches niederschlagen. Zuerst wird die Entwicklung des Populismus historisch eingebettet (Gehler, Priester), theoretisch und begrifflich verortet (Abts, Cau, Laermans, Priester) und (etwas überraschend) die Bedeutung der Medien für den Populismus herausgearbeitet (Pallaver). Dieser Einordnung und Klärung folgt eine Hinwendung zu den Akteuren des Populismus, also den Populisten selbst. In diesem Abschnitt werden in Fallstudien einzelne Propagandisten wie Jörg Haider oder Sylvio Berlusconi mit Bezug zu ihren Parteigründungen dargestellt (Brunazzo, Decker, Gärtner, Klinkhammer, Orsina). So werden ihre Erfolge wie die Bedeutung ihres Charismas als Grundlage für ihren Erfolg untersucht. In einem zusätzlichen Beitrag werden Romano Prodi und Angela Merkel als mögliche Antagonisten des Populismus miteinander verglichen – und daraus das Bild eines konzeptionellen Antipoden für Populisten abgeleitet.

Es ist nur konsequent, in dem abschließenden dritten Kapitel die Reaktionen der existierenden, eingesessenen Parteien gegenüber der Ausbreitung populistischer Parteien in den Blick zu nehmen. Dabei erfolgt eine Unterteilung in die derzeit wichtigsten ideologischen Parteirichtungen: Die Europäische Volkspartei (van Hecke, Andrione-Moylan), die Sozialdemokraten (Bernadini), die Grünen (Heiss) und die Liberalen (Thiemeyer). Bemerkenswert sind die aus diesen Beiträgen gut abzuleitenden Unterschiede in Reaktion und Umgang mit Populisten. Vor allem zeigt sich eine parteipolitische Problemlage, wenn Werte und politische Einstellungen zwischen Populisten und Vertretern diese Parteigruppierungen nicht weit auseinanderfallen. Da der europäische Populismus, abgesehen von Griechenland, eher ein Rechtspopulismus ist, sind es wenig überraschend die konservativen und der politisch-ideologischen Einordnung nach eher „rechten" bzw. konservativen Parteien, die in einen Konflikt aus Teilakzeptanz und Ablehnung geraten.

Den Band beschließt (erfreulicherweise für einen Sammelband) eine Zusammenfassung des österreichischen Politikwissenschaftlers Anton Pelinka. Er ist es dann auch, der eine zentrale Beobachtung aus den Beiträgen des Bandes zusammenfasst, die sich mit Ergebnissen anderer Forscher und Forscherinnen deckt: Populismus ist eine auf Inklusion und Exklusion ausgerichtete, ideologisch (rechts oder links) angebundene Strategie, welche Eliten, Migranten / innen, Muslime und Muslima sowie Globalisierung als Feind markiert.[3] Die Stilisierung als Fürsprecher und Fürsprecherin des Volkes dient dabei zum einen dem Machtgewinn, zum anderen ist sie Ausdruck einer tiefen Unzufriedenheit hinsichtlich eines Wandels der Welt, die man sich so nicht wünscht. Gerade dies

macht den Populismus so erfolgreich. Er greift Sorgen und bestehende Ressentiments in der Bevölkerung auf, bündelt und formuliert sie und bindet sie in eine antielitäre Rhetorik ein.[4] Dabei ist deren Formulierung radikal und im Sinne eines „schlechten Stils" bewusst gegen „Political Correctness" gerichtet.[5]

Der Sammelband von Pallaver, Gehler und Cau stellt eine hochinteressante und lesenswerte Zusammenstellung von Beiträgen zu dem erstarkten Phänomen des Populismus dar. Die Beiträge sind überwiegend sehr gut zu lesen und speziell hinsichtlich ihrer historischen Tiefenschärfe zu empfehlen. Die Konzentration der meisten Beiträge auf eine solche Tiefenperspektive erweist sich als kluges Vorgehen. So unterliegen aktuelle Phänomene in der Regel einer hohen Dynamik, welche es Wissenschaftlern und Wissenschaftlerinnen schwer macht, sie angemessen in ihrer aktuellen Form zu beschreiben. Dies gilt in ganz besonderer Form für den Populismus, seine parteiförmige Institutionalisierung und seine Akteure. So sind eben viele der noch 2015 relevanten Akteure manch populistischer Partei (siehe die AfD) bereits nicht mehr „im Dienst", während andere ihren Weg an die Regierung (und damit neue Bedingungen ihres Wirkens) schafften (Salvini). Folglich sollte die Festlegung des Bandes auf den Zeitraum 1990–2015 nicht als Grund für ein Beiseitelegen mit gleichzeitigem Griff zu jüngeren Werken, genommen werden. Zwar bedient der Band nicht aktuelle Interessen an den noch einmal dynamischeren Entwicklungen seit den Fluchtbewegungen 2015, er schafft aber auf wohltuende Weise ein Verständnis für die längerfristigen Entstehungswege eines derzeit aktuellen Problems. Diesen Blickwinkel sich anzueignen ist jedem / jeder in diesem Bereich arbeitenden Forscher und Forscherin nur anzuraten. Denn letztlich kann diese Form des Populismus auch die Demokratie, die wir in Europa kennen, an ihre Grenzen führen.[6] Das sollte man wissen.

Anmerkungen

1 K. Priester, Populismus. Historische und aktuelle Erscheinungsformen, Frankfurt a. M. 2007; C. Mudde, Ch. R. Kaltwasser, Populism. A Very Short Introduction, Oxford 2017; J. W. Müller, Was ist Populismus? Ein Essay, Frankfurt a. M. 2017 (5. Aufl.).

2 Y. Mounk, The People vs. Democracy. Why our Freedom is in Danger & How to Save it, Cambridge 2018.

3 A. Akkerman, C. Mudde, A. Zaslove, How Populist Are the People? Measuring Populist Attitudes in Voters, in: Comparative Political Studies 47 (2014), S. 1324–1353; J. B. Judis, The Populist Explosion, New York 2016; G. Pickel, S. Pickel, Migration als Gefahr für die politische Kultur? Kollektive Identitäten und Religionszugehörigkeit als Herausforderung demokratischer Gemeinschaften, in: Zeitschrift für Vergleichende Politikwissenschaft 12 (2018) 1, S. 297–320; C. Torre (ed.), The Promise and Perils of Populism. Global Perspectives, Lexington 2015.

4 K. von Beyme, Rechtspopulismus. Ein Element der Neodemokratie? Wiesbaden 2017; R. Wodak, Politik mit der Angst. Zur Wirkung rechtspopulistischer Diskurse, Wien 2014.

5 B. Moffitt, Populism. Performance, Political Style, and Representation, Stanford 2016, S. 44.

6 S. Levitsky, D. Ziblatt, How Democracies Die, New York 2018.

Alice Weinreb: Modern Hungers – Food and Power in the Twentieth-Century Germany, New York: Oxford University Press 2017, pp. 317.

Rezensiert von
Nancy Nilgen, Leipzig

Alice Weinrebs Studien sind ein Garant für eine gelungene Mischung aus interessanten und aktuellen geschichtswissenschaftlichen Fragestellungen, einem vielfältigen und vor allem umfangreichen Quellenfundus, die ihren teils gewagten Thesen gut standhalten können sowie einem wahren Lesevergnügen. Ihre aktuelle und bereits preisgekrönte Veröffentlichung bildet da keine Ausnahme.

Auf der Grundlage des Prinzips der Biomacht und Biopolitik nach Foucault wählte Weinreb die Darstellung der ernährungshistorischen Entwicklungen des 20. Jahrhunderts am Beispiel der deutschen Geschichte. Hierbei konzentriert sie sich primär auf die Einordnung jener Entwicklungen, statt den methodischen Diskurs ausführlich zu ergänzen. Tatsächlich tauchen die foucaultschen Begrifflichkeiten, nach ihrer kurzen Einführung zu Beginn, kaum mehr auf. Was den Erkenntnisreichtum des Buchs allerdings keineswegs trübt. Das Gegenteil ist der Fall.

Ausgangspunkt sind die Veränderungen der Ernährungsweise, der Lebensmittelwirtschaft und -beschaffung, die die Industrialisierung und Globalisierungsphase des 19. Jahrhunderts mit sich brachte. Ohne in aller Einzelheit noch einmal darauf einzugehen, erläutert die Autorin stattdessen deren Auswirkungen auf die Politik und Machtverhältnisse des 20. Jahrhundert.

Das erste Kapitel beginnt mit dem Ersten Weltkrieg und seinem fatalen Verlauf für die Lebensmittelversorgung im kriegsgebeutelten Europa. Das prominente Beispiel der englischen Seeblockade steht hier ebenso im Mittelpunkt wie das gewaltige Nahrungsmittelhilfeprogramm für das besetzte Belgien durch Amerika und die Folgen dieses Krieges: Die Radikalisierung politischer Mächte in Europa und vor allem in Deutschland. Der bei der deutschen Bevölkerung gefürchtete „Geist des Hungers“ (S. 31) verhalf den Faschisten zum Aufstieg, und die Idee der Lebensmittelautarkie des Reichs schien in Vorbereitung auf einen neuen Krieg als deren logische Konsequenz. Sie setzten aber nicht allein auf Autarkie. Wohl wissend, dass man nicht in der Lage war, die Bevölkerung durch die eigene Landwirtschaft zu versorgen, beutete man dafür die besetzten Gebiete in Osteuropa aus. Um die Lebensmittelversorgung der Deutschen auch im Zweiten Weltkrieg aufrecht erhalten zu können, ließ man die Bevölkerung in den Ostgebieten schlichtweg verhungern. Mehr noch, die Nationalsozialisten verknüpften ihre perfiden Rassentheorien mit der Lebensmittelverteilung. Ihre tödliche Ernährungspolitik inklusive einer regelrechten „Institutionalisierung der Lebensmittelrationierungen“ (S. 75) wurde somit ein elementarer Bestandteil des Genozids. Der Hunger erreichte schlussendlich aber auch die deutsche Bevölkerung, allerdings erst mit Ende des Krieges. Den Alliierten fiel es zunächst schwer, in den Tätern nun Opfer zusehen. Die Bilder hungernder deutscher Mütter und Kinder halfen aber

vor allem den Amerikanern bei diesem hart diskutierten Perspektivwechsel. Abermals arrangierte man ein Nahrungsmittelhilfsprogramm gigantischen Ausmaßes. Und wieder nutzte man diese Hilfeleistung und das damit verbundene Image im Kampf gegen einen alten und jetzt erstarkten Feind, den Bolschewismus. Der nächste Krieg stand vor der Tür, und nach Überzeugung der Autorin übernahm der Hunger der Deutschen im Kalten Krieg eine ähnlich zentrale Rolle wie in den beiden Weltkriegen vorher (S. 111).

Mit den 1950er Jahren und der Sicherstellung der Lebensmittelversorgung war es nun nicht mehr der Hunger, der das bloße Überleben in Frage stellte. Vielmehr war es jetzt der Hunger nach einem vielfältigeren Nahrungsmittelangebot und Konsumgütern. Spätestens an dieser Stelle könnte man kritisieren, dass Alice Weinreb keine klare Unterscheidung zwischen den verschiedenen Abstufungen des Hungers zieht. Man könnte aber auch argumentieren, dass hier eine derartige Differenzierung nicht zwangsläufig nötig ist, impliziert doch bereits der Titel *Modern Hungers*, dass mehr als nur eine Form thematisiert wird.

Dennoch erscheint das Gesamtwerk dem Leser in zwei Teilen präsentiert. Die Darstellung wirkt mit dem Beginn der Nachkriegszeit nicht länger wie eine Aneinanderreihung zahlreicher historischer Fakten, gefüttert mit noch zahlreicherem Quellenmaterial. Hier beginnt die wesentlich umfangreichere Analyse. Diese Zweiteilung mag methodische Gründe haben, denn nun werden die Entwicklung in der Bundesrepublik und der DDR mittels des historischen Vergleichs untersucht, während die Autorin sich zuvor auf verflechtungs- und transferhistorische Merkmale konzentrierte. Wahrscheinlicher ist die Tatsache, dass sich Alice Weinreb im zweiten Teil ihres Buches ihrem eigentlichen Steckenpferd widmet, der Ernährungsgeschichte beider deutscher Staaten in der zweiten Hälfte des 20. Jahrhunderts. Hierzu veröffentlichte sie bereits renommierte Studien sowohl zur Geschichte der Schulkantinen in der DDR[1] als auch zu den Küchen der Vertriebenen aus Osteuropa, die nach dem Krieg nach Deutschland zurückkehren mussten.[2] Bedauerlicherweise thematisiert sie letztgenanntes nicht noch einmal ausführlich in Modern Hungers. Dabei würde gerade diese transferhistorische Perspektive vermutlich bisher noch nicht erforschte Ergebnisse zu Tage fördern. Dies gilt vor allem für die Küchen in der ehemaligen DDR. Stattdessen konzentriert sie sich auf die Auswirkungen der sogenannten Fresswelle in beiden Teilstaaten. Das ist zwar nicht neu, aber eingebettet in den direkten Vergleich präsentiert die Autorin interessante Rückschlüsse. So werden beispielsweise mehr Gemeinsamkeiten als angenommen im Umgang mit dem Übergewicht der Bevölkerung deutlich. Im Epilog schließt die Autorin mit einer Aussicht auf die deutsche Geschichte nach 1989. Das wirkt erfrischend, enden doch nach wie vor viele Studien insbesondere im Feld der Ernährungsgeschichte mit eben jenem Jahr. Dass seither 30 Jahre vergangen sind, wird dabei oft ignoriert beziehungsweise erst jüngst zur Sprache gebracht. Das Fazit konzentriert sich dadurch aber auch fast ausschließlich auf die Entwicklungen in der zweiten Hälfte des 20. Jahrhunderts. So wirkt der erste Teil des Buches im Gesamten betrachtet wie eine sehr lange Einleitung.

Zusammengefasst handelt es sich hier allerdings um eine wichtige Bereicherung innerhalb dieses Forschungsfeldes. Entscheidende Aspekte der Alltagsgeschichte werden hier nicht losgelöst von politischen Einflüssen untersucht, sondern bewusst mit ihnen verknüpft. Auch die Perspektiven und die Argumentation, die Alice Weinreb aufzeigt, sind nachvollziehbar und hochspannend. Das Werk hat fraglos das Potential, ein Standardwerk zu werden.

Anmerkungen:

1 A. Weinreb, Die sozialistische Schulspeisung: Kinder, Mütter und die Bedeutung der Arbeit in der DDR, in: M. Middell, F. Wemheuer (Hrsg.), Hunger, Ernährung und Rationierungssysteme unter dem Staatssozialismus, Frankfurt a. M. 2011, S. 245–267.

2 A. Weinreb, The Tastes of Home. Cooking the Lost Heimat in West Germany in the 1950s and 1960s, in: German Studies Review (2011), S. 345–364.

Patrick Boucheron (ed.): Histoire mondiale de la France, Paris: Seuil 2018, 1076 pp.

Reviewed by
Marco Meriggi, Naples

In this new edition which appeared in 2018, just over a year after the first, the volume includes, besides the introduction of the editor Patrick Boucheron, 161 contributions, written by 132 different authors. These are short articles of four or five pages, enriched with an essential bibliography and assembled into sections. Each article corresponds to a date, connected with a theme.

Dates range from 34,000 before Christ (the presumable composition age of prehistoric paintings housed in the Chauvet cave) to 2015, the year of the IS terrorist attacks to the editorial staff of the satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo and later to the Bataclan theatre.

The first two sections include prehistory, the ancient world and the early Middle Ages and touch the year 800 after Christ. The third and the fourth ones (the feudal order; growth of France) respectively arrive until 1159 and 1336. The fifth (the great Western monarchy) considers a period from 1347 to 1629, whereas the last seven sections are respectively entitled: absolute power (1633–1720); the nation of the enlightenment (1751–1794); a home for the universal revolution (1795–1852); the globalization of France (1858–1905); modernities in the storm (1907–1960); after the empire, in Europe (1960–1987); today, in France (1989–2015).

The common thread that runs through this complex narrative structure is, admittedly, of a political nature, and one should primarily appreciate the book as the result of a civil commitment by the authors and the editor.

Boucheron's ambition is, in fact, that of proposing "a pluralist conception of history" against the narrowly nationalistic historical narration, which in recent years has ruled the public debate in France. In this way, he aims to challenge those authors who – precisely by emphasizing the national identity obsession – seem to have acquired the monopoly of the popularization of the history of France.

This kind of literature, which still enjoys huge editorial success in the French bookstores, has built its fortune above all by painting „the history [of France] as an endless struggle to keep its sovereignty preserved from external influences" (p. 11). These latter are accused by this literature of distorting, weakening, and finally endangering France in its very essence.

According to Boucheron, this has been an easy, simplistic, and reductive answer to the challenges launched by globalization over the last thirty years, as well as by the increasing problems of integration of ethnic and cultural plurality within a complex society, as it is today the French one.

However, the fact is that France, actually, since the most remote times has always been a complex and culturally composed framework, even before today's French territory was given the name of France. Opportunely, Boucheron recalls what Lucien Febvre explained in a very lucid way already in the year 1944, inviting his audience in the University of Paris to reject "the idea of a necessary, fatal, prefigured France; the idea of a France once and for all given by the geographical nature to the 'man of France'" (p. 11).

Just as the idea of provincializing Europe has been proposed, the question is now, therefore, provincializing France; that is, a country at the core of the Eurocentric master narrative of History, particularly in relationship to two topics: modern state, both in its bureaucratic and military components; freedom and universal rights, on the other hand.

Now, provincializing France means, within this book, showing how the supposed identity of a nation – of every nation, indeed – is an object perpetually under construction and transformation, whose content is partly the result of the agency of exogenous factors and actors, as well as of intellectual and material contributions borrowed from other cultures.

Thus, from the time of the Cro Magnon man to the present day, France appears to be the result of a cultural hybridization, and we can only understand its history through the perspective offered by the global network. Further, if this network, up until the early part of the modern age, mainly (though not exclusively) coincides with the European space, in the last few centuries – and, of course, even more in recent decades – it has expanded greatly beyond the borders of Europe.

Many are the forms of cultural and material hybridization in which France has been involved over time. Drastically summarizing, one can say, first, that France has often played the function of a leading centre of extensive transnational processes in the political and economic spheres. This appears evident, for example, in the articles dedicated to the Norman conquest of various parts of Europe, to the Crusades, to Charles VIII expeditions in Italy at the end of the fifteenth century, to the commercial India companies at Colbert's time. More generally, see also the reconstruction of the French power politics developed in many other articles, from the age of Louis XIV until the modern colonial empire building on a global scale between 19th and 20th centuries.

However, the "hexagon" was also often the place where important and not always enough known experiences of contamination from abroad were produced. It was, in other words, a sort of living open laboratory, not a fortress enclosed in itself and anx-

ious to preserve its supposed nature intact. Very interesting, among the many, appear to be, from this point of view, the articles dedicated to such topics as, for instance, the import of the Neolithic revolution in France in 5,800 b. C. – three millennia after its first appearance in the Middle East –, or as the Hungarian origin of St. Martin, patron of Gaul. Again, particularly intriguing results the contribution offered by Rabbi Rachi, commentator of the Bible and the Talmud, to the process of growth of the French language at the beginning of the twelfth century. But think, also, to the fairs of Champagne, a medieval place of intertwining of great European trade and of encounter between East and West, or – suddenly jumping to the present time– to the victory of the "black-blanc-beur" French national team at the 1998 football world championships.

Over the centuries, finally, France was a pole of attraction, which first Europe, then the whole world was looking at, as an example from which to draw inspiration. This happened in the religious field, how the story of the abbey of Cluny in the tenth century and the following ones clarifies; even more in the cultural field, if one recalls phenomena like the enlightenment, or, in recent times, like the planetary diffusion of Michel Foucault's thought. Obviously, this was also the case in the politics. Just think of the "universality" of the French revolution and its ideals, to which an entire section of the volume is dedicated. Of course, this list could continue.

I do not think it is a coincidence that the cultural operation promoted by this peculiar world History of a nation has seen the light in France in the first instance, even if it was promptly replicated also in Italy (thanks to Andrea Giardina) and in Spain (by José M. Núñez Seixas). The hexagon is, in fact, perhaps the European country whose problems of multi-ethnic and multi-cultural integration have been in the last few years the most dramatic. At the same time, France is also the country which in the last decades offered the intellectual ground to many highly interesting historical considerations on cultural hybridization and critical rethinking of the theme of space and of its relationship with history.

I think not only of the great lesson of the Annales school, but also of the work of such scholars as Denys Lombard and Serge Gruzinski, who have, however, mainly consecrated their works to spatial and historical contexts far from France. I also think, of course, of the tradition of human geography, recently re-proposed in the key of Géohistoire by a scholar like Christian Grataloup.

Finally, France is the country where the regression towards the myth of "pure" identity and nationalism in the worst sense has been politically more alarming. It is no coincidence that the cultural approach suggested by Boucheron found an immediate resonance into the political program of Emmanuel Macron, who in an important interview explicitly acknowledged his intellectual debt to him.

This world History of France has, therefore, certainly many merits; not least, that of adopting a simple and captivating narrative style, far from academic pedantry and at the same time, however, careful to offer the reader a reasoned methodological lesson about the purposes of historical reflection. This latter consists in the study of complexity and entanglements, as well as in the clarification of connections, which

often take place beyond the space enclosed within national borders; the space which, vice-versa, seems to be the privileged object of narrative of the popular unprofessional literature on History, which the volume edited by Boucheron explicitly aims to compete with.

The resulting experiment is undoubtedly interesting. However, I am not entirely convinced that the formula adopted is the best, if what one really cares about is to produce lasting results. In fact, the choice of fragmenting the history of France in dozens and dozens of short articles, which are weakly connected to each other, seems, in the end, to produce the side effect of losing sight of the very object of the work: France itself, precisely. This happens despite the presence, at the bottom of each contribution, of a sequence of references to other dates included in the work.

From this point of view, after the reading of the over 1000 pages of this book, one remains with the unfulfilled desire of a more structured, selective and ambitious narration.

More than "World history of France", the work we have here discussed about should be properly, perhaps, better entitled „World histories in France" (or "connected with France").

Frederick Cooper: Citizenship, Inequality, and Difference, Princeton: Princeton University Press 2018, xii + 205 pp.

Reviewed by
Mike Rapport, Glasgow

We live in a world where bounded citizenries are the norm. We also live in a world where political movements offering deceptively simple solutions to the complexities of globalisation and migration have been gaining traction. Brexiters, Donald Trump, Jair Bolsonaro, Marine Le Pen, Viktor Orbán, Recep Erdoğan, among many others, have either won power or gained traction by indulging in identity politics and stoking fears of cultural 'difference'. They have prioritised the nation-state in seeking to secure votes and support for their policies. In doing so, such modern-day populism posits a definition of citizenship that confines it strictly to national boundaries, while at the same time driving at a more exclusive definition of citizenship *within* those borders. They seek to roll back the more multi-layered concepts of the citizen that more readily accept overlaps in different forms and sources of identity and belonging. Playing to the British Conservative Party base, Prime Minister Theresa May indulged in this kind of rhetoric when she (now notoriously) opined in 2016 that 'If you believe you are a citizen of the world, you are a citizen of nowhere'. Such language tends to reduce identity and citizenship to the simple idea that the

nation is the primary source of an individual's political identity and that citizenship can only be enjoyed within the confines of the nation-state. As Hannah Arendt once put it, the world found nothing sacred in the abstract nakedness of being human'. In his pithy, clearly-argued book, Frederick Cooper makes a similar judgment: 'Jurists and politicians seem convinced that every person belongs somewhere, and that somewhere is defined … as citizenship in a state' (p. 93). Yet arguments that seek to align citizenship with the state run into difficulty when confronting concepts such as 'multi-cultural citizenship, multinational citizenship, multilevel citizenship, diasporic citizenship, flexible citizenship, and global citizenship' (p. 9). Cooper shows that in fact the world of citizenries bounded by national borders is almost the exception, not the rule. Citizenship has historically operated at different levels at the same time – locally, nationally and transnationally – as indeed the example first of Spain and then of the Spanish empire have demonstrated. Moreover (and the examples of the Greek polis and the Roman Empire bear this out) notions of citizenship actually pre-date the nation-state.

An historian of empire, Cooper points to multiple examples of how citizenship has operated in a rich variety of ways, with different degrees of inclusion and exclusion and at different political and social levels. In fact, Cooper suggests, the notion of citizenship originally arose in the context of empire and, as such, operated at different levels. For much of its existence, the notion of citizenship has not been democratic or inclusive. The imperial experience shows that multi-layered conceptions of citizenship can reinforce the exclusion of people on the basis of race, gender and poverty – in other words, that citizenship, in itself, is not incompatible with hierarchies and oligarchies. Yet at the same, fluid a concept as it is, citizenship can also be used to break down such barriers by being the basis for claims to emancipation, equality, the suffrage, and social welfare. Cooper's analysis is an impressive sweep both through the past and across geographical space. His book takes us from the imperial citizenship of the Roman Empire (with a trenchant discussion of the Edict of Caracalla in 212 CE, giving Roman citizenship to all freemen in the provinces of the Roman Empire, possibly the biggest extension of citizenship in world history, since it affected no fewer than 30 million people) before making a well-placed leap to the globe-spanning empires of Spain, Britain and France from the sixteenth to the nineteenth centuries. Along the way, he explores such variants as operated in the United States, the Ottoman Empire and Germany. Moving into the twentieth century experience, Cooper discusses claims that sought to make the 'state' correspond with the 'nation', a process that he outlines from the collapse of the multinational empires at the end of the First World War until the 1990s. Here, his sophisticated discussion takes us through the collapse of imperial Russia, the break-up of the Soviet Union, claims to citizenship from the colonized peoples of the British and French Empires (after the Second World War, the Fourth Republic granted citizenship to the inhabitants of the French Empire – the advocates of the measure citing Caracalla's edict), the practice and theory of citizenship in the succes-

sor states to the Ottoman Empire and in the European empires in Africa.

At the bottom line, therefore, Cooper's book, originally written for the Lawrence Stone Lectures at the Princeton University, demonstrates that (p. 41) while the word 'citizenship' originates in Europe, the questions it raises about political identities is a global one. The book culminates with an assessment of the experiment in citizenship represented by the European Union – an analysis that is not uncritical, but which, at the very outset, Cooper judges to be 'one of the world's most innovative citizenship regimes' (p. 1). He is, of course right, for it combines both political and social rights in a trans-national framework, rights which are automatically attributed to citizens of member-states, which will also have their own individual laws, entitlements and duties. In this trans-national sense – and only in this sense (despite the darker fantasies of Euro-sceptics) – citizenship of the European Union recalls the practice of citizenship in the European empires, going back to Rome.

Since it is a construct through which individuals and groups can make claims to political and social rights, how citizenship is defined is contentious, particularly in the current political climate where polities are struggling to rise to the challenges posed by financial, economic and humanitarian crises. Much contemporary discourse revolves around a clash of ideas of citizenship, between more exclusive and more inclusive forms. Such debates became all the more urgent in the twentieth century because citizenship is now coupled not only with political rights, but with social rights as well. The challenge, Cooper suggests, is not to find a definitive solution one way or another between inclusive and exclusive conceptions of citizenship, but rather to think through this challenge in a world where individuals are located within a specific geo-political space, but not necessarily contained within it. An inclusive, democratic state must confront the diversity within its own boundaries, while at the same time welcome and integrate refugees and immigrants without losing its sense of collective identity altogether. In other words, the state has to 'balance commonality and social complexity' (p. 15). In our own age, this is the very opposite of what many states are currently doing.

Jochen Bung / Armin Engländer (Hrsg): Souveränität, Transstaatlichkeit und Weltverfassung (= Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie, Beiheft 153), Stuttgart: Franz Steiner / Nomos Verlag 2017, 133 S.

Rezensiert von
Helmut Goerlich, Leipzig

Der Band publiziert die Vorträge der Tagung der Internationalen Vereinigung für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie (IVR) im September 2014 in Passau. Vorgetragen hatten acht Referenten, alle etablierte Vertreter ihres Fachs. Nach dem Vorwort findet man eine Übersicht der Herausgeber, Ordinarien in Hamburg bzw. München zu Souveränität Transnationalität und Weltverfassung. Sie steht noch ganz im Licht des Multilateralismus, der seither gelitten

hat, aber unverändert großes Gewicht auf die Waage bringt.

Als erster stellt Reinhard Merkel den demokratischen Interventionismus in Frage, der heute ja auch von Multilateralisten gehandhabt wird. Hier wird dieser Interventionismus aller – auch der Unilateralisten – verhandelt. Merkel macht dabei auch Widerstand zum Thema. Der zweite Vortrag, gehalten von Mikail Antonov, St. Petersburg zu konservativer Philosophie und Souveränitätsdogmatik in englischer Sprache, verteidigt in reflektierter Weise die russische Sicht zugunsten einer auf Recht und Vernunft gegründeten internationalen Politik eines traditionalistischen und in diesem Rahmen auch Minderheitenschutz gewährenden herkömmlichen russischen Nationalismus, der auch auf eine Verbrüderung mit ähnlich ausgerichteten Gegenspielern aus dem Westen setzt.

Hauke Brunkhorst balanciert unter der Überschrift Recht und Revolution seine Thesen zum kantischen Konstitutionalismus auch als Schranke einer nur evolutionären Anpassung so aus, dass auch Raum für Widerstand in Maßen bleibt, der allerdings in der verfassunggebenden Gewalt des Volkes aufgehen soll – und so rechtsförmig gefasst werden kann..

Gunther Teubner verhandelt Paradoxien transnationaler Verfassungen. Ihm geht es dabei um transnationales Richterrecht, wobei er sich auseinandersetzt mit dem führenden Verfassungssoziologen der angelsächsischen Welt, nämlich Christopher Thornhill. Dieser vertritt, dass heute die verfassungsgebende Gewalt bei den nationalen Verfassungs- und vergleichbaren Gerichten, internationalen Gerichten und vielen transnationalen Schiedsgerichten liege; nach Teubners Beobachtungen geht damit eine Wiederkehr des Naturrechts einher, neben dem „Dauerboom“ von Grund- und Menschenrechten. Hinzukommt für ihn nicht nur das Wirtschaftsrecht in seinen Asymmetrien, sondern auch eine Konstitutionalisierung „von unten“ in den Protestbewegungen, die sich nicht nur gegen „den Staat“, sondern auch zielgerichtet gegen organisiert-professionelle Instanzen der Wirtschaft und anderer Funktionssysteme, die für Fehlentwicklungen verantwortlich gemacht werden, richten. Das sind ihm Indikatoren von Konstitutionalisierung in unterschiedlichen Intensitätsgraden. Dabei wird nicht alles nach außen verrechtlicht, sondern oft nur eine partielle Externalisierung erreicht. Dagegen sind Staatsverfassungen sozusagen Programm einer einseitigen Liebe, wie Teubner meint, die manchmal doch erwidert wird und daher Bestand hat und zur Entwicklung beiträgt.

Sabine Müller-Mal widmet sich nicht dem Raum an sich, sondern dem „Rechtsraum“ und zwar nach einer belastenden Vorgeschichte von Raum, Großraum und zudem „Volk ohne Raum“, nicht nur in Europa, sondern auch darüber hinaus. Sie will mithin Raum als zwangsläufigen Rechtsbegriff reklamieren. Sie sieht ihn nämlich vor allem als Folie im Hintergrund für ein besseres Verständnis von transnationalen und globalen Rechtsentwicklungen. „Rechtsraum“ löst sich dabei vom „Natur“raum, meint sie, und wird so zum „Beschreibungsbegriff“, der Ausdehnungen und Entgrenzungen des Rechts vorstellbar macht. Damit verabschiedet sie sich auch von älteren, quasi imperialen Raumvorstellungen und lässt diese auf sich beruhen. Allerdings müsste sich der Beitrag heute mit den Präsentationen und Er-

gebnissen des Münchner Symposions zum „Europäischen Rechtsraum“ zu Ehren des Richters des Bundesverfassungsgerichts Prof. Dr. P. M. Huber aus Anlass seines 60. Geburtstages vom Januar 2019 auseinandersetzen (dazu ein Hinweis in EuGRZ 2019, S. 155 ff.).

Stefan Kadelbach, behandelt „Konstitutionalisierung und Rechtspluralismus“ als Konkurrenten mit je eigenen Ordnungsentwürfen. Beide Konzepte hegen eine Vorstellung vom Bewusstsein der Rechtssubjekte. Sie unterscheiden sich aber in ihren Annahmen darüber, wie dieses Bewusstsein in die äußere Wirklichkeit tritt. Wenn innere Eigenschaften einer Norm ihren Geltungsanspruch prägen, sie aber dennoch von einer äußeren Anerkennung abhängig sind, dann kommt es nach der These von Kadelbach zu einer kontextgebundenen Brechung universeller Norminhalte. Daher können auch Menschenrechte sehr verschieden wirken – so kann etwa die Religionsfreiheit einerseits die Freiheit der Gläubigen schützen, und andererseits in einem anderen Kontext die Macht der Staatsreligion stärken. Die Brechungen der gesellschaftlichen Psychologie, insbesondere wie sie in rechtlicher Form wirkt, das ist nicht allgemeingültig und nur in Grenzen vorhersehbar.

Peter Keller, sprach über die Geltung sozialer Normen. Dieser letzte Vortrag schloss gut an Kadelbachs Erwägungen zur gesellschaftlichen Psychologie an. Nach einer sehr ausdifferenzierten Analyse der Normbegriffe vergleicht dieser Untersuchung soziale, konventionale und rechtliche Normen, was die Geltung, die Reichweite und die prägende Kraft der jeweiligen Norm angeht. Damit erweist sich die sozialphilosophische Öffnung, zu der man in der Tradition von Hans Kelsen her ohne Weiteres fähig ist. Etwas, was – wie man heute endlich dank Horst Dreier weiß - lange in Deutschland nicht gesehen wurde.

Insgesamt war die Tagung mit einem breiten Spektrum von Fragen befasst, die sich in dem weltumspannenden Titel des Bandes spiegeln. Ob diese Themen wirklich zusammengehören, das muss nicht entschieden werden, schon deshalb und dann nicht, wenn jeder Beitrag sich selbst trägt, und so eine sinnvolle Ergänzung des aktuellen Spektrums der Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie darstellt. Die globale Perspektive ist allemal gewahrt, die Realitäten der schwindenden normativen Kraft selbst der Menschenrechte ist ins Auge gefasst und der Versuch unternommen, sich solchen Entwicklungen zu stellen. Diese Entwicklung verunsichert und verleitet manchen zum Rückgriff auf einen Unilateralismus. Darin liegt indes keine tragfähige Lösung. Zunächst sollte man genauer hinsehen: Es gibt nämlich auf der anderen Seite aus schlichten Gründen zweifellos ein gemeinsames Band der Sachfragen und hier durchgehend in der Abfolge der Beiträge dieses Buches. Sie alle sind befasst mit grenzüberschreitenden Fragen und Phänomenen, von der sei es auch humanitär legitimierten Intervention und der wie eh und je postulierten sowie als Ordnungselement fungierenden Souveränität als ihrem unverzichtbaren Gegenstück bis zur Revolution und Wandel des Rechts sowie der Herausbildung transnationaler Verfassungselemente und dem Rechtsbegriff des Rechtsraums und alsdann mit einem zu ordnenden Rechtspluralismus und entgrenzter Normtheorie. Insofern führte ein fester Faden durch das Labyrinth der Tagung, der unschwer zu finden war. Er

geleitet nun hintergründig auch durch den Band und macht diesen als kleines Gesamtwerk verständlich. Insofern haben die Organisatoren der Tagung und die Herausgeber des Bandes gute Arbeit geleistet. Sie machen das sowohl in ihrem Vorwort als auch in ihren einleitenden Bemerkungen unter dem Titel des Buches mit Bezügen nicht auf philosophische Klassiker wie Immanuel Kant, sondern auch auf das Bundesverfassungsgericht deutlich. Erst dadurch stößt man auf den Sinn hinter dem Duktus der Reihe der einzelnen Beiträge, den die einzelnen Autoren nicht aufzuschließen veranlasst waren. Für sie lag er mit der Aufgabenstellung ihres Vortrages im Rahmen der gesamten Thematik der Tagung gewiss auf der Hand. Hier ist abschließend dieser Hintergrund aufzuhellen, um die Gesamtveranstaltung hinreichend zu würdigen. Nach allem ist die Lektüre mit Nachdruck zu empfehlen.

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