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**Narrating World History
after the Global Turn:
The Cambridge World History (2015)**

**Ed. by Matthias Middell and
Katja Castryck-Naumann**



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Editorial

With this issue we close the 29th year of a journal that owes its beginning to the special circumstances of the upheaval of 1989. Until autumn of this year, it was almost impossible to dream of founding an academic journal for Leipzig's school of world history writing led by scholars like Walter Markov and Manfred Kossok, because real-socialism in its East German variant was characterized above all by inscrutable bureaucratic rules that concealed the desired control over thoughts and concepts. True, the leading historical journal in the country, the *Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft*, was open not only to national history narratives and hosted also debates on the world historical importance of past events but this remained unsystematic and often heavily impacted by an orthodox understanding of Marxism-Leninism. The other review that could have become home for world history approaches, the journal "*Asien-Afrika-Lateinamerika*" founded in 1973 as successor to the Leipzig based yearbook of the same title, had developed into a place where contemporary issues and current political strategies of the GDR-government towards the so-called Third world dominated completely.

The only possibility to publish on a regular basis comparative historical research based upon case studies dealing with different world regions where small booklets appearing four times a year undercover as teaching material for university purposes. These "*Leipziger Beiträge zur Revolutionsforschung*" brought through the approval process in small print runs, were at least connected to a trunk of loyal readers, even if most of them thought twice during the transition to the new currency in 1990 whether the ideas published in *Comparativ* would now be worth West German money. Clemens Heller of the *Maison des Sciences de l'Homme* in Paris stepped in and generously provided the cost of printing the first two issues as venture capital and also bought the first subscription in France.

An intellectual tradition of world historiography was to be continued, while at the same time the standards for writing history were subject to rapid change – locally and globally. Some time passed before the journal took its place among the new journals of global history, and here is an opportunity to thank all the authors who entrusted us with their ideas for thematic issues and essays, although elsewhere it might have given them more reputation and fuel for a mainstream career. What has distinguished the magazine on the

one hand and continues to do so today is a strong sense of community. But this community, contrary to many a grudging prediction, has not simply remained stable and slowly become “historical”, but has grown and changed. Since a memorable founding meeting in 2002, the European Network in Universal and Global History has been the institutional framework of this community and has been constantly changing and thoroughly rejuvenated in the course of numerous congresses on world and global history.

This thematic issue follows earlier attempts to provide an interim balance or at least some orientation along the way on what happens to the field of world and global history writing. In 1994, we asked for the first time in a thematic issue of *Comparativ* about the relationship between older world history and more recent global history, and the distinction has since found many supporters, but also variants of its justification. In an issue appearing in 2000 on skulls and bones as objects and subjects of a history of humanity we addressed the issue of the fundamental turn away from Eurocentrism in anthropology and world history writing.

In between we explored in the now 170 issues the many facets of the global with focus on social, cultural, political, economic histories as well as their spatial framing.

In 2010, we devoted another themed issue to the then current trends in global history and observed with some surprise the double trend that global history has now become an empirical matter, expressed in dissertations, journal articles, and research monographs with a well-defined subject matter and corpus of sources, while at the same time „world history“ of classical coinage has not only survived in one or many volumes, but has experienced a true renaissance and has met with abundant demand. This boom is far from over. The appetite for a complete narrative of world history has rather increased and it is no coincidence that this issue is mainly about one particular example, the *Cambridge World History*, which appeared in 2015 under the main responsibility of Merry E. Wiesner-Hanks from the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee. We asked specialists from various epochs and approaches to discuss one volume each for us and tried to make an overall interpretation ourselves. The total of nine volumes do not make it easy to keep track of the whole, as they are a collective work of more than 200 authors. State of the art in a way, but also a collection of very individual manuscripts. Can trends and commonalities be read from them, or do we have to capitulate in the end to the diversity? The contributions in this issue seek to find an answer together. And perhaps a rudimentary analysis of the composition of this authorship will help us to understand what global history confronts us in this narrative.

The *Cambridge World History* is evidently an important milestone in the development of the field, given already the wide dissemination and the high quality of the contributions made to become a major reference in the classroom everywhere. But at the same time this is not the ultimate word global historians have to say. On the contrary, it is an invitation to take notice of the achieved level of scholarship in order to go beyond. *Comparativ* will continue to accompany historiography critically on this path and give space for innovative approaches.

Matthias Middell / Katja Castryck-Naumann

The Cambridge World History as a Result of the Generational Effort to Renew World History Writing. Introduction

Matthias Middell

Sitting in front of an editorial monument whose ambition is to represent the whole history of humankind – written by more than 200 proven experts – invites reflection on where we stand with global history. This is the reason why we devote a whole thematic issue of *Comparativ* to the Cambridge World History (CWH). We think the nine volumes merit detailed analysis, and at the same time, we devote some more-synthetic observations to the whole enterprise.

The CWH, which came out in 2015, is by far not the only massive attempt to bring world or global history into a book-length format; we can refer here to a previous issue of *Comparativ* in 2010, which focuses on world history writing. In this issue, we already observed a dual trend. One trend was leading to a growing number of research monographs produced by a younger generation of scholars to whom contributing to global history is, above all, a question of empirical investigation and a turn towards transnational archival configurations. The other trend was leading to the renewal of large-scale narratives integrating the results of the former trend.¹ Both trends have since 2010 only further accelerated. Global history has become so much more attractive – even to historians without any former interest in large-scale interpretations – that it has proven difficult to determine where the boundaries of the field are. As a consequence, Sebastian Conrad in-

1 M. Middell (ed.), *Die Verwandlung der Weltgeschichtsschreibung* (= *Comparativ* 20 [2010] 6), Leipzig 2010. Peer Vries and Hans-Heinrich Nolte had analysed in this issue Jürgen Osterhammel's monumental synthesis "Transformation of the World" (2009; English translation published in 2014), while other authors had a look at more general developments in the field.

sists in his introduction to *What is Global History?* that it is rather a specific attitude than a subfield of general historiography.² This view has been confirmed by other authors³ and has turned out to be an appealing definition because it allows almost everyone to declare him- or herself a global historian without too much hesitation about further qualifications and consequences. Such a standpoint avoids any distinction according to the strict criteria required to classify what is and what is not global or world history. The global historical “perspective” is relatively vaguely defined but contains in any case the integration of developments across continents without being necessarily of planetary scope. Transregional histories as well as transnational histories thus are not necessarily distinct from global histories.⁴

This flexibility has continuously inspired debates at conferences about whether these terms are simply interchangeable or refer to distinct ways of doing research and narrating history. Notwithstanding the lacking distinction, the advantage is that global history remains an open and integrative field and allows specialists on all kinds of empirical problems to contribute without feeling excluded from the growing market for global historical scholarship. Such a growth has become visible not only in the increasing number of job advertisements but also in the growing demand from the public and in the almost insatiable hunger among publishers for new book series, handbooks, or comprehensive stories about the world. All of them refer to *global* or *transnational* as a particular (still not very much defined) quality.

This has inspired pioneers of the world history movement, which first grew in the USA in the late 1980s and early 1990s, to canonize what they achieved over these two decades. Beyond providing individual answers to the question of what world or global history is or should be, these scholars created a book market with a whole series of publications that mirror a growing consensus.⁵ The field has reached a certain level of maturity, and a new generation of young scholars is no longer converting to global history, as the generation before had done, but has been attracted to the field since their first days of study. The breakthrough from a rather marginalized position to a certain centrality in today’s practice of historical writing (a centrality that, however, cannot act as a diagnosis for all parts of the world to the same extent⁶) has led some authors to challenge the growing sentiment of satisfaction.⁷

2 S. Conrad, *What is Global History?*, Princeton 2016.

3 R. Wenzlhuemer, *Globalgeschichte schreiben. Eine Einführung in 6 Episoden*, Konstanz, München 2017.

4 For a more precise distinction see M. Middell (ed.), *The Routledge Handbook of Transregional Studies*, London 2018. On the relationship between transnational and global histories one can refer back to J. Osterhammel, *Geschichtswissenschaft jenseits des Nationalstaats. Studien zu Beziehungsgeschichte und Zivilisationsvergleich*, Göttingen 2001.

5 J. H. Bentley (ed.), *The Oxford Handbook of World History*, Oxford, New York 2011; M. Berg (ed.), *Writing the History of the Global. Challenges for the 21st Century*, Oxford 2013; J. Belich / J. Darwin / M. Frenz / Ch. Wickham (eds.), *The Prospect of Global History*, Oxford 2016.

6 S. Beckert / D. Sachsenmaier (eds.), *Global History, Globally. Research and Practice around the World*, London 2018; M. Middell (ed.), *Global History Writing. European Perspectives*, London 2019.

7 J. Adelman, *Is global history still possible, or has it had its moment?*, in: Aeon (2017), <https://aeon.co/essays/is-global-history-still-possible-or-has-it-had-its-moment> (accessed 18 July 2020).

This has to do mainly with two trends. The first was internal. One could cynically remark that the marginal discovery/perception that things are connected is shrinking – compared to the success such a conceptual point of departure offered in the 1990s and 2000s. Of course, the empirical research on transregional entanglements continues, but the surprise effect with which corresponding studies were published just a few years ago has worn off somewhat. It is now standard to see the world as entangled or connected, following these links across archives and reconstructing how various actors, elites, and others have connected the world. Long-distance traders and entrepreneurs of multinational corporations, as a well as sailors, migrants, administrators in international organizations, and many more, have contributed to situations where, to a growing degree, societies became dependent on each other and no longer had a realistic chance to retire from entanglements as such – although the individual connections may have been cut or weakened.

But is the picture of an evergrowing interconnectedness sufficient to mirror the complexities of global trends. Against a background of years, if not even already decades, of enthusiasm concerning the transgression of borders, doubts have been expressed more and more loudly. These doubts have been fuelled by tendencies in the world outside academia. What is known as the financial crisis of 2008–2010 had shattered parts of the globalization ideology so dominant in the two decades before. This globalization, which was presented beforehand as a kind of natural force without leaving space for alternatives, all of a sudden took on individual faces – often not very sympathetic ones when we think of the *nouveau riche* among the speculative bankers who often fell from the pedestal from one moment to the next. And states, whose representatives had insisted that they cannot do very much against the anonymous forces of the market, surprisingly proved capable of bailing out banks. This inspired interestingly enough not only criticism from the left but also a tendency towards renationalization and recentring on a supposed unique West and related white supremacy. What can be summarized as the right-wing populist turn has also challenged some of the underlying assumptions inscribed upon globalization theories, including parts of global history that had mirrored them.

All in all, this has opened a box of self-criticism, which, in turn, has its merits when it comes to the stimulation of further reflexivity.⁸ Notwithstanding, does it paint the right picture of what has to be criticized? To find an answer to that question is not as easy as it seems. Global history has a diversified history of its own, and it is present in different historiographies – regarding their geographies and their epochal foci – in very different ways.⁹ It is challenging to get a full picture of the landscape because many languages have to be mastered and many academic traditions have to be considered. Therefore, working against the impression given by standard bibliographies distributed to freshmen at college, we must start from the idea that global history not only is done in a few

8 R. Drayton/D. Motadel, Discussion. The futures of global history, in: *Journal of Global History* 13 (2018) 1, pp. 1–21.

9 D. Woolf, *A Global History of History*, Cambridge 2011.

universities by a few prominent stars of the community but also is a much broader and highly diversified phenomenon.

Some researchers have evidently specialized in the histories of entanglements, with a few never forgetting that someone controls the flow circulating along these lines of connectedness and that power asymmetries evolve out of such controlling (including bordering) activities and out of the profits gained by dominating the channels of mobility. In contrast, others in such an entanglement lose and remain marginalized as well as controlled. For historians, who do not have the ambition to produce a theory about something that is completely new but to reconstruct the contradictory past of the world today, this all has not come as a surprise. The question is not whether the world is entangled or not but rather how this translates into the historical change, including the transformation of mobilities and control options towards such mobilities. Without any doubt, the world has been and is on the move,¹⁰ but we should not forget that this movement leads to a variety of spatial formats (territorial and non-territorial ones) used by different actors to frame their interactions and that there is a choice to be made on how to arrange spatial formats to a complex spatial order, which is chosen by the one or the other society.¹¹

When looking into current research, we observe the dominating impression that scholars have been interested more in mobilities than in such frames and their emergence over a very long time. Nevertheless, this was never the sole focus of global history research. Let us think only of the many contributions to imperial history and to the history of nation-states acting under the global condition, or of international organizations, or of power relations within commodity chains, and so on. And this is even more true when we skim through the many variants of global history synthesis published over the past ten years or so. None of these studies have focused on mobilities, connections, and circulations only, instead embedding them in one way or the other into histories of statehood (imperial or national) and into institutionalized international cooperation (economic, political, or cultural).

Insofar, one may ask if global history needs a complete U-turn or rather a soft recalibration when being confronted with the criticism that it has exaggerated the story of connections to the disadvantage of the spatial fix, as David Harvey called it almost 30 years ago. The question whether globalization has come or is about to come to an end since trade wars are launched and severe anti-migration laws are introduced is a question that only makes sense when balanced against a definition of globalization that perceives the phenomenon as something completely new and identifies it solely with border transgression.¹²

10 T. Cresswell, *On the Move. Mobility in the Modern Western World*, Hoboken 2012.

11 This argument is developed in further detail in S. Marung / M. Middell, *The Respatialization of the World as one of the Driving Dialectics under the Global Condition*, in: S. Marung / M. Middell (eds), *Spatial Formats under the Global Condition*, Berlin 2019, pp. 1–15.

12 See the short video with the very suggestive title “Will Covid-19 kill Globalization?” published by *The Economist* on 30 September 2020, <https://youtu.be/KJhlo6DtJlk> (accessed 18 October 2020). The diagnosis here is a turn to “slowbalization” where globalization is on retreat and humanity enters a “dark period”.

The CWH, which is the focus of this issue, can be taken as an example of such integration of the (relatively new) attention to connectedness into the already existing structures of world history writing.¹³ To have a closer look at this giant work – put together by Merry E. Wiesner-Hanks, who is known for her long-standing efforts to bring transnational and global perspectives to gender history and to give gender perspectives the appropriate place within global history narratives¹⁴ – may help us understand where we are with the development of global history both as a specialized field and as a perspective open to all historians.

1. A Monument of Generational Effort

With over 200 contributors, the nine volumes of the CWH offer an impressive cross-section of current production in the field of world history, so it might be interesting in this introduction to take a closer look at the construction principles of the narrative, with the individual articles in this issue taking a closer look at the individual volumes. Not surprising, authority over the structure of the narrative is hierarchically distributed. Overall, editor Merry E. Wiesner-Hanks represents the enterprise as a whole¹⁵ – with a 17-member editorial board, from which the volumes' editors were recruited, assisting her. Since the partition of the whole work into seven volumes (two of them coming in two parts each) involves both basic decisions about periodization and the proportions of the items to be considered, there is likely to be close interaction between the chief editor and the editorial board.

Looking at this volume structure, the first thing that stands out is the decision for a broad chronology, which strongly suggests cooperation between historians and archaeologists as well as the involvement of anthropologists. Although the preface opens with a critical reference to the tradition of the Cambridge Histories, which were announced as the “largest and most comprehensive” works in the English language of their time and which, occasionally, even promised to reflect “every major theme”, the author was tempted to find the formula “comprehensive but not exhaustive”.¹⁶ Visibly, the project is very much inspired by the concept of North American world history, which is significantly

13 For overviews on this particular field within the general history of historiography, see, e.g., H. Inglebert, *Le monde, l'histoire. Essai sur les histoires universelles*, Paris 2014; J. Osterhammel, *World History*, in: D. Woolf/A. Schneider (eds.), *Oxford History of Historical Writing*, Vol. 5: *Historical Writing since 1945*, Oxford 2011, pp. 93–112; M. Middell/K. Naumann, *The Writing of World History in Europe from the Middle of the Nineteenth Century to the Present. Conceptual Renewal and Challenge to National Histories*, in: M. Middell/L. Roura (eds.), *Transnational Challenges to National History Writing*, Basingstoke/New York 2013, pp. 54–139; with focus on the comparison between the USA, China, and Germany: D. Sachsenmaier, *Global Perspectives on Global History. Theories and Approaches in a Connected World*, Cambridge/New York 2011.

14 M. E. Wiesner-Hanks, *Crossing borders in transnational gender history*, in: *Journal of Global History* 6 (2011) 3, pp. 357–380.

15 Besides the general introduction to the CWH, see also the video with a sort of takeaway what the many volumes are about: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NVLUwLxiTOo>.

16 Preface, CWH I, p. XV.

driven by the efforts to reform the education of undergraduates in college. This is also obvious when one looks at the composition of the project's editorial board: of the 18 editors coming from universities, eleven come from North America, two from Australia, one from Great Britain, one from Israel, one from Japan, one from Jamaica, and one from the Netherlands.

This dominance of professors from US universities continues unabated in the composition of authorship, which is not particularly surprising when one considers the role of the editorial board and those responsible for recruiting the authors of individual articles. The editors of the individual volumes come from only five countries (USA, Great Britain, Australia, Israel, and, in one case, France as a temporary dual association with the Collège de France, adding a little more colour to the composition), whereas the authors come from no less than 19 countries. However, the overwhelming majority of them are also active in US institutions. This dominance is legitimized by the general editor with the finding that "contemporary world and global history is overwhelmingly Anglophone, and, given the scholarly diaspora, disproportionally institutionally situated in the United States and the United Kingdom".¹⁷

Whether this is true or not is the subject of scientific debate.¹⁸ Above all, however, such an assessment clashes with the thesis advocated in the same volume that world history is ultimately pursued everywhere, albeit in very different ways, because it is a necessity for the orientation of societies in their broader environment.¹⁹ After having read the strong demarcation to earlier Cambridge Histories, which are very clearly denounced as Eurocentric,²⁰ and after having expected the whole project to be as multicentric – "global" perhaps? – as possible, one is surprised by such normative assumptions about who represents the "real" world or global history. Moreover, the selection of those who are responsible for the narrative in its many chapters is obviously based not only on pragmatic reasons but also on the assumption of a concentration of competence for world history narration in certain academic systems. At the same time, this rejects a naive multiperspectivity claim – as expressed by the editors of the first *History of Mankind*, developed by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization – and could only be tamed with difficulty later on when the incompatibility of the various (methodological) nationalisms came the fore.²¹

17 CWH I, p. XIX.

18 Dominic Sachsenmaier seems to confirm this with figures given in his comparative analysis (see footnote 13), but we have to consider that area studies in the USA had been much less institutionalized than in Germany. When the crisis of area studies was declared after 1989, and in particular after 2001 in the USA, many area historians found refuge in history departments, while nothing similar happened in Europe, where people remained in their traditional institutional setting of regional studies institutes. Comparing then the number of professors at history departments only results in biased figures.

19 CWH I, pp. 41–53.

20 CWH I, p. XIX.

21 K. Naumann, Mitreden über Weltgeschichte – die Beteiligung polnischer, tschechoslowakischer und ungarischer Historiker an der UNESCO-Scientific and Cultural History of Mankind (1952–1969), in: *Comparativ* 20 (2010) 6, pp. 186–226; P. Duedahl, Selling Mankind: UNESCO and the Invention of Global History, 1945–76, in: *Journal of World History* 22 (2011) 1, pp. 101–133; K. Naumann, Avenues and Confines of Globalizing the Past.

It is undoubtedly not the case that geographical origin or the take-up of a position in an academic institution necessarily has a determining influence on the relationship with the various centrisms – of which Eurocentrism is only one. Nor is it necessary to subscribe to the idea that the mix of authorship already provides sufficient symbolic protection against the danger of Eurocentrism. Rather, the problem, in my opinion, is that a strong criticism of Eurocentrism is formulated in countless places in the CWH, but the strategies for its implementation are not systematically reflected on at any point. Instead we are given two “guarantees” for the non-Eurocentric approach.

One argument for this is institutional. The North American world history movement is described as representing a new beginning in world historiography and a clear turning away from any European predecessors: Hegel, Marx, or Weber. Be that as it may, it is not clear which theoretical roots should take their place or which theoretical roots should be claimed or cut off instead. Or, perhaps, there should be strict refraining from any explicit theoretical foundation.

The second argument manifests itself in a very convincing way in the practice of the different volumes to present, after synthesizing contributions, the entire breadth of area expertise in chapters on different world regions. Thus, the knowledge system of area studies is taken as a basis, whose world-regional basic units, however, are also historically bounded constructs. What can be concluded from this perspective on the division of the world into different worlds of experience also remains unsaid. To some extent, the concept of multiple modernities shines through the pages of the CWH, as does the idea of a gradual synchronization of many world histories into one global history. Nonetheless, after reading the introduction to the complete work, this question is somehow still unanswered, and one has to be content with different answers in the individual volumes or even individual chapters. The narrative strategy that follows is one of diversity and of loose ends lying side by side.

As Marnie Hughes-Warrington understandably suspects, universal stories are the primitive forms of world historiography.²² The CWH reflects the consensus of many contemporary historians that such universalism is now outdated and old-fashioned because it forces the manifold historical experiences into a much too coherent narrative. This model has been replaced by a massive mobilization of knowledge from area studies and scholars from all parts of the world.²³ The result is a panorama of recent empirical findings, under which not only universal historical concepts of the past collapse but also coherent narrative strategies are either obsolete or at least difficult to formulate. Such strategies had been the signature of an age of professionalization of (also) the historical disciplines, which was also the age of a very specific response to the challenge of the

UNESCO's International Commission for a Scientific and Cultural History of Mankind (1952–1969), in: M. Herren (ed.), *Networks in Times of Transition. Toward a Transcultural History of International Organisations*, Heidelberg 2014, pp. 187–200.

22 CWH I, p. 47.

23 K. Naumann/T. Loschke/S. Marung/M. Middell (eds.), *In Search of Other Worlds. Towards a Cross-Regional History of Area Studies*, Leipzig 2018.

global, namely imperialism and nationalism. Today, the world has become or is about to become polycentric which may also mean that world history has lost its centre but world history writing conceptualizes the (emerging) polycentric structure by hints at diversity and parallel developments.

Let us return to the composition of the editorial board. It proves to be surprisingly homogeneous not only in terms of geographical location. The board consists of 4 female historians and 14 male historians: the men were born between 1938 and 1961; the women, with one exception, were born between 1950 and 1953. The average age of the editorial board in 2015 was just over 64 years, although the dispersion is remarkably small; most editors were in the first half of their seventies when the complete work was published and were thus generally at the peak of their individual academic careers during the production process of the CWH. The proximity of numerous (though, by no means, all) members to the World History Association, which was founded in 1982 and has had its own journal since 1990, is striking. Its central figure, Jerry H. Bentley, who taught at the University of Hawaii until his death²⁴, had also published a handbook on world history and had written a widely used university textbook with his colleague Herbert F. Ziegler.²⁵ Other co-editors contributed to the textbook *Worlds Apart, Worlds Together*, which was, and still is, also widely used in North American colleges.²⁶

The CWH was thus able to build on already tested narrative patterns, supplementing them selectively by incorporating the results of the debate on so-called Big History, which is primarily concerned with the relationship between Earth and human history; with the California School of Global History, with its focus on the comparison between European and Asian developments; and with a larger number of input from the various area studies. We are thus dealing with an extensive collective enterprise, whose authorship is unexpectedly homogeneous and which has been shaped by the organizational and intellectual consolidation of the world history movement in the United States since the early 1980s – a powerful grouping that has worked to establish a new teaching of history at colleges and a new view of history in academic production.

2. The Structure of the Work

Following Massimo Livi Bacci's estimates of the world population,²⁷ David Christian gives a very memorable rule of thumb for the classification into a total of seven books (in nine volumes): despite the enormous time span covered by a Palaeolithic period (however calculated), only about 12 per cent of all modern people ever living lived in

24 M. Middell/K. Naumann, Globalizing History and Historicizing Globalization. In Memoriam Jerry Bentley, in: *Comparativ* 22 (2012) 6, pp. 7–10.

25 J. H. Bentley/H. F. Ziegler, *Traditions & Encounters. A Global Perspective on the Past*, Boston 2000.

26 R. L. Tignor et al. (eds.), *Worlds Together, Worlds Apart. A History of the World from the Beginnings of Humankind to the Present*, 2 Vols, New York/London 2008.

27 M. Livi-Bacci, *A Concise History of World Population*, Oxford 1992.

this period, which is why only the second half of the first book is dedicated to them. The period between the end of the Palaeolithic and 1750 accounted for 80 per cent of mankind, which is why a total of six volumes are dedicated to them, and one of the last two volumes (albeit divided into two halves) deals with the comparatively few years since 1750, in which only about eight per cent of mankind spent their lives despite rapidly increasing numbers. Such a planetary perspective on the entire genus sets the tone for the narrative in vol. I. It is about looking at the fate and experiences of humanity – no longer, however, in a naively positivist enumeration of all history in a tour of the world's regions but as a problematized historical construction.

Christian highlights the role of climate change in the exit of humanity from its original habitat in Africa and the mastery of fire as a key distinguishing feature of modern human beings from their more or less close relatives. Migration became the central technique used by nomadic people in the Palaeolithic period as a fascinating ability to adapt to very different life circumstances, which manifested itself in very different dimensions of their cultural endowment (from language to the use of tools and the expression of specific social structures). Since this migration was asynchronous and strongly influenced by environmental conditions, a fragmentation of the narrative into different regional variants (also called case studies in the introduction) is an obvious narrative principle and, at the same time, introduces the quite different focus of the mobilized specialists. “Out of Africa” is the great motif of this narrative in the first volume. A common origin and common characteristics of humankind, which distinguish it from other species, are the solid pillars that support the unity of the world (and its history).

At the same time, however, the editors and authors are aware that it is precisely such a clear and somehow linear narrative that has drawn serious doubts and fundamental criticism. Overcoming such doubts demands more than introducing regional nuances. A world history that simply paces the globe epoch by epoch was successful at the beginning of the twentieth century but no longer stands up to the professional standards of the twenty-first century. This is probably why the first volume of the CWH is surprising in that it is dedicated half to a history of world historiography and half to a multifaceted account of the early history of humankind. The section on recent trends of world history writing makes several attempts to counter the accusation of any kind of centrism. Marnie Hughes-Warrington had already formulated in 2010 a text that touches upon these topics, offering a perspective that is taken up again in the CWH and articulates the programmatic approach that appears more covertly in other parts of the volume: “World history is, and probably will continue to be, characterized by multiplicity: first, in the use of data from different times and places; second, in the blending of many methods from a broad range of disciplines; third, in the diverse backgrounds and purposes of authors; and finally, in the mixture of narrative styles and organisational concepts.”²⁸ This idea

28 M. Hughes-Warrington, *World history, writing of*, in: W. H. McNeill et al. (eds.), *Encyclopedia of World History*, Great Barrington 2010, pp. 2847–2856, quote p. 2856; reproduced in CWH I, p. 53.

has become one of the standards when narrating world history. *Polyphony*, *overlapping periodizations*, and *changes of perspective* are the keywords of this narrative technique.

In keeping with this programmatic prelude, the volumes of the CWH are only arranged chronologically to a limited extent. Although they each claim to deal with an epochal context, they also take into account the fact that this context cannot be observed simultaneously in different parts of the world. After the Palaeolithic in vol. I, the next volume is devoted to the Neolithic revolution and the development of agriculture, together with the associated development of the interaction between sedentariness and nomadism. It ranges from 12000 BCE to about 500 BCE, and after only six more general chapters, it comes to the enormous diversity of features for individual regions under investigation. Vol. III, on the other hand, focuses on the origin of the city together with the new techniques of administration and information as well as the importance of rituals and the exercise of power for the period 4000 BCE to 1200 BCE; thus it prepares for vol. IV, which deals with the great empires and networks between 1200 BCE and 900 BCE. Vol. V cuts this periodization again and presents the expansion of transregional networks through exchange and conquest between 500 BCE and 1500 BCE. In this way, three processes that earlier world histories attempted to force into an unambiguous chronology, which necessarily privileged development in a single region over the time-shifted observation of similar processes in different regions, overlap. It is here that the CWH reveals its particular strength because it can offer the most prominent expertise in the (mostly Anglo-Saxon) world for the treatment of each of the world's regions.

World regions are not anachronistically constructed according to the “myth of continents”;²⁹ the result is that their design is not always guided by the same criteria in its analytical derivation. Sometimes a region of investigation results from the findings of archaeological (and now increasingly also genetic) research; sometimes its design and naming repeat an academic tradition that follows on from earlier state formations. But, regardless of such individual questions, reading these volumes gives the impression that, although the world was at times (weakly) connected by various flows of people, goods, and viruses, it ultimately disintegrates into its parts, in which, however, similar things happen with more or less delay. Here, an evolutionist narrative style that focuses on the sooner or later is countered by the organization of the volumes, which downgrades the non-simultaneity to an internal problem in the individual volume and instead emphasizes the common fate of humanity – a basic motif that often can be found in the production of the North American world history movement.

This perspective brings two points of view to the fore. On the one hand, it tries at all costs to avoid the accusation of Eurocentrism, which faces critical opprobrium, particularly in the many older traditions of world history writing presented in the first volume (quasi acting as a background film of the new world history). It is methodologically difficult to determine the proportions of Eurocentrism in such a huge text. We have therefore used

the index to evaluate which region is mentioned on how many pages. This procedure has its weaknesses because sometimes there is only one single mention in a sentence or enumeration, whereas sometimes the whole page is devoted to the description of historical events in a region (or a part of it). Nevertheless, on average, the procedure does give an impression of the volumes dedicated to the different parts of the world. It turns out that Asia – the most populous continent throughout almost the entire history of humankind – also receives by far the most attention, with 1,950 pages. It is followed by Europe, with 1,161 pages, or, if we add Russia, with 1,377 pages. The Americas are treated on only 1,050 pages (of which 286 are devoted to North America, 169 to Central America, and 310 to South America). Africa receives attention on 590 pages, and the Near and Middle East is explicitly mentioned on 365 pages, whereas Oceania plays a marginal role with 132 pages. The world history described in the CWH is thus one-third Asian, one-quarter European, almost one-fifth American, and only one-tenth African, not to mention the 6 per cent devoted to the Middle East.

On the other hand, this perspective suggests that the convergences should be dated as early as possible after the common departure from the original African homeland had developed into a heterogeneity of living conditions and forms of life determined by environmental influences and processes of adaptation reacting to them. David Northrup makes this part of the narrative particularly strong in his contribution, “From divergence to convergence: centrifugal and centripetal forces in history”, to vol. I³⁰ after Michael Lang expresses scepticism about universals in his contribution on the handling of periodization in nineteenth- and twentieth-century world history writing, placed immediately before the chapter by Northrup.³¹ Set up in such a way, Northrup can make his plea for an inclination of observing converging developments since about the year 1000, which, at any rate, avoids the cut around 1500, which is often emphasized in Eurocentric narratives, as well as the sole focus on the nineteenth century.

A look at the organization of the last two volumes – which, each published in two half-volumes, make up almost half of the CWH’s volumes – confirms that this world history cannot do without “early modern times” and “modern times”. Vol. VI deals with the construction of the globalizing world between 1400 and 1800, whereas vol. VII focuses on the relationship between “Production, Destruction, and Connection” since 1750, with two parts that discuss, on the one hand, the drawing of boundaries and, on the other hand, common transformations.

Following the general pattern of the volumes, recent history is first presented in overviews, followed by more in-depth descriptions of individual problems. We will not go into great detail here since the volumes are subject to individual review articles in this issue. At the very end of vol. VII.2, and the entire CWH, is a chapter on “Globalization, Anglo-American style” written by Thomas W. Zeiler. In a sense, he does not just introduce the concept of a certain globalization that has become central since the end of the

30 CWH I, pp. 110–131.

31 CWH I, pp. 84–109.

Cold War and that deserves attention in its capacity as a suggestive tool for the creation of a newly conceived unity of the world. His ambition goes further and sets a counterpoint to the introduction, which shuns clear definitions and pleads for the diversity of interwoven narratives.

Zeiler states that globalization has undoubtedly long historical roots, but in the narrower sense, it can only be spoken of from around 1800 onwards. Since then, Great Britain first and the United States later have had far superior power and have shaped globalization, however diverse the origins of its many phenomena may be. From nineteenth-century liberalism to the Reaganomics of the 1980s, the intellectual tradition, which understood globalization as the globalization of markets, has remained dominant. Under the combined effect of technological innovation and deregulating politics, a (albeit not linear) progressive expansion of global flows was achieved, with consequences for sovereignty and mass income. All the same, this success story was interrupted by US isolationism, by the impediments to capitalist expansion by Soviet-style communism, and by the long period of crisis and war from 1929 to 1945; although, even during this last phase, some globalization trends remained visible (from the cultural imprint of the GIs to the scientific cooperation that made the construction of the atomic bomb possible). On the other hand, the Cold War was, in Zeiler's reading, already characterized by a revival of globalization and increasing new momentum under American-British leadership, not least because the regulations introduced by the Labour government in Britain and the New Deal in the United States were now withdrawn and gave way to the model of rapidly advancing financialization. From the Reagan to the Clinton administration, the USA became the forerunner of market-oriented globalization, which was particularly well received in East Asia and made China a prime example of the economic growth that resulted from such market integration. However, the celebration did not last forever, and the crisis of 2008–2010 brought the already resounding criticism of globalization to a new loudness and gathered in the Occupy Wall Street movement. Nevertheless, Zeiler remains optimistic: "the long-term trend is now clear: the world has become more unified, and people from prime ministers to peasants have learned to take into account global conditions when making their decisions."³²

The last sentence of the CWH could be read as the motto not only of Zeiler's chapter but of the entire work: "Globalization is now among the defining trends in world history, and will likely remain so in the future."³³ A total of nine volumes with some 5,000 pages and 200 highly competent individual authors naturally paint a more nuanced picture than the apotheosis of an Anglo-Saxon globalization, which is summarized here in somewhat more detail and knows no alternatives. In fact, however, the idea of alternative developments as an underlying concept is sought in vain in the CWH, especially as the volumes approach the present. This is undoubtedly due to the fact that the understanding of globalization as a primarily Anglo-Saxon-dominated form of world affairs is certainly not

32 CWH VII.2, p. 512.

33 Ibid.

shared by all contributors, but there is hardly anything conceptually opposed to it. The research on the search for independent (though so far failed) variants of globalization,³⁴ which led from the internationalist workers' movement to the politics of the communist and socialist world movements and to the manifold emancipation efforts in the "Third World",³⁵ does not in fact appear in the CWH. Since relevant research has only recently been taken up more intensively, one might only be able to criticize on a very abstract level a work published five years ago. At the same time, however, it shows how every narrative of world history is time-bound in a double meaning: depending on the state of empirical research and depending on the sociopolitical debates to which it refers.

3. Perspectives

The reconstruction of the narrative styles of contemporary world history writing proves to be quite complex. Most of them are no longer written by individual authors and refer to a differentiated research landscape, which – as in other areas of historical studies – represents a veto power of the sources against narratives that are all too simplistic but which thus gain persuasive power or at least distinguishability. Nevertheless, they also have to serve the expectations of the readers that demand answers to great questions about (the state of) the unity of the world, about the subject of this history (i.e. humanity, which is usually treated in an abstract way and then differentiated geographically, temporally, and socially), and about a prognosis that can be read from the history to date. For world history, however justified and epistemologically anchored, should nevertheless allow positioning in world events – at least for differently aggregated collective actors if not for individuals. It seems obvious to focus on the experiences of such collective actors with the crises and economic cycles of interdependencies of various kinds. These interdependencies are described either as being characterized by power asymmetries or as resulting from the confrontation with "global challenges". Thus, a world history from the perspective of intensely interwoven societies that profit greatly from capital flows, the immigration of skilled workers, and the circulation of innovation is certainly different from a world history written against the background of (and to explain) centuries of peripheralization. The more recent boom in global history has produced these unequal histories simultaneously and now poses a challenge to what extent thinking and telling

34 See the summary of arguments towards the idea of a multiplicity of globalizations in: J. Osterhammel, *Die Flughöhe der Adler. Historische Essays zur globalen Gegenwart*, München 2017.

35 Among a series of contributions to this debate: O. Sanchez-Sibony, *Red Globalization. The Political Economy of the Soviet Cold War from Stalin to Khrushchev*, New York 2014; J. Mark/P. Apor, *Socialism Goes Global: Decolonization and the Making of a New Culture of Internationalism in Socialist Hungary, 1956–1989*, in: *Journal of Modern History* 87 (2015) 4, pp. 852–891; J. Mark/A. M. Kalinovsky/S. Marung (eds.), *Alternative Globalizations. Eastern Europe and the Postcolonial World*, Bloomington 2020; A. Calori/A.-K. Hartmetz/B. Kocsev (eds.), *Globalization Projects East and South. Spaces of Economic Interaction During the Cold War*, Berlin 2019; M. Middell (ed.), *Kommunismus jenseits des Eurozentrismus*, Berlin 2019; A. Getachew, *Worldmaking after Empire. The Rise and Fall of Self-determination*, Princeton 2019.

incompatible things together means a contribution to the further development of an awareness of the global condition.

If we look from a bird's-eye view at the huge text in its entirety that lies before us with the CWH, it becomes clear that, firstly, a rigid chronology is replaced by overlapping periodizations. One might suspect a lack of consensus on a binding chronology behind this, but this is rooted in more than literary stubbornness; rather, it reflects the findings of the empirical turn that world historical research has taken since the 1990s, namely the discovery of the divergent temporalities that characterize regions, groups of actors, and dimensions of global processes. While these divergent rhythms may remind us of Braudel's often-quoted scheme of the structures of long and medium durations and the ripple of waves in the history of events, they cannot be reduced to such a relatively simple model.

In the same way, secondly, the other fundamental category of historical development – space, after the refinements of its perception as a result of the spatial turn – poses a serious challenge. A simple division into world regions based on the continental division of geography has been problematized, as has the model of the Russian matryoshka dolls, according to which the local, regional, national, and continental are imagined as nestable scales of the global. The volumes of the CWH reflect numerous results of a discussion that has been revolving around globalization as a dialectic of de- and reterritorialization (without using this terminology) for a little more than a decade and, in the process, has discovered and made empirically describable spatial formats and spatial orders that allow us to better understand how the local and the transregional interact with one another in a variety of ways. The CWH demonstrates the usefulness of the spatial turn and a focus on processes of spatialization without developing explicitly such a conceptual framework. In contrast to a mode of telling world history as it emerged around 1900, the greater attention paid to the significance of space and spattialization processes – quite analogous to the growing attention paid to multiple temporalities – has resulted in numerous new structuring possibilities for narratives but also in much more complex demands on their organization.

A third basic problem for world-historical narratives in the beginning of the twenty-first century is the way in which the Eurocentric assumptions, also from the late nineteenth century, can be overcome, which finally led to modernization theory. In such an approach, world history resembles a convoy in which some societies are placed far ahead and reach the most advanced state first, followed by others – be it at the price of political and economic dependence or with the advantage of catching up with innovation at more favourable costs. That these assumptions were accompanied by imperial rule, colonization, and racism is now widely recognized and is often a reason to reject them explicitly. In a certain way, however, they have been renewed in the guise of the globalization ideology that has been emerging since the 1980s. This ideology, which should not be confused with the scientific study of global processes, tied in with teleological expectations of salvation and progress, declaring successful globalization to be without alternative and describing it both as an instrument and as the ultimate goal of future historical

development. Global historians have given very different answers to this intellectual-ideological challenge of the globalization ideology, mostly distancing themselves from reducing global history to a history of globalization – whatever might be meant by this formula. Nevertheless, this does not solve the problem raised.

The narrative of the CWH persists in answering two very important subquestions: what manifestations of global processes can be observed in the historical periods dealt with, and how do individual societies adapt to these processes and become intertwined in the process? These are, as said, extremely important aspects of the overall problem. At the same time, however, they also promote the notion that there is such a thing as “globalization”, which acts as the ultimate invisible hand behind the backs of humanity divided into many societies, cultures, and groups, perhaps even driving its course through world history. World history writing is located in a unique way in the tension between, on the one hand, the fascination with the sociopolitical debate for mechanisms without alternatives, which make only a certain politics seem possible, and, on the other hand, the rapidly growing attention in general historiography to contingency. Andrew Shryock and Daniel Lord Smail have shown in an article published in 2013, based on the mention of the word *contingency* in articles published in the *American Historical Review* for the period between 1975 and 2010, that after two inconspicuous decades, the use of the word *contingency* has been greatly increasing from 1995 onwards, rising to over 300 mentions per year – compared to an average level of 5 to 25 mentions per year before the mid-1990s. In their perception, this has been accompanied by the intensive questioning of deterministic metanarratives. However, they are more sceptical about the effect on narratives that cover longer periods of time.³⁶

One way out of this tension between the empirical findings of fuzzy causalities and multiple contingencies, on the one hand, and the need for simply carved explanations, on the other hand, could be to take the methodological innovation inherent in categories such as multiple modernities³⁷ seriously and to transfer it to global processes. Then the object of world history would not be globalization but a multitude of globalizations, and these globalizations would not form an anonymous structural context but could be assigned to very different groups of actors as undertakings, strategies, or even fantasies and imaginations. In fact, recent world histories offer an enormous amount of clues to a narrative that pursues these projects of dominating, shaping, and ordering the (respectively known and relevant) world. In a world in which we can currently observe the competition between different world order designs, such a perspective is actually quite obvious. Nobody will be able to claim that a power determines the world order or that, even from a single perspective, such an order could be described, let alone enforced. This is often deplored in current political discourses and is given a longing that is looking for a different state in the past. The task of a contemporary global history would presumably consist not of constantly feeding this illusion but of preparing for the fact that a clearly

36 A. Shryock/D. Lord Smail, History and the pre-, in: *The American Historical Review* 118 (2013) 2, pp. 709–737.

37 S. N. Eisenstadt, Multiple Modernities, in: *Daedalus* 129 (2000) 1, pp. 1–29.

ordered world that obeys the ideas of a certain group of actors alone can neither be expected in the future nor be observable in the past.

In any case, we are far away from the unquestionable dominance of a single concept of how the world should be shaped, which without would end all interdependencies. It is rather quite the contrary. The fact that the world histories at hand offer so much material on this topic is due not only to their characterization by the sociopolitical situation described above but also to the fact that they are based on a state of research that has largely abandoned structuralism and is looking for actor-centred approaches. To put globalization projects at the centre of future world history writing that compete and cooperate with each other, take over from each other, and refer to each other remains for the time being, however, rather a theoretical concept. But one probably does not do particularly wrong if one assumes that the world histories of the next generation will follow a concept of competing globalization projects instead of focusing on one type of Anglo-Saxon globalization alone, as described in Zeiler's final chapter to the CWH.

Narratives depend as much on preliminary conceptual decisions as on the compositional mastery of the editors or authors. To a great extent, they also rely on the current state of research. The CWH expresses in a very successful and highly competent way the state of an upturn in world history writing, teaching, and investigating on which a certain generation of mainly Anglo-American historians worked between the late 1980s and the 2010s. The CWH's presentation differs markedly from the way world history was told around 1900 or between 1950 and 1970 and makes visible what has been achieved in a phase in which global history has not only renewed itself but also, at the same time, given historiography as a whole rekindled social attention. Nonetheless, it also points to challenges that perhaps only the next generation of global historians will consistently address in their ways of telling world history.

We are very happy that we were able to find experts for the different epochs from different countries to examine the individual volumes of CWH. The reviews come to different conclusions, but they agree on some aspects. The first is the recognition of the incredible solidity of the many contributions to this CWH. It is truly a consistently reliable handbook that will set the standard for many years to come in presenting a vast number of historical developments that together form a sure guide through world history. Given the high quality of research on global history, this may not come as a total surprise, but it is a tremendous achievement on the part of the general editor and her advisory board to have maintained and secured this throughout all the volumes.

The second thought that is reflected in all the reviews of the individual volumes is the admiration for the skill with which the authors have managed to summarize immensely complex objects on usually no more than 20 or 25 pages while remaining readable even for an audience beyond academic readership. Some reviewers ask whether such short chapters are nevertheless the appropriate format for presenting world-historical developments.

The third idea follows on directly from this and emphasizes the broad perspective of this world history, which is based on a wide range of area studies expertise. To guarantee

this broad spectrum the number of authors and chapters had probably to be as high as it is. In this way, we hold in hand and store on our shelves a foundation of knowledge about a myriad of parallel developments that have become increasingly intertwined. This foundation forms the starting point for the next stage in the writing of world history, which is now being taken into the hands of a generation that has had different academic socialization experiences and was educated in a different political environment than the period immediately following the end of the Cold War. One can be curious about the new turns that the writing of world history will take.

Introducing World History, to 10,000 BCE. On CWH volume I

Katja Castryck-Naumann

The *Cambridge World History* is a chronological synthesis of the history of mankind from its beginnings until the present day. Accordingly, the first volume covers the origins of our species. But it is of interest to more than just those seeking an interpretation of the Palaeolithic within the history of the world (something to which I will return), for it begins with a 300-page overview of the subject as a whole, namely world history as a sub-discipline of history, in which approaches and themes that have shaped and defined scholarship in world history are presented. As David Christian, the editor of the volume, writes, readers not yet familiar with the field are introduced to the diversity of approaches, while for practitioners of world history, major themes are recapitulated, and less familiar aspects highlighted. David Christian's excellent introduction to this volume is recommended to everyone, since it offers far more than an extended table of contents or a distillation of the chapters to come. In particular, he outlines the central themes and arguments of each chapter in a larger context, and fittingly summarizes, compares, and connects them. The explicit objective of making the chapters authoritative without striving for completeness is clearly apparent.

The eleven chapters of the first volume provide an introduction to the development of world history research, questions of periodization, the relationship between world history and anthropology, and six thematic fields.

The decision to place the genealogies of today's world and global history at the beginning of the volume in two separate chapters (instead of mentioning them in passing) is firmly programmatic. Understanding the trajectories of one's own field is a less trodden path of self-reflection in English-language historiography than in say, European historiographies, and even among world historians, only a handful have addressed the manifold precursors of today's interest in global interpretations. Two of them are Marnie Hughes-Warrington and Dominic Sachsenmaier, who condense extensive research of their own here, and also

introduce a significant learning process within the field: namely that whoever creates new, contemporary world histories takes a different tack from earlier interpretations, and that the historicization of such conceptual changes can be extremely illuminating owing to the more precise understanding of which views of history are demolished and which futures the new narratives are aimed at.

A broad understanding of historiography is central to the two surveys on the genesis of world history. Attention is paid no longer just to research and teaching at modern-day universities, but also to the whole range of earlier traditions, including oral forms such as legends, myths, and songs. In addition, we assume today that at all times world history “could only possibly mean the history of one’s own world, that is, the world one was exposed to”, and that we can find world histories in any culture and time (p. 56). World history exists in plural and in parallel variants. Oral and religious traditions still thrive to this day; ignoring them would imply reproducing the Eurocentric outlook that world historiography has long been imbued with.

In her chapter (“Writing world history”), Marnie Hughes-Warrington introduces world history as the “one of the oldest, most persistent and most pliable forms of history writing” (p. 41). Since all history is world history (as searching for one’s own origins entails thinking about others), histories only differ in terms of the degree to which the purpose of making sense of the world is made explicit. Indigenous communities around the world made sense of their past, if not in writing, then in painting, song, or dance. Regarding ancient times, we know of rich traditions of Chinese, Islamic, and Mediterranean universal history writing which continued to flourish. As exchange between different countries and peoples increased, knowledge about the wider world increased, prompting revisions of earlier views and narratives. As of the fifteenth century, universal histories thrived, especially (but not only) in Europe, while later on, interest in the genre was spurred again by both the philosophical turn and the spread of literacy. Multi-authored and multi-volume universal histories as well as some single-authored works continued to be written in the centuries to come right up to the present day. Yet universal history was also increasingly criticized for being speculative and out of step with the professionalization of historiography, the emergence of history as an academic discipline, and the demand for rigorous analysis as well as the usage of primary sources. Although interest in the trajectories of civilizations and their interactions did not cease, during the twentieth century new efforts focused increasingly on relations between people(s) across the globe. Indeed, at the latest since the 1970s, a “relational shift” has characterized world history research, which consolidated relatively rapidly due to the founding of organizations, journals, conferences, and internet discussion forums devoted to world history. Offering much food for thought, the chapter by Marnie Hughes-Warrington is especially recommended to those seeking an overview of the formative authors and books from these different times. The same goes for the chapter by Dominic Sachsenmaier (“The evolution of world histories”), which drills down into some of the lines of development outlined above, yet also complements the chapter by Hughes-Warrington. For one thing, he outlines how Eurocentric world historical narratives, which became more pronounced in the context of co-

lonialism, travelled and were shared around the world in the course of the global reception of “Western-originating” education and research in history. The spread of academic historiography with its inherent hierarchies, including ordering the world in centres and peripheries of development, influenced how world history was thought and practised in different societies. However, it is interesting to note that whereas in Europe, world history written from the postulate of its own superiority and with little interest in other self-directed developments became more and more marginalized while the study of other regions was delegated to specialist disciplines, elsewhere – especially in the Ottoman Empire and Asia – the genre gained prominence. Western history writ large as world history served different purposes: it became a source of efforts towards modernization and a background against which alternative historical interpretations could be put forward, whether aiming at national formation efforts or Marxist-based historical interpretations. Overall, Sachsenmaier draws attention to local, regional, and national factors as well as differing political contexts influencing world historical research wherever it was and is practised. But this is not to say that we are dealing with monolithic, closed national or cultural traditions in which the history of the world is interpreted. Exchange in this field has been on the rise for some time, and today specificities are “enmeshed with an increasingly pluralistic and transnationally entangled landscape of border-crossing historical studies” (p. 76). Since the field is not identical all over the world and differences are likely to remain, Sachsenmaier argues that bringing these different traditions into sustained dialogue with each other is vital.

In both chapters, the spirit of optimism prevailing in the 1990s and early 2000s, when more and more historians from different branches of historiography turned against Eurocentrism and the prime focus on the nation, is apparent.

On the one hand, a broad alliance of all those interested in cross-border transfer, other cultures, and global processes arose during this period. Marnie Hughes-Warrington rightly points out that world history was and is written under very different labels – as universal, ecumenical, comparative, big, new world or global history, or as world-system studies. Her chapter, which is based on an essay in the *Encyclopedia of World History* (2010) edited by William McNeill, also takes in more recent approaches devoted to transnational, imperial, and post-colonial processes. Indeed, all of these perspectives aim to construct “a meaningful ‘world’ [...] taken from an entire meaningful system of existence or activity by historians and people in the past” (p. 41). My impression is, however, that this alliance is much less visible today than it was ten or fifteen years ago. World/global history, the new imperial history, and transnational studies have been institutionalized as separate fields; in many national research landscapes they are in sometimes fierce competition with each other, and it is not yet apparent that common answers to today’s challenges – such as the national backlash and the rising populist movements in many societies and in international politics – are being found again. Perhaps here, as in other chapters of the volume, we read about methodological innovations, about disciplinary and interdisciplinary coalitions, which are formative for an ending period of world historiography. At any rate, in view of developments in the years since the *Cambridge*

World History was written, the conditions for researching and teaching world history have changed, maybe more fundamentally than it is apparent.

On the other hand, many of those who began to anchor world history at universities with verve in the 1990s shared the hope and ambition that they would be able to transform general academic historiography with strong research into world history. Does this ambition still exist today? When transnational and global history became centres of innovation in historiography, many argued that this new role should be used to establish balanced exchanges and relations between historians from different parts of the globe. A “more decentred network of collaboration around the world [is] still a project for the future” according to Sachsenmaier (p. 78). How the lasting worldwide integration of the historical sciences can be achieved alongside a sustained global field of world historical scholarship is a question that is rightly posed here. Finding answers to it will doubtless influence future trajectories of world historical thinking.

These two contributions are followed by two chapters on periodization questions. Michael Lang (“Evolution, rupture, and periodization”) invites us to tackle the challenge – or rather the perhaps insoluble dilemma – that national lines of development can no longer be regarded as a natural framework for general historical periodization. However, narratives which depict the history of humankind as an evolutionary process bear the risk of universalization. In addition, world historians are increasingly re-perspectivizing human history as a history of the Anthropocene. In neighbouring fields such as post-colonial history, by contrast, there is a tendency to continue the history of colonialism and decolonization into the present day as well as to think in terms of the ongoing and current challenges of the postcolonial situation. Both sides may be reacting to similar or linked phenomena, but they are moving apart from each other. What will it take to start a conversation about how these two tendencies can be combined or at least related to each other?

David Northrup in his chapter (“From divergence to convergence: centrifugal and centripetal forces in history”) proposes dividing the history of mankind into two phases: a long period marked by processes of divergence and diversification, and a shorter period of the last 1,000 years, during which a trend towards convergence dominated. As Northrup points out, a watershed around 1500 could also be assumed, while other turning points are under discussion, too. Since good reasons are cited for each of these temporal divisions, it is rather unlikely that a *single* periodization will prevail. In my opinion, however, the question remains whether the new, more complex narratives developed of late are compatible with periodizations based on singular, detached dynamics, or whether multilayered, dialectical constellations, such as the co-constitution of difference and integration, are of greater analytical value.

Assessing all six articles that present individual thematic fields would go beyond the scope of this review. They differ from each other in various respects, from their conceptual framing to reader guidance. Some are also easily accessible to students, while others are more research-based. What they have in common is that they all consider a historically formative phenomenon over a long period of time on the basis of recent secondary

literature. We can read about the history of human thought, belief, and knowledge from its beginnings (Luke Clossey) as well as about the long history of technological innovation as a defining feature of humanity and a driver of historical change (Daniel R. Headrick). And we can see the many issues arising at the intersection of gender history and the history of mankind (Merry E. Wiesner-Hanks). Therefore, allow me to introduce three of these thematic chapters in some detail.

In his chapter “Fire and fuel in human history,” Johan Goudsblom discusses the bonds between humans and fire. Here, as in other chapters, particularities of the human species are underlined: “no other animal species has acquired the capacity to control fire and exploit the energy released by it.” This special bond is not only unique but also universal, and in fact, as Goudsblom writes, it is also the result of collective learning. All in all, the “human relationship to fire is unique, universal, and cultural.” (p. 185) This relationship led to the development of new technologies associated with fire and entailed a great deal of destruction as well as mankind’s serious vulnerability due to its increasing dependence on fire and fuels. One does not have to accept Goudsblom’s subdivision into five phases (a time before the domestication of fire, the fire regime, the agrarian regime, the industrial regime, and a current phase of transition) in its entirety to appreciate the long-term account he offers. His plea to recognize continuities between the different regimes in view of ongoing learning processes and to link the foundational changes in modes of production with the basic ability to use fire provides connecting points for many historians working on other topics. The same is true for the interrelation between the management of fire control and emerging forms of city government, which can be observed for example in fire protection measures, as well as in the changing relationship between urban and rural areas, the latter being the main providers of wood and other fuels. The author ends with a brief discussion of the situation nowadays. People often forget that electrification was based on fire, and that fire is still a central source of energy today. As the remaining fossil fuels are finite, “our present burning practices will have come to an end” and “if global trend to electrification should continue, we have to sever the bondage to fire and fuel.” This is undoubtedly the case. In view of this, however, we can also ask whether a world history of the human usage of fire, which starts at the beginning, is sufficient for an understanding of the present situation. What would be revealed if, instead of starting in the Palaeolithic, we contextualised the present threshold period in earlier phases of resource scarcity and associated learning processes?

Mary Jo Maynes and Ann Waltner’s chapter entitled “Family history and world history: from domestication to biopolitics” provides an insight into the intersections between family history and world history. Domestic life and families are a foundational theme for a history of humankind, if only because domestic life and families are basic settings in which individuals locate themselves. In their description, the authors refer to an expanded understanding of domestication, which includes not just the trend towards agriculture and herding, but also cognitive, social, and cultural processes characterizing early human settlement. This directs our attention to the cultural invention of human domestic life, which becomes apparent as a previously largely ignored driver of early

human history. Citing Clive Gamble, it is also argued here that “the world’s earliest village communities were also the first to develop fully modern minds and fully symbolic culture” (p. 208) including domestic culture, which has been a site of history ever since. Global history can gain a lot from the perspective of family history, Maynes and Waltern argue. Power was exercised and transmitted through dynastic inheritance; global business networks operated on trust within merchant houses and were connected to imperial control; household labour played a crucial role in economies; and legislation regulating families was used to strengthen the state. Biopolitics, the second conceptual tool used in the chapter, highlights the nexus between political control over the human body and the regulation of fertility and family structures. Indeed, as we can see, the family and politics are closely intertwined. The chapter offers a tour de force by illustrating the crucial role of the domestic throughout history and the far-ranging revisions that a global approach can offer. For example, the Palaeolithic was long regarded as a man’s world. But the notion of “men as the hunter” and main provider of food is misleading; even during early human history, women were responsible for not just reproduction but also production. Families and domestic dynamics also played a key role in the transition to agrarian societies, while the question of how to bring up children always influenced social structures and their development. By the early modern era, different forms of marriage and kinship had emerged across the globe, and they continued to multiply in the course of cross-cultural encounters. Colonial exchange appears to be a separate chapter in this trajectory, as marriages and other forms of sexual unions between colonizers and indigenous people were of importance for the racial ideologies underpinning colonial government (pp. 222ff). The family entered the realm of global politics, and in the centuries to come the domestic and the political became more and more closely connected. State authorities interfered strongly with family matters and viewed the management of their populations as their responsibility, as the conscription of young men, abortion legislation, the one-child policy, and the population politics of fascist regimes and eugenics remind us. Biopolitical considerations gained new momentum in the post-war period, for example in the United Nations, which is not mentioned in this account. The Cold War rivalry intensified the politization of gender relations and domestic life as competing models were advocated and juxtaposed. As in other chapters, current trends are discussed very briefly at the end, and a readership interested in contemporary circumstances would enjoy further excursions in this regard. The issues currently at stake are numerous, including new forms of regulating sperm donation and international adoption. Global historical research on them could be a promising relevant field attractive to younger generations of historians, I believe.

As with any selection, it can be asked whether there are any other thematic fields that are fundamental to world history as the history of mankind, and as a reader I would have liked to see an explanation of why these phenomena and processes were chosen. It seems that they are presented here as authoritative themes because they have been foundational conditions and drivers of historical change throughout the ages. The examples chosen are definitely convincing, but they also encourage us to consider how the individual

elements relate to each other. Is this an argument for a history of mankind which comprises multiple aspects (technology, gender, etc.) and can be additionally supplemented by topics such as health, political orders or the economy? Or is a kind of basic structure developed here that stands on its own? In other words, are we reading a world history of the family, or a contribution to a world history in which the family is one of the central dimensions? In any event, the topics selected have only been on the agenda of world history research for a few years. Reference to more traditional areas of world historical reflection which are now also being examined from the perspectives of encounters, transfers and entanglements would have underlined the innovative capacity of the field. There is no question that migration is a genuinely world historical process, and Patrick Manning has written an impressive chapter on "Migration in human history" based on decades of research with insightful maps. Using a dense empirical approach, he shows basic patterns in human migration in a transepochal synopsis. People left their home regions for various reasons and along many routes, and moved to a destination where the landscape, culture and language were different. Some returned, some stayed, some moved on. In comparison with other species, the characteristics of human migration can be seen in cross-habitat migration and the reliance of humans on movement across water. This enabled *Homo sapiens* to occupy any territory on the Earth and remained a basic style of movement despite changing conditions (p. 279). Cross-community migration transformed the ecologies which were entered and involved adaptation. Migration has always been "connected with learning a new language and exchange of customs, technologies and innovations." (p. 280) Migration thus has a foundational social function: it creates and spreads innovation from one habitat to another, and therefore facilitates social evolution. The realization that migration accounts for most of the changes in human societies (*ibid.*) and that the study of migratory processes is crucial for understanding how learning was transmitted from generation to generation is groundbreaking. Furthermore, the findings of global migration history are paradigmatic for world historiography. First, they show that communities of all kinds "are all best studied not as discrete social groupings but as permeable groups linked to each other through voluntary and involuntary movements" (p. 277). Migration-related approaches illustrate heterogeneity, connections, and processes of interaction, and "facilitate an understanding of the multiple levels and scales at which human experience enfolds." Scales are specific to space and time, to the groups which migrate, and to the resulting social processes. Migration is not limited to the movement of people, but includes the spread of technology, ideas, goods, and of animals and plants. The fact that such an elaborate understanding leads to historical migration processes being studied with a wealth of methods, including genetic analysis, is an aspect that affects other areas of research. At any rate, as the chapter clearly shows, migration is a continuity in the history of mankind and will probably also shape the future. Patrick Manning's remarks can be taken further in many directions. In fact, much is already known about recruiters, dispatchers, supportive networks, gate keepers, mechanisms of maintaining contacts, and shifting identities, and there is some evidence that migration has increased over the millennia, even though there have been periods of

decreasing mobility. This makes it all the more interesting to look at moments of qualitative change in migration beyond the major phases that Manning identifies, and to embed them in the interplay of flow and control. What consequences does it have for global networking, for example, that people today are less inclined to move from densely into sparsely populated areas, but increasingly migrate from rural areas to cities, and therefore most urban settlers arrive from the hinterland rather than from far-flung places (p. 307)? Manning gives us one possible consequence to think about: migration between cities is continuing to increase, creating multilingual cities. We might therefore have “a multilingual rather than an English-only future” (p. 309).

Finally, there is the inspiring chapter by Jack Goody entitled “What does anthropology contribute to world history?” For a long time and for many practitioners, both fields had their place at opposite ends of the academic spectrum. Although anthropological research is not restricted to early and non-literate communities, beginning with the works of Bronislaw Malinowski, general interest shifted to particular societies with their peculiarities studied through observation while comparative and historical reflections were relegated to the margins of the discipline. Anthropologists who gravitated towards sociological research during the post-1945 period increased the divide between an interest in other cultures and macro-studies of development based on Western experience.

However, anthropology and world history are not as far apart as one might think, and in fact they have enormous potential to enrich each other, as Goody argues. Historians are trained to work in archives and libraries, mostly with written documents from the past. Only contemporary history uses oral sources and first-hand observations. Yet scholars from both fields have to reconcile explaining particular constellations, patterns, and developments with embedding them in wider contexts. For Goody, anthropology is of paramount value for historians as it helps make the study of the past less ethnocentric, and the history of the “West” less focused on Europe. It can do so in several ways. Studying other societies and early human communities can counter the bias in favour of one’s own culture. It can encourage usage of observational evidence in addition to written sources. And it helps historians abandon diffusionist perspectives that see other cultures as recipients of Western ideas, institutions etc. Changes are of course occurring in historical studies, perhaps especially within world history. Nevertheless, it is important to point out that pre-literate societies cultures “had their own story, or prehistory from the standpoint of writing, a life of their own, and this too is often misunderstood by historians.” The warning that historians “tend to neglect or misinterpret evidence from earlier times” and “to attribute uniqueness to the institutions of one’s own society, or to the west” (such as democracy, law, religion, even family) is rightly placed in the first volume of the *Cambridge World History*. As shown above, it offers a set of chapters which depict their subjects from earliest times up to the present. They are compelling examples of histories that do not regard other cultures as “savage.” Goody suggests an additional shift, namely to explain “the differences that existed between “us” and “them” [...] in more concrete terms, rather than by means of questionable developmental sources” (p. 266).

World historians can also profit from regional interests developed by some anthropologists. Studies of Africa as whole, for example, addressed broader questions and paved the way for comparison. They cut the cake in a different way, though. The broader perspectives did not aim primarily at taking the “East” into account, but at re-evaluating the boundary between the supposedly modern “West” and presumably traditional “East,” as well as at re-equilibrating the pre-conceived imbalance between the two. That is to say, “[t]aking the world into account was not itself enough, unless one balanced the assumed disparity” (p. 268). This perspective facilitates the challenge in world history to be met that our task is not only to extend ranges and scopes (from the national to the world), but to follow the historical widening of worlds and rebalance our comparisons – up to the point of seeing “Western primacy as essentially contextual and alternating” (p. 272). For anthropology, world history has a lot to offer, too. It reminds us that some early cultures developed writing. Its long-standing ignorance as well as regarding China or India as part of other cultures, despite their substantial written traditions, reinforced the tendency to see anthropology’s subject as dealing with “primitive,” “simple,” and “oral,” and ignoring anything modern. Replacing the distinction between “simple/complex” or “modern/traditional” societies with differentiation into literate/oral enables consideration of for example “Eurasia with its written history [...] as a whole analytically, making ‘world history’, or at least Eurasian history of the written variety, more manageable”. (p. 268) Above all, a historical perspective adds dynamic context to static observation.

Jack Goody died in 2015, and this chapter must have been one of the last pieces he wrote. A scholar left the stage who like nobody else connected anthropology and history for their own sake. Reading Goody’s emphatic argument for world historical scholarship that listens to its neighbouring discipline kindles the hope that joint debates and collaborative research will intensify.

The second part of the first volume deals in seven chapters with the earliest and longest period of human history. The Palaeolithic period, which began more than 2.5 million years ago and ended about 10,000 years ago with the last ice age, was the age of the origin and worldwide dispersal of our species; here we also see it as a period of migration, innovation, and a strong formative force for today.

After all, David Christian and a team of authors with different disciplinary backgrounds (African studies, historical linguistics, human palaeology, and prehistoric anthropology) argue fundamentally for the integration of “Paleolithic history as a foundational phase in the development of mankind more fully within modern world historical teaching and research” (p. 37). They write from an understanding of world history that starts with the very beginnings of mankind and which, in the search for the first human traces and migratory movements, pays particular attention to the role of nature, the environment, and climate. One senses the proximity to Big History (which was largely established by David Christian) as well as the aim of the *Cambridge World History* to embed world historical fields of research that have developed over the last two or three decades in a new synthesis. It is therefore astonishing that hardly any reference is made to the research presented in the first part of the book on the history of the use of fire, the family, technol-

ogy, or migration. It seems that two largely separate scientific communities are writing here: one developing the Palaeolithic for world history, the other exploring questions of general history. A more intensive dialogue would certainly be of mutual benefit; it would help to integrate the Palaeolithic from ongoing research *and* received knowledge into world historical narratives, providing an appropriate place for the beginnings of human history.

Although the chapters stand on their own and can be read very well individually, it is the shared guidelines and the interpretation of the period in a world historical perspective which make them interesting and worthy of discussion, and which also speak to historians dealing with other historical periods.

Firstly, the Palaeolithic is presented as a phase which laid the foundations for the rest of human history. “Paleolithic lifeways shaped us psychologically, physiologically, and genetically” (p. 22). In this early period, a cultural and ecological creativity emerged combining new knowledge and techniques (especially tool-making methods with prepared-core, later with blades), leading to increasing power over the environment. This set the course for later developments. Accordingly, archaeological traditions are also interpreted as records of thought which as well as providing information about how early humans stored and collected non-genetic information are also a source of evidence on their capacity for creating novel structures out of this information (see for instance John F. Hoffecker on “Migration and innovation in Paleolithic Europe”). This includes in particular the emergence of language, which enabled knowledge to be preserved and passed on, the formation of larger communities, and contact to be established with other communities. A prerequisite for this was the formation of the modern vocal tract, in which the neck is at right angles to the head, facilitating the wide range of speech sounds that characterize our languages today. This process was accompanied by the cerebral consolidation of the ability to make syntactic connections, allowing people to speak about things they have not seen or experienced themselves, with far-reaching consequences. “Syntax is essential to be able to be abstract, to classify things and experiences, and to organize one’s knowledge [...] and it allows for planning, for thinking of consequences, for cooperative activities” (Christopher Ehret: “Early humans: tools, languages, and culture,” p. 346). It is most illuminating to follow the authors when they show, using a wealth of examples, where and how these new skills for communication, cooperation, planning and reasoning can be identified. At the same time, as in the volume as a whole, there is a tendency here to portray humans as special. Is this an expression of an anthropocentrism which is not exactly new or undisputed?

Secondly, the authors invite us to take a fresh look at the relationship between mankind and nature. There are probably only two periods in human history when mankind shaped nature: during the transition to a sedentary way of life and an agriculture-based diet (the agrarian revolution), and in the comparatively short period since industrialization; both followed the Palaeolithic and were comparatively short. At all other times, nature and climate change set the course of development. This finding from recent research has been broadened from various angles into the thesis of environmental determinism, to which

the chapter by Felipe Fernández-Armesto (“Before the farmers: Culture and climate from the emergence of *Homo sapiens* to about ten thousand years ago”) is devoted. It offers a broad general survey of the complex relationship between human lifeways and climate change in the Palaeolithic. However, the author not only traces the climatic fluctuations that occurred during the Palaeolithic and how human communities reacted to them, but also takes a stand in the debate on how far the environment explains or determines culture. Fernández-Armesto vehemently disputes determination through the environment, arguing that the most distinctive feature of human culture is its “relative flexibility in adapting to a variety of environments relative mutability” (p. 314). He offers two proofs that humans did not simply adjust to environments: for one thing, the continuous migrations into and appropriation of unfamiliar, new environments, and also the different ways in which human communities reacted to similar or identical environmental conditions. The author explains cultural diversity with the human capacity for imagination. It is the power of imagination that “freed human cultures to respond with extraordinary elasticity and diversity to the environments they confronted” (ibid.). Imagination is associated with two further human characteristics, namely anticipation and memory. “[O]ur ancestors had a theory of mind, consciousness of their own consciousness [...] they had the mental equipment necessary to be able to imagine themselves in changed circumstances and new environments (p. 319). For this reason, “climate [is] the context of our story, and the experience of *Homo sapiens* is its subject.”

As in other chapters, the position being argued against is vague, and this leaves a divided impression, because it would be interesting to know more about the pros and cons of both sides. At least those keen to read more about Fernández-Armesto’s thesis that culture is exempt from evolution can do so in the book he wrote alongside his chapter for the *Cambridge World History*. In it, he sets out in detail the argument presented in a nutshell in the chapter that “Ultimately, no environmental conditions, no genetic legacy, no predictable patterns, no scientific laws determine our behaviour. We can consequently make and remake our world in the freedom of unconstrained imaginations.”¹ How does this relate, we might ask, to the above-mentioned finding that “Paleolithic lifeways shaped us psychologically, physiologically, and genetically”?

Thirdly, the authors position themselves in the discussion about where humanity originated. Until 48,000 years ago, we read, human history was African history. It was in Africa that the fully modern human ancestors of us all today evolved, along with the first blade-based toolkits, bone tools, and works of art. From there, our ancestors spread first into southwestern Asia, from there into Europe and Asia, and later into the Americas, slowly replacing other species that had lived there. “We are an African species” is a core finding which is of course of great importance to world historians. It supports the attempt to give an open, decentralized perspective to the older narratives of world history, which focused on Europe and attributed an initial role to it. A reflection on

1 F. Fernández-Armesto, *Foot in the River. Why Our Lives Change and the Limits of Evolution*, Oxford 2018, back cover.

the European origins of archaeology does not come as a surprise, but is certainly worth reading: “European scholars dominated early attempts to describe human evolution, and the Paleolithic evidence from Europe was so rich and diverse that it seemed natural to assume that our species evolved in Europe” (p. 29, pp. 395f.). This is why it took so long for the African origins of humanity to be recognized.

With the African origins now clear, it can be shown (according to the authors) that Africa at the beginning of the Holocene was not a place apart. The same trajectories of human change emerged in Africa as in several other parts of the world, including the trend towards agricultural ways of life, which can be observed around 9000 BCE in groups of grain collectors from Niger-Congo, and a little later in Nilo-Saharan peoples in eastern Sahara, who herded cattle for the first time in world history (see Christopher Ehret’s chapter “Africa from 48,000 to 9500 BCE”). That African humans were able to adapt to almost every terrestrial climate reaffirms the interest of recent world history in tracing how communities and societies around the world responded to all sorts of global circumstances.

The most recent research in this field seems to be less convinced about the African origins and established genetic genealogies, and it would have been interesting to read how the authors respond to the proponents of genetic determinism (as well as to questioning the tree model in historical linguistics, which is another recent debate left untouched).

More important, however, is a discrepancy between the usage of the term “modern” in this part of the volume, and a shared understanding of modern/modernity by historians working on periods since the seventeenth century. For the latter, the term signifies the changes in the course of the Enlightenment and the coming of specific socio-cultural practices, whereas David Christian and his co-authors use it to denote a qualitative difference in developments during the Palaeolithic. Chris Ehret in particular argues in chapters 14 and 15 that we see first in Africa the “evolution of fully modern humans with modern forms of language, followed by a slow accumulation of new skills, new social relationships, and new cultural forms” (p. 27). How can this be squared with, say, Frederick Cooper’s debunking of different uses of the term modern in his book *Colonialism in Question: Theory, Knowledge, History* (1991)? Although the fact that far-reaching developments occurred during the Palaeolithic is immediately obvious, the interpretation of this as the emergence of a *modern* human will be less accessible to modern historians. In my opinion, consideration of how the use of “modern” relates to its uses in the first part of the volume as well as in the later volumes would have been appropriate. What are the advantages and disadvantages of expanding the common understanding of “modern” in this way? Moreover, answering these questions would have been important seeing as how the authors attempt to build bridges to modern times and argue for the integration of Palaeolithic history as a foundational phase “more fully within modern world history” (see quotation above). Since this different use of a key term of (world) history is not resolved, the Palaeolithic period appears to a large extent as a separate, somehow isolated period. It is a pity that reconciling the individual volumes played such a minor role in the

preparation of the *Cambridge World History*, for this would have resulted in a number of further questions and tasks for the field.

The fourth central idea of this part is the emphasis on migration, mobility, and nomadism in the Palaeolithic period, unfortunately without reference to the arguments and broad contextualization offered in Patrick Manning's chapter. In contrast to previous narratives, the spread of mankind across the globe is not described as a linear event. Instead, it is stressed that, not least due to climate change, periods of further settlements alternated with periods of contraction; there must have been in practice many different periods of advance and retreat (p. 33). The directions and routes of dispersal are also presented as an open process. Several routes are currently emerging in research, and those wishing to learn more about the ongoing debates are well served by the chapters on migrations in and from Africa (Chris Ehret), to Asia (Robin Dennell), to Australia (Peter Hiscock), and to the Americas (Nicole Waguespack). More than elsewhere, questions are raised here: Why did migrations spanning all parts of the world happen when people are reluctant to leave their homes? Why did people settle in strange and often completely different environments (in colder zones, in deserts, or by the sea) where the habits from the African grasslands were of little use and new diseases were encountered? Why did the human population slowly increase despite a nomadic lifestyle in which more children don't facilitate mobility? The fact that these questions are largely left unanswered, and that various possible reasons are mentioned, is for me one of the most convincing parts of the overall account, and also illustrates why the term "migration" instead of "dispersal" is frequently mentioned. Just as important as the reasons for continuous migrations are the preconditions. This aspect is also treated with caution by the authors, who refer to different arguments and what cannot yet be explained – for example, that although migrations lead to new technologies, the practice of, say, preparing food over a fire developed without demonstrable migration. There is general agreement that migrations and trans-regional migrations had consequences: they changed social relations, the size and organization of groups and their interactions with other, food-gathering strategies, and also spread art – all of which, we read, originated in Africa.

One significant merit of the overall account of the Palaeolithic is that although much space is devoted to questions of dating (an important theme for this period), this is done in a pleasingly unorthodox manner. Fluctuating and diverging classifications are openly admitted, and the reader is repeatedly reminded that this or that is disputed. This also applies to the question of the end of the period, the transition to a sedentary lifestyle and agriculture-based forms of nutrition. This is described as a slow transformation characterized by the combining of planting and foraging with hunting and herding. For a long time, the transition to agriculture was seen as a revolution; here, the shift is presented much less drastically. The lives of agricultural settlers seem to have been so much like the lives of the early farmers who succeeded them that it is difficult to draw a clear dividing line. This makes the reader even keener to continue and reach for the second volume of the series. It is also a strength of this part that the research techniques on which the

findings and arguments are based (such as radiometric dating, genetic comparison, and better ways of tracing climate change) are continuously described.

All in all, the 167 pages, which probably take the majority of (world) historians into new territory, are highly worth reading, since in addition to a wealth of empirical findings, they present new interpretations of the period which actually offer links to general discussions in the field of world history and open up new perspectives. When David Christian begins by emphasizing that only 12 per cent of the approximately 80 billion people who have populated the world since the emergence of our species lived during the Palaeolithic, and that therefore just half a volume for this period is justified – just as two volumes deal with the period after 1750, because 80 percent of humans lived between these two phases – one is forced to agree with him not only on the basis of the figures, but also because this part makes it clear that the Palaeolithic was of fundamental importance in all kinds of ways.

As a reader, I would have liked to see more space given to the consequences and questions stemming from the syntheses of thirty years of research presented here, because this would have outlined the future topics that world historiography still needs to address.

And as a historian specializing in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, I found one aspect unconvincing: namely the Ice Age being described as an era “what we would now call a kind of globalization” – with the understanding that “key elements of culture were similar all over the inhabited world.” (p. 329) An understanding of globalization is propagated here without considering alternative, less homogenizing interpretations. This may correspond to the concept behind the series, but at the same time it shows that this account is a variant of a world historical overview which encourages reflection without being authoritative. We also read here syntheses that are materialistically oriented, but in which the material is almost always seen and thought of as universal and ahistorical. As a result, we lose sight of conflicts regarding distribution and power, and so we must turn to other books to learn about social, economic, and political struggles in the history of mankind.

A World with Agriculture, 12,000 BCE–500 CE. On CWH volume II

Eric Vanhaute

The world with agriculture has secured for the human species its primacy and dominance over the natural world, with all the uncertainties that the industrialized exploitation of selected plants and animals and associated population expansion represent for the sustainable health of the planet. With the development of a world with agriculture, world history became a human story (p. 8).

The editors' introduction to CWH Vol II leaves no doubt; the invention of agriculture was one of the most important, some say the most important, game changer in the human race's journey (pp. 1–25). This second of the nine-volume thick Cambridge World History focuses exclusively on the expansion of the human world *with* agriculture, and rightly so. The volume forges a wide perspective, both in space and time, "to capture the expansive timeframe of the origins and diffusions of agriculture worldwide" (p. 1). Further quoting the editors, this world-historical approach allows for "an understanding that is simultaneously both global and local. [...] Critical to any broader study of agricultural origins is not only the mapping of expansive regional patterns, but also the interpretation of local ecologies that has framed the understanding of prehistoric behaviour. What continues to confound researchers is the answer to the seemingly simple question of why the advantages of agriculture apparently became obvious to many prehistoric populations in vastly different parts of the world" (p. 2).

A world-historical ambition integrates narratives about differences and similarities with a quest for causes and impact. How is this challenge handled in this volume consisting of 23 chapters? What choices have been made by editors and authors? In the first part of this short essay, I will focus on the construction of the world in scales of space and time.

In the second part, I will deal with the historical narrative concerning the story of the birth and dispersion of agricultural societies.

1. The World: Scales of Space and Time

Every world-historical narrative strives to capture the big picture. But how big is this picture? And how big is this world? A world is not a constant; it is bound by human activity. It refers to social change that can only be understood in specific contexts of space and time. For that reason, no single delineation can be absolute. On the contrary, choosing a space and time perspective (where? when?) is linked to an intrinsic thematic choice (which social change?). Consequently, world history does not apply exclusive frameworks of space and time; it does not draw fixed boundaries. In general, it uses the discursive technique of overlapping scales. They do not exclude each other; they create spaces of contact and interaction, of fusion and of friction. The volume covers the period of diffusion and adoption of agriculture until the first millennium of the Common Era (marked as 500 CE). Although this periodization makes sense in this volume, its logic is much less clear in the book series setup. In her general preface, editor-in-chief Merry E. Wiesner-Hanks states that the choice for overlapping chronologies in the book series reflects “the complex periodization of truly global history” (p. XXVIII). However true this may be, without a rationale behind this chronological patchwork, it remains unclear how the different volumes will correlate to each other. The primacy of agriculture in human history only decreases in the nineteenth century, but no other volume continues the story carved out in this book on “early agricultures”. This lack of synergy is a flaw in a world-historical book series.

Agricultural change is covered in depth in the chapters dealing with major world regions. This regional, bottom-up approach allows for a series of extremely rich overviews. As the editors of this volume claim: “The more nuanced interpretations of the evidence call into question the respective roles of trans-regional connections and interactions, on the one hand, and bottom-up local processes of experimentation, on the other” (p. 17). Differences should not be seen as deviations from a norm, or as contradictions, but as a diversity that can teach us about the rich complexity of human adaptation (p. 20). Although an exhaustive comparative analysis is missing (limited to pp. 14–25), the introductory chapter convincingly shows the promises and possibilities of a comparative and transregional approach. As we illustrate below, it presents a range of exciting questions, debates, and claims. As a whole, the volume questions spatial definitions and chronological demarcations, rethinks regional sequences, and demonstrates how trans-regional connections were crucial in the expansion of agriculture. For example, the singularity of “Europe” as a world region is questioned by pointing to internal varieties and external connections (p. 23). Out of immense divergence and differences, new meta-narratives can be forged: “A world with agriculture was the result of countless individual decisions and intensive experimentation by communities, who committed their energy

and labours to the transmission of agricultural knowledge and practices across generations. [...] Despite the bewildering variety of adaptations to agriculture archeologically visible across world regions, the accumulation of evidence brings the global picture into meaningful focus” (p. 24). This global picture departs from older models that concentrated on economic drivers that are familiar to modern men (p. 25). They divided the world of the first farmers into a domestic sphere to be understood in economic models, and the “irrational beliefs” outside the production sphere. New insights also reveal that environmental change “cannot have been a simple forcing agent, because social formations reveal that decision-making strategies, risk management, communal resource use, and technological innovation played key roles in facilitating the movement towards food production” (p. 22). Much more attention is given to families and communities as actors, to new inequalities based on age and/or gender, to food strategies, and to patterns of mobility and migration of both men and agriculture.

2. The History: A World with Agriculture

Peasantries have been the single most important social group in world history since the birth of agriculture. All successful cultures and civilizations, excluding a few nomadic empires, were based on extensive peasant economies comprised of ninety per cent of the population or more.¹ The minimum social conditions for farming consisted of access to land, labour, tools, and seeds. Historically, the principal social units through which the means of farming were secured have been the rural household system and the village household system. Both have varied greatly in size, composition and social relations over time. Surplus production from the land was a precondition for societal change. Societal change was required to group agricultural producers into peasantries. Agricultural-based economic systems facilitated vaster communal units and extended village networks. This stimulated extensive changes in the structure of social relations, population growth, and village and supra-village institutions. The spread of agricultural village societies as the main food system took millennia. Much of the world’s population lived off farming by 5000 BCE; the first agricultural-based empires emerged by 3000 BCE. By that time, peasant economies had become sufficiently advanced and, in some regions, they supported more complex, urban-based societies and more complex and differentiated trade networks.

Agrarian change refers to historical and interrelated processes of the dispersion of agricultural societies, to the absorption of agrarian-rural worlds within wider geographies and non-agricultural sectors, and to the acts of negotiation, adaptation, and resistance of agrarian-rural peoples. The incorporation of rural zones and the creation of peasantries have been central to the expansion of village societies, early states, agrarian (tributary)

1 P. Brassley/R. Soffe, *Agriculture. A Very Short Introduction*, Oxford 2016; M. Mazoyer/L. Roudart, *A History of World Agriculture. From the Neolithic Age to the Current Crisis*, London 2006.

empires, and global capitalism.² In most societal settings, these zones were integrated as loci of appropriation of the produce of land and labour and as peripheral spaces of production, exploitation, and recreation. Agrarian change has often been framed in dichotomous and predominantly ahistorical models: market versus non-market relations, economic versus cultural forms of exchange, modern versus traditional societal arrangements – a long tradition of rural sociology is grafted upon these dichotomies. Concepts such as traditional, survival, subsistence, or informal economies have not been very helpful in understanding social change in a world-historical context. They freeze peasant history in dualistic frames and fail to grasp the dynamics and changes within peasant societies. When survival and subsistence refer to supporting oneself at not much more than a bare-bones level with little or no surpluses, peasant economies do not fit these typologies. On the contrary, they were rooted in a wide variety of reciprocal exchanges: redistributions that integrated different spaces in networks of mutual obligations, regional and extra-regional market transactions, and public retributions.

Peasant history is the history of the struggle over the fruits of their labour. Social relations in agricultural societies were built on the returns of the land to support and reproduce institutions and norms that defined new rules of ownership, inheritance, transmission, and control.³ Peasants gained a substantial part of their income from direct access to products resulting from input of their labour on the land; any loss implied a notable decline in their living standards. Peasantries not only fed civilizations, empires, states, and economies, they also supported their ecological and social resilience and fuelled their expansion. Farming societies developed a new, more intrusive and aggressive attitude to the resources of nature, land, and labour.⁴ The expansion of plant and animal husbandry presumed a more radical exploitation of diverse ecosystems and the development of new tools, new modes of clearing and renewing fertility, and new modes of cultivation and animal breeding. These had an increasing impact on labour-nature relations and resulted in massive worldwide deforestation. Like every social formation, peasantries developed as sets of social relationships. The households were basic economic units and the gateway to the wider world. They pursued an agricultural livelihood by combining subsistence and commodity production through direct access to nature, land, labour, and commodities. Together with extended families, kinship, and village societies, they were the vital nodes of production, consumption, reproduction, socialization, welfare, credit, and risk spreading. The economic roles that different household and community members took on were neither fixed nor permanent. They signified a transient social relationship, one that could be replaced rather quickly by other sources of labour and income.

2 E. Vanhaute, Agriculture, in: K. Hofmeester and M. van der Linden (eds.), *Handbook The Global History of Work*, Berlin 2018, pp. 217–235.

3 P. Bellwood, *First Farmers*, Oxford 2005; C. Renfrew and P. Bahn (eds.), *The Cambridge World Prehistory*, 3 vols, Cambridge 2014; M. E. Smith (ed.), *The Comparative Archeology of Complex Societies*, Cambridge 2011; G. Barker, *The Agricultural Revolution in Prehistory: Why did Foragers become Farmers?*, Oxford 2006.

4 E. B. Barbier, *Scarcity and Frontiers: How Economies Have Developed through Natural Resource Exploitation*, Cambridge 2011.

How have the editors Graeme Barker and Candice Goucher and their (30 plus) co-authors dealt with agrarian change? The central goal of the volume is to trace “common developments in the more complex social structures and cultural forms that agriculture enabled” (p. XXVIII). By tracing the origins of agriculture and the character of early agricultural communities across the world and surveying the development of more complex social structures and cultural forms that agriculture enabled, this volume adds a new, comprehensive overview to the extensive literature on these topics. It is a strong volume on its own, a real added value to existing literature for multiple reasons. First, the volume presents state-of-the-art research on all world regions written by an impressive team of skilled, experienced authors. Second, it is a genuinely interdisciplinary collection that underlines the essential contribution of archaeological sciences to the study of the agricultural origins of the human world. Third, it shows the striking divergence in agricultural regimes/systems, “a bewildering variety [...] provided the foundations for the spread of humans and their achievements to nearly every continent” (p. 24).

The volume’s composition is well thought out. The first part, chapters 1 to 7, deals with overarching themes and research methods related to the first agricultural systems. This includes consequences of “sedentism” on food (chapter 4), on community building (chapter 5), and on the growth of spatial and economic inequalities (herding, urbanism; chapters 6 and 7). For a non-specialist, the huge steps taken by integrating massive new data from archaeological fieldwork, including new methodologies such as archeogenetics (chapter 2), historical linguistics (chapter 3), and bioarcheology (chapter 4), are revealing. Chapter 2 illustrates the impact of the collaboration between archaeology and genetics on the spatial and chronological mapping of specific lineages within species. Chapter 4 highlights the contribution of scientific techniques to examine the impact of agriculture on diet, health, and the human lifespan, using techniques such as DNA analysis, imaging, stable isotopic studies, etc. This set of thematic and methodological chapters lists a number of pressing debates on the causes and consequences of the introduction of agriculture. Most central is the observation that “it is not surprising that the development of a commitment to sedentary agriculture was usually not as straightforward as many archaeologists have tended to assume” (p. 12). In addition, “sedentary village life based on early forms of agriculture could and did take many forms: the emergence of households, compounds, and commonly shared spaces differed greatly across Eurasia and the Americas” (pp. 12–13). This relates to the difficult transition to a more sedentary life, resulting in a substantial loss of plant diversity in diets centred on cereals, and related nutrient deficiencies: “Diets did not improve with the transition to agriculture. The pathways to agriculture were littered with problems too numerous to overlook: refuse disposal, vermin, contamination of water supplies, poor hygiene and sanitation levels, poor harvests, and soil exhaustion frequently resulted in a decline in the variety, quantity, and the quality of foodstuffs available” (pp. 11–12). Time and again, the authors try to integrate the diversity of human choices into more general tendencies in the transformation towards agricultural societies. The chapter on “the bioarchaeology of health and diet” shows that “overall, health declines over time and with the transition to agriculture, as does the

quality of the diet, but it is important to note that this interpretation can be very variable” (p. 122). This variability should be part of the analysis: “While synthetic studies are becoming more common in bioarchaeology, these studies do highlight that individuals and populations can be variable in their responses to subsistence changes, and there are many potential variables throughout the world over time that will ultimately affect the data interpretation” (p. 122). Science needs models to make sense of widely divergent processes. As Amy Bogaard argues in her excellent chapter on “Communities”: “In many ways early agricultural societies are extremely diverse, but underlying this range of cultural forms are striking similarities suggesting that agriculture tended to constrain and direct social behaviour along certain lines” (p. 124). Chapter 6 on “Pastoralism” identifies “some key differences between mixed farmers and those who lived principally from grazing livestock” (p. 164) (e.g. nomadic pastoralists versus transhumant pastoralists), and chapter 7 on “Agriculture and Urbanism” illustrates the distinctive styles of pre-industrial urbanism, and their divergent role within rural settings (p. 186). It looks for a working definition of the city as a new mode of settlement, and of the city-state as a new political entity (p. 192). But still “there are complex histories of villages, towns, and cities moving or being moved by political centres, further complicating the process of identifying the ‘urban core’” (p. 195).

The second set of chapters, 8 to 23, discusses the current understanding of the beginning of agriculture and the character of early agricultural societies on a region-by-region basis. It covers eight world regions: Southwest Asia, South Asia, China, Japan, Southeast Asia and Pacific, sub-Saharan Africa, the Americas, and Europe. The regional overviews offer comprehensive, state-of-the-art insights based on regional and local knowledge. They are illustrated with a case study, describing a particular early agricultural site. Time and again these chapters show the immense diversity of choices made by our ancestors. At the same time, they offer an excellent starting point for a more general, comparative synthesis, integrating diversity with some general tendencies.

As stated above, a discussion with other volumes in the series is missing and so is a more time-transcending view of the role of agriculture in societal change. This is expressed in the lack of an explicit analytical frame, or of some guiding concepts. Agricultural regimes (p. 22) and agricultural systems (p. 24) are mentioned but not discussed. This is strange because agrarian or farming systems have been an influential ordering tool in agricultural and rural history for a long time. The concept of systems or regimes emphasizes the organization, functioning, and outcomes of subsequent organizational forms of agriculture, with a strong focus on ecology, technology, and farming practices. This helps gain insight into models of transformation, classification, and differentiation of agrarian systems in a given region or within the world.⁵ That is why technical farming systems have to be supplemented with social-ecological agrosystems that describe rural production networks

5 See, for example, Mazoyer/Roudart, *History of World Agriculture*, pp. 21–23; G. M. Robinson, *Geographies of Agriculture: Globalisation, Restructuring and Sustainability*, Harlow 2004, pp. 1–29; M. B. Tauger, *Agriculture in World History*, London 2010, pp. 2–3.

as sets of region-specific social power relations shaping the economic reproduction of a given geographical area. They are the theoretical expression of historically constituted and geographically localized types of agriculture and ecological and social reproduction/production systems. It is true that these typologies, in a global-comparative context, are frequently based on Eurocentric models and understood in *priori* historical sequences. This can result in the creation of new myths underpinning existing power relations and legitimizing discourses both in academic knowledge and in applied fields such as development work.⁶ Bottom-up research shows that agrarian systems cannot be predicted from environmental, demographic, or evolutionary contexts. To make sense of social change in a broad time/space span, we can use the concept of a genealogy of evolving and changing regimes.⁷ Regimes thus become a tool to contextualize and understand how peasantries in a certain time/space are organized (internally) and embedded (externally). Each regime embodies an institutionalization of economic, social, political, cultural, and ecological forces that structure internal and external peasant relations. They organize forms and relations of production, reproduction, exchange, and extraction. They define how these relations are ordered and represented (or legitimized) via structures of power and forms of hegemony. Regimes are social space/time fixes: methodological tools to specify changing relations between “world ordering” and peasantries. A genealogy of societal regimes can provide a genuine, global comparative-historical lens to view the social, economic, political, and ecological relations of agrarian societies and empires. It aims at a non-hierarchical, non-evolutionary, and non-deterministic interpretation of global social change.

After having digested so many regionally diverse insights, we are left wondering what global knowledge this volume advances. After all, in its promotional language, the series promises that “it is the most comprehensive account yet of the human past”. For sure, the volume reflects “increasing awareness that world history can be examined through many different approaches and at varying geographic and chronological scales”, and that it “represents the newest thinking in world history” (p. XXVIII). As Wiesner-Hanks argues, the series aims to view key developments from multiple perspectives, comprehensive but not exhaustive (p. XXIX). This endeavour generates a set of useful overviews of the state of knowledge and volume II is an excellent example. The volume’s synergetic strength is in normalizing the complexity of societal change behind the generalizing and often teleological label of the “Neolithic Revolution”. Transformation can take very different paths and can have very different outcomes. There is not one model for change, let alone one trajectory of progress. The authors frequently remind us that one of the most fascinating stories from our collective past has been misrepresented in many ways. It only can be understood by considering “complex mixes of historically contingent decision-

6 M. Widgren, *Four Myths in Global Agrarian History*, in: A. Jarrick/J. Myrdal/M. Wallenberg Bondesson (eds.), *Methods in World History: A Critical Approach*, Lund 2016, pp. 85–105.

7 E. Vanhaute/H. Cottyn, *Into their Land and Labours: A Comparative and Global Analysis of Trajectories of Peasant Transformation*, ICAS Review Paper Series 8 (2017), pp. 1–21. See also P. McMichael, *Food Regimes and Agrarian Questions*, Halifax 2013, pp. 1–12.

making [...] Perhaps the dominant message from this book is that the global pathways to food production were many and varied [...] complex and often contradictory” (pp. 7–8). In addition, this collection of essays is proof of the strength of interdisciplinary, integrated research that combines methods and techniques from very different fields. Accumulation of data and insights changes knowledge. But tallying up regional and thematic knowledge does not make a global narrative. Giving meaning to widely divergent processes within a major turn in the human race’s history requires integrative concepts and frameworks, which can enable interpretative connections within wider spaces and time frames, bringing together yesterday, today, and tomorrow.

Early Cities in Comparative Perspective, 4000 BCE–1200 CE. On CWH volume III

Jörg Rüpke

The roughly chronological order of the starting dates of the periods dealt with by the series Cambridge World History cannot conceal the fact that the volumes have thematic rather than chronological foci. The period covered by this volume starts earlier and ends later than the following one, volume IV on “Empires”.¹ It has a very clear focus on cities, in particular of the early and ancient empires of the regions and periods covered. Only very occasionally does it consider the second half of the first millennium CE or even beyond (e.g. with a view on the rather short-lived North American city of Cahokia). As such, it covers a wider area than the whole Cambridge Ancient History (with its still Mediterranean focus) in temporal as much as spatial terms. Geographically, the “Ancient Orient” and the classical Mediterranean world are covered by four chapters each (depending on attribution), Middle and South America are treated in six, Asia in three, and non-Mediterranean Africa and North America in one each.

How can such a focused volume function within a “world history”? The answer of the volume is by comparison across periods and regions. The editor obliged his authors make considerable efforts to not only claim a comparative approach by offering diverse material to be compared, but to also actually make comparisons explicit. The chapters are organized in six groups and all authors of each group wrote a common concluding chapter to this group, rendering explicit points of difference as well as shared features. For the sake of the reader, repetitions are not made by just referencing the relevant chapters, thereby driving important points home. Overall, the structure does not require that

1 B. Craig (ed.), *The Cambridge World History IV: A World with States, Empires, and Networks 1200 BCE–900 CE*, Cambridge 2015.

the chapters and parts are read in sequence, but it does require continuous reading in whatever sequence (provided you keep “parts” together) as it involves significant arguing rather than just offering a series of “fresh perspectives”.

This is not to deny that fresh perspectives exist – quite to the contrary. Above all, archaeological data are confronted with long-established perspectives as well as questions produced by recent cultural or historical research, which, in turn, are further developed in dialogue with new methods in material research, from geographical information systems (GIS) to modelling virtual sites. Rarely are chapters overwhelmingly descriptive or narrative. They mostly try to engage with the big questions of old and new research, thematizing services offered by cities, their function in power structures, urban imaginaries, and economic and technological innovation. To this end, the introductory chapter by Norman Yoffee and Nicola Terrenato (pp. 1–24) is very helpful, starting with a detailed analysis of Numa Fustel de Coulanges’s *La cité antique* (who, however, focused on social innovation) and reviewing sociological thinking from the turn of the nineteenth to twentieth century (Émile Durkheim, Ferdinand Tönnies, Georg Simmel, and Max Weber) to sociological and geographical urban studies of the twentieth century. In addition to ecological, economic, and political factors, it is the question of the atmosphere of those cities and the imaginaries of the inhabitants that is foregrounded and leading to a focus on ideology and religion (pp. 17–18). It is the latter that will be followed with a particular interest in this review.

The introduction makes clear that the volume is not about origins or any “rise” of cities in early and ancient history (a short summary of the topic on pp. 3–4). Up to the very end, the volume denies the reader any “grand narrative” (p. 548). There is no definition of “early cities”. Thus, it is principally a shared methodology that keeps the selected places together. They are all objects primarily of archaeological methods – even a city like Jerusalem is treated from that point of view.

The first group of chapters deal with cities as performance arenas, dealing with ancient Egyptian founding of cities as a performance of power in itself (pp. 27–47, John Baines), Classical Maya city building and permanent rebuilding with, among others, an interest in spectacular views by new buildings or orientation (p. 64, Stephen Houston, Thomas G. Garrison). It is economic function versus political power that is being balanced in these chapters and it is the latter’s use of ritual performances, which is foregrounded (e.g. for Southeast Asian cities between 500 BCE and 1500 CE, p. 91, Miriam T. Stark). Agency is given to rulers and elites, and typically religion is seen as being involved, gods and the dead being relevant co-citizens (p. 95) – if not co-rulers. The comparative chapter (pp. 94–109) is rich in observations of the many dimensions of performance, including sound, smell, taste, atmosphere, duration, and embodiment. And yet, the model used for the interpretation of rituals is rather simple: These produce solidarity, even if many are observers rather than performers, even if the audience might comprise just a tiny fraction of the population, and even if the ritual roles and the demonstrative destruction of wealth – and lives – in such rituals signal and perform differences in power and instil fear. In ancient cities, rituals were staged by very different agents and

could mark competing claims to – for example, religious – authority, elite's rituals were frequently invisible, could be copied or ridiculed. Here, the potential of the performative approach to look at the very different experiences and appropriations of rituals by different actors is not taken advantage of. After all, literary and epigraphic texts from ancient Mediterranean cities demonstrate that very different groups could take to the street and that actors from different social layers or different genders had very different experiences and spaces for individual participation.² Despite the term, rather static interpretations of rituals are employed.

The second part (ch. 6–10) focuses on information technologies, arguing throughout that the vastly different techniques of storing information (phonological writing, iconographies, and knots) and the supplied materials were, above all, urban inventions, enabling the administration of growing social and economic complexity (pp. 156, 212), accountability of those in charge (p. 214), and, by means of standardization (p. 207), the production of “legibility” (pp. 178, 225) of the incipient states – in one word: producing control (p. 225). With characteristic differences, this holds true for fourth-millennium CE Uruk (pp. 113–130, Hans J. Nissen), second-millennium CE Chinese Zhongzhou and Yinxu (pp. 131–157, Wang Haicheng), lowland Maya cities of the first millennium CE, and second-millennium CE Andean Cuzco and its empire (pp. 181–206, Gary Urton). It is when – for a variety of reasons – these functions are also displayed that writing material was used, which was durable enough to be preserved for later research (p. 216). Thus, the history of information technology might be entangled with architecture as with education and social equality or inequalities (for instance, in the exclusivity of “a script community”, p. 219). Any reference to the subversive or contra factual use of writing (widely attested in the Mediterranean) is lacking – experts collecting omens, prophets diffusing political and social critique (ancient Israel), historians or mythographers fixing *their* version of events, philosophers reflecting on better life and utopian cities, as well as the many opponents producing graffiti, the suppressed hiding curse tablets, and magicians impressing clients and themselves with meaningless pictograms.³ Writing was

2 See, e.g., A. Chaniotis (ed.), *Ritual Dynamics in the Ancient Mediterranean: Agency, Emotion, Gender, Representation* (Heidelberger althistorische Beiträge und epigraphische Studien 49), Stuttgart 2011; R. L. Grimes, *Ritual, Media, And Conflict*, New York 2011; U. Hüsken/C. Brosius, *Ritual Matters: Dynamic Dimensions in Practice*, London 2010; A. Michaels (ed.), *Ritual Dynamics and the Science of Ritual*, Wiesbaden 2010; P. Van Nuffelen, *Playing the Ritual Game in Constantinople (379–457)*, in: L. Grig/G. Kelly (eds.), *Two Romes: Rome and Constantinople in Late Antiquity* (Oxford Studies in Late Antiquity), Oxford 2012, pp. 183–200; G. Woolf, *Ritual and the Individual in Roman Religion*, in: J. Rüpke (ed.), *The Individual in the Religions of the Ancient Mediterranean*, Oxford 2013, pp. 136–160; R. Raja/J. Rüpke, *Appropriating Religion: Methodological Issues in Testing the “Lived Ancient Religion” Approach*, in: *Religion in the Roman Empire* 1 (2015) 1, pp. 11–19.

3 See, e.g., R. Gordon, *Charaktères Between Antiquity and Renaissance: Transmission and Re-Invention*, in: V. Dassen/J.-M. Spieser (eds.), *Les savoirs magiques et leur transmission de l'Antiquité à la Renaissance* (Micrologus Library 60), Florence 2014, pp. 253–300; R. Gordon, *Negotiating the Temple-Script: Women's Narratives among the Mysian-Lyidian “Confession-Texts”*, in: *Religion in the Roman Empire* 2 (2016) 2, pp. 227–255. For graffiti, see, e.g., T. Hillard, *Graffiti's Engagement: The Political Graffiti of the Late Roman Republic*, in: G. Sears/P. Keegan/R. Laurence (eds.), *Written Space in the Latin West, 200 BC to AD 300*, London 2013, pp. 105–122; R. Morstein-Marx, *Political Graffiti in the Late Roman Republic: “Hidden Transcripts” and “Common Knowledge”*, in: C. Kuhn (ed.), *Politische Kommunikation und öffentliche Meinung in der antiken Welt*, Stuttgart 2012, pp. 191–217. For pro-

not confined to cities, but the chance to find actual readers was much higher. Cities were not only controlled by information technologies, they also offered a space for these new types of communication. Beyond being a neutral space for this that could be used by the owners or instigators of the built environment for display or hiding, such space could be illegitimately appropriated by others, for instance in the form of graffiti on the walls of private buildings or in temple interiors. Even more, urban space could be shaped in order to create space for such forms of communication (libraries) or ostensive storing or hiding (archives). Urban space could even be developed in order to conform to imaginaries stored in and communicated by such technologies; Jerusalem will offer an example in a later part of the volume (which might have been referred to already in this section). “Urban landscape” in the headline of the third part of chapters is ambivalent and is used to this end. On the one hand, focus is on the complexity, contingent on very different sets of agents, within cities. On the other hand, it is on the surroundings, a landscape sometimes even physically shaped, but in all cases, regardless of distances, influenced by cities. Ruralization is not the alternative to but a consequence of urbanization (p. 316). Chapters deal with the paired centres of Tiwanaku and Khonkho Wankane, which are dealing with the ecological challenges of the extreme altitude by also topographically and ritually attributing agency to the mountains and rivers around the second half of the first millennium CE (pp. 229–252, John W. Janusek). Mesopotamian cities (3500–1600 BCE) offer the interesting triangular constellation of a king close to a god and temples keeping wide-ranging economic functions and a sort of autonomy with regard to the king by reference to the same god(s). Again, shared identity is stressed by the chapter (pp. 258, 260, Geoff Emberling) in the face of significant traces of heterarchy and pre-urban forms of authority (p. 302). First-century BCE (and later) Teotihuacan (pp. 279–299, Sarah C. Clayton) also featured residential compounds that were even walled and must have had a high degree of independence (p. 288). The comparative chapter, written as always by the authors of these chapters (pp. 300–316), also offers a useful stocktaking in the middle of the book. It points to the fact that economic transaction (production-like exchange) were usually embedded in social and power relations (p. 301). Cities transformed not only spaces but also social relations. Providing safety (p. 301), they created new social divisions, even in addition to the continuation of earlier ones (p. 305). Walls were not necessarily among the first priorities or were never built (p. 309). Again, “most cultures” are credited with a close relationship between rulers and temples, even if they “had a variety of relationships” (p. 307).

It is the fourth part that brings the distribution of power centre stage and offers a broad range of cases judged exceptional in interpretations that primarily see the foundation and maintenance of cities as an exercise in central political control. Thus, the cities of the

phesy, see, e.g., D. S. Potter, *Prophecy and History in the Crisis of the Roman Empire: A Historical Commentary on the Thirteenth Sibylline Oracle* (Oxford Classical Monographs), Oxford 1990; M. Nissinen/C. E. Carter (eds.), *Images and Prophecy in the Ancient Eastern Mediterranean* (Forschungen zur Religion und Literatur des Alten und Neuen Testaments, vol. 233), Göttingen 2009; R. R. Wilson, *Prophecy and Society in Ancient Israel*, Philadelphia 1980.

Indus civilization (2600–1900 BCE) and the “Early Historic cities” of the alluvial plain between the Ganges and Yamuna are presented as places without clear differentiation of palaces in the first case and (resulting in much more problematic excavations) places reflecting a very complex economic and social composition and a high degree of resilience against the many changes in power holding (pp. 319–342, Carla M. Sinopoli). The widely proliferating model of the Greek city is presented as a place of concentration of capital, showing in later stages monumentalization without strong rulers (pp. 343–363, Ian Morris, Alex R. Knodell). Jenne-jeno, in the middle of the Niger, and East African cities like Nubian Kerma (from c. 3000 BCE onwards) again argue against the equation of urbanism and centralized power (pp. 364–380, Roderick J. McIntosh). Evidently, the authors argue, the often claimed nexus of kingship, religious institutions, and centralized administration does not work here (p. 383). In some instances, institutions were developed to fight division of labour and social differentiation, leading to hierarchies of power, for example by forging castes or guilds (p. 391) or by political and religious ideologies sanctioning the display of wealth (p. 388). The question whether cities built on such broadly based power structures are more resilient or more vulnerable has been discussed from very different positions by historical agents in defending “democracies” or broadly based “aristocracies” or in arguing for the effectiveness of monarchical rule and its centralized administration (p. 386).

The massive changes in eight- and ninth-century Baghdad (pp. 397–415, Françoise Micheau), five millennia of Jerusalem (pp. 416–436, Ann E. Killebrew) and eleventh- to fourteenth-century Cahokia on the Mississippi (pp. 437–454, Timothy R. Pauketat with Susan M. Alt and Jeffery D. Kruchten) are analysed in the fifth part as “creations” and “imagined cities”. The histories of memories as well as of the built environments point – in the reviewer’s opinion – to a sort of co-evolution of city and especially religion. “Cahokian religion” is even explicitly understood “as a dynamic component of urbanization, reinvented or reimagined during performances that ultimately altered the political, social, and economic lives of people in distant lands” (p. 453). And yet, the comparative conclusion of the part – despite its useful references to memory, sensory input, and narratives and the differences of imagined and built cities (pp. 458–459) – falls back to a position widespread in recent archaeological theory that considers built cities are above all an expression of cosmic order.⁴ This is far from self-evident, as the “lived ancient religion” has demonstrated for the early cities (as understood in this volume). First of all, such cosmologies are far from stable and subject to change, sometimes even within a generation of rulers. Second, the rationalization and over-determination on part of the producers (bringing ecological conditions, technical possibilities, economic constraints, performative constraints of time, visibility and acoustics, and a variety of communicative interests in line) is frequently neither fully or even correctly decoded by users and

4 See, e.g., T. Insoll (ed.), *Archaeology and World Religion*, London 2001; T. Insoll (ed.), *The Oxford Handbook of the Archaeology of Ritual and Religion*, Oxford 2011. For a perspective on religious experience, see, in contrast, R. Raja / J. Rüpke (eds.), *A Companion to the Archaeology of Religion in the Ancient World*, Malden 2015.

observers with their own “aesthetics of reception”. Third, diverse instigators, financiers, architects, and actual builders might bring very different interests and even patches of ideologies into their uncoordinated, competitive or replacing building or reworking (and of course simple use of space).⁵

The final part thematizes “early imperial cities”, namely Assur (from 2000 BCE onwards) and neo-Assyrian capitals in the first half of the first millennium BCE (pp. 469–490, Adelheid Otto), Tenochtitlan before the sixteenth century CE (pp. 491–512, Gerardo Gutiérrez), and finally Rome (pp. 513–531, Nicola Terrenato), the latter chapter being a narrative of the rise and extension of the empire administered from the city. As could be expected, the comparative chapter (pp. 532–545) stresses the oversized quality of these cities, their accumulation of wealth (p. 535), and the urbanism and statehood in these cases. The analytical angle of the chapter is from top. Art and architecture are seen as expression of political ideologies and religion and rulership as indivisible (pp. 536, 541–542). The high diversity of the population of such an imperial city in terms of identities, ethnicities, and languages is acknowledged, likewise the social differences and degrees of specialization, even in the religious realm, under such conditions (pp. 539–540). Following the ideology of texts produced by rulers rather than recent research, however, “ideology and religion” are identified as an additional cohesive force beyond “coercion and threat” (p. 541). Again, the reviewer would have liked to see a more nuanced analysis, discussing the surprisingly restricted role of religion as a cohesive force in the Roman empire for instance⁶ or raising the question whether religion was a disruptive rather than cohesive force, which demanded careful and maybe even expensive handling by the ruling centre, instigated rebellions (Palestine, Egypt), or enabled coherent counter ideologies (Gaul).

Evidently, “imperial cities” is intended as a bridge to the fourth volume of the Cambridge World History on empires and networks. Perhaps it is intentional that further questions about the relation between cities and empires are not on the agenda of this volume. Do certain types of empires further urbanization? Or presuppose urbanization? Do they simply extend urban networks or transform them into more hierarchical networks? How do the large, if not global, aspirations of empires relate to urban imaginaries putting a town at the centre of the world or conceptualizing that town as a microcosmos? It is with regard to these questions that the price to be paid for a thoroughly comparative approach becomes especially visible. Naturally, the comparison between units focuses analysis on these units instead of their diachronic or synchronic connections and their entangle-

5 See, e.g., M. Arnhold, Sanctuaries and Urban Spatial Settings in Roman Imperial Ostia, in: Raja/Rüpke (eds.), *A Companion to the Archaeology of Religion in the Ancient World*, pp. 293–303; A.-K. Rieger, Waste Matters: Life Cycle and Agency of Pottery Employed in Graeco-Roman Sacred Spaces, in: *Religion in the Roman Empire* 2 (2016) 3, pp. 307–339; J. Rüpke, The Horologium of Augustus (Review), in: *American Journal of Archaeology* 121 (2017) 3, www.ajaonline.org/book-review/3498.

6 See J. Rüpke, *Reichsreligion? Überlegungen zur Religionsgeschichte des antiken Mittelmeerraums in römischer Zeit*, in: *Historische Zeitschrift* 292 (2011), pp. 297–322; J. Rüpke, *From Jupiter to Christ: On the History of Religion in the Roman Imperial Period*, Oxford 2014.

ments: How did cities react to cities? It has to be said in advance that beyond their role in economic exchange cities do not figure prominently in the subsequent volume.

The volume is rounded off by a concluding chapter on “the meaning of early cities” by the editor (pp. 546–557). Yoffee is pointing to the long-living or newly forming memory of many cities under scrutiny, a memory that is also shaping academic approaches (pp. 551–552). The final pages, however, are given to the fragility of such cities, their sometimes short lifespan, their inability to reconcile the complexity of cities, and the aim to reduce complexity, which is driving urbanization (557). It comes here to the fore that there is another, an implicit, definition of “early cities”. These are past cities. The memories referred to are not the memory – which is the challenge and chance (“legacy”, see the brief treatment, p. 461) – of ancient Athens in modern Athens (and Rome and Baghdad and Mexico City), but present memories of cities of a bygone past. This adds to the insinuation that frailty and the end of cities are properties of a past radically different from modern cities. Are modern cities not threatened by failure? And are past cities not resurrected by being included into growing present conurbations? Is not archaeological with its long-standing focus on ancient *cities* (Pompeii, Troy, Machu Picchu, etc.) a major tool in this very business? By rejecting any other grand narrative, *the* grand narrative of the radical break between the modern world (starting in Lord Acton’s *Cambridge Modern History* with a volume on the Renaissance) is performed again.

Without doubt, despite all criticism, this book is not only an effort, but an achievement, highly readable and informative, and a model for historical comparison. And yet, the state of the art as presented in this volume is tainted by a pervasive divide, again implicitly hinted at in the volume’s final sentences. Recent urban studies have focused on the very complexity of cities, not only in terms of functions and services offered or the diversity of their populations. From different angles this has been described as the overlapping of different networks, the different groups’ differences in making urban space, and diverse agents’ different appropriations of spaces as “espace vécu”.⁷ Diversity is also reflected in classical sociological theory focusing on the *individual* (Simmel) located in spaces and networks different from those of the other city dwellers who he or she is encountering. From a similar starting point, those approaches that are focusing on economic factors stress the diversity, the division of labour, and the hindrances of exchange that need to be overcome. In contrast, narratives focusing on the political dimension presume hierarchy instead of heterarchy as the default situation.

Religion, then, finds two very different places in such narratives. In the former, dominant in recent studies on today’s cities, religion is a tool for the urban aspirations of inhabitants of or migrants to the city. By risking to enlarge the situative constellation of powerful agents by introducing a god or gods into social interaction, religious practices open up or recall horizons and resources beyond present power structures on a scale demanding redress to wrongdoing experienced through competition among equals up to globalizing

7 H. Lefebvre, *La production de l’espace* (Collection société et urbanisme), Paris 1974; E. W. Soja, *Postmodern Geographies*, London 1989; see also M. Löw, *Raumsoziologie* (Wissenschaft 1506), Frankfurt am Main 2001.

or universalist projects.⁸ In the second case, dominant, but not all-pervasive in the “Early Cities”, religion is a resource administered by elites and rulers, enlarging their power by monopolizing the alliance with even more powerful agents – and strangely enough fully interiorized by the powerless so that they feel compelled to solidarity (to explain, this is what Fustel de Coulange’s “Ancient City” was all about). Both perspectives explain some phenomena each.⁹ But how to combine that? Answers are totally absent from handbooks of urban studies, never treating religion in a longer historical perspective nor as part of a city’s legacy or as part of the contemporary appropriation of space.¹⁰ City, likewise, is never a topic of handbooks of religious studies. For now, the answer can only be a negative one: There is enough evidence in the volume to question the easy way out, with the former position capturing the modern and the latter premodern or “early” cities. Urban religion is a phenomenon across periods.

If religion is a focus, it is not the topic of the volume. As far as I can see, beyond the notion of the city-state in early civilizations and the role of cities and port cities in regional production and transregional exchange, competing world or global histories do not give a similar prominence to cities. Against the backdrop of their paramount role in the present and the obvious evolutionary success of urbanization, this leaves a blank. Norman Yoffee has started to fill it.

8 See, in general, J. Rüpke, *Religious Agency, Identity, and Communication: Reflecting on History and Theory of Religion*, in: *Religion* 45 (2015) 3, pp. 344–366; used as an analytical perspective in the study of urban transformations in J. Rüpke, *Pantheon: A New History of Roman Religion*, D.M.B. Richardson (trans.), Princeton 2018.

9 Cf. the short descriptive chapter by J. A. Baird, *Religion and Ritual*, in: P. Clark (ed.) *The Oxford Handbook of Cities in World History*, Oxford 2016, pp. 181–196, pointing to diversity and expressing cosmologies.

10 See, e.g., G. Bridge/S. Watson, *The New Blackwell Companion to the City* (Blackwell Companions to Geography), Malden 2000.

A World with States, Empires, and Networks, 1200 BCE–900 CE. On CWH volume IV

Stephan Conermann

I have the fourth volume of the seven-volume series “The Cambridge World History” in front of me. The period covered extends from 1200 BC to 900 BC, a proud 2100 years in all. Beyond that, it is about nothing less than the whole world. Global social, economic, cultural, political and technological developments and contexts are to be the focus of the individual contributions. The aim is to avoid the still predominant view of the “advanced civilizations” of this epoch and to include hitherto marginalized spaces and societies in the academic consideration. The beginning and end of the chosen period are justified as follows: Until 1200 BC, i.e. about 8000 years after the first appearance of agriculture and sedentary life, a differentiation and diversity of human communities and ways of life had emerged, which would shape the following period. On the one hand, there were large agrarian cultures in the Afro-Eurasian world zone, which were dominated by small elites within a “state structure”. On the other hand, people in many other regions continued to follow nomadic habits. Often they had not even adopted agriculture and settled down, let alone founded “states” and “civilizations”. One may accept this explanation for the beginning of the epochal boundary, but one searches in vain in the introduction for a plausibility check regarding its end point. For the European-Middle Eastern region it could be justified with the end of Late Antiquity and the establishment of the Frankish and Abbasid Empires and the simultaneous consolidation of Byzantium. But for the rest of the world?

The volume is divided into two parts. First, eight contributions offer global historical approaches via the cross-cutting areas of economy (“Global economic history”, pp. 29–54), gender and power (“The gendering of power in the family and the state”, pp. 55–75), slavery (“Slavery”, pp. 76–100), axis time (“The Axial Age in world history”,

pp. 101–119), science (“Developments in science and technology”, pp. 120–153), gender and sexuality (“Discourses on gender and sexuality”, pp. 154–178), art (“Art”, pp. 179–234), and nomadism (“Pastoral nomadism”, pp. 235–266). These themes are all important, but their selection is not justified anywhere. In this respect, the feeling of a certain arbitrariness arises. Why these objects? Why not the environment, mobility, knowledge, religion, war and peace, domination, or culture, for example? Interestingly, as is so often the case, the law is missing. Yet legal norms and practices form the basis of every social order, at least if one understands by it a system that is defined by institutions, social relations, value orientations, and actions.

In the second part of the collective volume, we find a series of regional overviews (West and Central Asia, the Mediterranean, East Asia, South Asia, the Americas, Africa, and Australasia and the Pacific), each of which is accompanied by one or two case studies that examine a smaller geographical area or a topic within that region in greater detail. The focus of this individual analysis naturally depends on the expertise of the – by the way, excellently selected – authors. For example, Jeffrey Lerner writes about Bactria, Xinru Liu about the Silk Road, Ralph Austen about the Trans-Saharan trade, and Shonaleeka Kaul about Pataliputra.

Since I am of course not an expert on all the topics discussed in this volume, I will concentrate on two contributions in the following that I can reasonably assess. In this way, it may be possible to arrive at more general statements about the quality of the individual contributions and the coherence of the volume and to make an overall assessment of this form of world history.

First a few words about the article on slavery by Peter Hunt. Hunt, who teaches Greek history at the University of Colorado Boulder, is a specialist on the classical Greek form of slavery. While his book “Slaves, Warfare and Ideology in the Greek Historians”¹ deals with the question of the participation of slaves and Helots in war campaigns and the representation of these groups in Greek historiography, he has also written an excellent introduction to the subject for students.² So what is his contribution to the *Cambridge World History*? He begins by stating that although source material is extremely difficult to find for many regions of the world, one must assume that the phenomenon of slavery occurred in almost all societies during the period under study. This is followed by a more detailed discussion of a possible definition of “slavery”. According to Hunt, the fact that persons are considered property is the focus of many approaches. However, there are two problems: first, someone can have property rights over another person without that person being enslaved. Furthermore, slaves are not treated exclusively as property in any legal context, but also as persons who have certain rights and are responsible for their crimes. To escape this dilemma, Orlando Patterson described slavery as the “permanent, violent domination of natally alienated and generally dishonoured persons”.³

1 P. Hunt, *Slaves, Warfare and Ideology in the Greek Historians*, Cambridge 1998.

2 P. Hunt, *Ancient Greek and Roman Slavery*, Hoboken 2018.

3 O. Patterson, *Slavery and Social Death: A Comparative Study*, Cambridge 1982, p. 2.

Slaves, according to his famous dictum, are “socially dead”. This, of course, only means that they have no recognized legitimate rights and ties. At this point, one wonders why slavery researchers are always trying to distinguish slavery from debt bondage, serfdom, forced labour and forced prostitution, unfree peasants, etc. Sometimes one gets the feeling that they are eager to maintain the supposed singularity of the system. This may be a legitimate aspiration, but it may be equally reasonable to view all these phenomena as different forms of strong and enduring asymmetrical dependencies. In the Cluster of Excellence (EXS 2036) “Beyond Slavery and Freedom. Asymmetrical Dependencies in Pre-modern Societies”⁴, which was newly established at the University of Bonn in 2019, we refer to the internal relationship between two actors, in which one actor completely controls the other – and especially their access to resources – so that the other loses his/her autonomy completely to define strong asymmetrical dependencies. Such asymmetrical dependency between actors must be supported by an institution that guarantees that the dependent actor cannot change his situation either through escape or resistance/contradiction. This rather sociological approach has the double advantage of being able to compare different forms of asymmetrical dependency and to avoid the semantic charge of the term “slavery” (and its opposite “freedom”).

In the second section of his essay, which deals with the different functions of male and female slaves, Hunt uses an approach developed by Moses Finley half a century ago.⁵ In his model, he distinguished between “slave societies” and “societies with slaves”. In a “slave society”, according to Finley, at least 20 percent of the population are enslaved. In addition, they play the leading role in the production of economic surplus. Finally, slaves must be important enough in a society to exert a lasting cultural influence. In total, only five (Western) societies met these criteria: ancient Greece and Rome, modern Brazil, the Caribbean, and the southern United States. This means that in the period considered by Hunt there were only two slave societies in the world, Rome and Greece. The problem is that we know very much about these two societies and very little about most of the others. Therefore, many statements Hunt makes about the use of slaves in non-Roman and non-Greek contexts are quite general. For example, he quotes David Turley: “the social distance in slave societies between slaves and their masters was more emphatically underlined than in most societies with slaves.”⁶ Is this proven to be the case? Or is this more of a claim still waiting to be validated by empirical research? This vagueness runs through the rest of the contribution, despite all of the author’s efforts to find examples from outside of Rome and Greece. Statements such as “slavery is rare among hunter-gatherers, is sometimes present in incipient agricultural societies, and then becomes common among societies with more advanced agriculture” (p. 87) are somehow as banal as the statement that due to wars there were a great many prisoners of war who were sold as slaves through an international slave trade. Moreover, Hunt’s understanding of the law remains influ-

4 www.dependency.uni-bonn.de.

5 M. Finley, *Ancient Slavery and Modern Ideology*, New York 1980.

6 D. Turley, *Slavery*, Oxford 2000, pp. 62–100, here p. 63.

enced by the model of the classical world when he formulates, for example, “A large-scale system of slavery requires the coercive backing provided by a strong state [...]. States promulgate laws; these usually confirmed property rights [...]. Behind the law lay the state’s superiority in the exercise of violence” (pp. 91–92). It is a very controversial and ultimately open question whether non-European societies have developed a similar understanding of property and ownership. This seems rather doubtful. With my remarks I do not want to question the author’s expertise at all. Peter Hunt has tried very hard and his article certainly has its merits, but he fails in his attempt to make really coherent and at the same time differentiated statements about slavery all over the world for a period of more than 2000 years in just over 20 pages.

Let us look at another contribution, as already announced above. Charles F. Pazdernik, Professor of Classical Philology at Grand Valley State University in Allendale, Michigan, devotes his essay to Late Antiquity in Europe, i.e. he concentrates on the period from about 300 to 900 AD. At the beginning of what is commonly called “Late Antiquity” were the governments of the two Roman emperors Diocletian (r. 284–305) and Constantine I. (r. 306–337). This is a common consensus, because the far-reaching reforms of Diocletian and Constantine’s toleration of Christianity can certainly be understood as an important caesura. The end of the epoch was marked by the end of the Carolingian Empire, the renewed strengthening of Byzantium and the fragmentation of the Abbasid Empire. Space, i.e. “Europe”, was rather an arbitrary term, behind which there was no concept. This can be accepted. However, one could certainly have chosen a different, less problematic concept of space. Anyway, after the spatial turn, it seems to be not quite up to the current state of discussion to continue thinking in terms of purely geographically defined metropolitan areas.

Pazdernik characterizes late antiquity as follows: “Late antiquity, especially as it relates to Europe, may accordingly be characterized as a period of disruption, transition, and transformation away from a Mediterranean-centred, late Roman imperial political and sociological order, the effects of which were experienced differently in the various post-Roman successor states that developed both within and beyond former, centrally administered imperial territories” (p. 379). This certainly valid claim should be read together with the author’s own statement that an important aspect of this epoch was the adoption of monotheistic religions and universalistic aspirations for power by empires. The 7th and 8th centuries in particular should no longer be seen as the “Dark Middle Ages”, but rather as a time of shifts and new orientations that led to the establishment of the three empires mentioned above and, in the medium term, to the emergence of a radically changed world shaped by Christian monarchies throughout Europe. These are not fundamentally new insights. However, the fundamental importance of the epoch, also in terms of global history, could have been emphasized even more. As is the case with many handbooks from Anglo-American academia, it is striking that German-language research is almost not taken into account in the *Cambridge World History*. Thus, this article, for example, does not include the results of the collective research project (Priority Program 1173) which focused on “Integration and Disintegration of Cultures in the European

Middle Ages” over a period of six years (2005–2011). Among other things, Michael Borgolte, one of the two spokespersons of the joint project, has published a weighty monograph on the European Middle Ages.⁷ In his opinion, the history of Europe during this period was characterized by the competition of three monotheistic religions, one of which – Christianity – even split into two major branches. In my opinion, the most important phenomenon seems to be that a huge monotheistic cosmos developed over late antiquity, which, despite its bloody inner conflicts, is nevertheless characterized by numerous path dependencies and shared perceptions of the world. The formation of the three monotheisms ultimately represented a long process. During the period under scrutiny here, there were of course also numerous polytheistic cultures, but these are incomparably less well documented in the sources and unfortunately are not taken into account in the contribution by Pazdernik. Pazdernik might also have been able to say something more about the second major complex of themes of Late Antiquity in Europe, the so-called “migration of peoples” (“Völkerwanderung”). Here, German-speaking medieval historians have been able to provide important impulses in recent years. In 2017, for example, the collegiate research group (FOR 2496) “Migration and Mobility in Late Antiquity and the Early Middle Ages” at the University of Tübingen, which was established by Mischa Meier, Steffen Patzold, and Sebastian Schmidt-Hofner, began its work. The intensive discussions about the period from 300 to 900 AD have shown that the formation of larger, more powerful associations of rulers, which, unlike the small groups they replaced, could no longer be controlled by the conventional instruments of Roman politics, can only be understood against the background of complex social changes and processes of differentiation in the regions beyond the Roman borders. These groups, which cannot be grasped by the modern term “ethnicity”, often acted situatively, were generally fluid in their composition, and were in a state of constant change. Unfortunately, the contribution by Pazdernik tells us nothing about all these things. Instead, the history of the Roman Empire in the 5th century and the upheavals in the two following centuries are presented in a very traditional way. The subsequent descriptions of the three great empires that emerged at the end of the epoch are just as concise and thus rather undifferentiated as the descriptions of post-Roman Britain, Scandinavia and the Slavs. In this case, too, it must be stated that the author simply fails in his attempt to present the highly complex subject adequately on 25 pages. No wonder, because on the one hand an interested, educated reader should probably also get an insight into the topic. On the other hand, the entire European area is supposed to be covered in one article. That leaves only 1–2 pages each for the history of the Byzantine Empire, the Abbasids (where are the beginnings of Islam and where are the Umayyads?), the British Isles, Northern Europe and the Slavic region... This must be unsatisfactory in the end.

In the context of the article on Late Antiquity in Europe discussed here, it should be pointed out that it would certainly have been good for a “world history” to take into

7 M. Borgolte, Christen, Juden, Muselmanen. Die Erben der Antike und der Aufstieg des Abendlandes 300 bis 1400 n. Chr., Munich 2006.

account the relationship of the Islamic world to Late Antiquity together with Europe. Both regions must be thought of in a common horizon. Looking at only one side, one becomes suspicious of a Eurocentric viewpoint and also neglects the more recent discussions in Islamic Studies. The long-term project “Corpus Coranicum”, which is affiliated with the Berlin-Brandenburg Academy of Sciences and Humanities and was initiated by Angelika Neuwirth, Michael Marx, and Nicolai Sinai, as well as the Collaborative Research Centre 980 “Episteme in Motion. Knowledge Transfer from the Old World to the Early Modern Period” are on the one hand about placing the Qur’an in the context of late antique debates and revealing the interrelationships between the Qur’an and late antique knowledge content and cultures.⁸ On the other hand, however, they also aim at placing the emergence and formation of Islam in a context of late antique processes of change and transformation. The accompanying re-evaluation and temporal expansion of Late Antiquity up to the 9th century deconstructs the discourse of decline (keyword: fall of the Roman Empire) and the narrative of the triumphant rise of Christianity. This leaves room for revealing substantial commonalities between the three text cultures.

At this point, let us note that the two texts that were analysed in more detail cannot fulfil the claim of providing an all-encompassing insight into their respective topics. A cursory review of the other contributions to the volume unfortunately yields similar results. In this respect, I do not consider the overall concept of the *Cambridge World History* to be very convincing. Against this background, the question arises as to what the claim of a “world history” – or better: a “global history” – could be. I think that Sebastian Conrad, in his introduction to this topic is right when he writes: “The focus is on cross-border processes, exchange relations, but also comparisons within the framework of global contexts. The interweaving of the world is always the starting point, and the circulation of and exchange between things, people, ideas and institutions are among the most important objects of this approach.”⁹ In his opinion, global historical investigations should always be accompanied and mirrored by case studies on the meso or micro level. What remains open is the fundamental question of how one can “write a history of the world and its interdependence that is not Eurocentric and does not pre-structure its narrative logic by using Western terms.”¹⁰ Writing real global history is a very great theoretical, but above all methodological challenge.

Are there other, better approaches than the one chosen for the *Cambridge World History* to cover large topics via numerous shorter individual contributions? I think so. In “History of the World”, edited by Jürgen Osterhammel and Akira Iriye, the burden is shared

8 See for example the two excellent anthologies by A. Neuwirth/N. Sinai/M. Marx (eds.), *The Qur’ān in Context. Historical and Literary Investigations into the Qur’ānic Milieu*, Leiden/London 2010 and N. Schmidt/N. K. Schmid/A. Neuwirth (eds.), *Denkraum Spätantike. Reflections of Antiquity in the Context of the Koran*, Wiesbaden 2016.

9 S. Conrad, *Globalgeschichte. Eine Einführung*, Munich 2013; quote from the extended English edition: *What Is Global History?*, Oxford/Princeton 2016, p. 9.

10 Ibid., p. 136.

by only a few shoulders. This is how the volume that deals with our epoch¹¹ consists of a very reflective introduction and five long contributions: “Pre- and Early History” (Hermann Parzinger); “Early Advanced Civilizations” (Karen Radner); “The Classical World” (Hans-Joachim Gehrke); “Ancient China” (Mark Edward Lewis); “South Asia and Southeast Asia” (Axel Michaels). Of course, this structure also has its disadvantages, especially if the individual contributors do not follow overriding thematic guiding questions, but rather narrate from a disciplinary internal perspective. The editors of “Neue Fischer Weltgeschichte” have chosen a different approach. The series consists of 21 monographs which, in contrast to their predecessor, are largely written by German authors. The aim is a global history of individual spaces and the relationship of the spaces to each other. The authors were asked to take into account state, economy, society, religion and culture. Whether the individual authors will really succeed in doing so remains to be seen. If one looks at the volume written by Reinhold Kaiser, for example, his presentation – to put it bluntly – still follows the Eurocentric narrative of the birth of high medieval and modern Europe from the defensive struggle against the Muslims and the brilliant victory of the Christian church.¹²

11 Frühe Zivilisationen. Die Welt vor 600, ed. by Hans-Joachim Gehrke, München 2017; English version: Making Civilizations: The World before 600, ed. by Hans-Joachim Gehrke, Harvard 2020.

12 R. Kaiser, Die Mittelmeerwelt und Europa in Spätantike und Frühmittelalter, Frankfurt on the Main 2014.

Expanding Webs of Exchange and Conflict, 500 CE–1500 CE. On CWH volume V

Wolfram Drews

In the concluding essay of this volume, Diego Olstein convincingly answers the question: Does it make sense to speak of global history for the premodern eras? Olstein provides several precise criteria that justify the label of global history in relation to different regions of Afro-Eurasia; these same criteria can also be applied to pre-Columbian America, where processes of transregional interdependence that fit his criteria can be identified. Thus, in several regions of Asia, Europe, Africa, and the Americas, one sees roughly synchronous processes that result in a level of complexity that transcend the limits of the respective “worlds”. However, what is missing in the “Middle Millennium” is an exchange between the so-called Old and New Worlds, although comparable processes can be detected in both.

The twenty-five chapters of this volume (plus introduction and epilogue) are divided into five parts of different lengths. “Part I: Global Developments” consists of five chapters, with contributions by Joachim Radkau (on humans and the environment); Susan Mosher Stuard (on family, sexuality, and gender), Susan Reynolds (social institutions and hierarchy), Linda Walton (on educational institutions), and Clifford J Rogers (on warfare). Thus, each contribution to this first section analyses continuity and change in a specific historical process. Although there is no explicit connection between chapters, each author succeeds in bringing a global perspective to their topic. “Part II: Eurasian Commonalities” has only two chapters. The first chapter is a collaboration by eleven authors and provides a comparative analysis of courtly cultures in Western Europe, Byzantium, the Islamic world, India, China, and Japan. In the second chapter of this section, Björn Wittrock examines “transmutations and renovations of complexes of religious-cultural, societal, and political practices that occurred between the tenth and the thirteenth

century in several civilizations” (p. 208). He argues that this period represents an Axial Age and uses the term “cultural crystallization” to designate “articulations of new conceptions of cosmology, temporality, agency, and belonging” (p. 209) that fundamentally impacted social organization and institutions.

“Part III: Growing Interactions” is comprised of six chapters. Richard Smith discusses trade relations in Afro-Eurasia; Michael Balard examines European and Mediterranean trade networks; and Himanshu Prabha Ray addresses trade routes and maritime communities in the Indian Ocean. Dagmar Schäfer and Marcus Popplow jointly analyse technological innovations within expanding webs of exchange, while Charles Burnett focuses on the transmission of science and philosophy. In the final chapter of this section, Anatoly M. Khazanov focuses on the contribution of pastoral nomadic migrations and conquests to these “growing interactions”. Clearly, these chapters share a common focus on connectivity. But what makes this section particularly interesting is that, unlike many studies, the discussion of connectivity is not limited to trade links between different regions of the world. It also addresses scientific and technological innovation. The inclusion of Khazanov’s contribution on pastoral migrations and conquests in this section, rather than in the fifth part on state formation, may come as a surprise to some readers. However, its placement here is justifiable given that not all nomadic migrations resulted in the formation of empires and undoubtedly these migrations made a significant contribution to “growing interactions”.

“Part IV: Expanding Religious Systems” has only three chapters. Michael Cook’s contribution on the “centrality” of Islamic civilisation opens the section. It is followed by Miri Rubin’s examination of Christendom’s regional systems and Tansen Sen’s contribution on the spread of Buddhism. By placing the discussion of Islam first, the editors highlight two key points: (1) the unmistakable geographic centrality of the areas in which Islam was the dominant religion and (2) the fact that Islam is the only religion that emerged during this time frame. Because of Islam’s central geographic location – and the relative religious toleration it offered – members of other religious groups living in the “Arab-Islamic world” as well as Muslims were able to act as cultural mediators between Europe, Africa, and Asia.

Under the heading “State Formation”, the fifth and final section of the volume focuses primarily on the issue of empire building and is the longest section of the volume with seven chapters. Johann P. Arnason opens the section with a theoretical and empirical analysis of the fundamental features of state formation and empire building. The next six chapters focus on state building in various parts of the world. Richard von Glahn details the history of Chinese empire formation between the Sui and the Song dynasties. Michal Biran examines the Mongol’s unprecedented mobilization of peoples, goods, and ideas that led to the formation of the largest contiguous empire in history. Although Biran acknowledges the destructive dimension of empire formation, she primarily highlights the active role played by Chinggis Khan and his descendants in advancing intercivilizational exchange. Jean-Claude Cheynet traces the history of the Byzantine empire, arguing that contrary to the image of stability promoted in imperial discourse and later accepted

by many historians, the structures of the empire underwent multiple adaptations in response to new situations. David C. Conrad examines “early polities of Western Sudan” from the eighth century to the fifteenth century (i.e. West Africa, not the modern state in East Africa). Finally, the last two chapters shift the focus to the so-called New World. Michael E. Smith analyses empire formation in Postclassic Mesoamerica (from the eighth century to the fifteenth century), and Sabine MacCormack examines the entanglement of state and religion in the formation of the Inca empire.

An introduction by the two editors and an epilogue by Diego Olstein titled “‘Proto-globalization’ and ‘Proto-glocalizations’ in the Middle Millennium” provide a cohesive framework for interpreting the five sections. This structure of the volume allows the editors to present a global history of the Middle Millennium that is comprehensive enough to capture the complexity and diversity of the age while, at the same time, offering a clear analytical path that stimulates synthesis and theory formation. This latter task is largely accomplished in Olstein’s concluding essay, which skillfully condenses the results of the chapters into a cohesive synthesis. In writing the epilogue, Olstein expressly follows the preparatory work of the late Israeli sociologist Shmuel Eisenstadt, who worked out the concept of the synthesis before his death.

The first section utilizes a global comparative perspective to examine changes in nature and society. The second and shortest section is guided in the narrower sense by a comparative studies approach, whereby facets of historic change and of human agency play only a subordinate role. Although the comparison of courtly cultures in the first chapter of this section provides an illuminating and meaningful example (and, if sources allowed, would certainly have included analogous materials on pre-Columbian cultures), Wittrock’s contribution on “transregional reorientations” between the tenth and thirteenth centuries is probably the most theoretical in the entire volume. Together, the two contributions offer enlightening perspectives, even though the reader may wonder why the two contributions are grouped under the heading “Eurasian Commonalities”. The conceptual framework of sections three, four, and five, in which the focus is on interactions of people often across (supposed) cultural, civilizational, and imperial boundaries, is immediately apparent. But the sphere of human interaction represents a departure from the typical focus of global medieval histories on trade, migration, and empire – although these topics are certainly covered in this volume. Under “Growing Interactions”, the editors also include contributions on exchange processes involving the transmission of scientific knowledge and technological innovations. The fourth section addressing religious expansion refers to previously discussed trade routes, whose existence was a prerequisite for the dissemination of Islam, Christianity, and Buddhism, and one could add essential for the spread of Judaism, as, for example, into the area of the Ashkenazi and for Sephardic Judaism’s spread within the Arab-Islamic world. This section also touches on migration – a topic also broached in the preceding section, albeit with reference to nomadic migrations and empire building. The topic of empire building *grosso modo* corresponds with the focus of the fifth section “State Formation”.

This volume can be understood as realizing the oft-cited maxim of “provincializing Europe”, given that China, not Western Europe, is the point of inception. The volume also provides only minimal coverage of the “Islamic World”, despite one chapter’s title referencing its “centrality”. Similarly, Judaism’s contribution to the era receives few mentions, although Richard Smith’s discussion of Afro-Eurasia trade routes briefly touches on long-distance Jewish traders, known as Radhanites, who were said to have traded their goods all the way from the land of the Franks to China. However, their very existence remains a topic of scholarly controversy; for example, Michael Toch, a professor of medieval history at Hebrew University of Jerusalem, has expressed doubts about this alleged network of Jewish traders.

The volume does encourage comparisons beyond those found in Olstein’s epilogue: on the existence of commercial corporations and dealer associations in Europe and in India (see pp. 287, 295, and 305–6), on competition as stimulus for technological innovation (see p. 332), and on reactions to comparable environmental conditions (see p. 336). For example, one could compare the translation practices used by persons of different backgrounds at various levels of mediation. These distinctions can be seen not only in the translation practices used in Toledo, but also in Tang and Song China (see pp. 453 and 472). The volume also prompts other comparisons such as between the institutionalization of Christianity, Islam, and Buddhism.

Beginning with the Song dynasty, the Chinese civil service examination system had established a non-hereditary elite based on educational merit. However, China had no educational institution comparable to European universities, which were formed in the Middle Millennium as self-regulating legal corporations. As Olstein notes in his concluding essay, “the development of universities with well-defined rights and duties” that were recognized by rulers and state institutions was “singular” to Latin Europe (p. 678). Europe’s special status on the world stage was not a given during the Middle Millennium; at best, its exceptionality was limited to its natural environment (i.e. its preponderance of coastline in relationship to its continental mass) and its autonomous institutions, the latter of which only receives sporadic coverage in this volume. But knowledge, as everyone knew in the Middle Millennium and in antiquity, came from the East, not the West (p. 344).

The fifth section opens with Arnason’s comparative study of civilizations; global in its scope and perspective, this study makes an exemplary contribution to category formation and theory building. In Arnason’s essay, Latin Europe is presented as a “western Eurasian periphery”, in which the Carolingian empire, as a “civilizational matrix”, has decisively shaped the course of political and cultural history. Nonetheless, the Carolingian empire did not encompass the whole of Western Christendom, and Europe continued to have multiple political centres and differing regional patterns of development. This pluralism of political centres and divergence of regional trajectories is particularly evident when juxtaposed with China, where the staying power of a sacral-imperial centre of power prevented a comparable territorial and institutional division between secular and sacred power (*inter imperium et sacerdotium*). However, after the demise of the Tang

dynasty, the imperial centre increasingly withdrew from the regulation of everyday life, which, in turn, encouraged the rise of cities and led to the strengthening of local elites. A by-product of these changes was the downfall of the old aristocracy; after the Tang era, there were no longer any elites capable of challenging imperial authority. The Chinese imperial model became the political ideal, and Korea, Japan, and Vietnam emulated it in forming their own more centralized states. However, each adapted the model to local conditions, as evidenced, for example, by the Japanese court's promotion of a distinct ideology of elite formation. In Latin Europe, there was no comparable centre of imperial power having the same level of political and cultural clout. In the Islamic world, many traditions from the Byzantine and Sasanian worlds were absorbed, and various ethnic communities were integrated into the Islamic realm; this was particularly the case in North Africa, as well as in Western and Central Asia. However, unlike in early medieval Western Europe, no state formation based on ethnicity emerged.

The large-scale comparison of civilizations is also impressive, since, unlike older European comparative models, European developments do not serve as the yardstick against which other civilizations are judged inferior. In fact, in Arnason's analysis, Europe appears deficient in many respects, especially when compared to the Chinese empire. In China, the invasion of steppe nomads continued until the early modern era, so that Chinese civilization was constantly shaped by the dual influence of sedentary and nomadic populations. This combining of traditions gave rise to some of the most successful dynasties (e.g. Sui and Tang dynasties) of the Chinese Middle Millennium. Under the Tang dynasty, China experienced what was probably the most cosmopolitan and multi-cultural epoch in its history, and it was in this era that the Chinese model took root in the East Asian periphery. The political, social, and cultural changes of the Tang dynasty point to the advantages of applying newer entangled history approaches to the study of history (see pp. 514–15). In Korea, Japan, and Vietnam, we see not only the adoption of the Sui-Tang political model, but also the adoption and further development of Chinese script and of Buddhism. The history of Buddhism's spread also highlights multidimensional and reverse processes of exchange. For example, Buddhist pilgrims from India (the homeland of Buddhism) travelled to China to visit holy sites, impacting tradition building in India. Also, traditions from Japanese Buddhism affected Chinese schools. The inclusion of African history in a global history of the Middle Millennium is a challenge, especially given the absence of written traditions outside the Islamic world. The present volume overcomes this challenge through an entangled history of economic exchanges on Saharan trade routes and through a comparative analysis of empire formation in what is now present-day Mali. Here we see some unique models of social organization, such as government by "heterarchy", i.e. networks of groups of competing and overlapping interests, such as farmers, herders, hunters, and merchants. Another possible comparison between African and Eurasian history concerns the frequent dominance of mounted invaders (p. 607), which receives only a brief mention in this volume.

The integration of American history requires the use of a comparative perspective, since there were no detectable interactions between the so-called Old and New Worlds (the

Vikings' arrival in North America is ignored given the lack of any appreciable effect during this era. For the Maya, we can surmise that the collapse of classical Maya culture and its political communities coincided roughly with the (alleged) decline of the late Roman period in Latin Europe. With the end of the Classical period, the Maya writing system continued to exist, but in a reduced and functionally limited form. The focus of Maya urban society also shifted from the southern lowland cities to the northern part of the Yucatán peninsula during the postclassic period. The collapse of this period, like that of the classical period, is compared with the "decline processes" of late antiquity (p. 623). However, against the backdrop of subsequent Spanish conquest, the possibility of interpreting such changes as transformations (as occurs in current research on the early Middle Ages) is ignored. The history of Mesoamerica offers numerous possibilities of comparison with Eurasian history, with reference to developmental trends, the emergence of imperial centres (e.g. Chichén Itzá, Teotihuacán, or Tenochtitlán), or the dissemination of the so-called "international" sign and semiotic system (p. 633), which could be compared to the dissemination of Latin or Chinese writing systems. Another noteworthy avenue of comparison with Eurasia is the transregional exchanges of technological innovation between South and Central America.

Unlike in Mesoamerica, the Incas established an imperial system that lasted only a few decades. The Incas reorganized the existing religious cults of conquered peoples within the Inca religious framework (cult of the sun) and created empire-wide pilgrimage centres in which sacred rituals advanced the legitimacy of Inca conquest. The principles of reciprocity, redistribution, and vertical control governed all relations in the Inca empire. Nonetheless, some subjugated groups resisted integration of the empire and even collaborated with the Spanish invaders. The Inca economy produced such large surpluses that its accumulated wealth survived until the end of the sixteenth century. The Incas imagined their empire as a "world" of its own. Despite the absence of indigenous writings, this world can be interpreted utilizing the methods of historical comparison and the findings of archaeological research.

This volume can only be criticized on a few points. The structure of Miri Rubin's contribution on regional systems of Christianity unfortunately is rather unclear; its initial reference to the Virgin Mary's centrality is unnecessary, given this may not have been the case for East Syriac (so-called Nestorian) Christians. Also, although Emperor Justinian did succeed in conquering the Vandal and Ostrogothic kingdoms, he did not conquer the Visigoth kingdom; only a coastal strip in the southeast of the Iberian Peninsula was temporarily under Justinian's rule (contrary to what is stated on p. 427). This essay also exhibits some repetitions (see pp. 428–29) and would have benefited from a clearer structure.

Also, it would have been helpful if this volume had included a discussion of changing approaches to world history and more specifically a discussion of this volume's methodology: How did new (and old) concepts of world history inform the writing of this volume and other volumes in this series? Clearly this volume draws on newer approaches; yet changes in terminology and concepts are never explicitly addressed.

However, this shortcoming pales in the face of Diego Olstein's concluding magisterial large-scale civilizational comparison that does not shy away from offering an incisive and pointed theoretical analysis. Olstein begins with the local and then turns to large-scale transformations that reshaped local worlds, especially in Afro-Eurasia. He examines the often entangled transregional processes of empire building, the expansion of trade routes, and religious conversion and institutionalization (especially with reference to Christianity, Islam, Buddhism, and Confucianism) that acted as integrative forces in the Middle Millennium. Following Eisenstadt's theory, Olstein describes this period as "a second axial age of sorts" (p. 667). These forces of regional integration, he argues, resulted in the three levels of proto-globalization. The first level encompasses economic, political, military, and cultural relations between the realms of Islam, India, China, and Europe. The second level involves relationships that gave rise to processes of hybridization in at least two of the above four regions. The third level concerns the success of some states in constructing hegemonies within the realms of Islam, India, China, and Europe and the reaction to these. However, the geographic scope of this "proto-globalization" was limited to North Africa and Eurasia; thus, it fell short of encompassing the entire globe. Moreover, in comparison to the modern era, local conditions prevailed upon global trends in a process that Olstein labels "proto-glocalization". Nonetheless, the changing balance between local structures and processes of regional and transregional integration – that is to say empire building, trade expansion, and religion – was transforming local communities. In addition to these three integrative forces, other factors, such as migration and the diffusion of languages, knowledge, and technological innovation, were also affecting local conditions. Islam was a proto-global phenomenon par excellence, as was the Mongol empire.

As in Afro-Eurasia, trade and conquest can be identified as forces of integration for the indigenous cultures of the Americas. In addition to these forces, periodization and sequencing could be added as points of comparison between the Old and New Worlds. In both Mesoamerica and Afro-Eurasia, we see the collapse of the largest political entities, political fragmentation, and decline in trade at the beginning of the Middle Millennium, and in all regions, these trends were subsequently reversed and "growing connectedness" intensified. If one considers the sixteenth century as the starting point of "full-fledged globalization", as some scholars have, then the Middle Millennium from Olstein's perspective "represents its threshold" (p. 684).

The Construction of a Global World, 1400–1800. Part I: Foundations. Part II: Patterns of Change. On CWH volumes VI,1 and VI,2

Wolfgang Reinhard

So far, Cambridge histories have been known as systematic and exhaustive presentations of the histories of the regions of the world. The New Cambridge Modern History, despite its focus on Europe and the West, also contains satisfactory information on the rest of the world, however from the perspective of expanding Europe. But if one expects to receive similar information from the new World History, one will be disappointed. Certain things one is looking for are missing or at least not discovered easily. This is a consequence of the basic concept of a balanced treatment of the whole world, at a time when the state of research and the participation in historiography are not at all balanced worldwide.

The output is a collection of essays meant to demonstrate the actual open-ended character of research. And it became an exclusively anglophone undertaking – which, however, uses metric measures such as hectare and kilometre. Only six out of the 39 authors are women; 31 live in the US, the three editors included; five in the UK; and just one each in Jerusalem, Kyoto, and Leiden. They are all experts of their subjects or have at least published in that field. The editors claim proudly to have recruited authors with knowledge of the archives instead of mere generalists. The first of the two volumes dealing with the period 1400–1800 concerns foundations and the second is on patterns of change – the most banal of possible historical differentiations, that is between continuity and change. But even this most general distinction does not work neatly. Nevertheless, each volume has separate sections, chapters, and pages as well as an index of its own. Footnoting is comparatively light, and recommended further readings are exclusively anglophone. Maps are sufficient, illustrations rather exceptional.

The introduction by Sanjay Subrahmanyam has a specific problem with the loosely defined period 1400–1800, which is well known to this reviewer in his capacity as volume editor of another world history.¹ Whereas after 1800 world history can be to a large extent presented in transverse sectional views, there is no alternative to regional chapters before 1400. Between 1400 and 1800, however, a global world is under construction, but with different speeds and intensities in different fields and regions. Therefore, out of necessity, contributions require different approaches and comparison. Subrahmanyam mentions global problems such as demography, the expansion of world trade together with bullion flows, and environmental history. And he reminds us of parallels and contacts between Asiatic and European monarchs. He employs the dubious Eurocentric category “early modern” without reflecting upon it, but, on the other hand, following Kenneth Pomeranz,² he attacks quite aggressively every kind of European exceptionalism, Wallerstein’s world system included.³ Nevertheless, at the same time, he insists on Europe’s unequal power relations with the rest of the world, which “not only sully the immaculate birth of European modernity, but might even lend itself to the language of ‘reparations’” (p. 16).

Five chapters present “global matrices” as fundaments of globality, despite obvious processes of change such as the development of the biological old regime, which is described by the environmental historian Robert E. Marks. With an increase of population by 223 per cent, which corresponded to only a 200 per cent increase in agriculture, the Columbian Exchange had to save the world! The mixed regime of agriculture plus stock farming, however, is not even mentioned – perhaps because it was a European achievement? The historian of malaria James L.A. Webb, Jr, in his particularly wide-ranging contribution, analyses what already four decades ago has been called “l’unification microbienne du monde”. In contrast, Francesca Bray finds it difficult to present global technological transitions because sources exist only in China (her field of research) and Europe. She solves her problem with four vignettes on silver mining in Potosí, the Chinese cotton revolution, and European import substitution of porcelain and printed cotton. The famous historian of culture Peter Burke uses big cities as paradigms of urbanization. Finally, the genderologist Merry Wiesner-Hanks starts with the story of gender historiography – a very Western subject. Next, she presents gleanings from the wide world on intercultural marriages and transgender while focusing on Europe and the Sikhs’ religious influence on gender relations.

“Macro-regions” are the leitmotiv of the next section and are, according to Subrahmanyam, considered as significant clusters of historiographical interest. They should provide a certain number of spatial building blocks in order to have a better-balanced world history. But he considers it outdated to define these blocks in terms of culture or religion

1 W. Reinhard (ed.), *Weltreiche und Weltmeere 1350–1750* (Geschichte der Welt, vol. 3), Munich 2014.

2 K. Pomeranz, *The Great Divergence: China, Europe and the Making of the Modern World Economy*, Princeton 2000.

3 I. Wallerstein, *The Modern World System*, 4 vols, Berkeley 1974–2011.

following Max Weber (p. 19 sq.). Unfortunately, the static and monolithic concept of culture that he insinuates is also outdated. In contrast, a differentiating concept of culture open for unlimited interaction is still a more promising way to build regional blocks compared to the vague geopolitical assumptions suggested by Subrahmanyam. The very practice of later chapters demonstrates this.⁴

The long-term geopolitical realignment after the breakdown of the Mongolian empire when the empires of Eurasian nomads were torn apart and taken over by China and Russia, which is the subject of the chapter by the specialist Thomas W. Allsen, coincides with cultural changes, such as the replacement of religious plurality by Buddhism in the East and Islam in the West. Jos Gommans, an expert in Mughal history, starts with the geography of the Indian Ocean world and continues with China and the Mughal, Safavid, and Ottoman empires. According to him, the expansion of the latter three was more important than the European activity in the Indian Ocean, which anyhow first of all served to enforce Asian influence on Europe (p. 202). He considers the Arabic “cosmopolis” between Morocco and the Philippines also more important than the Latin, Buddhist, and Confucian “cosmopoleis”. The historian of the Conquista Matthew Restall also attempts an affected approach to his subject: America’s indigenous empires. According to him, 1492 is not the key date but 1519, when the deplorable Caribbean empire of Castile started not so much to destroy but to appropriate the higher developed indigenous empires. In contrast to Carlo Ginzburg (vol. II, p. 471), Restall doubts that literacy was a comparative advantage of the Spanish conquerors (p. 235). To Ray A. Kea, a historian of Ghana, is left the Herculean task to present the whole of Africa on the basis of a limited and unequal fund of sources and state of research. He makes the Islamic empires and movements of the Sudan together with the coastal towns of Guinea parts of “Greater Sahara” and Ethiopia, the Swahili coast, the Zambesi area, and the impulses of the Luda-Lunda core country parts of “Greater Zambesia”. But I cannot follow his conclusion that the distinctive properties of early modernity in terms of travel, global trade, urban-rural dynamics, political theology, and individualistic anthropology proclaimed in 1999 by Subrahmanyam apply to Africa.⁵

The chapters of the section “large-scale political formation” are closer to empirical results. Jorge Flores, an expert for Portuguese India, treats both Iberian empires as similar but still different cases of composite monarchies – not a very surprising conclusion. Sometimes their economic and personal networks look like a single one. The Qing historian Laura Hostetler focuses on the imperial competition between China and Russia in central Asia, for a second time. This time the focus is on diplomacy, mutual information, cartography, and geographical research in Russian Asia. Kangxi and Peter the Great practiced a similar style of policy. Giancarlo Casale, known as a historian of Ottoman Eastern expansion, proves, in his chapter on early modern Islamic empires, is more successful

4 Reinhard, *Weltreiche*, pp. 13–15.

5 S. Subrahmanyam, *Connected Histories: Notes toward a Reconfiguration of Early Modern Eurasia*, in: V. Lieberman (ed.), *Beyond Binary Histories. Re-Imagining Eurasia to 1830*, Ann Arbor 1999, pp. 289–316.

than others with his elegant attempt to invert established convictions. The victory of Morocco over Songhay in 1591 demonstrates that this history is not limited to the Ottomans, the Safavids, and the Mughals. In addition, according to him, the influence of Islam on politics was rather limited. Effective empire building between Morocco and Aceh on Sumatra did not start before 1500. Only a minority of the subjects of the Mughals were Muslims; for some time, this was also true of the Ottomans. Most Muslims lived elsewhere anyhow. In contrast to European confessional policy, religious plurality should even be considered a strong point of these empires. The basis of their success can be found in their three-level land tenure with a privileged layer of rent collectors between the ruler on top and the peasants at the bottom. Slave elites of foreign origin made the system complete, in the case of the Mughals, however, only metaphorically. Fire arms were important but did not constitute “gunpowder empires”. The “oriental despotism” of Montesquieu, Marx, and Weber is another legend. In reality, life was safer and trade more free under the shari’a than under European law. Because the shari’a could even be turned against them, the rulers turned to legitimation through messianism in the case of the Safavids and secular law in the case of the Ottomans, and finally even to Shiite or Sunni confessionalization.

Besides large empires, the early modern world consisted of at least four so-called “crossroads regions”. Morris Rossabi, a historian of China and the Mongols, considers central Asia, for a third time, as a meeting place of cultures and religions. Decline and subjection of indigenous polities only reduced but did not extinguish this capacity. He refers to the extinction of the Zunghars and the Chinese conquest of Xinjiang, to the rise of the Uzbeks in the West, and to the relations of central Asian khanates with Russia. As an expert on Indonesian Islam, Michael Laffan is responsible for Southeast Asia, which is characterized by a double bifurcation – continent versus islands and Theravada-Buddhism versus Islam – as well as by a plurality of polities and empires of complex ethnicity. In addition, Chinese influence was important, but both the leader of the famous Chinese naval expeditions Zheng He and his chronicler were Muslims. Finally, the spice wars of the Iberians were replaced by the sea power of West European chartered companies. Alan L. Karras, who publishes on smuggling, insists on the role of the Caribbean as the first theatre of global conflicts between the old world and the new, which made it the crucible of modern world history. But this fact is widely ignored because the lack of common identity of the islands has resulted in separate research in different languages and because the recently created Atlantic history is colonized by US scholars (p. 395) – a Berkeley professor should know. He records colonization and piracy, trade and smuggling, sugar and slaves, premature and limited decolonization, and consumers who simply did not want to know how sugar was produced – not much of a change in attitude in history. Last but not least, Filippo de Vivo, professor of Italian history, once again contradicts the contention that the discoveries ruined the Mediterranean economy and insists that the contrast between Christians and Muslims in spite of armed conflicts and piracy did not prevent trade and other peaceful interaction. Besides Bosnia and Crete, several port cities were crossroads centres. Crossroads people were either outstanding individuals such

as *Leo Africanus* or groups such as merchants, slaves, mercenaries, and Jewish or other minorities.

The final section “Overview” contains just one contribution, “political trajectories compared”, by Jack A. Goldstone, an adept of global history. For the first time in this volume, Europe is focused upon, because the thoroughly organized modern state is a product of the European nineteenth century. It differs from the loosely structured polities and empires that developed since early times everywhere in the world. But the slow rise of this modern state in Europe must not be treated as “the Rise of the West”, because, according to Goldstone, Europe has adopted a lot of technological and administrative innovations from Asia. For the latter statement, Voltaire’s theoretical enthusiasm for the Chinese examination system is considered as sufficient verification. In addition, the rising European state allegedly was formed by military competition and economic exchange with Asia. And finally, the European state has quickly been adopted and improved by the rest of the world. Therefore, the rise of the modern state should not be considered as a European, but as a global process, which would not have happened without the globalization of the world 1400–1800.

Supported by a warm phase of the Little Ice Age, stable, but structurally different empires were established worldwide, about 1550, after political chaos. America’s and, to some extent also Africa’s underdevelopment in that respect are explained as a consequence of European dominance. In contrast to Asia, Europe based its political growth upon trade – an incorrect statement, because war was the decisive factor. Nevertheless, according to Goldstone, Europe was an underdeveloped nation because it exported bullion as raw material to import finished products. This statement would make today’s US an underdeveloped nation if we consider their balance of trade and payment. The climatic crisis of the seventeenth century led to popular uprisings worldwide, which were answered with restructuration, in particular with cultural and religious retrenchment. But in about 1700, Asian armies were still superior.

In the eighteenth century, however, Western exception was developing and has to be explained in a new way “falling out of love with ancient wisdom” (p. 470) – just notice the emotional language! According to Goldstone, Britain and Europe in general took the lead not because of superiority or particular advantages but rather because of benefits from relative backwardness. Europe from 700 to 1500 has been comparatively isolated – at least for 1150–1350, exactly the opposite is true. Next, Europe has also lost contact with its cultural roots in antiquity – no expert in Medieval or Renaissance history will confirm this statement today. Finally, the European system of government was less strong than that of Asian monarchies because of the limited authority of European rulers. Recently, I could indeed demonstrate how the English, in particular during the eighteenth century, managed to transform this handicap into an advantage.⁶ But, according to Goldstone, Europe’s essential achievement was the revival of the classical tradition,

which – somehow, in an unexplained way – led to an explosion of scientific discovery and practical invention during the Enlightenment. Politics became a kind of science. In addition, Europe now remembered republican ideals. After Locke and Montesquieu, this process would culminate in the American independence and in Thomas Paine – *Quod erat demonstrandum*. I think we had better not fall in love with this new globalized wisdom.

The second volume has a better chance because patterns of change need less conceptual acrobatics. The section on “migrations and encounters” starts with a chapter by the leading specialist Dirk Hoerder on global migrations. Migration happened always and everywhere, not only from villages to cities and between villages but also on the macro-regional and the global levels. Migrants might be fugitives or conquerors, workers or settlers. Labour regimes produced the forced migration of African slaves as well as the status of indentured servant, which was used by one-half or even two-thirds of the immigrants on their way to North America. Jeremy Black is an expert on warfare. He describes “little wars” of nomads and bandits and “big wars” of empires. Despite endless varieties of violence, he is able to identify some global common patterns: war is an affair of men – Dahomey’s female force is not mentioned – human and material resources are limited, large armies cannot be mobilized at harvest time or during winter, and communication and transport are cumbersome and slow. Europeans wage worldwide wars but not yet world wars because the participant powers remain still a minority. The explicative value of the thesis of the “military revolution” is limited.⁷ European success overseas was more often a matter of indigenous allies. The Ottoman empire as leading land power and the rise of British sea power deserve special consideration.

The first intercultural relations, as described by John E. Wills, Jr, were still not global but rather regional processes, dialogues with obvious spatial and temporal limits or sometimes even a triologue between Tibetans, Mongols, and Chinese under the Ming and the Qing. Under premodern conditions religion remained the essence of culture. Being an expert on China mission history, Wills presents not only Islam and Christianity in China extensively but also the spread of Chinese culture, in particular of Confucianism, to Korea and Japan. For some time, Japan was also under the influence of Jesuit missionaries. After the extermination of the Christian church, this impact was replaced by “rangaku”, the Dutch science, a carefully calculated reception of Western useful knowledge. Muslim expansion into a world of unbelievers happened quite often under the lead of Sufis and their fraternities. Especially in the multicultural world of India, Sufi influence played a key role beside different Hindu sects and the syncretistic new religion of the Sikhs. Because of many open-minded Muslims, Jews, and Christians, the Eastern Mediterranean became the field of many-sided intellectual exchanges characterized by mutual respect. Even in Latin America, the clash of cultures did not end with suppression but resulted in remarkable syncretism. The same is true of Africa, not to speak of the Afro-American

7 G. Parker, *The Military Revolution: Military Innovation and the Rise of the West, 1550–1800*, 2nd edn, Cambridge 1996.

religions still alive today: “We find no barrier of cultural difference that was unbreachable” (p. 76).

The search for “legal encounters and the origins of global law” is much less promising. Was there anything else besides Western designs of international law? Nevertheless, the legal historian Lauren Benton and the global historian Adam Clulow are unable to present a common theory but do offer an equally not common but at least converging global legal practice, which can be extracted from abundant sources of intercultural legal transactions. The first common assumption was that political and legal transactions had to be handled correctly according to whatsoever rules. The second is a kind of mutual respect for the plurality of law and government that existed. The third is that protection was a universal (quasi-)legal relationship, which sometimes even included European chartered companies.

Of course, the section on “trade, exchange, and production”, which includes eight chapters, is the focus of this volume. Once again, most of the processes in question concern entire continents but nevertheless only parts of the globe. True global extension remains exceptional. The Columbian Exchange is one of these exceptions. Noble David Cook, who published on the mortality of Amerindians, presents it perfectly and makes us forget that we read about it in two other chapters. Equally brilliant is the chapter on the slave trade and the African diaspora. John Thornton, historian of the Black Atlantic, describes not only the slave trade, which, by the way, has been declared a crime against humanity in 2001 at Durban, he includes as well slave life in America, the cultural achievements of African America, and slave resistance together with the autonomous communities founded by fugitives.

The task of Francesca Trivellato, who is a historian of Sephardic trade in the Mediterranean, is more difficult. “The organization of trade in Europe and Asia, 1400–1800” concerns subjects that correspond to each other but remain separate most of the time. It is during the early modern period that they start to interact and therefore have to be compared. In the meantime, we know a lot about Asian merchants and bankers and learn to accept that, despite all differences, they were at least on par with their European counterparts for most of the time. Therefore, Trivellato discovers many parallels and analogies between Europe, the Ottoman empire, India, China, and Japan in the fields of technology and infrastructure, business organization and procedure, brokerage and business on commission, credit market, and financial transactions. The problem of public credit, which was invented in Europe but did not exist in Asia (p. 178), hopefully has been solved recently.⁸ The different consequences were the constant European superiority at sea. But according to Trivellato, the rise of Britain cannot be exclusively explained with the profits from the slave trade and the plantation system as Williams⁹ and Pomeranz¹⁰ want to have it. Nevertheless, because of economic links, this business

8 Cf. Reinhard, *Staatsmacht und Staatskredit*.

9 E. Williams, *Capitalism and Slavery*, Chapel Hill 1944.

10 Pomeranz, *The Great Divergence*.

had consequences that should not be ignored (pp. 161, 187) – a conclusion I had arrived at as early as 1997.¹¹

Another difference was the reduction of business risk. Did Europeans use formal legal institutions to reduce uncertainty, whereas Asians had to rely on family networks? Charles H Parker, a convert from Dutch to global history, treats this problem again in his chapter on entrepreneurs, families, and companies. Besides the maritime trade circuits of the Mediterranean, Atlantic, and Indian Oceans, trade over land was still important. Paradigmatic family networks demonstrate that: the Russian Stroganov and the Armenian Shahrman of Isfahan. The activities of women inside these networks have to still be appreciated. Jews and Christians even made dowries a part of their capital stocks. In contrast, large organizations such as the German Hanse or the later chartered companies were European exceptions. The rule was self-organizing “trade diasporas” of Armenians, Jews, and other particular groups.

The basic condition of early modern world trade consisted in the streams of silver that originated from Spanish America and ended in China. This is perhaps the most global subject of all. The leading expert Dennis O. Flynn presents silver movements in a global context, visualized as a hydraulic model of the unified theory of prices. He falsifies the theory of the balance of trade, which explains the flow of silver as a consequence of the lacking offer of goods from the side of Europe. If that were true, other means of payment such as gold had to flow in the same direction, which was not the case (p. 217). James D. Tracy, another convert from Dutch to global history, wrote a chapter on Dutch and English trade to the Indian Ocean and the Levant to around 1700. He is still working with the trade-balance model. Armed trade was the secret of European success, when Asians had to rely on mere networks. Through Trevor Burnard, we had the dubious pleasure to make the acquaintance of the disgusting planter Thomas Thistlewood.¹² In his chapter, he describes slave trade and slave life once again. According to him, the plantation model of Barbados was more successful than the Brazilian one because of the better access to capital and sales management on the one hand, and of the system of gang labour on the other hand. Around 1800, the plantation economy was not declining but ready for a new upswing.

This section ends with another theoretically oriented comparative chapter, this one on industrious revolutions in early modern world history, written by Kaoru Sugihara for Japan and by Roy Bin Wong for China. Jan de Vries presented this concept in 1994.¹³ According to him, many Britons had created additional buying power and demand by working longer and harder for the same wage. This increase of demand was consequential for the industrial revolution. Global historians ask if this behaviour occurred in other economies as well, and if yes, why no industrial revolution happened there. Certainly,

11 W. Reinhard, *Parasit oder Partner? Europäische Wirtschaft und Neue Welt 1500–1800*, Münster 1997.

12 T. Burnard, *Mastery, Tyranny, and Desire: Thomas Thistlewood and His Slaves in the Anglo-Jamaican World*, Chapel Hill 2004.

13 J. De Vries, *The Industrial Revolution and the Industrious Revolution*, in: *Journal of Economic History* 54 (1994), pp. 249–270.

differentiation is necessary. Britain was not Europe, and Pomeranz's Yangzi delta was not China. Nevertheless, despite differences in all three cases, elements of the growth of industriousness as a result of greater labour absorption can be identified (p. 304). The European variety, however, became more visible because of the new taste for imported luxury goods. But the East Asian "peasant path" did not imply the total integration in a growing market economy but led to pursuing the rise of land productivity through a combination of commercialization and proto-industrial bi-employment (p. 306). Formal and informal political and cultural conditions are responsible for the differences. Therefore, the industrial revolution altered the modern world, not because the emergence of an industrial work force in England was repeated in most other countries, but because different regions provided a variety of institutional mechanisms for creating a modern workforce (p. 307). Once again: *quod erat demonstrandum*.

Even if we accept this world history's programme "comprehensive but not exhaustive" (vol 1, p. XIX), this section, which is particularly close to empiric research, is nevertheless obviously insufficient in several respects. Iberian activities in the Indian Ocean are covered superficially elsewhere. But the activities of the English and Dutch companies in the eighteenth century, which became essential for the course of world history, are not even mentioned. And "production" appears nowhere else but in the headline of the section. Instead, the book pays tribute to a comparatively recent development of the historical mainstream and includes a section "religion and religious change". Religion is back again!

Guy Stroumsa starts with a chapter on his field of interest "the scholarly discovery of religion in modern times". According to him, Vico, Lafitau, and Fontenelle were the beginners, after ethnology instead of theology, because the discoveries had become the basis of the study of religion. Stroumsa returns to Paul Hazard, an unjustly forgotten pioneer of intellectual history.¹⁴ But he does not even try to define "religion". Or is that simply impossible?¹⁵ Next Ronnie Po-chia Hsia, extremely competent as volume editor of the Cambridge History of Christianity, presents a masterly sketch of Christianity worldwide, including Orthodox churches, which quite often are simply left out.

Because of their universal pretensions and their missionary activity, both Christianity and Islam are true global religions. But Islam is much less institutionalized. Therefore, it is difficult to create a complete overview. But we are lucky to have the Sufi specialist Nile Green as the author of the respective chapter. He is able to present a popular Islam of alphabets guided by Sufi dynasties and organized in fraternities around the shrines of saints. On the other hand, according to him, all Sufis are, at the same time, ulama, that is learned experts of religious doctrine and law, some of them even celebrities with worldwide networks. Therefore, a collective religious identity is still possible. Quite often, Sufis are the spearheads of collective conversions, which are analysed in detail as well as the individual ones. However, because the conversion consists in a simple declaration,

14 P. Hazard, *La crise de la conscience européenne 1680–1715*, Paris 1935 (English 1952).

15 P. Schalk (ed.), *Religion in Asien? Studien zur Anwendbarkeit des Religionsbegriffs*, Uppsala 2013.

an acculturation has to follow, which is quite often combined with a kind of religious negotiation. The chapter ends with the forced “confessionalization” of Islamic empires – in India, for example, two gurus of the Sikhs were executed – and the reform movements of the eighteenth century.

The final chapter concerns religious change in East Asia. Eugenio Menegon, expert on Chinese Christianity, writes on China, Gina Cogan, who specializes in Japanese Buddhism, on Korea and Japan. Chinese religious policy used to change not only with dynasties but even with singular emperors. Sometimes Buddhism and Daoism exerted remarkable influence, but one has to distinguish between the popular Tibetan and the rising Chan (that is Zen) Buddhism. The popular religion, with its local deities and shamanist traditions, was able to amalgamate elements of Buddhism and Daoism. In addition, there were Christian and Muslim minorities. Whereas the ancient Muslims, the Hui, were signified, the recently conquered Uyghurs remained obstinate, until today. In Korea, a Confucian dynasty replaced a Buddhist one in 1392. One consequence was the enforcement of patriarchy. Christianity originally was introduced by laymen from China. In contrast, Jesuits had created a church with numerous members in Japan, which, however, was mercilessly extinguished after 1600. From now on, the established Buddhist sects, recently complemented by Zen schools, were employed to control the subjects. The unifiers of the empire had already broken the political and military power of the big Buddhist monasteries in the sixteenth century. The Shinto deities, the Kami, were identified with the different Buddhas. Shintoism as a separate religion is a product of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, but pilgrimage to shrines was always an essential element of popular piety. In addition, a new Japanese political Confucianism practiced a critical attitude towards Buddhism.

The two chapters of the final section, despite or because of the promising headline “questions of method”, are rather disappointing. In the first place, Sanjay Subrahmanyam uses an imposing collection of readings from different cultures to falsify Hegel’s verdict that non-European cultures have no sense of history and therefore no historiography. Certainly, although never the Chinese, many historians from other parts of Asia used to include information on other cultures besides their own and even on Europe in their works. That is all. No further information on content and methods of the different historiographies follows. The second essay by the leading micro-historian Carlo Ginzburg is a complete stranger in the volumes, however an interesting one. An extensive philosophical investigation and a remarkable case study on the practice of censorship end with the statement that such micro-historical case studies might contribute to global history. What an exciting conclusion.

Most essays demonstrate impressive scholarship. Some are even excellent. But to enjoy some chapters does not include satisfaction with all the volumes. It looks as if papers of a conference on global and entangled history had been pasted together in a not very successful attempt to make them look coherent. Some topics are repeated again and again. Openness must not, by necessity, lack orientation as a consequence. A dose of German “Begriffsklauberei” might prove helpful. For nobody reflects on possible dif-

ferences between world history, universal history, and global history and possible useful consequences of this distinction. The terms are just used as synonyms.

Do the editors follow the lead of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), which presented the monumental *History of Humanity* published from 1994 to 2008 with the statement: “This work can serve only as a history of the world and not as a universal history”? That is, an almost complete “bookbinder’s synthesis” of the histories of all peoples of the world, which uses analytical plurality to achieve “a maximum of diversity”. This relapse into positivism serves to demonstrate political distance from UNESCO’s universal *History of Mankind* published from 1963 to 1976 and prepared since 1948 with much pathos. This and other attempts to discover a common goal and meaning of human history were all doomed to fail. In 1789, Friedrich Schiller defined universal history as a selection of those historical facts and events that contributed to the formation of the present world. In the 1990s, the notion “global history” was invented for the prehistory of our economically, politically, and culturally unified world. That means, “global history” is the most recent variety of “universal history”, but this time with a solid empirical basis.¹⁶

Because of unreflected terminology, these volumes of the *Cambridge World History* oscillate between a positivistic inventory of knowledge and the attempt to trim this knowledge to a global look. Therefore, the chapters differ conceptually. The editors declare this a merit, but according to the state of affairs they had no choice. At one end, we find four chapters about processes that included the entire globe: environment and disease, Columbian Exchange and silver flow. Most contributions, however, assemble at the other end, where regional phenomena are discussed, some of them – such as Asian trade or slave trade, Christianity or Islam – with gigantic dimensions, but still regional. As a rule, these chapters insist upon interactive agency, that is they practice entangled history. But to do this they need the very cultural concepts that have been banned by Subrahmanyam in his introduction.

The chapters between these extremes are the problematic ones. The essays on the modern state and the industrious revolution are debatable because of their empirical flaws and their ideological leanings. Other chapters collect gleanings, use them to identify worldwide parallels, and then declare the result as global. For different reasons, this procedure succeeds with migration, law, and technology. In other cases, such as gender and urbanization, I am not convinced.

This has to do with the ideological bias of the work, which, in my opinion, has become obsolete in the meantime anyhow. “Europe bashing” may be too strong a terminology but it indicates the tendency very well. Axiomatically, Europe is not allowed the slightest exceptionality – as if not every country or people were in some sense exceptional. Firstly, is it obvious that Europe was not better but only different, even if comparatively late, and with mere contingency competitive advantages originated from those differences? Both

16 W. Reinhard, *Weltgeschichte, Weltsysteme, Globalisierung. Geschichtskonzept und Konzeptgeschichte*, in: *Saeculum. Jahrbuch für Universalgeschichte* 63 (2013), pp. 53–69.

undebatable impulses of European origin, the modern state and the industrial revolution, are minimized as much as possible with much learning and some additional fakery. Nevertheless, the very dubious argument that their relative historical insignificance is proved by the quick takeover and improvement by others (vol. VI,1, p. 452, vol. VI, 2, p. 307) demonstrates indirectly that the ideological downgrading of Europe has become superfluous in the meantime. Because Europe's so-called achievements have been transferred to the complete property of others, with Greek philosophy and Roman law becoming European a long time ago, nobody downgrades Greeks and Romans for their achievements today.

But the most effective technique of downgrading is silence. Therefore, according to the first of the two volumes under review, Europe was not allowed to be a macro-region, England and France not large-scale political formations, and the Baltic not a crossroads region. Only the last chapter cannot avoid the European state. Significantly, the authors of the second volume cannot employ that strategy to the same extent.

Inspected closely, this anti-European attitude turns out an absurd comedy. Because besides the usual expatriates, no author from Africa, Asia, or Latin America, on the one hand, or from Germany, France, Italy, or Spain, on the other hand, is to be found among the 39 chapters. Claiming that “contemporary world and global history is overwhelmingly Anglophone, and, given the scholarly diaspora, disproportionately institutionally situated in the US and the UK” (vol. I, p. XX), the editors make dubious virtue of apparent necessity. That is to say, continuously blaming Western colonialism, at the same time American scholars are not ashamed to colonize global historiography (cf. vol. I, p. 395).

Production, Destruction, and Connection, 1750 to the Present. Part I: Structures, Spaces, and Boundary Making. On CWH volume VII,1

Matthias Middell

The Cambridge World History (CWH) vol. VII. 1, edited by John R. McNeill from Georgetown University and Kenneth Pomeranz from the University of Chicago, is the first of two volumes covering the period since the mid-18th century and is divided into four parts. The first part, “Material matrices”, includes six chapters focusing on the material basis, not to say economic, of modern development, followed by the second part, “Population and disease”, with four chapters. The third part, “Politics”, focuses on many topics, dealt with in a single chapter each: international law, nationalism, imperialism, reactions to European expansion, colonization and its legacy, the history of genocides, and the history of communism and fascism. Finally, the last part, “World regions”, sketches in six chapters the development in different regions of the world, beginning with the Middle East, reaching the United States via East Asia, Latin America, and Africa, to end with the Pacific. Each of the 23 chapters is written by highly respected specialists in the relevant subject matter and provide reliable interpretations of their respective topics, although space is extremely limited, as usually no more than 30 printed pages are available to summarize the essential events and structures that have shaped the world for more than 250 years. The editors very openly decline any illusion about the possibility to lead all the authors to one perspective and coherent interpretation while accepting that they remain guided by their individual theoretical points of view. McNeill and Pomeranz recognize the advantage of allowing experienced authors to use their own handwriting, so to say, and understand their editorial job as cooks who depend to a great extent on what fresh food is available on the market (p. 1).

The introduction starts with justifying, above all, the caesura of 1750 and suggests a certain unity of the epoch since then while not excluding alternative possibilities of periodization. This decision, which probably was not made by the editors of the two volumes but by the editor of the whole series, is not as undisputed as it may appear. The issue has been discussed widely amongst world and global historians over the past two decades. The central questions are if there is a point in what one has previously called “modern history” when global connections take on a new quality and does the period since constitute a sort of time frame that one can call the immediate past of our present times. There are many answers in the literature, and they differ depending on both the historical period and the societal dimension authors have specialized in.

A striking example is the debate about “when did globalization start?” between Dennis O. Flynn and Arturo Giráldez, on the one hand – arguing in favour of a caesura in the late sixteenth century when silver became the basis for an interdependent world economy ranging from the Atlantic to the Pacific to the Indian Ocean¹ – and Kevin O’Rourke and Jeffrey Williamson, on the other hand – demonstrating that price convergence across port cities did not happen before the 1820s.² Despite such views, as the editors of CWH vol. VII.1 laconically remark, it is rather a question of how globalization is defined than a fundamental dispute about facts that has stimulated this discussion. However, the debate goes deeper than simply setting the criteria for what we can call economic globalization, being the emergence of a sort of world currency versus the slow integrative process of global markets.

Christopher Bayly suggested to distinguish between an archaic and a modern globalization³ and summarized what others had already insisted on with regard to the new quality of the global condition.⁴ The central idea is that global connections have already been observed for a very long time, but a situation where these connections determine in essence the path a society takes is a relatively new one. Where exactly the point of no return

- 1 D. O. Flynn, Silver and Ottoman monetary history in global perspective, in: *The Journal of European Economic History* 31 (2002), pp. 9–43; D. O. Flynn / A. Giráldez, Conceptualizing global economic history: the role of silver, in: R. Gömmel / M. A. Denzel (eds.), *Weltwirtschaft und Wirtschaftsordnung. Festschrift für Jürgen Schneider zum 65. Geburtstag* 2002, pp. 101–113; D. O. Flynn / A. Giráldez, Cycles of silver. Globalization as historical process, in: *World Economics. A Journal of Current Economic Analysis and Policy* 3 (2002) 2, pp. 1–16; D. O. Flynn / A. Giráldez, Path dependence, time lags, and the birth of globalization. A critique of O’Rourke and Williamson, in: *European Review of Economic History* 8 (2004) 1, pp. 81–108; D. O. Flynn / A. Giráldez / R. von Glahn (eds.), *Global Connections and Monetary History, 1470–1800*, Farnham 2003; D. O. Flynn / A. Giráldez, Born Again: Globalization’s sixteenth century origins (Asian/Global versus European Dynamics), in: *Pacific Economic Review* 13 (2008) 3, pp. 359–387.
- 2 K. O’Rourke / J. G. Williamson, After Columbus. Explaining Europe’s overseas trade boom, 1500–1800, in: *Journal of Economic History* 62 (2002) 2, pp. 417–458; K. H. O’Rourke / J. G. Williamson, When did globalisation begin?, in: *European Review of Economic History* 6 (2002), pp. 23–50; K. H. O’Rourke (ed.), *The International Trading System, Globalization and History*, vol. 2, Cheltenham 2005.
- 3 Ch. A. Bayly, “Archaic” and “Modern” Globalization in the Eurasian and African Arena, c. 1750–1850, in: A. G. Hopkins (ed.), *Globalization in World History*, New York 2002, pp. 47–73.
- 4 M. Geyer / Ch. Bright, For a Unified History of the World in the Twentieth Century, in: *Radical History Review* 39 (1987), pp. 69–91; M. Geyer / Ch. Bright, World History in a Global Age, in: *The American Historical Review* 100 (1995) 4, pp. 1034–1060.

towards such a global condition can be located on a timeline remains a matter of dispute. Historians of early modern times, on the one hand, collect evidence that the slave trade, long-distance merchants with their importing of luxury goods, missionaries, the circulation of ideas within the large gunpowder empires, as well as many other global connections of the centuries before 1800 are not that different from the ones emerging during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. They are supported by political scientists who, for example, tell the story of a Westphalian system and the emerging problems of sovereignty within such a system.⁵ Historians of the twentieth century, on the other hand, write their histories of the most recent past as if there is no connection to the eighteenth century which is now more openly disputed as the origin of modernity.⁶

McNeill and Pomeranz do refer to these debates, but only in passing, and do not pretend that they have the key to the epoch's central characteristics. One has to read between the lines to decipher their interpretation, which is much more political than those provided by economic historians – hinting more at the complex puzzle that political scientists call too easily the world order. There are too many tendencies and dimensions that must be considered to speak only of one order, even when considering the fact that England and France fought bitterly for dominance in the various theatres of world affairs.

The editors and authors of the introduction to CWH vol. VII.1 point out that the epoch they present began with a world war that fundamentally changed the global order. With France's withdrawal from North America, a new balance of power emerged, and in a certain way the same was true for South Asia after the Battle of Plassey in 1757, which also led to France's withdrawal. Following the success story of the East India Company, which became a role model for other such enterprises (although very different in their relationship to statehood and free trade), European powers increasingly gained influence in the region. The editors also see the origin of the Atlantic revolutions in this world war, as the European powers faced enormous financial burdens. Even France staggered, facing a national bankruptcy, without which the unrest of 1789 and the transition from absolute to constitutional monarchy could not be explained.⁷ Although the defeat of the Mongols by Qing China and the fact that China was given more or less its present territorial form, similar to the simultaneous Russian expansion and boundary setting to the east, is not directly or even causally related to the events in the Atlantic, it does indicate

5 About the much more complicated development of territory as a category necessarily related to this kind of understanding of sovereignty, see S. Elden, *The Birth of Territory*, Chicago 2013. As a critique to the mystification of the peace treaty of Westphalia amongst political scientists: A. Osiander, *Sovereignty, International Relations, and the Westphalian Myth*, in: *International Organization* 55 (2001) 2, pp. 251–287; for a more recent opening in the discipline of international studies towards the interest amongst global historians for the nineteenth century, see B. Buzan/G. Lawson, *The Global Transformation: The Nineteenth Century and the Making of Modern International Relations*, in: *International Studies Quarterly* 57 (2013) 3, pp. 620–634.

6 A. Pečar/D. Tricoire, *Falsche Freunde. War die Aufklärung wirklich die Geburtsstunde der Moderne?*, Frankfurt am Main/New York 2015.

7 The argument has first been brought to the fore by Bailey Stone, *The genesis of the French revolution. A global historical interpretation*, Cambridge 1994 and later on further elaborated by L. Hunt, *The Global Financial Origins of 1789*, in: S. Desan/L. Hunt/W. M. Nelson (eds), *The French Revolution in Global Perspective*, Ithaca 2013.

that the parallelism of similar trends became more and more condensed over time, thus becoming an epochal signature.⁸

This signature, as stated by the editors of CWH vol. VII.1, most importantly contains the expansion of settler societies to the detriment of nomadic forms of life. McNeill and Pomeranz have thus found an original point of departure for the presentation of colonialism and imperialism and follow the theme across continents, pointing out how the settler colonies enforced a certain understanding of property and gained superiority over the decentralized tribal forms of organization through the centralization of state power, albeit slowly, as is evidenced by the persistence of the conflict well into the nineteenth century (for example, the eventually lost struggle of the Comanches and Sioux). Counter-trends are necessarily part of this process description – especially in South Asia and the Middle East, where the “tribal breakout”, described by Christopher Bayly,⁹ slowed down the development of centralized states and allowed the British colonial power to expand its position, with relatively few resources, through alliances with nomads.

One would have liked to read an overall presentation that follows this proposed red thread of the volume, which is explained in a prominent place at the beginning of the volume. However, the genre introduction demands a fair reflection on all the other approaches chosen by the authors of the individual chapters. Accordingly, we will have to wait for further elaboration of this interesting way of reading the long nineteenth century’s history.

The topic of demography and the history of industrialization lead the editors of the volume to question their chosen starting point of 1750, because until about 1850 there was hardly any significant increase in life expectancy, with population growth only occurring where birth rates were on the rise. So while the first 100 years of the period under consideration still belong to a pattern that can be described as pre-modern, a new pattern developed thereafter, leading to a dramatic increase in the world population based on the general industrial growth (from about 1820) and the increase in energy consumption (by a factor of 50 to 100), which started especially in the late nineteenth century.¹⁰ Agriculture, in turn, was only affected by massive capitalization during the period 1850–1920, as described in the respective chapter by Giovanni Federico.¹¹ Much of what McNeill and Pomeranz compile from the current state of research, on which the following chapters build their arguments, is more in line with the a long nineteenth century as a great period of transformation.

8 The now most popular account of this global outreach of what had been previously addressed as Atlantic revolution is D. Armitage/S. Subrahmanyam (eds), *The Age of Revolutions in Global Context, c. 1760–1840*, Basingstoke/New York 2010, but there is a whole historiography feeding this attempt to overcome the limitations of a purely Atlantic perspective.

9 Ch. A. Bayly, *Imperial Meridian. The British Empire and the World 1780–1830*, London 1983, pp. 33–54.

10 See the chapters by V. Smil on energy, CWH VII.1, pp. 164–186, and by M. Livi-Bacci on demography, CWH VII.1, pp. 187–211.

11 CWH VII.1, pp. 83–105.

Here, the editors follow the central narrative of the transport and communications revolution that took place in the first half of the nineteenth century and lowered costs in such a way that, at the same time, the capacity for transregional trade grew to such a degree that an effective division of labour between different locations and production regions distributed around the globe became possible for the first time. Until then, long-distance trade had been driven by the demand for goods that were either not found (like gold and silver) or did not grow (like opium) in the region of demand itself. Most of the trade happened within what Fernand Braudel called an “*économie-monde*”, which is perhaps best translated as large regional economic system.¹²

Roughly at the end of the second third of the nineteenth century, such an economic system was beginning to pay off, leading to specialization of certain products or services for which above-average productivity and a corresponding cost advantage were possible. Economically speaking, globalization as we know it today only began at this point in time, even though there had been, undeniably, exchanges of goods and credit-based trade over great distances, as well as migration, cultural exchange, and other forms of mobility, long before. When departing from this idea, one could thus read three different stages of modern world history into the short sequence of keywords – production, destruction, and connection – used in the title of the volume.

First, from the mid-eighteenth century to the first third of the nineteenth century – in which the Anglo-French competition upset an entire international order and this fundamental political-military destabilization gave rise to a new (presumably irreversible) balance of power between sedentary states and settler colonies, on the one hand, and nomadic groups, on the other – new horizons of expectation, initially regionally effective, emerged and condensed into globally effective ideologies. And this was essentially still based on the socioeconomic foundations and demographic patterns that had determined the world until then. Then a period of transformation began, which took place during a relatively short nineteenth century in core areas but which must be weighed against a much longer view of its global expansion, as the more extensive monographs by Christopher Bayly¹³ and Jürgen Osterhammel¹⁴ have shown in detail. And this was followed by a period in the late nineteenth century that marks the definitive transition towards a world in which no society could any longer withdraw from the increasingly precise division of labour and, as a result, became dependent on the network of exchange relationships between societies.

If one assumes such a three-part transformation, there is no reason to doubt that further transformations within the framework of the global condition have happened and will happen in the future and that, perhaps, we may currently be confronted with the challenges of another such transition in the history of modern globalization. This would offer an interesting framework for the narrative of the development since the mid-eighteenth

12 F. Braudel, *Civilisation matérielle, économie et capitalisme, XVe–XVIIIe siècle*, Paris 1979.

13 Ch. A. Bayly, *The Birth of the Modern World, 1780–1914. Global Connections and Comparisons*, Malden 2004.

14 J. Osterhammel, *Die Verwandlung der Welt. Eine Geschichte des 19. Jahrhunderts*, München 2009.

century. Again, the editors offer an attractive appetizer in the introduction to the two volumes, instead insisting immediately afterwards that the subsequent chapters will not be squeezed into such a straightjacket and therefore allow different general narrative patterns to be tested.

As already said, with an average length of 25 pages, the texts offer their authors extremely limited space for presenting developments spanning almost three centuries and the entire world. One can only praise the authors for how they deal with these constraints and make a reliable selection, focusing on fundamental contexts while remaining vivid and convincing with examples instead of getting lost in abstract discussions. At the same time, this style promotes a pragmatic positivism. The authors select from the historiographies they are most familiar with and present this state of research without much debate about perspectives on and alternatives to what is currently known. Many of the authors benefit from the fact that they have already dealt with comparable topics in general presentations elsewhere, where they sometimes had much more space available.¹⁵ This does not prevent the possibility that alternative historiographies will soon emerge; however, for the time being, what has been presented is considered the state of the art.

One could argue that there is no historiography that, for pragmatic or ideological reasons, does not have its blind spots, but dealing with this is not the concern of this volume or of the entire CWH. The model against which most authors openly write, or against which they were recruited regarding their area expertise, is a now outdated Eurocentrism, being replaced by a narrative of world regional diversity. While this is managed well for volumes of the CWH that focus on the time up until the sixteenth century, this becomes more problematic for the volume discussed here. This is because the volume covers a time of condensed interactions between world regions and, at the same time, it must cover the establishment (albeit more slowly and only temporarily, as one must qualify) of hegemony first by Northwest and Central Europe and later by the USA.¹⁶

A central argument for beginning this volume in the eighteenth century is the replacement of a (last) stagnation phase of the world population between 1610 and 1680 (possibly, as Geoffrey Parker has pointed out,¹⁷ caused by the climate change of the Little Ice Age) by a century of massive growth (by about 50%), which already signalled the even greater growth rates of the 19th century (about 80%) and the 20th century (225%). The basis of this growth changed from high birth rates to a major improvement in life expectancy and a simultaneous reduction in child mortality. This happened first only in a few countries and after the Second World War throughout the planet. But this disparity and

15 It would be too much to list here all the books written by the authors of this volume over the past years, but the general principle is that they have been selected exactly because they are the most prominent and often also the most prolific authors in the respective field.

16 Amongst the many interventions on the problem of how to conceive history after the deathly criticism of Eurocentrism, see A. Dirlik, *Is there History after Eurocentrism? Globalism, Postcolonialism, and the Disavowal of History*, in: *Cultural Critique* 42 (1999), pp. 1–34, and the distinction between different types of being Eurocentric: J. Osterhammel, *Die Flughöhe der Adler. Historische Essays zur globalen Gegenwart*, München 2017, pp. 101–114.

17 G. Parker, *War, Climate Change and Catastrophe in the Seventeenth Century*, New Haven, London 2013.

the differentiated geographies can only be explained by a list of different factors, as the chapters on alimentation, on medical care, and on the availability of medicines (determined by scientific progress as well as by corporate interests) indicate,¹⁸ not to mention the more or less successful efforts to limit or stimulate birth rates.

When confronted with such a multifactorial explanation, which is offered in a scattered manner over several chapters, the reader is left somewhat confused. A more editorial intervention in the logics of the individual essays would certainly have done the volume good at this point. The impression thus remains that the plea of the editors for a deeper world-historical caesura around 1750, or at least somewhere in the 18th century, is rather ignored by most authors or even openly and sceptically judged. The majority of the authors are not satisfied with the reference to the first appearance of new trends over the course of the nineteenth century (e.g. the change in the energy basis of human development or the introduction of machines and technologies during industrialization), pointing out again and again that the worldwide implementation of these developments took until far into the twentieth century to be considered “completed”. So, one can only wonder whether the mid-eighteenth or the mid-twentieth century might have been the actual global caesura for many of the developments presented in the first part of this volume. The editors freely admit that this is a perfect opportunity to talk past one another, depending on whether one is looking at the first appearance of a phenomenon or its worldwide implementation.

Incidentally, the end of the second third of the twentieth century is also the point in time when the demographic growth spurt is slowing down and the continuing growth of the world's population is more an effect of earlier growth than its linear or even exponential continuation. Meanwhile, serious forecasts show the halting of world population growth before the end of the 21st century. But these insights remain relatively isolated from other topics in the volume, and one may ask how demography, which is given such a prominent place in the opening of CWH vol. VII.1, relates to other dimensions of social and political development and how to formulate such relationship more systematically. The connection between industrialization and urbanization also seems less evident than conventional wisdom assumes. The megacities of the nineteenth century recorded the greatest growth, not as centres of manufactory production but as true portals of globalization due to their central position in communication and traffic (of goods as well as people). Furthermore, they acted as decision centres on the incipient worldwide flows, in which long historical experiences with global networking were institutionally bundled and culturally expressed.¹⁹ Industrialization found its place in cities with less dynamic growth, which does not change the prominent position of places like Manchester had in the emergence of new industries. Instead, it makes us aware that urbanization was a

18 See in particular the chapters by M. Harrison on diseases, CWH VII.1, pp. 237–257, and by E. Manela on smallpox eradication, CWH VII.1, pp. 258–281.

19 C. Baumann/A. Dietze/M. Maruschke (eds), *Portals of Globalization in Africa, Asia, and Latin America*, Leipzig 2017.

much more complex process with deeper roots than a simple equation of the urban with the industrial.

Whether the pattern of Western (or Western-influenced) pioneering in the nineteenth century and global succession in the twentieth century is also consistent with the history of urbanization remains to be examined. No doubt the cities of the nineteenth century are role models, for example in the expansion of urban infrastructure, the development of a cultural magnet effect, and as centres of consumption. But are the megacities of the Global South really replicas or rather cities in their own right, even if many of them contain a colonial legacy in their centres?

One can follow this struggle with periodization through almost all chapters of the volume: Giovanni Federico, for example, to whom the sketch about agriculture was assigned, refers to the use of chemical fertilizers and industrially manufactured equipment from the mid-nineteenth century onwards, and again to an extraordinarily slow spread from the pioneering locations across the globe. Even the massive increase of land used for agricultural purposes between 1850 and 1920 does not yet speak to an intensification of the production of agricultural products but rather to the expansion of more traditional forms of production, while the decline in the absolute number of farmers is only a phenomenon of the later twentieth century.

The transformation from a world in which most products (apart from a few luxury goods) were produced in the immediate vicinity to a truly global division of labour, which offered corresponding cost advantages because certain products were manufactured in places with the most favourable conditions (but which also caused growing demands on transport, administration, and transaction costs), had not really took off until the late nineteenth century. It was only at this time that functioning world markets emerged, linked by stock exchanges, telegraph systems, steamships, and railroads. There has been a long controversy as to which indicators could be used to measure the establishment of world markets.²⁰ The alignment of prices over long distances can be used as an indicator for this purpose, but this remains only a statistical approximation. In contrast, the orientation of entire societies towards the delivery of certain products to many different destinations on different continents has become the focus of research that traces individual fibres (such as cotton) or other raw materials (such as copper or rubber) from their origin to their processing into end products. As a result, an economic history emerges that leaves behind the framework of territories (often following the material made available by statistics that are produced by agencies established during the height of territorialization) and moves towards a systematic study of (border-crossing) value chains. At present, however, such an approach still serves more to illustrate global interdependencies than to become the theoretical-methodological foundation of globalization research.²¹

20 G. M. Winder, Conceptualizing the world economy: the world market, in: M. Middell (ed.), *The Routledge Handbook of Transregional Studies*, Abingdon/New York 2018, pp. 221–234.

21 It is not that this shift has not been suggested already for quite some time but it turns out to be extremely dif-

Undoubtedly, these processes had consequences for the mobility of goods but also people. The migration regimes adapted to the new requirements and opportunities of a world linked by markets. This also included the slave trade, which continued despite all efforts to abolish slavery (and in quantitative terms reached its peak during the nineteenth century²²), and on which a highly productive and highly profitable plantation economy was built. For much of the nineteenth century, at any rate, there can be no talk of a rapid and clear transition from coerced to free wage labour, and even after that, numerous hybrid forms of labour relations continue to exist.²³ The remarkable progress that global labour history has made in recent decades is impressively reflected in this volume. One of the most interesting facets of the narratives offered in CWH vols. VII.1 and VII.2 is that these stories of *production*, the first keyword, are integrated with stories of consumption,²⁴ the emergence of new diets and lifestyles, and the establishment of a new infrastructure for these new cultural patterns. Such stories hint at the possibility that production and consumption histories sometimes follow different rhythms and are judged differently by the respective specialized historiography with regard to global convergences and divergences. These views are left as loose ends for further discussion, which seems to me very promising.

The chapters on the Atlantic revolutions, presented as a history of intertwined political emancipation processes, and on the emergence of globally effective ideologies, which can also draw on a rich output by recent research on interdependencies beyond the Atlantic region, contribute to the impression of a narrative of progress in CWH vol. VII.1. Nonetheless, these chapters sparingly make any comparison with other world regions and therefore do not further shake up the idea of the Atlantic as the epicentre of political renewal, while in other parts of this world history the attention to simultaneous or functionally equivalent developments in East Asia, for example, is significantly greater. However, the editors are not content with tracing the slow emergence of the global condition in its materiality and cultural representations as a more or less linear process, rather devoting themselves, under the second keyword, *destruction*, and in a (albeit less extensive) part of their introduction, to the destructive tendencies of the period under discussion. The focus is on two epochs of (world) wars, namely the one between 1756 and 1815 and the one between 1914 and 1945. While a decline in the number of victims (amongst military and civilians) compared to the seventeenth century is recorded for the first period, the number of victims in the second period of the world wars skyrocketed, with 60 million dead during the Second World War alone. For the period between 1815

difficult either because the operationalization remains laborious or because thinking in terms of territories remains so attractive: T. K. Hopkins/I. Wallerstein, *Commodity Chains in the World Economy Prior to 1800*, in: *Review* 10 (1984) 1, pp. 157–170.

22 M. Zeuske, *Out of the Americas. Slave traders and the Hidden Atlantic in the nineteenth century*, in: *Atlantic Studies* 15 (2017) 1, pp. 103–135; id., *Handbuch Geschichte der Sklaverei. Eine Globalgeschichte von den Anfängen bis zur Gegenwart*, Berlin/Boston 2019.

23 M. van der Linden, *Workers of the World. Essays Toward a Global Labor History*, Leiden/ Boston 2008.

24 F. Trentmann (ed.), *The Oxford Handbook on the History of Consumption*, Oxford 2012.

and 1914, a long period of peace can be recorded for Europe, but in other parts of the world the number of victims is remarkable – as a result of the enormous sacrifice of internal conflicts in China in the mid-nineteenth century and as a consequence of the genocidal wars against indigenous and above all nomadic populations over larger parts of the nineteenth and into the early twentieth centuries, which were waged by colonial masters, settlers, and nation-builders. The destructive effect of industrialization on the ecological balance of humankind is mentioned only marginally in the introduction but is the subject of an impressive chapter by John McNeill directly following this introduction.²⁵ Not only the enormous increase in CO₂ emissions but also the radical reduction in biodiversity have become characteristics of a world history that, as the history of the Anthropocene, faces the challenge of a reconceptualization and renarration. The CWH as a whole, and this volume in particular, is distinguished by the fact that it already hints at this challenge, but the rather parallel presentation of related reinterpretations also illustrates how long the road to a world history that breaks away from old narrative patterns still lies ahead.

The third keyword of the introduction is *connection*, which makes the editors ask about convergences and connecting trends. They begin the corresponding reflections with references to the enforcement and expansion of large religious communities, which since the late nineteenth century have also been conceived of as world religions by a (secular) religious science observing them. From the tension between religion and secularity, the arc easily spans to include imagined communities, which, as nations, have demonstrated an astonishing assertiveness that even socialism and communism have failed to overcome.

The editors and Avieli Roshwald, to whom the chapter on nations and nation-states was entrusted, highlight the enormous dynamic inherent in this construction, which made it possible to transform a world of empires into a world of nation-states – even where the conditions for such a transformation were anything but optimal because no plausible basis for the idea of a homogeneous community with a common history and language could be found. Notwithstanding, the separation of the chapters “on nationalism” and “assessing imperialism” (Danielle Kinsley) does not make it easy to recognize that the most successful states of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries were by no means pure nation-states. Rather, they made use of a long tradition of imperial techniques of domination and, with their imperialism, continued the marginalization and oppression of other communities – interestingly, not only outwardly but certainly also internally through colonization within the *de jure* national territory.

Beside religion and nationalism, the editors present consumerism as a further clamp that provides cohesion in the world because a world of world markets had to open, out of necessity, to an increasing number of new groups of buyers through mass marketing. While each of the three cultural reference systems initially means differentiation – from other

belief systems, members of other nations, and other fashion styles – over time this differentiation allows reference to be made to models in distant locations with which physical contact is usually impossible or at least unlikely. Global connections are thus created between individuals and groups on different continents, but without them coming into contact with each other through personal encounters. The falling costs for copying such models as well as for their distribution facilitate this reference mechanism. Although fashion, music, sports, cinema, and theatre remain varied, a common feature across all genres and lifestyles is evident: the formation of overlapping imagined communities that are oriented towards globally circulating role models, charts, and record lists, which, in turn, are integrated into these communities' local way of life, thus creating a connection between far-flung and nearby corners of the world.

But here again, limits to such convergence can be identified, perhaps most clearly in the multiplication of ideas and practices of sexuality, on the one hand, and the alignment of family models and gender relations, on the other. While in the first trend increasing diversity can be observed, in the other trend an approximation of attitudes can be noted, even if it seems to be unsatisfactorily slow for one or the other (one can think of the demand for complete equality of the sexes). Which observation one puts on which side of the scales often appears to be a relatively arbitrary decision by the authors.

Where the idea of opposing trends does not easily address the complexity of global developments, there is another methodological instrument, which the editors unpack at the end of their introduction and which is used in greater detail in the chapters that focus on individual world regions:²⁶ the observation of different scales. Not everything discussed in CWH vol. VII.1 is actually planetary in size or range. However, a historiography that only knows local, national, and global scales does not have sufficient terminology for differentiation. Recent research on transregional processes offers a way out of this situation by calling attention to the fact that there are many developments that cover larger geographies than can be addressed with the categories of nations/states and regions/areas, but which nevertheless function below a level that is literally "global". Furthermore, transregional studies assume that many phenomena that we initially mark as global have their own geography, that is to say that they do not fit into the partly anachronistic categories of world regions, which partly owe their existence to colonial relations going back a long time or to obscure definitions corresponding to contingent short-term war requirements.²⁷

If one looks at the two volumes in their overall composition, the editors have covered an enormous diversity of individual approaches and perspectives, as expressed in the individual essays, with two nets that are supposed to ensure cohesion. One net is reflected in the structure of the double volume and begins with the materiality of a world that is growing together, followed by a focus on men and women (as the population of the

26 J. Obert Voll presents the Middle East, M. Selden looks into East Asia in world history since 1750, J. A. Charlip focuses on Latin America, F. Cooper on Africa, while I. Tyrrell discusses the USA and Lionel Frost the Pacific.

27 Middell, *Handbook of Transregional Studies*, pp. 1–16.

earth) and their politics, and concluding with the division of the world into different regions. The second volume (discussed in more detail in this thematic issue by Stefano Bellucci), which must be considered together with the first volume regarding the editors' concept, is divided into social developments, cultural dispositions and outstanding moments of a longer-term development, and ligaments of globalization, which include rubber, drugs, the automobile, and the Anglo-American style of globalization.

Above this, however, we find another layer of categories used by the editors to link together contributions from the different parts of the two volumes, namely production, destruction, and connection. The result is a heuristic that is intended to guide the use of the volumes and probably makes the most of the publisher's fundamental decision to divide world history into small portions of 25 pages each, as it must be prepared in an accessible way for use in study courses. One can easily imagine the intellectual scruples expressed by editors and authors when confronted with the arguments of the sales department of the publishing house not to exceed the limitations set by reading lists at universities. In this respect, it can be said as a final evaluation that this volume offers an excellent summary of many new insights into recent world historiography – reliable, detailed, and vivid – but, at the same time, that the student consumers for whom this work is primarily intended have contributed more to its conception than is apparent at a first glance.

Production, Destruction, and Connection from 1750 to the Present. Part II: Shared Transformations? On CWH volume VII,2

Stefano Bellucci

In a simplistic book titled *World History for Dummies*, Peter Haugen indicates ten crucial dates for the understanding of world history. The first date is 460 BCE, which corresponds to the birth of the democratic system in Athens; and the last is 1945, when the United States of America killed thousands of innocent Japanese civilians in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. This was the last act of the Second World War. All dates, from the first to the last, coincide with events all closely linked in one way or another to the history of the Western world, and its supremacy vis-à-vis the rest of the world. Just to be clear, Haugen's vulgarization of world history uses the same line of thought as Huntington and Fukuyama, according to whom the twentieth and twenty-first centuries are both characterized by an ever growing "Westernization" of the world. Huntington advanced the scenario of a history dominated by possible multiple conflicts of civilizations – between other civilizations and the Islamic world in particular; Fukuyama talks more reassuringly about a process of progressive extension of the democratic model, designed in Europe and North America, to the entire world. Reality is proving to be quite different from that envisaged by either of these academics.

After the collapse of the "communist" bloc in Eastern Europe and the disintegration of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the scenarios outlined by these "intellectuals" and many other social scientists did not in fact materialize. Two developments in particular need to be factored into any response from historians in their interpretation and analysis of world events: the growth of China and India, and the economic crisis that has engulfed the world since 2007 beginning in the USA, resulting from a social and

economic global restructuring. Given the above considerations, is it possible to imagine a global or world history that is not solely dependent on the history of the West? Is it possible today – in a world in which the crisis of socialist ideology has given way to the rise of ultra-capitalism on the one hand and religious extremism on the other, both to the detriment of labour globally – to discuss the idea of social progress in order to give a sense to world history?

1. World History of Societies since 1750

The questions above are at the core of volume VII, part 2, of the Cambridge World History (CWH, in reality, the ninth and last volume), and it deals with the question of worldwide “shared transformations”. The volume is edited by J. R. McNeill and Kenneth Pomeranz and covers the historical period from 1750 to the present, and is entitled: “Production, Destruction, and Connection”. This second part of the volume 7 deals with socio-cultural aspects, as well as economic aspects, of world history. The chapters are split into four sections: “Social Developments”, “Culture and Connections”, “Moments”, and “Ligaments of Globalization”. The chapters from the third section (“Moments”) are the only ones that directly deal with political aspects from the period running from 1750 to the present, with an analysis of some historical events or particularly crucial years, four specific years in particular. Before discussing these chapters further, let us first turn to the chapters on social, cultural, and economic aspects of world history according to the CWH.

In her general preface to the CWH, editor Merry E. Wiesner-Hanks writes:

Volume 7 (Production, Destruction, and Connection, 1750–Present) examines the uneven transition to a world with fossil fuels and an exploding human population that has grown ever more interactive through processes of globalization. The first book [part 1] [...] discusses the material situations within which our crowded world has developed, including the environment, agriculture, technology, energy, and disease ... nationalism, imperialism, decolonization, and communism [...] The second book [part 2] [...] explores topics that have been considered in earlier volumes [...] along with [topics] that only emerge as global phenomena in this era, such as sports, music, and the automobile, as well as specific moments of transition, including the Cold War and 1989 (CWH vol I, p. xvii).

According to the authors and editors of the volume, the main social developments that have characterized world history from 1750 to today, have occurred in the areas of migration (Dirk Hoerder), urbanization (Lynn H. Lees), family (Peter N. Stearns), sex (Julie Peakman), and the abolition of unfree labour (Alessandro Stanziani). Migration is a complex phenomenon and must be analysed on the basis of the premise that often instances of long-distance migration last many years because such migrants commonly rebuild their lives in the receiving country, and therefore to not return to live in their

country of origin. Migration can, however, be short distance over a brief period of time, as is the case, for example, with migrants undertaking seasonal work or rural workers undertaking work in urban centres. Dirk Hoerder seems to consider that the world is only made up of migrants, in the sense that he does not recognize – and this is perhaps a valid point – any type of indigenous people. The discussion on migration is closely related to that on urbanization expounded upon by Lynn H. Lees. From the eighteenth century onwards, the world has seen a demographic explosion and this man-made environment has brought with it considerable changes in human behaviour. Human beings were often forced to migrate, for example as slaves and forced labourers between the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries under various imperial systems, or as workers between the nineteenth and twentieth centuries who followed in the path of economic development, such as the construction of new communication routes in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. What is sometimes less clear in the chapter is an explanation as to how and why workers were “forced” to migrate – was it due to coercion or were they in search of economic opportunities? This migration trend has increased in number and constancy in the last two centuries of our world history, in large part as a result of new technologies.

This journey takes us to today’s migrants, who are partly the product of European imperialism and partly the product of political-economic and demographic imbalances. The issue of how economic nationalism pitted poor people against poor people is not discussed. Problems in terms of the definition and scope of migration occur in the piece by Lees on urbanization. There is no doubt that the demographic explosion of the last two centuries is directly related to the transformation of cities into megacities. The phenomenon is global but with crucial differences in the way in which urbanization has been managed: “planned” in those countries whose governments have access to public resources, and “uncontrolled” in those often ex-colonial countries, where urbanization had already taken hold before the government had the means to cope with the phenomenon. This explains why, today, megacities can be divided into those with good living conditions and those with less than tolerable ones, that is to say cities which have sanitization and pollution under control and those which do not (pp. 47–49). The numbers making up the migration and urbanization phenomenon are contained in various tables that provide a stark overview. There is little in terms of seeing the “positive”, if there is any, although the following chapters in the section on “Social Developments” seem a little less pessimistic.

Certainly, in terms of social development, the changes and continuity in the family structure, in sexual relations, and in the abolition of unfree labour have been defining elements in the last two and half centuries. They are thus, and for good reason, dealt with in this work. Peter Stearns describes a historical reality where, on the one hand, family represents the place where change can occur in terms of gender relations, between men and women, and in terms of generational relations, between the old and the young; on the other hand, family represents continuity between the present and the traditional past. Changes in the areas of sexual behaviour and work relations – particularly with the end of slavery – have been more radical in nature. In all of these categories, technology,

the industrial revolution, and new demands stemming from the capitalist world have created the need for new codes of behaviour and have signalled the end of others, for example the paternalistic model, which existed in the past when the rural and artisanal economy was dominant. There is a certain lack of clarity in how these developments are analysed in these chapters. The fact remains that the partial changes in family life or the more revolutionary changes in terms of sexual relations did not correspond to any radical demographic shift. This is apparent from the observation made by Stearns that, despite changes resulting from the industrial revolution and from imperialism, the idea of the family as the nucleus of the social life of human beings has remained steadfast. In the Global South, family life has only changed in recent times, too recently to ascertain the concrete ramifications vis-à-vis the survival of traditional family life.

The theme of labour, which deserved to be focused on as a key element in an in-depth and wholly new global history, is discussed in the same section on family and migration, by Alessandro Stanziani, in chapter 5. He is responsible for talking about one of the most truly significant revolutions in the last few centuries the capitalist revolution, and the resulting abolition of servitude and slavery. The triumph of “free” over “unfree” labour is closely linked to the history of the development of the capitalist system, which is characterized by a means of production based on wage labour. Wage labour creates greater wealth than slave or servile labour, and as a result, together with the increase in the productivity of labour, we have witnessed over the centuries (which this volume covers) unprecedented global economic growth and unprecedented global well-being.

This issue is key and it interrelates with various other themes discussed in sections II (“Cultures and Connections”) and III (“Moments”) of the volume. The chapter “Atlantic Revolutions” by Jaime Rodríguez talks about a series of revolutionary moments or “wars” in history, from the Spanish and European royalist wars to the American revolution/war of independence, which created new elites, with the question of slavery initially left to one side, “despite the universalistic pronouncements of the Declaration of Independence” (p. 281). The French revolution and the interconnected revolution in Haiti were also focused on, obtaining freedom from servitude and slavery and aiming to establish “freedom” as the legitimate fundament of human existence. But the freedom of wage labourers was limited to the choice of who to work for. The freedom was therefore much constrained. The Americas and Europe have been at the revolutionary core of world developments and, not by chance, these continents have also been the cradle of capitalism. The first and second world wars are analysed as a single historical moment by Richard Overly, in chapter 13, who coins them the “global wars”. The decision to combine the two wars in one analysis is an interesting one. These global wars, like the revolutions, are the result of conflicting political systems and opposing powers. The political systems are constituted by empire versus democracy; the powers are constituted by economic power versus the labour force – wage or slave – which rebels against the system, and which, in countries such as the Soviet Union and its allies, finds political support and legitimization. These systems and powers found themselves in direct opposition during the Cold War.

Daniel Sargent asks whether the Cold War was a “geopolitical struggle between two military blocs” or “an ideological competition, a war of ideas”. This is certainly an important question to ask. But, as the author of chapter 14 notes, while, on the one hand, there was capitalism, with the USA and Great Britain its leading exponents, on the other hand, there was a vision or “project that took Marx’s theory of history and transformed it into a tryst with history itself” (p. 323). This transformation has in some ways distorted the fundamental idea of Marx and has contributed to the aberrations that have occurred over a broad Euro-Asiatic geographical area, from Eastern Germany to North Korea and from Siberia to Afghanistan. Revisionism and post-revisionism are discussed in the chapter, but what is notably missing in Sargent’s handling of the subject is any analysis of the universal aspect. This is all the more striking because the work is on world history. As pointed out by Eric Hobsbawm, the Cold War was not just a war opposing the USA and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and their proxies. It was a global confrontation between advocates of two extremist systems, with both systems based on a distorted view of liberal-capitalist ideology, on the one hand, and Marxist ideology, on the other. Each group of advocates represented an intellectually impoverished political class, concerned principally with the pursuit of the private interests of a national elite.

The Cold War also represented, for the first time in the history of the world, the opposition between two universal systems, reflected in the opposition between individuals, families, classes, and other groups. The working classes living in both the Eastern and Western blocs achieved the highest levels of state protection and welfare during the Cold War. Yet, in the last twenty years, the governing elite around the world has been steadfastly dismantling the positive outcomes that were achieved during those years when there were two concrete opposing forces, each with a diametrically opposite vision of how the world should be run. The Cold War, with its armies and military proliferation, created social expectations for the common people, which the governing class of both sides could not ignore – because a protest movement could potentially be assimilated into an international political alignment.

In chapters 15 and 16 on the Cold War, two other key time periods are discussed: 1956 (in ch. 15) and 1989 (in ch. 16). 1956 is described by Carole Fink as the year that “encompass[ed] the complex political, social, economic, cultural, and intellectual transformations [... The year of] the Soviet repression of the Hungarian Revolution and the abortive Anglo-French-Israeli campaign in Suez” (p. 347). Indeed, from a world history point of view, 1956 is a crucial year. From that moment onwards, several political, global transformations took place within the Marxist world, with the Sino-Soviet split, as well as within the West, with the USA becoming the major power within this bloc and the European countries its vassals. Things changed a little in 1989. This is the year of “great significance” according to Nicole Rebec and Jeffrey Wasserstrom. Why so? Because of two images “a lone man standing up to tanks in Beijing in June [and ...] crowds cheering and lending their hands to the dismantling of the Berlin Wall in November” (p. 376). The authors try to identify events that took place in the year and around that year. They analyse the processes that led to the various revolts in the Eastern bloc and in China as

well as in South Africa and Latin America. They candidly admit that, historically speaking, it is too early to decide if 1989 will be remembered, celebrated, or despised in one or two hundred years' time. Having said this, while their analysis is acute and sophisticated, they seem to miss the main, obvious reason why 1989 constitutes an important year, and indeed it is an important moment of passage: the victory of capitalism against the rest, whatever the "rest" is. From that year onwards, all socialist forces – from moderate social-democrats to Marxist-Leninist – collapsed and disappeared from history. With them, ideas of social justice and the welfare state were also weakened. Therefore, politically the year is extremely important as the revolts that took place were indeed conservative by nature: religiously motivated (like in Iran and in Poland with the Solidarity movement) or calling for freedom, both political and economic, which translated into privatization of public goods. The capitalist mode of production and free market neoliberalism conquered the world. Some social classes or one social class, the rich, which derived its wealth from profit, benefitted from this capitalist mode, and – as Thomas Piketty and others revealed – wealth moved en masse from income to profit in the last two or three hundred years. Disparities increased, even more so in the former communist bloc, which was not prepared to deal with the aggressiveness of a liberalized economy.

2. Connections and Linkages in Globalization

Sections II and IV are insightful and enlightening. Section II, "Culture and Connections", looks at how consumerism commodified culture and contributed to the commodification of life beyond national boundaries. This occurred via a new way of trading, via the anonymous market, where seller and buyer do not interact directly, with the birth of the department store as well as through a transformation of religion. Scientific progress is at the core of the connected culture that the authors analyse in this section. Transformations in music, sport, and cinema are the results of this process. The department store is the precursor of the malls and shopping districts of today. These are the places where the commodification of culture took place, from the East to the West. According to Antonia Finnane, this denotes "the shift of culture products from the realms of ritual and relationships to the market place" (p. 138). The central theme of the chapter and the entire section is culture and its commodification and not commodities, their production, or their economic value. This methodology could perhaps be open to the criticism as to what culture really is in history, its relationship to power, which preceded the eighteenth century, and its capitalist commodification that the authors in this section try to explain. It could be argued that culture in itself has always been an ingredient of political power – see Guy Debord and his seminal work *La société du spectacle*. It is also debatable if sport is culture, but perhaps commodified sport could indeed be considered culture in the consumeristic sense of the term.

Music and cinema are more traditionally cultural sectors. However, Timothy Taylor treats commodification of music from a critical and economic point of view, looking,

for example, at the complex and thorny issue of copyright, which represents “the entry of musical work into the capitalist marketplace”. In this context “composers attempt to differentiate themselves from others in a capitalist market of works” (p. 206). What the author is describing is simply the transformation of the artist into a capitalist. It therefore follows that the historical change in the production and distribution of music-as-commodity is based on market logic. The chapter also discusses the ways in which music-as-commodity is acquired and consumed, from the concert to the Walkman to Internet downloading, with a personalization of music consumption. Contaminations between genres and different world music is also discussed in the chapter but the feeling is that the West represents the magnet of all connections. It would have been interesting if the author could have explained how music can be an instrument of protest too, as, for example, in the case of Woodstock’s concert or Mahler’s symphonic “world revolution”. The chapters on religion and science are also insightful although they leave some gaps in terms of their interrelation. They are extremely diverse in their approach to how religion and science are shaped by society and how they shape society. The main point made by Peter van der Veer in chapter 7 is that religion, from the eighteenth century onwards, is characterized by its relationship with nationalism, which is a secular force. In other words, we have witnessed in the last few centuries a process of secularization of religion. The author uses examples that go from Indian Hinduism to Islam in Iran, from Confucianism to Christianity. Chapter 8 on science by James McClellan III is extremely cerebral in its approach. The chapter starts with a series of questions and seeks to explain how difficult it is to define science. Only halfway into the chapter do we understand the extent to which science and its developments have penetrated all aspects of human history, from military to administration as well as from transport to everyday life, and the distinction to be made between “science” and “technology”. The author, very penetratingly and convincingly, explains that “science and applied science are probably better thought of as part of the coming into being of technological systems, rather than as science somehow, almost mechanically, turned into technology” (p. 197). Technology is the application of science into human life. It is the commodification of science. This is reflected in the spread of the research and development (R&D) as an industry (in the Western, capitalist sense). It is even possible to make a “ranking of nations in science and technology” (p. 199) in competition and based on material interests of the few against the many.

In section IV, “Ligaments of Globalization”, the last section of the volume, the editors try to explain how the phenomenon that today we call globalization is key to world history and can be explained by reference to the analysis of case studies represented by selected commodities: transport (ch. 17), automobiles (ch. 20), rubber (ch. 18), and also – less conventionally – drugs (ch. 19). The final chapter of this section is a critique of globalization and its Anglo-American interpretation. The chapter on transport describes how the industrialization of transportation took place worldwide. Transportation advanced with the progression of technology and, according to Daniel Headrick, had a big push that he calls a “revolution” between the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, with the expansion

of electrical technology. Interestingly, the author puts together transport with communication, and in the “age of globalization, 1945–2000” communication allowed an even greater expansion of transport capacity. The chapter on automobiles, which might more logically have followed the one on transport, but is placed here because the automobile is being analysed as a commodity rather than as an industry for the movement of people. The chapter is divided into two parts: “regimes of production” and “regimes of consumption”. From the analysis of regimes, Bernhard Rieger writes a history of global networks, which includes the extraction of primary material for the construction of cars, metals, as well as for their circulation, oil. Cars can be found in every corner of the planet, and it is only normal or even obvious that such a commodity and such an industry is present in the section on “Ligaments of Globalization”.

The chapter on rubber is a different story. Rubber is indeed a commodity that could serve well a historian’s aim to explain how world or global history works. The choice of rubber is, of course, arbitrary: Sven Beckert in *Empire of Cotton* explains how cotton could serve as another good example. Equally good examples are cocoa, diamonds, coffee, copper, etc., with historical commodity chains that are global by nature. However, the choice of rubber fits one purpose well: it connected the colonized world with that of the colonizers. As explained by Richard Tucker, from Amazonia to Southeast Asia, Western companies moved around the world in search of profitable production and at same time promoted colonial regimes. The latter took place with ruthless vigour in Africa, “when Britain, Germany, France, Belgium and Portugal carved the map of Africa into zone of colonial control” (p. 430) and rubber production flourished “in the Congo River basin, the second greatest rain forest on earth” (p. 431). Nationalism and wars in the Third World derived from or affected the rubber industry, showing quite clearly the intricate connection that exists between national and world politics with economic production. With ups and downs in the production, mainly due to new discoveries such as synthetic products or change in the demand from industries, including the military, today rubber is still a key global commodity. The global commodity chains related to rubber represents “the global ecological links of the automotive age and provide a horizon beyond which consumers saw no need to look” (p. 442).

3. Remarks on World History

One positive characteristic of this volume is that it analyses world history from a multi-disciplinary perspective. It is perhaps axiomatic that, by its very nature, the topic of world history lends itself to an interdisciplinary approach. The historical overview presented in volume VII, part 2, of the CWH stands in contrast to the idea of a micro-history, with its focus on specialization, which can run counter to an all-encompassing synthesis. Despite there being some room for criticism, the wide-ranging analysis provided in this volume makes it a valuable piece of work. It evokes the Fernand Braudel–style tradition of incorporating great historiographical theories and historical events over a long period

of time. In this sense, the volume brings back a global – multidisciplinary – vision of historical processes.

A second positive characteristic of this volume is that world history takes precedence over an Arnold Toynbee–style comparative analysis. This global history puts to one side any premise that history can be isolated into parts. Immanuel Wallerstein had already taught us that the “world economy rooted in a capitalist economy” was not just a phenomenon that affected the West. Perhaps, there is even no historical basis for Max Weber’s idea – now considered mainstream – that a specific relationship exists between the Protestant ethic and the spirit of capitalism. This is not to say that it is time to dust off Bernal’s *Black Athena* or Said’s *Orientalism*, but rather that the time has come to identify a philosophy of history. While such a quest might today be considered beset with difficulties, perhaps a renewed dialogue on the matter is timely.

What this volume seems to be missing – without wishing to detract from its undoubted usefulness for historians and for all those wishing to gain a closer understanding of world history – is a focus on today’s world view compared to the prism through which the world was viewed in the last two or three centuries. At the start of the twenty-first century, we seem to be increasingly in need of a broad theoretical framework in order to interpret events and developments, ranging from the attack on the Twin Towers to the Arab Spring; from the repositioning of the Russian Federation to the boom period in China and India; and from the economic growth of South America to the unexpected flourishing of various regions of Africa. Can the theory of randomness explain today’s events? In the negative, this begs the question as to whether a new philosophy of history can be identified.

Pietro Rossi, in *Il senso della storia. Dal Settecento al Duemila*, comments that global history, by its nature, encompasses a non-Eurocentric history. Europe has certainly played an important role in modern developments, and, up to the end of the 1800s, dominated on the global stage (a level of influence that, from the 1900s onwards, has been wielded by the United States of America), but, as William H. McNeill highlights in his classic *The Rise of the West*, it is essential to always keep in mind the growth of various forms of civilization. Civilizations and cultures with roots dating back thousands of years did not suddenly come to an end in 1750. These various strands of an age-old history have continued to develop and intertwine up to the current day, in the context of the development of a global capitalist system. Global civilizations underpin the potency of historical diversity in the world and the interaction between different eras and places, with all their variety and diversity. Oppositely, contemporary capitalism, based on the production and consumption of goods at a global level – the globalization of consumerism – from the eighteenth century to today, has become a force for uniformity and conformity, advocating one standardized mindset, often called democratic or liberal, but which, in reality, admits little in the way of cultural exceptions or criticisms of its models of production and exploitation of resources and labour.

One criticism that could be levelled at the volume concerns the type of reading that is put forward, namely, a reading of history that remains somewhat static. In some chap-

ters, in particular in Parts I and IV of the volume, it is evident that capitalism is the key theme of the two or three centuries that the volume covers. Capitalism, as David Harvey recalls, can be defined only in relation to its dynamic effects, in terms of the social relations it creates and the economic activities that flow from those relations. The CWH gives a structural analysis but not a social one. This may well be due to the fact that the CWH is organized through a system of separate entries.

A near total lack of class-based analysis is noticeable, however. From the field of sport to that of industry, from the Cold War to the history of the rubber industry, and from family to urban realities, there will always be winners and losers, and the former will often have triumphed by exploiting the latter. For example, how can one not highlight the fact that the really significant revolution to have taken place in the last two or three centuries, with dramatic and anthropological consequences, has been the creation of global worker-consumers, as referred to by Pier Paolo Pasolini. And how can one not highlight capitalism's process of immaterialism, which occurs through its financing procedures, which creates a powerful group that does not possess anything tangible but rather controls the financial structures that indirectly govern the economy. We have seen the advent of a new global, financial aristocracy that finds its own legitimization and source of wealth from a logarithmic calculation, that is to say from an immaterial source of power, equivalent to the various god-like figures that are present in the diverse systems of power existing in all human civilizations.

Another limitation in the global history exhibited in this volume is one already identified by Sebastian Conrad in *What is Global History?* The worldwide point of view in history – regardless of the approach, from the old universal history to subaltern studies, from transnational to world history, etc. – is in itself problematic. Combining the variety of sources with the need to avoid a finalistic interpretation of the historical phenomena seems an almost impossible task. A world history approach is powerful because it is capable of shedding some light from different geographical perspectives on labour, the environment, migration, empires, etc. Global history seems to be able to transcend “methodological nationalism”, as Marcel van der Linden suggests. However, getting rid of Eurocentrism is another issue. It is a huge endeavour for world historians, especially if culturally and physically based in the West. World history is undoubtedly the historical discipline that could help reach this goal, and in this sense the Cambridge World History, vol. VII, part 2, is a valuable reference work.

FORUM

Das fortdauernde Erbe der Sklaverei: Warum karibische Staaten Reparationen von Europa fordern¹

Claudia Rauhut

ABSTRACTS

Der Beitrag setzt sich mit aktuellen Reparationsforderungen für die Sklaverei in Rahmen der Agenda der *CARICOM Reparations Commission* auseinander, einem transregionalen Bündnis zivilgesellschaftlicher AktivistInnen aus überwiegend anglophonen Staaten der Karibik. Diese appellieren seit 2013 an europäische Regierungen, Maßnahmen zur Bekämpfung der Folgen der Sklaverei und Kolonialherrschaft in ihren ehemaligen Kolonien zu leisten. Nach einer kurzen Einführung in die globalgeschichtliche und geostrategische Bedeutung der Karibik für eine Analyse globaler Ungleichheiten basierend auf dem transatlantischen Versklavungshandel und karibischen Plantagensklavereien erfolgt eine historische Kontextualisierung der Reparationsforderungen. Anhand meiner ethnologischen Forschung in Jamaika, in der ich qualitative

- 1 Dieser Beitrag fasst zentrale Teilaspekte meines Forschungsprojektes „Reparationsforderungen für die Sklaverei in der Karibik: Akteur*innen, Debatten und Geschichtspolitik“ zusammen. Ich danke der Fritz-Thyssen-Stiftung für die Förderung des Projektes am Lateinamerika-Institut der Freien Universität Berlin zwischen 2016 und 2019. Mein Dank gilt weiterhin allen GesprächspartnerInnen in Jamaika, deren Argumente ich in anderen Publikationen ausführlicher analysiere, s. C. Rauhut, *Caribbean Activism for Slavery Reparations: An Overview*, in: W. Beushausen/M. Brandel/J. T. Farquharson/M. Littschwager/A. McPherson/J. Roth (Hrsg.), *Practices of Resistance in the Caribbean: Narratives, Aesthetics, Politics*, London/New York 2018; C. Rauhut, *Mobilizing Transnational Agency for Slavery Reparations: The Case of Jamaica*, *Journal of African American History: Special Issue on National and International Perspectives on Movements for Reparations* 103 (2018) 1–2, <https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/toc/jaah/2018/103/1-2>.

Interviews mit den AktivistInnen des *National Council for Reparations* durchführte, gebe ich einen einführenden Überblick zu deren zentralen Argumente. Es wird über die Schlüsselrolle Jamaikas in der Karibik sowie in globalen Debatten und Netzwerken für Reparationen reflektiert. Abschließend zeige ich die Bedeutung der Forderungen nicht nur für die karibische Region, sondern für eine notwendige Auseinandersetzung mit Sklaverei und Kolonialismus als gemeinsames Erbe in Europa auf.

This article deals with current demands for reparations for slavery in the context of the agenda of the CARICOM Reparations Commission, a transregional alliance of civil society activists from predominantly Anglophone Caribbean states. Since 2013 they have been calling on European governments to take measures to combat the consequences of slavery and colonial rule in their former colonies. After a short introduction to the global historical and geostrategic significance of the Caribbean for an analysis of global inequalities based on the transatlantic slave trade and Caribbean plantation slavery, a historical contextualization of reparations demands follows. Based on my ethnological research in Jamaica, in which I conducted qualitative interviews with National Council for Reparations activists, I give an overview of their central arguments. It reflects on Jamaica's key role in the Caribbean and in global debates and networks for reparations. Finally, I show the importance of the demands not only for the Caribbean region but also for a necessary confrontation with slavery and colonialism as a common heritage in Europe.

1. Die langfristigen Folgen der Sklaverei und Kolonialherrschaft in der Karibik

Die Region der Karibik ist bis heute maßgeblich durch ihre lange Geschichte der Sklaverei und Kolonialherrschaft geprägt. Sie war in der frühen Neuzeit die erste von europäischen Mächten kolonisierte Region und damit Eingangstor zur Eroberung der Amerikas.² Die Karibik hat die längste Geschichte kolonialer Verflechtungen mit Europa, bis heute besitzen europäische Staaten Überseegebiete und Kolonien in der Region. Sie hat somit von jeher eine zentrale geostrategische Bedeutung. Zwischen dem 16. und 19. Jahrhundert wurden laut der sozialhistorischen Datenbank „Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade Database“ mindestens 12,5 Millionen Menschen aus Afrika versklavt und in die amerikanischen Kolonien der EuropäerInnen verschleppt. 40 Prozent kamen nach Brasilien, 35 Prozent in die karibischen Kolonien der Briten, Franzosen, Holländer und Dänen, weitere 20 Prozent in die spanischen Kolonien der Karibik, Süd- und Zentralamerika und schließlich fünf Prozent in die USA.³ Die versklavten AfrikanerInnen wurden

2 Entgegen der allgemeinen Gleichsetzung und hegemonialen Deutung von Amerika als Synonym für die USA zielt der Begriff und das Konzept „die Amerikas“ auf ein pluralistisches, heterogenes Verständnis des amerikanischen Doppelkontinentes und seinen vielfältigen Verflechtungen zwischen Ländern der Karibik, Mittel- und Südamerika, Kanada und den USA. J. Roth, *Decolonizing American Studies: Toward a Politics of Intersectional Entanglements*, *Fiar. Forum for Inter-American Research* 7 (2014) 3, S. 135–170.

3 D. Eltis/D. Richardson, *Atlas of the Transatlantic Slave Trade*, New Haven 2010; *Voyages, The Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade Database*, <http://www.slavevoyages.org/> (Zugriff 30 January 2019). Zur Problematik der Mindestzahlen und Schätzungen s. C. Rauhut, *Transatlantic Slave Trade and Slavery*, in: *InterAmerican Wiki: Terms – Concepts* –

durch Zwangsarbeit in den Goldminen sowie auf den Zuckerrohr-, Kaffee-, Tabak- und Baumwollplantagen ausgebeutet – ihre unfreie Arbeitskraft bildete die Basis von weltmarktführenden kapitalistischen Plantagenökonomien. Die europäischen Kolonialmächte Großbritannien, Frankreich, Niederlande, Spanien, Dänemark und später die USA wetteiferten um die Territorialansprüche in der geostrategisch und wirtschaftlich wichtigen karibischen Region. Denn in den größten, höchst profitablen Kolonien wie Jamaika, Saint Domingue, Kuba und Puerto Rico erzielten sie im Bündnis mit den kreolischen Eliten durch den Verkauf von Zucker v. a. im 17. und 18. Jahrhundert, in Kuba noch im 19. Jahrhundert enorme Gewinne.⁴ Der aus Trinidad und Tobago stammende Historiker Eric Williams stellte schon 1944 die These auf, dass die Gewinne aus dem Versklavungshandel sowie aus den karibischen Plantagensklavereien in einem direkten Zusammenhang mit der Industrialisierung in Großbritannien standen.⁵ Die Williams-These wurde seitdem vielfach diskutiert, widerlegt, neu aufgegriffen, erweitert, bestätigt – unstrittig ist, dass der Aufstieg des Kapitalismus in Europa ohne Sklaverei in den Kolonien der Karibik nicht denkbar wäre. Dort wiederum erfolgte kaum eine industrielle Entwicklung, die AfrikanerInnen und deren Nachkommen standen am untersten Ende einer rassistischen kolonialen Gesellschaftsordnung. Diese war nicht mit dem formellen Ende der Kolonialzeit überwunden, vielmehr setzten sich soziale und ökonomische Ungleichheiten und koloniale Ordnungsmuster entlang der „color line“⁶ auch nach den jeweiligen Unabhängigkeiten fort.

Die koloniale Aufteilung der Region unter den EuropäerInnen hat zwar ein sehr heterogenes Mosaik an verschiedenen Sprachen, Kulturen und Religionen hervorgebracht, zugleich aber auch kaum überwindbare Barrieren und Grenzen zwischen heutigen karibischen Staaten in Bezug auf Mobilität, Migration und Staatsbürgerschaft.⁷ So herrschten seit dem frühen 16. Jahrhundert beispielsweise Spanien in Kuba, Puerto Rico und im östlichen Teil von St. Domingue (seit 1844 Dominikanische Republik), Frankreich im westlichen Teil von Saint Domingue (seit 1804 Haiti) sowie in Martinique, Guadeloupe, und Französisch-Guyana, Großbritannien bis in die 1960er Jahre in Jamaika, Barbados, Trinidad und Tobago, Guayana und St. Lucia sowie Dänemark in Dänisch-Westindien. Seit Beginn des 20. Jahrhundert eigneten sich zunehmend die USA wirtschaftlichen, geostrategischen und politischen Einfluss an und besetzten die Jungferninseln und Puerto Rico. Aufgrund dieser so unterschiedlichen Kolonialgeschichten, politischen Herrschaftssysteme und nationalen Ideologien waren und sind auch die Wege in die Unabhängigkeit sowie die postkolonialen Entwicklungen sehr verschieden: in Haiti er-

Critical Perspectives, www.uni-bielefeld.de/cias/wiki/s_Slave-Trade-and-Slavery.html (2019).

4 S. W. Mintz, *Three Ancient Colonies: Caribbean Themes and Variations*, Cambridge 2010; M. Zeuske, *Schwarze Karibik. Sklaven, Sklavenkultur und Emanzipation*, Zürich 2004; M. Zeuske, *Sklavenhändler, Negreros und Atlantikkreolen: Eine Weltgeschichte des Sklavenhandels im atlantischen Raum*, Berlin 2015.

5 E. Williams, *Capitalism and Slavery*, Chapel Hill 1944.

6 Ein durch den US-amerikanischen Soziologen, Bürgerrechtler und Panafrikanisten W. E. B. Du Bois geprägter Begriff, der bereits um 1903 die Diskriminierung von Menschen aufgrund von Hautfarbe als eines der größten Probleme des 20. Jahrhunderts prognostizierte, W. E. B. Du Bois, *The Souls of Black Folk*, New York 2005 [1903].

7 I. Kummels et al. (Hrsg.), *Transatlantic Caribbean. Dialogues of People, Practices, Ideas*, Bielefeld 2014.

kämpften die Versklavten durch eine Revolution 1804 die erste Unabhängigkeit in den Amerikas. Kuba erlangte um 1898 seine Unabhängigkeit von den Spaniern durch einen langen Kampf der Mambises, einer Allianz zwischen Versklavten, freien „gente de color“ und kreolischen Eliten. Nach einer anschließenden Phase neo-kolonialer Beherrschung durch die USA (zunächst bis 1902 formell durch ein Protektorat, später unter nahezu vollständiger Kontrolle der Wirtschaft) besiegten schließlich um 1959 die revolutionären KämpferInnen um Fidel Castro die US-gestützte Diktatur Fulgencia Batistas. Fortan begann der Aufbau eines sozialistischen Staates, der in Lateinamerika und der Karibik eine einzigartige grundlegende Transformation der Gesellschaft durch eine Boden- und Agrarreform, den Aufbau eines umfassenden Bildungs- und Gesundheitssystems sowie der Verstaatlichung von Unternehmen und Industriezweigen durchführte.⁸ Die britische Kolonialmacht besaß die meisten Kolonien in der Karibik – diese erreichten ihre Unabhängigkeit erst in den 1960er Jahren, manche, wie St. Kitts und Nevis sowie Dominica in den 1980er und 1990er Jahren; jedoch hat Großbritannien bis heute Kolonien wie z. B. die britischen Jungferninseln, Cayman oder Montserrat. Auch andere Staaten wie Frankreich oder die Niederlande haben noch immer ihre „Außengebiete“ in der Karibik. So gehören etwa Martinique und Guadeloupe und St. Martin als sogenannte DOMs (Départements d’outre-mer, Überseedepartments von Frankreich) zur Europäischen Union, während die niederländischen Inseln Aruba, Bonaire, Curaçao als autonome Teile des Königreichs der Niederlande gelten und somit keine souveränen Staaten sind. Bonilla und Boatcă zeigen, in welchem Maße die fragmentierte, partielle Unabhängigkeit und Souveränität vieler karibischer Staaten bis heute mit eingeschränkten zivilen und politischen Rechten der jeweiligen Bevölkerungen einhergehen.⁹ Trotz dieser historischen, wirtschaftlichen, kulturellen und politischen Unterschiede teilen karibische Gesellschaften die Erfahrung von Jahrhunderten Sklaverei und kolonialer Beherrschung sowie das Bedürfnis nach Aufarbeitung und Überwindung der langfristigen Folgen. Dass die gegenwärtig im globalpolitischen Kontext am stärksten ausgearbeiteten Forderungen nach Reparationen für den europäischen Handel mit Versklavten aus der Karibik kommen, erscheint zugleich als Resultat und integraler Bestandteil einer *longue durée* der kolonialen Verflechtungen zwischen Karibik und Europa.¹⁰

2. Reparationsforderungen im historisch-globalen Kontext

Die lange Geschichte der Reparationsforderungen umfasst eine Vielzahl von individuellen AkteurInnen und Organisationen, die in verschiedenen Sklaverei-Kontexten der

8 H. Thomas, Cuba: The Pursuit of Freedom, New York 1971.

9 Y. Bonilla, Non-Sovereign Futures: French Caribbean Politics in the Wake of Disenchantment, Chicago 2015; M. Boatcă, Caribbean Europe: Out of Sight, out of Mind?, in: B. Reiter (Hrsg.), Constructing the Pluriverse. The Geopolitics of Knowledge, Durham 2018, S. 197–218.

10 C. Rauhut/M. Boatcă, Globale Ungleichheiten in der *longue durée*: Kolonialismus, Sklaverei und Forderungen nach Wiedergutmachung, in: K. Fischer/M. Grandner (Hrsg.), Globale Ungleichheit. Über Zusammenhänge von Kolonialismus, Arbeitsverhältnissen und Naturverbrauch, Wien 2019, S. 91–107.

Amerikas und zu unterschiedlichen Zeiten dafür kämpften. Schon die versklavten Menschen haben, sobald sie ihre Freiheit erlangten, Kompensationen für die erlittenen Verluste gefordert und z. T. auch vor Gericht eingeklagt.¹¹ Die Forschung fokussiert v. a. Beispiele aus den USA – bekannt ist darin das Motto „40 acres and a mule“ (40 Morgen Land und ein Esel), mit dem Tecumseh Sherman als Anführer der Unionstruppen nach dem Ende des Bürgerkrieges um 1865 Entschädigung für jede Sklavenfamilie verlangte. Auch im Panafricanismus der 1900er Jahren, vertreten etwa durch die Universal Negro Improvement Association (UNIA, 1914 durch Marcus Garvey in Jamaika gegründet und in der gesamten Karibik und v. a. in den USA für die Rechte der afroamerikanischen Bevölkerung kämpfend), sowie in der Bürgerrechts- und Black Power-Bewegung seit den 1960er Jahren war der Ruf nach Reparationen enthalten. Seit 1987 beantragt der US-Kongressabgeordnete John Conyers, unterstützt durch zahlreiche aktivistische Gruppen der African Americans sowie durch Abgeordnete der Demokraten, jedes Jahr die Einrichtung einer *H.R. 40 Commission to Study Reparation Proposals for African Americans Acts*, um Reparationen als nationales Anliegen in den USA zu verhandeln – bisher wurde der Antrag immer abgelehnt.¹² Diese Beispiele dienen in der Forschung und im öffentlichen Diskurs über *Slavery Reparations* meist als Referenzpunkt, was entsprechend zu einer US-zentrierten Perspektive auf das Thema führte. Vergessen wird darin oft, dass viele Impulse, Ideen sowie auch die AkteurInnen selbst aus der Karibik kamen und sehr viel Austausch und Netzwerke zwischen karibischen und US-amerikanischen AktivistInnen bestanden, etwa innerhalb der transnationalen Black Power Bewegung.¹³ Darüber hinaus entwickelte sich in der Karibik eine eigene und spezifische Vorstellung von Reparationen, die sich primär an Großbritannien richtet – so z. B. durch jamaikanische Rastafarians, die seit den 1950er Jahren von der britischen Königin und der Regierung eine Finanzierung ihrer Repatriierung nach Afrika als eine mögliche Form von Reparation fordern.¹⁴ Karibische Vordenker postkolonialer Ansätze wie C. L. R. James, Aimé Césaire und Frantz Fanon sowie die Historiker Walter Rodney und Eric Williams appellierten Mitte des 20. Jahrhundert an europäische Staaten, für die historische Schuld gegenüber ihren Kolonien aufzukommen. Ihre Analyse der Wechselwirkung zwischen kolonisierten und kolonisierenden Gesellschaften sowie von kolonialen Ordnungsmustern, der Plantagensklaverei und der globalen Ausbreitung des Kapitalismus wird durch die

11 R. E. Finkenbine, *Belinda's Petition: Reparations for Slavery in Revolutionary Massachusetts*, *The William and Mary Quarterly* 64 (2007) 1, S. 95–104 (Zugriff 27. März 2017).

12 M. T. Martin et al. (Hrsg.), *Redress for Historical Injustices in the United States: On Reparations for Slavery, Jim Crow, and Their Legacies*, Durham 2007; C. J. Munford, *Race and Reparations: A Black Perspective for the 21st century*, Trenton 1996; C. P. Ogletree, *Repairing the Past: New Efforts in the Reparations Debate in America*, in: *Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review* 38 (2003), S. 297–320; R. Robinson, *The Debt: What America Owes to Blacks*, New York 2001.

13 K. Quinn (Hrsg.), *Black Power in the Caribbean*, Gainesville 2014.

14 B. M. Blake-Hannah, *Reparations: Rastafari Pathway to World Peace*, in: W. Zips (Hrsg.), *Rastafari: A Universal Philosophy in the Third Millennium*, Kingston 2006, S. 119–128; B. Chevannes, *Rastafari. Roots and Ideology*, New York 1994.

heutigen AktivistInnen für Reparationen stark rezipiert.¹⁵ Ein Meilenstein war die Erklärung der *World Conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance* der Vereinten Nationen im südafrikanischen Durban 2001, in der erstmals auf der Ebene internationaler Organisationen wie der Vereinten Nationen die Sklaverei als Verbrechen gegen die Menschlichkeit verurteilt und anerkannt wurde, dass die Nachkommen der Versklavten in Afrika sowie in der afrikanischen Diaspora bis heute an den Folgen leiden. Entsprechend wurden Maßnahmen zur Bekämpfung von strukturellen sozialen Ungleichheiten und Rassismus gefordert.¹⁶ An der Ausarbeitung der Durban-Agenda waren maßgeblich AktivistInnen aus der Karibik beteiligt, so etwa auch Sir Hilary Beckles, Historiker aus Barbados, seit 2013 Leiter der CARICOM Reparations Commission und seit 2015 Vizekanzler der University of the West Indies. Neben seinen umfangreichen Forschungen über die Geschichte der Sklaverei, des Widerstandes und der Abolition in der Karibik ist Beckles gegenwärtig wohl eine der bekanntesten Persönlichkeiten der karibischen Reparationsforderungen. In seinem programmatischen Buch *Britain's Black Debt. Reparations for Caribbean Slavery and Native Genocide* behandelt er die zentrale Rolle karibischer AkteurInnen innerhalb der globalen Reparationsbewegung und geht insbesondere auf die herausragende Bedeutung Haitis ein. Haiti war das erste Land, das die Abschaffung der Sklaverei durch eine Revolution der Versklavten erkämpft hat (1791–1804). Um jedoch als unabhängiger Staat anerkannt zu werden, musste Haiti seit 1825 insgesamt 21 Milliarden US-Dollar an Reparationen an Frankreich zahlen, was nur über die Aufnahme von Krediten bei französischen Banken möglich war. Laut Beckles ist die daraus entstandene immense Verschuldung einer der Gründe dafür, dass Haiti heute eines der ärmsten Länder der Welt ist. Beckles würdigt den Vorstoß des ehemaligen Präsidenten Aristide, der im Jahr 2004 Frankreich aufforderte, dieses Entschädigungsgeld zurückzuzahlen als „first time that a postcolonial Caribbean government had made an official request for reparations to a European government“.¹⁷ Haiti ist auch ein wichtiger Bezugspunkt innerhalb der CRC-Ansprüche. Forderung nach Reparationen für die Sklaverei kommen also nicht nur aus der anglophonen Karibik, sondern werden auch in der französisch-, spanisch-, niederländisch- und dänischsprachigen Karibik sowie in den jeweiligen Migrationskontexten in Europa von zivilgesellschaftlichen und staatlichen AkteurInnen öffentlich thematisiert. Die Formen, Inhalte und Verläufe sind vielseitig. Nicht immer verwenden sie explizit den Begriff Reparation, kämpfen jedoch ebenso gegen strukturelle soziale Ungleichheiten, wirtschaftliche Abhängigkeiten und Rassismus,

15 C. L. R. James, *The Black Jacobins: Toussaint L'Ouverture and the San Domingo Revolution*, London 1938; A. Césaire, *Discours sur le Colonialisme*, Paris 1950; F. Fanon, *Les Damnés de la Terre*, Paris 1961; W. Rodney, *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa*, London 1972; Williams, *Capitalism and Slavery*.

16 United Nations, *World Conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance: Declaration* (2001), <http://www.un.org/WCAR/durban.pdf> (Zugriff 22. Juli 2015).

17 H. M. Beckles, *Britain's Black Debt: Reparations for Caribbean Slavery and Native Genocide*, Kingston 2013, S. 214.

wie beispielsweise der Begriff Afro-Reparaciones, der in der spanisch-sprachigen Karibik und in Südamerika verwendet wird, impliziert.¹⁸

Dieser Beitrag widmet sich der anglophonen Karibik, mithin den ehemaligen britischen Kolonien. Sie wurden innerhalb der konkurrierenden Kolonialansprüche der EuropäerInnen in der Region am längsten durch die britische Kolonialmacht beherrscht. Zugleich sind es heute ihre zivilgesellschaftlichen VertreterInnen, die teilweise mit staatlicher Unterstützung und organisiert in der *CARICOM Reparations Commission* die Forderung nach Reparationen für die Sklaverei am stärksten sowohl national als auch auf der Ebene internationaler Politik voranbringen. Veranschaulicht wird dies später am Beispiel Jamaikas, das eine Schlüsselrolle im historischen und aktuellen Kampf einnimmt.

3. Die Agenda der *CARICOM Reparations Commission*

Die 2013 gegründete *CARICOM Reparations Commission* (CRC) innerhalb der Caribbean Union of Common Market, CARICOM arbeitet explizit an der Weiterentwicklung der Durban-Agenda von 2001. Sie fordert mit einem Zehn-Punkte-Plan die Regierungen ehemaliger europäischer Kolonialmächte auf, Reparationsmaßnahmen für die Sklaverei und den damit begangenen Verbrechen gegen AfrikanerInnen und deren Nachkommen zu leisten.¹⁹ Diese sollen eine Anerkennung der Sklaverei als Verbrechen gegen die Menschlichkeit verbunden mit einer offiziellen Entschuldigung durch die jeweiligen Regierungen umfassen. Weiterhin werden finanzielle Transferleistungen gefordert, die es karibischen Staaten ermöglichen sollen, Maßnahmen zur Bekämpfung der strukturellen sozioökonomischen Benachteiligung der afro-karibischen Bevölkerung umzusetzen. Erstmals werden nicht private Personen, Unternehmen oder Banken, sondern europäische Regierungen adressiert. Statt individueller Entschädigungen, wie sie beispielsweise die African Americans in den USA seit dem Ende der Sklaverei um 1865 fordern, geht es der CRC um kollektive Maßnahmen in Form von Investitionen in Infrastruktur, v. a. in den Bereichen öffentliche Bildung, Gesundheit und Wirtschaft.

Als ihr Kernstück setzt die CRC gegenwärtige strukturelle Probleme in karibischen Gesellschaften mit den langfristigen Folgen des transatlantischen Versklavungshandels und Kolonialismus in Verbindung. Es wird argumentiert, dass insbesondere die britische Kolonialmacht ihre karibischen Kolonien systematisch nicht entwickelt und technologisch schlecht vorbereitet („ill equiped“) in die administrative Unabhängigkeit entlassen hat, ohne jemals in den Aufbau einer sozialen Infrastruktur investiert zu haben. In Ländern wie Jamaika und Barbados gab es weder ein funktionierendes Bildungssystem (die CRC konstatiert bis zu 70 Prozent Analphabetentum in den 1960er Jahren und fordert daher im Punkt 6 „Illiteracy Eradication“) sowie Gesundheitssystem, noch wurden ein

18 C. Mosquera Rosero-Labbé/L. C. Barcelos (Hrsg.), *Afro-reparaciones: memorias de la esclavitud y justicia reparatoria para negros, afrocolombianos y raizales*, Bogotá 2007.

19 CARICOM Reparations Commission, 10-Point Reparation Plan, <http://caricomreparations.org/caricom/caricom-10-point-reparation-plan/> (Zugriff 10. Mai 2018).

nationaler Agrarwirtschafts- und Industriesektor entwickelt und ausreichend Fachkräfte ausgebildet.

Implizit argumentiert die Agenda mit einer bestimmten Forschungsausrichtung karibischer HistorikerInnen und SozialwissenschaftlerInnen, denen zufolge eine eigenständige nationale Entwicklung nach den Unabhängigkeiten kaum eingeschlagen werden konnte, da einheimische Eliten politisch nicht auf Augenhöhe mit britischen PolitikerInnen und Wirtschaftskonzernen standen. Stattdessen waren sie gezwungen, zu schlechten Bedingungen Kredite von der Weltbank und dem Internationalen Währungsfonds anzunehmen. Britische, später andere europäische und v. a. US-amerikanische Unternehmen führten die wirtschaftliche Ausbeutung in Form von monokulturellen Plantagenökonomien, die ausschließlich für den Export produzierten, fort. Im Ergebnis besteht bis heute eine von den Metropolen und transnationalen Konzernen abhängige Wirtschaftsform, die auf Extraktion von Rohstoffen und auf Tourismus setzt und eine bis heute nicht zu bewältigende Schuldenfalle verursacht.²⁰ Konsequenterweise wird daher im letzten Punkt der Agenda auch explizit ein Schuldenerlass gefordert:

*Caribbean governments that emerged from slavery and colonialism have inherited the massive crisis of community poverty and institutional unpreparedness for development. [...] The pressure of development has driven governments to carry the burden of public employment and social policies designed to confront colonial legacies. This process has resulted in states accumulating unsustainable levels of public debt that now constitute their fiscal entrapment. This debt cycle properly belongs to the imperial governments who have made no sustained attempt to deal with debilitating colonial legacies. Support for the payment of domestic debt and cancellation of international debt are necessary reparatory actions.*²¹

Auch im politischen Sinne handelt es sich allenfalls um formelle, nicht aber vollständige Unabhängigkeiten, auch als „flag independence“ bezeichnet – d. h. es werden zwar formelle nationale Symbole wie Flagge, Nationalhymne oder nationale Feiertage verwendet, jedoch würden wesentliche politische und wirtschaftliche Entscheidungen weiterhin in den Metropolen, also den Zentren ehemaliger europäischer Kolonialmächte getroffen.²² Karibische Gesellschaften kämpfen bis heute mit den Folgen der Sklaverei, die auf sozialer, wirtschaftlicher, politisch-legaler, kultureller und epistemologischer Ebene fortwirken. Jahrhunderte kolonialer Beherrschung, Plantagenökonomien und eine strenge rassialisierte Arbeitsteilung habe versklavte AfrikanerInnen und deren Nachkommen stigmatisiert und koloniale Ordnungsmuster, Rassismus und soziale Ungleichheiten produziert. In der Bewältigung der Folgen der Sklaverei stehen die Staaten der Karibik weitgehend alleine da. Weder Großbritannien noch andere ehemalige europäische

20 R. O. Singh/C. Bourne, External Debt and Adjustment in the Caribbean Countries, in: Social and Economic Studies 37 (1988) 4, S. 107–136; L. Lewis (Hrsg.), Caribbean Sovereignty, Development and Democracy in an Age of Globalization, New York 2013.

21 CARICOM Reparations Commission 2014.

22 F. W. Knight/C. A. Palmer (Hrsg.), The Modern Caribbean, Chapel Hill 1989; Lewis, Caribbean Sovereignty.

Kolonialmächte haben jemals ihre Rolle im Versklavungshandel, der kolonialen Beherrschung der Region und darin verübten Verbrechen politisch anerkannt. Zwar sind in den letzten Jahren in den meisten westeuropäischen Staaten zivilgesellschaftliche Initiativen und öffentliche Debatten zur Aufarbeitung der Sklaverei und des Kolonialismus deutlich vorangeschritten. Jedoch hat bisher keine Regierung Dialogbereitschaft in Bezug auf die karibischen Forderungen nach Anerkennung und Wiedergutmachung historischen Unrechts signalisiert. Gegen diese Verweigerung der Anerkennung tritt die CRC an und erfährt dafür im globalen Kontext eine große Aufmerksamkeit durch Medien, Universitäten und aktivistische Gruppen.

4. Die Rolle Jamaikas innerhalb karibischer Reparationsforderungen für die Sklaverei

In Jamaika gelten die Rastafarians, die sich in den 1930er Jahren als kulturell-religiöse Community unter Leonard Howell gründeten, als Pioniere der Reparationsforderungen. Sie verorteten sich in der langen Tradition des Widerstandes gegen die britische Kolonialmacht und das System der Sklaverei, exemplarisch verkörpert durch die Aufstände der Maroons (von den Plantagen und aus den Minen entflohenen Sklaven). Rastafarians waren die ersten, die bereits in den 1950er Jahren, als Jamaika noch eine britische Kolonie war, Briefe und Petitionen an die Königin schrieben und sie aufforderten, allen Menschen aus der afrikanischen Diaspora, insbesondere aus der Karibik, ihre Repatriierung nach Afrika zu ermöglichen, sofern sie dies wünschen. Die zentrale Bedeutung der Rastafarians im Kampf für Reparationen schlägt sich auch im Zehn-Punkte-Plan der CRC nieder, der gleich im zweiten Punkt Repatriierung aufführt.²³ Seit den 1990er Jahren arbeiten Rastafarians in Jamaika an einer breiteren Agenda, die über den Aspekt der Repatriierung hinausgeht. Sie gründeten ein Komitee und nahmen 1992 und 1993 an panafrikanischen Weltkonferenzen über Reparationen in Nigeria teil. Insbesondere die Abschlusserklärung von Abuja gilt als ein Wegbereiter der späteren, oben bereits erwähnten Durban-Erklärung von 2001.²⁴ In den Folgejahren entstand ein zunehmend breites zivilgesellschaftliches Bündnis für Reparationen über die Rastafari-Kontexte hinaus. Im Jahr 2009 gründeten WissenschaftlerInnen von der University of the West Indies (UWI), MenschenrechtsaktivistInnen, AnwältInnen, JournalistInnen und Rastafarians mit Unterstützung der jamaikanischen Regierung einen Nationalen Rat für Reparationen (*National Council for Reparations*, NCR). Den Vorsitz übernahm im Jahr 2012 vom Soziologen und Rastafari-Aktivisten Barry Chevannes die Historikerin Verene Shepherd, Delegierte in der CRC und seit 2017 Leiterin des *Centre for Reparation Research* an der UWI. Mit Verene Shepherd und anderen Mitgliedern des NCR habe ich

23 Blake-Hannah, Reparations; Chevannes, Rastafari; CARICOM Reparations Commission, 10-Point Reparation Plan.

24 The Abuja Proclamation, A Declaration of the first Abuja Pan-African Conference on Reparations For African Enslavement, Colonisation And Neo-Colonisation., <http://www.shaka.mistral.co.uk/abujaProclamation.htm>.

im Rahmen ethnologischer Forschungen in Kingston/Jamaika in den Jahren 2014 und 2017 qualitative Interviews durchgeführt und deren biographische Hintergründe, Narrative und Formen der Mobilisierung und transnationalen Vernetzung für Reparationen thematisiert.

Sie argumentieren, dass die jamaikanische Gesellschaft noch heute mit strukturellen Folgeproblemen resultierend aus Sklaverei und Kolonialherrschaft zu kämpfen hat. Diese würden sich etwa in der ungleichen Verteilung von Land und Besitz, in kolonialen Ideologien im Bildungs- und Rechtssystem, in instabilen Familien- und Genderbeziehungen, in transgenerationellen emotionalen und psychologischen Traumata sowie im alltäglichen und institutionellen Rassismus manifestieren. Sie verweisen zudem auf Forschungsliteratur, die die historischen Ursachen der fortdauernden sozialen und ökonomischen Ungleichheiten herausstellen und den Zusammenhang zwischen Armut, prekären Arbeits- und Wohnverhältnissen, geringer Bildung und schlechter Gesundheitsversorgung, chronischen Krankheiten, ungleicher Landverteilung und rassistischer Diskriminierung und Gewalt betonen.²⁵ Im Grunde rekonstruieren die von mir interviewten Mitglieder des NCR die langfristigen Folgen der Sklaverei und leiten daraus Ansprüche an Großbritannien ab, Verantwortung für dieses durch die lange Kolonialherrschaft der Briten verursachte Erbe zu übernehmen. Entsprechend streben sie von Großbritannien finanzierte Maßnahmen zur Wiedergutmachung an, die vor allem auf die strukturellen sozio-ökonomischen Defizite abzielen. Während in diesen Bereich durchaus kollektive Investitionen getätigt werden könnten, die potentiell eine Verbesserung der Lebenssituation der afrojamaikanischen Bevölkerungsmehrheit (über 90 Prozent) bewirken würden, besteht bei den AktivistInnen Konsens darüber, dass andere durch Sklaverei verursachte Schäden, etwa im Bereich der generationenübergreifenden Traumata, durch Geld nicht wiedergutmacht werden können. Daher sei neben materiellen Leistungen die symbolische Ebene der Anerkennung von historischem Unrecht von zentraler Bedeutung. In diesem Zusammenhang fordern die AktivistInnen auch erinnerungs- und geschichtspolitische Maßnahmen, etwa die Errichtung von Museen, Gedenkort und Gedenktagen, Mahnmalen, und Ausstellungen, die die Geschichte der Sklaverei und in diesem Zusammenhang begangener Verbrechen, aber auch den Widerstand dagegen angemessen aufarbeitet und sichtbar machen. Im Fokus der durch die Mitglieder des NCR organisierten Kampagnen, Gedenkveranstaltungen und Workshops steht weiterhin die öffentliche Bildung. Ihre Initiatoren konstatieren akute Defizite im Wissen über die Sklaverei und ihre Folgen. Dies sei Erbe eines britisch-imperialen Bildungssystems in Jamaika, das anhaltend koloniale Werte vermitteln würde, u. a. durch eine Abwertung und Stereotypisierung afrikanischer und afrokaribischer Traditionen und gleichzeitige Überbetonung der zivilisatorischen Errungenschaften des British Empire. Es bedürfe

25 H. M. Beckles/V. Shepherd (Hrsg.), *Caribbean Slave Society and Economy: A Student Reader*, Kingston 1991; T. Holt, *The Problem of Freedom: Race, Labor, and Politics in Jamaica and Britain, 1832–1938*, Baltimore 1992; H. Levy, *They Cry 'Respect!': Urban Violence and Poverty in Jamaica*, Kingston 1996; D. A. Thomas, *Exceptional Violence. Embodied Citizenship in Transnational Jamaica*, Durham 2011.

daher dringend einer Reform, die mit einem Perspektivwechsel in der schulischen und öffentlichen Bildung einhergehe, die die Narrative von versklavten AfrikanerInnen und deren Nachkommen, ihre sozialen, kulturellen und religiösen Praktiken sowie Formen des Widerstandes gegen die britische Kolonialherrschaft einschließe. Das bestehende Bildungssystem sei nur eines von vielen Beispielen dafür, dass ein wirkliches Ende der kolonialen Ordnung in Jamaika noch nicht erreicht sei, sondern das koloniale Erbe auch nach der Unabhängigkeit in vielen gesellschaftlichen Bereichen fortwirken würde.²⁶

Ein zentrales Argument für Reparationen begründen die AktivistInnen mit einem Verweis auf die Umstände der Abschaffung der Sklaverei in den karibischen Kolonien: Im Zuge der Emanzipation um 1833 erhielten die SklavenbesitzerInnen vom britischen Parlament 20 Millionen Goldene Pfund, die sie als Entschädigung für den „Verlust ihres Eigentums“ einklagten, denn sie sahen ihre Sklaven als Ware und Besitz an. Die Versklavten dagegen verblieben ohne jegliche Kompensation für erlittene Verluste, ohne Land, ohne Eigentum und ohne Arbeit. Sie waren nicht einmal wirklich frei, denn die Briten verpflichteten sie im Rahmen einer *apprenticeship* („Ausbildung“) zu unbezahlter Arbeit, oftmals auf denselben Plantagen und für dieselben BesitzerInnen, denen sie zuvor als Sklaven dienen mussten. Die SklavenbesitzerInnen profitierten über dieses System der Zwangsarbeit von einer weiteren Entschädigung, zusätzlich zu den 20 Millionen Pfund in bar. Die ungleichen Voraussetzungen nach dem Ende der Sklaverei in Bezug auf Eigentum, Landbesitz, Zugang zu Arbeit, Bildung und Bürgerrechten bewirkten, dass die nun formell freien Menschen über Generationen hinweg sozial und wirtschaftlich marginalisiert wurden. Wenngleich diese Entschädigungsprozesse karibischen HistorikerInnen seit Jahrzehnten bekannt sind,²⁷ nahm doch eine größere, auch außerakademische Öffentlichkeit in Europa erst durch Nicholas Draper's Buch *The Price of Emancipation: Slave-ownership, Compensation and British Society at the End of Slavery* sowie insbesondere durch die 2013 veröffentlichte online-Datenbank *Legacies of British Slave-ownership* und weitere Publikationen zum Thema Notiz davon.²⁸ Darin rekonstruieren britische HistorikerInnen wie Catherine Hall, Nicholas Draper und ihr Team vom University College London basierend auf den Akten der Slave Compensation Commission, welche Handelsleute, Unternehmen, Versicherungen, Banken, Missionare, Mitglieder der Königsfamilie und Kirchen welche Entschädigungssummen erhalten haben, welche konkreten Investitionen sie anschließend durchführten und welches Wachstum damit für die britische Wirtschaft erzielt wurde. Sie zeigen damit minutiös die fortlaufende

26 Rauhut, Mobilizing Transnational Agency for Slavery Reparations.

27 S. Wilmot, Not "Full Free": The Ex-slaves and the Apprenticeship System in Jamaica 1834–1838, in: *Jamaica Journal* 17 (1984) 3, S. 3–10; K. M. Butler, *The Economics of Emancipation: Jamaica and Barbados, 1823–1843*, Chapel Hill 1995; V. A. Shepherd (Hrsg.), *Working Slavery, Pricing Freedom: Perspectives from the Caribbean, Africa and the African Diaspora*, New York 2002.

28 N. Draper, *The Price of Emancipation: Slave-ownership, Compensation and British Society at the End of Slavery*, Cambridge 2010; C. Hall et al., *Legacies of British Slave-ownership: Colonial Slavery and the Formation of Victorian Britain*, Cambridge 2014; Centre for the Study of the Legacies of British Slave-ownership, *Legacies of British Slave-ownership*, <https://www.ucl.ac.uk/lbs/> (Zugriff 5. April 2018).

Bereicherung der Ober- und Mittelschicht Großbritanniens am System der Sklaverei auch nach deren offiziellem Ende auf.

Für die AktivistInnen in Jamaika sind diese Forschungsergebnisse von enormer Bedeutung, denn sie verweisen nicht nur auf den Wohlstand in Europa auf der einen Seite, sondern auch auf die strukturelle Verarmung karibischer Gesellschaften auf der anderen Seite. Deren BewohnerInnen erhielten keine Entschädigung nach der Sklaverei und mussten stattdessen massive Benachteiligungen in Form ungleicher Entwicklungsvoraussetzungen bewältigen. Heutige AktivistInnen stellen demgemäß einen symbolisch-diskursiven Bezug zwischen der Entschädigung der SklavenbesitzerInnen und den heutigen Forderungen nach Reparationen an die britische Regierung her. Dabei geht es ihnen weniger um eine Schuldzuweisung gemäß einer Täter-Opfer-Dichotomie, sondern darum, Ungleichheitsstrukturen in Folge von Sklaverei und Kolonialherrschaft zu benennen. Indem die AktivistInnen diese in einen transregionalen und transtemporalen Zusammenhang mit anhaltenden strukturellen Entwicklungsproblemen in Jamaika stellen, verknüpfen sie ihre Forderungen mit einem Entwicklungsdiskurs, rücken diesen jedoch in ein gänzlich neues Licht. Statt weiterhin Entwicklungshilfe von Großbritannien basierend auf dem hierarchischen Prinzip von Großzügigkeit und Barmherzigkeit zu empfangen, appellieren sie an Großbritannien, moralische und politische Verantwortung zur Wiedergutmachung historischen Unrechts zu übernehmen.²⁹

Ihre implizite Forderung nach einer überfälligen Umverteilung von Wohlstand in Form von Reparationen leiten sie nicht nur aus der Sklaverei, sondern auch aus der heute als unrechtmäßig empfundenen Entschädigung der Sklavenbesitzer um 1834 sowie der kolonialen Beherrschung durch Großbritannien bis zur Unabhängigkeit Jamaikas im Jahr 1962 ab. Darüber hinaus machen sie fortdauernde Schäden auch nach der formell-administrativen Dekolonisierung Jamaikas sichtbar, etwa die durch britische und transnationale Konzerne und Creditsysteme betriebene Ausbeutung natürlicher Ressourcen bei gleichzeitiger Verhinderung einer infrastrukturellen Entwicklung des Landes. Aber auch soziale Folgen wie die rassistische Diskriminierung Schwarzer Menschen führen sie auf die Sklaverei zurück. Sie zeigen damit die tiefen historischen Ursachen heutiger globaler Ungleichheiten auf, die eben nicht zufällig oder durch das vermeintliche Versagen der (bedingt) unabhängigen Regierungen nach 1962 entstanden sind, sondern durch Jahrhunderte Bereicherung Europas basierend auf Versklavungshandel und Sklaverei.³⁰ Adressat der Forderungen ist daher primär die britische Regierung.³¹ Sie gilt als Vorgängerin der kolonialen Regierung, die den legalen, politischen und ökonomischen

29 Rauhut, *Caribbean Activism for Slavery Reparations*; C. Rauhut, *The Link of a Former British Prime Minister's Ancestor to Caribbean Slavery Economy in the Current Call for Reparations in Jamaica*, in: O. Kaltmeier/W. Rausert/J. Roth (Hrsg.), *Cherishing the Past, Envisioning the Future. Entangled Practises of Heritage and Utopia in the Americas* (forthcoming).

30 C. Rauhut, *When the Slavery Past Haunts the Present: The Jamaican Redress of a Bank Loan Related to the End of Slavery*, in: D. J. Wilkins/P. Smiragina (Hrsg.) *Slavery Past, Present and Future*, Leiden (forthcoming).

31 In Jamaika wird dennoch auch eine interne Agenda für Reparationen diskutiert, die die Folgeprobleme der prekären Unabhängigkeit Jamaikas und ihrer postkolonialen Regierungen aufarbeitet; deren Analyse muss an anderer Stelle erfolgen.

Rahmen geschaffen und damit den Handel mit versklavten AfrikanerInnen und deren Ausbeutung in karibischen Plantagenökonomien überhaupt erst ermöglicht hat. Staatliche Maßnahmen sollen dennoch nicht ausschließen, dass private Individuen, Unternehmen oder Institutionen wie Kirchen, Versicherungsgesellschaften und Banken, die sich an der Sklaverei bereichert haben, Wiedergutmachungsmaßen einschließlich öffentlicher Entschuldigungen einleiten.³²

5. Globale Referenzen, Netzwerke und Aktionsstrategien für Reparationen

Über die Ebene bilateraler Verhandlungen hinaus betonen die AktivistInnen die Notwendigkeit, sich global zu vernetzen und neben den jeweils lokal relevanten Forderungen auch eine gemeinsame karibische Agenda innerhalb der CRC zu entwickeln. Daran arbeiten gegenwärtig die in bisher 12 Ländern etablierten Reparationskommissionen, u. a. in Trinidad and Tobago, Barbados, Guayana, Belize oder Saint Vincent and Grenadines – mit Erfolg, denn zumindest haben alle Premierminister der Mitgliedstaaten der CARICOM die Reparationsagenda unterzeichnet, ebenso wie die Regierung von Kuba, Venezuela sowie internationale lateinamerikanische Staatenbündnisse wie ALBA und CELAC und schließlich auch die Vereinten Nationen.³³ Verene Shepherd hat sich zudem als ehemalige Vorsitzende der UN-Working Group of Experts on People of African Descent (2009–2012) und Mitglied bis 2015 maßgeblich dafür eingesetzt, dass das Thema Reparationen in die Agenda der UN-Dekade „People of African descent: recognition, justice and development“ (2015–2024) aufgenommen wird.³⁴

Die AktivistInnen untermauern ihre Argumentation mit Präzedenzfällen von historischer Wiedergutmachung im globalen Vergleich. Neben den bekanntesten Entschädigungsmaßnahmen für die Opfer des Holocaust durch Deutschland verweisen sie auf aktuellere Beispiele wie etwa die Reparationszahlungen der britischen Regierung im Jahr 1995 für kolonialrassistische Verbrechen an den Maori in Neuseeland (Maori Waikato Raupatu Claims Settlement Bill 1863) oder den Mau Mau Unabhängigkeitskämpfern der 1950er Jahre in Kenia im Jahr 2012.³⁵ Auch besteht Interesse an den Reparationsfor-

32 National Commission on Reparation, Report of the Work of the National Commission on Reparation, May 2009 – October 2013, Kingston 2013.

33 CARICOM Press Release 53/2014, CARICOM Leaders accept Caribbean Reparatory Justice Programme as basis for further action on reparations, http://caricom.org/jsp/pressreleases/press_releases_2014/pres53_14.jsp (Zugriff 30. Juli 2015) Comunidad de Estados Latinoamericanos y Caribeños (CELAC). Declaración especial sobre la cuestión de las reparaciones por la esclavitud y el genocidio de las poblaciones nativas; www.celac.cancilleria.gob.ec (Zugriff 22. Oktober 2015; siehe auch Alianza Bolivariana para los Pueblos de Nuestra América (ALBA). www.portaalba.org (Zugriff 22. Oktober 2015).

34 United Nations, Program of activities for the implementation of the International Decade for People of African Descent (2014), http://www.un.org/en/events/africandescentdecade/pdf/A.RES.69.16_IDPAD.pdf (Zugriff 3. Mai 2016); C. Rauhut, Caribbean Leaders in the Transnational Struggle for Slavery Reparations, in: A. Bandau / A. Brüske / N. Ueckmann (Hrsg.), Reshaping Global Dynamics of the Caribbean: Relaciones y Desconexiones – Relations et Déconnexions – Relations and Disconnections, Heidelberg 2018, S. 281–296.

35 Beckles, Britain's Black Debt.

derungen der Ovaherero und Nama an die Bundesregierung für den von der deutschen Kolonialmacht in „Deutsch-Südwest Afrika“ (heute Namibia) begangenen Völkermord zwischen 1904–1908.³⁶ Auf Wunsch beider Seiten habe ich 2017 einen Kontakt zwischen VertreterInnen des Ovaherero Genocide Committees und Verene Shepherd hergestellt, die in ihrer Radiosendung „Talking History“ in Kingston ein entsprechendes Interview gesendet hat. Die Vernetzung wurde sehr positiv bewertet, denn Anschlüsse zu globalen Reparationsbewegungen werden als zentrales Mittel gesehen, um weltweit Verbündete zu suchen und die spezifisch lokalen Forderungen in einem globalen Kontext zu verankern. Damit soll schließlich auch der Appell an europäische Regierungen gestärkt werden, sich nicht länger einem überfälligen Dialog über Aufarbeitung und Wiedergutmachung der Sklaverei und ihrer Folgen zu entziehen. Nicht zuletzt machen die AktivistInnen der Karibik mit dem Verweis auf andere, wenn auch nur bedingt vergleichbare, da in ihren Verläufen, Zielen und Ergebnissen sehr unterschiedlichen Erfahrungen im Umgang mit historischem Unrecht, auf die grundsätzliche Möglichkeit, Legitimität und Relevanz von Reparationen aufmerksam. Diese programmatische globale Ausrichtung macht Sir Hilary Beckles in seiner Rede vor dem Unterhaus des britischen Parlaments im Jahr 2014 deutlich: „This 21st century will be the century of global reparatory justice.“³⁷ Die AktivistInnen in Jamaika sowie auch in der *CARICOM Reparations Commission* stehen in konstantem Austausch mit Einzelpersonen und Organisationen in karibischen und lateinamerikanischen Ländern, in den USA und in Europa, die ebenfalls für Reparationen für die Sklaverei kämpfen. Ihr Engagement traf insbesondere bei aktivistischen Gruppen in den USA auf große Resonanz. Im Jahr 2015 haben das *Institute of the Black World* und die neu gegründete *National African American Reparations Commission*, die sich als eine Art Dachorganisation verschiedener AktivistInnen und Gruppen in den USA versteht, zu einem *National/International Reparations Summit* nach New York eingeladen.³⁸ Anknüpfend an John Conyers Initiativen (s.o.) fordert auch sie eine Kommission für Reparationen im US-Kongress, um das Thema auf nationaler Ebene zu verhandeln. In einer gemeinsamen Abschlusserklärung wurde insbesondere die Zusammenarbeit mit AktivistInnen der CRC sowie die Entwicklung eines der CRC ähnlichen Zehn-Punkte-Plans für Reparationen beschlossen.³⁹

36 Auch hier steht eine offizielle Anerkennung und Entschuldigung durch Deutschland, welche verschiedene Opferverbände der namibischen Ovaherero und Nama im Bündnis mit deutschen NGOs wie etwa „Völkermord verjährt nicht“ seit Jahrzehnten fordern, bis heute aus, vgl. J. Zimmerer, *Der erste Völkermord des 20. Jahrhunderts*, in: Deutsches Historisches Museum (Hrsg.), *Deutscher Kolonialismus: Fragmente seiner Geschichte und Gegenwart*, Berlin 2016, S. 138–145; J. Zimmerer / J. Zeller (Hrsg.), *Völkermord in Deutsch-Südwestafrika: Der Kolonialkrieg (1904–1908) in Namibia und seine Folgen*, Berlin 2003; R. Kößler, *Namibia and Germany: Negotiating the Past*, Windhoek 2015 sowie <https://de-de.facebook.com/NoAmnestyOnGenocide/>.

37 CARICOM Press Release 188/2014, Chairman of CARICOM Reparations Commission addresses British House of Commons, http://www.caricom.org/jsp/pressreleases/press_releases_2014/pres188_14.jsp (Zugriff 30. Juli 2015).

38 <https://ibw21.org/press-release/final-communique-the-nationalinternational-reparations-summit/>.

39 Ebd.

Die aktuelle karibische Agenda hat demnach eine erneute Mobilisierung zivilgesellschaftlicher AkteurInnen und Debatten für Reparationen in den USA ausgelöst und transregionale Netzwerke gestärkt. Karibische AktivistInnen der CARICOM nehmen darin eine Schlüsselrolle ein und gestalten maßgeblich die jeweiligen Diskurse, Aktionen und Organisationsformen. Darüber hinaus eröffnen sie, so mein Argument, auch neue Perspektiven auf Reparationen in Bezug auf AkteurInnen, adressierte Institutionen, potentiell Begünstigte, Räume der Aushandlungen sowie inhaltliche Zielsetzungen. Bisher wurden die Diskussionen zum Thema in der Öffentlichkeit und Wissenschaft einseitig auf den Fall der USA ausgerichtet und entsprechend „durch die Brille“ partikularer US-amerikanischer Erfahrungen und Diskurse geführt, was mit einer gewissen Homogenisierung in der Analyse einherging. Während die Rolle karibischer AkteurInnen und deren Impulse für eine kritische Wissensproduktion in Geschichte und Gegenwart lange übersehen wurde, ist deren Kampf für Reparationen insbesondere durch die globale Zirkulation der CRC Agenda stärker sichtbar geworden und wird zukünftig auch den globalen Aktivismus sowie die Forschung über historisches Unrecht und Wiedergutmachung inspirieren.

6. Ausblick: Reparationen als transregionale Agenda zur Aufarbeitung von Sklaverei und Kolonialismus

So wie sich die AktivistInnen aus der Karibik in ihrem Kampf transnational vernetzen und Anschläge zu anderen Gruppen, Aktionsformen und Argumenten suchen, so zirkulieren auch die Ansätze, Ideen und Praktiken von Reparationsforderungen global. Sie sind nicht auf einzelne Nationalstaaten beschränkt, sondern Ergebnis eines längeren Kampfes innerhalb der Region. Dementsprechend müssen Forschungen über Reparationen statt einer nationalstaatlichen Container-Perspektive globalhistorische Ansätze transregionaler Verflechtungen anwenden und weiterentwickeln, wie in neueren Publikationen bereits umgesetzt.⁴⁰ Empirisch kann dies nur über Mikro-Studien in den jeweiligen lokalen Kontexten untersucht werden, denn diese sind, das veranschaulicht das Beispiel der Karibik, aufgrund der kolonialen Teilung sehr unterschiedlich in Bezug Sprachen, Kulturen, Religionen, Mobilität, Staatsbürgerschaft und politische Systeme. Laut Faye Harrison sei „no need for comparative research on Caribbean issues that draw boundaries that include or exclude on the basis of shared language and common colonial masters rather than on the basis of factors that may actually be more significant for understanding the workings of cultural, economic, and political development“.⁴¹ Ein solch bedeutender und verbindender Faktor ist zweifelsohne die Aufarbeitung der Sklaverei.

40 A. L. Araujo, *Reparations for Slavery and the Slave Trade. A Transnational and Comparative History*, London 2017; *National and International Perspectives on Movements for Reparations*, Chicago 2018 (= *Journal of African American History* 103 [2018], 1/2).

41 F. V. Harrison, *Outsider Within: Reworking Anthropology in the Global Age*, Illinois 2008, S. 206.

Die Karibik gilt als frühes Beispiel für transregionale Verflechtungen und auch transnationale Studien – darin sollte nach Glick Schiller der Fokus auf Agency, also die Handlungs- und Gestaltungsmacht von AkteurInnen systematisch mit Analysen zu strukturellen sozialen Ungleichheiten und globalen Machtverhältnissen gekoppelt werden.⁴² Von zentraler Bedeutung ist darin die Rolle der Sklaverei bzw. karibischen Zuckerrohrplantagenwirtschaft als Ausgangspunkt der Moderne.⁴³ Genau diese wird jedoch in einem Selbstverständnis Europas als Zentrum der Moderne und der Aufklärung ausgeklammert, in dem stattdessen die vermeintlich zivilisatorischen Errungenschaften der europäischen Expansionspolitik hervorgehoben werden. Einen notwendigen Einschluss der dunklen Seiten in der Auseinandersetzung mit Moderne, nämlich der Sklaverei und Kolonialität, haben etwa Coronil, Mignolo und andere TheoretikerInnen im Zuge lateinamerikanischer postkolonialer bzw. dekolonialer Ansätze geleistet, in dem sie Quijanos Konzept der Kolonialität der Macht zum Paradigma der *modernidad/colonialidad* weiterentwickelt haben.⁴⁴ Diese Perspektive, die von anhaltenden kolonialen Ordnungsmustern auf der Ebene der Ideologien, Epistemologien sowie auch sozio-ökonomischen Strukturen ausgeht, ist für die Analyse heutiger karibischer Gesellschaften zentral. Gemeinsam mit Manuela Boatcă schlage ich vor, diese in Lateinamerika entwickelten dekolonialen Ansätze mit denen der verwobenen Modernen und geteilten Geschichten zu verknüpfen, wie sie u. a. Randeria und Conrad propagiert haben. Diese fokussieren die wechselseitigen Interaktionen zwischen europäischen Metropolen und außereuropäischen kolonisierten Peripherien als konstituierend für eine „verwobene Moderne“.⁴⁵ Wir greifen hier die von AnthropologInnen und GlobalhistorikerInnen entwickelten Impulse auf, akteursbezogene Praktiken und Ideen systematisch aufeinander zu beziehen und als globale Verflechtungsgeschichte(n) konzeptionell weiterzuentwickeln. Damit würde die vermeintliche Peripherie der Karibik aufgehoben und stattdessen stärker in das Zentrum globalgeschichtlicher Entwicklungen und Forschungen gerückt werden. Die Erfahrung der Sklaverei in der Karibik und in Afrika muss sowohl im politischen als auch wissenschaftlichen Verständnis als Teil europäischer Geschichte anerkannt und aufgearbeitet werden.

Die *CARICOM Reparations Commission* hat, indem sie direkt Großbritannien adressiert, das Thema Reparationen für historisches Unrecht zu einem globalen Anliegen mit einer

42 N. Glick Schiller, *Theorizing About and Beyond Transnational Processes*, in: A. M. Cervantes-Rodríguez/R. Grosfoguel/E. Mielants (Hrsg.), *Caribbean Migration to Western Europe and the United States: Essays on Incorporation, Identity, and Citizenship*, Philadelphia 2009, S. 18–40.

43 S. W. Mintz, *Sweetness and Power. The Place of Sugar in Modern History*, New York 1985.

44 A. Quijano, *Colonialidad y Modernidad/Racionalidad*, *Perú Indígena* 13 (1992) 29, S. 11–20; F. Coronil, *Latin American Postcolonial Studies and Global Decolonization*, in: N. Lazarus (Hrsg.), *The Cambridge Companion to Postcolonial Literary Studies*, Cambridge 2004, S. 221–240; W. Mignolo, *The Darker Side of Western Modernity: Global Futures, Decolonial Options*, Durham 2011.

45 Rauhut/Boatcă, *Globale Ungleichheiten*; S. Conrad/S. Randeria, *Einleitung: Geteilte Geschichten – Europa in einer postkolonialen Welt*, in: S. Conrad/S. Randeria (Hrsg.), *Jenseits des Eurozentrismus: postkoloniale Perspektiven in den Geschichts- und Kulturwissenschaften*, Frankfurt am Main 2013, S. 32–70; M. Boatcă, *Two-Way Street. Moderne(n), Verwobenheit und Kolonialität*, *Österreichische Zeitschrift für Soziologie* 38 (2013) 4, S. 375–394 (Zugriff 9. September 2015).

neuen symbolischen, geographischen und politischen Reichweite gemacht. Sie fordert europäische Staaten auf, ihre eigene Geschichte im Zusammenhang mit den Kolonien und noch immer wirksamen Folgen der Sklaverei aufzuarbeiten. Im Ergebnis meiner Forschung in Jamaika habe ich symbolische und materielle Aspekte herausgearbeitet, um zu unterstreichen, dass es den Initiatoren von Reparationsforderungen um viel mehr als nur finanzielle Entschädigung geht. Zum einen streben sie die Unterstützung von erinnerungs- und geschichtspolitischen Aktivitäten, der Errichtung von Gedenktagen, Mahnmalen, Museen usw. in der Karibik und in Europa an. AktivistInnen engagieren sich damit für ein Neuschreiben globaler Geschichte, die die dunklen Seiten der europäischen Moderne, nämlich Sklaverei und Kolonialherrschaft, anerkennt und aufarbeitet, darin die Narrative der einst versklavten AfrikanerInnen und ihrer Nachkommen in der Diaspora einschließt. Dies ermöglicht eine Dekolonisierung der Erinnerungspolitik zur Sklaverei und bringt alternative Geschichtsverständnisse und Epistemologien hervor. Als genauso wichtig fordern die AktivistInnen aber auch eine finanzielle Transferleistung europäischer an karibischen Staaten, denn deren strukturelle Verarmung sehen sie in erster Linie als Folgen der Sklaverei an. Die Bewältigung heutiger globaler Ungleichheiten dürfe somit nicht länger als eine ausschließliche Angelegenheit karibischer Gesellschaften, sondern als integraler Bestandteil europäischer Entwicklungspfade und Verantwortung für geteilte Geschichten betrachtet werden.

Die Relevanz der karibischen Agenda für Reparationen liegt genau darin, dass sie auf eine überfällige Auseinandersetzung mit Sklaverei und Kolonialismus nicht nur in der Karibik, sondern gerade in Europa drängt. Die politische Dringlichkeit ist den letzten Jahren offensichtlich geworden und für die Forschung ergeben sich neue Möglichkeiten das Feld der Aufarbeitung und Wiedergutmachung von historischem Unrecht durch einen Einschluss kolonial-rassistischen Unrechts stärker zu historisieren und um regionale Perspektiven zu erweitern. Ein Fokus auf Jamaika und die Karibik zeigt einerseits, dass Aktivismus für Reparationen für die Sklaverei kein singuläres nationales Phänomen und insbesondere nicht ausschließlich auf die USA beschränkt ist, und andererseits die Relevanz der Karibik für globalgeschichtliche Entwicklungen und erinnerungs- und geschichtspolitische Fragen des Umgangs mit historischer Verantwortung.

REZENSIONEN

Magaly Rodríguez García / Elise van Nederveen Meerkerk / Lex Heerma van Voss (eds.): *Selling Sex in the City. A Global History of Prostitution, 1600's–2000's*, Leiden: Brill 2017, 891pp.

Reviewed by
Ruth Ennis, Leipzig

According to common wisdom (in the West), prostitution is known to be the oldest trade in the world. The four hundred years of policies, attitudes, and practices captured in “*Selling Sex in the City*” tell us, however, that if not untrue, such a statement is at least highly oversimplified and Eurocentric depending on where and when one looks. Spanning the precolonial period up to the present day, this book explores how European colonial expansion, urbanisation, and globalisation have changed, introduced, and/or influenced the regulation and practice of prostitution around the world. It too looks at how the labour market of sex work has been moulded by migration and war as well as political, social, and technological revolutions.

The editors Rodríguez García, van Nederveen Meerkerk, and van Voss have brought together a mighty band of historians to grapple with this complex subject matter, which has long been medically and morally contended. They take on these multifaceted debates across the books two parts, consisting of twenty-three urban overviews and eight thematic papers. Guided by the same set of questions, each overview hones in on a specific town or city to explore the perceptions of varying actors, the profiles of prostitutes, the cultures in which they were embedded as well as the policies, structures, and social attitudes which affected their lives (p. 2). The thematic contributions then engage the reader in a conversation by weaving in and out of the preceding chapters, highlighting the common threads as well as underlining the exceptions. All the while light is collectively brought to matters of definition, historiography, and historical contextualisation. As a whole, the project addresses the sale of sex across world regions with constant reflection upon broader entanglements in global history. The editors nevertheless note that the lack of sources for certain periods and spatial contexts has led to unavoidable underrepresentation. Likewise, several authors are careful to point out that even when an abundance of sources are available, there is need for critical re-

flection upon colonial and police records, judicial files as well as media, medical, missionary, and philanthropic reports. As these are often steeped in moral prejudice and institutional bias. The voices of sex workers themselves were seldom to be heard and descriptions of them being predominately limited to either “victim” or “criminal” which has contributed to the prevailing stereotype of the young, naïve, uneducated, migrant woman (see Maja Mechant’s chapter on “The Social Profiles of Prostitutes”, p. 833).

“Prostitution” is often a-historically assumed to have always existed, yet as we learn from several chapters, that the concept only first emerged in European languages in the 17th and 18th centuries.¹ Much of how we currently perceive prostitution has been historically framed by the regulation systems which were transferred around Europe, the New World, and subsequently the colonies via 19th-century imperial and colonial projects. Lumped in together under the imported category, the Yuroban wife who took a lover, as well as entertainers, dancers, concubines, and courtesans from Shanghai to Cairo all came to be known as “prostitution” through the colonial gaze.²

These pages capture the global transfer of regulated prostitution, while at the same time they show the unevenness of its implementation and the reactions towards it. Regulationists of the 19th and early 20th centuries had typically viewed prostitution as a “necessary evil” and the prostitute as a genetically predisposed “deviant woman” in need of state control. The so-called “French System”, which made its way throughout the Napoleonic Empire, as well as to the US and Britain in

the 1860s, was not intended to dispense of prostitution, but to monitor behaviour, protect state/military actors whilst curbing the spread of venereal disease.³ Whereas comparable systems of regulation in the Ottoman Empire were left largely unchallenged, the abolitionism of Western Europe which rose at the end of the 19th century contended such state practices and the idea of a pathological prostitute. Taking up descriptions of “fallen victims”, tricked, trafficked, and trapped into registered brothels, *Selling Sex in the City* explores these debates which still bear significance on how we talk about prostitution today.

A long entangled history stemmed from the emerging “white slavery” discourses of the 1880s, bringing about western dominated political and academic discourses regarding sex worker’s rights and human trafficking in the 1990s. Described by several authors and brilliantly articulated by Mark David Wyers (“*Selling Sex in Istanbul*”), dualistic notions of voluntarism and coercion in Europe and the United States began to pitch the sex worker against the trafficking victim, all the while the actions in the name of such discursive wars resembled neo-imperialism in post-colonial contexts.⁴ For those of us who are familiar with these debates of the past 30 years, *Selling Sex in City* is a toolkit to resolving some of what often felt like irresolvable dualisms around prostitution as work or as slavery. By combining a comparative historical approach with a global labour perspective, this book has managed to grasp the complexity of individual experiences while articulating the complicatedness of capturing them on a spectrum bracketed by the language of coercion and choice.

Whether perpetrated by the state or other third parties, both violence and abuse have long been a common aspect of sex worker's lives. These chapters nevertheless demonstrate how such oppressive conditions are not innate to the trade but rather the result of stigma and lack of legal protection. The historic tendency toward increased criminalisation, along with 100 years of anti-trafficking discourses and actions against "slavery" has generally resulted in the further harassment of women by authorities, rather than any increase in rights.⁵ While the editors are clear that this project does not view prostitution on a par with slavery, they point out that slavery has been examined from a global labour perspective for its historic function within economic systems.⁶ Thus convincingly justifying their examination of sex work as a labour activity irrespective of ones positioning in contentious contemporary debates. *Selling Sex in the City* gives new insights into how sex workers, like other historically stigmatised labourers, have navigated the fine lines of consent, coercion, and economic constraint.⁷ Addressing questions around work, legislation, migration, and prostitution, this book is a must-read for labour and legal historians, lawyers, and legislators, who are interested in the rights of sex workers and trafficking victims, as well as the conditions which affected them historically. It provides a densely rich and complex look at five hundred years of social, economic, and political entanglements that will fascinate global and world historians, as well as those interested in colonial, urban, and migration history. In providing novel approaches to understanding the contested theories and practices around sold sex, *Selling Sex in*

the City is an essential, even if very large, handbook for activists and political actors engaged in debates around sex work and human trafficking.

Notes

- 1 See the chapters of Mechant, *The Social Profiles of Prostitutes*, and M. Turno, *Sex for Sale in Florence*.
- 2 See S. Gronewold, *Prostitution in Shanghai*, pp. 567–593; H. Hammad/E. Biancani, *Prostitution in Cairo*; M. Umoren Ekpoottu, *Sexualizing the City: Female Prostitution in Nigeria's Urban Centres in a Historical Perspective*, pp. 306–328.
- 3 Mechant, *The Social Profiles of Prostitutes*, p. 67; E. Van Nederveen Meerkerk/M. Rodríguez García/L. H. Van Voss, *Sex Sold in World Cities, 1600s–2000s. Some Conclusions to the Project*, p. 871.
- 4 Umoren Ekpoottu, *Sexualizing the City: Female Prostitution in Nigeria's Urban Centres in a Historical Perspective*, p. 314; Van Nederveen Meerkerk/Rodríguez García/Van Voss, *Sex Sold in World Cities, 1600s–2000s. Some Conclusions to the Project*, p. 872.
- 5 M. D. Wyers, *Selling Sex in Istanbul*, pp. 791–792.
- 6 Van Nederveen Meerkerk/Rodríguez García/Van Voss, *Sex Sold in World Cities, 1600s–2000s. Some Conclusions to the Project*, p. 875.
- 7 Rodríguez García/Van Nederveen Meerkerk/Van Voss, *Selling Sex in World Cities, 1600s–2000s: An Introduction*, pp. 14–17.

Leos Müller: *Neutrality in World History (Themes in World History)*, London: Routledge 2019, 178 p.

Reviewed by Frederik Dhondt (Antwerp/Gent)

Leos Müller's book attempts to provide a conceptual overview of neutrality "in

world history”, linking maritime history and international law with the history of empire and global history. Müller conventionally situates the “birth of maritime neutrality” in the early modern era (pp. 18–42), sees its maturity in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries (pp. 43–83) and its widespread practice and legal codification in the nineteenth century (pp. 84–123), to end with its decline from the League of Nations to the present day (pp. 124–164). Müller clearly indicates when and how morality and neutrality switch according to the political and economic circumstances, from the medieval negation of neutrality to neutrality’s demise in a system of collective security. His approach is pedagogical: the reader is presented with a clear and concise overview of a major theme in world history.

The concept of neutrality used by Müller is extremely large, encompassing ideology, domestic and international public opinion, economics, maritime interests, warfare, private and non-state actors and about all of foreign policy. References to classics in humanities and social sciences (Piketty, Morgenthau, Kissinger, Waltz) illustrate the intellectual and academic context. The author grants attention to the international circulation of ideas, e.g. in his treatment of Thomas Paine’s defence of the League of Armed Neutrality (pp. 74–75). The role of public opinion in representative systems is highlighted, e.g. when Sweden decided not to formally abandon neutrality in the Crimean War, under the Riksdag’s pressure (p. 167). The impact of neutral trade is made very concrete, e.g. when Danish shipping allowed to reduce the impact of famine in revolutionary France (p. 80), or when Germany’s aggres-

sive submarine campaign caused hunger in Sweden between 1916 and 1918 (p. 128). Specialists of regional or specific cases will experience the benefits of a deprovincialized, broader approach, which lives up to the de facto interlocking of maritime theatres as the Baltic, the Atlantic and the Mediterranean, or of the extra-European implications of grand strategy from the seventeenth century on.

The author’s outlook was initially maritime and economical. This sometimes generates discomfort, when the old and debunked cliché of a ‘Second Hundred Years’ War’ between France and Britain (1688–1815) is used. Political science terminology, such as the “Westphalian system”, is unhelpful to understand the evolution of international law. The links with humanitarianism and pacifism are rendered explicit. This is of course wholly justified, but potentialities and actual results could have been better distinguished. When the neutralisation of the Congo Basin is cited as, as a symbolical export of Belgium’s own status to Africa (p. 7), it might be useful to add that this did not prevent Congo from being dragged into the African theatre in World War One. Moreover, the guarantee given by the Great Powers to Belgian independence in 1831 did not extend to the Congo Free State. At its absorption as a colony in 1909, Britain protested, and argued that its guarantee could only cover Belgian territory as agreed to in the 1839 Treaty of London.¹ One might be sceptical with regards to the utterance that ‘neutral Belgium guaranteed equal rights of access to all the engaged, even small, European states’ (p. 86). Congo would only become a Belgian colony in 1909. Leopold II, as head of state in the Congo Free State,

sabotaged the free trade-system to the advantage of a concession-system, whereby he only granted access to specific foreign corporations.

The broad approach leads to confusion, e.g. when it is stated that Alberico Gentili would have rejected neutrality (p. 35). The overview of the period 1500–1650 might have benefitted from scholarship by legal historians.² Eric Schnakenbourg's standard work ought to have been mentioned.³ A similar vagueness is felt in the development of permanent neutrality in chapter 4 (pp. 84–123).⁴ The early modern origins of neutrality explain why the author uses voluntary neutrality (p. 115) for states with a classical neutrality policy (which falls under the classical set of neutral rights and obligations in case of war). He contrasts this with 'neutralised' states. However, the variety in "neutralised" states and areas is such that further diversification would have been useful. Could one equate the status of the Ionian Islands, the Suez Canal and Belgium (p. 94)? Remarkably, the neutralisation of Chablais and Faucigny, or the failed permanent neutrality of Cracow (annexation by Austria in 1846) are not mentioned in an otherwise rather detailed overview. Is it really accurate to state that "from the point of view of international law, the status of neutralised territories or that of neutrals (long-term voluntary or occasional) is similar", and that the difference would boil down to ideology? (ibid.). Finally, the treatment of the Swiss conception of "super-neutrality" in the final chapter is described as 'legally binding', this is not explained further (p. 160).

The book often reads as a general introduction to the history of international

relations. This constitutes an achievement in so little space. There are barely any footnotes, and the author solely has to rely on the corpus to simultaneously expound developments in several geographic zones. The sections on Sweden-Norway, Denmark, and Finland were very clear and instructive. The treatment of the "new" neutral countries Ireland, Austria, and Finland after 1945 is insightful (pp. 148–149). By contrast, the discussion of the non-aligned movement (pp. 153–159) is too general. At some occasions, the synthesis appears outdated, e.g. for the US's entry into the Great War (p. 129).⁵ Integration the novel and original work of Beatrice De Graaf on the occupation of France after 1815 stresses that France, which was militarily occupied for three years, did pay compensations to states and even private individuals.⁶ This does not correspond with the stark contrast drawn between 1815 and 1919 (p. 131). It comes across as strange to state that the United Kingdom of the Netherlands (1814–1830) was a neutralised state (p. 92). It would have been more correct to point out that the Wellington Barrier had been built by the allies on the new state's territory, but that the United Kingdom of the Netherlands was not under an externally-imposed obligation of permanent neutrality. Only Belgium, which seceded in 1830–1831, was a permanently neutral state under the collective guarantee of the Great Powers. Likewise, recent scholarship makes it necessary to adapt the terminology used to describe the Versailles settlement (pp. 131–132).⁷

It is of course inevitable that such an ambitious work contains confusing or contradictory passages. This is for instance the case for the treatment of Belgian perma-

nent neutrality. On page 118, it is stated that the Fifth Hague Convention of 1907 imposed a duty on neutral powers to defend themselves in case of aggression. It is further explained that this constituted 'a departure from the concept of pure neutralization, which put the responsibility for upholding neutrality in the hands of the guaranteeing great powers. This is certainly not correct for the Belgian case. Permanent neutrality was always read as including the duty to credibly defend oneself. The guarantors' pledge to support Belgian independence and territorial integrity was subsidiary, and conditional on the neutralised state's own credible military effort. This was forcefully argued in the *Essai sur la neutralité de la Belgique*, written by Wilhelm Arendt at the request of King Leopold I (1845).⁸ The country's defence system was furthermore the object of intense debate. The Wellington Barrier was dismantled in 1859. This did not mean that Belgium would lapse into a pacigérat integral (a term designating a neutralised state having renounced to its right of self-defence).⁹ The Hague Conventions did not constitute an innovation from that point of view.

The author's task was gargantuan, as the law of neutrality (which is considered here as but one of many aspects of the problem) was in a state of constant flux, and the subject of a rich and subtle literature, which is hard to summarise for the lay audience addressed by the book series. To paraphrase the Swedish diplomat Richard Kleen, in his two-volume work dedicated to neutrality in 1898: "Dans nul autre domaine, les opinions ne sont aussi diverses, les principes moins clairs, le désaccord plus evident."¹⁰ Leos Müller's book offers

a solid introduction to the reader desiring to "visit [...] a new, unknown big city", as the author states.

Notes

- 1 See the special issue of *Journal of Belgian History* 48 (2018), "Congo at War(s)", ed. by E. Ngongo/B. Piret/N. Tousignant", ###
- 2 L. Benton, *A Search for Sovereignty. Law and Geography in European Empires, 1400–1900*, Cambridge 2010.
- 3 E. Schnakenbourg, *Entre la guerre et la paix. Neutralité et relations internationales, XVIIe–XVIIIe siècles*, Rennes 2013.
- 4 G. A. Frei, *Great Britain, International Law and Maritime Strategy, 1856–1914*, Oxford 2020.
- 5 J. Doenecke, *Nothing Less Than War: A New History of America's Entry into World War I*, Lexington 2014.
- 6 B. De Graaf, *Tegen de terreur. Hoe Europa veilig werd, 1815–1820*, Oxford 2018.
- 7 S. Pedersen, *The Guardians. The League of Nations and the Crisis of Empire*, Oxford 2015; L. V. Smith, *Sovereignty at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919*, Oxford 2018.
- 8 H. Lademacher, *Die belgische Neutralität als Problem der europäischen Politik 1830–1914*, Bonn 1971.
- 9 E. Descamps, *La neutralité de la Belgique au point de vue historique, diplomatique, juridique et politique. Étude sur la constitution des États pacifiques à titre permanent*, Bruxelles 1902.
- 10 R. Kleen, *Lois et usages de la neutralité d'après le droit international conventionnel et coutumier des états civilisés*, Paris, 1898, t. 1, p. VIII.

Megan Maruschke: Portals of Globalization. Repositioning Mumbai's Ports and Zones, 1833–2014 (= Dialectics of the Global, vol. 2), Berlin/Boston: De Gruyter Oldenbourg 2019, 253 p.

Reviewed by
Hugo Silveira Pereira, Lisbon

Global History is currently one of the most prolific fields of academic historical analysis, focusing on the establishment of transnational flows and the linkages between specific regions (countries, provinces, cities) and global frameworks. A key concept in the field is portals of globalization, theorized by Matthias Middell and Katja Nauman,¹ and applied by different researchers in different chronological and geographical contexts.²

Megan Maruschke's new book, "Portals of Globalization. Repositioning Mumbai's Ports and Zones, 1833–2014", is yet another proficient application of the concept. The work, which is a rewriting of the author's PhD dissertation in Global Studies (University of Leipzig), is divided in six chapters (besides introduction and conclusion) that analyse the role of the ports and trade zones of Mumbai since the colonial period to the present. As the author mentions, the book's perspective is historical and therefore it relies heavily on primary sources gathered in the United Kingdom and in India. The use of non-European archives is refreshing, as it allows readers to hear the voices of the Global South, which

are usually muted in historical analysis. However, some paragraphs do not indicate the source of information (for instance on p. 81, 84, and 179). In general terms, the book is easy to read, with short chapters and an accessible language, even though in some parts the proliferation of abbreviations renders the reading a tad more hermetic. Some may argue that the narrative is too descriptive, however, as an historical analysis, it must provide a description of the events in order to analyse them critically. One thing I missed was maps. I believe they would help readers to locate more precisely the event depicted in the narrative. Also, the inclusion of a glossary of the main terms used in the text (especially some of those listed in the abbreviations, p. XI–XII) would also be welcome.

Regardless, the academic quality of this book is evident and unsurprising, considering the excellence of the host conditions of Maruschke's research and her own previous experience with portals of globalization.³ I especially enjoyed the long-durée approach applied to a specific region of India. The analysis covers the period between the British Raj and present-day India (including the independence, the Cold War, the non-aligned movement, and late twentieth century resurgence of liberal policies). Maybe I missed something, but I could not understand the gap between the 1880s and the 1940s, which is not analysed.

Nonetheless, this approach allows testing the limits of the concept of portals of globalization. Usually, similar analysis focuses on one portal in a narrow time span. Maruschke's approach illustrates the flexibility of the concept. She shows how infrastructures with numerous roles (imperial, global, local, commercial, naval, military),

as is the case of Mumbai ports and trade zones, functioning as portals of globalization, served different goals and agendas and adapted to political, economic, and diplomatic circumstances without losing its global character.

In this sense, the book establishes different links with other analytical frameworks, bringing them to the debate on globalization and Global Studies. I was particularly interested in the relationship between State and private initiative and the frictions between different public and private agents who supposedly have opposing goals, in their attempts to control global flows. These feuds are a frequent subject in literature about portals of globalization (specifically in the resistances offered by the construction of Nation-States to the creation of global fluxes).

Maruschke illustrates this by describing the long-term contradictions between the need to territorialize India (both in the colonial era and after independence) and the necessity to globalize it. During the British Raj, she analyses the disputes between the government of India, the Bombay Presidency, and the many private companies that operated docks in Bombay. After independence, the author describes the interaction between the government of India and private companies in Export Processing Zones and Free Trade Zones: purportedly, these areas should promote globalization and some loss of sovereignty, but the State used them to enhance territorialisation, provide some protection to the remainder Indian economy, and control companies that operated locally, which, on their side, fought to protect their own interests and to promote new fluxes, unforeseen by the central State.

However, the relationship between private and public sectors was not always quarrelsome and this is one of the most interesting findings of the book. Frequently, private and public agents realize they could not operate alone and need the cooperation of the other, and therefore they establish a symbiotic relationship (often under the form of public-private partnerships). A good example is given on pp. 146–147, when India sought to promote a more liberal economic policy to foster globalization, but with a strong presence of the State, by building new infrastructures and by favouring national companies as privileged agents of globalization. This adds to the literature about public-private partnerships⁴ and hints at the debate on how the perspective of increasing profits or achieving given goals motivates or even forces State and private companies to work together.

A fascinating corollary of the previous discussion is how the search for globalization and the means to create global flows were inserted in diplomatic strategies (for instance to favour trade with Japan in detriment of China, as mentioned on p. 160). The role of the State here is clear. It followed a diplomatic strategy to stimulate commerce with neighbouring regions and global flows through Mumbai and through Indian agents living abroad. Nevertheless, the importance of private agents in the management of foreign investments and in the establishment of connections with other markets (especially during the Cold War) is irrefutable. This provides yet another example for the literature on track-two diplomacy,⁵ which highlights the role of non-governmental agents that act unofficially as go-betweens for different governments.

Associated with the previous research topic, Maruschke presents a very interesting new concept, transregionalism, referring to those relations between different regions of different countries that do not completely fit in the classic divisions of transnational or international. Historians often look at nations as homogeneous monoliths, when some of its areas have completely different behaviours. In this sense, this new concept proves to be very useful.

Naturally, globalizing phenomena are also present in the analysis. It is interesting to note how Mumbai ports promoted more global fluxes other than those associated with trade. I was especially captivated by the globalization of practices and experts, specifically those associated with port management, which fall upon the literature of knowledge transfer. But the globalization of agents, finance, and diplomats (those that worked in organizations under the umbrella of the UN) is also mentioned throughout the book.

Some important issues related with History of Technology are also briefly addressed in this work. I understand that this was not the focus of the author, but I was quite intrigued about the frictions between global and local agents in different stages of technological development (for instance, on p. 70, how the development of the harbour was made to shun away native vessels). Another subject I found interesting was the association between globalism and modernity/progress (pp. 191–195) and I wondered about the role played by technology in those representations of a modern city. To conclude, this book makes a very interesting analysis of the evolution of ports and trade zones around Mumbai in a period of over a century. Megan Maruschke

uses efficiently the concept of portals of globalization, and she also adds new features to it. Therefore, this work can be a methodological source for new papers on global studies. Several aspects mentioned throughout the narrative deserved a deeper approach. Understandably, it is impossible to cover them all in the limits of a book that results of a PhD project. However, this book paves the way for further analyses by different concepts and fields within the larger scope of Global History or History of Globalization.

Notes

- 1 M. Middell/K. Naumann, *Global History and the Spatial Turn: From the Impact of Area Studies to the Study of Critical Junctures of Globalization*, in: *Journal of Global History* 5 (2010), pp. 149–70, p. 162.
- 2 For a summary of works that use the concept, see H. S. Pereira, *Railways as Portals of Globalisation: The Case of the Portuguese Mainland and Colonial Rail Networks (1850–1915)*, in: *Comparativ. Zeitschrift für Globalgeschichte und vergleichende Gesellschaftsforschung* 28 (2018), pp. 121–138, pp. 122–123.
- 3 M. Maruschke, *Zones of Reterritorialization: India's Free Trade Zones in Comparative Perspective, 1947 to the 1980s*, in: *Journal of Global History* 12 (2017), pp. 410–432.
- 4 See, for instance: R. C. Marques, *Regulation by contract: Overseeing PPPs*, in: *Utilities Policy* 50 (2018), pp. 211–214.
- 5 J. W. McDonald Jr./D. B. Bendahmane (eds.), *Conflict Resolution: Track Two Diplomacy*, Washington 1987.

Matthias Middell (ed.): The Practice of Global History. European Perspectives, London: Bloomsbury 2019, 215 p.

Reviewed by
Carolyn Liebisch-Gümüß, Washington

Over the last 15 years, the Leipzig-based European Network in Universal and Global History (ENIUGH) has established itself as the main organization for bringing together global historians throughout Europe and connecting them with colleagues from other world regions. This book provides a forum for current debates in the field and innovative findings from the 2014 ENIUGH congress. Unlike its title may suggest, it is not an introduction to doing global history. Instead, it offers a range of thematically distinct essays from different subfields like cultural transfer studies or global economic history. This makes it a stimulating read for both insiders and everyone who wants to gain an impression of up-to-date trends in global history. What sets the volume's approach apart from the similar undertaking "Global History, Globally",¹ is its explicit focus on research in Europe. Gathering nine scholars from Paris as well as Amsterdam, Budapest, Exeter, and Ghent, Matthias Middell's aim is to inspire debates about "the European character of certain approaches in global history" (p. 19).

The opening essay by Michel Espagne makes a strong case for increased mutual awareness between the linguistically dif-

ferent academic communities in Europe and beyond. Why do German global historians pay considerably more attention to their Anglo-American colleagues than to their French neighbours? Why do global historians all too often write about certain regions without assessing vernacular texts? And how come they talk so much about Eurocentrism and still largely fail to acknowledge researchers from non-Western places as partners in their projects and discussions? To Espagne, knowledge of different languages is crucial to overcome these hurdles whereas a simple retreat to universal English would limit our sources, undercut the potentials of multilingual conceptual history, and obstruct access to distinct historiographic traditions. We might end up with increased uniformity where we could have achieved multi-perspectivity. However, Espagne's appeal must not be mistaken for particularism. For his essay encourages historians to explore cultural transfers crisscrossing the historical map of Europe and thus promotes a radically transregional view on the ways any "European space" (p. 37) and its cultural-national units were created in the first place. Upholding the value of language skills and regional specialization, Espagne's essay could also stimulate reflection on how both could be incorporated more systematically in the training of young scholars and the M.A. programs in global history. Despite the diversity of the contributions, at least two themes stand out for being addressed repeatedly throughout the volume: First, most authors focus on new trends in global economic and social history. Second, several essays track the still unfinished shift away from Western centric historical narratives about Western Europe's

neighbouring areas like Africa (Cocquery-Vidrovitch and Espagne) or Russia. Turning towards the former Eastern bloc, James Mark and Tobias Rupprecht dismiss older accounts that portrayed socialist countries as mere bystanders to a triumphing capitalist globalization. Grounded on a rich research survey, they argue convincingly in favour of moments of co-globalization as well as the legacies of alternative, “Socialist globalization” (p. 91). Alessandro Stanziani explains how looking at Russian economic history in the narrow terms of backwardness fails to see the long-lived compatibility of economic expansion and socio-political inequality. In our present times, where beliefs about capitalism and liberalism as quasi natural allies have become doubtful, narratives about illiberal forms of world economic inclusion as suggested by Mark, Rupprecht, and Stanziani obviously have much to offer. Marcel van der Linden and Atilla Melegh underline the ways a global view on labour has changed somewhat outdated paradigms in European historiography. In the spirit of a truly decentred global history, Van der Linden highlights that studies about labour history in e.g. Western Africa or India revitalized European labour history by revealing the narrowness of Weberian/Marxist concepts of classic wage labour. Melegh shows how the history of (labour) migration gave new impetus to the history of demographics which started to shift focus away from national family planning to migration-related factors. The resulting political conflicts that Melegh mentions, between post-migration-minded experts and nationalist voices, might themselves

make an interesting subject for historization.²

The individual essays in the volume certainly make important contributions to their respective subfields and to global history in general. However, they do not rely on any common analytical framework. Neither Espagne nor the others respond directly to the question about “Europeanness.” Nor is there a mosaic-like effect, in the sense that the single contributions would add up before the reader and reveal the contours of what could be European idiosyncrasies. The collection’s miscellaneousness thus appears somewhat random, but it undoubtedly gives a good impression of the methodological variety within the field. This includes such unusual approaches like combining the study of cultural transfer with quantitative data (Charle) or advocating regional approaches to the very large-scale debate on the so-called Great Divergence (Vanhaute). Needless to say, the field’s ample innovativeness cannot be grasped within eight articles. Further volumes envisaged by the editor might include domains that have received little attention here like global microhistory, global trends in gender history, or research on international organizations, to name but three. This would also be an important chance to give more visibility than in the present volume to the numerous female experts out there.³

In the end the question remains: What is distinct about the way global history is practiced and conceptualized in Europe? Perhaps the problem here is not so much the lack of answers and, as a result, of overall coherency, but the question itself. As the editor himself stresses, diversity within

Europe and connectivity beyond Europe are the most defining characteristic of the field. A glance at the footnotes in the volume is enough to prove the transcontinental – though predominantly transatlantic – dimension of ongoing debates. The extent to which European global historians build on long-distance intellectual transfer probably outweighs regional trends, as we also read in “Global History, Globally”.⁴ In light of this consensus, the endeavour to ascertain the European character of our approaches actually feels like a step back behind the bigger endeavour to challenge Eurocentrism in both our perspectives on the past and our present research practices. After all, it might be more productive to simply encourage a more multi-sided exchange between global historians. The volume makes a valuable contribution in this direction, and as the subsequent 2017 ENIUGH congress has seen participants from not only broader Europe but also from e.g. Gabon, Hong Kong, Israel, Pakistan, and Senegal, there are yet plenty more perspectives to explore.

Notes

- 1 S. Beckert/D. Sachsenmaier (eds.), *Global History, Globally. Research and Practice around the World*, London 2018.
- 2 With regard to Germany, one might think of the infamous „Kinder statt Inder“ dispute instigated by a CDU politician in 2000 as a relevant moment in such a cultural history of post-migrant demographic discourses.
- 3 Recently, Margrit Pernau spoke of global history as “still very much a boys’ network.” M. Pernau, *A Field in Search of Its Identity. Recent Introductions to Global History*, in: *Yearbook of Transnational History* 1 (2018), pp. 217–228, 226.
- 4 G. Austin, *Global History in (Northwestern) Europe. Explorations and Debates*,

in: Beckert/Sachsenmaier (ed.), *Global History*, pp. 21–44, 21.

The Oxford Illustrated History of the World, ed. by Felipe Fernández-Armesto, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2019, 481 p.

Reviewed by
Matthias Middell, Leipzig

When a renowned academic publisher such as Oxford University Press gathers well-known (mainly British and American) historians to write an illustrated history of the whole world, one can expect a cross between the highest erudition, light and metaphorical language and opulent visualization – and this is exactly what this volume delivers, which wants to be and indeed is a coffee table book and a serious intervention in an ongoing historiographical debate at the same time. The editor, who has proven a sense of world-historical curiosity from his earlier work on explorations across the Mediterranean and the Atlantic to his more recent Hispanic history of the USA, burns a firework of popular and amusing explanations right at the beginning, of what world history actually is, of what diversity of perspectives means for the desire for objective knowledge, of what distinguishes humankind from other species on earth (cultural diversity in constant change, among other things with the nice distinction between different lifeways and foodways) and how something like a trend

towards global convergence could nevertheless emerge.

Without using the category of dialectics, large narrative patterns are laid out in opposite directions and run through the volume as a kind of internal order, which nevertheless leaves each of the 11 authors (with Anjana Singh as the only female historians among them) room for manoeuvre for original presentation and interpretation. Divergence is narrated as a result of different adaptations to changing environmental conditions and led to the division into sedentary and nomadic, farmer and hunter, city-builder and tent dweller with all their many sub-variants. Convergence, on the other hand, comes more and more to the fore from Part 4 (i.e. from about the middle of the 14th century in the chronologically structured volume), with trade and transport between settlement areas, with contact, discovery, expansion and learning from others. While for a long-time divergence not only prevailed, but also increased, convergence – according to an assumption shared by all authors but heavily controversial with regard to dating – came to the fore at some point. Fernández-Armesto calls this convergence “globalization”, but at the same time makes it clear that it did not prevail at the expense of divergence and did not make it disappear, but merely overshadowed the trend towards divergence, so that the latter became less visible and has less impacted our historical consciousness. The fact that the dominant and hegemonic (primarily Anglo-Saxon) “West” had an outstanding function in globalizing the world connects the final vanishing point of this volume with the mainstream of the World History movement that has been expanding

since 1990. Jeremy Black has no easy task, when having the task in the final chapter to reduce the diversity of historical events since the Second World War to this one denominator.

The originality of this volume, however, lies elsewhere, namely in the conversation offered to climate and biodiversity researchers, which is not limited to discussing the man-made effects on the warming of the atmosphere over the last two centuries, but rather places the human-nature interaction in a longer perspective. David Christian provides a history of the Anthropocene, which he roughly dates to the last two centuries and clearly distinguishes from the Holocene. He reminds us that humankind’s mastery of nature is not so far off, no matter how powerful the diversion of rivers or the harvesting of energy with huge solar collector fields may feel. He points out that humanity is still unable to prevent earthquakes or predict pandemics. It’s as if he had already seen the helplessness before the Covid-19 virus rise when writing this chapter several years ago. The giant leap in population growth, rise in life expectancy, energy consumption and the volume of trade between the world’s regions since 1800 (which only in the second half of the 20th century had a visible impact across the globe) can only be explained by a huge step in innovation, which, while it is a general feature of human history (and rooted in the ability to transmit innovation through language over long distances and over several generations), has only had such enormous consequences at long intervals (such as the transition to agriculture 10–12,000 years ago and the use of fossil fuels in the 19th century). Christian refers to the enormous

adaptation efforts that succeeded in the wake of the agricultural revolution, but leaves open whether something like this is to be expected after global warming gets eventually out of control in the near future.

The last two continuous thematic threads of this illustrated world history concern “morality” and “initiative”, a peculiarly bashful formulation for the exercise of power and its legitimation. References to scandalous inequalities within or between societies and the justification of selfishness in destroying the livelihoods of others as well as humankind as a whole are not withheld from the reader. However, this is done from a peculiarly distanced perspective, which views humanity as an insect crawling irrationally through the landscape – just as the introductory metaphor of the galactic view of the Earth suggests, which feeds the illusion of objective observation. The text reads like an invitation to a kind of philanthropic engagement with this world and who would seriously decline such an invitation that something has to change here – after all, it is part of the basic equipment of the liberal promise of a better world for the future. However, the alternatives to capitalism and democracy have now disappeared from this world of the future. And this despite the fact that the attractiveness of capitalism is also dwindling in parallel with the hegemony of the West. Thus, the reader is left somewhat perplexed. The world continues to turn, inequality will probably continue to exist and the “Initiative” will return to China in the foreseeable future, where it had been for the greater part of historical development anyway. In such a way, the educated citizen who has worked

his way through this beautifully illustrated volume, even with the prospect of a manageable future, puts the work aside at the end and senses the limitations of his own possibilities to change the course of things.

**Thomas DaCosta Kaufmann /
Catherine Dossin / Béatrice Joyeux-
Prunel (eds.): *Circulations in the
Global History of Art (= Studies in Art
Historiography)*, Farnham: Ashgate
2015, 247 p.**

Reviewed by
Beáta Hock, Leipzig

It is a peculiar task to review an edited volume that not only has two or three contributions, on top of an Introduction “proper”, that might qualify as further sections of the book’s general introduction but that also contains an elaborate and extensive review (admittedly a critique) of its own as Afterword. It both appears a tempting and sound choice to enter in dialogue with this built-in critical assessment in the commentary below.

The Afterword is authored by James Elkins whose keen intellect and sharp, albeit occasionally arrogant, reasoning the present reviewer greatly values. This time, however, a peculiar epistemological shortsightedness seems to prevent him from crediting the goals and achievements garnered in “*Circulations in the Global History of Art*”. Elkins self-consciously talks as a representative of the North Atlantic – and in his eyes,

supreme – academic community and reads the texts collected in this book through the lens of his own inquiry into Global Art History.¹ Hence, his chief concern pertains to commensurability: whether a middle ground is possible between what he sees as two irreconcilable enterprises. These are the universalizing claims and other canonical certainties of modernist art history on the one hand and, on the other, extreme cultural relativism: a supposedly inevitable attendant of an approach that gives preference to localized, rooted cultures. Elkins doubts the methodological usefulness of the concept of “circulations” in finding this middle ground.

Quite conversely, the editors – themselves initiators of the Artl@s project digitally mapping art and literary history, and/or speakers at the conference from which the present collection of essays emerged – are convinced that thinking of circulations, rather than influences and diffusion, seems to be the only successful move towards a truly transnational narrative. Their project not only hinges on foregrounding transcultural encounters and exchanges as circulations but also on studying circulations in a historical materialist perspective. This materialist outlook is different from an “idealist” approach in that the latter equates the subject of art history with images, styles, and texts about these, whereas the materialist angle also reckons with the materiality of objects and images, the artist as embodied historical actor, as well as the various conditions in which circulations occur. This view incorporates a central insight of the Spatial Turn, the acknowledgment that “space matters”: where things happen is critical to knowing *how* and *why* they happen,² where the “why” and “how”

also imply factors that might pose *limitations* to interconnections between different parts of the world.

The traditional art historical narrative, dominated by a temporal/chronological viewpoint, usually falls back on categories like backwardness and belatedness to explain such limitations and the resulting historical alterity. Reinserting space helps recover the agency, projects and resources of historical actors, and this is exactly the ambition of this compilation: to bring in the so far unknown experience of art history’s various “Others”.

At the same time, this is an aspiration that James Elkins fails to comprehend or appreciate. It is hard for him to consent to the vista that when art history is opened up to account for non-European cultures, the discipline will not only be quantitatively (geographically) expanded, but it will qualitatively change as well (its preoccupations and key terms will have to be renegotiated) – “*and it will still be art history*”. Once it is understood that global interaction is inescapable and results in hybridity and “*métissage*”, which renders envisioning pure contexts no longer tenable, it is a tiny next step to accept that the dissolution of boundaries does not only affect the objects of art history (individual cultures, artistic genres, etc.) but the very study field, too.

A second accomplishment of the editors’ extraordinarily rich Introduction is an extended excursus about the older origins of thinking transnationally as opposed to within national containers, and this discussion embeds recent developments of art historiography within the broader discipline of history.

The first discussion chapter, authored by Thomas DaCosta Kaufmann reads as an-

other possible introduction for it critically reviews a set of concepts and theories related to the enterprise of writing world art history. Kaufmann also demonstrates that, at least for the period before 1800, the colonial pattern now commonly used to describe relations between dominating Europeans and the “foreign” cultures they encountered in Asia or Africa needs to be reversed, or at least Europeans need to be recognized as having been mere mediators between continents.

Monica Juneja’s essay might similarly aspire for the status of another introduction inasmuch as it addresses further crucial issues which the editors’s Introduction only passingly mentioned. Prioritizing materialist historicism and operating with the concept of circulations – which in Juneja’s case becomes transculturation – may lead to the notion of art becoming relativized: it might turn out that art has not always been a factor common to human societies, has not been produced everywhere, or if it was produced, it has not been necessarily perceived as such for it did not constitute a separate domain of social practice.

Michel Espagne’s take on the globalization of art history seems to be diametrically opposed to Juneja’s stance when he claims that the integration of art from outside Europe into art history was bound up with the representation of art as a universal human activity, and that “a history of art that does not include this universal dimension is inconceivable” (p. 105).

Other contributions, which cannot all be referenced in the scope of a brief review like this, offer individual case studies while they too delve into questions of terminology and methodology. Carolyn Guile revisits early modern Europe’s easternmost

borderland, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and the extraordinary variety in architectural form, religious and ethnic makeup that the Commonwealth bred. In light of this complexity, Guile unmasks the limitations of period terms such as “gothic,” “renaissance,” or “baroque” for capturing the architectural landscape of borderlands.

On the contemporary end of the timescale the volume straddles, Sophie Cras remains within the North Atlantic art world to investigate attempts to decentre this domain. Taking the 1999 *Global Conceptualism-exhibition* (Queens Museum) as her starting point, the author exposes the peculiar limits of “internationalism” as contemplated from such an undisputed center as New York.

This collection of articles will be most appreciated by researchers whose work reflects the conviction that there exist no such thing as separate civilizations, cultures always encounter each other and interconnect. Consequently, what makes up culture and art is not stable and fixed, arising from one single source, but the result of a ceaseless transformation and adaptation of ideas. Many of this appreciative readership may turn out to come from “geographically and economically small part[s] of the world”,³ eager to flatten out the inherent hierarchies of art history. One ancillary shortcoming of the present volume is that its list of contributors does not mirror a comparable attempt at the extension and decentralisation of the international scholarly community: all but one contributors hold positions at prestigious North Atlantic universities.

Notes

- 1 J. Elkins (ed.), *Is Art History Global?*, London 2007, and J. Elkins/Z. Valiavicharska/A. Kim (eds.), *Art and Globalization*, University Park 2011, as well as Elkins's book project in-progress "The Impending Single History of Art: North Atlantic Art History and Its Alternatives", accessible online: http://www.jameselkins.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=251.
- 2 See B. Warf/S. Arias (eds.), *The Spatial Turn: Interdisciplinary Perspectives*, Abingdon 2009, p. 1.
- 3 This is how James Elkins refers to art historians working outside Western institutions in his Afterword, p. 210.

Greg Burgess: *The League of Nations and the Refugees from Nazi Germany*. James G. McDonald and Hitler's Victims, London et al.: Bloomsbury Academic 2016, 224 S.

Rezensiert von
Isabella Löhr, Osnabrück

Mit seinem Buch über den Hochkommissar für Flüchtlinge aus Deutschland des Völkerbunds, James G. McDonald, greift Burgess ein Thema auf, das in der historischen Forschung zuletzt viel Aufmerksamkeit erfahren hat. Im Kontext von großräumigen Flüchtlingskrisen und einer internationalen bzw. europäischen Gemeinschaft, die im Verlauf des 20. Jh.s und am Beginn des 21. Jh.s hierauf nur unzureichende Antworten formuliert hat, richtet sich das Interesse von Historikerinnen und Historikern vermehrt auf die Genese

von Flüchtlingsregimen, auf die Entstehung der Figur des modernen Flüchtlings und auf die wichtige Frage nach dem Verhältnis von staatlicher Souveränität, Völkerrecht und humanitären Interventionen. In diesem Kontext ist auch die Studie von Burgess situiert. Er untersucht die verhältnismäßig kurze Amtszeit von McDonald als Hochkommissar des Völkerbunds, die von Dezember 1933 bis Dezember 1935 dauerte. McDonald beendete sein Mandat mit einem fulminanten Rücktrittsbrief, der eine scharfsinnige Analyse der politischen Blockaden, der institutionellen Schwierigkeiten und der moralischen Herausforderungen lieferte, die eine effektive Einhegung der Fluchtursachen verhindern und dazu führten, dass jüdische und politische Flüchtlinge aus Deutschland keine hinreichende humanitäre oder völkerrechtliche Unterstützung erhielten. In der internationalen Presse sorgte der Brief für Furore. Auch wenn die Mehrzahl der von Burgess zitierten Pressestimmen den Rücktrittsbrief mehr oder weniger einhellig als Dokument rezipierten, das die eklatante Entrechtung der jüdischen Bevölkerung in NS-Deutschland eindeutig beim Namen nannte und direkte politische Reaktionen forderten, geschah genau das nicht. Warum das der Fall war und warum McDonald mit seinen Maßnahmen und Vorschlägen beim Völkerbund nicht durchkam, ist die Leitfrage des Buches. Die Studie basiert auf dem Nachlass von McDonald, der in den 2000er Jahren ediert wurde. In Kombination mit Archivmaterial von und über ihn, das in verschiedenen Archiven verstreut und entsprechend fragmentarisch ist, gelingt es Burgess, ein umfassendes und detailliertes Bild von McDonalds Amtszeit zu zeich-

nen. Die Studie geht chronologisch vor. Das erste Kapitel thematisiert die Flucht aus Deutschland ab 1933. Das Augenmerk liegt auf den Problemen der Flucht, die Burgess anhand der restriktiven Einwanderungspolitiken der nordamerikanischen sowie verschiedener west- und osteuropäischer Länder festmacht. Burgess zeichnet ein instruktives Bild, indem er die angespannte weltwirtschaftliche und politische Lage in Einwanderungspolitiken übersetzt, Zahlen mit Blick auf gewährte Visa und Einwanderungsquoten nennt und durch einen Vergleich mit russländischen und armenischen Flüchtlingen in den frühen 1920er Jahren die historische Spezifik herausarbeitet, die die Flucht aus Deutschland kennzeichnete. Das zweite Einführungskapitel setzt ebenfalls 1933 ein. Es skizziert die kontroversen Diskussionen im Völkerbund um die Frage, ob und mit welchen Instrumenten der antisemitischen Politik in Deutschland begegnet werden könnte, zeichnet die Diskussion in Rat und Versammlung des Völkerbunds nach, an deren Ende die Entscheidung für die Einsetzung eines Hochkommissars stand, und diskutiert die Rolle, die McDonald als Beobachter und Kommentator der Ereignisse vor Ort vor seiner offiziellen Ernennung einnahm. Die Gründe für die Nomination von McDonald bestanden in seinen guten Kontakten zu jüdischen philanthropischen Organisationen in den USA, seiner gesellschaftlichen und politischen Netzwerke als Vorsitzender der US-amerikanischen Foreign Policy Association und seiner guten Kenntnisse der Situation in Deutschland.

Die folgenden Kapitel geben ein detailliertes Bild von den Maßnahmen und Vorschlägen, die McDonald erarbeitete und

skizzieren, warum und an welchen Stellen er damit in den verschiedenen Regierungen, im Sekretariat des Völkerbunds, in den internationalen Foren des Völkerbunds und auf zivilgesellschaftlicher Ebene scheiterte. Burgess liefert eine Analyse, die auf einer intimen Kenntnis der Quellen beruht und die für den einen oder die andere Leserin aufschlussreiche und wertvolle Details bereithält. Dazu gehört der immer wieder durchgeführte Vergleich mit den russländischen und armenischen Flüchtlingen Anfang der 1920er Jahre. Die Frage nach dem Zuschnitt des Hochkommissariats, seinen Kompetenzen und Grenzen, der Anbindung an den Völkerbund und die Gründe für die Wahl von McDonald geben gute Einblicke in administrative Routinen, Denk- und Handlungsmuster, die im Sekretariat des Völkerbunds unter Joseph Avenol herrschten, der für eine konservative, die Spielräume des Sekretariats eher verengende und die Interessen der Ratsmächte fördernde Politik bekannt war. Die folgenden Kapitel über die Arbeit von McDonald in Lausanne, wo das Hochkommissariat zunächst angesiedelt wurde, um Unabhängigkeit und Distanz zum Völkerbund zu gewährleisten, und London, wohin es im Oktober 1934 übersiedelte, zeichnen ein komplexes Bild von den widerstreitenden Interessen, die McDonalds Arbeit rahmten. In den Kapiteln analysiert Burgess die verschiedenen Versuche McDonalds, einen Wechsel in den nationalen und internationalen Politiken zugunsten der Geflohenen zu erreichen. Dazu gehörten Gesprächsversuche mit Vertretern der NS-Regierung, misslungene Versuche eine stabile Finanzierung für humanitäre Hilfe auf die Beine zu stellen, das Ausloten, ob die Geflohenen in West-

europa oder in Lateinamerika angesiedelt werden könnten, Gespräche mit nationalen Regierungsbeamten, die zumeist ohne handfeste Ergebnisse blieben, und die heikle Frage nach Nähe und Distanz zu jüdischen Interessengruppen und zum Thema Zionismus.

All das liest sich gut, was Burgess Anliegen geschuldet ist, eine „narrative history of the League of Nations, James McDonald and the High Commission for the Refugees from Germany“ zu schreiben, deren Fokus auf den Wahrnehmungen und Handlungsmöglichkeiten der historischen Akteure liegt und nicht, wie er betont, von den „distortions of the historian's own present“ abgelenkt werde (S. 10 und 3). Allerdings fragt man sich, was Burgess damit meint und genau hier liegt das Problem der Studie. Auch wenn Burgess seine Vorgehensweise der intensiven Kontextualisierung hinreichend oft rühmt, geht das auf Kosten einer analytischen und problemorientierten Untersuchung. So trifft er an einigen Stellen moralisierende Aussagen, die von einem idealistischen, ahistorischen Standpunkt aus formuliert sind und offensichtlich nach Schuldigen suchen. Das springt an zwei Stellen besonders ins Auge. Das ist zum einen die Diskussion um die Bedeutung der Bernheim-Petition von 1933, mit der es einen Moment so aussah, als ob die Minderheitenkommission des Völkerbunds ein Instrument in der Hand hielte, um die Nationalsozialisten zu zwingen, die Entrechtung der jüdischen Bevölkerung im gesamten Reichsgebiet rückgängig zu machen und den Minderheitenschutz als universalen Standard im Völkerrecht zu etablieren. Als Zeugen zitiert Burgess den Völkerrechtler Hersch Lauterpacht und

äußert in einem Tonfall, der von moralischen Schuldzuweisungen geprägt ist, sein Unverständnis darüber, dass Lauterpacht nicht gehört wurde. Hätte Burgess die Forschungsliteratur zur Geschichte des Völkerrechts ausführlich zu Rate gezogen, hätte er erkannt, dass die 1930er Jahre eine kritische Phase in der Ausformulierung völkerrechtlicher Prinzipien waren, deren Entwicklung genau zu dem Zeitpunkt, als McDonald und Lauterpacht Stellung bezogen, offen war. Das heißt, es entgeht Burgess, dass er wie unter dem Mikroskop die kontingente und ergebnisoffene Fabrikation wichtiger Grundlagen des modernen Völkerrechts beobachtet. Stattdessen bewertet er die Vorgänge und Positionen der historischen Akteure aus einer universalistischen Perspektive, was auf Kosten einer konsequenten Historisierung geht. Zweitens nimmt das Buch am Ende eine erstaunliche Wende mit der Frage, ob McDonald vielleicht doch eine Fehlbesetzung für den Posten war, weil ihm Format und Weitblick gefehlt hätten. Das ist insofern erstaunlich, als Burgess McDonald als Person eingangs aus dem Kreuzfeuer nimmt und seinen Nachlass als Mittel zum Zweck vorstellt, um eine historische Analyse des internationalen Umgangs mit politischen und jüdischen Flüchtlingen aus Deutschland zu unternehmen, ein Anliegen, das mit den Forschungen zu transnationalen Biographien eigentlich gut vereinbar ist, das er aber am Ende zugunsten eines mit guten Gründen kritisierten Verständnisses von Biographieforschung als Suche nach einem personalen Kern zurücknimmt. Hier hätte es eine gründliche Auseinandersetzung mit den methodischen und konzeptionellen Herausforderungen biographischer Forschungen im transnati-

onalen Raum bedurft, die er aber nicht unternimmt. Burgess liefert trotzdem eine inhaltsreiche und aufschlussreiche Studie, die allen Lesern und Leserinnen ans Herz

gelegt werden kann, die sich mit der Rolle des Völkerbunds bei der Entstehung moderner Flüchtlingsregime im Detail beschäftigen möchten.

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